natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The compensation is compatible to the extent that it does not overcompensate DPLP for the extra costs incurred in carrying out the public service missions entrusted to it under the management contracts, including a reasonable profit.
Nadomestilo bi bilo združljivo, če z njim niso bili prekomerno nadomeščeni dodatni stroški, ki jih nosi podjetje DPLP pri opravljanju nalog javne službe, za katere je pooblaščeno na podlagi pogodb o upravljanju, vključno z zmernim dobičkom.
Any overcompensation will have to be recovered.
Kakršno koli prekomerno nadomestilo bo treba vrniti.
The scope of the assessment of overcompensation includes those SGEIs for which compensation is provided for in the clauses of the successive management contracts.
V obseg ocene prekomernega nadomestila spadajo SSGP, za katere je z določbami zaporednih pogodb o upravljanju določeno nadomestilo.
It is important to note that the provisions of the successive management contracts differ to some extent.
Treba je opozoriti, da se določbe zaporednih pogodb o upravljanju med seboj nekoliko razlikujejo.
Consequently, overcompensation must be calculated on the basis of the specific parameters provided for in each contract.
Zato je treba prekomerno nadomestilo izračunati na podlagi posebnih parametrov, določenih v posameznih pogodbah.
Aided activities under the first management contract include all public services
Dejavnosti, upravičene do pomoči na podlagi prve pogodbe o upravljanju, vključujejo vse javne storitve
In the first management contract (1992-1996), the SGEI compensation covers all public services.
Na podlagi prve pogodbe o upravljanju (1992–1996) se nadomestilo za SSGP izplačuje za vse javne storitve.
The provisions of this contract do not apportion the compensation between the different public services according to whether or not they are eligible for compensation under the provisions of the contract.
Z določbami te pogodbe nadomestilo ni razdeljeno med različne javne storitve glede na to, ali je v zvezi z njimi na podlagi zadevne pogodbe mogoče zaprositi za nadomestilo ali ne.
Accordingly, the compensation provided for in the contract has to be understood to cover the additional costs of discharging all the public service missions without distinction.
Zato je treba šteti, da nadomestilo, določeno s to pogodbo, vključuje dodatne stroške, nastale pri opravljanju vseh nalog javne službe brez razlikovanja.
Checking potential overcompensation in this period will therefore encompass all the public service measures: the universal postal service (USO), press distribution and other missions entrusted to DPLP.
Nadzor nad morebitnim prekomernim nadomestilom za to obdobje bo torej vključeval vsa merila javne službe: univerzalno poštno storitev (obveznost univerzalne storitve ali OUS), dostavo tiska in druge naloge, za katere je bilo pooblaščeno podjetje DPLP.
Aided activity under the second, third and fourth management contracts comprises press distribution and other missions eligible for compensation
Dejavnosti, upravičene do pomoči na podlagi druge, tretje in četrte pogodbe o upravljanju, vključujejo dostavo tiska in druge naloge, v zvezi s katerimi je mogoče zaprositi za nadomestilo
By contrast, under the clauses of the second, third and fourth management contracts, the aided activities are limited to certain SGEI missions specified therein.
V nasprotju s prvo pogodbo o upravljanju se na podlagi druge, tretje in četrte pogodbe pomoči dodelijo le za nekatere SSGP iz teh pogodb.
The SGEI missions entitled to be compensated are: the distribution of newspapers and periodicals, and other public services listed in recital 33.
SSGP, v zvezi s katerimi je mogoče zaprositi za nadomestilo, so dostava dnevnega in periodičnega tiska ter druge javne storitve, navedene v uvodni izjavi 33.
The clauses determining the scope of the aided activities are contained in the management contracts: Article 7 of the second management contract, Article 15 of the third management contract, and Articles 12 and 13 of the fourth management contract.
Določbe, s katerimi so določene storitve, upravičene do pomoči, so vključene v pogodbe o upravljanju: člen 7 druge pogodbe o upravljanju, člen 15 tretje pogodbe o upravljanju ter člena 12 in 13 četrte pogodbe o upravljanju.
The universal postal service, by contrast, does not receive any compensation under the management contracts, with the exception of the first management contract.
Nasprotno pa univerzalna poštna storitev na podlagi pogodb o upravljanju – razen prve – ni upravičena do nobenega nadomestila.
The costs and revenues of the universal postal service are therefore not included in the calculation of overcompensation, except, where relevant, for the excess profits from the reserved area [62].
Stroški in prihodki v zvezi z univerzalno poštno storitvijo se torej pri izračunu prekomernega nadomestila – razen po potrebi presežnega dobička, ustvarjenega v rezerviranem sektorju – ne upoštevajo [62].
Calculation of overcompensation
Izračun prekomernega nadomestila
On account of the differences in the public service missions entrusted, as referred to in recitals 239-243, the potential overcompensation is calculated differently for the first management contract from the three subsequent management contracts.
Zaradi razlik med pooblastili za opravljanje javnih storitev iz uvodnih izjav od 239 do 243 se morebitno prekomerno nadomestilo izračuna ločeno za prvo in nadaljnje tri pogodbe o upravljanju.
Reasonable profit
Zmerni dobiček
In addition to the coverage of costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, the SGEI Framework also allows for compensation for a reasonable rate of return [63].
Z okvirom o SSGP je poleg kritja stroškov, nastalih pri izpolnjevanju obveznosti javne službe, določeno tudi nadomestilo za stopnjo zmernega dobička [63].
Paragraph 18 of the SGEI Framework specifies that the reasonable profit ‘should be taken to mean a rate of return on own capital that takes account of the risk, or absence of risk, incurred by the undertaking by virtue of the intervention by the Member State, particularly if the latter grants exclusive or special rights. This rate must normally not exceed the average rate for the sector concerned in recent years. In sectors where there is no undertaking comparable to the undertaking entrusted with the operation of the service of general economic interest, a comparison may be made with undertakings situated in other Member States, or if necessary, in other sectors, provided that the particular characteristics of each sector are taken into account. In determining what amounts to a reasonable profit, the Member State may introduce incentive criteria relating, among other things, to the quality of service provided and gains in productive efficiency.’
V točki 18 okvira o SSGP je določeno, da je treba za zmerni dobiček „šteti […] stopnjo donosa lastnega kapitala, ki mora upoštevati tveganje ali odsotnost tveganja, ki ga je podjetje imelo zaradi intervencije s strani države članice, zlasti če slednja odobri izključne ali posebne pravice. Ta stopnja običajno ne sme presegati povprečne stopnje za zadevni sektor v zadnjih letih. V sektorjih, kjer ni podjetja, primerljivega s podjetjem, pooblaščenim za opravljanje storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena, je primerjava možna s podjetji, ki imajo sedež v drugih državah članicah, ali po potrebi s podjetji iz drugih sektorjev, pod pogojem, da se upoštevajo posebne značilnosti posameznega [podjetja]. Pri določanju[,] kaj pomeni zmerni dobiček, lahko države članice uvedejo merila, iz katerih izhajajo spodbude, med drugim za kakovost opravljene storitve in povečanje učinkovitosti proizvodnje.“
The appropriate level of reasonable profit is thus to be chosen taking into account a number of parameters, in particular the average rate for the sector concerned, the risk associated with the undertaking’s activities and, where applicable, incentive criteria relating to the company concerned.
Ustrezno raven zmernega dobička je treba torej določiti ob upoštevanju različnih parametrov, zlasti povprečne stopnje za zadevni sektor, tveganja, povezanega z dejavnostmi podjetja, in – če je to primerno – meril, iz katerih izhajajo spodbude za zadevno podjetje.
In order to establish a level of reasonable profit, the Commission has based itself on several expert studies, which are set out in more detail below.
Komisija se je pri določanju ravni zmernega dobička oprla na več izvedenskih študij, ki so podrobneje predstavljene v nadaljevanju.
Based on the studies and on the level of risk of each management contract, the Commission has determined a range of reasonable levels of profit for DPLP for mail delivery, on the one hand, and press distribution, on the other, for each of the four management contracts.
Na podlagi študij in ravni tveganja za posamezne pogodbe o upravljanju je opredelila razpon ravni zmernega dobička za podjetje DPLP, ki se je po eni strani nanašal na dostavo pošte, po drugi strani pa na dostavo tiska za vsako od štirih pogodb o upravljanju.
These studies all attempt to identify sets of companies which are sufficiently comparable in terms of activities and risk profile to the postal incumbent in question and to establish a benchmark profit level for the latter on the basis of the observed levels of profit of the comparator firms.
Zadevnim študijam je skupno to, da si prizadevajo za opredelitev skupin podjetij, dovolj primerljivih z zadevnim tradicionalnim poštnim operaterjem, kar zadeva dejavnosti in profil tveganja, ter za določitev referenčne ravni dobička tradicionalnega operaterja na podlagi dobička, ugotovljenega v navedenih primerljivih podjetjih.
As regards risk in particular, the Commission wishes to underline that DPLP, during the entire period under investigation, has faced little or no competition in the vast majority of its operations since it either enjoyed a legally protected monopoly (this applies to most mail services), or a dominant position characterised by very high market shares and barriers to entry through the subsidisation of below-cost prices (e.g. press distribution).
Komisija želi zlasti v zvezi s tveganjem poudariti, da je bilo podjetje DPLP v celotnem preučevanem obdobju pri izvajanju velike večine dejavnosti izpostavljeno šibki konkurenci ali sploh ni imelo konkurence, in sicer zato, ker mu je bil z zakonom zagotovljen monopol (kar velja za večino storitev dostave pošte) ali ker je bilo v prevladujočem položaju, za katerega so značilni zelo visoki tržni deleži in ovire za vstop, nastale zlasti zaradi subvencioniranja cen, nižjih od stroškov (na primer pri dostavi tiska).
In the Commission’s opinion, this aspect has to be borne in mind in all analyses involving benchmarking with companies that, while providing similar services to DPLP, had to operate in a competitive environment.
Komisija meni, da je treba ta vidik upoštevati v vseh študijah, v katerih se zadevno podjetje primerja z družbami, ki so sicer zagotavljale storitve, podobne storitvam podjetja DPLP, vendar so morale svojo dejavnost opravljati v konkurenčnem okolju.
Furthermore, the extent to which a postal incumbent is exposed to risk depends essentially on the characteristics of the regulatory mechanism established by the public authority.
Poleg tega je stopnja izpostavljenosti tradicionalnega poštnega operaterja tveganju odvisna zlasti od značilnosti regulacijskega mehanizma, ki so ga vzpostavili državni organi.
In the context of mail delivery, a sector in which DPLP’s USO was mainly financed through stamp prices [64], the Commission considers that it makes a substantial difference in terms of risk whether the stamp prices were, to a greater or lesser degree, frequently adjusted by the regulator (e.g. at the start of each year or simply whenever necessary) so as to cover the net costs of the USO on an ongoing basis, or whether stamp prices [65] were fixed in advance for a long period (e.g. four to five years) as part of a long-term contract [66].
Kar zadeva dostavo pošte, pri kateri se je obveznost univerzalne storitve podjetja DPLP večinoma financirala s cenami znamk [64], Komisija meni, da je tveganje precej različno, kar je odvisno od tega, kako pogosto je regulativni organ prilagajal cene znamk (na primer na začetku vsakega leta ali preprosto vsakič, ko je bilo to potrebno): ali je torej z njimi ves čas pokrival neto stroške obveznosti univerzalne storitve ali pa so bile cene znamk [65] določene vnaprej za daljše obdobje (na primer za štiri ali pet let) na podlagi dolgoročne pogodbe [66].
The first type of price regulation tends to be rather low risk for the firm in question, in so far as stamp prices are adjusted on a relatively frequent basis so as to maintain a constant financial equilibrium between revenues and costs.
Prvi način regulacije cen teži k precej manjšemu tveganju za zadevno podjetje, saj se cene znamk prilagajajo v določenem časovnem intervalu, da se tako nenehno ohranja finančno ravnovesje med prihodki in stroški.
This type of regulation protects the company’s profit margins against uncertainty.
S tako regulacijo se zavarujejo stopnje dobička družbe zoper negotovosti.
The second type involves more risk as it exposes the operator to the consequences of variations in costs and revenues over a long period.
Drugi način je povezan z večjim tveganjem, saj mora operater nositi posledice nihanj stroškov in prihodkov v daljšem obdobju.
Likewise, in the context of press distribution activities (USO financed through financial compensation), it makes a substantial difference whether the compensation is based on actual net costs (i.e. net costs actually incurred) or whether it is based on projected net costs over a long period.
Enako velja za dostavo tiska (obveznost univerzalne storitve, ki se financira iz denarnih nadomestil), saj se položaj precej razlikuje glede na to, ali nadomestilo temelji na dejanskih neto stroških (dejansko nastalih neto stroških) ali na neto stroških, predvidenih za daljše obdobje.
For instance, if the compensation takes the form of a fixed lump-sum payment covering expected net costs over a long period, it leaves the operator exposed to all variations in revenues and costs.
Tako je z nadomestilom, izplačanim kot pavšalni znesek, ki pokrije neto stroške, predvidene za daljše obdobje, operater izpostavljen vsem nihanjem prihodkov in stroškov.
In such a case, the operator faces a higher degree of risk than when it is compensated in full on the basis of ex-post costs and revenues.
Zato zanj obstaja večje tveganje kot pri celostnem nadomestilu, določenem naknadno na podlagi stroškov in prihodkov.
Where the contract between the operator and the public authority is such that the public service is connected with a certain degree of risk, for instance because it leaves the incumbent exposed to significant variations in revenues and costs, the reasonable profit allowed to the incumbent should be commensurate with the corresponding level of risk involved.
Če operater in državni organi sklenejo pogodbo, na podlagi katere je javna služba povezana z določeno stopnjo tveganja – ker je na primer tradicionalni operater izpostavljen velikim nihanjem prihodkov in stroškov – mora biti zmerni dobiček, do katerega je ta upravičen, sorazmeren z ravnjo tveganja, ki mu je izpostavljen.
By contrast, where the contract between the incumbent and the public authority is such that the public service is not connected with substantial risk, the reasonable profit allowed should be low as well.
Nasprotno, če tradicionalni operater in državni organi sklenejo pogodbo, na podlagi katere javna služba ni povezana z bistvenim tveganjem, mora biti majhen tudi dovoljeni zmerni dobiček.
The Commission would also point out that the degree of risk incurred by the company and the extent to which the company is entitled to compensation for efficiency gains are closely intertwined.
Komisija še ugotavlja, da sta raven tveganja, ki mu je izpostavljena družba, in raven nadomestil, do katerih je upravičena za izboljšanje učinkovitosti, tesno povezani.
For instance, a public authority can set in advance a fixed level of compensation which anticipates and incorporates the efficiency gains that the undertaking can be expected to make over the lifetime of the entrustment act.
Tako lahko državni organi predhodno določijo raven fiksnega nadomestila, v katero se vnaprej vključi izboljšanje učinkovitosti, ki bi ga moralo podjetje navadno doseči v času veljavnosti pooblastila.
To some extent, therefore, risk and efficiency incentives go hand in hand.
Torej so tveganje in spodbude k učinkovitosti v določenem obsegu povezane.
Likewise, an ex-ante price cap over a long period normally provides stronger incentives for efficiency improvements, but is also more risky for the company involved.
Podobno tudi najvišja cena, določena a priori za daljše obdobje, običajno še bolj spodbuja k večji učinkovitosti, vendar je hkrati tudi bolj tvegana za zadevno podjetje.
Benchmarking of reasonable profit
Primerjalna študija zmernega dobička
In order to address the question of a reasonable rate of profit for DPLP, the Commission bases itself on several expert studies:
Komisija se je pri preučevanju vprašanja stopnje zmernega dobička podjetja DPLP oprla na več izvedenskih študij.
WIK study: in the context of Case C-36/07, a State aid procedure relating to the German postal operator, Deutsche Post AG (hereinafter ‘DP’), the Commission asked WIK Consult to carry out a study on the appropriate level of reasonable profit for postal incumbents [67] (hereinafter ‘WIK study’).
Študija družbe WIK: Komisija je v zadevi C-36/07, v kateri je obravnavala državno pomoč nemškemu poštnemu operaterju Deutsche Post AG (v nadaljnjem besedilu: podjetje DP), družbo WIK Consult zaprosila za študijo v zvezi z ustrezno ravnjo zmernega dobička za tradicionalne poštne operaterje [67] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: študija družbe WIK).
Deloitte study: on 23 April 2010, the Commission received a study by Deloitte [68] (hereinafter ‘Deloitte study’) setting out its views on the level of reasonable profit to be used for DP’s universal services.
Študija družbe Deloitte: Komisija je 23. aprila 2010 prejela študijo, v kateri je združenje za raziskave in svetovanje Deloitte [68] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba Deloitte) dalo mnenje o ravni zmernega dobička, ki bi jo bilo treba upoštevati za univerzalne storitve podjetja DP.
CRA study: on 1 March 2011, Belgium submitted an expert study in response to the WIK study by Charles Rivers Associates [69] (hereinafter ‘CRA’).
Študija družbe CRA: Belgija je 1. marca 2011 predložila študijo družbe Charles Rivers Associates [69] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba CRA), s katero je izpodbijala študijo družbe WIK.
The WIK study
Študija družbe WIK
In this study, WIK establishes a reasonable profit benchmark for DP.
Družba WIK je v tej študiji opredelila referenčni zmerni dobiček za podjetje DP.
Specifically, WIK first performs a function and risk analysis of DP and concludes that DP predominantly provides routine functions and faces limited entrepreneurial risk [70].
Najprej je dejansko analizirala naloge in tveganja, značilne za zadevno podjetje, pri čemer je menila, da to večinoma zagotavlja rutinske naloge in je zato izpostavljeno omejenemu podjetniškemu tveganju [70].
On the basis of this analysis, WIK selects appropriate comparators, i.e. determines the composition of the benchmark groups from which the reasonable profit benchmark is derived.
Družba WIK je na podlagi te analize izbrala podjetja za primerjavo oziroma, povedano drugače, opredelila sestavo referenčnih skupin, iz katerih je lahko nato izpeljala referenčni zmerni dobiček.
Overall, WIK points out that, conceptually, the adopted benchmark procedure follows the standard methodology used for profitability benchmarks in transfer pricing [71].
Na splošno je poudarila, da je njen ocenjevalni postopek temeljil na načelih metodologije, ki se običajno uporablja za vse referenčne vrednosti donosnosti pri transfernih cenah [71].
Such a methodology is applied not only in national transfer pricing regulations but also in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (hereinafter ‘OECD Guidelines’) [72].
Taka metodologija se uporablja v nacionalnih predpisih v zvezi s transfernimi cenami, pa tudi v smernicah Organizacije za ekonomsko sodelovanje in razvoj (OECD) za določanje transfernih cen (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice OECD) [72].
WIK considers several measures of profitability, distinguishing between the internal rate of return (IRR), which relies on cash flows and is deemed the conceptually correct measure of the profitability of an activity, and other measures derived from accounting data (rates of return), such as the return on capital employed (ROCE), the return on equity (ROE), the return on assets (ROA) and the return on sales (ROS) [73].
Družba WIK je uporabila več instrumentov za merjenje donosnosti, pri čemer je razlikovala med stopnjo notranjega donosa, ki temelji na denarnih tokovih in se obravnava kot teoretično pravilni instrument za merjenje donosnosti neke dejavnosti, ter drugimi kazalci, izpeljanimi iz računovodskih podatkov (stopnja dobička), kot so donos vloženega kapitala, donos lastniškega kapitala, donos sredstev in donos iz poslovanja [73].
As set out in Chapter 5 of the study, WIK proposes using the ROS as a profitability indicator.
Kot je pojasnjeno v poglavju 5 študije, je družba WIK v obravnavani zadevi kot kazalnik donosnosti predlagala uporabo donosa iz poslovanja.
One advantage of this measure is that it only depends on accounting profit (EBIT [74]) and sales data, which are both easily observable in the company’s accounts.
Ena od prednosti tega instrumenta je, da je odvisen le od računovodskih podatkov o dobičku (EBIT [74]) in prodaji, ki jih je mogoče preprosto razbrati iz računovodskih podatkov družbe.
In addition, the use of the ROS avoids the valuation and attribution of assets between different services, which would be necessary for a capital-based benchmark, such as the ROE and the ROCE, and which is normally a difficult exercise.
Poleg tega se z uporabo donosa iz poslovanja izognemo oceni in dodeljevanju sredstev posameznim storitvam, kar bi bilo pri referenčnem kazalniku na podlagi kapitala, kot sta donos lastniškega kapitala in donos vloženega kapitala, potrebno, je pa to običajno težko izvedljivo.
WIK also points out that a benchmark based on the ROS is advisable if the comparator companies and the benchmarked company belong to the same branch/industry sector so as to ensure that the structure of EBIT and sales is homogeneous.
Družba WIK je še navedla, da se referenčni kazalnik na podlagi donosa iz poslovanja svetuje, če podjetja, ki se uporabljajo za primerjavo, in družba, za katero se izvaja primerjalna študija, spadajo v isto vejo ali industrijski sektor, saj se tako zagotovi enotnost strukture EBIT in prodaje.
Regarding the composition of the benchmark group, WIK concludes that there is a trade-off between the comparability of companies in the sample and the size of the sample.
Kar zadeva sestavo referenčne skupine, je družba WIK ugotovila, da je treba poiskati kompromis med primerljivostjo podjetij iz vzorca in velikostjo zadevne skupine.
WIK argues against including European postal incumbents in the sample because their prices have been regulated in a market which has been foreclosed to competition in most countries over the entire period under investigation.
Nasprotovala je temu, da bi v vzorec vključili evropske tradicionalne poštne operaterje, saj so bile njihove cene v večini držav v celotnem obravnavanem obdobju regulirane na trgu, zaprtem za konkurenco.
For the same reason, the number of companies in direct competition with the postal incumbents is rather limited.
Iz istega razloga je precej omejeno tudi število družb, ki so neposredno konkurirale tradicionalnim poštnim operaterjem.
Mostly, these are smaller companies.
To so bile večinoma manjše družbe.