natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, in the contract submitted by one of the sampled exporting producers for the provision of HRS by a privately owned supplier there is even a condition to link the price to the SOE supplier price.
Poleg tega je v pogodbi o dobavi VVJ s strani dobavitelja v zasebni lasti, ki jo je posredoval eden od vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov, zapisan celo pogoj, da je pogodbena cena vezana na ceno državne družbe dobaviteljice.
On the basis of the totality of the information on the file it is established that the prices of HRS and CRS sold by SOEs in China are distorted, as a result of the strong predominance of the SOEs in the HRS and CRS market in China.
Na podlagi vseh informacij v spisu je bilo ugotovljeno, da so cene VVJ in HVJ, ki ju na Kitajskem prodajajo družbe v državni lasti, zaradi močne prevlade družb v državni lastni na kitajskem trgu VVJ in HVJ izkrivljene.
The prices of HRS and CRS of private suppliers are aligned with the prices of SOEs.
Cene zasebnih dobaviteljev za VVJ in HVJ so prilagojene cenam družb v državni lasti.
Taking this into account it is concluded that there are no reliable market prices in China for the HRS and CRS.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega je bilo sklenjeno, da za VVJ in HVJ na Kitajskem ni zanesljivih tržnih cen.
Since there are no "prevailing market terms and conditions" on the HRS and CRS market in China, the Commission, in accordance with Article 6(d) of the basic Regulation, had to look for an alternative benchmark.
Ker na trgu VVJ in HVJ na Kitajskem ni „prevladujočih tržnih pogojev“, je Komisija v skladu s členom 6(d) osnovne uredbe morala poiskati drugo nadomestno referenčno vrednost.
Since the whole of the Chinese market is distorted, it is considered impractical to adjust costs and prices in China in any meaningful way and import prices would appear to be similarly distorted by the predominance of SOEs.
Ker je izkrivljen celotni kitajski trg, bi bilo nepraktično prilagoditi stroške in cene na Kitajskem na kakršen koli smiseln način, uvozne cene pa bi bile podobno izkrivljene zaradi prevladujočega položaja družb v državni lasti.
Therefore, in accordance with Article 6(d)(ii) of the basic Regulation, an external benchmark was sought.
Zato se je v skladu s členom 6(d)(ii) osnovne uredbe pridobila zunanja referenčna vrednost.
The most appropriate benchmark appears to be a constructed benchmark on the basis of the world market prices of HRS and CRS regularly published in various specialised steel journals like Steel Business Briefing, MEPS and CRU.
Zdi se, da je najprimernejša sestavljena referenčna vrednost na podlagi svetovnih tržnih cen VVJ in HVJ, ki se redno objavljajo v različnih specializiranih jeklarskih dnevnikih kot Steel Business Briefing, MEPS in CRU.
Comparing the SOE prices to the out of country benchmark (constructed as explained in recital p. below) showed that these prices were well below the benchmark prices and consequently resulted in benefit for the Chinese exporting producers of OCS within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation.
Primerjava cen družb v državni lasti z zunanjo referenčno vrednostjo (konstruirano, kot je razloženo v uvodni izjavi (103)) je pokazala, da so bile te cene veliko nižje od referenčnih vrednosti in so kitajskim proizvajalcem izvoznikom jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, zato prinesle ugodnosti v smislu člena 3(2) osnovne uredbe.
This subsidy programme is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(c) of the basic Regulation given that the HRS and CRS is only used by limited number of industries and enterprises in China in their production.
Ta subvencijski program je specifičen program v smislu člena 4(2)(c) osnovne uredbe saj VVJ in HVJ v svoji proizvodnji uporablja samo omejeno število industrij in družb na Kitajskem.
Entrustment and direction of private suppliers
Pooblastilo in usmerjanje zasebnih dobaviteljev
The next question to be addressed is whether the private producers of HRS and CRS, which are not public bodies, are nevertheless entrusted or directed by the GOC to provide HRS and CRS to the OCS producers, within the meaning of Article 3.1(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.
Naslednje vprašanje za proučitev je, ali je kitajska vlada zasebnim proizvajalcem VVJ in HVJ, ki niso javni organi, zaupala ali ukazala, v smislu člena 3(1)(a)(iv) osnovne uredbe, zagotavljanje VVJ in HVJ za proizvajalce jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi.
Government policy
Vladna politika
At the outset, it has already been established that the GOC has a policy to provide HRS and CRS to the OCS sector, because public bodies, which are part of the government, are engaged in such provision and hold a predominant place in the market, which enables them to offer below-market prices.
Že na začetku je bilo ugotovljeno, da ima kitajska vlada politiko zagotavljanja VVJ in HVJ za sektor jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, saj so v tako preskrbo vključeni javni organi, ki so del vlade in imajo na trgu prevladujočo vlogo, ki jim omogoča ponujati cene, nižje od tržnih.
And in any event, regardless of the characterisation of those bodies as "public" or not, the same evidence shows the existence of government policy strongly interfering in this sector.
Ne glede na to, ali se za take organe uporablja oznaka „javni“, isti dokazi kažejo, da obstaja politika vlade, ki v ta sektor močno posega.
It now has to be determined whether that policy extends to private suppliers.
Zdaj je treba ugotoviti, ali ta politika vključuje zasebne dobavitelje.
Extension of policy to private suppliers of HRS and CRS
Razširitev politike na zasebne dobavitelje VVJ in HVJ
Government plans providing guidance and encouragement
Vladni načrti, ki zagotavljajo usmerjanje in spodbujanje
In a number of government plans and policy documents there are indications that steel producers in China (both SOEs and privately owned) are encouraged and supported by the GOC.
Številni vladni načrti in dokumenti o njenih politikah kažejo, da kitajska vlada proizvajalce jekla (družbe v državni in zasebni lasti) na Kitajskem spodbuja in podpira.
Certain sections of these documents suggest that there is a direct link between the government and the conduct of the private steel companies and on a number of occasions it can be observed that this "guidance" resulted in action by steel companies as is recommended in the plans.
Nekateri oddelki teh dokumentov posredno kažejo na neposredno povezavo med vlado in ravnanjem zasebnih jeklarskih družb in pogosto je mogoče opaziti, da imajo ta „navodila“ za svojo posledico ravnanje jeklarskih družb, ki se priporoča s temi načrti.
For example, Order of the NDRC No.35- Policies for the development of Iron and Steel Industry encourages the steel companies to act in certain way [32], sets conditions on investments and makes investment subject to approval by the authorities [33], influence competition for resources [34] and even provide for sanctions for non-complying companies [35].
Odredba agencije NDRC št. 35 – Razvojne politike za industrijo železa in jekla, na primer, spodbuja jeklarske družbe k določenemu ukrepanju [32], postavlja pogoje za naložbe in določa, da so naložbe predmet odobritve organov [33], vpliva na konkurenčno tekmovanje za vire [34] ter za družbe, ki tega ne upoštevajo, celo določa sankcije [35].
Also the Twelfth 5 Year Development Plan for the Steel Industry influences the business decisions of the steel companies which consequently can have impact on cost structure and prices [36].
Dvanajsti petletni načrt razvoja industrije jekla tudi vpliva na poslovne odločitve jeklarskih družb, kar lahko posledično vpliva na stroškovno strukturo in cene [36].
In addition to this the complainant provided in the Annex 24 to the complaint a collection of extracts from various policy documents of different government organisations highlighting the GOC support to the steel industry in general or organic coated business specifically [37].
Poleg navedenega je pritožnik v Prilogi 24 k pritožbi predložil zbirko izvlečkov iz različnih dokumentov o politikah različnih vladnih organizacij, v katerih je izpostavljena podpora kitajske vlade industriji jekla na splošno ali posebej za dejavnost izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi [37].
Furthermore, there is publicly available information showing that the privately owned companies act in accordance with different government plans and policy documents [38].
Na voljo so tudi javno dostopne informacije, ki kažejo, da družbe v zasebni lasti delujejo v skladu z različnimi vladnimi načrti in dokumenti o politikah [38].
Export restrictions on hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel
Omejevanje izvoza vroče in hladno valjanega jekla
The GOC has taken steps to discourage the export of HRS and CRS by means of export restrictions imposed through the complex VAT refund system.
Kitajska vlada je sprejela ukrepe za odvračanje izvoza VVJ in HVJ prek njegove omejitve z zapletenim sistemom vračila DDV.
More specifically HRS and CRS is subject to the payment of VAT at 17 %.
Točneje, za VVJ in HVJ velja 17-odstotna stopnja DDV.
VAT for domestically sold OCS produced from CRS (which is produced from HRS) is refundable at 13 % whereas if the company chooses to export HRS or CRS the VAT is not at all refunded.
DDV za jeklene izdelke, prevlečene z organskimi premazi, iz HVJ (proizvedenega iz VVJ), je družbam povrnjen po 13-odstotni stopnji, če pa družba sklene izvoziti VVJ in HVJ, ji DDV ni povrnjen.
This system means that the privately owned producers of HRS and CRS are not able to act with normal commercial freedom and has the effect of increasing the domestic supply of HRS and CRS and inevitably depressing its price on the Chinese market.
Ta sistem pomeni, da proizvajalci VVJ in HVJ v zasebni lasti pri svojem poslovanju ne uživajo običajne podjetniške svobode, učinkuje pa tudi na povečanje domače ponudbe VVJ in HVJ, čemur nujno sledi znižanje cen teh izdelkov na kitajskem trgu.
Thus private-owned HRS and CRS producers (in the same way as SOEs) are unable to act independently from the GOC policy.
Zato proizvajalci VVJ in HVJ v zasebni lasti (enako kot družbe v državni lasti) ne morejo poslovati neodvisno od politike kitajske vlade.
Pricing of private suppliers
Oblikovanje cen zasebnih dobaviteljev
In the section above concerning benefit for public bodies, it was established that due to the predominance of the steel SOEs in the HRS and CRS market the private producers of HRS and CRS have no choice but to align their prices with the SOEs prices.
V oddelku o ugodnostih za javne organe zgoraj je bilo ugotovljeno, da zaradi prevladujoče vloge jeklarskih družb v državni lasti na trgu VVJ in HVJ zasebni proizvajalci VVJ in HVJ nimajo izbire in morajo svoje cene uskladiti s cenami družb v državni lasti.
In other words they do not set the prices but they rather take them.
Z drugimi besedami, svojih cen ne oblikujejo sami, temveč jih sprejmejo od zunaj.
This is another sign that the private producers of HRS and CRS cannot act independently from the actions of GOC and other public bodies.
To je dodaten znak, da zasebni proizvajalci VVJ in HVJ ne morejo delovati neodvisno od ukrepov kitajske vlade in drugih javnih organov.
This fact is also supported by the information provided by the Chinese exporting producers which submitted replies to the anti-subsidy questionnaires which shows that the prices of private suppliers of HRS and CRS are almost aligned with those of SOEs.
Navedeno dejstvo je podprto tudi z informacijami, ki so jih predložili kitajski proizvajalci izvozniki, ki so predložili izpolnjene protisubvencijske vprašalnike, ki kažejo, da so cene zasebnih dobaviteljev VVJ in HVJ skoraj usklajene s cenami družb v državni lasti.
In view of the above finding that SOE prices are at below-market levels, it is clear that the prices of privately owned suppliers, being aligned to those of SOEs, are also at below-market levels.
Glede na navedeno ugotovitev o cenah družb v državni lasti, ki so nižje od tržnih, je jasno tudi, da so cene dobaviteljev v zasebni lasti nižje od tržnih, saj se prilagajajo cenam družb v državni lasti.
Financial contribution
Finančni prispevki
According to Article 3.1(a)(iv) – second indent - of the basic Regulation, a financial contribution exists where a government:
V skladu z drugo alinejo člena 3(1)(a)(iv) osnovne uredbe se za finančni prispevek šteje, da obstaja, kadar vlada:
On this basis, the inclusion of private suppliers in the GOC policy to supply HRS and CRS constitutes government "entrustment" and "direction" of private suppliers for the following reasons:
Na tej podlagi se vključitev zasebnih dobaviteljev v politiko kitajske vlade za preskrbo z VVJ in HVJ šteje za „zaupanje“ in „ukaz“ vlade zasebnim dobaviteljem zaradi naslednjih razlogov:
A government "action":
„ukrep“ vlade:
The GOC "policy" (see recital (86) above), constitutes an "action" or "actions".
„Politika“ kitajske vlade (glej uvodno izjavo (86)) se šteje kot „ukrep“ ali „ukrepanje“.
The policy is carried out by public bodies (SOEs), which are predominant in the market and sell at below-market prices and by the GOC, through plans and the manipulation of export restrictions.
To politiko izvajajo javni organi (družbe v državni lasti), ki imajo na trgu prevladujočo vlogo in blago prodajajo po cenah, nižjih od tržnih, izvaja pa jo tudi kitajska vlada prek načrtov in z oblikovanjem odločitev o omejitvi izvoza.
The overall effect is that private suppliers are effectively compelled to follow the below-market prices of public bodies.
Skupni učinek je ta, da so zasebni dobavitelji dejansko prisiljeni slediti cenam javnih organov, nižjih od tržnih.
"Addressed to a particular party":
„naslovljen na določeno stran“:
The government policy (notably the plans and export restrictions) applies to all HRS and CRS producers, both state-owned and private.
Politika vlade (zlasti načrti in omejevanje izvoza) velja za vse proizvajalce VVJ in HVJ, v državni in tudi zasebni lasti.
In this sense the policy is "addressed" to all producers.
V tem oziru je ta politika „naslovljena“ na vse proizvajalce.
This is evidenced by the fact that SOE and private prices are aligned and that private suppliers sell at prices which are commercially unreasonable.
To je dokazano z dejstvom, da so cene družb v državni lasti in cene zasebnikov usklajene ter da zasebni dobavitelji blago prodajajo po cenah, ki so trgovinsko nerazumne;
"the objective of which is a particular task or duty":
„katerega cilj je določena naloga ali dolžnost“:
The objective of the government policy, as evidenced by the price levels in China, is the provision of HRS and CRS at below-market prices.
Cilj politike vlade, kot je dokazano z ravnmi cen na Kitajskem, je preskrba z VVJ in HVJ po cenah, nižjih od tržnih.
The actions of the GOC and SOEs leave private suppliers with no other choice but to follow the practices of public bodies and this effectively imposes a particular task or duty on them.
Zasebni dobavitelji zaradi ukrepov kitajske vlade in družb v državni lasti nimajo druge izbire, kot da uveljavljajo prakse javnih organov, s tem pa so jim dejansko naložene določene naloge ali dolžnosti.
The GOC policy, especially through the plans and VAT manipulation, severely restricts the freedom of private suppliers from this task or duty.
Politika kitajske vlade zlasti prek načrtov in svojega delovanja na področju DDV resno omejuje svobodo zasebnih dobaviteljev pred takimi nalogami ali dolžnostmi.
Taking all of the above factors into consideration it can be concluded that the GOC export restriction, government planning and the predominance of SOEs limits the freedom of private suppliers of HRS and CRS, obliging them to act in a non-commercial manner and to accept economically irrational (below-market) prices which they would not do in a free and open market.
Ob upoštevanju navedenih dejavnikov je mogoče sklepati, da omejitev izvoza s strani kitajske vlade, vladno načrtovanje in prevladujoča vloga družb v državni lasti omejujejo svobodo zasebnih dobaviteljev VVJ in HVJ, saj jih zavezujejo k negospodarnemu ravnanju in sprejetju ekonomsko nesmiselnih (nižjih od tržnih) cen, česar ne bi storili na prostem in odprtem trgu.
This confirms that the government policy to supply HRS and CRS (including to the organic coated steel sector) extends to private suppliers.
To dokazuje, da je politika vlade za preskrbo z VVJ in HVJ razširjena tudi na zasebne dobavitelje.
Furthermore, in view of the above analysis, the evidence on the file and other publicly available information led the Commission to the conclusion that private producers of HRS and CRS in China are entrusted and directed by the GOC to provide goods in line with Articles 3.1(a)(iii) and 3.1(a)(iv) of the Basic regulation and act in the same way as steel SOEs.
Glede na analizo, predstavljeno zgoraj, dokaze iz spisa in druge javno dostopne informacije je Komisija sklenila, da kitajska vlada zasebnim proizvajalcem VVJ in HVJ na Kitajskem zaupa in ukazuje zagotavljanje blaga v skladu s členom 3(1)(a)(iii) in (iv) osnovne uredbe ter da ti proizvajalci delujejo enako kot jeklarske družbe v državni lasti.
Benefit (private suppliers)
Ugodnosti (zasebni dobavitelji)
The Commission established that the private suppliers of HRS and CRS act under entrustment and direction of the GOC and the investigation showed that the prices of privately owned suppliers of HRS and CRS are aligned with SOEs prices (see the section above).
Komisija je ugotovila, da zasebni dobavitelji VVJ in HVJ delujejo za izpolnitev nalog, zaupanih s strani kitajske vlade, in njenih ukazov, preiskava pa je pokazala, da so cene zasebnih dobaviteljev VVJ in HVJ poravnane s cenami družb v državni lasti (glej oddelek zgoraj).
Taking this into account it is concluded that the findings concerning benefit and specificity from the provision of HRS and CRS for below market prices by the SOEs also apply to the provision of HRS and CRS by privately owned suppliers.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega je bilo sklenjeno, da se ugotovitve v zvezi z ugodnostmi in specifičnostjo za družbe v državni lasti, ki izvirajo iz zagotavljanja VVJ in HVJ po cenah, nižjih od tržnih, uporabljajo tudi za zagotavljanje VVJ in HVJ s strani dobaviteljev v zasebni lasti.
Two sampled exporting producers have benefited from this programme.
Ugodnosti po tem programu sta pridobila dva vzorčena proizvajalca izvoznika.
One exporting producer (Panhua Steel Group) has benefited from the provision of HRS for less than adequate remuneration and the other exporting producer (Huadong Steel Group) has benefited from the provision of CRS for less than adequate remuneration.
Eden od njiju (skupina Panhua Steel) je pridobila ugodnosti iz naslova zagotavljanja VVJ za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo, drugi (skupina Huadong Steel) pa je pridobil ugodnosti iz naslova zagotavljanja HVJ za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo.
The amount of countervailable subsidy is calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipient, which is found to exist during the IP.
Znesek subvencije, proti kateri se lahko izvedejo izravnalni ukrepi, se izračuna glede na ugodnosti za prejemnika, ki je bila ugotovljena med OP.
That benefit is calculated by taking the sum of the differences between the actual purchase values and appropriate benchmark values of the HRS and CRS purchases.
Ta ugodnost se izračuna tako, da se seštejejo razlike med dejanskimi vrednostmi nakupov in ustreznimi referenčnimi vrednosti za nakupe VVJ in HVJ.
The resulting amount was then allocated over the total sales turnover of the cooperating exporting producer during the IP, because the subsidy is not contingent upon export performance and was not granted by reference to the quantities manufactured, produced, exported or transported.
Dobljeni znesek je bil nato dodeljen za skupni prihodek sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov od prodaje v OP, ker subvencija ni odvisna od opravljenega izvoza in ni bila dodeljena glede na izdelane, proizvedene, izvožene ali prevožene količine.
Since the Chinese market for HRS and CRS is distorted, world market prices of HRS and CRS were considered appropriate bases for constructing benchmark prices for HRS and CRS.
Ker je kitajski trg VVJ in HVJ izkrivljen, so se za ustrezno osnovo za konstruiranje referenčnih cen VVJ in HVJ štele svetovne tržne cene VVJ in HVJ.
On the basis of various steel journals (SBB and MEPS) domestic prices, net of taxes, of five countries/regions were selected (i.e. Europe, USA, Turkey, Japan and Brazil).
Na podlagi različnih jeklarskih dnevnikov (SBB in MEPS) so bile izbrane domače cene brez davka petih držav/regij (tj. v Evropi, ZDA, Turčiji, Japonski in Braziliji).
In order to arrive at the representative benchmark the Commission selected the biggest market for each relevant geographical region, i.e. Europe (EU), North America (USA), Latin America (Brazil), Asia (Japan) and Middle East/North Africa (Turkey).
Da bi Komisija dobila reprezentativne referenčne vrednosti, je izbrala največji trg za vsako zadevno geografsko regijo, tj. Evropo (EU), Severno Ameriko (ZDA), Latinsko Ameriko (Brazilija), Azijo (Japonska) in Bližnji vzhod/Severno Afriko (Turčija).
The monthly average prices for the IP period of each of the five countries/regions were arithmetically averaged so as to arrive at the monthly benchmark prices.
Za povprečne mesečne cene med OP za vsako od petih držav/regij se je izračunala aritmetična sredina, da se določijo mesečne referenčne cene.
The five countries/regions selected did not have the highest prices during the IP, they are all members of WTO, are among the ten biggest steel producers worldwide and are located in different continents.
Teh pet izbranih držav/regij med OP ni imelo najvišjih cen, so pa vse članice STO, štejejo med deset največjih proizvajalk jekla na svetu in so na različnih celinah.
The benchmark prices thus established are therefore considered reasonable and appropriate.
Tako ugotovljene referenčne cene se zato štejejo za razumne in ustrezne.
The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the IP for the sampled exporting producers amounts to 23,02 % for the Huadong Group and 27,63 % for the Panhua Group.
Stopnja subvencije za to shemo med OP za vzorčene proizvajalce izvoznike znaša 23,02 % za skupino Huadong in 27,63 % za skupino Panhua.
The weighted average subsidy rate for the cooperating companies not included in the sample is 25,37 %.
Tehtana povprečna stopnja subvencije za sodelujoče družbe, ki niso zajete v vzorcu, je 25,37 %.
Given the low level of cooperation, the subsidy rate for all non-cooperating companies is set at the level of the highest subsidy rate established for this scheme for an entity related to one of the sampled cooperating companies, i.e. 32,44 %.
Glede na nizko raven sodelovanja je stopnja subvencije za vse nesodelujoče družbe določena na ravni največje stopnje subvencioniranja za to shemo za subjekt, povezan z eno od vzorčenih sodelujočih družb, tj. 32,44 %.
Provision of land use rights for less than the adequate remuneration
Zagotavljanje pravic do uporabe zemljišča za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo
The complainant alleged that there is no functioning market for land in China and the amount paid by the companies for the use of land is below the normal market rate.
Pritožnik je zatrjeval, da na Kitajskem ni delujočega trga za zemljišča, ter da je znesek, ki so ga družbe plačale za pravice do uporabe zemljišč, pod običajno tržno stopnjo.
In its reply to the anti-subsidy questionnaire the GOC stated that "In accordance with the Land Administration Law of the PRC, land in urban districts shall be owned by the State;
Kitajska vlada je v svojem odgovoru na protisubvencijski vprašalnik izjavila:
GOC also stated that industrial and commercial land should be obtained by compensation for the use in open market by bidding, auction and competition.
Kitajska vlada je izjavila, da je treba tudi industrijska in trgovinska zemljišča pridobiti prek nadomestila za uporabo na odprtem trgu, ki se pridobi na razpisih, dražbah in natečajih.