natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Norway's submitted en route unit rate for 2016 of 381,42 NOK is in compliance with the Act referred to at point 66xf of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 390/2013 of 3 May 2013 laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions) and the Act referred to at point 66wm of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 391/2013 of 3 May 2013 laying down a common charging scheme for air navigation services).
Cena na enoto na zračnih poteh za leto 2016 v višini 381,42 NOK, ki jo je predložila Norveška, je v skladu z aktom iz točke 66xf Priloge XIII k Sporazumu EGP (Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) št. 390/2013 z dne 3. maja 2013 o določitvi načrta izvedbe za navigacijske službe zračnega prometa in funkcije omrežja) in aktom iz točke 66wm Priloge XIII k Sporazumu EGP (Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) št. 391/2013 z dne 3. maja 2013 o določitvi skupne ureditve pristojbin za navigacijske službe zračnega prometa).
OJ L 96, 31.3.2004, p. 10.
UL L 96, 31.3.2004, str.
OJ L 128, 9.5.2013, p. 31.
10.
OJ L 96, 31.3.2004, p. 1.
UL L 128, 9.5.2013, str.
OJ L 128, 9.5.2013, p. 1.
31.
OJ L 71, 12.3.2014, p. 20.
UL L 96, 31.3.2004, str.
No 204/16/COL
št. 204/16/COL
concerning alleged unlawful state aid granted to Íslandsbanki hf. and Arion Bank hf. through loan agreements on allegedly preferential terms (Iceland) [2017/1950]
o domnevno nezakoniti državni pomoči, dodeljeni bankama Íslandsbanki hf. in Arion Bank hf. na podlagi posojilnih pogodb pod domnevno ugodnejšimi pogoji (Islandija) [2017/1950]
THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘the Authority’),
NADZORNI ORGAN EFTE (v nadaljnjem besedilu: nadzorni organ) je –
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26 thereof,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum EGP), zlasti člena 61 Sporazuma in Protokola 26 k Sporazumu,
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum o nadzornem organu in sodišču), zlasti člena 24 Sporazuma,
HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 7(2) and Article 13 of Part II,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Protokol 3), zlasti člena 7(2) in člena 13 dela II,
HAVING called on interested parties to submit their comments and having regard to their comments,
PO POZIVU zainteresiranim stranem, naj predložijo pripombe, in ob upoštevanju teh pripomb,
(‘Arion’) had been granted unlawful state aid through long-term funding at favourable interest rates by the Central Bank of Iceland (‘CBI’) [1].
Nadzorni organ je z Odločbo št. 208/15/COL z dne 20. maja 2015 začel formalni postopek preiskave o domnevno nezakoniti državni pomoči, dodeljeni bankama ISB in Arion na podlagi dogovorov o preoblikovanju posojil pod domnevno ugodnejšimi pogoji.
By letter dated 23 October 2013, the Authority sent a request for information to the Icelandic authorities [2], to which the Icelandic authorities replied on 17 January 2014 [3].
Islandski organi so z dopisom z dne 28. avgusta 2015 [7] predložili pripombe k odločbi nadzornega organa.
The case was again discussed at a meeting between representatives of the Authority and of the Icelandic authorities, including a representative from the CBI, in Reykjavík in February 2015.
Centralna banka Islandije je z dopisom z dne 5. oktobra 2015 predložila pripombe k odločbi o začetku postopka [10].
These discussions were followed up with a letter dated 24 February 2015 [5], to which the Icelandic authorities replied on 1 April 2015 [6].
Nadzorni organ je z dopisom z dne 14. junija 2016 od centralne banke Islandije ter bank ISB in Arion zahteval dodatne informacije [11].
By Decision No 208/15/COL of 20 May 2015, the Authority initiated the formal investigation procedure into alleged unlawful state aid granted to ISB and Arion through loan conversion agreements on allegedly preferential terms.
Islandski organi so jih predložili z dopisom z dne 20. septembra 2016 [12].
By letter dated 28 August 2015 [7], the Icelandic authorities commented on the Authority's decision.
OPIS UKREPOV
On the same date, the Authority also received comments from one of the two alleged beneficiaries, i.e. Arion [8].
OZADJE
On 24 September 2015, the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union and in the EEA Supplement to it [9].
Zadevni ukrepi so povezani z zavarovanimi posojili in posojanjem vrednostnih papirjev centralne banke Islandije.
By letter dated 5 October 2015, the CBI submitted comments to the opening decision [10].
Centralna banka Islandije v okviru svoje vloge centralne banke in zadnjega možnega posojilodajalca ter v skladu z denarno politiko drugih centralnih bank finančnim podjetjem zagotavlja kratkoročne kredite v obliki zavarovanih posojil v skladu z zadevnimi določbami pravil centralne banke Islandije.
By letter dated 14 June 2016, the Authority requested additional information from the CBI, ISB and Arion [11].
Finančne institucije lahko zaprosijo za posojila čez noč ali tedenska posojila z zavarovanjem, ki ga centralna banka Islandije šteje za primernega.
The Icelandic authorities provided the requested information by letter dated 20 September 2016 [12].
Zavarovana posojila so se leta 2007 in 2008 stalno zviševala, centralna banka Islandije pa je postala pomemben vir likvidnosti finančnih podjetij.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES
Zavarovana posojila so bila najvišja 1. oktobra 2008, tik pred finančnim zlomom bank, ko je centralna banka Islandije finančnim institucijam posodila 520 milijard ISK.
BACKGROUND
Centralna banka Islandije je zato oktobra 2008 ob finančnem zlomu treh komercialnih bank (Landsbankinn, Glitnir in Kaupthing) do teh domačih finančnih podjetij pridobila znatne terjatve, ki so bile krite z različnimi vrstami zavarovanj.
The measures in question are linked to the CBI's collateral and securities lending.
Takrat je bilo skoraj 42 % zavarovanj za posojila centralne banke Islandije v obliki vrednostnih papirjev, za katere je jamčila zakladnica, ali vrednostnih papirjev s premoženjskim kritjem, približno 58 % osnovnega zavarovanja s premoženjem pa je zajemalo obveznice, ki so jih izdale banke Glitnir, Kaupthing in Landsbankinn [13].
As part of its role as a central bank and lender of last resort, and in line with the monetary policy of other central banks, the CBI provides short-term credit facilities to financial undertakings in the form of collateral loans, in accordance with the provisions of CBI rules pertaining thereto.
POSOJILNA POGODBA, SKLENJENA Z BANKO ISB
Financial institutions have the option of requesting overnight loans or seven-day loans against collateral considered to be eligible by the CBI.
Z zlomom banke Glitnir leta 2008 so postale terjatve centralne banke Islandije zapadle in plačljive, zaradi česar je zadevna centralna banka postala upnica propadle banke.
In 2007 and 2008, collateral lending increased steadily, and the CBI became a major source of liquidity for financial undertakings.
Z odločitvijo organa za finančni nadzor iz oktobra 2008 so bili načeloma vsa domača sredstva in vse obveznosti banke Glitnir (razen nekaterih izvzetih sredstev in obveznosti), vključno z njenimi neporavnanimi obveznostmi do centralne banke Islandije v višini približno 55,6 milijarde ISK, in posredno tudi lastništvo osnovnega zavarovanja s premoženjem (portfelj hipotekarnih kreditov), preneseni na banko ISB [14].
Collateral loans peaked on 1 October 2008, just before the collapse of the banks, when the CBI had loaned ISK 520 billion to financial institutions.
Ker je dolg centralni banki Islandije zajemal kratkoročna zavarovana posojila, bi takojšnje odplačilo resno vplivalo na likvidnostni položaj banke ISB in bi lahko ogrozilo njeno prestrukturiranje.
