natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
By letter dated 15 December 2010 [2] the EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’) informed the Icelandic authorities that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 in respect of the measures undertaken by the Icelandic State to restore certain operations of (old) Kaupthing Bank hf and establish and capitalise New Kaupthing Bank hf, now renamed Arion Bank (the opening decision) [3].
Nadzorni organ Efte (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Nadzorni organ) je v pismu z dne 15. decembra 2010 [2] islandske organe obvestil, da se je odločil začeti postopek iz člena 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 v zvezi z ukrepi, ki jih je islandska država sprejela za ponovno vzpostavitev nekaterih dejavnosti (nekdanje) banke Kaupthing Bank hf ter za ustanovitev in kapitalizacijo banke New Kaupthing Bank hf, zdaj preimenovana v Arion Bank (sklep o začetku postopka) [3].
The Authority also required that a detailed restructuring plan for Arion Bank be submitted within six months.
Nadzorni organ je tudi zahteval, da se v šestih mesecih predloži podroben načrt prestrukturiranja banke Arion Bank.
The Icelandic authorities did not respond to this comment.
Posodobljen načrt prestrukturiranja je bil poslan po elektronski pošti 30. aprila 2012.
By letter of 31 March 2011, the Icelandic authorities submitted a restructuring plan for Arion Bank.
Nadzorni organ je zahteval informacije o načrtu prestrukturiranja 11. julija 2011 in 13. februarja 2012.
An updated restructuring plan was submitted by e-mail on 30 April 2012.
Poleg tega so se predstavniki Nadzornega organa sestali z islandskimi organi in predstavniki banke Arion Bank 7. junija 2011 ter 27. in 28. februarja 2012.
Replies to the requests for information were received from the Icelandic Authorities on 26 October 2011, 16 April 2012, 30 April 2012, 21 May 2012 and 6 July 2012.
V tem oddelku bo Nadzorni organ opisal dogodke, dejstva ter gospodarski, politični in regulativni razvoj dogodkov, ki se nanašajo na zlom in obnovo islandskega finančnega sistema od oktobra 2008 do danes, da se določijo okoliščine, v katerih poteka ocenjevanje obravnavanih ukrepov pomoči.
The final versions of the commitments made by the Icelandic authorities and Arion Bank were submitted on 3 July 2012 [5].
Pred tem bo opisana kronologija zloma banke Kaupthing Bank.
In addition, the Authority's representatives met with the Icelandic authorities and representatives of Arion Bank on 7 June 2011 and 27-28 February 2012.
Zlom banke Kaupthing Bank
BACKGROUND
V septembru 2008 se je več velikih svetovnih finančnih ustanov znašlo v hudih težavah.
The Authority will describe in this section those events, facts and economic, political and regulatory developments relating to the collapse and the reconstruction of the Icelandic financial system from October 2008 to date that appear necessary to set out the context in which the assessment of aid measures at hand is undertaken.
Sredi pretresov na svetovnih finančnih trgih so tri največje komercialne islandske banke, ki so v predhodnih letih zabeležile izjemno rast, imele težave pri refinanciranju svojih kratkoročnih dolgov, prav tako pa so zabeležile tudi dvigovanje vlog.
Before doing so, it will recall in turn the chronology of Kaupthing Bank's breakdown.
Banka Lehman Brothers je 15. septembra prijavila stečajno zaščito in istega dne je bilo objavljeno, da bo Bank of America prevzela Merrill Lynch.
The collapse of Kaupthing Bank
HBOS, eno od največjih bank v Združenem kraljestvu, je morala prevzeti banka Lloyds TSB.
In September 2008 a number of major global financial institutions began to experience severe difficulties.
Cene delnic vseh treh komercialnih bank so strmo padle in bonitetne stopnje so se znižale.
In the midst of the turbulence in global financial markets, Iceland's three biggest commercial banks, which had experienced extraordinary growth over the preceding years, encountered difficulties in refinancing their short term debt and a run on their deposits.
