natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In that context, the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (‘ESMA’) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [7] should, to the extent feasible and relevant, minimise overlaps and avoid inconsistencies between the technical standards adopted pursuant to this Regulation and those adopted pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
To bi moralo tudi omogočiti, da repozitoriji sklenjenih poslov, registrirani ali priznani v skladu z navedeno uredbo, izvajajo naloge repozitorija sklenjenih poslov, dodeljene s to uredbo, če izpolnjujejo nekatera dodatna merila in če prej opravijo poenostavljeni postopek registracije.
The legal framework laid down by this Regulation should, to the extent possible, be the same as that of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 in respect of the reporting of derivative contracts to trade repositories registered for that purpose.
Zaradi zagotovitve skladnosti in učinkovitosti pooblastil ESMA, da naloži kazni, bi morale za udeležence na trgu, ki spadajo v področje uporabe te uredbe, s sklicevanjem na Uredbo (EU) št. 648/2012 veljati določbe glede pooblastil ESMA, kot je določeno v navedeni uredbi in opredeljeno z delegiranimi akti, sprejetimi na podlagi člena 64(7) navedene uredbe, in sicer v zvezi s poslovnikom.
This should also enable trade repositories registered or recognised in accordance with that Regulation to fulfil the repository function assigned by this Regulation, if they comply with certain additional criteria, subject to completion of a simplified registration process.
Posli s članicami Evropskega sistema centralnih bank (ESCB) bi morali biti izvzeti iz obveznosti poročanja o poslih financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji repozitorijem sklenjenih poslov.
In order to ensure consistency and effectiveness of ESMA’s powers to impose penalties, the market participants that fall within the scope of this Regulation should, by reference to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, be subject to the provisions regarding ESMA’s powers as laid down in that Regulation as specified, in respect of the rules of procedure, by the delegated acts adopted pursuant to Article 64(7) of that Regulation.
Za zagotovitev, da regulativni in nadzorni organi pridobijo ustrezen pregled nad tveganji, povezanimi s posli financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji, ki jih sklenejo subjekti, ki jih ti organi regulirajo ali nadzirajo, pa bi morali zadevni organi in članice ESCB tesno sodelovati.
Transactions with members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) should be exempted from the obligation to report SFTs to trade repositories.
Takšno sodelovanje bi moralo regulativnim in nadzornim organom omogočiti izpolnjevanje njihovih odgovornosti in nalog.
However, in order to ensure that regulators and supervisors obtain a proper overview of the risks linked to SFTs concluded by the entities they regulate or supervise, the relevant authorities and the members of the ESCB should cooperate closely.
Takšno sodelovanje bi moralo biti zaupno in pogojeno z upravičeno zahtevo ustreznih pristojnih organov ter bi moralo potekati samo zato, da se tem organom omogoči izpolnjevanje njihovih odgovornosti, pri čemer je treba ustrezno upoštevati načela in zahteve po neodvisnosti centralnih bank ter njihovo funkcijo monetarnih organov, vključno z izvajanjem dejavnosti monetarne politike, politike deviznega tečaja in politike finančne stabilnosti, za katere imajo članice ESCB zakonsko pooblastilo.
Such cooperation should enable regulators and supervisors to fulfil their respective responsibilities and mandates.
Članice ESCB bi morale imeti možnost, da zavrnejo predložitev informacij, če posle izvajajo v svoji funkciji monetarnih organov.
Such cooperation should be confidential, and conditional on a justified request from the relevant competent authorities, and should only be provided with a view to enabling those authorities to fulfil their respective responsibilities having due regard to the principles and requirements of the independence of central banks and the performance by them of their functions as monetary authorities, including the performance of monetary, foreign exchange and financial stability policy operations which members of the ESCB are legally empowered to pursue.
Organ, ki je vložil zahtevo, bi morale uradno obvestiti o vsaki taki zavrnitvi skupaj z utemeljitvijo.
The members of the ESCB should be able to refuse to provide information where the transactions are entered into by them in the performance of their functions as monetary authorities.
