natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This is for instance the case where the tied product is necessary for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed technology or for ensuring that production under the licence conforms to quality standards respected by the licensor and other licensees.
To se na primer zgodi, če je vezani izdelek nujno potreben za tehnično zadovoljivo izkoriščanje licenčne tehnologije ali za zagotovitev, da proizvodnja v okviru licence ustreza standardom kakovosti, ki jih upoštevajo dajalec licence in drugi pridobitelji licence.
In such cases tying is normally either not restrictive of competition or covered by Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement.
V takšnih primerih vezanje licenc praviloma bodisi ne omejuje konkurence ali pa je zajeto v členu 53(3) Sporazuma EGP.
Where the licensees use the licensor’s trademark or brand name or where it is otherwise obvious to consumers that there is a link between the product incorporating the licensed technology and the licensor, the licensor has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the quality of the products are such that it does not undermine the value of his technology or his reputation as an economic operator.
Če pridobitelji licenc uporabljajo blagovno znamko ali ime dajalca licence oziroma če je potrošnikom kako drugače očitno, da obstaja povezava med izdelkom, ki vključuje licenčno tehnologijo, in dajalcem licence, je v zakonitem interesu dajalca licence zagotoviti, da je kakovost izdelkov takšna, da ne škoduje vrednosti njegove tehnologije ali njegovemu ugledu, ki ga ima kot gospodarski subjekt.
Moreover, where it is known to consumers that the licensees (and the licensor) produce on the basis of the same technology it is unlikely that licensees would be willing to take a licence unless the technology is exploited by all in a technically satisfactory way.
Če potrošniki poleg tega vedo, da pridobitelji licenc (in dajalec licence) proizvajajo na podlagi iste tehnologije, je malo verjetno, da bi pridobitelji licenc bili pripravljeni prevzeti licenco, če vsi vpleteni tehnologije ne izkoriščajo na tehnično zadovoljiv način.
Tying is also likely to be pro-competitive where the tied product allows the licensee to exploit the licensed technology significantly more efficiently.
Vezanje licence lahko prav tako spodbuja konkurenco, če vezani izdelek pridobitelju licence omogoča, da na znatno učinkovitejši način izkorišča licenčno tehnologijo.
For instance, where the licensor licenses a particular process technology the parties can also agree that the licensee buys a catalyst from the licensor which is developed for use with the licensed technology and which allows the technology to be exploited more efficiently than in the case of other catalysts.
Če na primer dajalec licence podeli licenco za posebno procesno tehnologijo, se lahko stranki prav tako sporazumeta, da pridobitelj licence od dajalca licence kupi katalizator, ki je zasnovan tako, da se uporabi z licenčno tehnologijo, in omogoča, da se tehnologija izkorišča učinkoviteje kot v primeru drugih katalizatorjev.
Where in such cases the restriction is caught by Article 53(1), the conditions of Article 53(3) are likely to be fulfilled even above the market share thresholds.
Če je v takšnih primerih omejitev zajeta v členu 53(1), je verjetno, da bodo pogoji iz člena 53(3) izpolnjeni, tudi če se presežejo pragovi tržnih deležev.
Non-compete obligations
Obveznosti nekonkurence
Non-compete obligations in the context of technology licensing take the form of an obligation on the licensee not to use third party technologies which compete with the licensed technology.
Obveznosti nekonkurence v okviru tehnoloških licenc imajo obliko obveznosti, naložene pridobitelju licence, da ne uporablja tehnologij tretjih, ki so konkurenčne licenčni tehnologiji.
To the extent that a non-compete obligation covers a product or additional technology supplied by the licensor the obligation is dealt with in the preceding section on tying.
Če obveznost nekonkurence vključuje izdelek ali dodatno tehnologijo, ki ju dobavlja dajalec licence, je obveznost obravnavana v prejšnjem podpoglavju o vezanju licenc.
The TTBER exempts non-compete obligations both in the case of agreements between competitors and in the case of agreements between non-competitors up to the market share thresholds of 20 % and 30 % respectively.
V skladu s TTBER so obveznosti nekonkurence predmet skupinske izjeme tako v primeru sporazumov med konkurenti kot v primeru sporazumov med nekonkurenti, če ni presežen 20-odstotni prag tržnega deleža oziroma 30-odstotni prag tržnega deleža.
The main competitive risk presented by non-compete obligations is foreclosure of third party technologies.
Poglavitno tveganje, ki ga imajo za konkurenco obveznosti nekonkurence, je omejevanje dostopa na trg tehnologijam tretjih.
Non-compete obligations may also facilitate collusion between licensors in the case of cumulative use.
Obveznosti nekonkurence lahko tudi olajšajo dogovarjanje med dajalci licenc v primeru kumulativne uporabe.
Foreclosure of competing technologies reduces competitive pressure on royalties charged by the licensor and reduces competition between the incumbent technologies by limiting the possibilities for licensees to substitute between competing technologies.
Izključitev konkurenčnih tehnologij zmanjšuje konkurenčni pritisk na licenčnine, ki jih določa dajalec licence, in zmanjšuje konkurenco med uveljavljenimi tehnologijami, tako da pridobiteljem licenc omejuje možnosti prehoda z ene konkurenčne tehnologije na drugo.
As in both cases the main problem is foreclosure, the analysis can in general be the same in the case of agreements between competitors and agreements between non-competitors.
Ker je v obeh primerih poglavitna težava izključitev, je lahko analiza na splošno enaka za sporazume med konkurenti in sporazume med nekonkurenti.
However, in the case of cross licensing between competitors where both agree not to use third party technologies the agreement may facilitate collusion between them on the product market, thereby justifying the lower market share threshold of 20 %.
Vendar pa lahko v primeru navzkrižnega licenciranja med konkurenti, pri katerem se obe stranki sporazumeta, da ne bosta uporabljali tehnologij tretjih, sporazum med njima olajša dogovarjanje na proizvodnem trgu, kar upravičuje določitev nižjega praga tržnega deleža, tj. 20 %.
Foreclosure may arise where a substantial part of potential licensees are already tied to one or, in the case of cumulative effects, more sources of technology and are prevented from exploiting competing technologies.
Zaprtje trga se lahko pojavi, če je znaten del potencialnih pridobiteljev licenc že vezanih na en vir tehnologije ali – v primeru kumulativnih učinkov – na več virov tehnologije in če jim je onemogočeno izkoriščanje konkurenčnih tehnologij.
Foreclosure effects may result from agreements concluded by a single licensor with a significant degree of market power or by a cumulative effect of agreements concluded by several licensors, even where each individual agreement or network of agreements is covered by the TTBER.
Učinki omejevanja dostopa na trg so lahko posledica sporazumov, ki jih sklene en sam dajalec licence z znatno stopnjo tržne moči, ali kumulativnih učinkov sporazumov, ki jih sklene več dajalcev licenc, tudi če sta vsak posamezni sporazum ali mreža sporazumov zajeta v TTBER.
In the latter case, however, a serious cumulative effect is unlikely to arise as long as less than 50 % of the market is tied.
Vendar pa v slednjem primeru ni verjetno, da bi se pojavil pomemben kumulativni učinek, dokler je delež vezanega trga manjši od 50 %.
Above this threshold significant foreclosure is likely to occur when there are relatively high barriers to entry for new licensees.
Nad tem pragom se lahko pojavi znatna izključitev, če obstajajo razmeroma velike vstopne ovire za nove pridobitelje licenc.
If barriers to entry are low, new licensees are able to enter the market and exploit commercially attractive technologies held by third parties and thus represent a real alternative to incumbent licensees.
