natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
By contrast, after WAK subordinated part of its claims, it was legally possible for GfW to avoid insolvency proceedings and after waiving part of its claims and interest payments, WAK had outstanding claims of EUR 5,15 million which it could expect to recover as a result of the fact that GfW could continue trading.
V nasprotju s tem pa je bilo, ko je banka WAK podredila del svojih terjatev, pravno mogoče, da se je družba GfW izognila postopkom zaradi nesolventnosti, banka WAK pa je imela po odpovedi delu svojih terjatev in plačil obresti neporavnane terjatve v znesku 5,15 milijona EUR, katerih povrnitev je lahko pričakovala, saj je družba GfW lahko nadaljevala s poslovanjem.
It is also pointed out that if insolvency proceedings had been opened the repayments on the loan of EUR 1440476,92 made by GfW to WAK in the period 1 November to 31 December 2000 could have been contested by GfW under the insolvency rules.
Poudarjeno je tudi, da bi lahko družba GfW v primeru začetka postopkov zaradi nesolventnosti v skladu s predpisi o nesolventnosti izpodbijala odplačila posojila v znesku 1440476,92 EUR, ki jih je banki WAK izplačala v obdobju med 1. novembrom in 31. decembrom 2000.
This would have led to WAK being obliged to repay these funds.
Tako bi bila banka WAK obvezana k poplačilu teh sredstev.
Germany emphasises that an ex-post evaluation shows that the subordination and waiver of claims option made more economic sense as the repayments received by avoiding the insolvency of GfW was EUR 4670517,65, making it superior to the maximum EUR 2,4 million which could have been secured under the insolvency proceedings.
Nemčija poudarja, da naknadna ocena kaže, da je bila možnost podreditve in odpovedi terjatev z ekonomskega vidika bolj smiselna, saj so poplačila, prejeta zaradi preprečitve nesolventnosti družbe GfW, znašala 4670517,65 EUR, kar je več kot največ 2,4 milijona EUR, ki bi jih bilo mogoče zagotoviti v okviru postopkov zaradi nesolventnosti.
Germany concludes that as the subordination and waiver of claims was in accordance with the private creditor test, there was no aid to the winegrowing enterprises and merchants at the time of subordination and waiver of claims by WAK.
Nemčija ugotavlja, da vinogradniška podjetja in trgovci v času podreditve in odpovedi terjatev banke WAK niso prejeli pomoči, ker sta bili podreditev in odpoved terjatev v skladu s preskusom zasebnega upnika.
Common market organisation
Skupna ureditev trga
Until the entry into force of Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 of 29 April 2008 on the common organisation of the market in wine [16], winegrowing and wine processing were covered by Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999.
Pred začetkom veljavnosti Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 479/2008 z dne 29. aprila 2008 o skupni ureditvi trga za vino [16] je področje vinogradništva in predelave vina urejala Uredba (ES) št. 1493/1999.
Article 71 of Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 states that Articles 87, 88 and 89 of the Treaty (now Articles 107, 108 and 109 of the TFEU) shall apply to the production of and trade in the products covered by it.
Člen 71 Uredbe (ES) št. 1493/1999 določa, da se členi 87, 88 in 89 Pogodbe (zdaj členi 107, 108 in 109 PDEU) uporabljajo za proizvodnjo in trgovino s proizvodi, ki so zajeti v navedeni uredbi.
Before 31 July 2000, winegrowing and wine processing were covered by Regulation (EEC) No 822/87.
Pred 31. julijem 2000 je področje vinogradništva in predelave vina urejala Uredba (EGS) št. 822/87.
Article 76 of Regulation (EEC) No 822/87 states that Articles 92, 93 and 94 of the Treaty (now Articles 107, 108 and 109 of the TFEU) shall apply to the production of and trade in the products listed in Article 1 of the Regulation.
Člen 76 Uredbe (EGS) št. 822/87 določa, da se členi 92, 93 in 94 Pogodbe (zdaj členi 107, 108 in 109 PDEU) uporabljajo za proizvodnjo in trgovino s proizvodi iz člena 1 Uredbe.
Therefore, the measures at hand have to be examined in the light of State aid rules.
Zato je treba obravnavane ukrepe preučiti z vidika pravil glede državne pomoči.
Pursuant to Article 107(1) of the TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is prohibited, insofar as it affects trade between Member States.
V skladu s členom 107(1) PDEU je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, prepovedana, kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami.
WAK is a public-law corporation and is financed partly from funds of the federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate and partly from parafiscal charges.
Banka WAK je družba javnega prava, ki se deloma financira iz sredstev zvezne dežele Porenje-Pfalška, delno pa iz davkom podobnih dajatev.
The measure is therefore financed from state resources.
Ukrep se zato financira iz državnih sredstev.
Aid to an undertaking appears to affect trade between Member States where that undertaking operates in a market open to intra-Union trade [17].
Zdi se, da pomoč, ki se dodeli podjetju, prizadene trgovino med državami članicami, če podjetje posluje na trgu, odprtem za trgovanje v Evropski uniji [17].
There is a substantial intra-Union trade in agricultural products.
Trgovanje s kmetijskimi proizvodi znotraj Unije je obsežno.
Therefore, the present aid is liable to affect trade between Member States [18].
Zato bi zadevna pomoč lahko prizadela trgovino med državami članicami [18].
The Court has ruled that in order to determine whether a state measure constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU, it is also necessary to establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions [19] and/or whether the measure enabled the undertaking to avoid having to bear costs which it would normally have had to meet out of its own financial resources [20].
Sodišče je razsodilo, da je za presojo, ali državni ukrep pomeni pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, treba ugotoviti tudi, ali upravičeno podjetje dobi ekonomsko prednost, ki je pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji [19] ne bi dobilo, in/ali se je podjetje zaradi ukrepa lahko izognilo kritju stroškov, ki bi jih običajno moralo poravnati iz lastnih finančnih sredstev [20].
This would indeed be sufficient to indicate potential distortions of competition [21].
To bi zagotovo zadostovalo, da se pokažejo morebitna izkrivljanja konkurence [21].
Existence of aid to the Gesellschaft für Weinabsatz (GfW)
Obstoj pomoči družbi Gesellschaft für Weinabsatz (GfW)
The granting of loan by WAK
Odobritev posojila banke WAK
No risk premium was charged.
Premija za tveganje ni bila zaračunana.
The reference rate for Germany for this period lay between 5,23 % and 6,33 %.
V tem obdobju je referenčna mera za Nemčijo znašala 5,23–6,33 %.
Germany agrees with the Commission’s view that the granting of the loan was not done on market terms.
Nemčija se strinja z mnenjem Komisije, da posojilo ni bilo odobreno v skladu s tržnimi pogoji.
Had the loan been granted on market terms, a higher base rate would have been charged and a risk premium would have been added considering the limited security that the collateral for the loan offered.
Če bi bilo posojilo odobreno v skladu s tržnimi pogoji, bi bila zaračunana višja osnovna mera, zaradi omejene varnosti, ki jo je zagotavljalo zavarovanje posojila, pa bi bila dodana premija za tveganje.
It can be concluded that the loan granted to GfW contained a State aid element within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU as GfW received an economic advantage it would not have obtained under normal market conditions.
Ugotoviti je mogoče, da je posojilo, odobreno družbi GfW, vsebovalo element državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, ker je družba GfW dobila ekonomsko prednost, ki je pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji ne bi.
The aid element is calculated as the difference between the interest charged and the reference rate plus an appropriate risk premium.
Element pomoči se izračuna kot razlika med zaračunano obrestno mero in referenčno mero s prištetjem ustrezne premije za tveganje.
Possible passing on of aid to legal successors
Morebiten prenos pomoči na pravne naslednike
In accordance with settled case-law [22] recovery is according to Germany therefore not possible.
Po mnenju Nemčije v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso [22] vračilo zato ni mogoče.
As the remaining assets of GfW were sold off, the person who purchased them could possibly have benefited from the aid granted to GfW.
Ker so bila preostala sredstva družbe GfW prodana, bi lahko njihov kupec izkoristil pomoč, odobreno družbi GfW.
However, as the person paid the original purchase price and the market had slumped over the passed years, it is clear that the price paid by the purchaser was at least the market prices.
Ker je kupec plačal prvotno nakupno ceno, tržne razmere pa so se v zadnjih letih poslabšale, je jasno, da je bila cena, ki jo je plačal, vsaj enaka tržni ceni.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that no aid was passed on to the purchaser of GfW’s remaining stock.
Komisija tako ugotavlja, da pomoč ni bila prenesena na kupca preostanka zalog družbe GfW.
At the same time, GfW ceased to exist and therefore there is no aid to be recovered.
Hkrati pa je družba GfW prenehala obstajati, zato vračilo pomoči ni mogoče.
The subordination and waiver of claims by WAK
Podreditev in odpoved terjatev banke WAK
The subordination of claims and the waiver of claims and interest payments were financed by WAK’s own resources and a corresponding loan taken out by WAK and are therefore to be considered to be financed through State resources.
Banka WAK je podreditev terjatev ter odpoved terjatev in plačil obresti financirala iz lastnih sredstev in ustreznega posojila, zato se šteje, da ju je financirala iz državnih sredstev.
To establish whether the subordination of claims and the waiver of claims and interest payments constitute State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU to GfW it is necessary to establish whether GfW receives an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions and/or whether the measure enabled GfW to avoid having to bear costs which it would normally have had to meet out of its own financial resources.
Da se ugotovi, ali podreditev terjatev ter odpoved terjatev in plačil obresti pomenita državno pomoč družbi GfW v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, je treba ugotoviti tudi, ali družba GfW dobi ekonomsko prednost, ki je pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji ne bi in/ali se je družba GfW zaradi ukrepa lahko izognila kritju stroškov, ki bi jih običajno morala poravnati iz lastnih finančnih sredstev.
This assessment has to be done using the private creditor test.
Ta ocena se mora izvesti s preskusom zasebnega upnika.
According to settled case-law, waiving part of the claim can be required in order to increase the amount which is effectively recovered.
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso se lahko odpoved delu terjatev zahteva, da se poveča dejansko povrnjeni znesek.
A private creditor would act so as to minimise his losses [23].
Zasebni upnik bi ravnal tako, da bi čim bolj zmanjšal svojo izgubo [23].
In case a claim was not sufficiently secured, agreement to postpone the repayment would increase the chances of repayment without losses as the debtor would have the chance to overcome the crisis and improve its situation [24].
Če terjatev ni bila dovolj zavarovana, bi dogovor o preložitvi poplačila povečal možnosti za poplačilo brez izgube, ker bi imel dolžnik možnost, da premaga krizo in izboljša svoj položaj [24].
In the HAMSA [25] ruling of the CFI, the court rejects the Commissions previous practice of requiring equal share of waivers of claims for private and public creditors in relation to their share of the debt.
V sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje v zadevi HAMSA [25] je sodišče zavrnilo prejšnjo prakso Komisije, ki je zahtevala, da imajo zasebni in javni upniki enak delež odpovedi terjatvam glede na njihov delež dolga.
Paragraph 168 and 169 of the judgment reads:
Točki 168 in 169 sodbe navajata:
When a firm faced with a substantial deterioration of its financial situation proposes an agreement or series of agreements for debt arrangement to its creditors with a view to remedying the situation and avoiding liquidation, each creditor must make a decision having regard to the amount offered to it under the proposed agreement, on the one hand, and the amount it expects to be able to recover following possible liquidation of the firm, on the other.
Če podjetje, ki se srečuje z znatnim poslabšanjem svojega finančnega stanja, predlaga dogovor ali vrsto dogovorov za plačilo dolga upnikom z namenom izboljšanja stanja in preprečitve likvidacije, mora vsak upnik izbirati med zneskom, ki mu je ponujen v skladu s predlaganim dogovorom, na eni strani in zneskom, za katerega meni, da bi ga lahko izterjal ob morebitni likvidaciji, na drugi strani.
Its choice is influenced by number of factors, including the creditor’s status as the holder of a secured, preferential or ordinary claim, the nature and extent of any security it may hold, its assessment of the chances of the firm being restored to viability, as well as the amount it would receive in the event of liquidation.
Na njegovo izbiro vplivajo številni dejavniki, kot so njegov status upnika kot lastnika zavarovanih, prednostnih ali običajnih terjatev, narava in obseg vsakega morebitnega zavarovanja, ki ga ima, njegova presoja možnosti, da bo podjetje ponovno vzpostavilo sposobnost preživetja, ter znesek, ki bi ga prejel v primeru likvidacije.
If it turned out, for example, that in the event the firm was liquidated, the realisation value of its assets was only sufficient to cover mortgage and preferential claims, ordinary claims would have no value.
Če se na primer izkaže, da je v primeru likvidacije podjetja realizacija vrednosti njegovih sredstev zadostna samo za pokritje hipoteke in prednostnih terjatev, ne bi imele običajne terjatve nobene vrednosti.
In such a scenario, acceptance by an ordinary creditor of the cancellation of a major part of its claim would not really be a sacrifice.
Če bi se običajni upnik v takšnem primeru odpovedal večjemu delu svojih terjatev, to zanj dejansko ne bi pomenilo odrekanja.
It follows that, in the absence of knowledge about the factors which determine the respective values of the choices offered to creditors, the mere fact that there is an apparent lack of proportion between the amounts which the various creditors have written off is not in itself conclusive as to the reasons which led them to accept the debt remissions proposed.’
To pomeni, da zaradi pomanjkanja podatkov o dejavnikih, ki določajo vrednosti izbir, ki so na voljo upnikom, iz samega dejstva, da so zneski, ki so jih različni upniki odpisali, očitno nesorazmerni, ni mogoče sklepati o razlogih za njihovo sprejetje predlaganih odpustov dolga.“
In addition, in the HAMSA [26] case the CFI established that, a public creditor acts like a private creditor when he decides to waive a share of his claims, after extensive and reasonable evaluation of how much he might be able to recover, of the risk of liquidation and of the chance of the firm being restored to viability.
Poleg tega je Sodišče prve stopnje v zadevi HAMSA [26] ugotovilo, da javni upnik ravna kot zasebni upnik, če se po obširni in razumni oceni zneska, ki bi ga lahko izterjal, tveganja likvidacije in možnosti, da bo podjetje ponovno vzpostavilo sposobnost preživetja, odloči, da se bo odpovedal delu svojih terjatev.
Lastly, in the Commission’s decision in the Huta Cynku [27] case, the Commission decided that no advantage and thus no State aid exists where restructuring would yield better proceeds than liquidation.
Nazadnje je Komisija v odločbi v zvezi z zadevo Huta Cynku [27] odločila, da nobena ugodnost, in torej nobena državna pomoč, ne obstaja, kadar bi prestrukturiranje prineslo boljši iztržek kot likvidacija.
With reference to the case-law quoted above, when assessing whether a private creditor would have acted or has acted in the same way as WAK, it is necessary to examine the choices that WAK had when it was concluded that GfW was facing insolvency and what the economic implications connected to these choices would be.
Ob sklicevanju na zgoraj navedeno sodno prakso je treba pri ocenjevanju, ali bi zasebni upnik ravnal ali je ravnal kot banka WAK, preučiti izbire, ki jih je imela banka WAK na voljo, ko je ugotovila, da družbi GfW grozi nesolventnost, in preučiti, kakšne bi bile ekonomske posledice, povezane s temi odločitvami.
As a second step, it is also necessary to carry out the same examination for the winegrowing enterprises and merchants and then to evaluate whether the situation faced by WAK can be compared to and evaluated based on the actions of the winegrowing enterprises and merchants.
Nato je treba na enak način preučiti vinogradniška podjetja in trgovce ter oceniti, ali je mogoče položaj banke WAK primerjati in oceniti na podlagi ravnanja vinogradniških podjetij in trgovcev.
When informed that GfW was facing insolvency, WAK had two choices.
Ko je banka WAK izvedela, da družbi GfW grozi nesolventnost, je imela na voljo dve možnosti.
It could either allow for insolvency proceedings to be opened, or it could try to avoid this by reaching an agreement with GfW which would enable GfW to continue trading.
Odločila bi se lahko za začetek postopkov zaradi nesolventnosti ali pa bi se temu poskusila izogniti z dogovorom z družbo GfW, ki bi tej družbi omogočil nadaljevanje poslovanja.
Based on the information submitted by Germany and supported by a report from 3 February 2003 prepared by an independent auditor (see recital 88), the economic implications connected with these two decisions are according to Germany as follows.
Na podlagi informacij, ki jih je predložila Nemčija in ki so podprte s poročilom z dne 3. februarja 2003, ki ga je pripravil neodvisni revizor (glej uvodno izjavo 88), bi bile ekonomske posledice, povezane s tema dvema odločitvama, po navedbah Nemčije naslednje.
Ex-ante, in case of insolvency proceedings, WAK could expect to recover a maximum of about EUR 2,4 million of its claims.
Banka WAK bi lahko v primeru postopkov zaradi nesolventnosti predhodno pričakovala povrnitev največ približno 2,4 milijona EUR terjatev.
In the case WAK signed an agreement with GfW, waiving part of its claims and thereby enabling GfW to continue trading, WAK could ex-ante expect to recover some EUR 5,1 million of its claims.
Če bi banka WAK sklenila dogovor z družbo GfW, v okviru katerega bi se odpovedala delu terjatev in tako družbi GfW omogočila nadaljevanje poslovanja, bi lahko predhodno pričakovala povrnitev približno 5,1 milijona EUR terjatev.
This leaves a difference of EUR 2,7 million in favour of enabling GfW to avoid insolvency proceedings.
Če bi torej banka WAK družbi GfW omogočila, da se izogne začetku postopkov zaradi nesolventnosti, bi dobila povrnjenih 2,7 milijona EUR več.
Whether the winegrowing enterprises and merchants were willing to do the same, only had a slight impact on the recovery calculations, but did not change the outcome on the comparison of the two alternatives.
Pripravljenost vinogradniških podjetij in trgovcev na enako ravnanje je le nekoliko vplivala na izračune povrnitve, vendar ni spremenila izida primerjave obeh možnosti.
The estimate of a recovery rate in case of insolvency of EUR 2,4 million in the report is based on the German assumption that the claims of the winegrowing enterprises and merchants of EUR 4,4 million would have to be settled before those of WAK.
Ocena stopnje povrnitve v primeru nesolventnosti v znesku 2,4 milijona EUR v poročilu temelji na predpostavki Nemčije, da bi bilo treba terjatve vinogradniških podjetij in trgovcev v znesku 4,4 milijona EUR poravnati pred terjatvami banke WAK.
However, according to the European Commission, the German insolvency law states that only the debt to those winegrowing enterprises and merchants with prolonged retention of title would have had to be settled before the debts of WAK.
Vendar Evropska komisija navaja, da nemški zakon o nesolventnosti določa, da je treba pred dolgovi do banke WAK poravnati le dolg do vinogradniških podjetij in trgovcev s podaljšanim pridržkom lastninske pravice.
The other debts would be on an equal standing with the debt of WAK.
Drugi dolgovi so v enakem položaju kot dolgovi do banke WAK.
The European Commission’s own calculations show however that even in the case where the claims of WAK and the winegrowing enterprises and merchants would all have equal standing, WAK could expect to recover the maximum of EUR 4,7 million in case of insolvency (based on a maximum total repayment of EUR 6,8 million in case of insolvency and that WAK and the winegrowing enterprises received repayment in proportion to what they were owed — EUR 10 million and EUR 4,4 million respectively for WAK and the winegrowing enterprises and merchants).
Vendar izračuni Evropske komisije kažejo, da lahko celo v primeru, v katerem bi imele terjatve banke WAK ter vinogradniških podjetij in trgovcev enak položaj, banka WAK pričakuje povrnitev največ 4,7 milijona EUR v primeru nesolventnosti (na podlagi največjega skupnega poplačila 6,8 milijona EUR v primeru nesolventnosti ter dejstva, da so banka WAK in vinogradniška podjetja prejeli poplačilo, sorazmerno znesku, ki jim je dolgovan, tj. 10 milijonov EUR za banko WAK ter 4,4 milijona EUR za vinogradniška podjetja in trgovce).
It can therefore be concluded that ex ante the more favourable option for WAK would be to enable GfW to avoid insolvency.
Zato je mogoče skleniti, da bi bila za banko WAK predhodno ugodnejša možnost, da družbi GfW omogoči preprečitev nesolventnosti.
The winegrowing enterprises and merchants on the other hand faced a very different calculation.
Izračuni za vinogradniška podjetja in trgovce pa so bili na drugi strani zelo drugačni.
Firstly, they had already received 80 % of the payment for their delivered goods.
Ti so namreč že prejeli 80 % plačila za dobavljeno blago.
Secondly, according to the offer by GfW they would only receive 10 % of the 20 % still owed to them.
Poleg tega bi v skladu s ponudbo družbe GfW prejeli le 10 % od 20 % dolgovanega zneska.
In effect this meant that they would only receive an additional 2 % of the agreed purchase price if they signed the agreement.
Dejansko je to pomenilo, da bi v primeru sklenitve dogovora prejeli le dodatna 2 % dogovorjene nakupne cene.
This is certainly less than what they could expect in insolvency proceeding, irrespectively of their security standing (simple, extended or prolonged retention of title).
To je nedvomno manj od zneska, ki bi ga lahko pričakovali v okviru postopka zaradi nesolventnosti, ne glede na njihovo zavarovanje (navadni, razširjeni ali podaljšani pridržek lastninske pravice).
In average they could expect to receive 48 % of their remaining claims (EUR 2,1 million of the total EUR 4,4 million owed them).
V povprečju bi lahko po pričakovanjih prejeli 48 % svojih preostalih terjatev (2,1 milijona EUR od skupnega dolga 4,4 milijona EUR).
It is therefore no surprise that some of the winegrowing enterprises and merchants refused the offer by GfW.
Zato ni presenetljivo, da so nekatera vinogradniška podjetja in trgovci zavrnili ponudbo družbe GfW.
Thirdly, it must have been evident that it would be in WAK’s interest to waive part of its claims and avoid insolvency even if the winegrowing enterprises and merchants did not do the same, which again would enable the winegrowing enterprises and merchants to get a larger share of their remaining claims back than the offered 10 %.
Poleg tega je moralo biti očitno, da sta odpoved delu terjatev in preprečitev nesolventnosti v interesu banke WAK, čeprav se vinogradniška podjetja in trgovci svojim terjatvam ne bi odpovedali, kar bi jim dejansko omogočilo povrnitev večjega deleža preostalih terjatev od ponujenih 10 %.