natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
seriousness of infringement (SI or VSI);
o določitvi standardnih uvoznih vrednosti za določitev uvozne cene za nekatere vrste sadja in zelenjave
time (at least one rolling year from the date of a control);
ob upoštevanju Uredbe (EU) št. 1308/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 17. decembra 2013 o vzpostavitvi skupne ureditve trgov kmetijskih proizvodov in razveljavitvi uredb Sveta (EGS) št. 922/72, (EGS) št. 234/79, (ES) št. 1037/2001 in (ES) št. 1234/2007 [1],
number of drivers used for the transport activities managed by the transport manager (average per year)
ob upoštevanju Izvedbene uredbe Komisije (EU) št. 543/2011 z dne 7. junija 2011 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1234/2007 za sektorja sadja in zelenjave ter predelanega sadja in zelenjave [2] ter zlasti člena 136(1) Izvedbene uredbe,
The level of infringements against the provisions of the roadworthiness directives shall reflect the classification of deficiencies contained in Annex II of Directive 2014/47/EU, namely: SI = major deficiencies; VSI = dangerous deficiencies; MSI = driving with deficiencies, which creates immediate risk to road safety.
Zato bi morala ta uredba začeti veljati na dan objave v Uradnem listu Evropske unije –
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/405
Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2016/405
determining the quantities to be added to the quantity fixed for the subperiod from 1 July to 30 September 2016 under the tariff quotas opened by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2077 for eggs, egg products and egg albumin originating in Ukraine
o določitvi količin, ki se dodajo količini, določeni za podobdobje od 1. julija do 30. septembra 2016 v okviru tarifnih kvot, ki so z Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2015/2077 odprte za jajca, jajčne proizvode in albumine s poreklom iz Ukrajine
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2077 [2] opened annual tariff quotas for imports of eggs and egg albumin originating in Ukraine.
Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2015/2077 [2] je odprla letne tarifne kvote za uvoz proizvodov iz sektorja jajc, jajčnih proizvodov in albuminov s poreklom iz Ukrajine.
The quantities covered by the applications for import licences lodged from 1 to 7 March 2016 for the subperiod from 1 April to 30 June 2016 are less than those available.
Količine iz zahtevkov za uvozna dovoljenja, vloženih od 1. do 7. marca 2016 za podobdobje od 1. aprila do 30. junija 2016, so nižje od razpoložljivih količin.
The quantities for which import licence applications have not been lodged pursuant to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2077, to be added to the subperiod from 1 July to 30 September 2016, are set out in the Annex to this Regulation.
Količine, za katere zahtevki za uvozna dovoljenja niso bili vloženi na podlagi Izvedbene uredbe (EU) 2015/2077 in ki jih je treba dodati količinam za podobdobje od 1. julija do 30. septembra 2016, so navedene v Prilogi k tej uredbi.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2077 of 18 November 2015 opening and providing for the administration of Union import tariff quotas for eggs, egg products and albumins originating in Ukraine (OJ L 302, 19.11.2015, p. 57).
Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2015/2077 z dne 18. novembra 2015 o odprtju in upravljanju uvoznih tarifnih kvot Unije za jajca, jajčne proizvode in albumine s poreklom iz Ukrajine (UL L 302, 19.11.2015, str. 57).
Quantities not applied for, to be added to the quantities available for the subperiod from 1 July to 30 September 2016
Količine, za katere niso bili vloženi zahtevki in ki jih je treba dodati razpoložljivim količinam za podobdobje od 1. julija do 30. septembra 2016
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/406
Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2016/406
determining the quantities to be added to the quantity fixed for the subperiod from 1 July to 30 September 2016 under the tariff quotas opened by Regulation (EC) No 1384/2007 for poultrymeat originating in Israel
o določitvi količin, ki jih je treba dodati količini, določeni za podobdobje od 1. julija do 30. septembra 2016 v okviru tarifnih kvot, ki so z Uredbo (ES) št. 1384/2007 odprte za perutninsko meso s poreklom iz Izraela
The quantities covered by the applications for import licences lodged from 1 to 7 March 2016 for the subperiod from 1 April to 30 June 2016 are less than those available.
Količine v zahtevkih za uvozna dovoljenja, vloženih od 1. do 7. marca 2016 za podobdobje od 1. aprila do 30. junija 2016, so nižje od razpoložljivih količin.
The quantities for which import licence applications have not been lodged pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1384/2007, to be added to the subperiod from 1 July to 30 September 2016, are set out in the Annex to this Regulation.
Količine, za katere zahtevki za uvozna dovoljenja niso bili vloženi v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1384/2007 in ki jih je treba dodati količinam za podobdobje od 1. julija do 30. septembra 2016, so navedene v Prilogi k tej uredbi.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/415
Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2016/415
of 21 March 2016
z dne 21. marca 2016
withdrawing the acceptance of the undertaking for two exporting producers and repealing Decision 2008/577/EC accepting an undertaking offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia
o umiku sprejetja zaveze dveh proizvajalcev izvoznikov in razveljavitvi Sklepa 2008/577/ES o sprejetju zavez, ponujenih v zvezi s protidampinškim postopkom glede uvoza amonijevega nitrata s poreklom iz Rusije
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community [1] (the ‘basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 8 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1225/2009 z dne 30. novembra 2009 o zaščiti proti dampinškemu uvozu iz držav, ki niso članice Evropske skupnosti [1] („osnovna uredba“), in zlasti člena 8 Uredbe,
The Council, by Regulation (EC) No 2022/95 [2], imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia.
Svet je z Uredbo (ES) št. 2022/95 [2] uvedel dokončno protidampinško dajatev za uvoz amonijevega nitrata s poreklom iz Rusije.
Following an expiry and interim review, the Council, by Regulation (EC) No 658/2002 [3], imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia.
Po pregledu zaradi izteka ukrepa in vmesnem pregledu je Svet z Uredbo (ES) št. 658/2002 [3] uvedel dokončno protidampinško dajatev za uvoz amonijevega nitrata s poreklom iz Rusije.
Following another expiry and interim review, the Council, by Regulation (EC) No 661/2008 [4], imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia.
Po še enem pregledu zaradi izteka ukrepa in vmesnem pregledu je Svet z Uredbo (ES) št. 661/2008 [4] uvedel dokončno protidampinško dajatev za uvoz amonijevega nitrata s poreklom iz Rusije.
Following another expiry review the Commission, by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 999/2014 [5], imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia.
Po še enem pregledu zaradi izteka ukrepa je Komisija z Izvedbeno uredbo (ES) št. 999/2014 [5] uvedla dokončno protidampinško dajatev na uvoz amonijevega nitrata s poreklom iz Rusije.
The Commission, by Decision 2008/577/EC [6] (‘the Decision’) accepted a price undertaking (‘the undertaking’), inter alia, from the Russian producers JSC Acron and JSC Dorogobuzh, members of Acron Holding Company (referred to jointly as Acron) concerning imports of ammonium nitrate produced by these companies and sold to the first independent customer in the Union.
Komisija je s Sklepom 2008/577/ES [6] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sklep) med drugim sprejela cenovno zavezo ruskih proizvajalcev JSC Acron in JSC Dorogobuzh, ki spadata pod družbo Acron Holding Company (v nadaljnjem besedilu skupaj: družba Acron), glede uvoza amonijevega nitrata, ki ga ti podjetji proizvajata in prodata prvi neodvisni stranki v Uniji.
By the same Decision, the Commission also accepted an undertaking from Open Joint Stock Company (OJSC) Azot Cherkassy, Ukraine.
Z istim sklepom je Komisija tudi sprejela zavezo podjetja Open Joint Stock Company (OJSC) Azot Cherkassy iz Ukrajine.
Measures on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Ukraine expired on 17 June 2012 [7], thus the related undertaking also expired on the same day.
Ukrepi za uvoz amonijevega nitrata s poreklom iz Ukrajine so prenehali veljati 17. junija 2012 [7], s čimer je isti dan prenehala veljati tudi s tem povezana zaveza.
By the same Decision, the Commission also accepted an undertaking from EuroChem group.
Z istim sklepom je Komisija sprejela tudi zavezo skupine EuroChem.
By Decision 2012/629/EU [8], the Commission withdrew its acceptance of the undertaking offered by the EuroChem Group because of the impracticability of the undertaking.
Komisija je s Sklepom 2012/629/EU [8] umaknila svoje sprejetje zaveze, ki jo je ponudila skupina EuroChem, in sicer zaradi nezmožnosti zaveze družbe.
The undertaking accepted from Acron is based on three elements, namely (1) an indexation of the minimum prices in accordance with public international quotations, (2) a quantitative ceiling and (3) a commitment not to sell the products covered by the undertaking to the same customers in the European Union to which they sell other products, with the exception of certain other products for which Acron undertook to respect specific price regimes.
Zaveza, sprejeta s strani družbe Acron temelji na treh elementih, in sicer (1) indeksaciji minimalnih cen v skladu z javnimi mednarodnimi kotacijami, (2) količinski zgornji meji in (3) obveznosti, da ne prodaja izdelkov, zajetih v zavezi, istim strankam v Evropsko unijo, katerim že prodaja druge izdelke, razen nekaterih izdelkov, za katere se je družba Acron zavezala, da bo upoštevala posebni cenovni režim.
As referred to in recital (14) of Decision 2008/577/EC, when accepting the undertaking, the sales structure of Acron was such that the Commission considered the risk of circumventing the undertaking as limited.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 14 Sklepa 2008/577/ES, je bila prodajna struktura družbe Acron ob sprejetju zaveze takšna, da je Komisija menila, da je tveganje izogibanja zavezi omejeno.
Acron's business relationships
Acronove poslovne povezave
In May 2012, Acron informed the Commission of its intention to acquire stake in a chemical company in the Union.
Acron je maja 2012 seznanil Komisijo, da namerava pridobiti delež v kemičnem podjetju v Uniji.
In August 2012, Acron informed the Commission of a change in its corporate structure, namely that it acquired minority shares in this chemical company in the Union, indicating that this corporate change had no repercussions on the implementation of the undertaking.
Družba Acron je avgusta 2012 obvestila Komisijo o spremembi strukture svojega podjetja, in sicer da je pridobila manjšinski delež tega kemičnega podjetja v Uniji, pri čemer je zatrdila, da ta sprememba podjetja ne vpliva na izvajanje zaveze.
After assessing the evidence provided by Acron, the Commission did not initially consider that this change in Acron's corporate structure had an impact on the undertaking.
Komisija sprva, ko je ocenila dokaz, ki ga je predložila družba Acron, ni menila, da ta sprememba v strukturi podjetja vpliva na zavezo.
However, new evidence currently available to the Commission shows that Acron had submitted incomplete information when originally informing the Commission of the change in its structure.
Vendar je iz novih dokazov, ki so trenutno na voljo Komisiji, razvidno, da Acron ni predložil popolnih informacij, ko je prvotno obvestil Komisijo o spremembi v svoji strukturi.
In particular, the Commission had not been informed that this Union producer manufactures and sells not only chemical products, but also fertilizers including ammonium nitrate.
Komisija namreč ni bila obveščena, da ta proizvajalec iz Unije ne proizvaja in prodaja zgolj kemijskih proizvodov, ampak tudi gnojila, vključno z amonijevim nitratom.
Furthermore, the evidence currently available to the Commission also showed that Acron's shareholding further increased since it was notified to the Commission in August 2012.
Poleg tega je iz dokazov, ki jih ima trenutno na voljo Komisija, razvidno tudi, da se je lastniški delež družbe Acron dodatno povečal v obdobju po njegovi priglasitvi Komisiji avgusta 2012.
Preliminary assessment
Predhodna ocena
The Commission analysed the implications of the evidence available to it, and considered that there is a high risk of cross-compensation.
Komisija je analizirala posledice dokazov, ki jih ima na voljo, in meni, da obstaja visoko tveganje navzkrižne kompenzacije.
Indeed, if the fertilizer production and sales facility in the Union, in which Acron's acquired shares, sells any of its products to the same customers as Acron, the prices for such transactions could be set in a way to compensate for the Minimum Import Price subject to the undertaking.
Če bi namreč obrat za proizvodnjo in prodajo gnojil v Uniji, katerega delnice je pridobila družba Acron, prodal svoje proizvode istim strankam kot Acron, se cene za takšne transakcije lahko določijo tako, da izravnajo minimalno uvozno ceno, za katero velja zaveza.
Such a compensation would however not be identifiable by monitoring activities since the price structure for the majority of products produced by the fertilizer production and sales facility in which Acron's acquired shares is not subject to any publicly available source.
Takšne izravnave pa ne bi bilo mogoče ugotoviti z dejavnostmi spremljanja, ker struktura cen za večino izdelkov, ki jih proizvede obrat za proizvodnjo in prodajo gnojil, katerega delnice je pridobila družba Acron, ni navedena v nobenem javno dostopnem viru.
Thus it cannot be assessed whether the prices paid by the customers respond to the value of the products or take into account a potential rebate in order to compensate transactions subject to the undertaking for which a Minimum Import Price has to be respected.
Zato ni mogoče oceniti, ali cene, ki jih plačujejo stranke, ustrezajo vrednosti proizvodov in ali so upoštevani možni popusti, ki bi izravnali transakcije, za katere velja zaveza in pri katerih je treba upoštevati najnižje uvozne cene.
Consequently, the monitoring of the undertaking would become impracticable and unworkable.
Posledično bi spremljanje zaveze postalo neizvedljivo in ne bi delovalo.
The Commission informed Acron accordingly and announced that, in light of the circumstances described in recitals (7) and (8), it considered that the undertaking should be withdrawn.
Komisija je v skladu s tem obvestila družbo Acron in objavila mnenje, da bi bilo treba glede na okoliščine iz uvodnih izjav 7 in 8, zavezo umakniti.
Acron was given an opportunity to comment.
Družbi Acron je bila dana možnost, da poda svoje pripombe.
C. WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS AND HEARING
C. PISNA STALIŠČA IN ZASLIŠANJE
Acron submitted written submissions and was granted the opportunity to be heard.
Družba Acron je predložila pisna stališča in je dobila možnost za zaslišanje.
In response to the disclosure document, Acron reiterated the arguments already submitted when it was first informed of the incompliance of the undertaking with its shareholding in a Union producer of fertilizers.
V odgovor na dokument o razkritju je Acron ponovil argumente, ki jih je že predložil, ko je bil prvič obveščen, da njegova zaveza ni v skladu z njegovim lastništvom deleža v proizvajalcu gnojil v Uniji.
Those arguments have been addressed in the disclosure document and are also addressed in this Regulation.
Te trditve so bile obravnavane v dokumentu o razkritju in se obravnavajo tudi v tej uredbi.
Several parties have sent written submissions to the Commission supporting Acron's position (they however were not the addressees of the Commission's disclosure and request for comments).
Več strank je Komisiji poslalo pisna stališča, v katerih so podprle stališče družbe Acron (čeprav niso bile prejemnice razkritja Komisije in njenega zahtevka za pripombe).
These parties stated that they have not been involved in cross-compensation practices with Acron.
Te stranke so zatrdile, da z Acronom niso sodelovale pri navzkrižni kompenzaciji.
