natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The acquisition process should respect the principles of equal opportunity for all potential acquirers and the outcome should ensure conditions of effective competition in the relevant markets.
Pri prevzemu morajo biti spoštovana načela enakih možnosti za vse potencialne kupce, rezultat pa mora zagotavljati pogoje učinkovite konkurence na upoštevnih trgih.
Where the imposition of divestitures and/or the prohibition of acquisitions are not appropriate, the Authority may accept the imposition by the EFTA State of a claw-back mechanism, for example in the form of a levy on the aid recipients.
Kadar odprodaja in/ali prepoved prevzemov nista primerni, lahko Nadzorni organ dovoli, da država Efte uvede mehanizem za vračilo sredstev, na primer v obliki dajatve za prejemnice pomoči.
This would allow recovery of part of the aid from the bank after it has returned to viability.
To bi omogočilo izterjavo dela pomoči od banke, potem ko je začela ponovno uspešno poslovati.
Where banks receiving state support are requested to fulfil certain requirements as to lending to the real economy, the credit provided by the bank must be on commercial terms [43].
Če so banke, ki prejemajo državno pomoč, dolžne izpolnili določene zahteve glede zagotavljanja posojil realnemu gospodarstvu, morajo ta posojila zagotavljati po tržnih pogojih [43].
State aid cannot be used to offer terms (for example as regards rates or collateral) which cannot be matched by competitors which are not in receipt of State aid.
Državna pomoč se ne sme uporabiti za ponujanje pogojev, ki jih konkurenčne banke, ki ne prejemajo državne pomoči, ne morejo ponuditi (npr. obrestne mere ali zavarovanje s premoženjem).
However, in cases where limitations on the pricing behaviour of the beneficiary may not be appropriate, for example because they may result in a reduction of effective competition, EFTA States should propose other, more suitable, remedies to ensure effective competition, such as measures that favour entry.
Vendar pa morajo države Efte v primerih, ko omejitve glede določanja cen upravičenke niso primerne, na primer ker bi lahko povzročile zmanjšanje učinkovite konkurence, predlagati druga, ustreznejša sredstva za zagotavljanje učinkovite konkurence, denimo ukrepe, ki olajšujejo vstop na trg.
In the same vein, banks must not invoke state support as a competitive advantage when marketing their financial offers [44].
Podobno se banke pri trženju svojih finančnih ponudb ne smejo sklicevati na državno pomoč kot na konkurenčno prednost [44].
These restrictions should remain in place, depending on the scope, size and duration of the aid, for a period ranging between three years and the entire duration of the restructuring period.
Glede na obseg, višino in trajanje pomoči morajo te omejitve veljati najmanj tri leta, lahko pa tudi celotno obdobje prestrukturiranja.
They would then also serve as a clear incentive to repay the State as soon as possible.
To zagotavlja močno spodbudo bankam, da čim prej odplačajo državna sredstva.
The Authority will also examine the degree of market opening and the capacity of the sector to deal with bank failures.
Nadzorni organ bo proučil tudi stopnjo odprtosti trga in sposobnost sektorja, da prenese propad bank.
In its overall assessment the Authority may consider possible commitments by the beneficiary or commitments from the EFTA State concerning the adoption of measures [45] that would promote more sound and competitive markets, for instance by favouring entry and exit.
V svoji splošni oceni lahko Nadzorni organ upošteva morebitne zaveze upravičenke ali zaveze države Efte glede uvedbe ukrepov [45], ki bi spodbujali bolj zdrave in konkurenčne trge, na primer z olajšanjem vstopa na trg in izstopa z njega.
Such initiatives could, in appropriate circumstances, accompany the other structural or behavioural measures that would normally be required of the beneficiary.
Take pobude bi v ustreznih okoliščinah lahko spremljale druge strukturne ukrepe ali ukrepe glede ravnanja, ki bi jih upravičenka običajno sicer morala izvesti.
