natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The selection and remuneration of the credit rating agency by the rated entity (the issuer-pays model) engenders inherent conflicts of interest.
Izbira in plačevanje bonitetne agencije s strani ocenjevanega subjekta (model izdajatelj plača) povzroča s tem povezana nasprotja interesov.
Under that model, there are incentives for credit rating agencies to issue complacency ratings on the issuer in order to secure a long-standing business relationship in order to guarantee revenues or to secure additional work and revenues.
Navedeni model vključuje spodbude bonitetnim agencijam za izdajanje ugodnih bonitetnih ocen izdajatelja, s čimer bi zagotovili dolgotrajen poslovni odnos, ki bi prinašal prihodke ali zagotovil dodatno delo in prihodke.
Moreover, relationships between the shareholders of credit rating agencies and the rated entities may cause conflicts of interest, which are not sufficiently dealt with by the existing rules.
Poleg tega lahko razmerja med delničarji bonitetnih agencij in ocenjevanih subjektov povzročijo nasprotja interesov, ki jih obstoječa pravila ne odpravljajo v zadostni meri.
As a result, credit ratings issued under the issuer-pays model may be perceived as the credit ratings that suit the issuer rather than the credit ratings needed by the investor.
Posledično se lahko bonitetne ocene, izdane po modelu izdajatelj plača, dojemajo kot bonitetne ocene, ki ustrezajo izdajatelju, ne kot take, ki jih potrebuje vlagatelj.
It is essential to reinforce the conditions of independence applying to credit rating agencies in order to increase the level of credibility of credit ratings issued under the issuer-pays model.
Za večjo verodostojnost bonitetnih ocen, izdanih po modelu izdajatelj plača, je nujno okrepiti pogoje za neodvisnost, ki veljajo za bonitetne agencije.
In order to increase competition in a market that has been dominated by three credit rating agencies, measures should be taken to encourage the use of smaller credit rating agencies.
Za povečanje konkurence na trgu, na katerem prevladujejo tri bonitetne agencije, bi bilo treba sprejeti ukrepe za spodbujanje uporabe manjših bonitetnih agencij.
It has been the practice in recent times for issuers or related third parties to seek credit ratings from two or more credit rating agencies, and therefore, where two or more credit ratings are sought, the issuer or a related third party should consider appointing at least one credit rating agency which does not have more than 10 % of the total market share and which could be evaluated by the issuer or a related third party as capable of rating the relevant issuance or entity.
V zadnjem času je praksa izdajateljev ali povezanih tretjih oseb, da za bonitetne ocene zaprosijo dve ali več bonitetnih agencij, zato bi moral izdajatelj ali povezana tretja oseba v tem primeru razmisliti, da bi vsaj za eno bonitetno oceno pooblastil bonitetno agencijo, ki nima več kot 10-odstotnega skupnega tržnega deleža in za katero izdajatelj ali povezana tretja oseba presodi, da je zmožna oceniti zadevni vrednostni papir ali subjekt.
The credit rating market shows that, traditionally, credit rating agencies and rated entities enter into long-lasting relationships.
Trg bonitetnega ocenjevanja kaže, da bonitetne agencije in ocenjevani subjekti tradicionalno vzpostavljajo dolgotrajna razmerja.
This raises the risk of familiarity, as the credit rating agency may become too sympathetic to the desires of the rated entity.
S tem se pojavlja tveganje domačnosti, saj lahko postane bonitetna agencija preveč naklonjena željam ocenjevanega subjekta.
In those circumstances, the impartiality of credit rating agencies could, over time, become questionable.
V takšnih primerih bi nepristranskost bonitetnih agencij lahko sčasoma postala vprašljiva.
Indeed, credit rating agencies appointed and paid by a corporate issuer have an incentive to issue overly favourable ratings on that rated entity or on its debt instruments in order to maintain the business relationship with such issuer.
Bonitetne agencije, ki jih pooblasti in plača podjetniški izdajatelj, se dejansko spodbujajo k izdajanju izjemno ugodnih ocen takšnega ocenjevanega subjekta ali njegovih dolžniških instrumentov z namenom ohranitve poslovnega odnosa s tem izdajateljem.
Issuers are also subject to incentives that favour long-lasting relationships, such as the lock-in effect whereby an issuer refrains from changing credit rating agency as this could raise concerns of investors regarding the issuer’s creditworthiness.
Tudi izdajatelji so podvrženi spodbudam, ki podpirajo dolgotrajna razmerja, kot je učinek ujetosti, pri katerem se izdajatelj vzdrži menjave bonitetne agencije, saj bi lahko takšno ravnanje pri vlagateljih vzbudilo skrbi glede njegove kreditne sposobnosti.
