natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Discrimination between the charges levied for the exercise of shareholder rights domestically and on a cross-border basis is a deterrent to cross-border investment and the efficient functioning of the internal market and should be prohibited.
Razlikovanje med stroški za domače in za čezmejno uveljavljanje pravic delničarjev odvrača od čezmejnih naložb in ovira učinkovito delovanje notranjega trga ter bi moralo biti prepovedano.
Any differences between the charges levied for the domestic and the cross-border exercise of shareholder rights should be allowed only if they are duly justified and reflect the variation in actual costs incurred for delivering the services by intermediaries.
Kakršne koli razlike med zaračunanimi stroški za domače in čezmejno uveljavljanje pravic delničarjev bi morale biti dovoljene le, če bi bile ustrezno utemeljene in bi odražale razlike v dejanskih stroških, ki so jih imeli posredniki pri opravljanju storitev.
The chain of intermediaries may include intermediaries that have neither their registered office nor their head office in the Union.
Veriga posrednikov lahko vključuje posrednike, ki nimajo niti registriranega niti glavnega sedeža v Uniji.
Nevertheless, the activities carried out by third-country intermediaries could have effects on the long-term sustainability of Union companies and on corporate governance in the Union.
Dejavnosti, ki jih opravljajo posredniki iz tretjih držav, pa utegnejo vplivati na dolgoročno vzdržnost družb iz Unije in na upravljanje družb v Uniji.
Moreover, in order to achieve the objectives pursued by this Directive, it is necessary to ensure that information is transmitted throughout the chain of intermediaries.
Poleg tega je treba za uresničitev ciljev te direktive zagotoviti, da se informacije posredujejo po celotni verigi posrednikov.
If third-country intermediaries were not subject to this Directive and did not have the same obligations relating to the transmission of information as Union intermediaries, the flow of information would risk being interrupted.
Če se za posrednike iz tretjih držav ta direktiva ne bi uporabljala in če zanje ne bi veljale iste obveznosti, povezane s posredovanjem informacij, kot veljajo za posrednike iz Unije, bi obstajalo tveganje prekinitve toka informacij.
Third-country intermediaries which provide services with respect to shares of companies that have their registered office in the Union and the shares of which are admitted to trading on a regulated market situated or operating within the Union should therefore be subject to the rules on shareholder identification, transmission of information, facilitation of shareholder rights, and transparency and non-discrimination of costs to ensure the effective application of the provisions on shares held via such intermediaries.
Zato bi se morala za posrednike iz tretjih držav, ki nudijo storitve, povezane z delnicami družb, ki imajo registrirani sedež v Uniji in katerih delnice so sprejete v trgovanje na reguliranem trgu, ki se nahaja ali deluje v Uniji, uporabljati pravila o identifikaciji delničarjev, posredovanju informacij, lažjem uveljavljanju pravic delničarjev ter preglednosti in nediskriminatornosti stroškov, da se zagotovi učinkovita uporaba določil o delnicah v imetništvu prek takih posrednikov.
This Directive is without prejudice to national law regulating the holding and ownership of securities and arrangements maintaining the integrity of securities and does not affect the beneficial owners or other persons who are not shareholders under the applicable national law.
Ta direktiva ne posega v nacionalno pravo, ki ureja imetništvo in lastništvo vrednostnih papirjev, in v ureditev, ki ohranja integriteto vrednostnih papirjev, ter ne vpliva na dejanske lastnike ali druge osebe, ki niso delničarji v skladu z veljavnim nacionalnim pravom.
Effective and sustainable shareholder engagement is one of the cornerstones of the corporate governance model of listed companies, which depends on checks and balances between the different organs and different stakeholders.
Učinkovito in trajnostno sodelovanje delničarjev je eden od temeljev modela upravljanja družb, ki kotirajo na borzi, ki je odvisen od zavor in ravnovesij med različnimi organi in različnimi deležniki.
Greater involvement of shareholders in corporate governance is one of the levers that can help improve the financial and non-financial performance of companies, including as regards environmental, social and governance factors, in particular as referred to in the Principles for Responsible Investment, supported by the United Nations.
Večje sodelovanje delničarjev pri upravljanju družb je eden od vzvodov, ki lahko pripomore k izboljšanju finančne in nefinančne uspešnosti družb, tudi kar zadeva okoljske, socialne in upravljavske dejavnike, kot so zlasti navedeni v načelih o odgovornem vlaganju, ki jih podpirajo Združeni narodi.
In addition, greater involvement of all stakeholders, in particular employees, in corporate governance is an important factor in ensuring a more long-term approach by listed companies that needs to be encouraged and taken into consideration.
Poleg tega je večje sodelovanje vseh deležnikov, zlasti zaposlenih, pri upravljanju družb pomemben dejavnik za zagotavljanje dolgoročnejšega pristopa družb, ki kotirajo na borzi, tak pristop pa je treba spodbujati in upoštevati.
Institutional investors and asset managers are often important shareholders of listed companies in the Union and can therefore play an important role in the corporate governance of those companies, but also more generally with regard to their strategy and long-term performance.
Institucionalni vlagatelji in upravljavci premoženja so pogosto pomembni delničarji družb v Uniji, ki kotirajo na borzi, zato imajo lahko pomembno vlogo pri upravljanju teh družb ter tudi v širšem smislu pri strategiji in dolgoročni uspešnosti teh družb.
However, the experience of the last years has shown that institutional investors and asset managers often do not engage with companies in which they hold shares and evidence shows that capital markets often exert pressure on companies to perform in the short term, which may jeopardise the long-term financial and non-financial performance of companies and may, among other negative consequences, lead to a suboptimal level of investments, for example in research and development, to the detriment of the long-term performance of both the companies and the investors.
Vendar so izkušnje iz zadnjih let pokazale, da institucionalni vlagatelji in upravljavci premoženja pogosto ne sodelujejo z družbami, v katerih imajo delnice, in dokazi kažejo, da kapitalski trgi pogosto izvajajo pritisk na družbe za doseganje kratkoročne uspešnosti, kar lahko ogrozi dolgoročno finančno in nefinančno uspešnost družb in poleg tega, da ima druge negativne posledice, lahko vodi v neoptimalne ravni naložb, na primer v raziskave in razvoj, ter ima škodljive posledice za dolgoročno uspešnost družb in vlagateljev.
Institutional investors and asset managers are often not transparent about their investment strategies, their engagement policy and the implementation thereof.
Institucionalni vlagatelji in upravljavci premoženja pogosto niso pregledni glede svojih naložbenih strategij, svoje politike sodelovanja in njenega izvajanja.
Public disclosure of such information could have a positive impact on investor awareness, enable ultimate beneficiaries such as future pensioners optimise investment decisions, facilitate the dialogue between companies and their shareholders, encourage shareholder engagement and strengthen their accountability to stakeholders and to civil society.
Javno razkritje takih informacij bi lahko pozitivno vplivalo na ozaveščenost vlagateljev, končnim upravičencem, kot so bodoči upokojenci, omogočilo optimiziranje odločitev glede naložb, olajšalo dialog med družbami in njihovimi delničarji, spodbujalo sodelovanje delničarjev ter okrepilo njihovo odgovornost do deležnikov in civilne družbe.
Institutional investors and asset managers should therefore be more transparent as regards their approach to shareholder engagement.
Zato bi morali biti institucionalni vlagatelji in upravljavci premoženja bolj pregledni, kar zadeva njihov pristop do sodelovanja delničarjev.
They should either develop and publicly disclose a policy on shareholder engagement or explain why they have chosen not to do so.
Ti bi morali bodisi razviti in javno razkriti politiko o sodelovanju delničarjev bodisi pojasniti, zakaj so se odločili, da tega ne bodo storili.
The policy on shareholder engagement should describe how institutional investors and asset managers integrate shareholder engagement in their investment strategy, which different engagement activities they choose to carry out and how they do so.
Politika o sodelovanju delničarjev bi morala opisovati, kako institucionalni vlagatelji in upravljavci premoženja vključujejo sodelovanje delničarjev v svojo naložbeno strategijo, katere različne dejavnosti sodelovanja se odločijo izvajati ter kako to počnejo.
The engagement policy should also include policies to manage actual or potential conflicts of interests, in particular situations in which the institutional investors or asset managers or their affiliated undertakings have significant business relationships with the investee company.
Politika sodelovanja bi morala vključevati tudi politike za upravljanje dejanskih ali potencialnih nasprotij interesov, zlasti v primeru, ko imajo institucionalni vlagatelji ali upravljavci premoženja ali njihova pridružena podjetja pomembne poslovne odnose z družbo, v katero se vlaga.
The engagement policy or the explanation should be publicly available online.
Politika sodelovanja ali njena razlaga bi morala biti prek spleta dostopna javnosti.
Institutional investors and asset managers should publicly disclose information about the implementation of their engagement policy and in particular how they have exercised their voting rights.
Institucionalni vlagatelji in upravljavci premoženja bi morali javno razkriti informacije o izvajanju svojih politik sodelovanja in še posebej, kako so uresničevali svoje glasovalne pravice.
However, with a view to reducing the possible administrative burden, investors should be able to decide not to publish every vote cast if the vote is considered to be insignificant due to the subject matter of the vote or to the size of the holding in the company.
Da bi se zmanjšalo morebitno upravno breme, bi morali vlagatelji imeti možnost, da se odločijo, da ne objavijo vsakega oddanega glasu, če se šteje, da je bil glas nepomemben zaradi vsebine glasovanja oziroma zaradi velikosti deleža v podjetju.
Such insignificant votes may include votes cast on purely procedural matters or votes cast in companies where the investor has a very minor stake compared to the investor’s holdings in other investee companies.
Med takšne nepomembne glasove lahko sodijo glasovi o povsem postopkovnih vprašanjih ali glasovi v družbah, v katerih ima vlagatelj zelo majhen lastniški delež v primerjavi z njegovimi deleži v drugih družbah, v katere vlaga.
Investors should set their own criteria regarding which votes are insignificant on the basis of the subject matter of the vote or the size of the holding in the company, and apply them consistently.
Vlagatelji bi morali določiti svoja lastna merila glede nepomembnosti glasov na podlagi vsebine glasovanja ali velikosti lastniškega deleža v družbi ter jih dosledno uporabljati.
A medium to long-term approach is a key enabler of responsible stewardship of assets.
Srednje- do dolgoročni pristop je bistvenega pomena pri omogočanju odgovornega upravljanja s premoženjem.
The institutional investors should therefore disclose to the public, annually, information explaining how the main elements of their equity investment strategy are consistent with the profile and duration of their liabilities and how those elements contribute to the medium to long-term performance of their assets.
Zato bi morali institucionalni vlagatelji javnosti vsako leto razkriti informacije, ki pojasnjujejo, kako so glavni elementi njihove strategije kapitalskih naložb skladni s profilom in trajanjem njihovih obveznosti ter kako prispevajo k srednje- do dolgoročni donosnosti njihovega premoženja.
Where they make use of an asset manager, either through discretionary mandates involving the management of assets on an individual basis or through pooled funds, institutional investors should disclose to the public certain key elements of the arrangement with the asset manager, in particular how it incentivises the asset manager to align its investment strategy and decisions with the profile and duration of the liabilities of the institutional investor, in particular long-term liabilities, how it evaluates the asset manager’s performance, including its remuneration, how it monitors portfolio turnover costs incurred by the asset manager and how it incentivises the asset manager to engage in the best medium to long-term interest of the institutional investor.
Če uporabljajo upravljavca premoženja, bodisi preko diskrecijskih pooblastil, ki vključujejo upravljanje premoženja na posamični podlagi, bodisi preko združenih sredstev, bi morali institucionalni vlagatelji javnosti razkriti nekatere ključne elemente dogovora z upravljavcem premoženja, zlasti kako ta dogovor upravljavca premoženja spodbuja k uskladitvi svoje naložbene strategije in odločitev s profilom in trajanjem obveznosti institucionalnega vlagatelja, še posebej dolgoročnih obveznosti, kako ocenjuje uspešnost upravljavca premoženja, tudi njegove prejemke, kako spremlja stroške obrata portfelja, ki jih ima upravljavec premoženja, in kako ga spodbuja k delovanju, ki je srednje- do dolgoročno v največjem interesu institucionalnega vlagatelja.
This would contribute to a proper alignment of interests between the final beneficiaries of institutional investors, the asset managers and the investee companies and potentially to the development of longer-term investment strategies and longer-term relationships with investee companies involving shareholder engagement.
To bi pripomoglo k ustrezni uskladitvi interesov med končnimi koristniki storitev institucionalnih vlagateljev, upravljavci premoženja in družbami, v katere se vlaga, ter k morebitnemu razvoju dolgoročnejših naložbenih strategij in dolgoročnejših razmerij z družbami, v katere se vlaga, ki vključujejo sodelovanje delničarjev.
Asset managers should give information to the institutional investor that is sufficient to allow the latter to assess whether and how the manager acts in the best long-term interests of the investor and whether the asset manager pursues a strategy that provides for efficient shareholder engagement.
Upravljavci premoženja bi morali institucionalnemu vlagatelju posredovati informacije, ki bi slednjemu zadoščale za oceno, ali in v kolikšni meri upravljavec deluje v najboljšem dolgoročnem interesu vlagatelja in če izvaja strategijo, ki omogoča učinkovito sodelovanje delničarjev.
In principle, the relationship between the asset manager and the institutional investor is a matter for bilateral contractual arrangements.
Odnos med upravljavcem premoženja in institucionalnim vlagateljem načeloma ureja dvostranska pogodba.
However, although big institutional investors may be able to request detailed reporting from the asset manager, especially if the assets are managed on the basis of a discretionary mandate, for smaller and less sophisticated institutional investors it is crucial to set a minimum set of legal requirements, so that they can properly assess, and hold to account, the asset manager.
Veliki institucionalni vlagatelji od upravljavca premoženja lahko zahtevajo podrobno poročanje, zlasti ko se premoženje upravlja na podlagi diskrecijskega pooblastila, za manjše in preprostejše institucionalne vlagatelje pa je bistvenega pomena, da se določi vrsta minimalnih pravnih zahtev, da bodo lahko upravljavca premoženja ustrezno ocenili in terjali njegovo odgovornost.
Therefore, asset managers should be required to disclose to institutional investors how their investment strategy and the implementation thereof contribute to the medium to long-term performance of the assets of the institutional investor or of the fund.
Upravljavci premoženja bi torej morali institucionalnim vlagateljem razkriti, kako njihova naložbena strategija in njeno izvajanje prispevata k srednje- do dolgoročni donosnosti premoženja institucionalnega vlagatelja ali sklada.
That disclosure should cover reporting on the key material medium to long-term risks associated with the portfolio investments, including corporate governance matters and other medium to long-term risks.
To razkritje bi moralo vključevati poročanje o poglavitnih srednje- do dolgoročnih materialnih tveganjih, povezanih s portfeljskimi naložbami, vključno z zadevami upravljanja družb in drugimi srednje- do dolgoročnimi tveganji.
That information is key to allowing the institutional investor to assess whether the asset manager carries out a medium to long-term analysis of the equity and the portfolio which is a key enabler of efficient shareholder engagement.
Te informacije so bistvene za to, da lahko institucionalni vlagatelj oceni, ali upravljavec premoženja izvaja srednje- do dolgoročno analizo lastniškega kapitala in portfelja, ki je ključna za omogočanje učinkovitega sodelovanja delničarjev.
As those medium to long-term risks will impact the returns of the investors, more effective integration of those matters into investment processes may be crucial for institutional investors.
Ker bodo ta dolgoročna tveganja vplivala na donose vlagateljev, utegne biti učinkovitejše vključevanje teh vidikov v naložbene procese bistveno za institucionalne vlagatelje.
Moreover, asset managers should disclose to institutional investors the composition, turnover and turnover costs of their portfolio as well as their policy on securities lending.
Poleg tega bi morali upravljavci premoženja institucionalnim vlagateljem razkriti sestavo, obrat in stroške obrata portfelja in svojo politiko o posoji vrednostnih papirjev.
The level of portfolio turnover is a significant indicator of whether an asset manager’s processes are fully aligned with the identified strategy and interests of the institutional investor and indicates whether the asset manager holds equities for a period of time that enables it to engage with the company in an effective way.
Raven obrata portfelja je pomemben pokazatelj tega, ali so postopki upravitelja premoženja povsem usklajeni z opredeljeno strategijo in interesi institucionalnega vlagatelja, kaže pa tudi, ali ima upravljavec premoženja lastniške vrednostne papirje dovolj dolgo časa, da mu to omogoča učinkovito sodelovanje z družbo.
High portfolio turnover may be an indicator of a lack of conviction in investment decisions and momentum-following behaviour, neither of which is likely to be in the institutional investor’s best interests in the long term, especially as an increase in turnover raises the costs faced by the investor and can influence systemic risk.
Velik obrat portfelja lahko kaže na premajhno zaupanje v naložbene odločitve in na ravnanje, ki se prepušča trendom, to dvoje pa ni nujno v največjem dolgoročnem interesu institucionalnega vlagatelja, še posebej, ker povečanje obrata povečuje stroške za vlagatelja in lahko vpliva na sistemska tveganja.
On the other hand, unexpectedly low turnover may signal inattention to risk management or a drift towards a more passive investment approach.
Na drugi strani lahko nepričakovano majhen obrat portfelja kaže na nepozornost glede obvladovanja tveganj ali drsenje v smeri bolj pasivnega naložbenega pristopa.
Securities lending can cause controversy in the area of shareholder engagement under which the investors’ shares are in effect sold, subject to a buyback right.
Posoja vrednostnih papirjev je lahno sporna na področju sodelovanja delničarjev, v katerem so delnice vlagateljev dejansko prodane, ob upoštevanju pravice do ponovnega odkupa.
Sold shares have to be recalled for engagement purposes, including voting at the general meeting.
Za namene sodelovanja, tudi glasovanja na skupščini delničarjev, je treba prodane delnice vpoklicati nazaj.
It is therefore important that the asset manager reports on its policy on securities lending and how it is applied to fulfil its engagement activities, particularly at the time of the general meeting of the investee company.
Zato je pomembno, da upravljavec premoženja poroča o svoji politiki posoje vrednostnih papirjev in o tem, kako jo izvaja za izpolnjevanje svoji obveznosti sodelovanja, zlasti ob zasedanju skupščine delničarjev družbe, v katero se vlaga.
The asset manager should also inform the institutional investor whether and, if so, how the asset manager makes investment decisions on the basis of an evaluation of the medium to long-term performance of the investee company, including its non-financial performance.
Upravljavec premoženja bi moral institucionalnega vlagatelja tudi obvestiti, če in kako sprejema naložbene odločitve na podlagi presoje o srednje- do dolgoročni uspešnosti družbe, v katero se vlaga, vključno z njeno nefinančno uspešnostjo.
Such information is particularly useful to indicate whether the asset manager adopts a long-term oriented and active approach to asset management and takes social, environmental and governance matters into account.
Te informacije so posebej koristen pokazatelj tega, ali se upravljavec premoženja ravna po dolgoročno usmerjenem pristopu do upravljanja premoženja in ali upošteva socialne in okoljske vidike ter vidike upravljanja.
The asset manager should provide proper information to the institutional investor on whether and, if so, which conflicts of interests have arisen in connection with engagement activities and how the asset manager has dealt with them.
Upravljavec premoženja bi moral institucionalnemu vlagatelju posredovati ustrezne informacije o tem, ali je prišlo do nasprotij interesov in, če je tako, katera nasprotja interesov so se pojavila v zvezi z dejavnostmi sodelovanja in kako se je upravljavec premoženja z njimi spoprijel.
For example, conflicts of interests may prevent the asset manager from voting or from engaging at all.
Gre denimo za nasprotja interesov, ki utegnejo upravljavcu premoženja preprečiti glasovanje ali sodelovanje v celoti.
All such situations should be disclosed to the institutional investor.
Institucionalnemu vlagatelju bi bilo treba razkriti vse takšne okoliščine.
Member States should be allowed to provide that where the assets of an institutional investor are not managed on an individual basis but are pooled together with assets of other investors and managed via a fund, information should also be provided to other investors, at least upon request, in order to allow all the other investors of the same fund to be able to receive that information if they so wish.
Državam članicam bi bilo treba dovoliti, da v primeru, ko se premoženje institucionalnega vlagatelja ne upravlja posamično, temveč je združeno s premoženjem drugih vlagateljev in se upravlja prek sklada, določijo, da bi bilo treba informacije zagotoviti tudi drugim vlagateljem, vsaj na njihovo zahtevo, da bi omogočile, da vsi drugi vlagatelji v istem skladu lahko dobijo te informacije, če tako želijo.
Many institutional investors and asset managers use the services of proxy advisors who provide research, advice and recommendations on how to vote in general meetings of listed companies.
Mnogi institucionalni vlagatelji in upravitelji premoženja uporabljajo storitve svetovalcev za glasovanje, ki izvajajo raziskave in svetovanje ter pripravljajo priporočila o tem, kako glasovati na skupščinah delničarjev družb, ki kotirajo na borzi.
While proxy advisors play an important role in corporate governance by contributing to reducing the costs of the analysis related to company information, they may also have an important influence on the voting behaviour of investors.
Svetovalci za glasovanje imajo pomembno vlogo pri upravljanju družb, saj prispevajo k zmanjšanju stroškov analize informacij o družbah, lahko pa tudi pomembno vplivajo na glasovanje vlagateljev.