natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In that respect, the UBA is responsible for issuing, transferring and cancelling the guarantees of origin.
Komisija je glede podpore za električno energijo EEG ugotovila, da je združljiva z notranjim trgom na podlagi člena 107(3)(c) Pogodbe, vendar je izrazila pomisleke glede tega, da bi se lahko znižanja dodatne dajatve EEG na podlagi Pogodbe, zlasti člena 107(3)(b) in (c) Pogodbe, štela za združljiva.
THE DECISION TO INITIATE THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
Nazadnje je Komisija izrazila pomisleke glede tega, da je financiranje podpore za električno energijo EEG na podlagi zakona EEG iz leta 2012 v skladu s členoma 30 in 110 Pogodbe, saj je bila do dodatne dajatve EEG upravičena le proizvodnja električne energije EEG v Nemčiji, uvedena pa je bila tudi na porabo uvožene električne energije EEG, katere proizvajalci bi bili morda tudi upravičeni do podpore na podlagi zakona EEG iz leta 2012, če bi imeli sedež v Nemčiji.
On 18 December 2013, the Commission decided to initiate the formal investigation procedure as it considered that the EEG-Act 2012 constituted State aid for EEG electricity producers, electricity suppliers benefitting from the green electricity privilege, and EIU and had doubts as to the compatibility of that aid with the internal market.
PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANI
As regards the existence of State aid, the Commission reached the preliminary conclusion that the EEG-Act 2012 involved the conferral of selective economic advantages (i) on producers of electricity from RES and mine gas, notably through the feed-in tariffs, and (ii) on energy-intensive users, through the reduction of their EEG-surcharges.
Zainteresirane strani so predložile svoje pripombe glede sklepa o začetku postopka in uporabe smernic iz leta 2014 za ta sklep v skladu s točko 248 smernic iz leta 2014.
The Commission also came to the preliminary conclusion that these advantages were financed from State resources, given in particular (i) that the German legislator appeared to have introduced a special levy intended to finance the support for EEG electricity production, the EEG-surcharge, (ii) that the German legislator and the executive branch had designated the TSOs to collectively administer that surcharge according to rules laid down by the State in the EEG-Act 2012 and in implementing regulations, and (iii) that the TSOs were closely monitored in the administration of that resource.
Večina zainteresiranih strani je trdila, da se za zakon EEG iz leta 2012 ne bi smelo šteti, da vključuje državno pomoč na ravni proizvajalcev električne energije EEG ali v korist energetsko intenzivnim uporabnikom.
While the support for EEG electricity was found to be compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty, the Commission voiced doubts as to whether the reductions of the EEG-surcharge could be found compatible on the basis of the Treaty, and in particular Article 107(3)(b) and (c) of the Treaty.
Menijo, da je nemška država le organizirala sistem na podlagi (zaporednih) plačil med zasebnimi operaterji, v katerem navedeni operaterji uporabljajo lastna finančna sredstva.
Finally, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the financing of the support for EEG electricity under the EEG-Act 2012 complied with Articles 30 and 110 of the Treaty, given that although the EEG-surcharge only benefited EEG electricity production in Germany, it was also imposed on the consumption of imported EEG electricity the producers of which may have been eligible for support under the EEG-Act 2012 had they been located in Germany.
Samo dejstvo, da je sistem vzpostavljen na podlagi državne zakonodaje (zakona EEG iz leta 2012 in njegovih izvedbenih določb), ali sodelovanje agencije BNetzA, zveznega urada Bundesanstalt für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, agencije UBA in organa BAFA, naloge katerih naj bi bile omejene, po njihovem mnenju ne more spremeniti vsebovane zasebne narave sistema.
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
Ta analiza večinoma temelji na sodbah Sodišča v zadevah PreussenElektra [16] in Doux Élevage [17].
Interested parties submitted their observations on the Opening Decision and on the application of the 2014 Guidelines to this Decision pursuant to point 248 of the 2014 Guidelines.
Zainteresirane strani trdijo, da bi bilo treba pomoč, če je sploh prisotna, ob upoštevanju sklepa Komisije glede predhodne nemške sheme v zadevi NN 27/2000 [18] šteti za obstoječo pomoč.
Most interested parties argued that the EEG-Act 2012 should not be seen as involving State aid either at the level of EEG electricity producers, or in favour of the EIUs.
Zainteresirane strani so trdile tudi, da so znižanja dodatne dajatve EEG združljiva z notranjim trgom na podlagi člena 107(3)(b) ali (c) Pogodbe.
They take the view that the German State has merely organised a system based on (successive) payments between private operators where those operators use their own financial resources.
Navedene strani glede zakona EEG iz leta 2012 menijo, da si prizadeva za dvojni cilj, tj. podpiranje razvoja proizvodnje električne energije EEG ter ohranjanje industrijske baze Nemčije in Unije.
The mere fact that that system originates in State legislation (the EEG-Act 2012 and its implementing provisions), or the involvement of the BNetzA, the Bundesanstalt für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, the UBA and the BAFA, the attributions of which are allegedly limited, cannot, in their view, alter the innately private nature of the system.
Trdijo, da je morebitna pomoč, vključena v zakon EEG iz leta 2012, ustrezno in sorazmerno sredstvo za doseganje navedenega dvojnega cilja.
This analysis is mostly based on the Court judgments in the cases PreussenElektra [16] and Doux Élevage [17].
V vsakem primeru menijo, da Komisija v tem primeru ne bi smela uporabiti smernic iz leta 2014, saj bi bila taka uporaba retroaktivna.
If there is any aid at all, the interested parties argue that it should be considered to be existing aid in the light of the Commission's decision on a previous German scheme in case NN 27/2000 [18].
Prav tako ne bi smela zahtevati vračila zaradi varstva legitimnih pričakovanj udeležencev, da je bila pomoč dodeljena zakonito.
Moreover, interested parties have contended that the reductions in the EEG-surcharge are compatible with the internal market on the basis of either Article 107(3)(b) or (c) of the Treaty.
Nasprotno je nemško združenje odjemalcev energije (Bund der Energieverbraucher), ki se je Komisiji prvotno pritožilo glede zakona EEG iz leta 2012, trdilo, da znižanja dodatne dajatve EEG dejansko pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe za energetsko intenzivne uporabnike ter da škodijo tistim nemškim podjetjem in odjemalcem, ki morajo plačati višjo dodatno dajatev EEG, niso pa upravičeni do podobnih znižanj.
The EEG-Act 2012 is described by those parties as pursuing a dual objective of supporting the development of EEG electricity production and of preserving Germany's and the Union's industrial basis.
Navedeno združenje je nadalje trdilo, da znižanj ni mogoče šteti za združljiva na podlagi člena 107(3)(c) Pogodbe.
The interested parties submit that any aid involved in the EEG-Act 2012 is an appropriate and proportionate means of achieving that dual objective.
Podobno je trdilo tudi več nemških državljanov.
In any case, they state that the Commission should not apply the 2014 Guidelines to this case, because such application would be retroactive.
Trditve zainteresiranih strani so podrobneje obravnavane v oddelku 7.
It should also refrain from recovery due to the need to protect the beneficiaries' legitimate expectations that the aid was lawfully granted.
PRIPOMBE NEMČIJE GLEDE SKLEPA O ZAČETKU POSTOPKA IN PRIPOMB TRETJIH STRANI
In contrast, the German Association of Energy Consumers (Bund der Energieverbraucher), which initially complained to the Commission about the EEG-Act 2012, argued that the reductions in the EEG-surcharge do indeed constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, to energy-intensive users and that they harm those German undertakings and consumers that have to pay a higher EEG-surcharge without benefiting from similar reductions.
Nemčija poudarja, da je večina akterjev v sistemu, ki je bil vzpostavljen z zakonom EEG iz leta 2012, zasebnih, kar je bilo predmet obravnave že v zadevi PreussenElektra, in da navedeni akterji niso del javne uprave.
The Association further contended that the reductions cannot be found compatible on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty.
Država je vključena le zaradi sprejetja zakonodaje in strogega nadzora njenega izvajanja.
These arguments were also made by several German citizens.
Sodelujoča javna organa, tj. agencija BNetzA in organ BAFA, naj bi strogo upoštevala svoje omejene naloge in ne upravljata nobenih sredstev.
The arguments submitted by interested parties are addressed in more detail in Section 7.
Po navedbah Nemčije navedena organa nimata diskrecijske pravice.
COMMENTS FROM GERMANY ON THE OPENING DECISION AND ON THIRD PARTY COMMENTS
Nemčija ugotavlja tudi, da dodatne dajatve EEG kot take ne določa država, ampak temelji na tržnem mehanizmu, saj je odvisna od prihodkov od prodaje električne energije EEG na gotovinskem trgu.
Germany points out that most of the actors in the system established by the EEG-Act 2012 are private, something which was already the case under PreussenElektra, and that those actors are not part of public administration.
Nazadnje poudarja, da dobaviteljem v skladu z zakonom EEG iz leta 2012 dodatne dajatve ni treba prenesti na odjemalce, kar pomeni, da je prenos stvar politike oblikovanja cen dobaviteljev električne energije.
The only State involvement is in the adoption of the legislation and the strict control of its implementation.
Poleg tega noben od zadevnih operaterjev v sistemu nima posebnih pooblastil, ki izhajajo iz javnega prava; namesto tega se morajo pri izvrševanju medsebojnih zahtevkov za plačilo zanašati na civilna sodišča.
The public authorities involved, notably the BNetzA and the BAFA, are said to strictly comply with their limited attributions, without managing any funds.
Nemčija je navedla naslednje pravne argumente, ki so podobni argumentom zainteresiranih strani:
According to Germany, those authorities have no discretion.
odsotnost selektivnih gospodarskih prednosti, ker podpora za električno energijo EEG izpolnjuje merila iz sodbe v zadevi Altmark [19], znižanja za energetsko intenzivne uporabnike pa znašajo le toliko, da ublažijo obstoječ slabši položaj nemške industrije, odsotnost državnih sredstev in državnega nadzora zaradi neprimerljivosti pravnih in dejanskih razmer v zakonu EEG iz leta 2012 z razmerami, ki jih je proučilo Sodišče v zadevah Essent [20] in Vent de colère [21], dejstvo, da bi plačila na podlagi zakona EEG iz leta 2012, če bi že pomenila državno pomoč, ob upoštevanju odločbe Komisije v zadevi v zvezi z državno pomočjo NN 27/2000 pomenila obstoječo pomoč,
Further, Germany notes that the EEG-surcharge as such is not set by the State, but is based on a market mechanism, given that it depends on the revenues made from the EEG electricity sales on the spot market.
združljivost vsake dodeljene pomoči z notranjim trgom na podlagi člena 107(3)(b) in (c),
Finally, Germany stresses that the EEG-Act 2012 does not require suppliers to pass on the surcharge to consumers, which means the pass-on is a matter of the electricity suppliers' pricing policy.
odsotnost kršitve členov 30 in 110 Pogodbe, ker uvožene električne energije EEG ni mogoče primerjati z doma proizvedeno električno energijo EEG, zlasti ob upoštevanju nedavno sprejete sodbe v zadevi Ålands Vindkraft [22].
Moreover, none of the operators involved in the system have special powers originating in public law; rather, they have to rely on the civil courts to enforce their payment claims against each other.
(58) Trditve Nemčije so podrobneje proučene in ovržene v oddelku 7.
Germany made the following legal arguments, which are similar to those submitted by interested parties, namely
ZAVEZE, KI JIH JE PREDLOŽILA NEMČIJA
the absence of selective economic advantages, on the grounds that the support for EEG electricity meets the criteria of the Altmark judgment [19] and that the reductions for energy-intensive users merely amount to mitigating an existing disadvantage of the German industry;the absence of State resources and of State control, due to the incomparability of the legal and factual situation in the EEG-Act 2012 with the situations examined by the Court in cases Essent [20] and Vent de colère [21];the fact that, if they constitute State aid at all, the payments made under the EEG-Act 2012 would constitute existing aid in the light of the Commission's decision in State aid case NN 27/2000;
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 19, je Nemčija predložila naslednjo zavezo glede ponovne naložbe v višini 50 milijonov EUR v povezovalne daljnovode in evropske energetske projekte:
the compatibility of any aid granted with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) and (c);
„Glede zakona EEG iz leta 2012 bi bila mogoča skupna rešitev v zvezi s pravicami, povezanimi z zeleno električno energijo, ter vprašanjem v zvezi s členoma 30 in 110.
the absence of an infringement of Articles 30 and 110 of the Treaty due to the fact that imported EEG electricity cannot be compared with that which is domestically produced, notably in view of the recent Ålands Vindkraft ruling [22].(58) Germany's arguments are examined and rebutted in more detail in Section 7.
Rešitev bi bila ponovna naložba ocenjenega zneska, pridobljenega z domnevno diskriminacijo, v povezovalne daljnovode ali podobne evropske energetske projekte.
COMMITMENTS PROVIDED BY GERMANY
Ponovna naložba bi se lahko izvedla vzporedno z napredkom zadevnega projekta.
As mentioned above in recital 19, Germany provided the following commitment concerning the reinvestment of EUR 50 million into interconnectors and European energy projects:
Na podlagi podatkov, ki jih je sporočila Nemčija, bi morala ponovna naložba znašati 50 milijonov EUR za obdobje od januarja 2012 do julija 2014.
