natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, the entire risk of the assets of Straumur being of less value than the transferred deposits, and the obligation to make up for any potential shortfall, is allocated to the State.
Da se prestrukturiranje finančne institucije v sedanji finančni krizi šteje za združljivo s členom 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP, mora v skladu s smernicami o prestrukturiranju:
It thus seems that Íslandsbanki, aside from receiving some revenue (through interest payments on the bond) is able to acquire goodwill and additional market shares, without taking on any risk.
omogočiti ponovno uspešno poslovanje banke;
The Authority concludes that this constitutes an advantage.
vključevati zadosten lastni prispevek upravičenca (porazdelitev bremena);
Finally, the Authority also needs to assess whether the additional deposit guarantee conveys an advantage on Íslandsbanki and Icelandic banks in general.
vključevati zadostne ukrepe za omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence.
In this regard, the Authority notes that when the statement that deposits would be guaranteed were first made by the Icelandic authorities, it was not entirely clear how this guarantee would work in practice, in particular what effect such intervention would have on the bank that could not live up to its financial obligations vis-à-vis its depositors anymore.
Nadzorni organ bo torej na podlagi načrta prestrukturiranja, predloženega za banko Íslandsbanki, iz katerega je prav tako razviden prevzem banke Byr, v nadaljevanju ocenil, ali so ta merila izpolnjena in ali zato opisani ukrepi pomoči, pa tudi tisti, ki jih je opredelil Nadzorni organ v odločbi o banki Byr, pomenijo združljivo pomoč za prestrukturiranje.
In the meanwhile, it appears that such a bank would be allowed to fail, but that the Icelandic state would ensure — for example by transferring deposits to another bank and making up for the shortfall in assets — that deposits could be paid in full, and the depositors would never lose access to the full amount of their deposits.
Ponovno uspešno poslovanje
The Authority considers that it is of secondary importance how exactly the State would act in complying with the unlimited guarantee on domestic deposits.
Najpomembnejši cilj take pomoči je ponovno vzpostaviti dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje upravičenca, ki prejema pomoč za prestrukturiranje, pri določanju njene združljivosti pa je pomembno oceniti, ali se bo s pomočjo za prestrukturiranje to doseglo.
What matters is that it has assumed the obligation to step in if a bank would fail to pay out deposits, to an unlimited extent.
Kot je bilo navedeno, zaradi pretresa v islandskem gospodarstvu v začetku jeseni leta 2008, prisotnosti izrednih ukrepov, kot so kapitalske kontrole, razvijajočega se regulativnega okolja in makroekonomskih obetov, ki kljub skromni nedavni stabilizaciji ostajajo nekoliko negotovi, pri čemer je treba zlasti upoštevati sedanje gospodarske skrbi euroobmočja, postaja donosno poslovanje banke in zagotavljanje njenega dolgoročnega uspešnega poslovanja izziv.
This unlimited guarantee has, in the Authority's view, favoured Íslandsbanki: First, as it provides a valuable competitive advantage — an unlimited state guarantee, and hence a significant safety net — over alternative investment options and providers.
Nadzorni organ na začetku poudarja, da je treba pri spodnji oceni upoštevati ta premislek.
This is illustrated for example by a recent report of the Minister of Economic Affairs which states that: ‘Icelandic financial undertakings are currently operating in a sheltered environment with capital controls and a blanket deposit guarantee.
V oddelku 2 smernic o prestrukturiranju je določeno, da mora država EGP predložiti celovit in podroben načrt prestrukturiranja, ki zagotavlja popolne informacije o poslovnem modelu ter ponovno vzpostavlja dolgoročno poslovno uspešnost.
Under such conditions, bank deposits are practically the only secure option for Icelandic savers’ [77].
V točki 10 smernic o prestrukturiranju se zahteva, da je treba v načrtu prestrukturiranja opredeliti vzroke za težave banke in njene lastne pomanjkljivosti ter opisati, na kakšen način bodo predlagani ukrepi prestrukturiranja pripomogli k reševanju temeljnih problemov banke.
Second, it seems clear that in the absence of the guarantee Íslandsbanki could have more easily suffered from a run on its deposits like its predecessor [78].
Vzroki za težave banke Íslandsbanki so, kot je bilo opisano, navedeni v načrtu prestrukturiranja, a tudi v poročilu posebne preiskovalne komisije.
Thus the bank would likely have had to pay higher interest rates (to compensate for the risk) in order to attract or even simply retain the same amount of deposits were it not for the additional unlimited deposit guarantee that the Icelandic state has taken upon itself.
Med glavnimi vzroki, opredeljenimi v tem poročilu na ravni banke, so bili: prekomerno in netrajnostno povečanje, kolesje lastnikov banke, koncentracija tveganja, šibek lastniški kapital ter velikost bank v primerjavi z islandskim gospodarstvom.
Accordingly, the Authority concludes that the deposit guarantee entails an advantage for the bank.
Poleg tega se je banka Glitnir razširila v visoko zadolžene LBO [82] in na komercialne nepremičninske trge zunaj Islandije.
Selectivity
Zanašala se je predvsem na kratkoročno financiranje velikih medbančnih poslov, s posojanjem lastnikom je prevzela veliko tveganje, imela pa je tudi velike posamezne izpostavljenosti.
Second, the aid measure must be selective in that it favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’.
Regulativni ukrepi za uspešno poslovanje
The capitalisation measures, the liquidity facility and the Straumur agreement are selective as they only benefit Íslandsbanki.
Četudi so v načrtu prestrukturiranja banke Íslandsbanki obravnavane številne pomanjkljivosti banke, kot so opredeljene zgoraj, Nadzorni organ meni, da so propad banke Glitnir in zlom islandske finančne industrije povzročili številni dejavniki, značilni za Islandijo, ki se nanašajo na njeno majhno površino ter regulativne pomanjkljivosti in pomanjkljivosti pri nadzoru, ki jih je osvetlila posebna preiskovalna komisija.
Moreover, as state support can be selective even in situations where one or more sectors of the economy benefit and others do not, the Authority also considers the state guarantee on deposits which benefits the Icelandic banking sector as a whole as selective.
Dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje banke Íslandsbanki ter katere koli druge islandske banke torej ni odvisno izključno od ukrepov, sprejetih na ravni banke, ampak tudi od tega, ali so bile te pomanjkljivosti pri nadzoru in regulativne pomanjkljivosti odpravljene.
This conclusion also follows from the considerations set out above according to which banks are favoured over other undertakings that offer possibilities to save and invest money.
Nadzorni organ v zvezi s tem odobrava spremembe regulativnega in nadzornega okvira, ki so jih opravili islandski organi, kot je pojasnjeno v Prilogi.
Distortion of competition and affection of trade between Contracting Parties
Prvič, povečana so bila pooblastila in pristojnosti Organa za finančni nadzor, med drugim z novimi odgovornostmi glede velikih posameznih izpostavljenosti in z njimi povezanih tveganj, s čimer se po mnenju Nadzornega organa obravnava eden od dejavnikov, ki so povzročili finančni zlom.
The measures strengthen the position of Íslandsbanki in comparison to competitors (or potential competitors) in Iceland and other EEA States.
Drugič, z začasno visokimi zahtevami glede stopnje kapitalske ustreznosti in s številnimi določbami v zvezi z zavarovanjem s premoženjem, zlasti s prepovedjo podaljšanja kredita v zameno za jamstva za lastne delnice, naj bi se zagotovilo, da se v islandskih bankah ne more še enkrat razviti šibek kapitalski položaj.
Íslandsbanki is an undertaking which is active, as described above, on financial markets, which are open for international competition in the EEA.
Po mnenju Nadzornega organa bodo ti ukrepi prispevali k odpornosti islandskih bank.
Whilst the Icelandic financial markets are currently, particularly due to the capital controls, rather isolated, (a potential for) cross-border trade still exists, which will increase as soon as the capital controls are lifted.
Tretjič, izveden je bil sklop ukrepov v zvezi z upravičenostjo direktorjev in članov upravnega odbora ter njihovimi prejemki.
All measures under assessment must therefore be regarded as distorting competition and affecting trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement [79].
Za posojanje povezanim strankam (kot so lastniki) so bila vzpostavljena strožja pravila, tako lahko Organ za finančni nadzor zdaj banki prepove opravljanje posebnih dejavnosti, če ima razloge za to.
Conclusion
Prav tako so se spremenila pravila za zunanje in notranje računovodstvo, na primer skrajšalo se je obdobje, v katerem lahko zunanji računovodja dela za isto banko.
The Authority, therefore, comes to the conclusion that the measures taken by the Icelandic State to capitalise the new bank, as well as the liquidity facility, the deposit guarantee and the Straumur agreement involve state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Nadzorni organ odobrava dejstvo, da naj bi ti ukrepi preprečili ponovitev dogodkov, kar zadeva lastnike in visoke menedžerje.
The Authority recalls that it reached the same conclusion regarding the capitalisation measures granted to Byr in the Byr decisions.
Z ukrepi se je tudi povečalo zunanje spremljanje tveganja, kar zmanjšuje grožnje za uspešno poslovanje banke.
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
Četrtič, po mnenju islandskih organov obsežno sprejemanje vlog v islandskih komercialnih bankah pred krizo, kar je domnevno vsaj pospešilo njihov zlom, prav tako spodbuja že omenjeno možnost, da bi Organ za finančni nadzor omejil dejavnosti banke.
Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (…).
Poleg tega se po mnenju Nadzornega organa zdi, da so novi prepisi o likvidnih sredstvih in uravnoteženosti tujih valut [83] povzročili določene omejitve v zvezi s tem, da bi imele banke možnost privabiti nesorazmerno velike količine tujih vlog, če bi zaradi tega postalo poslovanje banke šibkejše in ranljivejše glede menjalnih tečajev in likvidnostnih tveganj.
The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.
Nadzorni organ z odobravanjem sprejema dejstvo, da so se islandski organi odzvali na ta vidik regulativne pomanjkljivosti.
The Icelandic authorities did not notify the aid measures covered by the opening decision to the Authority in advance of their implementation.
Načrt prestrukturiranja banke Íslandsbanki
The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.
Banka Íslandsbanki se je glede načrta prestrukturiranja in ukrepov na ravni banke v bistvu obrnila k bolj tradicionalnemu modelu bančništva, usmerjenem na njeno osnovno moč (domače bančništvo, morski sadeži in geotermalna industrija), ki se bo večinoma financiral z vlogami strank.
The granting of those aid measures was therefore unlawful.
Razmerje med vlogami in posojili se bo ob koncu obdobja prestrukturiranja […] še nadalje zmanjšalo z okrog 80 % na […] %.
COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID
Poleg tega, kot je bilo že navedeno, je bila banka Íslandsbanki, v primerjavi z banko Glitnir, od ustanovitve bistveno manj zadolžena, in ker je večina dolga velikih medbančnih poslov ostalo v stečajnem premoženju banke Glitnir, se bo morala glede na načrt prestrukturiranja le v zelo omejenem obsegu zanašati na refinanciranje nezavarovanega dolga na mednarodnih trgih.
As a preliminary remark, the Authority notes that whilst Íslandsbanki is a new legal entity that was established in 2008, it is — as regards domestic operations — evidently the economic successor of Glitnir, in the sense that there is an economic continuity between those two entities.
Dejansko se je izkazalo, da je bil eden od glavnih razlogov za zlom banke Glitnir zanašanje na refinanciranje na trgih velikih medbančnih poslov.
As those economic operations that were carried out by Íslandsbanki from the autumn of 2008 onwards could not have continued in the absence of the aid, the Authority considers the bank as an undertaking in difficulties.
Financiranje banke Íslandsbanki je do zdaj večinoma temeljilo na vlogah in lastniškem kapitalu, toda v načrtu prestrukturiranja je predvideno, da se bo pomen vlog rahlo zmanjšal z 80 % na […] % vseh obveznosti, […].
Moreover, the measures under assessment are at the same time rescue and restructuring measures.
Banka Íslandsbanki namerava to izravnati z izdajanjem kritih obveznic na domačem trgu.
As stated in the opening decision, the Authority would probably have temporarily approved the measures as compatible rescue aid had they been notified before their implementation, before then taking a final view on them on the basis of a restructuring plan.
Decembra 2011 je že uspešno izdala krite obveznice za 4 milijarde ISK, in […].
However, in the absence of a timely notification, the Authority initiated the formal investigation procedure and requested the submission of a restructuring plan.
Trenutno omejen apetit vlagateljev po nezavarovanih islandskih vrednostnih papirjih bi se lahko po mnenju te banke povečal, ko bo odpravljeno neomejeno jamstvo za vloge.
As indicated above, the final compatibility of these measures depends on whether the restructuring plan meets the criteria of the Authority's applicable state aid guidelines for undertakings in difficulties.
Glede na dejstva, ki so jih predložili islandski organi, Nadzorni organ meni, da je finančno stanje banke do konca obdobja prestrukturiranja videti zdravo.
Legal basis for assessment of compatibility: Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement and the Authority's Restructuring Guidelines
Vendar ob upoštevanju negotovosti, ki zadevajo jamstva za vloge in kapitalske kontrole, ter nejasnega prihodnjega razvoja trgov (državnih) dolžniških vrednostnih papirjev ne more sklepati, ali se bo strategija financiranja banke Íslandsbanki dolgoročno uresničila v skladu s predvidevanji.
While state aid to undertakings in difficulties such as Íslandsbanki is normally assessed under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, the Authority may, under Article 61(3)(b) of the Agreement allow state aid ‘to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an EC Member State or an EFTA State’.
Toda Nadzorni organ ob upoštevanju močnega zanašanja na vloge in krite obveznice med obdobjem prestrukturiranja ter velikim deležem tovrstnega dolga v bilanci stanja priznava, da majhne spremembe strategije financiranja, ki bodo ob tem morda potrebne, ne bodo ogrozile poslovne uspešnosti banke.
As is stated in paragraph 8 of the Banking Guidelines [80], the Authority reaffirms that, in line with the case law and the European Commission's decision making practice, Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement necessitates a restrictive interpretation of what can be considered a serious disturbance of an EFTA State's economy.
Kar zadeva stran sredstev bilance stanja, so bila najbolj tvegana mednarodna sredstva – kot so komercialni nepremičninski vrednostni papirji v tujini – prav tako zadržana v stečajnem premoženju banke Glitnir.
The Icelandic authorities have explained, as described in detail above, that Iceland's financial system entered into a state of systemic crisis in October 2008, leading to the collapse of its major banks as well as major savings banks within a time span of a few days.
Posledično se je bilanca stanja skrčila za 85 %.
The combined market share of the collapsed financial institutions exceeded 90 % in most segments of the Icelandic financial market.
Tako je bila odpravljena glavna pomanjkljivost poslovnega modela banke Glitnir, in sicer zanašanje na tvegana mednarodna sredstva brez ustrezne ocene tveganja in z omejenim poznavanjem trga.
The difficulties were coupled with a breakdown of confidence in the country's currency.
Nadzorni organ odobrava, da se banka glede na načrt prestrukturiranja v prihodnosti ne bo ukvarjala s podobnimi posli, temveč se bo osredotočila na svojo tradicionalno osnovno dejavnost.
Iceland's real economy has been severely hit by the financial crisis.
Banka se je od svoje ustanovitve očitno povečala, zlasti s prevzemom banke Byr.
Although more than three years have passed since the onset of the crisis, the Icelandic financial system is still in a state of turmoil.
Vendar to glede na načrt prestrukturiranja ni imelo velikega vpliva na poslovni model banke Íslandsbanki, ker je imela banka Byr v lasti večinoma domača sredstva, katerih značilnosti so bile podobne tistim iz portfeljev banke Íslandsbanki.
Even if the situation has eased significantly since 2008, it is evident that at the time that the measures were taken, they were intended to remedy a serious disturbance in the Icelandic economy.
Nadzorni organ v vsakem primeru meni, da bodo k temu, da se bo banka Íslandsbanki lahko osredotočila na svojo osnovno dejavnost, pripomogle odprodaje, h katerim se je banka zavezala, o čemer pa se podrobneje razpravlja v nadaljevanju.
Consequently, Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is considered to apply in this case.
Precejšen izziv za banko glede portfelja sredstev pa ostaja prestrukturiranje posojil, prenesenih z banke Glitnir.
The application of the Restructuring Communication
Nadzorni organ v tem pogledu pozitivno ugotavlja, da je ta postopek prestrukturiranja za banko prednostna naloga, kar prikazujejo številni splošni in posebej prilagojeni predlogi, ki jih je banka predložila preveč zadolženim strankam.
The Authority's State Aid Guidelines on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules [81] (‘the Restructuring Guidelines’) sets out the state aid rules applicable to the restructuring of financial institutions in the current crisis.
Veliko je bilo že doseženega, čeprav postopek ni napredoval tako hitro, kot je bilo sprva načrtovano.
According to the Restructuring Guidelines, in order to be compatible with Article 61(3)(b) EEA, the restructuring of a financial institution in the context of the current financial crisis has to:
Na primer 8. februarja 2012 je bila neka oblika prestrukturiranja izvedena v 2680 podjetjih, po trditvah islandskih organov je bila velika večina teh podjetij po prestrukturiranju zmožna servisirati dolg.
Lead to a restoration of the viability of the bank;
Nadzorni organ meni, da naj bi to pokazalo, kako trdne so metode prestrukturiranja banke Íslandsbanki.
Include sufficient own contribution by the beneficiary (burden-sharing);
Šibka kapitalizacija banke Glitnir je bila, kot je bilo navedeno, eden od dejavnikov za njen propad.
Contain sufficient measures limiting the distortion of competition.
V načrtu prestrukturiranja banke Íslandsbanki je predvideno, da bo banka precej presegla najnižjo stopnjo kapitalske ustreznosti v višini 16 %, kot jo v celotnem obdobju prestrukturiranja zahteva Organ za finančni nadzor.
The Authority will thus assess below, based on the restructuring plan submitted for Íslandsbanki, which also reflects the acquisition of Byr, whether these criteria are met, and if therefore the aid measures described above, as well as those identified by the Authority in the Byr decision constitute compatible restructuring aid.
Ta stopnja je precej nad prihodnjo najnižjo stopnjo iz svežnja Basel III, ki je 10,5 %.
Restoration of viability
Stopnja kapitalske ustreznosti ne bi padla pod to visoko referenčno merilo tudi ob upoštevanju primera izjemne situacije, ki ga je ta banka predložila skupaj s poročilom o procesu ocenjevanja ustreznega notranjega kapitala za tisto leto, priloženem načrtu prestrukturiranja.
Restoring the long-term viability of a beneficiary in receipt of restructuring aid is the main objective of such aid, and the assessment of whether restructuring aid will attain this, is an important aspect in determining its compatibility.
Banka Íslandsbanki bo glede na načrt prestrukturiranja dejansko postopoma zmanjšala svoj količnik kapitala, da bo s tem, ko bo začela izplačevati dividende, povečala donosnost [84].
As indicated above, the turmoil in the Icelandic economy in the wake of autumn 2008, the presence of extra-ordinary measures such as the capital controls, an evolving regulatory environment and a macroeconomic outlook that, in spite of some recent stabilisation, remains somewhat uncertain, given in particular the ongoing economic woes of the euro zone, make it challenging to operate a bank profitably and ensure its long-term viability.
Po mnenju Nadzornega organa je preudarno in tolažilno, da celo v primeru izjemne situacije, ki ga je predložila banka Íslandsbanki in za katerega se zdi, da temelji na razumnih parametrih, ostaja kapitalski presežek več kot […] milijard ISK, kar bi tej banki zagotovilo, da bi se bila v operativnem okolju, kot je bilo zgoraj opisano, precej zmožna odzivati na nepričakovane težave.
The Authority emphasises at the outset that this consideration needs to be borne in mind in the below assessment.
Nadzorni organ glede likvidnostnega položaja banke ugotavlja, da se v skladu z načrtom prestrukturiranja trenutne razmere zdijo dovolj trdne in da nič ne kaže, da bi se lahko razmere med obdobjem prestrukturiranja bistveno poslabšale.
Section 2 of the Restructuring Guidelines sets out that the EEA State should provide a comprehensive and detailed restructuring plan which provides complete information on the business model and which restores the bank's long-term viability.
Poleg tega je po mnenju Nadzornega organa glede na testiranje izjemnih situacij likvidnostnega količnika banke v okviru poročila o procesu ocenjevanja ustreznega notranjega kapitala, v skladu s katerim je banka na neželene dogodke dobro pripravljena, mogoče domnevati, da je likvidnostni položaj banke trden.
Paragraph 10 of the Restructuring Guidelines requires that the restructuring plan identifies the causes of the bank's difficulties and the bank's own weaknesses, and outlines how the proposed restructuring measures remedy the bank's underlying problems.
Nadzorni organ tudi z odobravanjem sprejema spremembe pri upravljanju podjetja in upravljanju tveganja banke Íslandsbanki, kot so bile opisane, s katerimi se obravnava pomanjkljivost pri poslovanju banke Glitnir ter s katerimi se bo prispevalo k objektivnejši in bolj strokovni oceni tveganja pri poslovanju banke.
The causes of Íslandsbanki's difficulties are, as described above, spelt out both in the restructuring plan, but also in the report of the Special Investigation Commission.
Glede donosnosti je v smernicah o prestrukturiranju določeno, da mora načrt prestrukturiranja pokazati, kako bo banka čim prej začela ponovno dolgoročno uspešno poslovati brez državne pomoči.
Amongst the main causes identified at the bank's level in the latter were the excessive and unsustainable expansion, the gearing of the bank's owners, the concentration of risk, weak equity and the size of the banks as compared to the Icelandic economy.
Banka mora biti zlasti sposobna ustvariti ustrezno donosnost kapitala, hkrati pa mora pokriti vse stroške tekočega poslovanja in izpolniti ustrezne regulativne zahteve.
Moreover, Glitnir had expanded into highly leveraged LBOs [82] and commercial real estate markets outside Iceland.
Zlasti v točki 13 smernic o prestrukturiranju je navedeno, da je dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje doseženo, ko je banka sposobna kriti vse svoje stroške, vključno z amortizacijo in finančnimi dajatvami, ter zagotoviti ustrezno donosnost kapitala ob upoštevanju profila tveganja banke.
It also relied predominately on short-term wholesale funding and took on major risk by lending to its owners, and the bank had large single exposures.
Nadzorni organ ob tem ponavlja, kar je bilo že omenjeno, in sicer da bi gospodarsko okolje, v katerem deluje banka Íslandsbanki, pomenilo izziv za katero koli banko.