natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The report also concluded that inherently riskier investment banking had become an ever increasing feature of the banks' activities and growth had contributed to the problems.
Ko je banka Landsbanki propadla, so postali največji dolžniki banke solastnik družbe Samson Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson in družbe, povezane z njim, medtem ko je bil njegov oče in solastnik družbe Samson Björgólfur Guðmundsson tretji največji dolžnik banke.
The reduction in finance available on the international markets
Njihove obveznosti do banke so skupno znašale več kot 200 milijard ISK, kar je presegalo lastniški delež banke.
Much of the banks' growth was facilitated by access to international financial markets, capitalising upon good credit ratings and access to European markets through the EEA Agreement.
Po mnenju posebne preiskovalne komisije so se nekateri delničarji kot lastniki presenetljivo lahko zadolževali pri banki.
The Icelandic banks borrowed 14 billion Euros on foreign debt securities markets in 2005 on relatively favourable terms.
V primeru banke Landsbanki je to razvidno iz dejstva, da je banka družbi v lasti Björgólfurja Thora Björgólfssona še 30. septembra 2008 zagotovila posojilo v višini 153 milijonov EUR, ko je bilo jasno, da ta banka ni imela dovolj tujih valut, da bi odplačala svoje obveznosti v tujini.
When access to European debt securities markets became more limited, the banks financed their activities on US markets, with Icelandic debt securities packaged into collateralised debt obligations.
Prav tako je bilo ugotovljeno, da so v primeru vsake banke obstajali močni indici, da so se meje med interesi največjih delničarjev in interesi banke zabrisale.
In the period before the collapse, the banks were increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing, leading to major and, according to the SIC, foreseeable re-financing risks.
Poudarjanje prednosti glavnih delničarjih je torej škodilo drugim delničarjem in upnikom.
The gearing of the banks' owners
Koncentracija tveganj
In the case of each major Icelandic bank, the principal owners were among the biggest debtors [8].
V zvezi z neobičajno izpostavljenostjo glavnim delničarjem je posebna preiskovalna komisija ugotovila, da banke niso imele dovolj raznovrstnih portfeljev sredstev.
Samson Holding Company (‘Samson’) was the biggest shareholder in the Landsbanki since its privatisation.
Ta komisija je menila, da so se evropski predpisi o veliki izpostavljenosti razlagali ozko, zlasti v primeru delničarjev, in da so se skušale banke izogniti predpisom.
When Landsbanki collapsed Samson's co-owner Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson and companies affiliated to him were the bank's largest debtors, while his father and co-owner of Samson, Björgólfur Guðmundsson was the bank's third largest debtor.
Šibek lastniški kapital
In total their obligations to the bank exceeded 200 billion ISK, which was greater than the bank's equity.
Čeprav je bil količnik kapitala banke Landsbanki (in dveh drugih glavnih bank) po poročilih vedno rahlo višji od najnižje zakonsko določene stopnje, je posebna preiskovalna komisija ugotovila, da količniki kapitala niso natančno izražali finančne moči bank.
The SIC was of the view that certain shareholders had abnormally easy access to borrowing from the banks in their capacity as owners.
To je bilo zaradi tega, ker so bile lastne delnice banke prek primarnih zavarovanj in terminskih pogodb o delnicah izpostavljene tveganju.
This was notable in the case of Landsbanki from the fact that as late as 30 September 2008, when it was clear that Landsbanki did not have sufficient foreign currency to honour its obligations abroad, the bank provided a loan of 153 million Euros to a company owned by Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson.
Osnovni kapital, ki ga je financirala družba sama, posebna preiskovalna komisija pa ga je opredelila kot „šibek lastniški kapital“, je pomenil več kot eno četrtino kapitalske osnove banke (ob primerjavi z osnovno sestavino kapitala, tj. lastniškim kapitalom delničarjev, od česar se odštejejo neopredmetena sredstva, pa več kot polovico).
It also concluded that that there were strong indications that in the case of each bank the boundaries between the interests of the largest shareholders and the interest of the bank were blurred.
Poleg tega so se pojavile težave, ki jih je povzročilo tveganje, da so bile banke zaradi delnic v vzajemni lasti izpostavljene.
The emphasis on the major shareholders was therefore to the detriment of other shareholders and creditors.
Banke so do sredine leta 2008 neposredno financirale lastne delnice ter navzkrižno financirale delnice drugih dveh bank, kar je znašalo približno 400 milijard ISK, tj. okrog 70 % osnovne sestavine kapitala.
Concentration of risk
Po mnenju posebne preiskovalne komisije je bil obseg financiranja lastniškega kapitala delničarjev z izposojanjem iz sistema tolikšen, da je bila ogrožena stabilnost sistema.
Related to the issue of the abnormal exposure to major shareholders was the conclusion of the SIC that the banks' portfolios of assets were insufficiently diversified.
Banke so imele precejšnje količine lastnih delnic kot zavarovanje za posojanje, zato se je, s tem ko so padle cene delnic, zmanjšala kakovost njihovega posojilnega portfelja.
The SIC was of the view that European rules on large exposure were interpreted in a narrow way, in particular in the case of the shareholders, and that the banks had sought to evade the rules.
To je vplivalo na uspešnost bank in ustvarilo nadaljnji negativen pritisk na cene delnic, banke so kot odziv na to (po domnevah posebne preiskovalne komisije glede na razpoložljive informacije) skušale umetno ustvariti nenormalno povpraševanje po lastnih delnicah.
Weak equity
Velikost bank
Although the capital ratio of Landsbanki (and the other two major banks) was always reported to be slightly higher than the statutory minimum, the SIC concluded that the capital ratios did not accurately reflect the financial strength of the banks.
Bilanca stanja treh glavnih bank (skupaj) je leta 2001 znašala malo več kot letni bruto domači proizvod (BDP) Islandije.
This was due to the risk exposure of the bank's own shares through primary collaterals and forward contracts on the shares.
Banke so do konca leta 2007 postale mednarodne, njihova sredstva pa so za devetkrat presegala islandski BDP.
Share capital financed by the company itself, referred to by the SIC as ‘weak equity’ represented more than 25 % of the banks' capital bases (or over 50 % when assessed against the core component of the capital, shareholders' equity less intangible assets).
V poročilu posebne preiskovalne komisije je navedeno, da so opazovalci do leta 2006 pripomnili, da je bančni sistem prerasel zmogljivost Centralne banke Islandije, in so dvomili, da bi lahko izpolnila vlogo posojilodajalca v skrajni sili.
Added to this were problems caused by the risk the banks were exposed to by holding each other's shares.
Islandski kratkoročni dolgovi (v glavnem nastali zaradi financiranja bank) so bili do konca leta 2007 petnajstkrat višji kot devizne rezerve, tuje vloge v treh bankah pa so bile osemkrat višje kot devizne rezerve.
By the middle of 2008 direct financing by the banks of their own shares, as well as cross-financing of the other two banks' shares, amounted to approximately 400 billion ISK, around 70 % of the core component of capital.
Jamstveni sklad depozitarjev in vlagateljev je imel minimalna sredstva v primerjavi z bančnimi vlogami, za katere naj bi ponujal jamstvo.
The SIC was of the opinion that the extent of financing of shareholders' equity by borrowing from the system itself was such that the system's stability was threatened.
Po ugotovitvah posebne preiskovalne komisije je bila Islandija zaradi teh dejavnikov dovzetna za naval na banke.
The banks held a substantial amount of their own shares as collateral for their lending and therefore as share prices fell the quality of their loan portfolio declined.
Nenadna rast bank v primerjavi z regulativno in finančno infrastrukturo
This affected the banks' performance and put further downward pressure on their share prices; in response to which (the SIC assumed from the information in their possession), the banks attempted to artificially create abnormal demand for their own shares.
Posebna preiskovalna komisija je ugotovila, da ustrezni nadzorni organi na Islandiji niso imeli potrebne verodostojnosti, ker posojilodajalec v skrajni sili ni imel zadostnih sredstev.
The size of the banks
V poročilu je bilo ugotovljeno, da islandski Organ za finančni nadzor in Centralna banka Islandije nista imela strokovnega znanja in izkušenj za urejanje bank v težkih gospodarskih časih, lahko pa bi ukrepala, da bi se zmanjšala stopnja tveganja, ki je nastajala v bankah.
In 2001 the balance sheets of the three main banks (collectively) amounted to just over a year of the gross domestic product (‘GDP’) of Iceland.
Organ za finančni nadzor, na primer, ni rasel v enakem obsegu kot banke, prakse upravnega organa tudi niso bile v koraku s hitrim razvojem dejavnosti bank.
By the end of 2007 the banks had become international and held assets worth nine times the Icelandic GDP.
Poročilo je prav tako kritično do vlade, saj ugotavlja, da bi morali nacionalni organi ukrepati, tako da bi z zmanjšanjem velikosti bank ali z zahtevo, naj ena ali več bank svoj sedež premakne v tujino, zmanjšali možni vpliv bank na gospodarstvo [9].
The SIC report notes that by 2006, observers were commenting that the banking system had outgrown the capacity of the Central Bank of Iceland (‘CBI’) and doubted whether it could fulfil the role of lender of last resort.
Neravnotežje in čezmerna širitev celotnega islandskega gospodarstva
By the end of 2007 Iceland's short-term debts (mainly incurred due to financing of the banks) were 15 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves, and the foreign deposits in the three banks were also 8 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves.
V poročilu posebne preiskovalne komisije so navedeni dogodki v zvezi s širšim gospodarstvom, ki so prav tako vplivali na hitro rast bank in prispevali, da sta bila obseg in vpliv med sektorji finančnih storitev ter preostalim gospodarstvom v neravnotežju.
The Depositors and Investors Guarantee Fund held minimal resources in comparison with the bank deposits it was meant to guarantee.
V poročilu je bilo ugotovljeno, da so k čezmerni širitvi in neravnotežju najverjetneje prispevale vladne politike (zlasti fiskalna politika), pa tudi da monetarna politika Centralne banke Islandije ni bila dovolj restriktivna.
These factors, the SIC concludes, made Iceland susceptible to a run on its banks.
V poročilu so tudi opozorili, da je bila sprostitev pravil v islandskem stanovanjskem finančnem skladu „ena največjih napak v monetarnem in fiskalnem upravljanju, narejena v obdobju, ki je vodilo do zloma bank“ [10].
The sudden growth of the banks in comparison with the regulatory and financial infrastructure
V poročilu je kritično obravnavano tudi to, s kakšno lahkoto so si banke izposojale od Centralne banke Islandije, pri čemer so se zaloge kratkoročnih zavarovanih posojil Centralne banke Islandije povečale s 30 milijard ISK jeseni leta 2005 na 500 milijard ISK do začetka oktobra 2008.
The SIC concluded that the relevant supervisory bodies in Iceland lacked the credibility that was necessary in the absence of a sufficiently resourced lender of last resort.
Islandska krona, zunanja neravnotežja in razmiki kreditne zamenjave
The report concludes that the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority (the ‘FME’) and CBI lacked the expertise and experience to regulate the banks in difficult economic times, but that they could have taken action to reduce the level of risk that the banks were incurring.
V poročilu je navedeno, da je bila leta 2006 vrednost islandske krone netrajnostno visoka, islandski primanjkljaj tekočega računa je znašal več kot 16 % BDP, obveznosti v tujih valutah, od katerih so bila odšteta sredstva, pa so znašale skoraj celotni letni BDP.
The FME, for example, did not grow in the same proportion as the banks and the regulator's practices did not keep up with the rapid developments in the banks' operations.
Obstajali so pogoji za finančno krizo.
The report is also critical of the government, concluding that the authorities should have taken action to reduce the potential impact of the banks on the economy by reducing their size or requiring one or more banks to move their headquarters abroad [9].
Krona je do konca leta 2007 izgubljala vrednost, razmiki kreditne zamenjave na Islandiji in banke pa so eksponentno rasli.
Imbalance and overexpansion of the Icelandic economy as a whole
Ukrepi, sprejeti za obnovo bančnega sektorja
The SIC report makes reference to events concerning the wider economy that also impacted upon the banks' rapid growth and contributed to the imbalance in size and influence between the financial services sector and the remainder of the economy.
Islandski organi so se po zlomu treh glavnih komercialnih bank oktobra 2008 (vključno z banko Landsbanki) znašli pred izzivom brez primere, tj. zagotoviti nadaljnje bančne dejavnosti na Islandiji [11].
The report concluded that government policies (in particular fiscal policy) most likely contributed to the overexpansion and imbalance and that the CBI's monetary policy was not sufficiently restrictive.
Minister za finance je bil v imenu ministrstva za finance pooblaščen, da izplačuje sredstva za ustanavljanje novih finančnih podjetij.
The report also refers to relaxing the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund's lending rules as ‘one of the biggest mistakes in monetary and fiscal management made in the period leading up to the banks' collapse’ [10].
Poleg tega bi imele vloge v stečajnih postopkih finančnih podjetij prednost pred drugimi terjatvami.
The report is also critical of the ease with which the banks were able to borrow from the CBI, with the stock of CBI short-term collateral loans increasing from 30 billion ISK in the autumn of 2005 to 500 billion ISK by the beginning of October 2008.
Vlada je izjavila, da se bodo vloge v domačih komercialnih bankah in hranilnicah ter njihovih podružnicah na Islandiji v celoti zaščitile.
The report notes that in 2006, the value of the Icelandic króna was unsustainably high, the Icelandic current account deficit was over 16 % of GDP, and liabilities in foreign currencies less assets neared total annual GDP.
Islandska vlada je v sodelovanju z Mednarodnim denarnim skladom (MDS) v prvih tednih po zlomu tudi pripravila gospodarski program, na podlagi česar je bila 20. novembra 2008 odobrena islandska zahteva, naj ji MDS zagotovi dvoletni „stand-by“ aranžma, v kar je bilo zajeto posojilo MDS v višini 2,1 milijarde USD, s čimer naj bi se okrepile islandske devizne rezerve.
The prerequisites for a financial crisis were in place.
Druge nordijske države ter nekateri drugi trgovinski partnerji pa so zagotovili dodatna posojila v višini do 3 milijard USD.
By the end of 2007 the value of the króna was depreciating and credit default swap spreads on Iceland and the banks rose exponentially.
Od posojila MDS je bilo 827 milijonov USD takoj na voljo, preostali znesek pa je bil na podlagi četrtletnih pregledov programa izplačan v osmih enakih obrokih.
Measures taken to reconstruct the banking sector
Program MDS je bil stabilizacijski program s široko osnovo s poudarkom na treh glavnih ciljih.
Following the collapse of the three biggest commercial banks in October 2008 (including Landsbanki) the Icelandic authorities were faced with the unprecedented challenge of safeguarding continued banking operations in Iceland [11].
Prvič, stabilizirati in obnoviti zaupanje v krono, da se omeji negativni učinek krize na gospodarstvo.
The policy followed by the Icelandic Government is primarily laid down in the Emergency Act [12] adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 6 October 2008.
V te ukrepe je bila zajeta uvedba kapitalskih kontrol, ki naj bi okrnile beg kapitala.
The law grants extraordinary powers to the FME to take control of financial undertakings and to dispose of their assets and liabilities as required.
Drugič, v program je bila vključena obsežna strategija za prestrukturiranje bank, katere končni cilj je bila obnova uspešno delujočega finančnega sistema na Islandiji ter zaščita mednarodnih finančnih odnosov države.
The Minister of Finance was authorised, on behalf of the Treasury, to disburse funds in order to establish new financial undertakings.
Pomožni cilji so med drugim zajemali: zagotoviti pravično vrednotenje bančnih sredstev, čim bolj povečati vračilo sredstev in okrepiti prakse nadzora.
Moreover, in bankruptcy proceedings of financial undertakings, deposits would be given priority over other claims.
Tretjič, cilj programa je bilo zagotavljanje vzdržnih javnih financ, s tem da se omeji socializacija izgub v propadlih bankah in izvede srednjeročni program fiskalne konsolidacije.
The Government declared that deposits in domestic commercial and savings banks and their branches in Iceland would be fully protected.
Islandski organi so poudarili, da so imeli zaradi izrednih okoliščin, povezanih z obsežnostjo bančnega sistema v zvezi s finančno zmogljivostjo državne blagajne, na voljo omejene možnosti politike.
Policy priorities focused initially on securing the basic functioning of the domestic banking, payment and settlement systems.
Opirali so se torej na rešitve, ki so se v mnogočem razlikovale od ukrepov, ki so jih sprejele vlade drugih držav, katerih finančna stabilnost je bila ogrožena.
In the first weeks after the crash, the Icelandic Government also prepared an economic program in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (the IMF), leading to the approval on 20 November 2008 of Iceland's request for a two year stand-by-arrangement from the Fund, which included a 2,1 billion USD loan from the IMF aimed at strengthening Iceland's currency reserves.
Tri velike komercialne banke: banke Glitnir, Landsbanki Íslands in Kaupthing, so bile na podlagi zakona o izrednih razmerah razdeljene v „nekdanje“ in „nove“ banke.
Additional loans of up to 3 billion USD were secured from other Nordic countries as well as certain other trading partners.
Za prevzem domačih dejavnosti nekdanjih bank je minister za finance ustanovil tri družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo, v katerih je imenoval tudi upravni odbor.
Of the IMF loan, 827 million USD was made available immediately, while the remaining amount was disbursed in eight equal instalments, subject to quarterly reviews of the program.
Nadzor nad nekdanjimi bankami je prevzel Organ za finančni nadzor, ki je v glavnem domača sredstva in obveznosti (vloge) teh bank dodelil novim bankam, ki so nadaljevale bančne dejavnosti na Islandiji.
The IMF Program was a broad-based stabilisation program focusing on three key objectives.
Nekdanje banke pa so bile dane pod nadzor vsaka svojega odbora za razpustitev [13].
Firstly, to stabilise and restore confidence in the króna so as to contain the negative impact of the crisis on the economy.
Tuja sredstva in obveznosti so bili večinoma vloženi v nekdanje banke, za katere so bili pozneje uvedeni postopki likvidacije, sčasoma so se zaprle tudi vse dejavnosti v tujini [14].
The measures included the introduction of capital controls aimed at stemming capital flight.
(30) V začasnih začetnih bilancah stanja treh novih bank z dne 14. novembra 2008 je bilo ocenjeno, da so združena celotna sredstva bank znašala 2886 milijard ISK, pri čemer naj bi država prispevala lastniški kapital v višini 385 milijard ISK.
The solutions relied upon were therefore in many ways different to the measures taken by the governments of other countries facing threats to financial stability.
Zaradi teh zapletov se je politika za poravnavanje računov med nekdanjimi in novimi bankami spremenila.
On the basis of the Emergency Act, the three large commercial banks, Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands and Kaupthing Bank, were split into ‘old’ and ‘new’ banks.
Tako naj bi stranke dogovore o vrednosti prenesenih neto sredstev skušale doseči s pogajanji, namesto da bi se zanašale na vrednotenja neodvisnih strokovnjakov.
The Minister of Finance founded three limited liability companies to take over the domestic operations of the old banks and appointed them boards of directors.
Jasno je bilo, da bi stranke težko dosegle dogovore o vrednotenjih, saj so bila očitno podvržena številnim domnevam, o katerih se stranke verjetno ne bi strinjale.