Informacije o tveganjih, ki so neločljivo povezana s trgi financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji, bi morale biti centralno shranjene ter enostavno in neposredno dostopne, med drugim ESMA, Evropskemu nadzornemu organu (Evropskemu bančnemu organu) (EBA), ustanovljenem z Uredbo (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [8], Evropskemu nadzornemu organu (Evropskemu organu za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) (EIOPA), ustanovljenem z Uredbo (EU) št. 1094/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [9], zadevnim pristojnim organom, ESRB in zadevnim centralnim bankam ESCB, vključno z Evropsko centralno banko (ECB) pri opravljanju njenih nalog v okviru enotnega mehanizma nadzora na podlagi Uredbe Sveta (EU) št. 1024/2013 [10], za namen prepoznavanja in spremljanja tveganj za finančno stabilnost, povezanih z dejavnostmi bančništva v senci, ki jih opravljajo regulirani in neregulirani subjekti.
They should notify the requesting authority of any such refusal together with the justification therefor.
ESMA bi moral pri pripravi regulativnih tehničnih standardov iz te uredbe ali predlogih za njihovo revizijo upoštevati tehnične standarde, sprejete na podlagi člena 81 Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012, ki ureja repozitorije sklenjenih poslov za pogodbe o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih in prihodnji razvoj navedenih tehničnih standardov.
Information on the risks inherent in securities financing markets should be centrally stored, and easily and directly accessible by, inter alia, ESMA, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (‘EBA’) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [8], the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) (‘EIOPA’) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [9], the relevant competent authorities, the ESRB and the relevant central banks of the ESCB, including the European Central Bank (ECB) in carrying out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism under Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 [10], for the purpose of identification and monitoring of financial stability risks entailed by shadow banking activities of regulated and non-regulated entities.
ESMA bi moral zagotoviti tudi, da imajo zadevni pristojni organi, ESRB in zadevne centralne banke ESCB, vključno z ECB, neposreden in takojšen dostop do vseh informacij, ki jih potrebujejo za opravljanje svojih dolžnosti, vključno z določanjem in izvajanjem monetarne politike ter izvajanjem nadzora nad infrastrukturo finančnih trgov.
ESMA should take into consideration the technical standards adopted pursuant to Article 81 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 regulating trade repositories for derivative contracts and the future development of those technical standards when drawing up or proposing to revise the regulatory technical standards provided for in this Regulation.
ESMA bi moral v ta namen v osnutkih regulativnih tehničnih standardov določiti pogoje dostopa do takih informacij.
ESMA should also aim to ensure that the relevant competent authorities, the ESRB and the relevant central banks of the ESCB, including the ECB, have direct and immediate access to the information necessary to perform their duties, including to define and implement monetary policy and to perform oversight of financial market infrastructures.
Sprejeti je treba določbe o izmenjavi informacij med pristojnimi organi in okrepiti dolžnosti medsebojne pomoči in sodelovanja.
In order to ensure this, ESMA should set out the terms and conditions for access to such information in draft regulatory technical standards.
Zaradi naraščajoče čezmejne dejavnosti bi si morali pristojni organi pri opravljanju svojih funkcij medsebojno zagotavljati ustrezne informacije, da bi poskrbeli za učinkovito uveljavljanje te uredbe, tudi v primerih, ko bi kršitve ali domnevne kršitve utegnile zadevati organe v dveh ali več državah članicah.
It is necessary to introduce provisions on the exchange of information between competent authorities and to strengthen the duties of assistance and cooperation which they owe each other.
Pri izmenjavi informacij je potrebno strogo varovanje poklicne skrivnosti, da se zagotovita nemoteno posredovanje teh informacij in zaščita pravic posameznikov.
Due to increasing cross-border activity, competent authorities should provide each other with the relevant information for the exercise of their functions in order to ensure the effective enforcement of this Regulation, including in situations where infringements or suspected infringements may be of concern to authorities in two or more Member States.
Brez poseganja v nacionalno kazensko ali davčno pravo bi morali pristojni organi, ESMA in drugi organi ali fizične ali pravne osebe, ki niso pristojni organi, prejete zaupne informacije uporabiti samo za opravljanje svojih dolžnosti in izvajanje svojih funkcij.
In the exchange of information, strict professional secrecy is needed to ensure the smooth transmission of that information and the protection of particular rights.
Vendar to ne bi smelo onemogočiti nacionalnim organom, ki so pristojni za preprečevanje, preiskovanje ali odpravo primerov slabega upravljanja, da v skladu z nacionalnim pravom opravljajo svoje funkcije.
Without prejudice to national criminal or tax law, the competent authorities, ESMA, bodies or natural or legal persons other than the competent authorities, which receive confidential information, should use it only in the performance of their duties and for the exercise of their functions.
Posle financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji v velikem obsegu uporabljajo upravitelji kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov za učinkovito upravljanje portfeljev.
However, this should not prevent the exercise, in accordance with national law, of the functions of national bodies responsible for the prevention, investigation or correction of cases of maladministration.
Taka uporaba lahko pomembno vpliva na uspešnost teh kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov.
SFTs are used extensively by managers of collective investment undertakings for efficient portfolio management.
Posli financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji se lahko uporabljajo za izpolnitev naložbenih ciljev ali za povečanje donosa.
Such use can have a significant impact on the performance of those collective investment undertakings.
Upravitelji uporabljajo tudi zamenjave celotnega donosa, ki imajo enake učinke kot posli financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji.
SFTs can be used either to fulfil investment objectives or to enhance returns.
Upravitelji kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov posle financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjave celotnega donosa pogosto uporabljajo pri izvajanju nekaterih strategij ali za povečanje njihovih donosov.
Managers also make use of total return swaps which have effects equivalent to SFTs.
Uporaba poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa lahko poveča splošen profil tveganja kolektivnega naložbenega podjema, pri čemer njihova uporaba vlagateljem ni ustrezno razkrita.
SFTs and total return swaps are extensively used by managers of collective investment undertakings to get exposure to certain strategies or to enhance their returns.
Ključno je zagotoviti, da lahko vlagatelji v take kolektivne naložbene podjeme sprejemajo odločitve na podlagi ustrezne obveščenosti ter ocenijo splošno tveganje in profil donosa kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov.
The use of SFTs and total return swaps could increase the general risk profile of the collective investment undertaking whereas their use is not properly disclosed to investors.
Kolektivni naložbeni podjem bi moral pri oceni poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa poleg njegove pravne oblike upoštevati tudi vsebino posla.
It is crucial to ensure that investors in such collective investment undertakings are able to make informed choices and to assess the overall risk and reward profile of collective investment undertakings.
Zaradi naložb na podlagi nepopolnih ali netočnih informacij glede naložbene strategije kolektivnega naložbenega podjema lahko vlagatelji utrpijo pomembne izgube.
When assessing SFTs and total return swaps, the collective investment undertaking should consider the substance of the transaction in addition to its legal form.
Zato je nujno, da kolektivni naložbeni podjemi razkrijejo vse ustrezne podrobne informacije, povezane z njihovo uporabo poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa.
Investments made on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate information as regards a collective investment undertaking’s investment strategy can result in significant investor losses.
Poleg tega je popolna preglednost zlasti pomembna na področju kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov, saj je vse premoženje, ki se uporablja v poslih financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjavah celotnega donosa, v lasti vlagateljev v kolektivne naložbene podjeme in ne njihovih upraviteljev.
It is therefore essential that collective investment undertakings disclose all relevant detailed information linked to their use of SFTs and total return swaps.
Popolno razkritje glede poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa je zato ključen instrument za zaščito pred morebitnim nasprotjem interesov.
In addition, full transparency is especially relevant in the area of collective investment undertakings as the entirety of assets that are subject to SFTs and total return swaps are not owned by the managers of collective investment undertakings but by their investors.
Nova pravila glede preglednosti poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa so tesno povezana z direktivama 2009/65/ES [11] in 2011/61/EU [12] Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta, saj ti direktivi tvorita pravni okvir, ki ureja vzpostavitev, upravljanje in trženje kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov.
Full disclosure as regards SFTs and total return swaps is therefore an essential tool to safeguard against possible conflicts of interest.
Kolektivni naložbeni podjemi lahko delujejo kot kolektivni naložbeni podjemi za vlaganja v prenosljive vrednostne papirje (KNPVP), ki jih upravljajo družbe za upravljanje KNPVP ali investicijske družbe KNPVP, ki so jim izdana dovoljenja v skladu z Direktivo 2009/65/ES, ali kot alternativni investicijski skladi (AIS), ki jih upravljajo upravitelji alternativnih investicijskih skladov (UAIS), ki jim je bilo izdano dovoljenje ali so bili registrirani v skladu z Direktivo 2011/61/EU.
The new rules on transparency of SFTs and total return swaps are closely linked to Directives 2009/65/EC [11] and 2011/61/EU [12] of the European Parliament and of the Council since those Directives form the legal framework governing the establishment, management and marketing of collective investment undertakings.
Nova pravila glede preglednosti poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa, uvedena s to uredbo, dopolnjujejo in bi se morala uporabljati poleg določb navedenih direktiv.
Collective investment undertakings may operate as undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) managed by UCITS management companies or by UCITS investment companies authorised under Directive 2009/65/EC or as alternative investment funds (AIFs) managed by alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs) authorised or registered under Directive 2011/61/EU.
Da bi vlagateljem omogočili seznanjenost s tveganji, ki so povezana z uporabo poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa, bi morali upravitelji kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov v periodična poročila vključevati podrobne informacije o vsaki uporabi teh tehnik.
The new rules on transparency of SFTs and total return swaps introduced by this Regulation supplement, and should apply in addition to, the provisions of those Directives.
Obstoječa periodična poročila, ki jih morajo pripravljati družbe za upravljanje KNPVP ali investicijske družbe KNPVP in UAIS, bi morala biti dopolnjena z dodatnimi informacijami o uporabi poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa.
In order to enable investors to become aware of the risks associated with the use of SFTs and total return swaps, managers of collective investment undertakings should include detailed information on any recourse they have to those techniques in periodical reports.
ESMA bi moral pri dodatni opredelitvi vsebine teh periodičnih poročil upoštevati upravno breme in posebnosti različnih vrst poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa.
The existing periodical reports that UCITS management companies or UCITS investment companies and AIFMs have to produce should be supplemented by the additional information on the use of SFTs and total return swaps.
Naložbena politika kolektivnega naložbenega podjema glede poslov financiranja z vrednostnimi papirji in zamenjav celotnega donosa bi morala biti jasno razkrita v predpogodbenih dokumentih, na primer v prospektu za KNPVP in ob predpogodbenem razkritju vlagateljem v AIS.
In further specifying the content of those periodical reports, ESMA should take into account the administrative burden and the specificities of different types of SFTs and total return swaps.
S tem naj bi bilo zagotovljeno, da vlagatelji razumejo tveganja, povezana s posameznim KNPVP ali AIS, preden se odločijo za naložbo vanj.
A collective investment undertaking’s investment policy with respect to SFTs and total return swaps should be clearly disclosed in the pre-contractual documents, such as the prospectus for UCITS and the pre-contractual disclosure to investors for AIFs.
Ponovna uporaba zavarovanja s premoženjem zagotavlja likvidnost in nasprotnim strankam omogoča zmanjšanje stroškov financiranja.
This should ensure that investors understand and appreciate the inherent risks before they decide to invest in a particular UCITS or AIF.
Vendar pa ustvarja kompleksne verige zavarovanja s premoženjem med tradicionalnim bančništvom in bančništvom v senci, zaradi česar prihaja do tveganj za finančno stabilnost.
Reuse of collateral provides liquidity and enables counterparties to reduce funding costs.
Nezadostna preglednost glede tega, v kolikšni meri so bili finančni instrumenti, ki so bili zagotovljeni kot zavarovanje s premoženjem, ponovno uporabljeni, in glede zadevnih tveganj v primeru stečaja lahko ogrozi zaupanje v nasprotne stranke in poveča tveganja za finančno stabilnost.
However, it tends to create complex collateral chains between traditional banking and shadow banking, giving rise to financial stability risks.
Da bi povečali preglednost ponovne uporabe, bi bilo treba uvesti minimalne zahteve glede informacij.
The lack of transparency on the extent to which financial instruments provided as collateral have been reused and the respective risks in the case of bankruptcy can undermine confidence in counterparties and magnify risks to financial stability.
Ponovna uporaba naj bi bila mogoča samo z izrecnim védenjem in soglasjem nasprotne stranke ponudnice.
In order to increase transparency of reuse, minimum information requirements should be imposed.
Zato bi morala biti pravica do ponovne uporabe razvidna na računu vrednostnih papirjev nasprotne stranke ponudnice, razen če ta račun ureja pravo tretje države, po katerem bi bilo mogoče razvidnost ponovne uporabe zagotoviti na drug ustrezen način.
Reuse should take place only with the express knowledge and consent of the providing counterparty.
Čeprav je področje uporabe pravil o ponovni uporabi v tej uredbi širše kot v Direktivi 2002/47/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [13], ta uredba ne spreminja področja uporabe navedene direktive, temveč bi jo bilo treba razlagati kot dodatek k navedeni direktivi.
The exercise of a right to reuse should therefore be reflected in the securities account of the providing counterparty unless that account is governed by the law of a third country which provides for other appropriate means to reflect the reuse.
Pogoji, pod katerimi imajo nasprotne stranke pravico do ponovne uporabe in uresničevanja te pravice, nikakor ne bi smeli zmanjšati ravni varstva za dogovore o prenosu lastniške pravice na finančnem zavarovanju v skladu z Direktivo 2002/47/ES.
Although the scope of the rules concerning reuse in this Regulation is wider than that of Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [13], this Regulation does not amend the scope of that Directive but should, rather, be read in addition to that Directive.
Katera koli kršitev zahtev glede preglednosti ponovne uporabe tako ne bi smela vplivati na nacionalno pravo, kar zadeva veljavnost ali učinek posla.
The conditions subject to which counterparties have a right to reuse and to exercise that right should not in any way diminish the protection afforded to a title transfer financial collateral arrangement under Directive 2002/47/EC.
Ta uredba določa stroga pravila glede informacij za nasprotne stranke o ponovni uporabi, ki ne bi smela vplivati na izvajanje sektorskih pravil, prilagojenih posameznim akterjem, strukturam in okoliščinam.
Against that background, any infringement of the transparency requirements of reuse should not affect national law concerning the validity or effect of a transaction.
Pravila o ponovni uporabi iz te uredbe bi se zato morala uporabljati na primer za kolektivne naložbene podjeme in depotne družbe ali stranke investicijskih podjetij samo, kolikor ne obstajajo strožja, v pravnem okviru za kolektivne naložbene podjeme ali za zaščito sredstev strank določena pravila o ponovni uporabi, ki predstavljajo lex specialis in imajo prednost pred pravili iz te uredbe.
This Regulation establishes strict information rules for counterparties on reuse which should not prejudice the application of sectorial rules adapted to specific actors, structures and situations.
Ta uredba zlasti ne bi smela posegati v pravila na podlagi prava Unije ali nacionalnega prava, ki omejujejo zmožnost nasprotnih strank, da ponovno uporabijo finančne instrumente, ki jih nasprotne stranke ali osebe, ki niso nasprotne stranke, zagotovijo kot zavarovanje s premoženjem.
Therefore, the rules on reuse provided for in this Regulation should apply, for example, to collective investment undertakings and depositories or clients of investment firms only insofar as no more stringent rules on reuse are provided for in the legal framework for collective investment undertakings or for safeguarding of client assets constituting a lex specialis and taking precedence over the rules contained in this Regulation.
Uporabo zahtev glede ponovne uporabe bi bilo treba odložiti za šest mesecev po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe, da bi imele nasprotne stranke dovolj časa, da prilagodijo obstoječe dogovore o zavarovanju s premoženjem, vključno s krovnimi dogovori, in zagotovijo, da bodo novi dogovori o zavarovanju s premoženjem skladni s to uredbo.
In particular, this Regulation should be without prejudice to any rule under Union law or national law restricting the ability of counterparties to engage in reuse of financial instruments that are provided as collateral by counterparties or persons other than counterparties.
Zaradi spodbujanja skladnosti terminologije na mednarodni ravni se izraz „ponovna uporaba“ v tej uredbi uporablja v skladu z okvirom politike FSB.