natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission notes that the expected losses on its retail banking activity over the 2012-16 period should remain small.
Po navedbah Komisije bi morale pričakovane izgube iz dejavnosti poslovanja s prebivalstvom v obdobju 2012–2016 ostati nizke.
They amount to some EUR [350-450] million, representing an annual cost of risk of [15-35] basis points.
Znašajo približno [350–-450] milijonov EUR, kar pomeni letne stroške tveganja v višini [15–35] bazičnih točk.
The historical cost of DBB/Belfius’ risk on its RCB activity was between [5 and 25] basis points between 2007 and 2011.
V obdobju 2007–2011 so pretekli stroški tveganja banke DBB/Belfius pri poslovanju s prebivalstvom in komercialnem bančništvu [znašali 5 in 25] bazičnih točk.
The Commission notes that the balance of structured products offered by the insurance arm of the Group is marginal.
Komisija navaja, da je bilanca strukturiranih produktov, ki jih ponujajo na poslovnem področju zavarovanja banke DBB/Belfius, majhna.
The Group should offer its customers only plain vanilla products, except for a new structured product like […] (without guaranteed capital) for which the risks are confined to its syndication and related operational costs.
Banka DBB/Belfius bi morala strankam ponujati le osnovne produkte, razen nekaterih novih strukturiranih produktov, kot je […] (brez zajamčenega kapitala), pri katerih so tveganja omejena na njihovo sindiciranje in s tem povezane operativne stroške.
Expected losses on the investment portfolio
Pričakovane izgube v portfelju naložb
On 31 December 2011 DBB/Belfius held a number of exposures [165] (in the form of securities, loans or others) on entities regarded as non-investment grade or which had already defaulted, and for which specific provisions had already been recorded.
Banka DBB/Belfius je imela z dne 31. decembra 2011 številne izpostavljenosti [165] (v obliki vrednostnih papirjev, posojil ali drugega) do subjektov, za katere se šteje, da niso uvrščeni v naložbene razrede ali še niso izpolnili svojih obveznosti, ter za katere so bile že evidentirane posebne določbe.
On 31 March 2012 DBB/Belfius also held positions in credit derivatives.
Banka DBB/Belfius je imela z dne 31. marca 2012 tudi pozicije v kreditnih izvedenih finančnih instrumentih.
Funding and liquidity
Financiranje in likvidnost
DBB/Belfius plans to strengthen its stable funding through increased deposit-taking from retail customers and public authorities.
Banka DBB/Belfius namerava s sprejemanjem vlog od prebivalstva in države okrepiti stabilne vire financiranja.
Less use will be made of short-term financing (unsecured or repo borrowing).
Manj pa se bo uporabljalo kratkoročno financiranje (nezavarovano izposojanje ali izposojanje v okviru transakcije začasne prodaje/začasnega odkupa).
Central Bank refinancing will provide [0-5 % of the funding] in 2016, whereas it accounted for [0-25] % in 2012.
Refinanciranje centralne banke bo v letu 2016 znašalo [0–5 % finančnih sredstev], v letu 2012 pa je znašalo [0–25] %.
DBB/Belfius has not used ELA since February 2012.
Banka DBB/Belfius od februarja 2012 ni uporabila izredne likvidnostne pomoči.
Sources of financing for DBB/Belfius
Viri financiranja banke DBB/Belfius
Since 7 March 2012 DBB/Belfius’ unsecured exposure to Dexia has come down to almost zero.
Od 7. marca 2012 se je nezavarovana izpostavljenost banke DBB/Belfius do skupine Dexia zmanjšala skoraj na nič.
The Commission therefore concludes that the liquidity ratios should improve considerably by the end of the restructuring period.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da bi se morali likvidnostni količniki do konca obdobja prestrukturiranja precej izboljšati.
The creation of a liquidity buffer of EUR [30-45] billion by 2016 should strengthen the Group’s liquidity position.
Z likvidnostnim blažilcem v višini [30–45] milijard EUR do leta 2016 bi se moral okrepiti likvidnostni položaj skupine DBB/Belfius.
