natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In order to preserve financial stability in the Union and increase the positive effects of market integration on growth and welfare, integration of supervisory responsibilities should therefore be enhanced.
Da bi ohranili finančno stabilnost v Uniji in okrepili pozitivne učinke povezovanja trgov na rast in blaginjo, bi bilo torej treba okrepiti integracijo odgovornosti za nadzor.
This is particularly important to ensure a smooth and sound overview over an entire banking group and its overall health and would reduce the risk of different interpretations and contradictory decisions on the individual entity level.
To je še zlasti pomembno z vidika zagotavljanja nemotenega in temeljitega pregleda nad celotno bančno skupino in njenim stanjem, prav tako bi to zmanjšalo nevarnost različnih razlag in protislovnih si odločitev na ravni posameznih subjektov.
The stability of credit institutions is in many instances still closely linked to the Member State in which they are established.
Stabilnost kreditnih institucij je v mnogih primerih še vedno tesno povezana z državo članico, v kateri imajo sedež.
Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually reinforcing market trends.
Dvomi o vzdržnosti javnega dolga, obetih za gospodarsko rast in sposobnostih preživetja kreditnih institucij ustvarjajo negativne tržne trende, ki se medsebojno krepijo.
This may lead to risks to the viability of some credit institutions and to the stability of the financial system in the euro area and the Union as a whole, and may impose a heavy burden for already strained public finances of the Member States concerned.
To lahko ogrozi sposobnost preživetja nekaterih kreditnih institucij in stabilnost finančnega sistema v euroobmočju in Uniji v celoti ter bistveno obremeni že tako javne finance zadevnih držav članic.
The European Parliament has called on various occasions for a European body to be directly responsible for certain supervisory tasks over financial institutions, starting with its resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the Commission communication on implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan [4] and of 21 November 2002 on prudential supervision rules in the European Union [5].
Evropski parlament je večkrat pozval, naj bo za nekatere naloge nadzora nad finančnimi institucijami neposredno odgovoren evropski organ: prvič je to storil v resoluciji z dne 13. aprila 2000 glede sporočila Komisije „Izvajanje okvira za finančne trge: akcijski načrt [4] in v resoluciji z dne 21. novembra 2002 o pravilih bonitetnega nadzora v Evropski uniji [5].
The European Council conclusions of 29 June 2012 invited the President of the European Council to develop a road map for the achievement of a genuine economic and monetary union.
Evropski svet je v sklepih z dne 29. junija 2012 pozval predsednika Evropskega sveta, naj oblikuje časovni načrt za vzpostavitev resnične ekonomske in monetarne unije.
On the same day, the euro Summit pointed out that when an effective single supervisory mechanism is established involving the European Central Bank (ECB) for banks in the euro area, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalise banks directly which would rely on appropriate conditionality, including compliance with State aid rules.
Istega dne je bilo na vrhu euroobmočja izpostavljeno, da bi ob vzpostavitvi učinkovitega enotnega mehanizma nadzora za banke v euroobmočju, v katerega bi bila vključena Evropska centralna banka (ECB), Evropski mehanizem za stabilnost (EMS) lahko neposredno dokapitaliziral banke po postopku rednega odločanja, kar bi bilo odvisno od ustreznih pogojev, vključno z upoštevanjem pravil o državni pomoči.
The European Council on 19 October 2012 concluded that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the Union institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards Member States whose currency is not the euro and by respect for the integrity of the internal market.
Evropski svet je na zasedanju 19. oktobra 2012 ugotovil, da bi poglabljanje ekonomske in monetarne unije moralo izhajati iz institucionalnega in pravnega okvira Unije, njegova značilnost pa bi morali biti tudi odprtost in preglednost v razmerju do držav članic, katerih valuta ni euro, ter spoštovanje celovitosti notranjega trga.
The integrated financial framework will have a single supervisory mechanism which will be open to the extent possible to all Member States wishing to participate.
Integrirani finančni okvir bo imel enotni mehanizem nadzora, ki bo, kolikor bo mogoče, odprt do vseh držav članic, ki bi želele sodelovati.
A banking union should therefore be set up in the Union, underpinned by a comprehensive and detailed single rulebook for financial services for the internal market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism and new frameworks for deposit insurance and resolution.
Zato bi bilo treba v Uniji ustanoviti bančno unijo, ki bi temeljila na celovitih in podrobnih enotnih pravilih za finančne storitve za notranji trg kot celoto, sestavljali pa bi jo enotni mehanizem nadzora in novi okviri za jamstva za vloge in reševanje.
In view of the close links and interactions between Member States whose currency is the euro, the banking union should apply at least to all euro area Member States.
Zaradi tesne povezanosti in soodvisnosti držav članic, katerih valuta je euro, bi morala bančna unija zajemati vsaj vse države članice euroobmočja.
With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market, and to the extent that this is institutionally possible, the banking union should also be open to the participation of other Member States.
Da bi ohranili in utrdili notranji trg, bi morala biti bančna unija, kolikor je to institucionalno mogoče, odprta tudi za sodelovanje drugih držav članic.
As a first step towards a banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union’s policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective manner, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied in the same manner to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non-prudential considerations.
Kot prvi korak k bančni uniji bi moral enotni mehanizem nadzora zagotavljati, da se politika Unije, ki se nanaša na bonitetni nadzor kreditnih institucij, izvaja usklajeno in učinkovito, da se enotna pravila za finančne storitve uporabljajo enako za kreditne institucije v vseh zadevnih državah članicah ter da so te kreditne institucije predmet nadzora najvišje kakovosti, ki ga ne ovirajo drugi pomisleki, ki niso bonitetne narave.
In particular, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) should be consistent with the functioning of the internal market for financial services and with the free movement of capital.
Predvsem bi moral enotni mehanizem nadzora (EMN) biti združljiv z delovanjem notranjega trga finančnih storitev in prostim pretokom kapitala.
A single supervisory mechanism is the basis for the next steps towards the banking union.
Enotni mehanizem nadzora je podlaga za naslednje korake v smeri bančne unije.
This reflects the principle that the ESM will, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalise banks directly when an effective single supervisory mechanism is established.
To je odraz načela, da bo EMS, ko bo učinkovit enotni mehanizem nadzora vzpostavljen, imel možnost neposredne dokapitalizacije bank na podlagi redne odločitve.
The European Council noted in its conclusions of 13/14 December 2012 that ‘In a context where banking supervision is effectively moved to a single supervisory mechanism, a single resolution mechanism will be required, with the necessary powers to ensure that any bank in participating Member States can be resolved with the appropriate tools’ and that ‘the single resolution mechanism should be based on contributions by the financial sector itself and include appropriate and effective backstop arrangements’.
Evropski svet je v sklepih z zasedanja 13. in 14. decembra 2012 zapisal, da „ko bo bančni nadzor dejansko prenesen na enotni mehanizem nadzora, bo potreben enoten mehanizem za reševanje, ki bo imel potrebna pooblastila za zagotovitev, da bo mogoče z ustreznimi orodji reševati katero koli banko v sodelujočih državah članicah“, in da „bi enotni mehanizem za reševanje moral temeljiti na prispevkih finančnega sektorja ter vključevati ustrezno in učinkovito skupno varovalno ureditev“.
As the euro area’s central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out clearly defined supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of the financial system of the Union.
ECB je kot centralna banka euroobmočja z obsežnim strokovnim znanjem na področju makroekonomske in finančne stabilnosti primerna za izvajanje jasno opredeljenih nadzorniških nalog s poudarkom na zaščiti stabilnosti finančnega sistema Unije.
Indeed many Member States’ central banks are already responsible for banking supervision.
V mnogih državah članicah so za nadzor nad bankami že dejansko odgovorne prav centralne banke.
Specific tasks should therefore be conferred on the ECB concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions within the participating Member States.
Zato bi bilo treba na ECB prenesti posebne naloge glede politik, ki se nanašajo na nadzor kreditnih institucij v sodelujočih državah članicah.
The ECB and the competent authorities of Member States that are not participating Member States (‘non-participating Member States’) should conclude a memorandum of understanding describing in general terms how they will cooperate with one another in the performance of their supervisory tasks under Union law in relation to the financial institutions referred to in this Regulation.
ECB in pristojni organi držav članic, ki niso sodelujoče države članice (v nadaljnjem besedilu: nesodelujoče države članice) naj bi sklenili sporazum o sodelovanju, v katerem je na splošno opisano, kako bodo med seboj sodelovali pri opravljanju nadzorniških nalog na podlagi prava Unije v zvezi s finančnimi institucijami, opredeljenimi v tej uredbi.
The memorandum of understanding could, inter alia, clarify the consultation relating to decisions of the ECB having effect on subsidiaries or branches established in the non-participating Member State whose parent undertaking is established in a participating Member State, and the cooperation in emergency situations, including early warning mechanisms in accordance with the procedures set out in relevant Union law.
Sporazum o sodelovanju bi lahko med drugim razjasnil postopek posvetovanja v zvezi z odločitvami ECB, ki učinkujejo na podrejene družbe ali podružnice v nesodelujoči državi članici, katerih nadrejena oseba ima sedež v sodelujoči državi članici, in sodelovanje v izrednih razmerah, vključno z mehanizmi zgodnjega opozarjanja v skladu s postopki, določenimi v upoštevnem pravu Unije.
The memorandum should be reviewed on a regular basis.
Sporazum o sodelovanju se redno pregleduje.
Specific supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union’s policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions should be conferred on the ECB, while other tasks should remain with national authorities.
Na ECB bi bilo treba prenesti tiste posebne nadzorniške naloge, ki so ključnega pomena za zagotovitev usklajenega in učinkovitega izvajanja politike Unije, ki se nanaša na bonitetni nadzor kreditnih institucij, medtem ko bi druge naloge morale ostati v pristojnosti nacionalnih organov.
The ECB’s tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macroprudential stability, subject to specific arrangements reflecting the role of national authorities.
Naloge ECB bi morale vključevati ukrepe za doseganje makrobonitetne stabilnosti, ob upoštevanju posebne ureditve, ki bi odražala vlogo nacionalnih organov.
Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise supervisory tasks in relation to all credit institutions authorised in, and branches established in, participating Member States.
Zato bi bilo treba ECB omogočiti, da nadzorniške naloge opravlja glede vseh kreditnih institucij, ki so pridobile dovoljenje v sodelujočih državah članicah, ter pri vseh podružnicah s sedežem v sodelujočih državah članicah.
When carrying out the tasks conferred on it, and without prejudice to the objective to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions, the ECB should have full regard to the diversity of credit institutions and their size and business models, as well as the systemic benefits of diversity in the banking industry of the Union.
ECB bi morala pri izvajanju nalog, ki se prenesejo nanjo brez poseganja v cilj zagotavljanja varnosti in trdnosti kreditnih institucij v celoti upoštevati raznolikost kreditnih institucij ter njihovo velikost in poslovne modele, pa tudi sistemske koristi, ki jih prinaša raznolikost bančništva Unije.
The exercise of the ECB’s tasks should contribute in particular to ensure that credit institutions fully internalise all costs caused by their activities so as to avoid moral hazard and the excessive risk taking arising from it.
Izvajanje nalog ECB bi še zlasti moralo prispevati k doseganju tega, da bodo kreditne institucije v celoti internalizirale vse stroške, ki nastanejo z njihovimi dejavnostmi, v izogib moralnemu tveganju in iz njega izhajajočemu pretiranemu prevzemanju tveganja.
It should take full account of the relevant macroeconomic conditions in Member States, in particular the stability of the supply of credit and facilitation of productive activities for the economy at large.
Pri tem bi bilo treba v celoti upoštevati makroekonomske razmere v državah članicah, še zlasti stabilnost ponudbe posojil in podpore proizvodnim dejavnostim za gospodarstvo nasploh.
Nothing in this Regulation should be understood as changing the accounting framework applicable pursuant to other acts of Union and national law.
Te uredbe ni v ničemer mogoče razlagati, kot da spreminja računovodski okvir, ki se uporablja na podlagi drugih aktov Unije in nacionalnega prava.
Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities.
Izdaja predhodnega dovoljenja za začetek opravljanja dejavnosti kreditnih institucij je eden od ključnih bonitetnih načinov, s katerim se zagotovi, da te dejavnosti izvajajo zgolj subjekti, ki imajo trdne ekonomske temelje, so organizirani tako, da se lahko soočajo s tveganji, specifičnimi za sprejemanje vlog in dajanje kreditov, ter imajo primerno vodstvo.
The ECB should therefore have the task of authorising credit institutions that are to be established in a participating Member State and should be responsible for the withdrawal of authorisations, subject to specific arrangements reflecting the role of national authorities.
ECB bi zato morala biti zadolžena za izdajanje dovoljenj kreditnim institucijam, ki se ustanovijo v sodelujoči državi članici, in odgovorna za njihov odvzem, ob upoštevanju posebne ureditve, ki bi odražala vlogo nacionalnih organov.
In addition to the conditions set out in Union law for the authorisation of credit institutions and the cases for withdrawal of such authorisations, Member States may currently provide for further conditions for authorisation and cases for withdrawal of authorisation.
Poleg pogojev, ki jih za izdajo dovoljenj kreditnim institucijam in za odvzem takšnih dovoljenj določa pravo Unije, lahko države članice trenutno določajo dodatne pogoje za izdajo dovoljenj in za njihov odvzem.
The ECB should therefore carry out its task with regard to authorisation of credit institutions and withdrawal of the authorisation in case of non-compliance with national law on a proposal by the relevant national competent authority, which assesses compliance with the relevant conditions laid down in national law.
ECB bi zato morala svoje naloge v zvezi z izdajanjem dovoljenj kreditnim institucijam in v zvezi z odvzemanjem dovoljenj v primeru kršitev nacionalnega prava opravljati na predlog zadevnega pristojnega nacionalnega organa, ki ocenjuje izpolnjevanje zadevnih pogojev, opredeljenih v nacionalnem pravu.
An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchase of a significant stake in a credit institution is an indispensable tool for ensuring the continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit institutions’ owners.
Ocena primernosti vsakega novega lastnika pred nakupom znatnega deleža v kreditni instituciji je nepogrešljivo orodje za zagotavljanje stalne ustreznosti in finančne stabilnosti lastnikov kreditnih institucij.
The ECB as a Union institution is well placed to carry out such an assessment without imposing undue restrictions on the internal market.
ECB je kot institucija Unije primerna za izvajanje takšnega ocenjevanja, ne da bi se s tem po nepotrebnem omejeval notranji trg.
The ECB should have the task of assessing the acquisition and disposal of significant holdings in credit institutions, except in the context of bank resolution.
ECB bi morala biti zadolžena za ocenjevanje pridobitve in odsvojitve znatnih deležev v kreditnih institucijah, razen v okviru reševanja bank.
Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on credit institutions’ financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions’ prudential soundness.
Predpogoj za bonitetno trdnost kreditnih institucij je upoštevanje pravil Unije, ki od kreditnih institucij zahtevajo, da imajo v lasti določeno raven kapitala za zaščito pred tveganji, ki so neločljivo povezana z njihovimi dejavnostmi, omejijo izpostavljenost do posameznih nasprotnih strank, javno razkrivajo informacije o svojem finančnem stanju, razpolagajo z zadostnimi likvidnimi sredstvi za zoperstavljanje stresnim tržnim razmeram in omejujejo finančni vzvod.
The ECB should have the task of ensuring compliance with those rules, including in particular by granting approvals, permissions, derogations, or exemptions foreseen for the purposes of those rules.
ECB bi morala biti zadolžena za zagotavljanje ravnanja, skladnega s temi pravili, zlasti tudi kar zadeva izdajanje soglasij, dovoljenj, odstopanj ali izjem, predvidenih v sklopu teh pravil.
Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer, a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate, during periods of economic growth, a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, global and other systemic institution buffers, and other measures aimed at addressing systemic or macroprudential risk, are key prudential tools.
Dodatni kapitalski blažilniki, vključno z varovalnim kapitalskim blažilnikom, proticikličnim kapitalskim blažilnikom, ki zagotavlja, da kreditne institucije v obdobjih gospodarske rasti zberejo zadostno kapitalsko osnovo, da lahko pokrijejo izgubo v obdobjih stresnih razmer, blažilniki za globalne in druge sistemsko pomembne institucije ter drugi ukrepi, namenjeni obvladovanju sistemskih ali makrobonitetnih tveganj, so ključna bonitetna orodja.
In order to ensure full coordination, where national competent authorities or national designated authorities impose such measures, the ECB should be duly notified.
Če pristojni nacionalni organi ali imenovani nacionalni organi uvedejo takšne ukrepe, bi morala biti ECB o tem ustrezno uradno obveščena, da se zagotovi popolno usklajevanje.
Moreover, where necessary the ECB should be able to apply higher requirements and more stringent measures, subject to close coordination with national authorities.
Po potrebi bi morala ECB imeti tudi možnost, da uvede strožje zahteve in ukrepe, pri čemer bi morala tesno sodelovati z nacionalnimi organi.
The provisions in this Regulation on measures aimed at addressing systemic or macroprudential risk are without prejudice to any coordination procedures provided for in other acts of Union law.
Določbe te uredbe, ki zadevajo ukrepe za obvladovanje sistemskih ali makrobonitetnih tveganj, ne posegajo v morebitne usklajevalne postopke iz drugih pravnih aktov Unije.
National competent authorities or national designated authorities and the ECB shall act in respect of any coordination procedure provided for in such acts after having followed the procedures provided for in this Regulation.
Pristojni nacionalni organi ali imenovani nacionalni organi in ECB spoštujejo morebitne usklajevalne postopke iz teh aktov, potem ko so ravnali po postopkih, določenih v tej uredbi.
The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements.
Varnost in trdnost kreditne institucije sta odvisni tudi od dodelitve zadostnega notranjega kapitala, ob upoštevanju tveganj, ki bi jim lahko bila institucija izpostavljena, ter od razpoložljivosti ustreznih notranjih organizacijskih struktur in ureditev korporativnega upravljanja.
The ECB should therefore have the task of applying requirements ensuring that credit institutions in the participating Member States have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and processes for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital.
ECB bi zato morala uveljavljati zahteve, s katerimi bi zagotovili, da so kreditne institucije v sodelujočih državah članicah uvedle stabilno ureditev, procese in mehanizme upravljanja, vključno s strategijami in postopki za ocenjevanje in ohranjanje ustreznosti notranjega kapitala.
In case of deficiencies it should also have the task of imposing appropriate measures including specific additional own funds requirements, specific disclosure requirements, and specific liquidity requirements.
V primeru pomanjkljivosti bi morala naložiti tudi primerne ukrepe, vključno s posebnimi dodatnimi kapitalskimi zahtevami, posebnimi zahtevami glede razkritja in posebnimi zahtevami glede likvidnosti.
Risks for the safety and soundness of a credit institution can arise both at the level of an individual credit institution and at the level of a banking group or of a financial conglomerate.
Tveganja za varnost in trdnost kreditne institucije se lahko pojavljajo tako na ravni posamezne kreditne institucije kot na ravni bančne skupine ali finančnega konglomerata.
Specific supervisory arrangements to mitigate those risks are important to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions.
Za zagotavljanje varnosti in trdnosti kreditnih institucij je treba predvideti posebne nadzorne ureditve, ki ta tveganja zmanjšujejo.
In addition to supervision of individual credit institutions, the ECB’s tasks should include supervision at the consolidated level, supplementary supervision, supervision of financial holding companies and supervision of mixed financial holding companies, excluding the supervision of insurance undertakings.
Poleg nadzora posameznih kreditnih institucij bi morale naloge ECB vključevati konsolidirani nadzor, dopolnilni nadzor, nadzor finančnih holdingov in nadzor mešanih finančnih holdingov, ne pa tudi nadzora zavarovalnic.
In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution’s financial and economic situation must be remedied at an early stage.
Za ohranjanje finančne stabilnosti, je treba proti slabšanju finančnega in gospodarskega stanja institucije posredovati v čim zgodnejši fazi.