natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to Article 3(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, agreements which may affect trade between EEA States but which are not prohibited by Article 53 of the EEA Agreement cannot be prohibited by national competition law.
V skladu s členom 3(2) poglavja II Protokola 4 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču sporazumov, ki lahko vplivajo na trgovino med državami Efte, vendar pa niso prepovedani po členu 53 Sporazuma EGP, ne more prepovedati nacionalna zakonodaja o konkurenci.
OJ L 153, 18.6.1994, p. 30 and EEA Supplement No 15, 18.6.1994, p. 29.
UL L 153, 18.6.1994, str. 30, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 15, 18.6.1994, str. 29.
See paragraph 3 of the subcontracting notice.
Glej odstavek 3 obvestila glede podizvajalskih pogodb.
See in this respect Commission Decision in Moosehead/Whitbread (OJ L 100, 20.4.1990, p. 32).
V zvezi s tem glej Odločbo Komisije v zadevi Moosehead/Whitbread (UL L 100, 20.4.1990, str. 32).
See in this respect Case 262/81, Coditel (II), [1982] ECR 3381.
V zvezi s tem glej zadevo 262/81, Coditel (II), [1982] Recueil 3381.
OJ L 103, 12.4.2001, p. 36 and EEA Supplement No 20, 12.4.2001, p. 179.
UL L 103, 12.4.2001, str. 36, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 20, 12.4.2001, str. 179.
OJ L 52, 22.2 2001, p. 38 and EEA Supplement No 9, 22.2.2001, p. 5.
UL L 52, 22.2.2001, str. 38, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 9, 22.2.2001, str. 5.
OJ L 52, 22.2.2001, p. 38 and EEA Supplement No 9, 22.2.2001, p. 5.
UL L 52, 22.2.2001, str. 38, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 9, 22.2.2001, str. 5.
See note 32.
Glej opombo 32.
See note 32 and OJ C 122, 23.5.2002, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 26, 23.5.2002, p. 7.
Glej opombo 32 in UL C 122, 23.5.2002, str. 1, ter Dopolnilo EGP št. 26, 23.5.2002, str. 7.
See paragraph 29 above.
Glej odstavek 29 zgoraj.
The reasons for this calculation rule are explained in paragraph 23 above.
Razlogi za ta izračun so razloženi v odstavku 23 zgoraj.
See e.g. the case law cited in note 18.
Glej na primer sodno prakso, navedeno v opombi 18.
See in this respect paragraph 98 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement cited in note 5.
V zvezi s tem glej odstavek 98 Smernic o uporabi člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP, navedenih v opombi 5.
This is also the case where one party grants a licence to the other party and accepts to buy a physical input from the licensee.
To velja tudi v primeru, da ena stranka podeli licenco drugi stranki in pristane, da bo od pridobitelja licence kupila materialni vložek.
The purchase price can serve the same function as the royalty.
Nakupna cena ima lahko isto funkcijo kot licenčnina.
See in this respect Case 193/83, Windsurfing International, [1986] ECR 611, paragraph 67.
V zvezi s tem glej zadevo 193/83, Windsurfing International, [1986] Recueil 611, odstavek 67.
For a general definition of active and passive sales, reference is made to paragraph 50 of the Guidelines on vertical restraints cited in note 36.
Za splošno opredelitev aktivne in pasivne prodaje se sklicuje na odstavek 50 Smernic o vertikalnih omejitvah, navedenih v opombi 36.
Field of use restrictions are further dealt with in Section IV.2.4 below.
Omejitve glede področja uporabe so podrobneje obravnavane v podpoglavju IV.2.4 spodaj.
This hardcore restriction applies to licence agreements concerning trade within the territory covered by the EEA Agreement.
Ta nedopustna omejitev se uporablja za licenčne sporazume v zvezi s trgovanjem na ozemlju, ki ga zajema Sporazum EGP.
As regards agreements concerning exports outside the EEA or imports/re-imports from outside the EEA, see for instance Case C-306/96, Javico, [1998] ECR I-1983 concerning imports/re-imports from outside the Community.
