natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
a restriction of intra-technology competition on the market for the supply of inputs and an exclusion of arbitrage between licensees enhancing the possibility for the licensor to impose discriminatory royalties on licensees.
Če na primer dajalec licence podeli licenco za posamezno procesno tehnologijo, se lahko pogodbenici prav tako sporazumeta, da pridobitelj licence od dajalca licence kupi katalizator, ki je zasnovan za uporabo z licenčno tehnologijo in omogoča, da se tehnologija izkorišča učinkoviteje kot v primeru drugih katalizatorjev.
Captive use restrictions, however, may also promote pro-competitive licensing.
Če je v takih primerih omejitev zajeta v členu 53(1), je verjetno, da bodo pogoji iz člena 53(3) izpolnjeni, tudi če se presežejo pragovi tržnih deležev.
If the licensor is a supplier of components, the restraint may be necessary in order for the dissemination of technology between non-competitors to occur.
Prepovedi konkurence v okviru podeljevanja licenc za tehnologijo imajo obliko obveznosti, naložene pridobitelju licence, da ne uporablja tehnologij tretjih oseb, ki konkurirajo licenčni tehnologiji.
In the absence of the restraint the licensor may not grant the licence or may do so only against higher royalties, because otherwise it would create direct competition with itself on the component market.
Če prepoved konkurence vključuje izdelek ali dodatno tehnologijo, ki ju dobavlja dajalec licence, je obveznost obravnavana v poglavju 4.2.6. o vezanju licenc.
In such cases a captive use restriction is normally either not restrictive of competition or covered by Article 53(3).
V skladu s TTBER so prepovedi konkurence predmet skupinske izjeme tako v primeru sporazumov med konkurenti kot tudi sporazumov med nekonkurenti, če ni presežen 20-odstotni oziroma 30-odstotni prag tržnega deleža.
However, the licensee must not be restricted in selling the licensed product as replacement parts for its own products.
Poglavitno tveganje, ki ga imajo prepovedi konkurence za konkurenco, je omejevanje dostopa na trg tehnologijam tretjih oseb.
The licensee must be able to serve the after-market for its own products, including independent service organisations that service and repair the products produced by it.
Prepovedi konkurence lahko tudi spodbujajo nedovoljeno dogovarjanje med dajalci licenc, če jih uporablja več pridobiteljev licenc v ločenih sporazumih (tj. v primeru kumulativne uporabe).
Where the licensor is not a component supplier on the relevant product market, the above reason for imposing captive use restrictions does not apply.
Omejevanje dostopa na trg za konkurenčne tehnologije zmanjšuje konkurenčni pritisk na licenčnine, ki jih zaračunava dajalec licence, in zmanjšuje konkurenco med uveljavljenimi tehnologijami, tako da omejuje možnosti pridobiteljev licenc za nadomeščanje ene konkurenčne tehnologije z drugo.
In such cases a captive use restriction may in principle promote the dissemination of technology by ensuring that licensees do not sell to producers that compete with the licensor on other product markets.
Ker je v obeh primerih poglavitna težava omejevanje dostopa na trg, je lahko analiza na splošno enaka za sporazume med konkurenti in sporazume med nekonkurenti.
However, a restriction on the licensee not to sell into certain customer groups reserved for the licensor normally constitutes a less restrictive alternative.
Vendar pa lahko v primeru navzkrižnega licenciranja med konkurenti, pri katerem se obe pogodbenici sporazumeta, da ne bosta uporabljali tehnologij tretjih oseb, sporazum omogoči nedovoljeno dogovarjanje na proizvodnem trgu, kar upravičuje določitev nižjega praga tržnega deleža, tj. 20 %.
Consequently, in such cases a captive use restriction is normally not necessary for the dissemination of technology to take place.