Thus, at the time of the collapse of the three commercial banks (Landsbankinn, Glitnir and Kaupthing) in October 2008, the CBI had acquired considerable claims against these domestic financial undertakings, which were backed by collateral of various types.
Po navedbah centralne banke Islandije je bila njena druga možnost, da bi namesto tega izterjala dolg, ostal pa ji bi portfelj hipotekarnih kreditov.
At that time, nearly 42 % of the collateral for CBI loan facilities took the form of Treasury guaranteed securities or asset-backed securities, while some 58 % of the underlying collateral consisted of bonds issued by Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbankinn [13].
Tega bi centralna banka Islandije težko upravljala.
LOAN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WITH ISB
Prodaja portfelja hipotekarnih kreditov se ob upoštevanju finančne krize in majhnega števila morebitnih kupcev na trgu takrat prav tako ni štela za eno od možnosti.
With the collapse of Glitnir in 2008, the CBI's claims became due and payable, thus making the CBI a creditor of the failed bank.
Zato je banka ISB zahtevala ponovno pogajanje o svojem dolgu s centralno banko Islandije, da bi se ta pretvoril v dolgoročni dolg z razumnim profilom amortizacije in tako ne bi dodatno negativno vplival na likvidnostni položaj banke ISB.
By decision of the Financial Supervisory Authority (‘FME’) in October 2008, in principle all domestic assets and liabilities (save for some excluded assets and liabilities) of Glitnir's were transferred to ISB, including Glitnir's outstanding liabilities to the CBI, which amounted to approximately ISK 55,6 billion, as well as indirectly the ownership of the underlying collateral (the mortgage loan portfolio) [14].
Po pogajanjih med banko ISB in centralno banko Islandije je bil 11. septembra 2009 dosežen dogovor, v skladu s katerim je banka ISB za centralno banko Islandije izdala samostojne obveznice v višini 55,6 milijarde ISK.
As the debt with the CBI consisted of short-term collateralised lending, instant repayment would have had a serious impact on ISB's liquidity position and could have jeopardised the restructuring of the bank.
Zavarovane so bile z istim ali podobnim portfeljem hipotekarnih kreditov kot krite obveznice, ki jih je banka Glitnir izdala v preteklosti.
According to the CBI, the alternative would have been for the CBI to collect the debt, which would have left the CBI with the mortgage loan portfolio.
Obveznice so presežno zavarovane, razmerje med vrednostjo kredita in vrednostjo zastavljenih nepremičnin pa znaša 70 % [15].
This would have been difficult for a central bank to manage.
Dospelost obveznice je deset let, pri čemer obrestna mera znaša 4,5 % in je vezana na indeks cen življenjskih potrebščin.
Selling the mortgage loan portfolio at the time was also not considered an option, taking into account the financial crisis and the very few potential purchasers on the market.
POSOJILNA POGODBA, SKLENJENA Z BANKO ARION
Therefore, ISB sought to renegotiate the debt with the CBI, in order to convert it into a long-term debt with a reasonable amortisation profile, to avoid a further negative impact on ISB's liquidity position.
Oktobra 2008 je bilo jasno, da banke Kaupthing ni več mogoče rešiti, zato je njene dejavnosti prevzel organ za finančni nadzor.
Following negotiations between ISB and the CBI, an agreement was reached on 11 September 2009, resulting in ISB issuing a stand-alone bond to the CBI in the amount of ISK 55,6 billion.
Ta se je v skladu z zakonom št. 125/2008 o organu za izplačila iz državne blagajne zaradi nepredvidenih razmer na finančnem trgu itd. (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zakon o izrednih razmerah), ki je bil sprejet 6. oktobra 2008, odločil, da banko Kaupthing razdeli na staro in novo banko.
The bond was asset-backed with the same, or similar, mortgage loan portfolio as the covered bonds that were issued by Glitnir in the past.
Nova banka, ki je pozneje postala banka Arion, je načeloma prevzela večino domačih sredstev in obveznosti.
The bond is over-collateralised with a loan-to-value (‘LTV’) ratio of 70 % [15].
