natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In cases where the licensee does not own a competing technology or is not already developing such a technology, a restriction on the ability of the parties to carry out independent research and development may be restrictive of competition where only a few technologies are available.
Medtem ko lahko Komisija z uredbo, naslovljeno na države članice EU, določi, da se TTBER ne uporablja, člen 7(2) TTBER omogoča Nadzornemu organu Efte, da s priporočilom razglasi, da se TTBER v primerih, ko vzporedne mreže podobnih sporazumov o prenosu tehnologije pokrivajo več kakor 50 % upoštevnega trga v državah Efte, ne uporablja za sporazume o prenosu tehnologije, ki vsebujejo specifične omejitve v zvezi s tem trgom.
In that case the parties may be an important (potential) source of innovation in the market.
Priporočilo se naslovi na državo Efte ali na države Efte, ki vključujejo zadevni upoštevni trg.
This is particularly so where the parties possess the necessary assets and skills to carry out further research and development.
Ko Nadzorni organ sprejme priporočilo v skladu s členom 7, imajo države Efte na voljo tri mesece, da Nadzorni organ uradno obvestijo, ali sprejemajo priporočilo.
In that case the conditions of Article 53(3) are unlikely to be fulfilled.
Če država Efte ne odgovori, se šteje, da je priporočilo sprejela.
In other cases where a number of technologies are available and where the parties do not possess special assets or skills, the restriction on research and development is likely either to fall outside Article 53(1) for lack of an appreciable restrictive effect or to satisfy the conditions of Article 53(3).
Če država Efte priporočilo sprejme ali se šteje, da ga je sprejela, ga mora izvesti v treh mesecih od datuma sprejetja [72].
The restraint may promote the dissemination of new technology by assuring the licensor that the licence does not create a new competitor and by inducing the licensee to focus on the exploitation and development of the licensed technology.
Medtem ko odprava ugodnosti TTBER s strani Nadzornega organa v skladu s členom 6 pomeni sprejetje odločitve v okviru člena 7 ali 9 poglavja II Protokola 4 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču, je namen neuporabe skupinske izjeme na podlagi priporočila Nadzornega organa in sprejetja s strani držav Efte v okviru člena 7 TTBER zgolj odpraviti ugodnost TTBER za zadevne omejitve in trge ter ponovno vzpostaviti polno uporabo člena 53(1) in (3) Sporazuma EGP.
Moreover, Article 53(1) only applies where the agreement reduces the licensee's incentive to improve and exploit its own technology.
V primeru neuporabe uredbe o skupinski izjemi na določenem trgu v zvezi s sporazumi, ki vsebujejo nekatere omejitve, bodo merila, razvita z ustrezno sodno prakso Sodišča Efte in sodišč Unije ter z obvestili in predhodnimi odločbami, ki jih je sprejel Nadzorni organ, predstavljala smernice o uporabi člena 53 za posamezne sporazume.
This is, for instance, not likely to be the case where the licensor is entitled to terminate the licence agreement once the licensee commences to produce on the basis of its own competing technology.
Po potrebi Nadzorni organ v posameznem primeru sprejme sklep, kar lahko zagotovi navodilo za vsa podjetja, ki delujejo na zadevnem trgu.
Such a right does not reduce the licensee's incentive to innovate, since the agreement can only be terminated when a commercially viable technology has been developed and products produced on the basis thereof are ready to be put on the market.
Za namene izračuna 50-odstotne stopnje pokritosti trga je treba upoštevati vsako posamezno mrežo licenčnih sporazumov, ki vsebujejo omejitve ali kombinacije omejitev s podobnimi tržnimi učinki.
According to Article 6 of the TTBER, the Authority and the competition authorities of the EFTA states may withdraw the benefit of the block exemption in respect of individual agreements that are likely to have anticompetitive effects (account must be taken of both actual and potential effects) and do not fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3).
Člen 7 TTBER Nadzornega organa ne obvezuje, da ukrepa, če je presežena 50-odstotna pokritost trga.
The power of the competition authorities of the EFTA states to withdraw the benefit of the block exemption is limited to cases where the relevant geographic market is no wider than the territory of the EFTA State in question.
Na splošno je neuporaba primerna, če obstaja verjetnost, da sta dostop do upoštevnega trga ali konkurenca na tem trgu znatno omejena.
The four conditions of Article 53(3) are cumulative and must all be fulfilled for the exception rule to be applicable [71].
Nadzorni organ bo pri presoji potrebe po uporabi člena 7 proučil, ali bi bila posamična odprava ugodnosti ustreznejši ukrep.
The block exemption can therefore be withdrawn where a particular agreement fails to fulfil one or more of the four conditions.
To je lahko zlasti odvisno od števila konkurenčnih podjetij, ki prispevajo h kumulativnemu učinku na trgu, ali od števila prizadetih geografskih trgov v državah Efte.
Where the withdrawal procedure is applied, the withdrawing authority bears the burden of proving that the agreement falls within the scope of Article 53(1) and that the agreement does not satisfy all four conditions of Article 53(3).
Za vsa priporočila, sprejeta v skladu s členom 7, je treba jasno določiti področje uporabe.
Given that withdrawal implies that the agreement in question restricts competition within the meaning of Article 53(1) and does not fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3), withdrawal is necessarily accompanied by a negative decision based on Articles 5, 7 or 9 of Chapter II of Protocol 4.
To pomeni zlasti, da mora Nadzorni organ podrobno določiti upoštevni(-e) proizvodni(-e) in geografski(-e) trg(-e), pa tudi, da mora opredeliti vrsto licenčne omejitve, za katero se TTBER ne bo več uporabljala.
According to Article 6 of the TTBER, withdrawal may in particular be warranted in the following circumstances:
Kar zadeva slednji vidik, lahko Nadzorni organ področje uporabe svojega priporočila prilagodi glede na problem konkurence, ki ga namerava rešiti.
access of third parties' technologies to the market is restricted, for instance by the cumulative effect of parallel networks of similar restrictive agreements prohibiting licensees from using third parties' technologies;
Če bodo na primer za namene določitve 50-odstotne stopnje pokritosti trga upoštevane vse vzporedne mreže nekonkurenčnih dogovorov, lahko Nadzorni organ kljub temu omeji področje uporabe priporočila zgolj na prepovedi konkurence, ki presegajo določeno trajanje.
access of potential licensees to the market is restricted, for instance by the cumulative effect of parallel networks of similar restrictive agreements preventing licensors from licensing to other licensees or because the only technology owner ready to license out relevant technology rights concludes an exclusive licence with a licensee who is already active on the product market on the basis of substitutable technology rights.
Tako je možno, da sporazumi s krajšim trajanjem ali manj omejevalni sporazumi ne bodo zajeti, ker imajo omejitve v teh sporazumih nižjo stopnjo omejevanja dostopa na trg.
In order to qualify as relevant, the technology rights need to be both technically and commercially substitutable in order for the licensee to be active on the relevant product market.
Kjer je ustrezno, lahko Nadzorni organ zagotovi navodila tudi z določitvijo stopnje tržnega deleža, ki se lahko v okviru določenega trga šteje za premajhno, da bi lahko posamezno podjetje občutno prispevalo h kumulativnemu učinku.
Articles 4 and 5 of the TTBER, containing the list of hardcore restrictions of competition and excluded restrictions, aim at ensuring that block-exempted agreements do not reduce the incentive to innovate, do not delay the dissemination of technology, and do not unduly restrict competition between the licensor and licensee or between licensees.
Če na splošno tržni delež izdelkov, ki vključujejo tehnologijo, ki jo je licenciral posamezen dajalec licence, ne presega 5 %, se ne šteje, da sporazum ali mreža sporazumov, ki pokrivajo navedeno tehnologijo, znatno prispeva h kumulativnemu učinku omejevanja dostopa na trg [73].
However, the list of hardcore restrictions and the list of excluded restrictions do not take into account all the possible impacts of licence agreements.
Prehodno obdobje najmanj šestih mesecev za neuporabo TTBER, ki ga bo moral Nadzorni organ v skladu s členom 7(2) določiti v priporočilu, bi moralo zadevnim podjetjem omogočiti prilagoditev njihovih sporazumov zaradi upoštevanja neuporabe TTBER.
In particular, the block exemption does not take account of any cumulative effect of similar restrictions contained in networks of licence agreements.
Nadzorni organ meni, da mora prehodno obdobje teči od datuma sprejetja nacionalnih izvedbenih ukrepov s strani države Efte, ki je naslovnica ukrepov.
Licence agreements may lead to foreclosure of third parties both at the level of the licensor and at the level of the licensee.
Priporočilo in nacionalni izvedbeni ukrepi, ki določajo neuporabo TTBER, ne bodo vplivali na status ugodnosti skupinske izjeme, ki ga imajo zadevni sporazumi, v obdobju pred začetkom veljavnosti nacionalnih izvedbenih ukrepov.
Foreclosure of other licensors may stem from the cumulative effect of networks of licence agreements prohibiting the licensees from exploiting competing technologies, leading to the exclusion of other (potential) licensors.
Za sporazume, ki ne spadajo na področje uporabe skupinske izjeme, ker so bili na primer prekoračeni pragovi tržnih deležev ali sta sporazum sklenili več kot dve pogodbenici, se izvede posamična presoja.
Foreclosure of licensors is likely to arise in cases where most of the undertakings on the market that could (efficiently) take a competing licence are prevented from doing so as a consequence of restrictive agreements and where potential licensees face relatively high barriers to entry.
Sporazumi, ki ne omejujejo konkurence v smislu člena 53(1) ali ki izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 53(3), so veljavni in izvršljivi.
Foreclosure of other licensees may stem from the cumulative effect of licence agreements prohibiting licensors from licensing other licensees and thereby preventing potential licensees from gaining access to the necessary technology.
Treba je opozoriti, da se ne predpostavlja nezakonitost sporazumov, ki ne spadajo na področje uporabe skupinske izjeme, pod pogojem, da ne vsebujejo nedopustnih omejitev konkurence.
The issue of foreclosure is examined in more detail in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.7.
Zlasti se ne predpostavlja, da se člen 53(1) uporablja samo, ker so bili prekoračeni pragovi tržnih deležev.
In addition, the Authority is likely to withdraw the benefit of the block exemption where, in individual agreements, a significant number of licensors of competing technologies impose on their licensees to extend to them more favourable conditions agreed with other licensors.
Vedno se zahteva posamična presoja na podlagi načel, opisanih v teh smernicah.
A special procedure for the disapplication of the TTBER in the EFTA states is set out in Article 7(2) of the TTBER as incorporated in the EEA Agreement.
Varni pristan, če je dovolj neodvisno nadzorovanih tehnologij
Whereas the Commission can disapply the TTBER by means of a regulation addressed to the EU Member States, Article 7(2) of the TTBER enables the Authority to declare by means of a recommendation that, where parallel networks of similar technology transfer agreements cover more than 50 % of a relevant market in the EFTA states, the TTBER shall not apply to technology transfer agreements containing specific restraints relating to that market.
Pritisk tehnologije na konkurenco je omejen, če tehnologija ne pomeni poslovno donosne alternative licenčni tehnologiji.
The recommendation is addressed to the EFTA state or EFTA states comprising the relevant market in question.
Dejstvo, da sporazum ne spada na področje uporabe varnega pristana, opisanega v točki 157, ne pomeni, da sporazum spada na področje uporabe člena 53(1), če pa spada na področje uporabe člena 53(1), pa to ne pomeni, da niso izpolnjeni pogoji iz člena 53(3).
Following the adoption of a recommendation by the Authority under Article 7, the EFTA states have three months to notify the Authority whether they accept the recommendation.
Kar zadeva varni pristan TTBER v zvezi s tržnimi deleži, ta dodatni varni pristan zgolj oblikuje predpostavko, da sporazum ni prepovedan s členom 53.
Silence on the part of an EFTA State will be understood as acceptance.
Zunaj varnega pristana se zahteva posamična presoja sporazuma na podlagi načel, opisanih v teh smernicah.
If an EFTA state accepts, or is deemed to accept, the recommendation, the EFTA State must implement the recommendation within three months from the day it was adopted [72].
Pri uporabi člena 53 za posamezne primere je treba ustrezno upoštevati način delovanja konkurence na zadevnem trgu.
Whereas withdrawal of the benefit of the TTBER by the Authority under Article 6 implies the adoption of a decision under Articles 7 or 9 of Chapter II of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the effect of the disapplication of the block exemption following an Authority recommendation and acceptance by the EFTA states under Article 7 of the TTBER is merely to remove, in respect of the restraints and the markets concerned, the benefit of the TTBER and to restore the full application of Article 53(1) and (3) of the EEA Agreement.
V zvezi s tem so še posebej pomembni naslednji dejavniki:
Following the disapplication of the block exemption for a particular market in respect of agreements containing certain restraints, the criteria developed by the relevant case-law of the EFTA Court and the Union Courts and by notices and previous decisions adopted by the Authority will give guidance on the application of Article 53 to individual agreements.
narava sporazuma;
Where appropriate, the Authority will take a decision in an individual case, which can provide guidance to all the undertakings operating on the market concerned.
tržni položaj pogodbenic;
For the purpose of calculating the 50 % market coverage ratio, account must be taken of each individual network of licence agreements containing restraints, or combinations of restraints, producing similar effects on the market.
tržni položaj konkurentov;
Article 7 of the TTBER does not entail an obligation on the part of the Authority to act where the 50 % market-coverage ratio is exceeded.
tržni položaj kupcev na upoštevnih trgih;
In general, disapplication is appropriate when it is likely that access to the relevant market or competition therein is appreciably restricted.
zrelost trga.
In assessing the need to apply Article 7, the Authority will consider whether individual withdrawal would be a more appropriate remedy.
Pomembnost posameznih dejavnikov se lahko razlikuje glede na posamezen primer in je odvisna od vseh drugih dejavnikov.
This may depend, in particular, on the number of competing undertakings contributing to a cumulative effect on a market or the number of affected geographic markets within the EFTA states.
Visok tržni delež pogodbenic je na primer navadno dober kazalnik tržne moči, vendar pa pri majhnih vstopnih ovirah morda ne bo pokazal tržne moči.
Any recommendation adopted under Article 7 must clearly set out its scope.
Zato ni mogoče zagotoviti strogih pravil glede pomembnosti posameznih dejavnikov.
This means, first, that the Authority must define the relevant product and geographic market(s) and, secondly, that it must identify the type of licensing restraint in respect of which the TTBER will no longer apply.
Sporazumi o prenosu tehnologije imajo lahko mnoge različne oblike.
As regards the latter aspect, the Authority may modulate the scope of its recommendation according to the competition concern which it intends to address.
Zato je pomembno proučiti naravo sporazuma z vidika konkurenčnega razmerja med pogodbenicama in z vidika omejitev, ki jih sporazum vsebuje.
For instance, while all parallel networks of non-compete arrangements will be taken into account for the purpose of establishing the 50 % market coverage ratio, the Authority may nevertheless restrict the scope of the recommendation only to non-compete obligations exceeding a certain duration.
Pri slednjem vidiku je treba upoštevati več kot le izrecne pogoje sporazuma.
Thus, agreements of a shorter duration or of a less restrictive nature might be left unaffected, due to the lesser degree of foreclosure attributable to such restraints.
Obstoj implicitnih omejitev lahko izhaja iz načina, kako sta pogodbenici sporazum izvajali, in spodbud, s katerimi sta se soočali.
Where appropriate, the Authority may also provide guidance by specifying the market share level which, in the specific market context, may be regarded as insufficient to bring about a significant contribution by an individual undertaking to the cumulative effect.
Tržni položaj pogodbenic, vključno z vsemi podjetji, ki so pod dejanskim ali pravnim nadzorom pogodbenic, je kazalnik stopnje tržne moči dajalca licence, pridobitelja licence ali obeh, če jo sploh imata.
In general, when the market share of the products incorporating a technology licensed by an individual licensor does not exceed 5 %, the agreement or network of agreements covering that technology is not considered to contribute significantly to a cumulative foreclosure effect [73].
Večji je njun tržni delež, večja bo verjetno njuna tržna moč.
Agreements that either do not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 53(1) or which fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3) are valid and enforceable.
Tržni deleži ter možne konkurenčne prednosti in pomanjkljivosti se prav tako uporabljajo pri presoji tržnega položaja konkurentov.
Individual assessment based on the principles described in these guidelines is always required.
Tržni položaj kupcev zagotavlja informacijo o tem, ali ima eden ali več kupcev kupno moč ali ne.
Safe harbour if there are sufficient independently controlled technologies
Prvi kazalec kupne moči je tržni delež kupca na nakupnem trgu.
In order to promote predictability beyond the application of the TTBER and to confine detailed analysis to cases that are likely to present real competition concerns, the Authority takes the view that outside the area of hardcore restrictions Article 53 is unlikely to be infringed where there are four or more independently controlled technologies in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties to the agreement that may be substitutable for the licensed technology at a comparable cost to the user.
Ta delež kaže na pomen njegovega povpraševanja za morebitne dobavitelje.
In assessing whether the technologies are sufficiently substitutable the relative commercial strength of the technologies in question must be taken into account.
Drugi kazalci se osredotočajo na položaj kupca na njegovem trgu za nadaljnjo prodajo, vključno z značilnostmi, kot so velika geografska razpršenost njegovih prodajnih mest in ugled njegove znamke pri končnih potrošnikih.
The competitive constraint imposed by a technology is limited if it does not constitute a commercially viable alternative to the licensed technology.
V nekaterih okoliščinah lahko kupna moč dajalcu licence in/ali pridobitelju licence prepreči uveljavljanje tržne moči na trgu ter tako prepreči težave, povezane s konkurenco, ki bi se sicer pojavile.
For instance, if due to network effects in the market consumers have a strong preference for products incorporating the licensed technology, other technologies already on the market or likely to come to market within a reasonable period of time may not constitute a real alternative and may therefore impose only a limited competitive constraint.
