natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Íslandsbanki argues in its comments that the Icelandic state acted as a market economy investor in participating in the recapitalisation of Sjóvá.
Noben zasebni vlagatelj ne bi sodeloval pri dokapitalizaciji v teh okoliščinah.
If, however, the Authority came to the view that the transaction involved state aid, Íslandsbanki states that the aid should be considered compatible under Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement.
Poleg tega zavarovalnica VIS trdi, da se pomoč ne bi smela razglasiti za združljivo.
The comments highlight in particular the importance of the measures for the Icelandic financial market, the contribution of private parties (Glitnir and Íslandsbanki) to the recapitalisation and the success of the restructuring of Sjóvá so far.
Člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP ni mogoče uporabiti predvsem zato, ker propad zavarovalnice Sjóvá ne bi povzročil resne motnje v islandskem gospodarstvu.
Comments from competitors
Zato pomoč ni bila potrebna.
The Authority also received comments from VIS and TM.
V vsakem primeru pa zavarovalnica VIS trdi, da pomoč ni skladna s smernicami o prestrukturiranju tako zaradi odsotnosti načrta prestrukturiranja kot zaradi izkrivljajočega učinka na konkurenco, vključno z možnostjo agresivnega oblikovanja cen zavarovalnice Sjóvá.
Both are Icelandic insurance companies and in direct competition with Sjóvá.
Zavarovalnica TM v svojih pripombah navaja, da posredovanje islandskih organov pri dokapitalizaciji zavarovalnice Sjóvá ni potekalo pod tržnimi pogoji, zato bi ga bilo treba šteti za državno pomoč.
VIS argues in its comments that the state intervention to enable the recapitalisation of Sjóvá should be considered as state aid.
Glede združljivosti ukrepa zavarovalnica TM trdi, da za to zadevo ni mogoče uporabiti izjem v členu 61(3)(b) ali členu 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP.
In particular, VIS notes that the market economy investor principle does not apply to the intervention given the economic situation of Sjóvá and more generally in Iceland at the time, as well as due to the terms of the intervention.
V zvezi s členom 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP zavarovalnica TM trdi, da je treba ta člen uporabiti restriktivno in da ga ni mogoče uporabiti za reševanje težav ene same družbe.
No private investor would have participated in the recapitalisation under these circumstances.
Poleg tega zavarovalnica TM trdi, da se zavarovalnica ne bi smela šteti za sistemsko pomembno in bi lahko zato varno prenehala poslovati v obstoječem regulativnem okviru.
Furthermore, VIS argues that the aid should not be declared compatible.
V vsakem primeru pa zavarovalnica TM trdi, da pomoč zavarovalnici Sjóvá ni bila potrebna, ciljno usmerjena in sorazmerna.
In particular, Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable as the failure of Sjóvá would not have caused a serious disturbance in the Icelandic economy.
Prav tako ta pomoč ne vključuje načrta prestrukturiranja, ki bi zagotovil zadostno porazdelitev bremen in ukrepe za omejitev izkrivljanja konkurence, zlasti v povezavi z oblikovanjem cen zavarovalnice Sjóvá.
The aid was therefore not necessary.
PRIPOMBE ISLANDSKIH ORGANOV
In any event, VIS argues that the aid does not comply with the Restructuring Guidelines, both due to the absence of a restructuring plan and because of the distortive effect on competition, including the potential for aggressive pricing behaviour by Sjóvá.
Islandski organi ne nasprotujejo predhodnim ugotovitvam Nadzornega organa, da je udeležba države v kapitalizaciji zavarovalnice Sjóvá državna pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP.
TM notes in its comments that the intervention of the Icelandic authorities in the recapitalisation of Sjóvá did not take place on market terms and therefore should be considered as state aid.
Predvsem ne izpodbijajo predhodnega sklepa Nadzornega organa, da ni mogoče uporabiti načela vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji.
Concerning the compatibility of the measure, TM argues that the exceptions in neither Article 61(3)(b) nor Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement are applicable to the case at hand.
