natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Until now, the Polish system was fully in line with these standards since the National Council for the Judiciary was composed of a majority of judges chosen by judges.
Zlasti je bilo navedeno, da bi bil nacionalni sodni svet z novimi pravili odvisen od političnih odločitev parlamentarne večine.
Articles 1(1) and 7 of the law amending the law on the National Council for the Judiciary would radically change this regime by providing that the 15 judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary will be appointed, and can be re-appointed, by the Sejm [22] as well as by establishing a new structure within the Council.
V mnenjih je bilo tudi poudarjeno, da je nacionalni sodni svet enotno telo, ki ga ni mogoče razdeliti na dva organa, ki ju ustava ne pozna, predlagani zakon pa bi spremenil ustavni red, tako da bi Sejmu zagotovil prevladujoč položaj nad sodstvom.
The new rules on appointment of judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary significantly increase the influence of the Parliament over the Council and adversely affect its independence in contradiction with the European standards.
Poleg tega bi bilo s predčasnim prenehanjem mandata sodnikov članov sveta in delovanja ustavnega organa kršeno načelo demokratične pravne države in načelo zakonitosti.
The fact that the judges-members will be appointed by the Sejm with a 3/5 majority does not alleviate this concern.27.
Kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj, Komisija ponovno opozarja, da učinkovita ustavna presoja teh določb trenutno ni mogoča.
The fact that according to Article 5(1) of the law amending the law on the National Council for the Judiciary the mandates of all the current judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary would be terminated prematurely further aggravates these concerns given that the Parliament will immediately gain a decisive influence on the composition of the Council to the detriment of the influence of judges themselves.
Upokojitvena starost in pooblastilo za podaljšanje mandata sodnikov
The politicisation of the National Council for the Judiciary is also aggravated by the new internal structure.
Člen 1(26)(b) in (c) ter člen 13(1) zakona o spremembi zakona o organizaciji splošnih sodišč določata, da se upokojitvena starost za splošne sodnike zniža s 67 na 60 let za sodnice in s 67 na 65 let za sodnike, minister za pravosodje pa bo dobil pooblastilo za odločanje o podaljšanju sodniških mandatov (do 70. leta starosti) na podlagi ohlapnih meril.
According to Article 1(7) of the law amending the law on the National Council for the Judiciary, the Council would be composed of two assemblies: the first with a majority of Members of Parliament, the second with judges appointed by the Parliament.
Do te odločitve zadevni sodniki ostanejo na položaju.
Formally, the Council would remain composed by a majority of judges, but in reality the new ‘political’ assembly could render more difficult the decision making process of the National Council for the Judiciary.
Nova upokojitvena ureditev bi škodljivo vplivala na neodvisnost sodnikov [25].
If the two assemblies diverged in their assessment of a candidate, the assembly that has a positive opinion could request a re-assessment by the Council in its full composition with a two-third majority of all members of the Council.
Nova pravila ustvarjajo dodatno orodje, s katerim lahko minister za pravosodje vpliva na posamezne sodnike.
Such a threshold would be very difficult to meet, also in view of the increased influence of the legislative power on the composition of the Council.
Zlasti lahko ohlapna merila za podaljšanje mandatov omogočijo neustrezno diskrecijsko pravico in ogrozijo načelo nezamenljivosti sodnikov [26].
This new regime would have a direct impact on the appointment and career of judges in Poland since the judges-members of the Council which are in the second assembly may under certain circumstances no longer have a final say on matters concerning the assessment of candidates for the post of judges [23].29.
Zakon znižuje upokojitveno starost, hkrati pa sodnikom omogoča, da jim minister za pravosodje mandat podaljša za največ deset let za sodnice in pet let za sodnike.
This situation raises concerns from the point of view of the independence of the judiciary.
Poleg tega ni določen časovni okvir, v katerem mora minister za pravosodje odločiti o podaljšanju mandata, kar ministru za pravosodje omogoča, da ohrani vpliv na zadevne sodnike v preostanku njihovega sodniškega mandata.
For example, a district court judge who has to deliver a judgment in a politically sensitive case, while the judge is at the same time applying for a promotion to become a regional court judge, may be inclined to follow the position favoured by the political majority in order not to put his/her chances to obtain the promotion into jeopardy.
Tudi pred doseženo upokojitveno starostjo bi lahko že samo predvidevanje, da bodo morali ministra za pravosodje zaprositi za tako podaljšanje, ustvarilo pritisk na zadevne sodnike.33.
Even if this risk does not materialise, the new regime does not provide for sufficient guarantees to secure the appearance of independence which is crucial to maintain the confidence which tribunals in a democratic society must inspire in the public [24].30.
Nova pravila z znižanjem upokojitvene starosti sodnikov in hkratnim pogojevanjem podaljšanja sodniškega mandata z odločitvijo ministra za pravosodje ogrožajo načelo nezamenljivosti sodnikov, ki je ključni element neodvisnosti sodnikov v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča in Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice.
The Commission notes that in their opinions concerning the bill, the Supreme Court and the National Council for the Judiciary raised a number of concerns as regards the constitutionality of the new regime.
Sodišče je med zahtevami za neodvisno sodišče navedlo, da morajo biti sodniki osebno in operativno neodvisni pri opravljanju svojih dolžnosti ter da morajo biti zaščiteni pred razrešitvijo z učinkovitimi varovali proti neustreznim posegom ali pritiskom izvršilne oblasti [27].
In particular, it was noted that the new rules would render the National Council for the Judiciary dependent on the political decisions of the parliamentary majority.
Zadevne določbe prav tako niso v skladu z evropskimi standardi, v skladu s katerimi morajo sodniki imeti zagotovljeno pravico do službenega položaja do obvezne upokojitvene starosti, če taka upokojitvena starost obstaja.34.
The opinions also underlined that the National Judicial Council is a unitary body that cannot be subdivided in two organs unknown to the Constitution and the bill would change the constitutional order by providing the Sejm with a dominating position over the judiciary.
Komisija ugotavlja, da nova pravila vzbujajo pomisleke tudi glede ustavnosti.
Furthermore, the premature termination of the mandate of the judges-members of the Council, and of the functioning of a constitutional organ, would violate the principle of a democratic state governed by the rule of law and the principle of legality.
Po mnenju vrhovnega sodišča [28] je s tem, ko je ministru za pravosodje omogočeno, da odloča o podaljšanju mandata sodnika, in ob hkratnem znižanju upokojitvene starosti sodnikov kršeno načelo nezamenljivosti sodnikov (člen 180(1) ustave).
As explained above, the Commission recalls that an effective constitutional review of these provisions is currently not possible.
Razrešitev, prisilna upokojitev in ponovno imenovanje vrhovnih sodnikov
The retirement age and the power to prolong the mandate of judges
V skladu s členom 87 novega zakona o vrhovnem sodišču bi bili na dan po začetku veljavnosti zakona vsi sodniki na vrhovnem sodišču razrešeni in upokojeni [29].
Articles 1(26)b-c and 13(1) of the law amending the law on Ordinary Courts Organisation stipulate that the retirement regime applicable to ordinary judges will be reduced from 67 to 60 for female judges and from 67 to 65 for male judges and the Minister of Justice will be granted the power to decide on the prolongation of judicial mandates (until the age of 70) on the basis of vague criteria.
V skladu s členom 88 istega zakona bi samo sodniki, ki jih navede minister za pravosodje, na začetku ostali dejavni za začasno obdobje, dokler predsednik republike ne oblikuje končnega izbora sodnikov, ki bodo lahko ostali na položaju po posebnem postopku preverjanja.
Pending this decision the judges concerned remain in office.
Ta postopek bi pomenil, da predsednik republike sodnike, ki bodo ostali na položaju, izbere med tistimi vrhovnimi sodniki, ki jih bo predhodno izbral minister za pravosodje in ocenil nacionalni sodni svet.
The new retirement regime would adversely impacts on the independence of judges [25].
Zakon vsebuje ohlapna in nejasna merila, v skladu s katerimi naj bi bili izbrani sodniki, ki bodo ostali na položaju.
The new rules create an additional tool through which the Minister of Justice can exert influence on individual judges.
Kakršni koli sklepi nacionalnega sodnega sveta glede tega za predsednika republike ne bi bili zavezujoči [30].
In particular, the vague criteria for prolongation of the mandates allow for undue discretion, undermining the principle of irremovability of judges [26].
Če je sodnik na položaju prvega predsednika vrhovnega sodišča razrešen ali upokojen, predsednik republike v skladu s členom 91 zakona o vrhovnem sodišču izbere začasnega prvega predsednika vrhovnega sodišča.
While decreasing the retirement age, the law allows judges to have their mandate extended by the Minister of Justice for up to 10 years for female judges and 5 years for male judges.
Z razrešitvijo in prisilno upokojitvijo vseh vrhovnih sodnikov, ob upoštevanju pravil, ki omogočajo njihovo morebitno ponovno imenovanje, bi bila kršena sodna neodvisnost vrhovnih sodnikov.
By decreasing the retirement age of judges while making prolongation of the judicial mandate conditional upon the decision of the Minister of Justice, the new rules undermine the principle of irremovability of judges which is a key element of the independence of judges according to the case law of the Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights.
Nezamenljivost sodnikov s strani izvršilne oblasti v času njihovega mandata je posledica njihove neodvisnosti in je zato vključena v zagotovila iz člena 6(1) EKČP [33].
Among the requirements of an independent court, the Court of Justice stated that judges should enjoy personal and operational independence in the exercise of their duties and should also be protected against dismissal through the existence of effective safeguards against undue intervention or pressure from the executive [27].
Zato se lahko sodniki razrešijo samo individualno, če je to upravičeno na podlagi disciplinskega postopka v zvezi z njihovo individualno dejavnostjo in so zagotovljena vsa zagotovila za obrambo v demokratični družbi.
The provisions concerned are also not in line with the European standards according to which judges should have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age, where such retirement age exists.34.
Sodnikov ni mogoče razrešiti kot skupine; sodnikov ni mogoče razrešiti iz splošnih razlogov, ki niso povezani z ravnanjem posameznika.38.
The Commission notes that the new rules also raise constitutionality concerns.
Ta zagotovila in varovala v obravnavanem primeru manjkajo in zadevne določbe bi pomenile grobo kršitev neodvisnosti vrhovnih sodnikov in načela delitve oblasti [34] ter s tem pravne države.
According to the opinion of the Supreme Court [28], allowing the Minister of Justice to decide on the prolongation of a judge's mandate, in combination with lowering the retirement age of judges, violates the principle of irremovability of judges (Article 180(1) of the Constitution).
Disciplinski postopki
As explained above, the Commission recalls that an effective constitutional review of these provisions is currently not possible.3.5.
Zakon o vrhovnem sodišču bi določal nov disciplinski senat in nova pravila za disciplinske postopke zoper vrhovne sodnike [35].
The Supreme Court
Ta nova pravila o disciplinskem postopku bi škodljivo vplivala na neodvisnost sodstva.
Dismissal, forced retirement and re-appointment of Supreme Court judges
Zlasti bi vpletenost ministra za pravosodje v disciplinske postopke zoper vrhovne sodnike ogrozila njihovo neodvisnost: s tem, ko bi imel minister za pravosodje pooblastilo za sprožitev disciplinskih postopkov zoper vrhovne sodnike in bi lahko vplival tudi na vodenje preiskav, bi dobil dodatno orodje, s katerim bi lahko znatno pritiskal na sodnike.
According to Article 87 of the new law on the Supreme Court, on the day following the entry into force of the law, all judges of the Supreme Court would be dismissed and retired [29].
Predvsem bi lahko minister za pravosodje v skladu s členom 56(5) zakona o vrhovnem sodišču ugovarjal odločitvi vodje disciplinskega postopka na vrhovnem sodišču, ki vodi preiskavo, da konča preiskavo zaradi neutemeljenosti; v takem primeru bi moral vodja disciplinskega postopka nadaljevati disciplinski postopek in slediti navodilom ministra za pravosodje.
According to Article 88 of the same law, only the judges indicated by the Minister of Justice would remain initially active for an interim period until the President of the Republic has made a final selection of the judges who will be allowed to stay in office following a special verification procedure.
Poleg tega bi lahko minister za pravosodje za vsak primer posebej sam imenoval vodjo disciplinskega postopka [36].
This procedure would require the President of the Republic to choose judges who will remain in office from those Supreme Court judges that are pre-selected by the Minister of Justice and assessed by the National Council for the Judiciary.
Z imenovanjem vodje disciplinskega postopka s strani ministra za pravosodje bi bil iz dane zadeve izključen kateri koli drug vodja disciplinskega postopka.
The law includes vague and undetermined criteria according to which the choice of judges that will remain in office should be made.
Kadar koli minister za pravosodje imenuje vodjo disciplinskega postopka, je treba opraviti predhodno preiskavo.
Any resolutions of the National Council for the Judiciary in this respect would not be binding on the President of the Republic [30].
V skladu s členom 57(2) bi bil vodja disciplinskega postopka, ki ga imenuje minister, obvezan slediti navodilom ministra za pravosodje v nekaterih primerih.
According to Article 91 of the law on the Supreme Court, if the judge holding the office of the First President of the Supreme Court is dismissed and retired, the President of the Republic chooses an interim First President of the Supreme Court.