Dvigovanje vlog iz nedomačih poslovalnic bank Landsbanki in Kaupthing se je močno povečalo in tudi v domačih poslovalnicah je prišlo do velikega dvigovanja gotovine.
The problems in the Icelandic financial sector unfolded more clearly on 29 September 2008, when the Icelandic Government announced that it had reached an agreement with Glitnir Bank whereby it would inject 600 million euros of equity into the bank in return for 75 % of its shareholdings.
8. oktobra 2008 so organi Združenega kraljestva ustavili plačila podružnice banke Kaupthing v Združenem kraljestvu Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (KSF).
However, the Government's planned take-over of Glitnir Bank failed to reassure markets and was subsequently abandoned.
Naslednji dan je FME na podlagi pooblastil, ki so mu bila dodeljena z zakonom o izrednih razmerah, prevzel nadzor nad banko.
The share prices of the three commercial banks plummeted and credit ratings were downgraded.
Finančna kriza in glavni vzroki za propad islandskih bank
On the first weekend in October it became clear that another one of the three large banks, Landsbanki, was in severe difficulty.
V nadaljevanju Nadzorni organ povzema sklepne ugotovitve komisije o vzrokih za propad, ki so najbolj pomembni za prenehanje banke Kaupthing Bank.
Glitnir Bank and Landsbanki were taken over by the FME on 7 October 2008.
Informacije izhajajo iz poglavja 2 (Povzetek) in poglavja 21 (Vzroki za zlom islandskih bank – odgovornost, napake in malomarnost) poročila posebne komisije za preiskave.
For a while it was hoped that Kaupthing Bank could escape the same fate and on 6 October 2008, the CBI granted Kaupthing a loan to the amount of 500 million euros against collateral in Kaupthing's Danish subsidiary, FIH Erhvervsbanken.
Globalno zmanjšanje likvidnosti na finančnih trgih, ki se je začelo leta 2007, je sčasoma povzročilo zlom treh glavnih islandskih bank, katerih poslovne dejavnosti so bile vse bolj odvisne od pridobivanja sredstev prek mednarodnih trgov.
However, the loan agreements and debt securities of Kaupthing Bank generally contained a clause stating that in the event of one of the bank's large subsidiaries defaulting, this would constitute a default by Kaupthing Bank which could lead to the bank's loans becoming due.
Razlogi za prenehanje islandskih bank pa so bili zapleteni in številni.
On 8 October 2008, the UK authorities placed Kaupthing's subsidiary in Britain, Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (KSF), under cessation of payments.
Posebna komisija za preiskave je preiskala vzroke, ki so povzročili zlom glavnih bank in poudariti je treba, da večina sklepnih ugotovitev velja za vse tri banke in da so številni vzroki medsebojno povezani.
The following day, the FME took control of the bank using powers conferred upon it by the Emergency Act.
V nadaljevanju so na kratko povzeti vzroki za propad, povezani z dejavnostmi bank.
The financial crisis and major causes of failure of the Icelandic banks
Prekomerna in nevzdržna širitev
In their notification of the aid granted to Arion Bank, the Icelandic authorities explained that the reasons for the collapse of the Icelandic banking sector and their need to intervene were set out in considerable detail in a report prepared by a Special Investigation Commission (‘SIC’) established by the Icelandic Parliament [6], whose remit was to investigate and analyse the processes leading to the collapse of the three main banks.
Posebna komisija za preiskave je ugotovila, da so v letih pred zlomom banke svoje bilance in posojilne portfelje razširile prek svojih operativnih in upravljavskih zmogljivosti.
The Authority summarises below the conclusions of the Commission concerning the causes of failure most relevant to the demise of Kaupthing Bank.
Posebna komisija za preiskave je zato ugotovila, da je do tega povečanja posojanja prišlo predvsem zaradi posojil podjetjem, ki drugje niso mogla dobiti kreditov.
