natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Nothing in this Regulation should alter in any way the current framework regulating the change of legal form of subsidiaries or branches and the application of such framework, or be understood or applied as providing incentives in favour of such change.
Ta uredba z ničemer ne bi smela preoblikovati trenutnega okvira za urejanje spremembe pravne oblike podrejenih družb ali podružnic in uporabe takšnega okvira niti je ne bi smeli razumeti ali uporabljati kot ukrep za spodbujanje takšne spremembe.
In this respect, the responsibility of competent authorities of non-participating Member States should be fully respected, so that those authorities continue to enjoy sufficient supervisory tools and powers over credit institutions operating in their territory in order to have the capacity to fulfil this responsibility and effectively safeguard financial stability and public interest.
V tem pogledu bi bilo treba v celoti spoštovati odgovornost pristojnih organov nesodelujočih držav članic, da bi ti organi še naprej razpolagali z ustreznimi orodji in pooblastili za nadzor kreditnih institucij, ki delujejo na ozemlju njihovih držav članic, zaradi česar bi bili sposobni izpolnjevati to odgovornost in učinkovito varovati finančno stabilnost in javni interes.
Moreover, in order to assist those competent authorities in fulfilling their responsibilities, timely information on a change of legal form of subsidiaries or branches should be provided to depositors and to the competent authorities.
Poleg tega bi morale biti vlagateljem in navedenim pristojnim organom zagotovljene pravočasne informacije o spremembi pravne oblike podrejenih družb ali podružnic, da bi pristojnim organom pomagali pri izpolnjevanju njihovih nalog.
In order to carry out its tasks, the ECB should have appropriate supervisory powers.
ECB bi morala imeti za opravljanje svojih nalog ustrezna nadzorniška pooblastila.
Union law on the prudential supervision of credit institutions provides for certain powers to be conferred on competent authorities designated by the Member States for those purposes.
Pravo Unije o bonitetnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij določa, da se nekatera pooblastila prenesejo na pristojne organe, ki jih za navedene namene imenujejo države članice.
To the extent that those powers fall within the scope of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB, for participating Member States the ECB should be considered the competent authority and should have the powers conferred on competent authorities by Union law.
Če ta pooblastila zadevajo področje nadzorniških nalog, prenesenih na ECB, bi morala v sodelujočih državah članicah za pristojni organ veljati ECB in bi morala imeti pooblastila, prenesena na pristojne organe na podlagi prava Unije.
This includes powers conferred by those acts on the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States and the powers conferred on designated authorities.
Sem spadajo tudi pooblastila, prenesena na enaki podlagi na pristojne organe matične države članice in države članice gostiteljice, ter pooblastila, prenesena na imenovane organe.
The ECB should have the supervisory power to remove a member of a management body in accordance with this Regulation.
ECB bi morala imeti takšna nadzorniška pooblastila, da bi v skladu s to uredbo iz upravljalnega organa lahko odstranila posameznega člana.
In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the ECB should be able to require all necessary information, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, where appropriate in cooperation with national competent authorities.
Da bi lahko ECB učinkovito opravljala svoje naloge, bi morala imeti možnost, da zahteva vse potrebne informacije ter izvaja preiskave in inšpekcijske preglede na kraju samem, po potrebi v sodelovanju s pristojnimi nacionalnimi organi.
The ECB and the national competent authorities should have access to the same information without credit institutions being subject to double reporting requirements.
ECB in pristojnim nacionalnim organom bi zadevne informacije morale biti dostopne, ne da bi bile s tem kreditnim institucijam naložene dvojne zahteve glede poročanja.
Legal profession privilege is a fundamental principle of Union law, protecting the confidentiality of communications between natural or legal persons and their advisors, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
Načelo varovanja zaupnosti med odvetnikom in stranko je temeljno načelo prava Unije, ki varuje zaupnost izmenjave informacij med fizičnimi ali pravnimi osebami in njihovimi svetovalci, in sicer v skladu s pogoji, določenimi s sodno prakso Sodišča Evropske unije.
When the ECB needs to require information from a person established in a non-participating Member State but belonging to a credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company established in a participating Member State, or to which such credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company has outsourced operational functions or activities, and when such requirements will not apply and will not be enforceable in the non-participating Member State, the ECB should coordinate with the competent authority in the non-participating Member State concerned.
Če mora ECB od osebe, ki ima sicer sedež v nesodelujoči državi članici, vendar pripada kreditni instituciji, finančnemu holdingu ali mešanemu finančnemu holdingu s sedežem v sodelujoči državi članici, ali ki je za to kreditno institucijo, finančni holding ali mešani finančni holding prevzela zunanje izvajanje operativnih funkcij ali dejavnosti, zahtevati informacije in tovrstne zahteve v nesodelujoči državi članici ne bodo veljale in jih tam ne bo mogoče uveljavljati, bi se morala ECB uskladiti s pristojnim organom v zadevni nesodelujoči državi članici.
This Regulation does not affect the application of the rules established by Articles 34 and 42 of Protocol No 4 on the statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, attached to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU (‘Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB’).
Ta uredba ne vpliva na izvajanje pravil na podlagi členov 34 in 42 Protokola (št. 4) o statutu Evropskega sistema centralnih bank in Evropske centralne banke, ki je priložen Pogodbi o Evropski unij (PEU) in PDEU (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Statut ESCB in ECB).
The acts adopted by the ECB under this Regulation should not create any rights or impose any obligations in non-participating Member States, except where such acts are in accordance with relevant Union law, in accordance with that Protocol and with Protocol No 15 on certain provisions related to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, attached to the TEU and to the TFEU.
Na podlagi aktov, ki jih sprejme ECB v skladu s to uredbo, v nesodelujočih državah članicah ne bi smele nastati nobene pravice ali obveznosti, razen kadar so taki akti v skladu z upoštevnim pravom Unije, v skladu z navedenim protokolom in Protokolom (št. 15) o nekaterih določbah, ki se nanašajo na Združeno kraljestvo Velika Britanija in Severna Irska, ki je priložen PEU in PDEU.
Where credit institutions exercise their right of establishment or to provide services in another Member State, or where several entities in a group are established in different Member States, Union law provides for specific procedures and for attribution of competences between the Member States concerned.
Če kreditne institucije uveljavljajo pravico do ustanavljanja ali opravljanja storitev v drugi državi članici ali če je več subjektov določene skupine ustanovljenih v različnih državah članicah, pravo Unije določa posebne postopke in razdelitev pristojnosti med zadevnimi državami članicami.
To the extent that the ECB takes over certain supervisory tasks for all participating Member States, those procedures and attributions should not apply to the exercise of the right of establishment or to provide services in another participating Member State.
Če ECB prevzame določene nadzorniške naloge za vse sodelujoče države članice, se ti postopki in razdelitev pristojnosti ne bi smeli uporabljati za uveljavljanje pravice do ustanavljanja ali opravljanja storitev v drugi sodelujoči državi članici.
When carrying out its tasks under this Regulation and when requesting assistance from national competent authorities, the ECB should have due regard to a fair balance between the involvement of all national competent authorities involved, in line with the responsibilities set out in applicable Union law for solo supervision and for supervision on a sub-consolidated basis and on a consolidated basis.
ECB bi morala pri izvajanju nalog v skladu s to uredbo in prošnjah za pomoč, ki jih naslovi na pristojne nacionalne organe, ustrezno upoštevati uravnoteženost sodelovanja vseh vpletenih pristojnih nacionalnih organov v skladu s pristojnostmi, določenimi v veljavnem pravu Unije, za nadzor posameznih subjektov in za nadzor na delno konsolidirani podlagi ter na konsolidirani podlagi.
Nothing in this Regulation should be understood as conferring on the ECB the power to impose penalties on natural or legal persons other than credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies, without prejudice to the ECB’s power to require national competent authorities to act in order to ensure that appropriate penalties are imposed.
Brez poseganja v pooblastila ECB, da od pristojnih nacionalnih organov zahteva, naj ukrepajo in poskrbijo, da bodo izrečene ustrezne kazni, ničesar v tej uredbi ne bi smeli razlagati kot podelitev pooblastil ECB za izrekanje kazni fizičnim ali pravnim osebam, ki niso kreditne institucije, finančni holdingi ali mešani finančni holdingi.
As established by the Treaties, the ECB is an institution of the Union as a whole.
Kakor je določeno v Pogodbah, je ECB institucija Unije kot celote.
It should be bound in its decision-making procedures by Union rules and general principles on due process and transparency.
ECB bi morala pri postopkih odločanja zavezovati pravila in splošna načela Unije o ustreznem postopanju in preglednosti.
The right of the addressees of the ECB’s decisions to be heard should be fully respected as well as their right to request a review of the decisions of the ECB according to the rules set out in this Regulation.
V celoti bi morala biti spoštovana pravica naslovnikov odločitev ECB do izjave, prav tako tudi njihova pravica zahtevati pregled odločitve ECB v skladu s pravili iz te uredbe.
The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way.
Prenos nadzorniških nalog pomeni za ECB veliko odgovornost v smislu zaščite finančne stabilnosti v Uniji ter v smislu najbolj učinkovite in sorazmerne uporabe njenih nadzorniških pooblastil.
Any shift of supervisory powers from the Member State to the Union level should be balanced by appropriate transparency and accountability requirements.
Vsak prenos nadzorniških pooblastil z ravni držav članic na raven Unije bi moral biti uravnotežen z ustreznimi zahtevami glede preglednosti in odgovornosti.
The ECB should therefore be accountable for the exercise of those tasks towards the European Parliament and the Council as democratically legitimised institutions representing the citizens of the Union and the Member States.
Zato bi morala ECB za opravljanje teh nalog odgovarjati Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu, ki kot demokratično legitimni instituciji predstavljata državljane Unije in države članice.
That should include regular reporting, and responding to questions by the European Parliament in accordance with its Rules of Procedure, and by the euro Group in accordance with its procedures.
To bi med drugim moralo pomeniti redno poročanje ter odgovarjanje na vprašanja Evropskega parlamenta v skladu z njegovim poslovnikom in na vprašanja Euroskupine v skladu z njenimi postopki.
Any reporting obligations should be subject to the relevant professional secrecy requirements.
V zvezi z obveznostmi poročanja bi morale veljati ustrezne zahteve o varovanju poklicnih skrivnosti.
The ECB should also forward the reports, which it addresses to the European Parliament and to the Council, to the national parliaments of the participating Member States.
ECB bi morala poročila, naslovljena na Evropski parlament in Svet, poslati tudi nacionalnim parlamentom sodelujočih držav članic.
National parliaments of the participating Member States should be able to address any observations or questions to the ECB on the performance of its supervisory tasks, to which the ECB may reply.
Nacionalni parlamenti sodelujočih držav članic bi morali imeti možnost, da na ECB naslovijo kakršne koli pripombe ali vprašanja o izvajanju nadzorniških nalog, ECB pa lahko na te pripombe ali vprašanja odgovori.
The internal rules of those national parliaments should take into account details of the relevant procedures and arrangements for addressing the observations and questions to the ECB.
V notranja pravila zadevnih nacionalnih parlamentov bi bilo treba vključiti podrobnosti o ustreznih postopkih in ureditvah za odzivanje na pripombe in vprašanja, naslovljena na ECB.
In this context particular attention should be attached to observations or questions related to the withdrawal of authorisations of credit institutions in respect of which actions necessary for resolution or to maintain financial stability have been taken by national authorities in accordance with the procedure set out in this Regulation.
V zvezi s tem bi bilo treba posebno pozornost nameniti pripombam ali vprašanjem, povezanim z odvzemom dovoljenj kreditnim institucijam, glede katerih so nacionalni organi v skladu s postopkom iz te uredbe sprejeli ukrepe, potrebne za reševanje ali za ohranitev finančne stabilnosti.
The national parliament of a participating Member State should also be able to invite the Chair or a representative of the Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of views in relation to the supervision of credit institutions in that Member State together with a representative of the national competent authority.
Nacionalni parlament sodelujoče države članice bi moral imeti tudi možnost, da predsednika ali predstavnika Nadzornega odbora povabi, naj sodeluje v izmenjavi mnenj v zvezi z nadzorom nad kreditnimi institucijami v tej državi članici skupaj s predstavnikom pristojnega nacionalnega organa.
This role for national parliaments is appropriate given the potential impact that supervisory measures may have on public finances, credit institutions, their customers and employees, and the markets in the participating Member States.
Takšno vlogo bi nacionalnim parlamentom morali nameniti zaradi možnih učinkov nadzornih ukrepov na javne finance, kreditne institucije, njihove stranke in zaposlene ter na trge v sodelujočih državah članicah.
Where national competent authorities take action under this Regulation, accountability arrangements provided for under national law should continue to apply.
Če pristojni nacionalni organi ukrepajo na podlagi te uredbe, bi se morale še naprej uporabljati ureditve glede odgovornosti iz nacionalnega prava.
This Regulation is without prejudice to the right of the European Parliament to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law pursuant to Article 226 TFEU or to the exercise of its functions of political control as laid down in the Treaties, including the right for the European Parliament to take a position or adopt a resolution on matters which it considers appropriate.
Ta uredba ne posega v pravico Evropskega parlamenta, da ustanovi začasni preiskovalni odbor zaradi preverjanja domnevnih kršitev ali nepravilnosti pri izvajanju prava Unije na podlagi člena 226 PDEU ali uresničevanja funkcije političnega nadzora, kakor je zapisano v Pogodbah, vključno s pravico Evropskega parlamenta, da sprejme stališče ali resolucijo v zadevah, v katerih se mu to zdi primerno.
In its action, the ECB should comply with the principles of due process and transparency.
ECB bi morala pri svojem ukrepanju ravnati v skladu z načeli ustreznega postopanja in preglednosti.
The regulation referred to in Article 15(3) TFEU should determine detailed rules enabling access to documents held by the ECB resulting from the carrying out of supervisory tasks, in accordance with the TFEU.
V uredbi iz člena 15(3) PDEU bi morali v skladu s PDEU določiti podrobna pravila o možnosti dostopa do dokumentov, ki jih ima ECB v povezavi z izvajanjem nadzorniških nalog.
Pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the CJEU is to review the legality of acts of, inter alia, the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.
Sodišče Evropske unije na podlagi člena 263 PDEU nadzira tudi zakonitost aktov ECB, razen priporočil in mnenj,s pravnim učinkom za tretje osebe.
In accordance with Article 340 TFEU, the ECB should, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by it or by its servants in the performance of their duties.
V skladu s členom 340 PDEU bi morala ECB v skladu s splošnimi načeli, skupnimi zakonodajam držav članic, nadomestiti kakršno koli škodo, ki jo je povzročila sama ali so jo povzročili njeni uslužbenci pri opravljanju svojih dolžnosti.
This should be without prejudice to the liability of national competent authorities to make good any damage caused by them or by their servants in the performance of their duties in accordance with national legislation.
To ne bi smelo posegati v odgovornost pristojnih nacionalnih organov, da v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo nadomestijo škodo, ki so jo povzročili sami ali njihovi uslužbenci pri opravljanju svojih dolžnosti.
Council Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community [7] applies to the ECB by virtue of Article 342 TFEU.
Uredba Sveta št. 1 o določitvi jezikov, ki se uporabljajo v Evropski gospodarski skupnosti [7], se uporablja za ECB na podlagi člena 342 PDEU.
When determining whether the right of access to the file by persons concerned should be limited, the ECB should respect the fundamental rights and observe the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial.
Ob ugotavljanju, ali bi bilo treba omejiti pravico zadevnih oseb do vpogleda v spis, bi morala ECB spoštovati temeljne pravice in upoštevati načela, priznana v Listini Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah, zlasti pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva in nepristranskega sodišča.
The ECB should provide natural and legal persons with the possibility to request a review of decisions taken under the powers conferred on it by this Regulation and addressed to them, or which are of direct and individual concern to them.
ECB bi morala fizičnim in pravnim osebam omogočiti, da zahtevajo pregled odločitev, ki so bile sprejete na podlagi pooblastil, prenesenih na ECB s to uredbo, in ki so na te osebe naslovljene ali se nanje neposredno in posamično nanašajo.
The scope of the review should pertain to the procedural and substantive conformity with this regulation of such decisions while respecting the margin of discretion left to the ECB to decide on the opportunity to take those decisions.
Pregled bi se moral osredotočiti na vprašanja procesne in vsebinske skladnosti teh odločitev s to uredbo, pri čemer bi morali spoštovati tudi diskrecijsko pravico ECB, da odloči o primernosti njihovega sprejemanja.
For that purpose, and for reasons of procedural economy, the ECB should establish an administrative board of review to carry out such internal review.
V ta namen in zaradi procesne gospodarnosti bi morala ECB oblikovati Upravni odbor za pregled, ki bi opravljal takšen notranji pregled.
To compose the board, the Governing Council of the ECB should appoint individuals of a high repute.
Svet ECB bi moral v ta odbor imenovati zelo ugledne posameznikov.
In making its decision, the Governing Council should, to the extent possible, ensure an appropriate geographical and gender balance across the Member States.
Po možnosti bi moral Svet ECB pri odločanju o tem med državami članicami doseči kar najustreznejšo geografsko uravnoteženost in uravnoteženo zastopanost obeh spolov.
The procedure laid down for the review should provide for the Supervisory Board to reconsider its former draft decision as appropriate.
Postopek za pregled bi moral dopuščati, da Nadzorni odbor po potrebi ponovno preuči svoj prejšnji osnutek odločitve.
The ECB is responsible for carrying out monetary policy functions with a view to maintaining price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU.
ECB v skladu s členom 127(1) PDEU opravlja naloge monetarne politike z namenom ohranjanja stabilnosti cen.
The exercise of supervisory tasks has the objective to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.
Cilj opravljanja nadzorniških nalog je zaščititi varnost in trdnost kreditnih institucij ter stabilnost finančnega sistema.
They should therefore be carried out in full separation, in order to avoid conflicts of interests and to ensure that each function is exercised in accordance with the applicable objectives.
Ti funkciji bi bilo zato treba izvajati popolnoma ločeno, da bi preprečili nasprotja interesov in zagotovili, da se obe opravljata v skladu z zastavljenimi cilji.
The ECB should be able to ensure that the Governing Council operates in a completely differentiated manner as regards monetary and supervisory functions.
ECB bi morala biti sposobna zagotoviti, da Svet ECB deluje tako, da je njegova monetarna funkcija povsem ločena od nadzorne.
Such differentiation should at least include strictly separated meetings and agendas.
To bi se moralo odražati najmanj pri strogo ločenih sestankih in v dnevnih redih.
Organisational separation of staff should concern all services needed for independent monetary policy purposes and should ensure that the exercise of the tasks conferred by this Regulation is fully subject to democratic accountability and oversight as provided for by this Regulation.
Organizacijska ločenost osebja bi morala zadevati vse službe, ki so potrebne za neodvisno monetarno politiko, zagotavljati bi morala tudi uresničevanje demokratične odgovornosti in nadzora, določenega v tej uredbi, nad opravljanjem nalog, ki se na ECB prenesejo s to uredbo.
The staff involved in carrying out the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation should report to the Chair of the Supervisory Board.
Osebje, ki sodeluje pri opravljanju nalog, ki se s to uredbo prenesejo na ECB, bi moralo poročati predsedniku Nadzornega odbora.
In particular, a Supervisory Board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up within the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors.
Zlasti bi moral biti v okviru ECB ustanovljen Nadzorni odbor, odgovoren za pripravo odločitev o nadzornih zadevah, ki bi lahko izkoristil specifično strokovno znanje nacionalnih nadzornih organov.
The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair, have a Vice Chair and include representatives from the ECB and from national competent authorities.
Nadzornemu odboru bi torej moral predsedovati predsednik, imenovan bi moral biti podpredsednik, vključevati pa bi moral predstavnike iz ECB in pristojnih nacionalnih organov.
The appointments for the Supervisory Board in accordance with this Regulation should respect the principles of gender balance, experience and qualification.
Pri imenovanjih članov Nadzornega odbora v skladu s to uredbo bi bilo treba upoštevati načela uravnotežene zastopanosti obeh spolov, izkušnje in usposobljenost.
All members of the Supervisory Board should be timely and fully informed on the items on the agenda of its meetings, so as to facilitate the effectiveness of the discussion and the draft decision making process.
Vsi člani Nadzornega odbora bi morali biti pravočasno in v celoti obveščeni o točkah dnevnega reda sestankov Nadzornega odbora, da bi omogočili učinkovito razpravo in postopek sprejemanja osnutkov odločitev.