natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Icelandic banks borrowed 14 billion euros on foreign debt securities markets in 2005 on relatively favourable terms.
Kljub temu da je začela imeti banka Glitnir težave z likvidnostjo in refinanciranjem, so se povečala posojila glavnim delničarjem.
When access to European debt securities markets became more limited, the banks financed their activities on US markets, with Icelandic debt securities packaged into collateralised debt obligations.
Po mnenju posebne preiskovalne komisije so se nekateri delničarji kot lastniki presenetljivo lahko zadolževali pri banki.
In the period before the collapse, the banks were increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing, leading to major and, according to the SIC, foreseeable re-financing risks.
Poleg tega so po njenih ugotovitvah obstajali močni indici, da sta skupini Baugur in FL skušali nedopustno vplivati na upravljanje banke ter da so se meje med interesi največjih delničarjev in interesi banke zabrisale.
The gearing of the banks' owners
Poudarjanje prednosti glavnih delničarjih je torej škodilo drugim delničarjem in upnikom.
In the case of each major Icelandic bank, the principal owners were among the biggest debtors [13].
Neodplačano posojilo skupini Baugur in povezanim družbam je po zlomu banke znašalo približno 2 milijardi EUR, kar je bilo okrog 70 % njenega lastniškega kapitala.
Glitnir's loans to major shareholders of the Baugur Group and related parties, in particular the FL Group, were substantial.
Posebna preiskovalna komisija se je spraševala tudi o dejavnosti skladov denarnega trga, ki so jih upravljale hčerinske družbe bank, ki so veliko vlagale v vrednostne papirje, povezane z lastniki bank.
In the spring of 2007 a new Glitnir board was appointed after the Baugur and FL Groups significantly increased their shareholdings in the bank.
Sklad Glitnir, podružnica banke Glitnir, je z naložbo 20 % svojega celotnega kapitala v vrednostne papirje skupin Baugur in FL tema skupinama posodil okrog 300 milijonov EUR.
Over the latter part of 2007 and beginning of 2008 loans to Baugur and companies related to Baugur nearly doubled, and at its peak lending to this group amounted to 80 % of the bank's equity [14].
Koncentracija tveganj
This increase in lending to major shareholders occurred despite the fact that Glitnir was starting to face liquidity and refinancing problems.
V zvezi z neobičajno izpostavljenostjo glavnim delničarjem je posebna preiskovalna komisija ugotovila, da banke niso imele dovolj raznovrstnih portfeljev sredstev.
The SIC was of the view that certain shareholders had abnormally easy access to borrowing from the banks in their capacity as owners.
Ta komisija je menila, da so se evropski predpisi o veliki izpostavljenosti razlagali ozko, zlasti v primeru delničarjev, in da so se skušale banke izogniti predpisom.
It also concluded that there were strong indications that Baugur and the FL Group had tried to exert undue influence on the bank's management, and that the boundaries between the interests of the largest shareholders and the interest of the bank were blurred.
Šibek lastniški kapital
The emphasis on the major shareholders was therefore to the detriment of other shareholders and creditors.
Čeprav je bil količnik kapitala banke Glitnir in dveh drugih glavnih islandskih bank po poročilih vedno rahlo višji od najnižje zakonsko določene stopnje, je posebna preiskovalna komisija ugotovila, da količniki kapitala niso natančno izražali finančne moči bank.
When the bank collapsed its outstanding loans to the Baugur Group and affiliated companies was approximately 2 billion euros, around 70 % of its equity.
To je bilo zaradi tega, ker so bile lastne delnice bank prek primarnih zavarovanj in terminskih pogodb o delnicah izpostavljene tveganju.
The SIC also questioned the operation of money market funds operated by subsidiaries of the banks, which invested heavily in securities connected to the owners of the banks.
Osnovni kapital, ki so ga financirale družbe same, posebna preiskovalna komisija pa ga je opredelila kot „šibek lastniški kapital“ [15], je pomenil več kot eno četrtino kapitalske osnove bank (ob primerjavi z osnovno sestavino kapitala, tj. lastniškim kapitalom delničarjev, od česar se odštejejo neopredmetena sredstva, pa več kot polovico).
Glitnir Funds, a subsidiary of Glitnir, lent around 300 million euros to Baugur and the FL Group by investing 20 % of its total capital in their securities.
Poleg tega so se pojavile težave, ki jih je povzročilo tveganje, da so bile banke zaradi delnic v vzajemni lasti izpostavljene.
Concentration of risk
Banke so do sredine leta 2008 neposredno financirale lastne delnice ter navzkrižno financirale delnice drugih dveh bank, kar je znašalo približno 400 milijard ISK, tj. okrog 70 % osnovne sestavine kapitala.
Related to the issue of the abnormal exposure to major shareholders was the conclusion of the SIC that the banks' portfolios of assets were insufficiently diversified.
Po mnenju posebne preiskovalne komisije je bil obseg financiranja lastniškega kapitala delničarjev z izposojanjem iz sistema tolikšen, da je bila ogrožena stabilnost sistema.
The SIC was of the view that European rules on large exposure were interpreted in a narrow way, in particular in the case of the shareholders, and that the banks had sought to evade the rules.
Banke so imele precejšnje količine lastnih delnic kot zavarovanje za posojanje, zato se je, s tem ko so padle cene delnic, zmanjšala kakovost njihovega posojilnega portfelja.
Weak equity
To je vplivalo na uspešnost bank in ustvarilo nadaljnji negativen pritisk na cene delnic, banke so kot odziv na to (po domnevah posebne preiskovalne komisije glede na razpoložljive informacije) skušale umetno ustvariti nenormalno povpraševanje po lastnih delnicah.
Although the capital ratio of Glitnir and the other two major Icelandic banks was always reported to be slightly higher than the statutory minimum, the SIC concluded that the capital ratios did not accurately reflect the financial strength of the banks.
Velikost bank
This was due to risk exposure of the banks' own shares through primary collaterals and forward contracts on the shares.
Bilanca stanja treh glavnih bank (skupaj) je leta 2001 znašala malo več kot letni bruto domači proizvod (BDP) Islandije.
Share capital financed by the companies themselves, referred to by the SIC as ‘weak equity’ [15], represented more than 25 % of the banks' capital bases (or over 50 % when assessed against the core component of the capital, i.e. shareholders' equity less intangible assets).
Banke so do konca leta 2007 postale mednarodne, njihova sredstva pa so za devetkrat presegala islandski BDP.
Added to this were problems caused by the risk that the banks were exposed to by holding each other's shares.
V poročilu posebne preiskovalne komisije je navedeno, da so opazovalci do leta 2006 pripomnili, da je bančni sistem prerasel zmogljivost Centralne banke Islandije, in so dvomili, da bi lahko izpolnila vlogo posojilodajalca v skrajni sili.
By the middle of 2008 direct financing by the banks of their own shares, as well as cross-financing of the other two banks' shares, amounted to approximately 400 billion ISK, around 70 % of the core component of the capital.
Islandski kratkoročni dolgovi (v glavnem nastali zaradi financiranja bank) so bili do konca leta 2007 petnajstkrat višji kot devizne rezerve, tuje vloge v treh bankah pa so bile osemkrat višje kot devizne rezerve.
The SIC was of the opinion that the extent of financing of shareholders' equity by borrowing from the system itself was such that the system's stability was threatened.
Jamstveni sklad depozitarjev in vlagateljev je imel minimalna sredstva v primerjavi z bančnimi vlogami, za katere naj bi ponujal jamstvo.
The banks held a substantial amount of their own shares as collateral for their lending and therefore as share prices fell the quality of their loan portfolios declined.
Po ugotovitvah posebne preiskovalne komisije je bila Islandija zaradi teh dejavnikov dovzetna za naval na banke.
This affected the banks' performance and put further downward pressure on their share prices; in response to which (the SIC assumed from the information in their possession), the banks attempted to artificially create abnormal demand for their own shares.
Nenadna rast bank v primerjavi z regulativno in finančno infrastrukturo
The size of the banks
Posebna preiskovalna komisija je ugotovila, da ustrezni nadzorni organi na Islandiji niso imeli potrebne verodostojnosti, ker posojilodajalec v skrajni sili ni imel zadostnih sredstev.
In 2001 the balance sheets of the three main banks (collectively) amounted to just over a year of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Iceland.
V poročilu je bilo ugotovljeno, da Organ za finančni nadzor in Centralna banka Islandije nista imela strokovnega znanja in izkušenj za urejanje bank v težkih gospodarskih časih, lahko pa bi ukrepala, da bi se zmanjšala stopnja tveganja, ki je nastajala v bankah.
By the end of 2007 the banks had become international and held assets worth nine times the Icelandic GDP.
Organ za finančni nadzor, na primer, ni rasel v enakem obsegu kot banke, prakse upravnega organa tudi niso bile v koraku s hitrim razvojem dejavnosti bank.
The SIC report notes that by 2006, observers were commenting that the banking system had outgrown the capacity of the CBI and doubted whether it could fulfil the role of lender of last resort.
Poročilo je prav tako kritično do vlade, saj ugotavlja, da bi morali nacionalni organi ukrepati, tako da bi z zmanjšanjem velikosti bank ali z zahtevo, naj ena ali več bank svoj sedež premakne v tujino, zmanjšali možni vpliv bank na gospodarstvo [16].
By the end of 2007 Iceland's short-term debts (mainly incurred due to financing of the banks) were 15 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves, and the foreign deposits in the three banks were also 8 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves.
Neravnotežje in čezmerna širitev celotnega islandskega gospodarstva
The Depositors and Investors Guarantee Fund held minimal resources in comparison with the bank deposits that it was meant to guarantee.
V poročilu posebne preiskovalne komisije so navedeni dogodki v zvezi s širšim gospodarstvom, ki so prav tako vplivali na hitro rast bank in prispevali, da sta bila obseg in vpliv med sektorji finančnih storitev ter preostalim gospodarstvom v neravnotežju.
These factors, the SIC concludes, made Iceland susceptible to a run on its banks.
V poročilu je bilo ugotovljeno, da so k čezmerni širitvi in neravnotežju najverjetneje prispevale vladne politike (zlasti fiskalna politika) ter da monetarna politika Centralne banke Islandije ni bila dovolj restriktivna.
The sudden growth of the banks in comparison with the regulatory and financial infrastructure
V poročilu so tudi opozorili, da je bila sprostitev pravil v islandskem stanovanjskem finančnem skladu „ena največjih napak v monetarnem in fiskalnem upravljanju, narejena v obdobju, ki je vodilo do zloma bank“ [17].
The SIC concluded that the relevant supervisory bodies in Iceland lacked the credibility that was necessary in the absence of a sufficiently resourced lender of last resort.
V poročilu je kritično obravnavano tudi to, s kakšno lahkoto so si banke izposojale od Centralne banke Islandije, pri čemer so se zaloge kratkoročnih zavarovanih posojil Centralne banke Islandije povečale s 30 milijard ISK jeseni leta 2005 na 500 milijard ISK do začetka oktobra 2008.
The report concludes that the FME and CBI lacked the expertise and experience to regulate the banks in difficult economic times, but that they could have taken action to reduce the level of risk that the banks were incurring.
Islandska krona, zunanja neravnotežja in razmiki kreditne zamenjave
The FME, for example, did not grow in the same proportion as the banks and the regulator's practices did not keep up with the rapid developments in the banks' operations.
V poročilu je navedeno, da je bila leta 2006 vrednost islandske krone netrajnostno visoka, islandski primanjkljaj tekočega računa je znašal več kot 16 % BDP, obveznosti v tujih valutah, od katerih so bila odšteta sredstva, pa so znašale skoraj celotni letni BDP.
The report is also critical of the government, concluding that the authorities should have taken action to reduce the potential impact of the banks on the economy by reducing their size or requiring one or more banks to move their headquarters abroad [16].
Obstajali so pogoji za finančno krizo.
Imbalance and overexpansion of the Icelandic economy as a whole
Krona je do konca leta 2007 izgubljala vrednost, razmiki kreditne zamenjave na Islandiji in banke pa so eksponentno rastli.
The SIC report makes reference to events concerning the wider economy that also impacted upon the banks' rapid growth and contributed to the imbalance in size and influence between the financial services sector and the remainder of the economy.
Ukrepi, sprejeti za obnovo bančnega sektorja
The report concluded that government policies (in particular fiscal policy) most likely contributed to the overexpansion and imbalance and that the CBI's monetary policy was not sufficiently restrictive.
Islandski organi so se po zlomu treh glavnih komercialnih bank oktobra 2008 (vključno z banko Glitnir) znašli pred izzivom brez primere, tj. zagotoviti nadaljnje bančne dejavnosti na Islandiji [18].
The report also refers to relaxing the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund's lending rules as ‘one of the biggest mistakes in monetary and fiscal management made in the period leading up to the banks' collapse’ [17].
Minister za finance je bil v imenu ministrstva za finance pooblaščen, da izplačuje sredstva za ustanavljanje novih finančnih podjetij.
The report is also critical of the ease with which the banks were able to borrow from the CBI, with the stock of CBI short-term collateral loans increasing from 30 billion ISK in the autumn of 2005 to 500 billion ISK by the beginning of October 2008.
Poleg tega bi imele vloge v stečajnih postopkih finančnih podjetij prednost pred drugimi terjatvami.
The report notes that in 2006, the value of the Icelandic króna was unsustainably high, the Icelandic current account deficit was over 16 % of GDP, and liabilities in foreign currencies less assets neared total annual GDP.
Prednostne naloge politike so bile sprva osredotočene na zavarovanje osnovnega delovanja domačih bančnih in plačilnih sistemov ter sistemov poravnav.
The prerequisites for a financial crisis were in place.
Islandska vlada je v sodelovanju z Mednarodnim denarnim skladom (MDS) v prvih tednih po zlomu tudi pripravila gospodarski program, na podlagi česar je bila 20. novembra 2008 odobrena islandska zahteva, naj ji MDS zagotovi dvoletni „stand-by“ aranžma, v kar je bilo zajeto posojilo MDS v višini 2,1 milijarde USD, s čimer naj bi se okrepile islandske devizne rezerve.
By the end of 2007 the value of the króna was depreciating and credit default swap spreads (CDS) on Iceland and the banks rose exponentially.
Druge nordijske države ter nekateri drugi trgovinski partnerji pa so zagotovili dodatna posojila v višini do 3 milijard USD.
Measures taken to reconstruct the banking sector
Od posojila MDS je bilo 827 milijonov USD takoj na voljo, preostali znesek pa je bil na podlagi četrtletnih pregledov programa izplačan v osmih enakih obrokih.
Following the collapse of the three biggest commercial banks in October 2008 (including Glitnir) the Icelandic authorities were faced with the unprecedented challenge of safeguarding continued banking operations in Iceland [18].
Program MDS je bil stabilizacijski program s široko osnovo s poudarkom na treh glavnih ciljih.
The policy followed by the Icelandic government is primarily laid down in the Emergency Act [19] adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 6 October 2008.
Prvič, stabilizirati in obnoviti zaupanje v krono, da se omeji negativni učinek krize na gospodarstvo.
The law grants extraordinary powers to the FME to take control of financial undertakings and to dispose of their assets and liabilities as required.
V te ukrepe je bila zajeta uvedba kapitalskih kontrol, ki naj bi okrnile beg kapitala.
The Minister of Finance was authorised, on behalf of the Treasury, to disburse funds in order to establish new financial undertakings.
Drugič, v program je bila vključena obsežna strategija za prestrukturiranje bank, katere končni cilj je bila obnova uspešno delujočega finančnega sistema na Islandiji ter zaščita mednarodnih finančnih odnosov države.
Moreover, in bankruptcy proceedings of financial undertakings, deposits would be given priority over other claims.
Pomožni cilji so med drugim zajemali: zagotoviti pravično vrednotenje bančnih sredstev, čim bolj povečati vračilo sredstev in okrepiti prakse nadzora.
The government declared that deposits in domestic commercial and savings banks and their branches in Iceland would be fully protected.
Tretjič, cilj programa je bilo zagotavljanje vzdržnih javnih financ, s tem da se omeji socializacija izgub v propadlih bankah in izvede srednjeročni program fiskalne konsolidacije.
Policy priorities focused initially on securing the basic functioning of the domestic banking, payment and settlement systems.
Islandski organi so poudarili, da so imeli zaradi izrednih okoliščin, povezanih z obsežnostjo bančnega sistema v zvezi s finančno zmogljivostjo državne blagajne, na voljo omejene možnosti politike.
In the first weeks after the crash, the Icelandic Government also prepared an economic program in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (the IMF), leading to the approval on 20 November 2008 of Iceland's request for a two year stand-by-arrangement from the Fund, which included a 2,1 billion USD loan from the IMF aimed at strengthening Iceland's currency reserves.
Opirali so se torej na rešitve, ki so se v mnogočem razlikovale od ukrepov, ki so jih sprejele vlade drugih držav, katerih finančna stabilnost je bila ogrožena.
Additional loans of up to 3 billion USD were secured from other Nordic countries as well as certain other trading partners.
Tri velike komercialne banke: banke Glitnir, Landsbanki Íslands in Kaupthing, so bile na podlagi zakona o izrednih razmerah razdeljene v „nekdanje“ in „nove“ banke.
Of the IMF loan, 827 million USD was made available immediately, while the remaining amount was disbursed in eight equal instalments, subject to quarterly reviews of the program.
Za prevzem domačih dejavnosti nekdanjih bank je minister za finance ustanovil tri družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo, v katerih je imenoval tudi upravni odbor.
The IMF Program was a broad-based stabilisation program focusing on three key objectives.
Nadzor nad nekdanjimi bankami je prevzel Organ za finančni nadzor, ki je v glavnem domača sredstva in obveznosti (vloge) teh bank dodelil novim bankam, ki so nadaljevale bančne dejavnosti na Islandiji, nekdanje banke pa so bile dane pod nadzor vsaka svojega odbora za razpustitev [20].
Firstly, to stabilise and restore confidence in the króna so as to contain the negative impact of the crisis on the economy.
Tuja sredstva in obveznosti so bile večinoma vložene v nekdanje banke, za katere so bili pozneje uvedeni postopki likvidacije, sčasoma so se zaprle tudi vse dejavnosti v tujini [21].
The measures included the introduction of capital controls aimed at stemming capital flight.
V začasnih začetnih bilancah stanja treh novih bank z dne 14. novembra 2008 je bilo ocenjeno, da so združena celotna sredstva bank znašala 2886 milijard ISK, pri čemer naj bi država prispevala lastniški kapital v višini 385 milijard ISK.
Secondly, the program included a comprehensive bank restructuring strategy, ultimately aimed at rebuilding a viable financial system in Iceland as well as safeguarding the country's international financial relations.
Celotni znesek obveznic, ki naj bi jih kot plačilo za vrednost sredstev, prenesenih v presežek obveznosti, izdale nove banke v korist nekdanjih bank, je bilo ocenjeno na 1153 milijard ISK.
Among subsidiary goals was to ensure fair valuation of the banks' assets, maximise asset recovery and strengthen supervisory practices.
Za izvedbo ocen vrednosti prenesenih sredstev in obveznosti je Organ za finančni nadzor imenoval podjetje Deloitte LLP.
Thirdly, the program aimed at ensuring sustainable public finances, by limiting the socialisation of losses in the failed banks and implementing a medium-term fiscal consolidation program.
V tem procesu se je pokazalo, da iz neodvisne ocene ne bodo izhajale fiksne vrednosti prenesenih neto sredstev, ampak vrednosti v določenem razponu.
The Icelandic authorities have underlined that due to the exceptional circumstances linked to the large size of the banking system in relation to the financial capacity of the Treasury, the policy options available to the authorities were limited.
Prav tako se je izkazalo, da bančni upniki niso soglašali glede postopka vrednotenja, ki so ga obravnavali kot pristranskega, pritoževali so se tudi, da niso mogli zaščiti svojih interesov.
The solutions relied upon were therefore in many ways different to the measures taken by the governments of other countries facing threats to financial stability.
Zaradi teh zapletov se je politika za poravnavanje računov med nekdanjimi in novimi bankami spremenila, tako naj bi stranke posledično dogovore o vrednosti prenesenih neto sredstev skušale doseči s pogajanji, namesto da bi se zanašale na vrednotenja neodvisnih strokovnjakov.
On the basis of the Emergency Act, the three large commercial banks, Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands and Kaupthing Bank, were split into ‘old’ and ‘new’ banks.
Jasno je bilo, da bi stranke težko dosegle dogovore o vrednotenjih, saj so bila očitno podvržena številnim domnevam, o katerih se stranke verjetno ne bi strinjale.
The Minister of Finance founded three limited liability companies to take over the domestic operations of the old banks and appointed them boards of directors.
Država je nameravala doseči soglasje o temeljnih ocenah, s čimer bi se zagotovili trdni temelji za začetno kapitalizacijo novih bank.
The FME took control of the old banks, allocated essentially their domestic assets and liabilities (deposits) to the new banks which continued banking operations in Iceland, while the old banks were placed under the supervision of their respective resolution committees [20].
Stabilne cene sredstev bi lahko prek temeljne ocene pripisali upnikom v obliki pogojno zamenljivih obveznic ali povečanj vrednosti osnovnega kapitala bank, saj je med pogajanji postalo jasno, da bi se lahko odbora za razpustitev bank Glitnir in Kaupthing ter večina njunih upnikov zanimali za pridobivanje kapitalskih deležev novih bank, zaradi tega bi lahko imeli koristi od morebitnih povečanj vrednosti prenesenih sredstev.
Foreign assets and liabilities were in the main placed in the old banks, which were later submitted to winding-up procedures and the eventual closure of all foreign operations [21].
Celotna kapitalizacija treh novih bank in podlaga za sporazume z upniki nekdanjih bank je bila objavljena 20. julija 2009.
In the provisional opening balance sheets of the three new banks of 14 November 2008 it was estimated that the banks' combined total assets would amount to 2886 billion ISK, with an equity to be provided by the State of 385 billion ISK.
Vlada, kot edina lastnica treh novih bank, je dosegla glavne točke sporazumov z odbori za razpustitev nekdanjih bank v zvezi s tem, kako se bo doseglo in izplačalo nadomestilo za prenos neto sredstev v nove banke.
The total amount of bonds to be issued by the new banks in favour of the old banks as payment for the value of the assets transferred in excess of liabilities was estimated at 1153 billion ISK.
V to so bili v zvezi z dvema novima bankama, Íslandsbanki in New Kaupthing (pozneje preimenovana v Arion Bank), vključeni pogojni sporazumi, v skladu s katerimi naj bi nekdanje banke v nove banke vpisale večinske deleže v lastniškem kapitalu.
The FME appointed Deloitte LLP to perform assessments of the value of transferred assets and liabilities.
Odbori za razpustitev nekdanjih bank so se oktobra 2009 (banka Glitnir) ter decembra 2009 (banki Kaupthing in Landsbanki Islands) na podlagi zgornjih okvirnih sporazumov odločili za izvršitev možnosti, doseženih s pogajanji, in za vpis v delež novih bank.