natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Given that Article 107(1) of the Treaty applies only to undertakings, it follows that in the case in question the measure does not fall within the scope of that Article.
Ker se člen 107(1) Pogodbe uporablja le za podjetja, iz tega sledi, da ukrep v obravnavani zadevi ne spada v področje uporabe tega člena.
Finally, the Commission notes that, from 1 January 2013, in the case of hybrid use of a building, it is possible under the Italian legislation to calculate the pro-rata commercial use of the real estate and to impose IMU on economic activities only.
Komisija navaja, da je po italijanski zakonodaji od 1. januarja 2013 v primeru mešane rabe stavb mogoče izračunati sorazmerno komercialno rabo nepremičnine in uvesti občinski davek le na gospodarsko dejavnost.
The Commission points out in this context that, if an entity performs both economic and non-economic activities, the partial exemption that it enjoys for the part of the real estate used for non-economic activities does not represent an advantage for that entity when it performs an economic activity as an undertaking.
Komisija v tem okviru opozarja, da, če subjekt opravlja gospodarske in negospodarske dejavnosti, delna oprostitev davka, do katere je upravičen za del nepremičnine, ki je v rabi za negospodarske dejavnosti, ne pomeni, da ima ta subjekt prednost, kadar opravlja gospodarsko dejavnost kot podjetje.
Therefore, the measure does not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) in this type of situation either.
Torej ukrep tudi v tovrstnem primeru ne pomeni državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1).
According to the Treaty and the established case law of the Court of Justice, when the Commission finds that aid is incompatible with the internal market, it is competent to decide that the State concerned must abolish or alter it [73].
Ko Komisija v skladu s Pogodbo in ustaljeno sodno prakso Sodišča ugotovi, da pomoč ni združljiva z notranjim trgom, je pristojna za odločitev, da jo mora zadevna država ukiniti ali spremeniti [73].
The Court has also consistently held that the obligation of a State to abolish aid regarded by the Commission as being incompatible with the internal market is designed to re-establish the previously existing situation [74].
Prav tako je Sodišče večkrat razsodilo, da je namen obveznosti države, da ukine pomoč, za katero Komisija meni, da ni združljiva z notranjim trgom, ponovna vzpostavitev prejšnjih razmer [74].
In this context, the Court has established that that objective is achieved once the recipient has repaid the amounts granted, thus forfeiting the advantage which it had enjoyed over its competitors on the market, and the situation prior to the payment of the aid is restored [75].
V tem okviru je Sodišče ugotovilo, da je cilj dosežen, ko prejemnik povrne zneske, ki so mu bili dodeljeni, in tako izgubi prednost, ki jo je imel pred konkurenti na trgu, ter ko se ponovno vzpostavijo razmere pred izplačilom pomoči [75].
Following that case law, Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/99 [76] stipulates that ‘where negative decisions are taken in respect of unlawful aid, the Commission shall decide that the Member State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the recipient.’
V skladu s to sodno prakso je v členu 14(1) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/99 [76] določeno, da „če se v primerih nezakonite pomoči sprejmejo negativne odločbe, Komisija odloči, da mora zadevna država članica sprejeti vse potrebne ukrepe, da upravičenec vrne pomoč“.
Thus, once the ICI exemption measure is considered unlawful and incompatible aid, it must in principle be recovered in order to re-establish the situation that existed on the market prior to the granting of the aid.
Ko se oprostitev občinskega davka na nepremičnine obravnava kot nezakonita in nezdružljiva pomoč, jo je treba načeloma vrniti, da se ponovno vzpostavijo razmere na trgu, kakršne so bile pred dodelitvijo pomoči.
However, Regulation (EC) No 659/99 imposes limits on ordering recovery.
Vendar v Uredbi (ES) št. 659/99 niso določene meje pri odreditvi vračila.
For example, Article 14(1) provides that ‘the Commission shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of Community law’ such as the protection of legitimate expectation.
V členu 14(1) je določeno, da „Komisija ne zahteva vračila pomoči, če bi bilo to v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava Skupnosti“, kot je zaščita načela upravičenega pričakovanja.
The Court of Justice has also recognised one exception to the obligation for a Member State to implement a recovery decision addressed to it, namely the existence of exceptional circumstances that would make it absolutely impossible for the Member State to execute the decision properly [77].
Sodišče je priznalo samo eno izjemo v zvezi z obveznostjo, da država članica izvede odločbo o vračilu, ki je nanjo naslovljena, namreč obstoj izjemnih okoliščin, zaradi katerih je absolutno nemogoče, da bi država članica odločbo primerno izvedla [77].
Since these exceptions were raised by the Italian authorities in the context of the formal investigation, the Commission must examine whether they apply to the present case in order to determine if recovery is required.
Ker so italijanski organi v okviru formalnega postopka preiskave navedli takšne izjeme, mora Komisija proučiti, ali se uporabljajo v tej zadevi, da določi, ali je potrebno vračilo.
The case law of the Court of Justice and the Commission's own decision-making practice have established that an order to recover aid would infringe a general principle of Union law if, as a result of the Commission's actions, a legitimate expectation exists on the part of the recipient of a measure that the aid has been granted in accordance with Union law.
Na podlagi sodne prakse Sodišča in prakse odločanja Komisije je bilo ugotovljeno, da bi se z odreditvijo vračila pomoči kršilo splošno načelo prava Unije, če prejemniki ukrepa zaradi ravnanja Komisije legitimno pričakujejo, da je bila pomoč dodeljena v skladu s pravom Unije.
The Court has repeatedly held that the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation extends to any person in a situation where an authority of the Union has caused him or her to have justified expectations.
Sodišče je večkrat razsodilo, da pravica sklicevanja na načelo varstva legitimnega pričakovanja velja za vsako zadevno osebo, pri kateri je institucija Unije ustvarila legitimna pričakovanja.
However, a person may not plead legitimate expectation unless he or she has been given precise assurances by the administrative body [78].
Vendar se oseba ne sme sklicevati na načelo legitimnega pričakovanja brez natančnih zagotovil, ki jih je prejela od upravnega organa [78].
In the present case, the Italian authorities and the 78 interested parties have essentially invoked the existence of legitimate expectation based on the Commission's reply to a parliamentary written question of 2009 [79].
Italijanski organi in 78 zainteresiranih strani so se v tej zadevi dejansko sklicevali na obstoj legitimnega pričakovanja, ki je temeljilo na odgovoru Komisije na pisno vprašanje parlamenta iz leta 2009 [79].
In its reply, the Commission declared that it had ‘carried out a preliminary assessment and considered that there was no ground to proceed further, since it appears that the ICI tax regime is not liable to put ecclesiastic institutions in an advantageous competitive position’.
Komisija je v odgovoru izjavila, da je izvedla predhodno presojo in da je menila, da ni razlogov za nadaljnje ukrepanje, saj se zdi, da davčna shema občinskega davka na nepremičnine cerkvenim institucijam ne zagotavlja ugodnejšega konkurenčnega položaja.
The Commission maintains that this reply did not given rise to any legitimate expectation, for the following reasons.
Komisija vztraja pri tem, da odgovor ni ustvaril legitimnih pričakovanj zaradi naslednjih razlogov.
First, the Commission’s statement was merely the result of a ‘preliminary assessment’; the Commission did not state that it had taken a decision, but only that it considered that there was no ground to proceed further.
Izjava Komisije je bila zgolj posledica „predhodne presoje“; Komisija ni navedla, da je sprejela odločitev, ampak le, da po njenem mnenju ni bilo razlogov za nadaljnje ukrepanje.
Second, the Commission indicated tentatively that it appeared that the ICI exemption was not likely to confer any advantage on ecclesiastical institutions.
Komisija je okvirno navedla, da se zdi, da cerkvene institucije z oprostitvijo občinskega davka na nepremičnine verjetno niso pridobile nobene prednosti.
Third, the question and the reply referred only to ecclesiastical institutions, which are a subcategory of the non-commercial entities concerned by the ICI exemption.
Vprašanje in odgovor sta bila povezana le s cerkvenimi institucijami, ki so podkategorija nekomercialnih subjektov, na katere se nanaša oprostitev občinskega davka na nepremičnine.
In the light of the above, the Commission considers that it did not provide specific, unconditional and consistent assurances of a nature such that the recipients of the measure at issue entertained justified expectations that the scheme was lawful, in the sense that it did not fall within the scope of the state aid rules, and that consequently any advantage derived from it could not be subject to recovery proceedings.
Komisija glede na navedeno meni, da ni navedla posebnih, neomejenih in skladnih zagotovil take narave, da bi pri prejemnikih obravnavanega ukrepa ustvarila legitimna pričakovanja o zakonitosti sheme, v tem smislu da ni spadala v področje uporabe pravil o državni pomoči, ter da zato kakršna koli prednost, ki iz nje izhaja, ne bi mogla biti predmet postopkov vračila.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that it did not make any precise and unconditional statement to the effect that the ICI exemption at issue should not be considered state aid.
