natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This agreement between competitors will therefore have to be assessed on an individual basis.
Omejitve cen med konkurenti
Article 4 of the TTBER contains a list of hardcore restrictions of competition.
Nedopustne omejitve konkurence iz člena 4(1)(a) TTBER zadevajo sporazume med konkurenti, katerih cilj je določanje cen pri prodaji izdelkov tretjim osebam, vključno z izdelki, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo.
The classification of a restraint as a hardcore restriction of competition is based on the nature of the restriction and experience showing that such restrictions are almost always anti-competitive.
Določanje cen med konkurenti že po samem cilju pomeni omejitev konkurence.
In line with the case-law of the Court of Justice and the General Court [54] such a restriction may result from the clear objective of the agreement or from the circumstances of the individual case (see point (14) above).
Določanje cen je lahko v obliki neposrednega dogovora o točni ceni, ki se bo zaračunala, ali ceniku, ki določa nekatere najvišje dovoljene rabate.
Hardcore restrictions may be objectively necessary in exceptional cases for an agreement of a particular type or nature [55] and therefore fall outside Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Ni pomembno, ali se sporazum nanaša na fiksne, najnižje, najvišje ali priporočene cene.
In addition, undertakings can always plead an efficiency defence under Article 53(3) in an individual case [56].
Določanje cen se prav tako lahko izvede posredno z uporabo dejavnikov, ki podjetja spodbujajo, naj se ne oddaljijo od dogovorjene ravni cen, na primer s tem, da se stopnja licenčnine poviša, če se cene izdelka spustijo pod določeno raven.
It follows from Article 4(1) and 4(2) of the TTBER that, when a technology transfer agreement contains a hardcore restriction of competition, the agreement as a whole falls outside the scope of the block exemption.
Vendar pa obveznost pridobitelja licence, da plača določeno minimalno licenčnino, sama po sebi ne pomeni določanja cen.
For the purposes of the TTBER hardcore restrictions cannot be severed from the rest of the agreement.
Če se licenčnina izračuna na podlagi posamične prodaje izdelka, ima višina licenčnine neposreden učinek na mejne stroške izdelka in torej neposredno vpliva na ceno izdelka [57].
Moreover, the Authority considers that in the context of individual assessment it is unlikely that hardcore restrictions of competition fulfil the four conditions of Article 53(3) (see point (18) above).
Konkurenti se lahko zato odločijo za navzkrižno licenciranje z vzajemnimi tekočimi licenčninami (tj. licenčninami, obračunanimi na podlagi posamične prodaje izdelka) kot sredstvo usklajevanja in/ali višanja cen na prodajnih proizvodnih trgih [58].
Article 4 of the TTBER distinguishes between agreements between competitors and agreements between non-competitors.
Vendar pa bo Nadzorni organ obravnaval navzkrižne licence, za katere veljajo vzajemne tekoče licenčnine, kot določanje cen samo v primeru, da namen sporazuma ni spodbujanje konkurence in torej ne predstavlja licenčnega sporazuma, sklenjenega v dobri veri.
Article 4(1) TTBER lists the hardcore restrictions for licensing between competitors.
V takih primerih, ko sporazum ne ustvari nobene vrednosti in zanj ni nobene legitimne poslovne utemeljitve, je sporazum zgolj navidezen in pomeni kartel.
According to Article 4(1), the TTBER does not cover agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have as their object any of the following:
Nedopustna omejitev iz člena 4(1)(a) TTBER zajema tudi sporazume, v okviru katerih se licenčnina izračuna na podlagi celotne prodaje izdelkov, ne glede na to, ali se za njihovo proizvodnjo uporablja licenčna tehnologija.
the restriction of a party's ability to determine its prices when selling products to third parties;
Taki sporazumi so zajeti tudi s členom 4(1)(d), v skladu s katerim se ne sme omejiti sposobnost pridobitelja licence za izkoriščanje lastnih tehnoloških pravic (glej točko 116 teh smernic).