Če so vstopne ovire majhne, lahko novi pridobitelji licenc vstopijo na trg in izkoriščajo poslovno privlačne tehnologije tretjih in tako predstavljajo pravo alternativo že uveljavljenim pridobiteljem licenc.
In order to determine the real possibility for entry and expansion by third parties it is also necessary to take account of the extent to which distributors are tied to licensees by non-compete obligations.
Da se določijo realne možnosti za vstop in širitev tretjih, je treba prav tako upoštevati, v kolikšni meri so distributerji z obveznostmi nekonkurence vezani na pridobitelje licenc.
Third party technologies only have a real possibility of entry if they have access to the necessary production and distribution assets.
Tehnologije tretjih imajo realne možnosti za vstop na trg, le če imajo dostop do potrebnih proizvodnih in distribucijskih zmogljivosti.
In other words, the ease of entry depends not only on the availability of licensees but also the extent to which they have access to distribution.
Drugače povedano preprost dostop ni odvisen le od razpoložljivosti pridobiteljev licenc, temveč tudi od tega, v kolikšni meri imajo dostop do distribucije.
In assessing foreclosure effects at the distribution level the EFTA Surveillance Authority will apply the analytical framework set out in section IV.2.1 of the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [67].
Pri presoji izključitvenih učinkov in učinkov omejevanja dostopa na trg na ravni distribucije bo Nadzorni organ EFTA uporabil analitični okvir iz podpoglavja IV.2.1 Smernic o vertikalnih omejitvah [67].
When the licensor has a significant degree of market power, obligations on licensees to obtain the technology only from the licensor can lead to significant foreclosure effects.
Če ima dajalec licence znatno stopnjo tržne moči, lahko obveznosti, naložene pridobiteljem licenc, da tehnologijo pridobijo le od dajalca licence, privedejo do znatnih izključitvenih učinkov.
The stronger the market position of the licensor the higher the risk of foreclosing competing technologies.
Močnejši kot je tržni položaj dajalca licence, večje je tveganje izključitve konkurenčnih tehnologij iz trga.
For appreciable foreclosure effects to occur the non-compete obligations do not necessarily have to cover a substantial part of the market.
Da se pojavijo znatni izključitveni učinki, ni nujno, da obveznosti nekonkurence pokrivajo znaten del trga.
Even in the absence thereof, appreciable foreclosure effects may occur where non-compete obligations are targeted at undertakings that are the most likely to license competing technologies.
Tudi če jih ni, se lahko znatni izključitveni učinki pojavijo, če so obveznosti nekonkurence usmerjene na podjetja, za katera je najverjetneje, da bi podelila licence za konkurenčne tehnologije.
The risk of foreclosure is particularly high where there is only a limited number of potential licensees and the licence agreement concerns a technology which is used by the licensees to make an input for their own use.
Tveganje izključitve je še posebej visoko, če obstaja le omejeno število potencialnih pridobiteljev licenc in se licenčni sporazum nanaša na tehnologijo, ki jo pridobitelji licenc uporabljajo za izdelavo proizvodnega vložka za svojo lastno uporabo.
In such cases the entry barriers for a new licensor are likely to be high.
V takšnih okoliščinah je verjetno, da bodo vstopne ovire za novega dajalca licence velike.
Foreclosure may be less likely in cases where the technology is used to make a product that is sold to third parties; although in this case the restriction also ties production capacity for the input in question, it does not tie demand for the product incorporating the input produced with the licensed technology.
Izključitev je lahko manj verjetna v primerih, ko se tehnologija uporablja za proizvodnjo izdelkov, ki se prodajajo tretjim; kljub temu, da v tem primeru omejevanje veže tudi proizvodne zmogljivosti zadevnega proizvodnega dejavnika, ne veže povpraševanja po izdelku, ki vključuje proizvodni vložek, proizveden z licenčno tehnologijo.
To enter the market in the latter case licensors only need access to one or more licensee(s) that have suitable production capacity and unless only few undertakings possess or are able to obtain the assets required to take a licence, it is unlikely that by imposing non-compete obligations on its licensees the licensor is able to deny competitors access to efficient licensees.
Da bi dajalci licenc v slednjem primeru vstopili na trg, potrebujejo le dostop do enega ali več pridobiteljev licenc, ki imajo ustrezne proizvodne zmogljivosti in je malo verjetno – razen če le nekaj podjetij ima ali je sposobnih pridobiti sredstva, potrebna za prevzem licence – da bi dajalec licence lahko z naložitvijo obveznosti nekonkurence pridobiteljem licence konkurentom zavrnil dostop do učinkovitih pridobiteljev licenc.
Non-compete obligations may also produce pro-competitive effects.
Obveznosti nekonkurence lahko povzročijo tudi učinke, ki spodbujajo konkurenco.
First, such obligations may promote dissemination of technology by reducing the risk of misappropriation of the licensed technology, in particular know-how.
Prvič lahko takšne obveznosti spodbujajo razširjanje tehnologije z zmanjšanjem tveganja nezakonite uporabe licenčne tehnologije, zlasti tehničnega znanja in izkušenj.
If a licensee is entitled to license competing technologies from third parties, there is a risk that particularly licensed know-how would be used in the exploitation of competing technologies and thus benefit competitors.
Če ima pridobitelj licence pravico, da pridobi licenco za konkurenčne tehnologije od tretjih, obstaja tveganje, da se zlasti licenčno znanje in izkušnje uporabijo za izkoriščanje konkurenčnih tehnologij in torej koristijo konkurentom.
When a licensee also exploits competing technologies, it normally also makes monitoring of royalty payments more difficult, which may act as a disincentive to licensing.
Če pridobitelj licence izkorišča tudi konkurenčne tehnologije, je običajno oteženo tudi spremljanje plačil licenčnin, kar lahko nespodbudno vpliva na podeljevanje licenc.
Second, non-compete obligations possibly in combination with an exclusive territory may be necessary to ensure that the licensee has an incentive to invest in and exploit the licensed technology effectively.
Drugič, obveznosti nekonkurence – po možnosti združene z dodelitvijo izključnega ozemlja – se lahko izkažejo kot potrebne, da se za pridobitelja licence ustvarijo spodbude za vlaganje in učinkovito izkoriščanje licenčne tehnologije.
In cases where the agreement is caught by Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement because of an appreciable foreclosure effect, it may be necessary in order to benefit from Article 53(3) to choose a less restrictive alternative, for instance to impose minimum output or royalty obligations, which normally have less potential to foreclose competing technologies.
Če je sporazum zajet v prepovedi iz člena 53(1) Sporazuma EGP zaradi znatnega izključitvenega učinka, je za to, da se lahko koristijo ugodnosti iz člena 53(3), morda treba izbrati manj omejevalno alternativo, na primer določiti obveznosti glede najnižjega obsega proizvodnje ali najnižjih licenčnin, ki imajo praviloma manj možnosti, da konkurenčnim tehnologijam preprečijo dostop na trg.
Third, in cases where the licensor undertakes to make significant client-specific investments for instance in training and tailoring of the licensed technology to the licensee’s needs, non-compete obligations or alternatively minimum output or minimum royalty obligations may be necessary to induce the licensor to make the investment and to avoid hold-up problems.
Tretjič, če se dajalec licence zaveže, da bo izvedel obsežne naložbe, ki se osredotočajo na potrebe kupca, na primer na področju usposabljanja in prilagajanja licenčne tehnologije potrebam pridobitelja licence, so lahko obveznosti nekonkurence oziroma obveznosti, povezane z najnižjim obsegom proizvodnje ali najnižjimi licenčninami, potrebne, da je dajalec licence spodbujen k izvedbi naložbe in da se prepreči t. i. problem zadržanja.
However, normally the licensor will be able to charge directly for such investments by way of a lump sum payment, implying that less restrictive alternatives are available.
Vendar pa bo običajno dajalec licence imel možnost neposredno zaračunati za takšne naložbe v obliki pavšalnih plačil, kar pomeni, da obstajajo manj omejevalne alternative.
Settlement and non-assertion agreements
Sporazumi o poravnavi in sporazumi o neuveljavljanju pravic
Licensing may serve as a means of settling disputes or avoiding that one party exercises his intellectual property rights to prevent the other party from exploiting his own technology.
Podeljevanje licenc se lahko uporabi tudi kot sredstvo za reševanje sporov ali za preprečitev, da bi ena stranka uveljavljala svoje pravice intelektualne lastnine z namenom preprečiti drugi stranki sporazuma izkoriščanje lastne tehnologije.
Licensing including cross licensing in the context of settlement agreements and non-assertion agreements is not as such restrictive of competition since it allows the parties to exploit their technologies post agreement.
Podeljevanje licenc, vključno z navzkrižnim podeljevanjem licenc v okviru sporazumov o poravnavi in sporazumov o neuveljavljanju pravic, samo po sebi ne omejuje konkurence, saj strankam sporazuma omogoča, da izkoriščajo svoje tehnologije po sklenitvi sporazuma.
However, the individual terms and conditions of such agreements may be caught by Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Vendar pa so lahko posamezni pogoji iz takšnih sporazumov zajeti v členu 53(1) Sporazuma EGP.
Licensing in the context of settlement agreements is treated like other licence agreements.
Podeljevanje licenc v okviru sporazumov o poravnavi se obravnava kot drugi licenčni sporazumi.
In the case of technologies that from a technical point of view are substitutes, it is therefore necessary to assess to what extent it is likely that the technologies in question are in a one-way or two-way blocking position (cf. paragraph 32 above).
V primeru tehnologij, ki so s tehničnega vidika nadomestne, je zato treba oceniti, v kolikšnem obsegu je verjetno, da so zadevne tehnologije v položaju enostranskega ali dvostranskega blokiranja (glej odstavek 32 zgoraj).
If so, the parties are not deemed to be competitors.
V takem primeru se stranke ne obravnavajo kot konkurenti.
The block exemption applies provided that the agreement does not contain any hardcore restrictions of competition as set out in Article 4 of the TTBER.
Skupinska izjema se uporablja pod pogojem, da sporazum ne vsebuje nobene nedopustne omejitve konkurence iz člena 4 TTBER.
The hardcore list of Article 4(1) may in particular apply where it was clear to the parties that no blocking position exists and that consequently they are competitors.
Seznam nedopustnih omejitev iz člena 4(1) se lahko zlasti uporablja, če je bilo strankam očitno, da ni bilo nobenega položaja blokiranja in da so si bile zato konkurenti.
In such cases the settlement is merely a means to restrict competition that existed in the absence of the agreement.
V takšnih primerih je poravnava le sredstvo za omejevanje konkurence, ki je obstajala pred sklenitvijo sporazuma.
In cases where it is likely that in the absence of the licence the licensee could be excluded from the market, the agreement is generally pro-competitive.
V primerih, ko je verjetno, da bi bil pridobitelj licence v odsotnosti licence lahko izključen iz trga, ima sporazum na splošno spodbujevalni učinek na konkurenco.
Restrictions that limit intra-technology competition between the licensor and the licensee are often compatible with Article 53, see section 2 above.
Omejitve, ki omejujejo konkurenco med dajalcem in pridobiteljem licence znotraj tehnologij, so pogosto združljive s členom 53, glej podpoglavje 2 zgoraj.
Agreements whereby the parties cross license each other and impose restrictions on the use of their technologies, including restrictions on the licensing to third parties, may be caught by Article 53(1).
Sporazumi, s katerimi si stranke navzkrižno podeljujejo licence in nalagajo omejitve pri uporabi svojih tehnologij, vključno z omejitvami, ki se nanašajo na licenciranje tretjim, so lahko zajeti v prepovedi iz člena 53(1).
Where the parties have a significant degree of market power and the agreement imposes restrictions that clearly go beyond what is required in order to unblock, the agreement is likely to be caught by Article 53(1) even if it is likely that a mutual blocking position exists.
Če imajo stranke znatno stopnjo tržne moči in sporazum določa omejitve, ki očitno presegajo tisto, kar je potrebno za odpravo položaja blokiranja, obstaja verjetnost, da je sporazum zajet v prepovedi iz člena 53(1), tudi če je verjetno, da bo obstajal položaj medsebojnega blokiranja.
Article 53(1) is particularly likely to apply where the parties share markets or fix reciprocal running royalties that have a significant impact on market prices.
Člen 53(1) se lahko zlasti uporablja, če si stranke razdelijo trge ali določijo plačilo vzajemnih tekočih licenčnin, ki imajo znaten vpliv na tržne cene.
Where under the agreement the parties are entitled to use each other’s technology and the agreement extends to future developments, it is necessary to assess what is the impact of the agreement on the parties’ incentive to innovate.
Če imata stranki na podlagi sporazuma pravico do medsebojne uporabe svojih tehnologij in če ta pravica vključuje tudi prihodnji razvoj tehnologije, je treba oceniti vpliv sporazuma na spodbudo strank za inovacije.
In cases where the parties have a significant degree of market power the agreement is likely to be caught by Article 53(1) where the agreement prevents the parties from gaining a competitive lead over each other.
Kadar imata stranki znatno stopnjo tržne moči, je verjetno, da bo sporazum zajet v členu 53(1), če je strankama v skladu s sporazumom preprečeno, da bi si ena stranka pred drugo pridobila konkurenčno prednost.
Agreements that eliminate or substantially reduce the possibilities of one party to gain a competitive lead over the other reduce the incentive to innovate and thus adversely affect an essential part of the competitive process.
Sporazumi, ki odpravijo ali znatno zmanjšajo možnosti, da bi ena stranka pridobila konkurenčno prednost pred drugo, zmanjšajo spodbudo za inovacije in tako škodljivo vplivajo na poglavitno sestavino konkurenčnega procesa.
Such agreements are also unlikely to satisfy the conditions of Article 53(3).
Prav tako je malo verjetno, da bi takšni sporazumi izpolnjevali pogoje iz člena 53(3).
It is particularly unlikely that the restriction can be considered indispensable within the meaning of the third condition of Article 53(3).
Še posebej ni verjetno, da bi se lahko omejitev štela za nujno v smislu tretjega pogoja iz člena 53(3).
The achievement of the objective of the agreement, namely to ensure that the parties can continue to exploit their own technology without being blocked by the other party, does not require that the parties agree to share future innovations.
Za izpolnitev cilja sporazuma, tj. zagotoviti, da lahko vsaka od strank še naprej izkorišča svojo lastno tehnologijo, ne da bi ji druga stranka to preprečila, ni nujno, da se stranki sporazumeta, da si bosta delili prihodnje inovacije.
However, the parties are unlikely to be prevented from gaining a competitive lead over each other where the purpose of the licence is to allow the parties to develop their respective technologies and where the licence does not lead them to use the same technological solutions.
Vendar pa je malo verjetno, da bi bilo strankama preprečeno pridobiti konkurenčno prednost pred drugo, če je namen licence strankama omogočiti, da razvijeta svoji tehnologiji, in če ju licenca ne vodi k uporabi istih tehnoloških rešitev.
Such agreements merely create design freedom by preventing future infringement claims by the other party.
Takšni sporazumi ustvarjajo zgolj svobodo oblikovanja, s tem da preprečujejo, da bi v prihodnosti druga stranka vložila tožbo zaradi kršitve pravic.