natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Consequently, Directive 2004/17/EC should not apply when contracting entities award contracts intended to enable electricity production or the wholesale of electricity to be carried out in these geographical areas nor when they organise design contests for the pursuit of such an activity there.
Zato se Direktiva 2004/17/ES ne bi smela uporabljati, kadar naročniki oddajo naročila za omogočanje proizvodnje ali veleprodaje električne energije na teh geografskih območjih, niti kadar organizirajo natečaje za izvajanje takšne dejavnosti na teh območjih.
This Decision is based on the legal and factual situation as of 24 January 2012 as it appears from the information submitted by the applicant.
Ta odločba temelji na pravni podlagi in dejanskem stanju na dan 24. januarja 2012, razvidnih iz informacij, ki so jih predložili vložniki.
It may be revised, should significant changes in the legal or factual situation mean that the conditions for the applicability of Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC are no longer met.
Odločba se lahko spremeni, če bi pomembne spremembe pravne podlage ali dejanskega stanja pomenile, da pogoji za uporabo člena 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES niso več izpolnjeni.
This Decision is made solely for the purpose of granting an exemption pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2004/17/EC and is without prejudice to the application of the rules on competition.
Ta odločba se izdaja samo za namen odobritve izvzetja v skladu s členom 30 Direktive 2004/17/ES in ne vpliva na uporabo pravil o konkurenci.
This Decision applies to the production and wholesale of electricity in Norway and does not concern the activities of transmission, distribution and retail supply of electricity in Norway.
Ta odločba se uporablja za proizvodnjo in veleprodajo električne energije na Norveškem in ne zadeva dejavnosti prenosa, distribucije in maloprodaje električne energije na Norveškem.
The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the EFTA Public Procurement Committee Assisting the EFTA Surveillance Authority,
Ukrepi, določeni v tej odločbi, so v skladu z mnenjem Odbora Efte za javna naročila, ki pomaga Nadzornemu organu Efte –
The Act referred to at point 4 of Annex XVI to the Agreement on the European Economic Area laying down the procedures for the award of public contracts in the utilities sector (Directive 2004/17/EC) shall not apply to contracts awarded by contracting entities and intended to enable the activities of production and wholesale of electricity in Norway.
Akt iz točke 4 Priloge XVI k Sporazumu o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru, ki določa postopke za oddajo javnih naročil v sektorju gospodarskih javnih služb (Direktiva 2004/17/ES), se za naročila naročnikov, ki so namenjena omogočanju dejavnosti proizvodnje in veleprodaje električne energije na Norveškem, ne uporablja.
Directive 2003/54/EC was incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 146/2005 of 2 December 2005 (OJ L 53, 23.2.2006, p. 43), and entered into force for the EFTA States on 1 June 2007.
Direktiva 2003/54/EC je bila vključena v Sporazum EGP s Sklepom Skupnega odbora EGP št. 146/2005 z dne 2. decembra 2005 (UL L 53, 23.2.2006, str. 43) in je za države Efte začela veljati 1. junija 2007.
See European Commission decisions of 26 January 2011 in Case COMP/M.5978 — GDF Suez/International Power, of 22 December 2008 in case COMP/M.5224 — EDF/British Energy, of 14 November 2006, Case COMP/M.4180 — Gaz de France/Suez, of 9 December 2004 Case M.3440 — EDP/ENI/GDP.
Glej odločbe Evropske komisije z dne 26. januarja 2011 v zadevi COMP/M.5978 – GDF Suez/International Power, z dne 22. decembra 2008 v zadevi COMP/M.5224 – EDF/British Energy, z dne 14. novembra 2006 v zadevi COMP/M.4180 – Gaz de France/Suez in z dne 9. decembra 2004 v zadevi M.3440 – EDP/ENI/GDP.
