natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Exposures to regional governments, local authorities and public sector entities should be given level 1 status only where they are treated as exposures to their central government and the latter benefits from a 0 % risk weight in accordance with the same credit risk rules.
Izpostavljenostim do enot regionalne ali lokalne ravni države ter subjektov javnega sektorja bi bilo treba dodeliti status stopnje 1 le, če se obravnavajo kot izpostavljenosti do enot centralne ravni države in če je tej dodeljena 0-odstotna utež tveganja v skladu z istimi pravili o kreditnem tveganju.
The same status should apply to exposures to 0 % risk-weighted multilateral development banks and international organisations.
Isti status bi se moral uporabljati za izpostavljenosti do multilateralnih razvojnih bank in mednarodnih organizacij z 0-odstotno utežjo tveganja.
Given the extremely high liquidity and credit quality demonstrated by those assets, credit institutions should be allowed to hold them in their buffers without limit and they should not be subject to a haircut or a diversification requirement.
Zaradi izjemno visoke likvidnosti in kreditne kakovosti, ki so ju prikazala navedena sredstva, bi se moralo kreditnim institucijam omogočiti, da jih imajo v svojih blažilnikih v neomejenem obsegu in da za njih ne velja zahteva glede odbitka ali razpršenosti.
Assets issued by credit institutions should generally not be recognised as liquid assets, but level 1 treatment should be conferred upon bank assets supported by Member States governments, such as promotional and government-owned lenders as well as private bank assets with an explicit State guarantee.
Sredstva, ki jih izdajo kreditne institucije, se večinoma ne bi smela priznati za likvidna sredstva, vendar bi se morala bančna sredstva, za katera jamčijo vlade držav članic, kot so dajalci promocijskih kreditov in kreditodajalci v državni lasti, ter sredstva zasebnih bank z izrecnim državnim jamstvom obravnavati kot sredstva stopnje 1.
The latter constitute a legacy from the financial crisis that should be phased-out and, accordingly, only bank assets with a government guarantee granted or committed to prior to 30 June 2014 should be eligible as liquid assets.
Slednja so zapuščina finančne krize, ki bi se morala postopoma ukiniti, in tako bi se morala za likvidna sredstva šteti samo bančna sredstva z državnim poroštvom, ki so bila dodeljena ali odobrena pred 30. junijem 2014.
Similarly, senior bonds issued by certain specified asset management agencies of certain Member States should be treated as level 1 assets subject to the same requirements applicable to exposures to the central government of their respective Member State but only with a time-limited effect.
Podobno bi se morale kot sredstva stopnje 1 obravnavati tudi nadrejene obveznice, ki jih izdajo nekatere določene agencije za upravljanje nekaterih držav članic, za katere veljajo iste zahteve, ki se uporabljajo za izpostavljenosti do enot centralne ravni države zadevnih držav članic, vendar le s časovno omejenim učinkom.
Covered bonds are debt instruments issued by credit institutions and secured by a cover pool of assets which typically consist of mortgage loans or public sector debt to which investors have a preferential claim in the event of default.
Krite obveznice so dolžniški instrumenti, ki jih izdajo kreditne institucije in so zavarovane s kritnim premoženjem, ki ga običajno sestavljajo hipotekarni krediti ali javni dolg, do katerih imajo vlagatelji v primeru neplačila prednostno terjatev.
Their secured nature and certain additional safety features, such as the requirement on the issuer to replace non-performing assets in the cover pool and maintain the cover pool at a value exceeding the par value of the bonds (‘asset coverage requirement’), have contributed to make covered bonds relatively low-risk, yield-bearing instruments with a key funding role in mortgage markets of most Member States.
Dejstvo, da so zavarovane in imajo nekatere dodatne varnostne značilnosti, kot je zaveza izdajatelja, da nadomesti nedonosna sredstva v kritnem premoženju in da ohranja vrednost kritnega premoženja, ki je višja od nominalne vrednosti obveznic (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zahteva glede pokritosti sredstev), je prispevalo k temu, da so krite obveznice donosni instrumenti z razmeroma nizkim tveganjem in da imajo ključno vlogo financiranja na trgih hipotekarnih kreditov večine držav članic.
In certain Member States outstanding covered bond issuance exceeds the pool of outstanding government bonds.
V nekaterih državah članicah obseg izdanih nedospelih kritih obveznic presega obseg nedospelih državnih obveznic.
Certain covered bonds of credit quality step 1, in particular, exhibited an excellent liquidity performance during the period from 1 January 2008 to 30 June 2012 analysed by the EBA in its report.
Zlasti nekatere krite obveznice kreditne kakovosti 1 so izkazovale odlično likvidnost v obdobju od 1. januarja 2008 do 30. junija 2012, ki ga je analizirala EBA v svojem poročilu.
Nevertheless the EBA recommended treating these covered bonds as level 2A assets to align with BCBS standards.
Kljub temu je EBA predlagala, da se te krite obveznice obravnavajo kot sredstva stopnje 2A, da se uskladijo s standardi BCBS.
However, in the light of the considerations made above about their credit quality, liquidity performance and role in the funding markets of the Union, it is appropriate for these credit quality step 1 covered bonds to be treated as level 1 assets.
Vendar je ob upoštevanju zgoraj navedenih dejstev o njihovi kreditni kakovosti, likvidnosti in vlogi na trgih financiranja Unije, primerno, da se te krite obveznice kreditne kakovosti 1 obravnavajo kot sredstva stopnje 1.
In order to avoid excessive concentration risks and unlike other level 1 assets, the holdings of credit quality step 1 covered bonds in the liquidity buffer should be subject to a 70 % cap of the overall buffer, a minimum 7 % haircut and to the diversification requirement.
Da se prepreči presežna koncentracija tveganj, bi morala za krite obveznice kreditne kakovosti 1 v likvidnostnem blažilniku v nasprotju z drugimi sredstvi stopnje 1 veljati 70-odstotna omejitev glede na skupni blažilnik, najmanjši 7-odstotni odbitek in zahteva glede razpršenosti.
Covered bonds of credit quality step 2 should be recognised as level 2A assets subject to the same cap (40 %) and haircut (15 %) applicable to other liquid assets of this level.
Krite obveznice stopnje kreditne kakovosti 2 bi se morale priznati za sredstva stopnje 2A, za katera veljata ista zgornja meja (40 %) in odbitek (15 %) kot za ostala likvidna sredstva te stopnje.
This can be justified on the basis of available market data which indicate that credit quality step 2 covered bonds exhibited greater liquidity than other comparable level 2A and 2B assets, such as residential mortgage-backed securities (‘RMBSs’) of credit quality step 1.
To je mogoče upravičiti na podlagi razpoložljivih tržnih podatkov, ki kažejo, da imajo krite obveznice stopnje kreditne kakovosti 2 višjo likvidnost kot druga primerljiva sredstva stopenj 2A in 2B, kot so na primer listinjeni vrednostni papirji na podlagi hipotekarnih kreditov za stanovanjske nepremičnine (RMBS) kreditne kakovosti 1.
Furthermore, permitting these covered bonds to qualify for the purposes of the liquidity buffer would contribute to diversifying the pool of available assets within the buffer and prevent an undue discrimination or a cliff effect between them and covered bonds of credit quality step 1.
Če bi se poleg tega dovolilo, da se te krite obveznice obravnavajo kot primerne za namene likvidnostnega blažilnika, bi to prispevalo k razpršenosti skupine razpoložljivih sredstev znotraj blažilnika in preprečilo neupravičeno diskriminacijo ali učinek prepada med njimi in kritimi obveznicami kreditne kakovosti 1.
It should be noted, however, that a significant proportion of these covered bonds became credit quality step 2 as a result of the downgrade in the rating of the Member State's central government where their issuer was established.
Vendar je treba upoštevati, da je velik del teh kritih obveznic pridobil stopnjo kreditne kakovosti 2 zaradi znižanja bonitetne ocene centralne ravni držav članic, v katerih je imel izdajatelj sedež.
This reflected the country ceiling typically included in the methodologies of rating agencies which determines that financial instruments may not be rated over a certain level relative to their respective sovereign rating.
To je odražalo prag za državo, ki je običajno vključen v metodologije bonitetnih agencij in določa, da finančni instrumenti ne smejo imeti bonitetne ocene, višje od določene ravni glede na bonitetno oceno zadevne države.
Hence, country ceilings precluded the covered bonds issued in those Member States from reaching credit quality step 1, irrespective of their credit quality, which in turn reduced their liquidity compared with covered bonds of similar quality issued in Member States that were not downgraded.
S tem so pragovi za države preprečevali, da bi krite obveznice, izdane v teh državah članicah, dosegle stopnjo kreditne kakovosti 1, ne glede na njihovo dejansko kreditno kakovost, s čimer se je zmanjšala njihova likvidnost v primerjavi z likvidnostjo kritih obveznic podobne kakovosti, izdanih v državah članicah, katerih bonitetna ocena ni bila znižana.
Funding markets within the Union have become greatly fragmented as a result, which highlights the need to find an appropriate alternative to external ratings as one of criteria in prudential regulation to classify the liquidity and credit risk of covered bonds and other categories of assets.
Trgi financiranja v Uniji so posledično postali zelo razdrobljeni, kar izpostavlja potrebo, da se najde ustrezna alternativa za zunanje bonitetne ocene, ki so eno od meril v bonitetnih predpisih za razvrščanje likvidnostnega in kreditnega tveganja kritih obveznic in drugih kategorij sredstev.
In accordance with Article 39b(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2], the Commission must report by 31 December 2015 on alternative tools to credit ratings, with a view to deleting all references to credit ratings in Union law for regulatory purposes by 1 January 2020.
V skladu s členom 39b(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 1060/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [2] o bonitetnih agencijah mora Komisija do 31. decembra 2015 predložiti poročilo o alternativnih orodjih za bonitetne ocene z namenom, da se do 1. januarja 2020 črtajo vsa sklicevanja na bonitetne ocene v zakonodaji Unije za regulativne namene.
In relation to asset-backed securities (‘ABS’), the EBA had recommended, consistent with its own empirical findings and with the BCBS standard, that only RMBSs of credit quality step 1 be recognised as level 2B assets, subject to a 25 % haircut.
Za vrednostne papirje s premoženjskim kritjem je EBA v skladu s svojimi empiričnimi ugotovitvami in standardom BCBS priporočila, da se za sredstva stopnje 2B, za katera velja 25-odstotni odbitek, priznajo samo listinjeni vrednostni papirji na podlagi hipotekarnih kreditov za stanovanjske nepremičnine (RMBS) kreditne kakovosti 1.
It is also appropriate to deviate from this recommendation and expand level 2B eligibility to certain ABSs backed by other assets.
Primerno je, da se tudi to priporočilo ne upošteva v celoti in da se stopnja 2B dodeli tudi nekaterim vrednostnim papirjem s premoženjskim kritjem, ki so krita z drugimi sredstvi.
A broader range of eligible subcategories of assets would increase diversification within the liquidity buffer and facilitate the financing of the real economy.
Večji obseg upravičenih podkategorij sredstev bi povečal razpršenost v likvidnostnem blažilniku in olajšal financiranje realnega sektorja gospodarstva.
Furthermore, as available market data points to a low correlation between ABSs and other liquid assets such as government bonds, the bank-sovereign nexus would be weakened and fragmentation in the internal market would be mitigated.
Poleg tega razpoložljivi tržni podatki kažejo majhno korelacijo med vrednostnimi papirji s premoženjskim kritjem in drugimi likvidnimi sredstvi, kot so državne obveznice, zato bi se vzajemna povezanost bank in držav oslabila ter ublažila razdrobljenost notranjega trga.
In addition, there is evidence that investors tend to hoard high quality ABSs with short weighted-average life and high prepayments during periods of financial instability, as these convert into cash quickly and can be relied upon as a safe source of liquidity.
Poleg tega obstajajo dokazi, da vlagatelji v obdobjih finančne nestabilnosti pogosto kopičijo visokokakovostne vrednostne papirje s premoženjskim kritjem s kratko tehtano povprečno življenjsko dobo in visokimi predčasnimi plačili, saj jih lahko hitro konvertirajo v denarna sredstva, poleg tega pa se lahko nanje zanesejo kot na varne vire likvidnosti.
Certain sections of consumer credit ABSs, such as credit cards, also showed comparable good levels of liquidity.
Zato bi se moralo z ustreznimi pravili za sredstva stopnje 2B priznati vrednostni papirji s premoženjskim kritjem, ki so kriti ne le s stanovanjskimi hipotekarnimi krediti, temveč tudi z avtomobilskimi krediti, potrošniškimi krediti in krediti za MSP.
Lastly, allowing ABSs backed by real economy assets, such as those mentioned already and loans to SMEs, could contribute to economic growth as it would send a positive signal to investors in relation to these assets.
Vendar bi morale za njih veljati določene zahteve glede visoke kakovosti, skladne z merili, ki se uporabljajo za enostavna, pregledna in standardizirana listinjenja v drugi zakonodaji za finančni sektor, da se ohranita celovitost in funkcionalnost likvidnostnega blažilnika.
Appropriate rules should therefore recognise ABSs backed not just by residential mortgage loans, but also by auto loans, consumer credit and SME loans as level 2B assets.
Zlasti za listinjene vrednostne papirje na podlagi hipotekarnih kreditov za stanovanjske nepremičnine bi morale zahteve glede visoke kakovosti vključevati skladnost z določenimi količniki, ki prikazujejo razmerje med vrednostjo kredita in vrednostjo nepremičnine ter kreditom in dohodkom, vendar se navedeni količniki ne bi smeli uporabljati za tovrstne vrednostne papirje, ki so bili izdani pred datumom začetka uporabe zahteve glede likvidnostnega kritja.
However to preserve the integrity and functionality of the liquidity buffer, their eligibility should be subject to certain high quality requirements consistent with the criteria to be applied to simple, transparent and standardised securitisations in other financial sectorial legislation.
Da se upošteva nižja likvidnost, ki je bila ugotovljena pri listinjenih vrednostnih papirjih na podlagi potrošniških kreditov in kreditov za MSP v primerjavi z listinjenimi vrednostnimi papirji na podlagi hipotekarnih kreditov za stanovanjske nepremičnine in listinjenimi vrednostnimi papirji na podlagi avtomobilskih kreditov, bi se moral za slednje uporabljati višji odbitek (35 %).
For RMBSs in particular, high quality requirements should include complying with certain ratios on loan-to-value or loan-to-income, but those ratios should not apply to RMBS issued before the starting date of application of the liquidity coverage requirement.
Za vse vrednostne papirje s premoženjskim kritjem bi se morala tako kot za druga sredstva stopnje 2B uporabljati 15-odstotna zgornja meja likvidnostnega blažilnika in zahteva glede razpršenosti.
To account for the less high liquidity observed in consumer credit and SME loan ABSs relative to RMBSs and auto loan ABSs, the former should be subject to a higher haircut (35 %).
Pravila v zvezi z razvrstitvijo, zahtevami, zgornjimi mejami in odbitki za preostala sredstva stopenj 2A in 2B bi morala biti tesno usklajena s priporočili BCBS in EBA.
All ABSs should be subject, like other level 2B assets, to the overall 15 % cap of the liquidity buffer and to the diversification requirement.
Po drugi strani pa bi se morale delnice in enote v kolektivnih naložbenih podjemih (KNP) obravnavati kot likvidna sredstva iste stopnje in kategorije kot sredstva, na katerih temelji kolektivni podjem.
The rules in relation to the classification, requirements, caps and haircuts for the remaining level 2A and 2B assets should align closely with the BCBS's and the EBA's recommendations.
Prav tako je primerno, da se pri določanju količnika likvidnostnega kritja upošteva centralizirano upravljanje likvidnosti v zadružnih mrežah in institucionalnih shemah za zaščito vlog, kadar ima centralna institucija ali organ funkcijo, ki je podobna funkciji centralne banke, saj člani mreže običajno nimajo neposrednega dostopa do slednje.
Shares and units in collective investment undertakings (‘CIU’), on the other hand, should be treated as liquid assets of the same level and category as the assets underlying the collective undertaking.
Ustrezna pravila bi zato morala za likvidna sredstva priznati vpogledne vloge, ki jih položijo člani mreže pri centralni instituciji, ter drugo likvidnostno financiranje, ki je na voljo subjektom iz centralne institucije.
It is also appropriate in determining the liquidity coverage ratio to take into account the centralised management of liquidity in cooperative and institutional protection scheme networks where the central institution or body plays a role akin to a central bank because the members of the network do not typically have direct access to the latter.
Vloge, ki se ne štejejo za likvidna sredstva, bi morale imeti prednostne stopnje odliva, ki so dovoljene za vloge za operativne namene.
Appropriate rules should, therefore, recognise as liquid assets the sight deposits which are made by the members of the network with the central institution and other liquidity funding available to those from the central institution.
Stopnjo odliva za stabilne vloge na drobno bi bilo treba določiti na privzeto stopnjo v višini 5 %, vendar bi se morala omogočiti 3-odstotna ugodnejša stopnja odliva za vse kreditne institucije, ki so povezane s sistemom jamstva za vloge v državi članici, ki izpolnjuje določena stroga merila.
Deposits which do not qualify as liquid assets should benefit from the preferential outflow rates allowed for operational deposits.
Prvič, treba bi bilo upoštevati, kako države članice izvajajo Direktivo 2014/49/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [3] o sistemih jamstva za vloge.
The outflow rate for stable retail deposits should be set at a default rate of 5 %, but a preferential outflow rate of 3 % should be allowed to all credit institutions affiliated to a deposit guarantee scheme in a Member State that meets certain stringent criteria.
Drugič, sistem države članice bi moral biti skladen s posebnimi zahtevami glede roka za izplačilo, predhodnega financiranja in dostopa do dodatnih finančnih sredstev v primeru, da pride do velikih zahtev po njegovih rezervah.
First, account should be taken of the implementation of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [3] by Member States.
Tretjič, 3-odstotna prednostna stopnja se lahko uporabi, če jo Komisija predhodno odobri, kar pa stori le, če je prepričana, da je sistem jamstva za vloge države članice skladen z zgornjimi merili ter da ni prevladujočih pomislekov v zvezi z delovanjem notranjega trga za vloge na drobno.
Second, the scheme of a Member State should comply with specific requirements relating to the repayment period, ex-ante funding and access to additional financial means in the event of a large call on its reserves.
V vsakem primeru se 3-odstotna prednostna stopnja za stabilne vloge na drobno ne bi smela uporabljati pred 1. januarjem 2019.
Last, the application of the preferential 3 % rate should be subject to the Commission's prior approval, which should be granted only where the Commission is satisfied that the deposit guarantee scheme of the Member State complies with the above criteria and there are no overriding concerns regarding the functioning of the internal market for retail deposits.
Kreditne institucije bi morale določiti druge vloge na drobno, za katere veljajo višje stopnje odliva.
In any event, the 3 % preferential rate for stable retail deposits should not be applicable before 1 January 2019.
Ustrezna pravila, ki temeljijo na smernicah EBA o vlogah na drobno, za katere veljajo drugačni odlivi, bi morala določati merila za določitev navedenih vlog na drobno na podlagi njihovih posebnih značilnosti, in sicer velikosti celotne vloge, narave vloge, nadomestil, verjetnosti dviga in tega, ali je vlagatelj rezident ali nerezident.
Credit institutions should be able to identify other retail deposits subject to higher run-off rates.
Ne bi se smelo domnevati, da bodo kreditne institucije vedno prejele likvidnostno podporo od podjetij, ki so del iste skupine ali institucionalne sheme za zaščito vlog, kadar bodo imele težave pri izpolnjevanju svojih plačilnih obveznosti.
Appropriate rules based on the EBA Guidelines on retail deposits subject to different outflows should set out the criteria to identify those retail deposits on the basis of their specific features, namely the size of the total deposit, the nature of the deposit, the remuneration, the probability of withdrawal and whether the depositor is resident or non-resident.
Vendar bi morali biti v primerih, ko opustitev uporabe količnika likvidnostnega kritja na posamični ravni ni dovoljena v skladu s členom 8 ali 10 Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013, likvidnostni tokovi med dvema kreditnima institucijama, ki sta del iste skupine ali iste institucionalne sheme za zaščito vlog, načeloma upravičeni do simetričnih stopenj prilivov in odlivov, da se prepreči izguba likvidnosti na notranjem trgu, če so vzpostavljeni vsi potrebni zaščitni ukrepi in samo po predhodni odobritvi sodelujočih pristojnih organov.
It may not be assumed that credit institutions will always receive liquidity support from other undertakings belonging to the same group or to the same institutional protection scheme when they experience difficulties in meeting their payment obligations.
Do take ugodnejše obravnave bi morali biti upravičeni samo čezmejni tokovi, in sicer na podlagi dodatnih objektivnih meril, vključno z nizkim profilom likvidnostnega tveganja ponudnika in prejemnika.
However, where no waiver has been granted for the application of the liquidity coverage ratio at individual level in accordance with Articles 8 or 10 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, liquidity flows between two credit institutions belonging to the same group or to the same institutional protection scheme should in principle receive symmetrical inflow and outflow rates to avoid the loss of liquidity in the internal market, provided that all the necessary safeguards are in place and only with the prior approval of the competent authorities involved.
Da se prepreči, da bi se kreditne institucije za doseganje svojega količnika likvidnostnega kritja zanašale izključno na predvidene prilive in da se zagotovi najmanjša raven deležev likvidnih sredstev, bi bilo treba določiti zgornjo mejo količine prilivov, ki lahko izravnajo odlive, v višini 75 % celotnih predvidenih odlivov.
Such preferential treatment should only be given to cross-border flows on the basis of additional objective criteria, including the low liquidity risk profile of the provider and the receiver.
Vendar bi bilo treba zaradi obstoja specializiranih poslovnih modelov dovoliti nekatera izvzetja pri tej zgornji meji, bodisi v celoti bodisi deloma, da se lahko uporabi načelo sorazmernosti, na podlagi predhodne odobritve pristojnih organov.
In order to prevent credit institutions from relying solely on anticipated inflows to meet their liquidity coverage ratio, and also to ensure a minimum level of liquid assets holdings, the amount of inflows that can offset outflows should be capped at 75 % of total expected outflows.
Ta bi morala vključevati izvzetje za tokove znotraj skupine in institucionalne sheme za zaščito vlog ter kreditne institucije, specializirane za pretočno hipotekarno kreditiranje ali zakup in odkup terjatev.