natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In order to ensure that administrative penalties have a dissuasive effect, they should normally be published except in certain well-defined circumstances.
Da bi zagotovili, da bodo imele upravne kazni odvračilni učinek, bi jih bilo običajno treba objaviti, razen v nekaterih ustrezno opredeljenih okoliščinah.
For the purposes of assessing the good repute of directors and members of a management body, an efficient system of exchange of information is required where EBA, subject to professional secrecy and data protection requirements, should be entitled to maintain a central database containing details of administrative penalties, including any appeals in relation thereto, which is accessible to competent authorities only.
Za ocenjevanje dobrega imena direktorjev in članov upravljalnih organov je potreben učinkovit sistem izmenjave informacij, v okviru katerega bi moral EBA imeti možnost, da ob spoštovanju poklicne skrivnosti in zahtev za varstvo podatkov vzdržuje centralno bazo podatkov s podrobnostmi glede upravnih kazni, vključno s pritožbami zoper kazni, do katere bi imeli dostop zgolj pristojni organi.
In any event, information about criminal convictions should be exchanged in accordance with Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA [7] and Decision 2009/316/JHA [8], as transposed into national law, and with other relevant provisions of national law.
V vsakem primeru bi bilo treba informacije o kazenskih obsodbah izmenjavati v skladu z Okvirnim sklepom 2009/315/PNZ [7] in Sklepom 2009/316/PNZ [8], kakor sta prenešena v nacionalno pravo, ter drugimi relevantnimi določbami nacionalnega prava.
In order to detect potential breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, competent authorities should have the necessary investigatory powers and should establish effective mechanisms to encourage reporting of potential or actual breaches.
Za ugotavljanje morebitnih kršitev nacionalnih določb, ki prenašajo to direktivo, in Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 bi morali imeti pristojni organi potrebna preiskovalna pooblastila in bi morali vzpostaviti učinkovite mehanizme za spodbujanje poročanja o morebitnih ali dejanskih kršitvah.
Those mechanisms should be without prejudice to the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged.
Ti mehanizmi ne bi smeli posegati v pravico do obrambe obdolžencev.
This Directive should provide for administrative penalties and other administrative measures in order to ensure the greatest possible scope for action following a breach and to help prevent further breaches, irrespective of their qualification as an administrative penalty or other administrative measure under national law.
Da se zagotovi, da se zajame širok krog ukrepov, ki se uporabijo ob kršitvi, in da se pomaga preprečevati nadaljnje kršitve, bi morala ta direktiva določati upravne kazni in druge upravne ukrepe, ne glede na to, ali je ukrep v skladu z nacionalnim pravom opredeljen kot upravna kazen ali drug upravni ukrep.
Member States should be able to provide for additional penalties to, and higher level of administrative pecuniary penalties than, those provided for in this Directive.
Državam članicam bi moralo biti omogočeno, da določijo dodatne kazni in višje ravni upravnih denarnih kazni od tistih iz te direktive.
This Directive should be without prejudice to any provisions in the law of Member States relating to criminal penalties.
Ta direktiva ne bi smela posegati v določbe iz prava držav članic v zvezi s kaznimi po kazenskem pravu.
Member States should ensure that credit institutions and investment firms have internal capital that, having regard to the risks to which they are or may be exposed, is adequate in quantity, quality and distribution.
Države članice bi morale zagotoviti, da imajo kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja notranji kapital, ki je glede na tveganja, katerim so ali bi lahko bile izpostavljene, ustrezen glede na količino, kakovost in razporeditev.
Accordingly, Member States should ensure that credit institutions and investment firms have strategies and processes in place for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital.
V skladu s tem bi morale države članice zagotoviti, da kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja vzpostavijo strategije in procese za ocenjevanje in ohranjanje ustreznosti svojega notranjega kapitala.
Competent authorities should be entrusted with ensuring that institutions have a good organisation and adequate own funds, having regard to the risks to which the institutions are or might be exposed.
Pristojne organe bi bilo treba pooblastiti za zagotavljanje, da imajo institucije dobro organizacijo in ustrezen kapital ob upoštevanju tveganj, katerim so ali bi jim bile lahko izpostavljene.
To ensure that institutions which are active in several Member States are not disproportionately burdened as a result of the continued responsibilities of individual Member State competent authorities as regards authorisation and supervision, it is essential to significantly enhance the cooperation between competent authorities.
Za zagotovitev, da institucije, ki so dejavne v več državah članicah, niso nesorazmerno obremenjene zaradi trajnih odgovornosti pristojnih organov posameznih držav članic, kar zadeva dovoljenja in nadzor, je nujno, da se znatno okrepi sodelovanje med pristojnimi organi.
EBA should facilitate and enhance such cooperation.
EBA bi moral takšno sodelovanje olajšati in okrepiti.
In order to ensure comprehensive market discipline across the Union, it is appropriate that competent authorities publish information concerning the carrying out of the business of credit institutions and investment firms.
Da se zagotovi dosledna tržna disciplina po vsej Uniji, je primerno, da pristojni organi objavijo informacije v zvezi s poslovanjem kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij.
Such information should be sufficient to enable a comparison of the approaches adopted by the different competent authorities of the Member States and complement requirements found in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 regarding disclosure of technical information by institutions.
Takšne informacije bi morale zadostovati za primerjavo pristopov, ki jih sprejmejo različni pristojni organi držav članic, in bi morale dopolniti zahteve iz Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 v zvezi z razkritjem tehničnih informacij institucij.
Supervision of institutions on a consolidated basis aims to protect the interests of depositors and investors of institutions and to ensure the stability of the financial system.
Nadzor institucij na konsolidirani podlagi je usmerjen predvsem v zaščito interesov vlagateljev in investitorjev institucij ter v zagotavljanje stabilnosti finančnega sistema.
In order to be effective, supervision on a consolidated basis should therefore be applied to all banking groups, including those the parent undertakings of which are not credit institutions or investment firms.
Da bi bil nadzor na konsolidirani podlagi učinkovit, bi moral zato veljati za vse bančne skupine, vključno s skupinami, katerih nadrejene osebe niso kreditne institucije ali investicijska podjetja.
Member States should provide competent authorities with the necessary legal instruments to enable them to exercise such supervision.
Države članice bi morale pristojnim organom zagotoviti potrebne pravne instrumente, da se jim omogoči izvajanje takšnega nadzora.
In the case of groups with diversified activities where parent undertakings control at least one subsidiary, the competent authorities should be able to assess the financial situation of each credit institution or investment firm in such a group.
Pri skupinah z različnimi dejavnostmi, v katerih nadrejene osebe obvladujejo vsaj eno podrejeno družbo, bi morali biti pristojni organi sposobni oceniti finančno stanje vsake kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja v taki skupini.
The competent authorities should at least have the means of obtaining from all undertakings within a group the information necessary for the performance of their function.
Pristojni organi bi morali imeti na voljo vsaj načine, s katerimi lahko od vseh podjetij v skupini pridobijo potrebne informacije za opravljanje svojih funkcij.
Cooperation between the authorities responsible for the supervision of different financial sectors should be established in the case of groups of undertakings carrying out a range of financial activities.
Vzpostaviti bi bilo treba sodelovanje med organi, pristojnimi za nadzor različnih finančnih sektorjev pri skupinah družb, ki opravljajo več različnih finančnih dejavnosti.
Member States should be able to refuse or withdraw a credit institution's authorisation in the case of certain group structures considered inappropriate for carrying out banking activities, because such structures cannot be supervised effectively.
Države članice bi morale imeti možnost, da zavrnejo ali odvzamejo dovoljenje kreditne institucije v primeru nekaterih struktur skupin, ki se štejejo za neprimerne za opravljanje bančnih dejavnosti, saj takih struktur ni mogoče učinkovito nadzorovati.
In that respect the competent authorities should have the necessary powers to ensure the sound and prudent management of credit institutions.
V zvezi s tem bi morali pristojni organi imeti potrebna pooblastila za zagotavljanje preudarnega in skrbnega upravljanja kreditnih institucij.
In order to secure a sustainable and diverse Union banking culture which primarily serves the interest of the citizens of the Union, small-scale banking activities, such as those of credit unions and cooperative banks, should be encouraged.
Da bi zagotovili vzdržno in raznoliko bančno kulturo v Uniji, ki bo služila predvsem interesom državljanov Unije, bi bilo treba spodbujati bančne dejavnosti majhnega obsega, kot so dejavnosti kreditnih zadrug in zadružnih bank.
The mandates of competent authorities should take into account, in an appropriate manner, the Union dimension.
V mandatih pristojnih organov bi bilo treba ustrezno upoštevati razsežnost Unije.
Competent authorities should therefore duly consider the effect of their decisions not only on the stability of the financial system in their jurisdiction but also in all other Member States concerned.
Pristojni organi bi morali zato ustrezno razmisliti o učinku, ki ga imajo njihove odločitve ne le na stabilnost finančnega sistema v njihovi državi članici, ampak tudi v vseh drugih zadevnih državah članicah.
Subject to national law, that principle should serve to promote financial stability across the Union and should not legally bind competent authorities to achieve a specific result.
Ob upoštevanju nacionalnega prava bi se moralo to načelo uporabljati za spodbujanje finančne stabilnosti v Uniji, pri čemer pristojni organi ne bi smeli imeti pravne zaveze za dosego določenega rezultata.
The financial crisis demonstrated links between the banking sector and so-called 'shadow banking'.
Finančna kriza je razkrila povezavo med bančnim sektorjem in tako imenovanim bančništvom v senci.
Some shadow banking usefully keeps risks separate from the banking sector and hence avoids potential negative effects on taxpayers and systemic impact.
Del bančništva v senci prikladno pripomore k temu, da ostanejo tveganja ločena od bančnega sektorja ter s s tem preprečuje negativne učinke za davkoplačevalce in sistem.
Nevertheless, a fuller understanding of shadow banking operations and their links to financial sector entities, and tighter regulation to provide transparency, a reduction of systemic risk and the elimination of any improper practices are necessary for the stability of the financial system.
Vendar pa je boljše poznavanje delovanja bančništva v senci ter njegovih povezav s subjekti finančnega sektorja in ožja ureditev za zagotovitev preglednosti, zmanjšanje sistemskega tveganja in odprava vseh neprimernih praks obvezen del stabilnosti finančnega sistema.
Additional reporting from institutions can establish some of this but specific new regulation is also necessary.
To je deloma mogoče doseči z dodatnim poročanjem institucij, potrebna pa je tudi posebna nova ureditev.
Increased transparency regarding the activities of institutions, and in particular regarding profits made, taxes paid and subsidies received, is essential for regaining the trust of citizens of the Union in the financial sector.
Večja preglednost v zvezi z dejavnostmi institucij in zlasti v zvezi z ustvarjenimi dobički, plačanimi davki in prejetimi subvencijami je nujna, da državljani Unije znova pridobijo zaupanje v finančni sektor.
Mandatory reporting in that area can therefore be seen as an important element of the corporate responsibility of institutions towards stakeholders and society.
Obvezno poročanje v zvezi s tem lahko zato štejemo kot pomemben element družbene odgovornosti institucij do zainteresiranih strani in družbe.
Weaknesses in corporate governance in a number of institutions have contributed to excessive and imprudent risk-taking in the banking sector which has led to the failure of individual institutions and systemic problems in Member States and globally.
Pomanjkljivosti pri korporativnem upravljanju več institucij so prispevale k pretiranemu in nepremišljenemu prevzemanju tveganj v bančnem sektorju, kar je povzročilo propad posameznih institucij ter sistemske težave v državah članicah in po vsem svetu.
The very general provisions on governance of institutions and the non-binding nature of a substantial part of the corporate governance framework, based essentially on voluntary codes of conduct, did not sufficiently facilitate the effective implementation of sound corporate governance practices by institutions.
Zelo splošne določbe o upravljanju institucij in nezavezujoča narava večjega dela okvira korporativnega upravljanja, ki temelji predvsem na prostovoljnih kodeksih ravnanja, niso zadovoljivo prispevali k učinkovitemu izvajanju preudarnega upravljanja institucij.
In some cases, the absence of effective checks and balances within institutions resulted in a lack of effective oversight of management decision-making, which exacerbated short-term and excessively risky management strategies.
Pomanjkanje učinkovitega medsebojnega nadzora v institucijah je v nekaterih primerih povzročilo neučinkovit nadzor nad sprejemanjem vodstvenih odločitev, kar je spodbudilo kratkoročne in pretirano tvegane strategije upravljanja.
The unclear role of the competent authorities in overseeing corporate governance systems in institutions did not allow for sufficient supervision of the effectiveness of the internal governance processes.
Zaradi nejasne vloge pristojnih organov pri nadziranju sistemov korporativnega upravljanja v institucijah učinkovitosti postopkov notranjega upravljanja ni bilo mogoče zadostno nadzorovati.
In order to address the potentially detrimental effect of poorly designed corporate governance arrangements on the sound management of risk, Member States should introduce principles and standards to ensure effective oversight by the management body, promote a sound risk culture at all levels of credit institutions and investment firms and enable competent authorities to monitor the adequacy of internal governance arrangements.
Da bi obvladali morebitne negativne posledice slabo zasnovanih ureditev korporativnega upravljanja za preudarno upravljanje tveganj, bi morale države članice uvesti načela in standarde za zagotavljanje učinkovitega nadzora s strani upravljalnega organa, spodbujati kulturo preudarnega prevzemanja tveganj na vseh ravneh kreditnih institucij in investicijskih firm ter omogočiti, da lahko pristojni organi spremljajo ustreznost ureditev notranjega upravljanja.
Those principles and standards should apply taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of institutions' activities.
Ta načela in standardi bi se morali uporabljati ob upoštevanju vrste, obsega in zapletenosti dejavnosti institucij.
Member States should be able to impose corporate governance principles and standards additional to those required by this Directive.
Države članice bi morale imeti možnost, da na področju korporativnega upravljanja poleg načel in standardov, ki se zahtevajo s to direktivo, uvedejo tudi druga načela in standarde.
The definitions used in this Directive are intended to embrace all existing structures without advocating any particular structure.
Opredelitve v tej direktivi skušajo zajeti vse obstoječe sisteme, pri čemer ne zagovarjajo nobenega določenega sistema.
They are purely functional for the purpose of setting out rules aimed at a particular outcome irrespective of the national company law applicable to an institution in each Member State.
So zgolj funkcionalne narave, saj je njihov namen določiti pravila, ki bi privedla do določenega rezultata ne glede na nacionalno pravo gospodarskih družb, ki se v posameznih državah članicah uporablja za institucije.
The definitions should therefore not interfere with the general allocation of competences in accordance with national company law.
Opredelitve torej ne bi smele posegati v splošno porazdelitev pristojnosti na podlagi nacionalnega prava gospodarskih družb.
A management body should be understood to have executive and supervisory functions.
"Upravljalni organ" bi moral imeti izvršno in nadzorno funkcijo.
The competence and structure of management bodies differ across Member States.
Pooblastila in sestava upravljalnih organov se po posameznih državah članicah razlikujejo.
In Member States where management bodies have a one-tier structure, a single board usually performs management and supervisory tasks.
V državah članicah, kjer imajo upravljalni organi enotirno strukturo, upravni odbor običajno opravlja vodstvene in nadzorne naloge.
In Member States with a two-tier system, the supervisory function is performed by a separate supervisory board which has no executive functions and the executive function is performed by a separate management board which is responsible and accountable for the day-to-day management of the undertaking.
V državah članicah z dvotirnim sistemom nadzorno funkcijo opravlja ločen nadzorni svet, ki nima izvršne funkcije, pri čemer slednjo funkcijo opravlja uprava, ki je pristojna in odgovorna za vsakodnevno vodenje družbe.
Accordingly, separate tasks are assigned to the different entities within the management body.
Posamezne naloge so v skladu s tem dodeljene različnim subjektom znotraj upravljalnega organa.
The role of non-executive members of the management body within an institution should include constructively challenging the strategy of the institution and thereby contributing to its development, scrutinising the performance of management in achieving agreed objectives, satisfying themselves that financial information is accurate and that financial controls and systems of risk management are robust and defensible, scrutinising the design and implementation of the institution's remuneration policy and providing objective views on resources, appointments and standards of conduct.
Vloga neizvršnih članov upravljanega organa institucije bi morala vključevati konstruktivno kritiko strategije institucije in s tem prispevati k njenemu oblikovanju, skrben pregled uspešnosti upravljanja pri doseganju dogovorjenih ciljev, zagotavljanje, da so finančne informacije pravilne ter da so finančni nadzor in sistemi za upravljanje tveganj stabilni in zadostni, skrben pregled strukture in izvajanja politike prejemkov institucije ter zagotavljanje nepristranskih mnenj v zvezi z viri, imenovanji in standardi ravnanja.
In order to monitor management actions and decisions effectively, the management body of an institution should commit sufficient time to allow it to perform its functions and to be able to understand the business of the institution, its main risk exposures and the implications of the business and the risk strategy.
Da bi lahko učinkovito spremljal ukrepe in odločitve v zvezi z upravljanjem, bi moral upravljalni organ institucije posvetiti dovolj časa izvajanju svojih funkcij in biti sposoben razumeti poslovanje institucije, njene glavne izpostavljenosti tveganju ter posledice poslovanja in strategije upravljanja tveganj.
Combining too high a number of directorships would preclude a member of the management body from spending adequate time on the performance of that oversight role.
Preveliko število direktorskih funkcij bi članu upravljalnega organa preprečilo, da dovolj časa posveti izvajanju te nadzorniške vloge.
Therefore, it is necessary to limit the number of directorships a member of the management body of an institution may hold at the same time in different entities.
Zato je treba omejiti število direktorskih funkcij, ki jih ima lahko hkrati član upravljalnega organa institucije v različnih subjektih.
However, directorships in organisations which do not pursue predominantly commercial objectives, such as non-profit-making or charitable organisations, should not be taken into account for the purposes of applying such a limit.
Vendar pa pri uporabi take omejitve ne bi smeli upoštevati direktorske funkcije v organizacijah, katerih glavni cilji niso prvenstveno komercialne narave, kot so neprofitne ali dobrodelne organizacije.
When appointing members of the management body, the shareholders or members of an institution should consider whether the candidates have the knowledge, qualifications and skills necessary to safeguard proper and prudent management of the institution.
Pri imenovanju članov upravljalnega organa bi morali delničarji ali člani institucije preučiti, ali kandidati imajo znanje, kvalifikacije in veščine, ki so potrebne za zagotavljanje ustreznega in skrbnega upravljanja institucije.
Those principles should be exercised and manifested through transparent and open appointment procedures, with regard to members of the management body.
Ta načela bi se morala uresničevati in izražati prek preglednih in odprtih postopkov imenovanja članov upravljalnega organa.
The lack of monitoring by management bodies of management decisions is partly due to the phenomenon of 'groupthink'.
Vzrok za to, da upravljalni organi pomanjkljivo spremljajo odločitve v zvezi z upravljanjem, je delno povezan s pojavom kolektivnega razmišljanja.
This phenomenon is, inter alia, caused by a lack of diversity in the composition of management bodies.
Ta pojav je med drugim posledica neraznolikosti sestave upravljalnih organov.
To facilitate independent opinions and critical challenge, management bodies of institutions should therefore be sufficiently diverse as regards age, gender, geographical provenance and educational and professional background to present a variety of views and experiences.
Za spodbujanje neodvisnih mnenj in kritičnega razmišljanja bi morali biti upravljalni organi institucij zato dovolj različni, kar zadeva starost, spol, geografski izvor in izobrazbo ter poklicne izkušnje, da bi zastopali različna mnenja in izkušnje.
Gender balance is of particular importance to ensure adequate representation of population.
Za zagotovitev ustrezne zastopanosti prebivalstva je zlasti pomembno ravnovesje med spoloma.
In particular, institutions not meeting a threshold for representation of the underrepresented gender should take appropriate action as a matter of priority.
Zlasti bi morale institucije, ki ne dosegajo praga glede zastopanosti spola, ki je premalo zastopan, prednostno sprejeti ustrezne ukrepe.
Employee representation in management bodies could also, by adding a key perspective and genuine knowledge of the internal workings of institutions, be seen as a positive way of enhancing diversity.
Zastopanost zaposlenih v upravljalnih organih lahko štejemo tudi za pozitiven način krepitve raznolikosti, saj prinaša ključno perspektivo in dejansko poznavanje notranjega delovanja institucij.
More diverse management bodies should more effectively monitor management and therefore contribute to improved risk oversight and resilience of institutions.
Bolj raznoliki upravljalni organi bi morali učinkoviteje spremljati upravljanje in zato prispevati k izboljšanemu nadzoru nad tveganjem in izboljšani vzdržljivosti institucij.
Therefore, diversity should be one of the criteria for the composition of management bodies.
Zato bi morala biti raznolikost eno od meril pri sestavi upravljalnih organov.