natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In order to substantiate this argument, the Norwegian authorities make reference to the CFI judgment in the Linde case [29].The Authority fails to see a link between the facts of the Linde case [30] and the behaviour of the State in the case under assessment in the current decision.The Linde case concerned a group of agreements on the privatisation of an industrial undertaking.
Nadzorni organ ne vidi povezave med dejstvi v zadevi Linde [30] in ravnanjem države v zadevi, ki se preučuje v tej odločbi.Zadeva Linde se je nanašala na skupek sporazumov o privatizaciji industrijskega podjetja.
The Court found that the payment to Linde AG to fulfil engagements the German authorities had entered into in a contract with a third party represented a normal commercial transaction where the German authorities acted as rational market operators in a market economy and that the transaction was justified on commercial grounds [31].
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je plačilo v korist Linde AG za izpolnitev obveznosti, ki so jih prevzeli nemški organi s sklenitvijo pogodbe s tretjo osebo, običajna poslovna transakcija, pri čemer so nemški organi delovali kot razumen nosilec dejavnosti v tržnem gospodarstvu, in da je bila transakcija iz poslovnih razlogov upravičena.
The case does not in any way concern public service compensation, which is what the three measures under assessment in this decision represent.
Ta zadeva se nikakor ne nanaša na nadomestilo za opravljanje javne službe, kar navedeni trije ukrepi, ki se preučujejo v tej odločbi, dejansko so.
When buying a public service, the state is not acting in its capacity of a buyer of goods and services on a market.
Pri nakupu javne storitve država ne deluje kot kupec blaga in storitev na trgu.
To the contrary, the reason why the state has to intervene by buying the public service is that the market can either not deliver what the state wants or does not deliver it under the conditions required by the state.
Nasprotno, država mora posredovati pri nakupu javne storitve zato, ker trg ali ne more zagotoviti tistega, kar država želi, ali trg tega ne zagotavlja po pogojih, ki jih država določa.
When it comes to public services, the compensation shall be given on the basis of the costs of the provider and not on the basis of the value of the service for the state.1.3.2.
Pri javnih storitvah se nadomestilo izplača na podlagi stroškov, ki jih ima izvajalec, in ne na podlagi vrednosti storitve za državo.
Public service compensation – the private market operator principle and Altmark
Nadomestilo za opravljanje javne službe – načelo zasebnega tržnega udeleženca in sodna praksa v zadevi Altmark
The ECJ has explicitly clarified what can and cannot be considered as state aid within the realm of public service compensation.
Evropsko sodišče je izrecno pojasnilo, kaj se lahko šteje kot državna pomoč v okviru nadomestila za opravljanje javne službe in kaj ne.
According to the Altmark jurisprudence, state compensation for the provision of a public service that cumulatively fulfils the four criteria laid down in that case [32] (‘the Altmark criteria’) does not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement [33].
V skladu s sodno prakso v zadevi Altmark se državno nadomestilo za opravljanje javne službe, ki kumulativno izpolnjuje štiri merila, določena v tej zadevi [32] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: merila Altmark), ne šteje za državno pomoč v smislu člena 61 Sporazuma EGP.
Conversely, state measures which do not comply with one or more of the conditions must be regarded as state aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement [34].The Authority will in the following section assess whether the Altmark criteria are fulfilled regarding the three measures under assessment.
Nasprotno pa se državna intervencija, ki ne izpolnjuje enega ali več omenjenih pogojev, šteje za državno pomoč v smislu člena 61 Sporazuma EGP. [34]Nadzorni organ bo v naslednjem razdelku ocenil, ali so merila Altmark pri treh ukrepih, ki se preučujejo, izpolnjena.
As a subsidiary point, the Authority notes, in any event, that the Norwegian authorities have neither explained in any detail how the implementation of the three measures can be likened to the behaviour of a private market operator, nor provided any evidence that a private investor would have acted in this way.
Nadzorni organ v vsakem primeru opozarja, da norveški organi niso niti podrobno obrazložili, kako se lahko izvajanje navedenih treh ukrepov primerja z ravnanjem zasebnega tržnega udeleženca, niti utemeljili, zakaj bi zasebni vlagatelj tako ravnal.
In that regard, the Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have only made general remarks on how they had to implement the measures due to Hurtigruten’s weak financial position [35] in order to ensure that it would continue to provide the public service, as it would be difficult, for the Norwegian authorities, to find another undertaking to provide the service (at least in the short to medium term).
S tega vidika Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da so norveški organi zgolj na splošno navedli, kako so morali izvesti ukrepe zaradi slabega finančnega položaja podjetja Hurtigruten [35], da bi to lahko še naprej neprekinjeno opravljalo javne storitve, ker naj bi norveški organi težko našli drugo podjetje za opravljanje teh storitev (vsaj kratkoročno do srednjeročno).
The Norwegian authorities have not made any attempt at comparing their actions to that of a private market operator in any detail, but have only made a general reference to the fact that the three measures represented the least costly alternative and that the negotiations were carried out on the basis of the findings in the underlying material of the PWC Report.
Norveški organi svojih ukrepov v ničemer niso poskušali podrobno primerjati z ukrepi zasebnega tržnega udeleženca, temveč se zgolj na splošno sklicujejo na dejstvo, da so bili navedeni trije ukrepi najcenejša možnost in da so pogajanja temeljila na ugotovitvah iz gradiva, ki je bilo podlaga za poročilo PWC.
The Norwegian authorities have argued that the increase in compensation was made within the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement (which had been the subject of a tender process in 2004), and that the Altmark criteria have been satisfied.
Norveški organi zatrjujejo, da povišanje nadomestila spada v okvir Sporazuma Hurtigruten (ki je bil predmet razpisnega postopka iz leta 2004) in da so bila merila Altmark izpolnjena.
In light of this they hold that the three measures did not confer an advantage on Hurtigruten.
Na podlagi tega menijo, da navedeni trije ukrepi podjetju Hurtigruten niso zagotavljali prednosti.
The Hurtigruten Agreement (which was concluded on 17 December 2004) was not notified to the Authority and accordingly has not been subject to a state aid assessment to verify whether it complied with the Altmark criteria.
Sporazum Hurtigruten (sklenjen 17. decembra 2004) Nadzornemu organu ni bil priglašen in torej ni bil predmet ocene državne pomoči, ki bi preverila izpolnjevanje meril Altmark
In the following, the Authority will assess whether the three measures contained in the Supplementary Agreement comply with the Altmark criteria.
V nadaljevanju bo Nadzorni organ preučil, ali navedeni trije ukrepi iz Dopolnilnega sporazuma izpolnjujejo merila Altmark.
The fourth and second Altmark criteria
Četrto in drugo merilo Altmark V skladu s četrtim merilom Altmark mora biti upravičenec izbran s postopkom oddaje javnega naročila.
According to the fourth Altmark criterion, the beneficiary must be chosen in a public tender.
Prav tako nadomestilo ne sme presegati stroškov, ki bi jih imelo dobro vodeno podjetje, ki je ustrezno opremljeno s sredstvi za opravljanje javnih storitev. [36]To merilo je treba brati v povezavi z drugim merilom, ki določa, da je treba parametre za izračun plačil nadomestila določiti vnaprej ter objektivno in pregledno.
Alternatively, the compensation cannot exceed the costs of a well-run undertaking that is adequately equipped with the means to provide the public service [36].This criterion should be read in light of the second criterion which requires that the parameters for calculating the compensation payments must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [37].Hurtigruten was chosen as a public service provider following a public procurement procedure carried out in 2004, resulting in the conclusion of the Hurtigruten Agreement.
Podjetje Hurtigruten je bilo izbrano kot izvajalec javnih storitev s postopkom oddaje javnega naročila iz leta 2004, kar je vodilo k sklenitvi Sporazuma Hurtigruten.
The adjustment of the compensation agreed upon on 27 October 2008 was made on the basis of Article 8 of the Hurtigruten Agreement.
Nadomestilo, ki je bilo dogovorjeno 27. oktobra 2008, je bilo prilagojeno na podlagi člena 8 Sporazuma Hurtigruten.
The Authority recalls that Article 8 is a revision clause which allows both parties to require the renegotiation of the contract regarding extraordinary adjustments to the state’s remuneration, and reads as follows (the Authority’s translation):
Nadzorni organ želi spomniti, da je člen 8 določba o reviziji, ki dovoljuje, da obe stranki lahko začneta ponovna pogajanja o pogodbi za izredne prilagoditve nadomestila države, in se glasi (v prevodu Nadzornega organa):
‘Official acts that entail considerable changes of cost as well as radical changes of prices of input factors that the parties could not reasonably foresee, are grounds for either of the contracting parties to demand a renegotiation about extraordinary adjustments of the state's remuneration, changes in the service delivered or other measures. In such negotiations, the other party shall be entitled to access all necessary documentation.’ [38]
„Uradne dajatve, ki povzročijo bistvene spremembe pri stroških ali korenite spremembe pri cenah vhodnih dejavnikov in ki jih pogodbenici ne moreta razumno predvideti, so utemeljen razlog, na podlagi katerega vsaka od pogodbenic lahko zahteva ponovna pogajanja za izredne prilagoditve nadomestila države, spremembe pri opravljenih storitvah ali druge ukrepe. Med takšnimi pogajanji bo imela druga pogodbenica dostop do vse potrebne dokumentacije [38].“
Although the revision clause was part of the public tender procedure, in the Authority’s view it needs to be assessed whether the exercise of this provision later in the contract period is covered by the original tender procedure within the meaning of the fourth Altmark criterion.
Čeprav je bila določba o reviziji sestavni del postopka javnega razpisa, je po mnenju Nadzornega organa treba preveriti, ali je uresničevanje te določbe pozneje v pogodbenem obdobju zajeto v prvotnem razpisnem postopku v smislu četrtega merila Altmark.
The Norwegian authorities have stated that Article 8 is a traditional and common renegotiation/revision provision and have argued that the three measures did not imply any substantial amendment to the Hurtigruten Agreement as the extra compensation is related to documented cost increases on the public service side.
Norveški organi trdijo, da je člen 8 ustaljena in običajna določba o ponovnih pogajanjih/reviziji, in navajajo, da navedeni trije ukrepi ne vsebujejo nobene bistvene spremembe Sporazuma Hurtigruten, saj je dodatno nadomestilo povezano z dokumentiranim povišanjem stroškov iz naslova javne službe.
Therefore, according to the reasoning put forward by the Norwegian authorities, there is no over-compensation, but rather a restoration of the balance in the contract in a manner similar to what would be the result of the application of Article 36 of the Norwegian Contract Act and other similar provisions in Norwegian law.
Po utemeljevanju norveških organov ne gre za prekomerno nadomestilo, temveč bolj za ponovno vzpostavitev pogodbenega ravnotežja na podoben način, kot bi izhajal iz uporabe člena 36 norveškega zakona o obligacijskih razmerjih in drugih podobnih določb norveške zakonodaje.
The Authority firstly notes that general procurement principles dictate that substantial adjustments to contracts normally require a new tender procedure [39].
Nadzorni organ najprej ugotavlja, da po splošnih načelih javnega naročanja obsežnejše prilagoditve pogodb običajno zahtevajo nov razpisni postopek.
Given that the application of Article 8 in this case – under which ‘considerable changes of costs’ and ‘radical changes of prices of input factors’ permit renegotiation – has had the effect that the State’s remuneration in favour of Hurtigruten has been substantially increased [40] by virtue of the three measures contained in the Supplementary Agreement, the Authority is of the view that such an increase in the compensation could in principle have triggered a call for a new tender procedure.The Authority is of the view that the increased state remuneration under the three measures contained in the Supplementary Agreement cannot be held to be covered by the original tender.
Glede na to, da je posledica uporabe člena 8 v tem primeru – v skladu s katerim „bistvene spremembe pri stroških“ in „korenite spremembe pri cenah vhodnih dejavnikov“ dovoljujejo ponovna pogajanja –, da se je nadomestilo države v korist podjetja Hurtigruten na podlagi treh ukrepov iz Dopolnilnega sporazuma bistveno povečalo [40], Nadzorni organ meni, da bi tako povečanje nadomestila načeloma lahko sprožilo nov razpis.Po mnenju Nadzornega organa se ne more šteti, da je povišanje nadomestila države v okviru treh ukrepov iz Dopolnilnega sporazuma zajeto v prvotnem razpisu.
The Authority does not necessarily hold that any extraordinary compensation granted under a renegotiation clause of a contract that has been put out to tender will fail to clear the fourth Altmark criterion and hence involve state aid.
Vendar po mnenju Nadzornega organa to še ne pomeni nujno, da izredno nadomestilo, dodeljeno v okviru določbe o ponovnih pogajanjih iz pogodbe, ki je bila predmet razpisa, ne bi moglo izpolnjevati četrtega merila Altmark in torej vključuje državno pomoč.
However, Article 8 does not, as explained in the following, provide objective and transparent parameters on the basis of which the compensation in the form of the three measures was calculated in line with the requirement of the second Altmark criterion.
Kljub temu člen 8, kot je pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, ne zagotavlja objektivnih in preglednih parametrov, na podlagi katerih je bilo izračunano nadomestilo v obliki treh ukrepov v skladu z zahtevo iz drugega merila Altmark.
The Authority observes that Article 8 does not give Hurtigruten a right to an increased compensation on the basis of predetermined parameters.
Nadzorni organ ugotavlja, da člen 8 podjetju Hurtigruten ne podeljuje pravice do povišanja nadomestila na podlagi vnaprej določenih parametrov.
This clause merely gives the company a right to initiate renegotiations either (i) in case official acts entail considerable changes of cost that were not reasonably foreseeable, or (ii) when prices of input factors change radically.
Ta določba podjetju zgolj daje pravico, da ponovno začne pogajanja ali (i) kadar uradne dajatve povzročijo bistvene spremembe pri stroških, ki jih ni bilo mogoče razumno predvideti, ali (ii) kadar se korenito spremenijo cene vhodnih dejavnikov.
Furthermore, Article 8 does not provide specific guidance on how the extra compensation should be calculated.
Poleg tega člen 8 ne vsebuje posebnih navodil za izračun dodatnega nadomestila.
According to the text of the provision there are no parameters defining which input factors are covered by the renegotiation clause or how such costs should be compensated.
Besedilo določbe ne navaja parametrov, ki bi opredeljevali, kateri vhodni dejavniki so zajeti v določbo o ponovnih pogajanjih, ali način nadomestila takih stroškov.
Moreover, there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted.
Poleg tega ni nobenih omejitev glede dovoljene višine dodatnega nadomestila.
Judging solely by the text of the renegotiation clause, the concrete application of the provision appears to largely depend on the discretion of the Norwegian authorities as well as the negotiation skills of the concerned parties.
Sodeč samo po besedilu določbe o ponovnih pogajanjih se zdi, da je njena konkretna uporaba večinoma odvisna od presoje norveških organov in od pogajalskih spretnosti zadevnih pogodbenic.
On the other hand, the Norwegian authorities have argued that the text of Article 8 must be interpreted on the basis of its context, purpose and objective of striking a fair balance between the parties’ rights and obligations [41].
Po drugi strani norveški organi trdijo, da se mora besedilo člena 8 razlagati glede na sobesedilo, namen in cilj, ki je doseči pravično ravnotežje med pravicami in obveznostmi pogodbenic.
However, even when those factors are taken into account, the concrete application of the clause in the case at hand, as explained in the following, demonstrates that it does not meet the requirements of transparency and objectivity of the second Altmark criterion.
Kakor koli, tudi če upoštevamo te dejavnike, konkretna uporaba določbe v obravnavanem primeru, kot je pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, kaže, da ne izpolnjuje zahtev po preglednosti in objektivnosti iz drugega merila Altmark.
With regard to the NOx tax specifically, the Norwegian authorities have explained that the outcome of the negotiations with Hurtigruten set the level for reimbursements at 90 % [42] and that the Norwegian authorities did not wish to take away any incentive on Hurtigruten’s side to reduce NOx emissions by fully reimbursing all NOx tax-related expenses.
Posebej v zvezi z davkom na NOx so norveški organi pojasnili, da je bila kot rezultat pogajanj s podjetjem Hurtigruten določena 90-odstotna stopnja nadomestila [42] in da norveški organi niso želeli odvzeti spodbude podjetju Hurtigruten za zmanjšanje emisij NOx s celotnim povračilom vseh stroškov, povezanih z davkom na NOx.
However, the Norwegian authorities have not provided the Authority with an explanation of the parameters for the calculation.
Vendar norveški organi Nadzornemu organu niso dali nobene razlage o parametrih za izračun.
On the contrary, the Norwegian authorities have showed that the application of Article 8 is highly discretionary, as they explain that other public service contracts such as those pertaining to regional car ferry services include similar clauses [43], and that under these similar clauses, the regional car ferry operators have been reimbursed at 100 % for NOx taxes paid and contributions to the NOx Fund [44].Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have not presented the Authority with the parameters for the calculation of (i) the general compensation (of NOK 66 million) and, (ii) the reduction of the requirement relating to the number of ships operated under the public service contract (evaluated at NOK 3,6 million for the period from 16 November 2008 to 31 December 2008 and NOK 7,7 million for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 March 2009).
Nasprotno, norveški organi prikazujejo, da je uporaba člena 8 predvsem stvar presoje, ko pojasnjujejo, da druge pogodbe za opravljanje storitev po javnem naročilu, na primer tiste, ki se nanašajo na regionalne trajektne povezave za prevoz avtomobilov, vsebujejo podobne določbe [43] in da so v skladu s takimi podobnimi določbami upravljavci regionalnih trajektnih povezav za prevoz avtomobilov prejeli 100-odstotno nadomestilo za plačane davke na NOx in prispevke v sklad za NOx. [44]Poleg tega norveški organi Nadzornemu organu niso predložili parametrov za izračun (i) splošnega nadomestila (v višini 66 milijonov NOK) in (ii) zmanjšanje zahteve v zvezi s številom ladij, ki obratujejo v okviru pogodbe za opravljanje storitev po javnem naročilu (ocenjeno na 3,6 milijona NOK za obdobje od 16. novembra 2008 do 31. decembra 2008 in 7,7 milijona NOK za obdobje od 1. januarja 2009 do 31. marca 2009).
Instead, the Norwegian authorities initially made reference to the weak financial position of Hurtigruten [45] and the documents underlying the PWC Report which lay the basis for the extensive negotiations that led them to agree to make the additional payments to ensure the continuation of the public service based on allegedly commercial considerations and the extra cost of performing the public service.
Namesto tega so se norveški organi prvotno sklicevali na šibak finančni položaj podjetja Hurtigruten [45] in na dokumente, na katerih temelji poročilo PWC in ki so bili podlaga za obsežna pogajanja, katerih izid je bila privolitev v dodatna plačila, da se zagotovi neprekinjeno opravljanje javne službe domnevno na podlagi poslovnih premislekov in dodatnih stroškov pri opravljanju javne službe.
Thereafter, the Norwegian authorities have simply provided the Authority with two commissioned reports prepared by BDO Noraudit in order to justify ex post that the three measures do not involve over-compensation.
Potem so norveški organi Nadzornemu organu preprosto predložili dve naročeni poročili, ki ju je pripravilo BDO Noraudit in ki naknadno upravičujeta, da navedeni trije ukrepi ne vključujejo prekomernega nadomestila.
However, contrary to the opinion of the Norwegian authorities, in the view of the Authority the three reports indicate that the three measures actually involve over-compensation - in the sense that the compensation is not limited to the increased cost of providing the public service – and do not provide clarification regarding the parameters used to determine these costs [46].
Vendar po mnenju Nadzornega organa navedena tri poročila v nasprotju s stališčem norveških organov kažejo, da trije ukrepi dejansko vključujejo prekomerno nadomestilo – saj nadomestilo ni omejeno na povišanje stroškov pri opravljanju javne službe – in ne pojasnjujejo parametrov, uporabljenih za določitev teh stroškov. [46]
Additionally, the second BDO Noraudit Report appears to be based on the tenet that all increased costs of providing the public service can be covered by extra compensation granted under Article 8, regardless of whether they represent radical changes that could have been reasonably foreseen (or otherwise fulfil the criteria of Article 8).
Poleg tega se zdi, da drugo poročilo BDO Noraudit temelji na predpostavki, da dodatno nadomestilo, dodeljeno v skladu s členom 8, lahko pokrije vse povečane stroške pri opravljanju javne službe ne glede na to, ali so posledica korenitih razumno predvidljivih sprememb ali ne (oziroma drugače izpolnjujejo merila iz člena 8).
With regard to the increase of fuel costs, the Hurtigruten Agreement already had a price adjustment mechanism (Article 6-2).
Glede povišanih stroškov za gorivo je bil v Sporazum Hurtigruten že vgrajen mehanizem za prilagoditev cen (člen 6.2).
The Authority holds that potential tender participants would reasonably expect this provision to deal with the issue of increased fuel costs.
Nadzorni organ meni, da se ta določba, kakor bi morebitni udeleženci v razpisu smiselno pričakovali, nanaša na vprašanje povišanih stroškov za gorivo.
As the price of fuel is an important cost element for cruise/ferry operators, the Authority assumes that operators within the sector usually take steps to ensure that price fluctuations do not expose them to undue financial risk.
Ker je cena goriva pomemben stroškovni element za upravljavce križarjenj/trajektnih prevozov, Nadzorni organ domneva, da upravljavci v tem sektorju običajno poskrbijo, da zaradi cenovnih nihanj ne bodo izpostavljeni nepotrebnemu finančnemu tveganju.
In practice, Hurtigruten did in fact hedge some of its fuel costs.
V resnici je podjetje Hurtigruten dejansko zavarovalo nekatere stroške za gorivo.
Regardless of this, the Norwegian authorities opted to make additional payments in the framework of the revision clause of Article 8.
Ne glede na to so se norveški organi odločili, da izvedejo dodatna plačila na podlagi določbe o reviziji iz člena 8.