natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Mobarakeh Steel Company (Iran)
Kot je ugotovljeno v uvodnih izjavah 632 in 655 dokončne uredbe, je Komisija menila, da je ukrep v obliki fiksnega zneska na tono, določenega za posamezno družbo, natančneje odražal škodljivi damping, ki je bil ugotovljen za proizvajalca izvoznika, kot minimalna uvozna cena.
The exporting producer offered one MIP per tonne for all of its exports, adjusted for sales via its trader in the Union.
Zagotavlja tudi, da dajatev v celoti odpravlja škodljivi damping in s tem nudi takojšnjo zaščito industriji Unije, kar za minimalno uvozno ceno ne velja.
As acknowledged in recitals 632 and 655 of the definitive Regulation, the Commission considered that a measure in the form of a company-specific fixed amount per tonne reflected the injurious dumping found for the exporting producer more accurately than a MIP.
Ker proizvajalec izvoznik v Unijo prodaja tudi druge izdelke, predlagane cenovne zaveze ne bi bilo mogoče učinkovito spremljati, zaradi česar obstajajo možnosti za navzkrižno kompenzacijo cen.
It also ensures that, unlike a MIP, the duty removes the injurious dumping entirely, giving immediate protection to the Union industry.
V odgovoru na oceno Komisije je proizvajalec izvoznik trdil, da Komisija ni omenila dejstva, da je njegova ponudba odražala predlog Komisije v fazi preiskave.
Due to the fact that the exporting producer sells to the Union other products, the price undertaking proposed would be impossible to be effectively monitored, offering opportunities for price cross-compensation.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je zahteval pojasnilo, zakaj ponudba, ki odraža navedeni predlog, ni primerna.
In response to the Commission's assessment, the exporting producer argued that the Commission was silent on the fact that its offer mirrored Commission's proposal at a stage of the investigation.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je trdil, da je minimalna uvozna cena, ki jo je predlagal, višja od tiste, ki jo je predlagala Komisija v preiskavi, zato minimalna uvozna cena, predlagana v zavezi, po definiciji odpravlja škodo, povzročeno industriji Unije.
The exporting producer requested an explanation as to why an offer mirroring that proposal is not suitable.
Poleg tega je proizvajalec izvoznik trdil, da ni razlike med minimalno uvozno ceno in posebno dajatvijo na tono v zvezi z odpravo škodljivega učinka dampinga za najdražji izdelek, zato je ta trditev brezpredmetna.
The exporting producer argued that the MIP it proposed is higher than that proposed by the Commission during the investigation and thus the MIP proposed in the undertaking, by definition, removes the injury to the Union industry.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je trdil, da dejstvo, da prodaja druge izdelke v Unijo, samodejno ne povzroči tveganja navzkrižne kompenzacije.
Furthermore, the exporting producer argued that there is no difference between a MIP and a specific duty per tonne as far as removal of injurious effect of dumping for the most expensive product is concerned, thus this argument is irrelevant.
Trdil je tudi, da bi računi na podlagi zaveze odpravili vsakršno tveganje izogibanja ali navzkrižne kompenzacije povsem enako kot veljaven trgovinski račun, predlagan v dokumentu o splošnem dokončnem razkritju.
The exporting producer argued the fact that it sells other products to the Union does not automatically create a risk of cross-compensation.
Komisija je opozorila, da je v svoji oceni obravnavala podobnosti med ponudbo zaveze in možnostjo, o kateri je potekal razmislek v fazi preiskave, in poleg tega v uvodni izjavi 15 zgoraj poudarja in povzema del dokončne uredbe, ki pojasnjuje, zakaj je bila ta možnost zavrnjena.
Finally, it argued that the undertaking invoices would remove any risk of circumvention or cross-compensation just in the same way as the valid commercial invoice proposed in the final general disclosure document would.
Enaka razlaga se nanaša na pripombo proizvajalca izvoznika, v kateri primerja račune na podlagi zaveze z eno od rešitev, o kateri je potekal razmislek med preiskavo, nazadnje pa jo je Komisija zavrnila.
The Commission noted that its assessment is not only vocal on the similarities between the undertaking offer and an option being considered at a stage of the investigation, in recital 15 above it points to and summarises the part of the definitive Regulation explaining why that option was rejected.
Dejstvo, da je minimalna uvozna cena, ki jo je predlagal proizvajalec izvoznik, višja od tiste, o kateri je razmišljala Komisija na neki točki preiskave, ne pomeni, da ta minimalna uvozna cena že po definiciji odpravlja škodljivi učinek dampinga.
The same reasoning applies to the exporting producer's comment comparing undertaking invoices to one of the solutions being considered during the investigation and ultimately rejected by the Commission.
Gre za majhno razliko, ki ne vpliva na sklepanje, da je povprečna minimalna uvozna cena neustrezna, saj ne bo odpravila škodljivih učinkov dampinga za vse vrste izdelkov, zlasti najdražje.
The fact that the MIP proposed by the exporting producer is higher than the one considered by the Commission at one point during the investigation does not mean that it, by definition, removes the injurious effect of dumping.
Pripomba, da sta minimalna uvozna cena in posebna dajatev enako neučinkoviti, prav tako ni na mestu.
The difference is minor and it did not affect the reasoning that an average MIP is inadequate as it will not remove the injurious effects of dumping for all product types, in particular the most expensive ones.
Za razliko od minimalne uvozne cene so v primeru posebne dajatve uvozniki prisiljeni plačati več za dražjo vrsto izdelkov, saj je tržna cena vrste izdelkov del cene, ki jo plačajo, drugi del pa je dajatev.
The comment that the MIP and a specific duty are equally ineffective in this respect is also misplaced.
Situacija je drugačna v primeru minimalne uvozne cene, ki je enaka za vse vrste izdelkov.
Unlike a MIP, a specific duty forces importers to pay more for more expensive product type, as the market price of a product type is a part of the price they pay, the other part being the duty.
Prodajo drugih izdelkov v Unijo pa je res mogoče uporabiti za navzkrižno kompenzacijo le, če se prodajajo istim strankam kot vroče valjani ploščati izdelki.
This is different in case of a MIP that is the same for all product types.
Vendar je Komisija ugotovila, da sta navzkrižna kompenzacije in tveganje navzkrižne kompenzacije dva različna pojma.
Finally, indeed, sales of other products to the Union may be used for cross-compensation only if they are sold to the same customers as the HRF.
Komisija se na primer zaveda, da proizvajalec izvoznik prodaja druge izdelke v Unijo, vendar nima podatkov glede strank proizvajalca izvoznika za te izdelke.
However the Commission noted that cross-compensation and the risk of cross-compensation are two different concepts.
Proizvajalec izvoznik zlasti ni zanikal prodaje drugih izdelkov svojim odjemalcem vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov in se tudi ni zavezal, da tega ne bo počel v prihodnosti.
For instance, the Commission knows that the exporting producer sells other products to the Union but does not have data concerning the exporting producer's customers for those products.
Ta položaj, ki sicer ne dokazuje navzkrižne kompenzacije, jasno predstavlja tveganje navzkrižne kompenzacije, ki je Komisija ne more nadzorovati.
Notably, the exporting producer did not deny selling other products to its HRF customers nor did it undertake not to do that in the future.
PJSC Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (Rusija)
This situation, whilst not proving cross-compensation, clearly presents a risk of cross-compensation that the Commission is unable to monitor.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je ponudil dve minimalni uvozni ceni na tono, eno za plošče in eno za kolobarje.
PJSC Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (Russia)
Proizvajalec izvoznik je ponudil tudi mehanizem prilagoditve cen in se v spremembi svoje ponudbe zavezal, da bo zadevni izdelek prodajal samo neposredno neodvisnim strankam v Uniji in da ne bo prodajal drugih izdelkov svojim odjemalcem vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov v Uniji.
The exporting producer offered two MIPs per tonne, one for sheets and one for coils.
Ponudba proizvajalca izvoznika je bila predložena po zaključku preiskave in bi jo bilo zato treba zavrniti.
The exporting producer also offered a price adjustment mechanism and, in an amendment to its offer, undertook to sell the product concerned only directly to independent customers in the Union and not to sell other products to its HRF customers in the Union.
Medtem ko se v skladu s členom 8(2) osnovne uredbe v izjemnih okoliščinah zaveze lahko ponudijo po izteku obdobja, v katerem se na podlagi člena 20(5) osnovne uredbe lahko vlagajo stališča, bi morala biti takšna ponudba podana v razumnem času pred zaključkom preiskave.
The exporting producer's offer was submitted after the conclusion of the investigation and as such should be rejected.
Vendar je ponudba na podlagi dveh povprečnih minimalnih uvoznih cen neustrezna, tudi če bi bila podana pravočasno, saj ne bo odpravila škodljivih učinkov dampinga za vse vrste izdelkov, zlasti najdražje.
Whilst, according to Article 8(2) of the basic Regulation, in exceptional circumstances, undertakings may be offered after the period during which representations may be made pursuant to Article 20(5) of the basic Regulation, such offer should come at a reasonable time before the conclusion of the investigation.
Zaradi svetovne strukture in prodajnih dejavnosti proizvajalca izvoznika predlagane cenovne zaveze ne bi bilo možno učinkovito spremljati, zaradi česar obstajajo različne možnosti za navzkrižno kompenzacijo cen.
However, even if the offer was submitted in due time, the offer based on two average MIPs is inadequate as it will not remove the injurious effects of dumping for all product types, in particular the most expensive ones.
Proizvajalec izvoznik ima številne povezane družbe in v Unijo prodaja še druge izdelke iz jekla.
Due to the global structure and sales activities of the exporting producer, the price undertaking proposed would be impossible to be effectively monitored, offering several opportunities for price cross-compensation.
V odgovor na oceno Komisije je proizvajalec izvoznik izrazil nestrinjanje z zgornjo oceno in poudaril pomen svojih dodatnih zavez, da bo uporabljal samo en prodajni kanal in da svojim odjemalcem vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov ne bo prodajal drugih izdelkov.
The exporting producer has a number of related companies and sells also other steel products to the Union.
V zvezi z dodatnimi zavezami je Komisija ugotovila, da je glede na globalno strukturo proizvajalca izvoznika in globalno strukturo njegovih strank nemogoče spremljati vse možnosti navzkrižne kompenzacije, ki so na voljo.
In response to the Commission's assessment, the exporting producer expressed its disagreement with the above assessment whilst emphasising the importance of its additional commitments to use only one sales channel and not to sell other products to its HRF customers.
Če na primer podjetja, ki so vključena v zavezo, odjemalcu vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov v Uniji ne prodajajo drugih izdelkov, ni ovir za to, da bi njihove povezane družbe v Uniji ali zunaj nje sklepale transakcije s potencialom navzkrižne kompenzacije s temi strankami ali njihovi povezani subjekti.
In relation to the additional commitments the Commission noted that, considering the exporting producer's global structure and the global structure of its customers, it is impossible to monitor all the available cross-compensation possibilities.
Čeprav se proizvajalec izvoznik z oceno ustreznosti svoje ponudbe ni strinjal, ni predložil dodatnih argumentov zoper sklep, ki ga je sprejela Komisija.
For instance if the companies covered by the undertaking do not sell other products to an HRF customer in the Union, there is nothing preventing their related companies be it in the Union or outside entering into potentially cross-compensatory transactions with these customers or their related entities.
Novolipetsk Steel OJSC (Rusija)
Whilst the exporting producer disagreed with the assessment of the adequacy of its offer it did not put forward any additional arguments against the conclusion reached by the Commission.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je najprej ponudil različne minimalne uvozne cene na tono glede na vrsto izdelka.
Novolipetsk Steel OJSC (Russia)
Nato je svojo ponudbo spremenil in predlagal eno minimalno uvozno ceno na tono za vse vrste izdelkov z mehanizmom prilagoditve cen na podlagi povprečnih cen vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov.
The exporting producer first offered several MIPs per tonne depending on a product type.
Poleg tega je proizvajalec izvoznik predlagal količinsko zgornjo mejo na letni ravni in se zavezal, da bo prodajal samo svoji povezani družbi v Uniji in samo za nadaljnjo predelavo.
Then it amended its offer, proposing one MIP per tonne for all product types with an adjustment mechanism based on the average HRF prices.
Poleg tega sprejetje ponudbe ne bi bilo smiselno.
In addition, the exporting producer proposed a quantitative annual ceiling and undertook to sell only to its related company in the Union and only for further processing.
Poleg tega povezane družbe v Uniji prav tako proizvajajo in prodajajo podoben izdelek.
The acceptance of the offer would also be impractical.
V odgovoru na oceno Komisije je proizvajalec izvoznik trdil, da Komisija ni upoštevala dveh ključnih elementov njegove ponudbe, in sicer količinske zgornje meje in zaveze o končni rabi (tj. samo za nadaljnjo obdelavo).
Furthermore, related companies in the Union also produce and sell the like product.
Po navedbah proizvajalca izvoznika ti dve zavezi zagotavljata, da izvoza po dampinških cenah ne bi bilo več, saj se zadevni izdelek ne bi izvažal na prosti trg Unije.
In response to the Commission's assessment the exporting producer argued that the Commission overlooked the two key elements of its offer namely the quantitative ceiling and the end-use commitment (i.e. further processing only).
Proizvajalec izvoznik je trdil, da v dokončni uredbi Komisija ni ugotovila škode na zaprtem trgu.
According to the exporting producer these two commitments ensure that exports at dumped prices would cease as the product concerned would not be exported to the Union free market.
Kljub tem argumentom je proizvajalec izvoznik v duhu polnega sodelovanja spremenil svojo ponudbo, tako da je ponudil dvaindvajset minimalnih uvoznih cen, ki temeljijo na vrstah izdelkov.
The exporting producer then argued that in the definitive Regulation the Commission did not find injury on the captive market.
V zvezi s tveganjem navzkrižne kompenzacije je proizvajalec izvoznik trdil, da je glede na to, da prodaje na prostem trgu ne bo, pravzaprav nepomembno, po kakšni minimalni ceni se zadevni izdelek prodaja znotraj skupine.
Despite these arguments, in the spirit of full cooperation, the exporting producer amended its offer, offering 22 MIPs based on product types.
Ker je takšna minimalna cena nepomembna, je tveganje navzkrižne kompenzacije prav tako nepomembno.
With regard to the risk of cross-compensation the exporting producer argued that, as there will be no sales to the free market, it is in fact irrelevant at which minimum price the product concerned is sold within the group.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je nadalje trdil, da so transakcije znotraj skupine predmet politike transfernih cen skupine in se zato ne morejo uporabiti za navzkrižno kompenzacijo.
Since such minimum price is irrelevant, the risk of cross-compensation is equally irrelevant.
Proizvajalec izvoznik v obdobju preiskave ni prodajal vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov svojim povezanim subjektom v Uniji.
The exporting producer further argued that intra-group transactions are subject to group's transfer price policy and thus cannot be used for cross-compensation.
Poleg tega, v nasprotju z navedbami proizvajalca izvoznika, prodaja vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov za nadaljnjo predelavo znotraj skupine ni bila izključena iz ugotovitve glede škodljivega dampinga v dokončni uredbi.
The exporting producer did not sell HRF to its related entities in the Union during the investigation period.
Ta prodaja je trenutno predmet veljavne dajatve in te ugotovitve ni mogoče razveljaviti z zavezo.
In addition, contrary to what the exporting producer suggested, intra-group sales of HRF for further processing were not excluded from the finding of injurious dumping in the definitive Regulation.
Glede na to, da trditev proizvajalca izvoznika glede tega, da navzkrižna kompenzacija v skupini ni mogoča, temelji na napačni domnevi, da prodaja za predelavo znotraj skupine ne povzroča škodljivega dampinga, je bila ta trditev zavrnjena.
These sales are currently covered by the applicable duty and this finding cannot be reversed through an undertaking.
Poleg tega je politika notranjih transferjev v skupini interna odločitev skupine in zato ni zadostna zaščita pred navzkrižnimi kompenzacijami.
Considering that the exporting producer's argument for impossibility of cross-compensation within the group hinges on an incorrect assumption that intra-group sales for processing do not cause injurious dumping, that argument was therefore rejected.
Tudi če bi bila, bi bilo navzkrižno kompenzacijo znotraj skupine mogoče doseči na drugačen način kot s prodajo blaga.
Furthermore, the group's internal transfer policy is the group's own internal decision and as such it is not a sufficient guarantee against cross-compensation.
Ponudbe dvaindvajsetih minimalnih uvoznih cen, ki temeljijo na skupinah vrst izdelkov, ni bilo mogoče sprejeti, saj njihovo učinkovito spremljanje s strani carinskih organov ne bi bilo mogoče.
Even if it were, cross-compensation within the group could be done via other means than a sale of goods.
Metinvest Group (Ukrajina)
The offer of 22 MIPs based on groups of product types could not be accepted as its effective monitoring by customs would be impossible.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je v svoji prvotni ponudbi predlagal dve možnosti.
Metinvest Group (Ukraine)
Prvi scenarij temelji na eni minimalni uvozni ceni na tono (povprečna cena v obdobju preiskave, povečana za dajatev in prilagojena za zvišanje cene surovin po obdobju preiskave) in vključuje možnost prodaje po ceni, nižji od minimalne uvozne cene, z uporabo dajatve.
The exporting producer proposed two scenarios in its original offer.
Drugi scenarij temelji na nižji minimalni uvozni ceni na tono (brez prilagoditve za zvišanje cene surovin po obdobju preiskave) in ne vključuje možnosti prodaje po ceni, ki je nižja od te minimalne uvozne cene.
The first scenario is based on one MIP per tonne (its average price during the investigation period, increased by the duty and adjusted for the increase of the price of the raw materials after the investigation period ) and with possibility of selling below that MIP, under the duty.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je nato svojo ponudbo spremenil, tako da je dodal količinsko zgornjo mejo na letni ravni za prodajo v okviru zaveze.
The second scenario is based on a lower MIP per tonne (without the adjustment for the increase of the price of the raw materials after the investigation period) and without possibility of selling below that MIP.
Komisija ne sprejema t. i. klavzul à la carte, ki bi proizvajalcu izvozniku omogočale prodajo v okviru zaveze in vzporedno pod minimalno uvozno ceno z uporabo dajatve, tako da bi lahko prišel v poštev samo drugi scenarij.
Subsequently, the exporting producer amended its offer by adding an annual quantitative ceiling for sales under the undertaking.
Sprejem takšne klavzule bi omogočil mehanizem navzkrižne kompenzacije, pri katerem bi se transakcije na ravni minimalne uvozne cene lahko kompenzirale s transakcijami po cenah, nižjih od minimalne uvozne cene.
The Commission does not accept the so called pick-and-choose clauses whereby the exporting producer is allowed to sell within an undertaking and in parallel below the MIP under the duty, thus the only scenario open for consideration is the second one.
Člen 50 pridružitvenega sporazuma med EU in Ukrajino daje prednost zavezam, pod pogojem, da Komisija prejme izvedljivo ponudbo, ki je ustrezna in za sprejetje katere se ne šteje, da ni smiselno.
Acceptance of such clause would allow for a cross-compensation mechanism where transactions at the MIP level could be offset by transactions at prices below MIP.
V tem primeru iz razlogov, pojasnjenih v nadaljevanju, Komisija ni prejela izvedljive ponudbe zaveze in zato prednosti ni mogoče upoštevati.
Article 50 of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement expresses a preference for undertakings, provided that the Commission receives a workable offer that is adequate and the acceptance of which is not considered impractical.
Po oceni Komisije obstaja več razlogov, zakaj ponudba ni ustrezna.
In this case, for the reasons explained below, the Commission did not receive a workable undertaking offer and therefore the preference cannot be accommodated.
Ponudba temelji na eni povprečni minimalni uvozni ceni, zato ne bo odpravila škodljivih učinkov dampinga za vse vrste izdelkov, zlasti najdražje.
In the Commission's assessment there are several reasons for which the offer is inadequate.
Proizvajalec izvoznik ni predlagal prilagoditve na račun prodaje prek svojih povezanih družb.
It is based on one average MIP thus it will not remove the injurious effects of dumping for all product types, in particular the most expensive ones.
Medtem ko cene vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov ponavadi v daljšem časovnem obdobju znatno nihajo, proizvajalec izvoznik ni predlagal mehanizma prilagoditve cen.
The exporting producer did not propose an adjustment on the account of sales via its related companies.
Poleg tega sta v zavezo vključena le dva od treh proizvodnih obratov, ki so v obdobju preiskave zadevni izdelek izvažali v Unijo.
While the prices of HRF tend to vary significantly over time, the exporting producer did not propose an adjustment mechanism.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je še predlagal, da bi pogoji zaveze vključevali njegovo prodajo povezanim subjektom v Uniji.
Furthermore, only two out of the three production sites that exported the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period are covered by the undertaking.
Proizvajalec izvoznik ima več povezanih družb v različnih državah članicah in zunaj Unije in nekatere izmed njih proizvajajo in prodajajo podoben izdelek.
Finally, the exporting producer proposed that its sales to related entities in the Union would be covered by the terms of the undertaking.
Proizvajalec izvoznik prodaja v Unijo prek ene ali več od teh družb.
The exporting producer has several related companies in various Member States and outside the Union, some of which produce and sell the like product.
V odgovor na oceno Komisije je proizvajalec izvoznik predložil tretjo različico svoje ponudbe zaveze.
The exporting producer sells to the Union via one or more of these companies.
V novi različici ponudbe je proizvajalec izvoznik predlagal štiri različne minimalne uvozne cene in se zavezal, da ne bo prodajal pod njimi.
In response to the Commission's assessment, the exporting producer submitted a third version of its undertaking offer.
Po navedbah proizvajalca izvoznika je bila ta sprememba uvedena kljub mnenju Komisije v fazi preiskave, da je sprejemljiva ena minimalna uvozna cena za vse vrste izdelkov, kar je privedlo do uvedbe dajatve.
In the new version of the offer the exporting producer proposed four different MIPs and undertook not to sell below them.
Poleg tega se je proizvajalec izvoznik zavezal, da bo v ponudbo zaveze vključil tretji proizvodni obrat, da zadevnega izdelka ne bo prodajal prek svojih povezanih subjektov v Uniji, da bo sporočal podatke o prodaji v Uniji drugih izdelkov svojim odjemalcem vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov v Uniji in da zadevnega izdelka in drugih izdelkov ne bo prodajal zunaj Unije svojim odjemalcem vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov v Uniji.
According to the exporting producer this change was made despite the Commission considering a single MIP for all product types acceptable at a stage of the investigation that lead to the imposition of the duty.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je tudi predlagal nižjo količinsko zgornjo mejo na letni ravni.