natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Authority is of the opinion that the qualification of a cooperative as truly mutual would also depend on a number of other factors, such as the frequency of contacts between the cooperative and the members; the active involvement of the members in the running of the cooperative; the active involvement of the members in the management and decision making of the cooperative; the non-automacy of membership in the cooperative, but active application and approval from existing members; large part of the bonuses paid to members in proportion to the profits; large parts of benefits reserved for members in comparison to benefits for clients that are not members; etc. In the view of the Authority, an assessment of whether a cooperative is genuinely mutual would have to take into account these and similar criteria.
Nadzorni organ meni, da bi bila označitev zadruge kot resnično vzajemne zadruge odvisna tudi od vrste drugih dejavnikov, na primer pogostosti stikov med zadrugo in njenimi člani; aktivne udeležbe članov pri vodenju zadruge; aktivne udeležbe članov pri upravljanju in sprejemanju odločitev v zadrugi; nesamodejnosti članstva v zadrugi, temveč aktivne vloge za članstvo in odobritve s strani obstoječih članov; velikega dela premij, izplačanih članom sorazmerno z dobičkom; velikega dela ugodnosti, rezerviranih za člane v primerjavi z ugodnostmi za stranke, ki niso člani, itd. Po mnenju Nadzornega organa bi ocena, ali je zadruga resnično vzajemna, morala upoštevati ta in podobna merila.
The Authority notes that some of the cooperatives to be covered by the present scheme are pure mutual cooperatives whereas others are prevalently mutual cooperatives.
Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da so nekatere zadruge, ki naj bi jih zajemala ta shema, popolnoma vzajemne zadruge, medtem ko so druge predvsem vzajemne zadruge.
With regard to consumer cooperatives it is stated in the draft Section 10-50 of the Tax Act that only prevalently mutual consumer cooperatives are covered by the scheme [60].
V zvezi s potrošniškimi zadrugami je v oddelku 10–50 Zakona o davku navedeno, da shema zajema samo večinoma vzajemne potrošniške zadruge [60].
Thus, in the present case it appears that the pure mutual character of some of the cooperatives covered by the notified scheme is questionable.
Zato se v zadevnem primeru zdi, da je popolna vzajemnost nekaterih zadrug iz priglašene sheme vprašljiva.
For instance, a large part of the business of certain cooperatives covered by the scheme, in particular the consumer cooperatives, is not related to trade with the members, but to trade with other clients.
Na primer, velik del poslovanja določenih zadrug, zajetih v shemi, zlasti potrošniških zadrug, ni povezan s trgovino s člani, temveč s trgovino z drugimi strankami.
Furthermore, due to the size of some of the cooperatives covered, the active involvement of the members in the running of and management of the cooperative will be limited.
Poleg tega je zaradi velikosti nekaterih zadrug aktivna udeležba članov pri vodenju in upravljanju teh zadrug omejena.
In addition, membership seems to a large extent to be automatic, at least with regard to consumer and housing cooperatives.
Članstvo se zdi v veliki meri samodejno, vsaj pri potrošniških in stanovanjskih zadrugah.
Hence, in the Authority’s view, the scheme is not designed only to cover cooperatives with a particularly strong mutual identity.
Zato Nadzorni organ meni, da shema ni oblikovana samo za zadruge z izredno močno vzajemnostjo.
Furthermore, in relation to the assessment of whether the scheme is well designed to reach the objective of common interest, it must be considered whether the targeted activity entails any additional costs which are compensated by the aid.
V zvezi z oceno, ali je shema dobro oblikovana za doseganje cilja v skupnem interesu, je treba upoštevati, ali ciljna dejavnost prinaša dodatne stroške, ki jih pomoč izravnava.
The Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not provided any data allowing the Authority to quantify, in a direct or indirect manner, the costs involved for an undertaking in assuming the cooperative form.
Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da norveški organi niso predložili nobenih podatkov, ki bi Nadzornemu organu neposredno ali posredno omogočili oceniti stroške, ki jih ima podjetje pri prevzemu oblike zadruge.
