natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Article 16(1) of the implementing Law provides: ‘If, on the day of publication of this Act, the General Assembly: 1) has not been convened by the President of the Tribunal, or 2) has been convened by the President of the Tribunal in a manner incompatible with the requirements of the Act referred to in Article 3, or 3) has not submitted candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal to the President of the Republic, or 4) has submitted candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal to the President of the Republic, but the President of the Republic has not appointed the President of the Tribunal, or 5) has selected candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal in violation of the Act referred to in Article 3, — the procedure for submitting candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal shall be carried out in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 21 of this Act.’
Je tudi predpogoj za ohranjanje vseh pravic in obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz Pogodb in mednarodnega prava, ter za vzpostavitev vzajemnega zaupanja državljanov, podjetij in nacionalnih organov v pravne sisteme vseh drugih držav članic.
Article 16(2) provides: ‘In the cases referred to in paragraph 1(1)-(5), all actions and instruments implemented within the framework of the procedure for submitting candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal to the President of the Republic shall be repealed.’
Komisija ugotavlja, da je bilo v obdobju enega leta uzakonjenih šest zakonodajnih aktov v zvezi z ustavnim sodiščem.
The acting President of the Tribunal is given a wide range of powers as long as there is no new President of the Tribunal.
Tako zakonodajno delovanje brez ustreznega posvetovanja z vsemi zadevnimi deležniki in brez duha lojalnega sodelovanja, ki je potrebno med državnimi organi, škodi stabilnosti, integriteti in pravilnemu delovanju ustavnega sodišča.
In particular, according to Article 18 of the Implementing Law the acting President shall enable the unlawfully elected ‘December judges’ to perform their duties as judge (see section 2 above) and lead the new selection process and exercise fully the powers of the President of the Tribunal as long as there is no formally appointed new President [69].
PRIPOROČENO UKREPANJE
These provisions which allow the President of the Republic to directly appoint an acting President raise serious concerns as regards the principles of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as protected by the Polish constitution.
Komisija priporoča, da poljski organi sprejmejo nujne ustrezne ukrepe za odpravljanje te sistemske nevarnosti za načelo pravne države.
In particular, the constitution does not provide for the function of acting President of the Tribunal.
Komisija zlasti priporoča, da poljski organi sprejmejo naslednje ukrepe, ki jih je zahtevala že v Priporočilu z dne 27. julija 2016:
Moreover, the power given to the President of the Republic to appoint an acting President of the Tribunal appears to be contrary to Article 194(2) of the constitution which provides that the President and Vice-President of the Tribunal shall be appointed by the President of the Republic ‘from amongst candidates proposed by the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal’, while the procedure in the Implementing Law denies any such role to the General Assembly.
v celoti izvršijo sodbi ustavnega sodišča z dne 3. in 9. decembra 2015, ki zahtevata, da trije sodniki, ki jih je oktobra 2015 zakonito imenovala prejšnja sestava Sejma, nastopijo svojo funkcijo ustavnih sodnikov in da trije sodniki, ki jih je imenovala nova sestava Sejma brez ustrezne pravne podlage, svoje funkcije sodnika ne nastopijo, ne da bi bili zakonito imenovani, zato mora predsednik republike nujno sprejeti zaprisego treh sodnikov, ki jih je izvolila prejšnja sestava Sejma;
The judgment of the Tribunal of 7 November 2016 confirms that candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal should be proposed by the General Assembly.
objavijo in v celoti izvršijo sodbo ustavnega sodišča z dne 9. marca 2016 in sodbo z dne 11. avgusta 2016 v zvezi z zakonom z dne 22. julija 2016 o ustavnem sodišču ter vse druge sodbe, izrečene po tem datumu, in prihodnje sodbe;
Furthermore, the criteria to be used by the President of the Republic to choose the acting President appear arbitrary.
zagotovijo, da bodo vse reforme zakona o ustavnem sodišču spoštovale sodbe ustavnega sodišča, v celoti upoštevale mnenje Beneške komisije in zagotovile, da učinkovitost ustavnega sodišča kot varuha ustave ne bo spodkopana;
The choice should be made from amongst the judges of the Tribunal with the longest period in ordinary courts or in central government posts.
se vzdržijo ukrepov in javnih izjav, ki bi lahko spodkopale legitimnost in učinkovitost ustavnega sodišča.
These criteria appear arbitrary as someone with no meaningful experience in the judiciary but only in central government could be selected, while someone with a long experience in the Tribunal itself but not in ordinary courts could not be selected.
Komisija poleg teh ukrepov priporoča, da poljski organi:
These provisions also disregard any prior steps in the selection process taken by the Tribunal before the entry into force of the new law.
zagotovijo, da lahko ustavno sodišče urgentno učinkovito pregleda ustavnost zakona o statusu sodnikov, zakona o organizaciji in postopkih ter izvedbenega zakona in da se zadevne sodbe nemudoma objavijo in v celoti izvršijo;
Article 16(3) of the Law of 22 July 2016 required the Tribunal to initiate the selection process of the candidate between the 30th and the 15th day before the end of the term of office of the incumbent.
zagotovijo, da ne pride do imenovanja novega predsednika ustavnega sodišča, dokler niso objavljene in v celoti izvršene sodbe ustavnega sodišča o ustavnosti novih zakonov in dokler trije sodniki, ki jih je oktobra 2015 zakonito imenovala 7. sestava Sejma, ne nastopijo svojih funkcij ustavnih sodnikov;
Article 16(2) of the Implementing Law repeals any steps taken by the Tribunal to fulfil this obligation.
zagotovijo, da, dokler novi predsednik ustavnega sodišča ni zakonito imenovan, tega nadomešča podpredsednik ustavnega sodišča in ne vršilec dolžnosti predsednika oziroma oseba, imenovana za predsednika ustavnega sodišča dne 21. decembra 2016.
Such interference by the legislative power with any possible decision taken previously by the Tribunal raises concerns as regard the independence of the judiciary and the principle of loyal cooperation between state organs.
Komisija poudarja, da je lojalno sodelovanje, ki je potrebno med različnimi državnimi institucijami v zadevah, povezanih z načelom pravne države, bistvenega pomena za iskanje rešitve v trenutnih razmerah.
The appointment of a President of the Tribunal on 21 December 2016
Komisija poziva poljsko vlado, naj odpravi težave, navedene v tem priporočilu, v dveh mesecih po prejemu tega priporočila, in Komisijo obvesti o ukrepih, sprejetih v ta namen.
On 19 December 2016, the President of the Republic appointed judge Julia Przylębska, to the position of acting President of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Komisija tudi opozarja, da priporočila, sprejeta v okviru za krepitev pravne države, ne preprečujejo neposredne uporabe mehanizma iz člena 7 PEU, če bi nenadno poslabšanje stanja v državi članici zahtevalo močnejši odziv EU [79].
The Commission considers that this procedure which led to the appointment of a new President of the Tribunal is fundamentally flawed as regards the rule of law.
Na podlagi tega priporočila je Komisija pripravljena nadaljevati konstruktiven dialog s poljsko vlado.
As explained above, the procedure was led by an acting President whose appointment raises serious concerns as regards the principles of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as protected by the Polish constitution.
V Bruslju, 21. decembra 2016
Furthermore, the fact that the procedure allowed the three ‘December judges’ unlawfully nominated by the new legislature of the Sejm to participate in the process rendered the entire selection process unconstitutional (see section 2 below).
Za Komisijo
Similarly, the fact that the lawfully elected ‘October judges’ could not participate in the process equally had an impact on the outcome, and therefore vitiated the process.
Prvi podpredsednik
Moreover, the very short notice for the convocation of the General Assembly and the refusal to postpone the meeting raise serious concerns.
Priporočilo Komisije (EU) 2016/1374 z dne 27. julija 2016 v zvezi z načelom pravne države na Poljskem, (UL L 217, 12.8.2016, str. 53).
Finally, the election of candidates by six judges only is incompatible with the judgment of the Tribunal of 7 November 2016 according to which Article 194(2) of the constitution must be understood as providing that the President of the Tribunal shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from amongst candidates which have obtained a majority vote in the General Assembly of the Tribunal.
Sporočilo „Novi okvir EU za krepitev načela pravne države“, COM(2014) 158 final.
For these reasons, the Commission considers that these provisions on the appointment of an acting President of the Tribunal and of an President of the Tribunal, and their implementation on 19, 20 and 21 December 2016 seriously threaten the legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal and consequently the effectiveness of the constitutional review.
Glej oddelek 2 Priloge I k COM(2014) 158 final.
FINDING OF A SYSTEMIC THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
Členi 38(3)–(6), 61(6), 83(2) ter členi 84–87 in 89 zakona z dne 22. julija 2016.
For the reasons set out above, the Commission considers that whereas some of the issues addressed in its recommendation of 27 July 2016 have been addressed, important issues remain unresolved, and new concerns have arisen in the meantime.
Člen 26(1)(1)(g) in člen 68(5)–(7) zakona z dne 22. julija 2016.
The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland presented in its Recommendation of 27 July 2016 remains.
Členi 38(3)–(6), 61(3), 61(6) ter člena 68(5)–(7) in 83(2) zakona z dne 22. julija 2016.
In particular:
Resolucija Evropskega parlamenta z dne 14. septembra 2016 o najnovejših dogodkih na Poljskem in njihovem vplivu na temeljne pravice iz Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah (2016/2774(RSP)).
As regards the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, its judgments of 3 and 9 December 2015 have still not been implemented; as a result, the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm cannot take up their judicial functions in the Constitutional Tribunal.
Mnenje št. 860/2016, CDL-AD(2016)026.
A solution is all but forthcoming as the three new laws adopted in November and December 2016 [70] require that the three judges nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm without a valid legal basis take up their judicial functions.
Glej odlok predsednika ustavnega sodišča z dne 7. novembra 2016.
Moreover, the absence of the three judges lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm, taken together with the attendance requirements which remain high, have at different occasions threatened the effectiveness of the Tribunal because of a lack of quorum for the adoption of resolutions by the General Assembly or of judgments in full bench.
Oddelek 2.
As regards the publication of judgments, the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9 March 2016 has still not been published in the Official Journal.
Glej tudi člen 6(7).
In addition, the Polish Government refuses to publish the judgment of 11 August 2016 concerning the Law of 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal and all other judgments rendered after that date, including the judgement of 7 November 2016 concerning the provisions of the Law of 22 July 2016 on the selection of the candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal.
Mnenje št. 860/2016, CDL-AD(2016)026, točka 106.
As a result, the uncertainty continues on the legal basis on which the Tribunal must act and on the legal effects of its judgments.
Glej člen 5.
The Commission notes that the Law on the organisation and proceedings contains a provision which gives the power to the President of the Tribunal to order publication of the judgments [71].
Glej člena 6(1) in 11(5).
However, the Implementing Law still precludes the publication of certain judgments rendered by the Tribunal, including the judgments referred to above [72].
Glej člena 18(2) in 21(2).
As regards the effectiveness of the constitutional review, the Commission considers that even if certain improvements can be noted as compared to the Law of 22 July 2016, the three new laws adopted in December 2016 contain a number of provisions which do not respect earlier judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal and added new concerns as compared to those identified in the Recommendation of 27 July 2016.
Mnenje št. 833/2015, CDL-AD(2016)001, točka 136.
These new concerns relate in particular to the disciplinary proceedings, the possibility of early retirement, the new requirements for judges of the Tribunal, the significant changes to the internal organisation of the Tribunal, the selection procedure for candidates to the post of President and Vice-President of the Tribunal, the role of the Vice-President of the Tribunal and the appointment of an acting President of the Tribunal.
Glej opombe v točki 7.
The Commission considers in particular that the combined effect of the provisions on the appointment of an acting President of the Tribunal, the selection procedure for the candidates to the post of President and the refusal to swear in the judges elected by the 7th Sejm while providing for the taking up of office of the three judges nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm without a valid legal basis, seriously threaten the legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal and consequently the effectiveness of the constitutional review.
Glej točko 23 Priporočila.
In addition, as long as the the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm cannot take up their judicial functions in the Constitutional Tribunal, the Commission considers that the selection process of the new President of the Tribunal remains fundamentally flawed.
Mnenje št. 860/2016, točka 101, Mnenje št. 833/2015, točke 43, 142 in 143.
The Commission also notes that the timing of the adoption of these three laws and the lack of an appropriate vacatio legis for a number of key provisions denies the possibility to the Constitutional Tribunal to review their constitutionality before their entry into force.
Člen 188 ustave.
In addition, actions and public statements by the Polish authorities undermining the legitimacy and efficiency of the Constitutional Tribunal continue to occur, including the launching of a criminal investigation against the President of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Člen 189 ustave.
The Commission recalls the principle of loyal cooperation between state organs which is, as underlined in the opinions of the Venice Commission, a constitutional precondition in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
Člen 198 ustave se nanaša na predsednika republike, predsednika vlade in člane sveta ministrov, predsednika nacionalne banke Poljske, predsednika vrhovnega revizijskega urada, člane nacionalnega sveta za radiotelevizijo, osebe, katerim predsednik vlade podeli pooblastila za vodenje ministrstva, in vrhovnega poveljnika oboroženih sil.
The Commission is particularly concerned by the consequences of this situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law:
Člen 126 ustave.
The fact that the Constitutional Tribunal is prevented from fully ensuring an effective constitutional review adversely affects its integrity, stability and proper functioning, which is one of the essential safeguards of the rule of law in Poland.
Glej oddelek 4.2.1 Priporočila.
Where a constitutional justice system has been established, its effectiveness is a key component of the rule of law.
Glej oddelek 4.2.3 Priporočila.
Under the current circumstances, the constitutionality of Polish laws [73] can no longer be effectively guaranteed.
Glej oddelek 4.2.7 Priporočila.
The trust in the Polish legal system, in its integrity and coherence is seriously damaged by the refusal of the Polish Government to publish the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Glej oddelek 4.2.6 Priporočila.
This is confirmed by the fact that the Supreme Court considered it necessary to issue a resolution [74] stating that judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal are binding even if they are not published.
Glej oddelek 4.2.8 Priporočila.
Similar statements have been expressed by the Chief Council of the Supreme Administrative Court [75] and other authorities, in particular the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland, [76] the National Bar Association, [77] and the National Solicitor Association [78].
Glej točko 43 Priporočila.
Respect for the rule of law is not only a prerequisite for the protection of all the fundamental values listed in Article 2 TEU.
Glej uvodno izjavo 19 zgoraj.
It is also a prerequisite for upholding all rights and obligations deriving from the Treaties and from international law, and for establishing mutual trust of citizens, businesses and national authorities in the legal systems of all other Member States.
Člen 24(1) določa: „Proti ustavnim sodnikom se uvede disciplinski postopek, ki ga vodi ustavno sodišče, zaradi kršenja zakona, ogrožanja dostojanstva funkcije ustavnega sodnika, kršitve etičnega kodeksa ustavnih sodnikov ali drugega neetičnega ravnanja, ki bi lahko zmanjšalo zaupanje v njihovo nepristranskost ali neodvisnost.“
The Commission observes that within a period of 1 year six consecutive legislative acts have been enacted regarding the Constitutional Tribunal.
Člen 11(3) zakona o statusu sodnikov se nanaša na pravila o finančni udeležbi ustavnih sodnikov v gospodarski družbah, člen 13 se nanaša na obveznost ustavnih sodnikov, da predložijo izjavo o dejavnosti zakonca, člen 14 pa se nanaša na obveznost ustavnih sodnikov, da prijavijo premoženje.
Such legislative activism without proper consultation of all the stakeholders concerned and without a spirit of loyal cooperation required between state authorities, is detrimental to the stability, integrity and proper functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Člen 11(3).
RECOMMENDED ACTION
Člen 14.
The Commission recommends that the Polish authorities take appropriate action to address this systemic threat to the rule of law as a matter of urgency.
Člen 13.
In particular the Commission recommends that the Polish authorities take the following actions already requested in its Recommendation of 27 July 2016:
Glej mnenje vrhovnega sodišča o osnutku zakona o statusu sodnikov z dne 12. oktobra 2016.
implement fully the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015 which requires that the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the previous legislature can take up their function of judge in the Constitutional Tribunal, and that the three judges nominated by the new legislature without a valid legal basis do not take up the post of judge without being validly elected; for this reason, the President of the Republic is required to urgently take the oath of the three judges elected by the previous legislature;
Členi 16 do 32 vsebujejo podrobne določbe o tajništvu sodišča in uradu pravne službe ustavnega sodišča.
publish and implement fully the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9 March 2016 and the judgment of 11 August 2016 concerning the Law of 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal and other judgments rendered after that date and future judgments;
Člen 11.
ensure that any reform of the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal respects the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal, takes the Opinions of the Venice Commission fully into account and ensures that the effectiveness of the Constitutional Tribunal as a guarantor of the Constitution is not undermined;
Člen 23 določa, da na dan po dnevu objave začnejo veljati členi 1–3, 12 in 16–22.
refrain from actions and public statements which could undermine the legitimacy and efficiency of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Členi 4–5 in 8 začnejo veljati 1. januarja 2018.
In addition to these actions, the Commission recommends that the Polish authorities:
Ostali členi osnutka zakona začnejo veljati 14 dni po dnevu objave zakona.
ensure that the Constitutional Tribunal can as a matter of urgency effectively review the constitutionality of the Law on the status of judges, the Law on organisation and proceedings and the Implementing Law, and that the judgments concerned are published without delay and implemented fully;
Členi, ki začnejo veljati na dan po dnevu objave, se med drugim nanašajo na imenovanje „vršilca dolžnosti predsednika ustavnega sodišča“, vključitev treh nezakonito izvoljenih „decembrskih sodnikov“ in novi postopek izvolitve kandidatov za funkcijo predsednika ustavnega sodišča.
ensure that no appointment of the new President of the Constitutional Tribunal take place as long as the judgments by the Constitutional Tribunal on the constitutionality of the new laws have not been published and implemented fully, and as long as the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm have not taken up their judicial functions in the Tribunal;
Glej člena 1 in 2 izvedbenega zakona.
ensure that as long as a new President of the Constitutional Tribunal has not been lawfully appointed, he is replaced by the Vice-President of the Tribunal and not by an acting President, or by the person appointed as President of the Tribunal on 21 December 2016.
Ostale določbe teh dveh zakonov začnejo veljati 14 dni po dnevu objave zakonov.
The Commission underlines that the loyal cooperation which is required amongst the different state institutions in rule of law related matters is essential in order to find a solution in the present situation.
Samo členi 16 do 32 zakona o organizaciji in postopkih začnejo veljati 1. januarja 2018.
The Commission invites the Polish Government to solve the problems identified in this recommendation within 2 months of receipt of this recommendation, and to inform the Commission of the steps taken to that effect.
Glej člena 3 in 23.
The Commission also recalls that Recommendations adopted under the rule of Law Framework do not prevent the mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU being activated directly, should a sudden deterioration in a Member State require a stronger reaction from the EU [79].
Samo člen 18(1), (4) in (5) zakona z dne 22. julija o organizacijskih in upravnih delovnih pogojih na ustavnem sodišču ter uradu ustavnega sodišča ostane v veljavi do 1. januarja 2018.
On the basis of this Recommendation, the Commission stands ready to pursue a constructive dialogue with the Polish Government.
Zakon o spremembi zakona o radiodifuziji z dne 30. decembra 2015, objavljen v Uradnem listu 7. januarja 2016, točka 25.
Done at Brussels, 21 December 2016.
Zakon o spremembi zakona o javni upravi in nekaterih drugih zakonov z dne 30. decembra 2015, objavljen v Uradnem listu 8. januarja 2016, točka 34.
For the Commission
Zakon o spremembi zakona o policiji in nekaterih drugih zakonov z dne 15. januarja 2016, objavljen v Uradnem listu 4. februarja 2016, točka 147.
First Vice-President
Zakon o javnem tožilstvu z dne 28. januarja 2016, objavljen v Uradnem listu 15. februarja 2016, točka 177; Zakon o izvajanju zakona o javnem tožilstvu z dne 28. januarja 2016, objavljen v Uradnem listu 15. februarja 2016, točka 178.
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland (OJ L 217, 12.8.2016, p. 53).
Zakon o varuhu človekovih pravic in spremembi nekaterih drugih zakonov z dne 18. marca 2016.
Communication ‘A new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’, COM(2014) 158 final.
Zakon je predsednik republike podpisal 4. maja 2016.
See COM(2014) 158 final, section 2, Annex I.
Zakon o nacionalnem svetu za medije z dne 22. junija 2016.
Articles 38(3)-(6), 61(6), 83(2), 84-87 and 89 of the Law of 22 July 2016.
Zakon je predsednik republike podpisal 27. junija 2016.