natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In its letter of 23 May 2013 the Commission explained to the GOC that it was unable to verify certain parts of Huaixia Bank's (‘Huaxia’) reply to Appendix A, namely the ownership structure, the creditworthiness assessment of the sampled exporting producers and the risk premiums charged to different industries and in particular to the industry concerned.
Komisija je v dopisu z dne 23. maja 2013 kitajski vladi pojasnila, da ni mogla preveriti določenih delov Dodatka A, ki ga je izpolnila banka Huaxia („Huaxia“), in sicer lastniške strukture, ocene kreditne sposobnosti vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov in premije za tveganje, obračunane različnim industrijam in zlasti zadevni industriji.
In its reply of 3 June 2013 the GOC claimed that Huaxia explained the ownership structure and provided further details and explanations to the Commission concerning its shareholders, that the creditworthiness assessment of clients is covered by bank secrecy laws and contractual agreements between the banks and its clients.
Kitajska vlada je v svojem odgovoru z dne 3. junija 2013 trdila, da je Huaxia pojasnila lastniško strukturo in zagotovila dodatne podrobnosti in pojasnila Komisiji o svojih delničarjih ter da je ocena kreditne sposobnosti strank zajeta v zakonih o bančni tajnosti in pogodbenih dogovorih med bankami in njihovimi strankami.
In respect to the ownership structure it is noted that in its reply to the Appendix A Huaxia claimed that it was incorporated ‘without any government shares’ and did not disclose any information on the government ownership even though this was specifically requested by the Commission in the Appendix A. The Commission pointed out that this is in contradiction to the other information provided by the GOC and that Huaxia admitted that some of the shareholders are state-owned and provided a paper with information in Chinese on some of them.
Glede lastniške strukture je treba opozoriti, da je Huaxia v Dodatku A trdila, da je bila ustanovljena „brez vsakršnih vladnih delnic“, in ni razkrila nobenih informacij o vladnem lastništvu, čeprav je Komisija v Dodatku A to izrecno zahtevala. Komisija je poudarila, da je to v nasprotju z drugimi informacijami, ki jih je predložila kitajska vlada, in da je Huaxia priznala, da so nekateri delničarji v državni lasti, ter predložila dokument z informacijami o nekaterih od njih v kitajskem jeziku.
It is still not clear from the information submitted by Huaxia what is the proportion of state ownership of the bank.
Iz informacij, ki jih je predložila Huaxia, še vedno ni jasno, kakšen je delež državnega lastništva banke.
As for the creditworthiness assessment, the Commission notes that the bank was able to provide such document for one of the companies (after protecting the identity of the company with some modifications in the document) while for the other requested documents it claimed that they are covered by secrecy laws and contractual agreements between the banks and its clients.
Komisija v zvezi z oceno kreditne sposobnosti ugotavlja, da je banka zagotovila tak dokument za eno od družb (z nekaterimi spremembami v dokumentu zaradi varovanja identitete družbe), za ostale zahtevane dokumente pa je trdila, da so zajeti v zakonih o tajnosti in pogodbenih dogovorih med bankami in njihovimi strankami.
This discrepancy of treatments difficult to understand.
Ta razlika v obravnavi je težko razumljiva.
Export Import Bank of China
Kitajska izvozno-uvozna banka
In its letter of 23 May 2013 the Commission informed the GOC that the replies of the Export-Import Bank of China (‘EXIM’) to the Appendix A and to the deficiency letters were incomplete and that EXIM failed to submit certain documents which were specifically requested, i.e. Articles of Association, the Notice of Establishing Export-Import bank of China Issued by the State Council or Measures for the management of Export Sellers's Credit for Hi-Tech products of the Export –Import Bank of China.
Komisija je v svojem dopisu z dne 23. maja 2013 kitajsko vlado obvestila, da so bili odgovori Kitajske izvozno-uvozne banke („EXIM“) v Dodatku A in na pozive k dopolnitvi nepopolni ter da EXIM ni predložila nekaterih dokumentov, ki so bili posebej zahtevani, tj. statuta, obvestila o ustanovitvi Kitajske izvozno-uvozne banke, ki ga je izdal državni svet, ali ukrepov za upravljanje izvoznih kreditov Kitajske izvozno-uvozne banke za visokotehnološke izdelke.
Concerning the Articles of Association, the GOC claimed in its letter of 3 June 2013 that EXIM, because of its internal policy, could not submit Articles of Association (which is an internal management document) but referred to the on-line version which was allegedly offered to be consulted on the laptop provided by EXIM during the verification.
V zvezi s statutom je kitajska vlada v svojem dopisu z dne 3. junija 2013 trdila, da EXIM zaradi svoje notranje politike ni mogla predložiti statuta (ki je dokument o notranjem upravljanju), vendar se je sklicevala na spletno različico, ki naj bi bila na voljo na prenosnem računalniku, ki ga je med preverjanjem zagotovila EXIM.
The Commission is puzzled by this explanation which makes no sense.
Komisija ne razume tega pojasnila, saj je nesmiselno.
If the document was available on-line during the verification the Commission see no reason why it could not have been submitted as repeatedly requested already in the questionnaire, deficiency letter and again during the verification.
Če je bil med preverjanjem dokument na voljo na spletu, Komisija ne vidi nobenega razloga, zakaj ga ni bilo mogoče predložiti, saj ga je že večkrat zahtevala v vprašalniku in pozivu k dopolnitvi ter ponovno med preverjanjem.
In fact, the claim that EXIM made this document available on the laptop during the verification is incorrect.
Trditev, da je EXIM med preverjanjem omogočila dostop do tega dokumenta na prenosnem računalniku, dejansko ni resnična.
EXIM stated that the Commission should review the document online but the Commission official explained that they do not have internet access on the verification premises.
EXIM je navedla, naj Komisija dokument pregleda na spletu, vendar je uradnik Komisije pojasnil, da v prostorih preverjanja nimajo dostopa do interneta.
In addition, EXIM did not even provide a link to the online version of Articles of Association.
Poleg tega EXIM ni zagotovila povezave do spletne različice statuta.
As for the other two documents, EXIM reasoned that they could not be provided because of their confidential nature and internal rules.
Kar zadeva ostala dva dokumenta, je EXIM pojasnila, da ju ni bilo mogoče zagotoviti zaradi njune zaupne narave in notranjih pravil.
It was the EXIM itself which stated in its reply to the deficiency letter that the ‘EXIM bank was formed and operates in accordance with The Notice of Establishing Export-Import Bank of China Issued by the State Council and The Articles of Association of Export-Import Bank of China’.
EXIM je sama izjavila v svojem pozivu k dopolnitvi, da je bila „banka EXIM ustanovljena in deluje v skladu z obvestilom o ustanovitvi Kitajske izvozno-uvozne banke, ki ga je izdal državni svet, in statutom Kitajske izvozno-uvozne banke“.
Therefore this was deemed an essential document for verification of the allegations in the complaint that EXIM is public body, but the Commission was denied access to this document.
Zato se je ta dokument štel za bistvenega za preverjanje trditev v pritožbi, da naj bi bila EXIM javni organ, vendar Komisiji ni bil dovoljen dostop do tega dokumenta.
In this context it is noted that another policy bank, i.e. CDB provided a similar document concerning its establishment and also several other State Council notices were submitted in this investigation.
V tem okviru je treba opozoriti, da je druga banka za izvajanje politik, tj. Kitajska razvojna banka, predložila podoben dokument o svoji ustanovitvi, v tej preiskavi pa je bilo predloženih tudi več drugih obvestil državnega sveta.
Also EXIM did not support its claims on the confidentiality by any evidence whatsoever.
EXIM z nobenimi dokazili ni podprla svojih trditev o zaupnosti.
In addition, as explained in recital (117), governments cannot simply invoke internal rules in order to avoid obligations under the SCM Agreement and basic Regulation.
Poleg tega, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (117), se vlade ne morejo preprosto sklicevati na notranja pravila, da bi se izognile obveznostim iz Sporazuma o subvencijah in izravnalnih ukrepih ter iz osnovne uredbe.
The same applies for the Measures for the management of Export Sellers's Credit for Hi-Tech products of the Export–Import Bank of China where EXIM claimed also confidentiality without any supporting evidence and even refused to discuss the purpose of this document.
Enako velja za ukrepe za upravljanje izvoznih kreditov Kitajske izvozno-uvozne banke za visokotehnološke izdelke, pri čemer je EXIM zahtevala zaupnost brez kakršnih koli podpornih dokazov in o namenu tega dokumenta niti ni želela razpravljati.
EXIM also failed to provide information on the composition of the Board of Directors and Board of Supervisors, which was repeatedly requested, with the explanation that ‘the composition of the Board of Directors is changing’ and that the Commission's questions concerning the CCP affiliations of the members of the Board's ‘are invasive and inappropriate questions in the context of an anti-subsidy investigation.’ The fact that the composition of the Board of Directors is changing is not relevant for the purpose of this investigation.
EXIM prav tako ni zagotovila informacij o sestavi upravnega in nadzornega odbora, ki so bile večkrat zahtevane, pri čemer je pojasnila, da se „sestava upravnega odbora spreminja“ in da so vprašanja Komisije v zvezi s povezanostjo članov v odboru s Komunistično partijo Kitajske („KPK“) „invazivna in neprimerna vprašanja v okviru protisubvencijske preiskave“. Dejstvo, da se sestava upravnega odbora spreminja, za namen te preiskave ni pomembno.
What is relevant is how the state is represented in the Boards of EXIM; however, the GOC and EXIM refused to provide this information.
Pomembno je, kako je država zastopana v odborih banke EXIM, vendar kitajska vlada in EXIM nista hoteli zagotoviti teh informacij.
The Commission also considers the CCP membership of senior management of the EXIM (and all banks in this matter) essential for the purpose of establishing the extent of state influence on the banks' management.
Komisija tudi meni, da je članstvo višjega vodstva EXIM (in vseh bank v tej zadevi) v KPK bistveno za namen določitve obsega državnega vpliva na upravljanje bank.
According to the CCP Constitution ‘The Party must uphold and improve the basic economic system, with public ownership playing a dominant role and different economic sectors developing side by side…’ [33], therefore the examination of influence of the CCP in EXIM was deemed to be necessary for the purpose of this investigation and in particular to assess the level of state control in the banks.
V skladu z ustavo KPK mora „[p]ogodbenica ohraniti in izboljšati osnovni gospodarski sistem, pri čemer ima javna lastnina vodilno vlogo in se različni gospodarski sektorji razvijajo drug ob drugem …“ [33], zato je bilo za namen te preiskave treba proučiti vpliv KPK v banki EXIM, zlasti za ocenitev ravni državne kontrole v bankah.
Concerning the statistics on the export of different categories of products already requested in the questionnaire and which EXIM is legally obliged to report to the CBRC, the GOC claimed in its letter of 3 June 2013 that it needed more time to prepare such information.
Glede statističnih podatkov o izvozu različnih kategorij izdelkov, ki so že bili zahtevani v vprašalniku in za katere je EXIM zakonsko obvezana, da jih sporoča Komisiji bančnih regulatorjev Kitajske, je kitajska vlada v svojem dopisu z dne 3. junija 2013 trdila, da potrebuje več časa za pripravo takih informacij.
In this respect it is noted that, since the Commission requested this information already in the initial questionnaire, the GOC had more than three and a half months to prepare this information but failed to do so.
S tem v zvezi je treba opozoriti, da je Komisija zahtevala te informacije že v prvotnem vprašalniku, zato je imela kitajska vlada več kot tri mesece in pol časa za pripravo teh informacij, vendar tega ni storila.
EXIM alleged that ‘this type of information can be found in annual reports’; however, this is incorrect.
EXIM je trdila, da je „te vrste informacij mogoče najti v letnih poročilih“, vendar to ne drži.
The information in the annual reports the GOC referred to covers different periods than the information requested by the Commission in the questionnaire and during the verification visit.
Informacije v letnih poročilih, ki jih je navedla kitajska vlada, zajemajo drugačna obdobja kot informacije, ki jih je zahtevala Komisija v vprašalniku in med preveritvenim obiskom.
The GOC rightly claimed that in the questionnaire reply it submitted, inter alia, the amounts of export credits for exports of mechanical and electrical products and new high-tech products.
Kitajska vlada je upravičeno trdila, da je v izpolnjenem vprašalniku med drugim navedla zneske izvoznih kreditov za izvoz mehanskih in električnih izdelkov ter novih visokotehnoloških izdelkov.
It is noted the Commission never contested the submission of these figures.
Opozoriti je treba, da Komisija nikoli ni izpodbijala predložitve teh podatkov.
The Commission contested the fact that, when it attempted to verify these figures during the verification visit, EXIM was not able to provide any supporting evidence or even explain where are these figures come from.
Komisija je izpodbijala dejstvo, da EXIM ni mogla zagotoviti nobenih podpornih dokazov niti pojasniti, od kod izvirajo ti podatki, ko je Komisija želela te podatke preveriti med preveritvenim obiskom.
Similarly, the Commission was not allowed to verify the data concerning the proportion of export credits to the PV industry which the GOC submitted in the questionnaire reply.
Podobno Komisiji ni bilo dovoljeno preveriti podatkov o deležu izvoznih kreditov za fotonapetostno industrijo, ki jih je kitajska vlada navedla v izpolnjenem vprašalniku.
Interestingly enough, EXIM did not consider any of these figures confidential but when the Commission asked for the source data to verify them, EXIM refused the access to it, citing confidentiality reasons.
EXIM teh podatkov ni štela za zaupne, ko pa je Komisija prosila za vir podatkov, da bi jih preverila, ji EXIM ni omogočila dostopa, pri čemer se je sklicevala na zaupnost.
EXIM applied the same reasoning concerning the amounts of export credits given to the sampled producers and cooperating producers.
EXIM je uporabila enak argument pri zneskih izvoznih kreditov za vzorčene proizvajalce in sodelujoče proizvajalce.
It reported figures in the reply to the deficiency letter but did not allow the Commission to verify it on the basis of the confidentiality.
Podatke je navedla v odgovoru na poziv k dopolnitvi, vendar jih Komisija zaradi zaupnosti ni mogla preveriti.
Effectively, it was not possible to verify the vast majority of the statistics submitted by EXIM.
Tako torej ni bilo mogoče preveriti velike večine statističnih podatkov, ki jih je predložila EXIM.
The EXIM also refused to explain and support with relevant evidence the credit ratings of the sampled exporting producers and the analyses which led to these ratings.
EXIM prav tako ni želela pojasniti in z ustreznimi dokazi podpreti bonitetnih ocen vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov ter analiz, na katerih so temeljile take bonitetne ocene.
China Development Bank (‘CDB’)
Kitajska razvojna banka („KRB“)
In its letter of 3 June 2013 the GOC was concerned that the Commission asked ‘personal questions concerning the political party affiliations of members of the Boards and senior management’.
Kitajska vlada je v svojem dopisu z dne 3. junija 2013 izrazila zaskrbljenost, ker je Komisija zastavljala „osebna vprašanja glede povezanosti članov odborov in višjega vodstva s politično stranko“.
This is not correct.
To ne drži.
The questions concerning the links of the Board members and senior management to the CCP were purely of technical character and, as explained in the recital (151) above, the reason for asking them was to help determine the role of the CCP in Chinese economy.
Vprašanja v zvezi s povezanostjo članov odbora in višjega vodstva s KPK so bila zgolj tehnične narave in, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (151), je bil njihov namen pomagati določiti vlogo KPK v kitajskem gospodarstvu.
During the verification the Commission attempted to verify the creditworthiness assessment of the sampled exporting producers.
Med preverjanjem je Komisija poskušala preveriti oceno kreditne sposobnosti vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov.
CDB provided some general information but refused to disclose any information in relation to creditworthiness assessment of the sampled exporting producers or even the risk evaluation and assessment report of the PV industry.
KRB je predložila nekatere splošne informacije, ni pa želela razkriti nobenih informacij v zvezi z oceno kreditne sposobnosti vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov, niti poročila fotonapetostne industrije o ovrednotenju in oceni tveganja.
In the reply to the deficiency letter the CDB submitted a figure concerning the risk premium charged for the industry concerned.
V odgovoru na poziv k dopolnitvi je KRB navedla podatek v zvezi s premijo za tveganje, ki se zaračuna zadevni industriji.
During the verification the CDB corrected its reply in this respect but did not provide any supporting evidence for this figure or explanation of what was the basis for this figure, despite repeated requests from the Commission during the verification visit.
Med preverjanjem je KPK popravila svoj odgovor v zvezi s tem, vendar ni predložila nobenih podpornih dokazov za ta podatek ali pojasnila, kaj je bila podlaga zanj, kljub temu, da je Komisija med preveritvenim obiskom to večkrat zahtevala.
Chinese state-owned banks are public bodies
Kitajske državne banke so javni organi
The complainant claims that SOCBs in the PRC are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation.
Pritožnik trdi, da so državne poslovne banke v LRK javni organi v smislu člena 2(b) osnovne uredbe.
The WTO Appellate Body (AB), in its report in United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China [34] (the AB report) defined a public body as an entity that ‘possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority’.
Pritožbeni organ STO („PO“) je v svojem poročilu v zadevi ZDA – dokončne protidampinške in izravnalne dajatve na nekatere izdelke s Kitajske [34] („poročilo PO“) opredelil javni organ kot subjekt, ki „ima, izvaja ali pa mu je zaupano pooblastilo vlade“.
According to the AB, evidence that government exercises meaningful control over an entity and its conduct may serve as evidence that the relevant entity possesses governmental authority and exercises such authority in the performance of governmental functions.
Po navedbah PO lahko dokaz, da vlada izvaja bistven nadzor nad subjektom in njegovim ravnanjem, pomeni tudi dokaz, da ima ustrezni subjekt pooblastilo vlade in to pooblastilo izvaja pri opravljanju vladnih funkcij.
Where the evidence shows that the formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there is also evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way, then such evidence may permit an inference that the entity concerned is exercising governmental authority [35].
Kadar dokazi kažejo, da so formalni indici vladnega nadzora mnogoteri, in pri tem obstajajo tudi dokazi, da se je tak nadzor izvajal smiselno, je na podlagi teh dokazov mogoče sklepati, da zadevni subjekt izvaja vladno pooblastilo [35].
The AB also considered that public bodies are also characterised by the ‘performance of governmental functions’ [36] which would ‘ordinarily be considered part of governmental practice in the legal order of the relevant Member’ [37].
PO je menil tudi, da je značilnost javnih organov tudi „izvajanje vladnih funkcij“ [36], ki bi se „v pravnem redu ustreznega člana običajno štele za funkcije v okviru vladne prakse“ [37].
The following analysis focuses on whether the SOCBs in question perform functions which are ordinarily considered part of governmental practice in China and, if so, whether they exercise government authority when doing so.
Naslednja analiza se osredotoča na vprašanje, ali zadevne banke v državni lasti izvajajo dejavnosti, ki se običajno štejejo za del vladne prakse na Kitajskem, in ali pri tem izvajajo vladno pooblastilo.
The Chinese authorities have provided only very limited information concerning shareholding/ownership of banks in the PRC.
Kitajski organi so predložili samo zelo omejene informacije glede deležev/lastništva bank v LRK.
However, as further outlined below, the Commission compiled available information in order to arrive at a representative finding.
Vendar kot je opisano v nadaljevanju, je Komisija zbrala vse razpoložljive informacije, da bi prišla do reprezentativne ugotovitve.
In performing its analysis whether banks are entities possessing, vested with or exercising government authority (public bodies) the Commission also sought information concerning not only the government ownership of the banks but also other characteristics such as the government presence on the board of directors, the government control over their activities, the pursuit of government policies or interests and whether entities were created by statute.
Pri izvajanju analize, ali so banke subjekti z vladnimi pooblastili, pooblaščene za izvajanje ali izvajajo vladna pooblastila (javni organi), je Komisija poleg informacij o vladnem lastništvu bank zbirala tudi informacije o drugih značilnostih, kot so prisotnost vlade v upravnih odborih, vladni nadzor nad njihovimi dejavnostmi, upoštevanje vladnih politik ali interesov in ali so bili subjekti ustanovljeni z zakonom.
From the available information it is concluded that the state-owned banks in the PRC hold the highest market share and are the predominant players in the Chinese financial market.
Iz razpoložljivih informacij je bilo ugotovljeno, da državne banke v LRK obvladujejo največji tržni delež in so prevladujoči akterji na kitajskem finančnem trgu.
According to the 2006 Deutsche Bank Research on the PRC's banking sector [38], the state-owned banks' share may amount to more than 2/3 of the Chinese market.
Glede na raziskavo Deutsche Bank o bančnem sektorju v LRK iz leta 2006 [38] utegne delež državnih bank znašati več kot dve tretjini kitajskega trga.
For the same matter the WTO Trade Policy Review of China noted that ‘The high degree of state ownership is another notable feature of the financial sector in China’ [39] and ‘there has been little change in the market structure of China's banking sector, which is dominated by state-owned banks’ [40].
Glede tega je bilo v pregledu trgovinske politike Kitajske, ki ga je izvedla STO, ugotovljeno, da „je visoka stopnja državnega lastništva še ena pomembna značilnost finančnega sektorja na Kitajskem“ [39] in da se je „struktura trga kitajskega bančnega sektorja, na katerem prevladujejo banke v državni lasti, zelo malo spremenila“ [40].
It is pertinent to note that the five largest state-owned commercial banks (the Agricultural Bank, the Bank of China, the Construction Bank of China, the Bank of Communications and the Industrial and Commercial Bank) appear to represent more than half of the Chinese banking sector [41].
Primerno je opozoriti, da pet največjih državnih poslovnih bank (Kmetijska banka – ang. Agricultural Bank, Banka Kitajske –ang. Bank of China, Konstrukcijska banka Kitajske – ang. Construction Bank of China, Komunikacijska banka – ang. Bank of Communications ter Industrijska in poslovna banka – ang. Industrial and Commercial Bank) domnevno predstavlja več kot polovico kitajskega bančnega sektorja [41].
The government ownership of the five-largest state-owned banks was also confirmed by the GOC in its reply to the deficiency letter.
Vladno lastništvo petih največjih državnih bank je potrdila tudi kitajska vlada v svojem odgovoru na poziv k dopolnitvi.