natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Decision ECB/2004/3 [3] was amended by Decision ECB/2011/6 [4] in order to ensure the protection of the public interest as regards the stability of the financial system in the Union and in Member States, in respect of requests for access to ECB documents relating to ECB activities and policies or decisions drawn up or held by the ECB in the field of financial stability, including those relating to the provision of support by the ECB to the European Systemic Risk Board.
Sklep ECB/2004/3 [3] je bil spremenjen s Sklepom ECB/2011/6 [4] in sicer z namenom zagotoviti varstvo javnega interesa v zvezi s stabilnostjo finančnega sistema v Uniji in državah članicah glede zahtev za dostop do dokumentov ECB v zvezi z dejavnostmi ECB in politikami ali sklepi, ki jih je ECB sestavila ali jih hrani in se nanašajo na finančno stabilnost, vključno s tistimi, ki se nanašajo na zagotavljanje podpore ECB Evropskemu odboru za sistemska tveganja.
In carrying out the specific tasks referred to in the first recital, the ECB will also draw up or hold documents relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.
Za izvajanje posebnih nalog iz prve uvodne izjave bo ECB tudi sestavila ali hranila dokumente v zvezi z bonitetnim nadzorom kreditnih institucij.
Such documents will qualify as ECB documents within the meaning of Decision ECB/2004/3.
Takšni dokumenti bodo opredeljeni kot dokumenti ECB v smislu Sklepa ECB/2004/3.
There is a need to ensure the protection of the public interest as regards the Union's or a Member State's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the context of public access requests to ECB documents.
Treba je zagotoviti varstvo javnega interesa v zvezi s politiko Unije ali države članice glede bonitetnega nadzora kreditnih institucij v okviru zahtev za dostop javnosti do dokumentov ECB.
There is also a need to ensure the protection of the public interest as regards the purpose of supervisory inspections.
Varstvo javnega interesa je treba zagotoviti tudi v zvezi z namenom nadzorstvenih pregledov.
In accordance with Article 23.1 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, adopted in Decision ECB/2004/2, the proceedings of the decision-making bodies of the ECB, or any committee or group established by them, of the Supervisory Board, its Steering Committee and any of its substructures of a temporary nature shall be confidential unless the Governing Council authorises the President of the ECB to make the outcome of their deliberations public.
V skladu s členom 23.1 Poslovnika Evropske centralne banke, ki je bil sprejet s Sklepom ECB/2004/2, so razprave organov odločanja ECB oziroma odborov ali skupin, ki jih ti ustanovijo, Nadzornega odbora, njegovega Usmerjevalnega odbora in vseh njegovih začasnih podstruktur zaupne, razen če Svet ECB pooblasti predsednika ECB, da objavi rezultate njihovih posvetovanj.
The President is to consult the Chair of the Supervisory Board prior to making any such decision in relation to the proceedings of the Supervisory Board, its Steering Committee and any of its substructures of a temporary nature.
Predsednik se pred sprejetjem katere koli takšne odločitve v zvezi z razpravami Nadzornega odbora, njegovega Usmerjevalnega odbora in vseh njegovih začasnih podstruktur posvetuje s predsednikom Nadzornega odbora.
The applicable Union law is relevant for both disclosure and confidentiality of information held by competent authorities in the exercise of prudential supervision of credit institutions, in particular Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council [5] and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [6].
Pravo Unije, ki se uporablja, zlasti Uredba (EU) št. 575/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [5] in Direktiva 2013/36/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [6], je upoštevno za razkritje in zaupnost informacij, ki jih hranijo pristojni organi pri izvajanju bonitetnega nadzora kreditnih institucij.
Developments in the economies of the Member States and in the financial markets, and their impact on the conduct of the ECB's monetary policy, and/or on the stability of the financial system in the Union or in a Member State, have increased the need for interaction between the ECB and Member States' authorities, and between the ECB and European and international institutions or bodies.
Gospodarski razvoj držav članic in finančnih trgov ter njihov vpliv na izvajanje monetarne politike ECB in/ali stabilnost finančnega sistema v Uniji ali državi članici sta povečala potrebo po medsebojnem sodelovanju med ECB in organi držav članic ter med ECB in mednarodnimi institucijami ali telesi.
It has proven to be of crucial importance for the ECB to be in a position to convey pertinent and candid messages to European and Member States' authorities so as to most effectively serve the public interest in the fulfilment of its mandate.
Izkazalo se je, da je za ECB ključno, da evropskim organom in organom držav članic posreduje ustrezna in jasna sporočila in tako najbolj učinkovito služi javnemu interesu pri izpolnjevanju svojega poslanstva.
This could entail that effective informal and confidential communication must also be possible and should not be undermined by the prospect of disclosure.
To lahko pomeni, da mora biti mogoča tudi neformalna in zaupna komunikacija, na kar možnost razkritja ne sme vplivati.
More specifically, the ECB is required to interact with national authorities and bodies, Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, relevant international organisations, supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries, in relation to: (a) the ESCB's support for the general economic policies of the Union pursuant to Article 127(1) of the Treaty; (b) the ESCB's contribution to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, pursuant to Article 127(5) of the Treaty; and (c) the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
Podrobneje, ECB mora sodelovati z nacionalnimi organi in telesi, institucijami Unije, telesi, uradi in agencijami, ustreznimi mednarodnimi organizacijami, nadzornimi organi in vladami tretjih držav pri (a) podpori ESCB v zvezi s splošno ekonomsko politiko Unije v skladu s členom 127(1) Pogodbe, (b) prispevku ESCB k nemotenemu izvajanju politike, ki jo v zvezi z bonitetnim nadzorom kreditnih institucij in stabilnostjo finančnega sistema izvajajo pristojni organi, in sicer v skladu s členom 127(5) Pogodbe, in (c) nalogah, ki so na ECB prenesene z Uredbo (EU) št. 1024/2013.
In particular, pursuant to Article 6(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, both the ECB and national competent authorities have a duty to cooperate in good faith and an obligation to exchange information.
Zlasti v skladu s členom 6(2) Uredbe št. 1024/2013 za ECB in pristojne nacionalne organe velja, da morajo med seboj sodelovati v dobri veri in si izmenjevati informacije.
The ECB also cooperates at international level where ESCB tasks are concerned.
Kadar gre za naloge ESCB, ECB sodeluje tudi na mednarodni ravni.
For the ECB to cooperate effectively, it is essential to provide and preserve a ‘space to think’ for the free and constructive exchange of views and information between the abovementioned authorities, institutions and other bodies.
Za učinkovito sodelovanje ECB je poglavitno, da zagotovi in ohrani „prostor za razmislek“ za svobodno in ustvarjalno izmenjavo stališč in informacij med zgoraj navedenimi organi, institucijami in drugimi telesi.
On this basis, the ECB should be entitled to protect documents exchanged as part of its cooperation with national central banks, national competent authorities, national designated authorities and other relevant authorities and bodies.
Na tej podlagi bi morala ECB imeti pravico varovati dokumente, ki jih izmenja v okviru sodelovanja z nacionalnimi centralnimi bankami, pristojnimi nacionalnimi organi, imenovanimi nacionalnimi organi in drugimi ustreznimi organi in telesi.
In addition, in carrying out the task of the ESCB to promote the smooth operation of payment systems, it is important to protect documents the disclosure of which would undermine the public interest as regards the soundness and security of the financial market infrastructures, payment schemes and payment service providers.
Poleg tega je pri izvajanju naloge ESCB glede podpiranja nemotenega delovanja plačilnih sistemov pomembno varovati dokumente, katerih razkritje bi ogrozilo javni interes v zvezi s trdnostjo in varnostjo infrastruktur finančnega trga, plačilnih shem in izvajalcev plačilnih storitev.
