natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
These studies paint a stark picture of the significant investor protection concern raised by the offer of these CFDs to retail clients.
Na primerih teh slabih praks temelji dokument organa ESMA o vprašanjih in odgovorih v zvezi s ponudbo CFD-jev in drugih špekulativnih produktov malim vlagateljem na podlagi MiFID, v katerem so ti primeri tudi opisani.
The type of clients involved
Pristojni nacionalni organi so v tem sektorju trga ugotovili tudi agresivne prakse trženja in zavajajoča tržna sporočila.
CFDs are marketed, distributed or sold to both retail and professional clients.
Vključujejo na primer uporabo sponzorskih dogovorov ali povezav z večjimi športnimi ekipami, ki dajejo zavajajoč vtis, da so kompleksni in špekulativni produkti, kot so CFD-ji, primerni za množični maloprodajni trg s spodbujanjem splošnega poznavanja blagovne znamke.
However, retail (unlike professional) clients do not normally possess the experience, knowledge and expertise to make investment decisions which properly assess the risks they incur with regard to the complex CFDs that are restricted by this Decision.
Poleg tega vključujejo tudi uporabo zavajajočih izjav, kot so „Trgovanje še nikoli ni bilo tako preprosto“, „Začnite svojo kariero borznega trgovca zdaj“, ali „Zaslužite 13000 GBP v 24 urah!
Indeed, one study in a Member State has indicated that the highest maximum leverage levels were often offered to retail clients, whilst professional clients and eligible counterparties were offered lower maximum leverage levels.
Začnite zdaj“.
Given the evidence of losses observed by ESMA in retail client accounts described in this Decision, it is clear that a significant investor protection concern exists in respect of the unrestricted marketing, distribution or sale of CFDs to this category of client.
V okviru priprave dokumenta z odgovori in vprašanji o CFD-jih so nekateri pristojni nacionalni organi organu ESMA poročali, da ponudniki CFD-jev tveganj teh produktov pogosto ne razkrijejo ustrezno.
Marketing and distribution activities in relation to CFDs
Nekateri pristojni nacionalni organi so ugotovili zlasti, da ponudniki CFD-jev niso ustrezno opisali možnosti za hitre izgube, ki bi lahko presegle njihova vložena sredstva.
Although CFDs are complex products, they are offered to retail clients most commonly via electronic trading platforms, without the provision of investment advice or portfolio management.
V tem okviru so nekateri pristojni nacionalni organi izrazili tudi pomisleke glede „proizvodne“ narave poslovnih modelov nekaterih ponudnikov CFD-jev.
An assessment of appropriateness is required in such cases pursuant to Article 25(3) of Directive 2014/65/EU.
Ker je lahko povprečna življenjska doba računa stranke razmeroma kratka, lahko to povzroča pri ponudnikih pritiske zaradi ohranjanja stalnega pritoka novih strank in jih lahko prisili, da sprejmejo agresivne tržne in prodajne prijeme, ki niso v najboljšem interesu malih vlagateljev.
However, this assessment does not prevent CFD providers or their clients or potential clients proceeding with a transaction, subject to a simple warning to the client.
Skupna značilnost načinov trženja in prodaje, ki jih uporabljajo v panogi CFD-jev, je ponudba (denarnih in nedenarnih) ugodnosti pri trgovanju, kot so bonusi za privabljanje in spodbujanje malih vlagateljev za vlaganje v CFD-je, ponujanje daril (na primer počitnic, avtomobilov in elektronskega blaga), seminarji o trgovanju ali znižani stroški (na primer razmika ali nadomestil).
This can occur where the client has provided no or insufficient information to the provider as to their knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product as well as where the provider has concluded that the product is not appropriate for the client.
Bonusi in druge ugodnosti, s katerimi se trguje, lahko delujejo tako, da odvračajo pozornost od visoko tvegane narave produkta.
This enables retail clients to access products, such as CFDs, which, by their features, should not be distributed to them.
Običajno so namenjeni privabljanju malih vlagateljev in spodbujanju trgovanja.
The UK-FCA observed repeated failings by the approach of CFD providers to completing the appropriateness assessment, including inadequacies in the assessment itself, inadequate risk warnings to retail clients who failed the appropriateness assessments and lack of establishment of a process to assess whether clients who fail the appropriateness assessment, but who nonetheless wish to trade CFDs, should be allowed to proceed with CFD transactions.
Mali vlagatelji lahko te predstavitve upoštevajo kot glavno lastnost produkta, vse dokler niso več sposobni pravilno oceniti stopnje tveganja, povezanega s produktom.
Revisiting this issue in late 2016, the UK-FCA found that a significant number of firms had failed to address these failings following the previous feedback provided to them.
Poleg tega morajo stranke zaradi takih ugodnosti pri trgovanju za odprtje trgovalnega računa s CFD-ji ponudniku pogosto vplačati sredstva in izvesti določeno število poslov v določenem časovnem obdobju.
Furthermore, NCAs have voiced concerns about CFD providers' compliance with their obligations to give clients clear and not misleading information, or act in the best interests of clients.
Ker dokazi kažejo, da večina malih vlagateljev pri trgovanju s CFD-ji izgubi denar, to pogosto pomeni, da stranke izgubijo več denarja pri pogostejšem trgovanju s CFD-ji, kot bi ga, če ne bi prejele dodatne ponudbe.
NCAs have also voiced concerns regarding the inadequate performance of appropriateness tests in practice and inadequate warnings to clients when they fail the appropriateness test.
Nadzor, ki ga je izvedlo več nacionalnih pristojnih organov, je pokazal, da so pogoji pri promocijskih ponudbah pogosto zavajajoči in da številne stranke niso bile seznanjene s pogoji za dostop do ponujenih ugodnosti/bonusov.
Examples of these bad practices are described in and gave rise to ESMA's Questions and Answers relating to the provision of CFDs and other speculative products to retail clients under MiFID
Številne stranke so imele tudi težave pri dvigu sredstev, ko so take bonuse poskušale izkoristiti.
NCAs have also observed aggressive marketing practices as well as misleading marketing communications in this sector of the market.
Poleg dejavnikov, ki so bili opisani, številni pristojni nacionalni organi ugotavljajo, da so pri distribucijskih modelih, ugotovljenih v tem sektorju trga, prisotna nekatera nasprotja interesov.
They include, for example, the use of sponsorship arrangements or affiliations with major sports teams, which give the misleading impression that complex and speculative products such as CFDs are suitable for the retail mass market by promoting general brand name awareness.
Pritisk, da se ohrani stalni dotok novih strank, poveča možnost za pojavitev nasprotij interesov.
Furthermore, they also include the use of misleading statements such as ‘Trading has never been so easy’, ‘Start your career as a trader right now’, ‘Earn GBP 13000 in 24 Hours!
Nasprotja interesov izhajajo in bi lahko izhajala iz dejstva, da so nekateri ponudniki CFD-jev nasprotne stranke poslom strank in ne zavarujejo njihove izpostavljenosti, zaradi česar so njihovi interesi v neposrednem nasprotju z interesi stranke.
Get started’.
Pri teh ponudnikih obstajata večje tveganje in spodbuda za manipulacijo ali uporabo manj preglednih referenčnih cen, ali izvajanje drugih vprašljivih praks, kot je zaključek donosnih poslov pod pretvezo.
In the context of the development of the CFD Q&As, some NCAs have reported to ESMA that CFD providers often fail to adequately disclose the risks of these products.
Obstaja tudi tveganje, da bi ponudniki morda izkoristili asimetrična odstopanja (izgubo zaradi odstopanja bi na primer prenesli na stranko, zadržali pa bi dobiček, dobljen zaradi odstopanja).
In particular, some NCAs found that CFD providers did not adequately describe the potential for rapid losses that could exceed their invested funds.
Ponudniki lahko namerno podaljšajo čas med kotacijo in izvedbo poslov s CFD-ji, da bi še naprej izkoriščali to prakso.
Also in this context, some NCAs have also raised concerns about the ‘churning’ nature of some CFD providers' business models.
Pristojni nacionalni organi so opredelili tudi prakse, pri katerih ponudniki CFD-jev uporabijo asimetrični ali nedosledni pribitek k osnovnemu razmiku.
Because the average life span of a client account can be relatively short, this can place a certain pressure on providers to maintain a steady stream of new clients, which could incentivise providers to adopt aggressive marketing and sales techniques that are not in the retail client's best interests.
Opisane prakse trženja in razširjanja, povezane s CFD-ji, potrjujejo obstoj resnega zadržka glede zaščite vlagateljev v zvezi s temi CFD-ji.
A common feature of marketing and sales techniques adopted by the CFD industry has been the offer of trading (monetary and non-monetary) benefits, such as bonuses to attract and encourage retail clients to invest in CFDs, the offer of gifts (for example holidays, cars, electronic goods), trading tutorials or reduced costs (for example spread or fees).
VELJAVNE OBSTOJEČE REGULATIVNE ZAHTEVE V SKLADU S PRAVOM UNIJE NE UREJAJO UGOTOVLJENEGA RESNEGA ZADRŽKA GLEDE ZAŠČITE VLAGATELJEV (ČLEN 40(2)(b) UREDBE (EU) št. 600/2014)
Bonuses and other trading benefits can act as a distraction from the high-risk nature of the product.
Organ ESMA je v skladu s členom 40(2)(b) Uredbe (EU) št. 600/2014 proučil, ali v veljavnih regulativnih zahtevah v Uniji, ki se uporabljajo za ustrezni finančni instrument ali posel, ta nevarnost ni obravnavana.
They are typically targeted to attract retail clients and incentivise trading.
Veljavne regulativne zahteve, ki se uporabljajo, so določene v Direktivi 2014/65/EU, Uredbi (EU) št. 600/2014 in Uredbi (EU) št. 1286/2014 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta.
Retail clients can consider these promotions as a central product feature to the point they may fail to properly assess the level of risks associated with the product.
Vključujejo zlasti: (i) zahtevo, da strankam zagotovijo ustrezne informacije, iz člena 24(3) in (4) Direktive 2014/65/EU; (ii) zahteve glede primernosti in ustreznosti iz člena 25(2) in (3) Direktive 2014/65/EU; (iii) zahteve glede najboljšega izvrševanja iz člena 27 Direktive 2014/65/EU; (iv) zahteve glede upravljanja produktov iz člena 16(3) in člena 24(2) Direktive 2014/65/EU, in (v) zahteve glede razkritja iz členov od 5 do 14 Uredbe (EU) št. 1286/2014.
Furthermore, such trading benefits to open CFD trading accounts often require clients to pay funds to the provider and conduct a specified number of trades over a specified period of time.
Nekateri ponudniki, borzni posredniki in trgovinske organizacije so v svojih odzivih na poziv k predložitvi dokazov izrecno navedli, da mora organ ESMA obravnavati učinke nove zakonodaje pred začetkom izvajanja intervencijskih ukrepov za produkte, predvsem učinke nedavne uvedbe direktive MiFID II (zlasti pravil glede upravljanja produktov) in PRIIP.
Given that the evidence demonstrates that the majority of retail clients lose money trading CFDs, this often means that clients lose more money from trading CFDs more frequently than they otherwise would have without receiving a bonus offer.
Opozoriti je treba, da sta področje uporabe in vsebina več veljavnih regulativnih zahtev na podlagi Direktive 2014/65/EU in Uredbe (EU) št. 600/2014 podobna tistim iz Direktive 2004/39/ES.
Supervisory work by several NCAs has discovered that the terms and conditions on promotional offers are often misleading and that many clients were unaware of the conditions to access the benefits/bonuses offered.
Medtem ko je bil namen sprejetja Direktive 2014/65/EU in Uredbe (EU) št. 600/2014 izboljšanje več pomembnih vidikov investicijskih storitev in poslov za izboljšanje zaščite vlagateljev (vključno s pooblastili za poseganje v zvezi s produkti), izboljšave številnih ustreznih določb ne obravnavajo določenih zadržkov iz tega sklepa.
Finally, a number of clients reported difficulties in withdrawing funds when trying to use such bonuses.
Z vidika tveganj in škode za vlagatelje, ki ju obravnava ta sklep, je več določb zato ostalo pretežno nespremenjenih.
In addition to the factors outlined above, many NCAs observe that distribution models observed in this sector of the market bear certain conflicts of interest.
Zahteve za predložitev ustreznih informacij strankam so bile podrobneje razložene v Direktivi 2014/65/EU s pomembnim izboljšanjem na področju razkritja stroškov in pristojbin, pri čemer morajo investicijska podjetja strankam predložiti zbirne informacije o vseh stroških in pristojbinah v zvezi z investicijskimi storitvami in finančnimi instrumenti.
The pressure to maintain a pipeline of new clients increases the potential for conflicts of interest to occur.
Vendar samo pravila o razkritju, vključno z izboljšanimi informacijami o stroških, očitno ne zadoščajo za obravnavanje kompleksnega tveganja, ki izhaja iz trženja, razširjanja ali prodaje CFD-jev malim vlagateljem.
Conflicts of interest have and may arise from the fact that some CFD providers are counterparties to clients' trades without hedging their exposure, therefore placing their interests in direct conflict with that of their clients.
Zlasti člen 24(3) Direktive 2014/65/EU med drugim določa, da morajo investicijska podjetja zagotoviti, da so vse informacije, vključno s tržnimi sporočili, ki jih naslovijo na stranke ali potencialne stranke, poštene, jasne in nezavajajoče.
For these providers there is a greater risk and incentive to manipulate or use less transparent reference prices, or to pursue other questionable practices such as cancelling profitable trades on spurious pretexts.
Člen 24(4) Direktive 2014/65/EU nadalje določa, da morajo investicijska podjetja strankam in potencialnim strankam pravočasno zagotoviti ustrezne informacije glede podjetja in njegovih storitev, finančnih instrumentov in predlaganih strategij, mest izvrševanja ter vseh stroškov in povezanih pristojbin, zlasti glede smernic in opozoril glede tveganj, povezanih z vlaganjem v te finančne instrumente, in ali je finančni instrument namenjen malim ali profesionalnim vlagateljem.
There is also a risk that providers may seek to exploit asymmetric slippage (for example pass on any loss as a result of slippage to the client, while retaining any profit obtained as a result of slippage).
Organ ESMA upošteva tudi pomembnost pravil o razkritju iz Uredbe (EU) št. 1286/2014.
Providers may purposefully delay the time between quotes and execution of CFD trades to further exploit this practice.
Uredba (EU) št. 1286/2014 določa enotna pravila o obliki in vsebini dokumenta s ključnimi informacijami, ki ga zagotovijo proizvajalci paketnih naložbenih produktov za male vlagatelje in zavarovalnih naložbenih produktov (PRIIP) malim vlagateljem, da bi jim pomagali razumeti in primerjati ključne dejavnike in tveganja PRIIP.
NCAs have also identified practices whereby CFD providers apply an asymmetrical or inconsistent mark up to core spreads.
Zlasti člen 5 Uredbe (EU) št. 1286/2014, kot se dodatno izvaja v Delegirani uredbi Komisije (EU) 2017/653, med drugim določa metodologijo za prikaz zbirnega kazalnika tveganja in spremnih pojasnil, tudi glede tega, ali lahko mali vlagatelj izgubi ves vloženi kapital ali ima dodatne finančne obveznosti.
The marketing and distribution practices associated with CFDs described above confirms the existence of a significant investor protection concern in respect of these CFDs.
Vendar s to vrsto razkritja mali vlagatelji niso ustrezno opozorjeni na posledice vlaganja zlasti v CFD-je.
APPLICABLE EXISTING REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER UNION LAW DO NOT ADDRESS THE SIGNIFICANT INVESTOR PROTECTION CONCERN IDENTIFIED (ARTICLE 40(2)(b) OF REGULATION (EU) No 600/2014)
Razmerje uspešnosti se na primer nanaša le na posamezni CFD, kar pa stranki ne razkrije skupnega deleža računov malih vlagateljev, ki pri trgovanju s CFD-ji izgubijo denar.
As required under Article 40(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 600/2014, ESMA has considered whether existing regulatory requirements in the Union that are applicable to the relevant financial instrument or activity do not address the threat.
Poleg tega zbirni kazalnik tveganja ne vključuje neposrednih informacij o pretekli uspešnosti produkta, te informacije pa morda niso vključene v spremne pojasnjevalne opise, saj se proizvajalec PRIIP lahko sam odloči glede obsega, v katerem bi bilo treba vključiti nekatera pojasnila.
The applicable existing regulatory requirements are set out in Directive 2014/65/EU, Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
Organ ESMA je proučil, ali bi lahko bili v navedenih zahtevah obravnavani nekateri ali vsi zadržki v zvezi s trženjem, distribucijo ali prodajo CFD-jev malim vlagateljem ali vsaj odpravljena potreba po vključitvi opozoril o tveganju v ta sklep.
In particular, they include: (i) the requirement to provide appropriate information to clients in Article 24(3) and (4) of Directive 2014/65/EU; (ii) the suitability and appropriateness requirements in Article 25(2) and (3) of Directive 2014/65/EU; (iii) the best execution requirements in Article 27 of Directive 2014/65/EU; (iv) the product governance requirements in Articles 16(3) and 24(2) of Directive 2014/65/EU; and (v) the disclosure requirements in Articles 5 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014.
Vendar te zahteve ne zagotavljajo, da se malim vlagateljem po celotni Uniji zagotovijo enotne in učinkovite informacije o tveganjih v zvezi s trgovanjem s CFD-ji.
Some providers, brokers and trade organisations explicitly mentioned in their responses to the call for evidence that ESMA needs to consider the effects of new legislation before applying any product intervention measures, notably the recent introduction of MiFID II (in particular, the product governance rules) and PRIIPs.
Zlasti se zdi, da ti zadržki niso obravnavani v navodilih in opozorilih iz člena 24(4) Direktive 2014/65/EU glede na različne informacije, ki se lahko zagotovijo strankam in s katerimi stranke morda niso ustrezno opozorjene na konkretne posledice, ki izhajajo iz trgovanja s CFD-ji.
It should be noted that the scope and content of several applicable regulatory requirements under Directive 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 are similar to those existing under Directive 2004/39/EC.
Opozorila o tveganju, vključena v ta sklep, bi malim vlagateljem zagotovila pomembne informacije, tj. delež računov malih vlagateljev, ki so izgubili denar pri trgovanju s CFD-ji prek posameznega podjetja.
While the adoption of Directive 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 aimed to improve several notable aspects of investment services and activities to strengthen investor protection (including through product intervention powers), the improvements in a number of relevant provisions do not address the specific concerns described in this Decision.
Poleg tega bi se uskladile prakse pri čezmejnem poslovanju, s čimer bi se vlagateljem po celotni Uniji zagotovila enaka raven informacij.
From the perspective of the risks and the investor detriment addressed in this Decision, several provisions have therefore remained substantially unchanged.
Zahteve glede ustreznosti so bile okrepljene tudi v Direktivi 2014/65/EU z zahtevo po zagotovitvi poročila o ustreznosti za stranko in podrobnejši opredelitvi ocene ustreznosti.
The requirements to provide appropriate information to clients have been further detailed in Directive 2014/65/EU, with a significant improvement in the area of the disclosure of costs and charges, with investment firms required to provide clients with aggregated information on all costs and charges in connection with the investment services and the financial instruments.
Zlasti člen 25(2) Direktive 2014/65/EU določa, da morajo ponudniki CFD-jev pridobiti potrebne informacije v zvezi z znanjem in izkušnjami stranke ali potencialne stranke na investicijskem področju, med drugim glede na specifično vrsto produkta, finančni položaj stranke ali potencialne stranke, kar vključuje njeno zmožnost kritja izgub, in njene naložbene cilje, vključno s stopnjo dovoljenega tveganja, da bi ponudnik CFD-jev stranki ali potencialni stranki lahko priporočil finančne produkte, ki so primerni zanjo in so v skladu z njenim dovoljenim tveganjem in njeno zmožnostjo kritja izgub.
However, disclosure-based rules alone — including improved information on costs — are clearly insufficient to tackle the complex risk arising from the marketing, distribution or sale of CFDs to retail clients.
Vendar se zahteve o primernosti uporabljajo le za zagotavljanje investicijskega svetovanja ali upravljanja portfeljev, zato običajno niso pomembne za trgovanje s CFD-ji, ki večinoma poteka prek elektronskih platform ter brez zagotavljanja investicijskega svetovanja ali upravljanja portfeljev.
In particular, Article 24(3) of Directive 2014/65/EU requires inter alia investment firms to ensure that all information, including marketing communications, addressed to clients or potential clients is fair, clear and not misleading.
Poleg tega so cilji ocene ustreznosti (ob upoštevanju produktov glede na znanje in izkušnje, finančni položaj in investicijske cilje stranke) pretežno nespremenjeni v primerjavi z režimom iz Direktive 2004/39/ES in, kot je razvidno iz tega sklepa, niso zadostni, da bi se bilo mogoče izogniti ugotovljeni škodi za vlagatelja.
Article 24(4) of Directive 2014/65/EU further requires investment firms to give appropriate information in good time to clients and potential clients with regard to the firm and its services, the financial instruments and proposed strategies, execution venues and all costs and related charges, including notably guidance on and warnings of the risks associated with investing in those financial instruments and whether the financial instrument is intended for retail or professional clients.
Podobno je Direktiva 2014/65/EU okrepila zahteve glede ustreznosti, zlasti z zoženjem seznama nekompleksnih produktov in posledično z omejitvijo obsega produktov za storitve, namenjene zgolj izvrševanju.
ESMA has also taken into consideration the relevance of the disclosure rules under Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014.
Člen 25(3) Direktive 2014/65/EU določa, da morajo ponudniki CFD-jev svoje stranke ali potencialne stranke prositi, da jim posredujejo informacije v zvezi z njihovim znanjem in izkušnjami na investicijskem področju, med drugim glede specifičnih ponujenih ali zahtevanih produktov, da bi ponudnik lahko ugotovil, ali produkt ustreza stranki ali potencialni stranki.
Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 lays down uniform rules on the format and content of the key information document to be provided by manufacturers of packaged retail and insurance based investment products (‘PRIIPs’) to retail investors in order to help them understand and compare the key features and risks of a PRIIP.
Če ponudnik meni, da produkt ni ustrezen za stranko ali potencialno stranko, jo mora na to opozoriti.
In particular, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014, as further implemented in the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 sets out inter alia a methodology for the presentation of the summary risk indicator and accompanying explanations including whether the retail investor can lose all invested capital or incur additional financial commitments.
CFD-ji sodijo med kompleksne finančne produkte, zato je treba zanje opraviti preizkus ustreznosti v skladu s členom 25(3) Direktive 2014/65/EU.
However, this type of disclosure does not sufficiently draw retail clients' attention to the consequences of investing in CFDs in particular.
Vendar pa je to veljajo že v Direktivi 2004/39/ES, ki je predlagala skoraj enak preizkus ustreznosti kot Direktiva 2014/65/EU.
For example, the performance ratio only relates to the individual CFD product and this does not provide the client with the overall percentage of retail client accounts that lose money when trading CFDs.
Kot je razvidno iz tega sklepa in kot dokazujejo nadzorne izkušnje pristojnih nacionalnih organov, preizkus ustreznosti ne zadošča za obravnavanje zadržka glede zaščite vlagateljev, opisanega v tem sklepu.