natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is therefore important to analyse the nature of the agreement in terms of the competitive relationship between the parties and the restraints that it contains.
Negativni učinki na tržno konkurenco, ki so lahko posledica omejevalnih sporazumov o prenosu tehnologije, vključujejo:
In the latter regard it is necessary to go beyond the express terms of the agreement.
zmanjšanje konkurence med tehnologijami med podjetji, ki poslujejo na tehnološkem trgu ali na trgu izdelkov, ki vključujejo zadevne tehnologije, vključno s spodbujanjem nedovoljenega dogovarjanja, bodisi izrecnega bodisi tihega;
The existence of implicit restraints may be derived from the way in which the agreement has been implemented by the parties and from the incentives that they face.
ter
The market position of the parties, including any undertakings de facto or de jure controlled by the parties, provides an indication of the degree of market power, if any, possessed by the licensor, the licensee or both.
zmanjšanje konkurence znotraj tehnologij med podjetji, ki proizvajajo izdelke na podlagi iste tehnologije.
The higher their market share the greater their market power is likely to be.
Sporazumi o prenosu tehnologije lahko zmanjšajo konkurenco med tehnologijami, torej konkurenco med podjetji, ki podeljujejo licence ali proizvajajo na podlagi nadomestnih tehnologij.
This is particularly so where the market share reflects cost advantages or other competitive advantages vis-à-vis competitors.
To zlasti velja v primeru nalaganja medsebojnih obveznosti.
These competitive advantages may for instance result from being a first mover in the market, from holding essential patents or from having superior technology.
Če si na primer konkurenti med seboj prenesejo konkurenčne tehnologije in si naložijo medsebojno obveznost, da si bodo vzajemno zagotavljali prihodnje izboljšave lastnih tehnologij, in če tak sporazum preprečuje enemu konkurentu pridobitev tehnološke prednosti pred drugim, je konkurenca med udeleženkami na področju inovacij omejena (glej tudi točko 241 v nadaljevanju).
However, market shares are always only one factor in assessing market positions.
Podeljevanje licenc med konkurenti lahko tudi omogoči nedovoljeno dogovarjanje.
For instance, in particular in the case of technology markets, market shares may not always be a good indicator of the relative strength of the technology in question and the market share figures may differ considerably depending on the different calculation methods.
Nevarnost nedovoljenega dogovarjanja je zlasti velika na koncentriranih trgih.
Market shares and possible competitive advantages and disadvantages are also used to assess the market position of competitors.
Pogoj za nedovoljeno dogovarjanje je, da imajo zadevna podjetja podobna stališča glede svojih skupnih interesov in delovanja mehanizmov usklajevanja.
The stronger the actual competitors and the greater their number the less risk there is that the parties will be able to exercise market power individually.
Da bi nedovoljeno dogovarjanje na trgu delovalo, morajo imeti podjetja prav tako možnost medsebojnega spremljanja ravnanja drugega na trgu, obstajati pa morajo tudi ustrezna odvračilna sredstva, ki zagotavljajo spodbudo, da se ne odstopa od skupne politike na trgu, medtem ko morajo biti vstopne ovire dovolj velike za omejitev vstopa ali širitve zunanjih konkurentov.
However, if the number of competitors is rather small and their market position (size, costs, R & D potential, etc.) is rather similar, this market structure may increase the risk of collusion.
Sporazumi lahko spodbujajo nedovoljeno dogovarjanje z večanjem preglednosti trga, nadzorovanjem nekaterih ravnanj in večanjem vstopnih ovir.
The market position of buyers provides an indication of whether or not one or more buyers possess buyer power.
Nedovoljeno dogovarjanje se lahko izjemoma spodbuja tudi z licenčnimi sporazumi, ki povzročajo visoko stopnjo izenačevanja stroškov, ker je pri podjetjih, ki imajo podobne stroške, večja verjetnost, da imajo podobna stališča glede usklajevanja [75].
The first indicator of buyer power is the market share of the buyer on the purchase market.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko vplivajo na konkurenco med tehnologijami tudi z vzpostavljanjem ovir za vstop in širitev konkurentov.
This share reflects the importance of its demand for possible suppliers.
Taki učinki omejevanja dostopa na trg so lahko posledica omejitev, ki pridobiteljem licenc preprečujejo pridobiti licenco od tretjih oseb ali jih od tega odvračajo.
Other indicators focus on the position of the buyer on its resale market, including characteristics such as a wide geographic spread of its outlets, and its brand image amongst final consumers.
Tretje osebe so lahko na primer izključene iz trga, če že prisotni dajalci licenc pridobiteljem licenc nalagajo prepovedi konkurence v takšnem obsegu, da je tretjim osebam na razpolago nezadostno število pridobiteljev licenc, in če je vstop na ravni pridobiteljev licenc otežen.
In some circumstances buyer power may prevent the licensor and/or the licensee from exercising market power on the market and thereby solve a competition problem that would otherwise have existed.
Dobaviteljem nadomestnih tehnologij je dostop na trg lahko preprečen tudi, če dajalec licence z zadostno stopnjo tržne moči veže skupaj različne dele tehnologije in jih licencira v paketu, medtem ko je le del paketa bistven pri proizvodnji določenega izdelka.
This is particularly so when strong buyers have the capacity and the incentive to bring new sources of supply on to the market in the case of a small but permanent increase in relative prices.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko tudi zmanjšajo konkurenco znotraj tehnologij, torej konkurenco med podjetji, ki proizvajajo na podlagi iste tehnologije.
Where the strong buyers merely extract favourable terms from the supplier or simply pass on any price increase to their customers, the position of the buyers is not such as to prevent the exercise of market power by the licensee on the product market and therefore not such as to solve the competition problem on that market [74].
Sporazum, ki pridobiteljem licenc nalaga ozemeljske omejitve in jim tako prepreči prodajo na ozemljih drugih pridobiteljev, zmanjšuje konkurenco med njimi.
Entry barriers are measured by the extent to which incumbent companies can increase their price above the competitive level without attracting new entry.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko zmanjšajo konkurenco znotraj tehnologij tudi z omogočanjem nedovoljenega dogovarjanja med pridobitelji licenc.
In the absence of entry barriers, easy and quick entry would render price increases unprofitable.
Poleg tega lahko licenčni sporazumi, ki zmanjšujejo konkurenco znotraj tehnologij, omogočajo nedovoljeno dogovarjanje med lastniki konkurenčnih tehnologij ali zmanjšajo konkurenco med tehnologijami s povečevanjem vstopnih ovir.
When effective entry, preventing or eroding the exercise of market power, is likely to occur within one or two years, entry barriers can, as a general rule, be said to be low.
Celo omejevalni licenčni sporazumi imajo pogosto tudi za konkurenco pozitivne učinke v obliki učinkovitosti, ki lahko odtehtajo njihove protikonkurenčne učinke.
Entry barriers may result from a wide variety of factors such as economies of scale and scope, government regulations, especially where they establish exclusive rights, state aid, import tariffs, intellectual property rights, ownership of resources where the supply is limited due to for instance natural limitations, essential facilities, a first mover advantage or brand loyalty of consumers created by strong advertising over a period of time.
Ta presoja morebitnih za konkurenco pozitivnih učinkov se opravi v okviru člena 53(3), ki vsebuje izjemo glede uporabe prepovedi iz člena 53(1) Pogodbe.
Restrictive agreements entered into by undertakings may also work as an entry barrier by making access more difficult and foreclosing (potential) competitors.
Če naj se to odstopanje uporabi, mora licenčni sporazum ustvariti objektivne gospodarske koristi, omejevanje konkurence mora biti nujno za uresničitev učinkovitosti, potrošnikom mora biti zagotovljen pravičen delež povečanih učinkovitosti, sporazum pa pogodbenicama ne sme dati možnosti izključitve konkurence glede znatnega dela zadevnih izdelkov.
Entry barriers may be present at all stages of the research and development, production and distribution process.
Podjetje, ki se sklicuje na člen 53(3), mora s prepričljivimi trditvami in dokazi dokazati, da so izpolnjeni pogoji za upravičenost do izjeme [76].
The question whether certain of these factors should be described as entry barriers depends particularly on whether they entail sunk costs.
Presoja omejevalnih sporazumov na podlagi člena 53(3) se opravi v okviru dejanskih okoliščin sporazuma [77] in na podlagi dejstev, ki obstajajo v danem trenutku.
Sunk costs are those costs which have to be incurred to enter or be active on a market but which are lost when the market is exited.
Ta presoja zato upošteva vsebinske spremembe dejstev.
The more costs are sunk, the more potential entrants have to weigh the risks of entering the market and the more credibly incumbents can threaten that they will match new competition, as sunk costs make it costly for incumbents to leave the market.
Pravilo o izjemi iz člena 53(3) se uporablja, dokler so izpolnjeni vsi štirje pogoji, in se preneha uporabljati, ko to več ne drži [78].
In general, entry requires sunk costs, sometimes minor and sometimes major.
Vendar pa je treba pri uporabi člena 53(3) upoštevati začetne nepovratne naložbe katere koli izmed pogodbenic ter čas in omejitve, ki so potrebni, da se izvedejo in povrnejo naložbe, povezane s povečanjem učinkovitosti.
In a mature market, that is to say a market that has existed for some time, where the technology used is well known and widespread and not changing very much and in which demand is relatively stable or declining, restrictions of competition are more likely to have negative effects than in more dynamic markets.
Tveganje, ki sta mu izpostavljeni pogodbenici, in nepovratne naložbe, ki jih je treba opraviti za izvedbo sporazuma, lahko torej privedejo do tega, da – odvisno od primera – sporazum ne spada na področje uporabe člena 53(1) ali pa izpolnjuje pogoje iz člena 53(3) v obdobju, ki je potrebno, da se naložbe povrnejo.
In the assessment of particular restraints other factors may have to be taken into account.
Prvi pogoj iz člena 53(3) zahteva presojo objektivnih koristi z vidika učinkovitosti, ki jih ustvari sporazum.
Such factors include cumulative effects, that is to say, the coverage of the market by similar agreements, the duration of the agreements, the regulatory environment and behaviour that may indicate or facilitate collusion such as price leadership, pre-announced price changes and discussions on the ‘right’ price, price rigidity in response to excess capacity, price discrimination and past collusive behaviour.
V zvezi s tem lahko licenčni sporazumi združijo dopolnilne tehnologije in druga sredstva, s čimer omogočijo uvedbo novih oziroma izboljšanih izdelkov na trg ali proizvodnjo obstoječih izdelkov z manjšimi stroški.
The negative effects on competition on the market that may result from restrictive technology transfer agreements include the following:
Zunaj okvira nedopustnih kartelov je podeljevanje licenc pogosto, ker je licenciranje tehnologije za dajalca licence učinkovitejše od njenega izkoriščanja.
reduction of inter-technology competition between the companies operating on a technology market or on a market for products incorporating the technologies in question, including facilitation of collusion, both explicit and tacit;
To se zlasti lahko zgodi, če ima pridobitelj licence že dostop do potrebnih proizvodnih sredstev.
foreclosure of competitors by raising their costs, restricting their access to essential inputs or otherwise raising barriers to entry;
Sporazum pridobitelju licence omogoča, da pridobi dostop do tehnologije, ki jo lahko združi z navedenimi sredstvi, kar mu omogoča izkoriščanje novih ali izboljšanih tehnologij.
and
Še en primer, v katerem lahko podelitev licence potencialno izboljša učinkovitosti, je, če pridobitelj licence že ima tehnologijo in če združitev te tehnologije s tehnologijo dajalca licence ustvarja sinergije.
reduction of intra-technology competition between undertakings that produce products on the basis of the same technology.
V primeru združitve obeh tehnologij lahko pridobitelj licence doseže razmerje med stroški in obsegom proizvodnje, ki sicer ne bi bilo možno.
Technology transfer agreements may reduce inter-technology competition, that is to say, competition between undertakings that license or produce on the basis of substitutable technologies.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko prav tako kot vertikalni sporazumi o distribuciji privedejo do učinkovitosti na ravni distribucije.
This is particularly the case where reciprocal obligations are imposed.
Take učinkovitosti so lahko v obliki prihrankov stroškov ali v obliki zagotavljanja kakovostnih storitev potrošnikom.
For instance, where competitors transfer competing technologies to each other and impose a reciprocal obligation to provide each other with future improvements of their respective technologies and where this agreement prevents either competitor from gaining a technological lead over the other, competition in innovation between the parties is restricted (see also point (241) below).
Pozitivni učinki vertikalnih sporazumov so opisani v Smernicah Nadzornega organa o vertikalnih omejitvah [79].
Licensing between competitors may also facilitate collusion.
Tudi sporazumi, pri katerih lastniki tehnologije združijo tehnologije v paket, ki ga licencirajo tretjim osebam, lahko privedejo do povečanja učinkovitosti.
The risk of collusion is particularly high in concentrated markets.
Taki dogovori o združevanju lahko zlasti zmanjšajo transakcijske stroške, ker pridobiteljem licenc ni treba sklepati ločenih licenčnih sporazumov z vsakim dajalcem licence posebej.
Collusion requires that the undertakings concerned have similar views on what is in their common interest and on how the coordination mechanisms function.
Podeljevanje licenc lahko prav tako spodbuja konkurenco, tako da zagotavlja svobodo oblikovanja.
For collusion to work the undertakings must also be able to monitor each other's market behaviour and there must be adequate deterrents to ensure that there is an incentive not to depart from the common policy on the market, while entry barriers must be high enough to limit entry or expansion by outsiders.
V sektorjih, v katerih obstaja veliko število pravic intelektualne lastnine in v katerih lahko posamezni izdelki kršijo številne obstoječe in prihodnje lastninske pravice, licenčni sporazumi, s katerimi se pogodbenici sporazumeta, da ne bosta uveljavljali lastninskih pravic nasproti drugi, pogosto spodbujajo konkurenco, ker pogodbenicama omogočajo, da razvijata lastne tehnologije, ne da bi bili izpostavljeni tveganju posledičnih tožb zaradi kršitve pravic.
Agreements can facilitate collusion by increasing transparency in the market, by controlling certain behaviour and by raising barriers to entry.
Nadzorni organ bo pri uporabi preskusa nujnosti iz člena 53(3) zlasti proučil, ali posamične omejitve omogočajo učinkovitejše izvajanje zadevne dejavnosti, kot bi bilo mogoče v odsotnosti zadevne omejitve.
Collusion can also exceptionally be facilitated by licensing agreements that lead to a high degree of commonality of costs, because undertakings that have similar costs are more likely to have similar views on the terms of coordination [75].
Pri tej presoji je treba upoštevati tržne pogoje in dejanske okoliščine, s katerimi se srečujeta pogodbenici.
Licence agreements may also affect inter-technology competition by creating barriers to entry for and expansion by competitors.
Podjetjem, ki se sklicujejo na uporabo člena 53(3), ni treba proučiti hipotetičnih in teoretičnih alternativ.
Such foreclosure effects may stem from restraints that prevent licensees from licensing from third parties or create disincentives for them to do so.
Vendar pa morajo pojasniti in ponazoriti, zakaj bi bile na videz realne in precej manj omejevalne alternative znatno manj učinkovite.
For instance, third parties may be foreclosed where incumbent licensors impose non-compete obligations on licensees to such an extent that an insufficient number of licensees are available to third parties and where entry at the level of licensees is difficult.
Če bi uporaba na videz poslovno realne in manj omejevalne alternative povzročila znatne izgube učinkovitosti, se zadevna omejitev šteje za nujno.
Suppliers of substitutable technologies may also be foreclosed where a licensor with a sufficient degree of market power ties together various parts of a technology and licenses them together as a package while only part of the package is essential to produce a certain product.
V nekaterih primerih je morda prav tako treba proučiti, ali je sporazum kot tak nujen za doseganje učinkovitosti.
Licence agreements may also reduce intra-technology competition, that is to say, competition between undertakings that produce on the basis of the same technology.
To lahko na primer velja v primeru tehnoloških združenj, ki vključujejo dopolnilne, vendar nebistvene tehnologije [80], pri čemer je treba proučiti, v kolikšnem obsegu vključitev navedenih tehnologij privede do posebnih učinkovitosti oziroma ali bi bilo lahko združenje brez znatne izgube učinkovitosti omejeno na tehnologije, za katere ne obstajajo nadomestne tehnologije.
An agreement imposing territorial restraints on licensees, preventing them from selling into each other's territory reduces competition between them.
V primeru preproste podelitve licence med dvema pogodbenicama na splošno zadostuje proučitev nujnosti posameznih omejitev.
Licence agreements may also reduce intra-technology competition by facilitating collusion between licensees.
Običajno manj omejevalna alternativa od licenčnega sporazuma kot takega ne obstaja.
Moreover, licence agreements that reduce intra-technology competition may facilitate collusion between owners of competing technologies or reduce inter-technology competition by raising barriers to entry.
Pogoj, da mora biti potrošnikom zagotovljen pravičen delež doseženih koristi, pomeni, da morajo potrošniki izdelkov, ki se proizvajajo v okviru licence, prejeti vsaj nadomestilo za negativne učinke sporazuma [81].
Even restrictive licence agreements often also produce pro-competitive effects in the form of efficiencies, which may outweigh their anti-competitive effects.
To pomeni, da morajo povečane učinkovitosti v celoti izravnati verjetne negativne učinke na cene, obseg proizvodnje in druge pomembne dejavnike, ki jih povzroči sporazum.
The assessment of the possible pro-competitive effects takes place within the framework of Article 53(3), which contains an exception from the prohibition rule of Article 53(1).
To lahko pogodbenici storita, tako da spremenita stroškovno strukturo zadevnih podjetij, jih spodbudita k znižanju cen ali potrošnikom omogočita pridobitev dostopa do novih oziroma izboljšanih izdelkov, kar omogoča izravnavo morebitnih povišanj cen [82].
For that exception to be applicable the licence agreement must produce objective economic benefits, the restrictions on competition must be indispensable to attain the efficiencies, consumers must receive a fair share of the efficiency gains, and the agreement must not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned.
Zadnji pogoj iz člena 53(3), po katerem sporazum pogodbenicama ne sme dati možnosti izključitve konkurence glede znatnega dela zadevnih izdelkov, predpostavlja analizo preostalih konkurenčnih pritiskov na trg in učinka sporazuma na take vire konkurence.
An undertaking that relies on Article 53(3) must demonstrate, by means of convincing arguments and evidence, that the conditions for obtaining an exemption are satisfied [76].
Pri uporabi zadnjega pogoja iz člena 53(3) je treba upoštevati razmerje med členom 53(3) in členom 54.
The assessment of restrictive agreements under Article 53(3) is made within the actual context in which they occur [77] and on the basis of the facts existing at any given point in time.
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso v zvezi s členom 101(3) in členom 102 Pogodbe uporaba člena 53(3) ne more preprečiti uporabe člena 54 [83].
The assessment is therefore sensitive to material changes in the facts.
Poleg tega je treba člen 53(3) zaradi doslednosti razlagati tako, da izključuje uporabo pravila o izjemi za omejevalne sporazume, ki pomenijo zlorabo prevladujočega položaja, saj je namen členov 53 in 54 ohranjati učinkovito konkurenco na trgu [84].
The exception rule of Article 53(3) applies as long as the four conditions are fulfilled and ceases to apply when that is no longer the case [78].
Dejstvo, da sporazum znatno zmanjša eno od razsežnosti konkurence, še ne pomeni nujno, da je konkurenca izključena v smislu člena 53(3).
However, when applying Article 53(3) it is necessary to take into account the initial sunk investments made by any of the parties and the time needed and the restraints required to commit and recoup an efficiency enhancing investment.
Tehnološko združenje ima lahko na primer za posledico industrijski standard, kar privede do okoliščin, v katerih je malo konkurence z vidika tehnološkega formata.
Article 53 cannot be applied without considering the ex ante investment and the risks relating thereto.
Ko poglavitni udeleženci na trgu prevzamejo določen format, lahko mrežni učinki zelo otežijo preživetje alternativnih formatov.
The risk facing the parties and the sunk investment that must be committed to implement the agreement can thus lead to the agreement falling outside Article 53(1) or fulfilling the conditions of Article 53(3), as the case may be, for the period of time required to recoup the investment.
Vendar to ne pomeni, da oblikovanje dejanskega industrijskega standarda vedno izključuje konkurenco v smislu zadnjega pogoja iz člena 53(3).
The first condition of Article 53(3) requires an assessment of the objective benefits in terms of efficiencies produced by the agreement.
V okviru standarda lahko dobavitelji konkurirajo na področju cen, kakovosti in lastnosti izdelkov.
In this respect, licence agreements have the potential of bringing together complementary technologies and other assets allowing new or improved products to be put on the market or existing products to be produced at lower cost.
Vendar pa je za uskladitev sporazuma s členom 53(3) treba zagotoviti, da sporazum neupravičeno ne omejuje konkurence in neupravičeno ne omejuje prihodnjih inovacij.
Outside the context of hardcore cartels, licensing often occurs because it is more efficient for the licensor to licence the technology than to exploit it itself.
To poglavje obravnava različne vrste omejitev, ki jih običajno vsebujejo licenčni sporazumi.
This may particularly be the case where the licensee already has access to the necessary production assets.
Glede na njihovo razširjenost je koristno zagotoviti navodila glede načina njihove presoje zunaj varnega pristana TTBER.
The agreement then allows the licensee to gain access to a technology that can be combined with those assets, allowing it to exploit new or improved technologies.
Omejitve, ki so že bile obravnavane v drugih poglavjih teh smernic, zlasti v poglavjih 3.4 in 3.5, so v tem poglavju omenjene le na kratko.
Another example of potentially efficiency-enhancing licensing is where the licensee already has a technology and the combination of this technology and the licensor's technology gives rise to synergies.
To poglavje zajema sporazume med nekonkurenti, pa tudi sporazume med konkurenti.
When the two technologies are combined the licensee may be able to attain a cost/output configuration that would not otherwise be possible.
Slednje delimo – kjer je potrebno – na vzajemne in nevzajemne sporazume.
Licence agreements may also give rise to efficiencies at the distribution stage in the same way as vertical distribution agreements.
Tako razlikovanje ni potrebno v primeru sporazumov med nekonkurenti.