natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Measures to be adopted per crisis level:
Pri razvoju načrta preventivnih ukrepov in načrta za izredne razmere pristojni organ preuči prispevek naslednjega okvirnega in nepopolnega seznama ukrepov samo v primeru izrednih razmer:
brief description of the measure and main actors involved;
ukrepi na strani ponudbe:
describe the reporting obligations imposed on natural gas undertakings at alert. level.
uporaba strateških zalog plina,
describe in detail the procedure to implement the measure (e.g. what would trigger the introduction of the measure, who would take the decision);
predpisana uporaba zalog alternativnih goriv (npr. v skladu z Direktivo Sveta 2009/119/ES [1]),predpisana uporaba električne energije, pridobljene iz virov, ki niso plinski,
justify the compliance of the measure with the conditions established in Article 11(6);
predpisano povečanje proizvodnje plina,
Cooperation mechanisms
predpisano praznjenje skladišča;
describe the mechanisms in place to cooperate within each of the relevant risk groups and to ensure appropriate coordination for each crisis level.
ukrepi na strani povpraševanja:
Describe, to the extent they exist and have not been covered in point 2, the decision-making procedures for appropriate reaction at regional level at each crisis level;
različne stopnje za obvezno zmanjšanje povpraševanja, vključno s:
describe the mechanisms in place to cooperate with other Member States out of the risk groups and to coordinate actions for each crisis level.
predpisano menjavo goriva,
Solidarity among Member States
predpisano uporabo prekinljivih pogodb, kadar se ne uporabljajo v celoti v okviru tržnih ukrepov,
describe the agreed arrangements among directly connected Member States to ensure the application of the solidarity principle referred to in Article 13;
predpisanim zmanjšanjem stalne obremenitve.
if applicable, describe the agreed arrangements between Members States that are connected to each other via a third country to ensure the application of the solidarity principle referred to in Article 13.
Direktiva Sveta 2009/119/ES z dne 14. septembra 2009 o obveznosti držav članic glede vzdrževanja minimalnih zalog surove nafte in/ali naftnih derivatov (UL L 265, 9.10.2009, str. 9).
Where this task has been delegated by any competent authority, please indicate the name of the body/(ies) responsible for the preparation of this plan on its behalf.
PRILOGA IX
Include regional and national measures.
Korelacijska tabela
ANNEX VIII
Uredba (EU) št. 994/2010
List of non-market-based security of gas supply measures
Ta uredba
In developing the preventive action plan and the emergency plan the competent authority shall consider the contribution of the following indicative and non-exhaustive list of measures only in the event of an emergency:
Priloga I
supply-side measures:
Priloga II
use of strategic gas storage,
Priloga III
enforced use of stocks of alternative fuels (e.g. in accordance with Council Directive 2009/119/EC [1]),enforced use of electricity generated from sources other than gas,
Priloga IV
enforced increase of gas production levels,
Priloga V
enforced storage withdrawal;
Priloga VI
demand-side measures:
Priloga VII
various steps of compulsory demand reduction including:
Priloga VIII
enforced fuel switching,
Priloga IX
enforced utilisation of interruptible contracts, where not fully utilised as part of market-based measures,
Večja motnja v oskrbi s plinom lahko vpliva na vse države članice, Unijo in pogodbenice Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Energetske skupnosti, podpisane 25. oktobra 2005 v Atenah.
enforced firm load shedding.
Prav tako lahko resno škoduje gospodarstvu Unije in ima hude socialne posledice, zlasti za ranljive skupine odjemalcev.
Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9).
ne vplivata negativno na zmožnost katere koli druge države članice, da svoje zaščitene odjemalce oskrbuje s plinom v skladu s tem členom v primeru izrednih razmer na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni ali na ravni Unije, in
ANNEX IX
sta ob izrednih razmerah na regionalni ravni ali ravni Unije skladna s členom 12(5).
Correlation table
Načrti preventivnih ukrepov in načrti za izredne razmere se objavijo in priglasijo Komisiji do 1. marca 2019.
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010
Komisija obvesti KSP o priglasitvi načrtov, ki jih objavi na spletnem mestu Komisije.
This Regulation
Pooblastilo za sprejemanje delegiranih aktov iz členov 3(8), 7(5) in 8(5) se prenese na Komisijo za obdobje petih let od 1. novembra 2017.
Annex I
Komisija pripravi poročilo o prenosu pooblastila najpozneje devet mesecev pred koncem petletnega obdobja.
