natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The differentiation based on creditworthiness strengthens the price signal for weaker banks, allows to better align the price of guarantees with the risk profile of the beneficiary institution thus lowering distortions of competition between institutions and contributing to the protection of a level playing field across banks in the single market.
Razlikovanje na podlagi kreditne sposobnosti krepi signal cene za šibkejše banke, omogoča boljše uravnavanje cene jamstev s profilom tveganja institucij upravičenk in tako zmanjšuje izkrivljanje konkurence med institucijami ter prispeva k zagotavljanju enakih konkurenčnih pogojev za banke na enotnem trgu.
The approval of the extension of a guarantee scheme [10] beyond 1 January 2011 would therefore require the fee for a government guarantee [11] to be higher than under the pricing formula recommended by the ECB in October 2008 at least:
Odobritev podaljšanja državne jamstvene sheme [10] po 1. januarju 2011 bi torej zahtevalo višjo provizijo za jamstvo [11], kot je bila določena v formuli za izračunavanje cen, ki jo je priporočila ECB oktobra 2008, in sicer za vsaj
by 20 basis points for banks with a rating of A+ or A [12],
20 bazičnih točk za banke z bonitetno oceno A + ali A [12],
by 30 basis points for banks rated A- [13], and
30 bazičnih točk za banke z bonitetno oceno A– [13], in
by 40 basis points for banks rated below A-.
40 bazičnih točk za banke z bonitetno oceno pod A–.
Banks without rating will be considered to belong to the category of banks with a BBB rating [14].
Za banke brez bonitetne ocene se bo štelo, da spadajo v kategorijo bank z bonitetno oceno BBB [14].
EFTA States would have the possibility to go beyond these minimum requirements in defining the top-ups for the guarantee fee.
Države Efte bi imele možnost, da presežejo te minimalne zahteve pri opredelitvi dodatnih provizij za jamstvo.
As a further element of flexibility allowing EFTA States to adjust the conditions to the specific circumstances prevailing in their financial sectors, the Authority would accept a different model for the calculation of a fee increase provided that it can be unequivocally demonstrated that this formula leads at least to the minimum rise set out above for the banks concerned [15].
Za zagotovitev dodatne prožnosti državam članicam Efte pri prilagajanju pogojev posebnim okoliščinam, ki prevladujejo v njihovem finančnem sektorju, bi lahko Nadzorni organ sprejel tudi drugačen model za izračun povišanja provizije, če je mogoče nedvoumno dokazati, da nova formula zagotovi vsaj minimalno povišanje za zadevne banke, kot je določeno zgoraj [15].
Viability review of banks still dependent on government debt guarantees
Pregled uspešnosti poslovanja bank, ki so še vedno odvisne od državnih jamstev za dolg
While limited usage could be allowed without prompting further scrutiny, a larger usage both in absolute terms and in relation to the bank's total amount of liabilities should trigger the requirement of a viability review as a prerequisite for the conformity of the further extension of guarantee schemes with Article 61(3)(b) EEA.
Čeprav bi bilo mogoče dovoliti omejeno uporabo jamstev brez nadaljnjega nadzora, bi bilo treba ob obsežnejši uporabi (tako v absolutnem smislu kot v razmerju s celotnim obsegom obveznosti banke) uveljaviti zahtevo po pregledu uspešnosti poslovanja kot predpogoj za skladnost nadaljnjega podaljšanja jamstvenih shem s členom 61(3)(b) Sporazuma EGP.
A persistent failure to obtain a considerable proportion of the funding needed without government guarantees may indicate a lack of confidence in the viability of a bank's business model.
Nenehno zavračanje znatnega zneska financiranja, potrebnega za poslovanje brez državnih jamstev, lahko pomeni pomanjkanje zaupanja v zmogljivost bančnega poslovnega modela za uspešno poslovanje.
It should be avoided that a bank retains a heavy reliance on guarantee schemes, which were designed to tackle unprecedented difficulties in access to financing, even when these exceptional circumstances have subsided, thereby possibly allowing that bank to postpone necessary structural adjustments.
Ne bi se smelo dovoliti, da se banka stalno močno zanaša na jamstvene sheme, ki so bile oblikovane za reševanje težav z dostopom do financiranja, kakršnih pred tem še nismo imeli, čeprav so se te izjemne razmere pomirile, saj bi se s tem banki dovolilo, da odloži potrebne strukturne prilagoditve.
Therefore, the Authority considers it appropriate that guarantee schemes to be prolonged beyond 1 January 2011 should include a threshold concerning the ratio of total guaranteed liabilities outstanding over total liabilities of a bank and the absolute amount of guaranteed liabilities which, if exceeded, triggers the requirement of a viability review.