To zlasti velja, če imajo močni kupci sposobnost in spodbudo, da na trg uvedejo nove vire dobave v primeru majhnega, a trajnega povišanja relativnih cen.
The fact that an agreement falls outside the safe harbour described in point (157) does not imply that the agreement is caught by Article 53(1) and, if so, that the conditions of Article 53(3) are not satisfied.
Če močni kupci zgolj pridobijo ugodne pogoje od dobavitelja ali pa preprosto prenesejo vsa povišanja cen na svoje kupce, njihov položaj ni tak, da bi pridobitelju licence preprečil uveljavljanje tržne moči na proizvodnem trgu, in torej tudi ne tak, da bi na navedenem trgu preprečil pojav težav, povezanih s konkurenco [74].
As for the market share safe harbour of the TTBER, this additional safe harbour merely creates a presumption that the agreement is not prohibited by Article 53.
Vstopne ovire se merijo po tem, koliko lahko že uveljavljene družbe na trgu povišajo svoje cene nad konkurenčno raven, ne da bi povzročile vstop novih gospodarskih subjektov.
Outside the safe harbour individual assessment of the agreement based on the principles developed in these guidelines is required.
Brez vstopnih ovir bi lahek in hiter vstop na trg odpravil možnost ustvarjanja dobička na podlagi povišanja cen.
The following factors are particularly relevant in this respect:
Vstopne ovire lahko izhajajo iz številnih dejavnikov, kot so ekonomije obsega in ekonomije povezanih proizvodov, vladni predpisi, zlasti če določajo izključne pravice, državne pomoči, uvozne tarife, pravice intelektualne lastnine, lastništvo virov (kjer je ponudba omejena, na primer zaradi naravnih omejitev), osnovna oprema, prednost prvega na trgu ali zvestoba potrošnikov znamki, ki jo je ustvarilo močno oglaševanje v določenem časovnem obdobju.
the nature of the agreement;
Omejevalni sporazumi, ki jih sklenejo podjetja, lahko prav tako učinkujejo kot vstopna ovira, s tem da otežujejo dostop in s trga izključujejo (potencialne) konkurente.
the market position of the parties;
Vstopne ovire so lahko prisotne na vseh ravneh raziskovalnega in razvojnega procesa, procesa proizvodnje ter distribucije.
the market position of competitors;
Vprašanje, ali bi bilo treba nekatere od teh dejavnikov opisati kot vstopne ovire, je zlasti odvisno od tega, ali povzročajo nepovratne stroške.
the market position of buyers on the relevant markets;
Nepovratni stroški so stroški, ki so potrebni za vstop ali delovanje na trgu, vendar pa se ob izstopu s trga ne povrnejo.
entry barriers;
Večji kot so nepovratni stroški, bolj morajo nova podjetja, ki vstopajo na trg, pretehtati tveganost vstopa na trg in bolj verodostojno lahko že uveljavljena podjetja grozijo, da se bodo spoprijela z novo konkurenco, saj je za uveljavljena podjetja zaradi nepovratnih stroškov zelo drago zapustiti trg.
maturity of the market.
Vstop na trg na splošno zahteva nepovratne stroške, včasih večje in drugič manjše.
The importance of individual factors may vary from case to case and depends on all other factors.
Zaradi tega je dejanska konkurenca na splošno bolj učinkovita in bo imela pri presoji primera večjo težo kot potencialna konkurenca.
For instance, a high market share of the parties is usually a good indicator of market power, but in the case of low entry barriers it may not be indicative of market power.
Na zrelem trgu, to je na trgu, ki že nekaj časa obstaja, na katerem se uporablja tehnologija, ki je dobro poznana, razširjena in se ne spreminja veliko, ter na katerem je povpraševanje sorazmerno stabilno ali upada, obstaja večja verjetnost, da bodo imele omejitve konkurence negativen učinek kot na bolj dinamičnih trgih.
It is therefore not possible to provide firm rules on the importance of the individual factors.
Pri presoji posameznih omejitev je treba včasih upoštevati tudi druge dejavnike.
Technology transfer agreements can take many shapes and forms.
Taki dejavniki vključujejo kumulativne učinke, kot so pokritje trga s podobnimi sporazumi, trajanje sporazumov, zakonski okvir in ravnanje, ki lahko nakazuje na ali spodbuja nedovoljeno dogovarjanje, na primer v smislu prevladujočega položaja pri določanju cen, vnaprej napovedanih sprememb cen in razprav o „pravi“ ceni, cenovne togosti, ki je odziv na presežne zmogljivosti, diskriminacije pri cenah in preteklega nedovoljenega dogovarjanja.