natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Total equity (in EUR billion)
Skupni lastniški kapital (v milijardah EUR)
Outstanding notional amount of CT1 securities (in EUR billion)
Neporavnani nominalni znesek vrednostnih papirjev CT1 (v milijardah EUR)
RESTRUCTURING PLAN APPROVED IN THE 2012 RESTRUCTURING DECISION
NAČRT PRESTRUKTURIRANJA, ODOBREN V SKLEPU O PRESTRUKTURIRANJU IZ LETA 2012
DIFFICULTIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMITMENTS ON WHICH THE RESCUE DECISION AND THE 2012 RESTRUCTURING DECISION ARE BASED
TEŽAVE PRI IZVAJANJU ZAVEZ, NA KATERIH TEMELJITA SKLEP O REŠEVANJU IN SKLEP O PRESTRUKTURIRANJU IZ LETA 2012
Re-notification of the recapitalisation measure
Ponovna priglasitev ukrepa dokapitalizacije
ING is only required to make coupon payments on the CT1 securities to the Netherlandswhen a dividend on ordinary shares is paid.
ING mora izvesti plačila kuponov za vrednostne papirje CT1 Nizozemski le, kadar se plača dividenda na navadne delnice.
At the time of the Rescue Decision, ING stated that it would continue its then prevailing dividend policy, market circumstances permitting.
Ob sprejetju sklepa o reševanju je ING navedla, da bo nadaljevala svojo takratno prevladujočo politiko dividend, če bodo to dovoljevale razmere na trgu.
However since ING did not pay dividends in 2010 and 2011, the Netherlandson 21 November 2011 re-notified the recapitalisation measure in line with its commitment on which the Rescue Decision is based.
Toda ING leta 2010 in 2011 ni plačala dividend, zato je Nizozemska 21. novembra 2011 ponovno priglasila ukrep dokapitalizacije v skladu s svojo zavezo, na kateri temelji sklep o reševanju.
The re-notification commitment aimed at assuring a sufficient remuneration in view of the uncertainty of payment of coupons intrinsic to the CT1 securities.
Cilj zaveze ponovne priglasitve je bil zagotoviti ustrezno nadomestilo ob upoštevanju negotovosti glede plačila kuponov, ki ustrezajo vrednostnim papirjem CT1.
Difficulties in the implementation of the WUB commitment and the insurance divestment commitments [16] – amendment of those commitments in order to ensure compatibility of the restructuring aid
Težave pri izvajanju zaveze banke WUB in zavez za odsvojitev zavarovalniškega poslovanja [16] – sprememba teh zavez za zagotovitev združljivost pomoči za prestrukturiranje
In the autumn of 2010, ING organized a market sounding to test whether market players were interested in purchasing WUB.
ING je jeseni leta 2010 izvedla analizo trga, da bi preverila, ali so bili akterji na trgu zainteresirani za nakup banke WUB.
ING contacted many market parties [17].
Vzpostavila je stik s številnimi tržnimi akterji [17].
There was no real interest in WUB.
Za banko WUB ni bilo resnega zanimanja.
The new design envisaged the integration of parts of WUB into NN Bank, which is part of ING's European insurance business.
Preoblikovana zaveza je predvidevala vključitev delov banke WUB v banko NN Bank, ki je del evropske zavarovalniške družbe ING.
That structure, whereby parts of WUB would be integrated into NN Bank and in which a large part of the historical mortgage portfolio (amounting to EUR 34 billion) would be retained by ING, is referred to by the Netherlandsand ING as the Van Gogh scenario.
Tako strukturo, v kateri bi bili deli banke WUB vključeni v banko NN Bank in v kateri bi velik del preteklega portfelja hipotekarnih posojil (v znesku 34 milijard EUR) zadržala ING, Nizozemska in ING imenujeta scenarij Van Gogh.
In addition to its difficulties in executing the WUB commitment, ING faced difficulties in the implementation of the commitment to divest ING Insurance.
ING se je poleg težav pri izvajanju zaveze banke WUB soočila še s težavami pri izvajanju zaveze k odsvojitvi družbe ING Insurance.
ING initially intended to implement the commitment to divest ING Insurance through an initial public offer ("IPO") which would cover the entire Insurance business but later it decided to use two separate IPOs, one for EurAsia [19] and one for the United States, instead of a single IPO.
ING je sprva nameravala izvesti zavezo k odsvojitvi ING Insurance prek začetne javne ponudbe, ki bi zajela celotno zavarovalniško poslovanje, vendar se je pozneje namesto ene odločila uporabiti dve ločeni začetni javni ponudbi, eno za EurAsia [19] in eno za ZDA.
However in view of the worsening economic and market environment in Europe, ING changed its base case of an IPO for the EurAsia Insurance business and intends to explore possibilities to divest separately some of the constituents of this EurAsia Insurance business.
Vendar je ING ob upoštevanju vedno slabših gospodarskih in tržnih razmer v Evropi spremenila svoj osnovni scenarij začetne javne ponudbe za poslovanje EurAsia Insurance in namerava proučiti možnosti za ločeno odsvojitev nekaterih sestavnih delov navedenega EurAsia Insurance.
According to the Netherlands, macro-economic and regulatory developments, unfavourable valuations and ING's own exposure to industry-wide issues have delayed the divestment of ING Insurance.
Po mnenju Nizozemske so makroekonomske in zakonodajne spremembe, neugodna vrednotenja in izpostavljenost ING vprašanjem na ravni gospodarske panoge upočasnili odsvojitev družbe ING Insurance.
With respect to the macro-economic environment, long-term interest rates have continued to fall in both the Netherlands and the United Statesand the liabilities of insurance companies have risen as a result.
V zvezi z makroekonomskih okoljem so dolgoročne obrestne mere na Nizozemskem in v Združenih državah še naprej padale, posledica tega pa je bilo povečanje obveznosti zavarovalnic.
In addition, the escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis has had an impact on the asset values of life insurers.
Poleg tega je stopnjevanje evropske dolžniške krize vplivalo na vrednosti sredstev ponudnikov življenjskih zavarovanj.
There is uncertainty about the new Solvency II rules [20], which makes it difficult for public investors and industrial partners to value an insurance company accurately.
V zvezi z novimi pravili Solventnosti II [20] obstaja negotovost, zaradi česar imajo javni vlagatelji in industrijski partnerji težave pri natančnem vrednotenju zavarovalnice.
According to the Netherlands, the valuation metrics have deteriorated, with European and United States life insurance indices trading at historical lows near 0.4 times the book-value of equity (down from 0.9 times its book-value in the second half of 2009).
Po navedbah Nizozemske se je nabor vrednotenja poslabšal, pri čemer se z evropskimi in ameriškimi indeksi življenjskega zavarovanja posluje po neobičajno nizkih stopnjah, tj. skoraj 0,4-kratni knjigovodski vrednosti lastniškega kapitala (v primerjavi z 0,9-kratno knjigovodsko vrednostjo v drugi polovici leta 2009).
Moreover, […] [21] Nationale Nederlanden has […] by the continuing uncertainty concerning a sector-wide mis-selling case in the Netherlands (the so-called Woekerpolissen).
Poleg tega […] [21] je Nationale Nederlanden […] zaradi nadaljevanja negotovosti v zvezi s primerom zavajajoče prodaje na ravni sektorja na Nizozemskem (t.i. Woekerpolissen).
In respect of ING Insurance US, ING indicated that […] in respect of VA products, which constitute a large part of the balance sheet of ING Insurance US [22].
V zvezi z ING Insurance US je ING navedla, da […] v zvezi s produkti rentnih zavarovanj s spremenljivim donosom, ki sestavljajo velik del bilance ING Insurance US [22].
Against that background ING will no longer be able to divest its insurance business by the end of 2013, which the Netherlandsconfirmed in response to Commission's Opening Decision.
Glede na navedeno ING ne bo več mogla odsvojiti svojega zavarovalniškega poslovanja do konca leta 2013, kar je Nizozemska potrdila v odzivu na sklep o začetku postopka Komisije.
Alleged aggressive pricing strategy by ING Direct Italia
Domnevna strategija agresivnega določanja cen ING Direct Italia
By letter of 5 December 2011, Mediobanca alleged that ING had acted as price leader on the Italian market in breach of the price leadership ban to which it was subject.
Banka Mediobanca je v dopisu z dne 5. decembra 2011 trdila, da je ING narekovala cene na italijanskem trgu, pri čemer je kršila prepoved narekovanja cen, ki je veljala zanjo.
More precisely, it claimed that in the fourth week of September 2011 (19-25 September), ING Direct Italia had raised its 12-month gross interest rate for new customers from 3,50 % (the rate applicable in the previous week, which had been in place at least since the fourth week of June 2011) to 4,20 %, positioning itself as the price leader.
Natančneje je trdila, da je v četrtem tednu septembra 2011 (tj. 19.–25. septembra) banka ING Direct Italia povečala svojo 12-mesečno bruto obrestno mero za nove stranke s 3,50 % (obrestna mera, ki se je uporabljala v predhodnem tednu in je veljala vsaj od četrtega tedna v juniju leta 2011) na 4,20 %, s čimer je narekovala cene.
According to Mediobanca, as a result of ING Direct Italia's new offer, Banca Sistema raised its 12-month gross interest rate for all customers to 4,25 % in the last week of September 2011 (26-30 September), making it – at least in theoretical terms – a more competitive product [23].
Po navedbah banke Mediobanca je zaradi nove ponudbe ING Direct Italia banka Banca Sistema v zadnjem tednu v septembru leta 2011 (tj. 26.–30. septembra) dvignila svojo 12-mesečno bruto obrestno mero za vse stranke na 4,25 %, s čimer je njena obrestna mera vsaj teoretično postala konkurenčnejši produkt [23].
REASONS FOR THE OPENING DECISION
RAZLOGI ZA SKLEP O ZAČETKU POSTOPKA
In the Opening Decision the Commission indicated the following doubts with respect to the amendments proposed by the Netherlandsand their capability to continue to ensure compatibility of the recapitalisation measure and the restructuring aid with the internal market:
Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka navedla naslednje dvome glede sprememb, ki jih je predlagala Nizozemska, in njihovo zmožnostjo, da še naprej zagotavljajo združljivost ukrepa dokapitalizacije in pomoči za prestrukturiranje z notranjim trgom:
Doubts on the appropriate remuneration of the recapitalisation measure
Dvomi glede ustreznega nadomestila ukrepa dokapitalizacije
ING seems to have followed an opportunistic remuneration strategy in respect of the CT1 securities, which appears to be at odds with its previously declared intentions in terms of dividend distribution policy.
Zdi se, da je ING ravnala v skladu z oportunistično strategijo nadomestila pri vrednostnih papirjih CT1, ki je dozdevno v nasprotju z njenimi predhodno izraženimi nameni v zvezi s politiko izplačevanja dividend.
According to the Commission, ING seemed to have pursued a distribution policy which limited coupon payments to the State while ING was in a position to pay dividends from the realised profits.
Po navedbah Komisije je ING dozdevno izvajala politiko izplačevanja, ki je plačila kuponov omejila na državo, dokler je ING dividende lahko izplačevala iz ustvarjenega dobička.
Therefore, without firm behavioural constraints regarding the remuneration conditions attached to the CT1 securities the Commission doubted that it could continue to regard the recapitalisation measure as compatible with the internal market without any modification, in line with the reservations which it had expressed in Recital (32) of the Rescue Decision.
Ker ni bilo strogih omejitev glede ravnanja v zvezi s pogoji nadomestil, ki veljajo za vrednostne papirje CT1, je Komisija v skladu s pomisleki, ki jih je izrazila v uvodni izjavi (32) sklepa o reševanju, dvomila, da bi se lahko popolnoma nespremenjen ukrep dokapitalizacije še naprej obravnaval kot združljiv z notranjim trgom.
In particular, it appeared that behavioural constraints were required to address "State aid arbitrage", whereby the beneficiary takes strategic decisions which seek to minimize the return to the MemberStatewhich would have been obtained by the latter if the beneficiary had followed a normal course of business.
Zlasti se je zdelo, da so bile omejitve glede ravnanja potrebne za obravnavanje „arbitraže državne pomoči“, pri čemer upravičenec sprejema strateške odločitve, s katerimi poskuša čim bolj zmanjšati vračilo državi članici, ki bi ga pridobila, če bi upravičenec upošteval običajen potek poslovanja.
Such constraints could in the view of the Commission either be an increase in the remuneration, a clarification of the repayment schedule, or some combination of such measures.
Po mnenju Komisije bi takšne omejitve pomenile povečanje nadomestila, pojasnitev načrta odplačil ali kombinacijo takih ukrepov.
Doubts regarding the proposed amendment of commitments in order to ensure compatibility of the restructuring aid
Dvomi glede predlagane spremembe zavez, da bi se zagotovila združljivost pomoči za prestrukturiranje
ING had proposed the integration of the core of WUB with NN Bank as described in Recital (4) above.
ING je predlagala vključitev osnovnega dela banke WUB v banko NN Bank, kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi (4).
The proposal to divest WUB after its integration into the newly created NN Bank was notified to the Commission.
Komisiji je priglasila predlog za odsvojitev banke WUB po njeni vključitvi v novo ustvarjeno banko NN Bank.
Based on a preliminary assessment of the financial information and projections described in Recitals (39) to (78) of the Opening Decision, the Commission raised doubts that NN Bank would be a stand-alone entity and doubted that its divestment would have the same competitive value as the original WUB commitment.
Komisija je podlagi predhodne ocene finančnih informacij in napovedi, opisanih v uvodnih izjavah od (39) do (78) sklepa o začetku postopka, izrazila pomisleke, da bi bila banka NN Bank samostojen subjekt in da bi njena odsvojitev imela enako konkurenčno vrednost kot prvotna zaveza banke WUB.
In particular, the Commission expressed doubts that NN Bank was comparable in scope and product offering to the WUB commitment (since the former had lower market shares and financial metrics than the latter) and was not convinced that NN Bank would grow strong enough to become a sizeable player in the foreseeable future.
Komisija je zlasti izrazila dvome, da je bila banka NN Bank glede obsega in ponudbe produktov primerljiva z zavezo banke WUB (saj je prva imela nižje tržne deleže in finančne nabore od slednje) in ni bila prepričana, da se bo banka NN Bank tako okrepila, da bo v bližnji prihodnosti postala pomemben akter.
Furthermore, the Commission expressed doubts that NN Bank would be in a position to function as an independent market actor.
Poleg tega je Komisija izrazila dvome, da bo banka NN Bank lahko delovala kot neodvisen akter na trgu.
The information provided to the Commission did not allow it to sufficiently establish whether NN Bank has critical scale and have sufficient access to funding to sustain and grow its business.
Komisija na podlagi informacij, ki so ji bile predložene, ni mogla ustrezno ugotoviti, ali ima banka NN Bank kritični obseg in ustrezen dostop do financiranja, da bi obdržala in povečala svoje poslovanje.
That information also did not establish the viability of the entity.
Te informacije tudi niso določale sposobnosti preživetja subjekta.
Moreover, the Commission also wondered whether given market developments based on the latest information available, the schedule for the sale of ING Insurance by 2013, which was supposed to ensure the independence of the new bank, could be confirmed any longer and requested an updated divestment schedule for ING Insurance Europe.
Poleg tega je Komisijo tudi zanimalo, ali bi dani tržni razvoji na podlagi najnovejših razpoložljivih informacij, tj. načrta za prodajo ING Insurance do leta 2013, s čimer naj bi se zagotovila neodvisnost nove banke, lahko bili potrjeni še naprej, in je zahtevala posodobljen načrt odsvojitve za ING Insurance Europe.
On that basis the Commission expressed doubts that the proposed amendment would continue to ensure the compatibility of the aid.
Na podlagi navedenega je Komisija izrazila dvome, da bi predlagana sprememba še naprej zagotavljala združljivost pomoči.
Doubts as to the pricing behaviour of ING Direct Italia
Dvomi glede določanja cen banke ING Direct Italia
The Commission decided to investigate the pricing behaviour of ING Direct in Italia.
Komisija je sklenila, da bo raziskala določanje cen banke ING Direct v Italiji.
The pricing behaviour of ING Direct as alleged by Mediobanca, if confirmed, would have raised doubts as to whether ING had respected the commitment on which the Rescue Decision was based, to refrain from expansion of its business activities that it would not have pursued if it had not received the recapitalisation measure.
Če bi se potrdilo določanje cen banke ING Direct, kot je trdila banka Mediobanca, bi se pojavili dvomi, ali je ING upoštevala zavezo, na kateri je temeljil sklep o reševanju, in sicer da se vzdrži širjenja svojih poslovnih dejavnosti, za kar si ne bi prizadevala, če ne bi prejela ukrepa dokapitalizacije.
The investigation of the Commission also covers the question of whether the relevant market for the assessment of the pricing strategy of ING Direct is the overall market for savings and mortgage products or the more specialised market for internet savings and mortgages.
Preiskava Komisije zajema tudi vprašanje, ali je ustrezni trg za oceno strategije določanja cen banke ING Direct splošni trg prihrankov in hipotekarnih produktov ali bolj specializirani trg spletnega varčevanja in spletnih hipotekarnih posojil.
THIRD PARTY OBSERVATIONS
PRIPOMBE TRETJIH STRANI
The Commission has obtained the following third party observations:
Komisija je pridobila naslednje pripombe tretjih strani:
Observations from ING
Pripombe družbe ING
According to ING the re-notification commitment in the Rescue Decision merely allows the Commission to assess whether it is likely that ING will pay at least 10 % per annum remuneration.
Po mnenju ING zaveza ponovne priglasitve v sklepu o reševanju zgolj omogoča Komisiji, da oceni verjetnost, ali bo ING plačala vsaj 10 % nadomestila na leto.
ING redeemed 500 million CT1 securities (with a nominal value of EUR 5 billion) with a return of 15 % for the Netherlandson 21 December 2009.
ING je 21. decembra 2009 izplačala 500 milijonov vrednostnih papirjev CT1 (z nominalno vrednostjo 5 milijard EUR) s 15-odstotnim donosom za Nizozemsko.
In addition, ING redeemed another 200 million CT1 securities (with a nominal value of EUR 2 billion) with a return for the Netherlands of 19,5 % on 13 May 2011, providing the Netherlands an overall return on the repaid EUR 7 billion of 17 % per annum.
Poleg tega je ING 13. maja 2011 izplačala 200 milijonov vrednostnih papirjev CT1 (z nominalno vrednostjo 2 milijardi EUR) z 19,5-odstotnim donosom za Nizozemsko, s čimer je Nizozemski zagotovila skupen donos na poplačanih 7 milijard EUR v višini 17 % na leto.
Therefore according to ING there can be no serious doubts that the State will receive an overall return of at least 10 % per annum.
Zato po mnenju ING ni nobenih resnih dvomov o tem, da bo država prejela skupen donos v višini najmanj 10 % na leto.
According to ING, the Rescue Decision did not (and could not) take into account the developments in the next few years (the sovereign debt crisis).
Po mnenju ING sklep o reševanju ni upošteval (in ni mogel upoštevati) razvoja dogodkov v prihodnjih nekaj letih (državna dolžniška kriza).
In the 2012 Restructuring Decision, the Commission accepted ING’s restructuring plan which indicated that ING expected to be able to make dividend payments on ordinary shares only as of 2013.
V sklepu o prestrukturiranju iz leta 2012 je Komisija sprejela načrt za prestrukturiranje ING, iz katerega so bila razvidna pričakovanja ING, da bo lahko izvajala plačila dividend na navadne delnice šele od leta 2013.
Although ING declared profits in 2010 and 2011, it had to retain them to build up capital levels to meet the new Basel III requirements [24].
Čeprav je ING leta 2010 in 2011 objavila dobiček, ga je morala obdržati, da je povečala raven kapitala za izpolnjevanje novih zahtev svežnja Basel III [24].
ING points out that the Van Gogh scenario constitutes an enhanced opportunity to achieve the objective of the Commission to create a viable and competitive business, which is stand alone and separate from the business retained by ING.
ING poudarja, da scenarij Van Gogh pomeni večjo možnost za doseganje cilja Komisije, da se ustvari za preživetje sposobna in konkurenčna družba, ki je neodvisna in ločena od poslov, ki jih zadrži ING.
Under the Van Gogh scenario NN Bank will have access to more customers and operate under a much stronger retail brand than was foreseen under the WUB commitment.
V scenariju Van Gogh bo banka NN Bank imela dostop do več strank in bo delovala pod precej močnejšo znamko poslovanja s prebivalstvom, kot je bilo predvideno z zavezo banke WUB.
The Van Gogh scenario furthermore includes a longer term portfolio funding than provided for in the WUB commitment, resulting in a bank which has a competitive advantage in current markets given its lack of a back book and its diversified funding possibilities.
Scenarij Van Gogh nadalje vključuje dolgoročnejše financiranje portfelja, kot je bilo zagotovljeno v zavezi banke WUB, kar je ustvarilo banko s konkurenčno prednostjo na sedanjih trgih, saj nima preteklega portfelja, njene finančne možnosti pa so raznovrstne.
Through its combination with WUB, NN Bank is well positioned to grow in the current challenging market place.
Banka NN Bank je v kombinaciji z banko WUB v dobrem položaju za rast na trenutno težavnem trgu.
Until the IPO of ING Insurance Europe, both ING Insurance Europe and WUB will remain operationally separated from the remainder of ING to ensure their independence.
Do začetne javne ponudbe ING Insurance Europe bo poslovanje ING Insurance Europe in banke WUB še naprej ločeno od ostale skupine ING, da se zagotovi njuna neodvisnost.
In addition, ING has proposed additional ring-fencing measures to further guarantee the independence of the integrated entity resulting from WUB and the newly created NN Bank.
Poleg tega je ING predlagala dodatne omejitvene ukrepe, da se dodatno zagotovi neodvisnost vključenega subjekta, ki je rezultat banke WUB in novo ustvarjene banke NN Bank.
According to ING, the Van Gogh scenario therefore meets and even exceeds the objectives of the Commission.
Po mnenju ING scenarij Van Gogh torej dosega in celo presega cilje Komisije.
ING points out that there is no evidence that ING Direct Italia breached the price leadership ban.
ING poudarja, da ni dokazov, da je ING Direct Italia kršila prepoved narekovanja cen.
The complaint from Mediobanca in respect of ING Direct Italia’s compliance with the price leadership ban is unsubstantiated.
Pritožba banke Mediobanca v zvezi z združljivostjo ING Direct Italia s prepovedjo narekovanja cen ni utemeljena.
Mediobanca mentioned only one concrete instance (September 2011), which is however factually incorrect since Banca Sistema offered a better rate than ING. In particular, Banca Sistema was already offering a rate of 4,25 % on 30 August 2011, which was evidenced in the information provided to the Commission on 13 June 2012.
Banka Mediobanca je navedla zgolj en konkretni primer (september 2011), ki pa je stvarno netočen, saj je banka Banca Sistema ponudila boljšo obrestno mero kot ING. Banka Banca Sistema je že 30. avgusta 2011 ponudila obrestno mero v višini 4,25 %, kar je bilo razvidno iz informacij, predloženih Komisiji 13. junija 2012.
According to ING, the Commission’s doubts as to whether ING could have achieved its market share without aid are unfounded.
Po mnenju ING so dvomi Komisije glede tega, ali ING lahko doseže svoj tržni delež brez pomoči, neutemeljeni.
ING demonstrated that its market share in Italyhas not increased since it received aid.
ING je dokazala, da se njen tržni delež v Italiji ni povečal, odkar je prejela pomoč.
In any event, none of the aid which ING received was related to ING Direct Europe (including ING Direct Italia).
V vsakem primeru nobena od pomoči, ki jo je prejela ING, ni bila povezana z ING Direct Europe (vključno z ING Direct Italia).
ING submits that it did not pursue a high-risk strategy.
ING navaja, da ni uporabljala strategije z visoko stopnjo tveganja.