natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Counterparties and CCPs that conclude, modify, or terminate a derivative contract should ensure that the details of that contract are reported to a trade repository.
Nasprotne stranke in CNS, ki sklenejo, spremenijo ali prekinejo pogodbo o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih, bi morale zagotoviti, da se o podrobnostih te pogodbe poroča v repozitorij sklenjenih poslov.
They should be able to delegate the reporting of the contract to another entity.
Imeti morajo možnost, da za poročanje o pogodbi pooblastijo drug subjekt.
An entity or its employees that report the details of a derivative contract to a trade repository on behalf of a counterparty, in accordance with this Regulation, should not be in breach of any restriction on disclosure.
Subjekt ali njegovi zaposleni, ki v skladu s to uredbo v imenu nasprotne stranke v repozitorij sklenjenih poslov poročajo o podrobnostih pogodbe o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih, ne bi smeli kršiti nobene omejitve o razkritju.
When preparing the draft regulatory technical standards regarding reporting, ESMA should take into account the progress made in the development of a unique contract identifier and the list of required reporting data in Annex I, Table 1 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 [20] implementing Directive 2004/39/EC and consult other relevant authorities such as the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.
Pri pripravi osnutka regulativnih tehničnih standardov v zvezi s poročanjem bi moral ESMA upoštevati napredek pri razvoju enotnega identifikatorja pogodb in seznam zahtevanih podatkov poročanja v Tabeli 1 Priloge I Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1287/2006 [20] o izvajanju Direktive 2004/39/ES ter se posvetovati z drugimi zadevnimi organi, kot je Agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev.
Taking into consideration the principles set out in the Commission’s Communication on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector and legal acts of the Union adopted as a follow-up to that Communication, Member States should lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringements of this Regulation.
Države članice bi morale ob upoštevanju načel iz sporočila Komisije o okrepitvi sistemov sankcij v sektorju finančnih storitev in zakonodajnih aktov Unije, ki izhajajo iz tega sporočila, določiti pravila o kaznih, ki se uporabljajo za kršitve te uredbe.
Member States should enforce those penalties in a manner that does not reduce the effectiveness of those rules.
Države članice bi morale te kazni izvrševati tako, da se ne zmanjša učinkovitost pravil.
They should be based on guidelines adopted by ESMA to promote convergence and cross-sector consistency of penalty regimes in the financial sector.
Temeljiti bi morale na smernicah, ki jih je sprejel ESMA za spodbujanje konvergence in medsektorske usklajenosti sistemov kaznovanja v finančnem sektorju.
Member States should ensure that the penalties imposed are publicly disclosed, where appropriate, and that assessment reports on the effectiveness of existing rules are published at regular intervals.
Države članice bi morale zagotoviti, da so naložene kazni javno razkrite, kadar je to primerno, ter da se redno objavljajo poročila o učinkovitosti veljavnih predpisov.
A CCP might be established in accordance with this Regulation in any Member State.
CNS se lahko v skladu s to uredbo ustanovi v kateri koli državi članici.
No Member State or group of Member States should be discriminated against, directly or indirectly, as a venue for clearing services.
Nobena država članica ali skupina držav članic ne sme biti kot mesto za izvajanje klirinških storitev niti neposredno niti posredno diskriminirana.
Nothing in this Regulation should attempt to restrict or impede a CCP in one jurisdiction from clearing a product denominated in the currency of another Member State or in the currency of a third country.
V tej uredbi ne sme nič omejevati ali ovirati CNS, da bi v eni jurisdikciji opravljal kliring za produkt, izražen v valuti druge države članice EU ali v valuti tretje države.
Authorisation of a CCP should be conditional on a minimum amount of initial capital.
Dovoljenje za CNS bi moralo biti pogojeno z minimalnim začetnim kapitalom.
Capital, including retained earnings and reserves of a CCP, should be proportionate to the risk stemming from the activities of the CCP at all times in order to ensure that it is adequately capitalised against credit, counterparty, market, operational, legal and business risks which are not already covered by specific financial resources and that it is able to conduct an orderly winding-up or restructuring of its operations if necessary.
Kapital, vključno z zadržanim dobičkom in rezervami CNS, bi moral biti stalno sorazmeren s tveganjem, ki izhaja iz dejavnosti CNS, da se zagotovi ustrezna kapitalizacija CNS za kreditno tveganje, tveganje nasprotnih strank, tržno, operativno, pravno in poslovno tveganje, ki še niso krita s posebnimi finančnimi sredstvi, in da lahko CNS po potrebi urejeno preneha poslovati ali poslovanje prestrukturira.
As this Regulation introduces a legal obligation to clear through specific CCPs for regulatory purposes, it is essential to ensure that those CCPs are safe and sound and comply at all times with the stringent organisational, business conduct, and prudential requirements established by this Regulation.
Ker se s to uredbo za regulativne namene uvaja zakonska obveznost kliringa prek določenih CNS, je bistvenega pomena, da se zagotovijo varnost in stabilnost teh CNS ter njihova stalna skladnost s strogimi organizacijskimi in bonitetnimi zahtevami ter zahtevami poslovanja, ki jih določa ta uredba.
In order to ensure uniform application of this Regulation, those requirements should apply to the clearing of all financial instruments in which the CCPs deal.
Za zagotavljanje enotne uporabe te uredbe bi morale te zahteve veljati za kliring vseh finančnih instrumentov, s katerimi poslujejo CNS.
It is therefore necessary, for regulatory and harmonisation purposes, to ensure that counterparties only use CCPs which comply with the requirements laid down in this Regulation.
V regulativne namene in zaradi uskladitve je zato treba zagotoviti, da nasprotne stranke uporabljajo le CNS, ki izpolnjujejo zahteve iz te uredbe.
Those requirements should not prevent Member States from adopting or continuing to apply additional requirements in respect of CCPs established in their territory including certain authorisation requirements under Directive 2006/48/EC.
Kljub tem zahtevam bi države članice še vedno lahko sprejemale ali nadalje uporabljale dodatne zahteve glede CNS s sedežem na njihovem ozemlju, vključno z nekaterimi zahtevami za izdajo dovoljenj iz Direktive 2006/48/ES.
However, imposing such additional requirements should not influence the right of CCPs authorised in other Member States or recognised, in accordance with this Regulation, to provide clearing services to clearing members and their clients established in the Member State introducing additional requirements, since those CCPs are not subject to those additional requirements and do not need to comply with them.
Vendar uvajanje tovrstnih dodatnih pogojev ne bi smelo vplivati na pravico CNS, ki jim je bilo v skladu s to uredbo izdano dovoljenje v drugih državah članicah, da opravljajo klirinške storitve za klirinške člane in njihove stranke s sedežem v državi članici, ki je uvedla dodatne zahteve, in ki so bili priznani, da opravljajo tovrstne storitve, saj te dodatne zahteve za navedene CNS ne veljajo niti jim jih ni treba upoštevati.
By 30 September 2014, ESMA should draft a report on the impact of the application of additional requirements by Member States.
Do 30. septembra 2014 bi moral ESMA sestaviti poročilo o vplivu, ki ga ima uporaba dodatnih zahtev držav članic.
Direct rules regarding the authorisation and supervision of CCPs are an essential corollary to the obligation to clear OTC derivative contracts.
Neposredna pravila v zvezi z izdajo dovoljenja CNS in nadzorom CNS so bistven dodatek k obveznosti kliringa pogodb o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih OTC.
It is appropriate that competent authorities retain responsibility for all aspects of the authorisation and the supervision of CCPs, including the responsibility for verifying that the applicant CCP complies with this Regulation and with Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems [21], in view of the fact that those national competent authorities remain best placed to examine how the CCPs operate on a daily basis, to carry out regular reviews and to take appropriate action, where necessary.
Smiselno je, da pristojni organi ostanejo odgovorni za vse vidike izdajanja dovoljenj CNS in nadzora CNS, vključno z odgovornostjo za preverjanje, ali CNS vlagateljica izpolnjuje zahteve iz te uredbe ter Direktive 98/26/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. maja 1998 o dokončnosti poravnave pri plačilih in sistemih poravnave vrednostnih papirjev [21], saj so ti nacionalni pristojni organi najprimernejši za pregledovanje vsakodnevnega poslovanja CNS, izvajanje rednih pregledov in sprejemanje ustreznih ukrepov, kadar je to potrebno.
Where a CCP risks insolvency, fiscal responsibility may lie predominantly with the Member State in which that CCP is established.
Če pri CNS obstaja tveganje nesolventnosti, lahko fiskalno odgovornost nosi predvsem država članica, kjer ima ta CNS sedež.
It follows that authorisation and supervision of that CCP should be exercised by the relevant competent authority of that Member State.
Iz tega sledi, da mora ustrezen pristojni organ te države članice CNS izdati dovoljenje in izvajati nadzor nad njo.
However, since a CCP’s clearing members may be established in different Member States and they will be the first to be impacted by the CCP’s default, it is imperative that all relevant competent authorities and ESMA be involved in the authorisation and supervisory process.
Ker pa imajo lahko klirinški člani CNS sedeže v različnih državah članicah in bo neizpolnitev finančnih obveznosti CNS nanje najprej vplivala, je nujno, da so v postopek izdaje dovoljenja in nadzora vključeni vsi ustrezni pristojni organi in ESMA.
This will avoid divergent national measures or practices and obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market.
To bo preprečilo različne nacionalne ukrepe ali prakse ter ovire za pravilno delovanje notranjega trga.
Furthermore, no proposal or policy of any member of a college of supervisors should, directly or indirectly, discriminate against any Member State or group of Member States as a venue for clearing services in any currency.
Poleg tega noben predlog ali politika katerega koli člana kolegija nadzornikov ne bi smela neposredno ali posredno diskriminirati države članice ali skupine držav članic kot mesta za izvajanje klirinških storitev v kateri koli valuti.
ESMA should be a participant in every college in order to ensure the consistent and correct application of this Regulation.
ESMA bi moral biti udeleženec vsakega kolegija, da se zagotovi dosledna in pravilna uporaba te uredbe.
ESMA should involve other competent authorities in the Member States concerned in the work of preparing recommendations and decisions.
ESMA bi moral v pripravo priporočil in odločitev vključiti druge pristojne organe v zadevnih državah članicah.
In light of the role assigned to colleges, it is important that all the relevant competent authorities as well as members of the ESCB are involved in performing their tasks.
Glede na vlogo, ki je bila podeljena kolegijem, je pomembno, da vsi zadevni pristojni organi ter članice ESCB sodelujejo pri opravljanju nalog kolegijev.
The college should consist not only of the competent authorities supervising the CCP but also of the supervisors of the entities on which the operations of that CCP might have an impact, namely selected clearing members, trading venues, interoperable CCPs and central securities depositories.
Kolegij bi morali sestavljati ne le pristojni organi, ki nadzorujejo CNS, temveč tudi nadzorniki subjektov, na katere bi lahko vplivali postopki CNS, npr. določene klirinške člane, mesta trgovanja, interoperabilne CNS in centralne registre vrednostnih papirjev.
Members of the ESCB that are responsible for the oversight of the CCP and interoperable CCPs as well as those responsible for the issue of the currencies of the financial instruments cleared by the CCP, should be able to participate in the college.
Članice ESCB, ki so odgovorne za nadzor nad CNS in interoperabilnimi CNS, ter tiste, ki so odgovorne za izdajo valut finančnih instrumentov, katerih kliring opravijo CNS, bi morale imeti možnost sodelovati v kolegiju.
As the supervised or overseen entities would be established in a limited range of Member States in which the CCP operates, a single competent authority or member of the ESCB could be responsible for supervision or oversight of a number of those entities.
Glede na to, da bi imeli nadzirani ali pregledovani subjekti sedež v omejenem številu držav članic, v katerih deluje CNS, se lahko zgodi, da je za nadzor ali pregled več od teh subjektov odgovoren en sam pristojni organ ali ena sama članica ESCB.
In order to ensure smooth cooperation between all the members of the college, appropriate procedures and mechanisms should be put in place.
Da bi zagotovili nemoteno sodelovanje med vsemi člani kolegija, bi bilo treba uvesti ustrezne postopke in mehanizme.
Since the establishment and functioning of the college is assumed to be based on a written agreement between all of its members, it is appropriate to confer upon them the power to determine the college’s decision-making procedures, given the sensitivity of the issue.
Ker naj bi ustanovitev in delovanje kolegija temeljila na pisnem dogovoru vseh njegovih članov, je ustrezno, da se glede na občutljivost zadeve tem članom podeli pooblastilo za določitev postopkov odločanja.
Therefore, detailed rules on voting procedures should be laid down in a written agreement between the members of the college.
Podrobna pravila o postopkih glasovanja bi zato morala biti določena s pisnim dogovorom med vsemi člani kolegija.
However, in order to balance the interests of all the relevant market participants and Member States appropriately, the college should vote in accordance with the general principle whereby each member has one vote, irrespective of the number of functions it performs in accordance with this Regulation.
Vendar pa bi moral kolegij zaradi ustreznega uravnoteženja interesov vseh zadevnih udeležencev na trgu in držav članic glasovati v skladu s splošnim načelom, po katerem ima na podlagi te uredbe vsak član po en glas, ne glede na število funkcij, ki jih opravlja.
For colleges with up to and including 12 members, a maximum of two college members belonging to the same Member State should have a vote and each voting member should have one vote.
V kolegijih, v katerih je do vključno 12 članov, bi morala imeti glasovalno pravico največ dva člana kolegija iz iste države članice, vsak član bi moral imeti en glas.
For colleges with more than 12 members, a maximum of three college members belonging to the same Member State should have a vote and each voting member should have one vote.
V kolegijih, v katerih je več kot 12 članov, bi morali imeti glasovalno pravico največ trije člani kolegija iz iste države članice, vsak član pa bi moral imeti glas.
The very particular situation of CCPs requires that colleges are organised and function in accordance with arrangements that are specific to the supervision of CCPs.
Zelo poseben položaj CNS zahteva, da so kolegiji organizirani in da delujejo v skladu z ureditvami, ki so specifične za nadzor CNS.
The arrangements provided for in this Regulation do not constitute a precedent for other legislation on the supervision and oversight of financial market infrastructures, in particular with regard to the voting modalities for referrals to ESMA.
Ureditve, ki jih določa ta uredba, ne pomenijo precedenčnega primera za drugo zakonodajo o nadziranju in pregledovanju infrastrukture, zlasti kar zadeva načine glasovanja za predložitev ESMA.
A CCP should not be authorised where all the members of the college, excluding the competent authorities of the Member State where the CCP is established, reach a joint opinion by mutual agreement that the CCP should not be authorised.
CNS ne bi smelo imeti dovoljenja, kadar vsi člani kolegija, razen pristojnih organov države članice, kjer ima CNS sedež, soglasno sprejmejo skupno mnenje, da se CNS ne bi smelo izdati dovoljenja.
If, however, a sufficient majority of the college has expressed a negative opinion and any of the competent authorities concerned, based on that majority of two-thirds of the college, has referred the matter to ESMA, the competent authority of the Member State where the CCP is established should defer its decision on the authorisation and await any decision that ESMA may take regarding conformity with Union law.
Če pa zadostna večina kolegija izrazi negativno mnenje in je kateri od zadevnih pristojnih organov na podlagi dvotretjinske večine kolegija posredoval zadevo ESMA, bi moral pristojni organ države članice, v katerih ima CNS sedež, odložiti izdajo dovoljenja do odločitve, ki bi jo lahko sprejel ESMA glede skladnosti CNS s pravom Unije.
The competent authority of the Member State where the CCP is established should take its decision in accordance with such a decision by ESMA.
Pristojni organ države članice, kjer ima CNS sedež, bi moral svojo odločitev sprejeti v skladu s tako odločitvijo ESMA.
Where all the members of the college, excluding the authorities of the Member State where the CCP is established, reach a joint opinion to the effect that they consider that the requirements are not met and that the CCP should not receive authorisation, the competent authority of the Member State where the CCP is established should be able to refer the matter to ESMA to decide on conformity with Union law.
Kadar vsi člani kolegija, razen organov države članice, kjer ima CNS sedež, sprejmejo skupno mnenje glede ugotovitve, da zahteve niso izpolnjene in da se CNS ne bi smelo dodeliti dovoljenja, bi moral imeti pristojni organ države članice, kjer ima CNS sedež, možnost zadevo predati ESMA, da odloči glede skladnosti CNS s pravom Unije.
It is necessary to reinforce provisions on exchange of information between competent authorities, ESMA and other relevant authorities and to strengthen the duties of assistance and cooperation between them.
Treba je okrepiti določbe o izmenjavi podatkov med pristojnimi organi, ESMA in drugimi zadevnimi organi ter okrepiti njihove dolžnosti medsebojne pomoči in sodelovanja.
Due to increasing cross-border activity, those authorities should provide each other with the relevant information for the exercise of their functions so as to ensure the effective enforcement of this Regulation, including in situations where infringements or suspected infringements may be of concern to authorities in two or more Member States.
Zaradi naraščajoče čezmejne dejavnosti bi si morali ti organi medsebojno zagotavljati ustrezne informacije za opravljanje svojih funkcij, da bi poskrbeli za učinkovito uveljavljanje te uredbe tudi v primerih, ko kršitve ali domnevne kršitve zadevajo organe v dveh ali več državah članicah.
For the exchange of information, strict professional secrecy is needed.
Pri izmenjavi informacij je potrebno strogo varovanje poslovnih skrivnosti.
It is essential, due to the wide impact of OTC derivative contracts, that other relevant authorities, such as tax authorities and energy regulators, have access to information necessary to the exercise of their functions.
Zaradi širokega vpliva pogodb o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih OTC je nujno, da imajo drugi zadevni organi, kot so davčni organi in energetski regulatorji, dostop do informacij, ki so potrebne za izvajanje njihovih funkcij.
In view of the global nature of financial markets, ESMA should be directly responsible for recognising CCPs established in third countries and thus allowing them to provide clearing services within the Union, provided that the Commission has recognised the legal and supervisory framework of that third country as equivalent to the Union framework and that certain other conditions are met.
Zaradi globalne narave finančnih trgov bi moral biti ESMA neposredno odgovoren za priznavanje CNS s sedežem v tretjih državah in jim tako omogočiti opravljanje klirinških storitev v Uniji, pod pogojem, da je Komisija priznala pravni in nadzorni okvir te tretje države kot enakovreden okviru Unije in da so izpolnjeni nekateri drugi pogoji.
Therefore, a CCP established in a third country, providing clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in the Union should be recognised by ESMA.
Zato bi ESMA moral priznati CNS s sedežem v tretji državi, ki opravlja klirinške storitve za klirinške člane ali mesta trgovanja s sedežem v Uniji.
However, in order not to hamper the further development of cross-border investment management business in the Union, a third-country CCP providing services to clients established in the Union through a clearing member established in a third country should not have to be recognised by ESMA.
Nasprotno pa za CNS iz tretje države, ki opravlja storitve za stranke s sedežem v Uniji prek klirinškega člana iz tretje države, ne bi smelo biti potrebno priznanje ESMA, saj bi to lahko oviralo nadaljnji razvoj čezmejnih poslov upravljanja naložb v Uniji.
In this context, agreements with the Union’s major international partners will be of particular importance in order to ensure a global level playing field and financial stability.
V tem okviru bodo imeli sporazumi z glavnimi mednarodnimi partnerji Unije pomembno vlogo pri zagotavljanju enakih konkurenčnih pogojev na globalni ravni in finančne stabilnosti.
On 16 September 2010, the European Council agreed on the need for the Union to promote its interest and values more assertively and, in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit, in the context of the Union’s external relations and to take steps, inter alia, to secure greater market access for European business and deepen regulatory cooperation with major trade partners.
(60) Evropski svet se je 16. septembra 2010 dogovoril, da mora Unija v okviru zunanjih odnosov Unije svoje interese in vrednote uveljavljati odločneje in v duhu recipročnosti in vzajemnih koristi ter da mora med drugim sprejeti ukrepe za zagotovitev večjega dostopa do trga za evropska podjetja in za poglobitev regulativnega sodelovanja z glavnimi trgovinskimi partnericami.
A CCP should have robust governance arrangements, senior management of good repute and independent members on its board, irrespective of its ownership structure.
Ne glede na lastniško strukturo bi morali CNS imeti zanesljivo ureditev upravljanja, višje vodstvo z dobrim ugledom in neodvisne člane odbora.
At least one-third, and no less than two, members of its board should be independent.
Vsaj tretjina in najmanj dva člana odbora bi morala biti neodvisna.
However, different governance arrangements and ownership structures may influence a CCP’s willingness or ability to clear certain products.
Različne ureditve upravljanja in lastniške strukture lahko vplivajo na pripravljenost ali zmožnost CNS za kliring določenih produktov.
It is thus appropriate that the independent members of the board and the risk committee to be established by the CCP address any potential conflict of interests within a CCP.
Zato je primerno, da neodvisni člani odbora in odbor za tveganje, ki ga ustanovi CNS, obravnavajo vsa morebitna navzkrižja interesov znotraj CNS.
Clearing members and clients need to be adequately represented as decisions taken by the CCP may have an impact on them.
Klirinški člani in stranke morajo biti ustrezno zastopani, saj lahko nanje vplivajo odločitve, ki jih sprejme CNS.
A CCP may outsource functions.
CNS lahko odda funkcije v zunanje izvajanje.