natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Therefore, Portugal claims that EMPORDEF did not increase its risk by exposing it further to ENVC by means of the 2012 and 2013 loans.
Vir: letni računovodski izkazi EMPORDEF za leta 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 in 2013 (na voljo na http://www.empordef.pt/main.html), letni računovodski izkazi ENVC za leta 2001, 2002, 2003, 2009, 2010 in 2011.
In its submission of 14 February 2014, Portugal clarified that as of February 2014, ENVC had neither reimbursed the 2012 and 2013 loans nor paid any interest.
Neto poslovni izid (v milijonih EUR)
Moreover, Portugal also noted that the loans to ENVC were, when necessary, accompanied by comfort letters issued by EMPORDEF.
Poleg tega se je ENVC najmanj od leta 2009 srečevala z negativnim lastniškim kapitalom: – 25,62 milijona EUR leta 2009, – 74,49 milijona EUR leta 2010, – 129,63 milijona EUR leta 2011, – 142,45 milijona EUR leta 2012 in – 193,46 milijona EUR leta 2013 [24].
Concerning the DGTF loans granted in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2011, Portugal is of the view that they were provided on market terms since the interest rate applied was EURIBOR plus a variable spread depending on each loan contract.
Po mnenju Portugalske (glej uvodno izjavo 43) je bila dokapitalizacija leta 2006 potrebna za uskladitev s členom 35 portugalskega zakonika o gospodarskih družbah, nadomestni možnosti pa sta bili zmanjšanje kapitala ENVC ali njena likvidacija.
Portugal also notes that the DGTF loans were provided bearing in mind the order book of ENVC, which would create reasonable expectations that ENVC would be able to pay back the loans.
Poleg tega je v načrtu za prestrukturiranje, ki ga je BPI pripravila avgusta 2005 (glej uvodno izjavo 47), poudarjeno, da je bila ENVC od konca leta 2003 v tehničnem stečaju („falência técnica“).
Portugal also highlights that the use of comfort letters is normal between private operators as a mechanism to guarantee access to the financial markets for companies with a lower borrowing capacity.
Komisija ugotavlja tudi, da poročilo IGF iz leta 2009 kaže, da je bila ENVC na dan 31. decembra 2005 in konec leta 2008 znova v tehničnem stečaju.
Portugal notes that EMPORDEF would in any case be considered liable in last instance for the debts of ENVC given that it was its sole shareholder.
Zato se zdi, da je ENVC v obdobjih tehničnega stečaja kazala vse znake stečaja, vendar pristojno sodišče tega ni uradno priznalo.
In any event, Portugal acknowledges that EMPORDEF never charged ENVC for the comfort letters.
To kaže, da je družba po domači zakonodaji izpolnjevala kriterije za uvedbo kolektivnih postopkov insolventnosti v skladu z uvodno izjavo 10 smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004 vsaj konec leta 2003, 2005 in 2008.
As regards the shipbuilding subsidies, Portugal claims that they were provided according to Decree-Law 296/89 — implementing Directive 87/167/EEC — and that they would therefore constitute compatible aid to the shipbuilding industry.
Na podlagi navedenega Komisija sklepa, da je bila ENVC v času, ko so bili dodeljeni vsi pretekli ukrepi, podjetje v težavah v smislu smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004.
In relation to the Atlântida vessel, Portugal observes that as of June 2012 its market value was estimated at EUR 29,24 million, taking into consideration inter alia the economic obsolescence and the physical and functional depreciation.
Na podlagi člena 107(1) PDEU „je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom, kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami“.
In this context, Portugal claims that there are no reasons to consider that the construction of the vessel entailed an undue advantage to ENVC, bearing in mind that the cost of construction exceeded the contractual price.
Za ugotovitev, ali gre za državno pomoč, je zato treba oceniti, ali so izpolnjena kumulativna merila iz člena 107(1) PDEU (tj. prenos državnih sredstev, selektivna prednost, možno izkrivljanje konkurence in vpliv na trgovino znotraj EU) za ugotovljene ukrepe.
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES
Komisija v zvezi s tem že ugotavlja, da Portugalska ne izpodbija značaja državne pomoči subvencij za ladjedelništvo, saj so bile – po mnenju portugalskih organov – zagotovljene v skladu z Uredbo z zakonsko močjo št. 296/89 o izvajanju Direktive 87/167/EGS.
This decision addresses as a preliminary point the issue of whether ENVC is a firm in difficulty in the sense of the 2004 R&R Guidelines [22].
Komisija bo ocenila njihovo združljivost z notranjim trgom v oddelku 6.4.
It then analyses whether the measures under scrutiny entail State aid to ENVC in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and then whether such aid, were it to be present, is lawful and compatible with the internal market.
V zvezi s subvencijami za strokovno usposabljanje, ki so bile zagotovljene v letih 2005 in 2006 v znesku 257791 EUR, Portugalska navaja, da so bile dodeljene v okviru operativnega programa za zaposlovanje, usposabljanje in socialni razvoj (POEFDS), ki ga sponzorira Evropski socialni sklad.
Difficulties of ENVC
Državna sredstva in odgovornost
As noted above in recital 42, Portugal claims that the gravity of ENVC's financial situation became evident only in 2009/2010 and that its irreversibility was only recognised in the annual accounts of the company of 2012.
Portugalska ne izpodbija predhodnih ugotovitev Komisije v sklepu o začetku postopka v zvezi s prisotnostjo državnih sredstev in odgovornostjo.
The Commission reiterates the views it expressed in its opening decision.
Komisija najprej poudarja, da so bila posojila DGTF, subvencije za ladjedelništvo in subvencije za strokovno usposabljanje zagotovljeni neposredno iz državnega proračuna (zlasti prek DGTF), zato ti pretekli ukrepi nedvomno vključujejo državna sredstva in jih je mogoče pripisati državi.
According to recital 9 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines, the Commission regards a firm as being in difficulty when it is unable, whether through its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its owners/shareholders or creditors, to stem losses which without outside intervention by the public authorities, will almost certainly condemn it to going out of business in the short or medium term.
Tudi ukrepi EMPORDEF so po mnenju Komisije vključevali državna sredstva (glede na to, da proračun EMPORDEF neposredno zagotavlja država) in jih je mogoče pripisati državi v smislu sodne prakse v zadevi Stardust Marine [25].
Recital 10 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines clarifies that a limited liability company is regarded as being in difficulty where more than half of its registered capital has disappeared and more than one quarter of that capital has been lost over the preceding 12 months, or where it fulfils the criteria under its domestic law for being the subject of collective insolvency proceedings.
Komisija najprej ugotavlja, da je to javni holding v stoodstotni državni lasti: izključni lastnik EMPORDEF v imenu države je DGTF.
Recital 11 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines adds that, even if the conditions in recital 10 are not satisfied, a firm may be considered to be in difficulty in particular where the usual signs of a firm being in difficulty are present, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover, growing stock inventories, excess capacity, declining cash flow, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling or nil net asset value.
Poleg tega je EMPORDEF pod neposrednim nadzorom ministrstva za finance in javno upravo v zvezi s finančnim nadzorom in ministrstva za nacionalno obrambo v zvezi s sektorskim nadzorom [26].
The Commission observes that ENVC is a limited liability company which has continuously registered significant losses since at least 2000 (see table 3 below):
Poleg tega je poslovanje EMPORDEF glede na njegovo spletno stran v skladu s cilji in politikami, ki jih je določil njegov izključni lastnik, tj. država [27].
Table 3
Poleg tega predsednika in izvršne direktorje EMPORDEF imenuje neposredno ministrstvo za nacionalno obrambo [28].
Source: annual accounts of EMPORDEF for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2013 (available at http://www.empordef.pt/main.html), annual accounts of ENVC for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2009, 2010 and 2011.
