natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
AS Oslo Sporveier granted a quality bonus to AS Sporveisbussene of NOK 3,9 million in 2004.
Podjetje AS Oslo Sporveier je leta 2004 bonus za kakovost v višini 3,9 milijona NOK dodelilo podjetju AS Sporveisbussene.
This represents 0,8 % of the revenue of AS Sporveisbussene that year (NOK 483,5 million).
Ta znesek pomeni 0,8 % prihodka podjetja AS Sporveisbussene v navedenem letu (483,5 milijona NOK).
The underfunding had accumulated over several years as the payments of premiums to the pension fund did not take adequate account of increased pension obligations resulting from factors such as increases in the employees’ salaries, longer life expectancy, changes in expected rates of disability etc. According to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet), the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier had coverage of only 46,9 % per 31 December 1995.
Ta se je kopičil nekaj let, saj se pri vplačevanju premij v pokojninski sklad niso upoštevale večje pokojninske obveznosti, ki so izhajale iz dejavnikov, kot so zvišanja plač za zaposlene, daljša pričakovana življenjska doba, spremembe v pričakovanih stopnjah invalidnosti itd. Po navedbah Finančnega nadzornega organa Norveške („Kredittilsynet“) je pokojninski sklad podjetja AS Oslo Sporveier na dan 31. decembra 1995 lahko pokril samo 46,9 % obveznosti.
Municipal pension funds with coverage below 95 % must be increased with a minimum of 1,5 % per year [53].
Občinski pokojninski sklad, ki krije manj kot 95 % obveznosti, se mora povečati za najmanj 1,5 % na leto [53].
Consequently, a payment plan to eliminate the shortfall by 2020 was laid down.
Zato je bil določen načrt plačevanja za odpravo primanjkljaja do leta 2020.
This plan was approved by the Financial Supervisory Authority on 9 July 1997.
Ta načrt je 9. julija 1997 potrdil Finančni nadzorni organ.
The change took effect on 1 June 2004.
Sprememba je bila opravljena 1. junija 2004.
Under the then applicable Norwegian law, all premiums intended to cover the shortfall had to be paid in full, before AS Sporveisbussene could transfer its pension obligations from one fund to another [57].
V skladu s takrat veljavno norveško zakonodajo, je bilo treba vse premije, namenjene za kritje primanjkljaja, izplačati v celoti, še preden bi podjetje AS Sporveisbussene lahko preneslo svoje pokojninske obveznosti iz enega sklada v drugega [57].
Except for a minor deficit of NOK 29000 in 1998, the operations had run with a profit since the start up in 1994.
Storitve so ustvarjale dobiček vse od začetkov v letu 1994, razen manjše izgube v višini 29000 NOK v letu 1998.
The Norwegian authorities have furthermore provided the Authority with a strategy document from 2003 for the commercial bus operations run by AS Sporveisbussene (“the 2003 strategy document”), where the stated goal for 2003 was to generate a gross profit of NOK 1,5 million (before overhead costs) and a turnover of NOK 14,1 million.
Norveški organi so Nadzornemu organu poslali tudi strateški dokument iz leta 2003 za komercialne avtobusne storitve, ki jih izvaja podjetje AS Sporveisbussene, v katerem je opredeljeni cilj za leto 2003 ustvariti bruto dobiček v višini 1,5 milijona NOK (pred režijskimi stroški) in promet v višini 14,1 milijona NOK.
Within that context, they stress that, contrary to the presentation of the facts in the opening decision [72], Oslo Municipality had actually become the sole owner of AS Oslo Sporveier in 2002, before the capital injection was carried out in 2004.
V tem okviru poudarjajo, da je občina Oslo v nasprotju s predstavitvijo dejstev v odločbi o začetku postopka [72] leta 2002 dejansko postala edina lastnica podjetja AS Oslo Sporveier, torej pred kapitalskim vložkom v letu 2004.
In addition, the Norwegian authorities have provided the Authority with information about the financial viability of the commercial bus operations.
Poleg tega so norveški organi Nadzornemu organu poslali informacijo o finančni uspešnosti komercialnih avtobusnih prevozov.
According to the 2003 strategy document for the commercial bus operations, the goal for 2003 was to generate a gross profit of NOK 1,5 million (before overhead costs) and a turnover of NOK 14,1 million.
V skladu s strateškim dokumentom iz leta 2003 o komercialnih avtobusnih storitvah je bil cilj za leto 2003 ustvariti bruto dobiček v višini 1,5 milijona NOK (pred režijskimi stroški) in promet v višini 14,1 milijona NOK.
Furthermore, as regards the public service capital injection, the Authority considers that AS Sporveisbussene received the capital injection to cover the underfunding of pension obligations that had accrued before 1997.
Nadzorni organ v zvezi s kapitalskim vložkom v javne storitve tudi meni, da je podjetje AS Sporveisbussene prejelo kapitalski vložek za kritje primanjkljaja v pokojninskih obveznostih, ki je nastal pred letom 1997.
It appears that the entire capital injection was used for this purpose.
Videti je, da je bil celotni kapitalski vložek uporabljen za ta namen.
It was obliged to do so every year until 2008.
To je namreč morala storiti vsako leto do leta 2008.
It is also evident that the compensation was and could only be granted for the purpose of financing local scheduled bus transport in Oslo.
Razvidno je tudi, da je nadomestilo bilo in bi lahko bilo dodeljeno samo za financiranje lokalnih rednih avtobusnih prevozov v Oslu.
As described above, the provisions providing for the scheme have been in place since before the EEA Agreement entered into force in Norway on 1 January 1994.
Kot je opisano zgoraj, so določbe, s katerimi je določena shema, veljale že pred 1. januarjem 1994, ko je na Norveškem začel veljati Sporazum EGP.
As it appears that the market for local bus transport was already exposed to some competition on that date, the Authority is of the view that the measure constitutes an existing aid scheme that existed before January 1994 and remained applicable thereafter.
Ker se zdi, da je bil trg lokalnega avtobusnega prevoza takrat že izpostavljen določeni meri konkurence, Nadzorni organ meni, da ukrep pomeni obstoječo shemo pomoči, ki je obstajala pred januarjem 1994 in se uporablja vse od takrat.
The administrative practice relating to the financing of the transport service remained substantially unchanged under the Transport Agreement concluded in 1997.
Upravna praksa v zvezi s financiranjem prevoznih storitev je v osnovi ostala nespremenjena na podlagi prevoznega sporazuma, sklenjenega leta 1997.
Additionally, the reorganisation did not involve any changes to the CTA or CTR.
Poleg tega v reorganizacijo niso bile vključene nobene spremembe ZKP ali UKP.
Other than the temporal prolongation, no changes with regard to the public service mission or its remuneration were made to the concession renewed with effect from 1 January 2000.
Razen začasnega podaljšanja se koncesija, ki je bila obnovljena z učinkom od 1. januarja 2000, v zvezi z nalogami javne storitve ali njenim plačilom ni spremenila.
AS Sporveisbussene simply continued, on the same terms, to carry out the public service on behalf of AS Oslo Sporveier on the basis of the concession, that merely constitutes an administrative act that implemented the provisions of the CTA concerning the operation and financing of the public scheduled services and which did not involve any changes in the way these services were to be carried out.
Podjetje AS Sporveisbussene je pod istimi pogoji preprosto nadaljevalo izvajanje javnih storitev v imenu podjetja AS Oslo Sporveier na podlagi koncesije, ki zgolj pomeni upravni akt, s katerim so se izvajale določbe ZKP v zvezi z izvajanjem in financiranjem javnih rednih storitev ter v katerega niso bile vključene nobene spremembe glede načina izvajanja teh storitev.
AS Oslo Sporveier introduced a new bonus/malus system in 2004.
Podjetje AS Oslo Sporveier je leta 2004 uvedlo nov sistem bonusov/malusov.
The Norwegian authorities have explained that this system constitutes part of the public service compensation for the provision of local scheduled bus transport in Oslo.
Norveški organi so pojasnili, da je ta sistem del nadomestila za javne storitve na področju izvajanja storitev lokalnega rednega avtobusnega prevoza v Oslu.
It aimed at increasing the quality of the services provided and was implemented within the CTA on 1 January 2008.
Cilj sistema je bil povečati kakovost izvajanih storitev, v okviru ZKP pa se je začel izvajati 1. januarja 2008.
As explained above, for the period 1994 to 2005 the average annual return for the public service was 1,98 %.
Kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj je povprečni letni donos za javne storitve v obdobju 1994–2005 znašal 1,98 %.
The system for allocating common costs for the services between AS Sporveisbussene and its subsidiaries changed in 2003 and a new system based on overheads was put in effect as from 2004.
Sistem za dodelitev skupnih stroškov za storitve med podjetje AS Sporveisbussene in njegova odvisna podjetja, se je spremenil leta 2003, nov sistem, ki je temeljil na režijskih stroških, pa je začel veljati leta 2004.
Under that system, the bus companies carried a proportionate share of common costs based on their turnover.
V okviru navedenega sistema so imela avtobusna podjetja sorazmeren delež skupnih stroškov na podlagi njihovega donosa.
Thus, a payment plan to remedy the fund’s shortfall by 2020 was implemented.
Zato je bil sprejet načrt plačil, po katerem bi se primanjkljaj v skladu odpravil do leta 2020.
In accordance with that plan, Oslo Municipality increased the public service compensation for AS Oslo Sporveier in order to cover all the costs incurred by the provision of the public service.
V skladu z navedenim načrtom je občina Oslo povečala nadomestila za javne storitve za podjetje AS Oslo Sporveier, da bi pokrila vse stroške, nastale pri izvajanju javnih storitev.
As stated in the preparatory works, chapter 10.1 of Prop.
Kot je navedeno v pripravljalnih delih, poglavje 10.1 Predl.
The two contributions would be viewed as separate transactions, to be treated separately for tax purposes, see Advance Ruling 22/05 by the Norwegian Directorate of Taxes, available online (in Norwegian): http://www.skatteetaten.no/Templates/BindendeForhandsuttalelse.aspx?id=28885.
Dva prispevka pomenita ločeni transakciji, ki bi ju bilo treba za davčne namene tudi ločeno obravnavati, glej zavezujočo informacijo št. 22/05 norveškega Davčnega direktorata, ki je na voljo na spletni strani (v norveščini): http://www.skatteetaten.no/Templates/BindendeForhandsuttalelse.aspx?id=28885.
This entails that under certain circumstances, group contributions could be made and tax consolidation could be achieved without altering the grantors’ net equity.
Iz tega sledi, da bi se prispevki znotraj skupine v določenih okoliščinah lahko zagotovili in da bi se davčna konsolidacija lahko dosegla brez spreminjanja neto lastniškega kapitala podjetij, ki prispevke dodeljujejo.
Additionally, the Norwegian authorities provided further information in meetings in Oslo on 29 November 2011 and in Brussels on 9 December 2011 and 17 January 2012. By e-mails of 13 December 2011 (Event No 621639) and 20 January 2012 (Event No 622816), the Norwegian authorities submitted further information.
Dodatne informacije so zagotovili tudi na sestankih v Oslu dne 29. novembra 2011 ter v Bruslju dne 9. decembra 2011 in 17. januarja 2012; posredovali so jih tudi v elektronskem dopisu z dne 13. decembra 2011 (ev. št. 621639) in 20. januarja 2012 (ev. št. 622816).
No 521/12/COL
št. 521/12/COL
to close the formal State aid investigation procedure initiated by Decision No 363/11/COL with regard to State aid to three Icelandic investment banks through rescheduled loans on preferential terms (Iceland)
o zaključku formalnega postopka preiskave državne pomoči, uvedenega z Odločbo št. 363/11/COL, v zvezi z državno pomočjo, dodeljeno trem islandskim investicijskim bankam prek reprogramiranih posojil pod ugodnejšimi pogoji (Islandija)
THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘the Authority’),
NADZORNI ORGAN EFTE (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Nadzorni organ) je –
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 and Protocol 26,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum EGP) ter zlasti člena 61 Sporazuma in Protokola 26 k Sporazumu,
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum o nadzornem organu in sodišču) ter zlasti člena 24 Sporazuma,
HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I and Article 4(4) and Article 6 of Part II.
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Protokol 3) ter zlasti člena 1(3) dela I ter člena 4(4) in člena 6 dela II,
HAVING called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to those provisions [1] and having regard to their comments,
PO POZIVU vsem zainteresiranim stranem, naj predložijo svoje pripombe v skladu z navedenimi določbami [1], in ob upoštevanju teh pripomb,
By letter dated 22 June 2010, the Authority received a complaint from the Icelandic securities firm H.F.
Nadzorni organ Efte (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Nadzorni organ) je v dopisu z dne 22. junija 2010 od islandske družbe H.F.
Verðbréf hf. alleging that the Icelandic Treasury had in March 2009 granted unlawful State aid to the investment banks Saga Capital and VBS through conversion of short-term debt with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘the CBI’) to long-term loans on favourable terms.
Verðbréf hf., ki posluje z vrednostnimi papirji, prejel pritožbo z navedbami o tem, da naj bi državna zakladnica Islandije marca 2009 investicijskima bankama Saga Capital in VBS s preoblikovanjem kratkoročnega dolga pri Centralni banki Islandije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: CBI) v dolgoročna posojila pod ugodnimi pogoji odobrila nezakonito državno pomoč.
The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 7 July 2010 (Event No 563424).
Nadzorni organ je dopis prejel in evidentiral 7. julija 2010 (ev. št. 563424).
Having received the relevant information from the Icelandic authorities and having discussed the case with them in a meeting on 6 June 2011 [2], the Authority decided by Decision No 363/11/COL of 23 November 2011 to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to State aid to three Icelandic investment banks through rescheduled loans on preferential terms [3].
Nadzorni organ je po prejetju ustreznih informacij od islandskih organov in razpravi z njimi o tej zadevi na sestanku 6. junija 2011 [2] z Odločbo št. 363/11/COL z dne 23. novembra 2011 odločil, da začne formalni postopek preiskave v zvezi z državno pomočjo trem islandskim investicijskim bankam prek reprogramiranih posojil pod ugodnejšimi pogoji [3].
By means of this Decision, the Authority called on interested parties to submit their comments.
Z navedeno odločbo je Nadzorni organ zainteresirane strani pozval k predložitvi pripomb.
By letter dated 21 February 2012 (Event No 625875), the Icelandic authorities submitted comments on the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL.
Z dopisom z dne 21. februarja 2012 (ev. št. 625875) so islandski organi predložili pripombe glede Odločbe Nadzornega organa št. 363/11/COL.
In June 2012 the Authority received information from the complainant, H.F.
Nadzorni organ je junija 2012 od pritožnika, družbe H.F.
Verðbréf hf., regarding the winding-up process of Saga Capital hf.
Verðbréf hf., prejel informacije v zvezi s postopkom prenehanja banke Saga Capital hf.
(Event No 641907).
(ev. št. 641907).
The Authority has also received information on this matter from other sources and followed closely the winding-up process of the investment banks that were the subject of the Decision No 363/11/COL.
Nadzorni organ je informacije o tej zadevi prejel tudi od drugih virov in je natančno spremljal postopek prenehanja investicijskih bank, ki so bile predmet Odločbe št. 363/11/COL.
The CBI’s collateral loans and securities lending scheme
Shema zavarovanih posojil in posojanja vrednostnih papirjev CBI
The measures that were under preliminary assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL are linked to the CBI’s collateral and securities lending scheme.
Ukrepi, za katere je bila v Odločbi Nadzornega organa št. 363/11/COL izvedena predhodna ocena, so povezani s shemo zavarovanih posojil in posojanja vrednostnih papirjev CBI.
The CBI, as part of its role as a central bank and lender of last resort and in line with the monetary policy of other central banks, provided short-term credit facilities to financial undertaking in the form of collateral loans [4], in accordance with the provisions of CBI rules pertaining thereto.
CBI je v okviru svoje vloge centralne banke in zadnjega možnega posojilodajalca ter glede na denarno politiko drugih centralnih bank zagotovila finančnim podjetjem kratkoročne kredite v obliki zavarovanih posojil [4] v skladu z zadevnimi določbami pravil CBI.
In 2007 and 2008 collateral lending increased steadily and the CBI became the financial undertakings’ main source of liquidity.
Leta 2007 in 2008 so se zavarovana posojila postopoma zviševala in CBI je postala glavni vir likvidnosti zadevnih finančnih podjetij.
At the time of the financial collapse of the three Icelandic commercial banks in October 2008, the CBI had acquired considerable claims against domestic financial undertakings, which were backed by collateral of various types.
Ob finančnem zlomu treh islandskih komercialnih bank oktobra 2008 je CBI pridobila znatne terjatve do domačih finančnih podjetij, ki so bile krite z različnimi vrstami zavarovanj.
Due to the banks’ collapse, the value of the collateral diminished and it became clear that the CBI had sustained losses due to unsound collateral.
Zaradi zloma bank se je vrednost zavarovanj zmanjšala in postalo je jasno, da je CBI zaradi nezanesljivih zavarovanj utrpela izgube.
After the Parliament had given its authorisation, the Treasury and the CBI concluded an agreement in January 2009, according to which the CBI assigned a part of its claims of collateral loans against financial undertakings, along with underlying securities, to the Ministry of Finance.
Po odobritvi Parlamenta sta zakladnica in CBI januarja 2009 sklenili sporazum, v skladu s katerim je CBI del svojih terjatev do finančnih podjetij za zavarovana posojila in osnovne vrednostne papirje prenesla na ministrstvo za finance.
In February 2010 the Ministry and the CBI agreed that the claims previously transferred by the CBI to the Ministry should be transferred back to Eignarhaldsfélag Seðlabanka Íslands (ESÍ), a recently established holding company of the CBI, at a reduced price as of 31 December 2009.
Februarja 2010 sta se ministrstvo in CBI dogovorila, da je treba terjatve, ki jih je CBI pred tem prenesla na ministrstvo, prenesti nazaj na banko Eignarhaldsfélag Seðlabanka Íslands (ESÍ), nedavno ustanovljen holding CBI, po znižani ceni, ki velja od 31. decembra 2009.
The Government Debt Management (GDM), which is administered by the CBI, offers lending facilities to primary dealers of government securities.
Mehanizem za upravljanje javnega dolga, s katerim upravlja CBI, primarnim vpisnikom državnih vrednostnih papirjev daje na voljo posojilne instrumente.
The purpose of this securities lending is to improve market functionality and to maintain liquidity in the market for bond series that the GDM is building up.
Posojanje vrednostnih papirjev je namenjeno izboljšanju delovanja trga in ohranjanju likvidnosti na trgu za serijo obveznic, ki jo pripravlja zadevni sektor.
The securities accepted by the GDM as collateral for the Treasury Bonds and Bills are all government bonds and mortgage benchmark bonds traded electronically in the secondary market.
Vrednostni papirji, ki se v okviru mehanizma za upravljanje javnega dolga sprejmejo kot zavarovanje za zakladne obveznice in menice, so vse državne obveznice in hipotekarne referenčne obveznice, s katerimi se trguje elektronsko na sekundarnem trgu.
Other electronically traded securities may also be accepted depending on the criteria specified in the facility.
Glede na merila, določena v okviru posojilnega instrumenta, se lahko sprejmejo tudi drugi vrednostni papirji, s katerimi se trguje elektronsko.
The interest rate for these loans is based on the CBI repo rate.
Obrestna mera za ta posojila je določena na podlagi obrestne mere dogovora CBI o ponovnem odkupu.
The maximum contract period is 28 days [5].
Najdaljše pogodbeno obdobje je 28 dni [5].
Conversion of short-term credit facilities to long-term loans
Preoblikovanje kratkoročnih kreditov v dolgoročna posojila
In March 2009 the Ministry of Finance concluded loan conversion agreements with Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. and Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
Ministrstvo za finance je marca 2009 z bankami Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. in Askar Capital Investment Bank hf. sklenilo sporazume o preoblikovanju dolga.
The loan agreements were all concluded on similar terms.
Vsi sporazumi so bili sklenjeni pod podobnimi pogoji.
They were repayable over the next seven years with indexation and an interest rate of 2 % per annum.
Vrniti jih je bilo treba v naslednjih sedmih letih z indeksacijo in letno obrestno mero 2 %.
The repayment terms of the loan to Askar Capital were similar, except that the annual interest rate was 3 %.
Pogoji odplačevanja posojila banki Askar Capital so bili podobni, vendar je letna obrestna mera znašala 3 %.
The total nominal amount of debt, attributable to the three investment banks, at the time of issue of the long-term bonds, was ISK 52,4 billion [6].
Celotni nominalni znesek dolga, ki se nanaša na tri investicijske banke, je v času izdaje dolgoročnih obveznic znašal 52,4 milijarde ISK [6].
The aforementioned measures were based on the proposals of a Working Group which on 20 January 2009 submitted a memorandum to the Minister of Finance for the restructuring of debt owed by financial undertakings due to collateral loan facilities with the CBI.
Zgoraj navedeni ukrepi so temeljili na predlogih delovne skupine, ki je 20. januarja 2009 ministrstvu za finance predložila memorandum o prestrukturiranju dolga finančnih podjetij zaradi instrumenta za zavarovana posojila pri CBI.
The memorandum was based on information regarding the financial undertakings and their ability to repay the debt.
Memorandum je temeljil na informacijah o finančnih podjetjih in njihovi zmožnosti za poplačilo dolga.
According to the memorandum, the financial undertakings concerned were, due to the implications of the financial collapse in Iceland, unable to pay their debts to the CBI in full.
V skladu z memorandumom zadevna finančna podjetja zaradi posledic finančnega zloma v Islandiji niso mogla v celoti poplačati dolgov do CBI.
The memorandum of the Minister’s Working Group also states that at the time, the entire apparatus of the Icelandic authorities had been preoccupied with trying to keep the country’s financial system operating and protecting the interest of deposit holders.
V memorandumu ministrove delovne skupine je tudi navedeno, da si je v tistem času celotni ustroj islandskih organov prizadeval predvsem za ohranitev delovanja državnega finančnega sistema in zaščito interesa imetnikov vlog.
Bearing that in mind, along with other considerations, it was considered necessary to make certain arrangements in order to ensure that the undertakings would be able to pay off their debts.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega in drugih preudarkov se je štelo za nujno, da se poskrbi za določene ureditve, s katerimi bi se podjetjem zagotovila možnost poplačila dolgov.