natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The "banking package" agreed by the Heads of State or Government at their meeting of 26 October 2011 [8] aims to restore confidence in the banking sector by way of guarantees on medium-term funding and the creation of a temporary capital buffer amounting to a capital ratio of 9 % of the highest quality capital after accounting for market valuation of sovereign debt exposures.
Bančni sveženj, ki so ga potrdili voditelji držav in vlad na zasedanju 26. oktobra 2011 [8], je namenjen povrnitvi zaupanja v bančni sektor z jamstvi za srednjeročno financiranje in oblikovanjem začasne kapitalske rezerve v višini 9-odstotnega deleža najkakovostnejšega kapitala na podlagi tržnega vrednotenja izpostavljenosti državnega dolga.
Despite those measures, the Authority considers that the requirements for state aid to be approved pursuant to Article 61(3)(b) will continue to be fulfilled beyond the end of 2011.
Nadzorni organ kljub navedenim ukrepom meni, da bodo pogoji za državno pomoč v skladu s členom 61(3)(b) tudi po letu 2011 še naprej izpolnjeni.
The Authority will keep the situation in the financial markets under review and will take steps towards more permanent rules for State aid for rescue and restructuring of banks, based on Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement, as soon as market conditions permit.
Nadzorni organ bo spremljal stanje na finančnih trgih in sprejel ukrepe za zagotovitev trajnejših pravil o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje bank na podlagi člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP, takoj ko bodo razmere na trgih to dopuščale.
To facilitate the implementation of the banking package and to take into account developments in the risk profile of banks since the start of the crisis, it is desirable to further clarify and update the rules in certain respects.
Zaradi lažjega izvajanja bančnega svežnja in upoštevanja razvoja profila tveganja bank od začetka krize je zaželeno, da se nekateri vidiki pravil dodatno pojasnijo in dopolnijo.
supplement the Recapitalisation Guidelines, by providing more detailed guidance on ensuring adequate remuneration for capital instruments that do not bear a fixed return;
dopolnjujejo smernice o dokapitalizaciji s podrobnejšimi navodili za zagotavljanje ustreznega nadomestila za kapitalske instrumente brez fiksnega donosa;
explain how the Authority will undertake the proportionate assessment of the long-term viability of banks in the context of the banking package; and
pojasnjujejo, kako bo Nadzorni organ izvedel sorazmerno oceno dolgoročne poslovne uspešnosti bank v okviru bančnega svežnja; in
introduce a revised methodology for ensuring that the fees payable in return for guarantees on bank liabilities are sufficient to limit the aid involved to the minimum, with the aim of ensuring that the methodology takes into account the greater differentiation of bank credit default swap (CDS) spreads in recent times and impact of the CDS spreads on the EFTA State concerned.
uvajajo spremenjeno metodologijo za zagotovitev, da bodo premije, ki se zaračunajo kot nadomestilo za jamstva za obveznosti bank, dovolj visoke za omejitev zadevne pomoči na najmanjšo potrebno, kar naj bi zagotovilo, da bodo v metodologiji upoštevane večje razlike v bančnih razponih poslov kreditnih zamenjav (CDS), ki se pojavljajo v zadnjem času, in učinek razponov CDS na zadevne države Efte.
Pricing and conditions for state recapitalisations
Cena in pogoji za državno dokapitalizacijo
The Recapitalisation Guidelines provide general guidance on the pricing of capital injections.
Smernice o dokapitalizaciji dajejo splošna navodila za določanje cene kapitalskih vložkov.
That guidance is geared mainly towards capital instruments bearing a fixed remuneration.
Ta navodila so v glavnem prilagojena za kapitalske instrumente s fiksnim donosom.
In view of the regulatory changes and the changing market environment, the Authority anticipates that State capital injections may in the future more commonly take the form of shares bearing a variable remuneration.
Zaradi regulativnih sprememb in spreminjajočega se tržnega okolja Nadzorni organ pričakuje, da se bodo državni kapitalski vložki v prihodnosti pogosteje zagotavljali v obliki delnic s spremenljivim donosom.
Clarification of the rules on pricing of capital injections is desirable given that such shares are remunerated in the form of (uncertain) dividends and capital gains, making it difficult to assess directly ex ante the remuneration on such instruments.
Razjasnitev pravil o ceni kapitalskih vložkov je zaželena, ker so donos iz teh delnic (negotove) dividende in kapitalski dobički, kar otežuje neposredno predhodno oceno donosa pri teh instrumentih.
The Authority will therefore assess the remuneration of such capital injections on the basis of the issue price of the shares.
Nadzorni organ bo zato ocenil donos takih kapitalskih vložkov na podlagi cene delnic ob izdaji.
Capital injections should be subscribed at a sufficient discount to the share price (after adjustment for the "dilution effect" [10]) immediately prior to the announcement of the capital injection to give a reasonable assurance of an adequate remuneration for the State [11].
Kapitalski vložki bi morali biti vpisani z dovolj velikim odbitkom cene delnic (po prilagoditvi za „učinek slabitve“ [10]) neposredno pred napovedjo kapitalskega vložka, da se zagotovi razumno zagotovilo, da bo država prejela ustrezno nadomestilo [11].
For listed banks, the benchmark share price should be the quoted market price of shares with equivalent rights to those attaching to the shares being issued.
Za banke, ki kotirajo na organiziranem trgu, bi morala biti merodajna objavljena tržna cena delnic, ki dajejo enake pravice kot novo izdane delnice.
For non listed banks, there is no such market price and EFTA States should use an appropriate market-based valuation approach (including a peer group P/E approach or other generally accepted valuation methodologies).
Za banke, ki ne kotirajo na organiziranem trgu, navedene tržne cene ni, zato bi morale države Efte uporabiti ustrezen tržni pristop za vrednotenje (vključno s pristopom primerljive skupine glede razmerja med ceno in dobičkom delnice ali drugimi splošno sprejetimi metodologijami vrednotenja).
Shares should be subscribed at an appropriate discount to that market (or market-based) value.
Delnice bi bilo treba vpisati po ustrezno znižani ceni glede na navedeno tržno vrednost (ali vrednost, določeno na podlagi tržnih pogojev).
If EFTA States subscribe for shares without voting rights, a higher discount may be required, the size of which should reflect the pricing differential between voting and non-voting shares in the prevailing market conditions.
Če države Efte vpišejo delnice brez glasovalnih pravic, se lahko zahteva večje znižanje cene, katerega obseg bi moral odražati razliko med ceno glasovalnih in neglasovalnih delnic ob prevladujočih tržnih pogojih.
Recapitalisation measures must contain appropriate incentives for banks to exit from state support as soon as possible.
Dokapitalizacijski ukrepi morajo vsebovati ustrezne spodbude za banke, da čim prej izstopijo iz shem državne pomoči.
In relation to shares with variable remuneration, if exit incentives are designed in a way that limits the upside potential for the EFTA State, for example by issuing warrants to the incumbent shareholders to allow them to buy back the newly issued shares from the State at a price that implies a reasonable annual return for the State, a higher discount will be required to reflect the capped upside potential.
Če so pri delnicah s spremenljivim donosom spodbude za izstop oblikovane tako, da omejujejo finančni potencial za državo Efte, npr. z izdajanjem pravic privilegiranim delničarjem, ki jim omogočajo, da lahko novo izdane delnice odkupijo nazaj od države po ceni, ki pomeni razumen letni donos za državo, se zahteva večje znižanje cene, ki odraža manjši finančni potencial.
Hybrid instruments should in principle contain an "alternative coupon satisfaction mechanism" whereby coupons which cannot be paid out in cash would be paid to the State in the form of newly issued shares.
Hibridni instrumenti bi morali načeloma vsebovati „alternativni mehanizem za izplačilo kuponov“, pri katerem bi se kuponi, ki jih ni mogoče izplačati v gotovini, državi poplačali v obliki novo izdanih delnic.
The Authority will continue to require EFTA States to submit a restructuring plan (or an update of the existing restructuring plan) within six months of the date of the Authority’s decision authorising rescue aid for any bank that receives public support in the form of recapitalisation or impaired asset measures.
Nadzorni organ bo od držav Efte tudi v prihodnje zahteval, da v šestih mesecih od datuma odločbe Nadzornega organa o odobritvi pomoči za reševanje predložijo načrt prestrukturiranja (ali posodobljen obstoječi načrt prestrukturiranja) za vse banke, ki prejemajo državno pomoč v obliki dokapitalizacije ali ukrepov za oslabljena sredstva.
Where a bank has been the subject of a previous rescue aid decision under the rules governing the compatibility of aid to banks with Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement, whether as part of the same restructuring operation or not, the Authority may require the submission of the restructuring plan within a period shorter than six months.
Če je bil v zvezi z neko banko v preteklosti že izdan sklep o pomoči za reševanje v skladu s pravili, ki urejajo skladnost pomoči za banke s členom 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP, ne glede na to, ali je bila pomoč odobrena za isto prestrukturiranje ali ne, lahko Nadzorni organ zahteva, da se načrt prestrukturiranja predloži prej kot v šestih mesecih.
The Authority will undertake a proportionate assessment of the long-term viability of banks, taking full account of elements indicating that banks can be viable in the long-term without the need for significant restructuring, in particular where the capital shortage is essentially linked to a confidence crisis on sovereign debt, the public capital injection is limited to the amount necessary to offset losses stemming from marking sovereign bonds of the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement to market in banks which are otherwise viable, and the analysis shows that the banks in question did not take excessive risk in acquiring sovereign debt.
Nadzorni organ bo izvedel sorazmerno oceno dolgoročne poslovne uspešnosti bank, pri čemer bo v celoti upošteval elemente, ki kažejo, da lahko banke dolgoročno uspešno poslujejo brez obsežnega prestrukturiranja, zlasti če je pomanjkanje kapitala povezano predvsem s krizo zaupanja na trgu državnih obveznic, če je državni kapitalski vložek omejen na znesek, potreben za izravnavo izgub, ki izvirajo iz določanja cene državnih obveznic pogodbenic Sporazuma EGP glede na dnevna gibanja na trgih, v bankah, ki sicer uspešno poslujejo, in če analiza kaže, da zadevne banke pri pridobitvi državnega dolga niso prevzele prevelikega tveganja.
Pricing and conditions for state guarantees
Cena in pogoji za državna jamstva
Banks may benefit from a state guarantee for the issuance of new debt instruments, whether secured or unsecured, with the exception of instruments that qualify as capital.
Bankam se lahko odobri državno jamstvo za izdajo novih dolžniških instrumentov, bodisi zavarovanih ali nezavarovanih, z izjemo instrumentov, ki se uvrščajo v kapital.
Since pressure on the funding of banks is concentrated in the term funding markets, state guarantees should in general only cover debt with a maturity of between one and five years (seven years in the case of covered bonds).
Ker je pritisk na financiranje bank največji na trgih srednje- in dolgoročnega financiranja, bi morala državna jamstva na splošno kriti samo dolžniške instrumente z ročnostjo od enega do pet let (za krite obveznice pa sedem let).
To take into account the greater differentiation by risk of bank CDS spreads in recent times, that pricing formula should be updated to refer to median CDS spreads over a three-year period ending one month before the grant of guarantees.
Ker so v zadnjem času razlike v tveganju bančnih razponov CDS večje, bi bilo treba navedeno formulo za določitev cene posodobiti, tako da bo upoštevana mediana razponov CDS v triletnem obdobju, ki se zaključi en mesec pred odobritvijo jamstev.
Since increases in CDS spreads in recent years are partially due to influences that are not specific to individual banks, in particular the growing tensions in sovereign debt markets and an overall increase in the perception of risk in the banking sector, that formula should isolate the intrinsic risk of individual banks from changes in CDS spreads of EEA States and of the market as a whole.
Večji razponi CDS v zadnjih letih so delno povezani z vplivi, ki niso značilni le za posamezne banke, zlasti z naraščajočimi napetostmi na trgih državnega dolga in na splošno večjim zaznavanjem tveganj v bančnem sektorju, zato bi bilo treba v formuli ločiti notranja tveganja posameznih bank in spremembe v razponih CDS držav Efte in trga kot celote.
That formula should also reflect the fact that guarantees on covered bonds expose the guarantor to substantially lower risk than guarantees on unsecured debt.
Poleg tega bi morala formula odražati tudi dejstvo, da je izdajatelj jamstva za krite obveznice izpostavljen bistveno manjšemu tveganju kot izdajatelj jamstva za nezavarovane dolžniške instrumente.
In line with the principles mentioned in paragraph 17, the revised pricing formula set out in the Annex establishes the minimum guarantee fees that should apply where state guarantees are granted on a national basis, without any pooling of guarantees among EFTA States.
V skladu z načeli, opisanimi v odstavku 17, spremenjena formula za izračun cene, določena v Prilogi, določa najnižje premije za jamstva, ki naj bi se uporabljale, kadar se državna jamstva odobrijo na nacionalni osnovi brez združevanja jamstev med državami Efte.
The Authority will apply that formula to all state guarantees on bank liabilities with a maturity of one year or more issued on or after 1 January 2012.
Nadzorni organ bo to formulo uporabljal za vsa državna jamstva za obveznosti bank z ročnostjo enega leta ali več, izdana 1. januarja 2012 ali pozneje.
Where guarantees cover liabilities that are not denominated in the domestic currency of the guarantor, an additional fee should apply to cover the foreign-exchange risk taken by the guarantor.
Kadar jamstva krijejo obveznosti, ki niso denominirane v domači valuti izdajatelja jamstva, bi bilo treba zaračunati dodatno premijo za tečajno tveganje, ki ga prevzame izdajatelj.
Where it is necessary for guarantees to cover debt with a maturity of less than one year, the Authority will continue to apply the existing pricing formula, which is set out for reference in the Appendix.
Kadar je potrebno, da jamstva krijejo dolžniške instrumente z ročnostjo, krajšo od enega leta, bo Nadzorni organ še naprej uporabljal sedanjo formulo za izračun cene, ki je informativno navedena v Prilogi.
The Authority will not authorise guarantees covering debt with a maturity of less than three months except in exceptional cases where such guarantees are necessary for financial stability.
Nadzorni organ ne bo odobril jamstev za kritje dolžniških instrumentov z ročnostjo, krajšo od treh mesecev, razen v izjemnih primerih, ko so taka jamstva nujna za finančno stabilnost.
In such cases, the Authority will assess the appropriate remuneration taking into account the need for appropriate incentives to exit from state support as soon as possible.
V takih primerih bo Nadzorni organ ocenil ustrezno nadomestilo ob upoštevanju potrebe po ustreznih spodbudah za čimprejšnji izstop iz shem državne pomoči.
If EFTA States decide to establish pooling arrangements for guarantees on bank liabilities, the Authority will review its guidance accordingly, to ensure in particular that weight is given to CDS spreads of EFTA States only to the extent that they remain relevant.
Če se države Efte odločijo vzpostaviti ureditev za združevanje jamstev za obveznosti bank, bo Nadzorni organ ustrezno pregledal svoja navodila, zlasti za zagotovitev, da bodo imeli razponi CDS držav Efte le tolikšno težo, kot je potrebna, da se še naprej upoštevajo.
To enable the Authority to assess the application in practice of the revised pricing formula, EFTA States should indicate, when notifying new or prolonged guarantee schemes, an indicative fee for each bank eligible to benefit from those guarantees, based on an application of the formula using recent market data.
Da bi Nadzorni organ lahko ocenil uporabo spremenjene formule za izračun cene v praksi, bi morale države Efte pri priglasitvi novih jamstvenih shem ali podaljšanja obstoječih shem navesti okvirno premijo za vsako banko, ki je upravičena do navedenih jamstev, na podlagi formule in ob uporabi najnovejših tržnih podatkov.
EFTA States should also communicate to the Authority, within three months following each issue of guaranteed bonds, the actual guarantee fee charged in relation to each issue of guaranteed bonds.
Poleg tega bi morale države Efte v treh mesecih po vsaki izdaji obveznic, kritih z jamstvom, Nadzornemu organu sporočiti dejansko premijo za jamstva, ki je bila zaračunana v zvezi s posamezno izdajo obveznic, kritih z jamstvom.
Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (“the State Aid Guidelines”), adopted and issued by the Authority on 19.1.1994, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as OJ) L 231 of 03.09.1994, p.1 and EEA Supplement No 32, 03.09.1994, p.1.
Smernice o uporabi in razlagi členov 61 in 62 Sporazuma EGP in člena 1 Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču (smernice o državni pomoči), ki jih je sprejel in izdal Nadzorni organ 19. januarja 1994, objavljene v Uradnem listu Evropske Unije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: UL), UL L 231, 3.9.1994, str. 1, in Dopolnilu EGP k Uradnemu listu Evropske unije št. 32, 3.9.1994, str. 1.
For the convenience of the reader, financial institutions are referred to simply as ‘banks’ in this document.
Za lažje razumevanje besedila se za finančne institucije v tem dokumentu uporablja izraz „banke“.
Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=16604&1=1
Na voljo na spletni strani: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=16604&1=1.
Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=16015&1=1
Na voljo na spletni strani: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=16015&1=1.
Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=16585&1=1
Na voljo na spletni strani: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=16585&1=1.
Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VIII—Return-to-viability-and-the-assessment-of-restructuring-measures-in-the-financial-sector.pdf
Na voljo na spletni strani: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VIII—Return-to-viability-and-the-assessment-of-restructuring-measures-in-the-financial-sector.pdf.
Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VIII—Financial-Crisis-Guidelines-2011.pdf
Na voljo na spletni strani: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VIII—Financial-Crisis-Guidelines-2011.pdf.
Statement of EU Heads of State or Government of 26.10.2011, (http://www.consilium.europa-.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125621.pdf).
Izjava voditeljev držav in vlad EU z dne 26. 10. 2011 (http://www.consilium.europa-.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125621.pdf).
In line with the Authority’s previous practice, existing or new bank support schemes (irrespective of the support instruments they contain: guarantee, recapitalisation, liquidity, asset relief, other) will only be prolonged or approved for a duration of six months to allow for further adjustments, if necessary, in mid-2012.
V skladu z dosedanjo prakso Nadzornega organa bodo obstoječe ali nove sheme pomoči za banke (ne glede na podporne ukrepe, ki jih vsebujejo – jamstva, dokapitalizacijo, likvidnost, finančno pomoč za oslabljena sredstva ali druge ukrepe) podaljšane ali odobrene le za šest mesecev, da se po potrebi omogočijo nadaljnje prilagoditve sredi leta 2012.
The "dilution effect" can be quantified using generally accepted market techniques (for instance, the theoretical ex-rights price (TERP)).
„Učinek slabitve“ se lahko oceni z uporabo splošno priznanih tržnih metod (npr. s teoretično ceno brez pravice vpisa (theoretical ex-rights price (TERP)).
If EFTA States underwrite the issue of shares, an adequate underwriting fee should be payable by the issuing institution.
Če države Efte vpišejo primarno izdajo delnic, bi morala institucija, ki delnice izda, plačati ustrezno provizijo za vpis primarne izdaje.
See Directorate-General for Competition Staff Working Document of 30.4.2010 on the application of State aid rules to government guarantee schemes covering bank debt to be issued after 30.6.2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/phase_out_bank_guarantees.pdf).
Glej delovni dokument generalnega direktorata za konkurenco z dne 30. aprila 2010 o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za jamstvene sheme držav, ki so namenjene kritju dolžniških instrumentov bank, izdanih po 30. juniju 2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/phase_out_bank_guarantees.pdf).
The Prolongation Guidelines extended the Restructuring Guidelines – the only one of the four Guidelines with a specified expiry date – on amended terms until 31 December 2011.
S smernicami o podaljšanju je bila do 31. decembra 2011 pod spremenjenimi pogoji podaljšana veljavnost smernic o prestrukturiranju, ki so bile edine od štirih smernic z določenim datumom prenehanja veljavnosti.
The Authority also indicated in the Prolongation Guidelines that it considered that the requirements for state aid to be approved pursuant to Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement, which exceptionally allows for aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an EU Member State or an EFTA State, were still fulfilled and that the Banking, Recapitalisation and Impaired Assets Guidelines would remain in place in order to provide guidance on the criteria for the compatibility of crisis-related aid to banks on the basis of Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement.
Nadzorni organ je v smernicah o podaljšanju navedel tudi, da so pogoji za državno pomoč v skladu s členom 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP, ki izjemoma dovoljuje pomoč za odpravljanje resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice EU ali države članice Efte, še vedno izpolnjeni in da bodo smernice o bančništvu, dokapitalizaciji in oslabljenih sredstvih še naprej ostale v veljavi za zagotavljanje navodil glede meril skladnosti za pomoč bankam, povezano s krizo, na podlagi člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP.
Therefore, the Banking, Recapitalisation and Impaired Assets Guidelines will remain in place beyond 31 December 2011.
Zato bodo smernice o bančništvu, dokapitalizaciji in oslabljenih sredstvih ostale v veljavi tudi po 31. decembru 2011.
In the same vein, the temporal scope of the Restructuring Guidelines is extended beyond 31 December 2011 [9].
Poleg tega se čas veljavnosti smernic o prestrukturiranju podaljšuje na obdobje po 31. decembru 2011 [9].
These Guidelines set out the necessary amendments to the parameters for the compatibility of crisis-related state aid to banks as from 1 January 2012.
V teh smernicah so določene potrebne spremembe parametrov skladnosti za pomoč bankam, povezano s krizo, od 1. januarja 2012 dalje.
In particular, these Guidelines:
Te smernice zlasti:
In all cases, the size of the discount must reflect the size of the capital injection in relation to the existing Core Tier 1 capital.
V vsakem primeru pa mora obseg znižanja cene odražati velikost kapitalskega vložka glede na obstoječi temeljni kapital prvega reda.
A higher capital shortage in relation to existing capital is indicative of greater risk to the State, and therefore requires a higher discount.
Večje pomanjkanje kapitala glede na obstoječi kapital pomeni večje tveganje za državo in torej zahteva večje znižanje cene.