natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In certain circumstances it may be more efficient if the royalties are agreed before the standard is chosen and not after the standard is decided upon, to avoid that the choice of the standard confers a significant degree of market power on one or more essential technologies.
V nekaterih okoliščinah je lahko učinkoviteje, če so licenčnine dogovorjene pred izbiro standarda in ne po njegovem sprejetju, da se prepreči, da bi izbira standarda podelila znatno stopnjo tržne moči eni ali več bistvenim tehnologijam.
On the other hand, licensees must remain free to determine the price of products produced under the licence.
Po drugi strani morajo pridobitelji licenc imeti pravico določati ceno izdelkov, ki se proizvajajo v okviru licence.
Where the selection of technologies to be included in the pool is carried out by an independent expert this may further competition between available technological solutions.
Dejstvo, da izbiro tehnologij, ki jih je treba vključiti v združenje, izvede samostojni strokovnjak, lahko spodbudi konkurenco med razpoložljivimi tehnološkimi rešitvami.
Where the pool has a dominant position on the market, royalties and other licensing terms should be fair and non-discriminatory and licences should be non-exclusive.
Če ima združenje prevladujoč položaj na trgu, morajo biti licenčnine in drugi licenčni pogoji sprejemljivi in nediskriminacijski, licence pa morajo biti neizključne.
These requirements are necessary to ensure that the pool is open and does not lead to foreclosure and other anti-competitive effects on down stream markets.
Te zahteve so nujne za zagotovitev, da je združenje odprto in ne vodi k preprečevanju dostopa na trg in drugim protikonkurenčnim učinkom na spodaj ležečih trgih.
These requirements, however, do not preclude different royalties for different uses.
Vendar pa te zahteve ne preprečujejo odmerjanje različnih licenčnin za različne uporabe.
It is in general not considered restrictive of competition to apply different royalty rates to different product markets, whereas there should be no discrimination within product markets.
Običajno se ne šteje, da uporaba različnih stopenj licenčnin za različne proizvodne trge omejuje konkurenco, ker ne sme obstajati diskriminacija znotraj proizvodnih trgov.
In particular, the treatment of licensees should not depend on whether they are licensors or not.
Zlasti obravnava pridobiteljev licenc ne sme biti odvisna od tega, ali so slednji dajalci licenc ali ne.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority will therefore take into account whether licensors are also subject to royalty obligations.
Zato bo Nadzorni organ EFTA ocenil, ali morajo tudi dajalci licenc spoštovati obveznosti plačila licenčnin.
Licensors and licensees must be free to develop competing products and standards and must also be free to grant and obtain licences outside the pool.
Dajalci in pridobitelji licenc morajo imeti pravico razvijati konkurenčne izdelke in standarde ter podeljevati in pridobivati licence zunaj združenja.
These requirements are necessary in order to limit the risk of foreclosure of third party technologies and ensure that the pool does not limit innovation and preclude the creation of competing technological solutions.
Te zahteve so potrebne, da se omeji tveganje preprečitve dostopa tehnologijam tretjih na trg in zagotovi, da združenje ne omejuje inovacij in ne preprečuje oblikovanja konkurenčnih tehnoloških rešitev.
Where a pool supports a (de facto) industry standard and where the parties are subject to non-compete obligations, the pool creates a particular risk of preventing the development of new and improved technologies and standards.
Če združenje podpira (dejanski) industrijski standard in če morajo stranke izpolnjevati obveznosti nekonkurence, združenje ustvarja posebno tveganje preprečevanja razvoja novih in izboljšanih tehnologij in standardov.
Grant back obligations should be non-exclusive and be limited to developments that are essential or important to the use of the pooled technology.
Obveznosti povratnega odstopa morajo biti neizključne in omejene na razvoj, ki je bistven ali pomemben za uporabo združenih tehnologij.
This allows the pool to feed on and benefit from improvements to the pooled technology.
To združenju omogoča prenos izboljšav združenih tehnologij in pridobitev koristi, ki so z njimi povezane.
It is legitimate for the parties to ensure that the exploitation of the pooled technology cannot be held up by licensees that hold or obtain essential patents.
Stranke lahko upravičeno zagotovijo, da izkoriščanje združenih tehnologij ne more biti preprečeno s strani pridobiteljev licenc, ki imajo ali pridobivajo osnovne patente.
One of the problems identified with regard to patent pools is the risk that they shield invalid patents.
Ena od težav, ugotovljenih v zvezi s patentnimi združenji, je tveganje, da ta združenja ščitijo neveljavne patente.
Pooling raises the costs/risks for a successful challenge, because the challenge fails if only one patent in the pool is valid.
Združevanje povečuje stroške oziroma tveganja uspešnega izpodbijanja, ker je za to, da izpodbijanje ne uspe, dovolj, da je samo en patent v združenju veljaven.
The shielding of invalid patents in the pool may oblige licensees to pay higher royalties and may also prevent innovation in the field covered by an invalid patent.
Zaščita neveljavnih patentov v okviru združenja lahko pridobitelje licenc zaveže k plačevanju višjih licenčnin in lahko tudi prepreči inovacije na področju, ki ga pokriva neveljavni patent.
In order to limit this risk, any right to terminate a licence in the case of a challenge must be limited to the technologies owned by the licensor who is the addressee of the challenge and must not extend to the technologies owned by the other licensors in the pool.
Da se to tveganje omeji, mora biti pravica do odpovedi licenčnega sporazuma v primeru izpodbijanja omejena na tehnologije, ki so v lasti dajalca licence, na katerega je izpodbijanje naslovljeno, in ne sme vključevati tehnologij, ki so v lasti drugih dajalcev licenc v združenju.
The institutional framework governing the pool
Institucionalni okvir, ki ureja združenje
The way in which a technology pool is created, organised and operated can reduce the risk of it having the object or effect of restricting competition and provide assurances to the effect that the arrangement is pro-competitive.
Način ustanovitve, organizacije in vodenja tehnološkega združenja lahko zmanjša tveganje, da ima slednje za cilj oziroma posledico omejevanje konkurence, in zagotavlja, da dogovor pozitivno vpliva na konkurenco.
When participation in a standard and pool creation process is open to all interested parties representing different interests it is more likely that technologies for inclusion into the pool are selected on the basis of price/quality considerations than when the pool is set up by a limited group of technology owners.
Če je sodelovanje pri procesu oblikovanja standarda ali ustanovitve združenja odprto za vse zainteresirane strani, ki zastopajo različne interese, obstaja večja verjetnost, da se bodo tehnologije, ki jih je treba vključiti v združenje, izbrale na podlagi ugotovitev v zvezi s ceno/kakovostjo, kot pa v primeru, da bi bilo združenje sestavljeno iz omejene skupine lastnikov tehnologije.
Similarly, when the relevant bodies of the pool are composed of persons representing different interests, it is more likely that licensing terms and conditions, including royalties, will be open and non-discriminatory and reflect the value of the licensed technology than when the pool is controlled by licensor representatives.
Podobno, če so pomembni organi združenja sestavljeni iz oseb, ki zastopajo različne interese, obstaja večja verjetnost, da bodo licenčni pogoji, vključno z odmerjanjem licenčnin, odprti in nediskriminacijski ter kazali na vrednost licenčne tehnologije, kot pa če združenje nadzorujejo predstavniki dajalca licence.
Another relevant factor is the extent to which independent experts are involved in the creation and operation of the pool.
Pomembno je tudi, v kolikšni meri so neodvisni strokovnjaki udeleženi pri ustanovitvi in vodenju združenja.
For instance, the assessment of whether or not a technology is essential to a standard supported by a pool is often a complex matter that requires special expertise.
Na primer, presoja bistvenosti tehnologije za standard, ki ga podpira združenje, je pogosto zapleteno vprašanje, ki zahteva ustrezno strokovno znanje.
The involvement in the selection process of independent experts can go a long way in ensuring that a commitment to include only essential technologies is implemented in practice.
Vključitev neodvisnih strokovnjakov v proces izbora lahko v veliki meri prispeva, da se tudi v praksi izpolni zaveza glede vključitve zgolj bistvenih tehnologij.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority will take into account how experts are selected and what are the exact functions that they are to perform.
Nadzorni organ EFTA bo upošteval način izbora strokovnjakov in natančno naravo njihovih funkcij.
Experts should be independent from the undertakings that have formed the pool.
Strokovnjaki morajo biti neodvisni od podjetij, ki so ustanovila združenje.
If experts are connected to the licensors or otherwise depend on them, the involvement of the expert will be given less weight.
Če so strokovnjaki povezani z dajalci licenc ali kako drugače odvisni od njih, bo njihovemu sodelovanju dana manjša teža.
Experts must also have the necessary technical expertise to perform the various functions with which they have been entrusted.
Strokovnjaki morajo prav tako imeti potrebno tehnično strokovno znanje za opravljanje različnih funkcij, ki so jim bile zaupane.
The functions of independent experts may include, in particular, an assessment of whether or not technologies put forward for inclusion into the pool are valid and whether or not they are essential.
Med funkcije neodvisnih strokovnjakov lahko sodi zlasti ocenjevanje veljavnosti in bistvenosti tehnologij, ki naj bi se vključile v združenje.
It is also relevant to consider the arrangements for exchanging sensitive information among the parties.
Prav tako je pomembno proučiti dogovore glede izmenjave občutljivih podatkov med strankami.
In oligopolistic markets exchanges of sensitive information such as pricing and output data may facilitate collusion [69].
Na oligopolnih trgih lahko izmenjave občutljivih podatkov, kot so podatki o cenah in obsegu proizvodnje, olajšajo dogovarjanje [69].
In such cases the EFTA Surveillance Authority will take into account to what extent safeguards have been put in place, which ensure that sensitive information is not exchanged.
V takšnih primerih bo Nadzorni organ EFTA proučil, v kolikšnem obsegu so bili vzpostavljeni nadzorni ukrepi, ki zagotavljajo, da se občutljivi podatki ne izmenjujejo.
An independent expert or licensing body may play an important role in this respect by ensuring that output and sales data, which may be necessary for the purposes of calculating and verifying royalties is not disclosed to undertakings that compete on affected markets.
Neodvisni strokovnjak ali organ, ki podeljuje licence, imata lahko pomembno vlogo, tako da zagotavljata, da se podatki o obsegu proizvodnje in prodaji, ki so lahko potrebni za namene izračuna in preverjanja licenčnin, ne razkrijejo podjetjem, ki konkurirajo na zadevnih trgih.
Finally, it is relevant to take account of the dispute resolution mechanism foreseen in the instruments setting up the pool.
Pomembno je tudi upoštevati mehanizme reševanja sporov, predvidene v aktu o ustanovitvi združenja.
The more dispute resolution is entrusted to bodies or persons that are independent of the pool and the members thereof, the more likely it is that the dispute resolution will operate in a neutral way.
Bolj kot so za reševanje sporov pooblaščeni organi ali osebe, ki so neodvisni od združenja in članov združenja, bolj verjetno je, da bo reševanje sporov potekalo na nevtralen način.
The competence to handle individual cases falling under Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, is divided between the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the Commission according to the rules laid down in Article 56 of the EEA Agreement.
Pristojnost za obravnavo posameznih zadev, ki spadajo v področje uporabe členov 53 in 54 Sporazuma EGP, je razdeljena med Nadzorni organ EFTA in Komisijo v skladu s pravili iz člena 56 Sporazuma EGP.
Only one of the surveillance authorities is competent to handle any given case.
Za obravnavo katere koli dane zadeve je pristojen samo eden od nadzornih organov.
The TTBER replaces the act referred to in point 5 of Annex XIV to the EEA Agreement (Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996, OJ L 31, 9.2.1996, p. 2) on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement to certain categories of technology transfer agreements.
TTBER nadomesti akt, naveden v točki 5 Priloge XIV k Sporazumu EGP (Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 240/96 z dne 31. januarja 1996, UL L 31, 9.2.1996, str. 2) o uporabi člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP za nekatere skupine sporazumov o prenosu tehnologije.
See Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge, [2000] ECR I-1365, paragraph 130, and paragraph 106 of the EFTA Surveillance Authority Guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement, not yet published.
Glej združeni zadevi C-395/96 P in C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge, [2000] Recueil I-1365, odstavek 130, in odstavek 106 Smernic Nadzornega organa EFTA o uporabi člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP, še neobjavljenih.
Article 6 of the EEA Agreement provides that, without prejudice to future developments of case-law, the provisions of this Agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and to acts adopted in application of these two treaties, shall in their implementation and application, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities given prior to the date of signature of the EEA Agreement.
Člen 6 Sporazuma EGP določa, da se brez vpliva na prihodnji razvoj sodne prakse določbe Sporazuma EGP, kolikor so po vsebini enake ustreznim pravilom Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti in Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za premog in jeklo ter aktom, sprejetim za uporabo teh dveh pogodb, pri njihovem izvajanju in uporabi razlagajo v skladu z ustreznimi odločitvami Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti, sprejetimi pred datumom podpisa Sporazuma EGP.
As regards relevant rulings by the Court of Justice given after the date of signature of the EEA Agreement, it follows from Article 3(2) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement that the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court shall pay due account to the principles laid down by these rulings.
Kar zadeva ustrezne odločitve Sodišča, sprejete po datumu podpisa Sporazuma EGP, iz člena 3(2) Sporazuma o nadzornem organu in sodišču izhaja, da Nadzorni organ EFTA in Sodišče EFTA ustrezno upoštevata načela, določena s temi odločitvami.
Following the Agreement amending Protocol 4 to the Agreement of the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice of 24 September 2004, which entered into force on 20 May 2005, Chapter II of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement reflects to a large extent in the EFTA pillar Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).
Z začetkom veljavnosti dne 20. maja 2005 Sporazuma, ki spreminja Protokol 4 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča z dne 24. septembra 2004, se poglavje II Protokola 4 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču v veliki meri odraža v stebru Efte Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1/2003 (UL L 1, 4.1.2003, str. 1).
In the following the term “agreement” includes concerted practices and decisions of associations of undertakings.
V nadaljnjem besedilu izraz ‚sporazum‘ vključuje usklajena ravnanja in sklepe podjetniških združenj.
See EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on the concept of effect on trade between EEA States contained in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, not yet published.
Glej Obvestilo Nadzornega organa EFTA o konceptu vpliva na trgovino med državami Efte, ki ga vsebujeta člena 53 in 54 Sporazuma EGP, še neobjavljeno.
In the following the term “restriction” includes the prevention and distortion of competition.
V nadaljnjem besedilu izraz ‚omejevanje‘ vključuje preprečevanje in izkrivljanje konkurence.
This principle of EEA exhaustion is for example enshrined in Article 7(1) of the act referred to in point 4 of Annex XVII to the EEA Agreement (Directive 89/104/EEC, OJ L 40, 11.2.1989, p. 1) to approximate the laws of the EEA States relating to trademarks which provides that the trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the territory covered by the EEA Agreement under that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent.
To načelo izčrpanja v EGP je na primer zagotovljeno s členom 7(1) akta, navedenega v točki 4 Priloge XVII k Sporazumu EGP (Direktiva 104/89/EGS, UL L 40, 11.2.1989, str. 1) o približevanju zakonodaje držav Efte v zvezi z blagovnimi znamkami, ki določa, da znamka imetniku ne daje pravice, da prepove njeno uporabo v zvezi z blagom, označenim s to znamko, ki je bilo dano na trg na ozemlju, ki ga zajema sporazum EGP, s strani imetnika ali z njegovim soglasjem.
With regard to international exhaustion, the EFTA Court has held that “it is for the EFTA States (…) to decide whether they wish to introduce or maintain the principle of international exhaustion of rights conferred by a trade marked with regard to goods originating from outside the EEA”, see Case E-2/97 Maglite, [1998] Report of the EFTA Court, p. 172, paragraphs 25-27.
V zvezi z mednarodnim izčrpanjem pravic je Sodišče EFTA ugotovilo, da ‚se morajo države Efte (…) same odločiti, ali želijo uvesti oziroma ohranjati načelo mednarodnega izčrpanja pravic, podeljenih na podlagi blagovne znamke, v zvezi z blagom s poreklom izven EGP‘, glej zadevo E-2/97 Maglite, [1998] Poročilo Sodišča EFTA, str. 172, odst. 25–27.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities has in a later judgment held that “national rules providing for exhaustion of trademark rights in respect of products put on the market outside the EEA under that mark by the proprietor or with his consent are contrary to Article 7(1) of the Directive, as amended by the EEA Agreement”, Case C-355/96, Silhouette, [1998] ECR I-4799, paragraph 31.
Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je v poznejši sodbi menilo, da so ‚nacionalna pravila, ki določajo izčrpanje pravic iz znamke v zvezi z izdelki, označenimi s to znamko, ki so bili dani na trg zunaj EGP s strani imetnika ali z njegovim soglasjem, v nasprotju s členom 7(1) Direktive, kakor je bila spremenjena s Sporazumom EGP‘, zadeva C-355/96, Silhouette, [1998] Recueil I-4799, odst. 31.
On the other hand, the sale of copies of a protected work does not lead to the exhaustion of performance rights, including rental rights, in the work, see in this respect Case 158/86, Warner Brothers and Metronome Video, [1988] ECR 2605, and Case C-61/97, Foreningen af danske videogramdistributører, [1998] ECR I-5171.
Po drugi strani pa prodaja primerkov varovanega dela ne vodi do izčrpanja pravice izvajanja na delu, vključno s pravico dajanja v najem; v tej zvezi glej zadevo 158/86, Warner Brothers in Metronome Video, [1988] Recueil 2605, in zadevo C-61/97, Foreningen af danske videogramdistributřrer, [1998] Recueil I-5171.
See e.g. Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig, [1966] ECR 429.
Glej npr. združeni zadevi 56/64 in 58/64, Consten in Grundig, [1966] Recueil 429.
The methodology for the application of Article 53(3) is set out in the EFTA Surveillance Authority Guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement cited in note 5.
Metodologija za uporabo člena 53(3) je določena v Smernicah Nadzornega organa EFTA o uporabi člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP, navedenih v opombi 5.
See Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière, [1966] ECR 337, and Case C-7/95 P, John Deere, [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 76.
Glej zadevo 56/65, Société Technique Minière, [1966] Recueil 337, in zadevo C-7/95 P, John Deere, [1998] Recueil I-3111, odstavek 76.
See in this respect e.g. judgment in Consten and Grundig cited in note 12.
V tej zvezi glej npr. sodbo v zadevi Consten in Grundig, navedeni v opombi 12.
See in this respect the judgment in Société Technique Minière cited in note 14 and Case 258/78, Nungesser, [1982] ECR 2015.
V zvezi s tem glej sodbo v zadevi Société Technique Minière, navedeni v opombi 14, in zadevo 258/78, Nungesser, [1982] Recueil 2015.
See in this respect e.g. Case C-49/92 P, Anic Partecipazioni, [1999] ECR I-4125, paragraph 99.
V zvezi s tem glej npr. zadevo C-49/92 P, Anic Partecipazioni, [1999] Recueil I-4125, odstavek 99.
See Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83, CRAM and Rheinzink, [1984] ECR 1679, paragraph 26, and Joined Cases 96/82 and others, ANSEAU-NAVEWA, [1983] ECR 3369, paragraphs 23-25.
Glej združeni zadevi 29/83 in 30/83, CRAM in Rheinzink, [1984] Recueil 1679, odstavek 26, ter združene zadeve 96/82 in druge, ANSEAU-NAVEWA, [1983] Recueil 3369, odstavki 23–25.
See the judgment in John Deere, [1998] cited in note 14.
Glej sodbo v zadevi John Deere, [1998], navedeni v opombi 14.
Guidance on the issue of appreciability can be found in EFTA Surveillance Authority notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (OJ C 67, 20.3.2003, p. 20 and EEA Supplement No 15, 20.3.2003, p. 11.).
Usmeritve glede vprašanja znatnosti so na voljo v obvestilu Nadzornega organa EFTA Obvestilo Nadzornega organa o sporazumih majhnega pomena, ki ne omejujejo znatno konkurence po členu 53(1) Sporazuma EGP (UL C 67, 20.3.2003, str. 20, in Dopolnilo EGP k UL št. 15, 20.3.2003, str. 11).
The notice defines appreciability in a negative way.
V obvestilu je znatnost negativno opredeljena.
Agreements, which fall outside the scope of the de minimis notice, do not necessarily have appreciable restrictive effects.
Ni nujno, da imajo sporazumi zunaj področja uporabe obvestila de minimis znatne omejevalne učinke.
An individual assessment is required.
Potrebna je posamična presoja.
See Article 1(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.
Glej člen 1(2) poglavja II Protokola 4 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču.
EFTA Surveillance Authority notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of EEA competition law (OJ L 200, 16.7.1998, p. 48 and EEA Supplement No 28, 16.7.1998, p. 3.).
Obvestilo Nadzornega organa EFTA o opredelitvi upoštevnega trga za namene konkurenčnega prava EGP (UL L 200, 16.7.1998, str. 48, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 28, 16.7.1998, str. 3).
As to these distinctions, see also EFTA Surveillance Authority Guidelines on the applicability of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement to horizontal cooperation agreements (OJ C 266, 31.10.2002, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 55, 31.10.2002, p. 1).
V zvezi s temi razlikovanji glej tudi Smernice Nadzornega organa EFTA o uporabi člena 53 Sporazuma EGP za sporazume o horizontalnem sodelovanju (UL C 266, 31.10.2002, str. 1, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 55, 31.10.2002, str. 1).
See to that effect paragraphs 50 to 52 of the Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements, cited in the previous note.
V zvezi s tem glej odstavke 50 do 52 Smernic glede sporazumov o horizontalnem sodelovanju, navedenih v prejšnji opombi.
Idem, paragraph 51.
Idem, odstavek 51.
See in this respect the Notice on agreements of minor importance cited in note 20.
V zvezi s tem glej Obvestilo o sporazumih majhnega pomena, navedeno v opombi 20.