natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic component of an open and competitive market economy.
Inovativnost je bistveni in dinamični del odprtega ter konkurenčnega tržnega gospodarstva.
Intellectual property rights promote dynamic competition by encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new or improved products and processes.
Pravice intelektualne lastnine pospešujejo dinamično konkurenco prek spodbujanja podjetij k naložbam v razvoj novih ali izboljšanih izdelkov in postopkov.
So does competition by putting pressure on undertakings to innovate.
Enako velja za konkurenco, ki podjetja sili v inovativnost.
Therefore, both intellectual property rights and competition are necessary to promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof.
Zato so pravice intelektualne lastnine in tudi konkurenca nujne za spodbujanje inovativnosti in zagotavljanje konkurenčnega izkoriščanja le-te.
In the assessment of licence agreements under Article 53 it must be kept in mind that the creation of intellectual property rights often entails substantial investment and that it is often a risky endeavour.
Pri presoji licenčnih sporazumov po členu 53 je treba upoštevati, da nastanek pravic intelektualne lastnine pogosto vključuje znatne naložbe in je povezan s tveganji.
In order not to reduce dynamic competition and to maintain the incentive to innovate, the innovator must not be unduly restricted in the exploitation of intellectual property rights that turn out to be valuable.
Da se ne bi zmanjšala dinamična konkurenca in bi se ohranila spodbuda za inovacije, se izumitelja ne sme neupravičeno omejevati pri izkoriščanju pravic intelektualne lastnine, ki se izkažejo za dragocene.
For these reasons the innovator should normally be free to seek compensation for successful projects that is sufficient to maintain investment incentives, taking failed projects into account.
Zato mora izumitelj običajno imeti pravico, da za uspešne projekte zahteva nadomestilo, ki bo zadostno, da se ohranijo spodbude za naložbe, in bo upoštevalo tudi neuspele projekte.
Technology licensing may also require the licensee to make significant sunk investments in the licensed technology and production assets necessary to exploit it.
Licenciranje tehnologije prav tako lahko od pridobitelja licence zahteva, da opravi znatne nepovratne investicije v licenčno tehnologijo in proizvodna sredstva, potrebna za njeno izkoriščanje.
Article 53 cannot be applied without considering such ex ante investments made by the parties and the risks relating thereto.
Člena 53 ni možno uporabljati brez upoštevanja takšnih predhodnih investicij strank in s tem povezanih tveganj.
The risk facing the parties and the sunk investment that must be committed may thus lead to the agreement falling outside Article 53(1) or fulfilling the conditions of Article 53(3), as the case may be, for the period of time required to recoup the investment.
Tveganje, ki so mu izpostavljene stranke, in nepovratna investicija, ki jo je treba opraviti, lahko torej privedeta do tega, da sporazum ne spada v področje uporabe člena 53(1) oziroma da izpolnjuje pogoje iz člena 53(3) v obdobju, ki je potrebno, da se investicija povrne.
In assessing licensing agreements under Article 53, the existing analytical framework is sufficiently flexible to take due account of the dynamic aspects of technology licensing.
Pri presoji licenčnih sporazumov po členu 53 je obstoječi analitični okvir dovolj prožen, da ustrezno upošteva dinamične vidike licenciranja tehnologije.
There is no presumption that intellectual property rights and licence agreements as such give rise to competition concerns.
Ne domneva se, da so pravice intelektualne lastnine in licenčni sporazumi kot taki sporni z vidika konkurence.
Most licence agreements do not restrict competition and create pro-competitive efficiencies.
Večina licenčnih sporazumov ne omejuje konkurence in ustvarja učinkovitosti, ki spodbujajo konkurenco.
Indeed, licensing as such is pro-competitive as it leads to dissemination of technology and promotes innovation.
Licenciranje kot tako je dejansko ugodno za konkurenco, saj vodi do razširjanja tehnologije in spodbuja inovativnost.
In addition, even licence agreements that do restrict competition may often give rise to pro-competitive efficiencies, which must be considered under Article 53(3) and balanced against the negative effects on competition [13].
Poleg tega lahko celo licenčni sporazumi, ki omejujejo konkurenco, pogosto pripomorejo h konkurenci naklonjenim učinkovitostim, ki jih je treba proučiti v okviru člena 53(3) in pretehtati v primerjavi z negativnimi učinki na konkurenco [13].
The great majority of licence agreements are therefore compatible with Article 53.
Velika večina licenčnih sporazumov je zato združljiva s členom 53.
The general framework for applying Article 53 of the EEA Agreement
Splošni okvir za uporabo člena 53 Sporazuma EGP
Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement prohibits agreements which have as their object or effect the restriction of competition.
Člen 53(1) Sporazuma EGP prepoveduje sporazume, katerih cilj ali posledica je omejitev konkurence.
Article 53(1) applies both to restrictions of competition between the parties to an agreement and to restrictions of competition between any of the parties and third parties.
Člen 53(1) se uporablja za omejevanje konkurence med strankami sporazuma in tudi za omejevanje konkurence med katero koli stranko sporazuma in tretjimi.
The assessment of whether a licence agreement restricts competition must be made within the actual context in which competition would occur in the absence of the agreement with its alleged restrictions [14].
Presoja glede tega, ali licenčni sporazum omejuje konkurenco, mora biti opravljena v okviru okoliščin, v katerih bi konkurenca dejansko potekala, če ne bi bilo sporazuma in z njim povezanih domnevnih omejitev [14].
In making this assessment it is necessary to take account of the likely impact of the agreement on inter-technology competition (i.e. competition between undertakings using competing technologies) and on intra-technology competition (i.e. competition between undertakings using the same technology) [15].
Pri tej presoji je treba upoštevati verjetni učinek sporazuma na konkurenco med tehnologijami (tj. konkurenco med podjetji, ki uporabljajo konkurenčne tehnologije) in na konkurenco znotraj tehnologije (tj. konkurenco med podjetji, ki uporabljajo isto tehnologijo) [15].
Article 53(1) prohibits restrictions of both inter-technology competition and intra-technology competition.
Člen 53(1) prepoveduje omejevanje konkurence med tehnologijami in tudi konkurence znotraj tehnologije.
It is therefore necessary to assess to what extent the agreement affects or is likely to affect these two aspects of competition on the market.
Zato je treba presoditi, v kolikšni meri sporazum vpliva ali bo verjetno vplival na ta dva vidika konkurence na trgu.
The following two questions provide a useful framework for making this assessment.
Naslednji dve vprašanji ponujata koristen okvir za to presojo.
The first question relates to the impact of the agreement on inter-technology competition while the second question relates to the impact of the agreement on intra-technology competition.
Prvo vprašanje se nanaša na učinek sporazuma na konkurenco med tehnologijami, medtem ko se drugo vprašanje navezuje na učinek sporazuma na konkurenco znotraj tehnologije.
As restraints may be capable of affecting both inter-technology competition and intra-technology competition at the same time, it may be necessary to analyse a restraint in the light of both questions before it can be concluded whether or not competition within the meaning of Article 53(1) is restricted:
Ker lahko omejitve hkrati vplivajo na konkurenco med tehnologijami in na konkurenco znotraj tehnologije, bo morda potrebna analiza omejitve glede na obe vprašanji, preden se lahko zaključi, ali se omejuje konkurenca v smislu člena 53(1):
Does the licence agreement restrict actual or potential competition that would have existed without the contemplated agreement?
Ali licenčni sporazum omejuje dejansko ali potencialno konkurenco, ki bi obstajala v njegovi odsotnosti?
If so, the agreement may be caught by Article 53(1).
Če je odgovor pritrdilen, je sporazum lahko zajet s prepovedjo iz člena 53(1).
In making this assessment it is necessary to take into account competition between the parties and competition from third parties.
Pri tej presoji je treba upoštevati konkurenco med strankami in konkurenco s strani tretjih.
For instance, where two undertakings established in different EEA States cross licence competing technologies and undertake not to sell products in each other's home markets, (potential) competition that existed prior to the agreement is restricted.
Kadar si na primer v dveh različnih državah EGP ustanovljeni podjetji navzkrižno podelita licenci za konkurenčni tehnologiji in se zavežeta, da nobeno od njiju ne bo prodajalo izdelkov na domačem trgu drugega, se (potencialna) konkurenca, ki je obstajala pred sporazumom, omeji.
Similarly, where a licensor imposes obligations on his licensees not to use competing technologies and these obligations foreclose third party technologies, actual or potential competition that would have existed in the absence of the agreement is restricted.
Podobno se dejanska ali potencialna konkurenca, ki bi obstajala, če ne bi bilo sporazuma, omeji, kadar dajalec licence pridobiteljem licence nalaga obveznosti, da ne uporabljajo konkurenčnih tehnologij, in te obveznosti preprečujejo dostop na trg tehnologijam tretjih.
Does the agreement restrict actual or potential competition that would have existed in the absence of the contractual restraint(s)?
Ali sporazum omejuje dejansko ali potencialno konkurenco, ki bi obstajala, če ne bi bilo pogodbene(-ih) omejitve(-ev)?
For instance, where a licensor restricts its licensees from competing with each other, (potential) competition that could have existed between the licensees absent the restraints is restricted.
Če na primer dajalec licence omeji pridobitelje licence pri medsebojni konkurenci, se omeji (potencialna) konkurenca, ki bi lahko obstajala med pridobitelji licence, če ne bi bilo omejitev.
Such restrictions include vertical price fixing and territorial or customer sales restrictions between licensees.
Takšne omejitve vključujejo vertikalno določanje cen in prodajne omejitve med pridobitelji licenc, ki so vezane na ozemlje ali kupce.
However, certain restraints may in certain cases not be caught by Article 53(1) when the restraint is objectively necessary for the existence of an agreement of that type or that nature [16].
Vendar lahko nekatere omejitve v določenih primerih niso zajete s prepovedjo iz člena 53(1), če je omejitev objektivno nujna za obstoj sporazuma zadevne vrste ali narave [16].
Such exclusion of the application of Article 53(1) can only be made on the basis of objective factors external to the parties themselves and not the subjective views and characteristics of the parties.
Takšna izključitev uporabe člena 53(1) je mogoča le na osnovi objektivnih dejavnikov, ki so neodvisni od samih strank, in ne sme temeljiti na subjektivnih mnenjih in značilnostih strank.
The question is not whether the parties in their particular situation would not have accepted to conclude a less restrictive agreement, but whether, given the nature of the agreement and the characteristics of the market, a less restrictive agreement would not have been concluded by undertakings in a similar setting.
Vprašanje ni, ali stranke v dani situaciji niso bile pripravljene skleniti manj omejevalnega sporazuma, temveč ali bi glede na naravo sporazuma in značilnosti trga podjetja v podobnih okoliščinah morda sklenila manj omejevalen sporazum.
For instance, territorial restraints in an agreement between non-competitors may fall outside Article 53(1) for a certain duration if the restraints are objectively necessary for a licensee to penetrate a new market.
Tako lahko na primer ozemeljske omejitve v sporazumu med nekonkurenti za določeno obdobje ne spadajo v področje uporabe člena 53(1), če so objektivno potrebne, da se pridobitelj licence lahko prebije na nov trg.
Similarly, a prohibition imposed on all licensees to sell to certain categories of end users may not be restrictive of competition if such a restraint is objectively necessary for reasons of safety or health related to the dangerous nature of the product in question.
Podobno je mogoče, da prepoved prodaje nekaterim skupinam končnih uporabnikov, ki je naložena vsem pridobiteljem licence, ne omejuje konkurence, če je taka omejitev objektivno potrebna iz varnostnih ali zdravstvenih razlogov, povezanih z nevarno naravo zadevnega izdelka.
Claims that in the absence of a restraint the supplier would have resorted to vertical integration are not sufficient.
Trditve, da bi se dobavitelj v odsotnosti omejitve zatekel k vertikalni integraciji, ne zadostujejo.
Decisions on whether or not to vertically integrate depend on a broad range of complex economic factors, a number of which are internal to the undertaking concerned.
Odločitve glede tega, ali se vertikalno povezovati ali ne, so odvisne od širokega razpona zahtevnih ekonomskih dejavnikov, izmed katerih jih je za zadevno podjetje veliko število notranje narave.
In the application of the analytical framework set out in the previous paragraph it must be taken into account that Article 53(1) distinguishes between those agreements that have a restriction of competition as their object and those agreements that have a restriction of competition as their effect.
Pri uporabi analitičnega okvira, opisanega v prejšnjem odstavku, je treba upoštevati, da člen 53(1) razlikuje med sporazumi, katerih cilj je omejitev konkurence, in sporazumi, katerih posledica je omejitev konkurence.
An agreement or contractual restraint is only prohibited by Article 53(1) if its object or effect is to restrict inter-technology competition and/or intra-technology competition.
Sporazumi ali pogodbene omejitve so prepovedani s členom 53(1) le, kadar je njihov cilj ali posledica omejitev konkurence med tehnologijami in/ali konkurence znotraj tehnologije.
Restrictions of competition by object are those that by their very nature restrict competition.
Omejitve konkurence po cilju so tiste, ki že po svoji naravi omejujejo konkurenco.
These are restrictions which in light of the objectives pursued by the EEA competition rules have such a high potential for negative effects on competition that it is not necessary for the purposes of applying Article 53(1) to demonstrate any actual effects on the market [17].
To so omejitve, ki imajo glede na cilje, za katere si prizadevajo pravila konkurence EGP, tako velik potencial za negativen vpliv na konkurenco, da za namene uporabe člena 53(1) ni potrebno dokazati dejanskih učinkov na trgu [17].
Moreover, the conditions of Article 53(3) are unlikely to be fulfilled in the case of restrictions by object.
Poleg tega ni verjetno, da bodo pogoji iz člena 53(3) izpolnjeni v primeru omejitev po cilju.
The assessment of whether or not an agreement has as its object a restriction of competition is based on a number of factors.
Presoja, ali si sporazum prizadeva omejiti konkurenco ali ne, temelji na številnih dejavnikih.
These factors include, in particular, the content of the agreement and the objective aims pursued by it.
Ti dejavniki zlasti vključujejo vsebino sporazuma in objektivne cilje, za katere si sporazum prizadeva.
It may also be necessary to consider the context in which it is (to be) applied or the actual conduct and behaviour of the parties on the market [18].
Lahko je tudi treba upoštevati okoliščine, v katerih se (bo) uporablja(-l), ali dejansko ravnanje ter obnašanje strank na trgu [18].
In other words, an examination of the facts underlying the agreement and the specific circumstances in which it operates may be required before it can be concluded whether a particular restriction constitutes a hardcore restriction of competition.
Z drugimi besedami, lahko je potrebna proučitev dejstev, ki so osnova sporazuma, in posebnih okoliščin, v katerih sporazum deluje, preden se lahko ugotovi, ali neka omejitev pomeni nedopustno omejitev konkurence.
The way in which an agreement is actually implemented may reveal a restriction by object even where the formal agreement does not contain an express provision to that effect.
Način dejanskega izvajanja sporazuma lahko pokaže na omejitev po cilju tudi v primerih, ko formalni sporazum ne vsebuje izrecne določbe v ta namen.
Evidence of subjective intent on the part of the parties to restrict competition is a relevant factor but not a necessary condition.
Dokaz glede subjektivnega namena strank, da omejijo konkurenco, je pomemben dejavnik, vendar ni nujen pogoj.
For licence agreements, the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that the restrictions covered by the list of hardcore restrictions of competition contained in Article 4 of the TTBER are restrictive by their very object.
V zvezi z licenčnimi sporazumi Nadzorni organ EFTA meni, da so omejitve, zajete v seznamu nedopustnih omejitev konkurence iz člena 4 TTBER, omejitve po samem cilju.
If an agreement is not restrictive of competition by object it is necessary to examine whether it has restrictive effects on competition.
Če cilj sporazuma ni omejevanje konkurence, je treba proučiti, ali ima sporazum morda omejevanje konkurence za posledico.
Account must be taken of both actual and potential effects [19].
Pri tem je treba upoštevati dejanske in tudi potencialne učinke [19].
In other words the agreement must have likely anti-competitive effects.
Z drugimi besedami mora imeti sporazum verjetne protikonkurenčne učinke.
For licence agreements to be restrictive of competition by effect they must affect actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the relevant market negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods and services can be expected with a reasonable degree of probability.
Da je licenčni sporazum omejevalen glede na posledice, mora vplivati na dejansko ali potencialno konkurenco v takšni meri, da se na upoštevnem trgu lahko z razumno stopnjo verjetnosti pričakujejo negativni učinki na cene, proizvodnjo, inovativnost ali raznolikost oziroma kakovost blaga in storitev.
The likely negative effects on competition must be appreciable [20].
Verjetni negativni učinki na konkurenco morajo biti znatni [20].
Appreciable anti-competitive effects are likely to occur when at least one of the parties has or obtains some degree of market power and the agreement contributes to the creation, maintenance or strengthening of that market power or allows the parties to exploit such market power.
Znatni protikonkurenčni učinki so verjetni, kadar vsaj ena stranka ima ali doseže določeno stopnjo tržne moči in sporazum prispeva k vzpostavitvi, ohranjanju ali krepitvi te tržne moči oziroma strankam omogoča izkoriščanje take tržne moči.
Market power is the ability to maintain prices above competitive levels or to maintain output in terms of product quantities, product quality and variety or innovation below competitive levels for a not insignificant period of time.
Tržna moč je sposobnost ohranjanja cen nad konkurenčno stopnjo ali ohranjanja proizvodnje v smislu količine, kakovosti in raznolikosti izdelkov ali inovativnosti pod konkurenčno stopnjo v daljšem časovnem obdobju.
The degree of market power normally required for a finding of an infringement under Article 53(1) is less than the degree of market power required for a finding of dominance under Article 54 of the EEA Agreement.
Stopnja tržne moči, ki je običajno potrebna za ugotovitev kršitve v okviru člena 53(1), je nižja kot stopnja tržne moči, ki je potrebna za ugotovitev prevladujočega položaja v smislu člena 54 Sporazuma EGP.
For the purposes of analysing restrictions of competition by effect it is normally necessary to define the relevant market and to examine and assess, inter alia, the nature of the products and technologies concerned, the market position of the parties, the market position of competitors, the market position of buyers, the existence of potential competitors and the level of entry barriers.
Za namene analiziranja omejitev konkurence kot posledice je praviloma treba opredeliti upoštevni trg in proučiti ter presoditi, kakšni so med drugim narava zadevnih izdelkov in tehnologij, tržni položaj strank, tržni položaj konkurentov, tržni položaj kupcev, obstoj potencialnih konkurentov in raven ovir za vstop.
In some cases, however, it may be possible to show anti-competitive effects directly by analysing the conduct of the parties to the agreement on the market.
Vendar pa je v nekaterih primerih mogoče ugotoviti protikonkurenčne učinke neposredno z analizo ravnanja strank sporazuma na trgu.
It may for example be possible to ascertain that an agreement has led to price increases.
Možno je na primer dokazati, da je sporazum privedel do povišanja cen.
Licence agreements, however, also have substantial pro-competitive potential.
Licenčni sporazumi imajo lahko tudi precejšnje pozitivne učinke na konkurenco.
Indeed, the vast majority of licence agreements are pro-competitive.
Velika večina licenčnih sporazumov dejansko spodbuja konkurenco.
Licence agreements may promote innovation by allowing innovators to earn returns to cover at least part of their research and development costs.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko spodbujajo inovativnost s tem, da izumiteljem omogočajo dohodke, s katerimi si povrnejo vsaj del svojih stroškov za raziskave in razvoj.
Licence agreements also lead to a dissemination of technologies, which may create value by reducing the production costs of the licensee or by enabling him to produce new or improved products.
Licenčni sporazumi prav tako vodijo do razširjanja tehnologij, kar lahko ustvari vrednost, saj se zmanjšajo proizvodni stroški pridobitelja licence ali pa se slednjemu omogoči, da ustvari nove ali izboljšane izdelke.
Efficiencies at the level of the licensee often stem from a combination of the licensor's technology with the assets and technologies of the licensee.
Učinkovitosti na ravni pridobitelja licence pogosto izvirajo iz kombinacije tehnologije dajalca licence in sredstev ter tehnologij pridobitelja licence.
Such integration of complementary assets and technologies may lead to a cost/output configuration that would not otherwise be possible.
Tako povezovanje komplementarnih sredstev in tehnologij lahko privede do razmerja med stroški in obsegom proizvodnje, ki drugače ne bi bilo možno.
For instance, the combination of an improved technology of the licensor with more efficient production or distribution assets of the licensee may reduce production costs or lead to the production of a higher quality product.
Združitev izboljšane tehnologije dajalca licence z učinkovitejšimi proizvodnimi ali distribucijskimi zmogljivostmi pridobitelja licence lahko na primer zmanjša proizvodne stroške ali privede do tega, da se proizvede izdelek višje kakovosti.
Licensing may also serve the pro-competitive purpose of removing obstacles to the development and exploitation of the licensee's own technology.
Prav tako lahko licenciranje pozitivno vpliva na konkurenco, ker odstranjuje ovire za razvoj in izkoriščanje tehnologije samega pridobitelja licence.
In particular in sectors where large numbers of patents are prevalent licensing often occurs in order to create design freedom by removing the risk of infringement claims by the licensor.
Zlasti v sektorjih, za katere je značilno veliko število patentov, se licence pogosto podeljujejo z namenom zagotavljanja svobode oblikovanja, saj se z njimi odpravi tveganje za tožbe dajalca licence zaradi kršitve pravic.
When the licensor agrees not to invoke his intellectual property rights to prevent the sale of the licensee’s products, the agreement removes an obstacle to the sale of the licensee's product and thus generally promotes competition.
Ko dajalec licence privoli, da ne bo uveljavljal pravic svoje intelektualne lastnine za preprečevanje prodaje izdelkov pridobitelja licence, se s sporazumom odstrani ovira za prodajo izdelkov pridobitelja licence in se tako na splošno spodbuja konkurenca.