natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The evidence collected so far did not allow the Commission to provisionally establish whether Indian domestic prices of iron ore are suppressed in comparison with other markets.
Zato v tej fazi preiskave ni bilo mogoče preveriti trditev industrije Unije in proizvajalcev izvoznikov, te trditve pa bodo nadalje preiskane v zaključni fazi preiskave ter vzporedni protisubvencijski preiskavi.
Accordingly, the Union industry's and exporting producers' claims could not be verified at this stage of the investigation and will be further investigated at the definitive stage of the investigation, as well as in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation.
Izvozna cena
Export price
Proizvajalca izvoznika sta v Unijo izvažala predvsem prek povezanih družb uvoznic.
The exporting producers exported to the Union mainly through related companies acting as importers.
Izvoz neposredno neodvisnim strankam je predstavljal samo približno 1 % celotnega izvoza proizvajalcev izvoznikov v Unijo.
Exports made directly to independent customers only represented approximately 1 % of their total exports to the Union.
Ko sta proizvajalca izvoznika zadevni izdelek izvažala neposredno neodvisnim strankam v Uniji, je bila izvozna cena v skladu s členom 2(8) osnovne uredbe določena na podlagi plačane ali plačljive cene za zadevni izdelek, ko je bil prodan za izvoz v Unijo.
When the exporting producers exported the product concerned directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.
Ko sta proizvajalca izvoznika zadevni izdelek izvažala v Unijo prek povezanih družb, ki so delovale kot uvoznice, je bila izvozna cena v skladu s členom 2(9) osnovne uredbe določena na podlagi cene, po kateri je bil uvoženi izdelek prvič prodan naprej neodvisnim strankam v Uniji.
When the exporting producers exported the product concerned to the Union through related companies acting as an importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation.
V tem primeru se je cena prilagodila za vse stroške, ki so nastali med uvozom in nadaljnjo prodajo, vključno s PSA-stroški, ter za nastali dobiček.
In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing.
Ker nepovezani uvozniki niso sodelovali v preiskavi, je bil uporabljen 3,7-odstotni povprečni dobiček na podlagi podatkov iz pritožbe.
In the absence of cooperation from unrelated importers, an average profit of 3,7 % was used, based on data from the complaint.
Eden od proizvajalcev izvoznikov je trdil, da bi bilo treba izvozno ceno določiti na podlagi transfernih cen med proizvajalcem izvoznikom in njegovimi povezanimi družbami v EU in ne na podlagi člena 2(9) osnovne uredbe.
One of the exporting producers claimed that instead of applying Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, the export price should be based on the transfer prices between the exporting producer and its related companies in the EU.
Trdil je, da so te cene zanesljive, saj so carinski in davčni organi (za namene DDV in davka od dohodkov) nekaterih držav članic sprejeli, da so transakcije med trgovci in matično družbo izvedene po običajnih tržnih pogojih.
It argued that these prices are reliable since the customs and tax authorities (for VAT purposes and income tax) of some Member States accepted that the transactions between the traders and the mother company are at arm's length.
Komisija je zaradi naslednjih razlogov začasno zavrnila to trditev.
The Commission provisionally rejected this claim for the following reasons.
Prvič, namen preverjanja carinskih organov se bistveno razlikuje od namena preverjanja, ki ga izvede Komisija v okviru protidampinške preiskave.
First, the purpose of the customs authorities' verification differs substantially from the one the Commission carries out in the context of an anti-dumping investigation.
Ker so v tem primeru carinske dajatve enake nič, carinski organi niso imeli pobude, da bi podvomili v deklarirane izvozne cene.
In this case, since the customs duties are zero, the customs authorities had no incentive to question the declared export prices.
Poleg tega Komisija ni dobila dovolj dokazov, da so davčni organi izrecno sprejeli izvozne cene med proizvajalcem izvoznikom in njegovimi povezanimi družbami v EU.
In addition, the Commission did not receive sufficient evidence showing that the tax authorities explicitly accepted the export prices between the exporting producer and its related companies in the EU.
Drugič, prav tako ni bilo mogoče sprejeti trditve, da so organi, pristojni za DDV, sprejeli izvozne cene v skladu z običajnimi tržnimi pogoji, saj se plačani DDV družbi v vsakem primeru povrne, ko uvoženo blago proda naprej.
Second, the claim that VAT authorities have accepted the arm's length export prices could not be accepted either since the company is anyway reimbursed for the VAT collected at the moment it resells the goods imported.
Nenazadnje, proizvajalec izvoznik se je skliceval na dve uredbi Sveta, v katerih so bile sprejete transferne cene [4].
Finally, the exporting producer referred to two Council Regulations where transfer prices had been accepted [4].
Vendar je lahko Komisija v dveh zadevnih primerih prodajo prek povezanih uvoznikov primerjala s prodajo prek nepovezanih uvoznikov, kar je v obravnavanem primeru nemogoče, saj prodaja prek nepovezanih uvoznikov ni bila reprezentativna (približno 1 % celotne prodaje v EU).
However, in the two cases concerned, the Commission could compare sales via related importers with the sales via unrelated ones, which is impossible in the case at hand since the sales via unrelated importers were not representative (around 1 % of all sales to the EU).
Kar zadeva drugega proizvajalca izvoznika, se del celotnega izvoza (približno 10 %–17 %) ni prodal naprej pod pogoji, pod katerimi je bil uvožen, saj je te uvožene izdelke predelala povezana družba v Italiji.
As regards the other exporting producer, part of the total export sales (some 10-17 %) were not resold in the conditions in which they were imported as they were processed by a related company in Italy.
Ta povezana družba je uvažala polpredelane (gole) cevi, ki so bile nato nadalje predelane z dodajanjem zunanje (cink) in notranje (cement) obloge.
This related company imported semi-processed (bare) pipes which were then further processed by adding external (zinc) and internal coating (cement) to the pipes.
Zadevni izdelek vključuje uvožene gole cevi in dokončane cevi.
Both the imported bare pipes and the finished pipes are product concerned.
Nanašanje notranje in zunanje obloge na cevi zahteva znatne naložbe v stroje, opremo in surovine ter določeno število zaposlenih s posebnimi kvalifikacijami.
The internal and external coating of the pipes requires substantial investments in machinery and equipment, raw materials as well as a number of employees with specific qualifications.
Komisija lahko v primeru, da se izdelki ne prodajo naprej v stanju, v katerem so bili uvoženi, izvozno ceno konstruira „na kateri koli razumni osnovi“, kot je določeno v členu 2(9) osnovne uredbe.
In the scenario where products are not resold in the condition in which they were imported, the Commission may construct the export price ‘on any reasonable basis’, as provided for in Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation.
V tem primeru se je začasno odločila za prilagoditev cene, po kateri je bil predelani izdelek prvič prodan naprej neodvisnim strankam v Uniji, za vse stroške, nastale med uvozom in nadaljnjo prodajo (razen predelovalnih stroškov), PSA-stroške in dobiček.
In this case, the Commission has provisionally decided to adjust the price at which the processed product was first resold to independent customers in the Union by all costs incurred between importation and resale (excluding processing costs), SG&A expenses and for profit.
Komisija bo nadalje preiskala podatke v zvezi s stroški predelave, nastalimi v EU, da bi ugotovila, ali je prilagoditev primerna in kakšna stopnja prilagoditve je ustrezna.
In regard to processing costs incurred in the EU, the Commission will investigate further to determine whether an adjustment is appropriate and at what level.
Ker ni bilo drugega ustreznega merila, je bil za stopnjo dobička nepovezanega uvoznika uporabljen 3,7-odstotni povprečni dobiček na podlagi podatkov iz pritožbe.
In the absence of any other reasonable benchmark, an average profit of 3,7 % was used as a level of profit of unrelated importer, based on data from the complaint.
Razlogi za konstruiranje izvozne cene na tej podlagi so naslednji:
The reasons for constructing the export price on this basis are the following:
uvožene gole cevi se na trgu Unije ne prodajajo, saj jih brez nadaljnje predelave ni mogoče uporabljati za oskrbo z vodo ali odstranjevanje odplak.
the imported bare pipes are not sold on the Union market as these cannot be used for any water supply or sewage without further processing.
Iz istega razloga se ne prodajajo niti na domačem trgu v Indiji,
For the same reason, bare pipes are not sold on the domestic market in India either;
glede na višino stroškov predelave, ki so visoki zaradi opreme, surovin in delovne sile, potrebnih za preoblikovanje uvoženih golih cevi v uporaben izdelek, bi odbitek teh stroškov, ki so precej višji od stroškov dokončanja izdelka po željah stranke, prinesel nesmiseln in umeten rezultat.
in view of the magnitude of the processing costs, which are substantial as a result of the equipment, raw materials and labour needed to transform the imported bare pipes into a usable product, a deduction of these costs, which are much higher than the cost of finishing a product according to customer requirements, would lead to an unreasonable and artificial result.
