natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Where the CSD-banking service provider is in breach of, or risks breaching the requirements of this Regulation, including during times of stress, it shall immediately notify this to the relevant competent authority and it shall submit without undue delay to that relevant competent authority a detailed plan for the timely return to compliance.
Kadar izvajalec bančnih storitev za uporabnike CDD krši zahteve te uredbe, ali obstaja tveganje, da bi jih lahko kršil, tudi v času stresnih razmer, o tem nemudoma uradno obvesti zadevni pristojni organ in mu čim prej predloži podroben načrt za pravočasno ponovno vzpostavitev skladnosti.
Until compliance with the requirements of this Regulation and Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 is restored, the CSD-banking service provider shall report the items referred to in paragraph 2, as appropriate, at least daily, by the end of each business day unless the relevant competent authority authorise a lower reporting frequency and a longer reporting delay, by taking into account the individual situation of the CSD-banking service provider and the scale and complexity of its activities.
Dokler se skladnost z zahtevami iz te uredbe in Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014 ponovno ne vzpostavi, izvajalec bančnih storitev za uporabnike CDD vsaj dnevno poroča o postavkah iz odstavka 2, kakor je ustrezno, ob koncu vsakega delovnega dne, razen če zadevni pristojni organ ne odobri manjše pogostosti poročanja in daljšega odloga za poročanje na podlagi individualnega položaja izvajalca bančnih storitev za uporabnike CDD ter ob upoštevanju obsega in kompleksnosti njegovih dejavnosti.
A CSD-banking service provider shall publicly disclose a comprehensive qualitative statement that specifies how liquidity risks, including intraday liquidity risks are measured, monitored and managed on an annual basis.
Izvajalec bančnih storitev za uporabnike CDD vsako leto javno razkrije celovito izjavo o kakovosti, v kateri navede, kako se merijo, spremljajo in upravljajo likvidnostna tveganja, vključno z likvidnostnimi tveganji znotraj enega dne.
CSD-banking service providers shall identify the relevant currencies under point (ii) of Article 36(8)(b) 12 months after obtaining the authorisation to provide banking-type ancillary services.
Izvajalci bančnih storitev za uporabnike CDD dvanajst mesecev po pridobitvi dovoljenja za opravljanje pomožnih bančnih storitev določijo zadevne valute v skladu s točko (ii) člena 36(8)(b).
During the transitional period of 12 months referred to in paragraph 1, the CSD-banking service providers referred to in that subparagraph shall identify the relevant currencies under point (ii) of Article 36(8)(b) by taking into account both of the following:
V dvanajstmesečnem prehodnem obdobju iz odstavka 1 izvajalci bančnih storitev za uporabnike CDD iz navedenega pododstavka določijo zadevne valute v skladu s točko (ii) člena 36(8)(b) ob upoštevanju naslednjega:
a sufficiently large relative share of each currency in the total value of settlement by a CSD of settlement instructions, against payment calculated over a period of one year;
dovolj velikega relativnega deleža vsake valute v skupni vrednosti poravnave CDD, ki da navodila za poravnavo, za plačilo, izračunano za obdobje enega leta;
the impact of the non-availability of each currency on the smooth functioning of the operations of CSD-banking service providers under a wide range of potential stress scenarios referred to in Article 36.
vpliva nerazpoložljivosti vsake valute na nemoteno izvajanje dejavnosti izvajalcev bančnih storitev za uporabnike CDD ob zelo različnih možnih scenarijih stresnih situacij iz člena 36.
Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems — Bank for International Settlements, and Technical Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, April 2012.
Načela za infrastrukture finančnih trgov, Odbor za plačilne in poravnalne sisteme – Banka za mednarodne poravnave in Tehnični odbor Mednarodnega združenja nadzornikov trga vrednostnih papirjev, april 2012.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 152/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on capital requirements for central counterparties (OJ L 52, 23.2.2013, p.
Delegirana uredba Komisije (EU) št. 152/2013 z dne 19. decembra 2012 o dopolnitvi Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z regulativnimi tehničnimi standardi glede kapitalskih zahtev za centralne nasprotne stranke (UL L 52, 23.2.2013, str. 37).
37).
Direktiva 2013/36/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26. junija 2013 o dostopu do dejavnosti kreditnih institucij in bonitetnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij, spremembi Direktive 2002/87/ES in razveljavitvi direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES (UL L 176, 27.6.2013, str. 338).
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).
Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor, „Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management“ (Instrumenti za spremljanje upravljanja likvidnosti znotraj enega dne), april 2013.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ‘Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management’ April 2013
Delegirana uredba Komisije (EU) 2017/392 z dne 11. novembra 2016 o dopolnitvi Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z regulativnimi tehničnimi standardi o zahtevah glede izdaje dovoljenj, nadzora in poslovanja za centralne depotne družbe (glej stran 48 tega Uradnega lista).
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 of 11 November 2016 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on authorisation, supervisory and operational requirements for central securities depositories (see page 48 of this Official Journal).
Uredba (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o ustanovitvi Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ) in o spremembi Sklepa št. 716/2009/ES ter razveljavitvi Sklepa Komisije 2009/78/ES (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 12).
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).
Direktiva Sveta 86/635/EGS z dne 8. decembra 1986 o letnih računovodskih izkazih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih bank in drugih finančnih institucij (UL L 372, 31.12.1986, str. 1).
Council Directive 86/635/EEC of 8 December 1986 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions (OJ L 372, 31.12.1986, p. 1).
Uredba (ES) št. 1606/2002 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. julija 2002 o uporabi mednarodnih računovodskih standardov (UL L 243, 11.9.2002, str. 1).
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of international accounting standards (OJ L 243, 11.9.2002, p. 1).
Četrta direktiva Sveta z dne 25. julija 1978 o letnih računovodskih izkazih posameznih vrst družb, ki temelji na členu 54(3)(g) Pogodbe (78/660/EGS) (UL L 222, 14.8.1978, str. 11).
Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies (OJ L 222, 14.8.1978, p. 11).
Sedma direktiva Sveta z dne 13. junija 1983 o konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih, ki temelji na členu 54(3)(g) Pogodbe (83/349/EGS) (UL L 193, 18.7.1983, str. 1).
Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts (OJ L 193, 18.7.1983, p. 1).
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1569/2007 z dne 21. decembra 2007 o določitvi mehanizma za ugotavljanje enakovrednosti računovodskih standardov izdajateljev vrednostnih papirjev iz tretjih držav v skladu z direktivama 2003/71/ES in 2004/109/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (UL L 340, 22.12.2007, str. 66).
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1569/2007 of 21 December 2007 establishing a mechanism for the determination of equivalence of accounting standards applied by third country issuers of securities pursuant to Directives 2003/71/EC and 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 340, 22.12.2007, p. 66).
Direktiva 2002/47/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 6. junija 2002 o dogovorih o finančnem zavarovanju (UL L 168, 27.6.2002, str. 43).
Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements (OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43).
PRILOGA
ANNEX
Scenariji prenehanja ali prestrukturiranja
Winding-down or restructuring scenarios
Za scenarij, ko CDD ne more zbrati novega kapitala za izpolnitev zahtev iz člena 47(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014, se šteje, da sproži postopek svojega prestrukturiranja (v nadaljnjem besedilu: prestrukturiranje), kadar bi dogodki, opisani v scenariju, še vedno povzročili, da CDD še naprej upravlja sistem poravnave vrednostnih papirjev iz točke 3 oddelka A Priloge k Uredbi (EU) št. 909/2014 in opravlja vsaj še eno drugo osnovno storitev iz oddelka A Priloge k Uredbi (EU) št. 909/2014.
A scenario where the CSD is unable to raise new capital to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 47(1) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 shall be considered as triggering the restructuring of a CSD (‘restructuring’) where the events described in the scenario would still lead the CSD to continue to operate a securities settlement system as referred to in point (3) of Section A of the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 and to provide at least one other core service listed in Section A of the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 909/2014.
Za scenarij, ko CDD ne more zbrati novega kapitala za izpolnitev zahtev iz člena 47(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014, se šteje, da sproži postopek prenehanja svoje dejavnosti v nadaljnjem besedilu: prenehanje dejavnosti), kadar bi dogodki, opisani v scenariju, povzročili, da CDD ne more izpolniti opredelitve pojma iz člena 2(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014.
A scenario where the CSD is unable to raise new capital to comply with requirements laid down in Article 47(1) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 shall be considered as triggering the winding-down of its operations (‘winding down’) where the events described in the scenario would render the CSD unable to meet the definition of Article 2(1) of the Regulation (EU) No 909/2014.
Scenariji iz člena 7(a) vključujejo naslednje ocene:
The scenarios referred to in Article 7(a) shall include the following assessments:
v primeru prestrukturiranja CDD oceni pričakovano število mesecev, potrebnih za zagotovitev urejenega prestrukturiranja dejavnosti;
in the case of a restructuring, the CSD shall assess the expected number of months needed for ensuring the orderly restructuring of its operations;
v primeru prenehanja CDD oceni pričakovano število mesecev, potrebnih za prenehanje.
in the case of a winding-down, the expected number of months needed for the winding-down.
Scenariji so sorazmerni z naravo dejavnosti CDD, njeno velikostjo, njeno medsebojno povezanostjo z drugimi institucijami in finančnim sistemom, njenim poslovnim modelom in modelom financiranja, njenimi dejavnostmi in strukturo ter morebitnimi ugotovljenimi ranljivostmi ali slabostmi.
The scenarios shall be commensurate with the nature of the business of the CSD, its size, its interconnectedness to other institutions and to the financial system, its business and funding model, its activities and structure, and any identified vulnerabilities or weaknesses of the CSD.
Scenariji temeljijo na izjemnih, vendar možnih dogodkih.
The scenarios shall be based on events that are exceptional but plausible.
CDD pri pripravi scenarijev izpolni naslednji zahtevi:
When designing the scenarios, a CSD shall meet each of the following requirements:
dogodki, predvideni v scenariju, bi lahko povzročili prestrukturiranje dejavnosti CDD;
the events foreseen in the scenario would threaten to cause the restructuring of the CSD operations;
dogodki, predvideni v scenariju, bi lahko povzročili prenehanje dejavnosti CDD.
the events foreseen in the scenario would threaten to cause the winding-down of the CSD operations.
Načrt za zagotavljanje urejenega prestrukturiranja ali prenehanja dejavnosti CDD iz točke (b) člena 47(2) Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014 vključuje vse naslednje scenarije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: nesistemski dogodki):
The plan ensuring an orderly restructuring or winding-down of the CSD's activities referred to in point (b) of Article 47(2) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 shall include all the following scenarios (‘idiosyncratic events’):
propad pomembnih nasprotnih strank;
the failure of significant counterparties;
škoda ugledu institucije ali skupine;
damage to the institution's or group's reputation;
močen likvidnostnih odliv;
a severe outflow of liquidity;
neugodna gibanja cen sredstev, ki jim je institucija ali skupina pretežno izpostavljena;
adverse movements in the prices of assets to which the institution or group is predominantly exposed;
velike kreditne izgube;
severe credit losses;
velika izguba zaradi operativnega tveganja.
a severe operational risk loss.
Načrt za zagotavljanje urejenega prestrukturiranja ali prenehanja dejavnosti CDD iz točke (b) člena 47(2) Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014 vključuje vse naslednje scenarije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sistemski dogodki):
The plan ensuring an orderly restructuring or winding down of the CSD's activities referred to in point (b) of Article 47(2) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 shall include all the following scenarios (‘system-wide events’):
propad pomembnih nasprotnih strank, ki vpliva na finančno stabilnost;
the failure of significant counterparties affecting financial stability;
zmanjšanje likvidnosti, ki je na voljo na medbančnem trgu posojil;
a decrease in liquidity available in the interbank lending market;
povečano tveganje države in splošen odliv kapitala iz pomembne države poslovanja institucije ali skupine;
increased country risk and generalised capital outflow from a significant country of operation of the institution or the group;
neugodna gibanja cen sredstev na enem ali več trgih;
adverse movements in the price of assets in one or several markets;
makroekonomski upad.
supplementing Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards further specifying the content of the reporting on internalised settlements
o dopolnitvi Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z regulativnimi tehničnimi standardi o podrobnejši določitvi vsebine poročanja o internaliziranih poravnavah
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 [1], and in particular the second subparagraph of Article 9(2) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 23. julija 2014 o izboljšanju ureditve poravnav vrednostnih papirjev v Evropski uniji in o centralnih depotnih družbah ter o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES in 2014/65/EU ter Uredbe (EU) št. 236/2012 [1] in zlasti drugega pododstavka člena 9(2) Uredbe,
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has considered the ‘Report on the outcome of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors call for evidence on custodian banks' internalisation of settlement and Central Counterparties-like activities’ of 17 April 2009, which showcases considerable differences regarding the rules and monitoring procedures at the level of settlement internalisers across Member States, as well as regarding the understanding of the concept of internalised settlement.
Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ESMA) je preučil „Poročilo o rezultatu poziva Odbora evropskih bančnih nadzornikov k predložitvi dokazov o internalizaciji poravnave s strani skrbniških bank in o dejavnostih, podobnih delu centralnih nasprotnih strank“ z dne 17. aprila 2009, ki kaže na precejšnje razlike med državami članicami glede pravil in postopkov spremljanja na ravni internalizatorjev poravnave, kot tudi glede razumevanja koncepta internalizirane poravnave.
In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 909/2014, settlement internalisers are to report on settlements that they internalise.
V skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 909/2014 morajo internalizatorji poravnave poročati o poravnavah, ki jih internalizirajo.
In order to provide a good overview of the scope and of the extent of internalised settlements it is necessary to specify further the content of such reporting.
Za zagotovitev dobre preglednosti področja uporabe in obsega internaliziranih poravnav je treba vsebino takšnega poročanja podrobneje določiti.
The reports on internalised settlement should provide detailed information on the aggregated volume and value of settlement instructions settled by settlement internalisers outside securities settlement systems specifying asset class, type of securities transactions, type of clients, and issuer central securities depository (CSD).
Poročila o internalizirani poravnavi bi morala zagotoviti podrobne informacije o skupnem obse gu in vrednosti navodil za poravnavo, ki jih poravnajo internalizatorji poravnave zunaj sistemov poravnave vrednostnih papirjev, vključno z razredom sredstev, vrsto poslov z vrednostnimi papirji, vrsto strank in izdajateljsko centralno depotno družbo (v nadaljnjem besedilu: CDD).
A settlement internaliser should only report internalised settlements where it has executed a settlement instruction by a client of the settlement internaliser in its own books.
Internalizator poravnave bi moral poročati internalizirane poravnave samo, kadar je navodilo za poravnavo stranke internalizatorja poravnave vnesel v svoje poslovne knjige.
A settlement internaliser should not report subsequent alignments of book-entry positions to reflect the settlement of instructions by other entities in the holding chain of securities, as these do not qualify as internalised settlement.
Internalizator poravnave ne bi smel poročati poznejših usklajenjih pozicij v nematerializirani obliki, da bi se odražala poravnava navodil s strani drugih subjektov v verigi imetnikov vrednostnih papirjev, saj ta ne izpolnjujejo pogojev za internalizirano poravnavo.
Similarly, a settlement internaliser should not report transactions executed on a trading venue and transferred by the trading venue to a central counterparty (CCP) for clearing or to a CSD for settlement.
Podobno internalizator poravnave ne bi smel poročati poslov, izvršenih na mestu trgovanja, ki jih mesto trgovanja prenese na centralno nasprotno stranko za kliring ali na CDD za poravnavo.
In order to facilitate data comparability across settlement internalisers, calculations related to the value of internalised settlement instructions under this Regulation should be based on objective and reliable data and methodologies.
Za lažjo primerjavo podatkov med internalizatorji poravnave bi morali izračuni, povezani z vrednostjo navodil za internalizirano poravnavo v skladu s to uredbo, temeljiti na objektivnih in zanesljivih podatkih ter metodologijah.
The reporting requirements set out in this Regulation may require significant IT system changes, market testing and adjustments to legal arrangements of the institutions concerned.
Zahteve za poročanje iz te uredbe lahko zahtevajo precejšnje spremembe informacijskega sistema, testiranje trga in prilagoditve pravnih ureditev zadevnih institucij.
It is therefore necessary to give those institutions sufficient time to prepare for the application of those requirements.
Zato je tem institucijam treba dati dovolj časa, da se pripravijo na uvedbo teh zahtev.
This Regulation is based on the draft regulatory technical standards submitted by ESMA to the Commission.
Ta uredba temelji na osnutkih regulativnih tehničnih standardov, ki jih je ESMA predložila Komisiji.
ESMA has conducted open public consultations on the draft regulatory technical standards on which this Regulation is based, analysed the potential related costs and benefits and requested the opinion of the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2].
ESMA je opravila odprta javna posvetovanja o osnutkih regulativnih tehničnih standardov, na katerih temelji ta uredba, analizirala potencialne povezane stroške in koristi ter prosila za mnenje interesno skupino za vrednostne papirje in trge, ustanovljeno v skladu s členom 37 Uredbe (EU) št. 1095/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [2].
In accordance with Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014, in developing the draft regulatory technical standards on which this Regulation is based, ESMA has worked in close cooperation with the members of the European System of Central Banks,
ESMA je v skladu s členom 9(2) Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014 pri pripravi osnutkov regulativnih tehničnih standardov, na katerih temelji ta uredba, tesno sodelovala s članicami Evropskega sistema centralnih bank (ESCB) –
‘Internalised settlement instruction’ means an instruction by a client of the settlement internaliser to place at the disposal of the recipient an amount of money or to transfer the title to, or interest in, a security or securities by means of a book entry on a register, or otherwise, which is settled by the settlement internaliser in its own books and not through a securities settlement system.
„navodilo za internalizirano poravnavo“ pomeni navodilo stranke internalizatorja poravnave, naj prejemniku z vknjižbo v nematerializirani obliki ali drugače da na razpolago znesek denarja ali nanj prenese lastništvo vrednostnega papirja ali vrednostnih papirjev ali delež v njih, pri čemer internalizator poravnave ta posel poravna v svojih poslovnih knjigah in ne prek sistema poravnave vrednostnih papirjev;
‘Failed internalised settlement instruction’ means non-occurrence of settlement, or partial settlement, of a securities transaction at the date agreed by the parties concerned due to a lack of securities or cash, regardless of the underlying cause.
„neuspešna internalizirana poravnava“ pomeni neizvršitev poravnave ali delno poravnavo posla z vrednostnimi papirji na datum, dogovorjen med zadevnima strankama, zaradi pomanjkanja vrednostnih papirjev ali denarnih sredstev ne glede na vzrok.
The reports referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 shall include the following information:
Poročila iz prvega pododstavka člena 9(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 909/2014 vključujejo naslednje informacije:
country code of the place of establishment of the settlement internaliser;
oznako države sedeža internalizatorja poravnave;
reporting timestamp;
časovni žig poročanja;
period covered by the report;
obdobje, ki ga zajema poročilo;
identifier of the settlement internaliser;
identifikator internalizatorja poravnave;
contact details of the settlement internaliser;
kontaktne podatke internalizatorja poravnave;
the aggregated volume and value, expressed in euros, of internalised settlement instructions settled by the settlement internaliser during the period covered by the report;
skupni obseg in vrednost, izraženo v eurih, navodil za internalizirano poravnavo, ki jih je internalizator poravnave poravnal v obdobju, ki ga zajema poročilo;
the aggregated volume and value, expressed in euros, of internalised settlement instructions settled by the settlement internaliser during the period covered by the report, for each of the following types of financial instruments:
skupni obseg in vrednost, izraženo v eurih, navodil za internalizirano poravnavo, ki jih je internalizator poravnave poravnal v obdobju, ki ga zajema poročilo, za vsako od naslednjih vrst finančnih instrumentov: