natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
‘Annual changes in labour costs and tax burden due to increase in tax rates, taking into account the duration of the transitional period’
„Letne spremembe stroškov dela in prispevne obremenitve zaradi povišanja prispevnih stopenj glede na trajanje prehodnega obdobja“
No transitional period
Brez prehodnega obdobja
One year transitional period
Enoletno prehodno obdobje
Two year transitional period
Dveletno prehodno obdobje
Three year transitional period
Triletno prehodno obdobje
Increases in tax rates
Povišanja prispevnih stopenj
zone 4
cona 4
9,0 percentage points
9,0 odstotne točke
4,5 percentage points
4,5 odstotne točke
3,0 percentage points
3,0 odstotne točke
2,25 percentage points
2,25 odstotne točke
zone 3
cona 3
7,7 percentage points
7,7 odstotne točke
3,85 percentage points
3,85 odstotne točke
2,6 percentage points
2,6 odstotne točke
1,93 percentage points
1,93 odstotne točke
Increase in nominal labour costs due only to the rise in tax rates (wage growth not included)
Povišanje nominalnih stroškov dela izključno zaradi povišanja prispevnih stopenj (rast plače ni upoštevana)
Increase in total tax burden due to the rise in tax rates (effect of wage growth not included)
Povišanje skupne prispevne obremenitve zaradi povišanja prispevnih stopenj (učinek rasti plač ni upoštevan)
NOK 1186 million
1186 mio. NOK
NOK 593 million
593 mio. NOK
NOK 395 million
395 mio. NOK
NOK 296 million
296 mio. NOK
NOK 134 million
134 mio. NOK
NOK 67 million
67 mio. NOK
NOK 45 million
45 mio. NOK
NOK 34 million
34 mio. NOK
Increase in nominal total labour costs when normal wage growth is included
Povišanje celotnih nominalnih stroškov dela z upoštevanjem običajne rasti plač
Increase in total labour costs (wage growth and tax increase) compared to normal wage growth
Povišanje celotnih stroškov dela (rast plač in povišanje prispevkov) v primerjavi z običajno rastjo plač
The Ministry comments upon the figures presented in table 3 above, and points out that with no transitional period, the immediate increase in the social security contributions would be 9 and 7,7 percentage points in zones 4 and 3, respectively, which corresponds to an immediate increase in the firms’ labour costs of 8,6 and 7,2 % (as soon as the de minimis threshold is reached) reflecting an increase in total tax burden in zones 4 and 3 of NOK 1186 million and NOK 134 million.
Ministrstvo je pojasnilo številke, navedene v tabeli 3, in poudarilo, da bi se brez prehodnega obdobja prispevki za socialno varnost neposredno povečali za 9 odstotnih točk v coni 4 in za 7,7 odstotne točke v coni 3, kar ustreza 8,6-odstotnemu in 7,2-odstotnemu neposrednemu povišanju stroškov dela za podjetja (takoj, ko je dosežen prag de minimis), kar bi pomenilo povišanje celotne prispevne obremenitve v višini 1186 milijonov NOK v coni 4 in 134 milijonov NOK v coni 3.
The Norwegian authorities also referred to a research report by Møreforskning [13] that presents slightly higher figures (NOK 1,3 billion and NOK 177 million, respectively).The Norwegian authorities pointed out that if no transitional period was granted and provided there are no immediate carry-over effect in wages in response to the tax increases, the increase in labour costs of the firms in question in 2004 (when de minimis aid is not taken into consideration) would be about 300 % of the normal annual increase in labour costs (growth rates of 13,9 and 12,6 % in zone 4 and zone 3, respectively), compared with the estimated annual wage growth rate of 4,5 % .
Norveški organi oblasti so se sklicevali tudi na poročilo o raziskavi, ki jo je izvedel Møreforskning, [13] ki navaja nekoliko višje številke (1,3 milijarde NOK za cono 4 in 177 milijonov NOK za cono 3).Norveški organi oblasti so poudarili, da bi se, če prehodno obdobje ne bi bilo odobreno in če ne bi bilo nobenega neposrednega učinka prenosa na plače kot odziva na povečanja prispevkov, stroški dela za zadevna podjetja v letu 2004 (če se ne upošteva pomoč de minimis) povišali za približno 300 odstotkov običajnega letnega povišanja stroškov dela (13,9-odstotna stopnja rasti v coni 4 in 12,6-odstotna stopnja rasti v coni 3) v primerjavi z ocenjeno 4,5-odstotno letno stopnjo rasti plač.
With a transitional period of one year, the increase in the social security tax would be 4,5 and 3.9 percentage points in zones 4 and 3, respectively, which corresponds to an annual increase in the firms’ labour costs of 4,3 and 3,6 % (as soon as the allowed de minimis threshold is reached), reflecting an increase in the total tax burden in zones 4 and 3 of NOK 593 million and NOK 67 million respectively.
Z enoletnim prehodnim obdobjem bi se prispevki za socialno varnost povečali za 4,5 odstotne točke v coni 4 in za 3,9 odstotne točke v coni 3, kar ustreza letnemu povišanju stroškov dela za podjetja za 4,3 odstotka v coni 4 in 3,6 odstotka v coni 3 (takoj, ko je dosežen dovoljen prag de minimis), kar bi pomenilo povišanje celotne prispevne obremenitve v višini 593 milijonov NOK v coni 4 in 67 milijonov NOK v coni 3.
Provided that there is no carry-over effect in wages in response to the tax increases, the annual increase in labour costs (when de minimis aid is not taken into consideration) would be about twice of the normal annual increase in labour costs (205 % and 189 % in zone 4 and zone 3, respectively).
Če zaradi povečanj prispevkov ne bi bilo nobenih učinkov na plače, bi bilo letno povišanje stroškov dela (če se ne upošteva pomoč de minimis) približno dvakrat večje od običajnega letnega povišanja stroškov dela (205 odstotkov v coni 4 in 189 odstotkov v coni 3).
With a transitional period of two years, the ensuing increase in the social security tax rates would correspond to an isolated annual increase in the firms’ labour costs of 2,9 and 2,4 % (as soon as the de minimis threshold is reached), reflecting an increase in total tax burden in zones 4 and 3 of NOK 395 million and NOK 45 million each year.
Z dveletnim prehodnim obdobjem bi posledično povečanje prispevkov za socialno varnost ustrezalo posamičnemu letnemu povišanju stroškov dela za podjetja v višini 2,9 odstotka v coni 4 in 2,4 odstotka v coni 3 (takoj, ko je dosežen prag de minimis), kar bi za vsako leto pomenilo povišanje celotne prispevne obremenitve v višini 395 milijonov NOK v coni 4 in 45 milijonov NOK v coni 3.
Provided there is no carry-over effect in wages in response to the tax increases, the annual growth in labour costs of the firms in question (when de minimis aid is not taken into consideration) would be about 170 % and 160 % of the normal annual increase in labour costs in zones 4 and 3, respectively.
Če zaradi povečanj prispevkov ne bi bilo nobenih učinkov prenosa na plače, bi bilo letno povišanje stroškov dela za zadevna podjetja (če se ne upošteva pomoč de minimis) v coni 4 približno 170 odstotkov in v coni 3 približno 160 odstotkov običajnega letnega povišanja stroškov dela.
With a transitional period of three years, the ensuing increase in the social security tax rates would correspond to an isolated annual increase in the firms’ labour costs of 2,1 and 1,8 % in zones 4 and 3 (as soon as the allowed de minimis threshold is reached), reflecting an increase in total tax burden in zones 4 and 3 of NOK 296 million and NOK 34 million.
S triletnim prehodnim obdobjem bi posledično povečanje prispevkov za socialno varnost ustrezalo posamičnemu letnemu povišanju stroškov dela za podjetja v višini 2,1 odstotka v coni 4 in 1,8 odstotka v coni 3 (takoj, ko je dosežen dovoljen prag de minimis), kar bi pomenilo povišanje celotne prispevne obremenitve v višini 296 milijonov NOK v coni 4 in 34 milijonov NOK v coni 3.
Provided there is no carry-over effect in wages in response to the tax increases, the annual increase in labour costs of the firms in question (when de minimis aid is not taken into consideration) would be about 152 % and 145 % of the normal annual increase in labour costs in zones 4 and zone 3, respectively.
Če zaradi povečanj prispevkov ne bi bilo nobenih učinkov prenosa na plače, bi bilo letno povišanje stroškov dela za zadevna podjetja (če se ne upošteva pomoč de minimis) v coni 4 približno 152 odstotkov in v coni 3 približno 145 odstotkov običajnega letnega povišanja stroškov dela.
It was furthermore outlined that in the short run, adjustment to increased tax rates may take the form of changes in product prices, wages or production volume.
Navedeno je bilo tudi, da se lahko prilagoditve na povišane prispevne stopnje kratkoročno izrazijo kot spremembe v cenah proizvodov, plačah ali obsegu proizvodnje.
The Ministry of Finance also maintained that a substantial number of enterprises are exposed to international competition and, the fact that the profitability margins of the industry in the concerned regions are low on average, may indicate that in most cases, there are limited possibilities for increasing product prices.
Ministrstvo za finance je nadalje navedlo, da je veliko število podjetij izpostavljenih mednarodni konkurenci, in dejstvo, da so stopnje donosnosti industrije v zadevnih regijah povprečno nizke, kaže na to, da so možnosti za povišanje cene proizvodov večinoma omejene.
Furthermore, it is mentioned that figures referred in Table 3, show that even with a transitional period of three years, the annual increase in labour costs would be much higher that what could be expected to be reflected in corresponding wage adjustments the same year.
Omenilo je tudi, da številke iz tabele 3 kažejo, da bi bilo celo ob triletnem prehodnem obdobju letno povišanje stroškov dela mnogo višje od pričakovanih ustreznih prilagoditev plač v istem letu.
It was also referred that no empirical studies provided precise answers as to how the wage formation process was influenced by a change in the level of social security contributions.
Poleg tega je navedlo, da nobene empirične študije niso zagotovile natančnih podatkov o tem, kako je na oblikovanje plač vplivala sprememba v prispevni stopnji za socialno varnost.
Analytical results concerning partial regional changes are even more varied as regards the long-term incidence effects.
Analitični rezultati o delnih regionalnih spremembah se še bolj razlikujejo, kar zadeva dolgoročne posledične učinke.
No studies seem to have focused specifically on the time path of incidence effects.
Zdi se, da se nobena študija ni posebej osredotočila na časovno krivuljo posledičnih učinkov.
It is maintained that, due to nominal downward rigidity, one might expect that the time path of an increase in rates and decrease in rates would be asymmetric.
Zaradi stalnega nominalnega trenda zniževanja bi bilo mogoče pričakovati nesimetrično časovno krivuljo višanja in nižanja stopenj.
In the case of a significant increase in taxes, one might expect that it would take several years for the firms' costs to adjust to the tax increase.
V primeru precejšnjega povišanja prispevkov pa lahko pričakujemo, da se bodo stroški podjetij več let prilagajali povišanju prispevkov.
It was pointed out that this implied that the transitional period would not only postpone the rise in costs to firms, but also reduce the maximum level of costs the firms would have to bear the first year the full tax rate of 14,1 percent is applied.
To pomeni, da prehodno obdobje ne bi le odložilo povišanja stroškov za podjetja, temveč bi tudi znižalo najvišjo raven stroškov, ki bi jih podjetja morala nositi prvo leto uporabe polne prispevne stopnje v višini 14,1 odstotka.
Therefore, the Ministry stressed that the length of the transitional period was of greater importance when the adjustment process of nominal wages was taken into consideration.
Zato je ministrstvo poudarilo, da je dolžina prehodnega obdobja zelo pomembna, če upoštevamo proces prilagoditve nominalnih plač.
The Norwegian authorities concluded that a three-year transitional period compared to a two year period, would reduce the number of closures or necessary downscaling of production resulting from the increase of the contribution rate and, hence, reduce the risk of a substantially worsened employment situation, increased depopulation and rise in unemployment.
Norveški organi oblasti so sklenili, da bi triletno prehodno obdobje v primerjavi z dveletnim znižalo število zaprtij ali potrebno zmanjšanje obsega proizvodnje zaradi povišanja prispevne stopnje, in s tem tudi zmanjšalo nevarnost precejšnjega poslabšanja stanja v zaposlovanju, večjega odseljevanja prebivalcev in povečanja brezposelnosti.
Why do enterprises in zone 3 need the same transitional period as enterprises in zone 4?
Zakaj podjetja v coni 3 potrebujejo enako prehodno obdobje kot podjetja v coni 4?
The Norwegian authorities pointed out that the relative differences between the two zones are very small compared to the size of the transitional problems and the time needed for adjustments in both zones.
Norveški organi oblasti so poudarili, da so relativne razlike med conama zelo majhne v primerjavi z obsegom težav zaradi prehoda in časom, potrebnim za prilagoditve v obeh conah.
They also referred to the recent very high increase in the number of bankruptcies in zone 3.
Navedli so tudi nedavno zelo visoko povišanje števila stečajev v coni 3.
Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities pointed out that a one-year shorter transitional period in zone 3 than in zone 4 would not imply more equality between the zones, but rather that the increase in costs would be higher in zone 3 than in zone 4 (see table 3 above).
Poleg tega so poudarili, da eno leto krajše prehodno obdobje v coni 3 kot v coni 4 ne bi pomenilo večje enakosti med conama, temveč višje povečanje stroškov v coni 3 kot v coni 4 (glej tabelo 3 zgoraj).
Ten organisations and undertakings from Norway submitted comments to the decision to open an investigation.
Deset organizacij in podjetij iz Norveške je predložilo pripombe na sklep o začetku preiskave.
All comments support the Norwegian government’s proposal for a three-year transition period.
Vse pripombe podpirajo predlog norveške vlade za triletno prehodno obdobje.
Several of the comments pointed out that the system of regionally differentiated social security contributions is the single most important regional policy instrument in Norway, and that it would have dramatic effects on business and industry in the regions concerned if the increase in the social security contributions were to occur all at once, on 1 January 2004.
V več pripombah je poudarjeno, da je sistem regionalno diferenciranih prispevkov za socialno varnost najpomembnejši instrument regionalne politike na Norveškem ter da bi bile posledice za gospodarstvo in industrijo v regijah zelo hude, če bi se prispevki za socialno varnost povečali naenkrat 1. januarja 2004.
The Authority’s approval of the proposed transitional period is therefore considered to be of the greatest importance.
Zato je izredno pomembno, da Organ odobri predlagano prehodno obdobje.
By letter dated 23 October 2003 from the Mission of Norway to the European Union, forwarding a letter dated 21 October 2003 from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and a letter dated 21 October 2003 from the Ministry of Finance, all received and registered by the Authority on 24 October (Document No 03-7360 A), the Norwegian authorities briefly commented upon the comments from third parties.
S pismom misije Norveške Evropski uniji z dne 23. oktobra 2003, s katerim sta bili posredovani pismi Ministrstva za trgovino in industrijo z dne 21. oktobra 2003 ter Ministrstva za finance z dne 21. oktobra 2003, ki jih je Organ prejel in evidentiral 24. oktobra št. 03-7360 A, so norveški organi na kratko izrazili svoje stališče o pripombah tretjih strank.
The Norwegian authorities noted that the comments from third parties substantiated the arguments that previously had been presented to the Authority, and that no objections had been raised by third parties to the proposed transitional period.
Poudarili so, da pripombe tretjih strank podpirajo argumente, že prej predložene Organu, in da tretje stranke niso dale nobenih ugovorov na predlagano prehodno obdobje.
APPRECIATION
OCENA
Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
Člen 61(1) Sporazuma EGP se glasi:
‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
„Razen če ta sporazum ne določa drugače, je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica ES, država EFTE ali ki izhaja iz državnih sredstev v kakršni koli obliki, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva z izvajanjem tega sporazuma, če negativno vpliva na trgovino med pogodbenicami.“
As the present scheme satisfies all the conditions for the application of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the Authority takes the view that the notified transitional arrangement in zones 3 and 4 constitutes State aid.
Ker sedanji sistem izpolnjuje vse pogoje za uporabo člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, Organ meni, da priglašena prehodna ureditev v conah 3 in 4 zajema državno pomoč.
On 22 September 1999 [15] the Authority decided not to raise objections to a notification from the Norwegian authorities concerning the measures that the Norwegian Government intended to take in order to comply with the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s decision of 2 July 1998.
Organ je 22. septembra 1999 [15], sklenil, da ne bo dal pripomb na priglasitev norveških organov oblasti v zvezi z ukrepi, ki jih norveška vlada namerava sprejeti za uskladitev s sklepom Nadzornega organa EFTA z dne 2. julija 1998.
The Authority found that the aid could be exempted as regional aid (indirect transport aid) on the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.
Organ je ugotovil, da se pomoč lahko prizna kot regionalna pomoč (posredna pomoč za prevoz) na podlagi člena 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP.
Consequently, the current regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme is an existing aid scheme until the end of 2003.
Zato se kot trenutni program pomoči do konca leta 2003 uporablja sedanji sistem regionalno diferenciranih prispevkov za socialno varnost.
The Authority considers that any State aid resulting from the system of regionally differentiated social security contributions after 1 January 2004, would be new aid.
Organ meni, da je nova pomoč vsaka državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz sistema regionalno diferenciranih prispevkov za socialno varnost po 1. januarju 2004.
However, certain aspects of the notified scheme do not involve aid which should be scrutinized by the Authority under Article 61 of the EEA Agreement.
Vendar pa priglašeni sistem v nekaterih vidikih ne zajema pomoči, ki bi jo moral kontrolirati Organ v skladu s členom 61 Sporazuma EGP.
This concerns the following provisions:
Sem spadajo naslednje določbe:
enterprises paying the full rate, naturally, do not receive any aid under the scheme,
podjetja, ki plačujejo polno stopnjo, seveda ne prejemajo pomoči iz tega sistema,
received de minimis aid as described in section I 3.3 above, is not aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement [16],the reduced rate of 4 percentage points to all employees aged 62 years and above applies to all economic sectors and equally to all regions in Norway.
prejeta pomoč de minimis, kot je opisana v oddelku I.3.3 zgoraj, ni pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP [16],znižana stopnja v višini 4 odstotnih točk za vse zaposlene, stare 62 let ali več, velja za vse gospodarske sektorje in se uporablja enako v vseh regijah Norveške.
This is therefore considered to be a general measure falling outside the scope of Article 61(1).
To se zato obravnava kot splošni ukrep, ki ne spada v področje člena 61(1),
review of aid to agriculture and fishing falls outside the scope of the Authority’s competence [17].
presoja pomoči za kmetijstvo in ribištvo ne spada v področje pristojnosti Organa [17].
Against this background, the aid to be assessed in the case at hand, is the aid that stems from the notified transition period of three years for zones 3 and 4.
Na podlagi tega je pomoč, ki naj bi bila predmet presoje v obravnavanem primeru, pomoč, ki izhaja iz priglašenega prehodnega obdobja treh let za coni 3 in 4.
Notification requirement
Zahteva po priglasitvi
Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement states: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid.’ Aid provided without notification or aid that is notified late, i.e. notified after being ‘put into effect’ is considered unlawful aid.
Člen 1(3) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzoru organu in sodišču se glasi: „Nadzorni organ EFTA mora biti obveščen o vseh načrtih za dodelitev ali spremembo pomoči dovolj zgodaj, da lahko predloži pripombe.“ Pomoč, ki se dodeli brez priglasitve, ali pomoč, se priglasi pozno, velja po tem, ko se „začne uporabljati“, za nezakonito pomoč.
The Authority’s decision to adopt appropriate measures (Decision No 172/02/COL) also stated that the Norwegian authorities should ‘communicate’ to the Authority, before 25 March 2003, measures adjusting the aid scheme (see point I 2 above).
Organ je v svojem sklepu o sprejemu ustreznih ukrepov (sklep št. 172/02/COL) navedel tudi, da morajo norveški organi oblasti Organu „sporočiti“ do 25. marca 2003 ukrepe za prilagoditev programa pomoči (glej točko I.2 zgoraj).
By letters from the Mission of Norway to the European Union dated 26 March 2003 (Document No 03-1846 A) and 10 June 2003 (Document No 03-3707 A), the Norwegian authorities have complied with their obligation under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement and their obligation under the appropriate measures.
Norveški organi oblasti so s pismoma misije Norveške Evropski uniji z dne 26. marca 2003 (dok. št. 03-1846 A) in 10. junija 2003 (dok. št. 03-3707 A) izpolnili svojo obveznost iz člena 1(3) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzoru in sodišču ter tudi obveznost, ki izhaja iz ustreznih ukrepov.
The compatibility of the aid
Združljivost pomoči
Previous assessment by the Authority concerning the compatibility of the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme
Predhodna presoja, ki jo opravi Organ glede združljivosti sistema regionalno diferenciranih prispevkov za socialno varnost
In the decision to propose appropriate measures to Norway (Decision No 172/02/COL), the Authority considered that the present Norwegian regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme does not satisfy the conditions of Chapter 25.4.(27) and Annex XI of the State Aid Guidelines.
Organ v svojem sklepu o predložitvi ustreznih ukrepov Norveški (dok. št. 172/02/COL) meni, da sedanji norveški sistem regionalno diferenciranih prispevkov za socialno varnost ne izpolnjuje pogojev iz poglavja 25.4.(27) in Priloge XI Smernic o državni pomoči.
Aid granted to an eligible undertaking depends on the size of its wage bill, which depends in turn on the number of persons employed, and their salaries.
Pomoč, ki se dodeli upravičenemu podjetju, je odvisna od višine njegove plačilne liste, ki pa je odvisna od števila zaposlenih in njihovih plač.
As such, the amount of aid granted under the present scheme does not bear any relation to the additional transport costs actually incurred by a particular undertaking, and is not calculated in line with the above-mentioned provisions of the State Aid Guidelines.
Tak znesek pomoči, ki se dodeli v okviru sedanjega sistema, nikakor ni povezan z dodatnimi stroški prevoza, ki jih določeno podjetje dejansko ima, in se ne obračuna v skladu z zgoraj navedenimi določbami Smernic o državni pomoči.
The Authority therefore concluded that the present regionally differentiated social security contributions did not qualify for the derogation provided for under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.
Organ je zato sklenil, da sedanji regionalno diferencirani prispevki za socialno varnost ne izpolnjujejo pogojev za odstopanje, določeno v členu 61(3)(c) EGP.