Islandija prav tako ne nasprotuje temu, da je ponovni nakup obveznice družbe Avant s strani družbe ESI prek družbe SAT Holding morda vključeval element državne pomoči zavarovalnici Sjóvá.
In relation to Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement, TM argues that it needs to be applied restrictively and cannot be used to resolve the problems of a single company.
Vendar pa islandski organi trdijo, da je državna pomoč združljiva z delovanjem Sporazuma EGP na podlagi člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP, saj je bilo posredovanje potrebno za odpravljanje resne motnje v gospodarstvu pogodbenice.
In addition, TM submits that an insurance company should not be considered as systemically relevant, and therefore could be wound-up safely within the existing regulatory framework.
Organi pojasnjujejo težak gospodarski položaj, v katerem je bila Islandija v času izvedbe ukrepa.
In any event, TM argues that the aid to Sjóvá was neither necessary, well-targeted nor proportionate.
Potem ko se je septembra 2008 začela resno zniževati vrednost islandske krone in so oktobra 2008 propadle vse tri glavne banke, se je Islandija soočila z najhujšo gospodarsko krizo v svoji novejši zgodovini.
It also lacks a restructuring plan that provides for sufficient burden sharing and measures to limit distortions of competition, in particular in relation to Sjóvá's pricing behaviour.
Islandska vlada je morala sprejeti odločne ukrepe za preprečitev popolnega zloma finančnega sistema države, ki bi imel nepredvidljive posledice za islandsko družbo.
COMMENTS FROM THE ICELANDIC AUTHORITIES
V času izvedbe ukrepa je bil finančni sistem Islandije sredi pretresov in prizadet zaradi splošnega pomanjkanja zaupanja v finančne institucije.
The Icelandic authorities do not contest the preliminary findings of the Authority that the participation of the Icelandic state in the capitalisation of Sjóvá constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Zavarovalnica Sjóvá je kot ena od treh glavnih zavarovalnic na Islandiji sistemsko pomembna za finančni sistem Islandije.
In particular, they do not dispute the preliminary conclusion of the Authority that the market economy investor principle is not applicable.
Zaradi propada zavarovalnice Sjóvá bi velik del prebivalcev Islandije ostal brez zavarovalnega kritja in izgubil svoje zahtevke v položaju, ko se je islandska družba že spopadala z resnimi socialnimi težavami.
Neither does Iceland contest that the repurchase of the Avant bond by ESI — via SAT Holding — might have involved an element of state aid to Sjóvá.
Poleg tega bi propad še bolj načel zaupanje v institucije finančnega sistema in razširil finančno krizo na zavarovalniški sektor.
The Icelandic authorities argue that the state aid is, however, compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement, as the intervention was required to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Contracting Party.
Zaupanje javnosti v islandski zavarovalniški sektor je resno upadlo že na začetku leta 2009, saj so zavarovalnico Sjóvá, pa tudi lastnike drugih dveh glavnih zavarovalnic prevzeli upniki njihovih matičnih družb.
They explain the difficult economic situation Iceland was in at the time of the measure.
Zato bi propad zavarovalnice Sjóvá najverjetneje privedel do tega, da bi se kriza na finančnih trgih razširila z bančnega na zavarovalniški sektor.
After a severe depreciation of the Icelandic króna starting in September 2008 and the collapse of all three major banks in October 2008, Iceland faced the worst economic crisis in its recent history.
Organ FME se strinja s to analizo in navaja, da bi stečaj zavarovalnice Sjóvá imel resne posledice za gospodarstvo države.
The Icelandic government had to take bold steps to preserve the country's financial system from a complete breakdown with unforeseeable consequences for Iceland's society.
Nadaljnji obstoj zavarovalnice Sjóvá je bil pomemben za delovanje islandskega finančnega trga.
At the time of the measure, Iceland's financial system was in a state of turmoil and suffered from a general lack of confidence in financial institutions.
Stečaj bi imel na splošno učinke prelivanja na trga neživljenjskih in življenjskih zavarovanj.
Sjóvá, as one of the three major insurance companies in Iceland, is systematically important for Iceland's financial system.
Zavrl bi tekoča prizadevanja islandskih organov za preoblikovanje finančnih trgov.
It would also have further undermined the trust in the financial system's institutions and spread the contagion of the financial crisis to the insurance sector.
Te so bile možne zaradi pomanjkanja ustrezne kontrole tveganj in upravljanja družbe.
Public trust in Iceland's insurance sector had already severely diminished at the beginning of 2009 since not only Sjóvá but also the owners of the other two major insurance companies were taken over by the creditors of their respective parent companies.
Te dejavnosti in transakcije niso povezane s tekočim opravljanjem dejavnosti zavarovanja, ki ga zavarovalnica Sjóvá nadaljuje danes.
Therefore, a failure of Sjóvá most likely would have resulted in the financial market crisis spreading from the banking to the insurance sector.
Uspešno opravljanje dejavnosti zavarovanja zavarovalnice Sjóvá se ne kaže samo v finančnih napovedih načrta prestrukturiranja, temveč ga je potrdil tudi organ FME.
This analysis is shared by the FME, which notes that a bankruptcy of Sjóvá would have had severe consequences on the country's economy.
Poleg tega pripravljenost zasebnega tretjega vlagatelja, da od države pridobi večinski delež v družbi, dokazuje, da je poslovanje zavarovalnice Sjóvá po mnenju trga uspešno.
The credibility of the financial market and the economy in general was heavily damaged during the collapse of the Icelandic banks in October 2008.
Ta transakcija je privedla tudi do tega, da si je Islandija povrnila večino pomoči.
The remaining institutions were fragile, as was the confidence in financial institutions.
Islandski organi poudarjajo, da so nekdanji lastniki zavarovalnice Sjóvá izgubili svojo celotno naložbo ter da sta pri dokapitalizaciji sodelovali tako banka Glitnir kot banka Íslandsbanki.
Sjóvá's continued existence was important to the functioning of the Icelandic financial market.
Poleg tega zavarovalnica Sjóvá prispeva k prestrukturiranju z znižanjem stroškov in ponovnim povečevanjem svojega kapitala iz zadržanih dobičkov.
Bankruptcy would have had spill-over effects on the non-life and the life insurance markets in general.
Zato je breme v znatnem obsegu porazdeljeno med delničarji zavarovalnice Sjóvá in samo družbo.
It would have set back the on-going work of the Icelandic authorities to reconstruct the financial markets.
Islandski organi glede potrebe po izravnalnih ukrepih trdijo, da se ne bi smeli zahtevati nadaljnji strukturni ukrepi, saj je prestrukturiranje že privedlo do zmanjšanja bilančne vsote zavarovalnice Sjóvá za približno 70 % in bi vsaka odprodaja na osrednjih poslovnih področjih ogrozila uspešno poslovanje.
Regarding the scope of the necessary restructuring, the Icelandic authorities argue that the Authority should take into account that Sjóvá's financial difficulties were caused exclusively by its irregular investment activities and by transactions with its former owner Milestone.
Islandski organi navajajo tudi, da zavarovalnica Sjóvá izpolnjuje pogoje za malo in srednje podjetje, kar dodatno zmanjšuje potrebo po izravnalnih ukrepih.
These have been possible due to a lack of proper risk control and corporate governance.
Ti organi trdijo tudi, da so predlagane zaveze v zvezi z ravnanjem zavarovalnice Sjóvá in regulativnimi spremembami ustrezne za zmanjšanje kakršnega koli izkrivljanja konkurence.
They have no connection to the day-to-day insurance business continued by Sjóvá today.
Na pripombe tretjih strani, tj. zavarovalnic VIS in TM, islandski organi odgovarjajo predvsem s sklicevanjem na prejšnje pripombe in navajanjem nadaljnjih gospodarskih podatkov.
The viability of Sjóvá's insurance business is not only shown in the financial projections of the restructuring plan, but also confirmed by the FME.
NAČRT PRESTRUKTURIRANJA
In addition, the willingness of a private third-party investor to acquire a majority stake in the company from the state evidences that the market considers Sjóvá to be viable.
Islandski organi so 3. oktobra 2011 predložili prvi načrt prestrukturiranja zavarovalnice Sjóvá.
This transaction also resulted in the majority of the aid being recovered by Iceland.
Ta načrt je bil posodobljen 13. aprila 2012 in 28. maja 2013.
The Icelandic authorities highlight that the historic owners of Sjóvá lost their entire investment, and that both Glitnir and Íslandsbanki took part in the recapitalisation.
Načrt prestrukturiranja obravnava bistvena vprašanja, in sicer uspešno poslovanje, porazdelitev bremen in omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence.
Besides, Sjóvá is contributing to the restructuring by cutting cost and rebuilding its capital from retained profits.
V skladu z načrtom prestrukturiranja bo zavarovalnica Sjóvá zmanjšala splošni profil tveganja svojega naložbenega portfelja, izboljšala svoje postopke upravljanja naložb in obvladovanja tveganj, izboljšala upravljanje družbe in povečala dobičkonosnost.
There is therefore substantial burden sharing by both the shareholders in Sjóvá and the company itself.
Finančne napovedi
Regarding the need for compensatory measures, the Icelandic authorities argue that further structural measures should not be required as the restructuring has already led to a reduction of Sjóvá's balance sheet by about 70 %, and any divestments in the core business segments would endanger viability.
Islandski organi so predložili podrobne finančne informacije in finančne napovedi za zavarovalnico Sjóvá do leta 2016, vključno z osnovnim scenarijem in tremi scenariji izjemnih situacij.
The Icelandic authorities also note that Sjóvá qualifies as an SME, which further reduces the need for compensatory measures.
V vseh štirih scenarijih so bile za obdobje 2013–2016 predstavljene predpostavke v zvezi z rastjo bruto domačega proizvoda (BDP), inflacijo, razvojem tržnega deleža, donosom indeksiranih državnih obveznic, donosom iz denarnega toka, premijo za tveganje lastniškega kapitala in razporeditvijo lastniškega kapitala ter količnikoma zahtevki/premije in stroški/premije zavarovalnice Sjóvá.
Finally, they argue that the proposed commitments, both regarding the behaviour of Sjóvá and regulatory change, are appropriate to minimise any distortions of competition.
Osnovni scenarij
In response to the third-party comments from VIS and TM, the Icelandic authorities mainly refer to previous submissions and provide further economic data.
Osnovni scenarij:
THE RESTRUCTURING PLAN
predpostavke
This plan was further updated on 13 April 2012 and 28 May 2013.
Inflacija
The restructuring plan addresses the substantive issues of viability, burden-sharing and limiting distortion of competition.
Tržni delež zavarovalnice Sjóvá
Financial projections
Realna stopnja donosa denarnega toka
The Icelandic authorities have submitted detailed financial information and financial projections for Sjóvá until 2016, including a base case and three stress case scenarios.
Premija za tveganje lastniškega kapitala
Even though the restructuring period only lasts until the end of 2014, the Icelandic authorities have submitted additional planning data for 2015 and 2016.
Razporeditev lastniškega kapitala
This assists the Authority in particular in its assessment of the stress cases, which take into account stress events specific to the Icelandic market with effects beyond the restructuring period.
Zahtevki/premije brez pozavarovanja
In all four scenarios, assumptions were presented for the period 2013-2016 in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, inflation, market share development, the return on index-linked government bonds, cash yield, equity premium and allocation as well as claims/premiums and cost/premiums ratios of Sjóvá.
Stroški/premije brez pozavarovanja
Base case
Napovedana izkaz poslovnega izida in bilanca stanja v osnovnem scenariju sta opredeljena v spodnji preglednici.
In the base case scenario, the financial projections are based on the five-year prognosis for GDP growth and inflation of the Icelandic economy published by Statistics Iceland on 30 March 2012, and updated on the basis of the actual results of Sjóvá and the actual data on the Icelandic economy in 2012 on 28 May 2013.
izkaz poslovnega izida (v milijonih ISK)
The base case assumes in particular moderate economic growth, a reduction in inflation and flat development of interest rates, as well as constant market shares for Sjóvá.
Prihodki od premij
Base case:
Odhodki za škode
assumptions
Drugi prihodki
GDP growth
Odhodki iz poslovanja
Inflation
Poslovni izid zavarovalniškega poslovanja
Sjóvá's market share
Prihodki naložb
Index-link gvt bonds
Prihodki pred obdavčitvijo in amortizacijo
Yield cash real rate
Amortizacija dobrega imena
Equity premium
Dobiček pred obdavčitvijo
Equity allocation
Davki na dobiček
Claims/premiums net of reinsurance
Dobiček
Cost/premiums net of reinsurance
bilanca stanja (v milijonih ISK)
The projected profit and loss statement as well as the balance sheet in the base case are set out in the table below.
Sredstva:
profit and loss statement (in ISK million)
Poslovna sredstva
Premium earned
Dobro ime
Claims incurred
Druga neopredmetena sredstva
Other income
Davčna olajšava
Operational expenses
Vrednostni papirji
P/L of insurance operations
Pozavarovalna sredstva
Investment income
Terjatve
Income before tax and depreciation
Denar in denarni ustrezniki
Amortisation of goodwill
Skupaj sredstva
Profit before tax
Lastniški kapital:
Income taxes
Lastniški kapital na začetku obdobja
Profit
Letni dobiček
balance sheet (in ISK million)
Dividende
Assets:
Skupaj lastniški kapital
Operating assets
Obveznosti:
Goodwill
Zavarovalno-tehnične rezervacije
Other intangibles
Zavarovalno-tehnične rezervacije za življenjsko zavarovanje
Tax deduction
Obveznosti
Securities
Skupaj obveznosti
Reinsurance assets
Lastniški kapital in obveznosti
Account receivables
Glavni finančni kazalniki, kot so napovedani v osnovnem scenariju, so predstavljeni v spodnji preglednici.
Cash and cash equivalents
ključni finančni kazalniki
Total assets
Prilagojena kapitalska zahteva
Equity:
Donos lastniškega kapitala
Equity at beginning of period
Na koncu obdobja prestrukturiranja bo napovedani donos lastniškega kapitala zavarovalnice Sjóvá v osnovnem scenariju znašal približno […] %.
Profit of the year
Scenarij izjemnih situacij:
Dividend
„dvojno dno“
Total equity
Islandski organi so predložili simulacijo scenarija izjemnih situacij „dvojno dno“.
Liabilities:
V tem scenariju predpostavke glede BDP za obdobje 2013–2016 simulirajo nadaljnjo recesijo in višjo inflacijo.
Technical provisions
Kot nadaljnja izjemna situacija se predpostavlja tudi, da se obrestne mere ne spremenijo in da je premija za tveganje lastniškega kapitala negativna.
Tech. provisions for life insurance
Scenarij „dvojno dno“ je tako simulacija globoke recesije skupaj z nadaljnjimi izjemnimi elementi.
Accounts payable
Scenarij izjemnih situacij „dvojno dno“:
Total liabilities
finančna statistika (v milijonih ISK, razen če je določeno drugače)
Equity and liabilities
Skupni dobiček
The main financial ratios as projected in the base case are presented in the table below.
„kapitalske kontrole“
key financial ratios
Islandski organi so predložili simulacijo scenarija izjemnih situacij „kapitalske kontrole“.
Adjusted solvency
Zato se poveča stopnja inflacije.
Return on Equity
Zaradi višje stopnje inflacije pa se poveča škodni količnik.
At the end of the restructuring period, the projected return on equity of Sjóvá will reach about […] % in the base case scenario.
Predpostavlja se, da se realne obrestne mere povečajo na 6,5 %, premija za tveganje lastniškega kapitala pa doseže – 50 % zaradi bega kapitala.
Stress case:
Scenarij izjemnih situacij „kapitalske kontrole“:
‘double dip’
Islandski organi so predložili simulacijo scenarija izjemnih situacij „mrzla zima II“.
The Icelandic authorities have submitted a simulation of a ‘double dip’ stress scenario.
V tem scenariju izjemnih situacij je osnovni scenarij spremenjen s pojavom dveh izjemno mrzlih zim.
As a further stress, it is also assumed that interest rates are unchanged and that the equity premium turns negative.
Predpostavlja se, da je znesek škod enak 100 % premij.
The ‘double dip’ scenario thus simulates a deep recession combined with further stress elements.
Scenarij izjemnih situacij „mrzla zima II“:
‘Double dip’ stress case:
Scenariji izjemnih situacij:
financials (in ISK million unless specified otherwise)
sklep
‘capital controls’
Vendar bi se donosnost zavarovalnice Sjóvá glede na podatke iz dodatnih načrtov za leti 2015 in 2016 potem hitro spet vzpostavila celo v teh okoliščinah.
The Icelandic authorities have submitted a simulation of a ‘capital controls’ stress scenario.
Opis ukrepov prestrukturiranja
In this stress test, it is assumed that capital controls will be lifted in Iceland in 2014.
Prestrukturiranje zavarovalnice Sjóvá sestavlja več strukturnih ukrepov in ukrepov v zvezi z ravnanjem, ki so opisani spodaj.
As a consequence, the ISK devalues to its current offshore value, which is about 30 % below the official exchange rate.
Ločitev zavarovalniških dejavnosti in prenehanje naložb
This translates into an increase in the inflation rate.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, so glavni vzroki za finančne težave zavarovalnice Sjóvá izhajali iz naložbenih odločitev in posojanja skupine subjektom izven skupine, za kar je bila odgovorna nekdanja lastnica zavarovalnice, skupina Milestone.
In turn, the higher inflation rate increases the loss ratio.
Zato je imela zavarovalnica Sjóvá resne težave v zvezi s svojim naložbenim portfeljem.
Real interest rates are assumed to increase to 6,5 %, and the equity risk premium to reach -50 % due to capital flight.
Pri prestrukturiranju zavarovalnice Sjóvá sta bila zato ključna prenos njenih zavarovalniških dejavnosti poleti 2009 na novo družbo (ki se je pozneje preimenovala v Sjóvá) in likvidacija portfelja slabih naložb iz preteklosti.
‘Capital controls’ stress case:
Sprememba upravljanja družbe in nadzornih struktur
Stress case: ‘cold winter II’
Nov islandski zakon o zavarovalniških dejavnostih je začel veljati leta 2010.
The Icelandic authorities have submitted a simulation of a ‘cold winter II’ stress scenario.
Zakon vsebuje strožja pravila o upravljanju družb in drugih nadzornih mehanizmih v zavarovalnicah.
This stress case modifies the base case by the occurrence of two exceptionally cold winters.
Pomembne spremembe so:
This results in a significant increase of the number of losses (in particular car accidents) that are relatively small and therefore not covered by reinsurance.
direktor zavarovalnice ne sme biti direktor nobene druge finančne institucije ali zavarovalnice.
The amount of losses is assumed at 100 % of premiums.
Organ FME lahko odobri izjeme v primeru hčerinskih družb,
‘Cold winter II’ stress case:
vsak izvršni direktor ali direktor se mora udeležiti preverjanj, na podlagi katerih organ FME oceni kvalifikacije in znanje teh posameznikov.
Stress cases:
Organ FME lahko posameznika, ki tega ocenjevanja ne opravi uspešno, zavrne kot direktorja ali izvršnega direktorja zavarovalnice,
conclusion
upravni odbor mora določiti pravila upravljanja, pravila notranjega preverjanja, pravila notranje revizije, pravila o finančni dejavnosti in postopku, pravila in postopke za kakršno koli posojilno dejavnost ter pravila in postopke za poslovanje s povezanimi osebami,
In all three stress scenarios, the solvency ratio remains strong during the entire restructuring period, and Sjóvá would be profitable with the exception of specific stress events in certain years.
upravni odbor mora določiti pravila o trgovanju s finančnimi instrumenti, ki ga izvajajo sama družba ter osebno direktorji, izvršni direktorji in določeno ključno osebje znotraj družbe,