natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) establishes the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) composed of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national competent authorities (NCAs) of participating Member States.
Člen 25(2) uredbe o EMN zahteva, da ECB svoje nadzorniške naloge opravlja brez poseganja v svoje naloge, ki se nanašajo na denarno politiko, in v katere koli druge svoje naloge ter ločeno od njih.
Article 25(2) of the SSM Regulation requires the ECB to carry out its supervisory tasks without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks.
Nadzorniške naloge ECB ne bi smele posegati v njene naloge, ki se nanašajo na denarno politiko, niti ne bi smele biti z njimi določene.
The ECB's supervisory tasks should neither interfere with, nor be determined by, its tasks relating to monetary policy.
Poleg tega te nadzorniške naloge ne bi smele posegati v naloge ECB v zvezi z Evropskim odborom za sistemska tveganja (ESRB) ali katere koli druge naloge.
Moreover, these supervisory tasks should not interfere with the ECB's tasks in relation to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) or any other tasks.
Od ECB se zahteva, da Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu poroča, kako izpolnjuje to določbo.
The ECB is required to report to the European Parliament and to the Council as to how it has complied with this provision.
Nadzorniške naloge ECB ne smejo spremeniti stalnega spremljanja plačilne sposobnosti njenih nasprotnih strank za operacije denarne politike.
The ECB's supervisory tasks may not alter the ongoing monitoring of the solvency of its monetary policy counterparties.
Poleg tega bi moralo biti osebje, ki sodeluje pri opravljanju nadzorniških nalog, organizacijsko ločeno od osebja, ki sodeluje pri opravljanju drugih nalog, dodeljenih ECB, in zanj bi morale veljati ločene linije poročanja.
Furthermore, the staff involved in carrying out supervisory tasks should be organisationally separate from the staff involved in carrying out other tasks conferred on the ECB and subject to separate reporting lines.
Člen 25(3) uredbe o EMN zahteva, da ECB za namene člena 25(1) in (2) sprejme in objavi vsa potrebna notranja pravila, vključno s pravili o varovanju poslovne skrivnosti in izmenjavi informacij med obema področjema delovanja.
Article 25(3) of the SSM Regulation requires the ECB, for the purposes of Article 25(1) and (2), to adopt and make public any necessary internal rules, including rules regarding professional secrecy and information exchange between the two functional areas.
Člen 25(4) uredbe o EMN zahteva, da ECB zagotovi, da je pri delovanju Sveta ECB denarna funkcija povsem ločena od nadzorne funkcije.
Article 25(4) of the SSM Regulation requires the ECB to ensure that the operation of the Governing Council is completely differentiated as regards monetary and supervisory functions.
To se odraža tudi pri strogo ločenih sestankih in dnevnih redih.
Such differentiation shall include strict separation of meetings and agendas.
Da bi zagotovili ločenost med nalogami denarne politike in nadzorniškimi nalogami, člen 25(5) uredbe o EMN zahteva, da ECB vzpostavi odbor za mediacijo, ki odpravlja razhajanja med stališči, ki jih izrazijo pristojni organi zadevnih sodelujočih držav članic glede ugovorov Sveta ECB zoper osnutke odločitev Nadzornega odbora.
In order to ensure separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks, Article 25(5) of the SSM Regulation requires the ECB to set up a mediation panel to resolve differences of views expressed by the competent authorities of participating Member States concerned regarding an objection of the Governing Council to a draft decision by the Supervisory Board.
Odbor za mediacijo bo vključeval po enega člana iz vsake sodelujoče države članice, ki ga država članica izbere med člani Sveta ECB in Nadzornega odbora.
It will include one member per participating Member State, chosen by each Member State among the members of the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board.
Svoje odločitve sprejema z navadno večino, pri čemer ima vsak član en glas.
Its decisions are to be made by a simple majority, with each member having one vote.
ECB je dolžna sprejeti in javno objaviti uredbo o vzpostavitvi odbora za mediacijo ter njegov poslovnik;
The ECB is obliged to adopt and make public a regulation setting up the mediation panel and its rules of procedure;
v tem kontekstu je ECB sprejela Uredbo (EU) št. 673/2014 Evropske centralne banke (ECB/2014/26) [2].
in that context, the ECB adopted Regulation (EU) No 673/2014 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/26) [2].
Poslovnik ECB je bil spremenjen [3], da bi se notranja organiziranost ECB in njenih organov odločanja prilagodila novim zahtevam, ki izhajajo iz uredbe o EMN, in da bi se pojasnila razmerja med organi, ki so vključeni v postopek priprave in sprejemanja nadzorniških odločitev.
The ECB's Rules of Procedure have been amended [3] in order to adjust the internal organisation of the ECB and its decision-making bodies to the new requirements arising from the SSM Regulation and clarify the interaction of the bodies involved in the process of preparing and adopting supervisory decisions.
Členi 13g do 13j Poslovnika ECB določajo podrobnosti o sprejemanju odločitev Sveta ECB v zvezi z zadevami, povezanimi z uredbo o EMN.
Articles 13g to 13j of the ECB's Rules of Procedure provide details on the adoption of decisions by the Governing Council regarding matters related to the SSM Regulation.
Natančneje, člen 13g se nanaša na sprejemanje odločitev za namen opravljanja nalog, navedenih v členu 4 uredbe o EMN, člen 13h pa se nanaša na sprejemanje odločitev za namen opravljanja nalog, navedenih v členu 5 uredbe o EMN, s čimer se izpolnjujejo zahteve, določene v členu 26(8) uredbe o EMN.
In particular, Article 13g concerns the adoption of decisions for the purpose of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 4 of the SSM Regulation, and Article 13h concerns the adoption of decisions for the purpose of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 5 of the SSM Regulation, implementing the requirements laid down in Article 26(8) of the SSM Regulation.
Člen 13k Poslovnika ECB določa, da mora ECB nadzorniške naloge opravljati brez poseganja v svoje naloge, ki se nanašajo na denarno politiko, in v katere koli druge naloge ter ločeno od njih.
Article 13k of the ECB's Rules of Procedure provides that the ECB must carry out supervisory tasks without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks.
V tej zvezi se od ECB zahteva, da sprejme vse potrebne ukrepe za zagotovitev ločenosti med funkcijo denarne politike in nadzorno funkcijo.
In this respect, the ECB is required to take all necessary measures to ensure separation between its monetary policy and supervisory functions.
Hkrati ločenost funkcije denarne politike in nadzorne funkcije ne bi smela izključevati izmenjave informacij med tema dvema področjema delovanja, ki so potrebne za izpolnjevanje nalog ECB in Evropskega sistema centralnih bank (ESCB).
At the same time, the separation of the monetary policy and the supervisory functions should not preclude the exchange between these two functional areas of information necessary for the achievement of ECB and European System of Central Banks (ESCB) tasks.
Člen 13l Poslovnika ECB določa, da se morajo seje Sveta ECB v zvezi z nadzorniškimi nalogami voditi ločeno od rednih sej Sveta ECB in imeti ločen dnevni red.
Article 13l of the ECB's Rules of Procedure provides that Governing Council meetings regarding supervisory tasks must take place separately from regular Governing Council meetings and have separate agendas.
V skladu s členom 13m Poslovnika ECB o notranji strukturi ECB v zvezi z nadzorniškimi nalogami pristojnost Izvršilnega odbora v zvezi z notranjo strukturo ECB in zaposlenimi v ECB vključuje nadzorniške naloge.
According to Article 13m of the ECB's Rules of Procedure on the ECB's internal structure in relation to supervisory tasks, the competence of the Executive Board in respect of the ECB's internal structure and staff encompasses supervisory tasks.
Izvršilni odbor se o tej notranji strukturi posvetuje s predsednikom in podpredsednikom Nadzornega odbora.
The Executive Board is to consult the Chair and the Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board on this internal structure.
Nadzorni odbor lahko v dogovoru z Izvršilnim odborom ustanovi in razpusti podstrukture začasne narave, kot so delovne ali projektne skupine.
The Supervisory Board, in agreement with the Executive Board, may establish and dissolve substructures of a temporary nature, such as working groups or task forces.
Te pomagajo pri delu v zvezi z nadzorniškimi nalogami in poročajo Nadzornemu odboru.
These are to assist in work regarding supervisory tasks and report to the Supervisory Board.
Člen 13m tudi določa, da predsednik ECB po posvetovanju s predsednikom Nadzornega odbora imenuje sekretarja Nadzornega odbora in usmerjevalnega odbora.
Article 13m also provides for the appointment of the Secretary of the Supervisory Board and the Steering Committee by the President of the ECB, after having consulted the Chair of the Supervisory Board.
Sekretar sodeluje s sekretarjem Sveta ECB pri pripravi sej Sveta ECB v zvezi z nadzorniškimi nalogami in je odgovoren za sestavo zapisnikov teh sej.
The Secretary is to liaise with the Secretary of the Governing Council when preparing the meetings of the Governing Council regarding supervisory tasks and be responsible for drafting the proceedings of these meetings.
V uvodni izjavi 66 uredbe o EMN je navedeno, da bi morala organizacijska ločenost osebja zadevati vse službe, ki so potrebne za neodvisno denarno politiko, ter zagotavljati uresničevanje demokratične odgovornosti in nadzora, določenega v uredbi o EMN, nad opravljanjem nadzorniških nalog.
Recital 66 of the SSM Regulation states that organisational separation of staff should concern all services needed for independent monetary policy purposes and should ensure that the exercise of the supervisory tasks is fully subject to democratic accountability and oversight as provided for by the SSM Regulation.
Osebje, ki sodeluje pri opravljanju nadzorniških nalog, bi moralo poročati predsedniku Nadzornega odbora.
The staff involved in carrying out supervisory tasks should report to the Chair of the Supervisory Board.
V tem okviru je ECB za izpolnitev zahtev, vsebovanih v členu 25(2) uredbe o EMN [4], vzpostavila strukturo štirih generalnih direktoratov za izvrševanje nadzorniških nalog in sekretariat Nadzornega odbora, ki funkcijsko odgovarjajo predsedniku in podpredsedniku Nadzornega odbora.
Within this framework, in order to fulfil the requirements contained in Article 25(2) of the SSM Regulation [4], the ECB has established a structure of four Directorates-General for the performance of supervisory tasks and a Secretariat to the Supervisory Board, functionally reporting to the Chair and Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board.
ECB je nadalje identificirala več poslovnih področij, ki zagotavljajo podporo funkciji denarne politike in nadzorni funkciji ECB kot skupne službe in pri katerih taka podpora ne bo vodila do nasprotja interesov med cilji nadzora in denarne politike ECB.
The ECB has further identified several business areas to provide support to both the monetary policy and supervisory functions of the ECB as shared services, where such support will not lead to conflicts of interest between the ECB's supervisory and monetary policy objectives.
Na več poslovnih področjih s skupnimi službami so bili vzpostavljeni oddelki, namenjeni opravljanju nadzorniških nalog.
Divisions dedicated to supervisory tasks have been established within several ‘shared service’ business areas.
Člen 37 Statuta Evropskega sistema centralnih bank in Evropske centralne banke določa obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti za člane upravljavskih organov in zaposlene v ECB in nacionalnih centralnih bankah.
Article 37 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank lays down the obligation of professional secrecy for members of the governing bodies and the staff of the ECB and the national central banks.
V uvodni izjavi 74 uredbe o EMN je navedeno, da bi morale za Nadzorni odbor, usmerjevalni odbor in osebje ECB, ki izvaja nadzorniške naloge, veljati ustrezne zahteve o varovanju poslovne skrivnosti.
Recital 74 of the SSM Regulation states that the Supervisory Board, the steering committee and staff of the ECB carrying out supervisory duties should be subject to appropriate professional secrecy requirements.
Člen 27 uredbe o EMN razširja obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti na člane Nadzornega odbora in osebje, napoteno iz sodelujočih držav članic, ki opravlja nadzorniške dolžnosti.
Article 27 of the SSM Regulation extends the obligation of professional secrecy to members of the Supervisory Board, and staff seconded by participating Member States carrying out supervisory duties.
Izmenjavo informacij med funkcijo denarne politike in nadzorno funkcijo ECB je treba organizirati ob strogem upoštevanju omejitev, določenih v pravu Unije [5], ob upoštevanju načela ločenosti.
The exchange of information between the ECB's monetary policy and supervisory functions should be organised in strict compliance with the limits established by Union law [5], taking into account the principle of separation.
Veljale bodo obveznosti varovanja zaupnih informacij, kakor so določene v veljavnih zakonih in drugih predpisih, na primer v Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 2533/98 [6] o zbiranju zaupnih statističnih podatkov in določbah Direktive 2013/36/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [7] v zvezi z izmenjavo nadzorniških informacij.
Obligations protecting confidential information, as provided for in applicable laws and regulations, such as Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 [6] on the collection of confidential statistical data and the provisions of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [7] relating to the sharing of supervisory information, will apply.
Pod pogoji, določenimi v tem sklepu, se načelo ločenosti uporablja za pretok zaupnih informacij s funkcije denarne politike na nadzorno funkcijo in z nadzorne funkcije na funkcijo denarne politike ECB.
Subject to the conditions set forth in this Decision, the principle of separation applies to the exchange of confidential information from both the monetary policy to the supervisory function as well as from the supervisory to the monetary policy function of the ECB.
Po uvodni izjavi 65 uredbe o EMN v skladu s členom 127(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU) ECB opravlja naloge denarne politike z namenom ohranjanja stabilnosti cen.
According to recital 65 of the SSM Regulation, the ECB is responsible for carrying out monetary policy functions with a view to maintaining price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Cilj njenih nadzorniških nalog je zaščititi varnost in trdnost kreditnih institucij ter stabilnost finančnega sistema.
The objective of its supervisory tasks is to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.
Zato jih je treba opravljati popolnoma ločeno od funkcije denarne politike, da bi preprečili nasprotje interesov in zagotovili, da se vsaka od teh funkcij izvršuje v skladu z njenimi konkretnimi cilji.
They should therefore be carried out in full separation from the monetary policy functionin order to avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure that each of these policy functions is exercised in accordance with its particular objectives.
Hkrati učinkovita ločenost med funkcijo denarne politike in nadzorno funkcijo ne bi smela preprečevati, da se izkoristijo, kadar koli je to možno in zaželeno, vse prednosti, ki se pričakujejo kot posledica združitve teh dveh funkcij v isti instituciji, vključno z upoštevanjem obsežnega strokovnega znanja ECB o makroekonomskih vprašanjih in vprašanjih finančne stabilnosti ter zmanjševanjem dvojnega dela pri zbiranju informacij.
At the same time, effective separation between the monetary policy and supervisory functions should not prevent the reaping, wherever possible and desirable, of all the benefits to be expected as a result of combining these two policy functions in the same institution, including drawing on the ECB's extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues and reducing double work when gathering information.
Zato je treba vzpostaviti mehanizme, ki omogočajo ustrezen pretok podatkov in drugih zaupnih informacij med obema funkcijama –
It is therefore necessary to put in place mechanisms that allow an adequate flow of data and other confidential information between the two policy functions,
SPREJEL NASLEDNJI SKLEP:
Article 1
Področje uporabe in cilji
Scope and objectives
Ta sklep določa ureditve, ki so v skladu z zahtevo, da je funkcija denarne politike ECB ločena od nadzorne funkcije ECB (v nadaljnjem besedilu skupaj: funkciji), zlasti v zvezi z varovanjem poslovne skrivnosti in izmenjavo informacij med obema funkcijama.
This Decision sets out the arrangements complying with the requirement to separate the ECB's monetary policy function from its supervisory function (together referred to as ‘the policy functions’), in particular with respect to professional secrecy and the exchange of information between the two policy functions.
ECB opravlja svoje nadzorniške naloge brez poseganja v svoje naloge, ki se nanašajo na denarno politiko, in v katere koli druge naloge ter ločeno od njih.
The ECB shall carry out its supervisory tasks without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks.
Nadzorniške naloge ECB ne posegajo v njene naloge, ki se nanašajo na denarno politiko, niti niso z njimi določene.
The ECB's supervisory tasks shall neither interfere with, nor be determined by, its tasks relating to monetary policy.
Poleg tega nadzorniške naloge ECB ne posegajo v njene naloge v zvezi z ESRB ali katere koli druge naloge.
The ECB's supervisory tasks shall moreover not interfere with its tasks in relation to the ESRB or any other tasks.
Nadzorniške naloge ECB ter stalno spremljanje finančne trdnosti in plačilne sposobnosti nasprotnih strank za operacije denarne politike Eurosistema se oblikujejo na način, ki ne vodi v izkrivljanje namena katere koli od teh nalog.
The ECB's supervisory tasks and the ongoing monitoring of the financial soundness and solvency of the Eurosystem's monetary policy counterparties shall be articulated in a way which does not lead to distorting the finality of either of these functions.
ECB zagotovi, da je pri delovanju Sveta ECB denarna funkcija povsem ločena od nadzorne funkcije.
The ECB shall ensure that the operation of the Governing Council is completely differentiated as regards monetary and supervisory functions.
Člen 2
For the purposes of this Decision:
„zaupne informacije“ pomenijo informacije, ki se v skladu z ureditvijo zaupnosti v ECB razvrstijo kot „ECB-CONFIDENTIAL“ ali „ECB-SECRET“;
‘confidential information’ means information classified as ‘ECB-CONFIDENTIAL’ or ‘ECB-SECRET’ under the ECB's confidentiality regime;
druge zaupne informacije, vključno z informacijami, za katere veljajo pravila o varstvu podatkov ali obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti in nastanejo znotraj ECB ali jih Evropski centralni banki posredujejo drugi organi ali posamezniki;
other confidential information, including information covered by data protection rules or by the obligation of professional secrecy, created within the ECB or forwarded to it by other bodies or individuals;
katere koli zaupne informacije, za katere veljajo pravila o varovanju poslovne skrivnosti iz Direktive 2013/36/EU;
any confidential information falling under the professional secrecy rules of Directive 2013/36/EU;
ter zaupne statistične informacije v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 2533/98;
as well as confidential statistical information in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2533/98;
„potreba po seznanitvi“ pomeni potrebo po dostopu do zaupnih informacij, ki so potrebne za izpolnitev statutarne funkcije ali naloge ECB, ki mora biti v primeru informacij z oznako „ECB-CONFIDENTIAL“ dovolj široka, da lahko zaposleni dostopajo do informacij, pomembnih za njihove naloge, in od sodelavcev prevzamejo naloge z minimalno zakasnitvijo;
‘need to know’ means the need to have access to confidential information necessary for the fulfilment of a statutory function or task of the ECB, which in case of information labelled as ‘ECB-CONFIDENTIAL’ shall be broad enough to enable staff to access information relevant to their tasks and take over tasks from colleagues with minimal delays;
„neobdelani podatki“ pomenijo podatke, ki jih pošljejo poročevalske enote, po statistični obdelavi in potrjevanju, ali podatke, ki jih ustvari ECB pri izvrševanju svojih funkcij;
‘raw data’ means data transmitted by reporting agents, after statistical processing and validation, or data generated by the ECB through the execution of its functions;
„ureditev zaupnosti v ECB“ pomeni ureditev ECB, ki opredeljuje način razvrstitve po stopnji zaupnosti in varovanja zaupnih informacij ECB ter ravnanja z njimi.
‘ECB Confidentiality Regime’ means the regime of the ECB which defines how to classify, handle and protect confidential ECB information.
Člen 3
Article 3
Organizacijska ločenost
Organisational separation
ECB vodi avtonomne postopke odločanja za svojo nadzorno funkcijo in funkcijo denarne politike.
The ECB shall maintain autonomous decision-making procedures for its supervisory and monetary policy functions.
Vse delovne enote v ECB delujejo pod upravljavskim vodstvom Izvršilnega odbora.
All work units of the ECB shall be placed under the managing direction of the Executive Board.
Pristojnost Izvršilnega odbora v zvezi z notranjo strukturo ECB in zaposlenimi v ECB vključuje nadzorniške naloge.
The competence of the Executive Board in respect of the ECB's internal structure and the staff of the ECB shall encompass the supervisory tasks.
Izvršilni odbor se o tej notranji strukturi posvetuje s predsednikom in podpredsednikom Nadzornega odbora.
The Executive Board shall consult the Chair and the Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board on such internal structure.
Zaposleni v ECB, ki sodelujejo pri opravljanju nadzorniških nalog, so organizacijsko ločeni od zaposlenih, ki sodelujejo pri opravljanju drugih nalog, dodeljenih ECB.
ECB staff involved in carrying out supervisory tasks shall be organisationally separated from the staff involved in carrying out other tasks conferred on the ECB.
Zaposleni, ki sodelujejo pri opravljanju nadzorniških nalog, odgovarjajo Izvršilnemu odboru v zvezi z organizacijskimi vprašanji, vprašanji človeških virov in administrativnimi vprašanji, funkcijsko pa odgovarjajo predsedniku in podpredsedniku Nadzornega odbora, razen v primeru iz odstavka 4.
Staff involved in carrying out supervisory tasks shall report to the Executive Board in respect of organisational, human resources and administrative issues, but shall be subject to functional reporting to the Chair and the Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board, subject to the exception in paragraph 4.
ECB lahko vzpostavi skupne službe, ki zagotavljajo podporo funkciji denarne politike in nadzorni funkciji, v izogib podvajanju teh podpornih nalog, s tem pa se tudi prispeva k zagotavljanju učinkovitih in kakovostnih storitev teh služb.
The ECB may establish shared services providing support to both the monetary policy and the supervisory function in order to ensure that these support functions are not duplicated, thus helping to guarantee the efficient and effective delivery of services.
Za te službe ne velja člen 6 glede izmenjave informacij med njimi in zadevnima funkcijama.
Such services shall not be subject to Article 6 as regards any information exchanges by them with the relevant policy functions.
Člen 4
Article 4
Poslovna skrivnost
Professional secrecy
Od članov Nadzornega odbora, usmerjevalnega odbora in vseh podstruktur, ki jih ustanovi Nadzorni odbor, zaposlenih v ECB in osebja, napotenega iz sodelujočih držav članic, ki izvaja nadzorniške naloge, se zahteva, da tudi po prenehanju opravljanja svojih dolžnosti ne razkrijejo tistih informacij, za katere velja obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti.