natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Conclusion on measure 2
Pri družbah, ki so v postopku zaradi insolventnosti, bo, razen če obstaja velika verjetnost, da se bo družba sama uspešno prestrukturirala ali da jo bo skupaj z njenimi obveznostmi kupil nov vlagatelj, LGD novega posojila odvisen predvsem od pričakovane likvidacijske vrednosti družbe, v zvezi s katero bo posojilodajalec imel prednost odplačila v skladu s pravili o največji prednosti pri poplačilu.
The Commission concludes that measure 2 does not confer an economic advantage on Ilva stemming from State resources.
V nekaterih primerih je lahko pričakovana likvidacijska vrednost nizka v primerjavi z zneskom dolgov družbe z največjo prednostjo pri poplačilu.
Since the criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU are cumulative, the Commission concludes that measure 2 does not constitute State aid.
V takih primerih ima lahko družba težave pri dostopu do zasebnega financiranja in je verjetneje, da bo javno poroštvo prineslo prednost, ki ustreza celotnemu znesku, za katero je dano poroštvo.
State resources and imputability
Vendar pa so lahko v primerih, v katerih je ocenjena vrednost stečajne mase visoka, zasebni posojilodajalci (ali poroki) z izkušnjami z upravljanjem tveganih posojil zainteresirani za posredovanje.
As regards the State origin of the measure, the Commission observes that the measure consists in a loan guarantee granted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
V primeru družbe Ilva uspešen izid postopka prodaje kaže, da je tržna vrednost sredstev družbe Ilva, ki ni ustavila dejavnosti, ostala visoka kljub gospodarskim težavam družbe: navedena sredstva so bila namreč prodana za 1,8 milijarde EUR.
Given that the notion of Member State includes all levels of public authorities, regardless of whether it is a national, regional or local authority, the Commission concludes that the measure is imputable to the State.
Ta znesek ni posebno presenetljiv glede na konkurenčne prednosti družbe Ilva: obrat v Tarantu je največji integrirani obrat za proizvodnjo jekla v južni Evropi, obrati družbe Ilva pa so strateško postavljeni ob pomembnih uvoznih in izvoznih poteh ter blizu središča drugega največjega evropskega trga jekla (Italija).
State guarantees put State resources at risk, as their call is paid through the State budget.
Razliko med tržno vrednostjo sredstev družbe Ilva in slabo gospodarsko uspešnostjo družbe je mogoče pojasniti z več posebnimi dejavniki, vključno z naslednjima:
For this very reason, and contrary to the argument of the Italian authorities, even properly remunerated State guarantees involve State resources.
proizvodnja družbe Ilva je bila upravno omejena na 6 milijonov ton, kar je precej pod njeno skupno proizvodno zmogljivostjo, in sicer zaradi okoljske škode, ki bi nastala, če bi družba delovala s polno proizvodno zmogljivostjo s svojimi sedanjimi sistemi za varstvo okolja.
In addition, as further shown below, the Commission also finds in the present case that, since the guarantee fee charged by Italy is below market conditions, the Italian State also forewent — and still foregoes — resources that would have accrued to it with a higher, market-based guarantee fee.
Ker so za jeklarske obrate, kot je obrat v Tarantu, značilni velika kapitalska intenzivnost in visoki fiksni stroški, morajo delovati blizu svoje polne zmogljivosti, da bi bili donosni.
The assessment of the terms of a State guarantee, including the fee charged for it, can only preclude the finding of an economic advantage (if they do not correspond to market terms), not the finding of State resources which is not disputable.
Omejitev proizvodnje, ki je bila družbi Ilva naložena zaradi veljavnih okoljskih razlogov, je neizogibno privedla do poslabšanja njene dobičkonosnosti.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that measure 3 involves State resources.
Vendar bi se lahko družba Ilva z ustreznimi okoljskimi naložbami vrnila na bolj optimalne ravni proizvodnje.
