natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
While a temporary deferral of payment would probably correspond to the conduct of a private creditor and thus not involve state aid, such conduct, initially consistent with market conditions, could turn into state aid in cases of protracted delays in payment [38].
Ob upoštevanju, da sta portfelja posojil zajemala velik del strank bank Arion in ISB, bi prisvojitev takega zavarovanja lahko ogrozila finančno stabilnost bank Arion in ISB ter ti finančni ustanovi prisilila v stečaj.
From the point of view of a private creditor, enforcement of a claim that has become due is the self-evident norm.
Izvršitev zavarovanja bi pomenila tudi dodatne upravne stroške za centralno banko Islandije.
This also applies if the debtor undertaking is in financial difficulties, as well as in the case of insolvency.
Poleg tega centralna banka Islandije, če bi se portfelja posojil prodajala, tudi ne bi imela nobenega zagotovila, da bo povračilo sprejemljivo, in glede na takratno stanje na trgu na Islandiji je bilo malo verjetno, da bi se našli vlagatelji z zadostno kapitalsko močjo za nakup portfeljev.
Private creditors will not normally be willing in such circumstances to accept further deferral of payment if this does not bring them any clear advantage.
Zato bi centralna banka Islandije s prisvojitvijo portfeljev stanovanjskih posojil – z izvršitvijo zavarovanja ali po stečaju – na koncu izterjala manjši znesek kratkoročnega dolga.
On the contrary, once a debtor runs into financial difficulty, further loans would only be granted to the debtor under stricter terms, e.g. at a higher interest rate or with more comprehensive securities, as repayment is endangered.
Zaradi takega položaja se je centralna banka Islandije torej odločila, da sklene posojilni pogodbi in si zagotovi poplačilo svojih terjatev v celoti, z obrestmi in brez upravnih stroškov.
Exceptions may be justifiable in individual cases where non-enforcement seems to be the economically more sensible alternative.
Posojilni pogodbi sta bili torej sklenjeni, da bi se zagotovila največja izterjava, ki bi bila v tistem času mogoča.
This would be the case when non-enforcement offers clearly improved prospects of collecting a substantially higher proportion of the claims in comparison with other possible alternatives or if even greater consequential losses can be averted in this way.
Nadzorni organ na podlagi navedenega meni, da si je centralna banka Islandije s sklenitvijo posojilnih pogodb prizadevala za optimizacijo izterjave svojih terjatev.
It can be in the interest of a private creditor to keep the business of the debtor company running instead of liquidating its assets and thus, under certain circumstances, only collecting a part of the debt.
Nadzorni organ mora oceniti tudi, ali bi pogoji iz posojilnih pogodb in zlasti veljavne obrestne mere imeli zadostno vrednost za zasebnega upnika, da bi izpolnili zahtevo merila zasebnega upnika.
When a private creditor accepts to refrain from enforcing his claim in full, he will normally require the debtor to provide additional securities.
Nadzorni organ je v Odločbi št. 208/15/COL ugotovil, da je težko določiti ustrezna referenčna merila za obrestne mere med finančno krizo.
When this is not possible, for instance in cases of debtors in financial difficulty, the private creditor will seek assurances of maximum compensation should the financial condition of the debtor later improve.
V odgovor so banki ISB in Arion ter centralna banka Islandije predložile dodatne informacije in pripombe.
If insufficient securities or commitments are made by the debtor, a private creditor would generally not accept to conclude debt rescheduling agreements or provide the debtor with additional loans.
Banka ISB trdi, da so obrestne mere v skladu s takratnimi obrestnimi merami podobnih obveznic, zavarovanih s premoženjem.
With respect to the initial delay in settling payments, the CBI argues that settling payments with ISB in September 2009 and with Kaupthing in November 2009 cannot be considered a delay given the exceptional circumstances prevailing in Iceland after the collapse of the banking system in October 2008.
Dospelost obveznice banke ISB je deset let, obrestna mera znaša 4,5 % in je vezana na indeks cen življenjskih potrebščin, obveznica pa je presežno zavarovana, z razmerjem med vrednostjo kredita in vrednostjo zastavljenih nepremičnin, ki znaša 70 %.
During the period from the collapse until the settlement of the claims, Iceland was undergoing a comprehensive bank restructuring with the assistance of the IMF and there was considerable uncertainty about the fair valuation of the banks' assets.Therefore, the CBI as the creditor of the banks needed time to properly evaluate the assets that served as collateral.
Obrestna mera je bila določena na približno 50 bazičnih točk višje kot za obveznice stanovanjskega finančnega sklada z državnim jamstvom na dan izdaje.
The Authority has assessed these arguments and considers that the CBI acted in line with the private creditor test concerning the initial delay.
Za primerjavo, običajne obrestne mere v Evropi v tistem obdobju za podobne vrednostne papirje s premoženjskim kritjem so bile za 40–80 bazičnih točk višje kot za tiste z državnim jamstvom.
Further, the Authority needs to assess whether a private creditor holding similar short-term claims on the defaulting banks would have agreed to the transfer of the housing loan portfolios under the conditions set out above and to the subsequent conclusion of loan agreements with the new banks according to the same conditions.
Banka ISB je predložila tudi graf, iz katerega je razvidno, da so bile leta 2009 razlike v razmikih za Francijo, Nemčijo in Španijo v razponu od 40 do 160 bazičnih točk.
The Authority notes that in the wake of Glitnir's and Kaupthing's collapse in the autumn of 2008, the CBI found itself in a position where it was unrealistic to expect to enforce collateral like the ones in question in the case of Arion and ISB.
Podobno banka Arion trdi, da je bila njena posojilna pogodba s centralno banko Islandije sklenjena pod tržnimi pogoji.
Taking into account that the loan portfolios constituted a large share of Arion's and ISB's customer base, appropriating such collateral could have jeopardised the financial stability of Arion and ISB and driven these financial undertakings into bankruptcy.
Med drugim jo primerja s primerljivim dogovorom med bankama NBI in LBI.
Enforcing the collateral would have also entailed additional administrative expenses for the CBI.
Oba dogovora sta bila sklenjena približno hkrati, tj. ob koncu leta 2009 in začetku leta 2010, ter sta zajemala podobno poravnavo terjatev.
Moreover, if the loan portfolios had been offered for sale, the CBI would also have had no assurance of acceptable recovery, and it was highly unlikely that investors with sufficient capital strength would have been available to buy the portfolios, given the market situation in Iceland at the time.
Iz primerjave je razvidno, da so bili pogoji iz posojilne pogodbe za banko Arion strožji od tistih iz dogovora z banko LBI, ki je vključeval zasebnega posojilodajalca.
Therefore, appropriating the housing loan portfolios — either by enforcing the collateral or following bankruptcy — would have resulted in the CBI recovering a lower amount of the short-term debt in the end.
Dejansko se zdi, da so se v dogovoru z banko LBI zahtevale nižje obrestne mere in da je zajemal višjo glavnico, zavarovanje pa je bilo šibkejše in manj raznoliko kot pri posojilni pogodbi z banko Arion.
Faced with this situation, the CBI therefore chose to enter into the loan agreements to ensure full payment of its claims, with interest and without having to incur administrative expenses.
Kot je bilo navedeno, so bili v skladu z naborom podatkov, ki ga je predložila banka Arion, razmiki pri financiranju, ki so jih plačevale evropske banke, od 0,1 % do 1,90 % nad medbančnimi obrestnimi merami, pri čemer je bil srednji razmik 0,72 %.
The loan agreements were thus entered into to achieve maximum possible recovery at that time.
Najvišje obrestne mere za krite obveznice sta plačali banki Bank of Ireland septembra 2009 (1,9 % nad medbančnimi obrestnimi merami) in EBS Mortgage iz Irske (1,75 % nad medbančnimi obrestnimi merami) novembra 2009.
Based on these elements, the Authority considers that the CBI endeavoured to maximise the recovery of its claims when entering into the loan agreements.
Centralna banka Islandije trdi tudi, da so bili pogoji posojilnih pogodb, tj. obrestne mere in zavarovanje, zanjo ugodni.
The Authority also must assess whether the conditions attached to the loan agreements, and in particular the applicable interest rates, would have been sufficiently valuable to a private creditor to meet the requirement of the private creditor test.
Po njenem mnenju je to razvidno iz razpoložljivih informacij o izdanih instrumentih po svetu (kot je dokazala banka Arion, glej zgoraj) in tudi pogojev pri drugih takrat sklenjenih instrumentih, vključno z dogovorom z banko LBI.
In Decision No 208/15/COL, the Authority noted that it was difficult to determine the appropriate benchmarks for interest rates during the financial crisis.
Nadzorni organ opozarja, da se za posojilni pogodbi, sklenjeni med centralno banko Islandije in zadevnima bankama, obračunava obrestna mera LIBOR + 3,00 %, zavarovani pa sta s hipotekami in drugimi sredstvi.
In response to this, ISB, Arion and the CBI have submitted additional information and comments.
Kot je razvidno iz informacij, ki sta jih predložili banki ISB in Arion, je obrestna mera precej višja od povprečnih obrestnih mer za primerljive dolžniške instrumente, ki so bili sklenjeni v zadevnem obdobju, in celo presegajo najvišje stroške financiranja katere koli druge evropske banke v tistem času, ki so se zavarovale s hipotekami (tj. banka Bank of Ireland, medbančne obrestne mere + 1,9 %).
ISB argues that the interest rates are in line with the interest rates of similar asset-backed bonds at the time.
Nadzorni organ meni, da so informacije glede primerljivih dolžniških instrumentov, ki sta jih predložili banki, zanesljive in da so natančno ponazorile tržne pogoje ob sklenitvi posojilnih pogodb.
The ISB bond's maturity is 10 years, with an interest rate of 4,5 %, CPI linked (consumer price-indexed), and is over-collateralised with a LTV ratio of 70 %.
Ker so se o teh obrestnih merah dogovorile zasebne strani, nadzorni organ meni, da so ustreznejše referenčno merilo za določitev takratnih tržnih obrestnih mer kot razmiki kreditne izmenjave in obrestne mere na obveznice stanovanjskega finančnega sklada, ki jih je navedel pritožnik.
The interest rate was set at about 50 bps on top of the state-guaranteed HFF bonds on the date of issue.
Kar zadeva posojilno pogodbo, sklenjeno z banko Arion, nadzorni organ opozarja, da posojilo ni bilo denominirano v islandskih kronah, ampak v tujih valutah.
ISB also provided a graph which shows that the spread differences for France, Germany and Spain were in the range of 40–160 bps in 2009.
Kot je bilo ugotovljeno, je nadzorni organ pregledal in odobril pogoje dogovora o poravnavi že v odločbi o pomoči za prestrukturiranje za banko Arion.
Similarly, Arion argues that its loan agreement with the CBI was concluded on market terms.
Poleg tega bi zasebni upnik, kot je opozorila banka Arion, zaradi strogih omejitev čezmejnega pretoka kapitala na Islandiji in povezanih menjalniških poslov najverjetneje dal prednost denominaciji v tuji valuti in ne v islandskih kronah.
Arion compares it, inter alia, to a comparable agreement concluded between NBI and LBI.
Nadzorni organ ob upoštevanju takratnih tržnih parametrov in predloženih dokazov ugotavlja, da bi bili posojilni pogoji posojilnih pogodb na splošno in zlasti obrestne mere za zasebnega upnika v primerljivem dejanskem in pravnem položaju enako sprejemljivi.
Both agreements were concluded around the same time, i.e. end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, and involved similar settlements of claims.
Nadzorni organ ob upoštevanju navedenega ugotavlja, da posojilni pogodbi med centralno banko Islandije ter bankama ISB in Arion zadevnima bankama nista zagotovili gospodarske prednosti.
The comparison shows that the terms of Arion's loan agreement were more stringent than those in the LBI agreement, involving a private lender.
SELEKTIVNOST, IZKRIVLJANJE KONKURENCE IN VPLIV NA TRGOVINO MED POGODBENICAMI
Indeed, it appears that the LBI agreement required lower interest rates, involved a higher principal amount and had weaker and less diversified collateral than the Arion loan agreement.
Da bi se ukrep štel za državno pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, mora biti selektiven ter sposoben izkrivljati konkurenco in vplivati na trgovino med pogodbenicami.
In its letter of 31 March 2015 [39], Arion provided additional information on covered bond and senior unsecured bond issuances by banks in Europe during the period of 1 January 2009 until 31 December 2010.
Ker nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da v tej zadevi ni bila zagotovljena gospodarska prednost in ker kumulativni pogoji za obstoj državne pomoči zato niso izpolnjeni, mu v zvezi s tem ni treba podati nadaljnje ocene.
Taking into account that the loan provided by the CBI is primarily secured with mortgages, Arion argues that it is comparable to covered bonds issued by European banks during 2009 using residential mortgages as security.
SKLEPNA UGOTOVITEV
Asmentioned above, according to the dataset provided by Arion, funding spreads European banks were paying ranged from 0,1 % to 1,90 % over interbank rates, with a median spread of 0,72 %.
Nadzorni organ na podlagi opravljene ocene meni, da posojilni pogodbi, ki ju je centralna banka Islandije sklenila z bankama ISB in Arion, ne pomenita državne pomoči v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP –
The highest rates for covered bonds were paid by Bank of Ireland in September 2009 (1,9 % over interbank rates) and EBS Mortgage from Ireland (1,75 % over interbank rates) in November 2009.
SPREJEL NASLEDNJO ODLOČBO:
The CBI also argues that the terms of the loan agreements, i.e. the interest rates and collateral, were favourable to the CBI.
Člen 1
According to the CBI, this is evident from the available information on issued instruments worldwide (as documented by Arion, see above) and also from the terms of other instruments entered into at the time, including the LBI agreement.
Posojilni pogodbi, sklenjeni med centralno banko Islandije in banko Íslandsbanki hf. oziroma banko Arion banki hf., ne pomenita državne pomoči v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP.
The Authority notes that the loan agreements concluded between the CBI and the banks bear an interest rate of LIBOR + 3,00 % and are collateralised with mortgages and other assets.
Uradna preiskava je s tem zaključena.
As the information provided by ISB and Arion shows, this interest rate is well above the average interest rates for comparable debt instruments concluded at the time, and even exceed the highest funding cost of any other European banks at the time that had mortgages as collateral (i.e. Bank of Ireland, interbank rates + 1,9 %).
Člen 2
The Authority considers that the information concerning comparable debt instruments provided by the banks is reliable and that it presents and accurate picture of market conditions at the time the loan agreements were concluded.
Ta odločba je naslovljena na Islandijo.
Moreover, since these interest rates were agreed to by private parties, the Authority considers that they represent a more appropriate benchmark for determining market rates at the time than the CDS spreads and interest rates on HFF bonds cited by the complainant.
Člen 3
Concerning the loan agreement concluded with Arion, the Authority notes that the loan was denominated in foreign currencies instead of ISK.
Besedilo te odločbe v angleškem jeziku je edino verodostojno.
However, as noted by Arion, this change of denomination was in line with the terms of the settlement agreement, which provided that Arion should pay interest and instalments in foreign currencies to the extent the bank was able to and that Arion could, with the permission of the lender, change the denomination of the debt in part or full.
V Bruslju, 23. novembra 2016
As previously noted, the Authority has already reviewed and approved the terms of the settlement agreement in the Arion restructuring aid decision.
Za Nadzorni organ Efte
Moreover, as noted by Arion, due to the stringent limitations in Iceland on cross-border movement of capital and related foreign exchange transactions, a private creditor would in all likelihood have preferred a denomination in foreign currencies rather than in ISK.
Predsednik
Considering the market parameters at the time and the evidence presented, the Authority concludes that the lending terms in general, and the interest rates in particular, of the loan agreements would have been equally acceptable to a private creditor finding himself in a comparable factual and legal situation.
Članica kolegija
In light of the above, the Authority concludes that the loan agreements between the CBI and, respectively, ISB and Arion did not confer an economic advantage upon ISB and Arion.
Dokument št. 684053.
SELECTIVITY, DISTORTION OF COMPETITION AND EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN CONTRACTING PARTIES
Dokument št. 685741.
In order to qualify as state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must be selective as well as liable to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the Agreement.
Odgovor islandskih organov je zajemal dopise centralne banke Islandije (dokument št. 696093), banke ISB (dokument št. 696092) in banke Arion (dokument št. 696089).
However, given that the Authority concludes that no economic advantage was granted in the present case, and as the cumulative conditions for the existence of state aid are therefore not fulfilled, the Authority does not have to make any further assessment in this regard.
Dokument št. 709261.
CONCLUSION
Dokument št. 745267.
On the basis of the foregoing assessment, the Authority considers that the loan agreements the CBI concluded with ISB and Arion do not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Odgovor islandskih organov je zajemal dopisa centralne banke Islandije (dokument št. 753104) in banke Arion (dokument št. 753101).
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Dokument št. 771173.
Article 1
Dokument št. 771174.
The loan agreements concluded between the CBI and, respectively, Íslandsbanki hf. and Arion banki hf. do not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Dokument št. 775870.
The formal investigation is hereby closed.
Dokument št. 808042.
Article 2
Dokumenti št. 819287, 819289, 819291, 819293 in 819295.
This Decision is addressed to Iceland.
Za pregled gibanj zavarovanih posojil glej letno poročilo centralne banke Islandije za leto 2008, strani 9–11, na voljo na spletnem naslovu http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=7076.
Article 3
Banka Glitnir je vzpostavila program kritih obveznic, v skladu s katerim je bil portfelj hipotekarnih kreditov prodan skladu banke Glitni (Glitni banka Fund, GLB), ta pa je jamčil za obveznice (obveznosti banke Glitnir), ki so bile izdane v okviru programa kritih obveznic.
Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.
Krite obveznice niso bile prodane vlagateljem, ampak so bile uporabljene kot zavarovanje pri poslih začasne prodaje s centralno banko Islandije.
Done in Brussels, 23 November 2016.
Z odločitvijo organa za finančni nadzor z dne 14. oktobra 2008 so bile med drugim vse kosovne delnice iz sklada prenesene na banko ISB.
For the EFTA Surveillance Authority
Neporavnane obveznosti iz naslova kritih obveznic je imela v lasti centralna banka Islandije kot zavarovanje za neporavnani dolg banke Glitnir, ki ji ga je ta dolgovala, zdaj pa je bil dodeljen banki ISB in je ob sprejetju zadevne odločitve finančnega nadzornega organa znašal približno 55 milijard ISK.
President
Banka ISB je morala upravljati sklad in izvesti vsa odplačila prvotnega dolga, da bi zaščitila sredstva (portfelj hipotekarnih kreditov), ter plačati provizije vsem zadevnim udeležencem v prvotnem dolžniškem programu.
College Member
Ker so bili z upravljanjem sklada in odplačevanjem posojil prek sklada povezani predvidljivi stroški in zapleti, je banka ISB zahtevala ponovno pogajanje o dolgu s centralno banko Islandije, da bi med drugim poskusila podaljšati rok za poplačilo dolga.
Document No 685741.
Glej poročilo finančnega ministra o prestrukturiranju komercialnih bank, str. 13–17.
The reply from the Icelandic authorities contained letters from the CBI (Document No 696093), ISB (Document No 696092) and Arion (Document No 696089).
Na voljo na spletnem naslovu: http://www.althingi.is/altext/pdf/139/s/1213.pdf.
Document No 709261.
Za informacije v oglatih oklepajih velja obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti.
Document No 745267.
Javna različica Odločbe nadzornega organa Efte št. 244/12/COL z dne 27. junija 2012 o pomoči za prestrukturiranje za banko Íslandsbanki (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba o pomoči za prestrukturiranje za banko ISB) (UL L 144, 15.5.2014, str. 70, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 28, 15.5.2014, str. 1) in javna različica Odločbe nadzornega organa Efte št. 291/12/COL z dne 11. julija 2012 o pomoči za prestrukturiranje banki Arion Bank (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba o pomoči za prestrukturiranje za banko Arion) (UL L 144, 15.5.2014, str. 169, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 28, 15.5.2014, str. 89), točke 86, 149, 168 in 238.
The reply from the Icelandic authorities contained letters from the CBI (Document No 753104) and Arion (Document No 753101).
Smernice o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za podporne ukrepe v korist bank v okviru finančne krize od 1. decembra 2013 dalje (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice o bančništvu iz leta 2013) (UL L 264, 4.9.2014, str. 6, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 50, 4.9.2014, str. 1), točka 62, ki so nadomestile Smernice o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za ukrepe v zvezi s finančnimi institucijami (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice o bančništvu iz leta 2008) (UL L 17, 20.1.2011, str. 1, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 3, 20.1.2011, str. 1), točka 51.
Document No 771173.
Dokument št. 819287.
Document No 771174.
Glej: http://www.almchf.com/new-and-events/nr/121.
EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 208/15/COL of 20 May 2015 concerning alleged unlawful state aid granted to Íslandsbanki hf. and Arion banki hf. through loan conversion agreements on allegedly preferential terms (‘Decision No 208/15/COL’) ( OJ C 316, 24.9.2015, p. 6, and EEA Supplement No 57, 24.9.2015, p. 1).
Zadeva E-03/11, Pálmi Sigmarsson proti Seðlabanki Íslands, Poročilo sodišča Efte za leto 2011, str. 430.
Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/esa-docs/physical/208-15-COL.pdf.
Odločba o pomoči za prestrukturiranje za banko Arion, točke 86, 149, 168 in 238.
Document No 775870.
Finančno reorganizacijo in insolventnost kreditnih institucij, kot je banka Kaupthing, urejajo določbe zakona št. 161/2002 o finančnih podjetjih, ki vsebuje poseben sklop predpisov glede insolventnosti, tega pa dopolnjujejo splošne določbe zakona št. 21/1991 o stečajnem postopku, ki se na Islandiji uporabljajo za vse zadeve, povezane z insolventnostjo.
Document No 808042.
Likvidacijski postopki so v številnih pogledih podobni stečajnim postopkom in dejansko so v likvidacijske postopke s sklicevanjem vključene številne določbe zakona o stečajnem postopku, na primer določbe o obdelavi terjatev in druge določbe, ki zagotavljajo enako obravnavo upnikov.
Documents No 819287, 819289, 819291, 819293 and 819295.
Glej priloge od 1 do 3 k dopisu banke Arion z dne 31. marca 2015 (dokument št. 753101).
For an overview of developments in collateral loans, see the CBI's Annual Report 2008, p. 9-11, available at http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=7076
Dokument št. 696088.
Glitnir had set up a covered bond programme, according to which a mortgage loan portfolio was sold into the Glitni banka (GLB) Fund which in turn guaranteed the Notes (Glitnir's obligations) issued under the covered bond programme.
Indeksi trga obveznic iBoxx so referenčna merila za poklicno rabo in zajemajo izdajo likvidnih obveznic, uvrščenih v naložbene razrede.