natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the decision to extend the procedure, the Commission considered that the following guarantees, initially provided for in connection with the DMA sale operation, might constitute aid: a guarantee from Dexia SA and DCL on DMA’s ‘sensitive loans’ (covering total loans of some EUR 10 billion), a counter-guarantee by France on the ‘sensitive loans’ guarantee, and a ‘stop-loss’ guarantee on losses in any securities portfolio of Dexia SA and DCL.
Komisija je v sklepu o razširitvi postopka menila, da bi lahko pomoč pomenila naslednja jamstva, ki so bila sprva zagotovljena v povezavi s transakcijo prodaje družbe DMA, to so: jamstvo družbe Dexia SA in banke DCL v zvezi z občutljivimi posojili družbe DMA (ki krije skupna posojila v višini okrog 10 milijard EUR), posredno jamstvo Francije za jamstvo občutljivih posojil ter jamstvo za omejitev izgube za kateri koli portfelj vrednostnih papirjev družbe Dexia SA in banke DCL.
Since the Member States concerned have withdrawn those guarantees, the Commission no longer needs to make any assessment of them.
Komisiji ni več treba proučevati teh jamstev, ker so jih zadevne države članice opustile.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the following measures involve elements of State aid: the aid that was the subject of the conditional authorisation decision, Arcofin’s participation in the recapitalisation of Dexia on 30 September 2008, the refinancing guarantee provided by the Member States concerned for Dexia SA and DCL (the temporary guarantee, to be replaced by a final guarantee), the sale of DBB/Belfius, the ELA granted since 5 October 2011 (from the BNB, which has ended, and from BdF, which is still running), the recapitalisation of Dexia SA, the commitment to recapitalise the NEC and DMA, and the sale of DMA.
Komisija torej ugotavlja, da elemente državne pomoči vsebujejo naslednji ukrepi: pomoč, ki se je obravnavala v sklepu o pogojnem dovoljenju, udeležba družbe Arcofin pri dokapitalizaciji skupine Dexia z dne 30. septembra 2008, jamstvo za refinanciranje, ki so ga zadevne države članice zagotovile družbi Dexia SA in banki DCL (začasno jamstvo, ki naj bi se nadomestilo z dokončnim jamstvom), prodaja banke DBB/Belfius, izredna likvidnostna pomoč, dodeljena od 5. oktobra 2011 (banke BNB, ki se je nehala zagotavljati, in banke BdF, ki se še vedno zagotavlja), dokapitalizacija družbe Dexia SA, zaveza glede dokapitalizacije nove kreditne institucije in družbe DMA ter prodaja družbe DMA.
QUANTIFICATION OF AID
KOLIČINSKA OPREDELITEV POMOČI
The aid which was the subject of the conditional authorisation decision has already been quantified:
Pomoč, ki se je obravnavala v sklepu o pogojnem dovoljenju, je že bila količinsko opredeljena, in sicer:
of the EUR 6 billion recapitalisation in October 2008, the conditional authorisation decision deemed EUR 5,2 billion to be imputable to the Belgian and French States.
dokapitalizacija v višini 6 milijard EUR oktobra 2008, pri čemer se je v sklepu o pogojnem dovoljenju štelo, da se 5,2 milijarde EUR lahko pripišejo Belgiji in Franciji.
Arcofin’s EUR 350 million participation must be added to this;
K temu je treba prišteti udeležbo družbe Arcofin v višini 350 milijonov EUR,
the aid element in the guarantee from the Belgian and French States on a portfolio of impaired assets was valued at EUR 3,2 billion;
element pomoči iz jamstva Belgije in Francije za portfelj oslabljenih sredstev je bil ocenjen na 3,2 milijarde EUR,
of the maximum amount of ELA payable by the BNB, the portion guaranteed by the Belgian State was EUR 35 billion;
delež najvišjega zneska izredne likvidnostne pomoči, ki jo je izplačala banka BNB, za katerega je jamčila Belgija, je znašal 35 milijard EUR,
the guarantee from the Belgian, French and Luxembourg States on the refinancing of the Group was for a maximum of EUR 135 billion.
jamstvo Belgije, Francije in Luksemburga glede refinanciranja skupine Dexia je znašalo največ 135 milijard EUR.
The temporary refinancing guarantee from the Member States concerned for Dexia SA and DCL provisionally approved by the temporary approval decision increased from EUR 45 billion to EUR 55 billion and is to be replaced by a final guarantee for EUR 85 billion.
Začasno jamstvo za refinanciranje zadevnih držav članic za družbo Dexia SA in banko DCL, začasno dovoljeno s sklepom o začasni odobritvi, se je s 45 milijard EUR povečalo na 55 milijard EUR, nadomestilo pa naj bi se s končnim jamstvom v višini 85 milijard EUR.
As regards the amount of aid provided in the ELAs, the Member States concerned pointed out that ‘the amount of aid in the ELA measures should, in any event, be deemed to be no more than half the total amount of ELA, corresponding to the amount actually granted to Dexia by the BNB, the other half having been granted on behalf of and at the risk of the Banque de France’ [154].
Zadevne države članice glede zneska pomoči, zagotovljenega kot izredna likvidnostna pomoč, poudarjajo, da „se v vsakem primeru ne bi smelo šteti, da je znesek pomoči v ukrepih izredne likvidnostne pomoči za več kot polovico višji od skupnega zneska izredne likvidnostne pomoči, kar ustreza znesku, ki ga je banka BNB dejansko dodelila skupini Dexia, druga polovica pa je bila dodeljena v imenu in na odgovornost banke BdF“ [154].
This is not correct: it is clear both from the notification of the new ELA by the Belgian authorities and from the terms of the agreement of 2 February 2012 that each central bank was granting ELA to the bank ‘under its authority’, i.e. the BNB to DBB/Belfius and the BdF to DCL.
To ni res, saj je iz priglasitve novega ukrepa izredne likvidnostne pomoči, ki so jo poslali belgijski organi, in pogojev sporazuma z dne 2. februarja 2012 jasno, da je vsaka centralna banka ukrep izredne likvidnostne pomoči zagotavljala banki „pod svojo pristojnostjo“, in sicer banka BNB banki DBB/Belfius in banka BdF banki DCL.
Thus, even if the BdF did not meet its commitment to compensate the BNB for 50 % of the loss resulting from a default of DBB in connection with the ELA to DBB/Belfius, the BNB would still continue to be covered by a Belgian State guarantee for its total exposure to a default of DBB/Belfius.
Torej, četudi banka BdF ni izpolnila svoje zaveze, da bi banki BNB nadomestila 50 % izgub, nastalih zaradi neizpolnjevanja obveznosti družbe DBB v povezavi z izredno likvidnostno pomočjo banki DBB/Belfius, bi banko BNB še vedno krilo jamstvo Belgije za njeno skupno izpostavljenost glede neizpolnjevanja obveznosti banke DBB/Belfius.
However, only half of the ELA granted by the BdF to DCL is covered by a State counter-guarantee, i.e. Belgium’s counter-guarantee for the BNB, which itself undertook to contribute to only half of the BdF’s losses.
Toda posredno jamstvo države krije le polovico izredne likvidnostne pomoči, ki jo je banka BdF dodelila banki DCL, in sicer posredno jamstvo Belgije za banko BNB, ki se je prav tako zavezala, da bo prispevala le za polovico izgub banke BdF.
As far as the Commission is aware there is no French State guarantee for the BdF.
Kolikor je seznanjena Komisija, francosko državno jamstvo za banko BdF ne obstaja.
All of the ELA granted by the BNB constitutes aid.
Celoten znesek izredne likvidnostne pomoči, ki jo je dodelila banka BNB, pomeni pomoč.
However, only 50 % of the ELA granted by the BdF constitutes aid.
Toda le polovica zneska izredne likvidnostne pomoči, ki jo je dodelila banka BdF, pomeni pomoč.
The recapitalisation of Dexia by Belgium and France will be for EUR 5,5 billion.
Belgija in Francija bosta skupino Dexia dokapitalizirali v višini 5,5 milijarde EUR.
Regarding the advantage to Dexia resulting from the sale of DBB/Belfius to the Belgian State, as described earlier, this is estimated at between EUR 1 billion and EUR 2 billion. The advantage to DBB/Belfius resulting from the sale cannot be quantified.
Kot je že bilo opisano, je prednost skupine Dexia, ki izhaja iz prodaje banke DBB/Belfius Belgiji, ocenjena na 1 milijardo EUR do 2 milijardi EUR. Prednosti za banko DBB/Belfius, ki izhaja iz prodaje, ni mogoče količinsko opredeliti.
As for the advantage to either Dexia or DMA resulting from the sale of DMA, it is impossible to quantify the aid.
Glede prednosti bodisi za skupino Dexia bodisi za družbo DMA, ki izhaja iz prodaje te družbe, pomoči ni mogoče količinsko opredeliti.
Regarding the advantage to DMA resulting from the new shareholders’ commitment to provide capital for DMA if necessary, it is impossible to quantify the aid.
Glede prednosti družbe DMA, ki izhaja iz zavez novih delničarjev glede tega, da bodo tej družbi po potrebi zagotovili kapital, pomoči ni mogoče količinsko opredeliti.
Under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU ‘The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market: … aid to … remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’.
V členu 107(3)(b) PDEU je navedeno: „Kot združljivo z notranjim trgom se lahko šteje naslednje: […] pomoč za […] odpravljanje resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice“.
Since the financial crisis in the autumn of 2008, the Commission has authorised State aid for financial institutions under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU if the compatibility criteria laid down in the applicable communications are satisfied.
Komisija je od finančne krize jeseni leta 2008 dovoljevala državno pomoč za finančne institucije po členu 107(3)(b) PDEU, če so bila izpolnjena merila glede združljivosti iz sporočil, ki se uporabljajo.
In the Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis [155], the Commission states that it considers that the requirements for State aid to be approved for the financial sector pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU are still satisfied in all Member States.
Komisija v Sporočilu Komisije o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za podporne ukrepe v korist bank v okviru finančne krize od 1. januarja 2012 dalje [155] navaja, da so pogoji za državno pomoč, ki naj bi bili odobreni za finančni sektor v skladu s členom 107(3)(b) PDEU, v vseh državah članicah še vedno izpolnjeni.
The various Commission decisions approving measures taken by the Belgian, French and Luxembourg authorities to combat the financial crisis confirm that aid measures in the financial sector can be assessed on the basis of that provision.
Različni sklepi Komisije o odobritvi ukrepov, ki jih v boju proti finančni krizi sprejemajo belgijski, francoski in luksemburški organi, potrjujejo, da se ukrepi pomoči v finančnem sektorju lahko ocenjujejo na podlagi te določbe.
Consequently, as with the decisions of 19 November 2008, the decision of 13 March 2009 and 30 October 2009 concerning Dexia, the conditional authorisation decision, the opening decision on the sale of DBB/Belfius, the temporary approval decision, the decision of 3 April 2012 opening the procedure on the sale of Dexia BIL, the decision to extend the procedure, the decision on the first prolongation of the guarantee, the decision to increase the guarantee ceiling, the decision on the second prolongation of the guarantee and the closing decision on the sale of Dexia BIL, the legal basis for assessing the aid measures in question remains Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
Zato v odločbah z dne 19. novembra 2008, z dne 13. marca 2009 in 30. oktobra 2009 glede skupine Dexia ter v sklepu o pogojnem dovoljenju, sklepu o začetku postopka glede prodaje banke DBB/Belfius, sklepu o začasni odobritvi, sklepu z dne 3. aprila 2012 o začetku postopka glede prodaje družbe Dexia BIL, sklepu o razširitvi postopka, sklepu o prvem podaljšanju jamstva, sklepu o povečanju zgornje meje jamstva, sklepu o drugem podaljšanju jamstva in končnemu sklepu o prodaji družbe Dexia BIL ostaja pravna podlaga za oceno zadevnih ukrepov člen 107(3)(b) PDEU.
That being so, the Commission considers that the revised orderly resolution plan for Dexia and the restructuring plan for DBB/Belfius may be assessed on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, in the light of the Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules [156].
Zato Komisija meni, da se lahko spremenjeni načrt nadzorovanega reševanja skupine Dexia in načrt prestrukturiranja banke DBB/Belfius ocenita na podlagi člena 107(3)(b) PDEU z vidika Sporočila Komisije o ponovni vzpostavitvi uspešnega poslovanja in ocene ukrepov za prestrukturiranje v finančnem sektorju v sedanji krizi na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči [156].
As regards the aid identified in the conditional authorisation decision, as well as the additional aid linked to Arcofin’s recapitalisation of Dexia, on which the Commission reaches a conclusion in this Decision, the Commission notes that the aid granted to Dexia prior to the conditional authorisation decision was actually greater than the amount identified in that decision, because of the additional aid resulting from the recapitalisation by Arcofin, in respect of which the Commission had not received full details before it adopted the conditional authorisation decision.
Kar zadeva pomoč, opredeljeno v sklepu o pogojnem dovoljenju, ter dodatno pomoč, povezano z udeležbo družbe Arcofin pri dokapitalizaciji skupine Dexia, o kateri Komisija sprejme odločitev v tem sklepu, Komisija navaja, da je bila pomoč, dodeljena skupini Dexia pred sklepom o pogojnem dovoljenju, dejansko višja od zneska, opredeljenega v tem sklepu, in sicer zaradi dodatne pomoči, ki je izhajala iz udeležbe družbe Arcofin pri dokapitalizaciji, glede česar Komisija ni prejela vseh podrobnosti pred sprejetjem sklepa o pogojnem dovoljenju.
The Commission is nevertheless able to regard that aid, as well as the aid resulting from Arcofin’s recapitalisation of Dexia, as compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
Komisija lahko kljub temu to pomoč ter pomoč, ki je izhajala iz udeležbe družbe Arcofin pri dokapitalizaciji skupine Dexia, obravnava kot združljivo z notranjim trgom po členu 107(3)(b) PDEU.
The compatibility of the aid granted to Dexia prior to the conditional authorisation decision must be examined in the light of the new orderly resolution plan for Dexia, as well as the plans for the restructuring of Belfius and the sale of DMA, which replace the restructuring plan for Dexia notified to the Commission for the purpose of the conditional authorisation decision.
Združljivost pomoči, dodeljene skupini Dexia pred sklepom o pogojnem dovoljenju, je treba proučiti z vidika spremenjenega načrta nadzorovanega reševanja skupine Dexia ter načrtov prestrukturiranja družbe Belfius in prodaje družbe DMA, ki nadomeščata načrt prestrukturiranja skupine Dexia, ki je bil Komisiji priglašen za sklep o pogojnem dovoljenju.
Compatibility of the restructuring plan for DBB/Belfius
Združljivost načrta prestrukturiranja banke DBB/Belfius
The degree of restructuring required depends on the seriousness of the problems facing each bank and the scale of the aid received.
Zahtevana stopnja prestrukturiranja je odvisna od resnosti težav, s katerimi se spoprijema posamezna banka, in prejetega zneska pomoči.
The aid to be taken into account here results from the measures to recapitalise and to treat impaired assets, as well the guarantees obtained by the Dexia Group in the past, and from which DBB/Belfius also benefited.
V zvezi s tem je treba upoštevati pomoč, ki izhaja iz ukrepov dokapitalizacije ter ukrepov za obravnavanje oslabljenih sredstev, pa tudi jamstva, ki jih je skupina Dexia pridobila v preteklosti in ki so koristila tudi banki DBB/Belfius.
There is also the ELA granted by the BNB to DBB/Belfius because it could not access the market.
Obstajala je tudi izredna likvidnostna pomoč, ki jo je banka BNB dodelila banki DBB/Belfius, ker ni imela dostopa do trga.
The Commission also notes that DBB/Belfius was acquired by the Belgian State and was de facto split off from its parent company DCL/Dexia, which was facing major problems as described earlier, resulting in its being placed in orderly resolution.
Komisija tudi navaja, da si je banko DBB/Belfius pripojila Belgija in da je bila dejansko oddvojena od svoje matične banke DCL/Dexia, ki je imela večje težave, kot je bilo že opisano, zaradi katerih se je začelo njeno nadzorovano reševanje.
In the notification of the BNB’s ELA for DBB/Belfius on 21 October 2011, the Belgian authorities made two contradictory statements, first, that the measure ‘does not relate to the restructuring plan for Dexia’ [157], but also that the Commission should consider it as a revised version of the restructuring plan authorised on 26 February 2010 [158].
Belgijski organi so v priglasitvi izredne likvidnostne pomoči banke BNB za banko DBB/Belfius 21. oktobra 2011 navedli dve nasprotujoči si izjavi, po eni strani, da se ukrep „ne nanaša na načrt prestrukturiranja skupine Dexia“ [157], po drugi pa, da bi ga morala Komisija obravnavati kot spremenjeno različico načrta prestrukturiranja, odobrenega 26. februarja 2010 [158].
Moreover, in the notification of the first orderly resolution plan for Dexia, this ELA was the first of the measures mentioned by the Member States concerned as possibly being classified by the Commission as aid for Dexia ‘in the context of the orderly resolution plan’ [159].
Poleg tega je bila ta izredna likvidnostna pomoč v priglasitvi prvotnega načrta nadzorovanega reševanja skupine Dexia prvi izmed ukrepov, za katerega so zadevne države članice navedle, da ga Komisija morda označi kot pomoč za skupino Dexia „v okviru načrta nadzorovanega reševanja“ [159].
In the comments from the Member States concerned of 2 July 2012 in response to the decision to extend the procedure and the decision to increase the guarantee ceiling, although the Belgian authorities state that the ELAs ‘do not directly’ relate to the restructuring plan because the BNB is quite free to decide to grant ELA [160], they add that ELAs ‘may influence the restructuring plan’ [161].
Vendar belgijski organi v pripombah zadevnih držav članic z dne 2. julija 2012 v odgovor na sklep o razširitvi postopka in sklep o povečanju zgornje meje jamstva navajajo, da se ukrepi izredne likvidnostne pomoči „ne“ nanašajo „neposredno“ na načrt prestrukturiranja, saj lahko banka BNB dokaj svobodno odloča o dodelitvi izredne likvidnostne pomoči [160], in dodajajo, da ukrepi izredne likvidnostne pomoči „lahko vplivajo na načrt prestrukturiranja“ [161].
In any event, the Belgian authorities consider, first, that ‘there is … no reason for the Commission to change its mind about [the fact that] the ELA measures granted in 2011 were necessary to help to rescue Dexia’ [162].
Belgijski organi v vsakem primeru najprej menijo, da „ni razloga, da bi Komisija spremenila svoje mnenje glede [dejstva], da so bili ukrepi izredne likvidnostne pomoči, dodeljeni leta 2011, potrebni kot pomoč pri reševanju skupine Dexia“ [162].
They also accept that if the Commission classified the ELAs as State aid, this would be a ‘reason to regard the ELAs as forming part of the orderly resolution plan for Dexia’ [163].
Če bi Komisija ukrepe izredne likvidnostne pomoči opredelila kot državno pomoč, tudi priznavajo, da bi bil to „razlog, da se ukrepi izredne likvidnostne pomoči obravnavajo kot del načrta nadzorovanega reševanja skupine Dexia“ [163].
The Commission believes that, like all the aid measures that benefited Dexia, the ELA for DCL is now helping an entity which is part of an undertaking in controlled liquidation, whereas the ELA for DBB/Belfius came to an end shortly after DBB/Belfius was sold to the Belgian State [164].
Komisija je prepričana, da se z izredno likvidnostno pomočjo za banko DCL zdaj pomaga subjektu, ki je del podjetja v nadzorovanem likvidacijskem postopku, tako kot z vsemi ukrepi, ki so koristili skupini Dexia, izredna likvidnostna pomoč za banko DBB/Belfius pa se je prenehala kmalu za tem, ko je bila ta banka prodana Belgiji [164].
The compatibility of the restructuring plan must be assessed in the light of the conditions set out in the Bank Restructuring Communication, which are as follows:
Združljivost načrta prestrukturiranja je treba proučiti glede na pogoje iz sporočila o prestrukturiranju bank, ki so:
the restructuring plan must enable the institution to return to long-term viability;
načrt prestrukturiranja mora instituciji omogočiti, da ponovno začne dolgoročno uspešno poslovati;
the restructuring plan must ensure that restructuring costs are shared fairly between States and the bank;
načrt prestrukturiranja mora zagotavljati, da si države in banka pravično razdelijo stroške prestrukturiranja,
the restructuring plan must enable excessive distortions of competition resulting from the aid to be corrected.
načrt prestrukturiranja mora zagotoviti, da se omeji pretirano izkrivljanje konkurence, ki izhaja iz pomoči.
The institution’s return to long-term viability
Ponovna vzpostavitev dolgoročnega uspešnega poslovanja za institucije
As regards the comments from interested third parties (see recitals 348 and 349), the Commission considers, in response to comments A and B, that DBB/Belfius has not offered abnormally low price conditions either on its short-term financing products (fixed-term accounts) or long-term products (mortgages) capable of jeopardising its viability and distorting competition.
Komisija glede pripomb zainteresiranih tretjih strani (glej uvodni izjavi 348 in 349) v odgovor na pripombi A in B meni, da banka DBB/Belfius ni ponudila nenavadno nizkih cenovnih pogojev bodisi glede produktov kratkoročnega financiranja (računi, na katerih se sredstva vežejo za določeno obdobje) ali dolgoročnih produktov (hipoteke), s katerimi bi lahko ogrozila svoje uspešno poslovanje in izkrivljala konkurenco.
It also considers, in response to comment B, that although the institution’s change of name inevitably caused extra costs, they were not disproportionate and should help the Group in the long term.
V odgovor na pripombo B prav tako meni, da so zaradi spremembe imena institucije sicer neizogibno nastali dodatni stroški, vendar niso bili neustrezni in bi morali skupini Dexia dolgoročno pomagati.
The Commission notes the commercial and marketing initiatives with approval, particularly the bank’s change of name, which should enable the Group to limit the negative impact of the Dexia Group’s financial problems on its image and enable it to consolidate its deposit base.
Komisija odobrava poslovne pobude in pobude glede trženja, zlasti spremembo imena banke, ki bi skupini DBB/Belfius morala omogočiti, da omeji negativni učinek finančnih težav skupine Dexia na podobo skupine DBB/Belfius in da utrdi svojo depozitno osnovo.
The Group has a strong franchise and substantial customer base in Belgium in its three core business lines.
Banka DBB/Belfius ima močno franšizo in precejšnjo bazo strank v Belgiji na treh ključnih poslovnih področjih.
Cutting costs and rationalising certain processes should reduce the cost-income ratio to 69 %, in line with its competitors.
Z zmanjševanjem stroškov in racionalizacijo določenih procesov bi se moralo razmerje med stroški in prihodki zmanjšati na 69 %, kar je skladno z njenimi konkurenti.
The strategy for the subsidiaries (‘open-branch concept’) could keep costs down and develop activities and services with a high added value.
S strategijo za odvisne družbe („koncept odprtih podružnic“) bi se lahko ohranjala nizka raven stroškov ter razvijale dejavnosti in storitve z visoko dodano vrednostjo.
The main risks ‘inherited’ from the Dexia era have been identified and action to correct them has been or is going to be taken, in particular: de-risking strategy, review of asset allocation policies, strengthening deposit base and liquidity, limiting use of short-term market financing, changes to the pricing policy practised (taking liquidity costs into account), reducing balance sheet size.
Opredeljena so bila glavna tveganja, ki izhajajo iz obdobja v skupini Dexia, in za njihovo odpravo so bili sprejeti ali se bodo sprejeli naslednji ukrepi: strategija zmanjševanja tveganj, pregled politik dodelitve sredstev, okrepitev depozitne osnove in likvidnosti, omejitev uporabe kratkoročnega tržnega financiranja, spremembe v uporabljeni politiki določanja cen (upoštevanje likvidnostnih stroškov), zmanjšanje obsega bilance stanja.