natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the first place, the Commission observes that a rational market operator would have taken into consideration whether it would be more economically rational to liquidate the company or to provide additional capital, bearing in mind the poor financial performance of ENVC between 2000 and 2006 and considering as well the measures already granted by the State to ENVC before the 2006 capital increase (i.e. one of the DGTF loans for an amount of EUR 30 million granted in January/February 2006, the shipbuilding subsidies in excess of EUR 27 million and the professional training subsidies).
Na podlagi tega Komisija ugotavlja, da razumen udeleženec na trgu ENVC ne bi zagotovil dodatnih posojil.
According to the information provided by Portugal, nothing suggests that EMPORDEF made these considerations at the time of carrying out the 2006 capital increase.
Komisija bo zdaj ocenila, ali so posojila DGTF v višini 56 milijonov EUR zagotovila ENVC neupravičeno prednost.
In addition, Portugal notes that according to the restructuring plan prepared by BPI in August 2005, the costs associated to closing down ENVC were estimated at EUR 175 million.
Portugalska navaja, da so bila ta posojila zagotovljena z obrestno mero, vezano na 6-mesečni EURIBOR s spremenljivim razmikom, odvisnim od posamezne pogodbe.
According to Portugal, in view of the fact that liquidation was more onerous than the capital increase, the former line of action was not retained.
Po mnenju Portugalske bi bilo to plačilo zadovoljivo za vlagatelja, s čimer bi izključili prisotnost neupravičene prednosti in državne pomoči.
In this regard, the Commission observes that the estimation made by BPI in the restructuring plan is not backed by evidence.
Portugalska ugotavlja tudi, da so bila posojila DGTF zagotovljena ob upoštevanju knjige naročil ENVC.
On this basis, the Commission is not able to assess the accuracy of this estimation and conclude whether indeed it was more economically rational for EMPORDEF to carry out the capital increase than to proceed to the liquidation of the company.
Komisija se ne more strinjati s Portugalsko, da bi določitev obrestne mere, ki bi ustrezala 6-mesečnemu Euriboru s spremenljivim razmikom, zagotovila združljivost posojil DGTF s trgom.
Moreover, the Commission observes that the restructuring plan prepared by BPI noted that ENVC on its own did not have the capacity to return to viability and that it needed external funds in an amount of EUR 45-50 million in a base case and EUR 70-80 million is a pessimistic case.
Spodnja preglednica 4 povzema skupno obrestno mero, ki se je uporabljala za posojila DGTF ob njihovem podpisu:
The amount of the 2006 capital increase (EUR 24,875 million) remains significantly short from these estimations and would not have allowed ENVC to return to viability.
Preglednica 4
Finally, the Commission takes notes that ENVC was in need of in-depth restructuring as acknowledged by the restructuring plan prepared by BPI.
Skupna obrestna mera, ki se je uporabljala za posojila DGTF
Although the restructuring plan is merely a draft, it already indicates the difficulties of ENVC and the need for additional external funds.
Datum podpisa pogodbe
However, the restructuring plan makes clear that the return of ENVC to viability would significantly depend on the capacity of the management of the company to honour its contracts and the evolution of the shipbuilding markets.
Znesek v EUR
In this respect, the Commission observes that Portugal has provided no evidence that EMPORDEF took these elements into consideration when carrying out the 2006 capital increase, which — in any event — would fall short from the amounts estimated by the restructuring plan to allow the company to return to viability.
esečni EURIBOR (a) (%)
In view of the above, the Commission comes to the conclusion that a prudent market economy operator would not have provided the 2006 capital increase and therefore that it entailed an undue advantage to ENVC.
Razmik [34] (b)
As regards the 2012 and 2013 loans provided by EMPORDEF for a global amount of EUR 101118066,03, it results on the basis of the information provided by Portugal that in the course of 2012 EMPORDEF signed 70 contracts with ENVC, normally short-term with 90-day maturity.
Skupna obrestna mera (a) + (b) (%)
The loans were granted for several different amounts and had different interest rates, mainly 3-month EURIBOR plus a margin.
(plačano v dveh obrokih aprila 2011 in junija 2011)
However, some contracts had a fixed interest rate, in particular the contracts signed from October 2012 onwards (see for example the contracts signed on 30 March 2012 for EUR 16,7 million with an interest rate of 2 %, on 2 November 2012 for EUR 10,570 million with an interest rate of 5,871 % or on 1 December 2012 for EUR 1 million with the same interest rate of 5,871 %).
3,907 % (april 2011)
It also appears that the loan contracts were not collateralised.
3,580 % (junij 2011)
Portugal argues the absence of aid in the DGTF loans given that EMPORDEF applied to ENVC the same interest rates it received from the market.
5,568 (april 2011)
Since in any event EMPORDEF would be considered liable for the debts and liabilities of ENVC, given that it was its sole shareholder, Portugal claims that EMPORDEF did not increase its risk by exposing it further to ENVC.
5,241 (junij 2011)
In the first place, it does not appear that EMPORDEF would be liable for all the debts and liabilities of ENVC, given that EMPORDEF and ENVC are limited liability companies (‘sociedade anónima’).
Da bi ugotovila skladnost obrestnih mer, ki so se uporabljale za posojila DGTF, s trgom, bo Komisija uporabila najboljši razpoložljiv približek referenčne obrestne mere na podlagi takratnih veljavnih pravil.
As a general rule, in limited liability companies the liability of the members (participation holders) is limited to the face value of their shares according to Article 271 of Portuguese Companies Code [33].
Kot je navedeno v oddelku 6.1, Komisija v prvi vrsti meni, da bi ENVC v letih 2006 in 2008 izpolnjevala pogoje za podjetje v težavah.
On this basis, by providing the 2012 and 2013 loans to ENVC, EMPORDEF would have incurred additional risks going beyond its shares in the company.
Zlasti v zvezi s posojilom DGTF leta 2006 je bilo v takratnem veljavnem obvestilu Komisije o načinu določanja referenčnih obrestnih mer in diskontnih stopenj iz leta 1997 [36] ugotovljeno, da bi bilo treba izhodiščno obrestno mero (3,70 % na Portugalskem januarja 2006) [37] povišati za premijo 400 bazičnih točk ali več v razmerah, ki vključujejo posebno tveganje.
In any event, irrespective of the above, the Commission considers that EMPORDEF did not act as a rational market investor when providing the 2012 and 2013 loans to ENVC.
V zvezi s tem Komisija poudarja takratne težave ENVC in dejstvo, da je bila v tehničnem stečaju.
At that point in time, the financial situation of ENVC was extremely difficult: its losses in the previous year had reached EUR 22,70 million (see table 3 above) and its negative equity was of EUR -129,63 million (see recital 63 above).
Prav tako se je v skladu s posojilno pogodbo z DGTF leta 2006 ENVC strinjala, da bo kot zavarovanje uporabila prihodke od gradnje določenih plovil za portugalsko mornarico.
In view of the difficulties of ENVC, the Commission considers that a market economy investor would have assessed the financial situation of ENVC and analysed the ability of the company to pay back the loans and the interests.
Vendar ni jasno, ali bi tržno naravnan posojilodajalec sprejel tako zavarovanje glede na težave ENVC pri izvajanju gradenj z dobičkom in/ali v pogodbenih rokih (v zvezi s tem glej uvodno izjavo 80 in opombo 28).
In this respect, the Commission observes that several financial institutions — in relation to which the Commission has no reason to suspect that they did not operate as market investors — had refused to provide loans directly to ENVC.
Komisija v vsakem primeru ni prejela dokazov, na podlagi katerih bi lahko proučila te pogodbe o gradbenih delih.
This in itself indicates that the markets no longer believed that ENVC would be able to repay the loans.
Zato Komisija meni, da bi bilo razumno uporabiti razliko vsaj 400 bazičnih točk.
By merely replicating the interests it obtained for the loans in the market, EMPORDEF provided an undue advantage to ENVC, since the latter would not have been able to obtain those conditions — as a matter of fact, ENVC did not get any of the loans from the market.
Tako bi veljavna referenčna obrestna mera znašala vsaj 7,70 %, ki je precej višja od obrestne mere 4,198 %, ki jo je dejansko uporabil DGTF.
Although some of the interest rates applied by EMPORDEF to ENVC could appear relatively high (e.g. 3-month EURIBOR plus 8,431 % for the contract signed on 30 May 2012), the Commission considers that no private financial institution would have provided such a loan with no collateralisation to a firm clearly in difficulty.
V zvezi s posojilom DGTF leta 2008 je bilo v takratnem veljavnem sporočilu Komisije o spremembi metode določanja referenčnih obrestnih mer in diskontnih stopenj iz leta 2008 [38] ugotovljeno, da bi bilo treba k izhodiščni obrestni meri (2,05 % na Portugalskem decembra 2008) [39] dodati razliko, ki je odvisna od ocene zadevnega podjetja in ponujene stopnje zavarovanja.
On this basis, the Commission considers that a rational market operator would not have provided additional loans to ENVC.
Tako bi veljavna referenčna obrestna mera znašala vsaj 12,05 %, ki je prav tako višja od obrestne mere 4,417 %, ki jo je dejansko uporabil DGTF.
The Commission therefore concludes that the 2012 and 2013 loans entailed an undue advantage to ENVC.
V zvezi s posojili DGTF iz let 2010 in 2011 Komisija ponovno poudarja mnenje, da je ENVC med odobritvijo posojil izpolnjevala pogoje za podjetje v težavah (glej oddelek 6.1).
The Commission will now assess whether the DGTF loans for an amount of EUR 56 million provided ENVC with an undue advantage.
V skladu s takratnim veljavnim sporočilom Komisije o spremembi metode določanja referenčnih obrestnih mer in diskontnih stopenj iz leta 2008 je izhodiščna obrestna mera, ki velja za Portugalsko, aprila 2008 znašala 1,24 %, aprila 2011 pa 1,49 %.
Portugal indicates that these loans had an interest rate of 6-month EURIBOR plus a variable spread depending on each contract.
V zvezi s posojilom DGTF leta 2010 Komisija ugotavlja, da ENVC ni izrecno zagotovila zavarovanja, temveč zgolj obljubila, da bo uporabila prihodke, ki izhajajo iz zadevne okvirne pogodbe z ministrstvom za nacionalno obrambo za odplačilo posojila.
According to Portugal, this remuneration would be satisfactory for an investor, thereby excluding the presence of an undue advantage and this of State aid.
Na podlagi tega in ob upoštevanju takratnih težav ENVC Komisija meni, da bi se morala uporabljati razlika vsaj 1000 bazičnih točk.
Portugal also notes that the DGTF loans were provided bearing in mind the order book of ENVC.
Tako bi se uporabljala referenčna obrestna mera v višini vsaj 11,24 % v primerjavi z veliko nižjo obrestno mero, tj. 1,964 %, ki jo je zaračunal DGTF.
The Commission cannot share the views of Portugal that setting an interest rate corresponding to 6-month EURIBOR plus a variable spread would make the DGTF loans market-conform.
V zvezi s posojilom DGTF leta 2011 Komisija nazadnje ugotavlja, da tako kot pri posojilu DGTF leta 2010 ENVC ni izrecno zagotovila zavarovanja, ampak je zgolj obljubila, da bo uporabila prihodke, ki izhajajo iz zadevne okvirne pogodbe z ministrstvom za nacionalno obrambo za odplačilo posojila, to pa je moral potrditi upravni odbor ENVC in odobriti ministrstvo za nacionalno obrambo.
Table 4 below summarises the total interest rate applicable to the DGTF loans at the time of their signature:
Zato je zelo vprašljivo, ali bi lahko tržno naravnan posojilodajalec tako stopnjo zavarovanja štel za ustrezno.
Table 4
Glede na to, da je bila ENVC takrat podjetje v težavah, Komisija meni, da bi se morala uporabljati razlika vsaj 1000 bazičnih točk, tako da bi referenčna obrestna mera znašala vsaj 11,49 %, ki je precej višja od obrestnih mer, ki jih je dejansko uporabila ENVC (5,568 % aprila 2011 in 5,241 % junija 2011).
Total interest rate applicable to the DGTF loans
Glede na navedeno Komisija sklepa, da so posojila DGTF družbi ENVC zagotovila neupravičeno prednost.
Date of signature of the contract
V zvezi s patronatskimi izjavami, ki jih je izdal EMPORDEF med letoma 2007 in 2011, Komisija najprej ugotavlja, da se zdi, da so zelo podobne narave kot jamstvo, saj je EMPORDEF v večini teh izjav izrecno navedel, da bo storil vse, kar je potrebno, da bi ENVC zagotovil sredstva, ki jih potrebuje za spoštovanje zadevne posojilne pogodbe.
Amount in EUR
Vendar imata patronatski izjavi iz 8. januarja 2007 in 26. junija 2008 drugačno besedilo.
onth EURIBOR (a) (%)
EMPORDEF v teh izjavah ugotavlja, da ima ENVC v stoodstotni lasti in da se ta delež v kapitalu ne bo zmanjšal; v nasprotnem primeru lahko banka, ki je odobrila posojilo, zahteva od ENVC vračilo posojila pred njegovo ročnostjo.
Spread [34] (b)
Vendar Komisija zgolj na podlagi te izjave ne more sklepati, da bi bil EMPORDEF odgovoren, če ENVC ne bi odplačala zadevnih posojil, zato ni ustrezno, da patronatske izjave povezujemo z jamstvi.
Total interest rate (a)+(b) (%)
Zato ni bilo ugotovljeno, da so te izjave ENVC zagotovile prednost.
(paid out in two instalments in April 2011 and in June 2011)
V zvezi z drugimi patronatskimi izjavami (tj. izjavami, zagotovljenimi v letih 2009, 2010 in 2011), glede na to, da je EMPORDEF v njih izjavil, da bo ukrepal, če ENVC ne bo spoštovala zadevne posojilne pogodbe, se zdi jasno, da so enake jamstvu, saj EMPORDEF jamči finančni instituciji, ki je posojila odobrila, da bo storil vse, kar je potrebno, da bo ENVC zagotovil sredstva, ki jih potrebuje za odplačilo posojil.
3,907 % (April 2011)
Običajen udeleženec na trgu bi zahteval premijo v zameno za zagotovitev tovrstnega „jamstva“, ki pa je EMPORDEF nikoli ni plačal kljub precejšnjemu tveganju, da ENVC glede na njene takratne težave ne bo zmogla odplačati posojil.
3,580 % (June 2011)
V skladu z oddelkom 2.2 Obvestila Komisije o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč v obliki poroštev [40] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: obvestilo o poroštvih) se „(p)revzem tveganja […] navadno poplača z ustrezno premijo.
5,568 (April 2011)
Kadar posojilojemalcu ni treba plačati premije ali plača nizko premijo, pomeni to zanj prednost.
5,241 (June 2011)
Državno poroštvo v primerjavi z razmerami brez poroštva posojilojemalcu omogoči, da posojilo najame pod finančnimi pogoji, ki so ugodnejši od običajnih na finančnih trgih.
In order to ascertain the market-conformity of the interest rates applied to the DGTF loans, the Commission will use as the best available proxy the reference rates resulting from the applicable rules at the time.
Zaradi državnega poroštva so posojilojemalcu ponavadi na voljo nižje obrestne mere in/ali nižji stroški zavarovanja.
First, as indicated in section 6.1 above, the Commission considers that in 2006 and 2008 ENVC would qualify as a firm in difficulty.
V nekaterih primerih posojilojemalec brez državnega poroštva ne bi našel finančne ustanove, ki bi mu bila pripravljena odobriti posojilo pod kakršnimi koli pogoji“.
As regards in particular the 2006 DGTF loan, the Commission observes that according to the 2009 report of the IGF, as of 31 December 2005, ENVC was in a situation of technical bankruptcy.
Zato je treba proučiti, ali bi lahko jamstvo načeloma pridobili po tržnih pogojih na finančnih trgih in ali je bila za jamstvo plačana tržna premija [41].
As regards the 2008 DGTF loan, the same report indicates that as of the end of 2008 ENVC was again in a situation of technical bankruptcy (see recital 64 above).
Komisija ugotavlja, da patronatske izjave niso bile poplačane in da ENVC ni plačala EMPORDEF nobene premije.
In particular, concerning the 2006 DGTF loan, the Commission notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates of 1997 [36], applicable at the time, established that the base rate (3,70 % in Portugal in January 2006) [37] was to be increased by a premium amounting to 400bp or more in situations involving a particular risk.
Zato tveganje, ki ga je prevzel EMPORDEF, ni bilo poplačano.
In this respect, the Commission highlights the difficulties of ENVC at the time and the fact that it was in a situation of technical bankruptcy.
Zgolj na podlagi tega je mogoče sklepati, da so patronatske izjave, ki imajo zelo podobne značilnosti kot jamstvo, ENVC zagotovile neupravičeno prednost.
Also, according to the 2006 DGTF loan contract, ENVC agreed to have as collateral the revenues resulting from the construction of certain vessels for the Portuguese Navy.
V zvezi s trditvijo Portugalske, da bi se EMPORDEF v vsakem primeru na zadnji stopnji štel za odgovornega za dolgove ENVC, glede na to, da je bil njen izključni lastnik, se Komisija sklicuje na svojo obrazložitev v uvodni izjavi 88, ki se uporablja smiselno.
However, it is unclear whether a market-oriented lender would have accepted such collateral in view of ENVC's problems to carry out the constructions at a profit and/or within the contractual deadlines (see in this respect recital 80 and footnote 28 above).
Zato Komisija meni, da so patronatske izjave iz let 2009, 2010 in 2011 ENVC zagotovile neupravičeno prednost.
In any event, the Commission has not been provided with evidence allowing it to examine those construction contracts.
V zvezi s posojilom za plovilo Atlântida Komisija ugotavlja, da je EMPORDEF decembra 2009 zagotovil ENVC 37 milijonov EUR, ki jih je dobil od CGD za zaključek sodnega postopka z Atlanticoline.
The Commission therefore considers that applying a margin of at least 400bp would be reasonable.
V tistem obdobju, ko je bila ENVC že podjetje v težavah, bi razumen udeleženec na trgu ocenil položaj družbe in njeno sposobnost za odplačilo posojila, namesto da na ENVC preprosto prenese sredstva.
As a result, the applicable reference rate would be at least 7,70 %, which is well above the interest rate of 4,198 % actually applied by the DGTF.
Prav tako bi razumen udeleženec na trgu ocenil tveganja, povezana z operacijo, in možnost prodaje plovila drugemu kupcu – kar se je septembra 2014 nazadnje zgodilo (glej uvodno izjavo 30).
As regards the 2008 DGTF loan, the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates of 2008 [38], applicable at the time, established that to the base rate (2,05 % in Portugal in December 2008) [39] a margin was to be applied depending on the rating of the undertaking concerned and the level of collateralisation offered.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da je bilo posojilo EMPORDEF zagotovljeno po letni obrestni meri, vezani na 6-mesečni EURIBOR z 2-odstotnim razmikom, kar je v času pogodbe znašalo 2,993 %.
In view of the difficulties of ENVC at the time and the low level of collateralisation (see recital 97 above, which applies mutatis mutandis), the applicable margin would be at least 1000bp.
Vendar je v skladu s takratnim veljavnim Sporočilom Komisije o spremembi metode določanja referenčnih obrestnih mer in diskontnih stopenj iz leta 2008, izhodiščna obrestna mera, ki se je uporabljala za Portugalsko decembra 2009, znašala 1,45 %, ki bi ji bilo treba glede na težave ENVC in odsotnost izrecne zagotovitve zavarovanja dodati razliko v višini vsaj 1000 bazičnih točk.
As a result, the applicable reference rate would be at the very least 12,05 %, also above the interest rate of 4,417 % actually applied by the DGTF.
Zato bi se morala uporabljati referenčna obrestna mera v višini najmanj 11,45 %.
In relation to the 2010 and 2011 DGTF loans, the Commission reiterates its views that ENVC qualifies as a firm in difficulty at the moment the loans were granted (see section 6.1 above).
Izkrivljanje konkurence in vpliv na trgovino znotraj EU
According to the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates of 2008, applicable at the time, the base rate applicable for Portugal was 1,24 % in April 2008 and 1,49 % in April 2011.
Verjetno je, da so pretekli ukrepi vplivali na trgovino med državami članicami, saj je družba ENVC konkurirala ladjedelnicam iz drugih držav članic Evropske unije in tretjih držav.
As regards the 2010 DGTF loan, the Commission observes that there is no strict collateralisation but merely a promise by ENVC to use the revenues resulting from a given framework-contract with the Ministry of National Defence to repay the loan.
Zadevni pretekli ukrepi so tako omogočili ENVC, da je nadaljevala s poslovanjem in da se ji – za razliko od drugih konkurentov – ni bilo treba spoprijeti s posledicami, ki običajno izhajajo iz slabih finančnih rezultatov.
On this basis, and bearing in mind the difficulties of ENVC at the time, the Commission is of the view that the applicable margin should be at least 1000bp.
Pretekli ukrepi so torej izkrivili konkurenco.
Therefore, the applicable reference rate would be at least 11,24 %, compared to the much lower 1,964 % charged by the DGTF.
Sklepna ugotovitev o obstoju državne pomoči in količinska opredelitev
It is thus highly doubtful that this level of collateralisation could be considered adequate by a market-oriented lender.
Kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 68 in 69, skupni znesek subvencij za ladjedelništvo in subvencij za strokovno usposabljanje pomeni državno pomoč v višini 27129933,20 EUR in 257791 EUR, v tem zaporedju.
Therefore, given that ENVC was at the time a firm in difficulty, the Commission considers that the applicable margin should be at least 1000bp, which would result in a reference rate of at least 11,49 %, much higher than the interest rates actually applied to ENVC (5,568 % in April 2011 and 5,241 % in June 2011).
V zvezi s drugimi preteklimi ukrepi Komisija ponovno poudarja, da jih noben tržno naravnan udeleženec ne bi zagotovil ENVC glede na njene takratne težave.
Bearing in mind the above, the Commission comes to the conclusion that the DGTF loans provided ENVC with an undue advantage.
Zato Komisija meni, da je ENVC prejela državno pomoč v znesku, ki je enak skupnemu znesku dokapitalizacije leta 2006 (24,875 milijona EUR).
In what relates to the comfort letters issued by EMPORDEF between 2007 and 2011, the Commission first observes that they appear to have a very similar nature to a guarantee, since in most of these letters EMPORDEF specifically stated that it would do everything necessary to make sure that ENVC would have the necessary means available to honour the underlying loan agreement.
V zvezi s patronatskimi izjavami iz let 2009, 2010 in 2011 Komisija ponovno poudarja, da imajo zelo podobno naravo kot jamstva (glej uvodni izjavi 103 in 104).
However, the comfort letters dated 8 January 2007 and 26 June 2008 have a different wording.
V zvezi s tem se obvestilo o poroštvih v oddelku 4.1 glasi tako: „Komisija navaja, da bo tržni porok, če obstaja, podjetjem v težavah v trenutku dodelitve poroštva zaračunal visoko premijo zaradi pričakovane stopnje tveganja neplačila.
In these letters, EMPORDEF notes that it owns ENVC at 100 % and that this shareholding will not be diminished; otherwise the granting bank is allowed to ask ENVC to pay back the loan before maturity.
Če postane verjetnost, da posojilojemalec ne bo mogel odplačati posojila, zelo visoka, mogoče te tržne stopnje ni, v izjemnih okoliščinah pa je lahko element pomoči poroštva celo enak znesku, ki ga dejansko krije navedeno poroštvo“.
This statement alone does not allow the Commission to consider that EMPORDEF would be liable for ENVC's default on the respective loans and therefore it does not appear adequate to assimilate them to guarantees.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so banke zagotovile ENVC posojila le zaradi obstoja „jamstev“ (v obliki patronatskih izjav), s katerimi je EMPORDEF bankam zajamčil, da bo storil vse, kar je potrebno, da bo ENVC lahko odplačala posojila.
It is therefore not established that these letters have provided an advantage to ENVC.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da so bile patronatske izjave ENVC, ko je bila v težavah, zagotovljene brezplačno kljub precejšnjemu tveganju, da ne bo mogla izpolniti svojih obveznosti.