natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Scheme type/community/rules (clause 5.3.9)
kadar je to primerno, druge kontaktne in splošne informacije, ki se uporabljajo za izvajanje sheme.
This field shall be present and shall comply with the specifications from TS 119 612 clause 5.3.9.
Vrsta sheme/skupnost/pravila (razdelek 5.3.9)
It shall only include UK English URIs.
To polje mora biti vključeno in v skladu s specifikacijami iz razdelka 5.3.9.
It shall include at least two URIs:
TS 119 612.
A URI common to all Member States' Trusted Lists pointing towards a descriptive text that shall be applicable to all Trusted Lists, as follows:
Vključuje izključno URI v britanski angleščini.
Descriptive text:
Vključuje najmanj dva URI:
‘Participation in a scheme
URI, ki je skupen vsem zanesljivim seznamom držav članic, z napotilom na opisno besedilo, ki velja za vse zanesljive sezname, in sicer:
The “qualified” status of a trust service is indicated by the combination of the “Service type identifier” (“Sti”) value in a service entry and the status according to the “Service current status” field value as from the date indicated in the “Current status starting date and time”.
A ‚CA/QC‘ ‚Service type identifier‘ (‚Sti‘) entry (possibly further qualified as being a ‚RootCA-QC‘ through the use of the appropriate ‚Service information extension‘ (‚Sie‘) additionalServiceInformation Extension)
A “CA/QC” “Service type identifier” (“Sti”) entry (possibly further qualified as being a “RootCA-QC” through the use of the appropriate “Service information extension” (“Sie”) additionalServiceInformation Extension)
indicates that any end-entity certificate issued by or under the CA represented by the ‚Service digital identifier‘ (‚Sdi‘) CA's public key and CA's name (both CA data to be considered as trust anchor input), is a qualified certificate (QC) provided that it includes at least one of the following:
indicates that any end-entity certificate issued by or under the CA represented by the “Service digital identifier” (“Sdi”) CA's public key and CA's name (both CA data to be considered as trust anchor input), is a qualified certificate (QC) provided that it includes at least one of the following:
and provided this is ensured by the Member State Supervisory Body through a valid service status (i.e. ‚undersupervision‘, ‚supervisionincessation‘, ‚accredited‘ or ‚granted‘) for that entry.
and provided this is ensured by the Member State Supervisory Body through a valid service status (i.e. “undersupervision”, “supervisionincessation”, “accredited” or “granted”) for that entry.
and IF ‚Sie‘ ‚Qualifications Extension‘ information is present, then in addition to the above default rule, those certificates that are identified through the use of ‚Sie‘ ‚Qualifications Extension‘ information, constructed as a sequence of filters further identifying a set of certificates, must be considered according to the associated qualifiers providing additional information regarding their qualified status, the ‚SSCD support‘ and/or ‚Legal person as subject‘ (e.g. certificates containing a specific OID in the Certificate Policy extension, and/or having a specific ‚Key usage‘ pattern, and/or filtered through the use of a specific value to appear in one specific certificate field or extension, etc.).
and IF “Sie” “Qualifications Extension” information is present, then in addition to the above default rule, those certificates that are identified through the use of “Sie” “Qualifications Extension” information, constructed as a sequence of filters further identifying a set of certificates, must be considered according to the associated qualifiers providing additional information regarding their qualified status, the “SSCD support” and/or “Legal person as subject” (e.g. certificates containing a specific OID in the Certificate Policy extension, and/or having a specific “Key usage” pattern, and/or filtered through the use of a specific value to appear in one specific certificate field or extension, etc.).
These qualifiers are part of the following set of ‚Qualifiers‘ used to compensate for the lack of information in the corresponding certificate content, and that are used respectively:
These qualifiers are part of the following set of “Qualifiers” used to compensate for the lack of information in the corresponding certificate content, and that are used respectively:
‚QCStatement‘ meaning the identified certificate(s) is(are) qualified under Directive 1999/93/EC;
“QCStatement” meaning the identified certificate(s) is(are) qualified under Directive 1999/93/EC;
‚QCForESig‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for electronic signature under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014;
“QCForESig” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for electronic signature under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014;
‚QCForESeal‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for electronic seal under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014;
“QCForESeal” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for electronic seal under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014;
‚QCForWSA‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for web site authentication under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.
“QCForWSA” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for web site authentication under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.
‚NotQualified‘ meaning the identified certificate(s) is(are) not to be considered as qualified; and/or
“NotQualified” meaning the identified certificate(s) is(are) not to be considered as qualified; and/or
‚QCWithSSCD‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have their private key residing in an SSCD, or
“QCWithSSCD” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have their private key residing in an SSCD, or
‚QCNoSSCD‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have not their private key residing in an SSCD, or
“QCNoSSCD” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have not their private key residing in an SSCD, or
‚QCSSCDStatusAsInCert‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), does(do) contain proper machine processable information about whether or not their private key residing in an SSCD;
“QCSSCDStatusAsInCert” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), does(do) contain proper machine processable information about whether or not their private key residing in an SSCD;
‚QCWithQSCD‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have their private key residing in a QSCD, or
“QCWithQSCD” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have their private key residing in a QSCD, or
‚QCNoQSCD‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have not their private key residing in a QSCD, or
“QCNoQSCD” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have not their private key residing in a QSCD, or
‚QCQSCDStatusAsInCert‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), does(do) contain proper machine processable information about whether or not their private key is residing in a QSCD;
“QCQSCDStatusAsInCert” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), does(do) contain proper machine processable information about whether or not their private key is residing in a QSCD;
‚QCQSCDManagedOnBehalf‘ indicating that all certificates identified by the applicable list of criteria, when they are claimed or stated as qualified, have their private key is residing in a QSCD for which the generation and management of that private key is done by a qualified TSP on behalf of the entity whose identity is certified in the certificate; and/or
“QCQSCDManagedOnBehalf” indicating that all certificates identified by the applicable list of criteria, when they are claimed or stated as qualified, have their private key is residing in a QSCD for which the generation and management of that private key is done by a qualified TSP on behalf of the entity whose identity is certified in the certificate; and/or
‚QCForLegalPerson‘ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), are issued to a Legal Person under Directive 1999/93/EC.
“QCForLegalPerson” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), are issued to a Legal Person under Directive 1999/93/EC.
if none of the id-etsi-qcs 1 statement, QCP OID or QCP + OID information is included in an end-entity certificate, and
if none of the id-etsi-qcs 1 statement, QCP OID or QCP + OID information is included in an end-entity certificate, and
if no ‚Sie‘ ‚Qualifications Extension‘ information is present for the trust anchor CA/QC corresponding service entry to qualify the certificate with a ‚QCStatement‘ qualifier, or
if no “Sie” “Qualifications Extension” information is present for the trust anchor CA/QC corresponding service entry to qualify the certificate with a “QCStatement” qualifier, or
an ‚Sie‘ ‚Qualifications Extension‘ information is present for the trust anchor CA/QC corresponding service entry to qualify the certificate with a ‚NotQualified‘ qualifier,
an “Sie” “Qualifications Extension” information is present for the trust anchor CA/QC corresponding service entry to qualify the certificate with a “NotQualified” qualifier,
‚Service digital identifiers‘ are to be used as Trust Anchors in the context of validating electronic signatures or seals for which signer's or seal creator's certificate is to be validated against TL information, hence only the public key and the associated subject name are needed as Trust Anchor information.
“Service digital identifiers” are to be used as Trust Anchors in the context of validating electronic signatures or seals for which signer's or seal creator's certificate is to be validated against TL information, hence only the public key and the associated subject name are needed as Trust Anchor information.
The general rule for interpretation of any other ‚Sti‘ type entry is that, for that ‚Sti‘ identified service type, the listed service named according to the ‚Service name‘ field value and uniquely identified by the ‚Service digital identity‘ field value has the current qualified or approval status according to the ‚Service current status‘ field value as from the date indicated in the ‚Current status starting date and time‘.
The general rule for interpretation of any other “Sti” type entry is that, for that “Sti” identified service type, the listed service named according to the “Service name” field value and uniquely identified by the “Service digital identity” field value has the current qualified or approval status according to the “Service current status” field value as from the date indicated in the “Current status starting date and time”.
Specific interpretation rules for any additional information with regard to a listed service (e.g. ‚Service information extensions‘ field) may be found, when applicable, in the Member State specific URI as part of the present ‚Scheme type/community/rules‘ field.
Specific interpretation rules for any additional information with regard to a listed service (e.g.
Please refer to the applicable secondary legislation pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 for further details on the fields, description and meaning for the Member States' trusted lists.“
“Service information extensions” field) may be found, when applicable, in the Member State specific URI as part of the present “Scheme type/community/rules” field.
URI, ki je specifičen za zanesljivi seznam vsake države članice, z napotilom na opisno besedilo, ki velja za zanesljivi seznam te države članice:
Please refer to the applicable secondary legislation pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 for further details on the fields, description and meaning for the Member States' trusted lists.’
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/TrustedList/schemerules/CC, pri čemer je CC = ISO 3166-1 [2] dvočrkovna oznaka države, ki se uporablja v polju „Država sheme“ (razdelek 5.3.10),
A URI specific to each Member State's trusted list pointing towards a descriptive text that shall be applicable to this Member State trusted list:
podatki o tem, kje lahko uporabniki najdejo posebne politike/pravila za zadevno državo članico, v skladu s katerimi se storitve zaupanja v zanesljivem seznamu ocenjujejo v skladu s sistemom nadzora države članice in, kadar je to primerno, shemo potrjevanja,
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/TrustedList/schemerules/CC where CC = the ISO 3166-1 [2] alpha-2 Country Code used in the ‘Scheme territory’ field (clause 5.3.10)
podatki o tem, kje lahko uporabniki najdejo posebni opis za zadevno državo članico glede načina uporabe in razlage vsebine zanesljivega seznama v zvezi z navedenimi nekvalificiranimi storitvami zaupanja in/ali nacionalno opredeljenimi storitvami zaupanja.
Where users can obtain the referenced Member State's specific policy/rules against which trust services included in the list are assessed, in compliance with the Member State's supervisory regime and where applicable, approval scheme.
Ta opis se lahko uporabi za navedbo morebitne razdrobljenosti v nacionalnih sistemih potrjevanja v zvezi z overitelji, ki ne izdajajo kvalificiranih potrdil, in kako se v ta namen uporabljata polji „URI za opredelitev storitev sheme“ (razdelek 5.5.6) in „Razširitve informacij o storitvah“ (razdelek 5.5.9).
Where users can obtain a referenced Member State's specific description about how to use and interpret the content of the trusted list with regard to the listed non-qualified trust services and/or to nationally defined trust services.
Države članice LAHKO razširijo zgoraj naveden poseben URI za državo članico, tako da opredelijo in uporabijo dodatne URI (tj. URI, opredeljen na podlagi tega hierarhičnega posebnega URI).
This may be used to indicate a potential granularity in the national approval system related to CSPs not issuing QCs and how the ‘Scheme service definition URI’ (clause 5.5.6) and the ‘Service information extension’ field (clause 5.5.9) are used for this purpose.
Politika/pravno obvestilo v zvezi s seznamom o statusu storitev zaupanja (razdelek 5.3.11)
Member States MAY define and use additional URIs expanding the above Member State specific URI (i.e. URIs defined from this hierarchical specific URI).
To polje mora biti vključeno in v skladu s specifikacijami iz razdelka 5.3.11 TS 119 612, v katerem je politika/pravno obvestilo v zvezi s pravnim statusom sheme ali pravnimi zahtevami, ki jih shema izpolnjuje v okviru pristojnosti, v kateri je bila vzpostavljena, in/ali kakršnimi koli omejitvami ter pogoji, na podlagi katerih se zanesljivi seznam vodi in objavi, izražena z zaporedjem večjezikovnih znakovnih nizov (glej razdelek 5.1.4), ki v britanski angleščini kot obveznem jeziku in izbirno v enem ali več nacionalnih jezikih navaja dejansko besedilo take politike ali obvestilo, ki je sestavljeno na naslednji način:
TSL policy/legal notice (clause 5.3.11)
prvi obvezni del, skupen vsem zanesljivim seznamom držav članic, v katerem je naveden veljaven pravni okvir v angleščini:
This field shall be present and shall comply with the specifications from TS 119 612 clause 5.3.11 where the policy/legal notice concerning the legal status of the scheme or legal requirements met by the scheme under the jurisdiction in which it is established and/or any constraints and conditions under which the trusted list is maintained and published shall be a sequence of multilingual character strings (see clause 5.1.4) providing, in UK English as the mandatory language and optionally in one or more national languages, the actual text of any such policy or notice built as follows:
Pravni okvir, ki se uporablja za ta zanesljivi seznam je Uredba (EU) št. 910/2014 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 23. julija 2014 o elektronski identifikaciji in storitvah zaupanja za elektronske transakcije na notranjem trgu in o razveljavitvi Direktive 1999/93/ES;
A first mandatory part, common to all Member States' Trusted Lists indicating the applicable legal framework, and whose English version is the following:
Besedilo v nacionalnem jeziku države članice:
The applicable legal framework for the present trusted list is Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.
drugi, neobvezni del, ki je poseben za vsak zanesljivi seznam in navaja sklicevanje na nacionalni pravni okvir, ki se uporablja.
Text in a Member State's national language(s):
Trenutni status storitve (razdelek 5.5.4)
A second, optional part, specific to each trusted list, indicating references to specific applicable national legal frameworks
To polje mora biti vključeno in v skladu s specifikacijami iz razdelka 5.5.4.
Service current status (clause 5.5.4)
TS 119 612.
This field shall be present and shall comply with the specifications from TS 119 612 clause 5.5.4.
Migracija vrednosti „Trenutni status storitve“ storitev, ki so uvrščene na zanesljivi seznam držav članic EU od datuma pred začetkom veljavnosti Uredbe (EU) št. 910/2014 (tj. 30. junija 2016), se izvrši na datum začetka uporabe Uredbe (tj. 1. julija 2016), kot je določeno v Prilogi J k ETSI TS 119 612.
The migration of the ‘Service current status’ value of services listed in EUMS trusted list as of the day before the date Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 applies (i.e. 30 June 2016) shall be executed on the day the Regulation applies (i.e. 1 July 2016) as specified in Annex J to ETSI TS 119 612.
POGLAVJE III
CHAPTER III
NEPREKINJENA VELJAVNOST ZANESLJIVIH SEZNAMOV
CONTINUITY OF TRUSTED LISTS
Potrdila, ki se uradno sporočijo Komisiji v skladu s členom 4(2) tega sklepa, morajo izpolnjevati zahteve iz razdelka 5.7.1 ETSI TS 119 612 in se izdajo tako, da:
Certificates to be notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 4(2) of this Decision shall meet the requirements of clause 5.7.1 from ETSI TS 119 612 and shall be issued in such a way that they:
so do njihovega končnega datuma veljavnosti najmanj trije meseci („NotAfter“),
have at least a three months difference in their final date of validity (‘Not After’),
so bili generirani na podlagi novih parov ključev.
are created on new key pairs.
Predhodno uporabljeni pari ključev se ne smejo ponovno potrjevati.
Previously used key pairs must not be re-certified.
V primeru izteka veljavnosti enega od potrdil javnih ključev, ki se lahko uporabljajo za potrjevanje veljavnosti podpisa ali žiga zanesljivega seznama, ki je bil uradno sporočen Komisiji in je objavljen v osrednjem seznamu kazalcev Komisije, države članice:
In case of expiry of one of the public key certificates that could be used to validate the trusted list's signature or seal that has been notified to the Commission and that is published in the Commission's central list of pointers, Member States shall:
v primeru, da je bil trenutno objavljeni zanesljivi seznam podpisan ali ožigosan z zasebnim ključem, katerega potrdilo javnega ključa je poteklo, brez odlašanja ponovno izdajo nov zanesljivi seznam, podpisan ali ožigosan z zasebnim ključem, katerega uradno sporočeno potrdilo javnega ključa ni poteklo,
in case the currently published trusted list was signed or sealed with a private key whose public key certificate is expired, re-issue, without any delay, a new trusted list signed or sealed with a private key whose notified public key certificate is not expired;
na zahtevo generirajo nove pare ključev, ki se lahko uporabljajo za podpisovanje ali žigosanje zanesljivega seznama, in generirajo ustrezna potrdila javnih ključev,
when required, generate new key pairs that could be used to sign or seal the trusted list and undertake the generation of their corresponding public key certificates;
nemudoma Komisiji uradno sporočijo nov seznam potrdil javnih ključev, ki ustrezajo zasebnim ključem, ki se lahko uporabljajo za podpisovanje ali žigosanje zanesljivega seznama.
promptly notify to the Commission the new list of public key certificates corresponding to the private keys that could be used to sign or seal the trusted list.
V primeru, da je kompromitiran ali deaktiviran eden od zasebnih ključev, ki ustreza potrdilu javnega ključa, ki se lahko uporabi za potrjevanje veljavnosti podpisa ali žiga zanesljivega seznama, in ki je bil uradno sporočen Komisiji ter objavljen v osrednjem seznamu kazalcev Komisije, države članice:
In case of a compromise or decommissioning of one of the private keys corresponding to one of the public key certificates that could be used to validate the trusted list's signature or seal, that has been notified to the Commission and that is published in the Commission's central list of pointers, Member States shall:
brez odlašanja ponovno izdajo nov zanesljivi seznam, podpisan ali ožigosan z nekompromitiranim zasebnim ključem, če je bil objavljeni zanesljivi seznam podpisan ali ožigosan s kompromitiranim ali deaktiviranim zasebnim ključem,
re-issue, without any delay, a new trusted list signed or sealed with a non-compromised private key in cases where the published trusted list was signed or sealed with a compromised or decommissioned private key;
V primeru, da so kompromitirani ali deaktivirani vsi zasebni ključi, ki ustrezajo potrdilom javnega ključa, ki se lahko uporabijo za potrjevanje veljavnosti podpisa zanesljivega seznama, in ki so bili uradno sporočeni Komisiji ter objavljeni v osrednjem seznamu kazalcev Komisije, države članice:
In case of compromise or decommissioning of all the private keys corresponding to the public key certificates that could be used to validate the trusted list's signature, that have been notified to the Commission and that are published in the Commission's central list of pointers, Member States shall:
generirajo nove pare ključev, ki se lahko uporabljajo za podpisovanje ali žigosanje zanesljivega seznama, in generirajo ustrezna potrdila javnih ključev,
generate new key pairs that could be used to sign or seal the trusted list and undertake the generation of their corresponding public key certificates;
brez odlašanja ponovno izdajo nov zanesljivi seznam, podpisan ali ožigosan z enim od navedenih novih zasebnih ključev, katerega ustrezno potrdilo javnega ključa je treba uradno sporočiti,
re-issue, without any delay, a new trusted list signed or sealed with one of those new private keys and whose corresponding public key certificate is to be notified;
POGLAVJE IV
CHAPTER IV
TEHNIČNE SPECIFIKACIJE ZA ČLOVEKU BERLJIVO OBLIKO ZANESLJIVEGA SEZNAMA
SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN READABLE FORM OF THE TRUSTED LIST
Kadar je pripravljena in objavljena človeku berljiva oblika zanesljivega seznama, se zagotavlja v obliki datoteke Portable Document Format (PDF) v skladu z ISO 32000 [3], katere format mora ustrezati profilu PDF/A (ISO 19005 [4]).
When a human readable form of the trusted list is established and published, it shall be provided in the form of a Portable Document Format (PDF) document according to ISO 32000 [3] that shall be formatted according to the profile PDF/A (ISO 19005 [4]).
Vsebina zanesljivega seznama v človeku berljivi obliki na podlagi PDF/A mora izpolnjevati naslednje zahteve:
The content of the PDF/A based human readable form of the trusted list shall comply with the following requirements:
struktura človeku berljive oblike upošteva logični model, opisan v TS 119 612,
The structure of the human readable form shall reflect the logical model described in TS 119 612;
prikazano je vsako vsebovano polje, ki vključuje:
Every present field shall be displayed and provide:
naziv polja (npr. „Identifikator vrste storitve“),