natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
These relate essentially to three areas: interference under FISA; unlawful, intentional access to personal data by government officials; and access to information under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [157].
V drugih primerih, zlasti kadar so zahteve povezane z združljivostjo nadzora s pravom ZDA, bo tako sodelovanje vključevalo neodvisne nadzorne organe (npr. generalne inšpektorje), ki bodo imeli nalogo in pooblastila za izvedbo podrobne preiskave (zlasti na podlagi dostopa do vseh ustreznih dokumentov in pooblastila, da zahtevajo informacije in izjave) ter bodo obravnavali neskladnost [174].
First, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides a number of remedies, available also to non-U.S. persons, to challenge unlawful electronic surveillance [158].
Varuh človekovih pravic na področju zasebnostnega ščita bo lahko tudi predložil zadeve PCLOB v proučitev [175].
This includes the possibility for individuals to bring a civil cause of action for money damages against the United States when information about them has been unlawfully and wilfully used or disclosed [159]; to sue U.S. government officials in their personal capacity (‘under colour of law’) for money damages [160]; and to challenge the legality of surveillance (and seek to suppress the information) in the event the U.S. government intends to use or disclose any information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance against the individual in judicial or administrative proceedings in the United States [161].
Če kateri koli od teh nadzornih organov odkrije neskladnost, bo moral zadevni organ obveščevalne skupnosti (npr. obveščevalna agencija) odpraviti neskladnosti, saj bo varuh človekovih pravic le tako lahko predložil „pozitiven“ odgovor posamezniku (tj. da je bila morebitna neskladnost odpravljena), h kateremu se je vlada ZDA zavezala.
Second, the U.S. government referred the Commission to a number of additional avenues that EU data subjects could use to seek legal recourse against government officials for unlawful government access to, or use of, personal data, including for purported national security purposes (i.e. the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act [162]; Electronic Communications Privacy Act [163]; and Right to Financial Privacy Act [164]).
V okviru sodelovanja bo varuh človekovih pravic na področju zasebnostnega ščita tudi obveščen o rezultatu preiskave in mu bo omogočeno, da prejme vse informacije, ki jih potrebuje za pripravo odgovora.
All of these causes of action concern specific data, targets and/or types of access (e.g. remote access of a Computer via the internet) and are available under certain conditions (e.g. intentional/wilful conduct, conduct outside of official capacity, harm suffered) [165].
Varuh človekovih pravic na področju zasebnostnega ščita bo neodvisen od obveščevalne skupnosti ZDA in tako ne bo prejemal njenih navodil [176].
A more general redress possibility is offered by the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 702), according to which ‘any person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action’, is entitled to seek judicial review.
To je zelo pomembno ob upoštevanju dejstva, da bo moral varuh človekovih pravic „potrditi“, da (i) je bila pritožba ustrezno proučena in da (ii) se je upoštevala ustrezna zakonodaja ZDA, vključno zlasti z omejitvami in zaščitnimi ukrepi iz Priloge VI, ali, v primeru neskladnosti, da je bila taka kršitev odpravljena.
This includes the possibility to ask the court to ‘hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be […] arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ [166].
Da bo varuh človekovih pravic na področju zasebnostnega ščita lahko zagotovil navedeno neodvisno potrdilo, bo moral prejeti potrebne informacije o preiskavi, na podlagi katerih bo lahko ocenil točnost odgovora na pritožbo.
Finally, the U.S. government has pointed to the FOIA as a means for non-U.S. persons to seek access to existing federal agency records, including where these contain the individual's personal data [167].
Poleg tega se je državni sekretar zavezal, da bo podsekretar objektivno opravljal naloge varuha človekovih pravic na področju zasebnostnega ščita in da ne bo pod neustreznim vplivom, ki bi lahko vplival na predloženi odgovor.
Given its focus, the FOIA does not provide an avenue for individual recourse against interference with personal data as such, even though it could in principle enable individuals to get access to relevant information held by national intelligence agencies.
Na splošno ta mehanizem zagotavlja, da bodo posamezne pritožbe temeljito preiskane in rešene ter da bodo vsaj na področju nadzora pri tem vključeni neodvisni nadzorni organi s potrebnim strokovnim znanjem in izkušnjami ter pooblastili za preiskovanje in varuh človekovih pravic, ki bo lahko svoje naloge izvajal, ne da bi bil pod neustreznim, zlasti političnim, vplivom.
Even in this respect the possibilities appear to be limited as agencies may withhold information that falls within certain enumerated exceptions, including access to classified national security information and information concerning law enforcement investigations [168].
Poleg tega bodo lahko posamezniki predložili pritožbe, ne da bi jim bilo treba dokazati, da so bili nadzorovani, ali za to navesti indice [177].
This being said, the use of such exceptions by national intelligence agencies can be challenged by individuals who can seek both administrative and judicial review.
Komisija je na podlagi navedenega zadovoljna, da obstajajo ustrezna in učinkovita zagotovila proti zlorabi.
While individuals, including EU data subjects, therefore have a number of avenues of redress when they have been the subject of unlawful (electronic) surveillance for national security purposes, it is equally clear that at least some legal bases that U.S. intelligence authorities may use (e.g. E.O. 12333) are not covered.
Na podlagi zgoraj navedenega je Komisija sklenila, da ZDA zagotavljajo učinkovito pravno varstvo pred posegi njenih obveščevalnih organov v temeljne pravice oseb, katerih podatki se v okviru zasebnostnega ščita EU-ZDA prenašajo iz Unije v ZDA.
Moreover, even where judicial redress possibilities in principle do exist for non-U.S. persons, such as for surveillance under FISA, the available causes of action are limited [169] and claims brought by individuals (including U.S. persons) will be declared inadmissible where they cannot show ‘standing’ [170], which restricts access to ordinary courts [171].
V zvezi s tem Komisija upošteva sodbo Sodišča v zadevi Schrems, v skladu s katero „ureditev, ki ne določa nobene možnosti, da bi posameznik lahko uporabil pravna sredstva za pridobitev dostopa do osebnih podatkov, ki se nanj nanašajo, ali dosegel popravo ali izbris takih podatkov, posega v bistvo temeljne pravice do učinkovitega sodnega varstva, določene v členu 47 Listine“ [178].
In order to provide for an additional redress avenue accessible for all EU data subjects, the U.S. government has decided to create a new Ombudsperson Mechanism as set out in the letter from the U.S. Secretary of State to the Commission which is contained in Annex III to this decision.
Ocena Komisije je potrdila, da so v Združenih državah Amerike zagotovljena taka pravna sredstva, vključno prek uvedbe mehanizma varuha človekovih pravic.
This mechanism builds on the designation, under PPD-28, of a Senior Coordinator (at the level of Under-Secretary) in the State Department as a contact point for foreign governments to raise concerns regarding U.S. signals intelligence activities, but goes significantly beyond this original concept.
Mehanizem varuha človekovih pravic zagotavlja neodvisen nadzor s pooblastili za preiskovanje.
In particular, according to the commitments from the U.S. government, the Ombudsperson Mechanism will ensure that individual complaints are properly investigated and addressed, and that individuals receive independent confirmation that U.S. laws have been complied with or, in case of a violation of such laws, the non-compliance has been remedied [172].
V okviru stalnega spremljanja zasebnostnega ščita, ki ga izvaja Komisija in vključuje tudi letni skupni pregled, ki zajema tudi varuha človekovih pravic, se bo znova ocenila učinkovitost tega mehanizma.
The Mechanism includes ‘the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson’, i.e. the Under-Secretary and further staff as well as other oversight bodies competent to oversee the different elements of the Intelligence Community on whose cooperation the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson will rely in dealing with complaints.
Dostop in uporaba s strani javnih organov ZDA za namene kazenskega pregona in javnega interesa
In particular, where an individual's request relates to the compatibility of surveillance with U.S. law, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson will be able to rely on independent oversight bodies with investigatory powers (such as the Inspector-Generals or the PCLOB).
Kar zadeva posege v osebne podatke, ki se prenašajo v okviru zasebnostnega ščita EU-ZDA za namene kazenskega pregona, je vlada ZDA (prek Ministrstva za pravosodje) podala zagotovila glede veljavnih omejitev in zaščitnih ukrepov, ki po oceni Komisije izkazujejo ustrezno stopnjo varstva.
In each case the Secretary of State ensures that the Ombudsperson will have the means to ensure that its response to individual requests is based on all the necessary information.
V skladu s temi informacijami preiskave in zasegi organov pregona iz četrtega amandmaja ustave ZDA [179] načeloma [180] zahtevajo sodni nalog na podlagi dokazanega „utemeljenega razloga“.
Through this ‘composite structure’, the Ombudsperson Mechanism guarantees independent oversight and individual redress.
V nekaterih posebej določenih in izjemnih primerih, ko se zahteva za nalog ne uporablja [181], je kazenski pregon predmet preskusa „razumnosti“ [182].
Moreover, the cooperation with other oversight bodies ensures access to the necessary expertise.
Ali sta preiskava ali zaseg razumna, „se določi z oceno, v kakšni meri preiskava ali zaseg posega v zasebnost posameznika na eni strani in v kakšni meri sta potrebna za spodbujanje zakonitih vladnih interesov na drugi strani“ [183].
Finally, by imposing an obligation on the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson to confirm compliance or remediation of any non-compliance, the mechanism reflects a commitment from the U.S. government as a whole to address and resolve complaint from EU individuals.
Bolj splošno, četrti amandma zagotavlja zasebnost in dostojanstvo ter ščiti pred samovoljnimi in nasilnimi dejanji vladnih uslužbencev [184].
First, differently from a pure government-to-government mechanism, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson will receive and respond to individual complaints.
Ti pojmi zajemajo zamisel o nujnosti in sorazmernosti v pravu Unije.
Such complaints can be addressed to the supervisory authorities in the Member States competent for the oversight of national security services and/or the processing of personal data by public authorities that will submit them to a centralised EU body from where they will be channelled to the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson [173].
Ko organom kazenskega pregona zaseženih sredstev ni treba več uporabljati kot dokaze, bi jih morali vrniti [185].
This will in fact benefit EU individuals who can turn to a national authority ‘close to home’ and in their own language.
Čeprav pravica iz četrtega amandmaja ne zajema oseb, ki niso državljani ZDA in ne prebivajo v Združenih državah Amerike, so te z njo vseeno posredno varovane, saj osebne podatke hranijo ameriška podjetja, kar pomeni, da morajo organi kazenskega pregona v vsakem primeru zaprositi za sodno odobritev (ali vsaj spoštovati zahtevo po razumnosti) [186].
It will be the task of such an authority to support the individual in making a request to the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson that contains the basic information and thus can be considered ‘complete’.
Dodatno varstvo zagotavljajo posebni zakonsko določeni organi, pa tudi smernice Ministrstva za pravosodje, ki omejujejo dostop organov pregona do podatkov na razloge nujnosti in sorazmernosti (npr. z zahtevanjem, da FBI uporablja najmanj vsiljive preiskovalne metode, ki so mogoče, ob upoštevanju vpliva na zasebnost in državljanske svoboščine) [187].
The individual does not have to demonstrate that his/her personal data have in fact been accessed by the U.S. government through signals intelligence activities.
Glede na zagotovila vlade ZDA se enako ali večje varstvo uporablja za preiskave organov pregona na ravni države (z upoštevanjem preiskav, ki se izvedejo v skladu z državnimi zakoni) [188].
Second, the U.S. government commits to ensure that, in carrying out its functions, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson will be able to rely on the cooperation from other oversight and compliance review mechanisms existing in U.S. law.
Čeprav predhodna sodna odobritev sodišča ali velike porote (preiskovalni organ sodišča, ki ga sodnik ali sodnik nižjega sodišča vključi v poroto) ni potrebna v vseh primerih [189], so upravni sodni pozivi omejeni na posebne primere in bodo predmet neodvisnega sodnega pregleda vsaj v primerih, ko vlada zahteva izvršilni postopek pred sodiščem [190].
This will sometimes involve national intelligence authorities, in particular where the request is to be interpreted as one for access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act.
Enako velja za uporabo upravnih sodnih pozivov za namene javnega interesa.
In other cases, particularly when requests relate to the compatibility of surveillance with U.S. law, such cooperation will involve independent oversight bodies (e.g. Inspector Generals) with the responsibility and power to carry out a thorough investigation (in particular through access to all relevant documents and the power to request information and statements) and address non-compliance [174].
Poleg tega se glede na zagotovila vlade ZDA podobne vsebinske omejitve uporabljajo tudi v zvezi s tem, da lahko agencije zahtevajo dostop samo do tistih podatkov, ki so pomembni za zadeve, ki spadajo v njihovo pristojnost, in da morajo upoštevati standard razumnosti.
Also, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson will be able to refer matters to the PCLOB for its consideration [175].
Poleg tega pravo ZDA zagotavlja številne možnosti pravnega varstva za posameznike proti javnemu organu ali enemu od njegovih uslužbencev, če ti organi obdelujejo osebne podatke.
Where any non-compliance has been found by one of these oversight bodies, the Intelligence Community element (e.g. an intelligence agency) concerned will have to remedy the non-compliance as only this will allow the Ombudsperson to provide a ‘positive’ response to the individual (i.e. that any non-compliance has been remedied) to which the U.S. government has committed.
Te možnosti, ki vključujejo zlasti zakon o upravnem postopku (Administrative Procedure Act – APA), zakon o dostopu do informacij javnega značaja (Freedom of Information Act – FOIA) in zakon o zasebnosti elektronskih komunikacij (Electronic Communications Privacy Act – ECPA), so na voljo vsem posameznikom, ne glede na njihovo državljanstvo, v skladu z morebitnimi veljavnimi pogoji.
Also, as part of the cooperation, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson will be informed of the outcome of the investigation, and the Ombudsperson will have the means to ensure that it receives all the information necessary to prepare its response.
Običajno ima v skladu z določbami o sodni presoji zakona o upravnem postopku [191] (Administrative Procedure Act), „vsaka oseba, ki ji je bila storjena pravna krivica zaradi ukrepanja agencije ali na katero je to ukrepanje agencije negativno vplivalo ali jo oškodovalo,“ pravico, da zahteva sodno presojo [192].
Finally, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson will be independent from, and thus free from instructions by, the U.S. Intelligence Community [176].
To vključuje možnost, da se od sodišča zahteva, naj „ugotovi, da so ukrepanje, ugotovitve in sklepi agencije, za katere je bilo ugotovljeno, da so […] samovoljni, kapriciozni, da predstavljajo zlorabo diskrecijske pravice ali so na drugačen način neskladni s pravom, nezakoniti in naj jih razveljavi“ [193].
This is of significant importance, given that the Ombudsperson will have to ‘confirm’ that (i) the complaint has been properly investigated and that (ii) relevant U.S. law — including in particular the limitations and safeguards set out in Annex VI — has been complied with or, in the event of non-compliance, such violation has been remedied.
Naslov II zakona o zasebnosti elektronskih komunikacij [194] (Electronic Communications Privacy Act) podrobneje določa sistem zakonskih pravic do zasebnosti in tako ureja dostop organov kazenskega pregona do vsebin telefonskih, ustnih ali elektronskih komunikacij, ki jih hranijo tretji ponudniki storitev [195].
In order to be able to provide that independent confirmation, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson will have to receive the necessary information regarding the investigation to assess the accuracy of the response to the complaint.
Kot kaznivo dejanje obravnava nezakonit dostop do takih komunikacij (tj. dostop, ki ga ne odobri sodišče ali ki drugače ni dopusten) in določa pravno varstvo za prizadetega posameznika, saj lahko vloži civilno tožbo na zveznem sodišču ZDA za dejansko in kaznovalno odškodnino ter za pravično nadomestilo ali ugotovitveno določbo proti vladnemu uslužbencu, ki je namerno storil taka nezakonita dajanja, ali Združenim državam Amerike.
In addition, the Secretary of State has committed to ensure that the Under-Secretary will carry out the function as Privacy Shield Ombudsperson objectively and free from any improper influence liable to have an effect on the response to be provided.
Prav tako ima v skladu z zakonom o dostopu do informacij javnega značaja (Freedom of Information Act, člen 552 naslova 5 zakonodajne zbirke ZDA) vsaka oseba pravico, da pridobi dostop do evidenc zvezne agencije in, ko izčrpa vsa upravna sredstva, zahteva izvršitev take pravice na sodišču, razen če take evidence pred javnim razkritjem varuje izjema ali posebno izvzetje za organe kazenskega pregona [196].
Overall, this mechanism ensures that individual complaints will be thoroughly investigated and resolved, and that at least in the field of surveillance this will involve independent oversight bodies with the necessary expertise and investigatory powers and an Ombudsperson that will be able to carry out its functions free from improper, in particular political, influence.
Poleg tega več drugih zakonov dodeljuje posameznikom pravico, da vložijo tožbo zoper javni organ ali uslužbenca ZDA zaradi obdelave njihovih osebnih podatkov; taki zakoni so zakon o prisluškovanju telefonskim pogovorom [197] (Wiretap Act), zakon o računalniških goljufijah in zlorabah [198] (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act), zvezni zakon o odškodninskih zahtevkih [199] (Federal Torts Claim Act), zakon o pravici do finančne zasebnosti (Right to Financial Privacy Act) [200] in zakon o poštenem kreditnem poročanju (Fair Credit Reporting Act) [201].
Moreover, individuals will be able to bring complaints without having to demonstrate, or just to provide indications, that they have been the object of surveillance [177].
Komisija je zato sklenila, da so v ZDA vzpostavljena pravila, ki so namenjena omejitvi morebitnih posegov za namene kazenskega pregona [202] ali druge namene javnega interesa v temeljne pravice oseb, katerih osebni podatki se v okviru zasebnostnega ščita EU-ZDA prenašajo iz Unije v ZDA, na tisto, kar je nujno potrebno za doseganje zadevnega zakonitega cilja, in ki zagotavljajo učinkovito pravno varstvo pred takimi posegi.
In the light of these features, the Commission is satisfied that there are adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.
USTREZNA STOPNJA VARSTVA V OKVIRU ZASEBNOSTNEGA ŠČITA EU-ZDA
On the basis of all the above, the Commission concludes that the United States ensures effective legal protection against interferences by its intelligence authorities with the fundamental rights of the persons whose data are transferred from the Union to the United States under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.
Ob upoštevanju navedenih ugotovitev Komisija meni, da ZDA zagotavljajo ustrezno stopnjo varstva osebnih podatkov, ki se v okviru zasebnostnega ščita EU-ZDA prenašajo iz Unije samocertificiranim organizacijam.
In this respect, the Commission takes note of the Court of Justice's judgment in the Schrems case according to which ‘legislation not providing for any possibility for an individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him, or to obtain the rectification of erasure of such data, does not respect the essence of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter’ [178].
Komisija zlasti meni, da načela, ki jih je izdalo Ministrstvo za trgovino ZDA, kot celota zagotavljajo raven varstva osebnih podatkov, ki je v bistvu enakovredna ravni, ki jo zagotavljajo osnovna načela, določena v Direktivi 95/46/ES.
The Commission's assessment has confirmed that such legal remedies are provided for in the United States, including through the introduction of the Ombudsperson mechanism.
Poleg tega je učinkovita uporaba načel zagotovljena z obveznostmi glede preglednosti in upravljanjem zasebnostnega ščita s strani Ministrstva za trgovino.
The Ombudsperson mechanism provides for independent oversight with investigatory powers.
Komisija tudi meni, da nadzorni in pritožbeni mehanizmi, ki jih zagotavlja zasebnostni ščit, kot celota omogočajo ugotavljanje kršitev načel s strani organizacij v zasebnostnem ščitu in njihovo kaznovanje v praksi ter posamezniku, na katerega se nanašajo osebni podatki, ponujajo pravna sredstva za pridobitev dostopa do osebnih podatkov, povezanih z njim, in, na koncu, popravek ali izbris takih podatkov.
In the framework of the Commission's continuous monitoring of the Privacy Shield, including through the annual joint review which shall also involve the Ombudsperson, the effectiveness of this mechanism will be reassessed.
Nenazadnje, Komisija na podlagi razpoložljivih informacij o pravnem redu ZDA, vključno z zavezami vlade ZDA, meni, da bodo kakršni koli posegi javnih organov ZDA v temeljne pravice oseb, katerih podatki se v okviru zasebnostnega ščita prenašajo iz Unije v ZDA za namene nacionalne varnosti, kazenskega pregona ali drugih javnih interesov, in iz tega izhajajoče omejitve, uvedene za samocertificirane organizacije v zvezi z njihovim spoštovanjem načel, omejeni na tisto, kar je nujno potrebno za doseganje zadevnega zakonitega cilja, in da obstaja učinkovito pravno varstvo pred takim posegom.
Access and use by U.S. public authorities for law enforcement and public interest purposes
Komisija je sklenila, da so s tem izpolnjeni standardi iz člena 25 Direktive 95/46/ES, ki se razlagajo ob upoštevanju Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah, kot je Sodišče pojasnilo zlasti v sodbi v zadevi Schrems.
As regards interference with personal data transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield for law enforcement purposes, the U.S. government (through the Department of Justice) has provided assurance on the applicable limitations and safeguards which in the Commission's assessment demonstrate an adequate level of protection.
UKREPI ORGANOV ZA VARSTVO PODATKOV IN OBVEŠČANJE KOMISIJE
According to this information, under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution [179] searches and seizures by law enforcement authorities principally [180] require a court-ordered warrant upon a showing of ‘probable cause’.
Sodišče je v sodbi v zadevi Schrems pojasnilo, da Komisija nima pristojnosti za omejevanje pooblastil organov za zaščito podatkov, ki izhajajo iz člena 28 Direktive 95/46/ES (vključno s pooblastili za začasno ustavitev prenosa podatkov), če oseba, ki vloži zahtevek na podlagi navedene določbe, izrazi dvom glede združljivosti sklepa Komisije o ustreznosti varstva z varstvom temeljne pravice do zasebnosti in varstva podatkov [203].