natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Such information would have allowed for an adequate determination of the amount of subsidisation granted pursuant to the other subsidy schemes under investigation available to the non-cooperating exporting producers.
Take informacije bi omogočile ustrezno določitev zneska subvencioniranja, odobrenega v skladu z drugimi subvencijskimi shemami, ki so predmet preiskave, in so na voljo nesodelujočim proizvajalcem izvoznikom.
Since neither the representatives of the PRC nor the non-cooperating exporting producers provided the necessary information to determine whether the other subsidy schemes were available to the non-cooperating exporting producers, on the basis of best facts available, the Commission concluded that the other alleged subsidy schemes were indeed available to the other non-cooperating exporting producers, and proceeded to calculate the amounts of benefit conferred through those schemes on the basis of best facts available.
Ker predstavniki LRK niti nesodelujoči proizvajalci izvozniki niso zagotovili potrebnih informacij za ugotavljanje, ali so bile nesodelujočim proizvajalcem izvoznikom na voljo druge subvencijske sheme, je Komisija na podlagi najboljših razpoložljivih dejstev ugotovila, da so bile domnevne druge subvencijske sheme dejansko na voljo drugim nesodelujočim proizvajalcem izvoznikom, ter je nato tudi na podlagi najboljših razpoložljivih dejstev izračunala zneske prejetih ugodnosti iz teh shem.
INDIVIDUAL EXAMINATION ('IE')
INDIVIDUALNA PREISKAVA („IP“)
Claims for IE were submitted by two cooperating exporting producers pursuant to Article 27(3) of the basic Regulation, i.e. Union Steel China (Union Steel) and Shenzhen Sino Master Steel Co. Ltd. It was not possible to grant these IEs to both companies as, due to the high number of alleged subsidy schemes and time consuming nature of anti-subsidy investigation, it would be unduly burdensome and could prevent completion of the investigation in good time.
Zahtevka za IP na podlagi člena 27(3) osnovne uredbe sta predložila dva sodelujoča proizvajalca izvoznika, in sicer družbi Union Steel China (Union Steel) in Shenzhen Sino Master Steel Co. Ltd. Teh individualnih preiskav družbama zaradi velikega števila domnevnih shem subvencioniranja in dolgotrajne protisubvencijske preiskave ni bilo mogoče odobriti, saj bi bila preveliko breme in bi mogoče preprečila pravočasen zaključek preiskave.
However, Union Steel had already been individually examined in the parallel anti-dumping investigation and consequently individual injury margin was calculated for this company.
Vendar je bila družba Union Steel že individualno preiskana v vzporedni protidampinški preiskavi in pozneje je bila za to družbo izračunana individualna stopnja škode.
Given that the GOC provided only a reply concerning schemes used by the sampled exporting producers as explained in recital (34) above, it was practically impossible to analyse some of the subsidy schemes possibly used by Union Steel.
Ker je kitajska vlada odgovorila samo v zvezi s shemami, ki so jih uporabljali vzorčeni proizvajalci izvozniki, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (34), je bilo praktično nemogoče analizirati nekatere sheme subvencioniranja, ki bi jih družba Union Steel lahko uporabljala.
Consequently, on the basis of facts available under Article 28 of the Basic Regulation, the average subsidy rate applicable to other co-operating companies was attributed to this company.
Zato je bila tej družbi na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev v skladu s členom 28 osnovne uredbe pripisana povprečna stopnja subvencioniranja, ki se uporablja za druge sodelujoče družbe.
On the basis of the information contained in the complaint the Commission sought information related to the following schemes, which allegedly involved the granting of subsidies by the Governmental authority:
Na podlagi informacij iz pritožbe je Komisija želela pridobiti informacije v zvezi z naslednjimi shemami, ki so domnevno vključevale dodeljevanje subvencij s strani vladnega organa:
Government Provision of Goods and Services for Less than Adequate Remuneration ("LTAR")
Zagotavljanje blaga in storitev s strani vlade za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo („LTAR“)
Provision of inputs at less than adequate remuneration:
zagotavljanje sestavin za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo:
Hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel
vroče in hladno valjano jeklo,
Provision of land use rights for less than adequate remuneration
zagotavljanje pravic do uporabe zemljišča za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo,
Programmes consisting of provision of water for less than adequate remuneration
programi, ki vključujejo zagotavljanje vode za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo,
Programme consisting of provision of electricity for less than adequate remuneration
Program, ki vključuje preskrbo z električno energijo za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo
Programme consisting of provision of electricity and water at less than adequate remuneration in the Jiangsu Province
program, ki vključuje preskrbo z električno energijo in vodo v provinci Jiangsu za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo,
Provision of various inputs for less than adequate remuneration
zagotavljanje različnih vložkov za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo.
Preferential loans and interest rates to the OCS industry
Preferenčna posojila in obrestne mere za industrijo jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi.
Equity programmes
Programi lastniškega kapitala
Debt for equity swaps
Zamenjave terjatev za kapital
Equity infusions
Infuzije lastniškega kapitala
Unpaid dividends
Neplačane dividende
Income and other direct taxes
Davek na prihodek in drugi neposredni davki
Tax policies for the deduction of research and development expenses
odbitki za stroške raziskav in razvoja v okviru davčnih politik,
Tax concessions for Central and Western regions
davčne ugodnosti za osrednjo in zahodno regijo,
Income tax credit for the purchase of domestically manufactured production equipment
Davčni dobropisi glede prihodka za nakup na domačem trgu proizvedene proizvodne opreme
Preferential tax policies for companies that are encouraged as high and new technology enterprises
preferenčne davčne politike za družbe, ki se spodbujajo kot visokotehnološke družbe in družbe z novo tehnologijo,
Income tax concessions for the enterprises engaged in the comprehensive resource utilisation ('special raw materials')
davčne ugodnosti za dohodek za družbe z intenzivno rabo naravnih virov („posebne surovine“), davčni dobropisi pri nakupu posebne opreme,
Tax credit concerning the purchase of special equipment
Davčni dobropisi pri nakupu posebne opreme
Preferential income tax policy for the enterprises in the Northeast region
Preferenčne davčne politike za davek na prihodek za družbe v severovzhodni regiji
Income Tax exemption for investment in domestic technological renovation
različni lokalni davčni popusti (provinca Shandong, Chongqing, regija Guangxi Zhuang, davčne ugodnosti za razvoj osrednje in zahodne regije),
Various local tax discounts (Shandong Province, Chongqing City, Guangxi Region Zhuang, Tax privileges to develop central and western regions)
oprostitev od plačila davka od dividend med rezidenčnimi družbami, ki izpolnjujejo pogoje,
Dividend exemption between qualified resident enterprises Two free, three half tax exemptions for the productive FIEs
program, po katerem proizvodne družbe, v katere se vlaga tuji kapital, prvi dve leti od ustanovitve ne plačujejo davka, naslednja tri leta pa le po polovični davčni stopnji,
Local income tax exemption and reduction programmes for the productive FIEs
programi lokalne oprostitve in odloga davka na prihodek za proizvodne družbe, v katere se vlaga tuji kapital;
Income tax credit for FIEs purchasing domestically produced equipment
davčni dobropis glede prihodka za družbe, v katere se vlaga tuji kapital, za nakup na domačem trgu proizvedene opreme;
Income tax subsidies for FIEs based on geographical location
subvencija za davek na prihodek za družbe, v katere se vlaga tuji kapital, na podlagi geografske lege.
Indirect Tax and Import Tariff Programmes
Programi za posredne davke in uvozne tarife
Import tariff and VAT exemptions for FIEs and certain domestic enterprises using imported equipment in encouraged industries
Oprostitve od uvoznih dajatev in DDV za družbe, v katere se vlaga tuji kapital, in za nekatere domače družbe v spodbujanih industrijah, ki uporabljajo uvoženo opremo
VAT refunds to FIEs purchasing domestically produced equipment
Vračila DDV za družbe, v katere se vlaga tuji kapital, za nakup na domačem trgu proizvedene opreme
VAT deduction on fixed assets in the Central region
Odbitek DDV na opredmetena osnovna sredstva v osrednji regiji
Other tax privileges of Ma'anshan
Druge davčne ugodnosti v Ma‘anshanu
Grant Programmes
Programi subvencioniranja
China World Top Brand programme
Program najboljša kitajska znamka na svetu
Famous Brands programme
program znane znamke,
The State key technology project fund
Državni sklad ključnih tehnoloških projektov
Programmes to rebate anti-dumping legal fees
Programi za povračilo stroškov pravnega svetovanja s področja protidampinga
Purchase of goods by the Government for higher than adequate remuneration
Državni odkup blaga za več kot ustrezno nadomestilo.
Other regional programmes
Drugi regionalni programi
Subsidies provided in the Tianjin Binhai New Area and the Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Area
Subvencije, dodeljene v Tianjin Binhai New Area in Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Area
Programmes related to the Northeast Region
Programi v zvezi s severovzhodno regijo
Grants under the Science and technology programme of Jiangsu Province
Nepovratna sredstva, dodeljena na podlagi programa province Jiangsu za znanost in tehnologijo
Grants under the Science and Technology programme of Hebei Province
Nepovratna sredstva, dodeljena na podlagi programa province Hebei za znanost in tehnologijo
Ad hoc subsidies referred to in the complaint
Ad hoc subvencije, zatrjevane v pritožbi.
GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES FOR LESS THAN ADEQUATE REMUNERATION ("LTAR")
ZAGOTAVLJANJE BLAGA IN STORITEV S STRANI VLADE ZA MANJ KOT USTREZNO NADOMESTILO („LTAR“)
Provision of hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel (HRS and CRS) for less than adequate remuneration
Zagotavljanje vroče in hladno valjanega jekla (VVJ in HVJ) za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo
The allegation in the complaint was that the GOC controls certain upstream industries and products so as to provide favourably priced inputs to producers of OCS.
Trditev iz pritožbe je bila, da kitajska vlada nadzoruje nekatere industrije na začetku proizvodne verige in izdelke, da bi proizvajalcem jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, po ugodni ceni zagotavljala vložke.
On this basis OCS producers receive countervailable subsidies through the purchase from State-owned enterprises (SOEs) of government-produced HRS and CRS at a below the market price and thus at less than adequate remuneration for the SOEs.
Na tej podlagi proizvajalci jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, prejemajo subvencije, proti katerim se lahko uvedejo izravnalni ukrepi, saj od družb v državni lasti kupujejo VVJ in HVJ po ceni, nižji od tržne, in za manj kot ustrezno nadomestilo za družbe v državni lasti.
The Commission requested from the GOC detailed information concerning SOEs providing HRS and CRS to the Chinese exporting producers of OCS in order to verify the allegations in the complaint and to establish whether these SOEs are public bodies.
Komisija je od kitajske vlade zahtevala podrobne informacije v zvezi z družbami v državni lasti, ki kitajskim proizvajalcem izvoznikom jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, zagotavljajo VVJ in HVJ, da bi preverila trditve iz pritožbe ter ugotovila, ali so te družbe v državni lasti javni organi.
In particular, the Commission created Appendix B to the questionnaire for the GOC intended for the SOEs and invited the GOC to provide information requested therein.
V tej zvezi je Komisija oblikovala Prilogo B k vprašalniku za kitajsko vlado, namenjeno družbam v državni lasti in kitajsko vlado pozvala, da posreduje zahtevane informacije iz te priloge.
In the deficiency letter the Commission again asked the GOC to provide the information requested in Appendix B and encouraged GOC to coordinate the responses with the SOEs concerned.
Komisija je v pozivu k dopolnitvi kitajsko vlado zaprosila, da posreduje zahtevane informacije iz Priloge B in jo spodbudila k usklajevanju odgovorov z zadevnimi družbami v državni lasti.
However, GOC did not provide a reply to any of the questions in Appendix B and also failed to provide relevant information requested in the main questionnaire (e.g. on the ownership and control of Chinese government of the SOEs in the steel sector and its involvement in the reorganisation of Chinese steel industry).
Vendar pa kitajska vlada na vprašanja iz Priloge B in odgovorila in tudi ni zagotovila zahtevanih ustreznih informacije iz glavnega vprašalnika (npr. o svojem lastništvu in lastniškem deležu v družbah v državni lasti v sektorju jeklarstva in svoji vlogi v reorganizaciji kitajske industrije jekla).
Instead of providing the requested information the GOC stated in its response to the questionnaire that the complainants have failed to demonstrate that the HRS and CRS producers are public bodies.
Namesto da bi zagotovila zahtevane informacije je kitajska vlada v svojem odgovoru na vprašalnik navedla, da pritožniki niso dokazali, da so proizvajalci VVJ in HVJ javni organi.
Because of the lack of cooperation from the GOC the Commission had to look into other best information available.
Zaradi pomanjkljivega sodelovanja kitajske vlade je Komisija morala preučiti druge najboljše dostopne informacije.
The Commission notified GOC about this course of action.
Komisija je o tem ukrepanju obvestila kitajsko vlado.
In assessing whether the SOEs providing HRS and CRS to the Chinese exporting producers of OCS are public bodies the Commission considered the limited information provided by the GOC, information in the complaint, publicly available factual information from similar proceedings conducted by other investigating authorities, as well as other publicly available information, and based its findings on the totality of the information on the file.
Pri presoji, ali so te družbe v državni lasti, ki kitajskim proizvajalcem izvoznikom jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, zagotavljajo VVJ in HVJ, javni organi, je Komisija upoštevala omejene informacije, ki jih je zagotovila kitajska vlada, informacije iz pritožbe, javno dostopne dejanske podatke iz sorodnih postopkov, ki so jih opravile druge preiskovalne oblasti, ter tudi druge javno dostopne informacije in svoje ugotovitve utemeljila na vseh informacijah v spisu.
SOEs providing OCS producers with hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel are public bodies
Družbe v državni lasti, ki proizvajalcem jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, zagotavljajo vroče in hladno valjano jeklo, so javni organi
The complainant claims that SOEs in China are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation which provide goods (HRS and CRS) to OCS producers at below-market prices and thus confer a benefit to them.
Pritožnik zatrjuje, da so družbe v državni lasti na Kitajskem javni organi v smislu člena 2(b) osnovne uredbe, ki proizvajalcem jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, zagotavljajo blago (VVJ in HVJ) po cenah, nižjih od tržne, in jim na ta način prenašajo ugodnosti.
The WTO Appellate Body (AB), in its report in United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China [5] (the AB report) defined a public body as an entity that "possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority" [6].
Pritožbeni organ WTO (PO) je v svojem poročilu v zadevi ZDA – dokončne protidampinške in izravnalne dajatve na nekatere izdelke s Kitajske [5] (poročilo PO) kot javni organ opredelil subjekt, ki „ima, izvaja ali pa mu je zaupano pooblastilo vlade“ [6].
The AB also considered that public bodies are also characterised by the "performance of governmental functions" [7] which would "ordinarily be considered part of governmental practice in the legal order of the relevant Member" [8].
PO je upošteval tudi, da javne organe kot take opredeljuje tudi „izvajanje nalog vlade“ [7], ki bi jih „običajno šteli za del delovanja vlade v pravnem redu zadevne države članice“ [8].
In light of the WTO AB conclusions, there are two questions for the analysis, i.e. (a) whether the SOEs in question perform functions which are ordinarily considered part of governmental practice in China and (b) if so, whether they exercise government authority when doing so?
Glede na sklepe PO WTO je treba analizirati dve vprašanji: tj. (a) ali zadevne družbe v državni lasti opravljajo naloge, ki se običajno štejejo za del delovanja vlade na Kitajskem, in (b) če gre za to, ali pri tem izvajajo pooblastilo vlade?
Performance of governmental functions
Izvajanje nalog vlade
In the context of the GOC, there is ample evidence to show that the government is deeply involved in the management of the economy.
V okviru kitajske vlade je obilo dokazov, ki kažejo, da je vlada globoko vpeta v upravljanje gospodarstva.
The primary role of the Chinese government in the economy is guaranteed by the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.
Kitajski vladi je osrednja vloga v gospodarstvu zagotovljena z Ustavo Ljudske republike Kitajske.
According to Article 7 of the Constitution reads: "The state economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole people; it is leading force in the national economy. The state ensures the consolidation and growth of the state economy".
Njen člen 7 določa:
As regards the steel sector, the information on the file suggests that the SOEs producing HRS and CRS in China often perform governmental functions described, inter alia, in the sectoral plans for iron and steel industry.
V zvezi s sektorjem jeklarstva informacije v spisu nakazujejo, da družbe v državni lasti, ki proizvajajo VVJ in HVJ na Kitajskem, pogosto izvajajo opisane naloge vlade, med drugimi, v sektorskih načrtih za industrijo železa in jekla.
These plans confirm that the GOC has chosen to be closely involved in the management and development of the steel industry in China and their implementation by SOEs can therefore be considered to fall under the heading of governmental practices.
Ti načrti potrjujejo odločitev kitajske vlade, da se tesno vključi v upravljanje in razvoj industrije jekla na Kitajskem, izvajanje teh načrtov s strani družb v državni lasti pa je zato mogoče šteti, da spada pod poglavje vladnih praks.
The plans provide targets and goals for all operators in the iron and steel industry and direct the whole sector to produce specific outcomes.
Navedeni načrti določajo ciljne količine in splošne cilje za vse subjekte iz industrije železa in jekla ter usmerjajo proizvodnjo državnega sektorja k določenim rezultatom.
In fact, the GOC is using the iron and steel SOEs as a prolonged arm of the state in order to achieve goals and targets set in the plans.
Pravzaprav so železarske in jeklarske družbe v državni lasti podaljšana roka kitajske vlade in države, da bi dosegle začrtane splošne cilje in ciljne količine.
Order No. 35 of the NDRC – Policies for Development of Iron and Steel Industry, inter alia, outlines a policy to decrease the number of iron and steel smelting enterprises and sets goals on the output for those steel enterprise groups that rank top 10 in the domestic market (Article 3), for the production capacity prohibits the establishment of new iron and steel associated enterprises (Article 10), prescribes the conditions to access into the iron and steel industry on the equipment level and also prescribes the technical and economic indexes steel and iron enterprises should follow (Article 12), sets rules for the changes in the organisational structure of steel enterprises (Article 20), manages investments (Articles 22, 23), conditions access to financial funds (Articles 25,26), gives state the right to intervene in the purchase of raw materials (Article 30).
Odredba agencije NDRC št. 35 – Razvojne politike za industrijo železa in jekla med drugim določa okvirno politiko za zmanjšanje števila talilnic železa in jekla ter ciljne izhodne količine za tiste skupine jeklarskih družb, ki so med deset največjimi na domačem trgu (člen 3), v zvezi s proizvodnimi kapacitetami prepoveduje ustanavljanje novih družb, povezanih s proizvodnjo železa in jekla (člen 10), predpisuje pogoje za vstop v industrijo železa in jekla na ravni opreme ter tudi tehnične in ekonomske kazalnike, ki so jih jeklarske in železarske družbe dolžne doseči (člen 12), določa pravila za spremembe v organizacijski strukturi jeklarskih družb (člen 20), upravlja naložbe (člena 22 in 23), pogojuje dostop do finančnih sredstev (člena 25 in 26) ter daje državi pravico posredovati pri nakupu surovin (člen 30).
Twelfth 5 Year Development Plan for the Steel Industry summarises the achievement of goals set in the previous plan, covers the development strategy and sets goals for the entire steel industry.
Dvanajsti petletni načrt razvoja industrije jekla povzema dosežene cilje, začrtane s prejšnjim načrtom, pokriva strategijo razvoja in določa cilje za celotno industrijo jekla.
Similarly to the Order No.35 it sets very specific targets on the industrial clustering level (Section III.(III).6), encourages certain projects and discourages other (Section IV(IV))and discriminates in support for iron and steel industry in different provinces (Section IV(V), provides for support of large-scale steel enterprises and gives a leading role to the biggest state-owned Chinese steel producers such as Bao Steel, Anshan Iron and Steel, Wuhan Iron and Steel etc [9]. The plan also provides for the strengthening of the regulation and management of the existing steel enterprises' production operation (Section V(IV).
Podobno kot Odredba št. 35 ta načrt zelo natančno določa ciljne količine na ravni industrijskega grozdenja (Oddelek III.(III).6), spodbuja nekatere in odvrača druge projekte (Oddelek IV(IV)) ter diskriminira v podporo industriji železa in jekla v različnih provincah (Oddelek IV(V)), zagotavlja podporo družbam, ki proizvajajo jeklo v velikem obsegu, ter namenja vodilno vlogo največjim kitajskim proizvajalkam jekla v državni lasti, kot so družbe Bao Steel, Anshan Iron and Steel, Wuhan Iron and Steel itd [9]. Načrt predvideva tudi krepitev pravne ureditve in upravljanja proizvodnih dejavnosti sedanjih jeklarskih družb (Oddelek V(IV)).
Law of the People's Republic of China on the State-owned Assets of Enterprises also obliges the SOEs (or State-invested enterprises (SIEs) are referred to in this law) to comply with the national industrial policies [10].
Zakon Ljudske republike Kitajske o državnem premoženju v družbah zavezuje družbe v državni lasti (oziroma družbe, v katere se vlaga državni kapital, kot se drugače nanje sklicuje ta zakon) tudi k skladnosti z nacionalnimi politikami za industrijo [10].
Similarly the Tentative Measures for the supervision and Administration of the Investments by Central Enterprises oblige SOEs (SIEs) to follow development plans and industrial policies of the state [11].
Okvirni ukrepi za nadzor in upravljanje naložb centralnih družb podobno zavezujejo družbe v državni lasti (družbe, v katere se vlaga državni kapital) k uveljavljanju načrtov razvoja in industrijskih politik države [11].
According to Measures for the Administration of Development Strategies and Plans of Central Enterprises all SIEs shall formulate a development and strategy plan which State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) must examine and approve.
V skladu z ukrepi za upravljanje strategij razvoja in načrtov centralnih družb so vse družbe, v katere se vlaga državni kapital, dolžne oblikovati načrt razvoja in strategije, ki ga mora pregledati in odobriti komisija državnega sveta za nadzor in upravljanje premoženja v državni lasti (SASAC).