natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In accordance with the objectives of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, the regulatory capital requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council [5] for institutions originating, sponsoring or investing in securitisations should be amended to adequately reflect the specific features of STS securitisations when such securitisations also meet the additional requirements laid down in this Regulation, and to address the shortcomings which became apparent during the financial crisis, namely mechanistic reliance on external ratings, excessively low risk weights for highly-rated securitisation tranches and, conversely, excessively high risk weights for low-rated tranches, and insufficient risk sensitivity.
Isti odbor je 11. julija 2016 objavil posodobljen standard za regulativno kapitalsko obravnavo izpostavljenosti v listinjenju, ki zajema regulativno kapitalsko obravnavo za „enostavno, pregledno in primerljivo“ listinjenje.
On 11 December 2014 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the ‘BCBS’) published its ‘Revisions to the securitisation framework’ (the ‘Revised Basel Framework’) setting out various changes to the regulatory capital standards for securitisations to address specifically those shortcomings.
Ta standard spreminja spremenjeni baselski okvir.
On 11 July 2016, the BCBS published an updated standard for the regulatory capital treatment of securitisation exposures that includes the regulatory capital treatment for ‘simple, transparent and comparable’ securitisations.
Spremembe Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 bi morale upoštevati določbe o spremembah iz spremenjenega baselskega okvira.
That standard amends the Revised Basel Framework.
Za izračun kapitalskih zahtev za pozicije v listinjenju v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 575/2013 bi morale vse institucije uporabljati enake metode.
The amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should take into account the provisions of the Revised Basel Framework as amended.
Kot prvi korak in da se odpravijo vse oblike mehaničnega zanašanja na zunanje bonitetne ocene, bi morala institucija uporabiti lastne izračune regulativnih kapitalskih zahtev, če ima dovoljenje za uporabo pristopa na osnovi notranjih bonitetnih ocen (v nadaljnjem besedilu: pristop IRB) za izpostavljenosti iste vrste, kot so osnovne izpostavljenosti v listinjenju, in lahko izračuna regulativne kapitalske zahteve za osnovne izpostavljenosti, kot da te ne bi bile listinjene (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Kirb), v vsakem primeru z uporabo nekaterih vnaprej določenih vhodnih podatkov (v nadaljnjem besedilu: pristop IRB za listinjenje oziroma SEC-IRBA).
Capital requirements for positions in a securitisation under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should be subject to the same calculation methods for all institutions.
Institucijam, ki za svoje pozicije v danem listinjenju ne smejo uporabljati SEC-IRBA, bi moral biti nato na voljo standardizirani pristop za listinjenje (v nadaljnjem besedilu: SEC-SA).
In the first instance and to remove any form of mechanistic reliance on external ratings, an institution should use its own calculation of regulatory capital requirements where the institution has permission to apply the Internal Ratings Based Approach (the ‘IRB Approach’) in relation to exposures of the same type as those underlying the securitisation and is able to calculate regulatory capital requirements in relation to the underlying exposures as if these had not been securitised (‘KIRB’), in each case subject to certain pre-defined inputs (the Securitisation IRB Approach — ‘SEC-IRBA’).
SEC-SA bi moral temeljiti na formuli, ki kot vhodni podatek uporablja kapitalske zahteve, ki bi se izračunale v skladu s standardiziranim pristopom za kreditno tveganje za osnovne izpostavljenosti, kot če te ne bi bile listinjene (v nadaljnjem besedilu: KSA).
A Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA) should then be available to institutions that are not able to use the SEC-IRBA in relation to their positions in a given securitisation.
Kadar prva dva pristopa nista na voljo, bi morale institucije imeti možnost, da uporabijo pristop za listinjenje na osnovi zunanjih bonitetnih ocen (v nadaljnjem besedilu: SEC-ERBA).
The SEC-SA should rely on a formula using as an input the capital requirements that would be calculated under the Standardised Approach to credit risk in relation to the underlying exposures as if they had not been securitised (‘KSA’).
V okviru SEC-ERBA bi bilo treba kapitalske zahteve dodeliti tranšam listinjenja na podlagi njihove zunanje bonitetne ocene.
When the first two approaches are not available, institutions should be able to apply the Securitisation External Ratings Based Approach (SEC-ERBA).