Annex II
Jasno razložite, kdo mora izpolnjevati te obveznosti in kako.
Annex III
Če je primerno, opišite, kako in kdaj bi te obveznosti javne službe začele veljati.
Annex IV
navedite ukrepe in dejavnosti za ublažitev potencialnega vpliva motenj v oskrbi s plinom na daljinsko ogrevanje.
Annex V
V nasprotnem primeru navedite, zakaj sprejetje določenih ukrepov ni primerno.
Annex VI
navedite ukrepe in dejavnosti za ublažitev potencialnega vpliva motenj v oskrbi s plinom na sektor električne energije.
Annex VII
Zemeljski plin (v nadaljnjem besedilu: plin) ostaja bistveni element oskrbe z energijo v Uniji.
Annex VIII
Poleg tega bi morali pristojni organi izvesti celovito nacionalno oceno tveganja in oceniti naravna, tehnološka, poslovna, finančna, socialna, politična in tržna ter vsa druga relevantna tveganja.Za vsa tveganja bi bilo treba sprejeti učinkovite, sorazmerne in nediskriminatorne ukrepe, ki se pripravijo v okviru načrtov preventivnih ukrepov in načrtov za izredne razmere.
Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939
Uredba Sveta (EU) 2017/1939
of 12 October 2017
z dne 12. oktobra 2017
implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’)
o izvajanju okrepljenega sodelovanja v zvezi z ustanovitvijo Evropskega javnega tožilstva (EJT)
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 86 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije in zlasti člena 86 Pogodbe,
Having regard to the notification by Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, by which those Member States on 3 April 2017 notified the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of their wish to establish enhanced cooperation on the basis of the draft Regulation,
ob upoštevanju uradnega obvestila Belgije, Bolgarije, Češke, Nemčije, Grčije, Španije, Francije, Hrvaške, Cipra, Litve, Luksemburga, Portugalske, Romunije, Slovenije, Slovaške in Finske, s katerim so navedene države članice 3. aprila 2017 uradno obvestile Evropski parlament, Svet in Komisijo, da želijo vzpostaviti okrepljeno sodelovanje na podlagi osnutka uredbe,
The Union has set itself the objective of establishing an area of freedom, security and justice.
Unija si je zadala cilj vzpostaviti območje svobode, varnosti in pravice.
The possibility of setting up the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) is foreseen by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in the Title concerning the area of freedom, security and justice.
Možnost ustanovitve Evropskega javnega tožilstva (v nadaljnjem besedilu: EJT) je predvidena v Pogodbi o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU) pod naslovom o območju svobode, varnosti in pravice.
Both the Union and the Member States of the European Union have an obligation to protect the Union’s financial interests against criminal offences, which generate significant financial damages every year.
Unija in države članice Evropske unije so dolžne ščititi finančne interese Unije pred kaznivimi dejanji, ki vsako leto povzročijo znatno finančno škodo.
Yet, these offences are currently not always sufficiently investigated and prosecuted by the national criminal justice authorities.
Kljub temu pa sedaj nacionalni organi kazenskega pravosodja ne izvajajo vedno zadostnih preiskav in pregona v zvezi s temi kaznivimi dejanji.
On 17 July 2013, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the EPPO.
Komisija je 17. julija 2013 sprejela predlog uredbe Sveta o ustanovitvi EJT.
At its meeting of 7 February 2017, the Council registered the absence of unanimity on the draft Regulation.
Svet je na seji 7. februarja 2017 ugotovil, da o osnutku uredbe ni mogoče doseči soglasja.
In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 86(1) TFEU, a group of seventeen Member States requested, by a letter of 14 February 2017, that the draft Regulation be referred to the European Council.
V skladu z drugim pododstavkom člena 86(1) PDEU je skupina 17 držav članic v pismu z dne 14. februarja 2017 zahtevala, naj se osnutek uredbe predloži Evropskemu svetu.
On 9 March 2017, the European Council discussed the draft Regulation and noted that there was disagreement within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 86(1) TFEU.
Evropski svet je 9. marca 2017 razpravljal o osnutku uredbe in ugotovil, da je prišlo do nesoglasja v smislu tretjega pododstavka člena 86(1) PDEU.
On 3 April 2017, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain notified the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission that they wished to establish enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO.
Belgija, Bolgarija, Češka, Nemčija, Grčija, Španija, Francija, Hrvaška, Ciper, Litva, Luksemburg, Portugalska, Romunija, Slovenija, Slovaška in Finska so 3. aprila 2017 uradno obvestile Evropski parlament, Svet in Komisijo, da želijo med seboj vzpostaviti okrepljeno sodelovanje v zvezi z ustanovitvijo EJT.
In addition, respectively by letters of 19 April 2017, 1 June 2017, 9 June 2017 and 22 June 2017, Latvia, Estonia, Austria and Italy indicated their wish to participate in the establishment of the enhanced cooperation.
Vanj se lahko vključi tudi kadar koli pozneje – tudi kar zadeva že obstoječe okrepljeno sodelovanje – pri čemer mora upoštevati v tem okviru že sprejete akte.
In accordance with Article 328(1) TFEU, when enhanced cooperation is being established it is to be open to all Member States of the European Union.
Komisija in države članice, ki so vključene v okrepljeno sodelovanje v zvezi z ustanovitvijo EJT (v nadaljnjem besedilu: države članice), bi morale zagotoviti, da se spodbudi udeležba čim večjega števila držav članic Evropske unije.
It is also to be open to them at any other time, including with regard to an enhanced cooperation in progress subject to compliance with the acts already adopted within that framework.
Ta uredba bi morala biti v celoti zavezujoča ter se neposredno uporabljati samo v državah članicah, ki so vključene v okrepljeno sodelovanje v zvezi z ustanovitvijo EJT, ali na podlagi odločitve, sprejete v skladu z drugim ali tretjim pododstavkom člena 331(1) PDEU.
The Commission and the Member States which participate in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO (the ‘Member States’) should ensure that they promote participation by as many Member States of the European Union as possible.
V skladu s členom 86 PDEU bi bilo treba EJT ustanoviti iz Eurojusta.
This Regulation should be binding in its entirety and directly applicable only in the Member States which participate in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO, or by virtue of a decision adopted in accordance with the second or third subparagraph of Article 331(1) TFEU.
To pomeni, da bi bilo treba v tej uredbi med njima določiti tesen odnos, ki temelji na vzajemnem sodelovanju.
In accordance with Article 86 TFEU, the EPPO should be established from Eurojust.
V PDEU je določeno, da je stvarna pristojnost EJT omejena na kazniva dejanja, ki škodijo finančnim interesom Unije, v skladu s to uredbo.
This implies that this Regulation should establish a close relationship between them based on mutual cooperation.
Naloge EJT bi zato morale biti preiskovanje, pregon in obtožba storilcev kaznivih dejanj, ki škodijo finančnim interesom Unije, v skladu z Direktivo (EU) 2017/1371 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [2], ter kaznivih dejanj, ki so z njimi neločljivo povezana.
The TFEU provides that the material scope of competence of the EPPO is limited to criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union in accordance with this Regulation.
Za morebitno razširitev te pristojnosti na huda kazniva dejanja s čezmejnimi posledicami je potrebna soglasna odločitev Evropskega sveta.
The tasks of the EPPO should thus be to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment the perpetrators of offences against the Union’s financial interests under Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2] and offences which are inextricably linked to them.
V skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti se lahko boj proti kaznivim dejanjem, ki škodijo finančnim interesom Unije, zaradi njegovega obsega in učinkov bolje doseže na ravni Unije.
Any extension of this competence to include serious crimes having a cross-border dimension requires a unanimous decision of the European Council.
Sedanje stanje, ko so za kazenski pregon kaznivih dejanj, ki škodijo finančnim interesom Unije, izključno pristojni organi držav članic Evropske unije, ne omogoča vedno zadovoljivega doseganja tega cilja.
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, combatting crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union can be better achieved at Union level by reason of its scale and effects.
Ker ciljev te uredbe, to je okrepitev boja proti kaznivim dejanjem, ki škodijo finančnim interesom Unije, z ustanovitvijo vzpostavitvijo EJT, države članice Evropske unije ne morejo zadovoljivo doseči zaradi razdrobljenosti nacionalnega pregona na področju kaznivih dejanj, ki škodijo finančnim interesom Unije, temveč se glede na to, da bo imelo EJT pristojnost za pregon takih kaznivih dejanj, lažje dosežejo na ravni Unije, lahko Unija sprejme ukrepe v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 PEU.
The present situation, in which the criminal prosecution of offences against the Union’s financial interests is exclusively in the hands of the authorities of the Member States of the European Union, does not always sufficiently achieve that objective.
V skladu z načelom sorazmernosti iz navedenega člena ta uredba ne presega tistega, kar je potrebno za doseganje navedenih ciljev, in zagotavlja, da njen učinek v najmanjši možni meri posega v pravne ureditve in institucionalne strukture držav članic.
Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely, to enhance the fight against offences affecting the financial interests of the Union by setting up the EPPO, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States of the European Union, given the fragmentation of national prosecutions in the area of offences committed against the Union’s financial interests but can rather, by reason of the fact that the EPPO is to have competence to prosecute such offences, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU.
Ta uredba določa sistem deljene pristojnosti med EJT in nacionalnimi organi na področju boja proti kaznivim dejanjem, ki škodijo finančnim interesom Unije, pri čemer ima EJT pravico do prevzema zadeve.
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives and ensures that its impact on the legal orders and the institutional structures of the Member States is the least intrusive possible.
Ob upoštevanju načela lojalnega sodelovanja bi se morali EJT in pristojni nacionalni organi medsebojno podpirati in obveščati z namenom učinkovitega preprečevanja kaznivih dejanj, ki so v pristojnosti EJT.
This Regulation provides for a system of shared competence between the EPPO and national authorities in combating crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, based on the right of evocation of the EPPO.
Ta uredba ne posega v nacionalne sisteme držav članic v zvezi z načinom organizacije kazenskih preiskav.
In the light of the principle of sincere cooperation, both the EPPO and the competent national authorities should support and inform each other with the aim of efficiently combatting the crimes falling under the competence of the EPPO.
Ker bodo EJT dodeljena pooblastila za preiskave in pregon, bi bilo treba vzpostaviti institucionalne varovalke za zagotovitev njegove neodvisnosti in odgovornosti do institucij Unije.
This Regulation is without prejudice to Member States’ national systems concerning the way in which criminal investigations are organised.
EJT bi moralo delovati v interesu Unije kot celote ter ne bi smelo zahtevati ali sprejemati navodil od katere koli osebe izven EJT.
Since the EPPO is to be granted powers of investigation and prosecution, institutional safeguards should be put in place to ensure its independence as well as its accountability towards the institutions of the Union.
Stroga odgovornost dopolnjuje neodvisnost in pooblastila, dodeljena EJT v skladu s to uredbo.
The EPPO should act in the interest of the Union as a whole and neither seek nor take instructions from any person external to the EPPO.
Evropski glavni tožilec je v celoti odgovoren za izvajanje svojih dolžnosti kot vodja EJT in v tej vlogi nosi celotno institucionalno odgovornost za splošne dejavnosti EJT do Evropskega parlamenta, Sveta in Komisije.
Strict accountability is a complement to the independence and the powers granted to the EPPO under this Regulation.
Vsaka od navedenih institucij lahko pri Sodišču Evropske unije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sodišče) začne postopek za njegovo razrešitev v določenih okoliščinah, vključno s primeri hujše kršitve.
The European Chief Prosecutor is fully accountable for the performance of his/her duties as the head of the EPPO and as such he/she bears an overall institutional accountability for its general activities to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.
Isti postopek bi se moral uporabljati za razrešitev evropskih tožilcev.
As a result, any of these institutions can apply to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’), with a view to his/her removal under certain circumstances, including in cases of serious misconduct.
EJT bi moralo izdajati javno letno poročilo o svojih splošnih dejavnostih, ki bi moralo vsebovati najmanj statistične podatke o delu EJT.
The same procedure should apply for the dismissal of European Prosecutors.
Organizacijska struktura EJT bi morala omogočati hitro in učinkovito odločanje pri izvajanju kazenskih preiskav in pregona, ne glede na to, ali je vanje vključena ena ali več držav članic.
The EPPO should issue a public Annual Report on its general activities, which at a minimum should contain statistical data on the work of the EPPO.
Struktura bi morala zagotavljati tudi, da so zastopani vsi nacionalni pravni sistemi in vse nacionalne pravne tradicije držav članic, zastopanih v EJT, ter da preiskave in pregon v svojih državah članicah načeloma izvajajo tožilci, ki poznajo posamezni pravni sistem.
The organisational structure of the EPPO should allow quick and efficient decision-making in the conduct of criminal investigations and prosecutions, whether they involve one or several Member States.
V ta namen bi moralo biti EJT nedeljiv organ Unije, ki deluje kot enoten urad.
