natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Comments from the Norwegian authorities
Pripombe norveških organov
The Norwegian authorities are of the view that the contract with NEAS was concluded at market terms.
Stališče norveških organov je, da je bila pogodba z družbo NEAS sklenjena po tržnih pogojih.
They firstly emphasise that the agreement was concluded because Narvik’s finances were strained and it was in need of liquid capital.
Najprej poudarjajo, da je bil sporazum sklenjen, ker je bilo finančno stanje občine Narvik slabo in je potrebovala likvidna sredstva.
Secondly, NEAS needed to undergo recapitalization in order to restructure the company to create a larger regional company.
Poleg tega se je morala družba NEAS, če se je želela prestrukturirati in ustvariti večjo regijsko družbo, dokapitalizirati.
Lastly, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the municipality had been selling concession power at a loss because the concession power price was higher than the price obtained in the market.
Kot zadnje je občina v času sklenitve pogodbe prodajala električno energijo, pridobljeno po znižani ceni, z izgubo, ker je bila znižana cena višja od tržne.
By way of example, in the period April 1999 to December 1999, Narvik lost NOK 2,3 million on the sale of concession power.
V obdobju od aprila 1999 do decembra 1999 je na primer občina tako s prodajo električne energije, pridobljene po znižani ceni, izgubila 2,3 milijona NOK.
The Norwegian authorities argue that the appropriate market benchmark for the 50,5 year agreement is a permanent sale of a power plant, and that adjusted for relevant differences, the prices obtained by NEAS was in line with the price levels for the sale of power plants in the same period.
Norveški organi trdijo, da je ustrezna tržna referenčna vrednost za pogodbo z veljavnostjo 50,5 let trajna prodaja elektrarne in da so bile cene, ki jih je dosegla družba NEAS in so prilagojene glede na ustrezne razlike, skladne z ravnmi cen za prodajo elektrarn v istem obdobju.
For price data about the sale of power plants in 2000, the Norwegian authorities refer to a so-called real time review of the electricity market for year 2000 carried out by Pareto (the ‘Pareto Review’).
Za podatke o cenah pri prodaji elektrarn v letu 2000 norveški organi navajajo tako imenovani pregled trga z električno energijo v realnem času za leto 2000, ki ga je izvedel Pareto („Paretov pregled“).
In that review, it appears that the market prices for power plants sold in 2000 varied between NOK 1,64 and 1,77 per KWh of annual production capacity.
V tem pregledu se zdi, da so se tržne cene za elektrarne, ki so bile prodane v letu 2000, gibale med 1,64 NOK in 1,77 NOK za kWh letne proizvodne zmogljivosti.
Narvik’s sale of entitlement to concession power equals approximately NOK 1,00 per KWh of annual production capacity.
Prodaja pravice občine Narvik do električne energije po znižani ceni znaša približno 1,00 NOK za kWh letne proizvodne zmogljivosti.
According to the Norwegian authorities, the difference between these figures can be explained by the following factors.
Po mnenju norveških organov razlike v teh številkah pojasnjujejo v nadaljevanju opisani dejavniki.
Firstly, in 2000, the typical operating costs including ongoing reinvestment (without depreciation) for a newer power plant was about NOK 0,05 per KWh per year (plus feeding costs).
Prvič, leta 2000 so običajni stroški delovanja, vključno s tekočimi ponovnimi vlaganji (brez amortizacije), za novejšo elektrarno znašali približno 0,05 NOK na kWh letno (plus stroški dovajanja).
NEAS’ expected ongoing payment was twofold;
Pričakovano tekoče plačilo družbe NEAS je bilo dvojne narave:
Thus, the 2000 scenario would lead to a net profit of NOK 0,07 per KWh for a plant owner, compared to NOK 0,02 per KWh on the concession power.
Tako bi scenarij za leto 2000 lastniku elektrarne omogočil dobiček v višini 0,07 NOK za kWh v primerjavi z 0,02 NOK za kWh električne energije po znižani ceni.
At the time of the conclusion of the contract, the estimated 2010 price was NOK 0,20.
Ob sklenitvi pogodbe je bila predvidena cena za leto 2010 0,20 NOK.
On the basis of that estimate, the 2010 scenario would lead to a net profit of NOK 0,15 per KWh for a plant owner, compared to NOK 0,10 per KWh on the concession power.
Na podlagi te ocene bi scenarij za leto 2010 lastniku elektrarne omogočil dobiček v višini 0,15 NOK za kWh v primerjavi z 0,10 NOK za kWh električne energije po znižani ceni.
Secondly, the Norwegian authorities argue that the prices for the sale of the five power plants from the Pareto Review must be reduced by approximately 10-15 % when applying a capitalisation rate of 4 % to make up for the difference between the capitalisation over infinite time (capitalisation factor of 25) and 50 years (capitalization factor of 21,48).
Drugič. norveški organi trdijo, da je treba cene za prodajo petih elektrarn iz Paretovega pregleda pri 4-odstotni stopnji donosnosti vloženih sredstev znižati za približno 10–15 %, kar nadomesti razliko med kapitalizacijo v neomejenem času (faktor kapitalizacije 25) in kapitalizacijo v 50 letih (faktor kapitalizacije 21,48).
The Norwegian authorities further add that the early years have the greatest impact on the NPV calculation and that heavy reinvestment costs of ownership typically comes at a later stage, and therefore has little reduction effect on the NPV calculation.
Norveški organi še dodajajo, da na izračun neto sedanje vrednosti najbolj vplivajo prva leta in da večji stroški ponovnih vlaganj pri lastništvu običajno nastopijo pozneje, zato nimajo večjega vpliva na izračun neto sedanje vrednosti.
Taking this into account, the Norwegian authorities argue that there is a close correlation between on the one hand, power plant sales at approximately NOK 1,64 – NOK 1,77 per KWh of annual production capacity, and on the other hand, rents (payment for electricity access for 50,5 years) of approximately NOK 1,00 per KWh of concession power.
Z upoštevanjem zgoraj navedenega norveški organi trdijo, da obstaja tesna povezava med prodajo elektrarn po približni ceni med 1,64 NOK in 1,77 NOK za kWh letne proizvodne zmogljivosti na eni strani in najemninami (plačili za dostop do električne energije v obdobju 50,5 let) po približni ceni 1,00 NOK za kWh električne energije po znižani ceni na drugi strani.
The Norwegian authorities thus argue that a comparison which adjusts for these factors demonstrates that the price NEAS paid for the concession power was comparable to the price of power plants sold in the same period, and add that the conclusion on the price level is supported by the DT report and the two DS reports predating the conclusion of the 50,5 years concession power agreement.
Norveški organi tako trdijo, da primerjava, s katero se ti dejavniki prilagodijo, kaže, da so bile cene, ki jih je družba NEAS plačala za električno energijo, pridobljeno po znižani ceni, primerljive s cenami elektrarn, ki so se prodajale v tistem obdobju, in dodajajo, da sklenitev pogodbe na ravni cen podpira poročilo družbe DT ter dve poročili DS, izdelani pred sklenitvijo pogodbe o nakupu električne energije po znižani ceni v obdobju 50,5 let.
In reference to the Authority’s Guidelines for state aid elements in sales of land and buildings by public Authorities (‘the SOL’) [16], the Norwegian authorities argue that a competitive and unconditional tender procedure is only one method recognized by the Authority to determine market prices on the sale of public assets.
Glede na smernice Nadzornega organa o elementih državne pomoči pri prodaji zemljišč in objektov s strani javnih oblasti (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Smernice) [16], norveški organi trdijo, da je konkurenčni in brezpogojni razpisni postopek edini način za določanje tržnih cen pri prodaji javnih sredstev, ki ga organi priznavajo.
The Norwegian authorities emphasise that in the SOL, the Authority also recognises that an aid free market price can be established on the basis of an independent expert evaluation.
Norveški organi poudarjajo, da Nadzorni organ v Smernicah priznava, da se tržna cena, ki ne vključuje pomoči, lahko določi na podlagi neodvisne strokovne ocene.
The Norwegian authorities note that the DT and the two DS reports were delivered before the 50,5 year contract was concluded.
Norveški organi ugotavljajo, da so bila poročilo družbe DT in dve poročili DS poslana, preden je bila sklenjena pogodba za obdobje 50,5 let.
The second DS report determined the value on the basis of ‘direct market research’, which according to the Norwegian authorities resulted in a market testing similar to that of a tender procedure.
Drugo poročilo DS je določilo vrednost na podlagi „neposredne raziskave trga“, ki je po trditvah norveških organov privedlo do preverjanja trga, podobnega tistemu pri razpisnem postopku.
The Norwegian authorities also note that the final price was within the upper level of the three valuations.
Norveški organi tudi ugotavljajo, da je bila končna cena v okviru zgornje ravni treh ocen.
The Norwegian Authorities further argue that it was appropriate for no price adjustment clause to be included, since the purchase price was paid as a lump sum, and not on an ongoing basis.
Norveški organi še trdijo, da je bila vključitev klavzule za prilagoditev cene, ki ni vsebovala cene, ustrezna, saj je bila nakupna cena plačana v obliki pavšalnega zneska in ne na podlagi rednih plačil.
The Norwegian authorities argue that the fact that the sale was settled up front – partly in cash and partly as a contribution in kind – similar to a permanent power plant sale, it is ‘unnatural and very unusual’ to include a price adjustment mechanism.
Norveški organi trdijo, da je ob dejstvu, da je bila prodaja dogovorjena vnaprej (delno v gotovini in delno v stvarnem vložku), podobno kot pri trajni prodaji elektrarne, vključitev mehanizma za prilagoditev cen „neobičajna in zelo nenavadna“.
The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that by virtue of the contribution in kind model a subsequent adjustment would probably also have been illegal pursuant to the provisions of the Limited Liability Company Act [17].
Norveški organi še trdijo, da bi bila na podlagi modela stvarnega vložka naknadna prilagoditev v skladu z določbami Zakona o družbah z omejeno odgovornostjo prav tako nezakonita [17].
One third party, NEAS (now Nordkraft), submitted comments to Decision 393/11/COL.
Ena od tretjih strank, družba NEAS (zdaj družba Nordkraft), je predložila pripombe na Odločbo 393/11/COL.
NEAS essentially concurs with the views of the Norwegian authorities.
Družba NEAS se v bistvu strinja s stališči norveških organov.
It follows from this provision that, for state aid to be present, the measure must confer an economic advantage on the recipient.
Iz te določbe izhaja, da mora ukrep, če naj bo državna pomoč prisotna, prejemniku zagotavljati gospodarsko korist.
In the following, the Authority assesses the question of the presence, in the case at hand, of such an economic advantage.
V nadaljevanju Nadzorni organ ocenjuje vprašanje prisotnosti takšne pomoči v obravnavanem primeru.
The Court of Justice of the European Union has stated that in order to confirm whether a state measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage, which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions [18].
Sodišče Evropske unije navaja, da je za odločanje o tem, ali državni ukrep predstavlja pomoč, treba ugotoviti, ali ima podjetje, ki prejme pomoč, gospodarsko korist, ki je sicer v običajnih tržnih pogojih ne bi imelo [18].
In order to assess the presence of an economic advantage, the Authority applies the principle of a (hypothetical) market economy investor [19].
Za oceno prisotnosti gospodarske koristi Nadzorni organ uporablja načelo (hipotetičnega) zasebnega vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji [19].
If the transaction in question was carried out in accordance with the market economy investor principle, i.e., if the municipality sold the entitlement to concession power for its market value, and the price and terms of the transaction would have been acceptable for a prudent private investor operating in a market economy, the transaction would not confer an economic advantage on NEAS and thus not involve the grant of state aid.
Če je bila obravnavana transakcija izvedena v skladu z načelom zasebnega vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji, tj. če je občina prodala pravico do električne energije po znižani ceni po njeni tržni vrednosti in če bi bili cena in pogoji za preudarnega vlagatelja, ki deluje v tržnem gospodarstvu, sprejemljivi, transakcija za družbo NEAS ne bi pomenila gospodarske koristi in tako ne bi vključevala dodelitve državne pomoči.
On the contrary, state aid could be involved if the transaction was not carried out at market price.
V nasprotnem primeru bi bila državna pomoč lahko vključena, če transakcija ne bi bila izvedena po tržni ceni.
In making this assessment, the Authority cannot replace Narvik’s commercial judgement with its own, which implies that the municipality, as the owner of the concession power entitlement, enjoys a margin of discretion to choose the manner in which it operates under normal competitive conditions.
Pri pripravi te ocene Nadzorni organ ne more nadomestiti komercialne ocene občine Narvik s svojo, kar pomeni, da ima občina kot lastnica pravice do električne energije po znižani ceni pri izbiri načina, na katerega bo delovala v običajnih pogojih konkurence, diskrecijsko pravico.
An assessment of the price and terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS should be based on the information available to Narvik at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
Ocena cene in pogojev pogodbe med občino in družbo NEAS mora temeljiti na informacijah, ki so bile občini Narvik na voljo v času sklenitve pogodbe.
Generally, an informed ex ante assessment would be sufficient to exclude the presence of state aid, even if the assumptions used in the assessment prove to be wrong with hindsight.
V splošnem bi za izključitev prisotnosti državne pomoči zadoščalo informirano predhodno preverjanje, tudi če bi se v oceni uporabljene predpostavke za nazaj izkazale kot napačne.
In the following, the Authority therefore assesses whether Narvik acted as a private market investor when it entered into a contract to sell its entitlement to concession power.
V nadaljevanju zato Nadzorni organ ocenjuje, ali je občina delovala kot zasebni vlagatelj na trgu, ko je sklenila pogodbo za prodajo svoje pravice do električne energije po znižani ceni.
The Authority is mindful of the context in which the transaction was entered into.
Nadzorni organ se zaveda okoliščin, v katerih je bila transakcija sklenjena.
From the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority understands that at the time the contract was entered into the municipality was in a situation where it needed both access to liquidity (in order to meet its loan obligations), as well as capital to inject into NEAS.
Iz informacij, ki so jih prispevali norveški organi, Nadzorni organ razume, da je bila občina v času sklenitve pogodbe v takšnem položaju, da je potrebovala dostop do likvidnosti (za poplačilo dolgov) in kapitala za vlaganje v družbo NEAS.
In addition, it is noted that the Limited Liability Company Act restricted the possibility of incorporating a price adjustment mechanism in the contract when making a contribution in kind.
Poleg tega ugotavlja, da je Zakon o družbah z omejeno odgovornostjo pri stvarnih vložkih omejeval možnost vključitve mehanizma za prilagoditev cen v pogodbo.
In 1999, prior to the conclusion of the sales agreement in 2000, Narvik had furthermore incurred losses on its sale of concession power.
Leta 1999, pred sklenitvijo prodajne pogodbe v letu 2000, je imela občina tudi izgube zaradi prodaje električne energije, pridobljene po znižani ceni.
The municipality had therefore decided to sell off its entitlement to concession power for a longer term whilst at the same time complying with its expressed strategy of maximising its return on the concession power.
Občina se je zato odločila, da svojo pravico do električne energije po znižani ceni proda za daljši čas, hkrati pa upošteva lastno strategijo maksimiranja donosa pri električni energiji po znižani ceni, ki jo je izrazila.
The Norwegian authorities have argued that the Authority should be able to exclude the presence of an advantage by applying the principles of the SOL to the case at hand.
Norveški organi trdijo, da bi lahko Nadzorni organ z uporabo načel Smernic v obravnavanem primeru izključil prisotnost koristi.
The Authority notes that, although the SOL does not apply to the sale of entitlements to buy concession power, the SOL does indeed prescribe two methods with which public authorities normally can obtain a market price for the sale of publicly owned land and buildings and consequently ensure that the sale does not involve state aid.
Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da Smernice, čeprav se ne nanašajo na prodajo pravic do nakupa električne energije po znižani ceni, res predpisujejo dva načina, na katera javni organi lahko običajno pridobijo tržno ceno zemljišč in objektov v javni lasti in posledično zagotovijo, da prodaja ne vključuje državne pomoči.
The first method to exclude an aid element is the sale through an unconditional bidding procedure.
Prvi način za izključitev elementa pomoči je prodaja prek brezpogojnega postopka zbiranja ponudb.
The second, the sale at a price established by an independent expert evaluation made in accordance with generally accepted valuation standards.
Drugi način je prodaja po ceni, določeni z neodvisno strokovno oceno, ki se pripravi v skladu s splošno sprejetimi standardi vrednotenja.
The Authority notes that the sale of an asset through an unconditional bidding procedure normally will exclude the presence of an advantage.
Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da prodaja sredstva prek brezpogojnega postopka zbiranja ponudb običajno izključi prisotnost koristi.
At the least in genuinely open procedures where there is more than one bidder [20].
Vsaj v resnično odprtih postopkih, kjer obstaja več kot en ponudnik [20].
Narvik’s entitlement to concession power was however, not sold through an unconditional bidding process.
Pravica občine do električne energije po znižani ceni pa ni bila prodana prek brezpogojnega postopka zbiranja ponudb.
On the other hand, Narvik and NEAS each commissioned two assessments from external advisors, as described in paragraphs (26) to (29) above.
Po drugi strani sta tako občina Narvik kot družba NEAS pri zunanjih svetovalcih naročili vsaka po dve oceni, kot je opisano v odstavkih od (26) do (29).
However, neither the DS1, the DS2 nor the AA reports thoroughly clarify what method is used to determine the value assessments.
Vendar niti poročili DS1 in DS2 niti poročilo družbe AA ne pojasnjujejo dovolj podrobno, katera metoda je bila uporabljena za določanje ocene vrednosti.
In the absence of further clarifications, the Authority is not in the position to assess whether the market value assessments have been made in accordance with generally accepted market indicators and valuation standards.
Ker ni natančnejših pojasnil, Nadzorni organ ne more oceniti, ali so bile ocene tržne vrednosti izdelane v skladu s splošno sprejetimi tržnimi kazalci in standardi vrednotenja.
Therefore the view of the Authority is that the DS1, the DS2 and the AA reports are of limited value in assessing the value of the entitlement of the concession power.
Zato Nadzorni organ meni, da imajo pri ocenjevanju vrednosti pravice do električne energije po znižani ceni poročili DS1 in DS2 ter poročilo družbe AA omejeno vrednost.
On the other hand, the DT report does provide a detailed explanation of its assessments.
Po drugi strani so v poročilu družbe DT vrednotenja podrobno pojasnjena.
Consequently its results can be tested and verified.
Zato je njene rezultate mogoče preskusiti in preveriti.
The Authority therefore finds that the DT report is the most credible report.
Nadzorni organ zato ugotavlja, da je poročilo družbe DT najbolj verodostojno.
In the view of the Authority, the fact that all of the four reports give similar results [21] however strengthens the results of the DT report and arguably also those of the three other reports.
Vendar po mnenju Nadzornega organa dejstvo, da so rezultati vseh štirih poročil podobni [21], krepi verodostojnost rezultatov poročila družbe DT, pa tudi ostalih treh poročil.
The Authority notes that although a price determined by an independent value assessor normally can be held to exclude the presence of an advantage in the sale of easily appraisable generic land or buildings that have been subject to numerous transactions, this is not necessarily the case for land and buildings with more unique qualities or where the circumstances surrounding the sale are liable to cast doubt on whether the expert evaluation reflect the actual market value of the property [22].
Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da se pri ceni, ki jo določi neodvisni cenilec, običajno lahko šteje, da izključuje prisotnost koristi pri prodaji generičnih zemljišč ali objektov, ki jih je enostavno oceniti in so bili že predmet več transakcij, pri zemljiščih in objektih z več edinstvenimi lastnostmi ali pri katerih lahko okoliščine prodaje vzbudijo dvom o tem, ali strokovna ocena zrcali dejansko tržno vrednost lastnine, pa to ne velja nujno [22].
As explained in the following, fixed price power supply contracts of a duration exceeding 6 years are unusual and not commonly observed.
Kot je pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, so pogodbe za dobavo električne energije z nespremenljivo ceno, ki presegajo 6 let, nenavadne in redke.
Due to the lack of a market where comparable prices can be observed and due to the volatility of electricity prices, an expert evaluation is less suitable as an instrument to determine the market price of a fixed price 50,5 year power contract [23].
Ker ni trga, na katerem bi lahko preverjali primerljive cene, in zaradi nestabilnosti cen elektrike, je strokovna ocena kot instrument za določanje tržne cene pogodbe za dobavo energije z nespremenljivo ceno v trajanju 50,5 let manj primerna [23].
In any event, the Authority recalls that it is the market economy investor test, and not the SOL, which concerns sale of public land and buildings, that is the applicable test to assess whether a power contract concluded by a public authority involves an advantage ‘favouring’ an undertaking.
Nadzorni organ v vsakem primeru opozarja, da se za oceno, ali pogodba o prodaji električne energije, sklenjena s strani javnega organa, vključuje korist, ki „daje prednost“ podjetju, uporablja načelo zasebnega vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji in ne Smernice, ki zadevajo prodajo zemljišč in objektov v javni lasti. Splošno sodišče je v sodbi v zadevi Budapesti Erőmű Zrt proti Komisiji dejansko potrdilo, da se načelo zasebnega vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji nanaša na dolgoročne pogodbe o prodaji električne energije;
Indeed, that the general market economy investor principle applies to long term power contracts, has been confirmed by the General Court in Budapesti Erőmű Zrt v Commission where the General Court endorsed the approach taken by the European Commission (‘the Commission’) in a case concerning long term power contracts concluded by the Hungarian authorities [24].
v tej sodbi je v zadevi, ki se nanaša na dolgoročne pogodbe o prodaji električne energije, sklenjene s strani madžarskih organov, Splošno sodišče podprlo pristop, ki ga je izbrala Evropska komisija (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Komisija) [24].
In that case the Commission identified the main practices of commercial operators on European electricity markets that were relevant for the purposes of its analysis and assessed whether the agreements in the case at hand were in line with those practices, or whether the contracts were concluded on terms that would not have been acceptable to an operator acting purely on commercial grounds [25].
Komisija je v tem primeru prepoznala glavne prakse komercialnih dobaviteljev na evropskih trgih električne energije, ki so bile pomembne za namene analize, in ocenila, ali so bile pogodbe v obravnavani zadevi v skladu s temi praksami ali pa so bile sklenjene pod pogoji, ki ne bi bili sprejemljivi za dobavitelja, delujočega le na tržnih osnovah [25].