The Commission notes that the lowest committees in the hierarchy cannot actually approve high-value transactions (EUR 25 million is the threshold for Committee No 3 for a transaction with a local authority rated below investment grade, for instance), which is likely to improve risk control.
Komisija navaja, da transakcij z visoko vrednostjo dejansko ne morejo odobriti najnižji odbori v hierarhiji (na primer v odboru št. 3 je zgornja meja za transakcijo z lokalnim organom, čigar bonitetna ocena je nižja od naložbenega razreda, 25 milijonov EUR), zaradi česar se bo verjetno izboljšal nadzor nad tveganji.
Potential risks
Morebitna tveganja
The Commission notes that DBB/Belfius has refocused its activities on its core business line.
Komisija je opazila, da je banka DBB/Belfius svoje dejavnosti preusmerila na svoje ključno poslovno področje.
The solid franchise which the Group has in Belgium should enable it to ensure its long-term viability.
Solidna franšiza, ki jo ima banka DBB/Belfius v Belgiji, bi ji morala omogočiti dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje.
The principal risks (financial imbalance and vulnerability of the liquidity profit, for example) inherited from its membership of the Dexia Group should be reduced.
Zmanjšati bi bilo treba glavna tveganja (na primer finančno neravnotežje in ranljivost likvidnostnega dobička), ki izhajajo iz njene udeležbe v skupini Dexia.
The overall de-risking and deleveraging strategy that has begun to be applied should also help to ensure the Group’s long-term future.
K dolgoročni prihodnosti banke DBB/Belfius bi morala prispevati tudi celovita strategija zmanjšanja tveganj in finančnega vzvoda, ki se je začela uporabljati.
However, DBB/Belfius has still inherited a large asset portfolio and particularly a bond portfolio legacy from the Dexia era, which includes a number of sovereign and quasi-sovereign exposures with a negative marked-to-market value, on which losses might be greater than expected if market conditions deteriorate.
Vendar je banka DBB/Belfius še vedno podedovala velik portfelj sredstev, zlasti preostali portfelj obveznic iz obdobja v skupini Dexia, v katerega so zajete številne izpostavljenosti do državnih in paradržavnih posojilojemalcev z negativno vrednostjo glede na tržne razmere, v zvezi s katerimi bi lahko bile izgube v primeru poslabšanja tržnih pogojev večje od pričakovanih.
An examination of the projections above shows that the DBB/Belfius Group should be able to absorb these losses without jeopardising its viability.
Proučitev zgornjih projekcij kaže, da bi morala biti banka DBB/Belfius sposobna absorbirati te izgube, ne da bi ogrozila svoje uspešno poslovanje.
The Commission therefore considers, in line with the findings of the independent trustee, that the financial projections for DBB/Belfius indicate that the bank will be able to absorb the expected losses.
Komisija zato v skladu z ugotovitvami neodvisnega skrbnika meni, da je iz finančnih projekcij za banko DBB/Belfius razvidno, da bo banka lahko absorbirala pričakovane izgube.
The Commission takes a positive view of the fact that the cumulative impact of a 20 % reduction in the size of the balance sheet and the absence of any distribution of profits expected over the restructuring period should strengthen the regulatory solvency ratios (Core Tier 1 Basel III ratio of 10,7 % in 2016).
Komisija pozitivno ocenjuje dejstvo, da naj bi skupni vpliv 20-odstotnega zmanjšanja obsega bilance stanja in odsotnost kakršnega koli razdeljevanja dobička, ki se pričakuje v obdobju prestrukturiranja, okrepil regulativni količnik plačilne sposobnosti (10,7-odstotno razmerje temeljnega kapitala po sporazumu Basel III v letu 2016).
Stress scenario communicated in connection with the restructuring plan
Scenarij izjemnih situacij, predložen v zvezi z načrtom prestrukturiranja
The stress scenario provided by the Belgian authorities meets the Commission’s criteria.
Scenarij izjemnih situacij, ki so ga poslali belgijski organi, izpolnjuje merila Komisije.
It is based on the EBA method [167] and measures the bank’s viability when faced with a series of exogenous shocks that would affect the quality of its assets, the business model and the financing conditions, among other things.
Temelji na metodi Evropskega bančnega organa [167] in meri uspešno poslovanje banke, ko se spoprijema z nizom zunanjih pretresov, ki bi med drugim vplivali na kakovost njenih sredstev, poslovni model in pogoje financiranja.
The scenario shows an impact on the cumulative pre-tax result of around EUR [650-750] million, or around [10-40] % of the result expected in the baseline scenario.
Iz tega scenarija je razviden vpliv skupnih prihodkov pred obdavčitvijo v višini približno [650–750] milijonov EUR ali približno [10–40] % prihodkov, pričakovanih po osnovnem scenariju.
This impact would mainly affect the banking section (EUR -[650-750] million).
To bi v glavnem vplivalo na področje bančništva (-[650–-750] milijonov EUR).
The increase in the credit risk and the related losses expected on the asset portfolios would account for [25-75] % of the total impact.
Povečanje kreditnega tveganja in s tem povezanih pričakovanih izgub v portfelju sredstev bi pomenilo [25–75] % skupnega učinka.
DBB/Belfius’ solvency would not be threatened because its Core Tier 1 ratio would be [7,5-15] %, higher than the Basel III regulations require.
Zaradi [7,5–15]-odstotnega razmerja temeljnega kapitala, kar je višje od zahtev po sporazumu Basel III, se ne bi ogrozila plačilna sposobnost banke DBB/Belfius.
It is clear from the above projections that the DBB/Belfius Group is capable of facing impaired market conditions without its viability coming under threat.
Iz zgornjih projekcij je jasno, da se banka DBB/Belfius lahko spoprime z neugodnimi tržnimi razmerami, ne da bi pri tem ogrozila svoje uspešno poslovanje.
The institution’s own contribution
Lastni prispevek institucij
The Bank Restructuring Communication states (point 23) that restructuring aid should be limited to covering costs which are necessary for the restoration of viability.
V sporočilu o prestrukturiranju bank (v točki 23) je navedeno, da mora biti pomoč za prestrukturiranje omejena na kritje stroškov, potrebnih za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja.
The Commission considers that this condition is satisfied in the present case, for the following reasons.
Po mnenju Komisije je ta pogoj v obravnavani zadevi izpolnjen zaradi naslednjih razlogov.
DBB/Belfius is to refocus its activity on its core business lines and has sold its shares in DAM.
Banka DBB/Belfius bo svojo dejavnost preusmerila na ključna poslovna področja, vse svoje delnice v družbi DAM pa je prodala.
These decisions are thus helping to limit costs and to concentrate resources on core activities.
Ti dve odločitvi torej prispevata k omejitvi stroškov in usmeritvi sredstev na ključne dejavnosti.
However, given that DBB/Belfius, when the bank still belonged to the Dexia Group, was already subject to a prohibition on acquisition as a result of the conditional authorisation decision of 26 February 2010, the Commission considers that this commitment has therefore already lasted for almost four years.
Vendar Komisija meni, da ta zaveza traja že skoraj štiri leta, pri čemer upošteva dejstvo, da se je prepoved prevzema za banko DBB/Belfius uporabljala že, ko je še bila del skupine Dexia, in sicer kot posledica sklepa o pogojnem dovoljenju z dne 26. februarja 2010.
That being so, the Commission concludes that this commitment complies with the Bank Restructuring Communication.
Komisija zaradi navedenega ugotavlja, da je ta zaveza skladna s sporočilom o prestrukturiranju bank.
The commitment is an extra assurance that the restructuring costs will be limited to restoring the viability of the core activities and will not be used to develop diversification or to generate external growth.
Zaveza je dodatno zagotovilo za to, da bodo stroški prestrukturiranja omejeni na obnovo uspešnega poslovanja ključnih dejavnosti in se ne bodo uporabili za razvijanje razpršenosti ali ustvarjanje zunanje rasti.
Limitation of the amount of aid and own contribution
Omejitev zneska pomoči in lastni prispevek
The Bank Restructuring Communication states that banks must use their own resources in order to keep the amount of State aid received to a minimum.
V sporočilu o prestrukturiranju bank je navedeno, da morajo banke zaradi omejitve višine pomoči na najnižjo potrebno uporabiti svoje lastne vire.
This means, for example, that investors (shareholders, bond holders) should participate in absorbing losses and an adequate remuneration should be paid for State interventions.
To na primer pomeni, da bi morali pri absorbiranju izgub sodelovati vlagatelji (delničarji, imetniki obveznic), za državno pomoč pa bi bilo treba plačati ustrezno nadomestilo.
The Commission must thus make sure that the State aid is limited to the minimum necessary.
Komisija se mora torej prepričati, da je državna pomoč omejena na najnižjo potrebno.
This is why the Commission takes a positive view of the following points.
Zato Komisija pozitivno ocenjuje naslednje točke.
The Commission notes that in 2012 DBB/Belfius repurchased its own debt on several occasions at substantial discounts ([50-100] % of the nominal value), which enabled it to generate a profit after tax of EUR [250-750] million.
Komisija navaja, da je banka DBB/Belfius leta 2012 večkrat po precej znižani ceni ([50–100] % nominalne vrednosti) odkupila lastni dolg, kar ji je omogočilo, da je po obdavčitvi ustvarila [250–750] milijonov EUR dobička.
This profit corresponds to the losses sustained by bond holders and thus helps to share the burden.
Ta dobiček ustreza izgubam, ki so jih utrpeli imetniki delnic in tako prispeva k delitvi bremena.
The Commission further notes that Belfius is not planning, in its restructuring plan, to distribute dividends to shareholders until the end of 2016 in order to step up its regulatory capital.
Komisija nadalje navaja, da družba Belfius zaradi povečanja regulatornega kapitala v načrtu prestrukturiranja do konca leta 2016 ne načrtuje razdelitve dividend delničarjem.
Lastly, the Commission notes that adequate remuneration has been paid for the historical State aid from which DBB/Belfius benefited when it belonged to the Dexia Group, which means that the beneficiary bank is contributing to the restructuring costs.
Komisija še navaja, da je bilo za preteklo državno pomoč plačano ustrezno nadomestilo, do katerega je bila upravičena banka DBB/Belfius, ko je bila del skupine Dexia, kar pomeni, da upravičena banka prispeva k stroškom prestrukturiranja.
Consequently, the Commission considers that DBB/Belfius and its shareholders are contributing enough to the restructuring through their own resources.
Zato Komisija meni, da banka DBB/Belfius in njeni delničarji z lastnimi sredstvi dovolj prispevajo k prestrukturiranju.
Measures to correct distortions of competition
Ukrepi za odpravo izkrivljanja konkurence
According to the Bank Restructuring Communication, the restructuring plan should limit excessive distortions of competition resulting from the aid, in other words, the restructuring plan should include structural measures (sale and/or reduction of activities) and behavioural safeguards.
V sporočilu o prestrukturiranju bank je navedeno, da bi moral načrt prestrukturiranja omejiti pretirano izkrivljanje konkurence, ki izvira iz pomoči, kar pomeni da bi moral načrt prestrukturiranja vsebovati strukturne zaščitne ukrepe (prodaja in/ali zmanjšanje dejavnosti) in zaščitne ukrepe glede ravnanja.
Appropriate measures must be taken to minimise the distortions of competition caused by the State aid for DBB/Belfius.
Sprejeti je treba primerne ukrepe, da se čim bolj zmanjša izkrivljanje konkurence, ki ga povzroča državna pomoč za banko DBB/Belfius.
According to the Bank Restructuring Communication, the nature and form of the measures to limit distortions of competition will depend on two criteria: first, the amount of the aid and the conditions and circumstances under which it was granted and, second, the characteristics of the market or markets in which the beneficiary bank will operate.
V sporočilu o prestrukturiranju bank je navedeno, da se narava in oblika ukrepov za omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence določi na podlagi dveh meril: prvič, na podlagi višine pomoči ter pogojev in okoliščin, v katerih je bila pomoč dodeljena, in drugič, na podlagi značilnosti trgov, na katerih bo poslovala banka upravičenka.
The sale of DBB/Belfius formed part of the orderly resolution of the Dexia Group.
Prodaja banke DBB/Belfius je bila del nadzorovanega reševanja skupine Dexia.
Even when it was in the Dexia Group DBB/Belfius was a major player on the PWB market in Belgium and in insurance in Belgium.
Banka DBB/Belfius je bila celo tedaj, ko je bila del skupine Dexia, pomembnejša udeleženka na trgu bančnih poslov za javnost in podjetja v Belgiji in zavarovanja v Belgiji.
As explained earlier, DBB/Belfius benefited from the aid given to DCL/Dexia when DBB/Belfius still belonged to the Group.
Kot je bilo že pojasnjeno, je bila banka DBB/Belfius upravičena do pomoči za banko DCL/Dexia, ko je bila še del skupine Dexia.
The Commission acknowledges that the distortion of competition created by the aid to the Dexia Group was minimised thanks to the Group’s orderly resolution and removal from the market.
Komisija priznava, da se je zaradi nadzorovanega reševanja skupine Dexia in odstranitve s trga kar najbolj zmanjšalo izkrivljanje konkurence, ki ga je povzročila pomoč skupini Dexia.
As far as the new aid for DBB/Belfius is concerned, the Commission recognises that there has been no new capital injection or measure to treat impaired assets.
Komisija glede nove pomoči za banko DBB/Belfius priznava, da se oslabljena sredstva niso obravnavala z novo kapitalsko injekcijo ali ukrepom.
Separating DBB/Belfius off from the Dexia Group has been the only new structural aid measure, in the sense that it confers a certain advantage, but one that is unquantifiable.
Edini nov strukturni ukrep pomoči, v smislu da daje določeno prednost, a tako, ki je ni mogoče količinsko opredeliti, je bila ločitev banke DBB/Belfius od skupine Dexia.
DBB/Belfius has undoubtedly benefited from temporary emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) from the Banque Nationale de Belgique
Banka DBB/Belfius je nedvomno imela koristi od začasne izredne likvidnostne pomoči banke BNB.
The Commission further notes that DBB/Belfius has undertaken to limit the collection of new life insurance premiums to EUR [0-2,5] billion in 2013 and EUR [0-3] billion in 2014.
Komisija nadalje navaja, da se je banka DBB/Belfius zavezala k omejitvi zbiranja novih premij življenjskega zavarovanja, in sicer na [0–2,5] milijarde EUR v letu 2013 in [0-3] milijarde EUR v letu 2014.
This will prevent any increase in DBB/Belfius’ market share in that activity.
S tem se bo preprečilo vsako povečanje tržnega deleža banke DBB/Belfius v tej dejavnosti.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that the restructuring plan does not provide for any increase in DBB/Belfius’ market share in any of its key RCB, PWB and insurance activities.
Komisija prav tako navaja, da v načrtu prestrukturiranja ni določeno kakršno koli povečanje tržnega deleža banke DBB/Belfius v kateri koli od njenih ključnih dejavnosti, tj. pri bančnih poslih za javnost in podjetja, poslovanju s prebivalstvom in komercialnem bančništvu ter zavarovanju.
The restructuring plan will lead to a 20 % reduction in DBB/Belfius’ balance sheet total between 2011 and 2016.
V obdobju 2011–2016 se bo bilančna vsota banke DBB/Belfius z načrtom prestrukturiranja zmanjšala za 20 %.
DBB/Belfius is subject to certain behavioural ‘safeguards’, such as the fact that it will not make any acquisition of the share capital of other companies until 31 December 2014, so that the State aid and related aid measures cannot be used to generate external growth to the detriment of its competitors.
Za banko DBB/Belfius veljajo določeni zaščitni ukrepi glede ravnanja, kot na primer dejstvo, da do 31. decembra 2014, ne bo prevzemala tveganega kapitala v drugih družbah, tako da se državna pomoč in z njo povezani ukrepi ne morejo uporabiti za ustvarjanje zunanje rasti v škodo njenih konkurentov.
This principle is in line with point 40 of the Bank Restructuring Communication in particular.
To načelo je skladno zlasti s točko 40 sporočila o prestrukturiranju bank.
Lastly, the Belgian authorities have given an undertaking that DBB/Belfius will not benefit commercially from the fact that it has received support from the Belgian State.
Belgijski organi so se nazadnje zavezali, da banka DBB/Belfius zaradi pomoči države Belgije ne bo imela poslovnih koristi.
In the light of Dexia’s own contribution and the measures taken on its principal markets, the Commission concludes that all of the structural measures in the restructuring plan are enough to limit excessive distortions of competition resulting from the aid in question.
Komisija glede na lastni prispevek skupine Dexia in ukrepov, sprejetih na njenih glavnih trgih, ugotavlja, da vsi strukturni ukrepi iz načrta prestrukturiranja zadostujejo za omejitev pretiranega izkrivljanja konkurence, ki izhaja iz obravnavane pomoči.
Monitoring of measures
Spremljanje ukrepov
The Commission notes that the Bank Restructuring Communication recommends that the Member States concerned should submit regular detailed reports to the Commission to enable it to verify that the restructuring plan is being implemented in accordance with the commitments notified.
Komisija navaja, da je v sporočilu o prestrukturiranju bank priporočeno, naj zadevne države članice Komisiji pošiljajo redna podrobna poročila, da bo lahko preverila, ali se načrt prestrukturiranja izvaja v skladu s priglašenimi zavezami.
In that respect, the Commission will be sent six-monthly and end-of-year reports by the independent trustee responsible for monitoring the restructuring plan, at the latest 30 working days after each six-month period throughout the duration of the plan.
V zvezi s tem bo neodvisni skrbnik, odgovoren za spremljanje načrta prestrukturiranja, Komisiji v 30 delovnih dneh po koncu vsakega polletja pošiljal šestmesečno poročilo in poročilo ob koncu leta, dokler se ta načrt ne zaključi.
COMPATIBILITY OF DEXIA’S RESOLUTION PLAN
ZDRUŽLJIVOST NAČRTA REŠEVANJA SKUPINE DEXIA
The Commission must assess the compatibility with the internal market of all the aid measures concerned in the light of the guidelines it adopted for the banking sector against the background of the financial crisis, and in particular in the light of the Bank Restructuring Communication and the Banking Communication.
Komisija mora proučiti združljivost vseh zadevnih ukrepov pomoči z notranjim trgom glede na smernice, ki jih sprejela za bančni sektor ob upoštevanju bančne krize, in še zlasti glede na sporočilo o prestrukturiranju bank in sporočilo o bančništvu.
Under the terms of point 21 of the Bank Restructuring Communication, an orderly winding-up or the auctioning-off of a failed bank should always be considered where a bank cannot credibly return to long-term viability.
Pod pogoji točke 21 sporočila o prestrukturiranju bank je treba vedno razmisliti o pravilni likvidaciji ali prodaji neuspešne banke na dražbi, če banka ne more kredibilno ponovno začeti dolgoročno uspešno poslovati.
The Banking Communication defines the general principles of controlled winding-up [168].
V sporočilu o bančništvu so opredeljena splošna načela nadzorovane likvidacije [168].
It states that controlled liquidation may be applied in individual cases, where restructuring aid has been granted to a financial institution and it becomes clear that it cannot be restructured successfully.
V njem je navedeno, da se lahko takšna nadzorovana likvidacija uporablja v posameznih primerih, kadar je bila dodeljena pomoč za reševanje posamezni finančni instituciji, ko postane jasno, da te ni mogoče uspešno prestrukturirati.
In order to be compatible with the internal market as provided for in Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, liquidation aid must, according to the Commission’s practice in its decisions [169], satisfy the following three general conditions:
Da bi bila pomoč za likvidacijo združljiva z notranjim trgom, kot je določeno v členu 107(3)(b) PDEU, mora v skladu s prakso Komisije pri njenih odločbah [169] izpolnjevati naslednje tri splošne pogoje: