natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission also regards as positive the fact that the Framework Agreement with BIC includes a commitment by BIC not to distribute dividends or other equivalent benefits to shareholders in relation to BPN for a period of five years.
Komisija pozitivno ocenjuje tudi dejstvo, da okvirni sporazum z BIC vključuje zavezo BIC, da delničarjem pet let ne bo izplačala dividend ali drugih enakovrednih prejemkov v zvezi z BPN.
The purpose of that commitment is to ensure that the capital injected in BPN will not immediately leave the bank, in the form of resources distributed to shareholders.
Namen te zaveze je zagotoviti, da banka kapitala, vloženega v BPN, ne bo takoj sprostila v obliki sredstev, izplačanih delničarjem.
However the final assets eventually taken over by BIC differ from the BIC offer of 20 July 2011 and BIC also reserves the right to give back loans that are non-performing.
Vendar se končna sredstva, ki jih na koncu prevzame BIC, razlikujejo od ponudbe BIC z dne 20. julija 2011, pri čemer si BIC pridržuje tudi pravico do vračila nedonosnih posojil.
The Commission therefore considers that in order to maintain the aid to the minimum, any reduction in RWA resulting from the restitution of loans to the State should be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in capital, to the tune of [10-18] % of the reduction in the RWA.
Zato Komisija meni, da je treba za ohranitev pomoči na najnižji potrebni ravni poleg kakršnega koli zmanjšanja tveganju prilagojene aktive zaradi vračila posojil državi zagotoviti tudi ustrezno zmanjšanje kapitala, ki ustreza [10–18] % zmanjšanja tveganju prilagojene aktive.
The reduction in capital could take the form of a haircut to the book value of the loans given back to the State.
Zmanjšanje kapitala bi lahko bilo izvedeno kot odbitek na knjigovodsko vrednost za posojila, vrnjena državi.
The Commission notes that BIC has suggested that the combined entity could maintain a core tier 1 ratio of [10-18] % in the event it were to give back non-performing loans, by extending new credit to the economy.
Komisija ugotavlja, da bi lahko po navedbah BIC združeni subjekt v primeru vračila nedonosnih posojil ohranil [10–18]-odstotni delež navadnega lastniškega temeljnega kapitala, če bi gospodarstvu odobril nova posojila.
The Commission considers that such a measure would not limit the aid to the minimum for the following reasons.
Komisija meni, da s takšnim ukrepom pomoč ne bi bila omejena na najnižjo potrebno raven zaradi naslednjih razlogov.
First, BIC’s own capital ratio before the sale will be inferior to [10-18] % at the date of the sale.
Prvič, delež lastnega kapitala BIC pred prodajo bo nižji od [10–18] % na dan prodaje.
Therefore as soon as BPN is merged with BIC, the level of core tier 1 in the combined entity will immediately decrease (as reflected in the January 2012 Restructuring Plan).
Zato se bo stopnja navadnega lastniškega temeljnega kapitala združenega subjekta takoj po združitvi BPN z banko BIC zmanjšala (kot je navedeno v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz januarja 2012).
Accordingly, if the combined entity were to maintain a core tier 1 ratio of [10-18] % after the merger, it would have a capitalisation above what BIC itself has forecast.
Če bi združeni subjekt po združitvi ohranil [10–18]-odstotni delež navadnega lastniškega temeljnega kapitala, bi glede na to njegova kapitalizacija presegala stopnjo, ki jo je napovedala BIC.
Second, the January 2012 Restructuring Plan already factors in new lending to the economy, and for that purpose the (very high) [10-18] % core tier 1 level in BPN at the moment of the sale is considered sufficient.
Drugič, v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz januarja 2012 so nova posojila gospodarstvu že upoštevana, zato se šteje, da je (zelo visoka) [10–18]-odstotna stopnja navadnega lastniškega temeljnega kapitala v BPN ob prodaji zadostna.
There is therefore no need to dedicate even more capital than is foreseen in the January 2012 Restructuring Plan to the production of new loans.
Zato za nova posojila poleg kapitala, predvidenega v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz januarja 2012, ni treba nameniti še več dodatnega kapitala.
In this respect, the Commission takes a positive view of the commitment given by Portugal that the core tier 1 capital ratio of BPN at the date of the sale to Banco BIC will not be higher than [10-18] % and that if non-performing loans are transferred to the State or any entity controlled by the State after the sale, Banco BIC or the combined entity will transfer to the State or any entity controlled by the State any capital associated with those loans to the tune of [10-18] % of the loans’ risk weighted assets.
V zvezi s tem Komisija pozitivno ocenjuje zavezo Portugalske, da delež navadnega lastniškega temeljnega kapitala banke BPN na dan prodaje banki BIC ne bo presegal [10–18] % in da bo banka BIC ali združeni subjekt v primeru prenosa nedonosnih posojil na državo ali drug subjekt pod nadzorom države po prodaji na državo ali drug subjekt pod nadzorom države prenesel kakršen koli kapital, povezan z navedenimi posojili, v znesku [10–18] % tveganju prilagojene aktive posojil.
In addition, the Restructuring Communication states that an acquisition ban is necessary to keep the aid limited to the minimum necessary.
Poleg tega je v sporočilu o prestrukturiranju določeno, da je treba za ohranitev pomoči na najnižji potrebni ravni upoštevati prepoved prevzemov.
Point (23) of the Restructuring Communication mentions explicitly that ‘an undertaking should not be endowed with public resources which could be used to finance market-distorting activities not linked to the restructuring process. For example, acquisitions of shares in other undertakings or new investments cannot be financed through State aid unless this is essential for restoring an undertaking’s viability’.
V točki 23 sporočila o prestrukturiranju je izrecno navedeno, da „podjetje ne sme biti financirano z javnimi sredstvi, ki bi jih lahko uporabilo za financiranje dejavnosti, ki izkrivljajo trg in niso povezane s prestrukturiranjem. Z državno pomočjo se na primer ne smejo financirati nakupi delnic drugih podjetij ali nove naložbe, razen če je to nujno za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja podjetja“.
The Commission observes that already in the January 2012 Restructuring Plan it was indicated that the combined entity will become a viable entity that should realise an acceptable ROE and is even expected to realise profits.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je že v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz januarja 2012 navedeno, da bo združeni subjekt rentabilen subjekt, ki bo dosegel sprejemljivo donosnost lastniškega kapitala in predvidoma ustvaril celo dobiček.
That return to viability does not hinge on acquisitions.
Takšno ponovno doseganje rentabilnosti ni odvisno od prevzemov.
On the contrary, the Commission considers that an acquisition ban will ensure that the capital considered necessary for the restructuring remains in the bank, therefore aiding the return to viability.
Vendar Komisija meni, da bo s prepovedjo prevzemov zagotovljeno, da bo kapital, ki naj bi bil potreben za prestrukturiranje, ostal v banki, to pa bo prispevalo k ponovnemu doseganju rentabilnosti.
In this respect, the Commission considers that the commitment by Portugal to enforce an acquisition ban is necessary to ensure the compatibility of the restructuring aid with the internal market.
V zvezi s tem Komisija meni, da je zaveza Portugalske o uveljavitvi prepovedi prevzemov potrebna, da se zagotovi združljivost pomoči za prestrukturiranje z notranjim trgom.
As regards own contribution, the Restructuring Communication requires restructuring costs to be borne not only by the State but also by a bank’s past investors and former shareholders.
V zvezi z lastnim prispevkom sporočilo o prestrukturiranju določa, da stroškov prestrukturiranja ne sme kriti le država, ampak tudi nekdanji vlagatelji v banko in nekdanji delničarji.
That requirement ensures that rescued banks bear adequate responsibility for the consequences of their past behaviour and creates appropriate incentives for their future behaviour.
Navedena zahteva zagotavlja, da bodo rešene banke prevzele primerno odgovornost za posledice svojih preteklih ravnanj in da se ustvarijo ustrezne spodbude za njihovo ravnanje v prihodnosti.
In the present case the Commission takes a positive view of the fact that the shareholders have lost their stake in the bank without any compensation.
V obravnavanem primeru Komisija pozitivno ocenjuje dejstvo, da so delničarji izgubili svoj delež v banki in da za to niso prejeli nadomestila.
They are thus adequately participating in the burden-sharing for a bank whose value was negative according to the estimation of two independent entities appointed by Portugal.
Tako so bili primerno vključeni v porazdelitev bremena za banko, katere vrednost je bila po oceni dveh neodvisnih subjektov, ki jih je imenovala Portugalska, negativna.
It also regards as positive the fact that the board of BPN has been changed and replaced in the context of the nationalisation process.
Poleg tega Komisija pozitivno ocenjuje spremembo in zamenjavo upravnega odbora BPN v postopku nacionalizacije.
However, the Commission notes that subordinated bond holders, holding an amount of EUR 245 million, will be maintained in the bank that is being privatised and may continue to receive coupons.
Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da bodo imetniki podrejenih obveznic v znesku 245 milijonov EUR še vedno vključeni v banko, ki bo privatizirana, pri čemer bodo lahko še naprej prejemali kupone.
As stated in point 26 of the Restructuring Communication, ‘banks should not use State aid to remunerate own funds (equity and subordinated debt) when its activities do not generate sufficient profits’.
V skladu s točko 26 sporočila o prestrukturiranju „banke ne smejo uporabiti državne pomoči za izplačila za lastna sredstva (lastniški kapital in podrejeni dolg), če navedene dejavnosti ne ustvarjajo zadostnih dobičkov“.
As to the period under which BPN was in restructuring, BPN has not complied with the Commission’s policy on hybrid instruments as set out in point 26 of the Restructuring Communication.
Banka BPN v obdobju prestrukturiranja ni ravnala v skladu z usmeritvijo Komisije o hibridnih instrumentih iz točke 26 sporočila o prestrukturiranju.
The Commission clarified there that in a restructuring context the discretionary offset of losses (for example by releasing reserves or reducing equity) by beneficiary banks in order to guarantee the payment of dividends and coupons on outstanding subordinated debt, is in principle not compatible with the objective of burden-sharing.
Komisija je pojasnila, da v okviru prestrukturiranja diskrecijska izravnava izgub s strani bank upravičenk (npr. s sprostitvijo rezerv ali zmanjšanjem lastniškega kapitala), da bi zagotovile izplačilo dividend in kuponov na neodplačani podrejeni dolg, načeloma ni združljiva s ciljem porazdelitve bremena.
The Commission notes that the payment of coupons did not respect that principle and should be compensated for by a more in-depth restructuring [55].
Komisija ugotavlja, da pri izplačilu kuponov to načelo ni bilo upoštevano, pri čemer bi moralo biti navedeno izplačilo nadomeščeno s temeljitejšim prestrukturiranjem [55].
The Commission considers that the far-reaching restructuring of the bank can be sufficient to compensate for the lack of burden-sharing.
Komisija meni, da lahko obsežno prestrukturiranje banke zadostno nadomesti pomanjkljivo porazdelitev bremena.
However, since the bank is now being sold, a ban on calls until 31 December 2016 is necessary to provide a minimum level of burden-sharing from the bank’s capital holders.
Vendar je zaradi prodaje banke, ki poteka, prepoved izplačil do 31. decembra 2016 potrebna, da se zagotovi minimalna stopnja porazdelitve bremena na delničarje banke.
In this respect, the Commission takes stock of the commitment by Portugal that, in order to contribute to the restructuring process of BPN, Banco BIC, the combined entity and Portugal will not exercise until 31 December 2016 any call option rights in relation to subordinated debt issued by BPN prior to the date of the sale.
V zvezi s tem Komisija upošteva zavezo Portugalske, da banka BIC, združeni subjekt in Portugalska do 31. decembra 2016 ne bodo uveljavljali nakupnih opcij v zvezi s podrejenim dolgom, ki ga izda BPN pred dnevom prodaje, s čimer bodo prispevali k postopku prestrukturiranja BPN.
Remuneration of the aid measures
Plačilo v zvezi z ukrepi pomoči
The Commission notes that the remuneration for each of the aid measures listed in paragraphs (182) to (185) above, and in particular the guarantees, the capital injection and the transfer of assets to the SPVs, is not in line with the relevant Communications of the Commission.
Komisija ugotavlja, da plačilo za posamezne ukrepe pomoči iz uvodnih izjav od (182) do (185), zlasti za poroštva, kapitalsko injekcijo in prenos sredstev na pravne subjekte s posebnim namenom, ni v skladu z ustreznimi sporočili Komisije.
The state guarantees were priced at 20 bps, well below the level resulting from the application of the Commission’s rules on the remuneration of state guarantees on liabilities issued by financial institutions.
Plačilo za državna poroštva je znašalo 20 bazičnih točk, kar je bistveno manj od stopnje, ki temelji na uporabi pravil Komisije o plačilu državnih poroštev za obveznosti, ki jih izdajo finančne institucije.
The EUR 600 million capital injection into BPN of February 2012 clearly does not bear a remuneration that is in line with the Recapitalisation Communication.
Plačilo za kapitalsko injekcijo v znesku 600 milijonov EUR, ki jo je BPN prejela februarja 2012, nedvomno ni v skladu s sporočilom o dokapitalizaciji.
Indeed, the Portuguese authorities expect no remuneration on the capital injected.
Portugalski organi ne pričakujejo, da bodo za vloženi kapital prejeli plačilo.
As a matter of fact, the capital was injected with the purpose of allowing the sale of the bank at a negative price.
Kapital je bil dejansko vložen, da bi omogočili prodajo banke po negativni ceni.
As to the transfer of assets to the SPVs at book value, whilst the Commission acknowledges from a theoretical point of view that the transfer of assets to the three SPVs is intended to protect BPN’s viability and to allow for its sale, the transfer at book value entails aid that is not in line with the main requirements of the IAC.
V zvezi s prenosom sredstev na pravne subjekte s posebnim namenom po knjigovodski vrednosti Komisija priznava, da je bil prenos sredstev na vse tri pravne subjekte s posebnim namenom teoretično namenjen zaščiti rentabilnosti BPN in lažji prodaji BPN, vendar hkrati ugotavlja, da prenos po knjigovodski vrednosti vključuje pomoč, ki ni v skladu z glavnimi zahtevami iz sporočila o oslabljenih sredstvih.
In particular, the transfer is at book value, well above the real economic value and no remuneration for the State is contemplated.
Prenos je bil izveden po knjigovodski vrednosti, ki znatno presega realno ekonomsko vrednost, pri čemer plačilo državi ni predvideno.
The IAC recognises that in-depth restructuring can compensate for potential misalignments with the main criteria of that Communication, including those on pricing.
V sporočilu o oslabljenih sredstvih je potrjeno, da se lahko s temeljitim prestrukturiranjem nadomesti morebitna neusklajenost z glavnimi merili iz navedenega sporočila, vključno z merili o ceni.
The existence of in-depth restructuring of BPN is an element that could allow the Commission to find that measure compatible with the Impaired Assets Communication.
V primeru temeljitega prestrukturiranja BPN bi lahko Komisija navedeni ukrep štela za združljiv s sporočilom o oslabljenih sredstvih.
Thus, the transfer of assets to the SPVs could be assessed together with the rest of the measures in favour of BPN and as a part of the far-reaching restructuring.
Zato bi lahko bil prenos sredstev na pravne subjekte s posebnim namenom ocenjen z ostalimi ukrepi v korist BPN in v okviru obsežnega prestrukturiranja.
Point 25 of the Restructuring Communication sets out that any derogation from an adequate burden-sharing ex ante which may have been exceptionally granted in the rescue phase for reasons of financial stability should be compensated for by a further contribution at a later stage of the restructuring, for example in the form of claw-back clauses and/or by farther-reaching restructuring including additional measures to limit distortions of competition.
V točki 25 sporočila o prestrukturiranju je določeno, da je treba vsako odstopanje od ustrezne vnaprejšnje porazdelitve bremena, ki je bilo izjemoma odobreno v fazi reševanja zaradi ohranjanja finančne stabilnosti, nadomestiti s prispevkom na poznejši stopnji prestrukturiranja, na primer v obliki klavzul za vračilo sredstev in/ali daljnosežnejšega prestrukturiranja, vključno z dodatnimi ukrepi za omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence.
The Commission considers that the restructuring of BPN is sufficiently far-reaching.
Komisija meni, da je prestrukturiranje BPN dovolj obsežno.
It notes first that the bank is small in size.
Poleg tega ugotavlja, da je banka majhna.
Businesses and activities other than retail banking have been exited for good.
Posli in dejavnosti, ki ne spadajo na področje poslovanja s prebivalstvom, se ne bodo več izvajali.
Therefore, the Commission can conclude that burden-sharing is adequate in light of the far-reaching restructuring of BPN.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da je porazdelitev bremena glede na obsežno prestrukturiranje BPN ustrezna.
Measures to limit distortions of competition
Ukrepi za omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence
As regards measures to limit distortions of competition, the Restructuring Communication provides that the nature and form of such measures will depend on the amount of aid and the conditions and circumstances under which it was granted and also on the characteristics of the market(s) on which the beneficiary bank will operate.
V zvezi z ukrepi za omejevanje izkrivljanja konkurence sporočilo o prestrukturiranju določa, da se narava in oblika takih ukrepov določita na podlagi višine pomoči ter pogojev in okoliščin, v katerih je bila pomoč dodeljena, in tudi na podlagi značilnosti trgov, na katerih bo poslovala banka upravičenka.
While the amount of aid received by BPN is significant, account should be taken of the limited size of BPN.
Čeprav je BPN prejela precejšnjo pomoč, je treba upoštevati omejeno velikost BPN.
As indicated in point 32 of the Restructuring Communication, the Commission will analyse the likely effects of the aid on the markets where the beneficiary bank operates after the restructuring.
V skladu s točko 32 sporočila o prestrukturiranju bo Komisija analizirala verjetne učinke pomoči na trge, na katerih banka upravičenka posluje po prestrukturiranju.
First of all, the size and the relative importance of the bank on its market, once it is made viable, will be examined.
Najprej bo proučila velikost in relativno moč banke na trgu, ko bo na njem spet uspešno poslovala.
In that regard, the Commission notes that BPN will no longer continue as the same economic entity as before the state intervention.
V zvezi s tem Komisija ugotavlja, da BPN ne bo več poslovala kot gospodarski subjekt, ki je obstajal pred državno intervencijo [56].
It has undergone nationalisation and a profound in-depth restructuring.
Banka je bila nacionalizirana in temeljito prestrukturirana.
As a result, a much smaller bank will compete on the market.
Zato bo na trgu konkurirala precej manjša banka.
It ranks 12th as of mid-2011 with a market share for both deposits and loans of less than 1 %.
Od sredine leta 2011 je na 12. mestu, pri čemer je njen tržni delež za vloge in posojila manjši od 1 %.
Deposits and loans nearly halved in the period 2008-2011.
Obseg vlog in posojil se je v obdobju 2008–2011 skoraj prepolovil.
In its observations on the Decision of 24 October 2011, Portugal stated first that, already before the nationalisation, BPN had a market share of around [1-2] %.
Portugalska je v ugotovitvah o sklepu z dne 24. oktobra 2011 navedla, da je imela BPN že pred nacionalizacijo približno [1–2]-odstotni tržni delež.
Second, after nationalisation, BPN was significantly restructured and its size continued to be reduced.
Po nacionalizaciji je bila temeljito prestrukturirana, njen obseg pa se je dodatno zmanjšal.
Third, even after the integration with BIC, the new integrated entity will have less than [< 1] % of market share in Portugal, as the market share of BPN is currently around [< 1] % for both credit to customers and deposits and the market shares of BIC is in the order of [< 1] % for loans and [< 1] % for deposits.
Nov združeni subjekt bo tudi po združitvi z BIC imel manj kot [< 1]-odstotni tržni delež na Portugalskem, ker tržni delež BPN za posojila komitentom in vloge trenutno znaša približno [< 1] %, pri čemer ima BIC približno [< 1]-odstotni tržni delež za posojila in [< 1]-odstotni tržni delež za vloge.
The Commission also notes that the sale of the banking business via a tender procedure gave competitors the opportunity to acquire the brand and business of BPN thereby limiting the distortions of competition.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da so imeli konkurenti s prodajo bančne dejavnosti v postopku javnega razpisa možnost, da prevzamejo blagovno znamko in poslovanje BPN, s tem pa je bilo omejeno izkrivljanje konkurence.
The Commission also takes a favourable view on the dividend policy as described in paragraph ((56) (xiii)).
Komisija pozitivno ocenjuje tudi politiko izplačevanja dividend iz uvodne izjave ((56) (xiii)).
In addition, point 44 of the Restructuring Communication also mentions that banks should not cite state support as a competitive advantage when marketing their financial offers.
Poleg tega je v točki 44 sporočila o prestrukturiranju navedeno, da se banke pri trženju svojih finančnih ponudb ne smejo sklicevati na državno pomoč kot na konkurenčno prednost.
The Commission regards as positive the commitment given by Portugal that BIC will not refer to the use of state aid in its marketing campaigns and communication to investors.
Komisija pozitivno ocenjuje zavezo Portugalske, da se banka BIC v svojih trženjskih kampanjah in sporočilih za vlagatelje ne bo sklicevala na uporabo državne pomoči.
In its Decision of 24 October 2011, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the envisaged measures were sufficient when account was taken of the significant amount of aid and the fact that BPN had received a recapitalisation, guarantees and impaired asset measures which were not remunerated in accordance with the requirements of the relevant Communications.
Komisija je v sklepu z dne 24. oktobra 2011 izrazila dvom, ali so bili predvideni ukrepi glede na znaten znesek pomoči in dejstvo, da so bili za BPN sprejeti ukrepi v zvezi z dokapitalizacijo, poroštvi in oslabljenimi sredstvi, ki niso bili nadomeščeni v skladu z zahtevami iz ustreznih sporočil, zadostni.
In particular, the Commission noted that that the bank would operate in the market with an initial core tier 1 capital ratio of [10-18] %, far above the minimum levels of 9 % required at the end of 2011 and of 10 % at the end of 2012.
Komisija zlasti ugotavlja, da bo banka poslovala na trgu z začetnim [10–18]-odstotnim deležem navadnega lastniškega temeljnega kapitala, kar znatno presega zahtevano minimalno stopnjo, ki je konec leta 2011 znašala 9 %, konec leta 2012 pa 10 %.
In addition, BIC requested the right to sell back within […] months loans that were non-performing for at least […] days (up to […] % of the total nominal value of the loan portfolio).
Poleg tega je BIC zahtevala, da lahko v […] mesecih ponovno proda posojila, ki so nedonosna najmanj […] dni (do […] % skupne nominalne vrednosti portfelja posojil).
It also requested the maintenance of liquidity support from CGD in two forms.
Zahtevala je tudi ohranitev likvidnostne pomoči CGD v dveh oblikah.