natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This is because this Directive covers not only the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the application of national competition law in parallel to those Articles, but also covers the gaps and limitations in the tools and guarantees of NCAs needed to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, because such gaps and limitations negatively affect both competition and the proper functioning of the internal market.
Direktiva namreč ne zajema le uporabe členov 101 in 102 PDEU ter uporabe nacionalnega konkurenčnega prava vzporedno z navedenima členoma, ampak zajema tudi vrzeli in omejitve pri orodjih in jamstvih NOK, potrebnih za uporabo členov 101 in 102 PDEU, saj takšne vrzeli in omejitve negativno vplivajo na konkurenco in na pravilno delovanje notranjega trga.
Putting in place fundamental guarantees to ensure that NCAs apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU uniformly and effectively should be without prejudice to the ability of Member States to maintain or introduce more extensive guarantees of independence and resources for national administrative competition authorities and more detailed rules on the enforcement and fining powers of NCAs.
Vzpostavitev temeljnih jamstev za zagotovitev, da NOK enotno in učinkovito uporabljajo člena 101 in 102 PDEU, ne bi smela posegati v zmožnost držav članic, da ohranijo ali uvedejo obsežnejša jamstva za neodvisno delovanje in vire za nacionalne upravne organe, pristojne za konkurenco, ter podrobnejša pravila o pooblastilih NOK za uveljavljanje pravil konkurence in izrek glob.
In particular, Member States should be able to endow NCAs with additional powers beyond the core set provided for in this Directive to further enhance their effectiveness, such as powers to impose fines on natural persons or, by way of exception, the power to carry out inspections with the consent of those subject to inspection.
Zlasti bi morale imeti države članice možnost, da poleg temeljnega nabora pooblastil, določenega v tej direktivi, NOK podelijo dodatna pooblastila, da bi še bolj povečale njihovo učinkovitost, kot so pooblastila za izrek glob fizičnim osebam ali izjemoma pooblastilo za opravljanje pregledov s privolitvijo oseb, ki so predmet pregleda.
Conversely, detailed rules are necessary in the area of conditions for granting leniency for secret cartels.
Nasprotno pa so potrebna podrobna pravila na področju pogojev za odobritev prizanesljivosti v zvezi s skrivnimi karteli.
Undertakings will only disclose secret cartels in which they have participated if they have sufficient legal certainty that they will benefit from immunity from fines.
Podjetja bodo razkrila skrivne kartele, v katerih so bila udeležena, le če bodo imela zadostno pravno varnost, da jim bo priznana odpustitev glob.
The marked differences between the leniency programmes in the Member States lead to legal uncertainty for potential leniency applicants.
Opazne razlike med programi prizanesljivosti v državah članicah vodijo do pravne negotovosti za morebitne prijavitelje za prizanesljivost.
This may weaken their incentives to apply for leniency.
To bi lahko oslabilo spodbude zanje, da bi vložili prijavo za prizanesljivost.
If Member States were able to implement or apply clearer and harmonised rules for leniency in the area covered by this Directive, this would not only contribute to the objective of maintaining incentives for applicants to disclose secret cartels, in order to render competition enforcement in the Union as effective as possible, but would also guarantee a level playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market.
Če bi lahko države članice izvajale ali uporabljale jasnejša in bolj usklajena pravila za prizanesljivost na področju, ki ga zajema ta direktiva, to ne bi le prispevalo k cilju ohranjanja spodbud za prijavitelje, da razkrijejo skrite kartele, z namenom čim bolj učinkovitega uveljavljanja pravil konkurence v Uniji, temveč bi tudi zagotovilo enake konkurenčne pogoje za podjetja, ki poslujejo na notranjem trgu.
This should not prevent Member States from applying leniency programmes that cover not only secret cartels, but also other infringements of Article 101 TFEU and equivalent provisions of national competition law, or from accepting leniency applications from natural persons acting in their own name.
To državam članicam ne bi smelo preprečevati, da bi uporabljale programe prizanesljivosti, ki ne zajemajo le skrivnih kartelov, ampak tudi druge kršitve člena 101 PDEU ter enakovrednih določb nacionalnega konkurenčnega prava, ali da bi sprejele prijave za prizanesljivost, ki jih vložijo fizične osebe v svojem imenu.
