natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
These rules will supplement the already concluded framework which contains several features which enhance the accessibility of this mechanism for EU data subjects: (i) in preparing a claim before the panel, the data subject may be assisted by his or her national DPA; (ii) while the arbitration will take place in the United States, EU data subjects may choose to participate through video or telephone conference, to be provided at no cost to the individual; (iii) while the language used in the arbitration will as a rule be English, interpretation at the arbitral hearing and translation will normally [54] be provided upon a reasoned request and at no cost to the data subject; (iv) finally, while each party has to bear its own attorney's fees, if represented by an attorney before the panel, the Department of Commerce will establish a fund supplied with annual contributions by the Privacy Shield organisations, which shall cover the eligible costs of the arbitration procedure, up to maximum amounts, to be determined by the U.S. authorities in consultation with the Commission.
DOSTOP DO OSEBNIH PODATKOV, KI JIH JAVNI ORGANI PRENAŠAJO V OKVIRU ZASEBNOSTNEGA ŠČITA EU-ZDA, IN NJIHOVA UPORABA
While the panel will take into account other remedies already obtained by other Privacy Shield mechanisms when making its determination, individuals may still resort to arbitration if they consider these other remedies to be insufficient.
Komisija je ocenila omejitve in zaščitne ukrepe, ki so na voljo v zakonodaji ZDA, kar zadeva dostop in uporabo osebnih podatkov, ki jih javni organi v ZDA prenašajo v okviru zasebnostnega ščita EU-ZDA za namene nacionalne varnosti, kazenskega pregona in drugih javnih interesov.
This will allow EU data subjects to invoke arbitration in all cases where the action or inaction of the competent U.S. authorities (for instance the FTC) has not satisfactorily resolved their complaints.
Ugotovitve Komisije glede omejitev dostopa in uporabe osebnih podatkov, ki jih javni organi ZDA prenašajo iz Evropske unije v ZDA, in obstoja učinkovitega pravnega varstva so podrobneje pojasnjene v nadaljevanju.
Arbitration may not be invoked if a DPA has the legal authority to resolve the claim at issue with respect to the U.S. self-certified company, namely in those cases where the organisation is either obliged to cooperate and comply with the advice of the DPAs as regards the processing of human resources data collected in the employment context, or has voluntarily committed to do so.
Dostop in uporaba s strani javnih organov ZDA za namene nacionalne varnosti
Individuals can enforce the arbitration decision in the U.S. courts under the Federal Arbitration Act, thereby ensuring a legal remedy in case a company fails to comply.
Analiza Komisije kaže, da zakonodaja ZDA vsebuje številne omejitve glede dostopa do osebnih podatkov in njihove uporabe, ki se prenašajo v okviru zasebnostnega ščita EU-ZDA za namene socialne varnosti, pa tudi nadzornih in pritožbenih mehanizmov, ki zagotavljajo dovolj zaščitnih ukrepov, da so zadevni podatki učinkovito zaščiteni proti nezakonitim posegom in nevarnosti zlorabe [57].
Seventh, where an organisation does not comply with its commitment to respect the Principles and published privacy policy, additional avenues for judicial redress may be available under the law of the U.S. States which provide for legal remedies under tort law and in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, unfair or deceptive acts or practices, or breach of contract.
Od leta 2013, ko je Komisija izdala dve sporočili (glej uvodno izjavo 7), se je ta pravni okvir znatno okrepil, kakor je opisano v nadaljevanju.
In addition, where a DPA, upon receiving a claim by an EU data subject, considers that the transfer of an individual's personal data to an organisation in the United States is carried out in violation of EU data protection law, including when the EU data exporter has reason to believe that the organisation is not complying with the Principles, it can also exercise its powers vis-à-vis the data exporter and, if necessary, order the suspension of the data transfer.
Omejitve
In the light of the information in this section, the Commission considers that the Principles issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce as such ensure a level of protection of personal data that is essentially equivalent to the one guaranteed by the substantive basic principles laid down in Directive 95/46/EC.
Po zakonodaji ZDA je zagotavljanje nacionalne varnosti v pristojnosti predsednika kot glavnega poveljnika, glavnega upravitelja in, kar zadeva tuje obveščevalne službe, kot pristojnega za zunanje zadeva ZDA [58].
In addition, the effective application of the Principles is guaranteed by the transparency obligations, and the administration and compliance review of the Privacy Shield by the Department of Commerce.
Ker ima kongres pristojnosti za uvedbo omejitev in je to storil v različnih primerih, lahko v okviru teh omejitev usmerja dejavnosti obveščevalne skupnosti ZDA, zlasti z odredbami ali predsedniškimi direktivami.
ACCESS AND USE OF PERSONAL DATA TRANSFERRED UNDER THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD BY U.S. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
Trenutno sta glavna pravna instrumenta v zvezi s tem Odredba št. 12333 [59] in Predsedniška politična direktiva št. 28 (Presidential Policy Directive 28, v nadaljnjem besedilu: PPD-28).
As follows from Annex II, Sec.
Predsedniška politična direktiva št. 28 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: PPD-28), objavljena 17. januarja 2014, uvaja številne omejitve za „obveščevalne operacije SIGINT“ [60].
I.5, adherence to the Principles is limited to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest or law enforcement requirements.
Ta predsedniška direktiva je zavezujoča za obveščevalne organe ZDA [61] in ostane veljavna po spremembi v administraciji ZDA [62].
The Commission has assessed the limitations and safeguards available in U.S. law as regards access and use of personal data transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield by U.S. public authorities for national security, law enforcement and other public interest purposes.
PPD-28 je zlasti pomembna za nedržavljane ZDA, vključno s posamezniki iz EU, na katere se nanašajo osebni podatki.
In addition, the U.S. government, through its Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) [56], has provided the Commission with detailed representations and commitments that are contained in Annex VI to this decision.
Med drugim določa da:
By letter signed by the Secretary of State and attached as Annex III to this decision the U.S. government has also committed to create a new oversight mechanism for national security interference, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, who is independent from the Intelligence Community.
mora zbiranje obveščevalnih podatkov SIGINT temeljiti na statutu ali predsedniškem pooblastilu ter se mora izvajati v skladu z ustavo ZDA (zlasti četrtim amandmajem) in zakonodajo ZDA;
Finally, a representation from the U.S. Department of Justice, contained in Annex VII to this decision, describes the limitations and safeguards applicable to access and use of data by public authorities for law enforcement and other public interest purposes.
bi se morale vse osebe obravnavati z dostojanstvom in spoštovanjem, ne glede na njihovo državljanstvo ali prebivališče;
In order to enhance transparency and to reflect the legal nature of these commitments, each of the documents listed and annexed to this decision will be published in the U.S. Federal Register.
imajo vse osebe legitimne interese za varstvo zasebnosti pri obdelavi njihovih osebnih podatkov;
The findings of the Commission on the limitations on access and use of personal data transferred from the European Union to the United States by U.S. public authorities and the existence of effective legal protection are further elaborated below.
so zasebnost in državljanske svoboščine sestavni del premislekov pri načrtovanju obveščevalnih dejavnosti SIGINT v ZDA;
Access and use by U.S. public authorities for national security purposes
morajo obveščevalne dejavnosti SIGINT v ZDA zato vključevati ustrezne zaščitne ukrepe za osebne podatke vseh posameznikov, ne glede na njihovo državljanstvo ali prebivališče.
The Commission's analysis shows that U.S. law contains a number of limitations on the access and use of personal data transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield for national security purposes as well as oversight and redress mechanisms that provide sufficient safeguards for those data to be effectively protected against unlawful interference and the risk of abuse [57].
PPD-28 določa, da se lahko obveščevalni podatki SIGINT zbirajo izključno za namen tujih obveščevalnih služb in protiobveščevalnih služb za podporo nacionalnim in ministrskim misijam, ne pa za kateri koli drug namen (npr. za zagotavljanje konkurenčne prednosti podjetjem iz ZDA).
Since 2013, when the Commission issued its two Communications (see recital 7), this legal framework has been significantly strengthened, as described below.
V skladu s tem v skupnem „okviru prednostnih nalog nacionalnih obveščevalnih služb (National Intelligence Priorities Framework, v nadaljnjem besedilu: NIPF)“ potekajo tudi raziskave in določanje ustreznih izbirnikov, kar zagotavlja, da prednostne naloge obveščevalnih služb določijo oblikovalci politik na visoki ravni in da se te prednostne naloge redno pregledujejo, da se še naprej odzivajo na dejanske grožnje nacionalni varnosti in da se upoštevajo morebitna tveganja, vključno s tveganji za zasebnost [65].
Limitations
Na podlagi tega osebje agencije prouči in določi posebne izbirne izraze, s pomočjo katerih naj bi se zbirali tuji obveščevalni podatki, prilagojeni prednostnim nalogam [66].
Under the U.S. Constitution, ensuring national security falls within the President's authority as Commander in Chief, as Chief Executive and, as regards foreign intelligence, to conduct U.S. foreign affairs [58].
Izbirne izraze oziroma „izbirnike“ je treba redno pregledovati, da se preveri, ali še vedno zagotavljajo dragocene obveščevalne podatke v skladu s prednostnimi nalogami [67].
While Congress has the power to impose limitations, and has done so in various respects, within these boundaries the President may direct the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, in particular through Executive Orders or Presidential Directives.
Poleg tega zahtevi, določeni v PPD-28, da mora biti zbiranje vedno [68]„prilagojeno in izvedljivo“ in da mora obveščevalna skupnost dajati prednost razpoložljivosti drugih informacij ter ustreznim in izvedljivim alternativam [69], izražata splošno pravilo dajanja prednosti ciljnemu zbiranju podatkov pred množičnim zbiranjem podatkov.
This of course also applies in those areas where no Congressional guidance exists.
V skladu z zagotovili ODNI zagotavljata zlasti, da množično zbiranje ni niti „masovno“ niti „neselektivno“ in da izjema ne razveljavi pravila [70].
At present, the two central legal instruments in this regard are Executive Order 12333 (‘E.O. 12333’) [59] and Presidential Policy Directive 28.
Čeprav PPD-28 pojasnjuje, da morajo organi obveščevalne skupnosti včasih v določenih okoliščinah zbirati množične obveščevalne podatke SIGINT, na primer za ugotavljanje in oceno novih ali nastajajočih groženj, določa, da morajo ti organi dajati prednost alternativam, ki omogočajo izvajanje ciljnega zbiranja obveščevalnih podatkov SIGINT [71].
Presidential Policy Directive 28 (‘PPD-28’), issued on 17 January 2014, imposes a number of limitations for ‘signals intelligence’ operations [60].
Iz tega sledi, da se množično zbiranje podatkov izvaja le, če ciljno zbiranje podatkov z uporabo diskriminant, tj. identifikatorja, povezanega z določeno ciljno osebo (kot je e-poštni naslov ali telefonska številka ciljne osebe), ni mogoče „zaradi tehničnih ali operativnih razlogov“ [72].
This presidential directive has binding force for U.S. intelligence authorities [61] and remains effective upon change in the U.S. Administration [62].
To se nanaša na način zbiranja obveščevalnih podatkov SIGINT in na dejansko zbrane podatke [72] Glej opombo 68.
Among others, it stipulates that:
Za zagotovitev tega „uporablja filtre in druga tehnična orodja za osredotočanje zbiranja na tiste elemente, ki verjetno vsebujejo komunikacije, ki so pomembne za tuje obveščevalne službe“ (in bodo tako ustrezali zahtevam, ki so jih izrazili oblikovalci politike ZDA v skladu s postopkom, opisanim v uvodni izjavi 70).
the collection of signals intelligence must be based on statute or Presidential authorisation, and must be undertaken in accordance with the U.S. Constitution (in particular the Fourth Amendment) and U.S. law;
Zato bo množično zbiranje ciljno usmerjeno na vsaj dva načina.
all persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside;
Prvič, vedno bo povezano z določenimi cilji tuje obveščevalne službe (npr. pridobivanje obveščevalnih podatkov SIGINT o dejavnostih teroristične skupine, ki deluje v določeni regiji) in osredotočalo se bo na komunikacije, ki so povezane s takimi cilji.
all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information;
Glede na zagotovilo ODNI se to izraža v dejstvu, da „obveščevalne dejavnosti SIGINT ZDA dosežejo le del komunikacij, ki potekajo prek interneta“ [73].
privacy and civil liberties shall be integral considerations in the planning of U.S. signals intelligence activities;
Drugič, v zagotovilih ODNI je pojasnjeno, da bodo filtri in druga tehnična orodja, ki se uporabljajo, zasnovana tako, da se bodo osredotočala na „čim bolj natančno“ zbiranje za zagotovitev, da bo zbranih čim manj „neustreznih informacij“.
U.S. signals intelligence activities must, therefore, include appropriate safeguards for the personal information of all individuals, regardless of their nationality or where they might reside.
Tudi kadar ZDA menijo, da je treba obveščevalne podatke zbirati množično, v skladu s pogoji, določenimi v uvodnih izjavah 70 do 73, Predsedniška politična direktiva št. 28 omejuje uporabo takih podatkov na določen seznam šestih namenov nacionalne varnosti za varstvo zasebnosti in državljanskih pravic vseh oseb, ne glede na njihovo državljanstvo in prebivališče [74].
PPD-28 directs that signals intelligence may be collected exclusively where there is a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose to support national and departmental missions, and not for any other purpose (e.g. to afford a competitive advantage to U.S. companies).
Ti dovoljeni nameni vključujejo ukrepe za odkrivanje in preprečevanje groženj oboroženim silam ali vojaškemu osebju, ki izhajajo iz vohunstva, terorizma, orožja za množično uničevanje ali groženj kibernetski varnosti, pa tudi nadnacionalnih kriminalnih groženj, povezanih z drugimi petimi nameni, pregledovali pa se bodo vsaj enkrat letno.
In this regard, the ODNI explains that Intelligence Community elements ‘should require that, wherever practicable, collection should be focused on specific foreign intelligence targets or topics through the use of discriminants (e.g. specific facilities, selection terms and identifiers)’ [63].
Glede na zagotovila vlade ZDA so organi obveščevalne skupnosti okrepili svoje analitične prakse in standarde za iskanje neocenjenih obveščevalnih podatkov SIGINT, da bi izpolnili te zahteve; uporaba ciljnih poizvedb „zagotavlja, da se analitikom v proučitev vedno predložijo samo tisti obveščevalni podatki, za katere se šteje, da bi bili lahko koristni za obveščevalne namene“ [75].
Furthermore, the representations provide assurance that decisions about intelligence collection are not left to the discretion of individual intelligence agents, but are subject to the policies and procedures that the various U.S. Intelligence Community elements (agencies) are required to put in place to implement PPD-28 [64].
Te omejitve so zlasti pomembne za osebne podatke, ki se prenašajo v okviru zasebnostnega ščita EU-ZDA, zlasti, če se do osebnih podatkov dostopa zunaj ZDA, tudi med njihovim prenašanjem po čezatlantskih kablih iz Unije v ZDA.
Accordingly, the research and determination of appropriate selectors takes place within the overall ‘National Intelligence Priorities Framework’ (NIPF) which ensures that intelligence priorities are set by high-level policymakers and regularly reviewed to remain responsive to actual national security threats and taking into account possible risks, including privacy risks [65].
Kot so potrdili organi ZDA v zagotovilih ODNI, se za tako zbiranje uporabljajo omejitve in zaščitni ukrepi, navedeni v zadevnih zagotovilih, vključno s tistimi iz PPD-28 [76].
On this basis, agency personnel researches and identifies specific selection terms expected to collect foreign intelligence responsive to the priorities [66].
Čeprav ta načela niso navedena v zadevnih pravnih izrazih, zajemajo bistvo načel nujnosti in sorazmernosti.
Selection terms, or ‘selectors’, must be regularly reviewed to see if they still provide valuable intelligence in line with the priorities [67].
Ciljno zbiranje podatkov ima očitno prednost, medtem ko je množično zbiranje podatkov omejeno na (izredne) primere, ko ciljno zbiranje podatkov ni mogoče zaradi tehničnih ali operativnih razlogov.
Furthermore, the requirements stipulated in PPD-28 that intelligence collection shall always [68] be ‘as tailored as feasible’, and that the Intelligence Community shall prioritise the availability of other information and appropriate and feasible alternatives [69], reflect a general rule of prioritisation of targeted over bulk collection.
Tudi če se množičnemu zbiranju podatkov ni mogoče izogniti, je nadaljnja „uporaba“ takih podatkov z dostopom strogo omejena na posebne, legitimne namene nacionalne varnosti [77].
According to the assurance provided by the ODNI, they ensure in particular that bulk collection is neither ‘mass’ nor ‘indiscriminate’, and that the exception does not swallow the rule [70].
Tako kot direktiva, ki jo izda predsednik kot glavni upravitelj, so te zahteve zavezujoče za celotno obveščevalno skupnost in se še naprej izvajajo prek pravil in postopkov agencije, ki prenašajo splošna načela v posebna navodila za vsakodnevne dejavnosti.
While PPD-28 explains that Intelligence Community elements must sometimes collect bulk signals intelligence in certain circumstances, for instance in order to identify and assess new or emerging threats, it directs these elements to prioritise alternatives that would allow the conduct of targeted signals intelligence [71].
Poleg tega je kongres, čeprav ga ne zavezuje PPD-28, sprejel tudi ukrepe za zagotovitev, da sta zbiranje in dostop do osebnih podatkov v ZDA ciljno usmerjena in se ne izvajata „na splošni podlagi“.
It follows that bulk collection will only occur where targeted collection via the use of discriminants — i.e. an identifier associated with a specific target (such as the target's e-mail address or phone number) — is not possible ‘due to technical or operational considerations’ [72].
V zvezi s tem zakon ZDA o svobodi (USA FREEDOM Act), ki je bil sprejet 2. junija 2015, prepoveduje množično zbiranje evidenc na podlagi člena 402 FISA (pooblastilo za snemanje klicev sledenje) in člena 501 FISA (prejšnji člen 215 zakona o domovinski varnosti ZDA) [83] ter z uporabo NSL in namesto tega zahteva uporabo posebnih „izbirnih izrazov“ [84].
This applies both to the manner in which signals intelligence is collected and to what is actually collected [72] See footnote 68.
Čeprav FISA vsebuje dodatna pravna pooblastila za izvajanje nacionalnih obveščevalnih dejavnosti, vključno z obveščevalno dejavnostjo SIGINT, je ocena Komisije pokazala, da kar zadeva osebne podatke, ki se prenašajo v okviru zasebnostnega ščita EU-ZDA, ta pooblastila enako omejujejo javne posege javnih organov v ciljno zbiranje podatkov in dostop do podatkov.
According to the representations from the ODNI, even where the Intelligence Community cannot use specific identifiers to target collection, it will seek to narrow the collection ‘as much as possible’.
To je jasno pri tradicionalnem individualiziranem elektronskem nadzoru na podlagi člena 104 FISA [85].
In order to ensure this, it ‘applies filters and other technical tools to focus the collection on those facilities that are likely to contain communications of foreign intelligence value’ (and thus will be responsive to requirements articulated by U.S. policy-makers pursuant to the process described above in 70).
Kot je navedeno v členu 702 FISA, ki določa podlago za dva pomembna obveščevalna programa, ki ju izvajajo obveščevalne agencije ZDA (PRISM in UPSTREAM), se preiskave izvajajo ciljno z uporabo posameznih izbirnikov, ki opredeljujejo posebna komunikacijska sredstva, kot je e-poštni naslov ali telefonska številka ciljne osebe, ne pa ključnih besed ali imen ciljnih oseb [86].
As a consequence, bulk collection will be targeted in at least two ways: First, it will always relate to specific foreign intelligence objectives (e.g. to acquire signals intelligence about the activities of a terrorist group operating in a particular region) and focus collection on communications that have such a nexus.
Poleg tega je vlada ZDA v svojih zagotovilih navedla, da je Evropska komisija izrecno zagotovila, da obveščevalna skupnost ZDA „ne sodeluje pri neselektivnem nadzoru vseh, vključno z običajnimi evropskimi državljani“ [88].
According to the assurance provided by the ODNI, this is reflected in the fact that the ‘United States' signals intelligence activities touch only a fraction of the communications traversing the internet’ [73].
Kar zadeva osebne podatke, ki se zbirajo v ZDA, je ta izjava podprta z empiričnimi dokazi, ki kažejo, da se zahteve za dostop z NSL in na podlagi FISA, posamično ali skupaj, nanašajo le na razmeroma majhno število ciljnih subjektov v primerjavi s skupnim pretokom podatkov na internetu [89].
Second, the ODNI representations explain that the filters and other technical tools used will be designed to focus the collection ‘as precisely as possible’ in order to ensure that the amount of ‘non-pertinent information’ collected will be minimised.
Kar zadeva dostop do zbranih podatkov in varstvo podatkov, PPD-28 zahteva, da se dostop „omeji na pooblaščeno osebje, ki mora biti seznanjeno z informacijami za opravljanje svojih nalog“, ter da se osebni podatki „obdelujejo in hranijo pod pogoji, ki zagotavljajo ustrezno varstvo in preprečujejo dostop nepooblaščenim osebam, v skladu z veljavnimi zaščitnimi ukrepi za občutljive podatke“.
Finally, even where the United States considers it necessary to collect signals intelligence in bulk, under the conditions set out in recitals 70-73, PPD-28 limits the use of such information to a specific list of six national security purposes with a view to protect the privacy and civil liberties of all persons, whatever their nationality and place of residence [74].
Obveščevalno osebje je deležno ustreznega in zadostnega usposabljanja v zvezi z načeli iz PPD-28 [90].
According to the representations by the U.S. government, Intelligence Community elements have reinforced their analytic practices and standards for querying unevaluated signals intelligence to conform with these requirements; the use of targeted queries ‘ensures that only those items believed to be of potential intelligence value are ever presented to analysts to examine’ [75].
Vlada ZDA je pojasnila, da ta zahteva po razumnosti pomeni, da organom obveščevalne skupnosti ne bo treba sprejeti „kakršnih koli teoretično mogočih ukrepov“, ampak bodo morale „uravnotežiti svoja prizadevanja za zaščito legitimnih interesov glede zasebnosti in državljanskih svoboščin s praktičnimi potrebami obveščevalnih dejavnosti SIGINT“ [92].
These limitations are particularly relevant to personal data transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, in particular in case collection of personal data were to take place outside the United States, including during their transit on the transatlantic cables from the Union to the United States.
V zvezi s tem bodo nedržavljani ZDA obravnavani enako kot državljani ZDA, na podlagi postopkov, ki jih odobri generalni državni tožilec [93].