natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
20) (in particular recital 9 of that decision: prior administrative approval was necessary to benefit from special tax status under the coordination centre scheme); and Commission Decision 2003/81/EC of 22 August 2002 on the aid scheme implemented by Spain in favour of coordination centres in Vizcaya C 48/2001 (OJ L 31, 6.2.2003, p. 26) (in particular recital 14 of that decision: to qualify for the coordination centres scheme, an undertaking must obtain the prior approval of the tax authorities, which is granted for a period of up to five years).
Glej združene zadeve od C-78/08 do C-80/08, Paint Graphos, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, točka 65.
See recital 59.
Glej združeni zadevi C-182/03 in C-217/03, Belgija in Forum 187 ASBL proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, točka 95.
See Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, paragraph 82; Case 248/84 Germany v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1987:437, paragraph 18; and Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:311, paragraph 48.
To so družbe, ki imajo v Belgiji svoj statutarni sedež, glavni kraj poslovanja oziroma sedež vodstva ali uprave (člen 2(1), točka 5, CIR 92).
See Case C-399/08 P Commission v Deutsche Post ECLI:EU:C:2010:481, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited therein.
Glej člen 185(1) CIR 92.
See Case C-399/08 P Commission v Deutsche Post ECLI:EU:C:2010:481, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited therein.
To vključuje dohodke od nepremičnin v Belgiji, dohodke od nekaterih belgijskih sredstev ali kapitala in dobiček, ustvarjen prek stalne poslovne enote v Belgiji (členi 227–229 CIR 92).
See Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited therein.
Glej uvodno izjavo 25.
See Case 730/79 Phillip Morris ECLI:EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11 and Joined Cases T-298/97, T-312/97 etc.
Glej uvodne izjave 26 do 28.
Alzetta ECLI:EU:T:2000:151, paragraph 80.
Člen 179 v povezavi s členom 2(1), točka 5, CIR 92.
Case C-172/03 Heiser ECLI:EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 40.
Glej zadevo C-6/12 P, Oy, ECLI:EU:2013:525, točka 18, ter združeni zadevi C-106/09 P in C-107/09 P, Komisija proti Government of Gibraltar in Združenemu kraljestvu, ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, točka 73.
See Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 49 and 63.
Glej oddelek 6.3.2.1.
See Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 65.
Glej oddelek 6.3.1.2.
See Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, paragraph 95.
Glej oddelek 6.3.2.2.
I.e. companies having their registered seat, main establishment or actual management in Belgium, Article 2(1) 5o WIB 92.
Glej zadevo C-66/02, Italija proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2005:768, točka 78; zadevo C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio de Firenze in drugi, ECLI:EU:C:2006:8, točka 132; zadevo C-522/13, Ministerio de Defensa in Navantia, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2262, točke od 21 do 31.
See Article 185(1) WIB 92.
Glej tudi točko 9 Obvestila Komisije o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za ukrepe, ki zadevajo neposredno obdavčitev ustvarjenega dohodka (UL C 384, 10.12.1998, str. 3).
This includes income from real estate located in Belgium, income from certain Belgian based assets or capital and profit realised through a permanent establishment located in Belgium (Article 227 — 229 WIB 92)
Glej tudi Odločbo 2003/601/ES, uvodne izjave 33 do 35.
See recital 25.
Glej uvodno izjavo 125.
See recitals 26 to 28.
Glej uvodno izjavo 44.
Article 179 jo.
Pri predhodnih odločbah, ki niso tiste, ki se nanašajo na uporabo oprostitve presežnega dobička, naj ta obveznost ne bi povzročala težav s selektivnostjo.
Article 2(1) 5o WIB 92.
Običajne predhodne odločbe zagotavljajo zgolj pravno varnost v zvezi z davčno obravnavo na podlagi pravil, ki se za vse družbe, s predhodno odločbo ali brez nje, uporabljajo enako.
See Case C-6/12 P Oy ECLI:EU:2013:525, paragraph 18; Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 73.
Posledično bo, razen v zvezi z oprostitvijo presežnega dobička, obdavčljivi dobiček načeloma enak ne glede na to, ali je bil določen predhodno v predhodni odločbi ali naknadno v davčni napovedi.
See Section 6.3.2.1.
Vendar predhodna določba, s katero je odobrena oprostitev presežnega dobička, dejansko deluje kot predhodno dovoljenje.
See Section 6.3.1.2.
V zakonodaji je določeno, da je treba znižanje v primeru presežnega dobička, ki presega dobiček, dosežen pri poslovanju v običajnih tržnih razmerah, določiti s predhodno odločbo in ga ni mogoče zahtevati naknadno v davčni napovedi.
See Section 6.3.2.2.
Posledično družba, ki v okviru svoje običajne dejavnosti dejansko zabeleži visok (presežni) dobiček, ne more izkoristiti oprostitve presežnega dobička.
See Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission EU:C:2005:768, paragraph 78; Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 132; Case C-522/13 Ministerio de Defensa and Navantia EU:C:2014:2262, paragraphs 21 to 31.
Zato bosta družbi, ki sta v enakem pravnem in dejanskem položaju, ena po prestrukturiranju in druga v okviru svoje običajne dejavnosti, obravnavani različno, saj lahko samo prva družba zaprosi za predhodno odločbo o odobritvi oprostitve presežnega dobička.
See also point 9 of the Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation (OJ C 384, 10.12.1998, p. 3).
Zadeva C-21/15 P, Komisija proti Banco Santander in Santusa.
See also Decision 2003/601/EC, recitals 33 to 35.
Glej oddelek 6.3.1.2 in uvodno izjavo 136.
See recital 125.
Glej združeni zadevi C-182/03 in C-217/03, Belgija in Forum 187 ASBL proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416.
See recital 44.
Odločba Komisije 2003/757/ES z dne 17. februarja 2003 o shemi državne pomoči, ki jo je Belgija namenila centrom za usklajevanje s sedežem v Belgiji (UL L 282, 30.10.2003, str. 25).
For rulings other than those concerning the application of the Excess Profit exemption, this requirement would not raise selectivity concerns.
Glej združeni zadevi C-182/03 in C-217/03, Belgija in Forum 187 ASBL proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, točke od 95 do 97.
Normal rulings merely provide legal certainty for a tax treatment under rules that are equally applicable to all companies, with or without a ruling.
Glej združeni zadevi C-182/03 in C-217/03, Belgija in Forum 187 ASBL proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, točka 81.
Consequently, outside the Excess Profit exemption, in principle the profit subject to tax will be the same whether agreed ex ante in a ruling or ex post in a tax return.
Glej tudi zadevo T-538/11, Belgija proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2015:188, točki 65 in 66 ter navedena sodna praksa.
The ruling granting the Excess Profit exemption, however, effectively works as a prior authorisation.
Glej uvodno izjavo 65.
By law, the discount for excess profit allegedly exceeding the arm's length profit must be established via a ruling and cannot be claimed ex post in a tax return.
V smernicah OECD za določanje transfernih cen izraz „osrednji podjetnik“ ni opredeljen.
As a consequence, a company actually recording high (excess) profit in its normal course of business cannot benefit from the Excess Profit exemption.
V odstavku 9.2 teh smernic je uveden izraz „principal“ kot nasprotna stranka tujega povezanega podjetja, ki nastopa kot distributer z omejenim tveganjem, zastopnik, komisionar ali pogodbeni proizvajalec/ proizvajalec za dodelavne posle za principala, vendar pa v smernicah izraz „principal“ ni natančneje opredeljen.
As a result two companies in the same legal and factual situation, where this situation in one case arises from a restructuring and in another case follows the normal course of business will be treated differently because only the first company is eligible to apply for a ruling granting an Excess Profit exemption.
Drugi primeri, v katerih je subjekt naveden kot principal v okviru povezane transakcije, so navedeni v odstavkih 9.26 in 9.27 smernic OECD za določanje transfernih cen.
Case C-21/15 P Commission v Banco Santander and Santusa.
V strukturi skupine je lahko z ekonomskega vidika racionalno, da se funkcije porazdelijo med, na primer, subjekt, ki je zadolžen za strateške poslovne odločitve, in drug subjekt, ki je zadolžen za proizvodne in izvršilne funkcije.
See Section 6.3.1.2 and recital 136.
Zato mora biti taka struktura v skladu s tržnimi pogoji, da bi se upoštevalo neodvisno tržno načelo.
See Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:416.
Pogodbeno proizvajanje je opisano v odstavku 7.40 smernic OECD za določanje transfernih cen.
Commission Decision 2003/757/EC of 17 February 2003 on the aid scheme implemented by Belgium for coordination centres established in Belgium (OJ L 282, 30.10.2003, p. 25).
Distribucija z omejenim tveganjem je opisana v odstavku 9.127, izraz „zastopnik“ pa je naveden v odstavku 6.37 smernic OECD za določanje transfernih cen.
See Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, paragraphs 96 and 97.
Drugi enostranski metodi sta metoda dodatka na stroške in metoda preprodajne cene.
See Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, paragraph 81.
Glej uvodno izjavo 57.
See also Case T-538/11 Belgium v Commission EU:T:2015:188, paragraphs 65 and 66 and the case-law cited.
Glej sprotno opombo 37 ter odstavek 2.58 in naslednje smernic OECD.
See recital 65.
V smernicah OECD za določanje transfernih cen, sprejetih leta 1995, ki so veljale, ko je bila sporna shema uvedena, se za ugotovitev, ali je transferna cena v skladu s primerljivo tržno ceno, izrecno daje prednost tradicionalnim transakcijskim metodam, kot je metoda CUP, pred transakcijskimi metodami, kot je metoda TNMM (glej odstavek 3.49 smernic OECD iz leta 1995).
The OECD TP Guidelines do not define the term ‘central entrepreneur’.
V odstavku 2.3 smernic OECD iz leta 2010 je v zvezi s tem določeno: „To pomeni, da se lahko ob upoštevanju meril, opisanih v odstavku 2.2., tradicionalne transakcijske metode in metode transakcijskega dobička […] uporabljajo enako zanesljivo.
Paragraph 9.2 of those guidelines introduces the term ‘principal’ as the counterparty to a foreign associated enterprise acting as a limited risk distributor, agent, commissionaire or toll/contract manufacturer for the principal, but those guidelines do not further define the term ‘principal’.
Pri tem ima prednost uporaba standardnih transakcijskih metod.“
Other examples where an entity is referred to as the principal within a controlled transaction are given in paragraph 9.26 and 9.27 of the OECD TP Guidelines.
Glej odstavek 1.45 smernic OECD.
In a group structure, a separation of functions whereby, for example, one entity ensures strategic business decisions and another entity ensures production or execution functions may be economically rational.
Poleg tega je v odstavku 9.39 istih smernic navedeno: „Običajno je za stranko, ki ji je dodeljeno tveganje, povezano s povezano transakcijo, […] posledica ta, da mora ta stranka: […] (c) ta stranka običajno prejme nadomestilo v obliki povečanega pričakovanega donosa.“
To this end, such a structure must be in line with market conditions in order to comply with the arm's length principle.
Kolikor je mogoča ekonomska utemeljitev strukture osrednjega podjetnika.
A description of contract manufacturing is given in paragraph 7.40 of the OECD TP Guidelines.
Glej tudi odstavek 1.47 smernic OECD.
Limited risk distribution is described in paragraph 9.127 and a reference to the term ‘agent’ can be found in paragraph 6.37 of the OECD TP Guidelines.
Preostali dobiček je torej enak vsoti hipotetičnega povprečnega dobička samostojnega podjetja, ki se šteje za primerljivo, kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 17, imenovanega tudi „prilagojeni dobiček, dosežen pri poslovanju v običajnih tržnih razmerah,“ in „presežnega dobička“.
The other one sided methods are the cost plus and the resale minus.
Glej tudi uvodno izjavo 154.
See recital 57.
To je potrjeno tudi v odstavku 1.158 poročila OECD z naslovom „Uskladitev izračunanih transfernih cen z ustvarjanjem vrednosti, ukrepi 8–10, končna poročila iz leta 2015“, Projekt OECD/G20 o eroziji davčne osnove in preusmeritvi dobička, OECD Publishing, Pariz (v nadaljnjem besedilu: končno poročilo OECD o BEPS), ki zagotavlja nadaljnje smernice o sinergijah iz odstavka 7.13 smernic OECD: „[…] kadar sinergijske prednosti in nevšečnosti izhajajo izključno iz pripadnosti multinacionalni skupini brez namernega in usklajenega ukrepanja te multinacionalne skupine ali iz opravljanja kakršne koli storitve ali kakršne koli druge funkcije s strani članov skupine, takih sinergijskih prednosti ni treba ločeno nadomestiti ali posebej porazdeliti med člane skupine.“ ( […] when synergistic benefits or burdens of group membership arise purely as a result of membership in an MNE group and without the deliberate concerted action of group members or the performance of any service or other function by group members, such synergistic benefits of group membership need not be separately compensated or specifically allocated among members of the MNE group. – prosti prevod, francoska različica še ni objavljena).
See footnote 37 and paragraph 2.58 et seq. of the OECD TP Guidelines.
Glej primere iz odstavkov 1.168 in 1.169 končnega poročila OECD o BEPS.
The 1995 OECD TP Guidelines, which were in force when the contested scheme was set up, declare an express preference for traditional transaction methods, such as the CUP, over transactional methods, such as the TNMM, as a means to establish whether transfer pricing is at arm's length (see paragraph 3.49 of the 1995 OECD TP Guidelines).
Glej odstavek 3.18 smernic OECD: „Splošno pravilo se glasi, da je testna stranka tista stranka, pri kateri se lahko metoda za določanje transfernih cen uporabi na najzanesljivejši način, in za katero se lahko ugotovijo najzanesljivejše primerljivke, to pomeni, da bo to tista stranka, pri kateri je funkcijska analiza manj zapletena.“
Paragraph 2.3 of the 2010 OECD TP Guidelines provides in this regard: ‘As a result, where, taking account of the criteria described at paragraph 2.2, a traditional transaction method and a transactional profit method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, the traditional transaction method is preferable to the transactional profit method.’
Drugače bi razlaga Belgije v zvezi z neodvisnim tržnim načelom pomenila, da bi splošna uporaba te razlage smernic OECD s strani vseh držav, ki gostijo subjekte multinacionalnih skupin, nujno privedla do ugotovitve, da se dobiček skupine, izhajajoč iz sinergij v skupini ali ekonomije obsega, ne more obdavčiti v nobeni od teh držav.
See paragraph 1.45 of the OECD TP Guidelines.
Glej odstavek 9.58 smernic OECD.
In addition, paragraph 9.39 of those guidelines states: ‘In general, the consequence for one party of being allocated the risk associated with a controlled transaction (…) is that such party should: (…) c) Generally be compensated by an increase in the expected return.’
Glej uvodno izjavo 159.
Provided that the economic rationale for the central entrepreneur structure can be established.
Glej opombo 70.
See also paragraph 1.47 of the OECD TP Guidelines.
Glej uvodni izjavi 138 in 139.
The residual profit therefore equals the sum of the hypothetical average profit of a deemed comparable standalone company described in recital 17, also referred to as the ‘adjusted arm's length profit’, and the ‘excess profit’.
Glej uvodno izjavo 111.
This is also confirmed in paragraph 1.158 of the OECD's report Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10-2015 Final Reports, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (hereinafter: ‘OECD Report on BEPS’) which provides further guidance on synergies in relation to paragraph 7.13 of the OECD TP Guidelines: ‘(…) when synergistic benefits or burdens of group membership arise purely as a result of membership in an MNE group and without the deliberate concerted action of group members or the performance of any service or other function by group members, such synergistic benefits of group membership need not be separately compensated or specifically allocated among members of the MNE group.’
Glej po analogiji združene zadeve od C-78/08 do C-80/08, Paint Graphos, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, točka 71, v katerih Sodišče navaja možnost sklicevanja na naravo ali splošno sistematiko davčnega sistema, da bi se upravičilo, da zadruge, ki celoten dobiček razdelijo članom, niso obdavčene, če se davek zaračuna njihovim članom.
See also the examples given in paragraphs 1.168 and 1.169 of the OECD Report on BEPS.
Glej uvodno izjavo 89.
See paragraph 3.18 of the OECD TP Guidelines: ‘As a general rule, the tested party is the one to which a transfer pricing method can be applied in the most reliable manner and for which the most reliable comparables can be found, i.e. it will most often be the one that has the less complex functional analysis.’
Komisija navaja, da je Belgija predložila tri primere predhodnih odločb na podlagi člena 185(2)(b) CIR 92, ki so dejansko namenjene rešitvi dejanskih primerov dvojne obdavčitve (glej uvodno izjavo 67).
Otherwise, the interpretation given by Belgium to the arm's length principle implies that a general application of that interpretation of the OECD principles by all the States hosting entities of multinational groups would necessarily lead to the conclusion that profit of group resulting from intragroup synergies or economies of scale should not be taxed in any of those States.
Vendar se te predhodne odločbe jasno razlikujejo od predhodnih odločb o odobritvi oprostitve presežnega dobička.
See paragraph 9.58 of the OECD TP Guidelines.
Pri predhodnih odločbah o odobritvi negativne prilagoditve transfernih cen bo namreč negativna prilagoditev privedla do simetričnega zabeleženja dobička v poslovnih knjigah družb, ki so stranke v povezani transakciji.
See recital 159.
Negativna prilagoditev davčne osnove bi bila torej upravičena z naravo in splošno sistematiko davčnega sistema ter torej ne bi pomenila državne pomoči, če izhaja iz želje, da se kompenzira pozitivna prilagoditev na drugem davčnem ozemlju.
See footnote 70.
Nasprotno pa oprostitve presežnega dobička ni mogoče utemeljiti s podobnimi razlogi, ker nobeno drugo davčno ozemlje ne zahteva dobička, tako da se težava z dvojno obdavčitvijo ne pojavi.
See recitals 138 and 139.
Glej združene zadeve od C-78/08 do C-80/08, Paint Graphos, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, točka 75.
See recital 123.
Skupni forum EU za transferne cene je bil uradno ustanovljen s Sklepom Komisije 2007/75/ES z dne 22. decembra 2006 o ustanovitvi strokovne skupine za transferne cene (UL L 32, 6.2.2007, str.
See, for example, Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 69.
189).
See, by way of analogy, Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 71, in which the Court referred to the possibility of relying on the nature or general scheme of the national tax system as a justification for the fact that cooperative societies which distribute all their profits to their members are not taxed themselves as cooperatives, provided that tax is levied on the individual members.
Forum pomaga Komisiji in ji svetuje pri davčnih vprašanjih glede transfernih cen.
The Commission observes that Belgium has provided three examples of rulings based on Article 185(2)(b) WIB 92 which indeed aim at solving actual situations of double taxation (see recital 67).
Njegov predsednik je neodvisen.
Those rulings are, however, clearly different from the rulings granting the Excess Profit exemption.
Zadeva C-170/83, Hydrotherm, ECLI:EU:C:1984:271, točka 11.
Indeed, for rulings authorising a downward transfer pricing adjustment, the downward adjustment will lead to a symmetric recording of profit in the accounts of companies involved in the controlled transaction.
Glej tudi zadevo T-137/02, Pollmeier Malchow proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:2004:304, točka 50.
A downward adjustment of the tax base would therefore be justified by the nature and general scheme of the tax system and therefore not amount to State aid provided it is motivated by the desire to compensate for an upward adjustment in another tax jurisdiction.
Zadeva C-480/09 P, Acea Electrabel Produzione SpA proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2010:787, točke od 47 do 55; zadeva C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio de Firenze in drugi, ECLI:EU:C:2006:8, točka 112.
The Excess Profit exemption, by contrast, cannot be justified on similar grounds, because of the absence of another tax jurisdiction claiming the profit, so that double taxation concerns do not arise.
Glej po analogiji zadevo 323/82, Intermills, ECLI:EU:C:1984:345, točka 11: „Iz informacij, ki so jih predložile same tožeče stranke, izhaja, da po prestrukturiranju Valonska regija nadzoruje tako družbo Intermills kot tri industrijske družbe in da ima družba Intermills po prenosu proizvodnih obratov na tri novoustanovljene družbe, še vedno deleže v njih.
See Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 75.
Treba je torej ugotoviti, da kljub dejstvu, da je vsaka od treh industrijskih družb pravna oseba, ki je ločena od nekdanje družbe Intermills, vse te družbe skupaj tvorijo eno samo skupino, vsaj kar zadeva pomoč, ki so jo dodelili belgijski organi. […].“
The EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF) was formally established by Commission Decision 2007/75/EC of 22 December 2006 setting up an expert group on transfer pricing (OJ L 32, 6.2.2007, p.
Izjeme iz člena 107(2) Pogodbe, ki se nanašajo na pomoč socialnega značaja, dodeljeno posameznim potrošnikom, pomoč za povrnitev škode, ki so jo povzročile naravne nesreče ali izjemni dogodki, in pomoč, dodeljeno gospodarstvu nekaterih območij Zvezne republike Nemčije, se v tem primeru ne uporabljajo.
189) to assist and advise the European Commission on transfer pricing tax matters.
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 794/2004 z dne 21. aprila 2004 o izvajanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES (UL L 140, 30.4.2004, str. 1).
The JTPF has one representative from each Member State's tax administrations and 18 non-government organisation members.
Glej zadevo C-5/89, Komisija proti Nemčiji, ECLI:EU:C:1990:320, točka 17, in zadevo C-310/99, Italija proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2002:143, točka 104.
It is chaired by an independent chairperson.
Glej zadevo T-67/94, Ladbroke Racing proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:1998:7, točka 183; glej tudi združeni zadevi T-116/01 in T-118/01, P&O European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA in Diputacion Floral de Vizcaya proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:2003:217, točka 203.
Report on Compensating Adjustments which was welcomed by the Council of the European Union in its conclusions from 10 March 2015.
Glej zadevo T-290/97, Mehibas Dordtselaan proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:T:2000:8, točka 59, ter združeni zadevi C-182/03 in C-217/03, Belgija in Forum 187 ASBL proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, točka 147.
In the Glossary of the OECD TP Guidelines the term ‘compensating adjustment’ is defined as ‘an adjustment in which the taxpayer reports a transfer price for tax purposes that is, in the taxpayer's opinion, an arm's length price for a controlled transaction, even though this price differs from the amount actually charged between the associated enterprises.
Glej združeni zadevi C-182/03 in C-217/03, Belgija in Forum 187 ASBL proti Komisiji, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, točke od 150 do 152.
This adjustment would be made before the tax return is filed.’
Glej zadevo C-138/09, Todaro Nunziatina & C., ECLI:EU:C:2010:291, točka 21.
The Report, more generally, refers to taxpayer-initiated transfer pricing adjustments made at a later point of time (usually at the end of the year) of transfer prices set at the time of a transaction or series of transactions took place or before.
Glej Odločbo Komisije 2005/378/ES z dne 8. septembra 2004 o shemi pomoči, ki jo bo Belgija namenila centrom za usklajevanje (UL L 125, 18.5.2005, str. 10), in zlasti uvodne izjave 22, 34 in 37 ter člen 1(b).