natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Institutions should also be required to considerably improve measurement and management of counterparty credit risk by better addressing wrong-way risk, highly leveraged counterparties and collateral, accompanied by the corresponding enhancements in the areas of back-testing and stress testing.
Od institucij bi bilo treba poleg tega zahtevati, da z boljšo obravnavo tveganja neugodnega gibanja, nasprotnih strank z visokim finančnim vzvodom in zavarovanj s premoženjem bistveno izboljšajo merjenje in obvladovanje kreditnega tveganja nasprotne stranke, pri čemer bi morali ustrezno izboljšati tudi testiranje za nazaj in stresno testiranje.
Trade exposures to CCPs usually benefit from the multilateral netting and loss-sharing mechanism provided by CCPs.
Za trgovalne izpostavljenosti do CNS se običajno uporablja mehanizem večstranskega pobota in porazdelitve izgub, ki ga zagotovijo CNS.
As a consequence, they involve a very low counterparty credit risk and should therefore be subject to a very low own funds requirement.
Zaradi tega imajo zelo majhno kreditno tveganje nasprotne stranke in zato bi morala zanje veljati zahteva zelo nizka kapitalska zahteva.
At the same time, this requirement should be positive in order to ensure that institutions track and monitor their exposures to CCPs as part of good risk management and to reflect that even trade exposures to CCPs are not risk-free.
Ta zahteva bi morala biti hkrati pozitivna za zagotovitev, da institucije sledijo izpostavljenostim do CNS in jih spremljajo kot del dobrega upravljanja s tveganji, ter prikaz, da niti trgovalne izpostavljenosti do CNS niso brez tveganj.
A CCP's default fund is a mechanism that allows the sharing (mutualisation) of losses among the CCP's clearing members.
Jamstveni sklad CNS je mehanizem, ki omogoča porazdelitev (vzajemno) izgub med klirinškimi člani CNS.
It is used where the losses incurred by the CCP following the default of a clearing member are greater than the margins and default fund contributions provided by that clearing member and any other defence the CCP may use before recurring to the default fund contributions of the remaining clearing members.
Uporabi se, kadar so izgube, ki jih imajo CNS zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti klirinškega člana, večje od kritja in prispevkov tega klirinškega člana v jamstveni sklad ter kakršnih koli drugih lastnih namenskih sredstev, ki jih lahko CNS uporabi, in sicer preden se uporabijo prispevki ostalih klirinških članov v jamstveni sklad.
In view of this, the risk of loss associated with exposures from default fund contributions is higher than that associated with trade exposures.
Glede na navedeno je tveganje izgube, povezano z izpostavljenostmi iz naslova prispevkov v jamstveni sklad, večje od tveganja, povezanega s trgovalnimi izpostavljenostmi.
Therefore, this type of exposures should be subject to a higher own funds requirement.
Za to vrsto izpostavljenosti bi morala zato veljati višja kapitalska zahteva.
The "hypothetical capital" of a CCP should be a variable needed to determine the own funds requirement for a clearing member's exposures from its contributions to a CCP's default fund.
"Hipotetični kapital" CNS bi moral biti spremenljivka, potrebna za določitev kapitalske zahteve za izpostavljenosti klirinškega člana iz njegovih prispevkov v jamstveni sklad CNS.
It should not be understood as anything else.
Nobena druga razlaga ni mogoča.
In particular, it should not be understood as the amount of capital that a CCP is required to hold by its competent authority.
Zlasti se ne sme razumeti kot znesek kapitala, ki ga mora imeti CNS v skladu z zahtevo pristojnega organa.
The review of the treatment of counterparty credit risk, and in particular putting in place higher own funds requirements for bilateral derivative contracts in order to reflect the higher risk that such contracts pose to the financial system, forms an integral part of the Commission's efforts to ensure efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets.
Pregled obravnave kreditnega tveganja nasprotne stranke in zlasti vzpostavitev višjih kapitalskih zahtev za dvostranske pogodbe o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih, da se upoštevajo večja tveganja, ki jih lahko takšne pogodbe predstavljajo za finančni sistem, sta sestavni del prizadevanja Komisije za zagotovitev učinkovitih, varnih in zanesljivih trgov izvedenih finančnih instrumentov.
Consequently, this Regulation complements Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [14].