Zato se zdi Nadzornemu organu primerno, da se v jamstvene sheme, ki naj se podaljšajo na obdobje po 1. januarju 2011, vključi prag za razmerje med skupnimi neporavnanimi zajamčenimi obveznostmi in skupnimi obveznostmi banke ter absolutnim zneskom zajamčenih obveznosti, ki v primeru, da je preseženo, sproži zahtevo po pregledu uspešnosti poslovanja.
For any bank that requests government guarantees under a scheme covering new or renewed debt to be issued as from 1 January 2011 which takes or keeps the total amount of outstanding guaranteed liabilities beyond this threshold in relation to both of its elements (absolute and relative size) [16] the EFTA State concerned would be required to submit a review demonstrating the bank's long-term viability to the Authority within three months of the granting of guarantees.
Za vsako banko, ki zaprosi za državno jamstvo v okviru sheme, v kateri je zajet nov ali obnovljen dolg, ki se izda od 1. januarja 2011 naprej in ki obdrži ali zahteva kritje celotnega zneska neporavnanih zajamčenih obveznosti preko tega praga v zvezi z obema elementoma (absolutni in relativni obseg) [16], bi morala zadevna država Efte v treh mesecih od odobritve jamstev Nadzornemu organu predložiti presojo, v kateri bi izkazala sposobnost banke za dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje.
This mechanism does not apply to banks that are already in restructuring or are obliged to present a restructuring plan or that are already subject to a pending viability review at the material time.
Ta mehanizem se ne uporablja za banke, ki na določeni dan že izvajajo prestrukturiranje ali zanje velja obveznost predložitve načrta za prestrukturiranje oziroma so že predmet še nedokončanega pregleda uspešnosti poslovanja.
In those scenarios the award of additional State aid will have to be taken into account within the framework of the ongoing restructuring/viability review process [17].
V teh okoliščinah bo treba dodelitev dodatne državne pomoči upoštevati v okviru še nedokončanega prestrukturiranja oziroma postopka pregleda uspešnosti poslovanja [17].
For the small but not negligible group of banks exceeding this limit, it is warranted to scrutinise whether the considerable reliance on guarantees for funding indicates a more structural weakness of their business models.
Za majhno, vendar ne zanemarljivo skupino bank, ki presegajo to mejo, je upravičeno proučiti, ali njihovo močno zanašanje na jamstva za financiranje dejansko ne nakazuje strukturne slabosti njihovega poslovnega modela.
The trigger function provides an incentive for sound banks to initiate a swift process of return to funding predominantly or exclusively on undistorted market terms.
Zaradi zahteve po pregledu imajo zdrave banke spodbudo, da začnejo hiter postopek vrnitve na financiranje pretežno ali izključno po neizkrivljenih tržnih pogojih.
For all banks undergoing a thorough viability review either their long-term viability will be confirmed or doubts in that respect will indicate the need to confront the necessity of a farther-reaching restructuring.
Za vse banke, za katere se izvaja pregled uspešnosti poslovanja, bo bodisi potrjena njihova dolgoročna sposobnost za uspešno poslovanje bodisi bodo dvomi glede tega pokazali, da se je treba lotiti bolj daljnosežnega prestrukturiranja.
In relation to the content to be provided in a viability review exercise, reference can be made to the Restructuring Guidelines which set out that the principles concerning the analysis of a bank's situation with a view to the restoration of long-term viability in a restructuring plan apply by analogy to cases where the aid beneficiary is not under a formal obligation to present a restructuring plan but is nonetheless required to demonstrate long-term viability.
Za elemente, ki jih je treba zagotoviti za pregled uspešnosti poslovanja, se lahko sklicuje na smernice o prestrukturiranju, ki določajo, da se za analizo položaja banke pri ponovnem vzpostavljanju dolgoročne uspešnosti v načrtu prestrukturiranja uporabljajo ista načela kot za primere, v katerih upravičenec do pomoči nima formalne obveznosti, da predstavi načrt prestrukturiranja, vendar mora vseeno dokazati dolgoročno uspešnost.
In particular the bank will have to demonstrate the solidity of its funding capacity and, where necessary, to undergo a liquidity stress test [18].
Banka bo morala pokazati zlasti zanesljivost svoje finančne zmogljivosti in po potrebi opraviti stresni test likvidnosti [18].
A viability review should also take account of any factors specific to the beneficiary financial institutions [19] or to the EFTA State concerned [20] and the situation of its financial markets that have an impact on the viability assessment and on the indicative value of the ratio of guaranteed liabilities over total liabilities.
