natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For these reasons the Authority will examine very closely cases of non-exploitation.
Zato bo Nadzorni organ zelo natančno proučil primere neizkoriščanja.
Disapplication of the Block Exemption
Neuporaba skupinske izjeme
A special procedure for the disapplication of the TTBER in the EFTA States is set out in Article 7(2) of the TTBER as incorporated in the EEA Agreement.
Poseben postopek za neuporabo TTBER v državah Efte je določen v členu 7(2) TTBER, kakor je vključen v Sporazumu EGP.
Whereas the Commission can disapply the TTBER by means of a regulation addressed to the EC Member States, Article 7(2) of the TTBER enables the EFTA Surveillance Authority to declare by means of a recommendation that, where parallel networks of similar agreements cover more than 50 % of a relevant market in the EFTA States, the TTBER shall not apply.
Medtem ko lahko Komisija z uredbo, naslovljeno na države članice ES, razglasi, da se TTBER ne uporablja, člen 7(2) TTBER omogoča Nadzornemu organu EFTA, da s priporočilom razglasi, da se TTBER ne uporablja, kadar vzporedne mreže podobnih sporazumov pokrivajo več kakor 50 % upoštevnega trga v državah Efte.
The recommendation is addressed to the EFTA State or EFTA States comprising the relevant market in question.
Priporočilo se naslovi na državo Efte ali na države Efte, ki vključuje(-jo) zadevni upoštevni trg.
Following the adoption of a recommendation by the EFTA Surveillance Authority under Article 7, the EFTA States have three months to notify the Authority whether they accept the recommendation. Silence on the part of an EFTA State will be understood as acceptance.
Po tem ko Nadzorni organ EFTA sprejme priporočilo v skladu s členom 7, imajo države Efte na voljo tri mesece, da Nadzorni organ uradno obvestijo, ali sprejmejo priporočilo.
If an EFTA State accepts, or is deemed to accept, the recommendation, the EFTA State must implement the recommendation within three months from the day it was adopted.
Če država Efte ne odgovori, se šteje, da je priporočilo sprejela.
Whereas withdrawal of the benefit of the TTBER by the EFTA Surveillance Authority under Article 6 implies the adoption of a decision under Articles 7 or 9 of Chapter II of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the effect of the disapplication of the block exemption following an Authority recommendation and acceptance by the EFTA States under Article 7 of the TTBER is merely to remove, in respect of the restraints and the markets concerned, the benefit of the TTBER and to restore the full application of Article 53(1) and (3) of the EEA Agreement.
Medtem ko odprava ugodnosti TTBER s strani Nadzornega organa EFTA v skladu s členom 6 pomeni sprejetje odločitve v okviru člena 7 ali 9 poglavja II Protokola 4 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču, je namen neuporabe uredbe o skupinski izjemi na podlagi priporočila Nadzornega organa in sprejetja s strani držav Efte v okviru člena 7 TTBER zgolj odpraviti ugodnost TTBER za zadevne omejitve in trge ter ponovno vzpostaviti polno uporabo člena 53(1) in (3) Sporazuma EGP.
Following the disapplication of the block exemption for a particular market in respect of agreements containing certain restraints, the criteria developed by the relevant case law of the EFTA Court and the Community Courts and by notices and previous decisions adopted by the Authority will give guidance on the application of Article 53 to individual agreements.
V primeru neuporabe uredbe o skupinski izjemi na določenem trgu v zvezi s sporazumi, ki vsebujejo nekatere omejitve, bodo merila, razvita z ustrezno sodno prakso Sodišča EFTA in sodišč Skupnosti ter z obvestili in predhodnimi odločbami, ki jih je sprejel Nadzorni organ, predstavljala smernice o uporabi člena 53 za posamezne sporazume.
Where appropriate, the Authority will take a decision in an individual case, which can provide guidance to all the undertakings operating on the market concerned.
Kjer je to primerno, bo Nadzorni organ sprejel odločitev v okviru posameznega primera, kar lahko zagotovi smernice za vsa podjetja, ki poslujejo na zadevnem trgu.
For the purpose of calculating the 50 % market coverage ratio, account must be taken of each individual network of licence agreements containing restraints, or combinations of restraints, producing similar effects on the market.
Za namene izračuna 50-odstotne stopnje pokritosti trga je treba upoštevati vsako posamezno mrežo licenčnih sporazumov, ki vsebujejo omejitve ali kombinacije omejitev s podobnimi tržnimi učinki.
Article 7 of the TTBER does not entail an obligation on the part of the EFTA Surveillance Authority to act where the 50 % market-coverage ratio is exceeded.
