natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
25 November 2009
ENCV je med letoma 2000 in 2005 prejela več subvencij za ladjedelniške dejavnosti v višini 27129933,20 EUR (v nadaljnjem besedilu: subvencije za ladjedelništvo).
Comfort letter for revolving loan by CGD
Ta znesek ustreza več nevračljivim subvencijam za gradnjo več plovil in tankerjev, ki so bile po trditvah Portugalske zagotovljene v skladu z Uredbo z zakonsko močjo št. 296/89 o izvajanju Direktive Sveta 87/167/EGS [17].
7 September 2009
ENVC je v letih 2005 in 2006 prav tako prejela finančno pomoč za strokovno usposabljanje v višini 257791 EUR (v nadaljnjem besedilu: subvencije za strokovno usposabljanje) v okviru operativnega programa za zaposlovanje, usposabljanje in socialni razvoj (POEFDS), ki ga sponzorira Evropski socialni sklad.
Comfort letter for revolving loan by Banco Espírito Santo (BES)
V zvezi s plovilom Atlântida Portugalska pojasnjuje, da je za njegovo gradnjo leta 2006 potekal mednarodni javni razpis, pri katerem sta sodelovali le ENVC in še ena družba.
26 June 2008
Vendar sta bili obe ponudbi zavrnjeni, ker nista izpolnjevali potrebnih zahtev razpisa.
Comfort letter for BCP as performance bonds in relation to two shipbuilding contracts
Naročilo za gradnjo plovil je bilo dodeljeno ENVC pozneje z neposrednimi pogajanji z Atlanticoline, javno družbo, pristojno za pomorski prevoz med Azorskimi otoki.
8 January 2007
Začetna vrednost pogodbe za plovilo Atlântida je znašala 39,95 milijona EUR, pozneje pa se je povišala na 45,35 milijona EUR.
Aid for shipbuilding 2000-2005 [15] — see Annex II for details
Pozneje je Atlanticoline prekinila pogodbo z ENVC, saj naj plovilo Atlântida ne bi zmoglo doseči določene hitrosti.
Aid for professional training 2005-2006 [16]
Da bi končali spor med Atlanticoline in ENVC, je EMPORDEF 23. decembra 2009 prejel posojilo CGD v znesku 37 milijonov EUR.
23 December 2009
V posojilni pogodbi je bilo določeno, da mora EMPORDEF uporabiti posojilo za to, da družbi ENVC zagotovi potrebna sredstva, da bi lahko končala postopek z Atlanticoline.
Loan for the construction of the Atlântida vessel
Zaračunana obrestna mera je bil 6-mesečni EURIBOR z 2-odstotnim razmikom (v nadaljnjem besedilu: posojilo za plovilo Atlântida).
In 2010, ENVC entered into a contract with PDVSA for the construction of two asphalt carriers.
Za končano plovilo je bil leta 2014 objavljen javni razpis.
The contract value for each vessel was EUR 64,45 million, totalling EUR 128,9 million.
Ta postopek prodaje je bil objavljen v nacionalnih in mednarodnih časopisih, cena pa je bila edino merilo za izbiro zmagovalca javnega razpisa.
According to the construction contract, PDVSA was to make an advanced down payment to ENVC of 10 % of the total price of the contract, i.e. EUR 12,89 million, with the precedent condition of obtaining two standby letters of credit, which served the purpose of guaranteeing PDVSA's down payment in case ENVC would fail to comply with its contractual obligations.
Kupoprodajna pogodba s kupcem (Mystic Cruises SA) v vrednosti 8,75 milijona EUR je bila podpisana 30. septembra 2014.
The two standby letters of credit were issued by CGD on the basis of comfort letters from EMPORDEF and were withdrawn on 28 February 2014 and 31 March 2014.
SKLEP O ZAČETKU POSTOPKA
Portugal also explains that between 2007 and 2011 EMPORDEF issued numerous other comfort letters and guarantees in support of financing agreements between ENVC and commercial banks (the comfort letters detailed in recital 24 above and in the present recital will be jointly referred to as ‘the comfort letters’ — they total EUR 70792500).
