natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The notion of ‘applicable after the accession date’ has been defined in a series of Commission decisions [27] as covering schemes and individual measures that are either not limited in time or where the exact liability of the State is not exactly delimited – in other words, cases where the exact exposure of the State is still not known on the date of accession.
Pojem „v veljavi po datumu pristopa“ je bil opredeljen v številnih sklepih Komisije [27] in se nanaša na sheme in posamezne ukrepe, ki so časovno neomejeni ali pa obveznost države ni točno določena – z drugimi besedami, zadeve, kjer točna izpostavljenost države na dan pristopa še vedno ni znana.
In the light of the above considerations, it must be determined whether the state guarantees issued in favour of Oltchim throughout the period 1995-2000 were ‘applicable after accession’ in the sense that has been defined in the above-mentioned case practice.
V luči zgornjih premislekov je treba ugotoviti, ali so bila državna jamstva, ki so bila izdana v korist podjetja Oltchim v obdobju od 1995 do 2000, po pristopu „še vedno v veljavi“ v smislu zgoraj omenjene prakse.
To that end, it must be verified whether a situation obtained in which the state guarantees were either not limited in time or where the exact exposure of the State was not known before the date of accession.
Zato je treba preveriti, ali je nastalo stanje tako, da so državna jamstva časovno neomejena ali pa točna izpostavljenost države ni bila znana pred datumom pristopa.
Having examined the terms and conditions under which the state guarantees in question were issued, the Commission notes that they represented separate and individual, one-off measures, whereby the State backed up the company for taking out specified loans of determined amounts and determined duration.
Po pregledu rokov in pogojev, pod katerimi so bila izdana zadevna državna jamstva, Komisija navaja, da je šlo za ločene in posamezne enkratne ukrepe, s katerimi je država podprla podjetje pri najemu posebnih posojil v točno določenih zneskih in s točno določnim trajanjem.
The date until which the guarantees were valid was established when they were issued, as the guarantees stipulated a validity period up to the expiry of the underlying loans, which was precisely defined in the underlying loans.
Datum veljavnosti jamstev je bil določen ob njihovi izdaji, obdobje veljavnosti jamstev pa je trajalo do poteka osnovnih posojil, kar je bilo v osnovnih posojilih točno določeno.
That validity period was not modified afterwards.
Obdobje veljavnosti kasneje ni bilo spremenjeno.
Therefore, upon accession their validity in time was indeed limited, and had been established at a date prior to accession, namely when the loan agreement was concluded.
Ob pristopu je bila torej njihova veljavnost res časovno omejena in določena na datum pred pristopom, in sicer na dan podpisa sporazuma.
The Commission must therefore take note that the first of the situations in which a given measure will qualify as ‘new aid’ as of the accession date onwards, namely its lack of limitation in time upon the accession date, is not satisfied in the present case.
Komisija mora zato upoštevati, da prvi pogoj, na podlagi katerega določeni ukrep velja za „novo pomoč“ od datuma pristopa dalje, tj. da ukrep na datum pristopa ni časovno omejen, v tem primeru ni izpolnjen.
Secondly, the maximum liability of the State was delimited at the moment in time at which the guarantees were granted, as the guarantees cover only the specific loan for which they are granted.
Drugič, najvišja odgovornost države je bila v trenutku, ko so bila jamstva izdana, omejena, saj jamstva krijejo le določeno posojilo, za katerega so bila izdana.
Therefore, it must also be concluded that the second case of ‘applicability after accession’, namely unknown exposure of the State as of the accession date onwards, is not applicable.
Zato je treba ugotoviti, da tudi drugo merilo „veljavnosti po pristopu“ (neznana izpostavljenost države od dneva pristopa dalje) ni izpolnjeno.
In addition, the Commission also observes that the state guarantees were triggered before the accession date.
Poleg tega Komisija navaja, da so bila državna jamstva izdana pred datumom pristopa.
From the date of their triggering, the State became liable for the repayment of the outstanding amount of the loans that were taken with their back-up, and indeed, it subrogated itself into the obligations of the company for the repayment of the loans in question, becoming consequently a creditor of Oltchim for the amounts paid on account of the guarantees.
Od dneva njihove izdaje je država postala odgovorna za poplačilo neplačanega zneska posojil, ki so bila najeta z njeno pomočjo, in je prevzela obveznosti podjetja za poplačilo zadevnih posojil, s tem pa posledično postala upnik podjetja Oltchim za zneske, plačane na podlagi jamstev.
It is therefore to be concluded that the state guarantees granted to Oltchim during the period 1995-2000 cannot be qualified as new aid within the meaning of point 2.1 of the second paragraph of Annex V to the 2005 Accession Act of Bulgaria and Romania.
V zvezi s tem je treba torej ugotoviti, da državnih jamstev, izdanih podjetju Oltchim v obdobju od 1995 do 2000, ni mogoče opredeliti kot nove pomoči v smislu točke 2.1. drugega odstavka Priloge V Akta o pristopu Bolgarije in Romunije iz leta 2005.
Existence of aid: Advantage
Obstoj pomoči: Prednost
The private creditor test
3.1 Merilo zasebnega upnika
Romania argues that the notified measure, consisting of converting RON 1049 million of public debt into equity with a view to selling the total resulting public stake shortly afterwards (by the end of May 2012) does not confer any undue advantage on the company, because any private creditor in a situation similar to the one of the public creditor AVAS would have chosen that method of debt recovery rather than the liquidation of the company, which is financially less advantageous for the public creditor.
Romunija trdi, da priglašeni ukrep, ki zajema pretvorbo 1049 milijonov RON javnega dolga v lastniški kapital z namenom prodaje celotnega nastalega javnega lastniškega deleža kmalu po pretvorbi (do konca maja 2012) ne pomeni nobene neupravičene prednosti za podjetje, saj bi vsak zasebni upnik v podobnem položaju, kot je javna agencija AVAS, raje izbral ta način izterjave dolga kot pa likvidacijo podjetja, ki je finančno manj ugodna za javnega upnika.
In order to determine whether the notified measure confers an undue advantage on Oltchim, the Commission should assess whether the public creditor AVAS pursued the recovery of the public debt with the same diligence as a private creditor seeking to maximise recovery of the debt owed to it [28].
Da bi ugotovila, ali priglašeni ukrep pomeni neupravičeno prednost za podjetje Oltchim, mora Komisija oceniti, ali je javni upnik AVAS vodil postopek izterjave javnega dolga enako skrbno kot zasebni upnik, ki si prizadeva v največji možni meri izterjati dolg, ki mu je dolgovan [28].
That perspective takes into account the fact that, with the transfer of the public debt to AVAS, recovery of the debt is pursued by an institution that has no other relationship with the company but the one of a creditor with its debtor.
Takšen pogled upošteva dejstvo, da s prenosom javnih terjatev na agencijo AVAS izterjavo dolga vodi institucija, ki nima s podjetjem nobenega drugega odnosa kot tistega med upnikom in dolžnikom.
The assessment does not disregard the fact that the Ministry of Economy is the public shareholder of Oltchim, but it takes into account that the public shareholder does not have a role to play with respect to the recovery of the public debt, which is entrusted to the creditor AVAS.
Ocena ne zanemarja dejstva, da je Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo državni delničar podjetja Oltchim, in upošteva, da državni delničar ni pristojen za izterjavo javnega dolga; slednje je zaupano upniku, torej agenciji AVAS.
The Commission notes, however, that the effects of the debt conversion followed by privatisation for the current shareholder, i.e. the Ministry of Economy, must also be assessed in order to reach a conclusion on whether the proposed debt conversion followed by privatisation is a better financial solution for the State than wholly liquidating the company.
Komisija še navaja, da je treba preučiti tudi učinke pretvorbe dolga, ki bi ji sledila privatizacija, za trenutnega delničarja, torej Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo, da bi lahko ugotovila, ali predlagana pretvorba dolga, ki bi ji sledila privatizacija, za državo pomeni boljšo finančno rešitev kot popolna likvidacija podjetja.
Recovery of the public debt – Assessment of measure 3
3.2 Izterjava javnega dolga – ocena ukrepa 3
In the opening decision, the Commission considered that an additional element of state aid could stem from the fact that the State has not charged any interest and/or late payment penalties on Oltchim's overdue public debt after Romania's accession to the EU.
V sklepu o začetku postopka je Komisija menila, da bi lahko iz dejstva, da država ni zaračunavala obresti in/ali kazni za pozna plačila na zapadli javni dolg podjetja Oltchim po pristopu Romunije k EU, nastal dodatni element državne pomoči.
That public debt resulted from the triggering of the state guarantees (see description above in recitals 23-27 and assessment of the state guarantees above in recitals 88-95).
Ta javni dolg je nastal kot posledica izdaje državnih jamstev (glej zgornji opis v uvodnih izjavah (23)–(27) in ocene državnih jamstev v uvodnih izjavah (88)–(95)).
In the opening decision, the Commission took the view that the failure to accrue interest or enforce the public debt conferred an advantage on Oltchim, given that the company enjoyed capital free of charge.
V sklepu o začetku postopka je Komisija ocenila, da nezaračunavanje obresti ali neizvršba javnega dolga za podjetje Oltchim pomeni prednost, saj je podjetje brezplačno prejelo kapital.
In order to assess whether Romania behaved like a private creditor with regard to the outstanding debt resulting from the triggering of the state guarantees, it is necessary to assess the behaviour of the Romanian State over the period from 2007 until today, based on the information available to the Romanian authorities at the relevant points in time.
Da bi lahko ocenili, ali je Romunija delovala kot zasebni upnik v zvezi z neplačanim dolgom, izhajajočim iz uveljavljanih državnih jamstev, je nujno treba oceniti ravnanje romunske države v obdobju od 2007 do danes, in sicer na podlagi informacij, ki so bile v določenem trenutku romunskim organom na voljo.
The Commission first of all notes that the fact of not charging interest and penalties as of 2007 and until the modification of the notification of measure 1 results from GEO 51/1998 (see recital (27)).
Komisija najprej ugotavlja, da dejstvo, da obresti in kazni niso bile zaračunane od leta 2007 do spremembe priglasitve ukrepa 1, izhaja iz GEO 51/1998 (glej uvodno izjavo (27)).
It also has to be seen against the background of Law 30/2007, mandating AVAS to re-perform the debt conversion.
V obravnavi je treba upoštevati tudi zakon št. 30/2007, ki agencijo AVAS pooblašča za ponovno izvedbo pretvorbe dolga.
At the time the Romanian authorities were considering a continuation of Oltchim's activities and planning further investments rather than its liquidation.
V tem času so se romunski organi bolj nagibali k nadaljevanju dejavnosti podjetja Oltchim in načrtovanju nadaljnjih investicij kot pa k njegovi likvidaciji.
Therefore, the Commission first of all needs to ascertain whether Romania, by deciding in 2007 to carry out the debt-for-equity swap, rather than seeking the enforcement of the debt and/or liquidation of the company, behaved like a private creditor.
Zato mora Komisija najprej oceniti, ali je Romunija s tem, ko je leta 2007 izvedla pretvorbo dolga v lastniški kapital namesto da bi izterjala dolg in/ali likvidirala podjetje, ravnala kot zasebni upnik.
Reactions from the market to previous privatisation attempts, as well as the court actions of minority shareholders, showed that the market believed in the fundamental viability of Oltchim's business.
Odzivi trga na prejšnje poskuse privatizacije in tožbe manjšinskih delničarjev kažejo na to, da je trg verjel v temeljno sposobnost delovanja podjetja Oltchim.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that Romania had at its disposal also a business plan [29] for Oltchim which indicated that the company was viable.
Nadalje Komisija ugotavlja, da je Romunija imela na voljo tudi poslovni načrt [29] za podjetje Oltchim, ki je pokazal, da je podjetje sposobno poslovati brez izgub.
In the light of those elements, the Commission considers that it was not unreasonable for Romania, in its role as creditor, to decide to perform the debt to equity conversion and to pass a law along those lines that did not envisage charging interest and penalties on the outstanding debt, as that debt was to be in any event converted into equity.
V luči teh dejavnikov Komisija meni, da s strani Romunije kot upnika ni bilo neupravičeno, da se odloči za pretvorbo dolga v lastniški kapital in poleg tega sprejme zakon, ki ne predvideva zaračunavanja obresti in kazni na neplačani dolg, saj naj bi bil tudi ta dolg pretvorjen v lastniški kapital.
That analysis is not contradicted by the fact that Romania, prior to carrying out the debt-for-equity swap, sought state aid clearance.
Ta analiza ni v nasprotju z dejstvom, da je Romunija želela pridobiti odobritev za državno pomoč pred izvedbo pretvorbe dolga v lastniški kapital.
Indeed, by doing so, Romania merely fulfilled its obligations under Article 108(3) TFEU.
Pravzaprav je Romunija s tem le izpolnila svoje obveznosti iz člena 108(3) PDEU.
Given the difficulties Romania had encountered with minority shareholders before, and kept encountering for the application of Law 30/2007, it made perfect sense to seek confirmation from the Commission that the planned operation did not amount to state aid.
Glede na težave, ki jih je Romunija predhodno imela z manjšinskimi delničarji in s katerimi se je še naprej srečevala pri uporabi zakona št. 30/2007, je bilo povsem smiselno, da je želela pridobiti potrditev Komisije, da načrtovani postopek ne pomeni državne pomoči.
Due to the state aid assessment and the application of the standstill obligation, the debt-for-equity swap was eventually delayed by five years.
Zaradi ocene državne pomoči in uveljavitve obveznosti mirovanja je bila pretvorba dolga v lastniški kapital sčasoma preložena za pet let.
In that regard, the Commission observes first of all that, up to mid-2011, Romania had the firm intention of pursuing an expansive investment strategy with regard to Oltchim, which was explored by a number of expert studies [30].
V zvezi s tem Komisija ugotavlja, da je Romunija v zvezi s podjetjem Oltchim imela do sredine leta 2011 trden namen izvesti obsežno naložbeno strategijo, ki je bila predmet več izvedenskih študij [30].
It would have been against the State's strategy of making further investments in order to return the company to profitability and increase its value with a view to privatising in the medium-to-longterm to charge at the same time interest on the pending public debt.
Hkratno zaračunavanje obresti na čakajoči javni dolg bi bilo v nasprotju s strategijo države o nadaljnjih investicijah za povrnitev donosnosti podjetja in povečanje njegove vrednosti v smislu srednje- in dolgoročne privatizacije.
As a result of the doubts the Commission had raised with regards to the expansive investment strategy in its opening decision and, more importantly, as a result of the budgetary problems and the EU/IMF programme, Romania changed its strategy in 2011 and decided to privatise the company immediately after the debt-for-equity swap.
Zaradi dvomov, ki jih je navedla Komisija v sklepu o začetku postopka v zvezi z obsežno naložbeno strategijo, in zaradi proračunskih težav ter programa EU/MDS je Romunija leta 2011 spremenila svojo strategijo in se odločila podjetje po pretvorbi dolga v lastniški kapital takoj privatizirati.
It thereby abandoned the initial plans to make further investments of EUR 424 million before privatising.
S tem je opustila svoje prvotne načrte glede nadaljnjih investicij v višini 424 milijonov EUR pred privatizacijo.
In the new context, the charging of interest on the debt became a sensible strategy for the State in order to maximise the recovery of the debt owed to it.
V teh novih okoliščinah je zaračunavanje obresti na dolg za državo postalo smiselna strategija za čim večjo izterjavo dolga.
As outlined in recitals 75-77 above, further compound interest was charged on the public debt, corresponding to the period 1 January 2007 onwards, by means of a private agreement concluded in December 2011 between Oltchim and AVAS.
Kot je povzeto v uvodnih izjavah (75)–(77) zgoraj, so bile s sklenitvijo civilnopravnega sporazuma med podjetjem Oltchim in agencijo AVAS decembra 2011 za obdobje od 1. januarja 2007 dalje na javni dolg zaračunane nadaljnje obrestne obresti.
In particular, the interest rates that were applied on the public debt corresponded to whatever were the higher: the Commission reference rates relevant for each period or the interest rates applied for private loans of the company for the same period which can be considered adequate.
Uporabljene stopnje obresti na javni dolg so ustrezale tistim, ki so bile višje: bodisi referenčne stopnje Komisije iz ustreznih obdobij ali pa stopnje obresti, ki so bile uporabljene za zasebna posojila podjetja v enakem obdobju, ki se lahko štejejo za ustrezne.
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that Oltchim did not derive an advantage from the way in which the public authorities pursued, after accession, the recovery of the public debt to be now converted into equity.
Na podlagi tega Komisija zaključuje, da podjetje Oltchim ni imelo prednosti zaradi načina, ki so ga državni organi po pristopu izbrali za izterjavo javnega dolga, ki naj bi bil zdaj pretvorjen v lastniški kapital.
The debt conversion – measure 1
3.3 Pretvorba dolga – ukrep 1
The Commission must also assess whether measure 1, consisting (following modification of the notification – see recitals 14-16, 69-70 and 75-77 above) of converting into equity a total of RON 1049 million of public debt, to be followed shortly by full sale of the resulting public stake (privatisation), confers any undue advantage on Oltchim.
Komisija mora oceniti tudi, ali ukrep 1 (po spremembi priglasitve – glej uvodne izjave (14)–(16), (69)–(70) in (75)–(77) zgoraj), ki zajema pretvorbo javnega dolga v lastniški kapital v višini 1049 milijonov RON ter kmalu zatem popolno prodajo nastalega javnega lastniškega deleža (privatizacija), pomeni kakršno koli neupravičeno prednost za podjetje Oltchim.
The total public debt to be converted into equity includes the main public debt, held by the privatisation agency AVAS, of RON 538 million, and the interest accruing on the AVAS debt from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2011, of RON 511 million.
Skupni javni dolg, ki bo pretvorjen v lastniški kapital, vključuje glavne javne terjatve agencije za privatizacijo AVAS v višini 538 milijonov RON in obresti na terjatve agencije AVAS, natečene od 1. januarja 2007 do 31. decembra 2011 v višini 511 milijonov RON.
In order to assess whether the proposed debt conversion involves any undue advantage for Oltchim, it should be determined whether the debt conversion is indeed the best mechanism for maximising recovery of the public debt, as Romania argues.
Da bi ocenili, ali predlagana pretvorba dolga pomeni neupravičeno prednost za podjetje Oltchim, je treba ugotoviti, ali je pretvorba dolga zares najboljši način za čim večjo izterjavo javnega dolga, kot to navaja Romunija.
In practice, the Commission needs to determine whether a hypothetical private creditor in a situation comparable to the one of the privatisation agency AVAS, which is the creditor of Oltchim, would have indeed preferred that mechanism of recovering the debt to other recovery alternatives available, considering the fact that the debtor is facing serious financial difficulties.
V praksi mora Komisija ugotoviti, ali bi se hipotetični zasebni upnik v položaju, ki je primerljiv s položajem agencije za privatizacijo AVAS, upnice podjetja Oltchim, zares raje odločil za mehanizem pretvorbe dolga kot za druge razpoložljive načine izterjave, upoštevajoč dejstvo, da se dolžnik spopada z resnimi finančnimi težavami.
The Ministry of Economy, the current shareholder of Oltchim, does not have any role to play with respect to the recovery of the public debt, but nevertheless the outcomes of the two possible scenarios for the public shareholder are also taken into account in the analysis below.
Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo, trenutni delničar podjetja Oltchim, pri izterjavi javnega dolga nima nobene vloge, kljub temu pa so v spodnji analizi upoštevani tudi izidi dveh možnih scenarijev za javnega delničarja.
Romania argues that, considering the current situation of the company (serious undercapitalisation and excessive indebtedness), the only realistic options that a private creditor in a situation comparable to the one of the public creditor AVAS would have are either (i) to liquidate the company, or (ii) to convert the debt into equity and subsequently sell the entire resulting stake in the company.
Romunija trdi, da bi bila, upoštevajoč trenutno stanje podjetja (resna podkapitalizacija in čezmerna zadolženost), edina realna možnost, ki bi jo zasebni upnik imel v primerljivem položaju z javnim upnikom agencijo AVAS, (i) likvidacija podjetja ali (ii) pretvorba dolga v lastniški kapital in posledična prodaja celotnega nastalega lastniškega deleža v podjetju.
Any private creditor faced with such choices would prefer the one that maximises recovery of the pending debt.
Vsak zasebni upnik, soočen s takšno izbiro, bi izbral tisto možnost, ki omogoča čim večjo izterjavo nastalega dolga.
In other words, the creditor would choose the 'debt conversion followed by privatisation' option if the return expected from privatisation exceeded the amount that could be recovered through liquidation.
Z drugimi besedami, upnik bi izbral „pretvorbo dolga, ki bi ji sledila privatizacija“, če bi pričakovani donos iz privatizacije presegel znesek, ki bi ga dosegla izterjava prek postopka likvidacije.
In order to demonstrate that the debt conversion followed by a sale of the resulting stake brings more revenues to the creditor than liquidation, Romania submitted a report by an independent consultancy (see recitals 78-82 above) which compares the outcomes for the creditor of the two scenarios, i.e. debt conversion followed by privatisation and liquidation respectively.
Da bi dokazala, da pretvorba dolga v lastniški kapital, ki ji sledi prodaja nastalega deleža, prinaša upniku večje prihodke kot likvidacija, je Romunija posredovala poročilo neodvisnega svetovalnega podjetja (glej uvodne izjave (78)–(82) zgoraj), ki primerja izide za upnika v dveh scenarijih, tj. v primeru pretvorbe dolga, ki ji sledi privatizacija, in likvidacije.
The Commission has critically assessed the report, in order to verify whether its results withstand scrutiny and demonstrate indeed that, by converting its debt into equity, AVAS behaves like a private creditor.
Komisija je kritično ocenila poročilo, da bi preverila, ali njegovi rezultati vzdržijo preskus in ali dokazujejo, da v primeru pretvorbe dolga v lastniški kapital agencija AVAS ravna kot zasebni upnik.
Having scrutinised the report, the Commission observes the following:
Po pregledu poročila Komisija ugotavlja naslednje:
Value of the AVAS claim in a liquidation scenario: The liquidation assessment is based on a previous Raiffeisen liquidation report dating from February 2011, and on a liquidation report by the independent consultancy Romcontrol SA Bucharest, dated March 2011.
Vrednost terjatev agencije AVAS v likvidacijskem scenariju: ocena likvidacije temelji na predhodnem likvidacijskem poročilu podjetja Raiffeisen iz februarja 2011 in likvidacijskem poročilu neodvisnega svetovalca Romcontrol SA Bucharest iz marca 2011.