natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Norwegian authorities have referred to the financial situation of Hurtigruten in 2008 and the imminent possibility that Hurtigruten would terminate the contract in order to avoid bankruptcy.
Norveški organi se sklicujejo na finančni položaj podjetja Hurtigruten v letu 2008 in pretečo nevarnost, da bi podjetje Hurtigruten odstopilo od pogodbe, da prepreči stečaj.
According to the Norwegian authorities, these circumstances forced them to take emergency measures to ensure the continuation of the service.
Norveški organi trdijo, da so jih te okoliščine prisilile k sprejetju izrednih ukrepov za zagotovitev neprekinjenega opravljanja storitev.
The Norwegian authorities have argued that the emergency measures may be regarded as legitimate in order to ensure the continuation of the service.
Po mnenju norveških organov se izredni ukrepi lahko obravnavajo kot upravičeni za zagotovitev neprekinjenega opravljanja storitev.
However, they have not referred to an exemption provided for under Article 61(3) or any other provision of the EEA Agreement.
Vendar se pri tem ne sklicujejo na izjemo iz člena 61(3) ali katero koli drugo določbo iz Sporazuma EGP.
In the Authority's view, this argument cannot be assessed as rescue aid under Article 61(3)(c) and the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, as rescue aid under the guidelines is by nature a temporary and reversible assistance.
Stališče Nadzornega organa je, da ta argument ne upravičuje ocene ukrepa kot pomoči za reševanje v skladu s členom 61(3)(c) ter smernicami za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, saj je pomoč za reševanje v skladu s smernicami začasen in povraten ukrep podpore.
The three measures are not.
To za navedene tri ukrepe ne velja.
Furthermore, the Authority has examined whether the situation described by the Norwegian authorities could be regarded as a serious disturbance within the meaning of Article 61(3)(b), even though not invoked by the Norwegian authorities, and therefore compatible aid.
Poleg tega je Nadzorni organ preučil, ali se lahko položaj, ki ga opisujejo norveški organi, obravnava kot resna motnja v smislu člena 61(3)(b), čeprav se norveški organi ne sklicujejo na to, in torej predstavlja združljivo pomoč.
It is clear from case-law that the exemption in Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement needs to be applied restrictively and it must tackle a disturbance in the entire economy of a Member State (and not a sector or a region) [85].There is nothing in the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities indicating that the aid was aimed at tackling a disturbance in the entire economy of Norway.
Iz sodne prakse je razvidno, da je treba izjemo iz člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP uporabljati restriktivno in za odpravljanje motnje v celotnem gospodarstvu države članice (in ne v sektorju ali regiji) [85].Informacije, ki so jih predložili norveški organi, v ničemer ne nakazujejo, da je bila pomoč namenjena za odpravljanje motnje v celotnem gospodarstvu Norveške.
Even in the worst case scenario that Hurtigruten would have stopped providing the service and the State would have been compelled to sign a new contract for the whole or parts of the route, a temporary discontinuation of providing this transport service cannot be considered a serious disturbance in the entire economy of Norway, even taking into account the cultural, social and economic importance of the Hurtigruten service.
Tudi v najslabšem mogočem scenariju, če bi podjetje Hurtigruten prenehalo opravljati storitve in bi bila država prisiljena, da podpiše novo pogodbo za celotno ali del plovne poti, se začasna prekinitev opravljanja teh prometnih storitev ne more obravnavati kot resna motnja v celotnem gospodarstvu Norveške, tudi ob upoštevanju kulturne, družbene in gospodarske pomembnosti storitev podjetja Hurtigruten.
Therefore, the Authority does not consider the derogation under Article 61(3)(b) to be applicable in this case.
Stališče Nadzornega organa je torej, da v tem primeru ni mogoče uporabiti odstopanja iz člena 61(3)(b).
However, the Authority will address this argument put forward by the Norwegian authorities also under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, discussed below.
Kljub temu bo Nadzorni organ obravnaval ta argument norveških organov tudi v okviru člena 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP, ki je predmet razprave v nadaljevanju.
Restructuring measures - Article 61(3)(c)EEA
Ukrepi prestrukturiranja – člen 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP
The Norwegian authorities have referred to the exemption under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and argued that the State’s intervention constitutes restructuring aid.
Norveški organi se sklicujejo na izjemo iz člena 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP in trdijo, da posredovanje države pomeni pomoč za prestrukturiranje.
The Norwegian authorities have put forward their view that the material criteria for restructuring aid under the Authority’s Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines may be fulfilled.
Po mnenju norveških organov so lahko vsebinska merila za pomoč za prestrukturiranje v skladu s smernicami za reševanje in prestrukturiranje izpolnjena.
They claim that Hurtigruten was and is an important company in accordance with Section 1(7) of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and that it was a firm in difficulty according to the definition of the same guidelines [86].
Trdijo, da je podjetje Hurtigruten bilo in še vedno je pomembno podjetje v skladu z razdelkom 1(7) smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje ter da je bilo to podjetje v težavah po opredelitvi iz istih smernic [86].
The general principle in the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines is to allow restructuring aid to be granted only in circumstances in which any distortions of competition will be offset by the benefits flowing from the firm's survival.
Splošno načelo smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje je, da se lahko pomoč za prestrukturiranje odobri samo v okoliščinah, v katerih bodo kakršno koli izkrivljanje konkurence nadomestile koristi zaradi preživetja podjetja.
Authorisation will be granted only if strict conditions are met, including (i) that the aid must be conditional on implementation of a restructuring plan that restores the firm's long-term viability within a reasonable timescale; (ii) the beneficiary is required to finance a substantial proportion of its restructuring costs (at least 50 % for large firms); (iii) compensatory measures must be taken to prevent or to minimise the risks of distortion of competition (divestment of assets, reductions in capacity or market presence, etc.); (iv) the aid must be limited to the strict minimum; (v) the restructuring plan must be implemented in full; and (vi) the Authority must be in a position to make sure that the restructuring plan is being implemented properly, through regular reports communicated by the EFTA State concerned.
Ukrep se odobri samo, če so izpolnjeni strogi pogoji, in sicer (i) mora biti dodelitev pomoči pogojena z izvajanjem načrta prestrukturiranja, ki bo v razumnem časovnem okviru obnovil sposobnost preživetja podjetja; (ii) mora upravičenec financirati precejšen delež svojih stroškov prestrukturiranja (najmanj 50 % za velika podjetja); (iii) je treba sprejeti nadomestne ukrepe za preprečitev ali zmanjšanje tveganj izkrivljanja konkurence (odsvojitev sredstev, zmanjšanje zmogljivosti ali tržne prisotnosti itd.); (iv) mora biti pomoč omejena na najmanjši mogoči znesek; (v) mora biti načrt prestrukturiranja izveden v celoti ter (vi) mora imeti Nadzorni organ možnost preveriti, ali se načrt prestrukturiranja pravilno izvaja na podlagi rednih poročil, ki jih predloži zadevna država Efte.
In the Authority’s view, the three measures do not fulfill the conditions for authorisation of the aid laid down in Section 3.2.2 of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.
Po mnenju Nadzornega organa navedeni trije ukrepi ne izpolnjujejo pogojev za odobritev pomoči iz razdelka 3.2.2 smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
Firstly, the grant of the aid must be conditional on implementation of a restructuring plan [87], which should be notified and endorsed by the Authority [88].
Prvič, dodelitev pomoči mora biti pogojena z izvajanjem načrta prestrukturiranja [87], ki ga je treba priglasiti, Nadzorni organ pa ga mora odobriti.
The Norwegian authorities did not notify a restructuring plan to the Authority, although negotiations were carried out with Hurtigruten in application of Article 8 of the Agreement.
Norveški organi Nadzornemu organu niso priglasili načrta prestrukturiranja, čeprav so bila s podjetjem Hurtigruten izvedena pogajanja na podlagi člena 8 Sporazuma.
As confirmed by case-law [89], the State must be in possession of and bound to a credible restructuring plan at the time when it grants the aid.
Kot potrjuje sodna praksa [89], mora država pomoč odobriti na podlagi predloženega zavezujočega in izvedljivega načrta prestrukturiranja.
The Authority questions whether the adjustments to the State’s remuneration constitutes restructuring aid and the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities regarding the reorganisation and reform undertaken by Hurtigruten mainly in 2008 to face the financial difficulties of the company can be considered as a restructuring plan within the meaning of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.The Authority also fails to see a link between the amount of additional payments agreed between Hurtigruten and the State in application of Article 8 of the Hurtigruten Agreement for the provision of the public service and the costs of restructuring the company.
Nadzorni organ dvomi o tem, ali prilagoditve nadomestila države pomenijo pomoč za prestrukturiranje in ali se informacije, ki so jih predložili norveški organi v zvezi z reorganizacijo in reformo, ki jo je podjetje Hurtigruten pretežno izvedlo v letu 2008 za reševanje finančnih težav, lahko obravnavajo kot načrt prestrukturiranja v smislu smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.Nadzorni organ tudi ne vidi povezave med višino dodatnih plačil, ki so bila dogovorjena med podjetjem Hurtigruten in državo na podlagi člena 8 Sporazuma Hurtigruten za zagotovitev opravljanja javne službe, in stroški prestrukturiranja podjetja.
The Authority has not been provided with any information demonstrating that the restructuring of Hurtigruten was a condition to the aid measures.
Nadzorni organ ni prejel nobenih informacij, ki bi dokazovale, da so bili ukrepi pomoči pogojeni s prestrukturiranjem podjetja.
On the contrary, the letter dated 5 November 2008 signed by the Norwegian authorities does not refer to any restructuring or a restructuring plan.
Nasprotno, dopis z dne 5. novembra 2008, ki so ga podpisali norveški organi, ne navaja nobenega prestrukturiranja ali načrta prestrukturiranja.
The same applies to the Supplementary Agreement signed 8 July 2009 and 19 August 2009 by the Norwegian authorities and by Hurtigruten respectively; but rather, it confirms the granting of additional compensation to the original contract entered into in 2004 for the provision of a public service and does not make any reference to the payments constituting restructuring aid.
Enako velja za Dopolnilni sporazum, ki so ga norveški organi in podjetje Hurtigruten podpisali 8. julija 2009 oziroma 19. avgusta 2009 ter ki prej potrjuje dodelitev dodatnega nadomestila glede na prvotno pogodbo iz leta 2004 za opravljanje javne službe in nikjer ne navaja, da so plačila pomoč za prestrukturiranje.
Moreover, when the grant of aid was authorised by the Norwegian Parliament in December 2008, there was no reference to it being part of the restructuring of Hurtigruten [90].
Še več, ko je norveški parlament v decembru 2008 odobril dodelitev pomoči, ni nikjer navedel, da je to del prestrukturiranja podjetja Hurtigruten.
Finally, the letter from Hurtigruten to the banks on 9 January 2009 [91], where a reference is made to a ‘comprehensive restructuring plan’ seems not to have been submitted to the Norwegian authorities, and even if it was, the letter was not in the possession of the authorities at the time it took its decision to grant the aid, since it was issued only after the decision to grant aid was taken.
Ne nazadnje se zdi, da dopis, ki ga je podjetje Hurtigruten poslalo bankam 9. januarja 2009 [91], v katerem je omenjen „obsežen načrt prestrukturiranja“, ni bil predložen norveškim organom, in tudi če je bil, organi niso razpolagali z dopisom v času, ko so sprejeli odločitev o dodelitvi pomoči, saj je bil izdan šele po sprejetju odločitve o dodelitvi pomoči.
Furthermore, neither the two memoranda from the legal counsel of Hurtigruten nor the subsequent submission from the Norwegian authorities have supported the conclusion that the authorities were in possession of a restructuring plan when they took their decision regarding the three measures in 2008.
Tudi nobeden od obeh memorandumov pravnega zastopnika podjetja Hurtigruten niti poznejše navedbe norveških organov ne podpirajo ugotovitve, da je bil organom predložen načrt prestrukturiranja, ko so v letu 2008 sprejeli odločitev v zvezi s tremi ukrepi.
In summary, the information provided by the Norwegian authorities in the case at hand seems to demonstrate that when granting the three measures in 2008, the State did not take any restructuring consideration into account but were only concerned with the coverage of additional costs linked to the provision of a public service obligation [92].
Zdi se torej, da informacije, ki so jih v obravnavanem primeru predložili norveški organi, kažejo na to, da pri odobritvi navedenih treh ukrepov v letu 2008 država ni upoštevala nobenih premislekov v zvezi s prestrukturiranjem, temveč se je ukvarjala samo s pokritjem dodatnih stroškov, povezanih z zagotavljanjem obveznosti javne službe. [92]
The Authority takes the view that the material existence of a restructuring plan at the time when an EFTA State grants aid is a necessary precondition for the applicability of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.
Stališče Nadzornega organa je, da je materialni obstoj načrta prestrukturiranja v času, ko neka država Efte dodeli pomoč, nujen predpogoj za uporabo smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje. Država Efte, ki odobri pomoč, mora „ob odobritvi sporne pomoči razpolagati z načrtom prestrukturiranja, ki izpolnjuje zahteve [smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje]“.
