natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The fact that the President of the Republic (and in some cases also the Minister of Justice) has the power to exercise influence over disciplinary proceedings against Supreme Court judges by appointing a disciplinary officer who will investigate the case (‘disciplinary officer’) which will exclude the disciplinary officer of the Supreme Court from an on-going proceeding, creates concerns as regards the principle of separation of powers and may affect judicial independence.
Zakon prav tako odpravlja vrsto postopkovnih jamstev v disciplinskem postopku proti splošnim sodnikom in sodnikom vrhovnega sodišča: dokazi, zbrani s kršitvijo prava, bi se lahko uporabili zoper sodnika; pod nekaterimi pogoji ne bi bilo treba upoštevati dokazov, ki jih predloži zadevni sodnik; zastaranje v disciplinskih zadevah bi bilo odloženo za obdobje trajanja disciplinskega postopka, kar pomeni, da bi sodnik lahko bil predmet postopka za nedoločen čas; nazadnje, disciplinski postopek bi se lahko nadaljeval kljub odsotnosti zadevnega sodnika (tudi kadar je odsotnost upravičena).
Such concerns have also been raised in the opinions of the OSCE-ODHIR and of the Supreme Court.
Nova disciplinska ureditev prav tako vzbuja pomisleke glede njene skladnosti z zahtevami dolžnega pravnega postopanja iz člena 6(1) EKČP, ki se uporabljajo za disciplinski postopek proti sodnikom.
The law also removes a set of procedural guarantees in disciplinary proceedings conducted against ordinary judges and Supreme Court judges: evidence gathered in violation of the law could be used against a judge; under certain conditions evidence presented by the judge concerned could be disregarded; the time-barring for disciplinary cases would be suspended for the period of disciplinary proceedings, which means that a judge could be subject to a proceeding for an indefinite duration; finally, disciplinary proceedings could continue even if the judge concerned was absent (including when the absence was justified).
Zakon spreminja notranjo sestavo vrhovnega sodišča in mu dodaja dva nova senata.
The new disciplinary regime also raises concerns as to its compliance with the due process requirements of Art. 6(1) ECHR which are applicable to disciplinary proceedings against judges.
V novem senatu za izredni nadzor in javne zadeve se bodo ocenjevale zadeve, vložene na podlagi novega postopka z izrednim pravnim sredstvom.
The law modifies the internal structure of the Supreme Court, supplementing it with two new chambers.
Ta nov senat bodo sestavljali večinoma novi sodniki in v njem se bo preverjala veljavnost splošnih in lokalnih volitev ter preučevali volilni spori, vključno z volilnimi spori na volitvah v Evropski parlament.
A new chamber of extraordinary control and public matters will assess cases brought under the new extraordinary appeal procedure.
Poleg tega bo nov avtonomen disciplinski senat, ki ga bodo sestavljali le novi sodniki, zadolžen za pregled disciplinskih zadev na prvi in drugi stopnji proti sodnikom vrhovnega sodišča.
This new chamber will be composed in majority of new judges and will ascertain the validity of general and local elections and examining electoral disputes, including electoral disputes in European Parliament elections.
Ta dva nova v veliki meri avtonomna senata, ki ju bodo sestavljali novi sodniki, vzbujata pomisleke glede delitve oblasti.
In addition, a new autonomous disciplinary chamber composed solely of new judges will be tasked with reviewing in the first and second instance disciplinary cases against Supreme Court judges.
Kot je opozorila Beneška komisija, sta oba senata sicer del vrhovnega sodišča, vendar sta v praksi nad vsemi drugimi senati, zaradi česar obstaja tveganje, da bosta ta senata, ki ju sestavljajo novi sodniki, izvoljeni z odločilnim vplivom vladajoče večine, prevladala nad celotnim sodnim sistemom.
These two new largely autonomous chambers composed with new judges raise concerns as regards the separation of powers.
Beneška komisija je prav tako poudarila, da bo z zakonom sodna presoja volilnih sporov postala še posebej podvržena političnemu vplivu, zaradi česar bo delovanje poljske demokracije postalo resno ogroženo.
As noted by the Venice Commission, while both chambers are part of the Supreme Court, in practice they are above all other chambers, creating a risk that the whole judicial system will be dominated by these chambers which are composed of new judges elected with a decisive influence of the ruling majority.
Zakon uvaja laične sodnike, ki jih bo imenoval senat republike, za postopke pred vrhovnim sodiščem, ki zadevajo izredna pravna sredstva in disciplinske zadeve, ki jih obravnava vrhovno sodišče.
Also, the Venice Commission underlines that the law will make the judicial review of electoral disputes particularly vulnerable to political influence, creating a serious risk for the functioning of Polish democracy.
Kot je ugotovila Beneška komisija, uvedba laičnih sodnikov za dva nova senata vrhovnega sodišča ogroža učinkovitost in kakovost sodstva.
The law introduces lay judges, to be appointed by the Senate of the Republic, to proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the extraordinary appeals and disciplinary cases examined by the Supreme Court.
Nacionalni sodni svet
As observed by the Venice Commission, introducing lay judges to the two new chambers of the Supreme Court puts the efficiency and quality of justice in danger.
V skladu s poljsko ustavo neodvisnost sodnikov varuje nacionalni sodni svet.
The National Council for the Judiciary
Vloga nacionalnega sodnega sveta neposredno vpliva na neodvisnost sodnikov, zlasti v zvezi z njihovim napredovanjem, premestitvijo, disciplinskimi postopki, razrešitvijo in predčasno upokojitvijo.
According to the Polish Constitution the independence of judges is safeguarded by the National Council for the Judiciary.
Za napredovanje sodnika (npr. z okrožnega sodišča na regionalno sodišče) mora na primer predsednik republike sodnika ponovno imenovati, zato je treba ponovno slediti postopku sodne ocene in imenovanja, v katerem je udeležen nacionalni sodni svet.
The role of the National Council for the Judiciary has a direct impact on the independence of judges in particular as regards their promotion, transfer, disciplinary proceedings, dismissal and early retirement.
Tudi pravosodne svetovalce, ki že opravljajo naloge sodnika, mora nacionalni sodni svet oceniti, preden jih predsednik republike imenuje za sodnika.
For example, the promotion of a judge (e.g. from district court to regional court) requires the President of the Republic to once again appoint the judge, and therefore the procedure for judicial assessment and nomination involving the National Council for the Judiciary will have to be followed again.
Zato je v državah članicah, kjer je ustanovljen sodni svet, neodvisnost le-tega zlasti pomembna, da se prepreči neustrezen vpliv vlade ali parlamenta na neodvisnost sodnikov.
Also assistant judges who are already performing tasks of a judge must be assessed by the National Council for the Judiciary prior to their appointment as judge by the President of the Republic.
Zakon o nacionalnem sodnem svetu povečuje zaskrbljenost glede splošne neodvisnosti sodstva z zagotavljanjem predčasnega prenehanja mandata vseh sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta in z vzpostavitvijo popolnoma nove ureditve za imenovanje njegovih sodnikov članov, ki omogoča visoko stopnjo političnega vpliva.
For this reason, in Member States where a Council for the Judiciary has been established, its independence is particularly important for avoiding undue influence from the Government or the Parliament on the independence of judges.
V skladu s členom 6 zakona o nacionalnem sodnem svetu bodo mandati vseh sedanjih sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta predčasno prenehali.
The law on the National Council for the Judiciary increases the concerns regarding the overall independence of the judiciary by providing the premature termination of the mandate of all judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary, and by establishing an entirely new regime for the appointment of its judges-members which allows a high degree of political influence.
To prenehanje, o katerem je odločila zakonodajna veja oblasti, vzbuja pomisleke glede neodvisnosti sveta in delitve oblasti.
According to Article 6 of the law on the National Council for the Judiciary the mandates of all the current judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary will be terminated prematurely.
Parlament bo dobil odločilen vpliv na sestavo sveta v škodo vpliva sodnikov samih.
This termination decided by the legislative powers raises concerns for the independence of the Council and the separation of powers.
To preoblikovanje sestave nacionalnega sodnega sveta bi se lahko zgodilo že v enem mesecu in pol po objavi zakona.
The Parliament will gain a decisive influence on the composition of the Council to the detriment of the influence of judges themselves.
Predčasno prenehanje vzbuja tudi pomisleke glede ustavnosti, kot je poudarjeno v mnenju nacionalnega sodnega sveta, vrhovnega sodišča in varuha človekovih pravic.
This recomposition of the National Council for the Judiciary could already occur within one and a half month after the publication of the law.
Tudi nova ureditev za imenovanje sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta vzbuja resne pomisleke.
The premature termination also raises constitutionality concerns, as underlined in the opinion of the National Council for the Judiciary, of the Supreme Court and of the Ombudsman.
Dobro uveljavljeni evropski standardi, zlasti priporočilo Odbora ministrov Sveta Evrope iz leta 2010, določajo, da „bi morala biti vsaj polovica članov [sodnih svetov] sodnikov, ki jih v svojih vrstah izvolijo sodniki s sodišč vseh stopenj ob upoštevanju pluralizma v sodstvu“.
Also, the new regime for appointing judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary raises serious concerns.
Države članice so tiste, ki organizirajo svoje sodne sisteme, vključno s tem, ali ustanovijo sodni svet ali ne.
Well established European standards, in particular the 2010 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, stipulate that ‘not less than half the members of [Councils for the Judiciary] should be judges chosen by their peers from all levels of the judiciary and with respect for pluralism inside the judiciary’.
Kadar pa je tak svet ustanovljen, kot to velja na Poljskem, mora biti njegova neodvisnost zagotovljena v skladu z evropskimi standardi.
It is up to the Member States to organise their justice systems, including whether or not to establish a Council for the Judiciary.
Do sprejetja zakona o nacionalnem sodnem svetu je bil poljski sistem povsem v skladu s temi standardi, saj so nacionalni sodni svet sestavljali večinoma sodniki, ki so jih izbrali sodniki.
However, where such a Council has been established, as it is the case in Poland, its independence must be guaranteed in line with European standards.
Člen 1(1) in člen 7 zakona o spremembi zakona o nacionalnem sodnem svetu bi to ureditev korenito spremenila z določbo, da sejm imenuje in lahko tudi ponovno imenuje 15 sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta.
Until the adoption of the law on the National Council for the Judiciary, the Polish system was fully in line with these standards since the National Council for the Judiciary was composed of a majority of judges chosen by judges.
Poleg tega ni zagotovljeno, da bo na podlagi novega zakona sejm imenoval sodnike člane sveta, ki jih bo potrdilo sodstvo, saj kandidatov za ta mesta ne bodo predložile samo skupine 25 sodnikov, ampak jih bodo lahko predložile tudi skupine vsaj 2000 državljanov.
Articles 1(1) and 7 of the law amending the law on the National Council for the Judiciary would radically change this regime by providing that the 15 judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary will be appointed, and can be re-appointed, by the Sejm.
Poleg tega končni seznam kandidatov, ki ga bo sejm moral odobriti v enem kosu, vnaprej določi odbor sejma.
In addition, there is no guarantee that under the new law the Sejm will appoint judges-members of the Council endorsed by the judiciary, as candidates to these posts can be presented not only by groups of 25 judges, but also by groups of of at least 2000 citizens.
Nova pravila o imenovanju sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta znatno povečujejo vpliv parlamenta na svet in zmanjšujejo njegovo neodvisnost v nasprotju z evropskimi standardi.
Furthermore, the final list of candidates to which the Sejm will have to give its approval en bloc is pre-established by a committee of the Sejm.
Dejstvo, da bo sodnike člane sejm imenoval s tripetinsko večino, ne zmanjšuje tega pomisleka, saj sodnikov članov še vedno ne bodo izbrali njihovi kolegi.
The new rules on appointment of judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary significantly increase the influence of the Parliament over the Council and adversely affect its independence in contradiction with the European standards.
Poleg tega bo v primeru, da ni dosežena taka tripetinska večina, sejm imenoval sodnike člane sveta z absolutno večino glasov.
The fact that the judges-members will be appointed by the Sejm with a three fifths majority does not alleviate this concern, as judges-members will still not be chosen by their peers.
Ta položaj vzbuja pomisleke z vidika neodvisnosti sodstva.
In addition, in case such a three fifths majority is not reached, judges-members of the Council will be appointed by the Sejm with absolute majority of votes.
Na primer, sodnik na okrožnem sodišču, ki mora izreči sodbo v politično občutljivi zadevi, hkrati pa je vložil prošnjo za napredovanje na mesto sodnika na regionalnem sodišču, se lahko nagiba k temu, da sledi stališču politične večine, da ne bi ogrozil svojih možnosti napredovanja.
This situation raises concerns from the point of view of the independence of the judiciary.
Tudi če se to tveganje ne uresniči, nova ureditev ne daje zadostnih zagotovil za zavarovanje vtisa neodvisnosti, ki je bistven za vzdrževanje zaupanja, ki ga morajo v demokratični družbi vzbujati sodišča.
For example, a district court judge who has to deliver a judgment in a politically sensitive case, while the judge is at the same time applying for a promotion to become a regional court judge, may be inclined to follow the position favoured by the political majority in order not to put his/her chances to obtain the promotion into jeopardy.
Tudi pravosodne svetovalce bo moral oceniti politično orientiran nacionalni sodni svet pred njihovim imenovanjem za sodnike.
