natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Calculation formula for incompatible aid for period since 1 January 2003
Formula za izračun nezdružljive pomoči za obdobje od 1. januarja 2003
Incompatible aid =
Nezdružljiva pomoč =
(Benchmark rate — regulatory contribution rate)
(referenčna stopnja – predpisani prispevek)
Civil servants' gross wage sum in non-price regulated services
celotne bruto plače javnih uslužbencev, ki delajo v storitvah, ki niso cenovno regulirane
Based on the available data, the calculations estimate a cumulated comparative advantage of EUR [500 to 1000] million for the period 2003-2010 (see annex).
Ob uporabi podatkov, ki so na voljo, primerjalna prednost za obdobje 2003–2010 znaša [500–1000] milijonov EUR (glej Prilogo).
The annual amount of the incompatible aid has decreased over time from EUR […] million in 2003 to EUR […] million in 2010 due to the shrinking workforce of civil servants.
V tem obdobju se je letni znesek nezdružljive pomoči zaradi vedno manjšega števila javnih uslužbencev zmanjšal s […] milijonov EUR v letu 2003 na […] milijonov EUR v letu 2010.
Response to the arguments presented by Germany
Odgovor na trditve Nemčije
The 2011 Extension decision expressed doubts about the necessity and proportionality of the pension subsidy because the non-price regulated services benefited from a level of wage-based social security contributions that has effectively been 11 to 14 percentage points lower than the level that private competitors have had to carry.
V sklepu o razširitvi iz leta 2011 so bili izraženi pomisleki glede nujnosti in sorazmernosti subvencije za pokojnine, ker so bili prispevki za socialno varnost, plačani za storitve, ki niso cenovno regulirane, za 11–14 % nižji od prispevkov zasebnih konkurentov.
The 2011 Extension decision quantified the resulting annual advantage to be in the range of EUR 100 to 200 million.
V sklepu o razširitvi iz leta 2011 je bila letna prednost, ki je nastala, določena v razponu 100–200 milijonov EUR.
In reply to the 2011 Extension decision, Germany raises two main objections:
Nemčija je na sklep o razširitvi iz leta 2011 podala dva glavna ugovora:
Germany insists that the benchmark rate can only be based on the employer's share of social contributions, because private undertakings have no legal obligation to pay the employees' contribution.
Nemčija vztraja, da lahko referenčna stopnja temelji samo na deležu prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec, ker zasebna podjetja niso zakonsko zavezana k plačevanju prispevka uslužbencev.
Furthermore, the benchmark rate should take into account the fact that Deutsche Post has always paid higher than ‘competitive’ wages.
Poleg tega bi morala referenčna stopnja upoštevati, da je podjetje Deutsche Post vedno plačevalo več od „konkurenčnih“ plač;
Germany claims that the Commission has failed to establish that the revenues from the price-regulated universal services were sufficient to finance the claimed burdens of excess social costs.
Nemčija trdi, da Komisija ni uspela dokazati, da so prihodki od cenovno reguliranih univerzalnih storitev zadoščali za financiranje navedenih obremenitev za dodatne stroške za socialno varnost.
The Commission is right to include the employees' contribution into the benchmark rate and not to adjust the wage level to a ‘competitive wage’
Pravilno je, da je Komisija v referenčno stopnjo vključila prispevek uslužbencev in ne samo prilagodila stopnjo plače „konkurenčni plači“
Germany argues that any benchmark above the employer's share of the social contribution rate would put Deutsche Post at a disadvantage compared to competitors who are only liable to pay the employer's share.
Nemčija trdi, da bi vsaka referenčna vrednost, ki bi presegala delež prispevka za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec, podjetje Deutsche Post postavila v slabši položaj v primerjavi s konkurenti, ki morajo plačati samo delež delodajalca.
With regard to that first argument, the Commission observes that civil servants — unlike private employees — are not obliged to contribute to the pension and unemployment insurances.
Glede prve trditve Komisija poudarja, da javnim uslužbencem – v nasprotju z zasebnimi – ni treba plačevati prispevka za shemi pokojninskega zavarovanja in zavarovanja za primer brezposelnosti.
Therefore, those contributions must necessarily be included in the benchmark rate to ensure that both Deutsche Post and private competitors carry, directly or indirectly, equivalent levels of contributions.
Te prispevke je torej treba vključiti v referenčno stopnjo in tako zagotoviti, da podjetje Deutsche Post in zasebni konkurenti plačujejo enake stopnje neposrednih in posrednih prispevkov.
Germany furthermore maintains that the benchmark rate is applied neither to the gross wage of the civil servants nor to the incurred wage of the civil servants, but to ‘competitive’ wages.
Nemčija nadalje trdi, da se referenčna stopnja ni uporabila za bruto plače ali dejanske plače javnih uslužbencev, ampak samo za „konkurenčne“ plače.
In the 2002, 2007 and 2011 regulatory accounts, Deutsche Post considers that the ‘competitive wage’ should be based on the ETV wage or on collective wage agreements for the postal sector from 2003.
V regulativnih izkazih iz let 2002, 2007 in 2011 je podjetje Deutsche Post menilo, da bi morala „konkurenčna plača“ temeljiti na plači iz kolektivne delavske pogodbe ali pogodbah o plačah za poštni sektor od leta 2003.
In the 2009 regulatory accounts, the ‘competitive’ wage is defined as the 2007 minimum wage, which is even lower than the ETV wage.
V regulativnih izkazih iz leta 2009 je „konkurenčna plača“ opredeljena kot minimalna plača iz leta 2007, kar je celo manj od plače iz kolektivne pogodbe.
Germany claims that the calculation based on those ‘competitive’ wages is necessary to place the social costs of Deutsche Post at the same level as those of its competitors.
Nemčija trdi, da je izračun na podlagi teh „konkurenčnih“ plač potreben za umestitev stroškov podjetja Deutsche Post za socialno varnost na stopnjo, enako stopnji njegovih konkurentov.
The Commission cannot accept that argument because the aid must be limited to the minimum necessary to ensure that the gradual transition from a situation of largely restricted competition to one of genuine competition at Union level takes place under acceptable economic conditions.
Komisija te trditve ne more sprejeti, ker mora biti pomoč omejena na najnižjo potrebno, da se zagotovi postopen prehod iz položaja zelo omejene konkurence v položaj resnične konkurence na ravni Unije pod sprejemljivimi ekonomskimi pogoji.
It would be disproportionate to increase the aid to such an extent that since 1995 Deutsche Post would have to finance only social costs based on ‘competitive’ wages that do not reflect labour market conditions in earlier years.
Povečanje pomoči v tolikšni meri, da bi moralo podjetje Deutsche Post od leta 1995 financirati samo prispevke za socialno varnost na podlagi „konkurenčnih“ plač, ki ne odražajo pogojev na trgu dela v prejšnjih letih, bi bilo nesorazmerno.
Differences in wage levels for personnel hired at different points in time between incumbents and new entrants are a normal fact of economic life.
Razlike v stopnjah plač za osebje, ki ga prvotni operaterji in novi udeleženci na trgu zaposlijo v različnih obdobjih, so običajni del gospodarskega življenja.
In the France Telecom case [92], the Commission also rejected the argument presented by France that the level of wage-based social security contributions should also take into account the fact that civil servants are paid higher wages than the personnel employed by competitors.
V zadevi o državni pomoči družbi France Telecom [92] je Komisija prav tako zavrnila trditev Francije, da bi morala stopnja prispevkov za socialno varnost na podlagi plač upoštevati tudi to, da javni uslužbenci prejemajo višje plače od osebja, zaposlenega pri konkurentih.
The Commission pointed out in that context that thanks to civil servants, at the time of the market opening the historic operator had well-qualified and competent personnel, without which it would not have been able to maintain its market position.
Komisija je poudarila, da je imel prvotni operater v času odprtja trga zaradi javnih uslužbencev visoko kvalificirano in usposobljeno osebje, brez katerega ne bi mogel obdržati svojega položaja na trgu.
In any event, it would be entirely artificial to single out specific disadvantages of the postal incumbent and to disregard its considerable advantages e.g. in terms of market share, brand recognition and customer base.
V vsakem primeru bi bilo izpostavljanje določene pomanjkljivosti prvotnega poštnega operaterja in zanemarjanje njegove določene prednosti, npr. glede tržnega deleža, prepoznavnosti znamke in kroga strank, povsem umetno.
Finally, Deutsche Post's calculations cannot credibly establish that, without the obligation to employ civil servants, Deutsche Post would have achieved the calculated savings in wage costs.
Izračuni podjetja Deutsche Post ne morejo verodostojno dokazati, da bi podjetje brez obveznosti zaposlovanja javnih uslužbencev doseglo izračunane prihranke pri stroških za plače.
Even assuming that the civil servants would in 1995 have effectively changed to a private employee status, it is neither established how many civil servants would have been replaced in 1995 and later years by private employees nor at which wage level.
Tudi ob predpostavki, da bi javni uslužbenci v letu 1995 postali zasebni uslužbenci, ni bilo ugotovljeno, koliko javnih uslužbencev bi bilo v letu 1995 nadomeščenih z zasebnimi uslužbenci ali kakšna bi bila njihova plača.
Just the sheer number of Deutsche Post's civil servants in 1995 [93] renders implausible the assumption that it would have legally and economically possible to replace since 1995 all civil servants by equally productive private employees at a lower wage.
Že zaradi števila javnih uslužbencev v podjetju Deutsche Post v letu 1995 [93] ni verjetna predpostavka, da bi bilo zakonsko in ekonomsko mogoče od leta 1995 zamenjati vse javne uslužbence z enako produktivnimi zasebnimi uslužbenci po nižjih plačah.
The Commission therefore rejects those two claims made by Germany with regards to the benchmark rate and the wage.
Komisija zato zavrača ugovore Nemčije glede referenčne stopnje in plač.
On Germany's claim that price-regulated revenues have not been sufficient to finance the claimed burdens
O trditvi Nemčije, da cenovno regulirani prihodki niso zadoščali za financiranje navedenih obremenitev
Germany claims that the Commission only assessed the level of wage-based social security contributions for the non-price regulated services but did not verify whether the profits from price-regulated universal services were sufficient to finance the claimed burdens.
Nemčija trdi, da je Komisija ocenila samo stopnjo prispevkov za socialno varnost na podlagi plač za storitve, ki niso cenovno regulirane, ni pa preverila, ali je dobiček od cenovno reguliranih univerzalnih storitev zadoščal za financiranje navedenih obremenitev.
Germany presents two lines of reasoning.
Nemčija navaja dve utemeljitvi.
First of all, it claims that the Commission did not prove that the national regulator effectively approved the burdens which Deutsche Post has claimed.
Prvič, trdi, da Komisija ni dokazala, da je nacionalni poštni regulator dejansko odobril obremenitve, ki jih je navajalo podjetje Deutsche Post.
Secondly, Germany argues that, even if the regulator had approved those burdens, the profits from price-regulated universal services were insufficient to finance them.
Drugič, Nemčija trdi, da dobiček od cenovno reguliranih univerzalnih storitev, tudi če je regulator te obremenitve odobril, ni zadoščal za njihovo financiranje.
Germany submitted two expert studies by Professor Weber and CTcon to show that the price-regulated services have not been sufficient to cover the claimed burdens on excess social costs and, consequently, Deutsche Post has been under-compensated for its excess social costs.
Nemčija je predložila dve strokovni študiji profesorja Webra in podjetja CTcon, da bi dokazala, da cenovno regulirane storitve niso zadoščale za kritje navedenih obremenitev za dodatne stroške za socialno varnost in da je podjetje Deutsche Post za svoje dodatne stroške za socialno varnost prejelo prenizko nadomestilo.
The 2002, 2007 and 2011 price cap decisions are based on the regulatory accounts submitted by Deutsche Post and approve all burdens that have been claimed
Sklepi o najvišjih cenah iz let 2002, 2007 in 2011 temeljijo na regulativnih izkazih, ki jih je predložilo podjetje Deutsche Post, in so odobrili vse navedene obremenitve
Since the 2002 Price cap decision, it has also been clearly documented that the Postal regulator approved the burdens that Deutsche Post had and set the regulated prices accordingly to cover them.
Obstajajo dokazila, da je poštni regulator od sklepa o najvišjih cenah iz leta 2002 odobril obremenitve podjetja Deutsche Post in za njihovo kritje ustrezno reguliral cene.
The 2007 and 2011 Price cap decisions also confirm that the Postal regulator accepted Deutsche Post's claims and approved the fact that the claimed excess social costs were financed by the price-regulated revenues.
Sklepa o najvišjih cenah iz let 2007 in 2011 prav tako potrjujeta, da je poštni regulator sprejel trditve podjetja Deutsche Post in odobril financiranje navedenih dodatnih stroškov za socialno varnost iz cenovno reguliranih prihodkov.
The study by Professor Weber does not support the claim that the profits from the regulated universal services were insufficient to cover the burdens that Deutsche Post had claimed
Študija prof. Webra ne podpira trditve, da prihodki od reguliranih univerzalnih storitev niso zadoščali za kritje obremenitev, ki jih je navedlo podjetje Deutsche Post
The study by Professor Weber covers the period 1995-2010 and recognises that Deutsche Post has not only benefited from the pension subsidy but also from a full coverage of burden #2 by the price-regulated revenues (see Section VI.1.4.2(a) for a detailed description of the study).
Študija prof. Webra obsega obdobje 1995–2010 in poudarja, da je imelo podjetje Deutsche Post korist od subvencije za pokojnine in celotnega kritja obremenitve št. 2 iz cenovno reguliranih prihodkov (za podroben opis študije glej oddelek VI.1.4.2 a).
Price-setting rule according to Article 20(2) PostG 1997
Pravilo o določanju cen na podlagi člena 20(2) zakona PostG iz leta 1997
Price cap for regulated services =
Najvišja cena za regulirane storitve =
Efficient costs for regulated services + burdens =
Stroški učinkovitega zagotavljanja reguliranih storitev + obremenitve =
Total costs for regulated services + burden for non-regulated services
Skupni stroški reguliranih storitev + obremenitev zaradi nereguliranih storitev
The Postal regulator has to set the regulated prices such that the revenue covers the price-regulated services' own ‘efficient’ costs and the approved burdens.
Poštni regulator mora regulirane cene določiti tako, da prihodki krijejo stroške „učinkovitega zagotavljanja“ cenovno reguliranih storitev in odobrene obremenitve.
Expressed in a slightly different way, the regulated prices fully finance the total costs of the regulated services — irrespective of whether they are earmarked as ‘burden’ or ‘efficient’ cost — as well as the share of the burden that comes from the non-price regulated services.
Z drugimi besedami, regulirane cene v celoti financirajo celotne stroške reguliranih storitev – ne glede na to, ali so označeni kot „obremenitve“ ali „stroški za učinkovito zagotavljanje storitev“ – in delež obremenitve, ki izhaja iz storitev, ki niso cenovno regulirane.
Article 20(2) PostG 1997 ensures therefore that the approved burdens are fully covered by the price-regulated revenues.
Člen 20(2) zakona PostG iz leta 1997 tako zagotavlja, da cenovno regulirani prihodki v celoti pokrivajo odobrene obremenitve.
Contrary to Germany's claim, it is therefore excluded by law that the price-regulated services suffer from under-compensation due to the take-over of excess social costs from the non-price regulated services.
V nasprotju s trditvijo Nemčije zakon torej zahteva, da nadomestilo za cenovno regulirane storitve zaradi prenosa dodatnih stroškov za socialno varnost za uslužbence pri storitvah, ki niso cenovno regulirane, ni prenizko.
The expert study by Professor Weber suffers from two main defects: First, it exaggerates the level of the excess social costs.
V strokovni študiji prof. Webra sta prisotni dve veliki napaki. Prvič, navaja previsoko stopnjo dodatnih stroškov za socialno varnost.
Second, it overlooks that as a result of the exaggeration, the excess social costs include cost items for which Deutsche Post receives compensation not under burden #2, but under different headings.
Drugič, ne upošteva, da so zaradi te previsoke stopnje v dodatne stroške za socialno varnost vključeni tudi stroški, za katere je podjetje Deutsche Post prejelo nadomestila, ki niso dodeljena obremenitvi št. 2, ampak drugim stroškovnim postavkam.
In detail, the Commission would point to the following defects:
Komisija podrobneje opisuje naslednje pomanjkljivosti.
First, the expert study calculates the excess social costs based on the employer's share of the social contribution rate.
Prvič, v strokovni študiji so dodatni stroški za socialno varnost izračunani z uporabo deleža prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec.
However, the burden #2 is calculated based on the regulatory contribution rate.
Obremenitev št. 2 pa je izračunana na podlagi predpisanega prispevka.
As the latter is higher than the employer's share of the social contribution rate, the expert study's excess social costs are higher than burden #2.
Ker je slednji višji od deleža prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec, so dodatni stroški za socialno varnost, izračunani v strokovni študiji, višji od obremenitve št. 2.
Thus, the expert study includes excess social costs that the Postal regulator has considered as ‘efficient’ costs.
Strokovna študija torej vključuje dodatne stroške za socialno varnost, ki jih poštni regulator šteje za stroške „učinkovitega zagotavljanja“.
Second, the expert study omits that burden #1 on excess wages also covers a share of the excess social costs (e.g. due to the difference between incurred wages and the ‘competitive’ wage benchmark) and that they are subsequently financed through burden #1.
Drugič, v strokovni študiji ni upoštevano dejstvo, da obremenitev št. 1 (dodatne plače) obsega tudi del dodatnih stroškov za socialno varnost (npr. zaradi razlike med dejanskimi plačami in referenčno „konkurenčno“ plačo) in da so ti stroški torej financirani preko obremenitve št. 1.
Further social costs that the expert study includes are covered by separate burdens (e.g. the payments to BAnstPT by burden #6) and consequently compensated.
Nadaljnje stroške za socialno varnost, upoštevane v strokovni študiji, krijejo različne obremenitve (npr. plačila inštitutu BAnstPT krije obremenitev št. 6) in so torej povrnjeni.
Thus, while the total sum of incurred social costs is shown for civil servants, it is omitted that also other burdens than burden #2 cover excess social costs.
Prikazan je skupni znesek dejanskih stroškov za socialno varnost za javne uslužbence, ni pa navedeno dejstvo, da dodatne stroške za socialno varnost krijejo tudi druge obremenitve, ne samo obremenitev št. 2.
Third, it must be taken into account that the burden #2 contains excess social costs for both civil servants and private employees: The private employees' incurred social contributions were higher than the regulatory benchmark before 2003 because interest expenses of about EUR […] million for the private employee's supplementary pension insurance were included in those costs.
Tretjič, upoštevati je treba, da so v obremenitvi št. 2 vsebovani dodatni stroški za socialno varnost za javne in zasebne uslužbence. Prispevki zasebnih uslužbencev za socialno varnost so bili višji od regulativne referenčne vrednosti pred letom 2003, ker so bili v te stroške vključeni tudi stroški obresti v višini […] milijonov EUR za dodatno pokojninsko zavarovanje zasebnih uslužbencev.
Since 2003, those interest costs have been allocated to the financial costs and the incurred social costs for private employees have been below the regulatory benchmark since then.
Od leta 2003 so bili ti stroški obresti dodeljeni finančnim stroškom, stroški za socialno varnost za zasebne uslužbence pa so bili pod regulativno referenčno vrednostjo.
Consequently, the result of under-compensation is erroneous because the expert study overlooks that the claimed excess social costs are not only covered by burden #2 but and that the Postal regulator has considered a higher share of social costs as ‘efficient’ cost.
Zato je prenizko nadomestilo, opredeljeno v študiji, zavajajoče, ker študija ne upošteva, da navedeni dodatni stroški za socialno varnost niso kriti samo iz obremenitve št. 2 in da je poštni regulator menil, da so višji stroški za socialno varnost stroški „učinkovitega zagotavljanja“.
An appropriate correction of the expert study's mistakes on the compensation side puts the burdens exactly in balance with the excess social costs as required by Article 20(2) PostG 1997.
Ustrezen popravek napak v strokovni študiji, povezanih z nadomestilom, izravna obremenitve in dodatne stroške za socialno varnost, kakor to zahteva člen 20(2) zakona PostG iz leta 1997.
Germany's objection that the Commission erred in the 2011 Extension decision to only calculate the comparative advantage for the non-price regulated services must therefore be rejected because, pursuant to Article 20(2) PostG 1997, the Postal regulator has to set the price cap so that the price-regulated revenues cover the efficient costs of the price-regulated services and the approved burdens.
Ugovor Nemčije, da se je Komisija v sklepu o razširitvi iz leta 2011 zmotila, ker je izračunala samo primerjalno prednost za storitve, ki niso cenovno regulirane, je treba zavrniti, ker mora poštni regulator v skladu s členom 20(2) zakona PostG iz leta 1997 najvišjo ceno določiti tako, da cenovno regulirani prihodki krijejo stroške učinkovitega zagotavljanja cenovno reguliranih storitev in odobrenih obremenitev.
No proof of under-compensation of excess social costs based on WIK study
Ni dokaza o prenizkem nadomestilu za dodatne stroške za socialno varnost na podlagi študije podjetja WIK
Referring to the 2009 regulatory accounts, Germany maintains that Deutsche Post has actually suffered significant losses with its price regulated services since 1990 because the regulated revenues have been eaten up by the costs for the price-regulated services as well as the net costs from the universal service obligations [94] Thus, for that reason as well, Germany denies that the profits from price-regulated services would have been sufficient to finance any excess social costs from the non-price regulated services.
S sklicevanjem na regulativne izkaze iz leta 2009 Nemčija trdi, da je podjetje Deutsche Post od leta 1990 utrpelo precejšnje izgube pri svojih cenovno reguliranih storitvah, ker so regulirane prihodke izničili stroški za cenovno regulirane storitve in neto stroški zaradi izpolnjevanja obveznosti univerzalnih storitev [94]. Nemčija zato zavrača trditev Komisije, da bi dobiček od cenovno reguliranih storitev zadoščal za financiranje morebitnih dodatnih stroškov za socialno varnost iz storitev, ki niso cenovno regulirane.
The Commission observes in that regard first that, since 2003, it is obvious from the Postal regulator's decisions that he has earmarked a share of the price-regulated revenues as compensation for burden #2.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je iz sklepov poštnega regulatorja od leta 2003 naprej razvidno, da je določil delež prihodkov z reguliranimi cenami kot nadomestilo za obremenitev št. 2.
The existence of the contribution from the price-regulated revenue is therefore unambiguously established by the regulator's decisions.
Obstoj nadomestila od prihodkov z reguliranimi cenami je tako nedvomno določen s sklepi poštnega regulatorja.