natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Timely access to information on beneficial ownership should be ensured in ways which avoid any risk of tipping off the company concerned.
Pravočasen dostop do informacij o dejanskem lastništvu bi bilo treba zagotoviti tako, da bi se izognili vsakršnemu tveganju obveščanja zadevne družbe.
In order to ensure a level playing field among the different types of legal forms, trustees should also be required to obtain, hold and provide beneficial ownership information to obliged entities taking customer due diligence measures and to communicate that information to a central register or a central database and they should disclose their status to obliged entities.
Za zagotovitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev za različne pravne oblike bi morali biti skrbniki poleg tega dolžni pridobiti, imeti na voljo in pooblaščenim subjektom, ki sprejemajo ukrepe skrbnega preverjanja strank, zagotoviti informacije o dejanskem lastništvu ter te informacije posredovati osrednjemu registru ali osrednji zbirki podatkov, pooblaščenim subjektom pa bi morali razkriti svoj status.
Legal entities such as foundations and legal arrangements similar to trusts should be subject to equivalent requirements.
Enake zahteve bi morale veljati za pravne subjekte, kot so fundacije, in pravne ureditve, podobne skladom.
This Directive should also apply to activities of obliged entities which are performed on the internet.
Ta direktiva bi se morala uporabljati tudi za dejavnosti pooblaščenih subjektov, ki se opravljajo prek spleta.
New technologies provide time-effective and cost-effective solutions to businesses and to customers and should therefore be taken into account when evaluating risk.
Nove tehnologije podjetjem in strankam zagotavljajo časovno in stroškovno učinkovite rešitve, zato bi jih bilo treba upoštevati pri ocenjevanju tveganj.
The competent authorities and obliged entities should be proactive in combating new and innovative ways of money laundering.
Pristojni organi in pooblaščeni subjekti bi morali biti proaktivni v boju proti novim in inovativnim metodam pranja denarja.
The representatives of the Union in the governing bodies of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are encouraged to implement this Directive and to publish on its website AML/CFT policies, containing detailed procedures that would give effect to this Directive.
Predstavnike Unije v upravljavskih organih Evropske banke za obnovo in razvoj se spodbuja, da izvajajo to direktivo in da na njenem spletnem mestu objavijo politike AML/CFT, ki vsebujejo podrobne postopke za uveljavljanje te direktive.
The use of gambling sector services to launder the proceeds of criminal activity is of concern.
Uporaba storitev sektorja iger na srečo za pranje premoženjske koristi, pridobljene s kaznivimi dejanji, je skrb vzbujajoča.
In order to mitigate the risks relating to gambling services, this Directive should provide for an obligation for providers of gambling services posing higher risks to apply customer due diligence measures for single transactions amounting to EUR 2000 or more.
Za blažitev tveganj, povezanih s storitvami iger na srečo, bi morala ta direktiva zagotoviti obveznost, da se za ponudnike storitev iger na srečo, ki prinašajo večja tveganja, uporabijo ukrepi skrbnega preverjanja strank za posamezne transakcije, ki znašajo 2000 EUR ali več.
Member States should ensure that obliged entities apply the same threshold to the collection of winnings, wagering a stake, including by the purchase and exchange of gambling chips, or both.
Države članice bi morale zagotoviti, da pooblaščeni subjekti uporabijo enake mejne vrednosti pri izplačilu dobitkov, vplačilu stav, tudi z nakupom ali zamenjavo igralnih žetonov, ali obojega.
Providers of gambling services with physical premises, such as casinos and gaming houses, should ensure that customer due diligence, if it is taken at the point of entry to the premises, can be linked to the transactions conducted by the customer on those premises.
Ponudniki storitev iger na srečo s fizičnimi prostori, kot so igralnice, bi morali zagotoviti, da je morebitno skrbno preverjanje strank na točki vstopa v prostore mogoče povezati s transakcijami, ki jih stranka opravi v teh prostorih.
However, in proven low-risk circumstances, Member States should be allowed to exempt certain gambling services from some or all of the requirements laid down in this Directive.
Vendar pa bi državam članicam v dokazanih okoliščinah z nizkim tveganjem moralo biti dovoljeno, da določene storitve iger na srečo izvzamejo iz nekaterih ali vseh zahtev, določenih v tej direktivi.
The use of an exemption by a Member State should be considered only in strictly limited and justified circumstances, and where the risks of money laundering or terrorist financing are low.
Država članica bi lahko izvzetje uporabila le v strogo omejenih in utemeljenih okoliščinah ter takrat, kadar so tveganja pranja denarja ali financiranja terorizma nizka.
Such exemptions should be subject to a specific risk assessment which also considers the degree of vulnerability of the applicable transactions.
Za takšna izvzetja bi bilo treba opraviti specifično oceno tveganja, ki obravnava tudi stopnjo ranljivosti zadevnih transakcij.
They should be notified to the Commission.
O izvzetjih se uradno obvesti Komisijo.
In the risk assessment, Member States should indicate how they have taken into account any relevant findings in the reports issued by the Commission in the framework of the supranational risk assessment.
Države člane bi morale v oceni tveganja navesti, kako so upoštevale ustrezne ugotovitve iz poročil, ki jih je izdala Komisija v okviru ocene tveganja na nadnacionalni ravni.
The risk of money laundering and terrorist financing is not the same in every case.
Tveganje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma ni enako v vseh primerih.
Accordingly, a holistic, risk-based approach should be used.
Zato bi bilo treba uporabiti celosten pristop, ki temelji na tveganju.
The risk-based approach is not an unduly permissive option for Member States and obliged entities.
Pristop, ki temelji na tveganju, ni prekomerno permisivna možnost za države članice in pooblaščene subjekte.
It involves the use of evidence-based decision-making in order to target the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing facing the Union and those operating within it more effectively.
Vključuje učinkovitejše sprejemanje odločitev na podlagi dokazov za boljšo ciljno usmeritev na tveganja pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, s katerimi se soočajo Unija in tisti, ki v njej delujejo.
Underpinning the risk-based approach is the need for Member States and the Union to identify, understand and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing that they face.
Podpora pristopu, ki temelji na tveganju, izhaja iz potrebe držav članic in Unije po prepoznavanju, razumevanju in blažitvi tveganj pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, s katerimi se soočajo.
The importance of a supranational approach to risk identification has been recognised at international level, and the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [9], the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) (EIOPA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [10], and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (ESMA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [11], should be tasked with issuing an opinion, through their Joint Committee, on the risks affecting the Union financial sector.
Pomembnost nadnacionalnega pristopa k prepoznavanju tveganj je bila priznana na mednarodni ravni, pri tem pa bi morali imeti Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski bančni organ) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: EBA), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [9], Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: EIOPA), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1094/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [10], ter Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ESMA), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1095/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [11], nalogo izdati, prek njihovega skupnega odbora, mnenje o tveganjih, ki vplivajo na finančni sektor Unije.
The Commission is well placed to review specific cross-border threats that could affect the internal market and that cannot be identified and effectively combatted by individual Member States.
Primerno je, da Komisija ponovno preuči specifične čezmejne nevarnosti, ki bi lahko vplivale na notranji trg ter ki jih države članice ne morejo prepoznati in se proti njim tudi ne učinkovito bojevati.
It should therefore be entrusted with the responsibility for coordinating the assessment of risks relating to cross-border activities.
Zato bi ji bilo treba zaupati odgovornost za usklajevanje ocenjevanja tveganj, povezanih s čezmejnimi dejavnostmi.
Involvement of the relevant experts, such as the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and the representatives from the FIUs, as well as, where appropriate, from other Union-level bodies, is essential for the effectiveness of that process.
Za učinkovitost tega procesa je bistvenega pomena vključitev ustreznih strokovnjakov, kot je skupina strokovnjakov za preprečevanje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, predstavnikov iz FIU ter, kadar je to primerno, drugih organov na ravni Unije.
National risk assessments and experience are also an important source of information for the process.
Pomemben vir informacij za ta proces so tudi ocene tveganj in izkušnje na nacionalni ravni.
Such assessment of the cross-border risks by the Commission should not involve the processing of personal data.
Tako ocenjevanje čezmejnih tveganj s strani Komisije ne bi smelo vključevati obdelave osebnih podatkov.
In any event, data should be fully anonymised.
V vsakem primeru pa bi morali biti podatki popolnoma anonimizirani.
National and Union data protection supervisory authorities should be involved only if the assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing has an impact on the privacy and data protection of individuals.
Nacionalni nadzorni organi in nadzorni organi Unije za varstvo podatkov bi morali biti vključeni le, če ocena tveganja pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma vpliva na zasebnost posameznikov in varstvo njihovih osebnih podatkov.
The results of risk assessments should, where appropriate, be made available to obliged entities in a timely manner to enable them to identify, understand, manage and mitigate their own risks.
Kadar je to primerno, bi morali biti rezultati ocen tveganj pravočasno na voljo pooblaščenim subjektom, da bi lahko prepoznali, obvladali in ublažili tveganja, ki so jim izpostavljeni sami.
In addition, to identify, understand, manage and mitigate risks at Union level to an even greater degree, Member States should make available the results of their risk assessments to each other, to the Commission and to EBA, EIOPA and ESMA (the ‘ESAs’).
Za še boljše prepoznavanje, razumevanje, obvladovanje in blažitev tveganj na ravni Unije bi morale države članice poleg tega druga drugi, Komisiji in EBA, EIOPA in ESMA (v nadaljnjem besedilu: evropski nadzorni organi) omogočiti dostop do rezultatov ocen tveganj.
When applying this Directive, it is appropriate to take account of the characteristics and needs of smaller obliged entities which fall under its scope, and to ensure treatment which is appropriate to their specific needs, and the nature of the business.
Pri uporabi te direktive je primerno upoštevati značilnosti in potrebe manjših pooblaščenih subjektov, ki spadajo na njeno področje uporabe, ter zagotoviti obravnavanje, ki ustreza njihovim specifičnim potrebam in naravi poslovanja.
In order to protect the proper functioning of the Union financial system and of the internal market from money laundering and terrorist financing, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should be delegated to the Commission in order to identify third-country jurisdictions which have strategic deficiencies in their national AML/CFT regimes (‘high-risk third countries’).
Za zaščito pravilnega delovanja finančnega sistema Unije in notranjega trga pred pranjem denarja in financiranjem terorizma bi bilo treba na Komisijo prenesti pooblastila, da v skladu s členom 290 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU) sprejme akte, da se opredelijo jurisdikcije tretjih držav, ki imajo v svojih nacionalnih ureditvah AML/CFT strateške pomanjkljivosti (v nadaljnjem besedilu: tretje države z visokim tveganjem).
The changing nature of money laundering and terrorist financing threats, facilitated by a constant evolution of technology and of the means at the disposal of criminals, requires that quick and continuous adaptations of the legal framework as regards high-risk third countries be made in order to address efficiently existing risks and prevent new ones from arising.
Kar zadeva tretje države z visokim tveganjem, so za učinkovito spopadanje z obstoječimi tveganji in preprečevanje pojava novih zaradi spreminjajoče se narave nevarnosti pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, ki je posledica stalnega razvoja tehnologije in sredstev, ki so na voljo storilcem kaznivih dejanj, potrebne hitre in nenehne prilagoditve pravnega okvira.
The Commission should take into account information from international organisations and standard setters in the field of AML/CFT, such as FATF public statements, mutual evaluation or detailed assessment reports or published follow-up reports, and adapt its assessments to the changes therein, where appropriate.
Komisija bi morala upoštevati informacije mednarodnih organizacij in organov za določanje standardov na področju AML/CFT, kot so javne izjave FATF, poročila o vzajemnem vrednotenju ali podrobni oceni ali objavljena poročila o nadaljnjem ukrepanju, in svoje ocene po potrebi prilagoditi spremembam v njih.
Member States should at least provide for enhanced customer due diligence measures to be applied by the obliged entities when dealing with natural persons or legal entities established in high-risk third countries identified by the Commission.
Države članice bi morale zagotoviti vsaj to, da pooblaščeni subjekti pri obravnavi fizičnih oseb ali pravnih subjektov s sedežem v tretjih državah z visokim tveganjem, kot jih opredeli Komisija, uporabijo okrepljene ukrepe skrbnega preverjanja strank.
Reliance on third parties established in such high-risk third countries should also be prohibited.
Prav tako bi moralo biti prepovedano zanašanje na tretje osebe s sedežem v takšnih tretjih državah z visokim tveganjem.
Countries not included in the list should not be automatically considered to have effective AML/CFT systems and natural persons or legal entities established in such countries should be assessed on a risk-sensitive basis.
Za države, ki niso uvrščene na seznam, se ne bi smelo samodejno šteti, da imajo učinkovite sisteme AML/CFT, fizične osebe ali pravne subjekte s sedežem v takšnih državah pa bi bilo treba oceniti z upoštevanjem tveganja.
Risk itself is variable in nature, and the variables, on their own or in combination, may increase or decrease the potential risk posed, thus having an impact on the appropriate level of preventative measures, such as customer due diligence measures.
Narava samega tveganja je spremenljiva, pri čemer lahko spremenljivke same po sebi ali skupaj povečajo ali zmanjšajo potencialno tveganje in tako vplivajo na ustrezno raven preventivnih ukrepov, kakršni so ukrepi skrbnega preverjanja strank.
Therefore, there are circumstances in which enhanced due diligence should be applied and others in which simplified due diligence may be appropriate.
Zato obstajajo okoliščine, v katerih bi bilo treba uporabiti okrepljeno skrbnost, in okoliščine, v katerih je lahko primerna poenostavljena skrbnost preverjanja.
It should be recognised that certain situations present a greater risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.
Priznati bi bilo treba, da nekatere situacije predstavljajo večje tveganje pranja denarja ali financiranja terorizma.
Although the identity and business profile of all customers should be established, there are cases in which particularly rigorous customer identification and verification procedures are required.
Čeprav bi bilo treba ugotoviti identiteto in poslovni profil vseh strank, obstajajo primeri, v katerih so potrebni posebej strogi postopki identifikacije in preverjanja strank.
This is particularly true of relationships with individuals who hold or who have held important public functions, within the Union or internationally, and particularly individuals from countries where corruption is widespread.
To še posebej velja za odnose s posamezniki, ki so ali ki so imeli pomembno javno funkcijo znotraj Unije ali na mednarodni ravni, zlasti če posamezniki prihajajo iz držav z visoko stopnjo korupcije.
Such relationships may expose the financial sector in particular to significant reputational and legal risks.
Takšni odnosi lahko zlasti ogrozijo ugled finančnega sektorja in ga izpostavijo pravnim tveganjem.
The international effort to combat corruption also justifies the need to pay particular attention to such persons and to apply appropriate enhanced customer due diligence measures with respect to persons who are or who have been entrusted with prominent public functions domestically or abroad and with respect to senior figures in international organisations.
Mednarodno prizadevanje v boju proti korupciji upravičuje tudi potrebo, da se takšnim osebam posveti posebna pozornost in da se uporabijo ustrezni okrepljeni ukrepi skrbnega preverjanja strank v zvezi z osebami, ki so ali so bile na vidnem javnem položaju v matični državi ali v tujini, ter v zvezi s posamezniki na višjih položajih v mednarodnih organizacijah.
The requirements relating to politically exposed persons are of a preventive and not criminal nature, and should not be interpreted as stigmatising politically exposed persons as being involved in criminal activity.
Zahteve v zvezi s politično izpostavljenimi osebami so preventivne in ne kazenske narave, zato se jih ne bi smelo razlagati, kot da stigmatizirajo politično izpostavljene osebe, kot da so že same po sebi vpletene v kazniva dejanja.
Refusing a business relationship with a person simply on the basis of the determination that he or she is a politically exposed person is contrary to the letter and spirit of this Directive and of the revised FATF Recommendations.
Zavrnitev poslovnega odnosa osebo, ki temelji zgolj na ugotovitvi, da je politično izpostavljena oseba, je v nasprotju s črko in duhom te direktive ter revidiranimi priporočili FATF.
Obtaining approval from senior management for establishing business relationships does not need to imply, in all cases, obtaining approval from the board of directors.
Pridobitev odobritve višjega vodstva za vzpostavitev poslovnih odnosov ne pomeni, da je treba pridobiti odobritev uprave v vseh primerih.
It should be possible for such approval to be granted by someone with sufficient knowledge of the institution's money laundering and terrorist financing risk exposure and of sufficient seniority to take decisions affecting its risk exposure.
Moralo bi biti mogoče, da se takšna odobritev pridobi od nekoga, ki je dovolj dobro seznanjen z izpostavljenostjo institucije tveganju pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma ter je na dovolj visokem položaju, da sprejema odločitve, ki vplivajo na njeno izpostavljenost tveganju.
In order to avoid repeated customer identification procedures, leading to delays and inefficiency in business, it is appropriate, subject to suitable safeguards, to allow customers whose identification has been carried out elsewhere to be introduced to the obliged entities.
V izogib ponavljajočim se postopkom identifikacije strank, ki vodijo do zastojev in neučinkovitosti v poslovanju, je ob ustreznih zaščitnih ukrepih primerno, da pooblaščeni subjekti sprejmejo tudi stranke, katerih identifikacija je že bila izvedena drugje.
Where an obliged entity relies on a third party, the ultimate responsibility for customer due diligence should remain with the obliged entity to which the customer is introduced.
Kadar se pooblaščeni subjekt zanaša na tretjo osebo, bi moral končno odgovornost za skrbno preverjanje strank še vedno nositi pooblaščeni subjekt, ki stranko sprejme.
The third party, or the person that has introduced the customer, should also retain its own responsibility for compliance with this Directive, including the requirement to report suspicious transactions and maintain records, to the extent that it has a relationship with the customer that is covered by this Directive.
Tretja oseba ali oseba, ki je stranko predstavila, bi morala biti, kolikor ima odnos s stranko, zajet s to direktivo, tudi sama še naprej odgovorna za skladnost s to direktivo, vključno z obveznostjo poročanja o sumljivih transakcijah in vodenja evidenc.
In the case of agency or outsourcing relationships on a contractual basis between obliged entities and external persons not covered by this Directive, any AML/CFT obligations upon those agents or outsourcing service providers as part of the obliged entities could arise only from the contract between the parties and not from this Directive.
V primeru zastopanja ali zunanjega izvajanja, ki temelji na pogodbenem odnosu med pooblaščenimi subjekti in zunanjimi osebami, ki niso zajete s to direktivo, lahko kakršne koli obveznosti AML/CFT za te zastopnike ali zunanje izvajalce kot dele pooblaščenih subjektov izhajajo samo iz pogodbe med strankami in ne iz te direktive.
Therefore the responsibility for complying with this Directive should remain primarily with the obliged entity.
Za izpolnjevanje zahtev iz te direktive bi moral biti zato še naprej odgovoren predvsem pooblaščeni subjekt.
All Member States have, or should, set up operationally independent and autonomous FIUs to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
Vse države članice so ustanovile oziroma bi morale ustanoviti operativno neodvisne in avtonomne FIU za zbiranje in analizo informacij, ki jih prejmejo, s ciljem povezovanja sumljivih transakcij s kaznivimi dejanji, na katerih temeljijo, zaradi preprečevanja pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma ter boja proti njima.
An operationally independent and autonomous FIU should mean that the FIU has the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely, including the autonomous decision to analyse, request and disseminate specific information.
Operativna neodvisnost in avtonomnost FIU bi morala pomeniti, da so FIU pooblaščene in sposobne, da svobodno opravljajo svoje naloge, vključno z avtonomnim odločanjem o analizi, zahtevanju in posredovanju specifičnih informacij.
Suspicious transactions and other information relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing should be reported to the FIU, which should serve as a central national unit for receiving, analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities the results of its analyses.
O sumljivih transakcijah in drugih informacijah, pomembnih z vidika pranja denarja, povezanih predhodnih kaznivih dejanj ali financiranja terorizma, bi bilo treba poročati FIU, ki bi morale delovati kot osrednja nacionalna enota za sprejemanje, analizo in posredovanje rezultatov svoje analize pristojnim organom.
All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported, regardless of the amount of the transaction.
Poročati bi bilo treba o vseh sumljivih transakcijah, vključno s poskusi transakcij, ne glede na njihovo vrednost.
Reported information could also include threshold-based information.
Med informacijami o katerih se poroča so lahko tudi informacije v zvezi z mejnimi vrednostmi.