Člen 7 TTBER Nadzornega organa EFTA ne obvezuje, da ukrepa, če je presežena 50-odstotna pokritost trga.
In general, disapplication is appropriate when it is likely that access to the relevant market or competition therein is appreciably restricted.
Na splošno je neuporaba primerna, če obstaja verjetnost, da sta dostop do upoštevnega trga ali konkurenca na tem trgu znatno omejena.
In assessing the need to apply Article 7, the Authority will consider whether individual withdrawal would be a more appropriate remedy.
Nadzorni organ bo pri presoji potrebe po uporabi člena 7 upošteval, ali bi bila posamična odprava ugodnosti ustreznejši ukrep.
This may depend, in particular, on the number of competing undertakings contributing to a cumulative effect on a market or the number of affected geographic markets within the EFTA States.
To je lahko zlasti odvisno od števila konkurenčnih podjetij, ki prispevajo h kumulativnemu učinku na trgu, ali od števila prizadetih geografskih trgov v okviru držav Efte.
Any recommendation adopted under Article 7 must clearly set out its scope.
Za vsa priporočila, sprejeta v skladu s členom 7, je treba jasno določiti področje uporabe.
This means, first, that the EFTA Surveillance Authority must define the relevant product and geographic market(s) and, secondly, that it must identify the type of licensing restraint in respect of which the TTBER will no longer apply.
To pomeni zlasti, da mora Nadzorni organ EFTA podrobno določiti upoštevni izdelek in geografski(-e) trg(-e), pa tudi, da mora natančno opredeliti vrsto licenčne omejitve, za katero se TTBER ne bo več uporabljala.
As regards the latter aspect, the Authority may modulate the scope of its recommendation according to the competition concern which it intends to address.
Kar zadeva slednji vidik, lahko Nadzorni organ področje uporabe svojega priporočila prilagodi glede na problem konkurence, ki ga namerava rešiti.
For instance, while all parallel networks of non-compete arrangements will be taken into account for the purpose of establishing the 50 % market coverage ratio, the Authority may nevertheless restrict the scope of the recommendation only to non-compete obligations exceeding a certain duration.
Če bodo na primer vse vzporedne mreže nekonkurenčnih dogovorov upoštevane za namene določitve 50-odstotne stopnje pokritosti trga, lahko Nadzorni organ kljub temu omeji področje uporabe priporočila zgolj na obveznosti nekonkurence, ki presegajo določeno trajanje.
Thus, agreements of a shorter duration or of a less restrictive nature might be left unaffected, due to the lesser degree of foreclosure attributable to such restraints.
Tako je možno, da sporazumi s krajšim trajanjem ali manj omejevalni sporazumi niso prizadeti, ker imajo omejitve v teh sporazumih nižjo stopnjo preprečevanja dostopa na trg.
Where appropriate, the Authority may also provide guidance by specifying the market share level which, in the specific market context, may be regarded as insufficient to bring about a significant contribution by an individual undertaking to the cumulative effect.
Kjer je to primerno, lahko Nadzorni organ tudi zagotovi navodila, tako da natančno določi tržni delež, ki je lahko v posebnem tržnem okviru nezadosten, da bi znatno prispeval h kumulativnemu učinku posameznega podjetja.
In general, when the market share of the products incorporating a technology licensed by an individual licensor does not exceed 5 %, the agreement or network of agreements covering that technology is not considered to contribute significantly to a cumulative foreclosure effect [54].
Če na splošno tržni delež izdelkov, ki vključujejo tehnologijo, ki jo je licenciral posamezni dajalec licence, ne presega 5 %, se ne šteje, da sporazum ali mreža sporazumov, ki pokrivajo navedeno tehnologijo, znatno prispeva h kumulativnemu učinku preprečevanja dostopa na trg [54].
The transitional period for the disapplication of the TTBER of not less than six months that the EFTA Surveillance Authority will have to set in the recommendation under Article 7(2), should allow the undertakings concerned to adapt their agreements to take account of the disapplication of the TTBER.
Prehodno obdobje najmanj šestih mesecev za neuporabo TTBER, ki ga bo moral Nadzorni organ EFTA v skladu s členom 7(2) določiti v priporočilu, bi moralo zadevnim podjetjem omogočiti prilagoditev njihovih sporazumov zaradi upoštevanja neuporabe TTBER.
The Authority considers that the transitional period should run from the date of adoption by an EFTA State addressee of national implementing measures.
Nadzorni organ meni, da mora prehodno obdobje teči od datuma sprejetja nacionalnih izvedbenih ukrepov s strani države Efte, ki je naslovnica.
The recommendation and national implementing measures disapplying the TTBER will not affect the block exempted status of the agreements concerned for the period preceding the entry into force of the national implementing measures.
Priporočilo in nacionalni izvedbeni ukrepi, ki določajo neuporabo TTBER, ne bodo vplivali na status ugodnosti skupinske izjeme, ki ga imajo zadevni sporazumi, v obdobju pred začetkom veljavnosti nacionalnih izvedbenih ukrepov.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 53(1) AND 53(3) OF THE EEA AGREEMENT OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION
UPORABA ČLENA 53(1) IN ČLENA 53(3) SPORAZUMA EGP ZUNAJ PODROČJA UPORABE SKUPINSKE IZJEME
The general framework for analysis
Splošni okvir za analizo
Agreements that fall outside the block exemption, for example because the market share thresholds are exceeded or the agreement involves more than two parties, are subject to individual assessment.
Za sporazume, ki ne sodijo v področje uporabe skupinske izjeme, ker so bili na primer prekoračeni pragovi tržnih deležev ali sta sporazum sklenili več kot dve stranki, se izvede posamična presoja.
Agreements that either do not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement or which fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3) are valid and enforceable.
Sporazumi, ki ne omejujejo konkurence v smislu člena 53(1) Sporazuma EGP ali ki izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 53(3), so veljavni in izvršljivi.
It is recalled that there is no presumption of illegality of agreements that fall outside the scope of the block exemption provided that they do not contain hardcore restrictions of competition.
Treba je opozoriti, da se ne predpostavlja nezakonitost sporazumov, ki ne sodijo v področje uporabe skupinske izjeme, pod pogojem, da ne vsebujejo nedopustnih omejitev konkurence.
In particular, there is no presumption that Article 53(1) applies merely because the market share thresholds are exceeded.
Zlasti se ne predpostavlja, da se člen 53(1) uporablja samo, ker so bili prekoračeni pragovi tržnih deležev.
Individual assessment based on the principles described in these guidelines is required.
Zahteva se posamična presoja na podlagi načel, opisanih v teh smernicah.
In order to promote predictability beyond the application of the TTBER and to confine detailed analysis to cases that are likely to present real competition concerns, the EFTA Surveillance Authority takes the view that outside the area of hardcore restrictions Article 53 is unlikely to be infringed where there are four or more independently controlled technologies in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties to the agreement that may be substitutable for the licensed technology at a comparable cost to the user.
Da bi se povečala stopnja predvidljivosti zunaj področja uporabe TTBER in bi se podrobna analiza omejila na primere, ki bi lahko bili resnično sporni z vidika konkurence, Nadzorni organ EFTA meni, da je zunaj področja nedopustnih omejitev majhna verjetnost kršitve člena 53, če obstajajo najmanj štiri tehnologije, nadzorovane s strani neodvisnih tretjih, ki so na voljo ob tehnologijah, nadziranih s strani strank sporazuma, in ki ob primerljivih stroških za uporabnika lahko nadomestijo licenčno tehnologijo.
In assessing whether the technologies are sufficiently substitutable the relative commercial strength of the technologies in question must be taken into account.
Pri presoji, ali so tehnologije v zadostni meri nadomestljive, je treba upoštevati ustrezno gospodarsko moč zadevnih tehnologij.
The competitive constraint imposed by a technology is limited if it does not constitute a commercially viable alternative to the licensed technology.
Pritisk tehnologije na konkurenco je omejen, če tehnologija ne pomeni poslovno donosne alternative licenčni tehnologiji.
For instance, if due to network effects in the market consumers have a strong preference for products incorporating the licensed technology, other technologies already on the market or likely to come to market within a reasonable period of time may not constitute a real alternative and may therefore impose only a limited competitive constraint.
Če na primer zaradi učinkov, ki jih ima mreža na trg, potrošniki dajejo izrazito prednost izdelkom, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo, se lahko zgodi, da druge tehnologije, ki so na trgu že prisotne ali ki lahko vstopijo na trg v razumnem roku, ne pomenijo resnične alternative in imajo zato lahko le omejen pritisk na konkurenco.
The fact that an agreement falls outside the safe harbour described in this paragraph does not imply that the agreement is caught by Article 53(1) and, if so, that the conditions of Article 53(3) are not satisfied.
Dejstvo, da sporazum ne sodi v področje uporabe varnega pristana, opisanega v tem odstavku, ne pomeni, da sporazum sodi v področje uporabe člena 53(1) in v tem primeru niti, da niso izpolnjeni pogoji iz člena 53(3).
As for the market share safe harbour of the TTBER, this additional safe harbour merely creates a negative presumption that the agreement is not prohibited by Article 53.
Glede varnega pristana TTBER v zvezi s tržnimi deleži ta dodatni varni pristan oblikuje zgolj negativno predpostavko, da sporazum ni prepovedan s členom 53.
Outside the safe harbour individual assessment of the agreement based on the principles developed in these guidelines is required.
Zunaj varnega pristana se zahteva posamična presoja sporazuma na podlagi načel, opisanih v teh smernicah.
The relevant factors
Pomembni dejavniki
In the application of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement to individual cases it is necessary to take due account of the way in which competition operates on the market in question.
Pri uporabi člena 53 Sporazuma EGP za posamezne primere je treba ustrezno upoštevati način delovanja konkurence na zadevnem trgu.
The following factors are particularly relevant in this respect:
V zvezi s tem so še posebej pomembni naslednji dejavniki:
the nature of the agreement;
narava sporazuma;
the market position of the parties;
tržni položaj strank;
the market position of competitors;
tržni položaj konkurentov;
the market position of buyers of the licensed products;
tržni položaj kupcev licenčnih izdelkov;
entry barriers;
vstopne ovire;
maturity of the market; and
zrelost trga; in
other factors.
drugi dejavniki.
The importance of individual factors may vary from case to case and depends on all other factors.
Pomembnost posameznih dejavnikov se lahko razlikuje glede na posamezen primer in je odvisna od vseh drugih dejavnikov.
For instance, a high market share of the parties is usually a good indicator of market power, but in the case of low entry barriers it may not be indicative of market power.
Visok tržni delež strank je na primer običajno dober pokazatelj tržne moči, vendar pa pri majhnih vstopnih ovirah morda ne bo pokazal tržne moči.
It is therefore not possible to provide firm rules on the importance of the individual factors.
Zato ni mogoče zagotoviti strogih pravil glede pomembnosti posameznih dejavnikov.
Technology transfer agreements can take many shapes and forms.
Sporazumi o prenosu tehnologije imajo lahko različne oblike.
It is therefore important to analyse the nature of the agreement in terms of the competitive relationship between the parties and the restraints that it contains.
Zato je pomembno proučiti naravo sporazuma z vidika konkurenčnega razmerja med strankami in z vidika omejitev, ki jih sporazum vsebuje.
In the latter regard it is necessary to go beyond the express terms of the agreement.
V slednjem primeru je treba upoštevati več kot le izrecne pogoje sporazuma.
The existence of implicit restraints may be derived from the way in which the agreement has been implemented by the parties and the incentives that they face.
Obstoj implicitnih omejitev lahko izhaja iz načina, kako so stranke sporazum izvajale, in spodbud, s katerimi so se soočale.
The market position of the parties provides an indication of the degree of market power, if any, possessed by the licensor, the licensee or both.
Tržni položaj strank je pokazatelj morebitne stopnje tržne moči dajalcev licence, pridobiteljev licence, ali obojih.
The higher their market share the greater their market power is likely to be.
Višji je njihov tržni delež, večja bo verjetno njihova tržna moč.
This is particularly so where the market share reflects cost advantages or other competitive advantages vis-à-vis competitors.
To zlasti velja, če tržni delež odraža stroškovne prednosti ali druge konkurenčne prednosti pred konkurenti.
These competitive advantages may for instance result from being a first mover in the market, from holding essential patents or from having superior technology.
Te konkurenčne prednosti lahko na primer izhajajo iz dejstva, da je bilo podjetje eden izmed prvih gospodarskih subjektov na trgu, da je imetnik osnovnega patenta ali imetnik boljše tehnologije.
In analysing the competitive relationship between the parties it is sometimes necessary to go beyond the analysis set out in the above sections II.3 on market definition and II.4 on the distinction between competitors and non-competitors.
Pri analizi konkurenčnega razmerja med strankami sporazuma je včasih treba preseči analizo iz zgoraj navedenega podpoglavja II.3 o opredelitvi trga in podpoglavja II.4 o razlikovanju med konkurenti in nekonkurenti.
Even where the licensor is not an actual or potential supplier on the product market and the licensee is not an actual or potential competitor on the technology market, it is relevant to the analysis whether the licensee owns a competing technology, which is not being licensed.
Tudi če dajalec licence ni dejanski ali potencialni dobavitelj na proizvodnem trgu in pridobitelj licence ni dejanski ali potencialni konkurent na tehnološkem trgu, je za analizo pomembno dejstvo, ali je pridobitelj licence lastnik konkurenčne tehnologije, za katero ne podeljuje licence.
If the licensee has a strong position on the product market, an agreement granting him an exclusive licence to a competing technology can restrict competition significantly compared to the situation where the licensor does not grant an exclusive licence or licences other undertakings.
Če ima pridobitelj licence močan položaj na proizvodnem trgu, lahko sporazum, s katerim mu je podeljena izključna licenca za konkurenčno tehnologijo, znatneje omeji konkurenco, kot pa bi jo, če mu dajalec licence ne bi podelil izključne licence ali bi licence podelil drugim podjetjem.
Market shares and possible competitive advantages and disadvantages are also used to assess the market position of competitors.
Tržni deleži ter možne konkurenčne prednosti in pomanjkljivosti se prav tako uporabljajo pri presoji tržnega položaja konkurentov.
The stronger the actual competitors and the greater their number the less risk there is that the parties will be able to individually exercise market power.
Močnejši in številnejši kot so dejanski konkurenti, manjše je tveganje, da bodo stranke sposobne samostojno uveljavljati tržno moč.
However, if the number of competitors is rather small and their market position (size, costs, R&D potential, etc.) is rather similar, this market structure may increase the risk of collusion.
Vendar pa v primeru, da je število konkurentov razmeroma majhno in je njihov tržni položaj (velikost, stroški, možnosti R&R itd.) dokaj podoben, takšna tržna struktura lahko poveča nevarnost dogovarjanja.
The market position of buyers provides an indication of whether or not one or more buyers possess buyer power.
Tržni položaj kupcev zagotavlja informacijo o tem, ali ima eden ali več kupcev kupno moč ali ne.
The first indicator of buying power is the market share of the buyer on the purchase market.
Prvi kazalec kupne moči je tržni delež kupca na nakupnem trgu.
This share reflects the importance of his demand for possible suppliers.
Ta delež kaže na pomembnost povpraševanja kupca za njegove morebitne dobavitelje.
Other indicators focus on the position of the buyer on his resale market, including characteristics such as a wide geographic spread of his outlets, and his brand image amongst final consumers.
Drugi kazalci se usmerjajo na položaj kupca na njegovem trgu za nadaljnjo prodajo, vključno z značilnostmi, kot so velika geografska razpršenost njegovih prodajnih mest in ugled blagovne znamke pri končnih potrošnikih.
In some circumstances buyer power may prevent the licensor and/or the licensee from exercising market power on the market and thereby solve a competition problem that would otherwise have existed.
V nekaterih okoliščinah lahko kupna moč dajalcu licence in/ali pridobitelju licence prepreči uveljavljanje tržne moči na trgu ter tako prepreči težave, povezane s konkurenco, ki bi se pojavile v nasprotnem primeru.
This is particularly so when strong buyers have the capacity and the incentive to bring new sources of supply on to the market in the case of a small but permanent increase in relative prices.
To zlasti velja, če imajo močni kupci sposobnost in spodbudo, da na trg uvedejo nove vire oskrbe v primeru majhnega, a trajnega povišanja zadevnih cen.
Where the strong buyers merely extract favourable terms from the supplier or simply pass on any price increase to their customers, the position of the buyers is not such as to prevent the exercise of market power by the licensee on the product market and therefore not such as to solve the competition problem on that market [55].
Če močni kupci zgolj pridobijo ugodne pogoje od dobavitelja ali pa preprosto prenesejo vsa povišanja cen na svoje kupce, njihov položaj ni tak, da bi preprečil pridobitelju licence uveljavljanje tržne moči na proizvodnem trgu in torej tudi ne tak, da bi na navedenem trgu preprečil pojav težav, povezanih s konkurenco [55].
Entry barriers are measured by the extent to which incumbent companies can increase their price above the competitive level without attracting new entry.
Vstopne ovire se merijo po tem, v kolikšnem obsegu lahko že prisotne družbe na trgu povišajo svoje cene nad konkurenčno raven, ne da bi pritegnile nove konkurente.
In the absence of entry barriers, easy and quick entry would render price increases unprofitable.
Brez vstopnih ovir bi hiter in lahek vstop na trg odpravil dobičke na podlagi povišanja cen.
When effective entry, preventing or eroding the exercise of market power, is likely to occur within one or two years, entry barriers can, as a general rule, be said to be low.
Vstopne ovire se lahko praviloma štejejo za majhne, če je verjetno, da se učinkovit vstop na trg, ki preprečuje ali odpravi uveljavljanje tržne moči, lahko zgodi v letu ali dveh.