natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For licence agreements to be restrictive of competition by effect they must affect actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the relevant market negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods and services can be expected with a reasonable degree of probability.
Za namene analize omejitev konkurence po učinku je praviloma treba opredeliti upoštevni trg in proučiti ter presoditi, kakšni so med drugim narava zadevnih izdelkov in tehnologij, tržni položaj pogodbenic, tržni položaj konkurentov, tržni položaj kupcev, obstoj potencialnih konkurentov in raven ovir za vstop.
The likely negative effects on competition must be appreciable [22].
Vendar pa je v nekaterih primerih mogoče ugotoviti protikonkurenčne učinke neposredno z analizo ravnanja pogodbenic sporazuma na trgu.
Appreciable anti-competitive effects are likely to occur when at least one of the parties has or obtains some degree of market power and the agreement contributes to the creation, maintenance or strengthening of that market power or allows the parties to exploit such market power.
Mogoče je na primer dokazati, da je sporazum povzročil povišanje cen.
Market power is the ability to maintain prices above competitive levels or to maintain output in terms of product quantities, product quality and variety or innovation below competitive levels for a not insignificant period of time [23].
Vendar imajo lahko licenčni sporazumi tudi precejšnji potencial za spodbujanje konkurence in dejansko je velika večina tovrstnih sporazumov takih.
The degree of market power normally required for a finding of an infringement under Article 53(1) is less than the degree of market power required for a finding of dominance under Article 54 [24].
Licenčni sporazumi lahko spodbujajo inovativnost s tem, da izumiteljem omogočajo dohodke, s katerimi si povrnejo vsaj del svojih stroškov za raziskave in razvoj.
For the purposes of analysing restrictions of competition by effect it is normally necessary to define the relevant market and to examine and assess, in particular, the nature of the products and technologies concerned, the market position of the parties, the market position of competitors, the market position of buyers, the existence of potential competitors and the level of entry barriers.
Prav tako lahko omogočijo razširjanje tehnologij, kar lahko ustvari vrednost, tako da se zmanjšajo proizvodni stroški pridobitelja licence ali pa lahko slednji ustvari nove ali izboljšane izdelke.
In some cases, however, it may be possible to show anti-competitive effects directly by analysing the conduct of the parties to the agreement on the market.
Učinkovitosti na ravni pridobitelja licence pogosto izvirajo iz kombinacije tehnologije dajalca licence ter sredstev in tehnologij pridobitelja licence.
It may for example be possible to ascertain that an agreement has led to price increases.
Tako povezovanje komplementarnih sredstev in tehnologij lahko privede do razmerja med stroški in obsegom proizvodnje, ki sicer ne bi bilo mogoče.
However, licence agreements may also have substantial pro-competitive potential and the vast majority of those agreements are indeed pro-competitive.
Združitev izboljšane tehnologije dajalca licence z učinkovitejšimi proizvodnimi ali distribucijskimi zmogljivostmi pridobitelja licence lahko na primer zmanjša proizvodne stroške ali omogoči proizvodnjo izdelka višje kakovosti.
Licence agreements may promote innovation by allowing innovators to earn returns to cover at least part of their research and development costs.
Prav tako lahko podeljevanje licence pozitivno vpliva na konkurenco, ker odstranjuje ovire za razvoj in izkoriščanje tehnologije pridobitelja licence.
Licence agreements also lead to a dissemination of technologies, which may create value by reducing the production costs of the licensee or by enabling it to produce new or improved products.
Zlasti v sektorjih, za katere je značilno veliko število patentov, se licence pogosto podeljujejo z namenom zagotavljanja svobode oblikovanja, saj se z njimi odpravi tveganje za tožbe dajalca licence zaradi kršitve pravic.
Efficiencies at the level of the licensee often stem from a combination of the licensor's technology with the assets and technologies of the licensee.
Ko dajalec licence privoli, da ne bo uveljavljal svojih pravic intelektualne lastnine za preprečevanje prodaje izdelkov pridobitelja licence, se s sporazumom odstrani ovira za prodajo izdelkov pridobitelja licence in se tako na splošno spodbuja konkurenca.
Such integration of complementary assets and technologies may lead to a cost/output configuration that would not otherwise be possible.
V primerih, ko je licenčni sporazum zajet v členu 53(1), je treba pozitivne učinke sporazuma za konkurenco v primerjavi z njegovimi omejevalnimi učinki pretehtati v okviru člena 53(3).
