natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Such efficiencies can take the form of cost savings or the provision of valuable services to consumers.
Če podjetja niso niti dejanski niti potencialni konkurenti na upoštevnem tehnološkem trgu ali na trgu izdelkov, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo, se vzajemna licenca za vse praktične namene ne razlikuje od dveh ločenih licenc.
The positive effects of vertical agreements are described in the Authority guidelines on vertical restraints [79].
Položaj pa je drugačen v primeru sporazumov, s katerimi pogodbenici oblikujeta tehnološki paket, ki se licencira tretjim osebam.
A further example of possible efficiency gains is to be found in agreements whereby technology owners assemble a technology package for licensing to third parties.
Taki dogovori so tehnološka združenja, ki so obravnavana v poglavju 4.
Such pooling arrangements may in particular reduce transaction costs, as licensees do not have to conclude separate licence agreements with each licensor.
To poglavje ne obravnava obveznosti iz licenčnih sporazumov, ki običajno ne omejujejo konkurence v smislu člena 53(1).
Pro-competitive licensing may also occur to ensure design freedom.
Te obveznosti med drugim zajemajo:
In sectors where large numbers of intellectual property rights exist and where individual products may infringe upon a number of existing and future property rights, licence agreements whereby the parties agree not to assert their property rights against each other are often pro-competitive because they allow the parties to develop their respective technologies without the risk of subsequent infringement claims.
obveznosti glede zaupnosti;
In the application of the indispensability test contained in Article 53(3) the Authority will in particular examine whether individual restrictions make it possible to perform the activity in question more efficiently than would have been the case in the absence of the restriction concerned.
obveznosti pridobiteljev licenc, da ne bodo podeljevali podlicenc;
In making this assessment the market conditions and the realities facing the parties must be taken into account.
obveznosti pridobiteljev licenc, da ne bodo uporabljali licenčnih tehnoloških pravic po izteku sporazuma, pod pogojem, da so licenčne tehnološke pravice še naprej veljavne in se uporabljajo;
Undertakings invoking the benefit of Article 53(3) are not required to consider hypothetical and theoretical alternatives.
obveznosti pridobiteljev licenc, da bodo pomagali dajalcu licence pri uveljavljanju licenčnih pravic intelektualne lastnine;
They must, however, explain and demonstrate why seemingly realistic and significantly less restrictive alternatives would be significantly less efficient.
obveznosti, da plačujejo minimalne licenčnine ali proizvajajo minimalno količino izdelkov, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo;
If the application of what appears to be a commercially realistic and less restrictive alternative would lead to a significant loss of efficiencies, the restriction in question is treated as indispensable.
obveznosti, da bodo uporabili znamko dajalca licence ali navedli ime dajalca licence na izdelku.
In some cases, it may also be necessary to examine whether the agreement as such is indispensable to achieve the efficiencies.
Pogodbenici licenčnega sporazuma lahko običajno prosto določata licenčnino, ki jo mora plačati pridobitelj licence, in način njenega plačila, ne da bi bil sporazum zaradi tega zajet v členu 53(1).
This may for example be so in the case of technology pools that include complementary but non-essential technologies [80], in which case it must be examined to what extent the inclusion of those technologies gives rise to particular efficiencies or whether, without a significant loss of efficiencies, the pool could be limited to technologies for which there are no substitutes.
To načelo se uporablja za sporazume med konkurenti, pa tudi za sporazume med nekonkurenti.
In the case of simple licensing between two parties it is generally not necessary to go beyond an examination of whether individual restraints are indispensable.
Obveznosti za plačilo licenčnin so lahko na primer v obliki pavšalnih izplačil, odstotka prodajne cene ali fiksnega zneska za vsak izdelek, ki vključuje licenčno tehnologijo.
Normally there is no less restrictive alternative to the licence agreement as such.
Če se licenčna tehnologija nanaša na proizvodni dejavnik, vključen v končni izdelek, dejstvo, da se licenčnine izračunajo na podlagi cene končnega izdelka, običajno ne pomeni omejevanja konkurence, pod pogojem, da vključuje licenčno tehnologijo [85].
The condition that consumers must receive a fair share of the benefits implies that consumers of the products produced under the licence must at least be compensated for the negative effects of the agreement [81].
V primeru licenčnega sporazuma za programsko opremo so licenčnine, izračunane na podlagi števila uporabnikov, in licenčnine, izračunane na podlagi števila računalnikov, običajno združljive s členom 53(1).
This means that the efficiency gains must fully offset the likely negative impact on prices, output and other relevant factors caused by the agreement.
V primeru licenčnih sporazumov med konkurenti je treba opozoriti (glej točke 100 do 101 in 116 zgoraj), da lahko obveznosti za plačilo licenčnin v omejenem številu primerov pomenijo določanje cen, kar spada med nedopustne omejitve (glej člen 4(1)(a)).
They may do so by changing the cost structure of the undertakings concerned, giving them an incentive to reduce price, or by allowing consumers to gain access to new or improved products, compensating for any likely price increase [82].
Nedopustna omejitev po členu 4(1)(a) je, če konkurenti določajo vzajemne tekoče licenčnine v primeru, ko je licenca navidezna, saj njen namen ni omogočiti vključitev dopolnilnih tehnologij ali doseči kak drug cilj, ki spodbuja konkurenco.
The last condition of Article 53(3), according to which the agreement must not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned, presupposes an analysis of remaining competitive pressures on the market and the impact of the agreement on such sources of competition.
Prav tako gre za nedopustno omejitev po členu 4(1)(a) in 4(1)(d), če licenčnine zajemajo tudi izdelke, ki so proizvedeni izključno z lastnimi tehnološkimi pravicami pridobitelja licence.
In the application of the last condition of Article 53(3) the relationship between Article 53(3) and Article 54 must be taken into account.
Druge vrste dogovorov o licenčninah med konkurenti so v primeru, da ni presežen 20-odstotni prag tržnega deleža, predmet skupinske izjeme, tudi če omejujejo konkurenco.
In accordance with settled case-law concerning Article 101(3) and Article 102 of the Treaty, the application of Article 53(3) cannot prevent the application of Article 54 [83].
Zunaj varnega pristana skupinske izjeme se prepoved iz člena 53(1) lahko uporablja, če konkurenti navzkrižno podeljujejo licence in nalagajo tekoče licenčnine, ki so očitno nesorazmerne v primerjavi s tržno vrednostjo licence, ter če imajo take licenčnine znaten učinek na tržne cene.
Moreover, since Articles 53 and 54 both pursue the aim of maintaining effective competition on the market, consistency requires that Article 53(3) be interpreted as precluding any application of the exception rule to restrictive agreements that constitute an abuse of a dominant position [84].
Pri ugotavljanju, ali so licenčnine nesorazmerne, je pomembno proučiti licenčnine, ki jih plačajo drugi pridobitelji licenc na proizvodnem trgu za iste ali nadomestne tehnologije.
The fact that the agreement substantially reduces one dimension of competition does not necessarily mean that competition is eliminated within the meaning of Article 53(3).
V navedenih primerih ni verjetno, da bodo pogoji iz člena 53(3) izpolnjeni.
A technology pool, for instance, can result in an industry standard, leading to a situation in which there is little competition in terms of the technological format.
Ne glede na dejstvo, da se skupinska izjema uporablja le, če so tehnološke pravice veljavne in se izkoriščajo, se lahko pogodbenici običajno sporazumeta, da bodo obveznosti za plačilo licenčnin veljale tudi po izteku obdobja veljavnosti licenčnih pravic intelektualne lastnine, ne da bi bil s tem kršen člen 53(1).
Once the main players in the market adopt a certain format, network effects may make it very difficult for alternative formats to survive.
Ko te pravice prenehajo veljati, lahko tretje osebe zakonito izkoriščajo zadevno tehnologijo in konkurirajo pogodbenicama sporazuma.
This does not imply, however, that the creation of a de facto industry standard always eliminates competition within the meaning of the last condition of Article 53(3).
Taka dejanska in potencialna konkurenca bo navadno zadostovala za zagotovitev, da zadevna obveznost ne bo imela znatnih protikonkurenčnih učinkov.
Within the standard, suppliers may compete on price, quality and product features.
V primeru sporazumov med nekonkurenti skupinska izjema zajema sporazume, pri katerih se licenčnine izračunajo na podlagi izdelkov, proizvedenih z licenčno tehnologijo, pa tudi izdelkov, proizvedenih s tehnologijami, ki jih licencirajo tretje osebe.
However, in order for the agreement to comply with Article 53(3), it must be ensured that the agreement does not unduly restrict competition and does not unduly restrict future innovation.
Taki dogovori lahko poenostavijo obračunavanje licenčnin.
This section deals with various types of restraints that are commonly included in licence agreements.
Vendar pa lahko prav tako privedejo do omejevanja dostopa na trg, in sicer z večanjem stroška uporabe proizvodnih dejavnikov tretjih oseb, in imajo tako lahko podobne učinke kot prepoved konkurence.
Given their prevalence it is useful to provide guidance as to how they are assessed outside the safe harbour of the TTBER.
Če se licenčnine ne plačujejo zgolj na podlagi izdelkov, proizvedenih z licenčno tehnologijo, temveč tudi izdelkov, proizvedenih s tehnologijo tretjih oseb, bodo povečale strošek teh drugih izdelkov in znižale povpraševanje po tehnologiji tretjih oseb.
Restraints that have already been dealt with in the other sections of these guidelines, in particular Sections 3.4 and 3.5, are only dealt with briefly in this section.
Zunaj področja uporabe skupinske izjeme je zato treba proučiti, ali ima ta omejitev učinke omejevanja dostopa na trg.
This section covers both agreements between non-competitors and agreements between competitors.
V ta namen je primerno uporabiti analitični okvir iz poglavja 4.2.7 v nadaljevanju.
In respect of the latter a distinction is made — where appropriate — between reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements.
Če so učinki omejevanja dostopa na trg znatni, so taki sporazumi zajeti v členu 53(1) in malo verjetno je, da izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 53(3), razen v primeru, da ne obstaja noben drug praktični način za izračun in spremljanje plačil licenčnin.
No such distinction is required in the case of agreements between non-competitors.
Podeljevanje izključnih licenc in omejitve prodaje Za namene teh smernic je koristno razlikovati med omejitvami proizvodnje na določenem ozemlju (izključne ali edine licence) ter omejitvami prodaje izdelkov, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo, na določenem ozemlju in določeni skupini kupcev (omejitve prodaje).
Indeed, when undertakings are neither actual nor potential competitors on a relevant technology market or on a market for products incorporating the licensed technology, a reciprocal licence is for all practical purposes no different from two separate licences.
„Izključna licenca“ pomeni, da dajalec licence sam ne sme proizvajati na podlagi licenčnih tehnoloških pravic in tudi ne sme podeljevati licence za licenčne tehnološke pravice tretjim osebam – niti na splošno niti za določeno uporabo ali na določenem ozemlju.
The situation is different for arrangements whereby the parties assemble a technology package, which is then licensed to third parties.
To pomeni, da je na splošno in za določeno uporabo ali na določenem ozemlju pridobitelj licence edini, ki sme proizvajati na podlagi licenčnih tehnoloških pravic.
Such arrangements are technology pools, which are dealt with in Section 4 below.
Če se dajalec licence zaveže, da sam ne bo proizvajal ali drugim podelil licence za proizvodnjo na danem ozemlju, lahko navedeno ozemlje zajema ves svet ali njegov del.
This section does not deal with obligations in licence agreements that are generally not restrictive of competition within the meaning of Article 53(1).
Če se dajalec licence zaveže le, da tretjim ne bo podelil licence za proizvodnjo na določenem ozemlju, gre za edino licenco.
These obligations include but are not limited to:
Izključne ali edine licence pogosto spremljajo omejitve prodaje, ki pogodbenici omejujejo z vidika geografskega ozemlja, na katerem lahko prodajata izdelke, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo.
confidentiality obligations;
Vzajemno podeljevanje izključnih licenc med konkurenti spada na področje uporabe člena 4(1)(c) TTBER, v skladu s katerim je razdelitev trga in kupcev med konkurenti opredeljena kot nedopustna omejitev.
obligations on licensees not to sublicense;
Vzajemno podeljevanje edinih licenc med konkurenti pa je predmet skupinske izjeme do 20-odstotnega praga tržnega deleža.
obligations not to use the licensed technology rights after the expiry of the agreement, provided that the licensed technology rights remain valid and in force;
V okviru takih sporazumov se pogodbenici medsebojno zavežeta, da ne bosta podeljevali licenc za lastne konkurenčne tehnologije tretjim osebam.
obligations to assist the licensor in enforcing the licensed intellectual property rights;
Če imata pogodbenici znatno stopnjo tržne moči, lahko taki sporazumi omogočajo nedovoljeno dogovarjanje, s tem da zagotavljajo, da bosta pogodbenici na trgu edini viri proizvodnje, ki temelji na licenčnih tehnologijah.
obligations to pay minimum royalties or to produce a minimum quantity of products incorporating the licensed technology;
Nevzajemno podeljevanje izključnih licenc med konkurenti je predmet skupinske izjeme do 20-odstotnega praga tržnega deleža.
obligations to use the licensor's trade mark or indicate the name of the licensor on the product.
Pri preseženem pragu tržnega deleža je treba analizirati verjetne protikonkurenčne učinke takega podeljevanja izključnih licenc.
The parties to a licence agreement are normally free to determine the royalty payable by the licensee and its mode of payment without being caught by Article 53(1).
Če izključna licenca zadeva svetovni trg, pomeni, da dajalec licence zapušča trg.
This principle applies both to agreements between competitors and agreements between non-competitors.
V primerih, ko je izključnost omejena na določeno ozemlje, kot je država EGP, se dajalec licence skladno s sporazumom vzdrži proizvodnje blaga in opravljanja storitev znotraj zadevnega ozemlja.
Royalty obligations may for instance take the form of lump sum payments, a percentage of the selling price or a fixed amount for each product incorporating the licensed technology.
V okviru člena 53(1) je treba zlasti presoditi konkurenčno težo dajalca licence.
In cases where the licensed technology relates to an input which is incorporated into a final product it is as a general rule not restrictive of competition that royalties are calculated on the basis of the price of the final product, provided that it incorporates the licensed technology [85].
Če ima dajalec licence omejen tržni položaj na proizvodnem trgu ali ni sposoben učinkovito izkoriščati tehnologije na ozemlju pridobitelja licence, je malo verjetno, da bi bil sporazum zajet v členu 53(1).
In the case of software licensing royalties based on the number of users and royalties calculated on a per machine basis are generally compatible with Article 53(1).
Poseben primer je, če sta dajalec in pridobitelj licence konkurenta le na tehnološkem trgu in dajalec licence, na primer raziskovalni inštitut ali majhno raziskovalno podjetje, nima proizvodnih in distribucijskih zmogljivosti, s katerimi bi učinkovito dal na trg izdelke, ki vključujejo licenčno tehnologijo.
In the case of licence agreements between competitors it should be borne in mind (see points (100) to (101) and (116) above) that in a limited number of circumstances royalty obligations may amount to price fixing, which is considered a hardcore restriction (see Article 4(1)(a)).
V takih primerih je kršitev člena 53(1) malo verjetna.
It is a hardcore restriction under Article 4(1)(a) if competitors provide for reciprocal running royalties in circumstances where the licence is a sham, in that its purpose is not to allow an integration of complementary technologies or to achieve another pro-competitive aim.
Kolikor je podeljevanje izključnih licenc med nekonkurenti zajeto v členu 53(1) [86], verjetno izpolnjuje pogoje iz člena 53(3).
It is also a hardcore restriction under Article 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(d) if royalties extend to products produced solely with the licensee's own technology rights.
Pravica do podelitve izključne licence je običajno potrebna, da se pridobitelja licence spodbudi k vlaganju v licenčno tehnologijo in k pravočasni uvedbi izdelkov na trg.
Other types of royalty arrangements between competitors are block-exempted up to the market share threshold of 20 % even if they restrict competition.
To se zgodi zlasti, če mora pridobitelj licence izvesti obsežne naložbe v nadaljnji razvoj licenčne tehnologije.
Outside the safe harbour of the block exemption Article 53(1) may be applicable where competitors cross-license and impose running royalties that are clearly disproportionate compared to the market value of the licence and where such royalties have a significant impact on market prices.
Potem ko je pridobitelju licence s poslovnega vidika uspelo uspešno izkoristiti licenčno tehnologijo, bi poseganje v izključnost pridobitelju licence odvzelo sadove njegovega uspeha in škodljivo vplivalo na konkurenco, razširjanje tehnologije in inovacije.
In assessing whether the royalties are disproportionate it is necessary to examine the royalties paid by other licensees on the product market for the same or substitute technologies.
Nadzorni organ bo zato v sporazumih med nekonkurenti le izjemoma ukrepal proti podeljevanju izključnih licenc, ne glede na ozemlje uporabe licence.
In such cases it is unlikely that the conditions of Article 53(3) are satisfied.
Vendar, če ima pridobitelj licence že v lasti nadomestno tehnologijo, ki jo uporablja v interni proizvodnji, morda izključna licenca ne bo potrebna, da bi ga spodbudila k uvedbi izdelka na trg.
Notwithstanding the fact that the block exemption only applies as long as the technology rights are valid and in force, the parties can normally agree to extend royalty obligations beyond the period of validity of the licensed intellectual property rights without falling foul of Article 53(1).
Po takem scenariju je lahko podeljevanje izključne licence namesto tega zajeto v členu 53(1), zlasti če ima pridobitelj licence tržno moč na proizvodnem trgu.
Once these rights expire, third parties can legally exploit the technology in question and compete with the parties to the agreement.
Glavni primer, v katerem je ukrepanje morda upravičeno, je, če prevladujoči pridobitelj licence pridobi izključno licenco za eno ali več konkurenčnih tehnologij.
Such actual and potential competition will normally be sufficient to ensure that the obligation in question does not have appreciable anti-competitive effects.
Za take sporazume je verjetno, da so zajeti v členu 53(1), in ni verjetno, da izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 53(3).
In the case of agreements between non-competitors the block exemption covers agreements whereby royalties are calculated on the basis of both products produced with the licensed technology and products produced with technologies licensed from third parties.
Da pa se člen 53(1) uporablja, mora biti vstop na tehnološki trg otežen in licenčna tehnologija mora biti dejanski vir konkurence na trgu.
Such arrangements may facilitate the metering of royalties.
Izključna licenca lahko v takih okoliščinah tretjim pridobiteljem licenc omeji dostop na trg, poveča vstopne ovire in pridobitelju licence omogoči, da ohrani svojo tržno moč.
However, they may also lead to foreclosure by increasing the cost of using third-party inputs and may thus have effects similar to those of a non-compete obligation.
Dogovori, s katerimi se dve ali več pogodbenic dogovori o navzkrižni podelitvi licenc in se zaveže, da ne bodo podeljevale licenc tretjim osebam, so povod za posebno zaskrbljenost, če tehnološki paket, ki je nastal na podlagi navzkrižnega licenciranja, predstavlja dejanski industrijski standard, do katerega morajo imeti tretje osebe dostop, da lahko na trgu učinkovito konkurirajo.
If royalties are paid not just on products produced with the licensed technology but also on products produced with third-party technology, then the royalties will increase the cost of the latter products and reduce demand for third-party technology.
V takih primerih sporazum ustvari zaprt standard, rezerviran za pogodbenice sporazuma.
Outside the scope of the block exemption the question whether the restriction has foreclosure effects must therefore be considered.
Nadzorni organ bo takšne dogovore presodil v skladu z istimi načeli, kot se uporabljajo za tehnološka združenja (glej poglavje 4.4).
For that purpose it is appropriate to use the analytical framework set out in Section 4.2.7 below.
Običajno se bo zahtevalo, da se tehnologije, ki podpirajo tak standard, licencirajo tretjim osebam na pravičen, razumen in nediskriminatoren način [87].
In the case of appreciable foreclosure effects such agreements are caught by Article 53(1) and unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3), unless there is no other practical way of calculating and monitoring royalty payments.
Če pogodbenici dogovora konkurirata tretjim osebam na obstoječem proizvodnem trgu in se dogovor nanaša na navedeni proizvodni trg, lahko zaprti standard povzroči občutne izključitvene učinke.
For the purpose of these guidelines, it is useful to distinguish between restrictions as to production within a given territory (exclusive or sole licences) and restrictions on the sale of products incorporating the licensed technology into a given territory and to a given customer group (sales restrictions).
Ta negativni učinek na konkurenco je mogoče preprečiti le tako, da se licence podelijo tudi tretjim osebam.
An ‘exclusive licence’ means that the licensor itself is not permitted to produce on the basis of the licensed technology rights, nor is it permitted to license the licensed technology rights to third parties, in general or for a particular use or in a particular territory.
Tudi pri omejitvah prodaje je pomembno razlikovati med licenčnimi sporazumi med konkurenti in licenčnimi sporazumi med nekonkurenti.
This means that, in general or for that particular use or in that particular territory, the licensee is the only one allowed to produce on the basis of the licensed technology rights.
Omejitve aktivne in pasivne prodaje, naložene eni ali več pogodbenicam v okviru vzajemnega sporazuma med konkurenti, se štejejo za nedopustne omejitve konkurence v skladu s členom 4(1)(c) TTBER.
Where the licensor undertakes not to produce itself or license others to produce within a given territory, this territory may cover the whole world or any part of it.
Take omejitve prodaje so zajete v prepovedi iz člena 53(1) in ni verjetno, da izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 53(3).
Where the licensor undertakes only not to licence third parties to produce within a given territory, the licence is a sole licence.
Take omejitve se običajno obravnavajo kot razdelitev trgov, ker prizadeti pogodbenici preprečujejo, da aktivno in pasivno prodaja na ozemljih in skupinam kupcev, ki jih je dejansko oskrbovala ali bi jih realno lahko oskrbovala v odsotnosti sporazuma.