natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
While a continuation of the current Norwegian scheme would be incompatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the State aid Guidelines, recourse to Article 61(3)(c) should not be fully excluded, where a transitional arrangement phasing out that aid, would have the effect of avoiding an otherwise serious adverse economic effect to one or several regions.
Čeprav bi bilo nadaljnje izvajanje sedanjega norveškega sistema nezdružljivo s členom 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP in Smernicami o državni pomoči, uporabe člena 61(3)(c) ni treba popolnoma izključiti, kadar bi se s prehodno ureditvijo za postopno odpravo te pomoči izognili sicer resnim negativnim gospodarskim učinkom za eno ali več regij.
Under such circumstances, transitional arrangements might exceptionally be considered necessary and justified, in order to align the State aid measures with the requirements of the State aid rules, and to enable undertakings to adapt to the new economic environment [18].
V takih okoliščinah se prehodne ureditve lahko izjemoma obravnavajo kot potrebne in upravičene zaradi uskladitve ukrepov državne pomoči z zahtevami predpisov o državni pomoči ter da se omogoči podjetjem, da se prilagodijo na novo gospodarsko okolje [18].
The Norwegian authorities notably argued in the notification that no transitional period, or a very short one, would inter alia create uncertainty and crises in a large number of regional businesses and may severely hurt economic development in these regions.
Norveški organi oblasti so v priglasitvi trdili predvsem, da bi brez prehodnega obdobja ali z zelo kratkim prehodnim obdobjem med drugim prišlo do negotovosti in kriz v številnih podjetjih po regijah, kar bi resno ogrozilo gospodarski razvoj teh regij.
In the comments to the decision to open an investigation (see point I 5 above, in particular table 3), the Norwegian authorities inter alia submitted calculations regarding the effects of transitional periods of one and two years, respectively, for each of the zones and compared with the notified three-year period.
Norveški organi oblasti so v pripombah na sklep o začetku preiskave (glej točko I 5 zgoraj, zlasti tabelo 3) med drugim predložili izračune o učinkih enoletnega in dveletnega prehodnega obdobja za vsako cono ter jih primerjali s priglašenim triletnim obdobjem.
The Authority notes that, according to the calculations presented by the Norwegian authorities, if the regional differentiation of the social security contributions were to be abolished, and based on an assumption of no incidence effects, it would lead to an employment reduction in the private sector of 15400 persons in zone 4 and 2900 persons in zone 3, as a direct effect of the increase in total wage costs.
Organ ugotavlja, da bi po izračunih, ki so jih predstavili norveški organi, če bi se odpravila regionalna diferenciacija prispevkov za socialno varnost in ob predpostavki, da ne bi bilo nobenih posledičnih učinkov, to povzročilo zmanjšanje zaposlenosti v zasebnem sektorju za 15400 oseb v coni 4 in za 2900 oseb v coni 3, kar bi bil neposredni učinek povečanja celotnih stroškov plač.
The Authority furthermore notes that the profitability for enterprises in zones 3 and 4 is low.
Organ tudi ugotavlja, da je donosnost za podjetja v conah 3 in 4 nizka.
According to the Norwegian authorities, a (full) tax increase, taking the de minimis possibility into account, would, for the year 2001, correspond to about 24 % of total operating profit for companies in zone 3 and, correspondingly, almost 40 % in zone 4.
Po podatkih norveških organov oblasti bi (polno) povečanje prispevkov ob upoštevanju možnosti de minimis v letu 2001 ustrezalo približno 24 odstotkom celotnega dobička iz poslovanja za podjetja v coni 3, v coni 4 pa skoraj 40 odstotkom.
Without a transitional period, the increase in the social security tax corresponds to an immediate increase in the firms’ labour costs of 8,6 and 7,2 % in zones 3 and 4, respectively (as soon as the de minimis threshold is reached).
Brez prehodnega obdobja povečanje prispevkov za socialno varnost pomeni neposredno povišanje stroškov dela za podjetja v višini 8,6 odstotka v coni 3 in 7,2 odstotka v coni 4 (takoj ko je dosežen prag de minimis).
Assuming general wage increases as forecast by the authorities, no transition period would imply an increase in labour costs for enterprises in zones 3 and 4 in 2004, almost three times higher than the normally expected increase in such costs (de minimis effect not taken into consideration).
Ob domnevi, da se plače na splošno povišajo, kot to predvidevajo organi oblasti, bi bilo brez prehodnega obdobja povišanje stroškov dela za podjetja v conah 3 in 4 v letu 2004 skoraj trikrat višje od navadno pričakovanega povišanja takih stroškov (če se ne upošteva učinek de minimis).
The Authority also observes that a gradual phasing out of the differentiated tax rates over a period of three years means that the annual cost increases for the undertakings will be spread over this period.
Organ ugotavlja tudi, da postopna odprava diferenciranih prispevnih stopenj v obdobju treh let pomeni, da se letna povišanja stroškov za podjetja porazdelijo v tem obdobju.
An immediate abolishment of the current system would, in reality, imply a cost shock to the enterprises concerned.
Takojšnja odprava sedanjega sistema bi za zadevna podjetja dejansko pomenila stroškovni šok.
An appropriate transition period will mitigate the shock effects and give the undertakings time to adjust to a new economic environment.
Ustrezno prehodno obdobje bo ublažilo učinke šoka in podjetjem dalo čas, da se prilagodijo na novo gospodarsko okolje.
In this context, the Authority takes note of the arguments brought forward by the Norwegian authorities that adjustments in the price and wage formation is a process that takes time.
V zvezi s tem Organ upošteva argumente norveških organov oblasti, da je prilagoditev v oblikovanju cen in plač dolgotrajen proces.
Downward wage rigidity is by itself a commonly observed phenomenon.
Stalen trend zniževanja plač je sam po sebi splošen pojav.
In a regional context, this fact may be reinforced when wage negotiations, to a large extent, are organised at the national level.
Z regionalnega vidika se to dejstvo lahko zopet poudari predvsem, kadar se pogajanja o plačah organizirajo na nacionalni ravni.
Some undertakings may more easily than others, increase prices on their products as a response to increased wage costs.
Nekatera podjetja lahko lažje kot druga povečajo cene svojih izdelkov kot odziv na povečane stroške plač.
This may result in bankruptcies or closure of business activities.
To lahko povzroči stečaje ali zaprtja poslovnih dejavnosti.
Wage moderation or enhanced productivity are measures that would rectify the consequences of increased social security contributions, but any effects of such factors must be expected to materialise only in the longer run.
Spreminjanje plač ali povečana donosnost sta ukrepa, ki bi popravila posledice povečanih prispevkov za socialno varnost, vendar imajo lahko taki dejavniki dejanske učinke le v daljšem časovnem obdobju.
All undertakings will benefit from the introduction of the de minimis scheme.
Vsa podjetja bodo imela korist od uvedbe sistema de minimis.
However, the effect will be significant only for very small enterprises, gradually becoming rather insignificant as the enterprises become larger.
Vendar bo učinek pomemben le za zelo majhna podjetja, čim večja pa so podjetja, manjši bo njegov pomen.
An example may illustrate this:
To lahko ponazori naslednji primer:
In zone 4, the tax rate applicable for de minimis purposes is 5,1 % (the rate in 2003), which is 9 percentage points lower than the rate in zone 1.
V coni 4 se za namene de minimis uporablja 5,1-odstotna prispevna stopnja (stopnja v letu 2003), ki je 9 odstotnih točk nižja od stopnje v coni 1.
An undertaking with a wage bill before social security taxes of NOK 3 million (or lower) will benefit fully from the de minimis scheme in the sense that it will continue to pay the same amount in social security contributions as today.
Podjetje s povprečno plačilno listo pred odbitkom prispevkov za socialno varnost v višini 3000000 NOK (ali manj) bo imelo polno korist od sistema de minimis, ker bo še naprej plačevalo enak znesek za prispevke za socialno varnost kot danes.
9 % tax relief of an amount of NOK 3 million is NOK 270000.
Za znesek 3000000 NOK znaša 9-odstotna prispevna olajšava 270000 NOK.
Firms with larger wage bills will also get this benefit for a wage amount up to NOK 3 million but for wage bills exceeding this amount, they will have to pay a higher rate.
Podjetja z višjimi zneski plačilnih list bodo tudi deležna te olajšave za znesek do 3000000 NOK, za plačilne liste, ki presegajo ta znesek, pa bodo morali plačati višjo stopnjo.
Undertakings with wage bills in the range of NOK 3 million will, on average, employ some 10 persons.
Podjetja s plačilnimi listami v razponu 3000000 NOK imajo povprečno 10 zaposlenih.
For a medium sized enterprise with some 250 employees, the wage bill would be in the range of NOK 75 million.
Pri srednje velikih podjetjih s približno 250 zaposlenimi je plačilna lista v razponu 75 milijonov NOK.
Being subject to a full tax rate of 14,1 %, the social security bill will be more than NOK 10 million.
Ker zanje velja polna prispevna stopnja v višini 14,1 odstotka, se jim obračuna za več kot 10 milijonov NOK prispevkov za socialno varnost.
A tax relief of NOK 270000 will thus not be very significant.
Prispevna olajšava v višini 270000 NOK zato ne bo imela večjega pomena.
Based on key figures for non-financial joint stock companies, the Norwegian authorities have calculated that approximately 50 % of the total wage cost basis for these companies would fall outside the scope of the de minimis rule in zones 3 and 4.
Na podlagi podatkov za nefinančne delniške družbe so Norveški organi oblasti izračunali, da približno 50 odstotkov vseh stroškov plač za ta podjetja ne bi bilo zajetih v predpis de minimis v conah 3 in 4.
The conclusion of the effect of the de minimis scheme is that it alleviates the shock effect of a sudden rise in social security taxes (even eliminates it for the very small firms employing some 10 persons or less), but around 50 % of overall employment is in enterprises where the effects of the scheme will be limited.
Glede učinka sistema de minimis lahko sklenemo, da sicer ublaži šok zaradi nenadnega povečanja prispevkov za socialno varnost (ali ga celo odpravi pri zelo majhnih podjetjih z 10 ali manj zaposlenimi), vendar pa 50 odstotkov vseh zaposlenih dela v podjetjih, kjer bodo učinki tega sistema omejeni.
Another compensatory measure is the intended introduction of a direct transport aid scheme (the notified direct transport scheme will be subject to a separate decision).
Še en izravnalni ukrep je nameravana uvedba programa neposredne pomoči za prevoz (o priglašenem programu neposredne pomoči za prevoz bo sprejet poseben sklep).
While the notified direct transport aid would help certain undertakings that have long and costly transports of goods, this scheme would, however, not fully compensate for the abolition of reduced social security rates.
Čeprav bi priglašena neposredna pomoč za prevoz pomagala nekaterim podjetjem, ki imajo dolg in drag prevoz blaga, ta sistem ne bi v celoti nadomestil odprave zmanjšanih prispevnih stopenj za socialno varnost.
Furthermore, many undertakings, for example in the service industries, would not have the possibility to benefit from this scheme.
Poleg tega mnogo podjetij na primer v storitvenih panogah ne bi moglo imeti koristi od tega sistema.
It should also be mentioned that, according to the notified direct transport aid scheme, any benefits from reduced social security taxes, would be deducted from any calculated transport aid.
Omeniti je treba, da bi v skladu s priglašenim programom neposredne pomoči za prevoz vse koristi iz zmanjšanih prispevkov za socialno varnost odbili od kakršne koli obračunane pomoči za prevoz.
According to the notifications from Norway, in case of an approval by the Authority, transport aid would then be phased in as aid through reduced social security taxes is phased out.
Kot je Norveška navedla v svojih priglasitvah, bi se v primeru odobritve Organa pomoč za prevoz postopoma uvajala, medtem ko bi se zmanjšani prispevki za socialno varnost postopoma odpravili.
Concerning the difference in tax rates between zones 3 and 4, the Authority notes that the difference is not very big and that a shorter period for zone 3 than for zone 4 would imply a steeper rise in wage costs for enterprises in the former than in the latter zone.
Kar zadeva razliko v prispevnih stopnjah med conama 3 in 4, Organ ugotavlja, da razlika ni zelo velika in da bi krajše obdobje za cono 3 kot za cono 4 pomenilo hitrejšo rast stroškov plač za podjetja v coni 3 kot v coni 4.
The Authority is therefore of the opinion that any transition period in the two zones should be of equal length.
Organ zato meni, da bi moralo biti prehodno obdobje v obeh conah enako dolgo.
Concerning the question of a transition period as such, the Authority is of the view that such a period would be necessary for zones 3 and 4 to dampen the shock effects that would follow from an immediate application of the full social security tax.
V zvezi s prehodnim obdobjem kot takim Organ meni, da bi bilo tako obdobje potrebno za coni 3 in 4, da bi ublažilo šok, ki bi sledil takojšnji uvedbi polnega prispevka za socialno varnost.
As regards the length of a transition period, the Authority considers that the Norwegian authorities have demonstrated that time will be needed for undertakings to adjust to the new economic reality.
Kar zadeva dolžino prehodnega obdobja, Organ meni, da so norveški organi oblasti dokazali, da bodo podjetja potrebovala čas za prilagoditev novim gospodarskim razmeram.
On the basis of this information and the arguments provided, a period of three years seems appropriate.
Na podlagi teh podatkov in argumentov se zdi triletno obdobje ustrezno.
In addition to the arguments mentioned above, it should also be emphasised that the system of differentiated social security taxes has been in effect for almost 30 years and that undertakings have taken their decisions on location and investment under such a system.
Poleg navedenih argumentov je treba tudi poudariti, da je sistem diferenciranih prispevkov za socialno varnost v veljavi že skoraj 30 let ter da so podjetja sprejemala svoje odločitve o lokaciji in naložbah na podlagi takega sistema.
This also calls for some transitory arrangements.
Tudi zaradi tega so potrebne določene prehodne ureditve.
It has to be borne in mind that the current case does not relate to a single undertaking receiving aid, but to all undertakings in a whole region.
Upoštevati je treba dejstvo, da to vprašanje ne zadeva le eno podjetje kot prejemnika pomoči, temveč vsa podjetja v celi regiji.
These are undertakings that at the outset, and as a whole, are in a weak competitive position.
To so podjetja, ki so že od samega začetka in vseskozi v slabšem konkurenčnem položaju.
Increasing taxes will further weaken their position.
Povečanje prispevkov bo še bolj oslabilo njihov položaj.
However, it is important to note that the notified aid measure involves operating aid.
Poudariti pa je treba, da priglašen ukrep pomoči vključuje pomoč za tekoče poslovanje.
Regional aid aimed at reducing firms current expenses (operating aid) is normally prohibited.
Regionalna pomoč, katere namen je zmanjšati tekoče stroške (pomoč za tekoče poslovanje), je običajno prepovedana.
Exceptionally, however, such aid may be granted, for example, in regions of low population density, where the aid partly offsets additional transport costs [21].
Izjemoma pa se taka pomoč lahko odobri, na primer v regijah z nizko gostoto prebivalstva, kjer pomoč delno izravna dodatne stroške prevoza [21].
As shown in Table 1 above, zones 3 and 4 are low population density regions, less than 12,5 inhabitants per square kilometre.
Kot je prikazano v tabeli 1 zgoraj, imata coni 3 in 4 nizko gostoto prebivalstva, in sicer manj kot 12,5 prebivalca na kvadratni kilometer.
The Authority has to ensure that aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Organ mora zagotoviti, da pomoč ne bi imela tako velikega negativnega vpliva na pogoje poslovanja, da bi bilo to v nasprotju s skupnim interesom.
This is especially important where operating aid is at stake.
To je zlasti pomembno pri pomoči za tekoče poslovanje.
On the other hand, the Authority has to consider the serious economic and social adverse effects that an abrupt termination of the notified scheme would cause.
Po drugi strani pa mora Organ preučiti resne gospodarske in socialne negativne učinke, ki bi jih povzročila nenadna odprava priglašenega sistema.
In carrying out this balancing act, the Authority considers it strictly necessary that the Norwegian authorities comply with the set three-year transitional phasing out deadline.
Pri takem usklajevanju Organ meni, da je nujno, da norveški organi oblasti upoštevajo rok triletnega prehodnega obdobja, ki je določen.
In the Authority's view, a gradual phasing out of the current scheme in the economically fragile zones of 3 and 4, limited to three years, does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, under the particular circumstances of this case and having regard to all of the above considerations.
Po mnenju Organa postopna odprava sedanjega sistema v gospodarsko občutljivih conah 3 in 4, omejena na tri leta, ne vpliva negativno na pogoje poslovanja v takem obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnim interesom glede na posebne okoliščine tega primera in ob upoštevanju vseh navedenih premislekov.
The Authority concludes, with reference to the arguments above and given the particular circumstances of this case, that the notified three-year transitional period for the regionally differentiated social security contributions in zones 3 and 4 can be authorised by the Authority,
Organ na podlagi zgoraj navedenih argumentov in ob upoštevanju posebnih okoliščin v tem primeru sklene, da lahko odobri priglašeno triletno prehodno obdobje za regionalno diferencirane prispevke za socialno varnost v conah 3 in 4 –
The State aid which Norway is planning to implement in form of the notified transitional period for the regionally differentiated social security contributions in zones 3 and 4 is authorised under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.
Državna pomoč, ki jo namerava Norveška izvajati v obliki priglašenega prehodnega obdobja za regionalno diferencirane prispevke za socialno varnost v conah 3 in 4, se odobri v skladu s členom 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP.
This decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.
Ta odločba je naslovljena na Kraljevino Norveško.
This decision is authentic in the English language.
Ta odločba je verodostojna v angleškem jeziku.
Done at Brussels, 12 November 2003.
V Bruslju, 12. novembra 2003
Hereinafter referred to as the Surveillance and Court Agreement.
V nadaljnjem besedilu Sporazum o nadzoru organu in sodišču.
Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid (State Aid Guidelines), adopted and issued by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 19 January 1994.
Procesna in materialna pravila na področju državne pomoči (Smernice o državni pomoči), ki jih je sprejel in izdal Nadzorni organ EFTA 19. januarja 1994.
Published in the Official Journal of the European Communities L 231 of 3 September 1994, p. 1.
Objavljeno v Uradnem listu Evropskih skupnostiUL L 231, 3.9.1994, str. 1.
The Guidelines were last amended 5 November 2003 (not yet published in the Official Journal).
Smernice so bile nazadnje spremenjene 5. novembra 2003 (še niso objavljene v Uradnem listu).
Decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority No 172/02/COL (OJ C 52, 6. 3.2003, p. 16) and EEA Supplement No 13, 16.3.2003, p. 1.
Sklep Nadzornega organa EFTA št. 172/02/COL (UL C 52, 6.3.2003, str. 16) in Dopolnilo EGP št. 13, 16.3.2003, str. 1.
OJ L 266, 3.10.2002, p. 56 and EEA Supplement No 49, 3.10.2002, p. 42.
UL L 266, 3.10.2002, str. 56 in Dopolnilo EGP št. 49, 3.10.2002, str. 42.
OJ L 10, 13. 1.2001, p. 30.
UL L 10, 13.1.2001, str. 30.
EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 141/03/COL of 16 July 2003 (OJ C 216, 11. 9.2003, p. 3) and EEA Supplement No 45, 11.09.2003, p. 1.
Sklep Nadzornega organa EFTA št. 141/03/COL z dne 16. julija 2003 (UL C 216, 11.9.2003, str. 3) in Dopolnilo EGP št. 45, 11.9.2003, str. 1.
EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 141/03/COL of 16 July 2003 (OJ C 216, 11.9.2003, p. 3) and EEA Supplement No 45, 11. 9.2003, p. 1.
Sklep Nadzornega organa EFTA št. 141/02/COL z dne 16. julija 2003 (UL C 216, 11.9.2003, str. 3) in Dopolnilo EGP št. 45, 11.9.2003, str. 1.
EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 228/99/COL (OJ C 3, 6.1.2000, p. 3) and EEA Supplement No 1, 6.1.2000.
Sklep Nadzornega organa EFTA št. 228/99/COL (UL C 3, 6.1.2000, str. 3) in Dopolnilo EGP št. 1, 6.1.2000.
OJ L 244, 14. 9.2001, p. 32.
UL L 244, 14.9.2001, str. 32.
Decision No 172/02/COL.
Sklep št. 172/02/COL.
The Standing Committee of the EFTA States decided on 1 July 2003 (No 2/2003/SC) that the present scheme in zone 5 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement due to the exceptional circumstances in this zone (see point 1 above).
Stalni odbor držav EFTA je 1. julija 2003 sklenil (št. 2/2003/SC), da je sedanji sistem v coni 5 združljiv z izvajanjem Sporazuma EGP zaradi izjemnih okoliščin v tej coni (glej točko 1 zgoraj).
‘En analyse av regionale virkninger av omlegging av differensiert arbeidsgiveravgift’.
„En analyse av regionale virkninger av omlegging av differensiert arbeidsgiveravgift“.
Møreforskning, arbeidsrapport M 0309, see website: www.mfm.no
Møreforskning, arbeidsrapport M 0309, glej spletno stran: www.mfm.no
EFTA Court Case E-6/98, The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] Report of the EFTA Court, p. 74.
Primer Sodišča EFTA E-6/98, Vlada Norveške proti Nadzornemu organu EFTA [1999]. Poročilo Sodišča EFTA, str. 74.
EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 228/99/COL (OJ C 3, 6. 1.2000, p. 3) and EEA Supplement No 1, 6.1.2000.
Sklep Nadzornega organa EFTA št. 228/99/COL (UL C 3, 6.1.2000, str. 3) in Dopolnilo EGP št. 1, 6.1.2000.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid (OJ L 10, 13.1.2001, p. 30), as incorporated into the EEA Agreement by Decision No 88/2002 of 25 June 2002 of the EEA Joint Committee (OJ L 266, 3.10.2002, p. 56 and EEA Supplement No 49, 3.10.2002).
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 69/2001 z dne 12. januarja 2001 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES pri de minimis pomoči (UL L 10, 13.1.2001, str. 30), kot je vključena v Sporazum EGP s Sklepom Skupnega odbora EGP št. 88/2002 (UL L 266, 3.10.2002, str. 56, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 49, 3.10.2002).
Cumulation rules ensure that overall de minimis aid will not exceed the threshold of EUR 100000 in the course of three years (see Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001).
Pravila o kumulaciji zagotavljajo, da celotna pomoč de minimis ne preseže praga 100000 EUR v obdobju treh let (glej Uredba (ES) št. 69/2001).
See for example Articles 8(3), 20 and Protocols 3 and 9 to the EEA Agreement, as well as Article 24 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement.
Glej na primer: člena 8(3), 20 in protokola 3 in 9 k Sporazumu EGP ter člen 24 Sporazuma o nadzoru organu in sodišču.
The Authority noted that the Commission also authorised transitional arrangements.
Nadzorni organ je ugotovil, da je Komisija odobrila tudi prehodne ureditve.
Case C-24/95 Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Alcan Deutschland [1997] ECR I-1591.
Sodba Sodišča z dne 20. marca 1997, primer C-24/95 Land Rheinland-Pfalz proti Alcan Deutschland GmbH [1997] ECR I-1591.
As regards the Norwegian Government’s argument that the Authority had sent ‘no clear signals’, the Authority maintains its view as expressed in its Decision of 16 July 2003 in point 3.1.
V zvezi z argumentom norveške vlade, da Nadzorni organ ni poslal „nobenih jasnih signalov“, Nadzorni organ ostaja pri mnenju, ki ga je izrazil v svojem sklepu z dne 16. julija 2003 v točki 3.1.
State Aid Guidelines, Chapter 25.4.
Smernice o državni pomoči, poglavje 25.4.