natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
If such institutions are to be returned to long-term viability rather than liquidated, a far reaching restructuring of their operations will be required.
Da bi zagotovili dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja tovrstnih institucij in se izognili njihovi likvidaciji, bo potrebno obsežno prestrukturiranje njihovega poslovanja.
Under the prevailing circumstances, the crisis equally affects financial institutions that are fundamentally sound and whose difficulties stem exclusively from the general market conditions which have severely restricted access to liquidity.
V trenutnih okoliščinah kriza prav tako vpliva tudi na finančne institucije, ki so načeloma trdne in ki se srečujejo zlasti s težavami zaradi splošnih razmer na trgu, ki so znatno omejile dostop do likvidnosti.
Long-term viability of these institutions may require less substantial restructuring.
Dolgoročna sposobnost preživetja teh institucij lahko zahteva manj obsežno prestrukturiranje.
In any case however, measures taken by an EFTA State to support (certain) institutions operating within its national financial market may favour these institutions to the detriment of others operating within that EFTA State or in other EEA States.
V vsakem primeru pa bodo lahko ukrepi, ki jih bo država Efte sprejela za pomoč (nekaterim) institucijam, ki poslujejo na svojem nacionalnem finančnem trgu, koristili tem institucijam v škodo drugih, ki poslujejo v tej državi Efte ali v drugih državah EGP.
The ECOFIN Council on 7 October 2008 adopted Conclusions committing to take all necessary measures to enhance the soundness and stability of the banking system in order to restore confidence and the proper functioning of the financial sector.
Ekonomsko-finančni svet je 7. oktobra 2008 sprejel sklepe, v katerih se je zavezal, da bo sprejel vse potrebne ukrepe za okrepitev trdnosti in stabilnosti bančnega sistema, tako da se bo obnovilo zaupanje vanj in v dobro delovanje finančnega sektorja.
The recapitalisation of vulnerable systemically relevant financial institutions was recognized as one means, among others, of appropriately protecting the depositors’ interests and the stability of the system.
Dokapitalizacija ranljivih finančnih institucij sistemskega pomena je bila priznana kot eno od sredstev za ustrezno zaščito interesov vlagateljev in stabilnosti sistema.
It was further agreed that public intervention has to be decided on at national level but within a coordinated framework and on the basis of a number of EU common principles [2].
Poleg tega je bilo dogovorjeno, da je treba o javnem posredovanju odločati na nacionalni ravni, vendar znotraj usklajenega okvira, in na podlagi več skupnih načel EU [2].
On the same occasion the Commission offered to shortly issue guidance as to the broad framework within which the State aid compatibility of recapitalisation and guarantee schemes, and cases of application of such schemes, could be rapidly assessed.
Ob isti priložnosti je Komisija ponudila, da bi v kratkem izdala navodila v zvezi s splošnim okvirom, v katerem bi bilo mogoče hitro oceniti skladnost državne pomoči v obliki dokapitalizacije in jamstvenih shem ter primere uporabe tovrstnih shem.
Given the scale of the crisis, now also endangering fundamentally sound banks, the high degree of integration and interdependence of European financial markets, and the drastic repercussions of the potential failure of a systemically relevant financial institution further exacerbating the crisis, the Authority recognises that EFTA States may consider it necessary to adopt appropriate measures to safeguard the stability of the financial system.
Glede na obseg krize, ki zdaj ogroža tudi načeloma trdne banke, visoko stopnjo povezanosti in soodvisnosti evropskih finančnih trgov ter glede na hude posledice morebitnega bankrota finančne institucije sistemskega pomena, ki bi še poglobile krizo, Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da lahko države Efte ocenijo, da je za zaščito stabilnosti finančnega sistema nujno sprejeti ustrezne ukrepe.
Due to the particular nature of the current problems in the financial sector such measures may have to extend beyond the stabilisation of individual financial institutions and include general schemes.
Zaradi posebnega značaja sedanjih težav v finančnem sektorju je mogoče, da bodo morali tovrstni ukrepi presegati zgolj stabilizacijo posameznih finančnih institucij in bo treba uvesti splošne sheme.
While the exceptional circumstances prevailing at the moment have to be duly taken into account when applying the State aid rules to measures addressing the crisis in the financial markets the Authority has to ensure that such measures do not generate unnecessary distortions of competitions between financial institutions operating in the market or negative spill over effects on other EEA States.
Medtem ko je treba pri uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za ukrepe reševanja krize na finančnih trgih ustrezno upoštevati trenutne razmere, mora Nadzorni organ zagotoviti, da tovrstni ukrepi ne povzročajo nepotrebnega izkrivljanja konkurence med finančnimi institucijami, ki poslujejo na trgu, ali negativnih učinkov na druge države članice EGP.
It is the purpose of this Chapter to provide guidance on the criteria relevant for the compatibility with the EEA Agreement of general schemes as well as individual cases of application of such schemes and ad hoc cases of systemic relevance.
Namen tega poglavja je zagotoviti navodila glede meril skladnosti splošnih shem, pa tudi posameznih primerov uporabe tovrstnih shem in ad hoc primerov sistemske pomembnosti, s Pogodbo EGP.
In applying these criteria to measures taken by EFTA States, the Authority will proceed with the swiftness that is necessary to ensure legal certainty and to restore confidence in financial markets.
Pri uporabi navedenih meril za ukrepanje držav Efte bo Nadzorni organ deloval tako hitro, kot je potrebno za zagotovitev pravne varnosti in za obnovo zaupanja v finančne trge.
State aid to individual undertakings in difficulties is normally assessed under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Chapter on aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty of the State aid Guidelines [3] (hereinafter ‘R&R guidelines’) which articulates the Authority’s understanding of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement for this type of aid.
Državna pomoč posameznim podjetjem v težavah se navadno ocenjuje na podlagi člena 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP in Poglavja o pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah Smernic o državni pomoči [3] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice za reševanje in prestrukturiranje), ki pojasnjujeta, kako Nadzorni organ razume člen 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP v zvezi s tovrstno pomočjo.
The R&R guidelines are of general application, while foreseeing certain specific criteria for the financial sector.
Smernice za reševanje in prestrukturiranje so uporabne na splošno, vendar določajo tudi nekatera posebna merila za finančni sektor.
In addition, under Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement the Authority may allow State aid ‘to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an EC Member State or an EFTA State’.
Poleg tega lahko Nadzorni organ v skladu s členom 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP dovoli dodelitev državne pomoči „za odpravljanje resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice ES ali države Efte“.
The Authority reaffirms that, in line with the case law and the Commission’s decision making practice [4], Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement necessitates a restrictive interpretation of what can be considered a serious disturbance of an EFTA State’s economy.
Nadzorni organ potrjuje, da člen 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP v skladu s sodno prakso in prakso odločanja Komisije [4] zahteva ožjo razlago pojma resna motnja v gospodarstvu države Efte.
In the light of the level of seriousness that the current crisis in the financial markets has reached and of its possible impact on the overall economy of EEA States, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) is, in the present circumstances, available as a legal basis for aid measures undertaken to address this systemic crisis.
Ob upoštevanju ravni resnosti, ki jo je dosegla sedanja kriza na finančnih trgih, in njenih morebitnih posledic za celotno gospodarstvo držav članic EGP Nadzorni organ meni, da je člen 61(3)(b) v trenutnih razmerah na voljo kot pravna podlaga za ukrepe pomoči, namenjene reševanju te sistemske krize.
This applies, in particular, to aid that is granted by way of a general scheme available to several or all financial institutions in an EFTA State.
To velja zlasti za pomoč, ki se dodeli s splošno shemo, ki je na voljo več ali vsem finančnim institucijam v posamezni državi Efte.
Should the EFTA State’s authorities responsible for financial stability declare to the Authority that there is a risk of such a serious disturbance, this shall be of particular relevance for the Authority’s assessment.
Če bi organi države Efte, odgovorni za finančno stabilnost, Nadzornemu organu prijavili obstoj tveganja take resne motnje, bi bilo to še zlasti pomembno za oceno, ki jo bo opravil Nadzorni organ.
Ad hoc interventions by EFTA States are not excluded in circumstances fulfilling the criteria of Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement.
Ad hoc posredovanje držav Efte v razmerah, ki izpolnjujejo merila iz člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP, ni izključeno.
In the case of both schemes and ad hoc interventions, while the assessment of the aid should follow the general principles laid down in the R&R guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, the current circumstances may allow the approval of exceptional measures such as structural emergency interventions, protection of rights of third parties such as creditors, and rescue measures potentially going beyond 6 months.
Čeprav mora ocena pomoči slediti splošnim načelom iz smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, sprejetih na podlagi člena 61(3)(c) Pogodbe EGP, lahko tako v primeru shem in ad hoc posredovanj trenutne razmere omogočajo odobritev izrednih ukrepov, kot so nujno strukturno posredovanje, varstvo pravic tretjih oseb, (npr. upnikov) ter reševalni ukrepi, ki lahko trajajo dlje kot 6 mesecev.
It needs to be emphasised, however, that the above considerations imply that the use of Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement cannot be envisaged as a matter of principle in crisis situations in other individual sectors in the absence of a comparable risk that they have an immediate impact on the economy of an EFTA State as a whole.
Kljub temu pa je treba poudariti, da zgornje navedbe pomenijo, da uporabe člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP načeloma ni mogoče predvideti v kriznih situacijah v drugih posameznih sektorjih ob odsotnosti primerljivega tveganja, da bi lahko imele neposreden učinek na gospodarstvo celotne države Efte.
As regards the financial sector, invoking this provision is possible only in genuinely exceptional circumstances where the entire functioning of financial markets is jeopardised.
V primeru finančnega sektorja se je mogoče na to določbo sklicevati samo v resnično izjemnih okoliščinah, ko je ogroženo celotno delovanje finančnih trgov.
Where there is a serious disturbance of an EFTA State’s economy along the lines set out above, recourse to Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is possible not on an open-ended basis but only as long as the crisis situation justifies its application.
Če je v skladu z zgoraj navedenim gospodarstvo države Efte resno moteno, uporaba člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP ni časovno neomejena, ampak lahko traja samo, dokler jo krizna situacija upravičuje.
This entails the need for all general schemes set up on this basis, e.g. in the form of a guarantee or recapitalization scheme, to be reviewed on a regular basis and terminated as soon as the economic situation of the EFTA State in question so permits.
Torej je treba vse splošne sheme, oblikovane na tej podlagi, na primer v obliki jamstvenih ali dokapitalizacijskih shem, redno pregledovati in zaključiti, takoj ko gospodarski položaj zadevne države Efte to omogoča.
While acknowledging that it is currently impossible to predict the duration of the current extraordinary problems in the financial markets and that it may be indispensable in order to restore confidence to signal that a measure will be extended as long as the crisis continues, the Authority considers it a necessary element for the compatibility of any general scheme that the EFTA State carries out a review at least every six months and reports back to the Authority on the result of such review.
Medtem ko Nadzorni organ priznava, da trenutno ni mogoče predvideti trajanja sedanjih izrednih težav na finančnih trgih in da se lahko zgodi, da bo treba za obnovo zaupanja izdati sporočilo o podaljšanju ukrepa do konca krize, pa hkrati meni, da je nujni del skladnosti katere koli splošne sheme, da država Efte vsaj na šest mesecev izvaja pregled sheme in Nadzornemu organu poroča o rezultatih tovrstnih pregledov.
Furthermore, the Authority considers that the treatment of illiquid but otherwise fundamentally sound financial institutions in the absence of the current exceptional circumstances should be distinguished from the treatment of financial institutions characterized by endogenous problems.
Nadzorni organ poleg tega meni, da je treba ločevati med obravnavanjem nelikvidnih finančnih institucij, ki bi bile v odsotnosti sedanjih izrednih razmer načeloma trdne, in obravnavanjem finančnih institucij, ki se spopadajo z notranjimi težavami.
In the first case, viability problems are inherently exogenous and have to do with the present extreme situation in the financial market rather than with inefficiency or excessive risk-taking.
V prvem primeru so težave s sposobnostjo preživetja po naravi zunanje in so povezane s sedanjim izrednim položajem na finančnem trgu in ne z neučinkovitostjo institucije ali z njenim pretirano tveganim poslovanjem.
As a result, distortions of competition resulting from schemes supporting the viability of such institutions will normally be more limited and require less substantial restructuring.
Zaradi tega bo izkrivljanje konkurence, ki ga bo povzročila shema v podporo sposobnosti preživetja tovrstne institucije, navadno bolj omejena in bo zahtevala manj obsežno prestrukturiranje.
By contrast, other financial institutions, likely to be particularly affected by losses stemming for instance from inefficiencies, poor asset-liability management or risky strategies, would fit with the normal framework of rescue aid, and in particular need a far-reaching restructuring, as well as compensatory measures to limit distortions of competition [5].
Nasprotno pa bodo druge finančne institucije, za katere je verjetno, da jih bodo še posebej prizadele izgube med drugim zaradi neučinkovitosti, slabega upravljanja sredstev in obveznosti ali tveganih strategij, izpolnjevale običajne pogoje pomoči za reševanje in bodo zlasti potrebovale obsežno prestrukturiranje ter izravnalne ukrepe, da bo izkrivljanje konkurence čim bolj omejeno [5].
In all cases, however, in the absence of appropriate safeguards, distortions of competition may be substantial from the implementation of guarantee and recapitalization schemes, as they could unduly favour the beneficiaries to the detriment of their competitors or may aggravate the liquidity problems for financial institutions located in other EEA States.
V vseh primerih pa lahko odsotnost ustreznih varoval povzroči občutno izkrivljanje konkurence zaradi izvajanja jamstvenih in dokapitalizacijskih shem, saj lahko te dajo neupravičeno prednost prejemnikom v škodo njihovih konkurentov ali pa poslabšajo likvidnostne težave finančnih institucij v drugih državah EGP.
Moreover, in line with the general principles underlying the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement, which require that the aid granted does not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve its legitimate purpose and that distortions of competition are avoided or minimized as far as possible, and taking due account of the current circumstances, all general support measures have to be:
V skladu s splošnimi načeli, na katerih temeljijo pravila o državni pomoči v Sporazumu EGP, ki zahtevajo, da dodeljena pomoč ne sme presegati tega, kar je nujno potrebno za dosego njenega upravičenega namena, in da ne privede do izkrivljanja konkurence ali da se izkrivljanje čim bolj omeji, ter ob upoštevanju sedanjih razmer morajo biti vsi ukrepi splošne pomoči tudi:
well-targeted in order to be able to achieve effectively the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy,
dobro usmerjeni, da se lahko učinkovito doseže cilj reševanja resne motnje gospodarstva,
proportionate to the challenge faced, not going beyond what is required to attain this effect, and
sorazmerni z zadevnim izzivom in ne smejo presegati tega, kar je potrebno za to, da se doseže navedeni učinek, ter
designed in such a way as to minimize negative spill over effects on competitors, other sectors and other EEA States.
oblikovani na način, ki omogoča čim boljšo omejitev negativnih učinkov na konkurente, druge sektorje in druge države EGP.
The observance of these criteria in compliance with the State aid rules and the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EEA Agreement, including the principle of non-discrimination, is necessary for the preservation of the proper functioning of the internal market.
Upoštevanje teh meril v skladu s pravili o državni pomoči in temeljnimi svoboščinami, zagotovljenimi v Sporazumu EGP, vključno z načelom nediskriminacije, je nujno potrebno za ohranitev primernega delovanja notranjega trga.
In its assessment, the Authority will take into account the following criteria to decide upon the compatibility of the State aid measures enumerated below.
Nadzorni organ bo pri odločanju o skladnosti spodaj naštetih ukrepov državne pomoči v svoji oceni upošteval merila, opisana v nadaljevanju.
GUARANTEES COVERING THE LIABILITIES OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
JAMSTVA ZA OBVEZNOSTI FINANČNIH INSTITUCIJ
The principles set out above translate into the following considerations as regards guarantee schemes protecting liabilities established by way of a declaration, legislation or contractual regime, it being understood that these considerations are of a general nature and need to be adapted to the particular circumstances of every individual case.
Zgoraj navedena načela narekujejo naslednje glede jamstvenih shem za zaščito obveznosti, vzpostavljenih z izjavo, zakonodajo ali pogodbenim razmerjem, pri čemer se razume, da so te zahteve splošne narave in jih je treba prilagoditi posebnim okoliščinam vsakega posameznega primera.
Eligibility for a guarantee scheme
Upravičenost do jamstvene sheme
A significant distortion of competition may arise if some market players are excluded from the benefit of the guarantee.
Izvzem nekaterih tržnih akterjev iz ugodnosti jamstva lahko povzroči znatno izkrivljanje konkurence.
The eligibility criteria of financial institutions for coverage by such a guarantee must be objective, taking due account of their role in the relevant banking system and the overall economy, and non-discriminatory so as to avoid undue distortive effects on neighbouring markets and the internal market as a whole.
Merila upravičenosti finančnih institucij do kritja po takem jamstvu morajo biti nepristranska, ustrezno morajo upoštevati vlogo institucij v zadevnih bančnih sistemih ter celotnem gospodarstvu ter biti nediskriminatorna, da ne povzročijo pretirano izkrivljajočih učinkov na sosednje trge ter na notranji trg kot celoto.
In application of the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality, all institutions incorporated in the EFTA State concerned, including subsidiaries, and with significant activities in that EFTA State should be covered by the scheme.
Zaradi uporabe načela nediskriminacije na podlagi državljanstva morajo biti v shemo vključene vse institucije s sedežem v zadevni državi Efte, vključno s podružnicami, pa tudi vse, ki v zadevni državi Efte opravljajo velik delež svoje dejavnosti.
Material scope of a guarantee—types of liabilities covered
Materialno področje uporabe jamstva – vrste zajetih obveznosti
In the present exceptional circumstances, it may be necessary to reassure depositors with financial institutions that they will not suffer losses, so as to limit the possibility of bank runs and undue negative spill over effects on healthy banks.
V sedanjih izrednih okoliščinah se lahko zgodi, da je treba vlagatelje v finančne institucije pomiriti, da ne bodo utrpeli izgub, tako da se omeji tveganje izstopov iz banke in pretiranih negativnih učinkov na trdne banke.
In principle, therefore, in the context of a systemic crisis, general guarantees protecting retail deposits (and debt held by retail clients) can be a legitimate component of the public policy response.
Tako so lahko načeloma v okviru sistemske krize splošna jamstva, ki ščitijo bančne vloge fizičnih oseb (in dolgove majhnih vlagateljev), upravičen element odziva javne politike.
As regards guarantees going beyond retail deposits, the selection of the types of debt and liabilities covered must be targeted, to the extent practicable, to the specific source of difficulties and restricted to what can be considered necessary to confront the relevant aspects of the current financial crisis, as they could otherwise delay the necessary adjustment process and generate harmful moral hazard [6].
Kar zadeva jamstva, ki presegajo bančne vloge fizičnih oseb, mora biti izbira vrst zajetih dolgov in obveznosti usmerjena, kolikor je to izvedljivo, na posebne vire težav in omejena na to, kar lahko šteje za nujno pri spopadanju z ustreznimi vidiki trenutne finančne krize, saj bi sicer zadrževala potrebni postopek prilagajanja in ustvarila škodljivo moralno tveganje [6].
In the application of this principle, the drying-up of interbank lending due to an erosion of confidence between financial institutions may also justify guaranteeing certain types of wholesale deposits and even short and medium-term debt instruments, to the extent such liabilities are not already adequately protected by existing investor arrangements or other means [7].
Zaradi uporabe tega načela lahko upad medbančnega posojanja zaradi zmanjšanja zaupanja med finančnimi institucijami tudi upraviči jamstvo za nekatere vrste bančnih vlog pravnih oseb ter celo kratkoročnih in srednjeročnih dolžniških instrumentov, kolikor tovrstne obveznosti še niso dovolj dobro zaščitene z veljavno ureditvijo za vlagatelje ali na kakšen drug način [7].
The extension of the coverage of any guarantee to further types of debt beyond this relatively broad scope would require a closer scrutiny as to its justification.
Upravičenost razširitve kritja kakršnega koli jamstva na nadaljnje vrste dolgov, ki bi presegale ta sorazmerno širok obseg, bi zahtevala natančen pregled.
Such guarantees should not, in principle, include subordinated debt (tier 2 capital) or an indiscriminate coverage of all liabilities, as it would merely tend to safeguard the interests of shareholders and other risk capital investors.
Tovrstna jamstva naj načeloma ne bi vključevala podrejenega dolga (sekundarnega kapitala) ali vsesplošnega kritja vseh obveznosti, saj bi tako zavarovala le interese delničarjev in drugih vlagateljev rizičnega kapitala.
If such debt is covered, thereby allowing expansion of capital and thus of lending activity, specific restrictions may be necessary.
Če je tovrstni dolg pokrit, s čimer se omogoči povečanje kapitala in dejavnosti posojanja, potem je morda treba določiti posebne omejitve.
Temporal scope of the guarantee scheme
Časovni okvir jamstvene sheme
The duration and scope of any guarantee scheme going beyond retail deposit guarantee schemes must be limited to the minimum necessary.
Trajanje in področje uporabe vsake jamstvene sheme, ki presega sheme jamstva za bančne vloge fizičnih oseb, mora biti omejeno na nujno potrebno.