natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers must result in the aid beneficiary changing its behaviour so that the aid results in a net increase in the number of disadvantaged or disabled employees in the undertaking concerned.
Državna pomoč za zaposlovanje prikrajšanih delavcev in invalidov mora pri upravičencu do pomoči povzročiti spremembo ravnanja, tako da se zaradi pomoči poveča neto število prikrajšanih delavcev ali invalidov, zaposlenih v zadevnem podjetju.
Newly recruited disadvantaged or disabled employees should only fill newly created posts or posts that have fallen vacant following voluntary departure, disability, retirement on grounds of age, voluntary reduction of working time or lawful dismissal for misconduct.
Novo zaposleni prikrajšani delavci ali invalidi morajo zapolniti le novo ustvarjena delovna mesta ali delovna mesta, ki so prosta zaradi prostovoljnega odhoda, nezmožnosti opravljanja dela, starostne upokojitve, prostovoljnega skrajšanja delovnega časa ali zakonite odpovedi zaradi nediscipline.
Posts resulting from redundancy are not to be filled with subsidised disadvantaged or disabled workers.
Delovnih mest, ki so prosta zaradi presežka delovne sile, ne smejo zapolniti subvencionirani prikrajšani delavci ali invalidi.
Thus, State aid cannot be used to replace workers in respect of whom the undertaking no longer receives a subsidy and who have consequently been dismissed.
Tako se državna pomoč ne sme uporabiti za nadomeščanje delavcev, za katere podjetje ne prejema več subvencij in ki so bili zaradi tega razrešeni z delovnega mesta.
First, the beneficiary must have submitted an application for the aid to the EFTA State concerned before the categories of workers concerned by the measures were employed.
Preden se zaposlijo kategorije delavcev, ki jih zadevajo ukrepi, mora upravičenec predložiti vlogo za pomoč zadevni državi Efte.
Second, the EFTA State must demonstrate that the aid is paid in respect of a disadvantaged or disabled worker in an undertaking, where the recruitment would have not occurred without the aid.
Poleg tega mora država Efte dokazati, da je pomoč uporabljena za prikrajšane delavce ali invalide v podjetju, ki brez pomoči ne bi zaposlovalo.
internal documents of the aid beneficiary on employment costs in relation to the categories of workers concerned by the measure for two scenarios: with aid and without aid;
notranje dokumente upravičenca do pomoči o stroških zaposlovanja v zvezi s kategorijami delavcev, ki jih ukrep zadeva, za dva scenarija: s pomočjo in brez pomoči;
existing or past wage subsidies in the undertaking concerned: categories and number of workers subject to subsidies;
sedanje ali nekdanje subvencije plač v zadevnem podjetju: kategorije in število delavcev, za katere se prejemajo subvencije;
annual turnover of the categories of workers concerned by the measure.
letno fluktuacijo kategorij delavcev, ki jih ukrep zadeva.
The EFTA State must demonstrate that the aid is necessary and the amount is kept to the minimum in order to achieve the objective of the aid.
Država Efte mora dokazati, da je pomoč potrebna in da je znesek pomoči omejen na najmanjšega, da se doseže cilj pomoči.
EFTA States should provide evidence that the aid amount does not exceed the net additional costs of employing the categories of workers concerned by the measure compared to the costs of employing workers who are not disadvantaged or disabled [6].
Države Efte morajo predložiti dokaze, da znesek pomoči ne presega neto dodatnih stroškov zaposlovanja kategorij delavcev, ki jih ukrep zadeva, v primerjavi s stroški zaposlovanja delavcev, ki niso prikrajšani ali invalidi [6].
In any case, aid intensities must never exceed those laid down in Articles 40 [7] and 41 [8] of the General Block Exemption Regulation.
Intenzivnost pomoči ne sme biti v nobenem primeru večja od intenzivnosti, določene v členih 40 [7] in 41 [8] uredbe o splošnih skupinskih izjemah.
Eligible costs, to which aid intensities are to be applied, must be calculated in accordance with Articles 40 [9] and 41 [10] of the General Block Exemption Regulation.
Upravičene stroške, na podlagi katerih se določajo intenzivnosti pomoči, je treba izračunati v skladu s členoma 40 [9] in 41 [10] uredbe o splošnih skupinskih izjemah.
Negative effects on the aid
Negativni učinki na pomoč
If the aid is proportionate to achieve the objective of the aid, the negative effects of the aid are likely to be limited and an analysis of the negative effects may not be necessary.
Če je pomoč sorazmerna, tako da lahko doseže cilj pomoči, so negativni učinki pomoči verjetno omejeni in analiza negativnih učinkov morda ni potrebna.