This Directive should also be without prejudice to leniency programmes that exclusively provide for immunity from sanctions in criminal judicial proceedings for the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU.
Ta direktiva poleg tega ne bi smela posegati v programe prizanesljivosti, ki izključno zagotavljajo imuniteto pred sankcijami v kazenskih sodnih postopkih, ki zadevajo uveljavljanje člena 101 PDEU.
This Directive should not apply to national laws insofar as they provide for the imposition of criminal sanctions on natural persons, with the exception of the rules governing the interplay of leniency programmes with the imposition of sanctions on natural persons.
Ta direktiva se ne bi smela uporabljati za nacionalno pravo, če slednje določa izrek kazenskih sankcij fizičnim osebam, z izjemo pravil, ki urejajo povezanost programov prizanesljivosti z izrekom sankcij fizičnim osebam.
It also should not apply to national laws that provide for the imposition of administrative sanctions on natural persons that do not operate as an independent economic actor on a market.
Prav tako se ne bi smela uporabljati za nacionalno pravo, ki določa izrek upravnih sankcij fizičnim osebam, ki ne delujejo kot neodvisen gospodarski akter na trgu.
Pursuant to Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, Member States can entrust the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU exclusively to an administrative authority, as is the case in most jurisdictions, or they can entrust this to both judicial and administrative authorities.
Na podlagi člena 35 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 lahko države članice uveljavljanje členov 101 in 102 PDEU zaupajo izključno upravnemu organu, kot velja v večini jurisdikcij, ali pa lahko to zaupajo pravosodnemu in upravnemu organu.
In the latter case, the administrative authority is at least primarily responsible for conducting the investigation, while the judicial authority is typically entrusted with the power to take decisions imposing fines and can have the power to take other decisions, such as finding an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
V slednjih primerih je upravni organ v prvi vrsti pristojen najmanj za izvedbo preiskave, pravosodni organ pa je običajno pooblaščen za odločanje o izreku glob in je lahko pooblaščen tudi za sprejemanje drugih odločb, kot je na primer ugotavljanje kršitev členov 101 in 102 PDEU.
The exercise of the powers, conferred by this Directive on NCAs, including the investigative powers, should be subject to appropriate safeguards which at least comply with the general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular in the context of proceedings which could give rise to the imposition of penalties.
Pri izvajanju pristojnosti, ki jih ta direktiva podeljuje NOK, vključno s preiskovalnimi pooblastili, bi morali veljati ustrezni zaščitni ukrepi, ki spoštujejo vsaj splošna načela prava Unije in Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Listina), v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča Evropske unije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sodišče), zlasti v okviru postopkov, ki bi lahko privedli do izreka kazni.
These safeguards include the right to good administration and the respect of undertakings' rights of defence, an essential component of which is the right to be heard.
Ti zaščitni ukrepi vključujejo pravico do dobrega upravljanja in spoštovanje pravic obrambe podjetij, katerih bistven sestavni del je pravica do izjave.
In particular, NCAs should inform the parties under investigation of the preliminary objections raised against them under Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU in the form of a statement of objections or a similar measure prior to taking a decision finding an infringement, and those parties should have an opportunity to make their views on those objections known effectively before such a decision is taken.
Zlasti bi morali NOK stranke, ki so predmet preiskave, še pred sprejetjem odločbe, s katero je ugotovljena kršitev, s povzetkom ugotovitev o domnevnih kršitvah ali podobnim ukrepom obvestiti o predhodnih ugotovitvah o domnevnih kršitvah, podanih zoper njih v skladu s členom 101 ali 102 PDEU, zadevne stranke pa bi morale imeti priložnost, da učinkovito predstavijo svoja stališča o teh ugotovitvah, preden je takšna odločba sprejeta.
The right to access the file should be subject to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets and should not extend to confidential information and internal documents of, and correspondence between, the NCAs and the Commission.
Takšne odločbe bi morale biti obrazložene, da se lahko njihovi naslovniki seznanijo z njenimi razlogi in uveljavljajo svojo pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva.
Moreover, for decisions of NCAs, in particular those decisions finding an infringement of Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU, and imposing remedies or fines, the addressees should have the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Poleg tega bi morale države članice v skladu s pravico do dobrega upravljanja zagotoviti, da NOK pri uporabi členov 101 in 102 PDEU izvajajo postopke v razumnem časovnem okviru, ob upoštevanju posebnosti vsake zadeve.
Such decisions should be reasoned so as to allow addressees of such decisions to ascertain the reasons for the decision and to exercise their right to an effective remedy.
Navedene zaščitne ukrepe bi bilo treba oblikovati tako, da bi zagotovili ravnovesje med spoštovanjem temeljnih pravic podjetij in dolžnostjo, da se zagotovi učinkovito uveljavljanje členov 101 in 102 PDEU.
Moreover, in accordance with the right to good administration, Member States should ensure that, when applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, NCAs conduct proceedings within a reasonable timeframe, taking into account the specificities of each case.
Izmenjava informacij med NOK in uporaba takih informacij kot dokaz za namene uporabe člena 101 ali člena 102 PDEU bi morala potekati na podlagi člena 12 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003.
The design of those safeguards should strike a balance between the respect of the fundamental rights of undertakings and the duty to ensure that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are effectively enforced.
Krepitev vloge nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, z namenom nepristranske uporabe členov 101 in 102 PDEU ter v skupnem interesu učinkovitega uveljavljanja pravil konkurence Unije je bistven sestavni del učinkovite in enotne uporabe teh pravil.
The exchange of information between NCAs, and the use of such information in evidence for the application of Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU, should be carried out pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
Neodvisnost delovanja nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, bi bilo treba okrepiti, da bi se zagotovila učinkovita in enotna uporaba členov 101 in 102 PDEU.
Empowering national administrative competition authorities to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU impartially and in the common interest of the effective enforcement of the Union competition rules is an essential component of the effective and uniform application of those rules.
V ta namen bi bilo treba v nacionalnem pravu predpisati izrecno določbo, ki bi zagotavljala, da so nacionalni upravni organi, pristojni za konkurenco, pri uporabi členov 101 in 102 PDEU zaščiteni pred zunanjimi posegi ali političnim pritiskom, ki bi lahko ogrozili neodvisno presojo zadev v njihovi obravnavi.
The operational independence of national administrative competition authorities should be strengthened in order to ensure the effective and uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
Zato bi bilo treba v nacionalnem pravu vnaprej določiti razloge, na podlagi katerih se razrešijo osebe, ki v okviru nacionalnega upravnega organa, pristojnega za konkurenco, sprejemajo odločbe, s katerimi se izvajajo pooblastila iz členov 10 do 13 in člena 16 te direktive, da bi se odpravil kakršen koli razumni dvom o njihovi nepristranskosti in nedovzetnosti za zunanje dejavnike.
To this end, express provision should be made in national law to ensure that when applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, national administrative competition authorities are protected against external intervention or political pressure that is liable to jeopardise their independent assessment of the matters before them.
Podobno bi bilo treba v nacionalnem pravu vnaprej določiti jasna in pregledna pravila in postopke za izbor, zaposlitev ali imenovanje zadevnih oseb.
For that purpose, the grounds regarding the dismissal from the national administrative competition authority of those persons who take decisions exercising the powers referred to in Articles 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16 of this Directive should be laid down in advance in national law in order to remove any reasonable doubt as to their impartiality and their imperviousness to external factors.
Za zagotovitev nepristranskosti nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, se globe, ki jih ti organi izrečejo za kršitve členov 101 in 102 PDEU, ne bi smele neposredno uporabljati za financiranje teh organov.
Similarly, clear and transparent rules and procedures for the selection, recruitment or appointment of those persons should be laid down in advance in national law.
Da bi se zagotovila neodvisnost delovanja nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, bi morali njihovi vodilni zaposleni, osebje in tisti, ki sprejemajo odločitve, delovati neoporečno in se vzdržati vsakršnega ravnanja, ki bi bilo nezdružljivo z opravljanjem njihovih nalog.
Moreover, to ensure the impartiality of national administrative competition authorities, the fines that they impose for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU should not be used to finance these authorities directly.
