natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission requested additional information by letters of 26 February 2009, 8 October 2009 and 29 January 2010.
Komisija je v dopisih z dne 26. februarja 2009, 8. oktobra 2009 in 29. januarja 2010 zaprosila za dodatne informacije.
Romania replied by letters of 27 April 2009, 19 October 2009 and 3 February 2010, all registered on the same dates.
Romunija je odgovorila v dopisih z dne 27. aprila 2009, 19. oktobra 2009 in 3. februarja 2010, evidentiranimi istega dne.
The ‘grace period’ was extended until the end of 2004 by an Additional Protocol approved by Council Decision of 29 July 2002 and signed on 23 October 2002.
„Obdobje odloga“ je bilo podaljšano do leta 2004 z Dodatnim protokolom, odobrenim s Sklepom Sveta z dne 29. julija 2002 in podpisanim 23. oktobra 2002.
During the resulting total ‘grace period’, i.e. from 1993 until the end of 2004, Romania was allowed to give restructuring aid to the steel sector on terms and conditions resulting from Protocol 2 (as extended by the Additional Protocol) and on the basis of a National Restructuring Program (hereinafter ‘NRP’) agreed by the Community.
V skupnem „obdobju odloga“, tj. od leta 1993 do konca leta 2004, je Romunija lahko dodelila pomoč za prestrukturiranje jeklarskega sektorja pod pogoji iz Protokola 2 (kakor je bil razširjen z Dodatnim protokolom) in na podlagi nacionalnega programa prestrukturiranja (v nadaljnjem besedilu: NPP), kakor je določila Skupnost.
Paragraph (12) empowers the Commission and the Council to monitor the implementation of the Romanian NRP before and after accession, until 2009.
Odstavek (12) daje Komisiji in Svetu pristojnost za spremljanje izvajanja romunskega NPP pred pristopom in po njem, do leta 2009.
Paragraph (17) empowers the Commission to order recovery of State aid granted in breach of paragraphs (1) to (3) of Annex VII (as indicated in recitals (30)-(32) below).
Odstavek (17) daje Komisiji pooblastilo za izterjavo državne pomoči, dodeljene v nasprotju z odstavki (1) do (3) Priloge VII (kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah (30) do (32)).
Paragraph (1) of Annex VII stipulates that State aid granted by Romania for the restructuring of ‘specified parts of its steel industry’ from 1993 to 2004 shall be deemed compatible with the internal market provided that: ‘[…] the period provided for in Article 9(4) of Protocol 2 on ECSC products to the Europe Agreement […] has been extended until 31 December 2005’; the terms and conditions set out in the NRP have been complied with; no further State aid is granted or paid to beneficiaries of the NRP after 1 January 2005; and ‘[…] no State aid for restructuring is paid to the Romanian steel sector after 31 December 2004’.
Odstavek (1) Priloge VII določa, da se državna pomoč, ki jo je podelila Romunija v namene prestrukturiranja „določenim delom romunske jeklarske industrije“ od 1993 do 2004, šteje za združljivo s skupnim trgom pod pogojem, da: „[…] se obdobje iz člena 9(4) Protokola 2 o proizvodih ESPJ k Evropskemu sporazumu […] podaljša do 31. decembra 2005“; se upoštevajo pogoji iz NPP; se po 1. januarju 2005 upravičencem iz NPP ne dodeli ali izplača nadaljnja državna pomoč; in „[…] se po 31. decembru 2004 romunskemu jeklarskemu sektorju ne […] izplača nobena državna pomoč za prestrukturiranje“.
It also stipulates that: ‘For the purpose of these provisions and Appendix A, State aid for restructuring is to be understood as any measure concerning steel companies that constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty and that cannot be held to be compatible with the internal market in accordance with the normal rules applied in the Community’.
Določa tudi: „Za namene teh določb in Dodatka A državna pomoč za prestrukturiranje pomeni ukrep za jeklarska podjetja, ki spada v državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES in se ne more šteti za združljivega s skupnim trgom v skladu z običajnimi pravili, ki se uporabljajo v Skupnosti“.
The first subparagraph of paragraph (1) of Annex VII refers explicitly to Article 9(4) of Protocol 2, as extended by the Additional Protocol signed on 23 October 2002.
Prvi pododstavek odstavka (1) Priloge VII se nanaša izrecno na člen 9(4) Protokola 2, kakor je bil razširjen z Dodatnim protokolom, podpisanim 23. oktobra 2002.
Protocol 2 covered only ECSC steel, and even listed the ECSC steel products in an Annex.
Protokol 2 je zajemal samo jeklene izdelke ESPJ in je celo navajal jeklene izdelke ESPJ v prilogi.
The ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002.
Pogodba ESPJ je prenehala veljati 23. julija 2002.
Protocol 2 expired on 31 December 1997.
Protokol 2 je prenehal veljati 31. decembra 1997.
The Additional Protocol extended the validity of Protocol 2 from 1 January 1998 for another 8 years or until the date of Romania's accession (whichever came first).
Dodatni protokol je podaljšal veljavnost Protokola 2 od 1. januarja 1998 za dodatnih osem let ali do datuma pristopa Romunije k EU (kar je bilo prej).
This procedure is closed, taking note of the Commission’s lack of competence to assess the acts concerned,
Ta postopek je zaključen, ker Komisija ni pristojna za oceno dejanj, ki jih zajema ta postopek –
Council Decision 2013/517/CFSP
Sklep Sveta 2013/517/SZVP
on the Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
o podpori Unije za dejavnosti Mednarodne agencije za atomsko energijo na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje
On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
Evropski svet je 12. decembra 2003 sprejel Strategijo EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Strategija); poglavje III Strategije vsebuje seznam ukrepov, ki jih je treba sprejeti v Uniji in tretjih državah za boj proti širjenju tovrstnega orožja.
The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular by releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Unija Strategijo dejavno izvaja in uveljavlja ukrepe iz Poglavja III Strategije, in sicer zlasti s sproščanjem finančnih sredstev, namenjenih podpori za posebne projekte, ki jih izvajajo večstranske institucije, kot je tudi Mednarodna agencija za atomsko energijo (MAAE).
That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the Union to working towards making the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols the standard for the IAEA verification system.
Navedeno skupno stališče med drugim poziva k pospeševanju sklenitve celovitih sporazumov o nadzornih ukrepih in dodatnih protokolov z MAAE, Unijo pa obvezuje, da deluje tako, da bodo celoviti sporazumi o nadzornih ukrepih in dodatni protokoli postali merilo v sistemu preverjanja MAAE.
On 27 September 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/585/CFSP on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction [6].
Svet je 27. septembra 2010 sprejel Sklep 2010/585/SZVP o podpori dejavnostim MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje [6].
The strengthening of the control of high-activity radioactive sources in accordance with the G-8 statement and Action Plan on securing radioactive sources, adopted at the 2003 Evian Summit, remains an important objective for the Union, which will be pursued through outreach to third countries.
Krepitev nadzora nad visokoaktivnimi radioaktivnimi viri ostaja v skladu z izjavo in Akcijskim načrtom G-8 o varovanju radioaktivnih virov, sprejetima na vrhu v Evianu leta 2003, pomemben cilj Unije, ki se ga bo zasledovalo z vzpostavljanjem stikov s tretjimi državami.
On 8 July 2005, the States Parties and the European Atomic Energy Community agreed by consensus to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) with a view to expanding its scope to encompass nuclear material and facilities in peaceful domestic use and storage, as well as in transport, and to oblige States Parties to make violations subject to criminal sanctions.
Države pogodbenice in Evropska skupnost za atomsko energijo so se 8. julija 2005 soglasno dogovorile o spremembi Konvencije o fizičnem varovanju jedrskega materiala (CPPNM), tako da bo njeno področje uporabe zajemalo tudi jedrski material in objekte pri miroljubni domači uporabi in skladiščenju ter pri prevozu, države pogodbenice pa bodo za kršitve morale predvideti kazenske sankcije.
On 7 July 2007, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism entered into force.
S 7. julijem 2007 je začela veljati Mednarodna konvencija za preprečevanje jedrskega terorizma.
It requires States Parties to enact legislation to criminalise the offences set out in the Convention.
Države pogodbenice obvezuje, da uveljavijo zakonodajo, s katero bodo kršitve, navedene v Konvenciji, inkriminirane.
The IAEA pursues the same objectives as those set out in recitals 3 to 11 of this Decision.
MAAE zasleduje enake cilje, kot so navedeni v uvodnih izjavah 3 do 11.
This is done through the implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan which is financed entirely through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.
Zanje si prizadeva z izvajanjem svojega Načrta za jedrsko varnost, ki se v celoti financira iz prostovoljnih prispevkov v Sklad MAAE za jedrsko varnost.
The Union participates in the Nuclear Security Summit process and is committed to further enhancing its efforts which aim to strengthen nuclear security and to assist third countries in that regard.
Unija sodeluje v procesu vrha o jedrski varnosti in je zavezana k še odločnejšim prizadevanjem za okrepitev jedrske varnosti in pomoči tretjim državam v zvezi s tem.
The technical implementation of this Decision should be entrusted to the IAEA which, on the basis of its longstanding and broadly-recognised expertise in the area of nuclear security, could significantly strengthen relevant capabilities in the target countries.
Tehnično izvajanje tega sklepa bi bilo treba zaupati MAAE, ki bi lahko na podlagi svojega dolgoletnega in široko priznanega strokovnega znanja na področju jedrske varnosti znatno okrepila ustrezne zmogljivosti v ciljnih državah.
The projects as supported by the Union can only be financed through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.
Projekti, ki jih podpira Unija, se lahko financirajo le s prostovoljnimi prispevki v Sklad MAAE za jedrsko varnost.
Such contributions to be provided by the Union will be instrumental in enabling the IAEA to play a key role in the area of nuclear security by supporting the efforts of countries to fulfil their nuclear security responsibilities, as also recognised in the framework of the Nuclear Security Summit process,
Takšni prispevki, ki jih bo zagotovila Unija, bodo ključni pri omogočanju MAAE, da odigra ključno vlogo na področju jedrske varnosti s podpiranjem držav pri njihovih prizadevanjih za izpolnjevanje obveznosti na področju jedrske varnosti, kot je priznano tudi v okviru procesa vrha o jedrski varnosti –
For the purposes of immediate and practical implementation of certain elements of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Union shall support the IAEA’s activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification in order to further the following objectives:
Zaradi takojšnjega in praktičnega izvajanja nekaterih elementov Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje Unija podpira dejavnosti MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja, in sicer v podporo naslednjim ciljem:
to achieve progress towards the universalisation of international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments, including IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols;
doseganju napredka glede vsesplošne uporabe mednarodnih instrumentov na področju neširjenja in jedrske varnosti, vključno s celovitimi sporazumi o nadzornih ukrepih in dodatnimi protokoli z MAAE;
to enhance the protection of proliferation-sensitive materials and equipment and the relevant technology, providing legislative and regulatory assistance in the area of nuclear security and safeguards;
izboljšanju varovanja materialov in opreme ter ustrezne tehnologije, ki bi lahko postali predmet širjenja, ter zagotavljanju zakonodajne in regulativne pomoči na področju jedrske varnosti in nadzornih ukrepov;
to strengthen the detection of, and response to, illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.
izboljšanju odkrivanja nedovoljenega prometa z jedrskimi in drugimi radioaktivnimi materiali ter odzivanja nanj.
The projects of the IAEA, corresponding to measures of the Strategy, aim to:
Projekti MAAE, ki ustrezajo ukrepom iz Strategije, imajo naslednje cilje:
ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of support provided through previous Joint Actions and Council Decisions,
zagotoviti trajnost in učinkovitost podpore, ki se zagotavlja v okviru preteklih skupnih ukrepov in sklepov Sveta,
strengthen States’ indigenous nuclear security support infrastructures,
okrepiti domače infrastrukture držav v podporo jedrski varnosti,
strengthen States’ legislative and regulatory frameworks,
okrepiti nacionalni zakonodajni in regulativni okvir,
strengthen nuclear security systems and measures for nuclear and other radioactive materials,
okrepiti sisteme in ukrepe jedrske varnosti za jedrske in druge radioaktivne materiale,
strengthen States’ institutional infrastructures and capabilities to deal with nuclear and radioactive materials out of regulatory control,
okrepiti institucionalne infrastrukture in zmogljivosti držav za ukrepanje v zvezi z jedrskimi in radioaktivnimi materiali, ki niso pod upravnim nadzorom,
support awareness of and strengthen States’ response and resilience to cyber-crime impacting nuclear security,
povečati ozaveščenosti o kibernetskem kriminalu ter okrepiti odzivanje in odpornost držav na kibernetski kriminal, ki vpliva na jedrsko varnost,
develop additional laboratory capacity to support evaluation of industrial control and electronic system level technologies used to identify vulnerabilities to nuclear-related cyber-crime, and exploit and increase awareness of such issues, including through participation in regional exchanges, and the utilisation of compensatory or remediation measures.
razviti dodatne laboratorijske zmogljivosti v podporo ocenjevanju tehnologij industrijskega nadzora in tehnologij na ravni elektronskega sistema za opredelitev točk, izpostavljenih kibernetskemu kriminalu na jedrskem področju, ter izkoristiti in povečati ozaveščenosti o takšnih vprašanjih, vključno s sodelovanjem v regionalnih izmenjavah, in uporabo izravnalnih ali sanacijskih ukrepov.
The selection of recipient States and projects shall be made by the Council on the basis of a comprehensive IAEA evaluation of needs and various other considerations with the aim of ensuring maximum impact of action.
Svet bo na podlagi celovite ocene MAAE o potrebah in številnih drugih premislekov izbral države prejemnice in projekte, da se zagotovi čim večji učinek ukrepa.
The projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the IAEA as Implementing Entity.
Projekte iz člena 1(2) izvaja MAAE kot izvajalec.
It shall perform this task under the responsibility of the HR.
To nalogo opravlja pod pristojnostjo VP.
For this purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the IAEA.
V ta namen VP sklene potrebne dogovore z MAAE.
The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 8050000.
Referenčni finančni znesek za izvajanje projektov iz člena 1(2) znaša 8050000 EUR.
The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
Odhodki, ki se financirajo iz zneska, določenega v odstavku 1, se upravljajo v skladu s postopki in pravili, ki se uporabljajo za splošni proračun Unije.
It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
Če ima v tem postopku kakršne koli težave, o tem obvesti Svet; obvesti ga tudi o datumu sklenitve sporazuma o financiranju.
The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the IAEA.
VP poroča Svetu o izvajanju tega sklepa na podlagi rednih poročil, ki jih pripravi MAAE.
These reports shall form the basis for evaluation by the Council.
Ta poročila so podlaga za ocenjevanje, ki ga izvede Svet.
It shall expire 36 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement between the Commission and the IAEA or 12 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded before that date.
Veljati preneha 36 mesecev po datumu sklenitve sporazuma o financiranju med Komisijo in MAAE ali 12 mesecev po datumu sprejetja, če do tega datuma ni sklenjen sporazum o financiranju.
OJ L 107, 17.4.2008, p. 62, rectified by OJ L 212, 7.8.2008, p. 6.
UL L 107, 17.4.2008, str. 62, popravljeno z UL L 212, 7.8.2008, str. 6.
OJ L 259, 1.10.2010, p. 10.
UL L 259, 1.10.2010, str. 10.
European Union support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Podpora Evropske unije za dejavnosti MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje
Eligibility and selection of recipient States
Upravičenost in izbor držav prejemnic
States eligible to receive support under this Decision comprise all IAEA Member States and other countries in need of support in the field of nuclear security, subject to a subsequent decision by the Union, based on an IAEA proposal, for priority action.
Države, ki so upravičene do podpore na podlagi tega sklepa, vključujejo vse države članice MAAE in druge države, ki potrebujejo pomoč na področju jedrske varnosti, pri čemer Unija na podlagi predloga MAAE pozneje sprejme sklep za prednostno ukrepanje.
The selection of recipient States and projects to be implemented therein will be made on the basis of a comprehensive IAEA evaluation of needs and other pertinent considerations (Evaluation and decision preparation phase) by the relevant EU Council bodies, with the aim of ensuring maximum impact of action.
Izbor držav prejemnic in projektov, ki se bodo v teh državah izvajali, bodo na podlagi celovite ocene MAAE o potrebah in drugih ustreznih premislekov (faza ocenjevanja in priprave sklepa) opravila ustrezna telesa Sveta EU, da bi se zagotovil čim večji učinek ukrepa.
Close coordination with the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative, as well as other initiatives and programmes, will be undertaken to avoid duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness and continued risk reduction.
Za preprečevanje podvajanja ter optimizacijo stroškovne učinkovitosti in nadaljnjega zmanjševanja tveganj bo potekalo tesno usklajevanje s pobudo EU za centre odličnosti na področju kemičnih, bioloških, radioloških in jedrskih snovi (KBRJ) ter drugimi pobudami in programi.
The use of funds for specific activities will be in line with Union priorities and subject to regular prior consultation.
Uporaba sredstev za specifične dejavnosti bo skladna s prednostnimi nalogami Unije, zanjo pa se bo uporabljalo redno predhodno posvetovanje.
Projects will be implemented in the recipient States and can encompass activities in the following seven areas:
Projekti se bodo izvajali v državah prejemnicah teh regij, pri čemer lahko vključujejo dejavnosti z naslednjih sedmih področij:
Sustainability and Effectiveness of Support provided through previous Joint Actions and Council Decisions;
trajnost in učinkovitost podpore, ki se zagotavlja v okviru preteklih skupnih ukrepov in sklepov Sveta;
Strengthening of States’ Indigenous Nuclear Security Support Infrastructures;
krepitev domače infrastrukture držav v podporo jedrski varnosti;
Strengthening of States’ Legislative and Regulatory Frameworks;
krepitev nacionalnih zakonodajnih in regulativnih okvirov;
Strengthening of Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials;
krepitev sistemov in ukrepov jedrske varnosti za jedrske in druge radioaktivne materiale;
Strengthening of States’ Institutional Infrastructures and Capabilities to Deal with Nuclear and Radioactive Materials out of Regulatory Control;
krepitev institucionalnih infrastruktur in zmogljivosti držav za ukrepanje v zvezi z jedrskimi in radioaktivnimi materiali, ki niso pod upravnim nadzorom;
Supporting awareness of and Strengthening States’ response and resilience to Cyber-Crime impacting Nuclear Security;
povečanje ozaveščenosti o kibernetskem kriminalu ter krepitev odzivanja in odpornosti držav na kibernetski kriminal, ki vpliva na jedrsko varnost;
Laboratory capability addressing nuclear-related cyber-crime.
laboratorijske zmogljivosti za bolj proti kibernetskemu kriminalu na jedrskem področju.
I. EVALUATION AND DECISION PREPARATION PHASE
I. FAZA OCENJEVANJA IN PRIPRAVE SKLEPA
An evaluation, carried out by the IAEA, of recipient State needs to strengthen the nuclear security in the countries concerned using the methodology and criteria developed under Decision 2010/585/CFSP.
Ocena, s strani MAAE, nacionalnih potreb glede krepitve jedrske varnosti v državi prejemnici na podlagi metodologije in meril, določenih v okviru Sklepa 2010/585/SZVP.
Such evaluation will cover relevant criteria of all seven areas mentioned above.
Ta ocena bo zajemala ustrezna merila za vseh sedem navedenih področij.
To use the results of an overall evaluation and other pertinent considerations as a basis for selecting the States in which projects will be implemented.
Uporaba rezultatov celovite ocene in drugih ustreznih premislekov kot podlaga za izbor držav, v katerih se bodo izvajali projekti.
Provision of an overview of the evaluation results for nuclear security support in recipient States, both at the level of the State and at individual facilities, locations, transports or other applications in which nuclear and radioactive material are used or stored including infrastructure to deal with material out of regulatory control.
Zagotovitev pregleda rezultatov ocene za podporo na področju jedrske varnosti v državah prejemnicah, tako na ravni države kot tudi na ravni posameznih objektov, lokacij, prevozov ali drugih uporab, pri katerih se uporablja ali skladišči jedrski in radioaktivni material, vključno z infrastrukturo za ravnanje z materialom, ki ni pod upravnim nadzorom.
For all seven areas mentioned above, recipient States and projects will be identified and a list of proposed recipient States and recipients in reserve (second priority) to receive support under this Decision will be provided.
Za vseh sedem navedenih področij se bodo določile države prejemnice in projekti, pri čemer bo predložen seznam predlaganih držav prejemnic in rezervnih prejemnic (druga prioriteta) za prejem podpore na podlagi tega sklepa.
The IAEA will perform a part of this work based on co-funding, contributing with approximately 1 % of the total eligible cost of the project.
MAAE bo del te naloge opravila na podlagi sofinanciranja, pri čemer bo prispevala približno 1 % skupnih upravičenih stroškov projekta.
This work will be conducted based on the IAEA expertise on the topic.
To delo bo opravljeno na podlagi strokovnega znanja MAAE na tej področju.
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE OF PRIORITISED PROJECTS
FAZA IZVAJANJA PREDNOSTNIH PROJEKTOV