natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The restructuring plan approved by the Commission in the Parex Final Decision provided that the rescue aid previously approved by the Commission was to be extended until the end of the restructuring period and split between Citadele and Reverta.
likvidnostno podporo v obliki depozitov države za banki Citadele in Reverta [14];
The Parex Final Decision also approved additional restructuring aid for Reverta and Citadele.
državnimi poroštvi za obveznosti bank Citadele in Reverta [15];
It also laid down a utilisation mechanism for the aid which had been provisionally approved through the Rescue Decisions after Parex banka was split, in regard to:
državno dokapitalizacijo za banki Reverta in Citadele [16] ter
liquidity support in the form of State deposits for both Citadele and Reverta [14];
ukrepom finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva za banko Citadele [17].
State guarantees on liabilities of Citadele and Reverta [15];
OPIS RAZLOGOV ZA ZAČETEK FORMALNEGA POSTOPKA PREISKAVE
a State recapitalisation for Reverta and Citadele [16]; and
Dodatni ukrepi, ki jih je Latvija izvedla za banke Parex, Citadele in Reverta
an asset relief measure for Citadele [17].
Na podlagi poročila, ki ga je nadzorni skrbnik predložil 29. avgusta 2013 [18], ter dokumentov in informacij, ki jih je Latvija zagotovila od oktobra 2013, je razvidno, da je Latvija brez predhodne priglasitve Komisiji sprejela naslednje ukrepe:
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
22. maja 2009 je banki Parex odobrila podrejeni dolg v znesku 50,27 milijona LVL (kapital 2. reda) z rokom zapadlosti sedmih let, tj. do 21. maja 2016 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: prvi ukrep).
The additional measures implemented by Latvia for Parex banka, Citadele and Reverta.
Rok zapadlosti tega podrejenega dolga presega najdaljši rok zapadlosti petih let, določen v prvem sklepu o reševanju in potrjen v končnem sklepu o banki Parex;
Based on the report submitted on 29 August 2013 by the Monitoring Trustee [18] and documents and information submitted by Latvia since October 2013, it appeared that Latvia had put into effect the following measures without prior notification to the Commission:
27. junija 2013 je banki Citadele odobrila dodatno 18-mesečno podaljšanje roka zapadlosti (v nadaljnjem besedilu: drugi ukrep) za podrejene dolgove v znesku 37 milijonov LVL (od 45 milijonov LVL dolgov Latvije na navedeni datum) [19].
on 22 May 2009, Latvia granted to Parex banka a subordinated loan of LVL 50,27 million (qualifying as Tier 2 capital) with a maturity of seven years, i.e. until 21 May 2016 (the ‘First Measure’).
Latvija podaljšanja roka zapadlosti podrejenih dolgov ni priglasila Komisiji;
The maturity of that subordinated loan exceeds the maximum five-year maturity set in first rescue Decision and confirmed in the Parex Final Decision;
poleg tega Latvija od leta 2011 banki Reverta zagotavlja likvidnostno podporo, ki presega najvišje zgornje meje, ki jih je Komisija odobrila v končnem sklepu o banki Parex (v nadaljnjem besedilu: tretji ukrep) za osnovni in najslabši mogoči scenarij [20].
On 27 June 2013, Latvia granted Citadele an additional 18-month extension of the maturity (the ‘Second Measure’) of LVL 37 million of subordinated loans (out of a total of LVL 45 million held by Latvia at that time) [19].
Komisija je ob upoštevanju informacij o prvem in drugem ukrepu, ki so ji bile na voljo ob sprejetju sklepa o začetku postopka, resno dvomila, da bi se lahko ta ukrepa štela za združljiva z notranjim trgom, ker:
Latvia did not notify the extension of the maturity of the subordinated loans to the Commission.
je bila v prvotni oceni združljivosti podrejenih dolgov, ki jih odobri Latvija, petletna zapadlost dolgov opredeljena kot najkrajša potrebna in se je lahko zato na tej podlagi štela za združljivo ter
In addition, since 2011 Latvia has provided Reverta with liquidity support in excess of the maximum limits approved by the Commission in the Parex Final Decision (the ‘Third Measure’), both for the base case and for the worst case scenarios [20].
niso bile predložene nobene nove utemeljitve, ki bi upravičile, da je daljša zapadlost resnično nujno potrebna.