However, in some cases, even where the aid is necessary and proportionate for a specific undertaking to increase the employment of categories of workers concerned by the measure, the aid may result in a change in the behaviour of the beneficiary which significantly distorts competition.
Vendar lahko pomoč v nekaterih primerih, čeprav je potrebna in sorazmerna, da posamezno podjetje poveča zaposlovanje kategorij delavcev, ki jih ukrep zadeva, povzroči spremembo v ravnanju upravičenca, kar znatno izkrivlja konkurenco.
In those cases the Authority will conduct an analysis of the distortion of competition.
V teh primerih bo Nadzorni organ izvedel analizo izkrivljanja konkurence.
The extent of the distortion of competition caused by the aid can vary depending on the characteristics of the aid and of the markets affected [11].
Obseg izkrivljanja konkurence, ki ga povzroči pomoč, je lahko različen glede na značilnosti pomoči in prizadetih trgov [11].
For example, an aid scheme used to encourage undertakings in general in an EFTA State to employ more disadvantaged or disabled workers is likely to have a different effect on the market than a large amount of aid given ad hoc to a single undertaking to enable it to increase its employment of a certain category of workers.
Na primer, shema pomoči, ki se uporablja za splošno spodbujanje podjetij v državi Efte k zaposlovanju več prikrajšanih delavcev ali invalidov, bo na trg verjetno vplivala drugače kot visok znesek pomoči, dodeljen ad hoc enemu podjetju, da lahko poveča zaposlovanje posamezne kategorije delavcev.
The latter is likely to distort competition more significantly as the aid beneficiary’s competitors become less able to compete.
Z visokim zneskom pomoči, ki je dodeljen enemu podjetju, se lahko v večji meri izkrivi konkurenco, ker postanejo konkurenti upravičenca do pomoči manj sposobni konkurirati.
The distortion will be even greater if the labour costs in the beneficiary’s business represent a high share of the total costs.
Izkrivljanje je še večje, če stroški delovne sile v podjetju upravičenca predstavljajo visok delež celotnih stroškov.
In assessing the market characteristics, which can give a much more accurate picture of the likely impact of an aid, the Authority will among other things consider:
Nadzorni organ bo pri ocenjevanju značilnosti trga, ki zagotavljajo natančnejšo predstavo o verjetnem učinku posamezne pomoči, med drugim upošteval:
the structure of the market;
strukturo trga;
the characteristics of the sector or industry;
značilnosti sektorja ali industrije;
the situation on the national/regional labour market.
položaj na nacionalnem/regionalnem trgu dela.
The structure of the market will be assessed through the concentration of the market, the size of undertakings [12], importance of product differentiation [13], and barriers to entry and exit.
Struktura trga se bo ocenjevala glede na tržno koncentracijo, velikost podjetij [12], pomembnost diferenciranja izdelkov [13] ter ovire za vstop na trg in izstop z njega.
In general, the fewer undertakings there are, the larger their share of the market, and the less competition one would expect to observe [14].
Na splošno velja, da je pri manjšem številu podjetij na trgu njihov tržni delež večji, pri čemer je konkurence manj, kot bi jo pričakovali [14].
If the affected market is concentrated with high barriers to entry [15] and the aid beneficiary is a major player on it then it is more likely that competitors will have to alter their behaviour in response to the aid, for example postpone or abandon the introduction of a new product or technology or exit the market all together.
Če ima prizadeti trg velike ovire za vstop [15] in je upravičenec do pomoči pomemben udeleženec na tem trgu, potem je bolj verjetno, da bodo morali konkurenti zaradi dodeljene pomoči spremeniti svoje ravnanje, na primer uvedbo novega izdelka ali tehnologije preložiti na pozneje ali opustiti ali izstopiti s trga.
The Authority will also look at the characteristics of the sector, such as the existence of overcapacity and whether the markets in the industry are growing [16], mature or declining.
Nadzorni organ bo proučil tudi značilnosti sektorja, kot so obstoj presežne zmogljivosti in ali so trgi v industriji rastoči [16], zreli ali nazadujoči.
For example, the presence of overcapacity or of mature markets in an industry may increase the risk of aid leading to inefficiency and displacement of output among undertakings which do not have subsidised workers.
Prisotnost presežne zmogljivosti ali zrelih trgov v industriji lahko na primer poveča tveganje, da bo pomoč povzročila neučinkovitost in prerazporeditev donosa med podjetji, ki nimajo subvencioniranih delavcev.
Finally, the measure will be placed in the context of the situation on the labour market, that is to say, unemployment and employment rates, wage levels, and labour law.
Ukrep bo tudi umeščen v okvir razmer na trgu dela, to je stopenj brezposelnosti in zaposlenosti, ravni plač in delovnega prava.
Wage subsidies may in particular cases lead to the distortions of competition discussed in paragraphs 22 to 27.
Subvencije plače lahko v posebnih primerih povzročijo izkrivljanja konkurence, obravnavana v odstavkih 22 do 27.
Substitution and displacement effect
Učinek nadomestitve in prerazporeditve
The substitution effect relates to the situation where jobs given to a certain category of workers simply replace jobs for other categories.
Učinek nadomestitve pomeni, da je neka kategorija delavcev zaposlena na delovnih mestih, ki preprosto nadomestijo delovna mesta za druge kategorije.
A wage subsidy which targets a specific subgroup of workers splits the labour force into subsidised workers and unsubsidised workers, and may induce undertakings to replace unsubsidised workers with subsidised workers.
Pri subvenciji plače, ki je namenjena posebni podskupini delavcev, se delovna sila deli na subvencionirane delavce in nesubvencionirane delavce, zaradi česar lahko podjetja začnejo nesubvencionirane delavce nadomeščati s subvencioniranimi.
This occurs because relative wage costs for subsidised and unsubsidised workers are changed [17].
Vzrok so spremenjeni relativni stroški plač za subvencionirane in nesubvencionirane delavce [17].
Since undertakings which employ subsidised workers compete in the same markets for goods or services as those which do not employ subsidised workers, wage subsidies can contribute to the reduction of jobs elsewhere in the economy.
Ker podjetja, ki zaposlujejo subvencionirane delavce, in podjetja, ki ne zaposlujejo subvencioniranih delavcev, konkurirajo na istih trgih blaga ali storitev, lahko subvencije plače prispevajo k zmanjšanju števila delovnih mest na drugih področjih gospodarstva.
Such a situation occurs when an undertaking employing subsidised workers increases output, but displaces output among undertakings which do not employ subsidised workers and, as a result, the aid crowds out unsubsidised employment.
Do takšnih razmer pride, kadar podjetje, ki zaposluje subvencionirane delavce, poveča donos, vendar ga prerazporedi med podjetja, ki ne zaposlujejo subvencioniranih delavcev, zato pomoč izrine nesubvencionirano delo.
It is therefore particularly important that aid should have a positive effect on employment and should not merely enable undertakings to reduce costs which they would otherwise bear.
Zato je zelo pomembno, da ima pomoč pozitiven učinek na zaposlovanje in da podjetjem ne omogoča le zmanjševanja stroškov, ki bi jih morala sicer nositi.
For example, wage subsidies reduce the ongoing costs of production and thus would make entry more appealing and enable undertakings with otherwise poor commercial prospects to enter a market or introduce new products to the detriment of more efficient competitors.
Na primer, subvencije plače znižajo stalne stroške proizvodnje in tako zagotovijo privlačnejši vstop ter podjetjem s sicer slabimi poslovnimi možnostmi omogočijo, da vstopijo na trg ali uvedejo nove izdelke na škodo učinkovitejših konkurentov.
The availability of State aid may also affect an undertaking’s decision to leave a market where it is already operating.
Razpoložljivost državne pomoči bo vplivala tudi na odločitev podjetja, da zapusti trg, na katerem že posluje.
Wage subsidies could reduce the size of losses and enable an undertaking to stay in the market for longer — which may mean that other, more efficient undertakings that do not receive aid are forced to exit instead.
Subvencije plače bi lahko zmanjšale obseg izgub in omogočile podjetju, da ostane na trgu dlje, kar lahko pomeni, da so druga učinkovitejša podjetja, ki ne prejemajo pomoči, namesto tega prisiljena izstopiti s trga.
Investment incentives
Naložbene spodbude
In the markets where wage subsidies are granted, undertakings are discouraged from competing and may reduce their investments and attempts to increase efficiency and innovation.
Na trgih, na katerih so dodeljene subvencije plače, se podjetja odvrača od konkuriranja, pri čemer lahko ta podjetja zmanjšajo svoje naložbe in poskuse, da bi povečala učinkovitost in inovacije.
The aid beneficiary may delay the introduction of new less labour-intensive technologies because of a change in relative costs for labour-intensive and technology-intensive production methods.
Upravičenec do pomoči lahko odlaša z uvedbo novih manj delovno intenzivnih tehnologij zaradi spremembe relativnih stroškov za delovno in tehnološko intenzivne proizvodne metode.
Manufacturers of competing or complementary products may also decrease or delay their investment.
Proizvajalci konkurenčnih ali dopolnilnih izdelkov lahko prav tako zmanjšajo svoje naložbe ali z njimi odlašajo.
As a consequence, the overall investment level in the industry concerned will decline.
Zaradi tega se bo splošna raven naložb v zadevni industriji zmanjšala.
Wage subsidies within a particular region may result in some territories benefiting from more favourable production conditions than others.
Subvencije plač znotraj posamezne regije so lahko za nekatera območja koristne, ker zagotovijo ugodnejše pogoje proizvodnje v primerjavi z drugimi.
The last step in the analysis is to evaluate the extent to which the positive effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects.
Zadnja stopnja v okviru analize je ocena, v kolikšni meri pozitivni učinki pomoči presegajo njene negativne učinke.
This will be done on a case-by-case basis for all individual measures.
To se bo izvedlo na podlagi posameznih primerov za vse posamezne ukrepe.
The Authority is likely to take a more positive stance and therefore accept a higher degree of distortion of competition if the aid is necessary and well-targeted to achieve the objective of the aid and is limited to the net extra costs of compensating for the lower productivity of the categories of workers concerned by the measure.
Nadzorni organ bo verjetno zavzel pozitivnejše stališče in zato sprejel višjo raven izkrivljanja konkurence, če je pomoč potrebna in pravilno usmerjena k doseganju cilja pomoči ter pokriva le neto dodatne stroške nadomeščanja nižje produktivnosti kategorij delavcev, ki jih ukrep zadeva.
This Chapter corresponds to the Communication from the Commission of the European Communities – Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers subject to individual notification (OJ C 188, 11.8.2009, p. 6).
To poglavje se ujema s sporočilom Evropske komisije – Merila za analizo združljivosti državne pomoči za zaposlovanje prikrajšanih delavcev in invalidov, za katero velja posamična priglasitev (UL C 188, 11.8.2009, str. 6).
Article 66 et seq. of the EEA Agreement and Article 5 of Protocol 31 on social policy to the EEA Agreement.
Člen 66 in naslednji Sporazuma EGP ter člen 5 Protokola 31 k Sporazumu EGP o socialni politiki.
Joint Committee Decision No 120/2008 of 7.11.2008 (OJ L 339, 18.12.2008, p. 111, and EEA Supplement No 79, 18.12.2008, p. 20) entered into force on 8.11.2008.
Sklep Skupnega odbora št. 120/2008 z dne 7. novembra 2008 (UL L 339, 18.12.2008, str. 111, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 79, 18.11.2008, str. 20), ki je začel veljati 8.11.2008.
Due to their specific nature, individual measures applying to the compensation for the additional cost of employing disabled workers and additional costs incurred by social enterprises of which the grant equivalent exceeds EUR 10 million per undertaking per year will be assessed on the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.
Zaradi posebnih značilnosti se bodo posamezni ukrepi, ki veljajo za nadomestila za dodatne stroške zaposlovanja invalidov in dodatne stroške, ki jih imajo socialna podjetja, katerih ekvivalent dotacije presega 10 milijonov EUR letno na podjetje, ocenili na podlagi člena 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP.
For ad-hoc aid for the employment of disadvantaged workers below EUR 5 million and ad-hoc aid to large undertakings for the employment of disabled workers below EUR 10 million, the Authority will mutatis mutandis apply the principles as outlined in this guidance, though in a less detailed manner.
Za ad hoc pomoč za zaposlovanje prikrajšanih delavcev do 5 milijonov EUR in ad hoc pomoč velikim podjetjem za zaposlovanje invalidov do 10 milijonov EUR Nadzorni organ smiselno, čeprav manj podrobno, upošteva načela, opredeljena v teh navodilih.
Net additional costs take into account the costs corresponding to the employment of the targeted categories of disadvantaged or disabled workers (for example, due to lower productivity) and benefits, which the aid beneficiary extracts from this employment (for example, due to an improvement of the image of the undertaking).
V neto dodatne stroške se vključijo stroški iz zaposlovanja ciljnih kategorij prikrajšanih delavcev ali invalidov (na primer zaradi nižje produktivnosti) in koristi, ki jih upravičenec do pomoči pridobi z zaposlovanjem takšnih delavcev (na primer zaradi boljše podobe podjetja).
The aid intensity for disadvantaged workers must not exceed 50 % of the eligible costs.
Intenzivnost pomoči za prikrajšane delavce ne sme presegati 50 % upravičenih stroškov.
The aid intensity for disabled workers must not exceed 75 % of the eligible costs.
Intenzivnost pomoči za invalide ne sme presegati 75 % upravičenih stroškov.
For the employment of disadvantaged workers eligible costs are the wage costs over a maximum period of 12 months following recruitment.
Upravičeni stroški za zaposlovanje prikrajšanih delavcev so stroški plač za največ 12 mesecev po zaposlitvi.
However, where the worker concerned is a severely disadvantaged worker, eligible costs are the wage costs over a maximum period of 24 months following recruitment.
Če je zadevni delavec resno prikrajšan delavec, so upravičeni stroški plač za največ 24 mesecev po zaposlitvi.
For the employment of disabled workers eligible costs are the wage costs over any given duration during which the disabled worker is being employed.
Upravičeni stroški za zaposlovanje invalidov so stroški plač za celotno obdobje, v katerem je invalid zaposlen.
A number of markets can be affected by the aid, because the impact of the aid may not be restricted to the markets where the aid beneficiary is active but can extend to other markets, for example input markets.
Pomoč lahko vpliva na številne trge, ker se njenega vpliva ne more omejiti na trge, na katerih je dejaven upravičenec do pomoči, ampak se lahko razširi na ostale trge, na primer trge proizvodnih dejavnikov.
Size of the undertaking can be expressed in the terms of market shares as well as turnover and/or employment.
Velikost podjetja se lahko izrazi v smislu tržnih deležev ter prometa in/ali števila delovnih mest.
However, some markets are competitive despite there being few undertakings present.
Vendar so nekateri trgi konkurenčni kljub majhnemu številu prisotnih podjetij.
However, granting aid sometimes helps to overcome entry barriers and allows new undertakings to enter a market.
Vendar dodelitev pomoči včasih pomaga odpraviti ovire za vstop in novim podjetjem omogoči vstop na trg.
The existence of growing markets will usually lead to a less pronounced effect of the aid on competitors.
Zaradi obstoja rastočih trgov je učinek pomoči na konkurente običajno manj izrazit.
Such substitution effect depends on the elasticity of demand for labour, both for subsidised and unsubsidised workers.
Takšen učinek nadomestitve je odvisen od elastičnosti povpraševanja po delovni sili subvencioniranih in tudi nesubvencioniranih delavcev.
amending, for the 76th time, the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid by introducing a new chapter on criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers subject to individual notification
o šestinsedemdeseti spremembi procesnih in materialnih pravil na področju državne pomoči z uvedbo novega poglavja o merilih za analizo združljivosti državne pomoči za zaposlovanje prikrajšanih delavcev in invalidov, za katero velja posamična priglasitev
This Chapter gives guidance on the criteria the EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Authority’) will apply for the assessment of State aid in form of wage subsidies that needs to be notified individually pursuant to Article 6(1)(h) and (i) of the Act referred to at point 1j of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement (Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General Block Exemption Regulation)) [3], as adapted to the EEA Agreement by Protocol 1 thereto [4] (hereinafter referred to as ‘the General Block Exemption Regulation’).
To poglavje zagotavlja navodila za merila, ki jih bo Nadzorni organ Efte (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Nadzorni organ) uporabljal pri oceni državne pomoči v obliki subvencije plače, ki jo je treba posamično priglasiti v skladu s členom 6(1)(h) in (i) predpisa iz točke 1j Priloge XV k Sporazumu EGP (Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 800/2008 z dne 6. avgusta 2008 o razglasitvi nekaterih vrst pomoči za združljive s skupnim trgom z uporabo členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe (Uredba o splošnih skupinskih izjemah)) [3], kot je bil prilagojen Sporazumu EGP s Protokolom 1 k temu sporazumu [4] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: uredba o splošnih skupinskih izjemah).
This guidance is intended to make the Authority’s reasoning transparent and to create predictability and legal certainty.
Ta navodila so namenjena zagotavljanju preglednosti sklepanja Nadzornega organa ter ustvarjanju predvidljivosti in pravne varnosti.
No 533/09/COL
št. 533/09/COL
amending, for the 77th time, the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid by introducing a new chapter on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain types of State aid
o sedeminsedemdeseti spremembi procesnih in materialnih pravil na področju državne pomoči z uvedbo novega poglavja o poenostavljenem postopku obravnave nekaterih vrst državnih pomoči
THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY [1], HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area [2], in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26 thereof,
NADZORNI ORGAN EFTE JE [1] – OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru [2] in zlasti členov 61 do 63 ter Protokola 26 k Sporazumu,
Under Article 24 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Authority shall give effect to the provisions of the EEA Agreement concerning State aid.
V skladu s členom 24 Sporazuma o nadzornem organu in sodišču Nadzorni organ uveljavlja določbe Sporazuma EGP v zvezi z državno pomočjo.