The EFTA State’s commitment to introduce mechanisms to deal with bank difficulties at an early stage may be regarded positively by the Authority as an element promoting sound and competitive markets.
Nadzorni organ lahko zavezo države Efte, da bo uvedla mehanizme za reševanje težav bank na zgodnji stopnji, obravnava pozitivno kot element, ki podpira zdrave in konkurenčne trge.
Monitoring and procedural issues
Spremljanje in postopkovna vprašanja
In order to verify that the restructuring plan is being implemented properly, the Authority will request regular detailed reports.
Da bi preveril, ali se načrt prestrukturiranja ustrezno izvaja, bo Nadzorni organ zahteval redna podrobna poročila.
The first report will normally have to be submitted to the Authority not later than six months after approval of the restructuring plan.
Prvo poročilo bo praviloma treba predložiti Nadzornemu organu najpozneje šest mesecev po odobritvi načrta prestrukturiranja.
Upon notification of the restructuring plan the Authority has to assess whether the plan is likely to restore long term viability and to limit distortions of competition adequately.
Ob priglasitvi načrta prestrukturiranja mora Nadzorni organ oceniti, ali je verjetno, da bo načrt omogočil ponovno vzpostavitev dolgoročno uspešnega poslovanja in ustrezno omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence.
Where it has serious doubts as to the compliance of the restructuring plan with the relevant requirements, the Authority is required to open a formal investigation procedure, giving third parties the possibility to comment on the measure and thereby ensuring a transparent and coherent approach while respecting the confidentiality rules applicable in State aid proceedings.
Če Nadzorni organ resno dvomi o skladnosti načrta prestrukturiranja z zadevnimi zahtevami, mora sprožiti formalni postopek preiskave in s tem dati tretjim osebam možnost, da dajo pripombe o ukrepu, ter tako zagotoviti pregleden in usklajen pristop ob spoštovanju pravil o zaupnosti, ki veljajo v postopkih v zvezi z državno pomočjo.
Nevertheless the Authority does not have to open formal proceedings where the restructuring plan is complete and the measures suggested are such that the Authority has no further doubts as to compatibility in the sense of Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice.
Nadzornemu organu pa ni treba sprožiti formalnega postopka preiskave, če je načrt prestrukturiranja popoln in so predlagani ukrepi taki, da Nadzorni organ nima nadaljnjih pomislekov glede združljivosti v smislu člena 4(4) dela II Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča.
This might, in particular, be the case where an EFTA State has notified the Authority of an aid accompanied by a restructuring plan which meets all of the conditions set out in this Chapter, in order to obtain legal certainty as to the necessary follow-up.
To je zlasti verjetno v primerih, ko je država Efte priglasila Nadzornemu organu pomoč skupaj z načrtom prestrukturiranja, ki izpolnjuje vse pogoje iz tega poglavja, da bi si zagotovila pravno varnost glede potrebnih naknadnih ukrepov.
In such cases the Authority might adopt a final decision stating that rescue aid as well as restructuring aid is compatible under Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement.
V takih primerih lahko Nadzorni organ sprejme končno odločbo, v kateri ugotovi, da je pomoč za reševanje kot tudi pomoč za prestrukturiranje združljiva na podlagi člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP.
Temporary scope of the communication
Omejeno trajanje veljavnosti sporočila
This Chapter is justified by the current exceptional financial sector crisis and should therefore only be applied for a limited period.
Uporaba tega poglavja je upravičena zaradi trenutne izjemne krize v finančnem sektorju, zato bi moralo biti v veljavi samo v omejenem obdobju.
For the assessment of restructuring aid notified to the Authority on or before 31 December 2010, the Authority will apply this Chapter.
Nadzorni organ bo to poglavje uporabljal za oceno ukrepov pomoči za prestrukturiranje, ki mu bodo priglašeni do vključno 31. decembra 2010.
As regards non-notified aid, the Guidelines on the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid will apply.
Za nepriglašeno pomoč bodo veljale smernice o določitvi pravil, ki se uporabljajo za oceno nezakonite državne pomoči.
The Authority will therefore apply this Chapter when assessing the compatibility of non-notified aid granted on or before 31 December 2010.
Nadzorni organ bo to sporočilo zato uporabljal pri ocenjevanju združljivosti nepriglašene pomoči, dodeljene do vključno 31. decembra 2010.
Bearing in mind that this Chapter is based on Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement, the Authority may review its content and duration according to the development of market conditions, the experience gathered in the treatment of cases and the overriding interest in maintenance of financial stability.
Ob upoštevanju dejstva, da je podlaga tega poglavja člen 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP, lahko Nadzorni organ ponovno presodi njegovo vsebino in trajanje veljavnosti v skladu z razvojem razmer na trgu, izkušnjami, pridobljenimi pri obravnavanju zadev, in splošnim interesom za ohranjanje finančne stabilnosti.
This Chapter corresponds to the Communication of the European Commission (hereinafter ‘the Commission’) on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules ( OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, p. 9).
To poglavje se ujema s sporočilom Evropske komisije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Komisija) o ponovni vzpostavitvi uspešnega poslovanja in oceni ukrepov prestrukturiranja v finančnem sektorju v sedanji krizi na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči (UL C 195, 19.8.2009, str. 9).
At point 1 of its Communication cited in footnote 1 above, the Commission referred to a respective commitment made by the European Council at its meetings on 20 March 2009 and on 18 and 19 June 2009.
V točki 1 sporočila iz opombe 1 Komisija navaja ustrezno zavezo, ki jo je Evropski svet sprejel na zasedanjih 20. marca 2009 ter 18. in 19. junija 2009.
In its Communication to the European Council of 4 March 2009 on ‘Driving the European Recovery’ COM(2009) 114 final, the Commission announced a reform programme to address more general weaknesses in the regulatory framework applicable to financial institutions which operate in the Community.
V svojem sporočilu Evropskemu svetu z dne 4. marca 2009 z naslovom „Spodbujanje okrevanja evropskega gospodarstva“ (COM(2009) 114 konč.), je Komisija napovedala program reform za odpravo širših slabosti v regulativnem okviru, ki ureja delovanje finančnih institucij v Skupnosti.
See the chapters of the Guidelines on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions (hereinafter ‘the Banking Guidelines’), on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis (hereinafter ‘the Recapitalisation Guidelines’) and on the treatment of impaired assets in the EEA banking sector (hereinafter ‘the Impaired assets Guidelines’).
Glej poglavja Smernic o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za ukrepe v zvezi s finančnimi institucijami (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice o bančništvu), o dokapitalizaciji finančnih institucij v trenutni finančni krizi (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice o dokapitalizaciji) in o obravnavanju oslabljenih sredstev v bančnem sektorju EGP (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice o oslabljenih sredstvih).
The application of this Chapter is limited to financial institutions as referred to in the Banking Guidelines.
Uporaba tega poglavja je omejena na finančne institucije iz smernic o bančništvu.
The criteria and specific circumstances which trigger the obligation to present a restructuring plan have been explained in the Banking Guidelines, the Recapitalisation Guidelines and the Impaired Assets Guidelines.
Merila in posebne okoliščine, ki določajo obveznost predložitve načrta prestrukturiranja, so bila pojasnjena v smernicah o bančništvu, smernicah o dokapitalizaciji in smernicah o oslabljenih sredstvih.
They refer in particular, but not exclusively, to situations where a distressed bank has been recapitalised by the State, or where a bank benefiting from asset relief has already received State aid in whatever form that contributes to coverage or avoidance of losses (except participation in a guarantee scheme) which altogether exceeds 2 % of the total bank’s risk weighted assets.
Nanašajo se predvsem, vendar ne izključno, na primere, ko država dokapitalizira banko v težavah ali ko je banka, ki prejme finančno pomoč za oslabljena sredstva, že prejela državno pomoč v kakršni koli obliki, ki prispeva h kritju izgub ali preprečevanju njihovega nastanka (razen sodelovanja v jamstveni shemi) in ki skupaj presega 2 % skupne tveganju prilagojene tehtane aktive banke.
The degree of restructuring will depend on the seriousness of the problems of each bank.
Stopnja prestrukturiranja je odvisna od resnosti težav posamezne banke.
By contrast, in line with those Guidelines (in particular point 40 of the Recapitalisation Guidelines and Annex V to the Impaired Assets Guidelines), where a limited amount of aid has been given to banks which are fundamentally sound, EFTA States are required to submit a report to the Authority on the use of state funds comprising all the information necessary to evaluate the bank's viability, the use of the capital received and the path towards exit from reliance on state support.
Če pa je bil dan omejen znesek pomoči bankam, ki so načeloma zdrave, morajo države Efte v skladu z navedenimi smernicami (zlasti točko 40 smernic o dokapitalizaciji in Prilogo V k smernicam o oslabljenih sredstvih) Nadzornemu organu predložiti poročilo o uporabi državnih sredstev, ki vsebuje vse potrebne informacije za oceno uspešnosti poslovanja banke, uporabe prejetega kapitala in načrta za prenehanje odvisnosti od državne pomoči.
The viability review should demonstrate the risk profile and prospective capital adequacy of these banks and evaluate their business plans.
Pregled uspešnosti poslovanja mora vključevati profil tveganja in prihodnjo kapitalsko ustreznost teh bank ter oceniti njihove poslovne načrte.
That is to say, aid which was temporarily authorised by the Authority as rescue aid under the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty or aid temporarily authorised under Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement, as well as any new aid that may be notified as needed for restructuring.
Tj. pomoči, ki jo je Nadzorni organ začasno odobril kot pomoč za reševanje na podlagi smernic o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah ali pomoči, ki je bila začasno odobrena na podlagi člena 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP, pa tudi vsake nove pomoči, ki se lahko priglasi kot potrebna za prestrukturiranje.
This Chapter will therefore be applied instead of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty for the assessment of restructuring aid to banks in the current circumstances of systemic crisis.
Za oceno pomoči za prestrukturiranje bank v trenutnih razmerah sistemske krize se torej uporablja to poglavje namesto Smernic o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah.
At Community level, the Commission has, in the past, adopted a number of decisions relating to restructuring aid (compatible under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty) to ailing banks, on the basis of a comprehensive restructuring process which allowed the beneficiaries to regain their long-term viability without the aid unduly harming competitors.
Na ravni Skupnosti je Komisija v preteklosti sprejela več odločb o pomoči za prestrukturiranje (združljivi na podlagi člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES) za banke v težavah na podlagi obsežnega prestrukturiranja, ki je upravičenkam omogočilo, da so ponovno začele dolgoročno uspešno poslovati, ne da bi pomoč pri tem neupravičeno škodila njihovim konkurentom.
Typical restructuring strategies included reorientation of business models, closure or divestments of businesses divisions, subsidiaries or branches, changes in the asset-liabilities management, sale as a going concern or break-up and sale of different parts of business to viable competitors.
Značilne strategije prestrukturiranja so vključevale preusmeritev poslovnih modelov, zaprtje ali odprodajo poslovnih enot, hčerinskih družb ali podružnic, spremembe v upravljanju premoženja, prodajo delujočega podjetja ali razdelitev in prodajo različnih delov podjetja uspešno delujočim konkurenčnim podjetjem.
See for instance Commission Decision 98/490/EC of 20 May 1998 concerning aid granted by France to the Crédit Lyonnais group (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28), Commission Decision 2005/345/EC of 18 February 2004 on restructuring aid implemented by Germany for Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1), Commission Decision 2009/341/EC of 4 June 2008 on State aid C 9/08 (ex NN 8/08, CP 244/07) implemented by Germany for Sachsen LB (OJ L 104, 24.4.2009, p. 34) and the autumn 2006 State Aid Scoreboard, COM(2006) 761 final, p. 28 (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/2006_autumn_en.pdf), with a special survey on rescue and restructuring aid.
Glej na primer Odločbo Komisije 98/490/ES z dne 20. maja 1998 o pomoči, ki jo je Francija odobrila skupini Crédit Lyonnais (UL L 221, 8.8.1998, str. 28), Odločbo Komisije 2005/345/ES z dne 18. februarja 2004 o pomoči Nemčije pri prestrukturiranju v korist Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG (UL L 116, 4.5.2005, str. 1), Odločbo Komisije 2009/341/ES z dne 4. junija 2008 o državni pomoči C 9/08 (ex NN 8/08, CP 244/2007) Nemčije v korist banke Sachsen LB (UL L 104, 24.4.2009, str. 34) in Statistični pregled državnih pomoči za jesen 2006 (COM(2006) 761 konč., str. 28) (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/2006_autumn_en.pdf), ki vključuje posebno raziskavo o pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
In accordance with the Impaired Assets Guidelines.
V skladu s smernicami o oslabljenih sredstvih.
In accordance with the Banking Guidelines, the Recapitalisation Guidelines and the Impaired Assets Guidelines.
V skladu s smernicami o bančništvu, smernicami o dokapitalizaciji in smernicami o oslabljenih sredstvih.
See point 4 of this Chapter.
Glej točko 4 tega poglavja.
In accordance with the Banking Guidelines, the Recapitalisation Guidelines and the Impaired Assets Guidelines, where a limited amount of aid is granted to fundamentally sound banks, EFTA States are required to submit a viability review to the Authority.
Če se bankam, ki so načeloma zdrave, odobri omejen znesek pomoči, morajo države Efte v skladu s smernicami o bančništvu, smernicami o dokapitalizaciji in smernicami o oslabljenih sredstvih predložiti pregled uspešnosti poslovanja.
In accordance, in particular, with point 40 of the Recapitalisation Guidelines and Annex V to the Impaired Assets Guidelines.
Zlasti v skladu s točko 40 smernic o dokapitalizaciji in Prilogo V k smernicam o oslabljenih sredstvih.
As explained in point 8 of this Chapter, where Section 2 refers to a restructuring plan, the principles underlying Section 2 apply by analogy also to viability reviews.
Kot je pojasnjeno v točki 8 tega poglavja, se načela, ki so podlaga za oddelek 2 in veljajo za načrte prestrukturiranja, po analogiji uporabljajo tudi za preglede uspešnosti poslovanja.
An indicative model for a restructuring plan is reproduced in the Annex.
Okvirni vzorec za načrt prestrukturiranja je predstavljen v Prilogi.
Where appropriate the Authority will ask for the advice of an external consultant to examine the notified restructuring plans in order to assess viability, burden sharing and minimising competition distortions.
Nadzorni organ bo po potrebi pri proučitvi priglašenih načrtov prestrukturiranja pridobil mnenje zunanjega svetovalca, da bo ocenil uspešnost poslovanja, porazdelitev bremena in omejitev izkrivljanja konkurence na najmanjšo možno mero.
It may also request certification of various elements by supervisors.
Prav tako lahko zaprosi nadzornike za potrditev različnih elementov.
See for instance, Commission Decision of 2 April 2008 in case NN 1/2008 Northern Rock (OJ C 135, 3.6.2008, p. 21), and Decision 2009/341/EC in Case C 9/08 Sachsen LB.
Glej npr. Odločbo Komisije z dne 2. aprila 2008 v zadevi NN 1/08, Northern Rock (UL C 135, 3.6.2008, str. 21) in Odločbo 2009/341/ES v zadevi C 9/08, Sachsen LB.
See Decision 2009/341/EC in Case C 9/08 Sachsen LB.
Glej Odločbo 2009/341/ES v zadevi C 9/08, Sachsen LB.
Except in duly justified circumstances.
Razen v ustrezno utemeljenih okoliščinah.
See Commission Decision of 21 October 2008 in case C 10/08 IKB, not yet published.
Glej Odločbo Komisije z dne 21. oktobra 2008 v zadevi C 10/08, IKB (še ni objavljena).
In accordance with the principles set in Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 22).
V skladu z načeli iz Priporočila Komisije 2009/384/ES z dne 30. aprila 2009 o plačnih politikah v sektorju finančnih storitev (UL L 120, 15.5.2009, str. 22).
Understood as selling large quantities of assets at current low market prices which could lower the prices further.
Z izrazom „nujne prodaje“ (ang. „fire sales“) je mišljena prodaja velikih količin aktive po trenutnih nizkih tržnih cenah, kar bi lahko cene na trgu še dodatno znižalo.
According to the Commission, its practice has been to accept two to three years as the duration of a restructuring plan.
V skladu s prakso Komisije je sprejemljivo trajanje izvedbe načrta prestrukturiranja dve do tri leta.
See also point 20.
Glej tudi točko 20.
The absence of the tender as such does not automatically mean that there is State aid to the buyer.
Če prodaja ne poteka prek javnega zbiranja ponudb, to samo po sebi ne pomeni, da je kupec prejel pomoč.
This would normally result in an aid to the sold economic activity.
To bi imelo običajno za posledico, da bi bila pomoč dodeljena prodani gospodarski dejavnosti.
See Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Hytasa [1994] ECR I-4103, paragraph 22.
Glej združene zadeve C-278/92, C-279/92 in C-280/92, Hytasa, Recueil 1994, str. I-4103, točka 22.
See Case C-334/99 Gröditzer Stahlwerke [2003] ECR I-1139, paragraph 134 et seq. and Commission Decision 2008/719/EC of 30 April 2008 on State aid C 56/06 (ex NN 77/06) implemented by Austria for the privatisation of Bank Burgenland (OJ L 239, 6.9.2008, p. 32).
Glej zadevo C-334/99, Gröditzer Stahlwerke, Recueil 2003, str. I-1139, točka 134 in naslednje, ter Odločbo Komisije 2008/719/ES z dne 30. aprila 2008 o državni pomoči št. C 56/06 (ex NN 77/06) Avstrije za privatizacijo banke Bank Burgenland (UL L 239, 6.9.2008, str. 32).
See points 43 to 50 of the Banking Guidelines.
Glej točke 43 do 50 smernic o bančništvu.
For examples of such aid and conditions under which it was found compatible, see Commission Decision of 1 October 2008 in case NN 41/08 UK, Rescue aid to Bradford & Bingley (OJ C 290, 13.11.2008, p. 2) and the Commission Decision of 5 November 2008 in case NN 39/08 DK, Aid for liquidation of Roskilde Bank (OJ C 12, 17.1.2009, p. 3).
Za primere tovrstne pomoči in pogoje, v katerih se je štela za združljivo, glej Odločbo Komisije z dne 1. oktobra 2008 v zadevi NN 41/08, Združeno kraljestvo, Pomoč za reševanje banke Bradford & Bingley (UL C 290, 13.11.2008, str. 2) in Odločbo Komisije z dne 5. novembra 2008 v zadevi NN 39/08, Danska, Pomoč za likvidacijo Roskilde Bank (UL C 12, 17.1.2009, str. 3).
See Case T-17/03 Schmitz-Gotha [2006] ECR II-1139.
Glej zadevo T-17/03, Schmitz-Gotha, ZOdl. 2006, str. II-1139.
As already developed in previous Guidelines, in particular the Impaired Assets Guidelines, see points 21 et seq.
Kot je opisano v prejšnjih smernicah, zlasti v smernicah o oslabljenih sredstvih (glej točko 21 in naslednje).