natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to Article 5(1)(a) such obligations are not covered by the block exemption.
Taka pravica do odpovedi sporazuma ima lahko enak učinek kot klavzula o neizpodbijanju, zlasti če bi prehod s tehnologije dajalca licence na drugo pridobitelju licence povzročil precejšnje izgube (npr. če je pridobitelj licence že vložil sredstva v posamezne stroje ali orodja, ki jih ni mogoče uporabljati pri proizvodnji z drugo tehnologijo) ali če je tehnologija dajalca licence nujen proizvodni dejavnik za proizvodnjo pridobitelja licence.
The application of Article 5(1)(a) does not depend on whether or not the licensor pays consideration in return for acquiring the improvement or for obtaining an exclusive licence.
Na primer, v okviru standardnih patentov (tj. patentov, ki vključujejo določene standarde) bo moral pridobitelj licence, ki proizvaja izdelek, ki je skladen s standardom, nujno uporabiti vse patente, ki temeljijo na zadevnem standardu.
However, the existence and level of such consideration may be a relevant factor in the context of an individual assessment under Article 53.
V takem primeru lahko izpodbijanje veljavnosti zadevnih patentov povzroči precejšnje izgube, če se sporazum o prenosu tehnologije odpove.
When grant-backs are made against consideration it is less likely that the obligation creates a disincentive for the licensee to innovate.
Če tehnologija dajalca licence ni standardna tehnologija, vendar ima zelo močan tržni položaj, so lahko velike tudi spodbude za neizpodbijanje, glede na to, kako težko bo pridobitelju licence poiskati uspešno alternativno tehnologijo pod drugo licenco.
In the assessment of exclusive grant-backs outside the scope of the block exemption the market position of the licensor on the technology market is also a relevant factor.
Vprašanje, ali bi bile izgube dobička pridobitelja licence velike in bi ga zato močno odvračale od izpodbijanja, bi bilo treba presoditi za vsak primer posebej.
The stronger the position of the licensor, the more likely it is that exclusive grant-back obligations will have restrictive effects on competition in innovation.
V scenarijih iz točke 136 je pridobitelj licence lahko odvrnjen od izpodbijanja veljavnosti pravice intelektualne lastnine, če bi zaradi tega tvegal odpoved licenčnega sporazuma in se tako izpostavil velikim tveganjem, ki močno presegajo njegove obveznosti plačila licenčnin.
The stronger the position of the licensor's technology the more important it is that the licensee can become an important source of innovation and future competition.
Vendar pa je treba tudi opozoriti, da zunaj okvira navedenih scenarijev klavzula o odpovedi pogosto ne bo močno odvračala od izpodbijanja in zato ne bo imela enakega učinka kot klavzula o neizpodbijanju.
The negative impact of grant-back obligations can also be increased in case of parallel networks of licence agreements containing such obligations.
Javni interes krepitve spodbude za dajalca licence k licenciranju, s tem ko se ga ne prisili, da bi še naprej posloval s pridobiteljem licence, ki izpodbija sam predmet licenčnega sporazuma, je treba uravnotežiti z javnim interesom za odpravo morebitnih ovir za gospodarsko dejavnost, ki lahko nastanejo, če je bila pravica intelektualne lastnine dodeljena v zmoti [67].
When available technologies are controlled by a limited number of licensors that impose exclusive grant-back obligations on licensees, the risk of anti-competitive effects is greater than where there are a number of technologies only some of which are licensed on exclusive grant-back terms.
Pri uravnoteženju navedenih interesov bi bilo treba upoštevati, ali pridobitelj licence v času izpodbijanja izpolnjuje vse obveznosti iz sporazuma, zlasti obveznosti plačila dogovorjenih licenčnin.
Non-exclusive grant-back obligations are covered by the safe harbour of the TTBER.
V primeru podeljevanja izključnih licenc je ob upoštevanju vseh dejavnikov navadno manj verjetno, da bi imela klavzula o odpovedi protikonkurenčne učinke.
This is the case even where they are non-reciprocal, that is to say, only imposed on the licensee, and where under the agreement the licensor is entitled to feed-on the improvements to other licensees.
Po podelitvi licence se lahko dajalec licence znajde v posebnem položaju odvisnosti, saj bo pridobitelj licence njegov edini vir prihodkov, kar zadeva licenčne tehnološke pravice, če je licenčnina odvisna od proizvodnje na podlagi licenčnih tehnoloških pravic, kar je lahko pogosto učinkovit način strukturiranja plačil licenčnine.
A non-reciprocal grant-back obligation may promote the dissemination of new technology by permitting the licensor to freely determine whether and to what extent to pass on its own improvements to its licensees.
Po tem scenariju bi bile lahko ogrožene spodbude za inovacije in podeljevanje licenc, če bi bil na primer dajalec licence „ujetnik“ sporazuma z izključnim pridobiteljem licence, ki se ne trudi posebej, da bi razvijal, proizvajal in tržil izdelek, ki se (naj) proizvaja na podlagi licenčnih tehnoloških pravic [68].
A feed-on clause may also promote the dissemination of technology, in particular when each licensee knows at the time of contracting that it will be on an equal footing with other licensees in terms of the technology on the basis of which it is producing.
To je razlog, zakaj TTBER klavzule o odpovedi izključnih licenčnih sporazumov vključuje v skupinsko izjemo, če so le izpolnjeni tudi drugi pogoji varnega pristana, kot je upoštevanje praga tržnega deleža.
Non-exclusive grant-back obligations may in particular have negative effects on innovation in the case of cross-licensing between competitors where a grant-back obligation on both parties is combined with an obligation on both parties to share improvements of its own technology with the other party.
Zunaj varnega pristana je treba vsak primer posebej presoditi, pri čemer se upoštevajo različni interesi, opisani v točki 138 zgoraj.
The sharing of all improvements between competitors may prevent each competitor from gaining a competitive lead over the other (see also point (241) below).
Poleg tega je Nadzorni organ bolj naklonjen klavzulam o neizpodbijanju in odpovedi, ki se nanašajo na strokovno znanje in izkušnje, če je verjetno, da bo po razkritju licenčnega strokovnega znanja in izkušenj nemogoče ali zelo težko ponovno pridobiti navedeno licenčno strokovno znanje in izkušnje.
However, the parties are unlikely to be prevented from gaining a competitive lead over each other where the purpose of the licence is to permit them to develop their respective technologies and where the licence does not lead them to use the same technological base in the design of their products.
V takih primerih obveznost, naložena pridobitelju licence, da ne izpodbija licenčnega strokovnega znanja in izkušenj, spodbuja razširjanje nove tehnologije, zlasti tako, da šibkejšim dajalcem licenc omogoča podeljevanje licenc močnejšim pridobiteljem licenc, ne da bi tvegali izpodbijanje po tem, ko je pridobitelj licence že osvojil strokovno znanje in izkušnje.
This is the case where the purpose of the licence is to create design freedom rather than to improve the technological base of the licensee.
Zato klavzule o neizpodbijanju in odpovedi, ki zadevajo izključno strokovno znanje in izkušnje, niso izključene iz področja uporabe TTBER.
Non-challenge and termination clauses
Omejitev pridobitelja licence pri uporabi ali razvoju lastne tehnologije (med nekonkurenti)
The excluded restriction set out in Article 5(1)(b) TTBER concerns non-challenge clauses, that is to say, direct or indirect obligations not to challenge the validity of the licensor's intellectual property, without prejudice to the possibility, in the case of an exclusive licence, for the licensor to terminate the technology transfer agreement in the event that the licensee challenges the validity of any of the licensed technology rights.
V primeru sporazumov med nekonkurenti člen 5(2) izključuje iz področja uporabe skupinske izjeme vse neposredne ali posredne obveznosti, ki omejujejo sposobnost pridobitelja licence za izkoriščanje lastnih tehnoloških pravic ali sposobnost pogodbenic sporazuma za opravljanje raziskav in razvoja, razen če je slednja omejitev nujna za preprečitev razkritja licenčnega strokovnega znanja in izkušenj tretjim osebam.
The reason for excluding non-challenge clauses from the scope of the block exemption is the fact that licensees are normally in the best position to determine whether or not an intellectual property right is invalid.
Vsebina tega pogoja je enaka vsebini člena 4(1)(d), kar zadeva seznam nedopustnih omejitev glede sporazumov med konkurenti, ki je obravnavan v točkah 115 in 116 teh smernic.
In the interest of undistorted competition and in accordance with the principles underlying the protection of intellectual property, invalid intellectual property rights should be eliminated.
Vendar pa se v primeru sporazumov med nekonkurenti ne more šteti, da imajo take omejitve običajno negativne učinke na konkurenco ali da pogoji iz člena 53(3) običajno niso izpolnjeni [69].
Invalid intellectual property stifles innovation rather than promoting it.
Zato se zahteva posamična presoja.
Article 53(1) is likely to apply to non-challenge clauses where the licensed technology is valuable and therefore creates a competitive disadvantage for undertakings that are prevented from using it or are only able to use it against payment of royalties.
V primeru sporazumov med nekonkurenti pridobitelj licence običajno ni lastnik konkurenčne tehnologije.
In such cases the conditions of Article 53(3) are unlikely to be fulfilled.
Vendar pa lahko obstajajo primeri, v katerih se za namene skupinske izjeme pogodbenici obravnavata kot nekonkurenta, kljub dejstvu, da je pridobitelj licence lastnik konkurenčne tehnologije.
However, if the licensed technology is related to a technically outdated process which the licensee does not use, or if the licence is granted for free, no restriction of competition arises [65].
To velja v primeru, ko je pridobitelj licence lastnik tehnologije, vendar zanjo ne podeljuje licenc, in dajalec licence ni dejanski ali potencialni dobavitelj na proizvodnem trgu.
As to non-challenge clauses in the context of settlement agreements see points (242) and (243) below.
Za namene skupinske izjeme pogodbenici v takih okoliščinah nista konkurenta niti na tehnološkem trgu niti na prodajnem proizvodnem trgu [70].
Generally a clause obliging the licensee not to challenge the ownership of the technology rights does not constitute a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 53(1).
V takih primerih je pomembno zagotoviti, da sposobnost pridobitelja licence glede izkoriščanja in nadaljnjega razvoja lastne tehnologije ni omejena.
Whether or not the licensor has the ownership of the technology rights, the use of the technology by the licensee and any other party is dependent on obtaining a licence in any event, and competition would thus generally not be affected [66].
Ta tehnologija ima konkurenčni pritisk na trg, ki bi ga bilo treba ohraniti.
Article 5(1)(b) TTBER also excludes from the safe harbour of the block exemption the right, in the context of non-exclusive licences, for the licensor to terminate the agreement in the event that the licensee challenges the validity of any of the intellectual property rights that the licensor holds in the EEA.
V takih okoliščinah za omejitve, ki so naložene pridobitelju licence glede uporabe lastnih tehnoloških pravic ali raziskav in razvoja, običajno velja, da omejujejo konkurenco in ne izpolnjujejo pogojev iz člena 53(3).
Such a termination right can have the same effect as a non-challenge clause, in particular where switching away from the licensor's technology would result in a significant loss to the licensee (for example where the licensee has already invested in specific machines or tools which cannot be used for producing with another technology) or where the licensor's technology is a necessary input for the licensee's production.
Na primer, obveznost, naložena pridobitelju licence, da plača licenčnino ne le na podlagi izdelkov, ki jih proizvaja z licenčno tehnologijo, temveč tudi na podlagi izdelkov, ki jih proizvaja samo z lastno tehnologijo, bo običajno omejila sposobnost pridobitelja licence za izkoriščanje lastne tehnologije in bo zato izključena iz področja uporabe skupinske izjeme.
For example, in the context of standard essential patents the licensee producing a standard compliant product will necessarily have to use all patents reading on the standard.
Če pridobitelj licence ni lastnik konkurenčne tehnologije ali še ne razvija take tehnologije, lahko omejitev sposobnosti pogodbenic pri opravljanju neodvisnih raziskav in razvoja omejuje konkurenco, če je na trgu dostopnih le nekaj tehnologij.
In such a case, challenging the validity of the relevant patents may result in a significant loss if the technology transfer agreement is terminated.
V tem primeru sta lahko pogodbenici pomemben (potencialen) vir inovacij na trgu.
Where the licensor's technology is not standard essential, but has a very significant market position, the disincentive to challenge may also be high considering the difficulty for the licensee in finding a viable alternative technology to license-in.
To velja zlasti, če pogodbenici razpolagata s potrebnimi sredstvi in znanji za opravljanje nadaljnjih raziskav in razvoja.
The question whether the licensee's loss of profit would be significant, and therefore act as a strong disincentive to challenge, would need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
V navedenem primeru je malo verjetno, da bodo izpolnjeni pogoji iz člena 53(3).
In the scenarios described in point (136), the licensee may be deterred from challenging the validity of the intellectual property right if it would risk the termination of the licensing agreement and thus face significant risks which go far beyond its royalty obligations.
V drugih primerih, ko je dostopnih več tehnologij in pogodbenici ne razpolagata s posebnimi sredstvi ali znanji, je verjetno, da omejevanje raziskav in razvoja bodisi ni zajeto v prepovedi iz člena 53(1) zaradi pomanjkanja znatnih omejevalnih učinkov bodisi da izpolnjuje pogoje iz člena 53(3).
However, it should also be noted that, outside the context of these scenarios a termination clause will often not provide a significant disincentive to challenge and therefore not produce the same effect as a non-challenge clause.
Omejitev lahko spodbuja razširjanje nove tehnologije s tem, da dajalcu licence zagotavlja, da pridobitelj licence ne bo postal nov konkurent, in s tem, da pridobitelja licence privede do tega, da se osredotoči na izkoriščanje in razvoj licenčne tehnologije.
The public interest of strengthening the incentive of the licensor to license out by not being forced to continue dealing with a licensee that challenges the very subject matter of the licence agreement has to be balanced against the public interest to eliminate any obstacle to economic activity which may arise where an intellectual property right was granted in error [67].
Poleg tega se člen 53(1) uporablja le, če sporazum zmanjšuje spodbudo pridobitelja licence, da izboljšuje in izkorišča lastno tehnologijo.
In balancing those interests it should be taken into account whether the licensee fulfils all the obligations under the agreement at the time of the challenge, in particular the obligation to pay the agreed royalties.
To je na primer malo verjetno, če ima dajalec licence pravico, da odpove licenčni sporazum, ko pridobitelj licence začne proizvajati na podlagi lastne konkurenčne tehnologije.
In the case of exclusive licensing, termination clauses are usually less likely on balance to have anti-competitive effects.
Taka pravica ne zmanjša spodbude pridobitelja licence za inovacije, saj je mogoče sporazum odpovedati le, če je bila razvita poslovno donosna tehnologija in če so izdelki, ki so bili proizvedeni na podlagi te tehnologije, zreli za dajanje na trg.
Once the licence is granted, the licensor may find itself in a particular situation of dependency, as the licensee will be its only source of income as regards the licensed technology rights if royalties are dependent on production with the licensed technology rights, as may often be an efficient way to structure royalty payments.
V skladu s členom 6 TTBER lahko Nadzorni organ in organi držav Efte, pristojni za konkurenco, odpravijo ugodnosti skupinske izjeme za posamezne sporazume, za katere je verjetno, da bodo imeli protikonkurenčne učinke (upoštevati je treba dejanske in potencialne učinke), in ki ne izpolnjujejo pogojev iz člena 53(3).
In this scenario, the incentives for innovation and for licensing out could be undermined if, for example, the licensor were to be locked into an agreement with an exclusive licensee which no longer makes significant efforts to develop, produce and market the product (to be) produced with the licensed technology rights [68].
Pooblastilo organov, pristojnih za konkurenco v državah Efte, za odpravo ugodnosti skupinske izjeme je omejeno na primere, v katerih upoštevni geografski trg ni širši od ozemlja zadevne države Efte.
This is why the TTBER block-exempts termination clauses for exclusive licensing agreements as long as also the other conditions of the safe harbour, such as respecting the market share threshold, are fulfilled.
Štirje pogoji iz člena 53(3) so kumulativni in morajo biti vsi izpolnjeni, da se lahko uporabi pravilo o izjemi [71].
Outside the safe harbour, a case-by-case assessment has to be carried out taking into account the different interests as described in the point (138) above.
Skupinska izjema se zato lahko odpravi, če določen sporazum ne izpolnjuje enega ali več od teh štirih pogojev.
Moreover, the Authority takes a more favourable view of non-challenge and termination clauses relating to know-how where the recovery of the licensed know-how is likely to be impossible or very difficult once it is disclosed.
Pri uporabi postopka odprave ugodnosti je organ, ki odpravlja ugodnost skupinske izjeme, tisti, ki mora dokazati, da sporazum spada na področje uporabe člena 53(1) in da ne izpolnjuje vseh štirih pogojev iz člena 53(3).
In such cases, an obligation on the licensee not to challenge the licensed know-how promotes dissemination of new technology, in particular by allowing weaker licensors to license stronger licensees without fear of a challenge once the know-how has been absorbed by the licensee.
Glede na to, da odprava pomeni, da zadevni sporazum omejuje konkurenco v smislu člena 53(1) in ne izpolnjuje pogojev iz člena 53(3), mora odpravo spremljati negativna odločba na podlagi členov 5, 7 ali 9 poglavja II Protokola 4.
Therefore, non-challenge and termination clauses solely concerning know-how are not excluded from the scope of the TTBER.
V skladu s členom 6 TTBER je lahko odprava upravičena zlasti v naslednjih okoliščinah:
Limiting the licensee's use or development of its own technology (between non-competitors)
kadar je za tehnologije tretjih oseb dostop na trg omejen, na primer s kumulativnim učinkom vzporednih mrež podobnih omejevalnih sporazumov, ki pridobiteljem licenc prepovedujejo uporabo tehnologij tretjih oseb;
In the case of agreements between non-competitors, Article 5(2) excludes from the scope of the block exemption any direct or indirect obligation limiting the licensee's ability to exploit its own technology rights or limiting the ability of the parties to the agreement to carry out research and development, unless that restriction is indispensable to prevent the disclosure of licensed know-how to third parties.
kadar je dostop na trg potencialnim pridobiteljem licenc omejen, na primer s kumulativnim učinkom vzporednih mrež podobnih omejevalnih sporazumov, ki dajalcem licenc preprečujejo podeljevanje licenc drugim pridobiteljem licenc, ali če edini lastnik tehnologije, ki je pripravljen podeliti licenco za upoštevne tehnološke pravice, sklene dogovor o izključni licenci s pridobiteljem licence, ki je že dejaven na proizvodnem trgu na podlagi nadomestnotehnoloških pravic.
The content of this condition is the same as that of Article 4(1)(d) of the hardcore list concerning agreements between competitors, which is dealt with in points (115) and (116) of these guidelines.
Da bi bile tehnološke pravice upoštevne, morajo biti tehnično in ekonomsko nadomestljive, da je pridobitelj licence lahko dejaven na upoštevnem proizvodnem trgu.
However, in the case of agreements between non-competitors it cannot be considered that such restrictions generally have negative effects on competition, or that the conditions of Article 53(3) are generally not satisfied [69].
Cilj členov 4 in 5 TTBER, ki vsebujeta seznam nedopustnih omejitev konkurence in izvzetih omejitev, je zagotoviti, da sporazumi, ki so zajeti v skupinski izjemi, ne zmanjšujejo spodbud za inovacije, ne ovirajo razširjanja tehnologije in ne omejujejo neupravičeno konkurence med dajalcem in pridobiteljem licence ali med pridobitelji licenc.
Individual assessment is therefore required.
Vendar pa seznam nedopustnih omejitev in seznam izvzetih omejitev ne upoštevata vseh možnih učinkov licenčnih sporazumov.
In the case of agreements between non-competitors, the licensee normally does not own a competing technology.
Skupinska izjema zlasti ne upošteva nobenega kumulativnega učinka podobnih omejitev, vsebovanih v mrežah licenčnih sporazumov.
However, there may be cases where for the purposes of the block exemption the parties are considered non-competitors despite the fact that the licensee does own a competing technology.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko povzročijo omejevanje dostopa na trg tretjim osebam, tako na ravni dajalca licence kot na ravni pridobitelja licence.
This is the case where the licensee owns a technology but does not license it and the licensor is not an actual or potential supplier on the product market.
Omejevanje dostopa na trg drugim dajalcem licenc se lahko pojavi zaradi kumulativnega učinka mrež licenčnih sporazumov, ki pridobiteljem licenc prepovedujejo izkoriščanje konkurenčnih tehnologij, kar privede do izključitve drugih (potencialnih) dajalcev licenc s trga.
For the purposes of the block exemption, in such circumstances, the parties are neither competitors on the technology market nor competitors on the downstream product market [70].
Omejevanje dostopa na trg za dajalce licenc se lahko pojavi, če je večini podjetij na trgu, ki bi lahko (učinkovito) pridobila konkurenčno licenco, to zaradi omejevalnih sporazumov preprečeno in če se potencialni pridobitelji licenc srečujejo s sorazmerno velikimi ovirami za vstop na trg.
In such cases it is important to ensure that the licensee is not restricted in its ability to exploit its own technology and further develop it.
Omejevanje dostopa na trg za druge pridobitelje licenc je lahko posledica kumulativnega učinka licenčnih sporazumov, ki dajalcem licenc prepovedujejo podeljevanje licenc drugim pridobiteljem licenc in s tem potencialnim pridobiteljem licenc preprečujejo dostop do potrebne tehnologije.
This technology constitutes a competitive constraint in the market, which should be preserved.
Vprašanje omejevanja dostopa na trg je podrobneje obravnavano v poglavjih 4.2.2 in 4.2.7.
In such a situation restrictions on the licensee's use of its own technology rights or on research and development are normally considered to be restrictive of competition and not to satisfy the conditions of Article 53(3).
Poleg tega je verjetno, da bo Nadzorni organ odpravil ugodnost skupinske izjeme, če znatno število dajalcev licenc za konkurenčne tehnologije v posameznih sporazumih od pridobiteljev licenc zahteva enake ugodnosti, kot so bile priznane drugim dajalcem licenc.
For instance, an obligation on the licensee to pay royalties not only on the basis of products it produces with the licensed technology but also on the basis of products it produces only with its own technology will generally limit the ability of the licensee to exploit its own technology and thus be excluded from the scope of the block exemption.
Poseben postopek za neuporabo TTBER v državah Efte je določen v členu 7(2) TTBER, kakor je vključen v Sporazum EGP.