natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
With regard to the EUR 32 million VEB guarantee, this was intended to cover not only the principal but also the regular interest payments MAVA has towards MFB.
Poroštvo VEB v višini 32 milijonov EUR je bilo namenjeno ne samo za kritje glavnice, ampak tudi za redna plačila obresti, ki jih mora družba MAVA plačati MFB.
Against this background and given the fact that no adequate equivalent was transferred to MAVA, taking off the debt from the company's balance sheet has to be regarded as an advantage in favour of Malév.
Na podlagi navedenega in ob upoštevanju dejstva, da na družbo MAVA ni bila prenesena ustrezna enakovrednost, je treba umik dolga iz bilance stanja gospodarske družbe šteti za prednost v korist družbe Malév.
As regards the advance payment by MNV for the (later failed) sale of GH, according to the expert evaluation submitted by Hungary, GH had a net asset value of HUF 1,6 billion and an estimated market value of HUF 3,5 billion in 2009.
Glede predplačila podjetja MNV za (pozneje neizvedeno) prodajo GH je bila po strokovni oceni, ki jo je predložila Madžarska, v letu 2009 čista vrednost sredstev GH 1,6 milijarde HUF, ocenjena tržna vrednost pa 3,5 milijarde HUF.
In fact in January 2009 MNV paid to Malév HUF 1,6 billion as advanced payment.
V januarju 2009 je podjetje MNV družbi Malév plačalo 1,6 milijarde HUF predplačila.
This payment was secured by a pledge on HA-LNA, a CRJ jet (estimated market value HUF 1,8 billion).
To plačilo je bilo zavarovano z zastavno pravico na HA-LNA, tj. reaktivnem letalu CRJ (ocenjena tržna vrednost 1,8 milijarde HUF).
In February 2009 the preliminary purchase agreement was modified and MNV paid an additional HUF 2,7 billion (total HUF 4,3 billion), and a second rank pledge was registered on the same aircraft.
Februarja 2009 je bila predhodna kupna pogodba spremenjena in družba MNV je plačala dodatnih 2,7 milijarde HUF (skupaj 4,3 milijarde HUF) in na istem zrakoplovu je bila vpisana zastavna pravica druge stopnje.
In their comments to the opening decision, the Hungarian authorities admit that the advance payment was in fact undertaken in order to ensure Malév's liquidity during the negotiation phase of the re-nationalisation.
Madžarski organi v pripombah na sklep o začetku postopka priznavajo, da je bilo predplačilo v resnici opravljeno zato, da se je družbi Malév v fazi pogajanja ponovne nacionalizacije zagotovila likvidnost.
According to the preliminary purchase agreement, the repayment of this sum was immediately due (2 working days) in case the transaction failed.
V skladu s predhodno kupno pogodbo bi bilo treba v primeru neuspele transakcije ta znesek takoj vrniti (v dveh delovnih dneh).
Concerning the repeated granting of tax and social liabilities obligations deferrals by the tax authority, the Commission notes that on the basis of the submissions by Hungary it is clear that in the course of 2006-2007 a deferral of payment was requested by Malév on 12 different occasions (concerning different payments).
Glede ponavljajočih odlogov plačil davčnih obveznosti in socialnih prispevkov Komisija ugotavlja, da je iz predloženih stališč Madžarske jasno, da je družba Malév v letih 2006 in 2007 12-krat prosila za odlog plačila davčnih obveznosti (za različna plačila).
The tax authority granted deferrals every time.
Davčni organ je vsakič odobril odlog plačila.
According to the relevant Hungarian legislation, the granting of such deferrals is discretionary, and could have been refused.
V skladu z ustrezno madžarsko zakonodajo o odobritvi takšnih odlogov davčni organ odloča po lastni presoji in bi jo lahko tudi zavrnil.
Therefore, the measure must be considered selective [30].
Zato je treba sklep obravnavati kot selektiven [30].
Until July 2008, the statutory interest was charged and paid by Malév according to the deferral schedules.
Do julija 2008 so se zaračunavale zakonite obresti, ki jih je družba Malév plačevala v skladu s časovnim razporedom odlogov plačil.
In its decisions the tax authority reasoned by the difficult situation of Malév and the then envisaged restructuring.
Davčni organ je v svojih odločbah kot razlog navajal težak položaj družbe Malév in prestrukturiranje, ki je bilo v tej fazi predvideno.
As from July 2008, however, Malév stopped paying its tax and social security contributions and the interest (with the exception of one partial payment in December 2008), and no steps were taken by tax authority to recover this debt.
Od julija 2008 pa družba Malév ni več plačevala davkov in socialnih prispevkov ter obresti (razen delnega plačila v decembru 2008) in davčni organ ni izvedel nobenega ukrepa za izterjavo tega dolga.
Moreover, further payments were rescheduled also after Malév did not comply with the rescheduling agreements.
Tudi po tem, ko družba Malév ni ravnala v skladu z dogovori o prerazporeditvi, so bila prerazporejena še nadaljnja plačila.
As from April 2009, the tax and social liabilities due as from that moment (i.e. not the earlier already overdue payments) were not even rescheduled anymore without any concrete action taken by the APEH to enforce any of the debt.
Od aprila 2009 naprej davčne obveznosti in socialni prispevki, ki so zapadli takrat (tj. ne že prej zapadla plačila), niso bili več niti prerazporejeni in APEH ni sprejela nobenega konkretnega ukrepa za izterjavo dolga.
The Commission is of the view that no private creditor would have behaved like the Hungarian State.
Komisija meni, da noben zasebni upnik ne bi ravnal tako, kot država Madžarska.
Furthermore, after Malév failed to comply with the rescheduling agreements, no private creditor would have agreed to a further rescheduling.
Po tem, ko družba Malév ni več ravnala v skladu z dogovori o prerazporeditvi, noben zasebni upnik ne bi soglašal z nadaljnjimi prerazporeditvami.
Therefore, at latest as from July 2008, the non-enforcement of tax and social contributions liability by the tax authority and the further reschedulings transferred an advantage to Malév.
Zato je najpozneje od julija 2008 zaradi neizterjave davčnih obveznosti in socialnih prispevkov s strani davčnega organa in nadaljnjih prerazporeditev družba Malév pridobila prednost.
With regard to the February 2010 capital increase, by which the State re-nationalised the airline in which it had not held a stake since its privatisation, the most striking fact is that while 99,95 % of Malév was sold for a price equivalent of ca. EUR 740000 in 2007, in 2010 the State de facto paid an equivalent of EUR 94 million to regain 94,6 % ownership (by means of the capital increase: partly realised by injecting fresh capital of HUF 20,7 billion and partly through a debt-to-equity swap of the advanced payment for GH of HUF 4,7 billion HUF)), i.e. 127 times the original sales price.
V zvezi z dokapitalizacijo februarja 2010, s katero je država ponovno nacionalizirala letalsko družbo, v kateri od privatizacije ni imela deleža, je najbolj presenetljivo dejstvo, da je bilo v letu 2007 99,5 % družbe Malév prodane za ceno, ki je enakovredna približno 740000 EUR, leta 2010 pa je država za ponovno pridobitev 94,6-odstotnega lastništva dejansko plačala znesek, enakovreden 94 milijonom EUR (z dokapitalizacijo, ki je bila delno izvedena z vložitvijo svežega kapitala v višini 20,7 milijarde HUF in delno z zamenjavo terjatev predplačila za družbo Malév GH v višini 4,7 milijarde HUF v lastniške deleže), t.j.
This behaviour of the State, especially in view of the fact that in the meantime the airline accumulated losses, continued to have negative equity and no credible restructuring plan was present, is not market conform.
ratnik prvotne prodajne cene. To ravnanje države zlasti zaradi dejstva, da je letalska družba v vmesnem času imela bilančno izgubo, negativen kapital in nobenega verjetnega načrta za prestrukturiranje, ni skladno s trgom.
In fact, the Hungarian authorities acknowledged themselves that the company has been in "permanent difficulty" and no private investor was willing to purchase Malév early 2010.
Dejansko so madžarski organi sami potrdili, da je bila družba Malév v „stalnih težavah“ in da je v začetku leta 2010 noben zasebni vlagatelj ni bil pripravljen kupiti.
While the capital increase amounted to HUF 25,4 billion (i.e. this was the amount the Hungarian State paid to regain 94,6 % ownership of the airline), at the time of the swap, Malév had a negative equity of HUF 41 billion (EUR 152 million), accumulated losses in the amount of HUF 51 billion (EUR 189 million) and total debt of HUF 75 billion (EUR 278 million) [31].
Čeprav je dokapitalizacija znašala 25,4 milijarde HUF (t.j. to je bil znesek, ki ga je madžarska država plačala za ponovno pridobitev 94,6-odstotnega lastništva letalske družbe), je imela družba Malév v času zamenjave negativni kapital v višini 41 milijard HUF (152 milijonov EUR), bilančno izgubo v višini 51 milijard HUF (189 milijonov EUR) in skupni dolg v višini 75 milijard HUF (278 milijonov EUR) [31].
According to the 2010 financial accounts, at the beginning of 2010 "the airline's financing problems were serious, debt reached a dramatic level, funding sources were practically not present. […] Due to the absence of a strategic owner, no commercial funding was available."
Glede na finančna poročila za leto 2010 je imela letalska družba v začetku leta 2010 „velike finančne težave, dolg je bil ogromen, virov financiranja praktično ni bilo. […] Ker ni bilo strateškega lastnika, ni bilo na voljo poslovnih virov financiranja“.
Indeed, the airline has been loss-making at least since 2003 without any realistic prospect to return to viability, not even the private owner had succeeded in turning around the company.
Letalska družba je vsaj od leta 2003 ustvarjala izgubo brez realne možnosti obnove sposobnosti preživetja, tudi če bi zasebnemu vlagatelju uspelo preobrniti družbo.
Against this background it was clear that the capital increase would not be sufficient to return the company to viability and that after the re-nationalisation Malév would need further capital and liquidity in order merely to stay afloat.
Na podlagi navedenega je jasno, da dokapitalizacija ne bi zadostovala za obnovo sposobnosti preživetja in da bi po ponovni nacionalizaciji družba Malév že za samo preživetje rabila dodatni kapital in likvidnost. Komisija ugotavlja, da je v takih okoliščinah ponovna nacionalizacija družbe Malév z dokapitalizacijo februarja 2010 družbi prinesla prednost.
As to Hungary's argument that the State was better off by nationalising the company than enforcing its claims against Malév the Commission notes the following.
Glede trditve Madžarske, da je bilo za državo bolje, da je družbo Malév nacionalizirala kot da bi uveljavljala svoje terjatve do družbe, Komisija ugotavlja naslednje.
As Hungary acknowledges, in case of bankruptcy, they would have recovered a very small portion of their claims other than the one covered by the VEB guarantee.
Kot potrjuje Madžarska, bi v primeru stečaja razen dela, kritega s poroštvom VEB, lahko izterjali samo majhen del svojih terjatev. (Dejansko je bila v času transakcije vrednost sredstev družbe Malév negativna).
(In fact, Malév asset value was negative at the time of the transaction.) By contrast, the Hungarian State decided to keep the airline alive by swapping its debt and injecting fresh money in the amount of HUF 20,7 billion (ca. EUR 77 million).
V nasprotju s tem se je madžarska država odločila, da bo družbo ohranila pri življenju z zamenjavo svojega dolga in vložitvijo svežega denarja v višini 20,7 milijarde HUF (približno 77 milijonov EUR).
No private would have undertaken this further financial burden in a similar situation, especially without realistic chances to return the company to viability.
Noben zasebni vlagatelj v podobnem položaju ne bi prevzel tega finančnega bremena, zlasti brez realnih možnosti obnove sposobnosti preživetja.
The Commission also notes that at the same time Hungarian State increased Malév's capital, AirBridge (indirectly VEB) also swapped its debt amounting to HUF 1,4 billion into equity.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da je takrat, ko je madžarska država povečala kapital družbe Malév, družba AirBridge (posredno VEB) svoj dolg v višini 1,4 milijarde HUF tudi zamenjala v lastniške deleže.
However, this amount is only 5 % of the new capital and, in addition the State, on the top of the debt converted also contributed a substantial amount of fresh capital.
Vendar je ta znesek samo 5 % novega kapitala, medtem ko je država poleg zamenjave dolga tudi prispevala znaten znesek svežega kapitala.
In fact, the injection of fresh money made up for 77 % of the capital increase.
Dejansko je vložek svežega denarja predstavljal 77 % dokapitalizacije.
Moreover, given the bad financial conditions of Malév, the perspective for AirBridge to obtain the payment of that amount was very limited if not inexistent.
Zaradi slabega finančnega položaja družbe Malév je bila možnost, da bi družba AirBridge dobila plačilo tega zneska zelo majhna ali celo neobstoječa.
Thus the behaviour of the private party in this case is materially different from that of the Hungarian State and it cannot take as a point of reference to consider that the State behaved as a private investor.
Tako se ravnanje zasebnika v tem primeru bistveno razlikuje od ravnanja države in ne more biti referenčna točka za mnenje, da je država ravnala kot zasebni vlagatelj.
The 2010 Capital increase
Dokapitalizacija v letu 2010
Participant to the capital increase
Udeleženec v dokapitalizaciji
Contribution HUF billion
Vložek v milijardah HUF
Type of contribution
Vrsta vložka
Share of contribution
Delež vložka
Fresh capital
Sveži kapital
On the basis of the above the Commission concludes that under those circumstances the February 2010 re-nationalisation of Malév by means of the capital increase transferred an advantage to the company.
Glede na navedeno Komisija ugotavlja, da je v takih okoliščinah ponovna nacionalizacija družbe Malév z dokapitalizacijo februarja 2010 družbi prinesla prednost.
Measures 5-8
Ukrepi 5–8
Concerning the measures after the re-nationalisation, it is apparent that the shareholder loans and capital injections were intended to finance Malév's current operations and to avoid its imminent insolvency.
Glede ukrepov po ponovni nacionalizaciji je očitno, da so bila posojila delničarjev in dokapitalizacije namenjeni financiranju tekočega poslovanja in preprečevanju neizbežne plačilne nesposobnosti družbe Malév.
The State thus undertook these measures with the same objective:
Država je tako te ukrepe sprejela z enakim ciljem:
keeping Malév in business.
ohraniti poslovanje družbe Malév.
Moreover, they are also closely linked by their chronology, as they took place within very short time intervals (i.e. from May to September 2010).
Poleg tega so tesno povezani tudi kronološko, saj so se dogajali v zelo kratkih časovnih presledkih (t.j. od maja do septembra 2010).
Consequently, the Commission is of the view that, according to BP Chemicals, these shareholder loans cannot be assessed under the market economy investor principle and in particular, by applying the Reference Rate Communication [32], as they are all directly linked to measure 4 and hence their State aid character cannot be assessed in isolation.
Zato Komisija meni, da v skladu z BP Chemicals teh posojil delničarjev ni mogoče oceniti po načelu vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu in zlasti z uporabo Sporočila o referenčni obrestni meri [32], ker so vsa neposredno povezana z ukrepom 4 in zato značaja državne pomoči ni mogoče oceniti ločeno.
It is clear from the Hungarian submission that no private actor was willing to finance Malév, its only funding sources were supplier credits and the liquidity provided by the State.
Iz predloženih stališč Madžarske je jasno, da noben zasebni vlagatelj ni bil pripravljen financirati družbe Malév, njeni edini viri financiranja so bili dobaviteljevi krediti in likvidnost, ki jo je zagotovila država.
At the time of granting the loans the State could not seriously count on Malév meeting its interest payment obligation and that it would redeem the loan.
V času odobritve posojil država ni mogla resno računati, da bo družba Malév izpolnila svoje obveznosti glede plačevanja obresti in da bo posojilo odplačala.
Moreover, it is also questionable that any private creditor would take the risk to grant a loan which has to be repaid in a lump sum at the end of the maturity to a company in a comparable state like Malév (i.e. permanent difficulty).
Vprašljivo je tudi, ali bi kakšen zasebni upnik tvegal in odobril posojilo, ki se plača v enkratnem znesku ob zapadlosti družbi v stanju, primerljivem s stanjem družbe Malév (t.j. v stalnih težavah).
Finally, in view of the credit history of the company vis-à-vis the State (e.g. non reimbursement of the advance payment for GH, repeated tax deferrals and non-payments), the State and any other investor could not realistically expect that Malév would meet its obligations.
Zaradi kreditne zgodovine družbe do države (npr. nevračilo predplačila za GH, ponavljajoči odlogi plačila davkov in neplačila) država in drugi vlagatelji niso mogli realno pričakovati, da bo družba Malév izpolnjevala svoje obveznosti.
On the other hand, even according to the Reference rate Communication the stipulated interest and collaterals agreed would not be sufficient to rule out the presence of State aid.
Po drugi strani pa celo v skladu s Sporočilom o referenčni obrestni meri predpisane obresti in dogovorjena zavarovanja ne bi zadoščala za izključitev obstoja državne pomoči.
The stipulated interest rate was 9,97 % whereas the HUF reference rate at the time of the granting amounted to 5,97 %.
Predpisana obrestna mera je bila 9,97 %, referenčna obrestna mera HUF v času odobritve pa je znašala 5,97 %.
A mere 400 bps margin over the HUF base rate is insufficient in view of Malév's past performance and financial situation (a company continuously at the edge of bankruptcy).
Zaradi preteklih rezultatov in finančnega položaja družbe Malév (družba, ki je ves čas na robu stečaja) samo 400 bazičnih točk nad izhodiščno obrestno mero za madžarske forinte ne zadostuje.
As regards the collateralisation of the loans, the market value of GH (HUF 3,5 billion) in case of Malév's failure is questionable, as Malév was the dominant partner of the ground handling operation:
Kar zadeva zavarovanje posojil, je tržna vrednost GH (3,5 milijarde HUF) v primeru propada družbe Malév vprašljiva, ker je bila družba Malév prevladujoči partner zemeljske oskrbe:
in 2009 63 % of the income was generated by Malév.
v letu 2009 je 63 % dohodka ustvarila družba Malév.
Therefore, at least in the short term, its economic performance was dependent on Malév's existence and its market value would thus have decreased substantially in case Malév went bankrupt.
Zato je bil vsaj kratkoročno ekonomski učinek GH odvisen od obstoja družbe Malév in njena tržna vrednost bi se znatno zmanjšala, če bi šla družba Malév v stečaj.
In the absence of a credible restructuring plan, it was clear from the beginning that neither the loans nor the capital increase would allow turning around the company which continued to be in a critical state with zero market value.
Ker ni bilo verjetnega načrta za prestrukturiranje, je bilo že od začetka jasno, da posojila in dokapitalizacija ne bodo povzročile preobrata družbe s tržno vednostjo nič, ki je bila še naprej v kritičnem stanju.
These measures thus are practically equal to a straightforward grant, as the State had no perspective of recovering the "invested" funds.
Ti ukrepi so torej praktično enakovredni neposrednim nepovratnim sredstvom, ker država ni imela možnosti povračila „vloženih“ sredstev.
Therefore the Commission considers that measures 5-8 conferred an advantage to Malév.
Zato Komisija meni, da so ukrepi 5–8 družbi Malév dali prednost.
According to the foregoing assessment, all measures at stake (measures 1-8) confer an advantage to Malév.
V skladu z navedeno oceno vsi zadevni ukrepi (ukrepi 1–8) družbi Malév dajejo prednost.
