natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The arm's length principle the Authority applies in assessing transfer pricing rulings under the State aid rules is therefore an application of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, which prohibits unequal treatment in taxation of undertakings in a similar factual and legal situation.
To načelo zavezuje države EGP in nacionalna davčna pravila niso izključena iz njegovega področja uporabe [259].
This principle binds the EEA States and the national tax rules are not excluded from its scope [259].
Pri ugotavljanju, ali je bilo stališče o transfernih cenah v skladu z neodvisnim tržnim načelom, ki izhaja iz člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, lahko Nadzorni organ upošteva napotke Organizacije za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj (OECD), zlasti smernice OECD za določanje transfernih cen za mednarodna podjetja in davčne uprave.
When examining whether a transfer pricing ruling complies with the arm's length principle inherent in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the Authority may have regard to the guidance provided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’), in particular the ‘OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations’.
Te smernice ne obravnavajo vprašanj v zvezi z državno pomočjo samih po sebi, vendar zajemajo mednarodni dogovor o določanju transfernih cen ter zagotavljajo koristne napotke za davčne uprave in multinacionalna podjetja o tem, kako zagotoviti, da bo metodologija za določanje transfernih cen dala izid v skladu s tržnimi pogoji.
Those guidelines do not deal with matters of State aid per se, but they capture the international consensus on transfer pricing and provide useful guidance to tax administrations and multinational enterprises on how to ensure that a transfer pricing methodology produces an outcome in line with market conditions.
Če je torej ureditev na področju transfernih cen v skladu s smernicami OECD za določanje transfernih cen, vključno z napotki o izbiri najustreznejše metode, ki daje zanesljiv približek tržnega izida, davčno stališče, ki odobri tako ureditev, verjetno ne bo povzročilo državne pomoči.
Consequently, if a transfer pricing arrangement complies with the guidance provided by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, including the guidance on the choice of the most appropriate method and leading to a reliable approximation of a market based outcome, a tax ruling endorsing that arrangement is unlikely to give rise to State aid.
Če povzamemo, davčna stališča naslovnikom dajejo selektivno prednost zlasti, kadar:
In sum, tax rulings confer a selective advantage on their addressees in particular where:
stališče nepravilno uporablja nacionalno davčno zakonodajo, kar povzroči nižji znesek davka [260];
the ruling misapplies national tax law and this results in a lower amount of tax [260];
stališče ni na voljo podjetjem v podobnem pravnem in dejanskem položaju [261]; ali
the ruling is not available to undertakings in a similar legal and factual situation [261]; or
uprava za zadevnega davčnega zavezanca uporabi „ugodnejšo“ davčno obravnavo v primerjavi z drugimi davčnimi zavezanci v podobnem dejanskem in pravnem položaju.
the administration applies a more ‘favourable’ tax treatment compared with other taxpayers in a similar factual and legal situation.
To bi se na primer lahko zgodilo, kadar davčni organ sprejme shemo o določanju o transfernih cen, ki ni skladna z neodvisnim tržnim načelom, ker metodologija, ki jo odobri navedeno stališče, privede do izida, ki odstopa od zanesljivega približka tržno naravnanega izida [262].
This could, for instance, be the case where the tax authority accepts a transfer pricing arrangement which is not at arm's length because the methodology endorsed by that ruling produces an outcome that departs from a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome [262].
Enako velja, če stališče omogoča naslovniku, da uporabi druge, posrednejše metode za izračun obdavčljivega dobička, npr. z uporabo fiksnih marž za metodo dodatka na stroške ali metodo preprodajnih cen za določitev ustreznih transfernih cen, čeprav so na voljo bolj neposredne metode [263].
The same applies if the ruling allows its addressee to use alternative, more indirect methods for calculating taxable profits, for example the use of fixed margins for a cost-plus or resale-minus method for determining an appropriate transfer pricing, while more direct ones are available [263].
Davčne poravnave
Tax settlements
Do davčnih poravnav običajno pride v sporih med davčnimi zavezanci in davčnimi organi, nanašajo pa se na znesek dolgovanega davka.
Tax settlements generally occur in the context of disputes between a taxpayer and the tax authorities concerning the amount of tax owed.
So običajna praksa v številnih državah EGP.
They constitute a common practice in a number of EEA States.
Sklenitev takih davčnih poravnav omogoča davčnim organom, da se izognejo dolgotrajnim pravnim sporom pred nacionalnimi jurisdikcijami, in zagotavlja hitro izterjavo dolgovanega davka.
The conclusion of such tax settlements allows tax authorities to avoid long-standing legal disputes before national jurisdictions and to ensure quick recovery of the tax due.
Medtem ko pristojnost držav EGP na tem področju ni sporna, lahko gre za državno pomoč pri zaključku davčne poravnave, zlasti kadar se zdi, da se je znesek dolgovanega davka zmanjšal, pri tem pa ni bila podana jasna utemeljitev (kot je optimizacija izterjave dolga) ali pa se je to zgodilo nesorazmerno v korist davčnega zavezanca [264].
While the competence of EEA States in this field is not in dispute, State aid may be involved in the conclusion of a tax settlement, in particular where it appears that the amount of tax due has been reduced without clear justification (such as optimising the recovery of debt) or in a disproportionate manner to the benefit of the taxpayer [264].
V tem okviru lahko transakcija med davčno upravo in davčnim zavezancem zlasti vključuje selektivno prednost, kadar [265]:
In this context, a transaction between the tax administration and a taxpayer may in particular entail a selective advantage where [265]:
uprava davčnemu zavezancu omogoči nesorazmerne ugodnosti in zato za tega davčnega zavezanca uporabi „ugodnejšo“ diskrecijsko davčno obravnavo v primerjavi z drugimi davčnimi zavezanci v podobnem dejanskem in pravnem položaju;
in making disproportionate concessions to a taxpayer, the administration applies a more ‘favourable’ discretionary tax treatment compared to other taxpayers in a similar factual and legal situation;
je poravnava v nasprotju z veljavnimi davčnimi predpisi in je znesek davka zaradi tega nižji zunaj razumnega obsega.
the settlement is contrary to the applicable tax provisions and has resulted in a lower amount of tax, outside a reasonable range.
To se na primer lahko zgodi v primeru, kadar bi morala biti na podlagi ugotovljenih dejstev odmera davka v skladu z veljavnimi predpisi drugačna (vendar je bil znesek dolgovanega davka nezakonito znižan).
This might be the case, for example, where established facts should have led to a different assessment of the tax on the basis of the applicable provisions (but the amount of tax due has been unlawfully reduced).
Praviloma davčni ukrepi povsem tehnične narave, kot so pravila o amortizaciji, ne pomenijo državne pomoči.
In general, tax measures of a purely technical nature such as depreciation/amortisation rules do not constitute State aid.
Metoda izračunavanja amortizacije sredstev se razlikuje od ene države EGP do druge, vendar so takšne metode lahko sestavni del davčnih sistemov.
The method of calculating asset depreciation varies from one EEA State to another, but such methods may be inherent to the tax systems to which they belong.
Težave pri presoji morebitne selektivnosti v zvezi s stopnjo amortizacije nekaterih sredstev izhajajo iz obveznosti, da je treba določiti referenčno merilo (od katerega bi posebna stopnja ali metoda amortiziranja najbrž odstopala).
The difficulty in assessing possible selectivity with regard to the depreciation rate of certain assets lies in the requirement to establish a benchmark (from which a specific rate or depreciation method would possibly derogate).
Medtem ko je z računovodskega vidika namen te metode na splošno upoštevati ekonomsko amortizacijo, da bi se prikazala poštena slika finančnega stanja podjetja, ima davčni postopek različne namene, kot je omogočanje podjetjem, da odbitne odhodke porazdelijo po daljšem časovnem obdobju.
While in accounting terms, the purpose of this exercise is generally to reflect the economic depreciation of the assets with the aim of presenting a fair view of the financial situation of the company, the fiscal process follows different purposes such as allowing companies to spread deductible expenses over time.
Spodbude v zvezi z amortizacijo (npr. krajše obdobje amortiziranja, ugodnejša metoda amortiziranja [266], predčasno odplačilo itd.) za nekatere vrste sredstev ali podjetij, ki ne temeljijo na usmerjevalnih načelih zadevnih pravil o amortizaciji, lahko pomenijo obstoj državne pomoči.
Depreciation incentives (such as a shorter term of depreciation, a more favourable depreciation method [266], early depreciation, etc.) for certain types of assets or undertakings, which are not based on the guiding principles of the depreciation rules in question, may give rise to the existence of State aid.
Nasprotno se lahko pravila o pospešeni amortizaciji in predčasnih odplačilih za stvari, dane v zakup, obravnavajo kot splošni ukrepi, če so pogodbe o zakupu dejansko dostopne podjetjem vseh velikosti v vseh sektorjih [267].
In contrast, accelerated and early depreciation rules for leased assets may be seen as general measures if the lease contracts in question are really accessible to companies of all sectors and sizes [267].
Če ima davčni organ diskrecijsko pristojnost, da določa različna obdobja amortizacije ali različne načine vrednotenja za posamezna podjetja ali sektorje, se seveda domneva, da je ukrep selektiven.
If the tax authority has discretionary power to set different depreciation periods or different valuation methods, firm by firm or sector by sector, there is obviously a presumption of selectivity.
Ukrep je prav tako selektiven, če kot pogoj za uporabo sheme amortizacije zahteva vnaprejšnje dovoljenje davčne uprave, razen če dovoljenje ni omejeno na predhodno preverjanje pravnih zahtev [268].
Likewise, prior authorisation from a tax administration as a condition for applying a depreciation scheme involves selectivity if the authorisation is not limited to the prior verification of the legal requirements [268].
Posebne določbe, ki ne vsebujejo diskrecijskih elementov in na primer omogočajo določanje davka od dohodkov na fiksni osnovi, je mogoče upravičiti z naravo in splošno shemo sistema, če na primer upoštevajo specifične računovodske zahteve ali pomembnost zemljišč v sredstvih, kar je značilno za nekatere sektorje.
Specific provisions that do not contain discretionary elements, allowing, for example, income tax to be determined on a fixed basis, may be justified by the nature and general scheme of the system where, for instance, they take account of specific accounting requirements or of the importance of land in assets which are specific to certain sectors.
Takšne določbe zato niso selektivne, če sta izpolnjena naslednja pogoja:
Such provisions are therefore not selective, if the following conditions are fulfilled:
ureditev na fiksni osnovi upravičuje skrb za preprečevanje nesorazmernega upravnega bremena za posamezne vrste podjetij zaradi njihove majhnosti in/ali sektorjev dejavnosti;
the fixed basis regime is justified by the concern to avoid disproportionate administrative burden on certain types of undertakings because of their small size or sector of activity;
v povprečju zaradi ureditve na fiksni osnovi navedena podjetja nimajo manjše davčne obremenitve v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji, ki niso vključena v področje uporabe te ureditve, in ta ureditev ne pomeni prednosti za podkategorijo njenih upravičencev.
on average, the fixed basis regime does not have the effect of implying a lower tax burden for those undertakings as compared to other undertakings excluded from its scope and does not entail advantages for a sub-category of beneficiaries of the regime.
Vendar so takšna pravila lahko selektivna, če določajo odstopanja (neuporabo pravil proti zlorabam) za posamezna podjetja ali transakcije, ki so v nasprotju z logiko, s katero so utemeljena zadevna pravila proti zlorabam [270].
The provision of anti-abuse rules may be justified as measures to prevent tax avoidance by taxpayers [269].
VPLIV NA TRGOVINO IN KONKURENCO
However, such rules might be selective if they provide for a derogation (non-application of the anti-abuse rules) to specific undertakings or transactions, which would not be consistent with the logic underlying the anti-abuse rules in question [270].
Javna podpora podjetjem v skladu s členom 61(1) Sporazuma EGP pomeni državno pomoč samo, če „izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga“, in le „kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami EGP“.
A reduced excise duty can grant a selective advantage to the undertakings which use the product in question as an input or sell it on the market [271].
To sta sicer dva ločena in obvezna elementa pojma pomoči.
EFFECT ON TRADE AND COMPETITION
Vendar se v praksi ti merili pri presoji državne pomoči pogosto obravnavata skupaj, ker sta praviloma neločljivo povezani med seboj [272].
Public support to undertakings only constitutes State aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if it ‘distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ and only insofar as it ‘affects trade’ between EEA States.
Za ukrep, ki ga dodeli država, velja, da izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljal konkurenco, kadar bi verjetno izboljšal konkurenčni položaj prejemnika pomoči v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji, s katerimi tekmuje [273].
These are two distinct and necessary elements of the notion of aid.
V praksi se na splošno šteje, da gre za izkrivljanje konkurence v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, ko država dodeli finančno prednost podjetju v liberaliziranem sektorju, kjer obstaja ali bi lahko obstajala konkurenca [274].
In practice, however, these criteria are often treated jointly in the assessment of State aid as they are, as a rule, considered inextricably linked [272].
Dejstvo, da organi javno službo dodelijo notranjemu izvajalcu (čeprav bi lahko to storitev oddali tretjim osebam), samo po sebi ne izključuje morebitnega izkrivljanja konkurence.
A measure granted by the State is considered to distort or threaten to distort competition when it is liable to improve the competitive position of the recipient compared to other undertakings with which it competes [273].
Vendar pa je morebitno izkrivljanje konkurence izključeno, če so izpolnjeni naslednji kumulativni pogoji:
For all practical purposes, a distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is generally found to exist when the State grants a financial advantage to an undertaking in a liberalised sector where there is, or could be, competition [274].
storitev je predmet pravnega monopola (ki je bil vzpostavljen v skladu s pravom EGP) [275];
The fact that the authorities assign a public service to an in-house provider (even if they were free to entrust that service to third parties) does not as such exclude a possible distortion of competition.
pravni monopolist ne izključuje le konkurence na trgu, ampak tudi konkurenco za trg, ker izključuje kakršno koli možno konkurenco, da bi postal izključni ponudnik zadevne storitve [276];
However, a possible distortion of competition is excluded if the following cumulative conditions are met:
storitev ne konkurira drugim storitvam ter
a service is subject to a legal monopoly (established in compliance with EEA law) [275];
če je ponudnik storitev dejaven na drugem (geografskem ali proizvodnem) trgu, ki je odprt za konkurenco, je navzkrižno subvencioniranje treba izključiti.
the legal monopoly not only excludes competition on the market, but also for the market, in that it excludes any possible competition to become the exclusive provider of the service in question [276];
To pomeni, da se uporabljajo ločeni računi, stroški in prihodki so razporejeni na primeren način, in javnih finančnih sredstev, zagotovljenih za opravljanje storitve, ki je predmet pravnega monopola, ni mogoče uporabiti za druge dejavnosti.
the service is not in competition with other services; and
Javna podpora lahko izkrivlja konkurenco, tudi če podjetju, ki prejme pomoč, ne pomaga, da bi se širilo in povečalo tržni delež.
if the service provider is active in another (geographical or product) market that is open to competition, cross-subsidisation has to be excluded.
Zadostuje, da pomoč podjetju omogoča, da ohrani močnejši konkurenčni položaj, kot bi ga imelo, če pomoči ne bi bilo.
This requires that separate accounts are used, costs and revenues are allocated in an appropriate way and public funding provided for the service subject to the legal monopoly cannot benefit other activities.
V tem smislu za to, da se šteje, da pomoč izkrivlja konkurenco, običajno zadošča, da pomoč upravičencu daje prednost s tem, da ga razbremeni stroškov, ki bi jih sicer imelo pri izvajanju tekočih poslov [277].
Public support is liable to distort competition even if it does not help the recipient undertaking to expand and gain market share.
Opredelitev državne pomoči ne zahteva, da je izkrivljanje konkurence ali vpliv na trgovino znaten ali velik.
It is enough that the aid allows it to maintain a stronger competitive position than it would have had if the aid had not been provided.
Dejstvo, da je znesek pomoči nizek, ali, da je podjetje, ki prejme pomoč, majhno, samo po sebi ne izključuje, da pomoč izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco [278], vendar verjetnost, da bi lahko prišlo do izkrivljanja, ne sme biti zgolj hipotetična [279].
In this context, for aid to be considered to distort competition, it is normally sufficient that the aid gives the beneficiary an advantage by relieving it of expenses it would otherwise have had to bear in the course of its day-to-day business operations [277].
Javna podpora podjetjem pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP le, kolikor „prizadene trgovino“ med državami EGP.
The definition of State aid does not require that the distortion of competition or effect on trade is significant or material.
V zvezi s tem ni treba ugotavljati, ali pomoč dejansko vpliva na trgovino med državami EGP, ampak samo, ali bi pomoč lahko vplivala na navedeno trgovino [280].
The fact that the amount of aid is low or the recipient undertaking is small will not in itself rule out a distortion of competition or the threat thereof [278], provided however that the likelihood of such a distortion is not merely hypothetical [279].
Sodišča EGP so zlasti odločila: „kadar pomoč države članice okrepi položaj enega podjetja v razmerju do drugih konkurenčnih podjetij v trgovini znotraj EGP, se šteje, da pomoč vpliva na ta zadnja podjetja.“ [281]
Public support to undertakings only constitutes State aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement insofar as it ‘affects trade’ between EEA States.
Za javno podporo se lahko šteje, da bi lahko vplivala na trgovino med državami EGP, tudi če prejemnik ne sodeluje neposredno v čezmejni trgovini.
In that respect, it is not necessary to establish that the aid has an actual effect on trade between EEA States but only whether the aid is liable to affect such trade [280].
Subvencije lahko na primer ohranjajo ali povečujejo lokalno ponudbo in tako otežujejo subjektom v drugih državah EGP, da bi vstopili na trg [282].
In particular, the EEA Courts have ruled that ‘where State financial aid strengthens the position of an undertaking as compared with other undertakings competing in intra-[EEA] trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by the aid.’ [281]
Sorazmerno majhen obseg pomoči ali sorazmerna majhnost podjetja, ki prejme pomoč, namreč a priori ne izključujeta možnosti, da bi bila trgovina med državami EGP prizadeta [283].
Public support can be considered capable of having an effect on trade between EEA States even if the recipient is not directly involved in cross-border trade.
Javna subvencija, dodeljena podjetju, ki zagotavlja le lokalne ali regionalne storitve, pri čemer ne zagotavlja kakršnih koli storitev zunaj države izvora, lahko vseeno vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami, če lahko take storitve opravljajo podjetja iz drugih držav EGP (tudi prek pravice do ustanavljanja) in ta možnost ni le hipotetična.
For instance, the subsidy may make it more difficult for operators in other EEA States to enter the market by maintaining or increasing local supply [282].
Kadar država EGP na primer dodeli javno subvencijo podjetju za opravljanje storitev prevoza, lahko obseg opravljanja teh storitev zaradi subvencije ostane enak ali se poveča, zaradi česar imajo podjetja, ki so ustanovljena v drugih državah EGP, manj možnosti za opravljanje storitev prevoza na trgu te države EGP [284].
The relatively small amount of aid or the relatively small size of the undertaking which receives it does not as such exclude the possibility that trade between EEA States might be affected [283].
Takšen vpliv pa ni toliko verjeten, če je obseg gospodarske dejavnosti zelo majhen, kar je mogoče na primer dokazati z zelo majhnim prometom.
A public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional services and does not provide any services outside its State of origin may nonetheless have an effect on trade between EEA States where undertakings from other EEA States could provide such services (also through the right of establishment) and that possibility is not merely hypothetical.
Načeloma se lahko vpliv na trgovino pojavi tudi, če prejemnik izvaža vso ali večino svoje proizvodnje izven EGP, vendar je v takih primerih vpliv manj neposreden in ga ni mogoče predpostavljati zgolj zaradi dejstva, da je trg odprt za konkurenco [285].
For example, where an EEA State grants a public subsidy to an undertaking for supplying transport services, the supply of those services may, by virtue of the subsidy, be maintained or increased with the result that undertakings established in other EEA States have less of a chance of providing their transport services in the market in that EEA State [284].
Pri presoji o vplivu na trgovino ni treba opredeliti trga ali podrobno preučiti vpliva ukrepa na konkurenčni položaj upravičenca in njegovih konkurentov [286].
Such an effect may, however, be less likely where the scope of the economic activity is very small, as may for instance be evidenced by a very low turnover.
Vendar vpliv na trgovino med državami EGP ne sme biti zgolj hipotetičen ali domneven.
In principle, an effect on trade can also occur even if the recipient exports all or most of its production outside the EEA, but in such situations the effect is less immediate and cannot be assumed from the mere fact that the market is open to competition [285].
Na podlagi predvidljivih učinkov ukrepa je treba ugotoviti, zakaj ukrep izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljal konkurenco in lahko vpliva na trgovino med državami EGP [287].
In establishing an effect on trade, it is not necessary to define the market or to investigate in detail the impact of the measure on the competitive position of the beneficiary and its competitors [286].
Nadzorni organ in Komisija sta v več odločbah in sklepih menila, da je imel ukrep ob upoštevanju posebnih okoliščin primerov zgolj lokalen vpliv in zato ni vplival na trgovino med državami EGP.
However, an effect on trade between EEA States cannot be merely hypothetical or presumed.
V teh primerih sta Nadzorni organ in Komisija ugotovila zlasti, da je upravičenec dobavljal blago ali opravljal storitve na omejenem območju v državi EGP in ni bilo verjetno, da bi pritegnil stranke iz drugih držav EGP, ter da ni bilo mogoče predvideti, da bi ukrep imel več kot le zanemarljiv vpliv na pogoje čezmejnih naložb ali ustanavljanja.