Omejevanje dostopa na trg se lahko pojavi, če je znaten del potencialnih pridobiteljev licenc že vezanih na en vir tehnologije ali – v primeru kumulativnih učinkov – na več virov tehnologije in če jim je onemogočeno izkoriščanje konkurenčnih tehnologij.
In the context of technology licensing tying occurs when the licensor makes the licensing of one technology (the tying product) conditional upon the licensee taking a licence for another technology or purchasing a product from the licensor or someone designated by it (the tied product).
Učinki omejevanja dostopa na trg so lahko posledica sporazumov, ki jih sklene en sam dajalec licence z znatno stopnjo tržne moči, ali kumulativnega učinka sporazumov, ki jih sklene več dajalcev licenc, tudi če sta vsak posamezni sporazum ali mreža sporazumov zajeta v TTBER.
Bundling occurs where two technologies or a technology and a product are only sold together as a bundle.
Vendar pa v slednjem primeru ni verjeten pojav močnega kumulativnega učinka, dokler je delež vezanega trga manjši od 50 %.
In both cases, however, it is a condition that the products and technologies involved are distinct in the sense that there is distinct demand for each of the products and technologies forming part of the tie or the bundle.
Nad navedenim pragom se lahko pojavi znatno omejevanje dostopa na trg, če obstajajo razmeroma velike vstopne ovire za nove pridobitelje licenc.
This is normally not the case where the technologies or products are by necessity linked in such a way that the licensed technology cannot be exploited without the tied product or both parts of the bundle cannot be exploited without the other.
Če so vstopne ovire majhne, lahko novi pridobitelji licenc vstopijo na trg in izkoriščajo poslovno privlačne tehnologije tretjih oseb in tako predstavljajo resnično alternativo že uveljavljenim pridobiteljem licenc.
In the following the term ‘tying’ refers to both tying and bundling.
Da se določijo realne možnosti za vstop in širitev tretjih oseb, je treba prav tako upoštevati, v kolikšni meri so distributerji s prepovedmi konkurence vezani na pridobitelje licenc.
Article 3 of the TTBER, which limits the application of the block exemption by market share thresholds, ensures that tying and bundling are not block-exempted above the market share thresholds of 20 % in the case of agreements between competitors and 30 % in the case of agreements between non-competitors.
Tehnologije tretjih oseb imajo realne možnosti za vstop na trg le, če imajo dostop do potrebnih proizvodnih in distribucijskih zmogljivosti.
The market share thresholds apply to any relevant technology or product market affected by the licence agreement, including the market for the tied product.
Drugače povedano, preprost dostop ni odvisen le od razpoložljivosti pridobiteljev licenc, temveč tudi od tega, v kolikšni meri imajo dostop do distribucije.
Above the market share thresholds it is necessary to balance the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of tying.
Pri presoji učinkov omejevanja dostopa na trg na ravni distribucije bo Nadzorni organ uporabil analitični okvir iz poglavja VI.2.1 Smernic Nadzornega organa o vertikalnih omejitvah [89].
The main restrictive effect of tying is foreclosure of competing suppliers of the tied product.
Če ima dajalec licence znatno stopnjo tržne moči, lahko obveznosti, naložene pridobiteljem licenc, da tehnologijo pridobijo le od dajalca licence, privedejo do znatnih učinkov omejevanja dostopa na trg.
Tying may also allow the licensor to maintain market power in the market for the tying product by raising barriers to entry since it may force new entrants to enter several markets at the same time.
Močnejši kot je tržni položaj dajalca licence, večje je tveganje omejevanja dostopa na trg za konkurenčne tehnologije.
Moreover, tying may allow the licensor to increase royalties, in particular when the tying product and the tied product are partly substitutable and the two products are not used in fixed proportion.
Da se pojavijo znatni učinki omejevanja dostopa na trg, ni nujno, da prepovedi konkurence zajemajo znaten del trga.
Tying prevents the licensee from switching to substitute inputs in the face of increased royalties for the tying product.
Tudi če jih ni, se lahko znatni učinki omejevanja dostopa na trg pojavijo, če so prepovedi konkurence usmerjene na podjetja, za katera je najverjetneje, da bi podelila licence za konkurenčne tehnologije.
These competition concerns are independent of whether the parties to the agreement are competitors or not.
Tveganje omejevanja dostopa na trg je še posebej visoko, če obstaja le omejeno število potencialnih pridobiteljev licenc in se licenčni sporazum nanaša na tehnologijo, ki jo pridobitelji licenc uporabljajo za izdelavo proizvodnega dejavnika za lastno uporabo.
For tying to produce likely anti-competitive effects the licensor must have a significant degree of market power in the tying product so as to restrict competition in the tied product.
V takih okoliščinah je verjetno, da bodo vstopne ovire za novega dajalca licence velike.
In the absence of market power in the tying product the licensor cannot use its technology for the anti-competitive purpose of foreclosing suppliers of the tied product.
Omejevanje dostopa na trg je lahko manj verjetno v primerih, ko se tehnologija uporablja za proizvodnjo izdelkov, ki se prodajajo tretjim osebam.
Furthermore, as in the case of non-compete obligations, the tie must cover a certain proportion of the market for the tied product for appreciable foreclosure effects to occur.
Čeprav v tem primeru omejevanje veže tudi proizvodne zmogljivosti za zadevni proizvodni dejavnik, ne veže povpraševanja na podrejenih trgih pridobiteljev licence.
In cases where the licensor has market power on the market for the tied product rather than on the market for the tying product, the restraint is analysed as a non-compete clause or quantity forcing, reflecting the fact that any competition problem has its origin on the market for the ‘tied’ product and not on the market for the ‘tying’ product [88].
Da bi dajalci licenc v slednjem primeru vstopili na trg, potrebujejo le dostop do enega ali več pridobiteljev licenc, ki imajo ustrezne proizvodne zmogljivosti.
Tying can also give rise to efficiency gains.
Razen če je le nekaj podjetij sposobnih pridobiti sredstva, potrebna za prevzem licence, ali taka sredstva že imajo, ni verjetno, da bi dajalec licence lahko konkurentom onemogočil dostop do učinkovitih pridobiteljev licenc z naložitvijo prepovedi konkurence pridobiteljem licence.
This is for instance the case where the tied product is necessary for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed technology or for ensuring that production under the licence conforms to quality standards respected by the licensor and other licensees.
Prepovedi konkurence lahko povzročijo tudi učinke, ki spodbujajo konkurenco.
In such cases tying is normally either not restrictive of competition or covered by Article 53(3).
Take obveznosti lahko spodbujajo razširjanje tehnologije z zmanjšanjem tveganja protipravne prilastitve licenčne tehnologije, zlasti strokovnega znanja in izkušenj.
Where the licensees use the licensor's trademark or brand name or where it is otherwise obvious to consumers that there is a link between the product incorporating the licensed technology and the licensor, the licensor has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the quality of the products is such that it does not undermine the value of its technology or its reputation as an economic operator.
Če ima pridobitelj licence pravico, da pridobi licenco za konkurenčne tehnologije od tretjih oseb, obstaja tveganje, da se zlasti licenčno strokovno znanje in izkušnje uporabijo za izkoriščanje konkurenčnih tehnologij in torej koristijo konkurentom.
Moreover, where it is known to consumers that the licensees (and the licensor) produce on the basis of the same technology it is unlikely that licensees would be willing to take a licence unless the technology is exploited by all in a technically satisfactory way.
Če pridobitelj licence izkorišča tudi konkurenčne tehnologije, je običajno oteženo tudi spremljanje plačil licenčnin, kar lahko nespodbudno vpliva na podeljevanje licenc.
Tying is also likely to be pro-competitive where the tied product allows the licensee to exploit the licensed technology significantly more efficiently.
Poleg tega se lahko prepovedi konkurence – po možnosti v kombinaciji z dodelitvijo izključnega ozemlja – izkažejo kot potrebne, da se za pridobitelja licence ustvarijo spodbude za vlaganje v licenčno tehnologijo in njeno učinkovito izkoriščanje.
For instance, where the licensor licenses a particular process technology the parties can also agree that the licensee buys a catalyst from the licensor which is developed for use with the licensed technology and which allows the technology to be exploited more efficiently than in the case of other catalysts.
Če je sporazum zajet v členu 53(1) zaradi znatnega učinka omejevanja dostopa na trg, je morda treba za namen uporabe člena 53(3) izbrati manj omejevalno alternativo, na primer določiti obveznosti glede minimalnega obsega proizvodnje ali minimalnih licenčnin, ki imajo običajno manj možnosti, da konkurenčnim tehnologijam omejijo dostop na trg.
Where in such cases the restriction is caught by Article 53(1), the conditions of Article 53(3) are likely to be fulfilled even above the market share thresholds.
Nadalje, če se dajalec licence zaveže, da bo izvedel obsežne naložbe, ki se osredotočajo na potrebe kupca, na primer na področju usposabljanja in prilagajanja licenčne tehnologije potrebam pridobitelja licence, so lahko prepovedi konkurence oziroma obveznosti, povezane z minimalnim obsegom proizvodnje ali minimalnimi licenčninami, nujne, da se dajalca licence spodbudi k izvedbi naložb in prepreči t. i. problem zadržanja.
Non-compete obligations in the context of technology licensing take the form of an obligation on the licensee not to use third-party technologies which compete with the licensed technology.
Vendar pa bo imel običajno dajalec licence možnost neposredno zaračunati za take naložbe v obliki pavšalnih plačil, kar pomeni, da obstajajo manj omejevalne alternative.
To the extent that a non-compete obligation covers a product or an additional technology supplied by the licensor the obligation is dealt with in Section 4.2.6 on tying.
Podeljevanje licence za tehnološke pravice v okviru sporazumov o poravnavi je lahko sredstvo za reševanje sporov ali za preprečitev, da bi ena pogodbenica uveljavljala svoje pravice intelektualne lastnine z namenom preprečitve drugi pogodbenici, da izkorišča lastne tehnološke pravice [90].
The TTBER exempts non-compete obligations both in the case of agreements between competitors and in the case of agreements between non-competitors up to the market share thresholds of 20 % and 30 % respectively.
Sporazumi o poravnavi v zvezi s tehnološkimi spori so tako kot pri poslovnih sporih na številnih drugih področjih načeloma legitimen način iskanja obojestransko sprejemljivega kompromisa pri pravnem sporu v dobri veri.
The main competitive risk presented by non-compete obligations is foreclosure of third-party technologies.
Pogodbenici včasih raje prekineta spor ali pravdo, ker se ta izkažeta za predraga, zamudna in/ali je njun izid negotov.
Non-compete obligations may also facilitate collusion between licensors when several licensors use it in separate agreements (that is in the case of cumulative use).
Poravnave lahko sodiščem in/ali pristojnim upravnim organom tudi prihranijo napor pri odločanju o zadevi in lahko tako ustvarijo koristi, ki večajo blaginjo.
Foreclosure of competing technologies reduces competitive pressure on royalties charged by the licensor and reduces competition between the incumbent technologies by limiting the possibilities for licensees to substitute between competing technologies.
Po drugi strani pa je v splošnem javnem interesu, da se odpravijo neveljavne pravice intelektualne lastnine kot neupravičene ovire za inovacije in gospodarsko dejavnost [91].
As in both cases the main problem is foreclosure, the analysis can in general be the same in the case of agreements between competitors and agreements between non-competitors.
Podeljevanje licenc, vključno z navzkrižnim podeljevanjem licenc, v okviru sporazumov o poravnavi na splošno kot tako ne omejuje konkurence, saj pogodbenicama omogoča, da izkoriščata lastno tehnologijo po sklenitvi sporazuma.
However, in the case of cross-licensing between competitors where both agree not to use third-party technologies the agreement may facilitate collusion between them on the product market, thereby justifying the lower market share threshold of 20 %.
V primerih, ko je mogoče, da bi bil pridobitelj licence, če ne bi imel licence, lahko izključen s trga, dostop pridobitelja licence do zadevne tehnologije prek sporazuma o poravnavi na splošno ni zajet v členu 53(1).
Foreclosure may arise where a substantial proportion of potential licensees are already tied to one or, in the case of cumulative effects, more sources of technology and are prevented from exploiting competing technologies.
Lahko pa so v členu 53(1) zajeti posamezni pogoji iz sporazumov o poravnavi.
Foreclosure effects may result from agreements concluded by a single licensor with a significant degree of market power or from the cumulative effect of agreements concluded by several licensors, even where each individual agreement or network of agreements is covered by the TTBER.
Podeljevanje licenc v okviru sporazumov o poravnavi se obravnava kot drugi licenčni sporazumi [92].
In the latter case, however, a serious cumulative effect is unlikely to arise as long as less than 50 % of the market is tied.
V teh primerih je treba zlasti presoditi, ali sta pogodbenici potencialna ali dejanska konkurenta.
Above that threshold significant foreclosure is likely to occur when there are relatively high barriers to entry for new licensees.
Plačilo za omejitev v sporazumih o poravnavi
If barriers to entry are low, new licensees are able to enter the market and exploit commercially attractive technologies held by third parties and thus represent a real alternative to incumbent licensees.
Sporazumi o poravnavi vrste „plačilo za omejitev“ ali „plačilo za zamudo“ pogosto ne vključujejo prenosa tehnoloških pravic, vendar temeljijo na prenosu vrednosti od ene pogodbenice v zameno za omejitev vstopa na trg in/ali razširitev na trgu druge pogodbenice ter so lahko zajeti v členu 53(1) [93].
In order to determine the real possibility for entry and expansion by third parties it is also necessary to take account of the extent to which distributors are tied to licensees by non-compete obligations.
Če pa sporazum o poravnavi vključuje tudi podelitev licence za tehnološke pravice, ki so predmet osnovnega spora, in navedeni sporazum povzroči odloženo ali sicer omejeno sposobnost pridobitelja licence, da uvede izdelek na katerega koli od zadevnih trgov, je lahko sporazum zajet v členu 53(1) in bi ga bilo treba presoditi ob upoštevanju člena 4(1)(c) in 4(1)(d) TTBER (glej poglavje 3.4.2 zgoraj).
Third-party technologies only have a real possibility of entry if they have access to the necessary production and distribution assets.
Če sta pogodbenici takega sporazuma o poravnavi dejanska ali potencialna konkurenta in je bila od dajalca licence na pridobitelja licence prenesena znatna vrednost, bo Nadzorni organ posebej pozorno proučil tveganje dodelitve/razdelitve trga.
In other words, the ease of entry depends not only on the availability of licensees but also the extent to which they have access to distribution.
Sporazumi o navzkrižnem podeljevanju licenc v sporazumih o poravnavi
In assessing foreclosure effects at the distribution level the Authority will apply the analytical framework set out in Section VI.2.1 of the Authority guidelines on vertical restraints [89].
Sporazumi o poravnavi, s katerimi si pogodbenici navzkrižno podeljujeta licence in nalagajo omejitve pri uporabi svojih tehnologij, vključno z omejitvami glede licenciranja tretjim osebam, so lahko zajeti v členu 53(1).
When the licensor has a significant degree of market power, obligations on licensees to obtain the technology only from the licensor can lead to significant foreclosure effects.
Če imata pogodbenici znatno stopnjo tržne moči in sporazum določa omejitve, ki očitno presegajo tisto, kar je potrebno za odpravo položaja blokiranja, obstaja verjetnost, da je sporazum zajet v prepovedi iz člena 53(1), tudi če je verjetno, da obstaja položaj medsebojnega blokiranja.
The stronger the market position of the licensor the higher the risk of foreclosing competing technologies.
Člen 53(1) se lahko zlasti uporablja, če si pogodbenici razdelita trge ali določita plačilo vzajemnih tekočih licenčnin, ki imajo znaten vpliv na tržne cene.
For appreciable foreclosure effects to occur the non-compete obligations do not necessarily have to cover a substantial part of the market.
Če imata pogodbenici na podlagi sporazuma o poravnavi pravico, da uporabljata tehnologijo druga druge, in se sporazum nanaša tudi na prihodnji razvoj tehnologije, je treba presoditi učinek sporazuma na spodbudo pogodbenic za inovacije.
Even in the absence thereof, appreciable foreclosure effects may occur where non-compete obligations are targeted at undertakings that are the most likely to license competing technologies.
Kadar imata pogodbenici znatno stopnjo tržne moči, je verjetno, da bo sporazum zajet v členu 53(1), če sporazum preprečuje, da bi ena pogodbenica pridobila konkurenčno prednost pred drugo.
The risk of foreclosure is particularly high where there is only a limited number of potential licensees and the licence agreement concerns a technology which is used by the licensees to make an input for their own use.
Sporazumi, ki odpravijo ali znatno zmanjšajo možnosti, da bi ena pogodbenica pridobila konkurenčno prednost pred drugo, zmanjšajo spodbudo za inovacije in tako škodljivo vplivajo na bistveni del konkurenčnega procesa.
In such cases the entry barriers for a new licensor are likely to be high.
Prav tako je malo verjetno, da bi taki sporazumi izpolnjevali pogoje iz člena 53(3).
Foreclosure may be less likely in cases where the technology is used to make a product that is sold to third parties.
Še zlasti malo verjetno je, da bi se lahko omejitev štela za nujno v smislu tretjega pogoja iz člena 53(3).
Although in this case the restriction also ties production capacity for the input in question, it does not tie demand downstream of the licensees.
Za izpolnitev cilja sporazuma, tj. zagotoviti, da lahko vsaka od pogodbenic še naprej izkorišča lastno tehnologijo, ne da bi ji druga pogodbenica to preprečevala, ni nujno, da se pogodbenici sporazumeta, da si bosta delili prihodnje inovacije.
To enter the market in the latter case licensors only need access to one or more licensee(s) that have suitable production capacity.
Vendar pa je malo verjetno, da bi bilo posamezni pogodbenici preprečeno pridobiti konkurenčno prednost pred drugo, če je namen licence pogodbenicama omogočiti, da razvijeta lastni tehnologiji, in če jima licenca ne narekuje uporabe istih tehnoloških rešitev.
Unless only few undertakings possess or are able to obtain the assets required to take a licence, it is unlikely that by imposing non-compete obligations on its licensees the licensor is able to deny competitors access to efficient licensees.
Taki sporazumi zgolj ustvarjajo svobodo oblikovanja, tako da preprečujejo, da bi v prihodnosti katera od pogodbenic vložila tožbo zaradi kršitve pravic.
Non-compete obligations may also produce pro-competitive effects.
Klavzule o neizpodbijanju v sporazumih o poravnavi
First, such obligations may promote dissemination of technology by reducing the risk of misappropriation of the licensed technology, in particular know-how.
V okviru sporazuma o poravnavi klavzule o neizpodbijanju na splošno ne spadajo na področje uporabe člena 53(1).
If a licensee is entitled to license competing technologies from third parties, there is a risk that particularly licensed know-how would be used in the exploitation of competing technologies and thus benefit competitors.
Za take sporazume je značilno, da se pogodbenici sporazumeta, da ne bosta naknadno izpodbijali pravic intelektualne lastnine, ki so bile predmet spora.