natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Under Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation, duties may be levied retroactively if there is ‘in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, a further substantial rise in imports which, in the light of its timing and volume and other circumstances, is likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied’.
Statistični podatki Eurostata o uvozu, predstavljeni v preglednici 1, kažejo, da se je uvoz debelih pločevin iz LRK po obdobju preiskave znatno zmanjšal.
Comments on the possible retroactive imposition of anti-dumping duties
Preglednica 1
CISA submitted that any possible retroactive measures would have a negative impact on importers as they would ‘unnecessarily face additional costs’ since they pay anti-dumping duties.
Razvoj povprečnega mesečnega obsega uvoza
According to CISA the importers ‘have no intention of stockpiling the product concerned’ from the PRC and that the imports which have been registered were the remaining part of old contracts which were concluded before the initiation of the proceeding.
Vir: Eurostat.
CISA argued finally that ‘an unexpected duty is going to create losses’ on the side of the importers and users in the Union.
Mesečno povprečje v OP
CISA finally argued that ‘registering imports and threatening to impose measures retroactively is nothing else than creating yet another trade defence hurdle so that EU importers stop importing from China even before it has been proven that such imports are injuring the EU industry’.
Mesečno povprečje od marca do septembra 2016
Import statistics
Mesečno povprečje od marca do oktobra 2016
Eurostat import statistics presented in Table 1 below indicate that imports of heavy plate from the PRC decreased significantly after the investigation period.
Obseg uvoza iz LRK (v tonah)
Table 1
Gibanje v primerjavi z OP (%)
Development of average monthly volume of imports
Ni relevantno.
Source: Eurostat.
Sklep o retroaktivnosti
IP Monthly Average
Ker ni bilo nadaljnje znatne rasti uvoza, je Komisija sklenila, da pravni pogoj za retroaktivno pobiranje dajatev iz člena 10(4)(d) osnovne uredbe ni izpolnjen.
Monthly average March-September 2016
Zato se dajatev na registrirani uvoz ne bi smela uvesti retroaktivno.
Monthly average March-October 2016
DOKONČNI PROTIDAMPINŠKI UKREPI
Import volume from the PRC (tonnes)
Stopnja odprave škode
Trend versus IP (%)
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 222 začasne uredbe, je Komisija določila stopnjo odprave škode na podlagi primerjave med tehtano povprečno uvozno ceno v obdobju preiskave vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov iz LRK, ustrezno prilagojeno glede na stroške, nastale po uvozu, in carinske dajatve, ter tehtano povprečno neškodljivo ceno podobnega izdelka, ki so ga vzorčeni proizvajalci Unije v obdobju preiskave prodajali na trgu Unije.
N/A
CISA je predložila več pripomb v zvezi z metodologijo za izračun neškodljive cene podobnega izdelka, ki so ga vzorčeni proizvajalci Unije prodajali na trgu Unije v obdobju preiskave v obravnavani zadevi.
Conclusion on retroactivity
CISA je najprej želela pojasnilo, zakaj je Komisija uporabila metodologijo, kjer je izgube v obdobju preiskave prištela prodajnim cenam industrije Unije, nato pa stroškom proizvodnje prištela ciljno stopnjo dobička, ki znaša 7,9 %, namesto ciljnega dobička.
The Commission concludes that as there was no further substantial rise in imports the legal condition for retroactive collection of duties under Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation is not met.
Za vsak primer posebej se izbere ena od dveh metodologij, ki ju Komisija uporablja za določitev stopnje odprave škode.
Therefore duties should not be levied retroactively on the registered imports.
Kadar industrija Unije nima primerljive prodaje, se neškodljiva cena pogosto določi tako, da se skupnemu strošku prišteje ciljni dobiček.
DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
V obravnavanem primeru pa je bila primerljiva prodaja na voljo.
Injury elimination level
To pa zato, ker je podobni izdelek, ki ga je prodajala industrija Unije, sestavljalo na stotine vrst izdelkov, vzorčeni proizvajalci Unije pa so imeli obsežno mrežo povezanih družb, vključno s storitvenimi centri za jeklarstvo, v katerih nastajajo stroški, ki v poslovnih knjigah vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije niso evidentirani tako, da bi jih bilo mogoče zlahka pripisati posameznim kontrolnim številkam izdelka.
As shown in recital 222 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission determined the injury elimination level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price during the investigation period of the sampled exporting producers in the PRC, duly adjusted for post-importation costs and customs duties, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period.
Zaradi navedenih razlogov je bilo od proizvodnih družb in tudi vseh povezanih prodajnih družb (zlasti storitvenih centrov za jeklarstvo) v Uniji nemogoče zbrati informacije o stroških za posamezno kontrolno številko izdelka, da bi lahko izračunali skupni strošek na kontrolno številko izdelka.
CISA submitted a number of comments about the methodology to calculate the non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period in the present case.
Namesto tega je Komisija določila skupni strošek za vsako posamezno kontrolno številko izdelka tako, da je tehtani povprečni prodajni ceni prištela tehtano povprečno izgubo vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije.
Firstly CISA requested why the Commission used the methodology of adding to the Union industry's sales prices the loss incurred during the investigation period and then adding the target profit margin of 7,9 % instead of adding the target profit to the cost of production.
Nato se je k tako določenemu skupnemu strošku prištela 7,9-odstotna stopnja dobička, glede katere po začasnih ukrepih ni bilo predloženih nobenih pripomb.
The choice between the two methodologies used by the Commission to determine the injury elimination level is made on a case by case basis.
CISA je na koncu navedla, da je bila uporabljena metodologija „napačna“ in da sta metodologiji „privedli do popolnoma različnih rezultatov“.
In the absence of comparable sales by the Union industry, the non-injurious price is often established by adding the target profit to the total cost.
Navedla je primer, v katerem je uporabila hipotetične stroške proizvodnje in hipotetično prodajno ceno, s čimer naj bi pokazala, da je izračun ciljne cene na podlagi prodajne cene napačen.
In the present case however the comparable sales were available.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je večina informacij iz tega primera hipotetičnih in se ne nanaša na dejanske podatke, zato rezultat tega primera ne more dokazati, da je metodologija, uporabljena v tej zadevi, napačna.
This is because the like product sold by the Union industry consisted of hundreds of product types and the sampled Union producers had an extensive network of related companies, including steel service centres, which incur costs, and which are not recorded in the books of the sampled Union producers in a manner that could easily be allocated to the different PCN numbers.
Zato Komisija tega argumenta ne more šteti za dokaz.
For these reasons it was impossible to collect the cost information for each PCN not only from the production companies, but also from all the related sales companies (in particular steel service centres) in the Union to arrive at a total cost per PCN.
Če bi bila na voljo enaka raven podrobnih informacij, bi obe metodologiji privedli do podobnih rezultatov.
Hence, instead, the Commission established the total cost of every PCN by adding to the weighted average sales price the weighted average loss incurred by the sampled Union producers.
CISA je na koncu navedla, da „če večino kontrolnih številk izdelka, ki jih izvozijo kitajski proizvajalci izvozniki, prodajajo manj kot trije vzorčeni proizvajalci Unije, bi se bilo treba vprašati o reprezentativnosti podatkov o prodaji, prejetih od vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije, in torej zaključiti, da je izračun stopnje nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen na podlagi teh podatkov vprašljiv.
Then, the target profit margin of 7,9 %, on which no comments were received after provisional measures, was added to the total cost so established.
Da ne omenjamo dejstva, da se škode skoraj ne da dokazati, če industrija Unije ne proizvaja/prodaja vrst, ki jih izvažajo kitajski proizvajalci izvozniki“.
Finally CISA further submitted that the methodology used was ‘wrong’ and that the two methodologies ‘lead to completely different results’.
Komisija opozarja, da čeprav so bili vzorčeni trije proizvajalci Unije, dejstvo, „da večino kontrolnih številk izdelka, ki jih izvozijo kitajski proizvajalci izvozniki, prodajajo manj kot trije vzorčeni proizvajalci Unije“, ne pomeni, da jih industrija Unije ali celo vzorčeni proizvajalci Unije sploh ne prodajajo.
They provided an example using a hypothetical cost of production and a hypothetical sales price, which allegedly shows that calculating the target price on the basis of the sales price is wrong.
To pomeni le, da vsi trije vzorčeni proizvajalci Unije ne prodajajo vseh kontrolnih številk izdelka, ki jih izvažajo vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki iz LRK.
The Commission notes that since most information used in the example is hypothetical and does not refer to actual data, the result of such example cannot demonstrate that the methodology used in this particular case is wrong.
Komisija opozarja tudi, da niso vsi vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki iz LRK v Unijo izvažali istih kontrolnih številk izdelka.
Therefore the Commission cannot consider this argument as evidence.
