natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission notes that there are provisions for the treatment of confidential information in its countervailing duty investigations [96] and that, in any event, most of the Commission's requests, on this and other issues, were to inspect, rather than copy, such information.
Komisija opozarja, da obstajajo določbe za obravnavo zaupnih informacij v njenih preiskavah v zvezi z izravnalnimi dajatvami [96] ter da je v vsakem primeru v zvezi s tem in drugimi vprašanji večinoma zahtevala, da se takšne informacije preverijo in ne kopirajo.
In any event, the Commission notes that a strict application of the ‘client confidentiality’ principle could make verification of much relevant information in CVD investigations impossible.
V vsakem primeru Komisija poudarja, da bi lahko dosledna uporaba načela „zaupnosti strank“ onemogočila preveritev pomembnih informacij v preiskavah v zvezi z izravnalnimi dajatvami.
In such situations, it would become impossible to cross-check exporter's replies on many issues and to make random inspections of recipients of certain schemes in cases where there was no cooperation from exporters or where the investigation was conducted on an aggregate basis.
V takšnih situacijah bi bilo nemogoče navzkrižno preveriti odgovore izvoznika na številna vprašanja ali opraviti naključne preglede prejemnikov določenih shem v primerih, ko izvozniki ne sodelujejo ali pa je bila preiskava izvedena na skupni osnovi.
The GOC claimed that EXIM Bank fully cooperated with the investigation and certain documents requested by the Commission could not be provided due to internal policy rules, state secrecy, confidentiality or other laws.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da je Kitajska izvozno-uvozna banka v celoti sodelovala v preiskavi in da določenih dokumentov, ki jih je Komisija zahtevala, ni bilo mogoče predložiti zaradi pravil notranje politike, državne tajnosti, zaupnosti ali drugih zakonov.
Therefore non-provision of these documents cannot lead to the application of facts available.
Zato dejstvo, da ti dokumenti niso bili predloženi, ne sme biti razlog za uporabo razpoložljivih dejstev.
In accordance to the Commercial Banking Law these documents could not be provided by the EXIM Bank officials during the verification.
V skladu z zakonom o poslovnem bančništvu uradniki Kitajske izvozno-uvozne banke med preveritvijo niso mogli predložiti teh dokumentov.
In this respect, and contrary to the Commission assumption, the basic Regulation and the SCM Agreement cannot supersede the sovereign laws of the PRC.
V zvezi s tem in v nasprotju s predpostavko Komisije osnovna uredba in Sporazum SIU ne moreta nadomestiti državnih zakonov LRK.
GOC also claimed that the questions on political party affiliations of senior officials are irrelevant and disturbing for the GOC.
Kitajska vlada je poleg tega trdila, da so vprašanja o povezanosti višjih uradnikov s političnimi strankami nepomembna, in navedla, da jo takšna vprašanja motijo.
While WTO rules (on which the basic Regulation is largely based) may not ‘supersede’ domestic law, this does not prevent inferences being drawn by the Commission when such domestic laws appear to frustrate reasonable requests for information.
Medtem ko pravila STO (na katerih v veliki meri temelji osnovna uredba) morda ne morejo „nadomestiti“ domačih zakonov, to Komisiji ne preprečuje sprejemanja sklepov, če takšni domači zakoni očitno ovirajo razumne zahteve po informacijah.
Furthermore, the fact is that while EXIM Bank provided some responses in the reply to Appendix A it refused to support almost any of this information by source data or any sort of evidence.
Poleg tega je Kitajska izvozno-uvozna banka zagotovila nekaj odgovorov na vprašanja v Dodatku A, vendar je glede večine odgovorov zavrnila predložitev izvornih podatkov ali kakršnih koli dokazov, s katerimi bi podprla te informacije.
Therefore the information has only a value of oral statement, not supported by verified written documents.
Zato se te informacije štejejo zgolj za ustne izjave, ki niso podprte s preverjenimi pisnimi dokumenti.
If this practice were to be accepted the EXIM Bank could have provided virtually any information and the investigating authority would have had to accept it without being able to assess its accuracy.
Če bi bila ta praksa sprejemljiva, bi lahko Kitajska izvozno-uvozna banka predložila praktično kakršne koli informacije, preiskovalni organ pa bi jih moral sprejeti brez možnosti, da oceni njihovo točnost.
The questions on the political party affiliations and CCP units within EXIM Bank (an any other bank in this matter) are highly relevant for the purpose of establishing the extent of state influence on the banks' management in the light of the particular role of CCP under the Constitution of the PRC.