Vendar bi morale institucije kot alternativo vedno uporabiti SEC-ERBA, če SEC-IRBA ni na voljo za nekatere nizko- in srednje visoko ocenjene tranše listinjenja STS, opredeljene z uporabo ustreznih parametrov.
Under the SEC-ERBA, capital requirements should be assigned to securitisation tranches on the basis of their external rating.
Za listinjenje, ki ni STS, bi bilo treba uporabo SEC-SA po SEC-IRBA dodatno omejiti.
However, institutions should always use the SEC-ERBA as a fallback when the SEC-IRBA is not available for low-rated tranches and certain medium-rated tranches of STS securitisations identified through appropriate parameters.
Poleg tega bi morali pristojni organi imeti možnost prepovedati uporabo SEC-SA, če z njim ni mogoče zadostno obvladovati tveganj, ki jih listinjenje pomeni za solventnost institucije ali za finančno stabilnost.
For non-STS securitisations, the use of the SEC-SA after the SEC-IRBA should be further restricted.
Če so uradno obvestile pristojni organ, bi moralo biti institucijam dovoljeno, da uporabljajo SEC-ERBA za vsa ocenjena listinjenja, ki jih imajo, če ne morejo uporabiti SEC-IRBA.
Moreover, competent authorities should be able to prohibit the use of the SEC-SA when the latter is not able to adequately tackle the risks that the securitisation poses to the solvability of the institution or to financial stability.
Agencijska in modelska tveganja so pri listinjenju bolj prisotna kot pri drugih finančnih sredstvih, kar povzroča določeno stopnjo negotovosti pri izračunu kapitalskih zahtev za listinjenje tudi po upoštevanju vseh ustreznih dejavnikov tveganja.
Upon notification to the competent authority, institutions should be allowed to use the SEC-ERBA in respect of all rated securitisations they hold when they cannot use the SEC-IRBA.
Da bi bila ta tveganja ustrezno zajeta, bi bilo treba Uredbo (EU) št. 575/2013 spremeniti tako, da se določi najnižja spodnja meja uteži tveganja v višini 15 % za vse pozicije v listinjenju.
Agency and model risks are more prevalent for securitisations than for other financial assets and give rise to some degree of uncertainty in the calculation of capital requirements for securitisations even after all appropriate risk drivers have been taken into account.
Ker pa je relistinjenje bolj zapleteno in tvegano, so v skladu z Uredbo (EU) 2017/2402 dovoljene le nekatere oblike relistinjenja.
In order to capture those risks adequately, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should be amended to provide for a minimum 15 % risk-weight floor for all securitisation positions.
Poleg tega bi bilo treba za pozicije v relistinjenju določiti bolj konzervativen izračun regulativnega kapitala in spodnjo mejo uteži tveganja v višini 100 %.
Resecuritisations, however, exhibit greater complexity and riskiness and, accordingly, only certain forms of resecuritisations are permitted under Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Od institucije se ne bi smelo zahtevati, da za nadrejeno pozicijo uporabi višjo utež tveganja od tiste, ki bi se uporabljala, če bi imele neposredno v lasti osnovne izpostavljenosti, s čimer bi se upošteval učinek kreditne izboljšave, ki jo nadrejene pozicije prejmejo od podrejenih tranš v strukturi listinjenja.
In addition, positions in resecuritisations should be subject to a more conservative regulatory capital calculation and a 100 % risk-weight floor.
Uredba (EU) št. 575/2013 bi morala zato predvideti pristop vpogleda, v skladu s katerim bi bilo treba nadrejeni poziciji v listinjenju dodeliti najvišjo utež tveganja, enako z izpostavljenostjo tehtani povprečni uteži tveganja, ki se uporablja za osnovne izpostavljenosti, tak pristop pa bi moral biti pod določenimi pogoji na voljo ne glede na to, ali je zadevna pozicija ocenjena ali ne in ne glede to, kateri pristop se uporablja za osnovno skupino (standardizirani pristop ali pristop IRB).
An institution should not be required to apply a higher risk weight to a senior position than that which would apply if it held the underlying exposures directly, thus reflecting the benefit of credit enhancement that senior positions receive from junior tranches in the securitisation structure.
V veljavnem okviru je predvidena splošna zgornja meja za najvišje zneske tveganju prilagojenih izpostavljenosti za institucije, ki lahko izračunajo kapitalske zahteve za osnovne izpostavljenosti v skladu s pristopom IRB, kot da navedene izpostavljenosti ne bi bile listinjene (KIRB).
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should therefore provide for a ‘look-through’ approach according to which a senior securitisation position should be assigned a maximum risk weight equal to the exposure-weighted-average risk weight applicable to the underlying exposures, and such approach should be available irrespective of whether the relevant position is rated or unrated and the approach used for the underlying pool (Standardised Approach or IRB Approach), subject to certain conditions.
V obsegu, v katerem proces listinjenja zmanjšuje tveganje, povezano z osnovnimi izpostavljenostmi, bi morala biti ta zgornja meja na voljo za vse institucije v vlogi originatorjev in sponzorjev, ne glede na pristop, ki ga uporabljajo za izračun regulativnih kapitalskih zahtev za pozicije v listinjenju.
An overall cap in terms of maximum risk-weighted exposure amounts is available under the current framework for institutions that can calculate the capital requirements for the underlying exposures in accordance with the IRB Approach as if those exposures had not been securitised (KIRB).
Kot je poudaril Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski bančni organ) (EBA), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [6] v svojem poročilu o kvalificiranem listinjenju iz julija 2015, empirični dokazi o neplačilih in izgubah kažejo, da je bilo listinjenje STS med finančno krizo uspešnejše kot druge vrste listinjenj, kar kaže, da uporaba enostavnih in preglednih struktur ter zanesljivih praks izvrševanja pri listinjenju STS povzroča manjša kreditna, operativna in agencijska tveganja.
Insofar as the securitisation process reduces the risk attached to the underlying exposures, this cap should be available to all originator and sponsor institutions, regardless of the approach they use for the calculation of regulatory capital requirements for the positions in the securitisation.
Zato je primerno spremeniti Uredbo (EU) št. 575/2013, da se za listinjenje STS – če to izpolnjuje tudi dodate zahteve za zmanjšanje tveganja – določi umeritev, ki bo ustrezno upoštevala tveganja, na način, ki ga je v navedenem poročilu priporočil EBA in ki vključuje zlasti nižjo spodnjo mejo uteži tveganja za nadrejene pozicije v višini 10 %.
As pointed out by the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (‘EBA’), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [6], in its report on qualifying securitisation of July 2015, empirical evidence on defaults and losses shows that STS securitisations exhibited better performance than other securitisations during the financial crisis, reflecting the use of simple and transparent structures and robust execution practices in STS securitisation which deliver lower credit, operational and agency risks.
Manj strožje kapitalske zahteve, ki veljajo za listinjenje STS, bi morale biti omejene na listinjenje, pri katerem se lastništvo osnovnih izpostavljenosti prenese na subjekt s posebnim namenom pri listinjenju ali SSPE (v nadaljnjem besedilu: tradicionalno listinjenje).
It is therefore appropriate to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to provide for an appropriately risk-sensitive calibration for STS securitisations, provided that they also meet additional requirements to minimise risk, in the manner recommended by the EBA in that report which involves, in particular, a lower risk-weight floor of 10 % for senior positions.
Vendar bi moralo biti institucijam, ki zadržijo nadrejene pozicije v sintetičnem listinjenju, zavarovanem z osnovno skupino kreditov malim in srednjim podjetjem (MSP), dovoljeno tudi, da za te pozicije uporabijo nižje kapitalske zahteve, ki so na voljo za listinjenje STS, kadar se v skladu z določenimi strogimi merili šteje, da gre za posle visoke kakovosti, tudi kar zadeva primerne investitorje.
Lower capital requirements applicable to STS securitisations should be limited to securitisations where the ownership of the underlying exposures is transferred to a securitisation special purpose entity or SSPE (‘traditional securitisations’).
Zlasti bi morali za takšno podskupino sintetičnih listinjenj jamčiti ali posredno jamčiti bodisi enota centralne ravni države ali centralna banka države članice bodisi promocijski subjekt bodisi institucionalni investitor, pod pogojem, da je jamstvo ali posredno jamstvo, ki ga zagotavlja slednji, v celoti zavarovano z bančnimi vlogami pri institucijah v vlogi originatorjev.
However, institutions retaining senior positions in synthetic securitisations backed by an underlying pool of loans to small and medium-size enterprises (‘SMEs’) should also be allowed to apply to these positions the lower capital requirements available for STS securitisations where such transactions are regarded as of high quality in accordance with certain strict criteria, including on the eligible investors.
Ugodnejša regulativna kapitalska obravnava za listinjenje STS, ki bi bila na voljo za te posle v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 575/2013, ne posega v skladnost z okvirom Unije za državne pomoči, kot je opredeljen v Direktivi 2014/59/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [7].
In particular, such subset of synthetic securitisations should benefit from the guarantee or counterguarantee either by the central government or central bank of a Member State or a promotional entity, or by an institutional investor provided that the guarantee or counterguarantee provided by the latter is fully collateralised by cash on deposit with the originator institutions.
Za harmonizacijo nadzorniških praks v vsej Uniji bi bilo treba na Komisijo prenesti pooblastilo, da v skladu s členom 290 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU), ob upoštevanju poročila EBA, sprejme akte glede podrobnejše opredelitve pogojev prenosa kreditnega tveganja na tretje osebe, pojma sorazmernega prenosa kreditnega tveganja na tretje osebe in zahtev glede ocene pristojnih organov glede prenosa kreditnega tveganja, tako glede tradicionalnih kot sintetičnih listinjenj.
The preferential regulatory capital treatment for STS securitisations that would be available to those transactions under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 is without prejudice to compliance with the Union State aid framework, as set out in Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [7].
Tehnični standardi v zvezi s finančnimi storitvami bi morali zagotoviti ustrezno varstvo investitorjev in potrošnikov po vsej Uniji.
In order to harmonise supervisory practices throughout the Union, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should be delegated to the Commission, having taken account of the report by the EBA, in respect of further specifying the conditions for the transfer of credit risk to third parties, the notion of commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties and the requirements for competent authorities assessment of transfer of credit risk, both with regard to traditional and synthetic securitisations.
Učinkovito in ustrezno bi bilo, da se EBA kot visoko specializiranemu organu zaupa priprava osnutkov regulativnih tehničnih standardov, ki ne vključujejo odločitev politike, da se ti osnutki predložijo Komisiji.
In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.
Komisija bi morala te osnutke regulativnih tehničnih standardov sprejeti z delegiranimi akti na podlagi člena 290 PDEU in v skladu s členi 10 do 14 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010.
Technical standards in financial services should ensure adequate protection of investors and consumers across the Union.
Pri ostalih regulativnih kapitalskih zahtevah za listinjenje iz Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 bi bilo treba vnesti le bistvene spremembe, kolikor je to potrebno, da se upoštevajo nova hierarhija pristopov in posebne določbe za listinjenje STS.
As a body with highly specialised expertise, it would be efficient and appropriate to entrust the EBA with the elaboration of draft regulatory technical standards which do not involve policy choices, for submission to the Commission.
Zlasti pri določbah o priznavanju prenosa pomembnega deleža tveganja in zahtevah glede zunanjih bonitetnih ocen bi bilo treba tudi v prihodnje uporabljati na splošno enake pogoje, kot veljajo zdaj.
The Commission should be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards developed by the EBA, with regard to what constitutes an appropriately conservative method for measuring the amount of the undrawn portion of the cash advance facilities in the context of calculating the exposure value of a securitisation and with regard to further specifying the conditions to allow institutions to calculate KIRB for the pool of underlying exposures of a securitisation like in the case of purchased receivables.
Vendar bi bilo treba del pet Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 v celoti črtati, razen zahteve, da morajo institucije, pri katerih se ugotovijo kršitve določb poglavja 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402, uporabljati dodatne uteži tveganja.
The Commission should adopt those draft regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Primerno je, da se spremembe Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013, določene v tej uredbi, uporabljajo za vse pozicije v listinjenju, ki jih imajo institucije.
Only consequential changes should be made to the remaining regulatory capital requirements for securitisations laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 insofar as necessary to reflect the new hierarchy of approaches and the specific provisions for STS securitisations.
Vendar bi bilo treba institucijam, da se čim bolj omejijo prehodni stroški ter omogoči gladek prehod na nov okvir, dovoliti uporabo prejšnjega okvira do 31. decembra 2019, in sicer ustrezne določbe Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013, ki so se uporabljale pred datumom začetka uporabe te uredbe za vse neporavnane pozicije v listinjenju, ki so jih imele na datum začetka uporabe te uredbe –
In particular, the provisions related to the recognition of significant risk transfer and the requirements on external credit assessments should continue to apply in broadly the same terms as they do currently.
SPREJELA NASLEDNJO UREDBO:
However, Part Five of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should be deleted in its entirety with the exception of the requirement to hold additional risk weights which should be imposed on institutions found in breach of the provisions in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Člen 1
It is appropriate for the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 provided for in this Regulation to apply to all securitisation positions held by an institution.
Sprememba Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013
However, in order to mitigate transitional costs insofar as possible and to allow for a smooth migration to the new framework, institutions should continue to apply, until 31 December 2019, the previous framework, namely the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 that applied prior to the date of application of this Regulation, to all outstanding securitisation positions that they hold on the date of application of this Regulation,
Uredba (EU) št. 575/2013 se spremeni:
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
člen 4(1) se spremeni:
Article 1
točki (13) in (14) se nadomestita z naslednjim:
Amendment of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
‚originator‘ pomeni originatorja, kot je opredeljen v točki (3) člena 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402;
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 is amended as follows:
‚sponzor‘ pomeni sponzorja, kot je opredeljen v točki (5) člena 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402.;
Article 4(1) is amended as follows:
vstavi se naslednja točka:
points (13) and (14) are replaced by the following:
‚prvotni kreditodajalec‘ pomeni prvotnega kreditodajalca, kot je opredeljen v točki (20) člena 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402;“;
“originator” means an originator as defined in point (3) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402;
točke (61), (62) in (63) se nadomestijo z naslednjim:
“sponsor” means a sponsor as defined in point (5) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402;
‚listinjenje‘ pomeni listinjenje, kot je opredeljeno v točki (1) člena 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402;
the following point is inserted:
‚pozicija v listinjenju‘ pomeni pozicijo v listinjenju, kot je opredeljena v točki (19) člena 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402;
“original lender” means an original lender as defined in point (20) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402’;
‚relistinjenje‘ pomeni relistinjenje, kot je opredeljeno v točki (4) člena 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402;“;
points (61), (62) and (63) are replaced by the following:
točki (66) in (67) se nadomestita z naslednjim:
“securitisation” means a securitisation as defined in point (1) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402;
‚subjekt s posebnim namenom pri listinjenju‘ ali ‚SSPE‘ pomeni subjekt s posebnim namenom pri listinjenju ali SSPE, kot je opredeljen v točki (2) člena 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402;
“securitisation position” means a securitisation position as defined in point (19) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402;
‚tranša‘ pomeni tranšo, kot je opredeljena v točki (6) člena 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402;“;
“resecuritisation” means a resecuritisation as defined in point (4) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402;’;
doda se naslednja točka:
points (66) and (67) are replaced by the following:
‚serviser‘ pomeni serviserja kot je opredeljen v točki (13) člena 2 Uredbe (EU) 2017/2402.“;
“securitisation special purpose entity” or “SSPE” means a securitisation special purpose entity or SSPE as defined in point (2) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402;
v točki (k) člena 36(1) se točka (ii) nadomesti z naslednjim:
“tranche” means a tranche as defined in point (6) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402;’;
pozicije v listinjenju v skladu s točko (b) člena 244(1), točko (b) člena 245(1) in členom 253;“;
the following point is added:
člen 109 se nadomesti z naslednjim:
“servicer” means a servicer as defined in point (13) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.’.
„Člen 109
In point (k) of Article 36(1), point (ii) is replaced by the following:
Obravnava pozicij v listinjenju
securitisation positions, in accordance with point (b) of Article 244(1), point (b) of Article 245(1) and Article 253;’.
Institucije izračunajo znesek tveganju prilagojenih izpostavljenosti za pozicijo, ki jo imajo v listinjenju, v skladu s poglavjem 5.“;
Article 109 is replaced by the following:
v členu 134 se odstavek 6 nadomesti z naslednjim:
‘Article 109
Kadar institucija nastopa kot dajalec kreditnega zavarovanja za več izpostavljenosti pod pogojem, da neplačilo n-te izmed zavarovanih izpostavljenosti povzroči plačilo in da se s tem kreditnim dogodkom prekine pogodba, se uteži tveganja za izpostavljenosti, ki jih vsebuje košara izpostavljenosti, razen izpostavljenosti n–1, seštejejo do največ 1250 % in pomnožijo z nominalnim zneskom zavarovanja, ki ga zagotavlja kreditni izvedeni finančni instrument, da se pridobi znesek tveganju prilagojenih izpostavljenosti.