natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This means that an undertaking should not be endowed with public resources which could be used to finance market-distorting activities not linked to the restructuring process.
To pomeni, da podjetje ne sme biti financirano z javnimi sredstvi, ki bi jih lahko uporabilo za financiranje dejavnosti, ki izkrivljajo trg in niso povezane s prestrukturiranjem.
For example, acquisitions of shares in other undertakings or new investments cannot be financed through State aid unless this is essential for restoring an undertaking’s viability [29].
Z državno pomočjo se na primer ne smejo financirati nakupi delnic drugih podjetij ali nove naložbe, razen če je to nujno za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja podjetja [29].
Limitation of the amount of aid, significant own contribution
Omejitev višine pomoči in znaten lastni prispevek
In order to limit the aid amount to the minimum necessary, banks should first use their own resources to finance restructuring.
Zaradi omejitve višine pomoči na najnižjo potrebno morajo banke za financiranje prestrukturiranja najprej uporabiti svoje lastne vire.
This may involve, for instance, the sale of assets.
To lahko vključuje na primer prodajo aktive.
State support should be granted on terms which represent an adequate burden-sharing of the costs [30].
Državno pomoč je treba dodeliti pod pogoji, ki zagotavljajo ustrezno porazdelitev bremena stroškov [30].
This means that the costs associated with the restructuring are not only borne by the State but also by those who invested in the bank, by absorbing losses with available capital and by paying an adequate remuneration for state interventions [31].
To pomeni, da stroškov, povezanih s prestrukturiranjem, ne krije le država, temveč tudi tisti, ki so vlagali v banko, in sicer tako, da izgube absorbirajo z razpoložljivim kapitalom in za državno pomoč plačajo ustrezno nadomestilo [31].
Nonetheless, the Authority considers that it is not appropriate to fix thresholds concerning burden-sharing ex ante in the context of the current systemic crisis, having regard to the objective of facilitating access to private capital and a return to normal market conditions.
Kljub temu Nadzorni organ ob upoštevanju cilja, da se olajša dostop do zasebnega kapitala in ponovno vzpostavijo običajni tržni pogoji, meni, da v razmerah sedanje sistemske krize ni primerno vnaprej določiti fiksnih pragov glede porazdelitve bremena.
Any derogation from an adequate burden-sharing ex ante which may have been exceptionally granted in the rescue phase for reasons of financial stability must be compensated by a further contribution at a later stage of the restructuring, for example in the form of claw-back clauses and/or by farther-reaching restructuring including additional measures to limit distortions of competition [32].
Vsako odstopanje od ustrezne vnaprejšnje porazdelitve bremena, ki je bilo izjemoma odobreno v fazi reševanja zaradi ohranjanja finančne stabilnosti, je treba nadomestiti s prispevkom na poznejši stopnji prestrukturiranja, na primer v obliki klavzul za vračilo sredstev in/ali daljnosežnejšega prestrukturiranja, vključno z dodatnimi ukrepi za omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence [32].
Banks should be able to remunerate capital, including in the form of dividends and coupons on outstanding subordinated debt, out of profits generated by their activities.
Banke morajo biti sposobne iz dobičkov, ki jih ustvarijo s svojimi dejavnostmi, izplačati delničarje in lastnike hibridnega kapitala, med drugim v obliki dividend in kuponov na neodplačane podrejene dolgove.
However, banks should not use State aid to remunerate own funds (equity and subordinated debt) when those activities do not generate sufficient profits.
Vendar pa banke ne smejo uporabiti državne pomoči za izplačila za lastna sredstva (lastniški kapital in podrejeni dolg), če navedene dejavnosti ne ustvarjajo zadostnih dobičkov.
Therefore, in a restructuring context, the discretionary offset of losses (for example by releasing reserves or reducing equity) by beneficiary banks in order to guarantee the payment of dividends and coupons on outstanding subordinated debt, is in principle not compatible with the objective of burden sharing [33].
Zato v okviru prestrukturiranja diskrecijska izravnava izgub s strani bank upravičenk (npr. s sprostitvijo rezerv ali zmanjšanjem lastniškega kapitala), da bi zagotovile izplačilo dividend in kuponov na neodplačani podrejeni dolg, načeloma ni združljiva s ciljem porazdelitve bremena [33].
This may need to be balanced with ensuring the refinancing capability of the bank and the exit incentives [34].
Treba jo je uravnovesiti z zagotavljanjem sposobnosti banke za refinanciranje in pobud za izstop [34].
