natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Point 10(c) of the R&R Guidelines stipulates that a company is regarded as being in difficulty where it ‘fulfils the criteria under its domestic law for being the subject of collective insolvency proceedings’.
Poleg tega nič ne kaže, da je Latvija dejansko upoštevala te premisleke, ko je družbi airBaltic zagotovila podporo.
This appeared to be the case of airBaltic at least as of 21 September 2011 — if not earlier — when it filed for legal protection from its creditors.
Komisija ob upoštevanju navedenega ugotavlja, da argument latvijskih organov glede sočasnosti ne drži.
The Commission however notes that the court allegedly rejected the legal protection a few days later, apparently because of the negotiations between Latvia and BAS that culminated in the Agreement.
Na podlagi tega ugotavlja, da ukrepov 1, 2, 3 in 6 ni mogoče obravnavati kot eno transakcijo, dogovorjeno 3. oktobra 2011, zato jih bo ocenila ločeno.
Irrespective of this, the Commission considers that, in any event, it would appear that airBaltic is a firm in difficulty within the meaning of point 11 of the R&R Guidelines
Prvo državno posojilo (ukrep 1)
In accordance with that provision, a firm may be considered to be in difficulty ‘where the usual signs of a firm being in difficulty are present, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover, growing stock inventories, excess capacity, declining cash flow, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling or nil net asset value’.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je Latvija na zahtevo ministrstva za promet neposredno odobrila prvo državno posojilo iz državne blagajne.
However, it appears that airBaltic was able to achieve a profit in 2009 only due to the extraordinary drop in fuel prices.
Zato je jasno, da ukrep 1 vključuje državna sredstva in ga je mogoče pripisati državi.
Therefore, as indicated in the opening decision, it appears that the return to profitability in 2009 was a one-off occurrence due to extraordinary circumstances and not a structural trend.
Latvija ne nasprotuje tej ugotovitvi.
The company's debt and financial expenses increased significantly between 2008 and 2009 but in particular between 2009 and 2010, when the cost of financing increased from LVL 3,8 million (EUR 5,38 million) to LVL 17,4 million (EUR 24,64 million) [30].
Da bi Komisija presodila, ali je ukrep 1 pomenil neupravičeno selektivno prednost za družbo airBaltic, najprej ugotavlja, da sta bila prvo državno posojilo in posojilo družbe BAS dogovorjeni 3. oktobra 2011, tj. na dan podpisa sporazuma.
It also results that the cost-related variables of airBaltic increased at a rate of [5-10] % per year, that is, faster than the revenue-related variables which increased at [2 — 7] % annually.
Takrat sta bili Latvija in družba BAS večinska delničarja družbe in sta odobrili posojila v sorazmerju s svojima deležema (52,6 % in 47,2 %) ter pod enakimi in povezanimi pogoji.
Finally, the Commission reiterates the finding in the opening decision that the losses of airBaltic were of such magnitude that in 2010 its negative equity amounted to approximately LVL 23,3 million (EUR 32,99 million), which increased to approximately LVL 105,6 million (EUR 149,51 million) due the additional losses incurred in 2011.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 45, je Komisija v sklepu o začetku postopka menila, da je pripravljenost javnih organov za zagotovitev finančne podpore družbi airBaltic morda vplivala na odločitev družbe BAS za naložbo v to družbo.
Considering all of the factors mentioned above, it appears that the criteria in point 11 of the R&R Guidelines are met.
Vendar, čeprav je res, da je latvijska vlada izrazila zanimanje za ohranitev družbe airBaltic kot nacionalnega prevoznika [31], Komisija ugotavlja, da so pogajanja o podpori latvijske države še vedno potekala ter da podpora še ni bila določena in so zanjo veljali pogoji.
EXISTENCE OF STATE AID
Kot je pojasnilo Splošno sodišče, „sočasnost, pa čeprav ob znatnih zasebnih naložbah, ne more sama po sebi zadostovati za ugotovitev neobstoja pomoči v smislu člena [107(1) PDEU], ne da bi se upoštevalo ostale upoštevne dejanske in pravne elemente“ [32].
By virtue of Article 107(1) TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
Komisija je zato proučila tudi, ali se lahko dogovorjena [11–13]-odstotna obrestna mera za prvo državno posojilo (in posojilo družbe BAS) šteje za skladno s tržnimi obrestnimi merami.
In order to conclude whether state aid is present, the Commission must assess whether the cumulative criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU (i.e. transfer of State resources, selective advantage, potential distortion of competition and effect on intra-EU trade) are met for each of the six measures being assessed.
Vrednost blagovnih znamk je temeljila na ceni, po kateri jih je družba airBaltic odkupila od družbe BAS.
Measures 1, 2, 3 and 6 as a single transaction
Latvija je za določitev likvidacijske vrednosti zavarovanja uporabila […]-odstotno diskontno stopnjo v skladu z notranjo metodologijo vrednotenja zavarovanja latvijske državne zakladnice, za katero Komisija meni, da je ustrezna glede na naravo zavarovanja.
Latvia argues that measure 1 must be assessed together with measures 2, 3 and 6 since they were agreed on the same date, i.e. 3 October 2011, at a point in time when Latvia and BAS were both major shareholders of airBaltic.
Na tej podlagi je likvidacijska vrednost zavarovanja znašala [15–25] milijonov LVL ([21,3–35,5] milijona EUR) in je presegala znesek prvega državnega posojila za [15–25] %.
The Commission agrees with the Latvian authorities that the first State loan (measure 1) and the BAS loan cannot be assessed in isolation and must therefore be viewed as part of the overall context of the Agreement, on the basis of which both loans were provided.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da bi bila uporaba [11–13]-odstotne obrestne mere ob upoštevanju visokega zavarovanja prvega državnega posojila v skladu s sporočilom o referenčnih obrestnih merah [33].
However, the Commission disagrees with the argument of Latvia that the other measures must be assessed together as a single transaction.
Trditev, da je bila [11–13]-odstotna obrestna mera skladna s tržnimi obrestnimi merami, potrjuje tudi dejstvo, da se je družba BAS (zasebni vlagatelj) odrekla svoji pravici do zavarovanja svojega posojila (glej uvodno izjavo 26), saj je bilo zato posojilo družbe BAS bolj tvegano kot državno posojilo, vendar je bilo odobreno z enako obrestno mero.
The Commission is of the opinion that on 3 October 2011, when the Agreement was entered into, BAS and the State committed with absolute certainty to provide the first State loan (measure 1) and the BAS loan.
Komisija ob upoštevanju stopnje zavarovanja in uporabljene obrestne mere ugotavlja, da ukrep 1 ni pomenil selektivne prednosti za družbo airBaltic in da je prisotnost državne pomoči mogoče izključiti, ne da bi bilo treba nadalje proučiti, ali ukrep izpolnjuje ostale kumulativne pogoje iz člena 107(1) PDEU [34].
Those measures may therefore be said to have been granted at that date.
Znižanje obrestne mere za prvo državno posojilo z [11–13] % na [2–4] %
However, the exact amounts of the second State loan (measure 2) and of the capital increase (measure 3) cannot be ascertained with certainty from the information in the Agreement.
Latvijska vlada je 13. decembra 2011, tj. ko se je delež Latvije v družbi airBaltic povečal na 99,8 % (glej uvodno izjavo 21), sklenila, da odobri znižanje obrestne mere za prvo državno posojilo in s tem tudi za posojilo družbe BAS za [9–11] odstotnih točk, kar ustreza premiji za tveganje, oziroma z [11–13] % na [2–4] %.
In particular, as regards measure 2, the Agreement merely states that Latvia would provide a loan in proportion to its shareholding but does not quantify it.
Latvija meni, da je bilo znižanje obrestne mere upravičeno, saj je bilo posojilo brez tveganja glede na to, da je bila likvidacijska vrednost zavarovanja ocenjena na [15–25] milijonov LVL ([21,3–35,5] milijona EUR), kar presega znesek prvega državnega posojila za [15–25] % (glej uvodno izjavo 101).
In this respect, the Commission observes that Article 7.1 of the Agreement states that the foreseeable equity increase (resulting from capitalisation of the first and second State loans and the BAS loan, together with an additional cash contribution from BAS) would not exceed LVL 100 million (EUR 141,58 million).
Trditev Latvije, da je država z znižanjem obrestne mere znižala stroške financiranja družbe airBaltic (saj se je znižala tudi obrestna mera za posojilo družbe BAS), ki je bila takrat v 99,8-odstotni lasti države, Komisije ni prepričala.
However, the following points should be noted.
Po mnenju Latvije je bila to razumna odločitev za državo, saj se je njen izgubljeni dobiček v obliki obresti izravnal s prednostmi, ki jih je imela država kot večinski delničar družbe airBaltic, ker je družba plačevala nižje obresti.
First, only the first State loan and the BAS loan were quantified in the Agreement, at respectively LVL 16 million and LVL 14 million.
Po drugi strani Komisija opozarja, da je v času, ko sta bili odobreni prvo državno posojilo in posojilo družbe BAS, sporazum določal, da so pogoji za obe posojili enaki in povezani, zato bi se zaradi kakršne koli spremembe enega posojila enako spremenilo tudi drugo posojilo.
The figure of LVL 100 million was merely a forecast, an estimate of what might be required or expected in terms of equity increase by the end of the year; the amount of the equity increase was not clearly determined in the Agreement.
Znižanje obrestne mere je zato veljalo za obe posojili, zelo visoka stopnja zavarovanja posojila in dejstvo, da posojilo družbe BAS ni bilo zavarovano, pa se nista spremenili.
Indeed, the actual amount of the equity increase agreed in December 2011 was in fact LVL 110 million (see recital 33 above), i.e. in excess of what had been foreseen in the Agreement.
Družba BAS se je že na začetku strinjala, da se pogoji za njeno posojilo povežejo s pogoji za prvo državno posojilo, zato Komisija nima nobenih razlogov za domnevo, da ta odločitev ne bi bila skladna z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
The Commission is of the view that the amounts of Measures 2 and 3 were not determined or ascertainable on 3 October 2011.
Na tej podlagi Komisija ugotavlja, da tudi ob upoštevanju znižanja obrestne mere ukrep 1 ni pomenil selektivne prednosti za družbo airBaltic in da je mogoče izključiti prisotnost državne pomoči.
In addition, the State was not obliged to assign to airBaltic the claims resulting from syndicated loan 2.
Latvija je neposredno odobrila drugo državno posojilo iz državne blagajne na podlagi sklepa latvijske vlade z dne 13. decembra 2011, s katerim je ministrstvo za finance pooblastila, da v državnem proračunu zagotovi sredstva za konvertibilno posojilo družbi airBaltic v višini 67 milijonov LVL (94,86 milijona EUR).
The assignment of the claims of private investors to the State was a mere eventuality subject to BAS not fulfilling its obligations under the Agreement, something which was not known and which there was no reason to suspect on 3 October 2011.
Zato ukrep 2 vključuje državna sredstva in ga je mogoče pripisati državi.
For this reason, measure 6 cannot be considered as having been granted at the moment the Agreement was signed and cannot therefore be considered as pari passu with the first State loan and the BAS loan.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je družba BAS v času, ko je bilo odobreno drugo državno posojilo, tj. 13. decembra 2011, izgubila ves svoj delež v družbi airBaltic z izjemo ene delnice in da se je delež države v družbi s tem povečal na 99,8 %.
In addition, Latvia argues that most of the claims of the private investors which were supposed to be novated in the two syndicated loans were unsecured, and that had the State let the company go bankrupt, the private investors would have sued the State for damages, which would have been more costly for the State than providing the rest of measures to airBaltic.
Zato država in družba BAS kot delničarja nista bili več v primerljivem položaju.
In the Commission's view, the claim that the private investors would have sued the State asking for damages is purely hypothetical and not supported by any evidence.
Latvija trdi, da bi morala družba BAS v skladu s členom 7.2 sporazuma, ki določa, da bo Latvija družbi airBaltic odobrila posojilo „v sorazmerju s svojim deležem“, družbi airBaltic zagotoviti sredstva v znesku, ki ustreza njenemu številu delnic.
In addition, nothing shows that Latvia actually took into account these considerations when providing support to airBaltic.
Družba BAS naj bi ta sredstva zagotovila v denarni obliki decembra 2011, ko je bil odobren kapitalski vložek.
In view of the above, the Commission comes to the conclusion that the argument of concomitance raised by the Latvian authorities does not stand.
Vendar Komisija opozarja, da je imela družba BAS 13. decembra 2011 samo eno delnico družbe airBaltic.
For this reason, the Commission concludes that measures 1, 2, 3 and 6 cannot be considered as constituting a single transaction decided on 3 October 2011 and will therefore assess them separately.
Iz tega sledi, da bi morala država ravnati kot preudaren vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu in presoditi, ali je imela družba BAS glede na spremembo okoliščin v zvezi z deleži v času povečanja kapitala kakršne koli spodbude za vlaganje denarja v družbo.
The first State loan (measure 1)
Država je dejansko predvidela to možnost in v sporazum vključila več ukrepov ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih, zlasti v člen 7.4, če družba BAS ne bi izpolnila svojih obveznosti.
The Commission notes that the first State loan was provided directly by Latvia through the State Treasury upon request of the Ministry of Transport.
Poleg tega, kot priznava Latvija, naj bi se druga tranša drugega državnega posojila sprostila, če družba BAS ne bi zagotovila dodatnih sredstev.
This is expressly stated in the Agreement.
Na podlagi člena 7.4 sporazuma je imela država pravico, da od družbe BAS odkupi vse njene delnice družbe airBaltic za 1 LVL.
It is therefore clear that measure 1 entails State resources and that it is imputable to the State.
V času podpisa sporazuma je to za državo pomenilo zagotovilo, da bo družba BAS izpolnila svoje obveznosti, ali pa bo izgubila vse svoje delnice družbe airBaltic.
Latvia does not contest this point.
Vendar se je stanje 30. novembra 2011, ko je Latvijas Krājbanka latvijski državi prodala vse delnice družbe airBaltic v lasti družbe BAS razen ene (glej uvodno izjavo 21), drastično spremenilo.
In order to assess whether measure 1 entailed an undue selective advantage to airBaltic, the Commission first observes that the first State loan and the BAS loan were agreed on 3 October 2011, i.e. the date of signature of the Agreement.
V tem novem okviru člen 7.4 ni bil več smiseln.
At that moment in time, Latvia and BAS were the major shareholders of the company and the loans were provided in proportion to their shareholding (52,6 % and 47,2 % respectively), and with identical and linked conditions.
Družba BAS, ki je imela samo eno delnico, je imela dejansko le malo spodbude za izpolnitev svojih obveznosti, saj bi z njihovo neizpolnitvijo izgubila le svojo edino delnico družbe airBaltic.
As indicated in recital 45 above, the Commission had observed in the opening decision that BAS' decision to invest in airBaltic may have been influenced by the willingness of the public authorities to financially support the company.
Preudaren udeleženec na trgu bi v navedenih novih okoliščinah skrbno premislil o zagotovitvi dodatnih sredstev družbi airBaltic in bi drugo pogodbenico (tj. družbo BAS) vsaj prosil za zagotovilo, da bo družbi dejansko namenila sredstva.
However, while it is true that the Latvian Government had expressed its interest in maintaining airBaltic as the national carrier, [31] the Commission observes that the support of the Latvian State was under negotiation and was still undetermined and subject to conditions.
Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da se zdi malo verjetno, da bi družba BAS dala tako zagotovilo, saj bi morala vložiti zelo veliko denarja – veliko več, kot bi lahko na začetku ocenila – da bi ponovno pridobila svoj nekdanji 47,2-odstotni delež ali drugačen pomemben delež v družbi airBaltic.
On this basis, the Commission cannot exclude that the first State loan and the BAS loan were provided concomitantly, thereby excluding the presence of aid.
Latvija trdi tudi, da je bilo drugo državno posojilo odobreno pod tržnimi pogoji, zato je kakršna koli neupravičena prednost za družbo airBaltic izključena.
As the General Court has clarified, ‘simultaneity cannot in itself, even where significant private investments have been made, suffice for a finding that there has been no aid within the meaning of Article [107(1) TFEU] without taking into consideration the other relevant facts and points of law’ [32].
Latvija je v zvezi z zavarovanjem opozorila, da sta bili prvo in drugo državno posojilo enako zavarovani, tj. s terjatvami in blagovnimi znamkami družbe airBaltic.
The Commission has therefore also assessed whether the agreed interest rate of [11 — 13] % for the first State loan (and the BAS loan) can be considered to be at market level.
Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 101, je bila likvidacijska vrednost zavarovanja ocenjena na [15–25] milijonov LVL ([21,3–35,5] milijona EUR).
During the course of the formal investigation procedure, Latvia submitted evidence regarding the value of the collateral (trademarks and receivables) which was assessed by the independent auditor […] as part of an audit of the company initiated in the summer of 2011.
Zato se zdi, da bi bila razpoložljiva stopnja zavarovanja za drugo državno posojilo nizka.
As the receivables (as of 30 September 2011) were part of the relevant financial information, they were also subject to evaluation by […].
Poleg tega ni razlogov za domnevo, da bi se zasebni udeleženec na trgu strinjal z znižanjem zavarovanja, s katerim je bilo prvo državno posojilo že zavarovano, pod 100 %.
As regards the trademarks, their value was based on the price at which airBaltic had bought back the trademarks from BAS.
Da bi Komisija preverila skladnost obrestne mere, uporabljene za prvo tranšo drugega državnega posojila, s tržnimi obrestnimi merami, bo kot najboljši razpoložljivi približek uporabila obrestno mero, izračunano na podlagi sporočila o referenčnih obrestnih merah.
In order to determine the liquidation value of the collateral, Latvia applied a […] % discount rate in accordance with the Latvian Treasury's internal collateral valuation methodology, which the Commission considers to be adequate in view of the nature of the collateral.
Izhodiščna obrestna mera za Latvijo je 13. decembra 2011 znašala 2,2 %.
On this basis, the liquidation value of the collateral was LVL [15 — 25] million (EUR [21,3 — 35,5] million) which was [15 — 25] % higher than the amount of the first State loan.
Tej obrestni meri je treba dodati razliko, ki je odvisna od bonitetne ocene upravičenca in zavarovanja posojila.
In addition, the Commission observes that in view of the significant collateral on the first State loan, applying an interest rate of [11 — 13] % would be in line with the Reference Rate Communication.
Kot je navedeno v prejšnji uvodni izjavi, je stopnja zavarovanja nizka.
The assertion that an interest rate of [11 — 13] % was market confirm is moreover reinforced by the fact that BAS (a private investor) had waived its right to have the BAS loan collateralised (see recital 26 above): the BAS loan was therefore more risky than the State loan but was granted at the same interest rate.
Glede na takratne težave družbe airBaltic je treba izhodiščni obrestni meri v skladu s sporočilom o referenčnih obrestnih merah dodati 1000 bazičnih točk, rezultat pa je 12,2-odstotna obrestna mera.
Bearing in mind the level of collateralisation and the interest rate applied, the Commission concludes that measure 1 did not entail a selective advantage to airBaltic and that the presence of state aid can be excluded, without it being necessary to assess further whether the rest of the cumulative conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU would be met [34].
Zato se zdi, da [9–11]-odstotne obrestne mere za prvo tranšo drugega državnega posojila ni mogoče šteti za skladno s tržnimi obrestnimi merami.
The reduction of the interest rate of the first State loan from [11 — 13] % to [2 — 4] %
Druga tranša drugega državnega posojila je bila družbi dana na razpolago 14. decembra 2012 s [6–8]-odstotno obrestno mero.
On 13 December 2011, i.e. once Latvia's shareholding in airBaltic had increased to 99,8 % (see paragraph (21) above), the Latvian Government decided to authorise a cut in the interest rate on the first State loan — and thus also of the BAS loan — of [9 — 11] percentage points corresponding to the risk premium, from [11 — 13] % to [2 — 4] %.
Latvija trdi, da je ta obrestna mera višja od tiste, izračunane na podlagi sporočila o referenčnih obrestnih merah, in da je zato skladna z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
Latvia considers that the reduction of the interest rate was justified because the loan was risk-free, given that the liquidation value of the collateral was estimated to be LVL [15 — 25] million (EUR [21,3 — 35,5] million), i.e. [15 — 25] % higher than the amount of the first State loan (see recital 101 above).
V skladu s sporočilom o referenčnih obrestnih merah je izhodiščna obrestna mera za Latvijo 14. decembra 2012 znašala 1,91 %.
The Commission is not convinced by the arguments of Latvia when it claims that by lowering the interest rate, the State reduced the funding costs of airBaltic (since the interest rate of the BAS loan was also reduced), which at the time was almost exclusively owned by the State at 99,8 %.
Razlika, ki jo je treba dodati navedeni izhodiščni obrestni meri, je odvisna od bonitetne ocene upravičenca in stopnje zavarovanja.
This was — according to Latvia — a rational decision for the State since the foregone revenues for the State in the form of interest were compensated by the advantage that the State, as a majority shareholder of airBaltic, derived from the company having to pay lower interest.
Kot je pojasnjeno v oddelku 7.1, Komisija meni, da je bila družba airBaltic podjetje v težavah vsaj od leta 2011.
On the other hand, the Commission recalls that at the time the first State loan and the BAS loan were granted, the Agreement stipulated that the conditions of both were identical and linked, and therefore any change in one of the loans would result in an identical change on the other loan.
Poleg tega je bila druga tranša zavarovana s terjatvami in blagovnimi znamkami družbe airBaltic.
The reduction of the interest rate is therefore mirrored for both loans and the very significant level of collateralisation of the loan and the fact that the BAS loan was not collateralised remain unchanged.
Tu bi smiselno veljali argumenti o nezadostnosti zavarovanja, zato bi bilo treba obrestni meri dodati 1000 bazičnih točk.
Since BAS had agreed up front to link the conditions of the BAS loan to those of the first State loan, the Commission has no reasons to consider that this would not be a market-conform decision.
Dobljena referenčna mera bi torej znašala 11,91 %, kar je precej nad [6–8]-odstotno obrestno mero, ki se je dejansko uporabila.
On this basis, the Commission concludes that even taking into account the reduction of the interest rate, measure 1 did not entail a selective advantage to airBaltic and the presence of state aid can be excluded.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega Komisija meni, da preudaren udeleženec v tržnem gospodarstvu družbi airBaltic ne bi odobril drugega državnega posojila.
The second State loan (measure 2)
Na tej podlagi Komisija ugotavlja, da je ukrep 2 pomenil neupravičeno prednost za družbo airBaltic.