natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is important to lay down detailed rules with a view to ensuring that the statutory audits of public-interest entities are of adequate quality and are carried out by statutory auditors and audit firms subject to stringent requirements.
Določiti je treba podrobna pravila, da bi zagotovili primerno kakovost obveznih revizij subjektov javnega interesa ter da jih izvajajo zakoniti revizorji in revizijska podjetja v skladu s strogimi zahtevami.
A common regulatory approach should enhance the integrity, independence, objectivity, responsibility, transparency and reliability of statutory auditors and audit firms carrying out statutory audits of public-interest entities, contributing to the quality of statutory audits in the Union, thus to the smooth functioning of the internal market, while achieving a high level of consumer and investor protection.
S skupnim regulativnim pristopom bi morali izboljšati integriteto, neodvisnost, nepristranskost, odgovornost, preglednost in zanesljivost zakonitih revizorjev in revizijskih podjetij, ki izvajajo obvezne revizije subjektov javnega interesa, kar bi prispevalo h kakovosti obveznih revizij v Uniji in k nemotenemu delovanju notranjega trga, in hkrati zagotovilo visoko raven zaščite potrošnikov in vlagateljev.
The development of a separate act for public-interest entities should also ensure consistent harmonisation and uniform application of the rules and thus contribute to a more effective functioning of the internal market.
S pripravo posebnega akta za subjekte javnega interesa bi morala biti zagotovljena tudi celostna usklajenost in enotna uporaba pravil, to pa bi prispevalo k učinkovitejšemu delovanju notranjega trga.
These strict requirements should be applicable to statutory auditors and audit firms only insofar as they carry out statutory audits of public-interest entities.
Te stroge zahteve bi bilo treba uporabljati za zakonite revizorje in revizijska podjetja samo, kadar izvajajo obvezno revizijo subjektov javnega interesa.
The statutory audit of cooperatives and savings banks is characterised in some Member States by a system that does not allow them to choose their statutory auditor or audit firm freely.
Za obvezne revizije zadrug in hranilnic je v nekaterih državah članicah značilen sistem, ki ne dovoljuje, da bi prosto izbrale zakonitega revizorja ali revizijsko podjetje.
The audit association to which the cooperative or savings bank belongs as a member is obliged by law to carry out the statutory audit.
Za izvedbo obvezne revizije je pristojno združenje revizorjev, ki mu zadruga ali hranilnica pripada.
Such audit associations act on a non-profit-making basis without pursuing commercial interests, as results from their legal nature.
Taka združenja revizorjev delujejo na neprofitni podlagi brez profitnih interesov, kar je posledica njihove pravne narave.
In addition, the organisational units of these associations are not associated with a common economic interest, which could jeopardise their independence.
Poleg tega organizacijske enote teh revizijskih združenj niso povezane s skupnim ekonomskim interesom, kar bi lahko ogrožalo njihovo neodvisnost.
Accordingly, Member States should have the possibility to exempt cooperatives within the meaning of point (14) of Article 2 of Directive 2006/43/EC, savings banks or similar entities as referred to in Article 45 of Directive 86/635/EEC or their subsidiaries or legal successors from this Regulation provided that the principles of independence laid down in Directive 2006/43/EC are complied with.
Zato bi države članice morale imeti možnost izločiti zadruge, kot so opredeljene v točki 14 člena 2 Direktive 2006/43/ES, hranilnice in podobne subjekte, kot so opredeljeni v členu 45 Direktive 86/635/EGS, ali njihove podružnice ali pravne naslednike na podlagi te uredbe, če so izpolnjena načela o neodvisnosti iz Direktive 2006/43/ES.
The level of fees received from one audited entity and the structure of fees can threaten the independence of a statutory auditor or an audit firm.
Neodvisnost zakonitega revizorja ali revizijskega podjetja lahko ogrozita višina plačil, prejetih od enega revidiranega subjekta, in njihova struktura.
Thus, it is important to ensure that audit fees are not based on any form of contingency and that, when the audit fees from a single client including its subsidiaries are significant, a specific procedure involving the audit committee is established to secure the quality of the audit.
Zato je treba zagotoviti, da plačila za revizijske storitve niso odvisna od kakršnih koli pogojev in da se vzpostavi poseben postopek, ki vključuje revizijsko komisijo, za zagotovitev kakovosti revizij, kadar so plačila za revizijske storitve za eno stranko, vključno z njenimi hčerinskimi podjetji, znatna.
If the statutory auditor or the audit firm becomes excessively dependent on a single client, the audit committee should decide on the basis of proper grounds whether the statutory auditor or the audit firm may continue to carry out the statutory audit.
Če zakoniti revizor ali revizijsko podjetje postane prekomerno odvisen od ene stranke, bi morala revizijska komisija na podlagi utemeljenih razlogov odločiti, ali zakoniti revizor ali revizijsko podjetje lahko še naprej izvaja obvezno revizijo.
When taking such decision, the audit committee should take into consideration, inter alia, the threats to independence and the consequences of such decision.
Pri takšni odločitvi bi morala med drugim upoštevati nevarnosti za neodvisnost in posledice takšnih odločitev.
The provision of certain services other than statutory audit (non-audit services) to audited entities by statutory auditors, audit firms or members of their networks may compromise their independence.
Zakoniti revizorji, revizijska podjetja ali člani njihovih mrež lahko z opravljanjem nekaterih storitev, ki niso obvezne revizije (nerevizijske storitve), za revidirane subjekte ogrozijo svojo neodvisnost.
Therefore, it is appropriate to prohibit the provision of certain non-audit services such as specific tax, consultancy and advisory services to the audited entity, to its parent undertaking and to its controlled undertakings within the Union.
Torej bi bilo treba prepovedati opravljanje nekaterih nerevizijskih storitev, kot so storitve, povezane s posebnimi obdavčitvami, ter posvetovalne in svetovalne storitve za revidirane subjekte ter njihova nadrejena in podrejena podjetja v Uniji.
The services that involve playing any part in the management or decision-making of the audited entity might include working capital management, providing financial information, business process optimisation, cash management, transfer pricing, creating supply chain efficiency and the like.
Storitve, ki vključujejo kakšno koli funkcijo pri upravljanju ali odločanju revidiranega subjekta, bi lahko vključevale upravljanje obratnih sredstev, zagotavljanje finančnih informacij, optimizacijo poslovnega procesa, gotovinsko poslovanje, določanje transfernih cen, zagotavljanje učinkovitosti dobavne verige in podobno.
Services linked to the financing, capital structure and allocation, and investment strategy of the audited entity should be prohibited except the provision of services such as due diligence services, issuing comfort letters in connection with prospectuses issued by the audited entity and other assurance services.
Storitve, ki so povezane s financiranjem, strukturo in razdelitvijo kapitala ter naložbeno strategijo revidiranega subjekta, bi bilo treba prepovedati, razen storitev, kot so storitve na področju skrbnega pregleda poslovanja, izdajanje patronatskih izjav o prospektih, ki jih izdaja revidirani subjekt, in drugih zavarovalniških storitev.
It should be possible for Member States to decide to allow the statutory auditors and the audit firms to provide certain tax and valuation services when such services are immaterial or have no direct effect, separately or in the aggregate, on the audited financial statements.
Državam članicam bi moralo biti omogočeno, da se odločijo, ali bodo odobrile zakonitim revizorjem in revizijskim podjetjem opravljanje določenih nebistvenih davčnih storitev in storitev vrednotenja, če take storitve nimajo neposrednega učinka, ločeno ali skupaj, na revidirane računovodske izkaze.
Where such services involve aggressive tax planning, they should not be considered as immaterial.
Če takšne storitve vključujejo agresivno davčno načrtovanje, jih ne bi smeli obravnavati kot nebistvene.
Accordingly, a statutory auditor or an audit firm should not provide such services to the audited entity.
Zato zakoniti revizor ali revizijsko podjetje ne bi smelo zagotavljati takšnih storitev za revidirani subjekt.
A statutory auditor or an audit firm should be able to provide non-audit services which are not prohibited under this Regulation, if the provision of those services has been approved in advance by the audit committee and if the statutory auditor or the audit firm has satisfied itself that provision of those services does not pose a threat to the independence of the statutory auditor or the audit firm that cannot be reduced to an acceptable level by the application of safeguards.
Zakonitemu revizorju ali revizijskemu podjetju bi moralo biti omogočeno, da zagotavlja nerevizijske storitve, ki niso prepovedane s to uredbo, če to vnaprej odobri revizijska komisija ter če sta se zakoniti revizor ali revizijsko podjetje sama prepričala, da nudenje teh storitev ne predstavlja grožnje za neodvisnost zakonitega revizorja ali revizijskega podjetja, ki je z zaščitnimi ukrepi ni mogoče zmanjšati na sprejemljivo raven.