In the interests of promoting refinancing by the beneficiary bank, the Authority may favourably regard the payment of coupons on newly issued hybrid capital instruments with greater seniority over existing subordinated debt.
Da bi spodbujal banke upravičenke k refinanciranju, lahko Nadzorni organ ugodno obravnava izplačilo kuponov za novoizdane hibridne kapitalske instrumente, ki imajo prednost pred obstoječim podrejenim dolgom.
In any case, banks should not normally be allowed to purchase their own shares during the restructuring phase.
V vsakem primeru pa naj banke v fazi prestrukturiranja praviloma ne bi kupovale lastnih deležev.
Limiting distortions of competition and ensuring a competitive banking sector
Omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence in zagotavljanje konkurenčnega bančnega sektorja
Types of distortion
Vrste izkrivljanj
Whilst State aid can support financial stability in times of systemic crisis, with wider positive spillovers, it can nevertheless create distortions of competition in various ways.
Čeprav državna pomoč v času sistemske krize lahko podpira finančno stabilnost in ima še širše pozitivne učinke, pa lahko kljub temu na različne načine povzroči izkrivljanje konkurence.
Where banks compete on the merits of their products and services, those which accumulate excessive risk and/or rely on unsustainable business models will ultimately lose market share and, possibly, exit the market while more efficient competitors expand on or enter the markets concerned.
Če si banke konkurirajo in je pri tem odločilna kakovost njihovih proizvodov in storitev, bodo tiste, ki poslujejo pretirano tvegano in/ali uporabljajo nezanesljive poslovne modele, na koncu izgubile tržni delež in morda izstopile s trga, medtem ko se bodo učinkovitejše konkurentke širile ali vstopale na zadevne trge.
State aid prolongs past distortions of competition created by excessive risk-taking and unsustainable business models by artificially supporting the market power of beneficiaries.
Državna pomoč podaljšuje pretekla izkrivljanja konkurence, ki so jih povzročili pretirano tvegano poslovanje in nevzdržni poslovni modeli, saj umetno podpira tržno moč upravičenk.
In this way it may create a moral hazard for the beneficiaries, while weakening the incentives for non-beneficiaries to compete, invest and innovate.
Na ta način lahko ustvarja moralno tveganje za upravičenke, hkrati pa slabi spodbude za konkurenčno ravnanje, naložbe in inovacije bank, ki niso upravičene do pomoči.
Finally, State aid may undermine the single market by shifting an unfair share of the burden of structural adjustment and the attendant social and economic problems to other EFTA States, whilst at the same time creating entry barriers and undermining incentives for cross-border activities.
Nazadnje lahko državna pomoč s tem, ko nepravičen delež bremena strukturnih prilagoditev in spremljajočih socialnih in ekonomskih problemov prenese na druge države Efte, omaje enotni trg, hkrati pa ustvarja ovire za vstop in zmanjša spodbude za čezmejne aktivnosti.
Financial stability remains the overriding objective of aid to the financial sector in a systemic crisis, but safeguarding systemic stability in the short-term should not result in longer-term damage to the level playing field and competitive markets.
Finančna stabilnost ostaja glavni cilj pomoči, dodeljene finančnemu sektorju v sistemski krizi, vendar pa kratkoročno ohranjanje sistemske stabilnosti ne sme povzročiti dolgoročnejše škode pri zagotavljanju enakih pogojev in konkurenčnih trgov.
In a situation of financial, economic and budgetary crisis, differences between EFTA States in terms of resources available for state intervention become even more pronounced, and harm the level-playing field in the single market.
V razmerah finančne, gospodarske in proračunske krize postanejo razlike med državami Efte glede razpoložljivih virov za državne posege še bolj očitne in škodujejo zagotavljanju enakih pogojev na enotnem trgu.
Second, national interventions in the current crisis will, by their very nature, tend to focus on the national markets and hence seriously risk leading to retrenchment behind national borders and to a fragmentation of the single market.
Drugič, države članice v razmerah trenutne krize razumljivo dajejo večji poudarek svojim nacionalnim trgom, zato obstaja resna nevarnost, da se umaknejo na svoje nacionalne trge, kar lahko povzroči fragmentacijo enotnega trga.
Market presence of aid beneficiaries needs to be assessed with a view to ensuring effective competition and preventing market power, entry barriers and disincentives for cross-border activities to the detriment of EEA businesses and consumers.
Treba je oceniti prisotnost upravičenk na trgu, da se zagotovi učinkovita konkurenca ter preprečijo tržna moč, ovire za vstop na trg in ovire za čezmejno poslovanje, ki škodijo interesom podjetij in potrošnikov v EGP.
Third, the current scale of the public intervention necessary for financial stability and the possible limits to normal burden sharing are bound to create even greater moral hazard that needs to be properly corrected to prevent perverse incentives and excessively risky behaviour from reoccurring in the future and to pave the way for a rapid return to normal market conditions without state support.
Tretjič, sedanji obseg državnih posegov, potrebnih za ohranjanje finančne stabilnosti, in morebitne omejitve v običajni porazdelitvi bremena bodo nedvomno še povečali moralno tveganje, ki ga je treba ustrezno zmanjšati, da ne bi v prihodnosti ponovno prišlo do neprimernih spodbud in pretirano tveganega ravnanja in da se ustvarijo možnosti za hitro ponovno vzpostavitev običajnih tržnih pogojev brez državne pomoči.
Applying effective and proportionate measures limiting distortions of competition
Uporaba učinkovitih in sorazmernih ukrepov, ki omejujejo izkrivljanje konkurence
Measures to limit the distortion of competition should be tailor-made to address the distortions identified on the markets where the beneficiary bank operates following its return to viability post restructuring, while at the same time adhering to a common policy and principles.
Ukrepi za omejitev izkrivljanja konkurence morajo biti prilagojeni razmeram na trgih, na katerih banka upravičenka po prestrukturiranju ponovno uspešno posluje, poleg tega pa morajo biti skladni s skupno politiko in načeli.
The Authority takes as a starting point for its assessment of the need for such measures, the size, scale and scope of the activities that the bank in question would have upon implementation of a credible restructuring plan as foreseen in Section 2 of this Chapter.
Ocena Nadzornega organa glede potrebe po takih ukrepih temelji na vrednosti in obsegu dejavnosti, ki bi jih zadevna banka opravljala po izvedbi kredibilnega načrta prestrukturiranja, predvidenega v oddelku 2 tega poglavja.
Depending on the nature of the distortion of competition, it may be addressed through measures in respect of liabilities and/or in respect of assets [35].
Glede na naravo izkrivljanja konkurence so ukrepi lahko povezani z obveznostmi in/ali sredstvi [35].
The nature and form of such measures will depend on two criteria: first, the amount of the aid and the conditions and circumstances under which it was granted and, second, the characteristics of the market or markets on which the beneficiary bank will operate.
Narava in oblika takih ukrepov se določi na podlagi dveh meril: prvič, na podlagi višine pomoči ter pogojev in okoliščin, v katerih je bila pomoč dodeljena, in drugič, na podlagi značilnosti trgov, na katerih bo poslovala banka upravičenka.
As regards the first criterion, measures limiting distortions will vary significantly according to the amount of the aid as well as the degree of burden sharing and the level of pricing.
Pri prvem merilu se ukrepi za omejitev izkrivljanja konkurence zelo razlikujejo glede na višino pomoči, pa tudi stopnjo porazdelitve bremena in višino nadomestila.
In this context, the amount of State aid will be assessed both in absolute terms (amount of capital received, aid element in guarantees and asset relief measures) and in relation to the bank's risk-weighted assets.
V tem okviru bo državna pomoč ocenjena tako v absolutnem smislu (znesek prejetega kapitala, element pomoči v jamstvih in ukrepi finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva) kot tudi v razmerju do tveganju prilagojene tehtane aktive banke.
The Authority will consider the total amount of aid granted to the beneficiary including any kind of rescue aid.
Nadzorni organ bo upošteval celotni znesek pomoči, dodeljen upravičenki, vključno z morebitno pomočjo za reševanje.
In the same vein, the Authority will take into account the extent of the beneficiary's own contribution and burden sharing over the restructuring period.
Podobno bo Nadzorni organ upošteval tudi višino lastnega prispevka upravičenke in porazdelitev bremena v obdobju prestrukturiranja.
Generally speaking, where there is greater burden sharing and the own contribution is higher, there are fewer negative consequences resulting from moral hazard.
Na splošno je negativnih posledic moralnega tveganja manj, če sta porazdelitev bremena in lastni prispevek večja.
Therefore, the need for further measures is reduced [36].
S tem se zmanjša potreba po nadaljnjih ukrepih [36].
As regards the second criterion, the Authority will analyse the likely effects of the aid on the markets where the beneficiary bank operates after the restructuring.
Pri drugem merilu bo Nadzorni organ analiziral verjetne učinke pomoči na trge, na katerih banka posluje po prestrukturiranju.
First of all, the size and the relative importance of the bank on its market or markets, once it is made viable, will be examined.
Najprej bo proučil velikost in relativno moč banke na trgih, na katerih ponovno uspešno posluje.
If the restructured bank has limited remaining market presence, additional constraints, in the form of divestments or behavioural commitments, are less likely to be needed.
Če je banka po prestrukturiranju na trgih ohranila le omejeno prisotnost, je manj verjetno, da bodo potrebne dodatne omejitve v obliki odprodaje ali zavez glede ravnanja.
The measures will be tailored to market characteristics [37] to make sure that effective competition is preserved.
Ukrepi bodo prilagojeni značilnostim trgov [37], da se zagotovi ohranjanje učinkovite konkurence.
In some areas, divestments may generate adverse consequences and may not be necessary in order to achieve the desired outcomes, in which case the limitation of organic growth may be preferred to divestments.
Na nekaterih področjih ima lahko odprodaja negativne posledice in ni nujno potrebna za doseganje želenih rezultatov. V tem primeru je lahko omejitev organske rasti boljša rešitev.
In other areas, especially those involving national markets with high entry barriers, divestments may be needed to enable entry or expansion of competitors.
Na drugih področjih, zlasti tistih, ki vključujejo nacionalne trge z močnimi ovirami za vstop, pa bo morda potrebna odprodaja, da se omogoči vstop na trg ali širitev konkurentov.
Measures limiting distortions of competition should not compromise the prospects of the bank's return to viability.
Ukrepi za omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence ne smejo poslabšati možnosti banke, da začne spet uspešno poslovati.
Finally, the Authority will pay attention to the risk that restructuring measures may undermine internal market and will view positively measures that help to ensure that national markets remain open and contestable.
Nadzorni organ bo pozoren tudi na tveganje, da bi ukrepi prestrukturiranja omajali notranji trg, in bo pozitivno ocenil ukrepe, ki podpirajo nadaljnjo odprtost nacionalnih trgov in konkuriranje na njih.
While aid is granted to maintain financial stability and lending to the real economy in the granting EFTA State, where such aid is also conditional upon the beneficiary bank respecting certain lending targets in EFTA States other than the State which grants the aid, this may be regarded as an important additional positive effect of the aid.
Pomoč je namenjena ohranjanju finančne stabilnosti in zagotavljanju posojil realnemu gospodarstvu v državi Efte, ki dodeli pomoč; če pa je taka pomoč pogojena tudi z določenimi cilji glede zagotavljanja posojil, ki jih mora spoštovati banka upravičenka, v drugih državah Efte poleg tiste, ki dodeli pomoč, se to lahko šteje za pomemben dodaten pozitivni učinek pomoči.
This will particularly be the case where the lending targets are substantial relative to a credible counterfactual, where achievement of such targets is subject to adequate monitoring (for example, through cooperation between the home and host State supervisors), where the banking system of the host State is dominated by banks with headquarters abroad and where such lending commitments have been coordinated at Community level (for example, in the framework of liquidity assistance negotiations).
To velja še zlasti, kadar je ciljna raven za zagotavljanje posojil v primerjavi z verjetnim scenarijem brez določene ciljne ravni znatna, kadar se doseganje navedenih ciljev ustrezno spremlja (npr. s sodelovanjem med nadzornimi organi v državi, ki je dodelila pomoč, in drugih državah), kadar v bančnem sistemu države, ki je dodelila pomoč, prevladujejo banke s sedežem v tujini, in kadar se take zaveze glede zagotavljanja posojil usklajujejo na ravni Skupnosti (na primer v okviru pogajanj o likvidnostni pomoči).
Setting the appropriate price for State aid
Določitev primerne cene državne pomoči
Adequate remuneration of any state intervention generally is one of the most appropriate limitations of distortions of competition, as it limits the amount of aid.
Primerno plačilo za vsak poseg države je običajno eden od najustreznejših načinov za omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence, saj omeji višino pomoči.
Where the entry price has been set at a level significantly below the market price for reasons of financial stability, it should be ensured that the terms of the financial support are revised in the restructuring plan [38] so as to reduce the distortive effect of the subsidy.
Če je vstopna cena zaradi ohranjanja finančne stabilnosti občutno nižja od tržne cene, je treba zagotoviti, da se pogoji finančne pomoči v načrtu prestrukturiranja revidirajo [38], da se zmanjša izkrivljajoči učinek subvencije.
Structural measures — divestiture and reduction of business activities
Strukturni ukrepi – odprodaja in zmanjšanje poslovnih dejavnosti
On the basis of an assessment in accordance with the criteria of this Section, banks benefiting from State aid may be required to divest subsidiaries or branches, portfolios of customers or business units, or to undertake other such measures [39], including on the domestic retail market of the aid beneficiary.
Na podlagi ocene v skladu z merili, določenimi v tem oddelku, se lahko od bank, ki prejmejo državno pomoč, zahteva, da odprodajo hčerinske družbe ali podružnice, portfelje strank ali poslovne enote, ali da sprejmejo druge tovrstne ukrepe [39], tudi na domačem maloprodajnem trgu prejemnice pomoči.
In order for such measures to increase competition and contribute to the internal market, they should favour the entry of competitors and cross-border activity [40].
Da bi taki ukrepi pospeševali konkurenco in prispevali k ohranjanju notranjega trga, morajo olajšati vstop konkurentov in čezmejne dejavnosti [40].
In line with the requirement of restoration of viability, the Authority will take a positive view of such structural measures if they are undertaken without discrimination between businesses in different EFTA States, thus contributing to the preservation of an internal market in financial services.
V skladu z zahtevo po ponovni vzpostavitvi uspešnega poslovanja bo Nadzorni organ take strukturne ukrepe ocenil pozitivno, če bodo sprejeti brez diskriminacije med podjetji v različnih državah Efte in bodo tako prispevali k ohranjanju notranjega trga na področju finančnih storitev.
A limit on the bank’s expansion in certain business or geographical areas may also be required, for instance via market-oriented remedies such as specific capital requirements, where competition in the market would be weakened by direct restrictions on expansion or to limit moral hazard.
Morda bo potrebna tudi omejitev širjenja banke na nekaterih poslovnih področjih ali geografskih območjih, na primer s tržno naravnanimi ukrepi, kot so posebne kapitalske zahteve, če bi neposredne omejitve širjenja oslabile konkurenco na trgu ali za zmanjšanje moralnega tveganja.
At the same time, the Authority will pay particular attention to the need to avoid retrenchment within national borders and a fragmentation of the single market.
Hkrati bo Nadzorni organ namenil posebno pozornost potrebi, da se preprečita umik na nacionalne trge in fragmentacija enotnega trga.
Where finding a buyer for subsidiaries or other activities or assets appears objectively difficult, the Authority will extend the time period for the implementation of those measures, if a binding timetable for scaling down businesses (including segregation of business lines) is provided.
Če se bo iskanje kupca hčerinskih družb oziroma drugih dejavnosti ali sredstev izkazalo za objektivno težavno, bo Nadzorni organ podaljšal rok za izvedbo navedenih ukrepov, pod pogojem, da bo predložen zavezujoč časovni načrt za zmanjšanje poslovnih dejavnosti (vključno z ločevanjem poslovnih področij).
However, the time period for implementing those measures should not exceed five years.
Vendar pa rok za izvedbo teh ukrepov ne sme biti daljši od petih let.
In assessing the scope of structural remedies required to overcome distortions of competition in a given case, and with due regard to the principle of equal treatment, the Authority will take into account the measures provided for in cases relating to the same markets or market segments at the same time.
Nadzorni organ bo pri oceni potrebnega obsega strukturnih ukrepov za odpravo izkrivljanja konkurence v danem primeru ob ustreznem upoštevanju načela enakega obravnavanja upošteval ukrepe, predvidene v primerih, ki istočasno zadevajo iste trge ali dele trgov.
Avoiding the use of State aid to fund anti-competitive behaviour
Preprečevanje uporabe državne pomoči za financiranje protikonkurenčnega ravnanja
State aid must not be used to the detriment of competitors which do not enjoy similar public support [41].
Državna pomoč se ne sme uporabljati na škodo konkurentov, ki niso deležni podobne državne pomoči [41].
Subject to point 41, banks should not use State aid for the acquisition of competing businesses [42].
Razen v izjemnih primerih iz točke 41 banke ne smejo uporabljati državne pomoči za prevzem konkurenčnih dejavnosti [42].
This condition should apply for at least three years and may continue until the end of the restructuring period, depending on the scope, size and duration of the aid.
Ta pogoj mora veljati najmanj tri leta, glede na obseg, višino in trajanje pomoči pa lahko velja do konca obdobja prestrukturiranja.
In exceptional circumstances and upon notification, acquisitions may be authorised by the Authority where they are part of a consolidation process necessary to restore financial stability or to ensure effective competition.
V izjemnih okoliščinah lahko Nadzorni organ odobri prevzem (ki ga je treba priglasiti), če je ta sestavni del konsolidacije, ki je potrebna za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja ali za zagotavljanje učinkovite konkurence.