natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
One Chinese exporting producer requested evidence as to the level of trade of the sales of the Union industry on the domestic market, used for normal value calculation purposes, in order to consider whether a claim for a level of trade adjustment under Article 2(10)(d)(i) of the basic Regulation was warranted.
Pokazale so, da je običajno več kot 85 % prodaje vzorčenega proizvajalca Unije odpadlo na trgovce na drobno.
That information, which was considered confidential by all interested parties, including the Chinese exporting producer itself, was made available in ranges by interested parties in the open file.
Na podlagi teh novih dokazov, vključenih v javno dostopno dokumentacijo, je kitajski proizvajalec izvoznik predložil zahtevek za prilagoditev ravni trgovanja.
It showed that typically more than 85 % of the sampled Union producer's sales were to retailers.
Ker je imel povezane prodajne družbe v Uniji, je tudi menil, da se zaradi prilagoditev njegove izvozne cene v skladu s členom 2(9) osnovne uredbe raven trgovanja pri njegovi prodaji iz prodaje trgovcem na drobno spremeni v prodajo distributerjem.
Following that new evidence being placed on the open file, the Chinese exporting producer submitted a level of trade adjustment claim.
Isti argument je bil naveden po dokončnem razkritju.
Because said Chinese exporting producer had related sales companies in the Union, it also considered that the adjustments made under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation to its export price changed the level of trade of its sales from retailers to distributors.
Komisija je ugotovila, da so prilagoditve na podlagi člena 2(9) osnovne uredbe namenjene odpravi učinka povezanih uvoznikov v Uniji, ne pa spreminjanju ravni trgovanja pri prodaji, ki je bila v bistvu (običajno več kot 85 %) še naprej prodaja trgovcem na drobno.
The same argument was made after final disclosure.
Po pregledu podanih argumentov je Komisija navedeni zahtevek zavrnila.
The Commission noted that the adjustments under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation are intended to remove the effect of related importers in the Union, not to change the level of trade of the sale, which remained essentially (typically above 85 %) to retailers.
Stopnje dampinga
After review of the arguments presented, the Commission rejected that claim.
Kot je podrobno opisano v oddelku 3, je Komisija upoštevala pripombe zainteresiranih strani in na novo izračunala stopnjo dampinga vseh kitajskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov.
Dumping margins
Dokončne stopnje dampinga, izražene kot odstotni delež cene CIF meja Unije brez plačane dajatve, so:
As detailed in section 3, the Commission took into account interested parties' comments and recalculated the dumping margin of all Chinese exporting producers.
Preglednica 1
The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:
Dokončne stopnje dampinga
Definitive dumping margins
Dokončna stopnja dampinga
Company
Družbi Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd in Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd.
Definitive dumping margin
Druge sodelujoče družbe
Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd.
Vse druge družbe
INJURY
Komisija je po objavi začasne uredbe in prejemu pripomb dodatno proučila položaj nekaterih proizvajalcev podobnega izdelka v Uniji, ki so poročali o uvozu zadevnega izdelka, kakor je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 130 do 132 začasne uredbe.
Definition of the Union industry and Union production
Komisija je v skladu s členom 4(1)(a) osnovne uredbe ugotovila, da bi bilo treba šest družb, ki so se prvotno štele za del industrije Unije, izključiti iz opredelitve pojma industrija Unije.
Following the publication of the provisional Regulation and comments received, the Commission further examined the situation of certain Union producers of the like product which had reported imports of the product concerned as referred to in recitals (130) to (132) of the provisional Regulation.
Po pripombah je Komisija znova ocenila položaj navedenih šestih družb in zaključila, da interes, ki ga predstavlja njihova uvozna dejavnost, presega interes, ki ga predstavlja njihova proizvodna dejavnost.
In accordance with Article 4(1)(a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission established that six companies initially considered to be part of the Union industry should be excluded from the definition of the Union Industry.
Posledično je navedenih šest družb izključila iz opredelitve pojma industrija Unije.
Following comments, the Commission reassessed the situation of those six companies and concluded that the interest represented by their import activity exceeded the interest represented by their production activity.
Ker je bilo iz opredelitve pojma industrija Unije izključenih šest proizvajalcev Unije, preostalih 31 proizvajalcev predstavlja „industrijo Unije“ v smislu člena 4(1) osnovne uredbe.
As a result, it excluded those six companies from the definition of Union industry.
Kazalniki škode za tržni delež, proizvodnjo, proizvodno zmogljivost, izkoriščenost zmogljivosti, obseg prodaje, zaposlenost in produktivnost so bili ustrezno popravljeni, kakor je opisano v uvodnih izjavah 106, 113 in 121.
Given that six Union producers were excluded from the Union industry definition, the remaining 31 producers constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.
Potrošnja Unije
The injury indicators for market share, production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, employment and productivity were revised accordingly, as described under recitals (106), (113) and (121).
Ker pripomb glede potrošnje Unije ni bilo, je Komisija potrdila svoje sklepe iz uvodnih izjav 133 do 135 začasne uredbe.
Union consumption
Uvoz iz LRK
In the absence of any comments with respect to the Union consumption, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (133) to (135) of the provisional Regulation.
Po objavi začasne uredbe je zbornica CCCME ponovila svojo zahtevo, naj se razkrijejo vir in podrobni statistični podatki o izvozu, ki jih je predložil pritožnik, ter ponovila trditev, da opis metodologije, ki jo je pritožnik uporabil za opredelitev zadevnega izdelka, ni bil dovolj podroben.
Imports from the PRC
Zbornica CCCME ni predložila novih ali dodatnih argumentov v podporo navedenim trditvam, ki so že bile obravnavane v uvodnih izjavah 143 do 148 začasne uredbe.
Following the publication of the provisional Regulation, the CCCME repeated its request that the source and the detailed exports statistics submitted by the Complainant be disclosed and reiterated its claim that the description of the methodology followed by the Complainant to identify the product concerned was not sufficiently detailed.
Te trditve so bile zato zavrnjene.
The CCCME did not provide new nor additional arguments in support of those claims, which were already addressed in recitals (143) to (148) of the provisional Regulation.
Zbornica CCCME je po dokončnem razkritju spraševala, zakaj je tržni delež kitajskega uvoza in uvoza iz drugih tretjih držav ostal nespremenjen kljub odstranitvi šestih proizvajalcev iz opredelitve industrije Unije iz uvodne izjave 82.
Those claims were therefore rejected.
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da se tržni delež izračuna kot odstotek celotne potrošnje Unije.
Following final disclosure, the CCCME questioned why – despite the removal of six producers from the definition of the Union industry referred to in recital (82), the market share of Chinese imports and imports from other third countries remained unchanged.
Kakor je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 84, potrošnja Unije od objave začasne uredbe ni bila revidirana.
In that respect, it is noted that the market share is calculated as a percentage of total Union consumption.
Zato so tržni deleži kitajskega uvoza in uvoza iz drugih tretjih držav tudi ostali nespremenjeni.
As stated in recital (84), Union consumption was not revised since the publication of the provisional Regulation.
En nepovezan uvoznik je trdil, da do znižanja pri cenah uvoza iz LRK ni prišlo zaradi nepoštenih trgovinskih praks, temveč zaradi znižanja stroškov litija in hudega boja za pridobitev tržnega deleža v Uniji.
Therefore, the market shares of Chinese imports and imports from other third countries remained unchanged as well.
Kljub temu ni pojasnil, kako bi ti dogodki ovrgli katero koli ugotovitev iz začasne uredbe, zlasti ugotovitev dampinga.
One unrelated importer claimed that the decrease in prices of imports from the PRC was not due to unfair trade practices but to the decrease in the cost of lithium and the intense competition to win market share in the Union.
Trditev je zato treba zavrniti, razlogovanje iz uvodnih izjav 151 do 158 začasne uredbe pa potrditi.
However, it did not explain how these developments would invalidate any of the findings laid out in the provisional Regulation, notably the finding of dumping.
Zbornica CCCME in nekateri proizvajalci izvozniki so trdili, da je Komisija napačno ocenila razvoj povprečne cene kitajskega uvoza, ko je ugotovila, da je bistveno nižja od povprečne cene proizvajalcev Unije in tretjih držav.
The claim has therefore to be rejected and the reasoning in recitals (151) to (158) of the provisional Regulation is upheld.
Navedene stranke so trdile, da povprečna cena kitajskega uvoza ni razkrila ničesar o morebitnem nelojalnem nižanju prodajnih cen, saj ni bila opravljena „analiza na enaki osnovi“, in sicer analiza na podlagi vrste izdelka.
The CCCME and some exporting producers claimed that the Commission had wrongly assessed the evolution of the average price of Chinese imports by observing that it was markedly below the average price of Union producers and third countries.
