natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
the underwriting by DBB/Belfius of bonds guaranteed by the Member States concerned and issued by Dexia SA and/or DCL;
prodaja obveznic, ki jo je izvedla banka DBB/Belfius, za katere so jamčile zadevne države članice, izdali pa sta jih družba Dexia SA in banka DCL,
the future sale price of DMA;
prihodnja prodajna cena družbe DMA,
a future guarantee by Dexia SA and DCL in respect of DMA’s ‘sensitive loans’ covering a total loan amount of some EUR 10 billion;
prihodnje jamstvo družbe Dexia SA in banke DCL za „občutljiva posojila“ družbe DMA v skupni višini okrog 10 milijard EUR,
a future counter-guarantee by France of the ‘sensitive loans’ guarantee;
prihodnje posredno jamstvo Francije za „občutljiva posojila“,
coverage of the cash flow needs of DMA by its purchasers (of an amount of up to EUR 12,5 billion in the case of the CDC); and
kritje potreb po denarnem toku družbe DMA s strani njenih kupcev (v znesku do 12,5 milijard EUR v primeru hranilnice in posojilnice CDC) ter
a ‘stop-loss’ guarantee in respect of losses on any Dexia SA and DCL security portfolio.
jamstvo za omejitev izgube za kateri koli portfelj vrednostnih papirjev družbe Dexia SA in banke DCL.
The Commission notes that some of these measures were abandoned and are not included in the final version of the resolution plan.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so bili nekateri od teh ukrepov opuščeni in niso bili vključeni v končno različico načrta reševanja.
The procedure was extended to the resolution plan because the Commission had serious doubts as to the compatibility with the internal market of this aid under the orderly resolution plan for Dexia.
Postopek se je razširil na načrt reševanja, saj je imela Komisija resne pomisleke o združljivosti te pomoči z notranjim trgom v skladu z načrtom nadzorovanega reševanja skupine Dexia.
In practice, it had doubts as to whether the orderly resolution plan was appropriate, limited aid to the minimum necessary and contained adequate measures to compensate the resulting distortion of competition.
V praksi je imela pomisleke, ali je načrt nadzorovanega reševanja ustrezen, ali je pomoč omejena na najnižjo potrebno in ali je vseboval ustrezne ukrepe, da bi nadomestil izkrivljanje konkurence, ki iz tega izhaja.
In the case of the operation concerning DMA, structural links would be maintained between the Dexia Group and the new structure of DMA for a period that could extend as far as 2020, while DCL would continue to refinance the additional mortgage loans generated by the new structure.
V primeru transakcije v zvezi z družbo DMA bi se lahko strukturne povezave med skupino Dexia in novo strukturo DMA ohranjale vse do leta 2020, banka DCL pa bi še naprej refinancirala dodatne hipotekarne kredite, ki bi jih ustvarjala nova struktura.
Instead of being placed in actual resolution with aid limited to the minimum necessary, Dexia would therefore continue to participate in the production of new loans and to issue new bonds.
Skupina Dexia bi tako še naprej sodelovala pri ustvarjanju novih posojil in izdajala nove obveznice, namesto da bi s pomočjo, omejeno na najnižjo potrebno, prešla v dejansko likvidacijo.
Moreover, the initial version of the orderly resolution plan was based on a ‘permanent’ guarantee by the Member States concerned whose cost appeared to be too low given that the Dexia Group would produce new loans and issue new debt for a substantial period of time.
Poleg tega je prvotna različica načrta nadzorovanega reševanja temeljila na trajnem jamstvu zadevnih držav članic, vendar so se ob upoštevanju tega, da naj bi skupina Dexia v daljšem obdobju ustvarjala nova posojila in izdajala nove dolgove, njegovi stroški zdeli prenizki.
COMMENTS BY DEXIA ON THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL DECISION, THE DECISION TO EXTEND THE PROCEDURE, THE DECISION ON THE FIRST PROLONGATION OF THE GUARANTEE, THE DECISION TO INCREASE THE GUARANTEE CEILING AND THE DECISION ON THE SECOND PROLONGATION OF THE GUARANTEE
PRIPOMBE SKUPINE DEXIA O SKLEPU O ZAČASNI ODOBRITVI, SKLEPU O RAZŠIRITVI POSTOPKA, SKLEPU O PRVEM PODALJŠANJU JAMSTVA, SKLEPU O POVEČANJU ZGORNJE MEJE JAMSTVA IN SKLEPU O DRUGEM PODALJŠANJU JAMSTVA
Dexia denies that it failed to comply with the commitments set out in the conditional authorisation decision.
Skupina Dexia zanika, da ni izpolnila zavez iz sklepa o začasni odobritvi.
Dexia points out in particular that it made the planned sales ‘in advance of the timetable’ and that the deleveraging of the bond portfolio was much faster than planned [69].
Poudarja predvsem, da je načrtovane prodaje opravila „pred časovnim razporedom“ in da je bilo zmanjšanje finančnega vzvoda portfelja obveznic mnogo hitrejše od načrtovanega [69].
Dexia also points out that its new loan production was below the limits set by the restructuring plan [70].
Skupina Dexia poudarja tudi, da nova posojila niso presegla omejitev iz načrta prestrukturiranja [70].
The fact that Dexia’s balance sheet reduction target had not been met by 31 December 2010 was due to variations in the (euro/dollar) exchange parity and was rectified from 31 March 2011, i.e. three months in advance of the deadline permitted by point 18(d) of the commitments.
Zaradi spreminjanja menjalne paritete (med eurom in dolarjem) cilj zmanjšanja bilance stanja skupine Dexia ni bil izpolnjen do 31. decembra 2010, kar je bilo 31. marca 2011 popravljeno, tj. tri mesece pred dovoljenim rokom iz točke 18(d) zavez.
Dexia contends that any failures to comply with the commitments observed by the independent trustee after October 2011 have to be put down to the problems that it encountered in October 2011 (which had in turn to be put down to the worsening sovereign debt crisis which increased investors’ mistrust of bank counterparties) and its vulnerable liquidity profile.
Skupina Dexia nasprotuje ugotovitvi, da je treba kakršno koli neizpolnjevanje zavez po oktobru 2011, o katerem je poročal neodvisni skrbnik, pripisati težavam, ki jih je imela oktobra 2011 (ki pa jih je treba pripisati vse hujši dolžniški krizi, s katero se je poglobilo nezaupanje vlagateljev do nasprotnih strank banke), in njenemu ranljivemu profilu likvidnosti.
It states that, after October 2011, the targets of the Dexia restructuring plan of February 2010 were no longer achievable and that Dexia cannot therefore be accused of failing to comply, after October 2011, with the commitments set out in the conditional authorisation decision.
Navedla je, da po oktobru 2011 ciljev načrta prestrukturiranja skupine Dexia iz februarja 2010 ni bilo več mogoče doseči ter da skupine Dexia zato po oktobru 2011 ni mogoče obtožiti, da ni izpolnila zavez iz sklepa o pogojnem dovoljenju.
Dexia stresses, moreover, that the revised orderly resolution plan responded to all the Commission’s questions in its decisions to open and extend the procedure and was in line with the ‘provisional framework’.
Skupina Dexia poleg tega poudarja, da se je s spremenjenim načrtom nadzorovanega reševanja odzvala na vsa vprašanja Komisije iz njenih sklepov o začetku postopka preiskave in o razširitvi postopka ter da je bil ta načrt skladen z „začasnim okvirom“.
In response to the Commission’s comment in recital 275 of its decision to extend the procedure that the information communicated on the ‘final’ refinancing guarantee in the notification of the orderly resolution plan was inadequate and too vague to be able to assess the appropriateness of the guarantee, Dexia points out that the terms and conditions of the guarantee were specified in the document of 8 November 2012 attached as Annex 18 to the revised orderly resolution plan, and were summarised in Section IV.B.2(b) of the revised orderly resolution plan.
Skupina Dexia se je na pripombo Komisije iz uvodne izjave 275 sklepa o razširitvi postopka, da so bile informacije o „končnem“ jamstvu za refinanciranje, predložene v priglasitvi načrta nadzorovanega reševanja, neustrezne in preveč nejasne, da bi se lahko ocenila primernost jamstva, odzvala tako, da je poudarila, da so bili pogoji jamstva določeni v dokumentu z dne 8. novembra 2012, priloženega spremenjenemu načrtu nadzorovanega reševanja kot Priloga 18, ter da so bili povzeti v oddelku IV.B.2(b) tega načrta.
In Dexia’s view, the lack of new production by the entities placed in run-off management (in particular DCL, Dexia Sabadell and, in the event that disposal to a third party proved impossible, Crediop) in the revised orderly resolution plan for Dexia is enough to counter the Commission’s doubts in recital 281 of the decision to extend the procedure as to whether a lower remuneration than prescribed in the Annex to the 2011 Prolongation Communication was justified.
Ker subjekti, za katere je bil uveden likvidacijski postopek (zlasti banki DCL, Dexia Sabadell in, če bi se izkazalo, da prodaja tretji strani ni mogoča, družba Crediop) v spremenjenem načrtu nadzorovanega reševanja, niso ustvarjali novih produktov, je to po mnenju skupine Dexia zadostovalo za ugovarjanje pomislekom Komisije iz uvodne izjave 281 sklepa o razširitvi postopka glede tega, ali so upravičeni nižji prejemki od predpisanih iz Priloge k sporočilu o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči iz leta 2011.
The bank stresses that the Commission no longer needs to be concerned [71] that it was initially planned for the final guarantee to cover existing loans (Crediop’s EMTNs and EIB loans), contrary to the principle that aid is to be limited to the minimum necessary and that beneficiaries must make their own contribution, since the bank has been relieved of the risk raised by prior financing.
Skupina Dexia poudarja, da Komisiji ni treba več skrbeti glede tega [71], da je bilo sprva načrtovano, da naj bi se s končnim jamstvom krila obstoječa posojila (družbe Crediop v obliki EMTN in posojila EIB), kar je v nasprotju z načelom, da je treba pomoč omejiti na najnižjo potrebno in da morajo upravičenci zagotoviti lasten prispevek, saj ta skupina ne nosi tveganja, ki ga povzroča predhodno financiranje.
These concerns no longer stand as the final guarantee as planned in the revised orderly resolution plan does not cover the EMTNs or other existing instruments.
Ti pomisleki ne veljajo več, saj končno jamstvo, kot je bilo načrtovano v spremenjenem načrtu nadzorovanega reševanja, ne obsega EMTN (program „Euro Medium Term Note“) ali drugih obstoječih instrumentov.
In Dexia’s view, the EUR 85 billion ceiling of the final guarantee is justified because this level was necessary to meet Dexia’s peak financing needs in a stress scenario.
Skupina Dexia meni, da je zgornja meja končnega jamstva v višini 85 milijard EUR upravičena, saj je bila ta stopnja potrebna, da se zadosti največjim potrebam po financiranju te skupine glede na scenarij izjemnih situacij.
Explanations were provided in this respect in part IV.C.1 of the revised orderly resolution plan.
To je bilo pojasnjeno v delu IV.C.1 spremenjenega načrta nadzorovanega reševanja.
It refers to a memorandum from the French authorities [72] responding to the Commission’s questions about the new mortgage lending structure (now the development bank for the financing of French local authorities and French public health establishments, following the disposal of DMA) [73].
Sklicuje se na memorandum francoskih organov [72], ki ponuja odgovore na vprašanja Komisije o novi strukturi za hipotekarno kreditiranje (po prodaji družbe DMA je to zdaj nova razvojna banka za financiranje francoskih lokalnih skupnosti in francoskih ustanov javnega zdravstva) [73].
Dexia points out that the disposal of DenizBank has taken place and that the methods of disposal of DMA, Sofaxis, Domiserve, Exterimmo, LLD and DCL were outlined in the revised orderly resolution plan and will be specified at the time of their notification to the Commission.
Skupina Dexia poudarja, da se prodaja banke DenizBank ni opravila ter da so bile metode prodaje družb DMA, Sofaxis, Domiserve, Exterimmo, LLD in banke DCL opisane v spremenjenem načrtu nadzorovanega reševanja, pojasnjene pa bodo ob priglasitvi Komisiji.
Dexia contends that its recapitalisation of EUR 5,5 billion by the French and Belgian States would make it possible to maintain the regulatory ratios of the entities of the Dexia Group [75].
Skupina Dexia trdi, da bi se z dokapitalizacijo v višini 5,5 milijarde EUR, ki bi jo izvedli Belgija in Francija, lahko ohranila regulativna razmerja njenih subjektov [75].
Dexia refers, moreover, to the Group’s governance reform measures set out in Section I.F.2 of the revised orderly resolution plan which, in its view, responded to the comments in the report by the consultants […] (supported by the Commission) as to the operational risks […] inherent in the measures proposed in the orderly resolution plan.
Skupina Dexia se poleg tega sklicuje na ukrepe o spremembi vodenja iz oddelka I.F.2 spremenjenega načrta nadzorovanega reševanja, ki so po njenem mnenju ponujali odgovor na pripombe iz poročila svetovalcev […] (ki ga je podprla Komisija) glede operativnih tveganj […], ki so del ukrepov, predlaganih v tem načrtu.
In this respect, the Commission stressed in recitals 264 and 265 of the decision to extend the procedure that it was essential to address these risks in a systematic way, in particular by identifying key personnel so that steps could if necessary be taken to prevent their departure or the adverse consequences of such a departure on the Group.
Komisija je v uvodnih izjavah 264 in 265 sklepa o razširitvi postopka poudarila, da je ta tveganja nujno treba reševati sistematično, zlasti z opredelitvijo ključnih zaposlenih, da bi se lahko po potrebi z ukrepi preprečil njihov odhod ali neugodne posledice takega odhoda za skupino Dexia.
Lastly, Dexia refers to certain documents which responded to the Commission’s other comments [76].
Skupina Dexia se sklicuje na določene dokumente, ki so ponujali odgovore na druge pripombe Komisije [76].
COMMENTS BY THIRD PARTIES ON THE PURCHASE OF DBB/BELFIUS
PRIPOMBE TRETJIH STRANI GLEDE NAKUPA BANKE DBB/BELFIUS
Following publication of the formal investigation procedure on 11 February 2012, the Commission received comments from two interested third parties.
Ko je Komisija 11. februarja 2012 objavila formalni postopek preiskave, je prejela pripombe dveh zainteresiranih tretjih strani.
One of the comments received (‘comment A’) drew the Commission’s attention to the recent strategy by DBB/Belfius to offer aggressive increasing interest rates on the ‘Treasury Plus’ and ‘Treasury Plus Special’ deposit accounts offered to medium-sized and large enterprises in Belgium and to institutional customers.
Ena od prejetih pripomb (v nadaljnjem besedilu: pripomba A) je pozornost Komisije usmerila na nedavno strategijo banke DBB/Belfius, ki pri depozitnih računih, imenovanih „Treasury Plus“ in „Treasury Plus Special“, srednjim in velikim podjetjem v Belgiji ter institucionalnim strankam ponuja agresivne naraščajoče obrestne mere.
This third party considered that this aggressive pricing strategy created price imbalances between assets and liabilities requiring maturity conversion and was unsustainable in the long term.
Po mnenju te tretje strani so se s tako strategijo agresivnega določanja cen ustvarila cenovna neravnovesja med sredstvi in obveznostmi, ki zahtevajo spremembo zapadlosti, dolgoročno pa je bila nevzdržna.
Such a pricing policy would be impossible without State aid.
Taka politika določanja cen brez državne pomoči ne bi bila mogoča.
According to the other comment (‘comment B’), the costs of marketing, sports and cultural sponsorship and the change of name were excessive.
Po drugi pripombi (v nadaljnjem besedilu: pripomba B) pa so bili previsoki stroški trženja, sponzoriranja športa in kulture ter spremembe imena.
This third party also considered that the commercial strategy of DBB/Belfius was creating distortions of competition by aggressive pricing in particular in relation to property loans, savings bonds, internet savings accounts and their loyalty bonuses.
Ta tretja stran je tudi menila, da je poslovna strategija banke DBB/Belfius z agresivnim določanjem cen, zlasti v zvezi z nepremičninskimi posojili, varčevanjem v obveznicah, spletnimi varčevalnimi računi in njihovimi bonusi za zvestobo, izkrivljala konkurenco.
COMMENTS BY THE MEMBER STATES CONCERNED
PRIPOMBE ZADEVNIH DRŽAV ČLANIC
COMMENTS ON THE PURCHASE OF DBB/BELFIUS
PRIPOMBE O NAKUPU BANKE DBB/BELFIUS
The Member States made the following comments.
Države članice so navedle naslednje pripombe.
Comments in response to the decision to initiate the procedure in respect of the sale of DBB/Belfius
Pripombe v odgovor na sklep o začetku postopka preiskave o prodaji banke DBB/Belfius
In October 2012, Belgium stressed that the purchase of DBB/Belfius by the Belgian State was becoming urgent for reasons of financial stability.
Belgija je oktobra 2012 poudarila, da je zaradi finančne stabilnosti postajalo nujno, da ta država kupi banko DBB/Belfius.
In this respect, the BNB sent a letter to the Commission on 12 October 2011 reporting the serious difficulties that DBB/Belfius had experienced in early 2011 because of withdrawals of deposits and a substantial reduction of non-securitised financing.
Banka BNB je v zvezi s tem Komisiji 12. oktobra 2011 poslala dopis, v katerem je poročala o resnih težavah, ki jih je imela banka DBB/Belfius v začetku leta 2011 zaradi dvigov vlog in bistvenega zmanjšanja nelistinjenega financiranja.
In view of the systemic importance of DBB/Belfius for the Belgian and European financial sector, and the disturbances taking place in the financial markets, a measure to safeguard DBB/Belfius was necessary.
Ob upoštevanju sistemskega pomena banke DBB/Belfius za belgijski in evropski finančni sektor ter motenj na finančnih trgih je bil ukrep za zaščito te banke nujen.
The purchase of DBB/Belfius would make it possible to prevent a serious loss of public confidence, with the attendant risk of a run on the bank, which would in turn trigger a serious disturbance of the banking system as a whole both in Belgium and throughout Europe.
Nakup te banke bi omogočil, da se zaupanje javnosti ne bi resno zmanjšalo, pri čemer bi obstajalo spremljajoče tveganje navala na banko, ki pa bi povzročil resno motnjo v celotnem bančnem sistemu Belgije in po vsej Evropi.
Belgium considers that the purchase of DBB/Belfius did not contain State aid and that DBB/Belfius did not therefore have to be subject to commitments or measures to remedy distortions of competition.
Belgija meni, da v nakup banke DBB/Belfius ni bila vključena državna pomoč in da se zato tej banki ni bilo treba zavezati k zavezam ali ukrepom za odpravo izkrivljanja konkurence.
Belgium also requested that DBB/Belfius be released from all the commitments and conditions set out in the conditional authorisation decision.
Belgija je tudi prosila, da bila banka DBB/Belfius oproščena vseh zavez in pogojev iz sklepa o pogojnem dovoljenju.
Belgium recalls the principle of parity between public or private holdings in an enterprise set out in Article 345 TFEU.
Belgija se sklicuje na načelo paritete med javnimi ali zasebnimi deleži v podjetju, kot je določeno v členu 345 PDEU.
Purchase by the Belgian State cannot in itself be considered a component of State aid in favour of DBB/Belfius.
Če nakup opravi Belgija, se to samo po sebi ne more obravnavati kot sestavina državne pomoči v korist banki DBB/Belfius.
The transaction also took place in market conditions as is confirmed by independent experts and offered Belgium a reasonable return that would be acceptable to a private investor in similar circumstances.
Transakcija je bila opravljena pod tržnimi pogoji, kot potrjujejo tudi neodvisni strokovnjaki, in je Belgiji zagotovila primerno donosnost, ki bi bila v podobnih okoliščinah sprejemljiva tudi za zasebnega vlagatelja.
DBB/Belfius has always been a net provider of liquidity to the remainder of the Group.
Banka DBB/Belfius je preostali skupini Dexia vedno zagotavljala likvidna sredstva.
Belgium stresses that DBB/Belfius did not benefit from the aid received by the Dexia Group in the past.
