natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the absence of Union rules on the quantification of harm caused by a competition law infringement, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to determine its own rules on quantifying harm, and for the Member States and for the national courts to determine what requirements the claimant has to meet when proving the amount of the harm suffered, the methods that can be used in quantifying the amount, and the consequences of not being able to fully meet those requirements.
Upoštevati bi bilo treba vsakršno asimetrijo informacij med strankama in dejstvo, da ocenjevanje višine škode pomeni ocenjevanje tega, kako bi se zadevni trg razvijal, če ne bi bilo kršitve.
However, the requirements of national law regarding the quantification of harm in competition law cases should not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence), nor should they render the exercise of the Union right to damages practically impossible or excessively difficult (principle of effectiveness).
To ocenjevanje pomeni izvedbo primerjave dejanskega stanja s stanjem, ki je samo po sebi le domneva in kot takšno ne more biti nikoli popolnoma natančno določeno.
Regard should be had to any information asymmetries between the parties and to the fact that quantifying the harm means assessing how the market in question would have evolved had there been no infringement.
Zato je primerno, da se zagotovi, da so nacionalna sodišča pristojna za ocenjevanje višine škode, povzročene s kršitvijo konkurenčnega prava.
This assessment implies a comparison with a situation which is by definition hypothetical and can thus never be made with complete accuracy.
Države članice bi morale zagotoviti, da lahko nacionalni organi, pristojni za konkurenco, na zahtevo predložijo smernice glede višine.
It is therefore appropriate to ensure that national courts have the power to estimate the amount of the harm caused by the competition law infringement.
Za zagotovitev skladnosti in predvidljivosti bi morala Komisija zagotoviti splošne smernice na ravni Unije.
Member States should ensure that, where requested, national competition authorities may provide guidance on quantum.
Da bi odpravili asimetrijo informacij in nekatere težave v zvezi ocenjevanjem višine škode v zadevah na področju konkurenčnega prava, ter da bi zagotovili učinkovito reševanje odškodninskih zahtevkov, je primerno domnevati, da kršitve v primeru kartela povzročijo škodo, zlasti prek vpliva na ceno.
In order to ensure coherence and predictability, the Commission should provide general guidance at Union level.
Odvisno od okoliščin primera, karteli povzročijo zvišanje cene ali preprečijo znižanje cen, do katerega bi prišlo, z izjemo kartela.
To remedy the information asymmetry and some of the difficulties associated with quantifying harm in competition law cases, and to ensure the effectiveness of claims for damages, it is appropriate to presume that cartel infringements result in harm, in particular via an effect on prices.
Ta domneva ne bi smela zajemati konkretnega obsega škode.
Depending on the facts of the case, cartels result in a rise in prices, or prevent a lowering of prices which would otherwise have occurred but for the cartel.
Kršitelji bi morali imeti možnost izpodbijanja takšne domneve.
This presumption should not cover the concrete amount of harm.
To izpodbojno domnevo je primerno omejiti na kartele zaradi njihove skrivne narave, ki povečuje asimetrijo informacij in tožnikom otežuje pridobivanje dokazov, ki so potrebni za dokaz obstoja škode.
Infringers should be allowed to rebut the presumption.
Da bi zmanjšali negotovost za kršitelje in oškodovance, je za tožence zaželena poravnava „enkrat za vselej“.
It is appropriate to limit this rebuttable presumption to cartels, given their secret nature, which increases the information asymmetry and makes it more difficult for claimants to obtain the evidence necessary to prove the harm.
Zato bi bilo kršitelje in oškodovance treba spodbuditi k sklenitvi dogovora o povrnitvi škode, povzročene s kršitvijo konkurenčnega prava, in sicer s pomočjo mehanizmov sporazumnega reševanja sporov, kot so zunajsodne poravnave (tudi tiste, pri katerih lahko sodnik razglasi zavezujočo poravnavo), arbitraža in mediacija ali sprava.
Achieving a ‘once-and-for-all’ settlement for defendants is desirable in order to reduce uncertainty for infringers and injured parties.
Takšno sporazumno reševanje sporov bi moralo vključiti toliko oškodovancev in kršiteljev, kot je to zakonsko dopustno.
Therefore, infringers and injured parties should be encouraged to agree on compensating for the harm caused by a competition law infringement through consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, such as out-of-court settlements (including those where a judge can declare a settlement binding), arbitration, mediation or conciliation.
Določbe te direktive o sporazumnem reševanju sporov so zato namenjene omogočanju uporabe takšnih mehanizmov in njihove večje učinkovitosti.
Such consensual dispute resolution should cover as many injured parties and infringers as legally possible.
Zastaralni roki za vložitev odškodninskih tožb bi lahko bili takšni, da oškodovancem in kršiteljem ne bi dopuščali dovolj časa za sklenitev dogovora o odškodnini, ki se izplača.
The provisions in this Directive on consensual dispute resolution are therefore meant to facilitate the use of such mechanisms and increase their effectiveness.
Da bi obema stranema dali dejansko priložnost za sporazumno rešitev spora, preden začneta postopek pred nacionalnimi sodišči, bi se morali zastaralni roki za čas postopka sporazumnega reševanja spora pretrgati.
Limitation periods for bringing an action for damages could be such that they prevent injured parties and infringers from having sufficient time to come to an agreement on the compensation to be paid.
Poleg tega bi moralo imeti nacionalno sodišče v primeru, ko se stranki po vložitvi odškodninske tožbe pri njem odločita, da bosta predmet te tožbe poizkušali sporazumno rešiti, možnost pretrgati postopek, ki teče pred njim, za čas postopka sporazumnega reševanja spora.
In order to provide both sides with a genuine opportunity to engage in consensual dispute resolution before bringing proceedings before national courts, limitation periods need to be suspended for the duration of the consensual dispute resolution process.
Nacionalno sodišče bi moralo pri odločanju o tem, ali naj pretrga postopek, upoštevati interes hitre rešitve spora.
Furthermore, when parties decide to engage in consensual dispute resolution after an action for damages for the same claim has been brought before a national court, that court should be able to suspend the proceedings before it for the duration of the consensual dispute resolution process.
Da bi spodbudili sklepanje sporazumnih poravnav, kršitelj, ki plača odškodnino v okviru sporazumne rešitve spora, ne bi smel biti v slabšem položaju v razmerju do sokršiteljev kot v primeru, da ne bi sklenil sporazumne poravnave.
When considering whether to suspend the proceedings, the national court should take into account the advantages of an expeditious procedure.
To se lahko zgodi, kadar je kršitelj, ki sklene poravnavo, tudi po sklenitvi sporazumne poravnave še naprej solidarno odgovoren za celotno škodo, povzročeno s kršitvijo.
To encourage consensual settlements, an infringer that pays damages through consensual dispute resolution should not be placed in a worse position vis-à-vis its co-infringers than it would otherwise be without the consensual settlement.
Kršitelj, ki sklene poravnavo, zato načeloma ne bi smel biti dolžan prispevati k finančnemu znesku odškodnine, ki ga sokršitelji, ki niso sklenili poravnave, plačajo oškodovancu, s katerim je prvi kršitelj že sklenil poravnavo.
That might happen if a settling infringer, even after a consensual settlement, continued to be fully jointly and severally liable for the harm caused by the infringement.
Pogoj za to pravilo o neplačilu prispevka je, da bi se moral zahtevek oškodovanca zmanjšati za delež kršitelja, s katerim se je poravnal, v škodi, ki mu je bila povzročena, ne glede na to, ali je znesek poravnave enak sorazmernemu deležu škode, ki jo je sokršitelj, ki sklene poravnavo, povzročil oškodovancu, ki sklene poravnavo, ali ne.
A settling infringer should in principle therefore not contribute to its non-settling co-infringers when the latter have paid damages to an injured party with whom the first infringer had previously settled.
Ta sorazmerni delež bi bilo treba določiti v skladu s pravili, kot se uporabljajo za določitev prispevkov kršiteljev.
The corollary to this non-contribution rule is that the claim of the injured party should be reduced by the settling infringer's share of the harm caused to it, regardless of whether the amount of the settlement equals or is different from the relative share of the harm that the settling co-infringer inflicted upon the settling injured party.
Brez takšnega zmanjšanja odškodnine bi bili kršitelji, ki se niso poravnali, neupravičeno prizadeti s poravnavo, katere stranke niso bili.
That relative share should be determined in accordance with the rules otherwise used to determine the contributions among infringers.
Vendar pa bi moral zaradi zagotovitve pravice do popolne odškodnine kršitelj, ki sklene poravnavo, še vedno plačati odškodnino, kadar je to edina možnost oškodovanca, ki sklene poravnavo, da pridobi odškodnino za preostali znesek zahtevka.
Without such a reduction, non-settling infringers would be unduly affected by settlements to which they were not a party.
Preostali znesek zahtevka pomeni znesek oškodovanca, ki sklene poravnavo, zmanjšan za delež sokršitelja, ki sklene poravnavo, v škodi, ki je bila s kršitvijo povzročena oškodovancu.
However, in order to ensure the right to full compensation, settling co-infringers should still have to pay damages where that is the only possibility for the settling injured party to obtain compensation for the remaining claim.
Ta možnost, da se od sokršitelja, ki sklene poravnavo, zahteva odškodnino, obstaja, razen če je ta možnost izrecno izključena v okviru pogojev sporazumne poravnave.
The remaining claim refers to the claim of the settling injured party reduced by the settling co-infringer's share of the harm that the infringement inflicted upon the settling injured party.
Izogibati bi se bilo treba primerom, v katerih sokršitelji, ki sklenejo poravnavo, pri plačilu prispevka sokršiteljem, ki ne sklenejo poravnave, za odškodnino, ki so jo plačali oškodovancem, ki ne sklenejo poravnave, skupni znesek odškodnine presega njihovo relativno odgovornost za škodo, povzročeno s kršitvijo.
The latter possibility to claim damages from the settling co-infringer exists unless it is expressly excluded under the terms of the consensual settlement.
Kadar se torej od sokršiteljev, ki sklenejo poravnavo, zahteva, naj prispevajo k znesku odškodnine, ki ga oškodovancem, ki ne sklenejo poravnave, pozneje plačajo sokršitelji, ki ne sklenejo poravnave, bi morala nacionalna sodišča upoštevati znesek odškodnine, ki je že bila izplačana v okviru sporazumne poravnave, pri tem pa biti pozorno na to, da vsi sokršitelji niso nujno v enaki meri vpleteni v celoten vsebinski, časovni in geografski obseg kršitve.
Situations should be avoided in which settling co-infringers, by paying contribution to non-settling co-infringers for damages they paid to non-settling injured parties, pay a total amount of compensation exceeding their relative responsibility for the harm caused by the infringement.
Ta direktiva spoštuje temeljne pravice in upošteva načela, priznana z Listino Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah.
Therefore, when settling co-infringers are asked to contribute to damages subsequently paid by non-settling co-infringers to non-settling injured parties, national courts should take account of the damages already paid under the consensual settlement, bearing in mind that not all co-infringers are necessarily equally involved in the full substantive, temporal and geographical scope of the infringement.
Ker ciljev te direktive, in sicer vzpostavitve pravil glede odškodninskih tožb zaradi kršitev konkurenčnega prava Unije, da bi zagotovili polni učinek členov 101 in 102 PDEU ter pravilno delovanje notranjega trga za podjetja in potrošnike, države članice ne morejo zadovoljivo doseči, temveč se zaradi potrebne učinkovitosti in doslednosti pri uporabi členov 101 in 102 PDEU lažje dosežejo na ravni Unije, lahko Unija sprejme ukrepe v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 PEU.
This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
V skladu z načelom sorazmernosti iz navedenega člena ta direktiva ne presega tistega, kar je potrebno za doseganje navedenih ciljev.
Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to establish rules concerning actions for damages for infringements of Union competition law in order to ensure the full effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and the proper functioning of the internal market for undertakings and consumers, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of the requisite effectiveness and consistency in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU.
V skladu s Skupno politično izjavo z dne 28. septembra 2011 držav članic in Komisije o obrazložitvenih dokumentih [7] se države članice zavezujejo, da bodo v upravičenih primerih obvestilu o ukrepih za prenos priložile en ali več dokumentov, v katerih se pojasni razmerje med sestavnimi elementi direktive in ustrezajočimi deli nacionalnih instrumentov za prenos.
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
Zakonodajalec meni, da je posredovanje takih dokumentov v primeru te direktive upravičeno.
In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents [7], Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the components of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments.
Primerno je določiti pravila za začasno uporabo te direktive –
With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified.
SPREJELA NASLEDNJO DIREKTIVO:
It is appropriate to provide rules for the temporal application of this Directive,
POGLAVJE I
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
PREDMET UREJANJA, PODROČJE UPORABE IN OPREDELITVE POJMOV
SUBJECT MATTER, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
Predmet urejanja in področje uporabe
Article 1
Ta direktiva določa nekatera pravila za zagotovitev, da lahko vsakdo, ki je utrpel škodo zaradi kršitve konkurenčnega prava s strani podjetja ali podjetniških združenj, učinkovito uveljavlja pravico, da od tega podjetja ali združenja zahteva popolno odškodnino za takšno škodo.
Subject matter and scope
Ta direktiva določa pravila, ki spodbujajo neizkrivljanje konkurence na notranjem trgu in odpravljajo ovire za njegovo pravilno delovanje, in sicer z zagotavljanjem enakovredne zaščite po vsej Uniji za vsakogar, ki je utrpel takšno škodo.
This Directive sets out certain rules necessary to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law by an undertaking or by an association of undertakings can effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation for that harm from that undertaking or association.
Ta direktiva določa pravila, s katerimi se usklajuje izvajanje pravil o konkurenci s strani organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, in pravil v zvezi z odškodninskimi tožbami pred nacionalnimi sodišči.
It sets out rules fostering undistorted competition in the internal market and removing obstacles to its proper functioning, by ensuring equivalent protection throughout the Union for anyone who has suffered such harm.
Člen 2
This Directive sets out rules coordinating the enforcement of the competition rules by competition authorities and the enforcement of those rules in damages actions before national courts.
Opredelitve pojmov
Article 2
V tej direktivi se uporabljajo naslednje opredelitve pojmov:
Definitions
„kršitev konkurenčnega prava“ pomeni kršitev člena 101 ali 102 PDEU ali nacionalnega konkurenčnega prava;
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply:
„kršitelj“ pomeni podjetje ali podjetniško združenje, ki je kršilo konkurenčno pravo;
‘infringement of competition law’ means an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, or of national competition law;
„nacionalno konkurenčno pravo“ pomeni določbe nacionalnega prava, ki imajo večinoma isti cilj kot člena 101 in 102 PDEU ter se uporabljajo v isti zadevi in vzporedno s konkurenčnim pravom Unije v skladu s členom 3(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003, z izjemo določb nacionalnega prava, ki nalagajo kazenske sankcije fizičnim osebam, razen kadar so takšne kazenske sankcije sredstvo, s katerim se izvršujejo pravila konkurence, ki se uporabljajo za podjetja;
‘infringer’ means an undertaking or association of undertakings which has committed an infringement of competition law;
„odškodninska tožba“ pomeni tožbo po nacionalnem pravu, v okviru katere domnevni oškodovanec ali zastopnik enega ali več domnevnih oškodovancev, če pravo Unije ali nacionalno pravo zagotavlja to možnost, ali fizična ali pravna oseba, ki je pravni naslednik pravic domnevnega oškodovanca, vključno z osebo, ki je prevzela zahtevek, vloži odškodninski zahtevek na nacionalnem sodišču;
‘national competition law’ means provisions of national law that predominantly pursue the same objective as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and that are applied to the same case and in parallel to Union competition law pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, excluding provisions of national law which impose criminal penalties on natural persons, except to the extent that such criminal penalties are the means whereby competition rules applying to undertakings are enforced;
„odškodninski zahtevek“ pomeni zahtevek za povračilo škode, povzročene s kršitvijo konkurenčnega prava;
‘action for damages’ means an action under national law by which a claim for damages is brought before a national court by an alleged injured party, or by someone acting on behalf of one or more alleged injured parties where Union or national law provides for that possibility, or by a natural or legal person that succeeded in the right of the alleged injured party, including the person that acquired the claim;
„oškodovanec“ pomeni osebo, ki je utrpela škodo, povzročeno s kršitvijo konkurenčnega prava;
‘claim for damages’ means a claim for compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law;
„nacionalni organ, pristojen za konkurenco,“ pomeni organ, ki ga država članica v skladu s členom 35 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 določi kot odgovornega za uporabo členov 101 in 102 PDEU;
