natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
One company claimed that the proposal to withdraw the acceptance of the undertaking lacked a legal basis.
Stališče ene od družb je, da predlog za preklic sprejetja zaveze ni imel pravne podlage.
That party claimed that Article 13(9) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation did not explicitly mention ‘changed circumstances’ and linked any possibility to withdraw the acceptance of the undertaking with instances of breach.
Ta stranka je trdila, da člen 13(9) osnovne protisubvencijske uredbe „spremembe okoliščin“ izrecno ne omenja in kot razloge za preklic sprejetja zavez navaja le primere kršitev zavez.
Article 13(9) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation indeed does not explicitly mention ‘change in circumstances’.
V členu 13(9) osnovne protisubvencijske uredbe „sprememba okoliščin“ res ni izrecno navedena.
However, it clearly does not limit the instances in which the Commission may withdraw the acceptance of an undertaking to instances of breach.
Vendar pa pristojnost Komisije da prekliče sprejetja zavez ni omejena zgolj na primere kršitev.
It states that ‘[i]n case of breach or withdrawal of undertakings by any party to the undertaking, or in case of withdrawal of acceptance of the undertaking by the Commission [emphasis added], the acceptance of the undertaking shall, after consultation, be withdrawn…’.
Člen določa, da „[č]e katera koli stranka zaveze krši ali prekliče zavezo ali v primeru, da Komisija prekliče sprejem zaveze [poudarek dodan], se sprejem zaveze, po posvetovanju, s sklepom ali z uredbo Komisije, kakor je primerno, prekliče …“.
It therefore singles out the withdrawal of acceptance of an undertaking as a stand-alone basis for withdrawal.
Člen torej preklic sprejetja zavez določa kot samostojno podlago za preklic.
In fact, the Commission’s discretionary powers to accept or reject an undertaking offer have to be mirrored by the power to withdraw the acceptance of an undertaking, should the circumstances on the basis of which the undertaking offers were accepted change.
Diskrecijsko pravico Komisije, da sprejme ali zavrne ponudbo o zavezi, je treba razumeti v okviru njene pristojnosti, da prekliče sprejem zaveze, če so se okoliščine, v katerih je bila ponudba o zavezi sprejeta, spremenile.
More specifically, the Court held that the Commission, ‘when exercising the powers assigned to it in [the basic Regulation], has a very wide discretion to decide, in terms of the interests of the Community, any measures needed to deal with the situation which it has established.’ [12].
Sodišče je ocenilo, da ima Komisija „pri izvajanju svojih pristojnosti [osnovna uredba] široko diskrecijsko pravico za odločanje o ukrepih v interesu Skupnosti v dani situaciji“ [12].
Hence, the Commission, when accepting, rejecting or withdrawing an undertaking, enjoys the discretion necessary in order to be able to implement trade measures in the Union interest.
Zato ima Komisija ob sprejemu, zavrnitvi ali preklicu zavez diskrecijsko pravico za izvajanje trgovinskih ukrepov v interesu Unije.
The Commission therefore rejects the argument that a change in circumstances, as compared to those which prevailed at the time of the acceptance of the undertaking, cannot serve as a ground for withdrawal of that acceptance.
Komisija zato zavrača trditev, da sprememba okoliščin ne more biti podlaga za preklic zaveze.
Consistency of the withdrawal with previous legal acts concerning the same proceeding
Usklajenost preklica s predhodnimi zakonskimi akti v istih postopkih
One company claimed that Commission Decision 2013/223/EU [13] reconfirmed the acceptance of its undertaking.
Ena družba je trdila, da je Komisija s Sklepom 2013/223/EU [13] z dne 24. aprila 2013 ponovno potrdila sprejetje zavez te družbe.
A related argument was that Article 2(2) of the Implementing Regulation (EU) No 461/2013 imposing a definitive countervailing duty constituted another recognition that the undertaking could remain in force after the expiry of the anti-dumping duties.
S tem je povezano stališče, da določbe člena 2(2) Izvedbene uredbe (EU) št. 461/2013 o uvedbi dokončne izravnalne dajatve vsebujejo potrditev, da bi zaveze lahko ostale v veljavi po izteku protidampinških dajatev.
Both arguments are misguided.
Obe stališči sta neutemeljeni.
By Decision 2013/223/EU, the Commission withdrew the acceptance of the undertakings of one Indonesian and one Indian company that violated their reporting obligations.
S Sklepom 2013/223/EU je Komisija preklicala sprejetje zavez ene indonezijske in ene indijske družbe, ki sta kršili svoje obveznosti poročanja Komisiji.
A withdrawal for one company does not in any way preclude a subsequent decision of the Commission to withdraw acceptance of other undertakings should such action be warranted in light of circumstances of a particular case.
Preklic sprejetja zavez ene družbe ne preprečuje nadaljnjih odločitev Komisije o preklicu sprejetja zavez drugih družb, v kolikor bi bilo to potrebno glede na dane okoliščine.
Consequently, Implementing Regulation (EU) No 461/2013, published on 23 May 2013 reflected the amendment of Decision 2000/745/EC due to the adoption of Decision 2013/223/EU (withdrawal for one Indonesian and one Indian company).
Izvedbena uredba (EU) št. 461/2013 z dne 23. maja 2013 odraža spremembo Sklepa Komisije 2000/745/ES zaradi sprejetja Sklepa 2013/223/EU (preklic sprejetja zavez indonezijske in indijske družbe).
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 461/2013 imposing a definitive countervailing duty was published on the same day as Implementing Decision 2013/226/EU by which the Council repealed the anti-dumping duty.
Izvedbena uredba (EU) št. 461/2013 o uvedbi dokončne izravnalne dajatve je bila objavljena na isti dan kot Izvedbeni sklep 2013/226/EU, s katerim je Svet odpravil protidampinške dajatve.
The consequences of the latter decision could only be assessed by the Commission after its adoption.
Posledice te odločitve je Komisija lahko ocenila šele po njenem sprejetju.
The arguments of the party had to be thus rejected.
Stališča stranke je bilo torej treba zavrniti.
Mathematical adaptation of the MIP
Matematična prilagoditev minimalne uvozne cene („MIP“)
One company requested that the Commission should deduct from the MIP an amount corresponding to the fixed anti-dumping duty and thereby bring the MIP in compliance with the underlying measure — countervailing duty.
Ena od družb je zahtevala, da Komisija od MIP odšteje vrednost fiksne protidampinške dajatve in s tem prilagodi vrednost MIP glede na zadevni ukrep – izravnalno dajatev.
Such an operation could not be performed.
Tovrstnega izračuna ni bilo mogoče izvesti.
First and foremost, under the terms of the undertaking any revision of the scope and the minimum prices is only possible through an interim review in accordance with Article 19 of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation.
Prvič, v skladu s pogoji iz zaveze je kakršna koli sprememba obsega in minimalnih cen mogoča le po izvedbi vmesnega pregleda v skladu s členom 19 osnovne protisubvencijske uredbe.
Secondly, the company requested a mere deduction from the current MIP of amounts corresponding to the amount of the fixed anti-dumping duty.
Drugič, družba je zahtevala zgolj odbitek vrednosti fiksne protidampinške dajatve od sedanje MIP.
Had the undertaking been assessed only with regard to the countervailing duty, the export price (increased by the amount of the fixed countervailing duty) could have become a benchmark for the MIP.
Izvozna cena (povečana za vrednost fiksne izravnalne dajatve) bi lahko bila referenčno merilo za MIP le v primeru, da bi bila zaveza ocenjena glede na izravnalne dajatve.
In order to establish an appropriate MIP, the Commission would have to first identify export price that would serve as a benchmark.
Komisija bi za izračun ustrezne MIP morala najprej določiti izvozno ceno, ki bi služila kot referenčno merilo.
No such benchmark can be easily identified in the present case, not least because measures have been in force for a long time.
Tovrstnega merila v zadevnem primeru ni mogoče določiti, saj so ukrepi veljavni že dalj časa.
Further, the indexation mechanism currently in place that relates to the non-injurious price (target price) or the normal value cannot be simply transposed to the export price.
Trenutnega mehanizma usklajevanja, ki se nanaša na neškodljivo ceno (ciljna cena) ali normalno vrednost, ni mogoče preprosto prenesti v izvozno ceno.
Any simple mathematical adaptation would have required that all elements necessary to calculate the MIP are easily identifiable and undisputable.
Za vsako enostavno matematično prilagoditev bi morali biti vsi elementi, potrebni za izračun MIP, jasni in nedvomni.
Only then the Commission can guarantee the equivalence of the undertaking to the measure in force.
Komisija lahko šele nato zagotovi enakovrednost zavez in ukrepa v veljavi.
This condition is not fulfilled in the present case.
V tem primeru ti pogoji niso izpolnjeni.
A simple mathematical operation as suggested by the applicant is therefore impossible.
Preprosti matematični izračun, kot ga predlaga vložnik, zato ni mogoč.
The Commission has to act timely with regard to the undertaking in force in order to follow the decision of the Council to repeal the anti-dumping duties in force.
Komisija mora pravočasno ukrepati glede zaveze veljavi, da bi upoštevala sklep Sveta za razveljavitev veljavnih protidampinških dajatev.
Therefore, any further delay has to be avoided.
Zato se je treba kakršnim koli zamudam izogibati.
The withdrawal of the acceptance of the undertaking does not prejudice any possible future decision, should a company wish to submit an undertaking offer.
Umik sprejetja zavez ne posega v morebitne odločitve glede ponudb za zaveze, ki bi jih družba želela predložiti v prihodnje.
Following the second disclosure of the Commission’s findings, one party reiterated that the minimum import price should be decreased by a simple mathematical operation.
Po drugem razkritju ugotovitev Komisije je ena od strank ponovno poudarila, da bi se morala minimalna uvozna cena znižati na podlagi preprostega matematičnega izračuna.
It contested the Commission’s reasoning in that regard as ‘misplaced and lacking any basis’.
Obrazložitev Komisije je spodbijala kot „napačno in neutemeljeno“.
However, that position has not been substantiated any further and thus has to be rejected.
Vendar pa tega stališča ni podkrepila z dokazi in ga je zato treba zavrniti.
In any case, the claim has been address in recital 16 above.
Stališče je obravnavano v uvodni izjavi 16.
Consequently, the claim to mathematically adjust the MIP had to be rejected.
Zahtevek za matematični popravek MIP je bilo treba posledično zavrniti.
Pending case T-422/13
Postopek, ki teče pred sodiščem (zadeva T-422/13)
One company claimed that undertakings should remain in force pending the decision of the General Court in case T-422/13 CPME and Others v Council.
Stališče ene od družb je, da bi morale zaveze ostati veljavne do razsodbe Splošnega sodišča v zadevi T-422/13 CPME in drugi proti Svetu.
According to that company, should the Union industry be successful in their challenge of Council Implementing Decision 2013/226/EU repealing the anti-dumping duties, the Commission would be under obligation to reinstate the undertaking.
Po mnenju te družbe, bi morala Komisija, v kolikor bo industrija Unije uspešna v svoji tožbi zoper Izvedbeni sklep 2013/226/EU o razveljavitvi protidampinških dajatev, zaveze ponovno sprejeti.
This argument is misguided.
Ta trditev je neutemeljena.
The Commission has to assess the current situation and act timely in order to follow the decision of the Council to repeal the anti-dumping measures.
Komisija mora oceniti trenutno stanje in ukrepati pravočasno, da bi upoštevala sklep Sveta za razveljavitev veljavnih protidampinških dajatev.
An anticipation of a possible outcome of a court case cannot guide Commission’s decisions in that regard.
Čakanje na odločitev sodišča ne more vplivati na odločitev Komisije.
In view of this fact, the decision concerning the undertakings in force has to be taken in a timely manner.
V luči tega dejstva je treba odločitev glede veljavnih zavez sprejeti pravočasno.
One company claimed that breach of reporting obligations by one company should not have any consequences upon other companies.
Stališče ene od družb je, da kršitev obveznosti poročanja Komisiji ene družbe ne bi smelo vplivati na druge družbe.
It is hereby confirmed that only the company Pearl was found in breach of its reporting obligations.
Potrjuje se, da je le družba Pearl kršila svoje obveznosti poročanja Komisiji.
Possible review and undertakings
Morebitni pregled in zaveze
Two Indian companies claimed that undertakings should remain in force pending the results of a possible interim review of the MIP.
Stališče dveh indijskih družb je, da bi morale zaveze ostati v veljavi do objave ugotovitev morebitnega vmesnega pregleda MIP.
The Commission notes that because the anti-dumping duty expired the basis for the MIP has become non-existent (see recital 16 above).
Komisija ugotavlja, da je osnova za MIP neobstoječa, saj protidampinška dajatev ni več v veljavi (glej uvodno izjavo 16).
A decision to address the effects of this change has to be taken in a timely manner.
Odločitev o posledicah tovrstne spremembe je treba sprejeti pravočasno.
In parallel, a company can request a review of the measure in place and in that context offer a new undertaking concerning only the anti-subsidy measures in force.
Družba lahko hkrati zaprosi za pregled ukrepa v veljavi in v tem okviru ponudi novo zavezo, ki se nanaša samo na veljavne protisubvencijske ukrepe.
Following the second disclosure of the Commission’s findings, one party reiterated that the Commission should have initiated an ex-officio interim review while the undertaking should remain in force pending the outcome of such review.
Po drugem razkritju ugotovitev Komisije je ena od strank ponovno poudarila, da bi morala Komisija po uradni dolžnosti začeti izvajati vmesni pregled, medtem ko bi morale zaveze ostati veljavne do znanega izida tega pregleda.
The Commission notes first and foremost that the initiation of an anti-subsidy review investigation lies within its discretionary powers.
Komisija najprej ugotavlja, da je presoja o začetku preiskave v zvezi s protisubvencijskim pregledom ena od njenih diskrecijskih pravic.
However, in this particular case a review investigation is linked to the wish of an exporter to offer a new undertaking.
V tem primeru pa je preiskava v zvezi s pregledom povezana z željo izvoznika po ponudbi nove zaveze.
Thus, the Commission has no reason to initiate a review without a new undertaking offer from the exporter concerned, in line with Article 13 of the basic Regulation.
Komisija v skladu s členom 13 osnovne uredbe brez nove ponudbe zaveze zadevnega izvoznika nima razloga za začetek pregleda.
Further, as an equivalent form of measures, an undertaking has to correspond to the underlying measure imposed by the Council.
Poleg tega mora biti zaveza zaradi skladnosti ukrepov enaka zadevnemu ukrepu, ki ga je uvedel Svet.
This is no longer the case and thus has led the Commission to propose to withdraw the undertaking in force.
Ker temu ni več tako, je Komisija predlagala preklic veljavne zaveze.
Parties can indeed request an interim review based on the provisions of the basic anti-subsidy regulation and any possible new undertaking offer would be considered in the framework of any such review.
Stranke lahko zaprosijo za vmesni pregled na podlagi določb osnovne protisubvencijske uredbe, v okvir takšnega pregleda pa spadajo tudi kakršne koli nove ponudbe zavez.
Anti-subsidy duty as a barrier to imports
Protisubvencijska dajatev kot ovira za uvoz
Following the second disclosure of the Commission’s findings, one party claimed that the withdrawal of the acceptance of the undertaking ‘rather than reducing the level of protection in line with the expiry of the anti-dumping measures, (…) [would] make it impossible for users of PET to import’.
Po drugem razkritju ugotovitev Komisije je ena od strank trdila, da bi preklic sprejetja zaveze „namesto znižanja ravni varstva v skladu z iztekom protidampinških ukrepov /…/ uporabnikom PET onemogočil uvoz“.
The Commission notes in that regard that in the absence of an undertaking, the minimum import price ceases to be a benchmark for an exporter.
Komisija v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da minimalna uvozna cena ob odsotnosti zavez preneha veljati kot merilo za izvoznika.
The party did not substantiate why the countervailing duty would prevent Indian exporters from importing.
Stranka ni utemeljila, zakaj bi izravnalna dajatev indijskim izvoznikom preprečila uvoz.
In any case, the purpose of imposing measures and accepting an undertaking, if appropriate, is not about the possibility of users to import.
Namen uvedbe ukrepov in zaveze, v kolikor je ta sprejeta, ni povezana z možnostjo uporabnikov do uvoza.
The purpose is establishing a level of protection, as the party notes.
Kot stranka pravilno ugotavlja, je namen ukrepov vzpostavitev ravni varstva.
The interests of users have been assessed under the Union interest for imposing measures together with the interests of all other parties concerned.
Interesi uporabnikov so bili skupaj z interesi vseh drugih zadevnih strank ocenjeni v okviru interesov Unije za uvedbo ukrepov.
It has been concluded that the imposition of measures is not against the Union interest.
Ugotovljeno je bilo, da uvedba ukrepov ni v nasprotju z interesi Unije.
The argument had to be therefore rejected.
To stališče je bilo torej treba zavrniti.
Conclusion on submissions by parties
Sklepne ugotovitve o pripombah strank
None of the arguments raised by interested parties was such as to alter the Commission’s proposal to withdraw the acceptance of the undertaking.
Predložene pripombe ne spreminjajo predloga Komisije za preklic sprejetja zavez.
E. REPEAL OF DECISION 2000/745/EC
E. PREKLIC SKLEPA 2000/745/ES
In view of the above, the acceptance of the undertakings should be withdrawn and Decision 2000/745/EC should be repealed.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno bi bilo treba preklicati sprejetje zavez in razveljaviti Sklep 2000/745/ES.
Accordingly, the definitive countervailing duties imposed by Article 1(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 461/2013 should apply to imports of PET produced by the companies Dhunseri, Reliance and Pearl (TARIC additional code A585 for Dhunseri, TARIC additional code A181 for Reliance and TARIC additional code A182 for Pearl.),
V skladu s tem bi bilo treba dokončne izravnalne dajatve, naložene s členom 1(2) Izvedbene uredbe (EU) št. 461/2013, uporabljati za uvoz PET, ki ga proizvajajo družbe Dhunseri, Reliance in Pearl (dodatna oznaka TARIC A585 za družbo Dhunseri, dodatna oznaka TARIC A181 za družbo Reliance in dodatna oznaka TARIC A182 za družbo Pearl) –
Decision 2000/745/EC is repealed.
Sklep 2000/745/ES se razveljavi.
OJ L 137, 23.5.2013, p. 1.
UL L 137, 23.5.2013, str. 1.
OJ L 136, 23.5.2013, p. 12.
UL L 136, 23.5.2013, str. 12.
Judgment of the Court of 22 November 2012 in case C-522/10 P Usha Martin Ltd v Council of the European Union and European Commission, not yet reported.
Sodba Sodišča z dne 22. novembra 2012 v zadevi C-522/10 P Usha Martin Ltd. proti Svetu Evropske unije in Evropski Komisiji, poročilo še ni na voljo.
Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1912, paragraph 26; Case 255/84 Nachi Fujikoshi v Council [1987] ECR 1884, paragraph 42; Case 240/84 Toyo v Council [1987] ECR 1849, paragraph 34.
Sodba Sodišča v zadevi 256/84, Koyo Seiko proti Svetu, Receuil 1987, str. 1912, točka 26; Sodba Sodišča v zadevi 255/84, Nachi Fujikoshi proti Svetu, Receuil 1987, str. 1884, točka 42; in Sodba Sodišča v zadevi 240/84, Toyo proti Svetu, Receuil 1987, str. 1849, točka 34).
Case 191/82 Fediol v Commission [1983] ECR 2913, paragraph 26; see also Case T-162/94 NMB France and Others v Commission [1996] ECR II-427, paragraph 72; Case T-97/95 Sinochem v Council [1998] ECR II-85, paragraph 51; and Case T-118/96 Thai Bicycle v Council [1998] ECR II-2991, paragraph 32.
Sodba Sodišča v zadevi 191/82, Fediol proti Komisiji, Receuil 1983, str. 2913, točka 26; glej tudi Sodbo Sodišča v zadevi T-162/94, NMB France in drugi proti Komisiji, Receuil 1996, str. II-427, točka 72; Sodbo Sodišča v zadevi T-97/95, Sinochem proti Svetu, Receuil 1998, str. II-85, točka 51; in Sodbo Sodišča v zadevi T-118/96, Thai Bicycle proti Svetu, Receuil 1998, str. II-2991, točka 32).
OJ L 135, 22.5.2013, p. 19.
UL L 135, 22.5.2013, str. 19.
In the current undertaking the MIP and the indexation mechanism are based either on the non-injurious price established for the Union market (target price) or on the normal value (depending on the company in question) as determined in 1999.
V sedanji zavezi sta MIP in mehanizem usklajevanja izračunana bodisi na neškodljivi ceni določeni za trg Unije (ciljna cena) ali na normalni vrednosti (odvisno od zadevne družbe), določeni leta 1999.
In the latter case, since the anti-dumping duty expired the whole basis for the MIP is non-existent.
V zadnjem primeru je celotna osnova za MIP neobstoječa, saj protidampinška dajatev ni več v veljavi.
According to the case-law of the Court, ‘it is for the institutions, in the exercise of their discretionary power, to determine whether […] undertakings are acceptable.’ [11]. That discretionary power is in general wide in the sphere of measures to protect trade, because the Union Courts recognize that in that sphere, the Institutions have to examine complex economic, political and legal situations.
V skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča „so institucije, v okviru svojih diskrecijskih pravic pooblaščene, da presodijo ustreznost zavez [11].“ Na področju ukrepov za zaščito trgovine je diskrecijska pravica Komisije praviloma široka, saj Sodišča Evropske unije priznavajo dejstvo, da morajo institucije na tem področju presojati o kompleksnih ekonomskih, političnih in pravnih vprašanjih.
of 25 February 2014
z dne 25. februarja 2014
amending Decision 2007/479/EC on the compatibility with Union law of the measures taken by Belgium pursuant to Article 3a(1) of Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities
o spremembi Sklepa Komisije 2007/479/ES o združljivosti ukrepov, ki jih sprejme Belgija v skladu s členom 3a(1) Direktive Sveta 89/552/EGS o usklajevanju nekaterih zakonov in drugih predpisov držav članic o opravljanju dejavnosti razširjanja televizijskih programov, s pravom Skupnosti
Having regard to Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) [1] and in particular Article 14(2) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Direktive 2010/13/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 10. marca 2010 o usklajevanju nekaterih zakonov in drugih predpisov držav članic o opravljanju avdiovizualnih medijskih storitev (Direktiva o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah) [1] in zlasti člena 14(2) Direktive,
By Decision 2007/479/EC [2], the Commission decided that measures pursuant to Article 3a(1) of Council Directive 89/552/EEC [3] notified by Belgium to the Commission on 10 December 2003 are compatible with Community law.
Komisija je s Sklepom 2007/479/ES [2] odločila, da so ukrepi, sprejeti v skladu s členom 3a(1) Direktive Sveta 89/552/EGS [3], ki jih je Belgija 10. decembra 2003 priglasila Komisiji, skladni s pravom Skupnosti.
That decision was upheld by the Court of Justice [4].
Ta sklep je Sodišče potrdilo [4].
Article 3a of Directive 89/552/EEC has been replaced by Article 14 of Directive 2010/13/EU.
Člen 3a Direktive 89/552/EGS je bil nadomeščen s členom 14 Direktive 2010/13/EU.