Therefore, Decision ECB/2004/3 should be amended accordingly,
Zato je treba Sklep ECB/2004/3 ustrezno spremeniti –
in Article 3 the following definitions are added:
v členu 3 se dodajo naslednje opredelitve:
“national competent authority” (NCA) and “national designated authority” (NDA) have the meaning given to them by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013;
‚pristojni nacionalni organ‘ in ‚imenovani nacionalni organ‘ imata enak pomen kot v Uredbi Sveta (EU) št. 1024/2013;
in Article 4(1)(a) the first indent is replaced by the following:
„zaupnost postopkov organov odločanja ECB, Nadzornega odbora in drugih teles, ustanovljenih v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 1024/2013“
‘the confidentiality of the proceedings of the ECB's decision-making bodies, the Supervisory Board or other bodies established pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013,’
v členu 4(1)(a) se dodajo naslednje alinee:
in Article 4(1)(a) the following indents are added:
„politika Unije ali države članice v zvezi z bonitetnim nadzorom kreditnih institucij in drugih finančnih institucij,
‘the Union's or a Member State's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions,
namen nadzorstvenih pregledov,
the purpose of supervisory inspections,
člen 4(3) se nadomesti z naslednjim:
Article 4(3) is replaced by the following:
v členu 7(1) se sklicevanje na „generalnega direktorja generalnega direktorata Sekretariat in jezikovne storitve“ nadomesti z „generalni direktor generalnega direktorata Sekretariat“.
Access to a document drafted or received by the ECB for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the ECB, or for exchanges of views between the ECB and NCBs, NCAs or NDAs, shall be refused even after the decision has been taken, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
Člen 2
in Article 7(1), the reference to ‘Director-General Secretariat and Language Services’ is replaced by ‘Director-General Secretariat’.
Ta sklep začne veljati naslednji dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.
Article 2
V Frankfurtu na Majni, 21. januarja 2015.
Entry into force
Predsednik ECB
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
UL L 80, 18.3.2004, str.
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 January 2015.
33.
The President of the ECB
Uredba Sveta (EU) št. 1024/2013 z dne 15. oktobra 2013 o prenosu posebnih nalog, ki se nanašajo na politike bonitetnega nadzora kreditnih institucij, na Evropsko centralno banko (UL L 287, 29.10.2013, str. 63).
OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p. 33.
Sklep Evropske centralne banke z dne 4. marca 2004 o dostopu javnosti do dokumentov Evropske centralne banke (ECB/2004/3) (UL L 80, 18.3.2004, str. 42).
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
Sklep Evropske centralne banke z dne 9. maja 2011 o spremembah Sklepa ECB/2004/3 o dostopu javnosti do dokumentov Evropske centralne banke (ECB/2011/6) (UL L 158, 16.6.2011, str. 37).
Decision ECB/2004/3 of 4 March 2004 on public access to European Central Bank documents (OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p. 42).
Uredba (EU) št. 575/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26. junija 2013 o bonitetnih zahtevah za kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja ter o spremembi Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012 (UL L 176, 27.6.2013, str. 1).
Decision ECB/2011/6 of 9 May 2011 amending Decision ECB/2004/3 on public access to European Central Bank documents (OJ L 158, 16.6.2011, p. 37).
Direktiva 2013/36/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26. junija 2013 o dostopu do dejavnosti kreditnih institucij in bonitetnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij, spremembi Direktive 2002/87/ES in razveljavitvi direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES (UL L 176, 27.6.2013, str. 338).
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).
Uredba Sveta (EU) št. 1024/2013 z dne 15. oktobra 2013 o prenosu posebnih nalog, ki se nanašajo na politike bonitetnega nadzora kreditnih institucij, na Evropsko centralno banko (UL L 287, 29.10.2013, str. 63).“
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).
‚drugi ustrezni organi in telesa‘ so ustrezni nacionalni organi, institucije Unije, telesa, uradi in agencije, ustrezne mednarodne organizacije, nadzorni organi in vlade tretjih držav.
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).’
trdnost in varnost infrastruktur finančnega trga, plačilnih shem ali izvajalcev plačilnih storitev“
“other relevant authorities and bodies” means relevant national authorities and bodies, Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, relevant international organisations, supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries.
Dostop do dokumentov o izmenjavi mnenj med ECB in drugimi ustreznimi organi in telesi se zavrne tudi po tem, ko je bila odločitev sprejeta, če bi razkritje resno oslabilo učinkovitost ECB pri opravljanju njenih nalog, razen če prevlada javni interes za razkritje.“
Decision (EU) 2015/656 of the European Central Bank
Sklep Evropske centralne banke (EU) 2015/656
of 4 February 2015
z dne 4. februarja 2015
on the conditions under which credit institutions are permitted to include interim or year-end profits in Common Equity Tier 1 capital in accordance with Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (ECB/2015/4)
o pogojih, pod katerimi je kreditnim institucijam dovoljeno, da dobičke med letom ali čiste dobičke poslovnega leta vključijo v navaden lastniški temeljni kapital v skladu s členom 26(2) Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 (ECB/2015/4)
Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [1], and in particular Article 4(1)(d) and the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (EU) št. 1024/2013 z dne 15. oktobra 2013 o prenosu posebnih nalog, ki se nanašajo na politike bonitetnega nadzora kreditnih institucij, na Evropsko centralno banko [1] ter zlasti člena 4(1)(d) in drugega pododstavka člena 4(3) Uredbe,
Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2] has introduced a new procedure whereby the permission of the competent authority is required for the inclusion of interim profits or year-end profits in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital before an institution has taken a formal decision confirming the final profit or loss of the institution for the year.
Člen 26(2) Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [2] je uvedel nov postopek, s katerim se zahteva dovoljenje pristojnega organa za vključitev dobičkov med letom ali čistih dobičkov poslovnega leta v navaden lastniški temeljni kapital (CET1), preden institucija sprejme uraden sklep o potrditvi letnega dobička ali izgube.
Such permission is granted where the following two conditions are met: profits have been verified by persons independent of the institution that are responsible for the auditing of the accounts of that institution; and the institution has demonstrated that any foreseeable charge or dividend has been deducted from the amount of those profits.
To dovoljenje se izda, če sta izpolnjena naslednja pogoja: dobičke preverijo in potrdijo osebe, ki so neodvisne od institucije in so odgovorne za revizijo računovodskih izkazov zadevne institucije; in institucija dokaže, da so bile vse predvidljive obremenitve ali dividende odbite od zneska teh dobičkov.
Articles 2 and 3 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 241/2014 [3] specify the meaning of ‘foreseeable’ for the purposes of Article 26(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
Člena 2 in 3 Delegirane uredbe Komisije (EU) št. 241/2014 [3] opredeljujeta pomen pojma „predvidljiv“ za namene člena 26(2)(b) Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014 [4] lays down uniform requirements in relation to supervisory reporting.
Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) št. 680/2014 [4] določa enotne zahteve v zvezi z nadzorniškim poročanjem.
In accordance with Article 4(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the competent authority responsible for granting permission to credit institutions under its direct supervision to include interim or year-end profits in CET1 capital, where the abovementioned conditions are met.
V skladu s členom 4(1)(d) Uredbe (EU) št. 1024/2013 je Evropska centralna banka (ECB) pristojni organ, ki je odgovoren za izdajo dovoljenja kreditnim institucijam pod njenim neposrednim nadzorom za vključitev dobičkov med letom ali čistih dobičkov poslovnega leta v navaden lastniški temeljni kapital, če so izpolnjeni zgoraj navedeni pogoji.
Taking into account the fact that Delegated Regulation (EU) No 241/2014 has harmonised the approach to the deduction of foreseeable dividends from interim or year-end profits for the purposes of granting the permission referred to in Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, permission to include interim or year-end profits in CET1 capital should be granted when certain conditions are met.
Ob upoštevanju, da je Delegirana uredba (EU) št. 241/2014 uskladila pristop k odbijanju predvidljivih dividend od dobičkov med letom ali čistih dobičkov poslovnega leta za namene izdaje dovoljenja iz člena 26(2) Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013, bi bilo treba dovoljenje za vključitev dobičkov med letom ali čistih dobičkov poslovnega leta v navaden lastniški temeljni kapital izdati, če so izpolnjeni določeni pogoji.
In cases where the conditions to apply this Decision are not met the ECB will individually assess requests for permission to include interim or year-end profits in CET1 capital,
V primerih, ko pogoji za uporabo tega sklepa niso izpolnjeni, bo ECB posamično presojala zahteve za dovoljenje za vključitev dobičkov med letom ali čistih dobičkov poslovnega leta v navaden lastniški temeljni kapital –
Subject matter and scope
Vsebina in obseg uporabe
This Decision lays down the conditions under which the ECB has determined to grant permission to credit institutions to include interim or year-end profits in CET1 capital pursuant to Article 26(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
Ta sklep določa pogoje, pod katerimi ECB odloča o izdaji dovoljenja kreditnim institucijam, da vključijo dobičke med letom ali čiste dobičke poslovnega leta v navaden lastniški temeljni kapital v skladu s členom 26(2)(a) in (b) Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013.
This Decision is without prejudice to the right of credit institutions to request permission from the ECB to include interim or year-end profits in CET1 capital in cases not covered by this Decision.
Ta sklep ne posega v pravico kreditnih institucij, da tudi v primerih, ki niso zajeti v tem sklepu, zahtevajo dovoljenje ECB za vključitev dobičkov med letom ali čistih dobičkov poslovnega leta v navaden lastniški temeljni kapital.
This Decision applies to credit institutions for which the ECB carries out direct supervision in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/17) [5].
Ta sklep se uporablja za kreditne institucije, ki so v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 468/2014 Evropske centralne banke (ECB/2014/17) [5] pod neposrednim nadzorom ECB.
‘credit institution’ means a credit institution as defined in point 1 of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and which is supervised by the ECB.
„kreditna institucija“ pomeni kreditno institucijo, kot je opredeljena v točki 1 člena 4(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 in jo nadzira ECB;
‘consolidated basis’ has the same meaning as defined in point 48 of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
„konsolidirana podlaga“ ima enak pomen, kot je opredeljen v točki 48 člena 4(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013;
‘sub-consolidated basis’ has the same meaning as defined in point 49 of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
„subkonsolidirana podlaga“ ima enak pomen, kot je opredeljen v točki 49 člena 4(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013;
‘consolidating entity’ means the credit institution which shall comply with the requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on consolidated basis or sub-consolidated basis, as applicable, in accordance with Articles 11 and 18 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
„konsolidacijski subjekt“ pomeni kreditno institucijo, ki izpolnjuje zahteve iz Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 na konsolidirani ali subkonsolidirani podlagi, kot je primerno, v skladu s členoma 11 in 18 Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013;
‘interim profits’ means profits as laid down in the applicable accounting framework, computed for a reference period shorter than a full financial year, and before the credit institution has taken a formal decision confirming such a profit or loss of the institution.
„dobički med letom“ pomenijo dobičke, kot so opredeljeni v veljavnem računovodskem okviru in se izračunajo za referenčno obdobje, ki je krajše od celotnega poslovnega leta, in preden kreditna institucija sprejme uraden sklep o potrditvi takšnega dobička ali izgube institucije;
‘year-end profits’ means profits as defined in the applicable accounting framework, computed for a reference period equal to a full financial year, and before the credit institution has taken a formal decision confirming such a profit or loss of the institution.
„čisti dobički poslovnega leta“ pomenijo dobičke, kot so opredeljeni v veljavnem računovodskem okviru in se izračunajo za referenčno obdobje, ki je enako celotnemu poslovnemu letu, in preden kreditna institucija sprejme uraden sklep o potrditvi takšnega dobička ali izgube institucije;
‘pay-out ratio at consolidated level’ means the ratio between: (a) dividends, other than those paid in a form that does not reduce CET1 capital (e.g. scrip-dividends), distributed to owners of the consolidating entity; and (b) profit after tax attributable to owners of the consolidating entity.
„količnik izplačila na konsolidirani ravni“ pomeni razmerje med: (a) dividendami, ki niso izplačane v obliki, ki ne zmanjšuje navadnega lastniškega temeljnega kapitala (npr. dividende v obliki delnic), ki se razdelijo lastnikom konsolidacijskega subjekta; in (b) dobičkom po obdavčitvi, ki se pripiše lastnikom konsolidacijskega subjekta.
If for a given year the ratio between (a) and (b) is negative or above 100 %, the pay-out ratio shall be deemed to be 100 %.
Če je v danem letu razmerje med (a) in (b) negativno ali nad 100 %, se šteje, da znaša količnik izplačila 100 %.
If for a given year (b) is zero, the pay-out ratio shall be deemed to be 0 % if (a) is zero, and 100 % if (a) is above zero.
Če je v danem letu (b) enak nič, se šteje, da znaša količnik izplačila 0 %, če je (a) enak nič, oziroma 100 %, če je (a) nad nič;