natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Having regard to the provisions of Annex VII, and Appendix A to Annex VII, to the Protocol on Transitional Measures to the Accession Treaty of Romania,
ob upoštevanju določb iz Priloge VII in Dodatka A k Prilogi VII k Protokolu o prehodnih ukrepih k Pristopni pogodbi Romunije,
Having called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to the provision(s) cited above [1], and having regard to their comments,
po pozivu vsem zainteresiranim stranem, naj predložijo svoje pripombe v skladu z navedenimi določbami [1], in ob upoštevanju teh pripomb,
By letter dating from 2 February 2007, the Commission requested Romania to provide information regarding public debt waivers and the rescheduling of public debt for Petrotub Roman S.A. (hereinafter ‘Petrotub’) in the context of its privatisation in 2003 (following privatisation, the company was re-named Mittal Steel Roman, and subsequently ArcelorMittal Tubular Products S.A. [2] - hereinafter ‘AM Roman’).
Z dopisom z dne 2. Februarja 2007 je Komisija zaprosila Romunijo, naj posreduje informacije o odstopu terjatev in reprogramiranju javnih dolgov za podjetje Petrotub Roman S.A. (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Petrotub) v okviru njegove privatizacije leta 2003 (po privatizaciji se je podjetje preimenovalo v Mittal Steel Roman in nato v ArcelorMittal Tubular Products S.A. [2] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: AM Roman)).
By letter dated 25 September 2007, the Commission informed Romania that it decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [3] in respect of possible aid involved in the privatisation of Petrotub.
Z dopisom z dne 25. septembra 2007 je Komisija sporočila Romuniji, da bo začela postopek v skladu s členom 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije [3] glede morebitne pomoči pri privatizaciji podjetja Petrotub.
The Decision was published in the Official Journal of the European Union [4].
Sklep je bil objavljen v Uradnem listu Evropske unije [4].
Romania submitted its comments by letter of 26 November 2007, registered on the same date.
Romunija je svoje pripombe poslala z dopisom z dne 26. novembra 2007, evidentiranim istega dne.
AM Roman is a seamless steel tubes producer located in Roman, a Romanian region receiving assistance under Article 107(3)(a) TFEU [5].
Podjetje AM Roman je proizvajalec brezšivnih jeklenih cevi s sedežem v Romunski regiji Roman, ki prejema pomoč v skladu s členom 107(3)(a) PDEU [5].
Before privatisation in 2003, the company, then named Petrotub, was a producer of seamless steel tubes, whose production consisted of hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel tubes with diameters between 6 and 620 mm and wall width between 0,5 and 70 mm. These products have various applications in energy industries (oil, gas, chemicals, nuclear and conventional energy) and in the machinery and construction industries.
Pred privatizacijo leta 2003 je podjetje, ki se je takrat imenovalo Petrotub, proizvajalo brezšivne jeklene cevi, njegova proizvodnja pa je zajemala vroče in hladno valjane jeklene cevi s premeri med 6 in 620 mm ter debelino sten med 0,5 in 70 mm. Ti proizvodi so namenjeni različnim uporabam v energetski industriji (nafta, plin, kemikalije ter jedrska in konvencionalna energija) ter v strojni in gradbeni industriji.
After privatisation, the company continued to operate on the same product market.
Po privatizaciji je podjetje ostalo dejavno na istem proizvodnem trgu.
At present ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Holding B.V.
Podjetje ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Holding B.V.
Rotterdam NLD (of the ArcerlorMittal group) holds a 69,76 % stake in the company [6].
Rotterdam NLD (iz skupine ArcerlorMittal) ima zdaj 69,76-odstotni delež v podjetju [6].
The measure at stake
Zadevni ukrep
On 23 July 2003 the Romanian privatisation agency APAPS (now AVAS) [7] made public its intention to sell its 70 % stake in Petrotub.
23. julija 2003 je romunska agencija za privatizacijo APAPS (zdaj AVAS) [7] objavila, da bo prodala svoj 70-odstotni delež v podjetju Petrotub.
The privatisation took place through public tender.
Privatizacija je potekala prek javnega razpisa.
A sale agreement was signed with LNM Holdings NV (now ArcelorMittal) on 28 October 2003, for the purchase price of USD 6 million (EUR 5,1 million [8]).
28. oktobra 2003 je bila s podjetjem LNM Holding NV (zdaj ArcelorMittal) podpisana pogodba o prodaji, in sicer po nakupni ceni 6 milijonov USD (5,1 milijona EUR [8]).
In the context of privatisation, APAPS agreed on behalf of the Romanian state to write off public debt totalling EUR 22,5 million, and to reschedule the remaining public debt.
V okviru privatizacije se je agencija APAPS v imenu Romunije dogovorila o odstopu terjatev v vrednosti 22,5 milijona EUR javnega dolga in o reprogramiranju preostalih javnih dolgov.
In 1998 Petrotub had contracted a commercial loan of DEM [30-50] [9] million [EUR 15-25 million] with duration until 2011 from the German development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (hereinafter ‘KfW’), in order to purchase a new mill from Mannesmann AG.
Leta 1998 je podjetje Petrotub pri nemški razvojni banki Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (v nadaljnjem besedilu: KfW) najelo komercialno posojilo v znesku [30–50] [9] milijonov DEM [15–25 milijonov EUR] s trajanjem do leta 2011, da bi pri podjetju Mannesmann AG kupilo novo proizvodno linijo.
The KfW financing package was secured on its different segments with State guarantees granted by Germany and Austria and a bank guarantee from the Romanian bank Banca Comercială Română (BCR).
Paket financiranja banke KfW je bil za različne segmente zavarovan z državnimi jamstvi, ki sta jih odobrili Nemčija in Avstrija, in z bančnim jamstvom romunske banke Banca Comercială Română (BCR).
The German State guarantee was counter-guaranteed by the Romanian State.
Nemško državno jamstvo je bilo zavarovano s posrednim osebnim jamstvom romunske države.
The Romanian counter-guarantee covered 85 % of the total KfW loan of DEM 30-50 million.
Romunsko posredno osebno jamstvo je pokrivalo 85 % skupnega posojila banke KfW v znesku 30–50 milijonov DEM.
Romania charged Petrotub a one-off fee of [3-7 %].
Romunija je podjetju Petrotub zaračunala enkratno pristojbino v višini [3–7 %].
In the opening decision, the Commission informed Romania that the basis for opening the formal investigation procedure was Annex VII Section B on Steel Restructuring to the Protocol to the Accession Treaty of Romania (hereinafter ‘Annex VII’); and that, in the absence of specific provisions in Annex VII with respect to the legal situation of Romanian tube producers at the time of the privatisation, the Commission would investigate the existence and compatibility of State aid to AM Roman on that basis.
V sklepu o začetku postopka je Komisija sporočila Romuniji, da je podlaga za začetek formalnega postopka preiskave oddelek B o prestrukturiranju jeklarstva Priloge VII k Protokolu k Pristopni pogodbi Romunije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Priloga VII) in da bo Komisija ob upoštevanju neobstoja posebnih določb v Prilogi VII glede pravnega položaja romunskih proizvajalcev cevi med privatizacijo na tej podlagi proučila obstoj in združljivost državne pomoči podjetju AM Roman.
The Commission noted that the acquisition price (EUR 5,1 million) did not cover the loss incurred by the State in the form of the waiver of EUR 22,5 million of public debt to which the Romanian privatisation agency APAPS agreed in the context of privatisation.
Komisija je ugotovila, da nabavna cena (5,1 milijona EUR) ni pokrila izgube države v obliki odstopa terjatev v znesku 22,5 milijona EUR javnega dolga, o katerem se je v okviru privatizacije dogovorila romunska agencija za privatizacijo APAPS.
Before the opening of the formal investigation procedure, Romania had provided a report by an external consultant [10] to show that privatisation on the given terms had been the most advantageous solution for the State.
Pred začetkom formalnega postopka preiskave je Romunija predložila poročilo zunanjega svetovalca [10], da bi pokazala, da je bila privatizacija v navedenih pogojih najugodnejša rešitev za državo.
The report identified privatisation as leading to the most advantageous situation for the Romanian State.
V poročilu je bilo ugotovljeno, da bi imela privatizacija najugodnejši izid za Romunijo.
The table below compares the sums estimated to be obtained by each of the creditor public institutions in the privatisation and the liquidation scenarios [11].
V spodnji preglednici je primerjava zneskov, ki bi jih po ocenah dobil posamezni javni upnik v privatizaciji in scenarijih likvidacije [11].
Liquidation
likvidacija
Social Security Fund
Sklad socialne varnosti
Unemployment Fund
Sklad za zaposlovanje
Health Fund
Zdravstveni sklad
(including the sale price of EUR 5,1 million)
(vključno s prodajno ceno v znesku 5,1 milijona EUR)
State
žava skupaj
EUR [4-9] million
[4–9] milijonov EUR
EUR [19-26] million
[19–26] milijonov EUR
The report was based on the assumption that, in the event of liquidation, the 1998 guarantee would have been triggered, and the State (through the Ministry of Finance) would have become liable for the outstanding amount of the 1998 KfW loan taken by Petrotub, i.e. for EUR [15-25] million. In other words, in the liquidation scenario, the State would have eventually received only EUR [2-9] million, which is lower by comparison to the total of EUR [4-9] million received through privatisation.
Poročilo je temeljilo na predpostavki, da bi se pri likvidaciji uveljavilo jamstvo iz leta 1998, s čimer bi država (prek ministrstva za finance) postala odgovorna za poravnavo neplačanega posojila iz leta 1998, ki ga je podjetje Petrotub najelo pri banki KfW, tj. [15–25] milijonov EUR. Drugače rečeno, pri scenariju likvidacije bi država končno prejela samo [2–9] milijonov EUR, kar je manj v primerjavi s skupno [4-9] milijonov EUR pri privatizaciji.
In the opening Decision, the Commission questioned whether the outcomes of the privatisation and liquidation scenarios should have been estimated for the State as a whole, as the expert report suggested, or separately for each of the public creditors, in line with the HAMSA jurisprudence [12].
V sklepu o začetku je Komisija izrazila pomisleke glede tega, ali naj se izid privatizacije in scenarijev likvidacije oceni za državo kot celoto, kot je predlagano v strokovnem poročilu, ali za vsakega javnega upnika posebej, in sicer v skladu s sodno prakso v zadevi HAMSA [12].
Inter alia, the Commission also doubted that the loss of EUR [15-25] million as a result of the triggering of the 1998 guarantee could be taken into account in estimating the outcome of liquidation.
Med drugim je Komisija imela pomisleke tudi glede tega, da se lahko pri oceni izida likvidacije upošteva izguba v znesku [15–25] milijonov EUR kot posledica uveljavitve jamstva iz leta 1998.
In line with the HYTASA [13] and Gröditzer [14] cases, a distinction should be made between the obligations which the State must assume as shareholder of the company and the obligations it must assume as public authority.
V skladu z zadevama HYTAS [13] in Gröditzer [14] je treba razlikovati med obveznostmi, ki jih mora država prevzeti kot delničarka podjetja, in obveznostmi, ki jih mora prevzeti kot javni organ.
It follows that the costs assumed in relation to a public authority act cannot be taken into account for the purpose of estimating the costs that a private shareholder would have been in the position to, and willing to incur.
Stroškov, prevzetih v povezavi z ukrepom javnega organa, torej ni mogoče upoštevati pri oceni stroškov, ki bi jih lahko prevzel in tudi želel prevzeti zasebni delničar.
The Commission regards the fact that in 1998 the Romanian Ministry of Finance issued a sovereign guarantee for Petrotub as an indication that a private shareholder would not have been in the position to issue such a guarantee.
Komisija meni, da dejstvo, da je romunsko ministrstvo za finance leta 1998 izdalo državno jamstvo za podjetje Petrotub, nakazuje na to, da zasebni delničar ne bi mogel izdati takega jamstva.
Another indication in this sense is the fact that the 1998 guarantee was granted on terms and conditions that a private operator might not have accepted.
