natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
That the significant State interference, as described above, is clearly targeted is, inter alia, corroborated by the 12th 5 Year Development Plan for Aluminium (2011-2015) in which the Government of the PRC explicitly states its intention of ‘adjusting tax and export tax rebates and other economic levers, and strictly control the total amount of expansion and exports of primary products’.
Večje vmešavanje države, kot je opisano zgoraj, je med drugim jasno usmerjeno k podpori 12. petletnemu razvojnemu načrtu za aluminij (2011–2015), v katerem vlada LRK izrecno navaja, da namerava „prilagoditi olajšave na davke in izvozne dajatve ter druge ekonomske vzvode in strogo nadzorovati skupno količino širitve in izvoza primarnih izdelkov“.
Furthermore these plans have been implemented over many years and, as demonstrated above, during the RIP several implementing measures were in operation.
Poleg tega so bili ti načrti, kot je prikazano zgoraj, izvajani vrsto let, v OPP pa je potekalo več izvedbenih ukrepov.
During the RIP, these prices were around 7 % lower than the world market prices.
V OPP so bile te cene približno 7 % nižje od cen na svetovnem trgu.
In theory, Chinese companies can also buy certain quantities at LME prices when prices in the Chinese market are higher as a result of State intervention — whilst the opposite is impossible for non-Chinese operators.
V teoriji lahko kitajske družbe določene količine kupijo tudi po cenah LME, če so cene na kitajskem trgu kot posledica posredovanja države višje – obenem pa nasprotno ne velja za nekitajske subjekte.
It was therefore concluded that the Chinese aluminium market is distorted due to significant intervention of the State.
Zato je bilo mogoče skleniti, da je kitajski trg aluminija zaradi večjega vmešavanja države izkrivljen.
Interference by the Chinese State in the steel sector is demonstrated by the fact that a large majority of the large Chinese steel producers are State-owned and steel installed capacity and output are influenced by the various five-year Industrial Plans, in particular the current 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) for the iron and steel sector.
Vmešavanje kitajske države v jeklarski sektor dokazuje dejstvo, da je velika večina velikih kitajskih proizvajalcev jekla v državni lasti, ter da različni petletni industrijski načrti vplivajo na obstoječo zmogljivost in proizvodnjo jekla, zlasti veljavni dvanajsti petletni načrt (za obdobje 2011–2015) za železarski in jeklarski sektor.
An anti-dumping investigation which has been conducted by the Commission [18], confirmed the importance of the State intervention also in the specific sector of pipes and tubes, which are the main raw material used for the production of steel bicycles.
Protidampinška preiskava, ki jo je izvedla Komisija [18], je potrdila pomen vmešavanja države tudi v sektor cevi, ki so glavna surovina za proizvodnjo koles iz jekla.
It was therefore concluded that the Chinese steel market is distorted due to significant intervention of the State.
Zato je bilo mogoče skleniti, da je kitajski trg jekla zaradi večjega vmešavanja države izkrivljen.
Under such circumstances, neither of the companies has been in a position to prove that their business decisions regarding acquisition of raw materials are not subject to significant State interference and that costs of major inputs substantially reflect market values.
V takih okoliščinah nobeno od podjetij ni moglo dokazati, da njihove poslovne odločitve v zvezi s pridobivanjem surovin niso predmet večjega vmešavanja države in da stroški glavnih vložkov bistveno izražajo tržne vrednosti.
Concerning the other four criteria, the three cooperating Chinese exporting producers were able to demonstrate that they met the remaining criteria.
V zvezi z ostalimi štirimi merili so trije sodelujoči kitajski proizvajalci izvozniki dokazali, da jih izpolnjujejo.
In view of the above findings on criterion 1, it was considered, after consultation of the Advisory Committee, that MET should be rejected for the three cooperating Chinese group of exporting producers.
Glede na zgornje ugotovitve v zvezi z merilom 1 je bilo po posvetovanju s svetovalnim odborom sklenjeno, da se odobritev TGO trem sodelujočim skupinam kitajskih proizvajalcev uvoznikov zavrne.
The Commission officially disclosed the results of the MET findings to the companies concerned in the PRC and to the complainant.
Komisija je rezultate ugotovitev o TGO uradno razkrila zadevnim družbam iz LRK in pritožniku.
Following the MET disclosure, one company argued that the refusal to grant MET is based on the Chinese bicycle industry as a whole, rather than on an individual company basis.
Po razkritju ugotovitev o TGO je ena družba trdila, da zavrnitev odobritve TGO temelji na kitajski industriji koles kot celoti, namesto na podlagi posameznih družb.
In this respect it is noted that although the Commission made an assessment of the steel and aluminium sectors in China, there is a clear link between the steel and aluminium markets in the PRC and the purchases of steel and aluminium products as a raw material by the cooperating groups.
V zvezi s tem je ugotovljeno, da obstaja jasna povezava med trgom jekla in aluminija v LRK ter nakupi izdelkov iz jekla in aluminija kot surovin s strani sodelujočih skupin, čeprav je Komisija izvedla oceno jeklarskega in aluminijskega sektorja na Kitajskem.
Moreover it was argued that the cost advantage for the Chinese bicycle producers concerning steel and aluminium is insignificant as it represents only between 1,4 % and 1,75 % when considering that primary aluminium and steel account for 20 %-25 % of the manufacturing cost of bicycles and that the price difference between LME and SHFE prices was 7 % during the RIP.
Poleg tega je trdila, da je stroškovna prednost za kitajske proizvajalce koles glede jekla in aluminija neznatna, saj njen delež znaša le 1,4–1,75 % v primerjavi s primarnim aluminijem in jeklom, katerih delež znaša 20–25 % proizvodnih stroškov koles, ter da sta se ceni LME in SHFE razlikovali za 7 % v OPP.
In this respect it is highlighted that the pivotal factor in the analysis is the proportion of the raw material in the manufacturing cost (which in this case was significant as it accounted for at least 20 %-25 % of the manufacturing costs) and the fact that the raw material market is distorted in the PRC.
V zvezi s tem je poudarjeno, da je ključni dejavnik v analizi delež surovine v proizvodnih stroških (ki je bil v tem primeru visok, saj je znašal vsaj 20–25 % proizvodnih stroškov) in da je trg surovin v LRK izkrivljen.
The exact quantitative impact of the distortion in the company’s cost is not considered as a decisive factor.
Točen kvantitativni učinek izkrivljenosti v stroških družbe se ne šteje za odločilen dejavnik.
Furthermore, it was argued that in another investigation the Commission has analysed the prices of the direct raw materials used in the manufacturing of the product concerned rather than the price of the primary raw material and, therefore, in the current case, the Commission should have assessed the State interference in prices of direct raw material, i.e. aluminium alloy extrusion, rather than in the primary aluminium which is the primary raw material.
Trdila je tudi, da je Komisija v drugi preiskavi namesto cen primarne surovine analizirala cene neposrednih surovin, uporabljenih v proizvodnji zadevnega izdelka, in bi zato v sedanjem primeru Komisija morala oceniti vmešavanje države v cene neposredne surovine, tj. iztiskanje aluminijeve zlitine, namesto v cene primarnega aluminija, ki je primarna surovina.
In this respect it is noted that each investigation is analysed on its own merits.
V zvezi s tem je ugotovljeno, da se vsaka preiskava analizira na podlagi lastnih značilnosti.
Moreover, the fact that the market of primary aluminium is controlled by the State indicates that the market of intermediary aluminium products also does not operate under market economy conditions, i.e. responding to supply and demand.
Razen tega dejstvo, da trg primarnega aluminija nadzoruje država, pomeni, da trg vmesnih izdelkov iz aluminija prav tako ne deluje pod tržnogospodarskimi pogoji, torej se ne odziva na povpraševanje in ponudbo.
It was also argued that any price difference for primary aluminium between SHFE and LME may not lead to a price difference for aluminium alloy extractions between the respective markets, and that factors such as production efficiency, residual capacity, and cost of environmental obligations need to be taken into account.
Trdila je tudi, da vsaka razlika v ceni primarnega aluminija med SHFE in LME ne sme voditi k razliki v ceni ekstrakcij aluminijeve zlitine na zadevnih trgih ter da dejavnikov, kot so učinkovitost proizvodnje, preostala zmogljivost in stroški okoljskih obveznosti, ni treba upoštevati.
In this respect, it is highlighted that no evidence was submitted in support of this allegation.
V zvezi s tem je poudarjeno, da niso bili predloženi nobeni dokazi, ki bi to navedbo podpirali.
In the absence of supporting evidence, the Commission was not in the position to analyse and verify this allegation, which was therefore rejected.
Brez podpornih dokazov Komisija te navedbe ni mogla analizirati in preveriti, zato je bila zavrnjena.
In addition, it was claimed that, by ignoring the fact that there are a number of subsequent intermediary products, the Commission ignored the actual characteristics and factors for pricing the bicycle finish products.
Poleg tega je stran trdila, da je Komisija z neupoštevanjem dejstva, da obstajajo številni naknadni vmesni izdelki, namenoma prezrla dejanske značilnosti in dejavnike oblikovanja cen koles kot končnih izdelkov.
In particular, as the bicycle is sold directly to the end-consumer (unlike the primary aluminium), other factors than the price of the raw material determine the price of the bicycles such as the specific technical features of the bicycle and the demand of the consumers.
Zlasti ker se kolo proda neposredno končnemu uporabniku (za razliko od primarnega aluminija), cene koles ne določa cena surovine, temveč drugi dejavniki, kot so posebne tehnične lastnosti kolesa in povpraševanje potrošnikov.
However, no concrete details were provided on these characteristics and factors that should be taken into consideration and therefore it was not possible for the Commission to comment on them.
Vendar o teh značilnostih in dejavnikih, ki bi jih bilo treba upoštevati, ni bilo predloženih nobenih konkretnih podatkov, zato Komisija nanje ni mogla dati pripomb.
It was further alleged that the Commission made a wrong assessment of the principles under which the SHFE operates.
Domnevala je tudi, da je Komisija podala napačno oceno načel, v skladu s katerimi deluje SHFE.
It was argued that the CSRC regulates SHFE functions similarly to, among others, the Autorité des marchés financiers (‘AMF’) in France or the Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’) in UK and that CSRC’s role and specific regulatory/supervision measures are consistent with the G-20 principles.
Trdila je, da CSRC ureja funkcije SHFE na podoben način, kot med drugim organ za finančne trge (Autorité des marchés financiers – „AMF“) v Franciji ali oblast za finančne storitve (Financial Services Authority – „FSA“) v ZK ter da so vloga CSRC in posebni regulativni ukrepi/ukrepi nadzora v skladu z načeli G-20.
As a consequence the MET conclusions that are based on the role of the CSRC and operation of the SHFE are without merit.
Zato so sklepi TGO, ki so osnovani na vlogi CSRC in delovanju SHFE, neutemeljeni.
It is noted that the company failed to take into account the fact that while FSA [19] and AMF [20] are independent non-governmental bodies, CSRC is a ministry level unit operating directly under the State Council [21].
Ugotovljeno je, da družba ni upoštevala dejstva, da sta FSA [19] in AMF [20] sicer neodvisna nevladna organa, vendar je CSRC služba na ministrski stopnji, ki deluje neposredno pod državnim svetom [21].
The State Council is the highest executive organ of State power, as well as the highest organ of State administration [22].
Državni svet je najvišji izvršilni organ državne oblasti in najvišji organ državne uprave [22].
This is another example of the fact that the State is actively involved in the regulation of the aluminium market in the PRC.
Tudi ta primer dokazuje, da je država dejavno vključena v upravljanje trga aluminija v LRK.
As concerns the compliance to G-20 principles, the company merely provided a statement, without really explaining the principles to which it referred.
V zvezi s skladnostjo z načeli G-20 je družba zgolj podala izjavo, ne da bi resnično pojasnila načela, na katera se je sklicevala.
Moreover, one company disagreed with the Commission’s assessment that arbitrage between the worldwide benchmark, the LME, or other markets and SHFE prices is practically not possible and that therefore SHFE works in isolation from other world markets.
Poleg tega se ena družba ni strinjala z oceno Komisije, da arbitraža med svetovno referenco, LME, ali drugimi trgi cenami SHFE praktično ni mogoča in zato SHFE deluje ločeno od drugih svetovnih trgov.
It is noted that this contradicts the company’s acceptance of the price difference between the SHFE and the LME during the period when the SHFE price was higher than LME prices by arguing that during that period of time the Chinese producers paid more for the aluminium products than the Union producers.
Ugotovljeno je, da je to v nasprotju s sprejetjem družbe razlike v ceni pri SHFE in LME v obdobju, ko je bila cena SHFE višja od cen LME, z utemeljitvijo, da so v navedenem obdobju kitajski proizvajalci za izdelke iz aluminija plačali več kot proizvajalci Unije.
Furthermore, the company argued that as from 2010 the SHFE started to allow aluminium physical delivery to bonded warehouses in Shanghai’s free trade zone.
Poleg tega je družba trdila, da SHFE od leta 2010 dovoli fizično izročitev aluminija v carinska skladišča v šanghajskem območju proste trgovine.
It follows that this statement does not contradict, but rather confirms the Commission’s assessment that physical deliveries can take place only in a warehouse within the PRC which has been approved by the SHFE, unlike international exchanges, where delivery can take place worldwide.
Ta izjava torej potrjuje oceno Komisije (in ni v nasprotju z njo), da se fizične izročitve lahko izvedejo le v skladišču v LRK, ki ga je odobrila SHFE, medtem ko se pri mednarodnih izmenjavah izročitev lahko izvede po vsem svetu.
It was also argued that the SHFE is a futures market and aluminium futures contracts have been traded on the SHFE since 1991 and therefore the Commission’s assessment that no derivatives are sold on the SHFE is wrong.
Trdila je tudi, da je SHFE terminski trg in s standardiziranimi terminskimi pogodbami o aluminiju se na SHFE trguje od leta 1991, zato je ocena Komisije, da se na SHFE izvedeni finančni instrumenti ne prodajajo, napačna.
Indeed the SHFE is a futures market.
SHFE je dejansko terminski trg.
However, the futures contracts traded on SHFE are settled by physical delivery.
Vendar se poravnave terminskih pogodb, s katerimi se trguje na SHFE, izvedejo s fizično izročitvijo.
Derivatives products without physical delivery, i.e. not actually exercised but traded before their delivery date, are limited in the PRC and therefore the SHFE is merely a platform for physical exchanges which insulates the Chinese aluminium market.
Izvedeni produkti brez fizične izročitve, tj. tisti, ki se dejansko ne izročijo, temveč se z njimi trguje pred datumom izročitve, so v LRK omejeni in zato je SHFE zgolj platforma za fizične izmenjave, kar izolira kitajski trg aluminija.
It was also argued that the Commission’s reasoning relating to the effects on bicycle pricing of the VAT/tax measures and inventory measures relating to primary aluminium are economically dubious and insufficiently reasoned.
Trdila je tudi, da so argumenti Komisije v zvezi z učinki ukrepov glede DDV/davka na oblikovanje cen koles in ukrepov glede zalog v zvezi s primarnim aluminijem z gospodarskega vidika vprašljivi in nezadostno utemeljeni.
However, since the company did not explain which elements the Commission is missing in its analysis, nor did it further substantiate this claim, it was not possible for the Commission to comment.
Vendar ker družba ni obrazložila, katere elemente je Komisija v analizi spregledala, niti ni dodatno utemeljila svoje trditve, Komisija tega ni mogla komentirati.
Furthermore, it was argued that there are similarities between the industrial policy in the PRC and the EU policies and that the Commission has not demonstrated that the industrial policy in the PRC has any direct or significant impact on the input decisions, bicycles production or sales operation of the Chinese bicycles exporting producers.
Poleg tega je trdila, da obstajajo podobnosti med industrijsko politiko v LRK in politikami EU ter da Komisija ni dokazala, da ima industrijska politika v LRK kakršen koli neposreden ali pomemben učinek na odločitve glede vložkov, proizvodnjo ali prodajo koles kitajskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov koles.
In this respect it is noted that it was not specified to which EU policies the company was referring and therefore the Commission cannot comment on this allegation.
V zvezi s tem je ugotovljeno, da se politike EU, na katere se je družba sklicevala, niso natančno opredelile, zato Komisija te navedbe ne more komentirati.
In addition, concerning the statement that it has not been demonstrated that the industrial policy in the PRC has a significant impact on the input decisions, production or sales of the Chinese exporting producers of bicycles, it is noted that the existence of a 5-year Plan in the Aluminium sector in the PRC, the distortions of the aluminium price which is traded on an isolated Exchange when aluminium represents 20-25 % of the total manufacturing costs of a bicycle, indicate a clear link between the industrial policy in the PRC and the input decisions, production and sales of the Chinese exporting producers of bicycles.
V zvezi z izjavo, da ni bilo dokazano, da ima industrijska politika v LRK pomemben učinek na odločitve glede vložkov, proizvodnjo ali prodajo kitajskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov koles, je tudi ugotovljeno, da obstoj 5-letnega načrta v sektorju aluminija v LRK in izkrivljanje cene aluminija, s katerim se trguje na izolirani borzi, kadar stroški aluminija znašajo 20–25 % celotnih proizvodnih stroškov kolesa, kažeta na jasno povezavo med industrijsko politiko v LRK in odločitvami glede vložkov, proizvodnjo ali prodajo kitajskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov koles.
It was also argued that the Commission breached the three-month deadline specified in the basic Regulation.
Trdila je tudi, da je Komisija kršila trimesečni rok, določen v osnovni uredbi.
In this respect it is noted that due to the fact that the cooperation of the Chinese exporters was very low, the Commission made extra efforts to obtain more cooperation by contacting a large number of additional exporters that were identified later in the investigation.
V zvezi s tem je ugotovljeno, da si je Komisija zaradi zelo slabega sodelovanja kitajskih izvoznikov posebej prizadevala za večje sodelovanje, tako da je vzpostavila stik z velikim številom dodatnih izvoznikov, ki so bili prepoznani pozneje v preiskavi.
As a result, it was not possible to make the MET determination within the stipulated period.
Zato odločitve o TGO ni bilo mogoče sprejeti v predpisanem obdobju.
Moreover, it is recalled that the General Court [23] has recently held that a MET determination made outside the three month deadline laid down in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation is not in itself sufficient to lead to an annulment of a regulation imposing anti-dumping measures.
Poleg tega se opozarja, da je Splošno sodišče [23] nedavno odločilo, da sprejetje odločitve o TGO po preteku trimesečnega roka, predpisanega v členu 2(7)(c) osnovne uredbe, samo po sebi še ni zadosten razlog za razveljavitev predpisa o uvedbi protidampinških ukrepov.
It is also noted that Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation has meanwhile been amended with the effect that the Commission shall only make MET determinations in respect of companies included in a sample and that such a determination shall normally be made within seven months of, but in any event not later than eight months after the initiation of the investigation [24].
Ugotovljeno je tudi, da je bil člen 2(7) osnovne uredbe medtem spremenjen tako, da Komisija sprejme odločitve o TGO ob upoštevanju družb, vključenih v vzorec, in da se takšna odločitev običajno sprejme v sedmih mesecih od začetka preiskave, vendar nikoli pozneje kot v osmih mesecih po tem [24].
This amendment is applicable to all new and pending investigations, including the present one.
Ta sprememba velja za vse nove in tekoče preiskave, vključno s sedanjo.
The determinations were made within eight months from the date of the initiation.
Odločitve so bile sprejete v osmih mesecih od datuma začetka preiskave.
In view of the above, the claim relating to breach of the three month deadline is herewith rejected.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno se trditev v zvezi s kršitvijo trimesečnega roka zavrne.
Request of parties
1.3 Zahteva strani
One party requested that Market Economy Treatment (‘MET’) claims of producers in the PRC which stopped exporting to the Union should also be analysed.
Ena stran je zahtevala, da je treba zahtevke za tržnogospodarsko obravnavo („TGO“) proizvajalcev v LRK, ki so prenehali izvažati v Unijo, prav tako analizirati.
It was alleged that those producers only stopped exporting to the Union due to the anti-dumping duties in place since 2005.
Trdila je tudi, da so ti proizvajalci prenehali izvažati v Unijo zgolj zaradi protidampinških dajatev, ki veljajo od leta 2005.
In this regard it is highlighted that the findings with regard to dumping and injury relate to the review investigation period (‘RIP’) fixed in accordance with the Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation.
V zvezi s tem je poudarjeno, da se ugotovitve glede dampinga in škode nanašajo na obdobje preiskave v zvezi s pregledom („OPP“), določeno v skladu s členom 6(1) osnovne uredbe.
This means that data collected from the exporting producers in view of establishing normal value and the export price also strictly relate only to that period.
To pomeni, da se podatki, zbrani od proizvajalcev izvoznikov, da bi se vzpostavila normalna vrednost in izvozna cena, prav tako strogo nanašajo le na to obdobje.
The MET analysis is carried out in the context of determining normal value of exporting producers in the PRC which is then compared to the export price during the same period.
Analiza TGO se izvede v okviru določanja normalne vrednosti proizvajalcev izvoznikov v LRK, ki se nato primerja z izvozno ceno v enakem obdobju.
If a producer did not export the product concerned during the RIP, no export price can be established and no dumping margin can be calculated.
Če proizvajalec zadevnega izdelka ni izvozil v OPP, ni mogoče določiti izvozne cene in izračunati stopnje dampinga.
Therefore, there is no reason to examine MET for a producer which did not export the product concerned during the RIP.
Zato ni razloga za pregled TGO za proizvajalca, ki zadevnega izdelka ni izvozil v OPP.
Nevertheless, it is recalled that all exporting producers have the possibility to request an ‘interim review’ to have their situation revised pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation or, those exporting producers who have not exported the product concerned during the period of investigation on which the measures were based, have the possibility to request a ‘new exporter review’ pursuant to Article 11(4) of the same Regulation.
Kljub temu je treba opozoriti, da imajo vsi proizvajalci izvozniki možnost, da zahtevajo „vmesni pregled“, da se njihov položaj pregleda v skladu s členom 11(3) osnovne uredbe, proizvajalci izvozniki, ki niso izvozili zadevnega izdelka v obdobju preiskave, na katerem so temeljili ukrepi, pa imajo možnost zahtevati „pregled novega izvoznika“ v skladu s členom 11(4) iste uredbe.