natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
CCPs should only accept highly liquid collateral with minimal credit and market risk.
CNS bi morala sprejeti le visoko likvidno zavarovanje s premoženjem z minimalnim kreditnim in tržnim tveganjem.
In order to ensure that the collateral held by CCPs remains highly liquid at all times, it is necessary that CCPs establish transparent and predictable policies and procedures to assess and continuously monitor the liquidity of assets accepted as collateral, implement adequate valuation methodologies.
Za zagotavljanje, da zavarovanje s premoženjem CNS ostane ves čas zelo likvidno, mora CNS vzpostaviti pregledne in predvidljive politike in postopke za ocenjevanje in stalno spremljanje likvidnosti sredstev, sprejetih kot zavarovanje s premoženjem, in izvajati ustrezne metodologije vrednotenja.
To that purpose, CCPs should also implement concentration limits aimed at maintaining a sufficient diversification of the collateral to ensure that it can be liquidated promptly without significant market risk affecting its value.
V ta namen bi morale CNS uporabljati tudi omejitve koncentracije, namenjene ohranjanju zadostne razpršenosti zavarovanja s premoženjem, za zagotavljanje, da se lahko takoj unovči, ne da bi na njegovo vrednost vplivalo znatno tržno tveganje.
In determining their policies on eligible collateral and concentration limits they should take in account the global availability of such collateral in view of the potential macroeconomic effects of their policies.
Pri določanju politik glede primernega zavarovanja in omejitev koncentracije bi morale upoštevati globalno razpoložljivost takšnega zavarovanja s premoženjem glede na potencialne makroekonomske učinke politik.
To avoid wrong-way risk, clearing members should not, in general, be permitted to use as collateral their own securities or securities issued by an entity from their same group.
Da bi se izognili tveganju zaradi neugodnih gibanj, klirinškim članom na splošno ne bi smelo biti dovoljeno, da kot zavarovanje s premoženjem uporabijo svoje vrednostne papirje ali vrednostne papirje, ki jih izda subjekt iz iste skupine.
However, a CCP should be able to allow clearing members to post covered bonds that are insulated from the insolvency of the issuer.
Vendar bi CNS moralo biti omogočeno, da klirinškim članom dovoli izdajo kritih obveznic, ki ščitijo pred insolventnostjo izdajatelja.
The underlying collateral should nevertheless be appropriately segregated from the issuer and satisfy the minimum criteria for acceptability of collateral.
Osnovno zavarovanje s premoženjem pa bi moralo biti kljub temu ustrezno ločeno od izdajatelja in izpolnjevati minimalna merila za sprejemljivost zavarovanja s premoženjem.
A clearing member should not issue financial instruments for the primary purpose of using them as collateral by another clearing member.
Klirinški član ne bi smel izdati finančnih instrumentov predvsem za to, da bi jih drug klirinški član uporabil kot zavarovanje s premoženjem.
To ensure the safety of CCPs, a CCP should accept as collateral a commercial bank guarantee only after a thorough assessment of the issuer and of the legal, contractual and operational framework of the guarantee.
Za zagotovitev varnosti CNS bi morala CNS sprejeti garancijo poslovne banke kot zavarovanje s premoženjem šele po temeljiti oceni izdajatelja ter pravnega, pogodbenega in operativnega okvira garancije.
Unsecured exposures of CCPs to commercial banks should be avoided.
Treba bi se bilo izogniti nezavarovanim izpostavljenostim CNS poslovnim bankam.
Therefore, commercial bank guarantees may be accepted only under strict conditions.
Zato se lahko garancije poslovnih bank sprejmejo le pod strogimi pogoji.
Those conditions are generally met in markets characterised by a high concentration of commercial banks willing to provide credit to non-financial clearing members.
Ti pogoji so na splošno izpolnjeni na trgih, za katere je značilna visoka koncentracija poslovnih bank, ki so pripravljene dati posojilo nefinančnim klirinškim članom.
