natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Slovenia stated that it had acted with due care and with the intention to limit the risk of a systemic disturbance to a minimum.
Glede na to po njenem mnenju zaveza, ki jo je Slovenija sprejela v okviru sklepa iz leta 2013, tj. da bo odprodala hčerinske družbe na Balkanu, če njen delež v NLB ne bo pravočasno prodan, ni izravnalni ukrep, saj ne odpravlja izkrivljanja trga in ne prispeva k sposobnosti preživetja NLB niti je ne spodbuja.
As regards the comments on foreign currency deposits litigation, as described in point (d) of recital 27, Slovenia considered that those comments were not the subject of the 2018 opening Decision.
Kar zadeva ugotovitev Komisije, da NLB še ni izdala novega podrejenega dolga, je Slovenija poudarila, da je ena od tujih hčerinskih družb NLB (NLB Banka Skopje) novi podrejeni dolg v višini 10 milijonov EUR junija 2015 prodala […].
Regarding the argument that any additional measures would only impair NLB's long-term viability prospects, Slovenia considered that the Commission's assessment on commitments should be based on its assessment included in the 2013 Decision namely that the sale commitment would prevent State influence in NLB as owner.
Poleg tega je poudarila, da je NLB izpolnjevala vse predpisane kapitalske zahteve in še naprej imela presežne kapitalske ravni, da bi uspešno preživela morebitne stresne razmere.
Slovenia considers that additional compensatory measures of a commercial nature would not contribute to that objective.
Zato po njenem mnenju zaveza NLB za izdajo dodatnih podrejenih instrumentov ne bi prispevala k njeni dolgoročni sposobnosti preživetja, tudi zaradi njene presežne likvidnosti.
Slovenia highlighted that it is currently not involved in the day-to-day operations of NLB.
Kar zadeva ugotovitev Komisije, da je imela NLB še vedno visoko stopnjo nedonosnih posojil, je Slovenija trdila, da o dolgoročni sposobnosti preživetja NLB ni mogoče dvomiti le na podlagi tega argumenta.
COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA
Poleg tega je poudarila, da je NLB od decembra 2013 zaradi boljših postopkov upravljanja tveganja precej zmanjšala svoj portfelj nedonosnih posojil (za 70 %).
In response to the 2018 opening Decision, Slovenia expressed the view that the aid measures granted to NLB would continue to be compatible with the internal market on the basis of the amended commitments submitted by Slovenia on 21 December 2017.
Kar zadeva oceno Komisije, da Slovenija ni prepričljivo dokazala, da je učinkovito odpravila težave NLB s korporativnim upravljanjem, je Slovenija trdila, da se pri tej trditvi ne upoštevajo ustrezno dosežki NLB na tem področju.
Slovenia emphasised that the viability of NLB as the aid beneficiary would remain assured and that the overall series of commitments would remain equivalent in terms of burden sharing and compensatory measures.
Slovenija je navedla, da je vsakodnevno poslovanje NLB več kot pet let upravljala mednarodna ekipa upravljavcev z ustreznimi dotedanjimi dosežki in izkušnjami, ki je bila popolnoma neodvisna od slovenske države.
According to Slovenia, in order to comply with the commitments submitted as part of the 2013 Decision, NLB implemented a number of measures with the following objectives:
Prav tako je za ponazoritev, kako močno se je izboljšala struktura korporativnega upravljanja NLB, opozorila na naslednje sprejete ukrepe:
to strengthen NLB's corporate governance framework;
Slovenija je za ustrezno upravljanje celotnega državnega premoženja ustanovila Slovenski državni holding (v nadaljnjem besedilu: SDH);
to strengthen NLB's pricing policies and risk management framework;
zakonodajalec Slovenije je sprejel Zakon o Slovenskem državnem holdingu, ki določa izbirna merila za imenovanje članov nadzornega sveta SDH;
to rebalance NLB's business towards less risky activities;
NLB je uvedla dvotirni sistem korporativnega upravljanja, v katerem je upravni odbor odgovoren za njeno tekoče poslovanje, pri tem pa ga nadzoruje nadzorni svet.
to repair NLB's balance sheet structure; and
Slovenija je poudarila, da njeno neupoštevanje roka za izpolnitev zaveze o prodaji ni vplivalo na višino državne pomoči, dodeljene v korist NLB, pogoje in okoliščine, v katerih je bila pomoč dodeljena, ali lastni prispevek NLB in porazdelitev bremena.
to restore NLB's long-term profitability.
V skladu s tem je menila, da njena neizpolnitev zaveze o prodaji ne bi smela vplivati na ukrepe, potrebne za omejitev neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence na notranjem trgu.
As a result of those measures, Slovenia considered that NLB had returned to long-term viability, as it can cover all its costs and continue to earn an appropriate return on equity.
Slovenija je nadalje menila, da so bili sklep iz leta 2013 in njegove zaveze povezani le z ukrepi državne pomoči, dodeljenimi leta 2013, in trdila, da je Komisija prejšnji dve državni dokapitalizaciji odobrila že v sklepih z dne 7. marca 2011 oziroma 2. julija 2012.
Slovenia acknowledged that point 15 of the Restructuring Communication explicitly provided that the restructuring period should be as short as possible.
Slovenija je menila še, da dodatni ukrepi za sposobnost preživetja, porazdelitev bremena ali omejitev neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence na notranjem trgu ne bi bili potrebni ali primerni.
Slovenia emphasised however that the delayed implementation of the sale commitment was related to the foreign currency deposit litigation against NLB in Croatia which it considered to be outside of Slovenia's control.
Po njenem mnenju bi taki dodatni ukrepi kršili temeljno načelo Unije o sorazmernosti in bili v nasprotju s prakso Komisije na tem področju.
Going forward, Slovenia indicated that it would devise a credible time schedule for the sale of the 75 % - 1 stake in NLB by the end of 2019, with a major part to be sold already in 2018.
Slovenija je potrdila, da namerava vzpostaviti tudi mehanizem, ki se bo financiral iz t. i.
Slovenia accepted that the existing commitments which related to NLB's sound corporate governance should be extended, but also argued that the need to extend existing commitments which related to undue distortions of competition should be based on a case-by-case assessment.
Sklada za nasledstvo, da bi se NLB zagotovilo nadomestilo za pravne posledice, povezane s pravdnim postopkom, ki poteka na Hrvaškem.
This analysis should take into account the changed market conditions since 2013.
V ta namen je sprejela zakon za zaščito vrednosti kapitalske naložbe Republike Slovenije v NLB.
In addition, Slovenia argued that any commitments should not impede NLB's viability but rather should help to restore it.
Slovenija je v predložitvi z dne 25. julija 2018 poudarila, da si bo še naprej prizadevala za nevtralizacijo ali čim večjo ublažitev finančnih posledic za NLB in posledično uspešno izvedbo prodaje ene delnice manj kot 75 % delnic NLB tako, da bi se čim bolj povečala vrednost za slovenske davkoplačevalce.
In this respect, Slovenia considered that the commitment to divest the Balkan subsidiaries where the sale of its stake in NLB would not take place in time, which Slovenia made in the context of the 2013 Decision, not to be a compensatory measure, as it does not address a market distortion and does not assist or promote the viability of NLB.
Slovenija meni, da bi se s tem mehanizmom ublažil učinek pravdnega postopka na Hrvaškem na prodajno ceno NLB, izvedel bi se v okviru postopka prodaje ter zato ne bi pomenil državne pomoči v smislu člena 107 PDEU.
Regarding the Commission's observation that NLB has not yet issued new subordinated debt, Slovenia highlighted that one of NLB's foreign subsidiaries (NLB Banka Skopje) had sold new subordinated debt of EUR 10 million in June 2015 to […].
Slovenija je s poročilom, ki ga je pripravil njen finančni svetovalec, v predložitev vključila dodatne informacije, da bi pokazala, da bi za zaščito pred posledicami pravdnega postopka, o katerem še ni odločeno, tudi zasebni prodajalec ponudil mehanizem nadomestil.
Furthermore, Slovenia underlined that NLB had been fulfilling all its regulatory capital requirements and continued to have excess levels of capital to withstand a potential stress situation.
Poročilo vključuje okvirno oceno verjetnosti uspeha pri prodaji deleža v NLB na podlagi dveh scenarijev glede pravdnega postopka v zvezi z deviznimi vlogami na Hrvaškem: enega scenarija z zadevnim mehanizmom (z morebitnimi plačili na podlagi mehanizma v poznejši fazi) in drugega scenarija brez takega mehanizma.
Therefore, Slovenia considered committing NLB to issue additional subordinated instruments would not contribute to its long-term viability, also in light of its excess level of liquidity.
V bistvu je bilo v poročilu navedeno, da bodo vlagatelji zaradi nedavnih sodnih odločb na Hrvaškem izpostavljenost hrvaškega pravdnega postopka ocenili na skoraj 100 % največje izpostavljenosti.
Regarding the Commission's observation that NLB still had a high level of non-performing loans, Slovenia argued that NLB's long-term viability cannot be put into question only based solely on this argument.
V poročilu je bilo ugotovljeno, da bi vlagatelji zaradi skupnega učinka zmanjšanega zanimanja vlagateljev in prirastnega tveganja za denarne tokove NLB (oboje bi bilo posledica pravdnega postopka in odloga izplačila dividend) zahtevali višjo donosnost lastniškega kapitala, da bi se zagotovil vpis vseh delnic v prvi javni ponudbi.
Furthermore, Slovenia underlined that NLB has significantly reduced its non-performing loan book since December 2013 (by 70 %) as a result of improved risk management processes.
Združeni negativni učinek obveznosti ([…]) na prodajno ceno in zahteve glede višje donosnosti lastniškega kapitala manjšega števila vlagateljev ([…]) bi znašal […].
Regarding the Commission's assessment that Slovenia had not convincingly demonstrated that it had effectively addressed NLB's corporate governance problems, Slovenia argued that this statement did not accurately reflect NLB's achievements in this area.
V poročilu je bilo ugotovljeno, da je ta številka višja od najvišjega nominalnega zneska v višini […], pri katerem obstaja tveganje, ki izhaja iz pravdnega postopka, kot ga je ocenila NLB.
Slovenia considered that for in excess of five years, the daily operation of NLB had been conducted by an international management team with a relevant track record and experience, which was completely independent from the Slovenian State.
Poročilo torej podpira mnenje, da bo vzpostavitev mehanizma nadomestil v zvezi s hrvaškim pravdnim postopkom za podporo prodajni ceni NLB na koncu prinesla višje čiste prihodke za Slovenijo.
Slovenia also pointed to the following measures undertaken to illustrate how NLB's corporate governance structure had been greatly improved:
POSODOBLJEN SEZNAM ZAVEZ, KI GA JE PREDLOŽILA SLOVENIJA
Slovenia has created the Slovenian Sovereign Holding (‘SSH’) to properly manage all State assets.
Slovenski organi so 13. julija 2018 predložili nov sklop zavez v zvezi z državno pomočjo.
The Slovenian Sovereign Act has been adopted by the Slovenia legislature and sets out selection criteria for the appointment of members of the Supervisory Board of the SSH.
Slovenija je želela zavezo o prodaji spremeniti tako, da je predlagala zmanjšanje svojega deleža v NLB na manjšino, ki lahko prepreči sprejetje odločitve, kot sledi:
NLB has implemented a two-tier corporate governance system in which the Management Board is responsible for its day to day operations and in which it is supervised by the Supervisory Board.
za najmanj eno delnico več kot 50 % delnic do 31. decembra 2018;
Slovenia pointed out that its non-compliance with the sale commitment deadline did not influence the amount of State aid granted in favour of NLB, the conditions and circumstances under which the aid was granted nor NLB's own contribution and burden sharing.
preostale delnice, ki presegajo manjšino, ki lahko prepreči sprejetje odločitve, do 31. decembra 2019.
Against that background, Slovenia considered that its non-compliance with the sale commitment should not have an impact on the measures required to limit undue distortions of competition in the internal market.
Slovenija je v predlaganem seznamu spremenjenih zavez razlikovala med različnimi možnimi scenariji v zvezi s prodajo ene delnice manj kot 75 % delnic NLB.
Slovenia further considered that the 2013 Decision and its commitments only related to the State aid measures granted in 2013 and argued that the previous two State recapitalisations were already authorised by the Commission in its decisions of respectively 7 March 2011 and 2 July 2012 respectively.
V navedenih scenarijih so se uporabile različne skupine zavez (glej uvodne izjave od 50 do 52) in roki za izvedbo zavez, kot je navedeno v preglednici 3.
Such further measures would, according to Slovenia, violate the fundamental Union principle of proportionality and would contradict the Commission's case practice.
Slovenija v primeru ugodnih tržnih razmer ne izključuje možnosti prodaje deleža, večjega od ene delnice več kot 50 % delnic, in vse do celotnega deleža, za eno delnico manjšega od 75 % delnic, do 31. decembra 2018.
Slovenia confirmed it also intends to put in place a mechanism, to be financed by the so-called Succession Fund, in order to compensate NLB from the legal consequences related to the ongoing litigation in Croatia.
V zvezi z zavezami, ki so bile predložene v okviru sklepa iz leta 2013, Slovenija predlaga spremembo in podaljšanje veljavnosti naslednjih obstoječih zavez (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zaveze iz prve skupine):
For this purpose, Slovenia adopted an Act to protect of the value of Republic of Slovenia's capital investment in NLB.
dodelitev sedežev in glasovalnih pravic v nadzornem svetu in odborih neodvisnim strokovnjakom v skladu z odstavkom 9.6 zavez iz leta 2013, pri kateri je spremenjeno le to, da se bodo neodvisnim strokovnjakom dodelili vsi sedeži (namesto prejšnjih dveh tretjin);
In its submission of 25 July 2018, Slovenia highlighted that it would continue to make efforts to neutralise or mitigate to the fullest extent possible financial consequences for NLB in order to successfully complete the sale of the 75 % - 1 stake in NLB in a manner that would maximise value for Slovenian taxpayers.
zagotovitev, da vsaka banka v državni lasti ostane ločena gospodarska enota z neodvisnim odločanjem v skladu z odstavkom 9.10 zavez iz leta 2013;
Slovenia considers that this mechanism would mitigate the impact of the Croatian litigation on NLB's sale price, would be implemented in the context of the sale process and therefore would not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU.
zagotovitev, da slovenska državna podjetja nikakor ne bodo deležna ugodnejše obravnave kot podjetja, ki niso v državni lasti (prepoved diskriminacije), v skladu z odstavkom 11 zavez iz leta 2013;
Slovenia included in its submission additional information by means of a report prepared by their financial advisor to show that the compensation mechanism to protect against the consequences of the on-going litigation would also have been offered by a private vendor.
upoštevanje prepovedi prevzemov, kot je opisana v odstavku 12.4 zavez iz leta 2013.
The report includes an indicative evaluation of the likelihood of success for the sale of the stake in NLB based on two scenarios with respect to the Croatian foreign deposits litigation: one scenario including the mechanism (with potential payments under the mechanism at a later stage) and another scenario without such mechanism.
Poleg tega bodo do takrat, ko bo Slovenija svoj delež v NLB zmanjšala na manjšino, ki lahko prepreči sprejetje odločitve, podaljšane druge obstoječe zaveze (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zaveze iz druge skupine):
In essence, the report indicated, based on the recent Court decisions in Croatia, that investors will price in the exposure of the Croatian litigation virtually at 100 % of the maximum exposure.
zaveza o znižanju stroškov iz odstavka 2 zavez iz leta 2013, pri kateri je spremenjeno le to, da lahko operativni stroški na ravni skupine (brez enkratnih izrednih stroškov, ki se ne ponavljajo) znašajo največ […] EUR letno;
Moreover, the ECB in its supervisory function imposed dividend restrictions because of the ongoing litigation (prior consent of ECB is required for potential dividend pay-outs).
zaveza o odprodaji nestrateških hčerinskih družb iz odstavka 4 zavez iz leta 2013, pri kateri je spremenjeno le to, da NLB ne bo znova vstopila v posle in dejavnosti, ki jih je morala odprodati;
Therefore, without the mechanism NLB would be limited in its ability to pay a dividend and this would in all likelihood reduce the number of potential investors.
zaveza o prepovedi oglaševanja in agresivnih poslovnih strategij iz odstavka 12.1 zavez iz leta 2013;
The report concluded that the combined effect of the reduced investor interest and the incremental risk on NLB's cash flows (both as a result of the litigation and the postponement of dividend payments) would result in investors requiring a higher return of equity to ensure a fully-subscribed initial public offering (‘IPO’).
zaveza o mehanizmu za poplačilo kapitala in prepovedi izplačevanja dividend iz odstavka 12.2 zavez iz leta 2013, pri kateri je spremenjeno le to, da bo NLB na podlagi revidiranih izkazov ob koncu leta svojim delničarjem izplačala vsaj znesek svojega čistega prihodka, in sicer ob upoštevanju omejitev, naloženih z evropskimi ali slovenskimi predpisi, in pod pogojem, da so izpolnjene nekatere minimalne kapitalske zahteve;
The combined negative effect on the sale price of the liability ([…]) and the higher return on equity requirement from the lower number of investors ([…]) would amount to […].
zaveza o skrbniku za spremljanje iz odstavka 18 zavez iz leta 2013, ki bo veljala do konca leta 2019;
The report concluded that this figure is higher than NLB's estimate of the maximum nominal amount at risk of […] stemming from the litigation.
zaveza o skrbniku za odprodajo iz odstavka 19 zavez iz leta 2013.
The report therefore supports the view that establishing a compensation mechanism in relation to the Croatian litigation to support the sales price of NLB will ultimately lead to higher net proceeds for Slovenia.
V zvezi z zavezo o donosnosti lastniškega kapitala ter drugimi zavezami o upravljanju tveganja in kreditnih politikah v skladu z odstavki od 10.1 do 10.6 zavez iz leta 2013 Slovenija predlaga, naj se ta zaveza podaljša vsaj do prodaje ene delnice več od 50 % delnic NLB, pri njej pa je spremenjeno le to, da se bo oblikovanje cen novih posojil štelo za ustrezno, če bo novo posojilo prispevalo k pozitivni donosnosti lastniškega kapitala pred obdavčitvijo v višini vsaj […] pri vsakem posameznem posojilu ali pri vsakem poslu, sklenjenem z določeno stranko.
UPDATED COMMITMENT LIST SUBMITTED BY SLOVENIA
Če Slovenija ne bo do […] zmanjšala svojega deleža v NLB na manjšino, ki lahko prepreči sprejetje odločitve, bo zaveza glede donosnosti lastniškega kapitala znova veljala od […] do takrat, ko bo Slovenija to storila.
On 13 July 2018, the Slovenian authorities submitted a new set of State aid commitments.
Slovenija je kot izravnalna ukrepa za zamudo v postopku prodaje predložila tudi naslednji dodatni zavezi (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zavezi iz tretje skupine):
Slovenia sought to amend the sale commitment by proposing to reduce its stake in NLB to the Blocking Minority as follows:
NLB bo vlagateljem, neodvisnim od Slovenije, najpozneje do […] izdala instrument dodatnega kapitala, razen v primeru resnih motenj na trgu, pri čemer bo to storila na podlagi odobritve Komisije;
by at least 50 % plus one share (‘50 % + 1’) by 31 December 2018
NLB bo do […] zaprla [10–20] poslovalnic v Sloveniji.
the remaining shares exceeding the Blocking Minority by 31 December 2019.
Slovenija je nadalje navedla, da bo NLB do […] odprodala svoj delež v hčerinski zavarovalniški družbi NLB Vita, če Slovenija svojega deleža v NLB do 31. decembra 2018 ne bo zmanjšala na manjšino, ki lahko prepreči sprejetje odločitve.
In its proposed list of amended commitments, Slovenia distinguished between different possible scenarios in relation to the sale of the 75 % - 1 stake in NLB.
Preglednica 3
In those different scenarios, different commitments groups (see recitals 50 to 52) and commitment deadlines would apply, as outlined in Table 3.
Veljavne zaveze in roki v različnih scenarijih
Slovenia submits that where it has not entered into a binding sale and purchase agreement for the sale of its shareholding in NLB in accordance with the amended sale commitment and timetable set out in recital 46, Slovenia will grant to a Divestiture Trustee an exclusive mandate to reduce Slovenia's stake in NLB to the Blocking Minority for the […].
Scenarij
In case of favourable market conditions, Slovenia does not exclude the possibility of selling a stake larger than 50 % + 1 up to the entire 75 % - 1 stake by 31 December 2018.
Zaveze iz prve skupine
In relation to the commitments submitted as part of the 2013 Decision, Slovenia proposes to amend and extend the following existing commitments (‘Group 1 Commitments’):
Zaveze iz druge skupine
to allocate the seats and voting rights on the Supervisory Board and its committees to independent experts in accordance with paragraph 9.6 of the 2013 commitments amended only insofar that 100 % of the seats will be allocated to independent experts (instead of three quarters previously).
Zavezi iz tretje skupine
to ensure that each state-owned bank shall remain a separate economic unit with independent powers of decision in accordance with paragraph 9.10 of the 2013 commitments.
Donosnost lastniškega kapitala (vključno z upravljanjem tveganja in kreditnimi politikami)
to ensure that Slovenian State-owned companies will by no means be treated more favourably than non-State-owned companies (non-discrimination) in accordance with paragraph 11 of the 2013 commitments.
Slovenija proda eno delnico manj kot 75 % delnic NLB do 31.12.2018.
to comply with the acquisition ban as described in paragraph 12.4 of the 2013 commitments.
Do 31.12.2018, razen zaveze o prepovedi prevzemov (do 31.12.2019).
In addition, other existing commitments will be extended until the moment Slovenia has reduced its stake in NLB to the Blocking Minority (‘Group 2 Commitments’):
Do 31.12.2018, razen zaveze o skrbniku za spremljanje (do 31.12.2019).
The Reduction of Costs commitment paragraph 2 of the 2013 commitments, amended only insofar that operating costs at Group level (excluded one-off extraordinary costs having non-recurrent nature) can amount to a maximum of EUR […] on an annual basis.
Izdaja instrumenta dodatnega kapitala do […].
The Divestment of non-core subsidiaries commitment from paragraph 4 of the 2013 commitments, amended only insofar that NLB will not re-enter business and activities which it had to divest.
Zaprtje [10–20] poslovalnic do […].
The Bans of advertising and aggressive commercial strategies commitment from paragraph 12.1 of the 2013 commitments.
n. r.
The Capital repayment Mechanism and dividend ban commitment from paragraph 12.2 of the 2013 commitments amended only insofar that based on the audited year-end accounts, NLB will pay to its shareholders at least the amount of its net income, subject to limitations imposed by European or Slovenian regulations and provided that certain minimum capital requirements are met.
Do prodaje vsaj ene delnice več kot 50 % delnic v NLB.
The Monitoring Trustee commitment from paragraph 18 of the 2013 commitments, which will continue to apply until end of 2019.
Slovenija proda eno delnico več kot 50 % delnic NLB do 31.12.2018, preostale delnice, ki presegajo manjšino, ki lahko prepreči sprejetje odločitve, pa do 31.12.2019.
The Divestiture Trustee commitment from paragraph 19 of the 2013 commitments.
Do 31.12.2019.