natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
France explained that this improvement was due to the positive signal given by the launch of the mechanism (some power plants had abandoned their planned closures when the mechanism was launched).
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka navedla pomisleke glede možnosti dobaviteljev, zlasti novih udeležencev, da natančno in pravočasno predvidijo razvoj svojih portfeljev odjemalcev ter tako dajo zanesljiv cenovni signal trgu glede potreb po zmogljivosti sistema.
Moreover, while the French authorities do not contest the fact that there is currently overcapacity in France, this does not rule out threats to security of supply in the coming years, particularly if many loss-making power plants were forced to close.
Ti pomisleki, ki jih je med drugim potrdilo več tretjih strani, so bili izraženi s treh vidikov.
RTE's studies confirm that the ‘missing money’ problem exists and point out that there is a real risk that power plants could close, a hypothesis that is also supported by recitals 43, 44 and 46.
Prvič, Francija je predlagala, da se RTE naloži, naj alternativnim dobaviteljem pomaga pri boljšem predvidevanju končnega obsega njihovih obveznosti glede zmogljivosti.
The Commission's other objections:
Drugič, mehanizem omogoča preglednost in večjo likvidnost na trgu certifikatov.
As regards the proposal to charge different prices for using the network depending on the season, day of the week and/or time of day, France has confirmed that the TURPE is already hourly and seasonally adjusted.
Tretjič, navedeni mehanizem omogoča prilagoditev portfelja certifikatov malih dobaviteljev za ponovno uravnoteženje portfeljev v letu dobave, pa tudi po njem.
France also provided a satisfactory explanation regarding the de-rating factors applied to renewables, as requested by the Commission in recital 153 of the Opening Decision.
Ta rešitev bo alternativnim dobaviteljem pomagala bolje vnaprej oceniti njihove natančne obveznosti glede potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih.
The de-rating factors appear rather optimistic about the contribution of renewables to security of supply, no longer giving rise to concerns regarding under-estimated available capacity.
Ta rešitev bo dobaviteljem pomagala bolje oceniti njihove potrebe po zmogljivostih, zato bo omogočila določitev natančnejše cene zmogljivosti in po potrebi spodbudila k naložbam v nove zmogljivosti.
In any case, renewables will be able to choose the general scheme, based on monitored self-certification.
Morebiten neobstoj spodbud udeležencem za vzpostavitev ravnotežja pred letom dobave (LD)
Conclusion on the objective of common interest and the necessity of the measure
Francoski organi so po pomislekih, ki jih je Komisija navedla v zvezi s potencialno nezadostnostjo pobud udeležencem, da pred letom dobave (LD) vzpostavijo ravnotežje, predlagali, naj se za vsako večje skupno ponovno uravnoteženje, izvedeno pred letom dobave, naloži kazen.
For these reasons, the Commission takes the view that the mechanism, which addresses the objective of common interest of ensuring security of electricity supply, is indeed necessary in France.
Poleg tega so navedeni organi predlagali, naj se podvoji spodbujevalni koeficient „k“, ki se uporablja za neravnotežja, in dodatno povečajo kazni za izravnavo odstopanj (v zvezi s tržno transakcijo) za neravnotežja, ki presegajo najvišji prag 1 GW (glej točki 141 in 143 obrazložitve).
Furthermore, this does not contradict the objective set out in the EEAG to gradually phase out subsidies that are harmful to the environment, for example by facilitating demand management (232), increasing interconnection capacity (194), including the contribution of renewable energy in the mechanism (230) and giving preference to low-carbon generators (137).
K temu je treba dodati prejšnje pravilo, da je od začetka LD vsako ponovno vzpostavljanje ravnotežja plačljivo.
Discrimination between different types of demand-side response capacity
Te rešitve, ki jih je predlagala Francija, imajo en skupni cilj: udeležence mehanizma spodbuditi k vzpostavitvi ravnotežja pred začetkom LD, vsekakor pa pred izravnavo odstopanj.
France does not dispute the difference in treatment between explicit and implicit demand-side response.
To bo udeležence spodbudilo k temu, da bodo veliko večino potrebnih transakcij izvedli pred LD, poleg tega pa bo povečalo reprezentativnost RTC (ki se uporablja za izravnavo odstopanj in za prenos stroškov na porabnike).
On the contrary, France takes the view that these different conditions are needed precisely so as to enable both types of demand-side response to participate in the mechanism on equal terms.
Tako bo cenovni signal, izhajajoč iz trgovanja s potrdili o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih, po našem mnenju bolj reprezentativen in zanesljivejši, mehanizem pa bo zbujal večje zaupanje in tako po potrebi spodbudil nove naložbe.
France had to strike a balance between activation and availability obligations for the two types of capacity, without restricting the possibility to participate in the mechanism.
Francoski organi so se na očitek Komisije, da zgornja meja cene izravnave odstopanj ne izraža CONE, odzvali tako, da so se zavezali k postopnemu zviševanju regulirane cene (glej točki 146 in 147 obrazložitve), da bi jo nazadnje, od LD 2021, zvišali na vrednost, ki ustreza stroškom novega udeleženca (CONE).
The Commission is in agreement with France and takes the view that it is logical for the number of days covered by the implicit demand-side response obligation (PP1 days) to be lower than the number of days during which an explicit demand-side response operator must be available, as more is required of implicit demand-side response (activation as opposed to availability).
Ta rešitev je v skladu s tržnimi zahtevami in zahtevami Komisije, da se posredna zgornja meja cen zmogljivosti, ki so regulirane cene, uskladi s stroški novega udeleženca.
The Commission accepts that the number of PP2 hours should remain strictly defined, so as not to exclude explicit capacities from the mechanism or restrict their participation any more than is necessary.
Tako se lahko po potrebi izvedejo nove naložbe.
As explained in recitals 111 to 115, RTE has carried out a detailed study to set the number of PP1 and PP2 hours, so as to base this calculation on the impact that demand-side response could have in terms of addressing shortfalls.
Francoski organi so poleg tega Komisiji zagotovili, da razhajanje med ARENH in tržno ceno električne energije ne bo posredna zgornja meja cen zmogljivosti (glej točke 149 do 151 obrazložitve).
It was found that 94 % of shortfall hours could be caught during the 100 hours per year when demand is highest (for this reason, the PP1 period represents the 100-150 hours when demand is highest) and that 99 % of shortfall hours are included in the 300 hours when demand is highest (which is why PP2 covers between 100 and 300 [32] peak-demand hours).
Komisija še ugotavlja, da bodo francoski organi v okviru prihodnje ocene mehanizma preučili možnost za dodaten pritok državnih sredstev za financiranje proizvoda ARENH v zvezi z zmogljivostmi, da bi se po potrebi preprečilo, da bi ta proizvod oviral svobodno oblikovanje cen na trgu zmogljivosti.
Furthermore, the argument put forward by a number of third parties that explicit demand-side response capacities must be activated only during cold spells (meaning once every 10 years) is, in our view, not justified because all capacities will be activated at least once in each delivery year for the monitoring test.
Sklepna ugotovitev o signalih za nove naložbe
For these reasons, the Commission takes the view that France has struck the right balance between the different obligations of demand-side response capacities without restricting their participation in the mechanism.
Različne rešitve, ki jih predlaga Francija za boljše spodbude k novim naložbam, so tako v skladu s točko 226 Smernic.
The Commission takes note of France's proposal to evaluate the PP1/PP2 ratio in the future, and to revise it if necessary.
Francija bo zlasti začela izvajati ukrepe za zagotovitev vključenosti čezmejnih zmogljivosti in za spodbuditev novih naložb, kar bo številnim potencialnim operaterjem zmogljivosti omogočilo dostop do mehanizma.