Komisija je 23. januarja 2013 sklenila začeti formalni postopek preiskave.
Portugal notes that EMPORDEF never charged ENVC for the comfort letters.
Predhodno stališče Komisije v sklepu o začetku postopka je bilo, da bi se lahko družba ENVC štela za podjetje v težavah v smislu Smernic Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah iz leta 2004 [18] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004), zlasti glede na precejšnje izgube ENVC najmanj od leta 2000.
Between 2000 and 2005, ENVC received numerous subsidies for shipbuilding activities amounting to EUR 27129933,20 (‘the shipbuilding subsidies’).
Čeprav je Komisija v sklepu o začetku postopka poudarila, da je prejela omejene informacije o preteklih ukrepih, je sprejela predhodno stališče, da so vsi vključevali državna sredstva in jih je bilo mogoče pripisati državi [19].
This amount corresponds to multiple non-refundable subsidies for the construction of a number of vessels and tankers, which Portugal claims were provided according to Decree-Law 296/89 implementing Council Directive 87/167/EEC [17].
Prav tako je bilo predhodno stališče Komisije, da so pretekli ukrepi ENVC zagotovili neupravičeno prednost, saj se je zdelo malo verjetno, da bi kateri koli razumen zasebni izvajalec družbi ENVC glede na njene takratne težave odobril pretekle ukrepe.
ENVC also received financial aid for professional training amounting to EUR 257791 (‘the professional training subsidies’) in 2005 and 2006 under the Operational Programme for Employment, Training and Social Development (POEFDS) sponsored by the European Social Fund.
Ta prednost bi bila po naravi selektivna, saj je bila družba ENVC njena edina upravičenka.
In relation to the Atlântida vessel, Portugal explains that its construction was subject to an international public tender in 2006, in which only ENVC and one more company participated.
Komisija je prav tako ugotovila, da je verjetno, da so pretekli ukrepi vplivali na trgovino med državami članicami, saj je družba ENVC konkurirala ladjedelnicam iz drugih držav članic Evropske unije in tretjih držav.
However, both offers were rejected because they did not comply with the necessary requirements of the tender.
Pretekli ukrepi so torej družbi ENVC omogočili, da je nadaljevala s poslovanjem in da se ji, za razliko od drugih konkurentov, ni bilo treba spoprijeti s posledicami, ki običajno izhajajo iz slabih finančnih rezultatov.
The construction of the vessels was awarded to ENVC at a later stage through direct negotiation with Atlanticoline, the public company responsible for the ocean transportation in Azores.
Na podlagi navedenega je bilo predhodno stališče Komisije, da se zdi, da pretekli ukrepi pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU.
The initial value of the contract for the Atlântida vessel was EUR 39,95 million, subsequently increased to EUR 45,35 million.
Ker so bili pretekli ukrepi dodeljeni v nasprotju z obvestilom in obveznostmi neukrepanja iz člena 108(3) PDEU, se je po mnenju Komisije zdelo, da pomenijo nezakonito državno pomoč.
At a later point in time, Atlanticoline terminated its contract with ENVC claiming that the Atlântida vessel was incapable of reaching the stipulated speed.
Komisija je prav tako izrazila pomisleke o združljivosti preteklih ukrepov z notranjim trgom, zlasti ker portugalski organi niso navedli nobenih morebitnih razlogov za združljivost.
In order to put an end to the conflict between Atlanticoline and ENVC, EMPORDEF received a loan from CGD for an amount of EUR 37 million on 23 December 2009.
Kljub temu je Komisija ocenila, ali bi se lahko za pretekle ukrepe prima facie uporabljali možni razlogi združljivosti iz PDEU.
The loan agreement specified that the loan was to be used by EMPORDEF to provide ENVC with the necessary funds to allow ENVC to put an end to the proceedings with Atlanticoline.
Po izključitvi uporabe izjem iz člena 107(2) PDEU je Komisija prehodno ugotovila, da bi se lahko uporabljala kvečjemu izjema iz člena 107(3)(c) PDEU.
The interest rate charged was 6-month EURIBOR plus a 2 % spread (‘the loan for the Atlântida vessel’).
Po mnenju Komisije pretekli ukrepi niso bili dodeljeni v skladu s posebnimi pravili o državni pomoči, ki so se uporabljali za ladjedelniško industrijo med dodelitvijo preteklih ukrepov, tj. Okvir za državno pomoč ladjedelništvu [20] ali njegovi predhodniki [21].
The finished vessel was tendered out in the course of 2014.
Glede na to, da je ENVC med zagotovitvijo preteklih ukrepov veljala za podjetje v težavah v smislu smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004, je po mnenju Komisije edina ustrezna osnova za združljivost osnova, ki zadeva pomoč za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah iz člena 107(3)(c) PDEU, in sicer smernice za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004.
This sale procedure was publicised in national and international newspapers and the price was the sole criterion for choosing the winner of the tender.
Po mnenju Komisije pogoji pomoči za reševanje iz oddelka 3.1 smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004 niso bili izpolnjeni.
The purchase agreement with the buyer (Mystic Cruises SA) for EUR 8,75 million was signed on 30 September 2014.
Prav tako je Komisija v zvezi s pomočjo za prestrukturiranje iz oddelka 3.2 smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004 ugotovila, da Portugalska ni dokazala prisotnosti potrebnih elementov, da bi se lahko pretekli ukrepi šteli za združljivo pomoč za prestrukturiranje (načrt za prestrukturiranje, prispevek iz lastnih virov, izravnalni ukrepi itd.).
THE OPENING DECISION
Zato Komisija ni imela dokazov, da kateri koli od preteklih ukrepov na podlagi smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje izpolnjuje pogoje pomoči za reševanje ali prestrukturiranje.
On 23 January 2013, the Commission decided to open the formal investigation procedure.
Na podlagi navedenega je Komisija izrazila pomisleke o združljivosti preteklih ukrepov v korist ENVC z notranjim trgom.
In its opening decision, the Commission's preliminary view was that ENVC could be considered a firm in difficulty in the sense of the 2004 Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [18] ( ‘the 2004 R&R Guidelines’), in particular in view of ENVC's significant losses since at least 2000.
Poleg tega je Komisija podala veliko ugotovitev o ukrepih, ki jih Portugalska predvideva v okviru privatizacije ENVC.
Although the Commission highlighted in its opening decision that it had been provided with limited information on the past measures, it came to the preliminary view that all of them entailed State resources and were imputable to the State [19].
Čeprav ukrepi, predvideni v okviru privatizacije družbe ENVC, niso bili predmet sklepa o začetku postopka, je Komisija glede na ekonomski položaj družbe ENVC in značaj predvidenih ukrepov menila, da bi pri takih ukrepih lahko šlo za državno pomoč.
The Commission was also of the preliminary opinion that the past measures provided ENVC with an undue advantage, given that it seemed unlikely that any rational private operator would have provided ENVC with the past measures given the difficulties of ENVC at the time.
Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da je Portugalska zavrnila edino sprejemljivo ponudbo za privatizacijo ENVC in namesto tega sklenila družbo likvidirati (glej uvodni izjavi 14 in 15).
The advantage would be selective in nature given that its sole beneficiary was ENVC.
Na podlagi tega Komisija predpostavlja, da ukrepi, predvideni v okviru privatizacije družbe ENVC, niso bili zagotovljeni in zato ne bodo obravnavani v tem sklepu.
The Commission also noted that the past measures were likely to affect trade between Member States as ENVC was in competition with shipyards from other Members States of the European Union as well as from the rest of the world.
PRIPOMBE PORTUGALSKE O SKLEPU O ZAČETKU POSTOPKA
The past measures therefore enabled ENVC to continue operating so that it did not have to face, as other competitors, the consequences that would normally follow from its poor financial results.
Portugalska je v pripombah o sklepu Komisije o začetku postopka ugotovila, da je kljub izgubam, ki jih je ENVC nakopičila od leta 2000, zlasti pa od leta 2009, bila odločitev EMPORDEF, da družbi pomaga preživeti z zagotovitvijo zadostnih sredstev, razumna možnost po logiki načela udeleženca v tržnem gospodarstvu.
On the basis of the above, the Commission's preliminary view was that the past measures seemed to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
V zvezi s težavami družbe ENVC je Portugalska ugotovila, da se je resnost njenega finančnega položaja pokazala šele v obdobju 2009/2010 in da je bila njegova nepovratnost priznana šele v letnih računovodskih izkazih družbe iz leta 2012.
Also, since the past measures would have been granted in breach of the notification and stand-still obligations laid down in Article 108(3) TFEU, the Commission noted that they appeared to constitute unlawful State aid.
Portugalska je pojasnila tudi, da je bila dokapitalizacija leta 2006 izvedena zaradi zakonske obveznosti na podlagi člena 35 portugalskega zakonika o gospodarskih družbah.
The Commission also expressed doubts on the compatibility with the internal market of the past measures, in particular since the Portuguese authorities did not provide any possible grounds for compatibility.
V skladu s to določbo velja, da kadar zadevna družba izgubi delniški kapital, je treba (i) družbo razpustiti, (ii) delniški kapital zmanjšati za znesek, ki ni nižji od lastniškega kapitala („capital próprio“) družbe, ali pa (iii) morajo delničarji družbe prispevati k delniškemu kapitalu.
The Commission nonetheless assessed whether any of the possible compatibility grounds laid down in the TFEU would prima facie be applicable to the past measures.
Na tej podlagi so delničarji ENVC leta 2006 sklenili dokapitalizirati družbo v višini 24,875 milijona EUR.
After discarding the applicability of the exceptions laid down in Article 107(2) TFEU, the Commission preliminarily observed that only the exception laid down in point (c) of Article 107(3) TFEU could apply.
Po mnenju Portugalske je bil ta sklep sprejet v prepričanju, da nadomestne možnosti v skladu s členom 35 portugalskega zakonika o gospodarskih družbah družbi ENVC ne bi omogočile izpolnjevanja finančnih in trgovinskih obveznosti (zlasti do portugalske mornarice).
The Commission noted that the past measures did not appear to have been granted pursuant to the specific State aid rules applicable the shipbuilding industry at the time the past measures were granted, i.e. the Framework on State aid to shipbuilding [20] or its predecessors [21].
Od leta 2006 je imela ENVC v knjigi naročil 15 gradbenih projektov v skupni vrednosti 386 milijonov EUR.
In view of the fact that ENVC seemed to be a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the 2004 R&R Guidelines at the time when the past measures were provided, the Commission noted that only relevant compatibility basis appeared to be the one concerning aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, i.e. the 2004 R&R Guidelines.
Portugalska trdi, da bi se tudi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu odločil za dokapitalizacijo ENVC in ji omogočil nadaljnje poslovanje, s čimer bi se okrepila njena konkurenčnost na trgu ladjedelništva.
The Commission noted that the conditions for rescue aid laid down in section 3.1 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines did not seem to be met.
V dopisu z dne 14. februarja 2014 je Portugalska navedla, da je bila odločitev o dokapitalizaciji leta 2006 sprejeta ob upoštevanju portfelja družbe, pa tudi načrta za prestrukturiranje ENVC iz avgusta 2005.
Also, in relation to restructuring aid as defined in section 3.2 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines, the Commission observed that Portugal failed to demonstrate that any of the necessary elements for the past measures to be considered compatible restructuring aid (restructuring plan, own contribution, compensatory measures, etc.) were present.
Načrt za prestrukturiranje ni vseboval količinske opredelitve stroškov, povezanih z neuresničevanjem naročil, ki jih je takrat imela ENVC.
The Commission therefore lacked evidence whether any of the past measures could be found compatible on the basis of the R&R Guidelines as rescue or restructuring aid.
Vendar so stroški, povezani z zaprtjem družbe (vključno z odpustitvijo zaposlenih in ureditvijo obveznosti) po ocenah znašali 175 milijonov EUR.
In view of the above, the Commission expressed doubts on the compatibility of the past measures in favour of ENVC with the internal market.
Po mnenju Portugalske je bila likvidacija zahtevnejša od dokapitalizacije, zato ni bila izvedena.
In addition, the Commission made a number of observations on the measures planned by Portugal in the context of the privatization of ENVC.
V zvezi s posojili v letih 2012 in 2013 Portugalska trdi, da so bile obrestne mere, uporabljene za ENVC, enake obrestnim meram, kot jih je EMPORDEF uspel pridobiti na trgu.
Although the planned measures accompanying the privatisation of ENVC were not subject to the opening decision, the Commission, in view of the economic situation of ENVC and the nature of the planned measures, considered it likely that those measures would contain State aid.
Zato bi bilo treba obrestne mere obravnavati kot obrestne mere, ki izpolnjujejo tržne pogoje in ne vsebujejo elementa pomoči.
On this basis, the Commission understands that the planned measures accompanying the privatisation of ENVC were not provided and will therefore not be considered in the present decision.
Zato Portugalska trdi, da EMPORDEF ni povečal svojega tveganja, tako da ga je dodatno izpostavil ENVC s posojili v letih 2012 in 2013.
COMMENTS OF PORTUGAL ON THE OPENING DECISION
V dopisu z dne 14. februarja 2014 je Portugalska pojasnila, da družba ENVC od februarja 2014 ni niti vrnila posojil iz let 2012 in 2013 niti ni plačala obresti.
As regards the difficulties of ENVC, Portugal noted that the gravity of its financial situation became evident only in 2009/2010 and that its irreversibility was only recognised in the annual accounts of the company of 2012.
V zvezi s posojili DGTF, odobrenimi v letih 2006, 2008, 2010 in 2011, Portugalska meni, da so bila zagotovljena pod tržnimi pogoji, saj je bila uporabljena obrestna mera EURIBOR s spremenljivim razmikom, odvisnim od posamezne posojilne pogodbe.
Portugal also explained that the 2006 capital increase was due to a legal obligation on the basis of Article 35 of the Portuguese Companies Code.
Prav tako Portugalska ugotavlja, da so bila posojila DGTF zagotovljena ob upoštevanju knjige naročil ENVC, zaradi česar bi lahko razumno pričakovali, da bi lahko ENVC posojila vrnila.
According to this provision, when half of the share capital of a given company is lost, (i) the company must be dissolved, (ii) the share capital must be reduced for an amount not lower than the equity (‘capital próprio’) of the company, or (iii) the shareholders of the company must contribute to the share capital.
Portugalska poudarja tudi, da je uporaba patronatskih izjav med zasebnimi izvajalci običajna, in sicer kot mehanizem za zagotavljanje dostopa do finančnih trgov za družbe z manjšo sposobnostjo zadolževanja.
It is on this basis that the shareholders of ENVC decided in 2006 to inject EUR 24,875 million of capital into the company.
Portugalska ugotavlja, da bi se EMPORDEF nazadnje v vsakem primeru štel za odgovornega za dolgove ENVC, glede na to, da je bil njen izključni lastnik.
According to Portugal, this decision was taken in the belief that the alternative options under Article 35 of the Portuguese Companies Code would not allow ENVC to honour its financial and commercial commitments (in particular with the Portuguese Navy).
Portugalska vsekakor priznava, da EMPORDEF od družbe ENVC nikoli ni zahteval plačila za patronatske izjave.
As of 2006, ENVC had in its order book 15 construction projects for a global amount of EUR 386 million.
V zvezi s subvencijami za ladjedelništvo Portugalska trdi, da so bile zagotovljene v skladu z Uredbo z zakonsko močjo št. 296/89 o izvajanju Direktive 87/167/EGS in da bi zato pomenile združljivo pomoč za ladjedelniško industrijo.
Portugal claims that a market economy investor would have opted as well for increasing the capital of ENVC and allowing it to continue operating, thereby reinforcing its competitiveness in the shipbuilding market.
V zvezi s subvencijami za strokovno usposabljanje Portugalska trdi, da so bile zagotovljene vsem družbam, ki izpolnjujejo regulativne pogoje, in da zato ENVC ne bi zagotovile neupravičene selektivne prednosti.
In its submission of 14 February 2014, Portugal indicated that the decision to proceed to the 2006 capital increase was taken having in mind not only the portfolio of the company but also a restructuring plan for ENVC dated August 2005.
V zvezi s plovilom Atlântida Portugalska ugotavlja, da je njena tržna vrednost junija 2012 po ocenah znašala 29,24 milijona EUR, med drugim ob upoštevanju ekonomskega zastaranja ter fizične in funkcionalne amortizacije.
The restructuring plan, a draft of which was provided, was prepared by Banco Português de Investimento S.A.
Na podlagi tega Portugalska trdi, da ni nobenega razloga za domnevo, da je gradnja plovila vključevala neupravičeno prednost za ENVC. glede na to, da so stroški gradnje presegli pogodbeno ceno.
(‘BPI’) and covered the period 2005-2009.
OCENA UKREPOV
According to the restructuring plan, ENVC would need to focus on military activities in order to return to viability although it acknowledged that the financial and economic sustainability of ENVC was conditional on management capacity, the fulfilment of the existing contracts and the evolution of the shipbuilding market.
Težave ENVC
The restructuring plan did not quantify the costs associated to the non-fulfilment of the contracts available to ENVC at the time.
Kot je poudarjeno v uvodni izjavi 42, Portugalska trdi, da se je resnost finančnega položaja ENVC pokazala šele v obdobju 2009/2010 in da je bila njegova nepovratnost priznana šele v letnih računovodskih izkazih družbe iz leta 2012.
However, the costs associated to closing down the company (including the dismissal of the employees and the regularization of liabilities) were estimated at EUR 175 million.
Komisija ponovno poudarja stališča, ki jih je izrazila v sklepu o začetku postopka.
According to Portugal, in view of the fact that liquidation was more onerous than the capital increase, the former line of action was not retained.
V skladu z uvodno izjavo 9 smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004 „Komisija šteje za podjetje v težavah, ko ni zmožno z lastnimi sredstvi ali s sredstvi, ki jih lahko pridobi od svojih lastnikov/delničarjev ali upnikov, preprečiti izgube, ki bi brez zunanjega posredovanja državnih organov kratkoročno ali srednjeročno skoraj gotovo ogrozile obstoj družbe“.
Portugal further explains that the restructuring plan acknowledged the need for support to ENVC, since the company was not able on its own to continue operations in 2005-2007.
V uvodni izjavi 10 smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004 je pojasnjeno, da je družba z omejeno odgovornostjo podjetje v težavah, če „je izgubljena več kot polovica njenega osnovnega kapitala […] in je bila v preteklih 12 mesecih izgubljena več kot četrtina tega kapitala“ ali „če po domači zakonodaji izpolnjuje kriterije za uvedbo kolektivnih postopkov insolventnosti“.
However, Portugal observes that a 2009 report of the Inspecção-Geral de Finanças — IGF (the entity charged of supervising the Portuguese public companies) noted that the restructuring plan of ENVC had not been sufficiently implemented and that the financial and economic forecasts for the period 2008-2011 were too optimistic.
Uvodna izjava 11 smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 2004 dodaja, da lahko podjetje „velja za podjetje v težavah, tudi če ni izpolnjena nobena od okoliščin določenih v točki 10, zlasti ob prisotnosti običajnih znakov podjetja v težavah, kot so naraščajoče izgube, upadanje prometa, kopičenje zalog, presežki prostih zmogljivosti, padanje denarnih tokov, naraščajoči dolgovi, naraščajoči stroški obresti ali zmanjševanje čiste vrednosti sredstev“.
Therefore, the interest rates should be considered at market terms and free of aid.
Preglednica 3
According to Portugal, since EMPORDEF was the sole shareholder of ENVC, it could be considered liable at last instance for the debts and liabilities of ENVC.
Neto rezultati ENVC med letoma 2000 in 2013