natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In addition to the resource implications, this would in practice make it virtually impossible to complete the investigation within the deadlines.
Poleg posledic glede virov bi to v praksi skoraj onemogočilo dokončanje preiskave v rokih.
In any event, the totality of the evidence (including the transaction-specific data on prices and quantities) may be relevant to the public body determination.
Vsekakor so lahko vsi dokazi skupaj (vključno s podatki, specifičnimi za vsak posel, o cenah in količinah) pomembni za določitev javnega organa.
GOC claimed that its failure to provide responses to Appendix B intended for the SOEs supplying HRS and CRS to the OCS producers should not lead to the application of Article 28 of the Basic regulation and the fact that the Commission applied facts available is in breach it Article 12.7 of the ASCM agreement.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da se zaradi tega, ker ni predložila odgovorov v Prilogi B, namenjene družbam v državni lasti, ki proizvajalcem jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, zagotavljajo VVJ in HVJ, ne bi smel uporabiti člen 28 osnovne uredbe in da Komisija zaradi uporabe razpoložljivih dejstev krši člen 12.7 Sporazuma SIU.
GOC further claimed that the Commission required that the Appendix B be completed by many companies irrelevant to the investigation.
Kitajska vlada je tudi trdila, da je Komisija zahtevala izpolnitev Priloge B od več družb, ne glede na preiskavo.
This claim must be rejected.
To trditev je treba zavrniti.
The Commission constructed Appendix B in a way to verify the allegations in the complaint and did so in line with the findings of WTO Appellate Body in DS379 which set out certain guidelines for the determination of public body.
Komisija je Prilogo B oblikovala na način, da se preverijo domnevanja v pritožbi, in to je storila v skladu z ugotovitvami pritožbenega organa STO v DS379, ki navajajo nekatere smernice za določitev javnega organa.
The claim of the GOC that "it is not only SOEs to which appendix B pertained" does not represent reality.
Trditev kitajske vlade, da „Priloga B velja zgolj za družbe v državni lasti“, ni v skladu z realnostjo.
It is true that initially the Commission asked all producers of HRS/CRS to fill in Appendix B, but following the GOC reply to the questionnaire the Commission, in order to facilitate the work of the GOC in replying to Appendix B, scaled down the request only to SOEs concerned [96].
Komisija je najprej res pozvala vse proizvajalce VVJ/HVJ, naj izpolnijo Prilogo B, vendar je po izpolnitvi vprašalnika kitajske vlade to zahtevala le za zadevne družbe v državni lasti, da bi kitajsko vlado spodbudila k izpolnjevanju Priloge B [96].
Despite this effort from the Commission the GOC and the SOEs concerned did not reply to the Appendix B although it is clear (notably from the complaint) that SOEs providing HRS/CRS to the exporting producers of OCS are concerned by this investigation.
Kljub tem prizadevanjem Komisije kitajska vlada in zadevne družbe v državni lasti Priloge B niso izpolnile, čeprav je jasno (zlasti iz pritožbe), da ta preiskava zadeva družbe v državni lasti, ki proizvajalcem izvoznikom jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, zagotavljajo VVJ in HVJ.
Taking the above into account the Commission had no alternative but to apply Article 28 (1) of the basic Regulation and did so fully in compliance with Article 12.7 of the ASCM.
Ob upoštevanju zgoraj navedenega Komisija ni imela druge možnosti, kot uporabiti člen 28(1) osnovne uredbe, kar je storila popolnoma v skladu s členom 12.7 Sporazuma SIU.
The GOC claimed that the facts available used by the Commission do not support the conclusion that the cited steel industry "guidelines" are legally binding.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev, ki jih je uporabila Komisija, ni mogoče sklepati, da so citirane „smernice“ za industrijo jekla pravno zavezujoče.
The main steel industry planning document on the basis of which the Commission based its findings concerning the existence of a public body is the Order No. 35 of the NDRC – Policies of the Development of Iron and Steel Industry.
Glavni dokument za načrtovanje industrije jekla, na podlagi katerega je Komisija utemeljila svoje ugotovitve glede obstoja javnega organa, je Odredba agencije NDRC št. 35 – Razvojne politike za industrijo železa in jekla.
The Commission asked a direct question concerning the legal status of orders of the NDRC and it was confirmed that orders in Chinese legislation are legally binding as they fall into the one of the four categories of law in China.
Komisija je postavila neposredno vprašanje glede pravnega statusa odredb agencije NDRC in potrjeno je bilo, da so odredbe v kitajski zakonodaji pravno obvezujoče, ker spadajo v eno od štirih kategorij zakonodaje na Kitajskem.
Therefore this claim is in contradiction with the relevant information on the file.
Zato je ta trditev v nasprotju z ustreznimi informacijami o dokumentu.
The GOC claimed that the market distortion found by the Commission in the steel sector is irrelevant for the public body determination of the HRS/CRS producers and that the public body determination should have been made specifically to the entities supplying HRS/CRS to the two sampled groups of exporting producers and not only to all SOEs producing HRS/CRS in China in general.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da ugotovitev Komisije o izkrivljanju trga v sektorju jekla ni pomembna za določitev javnega organa proizvajalcev VVJ/HVJ in da bi se določitev javnega organa morala izvesti izrecno za subjekte, ki zagotavljajo VVJ/HVJ dvema vzorčenima skupinama proizvajalcev izvoznikov, in ne le na splošno za družbe v državni lasti na Kitajskem, ki proizvajajo VVJ/HVJ.
The Commission does not agree with this claim.
Komisija se s to trditvijo ne strinja.
The existence of the market distortion is a relevant, although not determining, factor in the analysis.
Če obstaja izkrivljanje trga, je to v analizi pomemben dejavnik, čeprav ni določujoč.
The "public body "finding of the Commission in the context of this proceeding concerns all the HRS/CRS producers which are fully or partly state-owned, because it was made on the basis of evidence relating to broad policy and industry-wide factors and was not a company-specific determination.
Ugotovitev „javnega organa“ s strani Komisije v okviru tega postopka zadeva vse proizvajalce VVJ/HVJ, ki so v celoti ali delno družbe v državni lasti, ker je bila utemeljena na dokazih v zvezi z obsežnimi političnimi dejavniki in dejavniki na ravni industrije ter ni bila določitev, specifična za družbo.
The state-owned entities supplying HRS/CRS to the two sampled exporting producers clearly fall within the scope of the public body finding and therefore it was not considered necessary to do make a specific determination limited to them.
Subjekti v državni lasti, ki zagotavljajo VVJ/HVJ dvema vzorčenima skupinama proizvajalcev izvoznikov, so jasno zajeti v ugotovitvi javnega organa in zato se ni zdelo potrebno izvesti posebne določitve, omejene le nanje.
In any event, the GOC provided no information which may serve for such a company-specific determination in response to the Commission's questionnaire.
V nobenem primeru kitajska vlada v odzivu na vprašalnik Komisije ni zagotovila informacij, ki bi omogočile tako določitev, specifično za družbo.
The GOC argument that the Commission cannot make a determination in the absence of "actual facts" on the specific SOEs concerned would mean that the GOC would actually benefit from non-cooperation (as it had refused to supply the "facts") and would thus obtain a "more favourable" result than if it had cooperated, which is the opposite to an adverse inference.
Argument kitajske vlade, da Komisija ne more izvesti določitve brez „dejanskih dejstev“ o zadevnih specifičnih družbah v državni lasti, bi pomenil, da bi kitajska vlada dejansko imela ugodnosti od nesodelovanja (ker je zavrnila zagotovitev „dejstev“) in bi tako pridobila „ugodnejši“ rezultat, kot če bi sodelovala, kar je v nasprotju z negativnim sklepom.
GOC objected that it was notified by the Commission of the "entrustment and direction" analyses only at the stage of final disclosure and therefore its rights of defence were breached.
Kitajska vlada je ugovarjala, da jo je Komisija o analizah „zaupanja nalog in ukazovanja“ obvestila šele na stopnji končnega razkritja, zaradi česar so bile kršene njene pravice do obrambe.
However, the Commission could not know that it would come to this conclusion at the earlier stage of the investigation.
Vendar Komisija ni mogla vedeti, da bo do tega sklepa prišla na zgodnejši stopnji preiskave.
This finding is a result of all the information and data collected throughout the proceeding and was disclosed as soon as the final determination was made, i.e. at the time when the definitive disclosure was made.
Ta ugotovitev temelji na vseh zbranih informacijah in podatkih v celotnem postopku in je bila razkrita takoj, ko je bila izvedena končna določitev, tj. takrat, ko je bilo izvedeno končno razkritje.
The complaint alleged subsidies related to the government provision of goods by SOEs.
V pritožbi je predložena domneva o subvencijah, povezanih z vladnim zagotavljanjem blaga prek družb v državni lasti.
The investigation showed that the government policy in question, which initially concerned SOEs, also applied to private entities, leading to a conclusion of entrustment or direction by government.
Preiskava je pokazala, da zadevna vladna politika, ki je najprej zadevala družbe v državni lasti, je veljala tudi za zasebne subjekte, kar je pripeljalo do sklepa o zaupanju nalog in ukazovanju s strani vlade.
The GOC claimed that the facts discussed by the Commission in no way justify the conclusion that any private body in the steel sector is entrusted and directed by the state to provide the subsidies countervailed.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da dejstva, o katerih je razpravljala Komisija, nikakor ne upravičujejo sklepa, da lahko država vsakemu zasebnemu subjektu v sektorju jekla zaupa naloge ali mu ukazuje, da zagotovi subvencije z izravnalnimi ukrepi.
In its analyses concerning entrustment and direction the Commission referred to number of government plans and policy documents and cited sections from these documents which show a direct link between the government and the conduct of the private steel companies and supported this finding by examples of actions by these private operators.
Komisija je v svojih analizah glede zaupanja nalog in ukazovanja navedla številne dokumente o vladnih načrtih in politikah ter citirala odseke iz teh dokumentov, ki so pokazali neposredno povezavo med vlado in ravnanjem zasebnih jeklarskih družb, pri čemer je to ugotovitev podprla s primeri dejanj teh zasebnih subjektov.
The GOC claimed that the Commission failed to distinguish between the consequences of government action and the intention of government action when doing the entrustment and direction analysis.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da Komisija pri opravljanju analize glede zaupanja nalog in ukazovanja ni razlikovala med posledicami vladnega dejanja in namero vladnega dejanja.
This claim is also rejected.
Ta trditev je prav tako zavrnjena.
The Commission established the existence of a government policy to support the steel industry and to provide HRS/CRS through public bodies (SOEs) at below-market prices.
Komisija je ugotovila, da obstaja vladna politika, ki podpira industrijo jekla in zagotavlja VVJ/HVJ prek javnih organov (družbe v državni lasti) po cenah, ki so nižje od tržnih.
It was further established that this policy (by means of the predominance of SOEs and the dissuasion of exports of HRS/CRS) effectively forced private producers to supply the domestic OCS industry at the same below-market prices charged by SOEs.
Poleg tega je bilo ugotovljeno, da je ta politika (s prevlado družb v državni lasti in odvračanjem izvoza VVJ/HVJ) učinkovito prisilila zasebne proizvajalce k zagotavljanju domače industrije jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, po enakih cenah, nižjih od tržnih, kot družbe v državni lasti.
Indeed, there is evidence that the prices of private suppliers are explicitly linked to those of SOEs.
Dejansko obstajajo dokazi, da so cene zasebnih dobaviteljev eksplicitno povezane s cenami družb v državni lasti.
Therefore, the Commission established that the one of the aims of the policy was to direct and entrust private bodies to follow the same practices as the SOEs.
Komisija je tako ugotovila, da je eden od ciljev politike zaupanje nalog in ukazovanje javnim organom, tako da bodo izvajali enake prakse kot družbe v državni lasti.
This is a classic case of the government, by itself and through SOEs, "exercising its authority" over private suppliers.
To je klasičen primer vlade, ki sama in prek družb v državni lasti „izvaja svoja pooblastila“ nad zasebnimi dobavitelji.
The policy has all the required elements for entrustment and direction i.e. a "government action", "addressed to a particular party", "the objective of which is a particular task or duty."
Politika ima vse potrebne elemente za zaupanje nalog in ukazovanje, tj. „ukrep vlade“, „naslovljen na določeno stran“, „katerega cilj je določena naloga ali dolžnost“.
As an illustration of government intentions, certain provisions of the Order No 35 penalise the companies which do not act in line with policies described therein.
Kot prikaz vladnih namer nekatere določbe Odredbe št. 35 predvidevajo kazen za družbe, ki ne ravnajo v skladu s politikami, ki so v njih opisane.
This shows that the GOC has an intention to lead the whole steel industry in a certain direction and that should there be companies which do not follow this intention there will be consequence for them.
To kaže, da kitajska vlada namerava voditi celotno industrijo jekla v določeno smer, in družbe, ki ne bodo sledile tej nameri, bodo občutile posledice.
The GOC also claimed that the Commission did not establish that the GOC has a policy to provide HRS and CRS to the OCS sector and that the Commission did not draw a conclusion to that effect.
Kitajska vlada je tudi trdila, da Komisija ni ugotovila, da kitajska vlada vodi politiko za zagotavljanje VVJ in HVJ sektorju jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, ter da Komisija ni predložila sklepa v zvezi s tem.
As shown in the analysis in recitals (49) - (72) above, the SOEs providing HRS/CRS to the OCS producers are public bodies, the extended arm of the GOC and it is clear that they provide HRS/CRS to the OCS exporting producers.
Kot je prikazano v analizi v uvodnih izjavah od (49) do (72), so družbe v državni lasti, ki proizvajalcem jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, zagotavljajo VVJ/HVJ, javni organi, podaljšana roka kitajske vlade, in jasno je, da proizvajalcem izvoznikom jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, zagotavljajo VVJ/HVJ.
It was also established that the prices of these inputs do not reflect the market values.
Ugotovljeno je bilo tudi, da cene teh sestavin ne odražajo tržnih vrednosti.
Therefore it is concluded that through these SOEs the GOC exercises a policy of provision of cheap HRS and CRS.
Zato se sklene, da kitajska vlada prek teh družb v državni lasti izvaja politiko zagotavljanja poceni VVJ in HVJ.
GOC claimed that the Commission has erroneously concluded that there is pervasive government control of the steel sector generally and that the steel industry complies with certain guidelines, but it has not concluded that the provision of steel to the OCS sector at below market prices is a goal of that policy.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da je Komisija napačno sklepala, da na splošno obstaja sprevržen nadzor sektorja jekla s strani vlade in da industrija jekla sledi določenim smernicam, pri čemer pa ni sklepala, da je cilj te politike zagotavljanje jekla sektorju jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, po cenah, nižjih od tržnih.
As explained in recital (419) above, the Commission has found that the government policy involves an intention to direct private suppliers to follow the below-market provision practices of SOEs.
Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (419), je Komisija ugotovila, da vladna politika vključuje namero ukazovanja zasebnim dobaviteljem, da bodo tako kakor družbe v državni lasti zagotavljali cene, ki so nižje od tržnih.
GOC claimed that the Commission did not make a finding that there is a specific intent by the GOC to provide actual financial contribution at issue in the case of provision of HRS and CRS as prescribed by the AB report in US –Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS from Korea [97].
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da Komisija ni ugotovila, da obstaja posebna namera kitajske vlade za zagotovitev dejanskega zadevnega finančnega prispevka v primeru zagotavljanja VVJ in HVJ, kot določa poročilo pritožbenega organa, zadeva ZDA – Preiskava o izravnalni dajatvi za DRAMS iz Koreje [97].
The governmental actions in question are based on a government policy intended to direct private suppliers to follow the below-market provision practices of SOEs.
Zadevni vladni ukrepi temeljijo na vladni politiki, ki ima namero ukazovanja zasebnim dobaviteljem, da bodo tako kakor družbe v državni lasti zagotavljali cene, ki so nižje od tržnih.
It is clear that in this case private suppliers of HRS/CRS are not exercising "free choice" in the market because the market is distorted by the predominance of SOEs and the export of HRS/CRS is discouraged.
Jasno je, da v tem primeru zasebni dobavitelji VVJ/HVJ nimajo „proste izbire“ na trgu, ker je trg izkrivljen zaradi prevlade družb v državni lasti in ker se odvrača od izvoza VVJ/HVJ.
The GOC claims that the Commission made no findings on the actual private bodies which supplied HRS/CRS to the sampled companies.
Kitajska vlada trdi, da Komisija ne more navesti nobenih ugotovitev o dejanskih zasebnih organih, ki so vzorčenim družbam zagotovili VVJ/HVJ.
As in the case of public bodies, the Commission made a sector-wide determination of entrustment and direction which applies to all private suppliers.
Kot v primeru javnih organov je Komisija v celotnem sektorju izvedla določitev zaupanja nalog in ukazovanja, ki velja za vse zasebne dobavitelje.
Since the government policy in question applies to all such entities, there is no need to make a company-specific determination.
Ker se zadevna vladna politika uporablja za vse take subjekte, ni potrebe po določitvi, ki je specifična za družbo.
The GOC claimed that the Commission rejected the GOC's evidence concerning the proportion of Chinese production of HRS and CRS which comes from SOEs.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da je Komisija zavrnila njene dokaze glede deleža kitajske proizvodnje VVJ in HVJ, ki izvira iz družb v državni lasti.
The table provided by the GOC in this respect cannot be considered evidence.
Razpredelnica, ki jo je v zvezi s tem navedla kitajska vlada, se ne more šteti za dokaz.
The GOC refused to provide source data before and during the verification for this table and therefore it cannot be considered to be reliable information.
Kitajska vlada pred preveritvijo in med njo ni želela zagotoviti vira podatkov za to razpredelnico, ki se zato ne more šteti za zanesljivo informacijo.
For this reason the Commission used information from the World Steel Capacity Book, which is generally accepted by the world steel industry.
Komisija je zato uporabila informacije iz Knjige svetovnih jeklarskih zmogljivosti, ki jo svetovna industrija jekla na splošno sprejema.
The GOC claimed that the Commission did not explain why the world market prices of HRS and CRS are the most appropriate benchmark and referred to the AB ruling in the US-Softwood Lumber IV that the out-of-country benchmark "must relate or refer to, to be connected with, the prevailing market conditions in the country of provision and must reflect price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions for purchase or sale".
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da Komisija ni pojasnila, zakaj se svetovne tržne cene VVJ in HVJ štejejo za najustreznejše referenčne cene, in je navedla odločitev pritožbenega organa v zadevi ZDA – mehki stavbni les IV glede zunanje referenčne vrednosti, ki „se mora nanašati na prevladujoče tržne pogoje v državi, v kateri se dobava opravi, ali biti z njimi povezana, ter mora odražati ceno, kakovost, razpoložljivost, tržljivost, prevoz in druge pogoje za nakup ali prodajo“.
GOC also claims that the "government predominance" cannot lead to relaxation of this jurisprudence, because if it were the option to use an out-of-country benchmark would not be available at all.
Kitajska vlada tudi trdi, da „vladna prevlada“ ne more omogočiti sprostitve te sodne prakse, ker sploh ne bi bila na voljo, če bi obstajala možnost uporabe zunanje referenčne vrednosti.
GOC claim that the Commission has not complied with the requirements of Article 14 of the ASCM.
Kitajska vlada trdi, da Komisija ne izpolnjuje zahtev člena 14 Sporazuma SIU.
The Commission disagrees with this claim.
Komisija se s to trditvijo ne strinja.
The prevailing market conditions in China are distorted as found by the Commission and explained in recitals (49) - (97) above.
Po ugotovitvah Komisije in kot je pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah od (49) do (97), so prevladujoči tržni pogoji na Kitajskem izkrivljeni.
Since steel is produced worldwide by similar processes and is traded worldwide, the most reasonable external benchmark is world price, since should China be in a normal non-distorted market situation, it is likely that the prices would align with the world prices.
Ker se jeklo po vsem svetu proizvaja s podobnimi postopki in se po vsem svetu trži, je najbolj smiselna zunanja referenčna vrednost svetovna cena, saj če bi bila Kitajska v normalnem, neizkrivljenem tržnem položaju, bi se cene verjetno uskladile s svetovnimi.
GOC provided very little information on the steel market in China even though it was specifically requested by the Commission.
Kitajska vlada je predložila zelo malo informacij o trgu jekla na Kitajskem, čeprav je Komisija to izrecno zahtevala.
Also China did not propose any other benchmark except the in-country benchmark which was not suitable because of market distortions found.
Kitajska prav tako ni predlagala nobene druge referenčne vrednosti, razen notranjo, ki ni bila ustrezna zaradi ugotovljenih tržnih izkrivljanj.
GOC claimed that the Commission did not base the specificity finding in respect to the provision of HRS/CRS for less than adequate remuneration on anything other than the tautological statement made by the complainants in the complaint and this is not sufficient to fulfil the requirements of the ASCM.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da Komisija ugotovitve o specifičnosti glede na zagotavljanje VVJ/HVJ za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo ni osnovala na ničemer drugem kot tavtološki trditvi pritožnikov v pritožbi, in to ni dovolj za izpolnitev zahtev Sporazuma SIU.
Both HRS and CRS are used as inputs only by a limited number of companies, since companies in many sectors will have no use for these products.
VVJ in HVJ se kot sestavina uporabljata le v omejenem številu družb, ker družbe v veliko sektorjih teh proizvodov ne potrebujejo.
The GOC itself in its reply to the questionnaire confirmed that the HRS and CRS are used only by limited number of industries.
Tudi kitajska vlada je v svojem izpolnjenem vprašalniku potrdila, da VVJ in HVJ uporablja le omejeno število industrij.
The GOC did not dispute this fact in the comments to definitive disclosure.
Kitajska vlada temu dejstvu v pripombah h končnemu razkritju ne oporeka.
Therefore it is confirmed that this subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(c) of the basic Regulation which is a reproduction of Article 2.1.(c) of the ASCM.
Zato je potrjeno, da je ta subvencija specifična v smislu člena 4(2)(c) osnovne uredbe, ki je reprodukcija člena 2.1.(c) Sporazuma SIU.
Preferential Loans and Interest Rates to the OCS industry
Preferenčna posojila in obrestne mere za industrijo jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi