natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The State guarantees were granted directly by the Greek State and, as such, measure 1 is imputable to the State.
Iz takšnih tržnih podatkov je razvidno, da bi družba HDS brez državnih poroštev še vedno imela dostop do financiranja na trgu, vendar bi bila poroštvena premija precej višja od 1 %.
State guarantees by definition put State resources at risk, as any public guarantee involves a potential loss of resources by the State.
Podobno se posojila družbi HDS, prikazana v preglednici 2, med sabo precej razlikujejo, kar zadeva izpostavljenost poroka tveganju neplačila, in sicer od 10 milijonov EUR glavnice (posojilo 4 banke National Bank leta 2004) do 164 milijonov EUR glavnice (posojilo 3 banke Alpha Bank leta 2006).
Besides, HDS had defaulted on several loans already in 2004, after which most of the guarantees were granted.
Zato so poroštva, odobrena v obdobju 2004–2006, družbi HDS zagotovila gospodarsko prednost, ki je pod tržnimi pogoji ne bi dobila.
As such, the guarantees involved State resources both in terms of guarantee fees possibly foregone and also in terms of exposure of the public budget in case of default of HDS.
Znesek prednosti ustreza razliki med stroški financiranja, ki bi ga družba HDS pridobila na trgu brez državnih poroštev, ter ceno (osnovna obrestna mera plus premije), dejansko plačano za ta državna poroštva in zadevna posojila.
Consequently, the criterion of State resources and imputability to the State is fulfilled for measure 1.
Vendar preiskava ni razkrila posebnih takratnih ponudb obrestnih mer za posojila družbi HDS brez državnega poroštva ali tržnih ponudb za to posojilo.
Selectivity
V nasprotju s temi družbami bi lahko grške banke vrsto vojaške proizvodnje družbe HDS in dejavnost njene glavne stranke, tj. grških oboroženih sil, štele tudi za dodaten poslovni razlog za zagotovitev financiranja družbi HDS.
As the guarantees were provided to an individual beneficiary, namely HDS on an ad hoc basis and not as part of a measure of general economic policy potentially available to all Greek companies and economic sectors, the measure is selective.
Tržni podatki v tem primeru zato sami po sebi ne zagotavljajo zanesljive vrednosti in natančnega referenčnega merila stroškov, po katerih bi lahko družba HDS med letoma 2004 in 2006 pridobila enaka posojila pod tržnimi pogoji.
It is settled case-law that, in order to determine whether a State measure constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, it is necessary to establish whether the recipient undertaking received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions.
Glede na finančni položaj družbe HDS v obdobju 2004–2006, kot je razviden iz finančnih podatkov družbe HDS v preglednici 1, in dejstvo, da grški organi Komisiji niso mogli zagotoviti načrta, ki bi za prihodnost družbe verodostojno kazal pozitiven razvoj, je treba kreditno sposobnost (oceno) družbe HDS šteti za najnižjo od petih možnih ocen iz sporočila iz leta 2008, in sicer „slaba/finančne težave (CCC in manj)“.
An economic advantage exists whenever the financial situation of an undertaking is improved as a result of a State intervention.
Zanesljivost rezultata navedenega izračuna se v tem primeru dodatno potrdi z dejstvom, da je takšen rezultat v razponu razmikov kreditnih zamenjav in donosov obveznic, opredeljenih v uvodnih izjavah 58 in 59.
However, an intervention by a public authority does not necessarily confer an advantage on the beneficiary, and as such does not constitute aid, if it is carried out under normal market conditions, in other words, if the public authority acted as a prudent operator in a market economy would have done in similar circumstances.
Zato je treba znesek prednosti, povezane s poroštvi, ki jih je država odobrila za posojila, ki jih je družba HDS pridobila v obdobju 2004–2006 (kot so opredeljena v uvodni izjavi 87 zgoraj), za vsako posamezno posojilo izračunati ločeno po naslednji metodologiji: razlika med: (i) tržno obrestno mero, ki temelji na sporočilu iz leta 2008, je izračunana, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 87, in se uporabi za glavnico posojila, ter (ii) dejanskimi stroški financiranja, ki jih mora plačati družba HDS, pri čemer se upoštevata obrestna mera, ki so jo banke uporabile za glavnico posojila, in 1-odstotna poroštvena premija, ki jo je uporabila država (glej preglednico 2), izračunana in zaračunana za obdobje, v katerem so bili družbi HDS dani na voljo različni zneski.
In that respect, the Greek State was the controlling shareholder of HDS at the time of the facts and remains so.
Leta 2007 je bil negativen lastniški kapital družbe HDS skoraj štirikrat višji kot leta 2006, torej se negativen razvoj ni zgolj ustalil, ampak celo precej povečal.
In that capacity, the Greek State has guaranteed eleven loans granted by five different banks between 2004 and 2011.
Po letu 2007 so se finančni podatki le še dodatno precej slabšali.
It cannot be ruled out that it may be in the interest of a controlling shareholder to provide guarantees on loans granted to its holding, insofar as less costly funding may provide higher remuneration (dividends) or increases in the value of its holding, at the cost of increasing its risk as guarantor.
Poleg tega je iz preglednice 3 razvidno, da je leta 2007 znesek neplačanih obveznosti družbe HDS dosegel dvomestno število milijonov EUR, pri čemer se je stalno povečeval s 15 milijonov EUR leta 2007 na 90 milijonov EUR leta 2011.
In the case of HDS, however, the State could not expect any such return, given the difficult financial situation of HDS during this period, as shown in the figures in Table 1, and in particular the continuous losses since 2004.
Glede na te dokaze Komisija meni, da je bilo od leta 2007 tveganje družbe HDS za neplačilo posojil, ki niso bila zavarovana s premoženjem, tako veliko, da brez državnih poroštev na trgu ne bi mogla dobiti takšnega posojila s kakršnimi koli obrestmi.
It follows that the rationale and potential remuneration associated to the State guarantees have to be assessed on a stand-alone basis, leaving aside any potential expectation of shareholder returns.
Dejansko noben posojilodajalec na trgu, seznanjen s finančnimi podatki družbe HDS v obdobju 2007–2011 in njenimi preteklimi neplačili, ne bi bil pripravljen zagotoviti financiranja družbi HDS brez zanesljivega poroštva ali zavarovanja s premoženjem, saj bi pričakoval, ta bi bilo takšno financiranje na koncu izgubljeno.
In particular, by reducing the risk that banks having lent to HDS between 2004 and 2011 were taking, the eleven guarantees in question were liable to reduce the interest rate charged on the underlying loans.
Poleg tega po letu 2007 noben porok na trgu posojilodajalcem ne bi zagotovil poroštva za posojila družbi HDS brez vnaprejšnje enkratne premije v višini 100 % glavnice, kar bi pomenilo zavarovanje celotne izgube, ki bi jo porok slej kot prej zagotovo utrpel, ko družba HDS ne bi plačala posojila.
Those interest rates were different but all, except two, below 5 % during that period.
Zato je element pomoči v državnih poroštvih, odobrenih družbi HDS v obdobju 2007–2011, enak enkratni poroštveni premiji, ki je enaka celotnemu znesku glavnice posojil, zavarovanih s poroštvi, in zaračunana vnaprej ob odobritvi posameznega poroštva, zmanjšani za poroštveno premijo, ki jo je družba HDS dejansko plačala za posamezno posojilo.
In view of HDS' poor performance, even on a stand-alone basis, no prudent operator in a market economy would have granted funding to HDS in the period 2004-2011 at the conditions associated with the eleven loans granted between 2004 and 2011 without the guarantees of the State.
Komisija je seznanjena s pojasnilom grških organov v zvezi z zneskom, ki je bil družbi HDS dejansko na voljo, kar zadeva posojilo bank National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank in EFG Eurobank v višini 30 milijonov EUR leta 2011 (poroštvo št. 10 v preglednici 2 zgoraj), in sicer 7095858 EUR namesto 30000000 EUR, kot je bilo prvotno navedeno v sklepu z dne 6. marca 2013.
In that respect, as regards the claim of the Greek authorities that HDS would have been able to have access to market funding without the State guarantee, a distinction must be made between: (i) the period from 2004 to 2006, and (ii) the period from 2007 to 2011.
Seznanjena je tudi s pojasnilom grških organov v zvezi z državnim poroštvom za posojilo banke Tbank v višini 10 milijonov EUR leta 2011 (poroštvo št. 11 v preglednici 2 zgoraj), da obligacijsko posojilo ni bilo izdano.
In the period from 2004 to 2006, based on HDS' financial data in Table 1, the Commission considers that HDS could have had access to funding from the market, albeit in terms less favourable than those resulting from the State guarantees.
Komisija ugotavlja tudi, da so bila državna poroštva odobrena za celoten znesek 40 milijonov EUR, tudi če je bilo družbi HDS dejansko na voljo le 7095858 EUR iz posojila 10 in 0 EUR iz posojila 11 v preglednici 2 zgoraj.
In 2004-2006, although HDS had significant losses from previous years and negative EBT, it still had a relatively stable annual turnover of approximately EUR 91-97 million.
Datumi odobritev so navedeni v preglednici 2 zgoraj.
Furthermore, HDS' own equity was still positive and it only turned negative in 2006 for the first time.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da so bila nekatera poroštva iz ukrepa 1 unovčena, zato je država postala upnik družbe HDS (ukrep 3).
As regards the level of such funding, the CDS spreads and bond yields indicated in recitals 58 and 59 confirm that certain financially high risk companies had access to financial markets in the 2004-2006 period under consideration and provide an order of magnitude of the conditions at which such companies could obtain funding.
Unovčitev poroštva je namreč naravna posledica zagotovitve takšnega poroštva s strani poroka.
Such market data suggests that, absent the State guarantees, HDS would still have had access to funding from the market, but at a guarantee premium significantly higher than 1 %.
To pomeni, da je gospodarska prednost državnega poroštva pod ugodnejšimi pogoji od tržnih razlika med poroštveno premijo, ki jo zaračuna država, in premijo, ki bi jo zaračunal morebitni porok na trgu.
Yet such differences were not translated into higher guarantee fees.
Kljub temu bi porok na trgu, kolikor bi ob zagotovitvi novih poroštev že prišlo do neplačil, ta pretekla neplačila družbe HDS upošteval in povečano tveganje izrazil vsaj v proviziji za poroštvo, ki jo mora družba HDS plačati za nova posojila, oziroma ne bi zagotovil poroštva ali posojila.
It follows that the fixed fee of 1 % provided by HDS to remunerate the State for the guarantees does not constitute a market based rate, as it does not reflect the increased risk of the guaranteed loans in case of default.
Na koncu Komisija meni, da trditev grških organov, da družba HDS za zadevna posojila ni mogla zagotoviti zavarovanj s premoženjem zaradi varnostnih razlogov, ne vpliva na to, da se poroštva v okviru ukrepa 1 štejejo za državno pomoč.
Therefore, the guarantees granted in 2004-2006 conferred an economic advantage on HDS, which it would not have obtained at market conditions.
Ker je pojem državne pomoči objektiven pojem, ni pomembno, zakaj družba HDS ni mogla zagotoviti zavarovanj s premoženjem, ampak zgolj to, da družba HDS brez poroštev ne bi mogla pridobiti posojil iz preglednice 2 pod enakimi pogoji.
The amount of the advantage corresponds to the difference between the cost of funding that HDS would have obtained from the market without the State guarantees and the price (base rate plus premiums) actually paid for those State guarantees and the respective loans.
Poleg tega so posojila, ki niso zavarovana s premoženjem, za posojilodajalca bolj tvegana kot posojila, zavarovana s premoženjem, in so torej povezana z višjimi obrestnimi merami, s katerimi se povrne sprejeto tveganje.
However, the investigation has not revealed specific contemporary quotes of interest rates for loans to HDS without the State guarantee or market quotes for the latter guarantee.
To objektivno dejstvo se izraža z obrestno mero, izračunano v skladu s sporočilom iz leta 2008, ki je obratno sorazmerna s kakovostjo zagotovljenega zavarovanja s premoženjem.
The market data available (recitals 58 and 59) portrays financial instruments which are different from the loans and guarantees contracted by HDS, notably as to maturity and amount and has been retrieved from companies which did not have financial data similar to those shown for HDS in Table 1 above (for 2004-2006) and a history of default similar to that of HDS as shown in Table 3 above (for 2004-2006).
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da se je z ukrepom 1 družbi HDS zagotovila prednost, ki ustreza znesku, izračunanem po pojasnjeni metodologiji, in sicer za poroštva, ki so bila odobrena za posojila, pridobljena v obdobju 2004–2006, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 89 zgoraj, in za poroštva, ki so bila odobrena za posojila, pridobljena v obdobju 2007–2011, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 91.
Furthermore, in contrast to those companies, the nature of HDS' military production and the activity of its main client, namely the Greek Armed Forces, could have been seen by Greek banks as an additional commercial reason to provide funding to HDS.
V zvezi s trditvami grških organov, povzetimi v uvodnih izjavah 33 in 34 tega sklepa, Komisija meni, da je treba finančne težave podjetja obravnavati objektivno na podlagi finančnih in gospodarskih kazalnikov zadevnega podjetja.
It follows that the market data in this case does not provide of itself a robust indication and precise benchmark of the cost at which HDS could have obtained the same loans between 2004 and 2006 at market conditions.
Razlog za finančne težave sam po sebi torej ne bi smel zmanjševati resnosti teh finančnih težav, kot so razvidne iz zadevnih finančnih in gospodarskih kazalnikov.
Therefore, in order to determine that hypothetical cost of funding from the market for the six loans granted during the years 2004-2006 (i.e. loans 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 shown in Table 2), the Commission has taken into account also the indications in the Communication on the reference and discount rates (‘the 2008 Communication’).
Vpliv na konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami
Given HDS' financial situation in 2004-2006 as portrayed in HDS' financial data in Table 1 and the fact that the Greek authorities were unable to provide the Commission with any plan credibly showing positive developments for the future of the company, HDS' creditworthiness (rating) must be considered the lowest of the five possible ratings provided for in the 2008 Communication, namely ‘Bad/Financial difficulties (CCC and below)’.
Zadevni ukrepi so družbi HDS omogočili financiranje vojaške in civilne proizvodnje po obrestni meri, ki je bila ugodnejša od običajnih tržnih obrestnih mer.
Furthermore, the loans in question had no collateral and have therefore to be qualified as ‘low collateral’ in the three step scale provided for in the 2008 Communication.
Zadevni ukrepi so torej izkrivljali konkurenco, saj so morale druge družbe, ki so poslovale na istih trgih, svoje dejavnosti financirati pod tržnimi pogoji in poslovati brez podobne državne podpore.
The market interest rate must therefore be calculated for each loan as the result of the sum of the 1-year IBOR at the time the loan was granted plus 1000 basis points as defined in the 2008 Communication.
Ne glede na pomen vojaške proizvodnje družbe HDS za bistvene varnostne interese Grčije je družba HDS poslovala tudi v sektorju, v katerem med državami članicami poteka trgovina s proizvodi za civilno uporabo.
The reliability of the result of the above calculation is further confirmed in the present case by the fact that such result is within the ranges of CDS spreads and bond yields identified in recitals 58 and 59.
Zato bi lahko ukrep 1 prizadel konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami.
Therefore, the amount of the advantage linked to the guarantees granted by the State for the loans obtained by HDS during the years 2004-2006 (as identified in recital 87 above) must be calculated separately for each loan according to the following methodology: the difference between: (i) the market interest rate based on the 2008 Communication calculated as explained in recital 87 applied to the loan principal, and (ii) the actual financing cost due by HDS taking into account the interest rate applied by the banks to the loan principal and the 1 % guarantee premium applied by the State (see Table 2), calculated and charged for the period during which the different amounts were made available to HDS.
Sklep glede obstoja državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU za ukrep 1
On the other hand, HDS' financial situation was substantially different in the period from 2007 to 2011.
Glede na navedeno Komisija ugotavlja, da poroštva, opredeljena kot ukrep 1, ki jih je družbi HDS zagotovila Grčija in so opisana v uvodnih izjavah 15 in 16, kolikor so imela koristi za civilne dejavnosti družbe HDS, pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU.
According to Table 1, in 2007, HDS lost a third of its turnover as compared to previous years, had losses (negative earnings before tax ‘EBT’) double its turnover, a negative equity more than quadruple its turnover and losses of previous years almost 9-fold its turnover.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je zadevna povečanja kapitala zagotovila grška država.
HDS' negative own equity in 2007 became almost four times higher than in 2006, thus not only stabilising that negative development but also largely increasing its intensity.
Zato je ukrep 3 mogoče pripisati grški državi in se financira z državnimi sredstvi.
After 2007, the financial data only further significantly deteriorated.
Kar zadeva znesek vključenih državnih sredstev, se Komisija ne strinja z grškimi organi, da se del povečanj kapitala ne bi smel šteti k ukrepu 3, saj je šlo za kapitalizacijo dolgov, ki so nastali zaradi unovčitve državnih poroštev (ukrep 1).
HDS' turnover gradually shrank to EUR 39 million in 2011 from EUR 95 million in 2006, while losses of previous years accumulated to EUR 1131 million in 2011, as compared to EUR 443 million in 2006.
Kapitalizacija dolga, ki nastane zaradi unovčitve poroštva, namreč ni samodejna konverzija, ampak zavestna odločitev države, da ne izterja dolga.
In 2011 HDS had a negative equity almost 14-fold its turnover and losses of previous years almost 29-fold its turnover.
Takšna konverzija pomeni možnost izgube vrednosti, saj je država svoj položaj upnice zamenjala za položaj delničarke in se torej odpovedala državnim sredstvom v obliki dolgov, za katere se je odločila, da jih ne bo izterjala.
In addition, Table 3 shows that the amounts on which HDS defaulted reached double-digit EUR million amounts as of 2007, consistently rising from EUR 15 million in 2007 to EUR 90 million in 2011.
Poleg tega bi delničar v primeru morebitne likvidacije družbe že po definiciji manj verjetno zbral svoj kapital kot upnik, zato ima konverzija dolga do države v kapital učinek odpovedi državnim sredstvom.
In light of this evidence, the Commission considers that as of 2007, HDS' risk of default on loans which were not collateralised was so high that, absent the State guarantees, it could not have obtained such a loan from the market at any rate.
Ker je bil ukrep zagotovljen posameznemu podjetju, tj. družbi HDS, Komisija ugotavlja, da je bil selektiven.
Indeed, no market lender presented with HDS' financial data in the period 2007-2011 and its history of default would have agreed to provide any funding without a solid guarantee or collateral to HDS, since every market lender would anticipate that such funding would eventually be lost.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, je prednost v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU vsaka gospodarska korist, ki je podjetje ne bi moglo pridobiti pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji.
In turn, no market guarantor would have provided to the lenders any guarantee on the loans to HDS after 2007 without upfront one-off premiums of 100 % of the loan principals, which would be fully securing the loss that the guarantor would face with certainty when HDS would default on the loans, sooner or later.
V zvezi s tem Komisija ni prejela prepričljivih dokazov grških organov, s katerimi bi utemeljili svojo trditev, da so bila zadevna povečanja kapitala pridobljena pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji, saj je država delovala kot razumni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, in zato ne morejo pomeniti prednosti.
Therefore, the aid element in the State guarantees granted to HDS in the period 2007-2011 is equivalent to a one-off guarantee premium equal to the full amount of the principal of the guaranteed loans and charged upfront when each guarantee was granted, minus the guarantee premium actually paid by HDS on each loan.
Komisija ugotavlja, da različna povečanja kapitala, ki jih je grška država kot delničarka vpisala leta 2011, in sicer med majem 2011 in decembrom 2011, niso bila podprta z analizo možnih donosov na domnevne naložbe, ki bi jih razumni vlagatelj proučil in upošteval, preden bi sprejel odločitev o naložbi.
The Commission takes note of the clarification of the Greek authorities with regard to the amount that was actually made available to HDS in relation to the loan of EUR 30 million by the National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank and EFG Eurobank in 2011 (guarantee number 10 in Table 2 above) which was EUR 7095858, instead of EUR 30000000 originally mentioned in the decision of 6 March 2013.
Kot je pojasnila Grčija, so bila povečanja kapitala izvedena, da bi se zagotovila sposobnost preživetja družbe HDS glede na njeno odločilno vlogo na področju nacionalne obrambe in varnosti.
The Commission also takes note of the clarification of the Greek authorities with regard to the State guarantee for the loan of EUR 10 million by Tbank in 2011 (guarantee number 11 in Table 2 above), according to which the bond loan was never issued.
Končni znesek povečanj kapitala v nobenem primeru ni zadostoval za pokritje negativnega lastniškega kapitala družbe HDS in ga torej ni mogoče šteti za ukrep, s katerim se ščiti vrednost družbe in podpira njeno prestrukturiranje.
The Commission also observes that, even if only EUR 7095858 of loan 10 and EUR zero of loan 11 in Table 2 above have been actually made available to HDS, the State guarantees were granted for the full amount of EUR 40 million.
V zvezi s tem iz informacij, ki jih je predložila Grčija, izhaja, da ni dokazov o predhodni ekonomski analizi, ki bi jo izvedla država glede tega, ali je bila konverzija terjatev, ki izhajajo iz unovčitve poroštev, v kapital ekonomsko ugodnejša od ohranitve ali izvršitve teh terjatev.
However, only the amounts of the loans actually disbursed play a role for the determination of the amount of aid to be recovered, as explained in recital 135 of the present decision.
Tržni upnik bi pred sprejetjem odločitve običajno proučil, katero dejanje je ekonomsko ugodnejše.
As regards the granting dates, they are provided in Table 2 above.
V zvezi z oceno, ali je država z zagotovitvijo zadevnih povečanj kapitala družbi HDS zagotovila prednost, je treba ugotoviti, ali je delovala enako kot bi deloval udeleženec v tržnem gospodarstvu v podobnem položaju.
The Commission in addition notes that some of the guarantees under measure 1 were called and thus the State became creditor of HDS (measure 3).
Takšen udeleženec v tržnem gospodarstvu ne bi upošteval javnopolitičnih stališč.
However, to the extent those defaults occurred after the relevant guarantee had been provided, this is irrelevant for the State aid qualification of the measure and for the total amount of economic advantage.
V tem smislu trditve grških organov v zvezi z ohranitvijo družbe, ki je pomembna za bistvene varnostne interese države, torej ni mogoče upoštevati kot stališče, ki bi ga upošteval vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, in kot taka ni pomembna za oceno zadevnih povečanj kapitala.
This is because the calling of a guarantee is a natural consequence of the provision of such a guarantee by a guarantor.
Čeprav ni dejanskih dokazov, da so grški organi izvedli analizo, omenjeno v uvodni izjavi 108, je iz razpoložljivih podatkov razvidno, da je bila konverzija manj ugodna od ohranitve statusa quo, tj. ohranitve dolžniških terjatev.