natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The impossibility to take into account the nature of a case (notably when involving fundamental rights issues), its importance and the context in which it is presented, could have prevented the Constitutional Tribunal from meeting the requirements for a reasonable length of proceedings as enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
To je vzbudilo pomisleke glede delitve oblasti in neodvisnosti ustavnega sodišča, saj bi Sejm lahko zavrnil predlog sodišča o odstavitvi sodnika.
As also noted by the Venice Commission, the sequencing rule could also have discouraged the putting of preliminary ruling questions to the Court of Justice, particularly if a hearing is required after the preliminary ruling has been received.
Zakon o ustavnem sodišču, sprejet 22. julija 2016
Minimum delay for hearings
Poleg določb v zvezi z imenovanjem sodnikov sodišča in objavo njegovih sodb (glej oddelka 2 in 3) zakon z 22. julija 2016 vsebuje tudi druge določbe o delovanju sodišča.
According to amended Article 87(2) [36], ‘[t]he hearing may not take place earlier than after three months from the day the notification on the date of the hearing has been delivered to the participants of the proceedings, and for cases adjudicated in full bench — after six months’.
Zakon se zgleduje po zakonu o ustavnem sodišču s 1. avgusta 1997, vendar dodaja nove določbe, med drugim o kvorumu za sklepčnost pri obravnavi zadev, večini, potrebni za izrekanje sodb ustavnega sodišča v polni sestavi senata, obravnavanju zadev v časovnem zaporedju, minimalnem roku za začetek obravnav, vlogi generalnega državnega tožilca, preložitvi posvetovanj, prehodnih določbah za odprte zadeve in obdobju vacatio legis.
The former version of the Law stated that the hearing cannot be held earlier than after 14 days from the delivery date of the notification of its date to participants of the proceedings.
Čeprav so bile opažene nekatere izboljšave v primerjavi z zakonom o spremembi z 22. decembra 2015 in so bili nekateri pomisleki odpravljeni, kot je navedeno v nadaljevanju, je Komisija mnenja, da številni pomisleki glede zakona z 22. decembra 2015 ostajajo in da je bilo uvedenih več novih določb, ki vzbujajo skrb.
Finally, this issue had to be seen in combination with the requirement concerning the scheduling of cases.
Na splošno učinki nekaterih določb zakona z 22. julija 2016, posamično ali v kombinaciji, vzbujajo zaskrbljenost glede učinkovitosti ustavnega pregleda in načela pravne države.
In particular the minimum delay for hearings (participants of the proceedings must be notified of a hearing before the Constitutional Tribunal at least 3 — and in important cases 6 — months before the date of the hearing) risked slowing down proceedings.
Člen 26(2) navaja, da je „za obravnavo zadev v polni sestavi senata potrebno sodelovanje najmanj enajstih sodnikov“.
As set out above, the absence of a general provision that would allow the Constitutional Tribunal to reduce these deadlines in urgent cases is incompatible with the requirements for a reasonable length of proceedings under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Poleg tega člen 26(1)(g) določa, da „Sodišče v polni sestavi senata odloča o zadevah, pri katerih trije sodniki to zahtevajo na podlagi vloge, ki jo predložijo v 14 dneh od prejema ustavne pritožbe ali vloge ali pravnega vprašanja iz člena 38(1)“.
Disciplinary proceedings
Člen 26(2) število sodnikov, zahtevanih za odločanje v polni sestavi senata, povečuje z devet (kot predvideva zakon o ustavnem sodišču iz leta 1997 in zakon s 25. junija 2015 pred spremembo z 22. decembra 2015) na enajst.
According to amended Article 28a [37], ‘[d]isciplinary proceedings may also be instituted further to an application from the President of the Republic of Poland or the Minister for Justice no later than three weeks after the date of receipt of the application, unless the President of the Court decides that the application is unfounded’.
To pomeni oviro za postopek sprejemanja odločitev ustavnega sodišča.
