natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On the basis that the debt was repaid in full and the interest rate of between 10 % and 16 % applied to PZL Dębica’s debt between 1 May 2004 and 14 August 2012 was much higher that the recovery rate applied by the Commission of between 5,26 % and 7,62 %, the Commission concludes that, irrespective of the legality of the aid, recovery was completed in compliance with the Commission’s recovery notice.
Na podlagi dejstev, da je bil dolg odplačan v celoti in da je bila obrestna mera v višini 10 %–16 %, ki je bila uporabljena za dolg PZL Dębica med 1. majem 2004 in 14. avgustom 2012, precej višja od obrestne mere za vračilo, ki bi jo uporabila Komisija in znaša 5,26 %–7,62 %, Komisija ugotavlja, da je bil dolg poplačan v skladu z obvestilom Komisije o vračilu ne glede na zakonitost pomoči.
The amount of interest actually paid exceeds the amount of interest that would have to be paid pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 794/2004.
Znesek dejansko plačanih obresti presega tistega, ki bi ga moralo podjetje plačati v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 794/2004.
Measures awarded after Poland’s accession to the EU
Ukrepi, dodeljeni po pristopu Poljske k EU
Poland informed the Commission of five measures to a total value of PLN 20873,65 which, it argued, should be treated as de minimis aid (listed in Table 2).
Poljska je Komisijo obvestila o petih ukrepih v skupni vrednosti 20873,65 PLN, za katere trdi, da bi morali biti obravnavani kot pomoč de minimis (navedeni v preglednici 2).
These measures fall within the scope of application of Regulation (EC) No 69/2001.
Ti ukrepi spadajo v področje uporabe Uredbe (ES) št. 69/2001.
The Commission acknowledges that Regulation (EC) No 69/2001, which allowed the award of up to EUR 100000 (approx. PLN 400000), did not explicitly exclude companies in difficulty.
Komisija priznava, da Uredba (ES) št. 69/2001, ki je dovoljevala dodelitev zneskov do 100000 EUR (pribl. 400000 PLN), ni izrecno izključevala podjetij v težavah.
That said, the Regulation did specifically envisage that loans, which can be compared to deferrals, should be ‘backed by normal security and […] not involve abnormal risk’ (recital 6).
Uredba pa je izrecno predvidevala, da morajo biti posojila, ki jih je mogoče primerjati z odlogi, zavarovana pod običajnimi pogoji in ne smejo vključevati neobičajno visokih tveganj (uvodna izjava 6).
In this case, the Commission takes the view that only the deferral of the Tax Office of 8 September 2006 complied with that requirement.
Komisija v tem primeru meni, da navedeno zahtevo izpolnjuje samo odlog davčnega urada z dne 8. septembra 2006.
First, the Commission considers that Poland did not provide sufficient information to allow verification of the calculation mechanism of the de minimis aid and the amount of aid presented by Poland as the ‘amount of aid’ in Table 2.
Prvič, Komisija meni, da Poljska ni predložila zadostnih informacij za preverjanje mehanizma izračuna pomoči de minimis in zneska pomoči, ki ga je Poljska navedla v preglednici 2 kot „znesek pomoči“.
In particular, detailed information was not provided on the applicable reference rates and the rates used to calculate the late payment charge, which would have enabled the calculations made according to the formula applied by Poland to be checked (see recital (36)).
Zlasti niso bile predložene podrobne informacije o veljavnih referenčnih obrestnih merah in obrestnih merah, uporabljenih za izračun zamudnih obresti, s katerimi bi bilo mogoče preveriti izračune v skladu z enačbo, ki jo je uporabila Poljska (glej uvodno izjavo 36).
Therefore the Commission considers the nominal amount of the three deferrals granted by the Mayor of Dębica on 7 April, 28 July and 5 October 2006, for which no security was provided, as the amount to be taken into consideration for de minimis purposes.
