natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Moreover it is provided that ‘The President of the Tribunal orders publication of the adjudications.’
Pomisleki glede položaja sodnikov
This provision is as such a step in the right direction.
Disciplinski postopki
However, Article 19 of the Implementing Law provides that ‘Judgments of the Tribunal and decisions of the Tribunal adopted in breach of the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 25 June 2015 […] or the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 22 July 2016 and issued prior to the date of entry into force of the Act referred to in Article 1 shall be published in the relevant official gazettes after their publication has been ordered by the acting President of the Tribunal, unless they concern regulatory instruments that have ceased to apply.’
Člen 26 zakona o statusu sodnikov določa: „Kršitev iz člena 24(1), ki jo zakrivi ustavni sodnik, lahko predsedniku ustavnega sodišča prijavi […] predsednik Republike Poljske na predlog generalnega tožilca po posvetovanju s prvim predsednikom vrhovnega sodišča.“ [33] Člen 27(5) določa: „Če vodja disciplinskega postopka ne najde razlogov za začetek disciplinskega postopka na zahtevo pooblaščenega organa, izda odredbo o zavrnitvi sprožitve postopka.
A similar provision was already held unconstitutional by the Tribunal in its judgment of 11 August 2016.
Organ, ki je vložil prijavo iz člena 26, lahko vloži pritožbo pri prvostopenjskem disciplinskem sodišču v sedmih dneh po vročitvi te odredbe.“ V skladu s členom 27(6) navedeno sodišče pritožbo preuči najpozneje v 14 dneh po dnevu vložitve.
The Commission's Recommendation underlined that the indication that judgments have been rendered illegally is contrary to the principle of the separation of powers as it is not for the Sejm to determine the lawfulness of judgments [20].
Če je odredba o zavrnitvi začetka disciplinskega postopka razveljavljena, so navodila disciplinskega sodišča glede nadaljnjega postopka za vodjo disciplinskega postopka zavezujoča.
Also the Venice Commission confirmed this position in its two opinions [21].
Komisija je v priporočilu v zvezi z načelom pravne države glede zakona z dne 22. decembra 2015 poudarila, da predsednik republike ne bi smel imeti pooblastila za začetek disciplinskega postopka, in navedla, da odprava take določbe iz zakona z dne 22. julija 2016 pomeni izboljšanje.
In addition, the exclusion from publication of judgments relating to normative acts which ceased to be applicable, as provided in Article 19 of the Implementing Law, excludes in particular the judgments of 9 March, 11 August and 7 November 2016.
Dejstvo, da bi lahko tak postopek začele institucije zunaj sodstva in da se lahko take institucije pritožijo na prvostopenjskem disciplinskem sodišču, če vodja disciplinskega postopka ne najde razloga za začetek disciplinskega postopka, lahko vpliva na neodvisnost ustavnega sodišča.
As long as the President of the Constitutional Tribunal has not been appointed this provision prevents the full publication of all judgments.
Možnost predčasne upokojitve
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that Article 114(2) of the Law on organisation and procedure will ensure that the future President of the Tribunal publishes all the judgments which have been adopted prior to his term of office.
Člen 10 izvedbenega zakona določa: „1.
In conclusion, the fact that the Polish Government has so far refused to publish in the Official Journal the judgments of 9 March 2016 and 11 August 2016 relating to legislative acts on the Constitutional Tribunal, and all other judgments rendered by the Constitutional Tribunal since 11 August 2016, creates uncertainty as to the legal basis for the Tribunal's judicial activity and as to the legal effects of its decisions.
Ustavni sodniki, katerih mandat se je začel pred dnevom začetka veljavnosti [zakona o statusu sodnikov], lahko v roku enega meseca od začetka njegove veljavnosti predsedniku ustavnega sodišča predložijo izjavo o upokojitvi zaradi novih pravil, ki so bila uvedena v času njihovega mandata in ki veljajo za opravljanje dolžnosti ustavnega sodnika iz člena 11(3) ter členov 13 in 14 tega zakona [34].
Compliance with final judgments is an essential requirement inherent in the rule of law.
Upokojitev sodnika v skladu z odstavkom 1 začne veljati na prvi dan meseca po mesecu, v katerem je bila izjava predložena.
The refusal to publish a binding and final judgment denies the latter's automatic legal and operational effect and breaches the principles of legality and separation of powers.
Upokojitev se potrdi z odredbo predsednika ustavnega sodišča.“
REVIEW OF THE LAW ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF NEW LEGISLATION
Zdi se, da ta določba spodbuja predčasno upokojitev, ker ustavnim sodnikom z uporabo izjeme omogoča, da v celoti izkoristijo prednosti statusa upokojenega sodnika, vključno s pokojnino, ne da bi dokončali svoj mandat.
In its Recommendation of 27 July 2016, the Commission considered in detail the Law of 22 July 2016 and its impact, taking into account the effect of the provisions both individually and collectively, as well as the previous case law of the Constitutional Tribunal and the opinion of the Venice Commission.
Za sodnika, ki po novih pravilih ne bi več želel opravljati dela, bi bila taka možnost predčasne upokojitve ugodnejša kot preprost odstop.
The Commission recommended that the Polish authorities ensure that any reform of the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal respect the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal, including those of 3 and 9 December 2015 and of 9 March 2016, and take the opinion of the Venice Commission of 11 March 2016 fully into account.
Ponujanje take ugodne ureditve pomeni poseganje zakonodajne oblasti v neodvisnost ustavnega sodišča, saj je namen spodbuditi sedanje ustavne sodnike k odstopu pred koncem mandata in vplivati na njihovo odločitev v zvezi s tem.
In particular, the Commission recommended that the Polish authorities ensure that requirements such as those relating to the attendance quorum, the handling of cases in chronological order, the possibility for the Public Prosecutor-General to prevent the examination of cases, the postponement of deliberations or transitional measures affecting pending cases and putting cases on hold do not, either separately or through their combined effect undermine the effectiveness of the Constitutional Tribunal as a guarantor of the Constitution.
Druge določbe
In their reply of 27 October 2016, the Polish Government fail to acknowledge that the majority of concerns expressed by the Commission and by the Venice Commission were not taken into account in the Law of 22 July 2016.
Zakon o statusu sodnikov uvaja nove zahteve za ustavne sodnike glede finančne udeležbe v gospodarskih družbah [35], prijave premoženja [36] in izjav o gospodarski dejavnosti njihovih zakoncev [37].
However, this argument is irrelevant because the Tribunal has been able to do so precisely by not applying the procedural requirements at stake (judgment of 11 August 2016) and the Government is refusing to publish these same rulings of the Tribunal in an attempt to prevent them from taking legal effect.
Zaradi teh določb bi lahko nastala vprašanja sorazmernosti in vprašanja ustavnosti [38], kot je opozorilo vrhovno sodišče.
The reply also presents brief explanations on the compliance of the legislation mentioned above with fundamental rights.
Zato je učinkovit ustavni pregled teh določb še posebno pomemben.
The Commission observes that these explanations by the Government do not remove the need for a genuinely effective constitutional review by the Constitutional Tribunal.
Komisija opozarja tudi, da zakon o organizaciji in postopkih znatno spreminja notranjo organizacijo ustavnega sodišča, pri čemer urad ustavnega sodišča nadomešča z dvema novima organoma, in sicer s tajništvom sodišča in uradom pravne službe ustavnega sodišča [39].
The reply also denies the fundamental role of the Constitutional Tribunal in ensuring the rule of law in Poland.
Izvedbeni zakon določa, da bo urad ustavnega sodišča ukinjen do 31. decembra 2017 [40] in da ni zagotovljeno, da bodo sedanji zaposleni po tem datumu še naprej zaposleni na ustavnem sodišču [41].
The Commission contests that statement.
V trenutnih okoliščinah, ko potekajo spori o ustavnem sodišču in ko obstajajo pomisleki iz oddelka 5 tega priporočila glede imenovanja novega predsednika in vršilca dolžnosti predsednika ustavnega sodišča, lahko taka reorganizacija povzroči še večjo nestabilnost ustavnega sodišča in vpliva na učinkovitost ustavnega pregleda.
The Constitutional Tribunal is indeed one of the main guarantors of the rule of law in Poland, in particular as it is bestowed with the task of ruling on the constitutionality of Polish laws.
Ključne določbe izvedbenega zakona bodo začele veljati brez obdobja vacatio legis [42] na dan po objavi zakona.
It clearly appears from the Polish constitution that the Constitutional Tribunal is competent to rule on the conformity of statutes and international agreements to the constitution, on the conformity of a statute to ratified international agreements whose ratification required prior consent granted by statute, on the conformity of legal provisions issued by central State organs to the constitution, ratified international agreements and statutes, on the conformity to the constitution of the purposes or activities of political parties, and on complaints concerning constitutional infringements [22].
Tudi določbe zakona o organizaciji in postopkih ter zakona o statusu sodnikov bodo začele veljati brez obdobja vacatio legis na dan po dnevu objave, vključno z določbami, ki nezakonito imenovanim „decembrskim sodnikom“ omogočajo nastop funkcije [43].
