natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission continued to seek and verify all information it deemed necessary for its definitive findings.
Komisija je nadaljevala z zbiranjem in preverjanjem vseh informacij, ki so bile po njenem mnenju potrebne za oblikovanje dokončnih ugotovitev.
As already mentioned in recital (12) of the provisional Regulation, one group of related exporting producers claimed individual examination in accordance with Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation.
Kot je navedeno že v uvodni izjavi 12 začasne uredbe, je ena skupina povezanih proizvajalcev izvoznikov zahtevala individualno preiskavo v skladu s členom 17(3) osnovne uredbe.
The examination of those claims at the provisional stage was too burdensome to be carried out and was deferred to the definitive stage.
Preučitev navedenih zahtevkov v začasni fazi je bila preveč obremenjujoča, da bi se jo dalo opraviti, in je bila odložena na dokončno fazo.
It was thus decided to grant an individual examination to the group claiming it, i.e. the Sira Group.
Zato je bilo odločeno, da se skupini, ki je zahtevala individualno preiskavo, tj. skupina Sira Group, ta odobri.
In respect of its operations in the PRC, the Sira Group is composed of Sira (Tianjin) Aluminium Products Co. Ltd and Sira Group (Tianjin) Heating Radiators Co. Ltd
Glede na njene dejavnosti v LRK skupino sestavljajo Sira (Tianjin) Aluminium Products Co. Ltd. in Sira Group (Tianjin) Heating Radiators Co. Ltd.
All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of aluminium radiators originating in the PRC and the definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of the provisional duty (‘final disclosure’).
Vse strani so bile obveščene o bistvenih dejstvih in premislekih, na podlagi katerih se je nameravala priporočiti uvedba dokončne protidampinške dajatve na uvoz aluminijastih radiatorjev s poreklom iz LRK in dokončno pobiranje zneskov, zavarovanih z začasno dajatvijo (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dokončno razkritje).
All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on this final disclosure.
Za vse strani je bil določen rok, v katerem so lahko predložile pripombe k temu dokončnemu razkritju.
As set out in recital (15) of the provisional Regulation, the product concerned is aluminium radiators and elements or sections of which such radiator is composed, whether or not such elements are assembled in blocks, excluding radiators and elements and sections thereof of the electrical type (‘the product concerned’).
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 15 začasne uredbe, so zadevni izdelek aluminijasti radiatorji in elementi ali deli, iz katerih je tak radiator sestavljen, ne glede na to, ali so taki elementi v blokih, razen električnih radiatorjev ter njihovih elementov in delov (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zadevni izdelek).
After publication of provisional measures, one party claimed that steel radiators are interchangeable with the product concerned and the like product and asked the Commission to analyse and include the steel radiator market trend to compare it in particular with the market of aluminium radiators.
Po objavi začasnih ukrepov je ena stran trdila, da so jekleni radiatorji zamenljivi z zadevnim izdelkom in podobnim izdelkom ter zaprosila Komisijo, da analizira in vključi gibanja na trgu jeklenih radiatorjev ter jih primerja zlasti s trgom aluminijastih radiatorjev.
Based on information available, it appears that aluminium radiators have different technical characteristics, especially as concerning the basic raw material (steel in one case and aluminium on the other), the weight, the thermal inertia and the heat conductibility.
Na podlagi razpoložljivih informacij se zdi, da imajo aluminijasti radiatorji drugačne tehnične lastnosti, zlasti glede osnovnih surovin (v enem primeru jekla in drugem aluminija), teže, toplotne vztrajnosti in toplotne prevodnosti.
Furthermore, the information collected did not point to direct competition and interchangeability between the two products.
Poleg tega zbrani podatki niso kazali na neposredno konkurenco in zamenljivost med tema dvema izdelkoma.
Finally, the party did not provide any evidence to support its allegations.
Poleg tega stran ni predložila nobenih dokazov, ki bi podprli njene trditve.
