natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The CCCME, Bodo Vehicle, Suzhou Rununion and Jinhua Vision reiterated their claim that since subparagraph (a)(ii) of section 15 of the Protocol of Accession of the PRC to the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) had lapsed after 11 December 2016, the existence of dumping should be established on the basis of the domestic prices and costs of the Chinese exporting producers.
Zbornica CCCME, Bodo Vehicle, Suzhou Rununion in Jinhua Vision so ponovili trditev, da je pododstavek (a)(ii) oddelka 15 Protokola o pristopu LRK k Svetovni trgovinski organizaciji (v nadaljnjem besedilu: STO) po 11. decembru 2016 prenehal veljati, zato bi bilo obstoj dampinga treba ugotoviti na podlagi domačih cen in stroškov kitajskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov.
The Commission addressed that claim as explained in section 3.1.1 of the provisional Regulation.
Komisija je to trditev obravnavala, kakor je opisano v oddelku 3.1.1 začasne uredbe.
The Commission applied the legislation in force and applicable to this investigation, namely Article 2(7)(a) and (b) of the basic Regulation.
Komisija je uporabila veljavno zakonodajo, ki se lahko uporabi v tej preiskavi, in sicer člen 2(7)(a) in (b) osnovne uredbe.
Giant Electric Vehicle ‘Giant’ responded to the provisional disclosure, restating its claims that the Commission should have granted Giant MET as, in Giant's view, it fulfilled the MET criteria in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation, notably criteria 1 and 3.
Družba Giant Electric Vehicle (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba Giant) je v odgovoru na začasno razkritje ponovila svoje trditve, da bi ji Komisija morala odobriti TGO, saj po njenem mnenju izpolnjuje merila za TGO iz člena 2(7)(c) osnovne uredbe, zlasti merili št. 1 in 3.
In particular, Giant challenged the Commission's interpretation of State interference, submitting that the possibility of State interference was not sufficient to reject an MET claim.
Družba Giant je zlasti ugovarjala razlagi Komisije glede vmešavanja države, pri čemer je navedla, da možnost vmešavanja države ni zadosten razlog za zavrnitev zahtevka za TGO.
In addition, it restated its arguments that the impact of the distortions on the price of aluminium was not significant.
Poleg tega je ponovila svoje argumente, da vpliv izkrivljanj na ceno aluminija ni bil pomemben.
Concerning criterion 1, the Commission found significant State interference in relation to the aluminium market as described in detail in the MET disclosure document dated 3 May 2018, the letter of 29 May replying to Giant's comments on the MET disclosure and the provisional Regulation, in particular recitals (88) and (89).
Kar zadeva merilo št. 1, je Komisija ugotovila znatno vmešavanje države v zvezi s trgom aluminija, kakor je podrobno opisano v dokumentu o razkritju za TGO z dne 3. maja 2018, dopisu z dne 29. maja, s katerim je odgovorila na pripombe družbe Giant glede razkritja za TGO, in začasni uredbi, zlasti uvodnih izjavah 88 in 89.
The Commission found that the Chinese government can exercise complete control over the aluminium market and regulates the aluminium market with the objective to prevent arbitrage in the economic sense.
Komisija je ugotovila, da lahko kitajska vlada popolnoma nadzoruje trg aluminija in ga regulira, da prepreči arbitražo v gospodarskem smislu.
The Commission found that that situation results in a distorted aluminium market the PRC and constitutes significant State interference by the Chinese government.
Po ugotovitvah Komisije to stanje povzroča izkrivljen trg aluminija v LRK in pomeni znatno vmešavanje države prek kitajske vlade.
The distortion in the aluminium market is so strong that there is no arbitrage, lack of which per se constitutes significant distortion.
Trg aluminija je tako močno izkrivljen, da na njem ni nobene arbitraže, kar samo po sebi pomeni znatno izkrivljanje.
Giant never challenged the Commission's findings of significant State interference in the PRC's aluminium market and of the Chinese government's complete control over it.
Družba Giant ni nikoli ugovarjala ugotovitvam Komisije o znatnem vmešavanju države na trgu aluminija v LRK in o tem, da ga kitajska vlada popolnoma nadzoruje.
It merely claimed that the effect of this State interference was not significant in value terms during the investigation period.
Trdila je le, da učinek tega vmešavanja države v obdobju preiskave ni bil pomemben v smislu vrednosti.
The Commission cannot accept the proposed interpretation, which is not supported by the case-law cited by Giant.
Komisija ne more sprejeti predlagane razlage, ki je sodna praksa, ki jo navaja družba Giant, ne podpira.
In fact, according to case-law, criterion 1 precludes the granting of MET where the State has significantly interfered with the operation of market forces.
Pravzaprav glede na sodno prakso merilo št. 1 preprečuje odobritev TGO, če se je država znatno vmešala v delovanje tržnih sil.
The significant State interference in that regard would not support the conclusion that market economy conditions prevail for a producer operating in such market.
Znatno vmešavanje države v zvezi s tem ne more podpreti sklepa, da pri proizvajalcu, ki deluje na takem trgu, prevladujejo pogoji tržnega gospodarstva.
Thus, the Commission's finding regarding criterion 1 in the provisional Regulation was confirmed.
Zato je bila ugotovitev Komisije glede merila št. 1 v začasni uredbi potrjena.
Concerning criterion 3, Giant claimed that the Commission did not address its claims that the financial incentives were insignificant and not carried over from the former non-market economy system but an expression of legitimate industrial policy.
Kar zadeva merilo št. 3, je družba Giant trdila, da Komisija ni obravnavala njenih trditev, da so bile finančne spodbude zanemarljive in da niso bile prenesene iz prejšnjega sistema netržnega gospodarstva, temveč so izražale legitimno industrijsko politiko.
In addition, Giant resubmitted that the Commission should have considered the significance of the land-use rights being granted basically for free over their life of 50 years.
Poleg tega je družba Giant znova navedla, da bi Komisija morala upoštevati pomen pravic uporabe zemljišč, danih praktično brezplačno za obdobje 50 let.
The Commission notes that the claim regarding financial incentives as well as the methodology applied in relation to the land-use rights, was not only already extensively dealt with in the MET disclosure document, but were also addressed in the letter of 29 May 2018 replying to Giant's comments.
Komisija ugotavlja, da sta bili trditev glede finančnih spodbud in metodologija, uporabljena v zvezi s pravicami uporabe zemljišč, obsežno obravnavani v dokumentu o razkritju za TGO, poleg tega pa tudi v dopisu z dne 29. maja 2018, s katerim je družbi Giant odgovorila na pripombe.
In addition, the Commission's reasoning is also described in the provisional Regulation, in particular in recitals (91) and (92).
Razlogovanje Komisije je prav tako opisano v začasni uredbi, zlasti uvodnih izjavah 91 in 92.
Based on the reasoning described in those documents, the Commission concluded that the preferential tax rate was a financial incentive of a quasi-permanent open-ended character which could also serve the purpose of attracting capital at discounted rates, thereby significantly distorting competition over a long period of time.
Komisija je na podlagi razlogovanja v navedenih dokumentih sklepala, da je bila preferenčna davčna stopnja finančna spodbuda, ki je navidezno trajna in odprta, kar bi se tudi lahko uporabilo za privabljanje kapitala po diskontnih stopnjah, s čimer bi se konkurenca na dolgi rok znatno izkrivila.
The Commission also concluded that the tax deduction for R&D expenses was recurrent and not limited in time and therefore would have similar effect.
Komisija je tudi sklepala, da je bila davčna olajšava za stroške razvoja in raziskav periodična in časovno neomejena, zato bi imela podoben učinek.
Finally, the Commission recalls that the Giant effectively did not pay for its land-use rights (see recital (21)).
Nazadnje, Komisija opozarja, da družba Giant efektivno ni plačala pravic uporabe zemljišč (glej uvodno izjavo 21).
Giant did not present any new argument.
Družba Giant ni podala nobenega novega argumenta.
Thus, criterion 3, that is, the requirement that there are no significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system, remains not fulfilled.
Zato merilo št. 3, tj. zahteva po neobstoju znatnih izkrivljanj, prenesenih iz nekdanjega sistema netržnega gospodarstva, ostaja neizpolnjeno.
The CEIEB claimed that the denial of MET to a Chinese exporting producer was discriminatory, as the Union industry purchases aluminium frames from the PRC and therefore also benefits from the distortions in the aluminium market in the PRC.
Združenje CEIEB je trdilo, da je bila zavrnitev TGO za kitajskega proizvajalca izvoznika diskriminatorna, saj industrija Unije aluminijaste okvire kupuje od LRK in ima torej tudi koristi od izkrivljanj na trgu aluminija v LRK.
The CEIEB also raised the issue of imports of aluminium frames from the PRC by the Union industry under a duty suspension scheme.
Združenje CEIEB je opozorilo tudi, da industrija Unije uvaža aluminijaste okvire iz LRK v okviru sheme opustitve dajatev.
Those claims were rejected.
Navedene trditve so bile zavrnjene.
Purchases by the Union industry are irrelevant for the analysis under Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation which aims at examining whether an exporting producer is entitled to MET for the determination of the normal value.
