natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
DMA has a portfolio of ‘sensitive loans’ with a nominal value of EUR [5-15] billion on 30 June 2012, and although it belongs to an undertaking operating in a market in which there is a shortfall, it is still a market in which competition can be distorted.
Družba DMA je imela 30. junija 2012 portfelj občutljivih posojil z nominalno vrednostjo [5-15] milijard EUR in, čeprav je del podjetja, ki deluje na trgu, na katerem obstaja primanjkljaj, je to vseeno trg, na katerem se lahko izkrivlja konkurenca.
The Commission will therefore base its assessment of the compatibility of the aid to DMA on the Bank Restructuring Communication, point 17 of which states:
Ocena združljivosti pomoči družbi DMA Komisije bo zato temeljila na točki 17 sporočila o prestrukturiranju bank, v kateri je navedeno:
‘The sale of an ailing bank to another financial institution can contribute to the restoration of long-term viability, if the purchaser is viable and capable of absorbing the transfer of the ailing bank, and may help to restore market confidence. It may also contribute to the consolidation of the financial sector. To this end, the purchaser should demonstrate that the integrated entity will be viable. In the case of a sale, the requirements of viability, own contribution and limitations of distortions of competition also need to be respected.’
„Prodaja banke v težavah drugi finančni instituciji lahko prispeva k ponovni vzpostavitvi uspešnega poslovanja, če kupec uspešno posluje in je sposoben absorbirati prenos banke v težavah ter lahko pripomore k povrnitvi zaupanja v trge. Prispeva lahko tudi h konsolidaciji finančnega sektorja. Zato mora kupec dokazati, da bo združeni subjekt uspešno posloval. V primeru prodaje je treba spoštovati tudi zahteve glede uspešnega poslovanja, lastnega prispevka in omejevanja izkrivljanja konkurence.“
However, the Commission takes a positive view of the fact that the French authorities wish to set up a development bank based on the DMA entity, whose activity will be strictly limited to providing simple funding (vanilla loans) to French local authorities and French public health establishments, for which the financing market is in shortfall.
Toda Komisija pozitivno ocenjuje dejstvo, da želijo francoski organi ustanoviti razvojno banko, ki bo temeljila na subjektu DMA, katere dejavnost bo strogo omejena na zagotavljanje preprostega financiranja (osnovnih oblik posojila) francoskim lokalnim skupnostim in francoskim ustanovam javnega zdravstva, pri katerih obstaja primanjkljaj na trgu financiranja.
The Commission will therefore also initially assess the compatibility with the internal market of the State aid which the development bank is set to receive, in the light of the merits of setting up such a development bank, of which DMA is to form part (Section 6.5.2 below).
Komisija bo zato tudi na začetku ocenila združljivost z notranjim trgom za državno pomoč, ki naj bi jo prejela razvojna banka, glede na prednosti pri ustanavljanju take razvojne banke, katere del bo družba DMA (oddelek 6.5.2. v nadaljevanju).
The financing provided by DMA likely to contain aid (level II) will be assessed separately.
Posebej pa bo ocenjeno financiranje, ki ga bo zagotovila družba DMA in bo verjetno vsebovalo pomoč (II. raven).
It is thus clear that support for hospitals may contain State aid.
Zato je jasno, da pomoč bolnišnicam lahko vsebuje državno pomoč.
This Decision will confine itself to assessing the aid provided at level I (aid to the development bank).
Ta sklep se omeji na ocenjevanje pomoči, zagotovljene na I. ravni (pomoč razvojni banki).
This is without prejudice to the Commission’s position on the existence of level II aid and its compatibility with the internal market.
To ne posega v stališče Komisije glede obstoja II. ravni pomoči in njene združljivosti z notranjim trgom.
Assessment of DMA as a development bank
Ocena družbe DMA kot razvojne banke
The Commission must establish whether the aid for the development bank is compatible with the internal market.
Komisija mora ugotoviti, ali je pomoč za razvojno banko združljiva z notranjim trgom.
Article 107(3) TFEU lays down certain exceptions from the general principle of incompatibility set out in Article 107(1) TFEU.
V členu 107(3) PDEU so navedene določene izjeme od splošnega načela nezdružljivosti iz člena 107(1) PDEU.
In particular, Article 107(3)(c) TFEU states that ‘The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market: … aid to facilitate the development of certain … activities … where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’.
V členu 107(3)(c) PDEU je zlasti navedeno: „Kot združljivo z notranjim trgom se lahko šteje naslednje: … pomoč za pospeševanje razvoja določenih … dejavnosti …, kadar takšna pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi;“.
The setting-up of a development bank does not come under any specific Commission communication setting out in detail for that purpose the rules laid down in Article 107(3) TFEU.
Ustanovitve razvojne banke ne zajema nobeno posebno sporočilo Komisije, v katerem bi bila za ta namen podrobno določena pravila iz člena 107(3) PDEU.
The Commission must therefore assess the compatibility of the measure directly on the basis of Article 107(3) TFEU.
Komisija mora zato oceniti združljivost ukrepa neposredno na podlagi člena 107(3) PDEU.
As none of the other objectives referred to in that provision is relevant, nor was any relied on by France, the Commission will examine the measure in the light of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.
Komisija bo proučila ukrep glede na člen 107(3)(c) PDEU, ker ni ustrezen nobeden od drugih ciljev iz te določbe niti se ni Francija sklicevala na nobenega od njih.
In order to examine the compatibility of the measure on that basis, it must be assessed whether the measure is appropriate for achieving the intended aim.
Oceniti je treba, ali je ukrep primeren za izpolnjevanje zastavljenega cilja, da se prouči združljivost ukrepa na tej podlagi.
To that end, it must be examined whether the measure 1) aims to achieve an objective of common interest, 2) makes an appropriate contribution to responding to the market shortfall, 3) is likely to have a knock-on effect, and 4) remains proportionate by minimising unwanted effects on trade and competition.
Zato je treba proučiti, ali ukrep 1) skuša doseči cilj skupnih interesov, 2) ustrezno prispeva k odzivu na tržni primanjkljaj, 3) najverjetneje povzroča posredni učinek ter 4) ostaja sorazmeren s kar največjim zmanjšanjem neželenih učinkov na trgovino in konkurenco.
Implementation of a clearly defined objective of common interest
Izvajanje jasno opredeljenega cilja skupnih interesov
The Commission must determine whether the creation and capitalisation of DMA are designed to meet an objective of common interest, which is one of the essential conditions laid down in Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.
Komisija mora ugotoviti, ali sta ustanovitev in kapitalizacija družbe DMA zasnovani za izpolnjevanje cilja skupnih interesov, ki je eden od osnovnih pogojev iz člena 107(3)(c) PDEU.
In addition, the Commission must determine whether the measure notified is appropriate for that objective.
Poleg tega mora Komisija določiti, ali je ukrep primeren za navedeni cilj.
The Commission notes that DMA is to operate in clearly defined sectors where France has shown that there is a market shortfall: the provision of financing for French local authorities and French public health establishments.
Komisija navaja, da bo družba DMA poslovala v jasno opredeljenih sektorjih, v katerih je v Francija dokazala, da obstaja tržni primanjkljaj, saj bo francoskim lokalnim skupnostim in francoskim ustanovam javnega zdravstva zagotavljala financiranje.
The Commission recognises that the financing market in these two sectors is not currently operating satisfactorily because of a market shortfall (‘credit crunch’).
Komisija priznava, da trg financiranja v obeh sektorjih trenutno ne deluje zadovoljivo zaradi tržnega primanjkljaj (t. i. kreditni krč).
The Commission considers that it has been shown that the existing private players (private banks) are not in a position to be able to make up this funding shortfall, in particular 1) because of the new regulatory constraints (introduction of the ‘Basel 3’ rules) which will penalise the provision of long-term liquidities unless backed up by deposits, but also 2) because of the financial crisis, which is encouraging banks to reduce their balance sheet and their supply of financing.
Komisija meni, da je bilo prikazano, da obstoječi zasebni udeleženci na trgu (zasebne banke) ne morejo nadomestiti tega primanjkljaja financiranja, zlasti ne 1) zaradi novih regulativnih omejitev (uvedba pravil iz sporazuma Basel III), ki bodo kaznovale zagotavljanje dolgoročnih likvidnih sredstev, ki niso podprta z depoziti, ampak tudi 2) zaradi finančne krize, ki banke spodbuja, da zmanjšujejo svoje bilance stanja in zagotavljanje finančnih sredstev.
The Commission therefore notes that the dominant market share [182] in financing for these sectors which the Dexia Group used to hold before it went into orderly resolution (new production of which will not, in principle, be authorised) is unlikely to be entirely taken up by other banking institutions.
Komisija zato navaja, da ni verjetno, da bi druge bančne institucije v celoti zavzele prevladujoči tržni delež [182] pri financiranju takih sektorjev, kot ga je imela skupina Dexia pred nadzorovanim reševanjem (novo ustvarjanje produktov pa načeloma ne bo dovoljeno).
It has also been shown that the medium- and long-term financing needs of local authorities and public health establishments in France may amount to EUR 18-20 billion and EUR 2-4 billion per year respectively.
Pokazalo se je tudi, da lahko srednje- in dolgoročne potrebe po financiranju lokalnih skupnosti in ustanov javnega zdravstva v Franciji znašajo 18–20 milijard EUR oziroma 2–4 milijarde EUR letno.
The banking institutions are likely to keep their supply at around EUR 10 billion (2013).
Bančne institucije bodo verjetno še naprej zagotavljale okrog 10 milijard EUR (v letu 2013).
The shortfall in local public sector financing in France thus stands at around EUR 10 billion, since the exceptional envelope provided by the CDC is unlikely to be renewed.
Primanjkljaj pri financiranju javnega sektorja na lokalni ravni je tako okrog 10 milijard EUR, saj ni verjetno, da bo hranilnica in posojilnica CDC ponovno zagotovila izjemna finančna sredstva.
The creation of DMA is designed to meet 20-25 % of the total demand, i.e. annual financing of around EUR 5 billion.
Z ustanovitvijo družbe DMA naj bi se zadostilo 20–25 % skupnih potreb, tj. letna finančna sredstva v višini okrog 5 milijard EUR.
It should also be noted that the beneficiaries’ financing needs are generally long-term, which will hit the banking institutions’ new liquidity ratios even harder.
Prav tako je treba navesti, da imajo upravičenci na splošno dolgoročne potrebe po financiranju, kar bo še bolj prizadelo nove likvidnostne količnike bančnih institucij.
The Commission notes that this factor is likely to place significant structural constraints on the banks’ appetite for this type of financing.
Komisija navaja, da se bo s tem dejavnikom precej strukturno omejil apetit bank po tej vrsti financiranja.
Appropriateness of the measure
Primernost ukrepa
The Commission must make sure that the creation of DMA is an appropriate response to the existing market shortfall (financing deficit).
Komisija se mora prepričati, ali je ustanovitev družbe DMA ustrezen odziv na obstoječi tržni primanjkljaj (pomanjkanje financiranja).
The Commission notes that the sector in which DMA will be operating is precisely defined and restricted to two classes of beneficiaries which have been shown to face a market shortfall.
Komisija navaja, da je sektor, v katerem bo poslovala družba DMA, jasno opredeljen in omejen na dva razreda upravičencev, pri katerih se je pokazal obstoj tržnega primanjkljaja.
Financing will be supplied to local authorities and public health establishments in France at market conditions not more attractive than those offered by other commercial banks.
Finančna sredstva bodo lokalnim skupnostim in ustanovam javnega zdravstva v Franciji zagotovljena pod tržnimi pogoji, ki niso privlačnejši od pogojev drugih komercialnih bank.
The Commission notes that the commitment to impose a price leadership ban is designed to place strict limits on DMA’s operation on the financing market for French local authorities and public hospitals without restricting other competitors’ access to the market.
Komisija navaja, da je zaveza k prepovedi prevladujočega položaja pri določanju cen zasnovana zato, da se postavijo točne meje za poslovanje družbe DMA na trgu financiranja za francoske lokalne skupnosti in ustanove javnega zdravstva, ne da bi se drugim konkurentom omejeval dostop do trga.
This commitment is not time-limited.
Ta zaveza ni časovno omejena.
Knock-on effect
Posredni učinek
The Commission must examine whether the creation of DMA is likely to have a knock-on effect, by making French local public sector financing more attractive so that the private sector will gradually take over from DMA.
Komisija mora proučiti, ali je verjetno, da bo ustanovitev družbe DMA povzročila posredni učinek s tem, da bo postalo financiranje francoskega javnega sektorja na lokalni ravni privlačnejše, tako da bo zasebni sektor postopoma prevzel družbo DMA.
The Commission notes that DMA will provide simple vanilla products.
Komisija navaja, da bo družba DMA ponujala osnovne produkte.
The commercial banks will be able to provide both similar and different products which could meet the demand from local authorities and public hospitals in France.
Komercialne banke bodo lahko zagotavljale podobne in druge produkte, ki bi lahko zadostili potrebam lokalnih skupnosti in javnih bolnišnic v Franciji.
The Commission must determine whether the aid provided by the measure is proportionate to the aim pursued (in other words, whether the aim could be achieved with fewer resources) and limited to the minimum necessary.
Komisija mora presoditi, ali je pomoč, ki jo zagotavlja ukrep, sorazmerna glede na zastavljeni cilj (z drugimi besedami, ali bi se lahko cilj dosegel z manj sredstvi) in omejena na najnižjo potrebno.
The Commission notes first of all that the level of capitalisation of DMA (EUR [0-5] billion) is small in comparison with the financing shortfall identified (EUR [5-10] billion).
Komisija najprej navaja, da je v primerjavi z ugotovljenim primanjkljajem pri financiranju ([5–10] milijard EUR) stopnja kapitalizacije družbe DMA majhna ([0–5] milijarde EUR).
The Commission then notes that, as a matter of principle, DMA will not, on average, be supplying financing at preferential rates compared to its competitors.
Komisija navaja, da družba DMA v primerjavi s svojimi konkurenti načeloma v povprečju ne bo zagotavljala financiranja po preferencialnih stopnjah.
This will mean that the existing competition is not penalised.
To bo pomenilo, da se obstoječa konkurenca ne bo kaznovala.
Assessment of DMA as a development bank receiving restructuring aid
Ocena družbe DMA kot razvojne banke, ki prejema pomoč za prestrukturiranje
The degree of restructuring required depends on how serious the problems encountered by each bank are and how much aid they have received.
Stopnja zahtevanega prestrukturiranja je odvisna od resnosti težav, ki jih ima vsaka banka, in od prejetega zneska pomoči.
In that respect, the aid to be taken into account here stems from the recapitalisation measures and measures to treat impaired assets, as well as the guarantees obtained in the past by the Dexia Group, from which DMA also benefited.
V zvezi s tem je treba upoštevati pomoč, ki izhaja iz ukrepov dokapitalizacije ter ukrepov za obravnavanje oslabljenih sredstev, pa tudi jamstva, ki jih je skupina Dexia pridobila v preteklosti in od katerih je imela koristi tudi družba DMA.
The compatibility of the restructuring plan must be assessed in the light of the conditions set out in the Bank Restructuring Communication.
Združljivost načrta prestrukturiranja je treba proučiti glede na pogoje iz sporočila o prestrukturiranju bank.
These are as follows:
Ti so naslednji:
the restructuring plan must ensure that the costs of restructuring are shared fairly between States and the bank;
načrt prestrukturiranja mora zagotoviti, da si države in banka pravično razdelijo stroške prestrukturiranja;
Returning the institution to long-term viability
Ponovna vzpostavitev dolgoročnega uspešnega poslovanja za institucije
The Commission notes that DMA will retain until maturity a substantial portfolio of ‘legacy’ assets which could have an impact on its financial results.
Komisija navaja, da bo družba DMA ohranila precejšen del portfelja „preostalih“ sredstev, kar bi lahko vplivalo na njene finančne rezultate.
The portfolio is likely to be amortised by [25-75] % by 2020.
Do leta 2020 se bo portfelj verjetno amortiziral za [25–75] %.
The Commission notes that the size of the existing assets portfolio is very large in the light of the new production envisaged.
Komisija navaja, da je obseg obstoječega portfelja sredstev glede na predvideno novo ustvarjanje proizvodov zelo velik.
The very poor yield on the existing portfolio will thus have a significant negative impact on the structure’s profitability (return on own funds).
Zelo slab donos obstoječega portfelja bo imel torej precejšen negativen učinek na donosnost strukture (donosnost regulatornega kapitala).
The projections forwarded by the French authorities show that it is primarily the (slow) rate of amortisation of the existing portfolio, rather than any increase in profitability of the activities envisaged, that will lead to an eventual improvement in the return on own funds.
Iz projekcij, ki so jih poslali francoski organi, je razvidno, da bo morebitno izboljšanje donosnosti regulatornega kapitala povzročila predvsem (počasna) stopnja amortizacije obstoječega portfelja, ne pa kakršno koli povečanje donosnosti predvidenih dejavnosti.
The indications of prices and margins to be applied are seen as realistic even though they are at the high end.
Navedbe cen in marž, ki naj bi se uporabljale, so videti realistične, čeprav so med najvišjimi.
As far as prices and margins are concerned, the Commission notes that DMA is likely to calibrate the first year’s financing offered at Euribor + [200-300] basis points.
Komisija glede cen in marž navaja, da bo družba DMA verjetno kalibrirala financiranje prvega leta po obrestni meri Euribor + [200–300] bazičnih točk.
This level is seen as realistic and comparable to what competitors are offering [183].
Ta stopnja je videti realistična in primerljiva s stopnjami, ki jih ponujajo konkurenti [183].
The Commission notes that the creation of the JV linking the development bank to La Banque Postale should allow DMA to benefit from a geographical and commercial network that will be a major asset for providing financing for a large number of local authorities scattered throughout France.
Komisija navaja, da bi morala ustanovitev skupnega podjetja, ki razvojno banko povezuje z banko LBP, družbi DMA omogočiti, da izkoristi geografsko in komercialno mrežo, kar bi pomenilo glavni adut pri zagotavljanju financiranja številnim lokalnim skupnostim, razpršenim po vsej Franciji.
The Commission notes that the levels of return on own funds communicated would not be enough to satisfy a private investor.
Komisija navaja, zasebni vlagatelj ne bi bil zadovoljen s poročano stopnjo donosnosti regulatornega kapitala.
The return on own funds is expected to reach just [2-6] % in 2017.
Donosnost regulatornega kapitala naj bi v letu 2017 po pričakovanjih dosegla komaj [2–6] %.
The Commission recognises, however, that DMA is a structure which has a capital surplus over the regulatory requirements [184], impacting on its profitability.
Vendar Komisija priznava, da je družba DMA struktura, v kateri kapital presega regulatorne zahteve [184], kar vpliva na njeno donosnost.
The Commission notes that this level of profitability is what might be expected of a development bank whose aim is to remedy a market shortfall.
Po navedbah Komisije se lahko taka stopnja donosnosti pričakuje od razvojne banke, ki skuša odpraviti tržni primanjkljaj.
Consequently, DMA’s business model is considered to be in line with the Commission’s requirements in terms of expected profitability.
Zato meni, da je poslovni model družbe DMA skladen z zahtevami Komisije v smislu pričakovane donosnosti.
The Commission notes that the financial projections for DMA show a cost of risk of just a few basis points.
Komisija navaja, da je iz finančnih projekcij za družbo DMA razvidno, da znašajo stroški tveganja le nekaj bazičnih točk.
France regarded this level as reasonable and stressed that the historical cost of the risk of the portfolio was less than [0-5] basis points.
Franciji se je zdelo, da je ta stopnja razumna, poudarila je, da so pretekli stroški tveganja za portfelj znašali manj kot [0–5] bazičnih točk.
Furthermore, the projections do not include any specific provisions for the risk of litigation on the sensitive loans held.
V projekcije poleg tega niso vključene posebne določbe glede tveganja sodnega postopka za občutljiva posojila.
The Commission considers that these hypotheses are only acceptable if future DMA shareholders undertake to cover any losses through adequate recapitalisation of the structure.
Po mnenju Komisije so take domneve sprejemljive le, če se prihodnji delničarji družbe DMA zavežejo, da bodo z ustrezno dokapitalizacijo strukture krili vse izgube.
Any losses will thus not be likely to threaten the existence of the structure and its ability to continue operating as a development bank.
Tako ni verjetno, da bi kakršne koli izgube ogrozile obstoj strukture in njeno zmožnost, da še naprej deluje kot razvojna banka.
Moreover, the French State has given a commitment that the business plan submitted to the Commission [185] will be implemented rigorously and that proposals will be made to reduce the general and staff costs of DMA or the NEC if (i) the profits made are [20-30] % less than the stated target; or if (ii) losses are recorded in the profit and loss account; or if (iii) DMA, the NEC or the JV are no longer keeping to the minimum regulatory ratios applicable.
Poleg tega se je Francija zavezala, da bo dosledno izvajala poslovni načrt, predložen Komisiji [185], in da bo oblikovala predloge za zmanjšanje splošnih stroškov in stroškov zaposlenih družbe DMA ali nove kreditne institucije, če (i) bodo ustvarjeni dobički [20–30] % nižji od navedenega cilja ali če (ii) bodo v izkazu poslovnega izida evidentirane izgube ali če (iii) družba DMA, nova kreditna institucija ali skupno podjetje ne bodo več spoštovale veljavnih minimalnih regulativnih razmerij.
On the basis of the above, the Commission therefore considers that the structure of DMA should be viable in the long term as a development bank.
Komisija na podlagi navedenega torej meni, da bi morala družba DMA dolgoročno uspešno poslovati kot razvojna banka.
Institution’s own contribution
Lastni prispevek institucij
According to the Bank Restructuring Communication, the restructuring plan must ensure that the costs of restructuring are shared fairly between the Member States concerned and the bank, in other words the restructuring plan must provide for the bank and its shareholders to make as great a contribution as possible through their own resources.
V skladu s sporočilom o prestrukturiranju bank mora načrt prestrukturiranja zagotavljati, da si države in banka pravično razdelijo stroške prestrukturiranja, kar pomeni, da mora biti v načrtu prestrukturiranja določeno, naj banka in njeni delničarji zagotovijo čim večji prispevek z lastnimi sredstvi.
That contribution is necessary to persuade banks benefiting from rescue measures to take appropriate consequences for their previous behaviour, and to create suitable incentives for their future conduct.
Ta prispevek je nujen, da banke, ki so upravičene do ukrepov za reševanje, prepriča, da prevzamejo ustrezne posledice za svoje prejšnje ravnanje in ustvarijo ustrezne spodbude za svoje prihodnje ravnanje.