natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
A private investor would have to come to his own judgement whether the specific assumptions used to justify the business plan are appropriate in this particular case.
Zasebni vlagatelj bi moral sam presoditi, ali so predpostavke, na katerih je utemeljen poslovni načrt, v tem primeru ustrezne.
Furthermore, a private investor can be expected to compare the expected return of the Ciudad de la Luz project with the expected return of alternative projects.
Od zasebnega vlagatelja bi tudi pričakovali, da bo primerjal pričakovani donos projekta Ciudad de la Luz s pričakovanim donosom alternativnih projektov.
Such an analysis had not been done at the time.
Taka analiza takrat ni bila opravljena.
Further, it was even not feasible to carry out such a comparison on the basis of the estimated positive cash flows provided in these studies.
Poleg tega taka primerjava ni bila niti izvedljiva na podlagi ocenjenih pozitivnih denarnih tokov v teh študijah.
In the context of a State aid investigation, jurisprudence requires the Commission to carry out its own assessment of the facts [22].
V okviru postopka preiskave državne pomoči sodna praksa zahteva, da Komisija izvede lastno oceno dejstev [22].
It is therefore necessary to judge the validity of reports carried out at the time of the transaction.
Zato je treba presoditi veljavnost poročil, opravljenih ob transakciji.
In view of the reports submitted by the Spanish authorities since the opening decision, there appear to have been two investment decisions concerning the project.
Glede na poročila, ki so jih predložili španski organi od sklepa o začetku postopka naprej, je videti, da sta bili v zvezi s projektom sprejeti dve naložbeni odločitvi.
The first of these was in 2000 based on the Arthur Andersen business plan of 2000 (covering investments in the period 2002-2006).
Prva je bila sprejeta leta 2000 na podlagi poslovnega načrta Atrhurja Andersena iz leta 2000 (ki je pokrival vlaganja v letih od 2002 do 2006).
In 2004, potentially to review whether further investment in the project was appropriate, the Consultia report was commissioned (covering actual investments in the period 2002-2004 and forecast investments in 2004-2014).
Leta 2004 je bilo naročeno poročilo družbi Consultia, da bi ugotovila, ali so primerna nadaljnja vlaganja v projekt (ki bi obravnavalo dejanske naložbe v projekt v obdobju 2002–2004 in predvidene naložbe v obdobju 2004–2014).
Consequently, the MEIP should be assessed for both investment decisions.
Nato bi bilo treba oceniti načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu v primeru obeh naložbenih odločitev.
The Commission has assessed whether a hypothetical private investor would have invested in the project creating the company Ciudad de la Luz.
Komisija je ocenila, ali bi teoretični zasebni vlagatelj vlagal v projekt ustanavljanja družbe Ciudad de la Luz.
According to the market economy investor principle, the investment undertaken is considered to be State aid if the expected compensation to be received by the State is lower than what a private investor would have requested under the circumstances of that particular project.
Po načelu vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu se šteje, da je opravljena naložba državna pomoč, če je pričakovano nadomestilo, ki naj bi ga prejel od države, manjše od tistega, kar bi zasebni vlagatelj zahteval v okoliščinah, kakršne so veljale v tistem projektu.
In order to finance a project, investors need to invest some capital.
Vlagatelji morajo za financiranje projekta vložiti nekaj kapitala.
Such capital has a cost, the cost of capital.
Tak kapital pomeni stroške, to so stroški kapitala.
Typically, there are two broad sources of capital:
Ponavadi obstajata dva splošna vira kapitala:
equity capital and (financial) debt capital.
lastniški kapital in (finančni) dolžniški kapital.
The total cost of capital is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), taking into account the proportion of equity capital and the proportion of debt capital.
Skupni stroški kapitala so tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala (WACC), z upoštevanjem deleža lastniškega in deleža dolžniškega kapitala.
The cost of debt capital and cost of equity capital are expected costs and not historical costs.
Stroški dolžniškega kapitala in stroški lastniškega kapitala so pričakovani in ne pretekli stroški.
In the particular case of Ciudad de la Luz, the business plan envisaged that the project would be fully financed with equity capital.
V primeru Ciudad de la Luz je poslovni načrt predvideval, da se bo projekt v celoti financiral z lastniškim kapitalom.
Therefore, the total cost of capital is the equity capital.
Zato so skupni stroški kapitala lastniški kapital.
A private equity investor would have been willing to invest in Ciudad de la Luz if the expected internal rate of return [23] was higher than or equal to the opportunity cost of equity capital [24] (i.e. the return that he could have obtained in a similar project).
Vlagatelj zasebnega kapitala bi bil pripravljen vlagati v Ciudad de la Luz, če bi bila pričakovana notranja stopnja donosa [23] višja ali enaka oportunitetnim stroškom lastniškega kapitala [24] (tj. donosu, ki bi ga lahko dosegel v podobnem projektu).
The Commission has calibrated the Capital Asset Pricing Model to obtain the cost of equity capital.
Komisija je za izračun stroškov lastniškega kapitala prilagodila model ocenjevanja dolgoročnih sredstev.
The cost of equity capital reflects the opportunity cost of investment for shareholders in companies or projects with the same (or similar) business and financial risk as the one under consideration.
Stroški lastniškega kapitala prikazujejo oportunitetne stroške naložbe za delničarje v družbah ali projektih z enakim (ali podobnim) poslovnim in finančnim tveganjem, kot je obravnavani.
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the cost of equity capital, Ke should be estimated by the following formula:
Skladno z modelom določanja cen dolgoročnih naložb (CAPM) bi morali biti stroški lastniškega kapitala, Ke, ocenjeni po naslednji formuli:
where Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm
kjer je Rf netvegana stopnja donosa, Rm
is the market risk premium and ß is the ‘Beta’, a measure of the systematic (non-diversifiable) risk associated with the stock of Ciudad de la Luz, which reflects both the business and financial risk.
premija za tržno tveganje in ß „beta“, merilo sistematičnega tveganja (tveganje, ki ga ni mogoče izločiti), povezanega z delnicami Ciudad de la Luz, ki kaže poslovno in tudi finančno tveganje.
For the risk free rate, Rf, market practice [25] suggests to take the long-term (typically 10 years) government bond rate in the country of operation (these are considered the least risky investments).
Skladno s tržno prakso [25] se netvegana stopnja donosa, Rf, meri z donosnostjo dolgoročnih (po navadi 10-letnih) državnih obveznic v državi poslovanja (te naložbe naj bi bile najmanj tvegane).
The average annual return on 10 year government bonds in Spain was 4,1 % in 2004 [26].
Povprečni letni donos na 10-letne državne obveznice v Španiji je leta 2004 znašal 4,1 % [26].
For the market risk premium, one should take the historical market risk premium over a reasonably long time period.
Za premijo za tržno tveganje bi morali šteti pretekle vrednosti premije za tržno tveganje v razumno dolgem obdobju.
It is common market practice to take the difference between the historical return on a diversified equity index in the country of operations, and the risk free rate.
Običajna tržna praksa je, da se šteje razlika med preteklimi donosi razpršenega lastniškega kapitala v državi poslovanja in netvegano stopnjo donosa.
According to Fernández (2004) [27], the historical market risk premium over government bonds in Spain (during the period 1991-2003) was between 6,8 %-9,3 %.
Fernández (2004) [27] pravi, da je pretekla premija za tržno tveganje za državne obveznice v Španiji (v obdobju med letoma 1991 in 2003) znašala od 6,8 do 9,3 %.
The Commission took a conservative approach in the estimation of the market risk premium and considered the lower bound of this interval, namely 6,8 %.
Komisija je s konservativnim pristopom pri oceni premije za tržno tveganje štela najnižjo vrednost, in sicer 6,8 %.
A subsequent and more recent paper by the same author [28] comes to reinforce the validity of this value, by presenting the required equity premium during the period 2000-2004 in the range of 6-7 %.
Isti avtor je v poznejšem in novejšem delu [28] okrepil veljavnost te vrednosti ter predstavil zahtevano premijo za tveganje lastniškega kapitala v obdobju med letoma 2000 in 2004 v razponu od 6 do 7 %.
For the estimate of beta, the Commission used publicly available information pertaining to companies that have been identified as direct competitors to Ciudad de la Luz by Spanish authorities, namely Carrere Group [29] and Babelsberg.
Za oceno količnika beta je Komisija uporabila javno razpoložljive podatke podjetij, za katera so španski organi ugotovili, da sta neposredna konkurenta Ciudad de la Luz, in sicer Carrere Group [29] in Babelsberg.
These figures were reported by financial analysts that carried an in-depth analysis of the two companies.
O teh podatkih so poročali finančni analitiki, ki so izvedli podrobno analizo obeh družb.
An average of the two betas, adjusted to match the financial risk profile of Ciudad de la Luz, gives a value around 1,5.
Povprečje dveh količnikov beta, prilagojenih tako, da ustrezata profilu finančnega tveganja Ciudad de la Luz, znaša okoli 1,5.
This is a conservative approach, since the investment in Ciudad de la Luz is likely to involve a higher degree of idiosyncratic risk as the other two established studios.
To je konservativni pristop, ker bo verjetno pri naložbah v Ciudad de la Luz več idiosinkratičnega tveganja kot pri drugih dveh uveljavljenih studiih.
Ciudad de la Luz it is a green-field investment in a region which does not host either Spanish or international film producers.
Naložba v Ciudad de la Luz je naložba v novo podjetje v regiji, v kateri ni ne španskih ne mednarodnih filmskih producentov.
In other words, Ciudad de la Luz’s beta is probably higher than that of its competitors.
Količnik beta bo torej v primeru Ciudad de la Luz večji kot pri konkurentih.
Applying the formula above (see recital 71), the Commission obtained that the expected cost of equity capital should be approximately 14,9 %.
Z uporabo navedene formule (glej uvodno izjavo 71) je Komisija ugotovila, da bi morali pričakovani stroški lastniškega kapitala znašati okoli 14,9 %.
A beta significantly below 1 would therefore imply a particular low-risk investment.
Količnik beta, ki je bistveno manjši od 1, bi torej pomenil naložbo z zelo majhnim tveganjem.
Spain did not substantiate such assumption and did not back it up with any hard and verifiable data.
Španija ni utemeljila take predpostavke, niti je ni podprla s kakršnimi koli zanesljivimi in preverljivimi podatki.
As stated above (see recital 70), a private investor would only invest in a project with an internal rate of return larger than the opportunity cost of capital.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj (glej uvodno izjavo 70), bi zasebni vlagatelj vlagal v projekt le po notranji stopnji donosa, ki bi bila višja od oportunitetnih stroškov kapitala.
The Commission notes that the 2000 business plan evaluated only the initial phases of the project in detail.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je poslovni načrt iz leta 2000 podrobno ocenil le prvo fazo projekta.
The Commission’s analysis (see Annex II) arrived at a negative net present value, based on the 2000 business plan and taking the cash flows presented in the business plan at face value.
Analiza Komisije (glej Prilogo II) je ugotovila negativno neto sedanjo vrednost na podlagi poslovnega načrta iz leta 2000 in ob nominalni vrednosti denarnih tokov iz poslovnega načrta.
On this basis, a private investor would not have invested in the project.
Na tej podlagi zasebni vlagatelj v projekt ne bi vlagal.
When establishing the internal rate of return, the Commission again takes a conservative approach by not questioning the assumptions of the business plan, in particular the stream of cash flows forecasted for the proposed project.
Pri ugotavljanju notranje stopnje donosa Komisija ponovno zavzema konservativni pristop in dvomi o predpostavkah iz poslovnega načrta, zlasti o denarnih tokovih, napovedanih za predlagani projekt.
However, it should be noted that the cash flows forecasted in the 2004 business plans appear to be unduly optimistic, especially taking into account the losses incurred by the company during the period 2002-2004 [30].
Treba je ugotoviti, da so denarni tokovi, napovedani v poslovnem načrtu iz leta 2004, videti neupravičeno optimistični, zlasti ob upoštevanju izgub, ki jih je družba utrpela v obdobju med letoma 2002 in 2004 [30].
Given the information at the Commission’s disposal, one can therefore consider that the expected cash flows presented in the 2004 business plan represented an upper bound [31].
Po informacijah, ki so na voljo Komisiji, bi torej lahko šteli, da so bili pričakovani denarni tokovi v poslovnem načrtu iz leta 2004 zgornja meja [31].
The stream of cash flows determines its expected return.
Denarni tokovi določajo pričakovano donosnost.
The Commission also takes at face value the expected return of Ciudad de la Luz.
Komisija upošteva tudi nominalno vrednost pričakovanega donosa Ciudad de la Luz.
However, it calibrates the cost of raising capital.
Vendar pa kalibrira stroške zbiranja kapitala.
This would have to be done by any rational private investor.
To bi storil tudi vsak razumni zasebni vlagatelj.
On the basis of the 2004 business plan proposed by Ciudad de la Luz, the internal rate of return of this project is 5,74 % (see Annex I).
Na podlagi poslovnega načrta iz leta 2004, ki ga je predložila Ciudad de la Luz, znaša notranja stopnja donosa tega projekta 5,74 % (glej Prilogo I).
A private investor in Ciudad de la Luz, facing an opportunity cost of capital of at least 14 % (as computed above, see recital 73), would not have undertaken this investment, since its internal rate of return is lower than the opportunity cost of capital.
Zasebni vlagatelj v Ciudad de la Luz se ob oportunitetnih stroških kapitala v višini vsaj 14 % (kot je izračunano zgoraj, glej uvodno izjavo 73) za naložbo ne bi odločil, ker je ta notranja stopnja donosa nižja od oportunitetnih stroškov kapitala.
Furthermore, the Commission computed the Net Present Value (NPV) of the investment in Ciudad de la Luz in order to give the magnitude of how much the project would be worth for the private investor.
Komisija je izračunala tudi neto sedanjo vrednost (NPV) naložbe v Ciudad de la Luz, da bi prikazala, koliko bi bil projekt vreden za zasebnega vlagatelja.
The object of any investment decision is to find real assets that are worth more than they cost, in other words, investments that have an expected return higher than the opportunity cost of capital.
Namen naložbene odločitve je poiskati realna sredstva, ki so vredna več kot stanejo, oziroma naložbo, katere pričakovani donos je večji od oportunitetnih stroškov kapitala.
If this is not the case, as for Ciudad de la Luz, the value of the project is negative and consequently the investment is not viable for any rational private investor.
Če ni tako, kakor v primeru Ciudad de la Luz, je vrednost projekta negativna, zato je naložba za vsakega razumnega zasebnega vlagatelja neizvedljiva.
The NPV of any project quantifies how much the investment is worth at the moment of taking a decision, and is computed by discounting the stream of cash flows forecasted in the business plan using the discount factor, which is the cost of capital.
NPV projekta določa, koliko je vredna naložba v trenutku sprejetja odločitve, izračuna pa se z diskontiranjem denarnih tokov, napovedanih v poslovnem načrtu, z diskontnim količnikom, kar so stroški kapitala.
Intuitively, the higher the cost of capital, the lower the NPV.
Višji so stroški kapitala, nižja je NPV.
The Commission has also undertaken a robustness check showing that the result is very solid.
Komisija je opravila tudi preizkus zanesljivosti, ki kaže, da je rezultat zelo zanesljiv.
Above a reasonable threshold, the result is hardly sensitive to the value of the opportunity cost of capital, as estimated by the Commission.
Komisija je ocenila, da je nad razumnim pragom rezultat skoraj neobčutljiv za vrednost oportunitetnih stroškov kapitala.
In other words, significant changes in the parameters calibrated by the Commission in calculating the cost of capital do not alter the result.
Velike spremembe parametrov, ki jih je kalibrirala Komisija pri izračunu stroškov kapitala, torej ne spremenijo rezultata.
The graph below plots the approximate values of the NPV against different values of the cost of capital (WACC) from 5 % to 20 %.
Graf spodaj prikazuje približne vrednosti NPV glede na različne vrednosti stroškov kapitala (WACC) od 5 % do 20 %.
The graph illustrates that the NPV becomes negative for a WACC of between 5 % and 6 %.
Graf kaže, da postane NPV negativna, če znaša WACC med 5 % in 6 %.
Hence, if the cost of capital is higher than 6 %, a private investor would not undertake the project.
Če so torej stroški kapitala višji od 6 %, zasebni vlagatelj ne bi vlagal v projekt.
Moreover, for values of WACC higher than 10 %, the value of the NPV is practically unaffected.
Vrednosti WACC, višje od 10 %, skoraj ne vplivajo na NPV.
The Commission has estimated a WACC of around 14 %, hence in a range where it can be concluded with high degree of confidence that the project is not profitable.
Komisija je ocenila, da je vrednost WACC okoli 14 %, torej v mejah, kjer bi lahko precej zanesljivo zaključili, da projekt ni donosen.
NPV(mil EUR) for different values of WACC
NPV (v mio. EUR) za različne vrednosti WACC
In response to the Commission’s assessment, on the basis of a consultancy report [32], the Spanish authorities argued that the Commission’s assessment was flawed.
V odgovoru na oceno Komisije so španski organi na podlagi svetovalnega poročila [32] trdili, da ima ocena Komisije napake.
Firstly, while the CAPM analysis as such was considered to be the correct approach, the consultancy report questioned the parameter values used by the Commission.
Prvič, medtem ko so šteli, da je CAPM kot taka pravilen pristop, pa svetovalno poročilo dvomi o vrednosti parametrov, ki jih je uporabila Komisija.
In particular, the equity premium and the ‘betas’ should have been lower.
Zlasti premija za tveganje lastniškega kapitala in količniki beta bi morali biti manjši.
Finally, the Commission did not take into account expected revenues deriving from the development of hotels and office space.
Komisija tudi ni upoštevala pričakovanih donosov, ki bi bili posledica razvoja hotelov in pisarn.
These arguments were rebutted by the Commission.
Komisija je te trditve ovrgla.
As regards the equity premium, Annex II explains in some detail why the values in the range proposed by Spain cannot be valid.
Priloga II v zvezi s premijo za tveganje lastniškega kapitala podrobneje razlaga, zakaj vrednosti, ki jih predlaga Španija, niso primerne.
In fact, for the relevant period, the author quoted by the Spanish authorities himself provides estimates which are in line with the Commission’s assessment.
Dejansko za zadevno obdobje avtor, ki ga navajajo španski organi, sam navaja ocene, skladne z oceno Komisije.
Annex II also explains why the Spanish authorities’ request for lower ‘betas’ is mistaken.
V Prilogi II je razloženo tudi, zakaj je zahteva španskih organov, da mora biti vrednost beta nižja, napačna.
The Commission uses values from public studies which calculated betas for close competitors of Ciudad de la Luz.
Komisija uporablja vrednosti iz javnih študij, ki so izračunale vrednosti beta za tesne konkurente Ciudad de la Luz.
The Spanish authorities’ proposal to use historical betas is refuted by financial experts.
Finančni strokovnjaki zavračajo predlog španskih organov, naj se uporabijo pretekle vrednosti beta.
In reply to the Spanish authorities’ request to consider the 2000 business plan, Annex II provides such a calculation.
V odgovor na zahtevo španskih organov, naj se upošteva poslovni načrt iz leta 2000, Priloga II navaja tak izračun.
Finally, with regard to possible revenues deriving from hotels and office space, the assertions made by the Spanish authorities were based on new evidence, namely six land valuation reports drawn up subsequently.
Glede morebitnih prihodkov od hotelov in pisarn so trditve španskih organov temeljile na novih dokazilih, in sicer šestih poročilih o oceni vrednosti zemljišč, pripravljenih pozneje.
This evidence was not part of the information available to a potential investor at the time.
Ta dokazila niso bila del informacij, ki so bile na voljo potencialnemu vlagatelju v tistem času.
While the Andersen report mentions the possibility of developing a hotel complex, it does not contain information about expected profitability and there was no business plan pertaining to the development of the land.
Andersonovo poročilo sicer omenja možnost razvoja hotelskega kompleksa, vendar ne vsebuje informacij o pričakovani donosnosti, poleg tega tudi ni bilo nobenega poslovnega načrta, ki bi se nanašal na razvoj zemljišč.
Annex II nevertheless looks in detail at the proposed ex post reports on land development.
Priloga II vseeno podrobno obravnava predlagana poznejša poročila o razvoju zemljišč.
They are seriously flawed.
Ta imajo resne pomanjkljivosti.
For instance, benchmark prices proposed for office space in the Ciudad de la Luz complex are those of the most prestigious business streets in Alicante.
Referenčne cene, predlagane za pisarne v kompleksu Ciudad de la Luz, so na primer cene za najprestižnejše poslovne ulice v Alicanteju.
Given that the Ciudad de la Luz complex is outside the city of Alicante and next to an industrial complex, these benchmark prices are highly inflated.
Ker kompleks Ciudad de la Luz leži zunaj mesta Alicante in blizu industrijskega kompleksa, so te referenčne cene prenapihnjene.
Similarly, the benchmark prices for hotels are based on 4 or 5 stars hotels.
Podobno tudi referenčne cene za hotele temeljijo na cenah za hotele s štirimi ali petimi zvezdicami.
No indication is given that there would be sufficient demand for such hotels outside of Alicante (and located close to a highway and an industrial complex).
Nobenih podatkov ni, ki bi nakazovali, da bo po takih hotelih zunaj Alicanteja (ki stojijo blizu avtoceste in industrijskega kompleksa) dovolj povpraševanja.
Apart from its own internal assessment, the Commission also commissioned an independent study on whether a private investor would have carried out such an investment in Ciudad de la Luz under the same terms [33].
Poleg teh lastnih notranjih ocen je Komisija naročila tudi neodvisno študijo, ali bi zasebni vlagatelj izpeljal tako naložbo v Ciudad de la Luz pod enakimi pogoji [33].
By way of contrast, the internal rate of return calculated on the basis of the business plan is well below the minimum cost of equity capital as estimated by Ecorys.
Nasprotno je notranja stopnja donosa, izračunana na podlagi poslovnega načrta, precej nižja od minimalnih stroškov lastniškega kapitala, kot jih je ocenila družba Ecorys.
Ecorys’ overall conclusion is therefore that it does not seem likely that the investments made in 2000 and 2004 were congruent with the conduct of a diligent private investor in a market economy.
Splošna sklepna ugotovitev družbe Ecorys je torej, da ni verjetno, da bi naložbe iz leta 2000 in 2004 ustrezale ravnanju preudarnega zasebnega vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
With regard to the 2000 investment plan, Ecorys finds that the reconstructed business case shows a negative NPV of PTA 9,3 billion.
Družba Ecorys v zvezi s poslovnim načrtom iz leta 2000 ugotavlja, da rekonstruirani poslovni primer izkazuje negativno NPV v višini 9,3 milijarde PTA.
Investing in the stock market would have been a much more interesting investment for a prudent market investor.
Vlaganje v delniški trg bi bilo za preudarnega tržnega vlagatelja veliko zanimivejša naložba.