natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It effectively would have meant that the actual maturity of such subordinated loans at issuance would have been considered of less than five years and hence the loans would have not qualified as Tier 2 capital.
Menila je, da bi takšna možnost otežila prodajo banke Citadele, ker bi lahko vplivala na zadevne končne pogoje in verjetno zvišala zadevne transakcijske stroške.
In response to an information request from the Commission as to whether Latvia had approached the EBRD regarding a possible extension by it of the maturity of subordinated loans regarding Citadele, the Latvian authorities provided a submission on 23 June 2014.
Poleg tega Latvija navaja, da bi lahko položaj banke EBOR v odnosu do banke Citadele banki EBOR otežil odločitev o odobritvi podaljšanja.
In it, they confirm that before they granted the Second Measure they did not approach the EBRD to propose to the latter to extend the maturity of subordinated loans it held.
V predložitvi z dne 23. junija 2014 navaja, da je bila trdno prepričana, da bi bila banka EBOR načeloma naklonjena odobritvi podaljšanja roka zapadlosti zadevnega instrumenta.
In that context, they reiterate that the Second Measure had to be adopted in order to prevent Citadele's impending breach of the new, more stringent, capital requirements.
Hkrati pa tudi priznava, da se je položaj banke EBOR razlikoval od položaja Latvije, saj je bila slednja večinski delničar banke Citadele in bi lahko kot taka odločilno vplivala na postopek prodaje ter bi se lahko s ponudniki pogodila o različnih možnostih plačila podrejenega dolga.
Latvia argues that it had to proceed with the extension of the maturity term of the subordinated debt it held in Citadele without delay and did not negotiate a comparable extension in relation to the subordinated debt also held by the EBRD.
Zato je Latvija sklenila, da bi lahko pomanjkanje nadzora banke EBOR nad prodajo banke Citadele banko EBOR odvrnilo od podaljšanja roka zapadlosti zadevnega dolga ali pa bi vsekakor vključevalo dolgotrajna pogajanja.
Latvia submits that its decision in that regard was shaped by the following three points.
O nepriglašeni likvidnostni podpori, dodeljeni banki Reverta (tretji ukrep)
The necessity of addressing effectively the impending breach of the new capital requirements: Citadele had calculated its needs for qualifying Tier 2 capital and had concluded that, in contrast to the adoption of the Second Measure which would involve a maturity prolongation of 18 months, any potential maturity change to the subordinated debt in which the EBRD was also a party would have required a considerably longer extension.
Latvija in banka Reverta ugotavljata, da je likvidnostna podpora, ki jo je Latvija dodelila banki Parex (in nato banki Reverta), od decembra 2010 presegla odobreno zgornjo mejo likvidnostne podpore iz uvodne izjave 55 končnega sklepa o banki Parex.
That difference was due to the fact that the principal of that loan was lower and consequently its impact on the capital position of Citadele would have been significantly lower.
V sklepu o začetku postopka je navedeno, da neporavnana likvidnostna podpora, ki je bila dodeljena banki Reverta, od 31. decembra 2013 znaša 362,52 milijona LVL, kar za 55,52 milijona LVL presega zgornjo mejo likvidnostne podpore v znesku 307 milijonov LVL, predvideno za „najslabši mogoči“ scenarij.
Latvia also states that an extension of the subordinated debt held by the EBRD would have presupposed negotiating with the EBRD in that respect.
Latvija trdi, da je Komisija v končnem sklepu o banki Parex prvotno odobrila pretvorbo 218,7 milijona LVL likvidnostne podpore za banko Parex v kapital.
Furthermore, in view of differences as to the governing law and of the overall requisite legal structure that would have to be put in place extending the subordinated loan to which the EBRD was also a party while at the same time extending a part of the subordinated debt held by Latvia alone would have required convoluted legal arrangements.
Ta znesek, ki naj bi se pretvoril v kapital, je bil pozneje v sklepu o spremembi znižan na 118,7 milijona LVL.
Latvia underlines that at the time of the extension, it also considered that a maturity extension of the subordinated debt held by the EBRD would render the divestment of Citadele more burdensome, as more interrelated contracts on the subordinated debt would exist at the time of the sale.
Če bi se znesek 118,7 milijona LVL likvidnostne podpore pretvoril v kapital, bi se likvidnostna podpora zmanjšala in bi bila v skladu z odobrenimi omejitvami.
It considered that such a possibility would complicate the sale of Citadele as it could have repercussions on the relevant closing conditions and could probably increase the relevant transactional costs.
Vendar je bilo od 118,7 milijona LVL likvidnostne podpore v kapital dejansko pretvorjenega le 49,5 milijona LVL.
Furthermore, Latvia notes that the EBRD's status vis-à-vis Citadele could have made it a more complex decision for the EBRD to consent to the extension.
Latvija poudarja ta dejavnik kot glavni vzrok previsoke likvidnostne podpore.
It states in its submission of 23 June 2014 that it firmly believed that, in principle, the EBRD would have been inclined to agree to the maturity prolongation of the relevant instrument.
Poleg tega Latvija trdi, da je bila čezmerna podpora tudi posledica zamud pri ustvarjanju denarnih sredstev v primerjavi s stopnjami ustvarjanja denarnih sredstev, predvidenih ob sprejetju končnega sklepa o banki Parex.
However, it also acknowledges that the EBRD's position differed from Latvia's in that the latter was the majority shareholder of Citadele and in that capacity it could exercise decisive influence over the sale process and could negotiate various options with respect to the payment of the subordinated loans with the bidders.
„Slabi dolžniki“ so zamujali s plačili, zato je bila izterjava denarnih sredstev odložena za približno dve leti.
Therefore, Latvia recognized that the EBRD's lack of control over the sale of Citadele could have constituted a disincentive for extending the maturity term of the respective loan or in any event lead to lengthy negotiations.
Latvija meni, da je ta pojav začasen, in pričakuje, da se bo čezmerna likvidnostna podpora v letih 2015 in 2016 zmanjšala.
Regarding the un-notified liquidity support granted to Reverta (the Third Measure)
Latvija in banka Reverta kljub temu priznavata odstopanje od odobrenih zneskov pomoči, ki je posledica težav, ki sta jih imeli pri ustrezni razdelitvi državne pomoči med odobreno likvidnostno podporo in kapitalskimi prispevki po sprejetju sklepa o spremembi.
Latvia and Reverta recognize that since December 2010 the liquidity support granted by Latvia to Parex banka (and then to Reverta) has exceeded the authorized liquidity cap set forth in recital 55 of the Final Parex Decision.
Latvijski organi nadalje pojasnjujejo, da bi morala Latvija, če bi se dovoljenje banke Parex (zdaj banka Reverta) za opravljanje bančnih storitev podaljšalo, vložiti več kapitala v banko Parex, kot je bilo prvotno predvideno (minimalna raven kapitala, ki jo zahtevajo pravila o plačilni sposobnosti, je bila dejansko višja od največje kapitalske podpore v znesku 218,7 milijona LVL, odobrene v končnem sklepu o banki Parex).
The Opening Decision indicated that the outstanding liquidity support to Reverta as of 31 December 2013 was LVL 362,52 million, which exceeded by LVL 55,52 million the LVL 307 million liquidity cap set forth for the ‘worst case’ scenario.
Glede na prvotni načrt prestrukturiranja, ki je bil predložen Komisiji, ekonomska vrednost, pridobljena z odprodajo sredstev in pretvorbo 218,7 milijona LVL, ne bi bila dovolj, da bi banka Parex (Reverta) izpolnila regulativne zahteve glede kapitalske ustreznosti.
Latvia contends that the Commission had originally authorized in the Final Parex Decision the conversion into capital of LVL 218,7 million liquidity support to Parex banka.
Zato bi banka Parex (Reverta) v primeru podaljšanja dovoljenja potrebovala dodatni kapital.
That amount to be converted was later reduced in the Amended Decision to LVL 118,7 million.
Po odvzemu dovoljenja za opravljanje bančnih storitev je bila stopnja dodatne pomoči omejena na znesek, potreben za postopek likvidacije.
Had LVL 118,7 million of liquidity support been converted into capital, then the liquidity support would have been reduced and would have complied with the authorized limits.
Po navedbah Latvije nadaljnja pretvorba likvidnostne podpore v kapital po 31. decembru 2011 ni bila več potrebna, ker je bilo banki Reverta odvzeto dovoljenje za opravljanje bančnih storitev.
However, only LVL 49,5 million out of LVL 118,7 million of liquidity support were actually converted into capital.
Latvija je svoj načrt, da likvidnostne podpore ne bo pretvorila v kapital, Komisiji sporočila po 31. decembru 2011 v okviru izmenjav informacij pred sprejetjem sklepa o spremembi, čeprav ni potrdila svoje dejanske namere v zvezi s tem ter ni izrecno opredelila in Komisiji sporočila tehničnih posledic svoje odločitve, da ne bo izvedla pretvorbe.
That factor is brought forward by Latvia as the main cause for the excessive level of liquidity.
Latvija zlasti ni omenila, da se sredstva, ki so bila že dodeljena kot likvidnostna podpora in ki ne bodo pretvorjena v kapital, ne bodo znižala tako hitro, kot se zahteva v končnem sklepu o banki Parex.
In addition, Latvia contends that the excess support was also caused by delays in cash generation compared to rates of cash generation envisaged at the time of the Parex Final Decision.
Ker je bilo do 31. decembra 2011 v kapital dejansko pretvorjenega le 49,5 milijona LVL likvidnostne podpore, 69,2 milijona LVL likvidnostne podpore pa ni bilo pretvorjenega, je raven likvidnostne podpore ostala višja od odobrene za približno enak znesek.
Bad debtors have delayed payments and hence cash recovery has been delayed by about two years.
Po navedbah Latvije je bila zato ohranitev likvidnostne podpore namesto pretvorbe v kapital za latvijske organe najmanj obremenjujoč ukrep, ki dejansko zmanjšuje državno pomoč na najmanjšo potrebno.
Latvia considers that phenomenon to be temporary and expects the excessive liquidity support to cease in the years 2015-16.
Latvija in banka Reverta potrjujeta, da banka Reverta ne potrebuje več „novega denarja“.
Nevertheless, Latvia and Reverta recognize the deviation from the authorized aid amounts resulting from the difficulties they encountered in appropriately allocating the State support between the authorized liquidity support and capital contributions following the adoption of the Amendment Decision.
Latvija glede na nižji znesek likvidnostne podpore, ki je bil pretvorjen v kapital, pričakuje, da bo banka Reverta ob koncu leta 2014 ohranila [300–350] milijonov LVL likvidnostne podpore, ob koncu leta 2015 [250–300] milijonov LVL, ob koncu leta 2016 in leta 2017 (ob likvidaciji banke Reverta) pa [200–250] milijonov LVL.
Further the Latvian authorities explain that had the banking license of Parex banka (now Reverta) been maintained, Latvia would have had to inject more capital into Parex banka than was originally envisaged (indeed the minimum level of capital required under the solvency rules was more than the maximum capital support of LVL 218,7 million authorized by the Final Parex Decision).
Po navedbah Latvije bo tako ta likvidnostna podpora presegla prvotno odobreno zgornjo mejo, ker (i) je bilo v kapital pretvorjene manj likvidnostne podpore in ker (ii) bo ob koncu poslovanja banke Reverta predvidoma ustvarjenih manj prejemkov, kot je bilo prvotno načrtovano.
On the basis of the original restructuring plan submitted to the Commission, the economic value realized from asset disposals and the conversion of LVL 218,7 million would have been insufficient for Parex banka (Reverta) to comply with the regulatory capital adequacy requirements.
Latvija po novih denarnih projekcijah, ki kažejo težave na področju izterjave sredstev, pričakuje, da bo imela banka Reverta ob koncu postopka likvidacije (31. decembra 2017) negativen kapitalski položaj v višini [250–300] milijonov LVL.
Therefore, had the licence been maintained, Parex banka (Reverta) would have needed additional capital.
O zavezi odprodaji dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja (četrti ukrep)
Following the withdrawal of the banking license, the level of additional aid was limited to the amount necessary for the winding down process.
Latvija je leta 2011 začela postopek prodaje banke Citadele, da bi izpolnila svoje zaveze iz končnega sklepa o banki Parex.
According to Latvia, it was no longer necessary to convert further liquidity support into capital after 31 December 2011 because the banking licence of Reverta had been withdrawn.
Pri prvem poskusu prodaje je družba Nomura International sodelovala kot svetovalec, vendar ta poskus zaradi nemirov na euroobmočju, ki sta jih povzročili gospodarska in finančna kriza v Grčiji, ter finančnega zloma bank Snoras in Krajbanka v Litvi in Latviji ni bil uspešen.
Latvia had communicated its plan not to convert liquidity support into capital to the Commission after 31 December 2011 during exchanges preceding the adoption of the Amendment Decision, though it did not confirm its intention to actually do so and did not expressly identify and share with the Commission the technical consequences of the non-conversion.
Poleg tega je Latvija februarja 2013 pri neodvisnem strokovnjaku […] naročila izvedbo posebne študije, med drugim o učinku prodaje dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja na datum, določen v zavezah.
In particular, Latvia did not mention that as a result of their ‘non-conversion’ into capital the funds that had already been granted as liquidity support would not fall as fast as they were required to do by the Final Parex Decision.
Strokovnjak je dokazal, da je vrednost dveh posameznih subjektov (dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja in preostalega dela banke Citadele) nižja od vrednosti celotne banke Citadele.
Since only LVL 49,5 million of liquidity support had been actually converted into capital by 31 December 2011 and LVL 69,2 million of liquidity support was not converted into capital, the level of liquidity support remained higher than approved by approximately the same amount.
Tako bi se z odvzemom dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja banki Citadele znižala knjižna vrednost banke, kar bi škodilo vrednosti delničarjev.
According to Latvia, keeping the liquidity support and avoiding converting it into capital was therefore the least onerous measure for the Latvian authorities and in fact reduces the State aid to the minimum necessary.
Na podlagi različnih projekcij je strokovnjak prikazal, da bi se brez dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja „poslovni prihodki banke močno zmanjšali, […]“, njen […] pa bi se poslabšal.
Latvia and Reverta confirm than Reverta no longer needs ‘fresh money’.
Po mnenju Latvije bi odprodaja dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja ločeno od preostalega dela banke Citadele leta 2013 glede na študijo strokovnjaka škodila uspešnemu poslovanju banke Citadele in s tem njeni tržljivosti.
Given the lower amount of liquidity support converted into capital, Latvia expects that Reverta will retain LVL [300-350] million in liquidity support at the end of 2014, LVL [250-300] million at the end of 2015, and LVL [200-250] million at the end of 2016 and 2017 (upon liquidation of Reverta).
Bistveno bi zmanjšala zmožnost banke za privabljanje zasebnih akterjev k vlaganju v banko Citadele po razumni ceni.
According to Latvia that liquidity support will therefore exceed the originally authorized cap, because: (i) less liquidity support has been converted into capital; and (ii) the running off of Reverta is expected to yield fewer cash proceeds than initially planned.
Zato se je leta 2013 začel drugi postopek prodaje celotne banke Citadele, pri katerem sta kot zunanji svetovalki sodelovali družbi Société Générale in Linklaters LLP.
Following the new cash projection reflecting the difficulties in the assets recovery Latvia expects Reverta to have a negative capital position of LVL [250-300] million at the end of the liquidation process (31 December 2017).
Trenutno se proučujeta dve metodi prodaje, in sicer združitev s pripojitvijo ali prva javna ponudba.
On the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business (the Fourth measure)
Izravnalni ukrepi, ki jih je predlagala Latvija
Latvia started the sale process of Citadele in 2011, to respect the commitments it had undertaken which were recorded in the Final Parex Decision.
Latvija je, da bi zagotovila združljivost dodatnih ukrepov pomoči, ki jih je odobrila za banke Parex, Citadele in Reverta v okviru prvega, drugega in tretjega ukrepa, ter neuspešne odprodaje dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja banke Citadele v roku iz zavez (četrti ukrep) z notranjim trgom v skladu s pravili Unije o državni pomoči, predlagala sklop zavez, ki so navedene v uvodnih izjavah 64 do 73.
The first sale attempt was undertaken with Nomura International as advisor but due to significant turmoil in the Eurozone caused by the economic and financial crisis in Greece, as well as collapse of Snoras and Krajbanka in Lithuania and Latvia, that attempt was not successful.
Rok prodaje banke Citadele in odprodaje dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja
In addition, in February 2013 Latvia ordered a specific study by an independent expert […] on, inter alia, the impact of the sale of the Wealth Management Business at the date specified in the commitments.
Latvija in banka Citadele se zavezujeta, da bosta storili vse, kar je v njuni moči, da bi čim prej in vsekakor pred […] pridobili zavezujoče ponudbe za prodajo celotnega deleža Republike Latvije v banki Citadele (vključno z dejavnostjo upravljanja premoženja).
The expert demonstrated that the value of the two single entities (Wealth Management Business and the remaining part of Citadele) was worth less than the value of Citadele as a whole.
Prodaja se izvede najpozneje do […].
As a consequence, depriving Citadele of its Wealth Management Business would diminish the book value of the bank and would thus impair shareholders' value.
Republika Latvija (in njen svetovalec) se po lastni presoji odloči glede ustrezne strukture in oblik prodajne transakcije (npr. prodaja deleža ali prva javna ponudba), če Republika Latvija sčasoma odproda svoj celotni delež v banki Citadele, in sicer najpozneje do […].
Through different projections the expert demonstrated that without the Wealth Management Business the bank's ‘operating profit would tumble, […]’ and that its […] would have deteriorated.
V primeru prve javne ponudbe se Republika Latvija zaveže, da se bo s Komisijo za finančne in kapitalske trge dogovorila o zavezujočem prospektu do […].
According to Latvia, on the basis of the expert's study, the divestment of the Wealth Management Business separately from the rest of Citadele within 2013 would have impaired the viability of Citadele, and consequently, its marketability.
Latvija in banka Citadele se tudi zavezujeta, da bo imenovan skrbnik za odprodajo, če do […] ne bosta prejeli nobenih zavezujočih ponudb ali če se s Komisijo za finančne in kapitalske trge v primeru prve javne ponudbe, katere cilj je enak, ne bosta dogovorili o prospektu.
It would have significantly reduced the bank's ability to attract private players to invest in Citadele at a reasonable price.
V takem primeru bo Republika Latvija sprejela potrebne ukrepe za zagotovitev, da je skrbnik za odprodajo imenovan in opravlja svoje naloge od dne […].
Therefore, a second sales process for the whole Citadele commenced in 2013 with the assistance of Société Générale and Linklaters LLP as external advisors.
Predvidoma bi se lahko finančni svetovalec za prodajo banke Citadele od dne […] imenoval tudi za skrbnika za odprodajo.
The two sale methods currently being contemplated are a Merger & Acquisition (‘M&A’) or an Initial Public Offering (‘IPO’).
Če je imenovan skrbnik za odprodajo, se Latvija in banka Citadele zavezujeta, da bosta do […] prejeli zavezujoče in za vse strani nepreklicne ponudbe ter da bosta do […] začeli zavezujoča in nepreklicna pogajanja o sporazumu za prodajo celotnega deleža Republike Latvije v banki Citadele, ki bo sklenjen najpozneje do […].
Compensatory measures proposed by Latvia
Nadalje se Latvija in banka Citadele zavezujeta, da bo dne […] banka Citadele […] novo dejavnost, preostale dejavnosti banke Citadele pa bodo […], če Republika Latvija do […] ne bo začela pogajanj o zavezujočem in nepreklicnem sporazumu, ki bo omogočil prodajo celotnega deleža Republike Latvije v banki Citadele do […], ali če Republika Latvija na podlagi prve javne ponudbe ne bo mogla prodati celotnega deleža v banki Citadele do […].
In order to ensure the compatibility with the internal market under the Union State aid rules of the additional aid measures granted by Latvia to Parex banka, Citadele and Reverta through the First, Second and Third Measures, as well as the failure to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele by the committed deadline (the Fourth Measure), Latvia has proposed a series of commitments which are set out in recitals 64 to 73.
Latvija in banka Citadele se zavezujeta, da bosta prodajno in nakupno transakcijo za prodajo celotnega deleža Republike Latvije v banki Citadele izvedli do […].
Deadline for the sale of Citadele and for the divestment of the Wealth Management Business
Če prodaja zadevnega deleža ne bo izvedena do […], se zavezujeta, da bo banka Citadele […] novo dejavnost, preostale dejavnosti banke Citadele pa bodo […].
Latvia and Citadele undertake to apply their best efforts to obtain as soon as possible and in any event before […] binding bids for the sale of the entire stake of the Republic of Latvia in Citadele (including the Wealth Management Business).
Če je v katerem koli primeru iz uvodnih izjav 64 do 67 banka Citadele […], lahko Republika Latvija in/ali banka Citadele katere koli dele dejavnosti banke Citadele, za katere so tretje osebe izrazile interes, prodata tej tretji osebi in jih nanjo preneseta (brez poseganja v načela […] in nobene nove državne pomoči).
The sale shall be completed by […]at the latest.
Dodatno znižanje zneska odobrenih kapitalskih prispevkov
It shall be let to the discretion of the Republic of Latvia (and its advisor) to decide what the appropriate structure and modalities of the sale transaction are (e.g. a trade sale or IPO), as long as the Republic of Latvia eventually divests its entire stake in Citadele by […]at the latest.
Sklep o spremembi je v zvezi z banko Reverta odobril pretvorbo državnih vlog in obresti (likvidnostna podpora) v skupnem znesku 118,7 milijona LVL v kapital.
In case of an IPO, the Republic of Latvia commits to agree on a binding prospectus with the FCMC by […].
Ker je bilo do zdaj v kapital pretvorjenega le 49,5 milijona LVL likvidnostne podpore, Latvija predlaga, da se najvišji dovoljeni skupni znesek kapitala, ki ga lahko Latvija dodeli banki Reverta, s predhodnega zneska 118,7 milijona LVL takoj in trajno zniža na 49,5 milijona LVL.
Latvia and Citadele also commit that a divestiture trustee will be appointed if, by […], no binding bids have been received or, in case of an IPO, having the same objective, no prospectus has been agreed with the FCMC.
Zaveza okrepitvi ukrepov delitve bremena s preprečevanjem kakršnega koli odtekanja denarja podedovanim podrejenim upnikom banke Reverta
In such case the Republic of Latvia will take the necessary steps so as to ensure that the divestiture trustee is appointed and is operational as of […].
Latvija priznava, da so okrepljeni ukrepi delitve bremena nujni za zagotovitev združljivosti prvega, drugega in tretjega ukrepa z notranjim trgom.
It is understood that the financial advisor for the sale of Citadele could also be appointed as divestiture trustee as of […].
Ti ukrepi bi med drugim zagotovili, da nobene tretje osebe ne bodo imele neupravičene koristi od dodatne državne pomoči, dodeljene bankama Reverta in Citadele.