natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This table showed a significant advantage for the first two categories (large industrial users).
Pri maloprodajnih dobavah je dobičkonosnost odvisna od tega, ali „element dobave“, ki ga plača odjemalec, pokrije stroške dobavitelja (tj. stroške nakupa električne energije na veleprodajnem trgu ali stroške lastne proizvodnje v primeru vertikalno povezanega podjetja), in od „trgovske marže“, ki vključuje druge stroške dobave (stroške trženja, informacijske sisteme, obračunavanje itd.) in povračilo na vloženi kapital.
For the other categories of end-user, the comparison is less conclusive but a small advantage can still be observed.
Zato je lahko dobavitelj na prostem trgu v zadevnem tržnem segmentu posloval dobičkonosno le v primeru „pozitivne trgovske marže“, tj. razlike med splošnimi stroški, ki jih je imel dobavitelj z oskrbo odjemalca, in regulirano tarifo.
The decision found that this advantage had been granted selectively, since the artificially low regulated prices favoured undertakings using electricity rather than, for example, gas, as an energy source.
Družba Centrica je obstoj podrejenega konkurenčnega položaja dobaviteljev na prostem trgu podprla z izračuni, ki so pokazali, da leta 2005 ni bilo trgovske marže za nobeno kategorijo odjemalcev [12] (ali da so bile morebitne marže z začetka leta med letom odpravljene).
Moreover, the existence of de facto and de jure selectivity was observed, in that the advantage was disproportionately bigger for large industrial end-users, which in certain cases benefited from all-inclusive prices that were less than half the energy component of estimated free-market prices.
To je pomenilo, da so bile regulirane tarife določene prenizko, da bi se lahko neodvisni dobavitelji dobičkonosno spopadali z njimi.
The opening decision indicated that, by encouraging end-users to switch back to the regulated market, the system might also have benefited distributors, who appeared to have enjoyed a guaranteed profit margin on their regulated activities.
Po navedbah družbe Centrica se za nekatere kategorije končnih uporabnikov (predvsem energetsko intenzivne uporabnike tarife G4 in druge velike industrijske odjemalce) ni bilo mogoče potegovati že pred pojavom tarifnega primanjkljaja, saj integralne tarife niso nikoli dopuščale konkurenčnosti.
The decision also considered that the system involved a transfer of state resources, since the price surcharge used to repay the deficit constitutes a parafiscal levy, the proceeds of which transit through the Spanish Regulator CNE (a public body) before being channelled to the final beneficiaries.
Domnevni podrejeni konkurenčni položaj, ki ga navaja družba Centrica, se je pojavil predvsem pri kategoriji odjemalcev, ki je zajemala storitvena podjetja in mala industrijska podjetja, priključena na nizkonapetostno omrežje, ter segment gospodinjstev.
The decision concluded that, in the light of Court of Justice case-law on this matter, these funds should be regarded as state resources.
Komisija je podatke, ki jih je predložila družba Centrica, predvsem primerjavo med reguliranimi tarifami in ocenjenimi tržnimi cenami, upoštevala pri odločitvi o začetku postopka (glej uvodno izjavo 30 in preglednico 3).
Considering that end-users operate in markets which are generally open to competition and trade within the EU, in the opening decision the Commission came to the conclusion that all the criteria laid down in Article 107(1) were fulfilled and that the measure constituted state aid in favour of end-users.
Družba Centrica meni, da je sistem kršil direktivo o električni energiji, ne samo zaradi diskriminacijskih ureditev glede primanjkljaja (ki so nadomestile izgubo distributerjev, ne pa izgub dobaviteljev), temveč tudi zato, ker je bila odjemalcem odvzeta pravica do preglednih cen in tarif [13].
After noting that none of the derogations provided for in Article 107 TFEU seemed applicable, the opening decision assessed whether the provision of electricity at regulated tariffs could be considered a service of general economic interest (SGEI) and as such benefit from the derogation provided for in Article 106(2) TFEU.
Ker je bil del cene za električno energijo, plačljive leta 2005, odložen na prihodnja leta, zaračunane končne cene za odjemalce niso bile pregledne.
The decision stated that, in the electricity sector, Member States' margin of discretion in establishing public service obligations is limited by the provisions of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC [10] (‘The Electricity Directive’).
Poleg tega je družba Centrica trdila, da mehanizem za povračilo primanjkljaja ni bil uravnotežen iz dveh razlogov:
This Directive lays down an obligation for Member States to establish a universal service obligation (including notably the right to be supplied at reasonable prices) only for household consumers and small enterprises [11].
Prvič, primanjkljaj naj bi poplačali predvsem končni uporabniki nizkonapetostne energije, čeprav so k njegovemu nastanku največ prispevali veliki končni uporabniki visokonapetostne energije.
The decision concluded that, in the light of the Electricity Directive, the provision of electricity at regulated tariffs to medium-sized or large undertakings could not be considered an SGEI in the strict sense of the term.
Drugič, od končnih uporabnikov na prostem trgu se je zahtevalo, naj plačajo primanjkljaj, h kateremu niso prispevali.
The Commission thus expressed serious doubts as to whether the elements of aid in the regulated tariffs that were applied to undertakings other than small enterprises could be considered compatible with the internal market.
Družba Centrica je podprla predhodno stališče Komisije, da so španske ureditve glede primanjkljaja vključevale prenos državnih sredstev.
The opening decision also found that it was possible that electricity distributors received state aid.
Po njenem mnenju so bila državna sredstva vključena v sklep španske vlade, da proizvajalcem energije omogoča listinjenje njihovih pravic do izterjave.
This part of the case is the subject of a separate decision (case C 3a/07).
Združenje neodvisnih dobaviteljev energije ACIE ocenjuje, da so bili stroški nakupa električne energije, ki so bili podlaga za regulirane tarife leta 2005, 68 % nižji od dejanskih stroškov, ki so jih imeli dobavitelji pri nakupu električne energije na veleprodajnem trgu.
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED PARTIES
Poleg tega so se morali dejansko prilagoditi ravni integralne tarife, ki jo je vlada določila za vsako kategorijo odjemalcev, saj sicer ne bi mogli pritegniti novih odjemalcev ali zadržati obstoječih.
The Commission's invitation to submit comments on the decision to open the in-depth investigation attracted numerous submissions from large industrial consumers, distributors, independent suppliers and governments of Spain's Autonomous Communities.
Združenje ACIE zlasti opozarja, da so njegovi člani na začetku leta 2005 sklenili pogodbe na podlagi vladnih napovedi veleprodajnih cen in da so morali pozneje take pogodbe spoštovati, čeprav se je izkazalo, da ne prinašajo dobička.
Only observations relevant to the alleged state aid in favour of electricity end-users will be summarised here.
Neodvisni dobavitelji so posledično utrpeli izgube.
COMMENTS FROM INDEPENDENT SUPPLIERS
Družba Centrica ocenjuje, da je leta 2005 utrpela 10 milijonov EUR izgub.
Comments were received from Céntrica and ACIE, the Association of Independent Energy Suppliers.
Po navedbah združenja ACIE je bilo več dobaviteljev, vključno z družbami Saltea Comercial, Electranorte, CYD Energia in RWE, prisiljenih zapustiti trg.
The arguments and conclusions are largely equivalent.
PRIPOMBE ENERGETSKO INTENZIVNIH UPORABNIKOV
Comments from Céntrica and ACIE
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki so v postopku sodelovali prek svojega združenja AEGE (Asociación de Empresas con Gran Consumo de Energia).
The main focus of Céntrica's submission is the alleged advantage conferred on electricity distributors.
Nekateri (Asturiana de Zinc, Ferroatlántica in Alcoa) so sodelovali tudi posamično.
However, the figures and arguments put forward by the company also suggest the presence of state aid for electricity end-users.
Družba Alcoa je proizvajalka aluminija s tremi tovarnami v Španiji, in sicer v San Cipriánu, La Coruñi in Avilésu, ki so leta 2005 imele koristi od integralne tarife G4 (prekinljiva tarifa, rezervirana za energetsko intenzivne uporabnike).
According to Céntrica, the coexistence between the free and regulated markets, and in particular the possibility for end-users to switch freely between the two, meant that the regulated tariffs acted as a price reference, or a de facto cap, on free-market prices.
Družba Ferroatlántica je proizvajalka aluminijevih in železnih zlitin, ki je imela koristi od tarife za prekinljivo oskrbo 3.4.
Suppliers could not charge prices higher than the regulated tariff, or they would fail to attract new customers and lose existing ones.
Družba Asturiana de Zinc je proizvajalka cinka, ki je imela koristi od tarife G4 v svojem obratu v mestu San Juan de Nieva.
Normally, in a free market, the price paid by electricity end-users consists of two components:
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki v svojih pripombah izpodbijajo ugotovitev Komisije, da industrijske tarife (G4 in druge prekinljive tarife) pomenijo državno pomoč, in trdijo, da tarife niso pomenile gospodarske prednosti, niso vključevale državnih sredstev ter niso vplivale na konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami.
the network access charge and a ‘supply component’, which results from market mechanisms and goes to the retail supplier.
Brez gospodarske prednosti
In retail supply, profitability depends on whether the ‘supply component’ paid by customers covers the supplier's costs (i.e. energy procurement costs in the wholesale market or own generation costs in the case of a vertically integrated company) and a ‘marketing margin’, which includes other supply costs (marketing costs, IT systems, billing, etc.) and remuneration on the capital invested.
Po mnenju energetsko intenzivnih uporabnikov je referenčna vrednost, uporabljena v odločitvi o začetku postopka za ugotavljanje obstoja prednosti, nepravilna.
Therefore, a free-market supplier could operate profitably in a given market segment only if there was a ‘positive marketing margin’, in other words a difference between the general costs incurred by the supplier in serving customers and the regulated tariff.
Komisija je industrijske tarife primerjala s povprečno veleprodajno tržno ceno (ceno na organiziranem trgu), ki naj bi predstavljala stroške, ki bi jih ta podjetja plačala na trgu pod običajnimi pogoji.
Céntrica substantiated the existence of a competitive disadvantage for free-market suppliers through calculations showing that there were no marketing margins in 2005 for any consumer category [12] (or that whatever margins existed at the beginning of the year were eroded during the year).
Ker so bile industrijske tarife nižje od cene na organiziranem trgu, je bilo v odločitvi o začetku postopka ugotovljeno, da je bila upravičencem s tarifami dodeljena tudi gospodarska prednost.
This meant that the regulated tariffs were set too low for independent suppliers to compete profitably.
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki trdijo, da gre pri organiziranem trgu za gotovinski trg, na katerem se z električno energijo trguje vsako uro za naslednji dan.
According to Céntrica, it was not possible to compete for certain categories of end-user (notably energy-intensive users on the G4 tariff and other large industrial users) even before the emergence of a tariff deficit, since the integral tariffs never left any margin to compete.
Veliki končni uporabniki, ki porabijo velike količine električne energije in so pavšalni odjemalci, ne kupujejo na organiziranem trgu, temveč značilno sklepajo dvostranske pogodbe z dobavitelji električne energije.
The figures provided by Céntrica, notably the comparison between regulated tariffs and estimated market prices, are taken over in the Commission's opening decision (see recital 30 and Table 3).
Tudi če bi se lahko evidentirane cene na organiziranem trgu štele za referenčno vrednost, v nobenem primeru ne bi bilo pravilno uporabiti povprečne veleprodajne cene iz leta 2005, kot je to storila Komisija, saj ta povprečna cena odraža povpraševanje po električni energiji pri dobaviteljih, ki so energijo dobavljali najrazličnejšim končnim uporabnikom, vključno z gospodinjstvi in malimi podjetji.
In Céntrica's view, the system breached the Electricity Directive, not only because of the discriminatory nature of the deficit arrangements (which compensated for the losses of distributors but not of suppliers) but also because consumers were deprived of the right to transparent prices and tariffs [13].
Po mnenju združenja AEGE ter družb Ferroatlántica in Asturiana de Zinc bi za referenčno vrednost ustrezala minimalna cena, evidentirana na organiziranem trgu leta 2005, tj. 18,6 EUR/MWh, saj bi ta cena odražala zelo konkurenčne tržne pogoje na organiziranem trgu (kjer proizvajalci ponujajo električno energijo po ceni, ki je enaka njihovim mejnim stroškom).
Since part of the electricity price payable for 2005 was deferred to future years, the final prices charged were not transparent for consumers.
Veliki industrijski odjemalci niso v primerljivem položaju z drugimi končnimi uporabniki, zlasti gospodinjstvi.
Besides, Céntrica claimed that the deficit repayment mechanism was not balanced for two main reasons:
Zato povprečna cena na organiziranem trgu ne bi bila primerna referenčna vrednost.
firstly, the deficit would be repaid mostly by low-voltage end-users, even though the users which contributed most to its creation were large high-voltage end-users.
Po mnenju družbe Alcoa bi morala Komisija namesto tega izpodbijane tarife primerjati s cenami, o katerih so se dvostransko dogovorili veliki končni uporabniki.
Secondly, end-users in the free market were required to pay for a deficit to which they did not contribute.
Družba Alcoa je predložila primer dvostransko dogovorjene tržne cene in navedla, da so imele njene tri tovarne aluminija vedno koristi od tarife G4.
Céntrica supported the Commission's preliminary view that the Spanish deficit arrangements involved a transfer of state resources.
Prve tri tovarne aluminija so enaki pavšalni uporabniki kot obrat Alúmina Española.
Céntrica also held that state resources were involved in the Spanish Government's decision to allow generators to securitise their collection rights.
Vendar zadnjenavedeni porabi precej manj električne energije (0,35 TWh v primerjavi z 1,3 TWh v tovarnah v Avilésu in La Coruñi ter 3,4 TWh v tovarni v San Cipriánu).
ACIE, the Association of Independent Energy Suppliers, estimates that the energy procurement cost taken as the basis for the regulated tariffs in 2005 was 68 % below the actual cost sustained by suppliers when purchasing energy in the wholesale market.
Povprečna cena, dogovorjena na podlagi te pogodbe, je bila 34,45 EUR/MWh (vključno s stroški jedrskega moratorija, stroški dostopa do omrežja in drugimi dodatnimi stroški).
ACIE underlined the severe repercussions that the 2005 tariff deficit had on independent suppliers.
Ta cena je bila dosežena na podlagi konkurenčnega razpisa, pri čemer so se ponudbe dobaviteljev gibale v razponu 5 EUR.
According to ACIE, suppliers in the free market were subject to similar procurement costs to those of distributors.
Po mnenju družbe Alcoa je mogoče razliko med dvostransko dogovorjeno ceno (34,45 EUR/MWh) in tarifo G4 (23,9 EUR/MWh) pojasniti z objektivnimi dejavniki.
Moreover, they were de facto obliged to adjust to the level of the integral tariff set by the government for each customer category, since otherwise they would not have been able to attract new customers or retain existing ones.
Za uporabnike tarife G4 zlasti veljajo regulativne omejitve, ki se za dvostranske pogodbe ne uporabljajo, kot so obveznost odjema vse električne energije, pogodbeno dogovorjene po tarifi G4 (ob zagroženih kaznih), zahteva po lastništvu opreme za nadzor napetosti ter zahteva po plačilu v 20 dneh (medtem ko imajo dvostranske pogodbe boljše plačilne roke).
In particular, ACIE points out that, at the beginning of 2005, its members concluded contracts based on the government's forecasts of wholesale prices, and that they later had to honour such contracts even though they turned out not to be profitable.
Družba Alcoa tako ugotavlja, da bi bila hipotetična tržna cena, ki bi veljala za njene tri tovarne aluminija, zaradi visoke ravni porabe v teh tovarnah precej pod 34,45 EUR/MWh.
As a result, independent suppliers experienced losses.
Če bi poleg tega upoštevali povprečno trgovsko maržo 10 EUR/MWh, bi bili neto dobavni stroški obrata za proizvodnjo aluminija 24,25 EUR/MWh, kar je zelo blizu integralni tarifi G4.
Céntrica estimates that in 2005 it suffered losses of EUR 10 million.
Družba Ferroatlántica je opozorila, da je odločitev o začetku postopka napačno predstavila regulirano tarifo 3.4, ki se je uporabljala leta 2005, saj je popuste napačno vključila v osnovno tarifo in tarifo primerjala s pristojbino, ki je bila desetkrat višja od tiste, ki se je uporabljala (in tiste za zelo velike odjemalce).
According to ACIE, several suppliers, including Saltea Comercial, Electranorte, CYD Energia and RWE, were forced out of the market.
Družba Ferroatlántica je prav tako predložila dokaze, da je povprečna mesečna tržna cena leta 2004 za terminske pogodbe za dobavo električne energije v letu 2005 znašala 31,68 EUR/MWh, decembra 2004 pa 31,05 EUR/MWh.
COMMENTS FROM ENERGY-INTENSIVE USERS
Iz tega sledi, da bi si neka družba v času določitve reguliranih tarif po navedeni ceni zagotovila osnovno oskrbo z električno energijo v letu 2005.
Some of them (Asturiana de Zinc, Ferroatlántica and Alcoa) also took part individually.
Dejansko so drugi popusti na navedeno tarifo poplačali zmožnost zagotavljanja storitev za uravnavanje povpraševanja in sprejetje teh storitev v dobro sistema.
Alcoa is an aluminium producer which operates three production facilities in Spain, located in San Ciprián, La Coruña and Avilés, which benefited from the G4 integral tariff (the interruptible tariff reserved for energy-intensive users) in 2005.
Družba Ferroatlántica glede tega dodaja, da je popust na tarifo odražal različne ponujene storitve, in sicer razlikovanje pri obračunavanju po urah (za nočni odjem in odjem ob koncu tedna), prekinljivost (sprejetje dobave na zahtevo upravljavca omrežja), sezonskost (z osredotočanjem dobave v mesecih z manj povpraševanja) in upravljanje jalove energije.
Ferroatlántica is an aluminium and iron alloys producer which benefited from the 3.4 interruptible tariff.
Samo ti popusti, ki so bili spremenljivi in določeni z uredbo iz leta 1995, ne pa raven regulirane tarife, lahko pojasnijo in po mnenju družbe Ferroatlántica utemeljijo nižjo povprečno ceno električne energije, plačano leta 2005.
Asturiana de Zinc is a zinc producer which benefited from the G4 tariff for its plant in San Juan de Nieva.
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki izpodbijajo trditev iz odločitve o začetku postopka, da prednost ni bila sorazmerna glede na porabljene količine in da se je povečevala za velike odjemalce.
In their observations, the energy-intensive users challenge the Commission's conclusion that the industrial tariffs (G4 and other interruptible tariffs) constitute state aid, arguing that the tariffs did not confer an economic advantage, did not involve state resources and did not affect competition and trade between Member States.
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki glede tega na primer trdijo, da je sama CNE potrdila, da bi morala biti raven tarife G4 celo nižja.
No economic advantage
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki ugotavljajo, da so veliki odjemalci pod tarifo G4 ali 3.4 porabili več tisočkrat več električne energije kot povprečni odjemalci visokonapetostne energije, medtem ko so zanjo plačali trikrat manj.
In the opinion of energy-intensive users, the benchmark used in the opening decision to establish the presence of an advantage is incorrect.
Poleg tega bi bilo običajno, da veliki odjemalci dobijo pri ceni večji popust na enoto.
The Commission compared the industrial tariffs with the average wholesale market price (the pool price), which was considered representative of the cost these companies would have paid in the market under normal conditions.
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki na podlagi tega trdijo, da je ugotovitev, da so industrijske tarife vključevale prednost, sporna.
Energy-intensive users claim that the pool is a spot market in which electricity is traded every hour for the following day.
Družba Alcoa je navedla tudi, da je bila cena, ki jo je sama plačala v Španiji, skoraj enaka povprečni tehtani ceni, ki so jo plačale tovarne aluminija v EU, in celo višja od povprečne tehtane cene, plačane v EGP.
According to the energy-intensive users, the pool suffers from certain shortcomings that affect its efficiency and competitiveness.
Brez državnih sredstev
Consequently, the pool prices do not accurately reflect marginal generation costs and therefore do not reflect a situation of perfect competition.
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki navajajo, da so bili prav sami tisti, ki so plačali industrijske tarife neposredno distributerjem, in to brez sredstev, ki bi jih nadzirala država, in da zato v skladu s sodno prakso PreussenElektra taka ureditev ni vključevala državnih sredstev.
Large end-users, which consume large volumes of electricity and have flat consumption profiles, do not purchase from the pool, but typically enter into bilateral contracts with electricity suppliers.
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki trdijo, da je prišlo do časovnega zamika med določitvijo tarif, kar se je zgodilo konec leta 2004, in sprejetjem mehanizma za povrnitev primanjkljaja, ki bi ga odplačali odjemalci, kar se je zgodilo šele junija 2006.
This is confirmed by OMEL's 2005 report, which shows that only seven of eligible users, representing 5 % of traded electricity, procured electricity directly on the pool.
Komisija je v odločitvi o začetku postopka navedla, da so bila vključena državna sredstva, saj je bila uvedba dodatne dajatve na računih uporabnikov opredeljena kot davku podobna dajatev.
In any event, even assuming that prices recorded on the pool could be considered a valid benchmark, it would not be correct to use the average wholesale price in 2005, as the Commission did, since this average price reflects the electricity demand of suppliers who served a varied portfolio of end-users, including households and small undertakings.
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki opozarjajo, da je opredelitev ukrepa kot pomoč odvisna izključno od okoliščin, ki so obstajale v času njegovega sprejetja, in ne more biti odvisna od prihodnjih dogodkov, zlasti kadar jih ni mogoče razumno predvideti.
According to AEGE, Ferroatlántica and Asturiana de Zinc, an appropriate benchmark would be the minimum price recorded on the pool in 2005, i.e. EUR 18,6/MWh, as this price would reflect the most competitive market conditions on the pool (where generators offer electricity at a price equivalent to their marginal costs).
Navajajo generalnega pravobranilca Jacobsa v zadevi Van Calster [14]:
Large industrial consumers are not in a comparable situation to other end-users, particularly households.
„stanje je treba oceniti na dan prvotne uvedbe pristojbin in ga ni mogoče spremeniti z učinkom za nazaj“.
Therefore, the average pool price would not be the appropriate benchmark.
Energetsko intenzivni uporabniki navajajo, da regulirane tarife iz leta 2005 v istem letu niso pomenile državne pomoči.
According to Alcoa, the Commission should instead compare the contested tariffs with prices contracted bilaterally by large end-users.
Ker tarife niso vključevale državne pomoči, energetsko intenzivni uporabniki menijo, da se Komisija pri ugotavljanju nasprotnega ne more opreti na dodatno dajatev.