the limitation of output, except limitations on the output of contract products imposed on the licensee in a non-reciprocal agreement or imposed on only one of the licensees in a reciprocal agreement;
Na splošno taki sporazumi omejujejo konkurenco, saj povečajo stroške pridobitelja licence, ki nastanejo pri uporabi lastnih konkurenčnotehnoloških pravic, in omejujejo konkurenco, ki je obstajala pred obstojem sporazuma [59].
the allocation of markets or customers except:
To velja za vzajemne in tudi nevzajemne dogovore.
the obligation on the licensor and/or the licensee, in a non-reciprocal agreement, not to produce with the licensed technology rights within the exclusive territory reserved for the other party and/or not to sell, both actively and passively or only actively, into the exclusive territory or to the exclusive customer group reserved for the other party;
Izjemoma pa lahko sporazum, v okviru katerega se licenčnina izračuna na osnovi celotne prodaje izdelka, v posameznem primeru izpolnjuje pogoje iz člena 53(3), če je mogoče na podlagi objektivnih dejavnikov ugotoviti, da je omejitev nepogrešljiva za uresničitev licenciranja, ki bo spodbujalo konkurenco.
the restriction, in a non-reciprocal agreement, of active sales by the licensee into the exclusive territory or to the exclusive customer group allocated by the licensor to another licensee provided that the latter was not a competing undertaking of the licensor at the time of the conclusion of its own licence;
To se lahko zgodi v primeru, da bi bilo v odsotnosti omejitve nemogoče ali neprimerno zapleteno izračunati in nadzirati licenčnino, ki jo plača pridobitelj licence, ker na primer tehnologija dajalca licence ne pušča vidnih sledi na končnem izdelku in praktično uporabne alternativne metode nadziranja niso na voljo.
the obligation on the licensee to produce the contract products only for its own use provided that the licensee is not restricted in selling the contract products actively and passively as spare parts for its own products;
Omejitve obsega proizvodnje med konkurenti
the obligation on the licensee, in a non-reciprocal agreement, to produce the contract products only for a particular customer, where the licence was granted in order to create an alternative source of supply for that customer;
Nedopustna omejitev konkurence, določena v členu 4(1)(b), se nanaša na vzajemno omejevanje proizvodnje, ki se naloži pogodbenicama.
the restriction of the licensee's ability to exploit its own technology rights or the restriction of the ability of any of the parties to the agreement to carry out research and development, unless such latter restriction is indispensable to prevent the disclosure of the licensed know-how to third parties.
Omejitev proizvodnje je količinska omejitev proizvodnje in prodaje izdelka za posamezno pogodbenico.
Distinction between reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements between competitors
Člen 4(1)(b) se ne uporablja za omejitve proizvodnje, ki so pridobitelju licence naložene v nevzajemnem sporazumu, ali omejitve proizvodnje, ki so naložene enemu od pridobiteljev licence v vzajemnem sporazumu, pod pogojem, da omejitev proizvodnje zadeva le izdelke, ki se proizvedejo s pomočjo licenčne tehnologije.
For a number of hardcore restrictions the TTBER makes a distinction between reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements.
Člen 4(1)(b) zato kot nedopustne omejitve opredeljuje vzajemne omejitve proizvodnje, ki jih pogodbenici naložita druga drugi, in omejitve proizvodnje, ki se naložijo dajalcu licence v zvezi z njegovo lastno tehnologijo.
The hardcore list is stricter for reciprocal agreements than for non-reciprocal agreements between competitors.
Če se konkurenti dogovorijo o vzajemni omejitvi proizvodnje, bosta cilj in verjetni učinek sporazuma zmanjšanje proizvodnje na trgu.
Reciprocal agreements are cross-licensing agreements where the licensed technologies are competing technologies or can be used for the production of competing products.
