natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Necessity and appropriateness
Prvič, trditev, da je bilo tveganje selitve CO2 za drugo polovico leta 2009 dokazano že v direktivi o ETS, je napačna.
The aid granted must be an appropriate and necessary instrument to achieve the envisaged objective.
Člen 10a(6) Direktive 2009/29/ES določa: „Države članice lahko ravno tako sprejmejo finančne ukrepe v korist sektorjem ali delom sektorjev, za katere je ugotovljeno, da so izpostavljeni visokem[u] tveganju premestitve emisij CO2 zaradi stroškov, povezanih z emisijami toplogrednih plinov, vključenih v ceno električne energije, z namenom da se nadomesti te stroške, in kjer so ti finančni ukrepi v skladu z veljavnimi pravili državne pomoči in jih je treba sprejeti na tem področju.“ Člen 10a(6) torej ne dokazuje tveganja selitve virov CO2, ampak zgolj določa, da je državna pomoč lahko ena od možnosti, če in ko je takšno tveganje ugotovljeno.
An instrument is appropriate and necessary if there are no other less distortive instruments to achieve the same results.
Direktiva 2009/29/ES se vsekakor nanaša samo na ETS-3, tj. obdobje po letu 2013.
In the case at hand, in order to determine whether the aid to be paid out under the notified scheme is necessary and appropriate, it must first be established that the eligible sectors (German aluminium, copper and zinc production) were, in the second half of 2009, subject to a risk of carbon leakage.
Podobno Sklep 2010/2/EU [47] vsebuje seznam sektorjev in delov sektorjev, ki veljajo za izpostavljene visokemu tveganju selitve virov CO2, šele od leta 2013, ko začne veljati tretja faza ETS.
Germany has argued that the carbon leakage risk for 2009 had already been established, notably by Decision 2010/2/EU [42].
Glede na temeljne predpostavke ne določa obstoja tveganja selitve virov CO2 za leto 2009.
The risk is said to have been present already in the second ETS trading period (2008-2012, ‘ETS-2’), with the transition to the third ETS trading period not constituting, according to Germany, a ‘qualitative leap’.
Kar je pomembneje, namen Sklepa 2010/2/EU je določiti seznam sektorjev in delov sektorjev, ki so jim v okviru EU ETS dodeljene brezplačne pravice.
In its opening decision, the Commission, inter alia, recalled that Member States had agreed to introduce the mechanisms to prevent carbon leakage in Directive 2009/29/EC [43] only as of 2013.
Ta dodelitev brezplačnih pravic je določena v členu 10a(12) Direktive 2009/29/ES.
This seemed justified since as of 2013 a stricter cap on CO2 emissions would apply, which was expected to lead, all other things being equal and based on the assumptions made at the time, to higher CO2 prices [44].
Sklep 2010/2/EU temelji na členu 10a(13) Direktive 2009/29/ES, ki se očitno sklicuje na člen 10a(12).
In addition, the Commission noted that the debate on the carbon leakage risk during the second ETS trading period (2008-2012) was not conclusive as to the extent of such a risk.
Ker je brezplačna dodelitev pravic sredstvo za obravnavanje neposrednih stroškov CO2, ki nastanejo v zadevnih industrijskih sektorjih (npr. pri njihovi lastni proizvodni dejavnosti), se pri odločanju, kateri sektorji ali deli sektorjev bi morda potrebovali nadomestilo za posredne stroške CO2, na ta sklep ni mogoče sklicevati [48].
One more recent study suggests the possibility of existence of carbon leakage in 2009 in the aluminium sector, but not for copper and zinc production.
Komisija skladno s smernicami za državno pomoč v okviru ETS meni, da je ukrep pomoči nujen in ustrezen za preprečevanje selitve virov CO2, ki je posledica posrednih stroškov emisij CO2, le, če so izpolnjeni vsaj trije pogoji: prvič, pokazati je treba, da potencialni upravičenci do pomoči v okviru stroškov za električno energijo nosijo precejšen delež posrednih stroškov CO2, ki so vračunani v ceni električne energije.
In any event, it seemed appropriate to establish coherent Union-wide criteria for such aid [45].
Drugič, ti posredni stroški CO2 morajo predstavljali precejšen delež proizvodnih stroškov upravičencev.
For the third ETS trading period, such criteria can be found in the ETS Guidelines.
Tretjič, upravičenci teh stroškov ne morejo prenesti na svoje odjemalce.
Interested parties have made the same argument as Germany, namely that the carbon leakage risk for the non-ferrous metal industries had already been recognised both by Article 10a(6) of Directive 2009/29/EC and by Decision 2010/2/EU.
Tudi če bi bili ti pogoji izpolnjeni, bi bilo treba dokazati, da bi se proizvodnja preusmerila ali preselila v države zunaj EU/EGP, tj. države z manj strogimi zahtevami glede zmanjšanja emisij.
They therefore questioned the need for a separate assessment as outlined by the Commission in its opening decision.
Selitev proizvodnje znotraj držav, vključenih v EU ETS, namreč ne bi pomenila selitve virov CO2.
Some of the interested parties have also insisted that the assessment should not be too strict: given that the Commission had found, in its opening decision, that the major beneficiaries had been profitable throughout the whole period covered by the scheme [46], some of these non-ferrous metal producers highlighted that the profitability of their German operations was actually relatively low, sometimes below the rate of return that was acceptable for this kind of industry, and that it would be too restrictive to say that aid would only be necessary and have an incentive effect if the beneficiary was on the verge of insolvency proceedings.
Ti oportunitetni stroški so bili vključeni v ceno in preneseni na odjemalce.
Moreover, some of the producers, such as […], […], […] and […], stated that carbon leakage was not limited to the question of whether a plant would eventually close down and relocate outside the Union.
Komisija je v poročilu o oceni učinka smernic za državno pomoč v okviru ETS prav tako ugotovila, da so lahko proizvajalci električne energije večino svojih stroškov CO2 v drugem obdobju trgovanja v okviru ETS (2008–2012) prenesli naprej, vendar pa je bil ta prenos po ocenah manjši od 100 % [49].
Rather, the issue was whether beneficiaries would consider investing in their German operations or to abstain from any investment.
( 76) Nemčija v zvezi z drugim pogojem ni predložila specifičnih informacij o deležu posrednih stroškov CO2 v skupnih proizvodnih stroških upravičencev.
They claimed that the notified scheme had the effect of encouraging such investments and that it was the prospect of receiving the aid that incentivised them to keep production going and to undertake significant investments in the plants in Germany.
Predložila je splošne informacije o deležu stroškov električne energije v skupnih stroških: v proizvodnji bakra so stroški energije ali električne energije predstavljali od 13 do več kot 40 % proizvodnih stroškov.
These arguments however are unconvincing.
V proizvodnji cinka so predstavljali skoraj 50 % proizvodnih stroškov, v proizvodnji aluminija pa 46 %.
To begin with, the claim that the carbon leakage risk for the second half of 2009 has already been established in the ETS Directive is erroneous.
Komisija ugotavlja, da različni upravičenci skupne stroške različno opredeljujejo, kar pomeni, da podatki niso medsebojno primerljivi.
Article 10a(6) therefore does not establish the carbon leakage risk, but merely states that State aid may be an option if and where such a risk has been determined.
Za druge upravičence informacije niso bile predložene.
In any case, Directive 2009/29/EC only addresses ETS-3, i.e. the period after 2013.
Ena od zainteresiranih strani, ki so tudi upravičenke, […], je navedla, da so posredni stroški CO2 leta 2009 znašali […] EUR na MWh in tako predstavljali kar […] % njenih skupnih proizvodnih stroškov.
Similarly, Decision 2010/2/EU [47] contains a list of sectors and subsectors that are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage only as of 2013 when the third phase of the ETS enters into force.
[…] je navedla, da stroški električne energije predstavljajo približno […] % njenega prometa.
In view of its underlying assumptions, it does not establish the existence of a carbon leakage risk for 2009.
Komisija ne more na podlagi teh informacij, ki niso specifične, zagotoviti, da je drugi pogoj izpolnjen.
More importantly, the objective of Decision 2010/2/EU is to determine the list of sectors and subsectors which shall benefit from the allocation of EU-ETS allowances free of charge.
Poleg tega, kot je že navedeno v uvodni izjavi 75, stroški CO2 očitno niso v celoti vključeni v ceno električne energije.
This allocation of free allowances is provided for in Article 10a(12) of Directive 2009/29/EC.
Stopnja njihove vključenosti v ceno je močno odvisna od vrste pogodbe in časa njene sklenitve.
Decision 2010/2/EU is based on Article 10a(13) of Directive 2009/29/EC which in turn clearly refers to Article 10a(12).
Iz informacije, ki jih je zagotovila […], je na primer razvidno, da je bil v zadevnem obdobju (od julija do decembra 2009) delež stroškov CO2 v ceni električne energije precej manjši od cene enoletne nestandardizirane terminske pogodbe na pravice v letu 2009.
As the allocation of allowances free of charge is a remedy for tackling the direct CO2 costs incurred by the industrial sectors concerned (e.g. through their own production activity), the decision cannot be relied on to determine which sectors and subsectors might need compensation for indirect CO2 costs [48].
Da bi Nemčija in zainteresirane strani dokazale, da je leta 2009 obstajalo tveganje selitve virov CO2, so opozorile na podatke, ki jih je Komisija zbrala pri pripravi smernic za državno pomoč v okviru ETS.
The Commission takes the view, consistent with the ETS Guidelines, that an aid measure cannot be necessary and appropriate to prevent carbon leakage due to indirect CO2 emission costs unless at least three conditions are fulfilled: First, it is necessary to show that the potential beneficiaries of the aid bear, within their electricity costs, a substantial share of indirect CO2 costs passed on through electricity prices.
Pomen teh podatkov je torej pri preučevanju morebitnega tveganja selitve virov CO2 za industrije na ravni držav članic omejen.
Secondly, these indirect CO2 costs must make up a substantial share of the beneficiaries' production costs.
Komisiji torej niso bili predloženi prepričljivi dokazi o dejanskem deležu posrednih stroškov CO2 v proizvodnih stroških.
Thirdly, the beneficiaries must not be in the position to pass on these costs to their customers.
Kar zadeva tretji pogoj, tj. zmožnost upravičencev, da svoje posredne stroške CO2 prenesejo na odjemalce, so Nemčija in več zainteresiranih strani navedle, da upravičenci nimajo vpliva na ceno kovin.
Even if these conditions are met, it would be necessary to establish that production shifts or relocation would occur outside the EU/EEA, i.e. that production would move to countries with less stringent emission reduction requirements.
Ker proizvodnja neželeznih kovin predstavlja svetovni trg, se cene določajo na Londonski borzi kovin (LME).
Indeed, shifts of production within the EU-ETS would not constitute carbon leakage.
Proizvajalci tako ne morejo zvišati cen, ne da bi izgubili tržni delež.
As regards the first condition, Germany has argued that CO2 costs were priced in as opportunity costs by electricity suppliers and passed on to their customers already in 2009 despite the fact that most ETS allowances had been allocated for free to the electricity suppliers.
Predložene informacije naj bi potrjevale izpolnitev tretjega pogoja, tj. da proizvajalci zaradi dejstva, da je konkurenca svetovna in da temelji na ceni, znatnega zvišanja stroškov niso mogli prenesti naprej.
This was because the allowances used in the generation of electricity, although granted for free, carried a ‘price’ in that they could in principle be sold.
Komisija na splošno ugotavlja, da informacije, ki so jih predložile Nemčija in zainteresirane strani, ne zagotavljajo prepričljivega dokaza za to, da so posredni stroški CO2 predstavljali takšen delež proizvodnih stroškov potencialnih upravičencev, da je obstajalo tveganje selitve virov CO2.
In its Impact Assessment Report on the ETS Guidelines, the Commission came to the same conclusion that electricity producers were able to pass on most of their CO2 costs in the second ETS trading period (2008-2012), although this pass-on was estimated to be below 100 % [49].
Spodbujevalni učinek
Germany has submitted general information on the proportion of electricity costs in total costs: For copper production, energy or electricity costs ranged from 13 to above 40 % of production costs.
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka med drugim podvomila, da bi katera koli pomoč, dodeljena v okviru priglašene sheme, upravičence spodbudila k ohranitvi proizvodne zmogljivosti v Nemčiji.
For zinc production, they made up nearly 50 %, for aluminium, 46 %.
Ne glede na to, ali je tveganje selitve virov CO2 leta 2009 dejansko obstajalo, je časovni razpon pomoči, ki je pravzaprav zajemal le drugo polovico leta 2009, veljal za prekratek, da bi lahko vplival na pomembnejše naložbene odločitve [51].
The Commission notes that the definition of total costs has not been consistent across the different beneficiaries, which means that the figures cannot be compared with each other.
Nemčija trdi, da je bila shema namenjena premostitvi vrzeli med letom 2009, ko je bila kriza najhujša, in letom 2013, ko bo mogoče vzpostaviti dolgoročno shemo podpore na podlagi smernic za državno pomoč v okviru ETS.
Germany has also submitted figures on the indirect CO2 cost component of four of the beneficiaries (in EUR per MWh): they range from EUR […] per MWh (for a copper producer) to EUR […] per MWh (for a zinc producer), with aluminium production varying between EUR […] and […] per MWh.
Poleg tega so Nemčija in zainteresirane strani zatrjevale, da je imela že sama napoved priglašene sheme v letu 2009 učinek ohranjanja proizvodne zmogljivosti [52].
No information was submitted on the other beneficiaries.
Eden od upravičencev, […], je predložil notranje dokumente v ponazoritev, da je napoved nemške vlade dejansko preprečila zaprtje njegovega obrata v Nemčiji.
From the interested parties who are also beneficiaries, […] stated that indirect CO2 costs in 2009 amounted to EUR […] per MWh, representing as much as […] % of its total production costs.
Komisija meni, da so predložene informacije o spodbujevalnem učinku pomoči protislovne.
[…] indicated that electricity costs make up approx. […] % of its turnover.
Po eni strani je proizvodnja neželeznih kovin ciklična dejavnost, kar ima lahko za posledico precejšnje povečanje proizvodnje v času rasti in presežno zmogljivost, ko se povpraševanje zmanjša [53].
This information — which is unspecific — does not allow the Commission to ensure that the second condition has been fulfilled.
Po drugi strani je vprašanje selitve virov CO2, ki je razlog za ukrep pomoči, povezano z okoljskimi politikami in neodvisno od težav s presežno zmogljivostjo.
In addition, as already mentioned in recital 75, it appears that CO2 costs are not entirely passed on in electricity prices.
Kot so navedle zainteresirane strani, je treba za preprečitev selitve virov CO2 podjetjem zagotoviti dolgoročno varnost, kar pomeni stabilne dolgoročne pogoje, saj bi jih samo to spodbudilo k naložbam za ohranjanje proizvodne zmogljivosti v Evropi v naslednjih desetih do dvajsetih letih.
The extent to which CO2 costs are passed on depends greatly on the type of contract and on the time the contract was concluded.
Vprašljivo je že, ali je pomoč za tekoče poslovanje res ustrezen instrument za spodbujanje večjih naložb udeležencev na trgu, kot trdijo nekatere zainteresirane strani (na primer v primerjavi s ciljno usmerjeno pomočjo za naložbe).
The information provided by […] for instance tends to demonstrate that in the period concerned (July to December 2009) the part of CO2 costs in electricity was significantly less than the 1-year-forward price of allowances for 2009.
Toda tudi če bi to držalo, ukrep pomoči ni bil namenjen obravnavanju dolgoročnih pogojev poslovanja proizvajalcev neželeznih kovin.
In order to prove that a carbon leakage risk existed in 2009, Germany and interested parties have pointed to the data gathered by the Commission in the preparation of the ETS Guidelines.
Njegov edini učinek je krepitev položaja upravičencev v obdobju presežne zmogljivosti, medtem ko morajo njihovi konkurenti to težavo premagovati z lastnimi sredstvi.
But this information cannot be relied on to establish the existence of a carbon leakage risk for German industries in 2009.
Zdi se, da pripombe zainteresiranih strani o pozitivnem učinku pomoči dejansko potrjujejo, da je ukrep bolj deloval zoper ciklični upad rasti, kot pa obravnaval potencialno strukturno vprašanje okoljskih politik, ki povzročajo višje cene električne energije in vodijo k selitvi virov CO2.
First, the Commission based its analysis in the Impact Assessment Report on data aggregated at European level.
Glede na to, da naj bi shema delovala le v drugi polovici leta 2009, medtem ko so se razmere na trgu proizvajalcev neželeznih kovin in cene nestandardizirane terminske pogodbe na pravice do emisije Unije močno spreminjale pred tem obdobjem in po njem, se zdi Komisiji malo verjetno, da bi lahko takšna kratkoročna podpora odločilno vplivala na srednje- in dolgoročne strategije upravičencev za ohranjanje in morebitno povečanje zmogljivosti v Uniji.
This data therefore only has limited significance when examining a potential risk of carbon leakage for industries at Member State level.
Komisija poleg tega meni, da so potencialni upravičenci lahko predvidevali, prvič, da bo Komisija za morebitno odobritev sheme potrebovala čas, in, drugič, da bo v ETS-3 v vsakem primeru vzpostavljen okvir za podporo.
More importantly, the findings in the Impact Assessment Report all relate to ETS-3 and are not applicable to 2009.
Komisija na podlagi tega, pa tudi na podlagi dejstva, da nobeden od upravičencev doslej dejansko ni zaprl in preselil obratov, sklepa, da so na nadaljnje delovanje obratov za proizvodnjo neželeznih kovin vplivali drugi dejavniki, in ne pričakovanje priglašene sheme.
Indeed, the different risk scenarios described in the Impact Assessment Report were based on the assumption of a tightening of the cap and a transition to auctioning in ETS-3; they were therefore not reflecting the factual situation in 2009 [50].
Iz notranjih dokumentov, ki jih je zagotovila […], je namreč razvidno, da je bil odločilni dejavnik dejansko dolgoročna podpora (ki se je začela leta 2009 in se nadaljuje po letu 2013).
Therefore, the Commission has not been presented with conclusive evidence on the actual share of indirect CO2 costs within production costs.
Skratka, Komisija ugotavlja, da spodbujevalni učinek pomoči, dodeljene v okviru sheme, ni bil dokazan.
On the third condition, that is to say the ability of the beneficiaries to pass on their indirect CO2 costs to their customers, Germany and several interested parties have stated that the beneficiaries have no influence on the metal price.
Sorazmernost
As the production of non-ferrous metals constitutes a world market, the prices are set at the London Metal Exchange (LME).
Ukrep državne pomoči je sorazmeren, če se pomoč upravičencem ohranja na najnižji možni ravni, ki zadostuje za doseganje cilja skupnega interesa.
Producers are therefore said to have no means to raise prices without losing market share.
To pomeni, da upravičenci ne morejo prejeti več pomoči, kot bi bilo potrebno za kritje finančnega bremena, ki se ga namerava zmanjšati za doseganje cilja skupnega interesa.
The information submitted tends to confirm that the third condition is met, namely that producers could not pass on substantial cost increases due to the fact that competition is worldwide and mainly driven by price.
Po trditvah Nemčije njena metodologija zagotavlja, da upravičenci ne dobijo čezmernega nadomestila in da je nadomestilo dejansko le delno.
Overall, the Commission finds that the information submitted by Germany and interested parties does not provide conclusive evidence that for the potential beneficiaries, indirect CO2 costs constituted a share of production costs of such a level that there was a risk of carbon leakage.
Prvič, Nemčija namerava zadržati izplačila v višini posrednih stroškov CO2 za 1 GWh porabljene električne energije, kar pomeni, da bi upravičenec prejel nadomestilo le za zadevne posredne stroške CO2, ki presegajo zadržani znesek.
Therefore, it has not been demonstrated that the scheme would be necessary and appropriate to achieve the objective of common interest of preventing carbon leakage.
Drugič, poudarja, da bi bil znesek pomoči zmanjšan za 10-odstotni varnostni odbitek.
Incentive effect
Tretjič, zatrjuje, da se z določitvijo različnih zneskov pomoči za tri različne kovine zagotavlja najnižji možni znesek nadomestila.
State aid has an incentive effect if the aid changes the recipients' behaviour towards reaching the objective of common interest.
Zainteresirane strani se na splošno strinjajo s stališčem Nemčije [54], pri čemer nekatere celo zagovarjajo polno nadomestilo za vse posredne stroške CO2.
In its opening decision, the Commission, inter alia, doubted that any aid granted under the notified scheme would incentivise the beneficiaries to maintain production capacity in Germany.
Vendar pa se zdi, da je metodologija pomanjkljiva z več vidikov.
Regardless of whether a carbon leakage risk was real and present in 2009, the time span of the aid, which essentially only covered the second half of 2009, was considered too short to influence investment decisions of a relevant magnitude [51].
Prva pomanjkljivost se nanaša na natančnost določanja posrednih stroškov CO2.
Germany argues that the scheme was conceived to bridge the gap between 2009 when the crisis hit hardest and 2013 when it will be possible to set up a long-term support scheme based on the ETS Guidelines.
Nemčija za izhodišče upošteva ceno nestandardizirane terminske pogodbe na EUA za leto 2009 (24 EUR na tono CO2) in na podlagi povprečnih emisij CO2 marginalne elektrarne v Nemčiji (0,8 tone CO2 na MWh [55]) predpostavlja, da del posrednih stroškov CO2 v stroških električne energije znaša 19 EUR na MWh.
Moreover, Germany and interested parties have claimed that the mere announcement of the notified scheme in 2009 has had the effect of maintaining production capacity [52].
Vendar pa je Nemčija priznala, da bo glede na to, da so zadevna podjetja praviloma sklenila dolgoročne pogodbe ob določenem času ter na podlagi danih cen električne energije in EUA, dejanski delež stroškov CO2 v stroških električne energije upravičenca odvisen od njegovega dobavnega režima.
One beneficiary, […], has submitted internal documents to show that the announcement made by the German Government did avert the closure of their plant in Germany.
To so potrdile tudi informacije, ki so jih zagotovile zainteresirane strani.
The Commission finds the information submitted on the incentive effect of the aid to be contradictory.
Nekatere zainteresirane strani so navedle, da so podjetja, ki električno energijo pridobivajo na podlagi dolgoročnih pogodb, dejansko zaščitena pred posrednimi stroški CO2 v ceni električne energije.
On the one hand, non-ferrous metal production is a cyclical business, which may result in an important increase of production during an upturn and thus in overcapacity when demand falls [53].
Poleg tega informacije, ki jih je zagotovila […], kažejo, da v ceno električne energije niso bili vključeni vsi stroški CO2.
On the other hand, the issue of carbon leakage motivating the aid measure is linked to environmental policies and is an issue that exists irrespective of overcapacity problems.
Predpostavka, da bi posredni stroški CO2 znašali 19 EUR na MWh, ne upošteva te okoliščine in ne preprečuje učinkovito izplačevanja čezmernih nadomestil.