natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Having regard to Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and in particular Article 4(6) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Direktive 2014/59/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 15. maja 2014 o vzpostavitvi okvira za sanacijo ter reševanje kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij ter o spremembi Šeste direktive Sveta 82/891/EGS ter direktiv 2001/24/ES, 2002/47/ES, 2004/25/ES, 2005/56/ES, 2007/36/ES, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU in 2013/36/EU in uredb (EU) št. 1093/2010 ter (EU) št. 648/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta ter zlasti člena 4(6) Direktive,
To determine whether Member States should grant institutions in their jurisdictions simplified obligations, Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU requires those Member States to ensure that competent and resolution authorities assess the impact that the failure of an institution could have due to a number of factors specified in that article.
Člen 4(1) Direktive 2014/59/EU za ugotavljanje, ali bi morale države članice institucijam v svojih jurisdikcijah odobriti poenostavljene obveznosti, od navedenih držav članic zahteva zagotovitev, da bodo pristojni organi in organi za reševanje ocenili učinek, ki bi ga lahko imel propad institucije zaradi številnih dejavnikov, določenih v navedenem členu.
That assessment should be distinct from, and should not predetermine, any other assessment to be made by resolution authorities, including, in particular, any assessment of the resolvability of an institution or group, or of whether the conditions for resolution referred to in Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council are satisfied.
Navedena ocena bi morala biti ločena od vseh drugih ocen, ki jih morajo izvesti organi za reševanje, zlasti od vsake ocene rešljivosti institucije ali skupine ali od ocene izpolnjevanja pogojev za reševanje iz Direktive 2014/59/EU in Uredbe (EU) št. 806/2014 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta, ter teh ocen ne bi smela vnaprej določati.
The specification of the criteria referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU should be practical, efficient and effective.
Opredelitev meril iz člena 4(1) Direktive 2014/59/EU bi morala biti praktična, učinkovita in uspešna.
The impact that the failure of an institution can have should therefore be assessed, first on the basis of quantitative criteria and subsequently on the basis of qualitative criteria.
Učinek, ki ga ima lahko propad institucije, bi bilo zato treba oceniti najprej na podlagi kvantitativnih meril in nato na podlagi kvalitativnih meril.
In general, the assessment based on qualitative criteria should only be conducted where the assessment on the basis of quantitative criteria does not lead to the conclusion that, in the light of the impact that the institution's failure could have, full obligations, rather than merely simplified obligations, are required.
Na splošno bi bilo treba oceno na podlagi kvalitativnih meril izvesti le, kadar ocena na podlagi kvantitativnih meril ne privede do zaključka, da se glede na učinek, ki bi ga lahko imel propad institucije, zahtevajo popolne obveznosti namesto samo poenostavljenih obveznosti.
To ensure a convergent and effective application of this Regulation, competent and resolution authorities should assess the quantitative criteria against a Union common threshold in the form of a total quantitative score.
Da bi se zagotovila usklajena in učinkovita uporabe te uredbe, bi morali pristojni organi in organi za reševanje pri ocenjevanju kvantitativnih meril uporabiti skupni prag Unije v obliki skupnega kvantitativnega rezultata.
Competent and resolution authorities should calculate that total quantitative score in accordance with a set of indicators, using the values from the applicable supervisory reporting framework laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014.
Pristojni organi in organi za reševanje bi morali izračunati navedeni skupni kvantitativni rezultat v skladu z nizom kazalnikov, pri čemer bi morali uporabiti vrednosti iz veljavnega okvira za nadzorniško poročanje iz Izvedbene uredbe (EU) št. 680/2014.
To ensure a desirable balance in terms of the expected ratio of institutions ineligible for simplified obligations within Member States and the distribution of ineligible institutions across Member States, the Union threshold for the total quantitative score for credit institutions should in principle be established at 25 basis points.
Da bi zagotovili primerno ravnovesje, kar zadeva pričakovan delež institucij v državah članicah, ki ne izpolnjujejo pogojev za poenostavljene obveznosti, in razdelitev teh institucij po državah članicah, bi bilo treba prag Unije za skupni kvantitativni rezultat za kreditne institucije načeloma določiti v višini 25 bazičnih točk.
However, competent and resolution authorities should be able to raise or lower the threshold of 25 basis points and set it within the range of 0 to 105 basis points, depending on the specificities of the Member State's banking sector.
Vendar bi moralo biti pristojnim organom in organom za reševanje omogočeno, da zvišajo ali znižajo prag v višini 25 bazičnih točk in ga glede na posebnosti bančnega sektorja države članice določijo v razponu od 0 do 105 bazičnih točk.
A highly concentrated banking sector may justify a higher threshold, whereas a large number of small institutions combined with a small number of large institutions may lead to a lower threshold.
Zelo koncentriran bančni sektor lahko upravičuje višji prag, medtem ko lahko veliko število malih institucij skupaj z majhnim številom velikih institucij privede do nižjega praga.
The threshold should strike the right balance between the cumulative value of total assets of credit institutions that could be eligible for simplified obligations in a given Member State and of credit institutions that would be ineligible based on the quantitative assessment.
S pragom bi moralo biti doseženo pravo ravnovesje med skupno vrednostjo vseh sredstev kreditnih institucij, ki bi lahko izpolnjevale pogoje za poenostavljene obveznosti v določeni državi članici, in kreditnimi institucijami, ki na podlagi kvantitativne ocene ne bi izpolnjevale pogojev.
Competent and resolution authorities should use appropriate proxies based on the national generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) where they do not receive the indicator values from institutions as a part of supervisory reporting.
Kadar pristojni organi in organi za reševanje kot del nadzorniškega poročanja ne prejmejo vrednosti kazalnikov od institucij, bi morali uporabiti ustrezne približke na podlagi nacionalnih splošno sprejetih računovodskih načel (GAAP).
Competent or resolution authorities should be able to assign a value of zero to the relevant indicators where the identification of proxies would be excessively cumbersome.
Če bi bila opredelitev približkov preveč zapletena, bi morali imeti pristojni organi ali organi za reševanje možnost, da zadevnim kazalnikom dodelijo vrednost nič.
That possibility should however be limited to institutions not reporting template 20 on the basis of Article 5(a)(4) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014, due to their not exceeding the threshold referred to in that Article.
Navedena možnost pa bi morala biti omejena na institucije, ki ne poročajo na podlagi predloge 20 v skladu s členom 5(a)(4) Izvedbene uredbe (EU) št. 680/2014, ker ne presegajo praga iz navedenega člena.
To ensure that the approach taken in this Regulation fully complies with the principle of proportionality and to eliminate any disproportionate burden, it should be possible for small credit institutions to be quantitatively assessed on the basis of their size only.
Za zagotovitev, da je pristop iz te uredbe v celoti v skladu z načelom sorazmernosti in da se odpravi kakršno koli nesorazmerno breme, bi moralo biti mogoče, da se male kreditne institucije kvantitativno ocenijo le na podlagi njihove velikosti.
Competent and resolution authorities should therefore be able to conclude that the failure of a small credit institution would not be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, other institutions or funding conditions, without applying the total quantitative score, provided that their qualitative assessment supports that conclusion.
Pristojnim organom in organom za reševanje bi moralo biti zato omogočeno, da brez uporabe skupnega kvantitativnega rezultata zaključijo, da propad majhne kreditne institucije verjetno ne bi imel znatnega negativnega učinka na finančne trge, druge institucije ali pogoje financiranja, pod pogojem, da njihova kvalitativna ocena podpira navedeni zaključek.
For those small credit institutions, the assessment of the qualitative criteria should also be conducted in a proportionate manner.
Za navedene male kreditne institucije bi bilo treba oceno kvalitativnih meril prav tako izvajati sorazmerno.
To ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the assessment of the impact of institutions' failure on financial markets, other institutions or funding conditions, the specification of quantitative and qualitative criteria should build upon terms and categories already laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.
Da se zagotovita uspešnost in učinkovitost ocene učinka propada institucij na finančne trge, druge institucije ali pogoje financiranja, bi bilo treba opredelitev kvantitativnih in kvalitativnih meril določiti na podlagi pogojev in kategorij, ki so že določeni v Direktivi 2013/36/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta.
In particular, pursuant to Article 131(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU, G-SIIs are identified as such on the basis of, inter alia, their size, interconnectedness with the financial system, complexity and cross-border activity.
Zlasti so v skladu s členom 131(2) Direktive 2013/36/EU globalne sistemsko pomembne institucije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: GSPI) opredeljene kot takšne med drugim na podlagi svoje velikosti, medsebojne povezanosti s finančnim sistemom, zapletenosti in čezmejne dejavnosti.
Since those criteria overlap to a large extent with the criteria of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, competent and resolution authorities should be able to decide that a G-SII's failure would be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, other institutions or funding conditions, without having to conduct a quantitative assessment.
Ker se navedena merila v veliki meri prekrivajo z merili iz člena 4(1) Direktive 2014/59/EU, bi morali imeti pristojni organi in organi za reševanje možnost, da brez opravljene kvantitativne ocene odločijo, da bi imel propad GSPI verjetno znaten negativen učinek na finančne trge, druge institucije ali pogoje financiranja.
Further, pursuant to Article 131(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU, O-SIIs are identified as such on the basis of, inter alia, their size, their importance for the economy of the Union or of the relevant Member State, the significance of their cross-border activities and their interconnectedness with the financial system.
Poleg tega so v skladu s členom 131(3) Direktive 2013/36/EU druge sistemsko pomembne institucije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: DSPI) opredeljene kot takšne med drugim na podlagi svoje velikosti, pomena za gospodarstvo Unije ali zadevne države članice, pomena svojih čezmejnih dejavnosti in medsebojne povezanosti s finančnim sistemom.
Since those criteria are very similar to the criteria of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, competent and resolution authorities should be able to decide that an O-SII's failure would be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, other institutions or funding conditions, without having to conduct a quantitative assessment.
Ker so navedena merila zelo podobna merilom iz člena 4(1) Direktive 2014/59/EU, bi morali imeti pristojni organi in organi za reševanje možnost, da brez opravljene kvantitativne ocene odločijo, da bi imel propad DSPI verjetno znaten negativen učinek na finančne trge, druge institucije ali pogoje financiranja.
Moreover, Article 107(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU requires the European Banking Authority (EBA) to issue guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
Poleg tega člen 107(3) Direktive 2013/36/EU zahteva, da Evropski bančni organ (EBA) izda smernice o skupnih postopkih in metodologijah za proces nadzorniškega pregledovanja in ovrednotenja v skladu s členom 16 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta.
Competent authorities and financial institutions, to which those guidelines are addressed, are required to make every effort to comply with them.
Pristojni organi in finančne institucije, na katere so navedene smernice naslovljene, morajo storiti vse, kar je v njihovi moči, da jih upoštevajo.
The categorisation under the EBA SREP guidelines by competent authorities should therefore be taken into account in the context of the assessment referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU.
Zato bi bilo treba v okviru ocene iz člena 4(1) Direktive 2014/59/EU upoštevati kategorizacijo v skladu s smernicami EBA za proces nadzorniškega pregledovanja in ovrednotenja, ki so jo pripravili pristojni organi.
Competent authorities classify institutions into four categories.
Pristojni organi razvrščajo institucije v štiri kategorije.
The first category (SREP Category 1) is comprised of G-SIIs and O-SIIs and, where appropriate, of other institutions categorised as such by a competent authority on the basis of their size, internal organisation, and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities.
Prva kategorija (kategorija 1 procesa nadzorniškega pregledovanja in ovrednotenja) zajema GSPI in DSPI ter, kjer je primerno, druge institucije, ki jih je kot takšne razvrstil pristojni organ na podlagi njihove velikosti, notranje organizacije ter narave, obsega in zapletenosti njihovih dejavnosti.
Accordingly, where the competent authority has determined that an institution falls within SREP Category 1, competent and resolution authorities should be able to decide that the failure of that institution would be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, other institutions or funding conditions, without having to conduct a quantitative assessment.
V skladu s tem bi morali v primeru, če je pristojni organ ugotovil, da institucija spada v kategorijo 1 procesa nadzorniškega pregledovanja in ovrednotenja, pristojni organi in organi za reševanje imeti možnost, da brez opravljene kvantitativne ocene odločijo, da bi imel propad navedene institucije verjetno znaten negativen učinek na finančne trge, druge institucije ali pogoje financiranja.
To ensure a consistent assessment of institutions, it is necessary to specify a minimal list of considerations on the basis of which competent and resolution authorities should perform their qualitative assessments, without preventing those authorities from taking into account other relevant considerations.
Da se zagotovi usklajena ocena institucij, je treba določiti minimalni seznam vidikov, na podlagi katerih bi morali pristojni organi in organi za reševanje izvajati svoje kvalitativne ocene, ne da bi bilo tem organom preprečeno upoštevanje drugih relevantnih vidikov.
The minimal list of qualitative considerations should refer to circumstances indicating that the failure of an institution could have a significant negative effect on financial markets, other institutions or funding conditions.
Minimalni seznam kvalitativnih vidikov bi se moral nanašati na okoliščine, ki kažejo, da bi imel lahko propad institucije znaten negativen učinek na finančne trge, druge institucije ali pogoje financiranja.
In the light of the diverse range of investment firms covered by Directive 2014/59/EU and the need not to pre-empt the ongoing work at Union level on the review of the prudential requirements for those firms, this Regulation should only specify the indicators that competent and resolution authorities should take into account to assess the criterion of size.
Glede na različne vrste investicijskih podjetij, ki jih zajema Direktiva 2014/59/EU, in potrebo, da se ne prepreči sedanje delo na ravni Unije v zvezi s pregledom bonitetnih zahtev za navedena podjetja, bi bilo treba v tej uredbi določiti le kazalnike, ki bi jih pristojni organi in organi za reševanje morali upoštevati pri ocenjevanju merila velikosti.
Those authorities should set the weights assigned to those indicators and determine the relevant thresholds.
Navedeni organi bi morali določiti uteži, dodeljene navedenim kazalnikom, in določiti ustrezne pragove.
An institution belonging to a group subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 111 and 112 of Directive 2013/36/EU (cross-border group) is highly interconnected and its activities are much more complex than those of a stand-alone institution.
Institucija, ki spada v skupino, nad katero se izvaja konsolidiran nadzor v skladu s členoma 111 in 112 Direktive 2013/36/EU (čezmejna skupina), je močno medsebojno povezana in njene dejavnosti so veliko bolj zapletene kot dejavnosti samostojne institucije.
The impact of the failure of an institution belonging to a cross-border group is thus likely to be more significant.
Učinek propada institucije, ki spada v čezmejno skupino, bo torej po vsej verjetnosti znatnejši.
Competent and resolution authorities should therefore conclude that the failure of an institution belonging to a cross-border group would be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, other institutions or funding conditions, where any of the assessments at the level of the individual Member States where the group has a presence concludes so.
Pristojni organi in organi za reševanje bi zato morali zaključiti, da bi imel propad institucije, ki spada v čezmejno skupino, verjetno znaten negativen učinek na finančne trge, druge institucije ali na pogoje financiranja, kadar je to ugotovljeno na podlagi katere koli ocene na ravni posameznih držav članic, v katerih je skupina prisotna.
To achieve this, competent and resolution authorities should coordinate their assessments and exchange all necessary information, within the structure of the Banking Union and within the framework of supervisory and resolution colleges.
Da bi bilo to doseženo, bi morali pristojni organi in organi za reševanje usklajevati svoje ocene in si izmenjevati vse potrebne informacije znotraj strukture bančne unije ter v okviru kolegijev nadzornikov in kolegijev za reševanje.
Competent and resolution authorities should be able to decide that the failure of certain institutions would not be likely to have a significant negative impact as referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, even when their total quantitative score reaches the predetermined threshold.
Pristojni organi in organi za reševanje bi morali imeti možnost, da odločijo, da propad nekaterih institucij verjetno ne bi imel znatnega negativnega učinka, kot je naveden v členu 4(1) Direktive 2014/59/EU, tudi če njihov skupni kvantitativni rezultat dosega vnaprej določeni prag.
That different treatment of those institutions should be justified by their exceptional characteristics.
Navedeno različno obravnavanje navedenih institucij bi moralo biti utemeljeno z njihovimi izjemnimi značilnostmi.
The first such group consists of promotional banks the purpose of which is to advance the public policy objectives of a Member State's central or regional government or local authority through the provision of promotional loans on a non-competitive, not-for-profit basis.
Prvo takšno skupino sestavljajo spodbujevalne banke, katerih namen je pospeševati cilje javne politike enot centralne ali regionalne ravni države članice ali lokalnih organov z zagotavljanjem promocijskih kreditov na nekonkurenčni in neprofitni osnovi.
The loans that those institutions grant are directly or indirectly guaranteed by the central or regional government or the local authority.
Za kredite, ki jih dajejo navedene institucije, neposredno ali posredno jamči enota centralne ali regionalne ravni države ali lokalni organ.
Promotional banks may thus be regarded as institutions the failure of which would not be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, other institutions or funding conditions, provided that conclusion is in line with the qualitative assessment performed for those promotional banks.
Spodbujevalne banke se torej lahko obravnavajo kot institucije, katerih propad verjetno ne bi imel znatnega negativnega učinka na finančne trge, druge institucije ali pogoje financiranja, če je ta zaključek v skladu s kvalitativno oceno, ki je bila opravljena za navedene spodbujevalne banke.
Since an orderly winding-up process in general prevents new business, credit institutions that have been subject to such a process may also be regarded as institutions the failure of which would not be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, other institutions or funding conditions, provided that this is in line with the qualitative assessment performed for those credit institutions.
Zlasti lahko sprejemajo različne odločitve, ko določajo pragove za skupni kvantitativni rezultat, uporabljajo posebno obravnavo za spodbujevalne banke in institucije, ki so predmet postopka prenehanja v skladu s predpisi, ter pridejo do različnih zaključkov o možnosti odobritve poenostavljenih obveznosti.
Having regard to the different purposes of recovery and resolution planning, competent and resolution authorities from the same Member State should be able to reach different conclusions to their assessments performed in accordance with this Regulation.
V teh primerih bi morali pristojni organi in organi za reševanje redno ocenjevati, ali je razlika še vedno upravičena.
In particular, they may make different decisions while setting thresholds for the total quantitative score, applying special treatment for promotional banks and institutions subject to an orderly winding-up process, as well as reach different conclusions on the possibility to grant simplified obligations.
Ta uredba temelji na osnutkih regulativnih tehničnih standardov, ki jih je EBA predložila Komisiji.
In those cases, competent and resolution authorities should regularly assess whether the difference remains justified.
EBA je opravila odprto javno posvetovanje o osnutkih regulativnih tehničnih standardov, na katerih temelji ta uredba, analizirala morebitne povezane stroške in koristi ter prosila za mnenje interesno skupino za bančništvo, ustanovljeno v skladu s členom 37 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010 –
This Regulation is based on the draft regulatory technical standards submitted by EBA to the Commission.
SPREJELA NASLEDNJO UREDBO:
EBA has conducted an open public consultation on the draft regulatory technical standards on which this Regulation is based, analysed the potential related costs and benefits, and requested the opinion of the Banking Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 37 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010,
Člen 1
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Kvantitativna ocena za kreditne institucije
Article 1
Pristojni organi in organi za reševanje ocenijo učinek propada kreditne institucije na finančne trge, druge institucije ali pogoje financiranja na podlagi skupnega kvantitativnega rezultata, izračunanega v skladu s Prilogo I. To oceno izvajajo redno in vsaj vsaki dve leti.
Quantitative assessment for credit institutions
Kreditna institucija, ki ima skupni kvantitativni rezultat enak ali višji od 25 bazičnih točk, se obravnava kot institucija, katere propad bi verjetno imel znaten negativen učinek na finančne trge, druge institucije ali pogoje financiranja.