However, such statements per se do not alleviate the risk of cross compensation.
Vendar takšne izjave same po sebi ne odpravljajo tveganja navzkrižne kompenzacije.
In any event, it is standing practice of the Commission not to accept price undertakings if the risk of cross-compensation is high, regardless of whether or not a cross-compensation actually took place.
V vsakem primeru je stalna praksa Komisije, da ne sprejema cenovnih zavez, če je tveganje navzkrižne kompenzacije visoko ne glede na to, ali je do navzkrižne kompenzacije dejansko prišlo ali ne.
Acron claimed to have been acting in good faith when it informed the Commission, in accordance with the definition of related party and pursuant to clause 5.14 of the undertaking, of some changes in its corporate structure.
Družba Acron je trdila, da je ravnala v dobri veri, ko je v skladu z opredelitvijo povezane stranke in klavzulo 5.14 zaveze obvestila Komisijo o nekaterih spremembah v svoji strukturi podjetja.
In addition, Acron claimed that it should be considered as a financial investor in the Union company and that its shareholding conferred to Acron only limited statutory rights in decision making, therefore not giving Acron control over the Union company in the sense of Union competition law.
Poleg tega družba Acron meni, da bi jo bilo treba obravnavati kot finančnega vlagatelja v podjetje v Uniji in da ji njen lastniški delež daje le omejene statutorne pravice pri odločanju, zato Acron nima nadzora nad podjetjem v Uniji v smislu konkurenčnega prava Unije.
Acron underlined that Union law and the national competition laws do not allow exchanging commercially sensitive information or coordinating sales with its competitors in the Union or elsewhere, which would be indispensable for any cross-compensation.
Družba Acron je poudarila, da pravo Unije in nacionalni zakoni s področja konkurence ne omogočajo izmenjave poslovno občutljivih podatkov ali usklajevanja prodaje s konkurenti v Uniji ali zunaj nje, kar bi bilo nujno za vsakršno navzkrižno kompenzacijo.
The Commission considers that Acron's arguments should be rejected for the following reasons.
Komisija meni, da argumenti družbe Acron niso sprejemljivi iz naslednjih razlogov:
Firstly, the Undertaking, offered by Acron, contains a definition of related party.
Prvič, zaveza, ki jo je ponudil Acron, vsebuje opredelitev povezane stranke.
As stipulated in Clause 1 of the undertaking, holding 5 % or more of shares in another company is sufficient to be considered as a related party; this is the benchmark that should be taken into account when assessing the monitorability and practicability of the undertaking.
Kot je določeno v prvi klavzuli zaveze, lastništvo 5 % ali več delnic v drugem podjetju zadostuje, da se imetnik delnic obravnava kot povezana stranka; to je referenčno merilo, ki bi ga bilo treba upoštevati pri oceni možnosti spremljanja in izvedljivosti zaveze.
Moreover, the Commission re-iterates the problems of cross-compensation referred to in recital (8).
Poleg tega Komisija ponovno izpostavlja težave navzkrižne kompenzacije iz uvodne izjave 8.
In addition, it cannot be excluded that some of the price quotations (being the basis for the price indexation mechanism of the undertaking) could be influenced by sales of the related producer in the Union.
Poleg tega ni mogoče izključiti, da bi na nekatere navedene cene (ki so podlaga za mehanizem indeksacije cen zaveze) lahko vplivala prodaja povezanih proizvajalcev v Uniji.
Acron itself admitted that shareholdings in the Union producer create a presumption of the existence of a risk of cross-compensation, although rebuttable.
Acron je sam priznal, da deleži v proizvajalcu v Uniji ustvarjajo predpostavko, da obstaja tveganje navzkrižne kompenzacije, četudi je ta ovrgljiva.
Considerations based on competition law, be it national or that of the Union, that such behaviour is theoretically not in Acron's interest, are not relevant for the assessment of the monitorability and practicability of the undertaking.
Pomisleki, ki temeljijo na nacionalnem pravu konkurence ali pravu konkurence Unije, da tovrstno ravnanje teoretično ni v interesu Acrona, niso relevantni za oceno možnosti spremljanja in izvedljivosti zaveze.
Indeed, such considerations do not per se alleviate the risk of cross-compensation.
Takšni pomisleki sami po sebi dejansko ne zmanjšujejo tveganja navzkrižne kompenzacije.
Acron claimed that cross-compensation is neither in its own commercial interest nor in the commercial interest of the related Union producer.
Acron je trdil, da navzkrižna kompenzacija ni v njegovem poslovnem interesu niti v poslovnem interesu povezanega proizvajalca v Uniji.
This statement per se does not alleviate the risk of cross-compensation, notably because the notion of commercial interest cannot be assessed in abstract terms.
Ta izjava sama po sebi ne zmanjšuje tveganja navzkrižne kompenzacije, zlasti ker pojma poslovnega interesa ni mogoče oceniti v abstraktnem smislu.
Further, according to the Commission's assessment, the incentives for cross-compensation cannot be excluded as both the related Union producer and Acron sell in the Union other products than ammonium nitrate potentially to the same customers.
Poleg tega Komisija ocenjuje, da ni mogoče izključiti spodbud za navzkrižno kompenzacijo, saj lahko tako povezani proizvajalec v Uniji kot Acron v Uniji istim strankam prodajata druge izdelke poleg amonijevega nitrata.
It would be impracticable, if not impossible, to trace such sales in the Union.
Izslediti takšno prodajo v Uniji bi bilo težko izvedljivo, če ne celo nemogoče.
In this respect, it is worth noting the complex structure of Acron's and the related Union producer's company groups.
V zvezi s tem velja omeniti kompleksno strukturo skupin Acrona in povezanega proizvajalca v Uniji.
Thus, a high risk of cross-compensation exists with sales of ammonium nitrate or other products to the same customers.
Zato obstaja veliko tveganje navzkrižne kompenzacije pri prodaji amonijevega nitrata ali drugih izdelkov istim strankam.
Secondly, the Union based producer cannot be subject to monitoring activities as it cannot be party to an undertaking since according to Article 8 of the basic Regulation undertakings can be offered only by exporters.
Drugič, proizvajalec v Uniji ne more biti predmet spremljanja, saj ne more biti stranka v zavezi, ker lahko v skladu s členom 8 osnovne uredbe zaveze ponudijo le izvozniki;
Thirdly, even if the Union producer could be party to the undertaking, quod non, the monitoring of such an undertaking would be impracticable as stated in recitals (8) and (19) above.
Tretjič, tudi če bi proizvajalec v Uniji lahko bil stranka v zavezi, kar v danem primeru ni, takšne zaveze ne bi bilo mogoče spremljati, kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 8 in 19 zgoraj.
Therefore, based on the evidence available to it, it is concluded that following the change in the corporate structure of Acron, there is a high risk of cross-compensation and the undertaking accepted from Acron becomes impracticable and therefore should be withdrawn.
Zato je na podlagi razpoložljivih dokazov mogoče sklepati, da po spremembi strukture podjetja Acron obstaja veliko tveganje navzkrižne kompenzacije in da zaveza, ki jo je sprejela družba Acron, postane neizvedljiva in bi jo zato bilo treba umakniti.
Finally, Acron suggested the implementation of an additional monitoring mechanism in the context of the undertaking.
Končno, Acron predlaga uvedbo dodatnega mehanizma spremljanja v okviru zaveze.
Specifically, Acron offered to regularly provide to the Commission an audited report on the cash-flows between the two company groups.
Acron je zlasti ponudil, da bo Komisiji redno pošiljal revidirano poročilo o denarnih tokovih med obema skupinama podjetij.