natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The ECB should have the task of carrying out early intervention actions as laid down in relevant Union law.
ECB bi morala izvajati ukrepe za zgodnje posredovanje, določene v upoštevnem pravu Unije.
It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities.
Svoje ukrepe za zgodnje posredovanje pa bi morala usklajevati z ustreznimi organi za reševanje.
As long as national authorities remain competent to resolve credit institutions, the ECB should, moreover, coordinate appropriately with the national authorities concerned to ensure a common understanding about respective responsibilities in case of crises, in particular in the context of the cross-border crisis management groups and the future resolution colleges established for those purposes.
Dokler bodo za reševanje kreditnih institucij pristojni nacionalni organi, bi se ECB z zadevnimi pristojnimi organi morala tudi ustrezno usklajevati in tako doseči skupno razumevanje odgovornosti vsakega od njih v primeru kriz, zlasti v povezavi s čezmejnimi skupinami za krizno upravljanje in bodočimi kolegiji za reševanje, ustanovljenimi v ta namen.
Supervisory tasks not conferred on the ECB should remain with the national authorities.
Nadzorniške naloge, ki se ne prenesejo na ECB, bi morale ostati v pristojnosti nacionalnih organov.
Those tasks should include the power to receive notifications from credit institutions in relation to the right of establishment and the free provision of services, to supervise bodies which are not covered by the definition of credit institutions under Union law but which are supervised as credit institutions under national law, to supervise credit institutions from third countries establishing a branch or providing cross-border services in the Union, to supervise payments services, to carry out day-to-day verifications of credit institutions, to carry out the function of competent authorities over credit institutions in relation to markets in financial instruments, the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing and consumer protection.
Te naloge bi morale vključevati pooblastilo za prejemanje uradnih obvestil od kreditnih institucij v zvezi s pravico do ustanavljanja in svobodnega opravljanja storitev, pooblastilo za nadzor organov, ki niso zajeti v opredelitvi kreditnih institucij iz prava Unije, vendar se v skladu z nacionalnim pravom nadzirajo kot kreditne institucije, pooblastilo za nadzor kreditnih institucij iz tretjih držav, ki ustanovijo podružnico ali opravljajo čezmejne storitve v Uniji, pooblastilo za nadzor plačilnih storitev ter pooblastilo za izvajanje tekočih preverjanj kreditnih institucij in opravljanje funkcije organov, pristojnih za kreditne institucije, v zvezi s trgi finančnih instrumentov in v zvezi s preprečevanjem uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma ter v zvezi z varstvom potrošnikov.
The ECB should cooperate, as appropriate, fully with the national authorities which are competent to ensure a high level of consumer protection and the fight against money laundering.
ECB bi morala po potrebi v celoti sodelovati z nacionalnimi organi, ki so pristojni za zagotavljanje visoke ravni varstva potrošnikov in preprečevanje pranja denarja.
The ECB should carry out the tasks conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system of the Union as well as of individual participating Member States and the unity and integrity of the internal market, thereby ensuring also the protection of depositors and improving the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the single rulebook for financial services in the Union.
ECB bi morala naloge, ki se nanjo prenesejo, izvajati z namenom zagotavljanja varnosti in trdnosti kreditnih institucij, stabilnosti finančnega sistema Unije in posameznih sodelujočih držav članic ter enotnosti in celovitosti notranjega trga, s čimer bi zagotavljala tudi varstvo vlagateljev in izboljšala delovanje notranjega trga, v skladu z enotnimi pravili za finančne storitve v Uniji.
In particular the ECB should duly take into account the principles of equality and non-discrimination.
Še zlasti bi morala ECB ustrezno upoštevati načeli enakosti in nediskriminacije.
The conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB should be consistent with the framework of the ESFS and its underlying objective to develop the single rulebook and enhance convergence of supervisory practices across the whole Union.
Prenos nadzorniških nalog na ECB bi moral biti skladen z ESFS ter z njegovim temeljnim ciljem oblikovati enotna pravila in okrepiti zbliževanje nadzorniških praks na celotnem ozemlju Unije.
Cooperation between the banking supervisors and the supervisors of insurance and securities markets is important to deal with issues of joint interest and to ensure proper supervision of credit institutions operating also in the insurance and securities sectors.
Sodelovanje med bančnimi nadzorniki ter nadzorniki za zavarovalniške trge in trge vrednostnih papirjev je pomembno pri obravnavanju vprašanj skupnega interesa in zagotavljanju ustreznega nadzora kreditnih institucij, ki delujejo tudi v sektorju zavarovalništva in vrednostnih papirjev.
The ECB should therefore be required to cooperate closely with EBA, ESMA and EIOPA, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and the other authorities which form part of the ESFS.
Zato bi od ECB morali zahtevati, naj v okviru ESFS tesno sodeluje z EBA, ESMA ter EIOPA, kakor tudi z Evropskim odborom za sistemska tveganja (ESRB) in drugimi organi, ki so del ESFS.
The ECB should carry out its tasks in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation and without prejudice to the competence and the tasks of the other participants within the ESFS.
ECB bi morala svoje naloge izvajati v skladu z določbami te uredbe ter brez poseganja v pristojnosti in naloge drugih akterjev znotraj ESFS.
It should also be required to cooperate with relevant resolution authorities and facilities financing direct or indirect public financial assistance.
Obenem bi od nje morali zahtevati, naj sodeluje z zadevnimi organi za reševanje in instrumenti, s katerimi se financira neposredna ali posredna javna finančna pomoč.
The ECB should carry out its tasks subject to and in compliance with relevant Union law including the whole of primary and secondary Union law, Commission decisions in the area of State aid, competition rules and merger control and the single rulebook applying to all Member States.
ECB bi morala svoje naloge opravljati v skladu z upoštevnim pravom Unije, vključno s celotnim primarnim in sekundarnim pravom Unije, odločitvami Komisije na področju državnih pomoči, pravili o konkurenci in nadzoru koncentracij ter enotnimi pravili, ki veljajo za vse države članice.
EBA is entrusted with developing draft technical standards and guidelines and recommendations ensuring supervisory convergence and consistency of supervisory outcomes within the Union.
EBA je zadolžen, da pripravlja osnutke tehničnih standardov ter smernice in priporočila, da bi zagotovili zbližanje nadzora in skladnost rezultatov nadzora v Uniji.
The ECB should not replace the exercise of those tasks by EBA, and should therefore exercise powers to adopt regulations in accordance with Article 132 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and in compliance with Union acts adopted by the Commission on the basis of drafts developed by EBA and subject to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
ECB ne bi smela opravljati teh nalog namesto EBA in bi torej morala pooblastila za sprejemanje uredb izvajati v skladu s členom 132 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU) in z akti Unije, ki jih sprejme Komisija na podlagi osnutkov EBA, v skladu s členom 16 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010.
Where necessary the ECB should enter into memoranda of understanding with competent authorities responsible for markets in financial instruments describing in general terms how they will cooperate with one another in the performance of their supervisory tasks under Union law in relation to financial institutions referred to in this Regulation.
ECB bi z organi, pristojnimi za trge finančnih instrumentov, po potrebi morala sklepati sporazume o sodelovanju, v katerih bi bilo na splošno opisano, kako bodo med seboj sodelovali pri opravljanju nadzorniških nalog na podlagi prava Unije v zvezi s finančnimi institucijami, navedenimi v tej uredbi.
Such memoranda should be made available to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the competent authorities of all Member States.
Takšni sporazumi bi morali biti dostopni Evropskemu parlamentu, Svetu in pristojnim organom vseh držav članic.
For the carrying out of its tasks and the exercise of its supervisory powers, the ECB should apply the material rules relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.
ECB bi morala za izvajanje nalog in izvrševanje nadzorniških pooblastil uporabljati materialna pravila v zvezi z bonitetnim nadzorom nad kreditnimi institucijami.
Those rules are composed of the relevant Union law, in particular directly applicable Regulations or Directives, such as those on capital requirements for credit institutions and on financial conglomerates.
Ta pravila sestavlja upoštevno pravo Unije, zlasti uredbe, ki se neposredno uporabljajo, ali direktive, na primer tiste o kapitalskih zahtevah za kreditne institucije in o finančnih konglomeratih.
Where the material rules relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions are laid down in Directives, the ECB should apply the national legislation transposing those Directives.
V primerih, ko so materialna pravila v zvezi z bonitetnim nadzorom kreditnih institucij zapisana v direktivah, bi ECB morala uporabljati nacionalno zakonodajo, s katero so bile te direktive prenesene.
Where the relevant Union law is composed of Regulations and in areas where, on the date of entry into force of this Regulation, those Regulations explicitly grant options for Member States, the ECB should also apply the national legislation exercising such options.
V primerih, ko gre pri upoštevnem pravu Unije za uredbe, in na področjih, na katerih zadevne uredbe na dan začetka veljavnosti te uredbe državam članicam izrecno ponujajo različne možnosti, bi ECB prav tako morala uporabljati nacionalno zakonodajo, s katero se izvršujejo take možnosti.
Such options should be construed as excluding options available only to competent or designated authorities.
Te možnosti bi bilo treba razlagati tako, da ne vključujejo možnosti, ki so na voljo le pristojnim ali imenovanim organom.
This is without prejudice to the principle of the primacy of Union law.
To ne posega v načelo primarnosti prava Unije.
It follows that the ECB should, when adopting guidelines or recommendations or when taking decisions, base itself on, and act in accordance with, the relevant binding Union law.
Iz tega sledi, da bi morala ECB pri sprejemanju smernic ali priporočil in odločitev izhajati iz upoštevnega zavezujočega prava Unije in ravnati v skladu z njim.
Within the scope of the tasks conferred on the ECB, national law confers on national competent authorities certain powers which are currently not required by Union law, including certain early intervention and precautionary powers.
V okviru obsega nalog, ki se prenesejo na ECB, nacionalno pravo pristojnim nacionalnim organom daje določena pooblastila, ki se trenutno s pravom Unije ne zahtevajo, vključno z nekaterimi pooblastili za zgodnje posredovanje in preventivno ukrepanje.
The ECB should be able to require national authorities in the participating Member States to make use of those powers in order to ensure the performance of full and effective supervision within the SSM.
ECB bi morala imeti možnost od nacionalnih organov v sodelujočih državah članicah zahtevati, naj uporabijo ta pooblastila, da bi zagotovili celovit in učinkovit nadzor v okviru EMN.
In order to ensure that supervisory rules and decisions are applied by credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies, effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties should be imposed in case of a breach.
Za zagotavljanje, da kreditne institucije, finančni holdingi in mešani finančni holdingi spoštujejo nadzorna pravila in nadzorniške odločitve, bi bilo treba v primeru kršitve naložiti učinkovite, sorazmerne in odvračilne kazni.
In accordance with Article 132(3) TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions [6], the ECB is entitled to impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply with obligations under its regulations and decisions.
V skladu s členom 132(3) PDEU in Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 2532/98 z dne 23. novembra 1998 o pooblastilih Evropske centralne banke za nalaganje sankcij [6] ima ECB pravico naložiti globe ali periodične denarne kazni družbam, ki ne izpolnjujejo obveznosti iz njenih uredb in sklepov.
Moreover, in order to enable the ECB to effectively carry out its tasks relating to the enforcement of supervisory rules set out in directly applicable Union law, the ECB should be empowered to impose pecuniary penalties on credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies for breaches of such rules.
Da bi ECB lahko učinkovito opravljala svoje naloge v zvezi z uveljavljanjem nadzornih pravil iz prava Unije, ki se uporablja neposredno, bi morala imeti tudi pooblastila za nalaganje denarnih kazni kreditnim institucijam, finančnim holdingom in mešanim finančnim holdingom, ki ta pravila prekršijo.
National authorities should remain able to apply penalties in case of failure to comply with obligations stemming from national law transposing Union Directives.
Nacionalnim organom bi moralo biti še naprej omogočeno, da naložijo kazni v primeru neizpolnjevanja obveznosti iz nacionalnega prava, s katerim se prenesejo direktive Unije.
Where the ECB considers it appropriate for the fulfilment of its tasks that a penalty is applied for such breaches, it should be able to refer the matter to national competent authorities for those purposes.
Če ECB meni, da bi bilo z vidika izpolnjevanja njenih nalog primerno, da se za takšne kršitve naložijo kazni, bi morala imeti možnost, da v ta namen zadevo predloži pristojnim nacionalnim organom.
National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities.
Nacionalni nadzorni organi imajo obsežno strokovno znanje, pridobljeno z dolgoletnimi izkušnjami, na področju nadzora kreditnih institucij na svojem ozemlju ter njihovih gospodarskih, organizacijskih in kulturnih posebnosti.
They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for those purposes.
V ta namen so vzpostavili ekipe, ki jih sestavlja številno, predano in visoko usposobljeno osebje.
Therefore, in order to ensure high-quality, Union-wide supervision, national competent authorities should be responsible for assisting the ECB in the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the exercise of the ECB supervisory tasks.
Da bi zagotovili visokokakovosten nadzor po celi Uniji, bi morali biti pristojni nacionalni organi zadolženi za pomoč ECB pri pripravi in izvajanju vsakršnih aktov v zvezi z opravljanjem njenih nadzorniških nalog.
This should include, in particular, the ongoing day-to-day assessment of a credit institution’s situation and related on-site verifications.
V tem okviru bi bilo treba predvsem nenehno in vsakodnevno ocenjevati stanje kreditnih institucij ter izvajati s tem povezana preverjanja na kraju samem.
The criteria laid down in this Regulation defining the scope of institutions that are less significant should be applied at the highest level of consolidation within participating Member States based on consolidated data.
Merila iz te uredbe za opredelitev institucij, ki so manj pomembne, bi se morala uporabljati na najvišji ravni konsolidacije v sodelujočih državah članicah na podlagi konsolidiranih podatkov.
Where the ECB carries out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation with regard to a group of credit institutions that is not less significant on a consolidated basis, it should carry out those tasks on a consolidated basis with regard to the group of credit institutions and on an individual basis with regard to the banking subsidiaries and branches of that group established in participating Member States.
Kadar ECB naloge, ki so nanjo prenesene s to uredbo, opravlja v zvezi s skupino kreditnih institucij, ki na konsolidirani podlagi ni manj pomembna, bi morala te naloge za skupino kreditnih institucij opravljati na konsolidirani podlagi, za podrejene bančne družbe in podružnice te skupine s sedežem v sodelujočih državah članicah pa na posamični podlagi.
The criteria laid down in this Regulation defining the scope of institutions that are less significant should be specified in a framework adopted and published by the ECB in consultation with national competent authorities.
Merila iz te uredbe za opredelitev institucij, ki so manj pomembne, bi morali natančneje opredeliti v okviru, ki ga sprejme in objavi ECB po posvetovanju z nacionalnimi pristojnimi organi.
On that basis, the ECB should be responsible to apply those criteria and verify, through its own calculations, whether those criteria are met.
ECB bi morala na tej podlagi biti odgovorna za uporabo zadevnih meril in s svojimi izračuni preverjati, ali so izpolnjena.
The ECB’s request for information to perform its calculation should not force the institutions to apply accounting frameworks differing from those applicable to them pursuant to other acts of Union and national law.
Ko bi ECB zahtevala informacije za namene svojih izračunov, to institucij ne bi smelo siliti v uporabo drugačnih računovodskih okvirov od tistih, ki jih morajo uporabljati na podlagi drugih aktov Unije in nacionalnega prava.
Where a credit institution has been considered significant or less significant, that assessment should generally not be modified more often than once every 12 months, except if there are structural changes in the banking groups, such as mergers or divestitures.
Ocene, ali kreditna institucija velja za pomembno ali manj pomembno, na splošno ne bi smeli spreminjati pogosteje kot enkrat v 12 mesecih, razen če bi v zadevnih bančnih skupinah prišlo do strukturnih sprememb, kot so na primer združitve oziroma odsvojitve.
When deciding, following a notification by a national competent authority, whether an institution is of significant relevance with regard to the domestic economy and should therefore be supervised by the ECB, the ECB should take into account all relevant circumstances, including level-playing field considerations.
Ko bi ECB na podlagi uradnega obvestila pristojnega nacionalnega organa ugotavljala, ali je posamezna institucija zelo pomembna za domače gospodarstvo in bi jo zato morala nadzirati ECB, bi morala upoštevati vse relevantne okoliščine, tudi kar zadeva enakost konkurenčnih pogojev.
As regards the supervision of cross-border credit institutions active both inside and outside the euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non-participating Member States.
V zvezi z nadzorom čezmejnih kreditnih institucij, ki delujejo tako v euroobmočju kot zunaj njega, bi ECB morala tesno sodelovati s pristojnimi organi v nesodelujočih državah članicah.
As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors.
Temu ustrezno bi za ECB kot pristojni organ morale veljati s tem povezane obveznosti glede sodelovanja in izmenjave informacij v skladu s pravom Unije in bi morala v celoti sodelovati v kolegijih nadzornikov.
In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a Union institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States whose currency is not the euro should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the SSM.
To, da nadzorniške naloge opravlja institucija Unije, ima z vidika finančne stabilnosti in trajnostnega povezovanja trgov nedvomno prednosti, zato bi morale imeti možnost sodelovanja v EMN tudi države članice, katerih valuta ni evro.
However, it is a necessary pre-condition for an effective exercise of supervisory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented fully and without delay.
Predpogoj za učinkovito opravljanje nadzorniških nalog pa je, da se nadzorniške odločitve izvajajo v celoti in brez odlašanja.
Member States wishing to participate in the SSM should therefore undertake to ensure that their national competent authorities will abide by and adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB.
Države članice, ki želijo sodelovati v tem novem mehanizmu, bi zato morale poskrbeti, da bodo njihovi pristojni nacionalni organi spoštovali in sprejeli vse ukrepe v zvezi s kreditnimi institucijami, ki jih bo zahtevala ECB.
The ECB should be able to establish a close cooperation with the competent authorities of a Member State whose currency is not the euro.
ECB bi moralo biti omogočeno, da vzpostavi tesno sodelovanje s pristojnimi organi držav članic, katerih valuta ni euro.
It should be obliged to establish the cooperation where the conditions set out in this Regulation are met.
Takšno sodelovanje bi morala vzpostaviti, če so izpolnjeni pogoji iz te uredbe.
Taking into account that participating Member States whose currency is not the euro are not present in the Governing Council for as long as they have not adopted the euro in accordance with the TFEU, and they cannot fully benefit from other mechanisms provided for Member States whose currency is the euro, additional safeguards in the decision-making process are provided for in this Regulation.
Glede na to, da sodelujoče države članice, katerih valuta ni euro, niso prisotne v Svetu ECB, vse dokler ne sprejmejo eura v skladu s PDEU, in da ne morejo v celoti izkoristiti drugih mehanizmov, ki so na voljo državam članicam, katerih valuta je euro, so v tej uredbi za proces odločanja zagotovljene dodatne varovalke.
However, those safeguards, in particular the possibility of the participating Member States whose currency is not the euro to request the immediate termination of the close cooperation after informing the Governing Council of its reasoned disagreement with a draft decision of the Supervisory Board, should be used in duly justified, exceptional cases.
Vendar pa bi morale biti te varovalke uporabljene v ustrezno utemeljenih izjemnih primerih, zlasti možnost države članice, katere valuta ni euro, da zahteva takojšnjo prekinitev tesnega sodelovanja po tem, ko je Svet ECB obvestila o svojem obrazloženem nestrinjanju z osnutkom odločitve Nadzornega odbora.
They should only be used as long as those specific circumstances apply.
Uporabljati bi se morale le, kolikor so podane posebne okoliščine.
The safeguards are due to the specific circumstances in which participating Member States whose currency is not the euro are under this Regulation, since they are not present in the Governing Council and cannot fully benefit from other mechanisms provided for Member States whose currency is the euro.
Varovalke so povezane s posebnimi okoliščinami, s katerimi se bodo morale na podlagi te uredbe soočiti sodelujoče države članice, katerih valuta ni euro, saj niso prisotne v Svetu ECB in ne morejo v celoti izkoristiti drugih mehanizmov, ki so na voljo državam članicam, katerih valuta je euro.
Therefore, the safeguards cannot and should not be construed as a precedent for other areas of Union policy.
Zato teh varovalk ni mogoče in jih ne bi smeli razlagati kot precedensa za področja drugih politik Unije.