Trdile so, da bi Komisija morala priznati, da lahko padajoča povprečna cena kitajskega uvoza odraža le spremembo nabora izdelkov.
Those parties claimed that the average price of Chinese imports disclosed nothing about potential undercutting in the absence of a ‘like-for-like analysis’, namely an analysis on the basis of the product type.
Kakor je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 154 začasne uredbe, se Komisija strinja, da lahko sprememba nabora izdelkov vpliva na razvoj povprečne cene uvoza iz LRK.
They claimed that the Commission should acknowledge that a declining average price of Chinese imports may well just reflect a change in product mix.
Vseeno je dejstvo, da so povprečne cene uvoza iz LRK nenehno in precej nižje od povprečnih cen iz katerega koli drugega vira oskrbe, kljub okoliščinam, v katerih zbornica CCCME sama trdi, da se je kakovost zadevnega izdelka izboljšala in da se je zadevni izdelek razširil v višje cenovne segmente.
As indicated in recital (154) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission agrees that a change in product mix may influence the evolution of the average price of imports from the PRC.
Poleg tega je ta padajoči trend treba upoštevati v zvezi z analizami na enaki osnovi, ki so pripeljale do ugotovitev znatnega nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen in dampinga.
However, it remains that the average prices of imports from the PRC have been constantly and significantly below the average prices from any other source of supply despite a context in which the CCCME itself claims that the product concerned improved in quality and expanded to higher price segments.
Kar zadeva izračune nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen, je en kitajski proizvajalec izvoznik s povezanimi uvozniki v Uniji trdil, da bi Komisija morala uporabiti sporočene CIF-vrednosti uvoza namesto računsko določene CIF-vrednosti.
In addition, this declining trend has to be considered in relation with the like-for-like analyses which led to findings of substantial undercutting and dumping.
Trdil je, da bi bilo treba razkriti metodologijo, uporabljeno za določitev CIF-vrednosti, uporabljene za izračune nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen.
With regard to undercutting calculations, one Chinese exporting producer with related importers in the Union claimed that the Commission should have used the reported CIF values of its imports instead of using a constructed CIF value.
Poleg tega je trdil, da je Komisija z uporabo take metodologije njegove cene umetno spravila na raven meje Unije, kjer pa ne konkurira proizvajalcem Unije.
It claimed that the methodology used to determine the CIF value used in the undercutting calculations should be disclosed.
Navedel je še, da je taka metodologija vpeljala razliko na ravni trgovanja, zaradi česar je primerjava cen postala nepoštena.
It also claimed that by using such methodology, the Commission had artificially brought its prices to Union's border's level which is not the point where it competes with Union producers.
Prvič, Komisija ugotavlja, da je vsem zadevnim strankam, vključno z zadevnim kitajskim proizvajalcem izvoznikom, ustrezno razkrila metodologijo, uporabljeno za izračun nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen (cena enote industrije Unije je bila primerjana s ceno enote posameznega proizvajalca izvoznika za posamezno vrsto izdelka, razlika pa je bila pomnožena z izvoženo količino proizvajalca izvoznika).
It further submitted that such methodology introduced a difference in level of trade which made the price comparison unfair.
Drugič, enaka trditev glede računske določitve izvozne cene navedenega kitajskega proizvajalca izvoznika za izračun dampinga je bila zavrnjena, kakor je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 75.
First, the Commission notes that it has duly disclosed to all parties concerned, including the Chinese exporting producer in question, the methodology used for the undercutting calculation (the Union industry's unit price was compared with the unit price of each exporting producer per product type and the difference was multiplied by the exporting producer's exported quantity).
Komisija mora pravzaprav iz enakih razlogov, in sicer zato, ker računska določitev CIF-cene ne spreminja ravni trgovanja pri prodaji, ki ostaja večinoma (običajno več kot 85 %) prodaja trgovcem na drobno, zavrniti tudi trditev o izračunu nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen.
Second, the same claim concerning the construction of the export price of that Chinese exporting producer for the dumping calculation was rejected as set out in recital (75).
Nazadnje, Komisija ne more uporabiti sporočenih CIF-cen za izračun nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen, ker je prodaja, na kateri temeljijo te cene, potekala med povezanimi osebami.
In fact, for the same reasons, namely the construction of the CIF price does not change the level of trade of the sale, which remains predominantly (typically above 85 %) to retailers, the Commission also has to reject the claim for the undercutting calculation.
Zadevni kitajski proizvajalec izvoznik poleg tega ni opredelil, kako bi bile lahko navedene cene zanesljive kljub temu razmerju.