Based on the above, the claim was rejected.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno je bila ta trditev zavrnjena.
In the absence of other comments regarding the product concerned and the like product, recitals (15) and (23) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.
Ker ni bilo drugih pripomb v zvezi z zadevnim izdelkom in podobnim izdelkom, se uvodni izjavi 15 in 23 začasne uredbe potrdita.
Market Economy Treatment (‘MET’) and Individual Treatment (‘IT’)
Tržnogospodarska obravnava (TGO) in individualna obravnava (IO)
Preliminary Remark
Uvodna opomba
As already mentioned in recital (6) above, it was decided to grant an individual examination to the Sira Group.
Kot je navedeno že v uvodni izjavi 6, je bila sprejeta odločitev, da se skupini Sira Group odobri individualna preiskava.
In respect of its operations in the PRC, the Sira Group is composed of Sira (Tianjin) Aluminium Products Co. Ltd and Sira Group (Tianjin) Heating Radiators Co. Ltd The Sira Group also claimed market economy treatment or individual treatment.
Glede na njene dejavnosti v LRK skupino sestavljajo Sira (Tianjin) Aluminium Products Co. Ltd. in Sira Group (Tianjin) Heating Radiators Co. Ltd. Skupina Sira Group je prav tako zahtevala tržnogospodarsko obravnavo (v nadaljnjem besedilu: TGO) ali individualno obravnavo (v nadaljnjem besedilu: IO).
MET
Tržnogospodarska obravnava (TGO)
It is recalled that, as mentioned in recitals (30) to (31) of the provisional Regulation, none of the sampled parties had claimed MET.
Treba je opozoriti, da, kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 30 in 31 začasne uredbe, nobena izmed vzorčenih strani ni vložila zahtevka za TGO.
As mentioned above in recital (13), the Sira Group, which was granted individual examination after the imposition of provisional measures, claimed MET and submitted MET claim forms for the two companies involved in the production and commercialisation of the product concerned.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 13, je skupina Sira Group, za katero je bila po uvedbi začasnih ukrepov odobrena individualna preiskava, vložila zahtevek za TGO in predložila obrazce zahtevka za TGO za dve družbi, vključeni v proizvodnjo in trženje zadevnega izdelka.
Briefly and for ease of reference only, these criteria are set out in summarised form below:
Ta merila so v nadaljevanju na kratko opisana zaradi lažjega sklicevanja:
firms have one clear set of independently audited accounting records,
družbe imajo jasno določeno zbirko računovodskih evidenc, ki se revidirajo neodvisno,
there are no distortions carried over from the non-market economy system,
ni izkrivljanj, ki bi ostala še iz sistema netržnega gospodarstva,
The information provided by the two companies belonging to the Sira Group in the MET claim forms was duly analysed and further information was requested and obtained.
Informacije, ki sta jih v obrazcih zahtevka za TGO zagotovili dve družbi iz skupine Sira Group, so bile ustrezno analizirane, poleg tega so bile zahtevane in pridobljene dodatne informacije.
In view of the findings it was not considered necessary to conduct a verification visit at the premises of the companies.
Glede na ugotovitve se ni zdelo potrebno, da se opravi preveritveni obisk v prostorih teh družb.
The MET investigation demonstrated that the Sira Group failed to meet the requirements of criterion 1 because of State interference in decisions concerning the main raw material, aluminium.
Preiskava v zvezi s TGO je pokazala, da skupina Sira Group ni izpolnjevala zahtev merila 1 zaradi vmešavanja države pri odločitvah, ki se nanašajo na glavno surovino, aluminij.
The cost of aluminium represents ca. 70 % of the cost of production of the product concerned.
Stroški aluminija predstavljajo približno 70 % proizvodnih stroškov zadevnega izdelka.
The investigation demonstrated that both producers in the Sira Group acquired the aluminium used for the production of the product concerned on the Chinese domestic market.
Preiskava je pokazala, da sta oba proizvajalca iz skupine Sira Group pridobila aluminij, ki se uporablja za proizvodnjo zadevnega izdelka, na kitajskem domačem trgu.
Prices are based on the quotation of aluminium in the State-controlled Shanghai Non-ferrous Metal Exchange market (‘the Exchange’ or ‘SHFE’).
Cene temeljijo na kotaciji aluminija na šanghajski borzi barvnih kovin pod nadzorom države (v nadaljnjem besedilu: borza ali SHFE).
The SHFE is a closed exchange for Chinese-registered companies and Chinese citizens and it is controlled by the State Securities Regulatory Commission.
SHFE je zaprta borza za kitajske registrirane družbe in kitajske državljane ter je pod nadzorom državne nadzorne komisije za vrednostne papirje.
Several rules governing the functioning of the Exchange contribute to low volatility and depressed prices at the SHFE: daily price fluctuations are limited to 4 % above or below the settlement price of the previous trading day, trading happens at a low frequency (until the 15th day of each month), futures contracts are limited to a duration of up to 12 months, and transaction fees are charged by both the Exchange and brokers.
Več pravil, ki urejajo delovanje borze, prispeva k temu, da so na SHFE prisotna majhna nihanja in nizke cene: dnevna nihanja cen so omejena na 4 % nad ali pod poravnalno ceno predhodnega trgovalnega dne, trgovanje poteka na nizki stopnji pogostosti (do 15. dne vsakega meseca), terminske pogodbe so omejene na največ 12 mesecev, transakcijske pristojbine pa zaračunavajo borza in posredniki.
Moreover, as concerns SHFE transactions, physical deliveries can only take place in an approved warehouse within the PRC, unlike international exchanges, where delivery can take place worldwide.
Poleg tega, kar zadeva transakcije na SHFE, se lahko fizične izročitve izvede le v odobrenem skladišču na ozemlju LRK, medtem ko so na mednarodnih borzah izročitve možne po celem svetu.
Moreover, as the SHFE is a platform for physical exchanges only (no derivatives are sold), this completely insulates the Chinese aluminium market.
Poleg tega, ker je SHFE platforma za izključno fizično izmenjavo (izvedeni finančni instrumenti se ne prodajajo), to popolnoma izolira kitajski trg aluminija.
As a consequence, arbitrage with the worldwide benchmark, the London Metals Exchange (‘LME’) or other markets is practically not possible and the exchange works in isolation from other world markets.
Posledično arbitraža v svetovnem merilu z Londonsko borzo kovin (London Metals Exchange – v nadaljnjem besedilu: LME) ali drugimi trgi praktično ni mogoča in izmenjava poteka ločeno od drugih svetovnih trgov.
Therefore, an equalization among these markets cannot take place.
Zato izravnava med temi trgi ni mogoča.
Aluminium price quotation at the LME was on a monthly average basis 14 % higher than at the SHFE during the IP.
Kotacija cene aluminija na LME je bila na podlagi mesečnega povprečja za 14 % višja od kotacije na SHFE v OP.
The State also interferes with the price setting mechanisms in the SHFE as it is both a seller and a purchaser, via the State Reserve Bureau and other State Bodies, of primary aluminium.
Država se vmešava tudi v mehanizme določanja cen na SHFE, saj je prodajalec in kupec primarnega aluminija prek urada za državne rezerve ali drugih državnih organov.
In addition, the State sets daily price limits via the rules of the SHFE which have been approved by the State Regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (‘the CSRC’).
Poleg tega država preko pravil SHFE dnevno določa omejitve cen, ki jih odobri državni regulativni organ, tj. kitajska nadzorna komisija za vrednostne papirje (China Securities Regulatory Commission – v nadaljnjem besedilu: CSRC).
In addition, the investigation demonstrated that primary aluminium for export is subject to a 17 % VAT and is not refundable on export whereas VAT for domestically sold aluminium and on finished goods is refundable at 13 %.
Poleg tega je preiskava pokazala, da se za primarni aluminij za izvoz uporablja 17 % DDV, ki ni vračljiv pri izvozu, medtem ko se 13 % DDV za aluminij, prodan na domačem trgu in končne izdelke, povrne.
Moreover, primary aluminium for export is subject to a 17 % export tax.
Prav tako se za primarni aluminij za izvoz uporablja 17 % izvozni davek.
As a result, the vast majority of primary aluminium production is sold on the Chinese market causing a price depression of the domestic primary aluminium price and an important cost advantage for producers of aluminium radiators in the PRC.
Zato se velik del proizvodnje primarnega aluminija proda na kitajskem trgu, kar povzroča znižanje cen domačega primarnega aluminija in pomembno stroškovno prednost za proizvajalce aluminijastih radiatorjev v LRK.
The Chinese State further interfered in the market during the IP as it eliminated the 5 % import duty on metals during the financial crisis.
Kitajska država se je poleg tega vmešavala na trg v OP, saj je med finančno krizo odpravila 5 % uvozne dajatve za kovine.
A further distortion by the Chinese State is in the form of interventions in the market by the State Reserves Bureau (‘SRB’) which is part of the National Development Reform Commission (‘NDRC’).
Nadaljnje izkrivljanje, ki ga kitajska država povzroča, je v obliki intervencij na trgu prek urada državnih rezerv (State Reserves Bureau – v nadaljnjem besedilu: SRB), ki je del nacionalne komisije za razvojne reforme (National Development Reform Commission – v nadaljnjem besedilu: NDRC).
At the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 the SRB started buying up stocks of primary aluminium from smelters.
Ob koncu leta 2008 in v začetku leta 2009 je SRB začel iz talilnic nakupovati zaloge primarnega aluminija.
This was a stimulus package aimed at limiting the effects of the global financial and economic crisis which cut demand.
To je bil paket spodbud za omejitev učinkov svetovne finančne in gospodarske krize, ki je zmanjšala povpraševanje.
The Xinhua News Agency reported the stockpiling measures in December 2008, explaining that it was planned to accumulate 300000 tonnes of aluminium at prices which were 10 % higher than the market price in a measure designed to prop up prices [5].
Tiskovna agencija Xinhua je decembra 2008 poročala o ukrepih kopičenja in pojasnila, da se načrtuje nakopičenje 300000 ton aluminija po cenah, ki so 10 % višje od tržne cene, da bi s tem ukrepom podprli cene [5].
The SRB stockpiling plan involved buying from several Chinese smelters although around half was to be bought from the Aluminium Corporation of China Ltd Furthermore, the Minister in charge of the NDRC explained that other parts of the stimulus package included relaxed export controls, electricity subsidies, reduced electricity prices and raising loan ceilings.
Načrt kopičenja s strani SRB je vključeval nakup od več kitajskih talilnic, čeprav naj bi približno polovico kupili od družbe Aluminium Corporation of China Ltd. Poleg tega je minister, pristojen za NDRC, pojasnil, da drugi deli svežnja spodbud vključujejo manj strog nadzor izvoza, subvencioniranje električne energije, nižje cene električne energije in povečanje zgornjih mej posojil.
The package is reported to have had an immediate effect on prices.
Sveženj naj bi imel takojšen učinek na cene.
The above demonstrates that the Chinese State has a primary role in the setting of prices of primary aluminium and that it interferes in the market.
Zgornje ugotovitve kažejo, da ima kitajska država glavno vlogo pri določanju cen primarnega aluminija in da se vmešava v trg.
That the significant State interference, as described above, is clearly targeted is, inter alia, corroborated by the 12th 5 Year Development Plan for Aluminium (2011-15) in which the Government of China explicitly states its intention of ‘adjusting tax and export tax rebates and other economic levers, and strictly control the total amount of expansion and exports of primary products’.
