natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On the basis of these figures, it can be concluded that the amounts and their justification debated at the National Assembly and the Senate to set the amount of the compensating balance or exceptional contribution from France Télécom correspond to the proportions verified ex post during the 10-year period mentioned in the debates on the draft law.
Na podlagi teh podatkov je mogoče ugotoviti, da zneski in njihova utemeljitev, o katerih se je razpravljalo v narodni skupščini in senatu za določitev višine doplačila ali izrednega prispevka podjetja France Télécom, ustrezajo velikostnim razredom, ki so bila preverjena naknadno med desetletnim obdobjem, omenjenim v razpravah o osnutku zakona.
Indeed, the maximum amount of the exceptional contribution announced, EUR 6 billion (FRF 40 billion) corresponds to the forecasts drawn up by the public body until 1996 to meet the future retirement costs forecasted at that time, i.e. EUR 3,6 billion (FRF 23,4 billion) plus the difference of EUR 2,4 billion payable by the State between the employer’s and employees’ contributions levied between 1997 and 2006, on the one hand, and the benefits to be paid, estimated in 1996 for the same 10-year period, on the other.
Najvišji znesek napovedanega izrednega prispevka, tj. 6 milijard EUR (40 milijard FRF), dejansko ustreza rezervacijam, ki jih je oblikovalo podjetje do leta 1996, da bi doseglo rešitev za prihodnje stroške za pokojnine, predvidene v višini 3,6 milijarde EUR (23,4 milijarde FRF), k čemur se v breme države prištejejo razlika 2,4 milijarde EUR med prispevki delodajalca in delojemalca v obdobju 1997–2006 ter dajatve, ki jih je treba plačati in so bile leta 1996 ocenjene za enako obdobje desetih let.
Furthermore, the information communicated by the French Republic and shown in Table 3 shows that, for the period 1997 to 2010, the cumulated cost of pensions for the civil servant staff of France Télécom to be financed by the French State as a result of the 1996 reform reached EUR […] billion. The costs to be financed by the State are defined as the balance between the annual contributions of France Télécom and the civil servants working there and the pensions paid to the retired civil servant staff, year-on-year, with the deduction of the annual payments from the public body managing the exceptional contribution from France Télécom.
Poleg tega je iz informacij, ki jih je posredovala Francoska republika in so povzete v preglednici 3, razvidno, da so skupni stroški pokojnin za javne uslužbence podjetja France Télécom, ki ga krije Francoska republika na podlagi reforme iz leta 1996, dosegli […] milijard EUR. Stroški, ki jih krije država, predstavljajo doplačilo razlike med letnimi prispevki podjetja France Télécom in njegovih zaposlenih javnih uslužbencev ter pokojninskimi dajatvami upokojenih javnih uslužbencev za vsako leto, pri čemer se odštejejo letna plačila javnega zavoda za upravljanje izrednega prispevka podjetja France Télécom.
Between 1997 and 2010, the trend in the costs was as follows:
V obdobju 1997–2010 so se stroški spreminjali, kot je prikazano v spodnji preglednici.
Costs to the French State resulting from the 1996 reform (1997-2010)
Stroški Francoske republike na podlagi reforme iz leta 1996 (1997–2010)
(employer’s and employees’)
(delodajalca in delojemalca)
Annual payments by the public body managing the exceptional contribution from France Télécom
Letna plačila javnega zavoda za upravljanje izrednega prispevka podjetja France Télécom
Benefits paid
Plačane dajatve
Costs to the State
Stroški države
On account of the provisions of the Finance Act 1997 which governs them, the amounts of the annual payments of the public body managing the exceptional contribution from France Télécom paid in 1997 did not correspond to the amounts of the benefits estimated or actually paid to the retired staff of France Télécom or to the amounts of the remaining costs to be financed by the State and were not determined on the basis of these amounts.
Zneski letnih plačil javnega zavoda za upravljanje izrednega prispevka podjetja France Télécom, plačani leta 1997, zaradi določb finančnega zakona za leto 1997, ki ta plačila ureja, ne ustrezajo zneskom dajatev, kot so bile ocenjene ali dejansko izplačane upokojenim uslužbencem podjetja France Télécom, niti stroškom, ki jih mora kriti država, ter niso bili določeni glede na navedene zneske.
Examination of the amounts actually transferred confirms this dissociation.
Pregled zneskov, ki so bili dejansko vrnjeni, potrjuje to nepovezanost.
Despite the exceptional contribution paid by France Télécom in 1997, Table 3 shows that the amounts of the benefits paid to retired civil servant staff of France Télécom exceeded annual resources from 2004, with the exception of the year 2006.