Zato Komisija meni, da je nominalna vrednost treh odlogov, ki jih je odobril župan mesta Dębica 7. aprila, 28. julija in 5. oktobra 2006 in za katere jamstvo ni bilo zagotovljeno, tisti znesek, ki ga je treba obravnavati kot pomoč de minimis.
An amount of PLN 264186 was the subject of two deferral decisions by the Mayor of Dębica.
Znesek v višini 264186 PLN je bil obravnavan v dveh sklepih župana mesta Dębica o odlogu.
Since these decisions concerned the same subject, the amount will be taken into consideration only once.
Ker se ta sklepa nanašata na isti predmet, se znesek upošteva samo enkrat.
As for the write-off decision issued by the Mayor of Dębica on 5 October 2006, it amounts to a cash grant and should therefore be counted in full.
Sklep o odpisu, ki ga je 5. oktobra 2006 izdal župan mesta Dębica, se nanaša na denarno dotacijo in ga je zato treba upoštevati v celoti.
In the light of the above, the total value of the aid is PLN 369788 (approx. EUR 93437 [21]) (see Table 7).
Ob upoštevanju zgoraj navedenega skupna vrednost pomoči znaša 369788 PLN (pribl. 93437 EUR [21]) (glej preglednico 7).
The total being less than EUR 100000, these measures are covered by Regulation (EC) No 69/2001.
Ker skupna vrednost znaša manj kot 100000 EUR, se za te ukrepe uporablja Uredba (ES) št. 69/2001.
Poland confirmed that PZL Dębica had not received any other de minimis aid.
Poljska je potrdila, da podjetje PZL Dębica ni prejelo nobene druge pomoči de minimis.
Deferral decision dated 7.4.2006
Sklep o odlogu z dne 7. 4. 2006
Deferral decision dated 28.7.2006
Sklep o odlogu z dne 28. 7. 2006
Deferral decision dated 8.9.2006
Sklep o odlogu z dne 8. 9. 2006
Write-off decision dated 5.10.2006
Sklep o odpisu z dne 5. 10. 2006
Deferral decision dated 5.10.2006
Sklep o odlogu z dne 5. 10. 2006
Article 107(1) of the Treaty covers interventions in various forms which reduce a company’s normal costs and which, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect.
Člen 107(1) Pogodbe zajema različne oblike posegov, ki znižujejo običajne stroške podjetja in ki sicer niso subvencije v ožjem pomenu besede, vendar so podobnega značaja in imajo enak učinek.
It is established case-law that the conduct of a public body with responsibility for collecting social security contributions which tolerates late payment of those contributions confers on an undertaking experiencing serious financial difficulty a commercial advantage by mitigating the burden associated with the normal application of the social security system which cannot be wholly removed by the interest and default surcharges applied to the late payment [22].
V sodni praksi je splošno sprejeto, da ravnanje javnega subjekta, ki je pristojen za pobiranje prispevkov za socialno varnost in ki dopusti, da so ti prispevki plačani z zamudo, podjetju v hudih finančnih težavah nakloni pomembno gospodarsko korist, s tem da mu olajša breme, ki izhaja iz običajne uporabe režima sistema socialne varnosti, te koristi pa ne morejo popolnoma odstraniti obresti in kazni zaradi zamud [22].
As a preliminary remark the Commission points out that state aid to PZL Dębica may have been awarded by virtue of the failure to enforce in full PZL Dębica’s public debt to the Social Security Office [23].
Komisija najprej opozarja, da je bila državna pomoč podjetju PZL Dębica morda dodeljena zaradi neuspešne popolne izterjave dolga podjetja PZL Dębica uradu za socialno varnost [23].
Poland argues that the deferral of debt by the Social Security Office does not involve state aid as the Social Security Office acted like a private creditor when it agreed in March 2012 to a deferral of the total amount owed, which was to be paid in accordance with a repayment schedule in 96 instalments.
Poljska trdi, da odlog dolga, ki ga je odobril urad za socialno varnost, ne pomeni državne pomoči, saj je urad za socialno varnost ravnal kot zasebni upnik, ko je marca 2012 odobril odlog skupnega dolgovanega zneska, ki naj bi ga podjetje odplačalo v 96 obrokih v skladu z načrtom odplačevanja.
Poland submitted an analysis of the private creditor test, carried out in October 2011 and confirming, in its view, that the Social Security Office would be better off deferring its claims on PZL Dębica rather than enforcing them.
Poljska je predložila analizo merila zasebnega upnika, ki je bila opravljena v oktobru 2011 in po mnenju Poljske potrjuje, da bi imel urad za socialno varnost več koristi od odloga terjatev do PZL Dębica kot od njihove izterjave.
Poland also claims that the Social Security Office, which participated in both restructuring plans, always had ample information on PZL Dębica’s financial condition and prospects and that it always acted in full knowledge of the company’s position.
Poljska trdi tudi, da je urad za socialno varnost, ki je sodeloval pri obeh načrtih prestrukturiranja, vedno imel dovolj informacij o finančnem stanju in pričakovanjih PZL Dębica ter je vedno ravnal ob popolnem poznavanju stanja podjetja.
Lastly, Poland referred to a number of actions undertaken by the Social Security Office to secure and enforce the debt.
Nazadnje se je Poljska sklicevala na več ukrepov, ki jih je urad za socialno varnost izvedel za zavarovanje in izterjavo dolga.
According to Poland, this confirms that the Social Security Office acted like a private creditor and sought to recover its claim.
Po navedbah Poljske to potrjuje, da je urad za socialno varnost ravnal kot zasebni upnik in poskušal izterjati svoje terjatve.
If a Member State relies on that test during the administrative procedure, it must, where there is doubt, establish unequivocally and on the basis of objective and verifiable evidence that the measure does indeed pass that test [25].
Če se država članica v upravnem postopku sklicuje na to merilo, mora v primeru dvoma nedvoumno in na podlagi objektivnih in preverljivih elementov dokazati, da ukrep dejansko izpolnjuje to merilo [25].
With a view to establishing whether an advantage was granted that could be classified as state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, Poland must therefore provide evidence demonstrating that the public authorities acted in the same way as a hypothetical private creditor, who would not tolerate non-payment and would take effective action to enforce the debt even if this resulted in insolvency proceedings.
Da bi se ugotovilo, ali je dodeljeno ugodnost mogoče opredeliti kot državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe, mora Poljska zato predložiti dokaze, ki kažejo, da so javni organi ravnali enako kot hipotetični zasebni upnik, ki ne bi dopuščal neplačevanja in bi sprejel učinkovite ukrepe za izterjavo dolga, tudi če bi to vodilo do stečajnega postopka.
The hypothetical private creditor would closely monitor the economic situation of the debtor; the lack of a restructuring plan and poor prospects for a return to viability would hasten debt recovery.
Hipotetični zasebni upnik bi pozorno spremljal gospodarsko stanje dolžnika; odsotnost načrta za prestrukturiranje in slabe možnosti za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja bi pospešili izterjavo dolga.
It follows that in order to determine whether any state aid was awarded by the public authorities, it must be established that in this case the Social Security Office sought to recover all the monies owed to it without incurring financial losses and that by deciding not to file for the company’s bankruptcy the Social Security Office intended to maximise recovery of the amounts owed to it as the hypothetical private creditor would [26].
Iz tega sledi, da je treba za določitev, ali so javni organi dodelili katero koli državno pomoč, dokazati, da je urad za socialno varnost v tem primeru poskušal izterjati vse dolgovane zneske brez finančnih izgub in da je z odločitvijo, da ne bo vložil predloga za stečajni postopek podjetja, nameraval povečati izterjani znesek, kot bi to storil hipotetični zasebni upnik [26].
The Commission will analyse the report submitted by Poland on the decision taken in 2012 to sign the deferral agreement.
Komisija bo analizirala poročilo Poljske o sklepu iz leta 2012 glede sklenitve sporazuma o odlogu.
However, the Commission notes that the Social Security Office had allowed debt to accumulate for a number of years.
Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da je urad za socialno varnost dovolil, da se je dolg kopičil več let.
Indeed, the information provided by Poland relates to the entire period from the end of the first restructuring period (and even before) to the commissioning of the study in October 2011 with a view to concluding a deferral agreement.
Informacije, ki jih je predložila Poljska, se dejansko nanašajo na celotno obdobje od konca prvega obdobja prestrukturiranja (in še prej) do naročila študije v oktobru 2011 zaradi sklenitve sporazuma o odlogu.
In view of the notification in 2008 of a second restructuring plan, the company did not actively seek an agreement with its creditors.
Glede na priglasitev drugega načrta prestrukturiranja v letu 2008 si podjetje ni aktivno prizadevalo za sklenitev sporazuma z upniki.
The Commission must therefore also check that the behaviour of the Social Security Office between the end of the first restructuring period and the signing of the deferral agreement passes the private creditor test.
Komisija mora zato preveriti tudi, ali ravnanje urada za socialno varnost med koncem prvega obdobja prestrukturiranja in sklenitvijo sporazuma o odlogu izpolnjuje merilo zasebnega upnika.
Social Security Office involvement in the first restructuring plan
Sodelovanje urada za socialno varnost pri prvem načrtu prestrukturiranja
As mentioned above, the Social Security Office decided to participate in the first restructuring plan prepared and approved in 2002, i.e. before Poland acceded to the EU.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, se je urad za socialno varnost odločil sodelovati pri prvemu načrtu prestrukturiranja, ki je bil pripravljen in odobren leta 2002, tj. pred pristopom Poljske k EU.
The plan included restructuring of financial debt to the Social Security Office.
Načrt je vključeval prestrukturiranje finančnega dolga uradu za socialno varnost.
On the basis of that restructuring plan, the Social Security Office agreed to defer PLN 1364600 in debt, while a larger amount of PLN 3890000 was to be settled by way of a loan from the Enterprise Restructuring Fund.
Urad za socialno varnost je na podlagi navedenega načrta prestrukturiranja odobril odlog dolga v višini 1364600 PLN, medtem ko naj bi se višji znesek v višini 3890000 PLN poravnal s posojilom Sklada za prestrukturiranje podjetij.
As explained above (see recital (13)) PZL Dębica did not receive financing from the Fund.
Kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj (glej uvodno izjavo 13), podjetje PZL Dębica ni prejelo sredstev iz sklada.
Consequently the Social Security Office decided not to defer the remaining part of the debt and in 2006 it threatened to institute proceedings to have the company declared bankrupt.
Urad za socialno varnost se je zato odločil, da ne bo odobril odloga preostalega dela dolga, in je leta 2006 zagrozil, da bo sprožil postopek za razglasitev stečaja podjetja.
The Commission notes that despite the failure of the financial restructuring and the financial arrears at the end of the first restructuring period, PZL Dębica managed to record a modest profit in 2006 (see Table 1).
Komisija ugotavlja, da je podjetje PZL Dębica leta 2006 zabeležilo skromen dobiček kljub neuspešnemu finančnemu prestrukturiranju in zaostalim plačilom ob koncu prvega obdobja prestrukturiranja (glej preglednico 1).
This confirms that the company’s organisational and technological restructuring efforts had borne fruit.
To potrjuje, da so prizadevanja podjetja za organizacijsko in tehnološko prestrukturiranje obrodila sadove.
In addition, from 2001 onwards the Social Security Office established security on a number of PZL Dębica’s assets to cover the growing debt.
Poleg tega je urad za socialno varnost po letu 2001 zavaroval več sredstev podjetja PZL Dębica za pokritje rastočega dolga.
The value of the mortgage reached PLN 11,6 million in 2007, covering 100 % of the debt.
Vrednost hipoteke je leta 2007 dosegla 11,6 milijona PLN in s tem pokrila 100 % dolga.
Lastly, the Commission notes that as of 2003 the Social Security Office began enforcing the debt through the sale of PZL Dębica’s assets (as illustrated in Table 5).
Nazadnje Komisija ugotavlja, da je urad za socialno varnost leta 2003 začel z izterjavo dolga prek prodaje sredstev PZL Dębica (kot je prikazano v preglednici 5).
The Social Security Office decided, however, not to proceed with a fire sale, which usually generates lower amounts than would normally be the case.
Urad za socialno varnost se je kljub temu odločil, da ne bo nadaljeval prisilne prodaje, ki običajno prinese nižje zneske kot navadna prodaja.
Indeed, in the context of reduced demand for industrial assets as a result of the current economic climate, this phenomenon could only be exacerbated.
Nedvomno bi se ta pojav lahko samo še poslabšal, saj je povpraševanje po industrijskih sredstvih manjše zaradi trenutnih gospodarskih razmer.
Instead, the Social Security Office agreed to a controlled sale organised by the company.
Namesto tega se je urad za socialno varnost strinjal z nadzorovano prodajo, ki jo je organiziralo podjetje.
The Social Security Office had to consent to the sale on the basis of an offer from a third party and the net profit from the sale was then transferred to the Social Security Office.
Urad za socialno varnost je moral odobriti prodajo na podlagi ponudbe tretje strani, čisti dobiček od prodaje pa je bil nato prenesen na urad za socialno varnost.
The evidence provided by Poland leads to the conclusion that although the sale conducted by PZL Dębica generated market values, the sales process was slower than a fire sale.
Na podlagi dokazov, ki jih je predložila Poljska, je mogoče zaključiti, da je bil proces prodaje počasnejši kot prisilna prodaja, četudi je prodaja, ki jo je organiziralo podjetje PZL Dębica, prinesla tržne vrednosti.
Between 2004 and 2006 the Social Security Office recovered over PLN 1,6 million through the controlled sale of PZL Dębica’s assets.
Urad za socialno varnost je med letoma 2004 in 2006 z nadzorovano prodajo sredstev PZL Dębica izterjal več kot 1,6 milijona PLN.
Enforcement of the debt by the Social Security Office between 2007 and 2012
Izterjava dolga urada za socialno varnost med letoma 2007 in 2012
The failure of financial restructuring in the first restructuring plan and the mounting debt of PZL Dębica resulted in the Social Security Office giving serious consideration to the bankruptcy scenario at the end of 2006.
Urad za socialno varnost je konec leta 2006 zaradi neuspešnega finančnega prestrukturiranja iz prvega načrta prestrukturiranja in zaradi naraščajočega dolga PZL Dębica resno razmišljal o stečaju.
As explained above (see recital (42)c)) on 20 November 2006 the Social Security Office informed the company of its intention to file for the bankruptcy of PZL Dębica.
Kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj (glej uvodno izjavo 42(c)), je urad za socialno varnost 20. novembra 2006 podjetje obvestil, da namerava vložiti predlog za stečajni postopek proti PZL Dębica.