Enako velja pri sporazumih, ki zmanjšujejo spodbude pogodbenic za razširitev proizvodnje, na primer z uporabo vzajemnih tekočih licenčnin na enoto, ki se višajo skupaj z večanjem proizvodnje, ali če se pogodbenici vzajemno obvežeta, da bo pogodbenica, ki preseže določen obseg proizvodnje, drugi pogodbenici plačala določen znesek.
A non-reciprocal agreement is an agreement where only one of the parties is licensing its technology rights to the other party or where, in the case of cross-licensing, the licensed technologies rights are not competing technologies and the rights licensed cannot be used for the production of competing products.
Ugodnejša obravnava nevzajemnih količinskih omejitev temelji na domnevi, da enostranska omejitev ne vodi nujno do zmanjšanja obsega proizvodnje na trgu, medtem ko je pri nevzajemni omejitvi manjše tudi tveganje, da sporazum ni licenčni dogovor, sklenjen v dobri veri.
An agreement is not reciprocal for the purposes of the TTBER merely because the agreement contains a grant-back obligation or because the licensee licenses back own improvements of the licensed technology.
Če je pridobitelj licence pripravljen pristati na enostransko omejitev, je verjetno, da bo sporazum omogočil resnično povezovanje dopolnilnih tehnologij ali povezovanje boljše tehnologije dajalca licence s proizvodnimi zmogljivostmi pridobitelja licence, s čimer se bo povečala učinkovitost.
Where a non-reciprocal agreement subsequently becomes a reciprocal agreement due to the conclusion of a second licence between the same parties, those parties may have to revise the first licence in order to avoid the agreement containing a hardcore restriction.
Podobno bo v vzajemnem sporazumu omejitev proizvodnje, ki bo naložena enemu od pridobiteljev licence, verjetno odražala večjo vrednost tehnologije, ki jo licencira ena od pogodbenic, in bo to lahko spodbudilo licenciranje, ki je za konkurenco pozitivno.
In the assessment of the individual case the Authority will take into account the time lapsed between the conclusion of the first and the second licence.
Razdelitev trgov in kupcev med konkurenti
Price restrictions between competitors
Nedopustna omejitev konkurence, določena v členu 4(1)(c) TTBER, se nanaša na razdelitev trgov in kupcev.
The hardcore restriction of competition contained in Article 4(1)(a) TTBER concerns agreements between competitors that have as their object the fixing of prices for products sold to third parties, including the products incorporating the licensed technology.
Cilj sporazumov, s katerimi si konkurenti razdelijo trge in kupce, je omejitev konkurence.
Price fixing between competitors constitutes a restriction of competition by its very object.
Sporazum, s katerim se konkurenti vzajemno dogovorijo, da ne bodo proizvajali na nekaterih ozemljih ali da ne bodo aktivno in pasivno ali zgolj aktivno prodajali na nekaterih ozemljih ali nekaterim kupcem, rezerviranim za drugo pogodbenico, se šteje za nedopustno omejitev.
Price fixing can take the form of a direct agreement on the exact price to be charged or on a price list with certain allowed maximum rebates.
Tako se na primer vzajemno podeljevanje izključnih licenc med konkurenti smatra za delitev trga.
It is immaterial whether the agreement concerns fixed, minimum, maximum or recommended prices.
Člen 4(1)(c) se uporablja ne glede na to, ali lahko pridobitelj licence še naprej prosto uporablja lastne tehnološke pravice.
Price fixing can also be implemented indirectly by applying disincentives to deviate from an agreed price level, for example, by providing that the royalty rate will increase if product prices are reduced below a certain level.
Ko se pridobitelj licence ustrezno opremi za uporabo tehnologije dajalca licence z namenom proizvodnje danega izdelka, je vzdrževanje ločene proizvodne linije, ki uporablja drugo tehnologijo, da se ugodi kupcem, ki jih zajemajo omejitve, lahko drago.
However, an obligation on the licensee to pay a certain minimum royalty does not in itself amount to price fixing.
Poleg tega je verjetno, da pridobitelj licence zaradi možnih protikonkurenčnih učinkov omejitve ne bo imel znatne spodbude, da bi proizvajal na podlagi lastne tehnologije.
When royalties are calculated on the basis of individual product sales, the amount of the royalty has a direct impact on the marginal cost of the product and thus a direct impact on product prices [57].
Prav tako je zelo malo verjetno, da bodo take omejitve nepogrešljive za uresničitev licenciranja, ki spodbuja konkurenco.
Competitors can therefore use cross-licensing with reciprocal running royalties as a means of coordinating and/or increasing prices on downstream product markets [58].
V skladu s členom 4(1)(c)(i) ni nedopustna omejitev, če dajalec licence v okviru nevzajemnega sporazuma podeli pridobitelju licence izključno licenco za proizvodnjo na podlagi licenčne tehnologije na določenem ozemlju in torej pristane, da sam ne bo proizvajal pogodbenih izdelkov na navedenem ozemlju ali jih s tega ozemlja dobavljal.
However, the Authority will only treat cross-licences with reciprocal running royalties as price fixing where the agreement is devoid of any pro-competitive purpose and therefore does not constitute a bona fide licensing arrangement.
Za take izključne licence velja skupinska izjema ne glede na obseg ozemlja.
In such cases where the agreement does not create any value and therefore has no valid business justification, the arrangement is a sham and amounts to a cartel.
Če licenca zadeva svetovni trg, izključnost pomeni, da dajalec licence ne bo vstopil na trg ali na njem še naprej deloval.
The hardcore restriction contained in Article 4(1)(a) TTBER also covers agreements whereby royalties are calculated on the basis of all product sales irrespective of whether the licensed technology is being used.
Skupinska izjema se uporabi tudi, če pridobitelju licence v okviru nevzajemnega sporazuma ni dovoljeno proizvajati na izključnem ozemlju, rezerviranem za dajalca licence.
Such agreements are also caught by Article 4(1)(d) according to which the licensee must not be restricted in its ability to use its own technology rights (see point (116) of these guidelines).
Namen takih sporazumov je lahko zagotovitev spodbude dajalcu in/ali pridobitelju licence, da vlaga v licenčno tehnologijo in jo razvija.
In general such agreements restrict competition since the agreement raises the cost of using the licensee's own competing technology rights and restricts competition that existed in the absence of the agreement [59].
Cilj sporazuma torej ni nujno delitev trgov.
This is so both in the case of reciprocal and non-reciprocal arrangements.
V skladu s členom 4(1)(c)(i) in iz istega razloga se skupinska izjema uporablja tudi za nevzajemne sporazume, s katerimi se pogodbenici dogovorita, da ne bosta aktivno ali pasivno prodajali na izključnem ozemlju ali izključni skupini kupcev, rezervirani za drugo pogodbenico.
Exceptionally, however, an agreement whereby royalties are calculated on the basis of all product sales may fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3) in an individual case where on the basis of objective factors it can be concluded that the restriction is indispensable for pro-competitive licensing to occur.
Nadzorni organ za namene uporabe TTBER „aktivno“ in „pasivno“ prodajo razlaga tako, kot sta opredeljeni v Smernicah o vertikalnih omejitvah [60].
This may be the case where in the absence of the restraint it would be impossible or unduly difficult to calculate and monitor the royalty payable by the licensee, for instance because the licensor's technology leaves no visible trace on the final product and practicable alternative monitoring methods are unavailable.
Omejitve, naložene pridobitelju ali dajalcu licence, ki se nanašajo na aktivno in/ali pasivno prodajo na ozemlju druge pogodbenice ali skupini kupcev druge pogodbenice, so predmet skupinske izjeme le, če sta zadevno ozemlje oziroma zadevna skupina kupcev rezervirana izključno za to drugo pogodbenico.
Output restrictions between competitors
Vendar pa lahko v nekaterih posebnih okoliščinah sporazumi, ki vsebujejo take omejitve prodaje, v posameznem primeru tudi izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 53(3), če izključnost nastopi na ad hoc podlagi, na primer, če je to potrebno za ublažitev začasnega pomanjkanja proizvodnje dajalca ali pridobitelja licence, kateremu sta izključno dodeljena ozemlje ali skupina kupcev.
The hardcore restriction of competition set out in Article 4(1)(b) TTBER concerns reciprocal output restrictions on the parties.
Verjetno je, da je v takih primerih dajalec ali pridobitelj licence še vedno v zadostni meri zaščiten pred aktivno in/ali pasivno prodajo, da ima spodbudo za licenciranje lastne tehnologije ali vlaganje v delo z licenčno tehnologijo.
An output restriction is a limitation on how much a party may produce and sell.
Čeprav bi take omejitve omejevale konkurenco, pa bi pospeševale za konkurenco spodbudno razširjanje tehnologije in integracijo take tehnologije v proizvodne zmogljivosti pridobitelja licence.
Article 4(1)(b) does not apply to output limitations on the licensee in a non-reciprocal agreement or output limitations on one of the licensees in a reciprocal agreement provided that the output limitation only concerns products produced with the licensed technology.
Tako tudi dejstvo, da dajalec licence imenuje pridobitelja licence kot edinega pridobitelja licence na posameznem ozemlju, kar pomeni, da licenca za proizvodnjo na podlagi tehnologije dajalca licence na zadevnem ozemlju ne bo podeljena tretjim osebam, prav tako ne pomeni nedopustne omejitve.
Article 4(1)(b) thus identifies as hardcore restrictions reciprocal output restrictions on the parties and output restrictions on the licensor in respect of its own technology.
V primeru takih t. i. edinih licenc velja skupinska izjema ne glede na to, ali je sporazum vzajemen ali ne, če sporazum ne vpliva na sposobnost pogodbenic, da na svojih ozemljih v celoti izkoriščata lastne tehnološke pravice.
When competitors agree to impose reciprocal output limitations, the object and likely effect of the agreement is to reduce output in the market.
Člen 4(1)(c)(ii) izključuje s seznama nedopustnih omejitev in v primeru, da ni presežen določeni prag tržnega deleža, vključuje v skupinsko izjemo omejitve v nevzajemnem sporazumu, ki se naložijo pridobitelju licence glede aktivne prodaje na ozemlju ali skupini kupcev, ki ju je dajalec licence dodelil drugemu pridobitelju licence.
The same is true of agreements that reduce the incentive of the parties to expand output, for example by applying reciprocal running royalties per unit which increase as output increases or by obliging each party to make payments if a certain level of output is exceeded.
Vendar to temelji na predpostavki, da zaščiteni pridobitelj licence v času sklenitve licenčnega sporazuma ni bil konkurent dajalcu licence.
The more favourable treatment of non-reciprocal quantity limitations is based on the consideration that a one-way restriction does not necessarily lead to a lower output on the market while the risk that the agreement is not a bona fide licensing arrangement is also lower when the restriction is non-reciprocal.
V navedenih okoliščinah ni upravičeno obravnavati takih omejitev kot nedopustnih omejitev.
When a licensee is willing to accept a one-way restriction, it is likely that the agreement leads to a real integration of complementary technologies or an efficiency enhancing integration of the licensor's superior technology with the licensee's productive assets.
S tem, ko se dajalcu licence dopušča, da pridobitelja licence, ki še ni bil prisoten na trgu, zaščiti pred aktivno prodajo s strani pridobiteljev licence, ki konkurirajo dajalcu licence in so zato na trgu že uveljavljeni, bodo take omejitve verjetno spodbudile pridobitelja licence k učinkovitejšemu izkoriščanju licenčne tehnologije.
Similarly, in a reciprocal agreement an output restriction on only one of the licensees is likely to reflect the higher value of the technology licensed by one of the parties and may serve to promote pro-competitive licensing.