Da ne bi bila ogrožena neodvisna presoja vodilnih zaposlenih, osebja in tistih, ki sprejemajo odločitve, bi se morali ti v času svoje zaposlitve ali mandata ter za razumno obdobje po tem vzdržati vseh nezdružljivih ravnanj, tako pridobitnih kot nepridobitnih.
To ensure the operational independence of national administrative competition authorities, their heads, staff and those who take decisions should act with integrity and refrain from any action which is incompatible with the performance of their duties.
To pomeni, da osebju in tistim, ki sprejemajo odločitve, v času njihove zaposlitve ali mandata ne bi smelo biti omogočeno, da sodelujejo v postopkih za uporabo člena 101 ali 102 PDEU, v katere so bili vključeni ali ki se neposredno nanašajo na podjetja ali podjetniška združenja, v katerih so bili zaposleni ali s katerimi so drugače poklicno sodelovali, če bi to lahko ogrozilo njihovo nepristranskost v konkretni zadevi.
To prevent the independent assessment by heads, staff and those who take decisions from being jeopardised, they should refrain from any incompatible actions, whether gainful or not, both during their employment or term of office and for a reasonable period thereafter.
Podobno osebje in tisti, ki sprejemajo odločitve, ter njihovi bližnji sorodniki ne bi smeli imeti interesa v zvezi s podjetji ali organizacijami, v zvezi s katerimi se izvajajo postopki za uporabo člena 101 ali 102 PDEU, v katere so vključeni, če bi to lahko ogrozilo njihovo nepristranskost v konkretni zadevi.
This means that during their employment or their term of office, the staff and those who take decisions should not be able to deal with proceedings for the application of Article 101 or 102 TFEU in which they have been involved or which directly concern undertakings or associations of undertakings by which they have been employed or otherwise professionally engaged, if this has the potential to compromise their impartiality in a specific case.
Pri oceni, ali bi bila v posamezni zadevi njihova nepristranskost lahko ogrožena, bi bilo treba upoštevati naravo in obseg interesa ter raven vključenosti ali udejstvovanja zadevnega posameznika.
Similarly, the staff and those who take decisions, as well as their close relatives, should not have any interest in any businesses or organisations which are subject to proceedings for the application of Article 101 or 102 TFEU in which they take part, if this has the potential to compromise their impartiality in a specific case.
Kadar je treba zagotoviti nepristranskost preiskave in postopka odločanja, bi se moral zadevni posameznik izločiti iz konkretne zadeve.
The assessment of whether their impartiality might be impaired in a specific case should take into account the nature and the magnitude of the interest and the level of involvement or engagement of the individual concerned.
To tudi pomeni, da v razumnem obdobju po zapustitvi nacionalnega upravnega organa, pristojnega za konkurenco, nekdanje osebje ali tisti, ki so sprejemali odločitve, kadar vstopajo v zaposlitev, povezano s postopki za uporabo člena 101 ali 102 PDEU, v katerih so sodelovali v času svoje zaposlitve ali mandata, v okviru svoje nove zaposlitve ne bi smeli biti vključeni v isto zadevo.
Where it is necessary to ensure the impartiality of the investigation and the decision-making process, the individual concerned should be required to recuse herself or himself from the specific case.
Pri določanju dolžine tega obdobja bi se lahko upoštevala narava nove zaposlitve zadevnih posameznikov ter raven njihove vključenosti in odgovornosti v istih postopkih v času njihove zaposlitve ali mandata v nacionalnem upravnem organu, pristojnem za konkurenco.
This also means that, for a reasonable period after leaving the national administrative competition authority, whenever former staff or those who took decisions engage in an occupation which is related to the proceedings for the application of Article 101 or 102 TFEU with which they were dealing during their employment or term of office, they should not be involved in the same case in their new occupation.
Vsak nacionalni upravni organ, pristojen za konkurenco, bi moral objaviti kodeks ravnanja, ki brez poseganja v uporabo strožjih nacionalnih pravil zajema pravila glede nasprotij interesov.
The length of that period might be determined by taking into account the nature of the new occupation of the individuals concerned as well as the level of their involvement and responsibility in the same proceedings during their employment or term in office in the national administrative competition authority.
Neodvisnost delovanja nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, ne bi smela izključevati sodne presoje ali parlamentarnega nadzora v skladu z nacionalnim pravom.
Every national administrative competition authority should publish a code of conduct that, without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules, covers rules on conflicts of interest.
Zahteve glede odgovornosti bi morale prispevati tudi k zagotavljanju verodostojnosti in legitimnosti ukrepov nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco.
The operational independence of national administrative competition authorities should not preclude either judicial review or parliamentary supervision in accordance with national law.
Sorazmerne zahteve glede odgovornosti vključujejo objavo rednih poročil o dejavnostih nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, ki se predložijo vladnemu ali parlamentarnemu organu.
Accountability requirements should also contribute to ensuring the credibility and the legitimacy of the actions of national administrative competition authorities.
Nadzirali ali spremljali bi se lahko tudi njihovi finančni odhodki, če to ne bi vplivalo na neodvisnost nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco.
Proportionate accountability requirements include the publication by national administrative competition authorities of periodic reports on their activities to a governmental or parliamentary body.
Nacionalni upravni organi, pristojni za konkurenco, bi morali imeti možnost, da prednostno razporejajo svoje postopke za uveljavljanje členov 101 in 102 PDEU, da učinkovito uporabljajo svoje vire ter da se lahko osredotočijo na preprečevanje in odpravo protikonkurenčnega ravnanja, ki izkrivlja konkurenco na notranjem trgu.
National administrative competition authorities might also be subject to control or monitoring of their financial expenditure, provided this does not affect their independence.
V ta namen bi morali imeti možnost zavreči pritožbe z utemeljitvijo, da ne spada med njihove prednostne naloge, razen pritožb, ki jih vložijo javni organi, ki si pristojnost za uveljavljanje členov 101 in 102 PDEU in nacionalnega konkurenčnega prava delijo z nacionalnim upravnim organom, pristojnim za konkurenco, kjer je to ustrezno.
National administrative competition authorities should be able to prioritise their proceedings for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to make effective use of their resources, and to allow them to focus on preventing and bringing anti-competitive behaviour that distorts competition in the internal market to an end.
To ne bi smelo posegati v pristojnost nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, da zavržejo pritožbe iz drugih razlogov, kot je nepristojnost, ali da odločijo, da ni nobene podlage za njihovo ukrepanje.
For this purpose, they should be able to reject complaints on the grounds that they are not a priority, with the exception of complaints lodged by public authorities which share competence with a national administrative competition authority for enforcing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and national competition law, where applicable.
Tako zavrženje bi moralo biti v primeru formalno vložene pritožbe predmet učinkovitih pravnih sredstev v skladu z nacionalnim pravom.
This should be without prejudice to the power of national administrative competition authorities to reject complaints on other grounds, such as a lack of competence, or to decide that there are no grounds for action on their part.
Pristojnost nacionalnih upravnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, da prednostno razporejajo svoje postopke za uveljavljanje pravil konkurence, ne posega v pravico vlade države članice, da za nacionalne upravne organe, pristojne za konkurenco, izda splošna pravila politik ali smernice glede prednostnih nalog, ki niso povezane s sektorskimi raziskavami ali s posebnimi postopki za uveljavljanje členov 101 in 102 PDEU.
In cases of formally filed complaints, such rejections should be subject to effective remedies in accordance with national law.
NOK bi morali imeti zadostne vire v smislu usposobljenega osebja, ki je zmožno opravljati kompetentne pravne in ekonomske ocene, finančnih sredstev, tehničnega in tehnološkega strokovnega znanja in opreme, vključno z ustreznimi orodji informacijske tehnologije, za zagotovitev, da lahko učinkovito opravljajo svoje naloge pri uporabi členov 101 in 102 PDEU.
The power of national administrative competition authorities to prioritise their enforcement proceedings is without prejudice to the right of a government of a Member State to issue to national administrative competition authorities general policy rules or priority guidelines that are not related to sector inquiries or specific proceedings for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
Če se naloge in pristojnosti NOK v skladu z nacionalnim pravom razširijo, bi morale države članice zagotoviti, da imajo NOK ustrezne vire za učinkovito opravljanje teh nalog.