Belgija poudarja, da ta banka ni bila upravičena do pomoči, ki jo je v preteklosti prejela skupina Dexia.
For instance, the aid in the form of guarantees and ELA approved by the conditional authorisation decision was clearly used to meet the liquidity needs of other Dexia Group entities.
Na primer pomoč v obliki jamstev in izredna likvidnostna pomoč, odobrena s sklepom o pogojnem dovoljenju, sta bili očitno uporabljeni za zadostitev potreb po likvidnih sredstvih drugih subjektov v skupini Dexia.
Most of the conditions and commitments in the conditional authorisation decision did not relate specifically to DBB/Belfius.
Večina pogojev in zavez iz sklepa o pogojnem dovoljenju se ni nanašala posebej na banko DBB/Belfius.
DBB/Belfius has also taken a range of restructuring measures since February 2010, including the closure of branches and reductions of its public financing activity, its bond portfolio, the size of its balance sheet and its costs.
Od februarja 2010 se je v banki DBB/Belfius izvedel tudi sklop ukrepov za prestrukturiranje, med katere je vključeno zapiranje podružnic ter zmanjševanje njene javnofinančne dejavnosti, portfelja obveznic, obsega bilance stanja in stroškov.
According to the case law [77], the Commission cannot simply conclude that the aid granted to a group has automatically benefited all the entities of that group.
Komisija glede na sodno prakso [77] ne more preprosto sklepati, da so bili vsi subjekti te skupine samodejno upravičeni do pomoči, dodeljene skupini Dexia.
The transfer mechanisms within the Dexia Group were to the detriment of DBB/Belfius.
Mehanizmi prenosa znotraj skupine Dexia so bili uporabljeni v škodo banke DBB/Belfius.
DBB/Belfius cannot be considered to be an entity continuing Dexia’s economic activity because of a range of elements which, in accordance with settled case law [78], have to be taken into account when making such an assessment and which in particular concern the purpose of the transfer, the transfer price, the identity of the shareholders or owners of the acquiring firm or the acquired firm, the time of the transfer and the economic logic of the transfer.
Banke DBB/Belfius ni mogoče obravnavati kot subjekta, ki nadaljuje gospodarsko dejavnost skupine Dexia, zaradi sklopa elementov, ki jih je glede na ustaljeno sodno prakso [78] treba upoštevati pri taki oceni ter ki zajema zlasti namen prenosa, ceno prenosa, identiteto delničarjev ali lastnikov podjetja, ki kupuje, ali pripojenega podjetja, čas prenosa in ekonomsko logiko prenosa.
The DBB/Belfius operation acquired by Belgium is significantly smaller than the size of the former Group and DBB/Belfius changed its name in order to rule out any perception of a link between it and the former Group.
Transakcija, s katero si je Belgija pripojila banko DBB/Belfius, je bila po obsegu bistveno manjša od nekdanje skupine Dexia, banka DBB/Belfius je zaradi izključitve kakršne koli zaznavne povezave med njo in nekdanjo skupino Dexia tudi spremenila ime.
DBB/Belfius was not, moreover, acquired below market price and the acquirer would thus be paying appropriately for any aid from which DBB/Belfius benefited as a Dexia Group entity.
Poleg tega banka DBB/Belfius ni bila pripojena pod tržno ceno, torej bi kupec ustrezno plačal za vsako pomoč, do katere bi lahko bila ta banka upravičena kot subjekt skupine Dexia.
The criterion of independence between Dexia and the new owners and new management of DBB/Belfius has also been met.
Prav tako je bilo izpolnjeno merilo glede neodvisnosti skupine Dexia ter novih lastnikov in nove uprave banke DBB/Belfius.
It is planned, moreover, to cut all financial links between DBB/Belfius and Dexia.
Poleg tega se načrtuje, da bi se prekinile vse finančne povezave med banko DBB/Belfius in skupino Dexia.
The purchase of DBB/Belfius by Belgium contains no transfer of capital or other State resources to DBB/Belfius.
V nakup banke DBB/Belfius, ki ga je opravila Belgija, ni vključen noben prenos kapitala ali drugih državnih sredstev tej banki.