Po drugi strani pa v primeru, da se pridobitelji licence med seboj dogovorijo, da ne bodo aktivno ali pasivno prodajali na določenih ozemljih ali določenim skupinam kupcev, sporazum pomeni kartel med pridobitelji licence.
Market and customer allocation between competitors
Ker taki sporazumi ne vključujejo prenosa tehnologije, tudi ne bi spadali na področje uporabe TTBER.
The hardcore restriction of competition set out in Article 4(1)(c) TTBER concerns the allocation of markets and customers.
Člen 4(1)(c)(iii) vsebuje dodatno izjemo od nedopustnih omejitev iz člena 4(1)(c), namreč omejitve, ki se nanašajo na lastno uporabo, torej obveznost pridobitelja licence, da proizvaja izdelke, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo, samo za lastno uporabo.
Agreements whereby competitors share markets and customers have as their object the restriction of competition.
Če je pogodbeni izdelek sestavni del, je torej pridobitelju licence lahko naložena obveznost, da proizvaja navedeni sestavni del le za namene vgradnje v svoje lastne izdelke in da sestavnega dela ne prodaja drugim proizvajalcem.
An agreement whereby competitors agree, in a reciprocal agreement, not to produce in certain territories or not to sell, both actively and passively or only actively, into certain territories or to certain customers reserved for the other party, is considered a hardcore restriction.
Vendar pa mora biti pridobitelju licence omogočeno, da prodaja sestavne dele kot rezervne dele za lastne izdelke in torej dobavlja tretjim osebam, ki izvajajo poprodajne storitve v zvezi s temi izdelki.
Thus for instance reciprocal exclusive licensing between competitors is considered market sharing.
Omejitve, ki se nanašajo na lastno uporabo, so morda potrebne za spodbujanje razširjanja tehnologije, zlasti med konkurenti, in so zajete v skupinski izjemi.
Article 4(1)(c) applies irrespective of whether the licensee remains free to use its own technology rights.
Take omejitve so obravnavane tudi v poglavju 4.2.5.
Once the licensee has tooled up to use the licensor's technology to produce a given product, it may be costly to maintain a separate production line using another technology in order to serve customers covered by the restrictions.
Končno, člen 4(1)(c)(iv) izključuje s seznama nedopustnih omejitev obveznost, naloženo pridobitelju licence v nevzajemnem sporazumu, da proizvaja pogodbene izdelke samo za določenega kupca z namenom oblikovanja alternativnega vira dobave za zadevnega kupca.
Moreover, given the anti-competitive potential of the restraints the licensee may have little incentive to produce under its own technology.
Pogoj za uporabo člena 4(1)(c)(iv) je torej, da je licenca omejena na oblikovanje alternativnega vira dobave za tega določenega kupca.
Such restrictions are also highly unlikely to be indispensable for pro-competitive licensing to occur.
Vendar pa ni pogoj, da se podeli samo ena taka licenca.
Under Article 4(1)(c)(i) it is not a hardcore restriction for the licensor in a non-reciprocal agreement to grant the licensee an exclusive licence to produce on the basis of the licensed technology in a particular territory and thus agree not to produce itself the contract products in or provide the contract products from that territory.
Člen 4(1)(c)(iv) zajema tudi okoliščine, v katerih se več kot enemu podjetju podeli licenca za dobavljanje istemu, določenemu kupcu.
Such exclusive licences are block-exempted irrespective of the scope of the territory.
Člen 4(1)(c)(iv) se uporablja ne glede na trajanje licenčnega sporazuma.
If the licence is worldwide, the exclusivity implies that the licensor will abstain from entering or remaining on the market.
Ta izjema na primer zajema enkratno licenco za izpolnitev zahtev projekta določenega kupca.
The block exemption also applies if in a non-reciprocal agreement the licensee is not allowed to produce in an exclusive territory reserved for the licensor.
Možnost, da bi taki sporazumi privedli do razdelitve trga, je omejena, če se licenca podeli zgolj za namen dobavljanja točno določenemu kupcu.