Even if this risk does not materialise, the new regime does not provide for sufficient guarantees to secure the appearance of independence which is crucial to maintain the confidence which tribunals in a democratic society must inspire in the public.
Beneška komisija ugotavlja, da bodo volitve 15 sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta s strani parlamenta v povezavi s takojšnjo zamenjavo sedanje sestave članov povzročile daljnosežno politizacijo tega organa.
Also assistant judges will have to be assessed by a politically influenced National Council for the Judiciary prior to their appointment as judge.
Beneška komisija priporoča obratno, da bi morali sodnike člane nacionalnega sodnega sveta izvoliti njihovi kolegi, kot je določeno v sedanjem zakonu.
The Venice Commission concludes that the election of the 15 judicial members of the National Council of the Judiciary by Parliament, in conjunction with the immediate replacement of the currently sitting members, will lead to a far reaching politicisation of this body.
Poleg tega je opozorila, da zakon slabi neodvisnost sveta glede na večino v parlamentu in prispeva k oslabitvi neodvisnosti sodstva kot celote.
The Venice Commission recommends that, instead, judicial members of the National Council for the Judiciary should be elected by their peers, as in the current Act.
Vrhovno sodišče, nacionalni sodni svet in varuh človekovih pravic so v svojih mnenjih o osnutku zakona izrazili številne pomisleke glede ustavnosti nove ureditve.
It also observed that the law weakens the independence of the Council with regard to the majority in Parliament and contributes to a weakening of the independence of justice as a whole.
Zlasti nacionalni sodni svet ugotavlja, da je svet po poljski ustavi protiutež parlamentu, ki je bil po ustavi pooblaščen, da odloča o vsebini zakonodaje.
In their opinions concerning the draft law, the Supreme Court, the National Council for the Judiciary and the Ombudsman raised a number of concerns as regards the constitutionality of the new regime.
S političnim imenovanjem sodnikov članov in predčasnim prenehanjem mandatov sedanjih sodnikov članov sveta se zato kršita načeli delitve oblasti in neodvisnosti sodstva.
In particular, the National Council for the Judiciary notes that under the Polish constitution, the Council serves as a counterweight to the parliament which has been constitutionally authorized to decide on the content of law.
Kot je pojasnjeno v prejšnjih priporočilih, učinkovita ustavna presoja teh določb trenutno ni mogoča.
The political appointment of judges-members and the premature termination of mandates of the current judges-members of the Council therefore violates the principles of separation of powers and judicial independence.
UGOTOVITEV SISTEMSKE NEVARNOSTI ZA NAČELO PRAVNE DRŽAVE
As explained in the previous Recommendations, an effective constitutional review of these provisions is currently not possible.
Zaradi zgoraj navedenih razlogov Komisija meni, da pomisleki iz priporočila v zvezi z načelom pravne države z dne 26. julija 2017 glede zakonov o vrhovnem sodišču in nacionalnem sodnem svetu niso bili odpravljeni z novima zakonoma o vrhovnem sodišču in nacionalnem sodnem svetu.
FINDING OF A SYSTEMIC THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
Poleg tega Komisija opaža, da nobeden od drugih pomislekov, navedenih v priporočilu z dne 26. julija 2017 glede ustavnega sodišča, zakona o organizaciji splošnih sodišč in zakona o nacionalni šoli za sodnike, ni bil odpravljen.
For the reasons set out above, the Commission considers that the concerns expressed in the Rule of Law Recommendation of 26 July 2017 relating to the laws on the Supreme Court and the National Council for the Judiciary have not been addressed by the two new laws on the Supreme Court and the National Council for the Judiciary.
Zato Komisija meni, da se je resno povečala sistemska nevarnost za načelo pravne države na Poljskem, kakor je predstavljena v priporočilih z dne 27. julija 2016, 21. decembra 2016 in 26. julija 2017.
Furthermore, the Commission observes that none of the other concerns set out in the Recommendation of 26 July 2017 relating to the Constitutional Tribunal, the law on Ordinary Courts Organisation and the law on the National School of Judiciary have been addressed.
Zakon o nacionalnem sodnem svetu in zakon o vrhovnem sodišču, tudi v kombinaciji z zakonom o nacionalni šoli za sodnike, ter zakon o organizaciji splošnih sodišč znatno povečujejo sistemsko nevarnost za pravno državo, kakor je bila opredeljena v prejšnjih priporočilih.
Consequently, the Commission considers that the situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland as presented in its Recommendations of 27 July 2016, 21 December 2016, and 26 July 2017 has seriously deteriorated further.