Hence, it is also not possible for the Authority to assess whether the aid is necessary and proportionate to the objective pursued.
Tako Nadzorni organ tudi ne more oceniti, ali je pomoč potrebna in sorazmerna z zastavljenim ciljem.
On the other hand, the Authority notes positively that the proposed tax deduction will, according to the notification, only be granted with regard to income deriving from trade with members and equivalent trade.
Po drugi strani pa Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da bo predlagana davčna olajšava v skladu s priglasitvijo dodeljena samo v zvezi s prihodkom, ki izhaja iz trgovine s člani in enakovredne trgovine.
Moreover, the notified scheme requires separate accounting for trade with members and trade with other parties in order for cooperatives to receive aid under the scheme.
Priglašena shema zahteva ločeno računovodstvo za trgovino s člani in trgovino z drugimi strankami kot pogoj, da zadruga pridobi pomoč po shemi.
Nevertheless, for the above mentioned reasons, the Authority has doubts as to whether the notified scheme is well-designed to reach the objective of common interest which is to uphold the cooperative form, and in particular pure mutual cooperatives, by facilitating the access to equity capital.
Kljub temu pa Nadzorni organ iz zgoraj navedenih razlogov dvomi, da je shema dobro oblikovana za doseganje cilja v skupnem interesu, tj. ohraniti obliko zadruge in zlasti obliko popolnoma vzajemnih zadrug s pomočjo lažjega dostopa do lastniškega kapitala.
No distortion of competition and trade in the EEA to an extent contrary to common interest
Brez izkrivljanja konkurence in trgovine v EGP v obsegu, ki je v nasprotju s skupnim interesom.
Concerning the potential distortion of competition and trade, the Authority notes that the scheme must be classified as operating aid as it relieves the beneficiaries of charges normally borne by undertakings in the ordinary exercise of their commercial activities, in this case, the corporate tax.
Nadzorni organ v zvezi z možnim izkrivljanjem konkurence in trgovine ugotavlja, da je treba shemo označiti kot pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, saj upravičence razbremeni stroškov, ki jih običajno nosijo podjetja pri rednem opravljanju gospodarskih dejavnosti, v tem primeru davka od dobička pravnih oseb.
Operating aid may only exceptionally be considered compatible with the EEA agreement if it allows fostering a common interest objective that otherwise could not be reached.
Pomoč za tekoče poslovanje je mogoče le izjemoma označiti kot združljivo s Sporazumom EGP, če omogoča spodbujanje doseganja cilja v skupnem interesu, ki ga sicer ne bi bilo mogoče doseči.
The Authority questions whether the objective pursued by the Norwegian authorities of upholding the corporate form of cooperatives by facilitating their access to equity capital could not have been reached with other, more proportionate, measures.
Nadzorni organ dvomi, da cilja norveških organov, tj. ohranitve oblike zadrug s pomočjo lažjega dostopa do lastniškega kapitala, ne bi bilo mogoče doseči z drugimi, bolj primernimi sredstvi.
In particular, the Authority stresses the fact that some of the cooperatives covered by the scheme are large undertakings operating in highly competitive markets within the EEA.
Nadzorni organ zlasti poudarja dejstvo, da so nekatere zadruge, zajete v shemi, velika podjetja, ki delujejo na zelo konkurenčnih trgih znotraj EGP.
As stated above, the Authority considers that the scheme would be aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest, at least to the extent that it is aimed at pure mutual cooperatives.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, Nadzorni organ meni, da je shema namenjena dobro opredeljenemu cilju v skupnem interesu, vsaj v obsegu, v katerem je namenjena popolnoma vzajemnim zadrugam.
However, it appears that the pure mutual character of some of the cooperatives covered is not given.
Vendar pa se zdi, da popolna vzajemnost nekaterih zajetih zadrug ni dokazana.
Hence, the Authority is of the opinion that the aid cannot be considered to be well targeted.
Zato Nadzorni organ meni, da pomoči ni mogoče označiti kot dobro ciljno usmerjene.
In addition, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the aid is necessary and proportionate to the objective pursued.
Poleg tega Nadzorni organ ne more oceniti, ali je pomoč potrebna in sorazmerna z zastavljenim ciljem.
On the basis of the above, the Authority finds that, even though the objective of the scheme can be considered a well-defined objective of common interest, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated that the positive effects of the aid will outweigh its negative effects.
Na podlagi navedenega Nadzorni organ meni, da čeprav je cilj sheme mogoče označiti kot dobro opredeljen cilj v skupnem interesu, norveški organi niso dokazali, da bodo pozitivni učinki pomoči odtehtali njene negativne učinke.
Therefore, the scheme cannot be considered to be compatible with Article 61(3)(c) EEA.
Zato sheme ni mogoče označiti kot združljive s členom 61(3)(c) EGP.
On the basis of the foregoing assessment, the Authority considers the notified tax exemption for certain cooperatives to be State aid incompatible with the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.
Na podlagi zgornje ocene Nadzorni organ meni, da je priglašena davčna oprostitev za določene zadruge državna pomoč, ki ni združljiva s pravili o državni pomoči iz Sporazuma EGP.
The Authority would like to stress that the present decision, as set out in Section II-1 above, does not apply to cooperatives active in the agriculture and fisheries sectors to the extent that the activities of these cooperatives fall outside the scope of the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement,
Nadzorni organ želi poudariti, da ta odločba, kot je navedena v zgornjem oddelku II-1, ne velja za zadruge v kmetijskem in ribiškem sektorju, če dejavnosti teh zadrug ne spadajo v področje uporabe pravil o državni pomoči iz Sporazuma EGP –
The planned scheme concerning tax exemptions for certain cooperatives constitutes State aid which is incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement within the meaning of Article 61 EEA.
Načrtovana shema v zvezi z davčnimi olajšavami za določene zadruge pomeni državno pomoč, ki ni združljiva z delovanjem Sporazuma EGP v smislu člena 61 EGP.
The notified scheme may not be implemented.
Priglašena shema se ne sme izvajati.
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’.
V nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum o nadzornemu organu in sodišču.
Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, adopted and issued by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 19 January 1994, published in OJ L 231, 3.9.1994, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 32, 3.9.1994.
Smernice o uporabi in razlagi členov 61 in 62 Sporazuma EGP in člena 1 Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornemu organu in sodišču, ki jih je sprejel in izdal Nadzorni organ Efte 19. januarja 1994, objavljene v UL L 231, 3.9.1994, str. 1, in v Dopolnilu EGP št. 32, 3.9.1994.
Decision 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 published in OJ L 139, 25.5.2006, p. 37 and EEA Supplement No 26, 25.5.2006, p. 1 as amended.
Odločba št. 195/04/COL z dne 14. julija 2004, objavljena v UL L 139, 25.5.2006, str. 37. in v Dopolnilu EGP št. 26, 25.5.2006, str. 1, kakor je bila spremenjena.
Published in OJ C 96, 17.4.2008, p. 27 and EEA Supplement No 20, 17.4.2008, p. 44.
Objavljeno v UL C 96, 17.4.2008, str. 27, in v Dopolnilu EGP št. 20, 17.4.2008, str. 44.
For more detailed information on the correspondence between the Authority and the Norwegian authorities, reference is made to the Authority’s Decision to open the formal investigation procedure, Decision No 719/07/COL, published in OJ C 96, 17.4.2008, p. 27 and EEA Supplement No 20, 17.4.2008 p. 44.
Podrobnejše informacije o korespondenci med Nadzornim organom in norveškimi organi najdete v Odločbi Nadzornega organa o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave, Odločba št. 719/07/COL, objavljena v UL C 96, 17.4.2008, str. 27, in v Dopolnilu EGP št. 20, 17.4.2008, str. 44.
See footnote 8 for the OJ reference.
Za sklic na UL glej opombo 8.
Section I-5 below.
Spodnji razdelek I-5.
Section 12.2 of the Proposal by the Norwegian Government of 29 September 2006 (Ot.prp. nr. 1 (2006-2007) Skatte- og avgiftsopplegget 2007 - lovendringer).
Oddelek 12.2 predloga norveške vlade z dne 29. septembra 2006 (Ot.prp. nr. 1 (2006-2007) Skatte- og avgiftsopplegget 2007 – lovendringer).
Unofficial translation by the Authority.
Neuradni prevod Nadzornega organa.
The original Norwegian text reads as follows: ‘[…] I tillegg kan det gis fradrag for avsetning til felleseid andelskapital med inntil 15 prosent av inntekten. Fradrag gis bare i inntekt av omsetning med medlemmene. Omsetning med medlemmene og likestilt omsetning må fremgå av regnskapet og kunne legitimeres.’
Izvirno norveško besedilo se glasi: „[…] I tillegg kan det gis fradrag for avsetning til felleseid andelskapital med inntil 15 prosent av inntekten. Fradrag gis bare i inntekt av omsetning med medlemmene. Omsetning med medlemmene og likestilt omsetning må fremgå av regnskapet og kunne legitimeres.“
Section 28 of the Act on cooperatives.
Oddelek 28 Zakona o zadrugah.
Section 29 of the Act on cooperatives.
Oddelek 29 Zakona o zadrugah.
The Norwegian authorities have stated that this provision is only relevant for cooperatives whose activities fall outside the scope of the EEA Agreement, cf. letter from the Norwegian authorities of 6 July 2009 (Event No 523765), p. 3.
Norveški organi so navedli, da se ta določba nanaša samo na zadruge, katerih dejavnosti ne spadajo v področje uporabe Sporazuma EGP; glej dopis norveških organov z dne 6. julija 2009 (evidenčna št. 523765), str. 3.
On this basis, the Authority will not go into an analysis of the notion of ‘equivalent trade’.
Na podlagi tega Nadzorni organ ne bo analiziral pojma „enakovredno trgovanje“.
Translation from the website of the Norwegian Co-operative Centre, www.samvirke.org
Prevod s spletne strani Norveškega zadružnega centra: www.samvirke.org
The information in this Section is largely based on the website of the Norwegian Co-operative Centre, a centre for information, documentation and advice concerning cooperatives and owned by the main cooperative organisations in Norway, www.samvirke.org
Vir informacij v tem oddelku je predvsem spletna stran Norveškega zadružnega centra, ki je center za informacije, dokumentacijo in svetovanje v zvezi z zadrugami ter je v lasti glavnih zadružnih organizacij na Norveškem: www.samvirke.org
Lov 14. desember 1951 No 3 om omsetning av råfisk (Råfiskloven), cf. in particular Section 3.
Lov 14. desember 1951 No 3 om omsetning av råfisk (Råfiskloven), glej zlasti oddelek 3.
Rt. 1917 p. 627 and Rt. 1927 p. 869.
Rt. 1917 str. 627 in Rt. 1927 str. 869.
Letter from the Norwegian authorities dated 20 February 2008 (Event No 465882), p. 2.
Dopis norveških organov z dne 20. februarja 2008 (evidenčna št. 465882), str. 2.
European Commission’s decision in Case C 2/2006 OTE.
Odločitev Evropske komisije v zadevi C 2/2006 OTE.
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, the European economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions On the promotion on co-operative societies in Europe COM(2004) 18 of 23 February 2004, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commission Communication on cooperatives’ or ‘the Commission Communication’.
Sporočilo Komisije Svetu, Evropskemu parlamentu, Ekonomsko-socialnemu odboru in Odboru regij o spodbujanju zadrug v Evropi, COM(2004)18 z dne 23. februarja 2004, v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporočilo Komisije o zadrugah ali Sporočilo Komisije.
Case E-6/98 Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Court Report p. 76, paragraph 34; Joined Cases E-5/04, E-6/04 and E-7/04 Fesil and Finnfjord, PIL and others and Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] Report of the EFTA Court p. 121, paragraph 76; Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 13; and Case C-241/94 France v Commission [1996] ECR I-4551, paragraph 20.
Zadeva E-6/98 Norveška proti Nadzornemu organu Efte [1999] Poročilo Sodišča Efte str. 76, točka 34; združene zadeve E-5/04, E-6/04 in E-7/04 Fesil in Finnfjord, PIL in drugi in Norveška proti Nadzornemu organu Efte [2005], Poročilo Sodišča Efte, str. 121, točka 76; zadeva 173/73 Italija proti Komisiji [1974] Recueil 709, točka 13; in zadeva C-241/94 Francija proti Komisiji [1996] Recueil I-4551, točka 20.
See, in particular, Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38; Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-6717, paragraph 90; and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 77.
Glej zlasti zadevo C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline in Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke]2001] Recueil I-8365, točka 38; zadevo C-501/00 Španija proti Komisiji [2004] ZOdl. I-6717, točka 90; in zadevo C-66/02 Italija proti Komisiji [2005] ZOdl. I-10901, točka 77.
See to that effect Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; and Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 132.
Glej zadevo C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] Recueil I-877, točka 14; in zadevo C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze in drugi [2006] ZOdl. I-289, točka 132.
Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraphs 107 et seq. and the case law cited there.
Zadeva C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze in drugi [2006] ZOdl. I-289, točka 107 in naslednje, in tam citirana sodna praksa.
Case C-487/06 P, British Aggregates Association v Commission, paragraphs 82 et seq.; Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR I-1487, paragraph 47; Joined cases C-428/06 to C-434/06 UGT-Rioja and others, not yet reported, paragraph 46.
Zadeva C-487/06 P, British Aggregates Association proti Komisiji, točka 82 in naslednje; zadeva C-409/00 Španija proti Komisiji [2003] Recueil I-1487, točka 47; združene zadeve C-428/06 do C-434/06 UGT-Rioja in drugi, še ni poročil, točka 46.
Cases T-211/04 and T-215/04 Government of Gibraltar v Commission, not yet reported, paragraph 143.
Zadevi T-211/04 in T-215/04 Vlada Gibraltarja proti Komisiji, še ni poročil, točka 143.
Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraphs 28-31.
Zadeva C-75/97, Belgija proti Komisiji [1999] Recueil I-3671, točke 28 do 31.
Cases T-211/04 and T-215/04 Government of Gibraltar v Commission, not yet reported, paragraph 143 with further references.
Zadevi T-211/04 in T-215/04 Vlada Gibraltarja proti Komisiji, še ni poročil, točka 143 z nadaljnjimi sklici.
Section 1.1 of the Commission Communication on cooperatives.
Oddelek 1.1 Sporočila Komisije o zadrugah.
Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 33; Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 42.
Zadeva 173/73 Italija proti Komisiji [1974] Recueil 709, točka 33; zadeva C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline in Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] Recueil I-8365, točka 42.
Case E-6/98 Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority, cited above, paragraph 38; Joined Cases E-5/04, E-6/04 and E-7/04 Fesil and Finnfjord, PIL and others and Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority, cited above, paragraphs 84-85; Joined cases T-127/99, T-129/99 and T-148/99 Territorio Histórico de Alava et a v Commission [2002] ECR II-1275, paragraph 163; Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 42; Case T-308/00 Salzgitter v Commission [2004] ECR II-1933, paragraph 42; Case C-172/03 Wolfgang Heiser [2005] ECR I-1627, paragraph 43.
Zadeva E-6/98 Norveška proti Nadzornemu organu Efte, citirano zgoraj, točka 38; združene zadeve E-5/04, E-6/04 in E-7/04 Fesil in Finnfjord, PIL in drugi in Norveška proti Nadzornemu organu Efte, citirano zgoraj, točki 84 in 85; združene zadeve T-127/99, T-129/99 in T-148/99 Territorio Histórico de Alava in drugi proti Komisiji [2002] Recueil II-1275, točka 163; zadeva C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline [2001] Recueil I 8365, točka 42; zadeva T-308/00 Salzgitter proti Komisiji [2004] ZOdl. II-1933, točka 42; zadeva C-172/03 Wolfgang Heiser [2005] ZOdl. I-1627, točka 43.
Cases T-211/04 and T-215/04 Government of Gibraltar v Commission, not yet reported, paragraph 144 with further references.
Zadevi T-211/04 in T-215/04 Vlada Gibraltarja proti Komisiji, še ni poročil, točka 144 z nadaljnjimi sklici.
Case C-159/01 Netherlands v Commission [2004] ECR I-4461, paragraphs 43-47.
Zadeva C-159/01, Nizozemska proti Komisiji [2004] Recueil I-4461, točke 43 do 47.
Cf. Section I-2.3 above.
Glej oddelek I-2.3 zgoraj.
Case C-241/94 France v Commission [1996] ECR I-4551, paragraph 21, Case C-342/96 Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I-2459, paragraph 23.
Zadeva C-241/94 Francija proti Komisiji [1996] Recueil I-4551, točka 21; zadeva C-342/96 Španija proti Komisiji [1999] Recueil I-2459, točka 23.
Case C-487/06 P, British Aggregates Association v Commission, paragraph 92.
Zadeva C-487/06 P, British Aggregates Association proti Komisiji, točka 92.
In this regard, the Authority refers to the European Commission decision in the case concerning a Danish scheme on compensation for CO2 duty, cf. Case C 41/2006 (ex N 318/2004), not yet published.
V zvezi s tem se Nadzorni organ sklicuje na odločbo Evropske komisije v zvezi z dansko shemo o povračilu za davek na CO2, glej zadevo C 41/2006 (ex N 318/2004), še ni objavljeno.
In paragraph 44 of the decision, the Commission states that the scheme in question only covers some of the undertakings that are in the factual situation that the scheme, according to the Danish authorities, seeks to rectify.
V odstavku 44 odločbe Komisija navaja, da zadevna shema zajema samo nekatera podjetja, ki so v dejanskem položaju, ki ga shema, po navedbah danskih organov, želi popraviti.
The Commission sees this as a derogation from the general logic that the Danish authorities argue should apply and concludes that, therefore, the scheme is not in line with this logic.
Komisija razume to kot odstopanje od splošne logike, ki bi morala po trditvah danskih organov veljati, in zaključuje, da iz tega razloga shema ni skladna s to logiko.
Joined Cases T-92/00 and T-103/00, Territorio Histórico de Álava - Diputación Foral de Álava and others v Commission [2002] ECR II-1385, paragraph 58.
Združeni zadevi T-92/00 in T-103/00, Territorio Histórico de Álava - Diputación Foral de Álava in drugi proti Komisiji [2002] Recueil II-1385, točka 58.
Case C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze [2006] ECR I-289, paragraphs 134-138; Case C-148/04 Unicredito Italiano [2005] ECR I-11137, paragraphs 48-49.
Zadeva C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze [2006] ZOdl. I-289, točke 134 do 138; zadeva C-148/04 Unicredito Italiano [2005] ZOdl. I-11137, točki 48 in 49.
The Norwegian authorities refer to the Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in Case 251/97 French Republic v Commission to justify their argumentation.
Norveški organi se sklicujejo na sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca Fennellyja v zadevi 251/97 Francoska republika proti Komisiji, s katerimi utemeljujejo svoje argumente. V skladu z argumenti, ki so jih v tej zadevi predložili francoski organi, je v bistvu mogoče trditi, da če država kupi blago ali storitve ali bolj nematerialne koristi, ki so v interesu splošne javnosti, po tržni ceni, ni elementa pomoči oziroma je prisotna pomoč, ki je vsaj potencialno združljiva.
According to the argumentation put forward by the French authorities in this case it is possible to argue, in essence, that when the State purchases goods or services or more intangible benefits in the general public interest at market price, there is no aid element at all, or that there is aid which is, at least potentially, compatible, cf. paragraph 20 of the Opinion.
Glej odstavek 20 sklepnih predlogov.