natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For the reasons indicated in the opening decision (and which have not been contested by Finland), these two criteria are met.
Zaradi razlogov, navedenih v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka (in ki jim Finska ne nasprotuje), sta ti dve merili izpolnjeni.
The measures are granted by individual decisions taken by the LG to make use of funds that it has been allocated in its annual budget by the regional assembly of Åland.
Ukrepi so odobreni s posameznimi sklepi, ki jih je sprejela lokalna vlada, da bi uporabila sredstva, ki ji jih je v letnem proračunu dodelila regionalna skupščina Ålandskih otokov.
The measures are thus clearly financed by the State and individually targeted at ÅI.
Tako je jasno, da ukrepe financira država in da so ciljno usmerjeni na podjetje ÅI.
Finland has argued that the measures are not State aid because they did not provide ÅI with an advantage that it would not have been able to obtain on the markets, be it from a private shareholder or from a private creditor.
Finska je trdila, da ukrepi niso državna pomoč, ker podjetju ÅI niso zagotovili prednosti, ki je v običajnih tržnih razmerah ne bi moglo pridobili, bodisi od zasebnega delničarja bodisi od zasebnega kreditodajalca.
It is a settled principle of State aid law (usually referred to as the Market Economy Investor Principle, or MEIP) that an investment by public authorities in the capital of undertakings constitutes State aid unless in similar circumstances a private investor, having regard in particular to the prospects of achieving a return, might have provided the same capital [13].
Ustaljeno načelo prava državne pomoči (ki se običajno imenuje načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu), da je naložba državnih organov v kapital podjetij državna pomoč, razen če bi zasebni vlagatelj v podobnih okoliščinah in zlasti ob upoštevanju možnosti donosa, morebiti zagotovil enak kapital [13].
Similarly, under point 3.1 of the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees [14] (‘the Guarantee Notice’), a guarantee provided by public authorities will constitute State aid unless funding is made available on conditions which would be acceptable for a private operator under the normal conditions of a market economy.
Podobno je v točki 3.1 Obvestila Komisije o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč v obliki poroštev [14] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: obvestilo o poroštvih) poroštvo, ki ga zagotovijo državni organi oblasti, državna pomoč, razen če gre za financiranje pod pogoji, ki bi bili pod normalnimi pogoji tržnega gospodarstva sprejemljivi za zasebni subjekt.
In the opening decision, the Commission expressed doubts that the MEIP was met in relation to the capital injections and guarantees, based in particular on two observations concerning ÅI:
Komisija je v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka izrazila dvom, da je bil v zvezi z dokapitalizacijami in poroštvi izpolnjeno načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu, zlasti na podlagi dveh ugotovitev v zvezi s podjetjem ÅI:
The profits between 1998 and 2000 were small and decreasing (respectively EUR 38000, 28000 and 9000).
Dobički med letoma 1998 in 2000 so bili majhni in so se zmanjševali (38000 EUR leta 1998, 28000 EUR leta 1999 in 9000 EUR leta 2000).
Similarly, when ÅI eventually again showed a profit in 2006 this was a mere EUR 557,43. The profit forecasted for 2007 in 2006 (i.e. what was anticipated when the decision to grant the last measures were taken) was only EUR 5868,46 [15].
V letu 2006 je podjetje ÅI končno spet poslovalo z dobičkom, vendar je znašal samo 557,43 EUR. Napovedani dobiček za leti 2007 in 2006 (t.j. kaj je bilo pričakovano, ko je bil sprejet sklep o odobritvi zadnjih ukrepov) je bil samo 5868,46 EUR [15].
In addition, it appeared to the Commission that ÅI’s cash flow was insufficient to cover its costs, and had been so since 2000, which led to the presumption that the measures had been necessary simply to cover this cash drain [16].
Poleg tega je Komisija menila, da denarni tok podjetja ÅI ni zadostoval za kritje stroškov in tako je bilo od leta 2000, kar je vodilo do domneve, da so bili ukrepi potrebni preprosto za kritje te izgube iz poslovanja [16].
