natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Commission Decision of 25 July 2001, State Aid No 49/99 — Spain.
Komisija je z dopisom SG (2001) D/290869 z dne 6. avgusta 2001 odobrila dodelitev kompenzacijske pomoči za pokritje takih izgub, in sicer na podlagi meril, določenih v metodologiji za nasedle stroške (sporočilo Komisije o metodologiji za analiziranje državne pomoči, povezane z nasedlimi stroški).
Commission letter to the United Kingdom of 27 February 2002 (State aid No 661/99).
Prva dodatna določba kraljevega odloka št. 809/2006 z dne 30. junija 2006 o revidiranju tarife električne energije od 1. julija 2006.
OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.
Uradni list Španije št. 156, 1.7.2006.
Wilson, R. (1993), Nonlinear Pricing, Oxford University Press.
Poleg tega država nikoli ni lastnica prihodkov iz dodatne dajatve ali nima diskrecijske pravice za razpolaganje s temi prihodki;
Castro Rodriguez, F. (1999), Wright tariffs in the Spanish electricity industry, The case of residential consumption, Utilities Policy, pp. 17-31.
ta sredstva se prenesejo na depozitni račun, ki ga upravlja CNE, in si jih država ne more prisvojiti.
Judgment of the ECJ of 17 March 1993 in Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91, paragraph 21:
Vendar v mesečnih obdobjih, krajših od enega leta, te razlike ni bilo v petih mesecih med januarjem in majem 2005.
‘The system at issue does not seek, through its object and general structure, to create an advantage which would constitute an additional burden for the State’.
Tako ni bilo nobene prednosti za celoten sistem reguliranih tarif.
The main source from which the figures in the opening decision are derived is the CNE report:
Španija je v zvezi s tem uveljavila mehanizem za vračilo celotnega primanjkljaja iz leta 2005.
‘El Consumo Eléctrico en el Mercado Peninsular en el Año 2005’, 25.7.2006, Section 2.
To je v skladu z univerzalnostjo računov sistema, uporabljenega v zadevnem obdobju.
For large industrial consumers (interruptible and THP), the report indicates that strong load modulation with supply in off-peak periods, which requires adjustments in production processes, allows for substantial discounts on the headline tariff.
Velika večina gospodinjstev in majhnih odjemalcev nizkonapetostne energije, ki bi se lahko od leta 2003 odločili za prosti trg [9], je še vedno uporabljala regulirane tarife, vendar se jih je leta 2005 znaten delež prav tako odločil za prosti trg.
see Articles 3(3)(c) and 5(2)(b).
je selektiven ter (d) vpliva na trgovino v Skupnosti in lahko izkrivlja konkurenco znotraj EU.
on Spanish electricity tariffs:
o španskih tarifah električne energije:
distributors SA.36559 (C 3/07) (ex NN 66/06) implemented by Spain
distributerji Državna pomoč SA.36559 (C 3/07) (ex NN 66/06), ki jo je odobrila Španija
(notified under document C(2013) 7743)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2013) 7743)
By letter dated 27 April 2006, the undertakings Céntrica plc and Céntrica Energía S.L.U.
Družbi Céntrica plc in Céntrica Energía S.L.U.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘Céntrica’) filed a complaint with the Commission regarding the system of regulated electricity tariffs implemented in Spain in 2005.
(v nadaljnjem besedilu skupaj imenovani: Céntrica) sta z dopisom z dne 27. aprila 2006 vložili pritožbo na Komisijo glede sistema reguliranih tarif električne energije, ki se je v Španiji izvajal leta 2005.
By letter dated 24 January 2007, the Commission informed the Spanish authorities that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in respect of the measure.
Komisija je z dopisom z dne 24. januarja 2007 španske organe obvestila, da se je v zvezi s tem ukrepom odločila začeti postopek iz člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU).
The Commission decision was published in the Official Journal of the European Union [2].
Odločitev Komisije je bila objavljena v Uradnem listu Evropske unije [2].
Spain submitted its observations by letter dated 26 February 2007.
Španija je svoje pripombe predložila z dopisom z dne 26. februarja 2007.
the Government of Galicia (letter dated 23 March 2007), Céntrica (letters dated 26 March and 3 July 2007), ACIE — Association of Independent Energy Suppliers (letter dated 26 March 2007), Government of Asturias (letter dated 27 March 2007), AEGE — Association of Energy-Intensive Users (letter dated 2 April 2007), Asturiana de Zinc — AZSA (letter dated 3 April 2007), Ferroatlántica — a metal producer (letter dated 3 April 2007), Alcoa (letter dated 3 April 2007), UNESA — Spanish Electricity Industry Association (letter dated 25 April 2007), ENEL Viesgo (letter dated 26 April 2007), Iberdrola (letter dated 26 April 2007), Union Fenosa Distribución (letter dated 27 April 2007), Hidrocantábrico Distribución Electrica (letter dated 27 April 2007), Endesa Distribución Electrica (letter dated 27 April 2007).
vlada Galicije (Xunta de Galicia) (dopis z dne 23. marca 2007), Céntrica (dopisa z dne 26. marca in 3. julija 2007), ACIE – združenje neodvisnih dobaviteljev energije (dopis z dne 26. marca 2007), vlada Asturije (dopis z dne 27. marca 2007), AEGE – združenje energetsko intenzivnih uporabnikov (dopis z dne 2. aprila 2007), Asturiana de Zinc – AZSA (dopis z dne 3. aprila 2007), Ferroatlántica – proizvajalec kovin (dopis z dne 3. aprila 2007), Alcoa (dopis z dne 3. aprila 2007), UNESA – špansko elektrogospodarsko združenje (dopis z dne 25. aprila 2007), ENEL Viesgo (dopis z dne 26. aprila 2007), Iberdrola (dopis z dne 26. aprila 2007), Union Fenosa Distribución (dopis z dne 27. aprila 2007), Hidrocantábrico Distribución Electrica (dopis z dne 27. aprila 2007) in Endesa Distribución Electrica (dopis z dne 27. aprila 2007).
Further information was submitted by Céntrica by letters dated 1 June 2007, 28 August 2007, 4 February 2008 and 1 March 2008.
Komisija je z dopisi z dne 30. julija 2009, 19. marca 2010, 6. oktobra 2011, 12. aprila 2012, 31. avgusta 2012, 4. februarja 2013 in 17. julija 2013 španske organe zaprosila, naj zagotovijo nadaljnja pojasnila o ukrepu.
The authorities replied by letters dated 5 October 2009, 26 April 2010, 7 December 2011, 12 June 2012, 18 October 2012, 11 February 2013 and 4 October 2013.
Zadeva je bila 19. aprila 2013 razdeljena na dva dela:
On 19 April 2013 the case was split into two parts:
zadevo SA.21817 (C3/07, ex NN 66/06), ki se nanaša na pomoč končnim uporabnikom električne energije, in zadevo SA.36559 (C3/07, ex NN 66/06), ki se nanaša na pomoč distributerjem električne energije.
Case SA.21817 (C 3/07 ex NN 66/06), which concerns aid to electricity end-users, and Case SA.36559 (C 3/07 ex NN 66/06), which concerns aid to electricity distributors.
Ta sklep obravnava le pomoč distributerjem električne energije.
The present Decision deals only with aid to electricity distributors.
PODROBEN OPIS UKREPA
THE SPANISH ELECTRICITY SYSTEM IN 2005
Razlika med reguliranimi in nereguliranimi dejavnostmi
Distinction between regulated and non-regulated activities.
Zakonodajni okvir, določen z zakonom št. 54/1997 z dne 27. novembra 1997 (Ley del sector eléctrico – LSE), ki je temelj španskega elektroenergetskega sistema, določa bistveno razliko med reguliranimi in liberaliziranimi dejavnostmi.
In the legislative framework laid down by Law 54/1997 of 27 November 1997 (Ley del sector eléctrico — LSE) which is the cornerstone of the Spanish electricity system, a fundamental distinction is made between regulated and liberalised activities.
Proizvodnja, uvoz, izvoz in maloprodajna dobava električne energije so liberalizirane dejavnosti, tj. dejavnosti, ki jih lahko gospodarski subjekti prosto opravljajo po tržnih pogojih in nad katerimi država ne izvaja strogega regulativnega nadzora, na primer z nadziranjem cen in pogojev dobave.
The generation, import, export and retail supply of electricity are liberalised activities, i.e. activities which can be freely exercised by economic operators on market terms, and over which the State does not exercise strict regulatory control, for example by controlling prices and conditions of supply.
Nasprotno pa država v celoti ureja distribucijo, prenos in dejavnosti, ki jih izvajata upravljavec trga [3] in upravljavec omrežja [4].
By contrast, distribution, transport and the activities carried out by the Market Operator [3] and by the System Operator [4] are fully regulated by the State.
Te dejavnosti v vsakem elektroenergetskem sistemu običajno ureja država, ker imajo upravljavci, ki jih izvajajo, dejanski ali pravni monopol in ker sicer upravljavci ne bi imeli nobenih omejitev glede kršenja pravil konkurence in bi lahko zaračunavali monopolne cene nad običajno tržno ceno.
These activities are normally regulated by the State in any electricity system, since the operators which perform them hold de facto or de jure monopolies and, otherwise, the operators would not face any constraints in breaching the competition rules and would be able to charge monopolistic prices above the normal market price.
Čista distribucija in dobava po reguliranih tarifah
Pure distribution and supply at regulated tariffs
Leta 2005 je distribucija zajemala tri vrste regulirane dejavnosti v španskem elektroenergetskem sistemu.
In 2005, distribution covered three types of regulated activity in the Spanish electricity system.
Prva je bila čista distribucija.
The first was pure distribution.
Čista distribucija vključuje prenos električne energije prek distribucijskih omrežij do točk porabe in v primeru neobstoja alternativnih omrežij pomeni monopol.
Pure distribution consists in the transmission of electricity to points of consumption over the distribution networks, and is a monopoly in the absence of alternative networks.
Druga vključuje nekatere dejavnosti komercialnega upravljanja, ki so tesno povezane z distribucijo, kot so odčitavanje števcev, sklepanje pogodb, izdajanje računov, zagotavljanje storitev za stranke itd. Tretja regulirana dejavnost leta 2005 je bila dobava po regulirani tarifi, zakon pa je to nalogo distributerjem dodelil poleg njihove glavne zakonske naloge (upravljanje in zagotavljanje dostopa do omrežij za distribucijo električne energije) [5].
The second includes certain commercial management activities closely related to distribution, such as reading meters, concluding contracts, invoicing, providing customer service, etc.
Distributerji električne energije po dokončanju reforme leta 2009 energije ne dobavljajo več po reguliranih tarifah.
The third regulated activity in 2005 was supply at the regulated tariff, and it was assigned by law to distributors in addition to their main statutory task (managing and providing access to electricity distribution networks) [5].
Zakon je od distributerjev zahteval, da kupujejo električno energijo za regulirane odjemalce na organiziranem veleprodajnem trgu (t. i. „pool“) po dnevni ceni (marginalna cena sistema ali cena na organiziranem trgu) ali neposredno od proizvajalcev energije iz obnovljivih virov [6] in jo nato preprodajajo končnim odjemalcem po veljavni regulirani tarifi.
After the reform completed in 2009, distributors no longer supply electricity at regulated tariffs.
Vloga distributerjev kot finančnih posrednikov sistema
Distributors were required by law to purchase the electricity required to supply regulated customers in the organised wholesale market (the ‘pool’) at the daily price (the marginal system price or ‘pool price’) or directly from renewable energy producers [6] and then to resell the electricity to final consumers at the applicable regulated tariff.
Leta 2005 je bilo kar 25 reguliranih tarif za končne uporabnike, ki so bile odvisne od ravni porabe, profila porabe in/ali uporabe in priključne napetosti omrežja.
Role of distributors as financial intermediaries of the system
Hkrati se je za končne uporabnike na prostem trgu uporabljalo še devet drugih reguliranih pristojbin za dostop do omrežja, ki so prav tako temeljile na priključni napetosti in drugih značilnostih [7].
In 2005 there were no fewer than 25 different regulated tariffs for end-users, depending on the consumption level, the consumption profile and/or use of consumption and the network connection voltage.
Na prostem trgu so končni uporabniki dobaviteljem plačevali pristojbine za dostop do omrežja, dobavitelji pa so jih prenesli na distributerje.
At the same time, 9 other regulated network access charges applied to end-users in the free market, also based on connection voltage and other characteristics [7].
Na reguliranem trgu so bile pristojbine za dostop do omrežja del regulirane tarife, ki je vključevala vse stroške in so jo končni uporabniki plačevali distributerjem (bile so implicitne).
In the free market, network access charges were paid by end-users to suppliers, who passed them on to distributors.
Španija od leta 2005 uvedla spremembe v sistemu reguliranih tarif.
In the regulated market, network access charges were embedded in the all-inclusive regulated tariff paid by end-users to distributors (they were implicit).
Zadnja sprememba je bila leta 2013, ko je sprejela nov zakonodajni okvir za elektroenergetski sektor (zakon št. 24/13), ki med drugimi ukrepi vsebuje reformo ureditve maloprodajnih cen.
Since 2005 Spain has introduced changes to the system of regulated tariffs.
Španija je napovedala, da se bo ta novi zakon skupaj z izvedbenimi določbami začel uporabljati med letom 2014.
The latest change dates from 2013, when Spain adopted a new legislative framework for the electricity sector (Law 24/13) which includes, among other measures, the reform of the regulation of retail market prices.
Ravni integralnih reguliranih tarif in reguliranih pristojbin za dostop do omrežja so bile predhodno določene za vse leto, običajno pred koncem leta N – 1, vendar jih je bilo mogoče med letom prilagoditi [8].
Spain announced that this new law and its implementing provisions would be applied during 2014.
Vendar so bila letna povišanja tarife navzgor omejena [9].
The levels of the regulated integral tariffs and the regulated network access charges were decided ex ante once for the whole year, normally before N-1 year end, but could be adjusted in the course of the year [8].
Načeloma so bile vse ravni tarif in pristojbin na podlagi napovedi določene na način, ki bi zagotavljal, da bi regulirani prihodki, ki bi izhajali iz njihove uporabe, zadoščali za pokritje celotnih reguliranih stroškov elektroenergetskega sistema.
However, annual tariff increases were subject to a maximum cap [9].
Ti regulirani stroški sistema so leta 2005 vključevali stroške dobave energije za integralne tarife, stroške nakupa energije iz posebnih shem pomoči (obnovljivih virov energije, soproizvodnje itd.), stroške prenosa in distribucije, ukrepe za uravnavanje povpraševanja, dodatne stroške proizvodnje električne energije na španskih otokih, podporo za premog, primanjkljaje iz prejšnjih let itd.
In principle, all tariff and charge levels were set, on the basis of forecasts, in such a way as to ensure that the regulated revenues resulting from their application would suffice to cover the electricity system's total regulated costs.
V regulativni ureditvi v Španiji so bili distributerji glavni finančni posredniki sistema (in še vedno so).
These regulated costs of the system included, in 2005, the costs of energy supply for integral tariffs, the costs of purchasing energy from special support schemes (renewable sources, cogeneration, etc.), transport and distribution costs, demand management measures, additional electricity generation costs in the Spanish islands, support for coal, previous years' deficits, etc.
Distributerji so obravnavali vse prihodke iz sistema reguliranih tarif, tj. pristojbin za dostop do omrežja in prihodkov iz integralnih tarif.
In the regulatory set-up in Spain, distributors were (and still are) the main financial intermediaries of the system.
Ti prihodki, skupaj imenovani „likvidni prihodki“ (ingresos liquidables), so se uporabljali za pokritje vseh reguliranih stroškov sistema.
Distributors handled all the revenue from the regulated tariff system, i.e. the network access charges and the revenue from integral tariffs.
Nobenih pravil ni bilo, da se določena kategorija prihodkov ali njihov delež namensko uporabi za določeno kategorijo stroškov ali njihov delež.
This revenue, collectively referred to as ‘payable revenue’ (ingresos liquidables), was used to cover all the regulated costs of the system.
Posledično prihodki iz pristojbin za dostop do omrežja niso bili v celoti ali deloma namenjeni financiranju višjih stroškov podpore za električno energijo iz obnovljivih virov ali električno energijo, proizvedeno na španskih otokih.
There were no rules earmarking a particular category of revenue, or a proportion thereof, for a particular category of costs or proportion thereof.
Potrditev obračuna je potekala v okviru obračunskega postopka, izvedenega pod neposrednim nadzorom španskega regulatorja Comisión Nacional de Energía (v nadaljnjem besedilu: CNE).
As a result, revenues from network access charges were not earmarked in whole or in part to finance the higher costs of support for electricity generated from renewable sources or the costs of generation in the Spanish islands.
Plačilo distributerjem (za dejavnosti, povezane s čisto distribucijo) je prav tako izhajalo iz likvidnih prihodkov, po odbitju vseh drugih stroškov.
The clearance of accounts took place within the framework of a settlement process carried out under the direct control of the Spanish regulator, the Comisión Nacional de Energía (hereinafter: ‘CNE’).
Primerjava distributerjev z dobavitelji in zadevne cene
The remuneration of distributors (for the activities related to pure distribution) was also drawn from the payable revenue, after deduction of all other costs.
Leta 2005 sta bili na maloprodajnem trgu električne energije v Španiji torej dejavni dve različni kategoriji upravljavcev:
Distributors v suppliers and respective prices
distributerji, ki so bili zavezani prodajati po reguliranih tarifah, in dobavitelji, ki so prodajali po prosto dogovorjenih pogojih.
Therefore, in 2005 two distinct categories of operator were active in the retail electricity market in Spain:
Distributerji v Španiji so iz zgodovinskih razlogov del vertikalno povezanih skupin (prvotni upravljavci), ki so tradicionalno upravljale distribucijska omrežja na določenih geografskih območjih in ki so se spreminjale le zaradi preteklih združitev in konsolidacij.
distributors, who were obliged to sell at regulated tariffs, and suppliers, who sold on freely negotiated terms.
Na reguliranem trgu so distributerji zaračunavali integralne tarife, ki niso razlikovale med stroški nakupa električne energije in stroški dostopa do omrežja.
For historical reasons, distributors in Spain are part of vertically integrated groups (incumbent operators) which have traditionally operated distribution networks in specific geographic areas, and which have changed only owing to past mergers and consolidations.
Dobavitelji so lahko del vertikalno povezanih skupin (ki imajo značilno ločene oddelke za proizvodnjo, distribucijo in dobavo) ali novi udeleženci na trgu.
In the regulated market, distributors charged integral tariffs which did not distinguish between the costs of energy procurement and network access costs.
Novi udeleženci pogosto nimajo lastne proizvodne zmogljivosti in so dejavni le na maloprodajnem trgu.
Suppliers can either belong to vertically integrated groups (which typically have separate generation, distribution and supply divisions) or be new market entrants.
Céntrica je eden od takih novih udeležencev.
New entrants often do not own generation capacity and are active only in the retail market.
Na prostem trgu so dobavitelji zaračunavali cene, ki so morale pokriti pristojbino za dostop do omrežja (ki se plača distributerjem), stroške nakupa električne energije (stroške nakupa električne energije na veleprodajnem trgu ali stroške lastne proizvodnje v primeru vertikalno povezane družbe) in „trgovsko maržo“, ki zajema druge stroške (stroške trženja, informacijske sisteme, obračunavanje itd.), ter donos na vloženi kapital.
Céntrica is one such new entrant.
Leta 2005 je soobstoj prostega in reguliranega trga, zlasti pa možnost končnih uporabnikov, da prosto prehajajo med obema, pomenil, da so regulirane tarife delovale kot referenčna cena (ali dejanska zgornja meja) za cene na prostem trgu.
In the free market, suppliers charged prices which had to cover the network access charge (payable to distributors), energy procurement costs (energy procurement costs in the wholesale market or own-generation costs in the case of a vertically integrated company) and a ‘commercialisation margin’, covering other costs (commercialisation costs, IT systems, billing, etc.) as well as a return on invested capital.
Zato je lahko dobavitelj v zadevnem tržnem segmentu posloval dobičkonosno le v primeru pozitivne trgovske marže, tj. določenega razmika med maloprodajno ceno – v tem primeru regulirano tarifo, do katere je bil upravičen odjemalec – in vsemi stroški, nastalimi pri zagotavljanju storitev odjemalcem.
In 2005, the coexistence between the free and regulated markets, and in particular the possibility for end-users to switch freely between the two, meant that the regulated tariffs acted as a price reference (or de facto cap) on free-market prices.
Tarifni primanjkljaj iz leta 2005
Therefore, a supplier could operate profitably in a given market segment only if there was a positive commercialisation margin, i.e. some headroom between the retail price — in this case the regulated tariff, to which the customer was entitled — and the overall costs incurred in serving customers.
Leta 2005 na ravni, na kateri so bile določene regulirane tarife in pristojbine za dostop do omrežja, ni bilo ustvarjenih dovolj prihodkov, da bi lahko bili v sistem povrnjeni vsi stroški, ki so bili naknadno dokumentirani za vse leto.
The 2005 tariff deficit
Manjši primanjkljaji so bili že zabeleženi v letih 2000, 2001 in 2002.
It was not the first time that the settlement process had given rise to a deficit, although the size of the 2005 deficit was unprecedented.
Med razlogi za to povišanje so bili neobičajno suho leto, zaradi česar se je proizvodnja električne energije v hidroelektrarnah zmanjšala za 55 %, dvig cen nafte, učinek tržne cene emisijskih pravic za CO2, ki so bile prejete brezplačno v okviru sistema trgovanja z emisijami, in povečano povpraševanje po električni energiji, ki je preseglo rast BDP.
Lower deficits had already been recorded in 2000, 2001 and 2002.
Španski regulator CNE je navedel, da integralne tarife leta 2005 v povprečju niso odražale vseh stroškov dobave, zlasti ne stroškov nakupa električne energije na veleprodajnem trgu.
Among other things, the Government underestimated actual electricity procurement costs.
Kot kaže spodnji graf, so bile implicitne cene iz povprečnih integralnih reguliranih tarif le v petih mesecih, med januarjem in februarjem 2005 in nato znova med aprilom in junijem 2005, pod povprečnimi cenami na veleprodajnem trgu električne energije.
Whereas, in general terms, electricity consumption by end-users in both the regulated and the free market developed in 2005 roughly as predicted in December 2004, the unforeseen price increases during the year set wholesale prices at EUR 62,4/MWh in 2005 compared with EUR 35,61/MWh in 2004, bringing the average wholesale price in 2005 to EUR 59,47/MWh.
Graf 1:
The causes of this increase include an unusually dry year, which reduced hydroelectric power production by 55 %, a rise in oil prices, the passing on of the market price of CO2 emission allowances received free of charge under the Emissions Trading System and an increase in the demand for energy higher than GDP growth.
Tehtana povprečna veleprodajna cena v primerjavi z implicitno ceno električne energije iz integralne tarife
However, the opposite was true between October 2006 and December 2007: during this 14-month period, average wholesale prices fell sharply below the energy prices implicit in the average regulated integral tariffs, well in excess of the difference observed in the seven months of 2005 when wholesale prices were above those implicit in the integral tariffs.
CNE – Informe sobre la evolución de la competencia en los mercados de gas y electricidad.
Graph 1:
Periodo 2005/2007 (Poročilo o razvoju konkurence na trgih plina in električne energije.