natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The initial rental price, USD 0.8 per m2 annually, was negotiated in February 2008.
Dogovor o prvotni zakupni ceni – 0,8 USD na m2 letno – je bil sklenjen februarja 2008.
The price was not subject to any adjustment under the Ground Lease Agreement.
Cena ni bila spremenjena s pogodbo o zakupu zemljišča.
In addition, in its opening decision, the Authority doubted the incentive effect of the agreements entered into after the construction of the Data Centre started in 2008.
Nadzorni organ je imel v odločbi o začetku postopka tudi pomisleke o spodbujevalnem učinku pogodb, ki so bile sklenjene po tem, ko se je leta 2008 začela gradnja podatkovnega centra [103].
The incentive effect is a fundamental prerequisite for aid to be regarded compatible under the Regional Aid Guidelines.
Spodbujevalni učinek je temeljni pogoj, da se pomoč obravnava kot združljiva v skladu s smernicami o regionalni pomoči.
The Regional Aid Guidelines define the term “start of work” as “start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies.” [105] It is an established fact that the work had already started in 2008 in the case at hand.
V smernicah o regionalni pomoči je pojem „začetek dela“ opredeljen kot „začetek gradbenih del ali prva trdna zaveza za naročilo opreme, vendar ne vključuje predhodnih študij izvedljivosti“ [105]. V obravnavani zadevi je ugotovljeno dejstvo, da se je delo leta 2008 že začelo.
By that time, no agreement with the authorities as regards municipal tax derogations had been initiated, according to the information available.
Na podlagi razpoložljivih informacij ni bil do takrat sklenjen noben dogovor z organi glede izjem od obveznosti plačila davkov na občinski ravni.
This is so, since the agreement with the Municipality was entered into even at a later point in time than the Investment Agreement (entered into in October 2009).
Tako je zato, ker je bila pogodba s to občino sklenjena celo pozneje kot investicijska pogodba (sklenjena oktobra 2009).
Even at a date as early as May 2009, when the Icelandic authorities have claimed that the Municipality and Verne initially negotiated the tax derogations, the requirement of incentive effect would not be met.
Celo že maja 2009, ko so islandski organi trdili, da sta se občina Reykjanesbær in družba Verne najprej dogovorili o izjemah od obveznosti plačila davkov, zahteva po spodbujevalnem učinku ne bi bila izpolnjena.
The aid was granted in February 2008.
Pomoč je bila dodeljena februarja 2008.
The aid cannot be regarded as regional investment aid since when entering into the Real Estate Purchase Agreement on 26 February 2008 and signing of the transfer of title on 9 May 2008 there was no link made between the aid granted and a defined commitment to invest in the area.
Ne more se obravnavati kot regionalna pomoč za naložbe, saj ob sklenitvi pogodbe o nakupu nepremičnine z dne 26. februarja 2008 in ob podpisu pogodbe o prenosu lastništva z dne 9. maja 2008 ni bilo nobene povezave med dodeljeno pomočjo in opredeljeno obveznostjo vlaganja v območje.
The building, with 4800 m2 of technical space, was expected to be ready for use in 2011.
Stavba s 4800 m2 tehničnega prostora naj bi bila za uporabo pripravljena leta 2011.
It was to use 20 MW of utility power.
Napajala naj bi se z 20 MW moči.
The second phase was to encompass bringing the first building to full occupancy by the end of 2012.
V drugi fazi naj bi se zagotovila polna zasedenost prve stavbe do konca leta 2012.
This would require an additional […] of capital, according to information submitted by the Icelandic authorities.
Za to bi bil glede na predložene informacije islandskih organov potreben dodaten kapital v višini […].
Pursuant to Act 176/2006.
V skladu z zakonom št. 176/2006.
A service agreement dated 8.12.2006 was signed between the Icelandic Treasury and KADECO on the development, administration and disposal of the real estate within the area.
Med islandskim finančnim ministrstvom in družbo KADECO je bil podpisan sporazum o opravljanju storitev z dne 8. decembra 2006 glede razvoja in upravljanja nepremičnin ter razpolaganja z njimi na tem območju.
The Real Estate Purchase Agreement and the Ground Lease Agreement are signed by Mr Kjartan Eiríksson, on behalf of the Treasury, “according to proxy dated 8.5.2007”, and the Supplementary Lease Agreement “[o]n behalf of the State Treasury, in accordance with law no. 176/2006 on provisions following the agreement with the U.S.A. regarding returning the defence area at Keflavík Airport, Kjartan Eiríksson with a registered proxy dated 8.5.2007”.
Pogodbo o nakupu nepremičnine in pogodbo o zakupu zemljišča je v imenu finančnega ministrstva „v skladu s pooblastilom z dne 8. maja 2007“ podpisal Kjartan Eiríksson; tudi dodatno pogodbo o zakupu zemljišča „v imenu finančnega ministrstva v skladu z zakonom št. 176/2006 o določbah po sporazumu z ZDA glede vrnitve obrambnega območja na letališču Keflavík“ je podpisal „Kjartan Eiríksson z evidentiranim pooblastilom z dne 8. maja 2007“.
Mr Eiríksson is the CEO of KADECO,
Gospod Eiríksson je izvršni direktor družbe KADECO.
The latest information available at the website of Registers Iceland are on the transactions registered in May 2012.
Najnovejše informacije, ki so na voljo na spletišču urada Registers Iceland, zajemajo transakcije, evidentirane maja 2012.
They demonstrate that the sales prices in registered transactions are consistently and in general above the official valuation, also for commercial buildings outside the capital area.
Iz njih je razvidno, da so prodajne cene za evidentirane transakcije dosledno in na splošno nad uradno vrednostjo, tudi za komercialne stavbe zunaj območja glavnega mesta.
Rep.
Rep., točka 174.
Case N-357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy) [2009] OJ C 95, p. 20, paragraph 40.
Državna pomoč za Fri-El Acerra S.r.l., zadeva N 357/08 (Italija), UL C 95, 24.4.2009, str. 20, točka 40.
Besides, State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities. [46] A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges, involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.
Poleg tega se lahko državna pomoč zagotovi tudi z davčnimi določbami zakonodajne, regulativne ali upravne narave ali s praksami davčnih organov [46].Znižanje davčne osnove ali celotno oziroma delno znižanje zneska davkov, taks ali pristojbin pomeni izgubo prihodkov in s tem porabo državnih sredstev v obliki proračunskih odhodkov.
The report explains that the same real estate expert as provided the valuation for building 869, one of the buildings sold to Verne, assessed a considerable part of the buildings in the area that the State offered for sale. However, not all buildings were assessed.
V poročilu je pojasnjeno, da je isti nepremičninski strokovnjak, ki je opravil oceno vrednosti za stavbo št. 869, tj. eno od stavb, prodanih družbi Verne, ocenil precejšen del stavb na tem območju, ki jih je država ponudila v prodajo, ni pa ocenil vseh stavb.
As of April 2010 Registers Iceland has published market information about commercial buildings on a monthly basis. [81] This data provides information about the number of sales contracts for commercial buildings entered into each month, dating back to January 2005, the number of transactions for which sales price was available and the total official value of buildings sold compared to the total sales price for all contracts entered into for each month, divided into two geographical categories; the capital city area and the rest of the country.
Od aprila 2010 je urad Registers Iceland vsak mesec objavljal tržne informacije o komercialnih stavbah [81], in sicer o številu prodajnih pogodb za komercialne stavbe, sklenjenih vsak mesec, od januarja 2005, številu transakcij, za katere je bila na voljo prodajna cena, in skupni uradni vrednosti prodanih stavb v primerjavi s skupno prodajno ceno za vse pogodbe, sklenjene vsak mesec, razdeljene pa so na dve geografski kategoriji – območje glavnega mesta in drugi deli države.
No 290/12/COL
št. 290/12/COL
on restructuring aid granted to Landsbankinn (Iceland)
o pomoči za prestrukturiranje za banko Landsbankinn (Islandija)
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’)
Nadzorni organ Efte (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Nadzorni organ) je –
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61(3)(b) and Protocol 26 thereof,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum EGP) ter zlasti člena 61(3)(b) in Protokola 26 k Sporazumu,
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’ or ‘SCA’), in particular to Article 24,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Sporazuma med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum o nadzornem organu in sodišču) in zlasti člena 24 Sporazuma,
HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I, Article 7(3) of Part II, and Article 13 of Part II,
OB UPOŠTEVANJU Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Protokol 3) in zlasti člena 1(3) dela I, člena 7(3) dela II ter člena 13 dela II,
Following informal correspondence in October 2008, and the passing of Act No 125/2008 on the Authority for Treasury Disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc. (referred to as the ‘Emergency Act’), which gave the Icelandic state wide-ranging powers to intervene in the banking sector, on 6 October by the Icelandic Parliament (the Althingi), the President of the EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘Authority’) wrote on 10 October 2008 to the Icelandic authorities and requested that state aid measures taken under the Emergency Act be notified to the Authority.
Predsednik Nadzornega organa Efte je v dopisu z dne 10. oktobra 2008, po tem ko so bili oktobra 2008 izmenjani neuradni dopisi in ko je islandski parlament („Althingi“) 6. oktobra sprejel Zakon št. 125/2008 o organu za izplačila iz državne blagajne zaradi nepredvidenih razmer na finančnem trgu itd. (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zakon o izrednih razmerah), s katerim je Islandija dobila obsežna pooblastila za poseganje v bančni sektor, islandske organe pozval, naj Nadzornemu organu priglasijo ukrepe državne pomoči, sprejete v okviru zakona o izrednih razmerah.
Further contact and correspondence followed periodically including notably a letter sent by the Authority on 18 June 2009 reminding the Icelandic authorities of the need to notify any state aid measures, and of the standstill clause in Article 3 of Protocol 3.
Temu so sledili občasni nadaljnji stiki in dopisi, predvsem vključno z dopisom, ki ga je 18. junija 2009 poslal Nadzorni organ, da je islandske organe opomnil o obveznosti priglasitve vsakega ukrepa državne pomoči ter o klavzuli o zamrznitvi iz člena 3 Protokola 3.
State aid involved in the restoration of certain operations of Landsbanki and the establishment and capitalisation of a new Landsbanki Bank (‘NBI’, later renamed Landsbankinn) was eventually notified retrospectively by the Icelandic authorities on 15 September 2010.
Islandski organi so 15. septembra 2010 navsezadnje za nazaj priglasili državno pomoč, povezano s ponovno vzpostavitvijo nekaterih dejavnosti banke Landsbanki ter ustanovitvijo in kapitalizacijo banke New Landsbanki Islands (pozneje preimenovane v Landsbankinn) [2].
[2]
Nadzorni organ je z dopisom z dne 15. decembra 2010 [3] islandske organe obvestil, da se je odločil začeti formalni postopek preiskave iz člena 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 v zvezi z ukrepi, ki jih je država Islandija sprejela za ponovno vzpostavitev nekaterih dejavnosti (nekdanje) banke Landsbanki Islands hf ter ustanovitvijo in kapitalizacijo banke New Landsbanki Islands (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba o začetku postopka).
By letter dated 15 December 2010 [3] the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 in respect of the measures undertaken by the Icelandic State to restore certain operations of (old) Landsbanki Islands hf and establish and capitalise New Landsbanki Islands (NBI hf) (the opening decision).
Nadzorni organ je tudi zahteval, naj se do 31. marca 2011 predloži podroben načrt prestrukturiranja banke Landsbankinn.
By e-mail of 24 March 2011, the Authority received one comment from interested parties, which was forwarded to the Icelandic authorities on 25 May 2011.
V dopisu z dne 23. maja 2012 je bil predložen revidiran načrt prestrukturiranja, iz katerega je bil med drugim razviden prenos vlog in sredstev s hranilnice SpKef z dne 22. aprila 2010, ki ni bil priglašen, upošteval pa se je tudi prevzem hranilnice Sparisjodur Svarfdaela (v nadaljnjem besedilu: hranilnica SpSv).
The Icelandic authorities did not respond to this comment.
Nadzorni organ je 11. julija 2011 in 13. februarja 2012 zahteval informacije v zvezi z načrtom prestrukturiranja.
By letter of 31 March 2011, the Icelandic authorities submitted a restructuring plan for Landsbankinn.
Nadzorni organ je 20. junija 2012 z Odločbo št. 212/12/COL (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba o hranilnici SpSv) odobril možno uporabo državne pomoči, odobrene banki Landsbankinn za prevzem hranilnice SpSv.
The Authority requested information with regards to the restructuring plan on 11 July 2011 and 13 February 2012.
Z Odločbo št. 127/11/COL z dne 13. aprila 2011 je Nadzorni organ odobril spremembe sheme pomoči za prestrukturiranje (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločbe o hranilnicah).
The request for information was answered by the Icelandic authorities on 17 October 2011 and 13 March 2012.
Poleg tega se je Nadzorni organ z islandskimi organi sestal 7. junija 2011 ter 27. in 28. februarja 2012.
The final versions of the commitments were submitted on 6 June 2012 and 13 June 2012.
OZADJE
On 20 June 2012, the Authority approved the potential use of state aid granted to Landsbankinn for the acquisition of SpSv in Decision No 212/12/COL (‘the SpSv Decision’).
Nadzorni organ bo v tem oddelku opisal tiste dogodke, dejstva ter gospodarski, politični in regulativni razvoj, ki se nanašajo na padec in prestrukturiranje islandskega finančnega sistema od oktobra 2008 do datuma, ki se zdi potreben za določitev okvira, v katerem je bila izvedena ocena obravnavanih ukrepov pomoči.