Nakupi industrije Unije niso pomembni za analizo v skladu s členom 2(7)(c) osnovne uredbe, katere namen je preveriti, ali je proizvajalec izvoznik upravičen do TGO pri določanju normalne vrednosti.
As a result, the Commission did not consider it relevant for the MET determination.
Posledično Komisija tega ni štela za pomembno za rezultate ocene za TGO.
In the absence of comments concerning the investigation period and period considered, recital (7) of the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
Ker pripomb glede obdobja preiskave in obravnavanega obdobja ni bilo, se uvodna izjava 7 začasne uredbe potrdi.
After the publication of the provisional Regulation, three Chinese exporting producers, one importer and the CCCME reiterated their claim set out in recitals (57) to (63) of the provisional Regulation to exclude electric bicycles with an auxiliary motor pedal assistance of up to 45 km/h (‘speed electric bicycles’) from the product scope.
Po objavi začasne uredbe so trije kitajski proizvajalci izvozniki, en uvoznik in zbornica CCCME ponovili svojo trditev iz uvodnih izjav 57 do 63 začasne uredbe, da je treba iz obsega izdelka izključiti električna kolesa s pedali s pomožnim motorjem s hitrostjo do 45 km/h (v nadaljnjem besedilu: hitra električna kolesa).
Those parties argued that speed electric bicycles have significantly different characteristics and intended uses, are not subject to the same regulatory requirements, have significantly different prices and costs, and that, from the consumers' perspective, they are not interchangeable with the other electric bicycles with an auxiliary motor pedal assistance of up to 25 km/h covered by this investigation.
Navedene stranke so trdile, da imajo hitra električna kolesa bistveno drugačne lastnosti in predvidene uporabe, da zanje ne veljajo iste regulativne zahteve, da so njihove cene in stroški bistveno drugačni ter da z vidika potrošnikov niso zamenljiva z drugimi električnimi kolesi s pedali s pomožnim motorjem s hitrostjo do 25 km/h, zajetimi v tej preiskavi.
The CCCME claimed that the Commission had failed to note that the consumer alteration of the software on cut-off speed mentioned by the complainant was illegal and added that this prospect could not be treated as a likely possibility.
Zbornica CCCME je trdila, da je Komisija prezrla, da potrošniško spreminjanje programske opreme glede končne hitrosti, na katero je opozoril pritožnik, ni bilo zakonito, in dodala, da te možnosti ni mogoče šteti za verjetno.
The complainant agreed that it was illegal for consumers to increase the auxiliary motor pedal assistance cut-off speed by making alterations to the software.
Pritožnik se je strinjal, da je bilo potrošniško povečanje končne hitrosti pomoči pri poganjanju s pedali s pomožnim motorjem s spreminjanjem programske opreme nezakonito.
However, it recalled that its claim was not related to such possibility but to the modifications by economic operators (importers, traders) before the electric bicycles were sold on the Union market.
Kljub temu je spomnil, da njegova trditev ni bila povezana s tako možnostjo, temveč s spremembami, ki so jih izvajali gospodarski subjekti (uvozniki, trgovci), preden so bila električna kolesa prodana na trgu Unije.
Indeed, when those changes to software programming involve a decrease in the cut-off speed of the auxiliary motor pedal assistance, they would be legal from a product type approval perspective.
Pravzaprav bi bile navedene spremembe programiranja programske opreme, če bi vključevale zmanjšanje končne hitrosti pomoči pri poganjanju s pedali s pomožnim motorjem, z vidika homologacije izdelka zakonite.
The complainant added that such changes to software programming created an obvious risk of circumvention of the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures.
Pritožnik je dodal, da so take spremembe programiranja programske opreme ustvarile očitno tveganje za izogibanje protidampinškim in protisubvencijskim ukrepom.
The Commission points out that recital (65) of the provisional Regulation does not only refer to consumer alteration of the software but to software programming in general.
Komisija poudarja, da se uvodna izjava 65 začasne uredbe ne nanaša le na potrošniško spreminjanje programske opreme, temveč na programiranje programske opreme v splošnem.
In addition, the same recital clearly referred to both the possibility to change the cut-off speed upwards and downwards.
Poleg tega se jasno nanaša na možnost spremembe končne hitrosti navzgor in navzdol.
While the CCCME notes that an increase by the consumer of the auxiliary motor pedal assistance cut-off speed would be illegal, it does not question other software programming changes, such as decreasing the cut-off speed of the auxiliary motor for pedal assistance by economic operators mentioned in recital (32) of this Regulation.
Čeprav zbornica CCCME ugotavlja, da bi bilo potrošniško povečanje končne hitrosti pomoči pri poganjanju s pedali s pomožnim motorjem nezakonito, ne dvomi o drugih spremembah programiranja programske opreme, kakršno je zmanjšanje končne hitrosti pomožnega motorja za pomoč pri poganjanju s pedali, ki ga opravijo gospodarski subjekti, navedeni v uvodni izjavi 32 te uredbe.
Following final disclosure, the CCCME argued that the Commission only presented the argument concerning economic operators rather than the consumers altering the software programming to increase or decrease the speed of the auxiliary motor assistance for the first time in the final disclosure.
Po dokončnem razkritju je zbornica CCCME trdila, da je Komisija šele v dokončnem razkritju prvič predstavila argument o tem, da gospodarski subjekti, ne pa potrošniki, spreminjajo programiranje programske opreme, da povečajo ali zmanjšajo hitrost pomoči pri poganjanju s pedali s pomožnim motorjem.
That statement is incorrect.
Navedena trditev ni pravilna.
As noted in the previous recital, recital (65) of the provisional Regulation referred to all types of software programming, irrespective of who carries out the software programming.
Kakor je ugotovljeno v prejšnji uvodni izjavi, se je uvodna izjava 65 začasne uredbe nanašala na vse vrste programiranja programske opreme ne glede na to, kdo ga izvede.
There is no indication that recital (65) of the provisional Regulation only referred to software programming carried out by consumers and did not include software programming carried out by economic operators.
Nič ne kaže na to, da se je uvodna izjava 65 začasne uredbe nanašala le na programiranje programske opreme, ki so ga opravili potrošniki, in da ni zajemala programiranja programske opreme, ki so ga opravili gospodarski subjekti.
In any event, the Commission observes that inclusion in the final disclosure is sufficient to allow all interested parties to comment.
Vsekakor Komisija ugotavlja, da je vključitev v dokončno razkritje dovolj, da se vsem zainteresiranim stranem dovoli, da podajo pripombe.
The CCCME claimed that the complainant's statement that all electric bicycles were subject to the same tests under the norm EN 15194 was inaccurate.
Zbornica CCCME je trdila, da navedba pritožnika, da so se za vsa električna kolesa izvedli isti preskusi na podlagi standarda EN 15194, ni točna.
The CCCME submitted that the norm EN 15194 subjects all electric bicycles to the same test procedures.
Navedla je, da po standardu EN 15194 za vsa električna kolesa veljajo isti preskusni postopki.
That norm, however, has no bearing on the difference in speed which commands different requirements and makes speed electric bicycles not interchangeable with other electric bicycles.
Kljub temu ta standard ne vpliva na razliko v hitrosti, ki narekuje različne zahteve in zaradi katere hitra električna kolesa niso zamenljiva z drugimi električnimi kolesi.
The CCCME further argued that speed electric bicycles, as opposed, to ordinary electric bicycles, did not fall under the scope of norm EN 15194.
Zbornica CCCME je prav tako trdila, da hitra električna kolesa v primerjavi z običajnimi električnimi kolesi ne spadajo na področje uporabe standarda EN 15194.
The CCCME submitted that speed electric bicycles are covered as moped vehicles for use on public roads by Regulation (EU) No 168/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
Zbornica CCCME je navedla, da so hitra električna kolesa kot mopedi za uporabo na javnih cestah zajeta z Uredbo (EU) št. 168/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta.
That Regulation excludes electric bicycles with an auxiliary motor pedal assistance of up to 25 km/h.
Navedena uredba s področja uporabe izključuje električna kolesa s pedali z dodatnim pogonom s pomožnim motorjem s hitrostjo do 25 km/h.
Additional rules applying to speed electric bicycles cover taxes, licensing and insurance, license plates and moped compliant helmet and safety compliance checks.
Dodatna pravila, ki se uporabljajo za hitra električna kolesa, zajemajo davke, izdajanje dovoljenj in zavarovanje, registrske tablice ter preverjanje skladnosti čelad za mopede in skladnosti z varnostnimi predpisi.
The CCCME submitted that the reasoning set out in recital (70) of the provisional Regulation that all electric bicycles share the same physical characteristics does not overcome the argument that there are distinct equipment and regulatory requirements associated with speed electric bicycles.
Zbornica CCCME je navedla, da razlogovanje iz uvodne izjave 70 začasne uredbe, da imajo vsa električna kolesa enake fizikalne lastnosti, ne prevlada nad argumentom, da so s hitrimi električnimi kolesi povezane različne zahteve glede opreme in regulativne zahteve.
The CCCME claimed that due to those distinct requirements, speed electric bicycles were not interchangeable with other electric bicycles and that consumers supported this view.
Trdila je, da zaradi teh različnih zahtev hitra električna kolesa niso zamenljiva z drugimi električnimi kolesi in da potrošniki podpirajo to stališče.
In order to substantiate that argument, the CCCME mentioned the opposition of the European Cyclist Federation to the Commission's proposal to request third party liability insurance for all electric bicycles, not only speed electric bicycles.
V podkrepitev navedenega argumenta je navedla nasprotovanje Evropske kolesarske zveze predlogu Komisije, da zahteva zavarovanje odgovornosti do tretjih oseb za vsa električna kolesa, ne le hitra električna kolesa.
The complainant reiterated its claim that all electric bicycles share the same physical characteristics.
Pritožnik je ponovil svojo trditev, da imajo vsa električna kolesa enake fizikalne lastnosti.
In particular, the complainant submitted that all electric bicycles are made of the same bicycle parts and components, and that there are no bicycles' parts which are exclusively used for speed electric bicycles.
Zlasti je navedel, da so vsa električna kolesa izdelana iz enakih delov in sestavnih delov koles in da ni takih delov koles, ki bi se uporabljali izključno za hitra električna kolesa.
This includes the motors manufactured by the major motor producers which can be used to power all types of electric bicycles with the adequate software programming.
To zajema motorje, ki jih izdelujejo glavni proizvajalci motorjev in ki se lahko z ustreznim programiranjem programske opreme uporabljajo za pogon vseh vrst električnih koles.
The difference between speed electric bicycles and other electric bicycles cannot therefore be reliably established on the basis of their physical appearance.
Zato razlike med hitrimi električnimi kolesi in drugimi električnimi kolesi ni mogoče zanesljivo ugotoviti na podlagi njihovega videza.
The complainant submitted that consumer perception is not a determining factor for the determination of the product scope in trade defence proceedings and claimed that electric bicycles of all auxiliary motor pedal assistance levels are available in the different use categories (for example, for use in commuting, trekking, racing, and on mountains) and are marketed to all customer groups irrespective of their age and gender.
Pritožnik je navedel, da dojemanje potrošnikov ni odločilen dejavnik pri določanju obsega izdelka v postopkih trgovinske zaščite in da so električna kolesa z vsemi ravnmi pomoči pri poganjanju s pedali s pomožnim motorjem na voljo v različnih kategorijah uporabe (na primer za uporabo pri prevozu na delo in domov, na izletih, tekmah in v gorah) ter se tržijo za vse potrošniške skupine ne glede na starost in spol.
Consumer perception and use therefore does not justify an exclusion of speed electric bicycles from the product scope.
Zato dojemanje potrošnikov in uporaba ne upravičujeta izključitve hitrih električnih koles iz obsega izdelka.
The complainant submitted that the criterion of type approval and more generally the classification under Regulation (EU) No 168/2013 are not suitable for the definition of the product scope in the present case.
Pritožnik je navedel, da merilo homologacije in splošneje razvrstitev po Uredbi (EU) št. 168/2013 nista primerna za opredelitev obsega izdelka v tem primeru.
The complainant argued that not all speed electric bicycles are subject to type approval but only those intended for use on public roads.
Trdil je, da homologacija ne velja za vsa hitra električna kolesa, temveč le za tista, ki so namenjena uporabi na javnih cestah.
This would exclude, for instance, an electric mountain bike used exclusively for competitive events or off-road mountains which would also not be subject to the further requirements related to type approval (license plate, helmet and insurance).
To bi na primer izključilo električno gorsko kolo, ki se uporablja izključno za tekmovanja ali gorska brezpotja, za katero prav tako ne bi veljale dodatne zahteve glede homologacije (registrska tablica, čelada in zavarovanje).
Furthermore, the complainant argued that electric bicycles which are not subject to type approval under the Regulation (EU) No 168/2013 are nevertheless subject to the exact same product safety requirements under the Union machinery directive.
Poleg tega je pritožnik trdil, da za električna kolesa, za katera ne velja homologacija po Uredbi (EU) št. 168/2013, kljub temu veljajo enake zahteve glede varnosti izdelkov po direktivi Unije o strojih.
The complainant further added that the applicable norm setting specific requirements is the same for all electric bicycles, namely the harmonised norm EN 15194 and therefore restated the claim reflected in recital (64) of the provisional Regulation.
Dodal je še, da je veljavni standard, ki določa posebne zahteve, enak za vsa električna kolesa, in sicer je to harmonizirani standard EN 15194, zato je ponovil trditev, navedeno v uvodni izjavi 64 začasne uredbe.