V zvezi s sporazumi, ki se nanašajo na izvoz zunaj EGP ali uvoz/ponovni uvoz iz držav zunaj EGP, glej na primer zadevo C-306/96, Javico, [1998] Recueil I-1983 glede uvoza/ponovnega uvoza iz držav zunaj Skupnosti.
See in this respect paragraph 77 of the judgment in Nungesser cited in note 16.
V zvezi s tem glej odstavek 77 sodbe v zadevi Nungesser, navedeni v opombi 16.
See in this respect Case 26/76, Metro (I), [1977] ECR 1875.
V zvezi s tem glej zadevo 26/76, Metro (I), [1977] Recueil 1875.
If the licensed technology is outdated no restriction of competition arises, see in this respect Case 65/86, Bayer v Süllhofer, [1988] ECR 5249.
Če je licenčna tehnologija zastarela, se ne pojavi omejevanje konkurence, v zvezi s tem glej zadevo 65/86, Bayer proti Süllhofer, [1988] Recueil 5249.
As to non-challenge clauses in the context of settlement agreements see point 209 below.
V zvezi s klavzulami o neizpodbijanju v okviru sporazumov o poravnavi glej točko 209 spodaj.
See paragraph 14 above.
Glej odstavek 14 zgoraj.
See paragraphs 66 and 67 above.
Glej odstavka 66 in 67 zgoraj.
See in this respect paragraph 42 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement, cited in note 5.
V zvezi s tem glej odstavek 42 Smernic o uporabi člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP, navedenih v opombi 5.
However, it follows from Article 7(2) of the TTBER that if an EFTA State addressee notifies the EFTA Surveillance Authority that it does not accept its recommendation, the Authority shall notify the Commission of this response.
Vendar pa iz člena 7(2) TTBER izhaja, da če država Efte, ki je naslovnica, uradno obvesti Nadzorni organ EFTA, da njegovega priporočila ne sprejme, Nadzorni organ o tem odgovoru uradno obvesti Komisijo.
Should the Commission disagree with the position of the EFTA State in question, Article 92(2) of the EEA Agreement shall apply.
Če se Komisija ne strinja s stališčem zadevne države Efte, se uporabi člen 92(2) Sporazuma EGP.
See in this respect paragraph 8 of the EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on agreements of minor importance, cited in note 20.
V zvezi s tem glej odstavek 8 Obvestila Nadzornega organa EFTA o sporazumih majhnega pomena, navedenega v opombi 20.
See in this respect Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar, [1999] ECR II-2969, paragraph 101.
V zvezi s tem glej zadevo T-228/97, Irish Sugar, [1999] Recueil II-2969, odstavek 101.
See in this respect paragraph 23 of the Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements, cited in note 23.
V zvezi s tem glej odstavek 23 Smernic o sporazumih o horizontalnem sodelovanju, navedenih v opombi 26.
See Joined Cases 25/84 and 26/84, Ford, [1985] ECR 2725.
Glej združeni zadevi 25/84 in 26/84, Ford, [1985] Recueil 2725.
See in this respect for example Commission Decision in TPS (OJ L 90, 2.4.1999, p. 6).
V zvezi s tem glej na primer Odločbo Komisije v zadevi TPS (UL L 90, 2.4.1999, str. 6).
Similarly, the prohibition of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement also only applies as long as the agreement has a restrictive object or restrictive effects.
Podobno se prepoved iz člena 53(1) Sporazuma EGP lahko uporablja le tako dolgo, kot ima sporazum omejevalni cilj ali omejevalne posledice.
Cited in note 36.
Navedene v opombi 36.
See in particular paragraphs 115 et seq.
Glej zlasti odstavke 115 et seq.
As to these concepts see Section IV.4.1 below.
V zvezi s temi pojmi glej podpoglavje IV.4.1 spodaj.
See paragraph 85 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement, cited in note 5.
Glej odstavek 85 Smernic o uporabi člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP, navedenih v opombi 5.
Idem, paragraphs 98 and 102.
Idem, odstavka 98 in 102.
See paragraph 130 of the judgment cited in note 5.
Glej odstavek 130 sodbe, navedene v opombi 8.
Similarly, the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement does not prevent the application of the EEA rules on the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital.
Podobno uporaba člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP ne preprečuje uporabe pravil EGP o prostem pretoku blaga, storitev, oseb in kapitala.
These provisions are in certain circumstances applicable to agreements, decisions and concerted practices within the meaning of Article 53(1), see to that effect Case C-309/99, Wouters, [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 120.
Te določbe se v nekaterih okoliščinah uporabljajo za sporazume, sklepe in usklajena ravnanja v smislu člena 53(1), v zvezi s tem glej zadevo C-309/99, Wouters, [2002] Recueil I–1577, odstavek 120.
See in this respect Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak (I), [1990] ECR II-309.
V zvezi s tem glej zadevo T-51/89, Tetra Pak (I), [1990] Recueil II-309.
See also paragraph 106 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement cited in note 5 above.
Glej tudi odstavek 106 Smernic o uporabi člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP, navedenih v opombi 8 zgoraj.
See the judgment in Nungesser cited in note 16.
Glej sodbo v zadevi Nungesser, navedeni v opombi 16.
For the applicable analytical framework see Section 2.7 below and paragraphs 138 et seq. of the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints cited in note 36.
Za veljavni analitični okvir glej podpoglavje 2.7 spodaj in odstavke 138 et seq. Smernic o vertikalnih omejitvah, navedenih v opombi 36.
See note 36.
Glej opombo 36.
The term “technology” is not limited to patents.
Izraz ‚tehnologija‘ se ne omejuje na patente.
It covers also patent applications and intellectual property rights other than patents.
Zajema tudi patentne prijave in pravice intelektualne lastnine, ki niso patenti.
See in this respect the judgment in John Deere cited in note 14.’
V zvezi s tem glej sodbo v zadevi John Deere, navedeni v opombi 14.“
In year two and three both A’s and B’s market share does not exceed the 30 % threshold.
V drugem in tretjem letu tržna deleža A niti B ne presegata 30-odstotnega praga.
The threshold is however exceeded from year four and this means that, in line with Article 8(2) of the TTBER, after year six the licence agreement between A and B can no longer benefit from the safe harbour but has to be assessed on an individual basis.
Vendar pa je prag presežen od četrtega leta naprej, kar pomeni, da v skladu s členom 8(2) TTBER licenčni sporazum med A in B po šestem letu ne more več uživati ugodnosti varnega pristana skupinske izjeme, temveč se mora presoditi na posamični osnovi.
The market share of A on the technology market depends on the amount of the product sold in the preceding year that was produced, by both A and B, with A’s technology.
Tržni delež A na tehnološkem trgu je odvisen od prihodkov od prodaje izdelka, ki sta ga proizvedla A in B s pomočjo tehnologije A, v predhodnem letu.
Article 4(1)(c) applies irrespective of whether the licensee remains free to use his own technology.
Člen 4(1)(c) se uporablja ne glede na to, ali lahko pridobitelj licence še naprej prosto uporablja svojo lastno tehnologijo.
Once the licensee has tooled up to use the licensor’s technology to produce a given product, it may be costly to maintain a separate production line using another technology in order to serve customers covered by the restrictions.
Ko se pridobitelj licence ustrezno opremi za uporabo tehnologije dajalca licence z namenom proizvodnje danega izdelka, je vzdrževanje ločene proizvodne linije, ki uporablja drugo tehnologijo, da bi služila kupcem, ki jih zajemajo omejitve, lahko drago.
Moreover, given the anti-competitive potential of the restraint the licensee may have little incentive to produce under his own technology.
Poleg tega je verjetno, da pridobitelj licence zaradi možnih protikonkurenčnih učinkov omejitve ne bo imel znatne spodbude, da bi proizvajal na podlagi lastne tehnologije.
Such restrictions are also highly unlikely to be indispensable for pro-competitive licensing to occur.
Prav tako je zelo malo verjetno, da bodo takšne omejitve nepogrešljive za dosego licenciranja, ki je za konkurenco spodbudno.
Under Article 4(1)(c)(ii) it is not a hardcore restriction for the licensor in a non-reciprocal agreement to grant the licensee an exclusive licence to produce on the basis of the licensed technology in a particular territory and thus agree not to produce himself the contract products in or provide the contract products from that territory.
V skladu s členom 4(1)(c)(ii) ni nedopustna omejitev, če dajalec licence v okviru nevzajemnega sporazuma podeli pridobitelju licence izključno licenco za proizvodnjo na podlagi licenčne tehnologije na določenem ozemlju in torej pristane, da sam ne bo proizvajal pogodbenih izdelkov na navedenem ozemlju ali jih iz tega ozemlja dobavljal.
Such exclusive licences are block exempted irrespective of the scope of the territory.
Za takšne izključne licence velja skupinska izjema ne glede na obseg ozemlja.
If the licence is world-wide, the exclusivity implies that the licensor abstains from entering or remaining on the market.
Če licenca zadeva svetovni trg, izključnost pomeni, da dajalec licence ne bo vstopil na trg ali na njem še naprej deloval.
The block exemption also applies where the licence is limited to one or more technical fields of use or one or more product markets.
Skupinska izjema se uporablja tudi, če je licenca omejena na eno ali več tehničnih področij uporabe oziroma na enega ali več proizvodnih trgov.
The purpose of agreements covered by Article 4(1)(c)(ii) may be to give the licensee an incentive to invest in and develop the licensed technology.
Namen sporazumov, zajetih s členom 4(1)(c)(ii), je lahko spodbujati pridobitelja licence k naložbam in razvoju licenčne tehnologije.
The object of the agreement is therefore not necessarily to share markets.
Cilj sporazuma torej ni nujno delitev trgov.
In the case of licence agreements between competitors it is recalled that in a limited number of circumstances royalty obligations may amount to price fixing, which is a hardcore restriction (cf. Article 4(1)(a)).
V primeru licenčnih sporazumov med konkurenti je treba opozoriti, da lahko obveznosti za plačilo licenčnin v omejenem številu primerov pomenijo določanje cen, ki sodi med nedopustne omejitve (glej člen 4(1)(a)).
It is a hardcore restriction under Article 4(1)(a) if competitors provide for reciprocal running royalties in circumstances where the licence is a sham, in that its purpose is not to allow an integration of complementary technologies or to achieve another pro-competitive aim.
Nedopustna omejitev po členu 4(1)(a) je, če konkurenti določajo vzajemne tekoče licenčnine v primeru, ko je licenca navidezna, saj njen namen ni omogočiti vključitev dopolnilnih tehnologij ali doseči kak drug cilj, ki spodbuja konkurenco.
In year three B’s market share is 15 % because its sales have increased to EUR 30 million in year two. In year four and thereafter B’s market share is 20 % as its sales are EUR 40 million annually. C’s market share on the product market is 0 % in year one and two, 5 % in year three and 7,5 % thereafter.
Tretje leto je tržni delež B 15 %, saj so se njeni prihodki od prodaje v drugem letu povečali na 30 milijonov EUR. Četrto leto in pozneje znaša tržni delež B 20 %, ker njeni letni prihodki od prodaje znašajo 40 milijonov EUR. Tržni delež C na proizvodnem trgu je 0 % prvo in drugo leto, 2,5 % tretje leto in 7,5 % naslednja leta.
From that year onward A sells EUR 10 million of the product produced with its own technology and EUR 10 million of the product produced with B’s technology. B sells from year two EUR 15 million of the product produced with its own technology and EUR 10 million of the product produced with A’s technology.
Od drugega leta naprej ustvari A prihodke v višini 10 milijonov EUR od prodaje izdelka, ki ga je izdelala s svojo lastno tehnologijo, in prihodke v višini 10 milijonov EUR od prodaje izdelka, proizvedenega s pomočjo tehnologije B. Od drugega leta naprej ustvari B prihodke v višini 15 milijonov EUR od prodaje izdelka, ki ga je izdelala s svojo lastno tehnologijo, in prihodke v višini 10 milijonov EUR od prodaje izdelka, izdelanega s pomočjo tehnologije A. Ugotovi se, da je skupni trg za izdelek in nadomestne izdelke vreden 100 milijonov EUR letno.
It is established that the total market of the product and its substitutes is worth EUR 100 million in each year. To assess the licence agreement under the TTBER, the market shares of A and B have to be calculated both on the technology market and the product market.
Za presojo licenčnega sporazuma v okviru TTBER je treba izračunati tržna deleža A in B na tehnološkem in tudi na proizvodnem trgu.
In year three A’s market share on the technology market is 12,5 %, reflecting the value of Xeran produced by B and C in the preceding year 2. In year four and thereafter A’s market share on the technology market is 27,5 %, reflecting the value of Xeran produced by B and C in the preceding year.
Tretje leto znaša tržni delež A na tehnološkem trgu 12,5 %, kar odraža prihodek od prodaje Xerana, ki sta ga v predhodnem, drugem letu proizvedli B in C. Četrto leto in v naslednjih letih znaša tržni delež A na tehnološkem trgu 27,5 %, kar odraža vrednost prodaje Xerana, ki sta ga v predhodnem letu proizvedli B in C.
No 298/05/COL
št. 298/05/COL
on the proposal for regionally differentiated rates of social security contributions for certain economic sectors (Norway)
o predlogu za stopnje prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki se razlikujejo po regijah, za nekatere gospodarske sektorje (Norveška)
HAVING REGARD TO the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice [3], in particular to Article 24 thereof,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča [3] ter zlasti člena 24 Sporazuma,
HAVING REGARD TO Article 1(2) in Part I and Articles 4(4), 6 and 7(5) in Part II in Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU člena 1(2) dela I ter člena 4(4), člena 6 in člena 7(5) dela II Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča,
HAVING REGARD TO the Authority’s Guidelines [4] on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU smernic Organa [4] o uporabi in razlagi členov 61 in 62 Sporazuma EGP,
HAVING REGARD TO the Authority’s Decision of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Odločbe Organa z dne 14. julija 2004 o izvajanju določb iz člena 27 dela II Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču,
HAVING REGARD TO the EFTA Court’s Judgment in Case E-6/98 the Government of Norway versus the EFTA Surveillance Authority [5],
OB UPOŠTEVANJU sodbe Sodišča EFTA v zadevi E-6/98 vlada Norveške proti Nadzornemu organu EFTA [5],
HAVING REGARD TO the Authority’s Decision No 172/02/COL of 25 September 2002 proposing appropriate measures with regard to the scheme of regionally differentiated social security contributions [6] and to the letter from the Norwegian authorities dated 29 October 2002 accepting the appropriate measures,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Odločbe Organa št. 172/02/COL z dne 25. septembra 2002, ki predlaga primerne ukrepe glede sheme prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki se razlikujejo po regijah [6], in dopisa norveških oblasti z dne 29. oktobra 2002, s katerim sprejemajo ustrezne ukrepe,
HAVING REGARD TO the Authority’s Decision No 218/03/COL of 12 November 2003 with regard to State aid in the form of regionally differentiated social security contributions [7],
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Odločbe Organa št. 218/03/COL z dne 12. novembra 2003 glede državne pomoči v obliki prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki se razlikujejo po regijah, [7]
HAVING CALLED ON interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to the provisions cited above [8],
PO POZIVU zainteresiranim strankam, da predložijo svoje pripombe v skladu z zgoraj navedenimi določbami [8],
Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Norwegian authorities notified their intention to apply reduced rates of social security contributions to undertakings located in designated geographical Zones 2, 3 and 4 in Norway and active in certain economic sectors.
Na podlagi člena 1(3) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču so norveške oblasti sporočile svojo namero, da bodo uporabile znižane stopnje prispevkov za socialno varnost v podjetjih iz označenih geografskih con 2, 3 in 4 na Norveškem, ki so dejavna v nekaterih gospodarskih sektorjih.
