natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In fact: due to the lowering of the retirement age all new judges will be appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the newly composed National Council for the Judiciary, which will be largely dominated by the political appointees.
Beneška komisija v svojem mnenju o osnutku zakona o vrhovnem sodišču poudarja, da predčasno upokojevanje sedanjih sodnikov spodkopava tako zajamčeno pravico do službenega položaja kot neodvisnost sodišča na splošno .
A forced retirement of current Supreme Court judges also raises concerns as regards the principle of irremovability of judges, which is a key element of the independence of judges as enshrined in the case law of the Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights, and in European standards.
Sodniki bi morali biti pred razrešitvijo zaščiteni z učinkovitimi varovali proti neustreznim posegom ali pritiskom drugih vej oblasti.
In its opinion on the draft law on the Supreme Court, the Venice Commission underlines that the early retirement of the currently sitting judges undermines both their security of tenure and the independence of the Court in general .
Za neodvisnost sodstva so potrebna zagotovila, ki zadostujejo za osebno zaščito tistih, katerih naloga je razsoditi v sporu.
Judges should be protected against dismissal through the existence of effective safeguards against undue intervention or pressure from other State powers.
Nezamenljivost sodnikov v času njihovega mandata je posledica njihove neodvisnosti in je zato vključena v zagotovila iz člena 6(1) EKČP.
Judicial independence requires guarantees sufficient to protect the person of those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute.
Zato je mogoča le posamezna razrešitev sodnikov, če je to upravičeno na podlagi disciplinskega postopka v zvezi z njihovo posamezno dejavnostjo in so zagotovljena vsa zagotovila za obrambo v demokratični družbi.
The irremovability of judges during their term of office is a consequence of their independence and thus included in the guarantees of Article 6(1) ECHR.
Sodnikov ni mogoče razrešiti kot skupine in ni jih mogoče razrešiti iz splošnih razlogov, ki niso povezani z ravnanjem posameznika.
As a consequence, judges must only be dismissed individually, if this is justified on the basis of a disciplinary procedure concerning their individual activity and presenting all guarantees for the defence in a democratic society.
Navedenih zagotovil in varoval v obravnavanem primeru je premalo in zadevne določbe pomenijo grobo kršitev neodvisnosti vrhovnih sodnikov in načela delitve oblasti ter s tem načela pravne države.
Judges cannot be dismissed as a group and judges cannot be dismissed for general reasons not related to individual behaviour.
Tudi šestletni mandat sedanjega prvega predsednika vrhovnega sodišča, določen z ustavo, bo predčasno prenehal (v skladu z ustavo bi se moral zaključiti konec leta 2020).
The above guarantees and safeguards are lacking in the present case and the provisions concerned constitute a flagrant violation of the independence of judges of the Supreme Court and of the separation of powers, and therefore of the rule of law.
Če bo mandat prvega predsednika vrhovnega sodišča prenehal, bo imenovanje „vršilca dolžnosti prvega predsednika vrhovnega sodišča“ s strani predsednika republike potekalo izven normalnega postopka, namreč v skladu z ustavo prvega predsednika vrhovnega sodišča imenuje predsednik republike med kandidati, ki jih predlaga generalna skupščina vrhovnega sodišča .
In addition, the mandate of six years of the current First President, established in the constitution, will be prematurely terminated (constitutionally it should end in 2020).
Tako predčasno prenehanje ustavno določenega mandata pomeni hudo kršitev načela nezamenljivosti in zajamčene pravice do službenega položaja.
If the mandate of the First President is terminated, the appointment of an ‘acting First President’ by the President of the Republic will occur outside the normal procedure: according to the constitution the First President should be appointed by the President of the Republic from among candidates proposed by the general assembly of the Supreme Court .
Imenovanje vršilca dolžnosti prvega predsednika vrhovnega sodišča v skladu z ad hoc postopkom brez posredovanja sodstva vzbuja resne pomisleke glede načela delitve oblasti.
Such a premature termination of a constitutionally enshrined mandate constitutes a serious violation of the principle of irremovability and security of tenure.
V skladu z obrazložitvenim memorandumom zakona je preoblikovanje sestave vrhovnega sodišča nujno potrebno zaradi načina, kako je vrhovno sodišče odločalo o zadevah v zvezi z „dekomunizacijo“ po letu 1989, in ker so na vrhovnem sodišču še vedno sodniki, ki so bodisi delali za predhodni režim bodisi razsojali po njegovih navodilih.
The appointment of an acting First President according to an ad hoc procedure without involvement of the judiciary raises serious concerns as regards the principle of separation of powers.
Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice je jasno poudarilo, da mora biti proces lustracije individualiziran (tj. razlikovati je treba med različnimi ravnmi sodelovanja z nekdanjim režimom), in meni, da so lustracijski ukrepi, ki se izvedejo dolgo časa po koncu komunističnega režima, lahko manj utemeljeni, ker so se tveganja novih demokracij zmanjšala.
According to the explanatory memorandum of the law, the recomposition of the Supreme Court is indispensable because of the way the Supreme Court handled after 1989 the ‘decommunisation’ cases and because there are still judges in the Court who either worked for, or adjudicated under, the previous regime.
Država bi lahko sprejela druge sorazmerne ukrepe za obravnavanje posameznih sodnikov, ki imajo komunistično ozadje (ki bi vključevali pregledne postopke za posamezne primere pred nepristranskimi organi, ki bi delovali na podlagi meril, predhodno določenih z zakonodajo).
The European Court of Human Rights has clearly underlined that a lustration process must be individualised (e.g. distinctions must be made between different levels of involvement with the former regime) and considers that lustration measures taking place long after the end of the communist regime may be less justified in view of the diminishing risks existing over newly created democracies.
Beneška komisija v svojem mnenju o osnutku zakona o vrhovnem sodišču meni, da je težko razumeti, zakaj bi bila oseba, ki je veljala za primerno za opravljanje uradnih dolžnosti za več naslednjih let, nenadoma ocenjena kot neprimerna.
There are other proportionate measures which the state could adopt in order to deal with individual judges having a communist background (which would include transparent proceedings applied in individual cases before impartial organs acting on the basis of criteria pre-established by law).
Obrazložitveni memorandum zakona je mogoče razumeti, da se bo zaradi reforme večina višjih sodnikov, od katerih so številni delali v prejšnjem režimu, upokojila.
In its opinion on the draft law on the Supreme Court, the Venice Commission considers that it is hard to see why a person who was deemed fit to perform official duties for several more years to come would suddenly be considered unfit.
Če je ta razlaga pravilna, je tak pristop nesprejemljiv: če organi dvomijo o lojalnosti posameznih sodnikov, bi morali uporabiti obstoječe disciplinske postopke ali postopke lustracije, ne pa spremeniti upokojitvene starosti.
The explanatory memorandum of the law may be understood as implying that, as a result of the reform, most senior judges, many of whom have served under the previous regime, would retire.
Beneška komisija ugotavlja, da predčasna razrešitev velikega števila sodnikov vrhovnega sodišča (vključno s prvim predsednikom vrhovnega sodišča), ki se je izvedla z uporabo nižje upokojitvene starosti, ki je začela veljati takoj, krši njihove pravice posameznika in ogroža neodvisnost sodstva kot celote; omogočiti bi jim bilo treba, da opravljajo svoje delo do trenutno veljavne upokojitvene starosti.
If this reading is correct, such approach is unacceptable: if the authorities doubt the loyalty of individual judges, they should apply the existing disciplinary or lustration procedures, and not change the retirement age.
Beneška komisija zlasti poudarja, da predčasno upokojevanje sedanjih sodnikov spodkopava tako zajamčeno pravico do službenega položaja kot neodvisnost sodišča na splošno.
The Venice Commission concludes that the early removal of a large number of justices of the Supreme Court (including the First President) by applying to them, with immediate effect, a lower retirement age violates their individual rights and jeopardises the independence of the judiciary as a whole; they should be allowed to serve until the currently existing retirement age.
Te določbe vzbujajo pomisleke glede ustavnosti.
The Venice Commission underlines in particular that the early retirement of the currently sitting judges undermines both their security of tenure and the independence of the Court in general.
Kot sta opozorila vrhovno sodišče in varuh človekovih pravic, razrešitev in prisilno upokojevanje sedanjih sodnikov vrhovnega sodišča kršita načelo neodvisnosti sodstva in neposredno vplivata na pravico do neodvisnega sodišča.
Finally, these provisions raise constitutionality concerns.
Varuh človekovih pravic navaja, da uvedba mesta vršilca dolžnosti prvega predsednika vrhovnega sodišča pomeni kršitev načela pravne države, saj krši načelo neprevzemanja pristojnosti državnih organov, načelo delitve in ravnovesja oblasti ter načelo neodvisnosti sodstva.
As noted by the Supreme Court and the Ombudsman, the dismissal and forced retirement of current Supreme Court judges violate the principle of judicial independence and directly affects the right to an independent court.
Pooblastilo za podaljšanje mandata sodnikov vrhovnega sodišča
The Ombudsman notes that the institution of an acting First President of the Supreme Court constitutes a violation of the rule of law by breaching the principle of non-assumption of competences of state powers, the principle of separation and balance of powers, and the principle of judicial independence.
V skladu z zakonom lahko sodniki vrhovnega sodišča, ki jih zadeva znižana upokojitvena starost in želijo podaljšati svoj tekoči mandat, predsednika republike prosijo za podaljšanje.
The power to prolong the mandate of Supreme Court judges
Glede pooblastila predsednika republike, da se odloči podaljšati tekoči mandat sodnikov vrhovnega sodišča, zakon ne določa niti meril, niti časovnega okvira za sprejetje odločitve in niti sodne presoje.
According to the law, Supreme Court judges affected by the lowered retirement age and wishing to prolong their active mandate can make a request to the President of the Republic.
Sodnik, ki je prosil za podaljšanje, je „na milost in nemilost“ prepuščen odločitvi predsednika republike.
As regards the power of the President of the Republic to decide to prolong the active mandate of Supreme Court judges, there are no criteria, no time-frame for taking a decision and no judicial review provided for in the law.
Poleg tega bo predsednik republike o podaljšanju lahko odločal dvakrat (vsakič za tri leta).
A judge who has asked for the prolongation is ‘at the mercy’ of the decision of the President of the Republic.
Ti elementi vplivajo na zajamčeno pravico do službenega položaja in bodo predsedniku republike omogočali, da vpliva na sodnike vrhovnega sodišča v mandatu.
In addition, the President of the Republic will be in position to decide twice on the prolongation (each time for 3 years).
Ta ureditev je v nasprotju s Priporočilom Sveta Evrope iz leta 2010, ki zahteva, da bi morale odločitve o izbiri in poklicni poti sodnikov temeljiti na objektivnih merilih, predhodno določenih z zakonodajo, za pripravo priporočil ali izražanje mnenj, ki jih v praksi upošteva ustrezen organ za imenovanje, pa bi bilo treba pooblastiti neodvisen in pristojen organ, ki ga v znatnem delu sestavljajo člani iz sodstva.
These elements affect the security of tenure and will allow the President of the Republic to exert influence over active Supreme Court judges.
Prav tako zahteva tudi, da bi morali zadevni sodniki imeti pravico do izpodbijanja odločitve v zvezi s svojo poklicno potjo.
The regime is contrary to the 2010 CoE Recommendation which requires that decisions concerning the selection and career of judges should be based on objective criteria pre-established by law and that there should be an independent and competent authority drawn in substantial part from the judiciary authorised to make recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.
Nova upokojitvena ureditev škodljivo vpliva na neodvisnost sodnikov.
It also requires that judges concerned should have the right to challenge a decision relating to their career .
Nova pravila ustvarjajo dodatno orodje, s katerim lahko predsednik republike vpliva na posamezne sodnike.
The new retirement regime adversely impacts the independence of judges.
Zlasti pomanjkanje meril za podaljšanje mandatov omogoča neustrezno uporabo diskrecijskega pooblastila, ki ogroža načelo nezamenljivosti sodnikov.
The new rules create an additional tool through which the President of the Republic can exert influence on individual judges.
Zakon znižuje upokojitveno starost, hkrati pa sodnikom omogoča, da jim predsednik republike mandat podaljša za največ šest let.
In particular, the lack of any criteria for prolongation of the mandates allow for undue discretion, undermining the principle of irremovability of judges.
Poleg tega ni določen časovni okvir, v katerem mora predsednik republike odločiti o podaljšanju mandata, kar predsedniku republike omogoča, da ohrani vpliv na zadevne sodnike v preostanku njihovega sodniškega mandata.
While decreasing the retirement age, the law allows judges to have their mandate extended by the President of the Republic for up to 6 years.
Tudi pred doseženo upokojitveno starostjo bi lahko že samo možnost, da bodo morali predsednika republike zaprositi za tako podaljšanje, ustvarila pritisk na zadevne sodnike.
Also, there is no time-frame for the President of the Republic to make a decision on the extension of the mandate, which allows the President to retain influence over the judges concerned for the remaining time of their judicial mandate.
