natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The GOC did not provide any data with respect to the actual land-use rights prices, minimum land prices formulated by the government which were mentioned in the reply to the anti-subsidy questionnaire and during the verification visit.
Kitajska vlada ni predložila nobenih podatkov v zvezi z dejanskimi cenami pravic do uporabe zemljišč in minimalnimi cenami zemljišč, ki jih oblikuje vlada, omenjenimi v izpolnjenem protisubvencijskem vprašalniku in med preveritvenim obiskom.
During the verification the Commission requested from the GOC evidence to support its claim that all the industrial land in China is assigned through bidding, quotation or auction.
Komisija je med preveritvenim obiskom od kitajske vlade zahtevala dokaze, ki bi podprli njeno trditev, da so vsa industrijska zemljišča na Kitajskem dodeljena prek razpisov, dražb ali natečajev.
GOC was not able to provide such evidence during the verification visit, but submitted some information in this respect after the verification visit.
Kitajska vlada ni mogla predložiti takih dokazov med preveritvenim obiskom, vendar pa je nekatere informacije v tej zvezi posredovala po njem.
However, all this evidence shows is that from thirteen land-use rights transactions concerning sampled exporting producers, only six were to be subject to bidding or auction process.
Vendar pa ti dokazi kažejo le to, da je samo šest od trinajstih poslov s pravicami do uporabe zemljišč, ki zadevajo vzorčene proizvajalce izvoznike, bilo predmet razpisnih ali dražbenih postopkov.
No information on the auction/bidding process participant was provided as requested by the Commission and in fact on all occasions the final price paid by the company was same as the price arbitrarily set by the local authorities.
Informacije o udeležencih postopka dražbe/javnega razpisa, kot jih je zahtevala Komisija, niso bile posredovane, pravzaprav je bila v vseh primerih končna cena, ki jo je plačala zmagovita družba, enaka ceni, ki so jo samovoljno določili javni organi.
The Commission also requested from the GOC, under the assumption that there is no market price for land in the PRC, its views on possible benchmarks.
Komisija je ob domnevi, da za zemljišča v LRK ni tržnih cen, od kitajske vlade zahtevala tudi njena stališča o morebitnih referenčnih vrednostih.
Although this was only an assumption and by no means a finding or conclusion at the time when the questionnaire was sent to the GOC, the GOC expressed its view that this assumption is false and did not provide any possible benchmarks.
Čeprav je ob pošiljanju vprašalnika kitajski vladi šlo le za domnevo in nikakor ugotovitev ali sklep, je kitajska vlada izrazila svoje stališče, da je ta domneva napačna in ni posredovala morebitnih referenčnih vrednosti.
GOC also pointed out to the alleged deficiency in the complaint that on one hand the complainant alleges that there is no market for land in China and "out of country benchmark" should be used, but on the other hand alleges that the SOEs receive land from the government at favourable terms vis-à-vis private industry and suggested that should any benchmark be used it should be the prices that "not favoured" Chinese industries are paying, but did not provide any information on these prices.
Kitajska vlada je izpostavila tudi, da je pritožba domnevno pomanjkljiva, in sicer da pritožnik po eni strani zatrjuje neobstoj trga zemljišča na Kitajskem in zagovarja uporabo „zunanje referenčne vrednosti“, po drugi strani pa, da družbe v državni lasti od vlade prejemajo zemljišča pod pogoji, ki so ugodnejši od tistih za zasebno industrijo, ter predlagala, da če naj se uporabijo referenčne vrednosti, potem bi to morale biti cene, ki jih plačujejo „nefavorizirane“ kitajske industrije, vendar o teh cenah ni predložila nobenih informacij.
In this context it should be noted that the complainant alleged that the land use rights market in China was distorted as a whole and both state-owned and private OCS producers have received land-use rights for less than adequate remuneration.
V tem oziru je treba navesti, da je pritožnik zatrjeval izkrivljenost trga pravic do uporabe zemljišč na Kitajskem v celoti, in da so tako proizvajalci jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, v državni kot tudi zasebni lasti, prejeli pravice do uporabe zemljišč za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo.
The land-use right provision in China falls under Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China and Real Right Law of the People's Republic of China.
Ureditev pravic do uporabe zemljišč na Kitajskem urejata Zakon Ljudske republike Kitajske o upravljanju zemljišč in Zakon Ljudske republike Kitajske o stvarnim pravicah.
No land can be sold but land-use rights may be assigned according to the law.
Zemljišč ni mogoče prodati, vendar se lahko v skladu z zakonom dodelijo pravice do uporabe zemljišč.
The State authorities can assign it through public bidding, quotation or auction.
Državni organi jih lahko dodelijo prek javnih razpisov, ponudb ali dražb.
The cooperating exporting producers have reported information regarding the land they hold as well as most of the relevant land-use rights contracts/certificates, but only very limited information was provided by the GOC about pricing of land-use rights.
Sodelujoči proizvajalci izvozniki so predložili informacije glede zemljišč, ki jih uporabljajo, in večino ustreznih pogodb/potrdil o pravicah do uporabe zemljišč, kitajska vlada pa je predložila zelo omejene informacije samo o določanju cen pravic do uporabe zemljišč.
As mentioned above the GOC claimed that the land-use rights in China are assigned through bidding, auction and competition.
Kot že omenjeno zgoraj je kitajska vlada zatrjevala, da se pravice do uporabe zemljišč na Kitajskem dodelijo prek javnih razpisov, dražb ali natečajev.
This is also provided for in the Article 137 of the Real Right Law of the People's Republic of China [42].
To določa tudi člen 137 zakona Ljudske republike Kitajske o stvarnih pravicah [42].
However, during the verification of cooperating exporting producers it was found that this system as described by the GOC does not always work like that in practice.
Vendar je bilo med preveritvijo sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov ugotovljeno, da ta sistem, kot ga je opisala kitajska vlada, v praksi ne deluje vedno tako.
For example out of six land-use rights purchased by Chongqing Wanda Steel Strip Co. Ltd. (part of Panhua Group Co. Ltd) for four of them, as confirmed by company officials, there was no bidding process.
Na primer, za štiri od šestih pravic do uporabe zemljišča, ki jih je kupila Chongqing Wanda Steel Strip Co. Ltd. (del skupine Panhua Group Co. Ltd), postopek javnega razpisa ni bil izveden, kar so potrdili uradni predstavniki družbe.
Chongqing Wanda was the only participant and the final transaction price paid by the company was in fact exactly the same as the initial price arbitrarily set by the local Land Resources Bureau.
Družba Chongqing Wanda je bila edina sodelujoča družba in končna cena posla, ki jo je plačala družba, je bila dejansko popolnoma enaka izklicni ceni, ki jo je samovoljno določil lokalni urad za zemljiške vire.
As for the remaining two land-use rights there was a bidding process, but no evidence for this was provided neither by the company nor by the GOC.
Za preostali pravici do uporabe zemljišča pa je bil izveden postopek javnega razpisa, vendar o tem nista posredovala nobenih dokazov niti družba niti kitajska vlada.
In fact, from the documents submitted by the GOC after the verification visit it appears that also these two land-use rights were purchased for the price identical to the price set by the local Land Resources Bureau.
Pravzaprav se iz dokumentov, ki jih je po preveritvenem obisku posredovala kitajska vlada, zdi, da sta bili ti dve pravici do uporabe zemljišča kupljeni za ceno, ki je enaka tisti, kot jo je določil lokalni urad za zemljiške vire.
Zhangjiagang Panhua Steel Strip Co., Ltd (also part of Panhua Group Co. Ltd) obtained three land-use rights by transfer from private companies in exchange for share in Panhua Group Co. Ltd.
Družba Zhangjiagang Panhua Steel Strip Co., Ltd (tudi del skupine Panhua Group Co. Ltd) je pridobila tri pravice do uporabe zemljišča prek prenosa s strani zasebnih družb v zameno za delež v skupini Panhua Group Co. Ltd.
Zhejiang Huadong Light Steel Building Material Co., Ltd obtained two of its land-use rights from local Land and Resources Bureau, Xiaoshan District and one from the private company.
Družba Zhejiang Huadong Light Steel Building Material Co., Ltd, je dve svoji pravici do uporabe zemljišča pridobila od lokalnega urada za zemljišča in vire okrožja Xiaoshan, eno pravico pa od zasebne družbe.
No evidence on bidding or auction could be provided as according to the GOC for the land-use rights purchased before 1 September 2006 there were no sales confirmation for land use rights transactions and in fact the GOC did not confirm or deny that these transactions were subject to bidding or auction.
Kitajska vlada o javnem razpisu ali dražbi ni mogla predložiti nobenih dokazov, saj po njenih navedbah za pravice do uporabe zemljišč, kupljene pred 1. septembrom 2006, ni bilo potrdil o prodaji za posle glede pravic do uporabe zemljišč, kitajska vlada pa pravzaprav ni potrdila ali zanikala, da so bili ti posli predmet javnega razpisa ali dražbe.
The findings of the proceeding confirm that the situation concerning land provision and acquisition in China is unclear and non-transparent and the prices are often arbitrarily set by the authorities.
Ugotovitve tega postopka potrjujejo, da je položaj v zvezi z zagotavljanjem in pridobivanjem zemljišč na Kitajskem nejasen in nepregleden ter da organi cene pogosto določajo samovoljno.
The authorities set the prices according to the Urban Land Evaluation System which instruct them among other criteria to consider also industrial policy when setting the price of industrial land.
Organi cene določajo v skladu s sistemom vrednotenja mestnih zemljišč, ki jim med drugimi nalaga tudi merilo upoštevanja industrijske politike ob določanju cene industrijskega zemljišča.
Also, at least in the steel sector, the access to industrial land is by law limited only to companies respecting the industrial policies set by the State [43].
Vsaj v sektorju jeklarstva je zakonsko omejen tudi dostop do industrijskih zemljišč na zgolj tiste družbe, ki upoštevajo industrijske politike države [43].
Also, the independent information submitted by the complainant suggest that the land in China is provided for below the normal market rates [44].
Tudi na podlagi neodvisnih informacij, ki jih je predložil pritožnik, je mogoče sklepati, da se zemljišča na Kitajskem zagotavljajo po cenah pod običajno tržno stopnjo [44].
Accordingly, the provision of land-use rights by the GOC should be considered a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation in the form of provision of goods which confers a benefit upon the recipient companies.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega je treba zagotavljanje pravic do uporabe zemljišč s strani kitajske vlade obravnavati kot subvencijo v obliki zagotavljanja blaga, ki družbam prejemnicam prinaša ugodnosti v smislu člena 3(1)(a)(iii) in (2) osnovne uredbe.
As explained in recitals (114) - (115) above, there is no functioning market for land in China and the use of an external benchmark demonstrates that the amount paid for land-use rights by the cooperating exporters is well below the normal market rate.
Kot je razloženo v uvodnih izjavah (114) in (115), na Kitajskem ni delujočega trga za zemljišča in uporaba zunanje referenčne vrednosti kaže, da je znesek, ki so ga sodelujoči izvozniki plačali za pravice do uporabe zemljišč, precej pod običajnim tržnim tečajem.
The subsidy is specific under Article 4 2(a) and 4 2(c) of the basic Regulation because the access to industrial land is by law limited only to companies respecting the industrial policies set by the State, only certain transactions were subject to a bidding process, prices often being set by the authorities and government practices in this area are unclear and non-transparent.
Subvencija je specifična v smislu člena 4(2)(a) in (c), ker je dostop do industrijskih zemljišč zakonsko omejen na zgolj tiste družbe, ki upoštevajo industrijske politike države, ker so bile le nekatere transakcije predmet razpisnega postopka, pri čemer so cene pogosto določili organi, ter ker so vladne prakse na tem območju nejasne in nepregledne.
Consequently, this subsidy is considered countervailable.
Zato se lahko za to subvencijo uvedejo izravnalni ukrepi.
As it was concluded that the situation in China with respect to land-use rights is not market-driven, there appear to be no available private benchmarks at all in China.
Ker je bilo ugotovljeno, da položaj na Kitajskem v zvezi s pravicami do uporabe zemljišč ni tržno usmerjen, se zdi, da na Kitajskem ni na voljo prav nobenih referenčnih vrednosti v zasebnem sektorju.
Given that the GOC did not cooperate or failed to submit any proposal for an external benchmark the Commission had to resort to facts available in order to establish an appropriate external benchmark.
Glede na to, da kitajska vlada ni sodelovala in ni predložila predloga za zunanjo referenčno vrednost, je morala Komisija, da bi določila ustrezno zunanjo referenčno vrednost, uporabiti razpoložljiva dejstva.
In this respect it is considered appropriate to use information from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan as an appropriate benchmark.
Glede tega se zdi primerno, da se kot ustrezna referenčna vrednost uporabijo informacije z ločenega carinskega območja Tajvan.
The Commission considers that the land prices in Taiwan offer the best proxy to the areas in China where the cooperating exporting producers are based.
Komisija meni, da so cene zemljišč na Tajvanu najboljši približek za območja na Kitajskem, kjer imajo sedež sodelujoči proizvajalci izvozniki.
The majority of the exporting producers are located in the eastern part of China, in developed high-GDP areas in provinces with a high population density.
Večina proizvajalcev izvoznikov je v vzhodnem delu Kitajske, na razvitih območjih z visokim BDP v provincah z gosto poseljenimi območji.
The benefit conferred on the recipients is calculated by taking into consideration the difference between the amount paid by each company for land use rights and the amount that should have been normally paid on the basis of the Taiwanese benchmark.
Ugodnost za prejemnike se izračuna z upoštevanjem razlike med zneskom, ki ga je vsaka družba plačala za pravice do uporabe zemljišč, in zneskom, ki bi moral biti običajno plačan na podlagi tajvanske referenčne vrednosti.
In doing this calculation, the Commission used the average land price per square meter established in Taiwan corrected for currency depreciation and GDP evolution as from the dates of the respective land use right contracts.
Pri izračunu je Komisija uporabila povprečno ceno zemljišča na kvadratni meter, ki je bila ugotovljena za Tajvan ter popravljena zaradi zmanjševanja vrednosti valute in sprememb v zvezi z BDP od datumov zadevnih pogodb za pravice do uporabe zemljišč.
The information concerning industrial land prices was retrieved from the website of the Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic affairs of Taiwan.
Informacije glede cen industrijskih zemljišč so bile pridobljene na spletni strani industrijskega urada tajvanskega ministrstva za gospodarske zadeve.
The currency depreciation and GDP evolution for Taiwan were calculated on the basis of inflation rates and evolution of GDP per capita at current prices in USD for Taiwan as published by the IMF in its 2011 World Economic Outlook.
Zmanjševanje vrednosti valute in spremembe v zvezi z BDP za Tajvan so bili izračunani na podlagi inflacijskih stopenj in spreminjanja BDP na prebivalca pri sedanjih cenah v USD za Tajvan, kot jih je Mednarodni denarni sklad objavil v svojih svetovnih gospodarskih napovedih (World Economic Outlook) za leto 2011.
In accordance with Article 7(3) of the basic Regulation this subsidy amount (numerator) has been allocated to the IP using the normal life time of the land use right for industrial use land in China, i.e. 50 years.
V skladu s členom 7(3) osnovne uredbe je bil ta znesek subvencije (števec) dodeljen za OP z uporabo običajne življenjske dobe pravice do uporabe zemljišč za uporabo industrijskih zemljišč na Kitajskem, tj. 50 let.
The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the IP for the cooperating exporting producers amounts to 0,34 % for the Huadong Group and 1,12 % for the Panhua Group.
Stopnja subvencije za to shemo med OP za sodelujoče proizvajalce izvoznike znaša 0,34 % za skupino Huadong in 1,12 % za skupino Panhua.
The weighted average subsidy rate for the cooperating companies not included in the sample is 0,73 %.
Tehtana povprečna stopnja subvencije za sodelujoče družbe, ki niso zajete v vzorcu, je 0,73 %.
Given the low level of cooperation, the subsidy rate for all non-cooperating companies is set at the level of the highest subsidy rate established for this scheme for an entity related to one of the sampled cooperating companies, i.e. 1,36 %.
Glede na nizko raven sodelovanja je stopnja subvencije za vse nesodelujoče družbe določena na ravni največje stopnje subvencioniranja za to shemo za subjekt, povezan z eno od vzorčenih sodelujočih družb, tj. 1,36 %.
Programme consisting of provision of water for less than adequate remuneration
Program, ki vključuje preskrbo z vodo za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo
The complaint alleged that water prices in China are exclusively determined by public authorities and that the pricing structure is set according to industrial macro-policies.
Trditev iz pritožbe je bila, da cene vode na Kitajskem določajo izključno javni organi in da je cenovna struktura določena v skladu z industrijskimi makropolitikami.
It also reported that water prices were different in the various local areas and that there was also a differentiation of rates on a company-by-company basis.
V pritožbi je bilo navedeno, da se tudi cene vode na različnih lokalnih območjih razlikujejo in da so se te cene razlikovale tudi od družbe do družbe.
The complaint alleged that it was likely that OCS producers had benefitted from water prices for less than adequate remuneration in accordance with the policy to encourage high-added value steel products.
Trditev iz pritožbe je bila, da so proizvajalci jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, v skladu s politiko spodbujanja jeklenih izdelkov visoke dodane vrednosti verjetno pridobili ugodnosti na podlagi cen vode za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo.
The water supply and market in China is administered by the NDRC, the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Environment.
Preskrbo in trg z vodo na Kitajskem upravljajo agencija NDRC, ministrstvo za vodne vire in ministrstvo za okolje.
The water supply market is still largely dominated by local state-owned companies, although the entrance of foreign investment companies in some water supply projects of certain cities has broken the monopoly of state suppliers.
Trg preskrbe z vodo še vedno pretežno obvladujejo lokalne družbe v državni lasti, čeprav je vstop tujih naložbenih družb v nekatere projekte preskrbe z vodo v nekaterih mesti odpravil monopol državnih dobaviteljev.
However, the GOC was unable to provide a detailed list of water suppliers with their service area and volumes supplied (see recital (129) below), but limited its reply to a list of water suppliers in the areas of the sampled exporting producers.
Vendar kitajska vlada ni mogla predložiti podrobnega seznama dobaviteljev vode z območij, ki jih pokrivajo, in dobavljenimi količinami (glej uvodno izjavo (129)), ampak je svoj odgovor omejila na seznam dobaviteljev z območij vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov.
As for pricing, the NDRC formulates the main pricing policy and the local authorities set the local water price after a hearing procedure with the aim to pursue a sustainable utilisation of water resources.
Glede oblikovanja cen velja, da glavno cenovno politiko oblikuje agencija NDRC, lokalni organi pa določajo lokalno ceno vode po obravnavi, da se uveljavilo trajnostno izkoriščanje vodnih virov.
The prices reflect the costs together with a reasonable profit for the local water suppliers.
Cene odražajo stroške z razumnim dobičkom za lokalne dobavitelje vode.
The GOC submitted the relevant price lists applicable in the municipalities where the sampled OCS producing exporters were located.
Kitajska vlada je predložila ustrezne cenike, veljavne za občine, v katerih so vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi.
It was clarified that the various municipal prices apply to all industrial users uniformly and do not vary by company or users.
Pojasnjeno je bilo, da različne občinske cene veljajo enako za vse industrijske uporabnike in da se med podjetji ali uporabniki ne razlikujejo.
The investigation confirmed that the NDRC sets the basic price of water, and the municipal price administrative authorities set the price for each municipality on the basis of several parameters (e.g. costs of distribution, profit, and reasonable surplus).
Preiskava je potrdila, da NFRC določa osnovno ceno vode, občinski upravni organi za cene pa določajo ceno za vsako občino na podlagi številnih parametrov (npr. stroški distribucije, dobiček in razumen presežek).
The water price is supplemented by a 'sewage treatment' fee also set at municipal level.
Ceni vode je dodana pristojbina za „čiščenje odplak“, ki se ravno tako določi na občinski ravni.
While the basic water price, the sewage treatment fee and other possible local surcharges are equally applicable to all users falling in the same categories, it was found that one of the two sampled exporters, Zhejiang Huadong Group, did not pay the sewage treatment fee.
Medtem ko se osnovna cena vode, pristojbina za čiščenje odplak in druge morebitne lokalne dajatve uporabljajo za vse uporabnike iz iste kategorije enako, je bilo ugotovljeno, da eden od dveh vzorčenih izvoznikov, skupina Zhejiang Huadong, pristojbine za čiščenje odplak ni plačala.
The exporter claimed that it paid this fee as a lump-sum amount to the Environment Protection Bureau.
Izvoznik je trdil, da je to pristojbino v pavšalnem znesku plačal uradu za varovanje okolja.
However, it is not considered that this payment was made on the place of the sewage treatment fee for the following three reasons:
Vendar se za to plačilo ne šteje, da je bilo opravljeno za plačilo pristojbine za čiščenje odplak iz naslednjih treh razlogov:
the official document reads "waste water emission" fee and not "sewage treatment" fee;
v uradnem dokumentu je navedena pristojbina za „izpust odpadnih vod“ in ne pristojbina za „čiščenje odplak“;
the payment is not proportional to the actual water consumption;
plačilo ni sorazmerno z dejansko porabo vode;
the total amount paid is quite small as compared to the actual amount that would have been payable if the sewage treatment fee on the actual water consumption had been due.
skupni znesek plačila je zelo majhen v primerjavi z dejanskim zneskom, ki bi ga bilo treba plačati, če bi se obračunala pristojbina za čiščenje odplak na dejansko porabljeno količino vode.
Alternatively, this could be viewed as revenue foregone by the government because a public body did not collect revenue otherwise due in the sense of Article 3(1)(a)(ii).
To bi lahko drugače ustrezalo opuščenemu prihodku vlade, saj javni organ ni izterjal prihodka, ki je sicer zapadel,v smislu člena 3(1)(a)(ii).
Huadong Steel Group received a benefit within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation to the extent that the government has provided water for less than adequate remuneration.
Skupina Huadong Steel je prejela ugodnosti v smislu člena 3(2) osnovne uredbe glede na to, da ji je vlada zagotavljala vodo za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo.