natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to the Icelandic authorities, the decision on the terms and conditions of the interest had not centred on what a fair and normal return on equity should be, since it had been clear in advance that the undertakings in question were unlikely to repay in full the liabilities in question.
Po navedbah islandskih organov odločitev o pogojih za obresti ni temeljila na vprašanju, kaj naj bi bila pravična in običajna donosnost lastniškega kapitala, saj je bilo vnaprej jasno, da zadevna podjetja verjetno ne bodo v celoti odplačala zadevnih obveznosti.
Instead, the Working Group had focused on finding an interest percentage sufficiently high to matter to the undertaking in question but not so high as to preclude the possibility for repayment, thus removing the incentive for these undertakings to restructure their finances.
Namesto tega se je delovna skupina osredotočila na odstotek obresti, ki bi bil dovolj visok, da bi vplival na zadevna podjetja, vendar ne tako visok, da bi bilo tem podjetjem odplačilo onemogočeno, saj jih to ne bi spodbudilo k prestrukturiranju njihovih financ.
The Icelandic authorities did however set certain conditions for the debt conversion.
Vendar so islandski organi določili nekatere pogoje za preoblikovanje dolga.
According to the conditions the debtor was inter alia obliged not to pay dividends, unless there was a corresponding down payment on the loans, the debtor could not enter into any major risk commitments that exceeded 20 % of equity (CAD), any bonuses to the debtors employees should be moderate, the debtors were obliged to provide the lender with detailed quarterly reports on their operations and the debtors’ CAD-ratios should not fall below 10 %.
V skladu s pogoji dolžnik med drugim ni smel izplačati dividend, razen v primeru ustreznega predplačila za posojila, dolžnik ni smel prevzeti večjih obveznosti v zvezi s tveganjem, ki bi presegle 20 % lastniškega kapitala, morebitni bonusi zaposlenim pri dolžniku naj bi bili zmerni, dolžnik je moral posojilodajalcu predložiti natančna četrtletna poročila o svojem poslovanju, kapitalski delež dolžnika pa ne bi smel biti manjši od 10 %.
In case the liquidity position of the debtors turned out to be unacceptable in the view of the CBI or their CAD-ratios fell below 10 %, the lender could require that the outstanding amount of the loans together with interest and other relevant costs be converted to equity.
Če se je izkazalo, da je bil likvidnostni položaj dolžnika po mnenju CBI nesprejemljiv ali je bil njegov kapitalski delež nižji od 10 %, je lahko posojilodajalec zahteval, da se neporavnani znesek posojil ter obresti in drugi ustrezni stroški pretvorijo v lastniška sredstva.
The purpose of those conditions was to increase the likelihood of full recovery of the loans and thereby to safeguard the Treasury’s interest.
Namen teh pogojev je bil povečati verjetnost vračila posojil v celoti in s tem zavarovati interes zakladnice.
For a more detailed description of the measures, reference is made to the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL [7].
Za podrobnejši opis ukrepov je naveden sklic na Odločbo Nadzornega organa št. 363/11/COL [7].
The objective of the measure and the national legal basis
Cilj ukrepov in nacionalna pravna podlaga
The Icelandic authorities considered that the objective of the measures was twofold; firstly, to try to secure the immense interests of the State by maximising the Treasury’s recovery of the claims, and, secondly, to give the financial undertakings a breathing space and a chance to work out their matters and get through the difficulties.
Po mnenju islandskih organov so imeli ukrepi dvojni cilj. Prvič, z ukrepi so si prizadevali zavarovati močan interes države, tako da bi zakladnica lahko v čim večji meri izterjala terjatve, in drugič, dati finančnim podjetjem čas in možnost, da uredijo svoje zadeve in prebrodijo težave.
The measures were based on an authorisation from the Icelandic parliament in paragraph 7.20 of the State supplementary budget for the year 2008, where the Minister of Finance, on behalf of the Treasury, was authorised to purchase from the Central Bank of Iceland commercial papers which had been pledged to the bank as collateral for loans as well as to settle these claims in the most viable manner possible.
Ukrepi so temeljili na pooblastilu islandskega parlamenta iz odstavka 7.20 državnega dodatnega proračuna za leto 2008, v skladu s katerim je bil minister za finance pooblaščen, da v imenu zakladnice od Centralne banke Islandije kupi vrednostne papirje, ki so bili banki zastavljeni kot zavarovanje za posojila, in da te terjatve poplača na čim bolj učinkovit način.
As previously noted the three beneficiaries to the aforementioned measures were Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. and Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
Kot je bilo navedeno, so bili trije upravičenci do zgoraj navedenih ukrepov banke Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. in Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
For a more detailed description of the three beneficiaries and subsequent developments regarding their operations, reference is made to Sections 2.5 and 2.6 of the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL.
Podrobnejši opis treh upravičencev in naknadnega razvoja njihovega poslovanja je naveden v oddelkih 2.5 in 2.6 Odločbe Nadzornega organa št. 363/11/COL.
In Decision No 363/11/COL, the Authority assessed preliminarily whether the Treasury’s measures to convert short-term claims to long-term loans on favourable terms were compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.
Nadzorni organ je v Odločbi št. 363/11/COL predhodno ocenil, ali so bili ukrepi zakladnice za preoblikovanje kratkoročnih terjatev v dolgoročna posojila pod ugodnimi pogoji združljivi z določbami o državni pomoči iz Sporazuma EGP.
However since the State’s involvement as a major creditor to the undertakings concerned derived from earlier measures, namely the CBI collateral loans and securities lending, it was necessary to consider whether those measures possibly constituted State aid.
Ker pa je udeležba države kot glavnega posojilodajalca zadevnih podjetij izhajala iz predhodnih ukrepov, tj. zavarovanih posojil in posojanja vrednostnih papirjev CBI, je bilo treba preučiti, ali so ti ukrepi morda pomenili državno pomoč.
The Authority therefore began its assessment by analysing the CBI short-term collateral loans to financial undertakings.
Nadzorni organ je zato svojo oceno začel z analizo kratkoročnih zavarovanih posojil CBI finančnim podjetjem.
The Icelandic authorities had underlined that the short-term credit facilities concerned belonged to regular monetary policy and financial market measures of the CBI and to the Treasury’s regular government debt management.
Islandski organi so poudarili, da so bili zadevni kratkoročni krediti del redne denarne politike in ukrepov CBI v zvezi s finančnimi trgi ter rednega upravljanja državnega dolga s strani zakladnice.
The Authority did not dispute that these measures belonged to monetary and government debt management policy and that they had been based on relevant rules thereon [8].
Nadzorni organ ni izpodbijal navedb, da so ti ukrepi spadali na področje denarne politike in politike upravljanja državnega dolga ter da so temeljili na ustreznih pravilih [8].
The measures had been taken at the initiative of the financial undertakings concerned and the CBI had not, at the time, been backed by any counter-guarantee of the State.
Ukrepi so bili sprejeti na pobudo zadevnih finančnih podjetij, pri čemer država takrat ni posredno osebno jamčila za CBI.
Therefore the Authority concluded that the CBI short-term collateral loans to financial undertakings and the Treasury’s short-term lending facilities did not involve State aid.
Zato je Nadzorni organ sklenil, da kratkoročna zavarovana posojila CBI finančnim podjetjem in instrumenti zakladnice za kratkoročna posojila niso vključevali državne pomoči.
However, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the Treasury’s loan conversion agreements amounted to State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Vendar pa so v skladu s predhodnim stališčem Nadzornega organa sporazumi o preoblikovanju dolga zakladnice pomenili državno pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP.
The following aspects were indentified in the decision to initiate a formal investigation procedure:
V odločbi o začetku formalnega postopka preiskave so bili predstavljeni naslednji vidiki:
The Authority concluded that the measures were clearly granted through State resources since the loans had been granted by the Ministry of Finance on the basis of authorisation provided for in the State budget.
Nadzorni organ je sklenil, da so bili navedeni ukrepi nedvomno financirani iz državnih sredstev, saj je posojila dodelilo ministrstvo za finance na podlagi odobritve, zagotovljene v državnem proračunu;
The Authority found that the measures conferred on the three investment banks a commercial advantages since they were relieved of charges, in the form of interest payments and other costs associated with the short-term credit facilities with the CBI, that would normally have been borne by their budgets.
Nadzorni organ je ugotovil, da so bile trem investicijskim bankam z ukrepi dodeljene poslovne prednosti, saj so bile oproščene stroškov v obliki plačil obresti in drugih stroškov, povezanih s kratkoročnimi krediti s CBI, ki bi jih sicer morale kriti iz lastnega proračuna.
The Authority also expressed doubt as to whether the measures were consistent with the conduct of a private creditor in a comparable legal and factual situation, given the favourable repayment terms of the loans and the fact that they did not foresee a step-up of interest rates in case the financial condition of the debtors improved.
Nadzorni organ je tudi izrazil pomisleke, ali so bili ukrepi v skladu z ravnanjem zasebnega upnika v primerljivem pravnem in dejanskem položaju glede na to, da so bili pogoji odplačevanja posojil ugodni in niso predvidevali povišanja obrestnih mer v primeru, da bi se finančno stanje dolžnikov izboljšalo;
With regard to selectivity, the Authority concluded that the measures could not be considered to be general in nature, since they favoured three undertakings in one particular economic sector and other undertakings and sectors did not benefit from them.
v zvezi s selektivnostjo je Nadzorni organ sklenil, da ukrepov ni bilo mogoče obravnavati kot splošnih, saj so zagotavljali ugodnosti trem podjetjem v določenem gospodarskem sektorju, druga podjetja in sektorji pa ugodnosti teh ukrepov niso imeli.
The measures would therefore have to be considered as selective [9].
Ukrepi bi se zato morali obravnavati kot selektivni [9].
Furthermore the Icelandic authorities had not presented clear evidence that the favourable loan conversion agreements had been effectively made available to all undertakings in a comparable legal and factual situation as Saga Capital, VBS and Askar Capital.
Poleg tega islandski organi niso predložili jasnih dokazov, da so bili sporazumi o ugodnem preoblikovanju dolga dejansko dani na voljo vsem podjetjem, katerih pravni in dejanski položaj je bil primerljiv s položajem bank Saga Capital, VBS in Askar Capital;
Finally, the Authority concluded that the measures were liable to distort competition.
Nadzorni organ je sklenil, da bi ukrepi lahko izkrivljali konkurenco.
Even though the investment banks concerned operated mostly on the Icelandic market and were of modest size, they were nevertheless engaged in provision of financial services which were fully open to competition and trade within the European Economic Area.
Čeprav so zadevne investicijske banke poslovale večinoma na islandskem trgu in so bile manjšega obsega, so kljub temu sodelovale pri zagotavljanju finančnih storitev, ki so bile v celoti odprte za konkurenco in trgovino v Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru.
Moreover, the Authority doubted that the State aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.
Poleg tega je Nadzorni organ dvomil, da bi bilo državno pomoč mogoče šteti za združljivo s Sporazumom EGP.
The Icelandic authorities had referred to Article 61(3) EEA and the Authority’s rescue and restructuring aid guidelines in support of their argument that the measure was compatible with the Agreement.
Islandski organi so svoj argument, da je bil ukrep združljiv s Sporazumom, utemeljili s sklicevanjem na člen 61(3) Sporazuma EGP ter smernice Nadzornega organa o pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
The Icelandic authorities did however not submit any evidence in favour of assessing the compatibility of the measure under Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement or the Authority’s temporary State aid guidelines regarding the financial crisis.
Vendar islandski organi niso predložili nikakršnih dokazov, ki bi omogočili oceno združljivosti ukrepa v skladu s členom 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP ali začasnimi smernicami Nadzornega organa o državni pomoči v zvezi s finančno krizo.
The Authority stressed that the temporary rules on aid to financial undertakings provide for the limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary, the restoration of the long-term viability of the bank and safeguards against undue distortion of competition.
Nadzorni organ je poudaril, da začasna pravila o pomoči finančnim podjetjem predvidevajo omejitev pomoči na najmanjšo potrebno, ponovno vzpostavitev dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja bank in zaščitne ukrepe za preprečevanje neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence.
In particular, the guidelines set out rules to secure appropriate and adequate remuneration for State recapitalisation [10].
Te smernice zlasti določajo pravila za zagotovitev primernega in ustreznega plačila za državno dokapitalizacijo [10].
The repayment terms of the loans provided by the State appeared not to take account of those principles.
Zdi se, da pogoji odplačevanja posojil, ki jih zagotavlja država, teh načel ne upoštevajo.
The loans had been granted with a repayment period of seven years, with indexation, and at fixed interest rates of 2 % per annum, which was far below market rates and no step-up of interest rates was foreseen to encourage redemption of State capital.
Posojila so bila odobrena s sedemletnim obdobjem odplačevanja z indeksacijo in 2-odstotnimi fiksnimi letnimi obrestnimi merami, ki so bile precej nižje od tržnih obrestnih mer, pri čemer ni bilo predvideno povišanje obrestnih mer za spodbujanje odkupa državnega kapitala.
In light of this, the Authority concluded that lending terms of this kind were not compatible with the Authority’s State aid guidelines.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega je Nadzorni organ sklenil, da takšni posojilni pogoji niso združljivi s smernicami Nadzornega organa o državni pomoči.
The comments of the Icelandic authorities are focused on their view that the measures were compatible with the EEA Agreement.
Pripombe islandskih organov zadevajo zlasti njihovo stališče, da so bili ukrepi združljivi s Sporazumom EGP.
In their view the measures had not been selective since the circumstances of the three investment banks had been unique and other banks, such as Straumur, SPB and SPRON, had not been in a similar situation as the three investment banks.
Menijo, da ukrepi niso bili selektivni, ker so bile okoliščine treh investicijskih bank izredne in druge banke, kot so Straumur, SPB in SPRON, niso bile v podobnem položaju kot navedene tri investicijske banke.
Some of the other banking institutions had already defaulted on their obligations against their creditors by the time the loan conversion agreements were made and their reorganisation efforts were so substantial that conversion of debts with the CBI would not have been a significant factor in their financial restructuring.
Nekatere druge bančne institucije v času, ko so bili sklenjeni sporazumi o preoblikovanju dolga, niso več izpolnjevale svojih obveznosti do svojih upnikov, pri čemer so bila njihova prizadevanja za reorganizacijo tako temeljita, da preoblikovanje dolgov prek CBI ne bi bilo pomembno za njihovo finančno prestrukturiranje.
The Icelandic authorities also maintained that their decisions to convert the loans had been in line with the private creditor principle since any creditor, in the same position as the Icelandic State was in at that time, would have acted in the same manner.
Islandski organi so prav tako zatrjevali, da so bile njihove odločitve o preoblikovanju posojil v skladu z načelom zasebnega upnika, saj bi vsak upnik v enakem položaju, v kakršnem je bila takrat islandska država, ravnal enako.
Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities provided information on the current status of the three investment banks and the developments that had occurred since the Authority issued Decision No 363/11/COL [11].
Poleg tega so islandski organi zagotovili informacije o trenutnem stanju treh investicijskih bank in njihovem razvoju po tem, ko je Nadzorni organ izdal Odločbo št. 363/11/COL [11].
In light of the fact that the three beneficiaries had ceased all economic activity since Decision No 363/11/COL was issued, and with reference to established practice by the European Commission and the Authority on the issue of pursuing the classification of measures in corresponding circumstances and assessing their compatibility [12], the Icelandic authorities maintained that there was no reason for the Authority to pursue the matter any further.
Glede na to, da so trije upravičenci po izdaji Odločbe št. 363/11/COL prenehali opravljati vsakršno gospodarsko dejavnost, ter glede na ustaljeno prakso Evropske komisije in Nadzornega organa v zvezi z vprašanjem nadaljnjega razvrščanja ukrepov v primerljivih okoliščinah in ocenjevanja njihove združljivosti [12] so islandski organi trdili, da Nadzorni organ nima razloga, da bi nadalje obravnaval zadevo.
This implies that for measures to be classified as State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, they must involve a grant by the State or through State resources, confer an advantage on the recipient undertaking, be selective, distort competition and be liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.
To pomeni, da morajo ukrepi, ki se opredelijo kot državna pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, vključevati sredstva s strani države ali črpati iz državnih sredstev, zagotoviti prednost podjetju, ki je prejemnik sredstev, biti selektivni, izkrivljati konkurenco in vplivati na trgovino med pogodbenicami.
As previously noted the Authority, in Decision No 363/11/COL, preliminarily concluded that the measures under assessment, i.e. the conversion of short-term credit facilities to long-term loans, fulfilled the criteria set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement and therefore constituted State aid.
Kot je bilo že navedeno, je Nadzorni organ v Odločbi št. 363/11/COL predhodno sklenil, da so ukrepi, ki so se ocenjevali, tj. preoblikovanje kratkoročnih kreditov v dolgoročna posojila, izpolnjevali merila iz člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP in so zato pomenili državno pomoč.
Furthermore, there was nothing to suggest that the measures were compatible with either the general State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement or the Authority’s temporary State aid guidelines regarding the financial crisis.
Poleg tega ni bilo nobenega razloga za domnevo, da so bili ukrepi združljivi s splošnimi določbami o državni pomoči iz Sporazuma EGP ali z začasnimi smernicami Nadzornega organa o državni pomoči v zvezi s finančno krizo.
The Authority has in the course of the investigation received no information which would alter this preliminary view.
Nadzorni organ med preiskavo ni prejel nobenih informacij, ki bi spremenile to predhodno stališče.
Moreover, the Icelandic authorities had not notified the aid measures covered by the opening decision to the Authority prior to their implementation.
Poleg tega islandski organi ukrepov pomoči, zajetih v odločbi o začetku postopka, niso priglasili Nadzornemu organu pred njihovim izvajanjem.
By not doing so they disrespected their notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.
S tem niso upoštevali svoje obveznosti priglasitve v skladu s členom 1(3) dela I Protokola 3.
The implementation of those aid measures was therefore unlawful.
Izvajanje teh ukrepov pomoči je bilo torej nezakonito.
Despite of this the Authority must nevertheless assess whether there is a reason for it to pursue the matter further.
Kljub temu mora Nadzorni organ oceniti, ali obstaja razlog, da zadevo še naprej obravnava.
As was noted in Decision No 363/11/COL, Askar Capital Investment Bank hf. had already in 2007 sustained significant losses from its investments in structured credit (sub-prime) products with US mortgages as underlying assets.
Kot je bilo navedeno v Odločbi št. 363/11/COL, je banka Askar Capital Investment Bank hf. že leta 2007 utrpela znatne izgube zaradi naložb v strukturirane kreditne proizvode (drugorazredna posojila), pri čemer je kot osnovno sredstvo uporabila hipoteke v ZDA.
The bank faced even greater difficulties in June 2010 when the Supreme Court of Iceland ruled that foreign currency denominated loans were illegal.
Banka se je s še večjimi težavami soočila junija 2010, ko je vrhovno sodišče Islandije razsodilo, da so bila posojila, denominirana v tuji valuti, nezakonita.
The bank eventually filed for bankruptcy on 14 July 2010 and was taken over by the Financial Supervisory Authority (‘the FME’) on the same day.
Banka je nato 14. julija 2010 napovedala stečaj in še istega dne jo je prevzel organ za finančni nadzor (v nadaljnjem besedilu: FME).
According to information later submitted to the Authority the bank is currently in the process of winding-up and has now ceased all economic activity.
V skladu z informacijami, ki so bile pozneje predložene Nadzornemu organu, je banka trenutno v postopku prenehanja in je prenehala opravljati vsakršno gospodarsko dejavnost.
As was also noted in Decision 363/11/COL, VBS Investment bank hf. financial situation deteriorated substantially after unsuccessful negotiation between the bank and its creditors and shareholders, and, subsequently, in 2010 the bank’s creditors ceased all negotiations.
Kot je bilo tudi navedeno v Odločbi št. 363/11/COL, se je finančni položaj banke VBS Investment bank hf. po neuspelih pogajanjih med banko in njenimi upniki ter delničarji bistveno poslabšal, zato so leta 2010 upniki banke prekinili vsa pogajanja.
By decision of 3 March 2010, the FME appointed VBS a provisional board of directors, and by a ruling of the Reykjavik District Court on 9 April 2010, a winding-up procedure of VBS was initiated, in accordance with Article 101 of Act No. 161/2002 on financial undertakings.
FME je s sklepom z dne 3. marca 2010 banki VBS določil začasni upravni odbor, s sodbo okrožnega sodišča v Reykjaviku z dne 9. aprila 2010 pa se je začel postopek prenehanja banke VBS v skladu s členom 101 zakona št. 161/2002 o finančnih podjetjih.
The bank’s operating license has now been revoked due to the fact that the bank is undergoing a winding-up procedure.
Operativna licenca banke je bila zaradi izvajanja postopka njenega prenehanja preklicana.
The North Eastern Iceland District Court, by a ruling of 16 May 2012, complied with the FME’s demands and declared that Saga Capital should undergo a winding-up procedure.
Okrožno sodišče v severovzhodni Islandiji je v sodbi z dne 16. maja 2012 upoštevalo zahteve FME in razglasilo, da bi bilo treba za banko Saga Capital izvesti postopek prenehanja.
On 14 June 2012, the Supreme Court of Iceland confirmed this ruling.
Vrhovno sodišče Islandije je 14. junija 2012 to sodbo potrdilo.
Nevertheless, the bank has ceased all licensed operations given the fact that its operating licence as a financial institution has been withdrawn.
Ne glede na to je banka prenehala opravljati vse licencirane dejavnosti, saj ji je bila kot finančni instituciji odvzeta operativna licenca.