natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Is the aid well designed to deliver the objective of common interest that is to say, does the proposed aid address the market failure or other objective?
Ali je pomoč oblikovana tako, da zagotovi dosego cilja skupnega interesa, to je, ali se predlagana pomoč nanaša na tržno nepopolnost ali drug cilj?
is State aid an appropriate policy instrument?
Ali je državna pomoč ustrezen instrument politike?
is there an incentive effect, namely does the aid change the behaviour of undertakings?
Ali obstaja spodbujevalni učinek, to je, ali pomoč spremeni ravnanje podjetij?
is the aid measure proportional, namely could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid?
Ali je ukrep pomoči sorazmeren, to je, ali bi bila lahko enaka sprememba v ravnanju dosežena z manj pomoči?
Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive?
Ali so izkrivljanje konkurence in učinki na trgovino omejeni, tako da je skupno ravnovesje pozitivno?
This balancing test is applicable to the design of State aid rules as well as to the assessment of cases.
Ta test tehtanja se uporablja za oblikovanje pravil o državni pomoči ter za oceno primerov.
The objective of common interest addressed by the Guidelines
Cilj skupnega interesa, ki ga obravnavajo smernice
The ninth recital of the Preamble to the EEA Agreement states the EFTA States’ determination to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment and stipulates that sustainable development is one of their objectives.
Deveta uvodna izjava Preambule Sporazuma EGP navaja odločenost držav Efte, da ohranijo, zaščitijo in izboljšajo kakovost okolja, in določa, da je trajnostni razvoj eden od njihovih ciljev.
Promoting environmental protection is thus an important objective of common interest.
Spodbujanje varstva okolja je zato pomemben cilj skupnega interesa.
In addition, Article 73(2) of the EEA Agreement mentions the need to integrate protection of the environment into the EFTA States’ other policies and it states that environment policy is to be based on the principles of prevention, rectifying pollution [10] at source and that the “polluter should pay”.
Poleg tega je v členu 73(2) Sporazuma EGP omenjena potreba po vključitvi varstva okolja v druge politike držav Efte in navedeno, da mora okoljska politika temeljiti na načelih preprečevanja, odpravljanja onesnaževanja pri viru [10] in ‚onesnaževalec plača‘.
These Guidelines lay down the conditions for authorising the granting of State aid to address those market failures which lead to a sub-optimal level of environmental protection.
Te smernice določajo pogoje za odobritev dodelitve državne pomoči za obravnavo tistih tržnih nepopolnosti, ki vodijo k nezadostni stopnji varstva okolja.
The most common market failure in the field of environmental protection is related to negative externalities.
Najpogostejša tržna nepopolnost na področju varstva okolja je povezana z negativnimi zunanjimi učinki.
Undertakings acting in their own interest have no incentive to take the negative externalities arising from production into account either when they decide on a particular production technology or when they decide on the production level.
Podjetij, ki delujejo v lastnem interesu, nič ne spodbuja k upoštevanju negativnih zunanjih učinkov, ki izhajajo iz proizvodnje, niti kadar se odločajo o določeni proizvodni tehnologiji niti kadar se odločajo o ravni proizvodnje.
In other words, the production costs that are borne by the undertaking are lower than the costs borne by society.
Z drugimi besedami, stroški proizvodnje, ki jih krije podjetje, so nižji od stroškov, ki jih krije družba.
Therefore undertakings have no incentive to reduce their level of pollution or to take individual measures to protect the environment.
Zato podjetij nič ne spodbuja k znižanju njihove ravni onesnaževanja ali k lastnim ukrepom za varstvo okolja.
Governments confronted with this market failure tend to use regulation in order to ensure that the negative externalities arising from production are accounted for.
Vlade, ki se spopadajo s tovrstno tržno nepopolnostjo, običajno uporabljajo ureditev, s katero želijo zagotoviti, da se upoštevajo negativni zunanji učinki, ki izhajajo iz proizvodnje.
Through the introduction of standards, taxation, economic instruments and other regulation, the undertakings producing pollution have to pay for the cost to society of pollution in accordance with the PPP.
Prek uvedbe standardov, obdavčenja, ekonomskih instrumentov in drugih predpisov morajo podjetja, ki povzročajo onesnaževanje, družbi plačati za stroške onesnaževanja v skladu z načelom ‚onesnaževalec plača‘.
Internalising these negative externalities will consequently raise the private costs borne by those undertakings, thereby negatively affecting their revenue.
Internalizacija teh negativnih zunanjih učinkov bo posledično zvišala zasebne stroške, ki jih krijejo navedena podjetja, ter s tem negativno vplivala na njihove prihodke.
Moreover, since the generation of pollution is unevenly spread among industries and undertakings, the costs of any environmentally friendly regulation tend to be differentiated, not only between undertakings, but also between EEA States.
Poleg tega se glede na to, da je ustvarjanje onesnaževanja med gospodarskimi panogami in podjetji neenakomerno porazdeljeno, stroški vseh okolju prijaznih predpisov običajno razlikujejo ne samo po podjetjih, temveč tudi med državami EGP.
EEA States may furthermore have a different appreciation of the need to introduce high environmental targets.
Nadalje lahko države EGP različno ocenjujejo potrebo po uvedbi visokih okoljskih ciljev.
In the absence of Community standards and market-based instruments fully reflecting the PPP level (regulatory failure), EFTA States may thus decide unilaterally to pursue a higher level of environmental protection.
Ker ne obstajajo standardi in tržni instrumenti Skupnosti, ki bi v celoti izražali raven načela ‚onesnaževalec plača‘ (nepopolnost v ureditvi), se lahko države Efte tako enostransko odločijo za uveljavitev višje stopnje varstva okolja.
This may in turn create additional costs for the undertakings active in their territory.
To pa lahko podjetjem, dejavnim na njihovem ozemlju, prinese dodatne stroške.
For that reason, in addition to regulation, EFTA States may use State aid as a positive incentive to achieve higher levels of environmental protection.
Zato lahko države Efte poleg urejanja s predpisi uporabijo državno pomoč kot pozitivno spodbudo za dosego višjih ravni varstva okolja.
They can do this in two ways:
To lahko naredijo na dva načina:
positive individual incentives to reduce pollution and other negative impacts on the environment: First, EFTA States can create positive incentives on an individual level (at the level of the undertaking) to go beyond Community standards [11].
pozitivne posamične spodbude za zmanjšanje onesnaževanja in drugih negativnih vplivov na okolje: prvič, države Efte lahko oblikujejo pozitivne spodbude na posamični ravni (na ravni podjetja) za preseganje standardov Skupnosti [11].
In this case, the aid beneficiary reduces pollution because it receives aid to change its behaviour, and not because it has to pay for the costs of this pollution.
V tem primeru upravičenec do pomoči zmanjša onesnaževanje zato, ker prejme pomoč za spremembo svojega ravnanja, ne pa zato, ker mora plačati stroške onesnaževanja.
The objective of State aid here is to address directly the market failure linked with the negative effects of pollution;
Pri tem je cilj državne pomoči neposredna obravnava tržne nepopolnosti, povezane z negativnimi učinki onesnaževanja,
positive incentives to introduce national environmental regulation going beyond Community standards: Second, EFTA States can impose national regulation going beyond the Community standards.
pozitivne spodbude za uvedbo nacionalnih okoljskih predpisov, ki presegajo standarde Skupnosti: drugič, države Efte lahko uvedejo nacionalne predpise, ki presegajo standarde Skupnosti.
However, this may lead to additional costs for certain undertakings, and thus affect their competitive conditions.
To pa lahko pripelje do dodatnih stroškov za določena podjetja in tako vpliva na njihove konkurenčne pogoje.
Moreover, such costs may not represent the same burden for all undertakings given their size, market position, technology and other specificities.
Poleg tega taki stroški morda ne pomenijo enake obremenitve za vsa podjetja zaradi njihove velikosti, tržnega položaja, tehnologije in drugih posebnosti.
In this case, State aid may be necessary, to lessen the burden on the most affected undertakings and thereby enable EFTA States to adopt national environmental regulation that is stricter than Community standards.
V tem primeru je lahko državna pomoč potrebna za zmanjšanje obremenitve najbolj prizadetih podjetij in lahko tako državam Efte omogoči, da sprejmejo nacionalne okoljske predpise, ki so strožji od standardov Skupnosti.
There is a role for government intervention to ensure more adequate environmental protection.
Namen posredovanja države je zagotoviti primernejše varstvo okolja.
Regulation and market-based instruments are the most important tools to achieve environmental objectives.
Najpomembnejši orodji za dosego okoljskih ciljev sta urejanje s predpisi in tržni instrumenti.
Soft instruments, such as voluntary eco-labels, and the diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies may also play an important role.
Tudi mehki instrumenti, kot so prostovoljni znaki za okolje, in razširjanje okolju prijaznih tehnologij imajo lahko pomembno vlogo.
However, even if finding the optimal mix of policy instruments can be complicated, the existence of market failures or political objectives does not automatically justify the use of State aid.
Čeprav je iskanje optimalne kombinacije političnih instrumentov lahko zapleteno, pa obstoj tržnih nepopolnosti ali političnih ciljev sam po sebi ne upravičuje uporabe državnih pomoči.
According to the PPP, the polluter should pay all the costs of its pollution, including the indirect costs borne by society.
V skladu z načelom ‚onesnaževalec plača‘ mora onesnaževalec plačati vse stroške povzročenega onesnaženja, vključno s posrednimi stroški, ki jih krije družba.
For this purpose, environmental regulation can be a useful instrument to increase the burden on the polluter.
V ta namen je lahko okoljska ureditev koristen instrument za povečanje obremenitve onesnaževalca.
Respect for the PPP ensures, in theory, that the market failure linked to negative externalities will be rectified.
Spoštovanje načela ‚onesnaževalec plača‘ teoretično zagotavlja, da bo odpravljena tržna nepopolnost, povezana z negativnimi zunanjimi učinki.
Consequently, if the PPP were fully implemented, further government intervention would not be necessary to ensure a market-efficient outcome.
Zato ne bi bili potrebni dodatni ukrepi države za zagotovitev tržno učinkovitega izida, če bi se načelo ‚onesnaževalec plača‘ v celoti izvajalo.
The PPP remains the main rule and State aid is in fact a second-best option.
Načelo ‚onesnaževalec plača‘ ostaja glavno pravilo, državna pomoč pa je dejansko druga najboljša možnost.
Using State aid in the context of the PPP would relieve the polluter of the burden of paying the cost of its pollution.
Uporaba državne pomoči v okviru načela ‚onesnaževalec plača‘ bi onesnaževalca razbremenila kritja stroškov povzročenega onesnaženja.
Therefore, State aid may not be an appropriate instrument in such cases.
Zato državna pomoč v takih primerih ne more biti ustrezen instrument.
However, on account, in particular, of incomplete implementation of the PPP, the existing level of environmental protection is often considered to be unsatisfactory for the following reasons:
Vendar pa se zlasti zaradi nepopolnega izvajanja načela ‚onesnaževalec plača‘ pogosto šteje, da je sedanja stopnja varstva okolja nezadovoljiva iz naslednjih razlogov:
first, the exact cost of pollution is not easy to establish.
prvič, natančnih stroškov onesnaževanja ni lahko opredeliti.
It is technically complicated to calculate the extra costs for society for all types of production, and it may sometimes be inefficient to take account of the fact that different producers have different levels of pollution if the associated administrative costs are very high.
Tehnično zapleteno je izračunati dodatne stroške, ki jih utrpi družba, za vse vrste proizvodnje in včasih je lahko neučinkovito upoštevati dejstvo, da imajo različni proizvajalci različne stopnje onesnaževanja, če so s tem povezani upravni stroški zelo visoki.
Different sensitivities towards changes in consumer prices (price elasticity) also play a role.
Prav tako je pomembna stopnja občutljivosti za spremembe maloprodajnih cen (cenovna elastičnost).
Furthermore, the valuation of the cost of pollution can differ among individuals and societies, depending on societal choices as regards, for instance, the effect of current policies on future generations.
Nadalje, vrednotenje stroškov onesnaževanja se lahko med posamezniki in družbami razlikuje glede na družbene izbire, recimo v zvezi z učinkom sedanjih politik na prihodnje generacije.
In addition, some costs are difficult to express without some uncertainty in monetary terms, such as shorter life expectancy or environmental damage.
Poleg tega je nekatere stroške težko izraziti v denarju brez določene negotovosti, kot na primer krajšo pričakovano življenjsko dobo ali okoljsko škodo.
There will therefore always be a degree of uncertainty involved in calculating the costs of pollution;
Izračunavanje stroškov onesnaževanja zato vedno vključuje nekaj negotovosti,
second, raising the price of a series of (industrial) products too abruptly in order to internalise the cost of pollution may act as an external shock and create disturbances in the economy.
drugič, preveč nenadno zvišanje cen vrste (industrijskih) izdelkov za internalizacijo stroškov onesnaževanja je lahko zunanji pretres in lahko povzroči motnje v gospodarstvu.
Governments may therefore consider it more desirable to progress with moderation towards integrating the full price of pollution into certain production processes.
Državam se zato lahko zdi bolj primerno zmerno napredovanje k vključitvi popolne cene onesnaževanja v določene proizvodne postopke.
In the context of an unsatisfactory level of environmental protection, State aid, although it does not resolve all the above-mentioned problems, may provide positive incentives for undertakings to carry out activities or make investments which are not mandatory and would otherwise not be undertaken by profit-seeking companies.
Državne pomoči lahko v okviru nezadovoljive stopnje varstva okolja in kljub temu, da ne rešujejo vseh zgoraj navedenih težav, zagotovijo pozitivne spodbude za podjetja za izvajanje dejavnosti ali naložb, ki niso obvezne in ki jih drugače podjetja, ki iščejo dobiček, ne bi izvajala.
In addition, State aid may be an appropriate instrument to enable EFTA States to adopt national environmental regulation going beyond Community standards, by lowering the burden on the undertakings most affected by that regulation, and thus making the regulation possible.
Poleg tega je lahko državna pomoč primeren instrument, ki državam Efte omogoča, da sprejmejo nacionalne okoljske predpise, ki presegajo standarde Skupnosti, s tem da zmanjšajo obremenitev podjetij, ki jih navedeni predpisi najbolj prizadenejo, ter tako omogočijo sprejem predpisov.
State aid for environmental protection must result in the recipient of the aid changing its behaviour so that the level of environmental protection will be higher than if the aid had not been granted.
Državna pomoč za varstvo okolja mora pri prejemniku pomoči povzročiti spremembo ravnanja, tako da bo raven varstva okolja višja, kot bi bila, če pomoč ne bi bila dodeljena.
However, investments which increase the level of environmental protection may at the same time increase revenues [12] and/or decrease costs [13] and thus be economically attractive in their own right.
Toda naložbe, ki povečajo stopnjo varstva okolja, lahko hkrati zvišajo prihodke [12] in/ali znižajo stroške [13] ter so s tem že same po sebi gospodarsko privlačne.
Therefore, it needs to be verified that the investment concerned would not have been undertaken without any State aid.
Zato je treba preveriti, ali se zadevna naložba res ne bi izvedla brez državne pomoči.
The objective is to be sure that undertakings would not, without the aid, engage in the same activity because of its intrinsic benefits.
Cilj je zagotoviti, da se podjetja brez pomoči ne bi odločala za opravljanje iste dejavnosti zaradi koristi, ki jih ima ta sama po sebi.
The incentive effect is identified through counterfactual analysis, comparing the levels of intended activity with aid and without aid.
Spodbujevalni učinek opredeljuje analiza obratnih hipotetičnih scenarijev, ki primerja ravni načrtovanih dejavnosti s pomočjo in brez nje.
Correct identification of the counterfactual scenario is key to determining whether or not State aid has an incentive effect.
Pravilna opredelitev scenarija nasprotnih dejstev je ključna za določitev, ali ima državna pomoč spodbujevalni učinek ali ne.
It is also essential for the calculation of the extra investment or production costs incurred to achieve the higher level of environmental protection.
Prav tako je bistvena za izračun dodatno nastalih naložbenih ali proizvodnih stroškov za dosego višje ravni varstva okolja.
Investment may be necessary in order to meet mandatory Community standards.
Za izpolnitev obveznih standardov Skupnosti bo morda potrebna naložba.
Since the company would have to comply with those standards in any event, State aid to meet mandatory Community standards that are already in force cannot be justified.
Ker bi moralo podjetje v vsakem primeru spoštovati te standarde, državne pomoči za izpolnitev obveznih standardov Skupnosti, ki so že v veljavi, ni mogoče upravičiti.
Aid is considered to be proportional only if the same result could not be achieved with less aid.
Za pomoč se šteje, da je sorazmerna samo, če ne bi bilo mogoče doseči istega rezultata z manj pomoči.
In addition, proportionality may also depend on the degree of selectivity of a measure.
Poleg tega je lahko sorazmernost odvisna tudi od stopnje selektivnosti ukrepa.
In particular, the aid amount must be limited to the minimum needed to achieve the environmental protection sought.
Zlasti je treba znesek pomoči omejiti na najmanjšega, ki je potreben za dosego želene stopnje varstva okolja.
Therefore, eligible costs for investment aid are based on the notion of the extra (net) cost necessary to meet the environmental objectives.
Zato upravičeni stroški za pomoč za naložbe temeljijo na pojmu dodatnih (neto) stroškov, ki so potrebni za izpolnitev okoljskih ciljev.
This concept implies that, in order to establish how much aid can be granted, all the economic benefits which the investment gives the company must in principle be subtracted from the additional investment costs.
Ta koncept pomeni, da je treba za določitev višine pomoči, ki se lahko dodeli, od dodatnih stroškov naložbe načeloma odšteti gospodarske koristi, ki jih naložba prinaša podjetju.
However, it is difficult to fully take into account all economic benefits which a company will derive from an additional investment.
Toda težko je v celoti upoštevati vse gospodarske koristi, ki jih podjetje pridobi od dodatne naložbe.
For example, according to the methodology for calculating eligible costs set out in points 80 to 84, operating benefits are not taken into account beyond a certain initial period following the investment.
Na primer, v skladu z metodologijo za izračun upravičenih stroškov, določeno v točkah 80 do 84, se stroški poslovanja ne upoštevajo dlje kot v določenem začetnem obdobju po naložbi.
Likewise, certain kinds of benefits which are not always easy to measure — such as the “green image” enhanced by an environmental investment — are not taken into account in this context either.
Poleg tega se nekatere koristi, ki jih ni vedno lahko izmeriti – kot na primer ‚zelena podoba‘, ki jo poudari okoljska naložba – prav tako ne upoštevajo v tej zvezi.
Consequently, in order for the aid to be proportionate, the Authority considers that the aid amount must normally be less than the eligible investment costs, see Annex.
Zato Nadzorni organ meni, da mora biti znesek pomoči običajno nižji od upravičenih stroškov naložbe, da bi bila pomoč sorazmerna (glej Prilogo).
It is only in cases where investment aid is granted in a genuinely competitive bidding process on the basis of clear, transparent and non discriminatory criteria — effectively ensuring that the aid is limited to the minimum necessary for achieving the environmental gain — that the aid amount may reach 100 % of the eligible investment cost.
Samo v primerih, ko je naložbena pomoč odobrena v resnično konkurenčnih postopkih zbiranja ponudb na podlagi jasnih, preglednih in nediskriminatornih meril – kar dejansko zagotavlja, da je pomoč omejena na najmanjši znesek, ki je potreben, da se doseže korist za okolje – lahko znesek pomoči doseže 100 % upravičenih stroškov naložbe.
This is because under such circumstances it can be assumed that the respective bids reflect all possible benefits that might flow from the additional investment.
To je zato, ker se v teh okoliščinah lahko predvideva, da zadevna zbiranja ponudb izražajo vse možne koristi, do katerih bi lahko prišlo zaradi dodatnih naložb.
Moreover, for some measures, it is not possible to calculate the amount of aid on the basis of the extra costs; this is the case for aid in the form of environmental tax exemptions or reductions and aid in the form of tradable permit schemes.
Poleg tega za nekatere ukrepe zneska pomoči ni mogoče izračunati na podlagi dodatnih stroškov; to velja za pomoč v obliki oprostitev ali znižanj okoljskih dajatev in pomoč v obliki shem trgovanja z dovoljenji.
In those cases, proportionality has to be ensured through conditions and criteria for granting the exemptions and reductions, which ensure that the beneficiary does not receive excessive advantages, and that the selectivity of the measure is limited to the strict minimum.
V teh primerih je treba sorazmernost zagotoviti s pogoji in merili za odobritev oprostitev in znižanj dajatev, ki zagotavljajo, da upravičenec ne prejme prevelikih ugodnosti in da je selektivnost ukrepa omejena na strogi minimum.
The cost of achieving environmental protection is often higher for small and medium-sized enterprises in relative terms compared to the size of their activity.
Stroški doseganja varstva okolja so pogosto relativno višji za mala in srednja podjetja v primerjavi z obsegom njihove dejavnosti.
In addition, the ability of small and medium-sized enterprises to bear such costs is often restricted by capital market imperfections.
Poleg tega sposobnost malih in srednjih podjetij, da krijejo take stroške, pogosto omejujejo pomanjkljivosti kapitalskega trga.
For this reason, and in view of the reduced risk of serious distortions of competition when the beneficiary is a small or medium-sized enterprise, a bonus can be justified for such enterprises for some types of aid.
Zaradi tega in glede na zmanjšano tveganje hujših izkrivljanj konkurence v primerih, ko je upravičenec malo ali srednje podjetje, je za takšna podjetja za določene vrste pomoči lahko upravičljiv bonus.
In addition, EFTA States are encouraged to ensure cost-effectiveness in achieving environmental benefits, for example by choosing measures for which the external costs avoided are significant in relation to the amount of aid.
Poleg tega se države Efte spodbujajo k zagotavljanju stroškovne učinkovitosti pri doseganju okoljskih koristi, na primer z izbiranjem ukrepov, za katere so zunanji stroški, ki se preprečijo, znatni v primerjavi z zneskom pomoči.
However, since there is no direct link between the external costs avoided and the cost incurred by the undertaking, only in exceptional cases may external costs avoided be used as a basis to determine State aid amounts.
Ker pa ne obstaja neposredna povezava med zunanjimi stroški, do katerih ni prišlo, in stroški, ki jih ima podjetje, se lahko samo v izjemnih primerih zunanji stroški, do katerih ni prišlo, uporabljajo kot podlaga za določitev zneskov državnih pomoči.