Pri pregledu uspešnosti poslovanja je treba upoštevati tudi vse posebne dejavnike glede upravičene finančne institucije [19] ali zadevne države Efte [20] in razmere na njenih finančnih trgih, ki vplivajo na oceno uspešnosti ter na okvirno vrednost razmerja med zajamčenimi in skupnimi obveznostmi.
As a general rule, the more significant the reliance on government guarantees is and the more it is combined with the use of other forms of State assistance and/or a low creditworthiness [21] the stronger the indication of a need to undergo changes in the business model in order to ensure long-term viability.
Na splošno velja, da je pri večjem zanašanju na državna jamstva in hkratni uporabi drugih oblik državne pomoči in/ali nizki kreditni sposobnosti [21], večja tudi potreba po spremembah poslovnega modela, da se zagotovi dolgoročno uspešnost poslovanja.
The mechanism triggering the requirement of a viability review conveys the signal that banks have to prepare for a return to normal market mechanisms without state support as the financial sector gradually emerges from crisis conditions and represents an incentive for individual institutions to scale down the reliance on government guarantees or to refrain from their use altogether.
Mehanizem, ki sproži zahtevo za pregled uspešnosti poslovanja, banke opozori, da se morajo pripraviti za vrnitev na normalne tržne mehanizme brez podpore države, saj finančni sektor postopoma okreva po krizi, in posamezne institucije spodbudi, da se postopoma manj zanašajo na državna jamstva ali njihovo uporabo v celoti opustijo.
At the same time, it affords sufficient flexibility to duly take account of potentially diverse circumstances affecting the situation of different banks or national financial markets and also caters for the possibility of an overall deterioration in relation to financial stability which cannot be excluded at this stage given the residual fragility in the recovery of financial markets.
Hkrati zagotavlja dovolj prožnosti, da se ustrezno upoštevajo potencialno različne okoliščine, ki vplivajo na položaj različnih bank ali nacionalne finančne trge, in upošteva tudi možnost splošnega poslabšanja finančne stabilnosti, ki je trenutno glede na preostalo krhkost okrevanja finančnih trgov ni mogoče izključiti.
Removal of the distinction between sound and distressed banks for the purposes of submitting a restructuring plan
Prenehanje razlikovanja med trdnimi bankami in bankami v težavah zaradi predložitve prestrukturiranja načrta
At the beginning of the crisis, the Authority established a distinction between unsound/distressed financial institutions and fundamentally sound financial institutions, that is to say, financial institutions suffering from endogenous, structural problems linked, for instance, to their particular business model or investment strategy and financial institutions whose problems merely and largely had to do with the extreme situation in the financial crisis rather than with the soundness of their business model, inefficiency or excessive risk taking.
Na začetku krize je Nadzorni organ začel razlikovati med finančnimi institucijami v težavah in načeloma trdnimi finančnimi institucijami, to je med finančnimi institucijami, ki se soočajo z notranjimi strukturnimi težavami, povezanimi na primer z njihovim poslovnim modelom ali strategijo vlaganja, ter finančnimi institucijami, katerih težave so predvsem posledica izjemnih razmer v času finančne krize, ne pa nestabilnosti njihovega poslovnega modela, neučinkovitosti ali pretirano tveganega poslovanja.
The distinction is defined in particular on the basis of a number of indicators set out in the Recapitalisation Guidelines: capital adequacy, current CDS spreads, current rating of the bank and its outlook as well as, inter alia, the relative size of the recapitalisation.
Razlikovanje temelji zlasti na kazalnikih, določenih v smernicah o dokapitalizaciji: kapitalski ustreznosti, trenutnemu razponu poslov zamenjav dolgov, trenutni bonitetni oceni in obetih banke ter med drugim relativnem obsegu dokapitalizacije.
Regarding the latter, the Authority deems aid received under the form of recapitalisation and asset relief measures of more than 2 % of the bank's risk weighted assets to be an indicator to distinguish between fundamentally sound and distressed banks.
V zvezi z dokapitalizacijo Nadzorni organ meni, da je pomoč v obliki dokapitalizacije in ukrepov finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva, ki presega 2 % tveganju prilagojene aktive banke, merilo za razlikovanje med načeloma trdnimi bankami in bankami v težavah.
The recapitalisation of a distressed bank triggers the requirement to submit a restructuring plan to the Authority, while the recapitalisation of a sound bank triggers the requirement to submit a viability plan.
Dokapitalizacija banke v težavah nalaga obveznost predložitve načrta prestrukturiranja Nadzornemu organu, dokapitalizacija trdne banke pa nalaga obveznost predložitve načrta za uspešno poslovanje.
The original rationale for establishing that distinction and for setting a range of indicators, including a threshold of 2 % of the bank's risk weighted assets, was the fear that capital needs resulting from impairments, higher expectations of the markets as to the capital levels of banks and temporary difficulties in raising capital on markets would otherwise lead to sound banks diminishing their lending to the real economy in order to avoid having to submit a restructuring plan when having recourse to State resources.
Prvotni razlog za tako razlikovanje in določitev vrste kazalnikov, vključno s pragom 2 % tveganju prilagojene aktive banke, je bila bojazen, da bodo zaradi potreb po kapitalu, nastalih zaradi oslabljenih sredstev, večjih pričakovanj trgov v zvezi z ravnmi kapitala bank in začasnih težav pri zbiranju kapitala na trgih zdrave banke zmanjšale posojila realnemu gospodarstvu, da bi se tako izognile obveznosti priprave načrta prestrukturiranja ob uporabi državnih sredstev.
At present, however, the banking sector overall faces fewer difficulties in raising capital on the markets or, inter alia, through retained earnings [22] and can therefore meet their capital needs without recourse to State aid [23].
Bančni sektor ima trenutno manj težav z zbiranjem kapitala na trgih ali, med drugim, prek zadržanega dobička [22] in lahko svoje potrebe po kapitalu izpolnjuje brez uporabe državne pomoči [23].
The amount of capital raised by financial institutions on the market has significantly increased over the course of 2009 and 2010, demonstrating renewed access for financial institutions to capital markets as well as anticipation of new regulatory requirements [24].
Količina kapitala, ki so ga finančne institucije zbrale na trgu, se je v letih 2009 in 2010 močno povečala, kar kaže na ponoven dostop do kapitalskih trgov za finančne institucije in pričakovanje novih regulativnih zahtev [24].
The distinction between sound and distressed banks therefore no longer seems relevant in order to determine which banks should enter into a discussion about their restructuring with the Authority.
Razlikovanje med zdravimi bankami in bankami v težavah se zato ne zdi več potrebno za določitev bank, ki naj bi z Nadzornim organom pričele razprave o svojem prestrukturiranju.
As a result, banks which still have recourse to the State in 2011 for raising capital or for impaired assets measures should be required to submit to the Authority a restructuring plan showing the bank’s determination to undertake the necessary restructuring efforts and return to viability without undue delay.
Zato je treba od bank, ki bodo leta 2011 še vedno uporabljale državno pomoč za zbiranje kapitala ali ukrepe za oslabljena sredstva, zahtevati, da Nadzornemu organu predložijo načrt prestrukturiranja, iz katerega bo razvidno, da je banka pripravljena sprejeti potrebne ukrepe za prestrukturiranje in čim prej spet vzpostaviti uspešno poslovanje.
Thus, as of 1 January 2011, a restructuring plan will be required from every beneficiary of a new recapitalisation or an impaired asset measure [25].
Zato bo morala od 1. januarja 2011 vsaka upravičenka do novega ukrepa dokapitalizacije ali ukrepa za oslabljena sredstva pripraviti načrt prestrukturiranja [25].
In assessing the restructuring needs of banks, the Authority will take into consideration the specific situation of each institution, the degree to which such a restructuring is necessary to restore viability without further state support as well as prior reliance on State aid.
Pri ocenjevanju potreb bank po prestrukturiranju bo Nadzorni organ upošteval položaj vsake institucije, v kakšni meri je prestrukturiranje potrebno za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja brez nadaljnje državne pomoči ter preteklo zanašanje na državno pomoč.
As a general rule, the more significant the reliance on State aid, the stronger the indication of a need to undergo in-depth restructuring in order to ensure long-term viability.
Splošno pravilo je, da močnejše kot je zanašanje na državno pomoč, večja je potreba po poglobljenem prestrukturiranju, da se dolgoročno zagotovi uspešno poslovanje.
In addition, the individual assessment will take account of any specific situation on the markets and will apply the restructuring framework in an appropriately flexible manner in the event of a severe shock endangering financial stability in one or more EFTA States.
Poleg tega se bodo pri posameznih ocenah upoštevale posebne razmere na trgih, v primeru resnih napetosti, ki bi ogrožale finančno stabilnost ene ali več držav Efte, pa se bo na ustrezno prožen način uporabil okvir prestrukturiranja.
Requiring a restructuring plan for banks benefiting from structural aid (that is to say, recapitalisation and/or impaired asset measures) — while at the same time accepting that the mere use of refinancing guarantees would still not trigger the requirement to submit a restructuring plan — conveys the signal that banks have to prepare for a return to normal market mechanisms without state support as the financial sector gradually emerges from crisis conditions.
Zahteva po pripravi načrta prestrukturiranja za banke, ki se jim odobri strukturna pomoč (to je dokapitalizacija oziroma ukrepi za oslabljena sredstva) – ob hkratnem upoštevanju, da sama uporaba jamstev za refinanciranje še vedno ne sproži zahteve za predložitev načrta prestrukturiranja – nakazuje, da se morajo banke pripraviti na povrnitev normalnih tržnih mehanizmov brez podpore države, saj finančni sektor postopoma izhaja iz krize.
It provides an incentive for individual institutions that still need aid to accelerate the necessary restructuring.
Pomeni spodbudo posameznim institucijam, ki še vedno potrebujejo pomoč za pospešitev potrebnega prestrukturiranja.
At the same time, it affords sufficient flexibility to duly take account of potentially diverse circumstances affecting the situation of different banks or national financial markets.
Hkrati zagotavlja dovolj prožnosti, da se ustrezno upoštevajo potencialno različne okoliščine, ki vplivajo na položaj različnih bank ali nacionalnih finančnih trgov.
It also caters for the possibility of an overall or country-specific deterioration in relation to financial stability, which cannot be excluded at present, given the residual fragility in the situation of financial markets.
Upošteva tudi možnost splošnega ali na posamezno državo omejenega poslabšanja finančne stabilnosti, ki ga glede na preostalo krhkost okrevanja finančnih trgov trenutno ni mogoče izključiti.
Temporal scope, general outlook
Časovni okvir, splošni obeti
Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, adopted and issued by the Authority on 19.1.1994, published in OJ L 231, 3.9.1994, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 32, 3.9.1994, p. 1.
Smernice o uporabi in razlagi členov 61 in 62 Sporazuma EGP in člena 1 Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzornem organu in sodišču, ki jih je sprejel in izdal Nadzorni organ 19. januarja 1994, objavljene v UL L 231, 3.9.1994, str. 1. in Dopolnilu EGP k Uradnemu listu Evropske unije št. 32, 3.9.1994, str. 1.
The Guidelines were last amended on 17 December 2008 (‘the State Aid Guidelines’).
Smernice so bile nazadnje spremenjene 17. decembra 2008 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice o državnih pomočeh).
The updated version of the State Aid Guidelines is published on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/
Posodobljena različica smernic o državni pomoči je objavljena na spletni strani Nadzornega organa:http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/.
For the convenience of the reader, financial institutions are referred to simply as ‘banks’ in this document.
Za lažje razumevanje besedila se za vse finančne institucije v tem dokumentu uporablja izraz „banke“.
Decision 28/09/COL of 29.1.2009.
Odločba 28/09/COL, 29.1.2009.
Decision 191/09/COL of 22.4.2009.
Odločba 191/09/COL, 22.4.2009.
Decision 472/09/COL of 25.11.2009.
Odločba 472/09/COL, 25.11.2009.
With a flexibility clause permitting a re-assessment of the situation and appropriate remedies in the event of a severe new shock to the financial markets across the EEA or in one or more EFTA States.
S klavzulo o fleksibilnosti, na podlagi katere se lahko ponovno ocenijo razmere in ustrezni ukrepi v primeru resnih novih napetosti na finančnih trgih v EGP ali eni ali več državah Efte.
See http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/recommendations_on_guaranteesen.pdf
Glej. http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/recommendations_on_guaranteesen.pdf
Individual notifications of government guarantees outside a scheme will generally require a guarantee fee along the same lines.
Ob posameznih priglasitvah državnih jamstev zunaj sheme se navadno zahteva plačilo provizije za jamstvo za podoben znesek.
Where the beneficiary is under restructuring obligations and a lower fee may be justified depending on the specific circumstances this deviation will have to be taken into account in the overall assessment of the restructuring and the measures necessary to minimise distortions of competition.
Kadar mora upravičenec izvesti prestrukturiranje, in je morda upravičeno plačilo nižje provizije glede na posebne okoliščine, bo treba to odstopanje upoštevati pri splošni oceni prestrukturiranja in potrebnih ukrepov za kar največje zmanjšanje izkrivljanja konkurence.
This includes guarantees covering liabilities of one year or less.
To vključuje jamstva, ki krijejo enoletne ali krajše obveznosti.
Or A1 and A2 depending on the rating system employed.
Ali A1 in A2, odvisno od uporabljenega bonitetnega sistema.
Or A3 depending on the rating system employed.
Ali A3, odvisno od uporabljenega bonitetnega sistema.