natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The application of this principle to individual Member States should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and warrants early assessment through notification to the Commission, BEREC and other NRAs ahead of 31 December 2016.
Uporabo tega načela za posamezne države članice bi bilo treba oceniti za vsak primer posebej in zagotoviti zgodnjo oceno na podlagi obvestila Komisiji, BEREC in drugim NRO pred 31. decembrom 2016.
For NRAs with limited resources, an additional transitional period beyond 2016 may exceptionally be needed to prepare the recommended cost model.
NRO z omejenimi sredstvi morda izjemoma potrebujejo dodatno prehodno obdobje po letu 2016 za pripravo priporočenega modela izračunavanja stroškov.
In such circumstances, an NRA should consider setting interim prices based on a benchmark that only considers an average of the access rates set by NRAs in compliance with the terms of this Recommendation.
V takšnih okoliščinah bi moral NRO razmisliti o določitvi začasnih cen na podlagi primerjave, ki upošteva le povprečje cen dostopa, ki jih je NRO določil v skladu s pogoji iz tega priporočila.
In the interim period, NRAs concerned may request BEREC’s practical support and guidance to overcome this limitation of resources and, in particular, the cost of implementing the recommended costing methodology.
V vmesnem obdobju lahko zadevni NRO zaprosi BEREC za praktično podporo in navodila za premagovanje teh omejenih sredstev, zlasti stroškov izvajanja priporočene metodologije za izračun stroškov.
NON-IMPOSITION OF REGULATED WHOLESALE ACCESS PRICES ON NGA NETWORKS
NEUVEDBA REGULIRANIH VELEPRODAJNIH CEN DOSTOPA DO OMREŽIJ
Due to current demand uncertainty regarding the provision of very high-speed broadband services it is important in order to promote efficient investment and innovation, in accordance with Article 8(5)(d) of Directive 2002/21/EC, to allow those operators investing in NGA networks a certain degree of pricing flexibility to test price points and conduct appropriate penetration pricing.
Zaradi sedanje negotovosti povpraševanja glede opravljanja širokopasovnih storitev zelo visoke hitrosti je za spodbujanje učinkovitih naložb in inovacij pomembno, da se v skladu s členom 8(5)(d) Direktive 2002/21/ES operaterjem, ki vlagajo v omrežja NGA, omogoči določena stopnja prožnosti pri oblikovanju cen, da preskusijo cenovne točke in izvajanje ustreznega oblikovanja cen za prodor na trg.
This would allow SMP operators and access seekers to share some of the investment risk by differentiating wholesale access prices according to the access seekers’ level of commitment.
To bi operaterjem s pomembno tržno močjo in tistim, ki želijo imeti dostop, omogočilo delno delitev tveganja, povezanega z naložbami, na podlagi oblikovanja različnih cen v skladu s stopnjo zavzetosti tistih, ki želijo imeti dostop.
This could result in lower prices for long-term agreements with volume guarantees, which could reflect access seekers taking on some of the risks associated with uncertain demand.
Posledica tega bi lahko bile nižje cene za dolgoročne sporazume z jamstvi za količine, kar bi lahko pomenilo, da tisti, ki želijo imeti dostop, prevzamejo nekatera tveganja, povezana z negotovim povpraševanjem.
In addition, pricing flexibility at wholesale level is necessary to allow both the access seeker and the SMP operator’s retail business to introduce price differentiation on the retail broadband market in order to better address consumer preferences and foster penetration of very high-speed broadband services.
Poleg tega je nujna prožnost pri oblikovanju cen na veleprodajni ravni, da se tistim, ki želijo imeti dostop, in operaterjem s pomembno tržno močjo omogoči oblikovanje različnih cen na maloprodajnem trgu širokopasovnih storitev, da se bolje obravnavajo prednostne izbire odjemalcev in hitrejši prodor širokopasovnih storitev zelo visoke hitrosti.
In line with points 48-57, to prevent such pricing flexibility leading to excessive prices in markets where SMP has been found, it should be accompanied by additional safeguards to protect competition.
Da se v skladu s točkami 48 do 57 prepreči, da bi takšna prožnost pri oblikovanju cen povzročila pretirane cene na trgih, na katerih je bil ugotovljen operater s pomembno tržno močjo, bi jo morali spremljati dodatni zaščitni ukrepi za varstvo konkurence.
To this end, the stricter non-discrimination obligation, i.e. EoI and technical replicability, should be complemented by guaranteed economic replicability of downstream products in conjunction with price regulation of copper wholesale access products.
Za ta namen bi bilo treba strožjo obveznost nediskriminacije, tj. EoI in tehnično ponovljivost, dopolniti z zajamčeno gospodarsko ponovljivostjo podrejenih proizvodov v povezavi z regulacijo cen veleprodajnih proizvodov dostopa do bakrenih omrežij.
In order to ensure transparency and to facilitate the monitoring of the evolution of the investment environment for NGA broadband as well as of competitive conditions NRAs should ask operators to provide the NRA with up-to-date information, including investment and NGA roll-out plans on a regular basis.
Da bi NRO zagotovili preglednost ter olajšali spremljanje razvoja okolja za naložbe v širokopasovna omrežja NGA in konkurenčne pogoje, bi morali operaterje zaprositi, da jim redno zagotavljajo posodobljene informacije, vključno z naložbenimi načrti in načrti za uvajanje omrežij NGA.
The results of any such monitoring exercise will also serve as an input for the monitoring process by the dedicated BEREC and Commission network of experts as referred to in recital 69.
Rezultati vsakega takšnega spremljanja bodo prispevali tudi k postopku spremljanja, ki ga opravita namenska mreža strokovnjakov BEREC in mreža strokovnjakov Komisije iz uvodne izjave 69.
In view of the benefits of pricing flexibility in these circumstances, under the recommended approach, wholesale access prices for passive NGA wholesale inputs or non-physical or virtual NGA wholesale inputs offering equivalent functionalities are deemed to be sufficiently constrained (i.e. price-related competition problems are considered to be effectively addressed) when: (i) there is a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from the infrastructure competition or a price anchor stemming from cost oriented wholesale copper access prices; and (ii) the ex-ante economic replicability test is in place in those cases where wholesale price regulation should not be imposed; and (iii) there is an obligation of providing wholesale access services on the basis of EoI.
Z vidika koristi prožnosti pri oblikovanju cen v teh razmerah se šteje, da so v okviru priporočenega pristopa veleprodajne cene dostopa za pasivne veleprodajne vložke v omrežja NGA ali nefizične oziroma virtualne veleprodajne vložke v omrežja NGA, ki nudijo enakovredne funkcije, dovolj omejene (tj. šteje se, da so problemi s konkurenco, ki so povezani s cenami, uspešno obravnavani), kadar: (i) obstaja dokazljiva omejitev maloprodajne cene, ki izhaja iz konkurence infrastrukture, ali cenovno sidro, ki izhaja iz stroškovno naravnanih cen dostopa do bakrenega omrežja, in (ii) je v primerih, kadar se regulacija veleprodajnih cen ne bi smela uvesti, na voljo predhodni preskus gospodarske ponovljivosti ter (iii) obstaja obveznost zagotavljanja veleprodajnih storitev dostopa na podlagi EoI.
In other words, where EoI is applied and NRAs consider that the above competitive safeguards are in place, they should not impose a regulated access price for those NGA wholesale inputs.
Z drugimi besedami, kadar se uporablja EoI in NRO meni, da so zagotovljeni zaščitni ukrepi, omenjeni zgoraj, ne bi smel nalagati regulirane cene dostopa za navedene veleprodajne vložke v omrežje NGA.
For active NGA wholesale inputs, sufficient competitive safeguards exist if access seekers can rely on upstream products in the market for network infrastructure access (for example unbundled access or virtually unbundled access), which are provided on an EoI basis, provided that the actual take-up of such upstream products or the presence of alternative infrastructures create a demonstrable retail price constraint, so that no additional safeguards are necessary at the wholesale level.
Konkurenčni zaščitni ukrepi za veleprodajne vložke aktivnega omrežja NGA so zadostni, če se lahko tisti, ki želijo imeti dostop, zanesejo na nadrejene proizvode na trgu za dostop do omrežne infrastrukture (na primer razvezani dostop ali virtualno razvezani dostop), ki se zagotavljajo na osnovi EoI, če dejanska uveljavitev takšnih nadrejenih proizvodov ali prisotnost alternativne infrastrukture ustvarja dokazljivo oviro za maloprodajno ceno tako, da na veleprodajni ravni dodatni zaščitni ukrepi niso potrebni.
Such demonstrable retail price constraint would not be sufficiently strong to conclude that the relevant wholesale market is effectively competitive and therefore that no operator has SMP.
Takšna dokazljiva ovira za maloprodajno ceno ne bi zadostovala za zaključek, da na ustreznem veleprodajnem trgu vlada učinkovita konkurenca in zato noben operater nima pomembne tržne moči.
This retail price constraint, however, should prevent the operator that has SMP at the wholesale level from setting excessive retail prices.
Vendar pa bi morala ta ovira za maloprodajno ceno preprečiti operaterju s pomembno tržno močjo na veleprodajni ravni, da bi določil pretirane maloprodajne cene.
The non-imposition or lifting of regulated wholesale access prices on NGA networks under points 48 and 49 is without prejudice to measures taken to address insufficient margins identified under the ex-ante economic replicability test as set out in this Recommendation for the purpose of safeguarding competition in cases where wholesale price regulation should not be imposed on the SMP operator.
Neuvedba ali odprava reguliranih veleprodajnih cen dostopa na omrežjih NGA v skladu s točkama 48 in 49 ne posega v ukrepe, sprejete za obravnavo nezadostnih marž, ugotovljenih v okviru predhodnega preskusa gospodarske ponovljivosti, kot je določen v tem priporočilu za zaščito konkurence v primerih, kadar se operaterju s pomembno tržno močjo ne bi smelo naložiti reguliranje veleprodajne cene.
If the product offered by the SMP operator on the legacy access network is no longer able to exercise a demonstrable retail price constraint on the NGA product (for example in the event of a copper switch-off), it could in principle be replaced by an NGA-based product that is tailored to have the same product features.
Če proizvod, ki ga ponuja operater s pomembno tržno močjo na obstoječem dostopovnem omrežju, ne more več zagotavljati dokazljive ovire za maloprodajno ceno za proizvod omrežja NGA (na primer pri izklopu bakrenega omrežja), bi ga načeloma lahko zamenjali s proizvodom na osnovi omrežja NGA, ki je prilagojen tako, da ima enake značilnosti proizvoda.
However, it is not envisaged that such an NGA-based anchor will be required in the immediate future or before 2020.
Vendar zahteva po takšnem sidru na osnovi omrežja NGA v bližnji prihodnosti ali pred letom 2020 ni predvidena.
The process for implementing EoI should be established by the NRA after having consulted the SMP operator and interested parties.
NRO bi moral vzpostaviti proces izvajanja EoI po posvetovanju z operaterjem s pomembno tržno močjo in z zainteresiranimi stranmi.
A detailed roadmap setting the key milestones necessary for the complete implementation of EoI for the relevant access products should be part of the adopted measure.
V okviru sprejetega ukrepa bi moral biti pripravljen podroben načrt z določenimi mejniki, ki so potrebni za celovito izvajanje EoI za ustrezne proizvode dostopa.
The benefit of a firm commitment to timely implementation of non-discrimination measures should provide sufficient safeguards for allowing pricing flexibility before full implementation of the roadmap, and can have an immediate positive effect on investment incentives.
Koristi odločne zavzetosti za pravočasno izvajanje nediskriminatornih ukrepov bi morale zagotoviti zadostne zaščitne ukrepe za omogočanje prožnosti pri določanju cen pred celovitim izvajanjem načrta in bi lahko takoj pozitivno vplivale na naložbene spodbude.
On the other hand, some discretion for NRAs on the timing of implementing pricing flexibility is necessary, in order to safeguard competition, in particular to avoid the risk of disrupting existing access agreements.
Po drugi strani pa NRO potrebujejo nekaj svobode pri časovnem načrtu izvajanja prožnosti pri določanju cen, da bi varovali konkurenco in zlasti preprečili tveganje glede prekinitve obstoječih sporazumov o dostopu.
A failure by the regulated SMP operator to abide by its commitments in the roadmap should result in consequences that have a deterrent effect.
Če regulirani operater s pomembno tržno močjo ne spoštuje svojih obveznosti v okviru časovnega načrta, bi morale slediti posledice z odvračilnim učinkom.
In particular, non-compliance with one or several milestones of the roadmap should lead to a reversal of the assumption that EoI has been imposed, as expressed in point 51 of this Recommendation.
Zlasti neskladnost z enim ali več mejniki načrta bi morala povzročiti spremembo predpostavke, da je bil uveden EoI, kot je navedeno v točki 51 tega priporočila.
As a result, the non-discrimination conditions for not imposing or maintaining regulated wholesale access prices on NGA networks are no longer met and should lead to the reimposition of regulated wholesale access prices or to the NRA’s making use of its powers to impose penalties in accordance with the Regulatory Framework.
Posledica tega je, da nediskriminatorni pogoji, ki nastanejo, če se regulirane veleprodajne cene dostopa do omrežij ne uvedejo ali ohranjajo, na omrežju NGA niso več izpolnjeni, kar bi moralo privesti do ponovne uvedbe reguliranih veleprodajnih cen dostopa do omrežja ali pa bi moral NRO uporabiti svoja pooblastila za uvedbo kazni v skladu z regulativnim okvirom.
For regulated wholesale access prices to be imposed following failure to comply with the non-discrimination obligation as established in point 54 without the need for NRAs to conduct a new market analysis, such possible consequence should be part of the initially notified measure and the market data on which the NRA based its initial market analysis should not have significantly changed.
Da bi se v primeru neizpolnjevanja obveznosti nediskriminacije iz točke 54 lahko uvedle regulirane veleprodajne cene za dostop do omrežja, ne da bi morali NRO izdelati novo tržno analizo, bi morala biti takšna možna posledica vključena v začetni predloženi ukrep, podatki, na podlagi katerih je NRO izdelal začetno tržno analizo, pa se ne bi smeli bistveno spremeniti.
The absence of the requirement to conduct a new market analysis is without prejudice to the need to notify any amendments of remedies according to the Article 7 procedure.
Če ni zahteve za izdelavo nove tržne analize, to ne posega v potrebo po priglasitvi kakršnih koli sprememb ukrepov v skladu s postopkom iz člena 7.
In order to establish whether alternative access seekers can economically replicate a downstream offer provided by the SMP operator with the regulated wholesale input available, in cases where wholesale price regulation should not be imposed, an NRA should undertake an economic replicability test.
Da se ugotovi, ali lahko alternativni subjekti, ki želijo imeti dostop, gospodarsko ponovijo podrejeno ponudbo operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo z razpoložljivim reguliranim veleprodajnim vložkom v primerih, kadar se reguliranje veleprodajne cene ne bi smelo uvesti, bi moral NRO opraviti preskus gospodarske ponovljivosti.
Given the uncertainties surrounding current demand for NGA-based retail services, SMP operators whose NGA-wholesale inputs are not subject to regulated access prices can use penetration pricing strategies in order to foster retail demand for such NGA-based retail services.
Ob upoštevanju negotovosti, povezane s sedanjim povpraševanjem po maloprodajnih storitvah, ki temeljijo na omrežju NGA, lahko operaterji s pomembno tržno močjo, katerih veleprodajni vložki v omrežje NGA niso urejeni z reguliranimi cenami dostopa do omrežja, uporabljajo strategije določanja cen za prodor na trg, da bi spodbudili maloprodajno povpraševanje po takšnih maloprodajnih storitvah, ki temeljijo na omrežju NGA.
The purpose of the economic replicability test is to ensure, in combination with the other competitive safeguards introduced such as EoI, the technical replicability test, and a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from a copper anchor or alternative infrastructures, that SMP operators do not abuse this pricing flexibility in order to exclude (potential) competitors from the market.
Namen preskusa gospodarske ponovljivosti je skupaj z drugimi uvedenimi konkurenčnimi zaščitnimi ukrepi, kot so EoI, preskus tehnične ponovljivosti in dokazljiva ovira za maloprodajno ceno, ki izhaja iz bakrenega sidra ali alternativne infrastrukture, zagotoviti, da operaterji s pomembno tržno močjo ne zlorabljajo prožnosti pri določanju cen, da bi iz trga izključili (možne) konkurente.
The guidance provided in Annex II is limited to the application of point 56.
Smernice iz Priloge II so omejene na uporabo točke 56.
Such a test will be without prejudice to ex-post margin squeeze tests applied pursuant to competition law by the Commission and/or national competent authorities.
Takšen preskus ne bo posegal v naknadne preskuse cenovnih škarij, ki jih Komisija in/ali pristojni nacionalni organi uporabljajo v skladu s konkurenčnim pravom.
In addition, NRAs may also apply an ex-ante margin squeeze test to regulated wholesale inputs in order to ensure that wholesale access pricing of copper-based access products does not hinder competition at retail level or to ensure an adequate economic space between the different copper access inputs.
Poleg tega lahko NRO uporabijo tudi predhodni preskus cenovnih škarij za regulirane veleprodajne vložke, s čimer zagotovijo, da določanje veleprodajnih cen za proizvode dostopa, ki temeljijo na bakrenem omrežju, ne ovira konkurence na maloprodajni ravni, ali zagotovijo ustrezen gospodarski prostor med različnimi vložki v dostop do bakrenega omrežja.
However, penetration pricing strategies should not be considered for legacy copper-based inputs given the maturity of the market and the cost orientation generally applicable to copper-based wholesale inputs.
Vendar se strategij oblikovanja cen za prodor na trg ne bi smelo upoštevati za starejše vložke, ki temeljijo na bakrenem omrežju, ob upoštevanju zrelosti trga in stroškovne naravnanosti, ki na splošno velja za veleprodajne vložke, ki temeljijo na bakrenem omrežju.
NRAs should ensure that the margin between the retail price of the SMP operator and the price of the NGA wholesale input covers the incremental downstream costs and a reasonable percentage of common costs.
NRO bi morali zagotoviti, da marža med maloprodajno ceno operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo in ceno veleprodajnega vložka v omrežje NGA pokrije povečane prodajne stroške in primeren odstotek skupnih stroškov.
Where wholesale price regulation for NGA wholesale inputs should not be imposed on the SMP operator when additional safeguards are implemented in accordance with this Recommendation, a lack of economic replicability can be demonstrated by showing that the SMP operator’s own downstream retail arm could not trade profitably on the basis of the upstream price charged to its competitors by the upstream operating arm of the SMP operator (‘equally efficient operator’ (EEO) test).
Kadar se operaterju s pomembno tržno močjo ne bi smela naložiti regulacija veleprodajnih cen za veleprodajne proizvode omrežja NGA, pri čemer se izvajajo dodatni zaščitni ukrepi v skladu s tem priporočilom, se odsotnost gospodarske ponovljivosti lahko dokaže s prikazom, da lastna podrejena maloprodajna enota operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo ne bi bila dobičkonosna na podlagi cene, ki jo njegova nadrejena enota zaračunava njegovim konkurentom („preskus enako učinkovitega konkurenta“ (EEO)).
The use of the EEO standard enables NRAs to support the SMP operators’ investments in NGA networks and provides incentives for innovation in NGA-based services.
Uporaba standarda EEO omogoča NRO, da podprejo naložbe operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo v omrežja NGA in zagotovijo spodbude za inovacije na področju storitev, ki temeljijo na omrežju NGA.
Where specific market circumstances apply, such as where market entry or expansion has been frustrated in the past, NRAs may make adjustments for scale to the SMP operator’s costs, in order to ensure that economic replicability is a realistic prospect.
Kjer veljajo posebne tržne razmere, na primer, v primeru neučinkovitega vstopa na trg ali širitve na trgu v preteklosti, lahko NRO zagotovi prilagoditve obsega stroškov operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo, da zagotovi realne možnosti za gospodarsko ponovljivost.
In such cases, the reasonably efficient scale identified by the NRA should not go beyond that of a market structure with a sufficient number of qualifying operators to ensure effective competition.
V takšnih primerih razumno učinkovit obseg, ki ga opredeli NRO, ne bi smel presegati obsega za tržno strukturo z zadostnim številom operaterjev, ki izpolnjujejo pogoje, da se zagotovi učinkovita konkurenca.
The NRA should set out and make public in advance in its adopted measure following a market analysis the procedure and parameters it will apply when running the ex-ante economic replicability test.
NRO bi moral v svojem ukrepu, sprejetem na podlagi analize trga, določiti in vnaprej objaviti postopek in parametre, ki jih bo uporabil pri opravljanju predhodnega preskusa gospodarske ponovljivosti.
The NRA may run the test before the launch of a new retail offer by the SMP operator, e.g. if the NRA considers it appropriate to align the timing of the economic replicability test with the technical replicability test if also undertaken before launch.
NRO lahko opravi preskus pred uvedbo nove maloprodajne ponudbe operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo, npr. če NRO meni, da je primerno uskladiti časovni načrt preskusa gospodarske ponovljivosti s preskusom tehnične ponovljivosti, če se tudi ta opravlja pred uvedbo.
The NRA need not to run the test for each and every new retail offer but only in relation to flagship products to be identified by the NRA.
NRO ni treba opraviti preskusa za vsako novo maloprodajno ponudbo, temveč le v povezavi z vodilnimi proizvodi, ki jih opredeli NRO.
An NRA may run the test at its own initiative, for example in the initial stages of the implementation of a measure that allows pricing flexibility on NGA networks, particularly where regulated wholesale access prices were imposed in the past, or to respond to changes in the structure of the market, for example as a result of technological developments.
NRO lahko opravi preskus na lastno pobudo, na primer v začetnih fazah izvajanja ukrepa, ki omogoča prožnost pri določanju cen na omrežjih NGA, zlasti kadar so bile v preteklosti naložene regulirane veleprodajne cene dostopa, ali da se odzove na spremembe v strukturi trga, na primer zaradi tehnološkega razvoja.
The economic replicability test set out by the NRA in advance should be adequately detailed and should include as a minimum a set of relevant parameters in order to ensure predictability and the necessary transparency for operators.
Preskus gospodarske ponovljivosti, ki ga vnaprej določi NRO, bi moral biti ustrezno podrobno opisan in bi moral vključevati vsaj niz ustreznih parametrov, da se zagotovita predvidljivost in potrebna preglednost za operaterje.