V tem smislu na to nakazuje tudi dejstvo, da je bilo jamstvo leta 1998 odobreno po pogojih, ki jih zasebni delničar morda ne bi sprejel.
COMMENTS FROM ROMANIA AND INTERESTED PARTIES
PRIPOMBE ROMUNIJE IN ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANI
In its submission of 27 November 2007, Romania argued mainly that the privatisation of Petrotub in October 2003 had not involved an advantage to Petrotub or the buyer, and therefore the operation had not involved State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
V dopisu z dne 27. novembra 2007 je Romunija v glavnem trdila, da privatizacija podjetja Petrotub oktobra 2003 ni pomenila prednosti za podjetje Petrotub ali kupca in zato ni vključevala državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU.
Romania first underlined that Petrotub had been sold through an open, transparent and unconditional tender procedure – a fact which, in the opinion of the Romanian authorities, showed that Petrotub had been sold at the market price and that the buyer did not derive any advantage from the purchase.
Romunija je najprej poudarila, da je bilo podjetje Petrotub prodano po odprtem, preglednem in brezpogojnem razpisnem postopku, kar po mnenju romunskih organov kaže na to, da je bilo podjetje Petrotub prodano po tržni ceni in da kupec od nakupa ni imel nobene ugodnosti.
Second, Romania considered that it had acted in the same way as any private vendor would have acted: in choosing between the privatisation and liquidation scenarios, the State opted for the scenario that was most advantageous exclusively on financial terms, without taking into account non-commercial or policy considerations of the kind that by their nature are characteristic of the exercise of public authority.
Kot drugo je Romunija menila, da je ravnala enako, kot bi ravnal kateri koli zasebni prodajalec, saj se je država pri izbiri med privatizacijo in scenariji likvidacije odločila za možnost, ki je bila najugodnejša izključno zaradi finančnih pogojev ter brez upoštevanja netržnih in političnih pomislekov, ki so po svoji naravi značilni za delovanje javnega organa.
In relation to this second argument, Romania showed that, under national law, the privatisation agency AVAS was required and empowered to estimate and compare the overall outcomes of privatisation and liquidation by reference to the State budget as a whole.
V zvezi s to drugo trditvijo je Romunija navedla, da je morala agencija za privatizacijo AVAS v skladu z nacionalnim pravom oceniti in primerjati splošne izide privatizacije in likvidacije ob upoštevanju državnega proračuna kot celote, za kar je bila tudi pooblaščena.
In other words, the privatisation agency chooses the scenario that is most advantageous for the State budget as a whole, in the same way in which a large holding company comprising several creditors would do.
Drugače rečeno, agencija za privatizacijo izbere scenarij, ki je najugodnejši za državni proračun kot celoto, enako kot bi to naredila večja matična družba, ki zajema več upnikov.
From this perspective, contrary to the Commission's views, the State could not and did not have to estimate the outcomes of privatisation and liquidation separately for each of the public bodies concerned.
S tega vidika in v nasprotju z mnenji Komisije država torej ni mogla in ji tudi ni bilo treba oceniti izidov privatizacije in likvidacije za vsak zadevni javni organ posebej.
In addition, in estimating the outcomes of liquidation, the State was entitled to take into account the loss associated with the triggering of the 1998 guarantee, because, under the given conditions, such guarantee would have been granted to Petrotub also by a private investor.
Poleg tega je država pri ocenjevanju izidov likvidacije upravičeno upoštevala izgubo v povezavi z uveljavitvijo jamstva iz leta 1998, saj bi v danih pogojih podjetju Petrotub takšno jamstvo odobril tudi zasebni vlagatelj.
The company was not in difficulty at the time when the guarantee was granted, and the risk premium charged to Petrotub for the guarantee was an appropriate remuneration for a shareholder guarantee issued in favour of a company which was in good condition at the time.
Podjetje v času odobritve jamstva ni bilo v težavah in premija za tveganje, ki ga je za jamstvo plačalo podjetje Petrotub, je bila primerno nadomestilo za jamstvo delničarja, izdano za podjetje, ki je takrat bilo v dobrem stanju.
Moreover, the 1998 guarantee must be assessed from the perspective of the relevant State aid rules in force at that time.
Poleg tega je jamstvo iz leta 1998 treba oceniti ob upoštevanju ustreznih pravil o državni pomoči, ki so se takrat uporabljala.
The Commission Communication on short-term export credit guarantees applicable at the time excluded long-term export credit guarantees from the scope of scrutiny under Article 107(1) TFEU (then Article 87(1) TEC) [15].
V Sporočilu Komisije o kratkoročnem zavarovanju izvoznih kreditov, ki se je takrat uporabljalo, so bila iz obsega izključena dolgoročna zavarovanja izvoznih kreditov pregleda v skladu s členom 107(1) PDEU (takrat člen 87(1) PES) [15].
Romania also stressed that in 1998, when the guarantee was granted, Petrotub was a tube producer, and as such was not covered by the ECSC definition of steel or by the provisions of Protocol 2 on ECSC steel in the Europe Agreement.
Romunija je poudarila tudi, da je podjetje Petrotub leta 1998, ko je bilo odobreno posojilo, proizvajalo cevi in zato zanj ni veljala opredelitev za jeklo iz Pogodbe ESPJ ali določbe Protokola 2 o jeklenih izdelkih, ki jih zajema Pogodba ESPJ, k Evropskemu sporazumu.
AM Roman and its parent company ArcelorMittal fully endorsed Romania's argumentation.
Podjetje AM Roman in njegova matična družba ArcelorMittal sta v celoti podprla utemeljitev Romunije.
The companies also underlined that, under the Romanian legislation applicable at the time, and under the Europe Agreement rules on State aid, the State guarantee issued in favour of Petrotub in 1998 did not involve State aid.
Podjetji sta poudarili tudi, da državno jamstvo, izdano leta 1998 za podjetje Petrotub, na podlagi takrat veljavne romunske zakonodaje in pravil o državni pomoči iz Evropskega sporazuma ni vključevalo državne pomoči.
Furthermore, the 1998 guarantee constituted a clear enforceable commercial obligation undertaken by the State as majority shareholder of the company concerned, and can therefore be included in the estimate of the liquidation costs.
Poleg tega je jamstvo iz leta 1998 pomenilo jasno izvršljivo komercialno obveznost, ki jo je prevzela država kot večinska lastnica zadevnega podjetja, zato ga je mogoče vključiti v oceno stroškov likvidacije.
ArcelorMittal also stressed that it had paid a market price for the acquisition of Petrotub, and therefore any possible advantage resulting from privatisation, quod non, would at any rate have remained with the State as a seller.
Podjetje ArcelorMittal je tudi poudarilo, da je za nakup podjetja Petrotub plačalo tržno ceno in bi zato morebitne ugodnosti, izhajajoče iz privatizacije (kar pa ne drži), v vsakem primeru imela država kot prodajalka.
Applicable law and Commission competence
Veljavna zakonodaja in pristojnosti Komisije
This procedure addresses events which took place before Romania’s accession to the European Union (1 January 2007).
Ta postopek se nanaša na dogodke pred pristopom Romunije k Evropski uniji (1. januarja 2007).
Petrotub was privatised in October 2003.
Podjetje Petrotub je bilo privatizirano oktobra 2003, leta 1998 pa je Romunija zanj izdala jamstvo v povezavi s posojilom pri banki KfW v znesku [30-50] milijonov EUR za nakup nove proizvodne linije.
Also, in 1998 the Romanian State had issued a guarantee in favour of Petrotub in relation to a loan of DEM [30-50] million from KfW to purchase a new mill. The 1998 guarantee is linked to the 2003 privatisation insofar as Romania argued that its costs in case of liquidation must be taken into account when assessing the 2003 privatisation operation under the market economy operator test.
Posojilo iz leta 1998 je povezano s privatizacijo leta 2003 zaradi trditve Romunije, da je treba pri oceni privatizacije leta 2003 v okviru preskusa nosilcev dejavnosti v tržnem gospodarstvu upoštevati stroške posojila, ki bi nastali pri likvidaciji.
As a general rule, Articles 107-108 TFEU do not apply to measures granted before accession which are no longer applicable thereafter [16].
Člena 107 in 108 PDEU se praviloma ne uporabljata za ukrepe, odobrene pred pristopom, ki jih po pristopu ni mogoče več uporabiti [16].
By derogation from this general rule, and therefore on an exceptional basis, the Commission has the competence to review State aid granted by Romania in the context of the restructuring of its steel industry before accession on the basis of Annex VII to the Accession Treaty of Romania [17].
Z odstopanjem od tega splošnega pravila je Komisija tako izjemoma pristojna za revizijo državne pomoči, ki jo je podelila Romunija v okviru prestrukturiranja jeklarske industrije pred pristopom, in sicer na podlagi Priloge VII k Pogodbi o pristopu Romunije [17].
The lex specialis nature of Annex VII
Lex specialis Priloge VII
Annex VII contains provisions allowing Romania to conclude the restructuring of its steel industry as initiated before accession.
Priloga VII vsebuje določbe, ki Romuniji omogočajo dokončanje prestrukturiranja jeklarske industrije, ki se je začelo še pred pristopom.
The pre-accession restructuring of the Romanian steel sector was carried out on the basis of Protocol 2 on ECSC Steel annexed to the Europe Agreement (hereinafter ‘Protocol 2’), as extended by the Additional Protocol signed on 23 October 2002 (hereinafter ‘the Additional Protocol’).
Predpristopno prestrukturiranje romunskega jeklarskega sektorja se je izvajalo na podlagi Protokola 2 o jeklenih izdelkih, ki jih zajema pogodba ESPJ, priloženemu Evropskemu sporazumu (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Protokol 2) in kakor je bil razširjen z Dodatnim protokolom, podpisanim 23. oktobra 2002 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Dodatni protokol).
Protocol 2 granted to Romania a ‘grace period’ of 5 years, from 1993 until the end of 1998, to restructure its ECSC steel industry in view of accession.
S Protokolom 2 je bilo Romuniji odobreno „obdobje odloga“ petih let, in sicer od leta 1993 do konca leta 1998, da lahko pred pristopom prestrukturira industrijo jeklenih izdelkov ESPJ.
The Romanian NRP was approved by the Council on 18 July 2005 [18].
Romunski NPP je Svet odobril 18. julija 2005 [18].
Annex VII is a ‘safeguard mechanism’ allowing the Commission to monitor after 1 January 2007 (the accession date) aid granted by Romania to the steel sector before accession on the basis of Protocol 2 (as extended by the Additional Protocol) and the NRP.
Priloga VII je „zaščitni mehanizem“, ki Komisiji omogoča, da po 1. januarju 2007 (datum pristopa) spremlja državno pomoč, ki jo je Romunija dodelila jeklarskemu sektorju pred pristopom na podlagi Protokola 2 (kakor je bil razširjen z Dodatnim protokolom) in NPP.
Furthermore, Annex VII empowers the Commission to recover aid given in breach of Protocol 2 and the NRP.
Poleg tega daje Priloga VII Komisiji pooblastila za izterjavo pomoči, dodeljene v nasprotju s Protokolom 2 in NPP.
Thus Annex VII is a lex specialis allowing on an exceptional basis and by derogation from the general regime the retroactive monitoring and review of State aid granted by Romania to its steel industry before accession.
Priloga VII je lex specialis, ki omogoča, izjemoma in z odstopanjem od splošne ureditve, retroaktivno spremljanje in preverjanje državne pomoči, ki jo je Romunija dodelila svoji jeklarski industriji pred pristopom.
In recent judgments concerning pre-accession State aid granted to Polish steel companies [19] the General Court confirmed the lex specialis character of Protocol 8 to the Accession Treaty of Poland, which contains equivalent provisions to those set out in Annex VII.
V nedavnih sodbah v zvezi s predpristopno državno pomočjo, dodeljeno poljskim jeklarskim podjetjem [19], je Splošno sodišče potrdilo lex specialis Protokola 8 k Pristopni pogodbi Poljske, ki vsebuje določbe, enakovredne tistim iz Priloge VII.