Vprašanja o povezanosti s političnimi strankami in članih KPK v Kitajski izvozno-uvozni banki (in kateri koli drugi banki v tej zadevi) so zelo pomembna za določitev obsega vpliva države na upravljanje bank glede na posebno vlogo KPK v skladu z ustavo LRK.
In addition to the justification of such questions which the Commission offered in the recital (151) above it is also noted that in accordance with CCP Constitution, all organisations, including private commercial enterprises, are required to established ‘primary organisations of the party’ if the firm employs at least three party members.
Poleg utemeljitev takšnih vprašanj, ki jih je Komisija navedla v uvodni izjavi (151), je treba opozoriti tudi, da ustava KPK določa, da morajo vse organizacije, vključno z zasebnimi trgovskimi podjetji, ustanoviti „osnovne organizacije partije“, če so v podjetju zaposleni vsaj trije člani partije.
These organisations guarantee and oversee the implementation of the principles and policies of the Party and the state and supports the meeting of shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors, and managers in the exercise of their functions and powers according to law [97].
Te organizacije zagotavljajo in nadzorujejo izvajanje načel in politik partije in države ter podpirajo skupščine delničarjev, upravne odbore, nadzorne odbore in poslovodne delavce pri izvajanju njihovih nalog in pooblastil v skladu z zakoni [97].
The Company Law of the PRC also obliges all companies in China to set up a CCP organisation within their organisational structure to carry our activities of the CCP [98].Therefore, the CCP is demonstrably linked to the activities of the GOC and to the operation of all kinds of firms and institutions in China; it is therefore legitimate to ask questions about party affiliations in this respect.
Poleg tega zakon LRK o gospodarskih družbah zavezuje vse družbe na Kitajskem, da v okviru svoje organizacijske strukture ustanovijo organizacijo KPK, ki opravlja dejavnosti KPK [98]. Torej je dokazano, da je KPK povezana z dejavnostmi kitajske vlade in delovanjem vseh vrst podjetij in ustanov na Kitajskem, zato je v zvezi s tem postavljanje vprašanj o povezanosti s strankami upravičeno.
Concerning the verification of CDB the GOC made the same claim in regards of the questions on political affiliations of management and the role of CCP in the bank.
V zvezi s preveritvijo Kitajske razvojne banke je kitajska vlada podala isto trditev glede vprašanj o politični pripadnosti vodstva in vlogi KPK v banki.
In this respect the Commission refers to the justifications in recitals (151) and (411) above.
V zvezi s tem se Komisija sklicuje na utemeljitve v uvodnih izjavah (151) in (411).
The GOC also claimed that the CDB could not provide the requested credit risk assessment reports because of the confidentiality reasons and that it provided a template of the credit rating and also a concrete example of credit risk assessment with the company name blanked out.
Kitajska vlada je trdila tudi, da Kitajska razvojna banka zaradi zaupnosti ni mogla zagotoviti zahtevanih poročil o oceni kreditnega tveganja ter da je predložila predlogo za bonitetno oceno in primer ocene kreditnega tveganja, na katerem je bilo ime družbe izbrisano.
It is noted that the credit rating template and the credit rating for unknown company of unknown industry is not an evidence of the credit risk assessment of one of the sampled exporters as requested by the Commission.
Opozoriti je treba, da predloga za bonitetno oceno in ocena kreditnega tveganja neznane družbe iz neznane industrije nista dokaz za oceno kreditnega tveganja enega od vzorčenih izvoznikov, ki jo je zahtevala Komisija.
With regard to the confidentiality issues, the Commission refers to the explanation in Recital (410).
Komisija se v zvezi z vprašanji glede zaupnosti sklicuje na obrazložitev v uvodni izjavi (410).
The GOC claimed that the Commission's finding that the SOCBs are public bodies is inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement because the Commission has not based its determination on any evidence whatsoever and has not provided a reasoned and adequate analysis of its determination that government involvement in the Chinese financial sector is so substantial that banks are required to follow preferential policies.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da ugotovitev Komisije, da so poslovne banke v državni lasti javni organi, ni skladna s členom 1.1 Sporazuma SIU, ker Komisija te ugotovitve ni utemeljila na nobenih dokazih ter ni zagotovila utemeljene in ustrezne analize v podporo svoji ugotovitvi, da je država vključena v kitajski finančni sektor v takšni meri, da morajo banke upoštevati preferenčne politike.
The Commission fundamentally disagrees with this claim.
Komisija se s to trditvijo nikakor ne strinja.
The independent information referred to in recitals (162) to (168) shows that the banks implement the preferential policies and this is also clear from several Chinese plans, laws and policy documents referred to in recital (102) above.
Neodvisne informacije, navedene v uvodnih izjavah od (162) do (168), kažejo, da banke izvajajo preferenčne politike, kar je razvidno tudi iz več kitajskih načrtov, zakonov in političnih dokumentov, ki so omenjeni v uvodni izjavi (102).
The Commission reviewed, analysed and cited a number of documents published by the international organisations including WTO, World Bank, IMF and OECD all of which conclude that the Chinese banking sector is subject to the significant state interventions in particular with regards to privileged recipients of loans and interest-rate setting.
Komisija je pregledala, analizirala in navedla veliko dokumentov, ki so jih izdale mednarodne organizacije, vključno s STO, Svetovno banko, Mednarodnim denarnim skladom in OECD, in v vseh se ugotavlja, da je kitajski bančni sektor podvržen pomembnim državnim posegom, zlasti v zvezi s privilegiranimi prejemniki posojil in določanjem obrestnih mer.
The GOC challenges the relevance of several documents used as best facts available to which the Commission referred in relation to the public body determination concerning the SOCBs.
Kitajska vlada izpodbija pomen nekaterih dokumentov, ki jih je Komisija uporabila kot najboljša razpoložljiva dejstva in se nanje sklicevala pri določitvi javnega organa v zvezi s poslovnimi bankami v državni lasti.
As a preliminary remark, it must be pointed out that the Commission had to resort to best facts available only because of the non-cooperation of GOC and its refusal to provide the requested information.
Najprej je treba opozoriti, da je morala Komisija uporabiti najboljša razpoložljiva dejstva zgolj zaradi nesodelovanja kitajske vlade in dejstva, da je slednja zavrnila zagotovitev zahtevanih informacij.
The GOC claimed that the Deutsche Bank Research report (‘DB report’) which the Commission cited in the recital (161) describes a historical situation in China and cannot provide a positive basis to assess the Chinese banking sector 7 years later.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da poročilo o raziskavi Deutsche Bank („poročilo DB“), ki ga je Komisija navedla v uvodni izjavi (161), opisuje pretekli položaj na Kitajskem in ne more zagotoviti pozitivne podlage za oceno kitajskega bančnega sektorja 7 let pozneje.
Firstly, the GOC is wrong in claiming that the report provides a basis to assess situation ‘7 years later’.
Prvič, trditev kitajske vlade, da poročilo zagotavlja podlago za oceno položaja „7 let pozneje“, je napačna.
Secondly the DB report is not the only document on which the Commission relies in its findings but only a starting point of the Commissions analysis of the Chinese banking sector and its ownership structure in particular.
Drugič, poročilo DB ni edini dokument, na katerega je Komisija oprla svoje ugotovitve, ampak zgolj izhodišče za njeno analizo kitajskega bančnega sektorja in zlasti njegove lastniške strukture.
Thirdly the other information which the Commission referred to for the purpose of establishing the ownership structure of the Chinese banking sector (WTO, IMF and OECD reports and working papers) is in line with the findings of the DB report.
Tretjič, druge informacije, na katere se Komisija sklicuje pri določitvi lastniške strukture kitajskega bančnega sektorja (poročila in delovni dokumenti STO, Mednarodnega denarnega sklada in OECD), so v skladu z ugotovitvami iz poročila DB.
In this context it must be noted that the GOC itself only provided a minimum of the repeatedly requested information in this respect and never actually contested the Commission's findings on the level of state ownership in the banking sector and state interference in the banking system on factual basis.
Pri tem je treba opozoriti, da je kitajska vlada sama zagotovila minimalne informacije v zvezi s tem, ki so bile večkrat zahtevane, in ni nikoli dejansko izpodbijala ugotovitev Komisije o ravni državnega lastništva v bančnem sektorju in poseganju vlade v bančni sistem na podlagi dejstev.
In fact the Commission, in its definitive disclosure document, cited the WTO Trade Policy Review reports from 2010 and 2012 in the same recital (161) in order to demonstrate that very little has changed in the period of two years.
V bistvu je Komisija v svojem dokumentu o dokončnem razkritju v isti uvodni izjavi (161) navedla pregleda trgovinske politike STO iz let 2010 in 2012, da bi prikazala, da je bilo v dveh letih le malo sprememb.
While the 2010 report stated that ‘the high degree of state ownership is another notable feature of the financial sector in China’ the 2012 report confirmed that little changed in this respect.
Medtem ko je v poročilu iz leta 2010 navedeno, da „je visoka stopnja državnega lastništva še ena pomembna značilnost finančnega sektorja na Kitajskem“, poročilo iz leta 2012 potrjuje, da se je v zvezi s tem le malo spremenilo.
The GOC also cited from the 2012 report and on the basis of these citations claimed that the report contradicts the Commission's assessment in recital (161) above.
Tudi kitajska vlada je navajala poročilo iz leta 2012 in na podlagi teh navedb trdila, da je poročilo v nasprotju z oceno Komisije iz uvodne izjave (161).
None of the citations from the report reproduced in the GOC's comments to definitive disclosure contradicts or even put in question the Commission's assessment in recital (161).
Nobena od navedb iz poročila, vključenih v pripombe kitajske vlade glede dokončnega razkritja, ne nasprotuje oceni Komisije iz uvodne izjave (161) ali vzbuja dvom v zvezi z njo.
The GOC also claimed that the Commission's findings in recital (162) above lack positive evidence because the Commission (in addition to the DB report and WTO Trade Policy Reviews discussed in recitals above) ‘simply refers to the World Bank Report and the Economic survey etc., but does not provide any reasoned and adequate explanation to support its findings’.
Kitajska vlada je trdila tudi, da ugotovitve Komisije iz uvodne izjave (162) niso ustrezno podprte s pozitivnimi dokazi, ker se Komisija (poleg na poročilo DB in pregleda trgovinske politike STO, ki so omenjeni v uvodnih izjavah zgoraj)„preprosto sklicuje na poročilo Svetovne banke in pregled gospodarskih gibanj itd., vendar ne navaja nobene utemeljene in ustrezne obrazložitve v podporo svojim ugotovitvam“.
In this respect it is noted that the World Bank report states, inter alia, the following: ‘Despite impressive progress in reforming and deepening the financial sector in the past three decades, China's financial system remains repressed and suffers from key structural imbalances. The current system, characterized by dominance of state-owned banks, strong state intervention, and remaining controls on interest rates, has been remarkably successful in mobilizing savings and allocating capital to strategic sectors during China's economic take-off’, or ‘In parallel, direct and indirect controls of financial institutions must give way to armslength market-based arrangements. This would mean an autonomous central bank adopting open market operations and using interest rates, rather than credit ceilings, to manage liquidity. Commercial banks would use commercial principles and creditworthiness analysis, rather than follow government signals, to guide lending’ and ‘The government at all levels has been closely involved in the commercial operations of financial institutions, either through holding of shares or indirect influences, mainly because it is heavily dependent on the use of commercial bank credit for policy goals’.
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da je v poročilu Svetovne banke med drugim navedeno naslednje: „Kljub impresivnemu napredku pri reformi in krepitvi finančnega sektorja v zadnjih treh desetletjih kitajski finančni sistem ostaja omejen in trpi zaradi bistvenih strukturnih neravnovesij. Sedanji sistem, za katerega so značilni prevlada bank v državni lasti, močni državni posegi in preostali nadzor nad obrestnimi merami, je bil izredno uspešen pri mobilizaciji prihrankov in dodeljevanju kapitala strateškim sektorjem med gospodarskim razvojem Kitajske“ ali „[v]zporedno se mora neposredni in posredni nadzor nad finančnimi institucijami umakniti nevtralnim ureditvam, ki temeljijo na trgu. To bi pomenilo samostojno centralno banko, ki bi prevzela operacije odprtega trga in za upravljanje likvidnosti uporabljala obrestne mere namesto zgornjih mej posojil. Poslovne banke bi za usmerjanje pri dajanju posojil upoštevale poslovna načela in analizo kreditne sposobnosti, ne pa navodil vlade“ in „[v]lada je bila na vseh ravneh tesno vključena v poslovne dejavnosti finančnih institucij, bodisi prek lastništva delnic bodisi prek posrednega vpliva, predvsem zato, ker je močno odvisna od uporabe posojil poslovnih bank za doseganje političnih ciljev“.
The 2010 OECD Economic Survey on China describes the PBOC policies on lending rates floor and deposit rate ceiling as a disincentive for the banks to price risk appropriately and a counter productive measure for competition in the banking sector and states that the purpose is to safeguard profitability of the predominantly state-owned banking sector.
Pregled gospodarskih gibanj na Kitajskem v letu 2010, ki ga je pripravila OECD, opisuje politike LBK glede najnižje določene posojilne obrestne mere in najvišje določene obrestne mere za vloge kot odvračilne dejavnike za ustrezno ocenjevanje tveganj s strani bank ter kot neproduktiven ukrep za konkurenco v bančnem sektorju ter navaja, da je njun namen zaščititi dobičkonosnost bančnega sektorja, ki je večinoma v državni lasti.
The GOC further claims that the Commission's determination that the PBOC is involved in and influences the setting of interest rates by State-owned commercial banks lacks proper reasoning and evidentiary basis.
Kitajska vlada nadalje trdi, da ugotovitev Komisije, da LBK sodeluje in vpliva na določanje obrestnih mer državnih poslovnih bank, ni ustrezno utemeljena in dokazana.
In this respect the GOC stated that the Commission ought to have known that in July 2013, the floor lending rates were abolished.
V zvezi s tem je kitajska vlada navedla, da bi morala Komisija vedeti, da je bila julija 2013 najnižja dovoljena posojilna obrestna mera ukinjena.
Firstly it must by noted that the Commission did not analyse the situation of the banking market in China in July 2013 as it was not relevant for this investigation.
Najprej je treba opozoriti, da Komisija ni analizirala razmer na kitajskem bančnem trgu julija 2013, ker niso bile relevantne za to preiskavo.
Secondly the claim that the Commission's determination lacks proper reasoning and evidentiary basis is incorrect.
Poleg tega trditev, da ugotovitev Komisije ni ustrezno utemeljena in dokazana, ne drži.
The relevant circulars clearly state the PBOC sets limits on lending as well as on deposit rates.
V zadevnih okrožnicah je jasno navedeno, da LBK določa omejitve za posojila in obrestne mere za vloge.
And thirdly, the OECD Economic Survey: China 2010 cited in recital (162) above also confirms the existence of such limits.
Nazadnje pregled gospodarskih gibanj na Kitajskem v letu 2010, ki ga je pripravila OECD in je naveden v uvodni izjavi (162), prav tako potrjuje obstoj takšnih omejitev.
The GOC claimed that the ‘Commission knew that the circulars, including the 8 June and 8 July 2012 circulars issued after the Coated Fine Paper findings had altered the interest rate practice of the PBOC in significant way’.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da je „Komisija vedela, da so okrožnice, vključno z okrožnicama z dne 8. junija in 8. julija 2012, izdanima po ugotovitvah glede PFP, močno spremenile prakso LBK v zvezi z obrestnimi merami“.
The Commission could not know if or how exactly the practice changed as the GOC refused to provide these circulars.
Komisija ni mogla vedeti, da se je praksa spremenila ali kako točno se je spremenila, saj je kitajska vlada zavrnila predložitev teh okrožnic.
Even the summaries from the PBOC websites submitted during the verification, but which the GOC incorrectly claims that the Commission completely disregarded, confirm that such limits still exist.
Tudi povzetki s spletnega mesta LBK, ki so bili predloženi med preveritvijo, za katere kitajska vlada napačno trdi, da jih je Komisija povsem prezrla, potrjujejo, da takšne omejitve še vedno obstajajo.
The GOC also claimed that ‘the Commission did not appear to base its finding on actual’ facts available ‘which contradicts the historical information that the Commission possessed, but rather made it incumbent upon the GOC to prove that the state of affairs examined during the Organic Coated Steel had changed.’ In view of the explanation in the recitals (415) — (419) above it is clear that this claim is incorrect.
Kitajska vlada je poleg tega trdila, da „Komisija svojih ugotovitev očitno ni utemeljila na ‚dejanskih dejstvih‘, ki nasprotujejo preteklim informacijam v lasti Komisije, ampak je kitajski vladi raje naložila dolžnost, da dokaže, da se je stanje, ki se je preiskalo v okviru zadeve v zvezi z jeklenimi izdelki, prevlečenimi z organskimi premazi, spremenilo“. Ob upoštevanju obrazložitve v uvodnih izjavah od (415) do (419) je jasno, da je ta trditev napačna.
There are no facts available on the file which contradict Commission's findings and the findings are not based only on the historical information but on positive evidence, based on all the information relevant for the IP.
V dokumentaciji ni dejstev, ki bi nasprotovala ugotovitvam Komisije, in ugotovitve ne temeljijo zgolj na preteklih informacijah, ampak na pozitivnih dokazih, ki temeljijo na vseh informacijah, relevantnih za OP.
The GOC claimed that the four points claimed by the Commission in the recital (166) above are incorrect and lack proper legal assessment.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da so štiri točke, ki jih Komisija navaja v uvodni izjavi (166), napačne in ne temeljijo na ustrezni pravni oceni.
GOC argued that the reference to the Article 34 of the Commercial Banking Law that banks are ‘to carry out their loan business according to the needs of the national economy’ is completely neutral.
Trdila je, da je navedba iz člena 34 zakona o poslovnem bančništvu, da morajo banke „poslovanje s posojili prilagoditi potrebam nacionalnega gospodarstva“, povsem nevtralna.