Finland has dismissed this view.
Finska je to stališče ovrgla.
Its arguments will be discussed below separately for the capital increases and the loan guarantees.
Njene trditve so obravnavane v nadaljevanju ločeno za povečanja kapitala in za poroštva za posojila.
The capital injections
Dokapitalizacije
First of all, Finland dismisses the view that ÅI had a liquidity problem.
Najprej je Finska ovrgla stališče, da je podjetje ÅI imelo likvidnostne težave.
In fact, although the company’s operations had been limited in size prior to the iTiden project, its operational result and liquidity had been satisfactory and remained so throughout the period covered by the investigation.
Čeprav je bil obseg dejavnosti podjetja pred projektom iTiden omejen, sta bila njegov poslovni rezultat in likvidnost zadovoljiva in sta taka ostala v celem obdobju, ki je zajeto v preiskavo.
The measures have thus not been necessary to cover the operations’ costs.
Ukrepi torej niso bili potrebni za kritje stroškov iz poslovanja.
Rather, the measures were intended to finance the expansion of the company and should consequently be considered investments.
Namen ukrepov je bil financirati širitev podjetja in jih je zato treba šteti kot naložbe.
In the light of the conditions of these investments, they were justified under the Market Economy Investor Principle and consequently do not constitute State aid.
Z vidika pogojev teh naložb so bili utemeljeni ob upoštevanju načela vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu in zato niso državna pomoč.
In this context, Finland argues that most capital increases were used to finance the iTiden project, whereas the rest were intended for ÅI's other projects (see recital 17 above).
V tej zvezi Finska trdi, da je bila večina povečanj kapitala uporabljena za financiranje projekta iTiden, ostalo pa za druge projekte podjetja ÅI (glej uvodno izjavo 17 zgoraj).
The Commission makes the following assessment.
Komisija daje naslednjo oceno.
As a preliminary point the Commission underscores that the capital that a shareholder provides to a firm is by definition not earmarked for a certain use but becomes part of the tangible equity of the company.
Najprej Komisija poudarja, da kapital, ki ga delničar zagotovi podjetju, po definiciji ni namenjen določeni uporabi, ampak postane del opredmetenega kapitala podjetja.
It is therefore normal, when an investment is provided as general equity, to assess its compliance with the MEIP against the general performance prospects of the firm as a whole.
Zato je običajno, da se v primeru, ko se naložba zagotovi kot splošni kapital, oceni njena skladnost z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu v razmerju do pričakovane splošne uspešnosti podjetja kot celote.
This does not exclude, where evidence thereof is available, making an assessment of the expected return on specific planned investments, provided of course that such information was available at the time when the investment decision was made.
To ne izključuje izdelave ocene pričakovanega donosa posebnih načrtovanih naložb, če so na voljo dokazi, seveda pod pogojem, da so bile v času, ko je bila sprejeta odločitev o vlaganju, take informacije na voljo.
As regards the general financial performance of ÅI, the Commission accepts, based on the evidence submitted in the investigation, that the operational result of ÅI consistently covered its losses and ensured liquidity.
Glede splošne finančne uspešnosti podjetja ÅI Komisija na podlagi dokazov, predloženih med preiskavo, sprejema, da je poslovni rezultat podjetja ÅI dosledno kril izgube in zagotavljal likvidnost.
The evidence available does not allow the conclusion that the capital increases (or the loans obtained through the guarantees) were used to cover losses stemming from ÅI’s operations.
Na podlagi dokazov, ki so na voljo, ni mogoče sklepati, da so bila povečanja kapitala (ali posojila, pridobljena prek poroštev) uporabljena za kritje izgub, nastalih pri poslovanju podjetja ÅI.
However, the fact remains that the LG made available to ÅI important additional capital that prima facie generated no or very little profits between 1997 and 2006.
