natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the case of companies created on or after 1 January 2008, the maximum loan must not exceed the estimated annual wage bill for the first two years in operation;
Pri podjetjih, ustanovljenih 1. januarja 2008 ali pozneje, najvišji znesek posojila ne sme preseči ocenjene letne mase plač v prvih dveh letih delovanja;
the reduction of the guarantee premium is applied during a maximum period of two years following the granting of the guarantee. If the duration of the underlying loan exceeds two years, EFTA States may apply for an additional maximum period of eight years the safe-harbour premiums set out in the Annex without reduction.
znižanje premije za poroštva se uporablja v obdobju največ dveh let po dodelitvi poroštva; če je trajanje zadevnega posojila daljše od dveh let, lahko države Efte največ osem nadaljnjih let uporabljajo premije varnega pristana iz Priloge brez znižanja;
The reduction of the guarantee premium is applied during a maximum period of two years following the granting of the guarantee. If the duration of the underlying loan exceeds two years, EFTA States may apply for an additional maximum period of eight years the safe-harbour premiums set out in the Annex without reduction.’
znižanje premije za poroštva se uporablja v obdobju največ dveh let po dodelitvi poroštva; če je trajanje zadevnega posojila daljše od dveh let, lahko države Efte največ osem nadaljnjih let uporabljajo premije varnega pristana iz Priloge brez znižanja;“
No 191/09/COL
št. 191/09/COL
amending, for the seventieth time, the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid by introducing a new chapter on the treatment of impaired assets in the EEA banking sector
o sedemdeseti spremembi procesnih in materialnih pravil na področju državne pomoči z uvedbo novega poglavja o obravnavanju oslabljenih sredstev v bančnem sektorju EGP
THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY [1], HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area [2], in particular to Articles 61 to 63 thereof and Protocol 26 thereto, HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice [3], in particular to Article 24 and Article 5(2)(b) thereof, WHEREAS under Article 24 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Authority shall give effect to the provisions of the EEA Agreement concerning State aid,
NADZORNI ORGAN EFTE JE [1] – OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru [2] in zlasti členov 61 do 63 Sporazuma ter Protokola 26 k Sporazumu, OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča [3] ter zlasti člena 24 in člena 5(2)(b) Sporazuma, KER v skladu s členom 24 Sporazuma o nadzornem organu in sodišču Nadzorni organ uveljavlja določbe Sporazuma EGP v zvezi z državno pomočjo,
WHEREAS under Article 5(2)(b) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Authority shall issue notices or guidelines on matters dealt with in the EEA Agreement, if that Agreement or the Surveillance and Court Agreement expressly so provides or if the Authority considers it necessary,
KER Nadzorni organ v skladu s členom 5(2)(b) Sporazuma o nadzornem organu in sodišču izda obvestila ali smernice o zadevah, ki jih obravnava Sporazum EGP, če to izrecno določa navedeni sporazum ali Sporazum o nadzornem organu in sodišču ali če Nadzorni organ meni, da je to potrebno,
RECALLING the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid adopted on 19 January 1994 by the Authority [4], WHEREAS, on 25 February 2009, the Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter EC Commission) adopted a Communication on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector [5],WHEREAS this Communication is also of relevance for the European Economic Area,
OB SKLICEVANJU na procesna in materialna pravila na področju državne pomoči, ki jih je 19. januarja 1994 sprejel Nadzorni organ [4],KER je Komisija Evropskih skupnosti (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Komisija ES) 25. februarja 2009 sprejela Sporočilo o obravnavanju oslabljenih sredstev v bančnem sektorju Skupnosti [5],KER je to sporočilo pomembno tudi za Evropski gospodarski prostor,
RECALLING that the Authority has consulted the EFTA States on the subject by letter dated 9 April 2009,
OB SKLICEVANJU na to, da se je Nadzorni organ o tej temi posvetoval z državami Efte v dopisu z dne 9. aprila 2009 –
The State Aid Guidelines shall be amended by introducing a new Chapter on the treatment of impaired assets in the EEA banking sector.
Smernice o državni pomoči se spremenijo z uvedbo novega poglavja o obravnavanju oslabljenih sredstev v bančnem sektorju EGP.
The new chapter is annexed to this Decision.
Novo poglavje je priloženo tej odločbi.
Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, adopted and issued by the Authority on 19 January 1994, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘OJ’) L 231, 3.9.1994, p. 1 and the EEA Supplement No 32 of 3.9.1994, p. 1.
Smernice o uporabi in razlagi členov 61 in 62 Sporazuma EGP in člena 1 Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču, ki jih je sprejel in izdal Nadzorni organ 19. januarja 1994, objavljene v Uradnem listu Evropske Unije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: UL) L 231, 3.9.1994, str. 1, in Dopolnilu EGP št. 32, 3.9.1994, str. 1.
The updated version of the State Aid Guidelines is published on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/
Posodobljena različica Smernic o državni pomoči je objavljena na spletni strani Nadzornega organa: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/
Published in OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1.
Objavljeno v UL C 72, 26.3.2009, str. 1.
THE TREATMENT OF IMPAIRED ASSETS IN THE EEA BANKING SECTOR [1]1.
OBRAVNAVANJE OSLABLJENIH SREDSTEV V BANČNEM SEKTORJU EGP [1]1.
Since mid-2007, the functioning of wholesale credit markets has been severely disrupted.
Od sredine leta 2007 delovanje grosističnih posojilnih trgov doživlja velike pretrese.
The result has been a drying up of liquidity in the banking sector and a reluctance of banks to lend to each other and to the broader economy.
Ti so povzročili pomanjkanje likvidnosti v bančnem sektorju in nepripravljenost bank za dajanje posojil drugim bankam ter širšemu gospodarstvu.
As the disruption of credit markets has intensified over the past 18 months, the financial crisis has intensified and the global economy has entered a severe recession.
V zadnjih osemnajstih mesecih se je položaj na kreditnih trgih še poslabšal, zato se je finančna kriza poglobila, svetovno gospodarstvo pa je zajela huda recesija.
It is difficult to envisage a resolution of the financial crisis and a recovery in the global economy without assured stability in the banking sector and the broader financial system.
Težko je pričakovati rešitev finančne krize in okrevanje svetovnega gospodarstva, če ne bo zagotovljena stabilnost bančnega sektorja in širšega finančnega sistema.
Only then will investor confidence return and banks resume their normal lending behaviour.
Šele to bo omogočilo povrnitev zaupanja vlagateljev in ponovno normalno kreditno aktivnost bank.
Accordingly, EEA States have put measures in place to support the stability of their banking sectors and underpin lending, such as the injection of new capital using public funds and the provision of government guarantees for bank borrowing.
Države EGP so zato sprejele ukrepe za podporo stabilnosti svojih bančnih sektorjev in spodbujanje kreditne aktivnosti, zlasti z injekcijami svežega kapitala iz javnih sredstev in dajanjem državnih jamstev za bančna posojila.
Several EEA States have announced their intention to complement their existing support measures by providing some form of relief for impaired bank assets.
Več držav EGP je napovedalo, da nameravajo dopolniti svoje obstoječe podporne ukrepe z zagotavljanjem neke vrste finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva bank.
These announcements, in parallel with a similar initiative in the United States, have triggered a wider debate within the EEA on the merits of asset relief as a government support measure for banks.
Te napovedi so ob podobni pobudi v ZDA sprožile širšo razpravo v EGP o prednostih finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva kot državnega ukrepa za pomoč bankam.
In the context of that debate, the Communication from the European Commission that corresponds to this Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines has been prepared by the European Commission services, in consultation with the European Central Bank (ECB), and builds on the recommendations issued on 5 February 2009 by the Eurosystem (see Annex 1).
V okviru te razprave so službe Evropske komisije v posvetovanju z Evropsko centralno banko (ECB) pripravile Sporočilo Evropske komisije, ki ustreza temu poglavju Smernic o državni pomoči Nadzornega organa Efte in temelji na priporočilih Eurosistema, izdanih 5. februarja 2009 (glej Prilogo 1).
This Chapter focuses on issues to be addressed by EFTA States in considering, designing and implementing asset-relief measures.
To poglavje se osredotoča na vprašanja, ki jih morajo obravnavati države Efte pri razmisleku o ukrepih finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva, njihovem oblikovanju in izvajanju.
At a general level, these issues include the rationale for asset relief as a measure to safeguard financial stability and underpin bank lending; the longer-term considerations of banking-sector viability and budgetary sustainability to be taken into account when considering asset-relief measures; and the need for a common and coordinated approach to asset relief within the EEA, notably to ensure a level playing field.