For this reason a higher concentration limit should be permitted in these cases.
Zato bi bilo treba v teh primerih dovoliti višjo omejitev koncentracije.
To limit its market risk, a CCP should be required to value its collateral at least daily.
Za omejitev tržnega tveganja bi bilo treba od CNS zahtevati, da vsaj enkrat dnevno ovrednoti svoje zavarovanje s premoženjem.
It should apply prudent haircuts that reflect the potential decrease of value of the collateral over the interval between its last revaluation and the time by which the collateral can reasonably be assumed to be liquidated under stressed market conditions.
Uporabljati bi morala skrbne odbitke, ki odražajo potencialno zmanjšanje vrednosti zavarovanja s premoženjem v intervalu med zadnjim prevrednotenjem in časom, do katerega se zavarovanje s premoženjem lahko upravičeno šteje za unovčenega v izjemnih tržnih pogojih.
The level of collateral should also take account of potential wrong-way risk exposures.
Stopnja zavarovanja s premoženjem bi morala upoštevati tudi potencialne izpostavljenosti tveganju zaradi neugodnih gibanj.
The implementation of haircuts should enable the CCP to avoid large and unexpected adjustments to the amount of collateral required, thus avoiding procyclical effects to the extent possible.
Uporaba odbitkov bi morala CNS omogočiti izogibanje velikim in nepričakovanim prilagoditvam znesku zahtevanega zavarovanja s premoženjem, da se tako izognejo procikličnim učinkom, kolikor je to mogoče.
A CCP should not concentrate collateral on a limited number of issuers or in a limited number of assets, so as to avoid potential significant adverse price effects in case of liquidation of the collateral in a short period of time.
CNS ne bi smela koncentrirati zavarovanja s premoženjem na omejeno število izdajateljev ali omejeno število sredstev, da se izogne morebitnim znatnim škodljivim učinkom na cene v primeru unovčenja zavarovanja s premoženjem v kratkem času.
Concentrated collateral positions should not be considered highly liquid for this reason.
Zaradi tega se koncentrirane pozicije v zavarovanju s premoženjem ne bi smele šteti za zelo likvidne.
Liquidity, credit and market risk should be considered at portfolio level as well as at the level of an individual financial instrument.
Likvidnostno, kreditno in tržno tveganje bi bilo treba obravnavati na ravni portfelja in na ravni posameznega finančnega instrumenta.
A concentrated portfolio can have a significant negative effect on the liquidity of the collateral or of the financial instruments in which the CCP can invest its financial resources, since selling large positions in stressed market conditions is unlikely to be feasible without depressing the market price.
Koncentriran portfelj ima lahko znaten negativen učinek na likvidnost zavarovanja s premoženjem ali finančnih instrumentov, v katere lahko CNS vlaga svoja finančna sredstva, saj prodaja velikih pozicij v izjemnih tržnih pogojih verjetno ni izvedljiva brez pritiska na tržne cene.
For the same reason, collateral maintained by the CCP should be monitored and valued on a continuous basis to ensure that it remains liquid.
Zaradi istega razloga bi bilo treba spremljati zavarovanje s premoženjem, ki ga drži CNS, ter ga stalno vrednotiti, da ostane likvidno.
Energy derivative markets show a particularly strong interlink with spot commodity markets and in these derivative markets the proportion of non-financial clearing members is high.
Trgi izvedenih finančnih instrumentov na energente kažejo posebno močno povezavo s promptnimi blagovnimi trgi in na teh trgih izvedenih finančnih instrumentov je delež nefinančnih klirinških članov visok.
On those markets, a significant number of market participants are also producers of the underlying commodity.
Na teh trgih je veliko udeležencev tudi proizvajalcev osnovnega blaga.
Access to sufficient collateral to back commercial bank guarantees in full could require substantial divesting by those non-financial clearing members of their current positions or could impede them from continuing to clear their positions as a direct clearing member of a CCP.
Dostop do zadostnega zavarovanja s premoženjem, da se v celoti krijejo garancije poslovnih bank, bi lahko zahteval znatno odprodajo trenutnih pozicij teh nefinančnih klirinških članov ali bi jih lahko oviral, da kot neposredni klirinški člani CNS nadaljujejo kliring pozicij.
That process could cause market disruptions in energy markets, in terms of liquidity and diversity of market participants.
Ta proces bi lahko – če se uvede takoj po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe – povzročal motnje na energetskih trgih, kar zadeva likvidnost in raznolikost udeležencev na trgu.
Therefore, its application should be postponed according to a well established time-frame.
Zato bi bilo treba njegovo uporabo preložiti v skladu z dobro izdelanim časovnim okvirom.
In order to ensure a consistent application of the framework established in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, all sectors should face similar requirements in the final form of the rules applicable to them.
Za zagotovitev dosledne uporabe okvira, določenega v Uredbi (EU) št. 648/2012, bi morale za vse sektorje veljati podobne zahteve v končni obliki predpisov, ki se zanje uporabljajo.
Energy firms currently operate under a well-established framework that will require time to adapt to the new requirements established to avoid detrimental effects to the real economy.
Energetska podjetja trenutno delujejo v dobro uveljavljenem okviru, ki bo potreboval čas za prilagoditev določenim novim zahtevam, da bi se preprečili negativni učinki na realno gospodarstvo.
Therefore, it is considered desirable to establish an application date for such types of markets that allows an appropriate transition from the current market practice without affecting unduly market structure and liquidity.
Zato je zaželeno, da se določi datum začetka uporabe za to vrsto trgov, ki omogoča ustrezen prehod s trenutne tržne prakse, ne da bi to neupravičeno vplivalo na strukturo trga in likvidnost.
The investment policy of a CCP should assign the highest priority to the principles of capital preservation and liquidity maximisation.
Naložbena politika CNS bi morala prednostno obravnavati načeli ohranitve kapitala in maksimizacije likvidnosti.
The investment policy should also ensure that no conflicts of interest arise with the commercial interests of the CCP.
Naložbena politika bi morala tudi zagotoviti, da ne prihaja do navzkrižja interesov s poslovnimi interesi CNS.
The criteria that financial instruments should meet to be considered eligible investments for the CCP, should take into account Principle 16 of the CPSS-IOSCO Principles — in order to ensure international consistency.
Merila, ki bi jih morali izpolnjevati finančni instrumenti, da bi se šteli za primerne naložbe za CNS, bi morala upoštevati načelo 16 CPSS-IOSCO, da se zagotovi mednarodna usklajenost.
In particular, a CCP should be required to apply restrictive standards concerning the issuer of the financial instrument, the transferability of the financial instrument and the credit, market, volatility and foreign exchange risk of the financial instrument.
Od CNS bi se moralo zlasti zahtevati, da uporablja stroge standarde glede izdajatelja finančnega instrumenta, prenosljivosti finančnega instrumenta ter kreditnega in tržnega tveganja, tveganja nestanovitnosti in valutnega tveganja finančnega instrumenta.
A CCP should ensure that it does not undermine measures taken to limit the risk exposure of its investments by having excessive exposures to any individual financial instrument, type of financial instrument, individual issuer, type of issuer or individual custodian.
CNS bi morala zagotoviti, da ne omejuje učinkovitosti ukrepov, sprejetih za omejitev izpostavljenosti naložb tveganju, s tem ko ohranja čezmerno izpostavljenost kateremu koli posameznemu finančnemu instrumentu, tipu finančnega instrumenta, posameznemu izdajatelju, tipu izdajatelja ali posameznemu skrbniku.
The use of derivatives by a CCP exposes it to additional credit and market risks and it is therefore necessary to define a restrictive set of circumstances in which a CCP can invest its financial resources in derivatives.
Z uporabo izvedenih finančnih instrumentov je CNS izpostavljena dodatnim kreditnim in tržnim tveganjem in zato je treba določiti strog niz okoliščin, v katerih lahko CNS investira svoja finančna sredstva v izvedene finančne instrumente.
Given that a CCP’s aim should be to have a flat position with regards to market risk, the only risks that a CCP should need to hedge are those concerning the collateral that it accepts or the risks arising from the default of a clearing member.
Glede na to, da bi moral biti cilj CNS ničelna pozicija, kar zadeva tržno tveganje, bi morala biti edina tveganja, pred katerimi bi se morala zavarovati CNS, tista, ki se nanašajo na zavarovanje s premoženjem, ki ga sprejme, ali tveganja, ki izhajajo iz neplačila klirinškega člana.
Risks concerning the collateral that a CCP accepts can be sufficiently managed through haircuts and it is not considered necessary for a CCP to use derivatives in this regard.
Tveganja v zvezi z zavarovanjem s premoženjem, ki ga sprejme CNS, se lahko zadovoljivo upravljajo prek odbitkov in ne zdi se potrebno, da CNS v zvezi s tem uporablja izvedene finančne instrumente.
Derivatives should only be used by a CCP for managing liquidity risk arising for exposures to different currencies and for the purposes of hedging the portfolio of a defaulted clearing member and only where the CCP’s default management procedures envisage such use.
CNS bi morala uporabljati izvedene finančne instrumente samo za upravljanje likvidnostnega tveganja, ki izhaja iz izpostavljenosti različnim valutam, in za varovanje portfelja klirinškega člana, ki je v zaostanku s plačili, in samo, kadar postopki CNS v primeru neizpolnjevanja obveznosti predvidevajo takšno uporabo.
To ensure the safety of CCPs, they should only be allowed to maintain cash in unsecured deposits in minimal proportions.
Za zagotavljanje varnosti CNS bi jim moralo biti dovoljeno, da ohranjajo le majhen del denarnih sredstev v nezavarovanih vlogah.
In securing its cash, CCPs should always ensure that they are always adequately protected against liquidity risk.
Pri varovanju svojih denarnih sredstev bi morale CNS vedno zagotoviti, da so ustrezno zaščitene pred likvidnostnim tveganjem.
It is necessary to set out rigorous stress and back testing requirements to ensure that a CCP’s models, their methodologies and the liquidity risk management framework work properly, taking into account all risks the CCP is exposed to, so that the CCP has at all times adequate resources to cover those risks.
Treba je določiti stroge zahteve za testiranje izjemnih situacij in testiranje za nazaj za zagotovitev, da modeli CNS, njihove metodologije in okvir upravljanja likvidnostnega tveganja delujejo pravilno, ob upoštevanju vseh tveganj, ki jim je izpostavljena CNS, tako da ima CNS ves čas ustrezna sredstva za kritje teh tveganj.
To ensure consistent application of requirements for CCPs, it is necessary to set out detailed provisions with respect to the types of tests to be undertaken, including both stress and back testing.
Za zagotovitev usklajene uporabe zahtev za CNS je treba določiti podrobne določbe glede vrste testov, ki jih je treba izvesti, vključno s testiranjem izjemnih situacij in testiranjem za nazaj.
In order to cater for the wide range of security and derivative contracts which may be cleared in the future, reflect differences in CCP’s business and risk management approaches, allow for future developments and new risks to be dealt with and allow for sufficient flexibility, a criteria based approach is necessary.
Potreben je pristop, ki temelji na merilih, da se zajame širok niz pogodb o vrednostnih papirjih in izvedenih finančnih instrumentih, za katere se bo morda v prihodnosti opravil kliring, odražajo razlike v pristopih k poslovanju CNS in upravljanju tveganj, omogoča obravnavanje prihodnjega razvoja in novih tveganj ter dovoli zadostna prožnost.
In validating a CCP’s models, their methodologies and the liquidity risk management framework it is important to use an appropriate independent party so that any necessary corrective measures can be found and implemented before implementation and to avoid any material conflicts of interest.
Pri ovrednotenju modelov CNS, njihovih metodologij in okvira za upravljanje likvidnostnega tveganja je pomembno, da se uporabi ustrezna neodvisna stranka, tako da je pred izvajanjem mogoče najti vse potrebne korektivne ukrepe in jih izvesti ter da se preprečijo vsa bistvena navzkrižja interesov.
The independent party should be sufficiently separate from the part of the CCP’s business that develops, implements and will operate the model or policies being reviewed and should not hold a material conflict of interest.
Neodvisna stranka bi morala biti dovolj ločena od dela poslovne dejavnosti CNS, ki razvija in izvaja ter bo upravljal model ali politike, ki se pregledujejo, in ne bi smela imeti bistvenega navzkrižja interesov.
Those conditions could be met either by an internal party that has separate reporting lines or an external party.
Te pogoje bi lahko izpolnjevala notranja stranka, ki ima ločene zahteve glede poročanja, ali zunanja stranka.
Various aspects of a CCP’s financial resources, notably margin coverage, default funds and other financial resources, are designed to cover different scenarios and objectives.
Različni vidiki finančnih sredstev CNS, zlasti stopnja pokritosti, jamstveni skladi ali druga finančna sredstva, so namenjeni kritju različnih scenarijev in ciljev.
It is therefore necessary to provide specific requirements to reflect these objectives and to ensure consistent application across CCPs.
Zato je treba določiti posebne zahteve, ki bodo odražale te cilje in zagotovile usklajeno uporabo po CNS.
In assessing the necessary coverage the CCP should not net off any exposures between defaulting clearing members, in order to avoid reducing the potential impacts that these exposures might have.
CNS pri ocenjevanju potrebnega kritja ne bi smela izravnati nobenih izpostavljenosti med klirinškimi člani, ki so v zaostanku s plačili, da bi se tako izognila zmanjšanju potencialnih učinkov, ki bi jih lahko imele te izpostavljenosti.
The different types of financial instruments which a CCP may clear are subject to a variety of specific risks.
Različne vrste finančnih instrumentov, za katere CNS lahko opravlja kliring, so podvržene različnim posebnim tveganjem.
A CCP should therefore be required to consider all the risks relevant to the markets it provides clearing services for in its models, their methodologies and the liquidity risk management framework to ensure it adequately measures its potential future exposure.
Od CNS bi bilo zato treba zahtevati, da preuči vsa tveganja, ki so pomembna za trge, katerim zagotavlja storitve kliringa, v svojih modelih, metodologiji in okviru upravljanja likvidnostnega tveganja, da bi ustrezno merila svoje potencialne prihodnje izpostavljenosti.
In order for such risks to be properly considered, stress testing requirements should include instrument-specific risks relevant to different types of financial instruments.
Da bi se ustrezno upoštevala takšna tveganja, bi morale zahteve za testiranje izjemnih situacij vključevati od različnih vrst finančnih instrumentov odvisna tveganja, ki se nanašajo na različne vrste finančnih instrumentov.
For a CCP to ensure that its model for calculating initial margins adequately reflects its potential exposures, in addition to the daily back testing of its margin coverage which looks at the adequacy of the margin being called, it should also back test key parameters and assumptions of the model.
Da bi CNS zagotovila, da njen model za izračun začetnega kritja ustrezno odraža njene potencialne izpostavljenosti, bi morala poleg dnevnega testiranja za nazaj svoje stopnje pokritosti, ki obravnava ustreznost zahtevanega kritja, testirati za nazaj tudi ključne parametre in postavke modela.
This is essential to ensure that CCPs’ models calculate initial margin accurately.
To je bistveno za zagotavljanje, da se z modeli CNS natančno izračuna začetno kritje.
Rigorous sensitivity analysis of margin requirements may take on increased importance when markets are illiquid or volatile and should be used to determine the impact of varying important model parameters.
Natančna analiza občutljivosti zahtev za kritje lahko pridobi na pomenu, ko so trgi nelikvidni ali nestanovitni, in bi se morala uporabljati za določanje učinka različnih pomembnih parametrov modela.
Sensitivity analysis is an effective tool to explore hidden shortcomings that cannot be discovered through back testing.
Analiza občutljivosti je učinkovito orodje za raziskovanje skritih pomanjkljivosti, ki jih ni mogoče odkriti s testiranjem za nazaj.
Failure to conduct stress and back tests regularly could lead to a CCP’s financial and liquid resources being inadequate to cover the actual risks it is exposed to.
Če se testiranje izjemnih situacij in testiranje za nazaj ne izvajata redno, bi to lahko privedlo do tega, da finančna in likvidna sredstva CNS ne bodo zadostna za pokrivanje dejanskih tveganj, ki jim je izpostavljena.
Appropriate tests will also allow a CCP’s models, their methodologies and the liquidity risk management framework to deal with changing markets and new risks promptly.
Ustrezni testi bodo tudi omogočili modelom CNS, njihovim metodologijam in okviru za upravljanje likvidnostnega tveganja, da se takoj začnejo ukvarjati s spreminjajočimi trgi in novimi tveganji.
Test results should therefore be used promptly by CCPs to review their models, methodologies and liquidity risk management framework.
CNS bi morale zato takoj uporabiti rezultate testiranja za pregled modelov, metodologij in okvira za upravljanje likvidnostnega tveganja.
Modelling extreme market conditions can help a CCP determining the limits of its current models, the liquidity risk management framework and the financial and liquid resources.
Modeliranje skrajnih tržnih razmer lahko pomaga CNS pri določanju meja trenutnih modelov, okvira za upravljanje likvidnostnega tveganja ter finančnih in likvidnih sredstev.
However, it requires the CCP to exercise judgment when modelling different markets and products.
Vendar od CNS zahteva, da pri modeliranju različnih trgov in proizvodov izvede oceno.
Reverse stress testing should be considered a helpful management tool, whilst not the main one, to determine the appropriate level of financial resources.
Povratno testiranje izjemnih situacij bi bilo treba obravnavati kot koristno, čeprav ne glavno orodje za določanje ustrezne ravni finančnih sredstev.
The involvement of clearing members, clients and other relevant stakeholders in the testing of a CCP’s default management procedures, through simulation exercises, is essential to ensure that they have the understanding and operational capability to successfully participate in a default management situation.
Vključenost klirinških članov, strank in drugih ustreznih zainteresiranih strani v testiranje postopkov CNS v primeru neplačila s simulacijskimi vajami, je bistveno za zagotovitev, da imajo razumevanje in operativne zmogljivosti za uspešno sodelovanje pri upravljanju v primeru neplačila.
Simulation exercises should replicate a default scenario to demonstrate the roles and responsibilities of clearing members, clients and other relevant stakeholders.
Simulacijske vaje bi morale posnemati scenarij v primeru neplačila za prikaz vloge in odgovornosti klirinških članov, strank in drugih ustreznih zainteresiranih strani.
Additionally it is important that a CCP has appropriate mechanisms that enable it to ascertain whether corrective action is required and to identify any lack of clarity in, or discretion allowed by, the rules and procedures.
Poleg tega je pomembno, da ima CNS ustrezne mehanizme, ki ji omogočajo, da preveri, ali so potrebni korektivni ukrepi, in opredeli morebitne nejasnosti v postopkih in pravilih ali možnosti lastne presoje, ki jo dovoljujejo pravila in postopki.