natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the Appendix A to the questionnaire the Commission requested information on how do the banks take account of risk when granting loans, how is the creditworthiness of the borrower assessed, what are the risk premiums charged for different companies/industries in China by the bank, which are the factors the bank takes into account when assessing the loan application, the description of loan application and approval process etc. However, neither the GOC nor the individual banks identified in the questionnaire provided any evidence in this respect.
Komisija je v Prilogi A k vprašalniku zahtevala informacije o tem, kako banke pri dodeljevanju posojil upoštevajo tveganje, kako se ocenjuje kreditna sposobnost posojilojemalca, kakšne premije za tveganje zaračuna banka različnim družbam/industrijam na Kitajskem, katere dejavnike banka upošteva pri obravnavi vloge za posojilo, opis vloge za posojilo in postopka odobritve itd. Vendar kitajska vlada in posamezne banke, navedene na vprašalniku, o tem niso predložile nobenih dokazov.
The GOC provided only replies of general nature not supported by any evidence whatsoever that any kind of credit risk assessment actually takes place.
Kitajska vlada je dala le splošne odgovore, ki niso bili podprti z nobenimi dokazi, da se kakršna koli ocena kreditnega tveganja dejansko sploh izvaja.
The Commission also requested the similar information from the cooperating exporting producers and attempted to verify it during the on-spot verification visits of sampled exporting producers.
Komisija je podobne informacije zahtevala tudi od sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov in si jih prizadevala preveriti med preveritvenimi obiski pri vzorčenih proizvajalcih izvoznikih na kraju samem.
Both groups of sampled exporting producers replied that banks request certain documents and perform some kind of credit risk analyses before the loans are granted.
Obe skupini vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov sta odgovorili, da banke pred odobritvijo posojil zahtevajo nekatere dokumente in opravijo neko vrsto analiz kreditnega tveganja.
However, they could not support their claims with any evidence.
Vendar svojih trditev niso mogli podpreti z nobenimi dokazi.
During the on-spot verification the Commission asked for the evidence that the banks requested such documents or that these documents were provided to the banks by the companies or any kind of report issued by the banks proving that such credit risk analyses was performed.
Komisija je med preveritvenim obiskom na kraju samem zaprosila za dokaze, da so banke zahtevale take dokumente ali da so jih družbe predložile bankam, oziroma kakršno koli poročilo, ki so ga objavile banke in bi dokazalo, da so bile take analize kreditnega tveganja opravljene.
However the sampled groups of exporting producers were not able to provide such evidence, neither were they able to provide any other evidence supporting their claims.
Toda vzorčene skupine proizvajalcev izvoznikov niso mogle predložiti takih dokazov niti nobenih drugih dokazov, ki bi podprli njihove trditve.
It is also noted that none of the sampled groups of exporting producers or individual companies within these groups has a credit rating assigned.
Treba je ugotoviti tudi, da nobena vzorčena skupina proizvajalcev izvoznikov ali posameznih družb znotraj teh skupin nima bonitetne ocene.
The information concerning credit risk assessment was repeatedly requested from interested parties as it is considered crucial inter alia account taken of (i) the finding of the IMF 2006 report which suggested that the bank liberalisation in China is incomplete and credit risk is not properly reflected [56], (ii) the IMF 2009 report which highlighted the lack of interest rate liberalisation in China [57], (iii) the IMF 2010 Country Report which stated that cost of capital in China is relatively low, credit allocation is sometimes determined by non-price means and high corporate saving is partly linked to low cost of various factor inputs (including capital and land) [58] and (iv) the OECD 2010 Economic Survey of China [59] and OECD Economic Department Working Paper No. 747 on China's Financial Sector Reforms [60] which stated that ownership of financial institutions remains dominated by the State raising issues as the extent to which banks' lending decisions are based purely on commercial considerations while banks' traditional role appears to be that of government agencies with ties to the government.
Od zainteresiranih strani so se večkrat zahtevale informacije o oceni kreditnega tveganja, ki se štejejo za bistvene, med drugim, ob upoštevanju (i) ugotovitve poročila Mednarodnega denarnega sklada za leto 2006, ki je pokazalo, da je liberalizacija bank na Kitajskem nepopolna in da kreditno tveganje ni ustrezno upoštevano [56]; (ii) poročila Mednarodnega denarnega sklada za leto 2009, ki je poudarilo pomanjkanje liberalizacije obrestne mere na Kitajskem [57]; (iii) poročila Mednarodnega denarnega sklada o posameznih državah 2010, ki je navajalo, da so stroški kapitala na Kitajskem razmeroma nizki, da je dodeljevanje posojil včasih določeno z necenovnimi načini in da je veliko varčevanje pravnih oseb delno povezano z nizkimi stroški različnih faktorskih vložkov (vključno s kapitalom in zemljišči) [58]; (iv) pregleda gospodarskih gibanj na Kitajskem 2010 Organizacije za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj [59] in delovnega dokumenta ekonomskega oddelka OECD št. 747 o reformah kitajskega finančnega sektorja [60], ki je navajal, da glede lastništva finančnih institucij še vedno prevladuje država, zaradi česar se pojavljajo vprašanja glede obsega, v katerem odločitve bank glede posojil temeljijo samo na poslovnih premislekih, medtem ko je tradicionalna vloga bank očitno vloga vladnih agencij, povezanih z vlado.
Having regard to the totality of the evidence, it is concluded that the vast majority of loans to the 2 sampled groups of exporting producers are provided by state-owned banks which are considered to be public bodies because they are vested with government authority and exercise government functions.
Ob upoštevanju vseh dokazov je bilo sklenjeno, da zagotavljajo veliko večino posojil dvema vzorčenima skupinama proizvajalcev izvoznikov banke v državni lasti, za katere se šteje, da so javni organ, ker jim je zaupano pooblastilo vlade in ker opravljajo naloge vlade.
There is further evidence that these banks effectively exercise government authority since as it is explained in recital (169) there is a clear intervention by the State (i.e. PBOC) in the way commercial banks take decisions on interest rates for loans granted to Chinese companies.
Obstajajo nadaljnji dokazi o tem, da te banke dejansko izvajajo pooblastilo vlade, saj, kot je razloženo v uvodni izjavi (169), država (tj. Ljudska banka Kitajske) očitno posega v način, kako poslovne banke odločajo o obrestnih merah za posojila, ki jih odobrijo kitajskim družbam.
The fact that banks exercise government authority is also confirmed by the way NDRC Order No.35- Policies for the development of Iron and Steel Industry [61], Decision 40 and Article 34 of the Law on Commercial Banks act with respect to the fulfilment of the government industrial policies.
Dejstvo, da banke izvajajo pooblastilo vlade, potrjuje tudi način, kako odredba agencije NDRC št. 35 – Razvojne politike za industrijo železa in jekla [61], sklep št. 40 in člen 34 zakona o poslovnih bankah delujejo glede uresničitve vladnih industrijskih politik.
There is also a great deal of circumstantial evidence, supported by objective studies and reports, that a large amount of government intervention is still present in the Chinese financial system as already explained in recital (178) above.
Obstaja tudi veliko posrednih dokazov, podprtih z objektivnimi raziskavami in poročili, da so v kitajskem finančnem sistemu še vedno prisotni številni posegi vlade, kot je že pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (178).
Finally, the GOC failed to provide information which would have enabled a greater understanding of the state-owned banks' relationship with government as explained in recitals (159) to (164).
Nazadnje, kitajska vlada ni zagotovila informacij, ki bi omogočale boljše razumevanje povezave med državnimi bankami in vlado, kot je razloženo v uvodnih izjavah od (159) do (164).
Thus, in the case of loans provided by state-owned commercial banks in China, the Commission concludes that there is a financial contribution to the organic coated steel producers in the form of a direct transfer of funds from the government within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation.
Zato je Komisija v primeru posojil, ki so jih dodelile poslovne banke v državni lasti na Kitajskem, sklenila, da gre za finančni prispevek proizvajalcem jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, v obliki neposrednega prenosa sredstev vlade v smislu člena 3(1)(a)(i) osnovne uredbe.
In addition, the same evidence shows that SOCBs (as well as privately owned banks) are entrusted or directed by the government and this consequently means that a financial contribution exists within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.
Poleg tega isti dokazi kažejo, da vlada bankam v državni lasti (in banke v zasebni lasti) zaupa naloge ali jim ukazuje, in to posledično pomeni, da gre za finančni prispevek v smislu člena 3(1)(a)(iv) osnovne uredbe.
In view of the analysis in Recitals (170) to (175) above, it is also determined that privately-owned banks are entrusted and directed by the GOC to provide loans to the OCS producers and that a financial contribution exists under Articles 3(1)(a)(i) and 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.
Ob upoštevanju analize iz uvodnih izjav od (170) do (175) je bilo ugotovljeno tudi, da kitajska vlada bankam v zasebni lasti zaupa naloge in ukazuje, da zagotavljajo posojila proizvajalcem jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, ter da gre za finančni prispevek v skladu s členom 3(1)(a)(i) in (iv) osnovne uredbe.
A benefit within the meaning of Articles 3(2) and 6(b) of the basic Regulation exists to the extent that the government loans are granted on terms more favourable than the recipient could actually obtain on the market.
Ugodnosti v skladu s členom 3(2) in členom 6(b) osnovne uredbe obstajajo, saj so vladna posojila dodeljena pod pogoji, ugodnejšimi od tistih, ki bi jih prejemnik dejansko lahko pridobil na trgu.
Since it has been established that non-government loans in China do not provide an appropriate market benchmark (privately owned banks being entrusted and directed by the GOC), such a benchmark has been constructed using the method described in recitals (191) and (192) below.
Ker je bilo ugotovljeno, da nevladna posojila na Kitajskem ne zagotavljajo ustrezne tržne referenčne vrednosti (kitajska vlada bankam v zasebni lasti zaupa naloge in jim ukazuje), je bila ta konstruirana z metodami, opisanimi v uvodnih izjavah od (191) do (192).
The steel industry belongs to the encouraged category according to the Decision No. 40.
Industrija jekla je uvrščena v kategorijo spodbujane industrije, kar je v skladu s sklepom št. 40.
Decision No 40, is an Order from the State Council, which is the highest administrative body in the PRC and in that regard the decision is legally binding for other public bodies and the economic operators.
Sklep št. 40 je odredba državnega sveta, tj. najvišjega upravnega organa v LRK, ter je zato pravno zavezujoč za druge javne organe in gospodarske subjekte.
It classifies the industrial sectors into 'Encouraged, Restrictive and Eliminated Projects'.
Sklep industrijske sektorje uvršča med „spodbujane, omejene in izključene projekte“.
This Act represents an industrial policy guideline that along with the Directory Catalogue shows how the GOC maintains a policy of encouraging and supporting groups of enterprises or industries, such as the steel/ OCS industry, classified by the Directory Catalogue as an 'Encouraged industry'.
Ta akt je smernica za industrijsko politiko, ki skupaj s kataloškim seznamom kaže, da kitajska vlada vzdržuje politiko spodbujanja in podpiranja skupin družb ali industrij, kot je industrija jekla/jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, ki jih kataloški seznam uvršča med „spodbujano industrijo“.
With respect to the number of industries listed as 'Encouraged' it is noted that these represent only a portion of the Chinese economy.
Glede števila industrij, navedenih kot „spodbujane“, je treba omeniti, da je to samo del kitajskega gospodarstva.
Furthermore, only certain activities within these encouraged sectors are given "encouraged" status.
Poleg tega imajo v teh spodbujanih sektorjih samo nekatere dejavnosti status „spodbujanih“ dejavnosti.
Decision No 40 also stipulates under Article 17 that the 'Encouraged investment projects' shall benefit from specific privileges and incentives, inter alia, from financial support.
Člen 17 sklepa št. 40 določa tudi, da so „spodbujani investicijski projekti“ upravičeni do posebnih ugodnosti in spodbud, med drugim, finančne podpore.
On the other hand, with reference to the 'Restrictive and Eliminated Projects', Decision No 40 empowers the state authorities to intervene directly to regulate the market.
Po drugi strani sklep št. 40 v zvezi z „omejenimi in izključenimi projekti“ pooblašča državne organe, da neposredno posredujejo in urejajo trg.
In fact, Articles 18 and 19 provide that the relevant authority prevents financial institutions from supplying loans to such 'Restrictive and Eliminated Projects'.
Pravzaprav člena 18 in 19 določata, da ustrezni organi finančnim ustanovam preprečijo dodeljevanje posojil takim „omejenim in izključenim projektom“.
It is clear from the above that Decision No 40 provides binding rules to all the economic institutions in the form of directives on the promotion and support of encouraged industries, one of which is the part of OCS industry:
Iz navedenega je očitno, da sklep št. 40 določa obvezujoča pravila za vse gospodarske ustanove v obliki usmeritev glede spodbujanja in podpore spodbujanih industrij, ena izmed teh pa je industrija jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi.
Furthermore, Order No. 35 of the NDRC - Policies for the development of Iron and Steel Industry, in particular Articles 24 and 25, limit the provision of loans only to steel enterprises which fully comply with the development policies for the iron and steel industry.
Poleg tega Odredba agencije NDRC št. 35 – Razvojne politike za industrijo železa in jekla, zlasti s členoma 24 in 25, omejuje zagotavljanje posojil na samo tiste jeklarske družbe, ki ravnajo popolnoma v skladu z razvojnimi politikami za industrijo železa in jekla.
The complainant also provided evidence that some other government plans and documents are encouraging and instructing for the financial support of steel industry in general and also in specific geographical regions of China [62] [63].
Pritožnik je predložil dokaze tudi o tem, da nekateri drugi vladni načrti in dokumenti spodbujajo in nalagajo obveznost finančne podpore industriji jekla na splošno in na posebnih geografskih območjih na Kitajskem [62], [63].
Taking all the above into consideration it becomes clear that the authorities only allow the financial institutions to provide preferential loans to limited number of industries/companies which comply with the development policies of the GOC.
Ob upoštevanju vsega navedenega je očitno, da organi finančnim ustanovam dovolijo zagotavljanje preferenčnih posojil samo omejenemu številu industrij/družb, ki ravnajo v skladu z razvojnimi politikami kitajske vlade.
On the basis of the evidence on the file and in the absence of the cooperation from the GOC on this matter it is concluded that the subsidies in form of preferential lending are not generally available and are therefore specific in the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation.
Na podlagi vseh dokazov v spisu in ob odsotnosti sodelovanja kitajske vlade v tej zadevi je bilo sklenjeno, da subvencije v obliki preferenčnih posojil niso splošno razpoložljive in so zato specifične v smislu člena 4(2)(a) osnovne uredbe.
Moreover there was no evidence submitted by any of the interested parties suggesting that the subsidy is based on objective criteria or conditions under Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation.
Poleg tega zainteresirane strani niso predložile nobenih dokazov, ki bi kazali, da subvencija temelji na objektivnih merilih ali pogojih iz člena 4(2)(b) osnovne uredbe.
The investigation showed that the two groups of sampled exporting producers benefited from the preferential lending in the investigation period.
Preiskava je pokazala, da sta ugodnosti na podlagi preferenčnih posojil v obdobju preiskave prejeli dve skupini vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov.
Accordingly, the financing of the organic coated steel industry should be considered a subsidy.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega je treba financiranje industrije jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, obravnavati kot subvencijo.
In view of the existence of a financial contribution, a benefit to the exporting producers and specificity, this subsidy should be considered countervailable.
Zaradi obstoja finančnega prispevka, ugodnosti za proizvajalce izvoznike in specifičnosti se lahko proti tej subvenciji uvedejo izravnalni ukrepi.
According to Article 6(b) of the basic Regulation the benefit conferred on the recipients is considered to be the difference between the amount that the company pays on the government loan and the amount that the company would pay for a comparable commercial loan obtainable on the market.
V skladu s členom 6(b) osnovne uredbe se kot ugodnost za prejemnike šteje razlika med zneskom, ki ga družba plača na vladno posojilo, in zneskom, ki bi ga družba plačala za primerljivo komercialno posojilo, ki bi ga pridobila na trgu.
As explained above (recitals (165) to (178)), since the loans provided by Chinese banks reflect substantial government intervention in the banking sector and do not reflect rates that would be found in a functioning market, an appropriate market benchmark has been constructed using the method described below.
Kot je bilo razloženo zgoraj (v uvodnih izjavah od (165) do (178)), ker posojila, ki jih zagotavljajo kitajske banke, odražajo znatno poseganje vlade v bančni sektor in ne odražajo obrestnih mer delujočega trga, je bila ustrezna referenčna vrednost konstruirana z metodami, opisanimi v nadaljevanju.
When constructing an appropriate benchmark, it is considered reasonable to apply Chinese interest rates, adjusted to reflect normal market risk.
Pri konstruiranju ustrezne referenčne vrednosti se zdi razumno, da se uporabijo kitajske obrestne mere, prilagojene tako, da odražajo običajno tržno tveganje.
Indeed, in a context where the exporters' current financial state has been established in a distorted market and there is no reliable information from the Chinese banks on the measurement of risk and the establishment of credit ratings, it is considered necessary not to take the creditworthiness of the Chinese exporters at face value, but to apply a mark-up to reflect the potential impact of the Chinese distorted market on their financial situation.
Pravzaprav se zdi v primeru, ko je tekoče finančno stanje izvoznikov ugotovljeno na izkrivljenem trgu ter kitajske banke ne predložijo nobenih zanesljivih informacij glede meritev tveganja in določanja bonitetne ocene, nujno, da se ne upošteva kreditna sposobnost kitajskih izvoznikov po nominalni vrednosti, ampak se doda pribitek, ki odraža morebitni učinek kitajskega izkrivljenega trga na njihov finančni položaj.
With respect to the above as explained in recitals (160), (163) and (164) both the GOC and the cooperating exporting producers were requested to provide information on the lending policies of the Chinese banks and the way loans were attributed to the exporting producers.
Glede na navedeno, kot je razloženo v uvodnih izjavah (160), (163) in (164), je Komisija od kitajske vlade in sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov zahtevala, naj predložijo informacije o posojilnih politikah kitajskih bank in načinu, kako so posojila proizvajalcem izvoznikom dodeljena.
Parties failed to provide such information, although repeatedly requested to do so, and refused access to the state-owned banks.
Stranki kljub večkratnim zahtevam teh informacij nista predložili in nista dovolili dostopa do bank v državni lasti.
Accordingly in view of this lack of cooperation and the totality of facts available, and in line with the provisions of Article 28(6) of the basic Regulation, it is deemed appropriate to consider that all firms in China would be accorded the highest grade of "Non-investment grade" bonds only (BB at Bloomberg) and apply the appropriate premium expected on bonds issued by firms with this rating to the standard lending rate of the People's Bank of China.
Glede na pomanjkanje sodelovanja in vse razpoložljive informacije ter v skladu z določbami člena 28(6) osnovne uredbe se zdi primerno upoštevati, da bi vsa podjetja na Kitajskem dobila samo obveznice najvišje ocene „stopnja nevlaganja“ (BB pri Bloombergu), in uporabiti ustrezno premijo, pričakovano za obveznice, ki jih izdajo podjetja s to oceno, za običajno obrestno mero Ljudske banke Kitajske.
The benefit to the exporting producers has been calculated by taking the interest rate differential, expressed as a percentage, multiplied by the outstanding amount of the loan, i.e. the interest not paid during the IP.
Ugodnosti za proizvajalce izvoznike so bile izračunane z upoštevanjem razlike v obrestnih merah, izražene v odstotku, pomnožene z neporavnanim zneskom posojila, tj. obresti, ki niso bile poravnane med OP.
This amount was then allocated over the total turnover of the co-operating exporting producers.
Ta znesek je bil nato dodeljen za skupni prihodek sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov od prodaje.
The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the IP for the sampled exporting producers amounts to 0,25 % for the Huadong group of companies and 0,89 % for the Panhua group of companies.
Stopnja subvencije za to shemo med OP za vzorčene proizvajalce izvoznike znaša 0,25 % za skupino družb Huadong in 0,89 % za skupino družb Panhua.
The weighted average subsidy rate for the cooperating companies not included in the sample is 0,58 %.
Tehtana povprečna stopnja subvencije za sodelujoče družbe, ki niso zajete v vzorcu, je 0,58 %.
Given the low level of cooperation, the subsidy rate for all non-cooperating companies is set at the level of the highest subsidy rate established for this scheme for an entity related to one of the sampled cooperating companies, i.e. 0,97 %.
Glede na nizko raven sodelovanja je stopnja subvencije za vse nesodelujoče družbe določena na ravni največje stopnje subvencioniranja za to shemo za subjekt, povezan z eno od vzorčenih sodelujočih družb, tj. 0,97 %.
EQUITY PROGRAMMES
PROGRAMI LASTNIŠKEGA KAPITALA
A number of alleged subsidy programmes concerning equity were detailed in the complaint in relation to exporting producers not selected in the sample and/or not cooperating with the investigation.
V pritožbi so bili podrobno predstavljeni številni programi domnevnega subvencioniranja glede lastniškega kapitala in v zvezi s proizvajalci izvozniki, ki niso bili zajeti v vzorcu in/ali v preiskavi niso sodelovali.
The Commission asked the GOC to submit information about these programmes in the original and supplementary questionnaires, and subsequently gave ample opportunity to the GOC to provide replies on these programmes.
Komisija je v izvornem in dopolnilnih vprašalnikih kitajsko vlado zaprosila, naj predloži informacije o teh programih, ter ji nato dala zadostne možnosti, da o teh programih predloži svoje odgovore.
The GOC took the view that it would only provide replies on alleged subsidy programmes concerning the two sampled exporting producers and confirmed this stance throughout the proceeding.
Kitajska vlada je sprejela stališče, da bo predložila samo odgovore o programih domnevnega subvencioniranja v zvezi z dvema vzorčenima proizvajalcema izvoznikoma, in ga branila med celotnim postopkom.