The notification was sent by letter dated 26 April 2004 from the Norwegian Mission to the European Union, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Trade and Industry together with a letter from the Ministry of Finance both dated 23 April 2004, received and registered by the Authority on 27 April 2004 (Event No 278992).
Priglasitev je bila poslana z dopisom norveške misije pri Evropski uniji z dne 26. aprila 2004, ki je posredoval dopis Ministrstva za trgovino in industrijo skupaj z dopisom Ministrstva za finance, oba z dne 23. aprila 2004, ter ki ga je Organ prejel in evidentiral 27. aprila 2004 (dogodek št. 278992).
After various exchanges of correspondence and meetings between the Authority and the Norwegian authorities [9], given the serious difficulties the Authority had to declare the notified measure compatible with Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, the Authority decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.The Authority’s Decision No 245/04/COL of 6 October 2004 to initiate the formal investigation procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto [10].
Po različnih izmenjavah korespondence, srečanjih med Organom in norveškimi oblastmi [9] ter ob upoštevanju resnih težav, ki jih je imel Organ z izrekanjem priglašenega ukrepa za združljivega s členom 61 Sporazuma EGP, se je Organ odločil, da sproži postopek, določen v členu 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču.Odločba Organa št. 245/04/COL z dne 6. oktobra 2006 o začetku formalnega postopka preiskave je bila objavljena v Uradnem listu Evropske unije in v Dopolnilu EGP k Uradnemu listu [10].
The Authority called on interested parties to submit their comments.By letter from the Norwegian Mission to the European Union dated 12 November 2004, the Norwegian authorities submitted their comments to the opening decision (Event No 299087).
Organ je pozval zainteresirane stranke, naj predložijo svoje pripombe.Norveške oblasti so predložile svoje pripombe na uvodno odločbo v dopisu Norveške misije pri Evropski uniji z dne 12. novembra 2004 (dogodek št. 299087).
The Authority received no comments from interested parties.
Organ ni prejel pripomb zainteresiranih strank.
Description of the proposed measure
Opis predlaganega ukrepa
On the basis of the Norwegian Social Security Act of 28 February 1997 (Lov om folketrygd), all employers in Norway are subject to compulsory contributions to the national social security scheme.
Na podlagi norveškega Zakona o socialni varnosti z dne 28. februarja 1997 („Lov om folketrygd“) so vsi delodajalci na Norveškem zavezani k plačilu obveznih prispevkov v nacionalno shemo socialne varnosti.
These contributions are calculated in relation to the gross salaries of employees and differentiated according to the place of residence of the employees.
Ti prispevki se izračunajo glede na bruto plače zaposlenih in se razlikujejo glede na kraj bivališča zaposlenih.
For this purpose, Norway is divided into five geographical zones.
V ta namen je Norveška razdeljena na pet geografskih con.
Zone 1 [11] comprises the most central parts of the southern part of the country and covers 76,6 % of the total population in Norway.
Cona 1 [11] obsega najbolj osrednje dele južnega dela države in vključuje 76,6 % celotnega prebivalstva Norveške.
Zone 2 [12] comprises less central parts of Southern Norway and covers 9,4 % of the total population in Norway.
Cona 2 [12] obsega manj osrednje dele južne Norveške in vključuje 9,4 % celotnega prebivalstva Norveške.
Zone 3 [13] covers mostly certain mountain regions in Southern Norway with a coverage of 2,6 % of the total population of Norway.
Cona 3 [13] obsega predvsem nekatere gorate predele južne Norveške in vključuje 2,6 % celotnega prebivalstva Norveške.
Zone 4 [14] is made up of the most northern part of South Norway as well as North Norway south of Zone 5.
Cono 4 [14] sestavljajo najsevernejši del južne Norveške in severna Norveška južno od cone 5.
Zone 4 covers 9,4 % of the total population.
Cona 4 vključuje 9,4 % celotnega prebivalstva.