natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission confirms the selection of Turkey as an analogue country within the meaning of Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation.
Komisija potrjuje izbiro Turčije kot primerljive države v smislu člena 2(7) osnovne uredbe.
One exporting producer claimed that the Commission erred in the determination of the normal value by basing it on only the profitable sales in the analogue country and adding a hypothetical profit margin to those sales which were not profitable.
En proizvajalec izvoznik je trdil, da je Komisija napačno določila normalno vrednost, saj jo je utemeljila le na dobičkonosni prodaji v primerljivi državi, prodaji, ki ni bila dobičkonosna, pa je prištela hipotetično stopnjo dobička.
The Commission confirms that for the determination of the normal value, as explained in recitals 61 and 62 of the provisional Regulation and as required by Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation, it had verified that at least 80 % of the sales of all product types of the like product on the Turkish domestic market were profitable.
Komisija potrjuje, da je za ugotavljanje normalne vrednosti, kot je bilo pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah 61 in 62 začasne uredbe ter zahtevano s členom 2(4) osnovne uredbe, preverila, da najmanj 80 % prodaje vseh vrst podobnega izdelka na turškem domačem trgu prinaša dobiček.
Accordingly, all the sales on the Turkish domestic market, whether profitable or not, were taken into account for the determination of the normal value.
Pri določanju normalne vrednosti je bila torej upoštevana celotna prodaja na turškem domačem trgu, ne glede na to, ali je bila dobičkonosna ali ne.
This claim is therefore unfounded and accordingly rejected.
Ta trditev torej ni utemeljena in se zato zavrne.
In the absence of further comments regarding the determination of the normal value, recitals 58 to 64 of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
Ker v zvezi z določanjem normalne vrednosti ni bilo nadaljnjih pripomb, se uvodne izjave 58 do 64 začasne uredbe potrdijo.
In the absence of any comments regarding export prices, recital 65 of the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
Ker v zvezi z izvoznimi cenami ni bilo pripomb, se uvodna izjava 65 začasne uredbe potrdi.
After provisional disclosure and subsequently after definitive disclosure one exporting producer claimed that the Commission erroneously adjusted its export price under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation.
En proizvajalec izvoznik je po začasnem razkritju in nato po dokončnem razkritju trdil, da je Komisija svojo izvozno ceno napačno prilagodila na podlagi člena 2(10)(i) osnovne uredbe.
It argued that the producer and the related trader constitute a single economic entity and that such an adjustment is therefore precluded.
Trdil je, da proizvajalec in povezani trgovec sestavljata en sam gospodarski subjekt in da takšna prilagoditev zato ni mogoča.
In any event, the level of the adjustment is too high since the Commission based it on the actual mark-up which was not established at arms-length but was rather the result of a transfer pricing agreement.
V vsakem primeru je stopnja prilagoditve previsoka, saj jo je Komisija utemeljila na dejanskem pribitku, ki pa ni bil določen glede na tržne cene, ampak je bil rezultat dogovora o transfernih cenah.
Instead the Commission should have made the adjustment, if any, on the basis of an estimated mark-up between a producer and unrelated importer at arms-length.
Namesto tega bi morala Komisija prilagoditev, če sploh, opraviti na podlagi glede na tržne cene ocenjenega pribitka med proizvajalcem in nepovezanim uvoznikom.
The investigation revealed that the exporting producer had itself a fully functional export department that negotiated sales conditions and terms with Union customers, placed the production orders, organised and carried out the shipping to the Union customers, including all shipping documents, of the final product, handled the export customs clearance and prepared sales documents.
Preiskava je razkrila, da ima sam proizvajalec izvoznik popolnoma delujoč izvozni oddelek, ki se je s strankami Unije pogajal o pogojih prodaje, oddajal naročila za proizvodnjo, organiziral in izvajal dobavo končnega izdelka strankam Unije, vključno z odpremnimi listinami, urejal carinjenje izvoza in pripravljal prodajne listine.
Indeed, there was no duplication of export related tasks between the exporting producer and the related trader.
Nalog, povezanih z izvozom, proizvajalec izvoznik in povezani trgovec dejansko nista opravljala ločeno.
However, the exporting producer issued sales invoices in to the trader, which, in turn, issued a sales invoice to the Union customer at the contractual price.
Vendar je proizvajalec izvoznik trgovcu izstavil račune o prodaji, trgovec pa je nato račun o prodaji izstavil stranki Unije po pogodbeni ceni.
The related trader collected the payment, deducted a mark-up and paid the remaining amount to the exporting producer.
Povezani trgovec je pobral plačilo, odbil pribitek in preostali znesek plačal proizvajalcu izvozniku.
The Commission therefore finds that the related trader cannot be considered as an internal sales department, even if the two companies would be considered as constituting a single economic entity, and that an adjustment under Article 2(10(i) to be fully justified.
Komisija zato meni, da povezanega trgovca, tudi če se obe družbi šteje za en gospodarski subjekt, ni mogoče šteti za notranji prodajni oddelek in da je prilagoditev na podlagi člena 2(10)(i) popolnoma upravičena.
Moreover, since the adjustment made reflects the mark-up actually charged between the related companies there is no reason to replace it with another theoretical amount.
Ker opravljena prilagoditev kaže pribitek, ki sta ga povezani družbi dejansko zaračunali, ni nobenega razloga za njegovo zamenjavo z drugim teoretičnim zneskom.
One exporting producer claimed that its production capacities were much higher than those of the Union industry, and that it therefore had an advantage in terms of lower costs in its production process of the product concerned.
En proizvajalec izvoznik je trdil, da so njegove proizvodne zmogljivosti precej višje od proizvodne zmogljivosti industrije Unije, zato ima prednost v obliki nižjih stroškov proizvodnega procesa zadevnega izdelka.
The Commission should therefore consider this alleged advantage related to its lower cost of production and make a necessary adjustment.
Komisija bi zato morala upoštevati to domnevno prednost, povezano z njegovimi najnižjimi stroški proizvodnje, in izvesti potrebno prilagoditev.
The Commission cannot accept this claim.
Komisija te trditve ne more sprejeti.
First, the exporting producer does not suggest a relevant legal provision under which such an adjustment could be made.
Proizvajalec izvoznik ne navaja ustrezne pravne določbe, na podlagi katere bi bilo mogoče izvesti takšno prilagoditev.
Second, it is not demonstrated that lower costs due to higher production capacities would affect the prices or price comparability within the meaning of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.
Poleg tega proizvajalec izvoznik ni dokazal, da bi nižji stroški zaradi večjih proizvodnih zmogljivosti vplivali na cene ali primerljivost cen v smislu člena 2(10) osnovne uredbe.
Indeed, even if a cost difference could be demonstrated it is not clear how this is reflected in the final price and whether it is not offset by a difference in other costs.
Tudi če bi bilo razliko v ceni mogoče dokazati, ni jasno, kako to vpliva na končno ceno in ali ta razlika ni izravnana z razliko pri drugih stroških.
In addition, the alleged benefit claimed by the exporting producer concerns the allegedly lower costs of production compared to the costs incurred by the Union Industry.
Poleg tega se domnevna korist proizvajalca izvoznika nanaša na domnevno nižje stroške proizvodnje v primerjavi s stroški industrije Unije.
In this respect it is recalled that the exporting producer was not granted MET and that its costs were therefore not verified.
S tem v zvezi je treba poudariti, da proizvajalcu izvozniku TGO ni bila dodeljena, zato njegovi stroški niso bili preverjeni.
Under Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission determined the normal value on the basis of the actual prices and/or costs of the analogue country producer because prices and costs in non-market economy countries are not the result of market forces and are therefore, as such, not a reliable proxy for market prices or costs.
Komisija je v skladu s členom 2(7)(a) osnovne uredbe normalno vrednost določila na podlagi dejanskih cen in/ali stroškov proizvajalca primerljive države, ker se cene in stroški v državah brez tržnega gospodarstva ne oblikujejo na podlagi tržnih sil, kot takšne pa niso zanesljiv približek tržnih cen ali stroškov.
One exporting producer in the PRC claimed that the Commission should adjust the ex-factory export price of one of its competitors by deducting from it a service fee and a licence fee it allegedly paid to a third party.
En proizvajalec izvoznik iz LRK je trdil, da bi morala Komisija prilagoditi izvozno ceno franko tovarna enega od njegovih konkurentov, in sicer tako, da bi od te cene odštela pristojbini za storitev in dovoljenje, ki naj bi ju konkurent plačal tretji stranki.
The Commission rejects this claim.
Komisija to trditev zavrača.
First, the exporting producer does not suggest a relevant provision of the basic Regulation under which such an adjustment could be made.
Proizvajalec izvoznik ne navaja ustrezne določbe osnovne uredbe, na podlagi katere bi bilo mogoče izvesti takšno prilagoditev.
Second, even if this claim could be construed as falling under Article 2(10)(e) of the basic Regulation, which provides for adjustments for transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs, that provision does not relate to service fees or costs related to a licence agreement.
Tudi če bi bilo mogoče to trditev razlagati tako, kot da zanjo velja člen 2(10)(e) osnovne uredbe, ki določa prilagoditve za prevoz, zavarovanje, manipuliranje, natovarjanje in druge tozadevne stroške, se navedena določba ne nanaša na pristojbine za storitev ali stroške v zvezi z licenčno pogodbo.
Such costs constitute business costs which are normally incurred by a producer of goods using a technology licence acquired from a third party irrespective of whether they are exported or sold domestically.
To so običajni poslovni stroški proizvajalca blaga, ki uporablja licenčno tehnologijo tretje stranke, ne glede na to, ali se blago izvaža ali prodaja na domačem trgu.
Such costs should therefore be reflected in the final price of both the export as well as the domestic sales.
Takšni stroški bi zato morali biti zajeti v končni ceni izvoza in domače prodaje.
These costs can therefore not affect the comparability between the export price and the normal value.
Ti stroški torej ne morejo vplivati na primerljivost izvozne cene in običajne vrednosti.
An adjustment under Article 2(10) is therefore not warranted and the claim is therefore rejected.
Prilagoditev na podlagi člena 2(10) torej ni upravičena, zato se trditev zavrne.
As stipulated in recitals 67 and 68 of the provisional Regulation, for the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.
Kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 67 in 68 začasne uredbe, so se, da bi se zagotovila poštena primerjava med normalno vrednostjo in izvozno ceno, v skladu s členom 2(10) osnovne uredbe v obliki prilagoditev ustrezno upoštevale razlike, ki vplivajo na cene in primerljivost cen.
On this basis, company specific adjustments were made for transport, ocean freight and insurance costs, handling, loading and ancillary costs, export duties and commissions in all cases where demonstrated to affect price comparability.
Na podlagi tega so se v vseh primerih, kadar je bil dokazan vpliv na primerljivost cene, izvedle prilagoditve za prevozne stroške, stroške čezmorskega prevoza, zavarovalne stroške, manipulativne stroške, stroške natovarjanja, druge dodatne stroške, izvozne dajatve in provizije za vsako posamezno družbo.
However, after the imposition of provisional measures the Commission noted a clerical omission in relation to the VAT adjustment.
Vendar pa je Komisija po uvedbi začasnih ukrepov ugotovila napako v zvezi s prilagoditvijo DDV.
This has been accordingly corrected for the dumping calculations reflected in the relevant table under recital 169 below.
Napaka je bila ustrezno popravljena za izračune dampinga, prikazane v zadevni preglednici v uvodni izjavi 169.
Two exporting producers claimed that the price comparison between the export price and the normal value has not been correctly made as far as one product type is concerned.
Dva proizvajalca izvoznika sta trdila, da primerjava cen med izvozno ceno in normalno vrednostjo za eno vrsto izdelka ni bila pravilno izvedena.
This claim is addressed in recitals 67-68 below.
Ta trditev je obravnavana v uvodnih izjavah 67 do 68.
In the absence of comments, the methodology used for calculating the dumping margins, as set out in recitals 69 to 73 of the provisional Regulation, is herewith confirmed.
Ker ni bilo pripomb, se potrdi metodologija za izračun dampinških stopenj, kot so določene v uvodnih izjavah 69 do 73 začasne uredbe.
One exporting producer claimed that, in the anti-dumping questionnaire, it had erroneously filled in incorrect Cost, Insurance and Freight values (CIF values) of a number of its export sales of the product concerned to the EU.
En proizvajalec izvoznik je trdil, da je v protidampinškem vprašalniku pomotoma vpisal napačne vrednosti stroškov, zavarovanja in prevoznine (vrednosti CIF) za več primerov izvoza zadevnega izdelka v EU.
The reported CIF values were too low thereby inflating the company’s dumping margin as well as its injury margin.
Sporočene vrednosti CIF so bile prenizke, zaradi česar sta se povečali dampinška stopnja družbe in stopnja škode.
The Commission examined this request thoroughly.
Komisija je to zahtevo temeljito proučila.
Having counterchecked and verified on spot the CIF prices of the respective transactions with the EU importer the Commission was able to verify the validity of this claim.
Komisija je cene CIF zadevnih transakcij z uvoznikom EU navzkrižno preverila in pregledala na kraju samem in je tako lahko preverila utemeljenost te trditve.
This claim was therefore accepted.
Zato je bila ta trditev sprejeta.
Taking into account the adjustments made to the normal value and to the export price, and in the absence of any further comments, the definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:
Ob upoštevanju prilagoditev normalne vrednosti in izvozne cene, in ker ni bilo dodatnih pripomb, so dokončne stopnje dampinga, izražene kot odstotek cene CIF meja Unije brez plačane dajatve, naslednje:
No comments were received in respect to the definition of the Union industry and Union production.
V zvezi z opredelitvijo industrije Unije in proizvodnje Unije ni bila prejeta nobena pripomba.
Therefore, the Commission confirms recitals 75 to 79 of the provisional Regulation.
Komisija zato potrjuje uvodne izjave 75 do 79 začasne uredbe.
After provisional disclosure, the sales volume figures submitted by the complainant concerning the sampled Union producers have been updated with data from the sampled Union producers.
Po začasnem razkritju so bili podatki o obsegu prodaje, ki jih je v zvezi z vzorčenimi proizvajalci Unije predložil pritožnik, posodobljeni s podatki vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije.
Accordingly, Table 1 was corrected (see below).
V skladu s tem je bila popravljena preglednica 1 (glej v nadaljevanju).
The correction does not change or invalidate the trend or the conclusions drawn from the data in the provisional Regulation.
Ta popravek ne spremeni ali razveljavi gibanja ali sklepov, oblikovanih na podlagi podatkov iz začasne uredbe.
Therefore, in the absence of any comments with respect to Union consumption, the trend in Union consumption established in recitals 80-82 of the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
Ker v zvezi s potrošnjo Unije ni bilo pripomb, se gibanje potrošnje Unije iz uvodnih izjav 80 do 82 začasne uredbe potrdi.
Union consumption (1000 m2)
Potrošnja Unije (1000 m2)
Source: Glass for Europe, the complainant and sampled Union producers’ questionnaire replies.
Vir: združenje Steklo za Evropo, pritožnik in izpolnjeni vprašalniki vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije
Due to the correction made in Union industry sales (see recital 62 above), the market share of the imports from the country concerned had to be corrected as well (see Table 2).
Ker so bili podatki o prodaji industrije Unije popravljeni (glej uvodno izjavo 62), se je tržni delež uvoza iz zadevnih držav nekoliko spremenil (glej preglednico 2).
The correction does not change the trend or the conclusions drawn from the data in the provisional Regulation.
Vendar ta popravek ne spremeni gibanja ali sklepov, oblikovanih na podlagi podatkov iz začasne uredbe.
Consequently, the Commission confirms recitals 83-87 of the provisional Regulation.
Komisija zato potrjuje uvodne izjave 83 do 87 začasne uredbe.
Import volume (1000 m2) and market share
obseg uvoza (1000 m2) in tržni delež
Recitals 88 to 89 of the provisional Regulation set out how the price undercutting during the IP has been determined.
V uvodnih izjavah 88 do 89 začasne uredbe je navedeno, kako je bilo ugotovljeno nelojalno nižanje cen v OP.
The weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market and adjusted to an ex-works level were compared to the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the sampled cooperating exporting producers.
Tehtane povprečne prodajne cene vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije za posamezno vrsto izdelka, zaračunane nepovezanim strankam na trgu Unije, prilagojene na raven cene franko tovarna, so se primerjale z ustreznimi tehtanimi povprečnimi cenami za posamezne uvožene vrste izdelkov vzorčenih sodelujočih kitajskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov.
The imports in question were to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a CIF basis, with upward adjustments, that is to say custom clearance, duty, handling and loading costs.
Zadevni uvoz je bil zaračunan prvi neodvisni stranki na trgu Unije in določen na podlagi CIF s prilagoditvami navzgor, in sicer za carinjenje, dajatve, manipulativne stroške in stroške natovarjanja.
Those adjustments increase the price, depending on the product control number, by 7 % to 15 %.
Te prilagoditve zvišujejo ceno glede na kontrolno številko izdelka, in sicer za 7 do 15 %.
The price comparison was made on a product type number-by-product type number basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted as set out in the recital above, and after deduction of rebates and discounts.
Primerjava cen je bila izvedena po številkah posameznih vrst izdelkov in za vsako vrsto transakcije posebej na isti ravni trgovine ter po ustrezni prilagoditvi iz navedene uvodne izjave ter odbitku rabatov in popustov.
The result of the comparison, when expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the IP, showed a weighted average undercutting margin between 10,6 % and 26,7 % of the prices of the sampled Union producers by the dumped imports.
Rezultat primerjave, izražen kot odstotek prihodkov od prodaje vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije v OP, je pokazal tehtano povprečno stopnjo nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen, ki je znašala med 10,6 % in 26,7 % cen vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije, zaradi dampinškega uvoza.
Two exporting producers claimed that the price comparison has not been correctly made as far as one product type is concerned.
Dva proizvajalca izvoznika sta trdila, da primerjava cen za eno vrsto izdelka ni bila pravilno izvedena.
In particular, it was argued that double-side coated solar glass should have been compared separately from single-side coated solar glass.
Trdila sta zlasti, da bi bilo treba obojestransko premazano solarno steklo in enostransko premazano solarno steklo primerjati ločeno.
Allegedly, the cost and price of the double-side coated solar glass is much higher than the cost and price of single-side coated solar glass.
Stroški in cena obojestransko premazanega solarnega stekla naj bi bila precej višja od stroškov in cene enojno premazanega solarnega stekla.
It was further claimed that double-side coated solar glass has solar transmittance coefficient ‘normally’ much higher than single-side coated solar glass.
Nadalje sta trdila, da je koeficient prepustnosti sončne energije obojestransko premazanega solarnega stekla „običajno“ precej višji od koeficienta prepustnosti enostransko premazanega solarnega stekla.
Finally, one exporter stated that PV modules never use double-side coated solar glass as its price is much higher than the price of single-side coated solar glass but the solar transmittance coefficient of double-side coated solar glass is the same as that of single-side coated solar glass when used in the production of PV modules.
En izvoznik je trdil tudi, da se za fotonapetostne module obojestransko premazano solarno steklo nikoli ne uporablja, saj je precej dražje od enostransko premazanega stekla, pri proizvodnji fotonapetostnih modulov pa je koeficient prepustnosti sončne energije obojestransko premazanega solarnega stekla enak koeficientu prepustnosti sončne energije enostransko premazanega solarnega stekla.
By contrast, for solar thermal applications the higher transmittance achieved by double-side coated solar glass is allegedly important since thanks to it the solar thermal applications can be much more efficient.
Nasprotno pa naj bi bila za solarne termalne naprave večja prepustnost obojestransko premazanega solarnega stekla pomembna, saj so lahko zaradi tega solarne termalne naprave precej učinkovitejše.
The Commission rejects the claims put forward by the exporting producers for the following reasons.
Komisija trditve proizvajalcev izvoznikov zavrača iz naslednjih razlogov.
First, beyond general allegations no evidence was provided by the exporting producer that there is a consistent difference in costs of production between single-side and double-side coated solar glass.
Proizvajalec izvoznik je podal le splošne trditve in nobenega dokaza, da obstaja dosledna razlika med stroški proizvodnje enostransko in dvostransko premazanega solarnega stekla.
The Union industry argued the contrary and claimed that depending on the coating technology used, production costs differ, and double-side coated glass is not necessarily more expensive than single-side coated and vice versa.
Industrija Unije je trditvi nasprotovala in trdila, da so proizvodni stroški odvisni od uporabljene tehnologije premazov, zato obojestransko premazano steklo ni nujno dražje od enostransko premazanega in obratno.
Second, indeed double-side coated glass can achieve higher solar transmittance than single-side coated glass (the former can reach maximum 98 % solar transmittance, while the latter — up to 95 %) and indeed this technical characteristic only matters for solar thermal applications, while it is irrelevant for PV modules.
Prepustnost sončne energije obojestransko premazanega stekla je res lahko višja od prepustnosti enostransko premazanega stekla (obojestransko premazano steklo lahko doseže največ 98 % prepustnosti sončne energije, enostransko premazano pa največ 95 %), pri čemer je ta tehnična značilnost pomembna le pri solarnih termalnih napravah, pri fotonapetostnih modulih pa ne.
However, contrary to what the exporting producer claims, double-side coated solar glass is also sold to producers of PV modules and even constitutes its main market.
Vendar se v nasprotju s trditvami proizvajalca izvoznika obojestransko premazano solarno steklo prodaja tudi proizvajalcem fotonapetostnih modulov, ki so celo njegov glavni trg.