natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Article 3
Nakupi tržnih dolžniških instrumentov, ki jih je izdala ali zanje v celoti jamči Helenska republika, v skladu s Sklepom (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/10) se izvajajo – v skladu s členom 5(3) navedenega sklepa in v okviru omejitev, ki jih določi Svet ECB v skladu z navedenim členom – po tem, ko Svet ECB pozitivno oceni napredek pri analiziranju in krepitvi vzdržnosti javnega dolga Grčije ter druge vidike obvladovanja tveganj.
PSPP purchases
Člen 4
Purchases of marketable debt securities issued or fully guaranteed by the central government of the Hellenic Republic pursuant to Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/10) shall be conducted — in line with Article 5(3) of that Decision and within the limits to be set by the Governing Council in accordance therewith — following a positive assessment by the Governing Council of the progress made in the analysis and reinforcement of the sustainability of Greece's public debt and other risk management considerations.
Razveljavitev
Article 4
Sklep (EU) 2015/300 (ECB/2015/6) se razveljavi.
Repeal
Člen 5
Decision (EU) 2015/300 (ECB/2015/6) is hereby repealed.
Končni določbi
Article 5
Ta sklep začne veljati 29. junija 2016.
Final provisions
V primeru razhajanj med tem sklepom, Sklepom (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/10) in Smernico (EU) 2015/510 (ECB/2014/60) ali Smernico ECB/2014/31, kakor ju nacionalne centralne banke držav članic, katerih valuta je euro, izvedejo na nacionalni ravni, prevlada ta sklep.
This Decision shall enter into force on 29 June 2016.
V Frankfurtu na Majni, 22. junija 2016
In the event of any discrepancy between this Decision, Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/10) and any of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 (ECB/2014/60) and Guideline ECB/2014/31, as implemented at national level by the national central banks of Member States whose currency is the euro, this Decision shall prevail.
Predsednik ECB
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 June 2016.
UL L 91, 2.4.2015, str.
OJ L 91, 2.4.2015, p.
UL L 240, 13.8.2014, str. 28.
3.
UL L 121, 14.5.2015, str.
OJ L 240, 13.8.2014, p.
20.
28.
Sklep Evropske centralne banke (EU) 2015/300 z dne 10. februarja 2015 o primernosti tržnih dolžniških instrumentov, ki jih izdaja ali zanje v celoti jamči Helenska republika (ECB/2015/6) (UL L 53, 25.2.2015, str.
OJ L 121, 14.5.2015, p.
29).
Decision (EU) 2015/300 of the European Central Bank of 10 February 2015 on the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic (ECB/2015/6) (OJ L 53, 25.2.2015, p.
SEZNAM ODBITKOV, KI SE UPORABLJAJO ZA TRŽNE DOLŽNIŠKE INSTRUMENTE, KI JIH JE IZDALA ALI ZANJE V CELOTI JAMČI HELENSKA REPUBLIKA
29)
Državne obveznice
ANNEX
Preostala zapadlost (leta)
HAIRCUT SCHEDULE APPLYING TO MARKETABLE DEBT INSTRUMENTS ISSUED OR FULLY GUARANTEED BY THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC
Odbitki pri obveznicah s fiksnimi in variabilnimi kuponi
Government bonds
Odbitki pri brezkuponskih obveznicah
Residual maturity (years)
3–5
Haircuts for fixed coupons and floaters
5–7
Haircuts for zero coupon
7–10
3-5
Bančne obveznice, za katere jamči država, in obveznice nefinančnih družb, za katere jamči država
Decision (EU) 2016/1162 of the European Central Bank
Sklep Evropske centralne banke (EU) 2016/1162
of 30 June 2016
z dne 30. junija 2016
on disclosure of confidential information in the context of criminal investigations (ECB/2016/19)
o razkritju zaupnih informacij v okviru preiskovanja kaznivih dejanj (ECB/2016/19)
Having regard to Decision ECB/2004/2 of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank [1], and in particular Articles 23 and 23a thereof,
ob upoštevanju Sklepa ECB/2004/2 z dne 19. februarja 2004 o sprejetju Poslovnika Evropske centralne banke [1] ter zlasti členov 23 in 23a Sklepa,
With the establishment of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM), both the European Central Bank (ECB) and national competent authorities (NCAs) could receive requests from national criminal investigation authorities for the disclosure of confidential information created or received in the course of carrying out their supervisory tasks and responsibilities.
Od vzpostavitve enotnega mehanizma nadzora (EMN) lahko Evropska centralna banka (ECB) in pristojni nacionalni organi od nacionalnih organov za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj prejmejo zahteve za razkritje zaupnih informacij, ki jih ustvarijo ali prejmejo pri izvajanju nadzorniških nalog in odgovornosti.
Pursuant to Article 136 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/17) [2], where, in carrying out its tasks under Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 [3], the ECB has reason to suspect that a criminal offence may have been committed, it will request the relevant NCA to refer the matter to the appropriate authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution, in accordance with national law.
V skladu s členom 136 Uredbe (EU) št. 468/2014 Evropske centralne banke (ECB/2014/17) [2] ECB, kadar pri opravljanju svojih nalog po Uredbi Sveta (EU) št. 1024/2013 [3] ugotovi, da obstaja razlog za sum, da je bilo morda storjeno kaznivo dejanje, od zadevnega pristojnega nacionalnega organa zahteva, da predloži zadevo ustreznim organom v preiskavo in morebiten kazenski pregon v skladu z nacionalnim pravom.
There is a history of cooperation between NCAs and national criminal investigation authorities in dealing with access to confidential information about supervised entities or supervised groups, within the meaning of Article 2(20) and Article 2(21), respectively, of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17), in accordance with national law.
Pristojni nacionalni organi in nacionalni organi za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj so že do sedaj sodelovali na področju dostopa do zaupnih informacij o nadzorovanih subjektih ali nadzorovanih skupinah v smislu člena 2(20) oziroma člena 2(21) Uredbe (EU) št. 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17) v skladu z nacionalnim pravom.
The conditions for such cooperation and for disclosure of confidential information to national criminal investigation authorities are largely determined by national law.
Pogoji takega sodelovanja in razkritja zaupnih informacij nacionalnim organom za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj so večinoma določeni v nacionalnem pravu.
However, Union law has certain implications for the conditions under which confidential information held by competent authorities, including the ECB, within the SSM may be disclosed to national criminal investigation authorities upon their request.
Vendar pravo Unije v nekaterih vidikih vpliva na pogoje, pod katerimi se lahko zaupne informacije, ki jih imajo pristojni organi v EMN, vključno z ECB, razkrijejo nacionalnim organom za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj na njihovo zahtevo.
Those Union law provisions establish, for example, the principle of sincere cooperation, the principles of cooperation in good faith and the obligation to exchange information within the SSM, the obligation to protect personal data and the obligation of professional secrecy.
Te določbe prava Unije določajo na primer načelo lojalnega sodelovanja, načelo sodelovanja v dobri veri in obveznost izmenjave informacij v okviru EMN, obveznost varstva osebnih podatkov in obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti.
In addition to applying to the disclosure of confidential information related to the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, including information held by an NCA when assisting the ECB in the exercise of the ECB's tasks under that Regulation, such conditions may in principle also apply to disclosure of confidential information related to monetary policy and other ESCB/Eurosystem-related tasks.
Poleg tega, da se ti pogoji uporabljajo za razkritje zaupnih informacij, ki so povezane z nalogami, prenesenimi na ECB z Uredbo (EU) št. 1024/2013, vključno z informacijami, ki jih ima pristojni nacionalni organ, kadar pomaga ECB pri opravljanju nalog po navedeni uredbi, se lahko načeloma uporabljajo tudi za razkritje zaupnih informacij, ki so povezane z denarno politiko in drugimi nalogami, povezanimi z ESCB/Eurosistemom.
The ECB should uphold its duty of professional secrecy and its duty to safeguard its functioning and independence.
ECB bi morala spoštovati dolžnost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti ter dolžnost, da zaščiti svoje delovanje in neodvisnost.
In addition, the ECB should continue to respect the public interest and certain private interests, which includes refraining from disclosing certain documents or information where such disclosure would undermine those interests.
Poleg tega bi morala ECB še naprej spoštovati javni interes in nekatere zasebne interese, kar vključuje nerazkritje nekaterih dokumentov ali informacij, kadar bi razkritje ogrozilo te interese.
However, these duties should not lead to an absolute prohibition on disclosure by the ECB to national criminal investigation authorities of confidential information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.
Vendar te dolžnosti ne bi smele povzročiti absolutne prepovedi tega, da bi ECB nacionalnim organom za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj razkrila zaupne informacije, za katere velja obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti.
Union law provides that confidentiality of certain information or documents must be protected, including personal data, and, subject to certain exceptions, prohibits disclosure to third parties of confidential information or documents.
Pravo Unije določa, da je treba varovati zaupnost nekaterih informacij in dokumentov, vključno z osebnimi podatki, ter ob upoštevanju nekaterih izjem prepoveduje razkritje zaupnih informacij in dokumentov tretjim osebam.
In particular, pursuant to the rules on professional secrecy contained in Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [4], confidential information received in the course of their duties by ‘persons working for or who have worked for competent authorities, and auditors or experts acting on behalf of competent authorities’, may be disclosed only in summary or aggregate form, such that individual credit institutions cannot be identified, without prejudice to cases covered by criminal law.
Zlasti lahko v skladu s pravili o poklicni skrivnosti iz Direktive 2013/36/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [4] „osebe, ki delajo ali so delale za pristojne organe, in revizorj[i] ali strokovnjak[i], ki delajo v imenu pristojnih organov“, razkrijejo zaupne informacije, ki jih prejmejo med opravljanjem svojih nalog, le v obliki povzetka ali zbirnih informacij, tako da posameznih kreditnih institucij ni mogoče prepoznati, brez poseganja v primere, za katere velja kazensko pravo.
Pursuant to Article 37.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, persons having access to data covered by Union legislation imposing an obligation of secrecy should be subject to such legislation.
V skladu s členom 37.2 Statuta Evropskega sistema centralnih bank in Evropske centralne banke se morajo za osebe z dostopom do podatkov, ki so predmet predpisov Unije o obveznosti varovanja skrivnosti, uporabljati ti predpisi.
A procedural framework for the management of requests received by the ECB, NCAs or national central banks (NCBs) from national criminal investigation authorities for confidential information related to the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, including information held by an NCA or NCB when assisting the ECB in the exercise of the ECB's tasks under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, or related to monetary policy and other ESCB/Eurosystem-related tasks has not yet been established in Union law.
V pravu Unije še ni bil vzpostavljen postopkovni okvir za ravnanje z zahtevami, ki jih ECB, pristojni nacionalni organi ali nacionalne centralne banke (NCB) prejmejo od nacionalnih organov za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj in se nanašajo na zaupne informacije v zvezi z nalogami, prenesenimi na ECB z Uredbo (EU) št. 1024/2013, vključno z informacijami, ki jih imajo pristojni nacionalni organi ali NCB, kadar pomagajo ECB pri opravljanju nalog po Uredbi (EU) št. 1024/2013, ali v zvezi z denarno politiko in drugimi nalogami, povezanimi z ESCB/Eurosistemom.
However, the application of national procedural rules which apply to such requests should be consistent with the general principles of Union law, in particular the principle of sincere cooperation, and the principle of cooperation in good faith and the obligation to exchange information as provided for in Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
Vendar bi morala biti uporaba nacionalnih postopkovnih pravil, ki veljajo za take zahteve, skladna s splošnimi načeli prava Unije, zlasti z načelom lojalnega sodelovanja ter načelom sodelovanja v dobri veri in obveznostjo izmenjave informacij, kakor je določeno v členu 6 Uredbe (EU) št. 1024/2013.
In this regard, in accordance with Union law the ECB would welcome being consulted on or informed of, as appropriate, requests for confidential information related to the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, including information held by an NCA or NCB when assisting the ECB in the exercise of the ECB's tasks under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, or related to monetary policy and other ESCB/Eurosystem-related tasks, which are received by an NCA or NCB from national criminal investigation authorities.
V tej zvezi bi bila ECB v skladu s pravom Unije zadovoljna, če bi se z njo posvetovali oziroma jo obvestili o zahtevah za zaupne informacije v zvezi z nalogami, prenesenimi na ECB z Uredbo (EU) št. 1024/2013, vključno z informacijami, ki jih imajo pristojni nacionalni organi ali NCB, kadar pomagajo ECB pri opravljanju nalog po Uredbi (EU) št. 1024/2013, ali v zvezi z denarno politiko in drugimi nalogami, povezanimi z ESCB/Eurosistemom, kadar take zahteve prejme pristojni nacionalni organ ali NCB od nacionalnih organov za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj.
This Decision should not apply to requests for access to information concerning persons who have an employment relationship with the ECB or a direct or indirect contractual relationship with the ECB for the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services.
Ta sklep se ne bi smel uporabljati za zahteve za dostop do informacij, ki se nanašajo na osebe, ki so z ECB v delovnem razmerju ali v neposrednem ali posrednem pogodbenem razmerju za izvedbo gradenj, dobavo proizvodov ali opravljanje storitev.
This Decision should therefore set out the conditions applied by the ECB with regard to the disclosure by the NCAs and NCBs of confidential information related to the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 or to monetary policy and other ESCB/Eurosystem-related tasks to a national criminal investigation authority and the related procedural framework.
Ta sklep bi moral zato določiti pogoje, ki jih bo ECB uporabljala za razkritje zaupnih informacij v zvezi z nalogami, prenesenimi nanjo z Uredbo (EU) št. 1024/2013, ali v zvezi z denarno politiko in drugimi nalogami, povezanimi z ESCB/Eurosistemom, s strani pristojnih nacionalnih organov in NCB nacionalnemu organu za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj, ter s tem povezan postopkovni okvir.
The ECB's Compliance and Governance Office acts as coordinator, within the ECB, of requests for access to documents falling within the scope of this Decision,
Služba za skladnost s predpisi in upravljanje ECB koordinira zahteve za dostop do dokumentov, ki spadajo v področje uporabe tega sklepa, znotraj ECB –
‘confidential information’ means any confidential information, including information covered by data protection rules, by the obligation of professional secrecy, by the professional secrecy rules contained in Directive 2013/36/EU or documents classified as ‘ECB-CONFIDENTIAL’ or ‘ECB-SECRET’ under the ECB's confidentiality regime, and excluding any information concerning persons who have an employment relationship with the ECB or a direct or indirect contractual relationship with the ECB for the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services;
„zaupne informacije“ pomenijo vse zaupne informacije, vključno z informacijami, za katere veljajo pravila o varstvu podatkov, obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti in pravila o poklicni skrivnosti iz Direktive 2013/36/EU, ter dokumenti, ki imajo v skladu z ureditvijo zaupnosti v ECB oznako „ECB-CONFIDENTIAL“ ali „ECB-SECRET“, razen informacij, ki se nanašajo na osebe, ki so z ECB v delovnem razmerju ali v neposrednem ali posrednem pogodbenem razmerju za izvedbo gradenj, dobavo proizvodov ali opravljanje storitev;
‘national criminal investigation authority’ means a national authority with competence in criminal law matters;
„nacionalni organ za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj“ pomeni nacionalni organ, ki ima pristojnosti v zadevah kazenskega prava;
‘national competent authority’ (NCA) has the same meaning as defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
„pristojni nacionalni organ“ ima enak pomen, kakor je opredeljen v členu 2(2) Uredbe (EU) št. 1024/2013.
This meaning is without prejudice to arrangements under national law that assign certain supervisory tasks to an NCB that is not designated as an NCA.
Ta pomen ne posega v ureditve po nacionalnem pravu, ki dodeljujejo nekatere nadzorniške naloge NCB, ki ni imenovana za pristojni nacionalni organ.
With regard to such arrangements, a reference to an NCA in this Decision shall also refer to the NCB in respect of the supervisory tasks assigned to it by national law.
Z zvezi s takimi ureditvami se sklicevanje na pristojni nacionalni organ v tem sklepu nanaša tudi na NCB glede nadzorniških nalog, ki so ji dodeljene po nacionalnem pravu.
Requests received by the ECB from national criminal investigation authorities
Zahteve nacionalnih organov za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj, ki jih prejme ECB
At the request of a national criminal investigation authority, the ECB may provide confidential information held by it and related to the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, or to monetary policy or other ESCB/Eurosystem-related tasks to an NCA or NCB for disclosure to the national criminal investigation authority in question under the following conditions:
ECB lahko na zahtevo nacionalnega organa za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj predloži zaupne informacije, ki jih ima in so povezane z nalogami, prenesenimi nanjo z Uredbo (EU) št. 1024/2013, ali z denarno politiko ali drugimi nalogami, povezanimi z ESCB/Eurosistemom, pristojnemu nacionalnemu organu ali NCB, da jih ta razkrije zadevnemu nacionalnemu organu za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj, pod naslednjimi pogoji:
the NCA or NCB in question commits to acting on behalf of the ECB in responding to such a request;
zadevni pristojni nacionalni organ ali NCB se zaveže, da bo odgovoril na tako zahtevo v imenu ECB;
either: (i) there is an express obligation to disclose such information to a national criminal investigation authority under Union or national law; or (ii) the relevant legal framework permits the disclosure of such confidential information and there are no overriding reasons for refusing to disclose such information relating to the need to safeguard the interests of the Union or to avoid any interference with the functioning and independence of the ECB, in particular by jeopardising the accomplishment of its tasks;
bodisi (i) pravo Unije ali nacionalno pravo vsebuje izrecno obveznost razkritja takih informacij nacionalnemu organu za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj bodisi (ii) ustrezni pravni okvir dovoljuje razkritje takih zaupnih informacij ter ni prednostnih razlogov za zavrnitev razkritja takih informacij, ki so povezani s tem, da je treba zaščititi interese Unije ali se izogniti poseganju v delovanje in neodvisnost ECB, zlasti takemu, ki bi ogrozilo izpolnjevanje njenih nalog;
the NCA or NCB in question commits to asking the requesting national criminal investigation authority to guarantee the protection from public disclosure of the confidential information provided.
zadevni pristojni nacionalni organ ali NCB se zaveže, da bo od nacionalnega organa za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj zahteval, da zagotovi varstvo predloženih zaupnih informacij pred javnim razkritjem.
Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to any specific provisions under Union or national law related to disclosure of such confidential information.
Odstavek 1 ne posega v nobene posebne določbe po pravu Unije ali nacionalnem pravu, ki se nanašajo na razkritje takih zaupnih informacij.
Requests received by NCAs or NCBs from national criminal investigation authorities
Zahteve nacionalnih organov za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj, ki jih prejmejo pristojni nacionalni organi ali NCB
The ECB shall request the NCAs and NCBs to agree that on receipt of a request from a national criminal investigation authority for disclosure of confidential information related to the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, or to monetary policy or other ESCB/Eurosystem-related tasks, they consult the ECB, where possible, on how to respond to the request, irrespective of whether the ECB, or the NCA or NCB concerned holds the information in question.
ECB od pristojnih nacionalnih organov in NCB zahteva soglasje, da se po prejemu zahteve nacionalnega organa za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj za razkritje zaupnih informacij, ki so povezane z nalogami, prenesenimi na ECB z Uredbo (EU) št. 1024/2013, ali z denarno politiko ali drugimi nalogami, povezanimi z ESCB/Eurosistemom, o odgovoru na zahtevo posvetujejo z ECB, kadar je to mogoče, ne glede na to, ali ima te informacije ECB ali zadevni pristojni nacionalni organ ali NCB.
The ECB shall advise as to whether the information in question may be disclosed, and, where applicable, whether there are overriding reasons relating to the need to safeguard the interests of the Union or to avoid any interference with the functioning and independence of the ECB for refusing to disclose the confidential information concerned.
ECB svetuje, ali se te informacije lahko razkrijejo in, kjer pride v poštev, ali obstajajo prednostni razlogi za zavrnitev razkritja zadevnih zaupnih informacij, ki so povezani s tem, da je treba zaščititi interese Unije ali se izogniti poseganju v delovanje in neodvisnost ECB.
The ECB shall advise the NCA or NCB, provided that it is consulted in a timely manner before the NCA or NCB makes a final decision and provides a final response to the request.
ECB svetuje pristojnemu nacionalnemu organu ali NCB, če se je ta z njo posvetoval pravočasno, preden sprejme končno odločitev in predloži končni odgovor na zahtevo.
The ECB shall request the NCAs to agree to inform the ECB in a timely manner and, in any event, before providing a final response, of requests for confidential information received from national criminal investigation authorities concerning less significant credit institutions directly supervised by the NCA concerned in the exercise of its supervisory responsibilities under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, where that NCA considers that the information requested is material, or that disclosure thereof has the potential to adversely affect the reputation of the SSM.
ECB od pristojnih nacionalnih organov zahteva soglasje, da jo pravočasno in v vsakem primeru pred predložitvijo končnega odgovora obvestijo o zahtevah za zaupne informacije, ki jih prejmejo od nacionalnih organov za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj in se nanašajo na manj pomembne kreditne institucije, ki jih zadevni pristojni nacionalni organ neposredno nadzira pri izvajanju nadzorniških odgovornosti po Uredbi (EU) št. 1024/2013, kadar ta pristojni nacionalni organ meni, da so zahtevane informacije pomembne ali bi njihovo razkritje lahko negativno vplivalo na ugled EMN.
The ECB shall use its best efforts to provide its response by the deadline set by the NCA concerned, provided the deadline is reasonable, objectively justifiable and expires before the NCA takes a final decision and provides a final response to the national criminal investigation authority.
ECB si po najboljših močeh prizadeva predložiti odgovor v roku, ki ga določi zadevni pristojni nacionalni organ, če je rok razumen in objektivno utemeljen ter se izteče, preden pristojni nacionalni organ sprejme končno odločitev in nacionalnemu organu za preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj predloži končni odgovor.