Veliko večino kontrolnih številk izdelka, ki jih izvažajo vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki v Unijo (tj. več kot 90 % obsega tega izvoza), proizvede en ali več vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije.
If the same level of detailed information was available, both methodologies would lead to similar results.
Po dokončnem razkritju je CISA v svojih pripombah in na zaslišanju ponovno obravnavala to vprašanje.
CISA finally submitted that ‘if the majority of the PCNs exported by the Chinese exporting producers are sold by less than three sampled Union producers, one should question the representativeness of the sales data received from the sampled Union producers and therefore conclude that calculating an undercutting margin on the basis thereof is rather debatable.
CISA je sklepala, da industrija Unije morda ni predložila pravilnih podatkov in da je bila ugodneje obravnavana, pri čemer so bile kršene pravice drugih strani do objektivne, nepristranske in nediskriminatorne preiskave.
Not to mention the fact that injury can hardly be proven if the Union industry does not even produce/sell the types exported by the Chinese exporting producers.’
Ta domnevna ugodnejša obravnava industrije Unije naj bi se kazala tudi s prizanesljivostjo Komisije do nje, ko ni zagotovila nekaterih pomembnih podatkov (CISA je navedla raven informacij o stroških proizvodnje).
The Commission notes that though three Union producers were sampled the fact ‘that the majority of the PCNs exported by the Chinese exporting producers are sold by less than three sampled Union producers’ does not mean that the Union industry or even the sampled Union producers do not sell them at all.
Glede očitka o ugodnejši obravnavi je trditev zavrnjena.
This only means that not all three sampled Union producers sell all PCNs exported by the sampled exporting producers from the PRC.
Zadevno vprašanje se nanaša na besedilo uvodnih izjav 191 do 193 zgoraj.
The Commission notes also that not all sampled exporting producers from the PRC exported to the Union the same PCNs.
Komisija je v navedenih uvodnih izjavah navedla razlog za izbiro med metodologijama, ki ju uporablja za določitev stopnje odprave škode.
Indeed, the vast majority of PCNs exported by the sampled exporting producers to the Union (accounting for more than 90 % of these exports by volume) is produced by one or more sampled Union producers.
Ker v zvezi s stopnjo odprave škode ni bilo drugih pripomb, se sklepi iz uvodnih izjav 217 do 223 začasne uredbe potrdijo.
Following final disclosure CISA returned to this issue in their comments and at the hearing.
Ponudba zaveze
CISA inferred that the Union industry may not have reported correct figures and had benefitted from favourable treatment in breach of the rights of other parties to an objective, impartial and non-discriminatory investigation.
Po dokončnem razkritju je en proizvajalec izvoznik iz LRK Komisiji predložil ponudbo cenovne zaveze.
This alleged favourable treatment to the Union industry would also be illustrated by the Commission's leniency towards them when failing to provide certain important information (CISA referred to level of information on the cost of production).
V navedeni ponudbi so bile določene minimalne uvozne cene za vrste debelih pločevin, ki jih proizvajalec izvoznik iz LRK prodaja v Unijo, predlagana pa je bila tudi metoda indeksacije navedenih minimalnih uvoznih cen na podlagi cen glavnih surovin.
As concerns the allegation of favourable treatment, the claim is rejected.
Komisija je zavrnila ponudbo cenovne zaveze, ker obstaja visoko tveganje navzkrižne kompenzacije cen zaradi prevelike razlike v minimalnih uvoznih cenah med različnimi vrstami, ki jih ni enostavno razlikovati, in prezapletene metode indeksacije.
The issue at stake concerns the wording in recitals 191 to 193 above.
Poleg tega struktura izvoznih poti proizvajalca izvoznika in vzporedni izvoz drugih izdelkov ne omogočata ustreznega spremljanja, zato je bila možnost navzkrižne kompenzacije z drugimi izdelki, ki jih prodajajo povezane družbe proizvajalca izvoznika, previsoka.
In these recitals the Commission stated the reason for the choice between the two methodologies used by the Commission to determine the injury elimination level.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je bil obveščen o razlogih za zavrnitev njegove ponudbe zaveze in je imel možnost, da predloži pripombe.
In the absence of any other comments on the injury elimination level, the conclusions set out in recitals 217 to 223 of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
Dokončni ukrepi
Undertaking offer
Glede na sklepe v zvezi z dampingom, škodo, vzročnostjo in interesom Unije ter v skladu s členom 9(4) osnovne uredbe bi bilo treba dokončne protidampinške ukrepe za uvoz zadevnega izdelka uvesti na ravni stopnje odprave škode v skladu s pravilom nižje dajatve.
Following final disclosure one exporting producer from the PRC submitted a price undertaking offer to the Commission.
Na podlagi navedenega se stopnje, po katerih bo uvedena dokončna protidampinška dajatev, določijo, kot je navedeno v preglednici 2:
This offer set minimum import prices (‘MIPs’) for the types of heavy plate sold to the Union by the exporting producer from the PRC, and also offered a method of indexation of these MIPs based on the prices of the main raw materials.
Preglednica 2
The Commission rejected the price undertaking offer because of the high risk of price cross-compensation since the difference in the MIPs between different not easily distinguishable types was too wide and the indexation method was too complex.
Stopnja dampinga, stopnja odprave škode in stopnja dajatve
In addition, the structure of the export sales channels of the exporting producer and the parallel export sales of other products could not allow a proper monitoring and, thus, the possibility of cross-compensation via other products sold by related companies of the exporting producer was too high.
Vir: Preiskava.
The exporting producer was informed of the reasons for rejection of their undertaking offer and was given the possibility to comment.
Družba
Definitive measures
Stopnja dampinga (v %)
On the basis of the above, the rates at which the definitive anti-dumping duty will be imposed are set as in Table 2 below:
Dajatev (v %)
Table 2
Wuyang Iron and Steel Co., Ltd in Wuyang New Heavy & Wide Steel Plate Co., Ltd
Dumping margin, Injury elimination level and duty rate
Druge sodelujoče družbe
Source: Investigation.
Vse druge družbe
Company
Stopnje protidampinških dajatev za posamezne družbe, navedene v tej uredbi, so bile določene na podlagi ugotovitev te preiskave.
Dumping margin (%)
Zato izražajo položaj teh družb med preiskavo.
Injury elimination level (%)
Te stopnje dajatev (v nasprotju z dajatvijo na ravni države, ki se uporablja za „vse druge družbe“) se torej uporabljajo izključno za uvoz zadevnega izdelka s poreklom iz LRK, ki ga proizvajajo te družbe, torej posebej navedeni pravni subjekti.
Duty (%)
Uvoženi zadevni izdelek, ki ga proizvaja katera koli druga družba, ki ni izrecno navedena z imenom in naslovom v izvedbenem delu te uredbe, vključno s subjekti, povezanimi s tistimi, ki so izrecno navedeni, teh stopenj ne morejo uporabljati in za njih velja stopnja dajatve, ki se uporablja za „vse druge družbe“.
Nanjing Iron and Steel Co., Ltd
Vsak zahtevek za uporabo teh stopenj protidampinških dajatev za posamezne družbe (npr. zaradi spremembe imena subjekta ali ustanovitve novih proizvodnih ali prodajnih obratov) je treba nasloviti na Komisijo [15], vključno z vsemi ustreznimi informacijami, zlasti o vsaki spremembi dejavnosti družbe na področju proizvodnje, domače prodaje in izvoza, povezanimi na primer z navedeno spremembo imena ali spremembo proizvodnih in prodajnih obratov.
Wuyang Iron and Steel Co., Ltd and Wuyang New Heavy & Wide Steel Plate Co., Ltd
Po potrebi se ta uredba ustrezno spremeni s posodobljenim seznamom družb, upravičenih do individualnih stopenj dajatev.
Other cooperating companies
Za zagotovitev ustreznega izvajanja protidampinške dajatve bi bilo treba stopnjo dajatve za „vse druge družbe“ uporabljati za nesodelujoče proizvajalce izvoznike in tudi za proizvajalce, ki v obdobju preiskave niso izvažali v Unijo.
All other companies
Dokončno pobiranje začasnih dajatev
Therefore, they reflect the situation found during that investigation with respect to these companies.
Ukrepi iz te uredbe so v skladu z mnenjem odbora, ustanovljenega s členom 15(1) Uredbe (EU) 2016/1036 –
These duty rates (as opposed to the country-wide duty applicable to ‘all other companies’) are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC and produced by the companies and thus by the specific legal entities mentioned.
SPREJELA NASLEDNJO UREDBO:
Any claim requesting the application of these individual company anti-dumping duty rates (e.g. following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission [15] with all relevant information, in particular any modification in the company's activities linked to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for example, that name change or that change in the production and sales entities.
Dokončna protidampinška dajatev se uvede na uvoz ploščatih izdelkov iz nelegiranega ali legiranega jekla (razen nerjavnega jekla, silicijevega jekla za elektropločevine, orodnega jekla in hitroreznega jekla), vroče valjanih, neplatiranih, neprevlečenih in neprekritih, ne v kolobarjih, debeline več kot 10 mm in širine 600 mm ali več ali debeline 4,75 mm ali več, vendar ne več kot 10 mm, in širine 2050 mm ali več, ki se trenutno uvrščajo pod oznake KN ex72085120, ex72085191, ex72085198, ex72085291, ex72089020, ex72089080, 72254040, ex72254060 in ex72259900 (oznake TARIC: 7208512010, 7208519110, 7208519810, 7208529110, 7208902010, 7208908020, 7225406010, 7225990035, 7225990040), ter s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske.
In order to ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duty, the ‘all other companies’ duty rate should not only apply to the non-cooperating exporting producers but also to those producers which did not have any exports to the Union during the investigation period.
Dodatna oznaka TARIC
Definitive collection of the provisional duties
Druge sodelujoče družbe iz Priloge
In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected.
Če ni določeno drugače, se uporabljajo ustrezne veljavne določbe o carinah.
The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation,
Člen 2
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Zneski, zavarovani z začasno protidampinško dajatvijo v skladu z Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2016/1777, se dokončno poberejo.
A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of flat products of non-alloy or alloy steel (excluding stainless steel, silicon-electrical steel, tool steel and high-speed steel), hot-rolled, not clad, plated or coated, not in coils, of a thickness exceeding 10 mm and of a width of 600 mm or more or of a thickness of 4,75 mm or more but not exceeding 10 mm and of a width of 2050 mm or more currently falling within CN codes ex72085120, ex72085191, ex72085198, ex72085291, ex72089020, ex72089080, 72254040, ex72254060 and ex72259900 (TARIC codes: 7208512010, 7208519110, 7208519810, 7208529110, 7208902010, 7208908020, 7225406010, 7225990035, 7225990040) and originating in the People's Republic of China.
Kadar kateri koli novi proizvajalec izvoznik iz Ljudske republike Kitajske Komisiji zagotovi zadostne dokaze, da:
The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:
izdelka iz člena 1(1) v obdobju preiskave (od 1. januarja 2015 do 31. decembra 2015) ni izvažal v Unijo,
TARIC additional code
ni povezan z nobenim izvoznikom ali proizvajalcem v Ljudski republiki Kitajski, za katerega veljajo ukrepi, uvedeni s to uredbo, in
Other cooperating companies listed in Annex
je zadevni izdelek dejansko izvažal v Unijo po obdobju preiskave, na katerem temeljijo ukrepi, ali je prevzel nepreklicno pogodbeno obveznost, da izvozi znatno količino zadevnega izdelka v Unijo,
Unless otherwise specified, the relevant provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.
se potem, ko se vsem zainteresiranim stranem omogoči, da predložijo pripombe, člen 1(2) spremeni tako, da se novega proizvajalca izvoznika doda na seznam sodelujočih družb, ki niso vključene v vzorec in za katere velja tehtana povprečna stopnja dajatve.
The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1777 shall be definitively collected.
Ta uredba začne veljati dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.
Where any new exporting producer in the People's Republic of China provides sufficient evidence to the Commission that:
V Bruslju, 27. februarja 2017
it did not export to the Union the product described in Article 1(1) during the investigation period (1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015),
Za Komisijo
it is not related to any of the exporters or producers in the People's Republic of China which are subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation,
Predsednik
it has actually exported to the Union the product concerned after the investigation period on which the measures are based, or it has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union,
UL L 176, 30.6.2016, str. 21.
Article 1(2) shall be amended, after giving all interested parties the possibility to comment, by adding the new exporting producer to the cooperating companies not included in the sample and thus subject to the weighted average duty rate.
Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2016/1777 z dne 6. oktobra 2016 o uvedbi začasne protidampinške dajatve na uvoz nekaterih debelih pločevin iz nelegiranega jekla ali drugih legiranih jekel s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske (UL L 272, 7.10.2016, str. 5).
Article 4
Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2016/1357 z dne 9. avgusta 2016 o obvezni registraciji uvoza nekaterih debelih pločevin iz nelegiranega jekla ali drugih legiranih jekel s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske (UL L 215, 10.8.2016, str. 23).