Vendar zavarovane obveznosti do centralne banke Islandije in zadevno zavarovanje, vključno s portfeljem stanovanjskih posojil, niso bili preneseni [16].
The bond's maturity is 10 years, with an interest rate of 4,5 %, CPI linked (i.e. consumer price-indexed).
Nadzor nad staro banko je prevzel odbor za reševanje, pozneje pa so bili zanjo uvedeni likvidacijski postopki, katerih cilj je bil končno prenehanje opravljanja vseh dejavnosti.
LOAN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WITH ARION
Banka Kaupthing, vlada in banka Arion so 3. septembra 2009 dosegle dogovor o kapitalizaciji banke Arion in podlagi za nadomestilo, ki ga banka Kaupthing plača banki Arion (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dogovor o kapitalizaciji z banko Kaupthing).
In October 2008, it was clear that Kaupthing could no longer be saved and the FME therefore took over the operations of the bank.
V skladu s tem dogovorom je imela banka Kaupthing možnost, da prevzame nadzor nad banko Arion z vpisom novega osnovnega kapitala, ki bi ga plačala iz lastnih sredstev stare banke (tj. iz sredstev, ki niso bila prenesena v skladu z odločitvijo organa za finančni nadzor, kot je bilo opisano).
In line with the Act No 125/2008 on the Authority for Treasury disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc. (the ‘Emergency Act’), which was passed on 6 October 2008, the FME decided to split Kaupthing into an old and a new bank.
Preden bi se banka Kaupthing lahko odločila, ali bo pridobila večinski lastniški delež v banki Arion, se je morala s centralno banko Islandije dogovoriti glede poravnave neporavnanih terjatev, saj so bila z nekaterimi sredstvi, ki bi jih potrebovala za plačilo novega osnovnega kapitala, zavarovana posojila centralne banke Islandije banki Kaupthing, vključno s portfeljem stanovanjskih posojil.
The new bank, which later became Arion, in principle took over most domestic assets and liabilities.
Zato so finančno ministrstvo, centralna banka Islandije in odbor za reševanje banke Kaupthing 30. novembra 2009 sklenili dogovor o poravnavi terjatev centralne banke Islandije do banke Kaupthing (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dogovor o poravnavi).
However, the secured liabilities towards the CBI and the respective collateral, including the housing loan portfolio, were not transferred [16].
Poravnava posojil čez noč je bila obravnavana v členu 3 dogovora o poravnavi, v katerem so se stranke v posebnem obrazcu, priloženemu dogovoru kot Dodatek II, dogovorile, da bo banka Arion prevzela dolg banke Kaupthing do centralne banke Islandije z izdajo obveznic v višini približno […] [17] milijard ISK, centralna banka Islandije pa bi portfelj stanovanjskih posojil dodelila banki Arion.
The old bank was placed under the supervision of a resolution committee and later became subject to winding-up procedures, with the aim of eventually closing all operations.
Banka Arion in centralna banka Islandije sta 22. januarja 2010 sklenili posojilno pogodbo, ki je bila po navedbah zadevnih bank formalna izvedba člena 3 dogovora o poravnavi in dogovora o kapitalizaciji, tj. ko so upniki banke Kaupthing postali lastniki banke Arion.
Kaupthing, the Government and Arion reached an agreement on 3 September 2009 regarding the capitalisation of Arion and the basis for compensation from Kaupthing to Arion (the ‘Kaupthing capitalisation agreement’).
Posojilna pogodba je nadomestila zgoraj navedeno obveznico.
According to this agreement, Kaupthing had the option of acquiring control of Arion by subscribing to new share capital and was to pay for the new share capital with the old bank's own assets (i.e. the assets that had not been transferred pursuant to the FME decision as described above).
Posojilna pogodba je v bistvu odražala pogoje obveznice, le da je bila njena glavnica denominirana v eurih, ameriških dolarjih in švicarskih frankih, ne v islandskih kronah.