See also the decisions adopted by the Commission exempting the production and sale of electricity in Sweden and in Finland from the application of Directive 2004/17/EC; Decision of 19 June 2006 establishing that Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC applies to the production and sale of electricity in Finland excluding the Åland Islands and decision of 29 October 2007 exempting the production and sale of electricity in Sweden from the application of Directive 2004/17/EC.
Glej tudi odločbi Komisije o izvzetju proizvodnje in prodaje električne energije na Švedskem in Finskem iz uporabe Direktive 2004/17/ES: odločba z dne 19. junija 2006, ki določa, da se člen 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES uporablja za proizvodnjo in prodajo električne energije na Finskem, razen na Ålandskih otokih, in odločba z dne 29. oktobra 2007, s katero sta bili proizvodnja in prodaja električne energije na Švedskem izvzeti iz uporabe Direktive 2004/17/ES.
Oslo — NO 1, Kristiansand — NO 2, Trondheim — NO 3, Tromsø — NO 4 and Bergen — NO 5.
Oslo – št. 1, Kristiansand – št. 2, Trondheim – št. 3, Tromsø – št. 4 in Bergen – št. 5.
On 5 September 2011, the boundary between bidding area NO 2 and NO 5 was moved northbound due to a new connection being put into operation.
Meja med območjema ponudnikov št. 2 in št. 5 je bila 5. septembra 2011 pomaknjena proti severu, ker je začela obratovati nova povezava.
The data provided in the application does not take into account this change.
V podatkih, navedenih v zahtevku, ta sprememba še ni upoštevana.
See decisions by the Ministry of Government Administration of 14 October 2002Statkraft — Agder Energi and of 7 February 2003Statkraft — Trondheim Energiverk.
Glej sklepa Ministrstva za državno upravo z dne 14. oktobra 2002Statkraft – Agder Energi in z dne 7. februarja 2003Statkraft – Trondheim Energiverk.
Decision of 19 June 2006 establishing that Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC applies to the production and sale of electricity in Finland excluding the Åland Islands and decision of 29 October 2007 exempting the production and sale of electricity in Sweden from the application of Directive 2004/17/EC, paragraphs 7-13.
V odločbi z dne 19. junija 2006 je ugotovljeno, da se člen 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/EC uporablja za proizvodnjo in prodajo električne energije na Finskem, razen na Ålandski otokih, z odločbo z dne 29. oktobra 2007 pa sta bili proizvodnja in prodaja električne energije na Švedskem izvzeti iz uporabe Direktive 2004/17/ES (odstavki 7–13).
See Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, COM(2005) 568 final of 15 November 2005, Decision of 29 October 2007 exempting the production and sale of electricity in Sweden from the application of Directive 2004/17/EC.
Glej Poročilo o napredku pri oblikovanju notranjega trga s plinom in električno energijo, COM(2005) 568 final z dne 15. novembra 2005, in Odločbo z dne 29. oktobra 2007 o izvzetju proizvodnje in prodaje električne energije na Švedskem pri izvajanju Direktive 2004/17/ES.
See Commission staff working document, Technical Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, COM(2010) 84 final, page 12.
Glej delovni dokument služb Komisije, Tehnična priloga k Sporočilu Komisije Svetu in Evropskemu parlamentu – Poročilo o napredku pri oblikovanju notranjega trga plina in električne energije, COM(2010) 84 final, str. 12.
% hours isolated
% ločenih ur
NO 1 — Oslo
št. 1 – Oslo
Since the opening of a joint Norwegian-Swedish market in 1996, the other Nordic countries have later been integrated in the market; Finland in 1998, Denmark in 1999/2000 and Estonia in 2010.
Od odprtja skupnega norveško-švedskega trga leta 1996 so se pozneje na trg vključile še druge nordijske države: Finska leta 1998, Danska leta 1999/2000 in Estonija leta 2010.
About 74 % of the consumption of electric energy in the Nordic region in 2010 was traded over the exchange.
S približno 74 % porabe električne energije v nordijski regiji se je v letu 2010 trgovalo prek borze.
Public version of [1]
Javna različica [1]
No 244/12/COL
št. 244/12/COL
on restructuring aid granted to Íslandsbanki (Iceland)
o pomoči za prestrukturiranje za banko Íslandsbanki (Islandija)
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),
Nadzorni organ Efte (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Nadzorni organ) je –
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61(3)(b) and Protocol 26 thereof,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum EGP), ter zlasti člena 61(3)(b) in Protokola 26 k Sporazumu,
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum o nadzornem organu in sodišču), zlasti člena 24 Sporazuma,
HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I, Article 7(3) of Part II, and Article 13 of Part II,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Protokol 3), zlasti člena 1(3) dela I, člena 7(3) dela II ter člena 13 dela II,
Following informal correspondence in October 2008, and the passing on 6 October by the Icelandic Parliament (the Althingi) of Act No 125/2008 on the Authority for Treasury Disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc. (referred to as the ‘Emergency Act’), which gave the Icelandic state wide-ranging powers to intervene in the banking sector, the President of the Authority wrote on 10 October 2008 to the Icelandic authorities and requested that state aid measures taken under the Emergency Act be notified to the Authority.
Predsednik Nadzornega organa je v dopisu z dne 10. oktobra 2008, po tem ko so bili oktobra 2008 izmenjani neuradni dopisi in ko je islandski parlament („Althingi“) 6. oktobra sprejel Zakon št. 125/2008 o organu za izplačila iz državne blagajne zaradi nepredvidenih razmer na finančnem trgu itd. (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zakon o izrednih razmerah), s katerim je Islandija dobila obsežna pooblastila za poseganje v bančni sektor, islandske organe pozval, naj Nadzornemu organu priglasijo ukrepe državne pomoči, sprejete v okviru zakona o izrednih razmerah.
Further contact and correspondence followed periodically including notably a letter sent by the Authority on 18 June 2009 reminding the Icelandic authorities of the need to notify any state aid measures, and of the standstill clause in Article 3 of Protocol 3.
Temu so sledili občasni nadaljnji stiki in dopisi, med drugim predvsem dopis, ki ga je 18. junija 2009 poslal Nadzorni organ, da je islandske organe opomnil o obveznosti priglasitve vsakega ukrepa državne pomoči ter o klavzuli o zamrznitvi iz člena 3 Protokola 3.
Following further correspondence state aid involved in the restoration of certain operations of Glitnir and the establishment and capitalisation of a new Glitnir Bank (by then re-named ‘Íslandsbanki’) was eventually notified retrospectively by the Icelandic authorities on 15 September 2010 [2].
Islandski organi so 15. septembra 2010 po nadaljnji izmenjavi dopisov navsezadnje za nazaj priglasili državno pomoč, vključeno v ponovno vzpostavitev nekaterih dejavnosti banke Glitnir ter ustanovitev in kapitalizacijo nove banke New Glitnir (pred tem datumom preimenovane v Íslandsbanki) [2].
By letter dated 15 December 2010 [3] the EFTA Surveillance Authority (the Authority) informed the Icelandic authorities that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 in respect of the measures undertaken by the Icelandic State to restore certain operations of (old) Glitnir Bank hf and establish and capitalise New Glitnir Bank hf, now renamed Íslandsbanki (the opening decision) [4].
Nadzorni organ Efte je z dopisom z dne 15. decembra 2010 [3] islandske organe obvestil, da se je odločil začeti postopek iz člena 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 v zvezi z ukrepi, ki jih je država Islandija sprejela za ponovno vzpostavitev nekaterih dejavnosti (nekdanje) banke Glitnir Bank hf ter ustanovitev in kapitalizacijo banke New Glitnir Bank hf, zdaj preimenovane v Íslandsbanki (odločba o začetku postopka) [4].
The Authority also required that a detailed restructuring plan for Íslandsbanki be submitted within six months.
Nadzorni organ je tudi zahteval, naj se v šestih mesecih predloži podroben načrt prestrukturiranja banke Íslandsbanki.
The Icelandic authorities did not respond to this comment.
Po prevzemu banke Byr novembra 2011 pa so islandski organi 22. februarja 2012 predložili nov načrt prestrukturiranja banke Íslandsbanki [6].
By letter of 31 March 2011, the Icelandic authorities submitted a restructuring plan for Íslandsbanki.
Nadzorni organ je 11. julija 2011 in 13. februarja 2012 zahteval informacije v zvezi z načrtom prestrukturiranja.
Following the acquisition of Byr in November 2011, the Icelandic authorities submitted a new restructuring plan for Íslandsbanki on 22 February 2012 [6].
Poleg tega se je Nadzorni organ z islandskimi organi sestal 7. junija 2011 in 27.–28. februarja 2012.
The request for information was answered by the Icelandic Authorities on 17 October 2011 and 13 March 2012.
Nadzorni organ bo v tem oddelku opisal tiste dogodke, dejstva ter gospodarski, politični in regulativni razvoj, ki se nanašajo na padec in prestrukturiranje islandskega finančnega sistema od oktobra 2008 do datuma, ki se zdi potreben za določitev okvira, znotraj katerega je bila izvedena ocena obravnavanih ukrepov pomoči.
The final versions of the commitments were submitted on 16 May 2012 and on 6 June 2012 [7].
Pred tem pa bo kronološko pregledal zlom banke Glitnir.
In addition, the Authority met with the Icelandic authorities on 7 June 2011 and 27-28 February 2012.
Zlom banke Glitnir
BACKGROUND
Septembra 2008 so se v številnih večjih globalnih finančnih institucijah začele pojavljati resne težave.
The Authority will describe in this section those events, facts and economic, political and regulatory developments relating to the collapse and the reconstruction of the Icelandic financial system from October 2008 to date that appear necessary to set out the context in which the assessment of aid measures at hand is undertaken.
Sredi pretresa na globalnih finančnih trgih in po zlomu družbe Lehman Brothers septembra 2008 so imele tri največje komercialne banke na Islandiji, ki so v prejšnjih letih doživele nenavadno rast, težave pri refinanciranju svojih kratkoročnih dolgov, prav tako pa so zabeležile tudi naval na vloge.
Before doing so, it will recall in turn the chronology of Glitnir's breakdown.
Družba Lehman Brothers je 15. septembra zaprosila za zaščito pred stečajem, istega dne pa je bilo objavljeno, da bo banka Bank of America prevzela družbo Merrill Lynch.
The collapse of Glitnir Bank
Drugje je eno največjih bank Združenega kraljestva morala prevzeti družba Lloyds TSB.
In September 2008 a number of major global financial institutions began to experience severe difficulties.
Medtem je imela banka Glitnir večje težave pri financiranju svojih dejavnosti.
In the midst of the turbulence in global financial markets and following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Iceland's three biggest commercial banks, which had experienced extraordinary growth over the preceding years, encountered difficulties in refinancing their short-term debt and a run on their deposits.
Izdaja obveznic je morala biti zaradi pomanjkanja zanimanja ukinjena, prodaja premoženja ni bila zaključena, nemška banka pa je zavrnila podaljšanje dveh posojil, ocenjenih na 150 milijonov EUR.
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection on 15 September and on the same day it was announced that the Bank of America was to take over Merrill Lynch.
Tržne razmere so se po padcu družbe Lehman Brothers tudi dramatično poslabšale.
Elsewhere, one of the United Kingdom's biggest banks, HBOS, had to be taken over by Lloyds TSB.
Vendar je dejstvo, da je 600 milijonov EUR pomenilo skoraj četrtino deviznih rezerv Islandije in da je imela banka Glitnir že nekaj časa težave pri refinanciranju, njen dolg pa je bil ocenjen na 1,4 milijarde EUR, kar naj bi odplačala v naslednjega pol leta, na podlagi javno dostopnih informacij kazalo na to, da predlog ni bil verjeten [8].
A bond issue had had to be cancelled due to a lack of interest, an asset sale was not completed, and a German bank refused to extend two loans estimated at 150 million euros.
Ne le v tujini, ampak tudi na Islandiji so ljudje množično dvigovali vloge z islandskih bank.
Market conditions also worsened dramatically after the fall of Lehman Brothers.
Domači dvigi so postali tako številčni, da so islandske banke in Centralna banka Islandije na neki stopnji skoraj izkusile pomanjkanje denarnih sredstev.
On 25 September 2008, the Chairman of Glitnir's Board contacted the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) to inform them that as a result of loans that had to be repaid in October, the bank had an immediate shortfall of 600 million euros.
Kreditna agencija Moody's je 30. septembra 2008 znižala bonitetno oceno banke Glitnir, ki je zadevala obveznosti odplačevanja nadaljnjih posojil.
On 29 September it was announced that the Icelandic government would provide Glitnir with 600 million euros in return for 75 % of its equity.
Temu pa so sledili pozivi h kritju več kot milijarde EUR.
The fact that 600 million euros amounted to nearly a quarter of Iceland's foreign currency reserves, and that Glitnir had experienced refinancing problems for some time and had debt estimated at 1,4 billion euros to repay over the following six months, according to publicly available information, suggested, however, that the proposal was not credible [8].
Banka Glitnir je morala 7. oktobra 2008 prositi islandski Organ za finančni nadzor, naj jo vzame pod nadzor [9].
As it turned out, the value of issued Glitnir shares collapsed from over 200 billion ISK to 26 billion ISK in one day.
Finančna kriza in glavni vzroki za propad islandskih bank
The Icelandic banks experienced massive withdrawals of deposits not only abroad but also within Iceland.
Islandski organi so v priglasitvi pomoči za banko New Glitnir (pozneje preimenovano v Íslandsbanki) pojasnili, da so bili razlogi za zlom islandskega bančnega sektorja in njihova potreba po poseganju v ta sektor precej podrobno pojasnjeni v poročilu posebne preiskovalne komisije, ki jo je ustanovil islandski parlament [10], katere nalogi sta bili preiskovanje in analiziranje procesov, zaradi katerih je prišlo do zloma treh glavnih bank.
Domestic withdrawals became so large that at one stage the Icelandic banks and the CBI were close to experiencing a shortage of cash.
Nadzorni organ v nadaljevanju povzema ugotovitve te komisije glede vzrokov za propad, ki so najpomembnejši za zlom banke Glitnir.
On 30 September 2008, the credit agency Moody's lowered Glitnir's credit rating, triggering repayment obligations for further loans.
Te informacije izhajajo iz poglavij 2 (Povzetek) in 21 (Vzroki za zlom islandskih bank – odgovornost, napake in malomarnost) poročila posebne preiskovalne komisije.
Margin calls of over a billion euros also followed.
Zaradi svetovnega znižanja likvidnosti na finančnih trgih, ki se je začelo leta 2007, je sčasoma prišlo do zloma treh glavnih islandskih bank, katerih poslovne dejavnosti so postajale čedalje bolj odvisne od pridobivanja sredstev prek mednarodnih trgov.
On 7 October 2008 Glitnir was required to ask the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) to be taken under its control [9].
Vendar so bili razlogi za zlom islandskih bank kompleksni in številni.
The financial crisis and major causes of failure of the Icelandic banks
Posebna preiskovalna komisija je raziskala vzroke, zaradi katerih je prišlo do zloma teh glavnih bank, omeniti je treba tudi, da se je večina ugotovitev nanašala na vse tri banke in da so mnoge medsebojno povezane.
In their notification of the aid granted to New Glitnir Bank (later Íslandsbanki), the Icelandic authorities explained that the reasons for the collapse of the Icelandic banking sector and their need to intervene were set out in considerable detail in a report prepared by a Special Investigation Commission (SIC) established by the Icelandic Parliament [10], whose remit was to investigate and analyse the processes leading to the collapse of the three main banks.