The information is drawn from Chapters 2 (Executive Summary) and 21 (Causes of the Collapse of the Icelandic Banks — Responsibility, Mistakes and Negligence) of the SIC report.
Poročilo tudi ugotavlja, da je bilo za dejavnosti bank značilno vse bolj tvegano investicijsko bančništvo in rast je pripomogla k težavam.
The global reduction in liquidity in financial markets that began in 2007 eventually led to the collapse of the three main Icelandic banks, whose business operations had become increasingly dependent on raising funding through international markets.
Zmanjšanje sredstev, ki so na voljo na mednarodnih trgih
The reasons for the demise of the Icelandic banks were however complex and numerous.
Večino rasti bank je omogočil dostop do mednarodnih finančnih trgov, prednosti zaradi dobrih bonitetnih stopenj in dostop do evropskih trgov prek Sporazuma EGP.
The SIC investigated the reasons which led to the collapse of the main banks, and it is notable that the majority of the conclusions applied to all three banks and many are inter-related.
V obdobju pred zlomom so bile banke vse bolj odvisne od kratkoročnih posojil, kar je povzročilo velika, in po mnenju posebne komisije za preiskave, predvidljiva tveganja refinanciranja.
Excessive and unsustainable expansion
V vseh velikih islandskih bankah so bili med največjimi dolžniki glavni lastniki [9].
The SIC concluded that in the years leading up to the collapse the banks had expanded their balance sheets and lending portfolios beyond their own operational and managerial capacity.
Posebna komisija za preiskave je menila, da so nekateri delničarji kot lastniki imeli prelahek dostop do sposojanja od bank.
The combined assets of the three banks had increased exponentially from 1,4 trillion ISK [7] in 2003 to 14,4 trillion ISK at the end of the second quarter of 2008.
Največji delničar v banki Kaupthing Bank je bila Exista hf z nekaj več kot 20-odstotnim deležem v banki.
Significantly, a large proportion of the growth of the three banks was in lending to foreign parties, which increased substantially during 2007 [8], most notably after the beginning of the international liquidity crisis.
Exista je bila tudi ena od največjih dolžnikov banke.
The reduction in finance available on the international markets
Posojila povezanim strankam so bila pogosto odobrena brez kakršnega koli posebnega zavarovanja s premoženjem [11].
Much of the banks' growth was facilitated by access to international financial markets, capitalising upon good credit ratings and access to European markets through the EEA Agreement.
Sklad denarnega trga banke Kaupthing je bil največji sklad družbe za upravljanje s premoženjem banke Kaupthing Bank in v letu 2007 je sklad veliko vlagal v obveznice, ki jih je izdala Exista.
The Icelandic banks borrowed 14 billion euros on foreign debt securities markets in 2005 on relatively favourable terms.
Konec leta je imel v lasti vrednostne papirje v vrednosti približno 14 milijard ISK.
When access to European debt securities markets became more limited, the banks financed their activities on US markets, with Icelandic debt securities packaged into collateralised debt obligations.
To je takrat predstavljajo približno 20 % vseh sredstev sklada.
In the period before the collapse, the banks were increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing, leading to major and, according to the SIC, foreseeable re-financing risks.
Robert Tchenguiz je imel v lasti deleže v banki Kaupthing Bank in v Existi in je bil tudi član odbora Existe.
The gearing of the banks' owners
Prejel je tudi velika posojila od banke Kaupthing Bank na Islandiji, banke Kaupthing Bank Luksemburg in banke Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (KSF).
In the case of each major Icelandic bank, the principal owners were among the biggest debtors [9].
Ob zlomu banke so posojila, ki so jih Robert Tchenguiz in povezane stranke prejele od matične družbe banke Kaupthing Bank, znašala okrog 2 milijardi EUR [12].
The SIC was of the view that certain shareholders had abnormally easy access to borrowing from the banks in their capacity as owners.
Koncentracija tveganj
The biggest shareholder in Kaupthing Bank was Exista hf., with just over a 20 % share in the bank.