Based on the information available to the Commission at the time of the Opening Decision, in regard to the First and Second Measures, the Commission had serious doubts that they could be qualified as compatible with the internal market, considering that:
Podobno ob sprejetju sklepa o začetku postopka niso bile predložene ustrezne utemeljitve, ki bi dokazovale združljivost tretjega ukrepa.
in the original assessment of the compatibility of the subordinated loans granted by Latvia, a five-year maturity of the loans was deemed the minimum necessary and therefore could be found compatible on that basis and
Na podlagi tega je Komisija začela formalni postopek preiskave v skladu s členom 13(1) in členom 4(4) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 [21] v zvezi z nezakonito pomočjo, odobreno s prvim, drugim in tretjim ukrepom iz uvodne izjave 19.
no new arguments had been presented to justify why a longer maturity was in fact the strict minimum necessary.
Kršitev zaveze odprodaji dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja banke Citadele
Similarly, no sufficient arguments had been brought forward at the time of the Opening Decision to demonstrate the compatibility of the Third Measure.
Latvija prav tako ni izpolnila svoje zaveze iz končnega sklepa o banki Parex, da bo odprodala dejavnost upravljanja premoženja banke Citadele, in sicer do 30. junija 2013 brez skrbnika za odprodajo oziroma do 31. decembra 2013 s skrbnikom za odprodajo (v nadaljnjem besedilu: četrti ukrep) [22].
On those grounds, the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure pursuant to Articles 13(1) and 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 [21], in regard to the unlawful aid granted through the First, Second and Third Measures described in recital 19.
Zato je bila kršena zaveza odprodaji dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja banke Citadele do navedenih rokov.
The breach of the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka sklenila, da kršitev zaveze iz uvodne izjave 21 pomeni zlorabo pomoči.
Latvia has also failed to comply with its commitment which is recorded in the Parex Final Decision to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele by 30 June 2013 without a Divestiture Trustee, or by 31 December 2013 with a Divestiture Trustee (the ‘Fourth Measure’) [22].
Komisija se je zato odločila, da bo začela formalni postopek preiskave v zvezi z zlorabo pomoči v skladu členom 16 Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999.
Therefore that commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele by those deadlines has been breached.
PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANI
In the Opening Decision, the Commission concluded that the breach of the commitment described in recital 21 constitutes misuse of aid.
Komisija je po sprejetju sklepa o začetku postopka prejela pripombe subjekta, ki ni zagotovil dokazil, da izpolnjuje pogoje za razvrstitev kot zainteresirana stran, tj. stran, na katere interese bi lahko vplival ukrep (npr. konkurenčne družbe in poklicna združenja [23]), ali da deluje v imenu zainteresirane strani.
Therefore, the Commission decided to open the formal investigation procedure for misuse of aid pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Prejete pripombe so se nanašale na domnevne nezakonitosti v zvezi z banko Parex in ne na prvi, drugi in tretji ukrep, ki jih je Latvija izvedla v zvezi bankami Parex, Citadele in Reverta, ali na četrti ukrep.
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
Pravzaprav se nanašajo na dejstva in informacije, ki niso neposredno pomembne za izvajanje pravil o državni pomoči v obravnavanem primeru.
Following the Opening Decision the Commission received comments from one individual that did not provide elements demonstrating that he qualifies as an interested party, i.e. a party whose own interests might be affected by the measure (for example competitors or trade associations [23]), or that he acted on behalf of an interested party.
Zato so se za oceno, izvedeno v okviru tega sklepa, zabeležile in obravnavale kot splošne tržne informacije.
The comments received were related to alleged illegalities involving Parex banka and were not related to the First, Second and Third Measures implemented by Latvia for Parex banka, Citadele and Reverta nor to the Fourth Measure.
PRIPOMBE LATVIJE O FORMALNEM POSTOPKU PREISKAVE
They essentially relate to facts and information not directly relevant for the enforcement of State aid rules in the case at stake.
Po sprejetju sklepa o začetku postopka je Latvija 26. maja 2014 predložila pripombe v zvezi z dvomi, ki jih je Komisija izrazila o združljivosti prvega, drugega in tretjega ukrepa, ter v zvezi s kršitvijo zaveze odprodaji dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja banke Citadele.
Therefore, for the assessment carried out in the present decision they have been registered and considered as generic market information.
Latvija je 30. maja 2014 predložila tudi posodobljen načrt prestrukturiranja, ki je vključeval informacije in izravnalne ukrepe, predstavljene v oddelkih 5.1 do 5.5 tega sklepa.
COMMENTS FROM LATVIA ON THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
Potem ko je Komisija zahtevala informacije, je Latvija 23. junija 2014 predložila dodatne elemente v zvezi z drugim ukrepom.
Following the Opening Decision, on 26 May 2014 Latvia submitted comments intended to address the doubts raised by the Commission in regard to the compatibility of the First, Second and Third Measures, as well as the to the breach of the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele.
O prvotnemu roku zapadlosti podrejenih dolgov, ki presega pogoje iz sklepov o reševanju in končnega sklepa o banki Parex (prvi ukrep)
On 30 May 2014 Latvia also submitted an updated restructuring plan, in which the information and compensatory measures presented in sections 5.1 to 5.5 of this Decision were included.
Latvija v pripombah z dne 26. maja 2014 trdi, da je bilo sprejetje prvega ukrepa nujno, da je lahko banka Parex izpolnila veljavne regulativne zahteve glede plačilne sposobnosti ter tako preprečila nepopravljivo zrušitev nestabilnega, obsežno medsebojno povezanega in soodvisnega latvijskega bančnega sistema.
After an information request from the Commission, on 23 June 2014 Latvia submitted additional elements regarding the Second Measure.
Latvija navaja, da so imeli latvijski organi v času sprejetja prvega sklepa o reševanju omejene informacije o dejanskem finančnem položaju banke Parex in kakovosti njenih sredstev.
On the initial maturity of the subordinated loans exceeding the terms of the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision (the First Measure)
Zato se je Latvija v prvotnem zahtevku Komisiji za odobritev ukrepov državne pomoči zavezala, da bo odobrila podrejene dolgove z rokom zapadlosti pet let, saj je bil to najkrajši zahtevani rok zapadlosti, da bi lahko podrejeni dolgovi izpolnjevali pogoje za razvrstitev kot kapital 2. reda v skladu z ustreznimi določbami latvijske zakonodaje.
In its comments of 26 May 2014, Latvia argues that the adoption of the First Measure was necessary to allow Parex banka to comply with the applicable regulatory solvency requirements and so prevent an irremediable collapse of the fragile, largely interconnected and interdependent Latvian banking system.
Latvija v nadaljevanju navaja, da je zaradi boljše ocene finančnega položaja banke Parex družbi PricewaterhouseCoopers naročila, naj opravi skrben pregled banke Parex, ki je bil končan 26. januarja 2009, tj. po sprejetju prvega sklepa o reševanju.
Latvia submits that at the time of the adoption of the first rescue Decision the Latvian authorities had limited information on the actual financial situation of Parex banka and the quality of its assets.
Latvija hkrati poudarja, da so bile razmere na trgu v letih 2008 in 2009 zelo spremenljive in da se je kakovost dolgov slabšala hitreje, kot je bilo pričakovano.
Therefore, in its initial request to the Commission for the approval of the State aid measures, Latvia undertook to grant subordinated loans with five years maturity, as that maturity was the minimum required for subordinated loans to qualify as Tier 2 capital pursuant to the relevant provisions of Latvian law.
Zaradi tega slabšanja razmer je Komisija sprejela tri sklepe o reševanju banke Parex, Latvija pa je predložila več različic načrta prestrukturiranja banke Parex, pri čemer je bila zadnja različica priglašena 11. maja 2009 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: načrt prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009).
Latvia further states that, in order to better evaluate the financial position of Parex banka, it instructed PricewaterhouseCoopers to perform a due diligence of Parex banka, which was completed on 26 January 2009, after the adoption of the first rescue Decision.
Latvija v zvezi s tem pojasnjuje, da so predpostavke in napovedi iz sklepov o reševanju zaradi hitrih sprememb gospodarskega okolja, ki sta jih povzročila predvsem svetovna finančna kriza in zmanjšanje tržnega zaupanja v banko Parex, hitro postale zastarele.
At the same time, Latvia underlines the fact that the market situation in 2008-09 was very dynamic and the quality of loans was deteriorating faster than expected.
Zato je Latvija sklenila, da rok zapadlosti pet let za podrejene dolgove, ki jih je odobrila banki Parex, ne bo več zadostoval za stabiliziranje nestabilnega latvijskega bančnega sistema.
That worsening situation was reflected by and resulted in the adoption by the Commission of three rescue decisions for Parex banka and the submission by Latvia of several versions of the restructuring plan for Parex banka, the latest being that notified on 11 May 2009 (the ‘2009 Restructuring Plan’).
Dejansko se je izkazalo, da je banka Parex, ki je bila takrat sistemska banka, potrebovala odobritev podrejenih dolgov z rokom zapadlosti več kot pet let, da bi lahko izpolnila zahteve glede plačilne sposobnosti in zlasti veljavne zahteve glede kapitalske ustreznosti.
In that context, Latvia explains that the assumptions and projections contained in the Rescue Decisions became quickly outdated, due to the rapid changes in the economic environment mainly driven by the global financial crisis and the decrease of market confidence in Parex banka.
Na podlagi tega je petletni dolg na začetku upravičen le za 80 % zneska za kapitalsko ustreznost, na začetku drugega leta za 60 % itd.
Indeed it turned out that Parex banka, a systemic bank at that time, needed to receive subordinated loans with maturity of more than five years to fulfil its solvency requirements and in particular to meet applicable capital adequacy requirements.
Določitev roka zapadlosti podrejenih dolgov, ki jih je Latvija odobrila banki Parex, na sedem let se je izkazala za nujno, da bi lahko vsi podrejeni dolgovi v skupnem znesku 50,27 milijona LVL, ki jih je odobrila država, izpolnjevali pogoje za razvrstitev kot kapital 2. reda v letih 2009 in 2010 in da bi tako banka Parex dosegla ciljni količnik kapitalske ustreznosti.
Under the regulatory framework (based on Basel II standards [24]) applicable to Parex banka at the time of the issuance of the subordinated loans only 80 % of the five-year loans of LVL 50,27 million (i.e. only LVL 40,22 million) would have qualified as Tier 2 capital.
V preglednici 1 so prikazani zneski upravičenega kapitala 2. reda banke Parex ob koncu posameznega leta na podlagi roka podrejenega dolga v znesku 50,27 milijona LVL, izdanega maja 2009.
In particular, for regulatory purposes a cumulative discount (or amortization) factor had to be applied annually to the amount of subordinated loans to reflect the diminishing value of those instruments as positive components of the regulatory capital.
Preglednica 1
As a result, a five-year loan at inception is only eligible for 80 % of its amount for capital adequacy purposes; for 60 % at the beginning of year two; and so on.
Rok podrejenega dolga, izdanega maja 2009, in njegova razvrstitev kot kapital 2. reda (v milijonih LVL)
That submission is further substantiated by Latvia through comparative calculations showing that, if the subordinated loans had been granted by Latvia for a term of five years only, they would not have been fully eligible as Tier 2 capital since their inception.
Rok zapadlosti
Setting the maturity of subordinated loans granted by Latvia to Parex banka at seven years turned out to be necessary to allow the whole amount of LVL 50,27 million subordinated loans granted by the State to qualify as Tier 2 capital over the period 2009-10 as so to allow Parex banka to meet its target capital adequacy ratio.
etni dolg
Table 1 illustrates the amounts of eligible Tier 2 capital held by Parex banka at the end of each year based on the term of subordinated loan of LVL 50,27 million issued in May 2009.
Nazadnje, Latvija trdi, da bi moral načrt prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009 v primeru le petletnega roka zapadlosti podrejenega dolga vključevati še druge ukrepe za povečanje kapitalske ustreznosti banke Parex (npr. injekcije svežega lastniškega kapitala, takojšnje podaljšanje podrejenih dolgov itd.).
Table 1
Če taki ukrepi ne bi obstajali, vlagatelji ne bi bili zaščiteni, stabilnost latvijskega finančnega sistema pa bi bila resno ogrožena.
Maturity Term
Minimalni zahtevani količnik kapitalske ustreznosti je pred marcem 2013 znašal 8,4 %.
ear loan
Latvija navaja, da je bil drugi ukrep sprejet v dobri veri, ker je bil ta ukrep po mnenju latvijskih organov v skladu z načelom vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji in ker državi ne povzroča materialne škode.
Latvia explains that on 9 June 2009 Nomura International (appointed by Latvia in March 2009 to organise the sale of Parex banka) presented to the Latvian authorities a sale strategy for Parex banka with a very aggressive timetable, planning for the sale process to be completed in 2010.
Latvija dalje navaja, da je ob sprejetju drugega ukrepa tako kot banka Citadele v dobri veri menila, da je bila možnost podaljšanja roka zapadlosti zadevnega podrejenega dolga predvidena v ustreznih sklepih Komisije in načrtu prestrukturiranja.
Finally, Latvia argues that, if the maturity of the subordinated loan had been five years only, the 2009 Restructuring Plan should have included other measures aimed at strengthening otherwise the capital adequacy of Parex banka (e.g. injections of fresh equity, immediate extension of the subordinated loans etc.).
Če banka Citadele takrat ne bi izpolnjevala strožjih zahtev glede kapitalske ustreznosti, ki jih je naložila Komisija za finančne in kapitalske trge, bi bili ogroženi stabilnost, uspešno poslovanje in tržljivost banke, kar bi nazadnje vplivalo na možnost prodaje pod dobrimi finančnimi pogoji.
In the absence of such measures depositors would have been left unprotected and the stability of the Latvian financial system would have been significantly threatened.
Latvija je predložila tudi hipotetični scenarij, v katerem drugi ukrep ni bil sprejet.
On the un-notified maturity extension of the subordinated loans (the Second Measure)
V hipotetičnem scenariju priporočeni količnik kapitalske ustreznosti ne bi bil dosežen, saj bi bil 31. decembra 2013 manjši od 9,3 % v primerjavi z zahtevanim 10-odstotnim minimalnim količnikom.
In regard to the Second Measure, Latvia submits that the further extension of the subordinated loan maturity was necessary due to regulatory changes which occurred in 2013.
Latvija tudi trdi, da alternativni ukrepi za povečanje kapitalske ustreznosti banke Citadele (tj. povečanje kapitala ali izdaja novih podrejenih dolgov) niso bili izvedljivi.
In particular, on 1 March 2013, Citadele was informed by the Latvia's Financial and Capital Market Commission (‘FCMC’) that the Group's capital adequacy ratio was required to reach 10 % minimum in absolute terms by the end of 2013, whereas the recommended ratio for addressing existing and potential risks was […].
Zlasti navaja, da banka Citadele leta 2013 ob upoštevanju zaveze latvijskih organov odprodaji banke Citadele v kratkem roku (tj. do 31. decembra 2014) ne bi mogla pridobiti podrejenih dolgov pri tretjih vlagateljih.
Prior to March 2013, the minimum required capital adequacy ratio had been 8,4 %.
Negotovost glede morebitnega pridobitelja in njegove prihodnje strategije bi ponudnike podrejenega dolga pripravila do tega, da bi za vsak podrejeni dolg, ki bi ga odobrili banki Citadele, zahtevali prodajno opcijo (sprememba klavzule o nadzoru) [25].
Latvia submits that the Second Measure was adopted in good faith, as the Latvian authorities considered that Measure as being in line with the market economy investor principle, and as it does not result in pecuniary losses of the State.
To bi pomenilo, da bi se dejanski rok zapadlosti takih podrejenih dolgov ob izdaji štel za krajšega od pet let, zato dolgovi ne bi izpolnjevali pogojev za razvrstitev kot kapital 2. reda.
Latvia further declares that at the time of the adoption of the Second Measure, it along with Citadele considered in good faith that the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated loan in question had been provided for under the relevant Commission Decisions and the Restructuring Plan.
V zvezi s tem poudarjajo, da je bilo sprejetje drugega ukrepa nujno, da banka Citadele ne bi kršila novih strožjih kapitalskih zahtev, ker je bila ta kršitev sicer neizogibna.
Latvia argues that any market investor, being in the position of the majority shareholder of Citadele, would have made its best efforts to maintain, to the extent possible, the value of its investment and would have been inclined to adopt and implement the measures necessary in order to prevent the book value of its shareholding from being diminished as a result of the bank failing to meet its capital requirements.
Latvija trdi, da je morala nemudoma podaljšati rok zapadlosti svojega podrejenega dolga v banki Citadele in da se ni pogajala o primerljivem podaljšanju v zvezi s podrejenim dolgom, ki je prav tako v lasti banke EBOR.
Had Citadele failed to comply with the more stringent capital adequacy requirements imposed by the FCMC at that time, the bank's stability, viability and marketability would have been jeopardized, ultimately affecting possibility of a sale in good financial conditions.
Latvija navaja, da je sklep v zvezi s tem sprejela na podlagi naslednjih treh točk.
Latvia also presents a counterfactual scenario, in which the Second Measure had not been granted.
Nujnost učinkovitega obravnavanja neizogibne kršitve novih kapitalskih zahtev: Banka Citadele je preračunala svoje potrebe po izpolnjevanju pogojev za kapital 2. reda in sklenila, da bi bilo za razliko od sprejetja drugega ukrepa, ki bi vključeval podaljšanje roka zapadlosti za 18 mesecev, v zvezi s kakršno koli morebitno spremembo zapadlosti podrejenega dolga, katerega imetnica bi bila tudi banka EBOR, potrebno bistveno večje podaljšanje.
Latvia also argues that alternative measures to strengthen the capital adequacy of Citadele (i.e. a capital increase or issuance of new subordinated loans) were not feasible.
Latvija navaja tudi, da bi podaljšanje podrejenega dolga v imetništvu banke EBOR predpostavljalo pogajanja z banko EBOR v zvezi s tem.
More specifically, it states that it would have been impossible for Citadele to obtain subordinated loans from third party investors in 2013 given the commitment of the Latvian authorities to divest Citadele within a short timeframe (i.e. by 31 December 2014).
Poleg tega bi ob upoštevanju razlik glede zakonske pristojnosti in splošne nujne pravne strukture, ki bi jo bilo treba vzpostaviti, podaljšanje podrejenega dolga, katerega imetnica je bila tudi banka EBOR, hkrati pa podaljšanje dela podrejenega dolga le v imetništvu Latvije zahtevalo zapleteno pravno ureditev.
Uncertainty regarding the potential acquirer and its future strategy would have prompted subordinated loan providers to demand a put option on any subordinated loan granted by them to Citadele (change of control clause) [25].
Latvija poudarja, da je v času podaljšanja menila tudi, da bi odprodaja banke Citadele s podaljšanjem roka zapadlosti podrejenega dolga v imetništvu banke EBOR postala težavnejša, saj bi v času prodaje obstajalo več medsebojno povezanih pogodb o podrejenem dolgu.