Dejstvo pa je, da je lokalna vlada podjetju ÅI dala na voljo pomemben dodatni kapital, ki na prvi pogled med letoma 1997 in 2006 ni ustvaril nič ali zelo malo dobička.
The crux therefore is — as Finland itself argues — whether the LG had reason to expect a return on its capital that would have been sufficient for a private investor to have made the same investment.
Kot trdi tudi Finska sama, je glavno vprašanje, ali je lokalna vlada imela razloge pričakovati donosnost kapitala, ki bi zadostoval tudi zasebnemu vlagatelju, da bi se odločil za enako naložbo.
This has to be assessed on the basis of what was known to the LG at the time of the capital increases.
To je treba oceniti na podlagi tega, kar je bilo lokalni vladi poznano v času povečanj kapitala.
Finland has argued that the lion’s share of the capital increases was intended to finance the iTiden project, phases 1 and 2, whereas the remaining capital increases were assigned to various other investments.
Finska trdi, da je bil levji delež povečanj kapitala namenjen financiranju prve in druge faze projekta iTiden, preostala povečanja kapitala pa so bila dodeljena različnim drugim naložbam.
For reasons of clarity, the capital increases that were used to finance the iTiden project are dealt with first in the analysis presented below.
Zaradi jasnosti so povečanja kapitala, uporabljena za financiranje projekta iTiden, v spodaj predstavljeni analizi obravnavana najprej.
The iTiden capital increases
Povečanja kapitala projekta iTiden
Finland argues that all capital increases with the exception of C-I, C-II, C-III, C-VIII and C-IX were made with the purpose of funding iTiden, which was by far ÅI’s biggest single project.
Finska trdi, da so bila vsa povečanja kapitala, razen C-I, C-II, C-III, C-VIII in C-IX, namenjena financiranju projekta iTiden, ki je bil daleč največji projekt podjetja ÅI.
The earliest capital increase assigned to the iTiden project was thus made in 2001 (C-IV).
Prvo povečanje kapitala je bilo tako projektu iTiden dodeljeno v letu 2001 (C-IV).
As regards the conditions on which these capital increases were made by the LG, and crucially the return that was expected at the time of the decision, Finland has provided the following information:
Glede pogojev, pod katerimi je lokalna vlada izvedla povečanje kapitala in, kar je bistveno, donosa, ki je bil pričakovan v času odločitve, je Finska predložila naslednje informacije:
The LG’s decisions to proceed with the capital increases related to iTiden were made on the basis of information provided at informal meetings involving the LG and representatives of ÅI.
Lokalna vlada se je za povečanje kapitala v zvezi s projektom iTiden odločala na podlagi informacij, ki so bile zagotovljene na neformalnih srečanjih lokalne vlade in predstavnikov podjetja ÅI.
Finland states that no minutes were kept of these meetings.
Finska navaja, da na teh srečanjih niso bili vodeni zapisniki.
Finland has nevertheless submitted to the Commission presentations made at such informal meetings or at meetings of ÅI’s board.
Kljub temu je Finska Komisiji predložila predstavitve s takih neformalnih srečanj ali srečanj upravnega odbora podjetja ÅI.
These contain succinct accounts of the background and main features of the iTiden project and profitability calculations for iTiden phase 1 and phase 2.
Te predstavitve vsebujejo kratka in jedrnata poročila o ozadju in glavnih značilnostih projekta iTiden in izračune donosnosti za prvo in drugo fazo projekta.
This evidence consequently allows the Commission to ascertain what return was anticipated by the LG at the time it made the capital increases related to iTiden.
Zato ta dokaz Komisiji omogoča, da preveri, kakšen donos je lokalna vlada pričakovala v času, ko je izvedla povečanje kapitala v zvezi s projektom iTiden.
On 31 January 2002, ÅI held an informal meeting with the LG in order to secure its approval to launch the construction of iTiden in 2002 (subsequent to the purchase of the land which had taken place in 2001).
31. januarja 2002 je imelo podjetje ÅI neformalno srečanje z lokalno vlado, da bi zagotovili odobritev začetka gradnje projekta iTiden v letu 2002 (po nakupu zemljišča, ki je bil opravljen leta 2001).
At this meeting, ÅI presented a profitability calculation, where the assumption was that the project would yield a yearly return of 3 % on ÅI’s own equity.
Na tem srečanju je podjetje ÅI predstavilo izračun donosnosti, ki je predvideval, da bo letni donos projekta 3 % lastniškega kapitala podjetja ÅI.
In this calculation it was estimated that phase 1 would yield a surplus of only EUR 700 assuming no return on ÅI’s own equity.
V tem izračunu je bilo ocenjeno, da bo presežek, ustvarjen v prvi fazi, samo 700 EUR, če se predpostavlja, da ne bo donosa lastniškega kapitala podjetja ÅI.
On 2 January 2006 the board of ÅI met to discuss the launch of the construction of phase 2 and the call for a capital increase that would be launched to finance this.
2. januarja 2006 se je sestal upravni odbor podjetja ÅI, da bi obravnaval začetek gradnje druge faze in poziv za povečanje kapitala za njeno financiranje.
According to a profitability calculation presented at the meeting, the project would break even with a return on equity of 3 %.
Po izračunu donosnosti, ki je bil predstavljen na srečanju, bi projekt pokril stroške z donosnostjo lastniškega kapitala v višini 3 %.
However, this calculation had to be revised to account for the increased cost of adapting the buildings to the tenant’s needs.
Vendar je bilo treba zaradi upoštevanja zvišanja stroškov prilagoditve stavb potrebam najemnikov ta izračun popraviti.
Thus, a revised calculation was established on 10 January 2006 to serve as a basis for the capital increase decided at the general assembly on 12 June 2006 (although the capital increase was only paid on 15 February 2007 for technical reasons — this is capital increase C-XI).
Tako je bil 10. januarja 2006 izdelan popravljen izračun, ki je bil podlaga za povečanje kapitala, o katerem je skupščina odločila 12. junija 2006 (čeprav je bilo povečanje kapitala iz tehničnih razlogov plačano šele 15. februarja 2007 – to je povečanje kapitala C-XI).
In this calculation, the assumed annual return on own equity for phase 2 of iTiden was set at 1 %.
V tem izračunu je pričakovani letni donos lastniškega kapitala za drugo fazo projekta iTiden znašal 1 %.
Finland has provided this evidence and states that this accurately accounts for the contemporaneous yield expectations based on which the LG decided to make the capital increases for the iTiden project, i.e. C-IV, C-V, C-VI, C-VII and C-X for phase 1 and C-XI for phase 2.
Finska je zagotovila ta dokaz in navaja, da točno prikazuje takratna pričakovanja o donosih, na podlagi katerih se je lokalna vlada odločila za povečanja kapitala za projekt iTiden, t.j. C-IV, C-V, C-VI, C-VII in C-X za prvo fazo in C-XI za drugo fazo.
These profitability assessments are based on anticipated revenue (i.e. rents) from iTiden.
Te ocene donosnosti temeljijo na pričakovanem prihodku (t.j. najemninah) projekta iTiden.
Finland has argued that the return on the LG’s investment should also take into account the prospect of capital gains consisting in an increase in value of the property over time.
Finska je trdila tudi, da bi donosnost naložbe lokalne vlade morala upoštevati tudi možnost kapitalskih dobičkov, ki jih sčasoma prinaša povečanje vrednosti nepremičnine.
However, Finland has provided no concrete evidence of this.
Vendar Finska ni zagotovila konkretnega dokaza o tem.
Such considerations are not integrated in the profitability calculations, which indicate that they were not taken into account when the investment decisions were made.
Taki razmisleki niso vključeni v izračune donosnosti, kar kaže na to, da pri sprejemanju odločitev o vlaganju niso bili upoštevani.
On the basis of the above evidence, the Commission finds that a private investor would not have made similar investments against this expected return.
Na podlagi zgornjih dokazov Komisija ugotavlja, da se zasebni vlagatelj na podlagi te pričakovane donosnosti ne bi odločil za podobne naložbe.
Any investor putting money into a project that involves some element of risk (such as commercial real estate development) will demand a return that adequately reflects the risk inherent in the investment.
Vlagatelj, ki vlaga denar v projekt, ki vključuje kakšen element tveganja (kot je gradnja poslovnih nepremičnin), bo zahteval donos, ki ustrezno odraža tveganost naložbe.
Thus, he will expect a ‘risk premium’ that exceeds the known return that he can receive from an alternative, risk-free asset (‘the risk-free rate’).
Tako bo pričakoval „premijo za tveganje“, ki presega poznani donos, ki ga lahko prejme iz drugih netveganih sredstev („obrestna mera brez tveganja“).
A common benchmark for the risk-free rate are AAA-rated government bonds for shorter maturities.
Skupno merilo za obrestno mero brez tveganja so državne obveznice z oceno AAA za krajše zapadlosti.
For the purpose of this assessment, the yield on two-year Finnish government bonds is used, as Finland did not issue bonds with shorter maturities.
Za to oceno je bil uporabljen donos dveletnih finskih državnih obveznic, ker Finska ni izdala obveznic s krajšo zapadlostjo.
Accordingly, this gives a risk-free rate of between 2,7 and 4,2 % in 2002, between 2,2 and 2,7 % in 2003 and between 2,8 and 3,8 % in 2006.
Skladno s tem je dobljena obrestna mera brez tveganja od 2,7 % do 4,2 % v letu 2002, od 2,2 % do 2,7 % v letu 2003 in od 2,8 % do 3,8 % v letu 2006.
Compared to the return on equity expected by the LG when it decided to make the iTiden-related capital increases, the Commission observes that the LG could have achieved the same or even higher returns without any of the risk associated with the property projects.
V primerjavi z donosnostjo lastniškega kapitala, ki ga je lokalna vlada pričakovala, ko se je odločila za povečanja kapitala v zvezi s projektom iTiden, Komisija ugotavlja, da bi lokalna vlada lahko dosegla enako ali celo višjo donosnost brez tveganja, povezanega z nepremičninskimi projekti.
Indeed, even under the most optimistic reading, the ‘risk premium’ (i.e. the return exceeding the risk-free premium) would have been at most 0,3 % for capital increases C-IV and C-V (i.e. the capital increases of 2001 and 2002).
Tudi ob najbolj optimističnem branju bi bila „premija za tveganje“ (t.j. donos, ki presega netvegano premijo) največ 0,3 % za povečanji kapitala C-IV in C-V (t.j. povečanji kapitala v letih 2001 in 2002).
For the capital increases made as a result of the 2003 decision to launch the construction of phase 1 of iTiden (and thus on the basis of the expected returns presented at the informal meeting of 4 March 2003, see recital 48 above), i.e. C-VI, C-VII and C-X, the expected return was zero, meaning that an infinitely better return could have been achieved by taking no risk at all.
Za povečanja kapitala, ki so bila izvedena zaradi odločitve o začetku gradnje prve faze projekta iTiden, ki je bila sprejeta leta 2003 (in s tem na podlagi pričakovanih donosov, ki so bili predstavljeni na neformalnem srečanju 4. marca 2003, glej uvodno izjavo 48 zgoraj), t.j. C-VI, C-VII in C-X, je bila pričakovana donosnost nič, kar pomeni, da bi bila neskončno boljša donosnost lahko dosežena brez kakršnega koli tveganja.
Similarly, for the capital increase for phase 2, C-XI, the expected return of 1 % was largely inferior to the risk-free rate available at the time.
Podobno je bila za povečanje C-XI za drugo fazo pričakovana donosnost v višini 1 % veliko nižja od obrestne mere brez tveganja, ki je bila takrat na voljo.
It is obvious that no private investor would have been satisfied with the negative, or marginal, risk premium that the LG was ready to accept for the capital increases mentioned in recitals 47 to 49 above.
Očitno je, da noben zasebni vlagatelj ne bi bil zadovoljen s to negativno ali mejno premijo za tveganje, ki jo je bila lokalna vlada pripravljena sprejeti za povečanja kapitala, navedena v uvodnih izjavah 47–49 zgoraj.
If need be, this can be corroborated by empirical data on expected returns in the Åland property market.
Po potrebi se to lahko podpre z empirični podatki o pričakovanih donosih na nepremičninskem trgu na Ålandskih otokih.
According to a report [17] from KPMG dated 10 July 2007, commissioned by the Finnish authorities and submitted to the Commission on 17 July 2007, the return demanded by private investors on office property investments in Åland is 7 % (and 8 % for industrial property).
Glede na poročilo [17] KPMG z dne 10. julija 2007, ki so ga naročili finski organi in ga Komisiji predložili 17. julija 2007, so zasebni vlagatelji za naložbe v pisarniške prostore na Ålandskih otokih zahtevali 7 % donosnost (in 8 % za industrijske nepremičnine).
Although this report was drawn up later than the investment decisions of the LG at issue in this decision, it is nevertheless relevant, as the report is based on observations of past investments and there is no obvious reason to believe that the required return would have been significantly lower in the preceding years.
Čeprav je bilo to poročilo pripravljeno po odločitvah lokalne vlade o vlaganju, ki jih ta sklep obravnava, je pomembno, ker temelji na ugotovitvah preteklih naložb in ni očitnega razloga za domnevo, da bi bila zahtevana donosnost v predhodnih letih znatno nižja.
At any rate, it provides convincing indications that the returns expected by ÅI would not have been sufficient for a private investor.
Vsekakor daje prepričljive navedbe, da donosi, ki jih je pričakovalo podjetje ÅI, za zasebnega vlagatelja ne bi bili zadostni.
Finland has argued that, despite the low or zero expected return, the investments would be consistent with the MEIP because (i) prior to starting construction, ÅI had approached potential tenants and was confident that it would achieve an occupancy rate of at least 80 % and (ii) in view of the actual financial performance of ÅI (and thus principally of the iTiden project) in the years from 2004 onwards, and the potential capital gains thus accrued, the investments turned out to be profitable.
Finska je trdila tudi, da so naložbe kljub nizki ali ničelni pričakovani donosnosti skladne z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu, ker i) je podjetje ÅI pred začetkom gradnje navezalo stik s potencialnimi najemniki in je bilo prepričano, da bo doseglo najmanj 80 % zasedenost in ii) zaradi dejanske finančne uspešnosti podjetja ÅI (in pri tem predvsem projekta iTiden) od leta 2004 dalje, in tako natečenih potencialnih kapitalskih dobičkov, so se naložbe izkazale kot donosne.
In this respect, and without it being necessary to go into the merits of ÅI’s financial performance in later years, it suffices to reiterate that the question is not whether the firm’s results today are adequate but whether, based on what was known and could be assumed at the time when the LG decided to make the State resources available to ÅI (having regard to the expected 80 % occupancy rate), a private investor acting on market terms would have provided the same capital to the firm.
V tej zvezi in brez potrebe, da bi se temeljite ukvarjali s finančno uspešnostjo podjetja ÅI v poznejših letih, je dovolj ponoviti, da vprašanje ni, ali so današnji rezultati podjetja ustrezni, ampak ali bi podlagi tega, kar je bilo poznano in je bilo mogoče predpostavljati takrat, ko se je lokalna vlada odločila, da bo dala državna sredstva na voljo podjetju ÅI (ob upoštevanju pričakovane 80 % zasedenosti), zasebni vlagatelj, ki deluje v tržnih pogojih, podjetju zagotovil enak kapital.
For the reasons explained above, the Commission finds that a private investor would not have done so.
Kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj, Komisija ugotavlja, da tega ne bi naredil.