natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In particular, investors with highly diversified portfolios and many foreign shareholdings rely more on proxy recommendations.
Na priporočilih posredniških podjetij bolj slonijo zlasti vlagatelji z izredno diverzificiranimi portfelji in številni tuji delničarji.
In view of their importance, proxy advisors should be subject to transparency requirements.
Zaradi pomembnosti svetovalcev za glasovanje bi morale zanje veljati zahteve glede preglednosti.
Member States should ensure that proxy advisors that are subject to a code of conduct effectively report on their application of that code.
Države članice bi morale zagotoviti, da svetovalci za glasovanje, ki morajo upoštevati kodeks ravnanja, poročajo o izvajanju tega kodeksa.
They should also disclose certain key information relating to the preparation of their research, advice and voting recommendations and any actual or potential conflicts of interests or business relationships that may influence the preparation of the research, advice and voting recommendations.
Razkriti bi morali tudi določene ključne informacije v zvezi s pripravo svojih raziskav, svetovanja in priporočil glede glasovanja ter o katerem koli dejanskem ali morebitnem nasprotju interesov ali poslovnih razmerjih, ki bi lahko vplivala na pripravo raziskav, svetovanja in priporočil glede glasovanja.
That information should remain publicly available for a period of at least three years in order to allow institutional investors to choose the services of proxy advisors taking into account their performance in the past.
Te informacije bi morale biti na voljo javnosti najmanj tri leta, da bi imeli institucionalni vlagatelji možnost izbire storitev svetovalcev za glasovanje ob upoštevanju njihove pretekle uspešnosti.
Third-country proxy advisors which have neither their registered office nor their head office in the Union may provide analysis with respect to Union companies.
Svetovalci za glasovanje iz tretjih držav, ki nimajo registriranega ali glavnega sedeža v Uniji, lahko podajo analizo v zvezi z družbami iz Unije.
In order to ensure a level playing field between Union and third-country proxy advisors, this Directive should also apply to third-country proxy advisors which carry out their activities through an establishment in the Union, regardless of the form of that establishment.
Za zagotovitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev med svetovalci za glasovanje iz Unije ter tistih iz tretjih držav bi se morala ta direktiva uporabljati tudi za svetovalce za glasovanje iz tretjih držav, ki opravljajo dejavnosti prek poslovne enote v Uniji, ne glede na pravno obliko te poslovne enote.
Directors contribute to the long-term success of the company.
Direktorji prispevajo k dolgoročni uspešnosti poslovanja družbe.
The form and structure of directors’ remuneration are matters primarily falling within the competence of the company, its relevant boards, shareholders and, where applicable, employee representatives.
Za obliko in strukturo prejemkov direktorjev je v prvi vrsti pristojna družba, njeni ustrezni organi in delničarji, kjer je primerno, pa tudi predstavniki delavcev.
It is therefore important to respect the diversity of corporate governance systems within the Union, which reflect different Member States’ views about the roles of companies and of bodies responsible for the determination of the remuneration policy and of the remuneration of individual directors.
Zato je pomembno, da se upošteva raznolikost sistemov upravljanja družb v Uniji, ki odražajo različna stališča držav članic glede vloge družb in organov, pristojnih za oblikovanje politike prejemkov ter prejemkov posameznih direktorjev.
Since remuneration is one of the key instruments for companies to align their interests and those of their directors and in view of the crucial role of directors in companies, it is important that the remuneration policy of companies is determined in an appropriate manner by competent bodies within the company and that shareholders have the possibility to express their views regarding the remuneration policy of the company.
Ker so prejemki eden izmed ključnih instrumentov, s katerim družbe uskladijo svoje interese z interesi direktorjev, in ker imajo direktorji ključno vlogo v družbah, je pomembno, da pristojni organi na primeren način določijo politiko prejemkov v družbah in da imajo delničarji možnost, da izrazijo svoje stališče v zvezi s politiko prejemkov družbe.
In order to ensure that shareholders have an effective say on remuneration policy, they should be granted the right to hold a binding or advisory vote on the remuneration policy, on the basis of a clear, understandable and comprehensive overview of the company’s remuneration policy.
Da se zagotovi, da lahko delničarji predložijo učinkovito mnenje o politiki prejemkov, bi morali imeti pravico, da zavezujoče ali posvetovalno glasujejo o politiki prejemkov na podlagi jasnega, razumljivega in celovitega pregleda politike prejemkov družbe.