V splošnem smislu ta vprašanja vključujejo utemeljitev za uporabo finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva, namenjene varovanju finančne stabilnosti in spodbujanju kreditne aktivnosti bank; dolgoročnejše preudarke glede uspešnega poslovanja bančnega sektorja in proračunske vzdržnosti, ki jih je treba upoštevati pri odločanju o ukrepih finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva; ter potrebo po skupnem in usklajenem pristopu k finančni pomoči za oslabljena sredstva znotraj EGP, zlasti zato, da se vsem zagotovijo enaki pogoji.
In the context of such an EEA approach, this Chapter also offers more specific guidance on the application of State aid rules to asset relief, focusing on issues such as (i) transparency and disclosure requirements; (ii) burden sharing between the State, shareholders and creditors; (iii) aligning incentives for beneficiaries with public policy objectives; (iv) principles for designing asset-relief measures in terms of eligibility, valuation and management of impaired assets; and (v) the relationship between asset relief, other government support measures and the restructuring of banks.
V okviru tega pristopa EGP to poglavje daje tudi bolj specifične smernice o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči pri finančni pomoči za oslabljena sredstva, pri čemer se osredotoča na vprašanja, kot so (i) zahteve glede preglednosti in razkritja; (ii) porazdelitev bremena na državo, delničarje in upnike; (iii) uskladitev spodbud za upravičence s cilji javnih politik; (iv) načela za oblikovanje ukrepov finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva glede upravičenosti, vrednotenja in upravljanja oslabljenih sredstev ter (v) razmerje med finančno pomočjo za oslabljena sredstva, drugimi državnimi ukrepi pomoči in prestrukturiranjem bank.
Asset relief as a measure to safeguard financial stability and underpin bank lending
Finančna pomoč za oslabljena sredstva kot ukrep za varovanje finančne stabilnosti in spodbujanje kreditne aktivnosti bank
The immediate objectives of the EEA State rescue packages announced in 2008 are to safeguard financial stability and underpin the supply of credit to the real economy.
Kratkoročna cilja ukrepov držav EGP za reševanje krize, napovedanih v letu 2008, sta varovanje finančne stabilnosti in spodbujanje zagotavljanja posojil realnemu gospodarstvu.
It is too early to draw definitive conclusions on the effectiveness of the packages, but it is clear that they have averted the risk of financial meltdown and have supported the functioning of important inter-bank markets.
Za dokončno oceno učinkovitosti teh ukrepov je še prezgodaj, vendar je že jasno, da so odvrnili tveganje finančnega zloma in da podpirajo delovanje pomembnih medbančnih trgov.
On the other hand, the evolution in lending to the real economy since the announcement of the packages has been unfavourable, with recent statistics suggesting a sharp deceleration in credit growth [2].
Po drugi strani so gibanja posojil realnemu gospodarstvu, odkar so bili ukrepi napovedani, neugodna, zadnji statistični podatki pa kažejo na močno upočasnitev rasti posojil [2].
In many EEA States, reports of businesses being denied access to bank credit are now widespread and it would seem that the squeeze on credit goes beyond that justified by cyclical considerations.
V številnih državah EGP so pogosta poročila o pomanjkanju bančnih posojil za podjetja, ki, kot kaže, presega okvire, ki bi jih bilo mogoče pojasniti s cikličnimi dejavniki.
A key reason identified for the insufficient flow of credit is uncertainty about the valuation and location of impaired assets, a source of problems in the banking sector since the beginning of the crisis.
Eden od ključnih razlogov za nezadosten tok posojil je negotovost glede vrednotenja oslabljenih posojil in ugotavljanja, katere banke taka sredstva imajo, kar je vir težav v bančnem sektorju že od začetka krize.
Uncertainty regarding asset valuations has not only continued to undermine confidence in the banking sector, but has weakened the effect of the government support measures taken so far.
Negotovost glede vrednotenja sredstev ne le še naprej načenja zaupanje v bančnem sektorju, temveč zmanjšuje tudi učinek do zdaj sprejetih državnih ukrepov pomoči.
For example, bank recapitalisation has provided a cushion against asset impairment but much of the capital buffer provided has been absorbed by banks in provisioning against future asset impairments.
Tako je na primer dokapitalizacija bank ublažila slabitev sredstev, vendar so banke večino zagotovljenega kapitala uporabile za preprečevanje slabitve sredstev v prihodnosti.
Banks have already taken steps to address the problem of impaired assets.
Banke so že sprejele ukrepe za rešitev problema oslabljenih sredstev.
They have recorded substantial write-downs in asset values [3], taken steps to limit remaining losses by reclassification of assets within their balance sheets and gradually put additional capital aside to strengthen their solvency positions.
Opravile so obsežne delne odpise vrednosti sredstev [3], sprejele ukrepe za omejitev preostalih izgub s prerazvrstitvami sredstev v svojih bilancah stanja in postopoma rezervirale dodatni kapital za okrepitev solventnosti.
However, the problem has not been resolved to a sufficient degree and the unexpected depth of the economic slowdown now suggests a further and more extensive deterioration in credit quality of bank assets.
Vendar problem ni bil rešen v zadostnem obsegu, nepričakovano huda gospodarska upočasnitev pa kaže na nadaljnje in obsežnejše poslabšanje kreditne kvalitete bančnih sredstev.
Asset relief would directly address the issue of uncertainty regarding the quality of bank balance sheets and therefore help to revive confidence in the sector.
Finančna pomoč za oslabljena sredstva bi bila neposredno namenjena reševanju problema v zvezi z negotovostjo glede kakovosti bilanc stanja bank in bi tako prispevala k ponovni okrepitvi zaupanja v sektor.
It could also help to avoid the risk of repeated rounds of recapitalisation of banks as the extent of asset impairment increases amid a deteriorating situation in the real economy.
Lahko bi pripomogla tudi k izogibanju nevarnosti večkratne dokapitalizacije bank, saj se obseg slabitve sredstev ob vse slabšem položaju v realnem gospodarstvu povečuje.
On this basis, several EEA States are actively considering relief for impaired bank assets as a complement to other measures.
Na podlagi povedanega več držav EGP aktivno razmišlja, da bi zagotovile finančno pomoč za oslabljena sredstva bank kot dopolnilo drugim ukrepom.
Longer-term considerations: A return to viability in the banking sector and sustainability of public finances
Dolgoročnejši dejavniki: ponovna vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja bančnega sektorja in vzdržnosti javnih financ
Asset-relief measures must be designed and implemented in the manner that most effectively achieves the immediate objectives of safeguarding financial stability and underpinning bank lending.
Ukrepi finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva morajo biti oblikovani in izvedeni tako, da se z njimi kar najučinkoviteje dosežeta kratkoročna cilja, tj. varovanje finančne stabilnosti in spodbujanje kreditne aktivnosti bank.
An important issue to be addressed in this context is ensuring an adequate participation in the asset-relief measures by setting appropriate pricing and conditions and through mandatory participation if deemed necessary.
Pri tem je pomembno, da se zagotovi primerna vključenost v ukrepe finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva, in sicer z določitvijo ustreznega določanja cen in pogojev ter z obveznim sodelovanjem, če se oceni, da je to potrebno.
However, the focus in designing and implementing asset-relief measures should not be limited to these immediate objectives.
Vendar oblikovanje in izvajanje ukrepov finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva ne sme biti osredotočeno le na ta dva kratkoročna cilja.
It is essential that longer-term considerations are also taken into account.
Bistveno je, da se upoštevajo tudi dolgoročnejši dejavniki.
If asset-relief measures are not carried out in such a way as to ring-fence the danger of serious distortions of competition among banks (both within EFTA States and on a cross-border basis) in compliance with the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines, including where necessary the restructuring of beneficiaries, the outcome will be a structurally weaker EEA banking sector with negative implications for productive potential in the broader economy.
Če ukrepi finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva ne bodo izvedeni na tak način, da bodo preprečili nevarnost resnega izkrivljanja konkurence med bankami (tako v državah Efte kot med njimi) v skladu s Smernicami o državni pomoči Nadzornega organa Efte, kar pomeni, da bo treba upravičence po potrebi tudi prestrukturirati, bo bančni sektor EGP na koncu strukturno šibkejši, to pa bo negativno vplivalo na proizvodni potencial širšega gospodarstva.
Furthermore, it could lead to a recurrent need for government intervention in the sector, implying a progressively heavier burden on public finances.
Poleg tega bi to lahko povzročilo, da bi morale države vedno znova ukrepati, kar bi pomenilo vse večjo obremenitev za javne finance.
Such risks are serious given the likely scale of state exposure.
Glede na pričakovano raven odgovornosti države pri ukrepih finančne pomoči so ta tveganja resna.
In order to limit the risk of such longer-term damage, government intervention in the banking sector should be appropriately targeted and accompanied by behavioural safeguards that align the incentives of banks with those of public policy.
Da bi omejili tveganje take dolgoročnejše škode, morajo biti posegi države v bančni sektor primerno ciljno usmerjeni, spremljati pa jih morajo ustrezni zaščiti ukrepi v zvezi z ravnanjem bank, ki bodo uskladili spodbude za banke s spodbudami javnih politik.
These measures should form part of an overall effort to restore the viability of the banking sector, based on necessary restructuring.
Ti ukrepi morajo biti del skupnih prizadevanj za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja bančnega sektorja in morajo temeljiti na potrebnem prestrukturiranju.
The need for restructuring in the banking sector as a counterpart of government support is discussed in more detail in the context of State aid rules later in Sections 5 and 6.
Potreba po prestrukturiranju v bančnem sektorju, ki mora spremljati državne ukrepe pomoči, je podrobneje prikazana v okviru pravil o državni pomoči v oddelkih 5 in 6.
In considering the design and implementation of asset-relief measures, it is also essential that EFTA States take account of the budgetary context.
Pri razmisleku o oblikovanju in izvajanju ukrepov finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva je ključno tudi, da države Efte upoštevajo proračunski okvir.
Estimates of total expected asset write-downs suggest that the budgetary costs — actual, contingent or both — of asset relief could be substantial — both in absolute terms and relative to GDP in EFTA States.
Ocene skupnega pričakovanega delnega odpisa vrednosti sredstev kažejo, da bi bili proračunski stroški – dejanski, pogojni ali oboji – lahko precej visoki, tako nominalno kot v deležu BDP držav Efte.
Government support through asset relief (and other measures) should not be on such a scale that it raises concern about the sustainability of public finances such as over-indebtedness or financing problems.
Pomoč države v obliki finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva (in drugih ukrepov) naj ne bi bila tako visoka, da bi ogrožala vzdržnost javnih financ, npr. zaradi prezadolženosti ali težav s financiranjem.
Such considerations are particularly important in the current context of widening budget deficits, rising public debt levels and challenges facing sovereign bond issuance.
Ti preudarki so še zlasti pomembni z vidika sedanjih naraščajočih proračunskih primanjkljajev, povečevanja javnega dolga in izzivov glede izdajanja državnih obveznic.
More specifically, the budgetary situation of EFTA States will be an important consideration in the choice of management arrangement for assets subject to relief, namely asset purchases, asset insurance, asset swap or a hybrid of such arrangements [4].
Konkretno to pomeni, da bo proračunski položaj držav Efte pomemben dejavnik pri izbiri načina upravljanja sredstev, za katera bodo države namenile finančno pomoč. Ti načini bodo lahko odkup sredstev, zavarovanje sredstev, zamenjava sredstev ali kombinacija teh načinov [4].
The implications for budgetary credibility may not differ significantly between the various approaches to asset relief, as financial markets are likely to discount potential losses on a similar basis [5].
Posledice različnih pristopov k finančni pomoči za oslabljena sredstva za verodostojnost proračunskih razmerij morda ne bodo zelo različne, saj bodo finančni trgi verjetno upoštevali potencialne izgube na podoben način [5].
However, an approach requiring the outright purchase of impaired assets would have a more immediate impact on budgetary ratios and government financing.
Vendar bi pristop, ki bi zahteval takojšen odkup oslabljenih sredstev, hitreje vplival na proračunska razmerja in javno financiranje.
While the choice of management arrangement of impaired assets is the responsibility of each EFTA State, hybrid approaches whereby bad assets are segregated from the balance sheet of banks in a separate entity (either within or outside the banks) which benefits in some way from a government guarantee could be considered.
Izbira načina upravljanja oslabljenih sredstev je sicer odgovornost vsake države Efte, lahko pa bi države razmislile o mešanih pristopih, s katerimi bi slaba sredstva izločile iz bilanc stanja bank in jih prenesle v ločen subjekt (znotraj ali zunaj bank), ki bi mu bilo na tak ali drugačen način dodeljeno državno jamstvo.
Such an approach is attractive as it provides many of the benefits of the asset purchase approach from the perspective of restoring confidence in the banking system, while limiting the immediate budgetary impact.
Ta pristop je zanimiv, saj zagotavlja številne prednosti pristopa z odkupom sredstev z vidika obnovitve zaupanja v bančni sistem, hkrati pa omeji takojšen proračunski učinek.
In a context of scarce budgetary resources, it may be appropriate to focus asset-relief measures on a limited number of banks of systemic importance.
V razmerah skromnih proračunskih virov bi bilo morda primerno osredotočiti ukrepe finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva na omejeno število bank sistemskega pomena.