For instance, the combination of an improved technology of the licensor with more efficient production or distribution assets of the licensee may reduce production costs or lead to the production of a higher quality product.
Če so izpolnjeni vsi štirje pogoji iz člena 53(3), je zadevni omejevalni licenčni sporazum veljaven in izvršljiv, ne da bi bila zato potrebna predhodna odločba [25].
Licensing may also serve the pro-competitive purpose of removing obstacles to the development and exploitation of the licensee's own technology.
Ni verjetno, da bi nedopustne omejitve konkurence izpolnjevale pogoje iz člena 53(3).
In particular in sectors where large numbers of patents are prevalent licensing often occurs in order to create design freedom by removing the risk of infringement claims by the licensor.
Navadno ne ustvarjajo objektivnih ekonomskih koristi in tudi ne koristi za potrošnike.
When the licensor agrees not to invoke its intellectual property rights to prevent the sale of the licensee's products, the agreement removes an obstacle to the sale of the licensee's product and thus generally promotes competition.
Poleg tega tovrstni sporazumi navadno ne izpolnjujejo tretjega pogoja, ki se nanaša na preskus nujnosti.
In cases where a licence agreement is caught by Article 53(1) the pro-competitive effects of the agreement must be balanced against its restrictive effects in the context of Article 53(3).
Če na primer pogodbenici določita prodajno ceno za izdelke, proizvedene na podlagi licence, bo to praviloma povzročilo manjši obseg proizvodnje in nepravilno razporejanje sredstev ter višje cene za potrošnike.
When all four conditions of Article 53(3) are satisfied, the restrictive licence agreement in question is valid and enforceable, with no prior decision to that effect being required [25].
Omejevanje cen prav tako ni nepogrešljivo za uresničitev možnih učinkovitosti, ki izhajajo iz tega, da oba konkurenta razpolagata z obema tehnologijama.
In general they do not create objective economic benefits or benefits for consumers.
Tehnologija je vložek, ki je vključen bodisi v izdelek bodisi v proizvodni proces.
Moreover, these types of agreements generally fail the indispensability test (under the third condition).
Zato lahko podeljevanje licence za tehnološke pravice vpliva na konkurenco tako na nabavnih trgih proizvodnih dejavnikov kot tudi na podrejenih trgih končnih izdelkov.
For example, if the parties fix the price at which the products produced under the licence must be sold, this will in principle lead to a lower output and a misallocation of resources and higher prices for consumers.
Sporazum med dvema pogodbenicama, ki prodajata konkurenčne izdelke na podrejenih trgih in si navzkrižno podeljujeta licenco za tehnološke pravice, povezane s proizvodnjo teh izdelkov na nabavnih trgih, lahko na primer omejuje konkurenco na zadevnem podrejenem trgu blaga ali storitev.
The price restriction is also not indispensable to achieve the possible efficiencies resulting from the availability to both competitors of the two technologies.
Navzkrižno podeljevanje licence lahko omejuje tudi konkurenco na nabavnem trgu za tehnologijo in morda tudi na drugih nabavnih trgih proizvodnih dejavnikov.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority's approach to defining the relevant market is laid down in its notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of EEA competition law [26].
Za namene presoje konkurenčnih učinkov licenčnih sporazumov je zato morda potrebna opredelitev upoštevnih proizvodnih trgov in tudi upoštevnih tehnoloških trgov [27].
These guidelines only address aspects of market definition that are of particular importance in the field of technology rights licensing.
Upoštevni proizvodni trg zajema pogodbene izdelke (ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo) in izdelke, ki jih kupci zaradi njihovih značilnosti, cene in predvidene uporabe štejejo za zamenljive ali nadomestljive s pogodbenimi izdelki.
Technology is an input, which is integrated either into a product or a production process.
Pogodbeni izdelki so lahko del proizvodnega trga končnih izdelkov in/ali polizdelkov.
Technology rights licensing can therefore affect competition both upstream in input markets and downstream in output markets.
Upoštevne tehnološke trge sestavljajo licenčne tehnološke pravice in njihovi nadomestki, torej druge tehnologije, ki jih pridobitelji licence zaradi njihovih značilnosti, licenčnin in predvidene uporabe štejejo za zamenljive ali nadomestljive z licenčnimi tehnološkimi pravicami.
For instance, an agreement between two parties which sell competing products downstream and which also cross-license technology rights relating to the production of these products upstream may restrict competition on the downstream goods or services market concerned.
Z vidika tehnologije, ki jo je na trg dal dajalec licence, je treba ugotoviti, katere so tiste druge tehnologije, na katere bi se lahko preusmerili pridobitelji licence v primeru majhnega, a trajnega povišanja relativnih cen, torej licenčnin.
The cross-licensing may also restrict competition on the upstream market for technology and possibly also on other upstream input markets.
Drugi možni pristop je proučitev trga za izdelke, ki vključujejo licenčne tehnološke pravice (glej točko 25 v nadaljevanju).
For the purposes of assessing the competitive effects of licence agreements it may therefore be necessary to define the relevant product market(s) as well as the relevant technology market(s) [27].
Izraz „upoštevni trg“ iz člena 3 TTBER, opredeljen v členu 1(1)(m), pomeni upoštevni proizvodni trg in upoštevni tehnološki trg tako s proizvodnega kot z geografskega vidika.
The relevant product market comprises the contract products (incorporating the licensed technology) and products which are regarded by the buyers as interchangeable with or substitutable for the contract products, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use.
„Upoštevni geografski trg“ je opredeljen v členu 1(1)(l) TTBER in zajema območje, na katerem so zadevna podjetja vključena v ponudbo proizvodov in povpraševanje po njih ali licenciranje tehnoloških pravic, na katerem so pogoji konkurence dovolj homogeni ter ki ga je mogoče razlikovati od sosednjih območij zato, ker so pogoji konkurence na teh območjih občutno drugačni.
Contract products can be part of a final and/or an intermediate product market.
Geografski trg za upoštevne tehnološke trge se lahko razlikuje od geografskega trga za upoštevne proizvodne trge.
The relevant technology markets consist of the licensed technology rights and its substitutes, that is to say, other technologies which are regarded by the licensees as interchangeable with or substitutable for the licensed technology rights, by reason of the technologies' characteristics, their royalties and their intended use.
Po tem, ko se opredelijo upoštevni trgi, se lahko različnim virom konkurence na trgu pripišejo tržni deleži in se uporabijo kot pokazatelj relativne moči tržnih udeležencev.
Starting from the technology which is marketed by the licensor, it is necessary to identify those other technologies to which licensees could switch in response to a small but permanent increase in relative prices, that is to say, to the royalties.
Pri tehnoloških trgih je eden možnih nadaljnjih korakov izračun tržnih deležev na osnovi deleža vsake posamezne tehnologije v celotnem prihodku iz naslova podeljevanja licence, kar prikaže delež tehnologije na trgu, kjer se podeljujejo licence za konkurenčne tehnologije.
An alternative approach is to look at the market for products incorporating the licensed technology rights (cf. point (25) below).
Vendar pa je to pogosto zaradi pomanjkanja jasnih in natančnih podatkov o licenčninah pogosto zgolj teoretičen in ne praktičen način.
The term ‘relevant market’ used in Article 3 of the TTBER and defined in Article 1(1)(m) refers to the relevant product market and the relevant technology market in both their product and geographic dimension.
Drugi pristop, ki se uporablja za izračun varnega pristana, kot je pojasnjeno v členu 8(d) TTBER, je izračun tržnih deležev na tehnološkem trgu na osnovi vrednosti prodanih izdelkov, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo, na podrejenih proizvodnih trgih (za podrobnosti glej točko 86 in nadaljnje).
The ‘relevant geographic market’ is defined in Article 1(1)(l) of the TTBER and comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply of and demand for products or the licensing of technology, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas The geographic market of the relevant technology market(s) can differ from the geographic market of the relevant product market(s).
Za posamezne primere izven varnega pristana TTBER je morda, če je v praksi izvedljivo, potrebna uporaba obeh opisanih pristopov, da se natančneje presodi tržna moč dajalca licence in se upoštevajo drugi razpoložljivi dejavniki, ki so dober pokazatelj relativne moči razpoložljivih tehnologij (za več dejavnikov glej točki 157 in 159 ter naslednje) [28].
Once relevant markets have been defined, market shares can be assigned to the various sources of competition in the market and used as an indication of the relative strength of market players.
Nekateri licenčni sporazumi lahko vplivajo na konkurenco pri inovativnosti.
In the case of technology markets, one way to proceed is to calculate market shares on the basis of each technology's share of total licensing income from royalties, representing a technology's share of the market where competing technologies are licensed.
