natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Entry barriers may result from a wide variety of factors such as economies of scale and scope, government regulations, especially where they establish exclusive rights, state aid, import tariffs, intellectual property rights, ownership of resources where the supply is limited due to for instance natural limitations, essential facilities, a first mover advantage or brand loyalty of consumers created by strong advertising over a period of time.
Vstopne ovire lahko izhajajo iz številnih dejavnikov, kot so ekonomije obsega in ekonomije povezanosti, vladni predpisi, zlasti če določajo izključne pravice, državne pomoči, uvozne tarife, pravice intelektualne lastnine, lastništvo nad viri, kjer je ponudba omejena, na primer zaradi naravnih omejitev, osnovna oprema, prednost prvega na trgu ali zvestoba potrošnikov blagovni znamki, ki jo je ustvarilo močno oglaševanje v določenem časovnem obdobju.
Restrictive agreements entered into by undertakings may also work as an entry barrier by making access more difficult and foreclosing (potential) competitors.
Omejevalni sporazumi, ki jih sklenejo podjetja, lahko prav tako učinkujejo kot vstopna ovira, s tem da otežujejo dostop in izključujejo (potencialne) konkurente.
Entry barriers may be present at all stages of the research and development, production and distribution process.
Vstopne ovire so lahko na vseh ravneh raziskovalnega in razvojnega procesa, procesa proizvodnje ter distribucije.
The question whether certain of these factors should be described as entry barriers depends particularly on whether they entail sunk costs.
Vprašanje, ali bi bilo treba nekatere od teh dejavnikov opisati kot vstopne ovire, je zlasti odvisno od tega, ali povzročajo nepovratne stroške.
Sunk costs are those costs which have to be incurred to enter or be active on a market but which are lost when the market is exited.
Nepovratni stroški so stroški, ki so potrebni za vstop ali delovanje na trgu, vendar pa se ob izstopu s trga ne povrnejo.
The more costs are sunk, the more potential entrants have to weigh the risks of entering the market and the more credibly incumbents can threaten that they will match new competition, as sunk costs make it costly for incumbents to leave the market.
Večji kot so nepovratni stroški, bolj morajo potencialna nova podjetja, ki vstopajo na trg, pretehtati tveganost vstopa na trg in bolj prepričljivo lahko že prisotna podjetja na trgu grozijo, da se bodo spoprijela z novo konkurenco, saj je zanje zaradi nepovratnih stroškov zelo drago zapustiti trg.
In general, entry requires sunk costs, sometimes minor and sometimes major.
Vstop na trg na splošno zahteva nepovratne stroške, ki so včasih večji, včasih manjši.
Therefore, actual competition is in general more effective and will weigh more heavily in the assessment of a case than potential competition.
Zaradi tega je dejanska konkurenca na splošno bolj učinkovita in bo imela pri ocenjevanju primera večjo težo kot potencialna konkurenca.
A mature market is a market that has existed for some time, where the technology used is well known and widespread and not changing very much and in which demand is relatively stable or declining.
Zrel trg je trg, ki že nekaj časa obstaja, na katerem se uporablja tehnologija, ki je dobro poznana, razširjena in se ne spreminja veliko, in na katerem je povpraševanje sorazmerno stabilno ali upada.
In such a market restrictions of competition are more likely to have negative effects than in more dynamic markets.
Na takšnem trgu je verjetnost negativnih učinkov omejevanja konkurence večja kot na bolj dinamičnih trgih.
In the assessment of particular restraints other factors may have to be taken into account.
Pri ocenjevanju posameznih omejitev se morajo včasih upoštevati tudi drugi dejavniki.
Such factors include cumulative effects, i.e. the coverage of the market by similar agreements, the duration of the agreements, the regulatory environment and behaviour that may indicate or facilitate collusion like price leadership, pre-announced price changes and discussions on the “right” price, price rigidity in response to excess capacity, price discrimination and past collusive behaviour.
Takšni dejavniki vključujejo kumulativne učinke, kot so pokritje trga s podobnimi sporazumi, trajanje sporazumov, zakonski okvir in vedenje, ki lahko nakazuje ali lajša dogovarjanje, kot so prevladujoč položaj pri določanju cen, vnaprej oznanjene spremembe cen in razprave o ‚pravi‘ ceni, cenovna togost kot odziv na presežne zmogljivosti, diskriminacija pri cenah in preteklo tajno dogovarjanje.
Negative effects of restrictive licence agreements
Negativni učinki omejevalnih licenčnih sporazumov
The negative effects on competition on the market that may result from restrictive technology transfer agreements include the following:
Negativni učinki na tržno konkurenco, ki so lahko posledica omejevalnih sporazumov o prenosu tehnologije, vključujejo:
reduction of inter-technology competition between the companies operating on a technology market or on a market for products incorporating the technologies in question, including facilitation of collusion, both explicit and tacit;
zmanjšanje konkurence med tehnologijami med podjetji, ki poslujejo na tehnološkem trgu ali na trgu izdelkov, ki vključujejo zadevne tehnologije, skupaj z lajšanjem dogovarjanja, bodisi izrecnega bodisi tajnega;
foreclosure of competitors by raising their costs, restricting their access to essential inputs or otherwise raising barriers to entry; and
omejevanje dostopa za konkurente z višanjem njihovih stroškov, omejevanjem njihovega dostopa do bistvenih proizvodnih dejavnikov ali s katerim koli drugim načinom večanja ovir pri vstopu na trg; in
reduction of intra-technology competition between undertakings that produce products on the basis of the same technology.
zmanjšanje konkurence znotraj tehnologij med podjetji, ki proizvajajo izdelke na podlagi iste tehnologije.
Technology transfer agreements may reduce inter-technology competition, i.e. competition between undertakings that license or produce on the basis of substitutable technologies.
Sporazumi o prenosu tehnologije lahko zmanjšajo konkurenco med tehnologijami, tj. konkurenco med podjetji, ki podeljujejo licence ali proizvajajo na podlagi med seboj nadomestljivih tehnologij.
This is particularly so where reciprocal obligations are imposed.
To zlasti velja v primeru medsebojnih obveznosti.
For instance, where competitors transfer competing technologies to each other and impose a reciprocal obligation to provide each other with future improvements of their respective technologies and where this agreement prevents either competitor from gaining a technological lead over the other, competition in innovation between the parties is restricted (see also paragraph 208 below).
Če si na primer konkurenti med seboj prenesejo konkurenčne tehnologije in si naložijo medsebojno obveznost, da bodo drug drugemu zagotavljali prihodnje izboljšave svojih tehnologij, in če tak sporazum preprečuje enemu konkurentu pridobitev tehnološke prednosti pred drugim, je konkurenca med strankami na področju inovacij omejena (glej tudi odstavek 208 spodaj).
Licensing between competitors may also facilitate collusion.
Podeljevanje licenc med konkurenti lahko tudi olajša dogovarjanje.
The risk of collusion is particularly high in concentrated markets.
Nevarnost dogovarjanja je zlasti velika na koncentriranih trgih.
Collusion requires that the undertakings concerned have similar views on what is in their common interest and on how the co-ordination mechanisms function.
Za dogovarjanje je potrebno, da imajo zadevna podjetja podobna stališča glede svojih skupnih interesov in delovanja mehanizmov usklajevanja.
For collusion to work the undertakings must also be able to monitor each other’s market behaviour and there must be adequate deterrents to ensure that there is an incentive not to depart from the common policy on the market, while entry barriers must be high enough to limit entry or expansion by outsiders.
Za obstoj dogovarjanja morajo podjetja prav tako biti sposobna spremljati vedenje drugo drugega na trgu, hkrati pa morajo obstajati tudi ustrezna odvračilna sredstva za zagotovitev spodbude, da se od skupne politike na trgu ne odstopa, medtem ko morajo biti vstopne ovire dovolj velike za omejitev vstopa ali širitve zunanjih konkurentov.
Agreements can facilitate collusion by increasing transparency in the market, by controlling certain behaviour and by raising barriers to entry.
Sporazumi lahko olajšajo dogovarjanje z večanjem transparentnosti trga, nadzorovanjem nekaterih ravnanj in večanjem vstopnih ovir.
Collusion can also exceptionally be facilitated by licensing agreements that lead to a high degree of commonality of costs, because undertakings that have similar costs are more likely to have similar views on the terms of coordination [56].
Dogovarjanje se lahko izjemoma olajša tudi s podeljevanjem licenc za sporazume, ki privedejo do visoke stopnje izenačevanja stroškov, ker je pri podjetjih, ki imajo podobne stroške, večja verjetnost, da imajo podobna stališča glede usklajevanja [56].
Licence agreements may also affect inter-technology competition by creating barriers to entry for and expansion by competitors.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko vplivajo na konkurenco med tehnologijami tudi z vzpostavljanjem ovir za vstop in širitev konkurentov.
Such foreclosure effects may stem from restraints that prevent licensees from licensing from third parties or create disincentives for them to do so.
Takšni učinki zapiranja trga so lahko posledica omejitev, ki pridobiteljem licenc preprečujejo pridobiti licenco od tretjih ali jih od tega odvračajo.
