natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The tax situation for investment funds and investment companies from 2006 onwards can be illustrated as follows:
Davčni položaj investicijskih skladov in investicijskih družb od leta 2006 naprej je mogoče ponazoriti takole:
Capital tax
davek na kapital
No taxation
brez obdavčitve
In its decision opening the formal investigation, the Authority raised doubts regarding the compatibility with the State aid rules of the exemption from taxation of the own assets of investment companies.
Nadzorni organ je v odločitvi o začetku formalnega postopka preiskave izrazil dvom o združljivosti oprostitve obdavčenja lastnih sredstev investicijskih družb s pravili o državni pomoči.
Contrary to the arguments brought forward by the Liechtenstein authorities, the Authority took the initial view that the tax legislation provided a selective advantage to investment companies which distorted competition and affected trade across the EEA.
Nadzorni organ je v nasprotju z argumenti, ki so jih predstavili lihtenštajnski organi, zavzel začetno stališče, da je davčna zakonodaja pomenila selektivno prednost investicijskim družbam, ki so izkrivljale konkurenco in vplivale na trgovino po EGP.
On this basis, the Authority could not exclude that the tax rules applicable to the own assets of investment companies (full exemption from payment of income and coupon tax and a partial exemption from payment of capital tax) constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Nadzorni organ na tej podlagi ni mogel izključiti, da davčna pravila, ki se uporabljajo za lastna sredstva investicijskih družb (popolna oprostitev plačila davka od dohodkov in davka na obresti od kuponskih obveznic ter delna oprostitev plačila davka na kapital), ne pomenijo državne pomoči v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP.
The Authority also had doubts that these measures could be considered compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement, in particular Article 61(3)(c).
Nadzorni organ je imel pomisleke, da je te ukrepe mogoče šteti za združljive z določbami Sporazuma EGP o državni pomoči, še zlasti s členom 61(3)(c).
The comments from third parties can be summarised as follows:
Pripombe tretjih oseb se lahko povzamejo takole:
Referring to decisions of the European Commission on an Irish Company Holding Regime [17] and a tax reduction from revenue from certain intangible assets in Spain [18], the third parties argued that any natural or legal person could establish an investment undertaking and therefore benefit from the tax exemptions; on that basis the tax exemption does not constitute a selective measure.In 1996 when the legislation was enacted, it was not clear that the State aid rules would be applicable to tax measures.
Tretje osebe so s sklicevanjem na odločbi Evropske komisije o irskem režimu holdinške družbe [17] in o zmanjšanju davčne stopnje od dohodkov od nekaterih neopredmetenih sredstev v Španiji [18] trdile, da bi lahko vsaka fizična ali pravna oseba ustanovila investicijsko družbo in tako izkoristila oprostitve plačila davka. Oprostitev davka s tega vidika ne pomeni selektivnega ukrepa.Leta 1996, ko je bila zakonodaja sprejeta, ni bilo jasno, da bi se lahko pravila o državni pomoči lahko uporabljala za davčne ukrepe.
If the Authority concludes that the exemptions were aid, they had been in place since 1996 and should constitute an existing aid measure.
Če Nadzorni organ ugotovi, da so oprostitve pomenile pomoč, je treba opozoriti, da so veljale od leta 1996 in bi se morale obravnavati kot obstoječi ukrep pomoči.
With reference to Article 15 of Protocol 3 (according to which recovery shall be subject to a limitation period of 10 years), the third parties argued that no recovery of aid can be required because the tax exemption was introduced in 1996.
S sklicevanjem na člen 15 Protokola 3 (v katerem je določen 10-letni zastaralni rok za izterjavo pomoči) so tretje osebe trdile, da ni mogoče zahtevati nobene izterjave pomoči, ker je bila davčna oprostitev uvedena leta 1996.
Recovery, it was argued, would contravene the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
Trdile so tudi, da bi izterjava kršila načeli legitimnih pričakovanj in pravne varnosti.
In some cases, no recovery could be required as the amount of the tax exemptions would fall within the de minimis rule.
V nekaterih primerih ne bi bilo mogoče zahtevati izterjave pomoči, ker bi znesek davčne oprostitve spadal v področje uporabe pravila de minimis.
In letters dated 17 March 2010 and 16 July 2010, the Liechtenstein authorities commented as follows:
Z dopisoma z dne 17. marca 2010 in 16. julija 2010 so lihtenštajnski organi dali naslednje pripombe.
The tax exemption does not involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement as it is not selective in nature.
Davčna oprostitev ne vključuje državne pomoči v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, ker po naravi ni selektivna.
In support of this argument reference was again made to two decisions of the European Commission, on the Irish Company Holding Regime and a tax reduction from revenue from certain intangible assets in Spain.
V podporo temu argumentu so se tudi organi sklicevali na odločbi Evropske komisije o irskem režimu holdinške družbe in o zmanjšanju davčne stopnje od dohodkov od nekaterih neopredmetenih sredstev v Španiji.
In the alternative it is argued that any aid is existing aid on the basis of the 10 year limitation period set out in Article 1(b)(iv) in conjunction with Article 15 of Part II of Protocol 3; and on the basis that the measure only became aid as a result of the evolution of the European Economic Area (Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3).
Če Nadzorni organ ne bi sprejel prejšnje trditve, lihtenštajnski organi podredno navajajo, da je vsa pomoč že obstoječa pomoč, za katero velja 10-letni zastaralni rok iz člena 1(b)(iv) v povezavi s členom 15 dela II Protokola 3. Poleg tega je ukrep postal pomoč šele z razvojem Evropskega gospodarskega prostora (člen 1(b)(v) dela II Protokola 3).
Finally the Liechtenstein authorities argue that if this is not accepted the Authority should not order recovery of aid on the basis that this would be contrary to general principles of EEA law, specifically the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
Nazadnje lihtenštajnski organi trdijo, da Nadzorni organ ne bi smel odrediti izterjave pomoči, če ti argumenti ne bi bili sprejeti, saj bi to bilo v nasprotju s splošnimi načeli prava EGP, zlasti v nasprotju z načelom legitimnih pričakovanj in pravne varnosti.
Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement provides that:
Člen 61(1) Sporazuma EGP se glasi:
The aid measure must be granted by the State or through State resources.
Ukrep pomoči mora dodeliti država ali mora biti dodeljen iz državnih sredstev.
The Liechtenstein authorities forego revenue corresponding to the non-payment of income, capital and coupon taxes.
Lihtenštajnski organi se odrekajo prihodku, ki ustreza neplačanemu davku od dohodkov, davku na kapital in davku na obresti od kuponskih obveznic.
For these reasons, the Authority considers that the tax rules applicable to investment companies involve the use of State resources.
Iz teh razlogov Nadzorni organ meni, da davčna pravila, ki se uporabljajo za investicijske družbe, vključujejo uporabo državnih sredstev.
Firstly, the aid measure must confer on the beneficiaries advantages that relieve them of charges that are normally borne from their budgets.
Prvič, ukrep pomoči mora upravičencem prinesti ugodnosti, na podlagi katerih so oproščeni dajatev, ki običajno bremenijo njihove proračune.
By not being obliged to pay any income or coupon tax and only a reduced capital tax on their own assets, investment companies receive an advantage in comparison to other undertakings that are subject to ordinary taxation on revenues from their business activities.
Ker investicijskim družbam ni treba plačevati davka od dohodkov in davka na obresti od kuponskih obveznic ter plačujejo znižano stopnjo davka na kapital na njihova lastna sredstva, imajo prednost pred drugimi podjetji, ki plačujejo običajni davek na prihodke od svojih poslovnih dejavnosti.
The advantage is selective as it was granted only to investment undertakings organised in the form of investment companies.
Ta prednost je selektivna, saj so jo bila deležna samo investicijska podjetja, organizirana kot investicijske družbe.
The Authority does not accept arguments put forward by the Liechtenstein authorities and third parties that each undertaking in Liechtenstein carrying out such economic activity is in principle free to choose the most advantageous legal form and consequently profit from the tax concessions.
Nadzorni organ ne sprejema argumentov lihtenštajnskih organov in tretjih oseb, da lahko načeloma vsako podjetje v Lihtenštajnu, ki opravlja tako gospodarsko dejavnost, prosto izbira najboljšo pravno obliko in posledično pridobi koristi od davčnih olajšav.
A tax benefit which is limited to a specified group of undertakings cannot be characterised as a general measure on the basis that any interested undertaking could fulfil specified criteria and qualify if it organised itself in a particular form [20].By reference to the European Court of Justice’s conclusions in the GIL Insurance [21] case, ‘Article 87(1) EC requires it to be determined whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to favour “certain undertakings or the production of certain goods” in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued by the system in question, are in a comparable legal and factual situation’.
Davčna ugodnost, ki je omejena na posebno skupino podjetij, ne more biti splošen ukrep z utemeljitvijo, da bi lahko vsako zainteresirano podjetje izpolnilo določena merila in izkoristilo ugodnosti, če bi izbralo posebno pravno obliko [20].Ob sklicevanju na sklepne ugotovitve Sodišča v zadevi GIL Insurance [21]„člen 87(1) ES zahteva, da se ugotovi, ali je nacionalni ukrep v okviru določene pravne ureditve take vrste, da omogoča prednost ‚posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga‘ v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji in proizvodnjo blaga, ki so glede na cilj, ki ga zasleduje zadevna ureditev, v primerljivem dejanskem in pravnem položaju“.
The Authority concludes that the undertakings in the same legal and factual position in this case are all those who pay the (full) income, capital and coupon taxes in Liechtenstein — and in comparison to those, investment companies in Liechtenstein receive a selective advantage.
Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da so v tej zadevi v enakem pravnem in dejanskem položaju vsa podjetja, ki v Lihtenštajnu plačujejo (polne) davke od dohodkov, na kapital in na obresti od kuponskih obveznic – in v primerjavi z njimi imajo investicijske družbe v Lihtenštajnu selektivno prednost.
More specifically, the investment companies benefit in comparison to the fund direction of undertakings organised as investment funds, which engage in the same activity but are subject to tax like all other undertakings in Liechtenstein.
Če smo še bolj podrobni, imajo investicijske družbe prednost v primerjavi z upravo sklada v podjetjih, organiziranih kot investicijski skladi, ki se ukvarjajo z enako dejavnostjo, vendar plačujejo enake davke kot vsa druga podjetja v Lihtenštajnu.
A specific tax measure can nevertheless be justified by the logic of the tax system.
Poseben davčni ukrep je kljub temu mogoče utemeljiti z logiko davčnega sistema.
The specific tax rules applicable to investment companies would not be selective in the sense of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the rule is justified by the nature and general scheme of the Liechtenstein tax system [22].
Posebna davčna pravila, ki se uporabljajo za investicijske družbe, ne bi bila selektivna v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, če jih je mogoče utemeljiti z naravo in splošno shemo lihtenštajnskega davčnega sistema [22].
Unlike certain recent complex fiscal aid cases, the objectives of the tax system in question are straightforward.
V nasprotju z nekaterimi nedavnimi zapletenimi primeri fiskalne pomoči so bili cilji pri zadevnem davčnem sistemu preprosti.
The objective, or logic, of the taxes is to generate revenue for the State.
Cilj ali logika davkov je ustvarjati prihodke za državo.
According to the Liechtenstein Tax Act, legal entities that operate in Liechtenstein must pay income tax on their revenues and a capital tax on the capital held as the company’s own equity.
Po lihtenštajnskem zakonu o davku morajo pravne osebe, ki delujejo v Lihtenštajnu, plačati davek od dohodkov v zvezi s svojimi prihodki in davek na kapital v zvezi kapitalom, ki predstavlja lastna sredstva družbe.
Companies divided into shares must also pay a coupon tax on dividends.
Podjetja, katerih kapital je razdeljen na delnice, plačajo tudi davek na obresti od kuponskih obveznic v zvezi z dividendami.
Investment companies are legal entities incorporated under Liechtenstein law in the form of companies limited by shares.
Investicijske družbe so pravne osebe, ki so po pravu Lihtenštajna delniške družbe.
As such, they are subject to the generally applicable tax provisions of the Liechtenstein Tax Act concerning income, capital and coupon tax.
Zato zanje veljajo splošno veljavne davčne določbe lihtenštajnskega zakona o davku v zvezi z davkom od dohodkov, na kapital in na obresti od kuponskih obveznic.
The Authority considers that the tax relief for the management company’s own assets falls neither within the logic of the general tax system in Liechtenstein, nor within any specific logic of the taxation of investment undertakings.
Nadzorni organ meni, da davčne olajšave za upravljanje lastnih sredstev podjetja ni mogoče uvrstiti v logiko splošnega davčnega sistema v Lihtenštajnu niti v katero koli posebno logiko obdavčevanja investicijskih družb.
In the view of the Authority, there is nothing in the organisational form of investment companies which would justify a special tax derogation in favour of the management activities of an investment company in comparison with the management activities of an investment fund [23].
Nadzorni organ meni, da ne more noben vidik organizacijske oblike investicijskih družb upravičiti posebnega davčnega odstopanja v korist dejavnosti upravljanja investicijskih družb v primerjavi z dejavnostmi upravljanja investicijskega sklada [23].
The reduction and exemptions applicable to domiciliary companies [24] and investment companies were designed to encourage these activities in Liechtenstein.
Zmanjšanje davkov in oprostitve, ki veljajo za domače družbe [24] in investicijske družbe, so bili uvedeni, da bi spodbudili te dejavnosti v Lihtenštajnu.
In the Authority’s view, therefore, the tax relief on the management company’s own assets cannot be justified by the nature and overall scheme of the Liechtenstein taxation system.
Zato Nadzorni organ meni, da davčnih olajšav za lastna sredstva družb za upravljanje ni mogoče upravičiti z naravo lihtenštajnskega davčnega sistema in splošno shemo, ki velja zanje.
In 2006, the legislation was changed and investment companies were subject thereafter to ordinary business taxation in the same way as the fund direction of investment funds and any other legal entity operating a business in Liechtenstein.
Zakonodaja se je leta 2006 spremenila in za investicijske družbe je po spremembi veljala enaka običajna obdavčitev ustvarjenega dohodka kot za uprave investicijskih skladov ter vse druge pravne osebe, ki poslujejo v Lihtenštajnu.
In view of the Liechtenstein authorities this eliminated the ‘inconsistency’ [25] of not levying any taxes on the own assets before.
Lihtenštajnski organi menijo, da je bila s tem odpravljena „nedoslednost“ [25], da pred tem niso bili zaračunani nobeni davki na lastna sredstva.
For these reasons, the Authority considers that the measures constituted a selective advantage to investment companies, which was remedied by the legislation effective from 2006 onwards.
Zaradi navedenih razlogov Nadzorni organ meni, da so ukrepi pomenili selektivno prednost za investicijske družbe, kar je bilo odpravljeno s sprejetjem zakonodaje, ki je začela veljati od leta 2006.
Thirdly, the aid measure must favour undertakings engaged in economic activities.
Tretjič, ukrep pomoči mora dajati prednost podjetjem, ki opravljajo gospodarske dejavnosti.
In the BBL [26] case, the European Court of Justice considered the activities of investment companies (‘SICAVs’ under Belgian law) which undertook collective investment with the aim of producing income on a continuing basis in transferable securities from capital raised from the public.
V zadevi BBL [26] je Sodišče proučilo dejavnosti investicijskih družb (po belgijski zakonodaji se imenujejo „SICAV“), ki so s kolektivnimi naložbami iz kapitala, zbranega od javnosti, nameravale ustvariti stalni dohodek v obliki prenosljivih vrednostnih papirjev.
The Court held that this constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Sixth VAT Directive.
Sodišče je menilo, da to pomeni gospodarsko dejavnost v smislu člena 4(2) Šeste direktive o DDV.
Investment companies are active in assembling and managing the assets of various investors with the intention of making profits via various fees for the services provided.
Investicijske družbe se ukvarjajo z zbiranjem in upravljanjem sredstev različnih vlagateljev, da bi prek različnih pristojbin, povezanih z opravljenimi storitvami, ustvarile dobiček.
The aid measure must distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.
Ukrep pomoči mora izkrivljati konkurenco in vplivati na trgovino med pogodbenicami Sporazuma EGP.
According to established case-law, the prohibition under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement applies to any aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition, irrespective of the amount, in so far as it affects trade between the Contracting Parties [28].
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso se prepoved iz člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP uporablja za vsako pomoč, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco, ne glede na količino, če vpliva na trgovino med pogodbenicami [28].
The Commission has also concluded that investment vehicles operate in international markets and pursue commercial and other economic activities in markets where competition is intense [29].
Komisija je tudi ugotovila, da investicijske družbe delujejo na mednarodnih trgih in se ukvarjajo s komercialnimi ter drugimi gospodarskimi dejavnostmi na trgih, na katerih obstaja velika konkurenca [29].
The Authority takes the view, therefore, that the tax concessions on the own assets of investment companies from 1996 to 2006 strengthened the competitive position of those investment companies within the EEA, as these tax concessions reduced the ordinary operational costs of these companies compared to others [30].
Zato Nadzorni organ meni, da so davčne olajšave v zvezi z lastnimi sredstvi, ki so jih bila investicijske družbe deležne med letoma 1996 in 2006, okrepile konkurenčni položaj zadevnih investicijskih družb v EGP, saj so omogočile znižanje običajnih stroškov poslovanja teh družb v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji [30].
Investment companies compete with other financial undertakings and operate in an open market characterised by substantial intra-EEA trade.
Investicijske družbe tekmujejo z drugimi finančnimi družbami in delujejo na odprtem trgu, na katerem poteka precejšnja trgovina znotraj EGP.
Trade between the Contracting Parties is also affected [31].
Prizadeta je tudi trgovina med pogodbenicami [31].
The Authority is therefore of the view that the tax concessions distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties.
Nadzorni organ zato meni, da davčne olajšave izkrivljajo ali bi lahko izkrivljale konkurenco ter vplivajo na trgovino med pogodbenicami.
The Authority therefore concludes that the reduced taxation of management companies’ own assets under the Liechtenstein Tax Act between 1996 and 2006 was State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Nadzorni organ zato ugotavlja, da je zmanjšano obdavčenje lastnih sredstev družb za upravljanje po lihtenštajnskem zakonu o davku med letoma 1996 in 2006 pomenilo državno pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP.
The Liechtenstein authorities have argued that the aid is existing aid as the measures only became aid due to an evolution of the EEA and/or as a result of Articles 1(b)(iv) and 15 of Part II of Protocol 3 which provides that the powers of the Authority to recover aid shall be subject to a limitation period of 10 years.
Lihtenštajnski organi so trdili, da je pomoč obstoječa pomoč, saj so ukrepi pomoč postali zaradi razvoja EGP in/ali zaradi člena 1(b)(iv) in člena 15 dela II Protokola 3, ki določata, da za pooblastila Nadzornega organa glede izterjave pomoči velja 10-letni zastaralni rok.
The Authority is of the view, however, that the European Court of Justice made it clear as early as the 1970s that tax exemptions of the nature of those under assessment could be State aid.
Vendar pa Nadzorni organ meni, da je Sodišče že leta 1970 jasno razglasilo, da so davčne oprostitve, ki so podobne ocenjevanim v tej zadevi, lahko državna pomoč.
The Court held in 1974 [32] that any measures intended to exempt firms in a particular sector from the charges arising from the normal application of a tax system (without there being any justification for this exemption on the basis of the nature or general scheme of this system) constituted State aid.
Sodišče je leta 1974 [32] razsodilo, da vsak ukrep, ki je namenjen temu, da podjetja v nekem sektorju oprosti stroškov, ki izhajajo iz običajne uporabe davčnega sistema (če ta oprostitev ni upravičena na podlagi narave ali splošne sheme tega sistema), pomeni državno pomoč.
In 1987 [33] the Court explicitly stated that a loss of tax revenue was equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.This approach is also reflected in decisions of the Authority prior to the implementation of the Liechtenstein Tax Act, where it concluded that exemptions from the tax payable by undertakings was (incompatible) State aid in Finland in 1994 [34] and in Norway in 1995 [35] and 1997 [36].
Sodišče je leta 1987 [33] izrecno navedlo, da je izguba davka enaka porabi državnih sredstev v obliki davčnih izdatkov.Tak pristop se kaže tudi v odločitvah Nadzornega organa pred uvedbo lihtenštajnskega zakona o davku, v katerih je ugotovil, da oprostitve davka, ki ga morajo plačati podjetja, pomenijo (nezdružljivo) državno pomoč na Finskem leta 1994 [34] ter na Norveškem v letih 1995 [35] in 1997 [36].
On 1 December 1997, following a wide-ranging discussion on the need for coordinated action at Community level to tackle harmful tax competition, the European Council of Ministers adopted a series of conclusions and agreed a resolution on a code of conduct for business taxation [37].
Ekonomsko-finančni svet je 1. decembra 1997 po obširni razpravi o potrebi po usklajenih ukrepih na ravni Skupnosti za preprečevanje škodljive davčne konkurence sprejel vrsto sklepov in resolucijo o kodeksu ravnanja za obdavčitev ustvarjenega dohodka [37].
As part of the agreement reached, the Commission undertook to contribute to the objective of tackling harmful tax competition by implementing a notice [38] on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation and committed itself ‘to the strict application of the aid rules concerned.’ When published in December 1998, the notice stated that ‘According to well-established practice and case-law [39], a tax measure whose main effect is to promote one or more sectors of activity constitutes aid’ [40].
Komisija se je v okviru sprejetega dogovora zavezala, da bo prispevala k cilju preprečevanja škodljive davčne konkurence z izvajanjem obvestila [38] o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za ukrepe, ki zadevajo neposredno obdavčitev ustvarjenega dohodka, in da bo „strogo izvajala zadevna pravila o pomoči“. Ko je bilo obvestilo decembra 1998 objavljeno, je določalo, da „po načelih ustaljene sodne prakse [39]davčni ukrep, katerega glavni cilj je spodbujati enega ali več sektorjev dejavnosti, predstavlja pomoč“ [40].