natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission acknowledges that these Articles exist but notes that the GOC, the banks and the sampled companies concerned were unable to demonstrate that loans were made without interference – given the preferential lending to the solar glass industry – and with a credit assessment – as despite requests no loan agreements or risk assessments, including credit ratings, were provided as exhibits or found linked to any loan provided to any sampled exporting producer.
Banke morajo tudi zagotoviti kreditno podporo za spodbujane industrije v skladu s sklepoma št. 40 in št. 9, ki imata zakonsko moč.
Second, banks are required to provide credit support to encouraged industries under Decision No 40 and Decision No 9, which have the force of law.
Kitajska vlada je med pregledom ministrstva za trgovino potrdila, da je industrija solarnega stekla spodbujana industrija.
The GOC confirmed during the inspection of the Ministry of Commerce that solar glass is an encouraged industry.
To je v skladu z glavnim katalogom o prestrukturiranju industrije iz leta 2011, ki ga je kitajska vlada priložila izpolnjenemu vprašalniku in ki solarno steklo uvršča med spodbujane industrije.
This is in line with the Industrial Restructuring Guidance Catalogue of 2011, which was provided by the GOC in its questionnaire reply and which classifies solar glass in the encouraged category.
Sklep št. 40 zagotavlja usmeritev za vse finančne institucije v obliki zavezujočih navodil glede spodbujanja in podpore spodbujanih industrij, pri čemer je industrija solarnega stekla spodbujana industrija.
Decision No 40 provides guidance to all financial institutions in the form of binding instructions on the promotion and support of encouraged industries, and the solar glass industry constitutes an encouraged industry.
Kitajska vlada je po razkritju izpodbijala oceno učinka sklepa št. 40 in priloženih uredb ter sklepa št. 9, ki jo je pripravila Komisija.
Following disclosure the GOC disputed the Commission’s assessment of the impact of Decision No 40 and the Regulations attached, and Decision No 9.
Komisija ponovno poudarja, da sklep št. 40 in priložene uredbe po njeni oceni določajo potrebe nacionalnega gospodarstva.
The Commission restates that its assessment of both Decision No 40 and the Regulations attached is that they set out the needs of the national economy.
Opredeljujejo strategijo za vlado in finančni sektor ter zlasti za neposredno posojanje spodbujanim industrijam, kot je industrija solarnega stekla, s strani finančnih institucij.
They set out a strategy for government and for the financial sector and in particular direct lending by financial institutions to encouraged industries such as solar glass.
Kitajska vlada je bila pozvana, naj pojasni pravni status sklepa državnega sveta, in sicer sklepa št. 40.
The GOC were asked to clarify the legal status of a Decision of the State Council such as Decision No 40.
Odgovorila je le, da je to uredba, ki jo je izdal državni svet, in da ni del kitajske zakonodaje.
Their only reply was that it is a Regulation issued by the State Council and does not form part of Chinese law.
Vendar pa v podporo tej trditvi ni predložila nobenega dokaza.
However they provided no evidence to substantiate that argument.
Stališče, ki ga zastopa kitajska vlada, je v nasprotju z javno dostopnimi informacijami, v katerih je državni svet naveden kot najvišji upravni organ z upravnimi pooblastili za sprejemanje predpisov.
The view taken by the GOC is in contradiction with publicly available information, which describes the State Council as the highest administrative authority with administrative rule-making power.
Glede na te vire so sklepi državnega sveta pravno zavezujoči predpisi [14].
According to those sources, Decisions of the State Council are legally binding rules.
Komisija na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev zato meni, da so sklep št. 40 in izvedbeni sklepi, priloženi k navedenemu sklepu, kot je sklep št. 9, upravni predpisi in tako del kitajske zakonodaje.
On the basis of the facts available, the Commission therefore takes the view that Decision No 40 and implementing Decisions attached to that Decision, such as Decision No 9, are administrative Regulations, and as such part of Chinese law.
Komisija zato potrjuje analizo iz uvodne izjave 191 uredbe o sončnih ploščah, v kateri je ugotovljeno, da sta sklepa št. 40 in št. 9 pravno zavezujoča za druge javne organe in gospodarske subjekte.
The Commission therefore confirms the analysis in recital 191 of the solar panels Regulation, which concludes that Decision No 40 and Decision No 9 are legally binding for other public bodies and economic operators.
Komisija je analizirala tudi, ali kitajska vlada bankam v zasebni lasti na Kitajskem zaupa naloge in/ali jim ukazuje, naj zagotovijo preferenčna posojila proizvajalcem solarnega stekla, in sicer v smislu člena 3(1)(a)(iv) osnovne uredbe.
The Commission also analysed whether privately-owned banks in China are entrusted and/or directed by the GOC to provide preferential loans to solar glass producers, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.
Člen 34 zakona o bančništvu se na Kitajskem uporablja tudi za zasebne banke.
Article 34 of the banking law applies also to privately owned banks in China.
Kitajska vlada in zainteresirane strani niso predložile nobenega dokaza, da bi izpodbijale sklep o pravnem položaju iz uvodne izjave 174 uredbe o sončnih ploščah, tj., da jim kitajska vlada naroča enako kot državnim bankam.
The GOC and interested parties have not provided any evidence that the conclusion on the legal situation reached in recital 174 of the solar panels Regulation, namely that the GOC instructs them in the same manner as state-owned banks, ceases to apply.
Člen 34 zakona o bančništvu bankam naroča, da „svojo posojilno dejavnost izvajajo v skladu s potrebami nacionalnega gospodarstva in družbenega razvoja ter v duhu državnih industrijskih politik“ [15].
Article 34 of the banking law states that banks are instructed to ‘carry out their loan business upon the needs of national economy and the social development and with the spirit of state industrial policies’ [15].
V teh okoliščinah, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 188 uredbe o sončnih ploščah, kitajska vlada odloča o strategiji posojil državnih komercialnih bank in zasebnih bank.
In these circumstances, as set out in recital 188 of the solar panels Regulation, the lending strategy of both SOCBs and privately owned banks is decided by the GOC.
Po razkritju je kitajska vlada izpodbijala sklep, da zasebnim bankam v LRK zaupa naloge ali jim ukazuje, zlasti pa je oporekala teži, ki jo je Komisija dala členu 34 zakona o bančništvu, z navedbo, da je „to, kar predstavlja ‚potrebe nacionalnega gospodarstva‘ odprto za razlago in se očitno razlikuje glede na osebo/organ, ki nadzoruje posojilno dejavnost“.
Following disclosure the GOC disputed the conclusion that they entrust or direct private banks in the PRC and disputed in particular the weight that the Commission has given to Article 34 of the banking law, stating that ‘what constitutes the “needs of national economy” is open to interpretation and obviously differs depending on the person/body scrutinising the provision’.
Poudariti je treba, da je kitajska vlada nasprotovala razlagi Komisije, vendar pa ni predložila svoje razlage lastnega zakona.
It is notable that the GOC, in disagreeing with the Commission’s interpretation, did not present their own interpretation of their own law.
Vendar mora Komisija zgolj upoštevati ugotovitve iz prejšnjih preiskav in razpoložljiva dejstva za ta primer, da bi ponovno potrdila sklep, da so potrebe nacionalnega gospodarstva določene v načrtih in uredbah, ki jih je izdala LRK, pri čemer člen 34 od bank zahteva zagotavljanje posojil v skladu s temi opisi nacionalnega gospodarstva, kar vključuje spodbujanje proizvodnje solarnega stekla.
However the Commission need only refer to the findings in previous investigations, and to the facts available in this case, to reassert the conclusion that the needs of the national economy are set out in the Plans and Regulations issued by the PRC and Article 34 requires banks to lend in line with these descriptions of the national economy, which includes encouraging the production of solar glass.
Zato ostaja ugotovitev, da kitajska vlada zasebnim bankam zaupa naloge in jim ukazuje, da spodbujanim industrijam posojajo v skladu s členom 34 zakona o bančništvu.
The finding remains therefore that the GOC entrusts and directs private banks to lend to encouraged industries in line with Article 34 of the Banking Law.
Komisija je v primeru posojil, ki so jih dodelile državne komercialne banke v LRK, zato sklenila, da gre za finančni prispevek proizvajalcem solarnega stekla v obliki neposrednega prenosa sredstev s strani vlade, kot je navedeno v členu 3(1)(a)(i) osnovne uredbe.
The Commission therefore concludes that in the case of loans provided by SOCBs in the PRC, there is a financial contribution to solar glass producers in the form of a direct transfer of funds by the government as set out in Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation.
Isti dokazi kažejo tudi, da vlada državnim komercialnim bankam (in bankam v zasebni lasti) zaupa naloge ali jim ukazuje, in to posledično pomeni, da gre za finančni prispevek, kot je navedeno v členu 3(1)(a)(iv) osnovne uredbe.
The same evidence also shows that SOCBs (as well as privately owned banks) are entrusted or directed by the government and this consequently means that a financial contribution exists as set out in Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.
Komisija glede specifičnosti ugotavlja, da kitajska vlada namenja preferenčna posojila omejenemu številu industrij in industriji solarnega stekla, ki je kot del fotonapetostnega sektorja ena izmed njih, kot je podrobno navedeno v uvodni izjavi 172 uredbe o sončnih ploščah.
With regard to specificity, the Commission notes that the GOC directs preferential lending to a limited number of industries and the solar glass industry, as part of the PV sector, is one of them, as is set out in detail in recital 172 of the solar panels Regulation.
Kitajska vlada je industrijo solarnega stekla v 12. petletnem načrtu vključila med „ključne“ industrije.
The GOC has included the solar glass industry amongst ‘key’ industries in the 12th Five Year Plan.
Sklep št. 40 navaja, da bo kitajska vlada dejavno podpirala razvoj nove energetske industrije in pospešila razvoj sončne energije.
Decision No 40 states that the GOC will actively support the development of new energy industries and expedite the development of solar energy.
Vsem finančnim institucijam je naročeno, naj zagotovijo kreditno podporo samo za spodbujane projekte, tj. kategorijo, v katero sodijo projekti v zvezi s solarnim steklom.
All financial institutions are instructed to provide credit support only to encouraged projects, the category in which the solar glass projects belong.
Ta odločitev obeta tudi izvajanje „drugih politik ugodnosti za spodbujane projekte“.
That decision also promises the implementation of ‘other preferential policies on the encouraged projects’.
Kitajska vlada je po razkritju izpodbijala ugotovitev glede specifičnosti in zlasti razlago 12. petletnega načrta s strani Komisije z navedbo, da „nima pravne veljavnosti, saj ni zavezujoč dokument“.
Following disclosure the GOC disputed the finding of specificity and in particular the Commission’s reading of the 12th Five Year Plan, stating that it ‘has no legal value as it is not a binding document’.
Komisija se s to izjavo ne strinja in poudarja, da je kitajska vlada v prejšnjih preiskavah navajala enake trditve, ki prav tako niso bile sprejete.
The Commission disagrees with this statement, and notes that the GOC made the same claims in previous investigations, which were also not accepted.
Besedilo 12. petletnega načrta navaja, da je načrt „pretehtal in odobril Nacionalni ljudski kongres in ima pravni učinek“.
The 12th Five Year Plan states that it was ‘deliberated and approved by the National People’s Congress, and it has the effect of law.’
Zato je Komisija sklenila, da subvencije v obliki preferenčnih posojil niso splošno dostopne in so zato specifične v smislu člena 4(2)(a) osnovne uredbe.
The Commission therefore concludes that the subsidies in form of preferential lending are not generally available and are therefore specific in the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation.
Ugodnost obstaja v obsegu, v katerem se vladna posojila ali posojila zasebnih organov na podlagi zaupanja nalog ali ukazov vlade dodelijo pod pogoji, ugodnejšimi od tistih, ki bi jih prejemnik dejansko lahko pridobil na trgu.
A benefit exists to the extent that government loans, or loans from private bodies entrusted or directed by the government, are granted on terms more favourable than the recipient could actually obtain on the market.
Komisija je kot v predhodnih preiskavah poskušala preveriti oceno kreditnega tveganja, ki so jo izvedle banke, ki so posodile denar vzorčenim družbam v OP.
As in previous investigations the Commission attempted to verify the credit risk assessments carried out by the banks that lent money to the sampled companies during the IP.
Družbe niso predložile nobenega dokaza v zvezi z bonitetno oceno, banke pa niso sodelovale v preiskavi.
No evidence was provided by the companies as to their credit rating, and the banks did not cooperate with the investigation.
Komisija zato ni videla nobenega dokaza, da so posojila družbam za proizvodnjo solarnega stekla temeljila na oceni tveganja in da je bila na podlagi tega določena obrestna mera.
The Commission was therefore unable to see any evidence that loans to solar glass companies were based on a risk assessment, and the interest rate set as a result of such exercise.
Komisija se je oprla na razpoložljiva dejstva, da bi ugotovila, ali so preferenčna posojila v LRK proizvajalcem izvoznikom, ki so prejeli posojila od bank v LRK, dejansko prinesla ugodnosti, saj ji kitajska vlada, proizvajalci izvozniki ali banke v zvezi s tem niso predložili nobenih informacij.
In the absence of any information provided by the GOC, the exporting producers or the banks, the Commission relied on facts available to establish whether preferential lending in the PRC did in fact confer a benefit on the sampled exporting producers who had loans from banks in the PRC.
Komisija je tako kot v preiskavi v zvezi s sončnimi ploščami začela s preiskavo uradno objavljenih obrestnih mer centralne banke, tj. LBK, za posojila v kitajskem juanu („CNY“).
The Commission, as in the solar panels investigation, started with the officially published central bank interest rates from the PBOC for loans in Chinese Renminbi Yuan (CNY).
Povprečna obrestna mera je v obdobju preiskave znašala 6,26 %.
The average interest rate over the investigation period was 6,26 %.
Komisija je nato obrestno mero LBK prilagodila tako, da je bilo upoštevano kreditno tveganje zadevnih družb.
The Commission then adjusted the interest rate of the PBOC to take account of the credit risk of the companies concerned.
Vendar pa slednje niso predložile nobenih neodvisnih bonitetnih ocen ali podobnih informacij, ki bi Komisiji omogočile, da izračuna bonitetno oceno.
However they did not provide any independent credit ratings or similar information that would allow the Commission to calculate a credit rating.
V vsakem primeru je Komisija v prejšnjih preiskavah ugotovila, da bonitetne ocene kitajskih družb izkrivlja podpora vlade in da ni nobenega dokaza o smiselni oceni tveganja prejemnikov posojil.
In any event, the Commission has established in previous investigations that credit ratings of Chinese firms are distorted by government support and that there is no evidence of any meaningful risk assessment of loan recipients.
Komisija je zato uporabila isto metodologijo kot v preiskavi v zvezi s sončnimi ploščami, pri čemer je štela, da imajo vse zadevne družbe oceno stopnje nevlaganja „BB“, kot jo je opredelila bonitetna hiša Bloomberg.
The Commission has therefore taken the same methodology as the solar panels investigation and considered all of the companies concerned as having a non-investment grade ‘BB’ rating as defined by the Bloomberg credit rating company.
Razlika v premijah za obveznice, ki so jih izdale družbe z oceno BB in obveznicami, ki so jih izdale družbe z oceno AAA (ki jo imajo obveznice LRK), zabeležene pri Bloombergu, je bila nato prišteta k povprečni obrestni meri za posojila LBK v OP.
The premium on bonds issued by companies with BB ratings against bonds issued by companies with AAA ratings (which the PRC has on its bonds), as recorded by Bloomberg, was then added to the average lending rate of the PBOC during the IP.
Rezultat je bila referenčna obrestna mera za OP za posojila vzorčenim družbam v CYN, ki je znašala 10,37 %.
The result was a benchmark interest rate for the IP, for loans to the sampled companies in CNY, of 10,37 %.
Komisija je s primerjavo referenčne obrestne mere in dejanske obrestne mere, zaračunane zadevnim družbam v OP, ugotovila, da se posojila za industrijo solarnega stekla dodeljujejo pod pogoji in okoliščinami, ugodnejšimi od tržnih.
By comparing this benchmark interest rate to the actual interest rate charged during the IP to the companies concerned the Commission concluded that loans are granted to the solar glass industry at below-market terms and conditions.
Kitajska vlada je po razkritju izpodbijala izbiro referenčne vrednosti s strani Komisije in sklepov, ki jih je Komisija izpeljala iz primerjave referenčne in dejansko plačane obrestne mere.
Following disclosure the GOC disputed the Commission’s choice of benchmark and the conclusions that the Commission has drawn from the comparison between the benchmark and the actual interest paid.
Primerjava referenčne obrestne mere in dejansko plačane obrestne mere jasno kaže, da so vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki, ki so prejeli posojila od kitajskih bank v CNY, plačali manj kot družbe v njihovem finančnem stanju, za katere veljajo običajne tržne obrestne mere.
The comparison between the benchmark and the actual interest paid clearly shows that the sampled exporting producers that borrowed from Chinese banks, in CNY, paid less than the normal commercial interest rates for companies in their financial position.
Komisija se je dejansko zavedala, da je LBK julija 2013 povišala najnižjo obrestno mejo za posojila in jo navedla v dokumentu o razkritju.
Second, the Commission was indeed aware that the PBOC lifted the floor on lending in July 2013 and mentioned it in the disclosure document.
Vendar to ne spremeni sklepa, da se kitajska vlada vmešava v posojilno dejavnost bank na Kitajskem, zlasti z uporabo sklepa št. 40 in priloženih uredb ter določb člena 34 zakona o bančništvu.
However this does not change the conclusion that the GOC interferes in the lending behaviour of banks in China, in particular through the application of Decision No 40 and the attached Regulations, and the provisions of Article 34 of the Banking Law.
Komisija je izračunala referenčno vrednost le za posojila v CNY, saj vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki od kitajskih bank niso prejeli posojil v EUR ali USD.
Third the Commission only calculated a benchmark for loans made in CNY, as the sampled exporting producers did not have loans in EUR or USD from Chinese banks.
Nazadnje je kitajska vlada zahtevala več informacij v zvezi s tem, zakaj je Komisija menila, da bodo vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki prejeli bonitetno oceno BB.
Finally the GOC requested more information as to why the Commission considered that the sampled exporting producers would be credit rated BB.
Bonitetna ocena BB je bila izbrana, ker Komisija ni prejela dokazov o izračunani bonitetni oceni za posamezne vzorčene proizvajalce izvoznike zaradi pomanjkanja sodelovanja zadevnih bank.
The reason that BB credit rating was chosen was because the Commission received no evidence that any credit rating was calculated for any sampled exporting producer because of the lack of cooperation from the banks concerned.
Bonitetna ocena BB ni škodljiv sklep in dejansko koristi zadevnim vzorčenim družbam, saj je najboljša ocena stopnje nevlaganja na finančnih trgih.
The BB credit rating is also not adverse inference, and in fact works in favour of the sampled companies concerned, as it is the best non-investment grade on the financial markets.
Komisija je morala v skladu s členom 28 uporabiti najboljša razpoložljiva dejstva, izpeljana iz sklepov uredbe o sončnih ploščah, ki je za vzorčene družbe uporabljala bonitetno oceno BB.
Under the terms of Article 28 the Commission was obliged to use best facts available, which were taken from the conclusions of the solar panels Regulation, which used a BB credit rating for the companies sampled there.
To se je v tem primeru štelo za razumno, poleg tega pa po razkritju niso bili prejeti nobeni dokazi, da so vzorčene družbe od zadevnih bank prejele različne bonitetne ocene.
This was considered reasonable in this case and no evidence was received after disclosure that the sampled companies were given a different credit rating by the banks concerned.
Sklep
Conclusion
Komisija je na podlagi ugotovitev preiskave sklenila, da je imela industrija solarnega stekla na Kitajskem ugodnosti od preferenčnih posojil v OP, ki so jih dodeljevale državne in zasebne banke.
On the basis of the findings of the investigation, the Commission concludes that the solar glass industry in China benefited from preferential loans in the IP, both from state-owned banks and from private banks.
Financiranje industrije solarnega stekla je subvencija v smislu osnovne uredbe, ker
The financing of the solar glass industry constitutes a subsidy within the meaning of the basic Regulation as there is
obstaja finančni prispevek vlade, kot je navedeno v členu 3(1)(a)(i);
a financial contribution by government as set out in Article 3(1)(a)(i);
gre za zaupanje nalog in ukazovanje s strani vlade, kot je navedeno v členu 3(1)(a)(iv); in
entrustment and direction by government as set out in Article 3(1)(a)(iv); and
to prinaša ugodnosti, kot zahteva člen 3(2).
a benefit is thereby conferred as required by Article 3(2).
Zaradi obstoja finančnega prispevka, ugodnosti za proizvajalce izvoznike in specifičnosti se lahko proti tej subvenciji uvedejo izravnalni ukrepi.
In view of the existence of a financial contribution, a benefit to the exporting producers and specificity, this subsidy should be considered countervailable.
Kitajska vlada je po razkritju izpodbijala uporabo ugotovitev iz prejšnjih preiskav za sprejetje sklepov o subvencioniranju v tem primeru, zlasti pa je trdila, da se je Komisija preveč opirala na ugotovitve iz uredbe o sončnih ploščah.
Following disclosure the GOC challenged the use of findings from previous investigations to reach conclusions on subsidisation in this case, and in particular alleged that the Commission was over-reliant on the findings of the solar panels Regulation.
Ta trditev je bila zavrnjena.
This allegation was rejected.
Kot je že bilo poudarjeno, je bila Komisija zaradi pomanjkanja sodelovanja bank v LRK prisiljena, da uporabi določbe člena 28 in najboljša razpoložljiva dejstva.
As previously noted, given the lack of cooperation from the banks in the PRC the Commission was forced to use the provisions of Article 28 and best facts available.
Najnovejša je preiskava v zvezi s sončnimi ploščami, ki vsebuje najsodobnejše ugotovitve glede subvencioniranja na Kitajskem.
The solar panels investigation is the most recent, and contains the most up-to-date findings on subsidisation in China.
Sončne plošče niso isti izdelek kot solarno steklo, vendar sodijo v isti sektor novih virov energije in so vključene v iste dokumente vladnega načrtovanja.
In the absence of other information, therefore, the use of findings in the solar panels investigation as ‘best facts available’ is appropriate.
V obeh primerih so se po koncu obeh obdobij preiskave zvišale najnižje obrestne mere, zato to ne vpliva na uporabo člena 28 in ugotovitev preiskave v zvezi s sončnimi ploščami kot najboljših razpoložljivih dejstev.