Kljub izrednemu prispevku, ki ga je podjetje France Télécom plačalo leta 1997, je iz preglednice 3 razvidno, da so dajatve, izplačane upokojenim javnim uslužbencem podjetja France Télécom, od leta 2004 presegale letna sredstva, z izjemo leta 2006.
Therefore the payments of annual contributions by France Télécom and the annual payments of the public body managing the exceptional contribution are not allocated separately and ex ante to the benefits paid to the retired staff of France Télécom in the earmarked account for pensions.
Tako plačila letnih prispevkov podjetja France Télécom in letna plačila zavoda, ki upravlja izredni prispevek, ločeno in predhodno niso namenjena dajatvam za upokojeno osebje podjetja France Télécom v okviru posebnega pokojninskega računa.
In fact, the allocation of the exceptional contribution solely to the financing of the benefits in question since 1997, if it had been applied instead of the system of payment of the amount plus 10 % per year provided for in the Finance Act 1997, would have led to the public body being wound up at the end of 2008, rather than at the end of 2011 as planned, in view of the amount not covered by the annual contributions, shown in Table 3.
Če bi se izredni prispevek dejansko namenil samo financiranju zadevnih dajatev od leta 1997, in sicer namesto sistema plačila zneska, ki se letno poveča za 10 %, kot je predvideno s finančnim zakonom iz leta 1997, bi javni zavod prenehal delovati konec leta 2008 in ne konec leta 2011, kot je bilo predvideno, ob upoštevanju zneska, ki se ne bi kril z letnimi prispevki iz preglednice 3.
In any event, in either case, the amount of the exceptional contribution would have been used up at 31 December 2011.
V vsakem primeru pa bi se v obeh primerih znesek izrednega prispevka porabil do 31. decembra 2011.
The gradual, then total opening-up of the telecommunications markets
Postopno odpiranje in nato popolno odprtje telekomunikacijskih trgov
The reform of the financing of pensions of the civil servant staff of France Télécom took place against the backdrop of the total opening-up to competition of the services markets on which France Télécom was operating.
Reforma financiranja pokojnin javnih uslužbencev podjetja France Télécom se je začela izvajati v okviru popolnega odprtja za konkurenco na trgih storitev, na katerih je delovalo podjetje France Télécom.
From 1988, the telecommunications sector has been gradually liberalised by Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment [26] and by Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services [27].
Od leta 1988 se je sektor telekomunikacij postopno liberaliziral v skladu z Direktivo Komisije 88/301/EGS z dne 16. maja 1988 o konkurenci na trgih za telekomunikacijsko terminalsko opremo [26] in Direktivo Komisije 90/388/EGS z dne 28. junija 1990 o konkurenci na trgih za telekomunikacijske storitve [27].
Directive 90/388/EEC provided for liberalisation measures to be implemented by 31 December 1990 regarding data communication and voice telephony and data services for corporate networks and closed user groups.
Direktiva 90/388/EGS določa ukrepe za liberalizacijo, ki jih je treba izvesti pred 31. decembrom 1990, na področju sporočanja podatkov in storitev govorne telefonije ter podatkov za podjetniška omrežja in zaprte skupine uporabnikov.
Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets [28] aimed for full liberalisation of the telecommunications sector from 1 January 1998.
Cilj Direktive Komisije 96/19/ES z dne 13. marca 1996 o spremembi Direktive 90/388/EGS v zvezi z izvajanjem popolne konkurence na telekomunikacijskih trgih [28] je popolna liberalizacija sektorja telekomunikacij od 1. januarja 1998.
Law No 96-659 of 26 July 1996 on the regulation of telecommunications (loi no 96-659 du 26 juillet 1996 relative à la réglementation des télécommunications) laid down the conditions allowing full effect to be given to the liberalisation of the sector by ending France Télécom’s monopoly in fixed line telephony and data transmission and organising charges and connections with competitors.
V zakonu št. 96-659 z dne 26. julija 1996 o ureditvi telekomunikacij so določeni pogoji, ki zagotavljajo popoln učinek liberalizacije sektorja z odpravo monopola podjetja France Télécom na fiksno telefonijo in prenos podatkov ter z ureditvijo tarif in medsebojnih povezav s konkurenti.
Pursuant to the provisions cited in recitals 46 and 47, since 1988, France Télécom has had to cope with the arrival of competitors — some partially owned by international groups — on the goods and services markets on which it was operating in France, some of which, such as mobile telephony or international communications, have a trans-border element.
Kot posledica uporabe določb iz uvodnih izjav 46 in 47 se je podjetje France Télécom od leta 1988 soočalo s prihodom konkurentov, med katerimi so bili nekateri v delni lasti mednarodnih skupin, na trge blaga in storitev, na katerih je podjetje delovalo v Franciji, pri čemer so bili nekateri od teh trgov čezmejni, npr. trg za mobilno telefonijo ali mednarodne komunikacije.
The reform of the financing of the France Télécom retirement pensions therefore took place at the same time as the liberalisation of the market at European Union level.
Reforma financiranja pokojnin podjetja France Télécom se je torej začela hkrati z liberalizacijo trga na ravni Evropske unije.
It therefore took effect on a market fully open to competition where, moreover, France Télécom entered into alliances and took significant stakes in other Member States.
Vplivala je na trg, popolnoma odprt za konkurenco, na katerem je podjetje France Télécom sklenilo partnerstva in izvedlo pomembne naložbe v drugih državah članicah.
In fact, the desire to promote the expansion of France Télécom on the European markets outside France is the a backdrop to the 1996 Law and the opening of the undertaking to private capital, as shown in declarations during the discussion of the draft, which report ‘the ambitions nurtured by the French Government for its national champion, France Télécom’ [31].
Dejansko se zdi, da je bila želja po spodbujanju širjenja podjetja France Télécom na še druge evropske trge poleg francoskega trga podlaga za zakon iz leta 1996 in odprtje podjetja zasebnemu kapitalu, kot izhaja iz izjav med razpravo o projektu, v katerih se omenjajo „ambicije, ki jih je imela francoska vlada za svojega paradnega konja, podjetje France Télécom“ [31].
At present, France Télécom claims to be the leading provider of broadband internet access and the third largest mobile operator in Europe and among the world leaders for telecommunications services to multinationals.
Podjetje France Télécom je trenutno glavni ponudnik širokopasovnega internetnega dostopa in tretji mobilni operater v Evropi ter eno od vodilnih svetovnih podjetij, ki ponujajo telekomunikacijske storitve večnacionalnim podjetjem.
Outside France, France Télécom is significantly active via its subsidiaries, with prominent market positions in Spain, the United Kingdom, Poland, Slovakia, Belgium and Austria [32].
Podjetje France Télécom je zunaj Francije zelo dejavno prek podružnic, pri čemer so najpomembnejše v Španiji, Združenem kraljestvu, na Poljskem, Slovaškem, v Belgiji in Avstriji [32].
The Commission also noted that, insofar as these measures constitute State aid, this aid was not notified to the Commission prior to its implementation although it was to be regarded as new aid according to case-law.
Poleg tega je Komisija ugotovila, da kolikor ti ukrepi pomenijo državno pomoč, ta ni bila priglašena Komisiji, preden se je začela izvajati, čeprav jo je treba v skladu s sodno prakso šteti za novo pomoč.
The French Republic had thus not complied with its notification obligation under the Treaty and the measure was therefore to be considered unlawful.
Francoska republika tako ni izpolnila svoje obveznosti priglasitve v skladu s Pogodbo, zato je treba ukrep šteti za nezakonit.
The Commission concluded that on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU that it was able to examine whether the aid was compatible with the internal market.
Komisija je sklenila, da lahko na podlagi točke (c) člena 107(3) PDEU preuči združljivost pomoči z notranjim trgom.
The Commission also noted that the same provision had permitted it to conclude that the aid granted to La Poste on the reform of the arrangements for financing the retirement pensions of its civil servants was compatible with the internal market [33] and that in view of the similarities between these two cases, it seemed appropriate in this case to carry out a similar analysis.
Komisija je tudi navedla, da je na podlagi iste določbe ugotovila, da je pomoč, dodeljena podjetju La Poste v času reforme načina financiranja pokojnin njegovih javnih uslužbencev, združljiva z notranjim trgom [33], ter da se ob upoštevanju podobnosti teh dveh primerov zdi ustrezno izvesti podobno analizo.
In its preliminary analysis of the compatibility of the aid with the internal market, and notwithstanding the similarity with the reform of the arrangements for financing the retirement pensions of La Poste, the Commission informed the French Republic of the following doubts:
Komisija je v okviru svoje predhodne preučitve združljivosti z notranjim trgom in kljub podobnostim z reformo financiranja pokojnin podjetja La Poste Francoski republiki sporočila naslednje dvome:
Firstly, whilst emphasising that it was not in possession of detailed information demonstrating that the contribution rates paid by France Télécom are equal to those paid by private enterprises governed by ordinary law operating in the telecommunications sector in France, the Commission noted that the rate of the contribution in full discharge of liabilities applied to France Télécom since 1997 is insufficient to put it on a level playing field with its competitors.
prvič, Komisija je ugotovila, da stopnja odvezujočega prispevka, ki se za podjetje France Télécom uporablja od leta 1997, ne zagotavlja konkurenčne enakosti (enakih konkurenčnih pogojev) glede na njegove konkurente, pri čemer je poudarila, da ni imela na voljo podrobnih informacij, ki bi dokazovale, da so stopnje prispevka, ki jih plačuje podjetje France Télécom, enake stopnjam, ki jih plačujejo zasebna podjetja splošnega prava, ki delujejo v sektorju telekomunikacij v Franciji.
This results from the fact that the rate applied to France Télécom includes only the contributions corresponding to the risks common to ordinary employees and civil servants and, in this regard, it excludes the contributions corresponding to the risks that are not common, such as unemployment and non-payment of wages in the event of a firm going into receivership or compulsory liquidation;
To izhaja iz dejstva, da stopnja, ki se uporablja za podjetje France Télécom, vključuje le prispevke za tveganja, ki so skupna osebam, zaposlenim v skladu s splošnim pravom, in javnim uslužbencem, ter v skladu s tem izključuje prispevke za tveganja, ki niso skupna, kot je brezposelnost ali neizplačilo plač v primeru stečajnega postopka ali likvidacije podjetja;
secondly, the Commission did not have sufficient information concerning the effects on competition of reducing the cost of retirement pensions, in order to assess whether any positive effects exceeded the negative effects.
drugič, Komisija ni imela dovolj informacij o učinkih zmanjšanja stroškov za pokojnine na konkurenco, da bi ocenila, ali morebitni pozitivni učinki odtehtajo negativne učinke.
To this end, the Commission also had to take into account the fact that France Télécom had not yet repaid in full the unlawful and incompatible aid pursuant to the Commission Decision of 2 August 2004 concerning State aid implemented in France for France Télécom (hereinafter: ‘Decision on the application of business tax to France Télécom’) [34], a decision with which France failed to conform within the time limit given, as established by the Court of Justice [35].
V ta namen je morala Komisija upoštevati tudi dejstvo, da podjetje France Télécom še ni v celoti vrnilo nezakonite in nezdružljive pomoči v skladu z Odločbo Komisije z dne 2. avgusta 2004 o državni pomoči Francije za France Télécom (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba o uporabi davka od dohodka za podjetje France Télécom) [34], pri čemer Francija zahtev iz te odločbe ni izpolnila v predpisanem roku, kot je ugotovilo Sodišče [35].
The comments presented by interested parties are summarised in Sections 4.1 to 4.3.
Pripombe zainteresiranih strani so povzete v oddelkih 4.1 do 4.3.
In its comments, which it considers to be supplementary to those submitted by the French Republic, France Télécom considers that it suffering from chronic overstaffing linked to its former status as a public administration and that, for the population concerned, it does not have the same potential for fluidity of employment as its competitors.
Podjetje France Télécom v svojih pripombah, ki jih ocenjuje kot dopolnilne k pripombam, ki jih je predložila Francoska republika, ugotavlja, da se sooča s problemom kronične prezaposlenosti, povezane z njegovimi prejšnjimi upravnimi kadrovskimi predpisi, in da za zadevno skupino prebivalstva nima enakih možnosti pretočnosti zaposlovanja kot njegovi konkurenti.
France Télécom has to bear very heavy training costs amounting to EUR 180 million, equivalent to 4,5 % of the total wage bill, compared to 2,9 % on average for French companies.
Zato si mora podjetje France Télécom še bolj prizadevati za prihranitev 180 milijonov EUR, kar je enako 4,5 % stroškov za plače v primerjavi z 2,9 % za povprečje francoskih podjetij.
France Télécom also alleges that its wage bill is about […] % higher, excluding surcharges and bonuses.
Podjetje France Télécom navaja tudi, da so plače višje za približno […] % pred zvišanji in dodatki.
In addition, since it cannot implement social plans, France Télécom financed the cost of measures associated with the departures of civil servants, such as end-of-career leave, to an amount exceeding EUR 8 billion between 1996 and 2006.
Ker podjetje France Télécom ni moglo izvajati socialnih načrtov, je v obdobju 1996–2006 financiralo stroške mehanizmov za izplačevanje dodatkov ob upokojitvi javnih uslužbencev, kot je dopust ob izteku poklicne poti, v višini več kot 8 milijard EUR.