The Authority had by its Decision No 253/10/COL, of 21 June 2011, temporarily approved a rescue aid scheme involving settlement of claims owned by the Central Bank of Iceland (‘CBI’) on savings banks, including SpSv.
Pred tem pa bo kronološko pregledal zlom banke Landsbanki.
By decision 127/11/COL of 13 April 2011 the Authority had approved amendments to the rescue aid scheme (‘the Savings Banks Decisions’)
Zlom banke Landsbanki
In addition, the Authority met with the Icelandic authorities on 7 June 2011 and 27-28 February 2012.
Ne le v tujini, ampak tudi na Islandiji so jeseni leta 2008 z islandskih bank množično dvigovali vloge.
BACKGROUND
Domači dvigi so postali tako številni, da so islandske banke in Centralna banka Islandije na neki stopnji skoraj izkusile pomanjkanje denarnih sredstev.
The Authority will describe in this section those events, facts and economic, political and regulatory developments relating to the collapse and the reconstruction of the Icelandic financial system from 2008 to date that appear necessary to set out the context in which the assessment of aid measures at hand is undertaken.
Islandske komercialne banke (zlasti banka Landsbanki) so se odzvale tako, da so kopičile vloge v tujini.
Before doing so, it will recall in turn the chronology of Landsbanki's breakdown.
Vloge strank v banki Landsbanki so se od konca tretje četrtine leta 2006 do sredine leta 2007 potrojile, saj so se povečale za skoraj 10 milijard EUR.
Icelandic banks experienced massive withdrawals of deposits not only abroad but also within Iceland in autumn 2008.
Evropska centralna banka je 3. oktobra 2008 banko Landsbanki pozvala k doplačilu kritja zneska v višini 400 milijonov EUR, in kljub temu da je bilo to pozneje umaknjeno, se je v podružnici banke v Združenem kraljestvu začel naval na njene vloge, kar pomeni, da je morala imeti na razpolago velike zneske v britanskih funtih.
Domestic withdrawals became so large that at one stage the Icelandic banks and the CBI were close to experiencing a shortage of cash.
Banka Landsbanki je za pomoč zaprosila Centralno banko Islandije, kar je bilo zavrnjeno 6. oktobra.
Access to foreign debt securities markets had been the main source of the Icelandic banks' growth, in particular between 2003 and 2006.
Ko banka ni imela razpoložljivih sredstev, ki jih je zahteval organ za finančne storitve Združenega kraljestva, so organi te države podružnico zaprli.
This source of financing however began to diminish, and foreign credit-rating agencies also expressed concern that the ratio of the banks' lending to deposits was low in comparison to other (foreign) banks.
Naslednjega dne je Centralna banka Nizozemske zahtevala, naj se za amsterdamsko podružnico banke Landsbanki imenuje stečajni upravitelj.
The Icelandic commercial banks (in particular Landsbanki) responded by accumulating deposits abroad.
Organ za finančni nadzor je z uporabo pristojnosti po zakonu o izrednih razmerah istega dne suspendiral upravni odbor banke Landsbanki, prevzel pristojnosti skupščin delničarjev in namesto njih imenoval odbore za razpustitev [4].
From the end of the third quarter of 2006 to the middle of 2007, customer deposits in Landsbanki tripled — an increase of almost 10 billion Euros.
Finančna kriza in glavni vzroki za propad islandskih bank
The largest proportion of this were accounts opened in the Landsbanki UK branch, in which retail deposits had grown from nothing to 6,6 billion Euros, while wholesale deposits (in branches in the UK and the Netherlands) had grown to 2,5 billion Euros.
Islandski organi so v priglasitvi pomoči Nadzornemu organu pojasnili, da so bili razlogi za zlom islandskega bančnega sektorja in njihova potreba po poseganju v ta sektor precej podrobno pojasnjeni v poročilu posebne preiskovalne komisije, ki jo je ustanovil islandski parlament [5], katere nalogi sta bili preiskovanje in analiziranje procesov, zaradi katerih je prišlo do zloma treh glavnih bank.
On 3 October 2008 the European Central Bank issued a margin call to Landsbanki to the amount of 400 million Euros and although this was later withdrawn the bank's UK branch had begun to experience a run on its deposits, meaning that it had to make available large amounts in pounds sterling.
Nadzorni organ v nadaljevanju povzema ugotovitve te komisije glede vzrokov za propad, ki so najpomembnejši za zlom banke Landsbanki.
Landsbanki's request for the assistance of the CBI was turned down on 6 October.
Ta informacija izhaja iz poglavja 2 (Povzetek) in poglavja 21 (Vzroki za zlom islandskih bank – odgovornost, napake in malomarnost) poročila posebne preiskovalne komisije.
When the bank failed to make the funds demanded by the UK Financial Services Authority available the UK authorities closed the branch.
Zaradi svetovnega znižanja likvidnosti na finančnih trgih, ki se je začelo leta 2007, je sčasoma prišlo do zloma treh glavnih islandskih bank, katerih poslovne dejavnosti so postajale čedalje bolj odvisne od pridobivanja sredstev prek mednarodnih trgov.
The following day the Dutch Central Bank requested that an insolvency practitioner be appointed for Landsbanki's Amsterdam branch.
Vendar so bili razlogi za zlom islandskih bank kompleksni in številni.
Also that day the FME suspended the board of directors of Landsbanki, took over the power of shareholders' meetings and appointed a Resolution Committee in its place using its powers under the Emergency Act [4].
Posebna preiskovalna komisija je raziskala vzroke, zaradi katerih je prišlo do zloma teh glavnih bank, omeniti je treba tudi, da se je večina ugotovitev nanašala na vse tri banke in da so mnoge medsebojno povezane.
The financial crisis and major causes of failure of the Icelandic banks
Vzroki za propad, povezani z dejavnostmi bank, so na kratko povzeti v nadaljevanju.
The Icelandic authorities explained in their submissions to the Authority that the reasons for the collapse of the Icelandic banking sector and their need to intervene were set out in considerable detail in a report prepared by a Special Investigation Commission (‘SIC’) established by the Icelandic Parliament [5], whose remit was to investigate and analyse the processes leading to the collapse of the three main banks.
Prekomerno in netrajnostno povečanje
The Authority summarises below the conclusions of the SIC concerning the causes of failure most relevant to the demise of Landsbanki.
Posebna preiskovalna komisija je ugotovila, da so banke v letih pred zlomom s povečanjem bilanc stanja in posojilnih portfeljev presegle svoje operativne in poslovodne zmožnosti.
The information is drawn from Chapters 2 (Executive Summary) and 21 (Causes of the Collapse of the Icelandic Banks — Responsibility, Mistakes and Negligence) of the SIC report.
Posebna preiskovalna komisija je na podlagi tega ugotovila, da je precej tega povečanja posojanja izhajalo iz posojil podjetjem, ki so jim kredit zavrnili drugje.
The global reduction in liquidity in financial markets that began in 2007 eventually led to the collapse of the three main Icelandic banks, whose business operations had become increasingly dependent on raising funding through international markets.
V poročilu je bilo tudi ugotovljeno, da je samo po sebi bolj tvegano bančništvo postalo vedno bolj značilno za dejavnosti bank, rast pa je še prispevala k težavam.
The SIC investigated the reasons which led to the collapse of the main banks, and it is notable that the majority of the conclusions applied to all three banks and many are inter-related.
Dostop do mednarodnih finančnih trgov, izkoriščanje dobrih bonitetnih ocen in dostop do evropskih trgov prek Sporazuma EGP so omogočili velik del rasti bank.
Causes of failure related to the banks' activities are briefly summarised below.
Islandske banke so si leta 2005 pod dokaj ugodnimi pogoji izposodile 14 milijard EUR na trgu tujih dolžniških vrednostnih papirjev.
Excessive and unsustainable expansion
Ko je postal dostop do trga evropskih dolžniških vrednostnih papirjev bolj omejen, so banke svoje dejavnosti financirale na trgih ZDA, s tem da so islandske dolžniške vrednostne papirje zapakirale v finančne instrumente, zavarovane z dolžniškimi instrumenti.
The SIC concluded that in the years leading up to the collapse the banks had expanded their balance sheets and lending portfolios beyond their own operational and managerial capacity.
Banke so se v obdobju pred zlomom vedno bolj zanašale na kratkoročno zadolževanje, zaradi česar so nastala večja in po mnenju posebne preiskovalne komisije predvidljiva tveganja za refinanciranje.
The combined assets of the three banks had increased exponentially from 1,4 trillion ISK [6] in 2003 to 14,4 trillion ISK at the end of the second quarter of 2008.
Kolesje lastnikov bank
Significantly, a large proportion of the growth of the three banks was in lending to foreign parties, which increased substantially during 2007 [7], most notably after the beginning of the international liquidity crisis.
Glavni lastniki so bili v primeru vsake glavne islandske banke med največjimi dolžniki [8].
This led the SIC to conclude that much of this increase in lending resulted from loans made to undertakings that had been refused credit elsewhere.
Največji delničar banke Landsbanki od njene privatizacije je bila družba Samson Holding Company (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba Samson).