V zvezi s posrednimi dokazi Komisija ugotavlja, da je 4. januarja 2012 portugalsko ministrstvo za nacionalno obrambo izdalo sporočilo za medije, ki navaja: „2. julija 2011 je ministrstvo za nacionalno obrambo sklenilo odložiti razgradnjo [ENVC].
Net result (in EUR million)
Avgusta je ministrstvo za nacionalno obrambo pooblastilo novo upravo EMPORDEF, da najde rešitev, s katero bi preprečili razgradnjo in zaprtje ENVC“ [29].
In addition to the significant losses of ENVC, which constitute a first indication of the difficulties of the company, some of the other usual signs of a firm in difficulty in the sense of the 2004 R&R Guidelines are also present.
Poleg tega je minister za nacionalno obrambo večkrat javno objavil ukrepe, ki jih je treba izvesti v zvezi z načrtovano privatizacijo ENVC [30].
For instance, ENVC's turnover was in constant decrease since at least 2008, passing from EUR 129,62 million in that year to EUR 55,58 million in 2009, EUR 20,22 million in 2010 and EUR 15,11 million in 2011.
Po zavrnitvi načrtov za privatizacijo je portugalska vlada pooblastila EMPORDEF za sprejetje potrebnih ukrepov v zvezi z ENVC [31].
Although in 2012 there was an increase in turnover (EUR 30,38 million) due to some additional works for a logistic support vessel [23], this was a one-off event and in 2013 the turnover plummeted again to EUR 3,79 million.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno Komisija sklepa, da je mogoče ukrepe EMPORDEF pripisati državi in da so pretekli ukrepi, ki jih je dodelila ENVC, vključevali državna sredstva.
In addition, ENVC had negative equity since at least 2009: EUR -25,62 million in 2009, EUR -74,49 million in 2010, EUR -129,63 million in 2011, EUR -142,45 million in 2012 and EUR -193,46 million in 2013 [24].
Selektivna prednost
According to Portugal (see recital 43 above), the 2006 capital increase was needed in order to comply with Article 35 of the Portuguese Companies Code, the alternatives being a reduction of ENVC's capital or the liquidation of the company.
V zvezi s tem, ali so pretekli ukrepi ENVC zagotovili neupravičeno selektivno prednost, Komisija ugotavlja, da po mnenju Portugalske to ne velja za večino preteklih ukrepov, saj bi bili v skladu s načelom udeleženca v tržnem gospodarstvu.
Moreover, the restructuring plan prepared by BPI dated August 2005 (see recital 47 above), highlights that since the end of 2003, ENVC was in a situation of technical bankruptcy (‘falência técnica’).
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka navedla, da je kljub omejenim informacijam, ki so bile takrat na voljo, malo verjetno, da bi kateri koli razumen zasebni izvajalec družbi ENVC odobril pretekle ukrepe.
Finally, the Commission observes that the 2009 report of the IGF indicates that as of 31 December 2005 and at the end of 2008, ENVC was again in a situation of technical bankruptcy.
Dejansko je bilo glede na takratne težave ENVC predhodno stališče Komisije, da razumen udeleženec na trgu, ki deluje pod tržnimi pogoji, ne bi zagotovil takega financiranja družbi, kot je ENVC.
Therefore, it appears that at those points in time when ENVC was in technical bankruptcy it showed all the signs of bankruptcy except that it had not been formally declared bankrupt by the competent court.
Poleg tega je Komisija predhodno sklenila, da bi bila ta prednost po naravi selektivna, saj je bila ENVC njena edina upravičenka.
This suggests that the company fulfilled the criteria under domestic law for being the subject of collective insolvency proceedings, in line with recital 10 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines at least at the end of 2003, 2005 and 2008.
V zvezi z dokapitalizacijo leta 2006 se Komisija ne strinja s Portugalsko, da bi se udeleženec v tržnem gospodarstvu odločil za dokapitalizacijo ENVC – namesto da bi jo likvidiral –, da bi ji omogočil nadaljnje poslovanje na trgu ladjedelništva, zlasti ob upoštevanju takratne knjige naročil s 15 gradbenimi projekti v vrednosti 386 milijonov EUR (glej uvodno izjavo 44).
In view of the above, the Commission concludes that ENVC was a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the 2004 R&R Guidelines at the time when all the past measures were granted.
Komisija najprej ugotavlja, da bi razumen udeleženec na trgu razmislil, ali bi bilo ekonomsko razumnejše likvidirati družbo ali zagotoviti dodatni kapital, ob upoštevanju slabe finančne uspešnosti ENVC med letoma 2000 in 2006, pa tudi ukrepov, ki jih je država dodelila ENVC že pred dokapitalizacijo leta 2006 (tj. eno od posojil DGTF v višini 30 milijonov EUR, ki je bilo odobreno januarja/februarja 2006, subvencije za ladjedelništvo, ki so bile višje od 27 milijonov EUR, in subvencije za strokovno usposabljanje).
Existence of aid
Čeprav se je zdelo, da vrednost naročil iz knjige naročil presega znesek, ki izhaja iz teh preteklih ukrepov, Komisija meni, da bi razumen udeleženec na trgu upošteval tudi verjetnost, da bi ENVC lahko izvedla gradbena dela z dobičkom in/ali v pogodbenih rokih, da bi se izognila plačilu kazni [32].
By virtue of Article 107(1) TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
Informacije, ki jih je zagotovila Portugalska, v nobenem primeru ne kažejo, da bi EMPORDEF to upošteval med izvajanjem dokapitalizacije leta 2006.
In order to conclude on whether State aid is present, it must therefore be assessed whether the cumulative criteria listed in Article 107(1) TFEU (i.e. transfer of State resources, selective advantage, potential distortion of competition and affectation of intra-EU trade) are met for the measures identified.
Poleg tega Portugalska ugotavlja, da so v skladu z načrtom za prestrukturiranje, ki ga je avgusta 2005 pripravila BPI, stroški, povezani z zaprtjem ENVC, po ocenah znašali 175 milijona EUR.
The Commission already notes in this respect that Portugal does not contest the State aid character of the shipbuilding subsidies since they were — according to the Portuguese authorities — provided according to Decree-Law 296/89 implementing Directive 87/167/EEC.
Po mnenju Portugalske je bila likvidacija zahtevnejša od dokapitalizacije, zato ni bila izvedena.
The Commission will assess their compatibility with the internal market in section 6.4 below.
V zvezi s tem Komisija ugotavlja, da ocena BPI v načrtu za prestrukturiranje ni podprta z dokazi.
In relation to the professional training subsidies provided in 2005 and 2006 amounting to EUR 257791, Portugal states that they were granted under the Operational Programme for Employment, Training and Social Development (POEFDS) sponsored by the European Social Fund.
Na tej podlagi Komisija ne more oceniti točnosti te ocene in skleniti, ali je bilo dejansko ekonomsko razumnejše, da EMPORDEF izvede dokapitalizacijo, namesto da družbo likvidira.
The Commission observes that these funds constitute per se State aid since they were provided by the Member State in the context of the Structural Funds 2000-2006.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da je bilo v načrtu za prestrukturiranje, ki ga je pripravila BPI, poudarjeno, da ENVC sama ni bila sposobna ponovno doseči rentabilnosti in da je potrebovala zunanja sredstva v znesku 45–50 milijonov EUR v osnovnem scenariju in 70–80 milijonov EUR v negativnem scenariju.
Therefore, the Commission will directly assess their compatibility with the internal market in section 6.4 below.
Višina dokapitalizacije leta 2006 (24,875 milijona EUR) precej zaostaja za temi ocenami in ENVC ne bi omogočila, da ponovno doseže rentabilnosti.
State resources and imputability
Nazadnje Komisija ugotavlja, da je ENVC potrebovala natančno prestrukturiranje, potrjeno v načrtu za prestrukturiranje, ki ga je pripravila BPI.
Portugal does not dispute the preliminary findings of the Commission as per the opening decision in relation to the presence of State resources and imputability.
Čeprav je načrt za prestrukturiranje zgolj osnutek, že opredeljuje težave ENVC in potrebo po dodatnih zunanjih sredstvih.
In the first place, the Commission highlights that the DGTF loans, the shipbuilding subsidies and the professional training subsidies were provided directly from the State budget (mainly through the DGTF) and therefore there is no doubt that these past measures entail State resources and are imputable to the State.
Vendar je v načrtu za prestrukturiranje pojasnjeno, da bi bilo ponovno doseganje rentabilnosti ENVC precej odvisno od zmogljivosti vodstva družbe za uresničevanje naročil in razvoja trga ladjedelništva.
As regards EMPORDEF, the Commission also considers that its actions entailed State resources (given that the budget of EMPORDEF is provided directly by the State) and that those actions are imputable to the State in the sense of the Stardust Marine case-law [25].
V zvezi s tem Komisija ugotavlja, da Portugalska ni predložila nobenih dokazov, da je EMPORDEF upošteval te elemente pri izvajanju dokapitalizacije leta 2006, ki v vsakem primeru ne bi zagotovila ocenjenih zneskov, ki so v skladu z načrtom za prestrukturiranje potrebni, da bi družba ponovno dosegla rentabilnost.
In the first place, the Commission notes that this is a public holding 100 % owned by the State: the sole shareholder of EMPORDEF on behalf of the State is the DGTF.
Na podlagi navedenega Komisija ugotavlja, da preudaren udeleženec v tržnem gospodarstvu leta 2006 ne bi izvedel dokapitalizacije, ki je torej vključevala neupravičeno prednost za ENVC.
Moreover, EMPORDEF is under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations, as regards financial supervision, and the Ministry of National Defence, as regards sectorial supervision [26].
V zvezi s posojili v letih 2012 in 2013, ki jih je dodelil EMPORDEF v skupnem znesku 101118066,03 EUR, je na podlagi informacij, ki jih je zagotovila Portugalska, mogoče sklepati, da je EMPORDEF leta 2012 z ENVC podpisal 70 pogodb, običajno kratkoročnih z 90-dnevno ročnostjo.
In addition, according to the web page of EMPORDEF, its operations are consistent with the objectives, policies and goals established by its sole shareholder, i.e. the State [27].
Posojila so bila odobrena v več različnih zneskih in z različnimi obrestnimi merami, predvsem s 3-mesečnim Euriborom plus razlika.
Moreover, the President of EMPORDEF and its Executive Directors are nominated directly by the Minister of National Defence [28].
Vendar so imele nekatere pogodbe fiksno obrestno mero, zlasti pogodbe, podpisane od oktobra 2012 (glej na primer pogodbe, podpisane 30. marca 2012 za 16,7 milijona EUR z obrestno mero v višini 2 %, 2. novembra 2012 za 10,570 milijona EUR z obrestno mero 5,871 % ali 1. decembra 2012 za 1 milijon EUR z enako obrestno mero, tj. 5,871 %).
In addition to the above, the rules governing the planned privatisation of ENVC (see section 2.2 above) clearly indicated that the final decision was to be taken by the Portuguese Government and not by EMPORDEF.
Prav tako se zdi, da posojilne pogodbe niso bile zavarovane s premoženjem.
In terms of indirect evidence, the Commission observes that on 4 January 2012, the Portuguese Ministry of National Defence issued a press release stating the following: ‘on 2 July 2011, the Ministry of National Defence decided to suspend the decommissioning of [ENVC].
Portugalska trdi, da posojila DGTF ne vključujejo pomoči glede na to, da je EMPORDEF za ENVC uporabil enake obrestne mere, kot jih je pridobil na trgu.
In August, the Ministry of National Defence mandated the new administration of EMPORDEF to find a solution that would avoid the decommissioning and closure of ENVC’ [29].
Ker bi se EMPORDEF v vsakem primeru štel za odgovornega za dolgove in obveznosti ENVC, glede da to, da je bil njen izključni lastnik, Portugalska trdi, da EMPORDEF ni povečal svojega tveganja, tako da ga je dodatno izpostavil ENVC.
Furthermore, on multiple occasions the Minister of National Defence publicly announced the steps to be undertaken as regards the planned privatisation of ENVC [30].
V prvi vrsti ni videti, da bi bil EMPORDEF odgovoren za vse dolgove in obveznosti ENVC, glede na to, da sta EMPORDEF in ENVC družbi z omejeno odgovornostjo („sociedade anónima“).
Once the privatisation plans were discarded, the Portuguese Government empowered EMPORDEF to take the necessary measures as regards ENVC [31].
Načeloma je pri družbah z omejeno odgovornostjo odgovornost članov (imetnikov deležev v kapitalu) omejena na nominalno vrednost njihovih delnic v skladu s členom 271 portugalskega zakonika o gospodarskih družbah [33].
In light of the above, the Commission concludes that EMPORDEF's actions are imputable to the State and that the past measures it granted to ENVC entailed State resources.
Na podlagi tega bi se EMPORDEF z zagotovitvijo posojil ENVC v letih 2012 in 2013 izpostavil dodatnim tveganjem, ki presegajo njegove delnice v družbi.
Selective advantage
Glede na težave ENVC Komisija meni, da bi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu ocenil finančni položaj ENVC in analiziral sposobnost družbe za vračilo posojil in obresti.
As regards whether the past measures provided ENVC with an undue selective advantage, the Commission observes that Portugal considers that this is not the case for most of the past measures since they would be in line with the MEO principle.
V zvezi s tem Komisija ugotavlja, da več finančnih institucij – za katere Komisija ni imela razloga za sum, da niso delovale kot tržni vlagatelji – ni želelo zagotoviti posojil neposredno ENVC.
In its opening decision, the Commission indicated that despite the limited information available at the time, it seemed unlikely that any rational private operator would have provided ENVC with the past measures.
To samo po sebi kaže, da trgi niso bili več prepričani v sposobnost ENVC za odplačilo posojil.
Indeed, given the difficulties of ENVC at the time, the Commission was of the preliminary view that a rational market operator, operating under market conditions, would not have provided such financing to a company like ENVC.
EMPORDEF je zgolj s posnemanjem obresti, ki jih je za posojila pridobil na trgu, ENVC zagotovil neupravičeno prednost, saj ta ne bi izpolnjevala teh pogojev – ENVC na trgu dejansko ni dobila nobenih posojil.
The Commission also preliminarily concluded the advantage would be selective in nature given that its sole beneficiary was ENVC.
Čeprav bi lahko nekatere obrestne mere, ki jih je EMPORDEF uporabil za ENVC, veljale za sorazmerno visoke (npr. 3-mesečni EURIBOR plus 8,431 % za pogodbo, podpisano 30. maja 2012), Komisija meni, da nobena zasebna finančna institucija ne bi zagotovila takega posojila podjetju, ki je v očitnih težavah, brez zavarovanja s premoženjem.
As regards the 2006 capital increase, the Commission does not share the opinion of Portugal that a MEO would have opted for increasing the capital of ENVC — instead of liquidating it — in order to allow the company to continue operating in the shipbuilding market, in particular in view of the order book at the time of 15 construction projects for an amount of EUR 386 million (see recital 44 above).
Komisija prav tako poudarja, da bi lahko EMPORDEF po poteku 90-dnevne ročnosti prvih pogodb opazil, da ENVC ni niti odplačala glavnice niti ni plačala obresti (glej uvodno izjavo 51).