natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, it is important to note that the exact comparison made between the GDP of a non-market economy (the PRC) and the GDP of a well-established market economy (Taiwan) is not a decisive fact because it is normal for a non-market economy to lag behind a functioning market economy in terms of GDP.
Ob tem je treba tudi opozoriti, da natančna primerjava med BDP v netržnem gospodarstvu (LRK) in BDP uveljavljenega tržnega gospodarstva (Tajvan) ni odločilen dejavnik, saj je glede BDP običajno, da netržno gospodarstvo zaostaja za delujočim tržnim gospodarstvom.
The real issue is what would be the 'prevailing market conditions' with regard to LUR in the PRC if it was a functioning market economy and on the basis of all evidence they would be very similar to those of Taiwan.
Pravo vprašanje je, kakšni bi bili „prevladujoči tržni pogoji“ glede pravic do uporabe zemljišč v LRK, če bi bilo gospodarstvo delujoče in tržno, ter bi bili na podlagi vseh dokazov zelo podobni tistim na Tajvanu.
GOC also claims that the Commission in its calculation used depreciation period of 50 years while not all of the relevant land use right contracts were based on the 50 years terms.
Kitajska vlada tudi trdi, da je Komisija v svojih izračunih uporabila amortizacijsko dobo 50 let, pri čemer vse ustrezne pogodbe o pravicah do uporabe zemljišč niso temeljile na 50-letnih pogojih.
This was not correct.
To ni bilo pravilno.
All the LUR, the provision of which was countervailed in this investigation, were based on the 50 years terms.
V tej preiskavi so vse pravice do uporabe zemljišč, proti zagotavljanju katerih so bili uvedeni izravnalni ukrepi, temeljile na 50-letnih pogojih.
GOC claimed that the conclusion concerning specificity is "wholly artificial" on the grounds that the range of economic activity paying the non-penalised rate encompasses the vast majority of the Chinese economy.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da je sklep glede specifičnosti „popolnoma nerealen“, saj razpon gospodarske dejavnosti, ki plačuje nekaznovane obrestne mere, obsega veliko večino kitajskega gospodarska.
The GOC also questioned the Commission's finding on 'regional' specificity and in particular the conclusion that this subsidy is only available in the geographical areas where the exporting producer is located.
Kitajska vlada je izrazila pomisleke glede ugotovitve Komisije o „regionalni“ specifičnosti in zlasti glede njenega sklepa, da je ta subvencija na voljo le na geografskih območjih, kjer deluje proizvajalec izvoznik.
According to the GOC the penalty applies across the board in all geographical areas in which all exporting producers are located and therefore there is no regional specificity.
Po mnenju kitajske vlade kazen velja za vse na vseh geografskih območjih, kjer delujejo vsi proizvajalci izvozniki, zato regionalna specifičnost ne obstaja.
This claims had to be rejected.
Te trditve je bilo treba zavrniti.
The Commission notes that the GOC seems to base its comments exclusively on the differential pricing system for the categories of 'encouraged', 'restricted', 'prohibited', and 'allowed' enterprises according to decision No. 40.
Komisija ugotavlja, da kitajska vlada svoje pripombe verjetno utemeljuje izrecno na sistemu oblikovanja različnih cen za kategorije „spodbujanih“, „omejenih“, „prepovedanih“ in „dovoljenih“ družb v skladu s sklepom št. 40.
However, the Commission based its findings on the special electricity pricing system available in the broader Chongqing municipality area where one of the sampled cooperating exporters has a production plant.
Komisija je svoje ugotovitve utemeljila na posebnem sistemu oblikovanja cen električne energije, ki je na voljo na širšem območju občine Chongqing, kjer ima eden od vzorčenih sodelujočih izvoznikov proizvodni obrat.
This exporter benefits from a lower electricity rate specifically applying only to a sub-set of companies belonging to certain sectors (namely ferroalloy electronic furnace and fertilizer companies) within the same category of large industrial users.
Ta izvoznik ima ugodnosti zaradi nižje cene električne energije, ki velja posebej in samo za podmnožico družb iz določenega sektorja (in sicer za proizvajalce železove zlitine v elektroobločnih pečeh in družbe, ki proizvajajo gnojila) v isti kategoriji velikih industrijskih uporabnikov.
Therefore, the Commission has concluded that the lower electricity rate only applying to this very restricted sub-set of companies belonging only to those specific eligible sectors is de jure specific.
Zato Komisija sklepa, da je nižja cena električne energije, veljavna le za to zelo omejeno podmnožico družb, ki pripadajo le posebnim upravičenim sektorjem, de iure specifična.
With regard to 'regional' specificity, recital (149) does not refer to any penalty system as the GOC indicates in its comments.
Glede „regionalne“ specifičnosti uvodna izjava (149) ne navaja nobenega sistema kaznovanja, kot v pripombah namiguje kitajska vlada.
This recital clarifies that this beneficial electricity rate applying to the restricted sub-set of companies including the producer of the product concerned is limited to a designated geographical area (i.e. the broader Chongqing municipality) which is part of the China's Vast Western Region encouraged according to the law referred to in the same recital and further explained in recital (233) above.
V tej uvodni izjavi je pojasnjeno, da je ta ugodna cena električne energije za omejeno podmnožico družb, vključno z zadevnim proizvajalcem izdelka, omejena na opredeljeno geografsko območje (tj. širšo občino Chongqing), ki je del obsežnih zahodnih regij Kitajske, spodbujanih v skladu z zakonodajo, navedeno v isti uvodni izjavi in dodatno pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (233).
As further stated in recital (149), this legislation refers to electricity pricing as one of the tools to achieve the main policy objective to foster the development of this region.
Uvodna izjava (149) dodatno pojasnjuje, da ta zakonodaja navaja oblikovanje cen električne energije kot eno od pripomočkov za doseganje glavnega cilja politike, ki se uporablja za spodbujanje razvoja te regije.
The Commission finding that this subsidy is also regionally specific is hereby confirmed.
Ugotovitev Komisije, da je ta subvencija prav tako regionalno specifična, se tako potrdi.
The GOC questioned the conclusions in recital (146) above concerning specificity on the basis of the differential pricing system between the categories of 'encouraged', 'restricted', 'prohibited', and 'allowed' enterprises.
Kitajska vlada je izrazila pomisleke glede sklepov v uvodni izjavi (146) v zvezi s specifičnostjo na podlagi sistema oblikovanja različnih cen za kategorije „spodbujanih“, „omejenih“, „prepovedanih“ in „dovoljenih“ družb.
As explained at length above, the Commission's finding of financial contribution refers to the lower electricity rate that this company is entitled to as part of the restricted sub-set of companies within the larger industrial user category.
Kot je natančno pojasnjeno zgoraj, ugotovitev Komisije o finančnem prispevku zadeva nižjo ceno električne energije, do katere je upravičena ta družba v okviru omejene podmnožice družb v kategoriji industrijskih uporabnikov večjega obsega.
The GOC arguments are therefore not relevant with respect to the findings by the Commission.
Argumenti kitajske vlade v zvezi z ugotovitvami Komisije torej niso ustrezni.
Other income and tax programmes not used by the sampled producers countervailed for the purposes of the "residual rate"
Za druge programe dohodka in davka, ki jih vzorčeni proizvajalci ne uporabljajo, so se sprejeli izravnalni ukrepi zaradi „preostale cene“
The GOC argued that the Commission had not applied consistently the relevant WTO rules concerning sampling contained in the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement (i.e. Articles 6.10, 9.2 and 9.3), because the purpose of sampling would be to limit the scope of the investigation.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da Komisija ni dosledno uporabljala ustreznih predpisov STO glede vzorčenja, ki ga vsebuje Protidampinški sporazum STO (tj. členi 6.10, 9.2 in 9.3), ker bi vzorčenje omejilo obseg preiskave.
This argument was linked to Article 19.4 WTO ASCM, which limits the amount of countervailing duty to the amount of subsidy "found to exist".
Ta argument je bil povezan s členom 19.4 Sporazuma SIU STO, ki omejuje znesek izravnalne dajatve na znesek subvencije, „ki so bile ugotovljene“.
The GOC concluded that if the Commission did not consider the extent of subsidisation sufficiently captured by the sample selected, the solution would have been to sample more companies.
Kitajska vlada je sklenila, da če po mnenju Komisije obseg subvencioniranja ne bi bil v zadostni meri zajet v izbranem vzorcu, bi bila rešitev vzorčenje več družb.
In the first place, the Commission notes that the analogy between sampling in anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations has certain limits, because unlike anti-dumping investigations in CVD investigations there is no general rule that each exporter receives an individual duty and so-called 'aggregate' cases are explicitly permitted.
Na začetku Komisija ugotavlja, da ima analogija med vzorčenjem v protidampinških in protisubvencijskih preiskavah določene omejitve, ker v preiskavah izravnalnih dajatev (v primerjavi s protidampinškimi preiskavami) ni splošnega pravila, da vsak izvoznik prejme posamezno dajatev, in tako imenovani agregatni primeri so izrecno dovoljeni.
Moreover, unlike in anti-dumping cases, the government is a required participant and respondent in a CVD case and the government is therefore implicitly included in the scope of any "sample" for the purposes of a CVD determination.
Poleg tega je v nasprotju s protidampinškimi primeri vlada v primeru izravnalnih dajatev nujen udeleženec in anketiranec, s čimer je implicitno zajeta v vsak „primer“ zaradi določitve izravnalne dajatve.
In other words, the government' actions as the grantor of the alleged subsidisation, always fall under the scope of the CVD investigation, regardless of the use of a sample of exporting producers.
Povedano drugače, vladni ukrepi so kot koncedent domnevnega subvencioniranja vedno zajeti v preiskavo izravnalnih dajatev, ne glede na uporabo vzorca proizvajalcev izvoznikov.
As regards the GOC comment that the recourse is to "sample more companies", the Commission notes that this is exactly what it did in this case.
Kar zadeva pripombo kitajske vlade v zvezi z „vzorčenjem več družb“, Komisija opozarja, da je v tem primeru uporabila točno to.
Further to the withdrawal of cooperation by one of the exporters that had originally agreed to cooperate, the Commission decided to include another exporter in the sample.
Zaradi umika od sodelovanja s strani enega od izvoznikov, ki je prvotno pristal na sodelovanje, je Komisija sklenila v vzorec vključiti drugega izvoznika.
However, shortly after this company was informed of its inclusion in the sample, it notified to the Commission that it no longer intended to cooperate in the investigation.
Vendar je ta družba kmalu po tem, ko je bila obveščena o vključenosti v vzorec, sporočila Komisiji, da ne namerava več sodelovati v preiskavi.
The Commission was consequently forced to limit the sample to the two remaining exporters originally sampled that had not withdrawn cooperation in order to avoid any further delay that would put in jeopardy the expeditious completion of the investigation within the prescribed legal deadlines.
Komisija je bila zato prisiljena omejiti vzorec na dva preostala izvoznika iz prvotnega vzorčenja, ki nista prekinila sodelovanja, da bi preprečila nadaljnjo zakasnitev, ki bi ogrozila hitro dokončanje preiskave v predpisanih pravnih rokih.
The Commission notes that this unsuccessful attempt undermined solely by the exporters' behaviour shows precisely that this GOC claim is without merit in that does not address the problem of companies which do not come forward for sampling in the first place or which withdraw if selected for sampling.
Komisija poudarja, da ta neuspel poskus spodkopavanja zgolj z vedenjem izvoznikov natančno kaže, da je ta trditev kitajske vlade neutemeljena in da ne obravnava problema družb, ki se sploh ne javijo za vzorčenje ali ki se umaknejo, če so izbrane za vzorčenje.
With respect to the application of facts available, the GOC referred to Article 12.7 ASCM and quoted WTO jurisprudence holding that facts on the record can only be used to replace missing information, and that non-cooperation does not justify determinations devoid of factual foundations.
V zvezi z uporabo razpoložljivih dejstev je kitajska vlada navedla člen 12.7 Sporazuma SIU in citirala sodno prakso WTO, v skladu s katero se lahko evidentirana dejstva uporabijo le za nadomestitev manjkajočih informacij in da nesodelovanje ne upravičuje določitev, ki niso utemeljene na dejstvih.
The Commission does not understand the logic of this claim, given that in its determination it has used the facts on the record as allowed under the WTO provision and the basic Regulation in full compliance with the relevant WTO jurisprudence.
Komisija ne razume logike te trditve, ker je v svoji določitvi evidentirana dejstva uporabila na način, kot ga predpisujeta določba STO in osnovna uredba ter popolnoma v skladu z ustrezno sodno prakso STO.
As the GOC has also recognised, the findings in Coated Fine Paper and in the various US DOC decisions constitute the best facts available to the Commission and are used precisely to replace the information gaps caused by the GOC lack of cooperation.
Kot je kitajska vlada tudi potrdila, so ugotovitve v zvezi s premazanim finim papirjem in v različnih sklepih Ministrstva za trgovino Združenih držav najboljša dejstva, ki so na voljo Komisiji, in se uporabljajo prav namesto informacijske vrzeli zaradi nesodelovanja kitajske vlade.
The GOC also questioned the use of these facts as they would not reflect a present subsidization and are also not specifically linked to the product concerned.
Kitajska vlada je tudi izrazila pomisleke glede uporabe teh dejstev, ker ne odražajo subvencioniranja v sedanjosti in niso specifično povezana z zadevnim izdelkom.
The Commission notes in this respect that most of these subsidy programmes concern non-recurring subsidies (e.g. grants, tax advantages linked to investment in assets) which are normally amortised over several years and therefore their benefits continue well in the future and thus even beyond the IP in this case.
Komisija v zvezi s tem poudarja, da večina teh subvencijskih programov zadeva neponavljajoče se subvencije (npr. nepovratna sredstva, davčne ugodnosti, povezane z naložbami v sredstva), ki se običajno amortizirajo v obdobju nekaj let, in zato njihove ugodnosti trajajo še dolgo, v tem primeru tudi dlje od OP.
Where recurring subsidies are involved, there is no evidence that these programmes have changed since the investigation in question.
V primerih ponavljajočih se subvencij ni dokazov, da so se ti programi spremenili, odkar se je začela zadevna preiskava.
As for the link between these programmes and the product concerned, the Commission recalls that all of these programmes cover the steel sector (they are not product-specific), or apply in the region where the OCS exporters have located their factories.
Kar zadeva povezavo med temi programi in zadevnim izdelkom, Komisija opozarja, da vsi ti programi vključujejo sektor jekla (niso specifični za izdelek) ali veljajo v regiji, kjer imajo izvozniki jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, svoje tovarne.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary in the file, the Commission has decided that it is reasonable to conclude that the benefits of these programmes still reflect the best proxy for present subsidization for producers of the product concerned.
Ker v spisu ni dokazov o nasprotnem, je po mnenju Komisije razumno sklepati, da ugodnosti teh programov še vedno odražajo najboljše nadomestilo za sedanje subvencioniranje za proizvajalce zadevnega izdelka.
It is stressed that the GOC had ample opportunity to submit evidence to the contrary on all these programmes but it deliberately decided not to submit it and as a result the Commission has to resort to the facts available on record as prescribed by the basic Regulation and the WTO ASCM.
Poudarjeno je, da je imela kitajska vlada zadostne možnosti za predložitev dokazov o nasprotnem za vse te programe, vendar jih namerno ni predložila, zato je Komisija morala uporabiti razpoložljiva evidentirana dejstva, kot je predpisano v osnovni uredbi in Sporazumu SIU STO.
The GOC claimed that all these programmes (unpaid dividends, debt-for equity swaps and equity infusions) were not initiated in accordance with requirements with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the ASCM.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da vsi ti programi (neplačane dividende, zamenjave terjatev za lastniški delež in infuzije lastniškega kapitala) niso bili zasnovani v skladu z zahtevami členov 11.2 in 11.3 Sporazuma SIU.
This claim had to be refused.
To trditev je bilo treba zavrniti.
As already explained in the section concerning the reply to the GOC's comments on initiation (recitals (399) - (406) above) the Commission services have analysed the evidence submitted by the complainant, which was substantial, as it appears clearly from the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint.
Kot je bilo že pojasnjeno v razdelku z odgovorom na pripombe kitajske vlade glede zasnove (uvodne izjave od (399) do (406)), so službe Komisije analizirale dokaze, ki jih je predložil pritožnik, in bili so tehtni, kot je jasno razvidno iz različice, ki je na voljo zainteresiranim stranem pritožnika za pregled.
The Commission services only proposed the initiation of an investigation on specific schemes after having duly analysed the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence which they consider sufficient on a prima facie basis.
Službe Komisije so sprožitev preiskave o specifičnih shemah predlagale, šele ko so ustrezno analizirale točnost in ustreznost dokazov, za katere menijo, da so zadostni na podlagi prima facie.
In the view of the GOC the equity programmes are unique ad-hoc subsidies, to the extent they exist, in that that they apply only to one particular recipient and not pursuant to any particular legislation and since "the Commission knows for a fact that the companies subject to the residual duty not only did not receive, but could not have received given their ad-hoc nature" these subsidies, they should not be countervailed.
Po mnenju kitajske vlade so programi lastniškega kapitala edinstvene ad hoc subvencije v obsegu svojega obstoja, ker veljajo le za enega določenega prejemnika in niso v skladu z nobeno določeno zakonodajo, in ker „Komisija ve, da družbe, za katere velja preostala dajatev, dejansko niso prejele in tudi niso mogla prejeti“ teh subvencij „zaradi njihove ad hoc narave“, se te ne bi smele izravnati.
In addition the GOC claimed that to the extent that facts available determinations are made, they must be based on actual facts.
Poleg tega je kitajska vlada trdila, da morajo določitve na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev temeljiti na dejanskih dejstvih.
For this reason the countervailing of ad hoc subsidies to companies other than those actually alleged to have received them is a violation of Article 12.7 of the ASCM.
Zato je izravnavanje ad hoc subvencij za družbe, za katere se ne domneva, da so jih že prejele, kršitev člena 12.7 Sporazuma SIU.
It is noted that the GOC did not reply to a single question in the questionnaire or in the deficiency letter concerning these schemes.
Poudarjeno je, da kitajska vlada ni odgovorila na niti eno vprašanje v zvezi s temi shemami v vprašalniku ali pismu o pomanjkljivostih.
Therefore the statement of the GOC that "the Commission knows for a fact that the companies subject to the residual duty not only did not receive, but could not have received given their ad-hoc nature" these subsidies, does not represent reality.
Zato izjava kitajske vlade, da „Komisija ve, da družbe, za katere velja preostala dajatev, dejansko niso prejele in tudi niso mogle prejeti“ teh subvencij „zaradi njihove ad hoc narave“, ni v skladu s stvarnostjo.
To the contrary, the complaint listed several companies benefiting from these equity schemes and did not allege this list to be exhaustive.
Nasprotno, pritožnik je naštel številne družbe, ki imajo ugodnosti od teh shem lastniškega kapitala, pri čemer ni predvidel, da bo ta seznam izčrpen.
Since the GOC did not provide any information on the nature or eligibility of these schemes the Commission has no other option but to apply facts available.
Ker kitajska vlada ni zagotovila nobenih informacij o naravi ali upravičenosti teh shem, Komisija nima druge možnosti, kot da uporabi razpoložljiva dejstva.
COMMENTS OF ZHEJIANG HUADONG
PRIPOMBE DRUŽBE ZHEJIANG HUADONG
Zhejiang Huadong claimed that it provided the Commission with all relevant legislations governing the mechanics and value-setting of sales of LURs in China and referred to the Provisions on the Assignment of State-Owned Construction LUR through bid invitation, auction and quotation to demonstrate that there is a well-functioning real estate market in China, where quotes and prices paid are made public.
Družba Zhejiang Huadong je trdila, da je Komisiji zagotovila vse ustrezne zakonodaje, ki veljajo za mehaniko in določanje vrednosti prodaje pravic do uporabe zemljišč na Kitajskem, ter je s sklicevanjem na določbe o dodeljevanju pravic do uporabe državnih stavbnih zemljišč prek razpisa za oddajo ponudb, dražbe in ponudbe pokazala, da trg nepremičnin na Kitajskem dobro deluje ter so plačane kvote in cene javno dostopne.
It further claimed that the real estate market that exists today in China, and the exhaustive official statistics on LUR prices available, form the best evidence for assessing the price of the LURs at the time this exporting producer bought them.
Poleg tega je trdila, da je sedanji trg nepremičnin na Kitajskem skupaj z izčrpnimi uradnimi statističnimi podatki o razpoložljivih cenah pravic do uporabe zemljišč najboljši dokaz za oceno cene pravic do uporabe zemljišč v času, ko jih je zadevni proizvajalec izvoznik kupil.
The Commission explains the findings in respect to Zhejiang Huadong's LURs in recital (115) above.
Komisija pojasnjuje ugotovitve v zvezi s pravicami do uporabe zemljišč družbe Zhejiang Huadong v uvodni izjavi (115).
These findings were not disputed in its comments to definitive disclosure.
Tem ugotovitvam v pripombah h končnemu razkritju ni oporekala.
Evidence at hand shows that the LUR market in China is distorted as the tenders investigated on-the-spot by the Commission were not competitive and the prices were arbitrarily set by the authorities.
Obravnavani dokazi kažejo, da je trg pravic do uporabe zemljišč na Kitajskem izkrivljen, saj ponudbe, ki jih je na licu mesta preiskovala Komisija, niso bile konkurenčne, cene pa so poljubno določali organi.
The factual basis for the determination that the prices are arbitrarily set is referred to in recitals (114) - (116) above, i.e. information on actual transactions submitted by the sampled exporting producers, Urban Land Evaluation System and Order of the NDRC No 35.
Dejanska podlaga za ugotovitev, da se cene določajo poljubno, je navedena v uvodnih izjavah od (114) do (116); gre za informacije o dejanskih transakcijah, ki so jih predložili vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki, sistem vrednotenja mestnih zemljišč in Odredba agencije NDRC št. 35.
Zhejiang Huadong claimed that according to Article 14(d) of the WTO SCM Agreement adequate benchmark prices should relate or refer to prevailing market conditions in the country of provision in the first instance or in the absence of such conditions, any out-of-country benchmark should be adjusted appropriately so as to avoid the countervailing of comparative advantages.
Družba Zhejiang Huadong je trdila, da bi se morale v skladu s členom 14(d) Sporazuma SIU STO ustrezne referenčne cene najprej nanašati na prevladujoče tržne pogoje v državi, kjer se dobava opravi, ali biti z njimi povezane, če pa takih pogojev ni, bi se morale vse zunanje referenčne vrednosti ustrezno prilagoditi, da se prepreči izravnava primerjalnih prednosti.