natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1).’
Pod pogojem, da se dosežejo cilji, določeni v členu 4 in členu 6, lahko države članice določbe iz člena 4(1a) in člena 7 prenesejo s sporazumi med pristojnimi organi in zadevnimi gospodarskimi sektorji.“
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Direktiva (EU) 2015/849 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC
o preprečevanju uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja ali financiranje terorizma, spremembi Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta ter razveljavitvi Direktive 2005/60/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta in Direktive Komisije 2006/70/ES
Flows of illicit money can damage the integrity, stability and reputation of the financial sector, and threaten the internal market of the Union as well as international development.
Tokovi nezakonitega denarja lahko škodujejo integriteti, stabilnosti in ugledu finančnega sektorja ter ogrozijo notranji trg Unije in mednarodni razvoj.
Money laundering, terrorism financing and organised crime remain significant problems which should be addressed at Union level.
Pranje denarja, financiranje terorizma in organizirani kriminal ostajajo velike težave, ki bi jih bilo treba obravnavati na ravni Unije.
In addition to further developing the criminal law approach at Union level, targeted and proportionate prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing is indispensable and can produce complementary results.
Poleg nadaljnjega razvoja kazenskopravnega pristopa na ravni Unije je nujno in lahko prinese dodatne rezultate tudi usmerjeno in sorazmerno preprečevanje uporabe finančnega sistema za namene pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma.
The soundness, integrity and stability of credit institutions and financial institutions, and confidence in the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised by the efforts of criminals and their associates to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to channel lawful or illicit money for terrorist purposes.
Prizadevanja storilcev kaznivih dejanj in oseb, ki jim pri tem pomagajo, da bi prikrili izvor premoženjskih koristi, pridobljenih s kaznivimi dejanji, ali pa zakonit ali nezakonit denar preusmerili v namene terorizma, lahko resno ogrozijo trdnost, integriteto in stabilnost kreditnih institucij in finančnih institucij ter zaupanje v finančni sistem kot celoto.
In order to facilitate their criminal activities, money launderers and financers of terrorism could try to take advantage of the freedom of capital movements and the freedom to supply financial services which the Union's integrated financial area entails.
Vpleteni v pranje denarja in tisti, ki financirajo terorizem, bi lahko poskušali olajšati izvrševanje kaznivih dejanj z izkoriščanjem prostega pretoka kapitala in svobode zagotavljanja finančnih storitev, ki ju zajema integrirano finančno območje Unije.
Therefore, certain coordinating measures are necessary at Union level.
Zato je treba na ravni Unije sprejeti nekatere usklajevalne ukrepe.
At the same time, the objectives of protecting society from crime and protecting the stability and integrity of the Union's financial system should be balanced against the need to create a regulatory environment that allows companies to grow their businesses without incurring disproportionate compliance costs.
Obenem bi bilo treba cilje za zaščito družbe pred kriminalom ter zaščite stabilnosti in integritete finančnega sistema Unije uravnotežiti s potrebo po oblikovanju regulativnega okolja, ki omogoča, da podjetja širijo svoje poslovanje in pri tem nimajo nesorazmernih stroškov zaradi zagotavljanja skladnosti s predpisi.
This Directive is the fourth directive to address the threat of money laundering.
Ta direktiva je že četrta direktiva, ki naslavlja nevarnost pranja denarja.
Council Directive 91/308/EEC [4] defined money laundering in terms of drugs offences and imposed obligations solely on the financial sector.
V Direktivi Sveta 91/308/EGS [4] je bilo pranje denarja opredeljeno v smislu nezakonitega trgovanja z mamili, obveznosti pa so bile naložene le finančnemu sektorju.
Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [5] extended the scope of Directive 91/308/EEC both in terms of the crimes covered and in terms of the range of professions and activities covered.
Z Direktivo 2001/97/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [5] je bilo razširjeno področje uporabe Direktive 91/308/EGS, kar zadeva kazniva dejanja ter kar zadeva poklice in dejavnosti.
In June 2003, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) revised its Recommendations to cover terrorist financing, and provided more detailed requirements in relation to customer identification and verification, the situations where a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing may justify enhanced measures and also the situations where a reduced risk may justify less rigorous controls.
Junija 2003 je Projektna skupina za finančno ukrepanje (v nadaljnjem besedilu: FATF) revidirala svoja priporočila, tako da je vanje zajela financiranje terorizma, in oblikovala podrobnejše zahteve v zvezi z identifikacijo in preverjanjem strank, primere, v katerih lahko večje tveganje pranja denarja ali financiranja terorizma upravičuje okrepljene ukrepe, ter primere, v katerih lahko manjše tveganje upravičuje manj strog nadzor.
Those changes were reflected in Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [6] and in Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [7].
Te spremembe so bile odražene v Direktivi 2005/60/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [6] ter v Direktivi Komisije 2006/70/ES [7].
Money laundering and terrorist financing are frequently carried out in an international context.
Pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma se pogosto izvajata v mednarodnem okviru.
Measures adopted solely at national or even at Union level, without taking into account international coordination and cooperation, would have very limited effect.
Ukrepi, sprejeti izključno na nacionalni ravni ali na ravni Unije, brez upoštevanja mednarodnega usklajevanja in sodelovanja, bi imeli zelo omejene učinke.
The measures adopted by the Union in that field should therefore be compatible with, and at least as stringent as, other actions undertaken in international fora.
Ukrepi, ki jih Unija sprejme na tem področju, bi morali biti zato združljivi z drugimi ukrepi, sprejetimi na mednarodnih forumih, in vsaj tako strogi.
Union action should continue to take particular account of the FATF Recommendations and instruments of other international bodies active in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
Pri ukrepih Unije bi bilo treba še naprej upoštevati zlasti priporočila FATF in instrumente drugih mednarodnih organov, dejavnih na področju boja proti pranju denarja in financiranju terorizma.
With a view to reinforcing the efficacy of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, the relevant Union legal acts should, where appropriate, be aligned with the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation adopted by the FATF in February 2012 (the ‘revised FATF Recommendations’).
Zaradi večje učinkovitosti boja proti pranju denarja in financiranju terorizma bi bilo treba relevantne pravne akte Unije, kadar je to ustrezno, uskladiti z Mednarodnimi standardi za boj proti pranju denarja ter financiranju terorizma in širjenju orožja, ki jih je FATF sprejela februarja 2012 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: revidirana priporočila FATF).
Furthermore, the misuse of the financial system to channel illicit or even lawful money into terrorist purposes poses a clear risk to the integrity, proper functioning, reputation and stability of the financial system.
Poleg tega zloraba finančnega sistema za preusmerjanje nezakonitega ali celo zakonitega denarja v namene terorizma jasno ogroža integriteto, pravilno delovanje, ugled in stabilnost finančnega sistema.
Accordingly, the preventive measures laid down in this Directive should address the manipulation of money derived from serious crime and the collection of money or property for terrorist purposes.
Zato bi morali preventivni ukrepi, določeni v tej direktivi, naslavljati manipuliranje z denarjem, pridobljenim s hudim kaznivim dejanjem, in zbiranje denarnih sredstev ali premoženja za namene terorizma.
The use of large cash payments is highly vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing.
Višji zneski pri plačilih v gotovini predstavljajo visoko tveganje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma.
In order to increase vigilance and mitigate the risks posed by such cash payments, persons trading in goods should be covered by this Directive to the extent that they make or receive cash payments of EUR 10000 or more.
Za boljši nadzor in manjša tveganja, ki jih prinašajo takšna plačila v gotovini, bi morale biti osebe, ki trgujejo z blagom, zajete s to direktivo, kolikor opravljajo ali prejemajo plačila v gotovini v višini 10000 EUR ali več.
Member States should be able to adopt lower thresholds, additional general limitations to the use of cash and further stricter provisions.
Države članice bi morale imeti možnost sprejeti nižje mejne vrednosti, dodatne splošne omejitve uporabe gotovine in druge strožje določbe.
The use of electronic money products is increasingly considered to be a substitute for bank accounts, which, in addition to the measures laid down in Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [8], justifies subjecting those products to anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations.
Proizvodi elektronskega denarja se vse pogosteje uporabljajo kot nadomestek za bančne račune, kar poleg ukrepov, določenih v Direktivi 2009/110/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [8], opravičuje, da so ti proizvodi podvrženi obveznostim preprečevanja pranja denarja in boja proti financiranju terorizma (AML/CFT).
However, in certain proven low-risk circumstances and under strict risk-mitigating conditions, Member States should be allowed to exempt electronic money products from certain customer due diligence measures, such as the identification and verification of the customer and of the beneficial owner, but not from the monitoring of transactions or of business relationships.
Vendar pa bi državam članicam v določenih dokazanih okoliščinah z nizkim tveganjem in pod strogimi pogoji za blažitve tveganja moralo biti dovoljeno, da proizvode elektronskega denarja izvzamejo iz določenih ukrepov skrbnega preverjanja strank, kot sta identifikacija in preverjanje stranke ter dejanskega lastnika, ne pa tudi iz spremljanja transakcij ali poslovnih odnosov.
The risk-mitigating conditions should include a requirement that exempt electronic money products be used exclusively for purchasing goods or services, and that the amount stored electronically be low enough to preclude circumvention of the AML/CFT rules.
Pogoji za blažitev tveganja bi morali vključevati zahtevo, da se izvzeti proizvodi elektronskega denarja uporabljajo izključno za nakup blaga ali storitev in da je elektronsko shranjeni znesek dovolj nizek, da izključuje izogibanje pravilom AML/CFT.
Such an exemption should be without prejudice to the discretion given to Member States to allow obliged entities to apply simplified customer due diligence measures to other electronic money products posing lower risks, in accordance with Article 15.
Takšno izvzetje ne bi smelo posegati v diskrecijsko pravico držav članic, da pooblaščenim subjektom omogočijo, da v skladu s členom 15 za druge proizvode elektronskega denarja, ki predstavljajo manjša tveganja, uporabljajo poenostavljene ukrepe skrbnega preverjanja strank.
As concerns the obliged entities which are subject to this Directive, estate agents could be understood to include letting agents, where applicable.
Kar zadeva pooblaščene subjekte za katere velja ta direktiva, se za pojem „nepremičninski zastopniki“ lahko šteje, da po potrebi vključuje posrednike pri najemu.
Legal professionals, as defined by the Member States, should be subject to this Directive when participating in financial or corporate transactions, including when providing tax advice, where there is the greatest risk of the services of those legal professionals being misused for the purpose of laundering the proceeds of criminal activity or for the purpose of terrorist financing.
Za pravne strokovnjake, kot jih opredeljujejo države članice, bi morala ta direktiva veljati, kadar so vključeni v finančne ali poslovne transakcije, vključno z davčnim svetovanjem, ki predstavljajo največje tveganje za zlorabo storitev teh pravnih strokovnjakov z namenom pranja premoženjske koristi, pridobljene s kaznivimi dejanji, ali financiranja terorizma.
There should, however, be exemptions from any obligation to report information obtained before, during or after judicial proceedings, or in the course of ascertaining the legal position of a client.
Vendar bi bilo treba dovoliti izvzetje od obveznosti sporočanja informacij, pridobljenih pred končanim sodnim postopkom, med njim ali po njem ali med ugotavljanjem pravnega položaja stranke.
Therefore, legal advice should remain subject to the obligation of professional secrecy, except where the legal professional is taking part in money laundering or terrorist financing, the legal advice is provided for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, or the legal professional knows that the client is seeking legal advice for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing.
Za pravno svetovanje bi morala zato še vedno veljati obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti, razen kadar je pravni strokovnjak udeležen pri pranju denarja ali financiranju terorizma, če je pravno svetovanje dano za namene pranja denarja ali financiranja terorizma ali pa pravni strokovnjak ve, da stranka išče pravno svetovanje za namene pranja denarja ali financiranja terorizma.
Directly comparable services should be treated in the same manner when provided by any of the professionals covered by this Directive.
Neposredno primerljive storitve bi bilo treba obravnavati enako ne glede na to, kateri strokovnjaki, ki so zajeti s to direktivo, jih izvajajo.
In order to ensure respect for the rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), in the case of auditors, external accountants and tax advisors, who, in some Member States, are entitled to defend or represent a client in the context of judicial proceedings or to ascertain a client's legal position, the information they obtain in the performance of those tasks should not be subject to the reporting obligations laid down in this Directive.
Da bi se zagotovilo spoštovanje pravic, zajamčenih v Listini Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Listina), v primeru revizorjev, zunanjih računovodij in davčnih svetovalcev, ki imajo v nekaterih državah članicah pravico braniti ali zastopati stranko v sodnem postopku ali ugotavljati njen pravni položaj, za informacije, ki jih pridobijo pri opravljanju navedenih nalog, ne bi smele veljati obveznosti poročanja, določene v tej direktivi.
It is important expressly to highlight that ‘tax crimes’ relating to direct and indirect taxes are included in the broad definition of ‘criminal activity’ in this Directive, in line with the revised FATF Recommendations.
Pomembno je izrecno poudariti, da so „davčna kazniva dejanja“, povezana z neposrednimi in posrednimi davki, vključena v široko opredelitev pojma „kaznivo dejanje“ iz te direktive v skladu z revidiranimi priporočili FATF.
Given that different tax offences may be designated in each Member State as constituting ‘criminal activity’ punishable by means of the sanctions as referred to in point (4)(f) of Article 3 of this Directive, national law definitions of tax crimes may diverge.
Glede na to, da so lahko v posamezni državi članici različne davčne kršitve opredeljene kot „kaznivo dejanje“, ki se kaznuje s sankcijami iz točke 4(f) člena 3 te direktive, se lahko opredelitve davčnih kaznivih dejanj v nacionalnem pravu razlikujejo.
While no harmonisation of the definitions of tax crimes in Member States' national law is sought, Member States should allow, to the greatest extent possible under their national law, the exchange of information or the provision of assistance between EU Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).
Čeprav prizadevanja niso usmerjena v harmonizacijo opredelitev davčnih kaznivih dejanj v nacionalnem pravu držav članic, bi države članice morale v največji možni meri, ki jo nacionalno pravo še dovoljuje, omogočati izmenjavo informacij oziroma pomoč med finančnimi obveščevalnimi enotami EU (FIU).
There is a need to identify any natural person who exercises ownership or control over a legal entity.
Identificirati je treba vsako fizično osebo, ki ima v lasti pravni subjekt ali ga nadzoruje.
In order to ensure effective transparency, Member States should ensure that the widest possible range of legal entities incorporated or created by any other mechanism in their territory is covered.
Države članice bi morale zaradi zagotovitve dejanske preglednosti poskrbeti, da zajamejo čim širši krog pravnih subjektov, registriranih ali ustanovljenih v okviru katerega koli drugega mehanizma na njihovem ozemlju.
While finding a specified percentage shareholding or ownership interest does not automatically result in finding the beneficial owner, it should be one evidential factor among others to be taken into account.
Čeprav ugotovitev določenega odstotka imetništva delnic ali lastniškega deleža ne prispeva samodejno k ugotovitvi dejanskega lastnika, bi to moral biti eden od dokaznih dejavnikov, ki ga je treba upoštevati.
Member States should be able, however, to decide that a lower percentage may be an indication of ownership or control.
Državam članicam pa bi moralo biti omogočeno, da se odločijo, da že nižji odstotek nakazuje lastništvo ali nadzor.
Identification and verification of beneficial owners should, where relevant, extend to legal entities that own other legal entities, and obliged entities should look for the natural person(s) who ultimately exercises control through ownership or through other means of the legal entity that is the customer.
Kadar je to ustrezno, bi bilo treba identifikacijo in preverjanje dejanskih lastnikov razširiti na pravne subjekte, ki imajo v lasti druge pravne subjekte, pooblaščeni subjekti pa bi morali poiskati fizično osebo oziroma osebe, ki prek lastništva ali na druge načine končno nadzorujejo pravni subjekt, ki je stranka.
Control through other means may, inter alia, include the criteria of control used for the purpose of preparing consolidated financial statements, such as through a shareholders' agreement, the exercise of dominant influence or the power to appoint senior management.
Nadzor na druge načine lahko med drugim vključuje merila nadzora, ki se uporabljajo za pripravo konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazov, denimo prek delničarskega sporazuma, izvajanja prevladujočega vpliva ali pristojnosti za imenovanje višjega vodstva.
There may be cases where no natural person is identifiable who ultimately owns or exerts control over a legal entity.
Lahko se zgodi, da ni mogoče identificirati nobene fizične osebe, ki končno poseduje ali nadzoruje pravni subjekt.
In such exceptional cases, obliged entities, having exhausted all other means of identification, and provided there are no grounds for suspicion, may consider the senior managing official(s) to be the beneficial owner(s).
Če ni razlogov za sum, lahko v takšnih izjemnih primerih pooblaščeni subjekti, potem ko so izčrpali vse druge načine identifikacije, štejejo višje vodstvo kot dejanskega lastnika oziroma lastnike.
The need for accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial owner is a key factor in tracing criminals who might otherwise hide their identity behind a corporate structure.
Potreba po natančnih in posodobljenih informacijah o dejanskem lastniku je eden ključnih dejavnikov pri iskanju storilcev kaznivih dejanj, ki bi svojo identiteto sicer lahko skrili za poslovno strukturo.
Member States should therefore ensure that entities incorporated within their territory in accordance with national law obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information on their beneficial ownership, in addition to basic information such as the company name and address and proof of incorporation and legal ownership.
Države članice bi zato morale zagotoviti, da subjekti, ustanovljeni na njihovem teritoriju v skladu z nacionalnim pravom, pridobijo in hranijo ustrezne, natančne in aktualne informacije o svojem dejanskem lastništvu, poleg osnovnih informacij, kot so ime in naslov družbe ter dokaz o registraciji in pravnem lastništvu.
With a view to enhancing transparency in order to combat the misuse of legal entities, Member States should ensure that beneficial ownership information is stored in a central register located outside the company, in full compliance with Union law.
Zaradi večje preglednosti bi morale države članice, kot ukrep proti zlorabam pravnih oseb, zagotoviti, da se informacije o dejanskem lastništvu ob doslednem spoštovanju prava Unije hranijo v osrednjem registru, ki se nahaja zunaj družbe.
Member States can, for that purpose, use a central database which collects beneficial ownership information, or the business register, or another central register.
Države članice lahko v ta namen uporabljajo osrednjo zbirko podatkov za zbiranje informacij o dejanskem lastništvu ali poslovni register ali kateri koli drug osrednji register.
Member States may decide that obliged entities are responsible for filling in the register.
Države članice lahko odločijo, da so za vnašanje podatkov v register odgovorni pooblaščeni subjekti.
Member States should make sure that in all cases that information is made available to competent authorities and FIUs and is provided to obliged entities when the latter take customer due diligence measures.
Države članice bi morale zagotoviti, da so te informacije v vseh primerih na voljo pristojnim organom in FIU ter posredovane pooblaščenim subjektom, ko ti izvajajo ukrepe skrbnega preverjanja strank.
Member States should also ensure that other persons who are able to demonstrate a legitimate interest with respect to money laundering, terrorist financing, and the associated predicate offences, such as corruption, tax crimes and fraud, are granted access to beneficial ownership information, in accordance with data protection rules.
Države članice bi morale tudi zagotoviti, da je v skladu s predpisi o varstvu podatkov dostop do informacij o dejanskem lastništvu odobren tudi drugim osebam, ki lahko izkažejo upravičen interes v zvezi s pranjem denarja, financiranjem terorizma in povezanimi predhodnimi kaznivimi dejanji, kot so korupcija, davčna kazniva dejanja in goljufije.
The persons who are able to demonstrate a legitimate interest should have access to information on the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held consisting of its approximate weight.
Osebe, ki lahko izkažejo upravičen interes, bi morale imeti dostop do informacij o vrsti in višini deležev v lasti upravičencev, in sicer o njihovi približni vrednosti.
For that purpose, Member States should be able, under national law, to allow for access that is wider than the access provided for under this Directive.
V ta namen bi morale države članice z nacionalnim pravom omogočiti širši dostop, kot je določen s to direktivo.