The Commission notes that the following points presented by the company to the Social Security Office would be important for a hypothetical private creditor to assess the debtor’s situation and determine the appropriate course of action in order to maximise recovery of the debts, and would therefore be monitored by the creditor:
Komisija ugotavlja, da bi bile naslednje točke, ki jih je podjetje predstavilo uradu za socialno varnost, pomembne za hipotetičnega zasebnega upnika oziroma za njegovo oceno dolžnikovega stanja in določitev ustreznih ukrepov, s katerimi bi v čim večji meri izterjal dolgove, in bi jih zato upnik spremljal:
the company’s growing sales and reduced production costs, which were achieved as a result of the restructuring measures undertaken by PZL Dębica under the first restructuring plan;
naraščajoča prodaja in nižji proizvodni stroški podjetja, ki so bili doseženi z ukrepi prestrukturiranja, ki jih je podjetje PZL Dębica izvedlo na podlagi prvega načrta prestrukturiranja;
the forecast profits for 2006 and an explanation that it was the failure to achieve profits before 2006 that led to the increase in the debt and PZL Dębica’s incapacity to repay quicker;
napovedan dobiček za leto 2006 in pojasnilo, da se je dolg povečal zaradi nezmožnosti ustvariti dobiček pred letom 2006, kar je tudi razlog za to, da podjetje PZL Dębica ni moglo prej odplačati dolga;
the overall positive revenue trend forecast for the coming years, which would allow continuous repayment of the debt and would guarantee that no new debt would accrue;
splošen pozitiven trend prihodkov, napovedan za prihodnja leta, ki bi omogočil redno odplačevanje dolga in preprečil nastanek novih dolgov;
the company’s marketing and innovation efforts and the new markets on which, as a result of its new marketing strategy, the company had started selling its products (coal and copper mining and new contracts with partners in Ukraine and China);
prizadevanja podjetja na področju trženja in inovacij ter novi trgi, na katerih je podjetje začelo prodajati svoje izdelke (pridobivanje premoga in bakra ter nove pogodbe s partnerji v Ukrajini in na Kitajskem) na podlagi nove strategije trženja;
the lack of other significant debts towards any other public authority or private creditor;
podjetje nima velikih dolgov do drugih javnih organov ali zasebnih upnikov;
an undertaking by the company to settle current and future social security payments on time.
podjetje se je zavezalo, da bo pravočasno poravnalo sedanje in prihodnje prispevke za socialno varnost.
The Commission notes that on the basis of the comprehensive information set out above indicating a growth path for PZL Dębica and tangible revenue for the Social Security Office, it was reasonable to assume that more would be recovered by allowing the company to continue to operate than by forcing it into liquidation.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je bilo na podlagi izčrpnih informacij, ki so navedene zgoraj ter nakazujejo potek rasti PZL Dębica in oprijemljive prihodke urada za socialno varnost, razumno sklepati, da bi zagotovitev nadaljnjega delovanja podjetja prinesla več koristi kot njegova prisilna likvidacija.
That said, the Commission notes that, as a matter of prudence, the Social Security Office did not agree to suspend enforcement proceedings which, according to PZL Dębica, were stifling the restructuring process.
Komisija ugotavlja, da urad za socialno varnost iz previdnosti ni pristal na prekinitev postopkov za izterjavo dolga, ki so po mnenju PZL Dębica ovirali proces prestrukturiranja.
The Social Security Office therefore acted like a private creditor, which would choose the course of action that would allow it to maximise recovery of the debt.
Urad za socialno varnost je torej ravnal kot zasebni upnik, ki bi ukrepal tako, da bi v največji meri izterjal dolg.
The Commission notes that in 2008 the Social Security Office adhered to the second restructuring plan and thereby signed up to deferral of part of the debt.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je urad za socialno varnost leta 2008 ravnal v skladu z drugim načrtom prestrukturiranja in s tem pristal na odlog dela dolga.
The remainder of the debt was to be settled as a result of an injection of funds by the state-owned Industrial Development Agency.
Podjetje je preostanek dolga nameravalo poravnati s sredstvi, ki naj bi jih vložila Agencija za industrijski razvoj v državni lasti.
However, the standstill obligation was respected and the measures were not implemented.
Vendar se je upoštevala obveznost mirovanja in ukrepi niso bili izvedeni.
The Commission notes that the Social Security Office did not rely on implementation of the second restructuring plan as a solution to the outstanding debt, but continued with the course of action embarked upon in 2007, as described above.
Komisija ugotavlja, da se urad za socialno varnost ni zanašal na izvedbo drugega načrta prestrukturiranja kot na rešitev glede neporavnanega dolga, ampak je nadaljeval z izvajanjem ukrepov, ki jih je sprejel leta 2007, kot je opisano zgoraj.