natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As explained in its Recommendation of 21 December 2016 [6], the Commission considers that the procedure which led to the appointment of a new President of the Tribunal is fundamentally flawed as regards the rule of law.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno Komisija ugotavlja, da sta neodvisnost in zakonitost ustavnega sodišča resno ogroženi, zato ustavnosti poljskih zakonov ni več mogoče učinkovito zagotavljati [7].
The procedure was initiated by an acting President whose appointment raised serious concerns as regards the principles of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as protected by the Polish Constitution.
Razmere so zlasti skrb vzbujajoče glede spoštovanja pravne države, saj je poljski parlament, kakor je bilo pojasnjeno v prejšnjih priporočilih, sprejel več zelo občutljivih novih zakonodajnih aktov, kot so nov zakon o javni upravi [8], zakon o spremembi zakona o policiji in nekaterih drugih zakonov [9], zakon o javnem tožilstvu [10], zakon o varuhu človekovih pravic in spremembi nekaterih drugih zakonov [11], zakon o državnem svetu za medije [12] in zakon o boju proti terorizmu [13].11.
Furthermore, the fact that the procedure allowed the three ‘December judges’ unlawfully nominated by the new legislature of the Sejm to participate in the process rendered the entire selection process unconstitutional.
Poleg tega je škodljiv učinek pomanjkanja neodvisne in zakonite ustavne presoje na Poljskem na pravno državo zdaj še veliko večji, ker neodvisno ustavno sodišče ne more več preveriti in zagotavljati ustavnosti novih zakonov v zvezi s poljskim sodnim sistemom, navedenih v točki 2(2) zgoraj in podrobneje analiziranih v oddelku 3 v nadaljevanju.
Similarly, the fact that the lawfully elected ‘October judges’ could not participate in the process equally had an impact on the outcome, and therefore vitiated the process.
NEVARNOSTI ZA NEODVISNOST SODSTVA
Moreover, the very short notice for the convocation of the General Assembly and the refusal to postpone the meeting raised serious concerns.
Zakon o nacionalni šoli za sodnike, zakon o nacionalnem sodnem svetu, zakon o organizaciji splošnih sodišč in zakon o vrhovnem sodišču vsebujejo številne določbe, ki vzbujajo resne pomisleke v zvezi z načeloma neodvisnosti sodstva in delitve oblasti.
The Commission also notes that following the appointment of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal a number of developments have further undermined the legitimacy of the Tribunal.
Pravosodni svetovalci
In particular: the Vice-President of the Tribunal, whose position is recognised in the Constitution, was obliged by the newly appointed President of the Tribunal to use his remaining leave until the end of his mandate; as a consequence of an action brought by the Prosecutor General to challenge the validity of the election in 2010 of three judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, these judges were subsequently excluded from the judicial activities of the Tribunal; the new President of the Tribunal changed the composition of benches hearing cases and cases were reassigned to panels consisting in part of unlawfully appointed judges; requests, in particular from the Ombudsman, aiming at removing judges unlawfully appointed from panels adjudicating cases were dismissed; an important number of judgements was delivered by benches which included unlawfully appointed judges; finally, after the end of the mandate of the Vice-President, an unlawfully appointed judge was appointed as the new Vice-President of the Tribunal.
V skladu s členom 2(1) in členom 2(36) zakona o spremembi zakona o nacionalni šoli za sodnike in državne tožilce, zakonom o organizaciji splošnih sodišč in nekaterimi drugimi zakoni so pravosodnim svetovalcem zaupane naloge sodnikov na okrožnih sodiščih za štiriletno obdobje.
These developments have de facto led to a complete recomposition of the Constitutional Tribunal outside the normal constitutional process for the appointments of judges.
Zlasti bo pravosodnim svetovalcem dovoljeno, da na okrožnih sodiščih delujejo kot sodniki posamezniki.
The reply of the Polish authorities received on 20 February 2017 to the Commission's complementary Recommendation does not alleviate the concerns of the Commission, and does not announce any concrete measures to address the issues raised by the Commission.
Vendar v skladu s poljskim pravnim sistemov pravosodni svetovalci nimajo enakega statusa kot sodniki [14].
The reply argues that the new laws on the Constitutional Tribunal and the appointment of the new President of the Constitutional Tribunal have created the proper conditions for its functioning after a period of paralysis caused by political quarrels of politicians of the opposition.
Pravosodni svetovalci so imenovani za omejeno štiriletno obdobje, po 36 mesecih pa se lahko začnejo prijavljati v nove postopke, da bi postali sodniki.
As regards the composition of the Tribunal the reply, like the previous reply to the Recommendation of 27 July 2016, denies any effect to the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015.
Za pravosodne svetovalce ne veljajo ista zagotovila za varstvo neodvisnosti sodstva kot za sodnike – na primer glede imenovanja, za katerega se ne uporablja enak postopek kot za sodnike.
Concerning the selection procedure for the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, the reply ignores the judgment of 7 November 2016 according to which the Constitution requires that the President of the Tribunal shall be appointed from amongst candidates which have obtained a majority vote in the General Assembly of the Tribunal.
V nasprotju s položajem sodnikov položaj pravosodnih svetovalcev, ki opravljajo sodniške funkcije, ni predviden v ustavi.
As to the role of the Vice-President of the Tribunal, the reply disregards the fact that the Constitution explicitly recognises the position of Vice-President which is subject to the same appointment procedure as the President of the Tribunal.
To pomeni, da je mogoče njihov status in zagotovila za njihovo neodvisnost spremeniti s splošnim zakonom in da ni potrebna sprememba ustave [15].16.
Regarding the appointment of an acting President of the Constitutional Tribunal, the reply fails to identify any legal basis in the Constitution, and considers that it was an exceptional adjustment mechanism dictated by extraordinary circumstances.
Med zakonodajnim postopkom o zakonu o nacionalni šoli za sodnike sta vrhovno sodišče in nacionalni sodni svet izrazila pomisleke glede tega, ali so zagotovila neodvisnosti pravosodnih svetovalcev skladna z ustavo in zadostna za izpolnitev zahtev poštenega sojenja iz člena 6(1) EKČP [16].
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the independence and legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal are seriously undermined and, consequently, the constitutionality of Polish laws can no longer be effectively guaranteed [7].
Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice je odločilo, da prejšnja ureditev v zvezi s pravosodnimi svetovalci na Poljskem ni izpolnjevala teh meril [17].17.
This situation is particularly worrying for the respect of the rule of law since, as explained in the previous Recommendations, a number of particularly sensitive new legislative acts have been adopted by the Polish Parliament, such as a new Civil Service Act [8], a law amending the law on the Police and certain other laws [9] and laws on the Public Prosecution Office [10], a law on the Ombudsman and amending certain other laws [11], a law on the National Council of Media [12] and an anti-terrorism law [13].11.
Zaradi svojega kratkega mandata so pravosodni svetovalci zelo občutljivi na zunanji vpliv, zlasti vpliv ministra za pravosodje.
Moreover, the adverse impact on the rule of law of the lack of an independent and legitimate constitutional review in Poland is now seriously aggravated by the fact that the constitutionality of the new laws relating to the Polish judicial system mentioned above in paragraph 2(2) and analysed further below in Section 3 can no longer be verified and guaranteed by an independent constitutional tribunal.
Minister za pravosodje znatno vpliva na poklicno pot pravosodnega svetovalca, saj je udeležen tudi v poznejšem postopku izbora in imenovanja sodnikov.
THE THREATS TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Pravosodni svetovalci, ki želijo postati sodniki, morajo opraviti povsem nov postopek izbora in imenovanja.
The law on the National School of Judiciary, the law on the National Council for the Judiciary, the law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation and the law on the Supreme Court contain a number of provisions which raise grave concerns as regards the principles of judicial independence and separation of powers.
Pravosodni svetovalci morajo najprej predložiti vlogo za imenovanje za sodnika pri nacionalnem sodnem svetu, ki celovito oceni kandidata in se odloči, ali ga bo predlagal za mesto sodnika predsedniku republike.
The Commission notes that a number of statements or opinions, including from the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman and the National Council for the Judiciary, have expressed concerns as regards the compatibility of the new laws with the Constitution.
Kandidata na mesto sodnika imenuje predsednik republike.
The assistant judges
Legitimna želja pravosodnih svetovalcev, da postanejo sodniki, ob pomanjkanju zadostnih zagotovil za zaščito njihove osebne neodvisnosti v tem obdobju, pravosodne svetovalce izpostavlja pritisku ministra za pravosodje in lahko vpliva na njihovo osebno neodvisnost pri razsojanju primerov.
Under Articles 2(1) and 2(36) of the law amending the law on the National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution, the law on Ordinary Courts Organisation and certain other laws, assistant judges are entrusted with the tasks of judge in district courts for a period of 4 years.
Predsedniki sodišč
In particular, assistant judges will be allowed to act as single judges in district courts.
V poljskem pravnem sistemu imajo predsedniki sodišč dvojno vlogo: nimajo odgovornosti samo kot vodje sodišč, ampak opravljajo tudi sodne funkcije.
However, under the Polish legal system, assistant judges do not have the same status as judges [14].
Novi zakon o organizaciji splošnih sodišč vzbuja pomisleke glede osebne neodvisnosti predsednika sodišča pri opravljanju sodne funkcije in tudi v zvezi z njegovim vplivom na druge sodnike.
Assistant judges are appointed for the limited term of 4 years and after 36 months they can start applying for new proceedings to become judges.
Člen 1(6), člen 17(1) in člen 18(1) novega zakona o organizaciji splošnih sodišč določajo pravila o razrešitvi in imenovanju predsednikov sodišč.
Assistant judges are not subject to the same guarantees for protecting judicial independence as those applicable to judges — for example as regards the appointment, which is not subject to the same procedure as for judges.
V šestmesečnem obdobju bi imel minister za pravosodje pooblastila, da imenuje in razreši predsednike sodišč, ne da bi bil zavezan določenim merilom, ne da bi bil obvezan navesti razloge, sodstvo (vključno z nacionalnim sodnim svetom in svetom sodnikov zadevnega sodišča) pa ne bi imelo možnosti, da zaustavi te odločitve.
Unlike the position of judges, the position of assistant judges performing judicial functions is not envisaged in the Constitution.
Poleg tega ni predvidena sodna presoja odločbe ministra za pravosodje o razrešitvi.
This implies that their status, as well as the guarantees for their independence, can be modified by ordinary law, and do not require any change of the Constitution [15].16.
Po šestmesečnem obdobju bi lahko minister za pravosodje predsednike sodišč imenoval po lastni presoji; samo v primeru razrešitve predsednika sodišča bi lahko nacionalni sodni svet s kvalificirano dvotretjinsko večino vseh članov sveta blokiral odločitev ministra za pravosodje [18].
During the legislative process of the law on the National School of Judiciary concerns have been expressed by the Supreme Court and the National Council for the Judiciary as to whether the guarantees for independence of assistant judges comply with the Constitution and are sufficient to meet the requirements of a fair trial enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR [16].
Pooblastila ministra za pravosodje, da samovoljno razreši predsednike sodišč, bi ministru za pravosodje omogočila, da ohrani vpliv na predsednike sodišč, kar lahko vpliva na njihovo osebno neodvisnost pri razsojanju o zadevah.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the previous regime regarding assistant judges in Poland did not meet these criteria [17].17.
Predsednik sodišča, ki je na primer pozvan, naj izda sodbo v občutljivi zadevi zoper državo, lahko občuti pritisk ministra za pravosodje, naj sledi stališču države, da ne bi bil razrešen kot predsednik sodišča.
Given their short mandate, the status of assistant judges makes them particularly vulnerable to external influence, notably from the Minister of Justice.
Tudi sodniki, ki niso predsedniki sodišč, vendar želijo to postati, se lahko nagibajo k temu, da ne delujejo v nasprotju s stališčem ministra za pravosodje, da s tem ne bi zmanjšali svojih možnosti imenovanja za predsednika sodišča.
The Minister of Justice has a significant influence on the career of assistant judges as is also involved in the subsequent process of the selection and appointment as judge.
Njihova osebna neodvisnost bi bila zato pri razsojanju o zadevah prav tako zmanjšana.
Assistant judges who would like to become a judge have to undergo an entirely new selection and appointment procedure.
Opozoriti je treba tudi, da imajo predsedniki sodišč kot vodje sodišč pomembna pooblastila v razmerju do drugih sodnikov in lahko torej posegajo tudi v osebno neodvisnost teh sodnikov.
The assistant judges must first make an application to be appointed judge to the National Council for the Judiciary which will proceed to a full assessment of the candidate and decide whether or not to propose the candidate for the post of judge to the president of the Republic.
Predsedniki sodišč imajo na primer pooblastilo, da zamenjajo sodnike na položaju vodij sektorjev ali vodij oddelkov sodišč, pooblastilo, da tem vodjem sektorjev in oddelkov izdajajo pisna obvestila o denarnih kaznih v primeru pomanjkljivosti, in pooblastilo, da sodnike brez njihovega soglasja premeščajo znotraj sodnega okrožja.
It is the President of the Republic who appoints the candidate to the post of judge.
Te določbe vzbujajo pomisleke glede ustavnosti, kot so v svojih mnenjih opozorili zlasti vrhovno sodišče, nacionalni sodni svet in varuh človekovih pravic.
The legitimate desire of assistant judges to become a judge, in connection with the lack of sufficient guarantees for protecting their personal independence during this period, exposes assistant judges to pressure from the Minister of Justice and may affect their personal independence when they adjudicate cases.
Če se omogoči taka možnost razreševanja predsednikov sodišč s strani ministra za pravosodje, se predvsem prezreta načeli neodvisnosti sodstva in delitve oblasti.
The court presidents
Imenovanje in poklicna pot sodnikov
In the Polish legal system, court presidents have a dual role: they do not only have a responsibility as court managers, but they also perform judicial functions.
V skladu s poljsko ustavo neodvisnost sodnikov varuje nacionalni sodni svet [19].
The new law on Ordinary Courts Organisation raises concerns with regard to the personal independence of court presidents when exercising their judicial function, but also as regards their influence over other judges.
Vloga nacionalnega sodnega sveta neposredno vpliva na neodvisnost sodnikov, zlasti v zvezi z njihovim napredovanjem, premestitvijo, disciplinskimi postopki, razrešitvijo in predčasno upokojitvijo.
Articles 1(6), 17(1) and 18(1) of the new law on Ordinary Courts Organisation provide rules on the dismissal and appointment of court presidents.
Za napredovanje sodnika (npr. z okrožnega sodišča na regionalno sodišče) mora na primer predsednik republike sodnika ponovno imenovati, zato je treba ponovno slediti postopku sodne ocene in imenovanja, v katerem je udeležen nacionalni sodni svet.25.
During a 6-month period, the Minister of Justice would be granted the power to appoint and dismiss presidents of courts without being bound by concrete criteria, with no obligation to state reasons, and with no possibility for the judiciary (neither for the National Council for the Judiciary, nor for the board of judges of a concerned court) to block these decisions.
Zato je v državah članicah, kjer je ustanovljen sodni svet, neodvisnost le-tega zlasti pomembna, da se prepreči neustrezen vpliv vlade ali parlamenta na neodvisnost sodnikov.
In addition, no judicial review is available against a dismissal decision of the Minister of Justice.
V okviru disciplinskih postopkov proti sodnikom, ki jih vodi svet, se je na primer Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice spraševalo o stopnji vpliva zakonodajnih ali izvršnih organov glede na to, da je bil svet sestavljen z večino članov, ki so jih ti organi neposredno imenovali [20].
After the 6-month period, the Minister of Justice would be able to appoint presidents of courts at his discretion; only in case of dismissal of a court president, the National Council for the Judiciary would be able, with a qualified majority of two thirds of all members of the Council, to block the decision of the Minister of Justice [18].
Iz istega razloga dobro uveljavljeni evropski standardi, zlasti priporočilo Odbora ministrov Sveta Evrope iz leta 2010, določajo, da „bi morala biti vsaj polovica članov [sodnih svetov] sodnikov, ki jih v svojih vrstah izvolijo sodniki s sodišč vseh stopenj ob upoštevanju pluralizma v sodstvu“ [21].
The power of the Minister of Justice to arbitrarily dismiss court presidents would allow the Minister of Justice to retain influence over court presidents which may affect their personal independence when they adjudicate cases.
Države članice so tiste, ki organizirajo svoje sodne sisteme, vključno s tem, ali ustanovijo sodni svet ali ne.
For example, a court president who is called upon to deliver a judgment in a sensitive case against the State may feel the pressure from the Minister of Justice to follow the position of the State in order to avoid being dismissed as a court president.
Kadar pa je tak svet ustanovljen, kot to velja na Poljskem, mora biti njegova neodvisnost zagotovljena v skladu z evropskimi standardi.26.
Also judges who are not court presidents, but would like to become court presidents may be inclined not to go against a position of the Minister of Justice, in order not to reduce their chances of being appointed court presidents.
Doslej je bil poljski sistem povsem v skladu s temi standardi, saj so nacionalni sodni svet sestavljali večinoma sodniki, ki so jih izbrali sodniki.
Their personal independence would as a result be equally affected when adjudicating cases.
Člen 1(1) in člen 7 zakona o spremembi zakona o nacionalnem sodnem svetu bi to ureditev korenito spremenila z določbo, da Sejm imenuje in lahko tudi ponovno imenuje 15 sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta [22], in vzpostavitvijo nove strukture znotraj sveta.
It should also be noted that court presidents, in their capacity as court managers, have important powers over other judges and may therefore also interfere with the personal independence of these judges.
Nova pravila o imenovanju sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta znatno povečujejo vpliv parlamenta na svet in zmanjšujejo njegovo neodvisnost v nasprotju z evropskimi standardi.
For example, court presidents have the power to replace judges in their function of heads of division or heads of section of courts, power to issue written notification to these heads of division and section involving pecuniary sanctions in case of deficiencies, and the power to transfer judges without their consent within the relevant judicial district.
Dejstvo, da bo Sejm sodnike člane imenoval s tripetinsko večino, ne zmanjšuje tega pomisleka.27.
Finally, these provisions raise constitutionality concerns as pointed out notably by the opinions of the Supreme Court, the National Council for the Judiciary and the Ombudsman.
Dejstvo, da bi se v skladu s členom 5(1) zakona o spremembi zakona o nacionalnem sodnem svetu mandati vseh sedanjih sodnikov članov nacionalnega sodnega sveta predčasno prenehali, še bolj povečuje pomisleke glede na to, da bi parlament takoj odločilno vplival na sestavo sveta v škodo vpliva samih sodnikov.
In particular, allowing for such possibility of dismissal of court presidents by the Minister of Justice disregards the principles of judicial independence and separation of powers.
Politizacija nacionalnega sodnega sveta je še večja zaradi nove notranje strukture.
The appointment and career of judges
V skladu s členom 1(7) zakona o spremembi zakona o nacionalnem sodnem svetu bi svet sestavljali dve skupščini: prva z večino poslancev, druga s sodniki, ki jih imenuje parlament.
According to the Polish Constitution the independence of judges is safeguarded by the National Council for the Judiciary [19].
Formalno bi imeli sodniki še vedno večino v sestavi sveta, v resnici pa bi lahko nova „politična“ skupščina otežila postopek odločanja nacionalnega sodnega sveta.
The role of the National Council for the Judiciary has a direct impact on the independence of judges in particular as regards their promotion, transfer, disciplinary proceedings, dismissal and early retirement.
Če se skupščini ne bi strinjali glede ocene kandidata, bi lahko tista skupščina, ki bi imela pozitivno mnenje, zahtevala ponovno oceno s strani sveta v polni sestavi z dvotretjinsko večino vseh članov sveta.
For example, the promotion of a judge (e.g. from district court to regional court) requires the President of the Republic to once again appoint the judge, and therefore the procedure for judicial assessment and nomination involving the National Council for the Judiciary will have to be followed again.25.
Tak prag bi bilo zelo težko doseči, tudi glede na povečan vpliv zakonodajne oblasti na sestavo sveta.
For this reason, in Member States where a Council for the Judiciary has been established, its independence is particularly important for avoiding undue influence from the Government or the Parliament on the independence of judges.
Ta nova ureditev bi neposredno vplivala na imenovanje in poklicno pot sodnikov na Poljskem, saj sodniki člani sveta, ki so v drugi skupščini, v določenih okoliščinah ne bi imeli več zadnje besede v zadevah v zvezi z ocenjevanjem kandidatov za mesta sodnikov [23].29.
For example, in the context of disciplinary proceedings against judges conducted by a Council, the European Court of Human Rights has questioned the level of influence of the legislative or executive authorities given that the Council was composed by a majority of members appointed directly by these authorities [20].
Ta položaj vzbuja pomisleke z vidika neodvisnosti sodstva.
For the same reason, well established European standards, in particular the 2010 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, stipulate that ‘not less than half the members of [Councils for the Judiciary] should be judges chosen by their peers from all levels of the judiciary and with respect for pluralism inside the judiciary’ [21].
Na primer, sodnik na okrožnem sodišču, ki mora izreči sodbo v politično občutljivi zadevi, hkrati pa je vložil prošnjo za napredovanje na mesto sodnika na regionalnem sodišču, se lahko nagiba k temu, da sledi stališču politične večine, da ne bi ogrozil svojih možnosti napredovanja.
It is up to the Member States to organise their justice systems, including whether or not to establish a Council for the Judiciary.
Tudi če se to tveganje ne uresniči, nova ureditev ne daje zadostnih zagotovil za zavarovanje vtisa neodvisnosti, ki je bistven za vzdrževanje zaupanja, ki ga morajo v demokratični družbi vzbujati sodišča [24].30.
However, where such a Council has been established, as it is the case in Poland, its independence must be guaranteed in line with European standards.26.
Komisija opozarja, da sta vrhovno sodišče in nacionalni sodni svet v svojih mnenjih o predlogu zakona izrazila več pomislekov glede ustavnosti nove ureditve.