‘For the EEG 2012, a global solution could be conceived for both the Grünstromprivileg and the Article 30/110 issue.
Nemčija to zavezo ponuja z zaščito svojega pravnega položaja (brez diskriminacije).“
The solution would consist of the reinvestment into interconnectors or similar European energy projects of the estimated amount of the alleged discrimination.
Poleg tega je Nemčija glede načrta prilagoditve iz uvodne izjave 27 in naslednjih predložila naslednjo zavezo:
The reinvestment could be made in parallel to the progress of the relevant project.
„Vračilo [znesek, ki ga je treba vrniti] v zvezi z zadevnim podjetjem je razlika med zadevnimi stroški EEG, določenimi na podlagi Smernic o državni pomoči za varstvo okolja in energijo za obdobje 2014–2020 (‚smernice iz leta 2014‘), in stroški EEG, določenimi na podlagi zakona EEG iz leta 2012.
On the basis of the figures communicated by Germany, the reinvestment should amount to EUR 50 million for the period January 2012-July 2014.
Načrt prilagoditve v zvezi s tem omejuje plačilo na podlagi smernic iz leta 2014 na največ 125 % (za leto 2013) in največ 150 % (za leto 2014) plačila, izvedenega za leto 2013 v skladu z zakonom EEG iz leta 2012.
Again, Germany offers this commitment by safeguarding its legal position (no discrimination).’
Negativni zneski vračila se ne upoštevajo.“
In addition, Germany provided the following commitment concerning the adjustment plan mentioned in recitals 27 et seq.:
OCENA POMOČI
‘Recovery [the recoverable amount] in respect of a given undertaking results from the difference of the relevant EEG costs as determined on the basis of the Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-20 (“2014 Guidelines”) and of the EEG costs as determined on the basis of the EEG-Act 2012.
Obstoj državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe
In that respect, the adjustment plan limits the payment to be made on the basis of the 2014 Guidelines to a maximum of 125 % (for the year 2013) and to a maximum of 150 % (for the year 2014) of the payment made in respect of the year 2013 according to the EEG-Act 2012.
Člen 107(1) PDEU določa, da „razen če Pogodbi ne določata drugače, je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom, kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami.“
Negative recovery amounts are not taken into account.’
Pri ugotavljanju, ali ukrep pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, mora Komisija uporabiti naslednja merila: ukrep mora biti pripisan državi in odobren iz državnih sredstev, zagotavljati mora prednost določenim podjetjem ali določenim sektorjem, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco, in lahko bi vplival na trgovino med državami članicami.
ASSESSMENT OF THE AID
Obstoj selektivnih prednosti, ki vplivajo na trgovino in konkurenco
Existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka ugotovila, da zakon EEG iz leta 2012 vključuje dve vrsti selektivnih prednosti, ki vplivajo na trgovino in konkurenco.
According to Article 107(1) of the Treaty, ‘save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market’.
Prva prednost se je dodelila proizvajalcem električne energije EEG.
In determining whether a measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, the Commission has to apply the following criteria: the measure must be imputable to the State and involve State resources, it must confer an advantage on certain undertakings or certain sectors which distorts or threatens to distort competition and is liable to affect trade between Member States.
Komisija je dejansko ugotovila, da so zagotovljene odkupne cene in premije proizvajalcem električne energije EEG za električno energijo, ki jo proizvajajo, zagotovile ceno, višjo od tržne cene.
Existence of selective advantages affecting trade and competition
To je veljalo tudi za neposredno trženje električne energije EEG, s čemer je bila zagotovljena pravica do znižane dodatne dajatve EEG na podlagi člena 39 zakona EEG iz leta 2012, saj je navedena določba proizvajalcem električne energije EEG omogočila, da svojo električno energijo prodajo po ceni, višji od tržne cene.
In its Opening Decision, the Commission found that the EEG-Act 2012 involved two types of selective advantages affecting trade and competition.
Ukrep je bil selektiven, saj so bili do njega upravičeni le proizvajalci električne energije EEG.
The first advantage was conferred on producers of EEG electricity.
Poleg tega je bil trg električne energije liberaliziran in proizvajalci električne energije so bili dejavni v sektorjih, v katerih je potekala trgovina med državami članicami (uvodna izjava 76 sklepa o začetku postopka).
Indeed the Commission found that the feed-in tariffs and premiums guaranteed the producers of EEG electricity a higher price for the electricity they produce than the market price.
Druga prednost je bilo znižanje dodatne dajatve EEG za nekatere energetsko intenzivne uporabnike na podlagi posebnega pravila o nadomestilih.
The same was true for direct marketing of EEG electricity that resulted in a right to a reduced EEG-surcharge under § 39 of the EEG-Act 2012, as that provision enabled the producers of EEG electricity to obtain a higher price for their electricity than the market price.
Komisija je ugotovila, da so imeli energetsko intenzivni uporabniki iz proizvodnega sektorja prednost, saj je bila njihova dodatna dajatev EEG omejena.
The measure was selective because it only benefited producers of EEG electricity.
S členoma 40 in 41 zakona EEG iz leta 2012 so bili oproščeni plačila stroškov, ki bi jih običajno imeli.
Moreover, the electricity market had been liberalised and electricity producers were active in sectors where trade between Member States took place (recital 76 of the Opening Decision).
Zaradi omejitve sistemski operaterji prenosnih omrežij in dobavitelji električne energije od energetsko intenzivnih uporabnikov niso mogli zahtevati vračila dodatnih stroškov za podporo za električno energijo EEG.
The second advantage consisted in the reduction of the EEG-surcharge for certain EIUs under the BesAR.
Za ukrep se je štelo tudi, da je selektiven, ker so bili do njega upravičeni le energetsko intenzivni uporabniki iz proizvodnega sektorja.
The Commission found that EIUs in the manufacturing sector enjoyed an advantage because their EEG-surcharge was capped.
Ukrep bi lahko tudi izkrivljal konkurenco in vplival na trgovino med državami članicami, ker so bili upravičenci proizvajalci energetsko intenzivnih proizvodov (na primer proizvajalci železnih in barvnih kovin, papirne industrije, kemična industrija, proizvajalci cementa), ki so bili dejavni v sektorjih, v katerih je potekala trgovina med državami članicami (uvodne izjave 77 do 80 sklepa o začetku postopka).
§§ 40 to 41 EEG-Act 2012 relieved them from a burden that they would normally have to bear.
Nemčija meni, da na ravni proizvajalcev električne energije EEG ali na ravni energetsko intenzivnih uporabnikov, ki so bili upravičeni do uveljavljanja posebnega pravila o nadomestilih, ni bila dodeljena nobena gospodarska prednost iz naslednjih razlogov.
Indeed, the cap prevented TSOs and electricity suppliers from recovering the additional costs for the support of EEG electricity from EIUs.
Proizvajalci električne energije EEG naj ne bi prejemali nobene gospodarske prednosti na podlagi dodatne dajatve EEG kot take, tudi če bi se štela za državno sredstvo, saj so zagotovljene odkupne cene, na podlagi katerih so prejeli povračilo, neodvisne od dodatne dajatve EEG.
The measure was also considered to be selective because only EIUs from the manufacturing sector could benefit from it.
Z dodatno dajatvijo EEG se le plača nadomestilo za izgube, ki jih imajo sistemski operaterji prenosnih omrežij.
Finally, the measure was liable to distort competition and affect trade between Member States because the beneficiaries were producers of energy-intensive goods (for example ferrous and non-ferrous metal producers, paper industries, chemical industry, cement producers) and were active in sectors in which trade between Member States took place (recitals 77 to 80 of the Opening Decision).
Poleg tega naj bi povračilo proizvajalcem električne energije EEG izpolnjevalo merila iz sodbe v zadevi Altmark [23].
Germany takes the view that there is no economic advantage either at the level of EEG electricity producers, or at the level of EIUs which benefit from the BesAR, for the following reasons.
Nemčija glede energetsko intenzivnih uporabnikov trdi, da posebno pravilo o nadomestilih ne dodeljuje gospodarske prednosti, ampak pomeni le plačilo nadomestila za slabši konkurenčni položaj navedenih podjetij v primerjavi z njihovimi konkurenti v drugih državah članicah (ki imajo nižje stroške financiranja energije iz obnovljivih virov) [24] in tretjih državah (ki večinoma nimajo primerljivih bremen).
EEG electricity producers are said not to receive any economic advantage resulting from the EEG-surcharge in itself even if it were to be considered a State resource given that the feed-in tariffs at which they are remunerated are independent from the EEG-surcharge.
Nekatere zainteresirane strani so nasprotovale ugotovitvam, da je znižana dodatna dajatev EEG pomenila gospodarsko prednost, ki bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco.
Rather, the EEG-surcharge merely compensates the losses incurred by the TSOs.
Namesto tega naj bi ukrep vzpostavil enake konkurenčne pogoje v Uniji, saj so stroški električne energije za industrijske uporabnike v Nemčiji višji kot drugod.