natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Authority considers that there is a need to clarify the measures it intends to take to facilitate the execution of recovery decisions and to set out actions EFTA States could take to ensure that they reach full compliance with the rules and principles as established by the body of EEA law, and, in particular, the case law of the Courts of the European Communities and of the EFTA Court.
Nadzorni organ meni, da je potrebno pojasniti ukrepe, ki jih namerava sprejeti za lažje izvajanje odločb o vračilu, in opredeliti ukrepe, ki jih lahko države Efte sprejmejo za celovito upoštevanje pravil in načel zakonodaje EGP in zlasti sodne prakse Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti in Sodišča Efte.
To this end, the present Chapter will first recall the purpose of recovery and the basic principles underlying the implementation of recovery decisions.
Zato bo to poglavje najprej opozorilo na namen vračila in na temeljna načela izvajanja odločb o vračilu.
It will then present the practical implications of these basic principles for each of the actors involved in the recovery process.
Po tem bo predstavilo praktične posledice teh temeljnih načel za vsakega od udeležencev postopka vračil.
THE PRINCIPLES OF RECOVERY POLICY
NAČELA POLITIKE VRAČIL
A short history of recovery policy
Kratka zgodovina politike vračil
Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 states that ‘[t]he EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid.
Člen 1(3) dela I Protokola 3 določa, da se „Nadzorni organ Efta pravočasno obvesti, kar mu omogoča, da lahko predloži pripombe na kakršne koli načrte izvedbe ali spremembe pomoči.
[…] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision.’
[…] Zadevna država ne sme izvajati svojih predlaganih ukrepov, dokler v tem postopku ni sprejeta dokončna odločitev.“
In cases where an EFTA State does not notify the Authority of its plans to grant or alter aid prior to such aid being put into effect, the aid is unlawful in relation to EEA law from the time that it is granted.
Če države Efte ne obvestijo Nadzornega organa o načrtih za dodelitev ali spremembo pomoči, preden se ta začne izvajati, je glede na pravo EGP pomoč nezakonita od trenutka dodelitve.
In its Kohlegesetz judgment [6] of 1973, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the ECJ) confirmed for the first time that the Commission had the power to order the recovery of unlawful and incompatible State aid.
V sodbi Kohlegesetz [6] iz leta 1973 je Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti (v nadaljnjem besedilu: SES) prvič potrdilo, da ima Komisija pravico zahtevati vračilo nezakonite in nezdružljive državne pomoči.
The Court held that the Commission was competent to decide that a Member State must alter or abolish a state aid that was incompatible with the common market.
Sodišče je določilo, da je Komisija pristojna, da odloči, da mora država članica spremeniti ali ukiniti državno pomoč, ki je nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom.
It should therefore also be entitled to require repayment of this aid [7].
Zato je tudi pooblaščena, da zahteva vračilo te pomoči [7].
In 2001, Protocol 3 was amended by inter alia inserting Part II which amongst others included basic rules on recovery [8].
V letu 2001 je bil Protokol 3 med drugim spremenjen z vključitvijo dela II, s katerim so bila določena tudi temeljna pravila o vračilu [8].
Further implementing provisions on recovery were included in Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004, as amended [9].
Nadaljnje izvedbene določbe o vračilu so bile vključene v Odločbo št. 195/04/COL z dne 14. julija 2004, kakor je bila spremenjena [9].
Article 14(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 confirms the constant case law of the ECJ [10] and establishes an obligation on the Authority to order recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid unless this would be contrary to a general principle of law.
Člen 14(1) dela II Protokola 3 potrjuje ustaljeno sodno prakso SES [10] in določa, da je Nadzorni organ zavezan zahtevati vračilo nezakonite in nezdružljive državne pomoči, razen če je to v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava.
This article also provides that the EFTA State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover unlawful aid that is found to be incompatible.
Ta člen tudi določa, da morajo zadevne države Efte sprejeti vse potrebne ukrepe za vračilo nezakonite pomoči, katere je ugotovljena nezdružljivost.
Article 14(2) establishes that the aid is to be recovered, including interest from the date on which the unlawful aid was at the disposal of the beneficiary until the date of its effective recovery.
Člen 14(2) določa, da vračilo pomoči vključuje obresti od dne, ko je bila nezakonita pomoč na razpolago upravičencu, do datuma dejanskega vračila.
Decision No 195/04/COL elaborates on the methods to be used for the calculation of recovery interest.
Odločba št. 195/04/COL opredeljuje načine, ki se uporabljajo za izračun obresti pri vračilu.
Finally, Article 14(3) states that ‘[…] recovery shall be effected without delay and in accordance with the procedures under the national law of the EFTA State concerned, provided that they allow the immediate and effective execution of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s decision.
Člen 14(3) pa natančno določa, da „[…] se vračilo izvede nemudoma in skladno s postopki, določenimi v nacionalni zakonodaji zadevne države Efte, če omogočajo takojšnjo in učinkovito izvajanje odločbe Nadzornega organa.
In a number of recent judgments, the ECJ further clarified the scope and interpretation of Article 14(3) of Council Regulation No 659/1999 (which corresponds to Article 14(3) in Part II of Protocol 3) thereby emphasising the need for an immediate and effective execution of recovery decisions [11].
V več nedavnih sodbah je SES dodatno pojasnilo področje uporabe in razlago člena 14(3) Uredbe Sveta št. 659/1999 (ki je skladen členu 14(3) dela II Protokola 3), pri čemer je poudarilo potrebo po takojšnji in učinkoviti izvršitvi odločb o vračilu [11].
In addition, the Authority has also started to apply the Deggendorf case law [12] in a systematic manner.
Poleg tega je Nadzorni organ tudi začel bolj sistematično izvajati sodno prakso iz zadeve Deggendorf [12].
This case law enables the Authority, if certain conditions have been satisfied, to order EFTA States to suspend the payment of a new compatible aid to a company until that company has reimbursed old unlawful and incompatible aid that is subject to a recovery decision.
Ta sodna praksa Nadzornemu organu omogoča, da po določenimi pogoji od držav Efte zahteva prekinitev plačila nove združljive pomoči podjetju, dokler ni to podjetje povrnilo stare nezakonite in nezdružljive pomoči, ki je predmet odločbe o vračilu.
Purpose and principles of recovery policy
Namen in načela politike vračil
Purpose of recovery
Namen vračil
The ECJ has held on several occasions that the purpose of recovery is to re-establish the situation that existed on the market prior to the granting of the aid.
SES je večkrat določilo, da je namen vračila ponovna vzpostavitev stanja na trgu pred dodelitvijo pomoči.
This is necessary to ensure that the level-playing field in the internal market is maintained.
To je potrebno, da bi se zagotovila ohranitev enakih pogojev na notranjem trgu.
In this context, the ECJ underlined that the recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid is not a penalty [13], but the logical consequence of the finding that it is unlawful [14].
V zvezi s tem je SES poudarilo, da vračilo nezakonite in nezdružljive pomoči ni kazen [13], temveč logična posledica ugotovitve njene nezakonitosti [14].
It can therefore not be regarded as disproportionate to the objectives of the EC Treaty as regards state aid [15].
Zato se ne more obravnavati kor nesorazmerno glede na cilje Pogodbe ES v zvezi z državno pomočjo [15].
According to the ECJ, the ‘re-establishment of the previously existing situation is obtained once the unlawful and incompatible aid is repaid by the recipient who thereby forfeits the advantage which he enjoyed over his competitors in the market, and the situation as it existed prior to the granting of the aid is restored’ [16].
Po mnenju SES je „ponovna vzpostavitev predhodno obstoječega stanja dosežena, ko prejemnik vrne nezakonito in nezdružljivo pomoč in se pri tem odpove prednosti, ki jo je užival pred konkurenti na trgu, ter so obnovljene razmere, ki so obstajale pred dodelitvijo pomoči“ [16].
In order to eliminate any financial advantages incidental to unlawful aid, interest is to be recovered on the sums unlawfully granted.
Da bi se odpravile kakršne koli finančne prednosti, ki so lahko posledica nezakonite pomoči, je treba vrniti tudi obresti na nezakonito dodeljene zneske.
Such interest must be equivalent to the financial advantage arising from the availability of the funds in question, free of charge, over a given period [17].
Te obresti morajo biti enakovredne finančni prednosti, ki izhaja iz brezplačne razpoložljivosti zadevnih sredstev za dano obdobje [17].
Furthermore, the ECJ has insisted that in order for a recovery decision to be fully executed, the actions undertaken by a Member State must produce concrete effects as regards recovery [18] and that recovery must be immediate [19].
Poleg tega SES vztraja, da je odločba Komisije o vračilu v celoti izvedena takrat, če imajo ukrepi, ki jih je sprejela država članica, konkreten učinek na vračilo [18] in je vračilo takojšnje [19].
For recovery to reach its objective, it is indeed essential that the repayment of the aid takes place without delay.
Za dosego cilja vračila je res bistveno, da je povračilo pomoči izvedeno nemudoma.
The obligation to recover unlawful and incompatible state aid and its exceptions
Obveznost izvedbe vračila nezakonite in nezdružljive državne pomoči in njene izjeme
Article 14(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 specifies that ‘[w]here negative decisions are taken in cases of unlawful aid, the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall decide that the EFTA State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary’.
Člen 14(1) dela II Protokola 3 določa, da, „če se v primerih nezakonite pomoči sprejmejo negativne odločbe, Nadzorni organ Efte odloči, da mora zadevna država Efte sprejeti vse potrebne ukrepe, da upravičenec vrne pomoč“.
The provisions in Protocol 3 impose two limits on the Authority’s power to order recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid.
Protokol 3 določa dvojno omejitev pri pooblastilu Nadzornega organa do zahteve vračila nezakonite in nezdružljive pomoči.
Article 14(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 provides that the Authority shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of law.
Člen 14(1) dela II Protokola 3 določa, da Nadzorni organ ne zahteva vračila pomoči, če bi bilo to v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava.
The general principles of law most often invoked in this context are the principles of the protection of legitimate expectation [20] and of legal certainty [21].
V zvezi s tem so najbolj pogosta sklicevanja na načelo zaščite upravičenega pričakovanja [20] in na načelo pravne varnosti [21].
It is important to note that the ECJ has given a very restrictive interpretation to these principles in the context of recovery.
Pomembno je poudariti, da je SES dalo zelo omejevalno razlago teh načel v zvezi z vračili.
Article 15 in Part II of Protocol 3 states that the powers of the Authority to recover aid shall be subject to a limitation period of 10 years (the so-called ‘prescription period’).
Člen 15 dela II Protokola 3 določa, da so pooblastila Nadzornega organa v zvezi z vračilom pomoči veljavna največ deset let (t.i. zastaralni rok).
Any action taken by the Authority or the Commission [22] or by an EFTA State, acting at the request of the Authority, with regard to the unlawful aid, shall interrupt the limitation period.
Kakršen koli ukrep glede nezakonite pomoči, ki ga sprejme Nadzorni organ ali Komisija [22] ali država Efte na zahtevo Nadzornega organa, prekine zastaralni rok.
The EFTA State to which a recovery decision is addressed is obliged to execute this decision [23].
Zato je država Efte, na katero je odločba naslovljena, zavezana, da to odločbo izvede [23].
The ECJ has recognised only one exception to the obligation for a Member State to implement a recovery decision addressed to it, namely the existence of exceptional circumstances that would make it absolutely impossible for the Member State to execute the decision properly [24].
SES je priznalo samo eno izjemo v zvezi z obveznostjo, da država članica izvede odločbo o vračilu, ki je nanjo naslovljena, namreč obstoj izjemnih okoliščin, zaradi katerih je absolutno nemogoče, da bi država članica odločbo primerno izvedla [24].
According to the ECJ, absolute impossibility can however not be merely supposed.
Vendar po mnenju SES domneva o absolutni nemožnosti ni dovolj.
The Member State concerned must demonstrate that it attempted, in good faith, to recover unlawful aid and it must cooperate with the Commission in accordance with Article 10 of the EC Treaty, with a view to overcoming the difficulties encountered [25].
Zadevna država članica mora dokazati, da si je v dobri veri prizadevala za vračilo nezakonite pomoči, in mora s Komisijo sodelovati v skladu s členom 10 Pogodbe ES, da bi se nastale težave premostile [25].
A review of the jurisprudence shows that the ECJ has interpreted the concept of ‘absolute impossibility’ in a very restrictive manner.
Pregled sodne prakse kaže, da pojem „absolutne nemožnosti“ SES razlaga zelo omejevalno.
The Court has confirmed on several occasions that a Member State may not plead requirements of its national law, such as national prescription rules [26] or the absence of a recovery title under national law [27], in order to justify its failure to comply with a recovery decision [28].
Sodišče je večkrat potrdilo, da se država članica ne more sklicevati na zahteve svojega nacionalnega prava, kot so nacionalni zastaralni roki [26] ali neobstoj določb o vračilu v skladu z nacionalnim pravom [27], da bi s tem opravičila neizpolnjevanje odločbe o vračilu [28].
In the same way, the ECJ held that the obligation to recover is not affected by circumstances linked to the economic situation of the beneficiary.
Prav tako je SES določilo, da na obveznost vračila ne vplivajo okoliščine, povezane z gospodarskim stanjem upravičenca.
It clarified that a company in financial difficulties does not constitute proof that recovery was impossible [29].
Pojasnilo je, da finančne težave v podjetju ne pomenijo dokaza, da je bilo vračilo nemogoče [29].
In such circumstances, the Court pointed out that the absence of any recoverable assets is the only way for a Member State to show the absolute impossibility of recovering the aid [30].
Sodišče je poudarilo, da je neobstoj kakršnih koli sredstev, ki bi jih bilo mogoče vrniti, v takih okoliščinah edini način, da država članica pokaže na absolutno nemožnost vračila pomoči [30].
In a number of cases, the Member State argued that they had not been able to execute the recovery decision because of the administrative or technical difficulties involved (e.g. the very high number of beneficiaries involved).
V več zadevah so se države članice zagovarjale, da odločbe o vračilu niso mogle izvesti zaradi s tem povezanih upravnih ali tehničnih težav (npr. zelo visoko število vključenih upravičencev).
The Court consistently refused to accept that such difficulties constitute an absolute impossibility to recover [31].
Sodišče je dosledno zavračalo, da bi take težave pomenile absolutno nemožnost vračila [31].
Finally, the apprehension of even insurmountable internal difficulties cannot justify a failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations under Community law [32].
Poleg tega prisotnost celo nepremostljivih notranjih težav za državo članico ne more opravičiti neizpolnjevanja obveznosti iz prava Skupnosti [32].
The use of national procedures and the necessity of an immediate and effective execution
Uporaba nacionalnih postopkov in potreba po takojšnjem in učinkovitem izvajanju
Article 14(3) in Part II of Protocol 3 specifies that ‘recovery shall be effected without delay and in accordance with the procedures under the national law of the EFTA State concerned, provided that they allow the immediate and effective execution of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s decision’.
Člen 14(3) dela II Protokola 3 določa, da „se vračilo izvede nemudoma in skladno s postopki, določenimi v nacionalni zakonodaji zadevne države Efte, če omogočajo takojšnjo in učinkovito izvajanje odločbe Nadzornega organa Efte“.
If EFTA States are free to choose, according to their national law, the means by which they implement recovery decisions, the measures chosen should give full effect to the recovery decision.
Države Efte lahko v skladu s svojo nacionalno zakonodajo prosto izberejo sredstva za izpolnjevanje odločb o vračilu, vendar morajo odločbo o vračilu izbrani ukrepi izvesti v celoti.
It is therefore necessary that the national measures taken by EFTA States lead to an effective and immediate execution of the Authority’s decision.
Zato je nujno, da nacionalni ukrepi držav Efte zagotovijo učinkovito in takojšnje izvajanje odločbe Nadzornega organa.
In its Olympic Airways judgment [33], the ECJ underlined that the implementation measures taken by the Member State must be effective and produce a concrete outcome in terms of recovery.
V sodbi Olympic Airways [33] je SES poudarilo, da morajo biti izvedbeni ukrepi držav članic učinkoviti ter vključevati konkreten rezultat pri vračilu.
The actions undertaken by the State must result in the actual recovery of the sums owed by the beneficiary.
Posledica ukrepov držav mora biti dejansko vračilo zneskov, ki jih dolguje upravičenec.
In its Scott judgment [34], the ECJ confirmed that line and emphasised that national procedures which do not fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 14(3) of the Procedural Regulation (which corresponds to Article 14(3) in Part II of Protocol 3) should be left unapplied.
V nedavni sodbi Scott [34] je SES potrdilo to usmeritev in poudarilo, naj se nacionalni postopki, ki ne izpolnjujejo pogojev iz člena 14(3) postopkovne uredbe (ki je skladen členu 14(3) dela II Protokola 3), ne uporabijo.
It refuted, in particular, the Member State’s argument that it had taken all steps available in its national system and insisted that these steps should also lead to a concrete outcome in terms of recovery, and this within the deadline set by the Commission.
Zlasti je ovrglo trditev države članice, da je ta sprejela vse razpoložljive ukrepe po nacionalnem sistemu, ter vztrajalo, da morajo ti ukrepi zagotoviti konkreten rezultat pri vračilu, in sicer v roku, ki ga je določila Komisija.
Article 14(3) in Part II of Protocol 3 requires that recovery decisions are implemented in a way that is both effective and immediate.
Člen 14(3) dela II Protokola 3 zahteva, da se odločbe o vračilu izvedejo učinkovito in takoj.
In the Scott case, the ECJ stressed the importance of the time-dimension in the recovery process.
V zadevi Scott je SES poudarilo pomen časa v postopku vračila.
The Court specified that the application of national procedures should not impede the restoration of effective competition by preventing the immediate and effective execution of the Commission’s decision.
Sodišče je natančno določilo, da uporaba nacionalnih postopkov ne sme preprečiti ponovne vzpostavitve učinkovite konkurence z onemogočanjem takojšnje in učinkovite izvedbe odločbe Komisije.
National procedures, which prevent the immediate restoration of the previously existing situation and prolong the unfair competitive advantage resulting from unlawful and incompatible aid, do not fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 14(3) in Part II of Protocol 3.
Nacionalni postopki, ki preprečujejo takojšnjo vzpostavitev predhodno obstoječega stanja in podaljšujejo nepošteno konkurenčno prednost, posledico nezakonite in nezdružljive pomoči, ne izpolnjujejo pogojev iz člena 14(3) dela II Protokola 3.
In this context it is important to recall that an action for annulment of a recovery decision brought under Article 36 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the Surveillance and Court Agreement) does not have a suspensive effect.
V zvezi s tem je pomembno opozoriti, da tožba za razveljavitev odločbe o vračilu v skladu s členom 36 Sporazuma med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču) nima odložilnega učinka.
In the context of such an action, the beneficiary of the aid may however apply for the suspension of the execution of the recovery decision pursuant to Article 40 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement.
Vendar lahko pri taki tožbi upravičenec pomoči zaprosi za odložitev izvedbe odločbe o vračilu v skladu s členom 40 Sporazuma o nadzornem organu in sodišču.
Applications for suspension must state the circumstances giving rise to urgency and must contain the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measures being applied for [35].
V prošnjah za odložitev morajo biti navedene okoliščine, ki povzročajo nujnost, ter dejanske in pravne ugovore, ki prima facie dokazujejo potrebnost začasnih ukrepov [35].
The EFTA Court may then, if it considers that the circumstances so require, order that application of the contested decision be suspended.
Vendar pa lahko Sodišče Efte, če meni, da okoliščine to zahtevajo, odloži izvršitev izpodbijane odločbe.
The principle of loyal cooperation
Načelo lojalnega sodelovanja
Article 3 EEA obliges EFTA States to facilitate the achievement of the EEA tasks and imposes mutual duties of cooperation on the EEA institutions and the EFTA States, with a view to attaining the objectives of the EEA Agreement.
Člen 3 Sporazuma EGP obvezuje države Efte, da olajšujejo izpolnjevanje nalog Skupnosti, ter institucijam EGP in državam Efte nalaga vzajemno dolžnost sodelovanja za doseganje ciljev Sporazuma EGP.
In the context of the implementation of recovery decisions, the Authority and the EFTA States’ authorities must therefore cooperate to attain the objective of the restoration of competitive conditions in the internal market.
V zvezi z izvajanjem odločb o vračilu morajo torej Nadzorni organ in organi držav Efte sodelovati, da bi dosegli ponovno vzpostavitev konkurenčnih razmer na notranjem trgu.
If an EFTA State encounters unforeseen or unforeseeable difficulties in executing the recovery decision within the required time-limit or perceives consequences overlooked by the Authority, it should submit those problems for consideration to the Authority, together with proposals for suitable amendments [36].
Če država Efte naleti na nepredvidene ali nepredvidljive težave za izvedbo odločbe o vračilu v predvidenem roku ali opazi posledice, ki jih je Nadzorni organ spregledal, mora te težave predložiti Nadzornemu organu v premislek skupaj s predlogi za primerne spremembe [36].
In such a case, the Authority and the EFTA State concerned must work together in good faith to overcome the difficulties, whilst fully observing the EEA Agreement [37].
V takem primeru morata Nadzorni organ in zadevna država Efte sodelovati v dobri veri, da se težave premostijo ob polnem upoštevanju določb iz Sporazuma EGP [37].
Likewise the principle of loyal cooperation requires that the EFTA States provide the Authority with all the information enabling it to establish that the means chosen constitute an adapted implementation of the decision [38].
Načelo lojalnega sodelovanja poleg tega zahteva, da države Efte Nadzornemu organu predložijo vse informacije, ki tej omogočajo, da ugotovi, ali se z izbranimi sredstvi odločba izvaja na prilagojen način [38].