The structure should also ensure that all national legal systems and traditions of the Member States are represented in the EPPO, and that prosecutors with knowledge of the individual legal systems will in principle handle investigations and prosecutions in their respective Member States.
Centralno raven sestavljajo evropski glavni tožilec, ki je vodja EJT kot celote in vodja kolegija evropskih tožilcev, stalni senati ter evropski tožilci.
To that end, the EPPO should be an indivisible Union body operating as a single office.
Na decentralizirani ravni ga sestavljajo evropski delegirani tožilci v državah članicah.
The central level consists of a European Chief Prosecutor, who is the head of the EPPO as a whole and the head of the College of European Prosecutors, Permanent Chambers and European Prosecutors.
Da se zagotavlja usklajeno ukrepanje EJT in s tem enakovredna zaščita finančnih interesov Unije, bi morala njegova organizacijska struktura in notranji proces odločanja omogočati tudi, da glavni urad spremlja, usmerja in nadzoruje vse preiskave in pregon, ki jih izvajajo evropski delegirani tožilci.
The decentralised level consists of European Delegated Prosecutors located in the Member States.
V tej uredbi se izrazi „splošni nadzor“, „spremljanje in usmerjanje“ ter „nadzor“ uporabljajo za opis različnih nadzornih dejavnosti, ki jih izvaja EJT.
In addition, to ensure consistency in its action and thus an equivalent protection of the Union’s financial interests, the organisational structure and the internal decision-making process of the EPPO should enable the Central Office to monitor, direct and supervise all investigations and prosecutions undertaken by European Delegated Prosecutors.
„Splošni nadzor“ bi bilo treba razumeti tako, kot da se nanaša na splošno upravljanje dejavnosti EJT, v okviru katerega se navodila dajejo le v zvezi z vprašanji, ki so za EJT horizontalnega pomena.
In this Regulation, the terms ‘general oversight’, ‘monitoring and directing’ and ‘supervision’ are used to describe different control activities exercised by the EPPO.
„Spremljanje in usmerjanje“ bi bilo treba razumeti tako, kot da se nanaša na pristojnosti spremljanja in usmerjanja posameznih preiskav in pregona.
‘General oversight’ should be understood as referring to the general administration of the activities of the EPPO, in which instructions are only given on issues which have a horizontal importance for the EPPO.
„Nadzor“ bi bilo treba razumeti tako, kot da se nanaša na podrobnejši in stalen nadzor nad preiskavami in pregonom, po potrebi vključno s posredovanjem in dajanjem navodil v zvezi z vprašanji, povezanimi s preiskavami in pregonom.
‘Monitoring and directing’ should be understood as referring to the powers to monitor and direct individual investigations and prosecutions.
Kolegij bi moral sprejemati odločitve o strateških vprašanjih, tudi glede določanja prednostnih nalog in politike EJT o preiskavah in pregonu, ter o vprašanjih splošnega pomena, ki izhajajo iz posameznih zadev, denimo v zvezi z uporabo te uredbe in pravilnim izvajanjem politike EJT o preiskavah in pregonu, ali o načelnih vprašanjih oziroma vprašanjih, ki so bistvena za oblikovanje skladne politike EJT o preiskavah in pregonu.
‘Supervision’ should be understood as referring to a closer and continuous oversight of investigations and prosecutions, including, whenever necessary, intervention and instruction-giving on investigations and prosecution matters.
Odločitve kolegija o vprašanjih splošnega pomena ne bi smele vplivati na dolžnost preiskovanja in pregona v skladu s to uredbo in nacionalnim pravom.
The College should take decisions on strategic matters, including determining the priorities and the investigation and prosecution policy of the EPPO, as well as on general issues arising from individual cases, for example regarding the application of this Regulation, the correct implementation of the investigation and prosecution policy of the EPPO or questions of principle or of significant importance for the development of a coherent investigation and prosecution policy of the EPPO.
Kolegij bi si moral po svojih najboljših močeh prizadevati za soglasno sprejemanje odločitev.
The decisions of the College on general issues should not affect the duty to investigate and prosecute in accordance with this Regulation and national law.
Če takega soglasja ni mogoče doseči, bi se morale odločitve sprejeti z glasovanjem.
The College should use its best efforts to take decisions by consensus.
Stalni senati bi morali spremljati in usmerjati preiskave in zagotavljati usklajenost dejavnosti EJT.