natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Further, as the original idea was to channel also CANTAT-3 capacity via the E-Farice hf., there were concerns that the competition in connectivity to Iceland would be eliminated, as only one supplier would remain in the market.
Ker naj bi po prvotni zamisli prek E-Farice hf. vključili tudi zmogljivost CANTAT-3, so nadalje obstajali pomisleki, da bi bila konkurenca glede povezljivosti do Islandije omejena, saj bi na trgu ostal samo en ponudnik.
COMMENTS BY THE ICELANDIC AUTHORITIES
PRIPOMBE ISLANDSKIH ORGANOV
In their comments to Decision No 125/05/COL dated 28 June 2005, the Icelandic authorities restate their opinion that there is no State aid involved in the Farice project.
V pripombah k Odločbi št. 125/05/COL z dne 28. junija 2005 so islandski organi ponovili svoje mnenje, da v projekt Farice ni vpletena državna pomoč.
According to the Icelandic authorities, the loan guarantee and the increase of the Government’s share capital are in line with the State aid provisions.
Po mnenju islandskih organov sta bila jamstvo za posojilo in povečanje delniškega kapitala vlade skladna z določbami o državni pomoči.
Furthermore, the Farice project constitutes infrastructure within the meaning of the State aid rules.
Poleg tega pomeni projekt Farice infrastrukturo v smislu pravil o državni pomoči.
However, as stated in a previous letter dated 21 January 2005, the Icelandic authorities are of the opinion that any State aid would be compatible with Article 61(3)(b) and (c) of the EEA Agreement.
Kot je bilo navedeno v prejšnjem dopisu z dne 21. januarja 2005, islandski organi menijo, da bi bila kakršna koli državna pomoč združljiva s členom 61(3)(b) in (c) Sporazuma o EGP.
The Icelandic authorities justify the necessity of the measures in question based on the consideration that telecom connectivity and broadband access are a necessary step for the modernisation of the EU society and economy and are a crucial aspect of the Lisbon agenda as well as a prerequisite for the development of the e-Europe Action Plan.
Islandski organi upravičujejo potrebo po zadevnih ukrepih na podlagi razmisleka, da sta telekomunikacijska povezljivost in širokopasovni dostop potreben korak za modernizacijo družbe in gospodarstva v EU ter odločilna vidika lizbonske strategije in predpogoj za razvoj akcijskega načrta za e-Evropo.
Given its geographic location, Iceland is particularly dependent on having access to economic and reliable telecom connectivity.
Zaradi svoje geografske lege je Islandija še posebej odvisna od dostopa do ekonomične in zanesljive telekomunikacijske povezljivosti.
The connectivity currently in place is neither satisfactory nor reliable or acceptable for the telecom-dependent Icelandic and Faroese economies due to the technical limitations of CANTAT-3.
Trenutna povezljivost zaradi tehničnih omejitev CANTAT-3 ni niti zadovoljiva niti zanesljiva oziroma sprejemljiva za islandsko in fersko gospodarstvo, ki sta odvisni od telekomunikacij.
Under these circumstances, the participation of the State resulted from the need to make the project viable.
V takih okoliščinah je bilo sodelovanje države posledica potrebe po zagotovitvi izvedljivosti projekta.
Without the state participation the project would either have been delayed or not undertaken at all.
Brez sodelovanja države bi bil projekt preložen, ali pa sploh ne bi bil izveden.
The Icelandic authorities are of the opinion that the advantages in terms of guaranteeing a reliable provision of telecom services in Iceland outweighs the disadvantages of a certain distortion of competition for other competitors.
Islandski organi menijo, da prednosti v smislu zagotavljanja zanesljivih ponudb telekomunikacijskih storitev prevladajo nad slabostmi določenega izkrivljanja konkurence za druge konkurente.
Prior to the establishment of Farice, introductory meetings were held with Icelandic operators whereby only three of the ‘smaller’ operators agreed to buy shares in the company.
Pred ustanovitvijo družbe Farice so bili organizirani uvodni sestanki z islandskimi operaterji, kjer so se samo trije od „manjših“ operaterjev strinjali z nakupom delnic v družbi.
In the opinion of the Icelandic authorities, considerable effort was put into the search for founding parties, setting no lower limit on share capital contributions.
Po mnenju islandskih organov so bila v iskanje ustanoviteljev vložena precejšnja prizadevanja, saj spodnja meja prispevkov v delniški kapital ni bila določena.
Therefore, the Icelandic authorities argue that there was widespread participation given the specific circumstances of the project.
Zato islandski organi menijo, da je glede na posebne okoliščine projekta šlo za široko udeležbo.
The Icelandic authorities underline that Section 7 of the Shareholders Agreement contains a pre-emptive right of the founding companies of Farice hf.
Islandski organi poudarjajo, da poglavje 7 sporazuma delničarjev vsebuje predkupno pravico ustanovnih družb Farice hf.
This right is equivalent to Article 34 of the Icelandic Act No 2/1995 on Public Limited Companies, according to which shareholders are entitled to subscribe to new shares in direct proportion to their holdings.
Ta pravica je enaka členu 34 islandskega Zakona št. 2/1995 o javnih delniških družbah, po katerem imajo delničarji pravico do vpisa novih delnic v neposrednem razmerju s svojimi deleži.
This right is transferable and, furthermore, each shareholder can always decide not to use this pre-emptive right.
Ta pravica je prenosljiva, poleg tega pa se lahko vsak delničar vedno odloči, da te predkupne pravice ne bo izkoristil.
Furthermore, Section 7(2) of the Shareholders Agreement, provides that the shareholders will endeavour to ensure that new parties can participate in the increase of capital, notwithstanding the pre-emptive rights.
Poglavje 7(2) sporazuma delničarjev nadalje določa, da si bodo delničarji prizadevali zagotavljati, da lahko pri povečanju kapitala sodelujejo nove stranke, ne glede na predkupne pravice.
The Shareholders Agreement provides for a non-discriminatory, transparent pricing on market terms.
Sporazum delničarjev določa nediskriminatorno in pregledno oblikovanje cen po tržnih pogojih.
The pricing policy of the company shall be based on the principles of cost orientation, transparency and non-discrimination.
Politika oblikovanja cen družbe mora temeljiti na načelih stroškovne naravnanosti, preglednosti in nediskriminacije.
The Icelandic authorities compare the Farice project with the situation addressed in Commission Decision N 307/2004, concerning a broadband infrastructure project in the United Kingdom to provide mass market broadband services to businesses and citizens in remote and rural Scotland.
Islandski organi primerjajo projekt Farice s primerom, obravnavanim v Odločbi Komisije N 307/2004 glede širokopasovnega infrastrukturnega projekta v Združenem kraljestvu, da bi zagotovili širokopasovne storitve množičnega trga podjetjem in državljanom v oddaljeni in podeželski Škotski.
According to their information, the prices for capacity on the Farice system are probably the highest ones for similar services across the North Atlantic.
Po njihovih informacijah so cene za zmogljivost v sistemu Farice verjetno najvišje med cenami za podobne storitve prek Severnega Atlantika.
This is one of the reasons why the volume sold in 2005 corresponds to less than 5 % of the currently installed capacity on Farice.
To je eden od razlogov, zakaj obseg, prodan v letu 2005, ustreza manj kot petim odstotkom trenutno nameščene zmogljivosti v Farice.
Concerning the question of open access, the Icelandic authorities stress that access to the infrastructure is open, transparent and non-discriminatory.
Glede vprašanja odprtega dostopa islandski organi poudarjajo, da je dostop do infrastrukture odprt, pregleden in nediskriminatoren.
Finally, the Icelandic authorities consider that if it were to be established that State aid was involved, the total amount of aid is limited.
Islandski organi menijo, da je, v primeru ugotovitve vpletenosti državne pomoči, skupni znesek pomoči omejen.
In particular regarding the loan guarantee, such a limited amount cannot be considered contrary to the common interest with regard to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.
Zlasti glede jamstva za posojilo takšen omejeni znesek ne more veljati za nasprotnega skupnemu interesu po členu 61(3)(c) Sporazuma o EGP.
The first share increase in January 2003 was therefore not a normal “share increase” of a company but in fact similar to the establishment of a new company with a new purpose.’ The fact that private operators have been holding the majority of the shares at all stages and contributing substantially to the company at the same time as the Icelandic State, shows that any eventual State aid would be very limited.
Na tej točki še ni bilo dokončno odločeno glede finančne potrebe celotnega projekta in končnega lastništva deležev […] Nobeno podjetje ne bi moglo izvesti dejanske gradnje in delovanja kabla […] Zato prvo povečanje deleža januarja 2003 ni bilo običajno ‚povečanje deleža‘ družbe, temveč je bilo pravzaprav podobno ustanovitvi nove družbe z novim namenom.“ Dejstvo, da so imeli zasebni operaterji v vseh fazah v lasti večino delnic in so znatno prispevali v družbo sočasno z islandsko državo, kaže, da bi bila morebitna državna pomoč zelo omejena.
