natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In particular, two types of demand-side response can participate in the mechanism: implicit demand-side response, which consists of suppliers reducing their capacity obligation by effectively switching off certain customers during peak hours on 10 to 15 days per year, thereby releasing capacity; and explicit demand-side response, which requires (larger) consumers or aggregators to get their demand reduction potential certified, and keep that capacity available (but not necessarily curtailed) during peak hours on 10-25 days per year.
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka ugotovila tveganje, da bi lahko navedeni mehanizem povzročil plačevanje prekomernega nadomestila nekaterim operaterjem zmogljivosti, zlasti zaradi naslednjih elementov:
In addition, in the Opening Decision the Commission criticised the fact that the mechanism was not open to all technologies that could contribute to security of supply, including interconnectors and/or foreign capacities.
tveganja precenitve porabe dobaviteljev – to je potencialno tveganje, če posamezne obveznosti dobaviteljev glede zmogljivosti niso dovolj jasne;
The Commission had also highlighted the risk of new generation capacity being excluded from participation in the mechanism, mainly because of the absence of reliable price signals for capacity guarantees.
morebitne nepreglednosti v zvezi z določanjem cen zmogljivosti, zlasti zaradi morebitnega velikega obsega transakcij, izvedenih na prostem trgu, ter transakcij znotraj skupine, kar bi lahko izkrivilo cenovni signal in povzročilo plačevanje prekomernega nadomestila;
More specifically, the Commission was concerned that:
omejene vključenosti v mehanizem (izključenost čezmejnih zmogljivosti in diskriminacija med različnimi operaterji zmogljivosti za izravnavo);
the relatively short validity period of capacity guarantees could not give a reliable price signal;
tržne moči družbe EDF – možnosti, da kot prodajalec umetno poveča vrednost potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih, pri čemer za svoj tržni oddelek obračuna nižje cene.
suppliers, and especially new entrants, could have difficulty forecasting the development of their client portfolios far in advance;
Komisija je v zvezi z navedenim natančneje opredelila tri vrste tveganja: tveganje kopičenja zmogljivosti, tveganje kopičenja potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih in tveganje „cenovnih škarij“.
the incentives for operators to be in balance before the delivery year were not sufficient; and
Preprečevanje negativnih učinkov na konkurenco in trgovino
the ceiling on the price of imbalance settlements did not reflect the cost of new entry (CONE).
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka poudarila nekatere težave v zvezi z morebitnim izkrivljanjem konkurence pri proizvodnji in dobavi električne energije.
Proportionality
Komisija je izrazila svoje pomisleke glede obstoja velike asimetrije informacij.
In the Opening Decision the Commission had identified a risk that the mechanism could lead to overcompensation of some capacity operators, primarily for the following reasons:
Veliki vertikalno povezani dobavitelji, zlasti tisti, ki so že navzoči na francoskem trgu, imajo lahko prednost, ker bolje poznajo trg, zlasti kar zadeva razpoložljivost zmogljivosti, potrebe po oskrbi in cene.
the risk of suppliers overestimating demand — this is a potential risk if the suppliers' individual capacity obligations are not sufficiently clear;
Zato lahko pripravijo zanesljivejše napovedi in so učinkovitejši pri izpolnjevanju obveznosti, naloženih v okviru mehanizma.
the potential lack of transparency regarding capacity pricing, in particular owing to a potentially high volume of OTC trades and intra-group transactions, which could distort the price signal and lead to overcompensation;
Novi udeleženci bodo poleg tega zaradi asimetrije informacij verjetno težje ocenili svoj prihodnji portfelj odjemalcev, ta ocena pa je bistvena za izračun potrebe po potrdilih o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih.
the limited participation in the mechanism (exclusion of cross-border capacity and discrimination between different demand-side response operators);
Komisija je izrazila tudi bojazen glede možnosti prvotnega prevladujočega operaterja, da bi kopičil zmogljivosti.
EDF's market power — the possibility of EDF artificially increasing the value of capacity guarantees as a seller, whilst applying lower prices to its retail branch.
Komisija je poleg tega poudarila tveganje, da bi prvotni prevladujoči operater imel možnost kopičiti potrdila o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih.
Underlying this, the Commission identified three more specific risks: the risk of capacity withholding, the risk of capacity guarantee withholding, and the risk of a price squeeze.
Komisija je še opozorila na tveganje izključevanja s cenami (omejitev marž ali cenovne škarje, plenilske cene), ki bi ga lahko izvajal prvotni prevladujoči operater.
Avoidance of negative effects on competition and trade
Komisija je poudarila, da lahko neobstoj dolgoročnih cenovnih signalov v zvezi z zmogljivostjo ustvari ali okrepi ovire za dostop novim proizvajalcem.
In the Opening Decision, the Commission identified a number of problems regarding potential distortions of competition at both generation and supply level.
Za dolgoročne naložbe, ki jih izvajajo novi udeleženci, je lahko potrebna določena raven predvidljivosti cen v posameznem številu let, česar ni mogoče zagotoviti z navedenimi potrdili, certificiranimi za eno leto.
The Commission expressed concerns regarding the existence of significant information asymmetries.
Komisija je poleg tega ponovila svoje stališče v zvezi z zmanjšano konkurenco v okviru mehanizma, ker naj bi bile iz njega izključene nekatere vrste operaterjev zmogljivosti (čezmejne zmogljivosti, diskriminacija med operaterji zmogljivosti za izravnavo).
Large vertically integrated suppliers, especially those already present on the French market, are likely to have an advantage because of their more comprehensive knowledge of the market, especially in terms of capacity availability, supply needs and prices.
PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANI IN STALIŠČA FRANCIJE
They are consequently able to produce more reliable forecasts and be more efficient in fulfilling the obligations imposed by the mechanism.
Komisija je v obdobju posvetovanja o sklepu o začetku postopka od zainteresiranih strani, ki niso francoska država, RTE in CRE, prejela 18 odgovorov.
Another effect of information asymmetries is that it is likely to be more difficult for new entrants to estimate their future portfolio of clients, which is a key aspect of calculating the need for capacity guarantees.
Ena od strank je odgovorila šele po predpisanem roku.
The Commission also expressed concerns regarding the possibility of a dominant incumbent operator being able to withhold capacity.
Različne pripombe bodo združene po spodaj navedenih temah.
The Commission also raised the risk of a dominant incumbent operator being able to withhold capacity guarantees.
Obravnavane bodo pri oceni ukrepa, vendar ne bodo izrecno navedene.
Furthermore, the Commission referred to a risk of price-based exclusionary practices (margin/price squeeze, predatory prices) by the dominant incumbent operator.
Predložitelji odgovorov so se razhajali glede opredelitve mehanizma kot pomoči.
The Commission stressed that the lack of long-term price signals for capacity might create or reinforce barriers to entry for new producers.
Polovica meni, da je navedeni ukrep državna pomoč, nekateri eksplicitno, nekateri pa implicitno, saj niso odgovorili na sklepanje Komisije v zvezi s tem; druga polovica pa meni, da navedeni mehanizem ne pomeni državne pomoči, in sicer iz naslednjih razlogov.
Long-term investments by new entrants may require some degree of price predictability over a certain number of years, which one-year certificates are unlikely to provide.
Dva predložitelja odgovorov se izrecno sklicujeta na odločbo francoskega sodišča Conseil d'État št. 369417 z dne 9. oktobra 2015 (tožba, ki jo je vložilo Association Nationale des Opérateurs Détaillants en Énergie ali A.N.O.D.E [14].), v kateri je Conseil d'État menilo, da predlagani mehanizem zmogljivosti nima značilnosti državne pomoči.
The Commission also reiterated its position regarding reduced competition in the mechanism owing to the exclusion of certain types of capacity operators (cross-border capacities, discrimination between demand-side response capacity operators).
Tudi francoski organi so se sklicevali na ugotovitve Conseil d'État v tej isti zadevi [15].
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED PARTIES AND OBSERVATIONS BY FRANCE
Trditve francoskih organov glede opredelitve navedenega ukrepa kot državne pomoči je treba brati skupaj s tistimi, ki so bile že navedene v sklepu o začetku postopka.
The Commission received 18 responses from interested parties other than France, RTE and the CRE during the consultation period on the Opening Decision.
Francoski organi so se odločili, da se bodo vključili v postopek poglobljene preiskave z Evropsko komisijo, pri čemer teh elementov niso več omenjali in so se osredotočili na predlog ukrepov, s katerimi bi bilo mogoče zagotoviti združljivost mehanizma zmogljivosti z notranjim trgom, ne glede na vprašanje o opredelitvi zadevnega ukrepa kot državne pomoči.
One party replied after the deadline.
Zaradi celovitosti so trditve Francije o opredelitvi kot državne pomoči vseeno povzete spodaj.
The various comments are grouped by topic below.
Pripombe zainteresiranih strani
They are addressed as part of the assessment of the measure, but not referred to explicitly.
Dva povezovalca zmogljivosti za izravnavo, dve vertikalno povezani podjetji za električno energijo in združenje Union française de l'électricité (francosko združenje za električno energijo) menijo, da se navedeni ukrep ne financira z državnimi sredstvi.
The respondents were divided concerning the classification of the mechanism as aid.
Natančneje, navedeni predložitelji odgovorov menijo, da zadevna sredstva prehajajo neposredno in izključno med zasebnimi operaterji; RTE nima sklada za izravnavo odstopanj niti ne razpolaga z njim.
Half of the respondents considered that the measure constituted State aid, either explicitly, or implicitly by not reacting to the Commission's arguments on this point; and half considered that the mechanism did not constitute State aid, for the reasons set out below.
Navedeni predložitelji odgovorov poleg tega dodajajo, da je mogoče pravila, ki se uporabljajo za upravljanje teh sredstev, primerjati s pravili, v katerih je opredeljeno upravljanje „odstopanj-prilagoditev“ v okviru mehanizma vodje za uravnavanje na energetskem trgu.
Two respondents explicitly referred to Decision No 369417 of 9 October 2015 by the French Council of State (action brought by the National Association of Energy Retailers — ANODE [14]), in which the Council of State considered that the proposed capacity mechanism did not have the characteristics of State aid.
Družba EDF dodaja, da je vloga francoske države v zvezi z navedenim mehanizmom le ta, da opredeli poseben regulativni okvir, v katerem so dejavni samo zasebni operaterji.
The French authorities also referred to the conclusions of the Council of State in this case [15].
Po navedbah družbe EDF francoska država z vzpostavitvijo mehanizma zmogljivosti dejansko izvaja svoje pristojnosti javne oblasti in deluje kot regulator trga.
The French authorities' arguments regarding classification of the measure as State aid should be read in conjunction with those already set out in the Opening Decision.
Navedena družba poleg tega meni, da se mehanizem zmogljivosti tudi jasno razlikuje od sistema, obravnavanega v zadevi Komisija proti Nizozemski (v nadaljnjem besedilu: NOx) [16], v kateri je nizozemska država podelila dejanske „pravice do onesnaževanja“, s katerimi se je mogoče izogniti plačilu glob in ki imajo od trenutka, ko jih podeli država, tržno vrednost.
The French authorities chose not to return to these aspects during the in-depth investigation with the Commission, and focused on the proposal for measures to ensure that the capacity mechanism was compatible with the internal market, irrespective of the question of classification as State aid.
Certifikati torej v razmerju med francosko državo in operaterji zmogljivosti nimajo nobene vrednosti.
For the sake of completeness, France's arguments concerning classification as State aid are nevertheless included below.
Stališča Francije
Comments by interested parties
Po navedbah francoskih organov cene potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih in torej prihodkov, ki bi jih lahko imeli operaterji zmogljivosti od prodaje svojih certifikatov, ne določi država.
Two demand-side response aggregators, two vertically integrated electricity companies, and the French Electricity Union considered that the measure is not financed using State resources.
Država ne posega niti v količino proizvodov, ponujenih na trgu.
More specifically, these respondents considered that the funds in question are channelled directly and exclusively between private operators; RTE neither holds nor uses imbalance settlement funds.
Nasprotno, v decentraliziranem sistemu ceno in število certifikatov določa trg.
Furthermore, according to these respondents, the rules applicable to the management of these resources can be compared to those governing management of ‘imbalance adjustment’ under the balance manager system in the energy market.
Finančni tokovi, ki se nanašajo na mehanizem zmogljivosti, torej potekajo med udeleženci zasebnega prava in jih nikakor ne nadzira država.
EDF added that the role of the French State in relation to the mechanism is restricted to setting out a specific regulatory framework in which only private operators are active.
Kar pa zadeva finančne tokove, povezane s plačilom za izravnavo odstopanj, francoski organi menijo, da bi morali biti ti v okviru sistema povsem postranski (glede na spodbude za vzpostavitev ponovnega ravnotežja na nabavnem trgu) in da se ne bi smeli obravnavati kot državna sredstva ali sredstva pod nadzorom države.
According to EDF, by establishing a capacity mechanism, the French State is in effect exercising its prerogatives as a public authority and acting as a market regulator.
Izravnava odstopanj, določena za mehanizem zmogljivosti, se izvede po modelu, ki je enak trenutno veljavnemu modelu v Evropi za izravnavo odstopanj na energetskem trgu („electricity balancing settlement mechanisms“).
EDF considered that the capacity mechanism is sufficiently distinct from the system at issue in Commission v Netherlands (the NOx case) [16], in which the Dutch State granted real ‘pollution rights’ that made it possible to avoid paying fines and had a market value from the moment they were granted by the State.
Francoski organi poleg tega navajajo, da je navedeni mehanizem bolj podoben tistemu, ki je bil obravnavan v zadevi PreussenElektra [17], kot mehanizmoma, obravnavanima v zadevah Vent de Colère [18] in Essent [19].
Certificates consequently have no value in the relationship between the French State and capacity operators.
Tako kot v zadevi PreussenElektra in v nasprotju s tem, kar je bilo določeno v zadevi Vent de Colère, mehanizem zmogljivosti ne vključuje mehanizma nadomestila dobaviteljem.
Observations by France
In v nasprotju z zadevo Essent (i) finančni tokovi vedno ostajajo v lasti zasebnih udeležencev (dobaviteljev in operaterjev zmogljivosti) in (ii) finančni tokovi ne izvirajo iz dajatve.
According to the French authorities, the price of capacity guarantees, and therefore the revenue that capacity operators could gain from selling their certificates, is not set by the State.
Obstoj državnih sredstev je toliko bolj vprašljiv, ker v nasprotju s sodno prakso PreussenElektra za potrdila o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih ni določena najnižja nakupna cena.
The State does not intervene concerning the quantity of products offered on the market either.
Poleg tega, kakor zatrjujejo navedeni organi, prenosa potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih ni mogoče obravnavati kot odpoved javnim sredstvom.
In a decentralised mechanism, it is the market that determines the price and quantity of certificates.
Država se namreč ne odpoveduje nobenim sredstvom, saj lahko tržna vrednost potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih izvira (i) iz notranje vrednosti osnovnega instrumenta, ki ga vključujejo, (ii) ali pa iz primanjkljaja ob njihovi izdaji.
Financial flows relating to the capacity mechanism take place between stakeholders governed by private law, and not at all under State control.
Navedena elementa sta zunaj pristojnosti države in zaradi njiju se navedeni primer razlikuje od zadev NOx in romunski zeleni certifikati, v katerih je bilo mogoče certifikate prodati na dražbi ali pa so ti certifikati imeli najnižjo vrednost.
In addition, the French authorities consider that the financial flows relating to the payment of imbalance settlements should make up a very small part of the mechanism (taking into account the incentives to rebalance on the market in advance) and cannot be considered to be State resources or under State control.
Nazadnje, v navedenem romunskem primeru so dobavitelji v skladu z zakonom izrecno zavezani, da stroške nakupa zelenih certifikatov prenesejo na porabnike.
The imbalance settlement laid down for the capacity mechanism follows a template identical to the model currently in force in Europe for the settlement of imbalances on the energy market (‘electricity balancing settlement mechanisms’).
Sodišče Evropske unije (Sodišče) je sklepalo podobno v zadevi Vent de Colère, pri čemer so bili dobavitelji le finančni posredniki (prispevek javni službi za električno energijo [20] pa je zagotavljal nadomestilo njihovih dodatnih stroškov).
The French authorities further argue that the mechanism is more similar to that dealt with in the PreussenElektra [17] case than to those discussed in the Vent de Colère [18] and Essent [19] cases.
Nasprotno pa lahko dobavitelji v francoskem mehanizmu povsem svobodno izberejo način, kako bodo prenesli stroške na svoje porabnike.
As in PreussenElektra, and contrary to Vent de Colère, the capacity mechanism does not provide for any compensation mechanism for suppliers.
Dobaviteljem noben mehanizem ne zagotavlja nadomestila dodatnih stroškov, povezanih z nakupom potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih.
Unlike in Essent, (i) the financial flows remain the property of private stakeholders at all times (suppliers and capacity operators), and (ii) the financial flows are not the result of a tax.
Ena od družb, ki je dejavna predvsem v Franciji in se ukvarja z veleprodajo, skupaj z družbo EDF meni, da je navedeni mehanizem obveznost javne službe, pri čemer se sklicuje na sklep Komisije v zadevi N475/2003, ki se je nanašala na javni razpis za novo zmogljivost na Irskem [21].
The presence of State resources is all the more debatable since, unlike in the PreussenElektra case-law, no minimum purchase price is set for capacity guarantees.
Družba EDF navaja, da je postopek certifikacije – če ustreza obveznosti razpoložljivosti – nadomestilo za storitev, ki jo zagotavljajo operaterji zmogljivosti, in ne domnevna brezplačno zagotovljena prednost.
Furthermore, according to the French authorities, the sale of capacity guarantees should not be considered to be a waiver of public resources; the State does not forego any resources, since the market value of certificates can come (i) from the intrinsic underlying value that they cover, or (ii) from their scarcity when they are issued.
Družba EDF in drugo vertikalno povezano podjetje za električno energijo menita, da mehanizem zmogljivosti operaterjem zmogljivosti ne zagotavlja selektivne prednosti.
These two factors are outside the power of the State and distinguish this case from the NOx and Romanian green certificates cases, in which the certificates could be sold at auction or had a minimum value (respectively).
Po njunem mnenju so različni udeleženci v okviru mehanizma v enakem dejanskem in pravnem položaju ter se obravnavajo povsem enako: plačujejo se jim čisto enaki zneski ne glede na uporabljeno tehnologijo.
Finally, in the Romanian case, the law explicitly obliged suppliers to pass on the costs of obtaining green certificates to consumers.
Noben operater torej ne bo mogel imeti prednosti zaradi posebnosti svojega proizvodnega parka.
The reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Vent de Colère was similar, where suppliers acted only as financial intermediaries (the contribution to the public electricity service [20] made it possible to compensate for their additional costs).
Po navedbah družbe EDF je zmotno trditi, da bi bila tako imenovana prednost selektivna, češ da navedeni mehanizem zmogljivosti „vključuje pomoč operaterjem zmogljivosti, ne pa drugim gospodarskim sektorjem“.
On the other hand, in the case of the French mechanism, suppliers are completely free to choose the way in which they pass on costs to their customers.
Komisija zato ne upošteva značilnosti mehanizma zmogljivosti („obsegajoč celoten trg“ in „tehnološko nevtralen“) niti sodne prakse Sodišča, v skladu s katero se selektivnost ukrepa oceni glede na druga podjetja v primerljivem dejanskem in pravnem položaju.
There is no mechanism to compensate suppliers for the additional costs relating to the purchase of capacity guarantees.
Prvič, po navedbah francoskih organov je dodelitev certifikatov v okviru mehanizma zmogljivosti vsekakor nadomestilo za obveznost razpoložljivosti v urah velike porabe ali obremenitve elektroenergetskega sistema.
Together with EDF, a company principally active in France in the wholesale market considers that the mechanism constitutes a public service obligation and refers to the Commission Decision in Case N475/2003 on an invitation to tender for new capacity in Ireland [21].
Drugič, francoski organi menijo, da je obveznost javne službe dobro opredeljena.
According to EDF, since the certification procedure corresponds to an availability commitment, it constitutes consideration for a service provided by the capacity operators, not an alleged advantage granted free of charge.
Kar zadeva izravnave, neobveznost njihove certifikacije olajša njihovo vključenost v mehanizem zmogljivosti.
Furthermore, EDF and another vertically integrated electricity company consider that the capacity mechanism does not confer a selective advantage on capacity operators.
Kar zadeva proizvodne obrate, poročevalski vidik postopka certifikacije ne izpodbije tega, da je obveznost javne službe jasno opredeljena: CRE bo lahko v primeru poskusa tržne manipulacije naložila potrebne kazni, zlasti če bi kateri od udeležencev precenil svoje zmogljivosti, da bi izvajal pritisk za zvišanje cen potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih.
In their opinion, the various participants in the mechanism are in the same factual and legal situation and are treated entirely equally: they are remunerated in the same way, whatever the technology used.
Ker je mehanizem zmogljivosti tehnološko nevtralen, francoski organi menijo, da ne zagotavlja nobene posebne selektivne prednosti za proizvodno tehnologijo ali tehnologijo za izravnavo.
In this way no operator can draw an advantage from the specific nature of its generation facilities.
Po navedbah Francije bi stališče Komisije, po mnenju katere je, kot kaže, mehanizem zmogljivosti selektiven, ker naj bi bil namenjen samo operaterjem zmogljivosti (ne pa drugim gospodarskim sektorjem), pomenilo, da bi bil vsak sektorski ukrep po naravi selektiven.
EDF takes the view that it is wrong to consider the supposed advantage selective because the capacity ‘provides for aid to capacity operators and not to other sectors of the economy’.
Noben predložitelj odgovorov ni navedel pripomb v zvezi s tem.
In so considering, the Commission misunderstands the characteristics of the capacity mechanism (market-wide and technology-neutral), as does CJEU case-law, which assesses the selectivity of a measure in relation to other undertakings in a comparable factual and legal situation.
Francoski organi menijo, da navedeni mehanizem zmogljivosti ne bo vplival na trg električne energije – na nacionalni ravni pa tudi z vidika medsebojnega vpliva med Francijo in sosednjimi državami –, ki bo še naprej deloval enako.