Finally, the Commission cannot use for the undercutting calculation the reported CIF prices because the underlying sales took place between related parties.
Po dokončnem razkritju je ista zainteresirana stran ponovila trditev, opisano v uvodni izjavi 90.
In addition, the Chinese exporting producer in question did not establish how those prices could be reliable despite this relationship.
Komisija spominja, da osnovna uredba ne predpisuje določne metodologije, kar zadeva določitev stopnje nelojalno znižanih prodajnih cen.
Following final disclosure, the same interested party repeated the claim described in recital (90).
Komisija ima zato pri ocenjevanju navedenega dejavnika široko polje proste presoje.
The Commission recalls that, as far as the determination of the undercutting margin is concerned, the basic Regulation does not prescribe a specific methodology.
To diskrecijsko pravico omejuje potreba po utemeljitvi sklepov na pozitivnih dokazih in objektivnem preverjanju, kot zahteva člen 3(2) osnovne uredbe.
The Commission therefore enjoys a wide margin of discretion in assessing that factor.
Treba je tudi opozoriti, da člen 3(3) osnovne uredbe posebej določa, da je treba obstoj znatnega nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen preveriti na ravni dampinškega uvoza, ne pa na ravni kakršne koli naknadne cene pri nadaljnji prodaji na trgu Unije.
That discretion is limited by the need to base conclusions on positive evidence and to make an objective examination, as required by Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation.
Na podlagi tega mora Komisija, kar zadeva elemente, upoštevane pri izračunu nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen (zlasti izvozno ceno), opredeliti točko, na kateri se prvič pojavi (ali bi se lahko pojavilo) konkuriranje proizvajalcem Unije na trgu Unije.
It should also be recalled that Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation specifically provides that the existence of significant price undercutting has to be examined at the level of the dumped imports, and not at the level of any subsequent resales price on the Union market.
Navedena točka je dejansko nakupna cena prvega nepovezanega uvoznika, ker se lahko družba načeloma odloči, ali bo dobavljala pri industriji Unije ali pri čezmorskih dobaviteljih.
On that basis, when it comes to the elements taken into account for calculation of undercutting (in particular the export price), the Commission has to identify the first point at which competition takes (or may take) place with Union producers in the Union market.
Navedena presoja bi morala temeljiti na izvozni ceni na ravni meja Unije, ki se šteje za primerljivo s ceno franko tovarna industrije Unije.
That point is in fact the purchasing price of the first unrelated importer because that company has in principle the choice to source either from the Union industry or from overseas suppliers.
Pri izvozni prodaji prek povezanih uvoznikov bi točka primerjave morala biti takoj za tem, ko blago prečka mejo Unije, ne pa v poznejši fazi v okviru distribucijske verige, na primer ob prodaji blaga končnemu uporabniku.
That assessment should be based on the export price at the Union frontier level which is considered to be a level comparable to the Union industry ex-works price.
Tako se analogno pristopu, uporabljenemu pri izračunih stopnje dampinga, izvozna cena računsko določi na podlagi cene pri nadaljnji prodaji prvi neodvisni stranki, ki je ustrezno prilagojena v skladu s členom 2(9) osnovne uredbe.
In the case of export sales via related importers, the point of comparison should be right after the good crosses the Union border, and not at a later stage in the distribution chain, e.g. when selling to the final user of the good.
Ker je navedeni člen edini člen osnovne uredbe, ki daje navodila za računsko določitev izvozne cene, je njena analogna uporaba upravičena.
Thus, by analogy with the approach followed for the dumping margin calculations, the export price is constructed on the basis of the resale price to the first independent customer duly adjusted pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation.
Navedeni pristop tudi zagotavlja skladnost, ko proizvajalec izvoznik blago neposredno proda nepovezani stranki (uvozniku ali končnemu uporabniku), ker se po tem scenariju cene pri nadaljnji prodaji že po definiciji ne bi uporabile.
As that article is the only article in the basic Regulation which gives guidance on the construction of the export price, the application thereof by analogy is justified.
Drugačen pristop bi vodil do diskriminacije med proizvajalci izvozniki, ki bi temeljila le na prodajnem kanalu, ki ga uporabljajo.
That approach also ensures coherence in cases where an exporting producer is selling the goods directly to an unrelated customer (whether importer or final user) because, under that scenario, resale prices would not be used by definition.
Komisija meni, da na določitev ustrezne uvozne cene za izračun stopnje nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen ne bi smelo vplivati to, ali je izvoz namenjen povezanim ali neodvisnim gospodarskim subjektom v Uniji.
A different approach would lead to discrimination between exporting producers based solely on the sales channel that they use.
Metodologija, ki jo je uporabila Komisija, zagotavlja enako obravnavo v obeh primerih.
The Commission considers that the establishment of the relevant import price for undercutting calculations should not be influenced by whether the exports are made to related or independent operators in the Union.
Da bi se omogočila poštena primerjava, je zato treba od cene pri nadaljnji prodaji nepovezanim strankam, ki jo je opravil povezani uvoznik, odbiti PSA-stroške in dobiček, da bi se dobila zanesljiva CIF-cena.
The methodology followed by the Commission ensures that both circumstances receive equal treatment.
Komisija je zato navedeno trditev zavrnila.
Therefore, in order to allow for a fair comparison, a deduction of SG&A and profit from the resale price to unrelated customers made by the related importer is warranted in order to arrive to a reliable CIF price.
Zbornica CCCME in štirje kitajski proizvajalci izvozniki so trdili, da pri zavrnitvi njihovega zahtevka za prilagoditev ravni trgovanja iz uvodne izjave 157 začasne uredbe ni bila obravnavana razlika v cenah, nastala na ravni kupcev, ki so proizvajalci originalne opreme.
The Commission, therefore, rejected that claim.
Navedene zainteresirane strani so navedle, da je za pošteno primerjavo cen potrebna prilagoditev navzgor, ki bi odražala pribitek kupcev, ki so proizvajalci originalne opreme, in pribitek lastnikov blagovnih znamk po uvozu.
The CCCME and four Chinese exporting producers claimed that the rejection of their claim for a level of trade adjustment under recital (157) of the provisional Regulation did not address the difference of prices arising at the level of OEM customers.
Isti argument je bilo znova podan po razkritju.
Those interested parties submitted that a fair price comparison required an upward adjustment to reflect the mark-up of OEM customers and brand owners post-importation.
Komisija je, kakor je že pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 157 začasne uredbe, obravnavala zahtevek za prilagoditev ravni trgovanja in sklepala, da ni doslednih in izrazitih razlik v cenah pri prodaji proizvajalcev originalne opreme in lastnikov blagovnih znamk v Uniji.
The same argument was also raised again after disclosure.
Prilagoditev kitajske uvozne cene navzgor s pribitkom uvoznikov blagovnih znamk, kar bi domnevno odražalo razliko na ravni trgovanja, bi izpodbila ugotovitev preiskave, da ni doslednih in izrazitih razlik v cenah pri prodaji proizvajalcev originalne opreme in lastnikov blagovnih znamk v Uniji.
The Commission considered, as already explained in recital (157) of the provisional Regulation, the claim for an adjustment of the level of trade and concluded that there is no consistent and distinct price difference for OEM and brand owner sales in the Union.
Zahtevek je bil zato zavrnjen.
Adjusting upwards the Chinese import price by the brand importers mark-up allegedly reflecting a difference in level of trade would undermine the investigation's finding that there is no consistent and distinct price difference for OEM and brand owner sales in the Union.
Po začasnem razkritju je družba Giant podala trditev glede izračuna konvencionalne carinske dajatve pri uvozu povezanih družb, ki nastopajo kot uvoznik.
Thus, the claim was rejected.
Trdila je, da bi znesek konvencionalne carinske dajatve moral temeljiti na dejanski CIF-vrednosti, ne pa na računsko določeni CIF-vrednosti.
Following provisional disclosure, Giant made a claim concerning the calculation of the conventional customs duty in case of imports by related companies acting as an importer.
Popravljene stopnje nelojalno znižanih prodajnih cen so znašale od 16,2 do 43,2 %, kakor je navedeno v preglednici 2.
They argued that the amount for the conventional customs duty should be based on the actual CIF value, not the constructed CIF value.
Preglednica 2
The revised undercutting margins ranged from 16,2 % to 43,2 % as indicated in Table 2.
Stopnje nelojalno znižanih prodajnih cen
Table 2
Stopnja nelojalno znižanih prodajnih cen
Undercutting margins
Ker drugih pripomb glede uvoza iz LRK ni bilo, je po reviziji izračunov nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen iz uvodne izjave 99 Komisija potrdila vse druge sklepe iz uvodnih izjav 136 do 157 začasne uredbe.
Undercutting margin
Gospodarski položaj industrije Unije