Before Kaupthing could decide whether it would acquire a majority stake in Arion, an agreement needed to be reached with the CBI on the settlement of the outstanding claims as some of the assets it would need to pay for the new share capital had been placed as collateral against loans provided by the CBI to Kaupthing, including the housing loan portfolio.
Ta sprememba denominacije valute je bila v skladu s pogoji dogovora o poravnavi, ki so določali, da bi morala banka Arion kljub valuti, v kateri je denominirana glavnica, plačati obresti in obroke v tujih valutah v obsegu, v katerem banka to zmore.
Therefore, on 30 November 2009, the Ministry of Finance, the CBI and the Kaupthing Resolution Committee entered into an agreement on the settlement of the CBI's claims against Kaupthing (the ‘settlement agreement’).
V dogovoru o poravnavi je bilo določeno tudi, da mora banka Arion centralni banki Islandije predložiti utemeljen pisni zahtevek, če ne bi zmogla plačevati v tujih valutah in bi želela plačevati v islandskih kronah.
The settlement of overnight loans was the subject of Article 3 of the settlement agreement and there the parties agreed that Arion Bank would assume Kaupthing's debt towards the CBI by issuing a bond in the amount of approximately ISK […] [17] billion, in a specific form attached to the agreement as Appendix II, with the CBI in turn assigning the housing loan portfolio to Arion.
S posojilno pogodbo je bilo zagotovljeno sedemletno posojilo z možnostjo podaljšanja dvakrat za tri leta v višini […] milijona EUR, […] milijonov USD in […] milijonov CHF.
On 22 January 2010, Arion and the CBI concluded a loan agreement, which, according to the CBI and Arion, represented the formal completion of Article 3 of the settlement agreement and the capitalisation agreement, i.e. when the creditors of Kaupthing became owners of Arion.
Banki Arion je bilo dovoljeno spreminjanje kombinacije valut, v katerih je treba vrniti posojilo.
The loan agreement replaced the aforementioned bond.
Obresti, ki se plačujejo, so bile EURIBOR/LIBOR + 300 bazičnih točk.
The loan agreement essentially reflected the terms of the bond, except that the principal amount of the loan agreement was denominated in EUR, USD and CHF instead of ISK.
Portfelj stanovanjskih posojil banke Arion se je uporabil kot zavarovanje za centralno banko Islandije.
This change in currency denomination was in line with the terms of the settlement agreement which provided that, despite the denomination of the principal, Arion should pay interest and instalments in foreign currencies to the extent the bank was able to.
PRITOŽBA
The settlement agreement also stipulated that if Arion was not able to pay in foreign currencies, and wished instead to pay in ISK, it had to submit a written reasoned application to the CBI.
Po navedbah pritožnika posojilni pogodbi med banko ISB, banko Arion in centralno banko Islandije v odločbah nadzornega organa, s katerima je bila bankama ISB in Arion odobrena pomoč za prestrukturiranje, nista bili ocenjeni [18].
The loan agreement provided for a seven-year loan, extendable by two three-year terms, for an amount of EUR […] million, USD […] million and CHF […] million.
Ker v teh primerih ukrepi niso bili obravnavani, je po mnenju pritožnika pomembno pridobiti mnenje nadzornega organa o (i) združljivosti teh dodatnih domnevnih ukrepov pomoči s Sporazumom EGP in (ii) posledicah, ker islandski organi niso priglasili teh ukrepov.
Arion was permitted to change the combination of the currencies in which the loan was to be repaid.
Po navedbah pritožnika takrat, ko je centralna banka Islandije sklenila posojilni pogodbi z bankama Arion in ISB, druge banke na Islandiji niso imele možnosti, da prejmejo tako financiranje od centralne banke Islandije ali drugih vladnih agencij.
The interest payable was EURIBOR/LIBOR + 300 bps.
Zato trdi, da je bila pomoč selektivna, saj je bila dodeljena izključno nekaterim finančnim institucijam, ki konkurirajo na islandskem bančnem trgu.
The housing loan portfolio of Arion served as collateral to the CBI.
Po njegovem mnenju je bila banki ISB z dodelitvijo posojila dodeljena pomoč, da centralni banki Islandije ni bilo treba izvršiti izdaje kritih obveznic, v primeru banke Arion pa je bilo posojilo dodeljeno, da bi se zagotovila ustrezna uravnoteženost njenega valutnega tveganja.
THE COMPLAINT
Trdi, da so bile druge finančne institucije, ki niso prejele take pomoči, prisiljene v prodajo sredstev na trgu, na katerem so imeli prednost kupci.
According to the complainant, the loan agreements between ISB, Arion and the CBI were not assessed in the Authority's decisions approving restructuring aid to ISB and Arion [18].
Po navedbah pritožnika sta banki ISB in Arion s posojilnima pogodbama pridobili jasno prednost v obliki dolgoročnega financiranja z ugodnimi obrestnimi merami, ki so bile nižje od tržnih obrestnih mer in drugim udeležencem na trgu niso bile na voljo.
Since the measures were not addressed in these cases, the complainant considers it important to obtain the opinion of the Authority on (i) the compatibility of these additional alleged aid measures with the EEA Agreement, and (ii) the consequences of the failure by the Icelandic authorities to notify these measures.
Po njegovem mnenju v teh nemirnih časih na finančnih trgih takih pogodb ne bi sklenil noben zasebni vlagatelj.
The complainant alleges that, at the time the CBI entered into the loan agreements with Arion and ISB, other banks in Iceland were not given the opportunity to receive such financing from the CBI or other government agencies.
V podporo svoji trditvi, da so bile obrestne mere takrat nižje od tržnih obrestnih mer, je predložil podatke o razmikih kreditne izmenjave islandske vlade v letu 2009 in obrestnih merah, ki so v letu 2009 veljale na izdajo obveznic HFF150224 in HFF150434, ki ju je izdal islandski finančni stanovanjski sklad.
The complainant therefore argues that the aid was selective as it was granted exclusively to certain financial institutions competing on the Icelandic banking market.
Pritožnik trdi, da so ukrepi okrepili položaj bank ISB in Arion na bančnem trgu in torej vplivali na položaj drugih udeležencev na trgu.
According to the complainant, by granting a loan to ISB, the bank was granted aid to avoid enforcement by the CBI on the covered bond issue; and in Arion's case, the loan was granted to secure an appropriate balance on the bank's currency risk.
Nazadnje pritožnik trdi, da sta načrta prestrukturiranja bank ISB in Arion, ki ju je izvedla islandska vlada in za katera je nadzorni organ ugotovil, da sta združljiva pomoč v skladu s členom 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP, zadoščala za odpravo motnje v islandskem gospodarstvu.
The complainant argues that other financial institutions, which did not receive such aid, were forced to sell off assets in markets that favoured buyers.
Po njegovem mnenju dodatni ukrepi pomoči, izvedeni z zgoraj navedenimi dogovori, niso bili potrebni, primerni ali sorazmerni za obnovo islandskega bančnega sistema in zato pomenijo nezdružljivo državno pomoč.
According to the complainant, the loan agreements gave ISB and Arion a clear advantage in the form of long-term funding with favourable interest rates below market rates and which were not available to other market participants.
RAZLOGI ZA ZAČETEK FORMALNEGA POSTOPKA PREISKAVE
According to the complainant, no private investor would have entered into such agreements at this turbulent time on the financial markets.
Nadzorni organ je v Odločbi št. 208/15/COL predhodno ocenil, ali bi lahko kratkoročni krediti, ki jih je centralna banka Islandije zagotovila bankama Glitnir in Kaupthing, ter posojilni pogodbi, ki ju je centralna banka Islandije sklenila z bankama Arion in ISB, pomenili državno pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, in če bi lahko pomenili, ali bi se lahko državna pomoč štela za združljivo z delovanjem Sporazuma EGP.