Kar zadeva druge izdelke, ki so se uvažali, sta imela oba proizvajalca izvoznika povezanega uvoznika v Združenem kraljestvu, ki je nadalje predelal uvožene izdelke z dodajanjem prirobnic in rezanjem cevi na manjše velikosti.
As regards other products that were imported, both exporting producers had a related importer in the UK which further processed the imported products by adding flanges and cutting the pipes into smaller sizes.
Komisija je začasno konstruirala izvozno ceno teh drugih izdelkov v skladu s členom 2(9) osnovne uredbe, tako da je prilagodila ceno, po kateri je bil uvoženi izdelek prvič prodan naprej neodvisnim strankam v Uniji, za vse stroške, nastale med uvozom in nadaljnjo prodajo, vključno s predelovalnimi stroški v Uniji, PSA-stroške in dobiček, da bi bila cena ponovno enaka ceni nepredelanega izdelka (ki ni razrezan in/ali nima prirobnic).
The Commission provisionally constructed the export price of these other products in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, by adjusting the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union by all costs incurred between importation and resale, including the processing costs in the Union, SG&A expenses, and for profit, in order to bring the price back to the price of unprocessed (not cut and/or with no flanges).
Eden od proizvajalcev izvoznikov je trdil, da bi morala Komisija za vrste izdelka, ki niso bile prodane naprej v istem stanju, v katerem so bile uvožene, ker jih je predelala povezana družba, izvozno ceno konstruirati na podlagi neposredne prodaje proizvajalca izvoznika v EU, ki bi jo po možnosti dopolnila z izvoznimi cenami družbe, zaračunanimi neodvisnim strankam v tretjih državah, in ne na podlagi cen, zaračunanih prvim neodvisnim strankam.
One of the exporting producers argued that for the product types which were not resold in the conditions in which they were imported as they were processed by a related company, the Commission should construct the export price, not on the basis of the prices charged to the first independent customers, but rather on the basis of the exporting producer's direct sales to the EU, possibly complemented with the company's export prices to independent customers in third countries.
Komisija je začasno sklenila, da bi bilo treba predlagani pristop zavrniti.
The Commission provisionally concluded that the suggested approach should be rejected.
Prvič, obseg in vrednost neposredne prodaje proizvajalca izvoznika v EU sta bila v obdobju preiskave zelo omejena, zato ta prodaja ni bila reprezentativna.
First, the direct sales to the EU of the exporting producer were very marginal during the IP both in volume and in value and are thus not representative.
Drugič, prodaja v tretje države ni primerna podlaga, saj ni ustrezen pokazatelj gospodarskega položaja in ravnanja proizvajalca izvoznika na trgu Unije, zlasti zaradi dejstva, da je proizvajalec izvoznik prek povezanih trgovcev v Unijo v istem obdobju prodal velike količine izdelkov.
Second, the sales to third countries are not a reasonable basis as they do not sufficiently reflect the economic position and behaviour of the exporting producer on the Union market, especially given the fact that the exporting producer did sell to the Union in large quantities via related traders during the same period.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je trdil tudi, da bi bilo treba prilagoditve omejiti na stroške „nastale med uvozom in nadaljnjo prodajo“ ter da bi morale biti te prilagoditve tako smiselno povezane s postopkom nadaljnje prodaje.
The exporting producer also argued that adjustments should be limited to those ‘incurred between importation and resale’ and should thus reasonably relate to the resale process.
Zato ti stroški ne morejo vključevati na primer PSA-stroškov, ki jih običajno krije proizvajalec, predelovalec ali izvoznik.
Thus, these costs can for instance not include the SG&A costs that are normally borne by a producer, processor or exporter.
PSA-stroški povezanih družb v EU ne bi bili razumni stroški za družbo, ki je zgolj uvoznica.
The SG&A costs of the related companies in the EU would not be reasonable costs for a mere importer.
Proizvajalec izvoznik in njegove povezane družbe v EU so domnevno en gospodarski subjekt, kar bi vplivalo na vrsto prilagoditev, ki se lahko izvedejo pri konstruiranju izvozne cene.
The exporting producer and its related companies in the EU are allegedly a single economic entity, which would have an impact on the kind of adjustments that can be made to construct the export price.
Družba je nadalje trdila, da bi bilo treba PSA-stroške in dobiček za konstruiranje izvozne cene ponovno izračunati, tako da bi se nanašali samo na dejavnost uvoznika.
The company further argued that the SG&A and profit to be used to construct the export price should be re-calculated so that they would only relate to the activity of an importer.
Komisija se v zvezi s trditvijo, da bi bilo treba prilagoditve omejiti na stroške, „nastale med uvozom in nadaljnjo prodajo“, sklicuje na uveljavljeno sodno prakso evropskih sodišč, v skladu s katero člen 2(9) osnovne uredbe ne izključuje prilagoditev za stroške, nastale pred uvozom, v kolikor navedene stroške običajno krije uvoznik.
As regards the argument that adjustments should be limited to those ‘incurred between importation and resale’ the Commission refers to established case-law of the European Courts according to which Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation does not preclude adjustments being made for costs incurred before importation, inasmuch as those costs are normally borne by the importer.
Poleg tega iz te sodne prakse izhaja, da obstoj enega samega gospodarskega subjekta ne vpliva na uporabo člena 2(9) osnovne uredbe ali na prilagoditve, določene v navedenem členu.
Moreover, it follows from this case-law that the existence of a single economic entity does not affect the applicability and the adjustments set out in Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation.
Ta sodna praksa kaže tudi, da dejstvo, da povezane družbe izvajajo samo nekatere funkcije, ne ovira uporabe člena 2(9) osnovne uredbe, vendar se to kaže v nižjem znesku PSA-stroškov, ki se odšteje od cene, po kateri se zadevni izdelek prvič proda naprej neodvisnemu kupcu.
This case-law also implies that the fact that the related companies perform only certain functions is not an obstacle to the application of Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation but is reflected in a lower amount of SG&A to be deducted from the price at which the product concerned is first resold to an independent buyer.
Zainteresirana stran, ki namerava izpodbijati obseg prilagoditev, izvedenih na podlagi člena 2(9) osnovne uredbe, v vsakem primeru nosi dokazno breme.
In any event, the interested party who intends to dispute the extent of the adjustments made on the basis of Article 2(9) of the Basic Regulation has a burden of proof.
Če ta stran meni, da so prilagoditve pretirane, mora zato predložiti konkretne dokaze in izračune, ki upravičujejo navedene trditve, ter zlasti alternativno stopnjo.
Hence, if this party deems the adjustments to be excessive it must supply specific evidence and calculations justifying those claims and, in particular, the alternative rate.
Komisija meni, da stopnja PSA-stroškov, ki jo je začasno uporabila za konstruiranje izvozne cene, izraža funkcije, ki jih izvajajo povezane družbe, zato je začasno zavrnila te trditve.
As the Commission is of the view that the level of SG&A provisionally used to construct the export price reflects the functions performed by the related companies it provisionally rejected these claims.
Primerjava
Comparison
Komisija je primerjala normalno vrednost in izvozno ceno sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov na podlagi franko tovarna.
The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the cooperating exporting producers on an ex-works basis.
Pritožnik je zahteval, da Komisija uporabi izredno metodo za ciljno usmerjen damping, določeno v drugem stavku člena 2(11) osnovne protidampinške uredbe, saj „obstaja vzorec izvoznih cen, ki se bistveno razlikuje med različnimi kupci in regijami, zaradi česar bodo stopnje dampinga bistveno višje, [saj] je indijski izvoz usmerjen […] v Združeno kraljestvo, Španijo, Italijo in Francijo ter na določene velike stranke“.
The complainant requested the Commission to apply the exceptional methodology of targeted dumping laid down in the second sentence of Article 2(11) of the basic AD Regulation because ‘there is a pattern of export prices, which differs significantly among different purchasers and regions, which will result in significantly higher dumping margins (as) the Indian exporters are targeting (…) UK, Spain, Italy and France and certain large customers’.
Komisija je začasno zavrnila trditve o ciljno usmerjenem dampingu, saj pritožnik ni predložil dovolj dokazov v podporo svoji trditvi.
The Commission provisionally dismissed the allegations of targeted dumping as the complainant failed to submit sufficient evidence in support of its allegation.
Edini dokazi, ki jih je predložil, so bili podatki Eurostata, ki kažejo, da večina izvoza proizvajalcev izvoznikov v EU vstopi prek samo štirih držav članic.
The only evidence submitted was Eurostat data showing that the majority of the exports to the EU of the exporting producers enter via only four Member States.
Vendar bi se lahko ti izvoženi izdelki naknadno poslali v druge države članice.
However, these exports could be subsequently shipped to other Member States as well.
Še pomembneje, predloženi niso bili nobeni podatki, ki bi dokazovali razlike v cenah med državami članicami.
In addition, and more importantly, no data was submitted evidencing differences in prices between Member States.
Poleg tega Komisija ni mogla določiti vzorca izvoznih cen, ki bi se bistveno razlikovale med različnimi kupci in regijami.
In addition, the Commission could not establish a pattern of export prices, which differs significantly among different purchasers and regions.
Preiskava je pokazala, da so bile cene proizvajalcev Unije, ki so prodajali v nekaterih državah članicah, nižje od povprečne cene v Uniji, vendar tega ni bilo mogoče povezati z morebitnimi ciljno usmerjenimi dampinškimi praksami, zlasti ker je to za cene veljalo že pred tem, ko so indijski proizvajalci izvozniki začeli izvažati v EU.
The investigation showed that the prices of Union producers selling in some Member States were lower than the average for the Union, but this could not be linked to any targeted dumping practices in particular because this was already the case before the Indian exporting producers started exporting to the EU.
Kadar je Komisija to lahko upravičila s potrebo po zagotovitvi poštene primerjave, je v skladu s členom 2(10) osnovne uredbe normalno vrednost in/ali izvozno ceno prilagodila za razlike, ki so vplivale na cene in njihovo primerljivost.
Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.
Prilagoditve so bile izvedene za stroške prevoza in zavarovanja, manipulativne stroške, stroške pakiranja, stroške kredita, bančne stroške, provizije, uvozne dajatve in poprodajne stroške.
Adjustments were made for freight and insurance, handling, packaging, credit costs, bank charges, commission, import charges and after sales costs.
Vendar prilagoditve za povračilo dajatev niso bile izvedene, saj proizvajalca izvoznika nista dokazala, da je neplačani ali vrnjeni davek na izvoz vključen v domačo ceno.
However, no adjustment was made for duty drawback since the exporting producers failed to prove that the tax not paid or refunded on export sales is included in the domestic price.
Indijska proizvajalca izvoznika sta zelo pozno v preiskavi trdila, da obstajajo bistvene fizikalne razlike med izdelki z različnimi kontrolnimi številkami proizvoda (PCN), ki bi upravičile prilagoditve za pošteno primerjavo cen ali izključitev nekaterih posebnih izdelkov, ki jih prodaja pritožnik.
The Indian exporting producers made a claim at a very late stage of the investigation that there are substantial physical differences within Product Control Numbers (PCNs) that would warrant adjustments for fair price comparison or the exclusion of certain special products sold by the complainant.
Vendar informacije, ki kažejo take razlike v fizikalnih lastnostih in morebitno vrednost prilagoditev, niso bile dovolj utemeljene, da bi se v tej fazi preiskave sprejelo stališče v zvezi s tem.
However, the information demonstrating such differences in physical characteristics and potential value of adjustments was not sufficiently substantiated to take a position at this stage of the investigation.
Trditev je bila zato začasno zavrnjena.
The claim is therefore provisionally rejected.
Stopnje dampinga
Dumping margins
Komisija je za sodelujoča proizvajalca izvoznika primerjala tehtano povprečno normalno vrednost vsake vrste podobnega izdelka s tehtano povprečno izvozno ceno ustrezne vrste zadevnega izdelka v skladu s členom 2(11) in (12) osnovne uredbe.
For the cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.
Stopnja sodelovanja je v tem primeru visoka, saj je uvoz sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov predstavljal 100 % celotnega izvoza v Unijo v obdobju preiskave.
The level of cooperation in this case is high because the imports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted 100 % of the total exports to the Union during the IP.
Komisija je na podlagi tega sklenila, da bo preostalo stopnjo dampinga določila na ravni sodelujoče družbe z najvišjo stopnjo dampinga.
On this basis, the Commission decided to base the residual dumping margin at the level of the cooperating company with the highest dumping margin.
Začasne stopnje dampinga, izražene kot odstotek cene CIF meja Unije brez plačane dajatve, so:
The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:
Ime družbe
Name of company
Začasna stopnja dampinga