natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Consequently, one transaction cannot really be compared with another based on a turnaround price or price per passenger.
Prav tam.
In addition, benchmarking is not an appropriate method to establish market prices if the available benchmarks have not been defined with regard to market considerations or the existing prices are significantly distorted by public interventions.
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je lahko gospodarsko neskladje pokazatelj finančne kontinuitete.
Such distortions appear to be present in the aviation industry, for reasons explained in paragraphs 57 to 59 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines:
Zadeva C-610/10, Komisija proti Španiji, [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:781, točka 106.
‘Publicly owned airports have traditionally been considered by public authorities as infrastructures for facilitating local development and not as undertakings operating in accordance with market rules.
Zakon o insolventnosti („Insolvenzordnung“) z dne 5. oktobra 1994 (BGBl.
Those airports' prices consequently tend not to be determined with regard to market considerations and in particular sound ex ante profitability prospects, but essentially having regard to social or regional considerations.
I S. 2866), kakor je bil nazadnje spremenjen s členom 16 Zakona z dne 20. novembra 2015 (BGBl.
In those circumstances, the Commission has strong doubts that at the present time, an appropriate benchmark can be identified to establish a true market price for services provided by airports.
Glej Odločbo Komisije z dne 27. februarja 2008 o državni pomoči C 46/07 (ex NN 59/07) Romunije za podjetje Automobile Craiova (nekdanji Daewoo Romunija) (UL L 239, 6.9.2008, str. 12).
Moreover, as the Union courts have recalled, benchmarking by reference to the sector concerned is merely one analytical tool amongst others to determine if a beneficiary has received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained in normal market conditions [61].
Glej na primer: zadevo T-296/97, Alitalia proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:2000:289; zadevi T-228/99 in T-233/99, WestLB proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:2003:57; zadevo T-366/00, Scott SA proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:2007:99; zadevi C-328/99 in C-399/00, Italija in SIM 2 Multimedia proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2003:252; zadevo T-358/94, Air France proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:1996:194.
Ryanair essentially argued that the MEO test can be applied based on a comparison with the commercial arrangements of other European airports.
Sklep Komisije C(2013) 3546 final z dne 19. junija 2013, SA.36197(N/2013) – Portugalska privatizacija družbe ANA – Aeroportos de Portugal, UL C 256, 5.9.2013, str. 3; zadeva C-40/85, Belgija proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:1986:305.
In particular, it compared charges paid by Ryanair at Bournemouth, Grenoble, Knock, Maastricht, Nîmes and Prestwick airports with the charges paid by Ryanair under the agreements at Lübeck airport.
Zadeva C-482/99, Francija proti Komisiji (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Stardust Marine), ECLI:EU:C:2002:294, točka 71.
The study did not assess whether the sample of benchmark airports fulfilled all the criteria spelled out in the 2014 Aviation guidelines, as it only assessed traffic volumes, type of airport traffic and prosperity of the surrounding area [62].
Cenitev, ki jo je opravila Berenberg Consult GmbH (odvisno podjetje banke Hamburger Privatbank Berenberg).
In its 2012 Opening decision, the Commission compared the charges laid down in the March and October 2010 Side letters with charges at Hamburg airport, which led to doubts as to the market conformity of the charges laid down in the Side letters.
[55] Glej točko 403 XXIII.
The Commission notes that traffic volume in Lübeck is much lower than in Hamburg airport.
Poročila Evropske komisije o politiki konkurence, 1993; točko 4.2.3.1.
In fact, Hamburg is the airport with the most traffic in Northern Germany.
Obvestila Komisije o pojmu državne pomoči po členu 107(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (UL C 262, 19.7.2016, str. 1).
Hamburg is used for all segments of air transport, whereas Lübeck was specialised in low cost carriers which required fewer check-incounters and facilities for transfer passengers, no passenger busses, less luggage handling personnel and facilities, less cleaning personnel, and allowed for a shorter circulation time.
Glej smernice za letalski sektor iz leta 2014, točka 53.
In addition to those considerations, the airport infrastructure must be open to all airlines and not dedicated to a specific airline in order to exclude that the advantage resulting from compatible aid to the airport operator is passed on to a specific airline.
V zvezi s primerjalno analizo s sklicevanjem na donosnost (v nasprotju z določanjem cen) v sektorju glej združeni zadevi T-319/12 in T-321/12, Španija in Ciudad de la Luz proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:2014:604, točka 44.
The Commission also notes in this context that price differentiation is a standard business practice.
Za dodatna merila ocenjevanja glej smernice za letalski sektor iz leta 2014, točka 60.
Such differentiated pricing policies should, however, be commercially justified.
Glej smernice za letalski sektor iz leta 2014, točki 59 in 63.
The Commission considers that arrangements concluded between airlines and an airport can be deemed to satisfy the MEO test when they incrementally contribute, from an ex ante point of view, to the profitability of the airport.
Glej smernice za letalski sektor iz leta 2014, točka 63.
The airport should demonstrate that, when setting up an arrangement with an airline (for example, an individual contract or an overall scheme of airport charges), it is capable of covering all costs stemming from the arrangement, over the duration of the arrangement, with a reasonable profit margin on the basis of sound medium-term prospects [64].
Glej smernice za letalski sektor iz leta 2014, točka 64.
In order to assess whether an arrangement concluded by an airport with an airline satisfies the MEO test, expected non-aeronautical revenues stemming from the airline's activity must be taken into consideration together with airport charges, net of any rebates, marketing support or incentive schemes.
Smernice za letalski sektor iz leta 2014, točka 64; Sklep Komisije (EU) 2015/1226 z dne 23. julija 2014 o državni pomoči SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN), ki jo je Francija izvedla za gospodarsko zbornico v Angoulêmu, skupino SNC-Lavalin, družbo Ryanair in družbo Airport Marketing Services (UL L 201, 30.7.2015, str. 48); Sklep Komisije (EU) 2015/1584 z dne 1. oktobra 2014 o državni pomoči SA.23098 (C 37/07) (ex NN 36/07), ki jo je Italija izvedla za Società di Gestione dell'Aeroporto di Alghero So.Ge.A.AL S.p.A. in več letalskih prevoznikov, ki delujejo na letališču Alghero (UL L 250, 25.9.2015, str. 38); Sklep Komisije (EU) 2016/2069 z dne 1 oktobra 2014 o ukrepih SA.14093 (C76/2002), ki jih je Belgija izvedla v korist družb Brussels South Charleroi Airport in Ryanair (UL L 325, 30.11.2016, str. 63).
Similarly, all expected costs incrementally incurred by the airport in relation to the airline's activity at the airport have to be taken into account.
Zadeva T-196/04, Ryanair proti Komisiji (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Charleroi), ECLI:EU:T:2008:585, točka 59.
Such incremental costs may encompass all categories of expenses or investments, such as incremental personnel, equipment and investment costs induced by the presence of the airline at the airport [65].
Zadeva C-305/89, Italijanska republika proti Komisiji Evropskih skupnosti (Alfa Romeo), ECLI:EU:C:1991:142.
The Commission considers in its constant decision making practice that costs which the airport would have to incur anyway, independently from the arrangement with the airline, should not be taken into account in the MEO test [66].
Poročilo je bilo omenjeno v točki 7.3.1.1 o donosnosti sporazuma med mestom Lübeck in družbo Infratil.
According to the Charleroi judgement [67] when assessing the measures in question the Commission has to take into account all the relevant features of the measures and their context.
Primerjaj Sklep (EU) 2015/1226.
In other words, the Commission has to analyse the expected impact of the agreement with Ryanair on FLG, taking into account all relevant features of the measure in question.
Sklep (EU) 2015/1584.
The Court declared in the Stardust Marine judgment that, ‘[…] in order to examine whether or not the State has adopted the conduct of a prudent investor operating in a market economy, it is necessary to place oneself in the context of the period during which the financial support measures were taken in order to assess the economic rationality of the State's conduct, and thus to refrain from any assessment based on a later situation.’ [68].
Poročilo družbe Oxera, Gospodarska presoja načela udeleženca v tržnem gospodarstvu: letališče Lübeck, 1. september 2014.
In order to apply the MEO test, the Commission has to place itself at the time when the agreement was concluded.
Zadeva T-210/02 RENV British Aggregates Association proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:2012:110, točki 82 in 83; združeni zadevi C-106/09 P in C-107/09 P, Komisija in Španija proti Government of Gibraltar in Združenemu kraljestvu, ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, točki 74 in 75; zadeva C-518/13 Eventech proti The Parking Adjudicator, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, točki 54 in 55.
The Commission has also to base its assessment on the information and assumptions which were at the disposal of FLG when the agreement was concluded.
Zadeva C-524/14 P, Komisija proti Hansestadt Lübeck, ECLI:EU:C:2016:971, točka 62.
Application of the MEO principle to the 2000 Agreement
V letih 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 in 2006 je Komisija od letalskega prevoznika Air Berlin, okoljevarstvene NVO (Bund Umwelt und Naturschutz) in državljanov prejela več pritožb glede domnevne državne pomoči družbi Flughafen Lübeck GmbH (v nadaljnjem besedilu: FLG), družbi Infratil Limited (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Infratil) [3] in letalskemu prevozniku Ryanair [4].
Preliminary remarks
Komisija je 7. novembra 2005 Nemčijo zaprosila za podatke, ki jih je Nemčija posredovala 7. februarja 2006.
The Commission notes that Air Berlin argued that the agreements between Ryanair and Lübeck airport were not profitable as the losses of FLG increased continuously (see Table 8) after the arrival of Ryanair.
Dodatne podatke je zahtevala z dopisom z dne 22. marca 2006, na katerega je Nemčija odgovorila 12. junija 2006.
As Ryanair and Wizz Air were the only airlines flying regular lines from the airport, Air Berlin concluded that FLG's losses must be attributable to these airlines.
Sestanka med službami Komisije, družbo Infratil, večinskim lastnikom družbe, ki upravlja letališče, in hanzeatskim mestom Lübeck (v nadaljnjem besedilu: mesto Lübeck) sta potekala 14. oktobra in 4. decembra 2006.
The Commission notes that even if a significant correlation between the number of Ryanair passengers at Lübeck airport and the losses incurred by FLG could be established, such correlation would not necessarily imply that the losses result from the operation of Ryanair at Lübeck airport.
Komisija je z dopisom z dne 10. julija 2007 Nemčijo obvestila, da se je v zvezi s financiranjem letališča Lübeck, finančnimi povezavami med mestom Lübeck in družbo Infratil ter finančnimi povezavami letališča z družbo Ryanair odločila začeti postopek iz člena 108(2) PDEU (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sklep o začetku postopka iz leta 2007).
Germany stated that more than […] % of the losses between 2000 and 2005 resulted from investments necessary to adapt the airport to increased passenger numbers.
Formalni postopek preiskave je bil evidentiran pod zadevo št.
Such investments were necessary to increase the airport value in the event of the envisaged privatisation and to prepare the airport to attract any airline.
SA.21877 (C 24/2007).
In addition, the Commission recalls that the MEO test is based on an ex ante assessment.
Popravek sklepa o začetku postopka iz leta 2007 je bil sprejet 24. oktobra 2007.
According to the case law of the Court of Justice, the conduct of a private market operator, which is used to assess the conduct of a public operator, does not need to be aimed at short-term profitability but can be guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term [69].
Sklep o začetku postopka iz leta 2007 je bil objavljen v Uradnem listu Evropske unije [5] 29. novembra 2007.
Even where an airport is loss-making over the period of Ryanair's operation, it is still possible that an airport airline agreement is incrementally profitable to an airport on an ex ante basis.
Popravek je bil objavljen 7. decembra 2007 [6].
As a final remark, the Commission notes that in the context of the present investigation, Ecorys was asked to compile a report on the profitability of the 2000 Agreement between FLG and Ryanair [70].
Komisija je zainteresirane strani pozvala, naj predložijo pripombe o zadevnih ukrepih v enem mesecu od datuma objave.
However, the report was based on a total cost approach, rather than an incremental cost approach and will therefore not be taken into consideration.
Komisija je prejela pripombe družb Ryanair, Air Berlin, Infratil, FLG, dveh NVO [7], Gospodarske zbornice Lübeck (v nadaljnjem besedilu: IHK Lübeck) [8], nemškega združenja letalskih prevoznikov (Bundesverband der Deutschen Fluggesellschaften, v nadaljnjem besedilu: BDF) in posameznikov [9].
Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
Nemčija je na te pripombe odgovorila 17. aprila 2008.
As a time frame for assessing the agreement in question a MEO would have chosen as a starting point the date of the signature of the agreement, i.e. 29 May 2000.
Ecorys, neodvisna svetovalna družba Komisije, je 24. julija 2008 od Nemčije zahtevala podatke, da bi pripravila poročilo o zadevi.
As an end date a MEO would have taken the end date as stipulated in the 2000 Agreement, i.e. 31 May 2010.
Nemčija se je 1. avgusta 2008 obrnila na Komisijo, da bi izpodbijala pravico družbe Ecorys, da pridobi podatke in dokumente.
For the purpose of assessing the agreement in question and given the findings in recitals 282 to 301, both the existence and the amount of possible aid in this agreement have to be assessed in the light of the situation prevailing at the time it was signed and, more specifically, in the light of the information available and developments foreseeable at that time.
Zahtevani podatki so bili posledično pridobljeni 18. septembra 2008.
At the time of the negotiation of the agreement, FLG expected the business of Ryanair at Lübeck airport to lead to increased passenger numbers, thereby increasing non-aeronautic revenues, to the expansion of non-aeronautic services, as well as to the attraction of further airlines.
Komisija je 16. aprila 2009 od Nemčije zahtevala dodatne podatke.
Even though FLG was making losses in the years preceding the agreement, Ryanair's business at the airport was expected to lead to moderate profits in the medium- to long-term.
Nemčija je 21. aprila 2009 in ponovno 7. julija 2009 zaprosila za podaljšanje roka.
Germany provided data on the ex ante expected growth of passenger numbers as well as the expected incremental costs and revenues, in a best-case and worst-case scenario.
Zahtevani podatki so bili predloženi 30. oktobra 2009.
Incremental revenues that a private investor would reasonably expect from the agreement include:
Komisija je 29. oktobra 2009 zahtevala dodatne podatke, ki jih je Nemčija predložila 16. decembra 2009.
additional aeronautical revenues from passengers and landing charges paid by Ryanair and
Dne 17. oktobra 2010 je Komisija prejela podatke od družbe Air Berlin.
additional non-aeronautical revenues from, for example, car parking, franchised shops, or directly operated shops.
Komisija je 20. aprila 2011 ugodila prošnji Nemčije za podaljšanje.
Applying the ‘single-till’ principle, the Commission takes the view that both aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues should be taken into account [71].
Nemčija je 21. aprila 2011 zaprosila za dodatno podaljšanje roka, ki ga je Komisija odobrila 27. aprila 2011.
Germany submitted that based on the charges stipulated in the 2000 Agreement, the airport expected to have average aeronautical revenues of EUR […] per passenger.
Komisija je odgovorila 15. junija 2011 in zahtevala manjkajoče podatke.
FLG estimated revenues from non-aviation business as representing […] % of aviation business income.
Komisija je 8. aprila 2011 poslala vprašalnik družbi Ryanair.
Incremental costs that a private investor would reasonably expect from the agreement would include:
Odgovore je prejela 4. julija 2011.
incremental operational costs directly caused by the Ryanair agreement,
Komisija je te navedbe 18. julija 2011 posredovala Nemčiji in zaprosila za pripombe do 18. avgusta 2011.
costs for marketing services,
Komisija je 7. februarja 2012 od družbe Ryanair zahtevala dodatne podatke glede študije družbe Oxera, ki jo je družba Ryanair predložila 4. julija 2011.
investment costs directly linked to the Ryanair agreement.
Družba Oxera je 16. februarja 2012 Komisijo prosila za pojasnilo v zvezi z enim od zastavljenih vprašanj.
Germany stated that it was necessary to increase the number of staff of FLG to handle the expected passenger numbers.
Komisija je pojasnilo predložila 17. februarja 2012.
FLG expected incremental operational and personnel costs of EUR […] per passenger.
Družba Ryanair je poslala svoje pripombe 13. aprila 2012.
Based on the 2000 Agreement, FLG expected incremental marketing costs for the period 2000-2012 of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Komisija je te pripombe posredovala Nemčiji 27. junija 2012.
Regarding investment costs, Germany stated that the airport infrastructure already existed prior to the agreement with Ryanair and that the initially planned operation of Ryanair at Lübeck airport did not require any additional infrastructure investments.
Nemčija je podala pripombe na navedbe družbe Ryanair v dopisu z dne 10. septembra 2012.
Germany submitted the following revenues and operating costs for the best case (Table 11) and the worst case (Table 12):
Končno poročilo družbe Ecorys z dne 29. marca 2011 je bilo poslano Nemčiji 29. junija 2011 in Nemčija je bila pozvana, naj predloži pripombe.
Table 11
Prevod poročila je bil posredovan Nemčiji 24. avgusta 2011 in Nemčija je bila pozvana, naj predloži pripombe do 26. septembra 2011.
Best-case costs and revenues
Nemčija je poslala svoje pripombe 10. oktobra 2011.
year
Nemčija je 30. junija 2011 poslala drugi del podatkov, ki jih je zahtevala Komisija.
passengers
Nemčija je 29. junija 2011 odgovorila na dopis Komisije z dne 15. junija 2011.
aeronautic revenues
Dne 5. julija 2011 je Komisija zaprosila Nemčijo, naj posreduje manjkajoče podatke.
non-aeronautic revenues
Nemčija je 15. julija 2011 predložila manjkajoče podatke.
operating costs
Družba Ryanair je 4. julija 2011 poslala pripombe Komisiji, ki so bile posredovane Nemčiji 8. avgusta 2011.
Table 12
Nemčija je podala pripombe na te navedbe 8. oktobra 2011.
Worst-case costs and revenues
Nemčija je 19. marca 2012 zaprosila za podaljšanje roka za predložitev podatkov do 17. aprila 2012.
FLG estimated positive financial effects from the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair.
Komisija je podaljšanje odobrila 21. marca 2012.
In this regard, Table 13 summarises the revenues from aeronautic and non-aeronautic activities, as well as the costs directly attributable to the operation of Ryanair at the airport and marketing costs.
Komisija je 18. aprila 2012 zahtevala od Nemčije, da posreduje manjkajoče podatke do 28. aprila 2012 brez možnosti podaljšanja.
Table 13
Komisija je tudi navedla, da bo v primeru neizpolnjevanja obveznosti izdana odredba o predložitvi podatkov v skladu s členom 10(3) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 [10].
Ex ante profitability assessment
Sestanek med Komisijo in Nemčijo je potekal 2. maja 2012.
profitability assessment
Komisija je 3. maja 2012 odobrila podaljšanje do 11. maja 2012.
marketing costs
V dopisu z dne 10. aprila 2013 je družba Ryanair poslala Komisiji poročilo o pristopu družbe Oxera k načelu udeleženca v tržnem gospodarstvu.
In the best case, Germany rounded passenger numbers to […], leading to aeronautic revenues of EUR […].
Poročilo je bilo poslano Nemčiji 3. maja 2013.
In the worst-case scenario, a total of […] passengers was expected, leading to aeronautic revenues of EUR […].
Dodatne navedbe družbe Ryanair so bile poslane Komisiji 20. decembra 2013.
Since non-aeronautic revenues were expected to amount to […] % of aeronautic revenues, non-aeronautic revenues were calculated to be EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
V dopisu z dne 24. februarja 2014 je Komisija pozvala družbo Ryanair, naj predloži pripombe o uporabi smernic za letalski sektor iz leta 2014 [11].
It was calculated that operating costs would amount to a total of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Komisija je 21. marca 2014 pozvala družbo Infratil, naj predloži pripombe o smernicah za letalski sektor iz leta 2014.
Marketing costs were not calculated on a per passenger basis, but were estimated, in total, to be EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Uradno vabilo vsem zainteresiranim stranem, naj predložijo pripombe o smernicah za letalski sektor iz leta 2014, je bilo objavljeno v Uradnem listu 15. aprila 2014 [12].
(315) Table 13 shows that revenues stemming from the 2000 Agreement were expected to exceed costs, leading to an annual surplus of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Nemčija je poslala svoje pripombe 12. maja 2014.
The Commission finds the approach taken by Germany sound.
Dodatne pripombe so bile posredovane družbama Air Berlin, Infratil in Schutzgemeinschaft gegen Fluglärm Lübeck und Umgebung eV (v nadaljnjem besedilu: SGF) [13].
The estimated average aeronautical revenues were based on the terms of the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair.
Nemčija je zaprosila za podaljšanje roka do 15. julija 2011.
The non-aeronautical revenues were expected to be […] % of the aeronautical revenue, which seems to be in line with general expectations as regards non-aeronautical revenues at other airports (see Table 6).
Komisija je v dopisu z dne 20. aprila 2011 Nemčijo pozvala, da odgovori na vprašanja glede pritožb do 28. aprila 2011.
The assumption that the staff number would need to be increased when passenger numbers increase also seems reasonable.
Nemčija je z dopisom z dne 21. aprila 2011 zaprosila za dodatno podaljšanje roka.
The Commission notes that investments related to the expansion of Lübeck airport were not specific to Ryanair but could potentially be exploited by other airlines.
Komisija je v dopisu z dne 27. aprila 2011 odobrila podaljšanje roka do 16. maja 2011.
This indicates that investment costs did not have to be included in the incremental costs of the Ryanair agreement.
Nemčija je informacije posredovala 16. maja 2011.
In this respect, the Commission notes that Germany emphasised that FLG continuously attempted to attract other airlines and succeeded in this attempt by attracting other airlines (such as Wizz Air).
Komisija je 20. maja 2011 poslala opomin v skladu s členom 10(3) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999, v katerem je navedla, da so bili poslani podatki nepopolni.
In addition, according to Germany, Lübeck airport unsuccessfully tried to initiate negotiations for an agreement with Air Berlin for years.
Rok za odgovor je bil 7. junij 2011.
Germany submitted that in order to successfully privatise Lübeck airport, it was necessary to significantly increase passenger numbers.
Nemčija je odgovorila z dopisom z dne 7. junija 2011, kjer zavrača, da je bil dopis z dne 20. maja 2011 opomin v smislu Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999, saj sta bili dve vprašanji preoblikovani in po njenem mnenju je bilo eno od vprašanj novo.
The Commission accepts that investments were made to prepare Lübeck airport for higher passenger numbers [72].
Komisija je z dopisom z dne 15. junija 2011 Nemčiji poslala drugi opomin v skladu s členom 10(3) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 in ji dala možnost, da zagotovi podatke do 29. junija 2011.
The Commission further notes that the 2000 Agreement did not require FLG to make investments [73].
V primeru neupoštevanja tega opozorila bi Komisija preučila možnost izdaje odredbe o predložitvi podatkov.