natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The present Chapter outlines the Authority’s policy in applying the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement to measures that support the deployment of traditional broadband networks, based on the existing decision-making practice of the Commission (Section 2) and also address a number of issues relating to the assessment of measures aiming to encourage and support the rapid roll-out of NGA networks (Section 3).
To poglavje povzema politiko Nadzornega organa glede uporabe pravil o državni pomoči iz Sporazuma EGP za ukrepe, ki podpirajo postavitev tradicionalnih širokopasovnih omrežij, glede na postopek sprejemanja odločitev Komisije (oddelek 2), ter obravnavajo tudi več vprašanj v zvezi z oceno ukrepov, ki so namenjeni spodbujanju in podpori hitrega uvajanja omrežij NGA (oddelek 3).
The Authority will apply the guidelines set out in this Chapter in the assessment of State aid to broadband, thereby increasing legal certainty and the transparency of its decision-making practice.
Nadzorni organ bo smernice iz tega poglavja uporabil pri oceni državne pomoči za širokopasovni dostop, s čimer bo povečal pravno varnost in preglednost svojega postopka odločanja.
THE AUTHORITY’S POLICY ON STATE AID FOR BROADBAND PROJECTS
POLITIKA NADZORNEGA ORGANA O DRŽAVNI POMOČI ZA PROJEKTE NA PODROČJU ŠIROKOPASOVNIH POVEZAV
The application of the State aid rules
Uporaba pravil o državni pomoči
In its decision-making practice, the Commission has taken an favourable view towards state measures for broadband deployment for rural and underserved areas, whilst being more critical for aid measures in areas where a broadband infrastructure already exists and competition takes place.
V svojih postopkih odločanja je Komisija naklonjena državnim ukrepom za postavitev širokopasovnega omrežja v podeželskih in manj pokritih območjih, bolj kritična pa je glede ukrepov pomoči na območjih, kjer je širokopasovna infrastruktura že na voljo in konkurenca obstaja.
Where state intervention to support broadband deployment satisfied the conditions of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as TFEU), corresponding to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, its compatibility has been assessed so far by the Commission mainly under Article 107(3) of TFEU, corresponding to Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement.
Kadar je državna intervencija za podporo postavitvi širokopasovnega omrežja izpolnjevala pogoje državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: PDEU), ki ustreza členu 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, je Komisija njeno združljivost do zdaj ocenjevala zlasti na podlagi člena 107(3) PDEU, ki ustreza členu 61(3) Sporazuma EGP.
The Commission’s State aid policy towards state measures to support broadband network deployments can be summarised in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 below.
Politika Komisije o državni pomoči glede državnih ukrepov za podporo postavitvi širokopasovnih omrežij je povzeta v oddelkih 2.2 in 2.3 v nadaljevanju.
Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement: Presence of aid
Člen 61(1) Sporazuma EGP: Prisotnost pomoči
the measure has to be granted out of state resources;
ukrep se mora odobriti iz državnih sredstev;
it has to confer an economic advantage to undertakings;
podjetjem mora prinesti gospodarsko prednost;
the advantage has to be selective and distort or threaten to distort competition;
prednost mora biti selektivna in izkrivljati konkurenco ali pomeniti nevarnost njenega izkrivljanja;
the measure has to affect intra-EEA trade.
ukrep mora vplivati na trgovino znotraj EGP.
Public support for broadband projects often involves the presence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement [9].
Javna podpora projektom na področju širokopasovnih povezav pogosto vključuje državno pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP [9].
First, the measures typically involve state resources (for instance, where the state supports broadband projects through subsidies, tax rebates or other types of preferential financing conditions) [10].
Prvič, ukrepi običajno vključujejo državna sredstva (če na primer država podpira projekte na področju širokopasovnih povezav s subvencijami, znižanji davkov ali drugimi vrstami preferencialnih pogojev financiranja) [10].
Second, as regards support granted for an economic activity, state measures supporting broadband deployment projects usually address the exercise of an economic activity (such as building, operating, and enabling access to broadband infrastructure including backhaul facilities and ground equipment, such as fixed, terrestrial wireless, satellite-based, or a combination thereof).
Drugič, kar zadeva pomoč gospodarski dejavnosti, državni ukrepi za podporo projektom postavitve širokopasovnih omrežij navadno obravnavajo opravljanje gospodarske dejavnosti (kot so izgradnja in delovanje širokopasovne infrastrukture ter omogočanje dostopa do nje, vključno s povezovalnimi zmogljivostmi za prenos signala in opremo na terenu, kot so fiksni, prizemni brezžični ali satelitskimi sistemi ali kombinacije teh tehnologij).
However, in exceptional cases where the network thus financed is not used for commercial purposes (e.g. the network only provides broadband access to non-commercial websites, services and information) [11], such state intervention would not involve the granting of an economic advantage on undertakings, and consequently would not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Vendar izjemoma, ko se tako financirano omrežje ne uporablja za komercialne namene (omrežje na primer zagotavlja le širokopasovni dostop do nekomercialnih spletnih strani, storitev in informacij) [11], takšna državna intervencija ne vključuje dajanja gospodarske prednosti podjetjem in torej ne pomeni državne pomoči v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP.
Third, as regards the granting of an advantage, the aid is usually granted directly to investors [12] of the network, which in most cases are chosen by means of an open tender [13].
Tretjič, glede dajanja prednosti se pomoč navadno dodeli neposredno vlagateljem [12] v omrežje, ki so večinoma izbrani z javnim razpisom [13].
While the use of a tender ensures that any aid is limited to the minimum amount necessary for the particular project, the financial support might enable the successful bidder to conduct a commercial activity on conditions which would not otherwise be available on the market.
Uporaba razpisnega postopka zagotavlja, da je vsaka pomoč omejena na najmanjši znesek, potreben za posamezen projekt, finančna podpora pa bi izbranemu ponudniku lahko omogočila opravljanje komercialne dejavnosti pod pogoji, ki na trgu sicer ne bi bili na voljo.
Indirect beneficiaries might include third party operators that obtain wholesale access to the infrastructure thus built, and also business users who get broadband connectivity under terms and conditions that would not apply without state intervention [14].
Med posredne upravičence bi lahko med drugim spadali drugi operaterji, ki pridobijo grosistični dostop do tako zgrajene infrastrukture, in tudi poslovni uporabniki, ki pridobijo širokopasovno povezljivost pod pogoji, ki brez državne intervencije ne bi veljali [14].
Fourth, as regards the selectivity criterion, state measures supporting the deployment of broadband networks are selective in nature in that they target undertakings which are active only in certain regions or in certain segments of the overall electronic communications services market.
Četrtič, kar zadeva merilo selektivnosti pomoči, so državni ukrepi za podporo postavitvi širokopasovnih omrežij selektivni, saj so usmerjeni k podjetjem, ki so dejavna samo v nekaterih regijah ali sektorjih celotnega trga elektronskih komunikacijskih storitev.
Moreover, concerning the distortion of competition, the intervention of the state tends to alter existing market conditions, in that a number of firms would now choose to subscribe to the services provided by the selected suppliers instead of existing, possibly more expensive alternative market-based solutions [15].
Poleg tega glede izkrivljanja konkurence državna intervencija pogosto spremeni obstoječe tržne pogoje, ker se zaradi nje veliko podjetij odloči za naročilo na storitve pri izbranih ponudnikih in ne uporabi obstoječih ter po možnosti dražjih nadomestnih tržnih rešitev [15].
Therefore, the fact that a broadband service becomes available, either at all or at a lower price than otherwise would have been the case, has the effect of distorting competition.
Zato dejstvo, da se širokopasovne storitve sploh zagotavljajo po polni ali po nižji ceni kot sicer, izkrivlja konkurenco.
Moreover, state support to broadband might reduce profitability and crowd out investment by market players that would otherwise be willing to invest in the targeted area or parts of it.
Poleg tega lahko državna podpora širokopasovnemu dostopu zmanjša donosnost in ovira naložbe udeležencev na trgu, ki bi sicer bili pripravljeni vlagati v ciljno območje ali njegove dele.
Finally, in so far as the state intervention is liable to affect service providers from other EEA States, it also has an effect on trade since the markets for electronic communications services (including the wholesale and the retail broadband markets) are open to competition between operators and service providers [16].
Nazadnje, če državna intervencija lahko vpliva na ponudnike storitev iz drugih držav EGP, vpliva tudi na trgovino, ker so trgi elektronskih komunikacijskih storitev (vključno z veleprodajnimi in maloprodajnimi trgi širokopasovnega dostopa) odprti za konkurenco med operaterji in ponudniki storitev [16].
Absence of aid: the application of the market economy investor principle
Odsotnost pomoči: uveljavljanje načela vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji
Where the state supports the roll-out of broadband by way of an equity participation or capital injection into a company that is to carry out the project, it becomes necessary to assess whether this investment involves State aid.
Če država podpre postavljanje širokopasovnega dostopa s kapitalsko udeležbo ali povečanjem kapitala podjetja, ki bo izvedlo projekt, je treba oceniti, ali ta naložba vključuje državno pomoč.
It follows from the principle of equal treatment that capital placed by the state, directly or indirectly, at the disposal of an undertaking in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions cannot be regarded as State aid.
Iz načela enakega obravnavanja izhaja, da kapitala, ki ga država neposredno ali posredno da na voljo podjetju v normalnih tržnih pogojih, ni mogoče obravnavati kot državno pomoč.
When equity participation or capital injections by a public investor do not present sufficient prospects of profitability, even in the long term, such intervention must be regarded as aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, and its compatibility with the common market must be assessed solely on the basis of the criteria laid down in that provision [17].
Če kapitalska udeležba javnega vlagatelja ali povečanje kapitala, ki jo ta opravi, niti dolgoročno ne vključuje zadostnih možnosti za donosnost, je treba tako intervencijo obravnavati kot pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP in je treba njeno združljivost s skupnim trgom oceniti le na podlagi meril iz navedene določbe [17].
The Commission has examined the application of the principle of the market economy private investor in the broadband field in its Amsterdam decision [18].
Komisija je proučila uporabo načela zasebnega vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji na področju širokopasovnih povezav v svoji odločbi v zvezi z mestom Amsterdam [18].
As underlined in this decision, the conformity of a public investment with market terms has to be demonstrated thoroughly and comprehensively, either by means of a significant participation of private investors or the existence of a sound business plan showing an adequate return on investment.
Kot poudarja ta odločba, je treba skladnost javne naložbe s tržnimi pogoji natančno in celovito dokazati s precejšnjo udeležbo zasebnih vlagateljev ali dobrim poslovnim načrtom za zadostno donosnost naložb.
Where private investors take part in the project, it is a sine qua non condition that they would have to assume the commercial risk linked to the investment under the same terms and conditions as the public investor.
Če v projektu sodelujejo zasebni vlagatelji, je osnovni pogoj, da morajo prevzeti poslovno tveganje, povezano z naložbo, pod enakimi pogoji kot javni vlagatelj.
Absence of aid: Public service compensation and the Altmark criteria
Odsotnost pomoči: nadomestilo za opravljanje javne službe in merila Altmark
In some instances, EFTA States may consider that the provision of a broadband network should be regarded as a service of a general economic interest (hereinafter referred to as SGEI) within the meaning of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement [19].
V nekaterih primerih države Efte lahko menijo, da je treba zagotavljanje širokopasovnih omrežij obravnavati kot opravljanje storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena (v nadaljnjem besedilu: SSGP) v smislu člena 59(2) Sporazuma EGP [19].
According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, provided that four main conditions (commonly referred to as the Altmark criteria) are met, state funding for the provision of an SGEI may fall outside the scope of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement [20].
Na podlagi sodne prakse Sodišča in če so izpolnjeni štirje glavni pogoji (splošno imenovani merila Altmark), je lahko državno financiranje za opravljanje SSGP zunaj področja uporabe člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP [20].
The four conditions are: (a) the beneficiary of a state funding mechanism for an SGEI must be formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of an SGEI, the obligations of which must be clearly defined; (b) the parameters for calculating the compensation must be established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over competing undertakings; (c) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the SGEI, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; and (d) where the beneficiary is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation granted must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.
Ti štirje pogoji so: (a) upravičenec do mehanizma državnega financiranja za SSGP mora biti uradno pooblaščen za opravljanje SSGP, te obveznosti pa morajo biti jasno opredeljene; (b) merila za izračun nadomestila morajo biti določena vnaprej ter objektivno in pregledno, da bi se preprečila ekonomska ugodnost, ki bi prejemniku dajala prednost v primerjavi konkurenčnimi podjetji; (c) nadomestilo ne sme presegati tistega, kar je potrebno za kritje vseh ali dela stroškov, ki so nastali z izpolnjevanjem obveznosti SGEI, ob upoštevanju realiziranih prejemkov in razumnega dobička zaradi izpolnjevanja teh obveznosti; ter (d) če upravičenec ni izbran s postopkom oddaje javnega naročila, se mora raven odobrenega nadomestila določiti na podlagi analize stroškov, ki bi jih povprečno, dobro vodeno podjetje, imelo pri izpolnjevanju teh obveznosti ob upoštevanju realiziranih prejemkov in razumnega dobička.
In two decisions [21] concerning measures taken by regional authorities to award a (subsidised) public service concession [22] to private operators for the deployment of basic broadband networks in underserved regions, the Commission came to the conclusion that the notified support schemes were in line with the four criteria laid down in Altmark, and did not therefore fall under Article 107(1) of TFEU [23].
V dveh odločbah [21] v zvezi z ukrepi, ki so jih regionalni organi sprejeli za dodelitev (subvencionirane) koncesije [22] za opravljanje javne službe zasebnim operaterjem za razvoj osnovnih širokopasovnih omrežij v manj pokritih regijah, je Komisija ugotovila, da so priglašene podporne sheme v skladu s štirimi merili iz sodbe Altmark in zato ne spadajo v področje uporabe člena 107(1) PDEU [23].
In particular, in both cases, the successful bidder was chosen on the basis of the lowest amount of aid requested and the amount of compensation granted was established on the basis of pre-determined and transparent criteria.
V obeh primerih je bil ponudnik izbran glede na najnižji znesek zahtevane pomoči, znesek dodeljenega nadomestila pa je bil določen na podlagi predhodno določenih in preglednih meril.
Moreover, the Commission found no evidence or risk of overcompensation.
Poleg tega Komisija ni odkrila nobenih dokazov o čezmernih nadomestilih ali ugotovila tveganja, da bi do njih lahko prišlo.
Conversely, the Commission has ruled that the notion of an SGEI and the subsequent reliance on the Altmark case-law could not be accepted where the provider had neither a clear mandate nor was he under any obligation to provide broadband access to and connect all citizens and businesses in underserved areas but was more oriented towards connecting businesses [24].
Nasprotno pa je Komisija odločila, da pojma SSGP in nadaljnjega sklicevanja na sodno prakso v zadevi Altmark ni bilo mogoče sprejeti, če ponudnik storitev ni imel jasnih pooblastil in ni bil zavezan zagotavljanju širokopasovnega dostopa ter priključkov za vse državljane in podjetja na manj pokritih območjih, ampak je bil bolj usmerjen v priključitev podjetij [24].
Moreover, according to the case-law, although EFTA States have wide discretion to define what they regard as services of general economic interest, the definition of such services or tasks by an EFTA State can be questioned by the Authority in the event of a manifest error [25].
Čeprav imajo države Efte veliko svobode pri opredelitvi storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena, lahko Nadzorni organ v skladu s sodno prakso v primeru očitne napake prouči opredelitev takih storitev ali nalog, ki so jo opravile države Efte [25].
In other words, although the determination of the nature and scope of an SGEI mission falls within the competence and discretionary powers of EFTA States, such competence is neither unlimited nor can it be exercised arbitrarily [26].
Drugače povedano, čeprav so za opredelitev vrste in obsega naročila SSGP pristojne države Efte, ki imajo pri tem veliko svobode, pa ta pristojnost ni niti neomejena niti je ni mogoče poljubno uveljavljati [26].
In particular, for an activity to be considered as an SGEI, it should exhibit special characteristics as compared with ordinary economic activities [27].
Poleg tega, da bi dejavnost veljala za SSGP, bi morala imeti posebne značilnosti, ki jih navadne gospodarske dejavnosti nimajo [27].
In this respect, the Authority will consider that in areas where private investors have already invested in a broadband network infrastructure (or are in the process of expanding further their network infrastructure) and are already providing competitive broadband services with an adequate broadband coverage, setting up a parallel competitive and publicly-funded broadband infrastructure should not be considered as an SGEI within the meaning of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement [28].
Zato Nadzorni organ meni, da na območjih, kjer so zasebni vlagatelji že vlagali v širokopasovno omrežno infrastrukturo (ali dodatno večajo svojo omrežno infrastrukturo) in že zagotavljajo konkurenčne širokopasovne storitve z zadostno pokritostjo s širokopasovnim dostopom, se vzpostavitev vzporedne konkurenčne javno financirane širokopasovne infrastrukture ne bi smela obravnavati kot SSGP v smislu člena 59(2) Sporazuma EGP [28].
Where, however, it can be demonstrated that private investors may not be in a position to provide in the near future [29] adequate broadband coverage to all citizens or users leaving thus a significant part of the population unconnected, a public service compensation may be granted to an undertaking entrusted with the operation of an SGEI provided that the conditions set out in paragraphs 23 to 27 are met.
Vendar, če je mogoče dokazati, da zasebni vlagatelji v bližnji prihodnosti [29] ne bodo sposobni zagotoviti ustrezne pokritosti s širokopasovnim omrežjem za vse državljane ali uporabnike, ter bo tako znaten del prebivalstva ostal nepriključen, se lahko podjetju, pooblaščenemu za opravljanje SSGP, dodeli nadomestilo za javno službo, če so izpolnjeni pogoji iz odstavkov 23 do 27.
As a preliminary point, it should be stressed that the considerations set out in those paragraphs are based on the specificities of the broadband sector and reflect the experience gained so far by the Commission in this area.
Uvodoma je treba poudariti, da ugotovitve iz navedenih odstavkov temeljijo na posebnostih sektorja širokopasovnih povezav in odražajo dosedanje izkušnje Komisije na tem področju.
Thus, the conditions set out in those paragraphs although they are not exhaustive, are however indicative of the Authority’s approach in assessing on a case-by-case basis whether the activities in question can be defined as an SGEI, and whether the public financing granted in this regard complies with the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.
Pogoji iz navedenih odstavkov, čeprav niso izčrpni, vendarle ponazarjajo pristop Nadzornega organa, da v vsakem posameznem primeru oceni, ali je mogoče obravnavane dejavnosti opredeliti kot SSGP in ali so dodeljena javna sredstva v skladu s pravili o državni pomoči iz Sporazuma EGP.
With regard to the definition of the scope of an SGEI mission for the purposes of ensuring widespread deployment of a broadband infrastructure, EFTA States are required to describe the reasons why they consider that the service in question, because of its specific nature, deserves to be characterised as an SGEI and to be distinguished from other economic activities [30].
Države Efte morajo glede opredelitve obsega naročila SSGP za zagotovitev obsežne postavitve širokopasovne infrastrukture navesti razloge, zakaj menijo, da je treba obravnavano storitev zaradi njenih značilnosti šteti za SSGP in jo razlikovati od drugih gospodarskih dejavnosti [30].
They should further ensure that the SGEI mission satisfies certain minimum criteria common to every SGEI mission and demonstrate that those criteria are indeed satisfied in the particular case.
Poskrbeti morajo tudi, da naročilo SSGP izpolnjuje nekatera minimalna merila, ki so skupna vsem naročilom SSGP, in dokazati, da so ta merila v posameznem primeru resnično izpolnjena.
These criteria include, at least, (a) the presence of an act of the public authority entrusting the operators in question with an SGEI mission and (b) the universal and compulsory nature of that mission.
Navedena merila vključujejo vsaj (a) akt javnega organa, ki zadevne subjekte pooblašča za opravljanje naročila SSGP ter (b) univerzalnost in obveznost tega naročila.
Thus, in assessing whether the definition of an SGEI for broadband deployment does not give rise to a manifest error of appreciation, EFTA States should ensure that the broadband infrastructure to be deployed should provide universal connectivity to all users in a given area, residential and business users alike.
Tako morajo države Efte, ko ocenjujejo, ali opredelitev SSGP za postavitev širokopasovnega omrežja ne povzroča očitne napake presoje, zagotoviti, da načrtovana širokopasovna infrastruktura omogoča univerzalno povezljivost vsem uporabnikom na danem območju, tj. zasebnim in poslovnim uporabnikom, brez razlike.
Moreover, the compulsory nature of the SGEI mission implies that the provider of the network to be deployed will not be able to refuse access to the infrastructure on a discretionary and/or discriminatory basis (because for instance, it may not be commercially profitable to provide access services to a given area).
Poleg tega obveznost naročila SSGP pomeni, da ponudnik načrtovanega omrežja ne bo mogel zavrniti dostopa do infrastrukture po lastni presoji ali zaradi neenake obravnave (ker na primer zagotavljanje dostopa določenemu območju ne bi bilo dobičkonosno).