natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As confirmed by the U.S. authorities in the representations of the ODNI, the limitations and safeguards set out therein — including those of PPD-28 — apply to such collection [76].
V skladu s temi pravili je hramba običajno omejena na največ pet let, razen če zakonodaja vsebuje posebno določbo ali če direktor nacionalne obveščevalne službe po natančni oceni vprašanj v zvezi z zasebnostjo, pri čemer upošteva mnenja uradnika za varstvo državljanskih svoboščin ODNI, pa tudi uradnih oseb agencije za varstvo zasebnosti in državljanske pravice agencije, določi, da je stalna hramba v interesu nacionalne varnosti [94].
Although not phrased in those legal terms, these principles capture the essence of the principles of necessity and proportionality.
Razširjanje je omejeno na primere, ko so podatki pomembni za osnovni namen zbiranja podatkov in tako ustrezajo zahtevi pooblaščenih tujih obveščevalnih organov ali organov kazenskega pregona [95].
Even where bulk collection cannot be avoided, further ‘use’ of such data through access is strictly limited to specific, legitimate national security purposes [77].
Na podlagi zgoraj navedenega je Komisija zato sklenila, da so v ZDA vzpostavljena pravila, namenjena omejitvi morebitnih posegov za namene nacionalne varnosti v temeljne pravice oseb, katerih osebni podatki se prenašajo iz Unije v ZDA v okviru zasebnostnega ščita EU-ZDA, na tisto, kar je nujno potrebno za doseganje zadevnega legitimnega cilja.
As a directive issued by the President as the Chief Executive, these requirements bind the entire Intelligence Community and have been further implemented through agency rules and procedures that transpose the general principles into specific directions for day-to-day operations.
Kot je prikazano v zgornji analizi, pravo ZDA zagotavlja, da se bodo nadzorni ukrepi uporabili le za pridobivanje tujih obveščevalnih podatkov, kar je legitimni cilj politike [97], in da bodo čim bolj prilagojeni.
Moreover, while Congress is itself not bound by PPD-28, it has also taken steps to ensure that collection and access of personal data in the United States are targeted rather than carried out ‘on a generalised basis’.
Zlasti množično zbiranje podatkov bo izjemoma dovoljeno le, če ciljno zbiranje podatkov ne bo mogoče, spremljali pa ga bodo dodatni zaščitni ukrepi, da se bosta zmanjšala količina zbranih podatkov in nadaljnji dostop (ki bo moral biti ciljno usmerjen in dovoljen le za posebne namene).
It follows from the available information, including the representations received from the U.S. government, that once the data has been transferred to organisations located in the United States and self-certified under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, U.S. intelligence agencies may only [78] seek personal data where their request complies with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) or is made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) based on a so-called National Security Letter (NSL) [79].
Po oceni Komisije je to skladno s standardom Sodišča iz sodbe v zadevi Schrems, v skladu s katerim mora predpis, ki pomeni poseg v temeljne pravice, zagotovljene v členih 7 in 8 Listine, določati „minimalne zahteve“ [98] in „ni zgolj na nujno potrebno omejena ureditev, ki splošno dovoljuje hrambo vseh osebnih podatkov vseh posameznikov, katerih podatki so bili preneseni iz Unije v Združene države, ne da bi se uporabljalo kakršno koli razlikovanje, omejitev ali izjema glede na cilj, ki se ga poskuša doseči, in ne da bi bilo predvideno objektivno merilo, ki bi omogočalo dostop javnih organov do podatkov in poznejšo uporabo teh podatkov samo v namene, ki so natančno določeni, strogo omejeni in bi lahko utemeljevali poseg, ki ga pomenita dostop in uporaba teh podatkov“ [99].
Several legal bases exist under FISA that may be used to collect (and subsequently process) the personal data of EU data subjects transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.
Prav tako ne bo neomejenega zbiranja in hrambe podatkov vseh oseb brez kakršnih koli omejitev ali neomejenega dostopa.
Aside from Section 104 FISA [80] covering traditional individualised electronic surveillance and Section 402 FISA [81] on the installation of pen registers or trap and trace devices, the two central instruments are Section 501 FISA (ex-Section 215 U.S. PATRIOT ACT) and Section 702 FISA [82].
Poleg tega zagotovila, predložena Komisiji, vključno z zagotovilom, da se ameriške obveščevalne dejavnosti SIGNIT nanašajo le na del komunikacij na internetu, izključujejo „splošni“ dostop do vsebine elektronskih komunikacij [100].
In this respect, the USA FREEDOM Act, which was enacted on 2 June 2015, prohibits the collection in bulk of records based on Section 402 FISA (pen register and trap and trace authority), Section 501 FISA (formerly: Section 215 of the U.S. PATRIOT ACT) [83] and through the use of NSL, and instead requires the use of specific ‘selection terms’ [84].
Učinkovito pravno varstvo
While the FISA contains further legal authorisations to carry out national intelligence activities, including signals intelligence, the Commission's assessment has shown that, insofar as personal data to be transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield are concerned, these authorities equally restrict interference by public authorities to targeted collection and access.
Komisija je ocenila nadzorne mehanizme, ki obstajajo v ZDA, glede morebitnih posegov obveščevalnih organov ZDA v osebne podatke, ki se prenašajo v ZDA, in možnosti individualne pritožbe, ki so na voljo posameznikov iz EU, na katere se nanašajo osebni podatki.
This is clear for traditional individualised electronic surveillance under Section 104 FISA [85].
Nadzor
As for Section 702 FISA, which provides the basis for two important intelligence programs run by the U.S. intelligence agencies (PRISM, UPSTREAM), searches are carried out in a targeted manner through the use of individual selectors that identify specific communications facilities, like the target's e-mail address or telephone number, but not key words or even the names of targeted individuals [86].
Za ameriško obveščevalno skupnost se uporabljajo različni mehanizmi pregleda in nadzorni mehanizmi, za katere so pristojne tri veje države.
Therefore, as noted by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), Section 702 surveillance ‘consists entirely of targeting specific [non-U.S.] persons about whom an individualised determination has been made’ [87].
Ti vključujejo notranje in zunanje organe izvršilne veje oblasti, številne kongresne odbore ter sodni nadzor, zlasti dejavnosti zakona o nadzoru tujih obveščevalnih podatkov.
Due to a ‘sunset’ clause, Section 702 FISA will have to be reviewed in 2017, at which time the Commission will have to reassess the safeguards available to EU data subjects.
Obveščevalne dejavnosti organov ZDA obsežno nadzoruje izvršilna veja oblasti.
Moreover, in its representations the U.S. government has given the European Commission explicit assurance that the U.S. Intelligence Community ‘does not engage in indiscriminate surveillance of anyone, including ordinary European citizens’ [88].
V skladu s členom 4(a)(iv) PPD-28 politike in postopki organov obveščevalne skupnosti „vključujejo ustrezne ukrepe za olajšanje nadzora nad izvajanjem zaščitnih ukrepov za varstvo osebnih podatkov“, ti ukrepi pa bi morali vključevati redno izvajanje revizij [101].
As regards personal data collected within the United States, this statement is supported by empirical evidence which shows that access requests through NSL and under FISA, both individually and together, only concern a relatively small number of targets when compared to the overall flow of data on the internet [89].
V zvezi s tem je bilo vzpostavljenih več ravni nadzora, vključno na ravni uradnikov za državljanske pravice in varstvo zasebnosti, generalnega inšpektorja, Urada ODNI za državljanske svoboščine in varstvo zasebnosti, PCLOB in predsedniškega obveščevalnega nadzornega odbora (President's Intelligence Oversight Board).
As regards access to collected data and data security, PPD-28 requires that access ‘shall be limited to authorized personnel with a need to know the information to perform their mission’ and that personal information ‘shall be processed and stored under conditions that provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons, consistent with the applicable safeguards for sensitive information’.
Te nadzorne funkcije pomaga izvajati osebje za skladnost v vseh agencijah [102].
Intelligence personnel receive appropriate and adequate training in the principles set forth in PPD-28 [90].
Kot je pojasnila vlada ZDA [103], obstajajo na različnih ministrstvih, pristojnih za obveščevalne dejavnosti, in v obveščevalnih agencijah uradniki za državljanske pravice ali varstvo zasebnosti, ki so pristojni za nadzor [104].
Finally, as regards the storage and further dissemination of personal data from EU data subjects collected by U.S. intelligence authorities, PPD-28 states that all persons (including non-U.S. persons) should be treated with dignity and respect, that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal data and that Intelligence Community elements therefore have to establish policies providing appropriate safeguards for such data ‘reasonably designed to minimize the[ir] dissemination and retention’ [91].
Čeprav se posebne pristojnosti teh uradnikov lahko nekoliko razlikujejo glede na zakonsko podlago, s katero so jim pooblastila podeljena, običajno zajemajo nadzor nad postopki za zagotovitev, da zadevno ministrstvo/agencija ustrezno upošteva pomisleke, povezane z zasebnostjo ali državljanskimi pravicami, in da ima vzpostavljene ustrezne postopke za obravnavo pritožb posameznikov, ki menijo, da je kršena njihova zasebnost ali državljanske svoboščine (in v nekaterih primerih, kot je ODNI, so lahko sami pooblaščeni za obravnavanje pritožb [105]).
The U.S. government has explained that this reasonableness requirement signifies that Intelligence Community elements will not have to adopt ‘any measure theoretically possible’, but will need to ‘balance their efforts to protect legitimate privacy and civil liberties interests with the practical necessities of signals intelligence activities’ [92].
Vodja ministrstva/agencije mora zagotoviti, da uradniki prejmejo vse podatke, in zagotovi se mu dostop do vsega gradiva, potrebnega za opravljanje njegovih nalog.
In this respect, non-U.S. persons will be treated in the same way as U.S. persons, based on procedures approved by the Attorney-General [93].
Uradniki za državljanske pravice in varstvo zasebnosti redno poročajo kongresu in PCLOB, vključno s poročanjem o številu in naravi pritožb, ki jih prejme ministrstvo/agencija, povzetkom obravnave takih pritožb, opravljenimi pregledi in preiskavami ter vplivom dejavnosti, ki jih je izvedel uradnik [106].
According to these rules, retention is generally limited to a maximum of five years, unless there is a specific determination in law or an express determination by the Director of National Intelligence after careful evaluation of privacy concerns — taking into account the views of the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer as well as agency privacy and civil liberties officials — that continued retention is in the interest of national security [94].
Glede na oceno nacionalnih organov za varstvo podatkov se lahko notranji nadzor, ki ga izvajajo uradniki za državljanske pravice ali varstvo zasebnosti, obravnava kot „razmeroma zanesljiv“, čeprav po njihovem mnenju ne dosega zahtevane stopnje neodvisnosti [107].
Dissemination is limited to cases where the information is relevant to the underlying purpose of the collection and thus responsive to an authorised foreign intelligence or law enforcement requirement [95].
Poleg tega ima vsak organ obveščevalne skupnosti svojega generalnega inšpektorja, ki je med drugim pristojen za nadzor nad tujimi obveščevalnimi dejavnostmi [108].
According to the assurances given by the U.S. government, personal information may not be disseminated solely because the individual concerned is a non-U.S. person and ‘signals intelligence about the routine activities of a foreign person would not be considered foreign intelligence that could be disseminated or retained permanently by virtue of that fact alone unless it is otherwise responsive to an authorized foreign intelligence requirement’ [96].
To v okviru ODNI vključuje Urad generalnega inšpektorja (Office of the Inspector General) s celovito pristojnostjo nad celotno obveščevalno skupnostjo in pooblastili za proučitev pritožb ali informacij v zvezi z obtožbami o protipravnem ravnanju ali zlorabi položaja v povezavi s programi ali dejavnostmi ODNI in/ali obveščevalne skupnosti [109].
On the basis of all of the above, the Commission concludes that there are rules in place in the United States designed to limit any interference for national security purposes with the fundamental rights of the persons whose personal data are transferred from the Union to the United States under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield to what is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question.
Generalni inšpektorji so zakonsko neodvisne [110] enote, pristojne za izvajanje revizij in preiskav v zvezi s programi in postopki, ki jih izvaja ustrezna agencija za nacionalne obveščevalne namene, vključno s primeri zlorab ali kršitev zakona [111].
As the above analysis has shown, U.S. law ensures that surveillance measures will only be employed to obtain foreign intelligence information — which is a legitimate policy objective [97] — and be tailored as much as possible.
Pooblaščeni so za dostop do vseh evidenc, poročil, revizij, pregledov, dokumentov, spisov, priporočil ali drugega ustreznega gradiva, po potrebi s sodnim pozivom, in lahko opravljajo zaslišanja [112].
In particular, bulk collection will only be authorised exceptionally where targeted collection is not feasible, and will be accompanied by additional safeguards to minimise the amount of data collected and subsequent access (which will have to be targeted and only be allowed for specific purposes).
Čeprav lahko generalni inšpektorji izdajajo samo nezavezujoča priporočila za popravne ukrepe, se njihova poročila, vključno s poročili o nadaljnjih ukrepih (ali odsotnosti ukrepov), objavijo in pošljejo Kongresu, ki lahko na podlagi teh poročil opravlja svojo nadzorno funkcijo [113].
In the Commission's assessment, this conforms with the standard set out by the Court of Justice in the Schrems judgment, according to which legislation involving interference with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter must impose ‘minimum safeguards’ [98] and ‘is not limited to what is strictly necessary where it authorises, on a generalised basis, storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose data has been transferred from the European Union to the United States without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective pursued and without an objective criterion being laid down by which to determine the limits of the access of the public authorities to the data, and of its subsequent use, for purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable of justifying the interference which both access to that data and its use entail’ [99].
Poleg tega so Nadzornemu odboru za zasebnost in državljanske svoboščine, neodvisni agenciji [114] izvršilne oblasti, sestavljeni iz dvostrankarskega petčlanskega odbora [115], ki ga imenuje predsednik z odobritvijo senata za šestletno obdobje, podeljena pooblastila na področju politik boja proti terorizmu in njihovem izvajanju z namenom varstva zasebnosti in državljanskih svoboščin.
Neither will there be unlimited collection and storage of data of all persons without any limitations, nor unlimited access.
Pri pregledu ukrepov obveščevalne skupnosti lahko dostopa do vseh ustreznih evidenc, poročil, revizij, pregledov, dokumentov, spisov in priporočil agencije, vključno z zaupnimi informacijami, opravlja pogovore in prisostvuje zaslišanjem.
Moreover, the representations provided to the Commission, including the assurance that U.S. signals intelligence activities touch only a fraction of the communications traversing the internet, exclude that there would be access ‘on a generalised basis’ [100] to the content of electronic communications.
Prejema poročila uradnikov za državljanske pravice in varstvo zasebnosti več zveznih ministrstev/agencij [116], jim lahko izdaja priporočila ter redno poroča kongresnim odborom in predsedniku [117].
Effective legal protection
Odbor za nadzor zasebnosti in državljanskih svoboščin mora v okviru svojega mandata pripraviti tudi poročilo o oceni izvajanja PPD-28.
The Commission has assessed both the oversight mechanisms that exist in the United States with regard to any interference by U.S. intelligence authorities with personal data transferred to the United States and the avenues available for EU data subjects to seek individual redress.
Navedene nadzorne mehanizme dopolnjuje obveščevalni nadzorni odbor (Intelligence Oversight Board), ustanovljen v okviru predsedniškega obveščevalnega svetovalnega odbora (President's Intelligence Advisory Board), ki nadzoruje skladnost obveščevalnih organov ZDA z ustavo in vsemi veljavnimi pravili.
Oversight
Za olajšanje nadzora se organe obveščevalne skupnosti spodbuja k oblikovanju informacijskih sistemov za omogočanje spremljanja, evidentiranja in pregledovanja poizvedb ali drugih iskanj osebnih podatkov [118].
The U.S. intelligence community is subject to various review and oversight mechanisms that fall within the three branches of the State.
Organi za nadzor in skladnost redno preverjajo prakse organov obveščevalne skupnosti za varstvo osebnih podatkov, vsebovanih v obveščevalnih podatkih SIGINT, in njihovo skladnost s temi postopki [119].
These include internal and external bodies within the executive branch, a number of Congressional Committees, as well as judicial supervision the latter specifically with respect to activities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Te nadzorne funkcije so podprte tudi z obsežnimi zahtevami za poročanje glede neskladnosti.
First, intelligence activities by U.S. authorities are subject to extensive oversight from within the executive branch.
Postopki agencije morajo zlasti zagotavljati, da se v primeru velikih težav v zvezi s skladnostjo, ki vključuje osebne podatke katere koli osebe, ne glede na državljanstvo, zbrane s pomočjo obveščevalnih dejavnosti SIGINT, taka težava takoj sporoči vodji organa obveščevalne skupnosti, ki nato obvesti direktorja nacionalne obveščevalne službe, ki na podlagi PPD-28 določi, ali so potrebni kakršni koli popravni ukrepi [120].
According to PPD-28, Section 4(a)(iv), the policies and procedures of Intelligence Community elements ‘shall include appropriate measures to facilitate oversight over the implementation of safeguards protecting personal information’; these measures should include periodic auditing [101].
Poleg tega morajo vsi organi obveščevalne skupnosti na podlagi Odredbe št. 12333 poročati obveščevalnemu svetovalnemu odboru o primerih neskladnosti [121].
Multiple oversight layers have been put in place in this respect, including civil liberties or privacy officers, Inspector Generals, the ODNI Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, the PCLOB, and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.
Ti mehanizmi zagotavljajo, da se težava obravnava na najvišji ravni v obveščevalni skupnosti.
These oversight functions are supported by compliance staff in all the agencies [102].
Če je vpletena oseba, ki ni državljan ZDA, direktor nacionalne obveščevalne službe v posvetovanju z državnim sekretarjem in vodjo ministrstva ali agencije, ki pošlje sporočilo, določi, ali je treba sprejeti ukrepe za obveščanje ustrezne tuje vlade v skladu z zaščito virov in metod ter osebja ZDA [122].
As explained by the U.S. government [103], civil liberties or privacy officers with oversight responsibilities exist at various departments with intelligence responsibilities and intelligence agencies [104].
Poleg za te nadzorne mehanizme v okviru izvršilne oblasti je kongres ZDA, natančneje stalni obveščevalni in pravosodni odbori ter obveščevalni in pravosodni odbori v okviru senata (House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees), pristojen za nadzor nad vsemi tujimi obveščevalnimi dejavnostmi v ZDA, vključno z dejavnosti SIGINT v ZDA.
While the specific powers of these officers may vary somewhat depending on the authorising statute, they typically encompass the supervision of procedures to ensure that the respective department/agency is adequately considering privacy and civil liberties concerns and has put in place adequate procedures to address complaints from individuals who consider that their privacy or civil liberties have been violated (and in some cases, like the ODNI, may themselves have the power to investigate complaints [105]).
V skladu z zakonom o nacionalni varnosti (National Security Act) „predsednik zagotovi, da se kongresni obveščevalni odbori v celoti in sproti obveščajo o obveščevalnih dejavnostih ZDA, vključno s katero koli pomembno predvideno obveščevalno dejavnostjo, kot se zahteva v skladu s tem podpoglavjem“ [123].
The head of the department/agency in turn has to ensure that the officer receives all the information and is given access to all material necessary to carry out his functions.
Poleg tega „[p]redsednik zagotovi, da se kongresni obveščevalni odbori nemudoma obvestijo o kakršni koli nezakoniti obveščevalni dejavnosti, pa tudi o kakršnih koli popravnih ukrepih, ki so bili sprejeti ali so načrtovani v povezavi s tako nezakonito dejavnostjo“ [124].
Civil liberties and privacy officers periodically report to Congress and the PCLOB, including on the number and nature of the complaints received by the department/agency and a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the reviews and inquiries conducted and the impact of the activities carried out by the officer [106] According to the assessment by the national data protection authorities, the internal oversight exercised by the civil liberties or privacy officers can be considered as ‘fairly robust’, even though in their view they do not meet the required level of independence [107].
Člani teh odborov imajo dostop do zaupnih podatkov, pa tudi do obveščevalnih metod in programov [125].
In addition, each Intelligence Community element has its own Inspector General with responsibility, among others, to oversee foreign intelligence activities [108].
S poznejšimi zakoni so bile zahteve za poročanje razširjene in izpopolnjene, tako v zvezi z organi obveščevalne skupnosti kot tudi ustreznimi generalnimi inšpektorji in generalnim državnim tožilcem.
This includes, within the ODNI, an Office of the Inspector General with comprehensive jurisdiction over the entire Intelligence Community and authorised to investigate complaints or information concerning allegations of unlawful conduct, or abuse of authority, in connection with ODNI and/or Intelligence Community programs and activities [109].
Na primer, FISA zahteva, da generalni državni tožilec „v celoti obvešča“ obveščevalne in pravosodne odbore v okviru senata ter stalne obveščevalne in pravosodne odbore o dejavnostih vlade v skladu z nekaterimi členi FISA [126].
Inspectors General are statutorily independent [110] units responsible for conducting audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations carried out by the respective agency for national intelligence purposes, including for abuse or violation of the law [111].
Zahteva tudi, da vlada kongresnim odborom predloži kopije „vseh sklepov, odredb ali mnenj sodišča za nadzor tujih obveščevalnih podatkov ali prizivnega sodišča za nadzor tujih obveščevalnih podatkov, ki vključujejo pomembno sestavo ali razlago“ določb FISA.
They are authorised to have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations or other relevant material, if need be by subpoena, and may take testimony [112].
Zlasti kar zadeva nadzor v skladu s členom 702 FISA, se ta izvaja z zakonsko določenimi poročili za obveščevalne in pravosodne odbore, pa tudi s pogostim obveščanjem in zaslišanji.