Regarding the competition concerns (see Section II.3.2 of Decision No 125/05/COL), the Icelandic authorities state that presently neither Farice hf. nor E-Farice ehf. have any plans to purchase or lease more CANTAT-3 capacity and that the discussions with Teleglobe at the time never led to any agreements.
Kar zadeva pomisleke glede konkurence (glej poglavje II.3.2 Odločbe št. 125/05/COL), islandski organi navajajo, da trenutno niti Farice hf. niti E-Farice ehf. ne načrtujeta nakupa ali zakupa več zmogljivosti CANTAT-3 in da pogovori z družbo Teleglobe nikoli niso pripeljali do kakršnih koli dogovorov.
It has also been shown that due to the high prices of Farice, customers have increasingly used CANTAT-3 capacity, which is able to compete with Farice hf.
Pokazalo se je tudi, da so stranke zaradi visokih cen Farice vedno bolj uporabljale zmogljivost CANTAT-3, ki je lahko konkurenčna Farice hf.
THE PRESENCE OF STATE AID WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 61(1) EEA AGREEMENT
PRISOTNOST DRŽAVNE POMOČI V SMISLU ČLENA 61(1) SPORAZUMA O EGP
Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
Člen 61(1) Sporazuma o EGP se glasi:
‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
„Razen če ta sporazum ne določa drugače, je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodelijo države članice ES, države Efte, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva z delovanjem tega sporazuma, če prizadene trgovino med pogodbenicami.“
THE LOAN GUARANTEE BY THE ICELANDIC STATE
JAMSTVO ZA POSOJILO S STRANI ISLANDSKE DRŽAVE
In general, a State guarantee enables its beneficiary to obtain better financial terms for a loan than those normally available on the financial markets.
Državno jamstvo upravičencu na splošno omogoča, da dobi boljše finančne pogoje za posojilo od tistih, ki so po navadi na voljo na finančnih trgih.
Therefore, guarantees given by the State may fall within the scope of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Zato lahko jamstva države spadajo na področje uporabe člena 61(1) Sporazuma o EGP.
However, in the provisions of Chapter 17.4(2) of the Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on State Guarantees (hereinafter: the Guidelines), the Authority has laid down a situation in which an individual State guarantee does not constitute State aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Vendar pa je v določbah poglavja 17.4(2) Smernic Nadzornega organa o državni pomoči glede državnih jamstev (v nadaljnjem besedilu „Smernice“) Nadzorni organ opredelil primer, v katerem posamezno državno jamstvo ne pomeni državne pomoči po členu 61(1) Sporazuma o EGP.
To this end, the State guarantee must fulfil all the following conditions:
V ta namen mora državno jamstvo izpolnjevati naslednje pogoje:
the borrower would, in principle, be able to obtain a loan on market conditions from the financial markets without any intervention by the State;
posojilojemalec bi bil načeloma zmožen dobiti posojilo pod tržnimi pogoji od finančnih trgov brez kakršne koli intervencije države;
the guarantee is linked to a specific financial transaction, is for a fixed maximum amount, does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan and is not open-ended;
jamstvo je povezano s specifično finančno transakcijo, določen je njegov najvišji znesek, ne zajema več kot 80 % neporavnanega posojila in ni odprto ter
the market price for the guarantee is paid (which reflects, amongst other things, the amount and duration of the guarantee, the security given by the borrower, the borrower’s financial position, the sector of activity and the prospects, the rates of default, and other economic conditions).
tržna cena za jamstvo je plačana (kar med drugim odraža znesek in trajanje jamstva, zavarovanje s strani posojilojemalca, finančni položaj posojilojemalca, sektor dejavnosti in obete, stopnje neporavnanih obveznosti in druge gospodarske pogoje).
The Authority will, therefore, firstly assess whether the State guarantee in favour of Farice hf. for the A Term Loan fulfils the four conditions set out in the Guidelines which would exclude that State aid is involved.
Zato bo Nadzorni organ najprej ocenil, ali državno jamstvo v korist Farice hf. za terminsko posojilo A izpolnjuje štiri pogoje, določene v Smernicah, kar bi izključilo vpletenost državne pomoči.
Only in the case of a negative finding in that regard will the Authority assess the individual conditions of Article 61(1) EEA Agreement.
Samo ob negativni ugotovitvi glede tega bo Nadzorni organ ocenil posamezne pogoje člena 61(1) Sporazuma o EGP.
Conditions, excluding the existence of aid — Chapter 17.4(2) of the State Aid Guidelines
Pogoji, ki izključujejo obstoj pomoči – poglavje 17.4(2) Smernic o državni pomoči
According to the information provided by the Icelandic authorities, the project could not gain momentum as a purely commercial business case and required the involvement of the State.
Po informacijah, ki so jih predložili islandski organi, projekt ne bi mogel zaživeti kot izključno komercialni poslovni primer, zato je bila potrebna udeležba države.
Although Farice hf. was not technically in financial difficulty (first condition), it could only secure a EUR 11 million loan on market conditions (D loan).
Čeprav Farice hf. tehnično ni bil v finančnih težavah (prvi pogoj), bi lahko pod tržnimi pogoji zagotovil le posojilo v znesku 11 milijonov EUR (posojilo D).
The fact that the banks did not only require a guarantee from the State for the A Term Loan but also from the two former state telecommunication monopolists (Síminn for the B Term Loan and Telefonverkið P/F for the C Term Loan), which were still owned by the respective States, shows that Farice was not in the position to obtain a loan on market conditions without any intervention by the State.
Dejstvo, da banka ni zahtevala le jamstva države za terminsko posojilo A, temveč tudi jamstvo dveh nekdanjih državnih telekomunikacijskih monopolistov (družbe Síminn za terminsko posojilo B in družbe Telefonverkið P/F za terminsko posojilo C), ki sta bila še vedno v lasti zadevnih držav, kaže, da Farice ni mogel dobiti posojila pod tržnimi pogoji brez kakršne koli intervencije države.
The second condition is therefore not fulfilled.
Drugi pogoj torej ni izpolnjen.
As to the third condition, the Authority took the preliminary view in the decision to open the formal investigation that the State guarantee covers 100 % of the guaranteed A Term Loan. The overall loan package is made up of four (or five [21]) different loan amounts with different borrowing conditions, different lenders and different guarantees.
Glede tretjega pogoja je Nadzorni organ pri odločbi o začetku formalnega postopka preiskave najprej menil, da državno jamstvo zajema 100 % zajamčenega terminskega posojila A. Skupni posojilni paket je sestavljen iz štirih (ali petih [21]) različnih posojilnih zneskov z različnimi posojilnimi pogoji, posojilodajalci in jamstvi.
The Icelandic authorities argue that there is only one loan at stake, at EUR 34,5 million and that for that reason the State guarantee relating to the A Term loan does not cover more than 80 % of the loan.
Islandski organi menijo, da gre samo za eno posojilo v znesku 34,5 milijona EUR in da zaradi tega državno jamstvo, ki se nanaša na terminsko posojilo A, ne zajema več kot 80 % odstotkov posojila.
However, as can be seen from the loan agreement, while granted for the same collateral, the four loans are granted by different banks which assume the responsibility for their loan amount only.
Kot pa je mogoče videti iz posojilnega sporazuma, gre sicer za isto jamstvo, vendar pa štiri posojila zagotavljajo različne banke, ki prevzemajo odgovornost samo za svoj znesek posojila.
The different loans do not only carry different interest rates but they also have different repayment periods, different number of instalments and different guarantors.
Različna posojila nimajo samo različnih obrestnih mer, temveč tudi različne dobe odplačevanja, različno število obrokov in različne poroke.
It should further be noted that the 80 % rule should ensure that the creditor still has an incentive to reflect on the risk which he is willing to assume.
Nadalje je treba navesti, da naj bi pravilo 80 % zagotovilo, da upnik ohrani pobudo premisleka o tveganju, ki ga je pripravljen prevzeti.
Against this background, it does not seem correct to take into account — in relation to the business decision made by the Nordic Investment Bank and in order to establish the loan basis to which the 80 % rule applies — that other loans are granted by Íslandsbanki and Føroya Banki.
Ob tem ozadju se ne zdi pravilno upoštevati – v zvezi s poslovno odločitvijo Nordic Investment Bank in zaradi določitve posojilne osnove, za katero velja pravilo 80 % – da druga posojila dajeta Íslandsbanki in Føroya Banki.
The Nordic Investment Bank has not assumed any responsibility for these loans.
Nordic Investment Bank ni prevzela nobene odgovornosti za ta posojila.
For these reasons, the Authority considers that each part of the overall loan amount constitutes an independent loan as such.
Zato Nadzorni organ meni, da vsak del skupnega zneska posojila pomeni neodvisno posojilo kot tako.
The combination of the loans in one joint document does not appear to be of significant relevance.
Zdi se, da združevanje posojil v enem dokumentu ni bistvenega pomena.
Regarding the fourth condition, the Authority notes that the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund charged a guarantee premium of 0,5 % p.a. in relation to the A Term Loan. The premium was paid upfront at an amount of EUR 438839. In addition a guarantee of ISK 120000 was charged.
Glede četrtega pogoja Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da je jamstveni sklad islandske države zaračunal 0,5-odstotno letno jamstveno premijo v zvezi s terminskim posojilom A. Premija je bila plačana na začetku v znesku 438839 EUR. Poleg tega je bila zaračunana jamstvena dajatev v znesku 120000 ISK.
Only assuming that the State Guarantee Fund took into account, in the assessment of the premium, the concrete characteristics of the guaranteed loan, in particular the conditions for repayment [23] and that it followed for its assessment the so-called market investor principle, would the fourth condition laid down in Chapter 17.4(2) of the Guidelines be fulfilled.
Četrti pogoj iz poglavja 17.4(2) Smernic bi bil izpolnjen samo ob domnevi, da je državni jamstveni sklad pri oceni premije upošteval konkretne značilnosti zagotovljenih posojil, predvsem pogojev odplačevanja [23], in da je pri svoji oceni spoštoval tako imenovano načelo vlagatelja v tržno gospodarstvo.
However, despite being invited to prove that the guarantee premium reflects the market rate, the Icelandic authorities have not substantiated this point, but mainly limited themselves to repeat the relevant provisions of the State Guarantee Fund Act.
Vendar pa islandski organi kljub povabilu, naj dokažejo, da jamstvena premija izraža tržno stopnjo, niso utemeljili te točke, temveč so se omejili predvsem na ponovitev ustreznih določb Zakona o državnem jamstvenem skladu.
The Authority notes that while taking into account that the guarantee in question is a guarantee of collection with a lesser risk, the premium charged to Farice is at the very low end of the spectrum of such charges to be fixed by the National Debt Management Agency (from 0,5 to 4 % [24]), which has not been reasoned by the Icelandic authorities despite the comment of the Authority in the Decision to open the formal investigation procedure [25].
Ob upoštevanju, da gre pri zadevnem jamstvu za jamstvo izterjave z manjšim tveganjem, Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da je premija, zaračunana družbi Farice, na samem dnu lestvice tovrstnih pristojbin, ki jih določa Agencija za upravljanje nacionalnega dolga (od 0,5 do 4 % [24]), česar islandski organi niso utemeljili, kljub pripombi Nadzornega organa v odločbi o začetku formalnega postopka preiskave [25].
Further indication of the appropriate market rate can be derived from Chapter 17.3(2) of the Guidelines which identifies the amount of aid, i.e. the cash grant equivalent, for an individual guarantee, as the difference between the market rate and the rate obtained thanks to the State guarantee after any premiums have been deducted.
Nadaljnjega pokazatelja ustrezne tržne stopnje je mogoče dobiti iz poglavja 17.3(2) Smernic, ki znesek pomoči, tj. ekvivalent gotovinske subvencije, za posamezno jamstvo opredeljuje kot razliko med tržno stopnjo in stopnjo, pridobljeno zahvaljujoč državnemu jamstvu po odbitku vseh premij.
This is based on the understanding that if the borrower profits from a favourable interest rate, which he would not have received without state intervention, the aid element is the amount which remains in comparison to the market rate and after the premium has been deducted.
To temelji na naslednjem razumevanju: če ima posojilojemalec dobiček od ugodne obrestne mere, ki ga brez državne intervencije ne bi bil deležen, je element pomoči tisti znesek, ki ostane v primerjavi s tržno stopnjo in po odbitju premije.
If the premium does not fully remove this advantage, the State guarantee would still benefit the recipient and thus distort the market.
Če premija te prednosti ne odstrani v celoti, bi državno jamstvo še vedno koristilo prejemniku in tako izkrivljalo trg.
In such circumstances the advantage resulting from the guarantee has not been removed by the premium and would have to be classified as aid [26].
V takih okoliščinah prednost, ki izhaja iz jamstva, ni bila odstranjena s premijo in bi bila opredeljena kot pomoč [26].
On the basis of the information available to it (the Authority has no information on credit ratings for Farice hf.), the Authority will try to establish an approximation of the value of the guarantee and the respective aid intensity by a comparison of the A Term Loan with the D Term Loan. In its Decision to open the formal investigation procedure, the Authority expressed doubts as to whether the interest rate of the A Term Loan should be compared with the B or D Term Loans.
Na podlagi razpoložljivih informacij (Nadzorni organ nima nobenih informacij o bonitetnih stopnjah za Farice hf.) bo Nadzorni organ poskušal določiti približek vrednosti jamstva in intenzivnosti zadevne pomoči s primerjavo terminskega posojila A in terminskega posojila D.