Zlasti:
The law on the National Council for the Judiciary and the law on the Supreme Court, also in combination with the law on the National School of Judiciary, and the law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation significantly increase the systemic threat to the rule of law as identified in the previous Recommendations.
prisilno upokojevanje znatnega števila sedanjih sodnikov vrhovnega sodišča, povezano z možnostjo podaljšanja njihovega aktivnega sodniškega mandata, pa tudi nova disciplinska ureditev za sodnike vrhovnega sodišča strukturno ogrožata neodvisnost sodnikov vrhovnega sodišča, pri čemer je neodvisnost sodstva ključni element pravne države;
In particular:
prisilno upokojevanje znatnega števila sedanjih sodnikov vrhovnega sodišča omogoča tudi daljnosežno in takojšnje preoblikovanje sestave vrhovnega sodišča.
the compulsory retirement of a significant number of the current Supreme Court judges combined with the possibility of prolonging their active judicial mandate, as well as the new disciplinary regime for Supreme Court judges, structurally undermine the independence of the Supreme Court judges, whilst the independence of the judiciary is a key component of the rule of law;
Ta možnost vzbuja pomisleke glede delitve oblasti, zlasti kadar se obravnavajo v povezavi s sočasnimi reformami nacionalnega sodnega sveta.
the compulsory retirement of a significant number of the current Supreme Court judges also allows for a far reaching and immediate recomposition of the Supreme Court.
Namreč, vse nove sodnike vrhovnega sodišča bo imenoval predsednik republike na priporočilo novo sestavljenega nacionalnega sodnega sveta, v katerem bodo prevladovali politično imenovani člani.
That possibility raises concerns in relation to the separation of powers, in particular when considered in combination with the simultaneous reforms of the National Council for the Judiciary.
Tako bo sedanja parlamentarna večina lahko določila, vsaj posredno, prihodnjo sestavo vrhovnega sodišča v veliko večjem obsegu, kot bi bilo to mogoče v sistemu, kjer obstoječa pravila o trajanju sodnih mandatov delujejo normalno – ne glede na to, koliko časa bi ti trajali in kateri državni organ bi imel pooblastilo, da odloča o imenovanju sodnikov;
In fact all new Supreme Court judges will be appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the newly composed National Council for the Judiciary, which will be largely dominated by the political appointees.
novi postopek z izrednim pravnim sredstvom vzbuja pomisleke v zvezi s pravno varnostjo in, kadar se obravnava v povezavi z možnostjo daljnosežnega in takojšnjega preoblikovanja sestave vrhovnega sodišča, v zvezi z delitvijo oblasti;
As a result, the current parliamentary majority will be able to determine, at least indirectly, the future composition of the Supreme Court to a much larger extent than this would be possible in a system where existing rules on the duration of judicial mandates operate normally – whatever that duration is and with whichever state organ the power to decide on judicial appointments lies;
prenehanje mandata vseh sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta in ponovno imenovanje sodnikov članov tega sveta po postopku, ki omogoča visoko stopnjo političnega vpliva, je prav tako vzrok za resne pomisleke;
the new extraordinary appeal procedure raises concerns in relation to legal certainty and, when considered in combination with the possibility of a far reaching and immediate recomposition of the Supreme Court, in relation to the separation of powers;
novi zakoni vzbujajo resne pomisleke glede njihove združljivosti s poljsko ustavo, kakor je poudarjeno v več mnenjih, zlasti s strani vrhovnega sodišča, nacionalnega sodnega sveta in varuha človekovih pravic.
the termination of the mandate of all judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary as well as the reappointment of its judges-members according to a process which allows a high degree of political influence, equally are a serious case for concern;
Vendar, kot je pojasnjeno v priporočilu v zvezi z načelom pravne države z dne 26. julija 2017, učinkovita ustavna presoja teh zakonov ni več mogoča.
the new laws raise serious concerns as regards their compatibility with the Polish Constitution as underlined by a number of opinions, in particular from the Supreme Court, the National Council for the Judiciary and the Ombudsman.
Komisija poudarja, da mora pravna država, ne glede na izbrani model sodnega sistema, varovati neodvisnost sodstva, delitev oblasti in pravno varnost.
However, as explained in the Rule of Law Recommendation of 26 July 2017, an effective constitutional review of these laws is no longer possible.
Države članice so tiste, ki organizirajo svoje sodne sisteme, vključno s tem, ali ustanovijo sodni svet ali ne, vloga le-tega pa je varovati neodvisnost sodstva.