This advantage has been granted from State resources.
Ta prednost je bila dodeljena iz državnih sredstev.
Moreover, Malév is an airline company and as such qualifies as an undertaking.
Poleg tega je Malév letalska družba in se šteje za podjetje.
It competes with other airlines which do not benefit from the same advantage.
Konkurira drugim letalskim družbam, ki nimajo enake prednosti.
Hence, the measures distort competition.
Zato ukrepi izkrivljajo konkurenco.
Furthermore, it is active in a sector (aviation) in which trade definitely exists between Member States; the criterion of the affectation of trade within the Union is also fulfilled.
Poleg tega deluje v sektorju (letalstvo), v katerem zagotovo obstaja trgovina med državami članicami, zato je izpolnjeno tudi merilo vpliva na trgovino znotraj Unije.
Finally, the measures are specific and selective in that they favour only one undertaking (i.e. Malév).
Ukrepi so specifični in selektivni, ker dajejo prednost samo enemu podjetju (tj. družbi Malév).
On account of the arguments exposed above, the Commission concludes that measures 1-8 fulfil the criteria enshrined in Article 107(1) TFEU.
Komisija na podlagi zgoraj predstavljenih trditev ugotavlja, da ukrepi 1–8 izpolnjujejo merila iz člena 107(1) PDEU.
Under those circumstances, they have to be considered State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
V skladu s tem jih je treba šteti za državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU.
Compatibility of the Aid with the Internal Market
Združljivost pomoči z notranjim trgom
Articles 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU provide for exemptions to the general rule that State aid is incompatible with the internal market as stated in Article 107(1).
Člena 107(2) in 107(3) PDEU določata izjeme od splošnega pravila, da državna pomoč ni združljiva z notranjim trgom, kot je navedeno v členu 107(1).
In addition, the Hungarian authorities confirmed the airline's permanent difficulties and that since the second half of 2006 it qualified for collective insolvency proceedings and thus fulfilled point 10(c) of the Rescue and restructuring Guidelines.
Poleg tega so madžarski organi potrdili stalne težave letalske družbe in da je od druge polovice leta 2006 izpolnjevala pogoje za uvedbo kolektivnega postopka insolventnosti in tako izpolnila točko 10(c) Smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
Consequently, the only basis for compatibility would be the Rescue and restructuring Guidelines.
Zato so edina podlaga za združljivost Smernice za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
With regard to eligibility and the "one time, last time" condition, the Commission notes that the measures under scrutiny do not form a "restructuring continuum".
V zvezi z upravičenostjo in pogojem o „enkratni pomoči“ Komisija ugotavlja, da proučevani ukrepi ne predstavljajo „nepretrganega prestrukturiranja“.
The airline changed owner twice in the relevant period (i.e. 2007-2010) as it was privatised and re-nationalised.
Letalska družba je v zadevnem obdobju (tj. 2007–2010) dvakrat spremenila lastnika, ker je bila privatizirana in ponovno nacionalizirana.
It was under continuous "restructuring" but without a coherent plan.
Nenehno je bila v postopku „prestrukturiranja“, vendar brez skladnega načrta.
In fact some cost reduction initiatives (layoffs and route cuttings) were started after privatisation but the unit cost did not decrease enough.
Po privatizaciji so se sicer začele izvajati nekatere pobude za znižanje stroškov (odpuščanja in opuščanje prog), vendar se stroški na enoto niso dovolj znižali.
According to the Hungarian authorities, a new "strategic orientation" was elaborated in 2009, which was again revised by the consultancy Roland Berger in the context of the re-nationalisation.
Po navedbah madžarskih organov je bila leta 2009 pripravljena nova „strateška usmeritev“, ki pa jo je svetovalno podjetje Roland Berger v okviru ponovne nacionalizacije spet spremenilo.
Therefore, the measures in questions are different restructuring measures, in principle violating the "one time, last time" principle.
Zato so zadevni ukrepi različni ukrepi prestrukturiranja, ki načeloma kršijo načelo o enkratni pomoči.