The Constitutional Tribunal shall also settle disputes over authority between central constitutional organs of the State [23].
Določbe zakona z dne 22. julija 2016 o ustavnem sodišču se bodo prenehale uporabljati na dan po dnevu objave izvedbenega zakona [44].
The fact that according to the constitution the Tribunal of State is to hear cases of violations of the constitution or of a statute committed by certain persons [24], and that the President of the Republic shall ensure observance of the constitution [25], does not affect this fundamental role of the Tribunal.
Ustavno sodišče zato ne bo moglo preučiti ustavnosti teh ključnih določb pred začetkom njihove veljavnosti.
The Commission notes that the Law on organisation and proceedings no longer contains the following provisions of the Law of 22 July 2016 identified as a concern in the Recommendation: Article 26(1)(1g) on the referral of cases to the full bench [26], Article 38(3) on the handling of cases in chronological order [27], Article 68(5)-(8) on the postponement of deliberations [28], Article 61(6) on the possibility of the Public Prosecutor-General to prevent the examination of cases [29] and Articles 83-86 on the transitional provisions for pending cases [30].
Ustavni pregled se v takih okoliščinah ne bi mogel več šteti za učinkovitega.
The Commission notes that the mere publication of the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 11 August 2016 which had already declared these provisions unconstitutional would have been sufficient to address these issues without a new law being necessary.
S tem v zvezi je treba opozoriti, da je Beneška komisija v mnenju z dne 11. marca 2016 poudarila, da mora imeti ustavno sodišče možnost pregleda splošnih zakonov, ki urejajo delovanje ustavnega sodišča, preden ti začnejo veljati.
Despite these improvements, the Commission notes nevertheless that certain concerns remain.
Posledice neučinkovitega ustavnega pregleda nove zakonodaje
In particular, the number of judges required to participate in a full bench remains at eleven while it was set at nine in the 1997 Act on the Constitutional Tribunal and in the Law of 25 June 2015.
Sejm je, pogosto po hitrem zakonodajnem postopku, sprejel več zelo občutljivih novih zakonodajnih aktov, zlasti na primer zakon o medijih [45], novi zakon o javni upravi [46], zakon o spremembi zakona o policiji in nekaterih drugih zakonov [47], zakon o javnem tožilstvu [48] ter nov zakon o varuhu človekovih pravic in spremembi nekaterih drugih zakonov [49].
As pointed out in the Recommendation [31] this represents a constraint on the decision-making process of the Constitutional Tribunal, in particular in the current circumstances where the Constitutional Tribunal has only 12 judges (since the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm have not taken up their judicial functions).
Komisija je v dopisih z dne 1. februarja 2016 in 3. marca 2016 poljsko vlado zaprosila za informacije o stanju in vsebini teh zakonodajnih reform, vendar doslej teh informacij še ni prejela.
The risk identified in the Recommendation that the attendance quorum for a full bench might on occasion not be reached has already materialised [32].
Sejm je sprejel še več drugih občutljivih osnutkov zakonodajnih aktov, kot sta zakon o državnem svetu za medije [50] in nov protiteroristični zakon [51].
Moreover, the Law on the organisation and proceeding, the Law on the status of judges and the Implementing Law contain other provisions which have aggravated certain concerns identified in the Recommendation (see section 2 on the appointment of judges and section 3 on the publication of judgments), or have introduced new concerns relating to the situation of judges (see section 4.1) and to the appointment of the President, the Vice-President and the acting President of the Tribunal (see section 5).
Dokler je ustavnemu sodišču preprečeno celovito zagotavljanje učinkovitega ustavnega pregleda, po mnenju Komisije ni mogoče učinkovito preveriti, ali so zakonodajni akti, kot so tisti, navedeni zgoraj, skladni z ustavo in temeljnimi pravicami.
The concerns relating to the situation of judges
Komisija na primer ugotavlja, da nova zakonodaja (zlasti zakonodaja o medijih [52]) vzbuja pomisleke glede svobode in pluralnosti medijev.
Disciplinary proceedings
Natančneje, nova zakonodaja o medijih spreminja pravila za imenovanje upravnega odbora in nadzornega sveta javne radiotelevizije, kar pomeni, da svet ni več neodvisen organ, ampak je pod nadzorom vlade (ministra za finance).
Article 26 of the Law on the status of judges provides: ‘The commission by a judge of the Tribunal of the misconduct referred to in Article 24(1) may be reported to the President of the Tribunal by […] the President of the Republic of Poland on the motion of the Prosecutor-General, after consulting the First President of the Supreme Court.’ [33] Article 27(5) provides: ‘If the disciplinary officer does not find grounds for initiating disciplinary proceedings at the request of an authorised entity, he or she shall issue an order refusing to initiate proceedings.
Nova zakonodaja določa tudi takojšnjo razpustitev obstoječih nadzornih odborov in upravnih svetov.
The authority which submitted the report referred to in Article 26 may complain to the disciplinary court of first instance within 7 days of service of this order.’
V zvezi s tem Komisija zlasti dvomi v možnosti sodnega varstva za osebe, ki jih zadeva zakon.
Pursuant to Article 27(6) that court shall examine the complaint no more than 14 days after the date on which it was submitted.
Ustavno sodišče, ki je zasedalo v sestavi petih sodnikov, je 13. decembra 2016 izreklo sodbo [53], v kateri je ugotovilo, da so nekatere določbe zakonodaje neustavne.
If the order refusing to initiate disciplinary proceedings is repealed, the disciplinary court's instructions as to further proceedings shall be binding on the disciplinary officer.
Zakonodaja, kot je novi zakon o javni upravi [54], je prav tako pomembna z vidika načela pravne države in temeljnih pravic.
In its Rule of Law Recommendation, the Commission underlined as regards the Law of 22 December 2015 that the President of the Republic should not have the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings and noted that the removal of such a provision in the Law of 22 July 2016 was an improvement.
V zvezi s tem je Komisija v dopisu z dne 1. februarja in dopisu z dne 3. marca 2016 poljsko vlado vprašala, kakšne so možnosti sodnega varstva za osebe, ki jih zadeva zakon [55].
The Commission also recalls that the provision of the Law of 22 December 2015 which involved other State institutions in disciplinary proceedings concerning judges of the Tribunal was declared unconstitutional by the Tribunal in its judgment of 9 March 2016 and was criticised by the Venice Commission in its opinion of 11 March 2016.
Poljska vlada Komisiji doslej ni odgovorila.
The Commission is therefore concerned by the reintroduction of a provision which gives the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings to the President of the Republic.
Tudi zakon o spremembi zakona o policiji in nekaterih drugih zakonov [56] vzbuja vprašanja glede spoštovanja temeljnih pravic, vključno z zasebnostjo in varstvom podatkov.
The fact that such proceedings could be initiated by institutions outside the judiciary, as well as the fact that such institutions may complain to the disciplinary court of first instance if the disciplinary officer does not find grounds for initiating disciplinary proceedings, could have an impact on the independence of the Tribunal.
Poleg tega nova protiteroristična zakonodaja vzbuja vprašanja glede spoštovanja temeljnih pravic [58] in je tudi predmet ustavne presoje.
Possibility of early retirement
Tudi zakon o spremembah zakona o javnih zbiranjih z dne 13. decembra 2016 [59] lahko vzbuja vprašanja v zvezi z združljivostjo s temeljnimi pravicami, zlasti svobodo zbiranja, kot je zapisana v Evropski konvenciji o človekovih pravicah [60].
Article 10 of the Implementing Law provides: ‘1.
Tiskovni urad Sejma je 14. decembra 2016 izdal izjavo glede sprememb pogojev, pod katerimi lahko mediji delajo v Sejmu in senatu, glede katerih so bili izraženi pomisleki v zvezi s spoštovanjem svobode izražanja in obveščanja.
Judges of the Tribunal whose term of office started before the date of entry into force of the [Law on the status of judges] may, within 1 month of its entry into force, submit to the President of the Tribunal a declaration to the effect that they are retiring as a result of the introduction during their term of office of the new rules governing the performance of the duties of a judge of the Tribunal laid down in Articles 11(3), 13 and 14 of this Act [34].
Dne 16. decembra 2016 je Sejm v spornih okoliščinah izglasoval zakon o proračunu za leto 2017, zlasti ker domnevno sklepčnost ni bila dosežena, ker je bil član Sejma izključen iz glasovanja in medijem preprečeno, da bi posneli glasovanje.
2.
Potrebno je učinkovito sodno varstvo v zvezi s temi ukrepi in razmerami, v katerih so bili sprejeti, po potrebi pa tudi njihov ustavni pregled.
The retirement of a judge under paragraph 1 shall take effect on the first day of the month after the month in which the declaration was submitted.
Komisija meni, da učinkovitega nadzora skladnosti zakonodajnih aktov s temeljnimi pravicami ne bo mogoče zagotoviti, dokler je ustavnemu sodišču preprečeno celovito zagotavljanje učinkovitega ustavnega pregleda.
The retirement shall be confirmed by an order of the President of the Tribunal.’
To vzbuja resne pomisleke glede načela pravne države, zlasti ker je Sejm nedavno sprejel več posebno občutljivih novih zakonodajnih aktov, ki bi morali biti predmet ustavnega pregleda.
This provision appears to be an incentive for early retirement because it would allow judges of the Tribunal — by way of exception — to take full benefit of the advantages of the status of a retired judge, including receiving a retirement pension, without having completed the term of their mandate.
IMENOVANJE PREDSEDNIKA, PODPREDSEDNIKA IN VRŠILCA DOLŽNOSTI PREDSEDNIKA USTAVNEGA SODIŠČA
Offering such advantageous regime represents an interference by the legislative power with the independence of the Tribunal as it aims at encouraging the current judges of the Tribunal to resign in advance of the end of their term of office and at influencing their decision in that respect.
Tudi novi izvedbeni zakon vsebuje določbe o izboru kandidatov za položaj predsednika ustavnega sodišča in določbe, ki predsedniku republike omogočajo, da določi sodnika, ki bo začasno opravljal dolžnosti predsednika ustavnega sodišča („vršilec dolžnosti predsednika ustavnega sodišča“).
Other provisions
Komisija opozarja, da člen 194(2) ustave določa, da predsednika in podpredsednika ustavnega sodišča imenuje predsednik republike „izmed kandidatov, ki jih predlaga generalna skupščina ustavnih sodnikov“.
The Law on the status of judges introduces new requirements for judges of the Tribunal concerning financial participation in companies [35], declarations of assets [36] and declarations on the economic activity of their spouses [37].
Poleg tega sta bila sprejeta zelo hitro (osnutek izvedbenega zakona je bil Sejmu predložen 24. novembra 2016), brez obdobja vacatio legis, ki bi omogočilo učinkovit ustavni pregled.
In addition, the Law stipulates far reaching consequences in case of non-compliance: failure to perform the obligations concerned shall be equivalent to resigning from the office of judge of the Tribunal.
Postopek izbora predsednika in podpredsednika ustavnega sodišča
These provisions could raise questions of proportionality and as noted by the Supreme Court, questions of constitutionality [38].
Izvedbeni zakon ter zakon o organizaciji in postopkih vsebujeta nova pravila o postopku predložitve kandidatov za položaj predsednika in podpredsednika ustavnega sodišča.
For these reasons, an effective constitutional review of these provisions is particularly important.
Postopek iz izvedbenega zakona [63] se nanaša posebej na sedanji postopek izbora predsednika ustavnega sodišča in se uporablja v primerih, opisanih v njegovem členu 16(1) (glej oddelek 5.3 v nadaljevanju).
The Commission also notes that the Law on the organisation and proceedings changes significantly the internal organisation of the Constitutional Tribunal, replacing the Office of the Constitutional Tribunal by two new bodies: a Registry and an Office of the Legal Service of the Tribunal [39].The Implementing Law provides that the Office of the Constitutional Tribunal will be abolished by 31 December 2017 [40] and that no guarantees are given to the present employees to remain employed by the Tribunal after that date [41].
Zakon o organizaciji in postopkih [64] določa postopek, ki se bo na splošno uporabljal za prihodnje postopke volitev na položaj predsednika in podpredsednika ustavnega sodišča in ki je v grobem podoben postopku iz izvedbenega zakona.
In the current context of the ongoing disputes concerning the Constitutional Tribunal, together with the concerns expressed in section 5 of this Recommendation on the appointment of a new President and an acting President of the Tribunal, such reorganisation could lead to further instability of the Tribunal and affect the effectiveness of the constitutional review.
V skladu z novim postopkom izbora kandidatov za predsednika ustavnega sodišča morajo trije „decembrski sodniki“, ki jih je nezakonito imenovala nova sestava Sejma, sodelovati v postopku [65].
Key provisions of the Implementing Law will enter into force without vacatio legis [42], the day after publication of the law.
Komisija meni, da je zaradi te zahteve celoten postopek izbora neustaven (glej oddelek 2 spodaj).
Also key provisions of the law on organisation and proceedings and on the status of judges will enter into force without vacatio legis, on the day after the date of publication, including provisions enabling the unlawfully appointed ‘December judges’ to take up their function [43].
Podobno lahko dejstvo, da zakonito izvoljeni „oktobrski sodniki“ ne morejo sodelovati v postopku, prav tako vpliva na izid in s tem razvrednoti postopek.
The provisions of the Law of 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal will cease to apply on the day after the date of publication of the Implementing law [44].
Poleg tega novi postopek ne zagotavlja, da bi bili predsedniku republike predlagani samo kandidati, ki imajo večinsko podporo generalne skupščine ustavnega sodišča [66].