It is settled case-law that, in order to determine whether a State measure constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, it is necessary to establish, among others, whether the recipient undertaking received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions.
Ta možnost pojasnjuje, zakaj so sredstva družbe Ilva ostala privlačna v očeh potencialnih vlagateljev, ki so pripravljeni izvesti ustrezne naložbe;
An economic advantage exists whenever the financial situation of an undertaking is improved as a result of a State intervention on terms differing from normal market conditions.
družba Ilva je že pet let pod izredno upravo, najprej zaradi okoljskih vprašanj in nato zaradi finančnih težav.
However, an intervention by a public authority does not necessarily confer an advantage on the beneficiary, and as such does not constitute aid, if it is carried out under normal market conditions.
Ker se njena sredstva več let niso upravljala pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji, se je družba znašla v finančnih težavah, ne da bi to pomenilo, da se ista sredstva ne bi mogla upravljati dobičkonosno pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji in ob ustrezni ravni zasebnih naložb.
In other words, if the public authority acts as a prudent operator in a market economy would do in similar circumstances, no State aid is involved.
Razlogi za finančne težave družbe Ilva so bili že dolgo znani.
In this respect, the Italian authorities argue that the premium charged by the Italian authorities for the State guarantee was set according to the recommendation of the […] expert.
Ker niso bili povezani z realno vrednostjo sredstev družbe Ilva, akterjev na trgu niso odvrnili od izkaza interesa za nakup njenih sredstev, ne le v nedavnem postopku prodaje, ampak tudi precej pred tem.
As such, the remuneration of the risk taken by the State is according to them in line with the remuneration that a prudent market economy operator would have required, and the guarantee does not confer an economic advantage on Ilva.
Iz tega izhaja, da je bilo že ob odobritvi državnega poroštva aprila 2015 mogoče pričakovati, da bodo sredstva družbe Ilva prodana ali likvidirana po razmeroma visoki ceni.
For their part, the interested parties having commented on measure 3 consider that a market economy operator would have not accepted such financial conditions.
Ker v skladu z italijanskim insolvenčnim pravom za nova posojila za velika podjetja velja največja prednost pri poplačilu, bi se ta prodajna cena, potem ko bi se stekla v stečajno maso, prednostno uporabila za odplačilo novih posojil (ali poroštev za ta posojila, če bi se unovčila).
WV Stahl, in particular, asks the Commission to establish the applicable market rate and recover the amount of incompatible aid in the form of the difference between this market rate and the actual rate charged to Ilva by the Italian authorities.
Na podlagi informacij, ki so jih zagotovili italijanski organi, je bilo ob odobritvi ukrepa 3 pričakovano naslednje zaporedje odplačila dolgov družbe Ilva:
As a preliminary remark, the Commission would like to point that, at the time of granting of the State guarantee at issue, Ilva was undergoing insolvency proceedings.
Graf 1
As such, it qualified as an undertaking in difficulty according to point 20(c) of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (‘R&R Guidelines’).
Zaporedje odplačila dolga družbe Ilva aprila 2015
In Section 4.1 of the Guarantee Notice, the Commission explains that ‘for companies in difficulty, a market guarantor, if any, would, at the time the guarantee is granted charge a high premium given the expected rate of default.
Ob upoštevanju precejšnje razlike med zneskom zadevnega posojila s poroštvom (400 milijonov EUR), na eni strani, in, zneskom drugih dolgov z isto ali večjo prednostjo odplačila (približno […] EUR) in vrednostjo stečajne mase družbe Ilva (1,8 milijarde EUR, če upoštevamo ceno, ki jo je ponudil najboljši ponudnik v nedavnem postopku prodaje), na drugi strani, Komisija ugotavlja, da bi udeleženec v tržnem gospodarstvu družbi Ilva lahko odobril posojilo ali poroštvo po ustrezni stopnji v obdobju njenih težav.
If the likelihood that the borrower will not be able to repay the loan becomes particularly high, this market rate may not exist and in exceptional circumstances the aid element of the guarantee may turn out to be as high as the amount effectively covered by that guarantee’.
To ugotovitev potrjuje dejstvo, da je družba Ilva med postopkom zaradi insolventnosti ohranila dostop do zasebnega financiranja.
This approach is also the one adopted by the Court, who ruled that where a State grants a guarantee for a bank loan to a company in difficulty ‘without adequate consideration’, the guarantees must be regarded as aid equal to the amount of the loan guaranteed.
Družba Ilva je imela ob odobritvi državnega poroštva (konec aprila 2015) odprte najmanj tri kreditne linije pri zasebnih bankah: […] EUR pri […], […] EUR pri […] in […] EUR pri […].
Against this background, the Commission first assessed whether the case at hand presents circumstances in which the likelihood that the borrower will not be able to repay the loan is so high that the guaranteed loan amount in full constitutes aid.
Navedena posojila so bila faktoring linije, ki imajo drugačen profil tveganja kot posojilo v višini 400 milijonov EUR s poroštvom italijanske države.
An undertaking in difficulty is an undertaking experiencing serious economic and financial distress, which, without intervention by the State, will almost certainly go out of business in the short or medium term.
Vendar je obstoj takih kreditnih linij dodaten kazalnik, da družba Ilva ni bila v takem položaju, da se ne bi noben upnik po nobeni stopnji odločil financirati njenega poslovanja.
In these circumstances, it is likely that no market operator would provide a loan or guarantee to such undertaking at any rate, so that any loan or guarantee by the State to such undertaking should in principle amount to aid equal to the full amount of the (guaranteed) loan.
Iz zgornjih dokazov je razvidno, da ta zadeva ne vključuje okoliščin, v katerih je mogoče popolnoma izključiti dostop upravičenca do zasebnega financiranja, tako da bi bilo treba element pomoči v javnem posojilu ali poroštvu šteti za državno pomoč v višini celotnega posojila ali poroštva.
Nevertheless, this central assumption requires to be checked against the facts of each case and, when the beneficiary is undergoing insolvency proceedings, against the insolvency rules applicable in the relevant Member State.
Komisija je nato ocenila, ali finančni pogoji javnega poroštva za posojilo v višini 400 milijonov EUR, odobrenega družbi Ilva, ustrezno poplačajo tveganje, ki ga je prevzela država.
In respect of the latter, the Commission takes note that Italian insolvency law for large undertakings gives a priority of repayment on the liquidation mass (pre-deduzione) to any new loan granted during the time of the insolvency proceedings, over loans granted before the declaration of insolvency.
Komisija se v zvezi s tem sklicuje na obvestilo o poroštvih: „tržni porok, če obstaja, [bo] podjetjem v težavah v trenutku dodelitve poroštva zaračunal visoko premijo zaradi pričakovane stopnje tveganja neplačila.“
Moreover, unlike loans granted before the declaration of insolvency, interest continues to accrue for loans granted during the time of the insolvency proceedings.
V tej zadevi je bilo državno poroštvo odobreno z letno premijo v višini 3,12 %.
These provisions aim at incentivizing potential creditors to support the undertaking during the time of its insolvency proceedings in order to preserve the economic value of its assets, pending the outcome of the proceedings (turnaround, sale or liquidation).
Ta premija je bila določena na podlagi mnenja […].
The mere existence of those provisions indicates that lenders in some instances do agree to lend new money to undertakings undergoing insolvency proceedings (i.e. to undertakings in difficulty).
V nasprotju s trditvami italijanskih organov Komisija meni, da mnenje […] ne vsebuje pravilne ocene plačila, ki bi ga preudaren udeleženec v tržnem gospodarstvu zahteval v zameno za svoje poroštvo, ker ne zagotavlja ustrezne ocene verjetnosti, da bi se poroštvo lahko unovčilo in v takem primeru plačalo.
This also suggests that the reasoning of a lender or guarantor dealing with a borrower in difficulty may be slightly different than in a business-as-usual situation.
Mnenje […] namreč v celoti temelji na napačni predpostavki, da bo posojilo v višini 400 milijonov EUR, odobreno družbi Ilva, preneseno na novo družbo (v nadaljnjem besedilu: NewCo), ki bo sredstva družbe Ilva upravljala pod boljšimi pogoji.
On the one hand, in both situations the lender or guarantor will assess the likelihood that the borrower will not be able to repay the loan.
Mnenje […] vključuje poglobljeno oceno kreditne sposobnosti te hipotetične družbe NewCo in na podlagi predvidene bonitetne ocene ugotavlja, da bi morala italijanska država uporabiti poroštveno premijo v višini od 1,53 % do 3,12 %.
On the other hand, emphasis may be laid in the first place on the probability of default of the borrower in a business-as-usual situation, whereas more attention might be paid to the loss-given-default (‘LGD’) on the loan or guarantee when it comes to borrowers that are likely to default at some point.
Vendar v času odobritve poroštva ni bilo razloga za domnevo, da bo posojilo v višini 400 milijonov EUR samodejno preneseno na hipotetičnega novega lastnika sredstev družbe Ilva.
For companies undergoing insolvency proceedings, unless there is a high probability that the company will be successfully restructured on its own or acquired by a new investor together with its liabilities, the LGD on a new loan will mainly depend on the expected liquidation value of the company, for which the lender will have a priority of repayment pursuant to applicable pre-deductibility rules.
V takih okoliščinah bi morali italijanski organi oceniti kreditno sposobnost družbe Ilva (in ne hipotetičnega kupca) in na tej podlagi oceniti LGD posojila.
In some cases, the expected liquidation value may be low as compared to the amount of the company's pre-deductible debts.
Ker mnenja […] ni bilo mogoče uporabiti za oceno, ali je premija, ki jo je zaračunala italijanska država, ustrezno plačilo za tveganje, je morala Komisija poiskati referenčna merila za stopnje, ki se uporabljajo za subjekte v podobnem finančnem položaju kot družba Ilva.
In those cases, the company might have difficulties to access private finance and a public guarantee is more likely to confer an advantage equal to the entire guaranteed amount.
V skladu z uveljavljeno in nedavno prakso odločanja o podjetjih, ki so predmet postopkov zaradi insolventnosti in namenjena prodaji, Komisija meni, da je, ker ni na voljo nobene druge bonitetne ocene in glede na opredelitev družbe Ilva kot podjetja v težavah, njena bonitetna ocena v najboljšem primeru CCC (glej tudi uvodno izjavo 189).
However, in cases where there is a high expected value of the liquidation mass, there can be a business case for private lenders (or guarantors) used to dealing with risky credits.
Zato je Komisija zbrala ustrezne finančne podatke iz podatkovne zbirke S&P Capital IQ Platform o razmikih kreditnih zamenjav (v nadaljnjem besedilu: CDS) in donosih obveznic za družbe z bonitetno oceno CCC+, D ali SD na datum odobritve ukrepa 3.
In the case of Ilva, the successful outcome of the sale process shows that the market value of Ilva's assets in continued operation stayed high despite the economic difficulties of the company: those assets were indeed sold at a price of EUR 1,8 billion.
CDS je dogovor o finančni zamenjavi, da bo prodajalec CDS kupcu (običajno upnik referenčnega posojila) v primeru neplačila posojila (s strani dolžnika) poplačal nastalo škodo.
This amount is not particularly surprising in light of Ilva's competitive strengths: the Taranto site is the largest integrated steelmaking site in Southern Europe and Ilva's sites are strategically located on important import and export routes and close to the heart of Europe's second largest steel market (Italy).
Povedano drugače, prodajalec CDS kupca zavaruje pred tveganjem neplačila referenčnega posojila.
