natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Without prejudice to the criteria set out in paragraph 1, host Member States may require categories of electronic money issuers and payment services providers that have establishments in their territory in forms other than a branch, and whose head office is situated in another Member State, to appoint a central contact point where this requirement is commensurate to the level of money laundering or terrorist financing risk associated with the operation of those establishments.
Države članice gostiteljice lahko brez poseganja v merila iz odstavka 1 od kategorij izdajateljev elektronskega denarja in ponudnikov plačilnih storitev, ki imajo na njihovem ozemlju podjetja v obliki, ki ni podružnica, in katerih sedež je v drugi državi članici, zahtevajo, da imenujejo osrednjo kontaktno točko, kadar je ta zahteva sorazmerna s stopnjo tveganja pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, povezanega z dejavnostmi teh podjetij.
Host Member States shall base their assessment of the level of money laundering or terrorist financing risk associated with the operation of those establishments on the findings of risk assessments carried out in accordance with Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 and other credible and reliable sources available to them.
Države članice gostiteljice kot podlago za oceno stopnje tveganja pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, povezanega z dejavnostmi teh podjetij, uporabijo ugotovitve ocen tveganja, opravljenih v skladu s členom 6(1) in členom 7(1) Direktive (EU) 2015/849, ter druge verodostojne in zanesljive vire, ki so jim na voljo.
As part of this assessment, host Member States shall take into account at least the following criteria:
Države članice gostiteljice pri tej oceni upoštevajo vsaj naslednja merila:
the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with the types of products and services offered and the distribution channels used;
tveganje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, povezano z vrstami ponujenih produktov in storitev ter uporabljenimi distribucijskimi kanali;
the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with the types of customers;
tveganje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, povezano z vrstami strank;
the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with the prevalence of occasional transactions over business relationships;
tveganje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, povezano s prevlado občasnih transakcij nad poslovnimi odnosi;
the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with the countries and geographic areas serviced.
tveganje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, povezano z državami in geografskimi območji, kjer se storitve opravljajo.
Without prejudice to the criteria set out in paragraphs 1 and 2, a host Member State may, in exceptional cases, empower the host Member State's competent authority require an electronic money issuer or payment services provider that has establishments in its territory in forms other than a branch, and whose head office is situated in another Member State, to appoint a central contract point providing that the host Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that the operation of establishments of that electronic money issuer or payment services provider presents a high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Država članica gostiteljica lahko brez poseganja v merila iz odstavkov 1 in 2 v izjemnih primerih pooblasti svoj pristojni organ države članice gostiteljice, da od izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki ima na njenem ozemlju podjetja v obliki, ki ni podružnica, in katerega sedež je v drugi državi članici, zahteva, da imenuje osrednjo kontaktno točko, če ima država članica gostiteljica utemeljene razloge za mnenje, da delovanje podjetij tega izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev predstavlja visoko tveganje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma.
Ensuring compliance with AML/CFT rules
Zagotavljanje skladnosti s pravili AML/CFT
The central contact point shall ensure that establishments specified in Article 45(9) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 comply with AML/CFT rules of the host Member State.
Osrednja kontaktna točka zagotovi, da podjetja iz člena 45(9) Direktive (EU) 2015/849, upoštevajo pravila AML/CFT države članice gostiteljice.
To this end, the central contact point shall:
V ta namen osrednja kontaktna točka:
facilitate the development and implementation of AML/CFT policies and procedures pursuant to Article 8(3) and (4) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 by informing the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider of AML/CFT requirements applicable in the host Member State;
olajšuje razvoj in izvajanje politik in postopkov AML/CFT v skladu s členom 8(3) in (4) Direktive (EU) 2015/849, tako da izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, obvešča o zahtevah AML/CFT, ki se uporabljajo v državi članici gostiteljici;
oversee, on behalf of the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider, the effective compliance by those establishments with AML/CFT requirements applicable in the host Member State and the appointing electronic money issuer's or payment services provider's policies, controls and procedures adopted pursuant to Article 8(3) and (4) of Directive (EU) 2015/849;
nadzoruje v imenu izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, ali zadevna podjetja učinkovito izpolnjujejo zahteve AML/CFT, ki se uporabljajo v državi članici gostiteljici, ter izvajajo politike, kontrole in postopke izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, sprejete v skladu s členom 8(3) in (4) Direktive (EU) 2015/849;
inform the head office of the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider of any breaches or compliance issues encountered in those establishments, including any information that may affect the establishment's ability to comply effectively with the appointing electronic money issuer's or payment services provider's AML/CFT policies and procedures or that may otherwise affect the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider's risk assessment;
obvesti sedež izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, o vseh kršitvah ali težavah glede skladnosti z zahtevami in pravili, ki jih ugotovi v teh podjetjih, vključno z vsemi informacijami, ki lahko vplivajo na sposobnost podjetja, da učinkovito izpolnjuje politike in postopke AML/CFT izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, ali kako drugače vplivajo na oceno tveganja izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje;
ensure, on behalf of the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider, that corrective action is taken in cases where those establishments do not comply, or are at risk of not complying, with applicable AML/CFT rules;
zagotovi v imenu izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, sprejetje popravnih ukrepov v primerih, ko ta podjetja ne izpolnjujejo veljavnih pravil AML/CFT ali kadar obstaja tveganje za to;
ensure, on behalf of the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider, that those establishments and their staff participate in training programs referred to in Article 46(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849;
zagotovi v imenu izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, da ta podjetja in njihovi zaposleni sodelujejo v programih usposabljanja iz člena 46(1) Direktive (EU) 2015/849;
represent the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider in its communications with the competent authorities and the FIU of the host Member State.
zastopa izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, pri komunikaciji s pristojnimi organi in FIU države članice gostiteljice.
Facilitation of supervision by competent authorities of the host Member State
Olajšanje nadzora s strani pristojnih organov države članice gostiteljice
The central contact point shall facilitate the supervision by competent authorities of the host Member State of establishments specified in Article 45(9) of Directive (EU) 2015/849.
Osrednja kontaktna točka olajša nadzor pristojnim organom države članice gostiteljice nad podjetji iz člena 45(9) Direktive (EU) 2015/849.
To this end, the central contact point shall, on behalf of the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider:
V ta namen osrednja kontaktna točka v imenu izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje:
represent the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider in its communications with competent authorities;
zastopa izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, pri komunikaciji s pristojnimi organi;
access information held by those establishments;
dostopa do informacij, ki jih imajo ta podjetja;
respond to any request made by competent authorities related to the activity of those establishments, provide relevant information held by the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider and those establishments to competent authorities and report on a regular basis where appropriate;
odgovarja na zahteve pristojnih organov v zvezi z dejavnostmi teh podjetij, pristojnim organom zagotavlja ustrezne informacije, ki jih imajo izdajatelj elektronskega denarja ali ponudnik plačilnih storitev, ki jo imenuje, in ta podjetja, ter redno poroča, kadar je to potrebno;
facilitate on-site inspections of those establishments where required by the competent authorities.
olajšuje preglede teh podjetij na kraju samem, kadar to zahtevajo pristojni organi.
Additional functions of a central contact point
Dodatne funkcije osrednje kontaktne točke
In addition to the functions specified in Articles 4 and 5, host Member States may require central contact points to perform, on behalf of the appointing electronic money issuer or payment services provider, one or more of the following functions:
Poleg funkcij, ki so določene v členih 4 in 5, lahko države članice gostiteljice od osrednjih kontaktnih točk zahtevajo, da v imenu izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev, ki jih imenuje, opravljajo eno ali več naslednjih funkcij:
file reports pursuant to Article 33(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 as transposed in national law of the host Member State;
vlagajo prijave v skladu s členom 33(1) Direktive (EU) 2015/849, kot je prenesena v nacionalno zakonodajo države članice gostiteljice;
respond to any request of the FIU related to the activity of establishments specified in Article 45(9) of Directive (EU) 2015/849, and providing relevant information related to such establishments to the FIU;
se odzovejo na vsako zahtevo FIU v zvezi z dejavnostmi podjetij iz člena 45(9) Direktive (EU) 2015/849 ter FIU zagotovijo ustrezne informacije v zvezi s takšnimi podjetji;
scrutinise transactions to identify suspicious transactions where appropriate, in light of the size and complexity of the electronic money issuer's or payment services provider's operations in the host Member State.
pregledujejo transakcije, da bi odkrile sumljive transakcije, kjer je to potrebno, pri čemer upoštevajo velikost in kompleksnost dejavnosti izdajatelja elektronskega denarja ali ponudnika plačilnih storitev v državi članici gostiteljici.
Host Member States may require central contact points to perform one or more of the additional functions specified in paragraph 1 where those additional functions are commensurate to the overall level of money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with the operation of those payment service providers and electronic money issuers that have establishments in their territory in forms other than a branch.
Države članice gostiteljice lahko od osrednjih kontaktnih točk zahtevajo, da opravljajo eno ali več dodatnih funkcij iz odstavka 1, kadar so te dodatne funkcije sorazmerne s splošno stopnjo tveganja pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, povezanega z dejavnostmi izdajateljev elektronskega denarja in ponudnikov plačilnih storitev, ki imajo na njihovem ozemlju podjetja v obliki, ki ni podružnica.
Host Member States shall base their assessment of the level of money laundering or terrorist financing risk associated with the operation of such establishments on the findings of risk assessments carried out in accordance with Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849, Article 3(2) of this Regulation where applicable, and other credible and reliable sources available to them.
Države članice gostiteljice kot podlago za oceno stopnje tveganja pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, povezanega z dejavnostmi teh podjetij, uporabijo ugotovitve ocen tveganja, opravljenih v skladu s členom 6(1) in členom 7(1) Direktive (EU) 2015/849, členom 3(2) te uredbe, kadar je to primerno, ter druge verodostojne in zanesljive vire, ki so jim na voljo.
Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC (OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7).
Direktiva 2009/110/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti ter nadzoru skrbnega in varnega poslovanja institucij za izdajo elektronskega denarja ter o spremembah direktiv 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES in razveljavitvi Direktive 2000/46/ES (UL L 267, 10.10.2009, str. 7).
Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).
Direktiva 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu in o spremembah direktiv 97/7/ES, 2002/65/ES, 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 97/5/ES (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1).
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1115
Izvedbena uredba Sveta (EU) 2018/1115
implementing Article 20(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/735 concerning restrictive measures in respect of the situation in South Sudan
o izvajanju člena 20(1) Uredbe (EU) 2015/735 o omejevalnih ukrepih glede na razmere v Južnem Sudanu
Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2015/735 of 7 May 2015 concerning restrictive measures in respect of the situation in South Sudan, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 748/2014, and in particular Article 20(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (EU) 2015/735 z dne 7. maja 2015 o omejevalnih ukrepih glede na razmere v Južnem Sudanu in razveljavitvi Uredbe (EU) št. 748/2014 ter zlasti člena 20(1) Uredbe,
On 7 May 2015, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2015/735.
Svet je 7. maja 2015 sprejel Uredbo (EU) 2015/735.
On 13 July 2018, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2428 (2018) which notably adds two persons to the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures.
Varnostni svet Združenih narodov je 13. julija 2018 sprejel Resolucijo 2428 (2018), s katero je zlasti dodal dve osebi na seznam oseb in subjektov, za katere veljajo omejevalni ukrepi.
These persons should therefore be added to Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/735.
Te osebe bi bilo zato treba dodati v Prilogo I k Uredbi (EU) 2015/735.
Since these two persons were already designated under Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2015/735, they should therefore be removed from Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2015/735 in order that they be designated under Annex I.
Ker sta bili ti osebi že uvrščeni na seznam iz Priloge II k Uredbi (EU) 2015/735, bi morali biti torej črtani iz Priloge II k Uredbi (EU) 2015/735, da bi se uvrstili na seznam iz Priloge I.
Annex I and II to Regulation (EU) 2015/735 should therefore be amended accordingly,
Prilogi I in II k Uredbi (EU) 2015/735 bi bilo zato treba ustrezno spremeniti –
Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/735 is hereby amended as set out in Annex I to this Regulation.
Priloga I k Uredbi (EU) 2015/735 se spremeni, kot je določeno v Prilogi I k tej uredbi.
Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2015/735 is hereby amended as set out in Annex II to this Regulation.
Priloga II k Uredbi (EU) 2015/735 se spremeni, kot je določeno v Prilogi II k tej uredbi.
OJ L 117, 8.5.2015, p. 13.
UL L 117, 8.5.2015, str. 13.
The following persons are added to the list set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/735:
Na seznam iz Priloge I k Uredbi (EU) 2015/735 se dodajo naslednje osebe:
Designation: a) Deputy Chief of General Staff for Logistics; b) Deputy Chief of Defence Staff and Inspector General of the Army
Funkcija: (a) namestnik načelnika generalštaba za logistiko; (b) namestnik načelnika generalštaba in glavni inšpektor vojaških sil
Date of birth: 1 Jan. 1960
Datum rojstva: 1. januar 1960
Place of birth: Yei, South Sudan
Kraj rojstva: Yei, Južni Sudan
Date of UN designation: 13 July 2018
Datum uvrstitve na seznam ZN: 13. julij 2018
Other information: As SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Riak was one of the senior officials of the Government of South Sudan who planned and oversaw an offensive in Unity state in 2015 that resulted in widespread destruction and large population displacement.
Druge informacije: Riak je bil kot namestnik načelnika generalštaba Sudanske ljudske osvobodilne vojske za logistiko eden od visokih uradnikov vlade Južnega Sudana, ki je načrtoval in nadzoroval ofenzivo v zvezni državi Unity leta 2015, ki je povzročila vsesplošno opustošenje in obsežno razselitev prebivalstva.
Malek Ruben Riak was listed on 13 July 2018 pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 (a), and 8 of resolution 2206 (2015), as reaffirmed in resolution 2418 (2018), for “actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan”; “Actions or policies that have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan …,” and as a leader “of any entity, including any South Sudanese government, opposition, militia, or other group, that has, or whose members have, engaged in any of the activities described in paragraphs 6 and 7,” and pursuant to paragraph 14 (e) of this resolution for “planning, directing, or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence in South Sudan”.
Malek Ruben Riak je bil na seznam uvrščen 13. julija 2018 v skladu z odstavki 6, 7(a) in 8 Resolucije 2206 (2015), kar je bilo ponovno potrjeno v Resoluciji 2418 (2018), za ‚dejanja ali politike, ki ogrožajo mir, varnost in stabilnost v Južnem Sudanu‘; zaradi ‚dejavnosti ali politik, katerih namen ali učinek je širjenje ali podaljševanje konflikta v Južnem Sudanu …‘, ter kot vodja ‚katerega koli subjekta, tudi katere koli južnosudanske vlade, opozicije, milice ali katere druge skupine, ki je sodelovala ali katere člani so sodelovali v kateri koli od dejavnosti, opisanih v odstavkih 6 in 7‘, in v skladu z odstavkom 14(e) navedene resolucije zaradi ‚načrtovanja, vodenja ali zagrešitve dejanj, ki vključujejo spolno nasilje in nasilje na podlagi spola, v Južnem Sudanu‘.
According to the report by the Panel of Experts on South Sudan in January 2016 (S/2016/70), Riak was one of a group of senior security officials who planned a Unity state offensive against the SPLM-IO beginning in January 2015, and subsequently oversaw its execution from late April 2015 onwards.
Riak je bil v skladu s poročilom skupine strokovnjakov za Južni Sudan iz januarja 2016 (S/2016/70) eden iz skupine visokih varnostnih uradnikov, ki so načrtovali ofenzivo v zvezni državi Unity proti SPLM-IO z začetkom januarja 2015 in ki je nato nadzoroval njeno izvedbo od konca aprila 2015 naprej.
The Government of South Sudan began arming Bul Nuer youth in early 2015 to facilitate their participation in the offensive.
Vlada Južnega Sudana je začela v začetku leta 2015 oboroževati mlade iz skupine Bul Nuer, da bi olajšala njihovo sodelovanje v ofenzivi.
Most Bul Nuer youth already had access to AK-pattern automatic rifles, but ammunition was critical to sustaining their operations.
Večina mladih iz skupine Bul Nuer je že imela dostop do avtomatskih pušk modela AK, strelivo pa je bilo ključnega pomena za vzdrževanje njihovih operacij.
The Panel of Experts reported evidence, including testimony from military sources, that ammunition was supplied to youth groups by SPLA headquarters specifically for the offensive.
Skupina strokovnjakov je poročala o dokazih, vključno s pričevanji iz vojaških virov, da je bilo s strani glavnega štaba SPLA skupinam mladih zagotovljeno strelivo posebej za ofenzivo.
Riak was the SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics at the time.
Riak je bil takrat namestnik načelnika generalštaba Sudanske ljudske osvobodilne vojske za logistiko.
The offensive resulted in systematic destruction of villages and infrastructure, the forced displacement of the local population, the indiscriminate killing and torturing of civilians, the widespread use of sexual violence, including against the elderly and children, the abduction and recruitment of children as soldiers, and large population displacement.
Ofenziva je povzročila sistematično uničevanje vasi in infrastrukture, prisilno razseljevanje lokalnega prebivalstva, neselektivno pobijanje in mučenje civilistov, vsesplošno uporabo spolnega nasilja, vključno z nasiljem nad starejšimi in otroki, ugrabitve in novačenje otrok vojakov ter obsežno razselitev prebivalstva.
Following the destruction of much of the southern and central parts of the state, numerous media and humanitarian organisations, as well as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) published reports about the scale of the abuses that were perpetrated.
Po uničenju večine južnih in osrednjih delov zvezne države so številni mediji in humanitarne organizacije, pa tudi misija Združenih narodov v Južnem Sudanu (UNMISS), objavili poročila o obsegu zagrešenih zlorab.
Paul MALONG AWAN (alias: a) Paul Malong Awan Anei, b) Paul Malong, c) Bol Malong)
Paul MALONG AWAN (tudi: (a) Paul Malong Awan Anei, (b) Paul Malong, (c) Bol Malong)
Title: General
Naziv: General
Designation: a) Former Chief of Staff of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), b) Former Governor, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State
Funkcija: (a) nekdanji načelnik generalštaba Sudanske ljudske osvobodilne vojske (SPLA), (b) nekdanji guverner province Severni Bahr el-Ghazal
Date of birth: a) 1962, b) 4 Dec. 1960, c) 12 Apr. 1960
Datum rojstva: (a) 1962, (b) 4. december 1960, (c) 12. april 1960
Place of birth: Malualkon, South Sudan
Kraj rojstva: Malualkon, Južni Sudan
Nationality: a) South Sudan, b) Uganda
Državljanstvo: (a) južnosudansko, (b) ugandsko
Passport no: a) South Sudan number S00004370, b) South Sudan number D00001369, c) Sudan number 003606, d) Sudan number 00606, e) Sudan number B002606
Št. potnega lista.: (a) S00004370, Južni Sudan, (b) D00001369, Južni Sudan, (c) 003606, Sudan, (d) 00606, Sudan, (e) B002606, Sudan
He reportedly directed efforts to kill opposition leader Riek Machar.
Pod njegovim vodstvom je SPLA napadala civiliste, šole in bolnišnice, civiliste prisilila, da so se razselili, izvajala prisilna izginotja, samovoljno zadrževala civiliste ter jih mučila in posiljevala.
He ordered SPLA units to prevent the transport of humanitarian supplies.
Mobiliziral je plemensko milico Mathiang Anyoor Dinka, ki uporablja otroke vojake.
Under Malong's leadership, the SPLA attacked civilians, schools and hospitals; forced the displacement of civilians; carried out enforced disappearances; arbitrarily detained civilians; and conducted acts of torture, and rape.
Pod njegovim vodstvom je SPLA omejevala delo UNMISS, Skupnega odbora za spremljanje in evalvacijo (JMEC) ter osebju mehanizma za spremljanje izvajanja sporazumov o premirju in zagotavljanju varnosti v prehodnem obdobju (CTSAMM) onemogočala dostop do lokacij, kjer bi lahko preiskovali in evidentirali zlorabe.