With a view to avoiding conflicts of interest it is important that the statutory auditor or the audit firm, before accepting or continuing an engagement for a statutory audit of a public-interest entity, assess whether the independence requirements are met, and in particular whether any threats to independence arise as a result of the relationship with that entity.
Da bi preprečili nasprotje interesov, je pomembno, da zakoniti revizor ali revizijsko podjetje pred sprejetjem posla obvezne revizije subjekta javnega interesa ali njegovim nadaljevanjem oceni, ali so izpolnjene zahteve glede neodvisnosti in zlasti ali je ogrožena neodvisnost zaradi razmerja z navedenim subjektom.
The statutory auditor or the audit firm should confirm its independence annually to the audit committee of the audited entity and should discuss with that committee any threat to its independence as well as the safeguards applied to mitigate those threats.
Zakoniti revizor ali revizijsko podjetje bi morala vsako leto revizijski komisiji revidiranega subjekta potrditi svojo neodvisnost ter s to komisijo razpravljati o kakršnih koli nevarnostih za svojo neodvisnost in uporabljenih zaščitnih ukrepih za ublažitev navedenih nevarnosti.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [13] should govern the processing of personal data carried out in the Member States in the context of this Regulation and such processing of personal data should be subject to the supervision of the Member States' competent authorities, in particular the public independent authorities designated by the Member States.
Direktiva 95/46/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [13] bi morala urejati obdelavo osebnih podatkov, ki se izvaja v državah članicah v okviru te uredbe, in taka obdelava osebnih podatkov bi morala biti pod nadzorom pristojnih organov držav članic, zlasti javnih neodvisnih organov, ki jih določijo države članice.
Any exchange or transmission of information by competent authorities should comply with the rules on the transfer of personal data as laid down in Directive 95/46/EC.
Vsaka izmenjava ali prenos informacij s strani pristojnih organov bi morala spoštovati pravila o posredovanju osebnih podatkov, določenimi v Direktivi 95/46/ES.
A sound engagement quality control review of the work carried out in each statutory audit engagement should be conducive to high audit quality.
K visoki kakovosti revizij bi morali prispevati z zanesljivim ocenjevanjem kakovosti posla, izvedenim v okviru vsake obvezne revizije.
Therefore, the statutory auditor or the audit firm should not issue his, her or its audit report until such an engagement quality control review has been completed.
Zato zakoniti revizor ali revizijsko podjetje ne bi smela izdati svojega revizijskega poročila, dokler ni zaključeno takšno ocenjevanje kakovosti posla.
The results of the statutory audit of a public-interest entity should be presented to the stakeholders in the audit report.
Rezultate obvezne revizije subjekta javnega interesa bi bilo treba zainteresiranim stranem predložiti v revizijskem poročilu.
In order to increase the confidence of stakeholders in the financial statements of the audited entity, it is particularly important that the audit report be well-founded and solidly substantiated.
Da bi povečali zaupanje zainteresiranih strani v računovodske izkaze revidiranega subjekta, je zlasti pomembno, da je revizijsko poročilo dobro zasnovano in trdno utemeljeno.
In addition to the information required to be provided under Article 28 of Directive 2006/43/EC, the audit report should in particular include sufficient information on the independence of the statutory auditor or the audit firm and on whether the statutory audit was considered capable of detecting irregularities, including fraud.
Poleg informacij, ki jih je treba zagotoviti v skladu s členom 28 Direktive 2006/43/ES, bi bilo treba v revizijsko poročilo zlasti vključiti zadostne informacije glede neodvisnosti zakonitega revizorja ali revizijskega podjetja in o tem, ali je bilo mogoče pri obvezni reviziji ugotoviti nepravilnosti, vključno s prevarami.
The value of statutory audit for the audited entity would be particularly enhanced if the communication between the statutory auditor or the audit firm, on the one hand, and the audit committee, on the other hand, were reinforced.
Vrednost obvezne revizije za revidirani subjekt bi se zlasti povečala, če bi izboljšali stike med zakonitim revizorjem ali revizijskim podjetjem na eni strani in revizijsko komisijo na drugi strani.
Further to the regular dialogue during the carrying out of the statutory audit, it is important that the statutory auditor or the audit firm submit to the audit committee an additional and more detailed report on the results of the statutory audit.
Poleg rednega dialoga med izvajanjem obvezne revizije je pomembno, da zakoniti revizor ali revizijsko podjetje revizijski komisiji predloži dodatno in podrobnejše poročilo o rezultatih obvezne revizije.
This additional report should be submitted to the audit committee no later than the audit report.
To dodatno poročilo bi moralo biti predloženo revizijski komisiji najpozneje takrat kot poročilo o reviziji.
Upon request, the statutory auditor or the audit firm should discuss key matters which have been mentioned in the additional report with the audit committee.
Na zahtevo bi moral zakoniti revizor ali revizijsko podjetje razpravljati z revizijsko komisijo o ključnih zadevah, navedenih v dodatnem poročilu.
In addition, it should be possible to make such additional detailed report available to competent authorities responsible for the oversight of statutory auditors and audit firms upon their request, and to third parties where national law so provides.
Poleg tega bi morali omogočiti, da je takšno dodatno podrobno poročilo na voljo pristojnim organom, odgovornim za nadzor zakonitih revizorjev in revizijskih podjetij na njihovo zahtevo ter tretjim stranem, če nacionalno pravo tako določa.
Statutory auditors or audit firms already provide competent authorities supervising public-interest entities with information on facts or decisions which could constitute a breach of the rules governing the activities of the audited entity or an impairment of the continuous functioning of the audited entity.
Zakoniti revizorji ali revizijska podjetja pristojne organe, ki nadzirajo subjekte javnega interesa, že obveščajo o dejstvih in odločitvah, ki bi lahko predstavljali kršitve pravil glede dejavnosti revidiranega subjekta ali ogrozili nemoteno poslovanje revidiranega subjekta.
However, supervisory tasks would be facilitated if supervisors of credit institutions and insurance undertakings and their statutory auditors and audit firms were required to establish an effective dialogue with each other.
Vendar bi lahko bilo izvajanje nadzornih nalog lažje, če bi morali nadzorniki kreditnih institucij in zavarovalnic ter njihovi zakoniti revizorji in revizijska podjetja vzpostaviti učinkovit medsebojni dialog.
Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [14] established the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
Uredba (EU) št. 1092/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [14] je vzpostavila Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja (ESRB).
The role of the ESRB is to monitor the build-up of systemic risk in the Union.
Naloga ESBR je spremljati nastanek sistemskega tveganja v Uniji.
Given the information that statutory auditors and audit firms of systemically important financial institutions have access to, their experience could help the ESRB in its work.
Glede na informacije, do katerih imajo dostop zakoniti revizorji in revizijska podjetja sistemsko pomembnih finančnih institucij, bi s svojimi izkušnjami lahko pomagala pri delu ESRB.
Therefore an annual forum for dialogue between statutory auditors and audit firms, on the one hand, and ESRB, on the other, on a sectoral, anonymised basis should be facilitated by this Regulation.
Zato bi bilo treba s to uredbo omogočiti letni forum za dialog med zakonitimi revizorji in revizijskimi podjetji na eni strani in ESRB na drugi, in sicer na sektorski osnovi in anonimno.
In order to increase the confidence in, and the liability of, the statutory auditors and the audit firms carrying out the statutory audit of public-interest entities, it is important that the transparency reporting by statutory auditors and audit firms be increased.
Da bi povečali zaupanje v zakonite revizorje in revizijska podjetja, ki izvajajo obvezno revizijo subjektov javnega interesa, ter njihove odgovornosti, morajo zakoniti revizorji in revizijska podjetja izboljšati poročanje o preglednosti.
Therefore, statutory auditors and audit firms should be required to disclose financial information, showing in particular their total turnover divided into audit fees paid by public-interest entities, audit fees paid by other entities and fees for other services.
Zato bi moralo biti določeno, da zakoniti revizorji in revizijska podjetja razkrijejo finančne informacije, zlasti skupni promet, razdeljen na plačila za revizijske storitve, ki jih plačajo subjekti javnega interesa, plačila za revizijske storitve, ki jih plačajo drugi subjekti, in plačila za druge storitve.
They should also disclose financial information at the level of the network to which they belong.
Razkriti bi morali tudi finančne informacije na ravni mreže, v katero so vključeni.
Statutory auditors and audit firms should provide additional supplementary information on audit fees to competent authorities with a view to facilitating their supervisory tasks.
Zakoniti revizorji in revizijska podjetja bi morali pristojnim organom predložiti dodatne dopolnilne informacije o plačilih za revizijske storitve, da jim olajšajo izvajanje nadzornih nalog.
It is important that the role of the audit committee in the selection of a new statutory auditor or audit firm be reinforced, in the interest of a more informed decision of the general meeting of shareholders or members of the audited entity.
Revizijski komisiji je treba zagotoviti večjo vlogo pri izbiranju novega zakonitega revizorja ali revizijskega podjetja, da lahko skupščina delničarjev ali člani revidiranega subjekta sprejmejo bolj utemeljeno odločitev.
Hence, when making a proposal to the general meeting, the administrative or supervisory body should explain whether it follows the preference of the audit committee and, if not, why.
Zato bi moralo upravno ali nadzorno telo ob predložitvi predloga skupščini pojasniti, ali upošteva izbiro revizijske komisije, če pa je ne, navesti razlog.
The recommendation of the audit committee should include at least two possible choices for the audit engagement and a duly justified preference for one of them, so that a real choice can be made.
Revizijska komisija bi morala v priporočilu predstaviti vsaj dve možnosti za izvedbo revizije in ustrezno utemeljiti izbiro ene od možnosti, da se lahko sprejme dejanska odločitev.
In order to provide a fair and proper justification in its recommendation, the audit committee should use the results of a mandatory selection procedure organised by the audited entity, under the responsibility of the audit committee.
Da lahko revizijska komisija v priporočilu zagotovi pravično in ustrezno utemeljitev, bi morala uporabiti rezultate obveznega postopka izbire, ki ga pod vodstvom revizijske komisije izvede revidirani subjekt.
In such selection procedure, the audited entity should not restrict statutory auditors or audit firms with a low market share from presenting proposals for the audit engagement.
Pri takšnem postopku izbire revidirani subjekt ne bi smel omejevati zakonitih revizorjev ali revizijskih podjetij z majhnim tržnim deležem pri predložitvi predlogov za izvedbo revizije.
Tender documents should contain transparent and non-discriminatory selection criteria to be used for the evaluation of proposals.
V razpisni dokumentaciji bi morala biti navedena pregledna in nediskriminatorna merila za izbor, ki se uporabijo pri ocenjevanju predlogov.
Considering, however, that this selection procedure could entail disproportionate costs for undertakings with reduced market capitalisation or small and medium-sized public-interest entities having regard to their size, it is appropriate to relieve such undertakings and entities from the obligation of organising a procedure for the selection of a new statutory auditor or audit firm.
Vendar je ob upoštevanju dejstva, da bi lahko imela podjetja z zmanjšano tržno kapitalizacijo ali mali in srednje veliki subjekti javnega interesa zaradi takšnega postopka izbire nesorazmerne stroške glede na svojo velikost, primerno, da so takšna podjetja in subjekti oproščeni obveznosti organiziranja postopka za izbor novega zakonitega revizorja ali revizijskega podjetja.
The right of the general meeting of shareholders or members of the audited entity to choose the statutory auditor or the audit firm would be of no value if the audited entity were to enter into a contract with a third party providing for a restriction of such choice.
Pravica skupščine delničarjev ali članov revidiranega subjekta, da izberejo zakonitega revizorja ali revizijsko podjetje, bi bila nična, če bi revidirani subjekt s tretjo osebo sklenil pogodbo, ki bi omejevala takšno izbiro.
Therefore, any clause of a contract entered into by the audited entity with a third party regarding the appointment or restricting the choice to particular statutory auditors or audit firms should be considered null and void.
Zato bi bilo treba vse določbe pogodbe, ki jo sprejmeta revidirani subjekt in tretja oseba v zvezi z imenovanjem ali omejitvijo izbire posameznih zakonitih revizorjev ali revizijskih podjetij, šteti za nične in neveljavne.
The appointment of more than one statutory auditor or audit firm by public-interest entities would reinforce the professional scepticism and help to increase audit quality.
Imenovanje več kot enega zakonitega revizorja ali revizijskega podjetja s strani subjektov javnega interesa bi okrepilo strokovno skrbnost in prispevalo k večji kakovosti revizije.
Also, this measure, combined with the presence of smaller audit firms in the audit market would facilitate the development of the capacity of such firms, thus broadening the choice of statutory auditors and audit firms for public-interest entities.
Ta ukrep bi, skupaj z vključenostjo manjših revizijskih podjetij na revizijskem trgu, olajšal razvoj zmogljivosti takšnih podjetij ter tako razširil izbiro zakonitih revizorjev in revizijskih podjetij za subjekte javnega interesa.