Beneška komisija v svojem mnenju o osnutku zakona o vrhovnem sodišču poudarja, da to pooblastilo predsedniku republike daje prevelik vpliv nad sodniki vrhovnega sodišča, ki se približujejo upokojitveni starosti.
Even before the retirement age is reached, the mere prospect of having to request the President for such a prolongation could exert pressure on the judges concerned.
Zato Beneška komisija meni, da predsednik republike kot izvoljeni politik ne bi smel imeti diskrecijskega pooblastila za podaljšanje mandata sodniku vrhovnega sodišča po upokojitveni starosti.
In its opinion on the draft law on the Supreme Court, the Venice Commission underlines that this power of the President of the Republic gives him excessive influence over Supreme Court judges who are approaching retirement age.
Nova pravila vzbujajo pomisleke tudi glede ustavnosti.
For this reason, the Venice Commission concludes that the President of the Republic as an elected politician should not have the discretionary power to extend the mandate of a Supreme Court judge beyond the retirement age.
V skladu z mnenjema vrhovnega sodišča in varuha človekovih pravic novi mehanizem podaljšanja sodniških mandatov ne spoštuje načela zakonitosti in delitve oblasti.
The new rules also raise constitutionality concerns.
Izredno pravno sredstvo
According to the Supreme Court and the Ombudsman's opinions, the new mechanism of prolongation of judicial mandates does not respect the principle of legality and separation of powers.
Zakon uvaja novo obliko sodne presoje dokončnih in zavezujočih sodb in odločitev, tj. izredno pravno sredstvo.
The extraordinary appeal
Tri leta po začetku veljavnosti zakona bo vrhovno sodišče lahko v celoti ali deloma razveljavilo katero koli dokončno sodbo, ki jo je poljsko sodišče izreklo v zadnjih 20 letih, vključno s sodbami vrhovnega sodišča, razen nekaterih izjem.
The law introduces a new form of judicial review of final and binding judgements and decisions, the extraordinary appeal.
Pooblastilo za vložitev izrednega pravnega sredstva imata med drugim generalni državni tožilec in varuh človekovih pravic.
Within three years from the entry into force of the law the Supreme Court will be able to overturn completely or in part any final judgement delivered by a Polish court in the past 20 years, including judgements delivered by the Supreme Court, subject to some exceptions.
Razlogi za izredno pravno sredstvo so raznoliki: izredno pravno sredstvo se lahko vloži, če je to potrebno za zagotovitev pravne države in socialne pravičnosti, odločbe pa ni mogoče razveljaviti ali spremeniti z drugimi izrednimi pravnimi sredstvi, ter če odločba bodisi (1) krši načela ali pravice in svoboščine oseb in državljanov, določene v ustavi, ali (2) očitno krši zakon zaradi napačne razlage ali napačne uporabe, ali (3) med ugotovitvami sodišča in zbranimi dokazi obstaja očitno protislovje.
The power to lodge the appeal is vested in, inter alia, the Prosecutor General and the Ombudsman.
Ta novi postopek z izrednim pravnim sredstvom vzbuja pomisleke glede načela pravne varnosti, ki je ključni element pravne države.
The grounds for the appeal are broad: the extraordinary appeal can be lodged if it is necessary to ensure the rule of law and social justice and the ruling cannot be repealed or amended by way of other extraordinary remedies, and either it (1) violates the principles or the rights and freedoms of persons and citizens enshrined in the Constitution; or (2) it is a flagrant breach of the law on the grounds of misinterpretation or misapplication; or (3) there is an obvious contradiction between the court's findings and the evidence collected.
Kakor je ugotovilo Sodišče, je treba opozoriti na poseben pomen načela pravnomočnosti, tako za pravni red EU kot za nacionalne pravne sisteme, in sicer „da bi se zagotovila stabilnost prava in pravnih razmerij in učinkovito izvajanje sodne oblasti, je namreč pomembno, da sodnih odločb, ki so postale pravnomočne, potem ko so bila izčrpana vsa razpoložljiva pravna sredstva ali potem ko so se iztekli roki zanje, ni več mogoče izpodbijati“.
This new extraordinary appeal procedure raises concerns as regards the principle of legal certainty which is a key component of the rule of law.
Kakor je ugotovilo Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice, izredna presoja ne sme biti „prikrita pritožba“ in „možnost obstoja dveh mnenj o temi ne sme biti razlog za ponovno proučitev“.
As noted by the Court of Justice, attention should be drawn to the importance, both for the EU legal order and national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata: ‘in order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called in question’.
Beneška komisija v svojem mnenju o osnutku zakona o vrhovnem sodišču poudarja, da je postopek z izrednim pravnim sredstvom nevaren za stabilnost poljskega pravnega reda.
As noted by the European Court of Human Rights, extraordinary review should not be an ‘appeal in disguise’, and ‘the mere possibility of there being two views on the subject is not a ground for re-examination’.
V mnenju ugotavlja, da bo mogoče ponovno odpreti vsako zadevo v državi v zadnjih 20 letih na praktično vsaki podlagi, kar bi sistem lahko privedlo do tega, da nobena sodba ne bo nikoli več dokončna.
In its opinion on the draft law on the Supreme Court, the Venice Commission underlined that the extraordinary appeal procedure is dangerous for the stability of the Polish legal order.
Novo izredno pravno sredstvo vzbuja pomisleke tudi glede ustavnosti.
The opinion notes that it will be possible to reopen any case decided in the country in the past 20 years on virtually any ground and the system could lead to a situation in which no judgement will ever be final anymore.
V skladu z vrhovnim sodiščem in varuhom človekovih pravic zakon vpliva na načelo stabilnosti sodne prakse in dokončnosti sodb, načelo varstva zaupanja v državo in pravo ter pravico, da se zadeva obravnava v razumnem roku.
The new extraordinary appeal also raises constitutionality concerns.
Druge določbe
According to the Supreme Court and the Ombudsman, the law affects the principle of stability of jurisprudence and the finality of judgements, the principle of protecting trust in the state and law as well as the right to have a case heard within a reasonable time.
Kot je poudarjeno v mnenju Beneške komisije in drugih organov, številne druge določbe zakona o vrhovnem sodišču vzbujajo pomisleke glede načel neodvisnosti sodstva in delitve oblasti.
Other provisions
Novi zakon uvaja novo disciplinsko ureditev za sodnike vrhovnega sodišča.
As underlined in the opinion of the Venice Commission and of other bodies, a number of other provisions in the Law on the Supreme Court raise concerns as regards the principles of judicial independence and separation of powers.
Določeni sta dve vrsti vodij disciplinskega postopka: vodja disciplinskega postopka na vrhovnem sodišču, ki ga imenuje kolegij vrhovnega sodišča za štiriletni mandat, ter izredni vodja disciplinskega postopka, ki ga imenuje predsednik republike za vsak primer posebej izmed sodnikov vrhovnega sodišča, splošnih sodnikov, sodnikov in tožilcev na vojaškem sodišču.
The new law establishes a new disciplinary regime for Supreme Court judges.
Na podlagi poljskega prava se lahko samo vodje disciplinskega postopka odločijo začeti disciplinski postopek proti sodnikom.
Two types of disciplinary officers are foreseen: the disciplinary officer of the Supreme Court appointed by the College of the Supreme Court for a four-year term of office, and the extraordinary disciplinary officer appointed on a case-by-case basis by the President of the Republic from among Supreme Court judges, ordinary judges, military court judges and prosecutors.
V imenovanje izrednega vodje disciplinskega postopka s strani predsednika republike sodstvo ni vključeno, imenovanje pa je enako zahtevi za začetek predhodne preiskave.
Under Polish law, only disciplinary officers can decide on the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against judges.
Iz imenovanja izrednega vodje disciplinskega postopka za disciplinski postopek v teku je izključen vodja disciplinskega postopka vrhovnega sodišča.
The appointment of an extraordinary officer by the President of the Republic occurs without involvement of the judiciary and equals to a request to initiate a preliminary investigation.
Dejstvo, da ima predsednik republike (in v nekaterih primerih tudi minister za pravosodje) moč, da vpliva na disciplinski postopek proti sodnikom vrhovnega sodišča z imenovanjem vodje disciplinskega postopka za preiskovanje zadeve („vodja disciplinskega postopka“), pri čemer je iz postopka v teku izključen vodja disciplinskega postopka vrhovnega sodišča, vzbuja pomisleke glede načela delitve oblasti in lahko vpliva na neodvisnost sodstva.
Appointment of an extraordinary disciplinary officer to an ongoing disciplinary proceeding excludes the disciplinary officer of the Supreme Court from that proceeding.
Ti pomisleki so bili izraženi tudi v mnenjih ODIHR OVSE in vrhovnega sodišča.