natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
During the assessment of draft measures notified to the Commission under Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC, it appeared that significant inconsistencies still exist across the Union in the application of non-discrimination obligations under Article 10 and of price control and cost accounting obligations under Article 13 of Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2] for the market for wholesale network infrastructure access (market 4) and to the wholesale broadband access market (market 5) referred to in Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC [3].
Med ocenjevanjem osnutka ukrepov, ki so bili Komisiji priglašeni v skladu s členom 7 Direktive 2002/21/ES, se je zdelo, da v celotni Uniji še vedno obstajajo znatne neskladnosti pri uporabi obveznosti nediskriminacije v skladu s členom 10 ter obveznosti cenovnega nadzora in stroškovnega računovodstva v skladu s členom 13 Direktive 2002/19/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [2] za trg veleprodajnega dostopa do omrežne infrastrukture (trg 4) in trg veleprodajnega širokopasovnega dostopa (trg 5) iz Priporočila Komisije 2007/879/ES [3].
Regulatory obligations imposed under Article 10 of Directive 2002/19/EC still vary considerably across the Union, even where the underlying market problems are comparable.
Regulativne obveznosti iz člena 10 Direktive 2002/19/ES se v Uniji še vedno zelo razlikujejo, celo tam, kjer so osnovni tržni problemi primerljivi.
While an increasing number of NRAs have recently considered a more detailed application of a general non-discrimination obligation using Key Performance Indicators and ensuring strict equivalence of access, the draft measures notified to the Commission under Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC in this respect show a significant divergence among the approaches of NRAs with regard to the scope, the application, compliance monitoring and enforcement of this obligation, in particular with regards to the equivalence model chosen (if one is applied at all).
Medtem ko je v zadnjem času vse več NRO upoštevalo podrobnejšo uporabo splošne obveznosti nediskriminacije z uporabo ključnih kazalnikov uspešnosti in zagotovilo strogo enakovrednost dostopa, pa osnutki ukrepov, ki so bili v zvezi s tem priglašeni Komisiji v skladu s členom 7 Direktive 2002/21/ES, kažejo velika razhajanja med pristopi NRO v zvezi s področjem uporabe, uporabo, spremljanjem skladnosti in izvrševanjem te obveznosti, zlasti glede izbranega modela enakovrednosti (če je bil sploh uporabljen).
Similarly, regulatory obligations regarding access pricing imposed under Article 13 of Directive 2002/19/EC in markets 4 and 5 also vary considerably across the Member States of the Union although such variations are not justified by underlying differences in national circumstances.
Prav tako se v državah članicah Unije zelo razlikujejo regulativne obveznosti glede oblikovanja cen dostopa v skladu s členom 13 Direktive 2002/19/ES na trgih 4 in 5, čeprav takšne razlike niso utemeljene z osnovnimi razlikami v nacionalnih razmerah.
In this respect, the Commission has consistently urged NRAs under its powers pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC: (i) to use appropriate cost-accounting methods and ensure consistent pricing of access products along the same value chain to safeguard the investment ladder principle; (ii) to apply the principles of the relevant cost model consistently to all relevant input data; and (iii) to recognise the importance of using the costs of a modern efficient network to set access prices.
V tem smislu Komisija v skladu s svojimi pooblastili iz člena 7 Direktive 2002/21/ES dosledno spodbuja NRO, da (i) uporabljajo ustrezne metode stroškovnega računovodstva in zagotavljajo skladno oblikovanje cen proizvodov dostopa v isti vrednostni verigi, s čimer varujejo načelo naložbene lestvice; (ii) uporabljajo načela ustreznega modela izračunavanja stroškov skladno za vse ustrezne vhodne podatke, ter (iii) priznajo pomembnost uporabe stroškov sodobnega učinkovitega omrežja za določanje cen dostopa.
The significant variations in the regulatory approaches chosen by NRAs with regard to these two remedies hold back the development of the internal market for electronic communications networks and services and, thus, hamper potentially significant welfare gains for the overall economy.
