natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
When a licensee also exploits competing technologies, it normally also makes monitoring of royalty payments more difficult, which may act as a disincentive to licensing.
Osnovni namen takega sporazuma je namreč dejansko rešiti obstoječe spore in/ali preprečiti spore v prihodnosti.
Second, non-compete obligations possibly in combination with an exclusive territory may be necessary to ensure that the licensee has an incentive to invest in and exploit the licensed technology effectively.
Vendar pa so klavzule o neizpodbijanju v sporazumih o poravnavi v posebnih okoliščinah lahko protikonkurenčne in so lahko zajete v členu 53(1).
In cases where the agreement is caught by Article 53(1) because of an appreciable foreclosure effect, it may be necessary in order to benefit from Article 53(3) to choose a less restrictive alternative, for instance to impose minimum output or royalty obligations, which normally have less potential to foreclose competing technologies.
Omejitev svobode do izpodbijanja pravice intelektualne lastnine ni del specifičnega predmeta pravice intelektualne lastnine in lahko omejuje konkurenco.
Third, in cases where the licensor undertakes to make significant client specific investments for instance in training and tailoring of the licensed technology to the licensee's needs, non-compete obligations or alternatively minimum output or minimum royalty obligations may be necessary to induce the licensor to make the investment and to avoid hold-up problems.
Klavzula o neizpodbijanju lahko na primer krši člen 53(1), če je bila pravica intelektualne lastnine podeljena na podlagi predložitve nepravilnih ali zavajajočih informacij [94].
However, normally the licensor will be able to charge directly for such investments by way of a lump sum payment, implying that less restrictive alternatives are available.
Pregled takih klavzul je lahko potreben tudi, če dajalec licence pridobitelju licence ne le podeli tehnoloških pravic, temveč ga finančno ali drugače pripravi do tega, da ne izpodbuja veljavnosti tehnoloških pravic, ali če so tehnološke pravice nujen proizvodni dejavnik za proizvodnjo pridobitelja licence (glej tudi točko 136 zgoraj).
Licensing of technology rights in settlement agreements may serve as a means of settling disputes or avoiding that one party exercises its intellectual property rights to prevent the other party from exploiting its own technology rights [90].
Tehnološka združenja so opredeljena kot dogovori, pri katerih dve ali več pogodbenic oblikuje tehnološki paket, za katerega se licenca ne podeljuje le članom združenja, temveč tudi tretjim osebam.
Settlement agreements in the context of technology disputes are, as in many other areas of commercial disputes, in principle a legitimate way to find a mutually acceptable compromise to a bona fide legal disagreement.
Z vidika strukture lahko tehnološka združenja obstajajo v obliki preprostih dogovorov med omejenim številom pogodbenic ali pa dodelanih organizacijskih dogovorov, pri katerih je organizacija podelitve licence za združene tehnologije zaupana neodvisnemu organu.
The parties may prefer to discontinue the dispute or litigation because it proves to be too costly, time-consuming and/or uncertain as regards its outcome.
V obeh primerih lahko združenje pridobiteljem licenc dovoli, da na trgu delujejo na podlagi ene same licence.
Settlements can also save courts and/or competent administrative bodies effort in deciding on the matter and can therefore give rise to welfare-enhancing benefits.
Tehnološka združenja in standardi niso neločljivo povezani, vendar tehnologije v okviru združenja pogosto v celoti ali deloma podpirajo dejanski ali pravni industrijski standard [95].
On the other hand, it is in the general public interest to remove invalid intellectual property rights as an unmerited barrier to innovation and economic activity [91].
Različna tehnološka združenja lahko podpirajo konkurenčne standarde [96].
Licensing, including cross-licensing, in the context of settlement agreements is generally not as such restrictive of competition since it allows the parties to exploit their technologies after the agreement is concluded.
Tehnološka združenja imajo lahko spodbujevalne učinke na konkurenco, zlasti z zniževanjem transakcijskih stroškov in določanjem pragov za kumulativne licenčnine, da se prepreči dvojna marginalizacija.
In cases where, in the absence of the licence, it is possible that the licensee could be excluded from the market, access to the technology at issue for the licensee by means of a settlement agreement is generally not caught by Article 53(1).
Ustanovitev združenja omogoča, da se licence za tehnologije, ki so vključene v združenje, podeljujejo z enim postopkom.
However, the individual terms and conditions of settlement agreements may be caught by Article 53(1).
To je še zlasti pomembno v sektorjih, v katerih prevladujejo pravice intelektualne lastnine in v katerih je za delovanje na trgu treba pridobiti licence od znatnega števila dajalcev licenc.
Licensing in the context of settlement agreements is treated in the same way as other licence agreements [92].
Če so pridobiteljem licenc zagotovljene stalne storitve v zvezi z uporabo licenčne tehnologije, lahko skupno podeljevanje licenc in skupne storitve nadalje znižajo stroške.
In these cases, it is particularly necessary to assess whether the parties are potential or actual competitors.
Patentna združenja imajo lahko tudi koristno vlogo pri izvajanju standardov, ki spodbujajo konkurenco.
Pay-for-restriction in settlement agreements
Tehnološka združenja lahko tudi omejujejo konkurenco.
‘Pay-for-restriction’ or ‘pay-for-delay’ type settlement agreements often do not involve the transfer of technology rights, but are based on a value transfer from one party in return for a limitation on the entry and/or expansion on the market of the other party and may be caught by Article 53(1) [93].
Ustanovitev tehnološkega združenja nujno pomeni skupno prodajo združenih tehnologij, kar v primeru združenj, ki so nastala izključno ali pretežno z združitvijo nadomestnih tehnologij, ustreza kartelnemu dogovoru o cenah.
If, however, a settlement agreement also includes a licensing of the technology rights concerned by the underlying dispute, and that agreement leads to a delayed or otherwise limited ability for the licensee to launch the product on any of the markets concerned, the agreement may be caught by Article 53(1) and would then need to be assessed in the light of Articles 4(1)(c) and 4(1)(d) of the TTBER (see Section 3.4.2 above).
Poleg zmanjševanja konkurence med pogodbenicami lahko tehnološka združenja povzročijo tudi zmanjšanje inovacij, zlasti če podpirajo industrijski standard ali oblikujejo dejanski industrijski standard, ker alternativnim tehnologijam omejujejo dostop na trg.
If the parties to such a settlement agreement are actual or potential competitors and there was a significant value transfer from the licensor to the licensee, the Authority will be particularly attentive to the risk of market allocation/market sharing.
Obstoj standarda in ustreznega tehnološkega združenja lahko novim in izboljšanim tehnologijam oteži vstop na trg.
Cross-licensing in settlement agreements
Sporazumi o ustanovitvi tehnoloških združenj in določitvi pogojev za njihovo delovanje niso – ne glede na število pogodbenic – zajeti v skupinski izjemi, saj sporazum o ustanovitvi združenja ne dovoljuje proizvodnje pogodbenih izdelkov določenemu pridobitelju licence (glej poglavje 3.2.4 zgoraj).
Settlement agreements whereby the parties cross-license each other and impose restrictions on the use of their technologies, including restrictions on the licensing to third parties, may be caught by Article 53(1).
Take sporazume urejajo izključno te smernice.
Where the parties have a significant degree of market power and the agreement imposes restrictions that clearly go beyond what is required in order to unblock, the agreement is likely to be caught by Article 53(1) even if it is likely that a mutual blocking position exists.
Ob sporazumih o ustanovitvi tehnoloških združenj se zastavljajo številna specifična vprašanja glede izbire tehnologij, ki so sestavni del združenja, in delovanja združenja, ki pa se ne pojavljajo v okviru drugih vrst podeljevanja licenc.
Article 53(1) is particularly likely to apply where the parties share markets or fix reciprocal running royalties that have a significant impact on market prices.
Podeljevanje licenc v okviru združenja na splošno šteje za večstranski sporazum, pri čemer se upošteva, da člani združenja običajno določijo pogoje za tako podeljevanje licenc, in zato ni zajeto s skupinsko izjemo.
Where under the settlement agreement the parties are entitled to use each other's technology and the agreement extends to future developments, it is necessary to assess what is the impact of the agreement on the parties' incentive to innovate.
Podeljevanje licenc v okviru združenja je obravnavano v točki 261 in poglavju 4.4.2 v nadaljevanju.
In cases where the parties have a significant degree of market power the agreement is likely to be caught by Article 53(1) where the agreement prevents the parties from gaining a competitive lead over each other.
Način ustanovitve, organizacije in delovanja tehnološkega združenja lahko zmanjša tveganje, da ima slednje za cilj oziroma posledico omejevanje konkurence, in zagotavlja, da dogovor pozitivno vpliva na konkurenco.
Agreements that eliminate or substantially reduce the possibilities of one party to gain a competitive lead over the other reduce the incentive to innovate and thus adversely affect an essential part of the competitive process.
Odprto sodelovanje
Such agreements are also unlikely to satisfy the conditions of Article 53(3).
Če je sodelovanje pri procesu oblikovanja standarda ali ustanovitve združenja odprto za vse zainteresirane strani, obstaja večja verjetnost, da se bodo tehnologije, ki jih je treba vključiti v združenje, izbrale na podlagi ugotovitev v zvezi s ceno/kakovostjo, kot pa v primeru, da bi združenje sestavljala omejena skupina lastnikov tehnologije.
It is particularly unlikely that the restriction can be considered indispensable within the meaning of the third condition of Article 53(3).
Izbor in narava združenih tehnologij
The achievement of the objective of the agreement, namely to ensure that the parties can continue to exploit their own technology without being blocked by the other party, does not require that the parties agree to share future innovations.
Treba je razlikovati med dvema osnovnima skupinama, in sicer (a) dopolnilnimi tehnologijami in nadomestnimi tehnologijami ter med (b) bistvenimi in nebistvenimi tehnologijami.
However, the parties are unlikely to be prevented from gaining a competitive lead over each other where the purpose of the licence is to allow the parties to develop their respective technologies and where the licence does not lead them to use the same technological solutions.
Tehnologiji nista nadomestni, temveč dopolnilni, če sta obe nujni za proizvodnjo izdelka ali izvedbo procesa, na katerega se navezujeta.
Such agreements merely create design freedom by preventing future infringement claims by the other party.
Nasprotno sta tehnologiji nadomestni, če vsaka posebej omogočata imetniku proizvodnjo izdelka ali izvedbo procesa, na katerega se navezujeta.
Non-challenge clauses in settlement agreements
Tehnologija je lahko bistvena bodisi (a) za proizvodnjo določenega izdelka ali izvedbo določenega procesa, na katerega se združene tehnologije navezujejo, bodisi (b) za proizvodnjo takega izdelka ali izvedbo takega procesa v skladu s standardom, ki vključuje združene tehnologije.
In the context of a settlement agreement, non-challenge clauses are generally considered to fall outside Article 53(1).
V prvem primeru je tehnologija bistvena (v nasprotju z nebistveno), če za navedeno tehnologijo ni gospodarsko ali tehnološko uspešnih nadomestnih tehnologij znotraj ali zunaj združenja in če je zadevna tehnologija nujni del tehnološkega paketa za namene proizvodnje izdelkov ali izvedbe procesov, na katere se združenje navezuje.
It is inherent in such agreements that the parties agree not to challenge ex post the intellectual property rights which were the centre of the dispute.
V drugem primeru je tehnologija bistvena, če predstavlja nujen del (torej ni uspešnih nadomestnih tehnologij) združenih tehnologij, potrebnih za skladnost s standardom, ki ga podpira združenje (standardna tehnologija).
Indeed, the very purpose of the agreement is to settle existing disputes and/or to avoid future disputes.
Bistvene tehnologije so nujno tudi dopolnilne.
However, non-challenge clauses in settlement agreements can under specific circumstances be anti-competitive and may be caught by Article 53(1).
Dejstvo, da imetnik tehnologije zgolj izjavi, da je tehnologija bistvena, še ne pomeni, da je taka tehnologija bistvena glede na merila, opisana v tej točki.
The restriction of the freedom to challenge an intellectual property right is not part of the specific subject-matter of an intellectual property right and may restrict competition.
Če so tehnologije v okviru združenja nadomestne, je več verjetnosti, da bodo licenčnine višje, kot bi bile sicer, ker pridobitelji licenc nimajo koristi od konkurenčnosti med zadevnimi tehnologijami.
For instance, a non-challenge clause may infringe Article 53(1) where an intellectual property right was granted following the provision of incorrect or misleading information [94].
Če so tehnologije v okviru združenja dopolnilne, patentno združenje znižuje transakcijske stroške in lahko privede do skupno nižjih licenčnin, ker lahko pogodbenice določijo skupno licenčnino za paket, namesto da licenčnine določajo vsaka za svojo tehnologijo, ne da bi pri tem upoštevale, da bo višja licenčnina za eno tehnologijo navadno zmanjšala povpraševanje po dopolnilnih tehnologijah.
Scrutiny of such clauses may also be necessary if the licensor, besides licensing the technology rights, induces, financially or otherwise, the licensee to agree not to challenge the validity of the technology rights or if the technology rights are a necessary input for the licensee's production (see also point (136) above).
Če se licenčnine za dopolnilne tehnologije določijo posamično, se lahko pogosto zgodi, da bo skupni seštevek teh licenčnin presegel, kar bi kolektivno določilo združenje za paket istih dopolnilnih tehnologij.
Technology pools are defined as arrangements whereby two or more parties assemble a package of technology which is licensed not only to contributors to the pool but also to third parties.
Presoja vloge nadomestnih tehnologij zunaj združenja je opisana v točki 262 v nadaljevanju.
In terms of their structure technology pools can take the form of simple arrangements between a limited number of parties or of elaborate organisational arrangements whereby the organisation of the licensing of the pooled technologies is entrusted to a separate entity.
Razlikovanje med dopolnilnimi in nadomestnimi tehnologijami ni povsem jasno v vseh primerih, ker so lahko tehnologije le delno nadomestne in le delno dopolnilne.
In both cases the pool may allow licensees to operate on the market on the basis of a single licence.
Če je verjetno, da bodo pridobitelji licenc zaradi učinkovitosti, ki izhajajo iz združitve dveh tehnologij, povpraševali po licenci za obe tehnologiji, se ti tehnologiji obravnavata kot dopolnilni, tudi če sta delno nadomestni.
There is no inherent link between technology pools and standards, but the technologies in the pool often support, in whole or in part, a de facto or de jure industry standard [95].
V takih primerih je verjetno, da bi v primeru neobstoja združenja pridobitelji licenc želeli pridobiti licenco za obe tehnologiji, ker lahko uporaba obeh tehnologij v primerjavi z uporabo le ene od njiju ustvari dodatne gospodarske koristi.
Different technology pools may support competing standards [96].
Če takih dokazov dopolnilnosti združenih tehnologij na podlagi povpraševanja ni, je to znak, da so te tehnologije dopolnilne, če lahko pogodbenice, ki prispevajo tehnologije v združenje, še naprej prosto in posamično podeljujejo licence za lastno tehnologijo, združenje pa je pripravljeno poleg podeljevanja licence za paket tehnologij vseh pogodbenic, podeljevati tudi licenc za tehnologijo vsake posamezne pogodbenice posebej, pri čemer skupne licenčnine, ki se zaračunajo ob pridobitvi ločenih licenc za vse združene tehnologije, ne presegajo licenčnin, ki jih združenje zaračuna za celoten paket tehnologij.
Technology pools can produce pro-competitive effects, in particular by reducing transaction costs and by setting a limit on cumulative royalties to avoid double marginalisation.
Vključitev nadomestnih tehnologij v združenje na splošno omejuje konkurenco med tehnologijami, saj je lahko enakovredna skupnemu podeljevanju licenčnih paketov in vodi k določanju cen med konkurenti.
The creation of a pool allows for one-stop licensing of the technologies covered by the pool.
Praviloma Nadzorni organ meni, da vključitev znatnih nadomestnih tehnologij v združenje pomeni kršitev člena 53(1).
This is particularly important in sectors where intellectual property rights are prevalent and licences need to be obtained from a significant number of licensors in order to operate on the market.
Nadzorni organ prav tako meni, da ni verjetno, da bi bili pogoji iz člena 53(3) izpolnjeni v primeru združenj, ki v pomembnem obsegu vključujejo nadomestne tehnologije.
In cases where licensees receive on-going services concerning the application of the licensed technology, joint licensing and servicing can lead to further cost reductions.
Ker sta zadevni tehnologiji nadomestni, vključitev obeh tehnologij v združenje ne privede do nobenih prihrankov transakcijskih stroškov.
Patent pools can also play a beneficial role in the implementation of pro-competitive standards.
Če združenja ne bi bilo, pridobitelji licenc ne bi povpraševali po obeh tehnologijah.
Technology pools may also be restrictive of competition.
Za odpravo pomislekov glede konkurence ne zadostuje, da lahko pogodbenice še naprej neodvisno podeljujejo licence.
The creation of a technology pool necessarily implies joint selling of the pooled technologies, which in the case of pools composed solely or predominantly of substitute technologies amounts to a price fixing cartel.
Pogodbenice bodo imele namreč verjetno le malo spodbude za neodvisno podeljevanje licenc, da ne bi ogrozile dejavnosti podeljevanja licenc v združenju, kar jim omogoča, da skupaj uveljavljajo tržno moč.
Moreover, in addition to reducing competition between the parties, technology pools may also, in particular when they support an industry standard or establish a de facto industry standard, result in a reduction of innovation by foreclosing alternative technologies.
Izbor in delovanje neodvisnih strokovnjakov
The existence of the standard and a related technology pool may make it more difficult for new and improved technologies to enter the market.
Pomemben dejavnik pri presoji tveganja za konkurenco in učinkovitosti tehnoloških združenj je tudi, v kolikšni meri so neodvisni strokovnjaki udeleženi pri ustanovitvi in delovanju združenja.
Pooling arrangements give rise to a number of particular issues regarding the selection of the included technologies and the operation of the pool, which do not arise in the context of other types of licensing.
Dejstvo, da izbiro tehnologij, ki jih je treba vključiti v združenje, opravi samostojni strokovnjak, lahko tudi spodbudi nadaljnjo konkurenco med razpoložljivimi tehnološkimi rešitvami.
Licensing out from the pool is generally a multiparty agreement, taking into account that the contributors commonly determine the conditions for such licensing out, and is therefore also not covered by the block exemption.
Nadzorni organ bo upošteval način izbora strokovnjakov in natančno naravo njihovih funkcij.
Licensing out from the pool is dealt with in point (261) and in Section 4.4.2 below.
Strokovnjaki bi morali biti neodvisni od podjetij, ki so ustanovila združenje.
the selection and nature of the pooled technologies, including the extent to which independent experts are involved in the creation and operation of the pool and whether safeguards against exchange of sensitive information and independent dispute resolution mechanisms have been put in place.
Med funkcije neodvisnih strokovnjakov lahko spada zlasti presoja veljavnosti in bistvenosti tehnologij, ki naj bi se vključile v združenje.
Open participation
Pomembno je tudi upoštevati morebitne mehanizme za reševanje sporov, določene v ustanovnih aktih združenja.
When participation in a standard and pool creation process is open to all interested parties it is more likely that technologies for inclusion into the pool are selected on the basis of price/quality considerations than when the pool is set up by a limited group of technology owners.
Bolj kot so za reševanje sporov pooblaščeni organi ali osebe, ki so neodvisni od združenja in njegovih članov, bolj verjetno je, da bo reševanje sporov potekalo na nevtralen način.
Selection and nature of the pooled technologies
Zaščitni ukrepi proti izmenjavi občutljivih informacij
The competitive risks and the efficiency enhancing potential of technology pools depend to a large extent on the relationship between the pooled technologies and their relationship with technologies outside the pool.
Prav tako je pomembno proučiti dogovore glede izmenjave občutljivih informacij med pogodbenicami [97].
Two basic distinctions must be made, namely:
Na oligopolnih trgih lahko izmenjave občutljivih informacij, kot so podatki o cenah in obsegu proizvodnje, spodbudijo nedovoljeno dogovarjanje [98].
between technological complements and technological substitutes; and (b) between essential and non-essential technologies.
V takih primerih bo Nadzorni organ proučil, v kolikšnem obsegu so bili vzpostavljeni zaščitni ukrepi, ki zagotavljajo, da se občutljive informacije ne izmenjujejo.
Two technologies are complements as opposed to substitutes when they are both required to produce the product or carry out the process to which the technologies relate.
Neodvisni strokovnjak ali organ, ki podeljuje licenco, imata lahko pomembno vlogo, tako da zagotavljata, da se podatki o obsegu proizvodnje in prodaji, ki bi bili lahko potrebni za namene izračuna in preverjanja licenčnin, ne razkrijejo podjetjem, ki konkurirajo na zadevnih trgih.
Conversely, two technologies are substitutes when either technology allows the holder to produce the product or carry out the process to which the technologies relate.
Posebno skrbno bi bilo treba sprejeti take zaščitne ukrepe, kadar zainteresirane strani hkrati sodelujejo pri prizadevanjih za ustanovitev združenj konkurenčnih standardov, če to lahko zahteva izmenjavo občutljivih informacij med konkurenčnimi združenji.
A technology can be essential either: (a) to produce a particular product or carry out a particular process to which the pooled technologies relate;
Varni pristan
or (b) to produce such a product or carry out such a process in accordance with a standard which includes the pooled technologies.
Ustanovitev in delovanje združenja, vključno s podeljevanjem licenc, na splošno ne spada na področje uporabe člena 53(1), ne glede na tržni položaj pogodbenic, če so izpolnjeni vsi naslednji pogoji:
In the first case, a technology is essential (as opposed to non-essential) if there are no viable substitutes (both from a commercial and technical point of view) for that technology inside or outside the pool and the technology in question constitutes a necessary part of the package of technologies for the purposes of producing the product(s) or carrying out the process(es) to which the pool relates.
sodelovanje v procesu ustanavljanja standarda in združenja je odprto za vse zainteresirane lastnike tehnoloških pravic;
In the second case, a technology is essential if it constitutes a necessary part (that is to say, there are no viable substitutes) of the pooled technologies needed to comply with the standard supported by the pool (standard essential technologies).
sprejeti so ustrezni zaščitni ukrepi, ki zagotavljajo, da se združujejo le bistvene tehnologije (ki so torej nujno tudi dopolnilne);