Vendar pa se bo Nadzorni organ pri analizi takih učinkov praviloma omejil na proučevanje učinka sporazuma na konkurenco znotraj obstoječih proizvodnih in tehnoloških trgov [29].
However, this may often be a merely theoretical and not a practical way to proceed because of lack of clear information on royalties.
Na konkurenco na takih trgih lahko vplivajo sporazumi, ki zavirajo uvedbo izboljšanih ali novih izdelkov, ki bi sčasoma nadomestili obstoječe izdelke.
Another approach, which is the one used for calculating the safe harbour, as explained in Article 8(d) of the TTBER, is to calculate market shares on the technology market on the basis of sales of products incorporating the licensed technology on downstream product markets (see for more details point (86) ff.).
V takih primerih je inovativnost vir potencialne konkurence, ki ga je treba upoštevati pri presoji učinka sporazuma na proizvodnih in tehnoloških trgih.
In individual cases outside the safe harbour of the TTBER it may be necessary, where practically possible, to apply both of the described approaches in order to assess the market strength of the licensor more accurately and to take into account other available factors which give a good indication of the relative strength of the available technologies (see for more factors points (157) and (159) ff.) [28].
Vendar pa je v omejenem številu primerov lahko koristno in nujno tudi ločeno analizirati učinke na konkurenco pri inovativnosti.
Some licence agreements may affect competition in innovation.
To zlasti velja, če sporazum vpliva na inovativnost, ki je usmerjena k ustvarjanju novih izdelkov, in če je že v zgodnji fazi možno prepoznati razvojne in raziskovalne pole [30]).
In analysing such effects, however, the Authority will normally confine itself to examining the impact of the agreement on competition within existing product and technology markets [29].
V takih primerih je mogoče analizirati, ali bo po sporazumu preostalo zadostno število konkurenčnih razvojnih in raziskovalnih polov, da se ohrani učinkovita konkurenca na področju inovativnosti.
Competition on such markets may be affected by agreements that delay the introduction of improved products or new products that over time will replace existing products.
Na splošno sporazumi med konkurenti pomenijo večje tveganje za konkurenco kot sporazumi med nekonkurenti.
In such cases innovation is a source of potential competition which must be taken into account when assessing the impact of the agreement on product markets and technology markets.
Vendar pa konkurenca med podjetji, ki uporabljajo isto tehnologijo (konkurenca znotraj tehnologije med pridobitelji licence), pomeni pomembno dopolnilo h konkurenci med podjetji, ki uporabljajo konkurenčne tehnologije (konkurenca med tehnologijami).
In a limited number of cases, however, it may be useful and necessary to also analyse the effects on competition in innovation separately.
Konkurenca znotraj tehnologije lahko na primer povzroči nižje cene za izdelke, ki vključujejo zadevno tehnologijo, kar lahko ne le ustvari neposredne in takojšnje koristi za potrošnike teh izdelkov, temveč tudi nadalje spodbudi konkurenco med podjetji, ki uporabljajo konkurenčne tehnologije.
This is particularly the case where the agreement affects innovation aiming at creating new products and where it is possible at an early stage to identify research and development poles [30].
Pri podeljevanju licence je treba upoštevati tudi, da pridobitelji licenc prodajajo svoj lasten izdelek.
In such cases it can be analysed whether after the agreement there will be a sufficient number of competing research and development poles left for effective competition in innovation to be maintained.
Ne ukvarjajo se z nadaljnjo prodajajo izdelka, ki ga je dobavilo drugo podjetje.
In general, agreements between competitors pose a greater risk to competition than agreements between non-competitors.
Možnosti za diferenciranje izdelkov in konkurenco med pridobitelji licence, ki bo temeljila na kakovosti, so torej lahko večje kot v primeru vertikalnih sporazumov za nadaljnjo prodajo izdelkov.
However, competition between undertakings that use the same technology (intra-technology competition between licensees) constitutes an important complement to competition between undertakings that use competing technologies (inter-technology competition).
Za določitev konkurenčnega razmerja med pogodbenicama je treba proučiti, ali bi si bili pogodbenici dejanska ali potencialna konkurenta, če sporazum ne bi bil sklenjen.
For instance, intra-technology competition may lead to lower prices for the products incorporating the technology in question, which may not only produce direct and immediate benefits for consumers of these products, but also spur further competition between undertakings that use competing technologies.
Če si pogodbenici v tem primeru ne bi bili dejanska ali potencialna konkurenta na nobenem od upoštevnih trgov, ki so zajeti v sporazumu, se šteje, da sta nekonkurenta.
In the context of licensing the fact that licensees are selling their own product must also be taken into account.
Načeloma se pogodbenici sporazuma ne štejeta za konkurenta, če se enostransko ali obojestransko blokirata.
They are not re-selling a product supplied by another undertaking.
Do enostranskega blokiranja pride, če tehnološke pravice ni mogoče izkoriščati brez kršitve druge legitimne tehnološke pravice, ali če ena pogodbenica ne more tržno učinkovito delovati na upoštevnem trgu, ne da bi pri tem kršila legitimno tehnološko pravico druge pogodbenice.
There may thus be greater scope for product differentiation and quality-based competition between licensees than in the case of vertical agreements for the resale of products.
To na primer velja, kadar ena tehnološka pravica zajema izboljšavo druge tehnološke pravice in izboljšanja ni mogoče zakonito uveljavljati brez licence za osnovno tehnološko pravico.
In order to determine the competitive relationship between the parties it is necessary to examine whether the parties would have been actual or potential competitors in the absence of the agreement.
Do obojestranskega blokiranja pride, če nobene od tehnoloških pravic ni mogoče izkoriščati brez kršitve druge legitimne tehnološke pravice, ali če nobena od pogodbenic ne more tržno učinkovito delovati na upoštevnem trgu, ne da bi pri tem kršila legitimno tehnološko pravico druge pogodbenice in če morata pogodbenici tako druga od druge pridobiti licenco ali se odpovedati svoji pravici nasproti drugi pogodbenici [31].
If without the agreement the parties would not have been actual or potential competitors in any relevant market affected by the agreement they are deemed to be non-competitors.
V praksi pa ne bo vedno mogoče z gotovostjo ugotoviti ali je posamezna tehnološka pravica legitimna in ali je kršena.
In principle, the parties to an agreement are not considered competitors if they are in a one-way or two-way blocking position.
Pogodbenici sta dejanska konkurenta na proizvodnem trgu, če sta pred sklenitvijo sporazuma že dejavni na istem upoštevnem proizvodnem trgu.
A one-way blocking position exists where a technology right cannot be exploited without infringing upon another valid technology right, or where one party cannot be active in a commercially viable way on the relevant market without infringing the other party's valid technology right.
Dejstvo, da sta obe pogodbenici že dejavni na istem upoštevnem proizvodnem trgu, ne da bi sklenili dogovor o podeljevanju licence, je močen pokazatelj, da se pogodbenici medsebojno ne blokirata.
This is, for instance, the case where one technology right covers an improvement of another technology right and the improvement cannot be legally used without a licence of the basic technology right.
Po takem scenariju se pogodbenici lahko štejeta za dejanska konkurenta, dokler se ne dokaže obstoj možnosti blokiranja (zlasti s končno sodno odločbo).
A two-way blocking position exists where neither technology right can be exploited without infringing upon the other valid technology right or where neither party can be active in a commercially viable way on the relevant market without infringing the other party's valid technology right and where the parties thus need to obtain a licence or a waiver from each other [31].
Pridobitelj licence se lahko šteje za potencialnega konkurenta na proizvodnem trgu, če je verjetno, da bi v odsotnosti sporazuma izvedel potrebne dodatne naložbe za vstop na upoštevni trg v primeru majhnega, a trajnega povišanja cen izdelkov.
However, in practice there will be cases where there is no certainty whether a particular technology right is valid and infringed.
Verjetni vstop na trg bi bilo treba presoditi na realni podlagi, to je na podlagi dejstev v danem primeru.
The parties are actual competitors on the product market if prior to the agreement both are already active on the same relevant product market.
Vstop je bolj verjeten, če ima pridobitelj licence sredstva, ki bi jih zlahka uporabil za vstop na trg, ne da bi tvegal velike nepovratne stroške, ali če je že pripravil načrte za vstop na trg oziroma že sicer začel vlagati sredstva.
The fact that both parties are already active on the same relevant product market, without having entered into a licensing arrangement, is a strong indicator that the parties are not blocking each other.
Obstajati morajo realne konkretne možnosti za vstop pridobitelja licence na upoštevni trg in konkuriranje uveljavljenim podjetjem [32].