Furthermore, according to the amended Article 31a(1) of the Law [38] ‘[i]n particularly gross cases, the General Assembly shall apply to the Sejm to depose the judge of the Court’.
Število je bilo v primerjavi z zakonom o spremembi z 22. decembra 2015 (ki je predvideval 13 sodnikov) zmanjšano.
Such an action of the General Assembly could have been initiated by an application by the President of the Republic or the Minister of Justice pursuant to the amended Article 31a(2), although the Constitutional Tribunal remained free to decide.
Vendar se zlasti zato, ker ima ustavno sodišče trenutno le 12 sodnikov, včasih lahko zgodi, da kvorum za sklepčnost ne bo dosežen, kar bi pomenilo, da sodišče vsaj začasno ne bi moglo razsojati.
The final decision would have been taken by the Sejm.
Poleg tega v skladu s členom 26(1)(g) sodišče razsoja v polni sestavi senata med drugim v primerih, ko to na podlagi vloge zahtevajo trije sodniki.
According to the former version of the Law the Executive branch was not entitled to institute disciplinary proceedings and the Sejm was not granted the power to depose a judge of the Court.
Pri tem ni nujno, da so to sodniki, ki so v določeni zadevi imenovani v senat.
The Constitutional Tribunal itself had the power to depose of a judge of the Tribunal.
Zakonodaja ne določa, da mora njihova vloga vsebovati utemeljitev ali da mora izpolnjevati posebne pogoje.
The Commission noted with concern the fact that certain amendments increased the involvement of other institutions of the State in disciplinary proceedings concerning judges of the Tribunal.
Taka določba omogoča, da se lahko pri nepredvidljivem številu zadev zahteva razsojanje v polni sestavi senata, kar bi lahko oviralo učinkovito delovanje sodišča in s tem učinkovitost ustavnega pregleda.
In particular, the President of the Republic or the Minister of Justice were given the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a Constitutional Tribunal judge [39] and, in particularly serious cases, the Sejm was given the power to take the final decision on the dismissal of a judge following a request to that effect by the Constitutional Tribunal [40].
Člen 38(3) določa, da se „datumi obravnav, na katerih se preučijo vloge, določijo v skladu z vrstnim redom, po katerem so bile zadeve predložene sodišču“.
The Commission considered that the fact that a political body decides on (and hence may refuse to impose) a disciplinary sanction as proposed by the Constitutional Tribunal may pose a problem regarding the independence of the judiciary, as the Parliament (as a political body) could be expected to decide on the basis of political considerations.
Člen 38(4) navaja omejeno število primerov, v katerih datum predložitve ni pomemben.
Similarly it was not clear why political institutions such as the President of the Republic and the Minister of Justice should have the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
Člen 38(5) določa, da „predsednik sodišča lahko določi datum začetka obravnave ne glede na zahtevo iz odstavka 3 [zgoraj] v primerih, kadar je to upravičeno zaradi zaščite državljanskih pravic in svoboščin, državne varnosti ali ustavnega reda.
Even if such proceedings required approval by the Tribunal or its President, already the fact that they could have been initiated by political institutions could have had an impact on the independence of the Tribunal.
Na zahtevo 5 sodnikov lahko predsednik sodišča še enkrat razmisli o svoji odločitvi v zvezi z določitvijo datuma obravnave.“
This raised concerns as regards the separation of powers and the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal as the proposal of the Tribunal to dismiss a judge could be rejected by the Sejm.
„Pravilo zaporedja“, v skladu s katerim mora sodišče zadeve obravnavati po vrstnem redu registracije vlog, je bilo uvedeno v zakonu o spremembi z 22. decembra 2015 in ga je sodišče med drugim že razglasilo za neskladnega z ustavo, saj posega v neodvisnost sodstva in njegovo ločenost od drugih vej oblasti.
Law adopted on 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal
V skladu s členom 38(3) pravilo zaporedja velja za „vloge“ in ne za „ustavne pritožbe“.
