natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to those data, RBS lost [3-7] % of market share between the 4th quarter of 2010 and the 4th quarter of 2016 in the market for SMEs with a turnover up to GBP 25 million.
Na podlagi analize v uvodnih izjavah od 122 do 131 Komisija ocenjuje, da je zelo verjetno, da bo z nadomestnim svežnjem dosežen prenos 3-odstotnega tržnega deleža z MSP kot strankami.
The Commission considers that using the market share loss since Q4 2011 ([0-5] %) is more prudent versus using the market share loss since Q4 2010 ([3-7] %), because the first data point (Q4 2010) gives a market share higher than what was communicated from other sources at the time of the Restructuring Decision and it can therefore not be excluded that it is a one-off peak not reflecting correctly the starting point in 2008-2009.
Komisija zato meni, da bo z nadomestnim svežnjem dosežena izguba tržnega deleža za MSP, predvidena leta 2009 v času sprejetja sklepa o prestrukturiranju.
The Commission therefore considers that the market share in the UK SME market segment which has already been lost can be prudently quantified at [0-5] %.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je ukrep A usmerjen na MSP kot stranke, vendar pa iz izkoriščanja nadomestnega svežnja ne izključuje srednje velikih korporacij.
The 5 % decrease in market share of RBS expected in the Restructuring Decision is exceeded when one aggregates the market share loss expected from the alternative package (up to 3 % resulting from Measure B alone) with the observed market share loss of [0-5] %.
Sklad za zmogljivost in inovacije bo bankam omogočil, da okrepijo in razširijo svoje obstoječe ponudbe poslovnega bančništva za večja MSP in s tem tudi za srednje velike korporacije.
Based on the analysis in recitals 122 to 131 the Commission assesses that there is a high likelihood a 3 % market share transfer in SME customers will be achieved by the alternative package.
Na primer, ena od bank je v svojih pripombah po sklepu o začetku postopka navedla, da bi vložila do 25 milijonov GBP v izpopolnjeno internetno bančništvo za poslovno platformo, ki bi zagotavljala izpopolnjene digitalne zmogljivosti (vključno z zmogljivostmi za devizne posle in mednarodna plačila) za male, srednje in velike korporacije.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the market share loss for SMEs anticipated in 2009 at the time of the Restructuring Decision would be met by the alternative package.
Ta banka je predvidela tudi, da bi ji drugi naložbeni načrti v višini do 50 milijonov GBP pomagali zajeti vse segmente trga.
The Commission observes that Measure A is targeted to SME customers, but it does not exclude mid-corporates from benefiting from the alternative package.
Komisija tudi meni, da bo shema spodbud za prenos računov (z velikimi denarnimi spodbudami za večja in kompleksnejša MSP) dodatno spodbudila konkurenčne subjekte k nadaljnjemu izboljšanju produktov in storitev za navedena večja MSP.
The Capability & Innovation Fund will enable banks to enhance and extend their existing business banking propositions for larger SMEs and therefore also for mid-corporates.
Navedeni konkurenčni subjekti bodo torej okrepili tudi zmogljivost za zagotavljanje storitev srednje velikim korporacijam.
For example, one of the banks indicated in their submission following the Opening Decision that it would invest up to GBP 25 million in a sophisticated internet Banking for Business platform that would provide sophisticated digital capabilities (including FX and international payment capabilities) to small, medium and large corporates.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da so nepovratna sredstva in denarne spodbude iz ukrepov A in B osredotočeni na tistih nekaj konkurenčnih subjektov, ki imajo veliko obstoječo zmogljivost ponudbe poslovnih TRR za MSP.
This bank also anticipated that up to GBP 50 million of other investments plans would help it to address all market segments.
Zadevni konkurenčni subjekti bodo tudi verjetno poskušali konkurirati za srednje velike korporacije.
The Commission also considers that the Incentivised Switching Scheme (with large dowries for the larger, more complex SME's) will further incentivise Challenger Entities to further enhance the products and services for those larger SME's.
Glede na podatke, ki jih je izračunal ponudnik, je tržni delež banke RBS v četrtem četrtletju 2010 (prvo izhodišče za podatke) na trgu za korporacije s prometom nad 25 milijonov GBP znašal kar [30–35] %.
Therefore those Challenger Entities will also enhance the capability to serve mid-corporate customers.
Glede na navedene podatke je banka RBS med četrtim četrtletjem 2010 in drugim četrtletjem 2017 na trgu za MSP s prometom do 25 milijonov GBP izgubila [5–10] % tržnega deleža.
The Commission also observes that the grants and dowries of Measures A and B are concentrated with those few Challenger Entities with strong existing SME BCA capability.
Podobno kot pri segmentu trga za MSP Komisija meni, da je razumneje uporabiti izgubo tržnega deleža od četrtega četrtletja 2011 kot izgubo tržnega deleža od četrtega četrtletja 2010.
Those Challenger Entities will also be the ones which are likely to try to compete for the mid-corporates.
Komisija navaja, da je ugotovljena izguba tržnega deleža banke RBS pri korporacijah od četrtega četrtletja 2011 do četrtega četrtletja 2016 ([0–5] %) v skladu z izgubo tržnega deleža pri MSP ([0–5]%).
According to the data calculated by the provider, RBS's market share segment was as high as [30-35] % in the 4th quarter of 2010 (first data point) in the market for corporates with a turnover above GBP 25 million.
Ugotovljena izguba tržnega deleža je še večja, če se upošteva izguba tržnega deleža od četrtega četrtletja 2011 do drugega četrtletja 2017 ([5–10] %).
According to those data, RBS lost [5-10] % of market share between the 4th quarter of 2010 and the 2nd quarter of 2017 in the market for SMEs with a turnover up to GBP 25 million.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da srednje velike korporacije pogosto zahtevajo bolj zapletene in raznovrstne bančne produkte.
Similar to the SME market segment, the Commission considers that using the market share loss from Q4 2011 is more prudent versus using the market share loss since Q4 2010.
Zanimanje za te stranke je izkazalo le zelo omejeno število konkurenčnih subjektov, saj jih večina nima zmogljivosti za dobičkonosen razvoj navedenih produktov.
The Commission notes that the observed market loss of RBS for corporates from Q4 2011 to Q4 2016 ([0-5] %) is in line with the market loss for the SME's ([0-5] %).
Po mnenju Komisije je prav tako razumno upoštevati pripombe Združenega kraljestva v uvodni izjavi 66(e), v katerih je poudarjeno, da bi imela odprodaja poslovnih enot Rainbow manjši in/ali bolj negotov učinek na konkurenco v segmentu srednje velikih korporacij kot v segmentu MSP.
The observed market loss is even larger when considering the market loss from Q4 2011 to Q2 2017 ([5-10] %).
Čeprav je izkrivljanje konkurence težje kvantificirati zaradi posrednega učinka nadomestnega svežnja na segment srednje velikih korporacij, Komisija meni, da bo nadomestni sveženj skupaj z ugotovljeno izgubo tržnega deleža verjetno dosegel učinek na konkurenco za srednje velike korporacije, ki je najmanj enakovreden odprodaji poslovnih enot Rainbow.
The Commission also notes that the mid-corporates often require more complex and more varied banking products.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je z ukrepoma A in B zajeto tudi izkrivljanje konkurence za srednje velike korporacije.
Only a very limited number of Challenger Entities have shown real interest in those customers, as most entities do not have the capacity to develop those products in a profitable way.
V zvezi s srednje velikimi korporacijami in MSP kot strankami se lahko za primerjavo enakovrednosti odprodaje poslovnih enot Rainbow in nadomestnega svežnja uporabi tudi ocenjena skupna kapitalska izguba pri različnih scenarijih.
The Commission also thinks it is reasonable to consider the UK comments in recital 66(e), outlining that the divestment of the Rainbow business would have had a smaller and/or more uncertain impact on competition in the mid-corporate segment compared to the SME segment.
Sklep o prestrukturiranju ni vseboval ocene stroškov kapitala pri odprodaji poslovnih enot Rainbow.
Although the distortion of competition is more difficult to quantify due to the indirect impact of the alternative package on the mid-corporate segment, the Commission considers that, together with the observed market loss, the alternative package will likely achieve a competition impact for mid-corporates at least equivalent to the divestment of the Rainbow business.
Vendar je smiselno uporabiti oceno stroškov kapitala, ki bi jih povzročila prodaja poslovnih enot Rainbow, če bi bila izvedena; kvantificirali so jo organi Združenega kraljestva.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that the distortion of competition is also addressed for the mid-corporates by Measures A and B.
Stroški, ki so nastali banki RBS od leta 2009 zaradi izpolnjevanja zaveze za odprodajo, znašajo [1–3] milijarde GBP.
With respect to both mid-corporates and SME clients, the estimated total capital loss of the different scenarios may also be used to compare the equivalence between the divestment of the Rainbow business and the alternative package.
To zajema več vrst stroškov, od katerih največji delež pomenijo stroški za tehnologijo, da se vzpostavi ločena platforma IT za poslovne enote Rainbow.
The Restructuring Decision did not contain an estimation of the capital cost of the divestment of the Rainbow business.
Neposredna kapitalska izguba nadomestnega svežnja je manjša, kot če bi se nadaljevala odprodaja poslovnih enot Rainbow.
However, it is reasonable to use the estimation of the capital cost which the Rainbow business sale would generate if it is pursued, which has been quantified by the UK authorities.
Če se prištejejo še stroški, ki so banki RBS že nastali, je nadomestni sveženj očitno dražji od tega, kar je bilo implicitno predvideno v sklepu o prestrukturiranju.
The cost that RBS has incurred since 2009 to comply with the divestment commitment stands at GBP [1-3]billion.
Skratka, glede na ta kazalnik nadomestni sveženj, kot trdijo organi Združenega kraljestva, ne zmanjša finančnega bremena banke RBS v primerjavi s tem, kar je bilo predvideno v sklepu o prestrukturiranju; dejansko je precej dražji.
This covers several types of costs, the biggest of which are technology costs to create a separate IT platform for the Rainbow business.
Za primerjavo različnih scenarijev se lahko uporabi tudi učinek na količnik CET1.
The direct capital loss of the alternative package is lower than if the divestment of the Rainbow business is continued.
Razlika med kazalnikom količnika CET1 in kazalnikom kapitalske izgube je, da se pri prvem upošteva tudi zmanjšanje RWA: če scenarij povzroči večje zmanjšanje tveganju prilagojene aktive, ima – za dano kapitalsko izgubo – manj negativen učinek na količnik CET1.
In addition, when adding the costs already incurred by RBS, the alternative package is clearly more costly than what was implicitly envisaged in the Restructuring Decision.
Podatke o CET1 so zagotovili organi Združenega kraljestva.
In conclusion, using that indicator, the alternative package, as claimed by the UK authorities, does not lighten the financial burden of RBS compared to what was envisaged in the Restructuring Decision; it is actually significantly more costly.
V preglednici 3 je prikazano, da je učinek nadomestnega svežnja na CET1 večji.
The CET1 ratio impact may also be used to compare the different scenarios.
Zdi se, da je to posledica dejstva, da vključuje manjšo izgubo sredstev.
The difference between the CET1 ratio indicator and the capital loss indicator is that the former also takes into account the reduction in RWA: if a scenario generates a larger reduction in risk weighted assets, it has — for a given capital loss — a less negative effect on the CET1 ratio.
Torej, čeprav je kapitalska izguba nekoliko manjša, ima nekoliko bolj negativen učinek na količnik CET1.
The CET1 figures were provided by the UK authorities.
Različne scenarije je mogoče primerjati tudi na podlagi skupnih sredstev.
Table 3 illustrates that the CET1 impact of the alternative package is more significant.
Učinek nadomestnega svežnja na skupna sredstva je bistveno manjši kot pri zavezi za odprodajo poslovnih enot Rainbow.
This seems to be the consequence of the fact that it involves a smaller loss of assets.
Zaveza za odprodajo poslovnih enot Rainbow je bila namenjena odprodaji poslovno uspešnega subjekta.
Hence, even if the capital loss is slightly smaller, is has a slightly more negative effect on the CET1 ratio.
Da bi bile poslovne enote Rainbow poslovno uspešen subjekt, so morale imeti dovolj sredstev, ki ustvarjajo prihodke, in strank, da so nosile stroške njihove velike mreže podružnic in infrastrukture.
The alternative scenarios can be compared across total assets as well.
Področje dejavnosti poslovnih enot Rainbow je torej poleg posojil in vlog za MSP, ki so bila v središču ukrepa, namenjenega povečanju konkurence na trgu MSP, vključeval tudi veliko količino posojil in vlog za prebivalstvo.
The total asset impact of the alternative package is significantly smaller than under the commitment to divest the Rainbow business.
Prenos sredstev in obveznosti prebivalstva ter drugih sredstev in obveznosti, ki ne pripadajo MSP, z nadomestnim svežnjem ni predviden.
The commitment to divest the Rainbow business aimed at divesting a viable entity.
Ta sveženj je osredotočen na prenos dela MSP kot strank z njihovimi sredstvi (posojili) in obveznostmi (vlogami).
In order to be a viable entity, the Rainbow business needed to have enough income-generating assets and customers to bear the costs of its large branch network and infrastructure.
Nadomestni sveženj je torej po višini prenesenih sredstev mnogo manjši, vendar pa se z njim poskuša doseči podoben rezultat na trgu bančnega poslovanja z MSP v Združenem kraljestvu.
Therefore, besides SME loans and deposits which were the focus of the measure targeted at increasing competition on the SME market, the Rainbow business' perimeter also included a large amount of retail loans and deposits.
Sklepna ugotovitev o enakovrednosti posodobljenega nadomestnega svežnja
The alternative package does not envisage the transfer of the retail and other non-SME assets and liabilities.
Banka RBS je od sprejetja sklepa o prestrukturiranju (14. decembra 2009) dejansko poskušala odprodati poslovne enote Rainbow, kot dokazujejo zaporedni postopki, ki so bili uvedeni, velika količina vključenih virov in delovna sila, namenjena odprodaji poslovnih enot Rainbow.
It is focused on achieving a transfer of part of the SME customers, with their assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits).
Pri tem so banki RBS nastali precejšnji stroški (zlasti ocenjeni stroški poskusa odprodaje poslovnih enot Rainbow, kot so opisani v uvodni izjavi 148).
The alternative package is therefore much smaller in terms of amounts of assets transferred, but attempts to deliver a similar outcome on the UK SME banking market.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da se zdi, da z nadomestnim svežnjem zahteve za banko RBS niso zmanjšane.
Conclusion on equivalence of the updated alternative package
V smislu stroškov bi bilo poleg stroškov, ki so banki RBS že nastali v preteklosti, z izvajanjem nadomestnega svežnja banki RBS naloženo dodatno stroškovno breme.
From the date of the Restructuring Decision (14 December 2009), RBS has genuinely tried to divest the Rainbow business as evidenced by the successive procedures launched, the significant amount of resources involved and manpower dedicated to the divestment of the Rainbow business.
Skupni stroški od leta 2009 bi bili bistveno višji od stroškov, ki so se implicitno pričakovali s sklepom o prestrukturiranju.
In doing so, RBS has incurred significant costs (notably, the estimated costs of attempting to divest the Rainbow business, as described in recital 148).
Nadomestni sveženj bo v povezavi z izgubljenimi tržnimi deleži privedel do skupnega zmanjšanja tržnega deleža banke RBS na trgu MSP, ki je najmanj enakovreden zmanjšanju, predvidenemu v sklepu o prestrukturiranju.
The Commission also notes that the alternative package does not seem to lighten the requirements on RBS.
Pomislek, da banka RBS zelo veliko pomoč iz let 2008–2009 uporablja za utrditev ali povečanje svojega tržnega deleža na že koncentriranem trgu MSP, bo torej ublažen enako, kot bi bil, če bi bila izvedena odprodaja poslovnih enot Rainbow, kot je bila predvidena s sklepom o prestrukturiranju.
In terms of costs, besides the cost already incurred by RBS in the past, the implementation of the alternative package would impose an additional cost burden on RBS.
Komisija zato meni, da je v smislu doseganja predvidenega učinka na konkurenco nadomestni sveženj enakovreden odprodaji poslovnih enot Rainbow.
The cumulative costs since 2009 would be significantly higher than what was implicitly expected by the Restructuring Decision.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da je banka RBS izpolnila vse zaveze in spremenjene zaveze (razen odprodaje poslovnih enot Rainbow) iz sklepa o prestrukturiranju in spremenjenega sklepa o prestrukturiranju.
The alternative package, in combination with the lost market shares, will result in total decrease of RBS market share in the SME market which is at least equivalent to what was envisaged in the Restructuring Decision.
Priglašena nadomestitev ene zaveze za odprodajo torej poteka v okviru pravilnega izvajanja preostalega dela načrta prestrukturiranja.
The concern that the very large 2008-2009 aid is used by RBS to consolidate or grow its market share in the already concentrated SME market would therefore be as much allayed as it would have been if the divestment of the Rainbow business had been implemented as envisaged by the Restructuring Decision.
SKLEPNA UGOTOVITEV
The Commission therefore considers that, in order to achieve the intended effect on competition, the alternative package is equivalent to the divestment of the Rainbow business.
Na podlagi zgornje ocene so bili dvomi Komisije o enakovrednosti nadomestnega svežnja, izraženi v sklepu o začetku postopka, odpravljeni.
The Commission also notes that RBS has implemented all Commitments and Amended Commitments (other than the divestment of the Rainbow business) from the Restructuring Decision and the Amended Restructuring Decision.
Sprememba v zavezah ne vpliva na sklepno ugotovitev iz sklepa o prestrukturiranju in spremenjenega sklepa o prestrukturiranju, zato bi bilo treba državno pomoč za banko RBS razglasiti za združljivo z notranjim trgom na podlagi člena 107(3)(b) PDEU.
The notified replacement of a single divestment commitment is therefore taking place in the context of a correct implementation of the rest of the restructuring plan.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da bi bilo treba morebitno državno pomoč upravičencem iz nadomestnega svežnja razglasiti za združljivo kot nujen del zavez, na podlagi katerih so ukrepi pomoči v korist banke RBS razglašeni za združljive –
On the basis of the foregoing assessment, the Commission's doubts on the equivalence of the alternative package expressed in the Opening Decision have been dispelled.
Člen 1
The amendment in commitments does not affect the conclusion reached in the Restructuring Decision and the Amended Restructuring Decision and the State aid provided to RBS should therefore be declared compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
Nadomestitev zaveze za odprodajo poslovnih enot Rainbow z nadomestnim svežnjem, ki ga je Združeno kraljestvo priglasilo v zvezi z banko RBS, je združljiva z notranjim trgom v smislu člena 107(3)(b) Pogodbe.
Furthermore, the Commission concludes that the potential State aid to beneficiaries from the alternative package should be declared compatible as a necessary part of the commitments on the basis of which the aid measures in favour of RBS are declared compatible,
Nadomestitev zaveze za odprodajo poslovnih enot Rainbow z nadomestnim svežnjem se zato odobri.
Article 1
Morebitna državna pomoč upravičencem do nadomestnega svežnja je združljiva z notranjim trgom v smislu člena 107(3)(b) Pogodbe.
The replacement of the commitment to divest the Rainbow business with the alternative package notified by the United Kingdom regarding RBS is compatible with the internal market within the meaning of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty.
Člen 3
The replacement of the commitment to divest the Rainbow business by the alternative package is accordingly authorised.
Ta sklep je naslovljen na Združeno kraljestvo Velika Britanija in Severna Irska.
The potential State aid to beneficiaries of the alternative package is compatible with the internal market within the meaning of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty.
Za Komisijo
This Decision is addressed to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
UL C 142, 5.5.2017, str.
Done at Brussels, 18 September 2017.
8.
For the Commission
UL C 119, 7.5.2010, str.
OJ C 142, 5.5.2017, p.
Za popoln seznam odobrenih ukrepov državne pomoči glej uvodne izjave 31 do 77 sklepa o prestrukturiranju.
8.
UL C 24, 23.1.2015, str.
OJ C 119, 7.5.2010, p.
4.
1.
Za pregled zahtevanih sprememb glej uvodne izjave od 27 do 49 spremenjenega sklepa o prestrukturiranju.
For a full list of the State aid measures approved, see recitals 31 to 77 of the Restructuring Decision.
Uvodna izjava 73 sklepa o prestrukturiranju.
OJ C 24, 23.1.2015, p.
V skladu z uvodno izjavo 73 sklepa o prestrukturiranju je trg bančnega poslovanja z MSP opredeljen kot segment trga bančnega poslovanja, ki zajema podjetja s prometom do 25 milijonov GBP, trg bančnega poslovanja s srednje velikimi korporacijami pa kot segment, ki zajema podjetja s prometom od 25 milijonov GBP do 1 milijarde GBP.
4.
Uvodna izjava 93 sklepa o prestrukturiranju.
For an overview of the amendments requested, see recitals 27 to 49 of the Amended Restructuring Decision.
Uvodna izjava 28 ter spremenjeni zavezi 3.1 in 3.2(A) Priloge I k spremenjenemu sklepu o prestrukturiranju.
Recital 73 of the Restructuring Decision.
Glej opombo 1.
Pursuant to recital 73 of the Restructuring Decision, SME banking market is defined as the segment of the banking market covering firms with a turnover up to GBP 25 million and mid-corporate as the segment covering firms with a turnover between GBP 25 million and 1 billion.
Ta tržni preizkus vključuje razgovore organov Združenega kraljestva s šestimi velikimi konkurenčnimi subjekti, 12 manjšimi konkurenčnimi subjekti ter sedmimi anketiranci s trga tveganega kapitala in finančne tehnologije ter raziskavo v zvezi z vedenjem strank pri prenosih računov v okviru divizije W&G, ki jo je po naročilu banke RBS izvedla družba Charterhouse.
Recital 93 of the Restructuring Decision.
Veliki konkurenčni subjekti so bili CYBG PLC, Co-op Bank, Handelsbanken, Metro Bank, Santander UK PLC in TSB Bank.
Recital 28 and Amended Commitments 3.1 and 3.2 (A) of Annex I to the Amended Restructuring Decision.
Manjši konkurenčni subjekti so bili Aldermore Group PLC, Allied Irish Bank, Atom Bank, Cumberland Building Society, Danske Bank, Monzo, OakNorth Bank, Paragon Bank PLC, Shawbrook Bank, Starling Bank, Tesco Bank in Virgin Money.
See footnote 1.
Anketiranci s trga tveganega kapitala in finančne tehnologije so bili British Business Bank Investments Limited, Business Growth Fund, Funding Circle, Louise Beaumont (neodvisna strokovnjakinja za finančno tehnologijo), Iwoca, Nesta in Transferwise.
This market testing includes the UK Authorities' interviews with six large Challenger Entities, 12 smaller Challenger Entities and seven Venture Capital and Fintech respondents, as well as RBS commissioned research by Charterhouse into the switching behaviour of customers within the W&G perimeter.
Banka RBS je podrobno opisana v uvodnih izjavah od 4 do 11 spremenjenega sklepa o prestrukturiranju.
The large Challenger Entities were CYBG PLC; Co-op Bank; Handelsbanken; Metro Bank; Santander UK PLC; and TSB Bank.
Ključne formalne številke od leta 2008 do leta 2016 so predstavljene v uvodnih izjavah od 7 do 10 sklepa o začetku postopka.