natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Where, in the course of proceedings which might lead to an agreement or a practice being prohibited, undertakings or associations of undertakings offer NCAs commitments which meet their concerns, these NCAs should be able to adopt decisions which make these commitments binding on, and enforceable against, the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned.
V odločbah o zavezah bi moralo biti ugotovljeno, da ni več nobenih razlogov za ukrepanje s strani NOK, brez ugotovitve, ali je šlo za kršitev člena 101 ali 102 PDEU ali ne.
In principle, such commitment decisions are not appropriate in the case of secret cartels, in respect of which NCAs should impose fines.
NOK bi morali sami presoditi, ali sprejmejo zaveze.
Commitment decisions should find that there are no longer grounds for action by the NCAs, without reaching a conclusion as to whether there has been an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.
Odločbe o zavezah ne posegajo v pristojnosti organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, in nacionalnih sodišč, da ugotovijo kršitev in odločijo o primeru.
It should be at the discretion of NCAs whether to accept commitments.
Poleg tega so se učinkovita sredstva za spremljanje, ali podjetja ali podjetniška združenja upoštevajo zaveze, in učinkovita sredstva za izrek sankcij v primeru neupoštevanja izkazala za učinkovita orodja za organe, pristojne za konkurenco.
Commitment decisions are without prejudice to the powers of competition authorities and national courts to make such a finding of an infringement and decide upon a case.
NOK bi morali imeti učinkovita sredstva za ponovni začetek postopka, če se je bistveno spremenilo katero od dejstev, na katerih je temeljila odločba o zavezi, kadar podjetje ali podjetniško združenje ravna v nasprotju s svojimi zavezami, ali kadar je odločba o zavezi temeljila na nepopolnih, nepravilnih ali zavajajočih informacijah, ki so jih zagotovile stranke.
Moreover, effective means of monitoring compliance by undertakings or associations of undertakings with commitments and effective means of imposing sanctions in cases of non-compliance have proven to be effective tools for competition authorities.
Za zagotovitev učinkovitega in enotnega uveljavljanja členov 101 in 102 PDEU bi morali imeti nacionalni upravni organi, pristojni za konkurenco, pooblastila za izrek učinkovitih, sorazmernih in odvračilnih glob podjetjem in podjetniškim združenjem zaradi kršitev člena 101 ali 102 PDEU, bodisi neposredno sami v okviru lastnih postopkov, zlasti v upravnih postopkih, pod pogojem, da taki nacionalni postopki omogočajo neposreden izrek učinkovitih, sorazmernih in odvračilnih glob, bodisi z zahtevkom za izrek glob v nekazenskem sodnem postopku.
NCAs should have effective means for the reopening of proceedings in cases where there have been material changes to any of the facts on which a commitment decision was based, where the undertaking or association of undertakings acted contrary to their commitments, or where a commitment decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the parties.
To ne posega v nacionalno zakonodajo, ki določa izrek sankcij podjetjem in podjetniškim združenjem s strani sodišč v kazenskih postopkih zaradi kršitve členov 101 in 102 PDEU, kadar se kršitev po nacionalnem pravu šteje za kaznivo dejanje ter ne vpliva na učinkovito in enotno uveljavljanje členov 101 in 102 PDEU.
To ensure the effective and uniform enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, national administrative competition authorities should have the power to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive fines on undertakings and associations of undertakings for infringements of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, either directly themselves in their own proceedings, in particular in administrative proceedings, provided that such proceedings enable the direct imposition of effective, proportionate and dissuasive fines, or by seeking the imposition of fines in non-criminal judicial proceedings.
Za zagotovitev, da imajo podjetja in podjetniška združenja interes upoštevati preiskovalne ukrepe in odločbe NOK, bi morali nacionalni upravni organi, pristojni za konkurenco, imeti možnost, da izrečejo učinkovite globe za neupoštevanje ukrepov in odločb iz člena 6 ter členov 8 do 12, in sicer bodisi neposredno sami v lastnem postopku bodisi z zahtevkom za izrek glob v nekazenskem sodnem postopku.
This is without prejudice to national laws which provide for the imposition of sanctions on undertakings and associations of undertakings by courts in criminal proceedings for the infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU where the infringement is a criminal offence under national law and provided that it does not affect the effective and uniform enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
To ne posega v nacionalno pravo, ki določa izrek takšnih glob podjetjem in podjetniškim združenjem s strani sodišč v kazenskem sodnem postopku.
