natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the context of the current situation in the financial markets, the recapitalisation of banks can serve a number of objectives.
Glede na trenutne razmere na finančnih trgih je lahko dokapitalizacija bank namenjena številnim ciljem.
First, recapitalisations contribute to the restoration of financial stability and help restore the confidence needed for the recovery of inter-bank lending.
Kot prvo, dokapitalizacije prispevajo k ponovni vzpostavitvi finančne stabilnosti ter pomagajo pri obnovi zaupanja, ki je potrebno za oživitev medbančnega posojanja.
Moreover, additional capital provides a cushion in recessionary times to absorb losses and limits the risk of banks becoming insolvent.
Poleg tega dodatni kapital v času recesije zagotavlja rezervo, saj absorbira izgube in omejuje tveganja plačilne nesposobnosti bank.
Under current conditions, triggered in particular by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, fundamentally sound banks may require capital injections to respond to a widespread perception that higher capital ratios are necessary in view of the past underestimation of risk and the increased cost of funding.
V trenutnih razmerah, ki so zlasti posledica propada banke Lehman Brothers, lahko načeloma zdrave banke potrebujejo kapitalske vložke, saj prevladuje mnenje, da so glede na podcenjevanje tveganj v preteklosti in zaradi povečanih stroškov pridobivanja sredstev potrebni višji kapitalski deleži.
Second, recapitalisations can have as objective to ensure lending to the real economy.
Kot drugo je lahko cilj dokapitalizacije zagotavljanje posojil realnemu gospodarstvu.
Fundamentally sound banks may prefer to restrict lending in order to avoid risk and maintain higher capital ratios.
Načeloma zdrave banke bodo morda bolj naklonjene omejevanju posojil, da bi se s tem izognile tveganju in ohranile višje deleže kapitala.
State capital injection may prevent credit supply restrictions and limit the pass-on of the financial markets’ difficulties to other businesses.
Kapitalski vložek iz državnih virov lahko prepreči omejitev ponudbe kreditov in omeji razširitev težav s finančnih trgov na druge dejavnosti.
Third, State recapitalisation may also be an appropriate response to the problems of financial institutions facing insolvency as a result of their particular business model or investment strategy.
Kot tretje je lahko državna dokapitalizacija tudi ustrezen odziv na težave finančnih institucij, ki jim zaradi njihovega posebnega poslovnega modela ali naložbene strategije grozi plačilna nesposobnost.
A capital injection from public sources providing emergency support to an individual bank may also help to avoid short term systemic effects of its possible insolvency.
Kapitalski vložek iz državnih virov, ki posamezni banki omogoča pomoč v izrednih razmerah, lahko prav tako pomaga preprečiti kratkoročne sistemske učinke morebitne plačilne nesposobnosti zadevne banke.
In the longer term, recapitalisation could support efforts to prepare the return of the bank in question to long term viability or its orderly winding-up.
Z dolgoročnega vidika bi dokapitalizacija bank lahko podpirala prizadevanja za pripravo zadevne banke na obnovitev dolgoročne sposobnosti poslovanja ali pa v podporo njeni nadzorovani likvidaciji.
Possible competition concerns
Možni pomisleki glede konkurence
With these common objectives in mind, the assessment of any recapitalisation scheme or measure must take into account possible distortions of competition at three different levels.
Glede na te skupne cilje mora ocena vsake sheme ali ukrepa dokapitalizacije upoštevati morebitno izkrivljanje konkurence na treh različnih ravneh.
First, recapitalisation by one EFTA State of its own banks should not give those banks an undue competitive advantage over banks in other EEA Member States.
Najprej dokapitalizacija, ki jo ena od držav Efte izvede za svoje banke, zadevnim bankam ne bi smela dati neupravičene konkurenčne prednosti pred bankami v drugih državah članicah EGP.
Access to capital at considerably lower rates than competitors from other EEA Member States, in the absence of an appropriate risk-based justification, may have a substantial impact on the competitive position of a bank in the wider single European market.
Dostop do kapitala po znatno nižjih obrestnih merah, kot so na voljo konkurentom v drugih državah članicah EGP, ki ne bi bil ustrezno utemeljen na podlagi tveganja, bi lahko imel pomemben učinek na konkurenčni položaj banke na širšem enotnem evropskem trgu.
Excessive aid in one EFTA State could also prompt a subsidy race among EEA Member States and create difficulties for the economies of other States in the EEA which have not introduced recapitalisation schemes.
Čezmerna pomoč v eni državi Efte bi prav tako lahko spodbudila tekmovanje pri dodeljevanju subvencij med državami članicami EGP in povzročila težave za gospodarstva držav EGP, ki niso uvedle shem dokapitalizacije.
A coherent and coordinated approach to the remuneration of public capital injections, and to the other conditions attached to recapitalisation, is indispensable to the preservation of a level playing field.
Za ohranitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev je nujen dosleden in usklajen pristop glede nadomestila za kapitalske vložke iz državnih virov in glede drugih pogojev, povezanih z dokapitalizacijo.
Secondly, recapitalisation schemes which are open to all banks within an EFTA State without an appropriate degree of differentiation between beneficiary banks according to their risk profiles may give an undue advantage to distressed or less-performing banks compared to banks which are fundamentally sound and better-performing.
Kot drugo lahko sheme dokapitalizacije, ki so na voljo vsem bankam v državi Efte, vendar ne temeljijo na primernem razlikovanju med upravičenimi bankami glede na njihove profile tveganja, dajo nepravično prednost bankam, ki so v težavah ali pa slabše poslujejo, v primerjavi z bankami, ki so načeloma zdrave in bolje poslujejo.
This will distort competition on the market, distort incentives, increase moral hazard and weaken the overall competitiveness of European banks (‘Ensuring fair competition between banks’)
To bi izkrivljalo konkurenco na trgu in pobude, povečalo moralna tveganja in oslabilo splošno konkurenčnost evropskih bank. („Zagotavljanje poštene konkurence med bankami“)
Thirdly, public recapitalisation, in particular its remuneration, should not have the effect of putting banks that do not have recourse to public funding, but seek additional capital on the market, in a significantly less competitive position.
Kot tretje državna dokapitalizacija, zlasti ustrezno nadomestilo, ne bi smela povzročiti znatno manj ugodnega konkurenčnega položaja bank, ki niso upravičene do državnih sredstev, temveč iščejo dodatni kapital na trgu.
A public scheme which crowds out market-based operations will frustrate the return to normal market functioning.
Državna shema, ki izrinja tržno naravnano poslovanje, bi le otežila vrnitev na normalno delovanje trga.
(‘Ensuring a return to normal market functioning’)
(„Zagotavljanje vrnitve na normalno tržno delovanje“)
Any proposed recapitalisation has cumulative competitive effects at each of these three levels.
Vsaka predlagana dokapitalizacija ima kumulativne učinke na konkurenco na vsaki od teh treh ravni.
However, a balance must be struck between these competition concerns and the objectives of restoring financial stability, ensuring lending to the real economy and dealing with the risk of insolvency.
Vendar pa je treba poiskati ravnovesje med temi pomisleki z vidika konkurence ter cilji ponovne vzpostavitve finančne stabilnosti, zagotavljanja posojil realnemu gospodarstvu in upravljanja tveganj za plačilno nesposobnost.
On the one hand, banks must have sufficiently favourable terms of access to capital in order to make the recapitalisation as effective as necessary.
Po eni strani morajo imeti banke dovolj ugodne pogoje za dostop do kapitala, da bo dokapitalizacija tako učinkovita, kot je potrebno.
On the other hand, the conditions tied to any recapitalisation measure should ensure a level playing field and, in the longer-term, a return to normal market conditions.
Po drugi strani pa bi morali pogoji, povezani z ukrepom dokapitalizacije, zagotoviti enake konkurenčne pogoje in z dolgoročnega vidika prehod na normalne tržne pogoje.
State interventions should therefore be proportionate and temporary and should be designed in a way that provides incentives for banks to redeem the State as soon as market circumstances permit, in order for a competitive and efficient European banking sector to emerge from the crisis.
Državni posegi bi zato morali biti sorazmerni in začasni ter bi morali biti oblikovani tako, da dajejo bankam spodbudo za izplačilo državi takoj, ko bodo tržne razmere to dopuščale, da bi iz krize izšel konkurenčen in učinkovit evropski bančni sektor.
Market-oriented pricing of capital injections would be the best safeguard against unjustified disparities in the level of capitalisation and improper use of such capital.
Tržno naravnane cene kapitalskih vložkov bi bile najboljši zaščitni ukrep pred neupravičenimi razlikami v stopnji kapitalizacije in nepravilno uporabo takega kapitala.
In all cases, EFTA States should ensure that any recapitalisation of a bank is based on genuine need.
Države Efte bi morale vedno zagotoviti, da dokapitalizacija bank izhaja iz resnične potrebe.
The balance to be achieved between financial stability and competition objectives underlines the importance of the distinction between fundamentally sound, well-performing banks on one hand and distressed, less-performing banks on the other.
Ravnovesje, ki ga je treba doseči med finančno stabilnostjo in cilji konkurence, poudarja pomen razlikovanja med načeloma zdravimi bankami, ki dobro poslujejo, in bankami v težavah, ki slabše poslujejo.
In its assessment of recapitalisation measures, whether in the form of schemes or support to individual banks, the Authority will therefore pay particular attention to the risk profile of the beneficiaries [6].
Komisija bo zato v oceni ukrepov dokapitalizacije (v obliki shem ali pa podpore posameznim bankam) namenila posebno pozornost profilu tveganja bank upravičenk [6].
In principle, banks with a higher risk profile should pay more.
Načeloma bi morale banke s profilom večjega tveganja plačati več.
In designing recapitalisation schemes open to a set of different banks, EFTA States should carefully consider the entry criteria and the treatment of banks with different risk profiles and differentiate in their treatment accordingly (see Annex 1).
Države članice bi morale pri določanju shem dokapitalizacije, ki so na voljo skupini različnih bank, skrbno pretehtati vstopna merila in način obravnave bank z različnimi profili tveganja ter temu ustrezno razlikovati obravnavanje teh bank (glej Prilogo 1).
Account needs to be taken of the situation of banks which face difficulties due to the current exceptional circumstances, although they would have been regarded as fundamentally sound before the crisis.
Pri tem je treba upoštevati položaj bank, ki se zaradi trenutnih izrednih razmer srečujejo s težavami, čeprav bi pred finančno krizo veljale za načeloma zdrave banke.
In addition to indicators such as compliance with regulatory solvency requirements and prospective capital adequacy as certified by the national supervisory authorities, pre-crisis CDS spreads and ratings should, for example, be a good basis for differentiation of remuneration rates for different banks.
Poleg kazalnikov, kot sta spoštovanje regulativnih zahtev glede plačilne sposobnosti in načrtovana kapitalska ustreznost, kakor jo potrdijo nacionalni nadzorni organi, bi morali biti na primer razmiki kreditnih zamenjav (CDS spreads) in bonitetne ocene iz obdobja pred finančno krizo dobra osnova za razlikovanje med stopnjami nadomestil za različne banke.
Current spreads may also reflect inherent risks which will weaken the competitive situation of some banks as they come out of the general crisis conditions.
Prav tako lahko trenutni razmiki kažejo na posebna tveganja, ki bodo oslabila konkurenčni položaj nekaterih bank, ko bodo izšle iz splošnih kriznih razmer.
Pre-crisis and current spreads should in any event reflect the burden, if any, of toxic assets and/or the weakness of the bank’s business model due to factors such as overdependence on short-term financing or abnormal leverage.
Razmiki iz obdobja pred krizo in trenutni razmiki bi morali vsekakor odražati morebitno breme slabe aktive in/ali slabosti poslovnega modela banke zaradi dejavnikov, kot sta čezmerna odvisnost od kratkoročne oblike financiranja ali nenormalen obseg posojil.
It may be necessary, in duly justified cases, to accept lower remuneration in the short term for distressed banks, on the assumption and condition that in the longer term the costs of public intervention in their favour will be reflected in the restructuring necessary to restore viability and to take account of the competitive impact of the support given to them in compensatory measures.
V ustrezno utemeljenih primerih je morda treba kratkoročno sprejeti nižje nadomestilo za banke v težavah ob domnevi in pod pogojem, da bodo stroški državnega posega v njihovo korist dolgoročno omogočili prestrukturiranje, potrebno za obnovitev sposobnosti poslovanja, in upoštevali konkurenčni učinek pomoči, ki je zagotovljena takim bankam, v obliki izravnalnih ukrepov.
Financially sound banks may be entitled to relatively low rates of entry to any recapitalisation, and correspondingly significantly reduced conditions on public support in the longer term, provided that they accept terms on the redemption or conversion of the instruments so as to retain the temporary nature of the State’s involvement, and its objective of restoring financial stability/lending to the economy, and the need to avoid abuse of the funds for wider strategic purposes.
Finančno zdrave banke so lahko upravičene do sorazmerno nizke stopnje nadomestil za kakršno koli dokapitalizacijo in temu primerno znatno manj strogih pogojev glede državne pomoči na dolgi rok, če sprejmejo pogoje o izplačilu ali pretvorbi instrumentov, tako da se ohrani začasna narava vpletenosti države in njen cilj ponovne vzpostavitve finančne stabilnosti/posojil gospodarstvu ter potreba po preprečevanju zlorabe sredstev v širše strateške namene.
Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB)
Priporočila Sveta Evropske centralne banke (ECB)
In the Recommendations of its Governing Council of 20 November 2008, the European Central Bank proposed a methodology for benchmarking the pricing of State recapitalisation measures for fundamentally sound institutions in the Euro area.
(16) Evropska centralna banka je v priporočilih svojega Sveta z dne 20. novembra 2008 predlagala metodologijo referenčnih meril za določanje cen državnih ukrepov dokapitalizacije za načeloma zdrave institucije v euroobmočju.
The guiding considerations underlying these Recommendations fully reflect the principles set out in this introduction.
Glavni pomisleki, ki so osnova navedenim priporočilom, v celoti upoštevajo načela, opisana v uvodu k temu sporočilu.
In line with its specific tasks and responsibilities, the ECB placed particular emphasis on the effectiveness of recapitalisation measures with a view to strengthening financial stability and fostering the undisturbed flow of credit to the real economy.
ECB v skladu s svojimi posebnimi nalogami in odgovornostmi posebej poudarja učinkovitost ukrepov dokapitalizacije z namenom krepitve finančne stabilnosti in spodbujanja nemotenega dotoka posojil realnemu gospodarstvu.
At the same time, it underlined the need for market-oriented pricing, including the specific risk of the individual beneficiary banks and the need to preserve a level playing field between competing banks.
Hkrati poudarja potrebo po tržno naravnanih cenah, vključno z upoštevanjem posebnega tveganja posameznih bank upravičenk in potrebo po ohranitvi enakih pogojev med konkurenčnimi bankami.
Although the EFTA States are not members of the ECB, the Authority welcomes its Recommendations which propose a pricing scheme for capital injections based on a corridor for rates of return for beneficiary banks which, notwithstanding variations in their risk profile, are fundamentally sound financial institutions.
Čeprav države Efte niso členice ECB, Nadzorni organ pozdravlja njihova priporočila, ki predlagajo cenovno shemo za kapitalske vložke na osnovi posebnega razpona stopenj donosa za banke upravičenke, ki so ne glede na razlike v svojih profilih tveganja načeloma zdrave finančne institucije.
This document aims to extend guidance to conditions other than remuneration rates and to the terms under which banks which are not fundamentally sound may have access to public capital.
Namen tega dokumenta je, da se usmeritve razširijo tudi na druge pogoje poleg stopnje nadomestil in na pogoje, pod katerimi imajo lahko tudi banke, ki načeloma niso zdrave, dostop do državnega kapitala.
In addition, while acknowledging that the current exceptional market rates do not constitute a reasonable benchmark for determining the correct level of remuneration of capital, the Authority is of the view that recapitalisation measures by EFTA States should take into account the underestimation of risk in the pre-crisis period.
Poleg tega Nadzorni organ sicer priznava, da trenutne izredne obrestne mere na trgu ne pomenijo ustreznega merila za določanje primerne ravni nadomestila za vložek kapitala, vendar meni, da bi morali ukrepi dokapitalizacije, ki jih izvedejo države Efte, upoštevati raven podcenjevanja tveganja, ki je bilo značilno za obdobje pred krizo.
Without this, public remuneration rates could give undue competitive advantages to beneficiaries and eventually lead to the crowding out of private recapitalisation.
Brez tega bi stopnje nadomestil za vložke kapitala iz državnih sredstev upravičencem lahko dale neupravičeno konkurenčno prednost, kar bi na koncu lahko izrinilo zasebno dokapitalizacijo.
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DIFFERENT TYPES OF RECAPITALISATION
NAČELA, KI UREJAJO RAZLIČNE VRSTE DOKAPITALIZACIJE
Closeness of pricing to market prices is the best guarantee to limit competition distortions [7].
Najboljše zagotovilo za omejitev izkrivljanja konkurence je majhno odstopanje cen od tržnih cen [7].
It follows that the design of recapitalisation should be determined in a way that takes the market situation of each institution into account, including its current risk profile and level of solvency, and maintains a level playing field by not providing too large a subsidy in comparison to current market alternatives.
Iz navedenega sledi, da bi morala biti dokapitalizacija zasnovana tako, da upošteva tržni položaj vsake institucije, vključno z njenim trenutnim profilom tveganja in stopnjo plačilne sposobnosti, ter ohranja enake pogoje, s tem da ne omogoča previsoke subvencije v primerjavi s trenutnimi alternativami na trgu.
In addition, pricing conditions should provide an incentive for the bank to redeem the State as soon as the crisis is over.
Poleg tega bi morale uporabljene cene banke spodbujati, da državo izplačajo takoj, ko bo krize konec.
These principles translate into the assessment of the following elements of the overall design of recapitalisation measures: objective of recapitalisation, soundness of the beneficiary bank, remuneration, exit incentives, in particular with a view to the replacement of state capital by private investors [8], to ensure the temporary nature of the State’s presence in banks’ capital, safeguards against abuse of aid and competition distortions, and the review of the effects of the recapitalisation scheme and the beneficiaries’ situation through regular reports or restructuring plans where appropriate.
Ta načela pomenijo, da se pri oceni obravnavajo naslednji vidiki splošne zasnove shem dokapitalizacije: cilj dokapitalizacije, sposobnost poslovanja upravičene banke, nadomestilo, pobude za izstop, zlasti da bi državni kapital nadomestili zasebni vlagatelji [8] s čimer bi se zagotovila začasna narava udeležbe države v kapitalu banke, zaščitni ukrepi za preprečevanje zlorabe pomoči in izkrivljanja konkurence ter pregled učinkov sheme dokapitalizacije in položaja bank upravičenk na podlagi rednih poročil ali načrtov prestrukturiranja, če so ti potrebni.
Recapitalisations at current market rates
Dokapitalizacije po sedanjih tržnih obrestnih merah
Where state capital injections are on equal terms with significant participation (30 % or more) of private investors, the Authority will accept the remuneration set in the deal [9].
Kadar za kapitalske vložke iz državnih virov veljajo enaki pogoji kot za pomembno udeležbo (30 % ali več) zasebnih vlagateljev, bo Nadzorni organ odobril nadomestilo, ki je bilo določeno z dogovorom [9].
In view of the limited competition concerns raised by such an operation, unless the terms of the deal are such as to significantly alter the incentives of private investors, in principle there does not appear to be any need for ex ante competition safeguards or exit incentives.
Glede na omejene pomisleke z vidika konkurence pri takem dogovoru se načeloma zdi, da ni potrebe po predhodnih zaščitnih ukrepih glede konkurence ali pobudah za izstop, razen če so pogoji dogovora taki, da znatno spremenijo pobude zasebnih vlagateljev.
Temporary recapitalisations of fundamentally sound banks in order to foster financial stability and lending to the real economy
Začasne dokapitalizacije načeloma zdravih bank za spodbujanje finančne stabilnosti in posojil realnemu gospodarstvu
In evaluating the treatment of banks in this category, the Authority will place considerable weight on the distinction between fundamentally sound and other banks which has been discussed in paragraphs 12 to 15.
Pri ocenjevanju obravnave bank v tej kategoriji bo Nadzorni organ dal večji pomen razlikovanju med načeloma zdravimi in drugimi bankami, ki je bilo opisano v odstavkih 12 do 15.
An overall remuneration needs to adequately factor in the following elements:
Skupno nadomestilo mora ustrezno upoštevati naslednje elemente:
Current risk profile of each beneficiary [10];
trenutni profil tveganja vsake upravičenke [10];
Characteristics of the instrument chosen, including its level of subordination; risk and all modalities of payment [11];
značilnosti izbranega instrumenta, vključno z njegovo ravnjo podrejenosti, tveganje ter vse pogoje in načine plačila [11];
Built-in incentives for exit (such as step-up and redemption clauses);
vključene pobude za izstop (kot so klavzule o povečanju (step-up) in klavzule o izplačilu);
Appropriate benchmark risk-free rate of interest.
ustrezna referenčna obrestna mera, ki ni izpostavljena tveganjem.
The remuneration for state recapitalisations cannot be as high as current market levels (about 15 %) [12] since these may not necessarily reflect what could be considered as normal market conditions [13].
Raven nadomestila za državno dokapitalizacijo ne more biti enako visoka kot trenutna tržna raven (okoli 15 %) [12] saj slednja ne ustreza nujno temu, kar bi lahko veljalo kot normalni tržni pogoji [13].
Consequently, the Authority is prepared to accept the price for recapitalisations of fundamentally sound banks at rates below current market rates, in order to facilitate banks to avail themselves of such instruments and to thereby favour the restoration of financial stability and ensuring lending to the real economy.
Zato je Nadzorni organ pripravljen sprejeti ceno dokapitalizacije načeloma zdravih bank po nižjih merah, kot so trenutne obrestne mere na trgu, da bi bankam olajšal uporabo takih instrumentov in s tem spodbudil ponovno vzpostavitev finančne stabilnosti in zagotavljanje posojil realnemu gospodarstvu.