Vzroki za propad, povezani z dejavnostmi bank, so na kratko povzeti v nadaljevanju.
The Authority summarises below the conclusions of the Commission concerning the causes of failure most relevant to the demise of Glitnir Bank.
Prekomerno in netrajnostno povečanje
The information is drawn from Chapters 2 (Executive Summary) and 21 (Causes of the Collapse of the Icelandic Banks — Responsibility, Mistakes and Negligence) of the SIC report.
Posebna preiskovalna komisija je ugotovila, da so banke v letih pred zlomom s povečanjem bilanc stanja in posojilnih portfeljev presegle svoje operativne in poslovodne zmožnosti.
The global reduction in liquidity in financial markets that began in 2007 eventually led to the collapse of the three main Icelandic banks, whose business operations had become increasingly dependent on raising funding through international markets.
Posebna preiskovalna komisija je na podlagi tega ugotovila, da je precej tega povečanja posojanja izhajalo iz posojil podjetjem, ki so jim kredit zavrnili drugje.
The SIC investigated the reasons which led to the collapse of the main banks, and it is notable that the majority of the conclusions applied to all three banks and many are inter-related.
Znižanje razpoložljivih finančnih sredstev na mednarodnih trgih
Causes of failure related to the banks' activities are briefly summarised below.
Dostop do mednarodnih finančnih trgov, izkoriščanje dobrih bonitetnih ocen in dostop do evropskih trgov prek Sporazuma EGP so omogočili velik del rasti bank.
Excessive and unsustainable expansion
Islandske banke so si leta 2005 pod dokaj ugodnimi pogoji izposodile 14 milijard EUR na trgu tujih dolžniških vrednostnih papirjev.
The SIC concluded that in the years leading up to the collapse the banks had expanded their balance sheets and lending portfolios beyond their own operational and managerial capacity.
Ko je postal dostop do trga evropskih dolžniških vrednostnih papirjev bolj omejen, so banke svoje dejavnosti financirale na trgih ZDA, s tem da so islandske dolžniške vrednostne papirje zapakirale v finančne instrumente, zavarovane z dolžniškimi instrumenti.
The combined assets of the three banks had increased exponentially from 1,4 trillion ISK [11] in 2003 to 14,4 trillion ISK at the end of the second quarter of 2008.
Banke so se v obdobju pred zlomom vedno bolj zanašale na kratkoročno zadolževanje, zaradi česar so nastala večja in po mnenju posebne preiskovalne komisije predvidljiva tveganja za refinanciranje.
Significantly, a large proportion of the growth of the three banks was in lending to foreign parties, which increased substantially during 2007 [12], most notably after the beginning of the international liquidity crisis.
Kolesje lastnikov bank
This led the SIC to conclude that much of this increase in lending resulted from loans made to undertakings that had been refused credit elsewhere.
Glavni lastniki so bili v primeru vsake glavne islandske banke med največjimi dolžniki [13].
The report also concluded that inherently riskier investment banking had become an ever increasing feature of the banks' activities and growth had contributed to the problems.
Banka Glitnir je dodelila znatna posojila glavnim delničarjem skupine Baugur in z njimi povezanim strankam, zlasti skupini FL.
The reduction in finance available on the international markets
Ko se je znatno povečal poslovni delež skupin Baugur in FL v banki, je bil spomladi leta 2007 imenovan nov upravni odbor banke Glitnir.
Much of the banks' growth was facilitated by access to international financial markets, capitalising upon good credit ratings and access to European markets through the EEA Agreement.
V zadnjem delu leta 2007 in v začetku leta 2008 so se posojila skupini Baugur in družbam, povezanim s to skupino, skoraj podvojila, tako da so posojila tej skupini na vrhuncu znašala 80 % lastniškega kapitala banke [14].