To ensure that undertakings and associations of undertakings have incentives to comply with the investigative measures and decisions of the NCAs, national administrative competition authorities should be able either to impose effective fines for non-compliance with the measures and decisions referred to in Articles 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 directly themselves in their own proceedings or to seek the imposition of fines in non-criminal judicial proceedings.
V skladu z Listino bi bilo treba v postopkih pred nacionalnimi upravnimi organi, pristojnimi za konkurenco, ali, odvisno od primera, v nekazenskih sodnih postopkih globe izreči, kadar je kršitev storjena naklepno ali iz malomarnosti.
This is without prejudice to national law which provide for the imposition of such fines on undertakings and associations of undertakings by courts in criminal judicial proceedings.
Pojma naklep in malomarnost bi bilo treba razlagati v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča glede uporabe členov 101 in 102 PDEU in ne kot pojma naklep in malomarnost v postopkih, ki jih v okviru kazenskih zadev vodijo organi kazenskega pravosodja.
In accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in proceedings before national administrative competition authorities or, as the case may be, in non-criminal judicial proceedings, fines should be imposed where the infringement has been committed intentionally or negligently.
To ne posega v nacionalno zakonodajo, po kateri ugotovitev kršitve temelji na merilu objektivne odgovornosti, pod pogojem, da je skladno s sodno prakso Sodišča.
The notions of intent and negligence should be interpreted in line with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and not in line with the notions of intent and negligence in proceedings conducted by criminal authorities relating to criminal matters.
Ta direktiva ne vpliva na nacionalna pravila o dokaznem standardu ali na obveznosti NOK, da preverjajo dejstva zadevnega primera, pod pogojem, da so takšna pravila in obveznosti skladni s splošnimi načeli prava Unije.
This is without prejudice to national laws under which the finding of an infringement is based on the criterion of objective liability, provided that it is compatible with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Globe bi bilo treba določiti glede na skupni svetovni promet zadevnih podjetij in podjetniških združenj.
This Directive does not affect national rules on the standard of proof or the obligations of NCAs to ascertain the facts of the relevant case, provided that such rules and obligations are compatible with general principles of Union law.
Periodične denarne kazni so ključno orodje, s katerim se zagotavlja, da imajo NOK na voljo učinkovita sredstva za obravnavo trenutnega in prihodnjega neupoštevanja njihovih ukrepov in odločb iz člena 6 ter členov 8 do 12 s strani podjetij in podjetniških združenj.
Fines should be determined in proportion to the total worldwide turnover of the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned.
Ne bi se smele uporabljati za ugotovljene kršitve, ki so bile storjene v preteklosti.
Periodic penalty payments are a key tool to ensure that NCAs have effective means to tackle continuing and future non-compliance by undertakings and associations of undertakings with their measures and decisions as referred to in Articles 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
Pooblastilo za izrekanje periodičnih denarnih kazni ne posega v pooblastilo NOK, da kaznujejo neupoštevanje ukrepov iz člena 13(2).
They should not apply to findings of infringements that have been committed in the past.
Take periodične denarne kazni bi bilo treba določiti glede na povprečni dnevni skupni svetovni promet zadevnih podjetij in podjetniških združenj.
The power to impose periodic penalty payments is without prejudice to the power of NCAs to punish non-compliance with the measures referred to in Article 13(2).
Za namene izreka glob in periodičnih denarnih kazni bi moral pojem odločbe zajemati vse ukrepe, katerih pravni učinki so zavezujoči in lahko vplivajo na interese naslovnika tako, da izrazito spremenijo njegov pravni položaj.
Such periodic penalty payments should be determined in proportion to the average daily total worldwide turnover of the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned.
Da se zagotovi učinkovita in enotna uporaba členov 101 in 102 PDEU, pojem podjetje iz členov 101 in 102 PDEU, ki bi ga bilo treba uporabljati v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča, pomeni gospodarsko enoto, tudi če je sestavljeno iz več pravnih ali fizičnih oseb.
For the purpose of imposing fines and periodic penalty payments, the term ‘decision’ should include any measure which produces binding legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the addressee by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position.