The discrepancy between the market value of Ilva's assets and its poor economic performance can be explained by several case-specific factors, including the two below:
Ta instrument je kot tak zelo pomemben, saj kaže, kakšna bi bila premija za tveganje/provizija za poroštvo, ki bi jo zahteval udeleženec na trgu za kritje tveganja neplačila posojila.
Ilva's production has been administratively capped at 6 million tonnes, well below its total production capacity, due to environmental harm that would ensue if the company run its full production capacity with the current environmental equipment.
Podatki, zbrani v zvezi z 11 primeri, ki so bili na voljo maja 2015, kažejo, da razmiki CDS za zapadlosti 10 let segajo od 6,3 % do 277,7 % s srednjo vrednostjo 17,6 %.
As steelmaking facilities like Taranto plant are extremely capital-intensive with high fixed costs, they require to be operated close to their full capacity to be profitable.
Donosi obveznic so dober pokazatelj „vseobsegajočih“ stroškov zadolževanja družbe, vključno z obrestno mero in poroštveno premijo, izraženo v odstotkih.
The production cap imposed on Ilva for valid environmental reasons inevitably led to a deterioration of its profitability.
Podatki, zbrani v zvezi z osmimi primeri, ki so bili na voljo maja 2015, kažejo stopnje od 5,3 % do 35,6 % s srednjo vrednostjo 17,0 % za desetletne obveznice.
However, with the right environmental investments, Ilva may go back to more optimal production levels.
Za 25-letne obveznice sta bila na voljo samo dva primera, pri katerih stopnja znaša 14,2 %.
This potential explains that Ilva's assets remained valuable in the eyes of potential investors ready to make the appropriate investments.
Kot je razvidno iz analiziranih podatkov, so bili na datum odobritve ukrepa 3 stroški financiranja družb z bonitetnimi ocenami CCC+, D ali SD precej višji od tistih, ki jih je imela družba Ilva zaradi državnega poroštva.
Ilva has been under extraordinary administration for five years — at a first stage because of environmental issues, and then because of its financial difficulties.
Družba Ilva je namreč lahko dobila posojilo s skupnimi stroški (obrestna mera v višini […] + poroštvena premija v višini 3,12 %) v višini […], medtem ko tržni podatki v istem obdobju kažejo skupne stroške v višini skoraj 17 %.
As Ilva's assets were not operated under normal market conditions for several years, the company encountered financial difficulties without this implying that the same assets could not be operated in a profitable way under normal market conditions and with the right level of private investments.
To preverjanje verodostojnosti kaže, da je z državnim poroštvom, opredeljenim kot ukrep 3, družbi Ilva dodeljena gospodarska prednost, ki je po tržnih pogojih ne bi pridobila.
The reasons for Ilva's financial difficulties were known for a long time.
Ta ugotovitev je v skladu z mnenjem konkurentov (glej uvodno izjavo 118).
As they were not related to the intrinsic value of Ilva's assets, they did not discourage market players from expressing interest in acquiring Ilva's assets not only during the recent sale process, but also long before it.
Po ugotovitvi obstoja gospodarske prednosti, ki ni na voljo po tržnih pogojih, se postavlja še vprašanje njene količinske opredelitve.
It follows that, already at the time of granting of the State guarantee in April 2015, a reasonably high price could be expected from the sale or liquidation of Ilva's assets.
Kot je bilo pojasnjeno zgoraj, je Komisiji uspelo zbrati nekatere podatke o tržnih stopnjah poroštev za obravnavano obdobje.
As according to Italian insolvency law for large undertakings, new loans are pre-deductible, this sale price feeding the liquidation mass would be used in priority to repay new loans (or guarantees on these loans, if called).
Vendar se ti podatki nanašajo na subjekte, ki niso popolnoma primerljivi z družbo Ilva, ter finančne instrumente, ki se razlikujejo od posojila in poroštva, odobrenih družbi Ilva, zato se sami po sebi ne morejo uporabiti kot ustrezno merilo, da bi se s potrebno stopnjo natančnosti določila prava tržna stopnja za zadevno poroštvo.
Based on information provided by the Italian authorities, the sequence of repayment of Ilva's debts was expected to be the following at the time of granting of measure 3:
Tudi preiskava ni razkrila predlaganih obrestnih mer za posojila podobne narave kot posojila, odobrena družbi Ilva, z državnim poroštvom ali brez njega, ali tržnih cen za državno poroštvo.
Graph 1
V obvestilu o poroštvu je navedeno, da je treba v takih okoliščinah morebitno prednost, povezano z odobritvijo poroštva (ki ustreza morebitnemu elementu pomoči), izračunati kot razliko med določeno tržno obrestno mero, ki bi veljala za upravičenca brez poroštva, in obrestno mero, pridobljeno z državnim poroštvom, potem ko se upoštevajo morebiti plačane premije.
Sequence of repayment of Ilva's debt in April 2015
Komisija meni, da je smiselno upoštevati tudi sporočilo o referenčnih obrestnih merah in diskontnih stopnjah iz leta 2008, da bi ocenili približek tržne obrestne mere za zadevno posojilo.
Considering the difference in magnitude between, on the one hand, the amount of the guaranteed loan at issue (EUR 400 million) and, on the other hand, the amount of other debts with a same or higher priority of repayment (ca.
V zvezi s tem se zdi, da je kreditna sposobnost (ocena) družbe Ilva najnižja od petih mogočih ocen, določenih v sporočilu iz leta 2008, in sicer „slaba/finančne težave (CCC in manj)“.
EUR […]) and the value of Ilva's liquidation mass (EUR 1,8 billion if one considers the price offered by the highest bidder in the recent sale process), the Commission concludes that a market economy operator could have granted a loan or guarantee at an adequate rate to Ilva during the period of its difficulties.
Poleg tega posojilo ni bilo povezano z nobenim zavarovanjem, ki bi posojilodajalcem (ali poroku) zagotavljalo dovolj likvidno, po možnosti prenosljivo in takoj uresničljivo pravico do sredstev družbe Ilva v primeru neplačila.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that Ilva kept access to private finance during the time of its insolvency proceedings.
Komisija na tej podlagi meni, da je treba tržno obrestno mero posojila s poroštvom, ki predstavlja ukrep 3, za posojilo izračunati kot rezultat vsote ustrezne izhodiščne obrestne mere, povečane za 1000 bazičnih točk, kot je opredeljeno v sporočilu iz leta 2008.
At the time of granting of the State guarantee (end of April 2015), Ilva had at least three lines of credit opened with private banks: EUR […] with […], EUR […] with […] and EUR […] with […]).
Kar zadeva ustrezno izhodiščno obrestno mero, se v sporočilu iz leta 2008 priporoča uporaba 1-letnih obrestnih mer na denarnem trgu (tj. v primeru Italije: 1-letna obrestna mera Euribor), pri čemer si Komisija pridržuje pravico do uporabe krajše ali daljše dospelosti v primerih, v katerih se to zdi smiselno.
Those credits were factoring lines, which have a different risk profile than the EUR 400 million loan guaranteed by the Italian State.
V tej zadevi Komisija meni, da zelo dolg rok zapadlosti posojila v višini 400 milijonov EUR, ki je predmet državnega poroštva, upravičuje izbiro izhodiščne obrestne mere, ki je v skladu s tem dolgim rokom zapadlosti.
Nevertheless, the existence of these credit lines constitutes an additional indicator that Ilva was not in a situation such that no creditor would at any rate have ever agreed to finance its operations.
Komisija se je zato odločila uporabiti obrestno mero za zamenjavo, ki ustreza tehtanemu povprečnemu trajanju posojila s poroštvom.