This problem was already identified in Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, which required credit rating agencies to apply a rotation mechanism providing for gradual changes in analytical teams and credit rating committees so that the independence of the rating analysts and persons approving credit ratings would not be compromised.
Ta težava je bila prepoznana že v Uredbi (ES) št. 1060/2009, ki je določila, da morajo bonitetne agencije uporabljati mehanizem rotacije, ki zagotavlja postopno spremembo skupin analitikov in bonitetnih komisij, s čimer bi se preprečilo ogrožanje neodvisnosti bonitetnih analitikov in oseb, odgovornih za odobritev bonitetnih ocen.
The success of those rules, however, was highly dependent on a behavioural solution internal to the credit rating agency, namely the actual independence and professionalism of the employees of the credit rating agency vis-à-vis the commercial interests of the credit rating agency itself.
Uspeh teh pravil pa je bil večinoma odvisen od rešitve glede ravnanja, ki je obveljala v bonitetni agenciji, in sicer dejanske neodvisnosti in strokovnosti zaposlenih v bonitetni agenciji nasproti poslovnim interesom same agencije.
Those rules were not designed to provide a sufficient guarantee towards third parties that the conflicts of interest arising from the long-lasting relationship would effectively be mitigated or avoided.
Navedena pravila niso bila zasnovana zaradi zagotavljanja tretjim osebam, da bodo nasprotja interesov, ki izhajajo iz dolgotrajnega razmerja, učinkovito zmanjšana ali da do njih ne bo prišlo.
A way to achieve this could be by limiting the period during which a credit rating agency can continuously provide credit ratings on the same issuer or its debt instruments.
Eden od načinov za doseganje tega bi lahko bila omejitev obdobja, v katerem lahko bonitetna agencija neprekinjeno izdaja bonitetne ocene istega izdajatelja ali njegovih dolžniških instrumentov.
Setting out a maximum duration of the contractual relationship between the issuer which is rated or which issued the rated debt instruments and the credit rating agency should remove the incentive for issuing favourable credit ratings with respect to that issuer.
Določitev najdaljšega obdobja pogodbenega odnosa med ocenjevanim izdajateljem ali izdajateljem, ki izda ocenjene dolžniške instrumente, in bonitetno agencijo, bi morala odpraviti spodbude k izdaji ugodnih bonitetnih ocen glede takšnega izdajatelja.
Additionally, requiring the rotation of credit rating agencies as a normal and regular market practice should also effectively mitigate the problem of the lock-in effect.
Poleg tega bi morala zahteva po rotaciji bonitetnih agencij kot običajnem in rednem tržnem ravnanju učinkovito zmanjšati problem učinka ujetosti.
Finally, the rotation of credit rating agencies should have positive effects on the credit rating market, as it would facilitate new market entries and offer existing credit rating agencies the opportunity to extend their business to new areas.
Navsezadnje bi morala imeti rotacija bonitetnih agencij pozitivne učinke na trg bonitetnega ocenjevanja, saj bi olajšala vstop novih udeležencev na trg in obstoječim bonitetnim agencijam omogočila širitev dejavnosti na nova področja.
It is, however, important that the implementation of a rotation mechanism is designed in such a way that the benefits of the mechanism more than outweigh its possible negative consequences.
Pomembno pa je, da je izvajanje mehanizma rotacije zasnovano tako, da so njegove koristi bistveno večje od možnih negativnih posledic.
For example, frequent rotation could result in increased costs for issuers and credit rating agencies because the cost associated with rating a new entity or financial instrument is typically higher than the cost of monitoring a credit rating that has already been issued.
Pogosta rotacija bi denimo lahko privedla do povišanih stroškov za izdajatelje in bonitetne agencije, saj je strošek, povezan z oceno novega subjekta ali finančnega instrumenta, običajno višji od stroška spremljanja že izdane bonitetne ocene.
It also takes a considerable amount of time and resources to get established as a credit rating agency, whether as a niche player or covering all asset classes.
Za uveljavitev bonitetne agencije je potrebno tudi veliko časa in sredstev, bodisi kot nišni akter bodisi kot bonitetna agencija, ki pokriva vse razrede finančnih instrumentov.
Further, ongoing rotation of credit rating agencies could have a significant impact on the quality and continuity of credit ratings.
Poleg tega bi nenehno menjavanje bonitetnih agencij lahko pomembno vplivalo na kakovost in stalnost bonitetnih ocen.
Equally important, a rotation mechanism should be implemented with sufficient safeguards to allow the market to adapt gradually before possibly enhancing the mechanism in the future.
Prav tako je pomembno, da bi bilo treba mehanizem rotacije izvajati z zadostnimi varovali, da se omogoči postopna prilagoditev trga pred morebitno krepitvijo mehanizma v prihodnje.
This could be achieved by limiting the scope of the mechanism to re-securitisations, which is a limited source of bank funding, while allowing credit ratings that are already issued to continue to be monitored upon request even after rotation becomes mandatory.
To bi se lahko doseglo z omejitvijo področja uporabe mehanizma za pozicije re-listinjenja, ki je omejen vir bančnih posojil, pri čemer bi se omogočilo nadaljevanje spremljanja že izdanih bonitetnih ocen po naročilu tudi po tem, ko bo rotacija postala obvezna.
Thus, as a general rule, rotation should only affect new re-securitisations with underlying assets from the same originator.
Tako bi morala rotacija v splošnem vplivati le na nove pozicije re-listinjenja s temeljnimi sredstvi istega originatorja.
The Commission should review whether it is appropriate to maintain a limited rotation mechanism or to apply it to other asset classes as well and, if so, whether other classes warrant different treatment with respect to, for example, the length of the maximum duration of the contractual relationship.
Komisija bi morala preučiti, ali naj se mehanizem omejene rotacije ohrani ali uporabi tudi za druge razrede finančnih instrumentov, in, če je tako, ali drugi razredi potrebujejo drugačno obravnavo, na primer zaradi najdaljšega obdobja trajanja pogodbenega odnosa.
If the rotation mechanism is established for other asset classes, the Commission should evaluate whether it is necessary to introduce an obligation on the credit rating agency to provide, at the end of the maximum duration period of the contractual relationship, information on the issuer and on the rated financial instruments (a handover file), to the incoming credit rating agency.
Če je bil mehanizem rotacije uveden za druge vrste finančnih instrumentov, bi morala Komisija oceniti, ali bi bonitetni agenciji naložili obveznost, da ob koncu najdaljšega obdobja trajanja pogodbenega razmerja novi bonitetni agenciji zagotovi informacije o izdajatelju in o ocenjenem finančnem instrumentu (primopredajna dokumentacija).
It is appropriate to introduce rotation on the credit rating market for re-securitisations.
Primerno je uvesti rotacije na bonitetnem trgu ocenjevanja pozicij re-listinjenja.
First, that is the segment of the European securitisations market that has underperformed since the financial crisis, and it is therefore the one in which the need to address conflicts of interest is greatest.
Prvič, gre za segment evropskega trga listinjenja, ki se je od finančne krize naprej podpovprečno razvijalo, in je zato na tem tržnem segmentu največja potreba po obravnavi nasprotij interesov.
Second, while the credit risk on debt instruments issued by, for instance, corporates to a high degree depends on the debt servicing capacity of the issuer itself, the credit risk on re-securitisations is generally unique to each transaction.
Drugič, medtem ko je kreditno tveganje dolžniških instrumentov, ki jih npr. izdajo podjetja, v veliki meri odvisno od izdajateljeve sposobnosti servisiranja dolga, je kreditno tveganje pozicij re-listinjenja na splošno pri vsaki transakciji drugačno.
Therefore, when a re-securitisation is created the risk of knowledge being lost by hiring a new credit rating agency is not high.
Pri izdaji pozicije re-listinjenja zato ni velikega tveganja izgube znanja zaradi najetja nove bonitetne agencije.
In other words, although there is currently only a limited number of credit rating agencies active in the credit rating market for re-securitisations, that market is more naturally open to competition and a rotation mechanism could be a driver for creating more dynamics in that market.
Z drugimi besedami, čeprav trenutno na bonitetnem trgu ocenjevanja pozicij re-listinjenja nastopa samo omejeno število bonitetnih agencij, je ta trg potencialno bolj odprt za konkurenco in bi mehanizem rotacije lahko spodbudil večjo dinamiko na tem trgu.
Finally, the credit rating market for re-securitisations is dominated by a few large credit rating agencies but there are other players who have been building up expertise in this area.
Končno, bonitetni trg ocenjevanja pozicij re-listinjenja obvladuje nekaj velikih bonitetnih agencij, obstajajo pa tudi drugi igralci, ki na tem področju pridobivajo strokovno znanje.
Regular rotation of credit rating agencies issuing credit ratings on re-securitisations should bring more diversity to the assessment of creditworthiness.
Redna rotacija bonitetnih agencij, ki izdajajo bonitetne ocene pozicij re-listinjenja, bi morala zagotoviti večjo raznovrstnost z vidika ocenjevanja kreditne sposobnosti.
Multiple and different views, perspectives and methodologies applied by credit rating agencies should produce more diverse credit ratings and ultimately improve the assessment of the creditworthiness of re-securitisations.
Več različnih stališč, pričakovanj in metodologij bonitetnih agencij bi moralo privesti k raznovrstnejšim bonitetnim ocenam in na koncu izboljšati presojo kreditne sposobnosti pozicij re-listinjenja.
For such diversity to play a role and to avoid complacency of both originators and credit rating agencies, the maximum period during which the credit rating agency is allowed to rate re-securitisations from the same originator must be restricted to a level that guarantees regular fresh assessments of creditworthiness.
Da pa bi bila taka raznovrstnost učinkovita in da ne bi prišlo do samozadovoljne drže tako originatorjev kot bonitetnih agencij, je treba najdaljše obdobje, v katerem je bonitetni agenciji dovoljena ocena pozicij re-listinjenja istega originatorja, omejiti na čas, ki zagotovi redno sveže ocenjevanje kreditne sposobnosti.
Those factors, together with the need to provide certain continuity of approach to credit ratings, mean that a period of four years is appropriate.
Navedeni dejavniki, skupaj s potrebo po zagotovitvi določene stalnosti v pristopu do bonitetnih ocen, pomenijo, da bi ustrezno obdobje znašalo štiri leta.
Where at least four credit rating agencies are appointed, the objectives for a rotation mechanism have already been achieved so the requirement to rotate should not apply.
Kadar se pooblastijo najmanj štiri bonitetne agencije, so cilji mehanizma rotacije že doseženi in rotacija ni potrebna.
In order to ensure real competition, such an exemption should only be applicable where at least four of the appointed credit rating agencies rate a certain proportion of the outstanding financial instruments of the originator.
Zaradi zagotovitve dejanske konkurence bi morala biti taka izjema uporabljena le, kadar vsaj štiri pooblaščene bonitetne agencije ocenijo določen delež originatorjevih neocenjenih finančnih instrumentov.
It is appropriate to structure a rotation mechanism for re-securitisations around the originator.
Primerno je, da se mehanizem rotacije za pozicije re- listinjenja strukturira v skladu z originatorjem.
Re-securitisations are issued out of special-purpose vehicles without any significant capacity to service the debt.
Pozicije re-listinjenja izdajo namenske družbe brez bistvenih sposobnosti servisiranja dolga.
Therefore, structuring rotation around the issuer would render the mechanism ineffective.
Ob strukturiranju rotacije okrog izdajatelja bi mehanizem zato postal neučinkovit.
Conversely, structuring rotation around the sponsor would mean that the exemption would almost always apply.
Nasprotno pa bi strukturiranje rotacije okrog sponzorja pomenilo, da bi izjema skoraj vedno veljala.
A rotation mechanism could be an important tool for lowering the barriers to entry to the credit rating market for re-securitisations.
Mehanizem rotacije bi bil lahko pomembno orodje za odpravljanje ovir za vstop na bonitetni trg pozicij re-listinjenja.
At the same time, however, it could make it more difficult for new market players to secure a foothold in the market because they would not be allowed to hold on to their clients.
Hkrati pa bi lahko novim tržnim udeležencem otežil obstanek na trgu, ker ne bi mogli obdržati svojih strank.
It is therefore appropriate to introduce an exemption from the rotation mechanism for small credit rating agencies.
Zato je primerno, da se za male bonitetne agencije uvede izjema.
In order to be effective, the rotation mechanism needs to be enforced in a credible manner.
Mehanizem rotacije je treba uveljaviti na verodostojen način, da se zagotovi njegova učinkovitost.
The rotation requirement would not achieve its objectives if the outgoing credit rating agency were allowed to rate re-securitisations from the same originator again within too short a period.
Zahtevana rotacija ne bo dosegla svojih ciljev, če bi se odhajajoči bonitetni agenciji prehitro dovolilo, da oceni pozicije re-listinjenja istega originatorja.
Therefore, it is important to provide for an appropriate period within which the outgoing credit rating agency cannot be appointed to rate re-securitisations from the same originator again.
Zato je pomembno, da se zagotovi ustrezno obdobje, znotraj katerega se odhajajoče bonitetne agencije ne more pooblastiti, da znova oceni pozicije re-listinjenja istega originatorja.
That period should be sufficiently long to allow the incoming credit rating agency to provide its credit rating services effectively, to ensure that the re-securitisations are truly exposed to a new scrutiny under a different approach, and to guarantee that the credit ratings issued by the new credit rating agency provide enough continuity.
Navedeno obdobje bi moralo biti dovolj dolgo, da se prihajajoči bonitetni agenciji omogoči učinkovita izvedba storitev bonitetnega ocenjevanja, s katerimi se zagotovi, da so pozicije re-listinjenja resnično podvržene novemu pregledu po drugačnem pristopu, in s katerimi se jamči, da bonitetne ocene, ki jih izda nova bonitetna agencija, zagotavljajo zadostno kontinuiteto.
At the same time, for a rotation mechanism to function properly, the length of the period is constrained by the supply of credit rating agencies with sufficient expertise in the area of re-securitisations.
Za pravilno delovanje mehanizma rotacije pa je dolžina obdobja omejena s številom bonitetnih agencij z zadostnim znanjem na področju pozicij re-listinjenja.
Therefore, the length of the period should be proportionate, should generally be equal to the length of the expired contract of the outgoing credit rating agency but should not exceed four years.
Zato bi morala biti dolžina obdobja sorazmerna in na splošno enaka trajanju pretekle pogodbe odhajajoče bonitetne agencije, vendar ne bi smelo biti daljše od štirih let.
Requiring a regular rotation of credit rating agencies is proportionate to the objective pursued.
Zahteva po redni rotaciji bonitetnih agencij je sorazmerna z zastavljenim ciljem.
The requirement only applies to registered credit rating agencies, which are regulated and which provide a service affecting the public interest (credit ratings that can be used for regulatory purposes) under the issuer-pays model and for a particular asset class (re-securitisations).
Zahteva velja le za registrirane bonitetne agencije, ki so regulirane in ki zagotavljajo storitev, ki vpliva na javni interes (bonitetne ocene, ki se lahko uporabijo za regulativne namene) na podlagi modela izdajatelj plača in za nekatere razrede finančnih instrumentov (pozicije re-listinjenja).
The privilege of having its services recognised as playing an important role in the regulation of the financial services market and being approved to carry out this function, gives rise to the need to respect certain obligations in order to guarantee independence and the perception of independence in all circumstances.
Privilegij opravljati storitve, za katere velja, da imajo pomembno vlogo pri ureditvi trga finančnih storitev, in imeti dovoljenje za tovrstno delovanje vodi k potrebi po spoštovanju nekaterih obveznosti, da se v vseh okoliščinah zagotovita neodvisnost in videz neodvisnosti.
A credit rating agency which is prevented from rating re-securitisations from a particular originator would still be allowed to rate re-securitisations from other originators as well as rating other asset classes.
Bonitetni agenciji, ki se ji prepreči ocenjevanje pozicij re-listinjenja določenega originatorja, se bo še vedno dovolilo bonitetno ocenjevanje pozicij re-listinjenja drugih originatorjev in drugih razredov finančnih instrumentov.
In a market context where the rotation rule applies to all participants, business opportunities will arise since all credit rating agencies would need to rotate.
Z vidika trga, na katerem pravilo rotacije velja za vse udeležence, se bodo pojavile nove poslovne priložnosti, saj bodo vse bonitetne agencije morale rotirati.
Moreover, credit rating agencies can always issue unsolicited credit ratings on re-securitisations from the same originator capitalising on their experience.
Razen tega lahko bonitetne agencije vedno izdajo nenaročene bonitetne ocene o pozicijah re-listinjenja istega originatorja in s tem obogatijo svoje izkušnje.
Unsolicited credit ratings are not constrained by the issuer-pays model and therefore are theoretically less affected by potential conflicts of interest.
Nenaročene bonitetne ocene niso omejene samo modelom izdajatelj plača, tako da je pri njih teoretično manj možnosti za potencialna nasprotja interesov.
For the clients of credit rating agencies, the maximum duration of the contractual relationship with a credit rating agency and the requirement to employ more than one credit rating agency also represent restrictions on their freedom to conduct their own business.
Določitev najdaljšega obdobja pogodbenega razmerja z bonitetno agencijo in zahteva najema več bonitetnih agencij tudi omejuje svobodno gospodarsko pobudo strank bonitetnih agencij.
However, those restrictions are necessary on public-interest grounds considering the interference by the issuer-pays model with the necessary independence of credit rating agencies to guarantee independent credit ratings that can be used by investors for regulatory purposes.
Ne glede na to pa so ob upoštevanju poseganja modela izdajatelj plača v potrebno neodvisnost bonitetnih agencij navedene omejitve z vidika javnega interesa nujne za zagotovitev neodvisnih bonitetnih ocen, ki jih vlagatelji lahko uporabijo v regulativne namene.