V skladu s tem bi bilo treba zagotoviti, da lahko NOK na podlagi pojma podjetje ugotovijo, da je za kršitev odgovorna obvladujoča družba, in ji izrečejo globe za ravnanje ene od njenih odvisnih družb, če takšna obvladujoča družba in njena odvisna družba tvorita eno gospodarsko enoto.
To ensure the effective and uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the notion of ‘undertaking’, as contained in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which should be applied in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, designates an economic unit, even if it consists of several legal or natural persons.
Da se podjetjem prepreči, da bi se s pravnimi ali organizacijskimi spremembami izognila odgovornosti za plačilo glob za kršitve členov 101 in 102 PDEU, bi morali NOK imeti možnost ugotoviti, da so za kršitev odgovorni pravni ali gospodarski nasledniki odgovornega podjetja, ter jim izreči globe za kršitve členov 101 in 102 PDEU v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča.
Accordingly, NCAs should be able to apply the notion of undertaking to find a parent company liable, and impose fines on it, for the conduct of one of its subsidiaries, where the parent company and its subsidiary form a single economic unit.
Za zagotovitev, da globe, izrečene za kršitve členov 101 in 102 PDEU, odražajo gospodarski pomen kršitve, bi morali NOK upoštevati težo kršitve.
To prevent undertakings escaping liability for fines for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU through legal or organisational changes, NCAs should be able to find legal or economic successors of the undertaking liable, and to impose fines on them, for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
NOK bi morali imeti tudi možnost, da določijo globe, ki so sorazmerne s trajanjem kršitve.
To ensure that the fines imposed for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU reflect the economic significance of the infringement, NCAs should take into account the gravity of the infringement.
Ta dejavnika bi bilo treba presoditi v skladu z ustrezno sodno prakso Sodišča in tako, da se zagotovi odvračilni učinek.
NCAs should also be able to set fines that are proportionate to the duration of the infringement.
Težo bi bilo treba presoditi od primera do primera za vse vrste kršitev, ob upoštevanju vseh okoliščin primera.
These factors should be assessed in accordance with the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and in a way that ensures deterrence.
Med drugim bi se lahko upoštevali dejavniki, kot so narava kršitve, skupni tržni delež vseh zadevnih podjetij, geografski obseg kršitve, vprašanje, ali je bila kršitev izvršena, vrednost prodaje blaga in storitev podjetja, na katero se kršitev neposredno ali posredno nanaša, ter velikost in tržna moč zadevnega podjetja.
The assessment of gravity should be made on a case-by-case basis for all types of infringements, taking into account all circumstances of the case.
Če je poleg tega storilec odgovoren za večkratne kršitve, to kaže na njegovo nagnjenost k takim kršitvam in je zato izjemno pomemben pokazatelj potrebe po povečanju ravni kazni za doseganje učinkovitega odvračilnega učinka.
Factors that might be taken into consideration include the nature of the infringement, the combined market share of all undertakings concerned, the geographic scope of the infringement, whether the infringement has been implemented, the value of the undertaking's sales of goods and services to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates and the size and market power of the undertaking concerned.
Zato bi morali imeti NOK možnost, da povečajo globo, ki se izreče podjetju ali podjetniškemu združenju, ki nadaljuje z isto ali stori podobno kršitev, potem ko je Komisija ali NOK sprejel odločbo, v kateri je bilo ugotovljeno, da je to podjetje ali podjetniško združenje kršilo člen 101 ali 102 PDEU.
The existence of repeated infringements by the same perpetrator shows its propensity to commit such infringements and is therefore a very significant indication that the level of the penalty needs to be increased to achieve effective deterrence.
NOK bi morali v skladu z Direktivo 2014/104/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta imeti možnost upoštevati morebitno odškodnino, plačano na podlagi sporazumne poravnave.
Accordingly, NCAs should have the possibility to increase the fine to be imposed on an undertaking or association of undertakings where the Commission or an NCA has previously taken a decision finding that that undertaking or association of undertakings has infringed Article 101 or 102 TFEU and that undertaking or association of undertakings continues to commit the same infringement or commits a similar infringement.
Prav tako bi v izrednih okoliščinah morali imeti možnost upoštevati ekonomsko sposobnost preživetja zadevnega podjetja.
In accordance with Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, NCAs should be able to take into account any compensation paid as a result of a consensual settlement.
Izkušnje so pokazale, da so podjetniška združenja redno udeležena pri kršitvah konkurence, zato bi NOK morali imeti možnost, da takšnim združenjem izrečejo učinkovite globe.
In addition, in exceptional circumstances, NCAs should be able to take into account the economic viability of the undertaking concerned.
Kadar se kršitev podjetniškega združenja nanaša na dejavnosti njegovih članov, bi moralo biti pri presoji teže kršitve zaradi določitve zneska globe v postopku zoper to združenje možno upoštevati vsoto zneskov prodaje blaga in storitev, na katero se kršitev neposredno ali posredno nanaša, ki jo opravijo podjetja, ki so člani združenja.
Experience has shown that associations of undertakings regularly play a role in competition infringements and NCAs should therefore be able to fine such associations effectively.
Kadar je globa izrečena ne le združenju, temveč tudi njegovim članom, se pri izračunu globe za združenje ne bi smel upoštevati promet članov, ki jim je izrečena globa.
When assessing the gravity of the infringement, in order to determine the amount of the fine in proceedings brought against associations of undertakings, where the infringement relates to the activities of its members, it should be possible to consider the sum of the sales of goods and services to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates by the undertakings that are members of the association.
Za zagotavljanje učinkovite izterjave glob, ki so izrečene podjetniškim združenjem za storjene kršitve, je treba določiti pogoje, pod katerimi je od presoje NOK odvisno, ali bodo v primeru, ko združenje ni plačilno sposobno, plačilo globe zahtevale od članov združenja.
When a fine is imposed not only on the association but also on its members, the turnover of the members on which a fine is imposed should not be taken into account when calculating the fine of the association.
Pri tem bi morali NOK upoštevati sorazmerno velikost podjetij v združenju ter zlasti položaj malih in srednjih podjetij.
In order to ensure effective recovery of fines imposed on associations of undertakings for infringements that they have committed, it is necessary to lay down the conditions in which it is at NCAs' discretion to require payment of the fine from the members of the association where the association is not solvent.
Plačilo globe enega ali več članov združenja ne posega v pravila nacionalnega prava, ki določajo izterjavo zneska, ki ga plačajo drugi člani združenja.
In doing so, NCAs should have regard to the relative size of the undertakings that belong to the association and, in particular, to the situation of small and medium-sized enterprises.
Odvračilni učinek glob se po Uniji močno razlikuje, pri čemer je v nekaterih državah članicah najvišji znesek globe, ki se lahko izreče, zelo nizek.
Payment of the fine by one or several members of an association is without prejudice to rules of national law that provide for recovery of the amount paid from other members of the association.
Da se zagotovi, da lahko NOK izrečejo odvračilne globe, bi bilo treba najvišji znesek globe, ki se lahko izreče za vsako kršitev člena 101 ali 102 PDEU, določiti na najmanj 10 % skupnega svetovnega prometa zadevnega podjetja.
The deterrent effect of fines differs widely across the Union, and in some Member States the maximum amount of the fine that can be imposed is very low.
To državam članicam ne bi smelo preprečiti, da bi ohranile ali uvedle višji najvišji znesek globe, ki se lahko izreče.
To ensure NCAs can impose dissuasive fines, the maximum amount of the fine that is possible to be imposed for each infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU should be set at a level of not less than 10 % of the total worldwide turnover of the undertaking concerned.
Programi prizanesljivosti so ključno orodje za odkrivanje skrivnih kartelov ter tako prispevajo k učinkovitemu pregonu in izreku kazni za najhujše kršitve konkurenčnega prava.
This should not prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing a higher maximum fine that can be imposed.
Vendar so trenutno med programi prizanesljivosti, ki se uporabljajo v državah članicah, opazne razlike.
Leniency programmes are a key tool for the detection of secret cartels, and thus contribute to the efficient prosecution of, and the imposition of penalties for, the most serious infringements of competition law.
Te razlike povzročajo pravno negotovost pri podjetjih kršiteljih glede pogojev, pod katerimi lahko vložijo prijavo za prizanesljivost, ter negotovost glede njihovega statusa v zvezi z odpustitvijo glob v skladu z zadevnimi programi prizanesljivosti.
However, there are currently marked differences between the leniency programmes applicable in the Member States.
Takšna negotovost bi lahko zmanjšala spodbude za morebitne prijavitelje, da bi vložili prijavo za prizanesljivost.
Those differences lead to legal uncertainty on the part of infringing undertakings concerning the conditions under which they are able to apply for leniency, as well as uncertainty about their immunity status under the respective leniency programmes.
To lahko vodi do manj učinkovitega uveljavljanja pravil konkurence v Uniji, saj se odkrije manj skrivnih kartelov.
Such uncertainty might weaken incentives for potential leniency applicants to apply for leniency.
Razlike med programi prizanesljivosti na ravni držav članic ogrožajo tudi enake konkurenčne pogoje za podjetja, ki poslujejo na notranjem trgu.
This in turn can lead to less effective competition enforcement in the Union, as fewer secret cartels are uncovered.
Zato je primerno z zmanjšanjem teh razlik povečati pravno varnost za podjetja na notranjem trgu in privlačnost programov prizanesljivosti v vsej Uniji, in sicer tako, da se vsem NOK omogoči, da priznajo odpustitev ter znižanje glob in sprejmejo skrajšane prijave pod enakimi pogoji.
The differences between leniency programmes at Member State level also jeopardise the level playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market.
V prihodnje bi bila lahko za uskladitev programov prizanesljivosti potrebna nadaljnja prizadevanja Evropske mreže za konkurenco.
It is therefore appropriate to increase legal certainty for undertakings in the internal market and to boost the attractiveness of leniency programmes across the Union by reducing these differences by enabling all NCAs to grant immunity and reduction from fines and accept summary applications under the same conditions.
NOK bi morali imeti možnost, da podjetjem priznajo odpustitev in znižanje glob, če so izpolnjeni določeni pogoji.
Further efforts by the European Competition Network to align leniency programmes could be needed in the future.
Združenja podjetij, ki opravljajo gospodarsko dejavnost v svojem imenu, bi morala biti upravičena do odpustitve ali znižanja glob, ko sodelujejo v domnevnem kartelu v svojem imenu in ne v imenu svojih članov.
NCAs should be able to grant undertakings immunity from fines and reductions of fines, if certain conditions are met.
Da bi kartel veljal za skrivnega, ni potrebno, da morajo biti vsi vidiki ravnanja skrivni.
Associations of undertakings which perform an economic activity on their own behalf should be eligible for immunity from fines or reductions of fines in cases where they participate in an alleged cartel on their own behalf and not on behalf of their members.
Kartel lahko, denimo, velja za skrivnega, kadar javnost, stranke ali dobavitelji niso seznanjeni z elementi kartela, zaradi katerih je celoten obseg ravnanja teže odkriti.
For a cartel to be considered a secret cartel, not all aspects of the conduct need to be secret.
Da bi bil prijavitelj upravičen do prizanesljivosti, bi moral končati svojo udeležbo v domnevnem skrivnem kartelu, razen kadar NOK meni, da je njegova nadaljnja udeležba razumno nujna za ohranitev integritete preiskave, na primer da zagotovi, da drugi domnevni udeleženci v kartelu ne odkrijejo, da je NOK seznanjen z domnevnim kartelom, dokler ta ne izvede preiskovalnih ukrepov, kot so nenapovedani pregledi.
In particular, a cartel can be considered a secret cartel when elements of the cartel which make the full extent of the conduct more difficult to detect are not known to the public or the customers or suppliers.
Da bi bil prijavitelj upravičen do prizanesljivosti, bi moral z NOK sodelovati odkrito, v celoti, neprenehoma in brez odlašanja.
In order to qualify for leniency, the applicant should end its involvement in the alleged secret cartel, except in cases where an NCA considers that its continued involvement is reasonably necessary to preserve the integrity of the investigation, for example, in order to ensure that other alleged participants in the cartel do not discover that the NCA was made aware of the alleged cartel before it carries out investigative measures such as unannounced inspections.
To med drugim pomeni, da prijavitelj pri načrtovanju vložitve prijave pri NOK ne bi smel uničiti, ponarejati ali skrivati dokazov glede domnevnega skrivnega kartela.
In order to qualify for leniency, the applicant should cooperate genuinely, fully, on a continuous basis and expeditiously with the NCA.
Kadar podjetje načrtuje vložitev prijave, obstaja nevarnost, da bi vodilni delavci in drugi zaposleni lahko uničili dokaze, da bi tako prikrili svojo udeleženost v kartelu, lahko pa bi do uničenja dokazov prišlo tudi zaradi drugačnih razlogov.