natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Companies A and B are active on the same relevant product and geographic market for a certain chemical product.
Družbi A in B sta dejavni na istem upoštevnem proizvodnem in geografskem trgu danega kemičnega izdelka.
They also each own a patent on different technologies used to produce this product.
Prav tako imata vsaka svoj patent za različni tehnologiji, s katerimi se proizvaja ta izdelek.
In year one A and B sign a cross licence agreement licensing each other to use their respective technologies.
V prvem letu A in B podpišeta sporazum o navzkrižnem licenciranju, s katerim druga drugi podelita licenco za uporabo svojih tehnologij.
In year one A and B produce only with their own technology and A sells EUR 15 million of the product and B sells EUR 20 million of the product. From year two they both use their own and the other’s technology.
Prvo leto A in B proizvajata vsaka samo s svojo lastno tehnologijo, pri čemer prihodki od prodaje s strani A znašajo 15 milijonov EUR in prihodki od prodaje, ki jo ustvari B, 20 milijonov EUR. Od drugega leta naprej obe družbi uporabljata svojo lastno tehnologijo in tehnologijo druge družbe.
In year two the market share of A on the technology market is therefore 15 %, reflecting its own production and sales of EUR 15 million in year one.
Drugo leto zato tržni delež A na tehnološkem trgu znaša 15 %, kar odraža njene prihodke od prodaje v višini 15 milijonov EUR, ki jih je v prvem letu ustvarila na podlagi lastne proizvodnje.
From year three A’s market share on the technology market is 20 %, reflecting the EUR 20 million sale of the product produced with A’s technology and produced and sold by A and B (EUR 10 million each).
Od tretjega leta naprej je tržni delež A na tehnološkem trgu 20 %, kar odraža prihodke od prodaje izdelka, ki je bil izdelan s pomočjo tehnologije A in sta ga prodali A in B, v skupni višini 20 milijonov EUR (vsaka od njiju 10 milijonov EUR).
Similarly, in year two B’s market share on the technology market is 20 % and thereafter 25 %.
Podobno znaša tržni delež B na tehnološkem trgu 20 % drugo leto in 25 % naslednja leta.
The market shares of A and B on the product market depend on their respective sales of the product in the previous year, irrespective of the technology used.
Tržna deleža A in B na proizvodnem trgu sta odvisna od prihodkov iz naslova prodaje izdelkov, ki sta jih ustvarili vsaka posebej v predhodnem letu, ne glede na uporabljeno tehnologijo.
The market share of A on the product market is 15 % in year two and 20 % thereafter.
Tržni delež A na proizvodnem trgu je 15 % v drugem letu in 20 % v naslednjih letih.
The market share of B on the product market is 20 % in year two and 25 % thereafter.
Tržni delež B na proizvodnem trgu je 20 % v drugem letu in 25 % v naslednjih letih.
As the agreement is between competitors, their combined market share, both on the technology and on the product market, has to be below the 20 % market share threshold in order to benefit from the safe harbour.
Ker je bil sporazum sklenjen med konkurentoma, mora biti njun skupni tržni delež na tehnološkem in tudi na proizvodnem trgu pod 20-odstotnim pragom tržnega deleža, da bi sporazum lahko užival ugodnost varnega pristana skupinske izjeme.
It is clear that this is not the case here.
Jasno je, da v danem primeru navedeno ne velja.
The combined market share on the technology market and on the product market is 35 % in year two and 45 % thereafter.
Skupni tržni delež na tehnološkem trgu in na proizvodnem trgu je 35 % v drugem letu in 45 % vsa naslednja leta.
This agreement between competitors will therefore have to be assessed on an individual basis.
Ta sporazum med konkurentoma bo zato treba presoditi na posamični osnovi.
Hardcore restrictions of competition under the Block Exemption
Nedopustne omejitve konkurence v okviru skupinske izjeme
Article 4 of the TTBER contains a list of hardcore restrictions of competition.
