natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Apart from asserting that the compensation of losses constitutes an advantage per se, Céntrica argued that incumbent market players (vertically integrated undertakings) could retain their market share and avoid losses by encouraging customers to switch from their loss-making supply divisions to their distribution divisions, which would receive compensation, where appropriate.
Dobavitelji
According to ACIE and Céntrica, the advantage for incumbent undertakings was ‘specific’ i.e. selective, since the financing and compensation mechanism specifically benefited distributors by giving them a financial and competitive advantage over free-market suppliers.
Vsi španski uporabniki
Céntrica argued that the distinction between distributors and free-market suppliers was purely formal, because both categories competed in the same market (retail electricity sales), both were affected by integral tariffs (either because they had been imposed by law or because they acted de facto as a cap on market prices) and both procured electricity at the same price and suffered the same losses.
Vsak mehanizem
In Céntrica's view, the preferential treatment of distributors was not justified by any reason pertaining to the logic and structure of the electricity system, nor could it be considered compensation for a service of general economic interest.
Distributerji
Céntrica maintains that the system breached the Electricity Directive, not only because of the discriminatory nature of the deficit arrangements, but also because consumers were deprived of the right to transparent prices and tariffs [18].
Le uporabniki, priključeni na njihova omrežja
Since part of the electricity price payable for 2005 was deferred to future years, the final prices charged were not clear to consumers.
Prek organiziranega trga ali od proizvajalcev iz posebne sheme
Céntrica takes the view that the selective advantage afforded by the deficit arrangements benefited not only distributors, but also the vertically integrated undertakings to which they belonged.
Veleprodajna nakupna cena
According to Céntrica, a vertically integrated group should be regarded as one undertaking for the purpose of applying the State aid rules.
Prodajna cena
In these circumstances, the groups had a vested interest in maintaining the market share that their distribution divisions counted on.
Prosto
Therefore, the vertically integrated groups should also be regarded as recipients of State aid.
Dobiček od prodaje
COMMENTS FROM DISTRIBUTORS
Cena na organiziranem trgu ali cena iz regulirane „posebne sheme“
Comments were received from UNESA (the association representing distributors), Iberdrola Distribución, Union Fenosa Distribución, Enel Viesgo Distribución and Endesa Distribución.
Regulirane tarife
Their observations largely overlap and will be dealt with together.
Brez profitne marže
Distributors (as represented by UNESA) make a distinction between pure distribution/commercial management activities, which they view as an SGEI, and supply at regulated tariffs, which according to them did not involve any State aid because it did not provide a financial advantage.
Distributerji tako ugotavljajo, da dobavitelji na prostem trgu glede na različni pravni in dejanski okvir niso tekmovali z distributerji, temveč z reguliranimi tarifami, ki so delovale kot referenčna cena na trgu.
Distributors recall that the legal context in which suppliers and distributors carried on their activities was very different; distributors were obliged to purchase electricity for supply at regulated tariffs in specific ways (either from the pool or from ‘special scheme’ producers), whereas suppliers were free to negotiate their prices.
Distributerji navajajo, da jim dejavnost dobave električne energije po tarifi ni prinašala nobenega dobička ali prednosti.
Distributors could not refuse to supply regulated customers and could not acquire customers other than those opting for regulated tariffs.
Medtem ko je pri čisti distribuciji in komercialnem upravljanju plačilo za distributerje vključevalo profitno maržo za povrnitev vloženega kapitala, so ti v primeru dobave po reguliranih tarifah dobili povrnjene le stroške brez kakršne koli profitne marže.
Distributors could not offer auxiliary services either, whereas suppliers were free to establish their supply conditions.
Stroški, ki so bili „priznani“ distributerju, so zlasti temeljili na splošni tehtani ceni, plačani za električno energijo v referenčnem obdobju.
The table below summarises the differences between free-market suppliers and distributors as regards retail sales of electricity [19]:
V nekaterih okoliščinah so lahko bili ti priznani stroški nižji od dejanskih skupnih stroškov distributerja.
Obligation to supply
Če so regulirane prodajne dejavnosti prinesle presežek, ta sredstva niso ostala pri distributerjih, temveč so bila med obračunskim postopkom dodeljena za financiranje drugih splošnih stroškov sistema.
Potential market
Znesek, ki ga je priznala država, je bil enak razliki med povprečno tehtano ceno nakupov električne energije, pomnoženo s količino energije, ki jo je prenesel posamezni distributer, po korekciji za standardne izgube.
Energy purchases
Distributerji so dalje trdili, da niso imeli nobene neposredne ali posredne finančne koristi od odjemalcev na prostem trgu, ki so preklopili nazaj na regulirane tarife, saj je bilo njihovo plačilo za čisto distribucijo in komercialno upravljanje popolnoma neodvisno od števila odjemalcev po reguliranih tarifah ali količine električne energije, prodane po tarifi.
Suppliers
Prvič, kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj, je bilo za dobavo po regulirani tarifi zagotovljeno le povračilo stroškov.
All Spanish users
Drugič, plačilo za čisto distribucijo je bilo prav tako neodvisno od števila odjemalcev po reguliranih tarifah, saj je temeljilo na obsegu „prenesene energije“, kar je vključevalo vso električno energijo, ki so jo distributerji prenesli v omrežju, ne glede na to, ali je bila prodana po reguliranih tarifah ali cenah na prostem trgu.
Any mechanism
Tretjič, plačilo za dejavnosti komercialnega upravljanja je bilo prav tako neodvisno od števila odjemalcev, ki jim je bila energija dobavljena po reguliranih tarifah, saj je zakon določal plačila na podlagi števila sklenjenih pogodb (za tarife za dostop do omrežja in regulirane tarife), in tako ni bilo povezano s številom odjemalcev, ki so uporabljali regulirane tarife.
Distributors
Od distributerjev se je zahtevalo, naj vsekakor poskrbijo za vse zahteve strank, kot so spremembe vrste priključka, pogodbe, izdajanje računov po tarifah za dostop, odčitavanje števcev itd., ne glede na vrsto dobave.
Only users connected to their networks
Distributerji tako ugotavljajo, da bi bilo treba „nadomestilo“, ki so ga prejeli v zvezi z dobavami po reguliranih tarifah, obravnavati bolj kot povračilo zneskov, ki so jih morali po zakonu plačati vnaprej, ali kot nadomestilo za izgubo in škodo.
Via the pool or from special scheme generators
Družba Iberdrola izrecno trdi, da bi bilo pravno in gospodarsko nepravilno, če bi s primanjkljajem obremenili distributerje.
Wholesale purchase price
Stroške, ki so nastali pri nakupu električne energije za regulirani trg, bi bilo treba pripisati elektroenergetskemu sistemu, ne pa distributerjem, ki so zgolj izvajali pravne določbe.
Sales price
Prihodki iz prodaje po reguliranih cenah nikoli niso postali last distributerjev, temveč so pripadali elektroenergetskemu sistemu kot celoti, zato bi se moral sam sistem šteti za „prodajalca“ električne energije po reguliranih cenah.
Profit margin
Po mnenju družbe Iberdrola v tako reguliranem sistemu, kot je španski, distributerjem ne bi bilo smiselno pripisati finančnih neravnovesij, ki so jih je povzročile zakonodajna ureditev ali napačne ocene prihodnjih stroškov energije.
Free
Družba Iberdrola prav tako opozarja, da distributerji niso obdržali prihodkov iz dodatne dajatve, ki je bila kot „posebni namenski prispevek“ takoj prenesena na depozitni račun, odprt pri CNE, in nato na proizvajalce, ki so prispevali k predfinanciranju primanjkljaja.
Margin on sales
PEIPOMBE REGIONALNE VLADE ASTURIJE
Pool price or regulated 'special scheme' price
Pripombe regionalne vlade Asturije so podobne spodaj navedenim pripombam španske vlade, na katere se sklicujejo.
Regulated tariffs
PRIPOMBE ŠPANIJE
No profit margin
Španija meni, da sistem reguliranih tarif iz leta 2005 ni vključeval pomoči niti za končne uporabnike niti za distributerje.
Distributors thus conclude that, given the different legal and factual context, free-market suppliers were not in competition with distributors, but rather with the regulated tariffs, which acted as the reference price in the market.
Zlasti glede distributerjev meni, da je nadomestilo, ki so ga prejemali, v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča v zadevi Altmark in torej ne pomeni državne pomoči.
Distributors submit that the activity of supplying electricity at the tariff did not bring them profits or advantages of any nature.
OBSTOJ POMOČI
Whereas for pure distribution and commercial management the distributors' remuneration included a profit margin to remunerate invested capital, for supply at regulated tariffs, distributors obtained only a reimbursement of their costs without any profit margin.
BREZ VZROČNE POVEZAVE MED UKREPOM DRžAVE IN PRIMANJKLJAJEM, PRI ČEMER SLEDNJEGA NI MOGOČE PRIPISATI DRžAVI
In particular, the costs ‘recognised’ to a distributor were based on the average weighted price paid for electricity during the reference period.
Španija trdi, da primanjkljaja ni mogoče pripisati državi, saj so ga povzročile nepredvidljive zunanje okoliščine, ne pa premišljen namen države, da subvencionira nekatere dejavnosti.
In certain circumstances, these recognised costs could be lower than the actual total costs borne by a distributor.
Španija navaja, da zakonodaja EU leta 2005 ni preprečevala dobave po reguliranih tarifah, ki jih določi država.
When the regulated sales activity yielded a surplus, these funds did not stay with distributors but were allocated, during the settlement process, to the financing of other general costs of the system.
Zato je bil regulativni ukrep države pravno veljaven, saj je izražal nacionalno suverenost.
The amount recognised by the State equalled the difference between the average weighted price of electricity purchases, multiplied by the quantity of energy transported by each distributor, after correction for standard losses.
Ena od teh posebnih pravic države je v določanju tarif, tako da pričakovani stroški ustrezajo pričakovanemu povpraševanju.
Distributors further contend that they did not draw any direct or indirect financial benefit from free-market customers switching back to regulated tariffs, as their remuneration for pure distribution and commercial management was entirely independent of the number of customers on regulated tariffs or the quantity of electricity sold at the tariff.
Distributerji so zbirali sredstva prek integralne tarife in tarife za dostop, nato pa so del tega prihodka prenesli na namenske račune (v skladu z deleži iz odloka o letnih tarifah).
First, as explained above, for supply at the regulated tariff there was only a reimbursement of costs.
Nato so odšteli nakupe električne energije na organiziranem trgu in tiste od proizvajalcev iz „posebne sheme“.
Second, the remuneration of pure distribution was also independent of the number of customers on regulated tariffs, as it was based on the volume of ‘transported energy’, which included all electricity transported by distributors on the network, irrespective of whether the energy was sold at the regulated tariffs or at free-market rates.
Če prihodek iz integralne tarife in tarife za dostop ni pokril stroškov reguliranih dejavnosti, je nastal tarifni primanjkljaj.
Third, the remuneration for commercial management activities was also independent of the number of customers supplied on regulated tariffs, as the law provided for payments based on the number of contracts concluded (for both access tariffs and regulated tariffs) and was therefore unrelated to the number of customers on regulated tariffs.
Španija meni, da je primanjkljaj iz leta 2005 povzročila razlika med vladnimi napovedmi veleprodajnih cen električne energije in dejanskimi cenami, evidentiranimi na organiziranem trgu.
Distributors were required in any event to manage all customers' requests, such as changes in the type of connection, contracts, invoicing of access tariffs, metering, etc., regardless of the type of supply.
Izjemno visoke cene leta 2005 so bile posledica nepredvidljivih razlogov zaradi višje sile (glej uvodno izjavo 26).
Distributors thus conclude that the ‘compensation’ they received in respect of supplies at regulated tariffs should be viewed rather as the reimbursement of sums they were required to advance in application of the law, or as compensation for loss and damage.
Ker je bil dogodek, ki je povzročil domnevno pomoč, povišanje veleprodajnih cen, ki je bilo večje od napovedanega, domnevne prednosti ni mogoče pripisati nobenemu pravnemu aktu.
Iberdrola specifically contends that it would be legally and economically incorrect to impute the deficit to distributors.
Tudi če se predpostavlja, da je ta pomoč obstajala, bi jo povzročile okoliščine, ki niso povezane z namerami države.
The costs incurred in purchasing electricity for the regulated market were imputable to the electricity system, not to distributors, which merely implemented legal provisions.
Obstoj višje sile po mnenju Španije prekinja vzročno povezavo med upravno odločbo, ki določa raven tarif, in konkurenčno prednostjo, ki pomeni državno pomoč.
The proceeds of sales at regulated prices never became the property of distributors, but belonged to the electricity system as a whole, and therefore the system should be seen as the ‘seller’ of electricity at regulated prices.
Niti ob predpostavki, da je bil izpolnjen objektivni pogoj vzročne povezave, ne bi bilo subjektivnega pogoja namernosti (pripisa odgovornosti) na strani države.
In a system as highly regulated as the Spanish one, it would be unreasonable, according to Iberdrola, to impute to distributors the financial imbalances caused by the regulatory structure or by errors in estimates of future energy costs.
BREZ DRžAVNIH SREDSTEV
Iberdrola also points out that distributors did not retain the revenue from the surcharge, which, as a ‘specifically earmarked contribution’, was transferred immediately to the deposit account opened by the CNE and passed on to the generators who prefinanced the deficit.
Španija navaja, da tarife niso vključevale javnih sredstev.
COMMENTS BY THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ASTURIAS
Prvič, Španija v zvezi s tem trdi, da dodatna dajatev ni „dajatev“ v smislu sodne prakse Sodišča Evropske unije glede davku podobnih dajatev, saj je ni pobrala država in ne ustreza davčnemu prispevku.
The comments by the Regional Government of Asturias are equivalent to those set out below by the Spanish Government, to which reference is made.
Po mnenju Španije je dodatna dajatev sestavni del tarife in ji je po naravi podobna.
COMMENTS BY SPAIN
Tarifa je tako zasebna cena.
Spain maintains that the regulated tariffs system in 2005 did not involve aid, either for end-users or for distributors.
Drugič, sredstev ni pobrala država in niso bila vplačana v sklad, ki ga je določila država.
In particular, as regards distributors, Spain considers that the compensation they received is in line with the Altmark case-law of the Court of Justice and does not, therefore, constitute State aid.
Tarif ni pobirala država, temveč distributerji, zato je šlo za zasebne cene, ki so zagotavljale pravično plačilo akterjem (kot določa zakon LSE).
EXISTENCE OF AID
Niso bile niti davki niti javne cene.
NO CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN STATE ACTION AND THE DEFICIT, AND NON-IMPUTABILITY OF THE DEFICIT TO THE STATE
Država ni ničesar plačala, saj je bil sistem tisti, ki je določil plačilo na podlagi tržnih sil za neregulirane dejavnosti in na podlagi tarif za dostop, ki jih država določi za regulirane dejavnosti.
Spain contends that the deficit was not imputable to the State, in that it was caused by unpredictable external circumstances and not by the State's deliberate intention to subsidise certain activities.
Ker v takem sistemu ni bilo nobenega bremena za državo, niso bila vključena državna sredstva, kot izhaja iz sodne prakse v zadevi Sloman Neptune [20].
Spain submits that supply at regulated tariffs set by the State was not precluded by EU law in 2005.
Poleg tega se ta sredstva nikoli niso stekala v državno blagajno, niso bila navedena v proračunski zakonodaji, računsko sodišče jih ni preverjalo in od dolžnikov jih ni bilo mogoče izterjati z upravnimi postopki izterjave.
Therefore, State regulatory intervention was legally valid, as it was the expression of national sovereignty.
Za dolgove do elektroenergetskega sistema se ni uporabljala obrestna mera, ki je veljala za dolgove do države.
One of these sovereign prerogatives consists in setting the tariffs so that expected costs match expected demand.
Španija znova poudarja, da ta sredstva upravlja španski regulator CNE, ki deluje izključno kot računovodski posrednik.
Distributors collected funds through integral and access tariffs, and then transferred part of this revenue to dedicated accounts (according to percentages set in the annual tariffs decree).
Španski organi opozarjajo, da je Komisija v odločbi o španskih nasedlih stroških iz leta 2001 (SA NN 49/99) že ugotovila, da „je prenos zneskov prek CNE predvsem računovodski.
Afterwards they deducted electricity purchases from the pool and from ‘special scheme’ generators.
Sredstva, prenesena v dobro računa na ime CNE nikoli niso postala last tega organa in so bila takoj plačana upravičencem v skladu s predhodno določenim zneskom, ki ga CNE nikakor ne more spreminjati“.
If the revenue from integral and access tariffs did not cover the cost of regulated activities, a tariff deficit was generated.
Komisija je na podlagi tega premisleka sklenila, da „ni bila v stanju ugotoviti, ali prihodki iz dajatve, določene v okviru sheme nasedlih stroškov, pomenijo državna sredstva“.
Spain submits that the 2005 deficit was caused by a discrepancy between government forecasts of wholesale electricity prices and the actual prices recorded on the pool.
Tretjič, Španija izpodbija ugotovitev Komisije, da so se regulirane prodaje distributerjev financirale prek „posebnega davka“, ki so ga plačevali vsi španski končni uporabniki električne energije.
The exceptionally high prices of 2005 were driven by unpredictable causes amounting to force majeure (see recital 26).
Po mnenju Španije distributerjev ni „financirala država“, temveč so prejemali razumno in pravično plačilo za izvajanje naloge, ki so jo po zakonu zavezani opravljati.
Since the event generating the alleged aid was a higher-than-forecast increase in wholesale prices, the alleged advantage could not be imputable to any legal act.
Poleg tega so distributerji pri prodaji električne energije po reguliranih tarifah in njenem nakupu od proizvajalcev na „organiziranem trgu“ ustvarili primanjkljaj (ki je bil pokrit z mehanizmom predfinanciranja iz kraljevega odloka z zakonsko močjo št. 5/2005), vendar so bili proizvajalci tisti, ki so prejemali prihodek od dodatne dajatve k tarifi, in ne distributerji.
Even assuming that this advantage had existed, it would have been caused by circumstances unrelated to the State's intentions.
BREZ PREDNOSTI
The existence of force majeure, according to Spain, breaks the causal link between the administrative decision setting the level of the tariffs and the competitive advantage giving rise to State aid.
Španija se ne strinja s predhodno ugotovitvijo Komisije, da so regulirane tarife distributerjem dajale gospodarsko prednost.
Even assuming that the objective condition of the causal link was met, the subjective condition of intention (imputability) on the part of the State would be absent.
Španija glede distributerjev izpodbija ugotovitev Komisije, da so tarifni sistemi distributerjem zagotovili minimalno profitno maržo.
NO STATE RESOURCES
Navaja, da je bila dobava distributerjev po reguliranih tarifah utemeljena s potrebo po zagotavljanju storitve splošnega pomena in da je bilo plačilo reguliranih dejavnosti namenjeno izključno pokritju stroškov zaradi opravljanja obveznosti, povezanih s temi dejavnostmi.
Spain submits that the tariffs did not involve public funds.
BREZ UČINKA NA KONKURENCO IN TRGOVINO MED DRŽAVAMI ČLANICAMI
First, Spain claims in this respect that the surcharge is not a ‘charge’ within the meaning of the case-law of the European Court of Justice on parafiscal levies, because it is not collected by the State and does not correspond to a fiscal levy.
Po mnenju španskih organov regulativne določbe, ki so veljale za dobavo po reguliranih tarifah, niso zmanjševale pravice ustanavljanja dobaviteljev električne energije, španski dobavitelji pa niso bili prednostno obravnavani v primerjavi z dobavitelji iz drugih držav članic.
According to Spain, the surcharge is an integral part of the tariff and is tariff-like in nature.
Iberski polotok je imel leta 2005 tako slabo zmogljivost medsebojnega povezovanja, da ni bilo pravega notranjega trga za energijo.
The tariff is thus a private price.
Španski organi menijo, da bi bilo glede na ta izoliran položaj nesorazmerno ugotoviti – kot to počne Komisija –, da je tarifa vplivala na konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami.
Second, the funds were not collected by the State and were not paid into a fund designated by the State.
Španski organi navajajo, da se električna energija ni izvažala iz Španije in da distributerji, ki so poslovali v Španiji, španske električne energije niso mogli prodajati zunaj nacionalnega ozemlja.
The tariffs were collected by distributors, not by the State, and therefore they were private prices which ensured the equitable remuneration of the players (as laid down in the LSE).
Po drugi strani pa je lahko v distribuciji pod enakimi pogoji kot španska podjetja sodelovalo katero koli upravičeno podjetje ter bilo pravno in gospodarsko enako obravnavano.
They were neither taxes nor public prices.
Španija meni, da so dobavitelji, ravno obratno, izvajali prosto, neregulirano dejavnost.
The State did not remunerate anything, since it was the system that provided remuneration by virtue of market forces for non-regulated activities and by virtue of access tariffs set by the State as regards regulated activities.
Spopadali so se s temu primernimi tveganji in prednostmi.
Since in such a system there is no burden for the State, no State resources would be involved, according to the Sloman Neptune case-law [20].
Prevzemanje teh tveganj je pomenilo sprejemanje dejstva, da njihova maloprodajna dejavnost pod nekaterimi nepredvidljivimi pogoji morda ne bo dobičkonosna.
Furthermore, these funds never flowed into the State coffers, were not mentioned in budgetary laws, were not subject to verification by the Court of Auditors, and could not be recovered from debtors by means of administrative recovery procedures.
Vendar bi se dobičkonosnost vrnila takoj, ko bi to omogočile tarife ali ko ne bi bilo več izjemnih okoliščin.
Debts vis-à-vis the electricity system were not subject to the interest rate applicable to debts owed to the State.
ANALIZA OB UPOŠTEVANJU SODNE PRAKSE V ZADEVI ALTMARK
Spain insists that these funds were handled by the Spanish regulator, the CNE, acting as a mere accounting intermediary.
Španija navaja, da leta 2005 obstoj reguliranih tarif ni bil v nasprotju z zakonodajo Unije, saj je bil rok za odprtje trga vsem odjemalcem, vključno z gospodinjstvi, 1. julij 2007.
The Spanish authorities point out that in its 2001 decision on the Spanish stranded costs (SA NN 49/99) the Commission had already established that ‘the transit of funds through the CNE is of an essentially accounting nature.
Po mnenju Španije je bilo pokrivanje stroškov, ki so distributerjem nastali pri dobavi po reguliranih tarifah, v skladu s štirimi merili sodne prakse v zadevi Altmark, zato ta poseg ne spada na področje uporabe državne pomoči.