natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It would enable these judges to take up their function while using the vacancies for which the previous legislature of the Sejm had already lawfully nominated three judges.
Zavrnitev vlade, da objavi sodbo ustavnega sodišča z 9. marca 2016, vzbuja resne pomisleke v zvezi s pravno državo, saj je spoštovanje pravnomočnih sodb bistvena zahteva v okviru načela pravne države.
These provisions are therefore contrary to the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015 and the opinion of the Venice Commission.
Če je objava sodbe predpogoj za njen začetek veljavnosti in če je taka objava dolžnost državnega organa, ki ni sodišče, ki je izreklo sodbo, je naknadni nadzor zakonitosti sodbe s strani tega državnega organa v nasprotju z načelom pravne države.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the Polish authorities should respect and fully implement the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015.
Zavrnitev objave sodbe pomeni nepriznavanje samodejnega pravnega in operativnega učinka zavezujoče in pravnomočne sodbe ter kršitev načel zakonitosti in delitve oblasti.
These judgments require that the State institutions cooperate loyally in order to ensure, in accordance with the rule of law, that the three judges that were nominated by the previous legislature can take up their function of judge in the Constitutional Tribunal, and that the three judges nominated by the new legislature without a valid legal basis do not take up the post of judge without being validly elected.
Zavrnitev objave sodbe z 9. marca ustvarja negotovost in polemike, ki bodo negativno vplivale ne le na navedeno sodbo, ampak tudi na vse nadaljnje in prihodnje sodbe sodišča.
The relevant provisions of the law adopted on 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal are contrary to the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015 and to the opinion of the Venice Commission and raise serious concerns in respect of the rule of law.
Ker so sodbe po sodbi z 9. marca 2016 razglašene v skladu s pravili, ki so se uporabljala pred 22. decembrom 2015, bo tveganje stalnih polemik glede vsake prihodnje sodbe oviralo pravilno delovanje poljskega ustavnega sodišča.
LACK OF PUBLICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL JUDGMENT OF 9 MARCH 2016 AND OF THE JUDGMENTS RENDERED SINCE 9 MARCH 2016
To tveganje že postaja resničnost, saj je ustavno sodišče od sodbe z 9. marca 2016 do zdaj izreklo 20 sodb, od katerih nobena ni bila objavljena v Uradnem listu.
On 22 December 2015, following an accelerated procedure, the Sejm amended the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal [24].
Komisija ugotavlja, da novi zakon o ustavnem sodišču z 22. julija 2016 navedenih pomislekov ne odpravlja.
The amendments are set out in more detail below in section 4.1.
Člen 80(4) zakona zahteva, da predsednik ustavnega sodišča pri predsedniku vlade „predloži vlogo“ za objavo sodb.
In its judgment of 9 March 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal declared unconstitutional the law adopted on 22 December 2015 in its entirety as well as specific provisions thereof.
Poleg tega člen 89 določa, da „se sodbe Sodišča, izrečene pred 20. julijem 2016 po postopku, ki ni skladen z zakonom o ustavnem sodišču s 25. junija 2015, objavijo v roku 30 dni od začetka veljavnosti [tega] zakona, razen sodb glede normativnih aktov, ki so bili razveljavljeni“.
So far the Polish authorities have failed to publish the judgment in the Official Journal.
Ta določba vzbuja pomisleke, saj objava sodb ne bi smela biti odvisna od odločitve zakonodajalca.
The Polish Government contests the legality of the judgment, as the Constitutional Tribunal did not apply the procedure foreseen by the law adopted on 22 December 2015.
Poleg tega je namigovanje, da so bile sodbe izrečene nezakonito, v nasprotju z načelom delitve oblasti, saj ugotavljanje skladnosti z ustavo ni naloga Sejma.
The same position is taken by the Government towards the judgments rendered by the Tribunal after 9 March 2016.
Ta določba je tudi v nasprotju s sodbo z 9. marca 2016 in ugotovitvami Beneške komisije.
The Commission considers that the judgment of 9 March 2016 is binding and must be respected.
Dejstvo, da je poljska vlada doslej zavračala objavo sodbe ustavnega sodišča z 9. marca 2016 ter vseh poznejših sodb v Uradnem listu, ustvarja negotovost glede pravne podlage za delovanje sodišča in glede pravnih učinkov njegovih sodb.
The Constitutional Tribunal was correct not to apply the procedure foreseen by the law adopted on 22 December 2015.
Ta negotovost ogroža učinkovitost ustavnega pregleda in vzbuja resne pomisleke glede pravne države.
In that respect the Commission agrees with the Venice Commission, which states on this point that ‘a simple legislative act, which threatens to disable constitutional control, must itself be evaluated for constitutionality before it can be applied by the Court. […] The very idea of the supremacy of the Constitution implies that such a law, which allegedly endangers constitutional justice, must be controlled — and if need be, annulled — by the Constitutional Tribunal before it enters into force’ [25].
Zakon z 22. julija 2016 teh pomislekov ne odpravlja.
This would have been contrary to the Polish Constitution which has tasked the Constitutional Tribunal with the role of ensuring constitutional review.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je Sejm 22. julija 2016 sprejel nov zakon o delovanju ustavnega sodišča, ki razveljavlja zakon o ustavnem sodišču s 25. junija 2015.
Similarly, the Tribunal could not have decided on the constitutionality of the qualified majority requirement while voting in accordance with the very requirement the constitutionality of which it was examining.
Ta zakon sledi zakonu z 22. decembra 2015, ki ga je ustavno sodišče razglasilo za protiustavnega.
The refusal of the Government to publish the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9 March 2016 raises serious concerns in regard of the rule of law, as compliance with final judgments is an essential requirement inherent in the rule of law.
Zato je treba oceniti, ali je ta zakon skladen z načeli pravne države, pri tem pa upoštevati njegov vpliv na učinkovitost ustavnega pregleda, tudi nedavno sprejetih zakonov, in ali torej predstavlja primeren ukrep za odpravo pomislekov glede spoštovanja načela pravne države, ki jih je Komisija navedla v svojem mnenju v zvezi z načelom pravne države s 1. junija.
In particular, where the publication of a judgment is a prerequisite for its taking effect and where such publication is incumbent on a State authority other than the court which has rendered the judgment, an ex post control by that State authority regarding the legality of the judgment is incompatible with the rule of law.
Zadevna zakonodaja in njen učinek sta podrobneje obravnavana v nadaljevanju, pri čemer se upošteva učinek določb tako posamično kot v kombinaciji ter predhodna sodna praksa ustavnega sodišča in mnenje Beneške komisije.
The refusal to publish the judgment denies the automatic legal and operational effect of a binding and final judgment, and breaches the principles of legality and separation of powers.
Sprememba zakona o ustavnem sodišču z 22. decembra 2015
The refusal to publish the judgment of 9 March creates a level of uncertainty and controversy which will adversely affect not only that judgment, but all subsequent and future judgments of the Tribunal.
22. decembra 2015 je Sejm po hitrem postopku spremenil zakon o ustavnem sodišču [26].
Since these judgments are, following the judgment of 9 March 2016, rendered in accordance with the rules applicable before 22 December 2015, the risk of a continuous controversy about every future judgment will undermine the proper functioning of constitutional justice in Poland.
Spremembe med drugim zadevajo povečanje kvoruma sodnikov za sklepčnost pri obravnavanju zadev [27], povečanje potrebne večine ustavnega sodišča za izrekanje sodb v polni sestavi senata [28], zahtevo po obravnavi zadev v časovnem zaporedju [29] in minimalni rok za začetek obravnav [30].
This risk is already a reality as the Tribunal has to date rendered 20 rulings since its ruling of 9 March 2016, and none of these rulings have been published in the Official Journal.
Nekatere spremembe [31] so povečale vključevanje drugih državnih institucij v disciplinske postopke proti sodnikom sodišča.
The Commission observes that the new law adopted on 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal does not remove the above concerns.
V sodbi z 9. marca 2016 je ustavno sodišče zakon z 22. decembra 2015 in njegove posebne določbe, zlasti tiste, navedene zgoraj, v celoti razglasilo za neustavne.
Article 80(4) of the Law requires an ‘application’ for publication of judgments from the President of the Constitutional Tribunal to the Prime Minister.
Poljski organi doslej te sodbe niso objavili v Uradnem listu (glej oddelek 3 zgoraj).
This seems to indicate that publication of judgments would be dependent on a decision of the Prime Minister.
Kot je navedeno v mnenju s 1. junija 2016, je Komisija zavzela stališče, da zlasti kombinirani učinek sprememb v zvezi s kvorumom za sklepčnost, glasovalno večino, obravnavanjem zadev v časovnem zaporedju in minimalnim rokom za začetek obravnav slabi učinkovitost ustavnega sodišča kot varuha ustave.
It therefore raises significant concerns regarding the independence of the Tribunal.
Tako stališče ima tudi Beneška komisija.
In addition, Article 89 stipulates that ‘In a period of 30 days from the entry into force of [this] Act the rulings of the Tribunal handed down before 20 July 2016 in a manner contrary to the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 25 June 2015 shall be published except for the rulings regarding normative acts that were repealed’.
Ker so te ugotovitve pomembne za oceno zakona z 22. julija 2016, so glavne točke navedene v nadaljevanju.
This provision gives rise to concern as the publication of the judgments should not depend on a decision of the legislator.
Kvorum za sklepčnost
In addition, the indication that the judgments have been rendered illegally is contrary to the principle of the separation of powers as it is not for the Sejm to determine compatibility with the Constitution.
Spremenjeni člen 44(3) navaja, da se „za razsojanje v polni sestavi senata zahteva udeležba najmanj 13 sodnikov sodišča“ [32].
Moreover, the provision is incompatible with the judgment of 9 March 2016 and the findings of the Venice Commission.
V skladu s spremenjenim členom 44(1) ustavno sodišče odloča v polni sestavi senata, razen če zakon ne določa drugače.
In conclusion, the fact that the Polish Government has so far refused to publish the judgment of 9 March 2016 of the Constitutional Tribunal, as well as all subsequent judgments, in the Official Journal creates uncertainty on the legal basis on which the Tribunal must act and on the legal effects of its judgments.
To velja zlasti za t. i. „abstraktne zadeve“ ustavnega pregleda na novo sprejetih zakonov.
This uncertainty undermines the effectiveness of constitutional review and raises serious concerns in respect of the rule of law.
Spremenjeni člen 44(1) določa tudi izjeme, zlasti za posamezne pritožbe ali zadeve, ki jih predložijo redna sodišča.
The law adopted on 22 July 2016 does not remove these concerns.
Prejšnja različica zakona je za odločitve v polni sestavi senata zahtevala prisotnost najmanj devetih sodnikov (člen 44(3), točka 3 zakona pred spremembo).
REVIEW OF THE LAW ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF NEW LEGISLATION
Komisija je menila, da kvorum za sklepčnost 13 od 15 sodnikov za polno sestavo senata (za „abstraktni“ ustavni pregled na novo sprejetih zakonov) pomeni resno oviro za postopek sprejemanja odločitev ustavnega sodišča, saj obstaja tveganje, da se njegovo delovanje blokira.
The Commission notes that on 22 July 2016 the Sejm adopted a new law relating to the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal, repealing the Law of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal.
Komisija je navedla, Beneška komisija pa potrdila, da je kvorum za sklepčnost 13 od 15 sodnikov neobičajno visok v primerjavi z zahtevami v drugih državah članicah.
This law follows the law adopted on 22 December 2015 which was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal.
Dejansko je povsem mogoče, da iz različnih razlogov ta kvorum za sklepčnost včasih ne bi bil dosežen, kar bi pomenilo, da sodišče vsaj začasno ne bi moglo razsojati.
It must therefore be assessed whether this law is compatible with the rule of law, taking into account its impact on the effectiveness of the constitutional review, including of recently adopted acts and therefore constitutes appropriate action to redress the rule of law concerns identified in the Commission's Rule of Law Opinion of 1 June.
Tak položaj bi nastal v sedanjih okoliščinah, saj ima sodišče trenutno samo 12 sodnikov.
The legislation concerned and its impact is considered in more detail below, taking into account the effect of the provisions both individually and collectively, as well as the previous case law of the Constitutional Tribunal and the opinion of the Venice Commission.
Glasovalna večina
Amendment of 22 December 2015 to the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal
V skladu s spremenjenim členom 99(1) razglasitev sodb ustavnega sodišča v polni sestavi senata (za „abstraktne zadeve“) zahteva dvotretjinsko večino prisotnih sodnikov.
On 22 December 2015, following an accelerated procedure, the Sejm amended the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal [26].
Glede na nov (višji) kvorum za sklepčnost (glej zgoraj) to pomeni, da mora sodbo odobriti najmanj devet sodnikov, če ustavno sodišče razsoja v polni sestavi senata [33].
The amendments, inter alia, increased the attendance quorum of judges for hearing cases [27], raised the majorities needed in the Constitutional Tribunal to hand down judgments by the full bench [28], required the handling of cases in chronological order [29] and provided a minimum delay for hearings [30].
Navadna večina glasov zadošča samo v primeru, da sodišče razsoja v senatu sedmih ali treh sodnikov (posamezne pritožbe in zahteve rednih sodišč za predhodno odločanje).
Certain amendments [31] increased the involvement of other institutions of the State in disciplinary proceedings concerning judges of the Tribunal.
Prejšnja različica zakona je za odločitve v polni sestavi senata zahtevala navadno večino glasov (člen 99(1) zakona pred spremembo).
In its judgment of 9 March 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal declared unconstitutional the law adopted on 22 December 2015 in its entirety as well as specific provisions thereof, in particular those referred to above.
Poleg višjega kvoruma za sklepčnost je dvotretjinska večina za sprejemanje odločitev (pri „abstraktnem“ ustavnem pregledu na novo sprejetih zakonov) bistveno povečala ovire za postopek sprejemanja odločitev ustavnega sodišča.
So far the Polish authorities have failed to publish the judgment in the Official Journal (see section 3 above).
Komisija je navedla, Beneška komisija pa potrdila, da je v veliki večini evropskih pravnih sistemov potrebna le navadna večina glasov.
As set out already in its Opinion of 1 June 2016, the Commission took the view that the effect of the amendments concerning the attendance quorum, the voting majority, the handling of cases in chronological order and the minimum delay for hearings, in particular their combined effect, undermined the effectiveness of the Constitutional Tribunal as a guarantor of the Constitution.
V vsakem primeru je ustavno sodišče ugotovilo, da poljska ustava zahteva glasovanje z navadno večino in da je zato zahteva po kvalificirani večini neustavna.
This conclusion is shared by the Venice Commission.
Obravnavanje zadev v časovnem zaporedju
As these findings are relevant for the assessment of the law adopted on 22 July 2016, the main conclusions are recalled hereunder.
V skladu s spremenjenim členom 80(2) [34] se datumi za obravnave ali seje brez navzočnosti javnosti, na katerih se obravnavajo vloge v abstraktnih zadevah ustavnega pregleda, „določijo v zaporedju, v katerem so bile zadeve predložene sodišču“.
Attendance quorum
Za to pravilo ni predvidenih izjem, v skladu s spremembo pa se pravilo uporablja za vse tekoče zadeve, za katere še ni bil določen datum obravnave [35].
The amended Article 44(3) stated that ‘Adjudicating in full bench shall require the participation of at least 13 judges of the Court’ [32].
Prejšnja različica zakona ni vsebovala takega pravila.
According to the amended Article 44(1) the Constitutional Tribunal shall rule by the full bench, unless otherwise specified by law.
„Pravilo zaporedja“, po katerem mora ustavno sodišče zadeve obravnavati v zaporedju, po katerem so bile registrirane, negativno vpliva na njegovo zmožnost hitrega odločanja o ustavnosti novih zakonov, zlasti glede na število odprtih zadev.
This applied in particular to what are described as ‘abstract cases’ of constitutional review of newly adopted laws.
Dejstvo, da ni mogoče upoštevati narave zadeve (zlasti, ko zadeva vprašanja o temeljnih pravicah), njene pomembnosti in konteksta, v katerem je predložena, bi ustavnemu sodišču lahko preprečilo izpolnjevanje zahteve po razumnem trajanju postopkov, kot je zapisana v členu 6 Evropske konvencije o človekovih pravicah in členu 47 Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah.
The amended Article 44(1) also provided for exceptions, notably for individual complaints or cases submitted by ordinary courts.
Kot je opozorila tudi Beneška komisija, bi pravilo zaporedja lahko sodišča odvrnilo, da predložijo zahteve za predhodno odločanje Sodišču, zlasti če je po prejemu predhodne odločbe potrebna obravnava.
The former version of the Law required, for a decision by the full bench, the presence of at least nine judges (Article 44(3), item 3 of the Law before the amendment).
Minimalni rok za začetek obravnav
The Commission considered that the attendance quorum of 13 out of 15 judges for the full bench (which deals with the ‘abstract’ constitutional review of newly adopted laws) represents a serious constraint on the decision-making process of the Constitutional Tribunal, with the risk of blocking it.
V skladu s spremenjenim členom 87(2) [36]„se obravnava ne sme začeti prej kot po treh mesecih od dneva, ko je bil datum obravnave sporočen udeležencem postopka, v zadevah, o katerih se razsoja v polni sestavi senata, pa šest mesecev po tem dnevu“.
The Commission noted, as confirmed by the Venice Commission, that an attendance quorum of 13 out of 15 judges is unusually high compared to requirements in other Member States.
V prejšnji različici zakona je bilo navedeno, da se obravnava ne sme začeti prej kot po 14 dneh od vročitve uradnega obvestila o datumu začetka udeležencem v postopku.
It is indeed entirely imaginable that for various reasons, such an attendance quorum might on occasion not be reached, which would then leave the Tribunal at least temporarily unable to adjudicate.
To vprašanje je treba obravnavati v povezavi z zahtevo glede načrtovanja obravnav.
In fact, such a situation would be present in the current circumstances, as the Tribunal has only 12 judges at this stage.
Minimalni rok za začetek obravnav (udeleženci v postopku morajo biti uradno obveščeni o začetku obravnave na ustavnem sodišču vsaj tri mesece (v pomembnih zadevah pa šest mesecev) pred datumom začetka obravnave) bi lahko upočasnil postopke.
Voting majority
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, dejstvo, da ni splošne določbe, ki bi ustavnemu sodišču v nujnih primerih omogočila skrajšanje teh rokov, ni v skladu z zahtevami po razumnem trajanju postopkov iz člena 6 Evropske konvencije o človekovih pravicah in člena 47 Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah.
According to the amended Article 99(1), judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal sitting as a full bench (for ‘abstract cases’) required a majority of two thirds of the judges sitting.
Disciplinski postopki
With a view to the new (higher) attendance quorum (see above) this meant that a judgment had to be approved by at least nine judges if the Constitutional Tribunal adjudicated as a full bench [33].
V skladu s spremenjenim členom 28a [37] se lahko „disciplinski postopki začnejo tudi na podlagi vloge predsednika Republike Poljske ali ministra za pravosodje, in sicer najpozneje tri tedne po datumu prejema vloge, razen če predsednik sodišča odloči, da je vloga neutemeljena“.
Only if the Tribunal adjudicated in a panel of seven or three judges (individual complaints and preliminary requests from ordinary courts), was a simple majority of votes required.
Poleg tega v skladu s spremenjenim členom 31a(1) zakona [38]„generalna skupščina v posebno hudih primerih Sejm zaprosi za odstavitev sodnika sodišča“.
The former version of the Law required, for a decision by the full bench, a simple majority of votes (Article 99(1) of the Law before the amendment).
Tak ukrep generalne skupščine bi se v skladu s spremenjenim členom 31a(2) lahko sprejel na podlagi vloge predsednika republike ali ministra za pravosodje, vendar bi o njem še vedno odločalo ustavno sodišče.
In addition to the increased attendance quorum, a two-thirds majority for adopting decisions (for ‘abstract’ constitutional review of newly adopted laws) significantly aggravated the constraints on the decision-making process of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Končno odločitev bi sprejel Sejm.
The Commission noted, as also confirmed by the Venice Commission, that in the vast majority of European legal systems, only a simple voting majority is required.
V skladu s prejšnjo različico zakona izvršilna oblast ni mogla uvesti disciplinskih postopkov, Sejm pa ni imel pristojnosti za odstavitev sodnika sodišča.
In any event, the Constitutional Tribunal found that the Polish Constitution required voting by simple majority, and that the requirement of a qualified majority was thus unconstitutional.
Samo ustavno sodišče je imelo pristojnost, da odstavi sodnika sodišča.
Handling of cases in chronological order
Komisija je z zaskrbljenostjo ugotovila, da so nekatere spremembe povečale vključevanje drugih državnih institucij v disciplinske postopke proti sodnikom sodišča.
According to amended Article 80(2) [34], the dates for hearings or proceedings in camera, where applications in abstract constitutional review proceedings were to be considered, ‘shall be established by order in which the cases are submitted to the Court’.
Zlasti sta predsednik republike ali minister za pravosodje dobila pristojnost, da začneta disciplinski postopek proti ustavnemu sodniku [39], v posebno hudih primerih pa je Sejm dobil pristojnost, da na podlagi zahteve s strani ustavnega sodišča sprejme končno odločitev o odstavitvi sodnika [40].
There were no exceptions foreseen to this rule and according to the amendment this rule applied to all pending cases for which no date for a hearing had been set yet [35].
Po mnenju Komisije dejstvo, da politični organ odloča o disciplinski sankciji na predlog ustavnega sodišča (in jo tako lahko zavrne), lahko predstavlja težavo glede neodvisnosti sodstva, saj je od parlamenta kot političnega organa mogoče pričakovati, da bo odločal na podlagi političnih meril.
The former version of the Law did not include such a rule.
Prav tako ni jasno, zakaj bi politične institucije, kot sta predsednik republike in minister za pravosodje, morale imeti pristojnosti za uvedbo disciplinskih postopkov.
The ‘sequence rule’ according to which the Constitutional Tribunal had to hear cases in the sequence in which they were registered negatively affected its capacity to render rapidly decisions on the constitutionality of new laws, in particular in view of the number of pending cases.
Tudi če bi ti postopki zahtevali odobritev sodišča ali njegovega predsednika, bi že dejstvo, da jih lahko začnejo politične institucije, lahko vplivalo na neodvisnost sodišča.