Komisija meni, da ni dala nobene natančne in neomejene izjave v zvezi s tem, da se zadevna oprostitev občinskega davka na nepremičnine ne bi smela obravnavati kot državna pomoč.
Italy has also argued that the replies given by the Commission to the complainants on the ICI exemption, about which Italy was informally told, created a legitimate expectation on the part of the non-commercial entities as regards the compatibility of the ICI exemption with Union law.
Italija je tudi trdila, da je Komisija z odgovori pritožnikom v zvezi z oprostitvijo občinskega davka na nepremičnine, o katerih je bila Italija neuradno obveščena, pri nekomercialnih subjektih ukrepa ustvarila legitimno pričakovanje glede združljivosti te oprostitve s pravom Unije.
The Commission does not agree with the views expressed by Italy.
Komisija se ne strinja s stališči Italije.
Preliminary assessment letters sent by the Commission to the complainants, of which the Member State was only unofficially informed, do not constitute the Commission’s final position.
Dopisi s predhodno presojo, ki jih je Komisija poslala pritožnikom, o katerih je bila država članica le neuradno obveščena, ne pomenijo uradnega stališča Komisije.
Whereas Commission decisions are made public and published in the Official Journal, this is not the case in a simple administrative procedure where - on the basis of the facts available - the Commission does not harbour serious doubts about the compatibility of the measures examined.
Odločitve Komisije se objavijo javno in v Uradnem listu, v preprostem upravnem postopku pa ni tako, kadar Komisija – na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev – nima resnih dvomov o združljivosti proučevanih ukrepov.
Moreover, the letter sent to the complainants on 15 February 2010 was challenged by two complainants before the General Court and did not become final; these Court actions were withdrawn only subsequent to the decision initiating the procedure.
Dve zainteresirani strani sta dopis, poslan pritožnikom 15. februarja 2010, izpodbijali pred Splošnim sodiščem s tožbama, ki pa nista postali pravnomočni; ti tožbi pred Sodiščem sta bili umaknjeni šele po sklepu o sprožitvi postopka.
The Commission therefore concludes that, in the present case, Italy and the 78 interested parties were not given any assurance by any institution of the Union which could justify legitimate expectation and therefore prevent the Commission from ordering recovery.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da v tej zadevi Italija in 78 zainteresiranih strani niso od nobene institucije Unije prejele nobenih zagotovil, s katerimi bi se lahko utemeljilo legitimno pričakovanje, ter tako preprečilo, da bi Komisija odredila vračilo.
Exceptional circumstances: absolute impossibility of recovery
Izjemne okoliščine: absolutna nezmožnost vračila
Under Article 288 of the Treaty, the Member State to which a recovery decision is addressed is obliged to execute the decision.
Država članica, na katero je v skladu s členom 288 Pogodbe naslovljen sklep o vračilu, mora ta sklep izvršiti.
As indicated above, there is one exception to this obligation, namely where the Member States demonstrates the existence of exceptional circumstances that would make it absolutely impossible to execute the decision properly.
Kot je bilo že navedeno, obstaja pri tej obveznosti ena izjema, in sicer kadar države članice dokažejo obstoj izjemnih okoliščin, zaradi katerih bi bilo absolutno nemogoče ustrezno izvršiti sklep.
Member States usually raise this argument in the context of the discussions with the Commission after the adoption of the decision [80].
Države članice to trditev običajno navajajo v okviru razprav s Komisijo po sprejetju sklepa [80].
However, in this case, Italy already argued before the adoption of the decision that recovery should not be ordered because it would be absolutely impossible to implement it.
Vendar je v tej zadevi Italija že pred sprejetjem sklepa trdila, da se vračila ne bi smelo odrediti, saj bi bilo to povsem nemogoče izvršiti.
Since Italy raised this issue in the context of the formal investigation, and since a general principle of law states that no one can be obliged to do the impossible, the Commission considers that it is necessary to deal with this question in the present Decision.
Ker je Italija to vprašanje izpostavila že v okviru formalnega postopka preiskave in ker je v splošnem pravnem načelu navedeno, da nihče ne more biti zavezan storiti nekaj nemogočega, Komisija meni, da je treba to vprašanje rešiti v tem sklepu.
It should first be recalled that the Court of Justice has constantly given a very strict interpretation to the concept of ‘absolute impossibility’.
Najprej je treba opozoriti, da je Sodišče stalno zelo ozko razlagalo pojem „absolutne nezmožnosti“.
The condition that recovery would be absolutely impossible is not fulfilled where Member States merely inform the Commission of the legal, political or practical difficulties involved in implementing the decision [81].
Pogoj, da bi bilo vračilo absolutno nemogoče, ni izpolnjen, kadar države članice zgolj obvestijo Komisijo o pravnih, političnih ali praktičnih težavah, povezanih z izvajanjem sklepa [81].
The only instance where ‘absolute impossibility’ could be accepted is where recovery would, from the beginning, be impossible in objective and absolute terms [82].
„Absolutna nezmožnost“ bi lahko bila sprejeta samo, kadar bi bilo vračilo objektivno in absolutno nemogoče že od začetka [82].
In the case at hand, the Italian authorities have argued that it would be absolutely impossible to define which real estate, belonging to non-commercial entities, was used for activities that were not of an exclusively commercial nature and to retrieve the information needed to determine the amount of tax that should have been paid.
V obravnavani zadevi so italijanski organi trdili, da bi bilo absolutno nemogoče določiti, katere nepremičnine v lasti nekomercialnih subjektov so bile v rabi za dejavnosti, ki niso bile izključno komercialne narave, in dobiti informacije, potrebne za določitev zneska davka, ki bi ga bilo treba plačati.
The Italian authorities explained that, because of the way the cadastre is structured, it is impossible to extrapolate retroactively from the cadastral databases the data concerning real estate belonging to non-commercial entities which was used for activities of a non-exclusively commercial nature of the type indicated in the ICI exemption.
Italijanski organi so pojasnili, da zaradi načina sestave katastra iz katastrskih zbirk podatkov ni mogoče za nazaj ekstrapolirati podatkov v zvezi z nepremičninami v lasti nekomercialnih subjektov, v rabi za dejavnosti, ki niso bile izključno komercialne narave, kot so navedene v oprostitvi občinskega davka na nepremičnine.
It is not possible to trace activities carried on in the real estate from the information contained in the cadastre.
Iz podatkov v katastru ni mogoče ugotoviti, kakšne dejavnosti so se opravljale na nepremičninah.
In other words, on the basis of the data in the cadastre, it is not possible to work out if, in a given property, an entity carried on either commercial or non-commercial activities.
Z drugimi besedami na podlagi podatkov iz katastra ni mogoče ugotoviti, ali je subjekt na danem premoženju opravljal komercialne ali nekomercialne dejavnosti.
In fact, each single property (including portions of real estate with a separate classification) is registered in the cadastre only on the basis of its objective characteristics, which take into account physical and structural elements linked to its intended use.
Dejansko je v katastru vsako posamezno premoženje (vključno z deli nepremičnin z ločeno razvrstitvijo) evidentirano le na podlagi objektivnih značilnosti, s katerimi se upoštevajo fizični in strukturni elementi, povezani s predvideno rabo.
As regards tax databases, and in particular records of the tax declarations of non-commercial entities, Italy explained that it was possible to identify from them only the real estate used exclusively on a non-commercial basis.
Italija je glede davčnih zbirk podatkov, zlasti evidence napovedi za odmero davka nekomercialnih subjektov, pojasnila, da je bilo z njihovo pomočjo mogoče ugotoviti le, katere nepremičnine so bile v rabi na izključno nekomercialni podlagi.
In this case, the buildings that produce revenue must be indicated in the standard tax declaration under Section RB on building revenue, whereas Section RS on mixed costs and receipts does not have to be filled in.
V tem primeru je treba stavbe, s katerimi je ustvarjen prihodek, navesti v standardni napovedi za odmero davka v oddelku RB o prihodkih od stavb, medtem ko oddelka RS o mešanih stroških in prihodkih ni treba izpolniti.
On the other hand, if a non-commercial entity owns real estate in which commercial activities are also carried on, then both Sections RB and RS have to be filled in.
Po drugi strani je treba izpolniti oba oddelka – RB in RS, če ima nekomercialni subjekt v lasti nepremičnino, v kateri se opravljajo tudi komercialne dejavnosti.
However, if more than one building is indicated under Section RB, it is not possible to identify the real estate in which the activity that generated the revenue indicated in the tax declaration was carried on.
Vendar, če je v oddelku RB navedena več kot ena stavba, ni mogoče ugotoviti, katera je tista stavba, na kateri se je opravljala dejavnost, s katero je bil ustvarjen prihodek, naveden v napovedi za odmero davka.
In any case, it should be noted that Section RS of the standard form includes aggregate cost and revenue data concerning goods and services used for both commercial and non-commercial purposes (goods and services used arbitrarily for commercial activities and other activities).
Upoštevati je treba, da so v oddelek RS standardne napovedi vključeni celotna vrednost in podatki o prihodkih v zvezi z blagom in storitvami za komercialne in nekomercialne namene (blago in storitve, ki se poljubno uporabljajo za komercialne in druge dejavnosti).
However, even when a single building is indicated under Section RB, because of the way the cadastral system is structured it is not possible to obtain a breakdown based on commercial/non-commercial uses of a building and therefore it is not possible to identify what portion of the building was used for the economic activity that generated the revenue stated in the tax declaration.
Vendar, tudi kadar je v oddelku RB navedena le ena stavba, zaradi načina sestave katastrskega sistema ni mogoče pridobiti razčlenitve na podlagi komercialne/nekomercialne rabe stavb in tako ni mogoče ugotoviti, kateri del stavbe je bil v rabi za gospodarsko dejavnost, s katero je bil ustvarjen prihodek, naveden v napovedi za odmero davka.
Consequently, the Commission considers that the Italian authorities have demonstrated that the recipients of the aid cannot be identified and the aid itself cannot be objectively calculated due to the lack of available data.
Komisija zato meni, da so italijanski organi dokazali, da ne morejo ugotoviti, kdo so prejemniki pomoči, pomoči same pa ni mogoče objektivno izračunati zaradi pomanjkanja razpoložljivih podatkov.
Basically, it is not possible to identify from the tax and cadastral databases the real estate belonging to non-commercial entities, which was used for non-exclusively commercial activities of the type indicated in the ICI exemption provisions.
Dejansko iz davčnih in katastrskih zbirk podatkov ni mogoče ugotoviti, katera je tista nepremičnina v lasti nekomercialnih subjektov, ki je bila v rabi za ne izključno komercialne dejavnosti, kot so navedene v določbah o oprostitvi občinskega davka na nepremičnine.
Consequently it is not possible to obtain the necessary information to calculate the amount of tax to be recovered.
Zato ni mogoče pridobiti potrebnih podatkov za izračun zneska davka, ki ga je treba vrniti.
Therefore, enforcing a possible recovery order would be impossible in objective and absolute terms.
Torej bi bilo izvrševanje morebitnega vračila objektivno in absolutno nemogoče.
In conclusion, the Commission finds that, given the specific nature of this case, it would be absolutely impossible for Italy to recover any aid illegally granted under the ICI exemption provisions.
Komisija torej ob upoštevanju posebne narave te zadeve ugotavlja, da bi bilo absolutno nemogoče, da bi Italija zahtevala vračilo kakršne koli pomoči, nezakonito dodeljene v skladu z določbami oprostitve občinskega davka na nepremičnine.
Recovery of the aid arising from the unlawful and incompatible exemption from this municipal tax on real estate should therefore not be ordered.
Vračila pomoči, ki izhaja iz nezakonite in nezdružljive oprostitve tega občinskega davka na nepremičnine, se zato ne bi smelo odrediti.
The Commission finds that Italy has unlawfully implemented the exemption from the municipal tax on real estate under Article 7(1)(i) of Legislative Decree No 504/92 in breach of Article 108(3) of the Treaty.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je Italija nezakonito izvajala oprostitev občinskega davka na nepremičnine v skladu s členom 7(1)(i) zakonske uredbe št. 504/92, s čimer je kršila člen 108(3) Pogodbe.
Since no grounds of compatibility can be identified for the scheme in question, it is found to be incompatible with the internal market.
Ker ni mogoče opredeliti nobenih razlogov za združljivost zadevne sheme, je ugotovljeno, da je nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom.
However, in the light of the exceptional circumstances invoked by Italy, recovery of the aid should not be ordered since Italy has demonstrated that it would be absolutely impossible to enforce.
Vendar se glede na izjemne okoliščine, na katere se je sklicevala Italija, ne bi smelo odrediti vračila pomoči, saj je Italija dokazala, da bi ga bilo absolutno nemogoče izvršiti.
The Commission considers that Article 149(4) TUIR does not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Komisija meni, da člen 149(4) Zakonika o davku od dohodkov ne pomeni državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe.