natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The fact that the State would be obliged to step in on its own account in case Iberpotash is not willing or able to take the necessary restoration measures with respect to its waste heaps is well established in the applicable legislation.
Čeprav odločitev za to uradno ni obvezna, pa Španija, če družba Iberpotash ne izpolni obveznosti za sanacijo svojih rudnikov, ne bi imela druge možnosti, kot da za tako sanacijo plača vnaprej, saj sicer ne bi izpolnila lastnih obveznosti.
Firstly, pursuant to Article 102 of Law 39/2015, the State may take measures in lieu of the party legally responsible for taking such measures.
Drugič, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 13, bi lahko Španija kršila svoje obveznosti na podlagi direktive o rudarskih odpadkih in okvirne direktive o vodah.
Spain would have to (i) enjoin Iberpotash to take specifically defined measures; (ii) inform Iberpotash that the administration will otherwise take such measures itself, and at what cost; (iii) implement such measures; and (iv) attempt to recover the cost from Iberpotash, which by definition will not be possible if Spain must execute the insufficient financial guarantee.
Če bi torej družba Iberpotash po izčrpanju mineralnih virov svoja rudnika opustila in ju ne bi sanirala, bi bilo to, da bi Španija sama plačala odstranitev jalovišč ali enako učinkovito sanacijo, glede na nezadostno garancijo edini način, da bi izpolnila svoje obveznosti na podlagi navedenih direktiv in se po možnosti izognila dnevnim denarnim kaznim, ki bi jih naložilo Sodišče Evropske unije.
While this decision is formally facultative, in the event of Iberpotash defaulting on its obligations to restore its facilities, Spain would have no option other than to pay upfront for such restoration, because Spain would otherwise not comply with its own obligations.
Tretjič, v skladu z določbami španskega zakona št. 27/2006 z dne 18. julija 2006 je mogoče španske organe prisiliti k izpolnitvi obveznosti na podlagi okoljske zakonodaje.
Secondly, as noted in recital 13, Spain may be in breach of its obligations under the Extractive Waste Directive and the Water Framework Directive.
Katera koli nevladna organizacija, ki izpolnjuje merila iz zakona št. 27/2006, lahko v primeru okoljske kršitve, navedene v členu 18(1) zakona št. 27/2006 (npr. vključno s kršitvami obveznosti na področju varstva voda), vloži tožbo na sodišču in tako upravo prisili k izpolnitvi okoljskih obveznosti.
Therefore, should Iberpotash abandon its facilities after depleting the mineral resources and not restore such facilities, given the insufficient guarantee, the only way for Spain to meet its obligations under those Directives and eventually avoid daily penalty payments imposed by the European Court of Justice is to pay itself for the removal of the salt tips or an equally effective restoration.
Četrtič, v členu 6(3) Direktive 2004/35/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta je navedeno, da kadar upravljavec, odgovoren za sprejetje sanacijskih ukrepov v zvezi z okoljsko škodo, ne izpolni svojih obveznosti, lahko pristojni organ v skrajnem primeru sam sprejme take ukrepe.
Thirdly, under the provisions of the Spanish Law 27/2006 of 18 July 2006 the Spanish authorities can be compelled to comply with their obligations under the environmental legislation.
Podobno lahko pristojni organ v skladu s členom 5(3), če tega ne stori zadevni upravljavec, sprejme potrebne preventivne ukrepe, da odpravi neposredno nevarnost okoljske škode.
Any non-governmental organisation that meets the criteria set out in Law 27/2006 may, in the event of an environmental infringement listed at Article 18(1) of Law 27/2006 (including e.g. infringements concerning the obligations in the area of water protection), take action in court to force the administration to comply with its environmental obligations.
Če družba Iberpotash po zaprtju svojih rudarskih dejavnosti ne bo sprejela potrebnih sanacijskih ukrepov, lahko nesanirana jalovišča postanejo neposredna nevarnost za okolje, tako da bodo v skrajnem primeru potrebni sanacijski ali preventivni ukrepi pristojnih javnih organov.
Fourthly, Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council indicates in Article 6(3) that where an operator responsible to take remedial actions with respect to an environmental damage fails to comply with its obligations, the competent authority may take these measures itself, as a means of last resort.
Nazadnje, španski organi sami navajajo, da lahko Administratión de la Generalitat v skladu s členom 9 zakona št. 12/1981, če upravljavec ne izpolni obveznosti, te ukrepe prisilno izvrši na stroške upravljavca.
Similarly, under Article 5(3), the competent authority may, if the relevant operator fails to do so, take necessary preventive measures in order to eliminate an imminent threat of an environmental damage.
Kot navajajo, v praksi uprava izvede ustrezne ukrepe, ki se nato financirajo iz finančne garancije ali, če garancija ne zadostuje, iz prodaje premoženja upravljavca.
If Iberpotash does not take necessary restoration measures once its mining activities are closed, the unrestored waste heaps may become an imminent threat for the environment requiring thus remedial or preventive action by the competent public authorities as a means of last resort.
Zato je javna uprava, če je finančna garancija bistveno nižja od zahtevane, izpostavljena tveganju, da premoženje upravljavca ne bo zadostovalo za financiranje ustreznih ukrepov, ki jih je izvedla.
Finally, the Spanish authorities themselves indicate that according to Article 9 of Law 12/1981 in case the operator does not comply with its obligations, the Administratión de la Generalitat can forcefully execute these measures at the costs of the operator.
To potrjuje, da se zaradi prenizke finančne garancije poveča tveganje, da sanacijski ukrepi, ki jih sprejme uprava, ne bodo zadostno pokriti s premoženjem upravljavca (zlasti kadar nima drugih dejavnosti v Španiji, kot v primeru družbe Iberpotash) in jih bo treba plačati iz javnih sredstev.
They indicate that in practice the administration implements the relevant measures that are then financed from the financial guarantee or, in case the guarantee is not sufficient, from the sale of assets of the operator.
Zato raven garancij, ki je bistveno nižja od potrebne, kot se zahteva po zakonu, državo izpostavi dejanskemu tveganju dodatne obremenitve njenih sredstev.
Therefore, in case the financial guarantee is significantly lower than required, the public administration runs a risk that the assets of the operator are not sufficient to finance the relevant measures it executed.
Povečano tveganje dodatne obremenitve države je torej dovolj konkretno, da zaradi pretirano nizke finančne garancije vsaj potencialno vpliva na državna sredstva.
This confirms that a too low financial guarantee increases the risk that the restoration measures taken by the administration will not be sufficiently covered by the assets of the operator (especially in case it does not have any other Spanish activities as in case of Iberpotash) and would need to be paid from the public resources.
Raven finančnih garancij, ki naj bi ju zagotovila družba Iberpotash, je bila določena z upravnima odločbama Generalitat de Catalunya o odobritvi dovoljenj za njeno opravljanje dejavnosti pridobivanja kalijevega oksida.
Therefore, a level of guarantees which is significantly lower than necessary as required by law is exposing the State to a concrete risk of additional burden on its resources.
Glede na to, da pojem država (članica) za namene uporabe člena 107(1) PDEU vključuje vse ravni javnih organov, ne glede na to, ali gre za nacionalni, regionalni ali lokalni organ, je mogoče odločitev za uporabo znižane ravni finančnih garancij pripisati državi.
The increased risk of additional burden on the State is thus sufficiently concrete to constitute at least a potential impact on State resources due to an excessively low level of the financial guarantee.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da je ukrep 1 vključeval prenos državnih sredstev in ga je mogoče pripisati državi.
The level of the financial guarantees to be established by Iberpotash has been set by the administrative decisions of Generalitat de Catalunya approving the permits to operate its extractive activity of potash.
Morebitno izkrivljanje konkurence
Given that the notion of (Member) State for the purposes of application of Article 107(1) TFEU includes all levels of public authorities, regardless of whether it is a national, regional or local authority, the decision to apply a reduced level of the financial guarantees is imputable to the State.
Komisija meni, da lahko znižani stroški družbe Iberpotash zaradi nižje ravni finančnih garancij, kot se zahteva z zadevno zakonodajo, izkrivljajo konkurenco na trgih, na katerih deluje družba Iberpotash – večinoma trgih kalijevega oksida in soli.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that Measure 1 involved a transfer of State resources and is imputable to the State.
Kot je pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju (glej uvodno izjavo (110) in naslednje), je to znižanje stroškov v zadevnem obdobju znašalo približno 1,8 milijona EUR, tako da v nasprotju s trditvami španskih organov ni bilo zanemarljivo.
Potential distortion of competition
Poleg tega dejstvo, da je družba Iberpotash edina španska proizvajalka kalijevega oksida, ne izključuje morebitnega izkrivljanja konkurence, saj je zadevni geografski trg nedvomno večji od španskega nacionalnega trga.
The Commission considers that the reduced costs of Iberpotash due to a level of financial guarantees which is lower than required by the relevant legislation are liable to distort competition on the markets where Iberpotash is active — mainly markets for potash and salt.
Komisija je že leta 1993 menila, da je trg kalijevega oksida večji od Španije, saj vključuje tudi Francijo, Združeno kraljestvo in druge države članice razen Nemčije.
As explained below (see recital 110 and following), this reduction of costs amounted over the relevant period to around EUR 1,8 million and thus, contrary to the claims of the Spanish authorities, was not negligible.
Poleg tega družba Iberpotash v svojem poročilu o vzdržnosti iz leta 2014 navaja, da samo 23 % svoje proizvodnje kalijevega oksida in soli proda v Španiji, medtem ko gre 50 % v druge evropske države, 18 % v Južno Ameriko, nadaljnja prodaja pa zajema tudi Severno Ameriko, Afriko in Azijo.
Further, the fact that Iberpotash is the sole Spanish producer of potash does not exclude a potential distortion of competition since the relevant geographic market is clearly wider than the national Spanish market.
V vseh teh regijah družba Iberpotash konkurira drugim proizvajalcem kalijevega oksida in soli, na to konkurenco pa lahko vplivajo umetno znižani stroški družbe Iberpotash.
The Commission has already in 1993 considered that the potash market was wider than Spain, including as well France, the UK and other Member States except Germany.
Nazadnje, morebitnega izkrivljanja konkurence ne ovrže trditev družbe Iberpotash, da ne glede na raven finančnih garancij njene okoljske obveznosti ostajajo enake (tj. zagotoviti sanacijo območij svojih rudnikov in preprečiti onesnaženje) in da mora kljub temu ohranjati rezervacije za kritje morebitne okoljske odgovornosti.
Further, Iberpotash in its Sustainability Report of 2014 indicates that only 23 % of its production of potash and salt is sold in Spain, while 50 % go to other European countries, 18 % to South America and there are also further sales to North America, Africa and Asia.
Poleg teh računovodskih rezervacij obveznost ohranjanja posebnih finančnih garancij v skladu z zadevno zakonodajo dejansko predstavlja običajne, vendar posebne stroške poslovanja, ki jih nosi družba Iberpotash – ali katera koli druga rudarska družba, za katero veljajo enaka pravila – zaradi provizij, ki jih banka zaračuna za zagotovitev in ohranjanje garancije, tako da lahko njihova neupravičeno nizka raven pomeni prednost za družbo Iberpotash in izkrivlja konkurenco.
In all these regions Iberpotash competes with other producers of potash and salt and this competition is liable to be affected by artificially lowered costs of Iberpotash.
Komisija tako ugotavlja, da bi lahko ukrep 1 izkrivljal konkurenco.
Finally, the potential distortion of competition is not put into question by the argument of Iberpotash that irrespective of the level of the financial guarantees its environmental obligations remain the same (i.e. to ensure restoration of its sites and prevent pollution) and it anyway needs to maintain provisions to cover possible environmental liabilities.
Vpliv na trgovino znotraj EU
In addition to these accounting provisions, the obligation of maintaining specific financial guarantees in line with the relevant legislation in fact represents normal but specific operating costs borne by Iberpotash — or any other mining company subject to the same rules — as a result of fees that the bank charges for establishing and maintaining the guarantee and their unduly low level thus has the potential to favour Iberpotash and distort competition.
Kot je bilo že navedeno zgoraj, sta trga kalijevega oksida in soli nedvomno čezmejna trga, pri čemer se 50 % proizvodnje družbe Iberpotash izvozi v druge evropske države.
The Commission thus concludes that Measure 1 has a potential to distort competition.
Zato bi lahko znižana raven finančnih garancij vplivala na trgovino med državami članicami EU.
Affectation of intra-EU trade
Trditev družbe Iberpotash, da sta trga soli zaradi visokih prevoznih stroškov samo nacionalna ali celo regionalna, torej ni podprta s podatki, ki jih je zagotovila v svojem poročilu o vzdržnosti iz leta 2014, saj se 80 % njene proizvodnje soli izvozi ne samo v druge evropske države, ampak tudi v Azijo, Severno Afriko in Ameriko.
As already indicated above, the markets for potash and salt are clearly cross-border markets with 50 % of Iberpotash's production being exported to other European countries.
Poleg tega so pripombe družbe Iberpotash k sklepu o začetku postopka v tej točki kontradiktorne, saj družba po eni strani trdi, da je trg soli nacionalen ali celo regionalen, po drugi strani pa, da je francoski proizvajalec soli njen neposredni konkurent in jo poskuša izriniti s trga.
Therefore, the reduced level of the financial guarantees is liable to affect trade between EU Member States.
Komisija tako ugotavlja, da ukrep 1 vpliva na trgovino znotraj EU.
The argument of Iberpotash that the markets for salt are only national or even regional due to high transportation costs is thus not supported by the figures provided by Iberpotash in its Sustainability Report of 2014, since 80 % of its production of salt is being exported not only to other European countries but also to Asia, North Africa and America.
Količinska opredelitev zneska pomoči
In addition, the observations of Iberpotash on the Opening Decision are contradictory in this point since they claim on the one hand that the market for salt is national or even regional and on the other hand that a French producer of salt is its direct competitor and is trying to exclude Iberpotash from the market.
Za določitev dejanskega zneska pomoči je treba najprej določiti vsaj približno „pravilen“ znesek finančnih garancij na podlagi veljavnih zakonodajnih pravil v zadevnem obdobju.
The Commission thus concludes that Measure 1 affects intra-EU trade.
Nato bi znesek pomoči ustrezal razliki med pričakovanim zneskom bančnih provizij, ki bi jih morala družba Iberpotash plačati, da bi zagotovila ta pravilno določen znesek garancije, in dejanskim zneskom bančnih provizij, ki jih je družba plačala.
Quantification of the aid
Tretja oseba trdi, da znesek pomoči ne bi smel biti omejen na nižje bančne provizije, temveč bi moral vključevati tudi potrebo po zagotovitvi zadostnega zavarovanja banki v obliki finančnih rezervacij.
Establishing the actual amount of the aid first requires establishing at least an approximate ‘correct’ amount of the financial guarantees under the applicable legislative rules in the relevant period.
Vendar glede na to, da je znesek „popravljenih“ garancij, kot je ocenjen v nadaljevanju, razmeroma skromen glede na letni promet družbe Iberpotash (približno 300 milijonov EUR) in celotne skupine ICL (5,4 milijarde USD), ni verjetno, da bi zagotovitev višjega zneska garancije od družbe zahtevala precejšnje dodatne stroške.
Then, the aid amount would correspond to the difference between the expected amount of banking fees that Iberpotash would have had to pay to constitute this correctly set guarantee amount, and the actual amount of banking fees that the company paid.
Ker je po navedbah španskih organov višje sodišče Katalonije decembra 2016 ugotovilo, da je zvišani znesek v višini 6979471,83 EUR za območje rudnika Balsareny/Sallent v skladu z veljavno zakonodajo, Komisija meni, da „pravilni“ znesek garancij za Balsareny/Sallent zdaj ustreza temu trenutno veljavnemu znesku, ki ga je odobrilo sodišče.
The third party claims that the amount of aid should not be limited to the lower banking fees but should include also the necessity to provide sufficient collateralisation to the bank in the form of financial reserves.
Poleg tega Komisija po analogiji (glej tudi uvodno izjavo 64) meni, da se lahko tudi zvišani znesek v višini 6160872,35 EUR za garancijo za rudnik Suria, ki velja od leta 2015, šteje za skladen z veljavno zakonodajo.
However, given that the amount of the ‘corrected’ guarantees as estimated below is relatively modest in view of the annual turnover of Iberpotash (around EUR 300 million) and the whole ICL group (USD 5,4 billion) it is unlikely that securing a higher guarantee amount would require significant additional costs to the company.
Čeprav v zvezi s tem rudnikom ni merodajnega sklepa sodišča, je zvišani znesek garancije za manjši rudnik Suria dejansko skoraj primerljiv z odobrenim zneskom za rudnik Balsareny/Sallent.
Since, according to the Spanish authorities, the Higher court of Justice of Catalonia has found in December 2016 the increased amount of EUR 6979471,83 for Balsareny/Sallent site to be in line with the applicable legislation, the Commission considers that at present the ‘correct’ amount of the guarantees for Balsareny/Sallent corresponds to this currently applicable amount approved by the court.
To potrjuje, da se lahko znesek šteje za ustrezen in skladen z veljavno zakonodajo.
Further, the Commission by analogy (see also recital 64 above) considers that the increased amount of EUR 6160872,35 for the guarantee for Suria applicable since 2015 can also be considered as in line with the applicable legislation.
Zato pravilni znesek garancij zdaj skupaj znaša 13140344,18 EUR.
Even though there is no authoritative court conclusion with respect to this site, the increased amount of the guarantee for a smaller site at Suria is in fact almost comparable to the approved amount for Balsareny/Sallent.
Vendar se pri izračunu tega zneska upošteva načrt Phoenix, ki je bil napovedan leta 2011 in se postopoma izvaja od leta 2012.
This confirms that the amount can be considered as adequate and in line with the applicable legislation.
Načrt med drugim predvideva naložbo v obrat za vakuumsko pridobivanje soli, namenjen predelavi in trženju soli, ki jo vsebujejo odpadki iz pridobivanja kalijevega oksida.
Therefore, the correct amount of the guarantees at present corresponds in total to EUR 13140344,18.
V skladu z načrtom naj bi družba Iberpotash nazadnje letno prodala približno 1,5 milijona ton soli.
However, the calculation of this amount takes into account the Plan Phoenix announced in 2011 and gradually implemented as of 2012.
Komisija se strinja s študijo ERF, da načrta Phoenix kot takega ni mogoče šteti za sanacijski ukrep in da dejansko ne bi ustavil rasti odlagališč odpadkov med delovanjem rudnikov.
The plan envisages, among others, investment in a vacuum salt plant in order to process and commercialise salt included in the potash mining waste.
Vendar se Komisija tudi strinja s trditvami družbe Iberpotash in španskih organov, da načrt dejansko vpliva na pričakovane skupne stroške sanacije.
According to the plan, Iberpotash should be ultimately selling annually around 1,5 million tonnes of salt.
V študiji ERF se ne upošteva dejstvo, da se bosta predelava in trženje soli verjetno nadaljevala tudi po ustavitvi dejavnosti pridobivanja kalijevega oksida.
The Commission agrees with the ERF Study that the Plan Phoenix as such cannot be considered as a restoration measure and would in fact not stop the growth of the waste deposits during the operation of the mines.
Načrt Phoenix bo torej postopoma verjetno pripomogel k odpravi jalovišč v prihodnje, zato se kot tak lahko upošteva pri določitvi ustrezne ravni garancij, kot je bilo v primeru zvišanih ravni garancij, ki so bile predlagane v letu 2015 in jih je vsaj za rudnik Balsareny/Sallent potrdilo nacionalno sodišče.
However, the Commission also recognises the claims of Iberpotash and the Spanish authorities that the plan does have an impact on the total expected restoration costs.
Vendar to pomeni, da sedanjih ravni finančnih garancij ni mogoče šteti za ustrezne za obdobje pred začetkom izvajanja načrta Phoenix v letu 2012.
The ERF Study does not take into account the fact that the salt processing and sales are likely to continue also once the potash mining activities are stopped.
Čeprav je družba Iberpotash tudi pred napovedjo načrta Phoenix predelovala in prodajala razmeroma majhne količine soli iz svojih jalovišč, se je večina odpadne soli preprosto kopičila na jaloviščih v upanju, da se bo lahko komercialno izkoriščala v prihodnosti.
The Plan Phoenix is thus likely to gradually contribute to elimination of the waste heaps in the future and as such can be taken into account for setting the appropriate level of the guarantees as has been the case for the increased levels of guarantees proposed in 2015 and, at least for Balsareny/Sallent, confirmed by the national court.
Vendar ni bilo konkretnega načrta, kako in kdaj povečati obrat za predelavo soli, da bodo količine tako predelane odpadne soli večje in bodo tako občutno vplivale na prihodnje stroške sanacije.
This fact, however, means that the current level of financial guarantees cannot be considered as adequate for the period before the start of the Plan Phoenix in 2012.
Zato se tako precej hipotetično prihodnje zmanjšanje jalovišč zaradi predelave in prodaje velikih količin soli ne bi smelo upoštevati, kar zadeva obdobje pred začetkom izvajanja načrta Phoenix.
Even though also before announcing Plan Phoenix Ibepotash processed and sold rather minor amounts of salt from its waste heaps, most of the salt waste was being simply accumulated on the waste heaps with a hope that it might be commercially used in the future.
Komisija mora zato preučiti druge razpoložljive dokaze za oceno približnega „pravilnega“ zneska garancij v obdobju 2006–2011 na podlagi takrat pričakovanih stroškov sanacije, brez vpliva načrta Phoenix.
However, there was no concrete plan on how and when to increase the salt processing facility so that the amounts of salt waste eliminated in this way would be more substantial and thus have an appreciable impact on the future restoration costs.
Kot je bilo že pojasnjeno zgoraj (glej uvodne izjave od 68 do 81), so bile najzanesljivejše ocene skupnih pričakovanih stroškov sanacije (brez načrta Phoenix) zagotovljene v študiji ERF, ki jo je predložil pritožnik.
Therefore, as regards the period before the launch of the Plan Phoenix, such rather hypothetical future reduction of the waste heaps due to the processing and sale of significant amounts of salt should not be taken into account.
Komisija meni, da so domneve iz tega strokovnega poročila verodostojne, saj večinoma temeljijo na tržni raziskavi in primerjavi z drugimi podobnimi rudniki drugje po svetu.
The Commission thus has to consider other available evidence for estimating an approximate ‘correct’ amount of the guarantees in the period 2006-2011 based on the restoration costs as expected at that moment, without the impact of the Plan Phoenix.
Nasprotno pa, kot je bilo pojasnjeno zgoraj, študije, ki jo je zagotovila družba Iberpotash, ni mogoče šteti za zanesljivo oceno pričakovanih stroškov sanacije, ker ne upošteva ustreznih sanacijskih ukrepov (glej uvodno izjavo 79).