natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Retired since February 2013.
št. 172
Head of the security department of the holding company ‘MZOR’, which is a state owned company under the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Belarus and therefore directly associated with the Lukashenka regime.
št. 189
Lieutenant Colonel, former operative of the military counter-intelligence of the KGB (currently head of the press service of the Investigative Committee of Belarus).
št. 197
He falsified evidence and used threats in order to extort confessions from opposition activists in the KGB detention centre in Minsk after the crackdown on the post-election protest demonstration in Minsk on 19 December 2010.
št. 198
He was directly responsible for the use of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and for denying the right to a fair trial.
št. 199
His actions constituted a direct violation of the international commitments of Belarus in the field of human rights.
št. 205
Deputy Head of penal colony IK-2 in Bobruisk
št. 220
Responsible for inhumane and cruel treatment of political prisoners A. Sannikau and A. Beliatski in penal colony IK-2 in Bobruisk.
št. 6
Opposition activists were tortured, denied access to legal representation and placed in the solitary confinement in the penal colony under his supervision.
št. 21
Trutko put pressure on A. Beliatski and A. Sannikau in order to force them to sign an appeal for pardon.
št. 22
As a former Head of the KGB Board of Intelligence, he shared responsibility for the repressive activity of the KGB against civil society and democratic opposition.
št. 23
Prosecutor of the City of Minsk, former Prosecutor of the Frunzenski District of Minsk, dealing with the case of protestor Vasili Parfenkov in February 2011, and with the case against A. Sannikau in July 2011.
št. 24
Responsible for implementing the politically-motivated administrative and criminal sanctions against representatives of civil society.
št. 25
Zhitomyr region, Ukraine (USSR)
Кирова 8 корп.
CEO of the semi-private Cosmos TV since June 2013, appointed by the Government of Belarus as representative of the state.
КГБ 210623, г.
Former Head of the KGB (July 2008-November 2012).
Osebno je sodeloval pri nečloveškem in ponižujočem ravnanju z opozicijskimi aktivisti v zaporu KGB v Minsku po zatiranju protestnih demonstracij po volitvah v Minsku 19. decembra 2010.
Responsible for transforming the KGB into the main organ of the repression of civil society and of the democratic opposition.
Do 2.8.2011 je bil tožilec v regiji Vitebsk.
Responsible for the dissemination, through the media, of false information about the demonstrators on 19 December 2010, alleging that they had brought materials to be used as weapons.
Tudi odgovoren za zadeve zoper Sjargeja Kavalenko in Andreja Hajdukova.
He personally threatened the lives and health of the wife and child of former presidential candidate, Andrei Sannikov.
Prvi namestnik predsednika nadzornega sveta (ponovno imenovan 21. januarja 2014), odgovoren za spremljanje skladnosti s postopki in predpisi za volilne kampanje v medijih; v tej vlogi je bil dejavno udeležen v režimski propagandi med volilnima kampanjama v letih 2010 in 2012.
He is the main initiator of orders for unlawful harassment of democratic opposition, the torture of political opponents and the mistreatment of prisoners.
Predsednik mu je 26. oktobra 2011 podelil nagrado „Red Frančiška Skarine“.
As a former Head of Military Counter-intelligence Board of the KGB (until 2012), he was responsible for the repressive activity of the KGB against civil society and the democratic opposition.
Poslovnež, dejavno udeležen v finančne transakcije, v katere je vpletena družina Lukašenko.
Under his supervision, KGB staff took part in interrogations of political activists following the demonstration on 19 December 2010.
Ni sprožil preiskave v primeru nepojasnjenih izginotij Jurija Zaharenka, Viktorja Gončarja, Anatolija Krasovskega in Dmitrija Zavadskega v Belorusiji v letih 1999 in 2000.
Dnipropetrovsk
Nekdanji minister za notranje zadeve in nekdanji vodja varnostne službe predsednika.
Minister of Defence since December 2009.
Imel je ključno vlogo pri nepojasnjenem izginotju Jurija Zaharenka, Viktorja Gončarja, Anatolija Krasovskega in Dmitrija Zavadskega v Belorusiji v letih 1999 in 2000.
As a member of the Security Council, he approves the repressive decisions agreed at ministerial level, including the decision to repress the peaceful demonstrations on 19 December 2010.
Nekdanji vodja posebne odzivne skupine na Ministrstvu za notranje zadeve (SOBR).
After December 2010, he praised the ‘total defeat of destructive forces’, when referring to the democratic opposition.
Минска
Zhuk, Alena Siamionauna (Zhuk Alena Syamionauna)
Минск, ул.
Judge of Pervomayskij district court in Vitsebsk.
Član spodnjega doma parlamenta, namestnik predsednika odbora za državno varnost.
On 24 February 2012, she sentenced Syarhei Kavalenka, who was considered as a political prisoner in 2012-2013, to two years and one month in prison for violation of probation.
Nekdanji vodja regionalne volilne komisije v regiji Grodno za predsedniške volitve 2010 in lokalne volitve marca 2014.
Alena Zhuk was directly responsible for violations of the human rights of a person because she denied Syarhei Kavalenka the right to a fair trial.
Kot predsednik regionalne volilne komisije je bil odgovoren za kršitve mednarodnih volilnih standardov na predsedniških volitvah 19. decembra 2010 in potvarjanje na lokalnih volitvah marca 2014 v regiji Grodno.
Syarhei Kavalenka was previously given a suspended sentence for hanging out a banned historical white-red-white flag, a symbol of the opposition movement, in Vitsebsk.
Organiziral je nepojasnjena izginotja Jurija Zaharenka, Viktorja Gončarja, Anatolija Krasovskega in Dmitrija Zavadskega v Belorusiji v letih 1999 in 2000.
The subsequent sentence given by Alena Zhuk was disproportionately harsh given the nature of the crime and not in line with the criminal code of Belarus.
Nekdanji minister za turizem in šport, nekdanji minister za notranje zadeve in nekdanji namestnik vodje predsednikove administracije.
The actions of Alena Zhuk constituted a direct violation of the international commitments of Belarus in the field of human rights.
Upokojen od februarja 2013.
Director General (CEO) State News Agency BELTA since May 2003.
Vodja varnostnega oddelka holdinga „MZOR“, ki je v lasti države in v pristojnosti ministrstva Republike Belorusije za industrijo, kar pomeni, da je neposredno povezan z režimom Lukašenka.
Responsible for relaying state propaganda in the media, which has supported and justified the repression of the democratic opposition and of civil society on 19 December 2010 using falsified information.
Tožilec v mestu Minsku, nekdanji tožilec v okrožju Frunzenski v Minsku, ki je vodil zadevo protestnika Vasilija Parfenkova februarja 2011 in zadevo zoper Aleša Sannikova julija 2011.
Deputy Prosecutor of the Zavodskoi District of Minsk dealing with the case of Khalip Irina, Martselev Sergei, Severinets Pavel, outstanding civil society representatives.
Kot član varnostnega sveta je tisti, ki odobri odločitve o represivnih ukrepih, dogovorjene na ministrski ravni, vključno z odločitvijo o zatiranju mirnih demonstracij 19. decembra 2010.
The accusation presented by him had a clear and imminent political motivation and was a clear violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Po decembru 2010 je v govorih o demokratični opoziciji navajal, da je to primer „popolnega poraza škodljivih sil“.
It was based on an incorrect classification of the events of 19 December 2010, and not sustained by evidence, proof or testimonies of witnesses.
Če Svet meni, da cilji tega sklepa niso bili doseženi, ga po potrebi podaljša ali spremeni.“
Republic of Belarus, 220012, Minsk, Nezavisimost ave., 86-B
210601 г.Витебск, ул.
Tel:
Жесткова, 14а (ul.
(+375 17) 263-63-83,
Zhestkova, 14a Vitebsk)
Fax:
Karabani, regija Minsk
(+375 17) 263-90-12
Минск
Beltechexport benefits from the regime as a main exporter of arms and military equipment in Belarus, which requires authorisation from the Belarusian authorities.
220020 г.
Beltech Holding benefits from the regime, in particular through Beltechexport, which is part of Beltech Holding.
Минск ул.
This Decision shall apply until 31 October 2015.
(angleško prečrkovanje beloruskega in ruskega zapisa)
It shall be kept under constant review.
Радужная, 27
Council Decision 2014/751/CFSP
Sklep Sveta 2014/751/SZVP
amending Decision 2010/573/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova
o spremembi Sklepa 2010/573/SZVP o omejevalnih ukrepih proti vodstvu pridnestrske regije Republike Moldavije
On 27 September 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/573/CFSP [1].
Svet je 27. septembra 2010 sprejel Sklep 2010/573/SZVP [1].
On the basis of a review of Decision 2010/573/CFSP, the restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova should be extended until 31 October 2015.
Na podlagi pregleda Sklepa 2010/573/SZVP bi bilo treba omejevalne ukrepe proti vodstvu pridnestrske regije Republike Moldavije podaljšati do 31. oktobra 2015.
Decision 2010/573/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,
Sklep 2010/573/SZVP bi bilo zato treba ustrezno spremeniti –
Article 4(2) of Decision 2010/573/CFSP is hereby replaced by the following:
Člen 4(2) Sklepa 2010/573/SZVP se nadomesti z naslednjim:
Article 2
V Bruslju, 30. oktobra 2014
Done at Brussels, 30 October 2014.
Predsednik
For the Council
Sklep Sveta 2010/573/SZVP z dne 27. septembra 2010 o omejevalnih ukrepih proti vodstvu pridnestrske regije Republike Moldavije (UL L 253, 28.9.2010, str.
The President
54).
Council Decision 2010/573/CFSP of 27 September 2010 concerning restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova (OJ L 253, 28.9.2010, p.
Ta sklep se uporablja do 31. oktobra 2015.
54).
Redno se pregleduje.
on the equivalence of the regulatory framework of Japan for central counterparties to the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories
o enakovrednosti regulativnega okvira Japonske za centralne nasprotne stranke zahtevam iz Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih OTC, centralnih nasprotnih strankah in repozitorijih sklenjenih poslov
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [1], and in particular Article 25(6) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 4. julija 2012 o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih OTC, centralnih nasprotnih strankah in repozitorijih sklenjenih poslov [1] ter zlasti člena 25(6) Uredbe,
The procedure for recognition of central counterparties (‘CCPs’) established in third countries set out in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 aims to allow CCPs established and authorised in third countries whose regulatory standards are equivalent to those laid down in that Regulation to provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in the Union.
Namen postopka za priznanje centralnih nasprotnih strank (v nadaljnjem besedilu: CNS) s sedežem v tretjih državah iz člena 25 Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012 je, da se CNS, ki imajo sedež in dovoljenje v tretjih državah, katerih regulativni standardi so enakovredni standardom iz navedene uredbe, omogoči opravljanje klirinških storitev za klirinške člane ali mesta trgovanja s sedežem v Uniji.
That recognition procedure and the equivalence decision provided for therein thus contribute to the achievement of the overarching aim of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to reduce systemic risk by extending the use of safe and sound CCPs to clear over-the-counter (‘OTC’) derivative contracts, including where those CCPs are established and authorised in a third country.
Postopek priznanja in v tem okviru predvidena odločitev o enakovrednosti tako prispevata k doseganju poglavitnega cilja Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012, tj. zmanjšanju sistemskega tveganja z razširjanjem uporabe varnih in stabilnih CNS za kliring pogodb o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih, s katerimi se trguje na prostem trgu (OTC), vključno s primeri, kadar imajo navedene CNS sedež in dovoljenje v tretji državi.
In order for a third country legal regime to be considered equivalent to the legal regime of the Union in respect of CCPs, the substantial outcome of the applicable legal and supervisory arrangements should be equivalent to Union requirements in respect of the regulatory objectives they achieve.
Da bi se pravne ureditve tretjih držav v zvezi z CNS obravnavale kot enakovredne pravni ureditvi Unije, bi morale v smislu učinkov pri doseganju regulativnih ciljev veljavne pravne in nadzorne ureditve v veliki meri biti enakovredne zahtevam Unije.
The purpose of this equivalence assessment is therefore to verify that the legal and supervisory arrangements of Japan ensure that CCPs established and authorised therein do not expose clearing members and trading venues established in the Union to a higher level of risk than the latter could be exposed to by CCPs authorised in the Union and, consequently, do not pose unacceptable levels of systemic risk in the Union.
Namen te ocene enakovrednosti je torej preveriti, ali pravne in nadzorne ureditve Japonske omogočajo, da CNS s sedežem in dovoljenjem v tej državi klirinških članov ali mest trgovanja s sedežem v Uniji ne izpostavljajo višji stopnji tveganja kot CNS z dovoljenjem v Uniji, posledično pa ne pomenijo nesprejemljivih stopenj sistemskega tveganja v Uniji.
On 1 September 2013, the Commission received the technical advice of the European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) on the legal and supervisory arrangements applicable to CCPs established in Japan.
Komisija je 1. septembra 2013 prejela tehnične nasvete Evropskega organa za vrednostne papirje in trge (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ESMA) glede pravnih in nadzornih ureditev, ki se uporabljajo za CNS z dovoljenjem na Japonskem.
A supplement to this advice was received on 27 January 2014.
Dopolnilo k temu nasvetu je Komisija prejela 27. januarja 2014.
The technical advice identified a number of differences between the legally binding requirements applicable, at a jurisdictional level, to CCPs in Japan and the legally binding requirements applicable to CCPs under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
V tehničnem nasvetu je bilo opredeljeno veliko razlik med pravno zavezujočimi zahtevami, ki na nacionalni ravni veljajo za CNS na Japonskem, in pravno zavezujočimi zahtevami, ki se za CNS uporabljajo v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 648/2012.
This Decision is not only based, however, on a comparative analysis of the legally binding requirements applicable to CCPs in Japan, but also on an assessment of the outcome of those requirements in terms of the level of risk mitigation they achieve.
Vendar ta sklep ne temelji samo na primerjalni analizi pravno zavezujočih zahtev, ki se uporabljajo za CNS na Japonskem, ampak tudi na oceni učinkov teh zahtev v smislu dosežene stopnje zmanjšanja tveganja.
In accordance with Article 25(6) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, three conditions need to be fulfilled in order to determine that the legal and supervisory arrangements of a third country regarding CCPs authorised therein are equivalent to those laid down in that Regulation.
V skladu s členom 25(6) Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012 morajo biti izpolnjeni trije pogoji, v skladu s katerimi se ugotovi, da so pravne in nadzorne ureditve v tretji državi v zvezi s CNS, ki jim je v tej tretji državi bilo izdano dovoljenje, enakovredne tistim, določenim v navedeni uredbi.
According to the first condition, CCPs authorised in a third country must comply with legally binding requirements which are equivalent to the requirements laid down in Title IV of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
V skladu s prvim pogojem morajo CNS z dovoljenjem v tretji državi izpolnjevati pravno zavezujoče zahteve, ki so enake zahtevam iz naslova IV Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012.
The legally binding requirements of Japan for clearing organisations (‘COs’) authorised therein consist of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act 2006 (‘FIEA’), which establishes the supervisory framework for organisations clearing securities and financial derivatives, and the Commodity Derivatives Act 2009 (‘CDA’), which provides the supervisory framework for organisations clearing commodities.
Pravno zavezujoče zahteve Japonske za klirinške organizacije z dovoljenjem v tej državi so zakon o finančnih instrumentih in borzah iz leta 2006 (Financial Instruments and Exchange Act), ki določa nadzorni okvir za organizacije, ki opravljajo kliring vrednostnih papirjev in izvedenih finančnih instrumentov, ter zakon o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih na blago iz leta 2009 (Commodity Derivatives Act), ki določa nadzorni okvir za organizacije, ki opravljajo kliring blaga.
The present decision only covers the regime set out in the FIEA.
Ta sklep zajema le ureditev iz zakona o finančnih instrumentih in borzah.
Pursuant to Article 194-7(1) of the FIEA, the Prime Minister delegates to the Commissioner of the Financial Services Agency of Japan (JFSA) the powers vested under the FIEA.
Temeljna načela za klirinške organizacije, določene v zakonu o finančnih instrumentih in borzah (v nadaljnjem besedilu: osnovna pravila), določajo visoke standarde, ki jih morajo izpolnjevati klirinške organizacije, da pridobijo licenco za opravljanje storitev kliringa na Japonskem.
Therefore, the Commissioner of the JFSA has the responsibility for granting a licence for clearing.
Ta osnovna pravila so prvi tir pravno zavezujočih obveznosti na Japonskem.
Moreover, in December 2013, the JFSA published the Comprehensive Guidelines for Supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures (‘the Guidelines’), which detail the supervisory framework with regard to financial market infrastructures, including COs, and in particular the way in which the FIEA will have to be complied with by the COs.
Da bi klirinške organizacije dokazale skladnost z osnovnimi pravili, morajo svoja notranja pravila in postopke predložiti v odobritev komisarju Japonske agencije za finančne storitve.
The Guidelines are implemented in the internal rules and procedures of COs.
Ta interna pravila in postopki so drugi tir pravno zavezujočih zahtev Japonske, ki mora določati preskriptivne podrobnosti o tem, kako bo klirinška organizacija, ki prosi za dovoljenje, izpolnila te standarde v skladu s smernicami.
The legally binding requirements in Japan therefore comprise a two-tiered structure.
Poleg tega notranja pravila in postopki klirinških organizacij vsebujejo dodatne določbe, ki dopolnjujejo osnovna pravila.
The core principles for COs laid down in the FIEA (the ‘primary rules’) set out the high-level standards with which COs must comply in order to obtain a licence to provide clearing services in Japan.
Ko ta notranja pravila in postopke odobri komisar Japonske agencije za finančne storitve, le-ti postanejo za klirinške organizacije pravno zavezujoči.
Those primary rules comprise the first tier of the legally binding requirements in Japan.
Ta pravila so zato sestavni del pravnih in nadzornih ureditev, ki jih morajo upoštevati CNS s sedežem na Japonskem.
In order to prove compliance with the primary rules, a CO must submit its internal rules and procedures to the Commissioner of the JFSA for approval.
V primeru neupoštevanja osnovnih pravil ali notranjih pravil in postopkov klirinških organizacij ima komisar Japonske agencije za finančne storitve pristojnost, da zoper klirinške organizacije sprejme upravne ukrepe, vključno z izdajo odredb za izboljšanje poslovnih operacij ali z razveljavitvijo licence klirinške organizacije v celoti ali delno.
Those internal rules and procedures comprise the second tier of the legally binding requirements in Japan, which must provide prescriptive detail regarding the way in which the applicant CO will meet those standards in accordance with the Guidelines.
Osnovna pravila, ki se uporabljajo za klirinške organizacije, dopolnjujejo pa jih njihova notranja pravila in postopki, imajo precejšnje učinke, ki so enakovredni učinkom pravil iz naslova IV Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012.
