natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In particular, the protection and surveillance zones in Bulgaria and Italy, now subject to restrictions in accordance with Directive 2005/94/EC, should be listed in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/247.
Zlasti bi bilo treba na seznam iz Priloge k Izvedbenemu sklepu (EU) 2017/247 dodati okužena in ogrožena območja v Bolgariji in Italiji, za katera zdaj veljajo omejitve v skladu z Direktivo 2005/94/ES.
The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/247 should therefore be amended to update regionalization at Union level in order to include the protection and surveillance zones established in Bulgaria and in Italy in accordance with Directive 2005/94/EC, following the recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in those Member States, and the duration of the restrictions applicable therein.
Prilogo k Izvedbenemu sklepu (EU) 2017/247 bi bilo zato treba spremeniti, da se bosta po nedavnih izbruhih visokopatogene aviarne influence v Bolgariji in Italiji posodobila regionalizacija na ravni Unije z vključitvijo okuženih in ogroženih območij, vzpostavljenih v navedenih državah članicah v skladu z Direktivo 2005/94/ES, ter trajanje omejitev, ki se na njih izvajajo.
Done at Brussels, 7 March 2018.
V Bruslju, 7. marca 2018
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/314 of 1 March 2018 amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/247 on protective measures in relation to outbreaks of the highly pathogenic avian influenza in certain Member States (OJ L 60, 2.3.2018, p. 44).
Izvedbeni sklep Komisije (EU) 2018/314 z dne 1. marca 2018 o spremembi Izvedbenega sklepa (EU) 2017/247 o zaščitnih ukrepih zaradi izbruhov visokopatogene aviarne influence v nekaterih državah članicah (UL L 60, 2.3.2018, str. 44).
the entry for Italy is replaced by the following:
Deli območja dežele Lombardija (oznaka ADNS 18/0001) v krogu s polmerom treh kilometrov s središčem na decimalnih koordinatah koordinatnega sistema WGS 84: N45.561533 E9.752275
‘Member State: Italy
Del B se spremeni:
The area of the parts of Lombardia Region (ADNS 18/0001) contained within a circle of radius of three kilometres, centred on WGS84 dec. coordinates N45.561533 E9.752275
Datum konca izvajanja v skladu s členom 31 Direktive 2005/94/ES
Part B is amended as follows:
30.3.2018 do 8.4.2018
Date until applicable in accordance with Article 31 of Directive 2005/94/EC
29.3.2018 do 6.4.2018
From 30.3.2018 to 8.4.2018
Deli območja dežele Lombardija (oznaka ADNS 18/0001), ki je večje od območja, opisanega pod okuženim območjem, in v krogu s polmerom 10 kilometrov s središčem na decimalnih koordinatah koordinatnega sistema WGS 84: N45.561533 E9.752275
Council Decision (EU) 2018/343
Sklep Sveta (EU) 2018/343
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 186, in conjunction with point (a)(v) of the second subparagraph of Article 218(6) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije in zlasti člena 186 v povezavi s točko (a)(v) drugega pododstavka člena 218(6) Pogodbe,
By Decision 2005/781/EC, the Council approved the conclusion of the Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil (the ‘Agreement’).
Svet je s Sklepom 2005/781/ES odobril sklenitev Sporazuma o znanstvenem in tehnološkem sodelovanju med Evropsko skupnostjo in Federativno republiko Brazilijo (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum).
In accordance with Article XII of the Agreement, the Agreement enters into force on the date on which both Parties have notified each other in writing that their respective internal procedures necessary for the Agreement to enter into force have been completed.
V skladu s členom XII Sporazuma začne Sporazum veljati na dan, ko se pogodbenici med seboj pisno obvestita o tem, da so dokončani vsi notranji postopki, potrebni za začetek veljavnosti Sporazuma.
The Agreement is initially valid for a period of five years and may be renewed by agreement between the Parties after evaluation during the penultimate year of each subsequent renewal period.
Sporazum na začetku velja za dobo pet let, veljavnost pa se lahko sporazumno podaljša po vrednotenju v predzadnjem letu vsakega sledečega podaljšanega obdobja.
By Decision 2012/646/EU, the Council approved the renewal of the Agreement for an additional period of five years.
Svet je s Sklepom 2012/646/EU odobril podaljšanje veljavnosti Sporazuma za nadaljnjih pet let.
The exchange of letters between the Parties, dated 14 November 2016 and 5 January 2017, confirmed their interest in renewing the Agreement for another five years.
Pogodbenici sta v izmenjavi pisem z dne 14. novembra 2016 in 5. januarja 2017 potrdili interes za podaljšanje veljavnosti Sporazuma za nadaljnjih pet let.
The renewal of the Agreement should be approved on behalf of the Union,
Podaljšanje veljavnosti Sporazuma bi bilo treba odobriti v imenu Unije –
The President of the Council shall designate the person(s) empowered to notify the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, on behalf of the Union, that the Union has completed its internal procedures necessary for the renewal of the Agreement in accordance with Article XII(2) of the Agreement.
Predsednik Sveta imenuje osebo(-e), pooblaščeno(-e), da v imenu Unije obvesti (-jo) Vlado Federativne republike Brazilije, da je Unija zaključila svoje notranje postopke, potrebne za podaljšanje veljavnosti Sporazuma v skladu s členom XII(2) Sporazuma.
Council Decision 2005/781/EC of 6 June 2005 on the conclusion of the Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil (OJ L 295, 11.11.2005, p. 37).
UL L 295, 11.11.2005, str. 38.
OJ L 295, 11.11.2005, p. 38.
Sklep Sveta 2012/646/EU z dne 10. oktobra 2012 o podaljšanju veljavnosti Sporazuma o znanstvenem in tehnološkem sodelovanju med Evropsko skupnostjo in Federativno republiko Brazilijo (UL L 287, 18.10.2012, str. 4).
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/351
Izvedbeni sklep Komisije (EU) 2018/351
of 8 March 2018
z dne 8. marca 2018
rejecting undertakings offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine
o zavrnitvi zavez, ponujenih v zvezi s protidampinškim postopkom glede uvoza nekaterih vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov iz železa, nelegiranega jekla ali drugega legiranega jekla s poreklom iz Brazilije, Irana, Rusije in Ukrajine
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 8 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe (EU) 2016/1036 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 8. junija 2016 o zaščiti proti dampinškemu uvozu iz držav, ki niso članice Evropske unije („osnovna uredba“), in zlasti člena 8 Uredbe,
By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 the European Commission (‘the Commission’) imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel (‘HRF’) originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine and terminated the investigation on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Serbia (‘the definitive Regulation’).
Evropska komisija („Komisija“) je z Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2017/1795 uvedla dokončno protidampinško dajatev na uvoz nekaterih vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov iz železa, nelegiranega jekla ali drugega legiranega jekla s poreklom iz Brazilije, Irana, Rusije in Ukrajine ter zaključila preiskavo o uvozu nekaterih vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov iz železa, nelegiranega jekla ali drugega legiranega jekla s poreklom iz Srbije („dokončna uredba“).
During the investigation that led to the imposition of this duty, five exporting producers from Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine offered price undertakings.
Med preiskavo, ki je privedla do uvedbe te dajatve, je pet proizvajalcev izvoznikov iz Brazilije, Irana, Rusije in Ukrajine ponudilo cenovne zaveze.
As these offers were made after an additional final disclosure that came late in the investigation, the Commission was unable to analyse whether such price undertakings were acceptable, prior to the deadline for the adoption of the definitive Regulation.
Ker so bile te ponudbe oddane po dodatnem dokončnem razkritju, do katerega je prišlo pozno v preiskavi, Komisija ni mogla proučiti sprejemljivosti takšnih cenovnih zavez pred iztekom roka za sprejetje dokončne uredbe.
Therefore, considering this as an exceptional circumstance, the Commission undertook to complete the analysis of these five offers at a later stage.
Zato je Komisija to upoštevala kot izjemno okoliščino in se zavezala, da bo teh pet ponudb do konca proučila v poznejši fazi.
After the conclusion of the investigation and the publication of the definitive Regulation a sixth exporting producer offered a price undertaking.
Po zaključku preiskave in objavi dokončne uredbe je cenovno zavezo ponudil še šesti proizvajalec izvoznik.
On 18 December 2017, the Commission informed all interested parties of the assessment of the undertaking offers underlying its intention to reject all undertaking offers (‘Commission's assessment’).
Komisija je 18. decembra 2017 vse zainteresirane strani obvestila o oceni ponujenih zavez, na podlagi katere je nameravala zavrniti vse ponujene zaveze („ocena Komisije“).
On the basis of this information, interested parties made written submissions providing comments on the assessment and, in some cases, further amendments to their offers.
Na podlagi teh informacij so zainteresirane strani predložile pisna stališča s pripombami o oceni in v nekaterih primerih dodatne spremembe svojih ponudb.
Interested parties who requested to be heard were also granted a hearing.
Poleg tega je bilo zainteresiranim strankam, ki so zahtevale zaslišanje, to odobreno.
On 3 January 2018, the Commission received a request from the Government of Ukraine for consultation pursuant to Article 50 bis EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.
Komisija je 3. januarja 2018 prejela zahtevo ukrajinske vlade za posvetovanje v skladu s členom 50a pridružitvenega sporazuma med EU in Ukrajino.
Written comments were submitted on 31 January 2018.
Ustreznost in izvedljivost vseh ponudb sta bili ocenjeni ob upoštevanju veljavnega pravnega okvira, vključno s pridružitvenim sporazumom med EU in Ukrajino v primeru ukrajinskega proizvajalca izvoznika.
UNDERTAKINGS
Ponujene zaveze in njihova ocena
The adequacy and practicability of all offers were assessed in the light of the applicable legal framework, including the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in the case of the Ukrainian exporting producer.
Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (Brazilija)
Undertaking offers and their assessment
Proizvajalec izvoznik je ponudil eno minimalno uvozno ceno na tono za določen obseg izvoza v Unijo in drugo, višjo minimalno uvozno ceno za količino nad tem.
Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (Brazil)
Proizvajalec izvoznik je ponudil tudi mehanizem prilagoditve cen.
The exporting producer offered one minimum import price (‘MIP’) per tonne for a certain volume of exports to the Union and another — higher — MIP for a volume above that.
Ponudba na podlagi ene povprečne minimalne uvozne cene je neustrezna, saj ne bo odpravila škodljivih učinkov dampinga za vse vrste izdelkov, zlasti najdražje.
The exporting producer also offered a price adjustment mechanism.
Kot je ugotovljeno v uvodnih izjavah 632 in 655 dokončne uredbe, je Komisija menila, da je ukrep v obliki fiksnega zneska na tono, določenega za posamezno družbo, natančneje odražal škodo, ki jo je povzročil proizvajalec izvoznik, za katerega je bil ugotovljen damping, kot minimalna uvozna cena.
The offer based on one average MIP is inadequate as it will not remove the injurious effects of dumping for all product types, in particular the most expensive ones.
Zagotavlja tudi, da dajatev v celoti odpravlja škodo in s tem nudi takojšnjo zaščito industriji Unije, kar za minimalno uvozno ceno ne velja.
As acknowledged in recitals 632 and 655 of the definitive Regulation, the Commission considered that a measure in the form of a company-specific fixed amount per tonne reflected the injury caused by the exporting producer found to be dumping more accurately than a MIP.
Poleg tega ponudba pokriva transakcije med povezanimi subjekti.
It also ensures that, unlike a MIP, the duty removes injury entirely, giving immediate protection to the Union industry.
Sama narava teh odnosov predstavlja številne možnosti za navzkrižno kompenzacijo.
Furthermore, the offer covers transactions between related entities.
Minimalno uvozno ceno bi lahko kompenzirali s katero koli drugo transakcijo, posojilom ali nepovratnimi sredstvi med dvema povezanima subjektoma.
The very nature of such relations presents numerous possibilities for cross-compensation.
Komisija teh transakcij ne more spremljati in nima ustreznih meril, na podlagi katerih bi lahko preverila, ali gre za resnične transakcije ali za kompenzacijo.
Any other transaction, loan or grant between the two related entities could be used to offset the MIP.
Poleg tega sprejetje ponudbe ne bi bilo smiselno.
The Commission is unable to monitor these transactions and it lacks appropriate benchmarks that would enable it to verify whether they are genuine or compensatory.
Proizvajalec izvoznik ima povezane družbe v več državah članicah in nekatere izmed njih zadevni izdelek nadalje predelujejo.
Furthermore, the acceptance of the offer would be impractical.
Proizvajalec izvoznik strankam v Uniji prodaja tudi druge izdelke, z njim povezani uvoznik pa prodaja podobne izdelke iz drugih virov.
The exporting producer has related companies in several Member States, some of which further process the product concerned.
Zato Komisija teh dejavnosti in izvajanja dveh različnih minimalnih uvoznih cen glede na obseg izvoza ne more učinkovito spremljati.
The exporting producer also sells other products to the Union customers and its related importer sells like products from other sources.
V odgovoru na oceno Komisije je proizvajalec izvoznik trdil, da minimalna uvozna cena, ki jo je predlagal v svoji ponudbi, odpravlja škodljivi učinek dampinga, saj je Komisija v fazi preiskave predlagala enako minimalno uvozno ceno.
It is thus impossible for the Commission to monitor these activities effectively, as well as the implementation of two different MIPs depending on the export volume.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je navedel, da je podlaga za minimalno uvozno ceno tehtano povprečje uvoznih cen vseh vrst izdelkov.
In response to the Commission's assessment, the exporting producer argued that the MIP proposed in its offer removes the injurious effect of dumping, as the same MIP was proposed by the Commission at a stage of the investigation.
Posledično minimalna uvozna cena ne bi škodovala proizvajalcem Unije, saj bi se cenejše vrste izdelkov uvrstile na višjo cenovno raven, kot bi bilo ustrezno, kar bi pomenilo izravnavo za dražje vrste izdelkov.
The exporting producer pointed out that the MIP is based on weighted average import prices of all product types.
Po mnenju proizvajalca izvoznika bi po tej logiki sestave vrst izdelkov njegovega izvoza v obdobju preiskave minimalna uvozna cena zadostovala za odpravo škodljivega učinka dampinga.
Consequently, the MIP would not be to the detriment of the Union producers since, lower-tier priced product types would be placed at a higher level prices than they should have been, thus compensating for the higher-tier priced product types.
Poleg tega je proizvajalec izvoznik trdil, da minimalna uvozna cena ne bi smela biti prilagojena na račun prodaje prek povezane družbe, med drugim zaradi načina določanja njegove izvozne cene v dokončni uredbi.
If this logic were to be applied to the product type composition of its exports during the investigation period, according to the exporting producer the MIP would be sufficient to remove the injurious effect of dumping.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je trdil, da navzkrižna kompenzacija iz več razlogov ni mogoča, zlasti ker bi bila navzkrižna kompenzacija razvidna iz letnih poročil proizvajalca izvoznika in njegove povezanih družb.
Furthermore, the exporting producer argued that the MIP should not be adjusted on the account of sales via a related company, due to, amongst others, the way its export price was established in the definitive Regulation.
Poleg tega je proizvajalec izvoznik spremenil svojo ponudbo zaveze.
The exporting producer then argued that cross-compensation is impossible for a number of reasons, in particular because cross-compensation would show in the annual reports of the exporting producer and its related companies.
V novi ponudbi se je proizvajalec izvoznik zavezal, da bo prenehal z nadaljnjo prodajo vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov prek povezanega subjekta v Uniji in da bo poročal o prodaji drugih izdelkov v Unijo.
The exporting producer also amended its undertaking offer.
Glede pripombe, da predlagana minimalna uvozna cena odpravlja škodljivi učinek dampinga, ker je identična tisti, ki jo je predlagala Komisija v fazi preiskave, je Komisija opozorila, da je bila ta rešitev nazadnje zavrnjena.
In the new offer the exporting producer undertook to cease resales of HRF via its related entity in the Union and to report on sales of other products to the Union.
Razlogi za to zavrnitev so navedeni med drugim v uvodnih izjavah 632 in 655 dokončne uredbe, kar je povzeto v uvodni izjavi 7 zgoraj.
Concerning the comment that the proposed MIP removes the injurious effect of dumping because it is identical to the one proposed by the Commission at a stage of the investigation, the Commission noted that ultimately that solution was rejected.
Pripomba glede tega, da je podlaga za minimalno uvozno ceno tehtano povprečje uvoznih cen, ni vplivala na sklep, da minimalna uvozna cena ne odpravlja škodljivega učinka dampinga za najdražje vrste izdelkov.
The reasons for this rejection were given in, among others, recitals 632 and 655 of the definitive Regulation, which are summarised in recital 7 above.
Komisiji ni uspelo pridobiti podatkov v podporo trditvi, da bi minimalna uvozna cena odpravila škodljivi učinek dampinga zaradi sestave vrst izdelkov izvoza v obdobju preiskave.
The Comment regarding MIP being based on weighted average import prices, did not affect the conclusion that the MIP does not remove the injurious effect of dumping for the most expensive product types.
Tudi vložnik takih podatkov ni predložil.
The Commission was not able to retrieve data to support the claim that the injurious effect of dumping would have been removed by the MIP due to the product-type composition of the exports during the investigation period.
Tudi če bi ji bili na voljo podatki, ki bi to trditev potrjevali, je Komisija menila, da ni ovir za premik sestave vrst izdelkov k dražjim vrstam izdelkov.
Nor did the Applicant provide such data.
Dejansko bi sama uporaba minimalne uvozne cene lahko spodbudila tak premik.
Even if it had available to it the data supporting this claim, the Commission found that there is nothing preventing the product-type composition to shift towards the higher-tier priced product types.
Glede pripombe, da minimalna uvozna cena ne bi smela biti prilagojena na račun prodaje prek povezane družbe, se Komisija lahko strinja, da glede na okoliščine primera v obdobju preiskave in zlasti glede na to, kako je bila določena izvozna cena za proizvajalca izvoznika v dokončni uredbi, ta prilagoditev ne bi bila upravičena.
Indeed, the very application of the MIP could favour such shift.
Vendar ni nobenega jamstva, da se okoliščine ne bodo spremenile, zlasti, ker sta družbi povezani.
Concerning the comment that the MIP should not be adjusted on the account of sales via a related company, the Commission could agree that indeed, considering the circumstances of the case in the investigation period and, in particular, the way the export price for the exporting producer was established in the definitive Regulation, this adjustment would not be warranted.
Kar zadeva spremembo ponudbe in tveganja navzkrižne kompenzacije, je Komisija opozorila, da bi zaveza o prenehanju nadaljnje prodaje zadevnega izdelka sicer omejila nekatera tveganja navzkrižne kompenzacije, vendar glavni problem, namreč uporaba minimalne uvozne cene za transakcije med povezanimi subjekti, ostaja.
However, there is no guarantee that the circumstances will not change in particular since the companies are related.
Take povezave med dvema subjektoma nudijo številne možnosti navzkrižne kompenzacije, ki jih Komisija ne more učinkovito spremljati.
Finally, concerning the amendment of the offer and the risks of cross-compensation, the Commission noted that, whilst the commitment not to re-sell the product concerned would limit some of the cross-compensation risks the principal issue, namely the MIP being applied to transactions between related entities, remains.
Vse izmed njih ne bi bile prikazane v letnih poročilih in za tiste, ki bi bile, Komisija ne bi imela ustreznih referenčnih meril za presojo, ali gre za kompenzacijo.
Such association between two entities offers numerous possibilities for cross-compensation that cannot be effectively monitored by the Commission.
Zaveza, ki pokriva povezano prodajo, je lahko sprejeta le, če se zadevni izdelek nazadnje proda naprej neodvisni stranki in je za te transakcije mogoče uporabiti ustrezno prilagojeno minimalno uvozno ceno.
Not all of these would be shown in the annual reports, and for those that would the Commission would lack the appropriate benchmarks capable of assessing whether they are of compensatory nature.
To ni mogoče, če se zadevni izdelek predela v drug izdelek.
This is impossible if the product concerned is transformed into another product.
(Brazilija)
Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais SA (Brazil)
Proizvajalec izvoznik je ponudil eno minimalno uvozno ceno na tono za ves svoj izvoz.
The exporting producer offered one MIP per tonne for all of its exports.
Kot je ugotovljeno v uvodnih izjavah 632 in 655 dokončne uredbe, je Komisija menila, da je ukrep v obliki fiksnega zneska na tono, določenega za posamezno družbo, natančneje odražal škodo, ki jo je povzročil proizvajalec izvoznik, za katerega je bil ugotovljen damping, kot enotna minimalna uvozna cena.
As acknowledged in recitals 632 and 655 of the definitive Regulation, the Commission considered that a measure in the form of a company-specific fixed amount per tonne reflected the injury caused by the exporting producer found to be dumping more accurately than a single MIP.
Zagotavlja tudi, da dajatev v celoti odpravlja škodo in s tem nudi takojšnjo zaščito industriji Unije, kar za enotno minimalno uvozno ceno ne velja.
It also ensures that, unlike a single MIP, the duty removes injury entirely, giving immediate protection to the Union industry.
Ponudba je neustrezna tudi zato, ker proizvajalec izvoznik ni predlagal mehanizma prilagoditve cen, medtem ko cene vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov ponavadi v daljšem časovnem obdobju znatno nihajo.
The offer is also inadequate as the exporting producer did not propose an adjustment mechanism while the prices of HRF tend to vary significantly over time.
Zaradi svetovne strukture in prodajnih dejavnosti proizvajalca izvoznika predlagane cenovne zaveze ne bi bilo možno učinkovito spremljati, zaradi česar obstajajo različne možnosti za navzkrižno kompenzacijo cen.
Due to the global structure and sales activities of the exporting producer, the price undertaking proposed could not be effectively monitored, offering several opportunities for price cross-compensation.
Proizvajalec izvoznik ima številne povezane družbe v več državah članicah in zunaj Unije.
The exporting producer has a number of related companies in several Member States and outside the Union.
Poleg tega proizvajalec izvoznik v Unijo prodaja tudi druge izdelke.
Furthermore, the exporting producer sells also other products to the Union.
Zato Komisija teh dejavnosti ne more učinkovito spremljati.