Zato ta uredba dopolnjuje Uredbo (EU) št. 648/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 4. julija 2012 o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih OTC, centralnih nasprotnih strankah in repozitorijih sklenjenih poslov [14].
Building on the work done in the context of the preparation and negotiation of Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management [15] and taking into account international and Union developments on those issues, the Commission should review whether those exemptions should continue to be applied in a discretionary or in a more general way and on whether the risks related to those exposures are addressed by other effective means laid down in this Regulation.
Na podlagi opravljenega dela med pripravami in pogajanji o Direktivi 2009/111/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2007/64/ES glede bank, ki so odvisne od centralnih institucij, nekaterih postavk lastnih sredstev, velikih izpostavljenosti, nadzornih režimov in kriznega upravljanja [15] ter ob upoštevanju razvoja dogodkov na tem področju na mednarodni in ravniUnije bi morala Komisija opraviti pregled, ali bi bilo treba izvzetja še naprej uporabljati po prosti presoji ali pa bolj splošno in ali se tveganja, povezana s temi izpostavljenostmi, uspešno obvladujejo na druge načine, predvidene v tej uredbi.
In order to ensure that exemptions of exposures by competent authorities do not jeopardise the coherence of the uniform rules established by this Regulation on a permanent basis, after a transitional period, and in the absence of any outcome of that review, the competent authorities should consult EBA on whether or not it is appropriate to continue making use of the possibility to exempt certain exposures.
Da bi zagotovili, da pristojni organi z izvzetjem izpostavljenosti ne bi trajno ogrozili usklajenega izvajanja enotnih pravil, določenih v tej uredbi, bi se morali pristojni organi po zaključenem prehodnem obdobju, če rezultati navedenega pregleda ne bi bili na voljo, posvetovati z EBA glede primernosti nadaljne uporabe možnosti izvzetja nekaterih izpostavljenosti.
The years preceding the financial crisis were characterised by an excessive build up in institutions' exposures in relation to their own funds (leverage).
V obdobju pred finančno krizo so se pretirano nakopičile izpostavljenosti institucij glede na njihov kapital (finančni vzvod).
During the financial crisis, losses and the shortage of funding forced institutions to reduce significantly their leverage over a short period of time.
V času finančne krize so morale institucije zaradi izgub in pomanjkanja financiranja v kratkem obdobju bistveno zmanjšati svoj finančni vzvod.
This amplified downward pressures on asset prices, causing further losses for institutions which in turn led to further declines in their own funds.
S tem so bili pritiski na zniževanje cen premoženja še večji, zaradi česar so imele institucije dodatne izgube, kar je nato povzročilo še dodatno zmanjšanje njihovega kapitala.
The ultimate results of this negative spiral were a reduction in the availability of credit to the real economy and a deeper and longer crisis.
Končni posledici tega negativnega poteka dogodkov sta bili zmanjšanje obsega kreditov, ki so na voljo realnemu gospodarstvu, ter resnejša in daljša kriza.
Risk-based own funds requirements are essential to ensure sufficient own funds to cover unexpected losses.
Kapitalske zahteve, ki temeljijo na tveganju, so bistvene za zagotovitev zadostnega kapitala za kritje nepričakovanih izgub.
However, the crisis has shown that those requirements alone are not sufficient to prevent institutions from taking on excessive and unsustainable leverage risk.
Vendar se je med krizo pokazalo, da te zahteve same ne zadostujejo, da bi se institucije odvrnilo od prevzemanja tveganja prevelikega in nevzdržnega finančnega vzvoda.
In September 2009, the G-20 leaders committed to developing internationally-agreed rules to discourage an excessive leverage.
Voditelji skupine G-20 so se septembra 2009 zavezali k oblikovanju mednarodno dogovorjenih pravil za odvračanje od prevelikega finančnega vzvoda.
To that end, they supported the introduction of a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the Basel II framework.
V ta namen so podprli uvedbo količnika finančnega vzvoda kot dodatnega ukrepa okvirnega sporazuma Basel II.
In December 2010, the BCBS published guidelines defining the methodology for calculating the leverage ratio.
BCBS je decembra 2010 objavil smernice, v katerih je opredeljena metodologija za izračun količnika finančnega vzvoda.
Those rules provide for an observation period that will run from 1 January 2013 until 1 January 2017 during which the leverage ratio, its components and its behaviour relative to the risk-based requirement will be monitored.
Ta pravila določajo obdobje opazovanja, ki bo trajalo od 1. januarja 2013 do 1. januarja 2017 in med katerim se bodo spremljali količnik finančnega vzvoda, njegovi sestavni deli in njegovo gibanje glede na zahtevo, ki temelji na tveganju.
Based on the results of the observation period the BCBS intends to make any final adjustments to the definition and calibration of the leverage ratio in the first half of 2017, with a view to migrating to a binding requirement on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.
Na podlagi rezultatov iz obdobja opazovanja namerava BCBS vse končne prilagoditve opredelitve in umeritve količnika finančnega vzvoda sprejeti v prvi polovici leta 2017, da bi se 1. januarja 2018 prešlo na zavezujočo zahtevo na podlagi ustreznega pregleda in umeritve.
The BCBS guidelines also provide for disclosure of the leverage ratio and its components starting from 1 January 2015.
Poleg tega smernice BCBS določajo razkrivanje količnika finančnega vzvoda in njegovih sestavnih delov od 1. januarja 2015.
A leverage ratio is a new regulatory and supervisory tool for the Union.
Količnik finančnega vzvoda je novo regulativno in nadzorniško orodje Unije.
In line with international agreements, it should be introduced first as an additional feature that can be applied on individual institutions at the discretion of supervisory authorities.
V skladu z mednarodnimi dogovori bi bilo treba to orodje najprej uvesti kot dodaten element, ki ga je mogoče uporabiti za posamezne institucije po presoji nadzornih organov.
Reporting obligations for institutions would allow appropriate review and calibration, with a view to migrating to a binding measure in 2018.
Ustrezen pregled in umeritev z namenom prehoda na zavezujoč ukrep leta 2018 bi se omogočila z obveznostjo poročanja za institucije.
When reviewing the impact of the leverage ratio on different business models, particular attention should be paid to business models which are considered to entail low risk, such as mortgage lending and specialised lending with regional governments, local authorities or public sector entities.
Pri pregledu učinka količnika finančnega vzvoda na različne poslovne modele bi bilo treba posebno pozornost nameniti poslovnim modelom, v okviru katerih naj bi bilo tveganje manjše, kot so hipotekarni krediti in posebni kreditni aranžmaji pri enotah regionalne in lokalne ravni držav ter osebah javnega sektorja.
EBA, on the basis of data received and the findings of the supervisory review during an observation period, should in cooperation with competent authorities develop a classification of business models and risks.
EBA bi na podlagi prejetih podatkov in ugotovitev iz nadzorniškega pregleda v obdobju opazovanja moral v sodelovanju s pristojnimi organi razviti klasifikacijo poslovnih modelov in tveganj.
Based on appropriate analysis, and also taking into account historical data or stress scenarios, there should be an assessment of the appropriate levels of the leverage ratio that safeguard the resilience of the respective business models and whether the levels of the leverage ratio should be set as thresholds or ranges.
Na podlagi ustrezne analize, pri kateri naj bi se upoštevali tudi pretekli podatki ali stresni scenariji, bi bilo treba oceniti, kateri katera raven količnika finančnega vzvoda še zagotavlja odpornost ustreznih poslovnih modelov in ali naj bi te količnike določili kot pragove ali intervale.
After the observation period and the calibration of the respective levels of the leverage ratio, and on the basis of the assessment, EBA can publish an appropriate statistical review, including averages and standard deviations, of the leverage ratio.
EBA bi moral po zaključku obdobja opazovanja in umeritve ustreznih količnikov finančnega vzvoda ter na podlagi navedene ocene objaviti ustrezen statistični pregled količnikov finančnega vzvoda, vključno s povprečji in standardnimi odkloni.
After adoption of the leverage ratio requirements, EBA should publish an appropriate statistical review, including averages and standard deviations, of the leverage ratio in relation to the identified categories of institutions.
Ta statistični pregled količnikov finančnega vzvoda, vključno s povprečji in standardnimi odkloni, za opredeljene kategorije bančnih institucij, bi moral EBA po sprejetju zahtev po količniku finančnega vzvoda tudi objaviti.
Institutions should monitor the level and changes in the leverage ratio as well as leverage risk as part of the internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP).
Institucije bi morale kot del procesa ocenjevanja ustreznega notranjega kapitala (ICAAP) spremljati raven in spremembe količnika finančnega vzvoda ter tudi tveganje, povezano s finančnim vzvodom.
Such monitoring should be included in the supervisory review process.
Tako spremljanje bi bilo treba vključiti v proces izvajanja nadzorniškega pregledovanjaa.
In particular, after the entry into force of the leverage ratio requirements, competent authorities should monitor the developments in the business model and corresponding risk profile in order to ensure up to date and proper classification of institutions.
Pristojni organi bi morali spremljati razvoj poslovnega modela in s tem povezanega profila tveganosti zlasti po uveljavitvi zahtev v zvezi s količnikom finančnega vzvoda, da bi zagotovili posodobljeno in primerno klasifikacijo institucij.
Good governance structures, transparency and disclosure are essential for sound remuneration policies.
Strukture dobrega upravljanja, preglednost in razkritje so bistveni za preudarne politike prejemkov.
In order to ensure adequate transparency to the market of their remuneration structures and the associated risk, institutions should disclose detailed information on their remuneration policies, practices and, for reasons of confidentiality, aggregated amounts for those members of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the institution.
Za zagotovitev ustrezne preglednosti njihovih struktur prejemkov in povezanega tveganja na trgu bi morale institucije razkriti podrobne informacije o svojih politikah in praksah prejemkov ter zaradi zaupnosti zbirne zneske za tiste zaposlene, katerih poklicne dejavnosti pomembno vplivajo na profil tveganja institucije.
That information should be made available to all stakeholders.
Te informacije bi morale biti na voljo vsem zainteresiranim stranem.
Those particular requirements should be without prejudice to more general disclosure requirements concerning remuneration policies applicable horizontally across sectors.
Te posebne zahteve ne bi smele posegati v splošnejše zahteve po razkritju informacij o politikah prejemkov, ki se uporabljajo horizontalno v vseh sektorjih.
Moreover, Member States should be allowed to require institutions to make available more detailed information on remuneration.
Poleg tega bi države članice morale imeti možnost, da od institucij zahtevajo, da dajo na voljo podrobnejše informacije o prejemkih.
The recognition of a credit rating agency as an external credit assessment institution (ECAI) should not increase the foreclosure of a market already dominated by three main undertakings.
Priznanje bonitetne agencije kot zunanje bonitetne institucije (ECAI) ne bi smelo povečati omejevanja dostopa do trga, na katerem že prevladujejo tri družbe.
EBA and ESCB central banks, without making the process easier or less demanding, should provide for the recognition of more credit rating agencies as ECAIs as a way to open the market to other undertakings.
Da bi odprli trg za druge družbe, bi morali EBA in centralne banke ESCB zagotoviti, da bi bilo za zunanje bonitetne institucije (ECAI) priznanih več bonitetnih agencij, pri čemer ta postopek ne bi smel postati lažji ali manj zahteven.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [16] and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [17], should be fully applicable to the processing of personal data for the purposes of this Regulation.
Za obdelavo osebnih podatkov za namene te uredbe se v celoti uporabljata Direktiva 95/46/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. oktobra 1995 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov [16] ter Uredba (ES) št. 45/2001 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 18. decembra 2000 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov v institucijah in organih Skupnosti in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov [17].
Institutions should hold a diversified buffer of liquid assets that they can use to cover liquidity needs in a short term liquidity stress.
Institucije bi morale imeti na voljo blažilnik v obliki raznovrstnih likvidnih sredstev, ki bi jih lahko uporabili za kritje likvidnostnih potreb vobdobju kratkoročnega likvidnostnega stresa.
As it is not possible to know ex ante with certainty which specific assets within each asset class might be subject to shocks ex post, it is appropriate to promote a diversified and high-quality liquidity buffer consisting of different asset categories.
Ker vnaprej ni mogoče zanesljivo vedeti, katera sredstva v okviru posameznih kategorij sredstev bi pozneje lahko bila izpostavljena šokom, je primerno spodbujati raznovrsten in visokokakovosten likvidnostni blažilnik, ki bi ga sestavljala sredstva iz različnih kategorij.
A concentration of assets and overreliance on market liquidity creates systemic risk to the financial sector and should be avoided.
Koncentracija sredstev in čezmerno zanašanje na tržno likvidnost pomenita sistemsko tveganje za finančni sektor ter bi se jima bilo treba izogibati.
A broad set of quality assets should therefore be taken into consideration during an initial observation period which will be used for the development of a definition of a liquidity coverage requirement.
V začetnem obdobju opazovanja bi bilo zato treba upoštevati širok niz kakovostnih sredstev, ki se bodo uporabila pri opredeljevanju zahteve glede likvidnostnega kritja.
When making a uniform definition of liquid assets at least government bonds, and covered bonds traded on transparent markets with an ongoing turnover would be expected to be considered assets of extremely high liquidity and credit quality.
Pri enotni opredelitvi likvidnih sredstev je pričakovati, da bodo vsaj državne obveznice in krite obveznice, s katerimi se trguje na preglednih trgih s stalnim prometom, obravnavane kot premoženje izjemno visoke likvidnosti in kreditne kakovosti.
It would also be appropriate that assets corresponding to Article 416(1)(a) to (c) should be included in the buffer without limitations.
Prav tako bi bilo primerno, da bi v blažilnik brez omejitev vključili sredstva iz člena 416(1)(a)do(c).
When institutions use the liquidity stock, they should put in place a plan to restore their holdings of liquid assets and competent authorities should ensure the adequacy of the plan and its implementation.
Ko bi institucije ta sredstva uporabile, bi morale vzpostaviti načrt za obnovitev imetja likvidnih sredstev, pristojni organi pa bi morali zagotoviti ustreznost načrta in njegovo izvajanje.
The stock of liquid assets should be available at any time to meet the liquidity outflows.
Za kritje likvidnostnih odlivov bi morala biti vedno na voljo likvidna sredstva.
The level of liquidity needs in a short term liquidity stress should be determined in a standardised manner so as to ensure a uniform soundness standard and a level playing field.
Raven likvidnostnih potreb v obdobju kratkoročnega likvidnostnega stresa bi bilo treba določiti na standardiziran način, da bi se zagotovili enoten standard stabilnosti in enaki konkurenčni pogoji.
It should be ensured that such a standardised determination has no unintended consequences for financial markets, credit extension and economic growth, also taking into account different business and investment models and funding environments of institutions across the Union.
Zagotoviti bi bilo treba, da takšna standardizirana določitev ne bi imela nenačrtovanih posledic za finančne trge, zagotavljanje kreditiranja in gospodarsko rast, pri čemer bi bilo treba upoštevati tudi različne poslovne in naložbene modele ter pogoje financiranja institucij v Uniji.
To this end, the liquidity coverage requirement should be subject to an observation period.
Zato bi moralo za zahtevo glede likvidnostnega kritja veljati obdobje opazovanja.
Based on the observations and supported by reports from EBA, the Commission should be empowered to adopt a delegated act to introduce in a timely manner a detailed and harmonised liquidity coverage requirement for the Union.
Komisija bi morala biti pooblaščena, da na podlagi zadevnih ugotovitev in poročil EBA sprejme delegirane akte, s katerimi pravočasno uvede podrobno opredeljeno in usklajeno zahtevo glede likvidnostnega kritja za Unijo.
In order to ensure global harmonisation in the area of regulation of liquidity any delegated act to introduce the liquidity coverage requirement should be comparable to the liquidity coverage ratio set out in the final international framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring of the BCBS taking into account Union and national specificities.
Vsak delegirani akt, s katerim se uvaja zahteva glede likvidnostnega kritja, bi moral biti zaradi zagotavljanja vsesplošne usklajenosti na področju regulacije likvidnosti primerljiv z zahtevo glede likvidnostnega kritja iz dokončnega mednarodnega okvira za merjenje, standarde in spremljanje likvidnostnega tveganja BCBS ter obenem upoštevati posebnosti Unije in nacionalne posebnosti.
To that end, during the observation period, EBA should review and assess, inter alia the appropriateness of a threshold of 60 % on level 1 liquid assets, a cap of 75 % of inflows to outflows and the phase-in of the liquidity coverage requirement from 60 % from 1 January 2015 increasing on a graduated basis to 100 %.
EBA bi moral v ta namen v obdobju opazovanja med drugim pregledati in oceniti ustreznost praga za likvidna sredstva prve stopnje, ki bi moral biti 60-odstoten, zgornje meje prilivov, ki bi morala znašati 75 % odlivov, in postopno uvajanje zahteve po likvidnostnem kritju, od višine 60 %, kolikor bi znašala 1. januarja 2015, do 100 %.