The Authority thus concludes that the aid to Hurtigruten was granted without a restructuring plan being available to the Norwegian authorities.
Zato Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da je bila pomoč podjetju Hurtigruten dodeljena, ne da bi norveški organi imeli na razpolago načrt prestrukturiranja.
In the absence of a link between the aid measures identified in this decision to a viable restructuring plan to which the EFTA State concerned commits itself [94], the conditions under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines are not met in this case.
Če ukrepi pomoči, opredeljeni v tej odločbi, niso povezani z izvedljivim načrtom prestrukturiranja, k izpolnjevanju katerega se zadevna država Efte zavezuje [94], pogoji iz smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje v tem primeru niso izpolnjeni.
Moreover, according to Section 2.2 of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, restructuring shall be based on a feasible, coherent and far-reaching plan to restore a firm's long-term viability.
Še več, v skladu z razdelkom 2.2 smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje mora prestrukturiranje temeljiti na izvedljivem, skladnem in obsežnem načrtu za obnovo sposobnosti preživetja podjetja.
Restructuring operations cannot be limited to financial aid designed to make good past losses without tackling the reasons for those losses.
Ukrepi prestrukturiranja ne morejo biti omejeni na finančno pomoč, ki je namenjena pokritju preteklih izgub brez obravnave razlogov, ki so te izgube povzročili.
As described above in Section I.5.2, the Norwegian authorities have submitted information on a four-point improvement programme introduced at the Hurtigruten’s annual general assembly on 15 May 2008 (increased revenue; reduction of debt; reduction of costs and new and higher payments for the public service) and subsequently, in February 2009, a financial restructuring as a fifth point.
Kot je navedeno v razdelku I.5.2 zgoraj, so norveški organi predložili informacije o programu izboljšav v štirih točkah, ki je bil predstavljen na letni skupščini podjetja Hurtigruten 15. maja 2008 (povečanje prihodkov, zmanjšanje dolga, zmanjšanje stroškov ter nova in višja plačila za javno službo), v februarju 2009 pa je bilo kot peta točka naknadno dodano finančno prestrukturiranje.
The Norwegian authorities request that the two memoranda from the legal counsel of Hurtigruten dated 23 March 2009 and 24 February 2010 with annexes are to be considered as the restructuring plan of the company.
Norveški organi želijo, da se oba memoranduma od pravnega zastopnika podjetja Hurtigruten z dne 23. marca 2009 in 24. februarja 2010 z njunimi prilogami obravnavata kot načrt prestrukturiranja podjetja.
The Authority notes that the documents submitted do not meet the condition set out in the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.
Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da predložena dokumenta ne izpolnjujeta pogoja iz smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
In particular, they do not in any detail describe the circumstances that led to the company’s difficulties, thereby providing a basis for assessing the appropriateness of the aid measures, and the memoranda did not include a market survey as required by the Guidelines.
To zlasti pomeni, da ne opisujeta podrobneje okoliščin, ki so privedle do težav podjetja, kar bi dalo podlago za oceno ustreznosti ukrepov pomoči, memoranduma pa tudi ne vključujeta tržne raziskave, ki jo predpisujejo smernice.
Considering the general competition concerns and the strict conditions for the authorisation of aid under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, the Authority concludes that the aid measures are not compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.
V zvezi z vprašanji splošne konkurence in strogimi pogoji za odobritev pomoči v skladu s smernicami za reševanje in prestrukturiranje Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da ukrepi pomoči niso združljivi s členom 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP v povezavi s smernicami za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
As an additional point, the Norwegian authorities have put forward their view that the Authority should take into consideration that the maritime services provided by Hurtigruten is to a great extent in assisted areas.
Kot dodatno točko so norveški organi navedli, naj Nadzorni organ upošteva, da podjetje Hurtigruten opravlja pomorske storitve pretežno na območjih, ki prejemajo pomoč.
Section 3.2.3, point 55, of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines foresees that the Authority takes the need of regional development into account when assessing restructuring aid in assisted areas in applying less stringent conditions as regards the implementation of compensatory measures and the size of the beneficiary’s contribution.
Točka 55 razdelka 3.2.3 smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje določa, da mora Nadzorni organ upoštevati potrebo po regionalnem razvoju pri oceni pomoči za prestrukturiranje na območjih, ki prejemajo pomoč, tako da uporabi manj stroge pogoje v zvezi z izvajanjem nadomestnih ukrepov in višino prispevka upravičenca.
As the restructuring plan presented by Hurtigruten does not include such compensatory measures [95] and the Norwegian authorities have not put forward any argumentation as to how this provision of the Guidelines might justify less own contribution to the restructuring in the case at hand, the Authority rejects this argument.4.
Ker načrt prestrukturiranja, kot ga je predstavilo podjetje Hurtigruten, ne vključuje takih nadomestnih ukrepov [95] in norveški organi niso v ničemer utemeljili, kako bi lahko ta določba smernic upravičila nižji lasten prispevek k prestrukturiranju v obravnavanem primeru, Nadzorni organ zavrača ta argument.4.
CONCLUSION ON COMPATIBILITY
SKLEPNA UGOTOVITEV O ZDRUŽLJIVOSTI
On the basis of the foregoing assessment, the Authority considers the three measures to be incompatible with the state aid rules of the EEA Agreement.
Na podlagi zgornje ocene Nadzorni organ meni, da navedeni trije ukrepi niso združljivi s pravili o državni pomoči iz Sporazuma EGP.
According to the EEA Agreement and the established case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Authority is competent to decide that the State concerned must abolish or alter aid [96] when it has found that it is incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
V skladu s Sporazumom EGP in z ustaljeno sodno prakso Sodišča Evropske unije je Nadzorni organ pristojen za odločanje, ali mora zadevna država razveljaviti ali spremeniti pomoč [96], če ugotovi, da ni združljiva z delovanjem Sporazuma EGP.
The Court has also consistently held that the obligation on a State to abolish aid regarded by the European Commission as being incompatible with the internal market is designed to re-establish the previously existing situation [97].
Sodišče je tudi dosledno trdilo, da je obveznost države, da razveljavi pomoč, za katero Evropska komisija meni, da ni združljiva z notranjim trgom, namenjena ponovni vzpostavitvi prejšnjega stanja.
In this context, the Court has established that that objective is attained once the recipient has repaid the amounts granted by way of unlawful aid, thus forfeiting the advantage which it had enjoyed over its competitors on the market, and the situation prior to the payment of the aid is restored [98].For the reasons set out above, the Authority considers the three measures may entail over-compensation for a public service obligation which constitutes state aid incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
V tem okviru je Sodišče ugotovilo, da je cilj dosežen, ko je prejemnik vrnil zneske, ki so mu bili odobreni z nezakonito pomočjo, in s tem izgubil prednost, ki jo je imel v primerjavi s svojimi konkurenti na trgu, s čimer je vzpostavljeno stanje pred izplačilom pomoči. [98]Iz zgoraj navedenih razlogov Nadzorni organ meni, da lahko navedeni trije ukrepi vsebujejo prekomerno nadomestilo za obveznost javne službe, ki pomeni državno pomoč, nezdružljivo z delovanjem Sporazuma EGP.
As these measures were not notified to the Authority, it follows from Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3 that the Authority shall decide that unlawful aid which is incompatible with the state aid rules under the EEA Agreement must be recovered from the beneficiaries.
Ker ti ukrepi niso bili priglašeni Nadzornemu organu, iz člena 14 dela II Protokola 3 izhaja, da Nadzorni organ odloči, da morajo upravičenci vrniti nezakonito pomoč, ki je nezdružljiva s pravili o državni pomoči iz Sporazuma EGP.
The Authority must respect the general principle of proportionality when requiring recovery [99].
Nadzorni organ mora spoštovati splošno načelo sorazmernosti, ko zahteva vračilo.
In accordance with the aim of the recovery and the principle of proportionality, the Authority will only require recovery of the portion of the aid that is incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
V skladu z namenom vračila in načelom sorazmernosti bo Nadzorni organ zahteval samo tisti delež pomoči, ki ni združljiv z delovanjem Sporazuma EGP.
Part of the payments made under the three measures can be considered compatible as a compensation for the provision of a public service obligation.
Del plačil, ki so bila izvedena v okviru treh ukrepov, se lahko šteje za združljivega kot nadomestilo za zagotavljanje obveznosti javne službe.
Thus, only the portion of the payments under the three measures that constitutes over-compensation shall be recovered.The Norwegian authorities are invited to provide detailed and accurate information on the amount of over-compensation granted to Hurtigruten.
Zato se vrne samo del plačil v okviru treh ukrepov, ki predstavlja prekomerno nadomestilo.Norveški organi so pozvani, da predložijo podrobne in točne informacije o znesku prekomernega nadomestila, ki je bilo dodeljeno podjetju Hurtigruten.