natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In cases where a licence agreement is caught by Article 53(1) the pro-competitive effects of the agreement must be balanced against its restrictive effects in the context of Article 53(3).
V primerih, ko je licenčni sporazum zajet v členu 53(1), je treba pozitivne učinke sporazuma za konkurenco v okviru člena 53(3) pretehtati v primerjavi z njegovimi omejevalnimi učinki.
When all four conditions of Article 53(3) are satisfied, the restrictive licence agreement in question is valid and enforceable, no prior decision to that effect being required [21].
Če so izpolnjeni vsi štirje pogoji iz člena 53(3), je zadevni omejevalni licenčni sporazum veljaven in izvršljiv, ne da bi bila v ta namen potrebna predhodna odločba [21].
Hardcore restrictions of competition only fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3) in exceptional circumstances.
Nedopustne omejitve konkurence izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 53(3) le v izjemnih okoliščinah.
Such agreements generally fail (at least) one of the first two conditions of Article 53(3).
Sporazumi, ki vsebujejo takšne omejitve, praviloma ne izpolnjujejo (vsaj) enega izmed prvih dveh pogojev iz člena 53(3).
They generally do not create objective economic benefits or benefits for consumers.
Navadno ne ustvarjajo objektivnih ekonomskih koristi in tudi ne koristi za potrošnike.
Moreover, these types of agreements generally also fail the indispensability test under the third condition.
Poleg tega te vrste sporazumov navadno tudi ne izpolnjujejo tretjega pogoja, ki se nanaša na preskus nujnosti.
For example, if the parties fix the price at which the products produced under the licence must be sold, this will generally lead to a lower output and a misallocation of resources and higher prices for consumers.
Če na primer stranki določita cene, po katerih se morajo prodajati izdelki, proizvedeni na podlagi licence, bo to praviloma privedlo do zmanjšanja proizvodnje in nepravilnega razporejanja sredstev ter višjih cen za potrošnike.
The price restriction is also not indispensable to achieve the possible efficiencies resulting from the availability to both competitors of the two technologies.
Omejevanje cen prav tako ni nepogrešljivo za dosego možnih učinkovitosti, ki izhajajo iz dejstva, da oba konkurenta razpolagata z obema tehnologijama.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority’s approach to defining the relevant market is laid down in its market definition guidelines [22].
Pristop Nadzornega organa EFTA glede opredelitve upoštevnega trga je določen v njegovih smernicah o opredelitvi trga [22].
The present guidelines only address aspects of market definition that are of particular importance in the field of technology licensing.
Pričujoče smernice obravnavajo zgolj vidike opredelitve trga, ki so posebnega pomena za področje licenciranja tehnologije.
Technology is an input, which is integrated either into a product or a production process.
Tehnologija je vložek, ki je vključen bodisi v izdelek bodisi proizvodni proces.
Technology licensing can therefore affect competition both in input markets and in output markets.
Zato lahko licenciranje tehnologije vpliva na konkurenco na trgu proizvodnih dejavnikov in tudi na trgu končnih izdelkov.
For instance, an agreement between two parties which sell competing products and which cross license technologies relating to the production of these products may restrict competition on the product market concerned.
Sporazum med dvema strankama, ki prodajata konkurenčne izdelke in navzkrižno licencirata tehnologiji, povezani s proizvodnjo teh izdelkov, lahko na primer omejuje konkurenco na zadevnem proizvodnem trgu.
It may also restrict competition on the market for technology and possibly also on other input markets.
Prav tako lahko omejuje konkurenco na tehnološkem trgu in mogoče tudi na drugih trgih proizvodnih dejavnikov.
For the purposes of assessing the competitive effects of licence agreements it may therefore be necessary to define relevant goods and service markets (product markets) as well as technology markets [23].
Za namene ocenjevanja konkurenčnih učinkov licenčnih sporazumov je zato lahko potrebna opredelitev zadevnih trgov za blago in storitve (proizvodnih trgov) in tudi tehnoloških trgov [23].
The term “product market” used in Article 3 of the TTBER refers to relevant goods and service markets in both their geographic and product dimension.
Izraz ‚proizvodni trg‘ iz člena 3 TTBER se navezuje na zadevne trge za blago in storitve z geografskega vidika in vidika proizvoda.
As is clear from Article 1(1)(j) of the TTBER, the term is used merely to distinguish relevant goods and service markets from relevant technology markets.
Kot je jasno razvidno iz člena 1(1)(j) TTBER, je izraz uporabljen zgolj za razlikovanje med zadevnimi trgi za blago in storitve in zadevnimi tehnološkimi trgi.
The TTBER and these guidelines are concerned with effects both on product markets for final products and on product markets for intermediate products.
TTBER in pričujoče smernice obravnavajo učinke na proizvodnih trgih za končne izdelke in tudi na proizvodnih trgih za polizdelke.
The relevant product market includes products regarded by the buyers as interchangeable with or substitutable for the contract products incorporating the licensed technology, by reason of the product characteristics, their prices and their intended use.
Upoštevni proizvodni trg obsega izdelke, ki jih kupci na podlagi njihovih značilnosti, cene in predvidene uporabe štejejo za zamenljive ali nadomestljive s pogodbenimi izdelki, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo.
Technology markets consist of the licensed technology and its substitutes, i.e. other technologies regarded by the licensees as interchangeable with or substitutable for the licensed technology, by reason of the technologies’ characteristics, their royalties and their intended use.
Tehnološke trge sestavljajo licenčna tehnologija in nadomestne tehnologije, tj. druge tehnologije, ki jih pridobitelji licence zaradi njihovih značilnosti, licenčnin in predvidene uporabe štejejo za zamenljive ali nadomestljive z licenčno tehnologijo.
The methodology for defining technology markets follows the same principles as the definition of product markets.
Metodologija za opredelitev tehnoloških trgov sledi istim načelom, kot se uporabljajo za opredelitev proizvodnih trgov.
Starting from the technology marketed by the licensor, one needs to identify those other technologies to which licensees could switch in response to a small but permanent increase in relative prices, i.e. the royalties.
Z vidika tehnologije, ki jo je na trg dal dajalec licence, je treba ugotoviti, katere so tiste druge tehnologije, na katere bi se lahko preusmerili pridobitelji licence v primeru majhnega, a trajnega povišanja zadevnih cen, tj. licenčnin.
An alternative approach is to look at the market for products incorporating the licensed technology (cf. paragraph below).
Drugi možni pristop je proučitev trga za izdelke, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo (glej odstavek 23 spodaj).
Once relevant markets have been defined, market shares can be assigned to the various sources of competition in the market and used as an indication of the relative strength of market players.
Po tem, ko se opredelijo upoštevni trgi, se lahko različnim virom konkurence na trgu pripišejo tržni deleži in se uporabijo kot pokazatelj relativne moči tržnih udeležencev.
In the case of technology markets one way to proceed is to calculate market shares on the basis of each technology’s share of total licensing income from royalties, representing a technology's share of the market where competing technologies are licensed.
Pri tehnoloških trgih je eden možnih nadaljnjih korakov izračun tržnih deležev na osnovi deleža vsake posamezne tehnologije v celotnem prihodku iz naslova licenciranja, kar prikaže delež tehnologije na trgu, kjer se licencirajo konkurenčne tehnologije. Vendar pa je to zaradi pomanjkanja jasnih in natančnih podatkov o licenčninah ipd. pogosto zgolj teoretičen in ne praktičen način.
However, this may often be a mere theoretical and not a practical way to proceed because of lack of clear information on royalties, etc. An alternative approach, which is the one used in Article 3(3) of the TTBER, is to calculate market shares on the technology market on the basis of sales of products incorporating the licensed technology on downstream product markets (see paragraph 70 below).
Drugi možni pristop, ki je uporabljen tudi v členu 3(3) TTBER, je izračun tržnih deležev na tehnološkem trgu na osnovi vrednosti prodanih izdelkov, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo, na nižje ležečih proizvodnih trgih (glej odstavek 70 spodaj).
Under this approach all sales on the relevant product market are taken into account, irrespective of whether the product incorporates a technology that is being licensed.
V okviru tega pristopa se upošteva vsa prodaja na upoštevnem proizvodnem trgu, ne glede na to, ali izdelek vključuje licenčno tehnologijo.
In the case of technology markets the approach of Article 3(3) to take into account technologies that are (only) being used in-house, is justified.
Za tehnološke trge je upravičen pristop iz člena 3(3), pri čemer se upoštevajo tehnologije, ki se uporabljajo (samo) interno.
Indeed, this approach is in general a good indicator of the strength of the technology.
Ta pristop je praviloma dober pokazatelj moči tehnologije.
First, it captures any potential competition from undertakings that are producing with their own technology and that are likely to start licensing in the event of a small but permanent increase in the price for licenses.
Najprej, ker zajema vso potencialno konkurenco s strani podjetij, ki proizvajajo s pomočjo svoje lastne tehnologije in ki bodo slednjo verjetno začela licencirati v primeru majhnega, a trajnega povišanja cen za licence.
Secondly, even where it is unlikely that other technology owners would start licensing, the licensor does not necessarily have market power on the technology market even if he has a high share of licensing income.
Drugič, tudi če ni verjetno, da bodo drugi lastniki tehnologij začeli podeljevati licence, dajalec licence nima nujno tržne moči na tehnološkemu trgu, četudi ima visok delež prihodka iz naslova licenciranja.
If the downstream product market is competitive, competition at this level may effectively constrain the licensor.
Če je nižje ležeči proizvodni trg konkurenčen, lahko konkurenca na tej stopnji učinkovito omejuje dajalca licence.
An increase in royalties upstream affects the costs of the licensee, making him less competitive, causing him to lose sales.
Dvig licenčnin na višje ležečem trgu vpliva na stroške pridobitelja licence, s čimer slednji postane manj konkurenčen in njegovi prihodki iz prodaje se zmanjšajo.
A technology’s market share on the product market also captures this element and is thus normally a good indicator of licensor market power.
Tržni delež tehnologije na proizvodnem trgu zajema tudi ta vidik in je zato običajno dober pokazatelj tržne moči dajalca licence.
In individual cases outside the safe harbour of the TTBER it may be necessary, where practically possible, to apply both of the described approaches in order to assess more accurately the market strength of the licensor.
Za posamezne primere zunaj varnega pristana TTBER bo morda, če je to v praksi izvedljivo, potrebna uporaba obeh opisanih pristopov, da bi se natančneje ocenila tržna moč dajalca licence.
Moreover, outside the safe harbour of the TTBER it must also be taken into account that market share may not always be a good indication of the relative strength of available technologies.
Poleg tega je treba zunaj varnega pristana TTBER upoštevati tudi dejstvo, da tržni delež ni vedno dober pokazatelj relativne moči razpoložljivih tehnologij.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority will therefore, inter alia, also have regard to the number of independently controlled technologies available in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties to the agreement that may be substitutable for the licensed technology at a comparable cost to the user (see paragraph 131 below).
Nadzorni organ EFTA bo zato med drugim upošteval tudi številne tehnologije, nadzorovane s strani neodvisnih tretjih, ki so na voljo ob tehnologijah, nadziranih s strani strank sporazuma, in ki ob primerljivih stroških za uporabnika lahko nadomestijo licenčno tehnologijo (glej odstavek 131 spodaj).
Some licence agreements may affect innovation markets.
Nekateri licenčni sporazumi lahko vplivajo na inovacijske trge.
In analysing such effects, however, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will normally confine itself to examining the impact of the agreement on competition within existing product and technology markets [24].
Vendar pa se bo Nadzorni organ EFTA pri analizi takšnih učinkov praviloma omejil na proučevanje vpliva sporazuma na konkurenco znotraj obstoječih proizvodnih in tehnoloških trgov [24].
Competition on such markets may be affected by agreements that delay the introduction of improved products or new products that over time will replace existing products.
Na konkurenco na takšnih trgih lahko vplivajo sporazumi, ki zavirajo uvedbo izboljšanih ali novih izdelkov, ki bi sčasoma nadomestili obstoječe izdelke.
In such cases innovation is a source of potential competition which must be taken into account when assessing the impact of the agreement on product markets and technology markets.
V takšnih primerih je inovativnost vir potencialne konkurence, ki ga je treba upoštevati pri presoji vpliva sporazuma na proizvodnih in tehnoloških trgih.
In a limited number of cases, however, it may be useful and necessary to also define innovation markets.
Vendar pa je v omejenem številu primerov lahko koristno in nujno opredeliti tudi inovacijske trge.
This is particularly the case where the agreement affects innovation aiming at creating new products and where it is possible at an early stage to identify research and development poles [25].
To zlasti velja, če sporazum vpliva na inovativnost, ki je usmerjena k ustvarjanju novih izdelkov, in če je že v zgodnji fazi možno prepoznati razvojna in raziskovalna združenja [25].
In such cases it can be analysed whether after the agreement there will be a sufficient number of competing research and development poles left for effective competition in innovation to be maintained.
V takšnih primerih se lahko analizira, ali bo po sporazumu preostalo zadostno število konkurenčnih razvojnih in raziskovalnih združenj, da se ohrani učinkovita konkurenca na področju inovativnosti.
The distinction between competitors and non-competitors
Razlikovanje med konkurenti in nekonkurenti
In general, agreements between competitors pose a greater risk to competition than agreements between non-competitors.
Na splošno sporazumi med konkurenti pomenijo večje tveganje za konkurenco kot sporazumi med nekonkurenti.
However, competition between undertakings that use the same technology (intra-technology competition between licensees) constitutes an important complement to competition between undertakings that use competing technologies (inter-technology competition).
Vendar pa konkurenca med podjetji, ki uporabljajo isto tehnologijo (konkurenca znotraj tehnologije med pridobitelji licence), pomeni pomembno dopolnilo h konkurenci med podjetji, ki uporabljajo konkurenčne tehnologije (konkurenca med tehnologijami).
For instance, intra-technology competition may lead to lower prices for the products incorporating the technology in question, which may not only produce direct and immediate benefits for consumers of these products, but also spur further competition between undertakings that use competing technologies.
Konkurenca znotraj tehnologije lahko na primer vodi do nižjih cen za izdelke, ki vključujejo zadevno tehnologijo, kar lahko ne le ustvari neposredne in takojšnje koristi za potrošnike teh izdelkov, temveč tudi dodatno spodbudi konkurenco med podjetji, ki uporabljajo konkurenčne tehnologije.
In the context of licensing it must also be taken into account that licensees are selling their own product.
V okviru licenciranja je tudi treba upoštevati, da pridobitelji licenc prodajajo svoj lasten izdelek.
They are not re-selling a product supplied by another undertaking.
Ne prodajajo nadalje izdelka, ki ga je dobavilo drugo podjetje.
There may thus be greater scope for product differentiation and quality-based competition between licensees than in the case of vertical agreements for the resale of products.
Možnosti za diferenciranje izdelkov in konkurenco med pridobitelji licence, ki bo temeljila na kakovosti, so torej lahko večje kot v primeru vertikalnih sporazumov za nadaljnjo prodajo izdelkov.
In order to determine the competitive relationship between the parties it is necessary to examine whether the parties would have been actual or potential competitors in the absence of the agreement.
Za ugotovitev konkurenčnega razmerja med strankami je treba proučiti, ali bi si bile stranke v odsotnosti sporazuma dejanski ali potencialni konkurenti.
If without the agreement the parties would not have been actual or potential competitors in any relevant market affected by the agreement they are deemed to be non-competitors.
Če si stranke v odsotnosti sporazuma ne bi bile dejanski ali potencialni konkurenti na nobenem od upoštevnih trgov, ki so zajeti v sporazumu, se šteje, da so nekonkurenti.
Where the licensor and the licensee are both active on the same product market or the same technology market without one or both parties infringing the intellectual property rights of the other party, they are actual competitors on the market concerned.
Če sta dajalec in tudi pridobitelj licence dejavna na istem proizvodnem ali tehnološkem trgu, ne da bi ena ali obe stranki kršili pravice intelektualne lastnine druge stranke, sta stranki na zadevnem trgu dejanska konkurenta.
The parties are deemed to be actual competitors on the technology market if the licensee is already licensing out his technology and the licensor enters the technology market by granting a license for a competing technology to the licensee.
Za stranki velja, da sta dejanska konkurenta na tehnološkem trgu, če pridobitelj licence že licencira svojo tehnologijo in dajalec licence vstopi na tehnološki trg s podelitvijo licence pridobitelju licence za konkurenčno tehnologijo.
The parties are considered to be potential competitors on the product market if in the absence of the agreement and without infringing the intellectual property rights of the other party it is likely that they would have undertaken the necessary additional investment to enter the relevant market in response to a small but permanent increase in product prices.
Stranki veljata za potencialna konkurenta na proizvodnem trgu, če je verjetno, da bi v odsotnosti sporazuma in ne da bi kršili pravice intelektualne lastnine druge stranke izvedli potrebne dodatne naložbe za vstop na upoštevni trg v primeru majhnega, a trajnega povišanja cen izdelkov.
In order to constitute a realistic competitive constraint entry has to be likely to occur within a short period.
Da bi vstop na trg pomenil realen konkurenčni pritisk, mora biti verjetno, da se bo zgodil v kratkem času.
Normally a period of one to two years is appropriate.
Navadno je to obdobje enega ali dveh let.
However, in individual cases longer periods can be taken into account.
Vendar se lahko v posamičnih primerih upoštevajo tudi daljša obdobja.
The period of time needed for undertakings already on the market to adjust their capacities can be used as a yardstick to determine this period.
Kot merilo za določanje tega obdobja se lahko uporabi čas, ki je potreben, da na trgu že dejavna podjetja prilagodijo svoje zmogljivosti.
For instance, the parties are likely to be considered potential competitors on the product market where the licensee produces on the basis of its own technology in one geographic market and starts producing in another geographic market on the basis of a licensed competing technology.
Stranki bosta na primer verjetno veljali za potencialna konkurenta na proizvodnem trgu, kadar pridobitelj licence proizvaja na podlagi svoje lastne tehnologije na enem geografskem trgu in začne proizvajati na drugem geografskem trgu na podlagi licenčne konkurenčne tehnologije.
In such circumstances, it is likely that the licensee would have been able to enter the second geographic market on the basis of its own technology, unless such entry is precluded by objective factors, including the existence of blocking patents (see paragraph 32 below).
V takih okoliščinah je verjetno, da bi pridobitelj licence imel možnost vstopiti na drugi geografski trg na podlagi svoje lastne tehnologije, razen v primeru, da tak vstop onemogočajo objektivni dejavniki, vključno z obstojem blokiranja patentov (glej odstavek 32 spodaj).
The parties are considered to be potential competitors on the technology market where they own substitutable technologies if in the specific case the licensee is not licensing his own technology, provided that he would be likely to do so in the event of a small but permanent increase in technology prices.
Stranki veljata za potencialna konkurenta na tehnološkem trgu, kadar imata v lasti med seboj nadomestljive tehnologije, vendar v tem posebnem primeru pridobitelj licence ne licencira svoje lastne tehnologije, medtem ko bi to verjetno počel v primeru majhnega, a trajnega povišanja cen tehnologije.
However, for the application of the TTBER potential competition on the technology market is not taken into account (see paragraph 66 below).
Vendar pa se pri uporabi TTBER ne upošteva potencialna konkurenca na tehnološkem trgu (glej odstavek 66 spodaj).
In some cases the parties may become competitors subsequent to the conclusion of the agreement because the licensee develops and starts exploiting a competing technology.
V nekaterih primerih lahko stranki postaneta konkurenta po sklenitvi sporazuma, ker pridobitelj licence razvije in začne izkoriščati konkurenčno tehnologijo.
In such cases it must be taken into account that the parties were non-competitors at the time of conclusion of the agreement and that the agreement was concluded in that context.
V takih primerih je treba upoštevati, da si stranki nista bili konkurenta v času sklenitve sporazuma in da je bil sporazum sklenjen v navedenih pogojih.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority will therefore mainly focus on the impact of the agreement on the licensee’s ability to exploit his own (competing) technology.
Nadzorni organ EFTA se bo zato osredotočal predvsem na vpliv, ki ga ima sporazum na sposobnost pridobitelja licence, da izkorišča lastno (konkurenčno) tehnologijo.
In particular, the list of hardcore restrictions applying to agreements between competitors will not be applied to such agreements unless the agreement is subsequently amended in any material respect after the parties have become competitors (cf. Article 4(3) of the TTBER).
Zlasti se seznam nedopustnih omejitev, ki zadeva sporazume med konkurenti, ne uporablja za take sporazume, razen v primeru, da se sporazum pozneje, ko sta stranki postali konkurenta, spremeni v bistvenih točkah (glej člen 4(3) TTBER).
The undertakings party to an agreement may also become competitors subsequent to the conclusion of the agreement where the licensee was already active on the product market prior to the licence and where the licensor subsequently enters the product market either on the basis of the licensed technology or a new technology.
Prav tako lahko podjetja, ki so stranke sporazuma, postanejo konkurenti po sklenitvi sporazuma, če je bil pridobitelj licence na proizvodnem trgu dejaven že pred pridobitvijo licence in če dajalec licence pozneje vstopi na proizvodni trg bodisi na podlagi licenčne tehnologije bodisi nove tehnologije.
Also in this case the hardcore list relevant for agreements between non-competitors will continue to apply to the agreement unless the agreement is subsequently amended in any material respect (cf. Article 4(3) of the TTBER).
Tudi v tem primeru se seznam nedopustnih omejitev, ki zadeva sporazume med nekonkurenti, še naprej uporablja za sporazum, razen v primeru, da se sporazum pozneje spremeni v bistvenih točkah (glej člen 4(3) TTBER).