natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As shown in Figure 8, the benchmark rate has been between 30 % and 34,1 % of the private employees' gross wage in the period 2003-2010 [86].
Kot je prikazano na sliki 8, je bila v obdobju 2003–2010 referenčna stopnja med 30 % in 34,1 % bruto plače zasebnih uslužbencev [86].
Germany objects that any benchmark above the employer's share of the social contribution rate would put Deutsche Post at a disadvantage compared to competitors who are only liable to pay the employer's share.
Nemčija meni, da bi vsaka referenčna vrednost, ki bi presegala delež prispevka za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec, podjetje Deutsche Post postavila v slabši položaj v primerjavi s konkurenti, ki morajo plačati samo delež delodajalca.
However, as the following simplified example shows (based on 2006 contribution rates), Deutsche Post would clearly be advantaged compared to private competitors if the benchmark rate were only equal to the employer's share of social contributions:
Vendar pa bi v skladu z naslednjim poenostavljenim primerom (na podlagi prispevkov za leto 2006) podjetje Deutsche Post v primerjavi z zasebnimi konkurenti očitno pridobilo prednost, če bi bila referenčna stopnja enaka samo deležu prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec:
Deutsche Post and a private competitor pay the same net wage of EUR 79,5 to a civil servant and a private employee respectively.
podjetje Deutsche Post in zasebni konkurent plačata enako neto plačo v višini 79,5 EUR javnemu uslužbencu oziroma zasebnemu uslužbencu;
The employer's and employee's share of the social contribution rate both amount to 20,5 % of the private employee's gross wage.
delež prispevka za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec, in delež, ki ga plača uslužbenec, oba znašata 20,5 % bruto plače zasebnega uslužbenca.
Adding the net wage of EUR 79,5 to the employee's share of EUR 20,5 gives the gross wage of EUR 100. The total social contributions are therefore equal to EUR 41 (= 41 % of private employee's gross wage).
Če neto plačo v višini 79,5 EUR prištejemo deležu v višini 20,5 EUR, ki ga plača uslužbenec, dobimo bruto plačo 100 EUR. Celotni prispevek za socialno varnost je torej enak 41 EUR (= 41 % bruto plače zasebnega uslužbenca);
By contrast, Germany considers that Deutsche Post should only assume the employer's share of the social contributions in addition to the civil servant's contribution to the health care expenses (assumed to be equal to the private employee's contribution of EUR 7,5 to the health and nursing insurances).
Nemčija trdi, da bi moralo podjetje Deutsche Post ob prispevku javnega uslužbenca za stroške zdravstvenega varstva (ob predpostavki, da je ta enak prispevku zasebnega uslužbenca v shemi zdravstvenega zavarovanja in zavarovanja za oskrbo v višini 7,5 EUR) kriti samo delež prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec;
Germany calculates the employer's share based on the incurred civil servant wage of EUR 87 (e.g. the sum of the net wage of EUR 79,5 and the civil servant's contribution to health care expenses of EUR 7,5).
Nemčija je delež, ki ga plača delodajalec, izračunala na podlagi dejanske plače javnega uslužbenca v višini 87 EUR (seštevek neto plače v višini 79,5 EUR in prispevka javnega uslužbenca za stroške zdravstvenega varstva v višini 7,5 EUR).
The social costs are therefore the sum of EUR 17,8 (employer's share of 20,5 % of incurred civil servant wage of EUR 87) and the civil servants' contribution to health care expenses of EUR 7,5.
Stroški za socialno varnost so torej seštevek 17,8 EUR (delež, ki ga plača delodajalec, v višini 20,5 % dejanske plače javnega uslužbenca v višini 87 EUR) in prispevka javnega uslužbenca za stroške zdravstvenega varstva v višini 7,5 EUR;
Based on Germany's calculations, the civil servant's social costs would amount to only EUR 25,3 compared to EUR 41 for the private employee.
na podlagi izračunov Nemčije bi stroški javnega uslužbenca za socialno varnost znašali samo 25,3 EUR v primerjavi s stroški za zasebnega uslužbenca v višini 41 EUR.
Although Deutsche Post and the private competitor pay the same net wage, Deutsche Post would have to bear social costs that are only about 62 % of the compulsory social contributions for a private employee if the employee's share of the social contributions is included in the benchmark.
Čeprav podjetje Deutsche Post in zasebni konkurent izplačujeta enako neto plačo, bi moralo podjetje Deutsche Post, če bi bil delež prispevka za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec, vključen v referenčno vrednost, kriti stroške za socialno varnost, ki znašajo samo 62 % obveznega prispevka za socialno varnost za zasebnega uslužbenca.
Furthermore, it must be noted that since 1999 the employer's share of the social contribution rate (which has been in the range of 19 % to 21 % since 1995) has also been significantly below the contribution rate of 33 % of the incurred civil servant wages that the 1995 Pension law defined as the benchmark for Deutsche Post's contribution to the Pension fund.
Poleg tega je treba opozoriti, da je bil delež prispevka za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec (in je od leta 1995 znašal med 19 % in 21 %), prav tako precej nižji od prispevka v višini 33 % dejanskih plač javnih uslužbencev, ki ga je pokojninski zakon iz leta 1995 opredelil kot referenčno vrednost za prispevek podjetja Deutsche Post v pokojninski sklad.
The German legislator did therefore not intend that Deutsche Post should only finance the employer's share but required Deutsche Post to pay a significantly higher contribution to the civil servants' pension costs and to assume as well all remaining social cost (e.g. contribution to civil servants' health care expenses).
Nemški zakonodajalec torej ni imel namena podjetju Deutsche Post naložiti samo financiranja deleža, ki ga plača delodajalec, ampak je od podjetja Deutsche Post zahteval, da plača precej višji prispevek za stroške pokojnin javnih uslužbencev in prevzame tudi preostale stroške za socialno varnost (npr. prispevek k stroškom za zdravstveno varnost javnih uslužbencev).
The Commission rejects therefore the use of the employer's share of the social contribution rate as benchmark rate because civil servants — unlike private employees — are not obliged to contribute to the pension and unemployment insurances.
Komisija zato zavrača uporabo deleža prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec, kot referenčno stopnjo, ker javnim uslužbencem – v nasprotju z zasebnimi uslužbenci – ni treba vplačevati prispevkov v pokojninsko shemo in shemo za primer brezposelnosti.
Therefore, those contributions must necessarily be included into the benchmark rate to ensure that both Deutsche Post and private competitors bear, directly or indirectly, equivalent levels of contributions.
Te prispevke je torej treba vključiti v referenčno stopnjo in tako zagotoviti, da podjetje Deutsche Post in zasebni konkurenti neposredno ali posredno plačujejo enake stopnje prispevkov.
Calculation of the wage base
Izračun plačne osnove
As the level of social contributions that Deutsche Post has to bear for its civil servants should be aligned to the level of compulsory social contributions that private competitors have to carry, it is important that Deutsche Post is not only subject to an equivalent rate but also that the rate is applied to an equivalent wage base.
Ker bi bilo treba višino prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki jih podjetje Deutsche Post plačuje za svoje javne uslužbence, izenačiti z obveznimi prispevki za socialno varnost, ki jih morajo plačevati zasebni konkurenti, je treba za podjetje Deutsche Post uporabiti enako stopnjo, to stopnjo pa uporabiti na enakovredni plačni osnovi.
As shown in the example above, calculating the employer's share of 20,5 % based on the incurred civil servant wages leads to a contribution of EUR 17,8 while the private competitor has to assume EUR 20,5 (e.g. 20,5 % based on the gross wage of EUR 100).
Kot je bilo prikazano na primeru, prispevek pri izračunu deleža v višini 20,5 %, ki ga plača delodajalec in temelji na dejanskih plačah javnih uslužbencev, znaša 17,8 EUR, zasebni konkurent pa mora plačati 20,5 % (npr. 20,5 % na bruto plačo v višini 100 EUR).
It is therefore necessary to construct a gross wage for the civil servant (hereinafter referred to as civil servants' gross wage) that provides an equivalent wage base to the private employees' gross wage.
Zato je treba določiti bruto plačo za javne uslužbence (v nadaljnjem besedilu: bruto plača javnih uslužbencev) s plačno osnovo, ki je enaka bruto plači zasebnih uslužbencev.
It is assumed that the civil servants' contribution to health expenses equals the private employees' contribution to the health and nursing insurances.
Predpostavlja se, da je prispevek javnih uslužbencev k stroškom zdravstvenega varstva enak prispevku zasebnih uslužbencev v shemi zdravstvenega zavarovanja in zavarovanja za oskrbo.
Therefore, the remaining difference between gross and incurred wage amounts to the employee's share of the contributions to the pension and unemployment insurances.
Preostala razlika med bruto plačo in dejansko plačo je torej delež prispevkov v shemo pokojninskega zavarovanja in zavarovanja za primer brezposelnosti, ki ga plača uslužbenec.
The following formula converts the incurred wage into a gross wage that is equivalent to the private employees' gross wage:
Naslednja formula pretvarja dejansko plačo v bruto plačo, ki je enaka bruto plači zasebnega uslužbenca:
Calculation of civil servants' gross wage (based on 2006 contribution rates)
Izračun bruto plače javnih uslužbencev (na podlagi prispevka za leto 2006)
Civil servants' gross wage =
Bruto plača javnih uslužbencev =
= incurred wage * 100
= Nastala plača * 100
100 – employee share of unemployment and pension insurance
100 – Delež zavarovanja za primer brezposelnosti in pokojninskega zavarovanja, ki ga plača uslužbenec
= incurred wage * 1,15
= Nastala plača * 1,15
Taking e.g. the 2006 contribution rates, the civil servants' gross wage is 15 % higher than the incurred civil servant wage.
Ob upoštevanju, na primer, prispevkov za leto 2006 je bruto plača javnih uslužbencev za 15 % višja od dejanske plače javnih uslužbencev.
That percentage quantifies therefore the error that would be made if the incurred wage were used instead of the gross wage as a base to calculate Deutsche Post's social contributions compared to private competitors' compulsory social contributions.
Ta odstotek torej predstavlja napako, ki bi bila storjena, če bi bila kot osnova za izračun prispevkov podjetja Deutsche Post za socialno varnost v primerjavi z obveznimi prispevki zasebnih konkurentov za socialno varnost upoštevana dejanska plača namesto bruto plače.
The example given at recital 308 illustrates that point as the employer's share of EUR 20,5, which is correctly based on the gross wage, is 15 % higher than an employer's share of EUR 17,8 which would result on the incorrect basis of the incurred wage.
Primer iz uvodne izjave 308 to nazorno prikazuje, saj je delež v višini 20,5 EUR, ki ga plača delodajalec in pravilno temelji na bruto plači, za 15 % višji od deleža v višini 17,8 EUR, ki ga plača delodajalec, kar bi bil rezultat, če bi bila za osnovo napačno uporabljena dejanska plača.
To conclude, the Commission finds that the benchmark rate for Deutsche Post's social contributions must be based on the employers' and the employees' contribution to pension insurance and unemployment insurance and the employers' contribution to health and nursing care.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da mora referenčna stopnja za prispevke podjetja Deutsche Post za socialno varnost temeljiti na prispevku za pokojninsko zavarovanje in zavarovanje za primer brezposelnosti, ki ga plačata delodajalec in uslužbenec, ter na prispevku za shemo zdravstvenega zavarovanja in zavarovanja za oskrbo, ki ga plača delodajalec.
The benchmark rate has to be applied to the civil servants' gross wage (as defined in Table 6).
Referenčno stopnjo je treba uporabiti pri bruto plači javnih uslužbencev (kot je opredeljeno v preglednici 6).
Establishment of the wage-based social security contributions borne by Deutsche Post for its civil servants
Prispevki za socialno varnost na podlagi plač, ki jih podjetje Deutsche Post plačuje za svoje javne uslužbence
That rate is applied to the incurred wage for civil servants.
Ta stopnja se uporabi za dejanske plače javnih uslužbencev.
However, the assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the aid also has to take into consideration the fact that from an economic point of view Deutsche Post does not have to bear the entire contribution of EUR 2045 million corresponding to 33 % of the incurred wages to the Pension Fund.
Vendar pa je treba pri oceni nujnosti in sorazmernosti pomoči upoštevati tudi, da podjetju Deutsche Post z ekonomskega vidika v pokojninski sklad ni treba več vplačevati celotnega prispevka v višini 2,045 milijarde EUR, kar ustreza 33 % dejanskih plač.
In that regard, the Commission considers that it is necessary to distinguish between the period from 1995 to 2002 and from 2003 until today.
Glede tega Komisija meni, da je treba razlikovati med obdobjem 1995–2002 in obdobjem od leta 2003 do danes.
Deutsche Post's contribution in the period 1995-2002
Prispevek podjetja Deutsche Post v obdobju 1995–2002
Accordingly, it would not be possible to maintain that the pension subsidy has placed Deutsche Post in a more favourable position than its competitors.
V skladu s tem ni mogoče ugotoviti, ali je subvencija za pokojnine podjetje Deutsche Post postavila v ugodnejši položaj v primerjavi s konkurenti.
The Commission has to reject argument because it does not take into account the specific regulatory arrangements decided by the German authorities with respect to the coverage of costs of non-price regulated services.
Komisija mora to trditev zavrniti, ker ne upošteva posebnih regulativnih dogovorov, ki so jih nemški organi sklenili glede kritja stroškov cenovno reguliranih storitev.
The Commission finds in this decision that Deutsche Post has been placed at an advantageous positions vis-à-vis competitors in the non-price regulated markets because a share of the incurred social costs for the civil servants working in those services has not been borne by those services themselves.
Komisija v tem sklepu ugotavlja, da je bilo podjetje Deutsche Post na trgih, ki niso cenovno regulirani, v ugodnejšem položaju kot njegovi konkurenti, ker deleža dejanskih stroškov za socialno varnost za javne uslužbence, ki opravljajo te storitve, niso krile storitve same.
Instead, that share of the incurred social costs has been put on the account of the price-regulated services whose revenues have been maintained at a sufficiently high level to allow the financing of those costs in addition to the incurred costs for the price-regulated services.
Namesto tega je bil ta delež dejanskih stroškov za socialno varnost prištet cenovno reguliranim storitvam, katerih prihodki so bili na dovolj visoki ravni, da so omogočali financiranje stroškov poleg stroškov, nastalih pri cenovno reguliranih storitvah.
In fact, Deutsche Post's management accounts show since 1995 that Deutsche Post has allocated to the non-price regulated services only an amount of social contributions based on the regulatory contribution rate.
Dejansko izkazi podjetja Deutsche Post od leta 1995 kažejo, da je podjetje storitvam, ki niso cenovno regulirane, dodelilo samo znesek prispevkov za socialno varnost na podlagi predpisanega prispevka.
Furthermore, the 2002 and subsequent regulatory accounts confirm that practice.
Poleg tega regulativni izkazi za leto 2002 in nadaljnja leta potrjujejo to prakso.
Therefore, the economic advantage for the non-price regulated services has thus existed before and after 1999 because those services have been unambiguously relieved from incurred costs.
Gospodarska prednost za cenovno regulirane storitve je torej obstajala pred letom 1999 in po njem, ker so bile te storitve očitno razbremenjene nastalih stroškov.
To the contrary, Germany's claim that Deutsche Post has suffered from a comparative disadvantage in the price-regulated markets because it had to finance higher social costs due to the lump-sum payments in the period 1995 to 1999 is not supported by the facts.
Trditev Nemčije, da je bilo podjetje Deutsche Post na cenovno reguliranih trgih v konkurenčno slabšem položaju, ker je moralo zaradi pavšalnih plačil v obdobju 1995–1999 financirati višje stroške za socialno varnost, ni podprta z dejstvi.
First, Deutsche Post still benefited from the exclusive right for most of its regulated services.
Prvič, podjetje Deutsche Post je še vedno imelo korist od izključne pravice za večino njegovih reguliranih storitev.
Second, and more importantly, the prices for the services subject to the exclusive right were set at a sufficiently high level to cover those costs from the captive consumers.
Drugič, kar je še pomembneje, cene za storitve, za katere je veljala izključna pravica, so bile dovolj visoke, da je podjetje te stroške krilo z lastnimi strankami.
For the period until 1995, price regulation based on the Postdienstverordnung [87] of 24 June 1991 was applicable. It set out that prices for the monopoly were to be balanced.
Za obdobje do leta 1995 je regulacija cen temeljila na uredbi o poštnih storitvah (Postdienstverordnung) [87] z dne 24. junija 1991, ki je določala, da morajo biti cene za monopol uravnotežene.
In the administrative practice, this included pension costs.
V upravni praksi je to vključevalo stroške za pokojnine.
For the period 1995-1997, price regulation was based on the Gesetz über die Regulierung der Telekommunikation und des Postwesens of 14. September 1994 (BGBl. I S. 2325, 2371).
Za obdobje 1995–1997 je regulacija cen temeljila na zakonu o urejanju telekomunikacij in poštnega sistema z dne 14. septembra 1994 (Gesetz über die Regulierung der Telekommunikation und des Postwesens, BGBl. I, str. 2325, 2371).
Article 4 in conjunction with Article 2 and Article 7 thereof allowed the price-regulated revenues to cover not only the costs incurred by the regulated services, including the contributions to the pension fund, but also to finance costs of non-price regulated services.
Člen 4 tega zakona je skupaj s členom 2 in členom 7 omogočal, da so prihodki z reguliranimi cenami krili stroške reguliranih storitev, vključno s prispevki za pokojninski sklad, in financirali stroške cenovno reguliranih storitev.
As Deutsche Post's annual accounts show, at the time of the 1995 pension reform, the level of the regulated prices was kept at the pre-existing level which had been in place when Deutsche Post had still to assume the total pension costs.
Kot je razvidno iz letnih izkazov podjetja Deutsche Post, je bila v času pokojninske reforme iz leta 1995 raven reguliranih cen na ravni, ki je veljala v času, ko je podjetje Deutsche Post še vedno moralo kriti celotne stroške za pokojnine.
While the pension costs were later either capped (for the period 1995-1999) at the level of the lump sum or fixed (as of 2000) at 33 % of the salary mass of the civil servants, which decreased year by year, the regulated prices were not correspondingly decreased to cover only social contributions in line with the compulsory social contributions that competitors pay.
Stroški za pokojnine so bili kasneje omejeni na raven pavšalnega plačila (v obdobju 1995–1999) oziroma so bili na stalni ravni 33 % celotne plače javnih uslužbencev (od leta 2000), ki se je iz leta v leto zmanjševala, regulirane cene pa niso bile ustrezno znižane, da bi krile samo prispevke za socialno varnost v skladu z obveznimi prispevki za socialno varnost, ki jih plačujejo konkurenti.
As the defined contributions to the Pension fund until 1999 (EUR 2045 million per year) remained about equal to the pension costs in 1994, the economic situation did not change for Deutsche Post with regard to the coverage of pension costs from the price-regulated services.
Ker so bili prispevki, določeni za pokojninski sklad do leta 1999 (2,045 milijarde EUR letno), približno enaki stroškom za pokojnine v letu 1994, se gospodarski položaj glede kritja stroškov za pokojnine iz cenovno reguliranih storitev za podjetje Deutsche Post ni spremenil.
Both the level of Deutsche Post's revenues as well as its contribution to the Pension fund remained in balance.
Tako raven prihodkov podjetja Deutsche Post kot njegov prispevek za pokojninski sklad sta ostala uravnotežena.
The PostG 1997 clearly set out that the regulated prices should not only cover the ‘efficient’ costs but also burdens from e.g. civil servants' social costs.
Zakon PostG iz leta 1997 jasno navaja, da bi morale regulirane cene kriti tako stroške učinkovitega zagotavljanja storitev kot tudi obremenitve, npr. stroške za socialno varnost javnih uslužbencev.
The PostG 1997 recognised therefore explicitly that the price-regulated revenues had to be set such that the coverage of the entire lump-sum payments was ensured.
Zakon PostG iz leta 1997 je torej izrecno določal, da morajo biti cenovno regulirani prihodki določeni tako, da zagotavljajo kritje celotnih pavšalnih plačil.
The regulated prices were therefore kept at the historically high level and were not reduced to a level such that Deutsche Post would have suffered from a comparative disadvantage.
Regulirane cene so bile tako ohranjene na visoki ravni iz preteklosti in niso bile znižane na takšno raven, da bi bilo podjetje Deutsche Post zaradi njih v konkurenčno slabšem položaju.
In fact, Deutsche Post has been placed in an even better position compared to its competitors since 2000, because the defined contributions to the Pension fund were reduced to 33 % of the incurred civil servant wages.
Od leta 2000 je bilo podjetje Deutsche Post celo v boljšem položaju kot njegovi konkurenti, ker so bili prispevki, določeni za pokojninski sklad, zmanjšani na 33 % dejanske plače javnih uslužbencev.
That level gives in absolute terms a reduction in costs, which fell from EUR 2045 million to EUR 735 million (even further in the subsequent years, as the number of civil servants was shrinking and that phenomenon was only off-set in part by the increase in wages).
V absolutnem smislu je zato prišlo do znižanja stroškov z 2,045 milijarde EUR na 735 milijonov EUR (še manj v naslednjih letih, saj se je število javnih uslužbencev zmanjševalo, ta trend pa je bil le delno izravnan z zvišanjem plač).
As the regulated prices were kept at the historically high level, Deutsche Post was allowed to earn since 2000 significantly positive profits from the price-regulated services.
Ker so bile regulirane cene ohranjene na visoki ravni iz preteklosti, je lahko podjetje Deutsche Post od leta 2000 s cenovno reguliranimi storitvami pridobilo precejšen dobiček.
Reviewing Deutsche Post's profitability from the price-regulated services over the whole period 1995-2002, the WIK study comes to the conclusion that Deutsche Post has e.g. until 1999 not suffered from losses from the price-regulated services despite the lump-sum payments to the Pension fund.
Ob pregledu dobička, ki ga je podjetje Deutsche Post imelo od cenovno reguliranih storitev v celotnem obdobju 1995–2002, je podjetje WIK v študiji ugotovilo, da podjetje Deutsche Post zaradi cenovno reguliranih storitev ni utrpelo nobenih izgub, npr. do leta 1999, kljub pavšalnim plačilom za pokojninski sklad.
Since 2000, the WIK study even shows significantly positive returns.
Študija podjetja WIK kaže celo precej pozitiven donos od leta 2000.
The Commission has therefore to reject Germany's claim that Deutsche Post was placed in a worse position than competitors with regard to the coverage of social contributions in the price-regulated services, and that the pension subsidy was necessary and proportionate before 2002.
Komisija mora zato zavrniti trditev Nemčije, da je bilo podjetje Deutsche Post v slabšem položaju kot konkurenti glede plačevanja prispevkov za socialno varnost pri cenovno reguliranih storitvah ter da je bila subvencija za pokojnine pred letom 2002 nujna in sorazmerna.
It is also not possible to devise a method as to how the Member State could calculate such a level for that period.
Prav tako ni mogoče določiti postopka, s katerim bi država članica izračunala znesek prispevkov za zadevno obdobje.