For instance, third parties may be foreclosed where incumbent licensors impose non-compete obligations on licensees to such an extent that an insufficient number of licensees are available to third parties and where entry at the level of licensees is difficult.
Tretji so lahko na primer izključeni iz trga, če že prisotni dajalci licenc pridobiteljem licenc nalagajo obveznosti nekonkurence v takšnem obsegu, da je tretjim na razpolago nezadostno število pridobiteljev licenc, in če je vstop na ravni pridobiteljev licenc otežen.
Suppliers of substitutable technologies may also be foreclosed where a licensor with a sufficient degree of market power ties together various parts of a technology and licenses them together as a package while only part of the package is essential to produce a certain product.
Dobaviteljem nadomestnih tehnologij je dostop lahko preprečen tudi, če dajalec licence z zadostno stopnjo tržne moči veže skupaj različne dele tehnologije in jih licencira v paketu, medtem ko je le del paketa bistven pri proizvodnji določenega izdelka.
Licence agreements may also reduce intra-technology competition, i.e. competition between undertakings that produce on the basis of the same technology.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko tudi zmanjšajo konkurenco znotraj tehnologij, tj. konkurenco med podjetji, ki proizvajajo na podlagi iste tehnologije.
An agreement imposing territorial restraints on licensees, preventing them from selling into each other's territory reduces competition between them.
Sporazum, ki pridobiteljem licenc nalaga ozemeljske omejitve, tako da jim prepreči prodajo na ozemlju drug drugega, zmanjšuje konkurenco med njimi.
Licence agreements may also reduce intra-technology competition by facilitating collusion between licensees.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko zmanjšajo konkurenco znotraj tehnologij tudi z olajšanjem dogovarjanja med pridobitelji licenc.
Moreover, licence agreements that reduce intra-technology competition may facilitate collusion between owners of competing technologies or reduce inter-technology competition by raising barriers to entry.
Poleg tega lahko licenčni sporazumi, ki zmanjšujejo konkurenco znotraj tehnologij, olajšajo dogovarjanje med lastniki konkurenčnih tehnologij ali zmanjšajo konkurenco med tehnologijami s povečevanjem vstopnih ovir.
Positive effects of restrictive licence agreements and the framework for analysing such effects
Pozitivni učinki omejevalnih licenčnih sporazumov in okvir za analizo takšnih učinkov
Even restrictive licence agreements mostly also produce pro-competitive effects in the form of efficiencies, which may outweigh their anti-competitive effects.
Celo omejevalni licenčni sporazumi imajo večinoma tudi za konkurenco pozitivne učinke v obliki učinkovitosti, ki lahko odtehtajo protikonkurenčne učinke.
This assessment takes place within the framework of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement, which contains an exception from the prohibition rule of Article 53(1).
Ta presoja se izvede v okviru člena 53(3) Sporazuma EGP, ki vsebuje izjemo glede uporabe prepovedi iz člena 53(1).
For this exception to be applicable the licence agreement must produce objective economic benefits, the restrictions on competition must be indispensable to attain the efficiencies, consumers must receive a fair share of the efficiency gains, and the agreement must not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned.
Za uporabo tega odstopanja mora licenčni sporazum ustvariti objektivne gospodarske koristi, omejevanje konkurence mora biti nujno za dosego učinkovitosti, potrošnikom mora biti zagotovljen pravičen delež povečanih učinkovitosti in sporazum strankam ne sme dati možnosti izključitve konkurence glede znatnega dela zadevnih izdelkov.
The assessment of restrictive agreements under Article 53(3) is made within the actual context in which they occur [57] and on the basis of the facts existing at any given point in time.
Presoja omejevalnih sporazumov v skladu s členom 53(3) se opravi v okviru dejanskih okoliščin sporazuma [57] in na osnovi dejstev, ki obstajajo v danem trenutku.
The assessment is sensitive to material changes in the facts.
Ta presoja upošteva pomembne spremembe dejstev.
The exception rule of Article 53(3) applies as long as the four conditions are fulfilled and ceases to apply when that is no longer the case [58].
Pravilo o izjemi iz člena 53(3) se uporablja, dokler so izpolnjeni vsi štirje pogoji, in se preneha uporabljati, ko to ne velja več [58].
However, when applying Article 53(3) in accordance with these principles it is necessary to take into account the initial sunk investments made by any of the parties and the time needed and the restraints required to commit and recoup an efficiency enhancing investment.
Vendar pa je pri uporabi člena 53(3) v skladu s temi načeli treba upoštevati začetne nepovratne investicije katere koli izmed strank ter čas in omejitve, ki so potrebni, da se izvedejo in povrnejo investicije, povezane s povečanjem učinkovitosti.
Article 53 cannot be applied without considering the ex ante investment and the risks relating thereto.
Člen 53 se ne more uporabiti brez upoštevanja predhodnih investicij in z njimi povezanih tveganj.
The risk facing the parties and the sunk investment that must be committed to implement the agreement can thus lead to the agreement falling outside Article 53(1) or fulfilling the conditions of Article 53(3), as the case may be, for the period of time required to recoup the investment.
Tveganje, ki so mu izpostavljene stranke, in nepovratne investicije, ki jih je treba opraviti za izvedbo sporazuma, lahko torej privedejo do tega, da – odvisno od primera – sporazum ne sodi v področje uporabe člena 53(1) ali pa izpolnjuje pogoje iz člena 53(3) v obdobju, ki je potrebno, da se investicije povrnejo.
The first condition of Article 53(3) requires an assessment of what are the objective benefits in terms of efficiencies produced by the agreement.
Prvi pogoj iz člena 53(3) zahteva presojo objektivnih koristi z vidika učinkovitosti, ki jih ustvari sporazum.
In this respect, licence agreements have the potential of bringing together complementary technologies and other assets allowing new or improved products to be put on the market or existing products to be produced at lower cost.
V zvezi s tem lahko licenčni sporazumi združijo dopolnilne tehnologije in druga sredstva, s čimer omogočijo uvedbo novih oziroma izboljšanih izdelkov na trg ali proizvodnjo obstoječih izdelkov z manjšimi stroški.
Outside the context of hardcore cartels, licensing often occurs because it is more efficient for the licensor to licence the technology than to exploit it himself.
Zunaj okvira nedopustnih kartelov je podeljevanje licenc pogosto, ker je licenciranje tehnologije za dajalca licence učinkovitejše od njenega izkoriščanja.
This may particularly be the case where the licensee already has access to the necessary production assets.
To se zlasti lahko zgodi, če ima pridobitelj licence že dostop do potrebnih proizvodnih sredstev.
The agreement allows the licensee to gain access to a technology that can be combined with these assets, allowing him to exploit new or improved technologies.
Sporazum pridobitelju licence omogoča, da pridobi dostop do tehnologije, ki jo lahko združi s temi sredstvi, kar mu omogoča izkoriščanje novih ali izboljšanih tehnologij.
Another example of potentially efficiency enhancing licensing is where the licensee already has a technology and where the combination of this technology and the licensor’s technology gives rise to synergies.
Še en primer, v katerem lahko podelitev licence potencialno izboljša učinkovitosti, je, če je pridobitelj licence že imetnik tehnologije in če združitev te tehnologije s tehnologijo dajalca licence ustvarja sinergije.
When the two technologies are combined the licensee may be able to attain a cost/output configuration that would not otherwise be possible.
V primeru združitve obeh tehnologij lahko pridobitelj licence doseže razmerje med stroški in obsegom proizvodnje, ki drugače ne bi bilo možno.
Licence agreements may also give rise to efficiencies at the distribution stage in the same way as vertical distribution agreements.
Licenčni sporazumi lahko prav tako kot vertikalni sporazumi o distribuciji privedejo do učinkovitosti na ravni distribucije.
Such efficiencies can take the form of cost savings or the provision of valuable services to consumers.
Takšne učinkovitosti so lahko v obliki prihrankov stroškov ali v obliki zagotavljanja kakovostnih storitev potrošnikom.
The positive effects of vertical agreements are described in the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [59].
Pozitivni učinki vertikalnih sporazumov so opisani v Smernicah o vertikalnih omejitvah [59].
A further example of possible efficiency gains is agreements whereby technology owners assemble a technology package for licensing to third parties.
Tudi sporazumi, pri katerih lastniki tehnologije združijo tehnologije v paket, ki ga licencirajo tretjim, lahko privedejo do povečanja učinkovitosti.
Such pooling arrangements may in particular reduce transaction costs, as licensees do not have to conclude separate licence agreements with each licensor.
Takšni kartelni dogovori lahko zlasti zmanjšajo transakcijske stroške, ker pridobiteljem licenc ni treba sklepati licenčnih sporazumov z vsakim dajalcem licence posebej.
Pro-competitive licensing may also occur to ensure design freedom.
Podeljevanje licenc lahko prav tako spodbuja konkurenco, če zagotavlja svobodo oblikovanja.
In sectors where large numbers of intellectual property rights exist and where individual products may infringe upon a number of existing and future property rights, licence agreements whereby the parties agree not to assert their property rights against each other are often pro-competitive because they allow the parties to develop their respective technologies without the risk of subsequent infringement claims.
V sektorjih, v katerih obstaja veliko število pravic intelektualne lastnine in v katerih lahko posamezni izdelki kršijo številne obstoječe in prihodnje lastninske pravice, licenčni sporazumi, s katerimi se stranke sporazumejo, da ne bodo uveljavljale lastninskih pravic nasproti drugi, pogosto spodbujajo konkurenco, ker strankam omogočajo, da razvijajo svoje tehnologije, ne da bi bile izpostavljene tveganju posledičnih tožb zaradi kršitve pravic.
In the application of the indispensability test contained in Article 53(3) the EFTA Surveillance Authority will in particular examine whether individual restrictions make it possible to perform the activity in question more efficiently than would have been the case in the absence of the restriction concerned.
Nadzorni organ EFTA bo pri uporabi preskusa nujnosti iz člena 53(3) zlasti proučil, ali posamične omejitve omogočajo učinkovitejše izvajanje zadevne dejavnosti, kot bi bilo mogoče v odsotnosti zadevne omejitve.
In making this assessment the market conditions and the realities facing the parties must be taken into account.
Pri tej presoji je treba upoštevati tržne pogoje in dejanske okoliščine, s katerimi se srečujejo stranke.
Undertakings invoking the benefit of Article 53(3) are not required to consider hypothetical and theoretical alternatives.
Podjetjem, ki se sklicujejo na uporabo člena 53(3), ni treba proučiti hipotetičnih in teoretičnih alternativ.
They must, however, explain and demonstrate why seemingly realistic and significantly less restrictive alternatives would be significantly less efficient.
Vendar pa morajo pojasniti in ponazoriti, zakaj bi bile na videz realne in precej manj omejevalne alternative znatno manj učinkovite.
If the application of what appears to be a commercially realistic and less restrictive alternative would lead to a significant loss of efficiencies, the restriction in question is treated as indispensable.
Če bi uporaba na videz poslovno realne in manj omejevalne alternative privedla do znatne izgube učinkovitosti, se zadevna omejitev šteje za nujno.
In some cases, it may also be necessary to examine whether the agreement as such is indispensable to achieve the efficiencies.
V nekaterih primerih je morda prav tako treba proučiti, ali je sporazum kot tak nujen za doseganje učinkovitosti.
This may for example be so in the case of technology pools that include complementary but non-essential technologies [60], in which case it must be examined to what extent such inclusion gives rise to particular efficiencies or whether, without a significant loss of efficiencies, the pool could be limited to technologies for which there are no substitutes.
To lahko na primer velja v primeru tehnoloških združenj, ki vključujejo dopolnilne, vendar nebistvene tehnologije [60], pri katerem je treba proučiti, v kolikšnem obsegu takšna vključitev privede do posebnih učinkovitosti oziroma ali bi združenje brez znatne izgube učinkovitosti lahko bilo omejeno na tehnologije, za katere ne obstajajo nadomestne tehnologije.
In the case of simple licensing between two parties it is generally not necessary to go beyond an examination of the indispensability of individual restraints.
V primeru preproste podelitve licence med dvema strankama na splošno zadostuje proučitev nujnosti posameznih omejitev.
Normally there is no less restrictive alternative to the licence agreement as such.
Običajno ne obstaja manj omejevalna alternativa od licenčnega sporazuma kot takega.
The condition that consumers must receive a fair share of the benefits implies that consumers of the products produced under the licence must at least be compensated for the negative effects of the agreement [61].
Pogoj, da mora biti potrošnikom zagotovljen pravičen delež doseženih koristi, pomeni, da morajo potrošniki izdelkov, ki se proizvajajo v okviru licence, prejeti vsaj nadomestilo za negativne učinke sporazuma [61].
This means that the efficiency gains must fully off-set the likely negative impact on prices, output and other relevant factors caused by the agreement.
To pomeni, da morajo povečane učinkovitosti v celoti izravnati verjetne negativne učinke na cene, obseg proizvodnje in druge pomembne dejavnike, ki jih povzroči sporazum.
They may do so by changing the cost structure of the undertakings concerned, giving them an incentive to reduce price, or by allowing consumers to gain access to new or improved products, compensating for any likely price increase [62].
To lahko storijo, tako da spremenijo stroškovno strukturo zadevnih podjetij, jih spodbudijo k znižanju cen ali potrošnikom omogočijo pridobitev dostopa do novih oziroma izboljšanih izdelkov, kar omogoča izravnavo morebitnih povišanj cen [62].