natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The GOC claimed that the Commission had no grounds on which to consider the GOC as being non-cooperative in this case as it either ignored or misunderstood its obligation to consider the ‘practical ability’ of the GOC to respond to its demand.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da Komisija ni imela razlogov za mnenje, da kitajska vlada v tem primeru ne sodeluje, saj Komisija bodisi ni upoštevala svoje obveznosti upoštevanja „dejanske zmožnosti“ kitajske vlade, da izpolni njene zahteve, bodisi jo je napačno razumela.
According to the GOC, the investigation as a whole has been unduly burdensome such that cooperation in general has been rendered impossible, and the Commission as an investigating authority has continually refused to work with the GOC so as to mitigate such burdens.
Glede na navedbe kitajske vlade je bila preiskava kot celota preveč obremenjujoča, tako da je bilo sodelovanje na splošno nemogoče, Komisija kot preiskovalni organ pa je nenehno zavračala sodelovanje s kitajsko vlado, s katerim bi se taka bremena ublažila.
This claim is a clear misinterpretation of facts.
Očitno je, da gre pri tej trditvi za napačno tolmačenje dejstev.
The Commission, to meet its legal obligations following the receipt of properly documented complaint and at the same time to respect relevant WTO jurisprudence, requested from the GOC only the information necessary to verify and assess the allegations in the complaint supported by sufficient evidence.
Komisija je, da bi izpolnila svoje pravne obveznosti po prejemu ustrezno dokumentirane pritožbe in hkrati spoštovala ustrezno sodno prakso STO, zahtevala od kitajske vlade le informacije, ki so potrebne, da se preverijo in ocenijo trditve v pritožbi, podprte z zadostnimi dokazi.
The Commission offered assistance to the GOC in the cover letter to the questionnaire as well as in the questionnaire itself.
Komisija je kitajski vladi ponudila pomoč v spremnem dopisu k vprašalniku, pa tudi v vprašalniku samem.
Also in the deficiency letter, the GOC was invited to contact the Commission should it have any questions concerning the requested information.
Tudi v pozivu k dopolnitvi je bila kitajska vlada pozvana, naj se obrne na Komisijo, če ima kakršna koli vprašanja glede zahtevanih informacij.
The Commission also granted exceptionally long deadline extensions for the information to be submitted (see recital (104) above).
Komisija je odobrila tudi izjemno dolgo podaljšanje rokov za predložitev informacij, ki jih je treba predložiti (glej uvodno izjavo (104)).
Furthermore, in this investigation, the Commission requested transaction-specific information from GOC only with regard to the sampled exporters, not to all solar panel producers in China, thus narrowing down the potential volume of required information to a major extent.
Poleg tega je Komisija v tej preiskavi od kitajske vlade zahtevala poslovne informacije le v zvezi z vzorčenimi izvozniki in ne v zvezi z vsemi proizvajalci solarnih panelov na Kitajskem, s čimer je v veliki meri zmanjšala potencialno količino zahtevanih informacij.
The Commission notes that the GOC appears to conflate arguments concerning its practical ability to provide data with other issues.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je kitajska vlada dozdevno pomešala argumente glede svoje praktične zmožnosti zagotavljanja podatkov z drugimi vprašanji.
For example, when discussing the Commission's allegedly excessive request for information on banks and financial institutions, it bases it argument mainly on the alleged insufficiency of the complaint, claiming that it is based on ‘illegal determinations’ in the Coated Fine Paper case.
V razpravi o domnevno prekomernih zahtevah Komisije po informacijah o bankah in finančnih institucijah je na primer svoj argument utemeljila predvsem na domnevnih pomanjkljivostih pritožbe, ki naj bi bila po njenih trditvah osnovana na „nezakonitih določitvah“ v zadevi v zvezi s premazanim finim papirjem.
Therefore, the GOC's complaint seems to relate to the quality of evidence for initiation, not its practical ability to provide information.
Zato se zdi, da se pritožba kitajske vlade nanaša na kakovost dokazov za začetek preiskave in ne na njeno dejansko zmožnost zagotavljanja informacij.
Indeed, in its letter of 3 June 2013 the GOC repeated its claim from the previous submissions that initiation of many of the programmes did not meet the evidentiary threshold of the Article 11.2 of the WTO SCM Agreement and that by initiating on these programme the Commission violated Article 11.3 of the WTO SCM Agreement.
Kitajska vlada je v svojem dopisu z dne 3. junija 2013 ponovila trditev prejšnjih stališč, da začetek številnih programov ni izpolnil dokaznega praga člena 11(2) Sporazuma o subvencijah in izravnalnih ukrepih STO ter da je Komisija s tem, ko je začela te programe, kršila člen 11(3) Sporazuma o subvencijah in izravnalnih ukrepih STO.
The Commission already replied to these claims in a letter and Memorandum to the GOC and since no new claims were raised in the letter of 3 June 2013 there is no need to re-address the same claims for second time in this regulation.
Komisija je na te trditve že odgovorila v dopisu in memorandumu kitajski vladi, poleg tega v dopisu z dne 3. junija 2013 ni bilo predloženih nobenih novih trditev, zato v tej uredbi istih trditev ni treba ponovno obravnavati.
The GOC also claimed that the Commission did not provide the GOC enough time to complete the questionnaire.
Kitajska vlada je trdila tudi, da ji Komisija ni zagotovila dovolj časa za izpolnitev vprašalnika.
This is simply incorrect.
To preprosto ne drži.
As explained in recital (104) above the Commission granted to the GOC substantial extensions of deadlines, providing the GOC maximum possible time without this having a substantial negative impact on the timely completion of the case.
Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (104), je Komisija kitajski vladi odobrila precejšnje podaljšanje rokov, s čimer ji je zagotovila kar največ časa, ne da bi to bistveno negativno vplivalo na pravočasno dokončanje primera.
The time allowed for the completion of the questionnaire and reply to the deficiency letter was substantially more than the time required by Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.
Rok za izpolnitev vprašalnika in odgovor na poziv k dopolnitvi je bil bistveno daljši od roka, zahtevanega v skladu s členom 11(2) osnovne uredbe.
The GOC claimed that the Commission ignored its request for aid in determining the relative necessity of the questionnaire responses for the purposes of avoiding facts available determinations.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da Komisija ni upoštevala njene zahteve za pomoč pri določanju relativne nujnosti po izpolnjenih vprašalnikih, da bi se s tem izognila določitvam na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev.
In its submission it referred to its request to the Commission to explain the purpose of particular requested information and to which factual determinations it would lead, in order to ‘ensure that it could cooperate to the best of its practical ability while at the same time providing the most essential information’.
Pri svojem stališču se je sklicevala na svojo zahtevo, naj Komisija pojasni namen določenih zahtevanih informacij in za katere dejanske določitve so potrebne, s čimer bi „zagotovila, da bi lahko sodelovala po svojih najboljših dejanskih zmožnostih ter hkrati zagotavljala najbolj bistvene informacije“.
Naturally, the Commission could not know before the actual information is provided to what conclusions it will lead.
Seveda Komisija pred predložitvijo dejanskih informacij ni mogla vedeti, kakšne sklepe bo izpeljala na njihovi podlagi.
The GOC also claims that the Commission structured the questionnaire so as to make it ‘functionally impossible’ to complete and the Commission engaged in ‘fishing expeditions.’ The Commission categorically rejects these allegations.
Kitajska vlada trdi, da je Komisija vprašalnik oblikovala tako, da ga je „funkcionalno nemogoče“ izpolniti, in da je izvajala „iskanje na slepo“. Komisija te trditve odločno zavrača.
As explained above, the questionnaire only requested the information which was necessary to make its determination.
Kot je bilo že pojasnjeno, so bile v vprašalniku zahtevane samo informacije, ki so bile potrebne za določitve.
It was also claimed by the GOC that the Commission insisted on the provision of documents which the GOC could not by law produce or compel to be produced and in this context referred to relevant EU and WTO law which make it clear that only false or misleading information should be disregarded and that it had no ‘practical ability’ to provide certain information of which, as state secret or otherwise, its internal laws strictly prohibit dissemination.
Kitajska vlada je trdila tudi, da je Komisija vztrajala pri zahtevi po predložitvi dokumentov, ki jih kitajska vlada v skladu z zakonom ni mogla predložiti ali zahtevati njihove predložitve, ter se je v tem okviru sklicevala na ustrezno pravo EU in STO, ki jasno določa, da se ne smejo upoštevati zgolj napačne ali zavajajoče informacije, trdila pa je tudi, da ni imela „dejanske zmožnosti“ za predložitev nekaterih informacij, ker so bile državna skrivnost ali iz drugega razloga, razširjanje takih informacij pa je v skladu z njenimi notranjimi zakoni strogo prepovedano.
It further claimed that the relevant provisions of WTO ADA and ASCM which envisage ways in which confidential information can be provided to investigating authorities and granted ‘confidential treatment’ do not always apply in the case where the information is to be provided by the authority of third country, in this case the GOC.
Nadalje je trdila, da ustrezne določbe Protidampinškega sporazuma in Sporazuma SIU STO, ki predvidevajo načine, na katere bi se zaupne informacije lahko zagotovile preiskovalnim organom in bi se zanje odobrila „zaupna obravnava“, ne veljajo vedno v primeru, ko mora informacije zagotoviti organ tretje države, v tem primeru kitajska vlada.
The GOC also claimed that the Commission will fall foul of the ASCM if it refuses to recognise the legal distinction between a government's practical ability to provide information which it is legally prohibited from releasing, on one hand, and other sorts of confidential information for which it may request confidential treatment in the normal course of an investigation.
Kitajska vlada je trdila tudi, da bo Komisija kršila Sporazum SIU, če ne bo priznala pravnega razlikovanja med dejansko zmožnostjo vlade, da zagotovi informacije, ki jih je zakonsko prepovedano razkriti, na eni strani in drugimi vrstami zaupnih informacij, za katere lahko zahteva zaupno obravnavanje pri normalnem poteku preiskave, na drugi strani.
The Commission did not disregard any information which the GOC did not produce, whatever the reason, because it is simply not possible to disregard something that was not provided.
Komisija ni zanemarila nobenih informacij, ki jih kitajska vlada iz kakršnega koli razloga ni predložila, ker preprosto ni mogoče zanemariti nečesa, kar ni bilo predloženo.
On the other hand in a situation where the GOC did not provide, or make available for inspection, certain information, and information of a similar nature was available to the Commission from other sources (mostly publicly available, but also from cooperating exporting producers or submitted by certain banks during on-spot investigations); the Commission included this information in the case file and used it in its determination.
Po drugi strani pa v primeru, ko kitajska vlada ni zagotovila ali zagotovila določenih informacij za pregled, in so bile Komisiji podobne informacije na voljo iz drugih virov (zlasti javno dostopne informacije, pa tudi informacije sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov ali tiste, ki so jih predložile določene banke med preiskavami na kraju samem), je Komisija te informacije vključila v spis zadeve in jih uporabila pri svojih določitvah.
The Commission does not agree with the claim that the WTO ADA and ASCM provisions which envisage ways in which confidential information can be provided to investigating authorities and granted ‘confidential treatment’ do not apply to the GOC.
Komisija se ne strinja s trditvijo, da za kitajsko vlado ne veljajo določbe Protidampinškega sporazuma in Sporazuma SIU STO, ki predvidevajo načine, na katere se zaupne informacije lahko zagotovijo preiskovalnim organom in se zanje odobri „zaupna obravnava“.
In this regard, the GOC is claiming that governments should be held to a different standard of cooperation than that of exporters and that situation of governments warrants a ‘modicum of comity’ to which exporters are not entitled.
V zvezi s tem Kitajska vlada trdi, da bi za vlade moral veljati drugačen standard sodelovanja kot za izvoznike in da so vlade v položaju, v katerem jim je jamčena „minimalna pravna kurtoazija“, do katere izvozniki niso upravičeni.
With regard to the conduct of countervailing duty investigations, the Commission does not agree.
Kar zadeva vodenje preiskav v zvezi z izravnalnimi dajatvami, se Komisija s tem ne strinja.
GOC is one of the interested parties in the proceeding for the purpose of the basic Regulation and at the same time, as an ‘interested Member’, the PRC is bound by the WTO provisions and jurisprudence.
Kitajska vlada je ena od zainteresiranih strani v postopku za namen osnovne uredbe in hkrati je LRK kot „zainteresirana članica“ zavezana upoštevanju določb in sodne prakse STO.
Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation states: ‘In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide necessary information within the time limits provided in this Regulation, or significantly impedes the investigation, provisional or final findings, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available.’ Article 12.7 of the WTO SCM Agreement, explicitly refers to the consequences of non-cooperation by governments (‘Interested Member’): ‘In cases in which any interested Member or interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available.’ Therefore when the investigating country, in this case, the EU, exercises its WTO rights in a countervailing duty investigation and requests information deemed necessary for the purpose of the investigation, governments and exporters are under the same obligation to cooperate.
Člen 28(1) osnovne uredbe navaja: „Če katera koli zainteresirana stran zavrne dostop do potrebnih informacij, jih ne predloži v rokih, predpisanih v tej uredbi, ali znatno ovira preiskavo, se lahko na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev sprejmejo začasne ali dokončne ugotovitve, in sicer pozitivne ali negativne“. Člen 12(7) Sporazuma SIU STO izrecno navaja posledice nesodelovanja vlad („zainteresirana članica“): „Če katera koli zainteresirana članica ali zainteresirana stran zavrne dostop do potrebnih informacij ali jih kako drugače ne zagotovi v razumnem roku ali če znatno ovira preiskavo, se lahko na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev sprejmejo začasne ali dokončne ugotovitve, in sicer pozitivne ali negativne“.
In the course of the investigation the GOC often referred to rules on confidentiality as a reason for not providing requested information, for example, the PBOC circulars, for verification purposes It is noted that even if the GOC was, as it claims, ‘legally prohibited from releasing such information’ it is still bound by its WTO obligations to provide information deemed necessary for the investigation.
Torej kadar preiskovalna država, v tem primeru EU, izvaja svoje pravice STO v preiskavi o izravnalni dajatvi in zahteva informacije, ki se ji zdijo potrebne za preiskavo, imajo vlade in izvozniki enako obveznost sodelovanja. Med preiskavo je kitajska vlada pogosto navajala pravila o zaupnosti kot razlog, da ni predložila zahtevanih informacij, na primer okrožnice Ljudske banke Kitajske, za namene preverjanja.
In this regard, provisions of the municipal law or internal rules of a WTO Member cannot absolve it from its WTO obligations to cooperate with investigations; in such cases of conflict, it is incumbent upon the GOC to suggest ways in which access can be afforded to information so that it can be adequately verified.
Ugotovljeno je, da kitajsko vlado, čeprav ji je bilo po njenih trditvah „zakonsko prepovedano razkriti take informacije“, še vedno zavezujejo zaveze STO, da bo zagotovila informacije, potrebne za preiskavo. V tem pogledu je določbe občinske zakonodaje ali notranjih pravil članice STO ne razrešujejo zavez STO k sodelovanju v preiskavah; v takih primerih spora mora kitajska vlada predlagati načine za dostop do informacij, da se lahko ustrezno preverijo.
Notwithstanding the above, the GOC never actually explained this claim and never provided any evidence (e.g. the legal provision by which it is ‘legally prohibited’ from releasing such information) in this regard.
Ne glede na navedeno kitajska vlada te trditve dejansko nikoli ni pojasnila in v zvezi s tem ni predložila nobenih dokazov (npr. pravne določbe, v skladu s katero ji je „zakonsko prepovedano“ razkriti take informacije).
Furthermore the GOC claimed that the pre-verification letter of 25 March 2013 was not sufficiently detailed and it did not contain specific questions which will be addressed during the on-the-spot verification visit.
Poleg tega je kitajska vlada trdila, da predpreveritveno pismo z dne 25. maja 2013 ni bilo dovolj natančno in ni vsebovalo posebnih vprašanj, ki bodo obravnavana med preveritvenim obiskom na kraju samem.
In this respect it must be noted that while there is no requirement for the Commission to send a list of all questions which will be asked during the on spot verification (and the Commission does not consider this appropriate), the pre-verification letter of 25 March 2013 contained a very specific and detailed list of issues and documents which would be addressed in line with Article 26(3) of the basic Regulation and WTO requirements.
Glede tega je treba opozoriti, da čeprav ni nobene zahteve, da mora Komisija poslati seznam vseh vprašanj, ki se bodo postavila med preverjanjem na kraju samem (poleg tega Komisija to ne šteje za primerno), je predpreveritveno pismo z dne 25. marca 2013 vsebovalo zelo specifičen in podroben seznam vprašanj in dokumentov, ki bodo obravnavani v skladu s členom 26(3) osnovne uredbe in zahtevami STO.
However, the letter made it clear that the list was non-exhaustive and that other issues and evidence may be addressed if appropriate.
Vendar je bilo v pismu pojasnjeno, da seznam ni izčrpen in da se lahko po potrebi obravnavajo tudi druga vprašanja in dokazi.
In this respect it should also be noted that the GOC did not object the contents of this letter prior to the verification, although on the other hand it refused to discuss some points not explicitly raised in the letter, such as information on biggest banks in the PRC, involvement of China Communist Party (‘CCP’) in the management of certain banks or access of some banks to the foreign currency reserves of State Administration of Foreign Reserves, claiming not to be ready to reply to questions on these issues.
V zvezi s tem je treba tudi opozoriti, da kitajska vlada pred preveritvijo ni ugovarjala vsebini tega pisma, po drugi strani pa je zavrnila razpravo o nekaterih točkah, ki niso izrecno izražene v pismu, kot so informacije o največjih bankah v LRK, vključenost Komunistične partije Kitajske („KPK“) pri upravljanju nekaterih bank ali dostop nekaterih bank do deviznih rezerv državne uprave deviznih rezerv, pri čemer je trdila, da na vprašanja v teh zadevah ni pripravljena odgovoriti.
The GOC also argued that the Commission was not flexible during the on-spot verification visit and in fact ‘fixed a peremptory time-limit in regard to any requests for changes by the GOC’.
Kitajska vlada je trdila tudi, da Komisija med preveritvenim obiskom na kraju samem ni bila prilagodljiva in je dejansko „postavila obvezujoče časovne omejitve v zvezi s kakršnimi koli zahtevami po spremembah s strani kitajske vlade“.
In the same vein it claimed that the Commission did not accept any of the ‘workable’ solutions proposed by the GOC concerning the verification at National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and refused to extend the verification until Monday 22 April 2013 to verify NBS.
Prav tako je trdila, da Komisija ni sprejela nobenih „izvedljivih“ rešitev, ki jih je predlagala kitajska vlada v zvezi s preverjanjem na nacionalnem statističnem uradu, in je zavrnila podaljšanje roka za preverjanje nacionalnega statističnega urada do ponedeljka, 22. aprila 2013.
Furthermore, the Commission officials started the verifications with a delay virtually each working day because, according to the GOC, of their late arrival.
Poleg tega so uradniki Komisije izvajanje preverjanj skoraj vsak delovni dan začeli z zamudo, in sicer zaradi poznega prihoda, kot je navedla kitajska vlada.
In respect of the above claims, the Commission underlines that the degree of flexibility shown by its officials on the spot has been full and unconditional.
Komisija v zvezi z navedenimi trditvami poudarja, da so bili njeni uradniki na kraju samem popolnoma in brezpogojno prilagodljivi.
The Commission officials have exceptionally offered to verify documents and evidence the GOC sought to introduce well after the close of a certain subject, well beyond the regular working hours on a number of occasions.
Uradniki Komisije so v številnih primerih izjemoma ponudili, da dokumente in dokazila, ki jih je kitajska vlada želela predstaviti, preverijo precej po zaključku določene teme in tudi precej po zaključku rednega delovnega časa.
This was done several times, even if it meant having to move at a very late hour to other verifications sites and/or return to sites where the Commission officials had already been and had already provided an opportunity to verify documents.
To so ponudili večkrat, tudi če bi zaradi tega morali na druge kraje preverjanj oditi ob zelo pozni uri in/ali se vračati na kraje, kjer so uradniki Komisije že bili in so že omogočili možnost za preverjanje dokumentov.
Unfortunately, however, the GOC did not take up these offers in the cases in question, which strongly suggest that the failure to submit the documents requested by the Commission during the regular hours had not been due to their time constraints or to the unwillingness of the Commission to verify them.
Na žalost pa kitajska vlada teh ponudb v zadevnih primerih ni sprejela, kar močno nakazuje, da razlog za to, da se dokumenti, ki jih je zahtevala Komisija med rednim delovnim časom, niso predložili, niso bile njihove časovne omejitve ali nepripravljenost Komisije, da jih preveri.
As regards the delay on the start of the verification visit, the Commission notes that the officials were present on time every day but that, unfortunately, some delays were caused by the daily registration procedures to access the different verification sites required by the GOC or simply by the lack of GOC representatives to accompany the officials when they arrived at verification sites which forced them to wait long time before the start.
Kar zadeva zamudo na začetku preveritvenega obiska, Komisija ugotavlja, da so bili uradniki vsak dan prisotni pravočasno, ampak da so nekaj zamud na žalost povzročili dnevni postopki registracije za dostop do različnih krajev preverjanj, ki jih zahteva kitajska vlada, ali pa je do zamud prišlo preprosto zato, ker ni bilo predstavnikov kitajske vlade za spremstvo uradnikov, ki so prispeli na kraje preverjanj, zaradi česar so bili prisiljeni dolgo čakati, preden so lahko začeli z delom.