The measure is therefore sufficiently flexible and provides adequate and appropriate incentives for the different types of demand-side response capacity as required by paragraph 226 of the EEAG.
Drugi pomisleki Komisije
In order to dispel the Commission's doubts on this point, the French authorities have proposed a mechanism that allows explicit participation in the French mechanism by cross-border generation capacities and demand-side response capacities.
Francoski organi so v skladu z zahtevami Komisije pojasnili, zakaj so v posameznih primerih sprejeli različne predloge za izboljšanje mehanizma, ki jih je dal organ, pristojen za konkurenco.
This proposal is conditional upon cooperation agreements with the transmission system operators in the neighbouring countries where participating capacities are located.
Sklepna ugotovitev o ustreznosti ukrepa
So as to avoid resorting to implicit participation of cross-border capacities in the absence of such an agreement, the French authorities have proposed that the relevant interconnections be certified to enable them to participate in the mechanism directly [33].
Iz zgornjih ugotovitev izhaja, da je navedeni ukrep vsekakor ustrezen za izpolnitev opredeljenega cilja skupnega interesa.
The remedy proposed by France, as described in recitals 119 to 124 of this Decision, therefore complies with paragraph 226 of the EEAG.
Spodbujevalni učinek
The Commission emphasises that the timetable for implementing this remedy, as set out in recital 125, must be considered a strict timetable and that France must inform the Commission about the various implementation stages of this remedy.
Komisija je v točki 184 obrazložitve sklepa o začetku postopka že ugotovila, da bi lahko imel navedeni mehanizem zahtevani spodbujevalni učinek.
Following the doubts expressed on this point by the Commission in the Opening Decision, France proposed a mechanism allowing new capacities to participate in the capacity mechanism, as described in recitals 131 to 138 of this Decision.
Komisija vztraja pri tej ugotovitvi.
This mechanism consists of multiannual contracts for new competitive capacities.
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka ugotovila tveganje precenitve porabe dobaviteljev, zlasti če posamezne obveznosti dobaviteljev glede zmogljivosti niso dovolj jasne.
The Commission had already concluded that longer-term contracts could be justified to attract new investment, particularly new entrants, in order to make it easier for them to secure financing [34].
Iz ugotovitev Komisije v točkah 245 do 247 obrazložitve izhaja, da so francoski organi predvideli ukrepe za pomoč dobaviteljem pri boljšem izračunu njihovih obveznosti glede zmogljivosti.
France explained that the aim of seven-year contracts for new investments was to guarantee around 50 % of new capacities' investment costs.
Ta rešitev je ustrezen odgovor na očitke, ki jih je navedla Komisija v sklepu o začetku postopka.
This measure would therefore help lower the rate of return required by property developers and the finance providers for these investment projects and would make it easier to secure external financing.
V prvotni različici mehanizma zmogljivosti so imeli različni udeleženci slab pregled nad transakcijami, izvedenimi na prostem trgu, saj so bili odvisni od rednih objav CRE, v katerih so bili podatki o obsegu trgovanja s potrdili o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih in povprečnih cenah transakcij.
It is also worth noting that this contract duration is shorter than the 20-year contract in place for the Landivisiau project in Brittany and the 15-year contract in the capacity mechanism in the United Kingdom.
Poleg tega so francoski organi za preprečitev zlorab in nepreglednosti vertikalno povezanim udeležencem naložili obveznost vodenja ločenih računov v registru potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivosti (en račun za operaterje zmogljivosti in en račun za dobavitelje).
Although it is difficult to find a good and reliable benchmark for the length of capacity contracts, it should be noted that shorter contracts have the advantage of being more flexible for the market over the longer term and prevent the lock-in effect in relation to the choice of technology.
Francija je po bojaznih Komisije, da bi bili poslovni sporazumi v okviru mehanizma nepregledni, predlagala rešitve za izboljšanje preglednosti celotnega trgovanja za vse udeležence.
The Commission takes the view that France has struck the right balance between the advantages and disadvantages of the different possible contract durations and that the chosen duration offers satisfactory security for long-term investments, on the one hand, while preventing the risk of technology ‘lock in’ that could be brought about by longer contacts.
Prvič, predlaga, da se vsem udeležencem omogoči dostop do registra transakcij, izvedenih na prostem trgu (katerih anonimnost se zagotovi), da se tako zagotovita preglednost količin in cen ter hkrati anonimnost udeležencev (glej točko 163 obrazložitve).
In the Opening Decision, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether suppliers, and particularly new entrants, would be able to accurately forecast, far in advance, how their customer portfolios would evolve and therefore give a reliable price signal to the market regarding the system's capacity needs.
Drugič, predlaga, naj se spodbudijo organizirane dražbe, tako da se njihovo število v štirih letih pred prvim letom dobave poveča na 15 in da se nekaterim operaterjem zmogljivosti (vodje skupine certifikacijskih organov > 3 GW) naloži, naj na trgu ponudijo svoje certifikate v skladu z natančnim časovnim razporedom (glej točki 164 in 165 obrazložitve).
These doubts, which were confirmed by a number of third parties, were dispelled on three levels.
Pristop, ki so ga predlagali francoski organi, prispeva k določeni prožnosti dobaviteljev, saj omogoča izvajanje transakcij na prostem trgu, hkrati pa zagotavlja določeno preglednost teh transakcij.
Firstly, France proposed to oblige RTE to help alternative suppliers better forecast the final level of their capacity obligations.
Prost dostop do registra transakcij (ki zagotavlja anonimnost) zagotavlja preglednost prostega trga in neobstoj asimetrije informacij med prevladujočim operaterjem – ki bo glavni prodajalec – in njegovimi konkurenti.
Secondly, the mechanism allows for greater transparency and liquidity of the certificates market.
Poleg tega udeležencem omogoča, da pri oblikovanju svojih ponudb na promptnem trgu upoštevajo cene, uporabljene na prostem trgu, in tako zagotovijo večjo skladnost med obema trgoma.
Thirdly, the mechanism allows smaller suppliers to rebalance their certificate portfolios through an adjustment, both during the delivery year and ex post.
Tako spodbuja tudi nadzor regulatorja, saj se z njim takoj odkrije poskus manipulacije s ceno s strani operaterja, če bi se njegovo ravnanje na organiziranem trgu močno razlikovalo od ravnanja na prostem trgu.
This remedy will help alternative suppliers to better predict their specific obligations in terms of capacity guarantees.
Poleg tega bi spodbuditev organiziranih dražb morala zagotoviti njihovo zadostno likvidnost, kar bi okrepilo tudi reprezentativnost referenčne tržne cene (cene zmogljivosti, ki jo večina dobaviteljev uporablja pri svoji prodaji pa tudi kot referenčno vrednost za mehanizem izravnave odstopanj).
Potential lack of incentives for operators to be in balance before the delivery year (DY)
Uvedba „dvojne obveznosti“ za leta LD–3, LD–2 in LD–1 je odgovor na tveganje tržne manipulacije s strani povezanih udeležencev.
After the Commission expressed reservations about the potential shortcomings of the incentives for operators to be in balance before the delivery year (DY), the French authorities proposed that any significant cumulative rebalancing taking place before the delivery year would be subject to a penalty.
Ti bi namreč lahko umetno zmanjšali svoje število neprodanih certifikatov, tako da bi izvedli notranje prenose.
Moreover, the authorities have proposed to double the ‘k’ incentive coefficient applied to imbalances, and to further increase the penalties for the settlement of imbalances (relating to an ongoing transaction) for imbalances exceeding the upper limit of 1 GW (see recitals 141 and 143).
Francoski organi z uvedbo obveznosti v zvezi z ravnjo certificirane zmogljivosti zagotovijo, da bodo povezani udeleženci morali – tudi pri notranjih prenosih – zagotoviti določeno likvidnost na organiziranem promptnem trgu.
Furthermore, the previous rule stipulates that, as of the beginning of the DY, any rebalancing is subject to payment.
Odločitev, da se določi obveznost v zvezi s certificirano zmogljivostjo na 25 %, zagotavlja, da bodo povezani udeleženci – in zlasti prevladujoči operater – vse ali del svojih certifikatov ponudili na organiziranem promptnem trgu in da se z notranjimi prodajami temu pogoju ne bodo mogli izogniti.
The remedies proposed by France have a common objective to encourage participants in the mechanism to be in balance before the DY begins, and in any event before imbalances are settled.
Ta rešitev je podobna rešitvi z ustvarjanjem trga.
This will encourage participants to carry out the vast majority of required transactions prior to the DY and will also make the MRP more representative (the MRP is used for the settlement of imbalances and for re-invoicing customers).
Uporaba praga (v GW) pri obveznosti, da se določen obseg potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih ponudi na organiziranih dražbah, bo omogočila, da bodo vlogo ustvarjalca trga („market maker“) v mehanizmu prevzeli največji udeleženci, zlasti prvotni operater, s čimer bo zagotovljena stalna likvidnost na dražbah.
As such, the price signal resulting from trading in capacity guarantees will, in our view, be more representative and reliable, and the mechanism will be more credible in terms of encouraging new investment if required.
Francoski organi so tako z zagotovitvijo likvidnosti trga odgovorili na očitek Komisije iz točke 200 obrazložitve sklepa o začetku postopka.
In response to the Commission's criticism that the price cap on the settlement of imbalances does not reflect the CONE, the French authorities have undertaken to gradually increase the administered price (see recitals 146 and 147), so that, by DY 2021, it will match the cost of new entry (CONE).
Francoski organi so splošneje s temi rešitvami odgovorili na pomisleke Komisije glede nepreglednosti mehanizma določanja cene, ki jih je navedla v sklepu o začetku postopka.
This remedy corresponds to market needs and the Commission's request to bring the indirect cap on capacity prices (the administered price) into line with the cost of new entry.
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka menila, da lahko tveganje za izključitev nekaterih udeležencev iz mehanizma, kot so nekatere zmogljivosti za izravnavo (zaradi morebitne diskriminacije med njimi), tuje zmogljivosti ali nove proizvodne zmogljivosti, zaradi manjšega konkurenčnega pritiska povzroči tveganje prekomernega plačevanja nadomestila udeležencem, ki so lahko vključeni v mehanizem.
If required, new investments can therefore be made.
Kakor je bilo pojasnjeno v oddelkih 5.3.2.1, 5.3.2.2 in 5.3.2.3, so se francoski organi zavezali, da bodo sprejeli ustrezne ukrepe za zagotovitev dejanske vključitve različnih zgoraj navedenih udeležencev v mehanizem.
The authorities have also assured the Commission that the spread between the ARENH and the market price for electricity does not constitute an indirect cap on capacity prices (see recitals 149 to 151).
To bo zagotovilo konkurenčnost v okviru mehanizma in bi moralo privesti do cene zmogljivosti, ki izključuje prekomerno nadomestilo.
More specifically, they explained that the volume of capacity guarantees linked to the ARENH product is sufficiently low in relation to the overall capacity market, and therefore cannot influence the price of the other capacity guarantees.
Da bi bila predlagana mehanizma za vključitev čezmejnih zmogljivosti in za sklepanje večletnih pogodb za nove proizvodne zmogljivosti morata biti v skladu s Smernicami, morata biti sorazmerna.
Furthermore, the current spread is such that the ARENH is not a competitive product at the present time.
Mehanizem za vključevanje čezmejnih zmogljivosti je opisan v točkah 119 do 124 obrazložitve tega sklepa.
The Commission noted, however, that the French authorities will examine, during a future assessment of the mechanism, whether it is appropriate to ‘unbundle’ the capacity part of the ARENH product, to ensure that this product does not distort the free setting of prices on the capacity market, if required.
Potem ko bodo za tuje zmogljivosti izdana dovoljenja za povezovanje prek daljnovodov, bodo te neposredno vključene na francoski trg potrdil o zagotovljenih zmogljivostih, tako da bo v primeru presoje, da se na tem trgu ne plačuje prekomerno nadomestilo, to veljalo tudi za prodajo navedenih potrdil s strani tujih zmogljivosti.
Conclusion on signals for new investments
V okviru mehanizma, uvedenega za vključitev tujih zmogljivostih, bodo lahko tudi povezovalne zmogljivosti prejele določeno plačilo zaradi prodaje dovoljenj za povezovanje prek daljnovodov.
The various remedies proposed to provide better incentives for new investment are in line with paragraph 226 of the EEAG.
Ker je mogoče oceniti, da bo sodelovanje na navedenih dražbah zelo obsežno (sodelujejo lahko vse zmogljivosti za izravnavo in proizvodne zmogljivosti za električno energijo sosednje države članice, povezane prek povezovalnih daljnovodov), zlasti če se upošteva obseg dovoljenj, za katera je mogoče pričakovati, da bodo ponujena na dražbi, je mogoče ugotoviti, da te dražbe ne bodo povzročile prekomernega nadomestila.
In particular, France will implement measures to ensure the participation of cross-border capacities and to encourage new investments, which will open up the mechanism to many potential capacity operators.
Ta mehanizem je zato sorazmeren.
The Commission's other objections
Mehanizem, ki so ga predlagali francoski organi za vključitev novih zmogljivosti na francoski trg zmogljivosti, je opisan v točkah 131 do 138 obrazložitve tega sklepa.
The French authorities clarified, to the Commission's satisfaction, the reasons for their adopting, where applicable, the various proposed improvements to the mechanism put forward by the Competition Authority.
Komisija v zvezi s sorazmernostjo navedenega mehanizma meni, da izključuje vsako prekomerno nadomestilo v korist novih zmogljivosti.
Conclusion on the appropriateness of the measure
Natančneje, ponudbe teh zmogljivosti bodo vsekakor morale biti nižje od prvotne referenčne cene, ki sama ustreza povprečni ceni, izhajajoči iz različnih konkurenčnih procesov (predlaga se, da se izračuna kot aritmetična povprečna cena zmogljivosti, izhajajoča iz dražbe, organizirane v LD–4, pa tudi iz dražb, organiziranih v LD–2 in tekočem LD–1).
In the light of the above considerations, the measure is an appropriate means of meeting the identified objective of common interest.
To, da dobavitelji novih zmogljivosti ob predložitvi svojih ponudb ne bodo vedeli za natančno prvotno referenčno ceno, bi moralo zagotoviti, da bodo ponudbe čim nižje, da bi bile konkurenčne.
Incentive effect
Ker udeleženci ob predložitvi svojih ponudb ne bodo vedeli, ali so bile druge ponudbe za nove zmogljivosti že predložene, bodo omejitve obsega za nove zmogljivosti ponudnike torej spodbudile k temu, da za svoje naložbe ponudijo čim nižjo ceno.
In recital 184 of the Opening Decision, the Commission had already concluded that the mechanism could have the required incentive effect.
Komisija zato meni, da bi moralo biti tveganje prekomernega nadomestila nično, kar zadeva nove naložbe; ta mehanizem je zato sorazmeren.
It stands by this conclusion.
Kakor je bilo pojasnjeno v točki 64(4) obrazložitve, je bojazen Komisije, da bi EDF lahko zlahka manipulirala s cenami zmogljivostmi v svojo korist, temeljila na treh vrstah tveganja, precej značilnih za mehanizem (pri čemer naj bi nekatera lahko uresničili vsi udeleženci):