natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Diversity should also be addressed in institutions' recruitment policy more generally.
Raznolikost bi morala biti tudi bolj splošno vključena v politiko zaposlovanja institucije.
Such a policy should, for instance, encourage institutions to select candidates from shortlists including both genders.
Taka politika bi morala na primer institucije spodbujati, da kandidate izbirajo z ožjih seznamov, na katerih sta zastopana oba spola.
In order to strengthen legal compliance and corporate governance, Member States should establish effective and reliable mechanisms to encourage reporting to competent authorities of potential or actual breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
Da bi okrepili pravno skladnost in korporativno upravljanje, bi morale države članice vzpostaviti učinkovite in zanesljive mehanizme za spodbujanje poročanja pristojnim organom o morebitnih ali dejanskih kršitvah nacionalnih določb, ki prenašajo to direktivo, in Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013.
Employees reporting breaches committed within their own institutions should be fully protected.
Zaposlene, ki poročajo o kršitvah v njihovih institucijah, bi bilo treba v celoti zaščititi.
Remuneration policies which encourage excessive risk-taking behaviour can undermine sound and effective risk management of credit institutions and investment firms.
Politike prejemkov, ki spodbujajo pretirano tvegano ravnanje, lahko ogrozijo preudarno in učinkovito upravljanje tveganj kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij.
Members of the G-20 committed themselves to implementing the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Principles for Sound Compensation Practices and Implementing Standards, which address the potentially detrimental effect of poorly designed remuneration structures on the sound management of risk and control of risk-taking behaviour by individuals.
Člani skupina G-20 so se zavezali k izvajanju načel Odbora za finančno stabilnost za dobro prakso prejemkov in izvedbene standarde, ki obvladujejo morebitni škodljiv učinek slabo zasnovanih struktur prejemkov na preudarno upravljanje tveganja in nadzor ravnanja posameznikov pri prevzemanju tveganj.
This Directive aims to implement international principles and standards at Union level by introducing an express obligation for credit institutions and investment firms to establish and maintain, for categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of credit institutions and investment firms, remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with effective risk management.
Cilj te direktive je izvajanje mednarodnih načel in standardov na ravni Unije z uvedbo izrecne obveznosti, da kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja za kategorije zaposlenih, katerih poklicne dejavnosti pomembno vplivajo na profil tveganosti kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij, vzpostavijo in ohranijo politike in prakse prejemkov, ki so v skladu z učinkovitim upravljanjem tveganj.
In order to ensure that institutions have in place sound remuneration policies, it is appropriate to specify clear principles on governance and on the structure of remuneration policies.
Da se zagotovi vzpostavitev preudarnih politik prejemkov v institucijah, je primerno določiti jasna načela glede upravljanja in strukture politik prejemkov.
In particular, remuneration policies should be aligned with the risk appetite, values and long-term interests of the credit institution or investment firm.
Slednje bi morale biti zlasti usklajene z nagnjenostjo k tveganju, vrednotami in dolgoročnimi interesi kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.
For that purpose, the assessment of the performance-based component of remuneration should be based on long-term performance and take into account the current and future risks associated with that performance.
Ocena elementa prejemkov, ki temelji na uspešnosti, bi morala v ta namen temeljiti na dolgoročni uspešnosti in upoštevati sedanja in prihodnja tveganja, povezana z uspešnostjo.
When considering the policy on variable remuneration a distinction should be made between fixed remuneration, which includes payments, proportionate regular pension contributions, or benefits (where such benefits are without consideration of any performance criteria), and variable remuneration, which includes additional payments, or benefits depending on performance or, in exceptional circumstances, other contractual elements but not those which form part of routine employment packages (such as healthcare, child care facilities or proportionate regular pension contributions).
Pri določanju politike o variabilnih prejemkih bi bilo treba ločevati med fiksnim prejemkom, ki vključuje plačila, sorazmerne redne pokojninske prispevke ali ugodnosti (kadar takšne ugodnosti ne upoštevajo kakršnekoli uspešnosti), in variabilnim prejemkom, ki vključuje dodatna plačila ali ugodnosti, ki so vezane na uspešnost ali, v izjemnih okoliščinah, druge pogodbene elemente ki niso del običajnega zaposlitvenega svežnja (kot so zdravstveno varstvo, varstvo otrok ali sorazmerni redni pokojninski prispevki).
Both monetary and non-monetary benefits should be included.
Vključiti bi bilo treba tako denarne kot nedenarne ugodnosti.
In any event, in order to avoid excessive risk taking, a maximum ratio between the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration should be set.
V vsakem primeru bi bilo treba za izogibanje prevzemanju pretiranega tveganja določiti največje dovoljeno razmerje med fiksnim in variabilnim delom celotnega prejemka.
It is appropriate to provide for a certain role for the shareholders, owners or members of institutions in that respect.
V tej zvezi je ustrezno določiti posebno vlogo delničarjev, lastnikov in članov institucij.
Member States should be able to set stricter requirements as regards the relationship between the fixed and the variable components of the total remuneration.
Državam članicam bi moralo biti omogočeno, da določijo strožje zahteve v zvezi z razmerjem med fiksnim in variabilnim delom celotnega prejemka.
With a view to encouraging the use of equity or debt instruments which are payable under long-term deferral arrangements as a component of variable remuneration, Member States should be able, within certain limits, to allow institutions to apply a notional discount rate when calculating the value of such instruments for the purposes of applying the maximum ratio.
Da bi spodbudili uporabo lastniških ali dolžniških instrumentov, za katere velja dolgoročni odlog, kot element variabilnih prejemkov, bi morale države članice imeti možnost, da ob določenih omejitvah institucijam dovolijo, da pri izračunu vrednosti teh instrumentov zaradi uporabe največjega dovoljenega razmerja uporabijo nominalno diskontno stopnjo.
However, Member States should not be obliged to provide for such a facility and should be able to provide for it to apply to a lower maximum percentage of total variable remuneration than set out in this Directive.
Vendar pa države članice ne bi smele biti obvezane, da zagotovijo to možnost, lahko pa v ta namen določijo nižji najvišji odstotek skupnega variabilnega prejemka od tistega, ki je določen v tej direktivi.
With a view to ensuring a harmonised and coherent approach which guarantees a level playing field across the internal market, EBA should provide appropriate guidance on the applicable notional discount rate to be used.
Da bi zagotovili usklajen in dosleden pristop, ki zagotavlja enake konkurenčne pogoje na celotnem notranjem trgu, bi moral EBA zagotoviti ustrezne smernice glede nominalne diskontne stopnje, ki naj se uporablja.
In order to ensure that the design of remuneration policies is integrated in the risk management of the institution, the management body should adopt and periodically review the remuneration policies in place.
Da se zagotovi, da je zasnova politik prejemkov vključena v upravljanje tveganj institucije, bi moral upravljalni organ sprejeti in redno pregledovati vzpostavljene politike prejemkov.
The provisions of this Directive on remuneration should reflect differences between different types of institutions in a proportionate manner, taking into account their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities.
Določbe te direktive o prejemkih bi morale sorazmerno odražati razlike med različnimi vrstami institucij ob upoštevanju njihove velikosti, notranje organiziranosti in narave, obsega ter zapletenosti njihovih dejavnosti.
In particular it would not be proportionate to require certain types of investment firms to comply with all of those principles.
Zlasti ne bi bilo sorazmerno, da se od nekaterih vrst investicijskih podjetij zahteva, da izpolnjujejo vsa takšna načela.
In order to protect and foster financial stability within the Union and to address any possible avoidance of the requirements laid down in this Directive, competent authorities should ensure compliance with the principles and rules on remuneration for institutions on a consolidated basis, that is at the level of the group, parent undertakings and subsidiaries, including the branches and subsidiaries established in third countries.
Da bi zaščitili in spodbujali finančno stabilnost v Uniji in se odzvali na morebitno izogibanje zahtevam iz te direktive, bi morali pristojni organi zagotoviti usklajenost z načeli in pravili o prejemkih za institucije na konsolidirani podlagi, to je na ravni skupine, nadrejenih oseb in podrejenih družb, vključno s podružnicami in podrejenimi družbami s sedežem v tretjih državah.
Since poorly designed remuneration policies and incentive schemes are capable of increasing to an unacceptable extent the risks to which credit institutions and investment firms are exposed, prompt remedial action and, if necessary, appropriate corrective measures should be taken.
Ker lahko slabo zasnovane politike prejemkov in sistem spodbud do nesprejemljive ravni povečajo tveganja, ki so jim izpostavljene kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja, bi bilo treba sprejeti takojšnje sanacijske ukrepe in po potrebi ustrezne popravne ukrepe.
Consequently, it is appropriate to ensure that competent authorities have the power to impose qualitative or quantitative measures on the relevant institutions that are designed to address problems that have been identified in relation to remuneration policies in the supervisory review.
Zato je primerno zagotoviti, da so pristojni organi pooblaščeni za uvedbo kvalitativnih ali kvantitativnih ukrepov za zadevne subjekte, ki so namenjeni reševanju težav, ugotovljenih v zvezi s politikami prejemkov pri nadzorniškem pregledovanju.
The provisions on remuneration should be without prejudice to the full exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 153(5) TFEU, general principles of national contract and labour law, Union and national law regarding shareholders' rights and involvement and the general responsibilities of the management bodies of the institution concerned, and the rights, where applicable, of the social partners to conclude and enforce collective agreements, in accordance with national law and customs.
Določbe o prejemkih ne bi smele posegati v celovito izvajanje temeljnih pravic, zagotovljenih na podlagi člena 153(5) PDEU, splošnih načel nacionalnega pogodbenega in delovnega prava, prava Unije in nacionalnega prava glede pravic in udeležbe delničarjev ter splošne odgovornosti upravljalnih organov zadevne institucije ter po potrebi pravic socialnih partnerjev, da sklepajo in izvajajo kolektivne pogodbe v skladu z nacionalnim pravom in običaji.
Own funds requirements for credit risk and market risk should be based on external credit ratings only to the extent necessary.
Kapitalske zahteve za kreditno tveganje in tržno tveganje bi morale temeljiti na zunanjih bonitetnih ocenah, kolikor je to potrebno.
Where credit risk is material, institutions should therefore generally seek to implement internal ratings-based approaches or internal models.
Če je kreditno tveganje pomembno, morajo institucije zato na splošno poskusiti uvesti pristope ali notranje modele, ki temeljijo na notranjih bonitetnih ocenah.
However, standardised approaches that rely on external credit ratings could be used where credit risk is less material, which is typically the case for less sophisticated institutions, for insignificant exposure classes, or in situations where using internal approaches would be overly burdensome.
Kljub temu bi bilo mogoče uporabiti standardizirane pristope, ki temeljijo na zunanjih bonitetnih ocenah, če je kreditno tveganje manj pomembno, kar je značilno za manj razvite institucije, nepomembne kategorije izpostavljenosti ali situacije, ko bi bila uporaba notranjih pristopov preveč obremenjujoča.
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC are one of the pillars upon which the overreliance on external credit ratings was built.
Direktivi 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES predstavljata enega izmed stebrov, na katerih je slonelo pretirano zanašanje na zunanje bonitetne ocene.
This Directive should take into account the G-20 conclusions and the FSB principles for Reducing Reliance on external credit ratings.
Ta direktiva bi morala upoštevati sklepe skupine G20 in načela Odbora za finančno stabilnost glede zmanjšanja zanašanja na zunanje bonitetne ocene.
Institutions should therefore be encouraged to use internal ratings rather than external credit ratings even for the purpose of calculating own funds requirements.
Institucije bi bilo zato treba spodbuditi k uporabi notranjih namesto zunanjih bonitetnih ocen, in sicer tudi za namene izračuna regulativnih kapitalskih zahtev.
Overreliance on external credit ratings should be reduced and the automatic effects deriving from them should be gradually eliminated.
Pretirano zanašanje na zunanje bonitetne ocene bi bilo treba zmanjšati, vse samodejne učinke, ki izhajajo iz ocen, pa postopoma odpraviti.
Institutions should therefore be required to put in place sound credit-granting criteria and credit decision-making processes.
Od institucij bi bilo treba zahtevati, da vzpostavijo zanesljiva merila za odobritev kreditov in procesi odločanja o kreditih.
Institutions should be able to use external credit ratings as one of several factors in that process but they should not rely solely or mechanistically on them.
Institucije bi lahko zunanje bonitetne ocene uporabile kot enega od več dejavnikov v tem procesu, vendar se ne bi smele na njih izključno ali samodejno zanašati.
The recognition of a credit rating agency as an external credit assessment institution (ECAI) should not increase the foreclosure of a market already dominated by three undertakings.
Priznanje bonitetne agencije kot zunanje bonitetne institucije(ECAI) ne bi smelo povečati omejevanja dostopa do trga, na katerem že prevladujejo tri družbe.
EBA, the Member States' central banks and the ECB, without making the process easier or less demanding, should provide for the recognition of more credit rating agencies as ECAIs in order to open the market to other undertakings.
Da bi odprli trg za druge družbe, bi morali EBA, centralne banke držav članic in ECB zagotoviti, da bi bilo več bonitetnih agencij priznanih kot zunanje bonitetne institucije, pri čemer ta proces ne bi smel postati lažji ali manj zahteven.
Given the wide range of approaches adopted by institutions using internal modelling approaches, it is important that competent authorities and EBA have a clear view of the range of values for risk-weighted assets and own funds requirements that arise for similar exposures under such approaches.
Glede na zelo raznolike pristope institucij, ki uporabljajo pristope notranjega modeliranja, je pomembno, da imajo pristojni organi in EBA jasno sliko o razponu vrednosti tveganju prilagojenih sredstev in kapitalskih zahtev, ki se v okviru takšnih pristopov pojavijo za podobne vrste izpostavljenosti.
To that end, institutions should be required to provide competent authorities with the results of internal models applied to EBA-developed benchmark portfolios covering a wide range of exposures.
V ta namen, bi morale institucije pristojnim organom predložiti rezultate notranjih modelov, ki se uporabljajo za referenčne portfelje, ki jih je razvil EBA in ki pokrivajo različne vrste izpostavljenosti.
Based on the information received, competent authorities should take appropriate steps to ensure that similarities or differences in results for the same exposure are justifiable in terms of the risks incurred.
Pristojni organi bi morali na podlagi prejetih informacij sprejeti ustrezne ukrepe, da bi zagotovili, da je mogoče podobnosti ali razlike v rezultatih za enako izpostavljenost upravičiti v smislu tveganj, ki so nastala.
The development of relationship-based lending should be encouraged where information gleaned from a continuing business relationship with clients is used to get a better quality of due diligence and risk assessment than is available purely from standardised information and credit scores.
Spodbujati bi se moral razvoj dolgoročnih posojilnih razmerij, ko se informacije, pridobljene iz stalnega poslovnega odnosa s strankami, uporabijo za zagotovitev kakovostnejše potrebne skrbnosti in ocene tveganja, kot ju je mogoče pridobiti zgolj iz standardiziranih informacij in kreditnih točk.
With respect to the supervision of liquidity, responsibility should lie with home Member States as soon as detailed criteria for the liquidity coverage requirement apply.
Za nadzor likvidnosti bi morale biti odgovorne matične države članice, takoj ko se začnejo uporabljati podrobna merila za zahtevo glede likvidnostnega kritja.
It is therefore necessary to accomplish the coordination of supervision in this field in order to introduce supervision by the home Member State by that time.
Da bi lahko matične države članice do takrat uvedle nadzor, bi ga bilo treba na tem področju uskladiti.
In order to ensure effective supervision, the competent authorities of the home and host Member States should further cooperate in the field of liquidity.
Za zagotavljanje učinkovitega nadzora bi morali pristojni organi matične države in države gostiteljice tesneje sodelovati na področju likvidnosti.
Where within a group liquid assets in one institution will under stress circumstances match liquidity needs of another member of that group, competent authorities should be able to exempt an institution from liquidity coverage requirements and apply those requirements on a consolidated basis instead.
Če znotraj skupine likvidna sredstva v eni instituciji v stresnih okoliščinah ustrezajo likvidnostnim potrebam druge članice skupine, bi moralo biti pristojnim organom omogočeno, da institucijo izvzamejo iz zahtev glede likvidnostnega kritja in namesto tega te zahteve uporabijo na konsolidirani podlagi.
Measures taken on the basis of this Directive should be without prejudice to measures taken in accordance with Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions [9].
Ukrepi, sprejeti na podlagi te direktive, ne bi smeli posegati v ukrepe, sprejete v skladu z Direktivo 2001/24/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 4. aprila 2001 o reorganizaciji in prenehanju kreditnih institucij [9].
Supervisory measures should not lead to discrimination among creditors from different Member States.
Nadzorni ukrepi ne bi smeli povzročiti diskriminacije med upniki iz različnih držav članic.
In the light of the financial crisis and the pro-cyclical mechanisms that contributed to its origin and aggravated its effect, the FSB, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), and the G-20 made recommendations to mitigate the pro-cyclical effects of financial regulation.
Glede na finančno krizo in prociklične mehanizme, ki so prispevali k njenemu nastanku in povečali njen učinek, so Odbor za finančno stabilnost, Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor (BCBS) in skupina G-20 pripravili priporočila za zmanjšanje procikličnih učinkov finančne uredbe.
In December 2010, the BCBS issued new global regulatory standards on bank capital adequacy (the Basel III rules), including rules requiring the maintenance of capital conservation and countercyclical capital buffers.
BCBS je decembra 2010 izdal nove globalne regulativne standarde o kapitalski ustreznosti bank (pravila Basel III), vključno s pravili, ki zahtevajo vzdrževanje varovalnih kapitalskih blažilnikov in proticikličnih kapitalskih blažilnikov.
It is therefore appropriate to require credit institutions and relevant investment firms to hold, in addition to other own fund requirements, a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that they accumulate, during periods of economic growth, a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods.
Zato je primerno, da se za kreditne institucije in zadevna investicijska podjetja poleg drugih kapitalskih zahtev zahtevata varovalni kapitalski blažilnik in proticiklični kapitalski blažilnik, s katerima se zagotovi, da v obdobjih gospodarske rasti akumulirajo zadostno kapitalsko osnovo za pokrivanje izgub v stresnih obdobjih.
The countercyclical capital buffer should be built up when aggregate growth in credit and other asset classes with a significant impact on the risk profile of such credit institutions and investment firms are judged to be associated with a build-up of system-wide risk, and drawn down during stressed periods.
Proticiklični kapitalski blažilnik bi se moral povečati, ko bi se presodilo, da je skupna kreditna rast in rast drugih kategorij sredstev, ki pomembno vplivajo na profil tveganosti takih kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij, povezana z nastankom tveganja na ravni celotnega sistema, in zmanjšal v stresnih obdobjih.
In order to ensure that countercyclical capital buffers properly reflect the risk to the banking sector of excessive credit growth, credit institutions and investment firms should calculate their institution-specific buffers as a weighted average of the countercyclical buffer rates that apply in the countries where their credit exposures are located.
Za zagotovitev, da proticiklični kapitalski blažilniki ustrezno odražajo tveganje prekomerne kreditne rasti za bančni sektor, bi morale kreditne institucije in investicijske firme izračunati njim lastne blažilnike kot tehtano povprečje stopenj proticikličnih blažilnikov, ki se uporabljajo za države, v katerih imajo kreditno izpostavljenost.
Every Member State should therefore designate an authority responsible for the quarterly setting of the countercyclical buffer rate for exposures located in that Member State.
Vsaka država članica bi morala zato imenovati organ, ki je odgovoren za četrtletno določanje proticikličnega blažilnika za izpostavljenosti v zadevni državi članici.
That buffer rate should take into account the growth of credit levels and changes to the ratio of credit to GDP in that Member State, and any other variables relevant to the risks to the stability of the financial system.
Ta stopnja blažilnika bi morala upoštevati ravni kreditne rasti in spremembe količnika med krediti in BDP v tej državi članici ter vse druge spremenljivke, ki so povezane s tveganji za stabilnost finančnega sistema.
In order to promote international consistency in setting countercyclical buffer rates, the BCBS has developed a methodology on the basis of the ratio between credit and GDP.
Da bi se pri določanju stopenj proticikličnih blažilnikov spodbudila skladnost na mednarodni ravni, je BCBS oblikoval metodologijo na podlagi razmerja med krediti in BDP.
Restrictions on variable remuneration are an important element in ensuring that credit institutions and investment firms rebuild their capital levels when operating within the buffer range.
Omejitve variabilnih prejemkov so pomemben element pri zagotavljanju, da kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja ponovno zagotovijo raven svojega kapitala pri delovanju znotraj razpona blažilnika.