natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
When exercising its tasks, the Supervisory Board should take account of all relevant facts and circumstances in the participating Member States and should perform its duties in the interest of the Union as a whole.
Nadzorni odbor bi moral pri opravljanju nalog upoštevati vsa pomembna dejstva in okoliščine v sodelujočih državah članicah in izpolnjevati svoje dolžnosti v interesu celotne Unije.
With full respect to the institutional and voting arrangements set by the Treaties, the Supervisory Board should be an essential body in the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB, tasks which until now have always been in the hands of national competent authorities.
Nadzorni odbor bi moral biti ključen organ pri izvajanju nadzorniških nalog ECB, za katere so bili doslej vedno odgovorni pristojni nacionalni organi, pri čemer bi se v celoti upoštevala institucionalna ureditev in način glasovanja iz Pogodb.
For this reason, the Council should be given the power to adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board.
Zato bi Svet moral biti pooblaščen za sprejetje izvedbenega sklepa o imenovanju predsednika in podpredsednika Nadzornega odbora.
After hearing the Supervisory Board, the ECB should submit a proposal for the appointment of the Chair and the Vice-Chair to the European Parliament for approval.
Po predstavitvi stališča Nadzornega odbora bi morala ECB predlog za imenovanje predsednika in podpredsednika predložiti v odobritev Evropskemu parlamentu.
Following the approval of this proposal, the Council should adopt that implementing decision.
Po odobritvi predloga bi moral Svet sprejeti izvedbeni sklep.
The Chair should be chosen on the basis of an open selection procedure, on which the European Parliament and the Council should be kept duly informed.
Predsednika bi bilo treba izbrati v okviru odprtega izbirnega postopka, o katerem bi bilo treba ustrezno obveščati Evropski parlament in Svet.
In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair, the Chair’s term of office should not exceed five years and should not be renewable.
Da se omogoči ustrezna rotacija in hkrati zagotovi popolna neodvisnost predsednika, njegov mandat ne bi smel biti daljši od petih let in ga ne bi smelo biti mogoče podaljšati.
In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the Supervisory Board should be able to invite EBA and the Commission as observers.
Da bi zagotovili popolno usklajenost z dejavnostmi EBA in bonitetnimi politikami Unije, bi Nadzorni odbor moral imeti možnost, da povabi EBA in Komisijo kot opazovalca.
The Chair of the European Resolution Authority, once established, should participate as observer in the meetings of the Supervisory Board.
Ko bo ustanovljen evropski organ za reševanje, bi se moral njegov predsednik kot opazovalec udeleževati sestankov Nadzornega odbora.
The Supervisory Board should be supported by a steering committee with a more limited composition.
Nadzornemu odboru bi moral pomagati usmerjevalni odbor v bolj omejeni sestavi.
The steering committee should prepare the meetings of the Supervisory Board, perform its duties solely in the interest of the Union as a whole, and work in full transparency with the Supervisory Board.
Usmerjevalni odbor bi moral pripravljati sestanke Nadzornega odbora, svoje dolžnosti izpolnjevati le v interesu celotne Unije in popolnoma pregledno sodelovati z Nadzornim odborom.
The Governing Council of the ECB should invite the representatives from participating Member States whose currency is not the euro whenever it is contemplated by the Governing Council to object to a draft decision prepared by the Supervisory Board or whenever the concerned national competent authorities inform the Governing Council of their reasoned disagreement with a draft decision of the Supervisory Board, when such decision is addressed to the national authorities in respect of credit institutions from participating Member States whose currency is not the euro.
Svet ECB bi moral povabiti predstavnike sodelujočih držav članic, katerih valuta ni euro, kadar koli bi razmišljal o tem, da bi ugovarjal osnutku odločitve, ki ga pripravi Nadzorni odbor, ali kadar koli zadevni pristojni nacionalni organi obvestijo Svet ECB o svojem obrazloženem nestrinjanju z osnutkom odločitve Nadzornega odbora, če je ta odločitev naslovljena na nacionalne organe glede kreditnih institucij iz sodelujočih držav članic, katerih valuta ni euro.
With a view to ensuring separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks, the ECB should be required to create a mediation panel.
Da bi dosegli ločenost monetarne politike od nadzorniških nalog, bi bilo treba od ECB zahtevati, da oblikuje odbor za mediacijo.
The setting up of the panel, and in particular its composition, should ensure that it resolves differences of views in a balanced way, in the interest of the Union as a whole.
Ustanovitev takšnega odbora in še zlasti njegova sestava bi morala zagotavljati, da se bodo nasprotujoča si mnenja razreševala uravnoteženo in v interesu celotne Unije.
The Supervisory Board, the steering committee and staff of the ECB carrying out supervisory duties should be subject to appropriate professional secrecy requirements.
Za Nadzorni odbor, usmerjevalni odbor in osebje ECB, ki izvaja nadzorniške naloge, bi morale veljati ustrezne zahteve o varovanju poklicne skrivnosti.
Similar requirements should apply to the exchange of information with the staff of the ECB not involved in supervisory activities.
Podobne zahteve bi morale veljati tudi za izmenjavo informacij z osebjem ECB, ki v nadzorne dejavnosti ni vključeno.
This should not prevent the ECB from exchanging information within the limits and under the conditions set out in the relevant Union legislation, including with the Commission for the purposes of its tasks under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and under Union law on enhanced economic and budgetary surveillance.
To ECB ne bi smelo preprečevati, da izmenjuje informacije v okviru omejitev in pod pogoji, določenimi v upoštevni zakonodaji Unije, tudi z Komisijo za namene njenih nalog na podlagi členov 107 in 108 PDEU ter na podlagi prava Unije o strožjem ekonomskem in proračunskem nadzoru.
In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence, in particular free from undue political influence and from industry interference which would affect its operational independence.
Da bi ECB nadzorniške naloge, ki se prenesejo nanjo, izvajala učinkovito, bi jih morala opravljati povsem neodvisno, zlasti brez vsakršnega neprimernega političnega vpliva in vmešavanja zadevnega sektorja, ki bi lahko vplivala na njeno operativno neodvisnost.
The use of cooling-off periods in supervisory authorities forms an important part of ensuring the effectiveness and independence of the supervision conducted by those authorities.
Uporaba obdobij nezdružljivosti za nadzorne organe je pomemben vidik zagotavljanja učinkovitosti in neodvisnosti nadzora, ki ga izvajajo.
To this end, and without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules, the ECB should establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures, including proportionate review periods, to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts with the legitimate interest of the SSM/ECB where a former member of the Supervisory Board begins work within the banking industry he or she once supervised.
ECB bi morala v ta namen in brez poseganja v izvajanje strožjih nacionalnih predpisov pripraviti in ohranjati celovite in uradne postopke, vključno s sorazmernimi roki za pregled, da bi lahko že vnaprej ocenila in preprečila možna nasprotja z legitimnimi interesi EMNEMN/ECB v primerih, ko bi nekdanji član Nadzornega odbora začel delati v bančništvu, tj. sektorju, ki ga je prej nadzoroval.
In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources.
ECB bi morala za učinkovito izvajanje nadzorniških nalog imeti na voljo zadostne vire.
Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB’s independence from undue influences by national competent authorities and market participants, and separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks.
Ti viri bi morali biti pridobljeni na način, ki bi zagotavljal neodvisnost ECB od neprimernih vplivov pristojnih nacionalnih organov in udeležencev na trgu ter ločenost nalog monetarne politike od nadzorniških nalog.
The costs of supervision should be borne by the entities subject to it.
Stroške nadzora bi morali kriti subjekti, nad katerimi se nadzor izvaja.
Therefore, the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB should be financed by annual fees charged to credit institutions established in the participating Member States.
Zato bi se morale nadzorniške naloge, ki jih izvaja ECB, financirati iz letnih nadomestil, zaračunanih kreditnim institucijam s sedežem v sodelujočih državah članicah.
It should also be able to levy fees on branches established in a participating Member State by a credit institution established in a non-participating Member State to cover the expenditure incurred by the ECB when carrying out its tasks as a host supervisor over these branches.
ECB bi prav tako morala imeti možnost, da zaračunava nadomestila podružnicam, ki jih v sodelujoči državi članici ustanovijo kreditne institucije s sedežem v nesodelujoči državi članici, da bi pokrila izdatke, ki jih ima pri izvajanju nadzora nad temi podružnicami kot gostujoči nadzornik.
In the case a credit institution or a branch is supervised on a consolidated basis, the fee should be levied on the highest level of a credit institution within the involved group with establishment in participating Member States.
Kadar se nadzor kreditne institucije ali podružnice opravlja na konsolidirani podlagi, se nadomestilo zaračuna na najvišji ravni kreditne institucije v udeleženi skupini s sedežem v sodelujočih državah članicah.
The calculation of the fees should exclude any subsidiaries established in non-participating Member States.
Iz izračuna tovrstnih nadomestil bi morale biti izvzete vse podrejene družbe s sedežem v nesodelujoči državi članici.
Where a credit institution is included in supervision on a consolidated basis, the fee should be calculated at the highest level of consolidation within participating Member States and allocated to the credit institutions established in a participating Member State and included in the supervision on a consolidated basis, based on objective criteria relating to the importance and risk profile, including the risk weighted assets.
Kadar je kreditna institucija vključena v nadzor na konsolidirani podlagi, bi morali nadomestilo določiti na najvišji ravni konsolidacije v sodelujočih državah članicah in jo zaračunati kreditnim institucijam, ki imajo sedež v sodelujoči državi članici in so vključene v nadzor na konsolidirani podlagi, na podlagi objektivnih meril, povezanih z njeno pomembnostjo in profilom tveganosti, vključno s tveganju prilagojeno aktivo.
Highly motivated, well-trained and impartial staff is indispensable to effective supervision.
Za učinkovit nadzor je nujno potrebno zelo motivirano, dobro usposobljeno in nepristransko osebje.
In order to create a truly integrated supervisory mechanism, appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among all national competent authorities and the ECB should be provided for.
Za vzpostavitev resnično integriranega mehanizma nadzora bi bilo treba zagotoviti ustrezne izmenjave in napotitve osebja med vsemi posameznimi pristojnimi nacionalnimi organi ter med slednjimi in ECB.
To ensure a peer control on an on-going basis, particularly in the supervision of large credit institutions, the ECB should be able to request that national supervisory teams involve also staff from competent authorities of other participating Member States, making it possible to install supervisory teams of geographical diversity with specific expertise and profile.
Za zagotovitev neprekinjenega medsebojnega strokovnega nadzora, zlasti pri nadzoru velikih kreditnih institucij, bi ECB morala imeti možnost zahtevati, naj nacionalne nadzorne skupine vključujejo tudi osebje pristojnih organov iz drugih sodelujočih držav članic, kar bi omogočilo ustanavljanje nadzornih skupin, ki bi bile geografsko raznolike ter bi imele specifična znanja in lastnosti.
The exchange and secondment of staff should establish a common supervisory culture.
Z izmenjavami in napotitvami osebja se razvija skupna kultura na področju nadzora.
On a regular basis the ECB should provide information on how many staff members from the national competent authorities are seconded to the ECB for the purposes of the SSM.
ECB redno zagotavlja informacije o številu članov osebja iz pristojnih nacionalnih organov, napotenih v ECB za namene EMN.
Given the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should carry out its tasks in respect of international standards and in dialogue and close cooperation with supervisors outside the Union, without duplicating the international role of EBA.
Zaradi globalizacije bančnih storitev in čedalje večjega pomena mednarodnih standardov bi morala ECB svoje naloge opravljati ob upoštevanju mednarodnih standardov ter v okviru dialoga z nadzornimi organi zunaj Unije in ob tesnem sodelovanju z njimi, ne da bi pri tem posegala v mednarodno vlogo EBA.
It should be empowered to develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with the supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries and with international organisations, while coordinating with EBA and while fully respecting the existing roles and respective competences of the Member States and the institutions of the Union.
Pooblaščena bi morala biti za vzpostavljanje stikov in sklepanje upravnih dogovorov z nadzornimi organi in upravami tretjih držav ter z mednarodnimi organizacijami, pri čemer bi se usklajevala z EBA ter popolnoma upoštevala obstoječe vloge in pristojnosti posameznih držav članic in institucij Unije.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [8] and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [9] are fully applicable to the processing of personal data by the ECB for the purposes of this Regulation.
Za obdelavo osebnih podatkov s strani ECB za namene te uredbe se v celoti uporabljata Direktiva Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 95/46/ES z dne 24. oktobra 1995 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov [8] ter Uredba (ES) št. 45/2001 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 18. decembra 2000 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov v institucijah in organih Skupnosti in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov [9].
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) [10] applies to the ECB.
Za ECB se uporablja Uredba (ES) št. 1073/1999 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 25. maja 1999 o preiskavah, ki jih izvaja Evropski urad za boj proti goljufijam (OLAF) [10].
The ECB has adopted Decision ECB/2004/11 [11] concerning the terms and conditions for European Anti-Fraud Office investigations of the European Central Bank.
ECB je sprejela Sklep ECB/2004/11 [11] o pogojih za preiskave Evropskega urada za boj proti goljufijam v Evropski centralni banki.
In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non-prudential considerations, and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments which concern credit institutions and Member States are addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible.
Da bi zagotovili, da so kreditne institucije predmet nadzora najvišje kakovosti, ki ga ne ovirajo drugi pomisleki, ki niso bonitetne narave, ter da se pravočasno in učinkovito odpravijo negativni vplivi, ki se medsebojno krepijo in ki jih imajo razmere na trgu na kreditne institucije in države članice, bi morala ECB čim prej začeti opravljati posebne nadzorniške naloge.
However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation.
Vendar je za prenos nadzorniških nalog z nacionalnih nadzornih organov na ECB potrebna določena mera priprav.
Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for.
Zato bi bilo treba določiti ustrezno obdobje postopnega uvajanja.
When adopting the detailed operational arrangements for the implementation of the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation, the ECB should provide for transitional arrangements which ensure the completion of ongoing supervisory procedures, including any decision and/or measure adopted or investigation commenced prior to the entry into force of this Regulation.
Pri sprejemanju podrobnih operativnih ureditev za izvajanje nalog, ki se s to uredbo prenesejo na ECB, bi ta morala poskrbeti za prehodno ureditev, ki bi zagotovila, da bodo tekoči nadzorniški postopki zaključeni, vključno z morebitnimi, že pred začetkom veljavnosti te uredbe sprejetimi odločitvami in/ali ukrepi ali začetimi preiskavami.
The Commission has stated in its Communication of 28 November 2012 on a Blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union that Article 127(6) TFEU could be amended to make the ordinary legislative procedure applicable and to eliminate some of the legal constraints it currently places on the design of the SSM (e.g. enshrine a direct and irrevocable opt-in by Member States whose currency is not the euro to the SSM, beyond the model of ‘close cooperation’, grant Member States whose currency is not the euro participating in the SSM fully equal rights in the ECB’s decision-making, and go even further in the internal separation of decision-making on monetary policy and on supervision).
Komisija je v svojem sporočilu z dne 28. novembra 2012 o načrtu za trdno in pravo ekonomsko in monetarno unijo navedla, da bi bil člen 127(6) PDEU lahko spremenjen tako, da bi določili uporabo običajnega zakonodajnega postopka in da bi odpravili nekatere zakonske omejitve, ki jih trenutno predpisuje za oblikovanje EMN (npr. da bi državam članicam, katerih valuta ni euro, dali možnost neposredne in nepreklicne vključitve v EMN, bolj intenzivno od modela tesnega sodelovanja; da bi državam članicam, katerih valuta ni euro in ki v celoti sodelujejo v EMN, zagotovili enake pravice pri odločanju v okviru ECB; ter da bi še povečali notranje ločevanje med odločanjem o denarni politiki in o nadzoru).
It has also stated that a specific point to be addressed would be to strengthen democratic accountability over the ECB insofar as it acts as a banking supervisor.
Navedla je tudi, da bi bilo treba obravnavati okrepitev demokratične odgovornosti ECB, ko deluje kot bančni nadzornik.
It is recalled that TEU provides that proposals for treaty change may be submitted by the Government of any Member State, the European Parliament, or the Commission, and may relate to any aspect of the Treaties.
Opozoriti je treba, da v skladu z PEU lahko predloge za spremembo Pogodb predloži vlada katere koli države članice, Evropski parlament ali Komisija, nanašajo pa se lahko na kateri koli vidik Pogodb.
This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, and has to be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles.
Ta uredba spoštuje temeljne pravice in upošteva načela, priznana v Listini Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah, zlasti pravico do varstva osebnih podatkov, svobodo gospodarske pobude ter pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva in nepristranskega sodišča, ter jo je treba izvajati v skladu s temi pravicami in načeli.
Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely setting up an efficient and effective framework for the exercise of specific supervisory tasks over credit institutions by a Union institution, and ensuring the consistent application of the single rulebook to credit institutions, cannot be sufficiently achieved at the Member State level and can therefore, by reason of the pan-Union structure of the banking market and the impact of failures of credit institutions on other Member States, be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU.
Ker ciljev te uredbe, to je vzpostavitve učinkovitega in uspešnega okvira za opravljanje posebnih nadzorniških nalog nad kreditnimi institucijami s strani institucije Unije ter zagotovitve dosledne uporabe enotnih pravil za kreditne institucije, ni mogoče zadovoljivo doseči na ravni držav članic ter ju je zaradi vseevropske strukture bančnega trga in vpliva propada kreditnih institucij na druge države članice lažje doseči na ravni Unije, lahko Unija sprejme ukrepe v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 PEU.
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives,
V skladu z načelom sorazmernosti iz navedenega člena ta uredba ne presega tistega, kar je potrebno za doseganje teh ciljev –
This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and each Member State, with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage.
S to uredbo se na ECB prenesejo posebne naloge, ki se nanašajo na politike bonitetnega nadzora nad kreditnimi institucijami, z namenom prispevati k varnosti in trdnosti kreditnih institucij ter k stabilnosti finančnega sistema v Uniji in vsaki državi članici, in sicer ob popolnem upoštevanju in dolžni skrbnosti za enotnost in celovitost notranjega trga, temelječega na enakem obravnavanju kreditnih institucij zaradi preprečevanja regulativne arbitraže.
The institutions referred to in Article 2(5) of the Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms [12] are excluded from the supervisory tasks conferred on ECB in accordance with Article 4 of this Regulation.
Nadzorniške naloge, ki se v skladu s členom 4 te uredbe prenesejo na ECB, ne zadevajo institucij iz člena 2(5) Direktive 2013/36/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26. junija 2013 o dostopu do dejavnosti kreditnih institucij in bonitetnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij [12].
The scope of the ECB’s supervisory tasks is limited to the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to this Regulation.
Obseg nadzorniških nalog ECB je omejen na bonitetni nadzor kreditnih institucij v skladu s to uredbo.