natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Precio medio ponderado final mercado mayorista
Proizvajalci električne energije iz obnovljivih virov so se lahko zlasti odločili za neposredno udeležbo na organiziranem trgu („pool“).
Source:
Leta 2005 je bila ta možnost še posebno privlačna in posledično je na organiziranem trgu sodelovalo več proizvajalcev električne energije iz obnovljivih virov, kot je bilo pričakovano, zaradi česar je imel sistem višje stroške.
CNE — Informe sobre la evolución de la competencia en los mercados de gas y electricidad.
Mehanizem, sprejet za predfinanciranje primanjkljaja
Periodo 2005/2007, p. 84.
Razvoj primanjkljaja ni ostal neopažen.
An important factor which also contributed to increasing the general costs of the system was the high level of support for the production of renewable energy.
Španski organi so že marca 2005, ko je postalo jasno, da nastaja tarifni primanjkljaj, v členu 24 kraljevega odloka z zakonsko močjo št. 5/2005 [10] določili, da naj bi sredstva za premostitev vrzeli med stroški in prihodki elektroenergetskega sistema zagotovilo pet največjih španskih „upravičenih podjetij za oskrbo z električno energijo“, tj. tistih, ki so bila upravičena do nadomestila za nasedle stroške [11], na podlagi naslednjih deležev:
In particular, renewable producers could opt for direct participation in the ‘pool’.
Iberdrola, S.A.:
In addition, direct support for the energy costs of electricity from the special scheme (renewables, cogeneration) not sold to the pool, which was entered in the accounts as a regulated cost, amounted to EUR 2701 million in 2005, an increase of 5,75 % over 2004.
Endesa, S.A.:
By way of illustration, the system's transport and distribution costs amounted to EUR 4142 in 2004, EUR 4410 million in 2005 and EUR 4567 million in 2006.
Elcogás, S.A.:
Mechanism adopted to prefinance the deficit
Z negativnim stanjem na računu nasedlih stroškov bi nastale pravice do izterjave, kar pomeni pravico družb, da v prihodnje od odjemalcev električne energije izterjajo prihodke.
The development of the deficit did not go unnoticed.
Družbe bi lahko te pravice listinile in jih prodale na trgu.
Already in March 2005, when it became clear that a tariff deficit was developing, by Article 24 of Royal Decree-Law 5/2005 [10] the Spanish authorities stipulated that the funds required to bridge the gap between the costs and revenues of the electricity system would be provided by Spain's five biggest ‘entitled electricity utilities’, which were those entitled to receive compensation for stranded costs [11], on the basis of the following percentages:
Te družbe, razen družbe Elcogás S.A., so matične družbe vertikalno povezanih skupin, ki običajno poslujejo v sektorju proizvodnje električne energije in prek oddelkov za distribucijo v distribucijskem sektorju.
Unión Eléctrica Fenosa, SA:
Elcogás S.A. je bil in ostaja družba, ki je dejavna le v sektorju proizvodnje električne energije [12].
12,84 %, Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico SA:
Enako je Španija za predfinanciranje primanjkljaja v elektroenergetskem sistemu v poznejših letih imenovala bodisi matično družbo skupine (npr. Endesa S.A., Iberdrola S.A.) bodisi njen oddelek za proizvodnjo električne energije (Endesa Generación S.A., Iberdrola Generación S.A. v kraljevem odlogu z zakonsko močjo 6/2009), nikoli pa oddelka za distribucijo (tj. Endesa Distribución Eléctrica, S.L., podružnico v popolni lasti, ki je bila leta 2005 odgovorna za distribucijo električne energije v okviru sistema reguliranih tarif).
Endesa, SA:
Španski organi so junija 2006 sprejeli odločitev glede ureditev za povrnitev primanjkljaja iz leta 2005 od odjemalcev električne energije prek reguliranih tarif.
Elcogás, SA:
Španski organi so s kraljevim odlokom št. 809/2006 [13] določili, da naj bi primanjkljaj iz leta 2005 (ali, natančneje, pravice do izterjave, dodeljene petim izbranim podjetjem za oskrbo z električno energijo) poplačali odjemalci v štirinajstih letih in pol prek posebne dodatne dajatve, ki se uporablja za integralno tarifo in tarifo dostopa do omrežja.
The negative balance on the stranded costs account would give rise to collection rights, consisting in the right for the companies to collect revenue from electricity consumers in the future.
Dodatna dajatev je bila obravnavana kot „posebni namenski prispevek“ (cuota con destino espécifico).
The companies could securitise these rights and sell them in the market.
Španski organi so določili, da naj bi se prihodki iz prispevka za financiranje primanjkljaja iz leta 2005 zbirali na depozitnem računu, ki ga upravlja CNE.
These companies, with the exception of Elcogás SA, are parent companies of vertically integrated groups which usually operate in the electricity generation sector, and in the distribution sector through distribution divisions.
CNE bi nato sredstva prenesla na imetnike pravic do izterjave, tj. na proizvajalce energije, ki so financirali primanjkljaj, ali subjekte, ki so od njih naknadno kupili pravice do izterjave, v skladu z deležem primanjkljaja, ki ga je financiral vsak od njih.
As Article 24 of Royal Decree-Law 5/2005 lays down, the motives and criteria governing the designation of these five companies for the purposes of prefinancing the 2005 tariff deficit — and not other companies operating in the Spanish electricity market — appears to be their right to receive compensation for stranded costs and not, for example, their activity in the distribution sector.
Učinki tarifnega primanjkljaja na španski trg
Elcogás SA was and continues to be a company solely active in electricity generation [12].
Leta 2005 je bilo 37,49 % potreb po električni energiji v Španiji pokritih z nakupi na prostem trgu.
In the same way, for the purposes of prefinancing the deficit in the electricity system in later years, Spain has designated either the parent company of the group (e.g. Endesa SA, Iberdrola SA) or its generation division (Endesa Generación SA, Iberdrola Generación SA in Royal Decree-Law 6/2009), but never the distribution division (i.e. Endesa Distribución Eléctrica, S.L., a wholly owned subsidiary responsible for distributing electricity under the system of regulated tariffs in 2005).
Ta količina ustreza sorazmerno majhnemu številu odjemalcev;
By Royal Decree 809/2006 [13], the Spanish authorities laid down that the 2005 deficit (or, more precisely, the collection rights granted to the five selected utilities) would be repaid by consumers over 14,5 years by means of a special surcharge applied to both integral and access tariffs.
Vendar je treba cenovno prednost, ki so jo leta 2005 v povprečju zagotavljale regulirane tarife, obravnavati vzporedno z vračanjem odjemalcem na regulirani trg, čeprav z nekaj časovnega zamika.
The surcharge, calculated as the yearly amount required to recover linearly the net present value of the 2005 deficit over 14,5 years, was set at 1,378 % of the integral tariff, and at 3,975 % of the access tariff for 2006.
Preglednica 2
The applicable interest rate was the 3-month Euribor.
Delež dobavnih lokacij in energije na prostem trgu (kot odstotek skupnega trga) v obdobju 2004–2006
The surcharge was regarded as a ‘specifically earmarked contribution’ (cuota con destino espécifico).
Električna energija
The Spanish authorities established that the revenues from the contribution to finance the 2005 deficit would accrue in the deposit account managed by the CNE.
Kot % dobavnih lokacij
The CNE would then transfer the funds to the owners of the collection rights, i.e. the utilities that financed the deficit or the entities that had subsequently purchased the collection rights from them, according to the share of the deficit financed by each of them.
Kot % energije
This quantity corresponds to a relatively small number of consumers;
Posledično so bili dobavitelji na prostem trgu, zlasti tisti, ki niso imeli proizvodnih zmogljivosti, temveč so morali električno energijo kupovati na veleprodajnem trgu, prisiljeni izbirati med ponudbami, ki so bile nižje od pogojev na prostem trgu in so bile izenačene z regulirano tarifo, kljub možnosti nastanka izgub, ali pa so zaračunavali višje cene, ki so odražale dejanske stroške nakupa električne energije, in s tem izgubljali tržni delež.
only 8,5 % of consumers purchased in the free market, whereas 91,5 % remained on regulated tariffs (down from 97 % in 2004).
ODLOČITEV O ZAČETKU POSTOPKA NA PODLAGI ČLENA 108(2) PDEU
38,9 % of them had exercised their option and their purchases accounted for 29 % of total electricity consumption in mainland Spain in 2005.
V odločitvi so regulirane tarife, ki so jih plačale različne kategorije končnih uporabnikov, primerjali s predvidenimi cenami, ki bi jih te morale plačati na prostem trgu, če ne bi bilo tarif, in zdelo se je, da pomenijo prednost za večino kategorij uporabnikov.
The vast majority of households and small low-voltage consumers, which could opt for the free market from 2003 [14], were still on regulated tariffs; however, in 2005 a large number of them also opted for the free market.
Domnevna pomoč v korist končnim uporabnikom je predmet ločenega sklepa v zadevi SA.21817 – Regulirane tarife električne energije:
On 31 December 2005, over 2 million consumers were in the free market (compared with 1,3 million in 2004).
odjemalci.
Table 2 —
Ker lahko veliki končni uporabniki in distributerji poslujejo na trgih, ki so na splošno odprti za konkurenco in trgovino znotraj Unije, je Komisija v odločitvi o začetku postopka ugotovila, da so bila izpolnjena vsa merila iz člena 107(1) PDEU in da je ukrep pomenil državno pomoč v korist končnim uporabnikom in distributerjem.
Share of supply sites and energy in the free market (as a percentage of the whole market) 2004-2006
Po ugotovitvi, da ni mogoče uporabiti nobenega odstopanja iz člena 107 PDEU, je bilo v odločitvi o začetku postopka ocenjeno, ali bi lahko dobavo električne energije po reguliranih tarifah šteli za storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena in tako uporabili odstopanje iz člena 106(2) PDEU.
Electricity
V odločitvi o začetku postopka je bilo navedeno, da je v elektroenergetskem sektorju stopnja diskrecije držav članic pri določanju obveznosti javnih storitev omejena z določbami Direktive 2003/54/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26. junija 2003 o skupnih pravilih za notranji trg z električno energijo in o razveljavitvi Direktive 96/92/ES [15] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: direktiva o električni energiji).
Mar
Ta direktiva določa obveznost držav članic, da zagotovijo univerzalne storitve (ki vključujejo predvsem pravico do dobave po primernih cenah) le za gospodinjske odjemalce in mala podjetja [16].
Jun
V odločitvi je bilo ugotovljeno, da ob upoštevanju zgoraj navedene direktive dobave električne energije srednje velikim in velikim podjetjem po reguliranih tarifah v ožjem smislu ne bi mogli šteti za storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena.
Sep
Komisija je tako izrazila resne dvome o tem, ali bi se lahko elementi pomoči v reguliranih tarifah, ki so bili uporabljeni za podjetja, ki niso bila mala podjetja, in distributerje, šteli za skladne z notranjim trgom.
Dec
PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANI
As a % of supply sites
Komisija je s pozivom k predložitvi pripomb glede odločitve o začetku temeljite preiskave pritegnila številna stališča, ki so jih predložili veliki industrijski odjemalci, distributerji, neodvisni dobavitelji in vlade španskih avtonomnih skupnosti.
As a % of energy
Tukaj bodo proučene le pripombe, ki so pomembne za položaj distributerjev.
CNE Report ‘Nota Informativa sobre los suministros de electricidad y gas natural en los mercados liberalizados, actualización 31 de diciembre de 2006’.
PRIPOMBE NEODVISNIH DOBAVITELJEV
Although the impact of the losses borne by suppliers began to be felt by mid-2005, when wholesale prices started to increase considerably, supply contracts could not be terminated immediately.
Prejete so bile pripombe družbe Céntrica in združenja neodvisnih dobaviteljev energije ACIE.
As a result, suppliers in the free market, particularly those which did not have generation capacity but had to procure electricity in the wholesale market, were forced to choose between making offers under free-market conditions which matched the regulated tariff, despite the possibility of incurring losses, and charging higher prices reflecting actual procurement costs, thereby losing market share.
Njihove trditve in ugotovitve se precej ujemajo in bodo obravnavane skupaj.
DECISION TO INITIATE THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 108(2) OF THE TFEU
Družba Céntrica se je v svojih pripombah osredotočila predvsem na domnevno državno pomoč, dodeljeno distributerjem električne energije.
The Commission decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure was based on the following grounds:
Opozarja, da so bili leta 2005 povprečni stroški nakupa električne energije na veleprodajnem trgu skoraj 70 % višji od napovedanih povprečnih stroškov nakupa iz integralnih tarif, ki jih je vlada določila s kraljevim odlokom št. 2329/2004.
The decision compared the regulated tariffs paid by the various categories of end-user with the estimated prices they would have had to pay in the free market in the absence of the tariffs, and found that there seemed to be an advantage in favour of most user categories.
Ta razlika med napovedanimi in dejanskimi stroški je povzročila, da prihodki iz sistema niso zadoščali za pokritje stroškov, predvsem zato, ker je bila cena, po kateri so distributerji kupovali električno energijo, višja od regulirane cene, po kateri so jo morali prodajati.
The alleged aid in favour of end-users is the object of a separate decision in Case SA.21817 — Regulated Electricity Tariffs:
Zato so distributerji na svojih računih zabeležili primanjkljaj.
consumers.
Vendar so računi distributerjev zaradi mehanizma, ki so ga španski organi sprejeli za zapolnitev prihodkovne vrzeli (na podlagi katerega se je od upravičenih proizvajalcev zahtevalo, naj prispevajo k predfinanciranju primanjkljaja, povračilo pa lahko naknadno izterjajo), ostali uravnoteženi, njihove izgube pa je dejansko poravnala država.
As regards distributors, the opening decision indicated that, by encouraging end-users to switch back to the regulated market, the system might have benefited distributors, who appeared to have enjoyed a guaranteed profit margin on their regulated activities.
Za dobavitelje na prostem trgu je bila predvidena drugačna obravnava, kljub dejstvu, da so prav tako utrpeli podobne izgube.
This advantage seemed to have been granted selectively to distributors, as they were the only market operators allowed to sell electricity at regulated tariffs.
Po mnenju družbe Céntrica in združenja ACIE so imeli dobavitelji na prostem trgu podobne stroške nakupa kot distributerji [17].
The decision also found that the system involved a transfer of State resources, since the price surcharge used to repay the deficit constitutes a parafiscal levy, the proceeds of which transit through the Spanish regulator CNE (a public body) before being channelled to the final beneficiaries.
Poleg tega so se morali dejansko prilagoditi ravni integralne tarife, ki jo je vlada določila za vsako kategorijo odjemalcev, saj sicer verjetno ne bi pritegnili novih odjemalcev ali zadržali obstoječih.
The decision concluded that, in the light of Court of Justice case-law on this matter, these funds should be regarded as State resources.
Združenje ACIE zlasti opozarja, da so njegovi člani na začetku leta 2005 sklenili pogodbe na podlagi vladnih napovedi veleprodajnih cen in da so morali pozneje take pogodbe spoštovati, čeprav se je izkazalo, da ne prinašajo dobička.
Considering that both large end-users and distributors operate in markets which are generally open to competition and trade within the Union, in the opening decision the Commission concluded that all the criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU were fulfilled and the measure constituted State aid in favour of end-users and distributors.
Neodvisni dobavitelji so posledično utrpeli izgube.
After noting that none of the derogations provided for in Article 107 TFEU seemed applicable, the opening decision assessed whether the supply of electricity at regulated tariffs could be considered a service of general economic interest (SGEI) and as such benefit from the derogation provided for in Article 106(2) TFEU.
Vendar država v nasprotju z distributerji ni nadomestila izgub neodvisnih dobaviteljev.
The opening decision stated that, in the electricity sector, Member States' margin of discretion in establishing public service obligations is limited by the provisions of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC [15] (‘The Electricity Directive’).
Družba Céntrica ocenjuje, da je leta 2005 utrpela 10 milijonov EUR izgub.
The Electricity Directive requires Member States to establish a universal service obligation (including notably the right to be supplied at reasonable prices) only for household consumers and small enterprises [16].
Po navedbah združenja ACIE je bilo več dobaviteljev, vključno z družbami Saltea Comercial, Electranorte, CYD Energia in RWE, prisiljenih zapustiti trg.
The decision concluded that, in the light of the above Directive, the supply of electricity at regulated tariffs to medium-sized and large undertakings, as opposed to households and small businesses, could not be considered an SGEI in the strict sense of the term.
Po mnenju združenja ACIE in družbe Céntrica je nadomestilo za izgube distributerjev izkrivilo konkurenco, povzročilo diskriminacijo v razmerju do neodvisnih dobaviteljev in bi ga bilo treba obravnavati kot državno pomoč.
The Commission thus expressed serious doubts as to whether the elements of aid in the regulated tariffs that were applied to undertakings other than small enterprises and to distributors could be considered compatible with the internal market.
Poleg trditve, da nadomestilo izgub pomeni prednost samo po sebi, je družba Céntrica uveljavljala mnenje, da bi lahko prvotni akterji na trgu (vertikalno povezana podjetja) ohranili svoj tržni delež in se izognili izgubam s spodbujanjem odjemalcev, naj njihove oddelke za dobavo, ki so ustvarjali izgubo, po potrebi zamenjajo z oddelki za distribucijo, ki naj bi prejeli nadomestilo.
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED PARTIES
Po mnenju združenja ACIE in družbe Céntrica je bila prednost za prvotna podjetja „specifična“, tj. selektivna, saj je mehanizem financiranja in kompenzacije posebej koristil distributerjem, ker jim je zagotovil finančno in konkurenčno prednost pred dobavitelji na prostem trgu.
The Commission's invitation to submit comments on the decision to open the in-depth investigation attracted numerous submissions from large industrial consumers, distributors, independent suppliers and governments of Spain's Autonomous Communities.
Družba Céntrica je trdila, da je bila razlika med distributerji in dobavitelji na prostem trgu povsem formalna, saj sta obe kategoriji konkurirali na istem trgu (maloprodaja električne energije), na obe so vplivale integralne tarife (ker so bile naložene z zakonom ali ker so dejansko delovale kot zgornja meja tržnih cen) in obe sta kupovali električno energijo po enaki ceni in utrpeli enake izgube.
Only the observations relevant to the position of distributors will be examined here.
Po mnenju družbe Céntrica prednostna obravnava distributerjev ni bila utemeljena z ničemer, kar bi se nanašalo na logiko in strukturo elektroenergetskega sistema, niti se ni mogla šteti za nadomestilo za storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena.
COMMENTS FROM INDEPENDENT SUPPLIERS
Družba Céntrica meni, da je sistem kršil direktivo o električni energiji, ne samo zaradi diskriminacijskih ureditev glede primanjkljaja, temveč tudi zato, ker je bila odjemalcem odvzeta pravica do preglednih cen in tarif [18].
Comments were received from Céntrica and ACIE, the Association of Independent Energy Suppliers.
Ker je bil del cene za električno energijo, plačljive leta 2005, odložen na prihodnja leta, zaračunane končne cene za odjemalce niso bile pregledne.