In addition to provisions on the appointment of judges of the Tribunal and the publication of its judgments (see sections 2 and 3), the law adopted on 22 July 2016 contains other provisions on the functioning of the Tribunal.
Tudi če pravilo zaporedja velja samo za vloge, bo vplivalo na sposobnost sodišča za hitro odločanje o ustavnosti zakonov na zahtevo institucionalnih akterjev.
The law is inspired by the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal of 1 August 1997 but adds new provisions, inter alia, on the attendance quorum of judges for hearing cases, the majorities needed in the Constitutional Tribunal to hand down judgments by the full bench, the handling of cases in chronological order, the minimum delay for hearings, the role of the Public Prosecutor-General, the postponement of deliberations, transitional provisions for pending cases and vacatio legis.
Člen 38(5) predvideva možnost, da predsednik ustavnega sodišča določi odstopanje od pravila zaporedja.
Article 26(2) states that ‘The examination of a case by the full Tribunal shall require the participation of at least eleven judges of the Tribunal’.
Kljub temu da zakon z 22. julija 2016 pomeni izboljšavo glede na zakon z 22. decembra 2015, vpliv pravila zaporedja na učinkovitost sodišča še vedno vzbuja nekatere pomisleke.
In addition, Article 26(1)(g) provides that ‘The Tribunal shall rule (…) in the full Tribunal on (…) cases in which three judges of the Tribunal submit an application to that effect within 14 days of receiving copies of a constitutional complaint or of an application or legal question referred to in Article 38(1)’.
Člen 61(1) določa, da „se obravnava ne sme začeti prej kot 30 dni po vročitvi obvestila o datumu začetka obravnave“.
Article 26(2) increases the number of judges required to participate in a full bench from nine (as under the 1997 Act on the Constitutional Tribunal and the Law of 25 June 2015 prior to its amendment of 22 December 2015) to 11.
Člen 61(3) določa, da „v primerih, ki zadevajo pravna vprašanja, ustavne pritožbe in spore o pristojnosti med osrednjimi ustavnimi organi države, predsednik sodišča lahko določi, da se rok iz odstavka 1 prepolovi, razen če pritožnik, sodišče, ki predloži pravno vprašanje, ali zadevni vložnik temu nasprotuje v sedmih dneh od vročitve odredbe predsednika sodišča“.
This represents a constraint on the decision-making process of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Dejstvo, da predsednik sodišča lahko določi, da se 30-dnevni rok prepolovi, je izboljšava glede na zakon z 22. decembra 2015, čeprav lahko pritožnik, sodišče, ki predloži pravno vprašanje, ali vložnik temu skrajšanju roka nasprotuje.
The number has been reduced compared to the 13 which was required by the amending Act of 22 December 2015.
Zakon z 22. julija 2016 ne predvideva vključevanja drugih državnih institucij v disciplinske postopke proti sodnikom sodišča.
However, in particular as the Constitutional Tribunal currently has only 12 judges to handle cases, the attendance quorum might on occasion not be reached, which would then leave the Tribunal at least temporarily unable to judicate.
To pomeni izboljšavo v primerjavi z zakonom z 22. decembra 2015, zato to vprašanje ne vzbuja več pomislekov.
In addition, according to Article 26(1)(g) the Tribunal adjudicates as a full bench, inter alia, in cases in which three judges file an application thereto.
Možnost generalnega državnega tožilca, da prepreči preučitev zadev
These judges do not have to be judges designated to an adjudicating bench in a given case.
Člen 61(6) določa, da „odsotnost generalnega državnega tožilca, ki je bil o obravnavi ustrezno obveščen, ali njegovega zastopnika z obravnave ne preprečuje preučitve zadeve, razen če zakon določa njegovo obvezno prisotnost na obravnavi“.
The Law does not provide that their application needs to be justified or meet any particular conditions.
Člen 30(5) določa, da „generalni državni tožilec ali njegov namestnik sodeluje pri zadevah, ki jih sodišče preučuje v polni sestavi“.
Such a provision permits for an unforeseeable number of cases to be considered by a full bench and could hamper the efficient functioning of the Tribunal and consequently the effectiveness of the constitutional review.
V praksi se zdi, da kombinacija členov 61(6) in 30(5) generalnemu državnemu tožilcu, ki je tudi minister za pravosodje, daje možnost, da odloži ali celo prepreči preučitev nekaterih zadev, vključno s tistimi, ki so obravnavane v polni sestavi, s tem, da se ne udeleži obravnave.
Article 69 provides: ‘Rulings shall be adopted by a simple majority of votes’.
To bi omogočilo neupravičeno poseganje v delovanje sodišča in bi ogrozilo neodvisnost sodstva ter načelo delitve oblasti.
This is an improvement as compared to the amending Act of 22 December 2015 in so far as it no longer contains the unconstitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority for adopting decisions and thus addresses this concern previously raised by the Commission.
Preložitev posvetovanja
Article 38(3) provides that ‘The dates of the hearings at which applications are examined shall be set in accordance with the order in which cases arrive at the Tribunal’.
Člen 68(5) določa, da „med posvetovanjem v polni sestavi vsaj štirje sodniki lahko nasprotujejo predlagani razsodbi, če menijo, da je zadeva posebej pomembna iz razlogov državne organizacije ali javnega reda in se ne strinjajo z besedilom razsodbe“.
Article 38(4) lists a limited number of cases in which the order in which an application arrives shall not be relevant.
Člen 68(6) določa, da„se v primeru nasprotovanja iz odstavka 5, posvetovanja preložijo za tri mesece in da ob nadaljnjem posvetovanju po izteku tega obdobja sodniki, ki so razsodbi nasprotovali, predstavijo skupni predlog razsodbe“.
Article 38(5) provides that ‘The President of the Tribunal may set the date for the hearing setting aside condition foreseen by paragraph 3 [above] in cases where it is justified by protection of the citizen's rights and freedoms, security of state or constitutional order.
Člen 68(7) določa, da „se v primeru, da med novim posvetovanjem iz odstavka 6 vsaj štirje sodniki znova nasprotujejo razsodbi, posvetovanja preložijo za nadaljnje tri mesece.
On an application from 5 judges the President of the Tribunal may consider again his decision to set the date for the hearing.’
Ob koncu tega obdobja se opravijo nova posvetovanja in glasovanje.“
The ‘sequence rule’ according to which the Tribunal must hear cases at which applications are considered in the sequence in which they have been registered was introduced in the amending Act of 22 December 2015 and has already been ruled by the Tribunal to be inconsistent, inter alia, with the Constitution, on the grounds that the said provision interferes with the judiciary's independence and its separateness from other branches of government.
Pri zadevah, ki se obravnavajo v polni sestavi, kar bi lahko pomenilo veliko število zadev (glej zgoraj), zakon z 22. julija 2016 omogoča, da vsaj štirje sodniki nasprotujejo osnutku razsodbe.
According to Article 38(3), the sequencing rule applies to ‘applications’ and does not relate to ‘constitutional complaints’.
To bi lahko vodilo k preložitvi posvetovanj o zadevi za najmanj tri mesece, v nekaterih primerih pa za šest mesecev po tem, ko sodišče začne s posvetovanjem.
Even if the sequencing rule applies only to applications, it will affect the capacity of the Tribunal to render rapidly decisions on the constitutionality of laws at the request of institutional actors.
Zakonodaja ne predvideva izjem za hitrejše obravnavanje nujnih zadev.
Article 38(5) does foresee a possibility for the President of the Constitutional Tribunal to derogate from the sequencing rule.
Učinek teh določb na učinkovitost ustavnega pregleda vzbuja pomisleke glede načela pravne države, saj ustavnemu sodišču preprečuje celovito zagotavljanje učinkovitega ustavnega pregleda ter učinkovitega in pravočasnega sodnega varstva v vseh zadevah.
However, this possibility is limited to specific cases and may give rise to delays, considering that five judges may file an application to reconsider the decision of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal to set the date for the hearing.
Prehodne določbe za odprte zadeve
Moreover, it is not clear whether the conditions would allow the President of the Tribunal to diverge from the sequencing rule in all cases requiring urgent decision.
Člen 83(1) določa: „Določbe tega zakona se uporabljajo za zadeve, ki so se začele, vendar ne končale pred začetkom veljavnosti tega zakona.“ V skladu s členom 83(2) „mora Sodišče zadeve iz odstavka 1 rešiti v enem letu od začetka veljavnosti tega zakona.
Therefore, even if the law adopted on 22 July 2016 constitutes an improvement over the law adopted on 22 December 2015, the impact of the sequencing rule on the effectiveness of the Tribunal still may give rise to certain concerns.
Ta rok ne velja za zadeve iz člena 84.“ Člen 84(1) določa: „Pri vlogah, ki jih oddajo subjekti iz pododstavkov 1 do 5 člena 191(1) Ustave in ki pred datumom začetka veljavnosti tega zakona še niso rešene, Sodišče […] prekine postopke za šest mesecev in vložnike pozove, da vloge dopolnijo v skladu z zahtevami iz člena 33(2) do (5).“ Člen 84(2) določa: „Če se vloga iz odstavka 1 dopolni v skladu z zahtevami člena 33(2) do (5), Sodišče odredi nadaljevanje prekinjenih postopkov po izteku roka iz odstavka 1.
Article 61(1) provides that ‘The hearing may not take place earlier than 30 days after notice of the date of the hearing is served.’
V nasprotnem primeru se postopek opusti.“
Article 61(3) provides that ‘In cases concerning legal questions, constitutional complaints and disputes on jurisdiction between central constitutional authorities of the state, the President of the Tribunal may order the time limit laid down in paragraph 1 to be halved, unless the complainant, court referring a legal question or applicant concerned expresses opposition within seven days of service of the President of the Tribunal's order’.
Člen 85(1) določa: „Če je bil datum obravnave določen pred začetkom veljavnosti tega zakona, se obravnava preloži, pristojni senat pa se prilagodi v skladu s tem zakonom.“ Člen 85(2) določa: „Določi se nov datum obravnave.
The fact that the President of the Tribunal may order to halve the period of 30 days is an improvement as compared to the law adopted on 22 December 2015, even if the complainant, the court referring a legal question or the applicant can object to the shortening of the period.
Obravnava poteka v skladu s tem zakonom.“ Člen 86 določa: „Če je bil datum objave sodbe določen pred začetkom veljavnosti tega zakona, se objava preloži, pristojni senat in zahteve glede sodbe pa se prilagodijo v skladu s tem zakonom.“
The law adopted on 22 July 2016 does not provide for the involvement of other institutions of the State in disciplinary proceedings concerning judges of the Tribunal.
Po eni strani člen 83(2) za obravnavanje odprtih zadev določa enoletni rok od datuma začetka veljavnosti zakona.
This is an improvement as compared to the law adopted on 22 December 2015 and therefore this matter no longer raises concerns.
Po drugi strani pa člen 84 določa, da se z odstopanjem od člena 83(2) odprte vloge (tj. vloge institucionalnih akterjev za ustavni pregled zakonodaje) zamrznejo za šest mesecev.
Possibility of Public Prosecutor-General to prevent examination of cases
Sodišče bi moralo od vložnikov zahtevati dopolnitev vlog, da bi se zagotovila skladnost z novimi postopkovnimi zahtevami, in bi z delom na podlagi teh vlog lahko začelo šele po šestih mesecih (tudi če bi bile vloge dopolnjene prej).
Article 61(6) provides that ‘Absence from the hearing of the Public Prosecutor-General, who has been properly notified thereof, or his/her representative shall not prevent examination of the case unless the obligation to participate in the hearing results from the provisions of the Act.’
Zakonodaja ne predvideva izjem za hitrejše obravnavanje nujnih zadev.
Article 30(5) provides that ‘The Public Prosecutor-General or his/her deputy shall participate in cases examined by the Tribunal sitting in full bench’.
Člena 85 in 86 pomenita zakonodajni poseg v odprte zadeve, zlasti tiste, ki so že v poznejši fazi, in bi lahko ohromila delovanje sodišča.
In practice, the combination of Articles 61(6) and 30(5) would appear to give a possibility to the Public Prosecutor-General, who is also the Minister of Justice, to delay or even to prevent the examination of certain cases, including cases handled by the full bench, by deciding not to participate at the hearing.
Kombiniran učinek teh prehodnih določb vzbuja velike pomisleke, saj bodo bistveno upočasnile delo sodišča in mu preprečile celovito zagotavljanje učinkovitega ustavnega pregleda.
This would allow for an undue interference with the functioning of the Tribunal and would violate the independence of the judiciary and the principle of the separation of powers.
To je zlasti pomembno glede na vse nove občutljive zakonodajne akte, kot je navedeno v mnenju Komisije (glej v nadaljevanju oddelek 4.3).
Postponement of deliberation
Člen 92 zakona z 22. julija 2016 določa, da „ta zakon začne veljati 14 dni po njegovi objavi“.
Article 68(5) provides that ‘During deliberations of the full Tribunal, at least four judges may object to the proposed settlement if they consider that the matter is particularly important for State organisational reasons or reasons of public order and they do not agree with the tenor of the settlement.’
Obdobje vacatio legis 14 dni je prekratko za učinkovit ustavni pregled zakona, razen če se ne uporabi preventivni ustavni pregled.
Article 68(6) provides that ‘In the event of an objection under paragraph 5, the deliberations shall be postponed for three months and, at the subsequent deliberations after the end of that period, the judges that made the objection shall present their joint proposed settlement.’
Zaradi pravne varnosti je pomembno zagotoviti dovolj časa, da se ustavnemu sodišču omogoči ustavni pregled zakona pred začetkom njegove veljavnosti.
Article 68(7) stipulates that ‘If, during the new deliberations referred to in paragraph 6, at least four judges again object, the deliberations shall be postponed by a further three months.
S tem v zvezi je treba opozoriti, da je Beneška komisija v mnenju z 11. marca 2016 poudarila, da mora imeti ustavno sodišče možnost pregleda splošnih zakonov, ki urejajo delovanje sodišča, preden ti začnejo veljati.
At the end of that period, new deliberations and voting shall take place.’
Posledice neučinkovitega ustavnega pregleda nove zakonodaje
For cases examined by a full bench, which could imply a large number of cases (see above) the law adopted on 22 July 2016 allows at least four judges of the Tribunal to raise an objection to a draft determination.
Sejm je, pogosto po hitrem zakonodajnem postopku, sprejel več zelo občutljivih novih zakonodajnih aktov, zlasti na primer zakon o medijih [41], novi zakon o javni upravi [42], zakon o spremembi zakona o policiji in nekaterih drugih zakonov [43], zakona o javnem tožilstvu [44] ter novi zakon o varuhu človekovih pravic in spremembi nekaterih drugih zakonov [45].
This could lead to the postponement of deliberations on a case for at least 3 months and in some instances for 6 months following the moment the Tribunal reaches the stage of deliberation.
Komisija je v dopisih s 1. februarja 2016 in 3. marca 2016 poljsko vlado zaprosila za informacije o stanju in vsebini teh zakonodajnih reform, vendar doslej teh informacij še ni prejela.
The Law does not provide for an exception to deal with urgent cases more rapidly.
Poleg tega je Sejm sprejel še več drugih občutljivih osnutkov zakonodajnih aktov, kot sta zakon o državnem svetu za medije [46] in novi protiteroristični zakon [47].