Secondly, France Télécom considers that the retirement pension costs borne between 1990 and 1996 were abnormal and placed it at a structural disadvantage in relation to its private-sector competitors, as referred to in the Combus judgment [36], the reference framework for assessing whether these charges were normal or abnormal being the ordinary law arrangements applicable to competitors.
Drugič, podjetje France Télécom meni, da so bili stroški za pokojnine, financirani v obdobju 1990–1996, nenormalno visoki in so ga glede na njegove zasebne konkurente postavili v neugoden strukturni položaj v smislu sodbe Combus [36], pri čemer se kot referenčni okvir za presojo običajnega ali neobičajnega značaja navedenih stroškov za konkurente uporablja sistem splošnega prava.
The principles laid down in the Combus judgment would appear to have been confirmed since by the Court in its Hotel Cipriani judgment [37].
Načela iz sodbe Combus so bila potrjena že v sodbi Splošnega sodišča v zadevi Hotel Cipriani [37].
France Télécom disputes that the situation of a single operator, in this case itself, before and after the reform introduced by the 1996 Law, constitutes an appropriate comparison for assessing whether there is an economic advantage within the meaning of the case-law.
Podjetje France Télécom se ne strinja, da položaj edinega operaterja, torej v tem primeru njega samega, pred reformo, uvedeno z zakonom iz leta 1996, in po njej pomeni ustrezen primerjalni okvir za presojo obstoja gospodarske prednosti v smislu sodne prakse.
In any event, if the reference framework were to be reduced to France Télécom before and after the 1996 reform, the measure could not be classified as selective since it would be applied homogeneously within that framework.
Tudi če bi se moral referenčni okvir omejiti na podjetje France Télécom pred reformo iz leta 1996 in po njej, se ukrep ne bi mogel šteti za selektivnega, ker bi se v navedenem okviru uporabljal homogeno.
As a result, the measures in question would either not constitute State aid within the meaning of the Treaty in that they release France Télécom from an abnormal structural disadvantage or cannot be classified as a selective advantage constituting State aid.
Iz tega bi izhajalo, da zadevni ukrepi ne pomenijo državne pomoči v smislu Pogodbe, ker odpravljajo neobičajno strukturno pomanjkljivost podjetja France Télécom, niti se ne morejo šteti za selektivno prednost, ki je element državne pomoči.
Alternatively, France Télécom considers that State aid, if it were confirmed, would be compatible with the internal market in accordance with the criteria established by the Commission in its decision on the retirement pension arrangements of La Poste (hereinafter: ‘La Poste decision’) [38].
Podjetje France Télécom poleg tega meni, da bi bila državna pomoč, če bi bila dokazana, združljiva z notranjim trgom na podlagi meril iz odločbe Komisije o pokojninskem sistemu podjetja La Poste (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba o La Poste) [38].
In this regard, the specific nature of its arrangements, in that it pays a contribution calculated on the basis solely of the common risks, does not mean that France Télécom has been placed in a favourable situation in relation to its competitors since 1996: apart from the structural disadvantages associated with the status of the civil servants it employs, France Télécom has had to pay a considerable amount associated with the 1996 reform, the compatibility of which with the internal market needs to be analysed and, of EUR 5,7 billion, which far exceeds that which France Télécom would have had to pay if its contribution had been subject to the risks that are not common.
Poseben značaj sistema navedenega podjetja, in sicer plačevanje prispevka, izračunanega samo na podlagi skupnih tveganj, ne pomeni, da je bilo podjetje France Télécom od leta 1996 glede na svoje konkurente v ugodnejšem položaju: poleg strukturnih pomanjkljivosti v zvezi s statusom javnih uslužbencev, ki jih podjetje France Télécom zaposluje, je moralo to kriti visoke stroške v zvezi z reformo iz leta 1996, za katere je treba preučiti združljivost z notranjim trgom in ki znašajo 5,7 milijarde EUR, kar močno presega znesek, ki bi ga moralo plačati podjetje France Télécom, če bi za njegov prispevek veljala tveganja, ki niso skupna.
France Télécom considers that, in its La Poste decision [39], the Commission accepted that the amount of an exceptional one-off contribution (EUR 2 billion), in the context of a reform which came into effect after the notification but before the Commission decision, offsets the contributions corresponding to the non-common risks, until the amount of the one-off contribution has been exhausted.
Podjetje France Télécom navaja, da je Komisija v odločbi o La Poste [39] priznala, da znesek izrednega enotnega prispevka (2 milijardi EUR) v okviru reforme, ki je začela veljati po uradni priglasitvi, vendar pred odločbo Komisije, nadomešča prispevke za tveganja, ki niso skupna, dokler se znesek enotnega prispevka ne izčrpa.