Člen 4 TTBER vsebuje seznam nedopustnih omejitev konkurence.
The classification of a restraint as a hardcore restriction of competition is based on the nature of the restriction and experience showing that such restrictions are almost always anti-competitive.
Uvrstitev omejitve med nedopustne omejitve konkurence temelji na naravi omejitve in izkušenj, ki kažejo, da so take omejitve skoraj vedno protikonkurenčne.
In line with the case law of the Community Courts [39] such a restriction may result from the clear objective of the agreement or from the circumstances of the individual case (cf. paragraph 14 above).
V skladu s sodno prakso sodišč Skupnosti [39] je taka omejitev lahko razvidna iz čistega namena sporazuma ali iz okoliščin posamezne zadeve (glej odstavek 14 zgoraj).
When a technology transfer agreement contains a hardcore restriction of competition, it follows from Article 4(1) and 4(2) of the TTBER that the agreement as a whole falls outside the scope of the block exemption.
Če sporazum o prenosu tehnologije vsebuje nedopustno omejitev konkurence, iz člena 4(1) in 4(2) TTBER izhaja, da sporazum kot celota ne sodi v področje uporabe skupinske izjeme.
For the purposes of the TTBER hardcore restrictions cannot be severed from the rest of the agreement.
Za namene uporabe TTBER nedopustnih omejitev ni mogoče ločiti od preostalega sporazuma.
Moreover, the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that in the context of individual assessment hardcore restrictions of competition will only in exceptional circumstances fulfil the four conditions of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement (cf. paragraph 18 above).
Poleg tega Nadzorni organ EFTA meni, da bodo v okviru posamične presoje nedopustne omejitve konkurence le v izjemnih okoliščinah izpolnjevale štiri pogoje iz člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP (glej odstavek 18 zgoraj).
Article 4 of the TTBER distinguishes between agreements between competitors and agreements between non-competitors.
Člen 4 TTBER razlikuje med sporazumi med konkurenti in sporazumi med nekonkurenti.
Agreements between competitors
Sporazumi med konkurenti
Article 4(1) lists the hardcore restrictions for licensing between competitors.
Člen 4(1) vsebuje seznam nedopustnih omejitev, ki se nanašajo na podeljevanje licenc med konkurenti.
According to Article 4(1), the TTBER does not cover agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have as their object:
V skladu s členom 4(1) v TTBER niso zajeti sporazumi, ki imajo, posredno ali neposredno, posamično ali skupaj z drugimi dejavniki pod nadzorom strank, za cilj:
the restriction of a party’s ability to determine its prices when selling products to third parties;
omejevanje možnosti stranke, da določa svoje cene pri prodaji izdelkov tretjim;
the limitation of output, except limitations on the output of contract products imposed on the licensee in a non-reciprocal agreement or imposed on only one of the licensees in a reciprocal agreement;
omejevanje proizvodnje, razen omejevanja proizvodnje pogodbenih izdelkov, ki se izvaja nad pridobiteljem licence v nevzajemnem sporazumu ali samo nad enim od pridobiteljev licence v vzajemnem sporazumu;
the obligation on the licensee(s) to produce with the licensed technology only within one or more technical fields of use, or one or more product markets;
obveznosti pridobitelja(-ev) licence za proizvodnjo na podlagi licenčne tehnologije samo znotraj enega ali več tehničnih področij uporabe ali enega ali več proizvodnih trgov;
the obligation on the licensor and/or the licensee, in a non-reciprocal agreement, not to produce with the licensed technology within one or more technical fields of use or one or more product markets or one or more exclusive territories reserved for the other party;
obveznosti dajalca in/ali pridobitelja licence na podlagi nevzajemnega sporazuma, da z licenčno tehnologijo ne bosta proizvajala znotraj enega ali več področij uporabe ali enega ali več proizvodnih trgov ali enega ali več izključnih ozemelj, rezerviranih za drugo stranko sporazuma;
the obligation on the licensor not to license the technology to another licensee in a particular territory;
obveznosti dajalca licence, da tehnologije ne bo licenciral drugemu pridobitelju licence na določenem ozemlju;
the restriction, in a non-reciprocal agreement, of active and/or passive sales by the licensee and/or the licensor into the exclusive territory or to the exclusive customer group reserved for the other party;
na podlagi nevzajemnega sporazuma, omejevanja aktivne in/ali pasivne prodaje s strani dajalca in/ali pridobitelja licence na izključnem ozemlju ali izključni skupini kupcev, rezervirani za drugo stranko sporazuma;
the restriction, in a non-reciprocal agreement, of active sales by the licensee into the exclusive territory or to the exclusive customer group allocated by the licensor to another licensee provided that the latter was not a competing undertaking of the licensor at the time of the conclusion of its own licence;
na podlagi nevzajemnega sporazuma, omejevanja aktivne prodaje na izključnem ozemlju ali izključni skupini kupcev, ki jo je dajalec licence dodelil drugemu pridobitelju licence, pod pogojem, da slednji ni konkurenčno podjetje dajalca licence v času sklepanja njegove lastne licence;
the obligation on the licensee to produce the contract products only for its own use provided that the licensee is not restricted in selling the contract products actively and passively as spare parts for its own products;
obveznosti pridobitelja licence, da proizvaja pogodbene izdelke samo za lastno uporabo pod pogojem, da za pridobitelja licence ni omejitve aktivne in pasivne prodaje pogodbenih izdelkov kot rezervnih delov za njegove lastne izdelke;
the obligation on the licensee in a non-reciprocal agreement to produce the contract products only for a particular customer, where the licence was granted in order to create an alternative source of supply for that customer;
na podlagi nevzajemnega sporazuma, obveznosti pridobitelja licence, da proizvaja pogodbene izdelke samo za določenega kupca, kadar je bila licenca podeljena zaradi oblikovanja alternativnega vira dobav za tega kupca;
the restriction of the licensee’s ability to exploit its own technology or the restriction of the ability of any of the parties to the agreement to carry out research and development, unless such latter restriction is indispensable to prevent the disclosure of the licensed know-how to third parties.
omejevanje sposobnosti pridobitelja licence za izkoriščanje njegove lastne tehnologije ali omejevanje sposobnosti katere koli od strank sporazuma za opravljanje raziskav in razvoja, razen če je ta omejitev nujno potrebna za preprečitev razkritja licenčnega strokovnega znanja in izkušenj tretjim.
For a number of hardcore restrictions the TTBER makes a distinction between reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements.
TTBER v zvezi s številnimi nedopustnimi omejitvami razlikuje med vzajemnimi in nevzajemnimi sporazumi.
The hardcore list is stricter for reciprocal agreements than for non-reciprocal agreements between competitors.
Seznam nedopustnih omejitev je strožji za vzajemne sporazume kot za nevzajemne sporazume med konkurenti.
Reciprocal agreements are cross-licensing agreements where the licensed technologies are competing technologies or can be used for the production of competing products.
Vzajemni sporazumi so sporazumi, na podlagi katerih si podjetja medsebojno podelijo licence za tehnologije, ki so konkurenčne ali se lahko uporabijo za proizvodnjo konkurenčnih izdelkov.
A non-reciprocal agreement is an agreement where only one of the parties is licensing its technology to the other party or where in case of cross-licensing the licensed technologies are not competing technologies and cannot be used for the production of competing products.
Nevzajemni sporazum je sporazum, v okviru katerega zgolj ena od strank licencira svojo tehnologijo drugi stranki ali pa v primeru navzkrižnega licenciranja licenčne tehnologije niso konkurenčne tehnologije in se ne morejo uporabiti za proizvodnjo konkurenčnih izdelkov.
An agreement is not reciprocal merely because the agreement contains a grant back obligation or because the licensee licenses back own improvements of the licensed technology.
Sporazum ni vzajemen zgolj zaradi tega, ker vsebuje obveznost povratnega odstopa licence ali ker pridobitelj licence povratno licencira svoje lastne izboljšave licenčne tehnologije.
In case at a later point in time a non-reciprocal agreement becomes a reciprocal agreement due to the conclusion of a second licence between the same parties, they may have to revise the first licence in order to avoid that the agreement contains a hardcore restriction.
V primeru, da nevzajemni sporazum pozneje postane vzajemni zaradi podelitve druge licence med istima strankama, bosta slednji morda morali ponovno proučiti prvo licenco, da bi preprečili morebitne nedopustne omejitve, ki bi jih lahko vseboval sporazum.
In the assessment of the individual case the EFTA Surveillance Authority will take into account the time lapsed between the conclusion of the first and the second licence.
Nadzorni organ EFTA bo pri presoji posamezne zadeve upošteval čas, ki je pretekel med podelitvijo prve in druge licence.
The hardcore restriction of competition contained in Article 4(1)(a) concerns agreements between competitors that have as their object the fixing of prices for products sold to third parties, including the products incorporating the licensed technology.
Nedopustne omejitve konkurence iz člena 4(1)(a) zadevajo sporazume med konkurenti, katerih cilj je določanje cen pri prodaji izdelkov tretjim, vključno z izdelki, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo.
Price fixing between competitors constitutes a restriction of competition by its very object.
Določanje cen med konkurenti že po samem cilju pomeni omejitev konkurence.
Price fixing can for instance take the form of a direct agreement on the exact price to be charged or on a price list with certain allowed maximum rebates.
Določanje cen je na primer lahko v obliki neposrednega dogovora o točni ceni, ki se bo zaračunala, ali ceniku, ki določa najvišje dovoljene rabate.
It is immaterial whether the agreement concerns fixed, minimum, maximum or recommended prices.
Ni pomembno, ali se sporazum nanaša na fiksne, najnižje, najvišje ali priporočene cene.
Price fixing can also be implemented indirectly by applying disincentives to deviate from an agreed price level, for example, by providing that the royalty rate will increase if product prices are reduced below a certain level.
Določanje cen se prav tako lahko izvede posredno z uporabo dejavnikov, ki spodbujajo podjetja, naj se ne oddaljijo od dogovorjene ravni cen, na primer s tem, da se stopnja licenčnine poviša, če se cene izdelka spustijo pod določeno raven.
However, an obligation on the licensee to pay a certain minimum royalty does not in itself amount to price fixing.
Vendar pa obveznost pridobitelja licence, da plača določeno minimalno licenčnino, sama po sebi ne pomeni določanja cen.
When royalties are calculated on the basis of individual product sales, the amount of the royalty has a direct impact on the marginal cost of the product and thus a direct impact on product prices [40].
Če se licenčnina izračuna na podlagi posamične prodaje izdelka, ima višina licenčnine neposreden učinek na mejne stroške izdelka in torej neposredno vpliva na ceno izdelka [40].
Competitors can therefore use cross licensing with reciprocal running royalties as a means of co-ordinating prices on downstream product markets [41].
Konkurenti se zato lahko odločijo za navzkrižno licenciranje z vzajemnimi tekočimi licenčninami (tj. licenčninami, obračunanimi na podlagi posamične prodaje izdelka) kot sredstvo usklajevanja cen na nižje ležečem proizvodnem trgu [41].
However, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will only treat cross licences with reciprocal running royalties as price fixing where the agreement is devoid of any pro-competitive purpose and therefore does not constitute a bona fide licensing arrangement.
Vendar pa bo Nadzorni organ EFTA obravnaval navzkrižne licence, za katere veljajo vzajemne tekoče licenčnine, kot določanje cen samo v primeru, da sporazum nima nikakršnega namena spodbujati konkurenco in torej ne pomeni licenčnega sporazuma, sklenjenega v dobri veri.
In such cases where the agreement does not create any value and therefore has no valid business justification, the arrangement is a sham and amounts to a cartel.
V takih primerih, ko sporazum ne ustvari nobene vrednosti in zanj ni nobene veljavne poslovne utemeljitve, je sporazum zgolj navidezen in pomeni kartel.
The hardcore restriction contained in Article 4(1)(a) also covers agreements whereby royalties are calculated on the basis of all product sales irrespective of whether the licensed technology is being used.
Nedopustna omejitev iz člena 4(1)(a) zajema tudi sporazume, v okviru katerih se licenčnina izračuna na podlagi celotne prodaje izdelkov, ne glede na to, ali je bila uporabljena licenčna tehnologija.
Such agreements are also caught by Article 4(1)(d) according to which the licensee must not be restricted in his ability to use his own technology (see paragraph 95 below).
Takšni sporazumi so zajeti tudi s členom 4(1)(d), v skladu s katerim se pridobitelju licence ne sme omejiti sposobnosti izkoriščanja njegove lastne tehnologije (glej odstavek 95 spodaj).
In general such agreements restrict competition since the agreement raises the cost of using the licensee's own competing technology and restricts competition that existed in the absence of the agreement [42].
Na splošno takšni sporazumi omejujejo konkurenco, saj povečajo stroške pridobitelja licence, ki nastanejo pri uporabi njegove lastne konkurenčne tehnologije, in omejujejo konkurenco, ki je obstajala v odsotnosti sporazuma [42].
This is so both in the case of reciprocal and non-reciprocal arrangements.
To velja za vzajemne in tudi nevzajemne dogovore.
Exceptionally, however, an agreement whereby royalties are calculated on the basis of all product sales may fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement in an individual case where on the basis of objective factors it can be concluded that the restriction is indispensable for pro-competitive licensing to occur.
Izjemoma pa lahko sporazum, v okviru katerega se licenčnina izračuna na osnovi celotne prodaje izdelka, v posameznem primeru izpolnjuje pogoje iz člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP, če se na podlagi objektivnih dejavnikov lahko zaključi, da je omejitev nepogrešljiva za dosego licenciranja, ki bo spodbujalo konkurenco.
This may be the case where in the absence of the restraint it would be impossible or unduly difficult to calculate and monitor the royalty payable by the licensee, for instance because the licensor’s technology leaves no visible trace on the final product and practicable alternative monitoring methods are unavailable.
To se lahko zgodi v primeru, da bi bilo v odsotnosti omejitve nemogoče ali neprimerno zapleteno izračunati in nadzirati licenčnino, ki jo plača pridobitelj licence, ker na primer tehnologija dajalca licence ne pušča vidnih sledi na končnem izdelku in praktično uporabne alternativne metode nadziranja niso na voljo.
The hardcore restriction of competition set out in Article 4(1)(b) concerns reciprocal output restrictions on the parties.
Nedopustna omejitev konkurence, določena v členu 4(1)(b), se nanaša na vzajemne omejitve proizvodnje, ki se naložijo strankam.
An output restriction is a limitation on how much a party may produce and sell.
Omejitev proizvodnje je omejitev količine izdelka, ki ga stranka lahko proizvede in proda.
Article 4(1)(b) does not cover output limitations on the licensee in a non-reciprocal agreement or output limitations on one of the licensees in a reciprocal agreement provided that the output limitation only concerns products produced with the licensed technology.
Člen 4(1)(b) se ne nanaša na omejitve proizvodnje, ki so pridobitelju licence naložene v nevzajemnem sporazumu, ali omejitve proizvodnje, ki so naložene enemu od pridobiteljev licence v vzajemnem sporazumu, pod pogojem, da omejitev proizvodnje zadeva le izdelke, ki se izdelajo s pomočjo licenčne tehnologije.
Article 4(1)(b) thus identifies as hardcore restrictions reciprocal output restrictions on the parties and output restrictions on the licensor in respect of his own technology.
Člen 4(1)(b) zato kot nedopustne omejitve opredeljuje vzajemne omejitve proizvodnje, ki jih stranke naložijo druga drugi, in omejitve proizvodnje, ki se naložijo dajalcu licence v zvezi z njegovo lastno tehnologijo.
When competitors agree to impose reciprocal output limitations, the object and likely effect of the agreement is to reduce output in the market.
Če se konkurenti dogovorijo o vzajemni omejitvi proizvodnje, bosta cilj in verjetna posledica sporazuma zmanjšanje proizvodnje na trgu.
The same is true of agreements that reduce the incentive of the parties to expand output, for example by obliging each other to make payments if a certain level of output is exceeded.
Enako velja pri sporazumih, ki zmanjšujejo spodbude strank za razširitev proizvodnje ali prodaje, s tem da se na primer stranki vzajemno obvežeta, da bo stranka, ki preseže določen obseg proizvodnje ali prodaje, drugi stranki plačala določen znesek.
The more favourable treatment of non-reciprocal quantity limitations is based on the consideration that a one-way restriction does not necessarily lead to a lower output on the market while also the risk that the agreement is not a bona fide licensing arrangement is less when the restriction is non-reciprocal.
Ugodnejša obravnava nevzajemnih omejitev količine izdelka temelji na domnevi, da enostranska omejitev ne vodi nujno do zmanjšanja obsega proizvodnje na trgu, medtem ko je tudi tveganje, da sporazum ni licenčni dogovor, sklenjen v dobri veri, manjše, če je omejitev nevzajemna.
When a licensee is willing to accept a one-way restriction, it is likely that the agreement leads to a real integration of complementary technologies or an efficiency enhancing integration of the licensor's superior technology with the licensee's productive assets.
Če je pridobitelj licence pripravljen pristati na enostransko omejitev, je verjetno, da bo sporazum vodil do resničnega povezovanja dopolnilnih tehnologij ali povezovanja boljše tehnologije dajalca licence s proizvodnimi zmogljivostmi pridobitelja licence, s katerim se bo povečala učinkovitost.
In a reciprocal agreement an output restriction on one of the licensees is likely to reflect the higher value of the technology licensed by one of the parties and may serve to promote pro-competitive licensing.
V vzajemnem sporazumu bo omejitev proizvodnje, naložena enemu izmed pridobiteljev licence, verjetno odražala večjo vrednost tehnologije, ki jo licencira ena od strank, in lahko spodbuja licenciranje, ki je za konkurenco pozitivno.
The hardcore restriction of competition set out in Article 4(1)(c) concerns the allocation of markets and customers.
Nedopustna omejitev konkurence, določena v členu 4(1)(c), se nanaša na razdelitev trgov in kupcev.
Agreements whereby competitors share markets and customers have as their object the restriction of competition.
Sporazumi, s katerimi si konkurenti razdelijo trge in kupce, imajo za cilj omejitev konkurence.
It is a hardcore restriction where competitors in a reciprocal agreement agree not to produce in certain territories or not to sell actively and/or passively into certain territories or to certain customers reserved for the other party.
Nedopustna omejitev konkurence je, kadar se konkurenta z vzajemnim sporazumom dogovorita, da ne bosta proizvajala na določenih ozemljih ali aktivno in/ali pasivno prodajala na določenih ozemljih oziroma določenim skupinam kupcem, ki so rezervirani za drugo stranko.
According to Article 4(1)(c)(iv) and for the same reason, the block exemption also applies to non-reciprocal agreements whereby the parties agree not to sell actively or passively [43] into an exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group reserved for the other party.
V skladu s členom 4(1)(c)(iv) in iz istega razloga se skupinska izjema uporablja tudi za nevzajemne sporazume, s katerimi se stranki dogovorita, da ne bosta aktivno ali pasivno [43] prodajali na izključnem ozemlju ali izključni skupini kupcev, rezervirani za drugo stranko.