Their arguments and conclusions are largely equivalent and will be dealt with together.
Družba Céntrica meni, da selektivna prednost, ki so jo omogočile ureditve glede primanjkljaja, ni prinesla koristi le distributerjem, temveč tudi vertikalno povezanim podjetjem, ki so jim so pripadali.
The main focus of Céntrica's submission is the alleged State aid granted to electricity distributors.
Po mnenju družbe Céntrica bi bilo treba vertikalno povezane skupine za uporabo pravil o državni pomoči obravnavati kot eno podjetje.
Céntrica points out that in 2005 the average cost of buying electricity in the wholesale market was nearly 70 % higher than the forecast average procurement cost embedded in the integral tariffs set by the Government by Royal Decree 2329/2004.
Družba trdi, da je španski sistem proizvodnim družbam omogočil, da povišajo cene na veleprodajnem trgu in še naprej ustvarjajo dobiček.
As a result of this discrepancy between these forecasts and actual costs, the revenue from the system was insufficient to cover costs, mainly because the price paid by distributors to purchase electricity was higher than the regulated price at which they had to sell it.
V teh okoliščinah je bilo v lastnem interesu skupin, da ohranijo tržni delež, na katerega so računali njihovi oddelki za distribucijo.
The distributors therefore recorded a deficit in their accounts.
Zato bi bilo treba tudi vertikalno povezane skupine obravnavati kot prejemnice državne pomoči.
However, as a result of the mechanism adopted by the Spanish authorities to fill the revenue gap (which consisted in requiring eligible generators to prefinance the deficit against a claim for subsequent reimbursement), the distributors' accounts remained balanced, and their losses were de facto offset by the State.
PRIPOMBE DISTRIBUTERJEV
A different treatment was reserved for free-market suppliers, despite the fact that they also suffered similar losses.
Prejete so bile pripombe združenja UNESA (ki zastopa distributerje) ter družb Iberdrola Distribución, Union Fenosa Distribución, Enel Viesgo Distribución in Endesa Distribución.
According to Céntrica and ACIE, suppliers in the free market were subject to similar procurement costs as distributors [17].
Njihove pripombe se precej prekrivajo in bodo obravnavane skupaj.
Moreover, they were de facto bound by the level of the integral tariff set by the Government for each customer category because otherwise they would have been unlikely to attract new customers or retain existing customers.
Distributerji (kot jih zastopa združenje UNESA) razlikujejo med čistimi distribucijskimi dejavnostmi/dejavnostmi komercialnega upravljanja, ki jih obravnavajo kot storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena, in dobavo po reguliranih tarifah, ki po njihovem mnenju ni vključevala nobene državne pomoči, ker ni zagotavljala finančne prednosti.
In particular, ACIE points out that, at the beginning of 2005, its members concluded contracts based on government forecasts of wholesale prices and that they later had to honour such contracts even though they turned out to be unprofitable.
Distributerji niso mogli zavrniti dobave reguliranim odjemalcem in so lahko pridobili le tiste odjemalce, ki so se odločili za regulirane tarife.
As a result, independent suppliers suffered losses.
Prav tako niso mogli ponujati dodatnih storitev, medtem ko so lahko dobavitelji prosto določali svoje pogoje dobave.
However, unlike distributors, independent suppliers' losses were not offset by the State.
V spodnji preglednici so povzete razlike med dobavitelji na prostem trgu in distributerji glede prodaje električne energije na drobno [19]:
Céntrica estimates that in 2005 it suffered losses of EUR 10 million.
Obveznost dobave
According to ACIE, several suppliers, including Saltea Comercial, Electranorte, CYD Energia and RWE, were forced out of the market.
Potencialni trg
According to ACIE and Céntrica, the compensation of distributors' losses distorted competition, created discrimination vis-à-vis independent suppliers and should be regarded as State aid.
Nakupi električne energije