‘injured party’ means a person that has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law;
„organ, pristojen za konkurenco,“ pomeni Komisijo ali nacionalni organ, pristojen za konkurenco oziroma oba, če se tako smiselno razume;
‘national competition authority’ means an authority designated by a Member State pursuant to Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, as being responsible for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU;
„nacionalno sodišče“ pomeni sodišče države članice v smislu člena 267 PDEU;
‘competition authority’ means the Commission or a national competition authority or both, as the context may require;
„pritožbeno sodišče“ pomeni nacionalno sodišče, ki je na podlagi rednega pritožbenega postopka pristojno za sodno presojo odločb nacionalnih organov, pristojnih za konkurenco, ali presojo sodb v zvezi z njimi, ne glede na to, ali je to sodišče pristojno za ugotavljanje kršitev konkurenčnega prava ali ne;
‘national court’ means a court or tribunal of a Member State within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU;
„odločba o kršitvi“ pomeni odločbo organa, pristojnega za konkurenco, ali pritožbenega sodišča, ki ugotovi kršitev konkurenčnega prava;
‘review court’ means a national court that is empowered by ordinary means of appeal to review decisions of a national competition authority or to review judgments pronouncing on those decisions, irrespective of whether that court itself has the power to find an infringement of competition law;
„pravnomočna odločba o kršitvi“ pomeni odločbo o kršitvi, zoper katero se ni mogoče ali ni več mogoče pritožiti na podlagi rednega pravnega sredstva;
‘infringement decision’ means a decision of a competition authority or review court that finds an infringement of competition law;
„dokaz“ pomeni vse vrste dokazov, ki so dopustni v postopku pred nacionalnim sodiščem, zlasti dokumente in vse druge predmete, ki vsebujejo informacije, ne glede na vrsto nosilca, na katerem so informacije shranjene;
‘final infringement decision’ means an infringement decision that cannot be, or that can no longer be, appealed by ordinary means;
„kartel“ pomeni dogovor ali usklajeno ravnanje dveh ali več konkurentov, katerega namen je usklajevanje njihovega konkurenčnega ravnanja na trgu ali vplivanje na relevantne parametre konkurence s praksami, kot so, vendar ne samo, določanje ali usklajevanje nakupnih ali prodajnih cen ali drugih pogojev trgovanja, vključno s pravicami intelektualne lastnine, razdelitev proizvodnih ali prodajnih kvot, delitev trgov in kupcev, vključno z manipulacijo razpisov za zbiranje ponudb, omejitve pri uvozu ali izvozu ali protikonkurenčni ukrepi zoper druge konkurente;
‘evidence’ means all types of means of proof admissible before the national court seized, in particular documents and all other objects containing information, irrespective of the medium on which the information is stored;
„program prizanesljivosti“ pomeni program v zvezi z uporabo člena 101 PDEU ali ustreznih določb nacionalne zakonodaje, na podlagi katerega udeleženec v skrivnem kartelu neodvisno od drugih podjetij v kartelu sodeluje s preiskovalnim organom ali organom, pristojnim za konkurenco, tako da prostovoljno predloži informacije o kartelu in svojo vlogo v njem, v zameno za kar se mu z odločbo ali ustavitvijo postopka prizna imuniteta pred kakršno koli globo, ki se naloži kartelu, ali znižanje takšne globe;
‘cartel’ means an agreement or concerted practice between two or more competitors aimed at coordinating their competitive behaviour on the market or influencing the relevant parameters of competition through practices such as, but not limited to, the fixing or coordination of purchase or selling prices or other trading conditions, including in relation to intellectual property rights, the allocation of production or sales quotas, the sharing of markets and customers, including bid-rigging, restrictions of imports or exports or anti-competitive actions against other competitors;
„izjava zaradi prizanesljivosti“ pomeni ustno ali pisno poročilo ali dokumentacijo, ki ju podjetje ali fizična oseba ali njun zastopnik prostovoljno zagotovi organu, pristojnemu za konkurenco, in v okviru katerih so navedene informacije podjetja ali fizične osebe o kartelu in opis njegove vloge v njem, pripravljeno pa je bilo posebej za predložitev organu, pristojnemu za konkurenco, z namenom priznanja imunitete ali znižanja globe v okviru programa prizanesljivosti, in ne izključuje predhodnih informacij;