natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Member States whose currency is the euro are particularly subject to spill-over effects from each other's budgetary policies.
Med državami članicami, katerih valuta je euro, prihaja do močnejših učinkov prelivanja proračunskih politik.
Member States whose currency is the euro should consult the Commission and each other before adopting any major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spill-over effects, so as to allow an assessment of the possible impact for the euro area as a whole.
Pred sprejetjem načrtov večjih reform svojih fiskalnih politik, ki bi lahko imele učinke prelivanja, bi se zato morale vse države članice, katerih valuta je euro, posvetovati s Komisijo in med seboj, ter tako omogočiti oceno možnih posledic za euroobmočje kot celoto.
They should also consider their budgetary plans to be of common concern and submit them to the Commission for monitoring purposes in advance of their becoming binding.
Svoje proračunske načrte bi morale obravnavati tudi kot zadevo skupnega pomena in jih, še preden postanejo zavezujoči, predložiti Komisiji za namene spremljanja.
The Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, should propose guidelines in the form of a harmonised framework for the specification of the content of draft budgetary plans.
Komisija bi morala v sodelovanju z državami članicami predlagati smernice v obliki harmoniziranega okvira za določitev vsebine osnutkov proračunskih načrtov.
In the exceptional cases where, after consulting the Member State concerned, the Commission identifies in the draft budgetary plan particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the SGP, the Commission, in its opinion on the draft budgetary plan, should request a revised draft budgetary plan, in accordance with this Regulation.
V skladu s to uredbo bi morala Komisija v izjemnih primerih, ko po posvetovanju z zadevno državo članico v osnutku proračunskega načrta ugotovi resno neupoštevanje obveznosti glede proračunske politike, ki so določene v paktu za stabilnost in rast, v svojem mnenju o osnutku proračunskega načrta zahtevati revizijo osnutka proračunskega načrta.
This will be the case, in particular, where the implementation of the draft budgetary plan would put at risk the financial stability of the Member State concerned or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union, or where the implementation of the draft budgetary plan would entail an obvious significant violation of the recommendations adopted by the Council under the SGP.
Tako bo predvsem v primerih, ko bi izvrševanje osnutka proračunskega načrta ogrozilo finančno stabilnost zadevne države članice ali pravilno delovanje ekonomske in monetarne unije ali bi pomenilo očitno veliko kršitev priporočil, ki jih je v okviru pakta za stabilnost in rast sprejel Svet.
The Commission's opinion on the draft budgetary plan should be adopted as soon as possible and in any event by the end of November, taking into account, to the extent possible, the specific national fiscal schedule and parliamentary procedures, in order to ensure that Union's policy guidance in the budgetary area can be appropriately integrated in the national budgetary preparations.
Mnenje Komisije o osnutku proračunskega načrta bi bilo treba sprejeti čim prej, najpozneje pa do konca novembra, pri tem pa bi bilo treba čim bolj upoštevati posamezni nacionalni fiskalni časovni načrt in parlamentarne postopke ter tako zagotoviti, da se lahko pri pripravi nacionalnih proračunov ustrezno upoštevajo smernice Unije za politike na proračunskem področju.
In particular, the opinion should include an assessment of whether the budgetary plans appropriately address the recommendations issued in the context of the European Semester in the budgetary area.
Mnenje bi moralo še zlasti vključevati oceno, ali proračunski načrt ustrezno odraža priporočila s proračunskega področja, izdana v okviru evropskega semestra.
At the request of the parliament of the Member State concerned or of the European Parliament, the Commission should be prepared to present its opinion to the parliament making the request, after it has been made public.
Na zahtevo parlamenta zadevne države članice ali Evropskega parlamenta bi morala biti Komisija pripravljena predstaviti svoje mnenje parlamentu, ki je podal zahtevo, potem ko je bilo objavljeno.
Member States are invited to take into account, in the process of adopting their budget law, the Commission opinion on their draft budgetary plan.
Države članice se pozove, da mnenje Komisije o osnutku proračunskega načrta upoštevajo v svojem postopku sprejemanja proračuna.
The extent to which that opinion has been taken into account in a Member State's budget law should be part of the assessment, if and when the conditions are met, leading to a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in the Member State concerned.
Do katere mere je zadevna država članica upoštevala mnenje v svojem proračunu, bi moralo biti del ocene, ki, če so izpolnjeni pogoji, vodi do odločitve o obstoju čezmernega primanjkljaja v zadevni državi članici.
In such a case, no follow-up to the early guidance from the Commission should be considered as an aggravating factor.
V takem primeru bi se moralo neukrepanje na podlagi pravočasnih navodil Komisije šteti kot oteževalni dejavnik.
Also, based on an overall assessment of the draft budgetary plans by the Commission, the Eurogroup should discuss the budgetary situation and prospects for the euro area as a whole.
Poleg tega bi morala Euroskupina na podlagi splošne ocene osnutkov proračunskih načrtov, ki jo izvede Komisija, razpravljati o proračunskem stanju in obetih za euroobmočje kot celoto.
Member States whose currency is the euro and which are subject to an excessive deficit procedure should be monitored more closely, in order to secure a full, sustainable and timely correction of the excessive deficit.
Države članice, katerih valuta je euro in ki so v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, bi bilo treba natančneje spremljati, da se zagotovi popolno, trajnostno in pravočasno zmanjšanje čezmernega primanjkljaja.
Closer monitoring by means of additional reporting requirements should ensure prevention and early correction of any deviations from the Council recommendations to correct the excessive deficit.
Natančnejše spremljanje po zaslugi dodatnih zahtev glede poročanja bi moralo zagotoviti preprečevanje in pravočasno odpravo odmikov od priporočil Sveta za zmanjšanje čezmernega primanjkljaja.
Such monitoring should complement the provisions set out in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.
Takšno spremljanje bi moralo dopolniti določbe iz Uredbe (ES) št. 1467/97.
Those additional reporting requirements should be proportionate to the stage of the procedure to which the Member State is subject, under Article 126 TFEU.
Navedene dodatne zahteve glede poročanja bi morale biti sorazmerne glede na fazo postopka, ki poteka v državi članici v skladu s členom 126 PDEU.
As a first step, the Member State concerned should carry out a comprehensive assessment of in-year budgetary execution for the general government and its subsectors, taking into account in particular financial risks associated to contingent liabilities with potentially large impacts on public budgets.
Kot prvi korak bi morale zadevne države članice pripraviti izčrpno oceno izvajanja proračuna za državo in njene podsektorje v tekočem koledarskem letu, pri tem pa upoštevati zlasti finančna tveganja, povezana s pogojnimi obveznostmi, ki bi lahko bistveno vplivale na javne proračune.
Additional reporting requirements for Member States whose currency is the euro and which are subject to an excessive deficit procedure should enable a better exchange of information between the Member States concerned and the Commission, and, as a consequence, the identification of risks in the compliance of a Member State with the deadline which has been set by the Council to correct its excessive deficit.
Dodatne zahteve glede poročanja za države članice, katerih valuta je euro in so v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, bi morale omogočiti boljšo izmenjavo informacij med zadevnimi državami članicami in Komisijo, posledično pa tudi ugotavljanje tveganj pri tem, koliko država članica izpolnjuje rok, ki ga je Svet določil za zmanjšanje njenega čezmernega primanjkljaja.
In the event of such risks being identified, the Commission should issue a recommendation to the Member State concerned setting out appropriate measures to be taken within a given timeframe.
Če se ugotovijo takšna tveganja, bi morala Komisija zadevni državi članici izdati priporočilo glede primernih ukrepov, ki jih je treba sprejeti v določenem roku.
Upon request, the Commission should present its recommendation to the parliament of the Member State concerned.
Komisija bi morala to priporočilo predstaviti parlamentu zadevne države članice, če jo ta povabi k temu.
Compliance with the recommendation should lead to a prompt correction of any developments putting at risk the correction of the excessive deficit within the established deadline.
Usklajenost s priporočilom bi moralo privesti k hitri odpravi dejavnikov tveganja za pravočasno zmanjšanje čezmernega primanjkljaja v določenem roku.
Assessment of compliance with the Commission recommendation should be part of the continuous assessment made by the Commission of effective action to correct an excessive deficit.
Ocena upoštevanja priporočila Komisije bi morala biti del stalnega postopka, s katerim Komisija ocenjuje učinkovitosti ukrepov za zmanjšanje čezmernega primanjkljaja.
When deciding whether effective action to correct the excessive deficit has been taken, the Council should also base its decision on whether or not the Member State complied with the Commission recommendation, while giving due consideration to Article 3(5) and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.
Pri odločanju, ali so bili sprejeti učinkoviti ukrepi za zmanjšanje čezmernega primanjkljaja, bi moral Svet upoštevati tudi, ali je država članica uresničila priporočilo Komisije, pri tem pa ustrezno upoštevati člen 3(5) in člen 5(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 1467/97.
Indeed, Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, which sets out in detail the excessive deficit procedure based on Article 126 TFEU, embeds elements of flexibility which allow unexpected adverse economic events to be taken into account.
Uredba (ES) št. 1467/97, ki podrobno opredeljuje postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem na podlagi člena 126 PDEU, dejansko vsebuje elemente prilagodljivosti, ki dopuščajo upoštevanje nepričakovanih neugodnih gospodarskih dogodkov.
Article 3(5) and Article 5(2) of that Regulation provide that if effective action has been taken in compliance with, respectively, a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or a decision to give notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occur after the adoption of that recommendation or decision to give notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or a revised decision to give notice under Article 126(9) TFEU.
Člen 3(5) in člen 5(2) navedene uredbe določata, da lahko Svet, če so bili na podlagi priporočila po členu 126(7) PDEU ali sklepa o pozivu po členu 126(9) PDEU sprejeti učinkoviti ukrepi in po sprejetju priporočila ali sklepa o pozivu nastopijo nepričakovani neugodni gospodarski dogodki z večjimi negativnimi posledicami za javne finance, na priporočilo Komisije odloči, da sprejme revidirano priporočilo po členu 126(7) PDEU ali revidiran sklep o pozivu po členu 126(9) PDEU.
The revised recommendation or revised decision to give notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.
V revidiranem priporočilu ali revidiranemu sklepu o pozivu se lahko ob upoštevanju pomembnih dejavnikov iz člena 2(3) Uredbe (ES) št. 1467/97 podaljša rok za zmanjšanje čezmernega primanjkljaja, in to praviloma za eno leto.
The Council should assess the existence of unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances against the economic forecasts in its initial recommendation or decision to give notice.
Svet bi moral na podlagi gospodarske napovedi iz svojega prvotnega priporočila ali sklepa o pozivu oceniti, ali obstajajo nepričakovani neugodni gospodarski dogodki z večjimi negativnimi posledicami za javne finance.
In the case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole, the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or a revised decision to give notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, provided that that does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.
V primeru resnega upada gospodarske aktivnosti v euroobmočju ali v celotni Uniji se lahko Svet na priporočilo Komisije tudi odloči, da sprejme revidirano priporočilo na podlagi člena 126(7) PDEU ali poziv na podlagi člena 126(9) PDEU, pod pogojem, da to srednjeročno ne ogrozi fiskalne vzdržnosti.
In addition, Article 2(1a) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 provides that, in implementing the debt ratio adjustment benchmark, account shall be taken of the influence of the cycle on the pace of debt reduction.
Poleg tega člen 2(1a) Uredbe (ES) št. 1467/97 predvideva, da je treba pri določanju referenčnega merila za prilagoditve deleža dolga upoštevati vpliv cikla na hitrost zmanjševanja dolga.
Thus, a Member State would not be considered as having breached the debt criterion laid down in Article 126(2)(b) TFEU if that is only because of negative cyclical conditions.
Na ta način se za državo članico ne bi štelo, da je prekršila merilo zadolževanja določeno v členu 126(2)(b) PDEU, če bi do tega prišlo zgolj zaradi negativnih konjunkturnih pogojev.
Also, since budgetary measures might be insufficient to ensure a lasting correction of the excessive deficit, Member States whose currency is the euro and are subject to an excessive deficit procedure should present an economic partnership programme detailing the policy measures and structural reforms needed to ensure an effective and lasting correction of the excessive deficit, building on the latest update of their national reform programme and their stability programme.
Ker ni nujno, da bodo proračunski ukrepi zadostovali za trajno zmanjšanje čezmernega primanjkljaja, bi morale države članice, katerih valuta je euro in so v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, predstaviti program ekonomskega partnerstva, v katerem podrobno navedejo ukrepe politik in strukturne reforme, potrebne za zagotovitev učinkovitega in trajnega zmanjšanja čezmernega primanjkljaja, pri čemer se oprejo na nazadnje posodobljeni program nacionalnih reform in program za stabilnost.
Furthermore, strengthening economic governance has involved a closer dialogue with the European Parliament.
Poleg tega krepitev ekonomskega upravljanja poteka v tesnem dialogu z Evropskim parlamentom.
While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of the dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State which is the subject of a Commission recommendation or of a Council opinion in accordance with this Regulation.
Kljub temu, da so sogovorniki Evropskega parlamenta v okviru dialoga ustrezne institucije Unije in njihovi predstavniki, lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta ponudi državi članici, na katero je naslovljeno priporočilo Komisije ali mnenje Sveta v skladu s to uredbo, možnost sodelovanja pri izmenjavi mnenj.
The Member State's participation in such an exchange of views is voluntary.
Sodelovanje države članice pri taki izmenjavi mnenj je prostovoljno.
In order to specify the extent of the reporting obligations for Member States subject to an excessive deficit procedure, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the content and scope of such reporting.
Da bi določili obseg obveznosti poročanja za države članice, ki so v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, bi bilo treba na Komisijo prenesti pooblastila, da v skladu s členom 290 PDEU sprejme akte v zvezi z vsebino in področjem tega poročanja.
The power to adopt opinions on economic partnership programmes, as established by this Regulation should be conferred on the Council.
Pooblastilo za sprejetje mnenj o programih ekonomskega partnerstva, ustanovljenih s to uredbo, bi bilo treba prenesti na Svet.
Those opinions are complementary to the excessive deficit procedure laid down under Article 126 TFEU in accordance with which the Council is to decide on the existence of an excessive deficit and on the measures required to put an end to it.
Ta mnenja so dopolnilni del postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, določenega v členu 126 PDEU, v skladu s katerim Svet odloča o tem, ali čezmerni primanjkljaj obstaja, pa tudi o ukrepih za njegovo odpravo.
Recalling the importance of sound public finances, structural reform and targeted investment for sustainable growth, the Member States' Heads of State or Government signed a Compact for Growth and Jobs on 29 June 2012, demonstrating their determination to stimulate job-creating growth in parallel to their commitment to sound public finances.
Da bi opozorili na pomen zdravih javnih financ, strukturnih reform in ciljno usmerjenih naložb v trajnostno rast, so predsedniki držav ali vlad 29. junija 2012 podpisali dogovor za rast in delovna mesta, s čimer so izkazali svojo odločenost, da se poleg zdravih javnih financ zavzemajo tudi za spodbujanje rasti, ki bo pospešila nastanek delovnih mest.
The Compact includes, in particular, measures to boost the financing of the economy.
Dogovor vključuje zlasti ukrepe za povečanje financiranja gospodarstva.
EUR 120000 million (equivalent to around 1 % of the Union's Gross National Income) are being mobilised for fast-acting growth measures.
Za zagotavljanje hitre rasti je zagotovljenih 120000 milijonov EUR (kar je približno 1 % bruto nacionalnega dohodka Unije).
As recommended in the annual growth survey in 2012 and 2013, the Member States should strive to maintain an adequate pace of fiscal consolidation while preserving investment aiming to achieve the Europe 2020 goals for growth and jobs.
Kot priporočeno v letnem pregledu rasti za leto 2012 in 2013 bi si morale države članice prizadevati za ohranitev ustrezne hitrosti fiskalne konsolidacije ter hkrati ohraniti naložbe, namenjene za doseganje ciljev, povezanih s strategijo Evropa 2020 za rast in delovna mesta.
The Commission is monitoring the impact of tight budget constraints on growth enhancing public expenditure and on public investment.
Komisija spremlja učinke strogih proračunskih omejitev na javnofinančne odhodke za spodbujanje rasti in na javne naložbe.
The Union's fiscal framework offers scope to balance the acknowledgement of productive public investment needs with fiscal discipline objectives: while fully respecting the SGP, the possibilities offered by the Union's existing fiscal framework to balance productive public investment needs with fiscal discipline objectives can be exploited in the preventive arm of the SGP.
Fiskalni okvir Unije omogoča uskladitev potreb po produktivnih javnih naložbah in ciljev fiskalne discipline. Ob vsestranskem upoštevanju Pakta za stabilnost in rast se lahko v njegovem preventivnem delu izkoristijo možnosti, ki jih ponuja obstoječi fiskalni okvir Unije, da se uravnotežijo potrebe po produktivnih javnih naložbah in cilji na področju fiskalne discipline.
The Commission has announced its intention to report on the scope for possible action within the boundaries of the existing Union fiscal framework.
Komisija je najavila svojo namero, da bo pripravila poročilo o obsegu možnih ukrepov v mejah obstoječega fiskalnega okvira Unije.
The European Parliament's resolution of 20 November 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ and the Commission's Communication of 28 November 2012 entitled ‘A blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ outline, respectively, the views of the European Parliament and of the Commission on the steps needed to achieve a deeper and better integrated economic and monetary union.
Resolucija Evropskega parlamenta z dne 20. novembra 2012 s priporočili Komisiji o poročilu predsednikov Evropskega sveta, Evropske komisije, Evropske centralne banke in Euroskupine z naslovom "Na poti do resnične ekonomske in monetarne unije", in sporočilo Komisije z dne 28. novembra 2012 z naslovom "Načrt za globoko in resnično EMU" predstavljata poglede Evropskega parlamenta in Komisije na nadaljnje korake k globlji in bolje povezani ekonomski in monetarni uniji.
Following the report ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, the European Council, in its conclusions in December 2012, set out its views on a number of issues with a view to the further strengthening of EMU,
V skladu s poročilom "Na poti do resnične ekonomske in monetarne unije" je Evropski svet v svojih sklepih decembra 2012 izrazil svoja stališča do številnih vprašanj, da bi nadalje okrepil EMU –
This Regulation sets out provisions for enhanced monitoring of budgetary policies in the euro area and for ensuring that national budgets are consistent with the economic policy guidance issued in the context of the SGP and the European Semester for economic policy coordination, by:
V tej uredbi so predpisane določbe o okrepljenem spremljanju proračunskih politik v euroobmočju in o zagotavljanju skladnosti nacionalnih proračunov s smernicami o ekonomski politiki, objavljenimi v okviru evropskega semestra za usklajevanje ekonomske politike, z:
complementing the European Semester, as established in Article 2-a of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, with a common budgetary timeline;
dopolnjevanjem evropskega semestra, kot je določen v členu 2-a Uredbe (ES) št. 1466/97, s skupnim proračunskim časovnim okvirom;
complementing the procedure for the prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, as established by Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011;
dopolnjevanjem postopka za preprečevanje in odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij, kakor je določeno v Uredbi (EU) št. 1176/2011;
complementing the multilateral surveillance system of budgetary policies, as established by Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, with additional monitoring requirements in order to ensure that Union policy recommendations in the budgetary area are appropriately integrated in the national budgetary preparations;
dopolnjevanjem sistema večstranskega nadzora proračunskih politik, ustanovljenem z Uredbo (ES) št. 1466/97, z dodatnimi zahtevami glede spremljanja, da se zagotovi, da se priporočila s področja proračunske politike Unije ustrezno vključijo v pripravo nacionalnih proračunov;
complementing the procedure for correcting a Member State's excessive deficit, as established by Article 126 TFEU and by Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, with closer monitoring of the budgetary policies of Member States subject to an excessive deficit procedure in order to secure a timely and lasting correction of an excessive deficit;
dopolnjevanjem postopka za zmanjšanje čezmernega primanjkljaja države članice, kot ga določata člen 126 PDEU in Uredba (ES) št. 1467/97, z natančnejšim spremljanjem proračunskih politik držav članic, ki so v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, da se zagotovi pravočasno in trajno zmanjšanje čezmernega primanjkljaja;