The remuneration policy should contribute to the business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability of the company and should not be linked entirely or mainly to short-term objectives.
Politika prejemkov bi morala prispevati k poslovni strategiji, dolgoročnim interesom in vzdržnosti družbe in ne bi smela biti v celoti ali zlasti povezana s kratkoročnimi cilji.
Directors’ performance should be assessed using both financial and non-financial performance criteria, including, where appropriate, environmental, social and governance factors.
Uspešnost direktorjev bi bilo treba ocenjevati na podlagi meril finančne in nefinančne uspešnosti, po potrebi pa tudi okoljskih, socialnih in upravljavskih dejavnikov.
The remuneration policy should describe the different components of directors’ pay and the range of their relative proportions.
V politiki prejemkov bi bilo treba opredeliti posamezne elemente prejemkov direktorjev in vrsto njihovih sorazmernih deležev.
It can be designed as a frame within which the pay of directors is to be held.
Lahko se jo oblikuje kot okvir, ki ga prejemki direktorjev ne smejo presegati.
The remuneration policy should be publicly disclosed, without delay, after the vote by the shareholders at the general meeting.
Politiko prejemkov bi bilo treba po glasovanju delničarjev na skupščini delničarjev brez odlašanja razkriti javnosti.
In exceptional circumstances, companies may need to derogate from certain rules in the remuneration policy such as criteria for fixed or variable remuneration.
V izjemnih okoliščinah se lahko zgodi, da morajo družbe odstopati od nekaterih pravil iz politike prejemkov, kot so merila za fiksne ali variabilne prejemke.
Therefore, Member States should be able to allow companies to apply such temporary derogation to the applicable remuneration policy if they specify in their remuneration policy how it would be applied in certain exceptional circumstances.
Zato bi morale države članice imeti možnost dovoliti družbam, da izvajajo tovrstna začasna odstopanja od veljavne politike prejemkov, če v politiki prejemkov navedejo, kako jih nameravajo izvajati v nekaterih izjemnih okoliščinah.
Exceptional circumstances should only cover situations where the derogation from the remuneration policy is necessary to serve the long-term interests and sustainability of the company as a whole or assure its viability.
Izjemne okoliščine bi morale zajemati le primere, ko je treba odstopati od politike prejemkov za uresničitev dolgoročnih interesov in vzdržnosti družbe kot celote ali za zagotovitev njenega preživetja.
The remuneration report should include information on remuneration awarded under such exceptional circumstances.
Poročilo o prejemkih bi moralo vsebovati informacije o prejemkih, dodeljenih v tovrstnih izjemnih okoliščinah.
To ensure that the implementation of the remuneration policy is in line with that policy, shareholders should be granted the right to vote on the company’s remuneration report.
Za zagotavljanje, da je izvajanje politike prejemkov skladno z navedeno politiko, bi moralo biti delničarjem omogočeno glasovanje o poročilu o prejemkih družbe.
In order to ensure corporate transparency, and accountability of the directors, the remuneration report should be clear and understandable and should provide a comprehensive overview of the remuneration of individual directors during the most recent financial year.
Da se zagotovita preglednost družb in odgovornost direktorjev, bi moralo biti poročilo o prejemkih jasno in razumljivo ter bi moralo vsebovati celovit pregled prejemkov posameznih direktorjev v zadnjem poslovnem letu.
Where the shareholders vote against the remuneration report, the company should explain, in the following remuneration report, how the vote of the shareholders was taken into account.
Če delničarji glasujejo proti poročilu o prejemkih, bi morala družba v naslednjem poročilu o prejemkih pojasniti, kako se je glasovanje delničarjev upoštevalo.
If a Member State uses this possibility, the company should explain, in the following remuneration report, in what manner the discussion at the general meeting was taken into account.
To ne bi smelo posegati v možnost držav članic zahtevati, da se to poročilo objavi tudi na drugačen način, na primer v izjavi o upravljanju družb ali v poslovnem poročilu.
In order to provide shareholders with easy access to the remuneration report, and to enable potential investors and stakeholders to be informed of directors’ remuneration, the remuneration report should be published on the company’s website.
Z razkritjem prejemkov posameznih direktorjev ter objavo poročila o prejemkih naj bi se zagotovili večji preglednost družb in odgovornost direktorjev, delničarjem pa naj bi se omogočil boljši pregled nad prejemki direktorjev.
This should be without prejudice to the possibility of Member States also to require the publication of the report by other means, for example as part of the corporate governance statement or management report.
S tem se ustvari nujen predpogoj za uveljavljanje pravic delničarjev ter sodelovanje delničarjev v zvezi s prejemki.
The disclosure of individual directors’ remuneration and the publication of the remuneration report are intended to provide increased corporate transparency and increased accountability of directors, as well as better shareholder oversight over directors’ remuneration.
Razkritje teh informacij delničarjem je zlasti potrebno, ker se jim s tem omogoči, da ocenijo prejemke direktorjev ter izrazijo stališče v zvezi s pogoji in ravnjo plačil direktorjev ter vezanostjo plačila na uspešnost posameznih direktorjev, da bi preprečili morebitne primere, ko bi bil znesek direktorjevih prejemkov neupravičen na podlagi njegove uspešnosti in uspešnega poslovanja družbe.
This creates a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of shareholder rights and shareholder engagement in relation to remuneration.
Poročila o prejemkih je treba objaviti, ker se s tem ne le delničarjem, temveč tudi potencialnim vlagateljem in deležnikom omogoči, da ocenijo prejemke direktorjev ter v kakšni meri so ti prejemki vezani na poslovanje družbe in kako družba v praksi izvaja politiko prejemkov.
In particular, the disclosure of such information to shareholders is necessary to enable them to assess directors’ remuneration and to express their views on the modalities and level of directors’ pay as well as on the link between pay and performance of each individual director, in order to remedy potential situations in which the amount of remuneration of a director is not justified on the basis of his or her individual performance and the performance of the company.
Z razkritjem in objavo anonimiziranih poročil o prejemkih teh ciljev ne bi mogli doseči.
Publication of the remuneration report is necessary in order to enable not only shareholders, but also potential investors and stakeholders to assess directors’ remuneration, to what extent that remuneration is linked to the performance of the company and how the company implements its remuneration policy in practice.
Da bi povečali preglednost družb in odgovornost direktorjev, delničarjem, potencialnim vlagateljem in deležnikom pa zagotovili popoln in zanesljiv pregled nad prejemki posameznih direktorjev, je zlasti pomembno zagotoviti, da se razkrijejo vsi elementi in celotni znesek prejemkov.
The disclosure and publication of anonymised remuneration reports would not allow the achievement of those objectives.
Zagotoviti je treba zlasti razkritje in objavo prejemkov, dodeljenih ali dolgovanih posameznim direktorjem, ne le s strani družbe, temveč tudi družb, ki so del iste skupine, da bi preprečili, da bi družba zaobšla zahteve iz te direktive in morebitna nasprotja interesov ter da bi zagotovili lojalnost direktorjev družbi.
In order to increase corporate transparency, and the accountability of directors, and to enable shareholders, potential investors and stakeholders to obtain a full and reliable picture of the remuneration of each director, it is of particular importance that every element and total amount of remuneration are disclosed.
Če bi prejemke, dodeljene ali dolgovane posameznim direktorjem s strani družb, ki so del iste skupine kot družba, izključili iz poročila o prejemkih, lahko nastane tveganje, da bi družbe poskušale zaobiti zahteve iz te direktive, s tem ko bi direktorjem zagotavljale prikrite prejemke preko odvisne družbe.
In particular, in order to prevent the circumvention of the requirements laid down by this Directive by the company, to avoid any conflicts of interests and to ensure loyalty of the directors to the company, it is necessary to provide for the disclosure and the publication of the remuneration awarded or due to individual directors not only from the company itself, but also from any undertaking belonging to the same group.
V tem primeru delničarji ne bi imeli popolnega in zanesljivega pregleda nad prejemki, ki jih družba izplača direktorjem, ter ne bi bili doseženi cilji iz te direktive.
If remuneration awarded or due to individual directors by undertakings belonging to the same group as the company were excluded from the remuneration report, there would be a risk that companies try to circumvent the requirements laid down by this Directive by providing directors with hidden remuneration via a controlled undertaking.
Za zagotovitev popolnega pregleda nad prejemki direktorjev se, kjer je to potrebno, v poročilu o prejemkih razkrijejo tudi zneski prejemkov, izplačanih na osnovi družinskega statusa posameznih direktorjev.
In such a case, shareholders would not have a full and reliable picture of the remuneration granted to the directors by the company and the objectives pursued by this Directive would not be achieved.
Zato bi moralo poročilo o prejemkih, kjer je to potrebno, zajemati tudi elemente prejemkov, kot so družinski ali otroški dodatki.
In order to provide a complete overview of directors’ remuneration, the remuneration report should also disclose, where applicable, the amount of remuneration granted on the basis of the family situation of individual directors.
Ker pa so osebni podatki o družinskem statusu posameznih direktorjev ali posebne kategorije osebnih podatkov v smislu Uredbe (EU) 2016/679 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [4] posebej občutljivi in zahtevajo posebno zaščito, bi bilo treba v poročilu razkriti zgolj znesek prejemkov, ne pa tudi podatka o tem, na kateri osnovi je bil izplačan.
The remuneration report should therefore also cover, where applicable, remuneration components such as family or child allowance.
V tej direktivi bi bilo treba osebne podatke, vključene v poročilo o prejemkih, obdelati zaradi večje preglednosti družb v zvezi s prejemki direktorjev, s čimer bi povečali odgovornost direktorjev ter nadzor delničarjev nad prejemki direktorjev.
However, because personal data which refer to the family situation of individual directors or special categories of personal data within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council [4] are particularly sensitive and require specific protection, the report should disclose only the amount of the remuneration and not the ground on which it was granted.
To ne posega v pravo držav članic o obdelavi osebnih podatkov direktorjev za druge namene.
Under this Directive, personal data included in the remuneration report should be processed for the purposes of increasing corporate transparency as regards directors’ remuneration with the view to enhancing directors’ accountability and shareholder oversight of directors’ remuneration.
Prejemkov in uspešnosti direktorjev se ne sme ocenjevati le letno, temveč tudi v ustreznem časovnem obdobju, da bi delničarjem, potencialnim vlagateljem in deležnikom omogočili, da ustrezno ocenijo, ali se s prejemki nagrajuje dolgoročna uspešnost, in analizirajo srednje- do dolgoročni razvoj uspešnosti in prejemkov direktorjev, zlasti glede na uspešnost poslovanja družbe.
This is without prejudice to Member State law providing for the processing of the personal data of directors for other purposes.
V mnogih primerih je mogoče zgolj leta pozneje oceniti, ali so bili izplačani prejemki v skladu z dolgoročnimi interesi družbe.
It is essential to assess the remuneration and the performance of directors not only annually but also over an appropriate time period to enable shareholders, potential investors and stakeholders to assess properly whether the remuneration rewards long-term performance and to measure the middle-to-long-term evolution in directors’ performance and remuneration, in particular in relation to company performance.
Predvsem podeljevanje dolgoročnih spodbud lahko zajame obdobja do sedem do deset let in se lahko združi z večletnimi obdobji odložitve.
In many cases, it is possible only after several years to evaluate whether the remuneration granted was in line with the long-term interests of the company.
Pomembno je tudi, da se lahko ocenijo prejemki direktorja v celotnem obdobju, v katerem ta direktor zaseda položaj v upravi določene družbe.
In particular the granting of long-term incentives may cover periods of up to seven to ten years and may be combined with deferral periods of several years.
V Uniji direktorji v povprečju ostanejo v upravi šest let, čeprav v nekaterih državah članicah to obdobje presega osem let.
It is also important to be able to assess the remuneration of a director over the entire period of his or her directorship on a particular company’s board.
Razkritje osebnih podatkov, vključenih v poročilo o prejemkih, bi bilo treba omejiti na deset let, da bi omejili poseganje v pravice direktorjev do zasebnosti in varstva njihovih osebnih podatkov.
In the Union, directors remain on a company board for a period of six years on average, although in some Member States that period exceeds eight years.
To obdobje je skladno z drugimi obdobji iz prava Unije v zvezi z javnim razkritjem dokumentov o upravljanju družb.
In order to limit interference with the directors’ rights to privacy and to the protection of their personal data, public disclosure by companies of directors’ personal data included in the remuneration report should be limited to 10 years.
Tako morajo na primer v skladu s členom 4 Direktive 2004/109/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [5] poslovna poročila ter izjave o upravljanju družb v okviru letnega poslovnega poročila ostati javna najmanj deset let.
That period is consistent with other periods laid down by Union law related to the public disclosure of corporate governance documents.
Nedvomno je v interesu, da različna poročila o upravljanju družb, vključno s poročili o prejemkih, ostanejo dostopna deset let, da bi imeli delničarji in deležniki splošni vpogled v poslovanje družbe.
For example, under Article 4 of Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and the Council [5], the management report and the corporate governance statements must remain publicly available as part of the annual financial report for at least 10 years.
Ob koncu desetletnega obdobja bi morala družba iz poročila o prejemkih odstraniti vse osebne podatke ali prenehati javno razkrivati celotno poročilo o prejemkih.
There is a clear interest in having various types of corporate governance reports, including the remuneration report, available for 10 years, so as to provide the overall state of a company to shareholders and stakeholders.
Po izteku tega obdobja bi bil lahko dostop do teh osebnih podatkov nujen za druge namene, denimo za sprožitev pravnih postopkov.
At the end of the 10-year period, the company should remove any personal data from the remuneration report or cease to disclose the remuneration report publicly as a whole.
Določbe o prejemkih ne bi smele posegati v popolno uveljavljanje temeljnih pravic, zagotovljenih s Pogodbama, zlasti s členom 153(5) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, splošnimi načeli nacionalnega pogodbenega in delovnega prava, prava Unije in nacionalnega prava o sodelovanju in splošni odgovornosti upravnih, vodstvenih in nadzornih organov zadevne družbe, kjer je primerno, pa tudi pravic socialnih partnerjev, da sklepajo in izvajajo kolektivne pogodbe v skladu z nacionalnim pravom in prakso.
Following that period access to such personal data could be necessary for other purposes, such as in order to exercise legal actions.
Določbe o prejemkih, kjer je primerno, tudi ne bi smele posegati v nacionalno pravo o zastopanosti zaposlenih v upravnih, vodstvenih ali nadzornih organih.
The provisions on remuneration should be without prejudice to the full exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Treaties, in particular Article 153(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, general principles of national contract and labour law, Union and national law regarding involvement and the general responsibilities of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies of the company concerned, and the rights, where applicable, of the social partners to conclude and enforce collective agreements, in accordance with national law and customs.
Posli s povezanimi strankami lahko škodujejo družbam in njihovim delničarjem, saj povezani stranki omogočajo, da si prilasti premoženje, ki pripada družbi.
The provisions on remuneration should also, where applicable, be without prejudice to national law on the representation of employees in the administrative, management or supervisory body.
Zato so pomembna jamstva za zaščito interesov družb in delničarjev.
Transactions with related parties may cause prejudice to companies and their shareholders, as they may give the related party the opportunity to appropriate value belonging to the company.
Zaradi tega bi morale države članice zagotoviti, da so bistveni posli s povezanimi strankami predloženi v odobritev delničarjem ali upravnemu ali nadzornemu organu na podlagi postopkov, ki povezani stranki preprečijo, da bi izkoristila svoj položaj, ter ustrezno zaščitijo interese družbe in delničarjev, ki niso povezane stranke, vključno z manjšinskimi delničarji.
Thus, adequate safeguards for the protection of companies’ and shareholders’ interests are of importance.
Če posli s povezanimi strankami vključujejo direktorja ali delničarja, ta direktor ali delničar ne bi smel sodelovati pri odobritvi ali glasovanju.
For this reason Member States should ensure that material related party transactions are submitted to approval by the shareholders or by the administrative or supervisory body according to procedures that prevent the related party from taking advantage of its position and provide adequate protection for the interests of the company and of the shareholders who are not a related party, including minority shareholders.
Države članice pa bi morale imeti možnost, da delničarju, ki je povezana stranka, dovolijo, da sodeluje pri glasovanju, če so v nacionalnem pravu v zvezi s postopkom glasovanja predvidena ustrezna jamstva za zaščito interesov družb in delničarjev, ki niso povezane stranke, vključno z manjšinskimi delničarji, denimo z določitvijo višjega večinskega praga za odobritev poslov.
Where the related party transaction involves a director or a shareholder, that director or shareholder should not take part in the approval or vote.
Družbe bi morale javno objaviti bistvene posle, najpozneje ob sklenitvi posla, ter pri tem navesti povezano stranko, datum in vrednost posla ter morebitne druge podatke, potrebne za oceno poštenosti posla.