The FME took control of the old banks, allocated essentially their domestic assets and liabilities (deposits) to the new banks which continued banking operations in Iceland.
Država je nameravala doseči soglasja o temeljnih ocenah, s čimer bi se zagotovili trdni temelji za začetno kapitalizacijo novih bank.
The old banks were placed under the supervision of their respective resolution committees.
Stabilne cene sredstev bi lahko prek temeljne ocene pripisali upnikom v obliki pogojno zamenljivih obveznic ali povečanj vrednosti osnovnega kapitala bank, saj je med pogajanji postalo jasno, da bi se lahko odbora za razpustitev bank Glitnir in Kaupthing ter večina njunih upnikov zanimali za pridobivanje kapitalskih deležev novih bank, zaradi tega bi lahko imeli koristi od morebitnih povečanj vrednosti prenesenih sredstev.
Foreign assets and liabilities were in the main placed in the old banks, which were later submitted to winding-up procedures and the eventual closure of all foreign operations.
Celotna kapitalizacija treh novih bank in glavne točke sporazumov z upniki nekdanjih bank o tem, kako bo izplačano nadomestilo za prenos neto sredstev v nove banke, so bili objavljeni 20. julija 2009.
[14]
V to so bili v zvezi z dvema novima bankama, in sicer New Glitnir (pozneje preimenovana v Íslandsbanki) in New Kaupthing (pozneje preimenovana v Arion Bank), vključeni pogojni sporazumi, v skladu s katerimi naj bi nekdanje banke v nove banke vpisale večinske deleže v lastniškem kapitalu.
In the provisional opening balance sheets of the three new banks of 14 November 2008 it was estimated that the banks' combined total assets would amount to 2886 billion ISK, with an equity to be provided by the State of 385 billion ISK.
Odbori za razpustitev nekdanjih bank so se oktobra 2009 (banka Glitnir) ter decembra 2009 (banki Kaupthing in Landsbanki Islands) na podlagi glavnih točk sporazumov odločili za vpis v delež v novih bankah.
The total amount of bonds to be issued by the new banks in favour of the old banks as payment for the value of the assets transferred in excess of liabilities was estimated at 1153 billion ISK.
Vlada je 18. decembra 2009 objavila, da je bila sanacija banke končana ter da so bili doseženi sporazumi med islandskimi organi in novimi bankami na eni strani in odbori za razpustitev bank Glitnir, Landsbanki Íslands in Kaupthing v imenu njihovih upnikov na drugi.
The FME appointed Deloitte LLP to perform assessments of the value of transferred assets and liabilities.
V sporazume so bile vključene poravnave glede sredstev, prenesenih z nekdanjih bank na nove, pa tudi da so bile nove banke tedaj v celoti financirane.
In this process it transpired that the independent assessment would not result in fixed values of net assets transferred but valuations within certain ranges.
Prispevek iz državne blagajne v lastniški kapital novih bank se je precej zmanjšal, in sicer s prvotno predvidenih 385 milijard ISK na 135 milijard ISK v obliki osnovnega kapitala, v primeru dveh od treh bank, tj. bank Íslandsbanki in Arion, pa približno na 55 milijard ISK kapitala 2. reda v obliki podrejenih dolgov ali skupno 190 milijard ISK.
It also emerged that the banks' creditors raised disagreements concerning the valuation process, which they considered not to be impartial, and complained that they were unable to protect their interests.
Poleg tega sta banki Íslandsbanki in Arion iz državne blagajne prejeli določena likvidnostna posojila.
These complications resulted in a change of policy for settling the accounts between the old and the new banks.
Osnovni kapital, ki so ga nekdanje banke zagotovile novim, je v celoti znašal približno 156 milijard ISK.
Instead of relying on valuations by an independent expert, the parties would try through negotiations to reach agreements on the value of the net assets transferred.
Skupna kapitalizacija novih bank je torej znašala približno 346 milijard ISK.