natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is true that during the verification the GOC showed the original of the letter intended for the banks, but when the Commission requested the GOC to submit evidence to show to which banks and financial institutions this letter was sent the GOC was not able to provide such evidence.
Res je, da je kitajska vlada med preverjanjem pokazala izvirnik dopisa, namenjenega bankam, vendar ko je Komisija od nje zahtevala, naj predloži dokaze o tem, katerim bankam in finančnim institucijam je bil poslan ta dopis, kitajska vlada takšnih dokazov ni mogla predložiti.
The GOC also alleged that some of the institutions indicated in Annex 7 to the deficiency letter were not banks.
Kitajska vlada je tudi trdila, da nekatere institucije, navedene v Prilogi 7 k pozivu k dopolnitvi, niso bile banke.
In this regard the Commission notes that these institutions had been notified to the Commission by the sampled exporting producers as institutions which extended loans to them.
V zvezi s tem Komisija pojasnjuje, da so vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki te institucije Komisiji priglasili kot institucije, ki so jim podaljšale posojila.
The GOC claimed that the Commission never addressed the issue of the PBOC Circulars YinFa [2003] and [2004] in its questionnaire or in the deficiency letters.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da Komisija v svojem vprašalniku ali pozivih k dopolnitvi ni nikoli obravnavala vprašanja okrožnic YinFa Ljudske banke Kitajske [2003] in [2004].
It is noted that in the pre-verification letter the Commission included ‘PBOC regulations/circulars/internal documentation concerning interest rates regulation in the PRC’ amongst the topics to be covered during the verification.
Opozoriti je treba, da je Komisija v predpreveritveno pismo med teme za obravnavo med preveritvijo vključila „uredbe/okrožnice/notranjo dokumentacijo Ljudske banke Kitajske o urejanju obrestnih mer v LRK“.
It is obvious that both circulars fall into this category.
Jasno je, da obe okrožnici sodita v to kategorijo.
In its reply to the deficiency letter the GOC even referred to an article on the PBOC website which referred to one of the circulars.
V svojem odgovoru na poziv k dopolnitvi se je kitajska vlada tudi sklicevala na članek na spletišču Ljudske banke Kitajske, ki se je skliceval na eno od okrožnic.
However the GOC did not provide any circulars from PBOC at all and only submitted information from the PBOC website which was incomplete in respect of the governance of interest rates on loans and deposits in China when compared to Circulars YinFa [2003] and [2004] which are both available on the web.
Vendar kitajska vlada sploh ni predložila nobenih okrožnic Ljudske banke Kitajske; predložila je le informacije s spletišča Ljudske banke Kitajske, ki so bile nepopolne v zvezi z upravljanjem obrestnih mer za posojila in vloge na Kitajskem v primerjavi z okrožnicami YinFa [2003] in [2004], ki sta na voljo na spletu.
It is also noted that the GOC did not refuse to submit these documents on the basis that it was not prepared for such question but rather because of the alleged confidentiality of the circulars.
Prav tako je treba opozoriti, da kitajska vlada ni zavrnila predložitve navedenih dokumentov, ker ne bi bila pripravljena na takšno vprašanje, temveč zaradi domnevne zaupnosti okrožnic.
In this regard it must be noted that the GOC's claim concerning the confidentiality of the PBOC circulars is inconsistent with its own practice in this proceeding.
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da trditev kitajske vlade glede zaupnosti okrožnic Ljudske banke Kitajske ni skladna z njeno prakso v tem postopku.
In its comments to definitive disclosure the GOC submitted full version of another PBOC Circular to support its claim that the special loans provided by state-owed commercial banks (SOCBs) were repealed and the confidentiality alleged elsewhere did not seem to be an obstacle.
Kitajska vlada je v svojih pripombah na dokončno razkritje predložila celotno različico še ene okrožnice Ljudske banke Kitajske v podporo svoji trditvi, da so bila posebna posojila državnih poslovnih bank razveljavljena, pri tem pa zaupnost, na katero se je sklicevala drugje, očitno ni bila ovira.
In respect to the extracts from the PBOC website, the Commission took note of them and, did not disregard their content.
Kar zadeva izvlečke s spletišča Ljudske banke Kitajske, se je Komisija z njimi seznanila in njihove vsebine ni zanemarila.
However to have the complete information on the matter also required the information in the two circulars which complemented the information submitted by the GOC.
Vendar da bi imela popolne informacije o tej zadevi, je Komisija zahtevala tudi informacije v obeh okrožnicah, ki so dopolnjevale informacije, ki jih je predložila kitajska vlada.
Claims for IE were submitted by 6 cooperating exporting producers pursuant to Article 27(3) of the basic Regulation, i.e. companies CNPV Dongying Solar Power Co. Ltd., Jiangsu Runda PV Co., Ltd., Kinve Solar Power Co., Ltd (Maanshan), Phono Solar Technology Co. Ltd., Shandong Linuo Photovoltaic Hi-Tech Co. Ltd., and Shandong Linuo Solar Power Holdings Co. Ltd. It was not possible to grant these companies individual examinations as, due to the high number of alleged subsidy schemes and time consuming nature of the investigation, it would be unduly burdensome and could prevent completion of the investigation in good time.
Zahtevke za IP je predložilo šest sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov v skladu s členom 27(3) osnovne uredbe, in sicer družbe CNPV Dongying Solar Power Co. Ltd., Jiangsu Runda PV Co., Ltd., Kinve Solar Power Co., Ltd (Maanshan), Phono Solar Technology Co. Ltd., Shandong Linuo Photovoltaic Hi-Tech Co. Ltd. in Shandong Linuo Solar Power Holdings Co. Ltd. Tem družbam ni bilo mogoče odobriti individualnih preiskav, saj bi bile zaradi velikega števila domnevnih subvencijskih shem in dolgotrajne narave preiskave preveč obremenjujoče ter bi lahko preprečile pravočasen zaključek preiskave.
On the basis of the information contained in the complaint the Commission sought information related to the following schemes, which allegedly involved the granting of subsidies by the Governmental authority:
Na podlagi informacij iz pritožbe je Komisija želela pridobiti informacije v zvezi z naslednjimi shemami, ki so domnevno vključevale dodeljevanje subvencij vladnega organa:
Preferential policy loans, other financing, guarantees and insurance
Preferenčne posojilne politike, drugo financiranje, jamstva in zavarovanja
Preferential policy loans;
preferenčne posojilne politike;
Provision of credit lines;
zagotavljanje kreditnih linij;
Export Guarantees and Insurances for Green Technologies;
izvozna jamstva in zavarovanja za zelene tehnologije;
Benefits provided through granting of access to offshore holding companies and loan repayments by the government;
ugodnosti, zagotovljene z omogočanjem dostopa off-shore holdinškim družbam, in odplačila posojil s strani države.
Grant Programmes
Programi nepovratnih sredstev:
Export product research development fund;
sklad za raziskave in razvoj izvoznih izdelkov;
Subsidies for development of ‘Famous Brands’ and China World Top Brands Programme;
subvencije za razvoj programov za znane blagovne znamke in najboljše kitajske blagovne znamke;
Funds for outward expansion of industries in Guandong Province;
sredstva za širitev dejavnosti v provinci Guangdong;
The Golden Sun demonstration programme;
demonstracijski program Golden Sun.
Direct Tax Exemption ad Reduction programmes
Programi neposrednih davčnih oprostitev in znižanja davka:
The two free/three half programme for foreign invested enterprises (FIEs);
program „dve leti brez, tri leta polovica“ za podjetja s tujimi naložbami („PTN“);
Income tax reduction for export-oriented FIEs;
zmanjšanje davka na dohodek za izvozno usmerjena PTN;
Income tax benefit for FIEs based on geographical location;
olajšave pri davku od dohodka za PTN na podlagi geografske lege;
Tax reduction for FIEs purchasing Chinese-made equipment;
znižanje davkov za PTN, ki kupujejo opremo, proizvedeno na Kitajskem;
Tax offset for research and development by FIEs;
davčna izravnava za raziskave in razvoj PTN;
Tax refunds for reinvestment of FIE profits in export oriented enterprises;
vračila davkov za naložbe dobička PTN v izvozno usmerjena podjetja;
Preferential tax programmes for FIEs recognised as high or new technology enterprises;
preferenčni davčni programi za PTN, priznana kot podjetja na področju visoke in nove tehnologije;
Tax reduction for high and new-technology enterprises involved in designated projects;
znižanje davkov za visokotehnološka podjetja in podjetja z novo tehnologijo, ki sodelujejo pri določenih projektih;
Preferential income tax policy for enterprises in the northeast region;
preferenčna politika glede davka na dohodek podjetij na severovzhodu države;
Guandong province tax programmes;
davčni programi province Guangdong.
Indirect Tax and Import Tariff Programmes
Programi za posredne davke in uvozne tarife:
VAT exemptions and import tariff rebates for the use of imported equipment;
oprostitve plačila DDV in znižanja uvoznih tarif za uporabo uvožene opreme;
VAT rebates on FIE purchases of Chinese-made equipment;
vračila DDV za PTN, ki kupujejo opremo, proizvedeno na Kitajskem;
VAT ad tariff exemptions for purchases of fixed assets under the foreign trade development funds programme;
oprostitve plačila DDV in tarif za nakupe osnovnih sredstev v okviru programa za razvoj zunanje trgovine.
Government provision of goods and services for less than adequate remuneration
Zagotavljanje blaga in storitev s strani vlade za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo:
Government provision of polysilicon for less than adequate remuneration;
zagotavljanje polisilicija s strani vlade za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo;
Government provision of aluminium extrusions for less than adequate remuneration;
zagotavljanje izdelkov in polizdelkov iz aluminija s strani vlade za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo;
Government provision of glass for less than adequate remuneration;
zagotavljanje stekla s strani vlade za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo;
Government provision of power;
zagotavljanje električne energije s strani vlade;
Government provision of land and land-use rights for less than adequate remuneration.
zagotavljanje zemljišč in pravic do rabe zemljišč s strani vlade za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo.
Financial market and institutions in China
finančni trg in institucije na Kitajskem
The GOC did not suggest any alternative source for this information.
Kitajska vlada za te informacije ni predlagala nobenega drugega nadomestnega vira.
The Commission attached a specific questionnaire (Appendix A) intended for the banks/financial institutions to the initial anti-subsidy questionnaire and asked the GOC to forward it to the banks/financial institutions which provided loans to the industry concerned.
Komisija je prvotnemu protisubvencijskemu vprašalniku dodala poseben vprašalnik (Dodatek A), namenjen bankam/finančnim institucijam, ter kitajsko vlado pozvala, naj ga posreduje bankam/finančnim institucijam, ki so odobrile posojila zadevni industriji.
The purpose of Appendix A was to verify allegations in the complaint that Chinese state-owned banks are public bodies.
Z Dodatkom A naj bi se preverile trditve v pritožbi, da so kitajske državne banke javni organi.
Inter alia, the Commission sought information concerning the structure of government control in those Chinese banks and the pursuit of government policies or interests with respect to the photovoltaic industry (i.e. board of directors and board of shareholders, minutes of shareholders/directors meetings, nationality of shareholders/directors, lending policies and assessment of risk with respect to loans provided to the cooperating exporting producers).
Komisija je med drugim zahtevala informacije glede strukture vladnega nadzora v navedenih kitajskih bankah in upoštevanja vladnih politik ali interesov v zvezi s fotonapetostno industrijo (tj. odbora uprave in odbora delničarjev, zapisnikov sestankov delničarjev/članov uprave, nacionalnosti delničarjev/članov uprave, posojilnih politik in ocene tveganja glede posojil, ki so bila odobrena sodelujočim proizvajalcem izvoznikom).
In the reply to the questionnaire, the GOC submitted a reply to Appendix A only for five banks (the China Development Bank (CDB), the EXIM Bank, the Bank of Shanghai, the Bank of China [31] and the Huaxia Bank).
Kitajska vlada je v Dodatku A vprašalnika predložila odgovore le za pet bank (Kitajska razvojna banka, Kitajska izvozno-uvozna banka, Šanghajska banka, Banka Kitajske [31] in banka Huaxia).
In the deficiency letter, the Commission repeated its initial request for information.
V pozivu k dopolnitvi je Komisija ponovila svojo prvotno zahtevo po informacijah.
The Commission also sought information about the state ownership of the banks and financial institutions.
Komisija je želela pridobiti tudi informacije o državnem lastništvu bank in finančnih institucij.
In its questionnaire reply, the GOC stated that it does not retain any records concerning the ownership shares and it did not provide any suggestion on how to obtain this information.
Kitajska vlada je v izpolnjenem vprašalniku navedla, da ne hrani nobene evidence o lastniških deležih in ni navedla nobenega predloga, kako pridobiti te informacije.
When the Commission, in its deficiency letter, pointed out that it is mandatory to include this information in the Articles of Association of the banks and these are accessible by the GOC as a shareholder, the GOC submitted shareholding information of 16 banks.
Ko je Komisija v pozivu k dopolnitvi poudarila, da je te informacije obvezno vključiti v statut banke in da je ta na voljo kitajski vladi kot delničarju, je kitajska vlada predložila informacije o deležu za 16 bank.
However, except for five banks, for which the GOC referred to the annual reports as a source, it did not provide any supporting evidence for this information and neither did it disclose what the source data for this information was.
Vendar razen za 5 bank, pri katerih je kitajska vlada kot vir navedla letna poročila, ni predložila nobenih podpornih dokazov za te informacije in tudi ni razkrila njihovega vira podatkov.
Concerning the other banks which provided loans to the industry concerned, the GOC did not provide any information at all concerning its ownership stake.
Glede drugih bank, ki so odobrile posojila zadevni industriji, kitajska vlada ni predložila nobenih informacij o svojem lastniškem deležu.
Consequently, the Commission was unable to verify the accuracy and correctness of the reported data concerning the state's ownership stakes in the banks and other financial institutions.
Komisija zato ni mogla preveriti točnosti in pravilnosti sporočenih podatkov o državnih lastniških deležih v bankah in drugih finančnih institucijah.
The GOC claimed that the BB rating applied to the sampled exporting producers (for the purpose of the loan benchmark) is ‘extremely unfavourable’ and that the Commission ‘in light of the actual facts of the case did not explain how did it come to the conclusion that this is the accurate or most reasonable conclusion. The GOC further claimed that this methodology amounts to “an impermissible adverse inference”.’ Although this claim was made in relation to the one of the previous cases (i.e. Coated Fine Paper) and before the disclosure of the information concerning the rating applied to the sample exporting producers in this proceeding, it should be noted that the Commission did not apply ‘adverse facts available’ in this case or in any other cases to which the GOC referred in its submission.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da je bonitetna ocena BB za vzorčene proizvajalce izvoznike (za referenčno vrednost posojil) „izredno neugodna“ in da Komisija „ob upoštevanju dejstev primera ni pojasnila, kako je prišla do sklepa, da je to točno ali najbolj smiselno“. Kitajska vlada je nadalje trdila, da ta metodologija pomeni „nedovoljen negativen sklep“. Čeprav je bila ta trditev povezana s trditvijo iz prejšnjih primerov (tj. v zvezi s premazanim finim papirjem) in je bila predložena pred razkritjem informacij glede bonitetne ocene za vzorčene proizvajalce izvoznike v tem postopku, je treba opozoriti, da Komisija v tem primeru ali v drugih primerih, na katere se je kitajska vlada sklicevala v svojih navedbah, ni uporabila „negativnih razpoložljivih dejstev“.
The Commission had only drawn appropriate conclusions from the facts on the record, which showed a lack of proper credit risk assessment, see recitals (175) to (178).
Komisija je le ustrezno sklepala na podlagi evidentiranih dejstev, ki so kazala na odsotnost ustrezne ocene kreditnega tveganja, glej uvodne izjave od (175) do (178).
It should be pointed out that during the IP the Chinese PV industry was making heavy losses and it was clear that its financial status was extremely difficult.
Treba je poudariti, da je imela kitajska fotonapetostna industrija v OP velike izgube, pri čemer je bilo jasno, da je bilo njeno finančno stanje izredno težavno.
Several credit risk assessments supplied by sampled companies demonstrated that a BB assessment for the IP as a whole was not unreasonable.
Številne ocene kreditnega tveganja, ki so jih zagotovile vzorčene družbe, so pokazale, da bonitetna ocena BB za celotno OP ni bila nerazumna.
In fact some credit risk assessments clearly demonstrate that several Groups were in fact more or less insolvent.
Dejansko nekatere ocene kreditnega tveganja jasno dokazujejo, da je bilo več skupin v resnici bolj ali manj plačilno nesposobnih.
Verification at banks
Preverjanje pri bankah
In its pre-verification letter the Commission envisaged the verification of the banks which submitted replies to the Appendix A to the questionnaire and provided a large proportion of loans to the sampled exporting producers, i.e. the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China, the Bank of Shanghai and the Huaxia Bank and it included a detailed list of subjects that would be covered during the verification.
Komisija je v svojem predpreveritvenem pismu napovedala preverjanje bank, ki so predložile izpolnjen Dodatek A k vprašalniku in zagotovile velik delež posojil vzorčenim proizvajalcem izvoznikom, tj. Kitajska razvojna banka, Kitajska izvozno-uvozna banka, Šanghajska banka in banka Huaxia, ter priložila podroben seznam tem, ki se bodo obravnavale med preverjanjem.
In the initial questionnaire intended for the GOC, the Commission had already made it clear that the information provided in the questionnaire replies might be subject to an on-the-spot verification.
Komisija je v prvotnem vprašalniku, namenjenem kitajski vladi, že jasno navedla, da se bodo informacije, predložene v izpolnjenih vprašalnikih, morda preverjale na kraju samem.
In the pre-verification letter the Commission had also stated that the GOC was ‘requested to make all supporting documents available that were used to prepare your substantive response, including original source documents and applications’.
Komisija je v predpreveritvenem pismu tudi navedla, da se od kitajske vlade „zahtevajo vsi podporni dokumenti, ki so bili uporabljeni pri [vaši] pripravi vsebinskega odgovora, vključno s prvotnimi izvirnimi dokumenti in vlogami“.
Two other major providers of preferential financing to the sampled exporting producers either did not submit requested information at all (Agricultural Bank of China) or the information was submitted on their behalf without a possibility to verify it (Bank of China).
Dva druga glavna ponudnika preferenčnega financiranja vzorčenim proizvajalcem izvoznikom bodisi sploh nista predložila zahtevanih informacij (Kmetijska banka Kitajske, ang. Agricultural Bank of China) bodisi so bile informacije predložene v njunem imenu brez možnosti preverjanja (Banka Kitajske).
Bank of Shanghai
Šanghajska banka
In its pre-verification letter of 25 March 2013 the Commission notified the GOC of its intention to verify the Bank of Shanghai (‘BoS’) and offered in order to facilitate the verification visit for the GOC, should it be necessary, to extend the verification visit until 22 April 2013 [32].
Komisija je v svojem predpreveritvenem pismu z dne 25. marca 2013 obvestila kitajsko vlado, da namerava preveriti Šanghajsko banko („ŠB“), in je, da bi kitajski vladi olajšala preveritveni obisk, tudi ponudila, da preveritveni obisk po potrebi podaljša do 22. aprila 2013 [32].
In its initial reply to the pre-verification letter of 5 April, the GOC did not confirm whether the verification of BoS would take place but enquired whether the Commission would be willing to verify the Bank of Shanghai in another location to the rest of the verification (i.e. Shanghai instead of Beijing).
V svojem prvotnem odgovoru na predpreveritveno pismo z dne 5. aprila kitajska vlada ni potrdila, ali bo preverjanje ŠB izvedeno, je pa vprašala, ali bi bila Komisija pripravljena Šanghajsko banko preveriti na drugi lokaciji med preostalim preverjanjem (tj. v Šanghaju namesto Pekingu).
To facilitate the verification visit, the Commission exceptionally agreed to this; however, it urged the GOC to confirm the verification in Shanghai by 9 April at the latest (i.e. three working days before the start of the verification in Beijing) in order for the team to be able to arrange the practicalities related to such a change in the verification planning.
Da bi Komisija olajšala preveritveni obisk, se je izjemoma strinjala s tem, vendar je kitajsko vlado pozvala, naj potrdi preverjanje v Šanghaju najpozneje do 9. aprila (tj. tri delovne dni pred začetkom preverjanja v Pekingu), da bo ekipa lahko uredila vse praktične vidike v zvezi s tako spremembo pri načrtovanju preverjanja.
In its letter of 3 June 2013 the GOC claimed that the verification of BoS did not take place because of the inflexibility on the Commission side, that the Commission did not propose any alternative dates for the verification and simply ‘declined to consider the verification of Bank of Shanghai’.
Kitajska vlada je v svojem dopisu z dne 3. junija 2013 trdila, da se preverjanje ŠB ni opravilo zaradi neprilagodljivosti Komisije, da Komisija ni predlagala nobenih alternativnih datumov za preverjanje in da je enostavno „zavrnila možnost, da bi proučila preverjanje Šanghajske banke“.
These claims are simply incorrect.
Te trditve so preprosto napačne.
The Commission stated clearly in its pre-verification letter that it was initially proposed to verify the banks on 17 and 18 April 2013 with a possibility of additional day on 22 April, leaving it to the GOC to propose appropriate times to visit the banks throughout the whole period of verification (i.e. full working week plus additional day).
Komisija je v svojem predpreveritvenem pismu jasno navedla, da je bilo prvotno predlagano, da se banke preverijo 17. in 18. aprila 2013 z možnostjo podaljšanja za dodatni dan, in sicer 22. april, pri čemer je kitajski vladi prepustila, da predlaga ustrezne datume za obisk bank v celotnem obdobju preverjanja (tj. polni delovni teden in dodatni dan).
Yet the GOC proposed dates for verification of BoS outside this window and did so only one working day before the start of verification visit.
Vendar je kitajska vlada za preverjanje ŠB predlagala datume zunaj tega okvira, kar je storila le en delovni dan pred začetkom preveritvenega obiska.
In the Commission's view, the flexibility offered was more than sufficient and altogether six alternative days were offered for the verification of BoS, contrary to the GOC's claim.
Komisija meni, da je bila več kot dovolj prilagodljiva, pri čemer je v nasprotju s trditvijo kitajske vlade za preverjanje ŠB ponudila skupaj šest alternativnih dni.