natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As interested parties have argued, in order to prevent carbon leakage, businesses need to have long-term security, that is to say stable long-term conditions, because only this would prompt them to undertake investments with a view to maintaining production capacity in Europe for the next ten to 20 years.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da Nemčija ni dokazala, da bi 10-odstotni odbitek zadoščal za preprečevanje čezmernih nadomestil, saj ni prepričljivo dokazala, do katere stopnje so stroški CO2 vključeni v ceno električne energije.
It is already questionable whether operating aid, as argued by some of the interested parties, is really the appropriate instrument to encourage meaningful investment by market operators (as compared for instance to targeted investment aid).
Še zlasti ni pokazala, kako je določila teh 10 %.
But even if this was the case, the aid measure has not been designed to address the long-term business conditions of the non-ferrous metal producers.
Poleg tega je iz informacij, ki so jih zagotovile zainteresirane strani, razvidno, da 10-odstotni dobitek ne zadostuje za preprečevanje čezmernega nadomestila.
Its only effect is to strengthen the beneficiaries' position during the overcapacity period while other competitors have to cope with the overcapacity issue with their own means.
Drugič, da bi Nemčija upoštevala različne razmere v proizvodnji aluminija, cinka in bakra, je iz nejasnih razlogov določila, da bi moral biti aluminij po odbitku 10-odstotne varnostne rezerve upravičen do najvišjega nadomestila (17 EUR na MWh), medtem ko bi cink in baker prejemala manjšo pomoč (16 oziroma 9 EUR na MWh).
The comments from interested parties on the positive impact of the aid in fact seem to confirm that the measure acted more against the cyclical downturn, rather than addressing the potentially structural issue of environmental policies entailing higher electricity costs and leading to carbon leakage.
Čeprav morda drži, da je gospodarska kriza proizvodnjo primarnega aluminija prizadela bolj kot na primer proizvodnjo bakra, Nemčija ni predložila dovolj informacij, da bi bilo mogoče razumeti, kako so bili določeni različni zneski pomoči.
Given that the scheme was meant to operate only in the second half of 2009 while both the market situation of non-ferrous metal producers and the Union allowance forward prices have been highly fluctuating before and after that period, the Commission therefore considers it unlikely that such a short-termed support is liable to decisively influence the beneficiaries' medium- and long-term strategies of maintaining and possibly increasing capacities within the Union.
Hkrati je iz nekaterih od teh informacij jasno razvidno, da bi največji upravičenec prejemal čezmerno nadomestilo [56].
Moreover, the Commission considers that it was foreseeable for the potential beneficiaries, first, that any approval of the scheme by the Commission would take time and, secondly, that a framework for support would be in place anyway in ETS-3.
Zaradi nejasne razlage zneskov pomoči za cink in baker je vprašljiva tudi njihova učinkovitost pri preprečevanju selitve virov CO2 v teh sektorjih.
This, and the fact that none of the beneficiaries has so far actually shut down and relocated, leads the Commission to the conclusion that the continued operation of non-ferrous metal producing plants has been determined by other factors than by the prospect of the notified scheme.
Na podlagi zgoraj navedenega Komisija ugotavlja, da shema ne zagotavlja, da bi bilo nadomestilo omejeno na najnižji potrebni znesek.
In the internal documents provided by […], it appears that in fact, long-term support (starting in 2009 and going beyond 2013) was a decisive factor.
Izkrivljanje konkurence in trgovine ter test tehtanja
In conclusion, the Commission finds that the incentive effect of the aid granted under the scheme has not been demonstrated.
Da bi bila državna pomoč združljiva, bi moralo biti izkrivljanje konkurence in trgovine, ki je posledica državne pomoči, omejeno, tako da je skupni učinek, kar zadeva cilj skupnega interesa, pozitiven.
Proportionality
Nemčija trdi, da shema ne povzroča večjega izkrivljanja konkurence in da je torej skupno ravnovesje pozitivno.
A State aid measure is proportional if aid to the beneficiaries is kept at the minimum sufficient for achieving the objective of common interest.
Prvič, Nemčija se sklicuje na cilje sheme, ki so podpreti temeljni steber evropske industrije, preprečiti selitev virov CO2 ter preprečiti izgubo industrijskega strokovnega znanja in izkušenj.
This means that the beneficiaries cannot receive more aid than would be necessary to cover the financial burden which is intended to be alleviated in view of the objective of common interest.
Drugič, Nemčija shemo opisuje kot nadomestilo za neugoden položaj, nastal zaradi ETS, za ponovno vzpostavitev poštene konkurence, in ne za njeno izkrivljanje.
Germany claims that its methodology ensures that the beneficiaries are not overcompensated and that in fact, compensation is only partial.
Zainteresirane strani so trdile, da če obstaja tveganje izkrivljanja konkurence na notranjem trgu, je zelo majhno, saj je shema namenjena ublažitvi prikrajšanosti proizvajalcev Unije pri konkuriranju proizvajalcem iz držav zunaj Unije.
First, Germany intends to apply a retention amounting to the indirect CO2 costs which correspond to 1 GWh of electricity consumption, meaning that a beneficiary would only be compensated for those indirect CO2 costs exceeding the retention.
Poleg tega so zatrjevale, da tudi konkurenca znotraj sektorja ne bo oškodovana, saj je bilo v sektorju neželeznih kovin v zmanjšanje emisij CO2 in večjo energetsko učinkovitost vloženega že veliko truda.
Secondly, it stresses that the aid amount would be reduced by a safety deduction of 10 %.
Nazadnje navajajo, da so cene električne energije v EU/EGP enake ali se vsaj zbližujejo, kar pomeni, da za nemške proizvajalce selitev obratov v druge države članice EU/EGP ne bi bila smiselna.
Thirdly, it contends that by setting different aid amounts for the three different metals, it is ensured that compensation is kept to a minimum.
Komisija meni, da argument, da shema ne bi povzročila hudega izkrivljanja konkurence, ampak bi – nasprotno – prispevala k pozitivnemu skupnemu učinku, ni sprejemljiv.
In general, interested parties agree with Germany's viewpoint [54], with some of them even advocating full compensation of indirect CO2 costs.
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da ima Komisija pri vprašanjih, ki spadajo na področje uporabe člena 107(3) PDEU, široko diskrecijsko pravico.
However, the methodology appears to be flawed in several ways.
Prvič, oblika pomoči spada med najbolj izkrivljajoče vrste pomoči.
First, this concerns the accuracy of determining the indirect CO2 costs.
Kot je Splošno sodišče navedlo v sodbi v zadevi Siemens, „pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, tj. pomoč, katere namen je podjetje razbremeniti stroškov, ki bi jih moralo običajno nositi v okviru tekočega poslovanja ali običajnih dejavnosti, načeloma ne spada na področje uporabe [člena 107(3) PDEU],“ saj „takšna pomoč načeloma izkrivlja konkurenco v sektorjih, v katerih je dodeljena, pri čemer zaradi svoje narave ne more izpolniti nobenega [cilja skupnega interesa]“ [57].
Germany takes the EUA forward price for 2009 (EUR 24 per tonne of CO2) as a starting point and assumes, based on the average CO2 emissions of a marginal power plant in Germany (0,8 tonnes of CO2 per MWh [55]), that the part of indirect CO2 costs within electricity costs is equivalent to EUR 19 per MWh.
Podobno je Sodišče v zadevi C-86/89, Italija proti Komisiji, ugotovilo, da je treba zadevno pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena brez posebnih pogojev in le v zvezi z uporabljenimi količinami, obravnavati kot pomoč za tekoče poslovanje za zadevne družbe, ter da je kot taka vplivala na pogoje trgovanja v obsegu, ki je v nasprotju s skupnim interesom [58].
However, Germany has recognised that the actual proportion of CO2 costs within a beneficiary's electricity costs will vary according to its supply arrangements, given that the undertakings concerned had typically entered long-term contracts at a given time and on the basis of given electricity and EUA prices.
Ta pristop je uporabila tudi Komisija, zlasti kar zadeva subvencije za kritje stroškov električne energije za sektor aluminija [59].
This was also confirmed by the information provided by interested parties.
Vsi pomisleki, izraženi v navedenih preteklih zadevah, veljajo tudi tukaj: pomoč sestavljajo nepovratna sredstva, ki se zadevnim proizvajalcem izplačajo za znižanje njihovih stroškov električne energije.
Some interested parties indicated that companies that were procuring their electricity through long-term contracts were indeed shielded from indirect CO2 prices in electricity.
Kot so potrdile zainteresirane strani, so ti stroški eden od glavnih proizvodnih stroškov v sektorjih, ki jih zadeva shema pomoči, in eden od glavnih dejavnikov proizvodnje, na podlagi katerih si proizvajalci konkurirajo.
Moreover, the information provided by […] shows that not the entire CO2 costs were passed on in electricity prices.
Pomoč je dodeljena za vsako porabljeno megavatno uro in tako neposredno vpliva na konkurenčnost upravičenih podjetij pri vsaki enoti, ki jo proizvedejo po porabi prve gigavatne ure.
The assumption that indirect CO2 costs would be equivalent to EUR 19 per MWh does not reflect this circumstance and does not effectively preclude overcompensation.
Poleg tega ni povezana z nobenim referenčnim koeficientom učinkovitosti.
The Commission therefore notes that Germany has not demonstrated that the 10 % deduction would be sufficient to prevent overcompensation as they did not convincingly demonstrate to what extent CO2 costs were passed on in electricity prices.
Povezana ni niti z dejanskimi stroški CO2 upravičencev, ki so vključeni v ceno električne energije.
In particular, they did not demonstrate how the 10 % were determined.
Lahko bi celo zmanjšala spodbude za energetsko učinkovitejšo proizvodnjo.
In addition, the information received from interested parties shows that the 10 % deduction is insufficient to prevent overcompensation.
Poleg tega se Komisija ne strinja s trditvijo, da shema pomoči ne bi ovirala konkurence v Uniji.
Secondly, in order to take into account the different situations of the aluminium, zinc and copper production, Germany has, on unclear grounds, decided that, after applying a safety deduction of 10 %, aluminium should be entitled to the highest compensation (EUR 17 per MWh), while zinc and copper would receive less aid (EUR 16 and 9 per MWh respectively).
Komisija ugotavlja, da, prvič, so že vzpostavljeni popravni ukrepi, na primer brezplačna dodelitev pravic v okviru EU ETS [60].
While it may be true that the production of primary aluminium has been more affected by the economic crisis than, for example, copper production, Germany has submitted insufficient information to understand how the different aid amounts have been determined.
Čeprav ta mehanizem ni bil namenjen posebej posrednim stroškom, ki jih povzroča ETS, je olajšal breme, ki ga nosi industrija Unije.
At the same time, some of this information clearly shows that the biggest beneficiary would have been overcompensated [56].
Drugič, obstaja zelo velika nevarnost, da bi ukrep škodoval konkurenci, saj se dodeljuje priložnostno ( ad hoc) zunaj usklajenega okvira, deluje samo na nacionalni ravni in torej koristi le podjetjem s sedežem v zadevni državi članici.
The absence of a clear explanation of the aid amounts for zinc and copper also puts into question their effectiveness in preventing carbon leakage for these sectors.
Skladno s tem je argument Nemčije in nekaterih zainteresiranih strani, da shema ne bi mogla škodovati konkurenci v Uniji, ker je v osnovi namenjena ponovni vzpostavitvi poštene konkurence s konkurenti iz držav zunaj Unije, zgrešen.
Based on these considerations, the Commission therefore concludes that the scheme does not ensure that compensation would be limited to the minimum necessary.
Če se podpora dodeli samo nemškim proizvajalcem za izboljšanje njihove konkurenčnosti v primerjavi s konkurenti iz držav zunaj Unije, to predstavlja tveganje, da se sočasno pripomore tudi k izboljšanju njihovega položaja v primerjavi s položajem konkurentov iz Unije [61].
Distortions of competition and trade and balancing test
To dokazuje tudi dejstvo, da bi morali upravičenci ob zaprtju obrata ali njegovi preselitvi iz Nemčije (in ne le iz Unije ali EGP) pomoč vrniti.
In order to be compatible aid, the distortion of competition and trade resulting from the State aid should be limited, so that the overall balance with regard to the objective of common interest is positive.
Podobno neprepričljiva je trditev, da se nemški proizvajalci neželeznih kovin zaradi primerljivih ravni cen električne energije vsekakor ne bi preselili v druge države članice EU/EGP.
Germany argues that the scheme does not result in a significant distortion of competition and that the overall balance is therefore positive.
Selitev obratov iz ene države članice v drugo ni edino merilo izkrivljanja konkurence na notranjem trgu.
Firstly, Germany invokes the objectives of the scheme to support a fundamental pillar of European industry as well as to prevent carbon leakage and the loss of industrial know-how.
To se pojavi že, če se v eni od držav članic z državno pomočjo omogoča ohranjanje proizvodne zmogljivosti, saj to vpliva na donosnost proizvodne zmogljivosti v drugih državah članicah.
Secondly, Germany describes the scheme as a compensation for an ETS-induced disadvantage to restore fair competition rather than distort competition.
Nemčija je v EU glavna, ne pa edina [62] lokacija nekaterih od zadevnih proizvajalcev neželeznih kovin, zato bi pomoč najverjetneje izkrivila pogoje konkurence med proizvajalci v EU in EGP.
Interested parties have argued that there was, if at all, only a small risk of competition distortions within the internal market since the scheme was designed to alleviate a handicap for Union producers in their competition with non-Union producers.
Nemčija je v predhodno predloženem uradnem obvestilu o shemi celo poudarila, da so nemški proizvajalci domnevno prikrajšani tudi v primerjavi s konkurenti iz drugih držav članic.
Moreover, they argued that intra-sector competition would not be harmed either, since the non-ferrous metal sector had already undertaken many efforts to reduce its CO2 emissions and to become more energy-efficient.
Komisija opaža tudi nevarnost, da bi shema, kot je ta v obravnavani zadevi, sprožila tekmovanje v subvencioniranju med državami članicami, kar bi povzročilo precejšnje izkrivljanje konkurence na notranjem trgu glede na razpoložljivost proračunskih sredstev v različnih državah članicah.
Finally, they claim that electricity prices within the EU/EEA are the same, or at least converging, which means that it would make no sense for German producers to relocate their plants to other EU/EEA Member States.
Ta nevarnost je v obravnavani zadevi še posebno velika, saj leta 2009 ni bilo usklajenega okvira, ki bi določal pogoje, ki bi jih morale upoštevati vse države članice.
The Commission considers, however, that the argument that the scheme would not lead to serious distortions of competition, but rather have an overall positive balance cannot be accepted.
Zato je tudi v primeru, da je priznan cilj skupnega interesa, kot je okoljski cilj preprečevanja selitve virov CO2, ključnega pomena, da se izkrivljajoči učinki pomoči omejijo na najnižjo možno raven ter da se na notranjem trgu ohranijo enaki konkurenčni pogoji za vse subjekte.
In that respect, it must be recalled that the Commission has wide discretion in matters falling under Article 107(3) TFEU.
Zmanjšanje izkrivljanj na notranjem trgu na najnižjo možno raven je bilo v resnici eden od specifičnih ciljev sprejetja smernic za državno pomoč v okviru ETS (skupaj s preprečevanjem selitve virov CO2 in ohranjanjem učinkovitosti ETS) [63].
First, the form of the aid belongs to the most distortive types of aid: As the Court of First Instance held in its Siemens judgment, ‘operating aid, that is to say, aid intended to relieve an undertaking of the expenses which it would itself normally have had to bear in its day-to-day management or its usual activities, does not in principle fall within the scope of [Article 107(3) TFEU]’, as ‘the effect of such aid is in principle to distort competition in the sectors in which it is granted, whilst nevertheless being incapable, by its very nature, of achieving any [objective of common interest]’ [57].
Takšna izkrivljanja se ne pojavljajo le znotraj gospodarskih sektorjev, temveč tudi med njimi.
Similarly, in Case C-86/89 Italy v Commission, the Court of Justice found that ‘the aid in question, which was granted without any specific conditions and solely according to the quantities used, should be regarded as an operating aid to the undertakings concerned and that, as such, it affected trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’ [58].
Če se država članica odloči dodeliti podporo samo nekaterim sektorjem, morajo sektorji, ki podpore ne prejmejo, morda nositi težje breme, da se dosežejo cilji zmanjšanja emisij zadevne države članice.
The Commission has also followed this approach, in particular as far as subsidies to cover electricity costs for the aluminium sector are concerned [59].
Vendar pa, kot je bilo ugotovljeno v uvodni izjavi 48, nemška shema ne spada na področje uporabe smernic za državno pomoč v okviru ETS.
All the concerns expressed in those past cases are also present here: the aid consists in a grant that is paid to the producers concerned in order to reduce their electricity costs.
Te se uporabljajo le za tretje obdobje trgovanja v okviru ETS.
As interested parties have confirmed, this is one of the main production costs in the sectors concerned by the aid scheme and is one of the main production factors on which producers compete.
Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da ne samo da lahko shema pomoči zelo škodljivo vpliva na pogoje trgovanja, ampak so tudi njeni pozitivni učinki nejasni.
In addition, the aid is granted for each MWh consumed and has thus a direct impact on the competitiveness of the eligible companies for each unit they produce beyond the consumption of the first GWh.
Iz razlogov, ki so navedeni v uvodni izjavi 63 in naslednjih, Nemčija zlasti ni prepričljivo dokazala, da je priglašena shema ustrezna in nujna.
Furthermore, the aid is not linked to any efficiency benchmark.
Komisija zato meni, da skupni učinek priglašene sheme ni pozitiven, saj lahko shema povzroči hudo izkrivljanje konkurence na notranjem trgu neželeznih kovin, njeni pozitivni učinki pa niso prepričljivo dokazani.
Finally, the aid is not even linked to the beneficiaries' actual CO2 costs included in electricity.
Sklepna ugotovitev glede preprečevanja selitve virov CO2
It might actually reduce their incentives to produce in a more energy-efficient way.
Komisija torej meni, da shema ni nujno in ustrezno sredstvo za uravnoteženo preprečevanje selitve virov CO2 ter da vsekakor lahko škodljivo vpliva na pogoje trgovanja v obsegu, ki je v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
Moreover, the Commission does not agree that the aid scheme would not disrupt competition in the Union.
Zato je ni mogoče šteti za združljivo z notranjim trgom.
The Commission notes that, first, remedies had already been in place, for instance the allocation of EU ETS allowances free of charge [60].
Tudi če bi Nemčija, kakor je sama predlagala, shemo spremenila, da bi upoštevala pomisleke Komisije glede sorazmernosti, tako da bi popravila ali spremenila metodo za izračun pomoči, to ne bi spremenilo ocene Komisije, kar zadeva nenujnost in neustreznost ukrepa ter izkrivljanje konkurence v Uniji.
Although this mechanism did not specifically target the indirect costs resulting from the ETS, it has alleviated the burden borne by the Union industry.
Tveganje selitve virov CO2 v letu 2009 namreč ni bilo dokazano, učinek sheme na konkurenco pa bi bil še vedno negativen.
Secondly, there is a very high risk that the measure would harm competition as it is granted ad hoc outside any harmonised framework and targets only the national level and therefore only benefits the undertakings established in that particular Member State.
Preprečevanje izgube delovnih mest
In that vein, the argument made by Germany and by some of the interested parties that the scheme could not hurt intra-Union competition since it was essentially designed to restore fair competition with outside-Union competitors misses the point: Support granted only to German producers in order to improve their competitiveness towards non-Union competitors at the same time risks also making them better off in comparison with their Union competitors [61].
Nemčija je poudarila tudi potrebo po preprečevanju izgube delovnih mest v Nemčiji, do katere bi prišlo v industriji neželeznih kovin in panogah na koncu proizvodne verige, če bi proizvajalci neželeznih kovin zmanjšali zmogljivost svojih obratov ali jih celo preselili v tretje države.
This is further demonstrated by the fact that the scheme would require beneficiaries to pay back the aid in case of plant closure or relocation outside Germany (and not only outside the Union or the EEA).
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka dvomila o tem, ali je mogoče že preprečevanje selitve zaradi ohranjanja delovnih mest šteti za cilj skupnega interesa.
Similarly, the allegation that German non-ferrous metal producers would not relocate to other EU/EEA Member States anyway due to comparable levels of electricity prices is not convincing.
Vsekakor je podvomila o trditvi Nemčije, da je bila industrija neželeznih kovin izpostavljena zunanjemu pretresu in da je treba to obravnavati kot nedelovanje trga, ki bo povzročilo izgubo delovnih mest.
Distortions of competition in the internal market are not only measured by the relocation of plants from one to the other Member State.
Dvomila je tudi o tem, ali je pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, ki je namenjena preprečevanju selitve družb, najmanj izkrivljajoč instrument za ohranjanje delovnih mest, saj so ukrepi za izboljšanje razmer na trgu dela običajno osredotočeni na trajnostne ukrepe, kot so izboljšanje izobraževanja in usposabljanja zaposlenih ali olajšanje dostopa do finančnih sredstev za nove naložbe [64].
Distortions of competition already arise when production capacity can be maintained in one Member State because of State aid, as this has repercussions on the profitability of production capacity in other Member States.
Zainteresirane strani so trdile, da je bilo zaradi finančne in gospodarske krize leta 2008 ter posrednih stroškov CO2 nadaljevanje proizvodnje neželeznih kovin v Evropi resnično ogroženo.
Germany is the main EU location of some of the non-ferrous metals producers concerned, but it is not the only one [62], so that the aid is likely to distort competition conditions between producers across the EU and the EEA.
Komisija opominja, da v njeni praksi odločanja ali v sodni praksi sodišč EU ni precedenčnega primera, v katerem bi domnevno tveganje selitve v države zunaj Unije kot tako upravičevalo dodelitev državne pomoči [65].
In fact, Germany had stressed in the earlier notification of the scheme that German producers were allegedly disadvantaged also in comparison with competitors in other Member States.
Ker Nemčija ni predložila prepričljivih utemeljitev, Komisija meni, da ni treba odstopati od njene prakse odločanja.
In addition, the Commission sees the risk that a scheme like the one at hand would trigger a subsidy race between Member States, a situation in which competition on the internal market would be significantly distorted according to the availability of budgetary resources in the various Member States.
Tudi če bi Komisija priznala takšen cilj, preostali pogoji združljivosti po njenem mnenju še vedno niso izpolnjeni.
This risk is particularly important in the present case given the absence in 2009 of a harmonised framework setting the conditions by which all Member States have to abide.
Ukrep je namreč z notranjim trgom združljiv le, če je dokazano, da upravičence jasno spodbuja k spremembi njihovega ravnanja glede na želeni rezultat.