Moreover, the internal rules and procedures of COs contain additional provisions which complement the primary rules.
Zlasti je treba omeniti pravno zavezujoče zahteve, ki veljajo za klirinške organizacije, glede števila primerov neizpolnjevanja finančnih obveznosti, ki jih morajo kriti s celotnimi finančnimi viri, in sicer morajo klirinške organizacije, ki opravijo več kot 95 % kliringa na Japonskem, pri skrajnih, vendar verjetnih tržnih pogojih pokriti neizpolnjene finančne obveznosti vsaj dveh klirinških članov, do katerih so najbolj izpostavljene, („načelo kritje 2“).
Once approved by the Commissioner of the JFSA, those internal rules and procedures become legally binding upon the CO.
Ta zahteva zagotavlja stopnjo zmanjševanja tveganja, enakovredno stopnji, ki se doseže z zahtevami iz naslova IV Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012, zato bi se morala obravnavati kot enakovredna.
Those rules therefore form an integral part of the legal and supervisory arrangements that CCPs established in Japan must comply with.
Pravno zavezujoče zahteve, ki se uporabljajo za klirinške organizacije v zvezi z likvidnostnim tveganjem, od klirinških organizacij, ki opravijo več kot 95 % kliringa na Japonskem, zahtevajo, da uporabljajo „načelo kritje 2“.
In the case of non-compliance with the primary rules or the CO's internal rules and procedures, the Commissioner of the JFSA has the power to take administrative actions against the CO, including issuing of orders to improve business operations or rescinding all or part of the CO's licence.
Ta zahteva zagotavlja stopnjo zmanjševanja tveganja, enakovredno stopnji, ki se doseže z zahtevami iz naslova IV Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012, zato bi se morala obravnavati kot enakovredna.
The primary rules applicable to COs complemented by their internal rules and procedures deliver substantial results equivalent to the effects of the rules contained in Title IV of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
Ne nazadnje imajo pravno zavezujoče zahteve, ki se uporabljajo za vse klirinške organizacije v zvezi z neprekinjenim poslovanjem, zahtevami glede zavarovanja, naložbeno politiko, tveganjem poravnave, ločevanjem in prenosljivostjo, izračunom začetnih kritij in upravljanjem, vključno z organizacijskimi zahtevami, zahtevami v zvezi z višjim vodstvom, odborom za tveganja, vodenjem evidenc, kvalificiranimi deleži, informacijami, posredovanimi pristojnim organom, navzkrižjem interesov, zunanjim izvajanjem ter vodenjem poslov, precejšnje učinke, ki so enakovredni tistim iz Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012 in bi jih zato bilo treba obravnavati kot enakovredne.
In particular, the legally binding requirements applicable to COs regarding the number of defaults to be covered by total financial resources require COs clearing more than 95 % of the volumes cleared in Japan to cover the default of at least the two clearing members to which they have the largest exposures under extreme but plausible market conditions (the ‘cover 2 principle’).
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pravne in nadzorne ureditve Japonske zagotavljajo, da klirinške organizacije, ki jim je bilo v okviru teh ureditev izdano dovoljenje, izpolnjujejo pravno zavezujoče zahteve, ki so enake zahtevam iz naslova IV Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012.
That requirement ensures an equivalent degree of risk mitigation to that pursued by the requirements set out under Title IV of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and therefore should be considered equivalent.
V skladu z drugim pogojem iz člena 25(6) je treba s pravnimi in nadzornimi ureditvami Japonske glede CNS, ki jim je bilo v tej državi izdano dovoljenje, zagotavljati stalen učinkovit nadzor navedenih CNS in izvrševanje predpisov.
The legally binding requirements applicable to COs regarding liquidity risk require COs clearing more than 95 % of the volumes cleared in Japan to apply the ‘cover 2 principle’.
Japonska agencija za finančne storitve je odgovorna za nadzor infrastruktur finančnih trgov.