natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
By virtue of Decisions No 46825/B.2248 of 29 September 2009 and No 2/69591/0025 of 2 October 2009 of the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance, the deadline for repayment of the loans was extended to 30 December 2010.
V skladu s sklepoma grškega ministra za gospodarske zadeve in finance št. 46825/B.2248 z dne 29. septembra 2009 in št. 2/69591/0025 z dne 2. oktobra 2009 je bil rok za vračilo posojil podaljšan do 30. decembra 2010.
Decision No 8264 of 9 December 2008 of the Greek Minister for Rural Development and Food provided for the allocation of the amount of EUR 150 million to 57 Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives.
Sklep grškega ministra za razvoj podeželja in prehrano št. 8264 z dne 9. decembra 2008 je določal, da se znesek v višini 150 milijonov EUR dodeli 57 združenjem kmetijskih zadrug.
It also referred to a Decision of 12 November 2008 of the Governmental Commission concerning the granting of loans amounting to EUR 150 million to the Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives and their members.
Navedeni sklep se sklicuje tudi na sklep vladne komisije z dne 12. novembra 2008 o odobritvi posojil v višini 150 milijonov EUR združenjem kmetijskih zadrug in njihovim članom.
According to the letter from the Greek authorities sent on 19 March 2010, all the loans in question (except one) were granted by the Agricultural Bank of Greece (hereinafter ‘ATE Bank’).
V dopisu grških organov z dne 19. marca 2010 je navedeno, da je vsa zadevna posojila (razen enega) odobrila Grška kmetijska banka (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ATE).
The Greek authorities added that the interest-rate subsidy and guarantee granted by the State in the cereals sector were necessary in order to deal with the fall of prices in 2008, which was caused by the overproduction of cereals in Greece.
Grški organi so dodali, da sta bila subvencioniranje obrestne mere in poroštvo, ki ju je odobrila država, v sektorju žit potrebna zaradi znižanja cen žita v letu 2008, ki je bilo posledica prekomerne letine žit v Grčiji.
In this letter, the Greek authorities expressed the opinion that the small credit facility granted by the State could not be considered as State aid, as it did not distort or threaten to distort competition, nor did it affect trade between Member States.
Grški organi so v tem dopisu navedli, da majhnega posojila, ki ga odobri država, ni mogoče šteti za državno pomoč, ker ni izkrivljalo in ne bi moglo izkrivljati konkurence ter ni vplivalo na trgovino med državami članicami.
The Greek authorities added that the benefit from the measure in question for individual producers was minimal.
Grški organi so dodali, da so bile ugodnosti, ki so jih imeli posamezni pridelovalci zaradi zadevnega ukrepa, zelo majhne.
Under Article 1 of the Loan Agreement between ATE Bank and the UACs (the ‘Loan Agreement’), the loan granted by ATE Bank should only be used by the borrower for the purchase or receipt of cereals produced in 2008.
V skladu s členom 1 sporazuma o posojilu med banko ATE in združenji kmetijskih zadrug (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporazum o posojilu) lahko posojilojemalec posojilo, ki ga odobri banka ATE, uporabi le za nakup ali prejetje žita, pridelanega v letu 2008.
Concerning the conditions for granting the loan, the Greek authorities indicated that the interest rate was the rate applicable to 12-month Greek treasury bonds (issued just before the date on which the interest started to run), plus 30 %.
Grški organi so v zvezi s pogoji za odobritev posojila navedli, da je bila uporabljena obrestna mera, ki velja za 12-mesečne grške državne obveznice (izdane tik preden so začele teči obresti), zvišana za 30 %.
They further argued that the Loan Agreement between ATE Bank and the UACs included a condition that proves that no State aid was involved.
Poleg tega so trdili, da je sporazum o posojilu med banko ATE in združenji kmetijskih zadrug vključeval pogoj, ki dokazuje, da državne pomoči ni bilo.
That condition stated: ‘The borrower hereby assumes the obligation, prior to disbursement of the loan, to sign with the Greek State, as represented by the Bank for the purposes hereof, a collateral contract over the products, by-products and other movables that the borrower will purchase with this loan, and over all the goods that are under his ownership or management, pursuant to the provisions of Law 2844/2000.’ In other words, the collateral is provided by the UACs to the State (as represented by ATE Bank), and is constituted by the products purchased by the UACs using the loan.
Ta pogoj je: „Posojilojemalec prevzema odgovornost, da bo v skladu z določbami zakona št. 2844/2000 pred izplačilom posojila z grško državo, ki jo za namene tega sporazuma zastopa Banka, podpisal pogodbo o zavarovanju s premoženjem v zvezi s proizvodi, stranskimi proizvodi in drugimi premičninami, ki jih bo posojilojemalec kupil s tem posojilom, in v zvezi z vsem blagom, ki je v njegovi lasti ali s katerim upravlja.“ To pomeni, da združenja kmetijskih zadrug državi (ki jo zastopa banka ATE) zagotovijo zavarovanje s premoženjem za proizvode, ki jih kupijo s posojilom.
The Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives (UACs) and Primary Agricultural Cooperatives in Greece that have obtained Greek State-guaranteed loans under Decision No 2/88675/0025/9.12.2008 of the Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance, as currently in force, shall have the option of restructuring loans guaranteed by the Greek State under the above Decision maturing on 30 September 2010 as follows:
Združenja kmetijskih zadrug in primarne kmetijske zadruge v Grčiji, ki so pridobili posojila s poroštvom grške države v skladu z veljavnim Sklepom št. 2/88675/0025 z dne 9. decembra 2008, ki ga je sprejel namestnik ministra za gospodarske zadeve in finance, se lahko v skladu z navedenim sklepom odločijo za prestrukturiranje posojil s poroštvom grške države z dne 30. septembra 2010:
The total duration of the restructured loan shall be five years, payable in half-yearly instalments (principal and interest), with the first instalment due on 30 March 2011 and the last on 30 September 2015.
Skupno trajanje prestrukturiranega posojila je pet let in se odplačuje v polletnih obrokih (glavnica in obresti), pri čemer se prvi obrok plača 30. marca 2011, zadnji pa 30. septembra 2015.
In addition, each borrower shall pay to the Greek State, until maturity of the loan, a safe-harbour premium amounting to 2 % of the current unpaid part of the loan.
Poleg tega vsak posojilojemalec grški državi do zapadlosti posojila plačuje premijo varnega pristana v višini 2 % trenutno neplačanega dela posojila.
The first premium shall be paid upon payment of the first instalment on 30 March 2011.
Prva premija se plača ob plačilu prvega obroka 30. marca 2011.
The existing collateral guarantees in the form of cereals in favour of the Greek State are hereby abolished.
Obstoječa jamstva za zavarovanje s premoženjem v obliki žita v korist grške države so tako odpravljena.
The interest rate on the restructured loan shall be the rate used by each financial institution for the same category of loans.
Obrestna mera za prestrukturirano posojilo je obrestna mera, ki jo posamezna finančna institucija uporablja za enako kategorijo posojil.
COMMENTS MADE BY GREECE
PRIPOMBE GRČIJE
In their reply dated 21 January 2011, the Greek authorities argued that both the interest-rate subsidy and State guarantee for the loans must be viewed in the light of the Communication from the Commission concerning the temporary Community framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis [5] (hereinafter ‘temporary framework’).
Grški organi so v odgovoru z dne 21. januarja 2011 trdili, da je treba subvencioniranje obrestne mere in državno poroštvo za posojila obravnavati v luči sporočila Komisije o začasnem okviru Skupnosti za ukrepe državnih pomoči v podporo dostopu do financiranja ob trenutni finančni in gospodarski krizi [5] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: začasni okvir).
In particular, it was argued that the loans in question were granted during the financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 and were aimed at overcoming that crisis.
Zlasti so trdili, da so bila zadevna posojila odobrena med finančno in gospodarsko krizo v letih 2008 in 2009 ter so bila namenjena premagovanju te krize.
The Greek authorities also held that, due to the large number of final beneficiaries (cooperative members), the benefit from the interest-free loan for each beneficiary was so limited that it could not be considered to be causing distortions.
Grški organi so poleg tega navedli, da so bile zaradi velikega števila končnih upravičencev (članov zadrug) ugodnosti brezobrestnega posojila za posameznega upravičenca tako majhne, da ni mogoče šteti, da bi povzročale izkrivljanje.
Lastly, the Greek authorities argued that each borrower’s obligation to pay a 2 % insurance premium, in accordance with Ministerial Decision No 2/21304/0025/26.10.2010 proves that there was no State aid.
Nazadnje so grški organi trdili, da obveznost posameznega posojilojemalca, da v skladu z ministrskim sklepom št. 2/21304/0025 z dne 26. oktobra 2010 plača zavarovalno premijo v višini 2 %, dokazuje, da državne pomoči ni bilo.
In their letter of 1 December 2011, the Greek authorities repeated a number of the arguments presented during the procedure concerning the need to implement these measures and the reasons for this.
Grški organi so v dopisu z dne 1. decembra 2011 ponovili več utemeljitev v zvezi s potrebo po izvajanju teh ukrepov in razlogi zanje, ki so jih navedli med postopkom.
They also argued that the issue of Ministerial Decision No 2/21304/0025/26.10.2010 and the application of an interest rate when the loans were restructured (the rate applied by each financial institution for the same category of loans) indicated that the interest-rate subsidy did not constitute aid.
Poleg tega so trdili, da zaradi sprejetja ministrskega sklepa št. 2/21304/0025 z dne 26. oktobra 2010 in uporabe obrestne mere ob prestrukturiranju posojil (tj. obrestne mere, ki jo posamezne finančne institucije uporabljajo za enako kategorijo posojil) subvencioniranje obrestne mere ne pomeni pomoči.
They added that, in the period from 2009 to 28 November 2011, the interest-rate subsidies granted by the State amounted to EUR 7762113.
Dodali so, da so v obdobju od leta 2009 do 28. novembra 2011 subvencije za obrestne mere, ki jih je odobrila država, znašale 7762113 EUR.
Existence of aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty
ΙV.1 Obstoj pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe
Under Article 107(1) of the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, is incompatible with the internal market.
V skladu s členom 107(1) Pogodbe je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom, če vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami.
Before proceeding to the assessment of whether the measure in question meets the conditions laid down in Article 107(1) of the Treaty, the Commission would point out that there are two aspects of the measure that should be examined in the light of this provision: (a) the interest-rate subsidy, and (b) the State guarantee.
Komisija pred izvedbo ocene, ali je zadevni ukrep skladen s pogoji iz člena 107(1) Pogodbe, opozarja na dva vidika ukrepa, ki ju je treba preučiti ob upoštevanju navedene določbe: (a) subvencioniranje obrestne mere in (b) državno poroštvo.
Interest-rate subsidy
ΙV.1.1 Subvencioniranje obrestne mere
The interest-rate subsidy granted by the Greek State to the cooperatives pursuant to Ministerial Decision No 56700/B.3033/8.12.2008 meets all the conditions laid down in Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Subvencioniranje obrestne mere, ki ga je grška država odobrila zadrugam v skladu z ministrskim sklepom št. 56700/B.3033 z dne 8. decembra 2008, je skladno z vsemi pogoji iz člena 107(1) Pogodbe.
The subsidy is granted by the Greek State and it confers a clear advantage, as in reality it makes the loan completely interest-free.
Subvencijo je odobrila grška država in pomeni jasno prednost, ker je tako posojilo dejansko popolnoma brezobrestno.
The direct beneficiaries of the aid are the cooperatives.
Neposredni upravičenci pomoči so zadruge.
However, given that the intention of the State by granting the loans was to increase the income of Greek farmers by artificially increasing the price of cereals sold by producers to cooperatives, the farmers (producers) are the indirect beneficiaries of the aid.
Vendar so glede na to, da je nameravala država z odobritvijo posojil povečati prihodek grških kmetov z umetnim zvišanjem cene žit, ki jih pridelovalci prodajo zadrugam, posredni upravičenci pomoči kmetje (pridelovalci).
Concerning the ‘distortion of competition’ condition, in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice, the mere fact that the competitive position of an undertaking is strengthened as compared to other competing undertakings, by giving it an economic benefit which it would not otherwise have received in the normal course of its business, points to a possible distortion of competition [6].
Kar zadeva pogoj v zvezi z „izkrivljanjem konkurence“, v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča že samo dejstvo, da se konkurenčni položaj podjetja v primerjavi z drugimi konkurenčnimi podjetji okrepi z dodelitvijo gospodarske koristi, ki je podjetje sicer v okviru svojega običajnega poslovanja ne bi imelo, pomeni nevarnost izkrivljanja konkurence [6].
Aid to an undertaking appears to affect trade between Member States where that undertaking operates in a market open to intra-Community trade [7].
Zdi se, da pomoč, ki se dodeli podjetju, vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami, če podjetje posluje na trgu, odprtem za trgovanje v Skupnosti [7].
Furthermore, according to the case law of the Court, there is no threshold or percentage below which trade between the Member States can be regarded as not having been affected.
Poleg tega v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča ni določen prag ali odstotek, pod katerim bi se lahko štelo, da ni vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami.
Even the relatively small amount of aid or the relatively small size of the undertakings does not a priori mean that trade between the Member States is not affected [8].
Celo sorazmerno majhen znesek pomoči ali sorazmerno majhna velikost podjetja, ki prejme pomoč, ne pomeni samodejno, da vpliv na trgovino med državami članicami ni mogoč [8].
There is substantial intra-Community trade in the cereals sector.
Trgovanje v sektorju žit v Skupnosti je obsežno.
Therefore, the present measure is liable to affect trade between Member States.
Zato bi lahko zadevni ukrep vplival na trgovino med državami članicami.
In the light of the above, it appears that as regards the interest-rate subsidy all the conditions laid down in Article 107(1) are met.
Glede na navedeno se zdi, da so v zvezi s subvencioniranjem obrestne mere izpolnjeni vsi pogoji iz člena 107(1) Pogodbe.
State guarantee
ΙV.1.2 Državno poroštvo
By Ministerial Decision No 2/88675/0025/9.12.2008, the Greek Government decided to grant Cooperatives its guarantee for the loans contracted with ATE Bank.
Grška vlada se je z ministrskim sklepom št. 2/88675/0025 z dne 9. decembra 2008 odločila, da bo zadrugam odobrila poroštvo za posojila, sklenjena pri banki ATE.
In general terms, the criteria laid down in Article 107(1) of the Treaty apply to guarantees.
Na splošno merila iz člena 107(1) Pogodbe veljajo za poroštva.
As indicated in Section 2.1 of the Commission Notice on application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees [9] (hereinafter ‘Notice on Guarantees’), guarantees granted directly by the State may indeed constitute State aid.
Kot je navedeno v oddelku 2.1 Obvestila Komisije o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč v obliki poroštev [9] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: obvestilo o poroštvih), poroštva, ki jih neposredno odobri država, lahko dejansko pomenijo državno pomoč.
The benefit of a State guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is borne by the State.
Ugodnost državnega poroštva je, da tveganje, povezano s poroštvom, nosi država.
This risk should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (Section 2.2 of the Notice on Guarantees).
Takšno tveganje se običajno plača z ustrezno premijo (oddelek 2.2 obvestila o poroštvih).
When the State forgoes such a premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking to which the State guarantee is granted and a drain on the resources of the State.
Kadar se država takšni premiji v celoti ali delno odpove, to pomeni ugodnost za podjetje, kateremu je bilo odobreno državno poroštvo, ter zmanjšanje državnih prihodkov.
The guarantee in this case is therefore granted through State resources.
Zato je poroštvo v tem primeru odobreno iz državnih sredstev.
The Notice on Guarantees further specifies that if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the State under a guarantee there may still be State aid.
V obvestilu o poroštvih je poleg tega navedeno, da gre lahko za državno pomoč, tudi če se izkaže, da država v okviru poroštva ne izvrši nikakršnih plačil.
The benefit granted to the UACs and, in the final instance, to farmers from the guarantee is clear: the borrowers did not have to pay, at least until 30 March 2011 (see recital 22) the appropriate premium which should normally be paid to remunerate the appropriate risk.
Ugodnosti, ki jih imajo združenja kmetijskih zadrug in na koncu tudi kmetje zaradi poroštva, so jasne: posojilojemalcem vsaj do 30. marca 2011 (glej uvodno izjavo 22) ni bilo treba plačati ustrezne premije, ki bi jo običajno morali plačati za poplačilo ustreznega tveganja.
Also, compared to a situation without a guarantee, the State guarantee enables the borrowers to obtain better financial terms for loans than those normally available on the financial markets.
Poleg tega državno poroštvo v primerjavi z razmerami brez poroštva posojilojemalcem omogoči, da posojilo najamejo pod finančnimi pogoji, ki so ugodnejši od običajnih pogojev na finančnih trgih.
Section 3.4 of the Notice on Guarantees provides a list of all conditions that have to be met in order for a State guarantee scheme not to be considered as State aid. It is clear that the measure under examination does not meet all the conditions in question.
Oddelek 3.4 obvestila o jamstvih vsebuje seznam vseh pogojev, ki morajo biti izpolnjeni, da se državna poroštvena shema ne obravnava kot državna pomoč.
For example, at least two of these conditions appear not to be met in this case.
Jasno je, da obravnavani ukrep ne izpolnjuje vseh zadevnih pogojev.
The guarantee in question covers more than 80 % of the loans, and the scheme under examination appears not to be closed to borrowers in financial difficulty.
Zdi se na primer, da v tem primeru nista bila izpolnjena vsaj dva od teh pogojev: zadevno poroštvo zajema več kot 80 % posojil in zadevna shema je na voljo tudi posojilojemalcem v finančnih težavah.
As mentioned in recital 29, the direct beneficiaries of this aid are the cooperatives.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 29, so neposredni upravičenci pomoči zadruge.
However, given that the intention of the Greek State in granting the loans was to increase the income of Greek farmers by artificially increasing the price of cereals sold by producers to Cooperatives, the farmers (producers) are the indirect beneficiaries of the aid.
Glede na to, da je nameravala grška država z odobritvijo posojil povečati prihodek grških kmetov z umetnim zvišanjem cene žit, ki jih pridelovalci prodajo zadrugam, pa so posredni upravičenci pomoči kmetje (pridelovalci).
The selectivity condition is equally fulfilled, since the beneficiaries of the aid are only those cooperatives and farmers who purchased or produced cereals in Greece in 2008.
Prav tako je izpolnjen pogoj selektivnosti, ker so upravičenci pomoči samo tiste zadruge in kmetje, ki so leta 2008 v Grčiji kupovali ali pridelovali žita.
The same considerations apply to the ‘distortion of competition’ and ‘effect on trade’ conditions as those referred to in recital 30.
Za pogoja „izkrivljanja konkurence“ in „vpliva na trgovino“ veljajo ugotovitve iz uvodne izjave 30.
Lastly, the Greek authorities argued that the collateral provided by the UACs to the State, as provided for in the Loan Agreement, indicates that there is no aid.
Nazadnje so grški organi trdili, da zavarovanje s premoženjem, ki so ga združenja kmetijskih zadrug zagotovila državi, kot določa sporazum o posojilu, pomeni, da pomoči ni bilo.
However, as decided by the Commission in the decision on initiating the procedure, this is not the case for the following reasons: (a) First, if the cooperatives fail to pay back the loans, it will be at the discretion of the State whether to make use of the rights granted by the collateral agreements or not. (b) Second, it appears that the collateral does not secure the full amount of the loan, since the price paid by the UACs to the farmers for the purchase of cereals (which should normally be equal to the loan amounts) is higher than the market price.
Vendar po mnenju Komisije iz odločitve o začetku postopka to ne velja zaradi naslednjih razlogov: (a) prvič, če zadruge ne vrnejo posojil, se lahko država sama odloči, ali bo uveljavljala pravice, odobrene s sporazumi o zavarovanju s premoženjem, ali ne; (b) drugič, zdi se, da zavarovanje s premoženjem ne zavaruje celotnega zneska posojila, saj je cena, ki jo združenja kmetijskih zadrug plačujejo kmetom za nakup žit (ki bi bila običajno enaka znesku posojil), višja od tržne cene.
This argument is inadmissible for the reasons detailed in recitals 38, 39 and 40.
Ta trditev je nesprejemljiva zaradi razlogov iz uvodnih izjav 38, 39 in 40.
Second, it appears from the wording of Ministerial Decision No 2/21304/0025/26.10.2010 that the UACs may make use, but are under no obligation to make use, of the relevant provision (see recital 22).
Poleg tega iz besedila ministrskega sklepa št. 2/21304/0025 z dne 26. oktobra 2010 izhaja, da imajo združenja kmetijskih zadrug možnost in ne dolžnost uporabiti zadevno določbo (glej uvodno izjavo 22).
The Greek authorities noted in this respect that, in fact, the borrowers had to make use of the provision in question since, as laid down in Article 13 of the Loan Agreement, unless they repaid the loan by 30 September 2009, the amount due would become payable by the State within three months, and the latter would in turn take administrative enforcement action against the borrower.
Grški organi so v zvezi s tem navedli, da so posojilojemalci dejansko morali uveljavljali zadevno določbo, ker mora v skladu s členom 13 sporazuma o posojilu dolgovani znesek povrniti država v treh mesecih, razen če je posojilo vrnjeno do 30. septembra 2009, pri čemer bi država zoper posojilojemalca sprejela upravni izvršilni ukrep.
This argument is also inadmissible: if the State repays the amounts due, it is not certain that it will take action against the original debtor with a view to recovering those amounts — it can always use its discretion not to do so.
Ta trditev je prav tako nesprejemljiva: če država dolgovani znesek povrne, ni nujno, da bo ukrepala zoper prvotnega dolžnika, da bi izterjala ta znesek, ampak se lahko kadar koli odloči, da tega ne bo storila.
Lastly, it appears the 2 % premium is not in itself an element which, pursuant to the Notice on Guarantees, proves that there is no State aid, as argued by the Greek authorities.
Nazadnje se zdi, da 2-odstotna premija sama po sebi ni element, ki bi v skladu z obvestilom o poroštvih dokazoval, da ni šlo za državno pomoč, kot so trdili grški organi.
Even if we were to accept that all the beneficiaries under the measure were small and medium-sized undertakings, as argued by the Greek authorities, the part of the Notice on Guarantees that would apply is Section 3.5.
Tudi če bi se strinjali s trditvami grških organov, da so vsi upravičenci v okviru ukrepa mala in srednje velika podjetja, bi v tem primeru veljal oddelek 3.5 obvestila o poroštvih.