V zvezi z neobičajno izpostavljenostjo velikim delničarjem je posebna komisija za preiskave ugotovila, da portfelj sredstev bank ni bil dovolj razpršen.
Exista was also one of the bank's biggest debtors.
Posebna komisija za preiskave je menila, da so bila evropska pravila o veliki izpostavljenosti tolmačena ozko, zlasti za delničarje in da so se banke poskušale izogniti tem pravilom.
During the period from 2005 to 2008, Kaupthing's total lending to Exista and related parties [10] increased steadily from 400-500 million euros to 1400-1700 million euros and during 2007 and 2008 such lending was nearly equal to the bank's capital base.
Šibek lastniški kapital
This increase in lending to major shareholders occurred despite the fact that Kaupthing was starting to face liquidity and refinancing problems.
Čeprav je bil količnik celotnega kapitala banke Kaupthing in drugih dveh velikih islandskih bank vedno sporočen kot nekoliko višji od zakonsko določenega, je posebna komisija za preiskave ugotovila, da količnik celotnega kapitala ni natančno odražal finančne moči bank.
Loans to related parties were also often granted without any specific collateral [11].
To je bilo zaradi izpostavljenost lastnih delnic bank tveganju prek osnovnih zavarovanj s premoženjem in terminskih pogodb o delnicah.
Kaupthing's Money Market Fund was the biggest fund of the Kaupthing Bank Asset Management Company and in 2007 the fund invested significantly in bonds issued by Exista.
Osnovni kapital, ki so ga financirale družbe same in ga posebna komisija za preiskave imenuje „šibek lastniški kapital“ [13], je predstavljal več kot 25 % kapitalske osnove bank (ali več kot 50 %, če se ocenjuje glede na temeljno sestavino kapitala, t.j. lastniški kapital delničarjev minus neopredmetena sredstva).
At year end it owned securities to the value of around 14 billion ISK.
Poleg tega je težave povzročalo še tveganje, ki so mu bile banke izpostavljene zato, ker so imele delnice ena druge.
This represented approximately 20 % of the fund's total assets at that time.
Do sredine leta 2008 je neposredno financiranje lastnih delnic bank ter navzkrižno financiranje delnic drugih dveh bank znašalo približno 400 milijard ISK, kar je okrog 70 % temeljne sestavine kapitala.
Robert Tchenguiz owned shares in Kaupthing Bank and Exista and also sat on the board of Exista.
Posebna komisija za preiskave je menila, da je obseg financiranja lastniškega kapitala delničarjev z izposojanjem iz sistema samega ogrožal stabilnost sistema.
He also received major loan facilities from Kaupthing Bank in Iceland, Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg and Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (KSF).
Velik del lastnih delnic bank je bil uporabljen kot zavarovanje za posojila in ko so cene delnic padle, se je kakovost njihovih portfeljev posojil znižala.
In total, the loan facilities Robert Tchenguiz and related parties had received from Kaupthing Bank's parent company at the collapse of the bank amounted to around 2 billion euros [12].
To je vplivalo na uspešnost delovanja bank in še dodatno nižalo cene delnic in zato so banke (predpostavlja posebna komisija za preiskave na podlagi informacij, ki jih ima) poskušale umetno ustvariti neobičajno povpraševanje po njihovih delnicah.
Concentration of risk
Velikost bank
Related to the issue of the abnormal exposure to major shareholders was the conclusion of the SIC that the banks' portfolios of assets were insufficiently diversified.
V letu 2001 so bilance stanja treh glavnih bank (skupaj) znašale nekaj več kot enoletni bruto domači proizvod Islandije (BDP).
The SIC was of the view that European rules on large exposure were interpreted in a narrow way, in particular in the case of the shareholders, and that the banks had sought to evade the rules.
Do konca leta 2007 so banke postale mednarodne in njihova sredstva so bila vredna devetkrat toliko kot bruto domači proizvod Islandije.
Weak equity
Poročilo posebne komisije za preiskave ugotavlja, da so do leta 2006 opazovalci menili, da je bančni sistem prerasel zmogljivost CBI in izrazili dvom, da bo lahko izpolnil vlogo posojilodajalca v skrajni sili.
Although the capital ratio of Kaupthing and the other two major Icelandic banks was always reported to be slightly higher than the statutory minimum, the SIC concluded that the capital ratios did not accurately reflect the financial strength of the banks.
Do konca leta 2007 je bil kratkoročni dolg Islandije (ki je nastal pretežno zaradi financiranja bank) petnajstkrat večji od deviznih rezerv in tuje vloge v vseh treh bankah so bile osemkrat višje od deviznih rezerv.
This was due to risk exposure of the banks' own shares through primary collaterals and forward contracts on the shares.
Jamstveni sklad vlagateljev in investitorjev je imel zelo malo sredstev v primerjavi z bančnimi vlogami, za katere naj bi jamčil.
Share capital financed by the companies themselves, referred to by the SIC as ‘weak equity’ [13], represented more than 25 % of the banks' capital bases (or over 50 % when assessed against the core component of the capital, i.e. shareholders' equity less intangible assets).
Posebna komisija za preiskave ugotavlja, da je zaradi teh dejavnikov Islandija postala dovzetna za množično dvigovanje vlog.
Added to this were problems caused by the risk that the banks were exposed to by holding each other's shares.
Nenadna rast bank v primerjavi z Nadzorno in finančno infrastrukturo
By the middle of 2008 direct financing by the banks of their own shares, as well as cross-financing of the other two banks' shares, amounted to approximately 400 billion ISK, around 70 % of the core component of the capital.
Posebna komisija za preiskave je ugotovila, da Nadzorni organi na Islandiji niso imeli potrebne verodostojnosti, ker ni bilo posojilodajalca v skrajni sili z zadostnimi sredstvi.
The SIC was of the opinion that the extent of financing of shareholders' equity by borrowing from the system itself was such that the system's stability was threatened.
Poročilo ugotavlja, da FME in CBI nista imela strokovnega znanja in izkušenj za urejanje bank v težkih gospodarskih časih, vendar bi lahko ukrepala, da bi se zmanjšala raven tveganja, ki so ga povzročale banke.
The banks held a substantial amount of their own shares as collateral for their lending and therefore as share prices fell the quality of their loan portfolios declined.
Na primer FME ni rasel v enakem razmerju kot banke in zakonodajalčeve prakse niso sledile hitremu razvoju dogodkov v dejavnostih bank.
This affected the banks' performance and put further downward pressure on their share prices; in response to which (the SIC assumed from the information in their possession), the banks attempted to artificially create abnormal demand for their own shares.
Poročilo je kritično tudi do vlade in ugotavlja, da bi organi morali ukrepati z zmanjšanjem velikosti bank ali z zahtevo, da se sedež ene ali več bank preseli v tujino in s tem zmanjšali možen vpliv bank na gospodarstvo [14].
The size of the banks
Neuravnoteženost in prevelik razmah islandskega gospodarstva kot celote
In 2001 the balance sheets of the three main banks (collectively) amounted to just over a year of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Iceland.
Poročilo posebne komisije za preiskave navaja dogodke, ki zadevajo širše gospodarstvo in ki so tudi vplivali na hitro rast bank in prispevali k neuravnoteženi velikosti in vpliv med sektorjem finančnih storitev in preostalim gospodarstvom.
By the end of 2007 the banks had become international and held assets worth nine times the Icelandic GDP.
Poročilo ugotavlja, da so vladne politike (zlasti fiskalna politika) najverjetneje prispevale k prevelikemu razmahu in neuravnoteženosti in da denarna politika CBI ni bila dovolj omejevalna.
The SIC report notes that by 2006, observers were commenting that the banking system had outgrown the capacity of the CBI and doubted whether it could fulfil the role of lender of last resort.
Poročilo tudi navaja, da je bila ublažitev pravil islandskega Stanovanjskega sklada glede posojanja „ena največjih napak denarnega in fiskalnega upravljanja, narejenih v obdobju pred zlomom bank“ [15].
By the end of 2007 Iceland's short-term debts (mainly incurred due to financing of the banks) were 15 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves, and the foreign deposits in the three banks were also 8 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves.
Poročilo navaja tudi, da so se banke preveč z lahkoto lahko zadolževale pri CBI in da so kratkoročna zavarovana posojila CBI jeseni leta 2005 znašala 30 milijard ISK, do začetka oktobra 2008 pa so se zvišala na 500 milijard ISK.
The Depositors and Investors Guarantee Fund held minimal resources in comparison with the bank deposits that it was meant to guarantee.
Islandska króna, zunanja neravnovesja in razmiki kreditne zamenjave
These factors, the SIC concludes, made Iceland susceptible to a run on its banks.
Poročilo ugotavlja, da je bila v letu 2006 vrednost islandske króne nevzdržno visoka, islandski primanjkljaj tekočega računa je presegal 16 % BDP-ja, obveznosti v tujih valutah minus sredstva pa so se približale skupnemu letnemu BDP-ju.
The sudden growth of the banks in comparison with the regulatory and financial infrastructure
Vzpostavljeni so bili predpogoji za finančno krizo.
The SIC concluded that the relevant supervisory bodies in Iceland lacked the credibility that was necessary in the absence of a sufficiently resourced lender of last resort.
Do konca leta 2007 se je vrednost króne zmanjšala in razmiki kreditne zamenjave Islandije in bank so se eksponentno povečali.
The report concludes that the FME and CBI lacked the expertise and experience to regulate the banks in difficult economic times, but that they could have taken action to reduce the level of risk that the banks were incurring.
Ukrepi, sprejeti za obnovo bančnega sektorja
The FME, for example, did not grow in the same proportion as the banks and the regulator's practices did not keep up with the rapid developments in the banks' operations.
Po zlomu treh največjih komercialnih bank v oktobru 2008 (vključno z banko Kaupthing) so se islandski organi soočili z izzivom brez primere – kako ohraniti nadaljevanje bančnih dejavnosti na Islandiji [16].
The report is also critical of the Government, concluding that the authorities should have taken action to reduce the potential impact of the banks on the economy by reducing their size or requiring one or more banks to move their headquarters abroad [14].
Minister za finance je bil pooblaščen, da v imenu državne blagajne izplača sredstva z namenom ustanovitve novih finančnih podjetij.
Imbalance and overexpansion of the Icelandic economy as a whole
Poleg tega bi v stečajnih postopkih finančnih podjetij vloge imele prednost pred drugimi terjatvami.
The SIC report makes reference to events concerning the wider economy that also impacted upon the banks' rapid growth and contributed to the imbalance in size and influence between the financial services sector and the remainder of the economy.
Vlada je izjavila, da bodo vloge v domačih komercialnih bankah in hranilnicah ter v njihovih poslovalnicah na Islandiji v celoti zaščitene.
The report concluded that government policies (in particular fiscal policy) most likely contributed to the overexpansion and imbalance and that the CBI's monetary policy was not sufficiently restrictive.
Na začetku so se prednostne naloge politike osredotočile na zagotavljanje osnovnega delovanja domačega bančnega in plačilnega sistema ter sistema poravnave.
The report also refers to relaxing the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund's lending rules as ‘one of the biggest mistakes in monetary and fiscal management made in the period leading up to the banks' collapse’ [15].
V prvih tednih po zlomu je islandska vlada v sodelovanju z Mednarodnim denarnim skladom (v nadaljnjem besedilu: MDS) tudi pripravila gospodarski program in 20. novembra 2008 je bila odobrena prošnja Islandije za dveletni stand-by aranžma Sklada, ki je vključeval posojilo MDS v višini 2,1 milijarde USD za krepitev deviznih rezerv Islandije.