Že sama grožnja, da bi bili disciplinski postopki sproženi v skladu z navodili ministra za pravosodje, bi neposredno vplivala na neodvisnost vrhovnih sodnikov.
The dismissal and forced retirement of all judges of the Supreme Court, considered in connection with the rules allowing for their possible reappointment, would violate the judicial independence of Supreme Court judges.
Sodišče je razsodilo, da mora sodišče, če želi biti neodvisno, svoje funkcije opravljati povsem avtonomno, ne da bi bilo podrejeno kateremu koli drugemu organu, in biti tako zaščiteno pred zunanjimi posegi ali pritiski, ki lahko ogrozijo neodvisno presojo sodnikov v postopkih, v katerih odločajo [37].
Judges should be protected against dismissal through the existence of effective safeguards against undue intervention or pressure from other state powers [31].
V obravnavanem primeru ti pogoji niso izpolnjeni.
According to the case law on the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights and European standards, judicial independence requires guarantees sufficient to protect the person of those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute [32].
Komisija opozarja, da bi zakon o vrhovnem sodišču, ki je nov samostojen zakon z več kot 110 členi in ki spreminja šest obstoječih zakonov, resno vplival na neodvisnost vrhovnega sodišča ter splošneje na delitev oblasti in pravno državo na Poljskem.
The irremovability of judges by the executive during their term of office is a consequence of their independence and thus included in the guarantees of Article 6(1) ECHR [33].
Obžaluje, da ta pomemben zakon ni bil predmet ustrezne priprave in posvetovanj, ki bi si jih zaslužil.
As a consequence, judges must only be dismissed individually, if this is justified on the basis of a disciplinary procedure concerning their individual activity and presenting all guarantees for the defence in a democratic society.
Druge določbe
Judges cannot be dismissed as a group; judges cannot be dismissed for general reasons not related to individual behaviour.38.
Štirje zakoni vsebujejo več drugih občutljivih določb, kar zadeva pravno državo in delitev oblasti, zlasti glede predčasnega prenehanja mandatov vodij disciplinskih postopkov na sodiščih [38], pooblastil ministra za pravosodje, da ocenjuje uspešnost sodišč [39], premeščanja sodnikov [40], strukture nacionalne šole za sodnike [41], prijave premoženja sodnikov [42] ter osebja nacionalnega sodnega sveta in vrhovnega sodišča [43].
These guarantees and safeguards are lacking in the present case and the provisions concerned would constitute a flagrant violation of the independence of judges of the Supreme Court and of the separation of powers [34], and therefore of the rule of law.
Ta vprašanja so bila v več analizah, zlasti s strani vrhovnega sodišča in nacionalnega sodnega sveta, opredeljena kot vprašanja, ki vzbujajo pomisleke, vključno z vprašanji skladnosti z ustavo [44].
Disciplinary proceedings
Vendar kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj, neodvisna in zakonita ustavna presoja trenutno ni mogoča.4.
The law on the Supreme Court would establishes a new disciplinary chamber and new rules for disciplinary proceedings against Supreme Court judges [35].
UGOTOVITEV SISTEMSKE NEVARNOSTI ZA NAČELO PRAVNE DRŽAVE
These new rules on disciplinary proceedings would adversely affect judicial independence.
Iz zgoraj navedenih razlogov Komisija meni, da se je sistemska nevarnost za načelo pravne države na Poljskem, predstavljena v priporočilih Komisije z dne 27. julija 2016 in 21. decembra 2016, resno povečala.
In particular, the involvement of the Minister of Justice in disciplinary proceedings against judges of the Supreme Court would constitute a threat to their independence: the fact that the Minister of Justice would have the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Supreme Court judges and also to influence the conduct of the investigations, would provide the Minister of Justice with an additional tool to put considerable pressure on judges.
Zlasti:
Notably, according to Article 56(5) of the law on the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice could object to the decision of the disciplinary officer of the Supreme Court who conducts an investigation to terminate this investigation due to a lack of grounds; in such a case the disciplinary officer of the Supreme Court would have to continue conducting the disciplinary proceedings and would be bound by the instructions from the Minister of Justice.
Nezakonito imenovanje predsednice ustavnega sodišča, omogočanje, da trije sodniki, ki jih je 8. sestava Sejma imenovala brez veljavne pravne podlage, nastopijo funkcijo, dejstvo, da je bil eden od teh treh sodnikov imenovan za podpredsednika ustavnega sodišča, dejstvo, da trije sodniki, ki jih je oktobra 2015 zakonito imenovala prejšnja sestava zakonodajalca, niso mogli nastopiti funkcije ustavnega sodnika, in poznejši dogodki znotraj ustavnega sodišča, opisani zgoraj, so de facto privedli do popolnega preoblikovanja sestave ustavnega sodišča zunaj običajnega ustavnega postopka za imenovanje sodnikov.
Whenever the Minister of Justice has appointed a disciplinary officer, a preliminary investigation must be conducted.
Zakon o nacionalni šoli za sodnike, ki že velja, ter zakon o nacionalnem sodnem svetu, zakon o organizaciji splošnih sodišč in zakon o vrhovnem sodišču, če bi začeli veljati, strukturno ogrožajo neodvisnost sodstva na Poljskem ter bi takoj in konkretno vplivali na neodvisno delovanje sodstva kot celote.
According to Article 57(2), the disciplinary officer appointed by the Minister would be bound by the instructions provided by the Minister of Justice in certain cases.
Ker je neodvisnost sodstva ključna sestavina pravne države, ti novi zakoni znatno povečujejo sistemsko nevarnost za pravno državo, kakor je opredeljena v prejšnjih priporočilih.
The Court of Justice has held that for a court to be independent it should exercise its functions wholly autonomously, without being subordinated to any other body and be thus protected against external interventions or pressure liable to jeopardise the independent judgment of its members as regards proceedings before them [37].
Novi zakoni vzbujajo resne pomisleke glede njihove združljivosti s poljsko ustavo, kakor je poudarjeno v več izjavah, zlasti s strani vrhovnega sodišča, nacionalnega sodnega sveta, poljskega varuha človekovih pravic, odvetniške zbornice ter združenj sodnikov in pravnikov ter drugih deležnikov [45].
These conditions are not fulfilled in the present case.
Vendar, kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj, učinkovita ustavna presoja teh zakonov ni več mogoča.
As a consequence, Supreme Court judges may feel pressure to follow the position of the executive power when adjudicating cases.3.5.3.
Ukrepi in javne izjave proti sodnikom in sodiščem na Poljskem s strani poljske vlade in poslancev iz vrst vladajoče večine so zmanjšali zaupanje v sodni sistem kot celoto.
Legislative process
Komisija opozarja na načelo lojalnega sodelovanja med državnimi organi, kar je, kot je poudarjeno v mnenjih Beneške komisije, ustavni osnovni pogoj v demokratični pravni državi.
The Commission notes that the law on the Supreme Court, which is a self-standing new act of more than 110 Articles and which amends six existing laws, would have a serious impact on the independence of the Supreme Court and more generally on the separation of powers and the rule of law in Poland.
Komisija opominja, da je v državah, kjer je vzpostavljen sistem ustavnega sodstva, njegova učinkovitost ključni element pravne države.
The Commission regrets that this important law has not been subject to the appropriate preparation and consultations that it should have deserved.
Poudarja tudi, da mora biti ne glede na izbrani model sodnega sistema neodvisnost sodstva varovana kot vidik prava EU.
On the contrary, the draft was tabled on 12 July 2017 and was adopted on 22 July 2017.
Države članice so tiste, ki organizirajo svoje sodne sisteme, vključno s tem, ali ustanovijo sodni svet ali ne, vloga le-tega pa je varovati neodvisnost sodstva.
The Commission considers that such a fast-track legislative process of the two chambers undermines in itself the trust in the judiciary in Poland and is not in line with the spirit of loyal cooperation between state institutions which should characterise a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
Kadar pa država članica tak svet ustanovi, kot je to na Poljskem, kjer poljska ustava izrecno daje nacionalnemu sodnemu svetu nalogo, da varuje neodvisnost sodstva, mora biti neodvisnost takega sodnega sveta zagotovljena v skladu z evropskimi standardi.
Other provisions
Ne glede na to, da v Evropi obstajajo najrazličnejši sodni sistemi, so bili vzpostavljeni skupni evropski standardi glede varstva neodvisnosti sodstva.
The four laws contain a number of other sensitive provisions from the point of view of the rule of law and the separation of powers, in particular regarding the premature termination of mandates of disciplinary officers in courts [38], the powers of the Minister of Justice to assess the performance of courts [39], the transfer of judges [40], the structure of the National School for Judiciary [41], the declaration of assets of judges [42], and the staff of the National Council for the Judiciary and of the Supreme Court [43].
Komisija z veliko zaskrbljenostjo ugotavlja, da po začetku veljavnosti zgoraj navedenih novih zakonov poljski sodni sistem ne bi bil več združljiv z evropskimi standardi v zvezi s tem.