natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The last condition of Article 53(3), according to which the agreement must not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned, presupposes an analysis of remaining competitive pressures on the market and the impact of the agreement on such sources of competition.
Zadnji pogoj iz člena 53(3), v skladu s katerim sporazum strankam ne sme dati možnosti izključitve konkurence glede znatnega dela zadevnih izdelkov, predpostavlja analizo preostalih konkurenčnih pritiskov na trg in vpliva sporazuma na takšne vire konkurence.
In the application of the last condition of Article 53(3) the relationship between Article 53(3) and Article 54 must be taken into account.
Pri uporabi zadnjega pogoja iz člena 53(3) je treba upoštevati razmerje med členom 53(3) in členom 54.
The application of Article 53(3) cannot prevent the application of Article 54 of the EEA Agreement [63].
Uporaba člena 53(3) ne more preprečiti uporabe člena 54 Sporazuma EGP [63].
Moreover, since Articles 53 and 54 both pursue the aim of maintaining effective competition on the market, consistency requires that Article 53(3) be interpreted as precluding any application of the exception rule to restrictive agreements that constitute an abuse of a dominant position [64].
Poleg tega je treba člen 53(3) zaradi doslednosti, saj si člen 53 in tudi člen 54 prizadevata ohranjati učinkovito konkurenco na trgu, razlagati tako, da izključuje uporabo pravila o izjemi za omejevalne sporazume, ki pomenijo zlorabo prevladujočega položaja [64].
The fact that the agreement substantially reduces one dimension of competition does not necessarily mean that competition is eliminated within the meaning of Article 53(3).
Dejstvo, da sporazum znatno zmanjša eno od razsežnosti konkurence, še ne pomeni nujno, da je konkurenca izključena v smislu člena 53(3).
A technology pool, for instance, can result in an industry standard, leading to a situation in which there is little competition in terms of the technological format.
Tehnološko združenje ima lahko na primer za posledico industrijski standard, kar privede do okoliščin, v katerih je malo konkurence z vidika tehnološkega formata.
Once the main players in the market adopt a certain format, network effects may make it very difficult for alternative formats to survive.
Ko poglavitni udeleženci na trgu prevzamejo določen format, lahko mrežni učinki zelo otežijo preživetje alternativnih formatov.
This does not imply, however, that the creation of a de facto industry standard always eliminates competition within the meaning of the last condition of Article 53(3).
Vendar to ne pomeni, da oblikovanje dejanskega industrijskega standarda vedno izključuje konkurenco v smislu zadnjega pogoja iz člena 53(3).
Within the standard, suppliers may compete on price, quality and product features.
V okviru tega standarda lahko dobavitelji konkurirajo na področju cen, kakovosti in lastnosti izdelkov.
However, in order for the agreement to comply with Article 53(3), it must be ensured that the agreement does not unduly restrict competition and does not unduly restrict future innovation.
Vendar pa je za uskladitev sporazuma s členom 53(3) treba zagotoviti, da sporazum neupravičeno ne omejuje konkurence in neupravičeno ne omejuje prihodnjih inovacij.
The application of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement to various types of licensing restraints
Uporaba člena 53 Sporazuma EGP za različne vrste omejitev licenčnih sporazumov
This section deals with various types of restraints that are commonly included in licence agreements.
To podpoglavje obravnava različne vrste omejitev, ki jih običajno vsebujejo licenčni sporazumi.
Given their prevalence it is useful to provide guidance as to how they are assessed outside the safe harbour of the TTBER.
Glede na razširjenost takih omejitev je koristno zagotoviti smernice o načinu njihovega ocenjevanja zunaj varnega pristana TTBER.
Restraints that have already been dealt with in the preceding parts of these guidelines, in particular sections III.4 and III.5, are only dealt with briefly in the present section.
Omejitve, ki so že bile obravnavane v predhodnih delih teh smernic, zlasti v podpoglavjih III.4 in III.5, so v tem podpoglavju omenjene le na kratko.
This section covers both agreements between non-competitors and agreements between competitors.
To podpoglavje zajema sporazume med nekonkurenti, pa tudi sporazume med konkurenti.
In respect of the latter a distinction is made - where appropriate - between reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements.
Slednje delimo - kjer je to potrebno - na vzajemne in nevzajemne sporazume.
No such distinction is required in the case of agreements between non-competitors.
Takšno razlikovanje ni potrebno v primeru sporazumov med nekonkurenti.
When undertakings are neither actual nor potential competitors on a relevant technology market or on a market for products incorporating the licensed technology, a reciprocal licence is for all practical purposes no different from two separate licences.
Če podjetja niso niti dejanski niti potencialni konkurenti na upoštevnem tehnološkem trgu ali na trgu izdelkov, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo, se vzajemna licenca za vse praktične namene ne razlikuje od dveh ločenih licenc.
Arrangements whereby the parties assemble a technology package, which is then licensed to third parties, are technology pools, which are dealt with in Section 4 below.
Dogovori, s katerimi stranke združijo tehnologije v paket za nadaljnjo podelitev licence tretjim, so tehnološka združenja, ki so obravnavana v podpoglavju 4 spodaj.
This section does not deal with obligations in licence agreements that are generally not restrictive of competition within the meaning of Article 53(1).
To podpoglavje ne obravnava obveznosti iz licenčnih sporazumov, ki običajno ne omejujejo konkurence v smislu člena 53(1).
These obligations include but are not limited to:
Te obveznosti med drugim zajemajo:
confidentiality obligations;
obveznosti glede zaupnosti;
obligations on licensees not to sub-license;
obveznosti pridobiteljev licenc, da ne bodo podeljevali podlicenc;
obligations not to use the licensed technology after the expiry of the agreement, provided that the licensed technology remains valid and in force;
obveznosti pridobiteljev licenc, da ne bodo uporabljali licenčne tehnologije po poteku sporazuma, pod pogojem, da je licenčna tehnologija še naprej veljavna in se uporablja;
obligations to assist the licensor in enforcing the licensed intellectual property rights;
obveznosti pridobiteljev licenc, da bodo pomagali dajalcu licence pri uveljavljanju licenčnih pravic intelektualne lastnine;
obligations to pay minimum royalties or to produce a minimum quantity of products incorporating the licensed technology; and
obveznosti pridobiteljev licenc, da bodo plačevali najnižje licenčnine ali proizvajali najmanjšo količino izdelkov, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo; in
obligations to use the licensor’s trademark or indicate the name of the licensor on the product.
obveznosti pridobiteljev licenc, da bodo uporabljali blagovno znamko dajalca licence ali navajali ime dajalca licence na izdelku.
Royalty obligations
Obveznosti za plačilo licenčnin
The parties to a licence agreement are normally free to determine the royalty payable by the licensee and its mode of payment without being caught by Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Stranki licenčnega sporazuma lahko običajno prosto določata licenčnino, ki jo mora plačati pridobitelj licence, in način njenega plačila, ne da bi bil sporazum zaradi tega zajet v členu 53(1) Sporazuma EGP.
This principle applies both to agreements between competitors and agreements between non-competitors.
To načelo se uporablja za sporazume med konkurenti, pa tudi sporazume med nekonkurenti.
Royalty obligations may for instance take the form of lump sum payments, a percentage of the selling price or a fixed amount for each product incorporating the licensed technology.
Obveznosti za plačilo licenčnin so lahko na primer v obliki pavšalnih izplačil, odstotka prodajne cene ali fiksnega zneska za vsak izdelek, ki vključuje licenčno tehnologijo.
In cases where the licensed technology relates to an input which is incorporated into a final product it is as a general rule not restrictive of competition that royalties are calculated on the basis of the price of the final product, provided that it incorporates the licensed technology.
Če se licenčna tehnologija nanaša na proizvodni dejavnik, vključen v končni izdelek, dejstvo, da se licenčnine izračunajo na podlagi cene končnega izdelka, običajno ne pomeni omejevanja konkurence, pod pogojem, da je vključena licenčna tehnologija.
In the case of software licensing royalties based on the number of users and royalties calculated on a per machine basis are generally compatible with Article 53(1).
V primeru licenčnega sporazuma za programsko opremo so licenčnine, izračunane na podlagi števila uporabnikov, in licenčnine, izračunane na podlagi števila računalnikov, običajno združljive s členom 53(1).
It is also a hardcore restriction under Article 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(d) if royalties extend to products produced solely with the licensee’s own technology.
Prav tako je nedopustna omejitev po členu 4(1)(a) in 4(1)(d), če licenčnine zajemajo tudi izdelke, ki so proizvedeni izključno z lastno tehnologijo pridobitelja licence.
Other types of royalty arrangements between competitors are block exempted up to the market share threshold of 20 % even if they restrict competition.
Druge vrste dogovorov o licenčninah med konkurenti so v primeru, da ni presežen 20-odstotni prag tržnega deleža, predmet skupinske izjeme, tudi če omejujejo konkurenco.
Outside the safe harbour of the block exemption Article 53(1) may be applicable where competitors cross license and impose running royalties that are clearly disproportionate compared to the market value of the licence and where such royalties have a significant impact on market prices.
Zunaj varnega pristana skupinske izjeme se prepoved iz člena 53(1) lahko uporablja, če konkurenti navzkrižno podeljujejo licence in nalagajo tekoče licenčnine, ki so očitno nesorazmerne v primerjavi s tržno vrednostjo licence, ter če imajo takšne licenčnine znaten vpliv na tržne cene.
In assessing whether the royalties are disproportionate it is relevant to have regard to the royalties paid by other licensees on the product market for the same or substitute technologies.
Pri ugotavljanju, ali so licenčnine nesorazmerne, je pomembno upoštevati licenčnine, ki jih plačajo drugi pridobitelji licenc na proizvodnem trgu za iste ali nadomestne tehnologije.
In such cases it is unlikely that the conditions of Article 53(3) are satisfied.
V navedenih primerih obstaja majhna verjetnost, da bodo pogoji iz člena 53(3) izpolnjeni.
Article 53(1) may also apply where reciprocal running royalties per unit increase as output increases.
Prepoved iz člena 53(1) se prav tako lahko uporablja, če se vzajemne tekoče kosovne licenčnine povečujejo vzporedno z obsegom proizvodnje.
If the parties have a significant degree of market power, such royalties may have the effect of limiting output.
Če imajo stranke znatno stopnjo tržne moči, lahko takšne licenčnine vplivajo tako, da omejijo obseg proizvodnje.
Notwithstanding the fact that the block exemption only applies as long as the technology is valid and in force, the parties can normally agree to extend royalty obligations beyond the period of validity of the licensed intellectual property rights without falling foul of Article 53(1).
Ne glede na dejstvo, da se skupinska izjema uporablja, le če je licenčna tehnologija veljavna in se izkorišča, se lahko stranke običajno sporazumejo, da bodo obveznosti za plačilo licenčnin veljale tudi po izteku obdobja veljavnosti licenčnih pravic intelektualne lastnine, ne da bi bil s tem kršen člen 53(1).
Once these rights expire, third parties can legally exploit the technology in question and compete with the parties to the agreement.
Ko te pravice prenehajo veljati, lahko tretji zakonito izkoriščajo zadevno tehnologijo in konkurirajo s strankami sporazuma.
Such actual and potential competition will normally suffice to ensure that the obligation in question does not have appreciable anti-competitive effects.
Takšna dejanska in potencialna konkurenca bo običajno zadostovala za zagotovitev, da zadevna obveznost ne bo imela znatnih protikonkurenčnih učinkov.
In the case of agreements between non-competitors the block exemption covers agreements whereby royalties are calculated on the basis of both products produced with the licensed technology and products produced with technologies licensed from third parties.
V primeru sporazumov med nekonkurenti skupinska izjema zajema sporazume, pri katerih se licenčnine izračunajo na podlagi izdelkov, proizvedenih z licenčno tehnologijo, pa tudi izdelkov, proizvedenih s tehnologijami, ki jih licencirajo tretji.
Such arrangements may facilitate the metering of royalties.
Takšni dogovori lahko olajšajo obračunavanje licenčnin.
However, they may also lead to foreclosure by increasing the cost of using third party inputs and may thus have similar effects as a non-compete obligation.
Vendar pa lahko prav tako privedejo do omejevanja dostopa na trg, tako da povečajo strošek uporabe proizvodnih dejavnikov tretjih in imajo tako lahko podobne učinke kot obveznost nekonkurence.
If royalties are paid not just on products produced with the licensed technology but also on products produced with third party technology, then the royalties will increase the cost of the latter products and reduce demand for third party technology.
Če se licenčnine ne plačujejo zgolj na podlagi izdelkov, izdelanih z licenčno tehnologijo, temveč tudi izdelkov, proizvedenih s tehnologijo tretjih, bodo povečale strošek teh drugih izdelkov in znižale povpraševanje po tehnologiji tretjih.
Outside the scope of the block exemption it must therefore be examined whether the restriction has foreclosure effects.
Zunaj področja uporabe skupinske izjeme je zato treba proučiti, ali ima omejevanje učinke zapiranja trga.
For that purpose it is appropriate to use the analytical framework set out in section 2.7 below.
V ta namen je primerno uporabiti analitični okvir iz podpoglavja 2.7 spodaj.
In the case of appreciable foreclosure effects such agreements are caught by Article 53(1) and unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3), unless there is no other practical way of calculating and monitoring royalty payments.
Če so učinki preprečevanja dostopa na trg znatni, so takšni sporazumi zajeti v členu 53(1) in malo verjetno je, da izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 53(3), razen v primeru, da ne obstaja noben drug praktični način za izračun in spremljanje plačil licenčnin.
Exclusive licensing and sales restrictions
Sporazumi o izključnih licencah in omejitve prodaje
For the present purposes it is useful to distinguish between restrictions as to production within a given territory (exclusive or sole licences) and restrictions on the sale of products incorporating the licensed technology into a given territory and to a given customer group (sales restrictions).
Za namene teh smernic je koristno razlikovati med omejitvami proizvodnje na določenem ozemlju (izključne ali edine licence) ter omejitvami prodaje izdelkov, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo, na določenem ozemlju in določeni skupini kupcev (omejitve prodaje).
Exclusive and sole licences
Izključne in edine licence
A licence is deemed to be exclusive if the licensee is the only one who is permitted to produce on the basis of the licensed technology within a given territory.
Šteje se, da je licenca izključna, če je pridobitelj licence edini, ki mu je dovoljeno proizvajati na podlagi licenčne tehnologije na določenem ozemlju.
The licensor thus undertakes not to produce itself or license others to produce within a given territory.
Tako se dajalec licence zaveže, da na danem ozemlju sam ne bo proizvajal oziroma drugim ne bo podeljeval licenc za proizvodnjo.
This territory may cover the whole world.
To ozemlje lahko zajema cel svet.
Where the licensor undertakes only not to licence third parties to produce within a given territory, the licence is a sole licence.
Če se dajalec licence zaveže le, da tretjim ne bo podelil licence za proizvodnjo na določenem ozemlju, gre za edino licenco.
Often exclusive or sole licensing is accompanied by sales restrictions that limit the parties in where they may sell products incorporating the licensed technology.
Izključne ali edine licence pogosto spremljajo omejitve prodaje, ki stranke omejujejo z vidika geografskega ozemlja, na katerem lahko prodajajo izdelke, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo.
Reciprocal exclusive licensing between competitors falls under Article 4(1)(c), which identifies market sharing between competitors as a hardcore restriction.
Vzajemno podeljevanje izključnih licenc med konkurenti sodi v področje uporabe člena 4(1)(c), v skladu s katerim je razdelitev trga med konkurenti opredeljena kot nedopustna omejitev.
Reciprocal sole licensing between competitors is block exempted up to the market share threshold of 20 %.
Vzajemno podeljevanje edinih licenc med konkurenti je predmet skupinske izjeme do 20-odstotnega praga tržnega deleža.
Under such an agreement the parties mutually commit not to license their competing technologies to third parties.
V okviru takšnih sporazumov se stranke medsebojno zavežejo, da ne bodo podeljevale licenc za svoje konkurenčne tehnologije tretjim.
In cases where the parties have a significant degree of market power such agreements may facilitate collusion by ensuring that the parties are the only sources of output in the market based on the licensed technologies.
Če imajo stranke znatno stopnjo tržne moči, lahko takšni sporazumi olajšajo dogovarjanje, s tem da zagotavljajo, da bodo stranke edini viri proizvodnje na trgu, ki temelji na licenčnih tehnologijah.
Non-reciprocal exclusive licensing between competitors is block exempted up to the market share threshold of 20 %.
Nevzajemno podeljevanje izključnih licenc med konkurenti je predmet skupinske izjeme do 20-odstotnega praga tržnega deleža.
Above the market share threshold it is necessary to analyse what are the likely anti-competitive effects of such exclusive licensing.
Pri preseženem pragu tržnega deleža je treba analizirati verjetne protikonkurenčne učinke takšnih izključnih licenc.
Where the exclusive licence is world-wide it implies that the licensor leaves the market.
Če izključna licenca zadeva svetovni trg, pomeni, da dajalec licence zapušča trg.
In cases where exclusivity is limited to a particular territory such as an EEA State the agreement implies that the licensor abstains from producing goods and services inside the territory in question.
V primerih, ko je izključnost omejena na določeno ozemlje, kot je država EGP, se dajalec licence po sporazumu vzdrži proizvodnje blaga in opravljanja storitev znotraj zadevnega ozemlja.
In the context of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement it must in particular be assessed what is the competitive significance of the licensor.
V okviru člena 53(1) Sporazuma EGP je treba zlasti oceniti konkurenčno težo dajalca licence.
If the licensor has a limited market position on the product market or lacks the capacity to effectively exploit the technology in the licensee’s territory, the agreement is unlikely to be caught by Article 53(1).
Če ima dajalec licence omejen tržni položaj na proizvodnem trgu ali ni sposoben učinkovito izkoriščati tehnologije na ozemlju pridobitelja licence, je malo verjetno, da bi bil sporazum zajet v členu 53(1).
A special case is where the licensor and the licensee only compete on the technology market and the licensor, for instance being a research institute or a small research based undertaking, lacks the production and distribution assets to effectively bring to market products incorporating the licensed technology.
Poseben primer je, če sta dajalec in pridobitelj licence konkurenta le na tehnološkem trgu in dajalec licence, na primer raziskovalni inštitut ali majhno raziskovalno podjetje, nima proizvodnih in distribucijskih zmogljivosti, s katerimi bi učinkovito dal na trg izdelke, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo.
In such cases Article 53(1) is unlikely to be infringed.
V takšnih primerih je kršitev člena 53(1) malo verjetna.
Exclusive licensing between non-competitors — to the extent that it is caught by Article 53(1) [65] — is likely to fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3).
V kolikor je podeljevanje izključnih licenc med nekonkurenti zajeto v členu 53(1) [65], lahko izpolnjuje pogoje iz člena 53(3).
The right to grant an exclusive licence is generally necessary in order to induce the licensee to invest in the licensed technology and to bring the products to market in a timely manner.
Pravica do podelitve izključne licence je običajno potrebna, da se pridobitelj licence spodbudi k vlaganju v licenčno tehnologijo in k pravočasni uvedbi izdelkov na trg.
This is in particular the case where the licensee must make large investments in further developing the licensed technology.
To se zgodi zlasti, če mora pridobitelj licence izvesti obsežne naložbe pri nadaljnjem razvijanju licenčne tehnologije.
To intervene against the exclusivity once the licensee has made a commercial success of the licensed technology would deprive the licensee of the fruits of his success and would be detrimental to competition, the dissemination of technology and innovation.
Potem ko je pridobitelju licence s poslovnega vidika uspelo uspešno izkoristiti licenčno tehnologijo, bi poseganje v izključnost pridobitelju licence odvzelo sadove njegovega uspeha in škodljivo vplivalo na konkurenco, razširjanje tehnologije in inovacije.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority will therefore only exceptionally intervene against exclusive licensing in agreements between non-competitors, irrespective of the territorial scope of the licence.
Nadzorni organ EFTA bo zato v sporazumih med nekonkurenti le izjemoma ukrepal proti izključnim licencam, ne glede na ozemlje uporabe licence.
The main situation in which intervention may be warranted is where a dominant licensee obtains an exclusive licence to one or more competing technologies.
Glavni primer, v katerem je ukrepanje upravičeno, je, če prevladujoči pridobitelj licence pridobi izključno licenco za eno ali več konkurenčnih tehnologij.
Such agreements are likely to be caught by Article 53(1) and unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3).
Za takšne sporazume je verjetno, da so zajeti v členu 53(1), in ni verjetno, da izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 53(3).
It is a condition however that entry into the technology market is difficult and the licensed technology constitutes a real source of competition on the market.
Nujno pa je, da je vstop na tehnološki trg otežen in da je licenčna tehnologija dejanski vir konkurence na trgu.
In such circumstances an exclusive licence may foreclose third party licensees and allow the licensee to preserve his market power.
Izključna licenca lahko v takšnih okoliščinah tretjim pridobiteljem licenc prepreči dostop na trg in pridobitelju licence omogoči, da ohrani svojo tržno moč.
Arrangements whereby two or more parties cross licence each other and undertake not to licence third parties give rise to particular concerns when the package of technologies resulting from the cross licences creates a de facto industry standard to which third parties must have access in order to compete effectively on the market.
Dogovori, s katerimi se dve ali več strank dogovori o medsebojni podelitvi licenc in se zaveže, da ne bodo podeljevale licenc tretjim, so povod za posebno zaskrbljenost, če tehnološki paket, ki je nastal na podlagi navzkrižnega licenciranja, pomeni dejanski industrijski standard, do katerega morajo tretji imeti dostop, da lahko na trgu učinkovito konkurirajo.
In such cases the agreement creates a closed standard reserved for the parties.
V takšnih primerih sporazum vzpostavi zaprt standard, namenjen samo strankam sporazuma.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority will assess such arrangements according to the same principles as those applied to technology pools (see section 4 below).
Nadzorni organ EFTA bo takšne dogovore ocenil v skladu z istimi načeli, kot se uporabljajo za tehnološka združenja (glej podpoglavje 4 spodaj).