Večje vmešavanje države, kot je opisano zgoraj, je med drugim jasno usmerjeno k podpori 12. petletnemu razvojnemu načrtu za aluminij (2011–2015), v katerem vlada Kitajske izrecno navaja, da namerava „prilagoditi olajšave na davke in izvozne dajatve ter druge ekonomske vzvode in strogo nadzorovati skupno količino širitve in izvoza primarnih izdelkov“.
This plan continues the policy which existed in the previous Aluminium Plan.
Ta načrt nadaljuje politiko iz predhodnega načrta za aluminij.
Furthermore these plans have been implemented over many years and, as demonstrated above, during the IP several implementing measures were in operation.
Poleg tega so bili ti načrti, kot je prikazano zgoraj, izvajani vrsto let, v OP pa je potekalo več izvedbenih ukrepov.
Thus, the multiple State-induced distortions in the Chinese primary aluminium prices affect the raw material prices.
Zato izkrivljanje cen kitajskega primarnega aluminija, večkrat povzročeno s strani države, vpliva na cene surovin.
In addition, the producers enjoy an advantage from these distortions, in the sense that they normally make their purchases in the Chinese market from local suppliers using Chinese spot markets prices (or SHFE) as a benchmark.
Poleg tega imajo proizvajalci koristi od teh izkrivljanj, saj običajno kupujejo na kitajskem trgu od lokalnih dobaviteljev, ki kot merilo uporabljajo kitajske promptne tržne cene (ali SHFE).
During the IP, these prices were around 15 % lower than the world market prices.
Med OP so bile te cene približno 15 % nižje od cen na svetovnem trgu.
In theory, Chinese companies can also buy certain quantities at LME prices when prices in the Chinese market are higher as a result of State intervention – whilst the opposite is impossible for non-Chinese operators.
V teoriji lahko kitajske družbe določene količine kupijo tudi po cenah LME, če so cene na kitajskem trgu kot posledica posredovanja države višje – obenem pa nasprotno ne velja za nekitajske subjekte.
An examination of the questionnaire responses of both Sira (Tianjin) Aluminium Products Co. Ltd and Sira Group (Tianjin) Heating Radiators Co. Ltd showed that they purchased primary aluminium products at prices linked to the SHFE price in the IP and that their purchase prices had followed the SHFE index over a longer period.
Pregled odgovorov na vprašalnike družb Sira (Tianjin) Aluminium Products Co. Ltd. in Sira Group (Tianjin) Heating Radiators Co. Ltd. je pokazal, da sta v OP kupovali izdelke iz primarnega aluminija po cenah, povezanih s ceno SHFE, in da so njune nakupne cene daljše obdobje sledile indeksu SHFE.
In addition, the investigation showed that one of the two companies concerned benefited from the ‘two free three half’ Business Income Tax rebate.
Poleg tega je preiskava pokazala, da je eno od dveh zadevnih podjetij imelo koristi od t. i. „prvi dve leti brez davka, nato tri leta polovična davčna stopnja“ popusta na poslovni davek na dohodek.
This rebate system of the Chinese State means that once a company starts to realise a profit it pays no Business Income Tax for two years and then only pays half for the next three years.
Ta sistem popustov kitajske države pomeni, da ko podjetje začne ustvarjati dobiček, prvi dve leti ne plačuje poslovnega davka na dohodek, nato pa naslednja tri leta plačuje polovico tega davka.
Such distortions are recorded as negative costs in the profit and loss account thereby increasing profitability.
Taka izkrivljanja so v izkazu poslovnega izida prikazana kot negativni stroški, s čimer se poveča dobičkonosnost.
Under such circumstances, neither of the companies has been in a position to prove that their business decisions regarding acquisition of raw materials are not subject to significant State interference and that costs of major inputs substantially reflect market values.
V takih okoliščinah nobeno od podjetij ni moglo dokazati, da njihove poslovne odločitve v zvezi s pridobivanjem surovin niso predmet večjega vmešavanja države in da stroški glavnih vložkov bistveno odražajo tržne vrednosti.
Therefore, they could not demonstrate that they fulfil criterion 1.
Zato nista mogli dokazati, da izpolnjujeta merilo 1.
In view of the above findings on criterion 1, it was considered, after consultation of the Advisory Committee, that MET should be rejected for the Sira Group.
Glede na navedene ugotovitve glede merila 1 se je po posvetovanju s svetovalnim odborom štelo, da se TGO skupini Sira Group zavrne.
In view of the above, the other MET criteria set out in Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation were not further analysed.
Glede na navedeno druga merila TGO iz člena 2(7)(b) osnovne uredbe niso bila dodatno analizirana.
The Commission officially disclosed the results of the MET findings to the group of related companies concerned in the PRC and to the complainant.
Komisija je rezultate ugotovitev o TGO uradno razkrila skupini povezanih zadevnih podjetij iz LRK in pritožniku.
Following the MET disclosure, the Sira Group commented on the proposed MET findings.
Po razkritju TGO je skupina Sira Group predložila pripombe o predlaganih ugotovitvah o TGO.
However, since the Sira Group labelled its comments as limited by nature, the Commission dealt with the issues raised on a bilateral basis by means of a specific disclosure document.
Vendar je Komisija pripombe obravnavala na dvostranski ravni s pomočjo posebnega dokumenta o razkritju, saj je skupina Sira Group svoje pripombe označila kot zaupne.
The comments did not lead to changes in the findings concerning criterion 1.
Pripombe niso spremenile ugotovitev glede merila 1.
Further to the above and in the absence of any comments, recitals (30) to (31) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.
Na podlagi navedenega in ker ni bilo nobenih pripomb, se uvodni izjavi 30 in 31 začasne uredbe potrdita.
Pursuant to Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, a country-wide duty, if any, is established for countries falling under that Article, except in those cases where companies are able to demonstrate that they meet all criteria set out in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation.
V skladu s členom 2(7)(a) osnovne uredbe se za države, ki jih zajema navedeni člen, po potrebi uvede dajatev na ravni države, razen v tistih primerih, ko lahko podjetja dokažejo, da izpolnjujejo vsa merila iz člena 9(5) osnovne uredbe.
Briefly, and for ease of reference only, these criteria were set out in recital (32) of the provisional Regulation.
Ta merila so zaradi lažjega sklicevanja na kratko določena v uvodni izjavi 32 začasne uredbe.
Both related exporting producers of the Sira Group claimed IT in case MET would not be granted.
Oba povezana proizvajalca izvoznika skupine Sira Group sta zahtevala IO, če jima TGO ne bi bila odobrena.
The investigation showed that they fulfilled all the conditions of Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation.
Preiskava je pokazala, da izpolnjujeta vse pogoje iz člena 9(5) osnovne uredbe.
The Sira Group was therefore granted IT.
Skupini Sira Group je zato bila odobrena IO.
On 28 July 2011, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO (‘DSB’) adopted an Appellate Body report and a Panel report as modified by the Appellate Body report on the case ‘European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China’ [6] (‘reports’).
Organ STO za reševanje sporov (Dispute Settlement Body – v nadaljnjem besedilu: DSB) je 28. julija 2011 sprejel poročilo pritožbenega organa in poročilo odbora, kot je bilo spremenjeno s poročilom pritožbenega organa v primeru „Evropske skupnosti – dokončni protidampinški ukrepi za nekatere železne ali jeklene pritrdilne elemente s Kitajske“ [6] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: poročila).
In the reports, it was found, inter alia, that Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation was inconsistent with Articles 6.10, 9.2 and 18.4 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.
V poročilih je bilo med drugim ugotovljeno, da člen 9(5) osnovne uredbe ni v skladu s členi 6.10, 9.2 in 18.4 Protidampinškega sporazuma STO, ter členom XVI:4 Sporazuma STO.