Velike razlike med regulativnimi pristopi, ki so jih izbrali NRO v zvezi s temi ukrepi, ovirajo razvoj notranjega trga elektronskih komunikacijskih omrežij in storitev ter s tem onemogočajo možne znatne socialne koristi za celotno gospodarstvo.
Such variations create regulatory uncertainty and result in a lack of consistent access regulation, thus limiting opportunities to realise economies of scale.
Takšne razlike ustvarjajo regulativno negotovost in imajo za posledico odsotnost skladnega reguliranja dostopa, s čimer omejujejo možnosti za uresničevanje ekonomije obsega.
Where SMP is found within markets 4 and/or 5 an appropriate set of remedies should be applied in accordance with the principles provided for in Directive 2002/19/EC, in particular Article 8(4) thereof.
Če je bila na trgu 4 in/ali 5 ugotovljena pomembna tržna moč, bi bilo treba uvesti ustrezne ukrepe v skladu z načeli iz Direktive 2002/19/ES, zlasti člena 8(4) Direktive.
As such, the remedies stipulated in this Recommendation have to be applied in accordance with the principles of Directives 2002/21/EC and 2002/19/EC.
Zato je treba ukrepe iz tega priporočila uporabljati v skladu z načeli iz direktiv 2002/21/ES in 2002/19/ES.
This Recommendation is consistent with Commission Recommendation 2010/572/EU [4] and builds upon the Commission’s guidance regarding the application of specific obligations in the Regulatory Framework provided in Recommendation 2010/572/EU.
To priporočilo je skladno s Priporočilom Komisije 2010/572/EU [4] in izhaja iz smernic Komisije glede uporabe posebnih obveznosti v regulativnem okviru iz Priporočila 2010/572/EU.
For example, it sets out in more detail when cost oriented wholesale access to NGA broadband may not be necessary, as stipulated in point 36 of Recommendation 2010/572/EU and sets out scenarios, in which established competitive safeguards should lead to NRAs deviating from the general principle of cost-oriented NGA access as expressed in point 25 of Recommendation 2010/572/EU.
Na primer podrobneje določa, kdaj stroškovno naravnan veleprodajni dostop do širokopasovnih dostopovnih omrežij naslednje generacije morda ni potreben, kot je določeno v točki 36 Priporočila 2010/572/EU, ter določa scenarije, v katerih bi morali vzpostavljeni konkurenčni zaščitni ukrepi privesti do odmika NRO od splošnega načela stroškovno naravnanega dostopa do omrežja NGA, kot je zapisano v točki 25 Priporočila 2010/572/EU.
As a result, the principles set out in the present Recommendation, in particular in recitals 25 to 28 as well as 49 and 50 and point 58 should be taken into account in interpreting both Recommendations.
Zato bi bilo treba pri razlagi obeh priporočil upoštevati načela iz tega priporočila, zlasti tista iz uvodnih izjav 25 do 28, 49 in 50 ter točke 58.
This Recommendation also deals with matters that are not addressed by Recommendation 2010/572/EU, for example the consistent application of Article 10 of Directive 2002/19/EC and a consistent approach to calculating wholesale copper access prices.
Predmet tega priporočila so tudi zadeve, ki v Priporočilu 2010/572/EU niso obravnavane, na primer skladna uporaba člena 10 Direktive 2002/19/ES in skladen pristop k izračunavanju veleprodajnih cen dostopa do bakrenih omrežij.
APPLICATION OF A NON-DISCRIMINATION OBLIGATION
UPORABA OBVEZNOSTI NEDISKRIMINACIJE
Ensuring equivalence of access
Zagotavljanje enakopravnosti dostopa
One of the main obstacles to the development of a true level playing field for access seekers to electronic communication networks is the preferential treatment of the downstream businesses, for example the retail arm, of a vertically integrated operator with significant market power (SMP operator) through price and non-price discrimination (for example, discrimination regarding quality of service, access to information, delaying tactics, undue requirements and the strategic design of essential product characteristics).
Ena od glavnih ovir za razvoj resnično enakih konkurenčnih pogojev za tiste, ki želijo imeti dostop do elektronskih komunikacijskih omrežij, je prednostna obravnava podrejenih podjetij v prodajni verigi, na primer maloprodajnih enot vertikalno povezanega operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo, prek cenovne in necenovne diskriminacije (na primer diskriminacije v zvezi s kakovostjo storitve, dostopom do informacij, taktiko zavlačevanja, pretiranimi zahtevami in strateško zasnovo bistvenih značilnosti proizvodov).
In this respect it is particularly difficult to detect and address non-price discriminatory behaviour through the mere application of a general non-discrimination obligation.
V tem pogledu je zlasti težko odkriti in obravnavati necenovno diskriminatorno ravnanje le z uporabo splošne obveznosti nediskriminacije.
It is, therefore, important to ensure true equivalence of access by strictly applying non-discrimination obligations and employing effective means to monitor and enforce compliance.
Zato je pomembno zagotoviti dejansko enakopravnost dostopa z dosledno uporabo obveznosti nediskriminacije in uvajanjem uspešnih načinov za spremljanje in izvrševanje skladnosti.
With regard to tackling and preventing non-price related discriminatory behaviour the Commission witnessed a considerable variation in the regulatory approach chosen by NRAs.
V zvezi z obravnavo in preprečevanjem necenovnega diskriminatornega ravnanja je Komisija opazila precejšnje razlike v regulativnih pristopih, ki so jih izbrali NRO.
The Commission considers that equivalence of inputs (EoI) is in principle the surest way to achieve effective protection from discrimination as access seekers will be able to compete with the downstream business of the vertically integrated SMP operator using exactly the same set of regulated wholesale products, at the same prices and using the same transactional processes.
Komisija meni, da je enakovrednost vložkov (EoI) načeloma najzanesljivejši način za doseganje uspešne zaščite pred diskriminacijo, ker bodo tisti, ki želijo dostop, lahko konkurirali podjetjem na koncu prodajne verige vertikalno povezanega operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo z uporabo popolnoma enakega niza reguliranih veleprodajnih proizvodov po enakih cenah in ob uporabi enakih transakcijskih postopkov.
In addition, and contrary to an Equivalence of Output (EoO) concept, EoI is better equipped to deliver transparency and address the problem of information asymmetries.
Poleg tega in za razliko od koncepta enakovrednosti učinka (EoO) je enakovrednost vložkov primernejša za doseganje preglednosti in obravnavanje problema asimetrije informacij.
NRAs are required under Article 8(4) of Directive 2002/19/EC to ensure that the regulatory obligations imposed in response to a designation of an operator as having SMP are based on the nature of the problem identified and proportionate in light of Article 8(5) of Directive 2002/21/EC and in particular Article 8(5)(b) thereof.
V skladu s členom 8(4) Direktive 2002/19/ES morajo NRO zagotoviti, da regulativne obveznosti, naložene zaradi določitve operaterja kot operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo, temeljijo na naravi ugotovljenega problema in so sorazmerne v smislu člena 8(5) Direktive 2002/21/ES, zlasti člena 8(5)(b) Direktive.
Providing regulated wholesale inputs on an EoI basis is likely to trigger higher compliance costs than less strict forms of non-discrimination obligations due to the necessary system adjustments.
Zagotavljanje reguliranih veleprodajnih vložkov na osnovi EoI lahko povzroči višje stroške skladnosti kot manj stroge oblike obveznosti nediskriminacije zaradi potrebnih prilagoditev sistema.
In addition, an SMP operator would not be able to benefit from some vertical synergies as it would only be allowed to use for itself the same wholesale products that it provides or offers to its competitors.
Poleg tega operater s pomembno tržno močjo ne bi mogel izkoriščati nekaterih vertikalnih sinergij, ker bi lahko sam uporabljal le iste veleprodajne proizvode, ki jih zagotavlja ali nudi svojim konkurentom.
However, these higher compliance costs should be measured against the benefits of more vigorous competition downstream.
Vendar bi bilo treba te višje stroške skladnosti meriti glede na koristi živahnejše konkurence navzdol po prodajni verigi.
In this respect, requiring the SMP operator to provide legacy copper-based wholesale inputs over existing systems on an EoI basis is less likely to create sufficient net benefits to pass a proportionality test due to the higher costs of redesigning existing provisioning and operational support systems to make them EoI compliant.
S tega vidika je manj verjetno, da bi zahteve operaterju s pomembno tržno močjo glede zagotavljanja starejših bakrenih veleprodajnih vložkov v obstoječe sisteme na osnovi EoI ustvarile zadostne čiste koristi, ki bi prestale preskus sorazmernosti, zaradi višjih stroškov rekonstrukcije obstoječih podpornih sistemov za zagotavljanje in delovanje, potrebnih za uskladitev z EoI.
Conversely, requiring the SMP operator to provide NGA wholesale inputs, which in many cases are provided over new systems, on an EoI basis is likely to create sufficient net benefits, and thus be proportionate, given the comparatively lower incremental compliance costs to ensure newly built systems are EoI-compliant.
Nasprotno pa bi zahteva operaterju s pomembno tržno močjo, da zagotovi veleprodajne vložke omrežij NGA, ki so v številnih primerih zagotovljeni v novih sistemih, na osnovi EoI lahko ustvarila zadostne čiste koristi in bi bila zato sorazmerna, ob upoštevanju primerjalno manjšega povečanja stroškov za zagotavljanje skladnosti na novo zgrajenih sistemov z EoI.
Before supplying new inputs to its downstream divisions, the SMP operator should be able to build in EoI at the design stage for new products at a proportionate cost.
Operater s pomembno tržno močjo bi moral biti pred vključitvijo novih vložkov v svoje enote navzdol po prodajni verigi sposoben vgraditi EoI v fazi snovanja novih proizvodov s sorazmernimi stroški.
Given the potentially high compliance costs, it may be disproportionate to require the SMP operator to apply EoI at each and every level of the value chain.
Ob upoštevanju možnih visokih stroškov skladnosti je morda nesorazmerno od operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo zahtevati, da uporablja EoI na vsaki ravni vrednostne verige.
Therefore, NRAs would first need to identify the level at which, given their national circumstances, the imposition of EoI would deliver the greatest benefits to competition and innovation, and then assess whether EoI would also be appropriate and proportionate for additional levels as well.
Zato bi morali NRO najprej opredeliti raven, na kateri bi v skladu z nacionalnimi razmerami uvedba EoI zagotovila največje koristi za konkurenco in inovacije, nato pa oceniti, ali bi bil EoI ustrezen in sorazmeren tudi na dodatnih ravneh.
Given the ability of EoI to deliver faster innovation in the retail market, EoI should, in principle, be introduced at the deepest possible network level at which competition will be effective and sustainable in the long term.
Ob upoštevanju zmožnosti EoI, da zagotovi najhitrejše inovacije na maloprodajnem trgu, bi bilo treba EoI praviloma uvesti na najnižji možni ravni omrežja, na kateri bo konkurenca učinkovita in trajnostna na dolgi rok.
In Member States with a high number of small scale SMP operators, the imposition of EoI on each of these operators may be disproportionate.
V državah članicah z velikim številom manjših operaterjev s pomembno tržno močjo je morda uvedba EoI za vsakega od teh operaterjev nesorazmerna.
Where NRAs conclude that an obligation to provide regulated wholesale inputs on an EoI basis is disproportionate, an EoO model should be applied, which ensures that the wholesale inputs provided to alternative operators — while not using the same systems and processes — are comparable, in terms of functionality and price, to those the vertically integrated SMP operator consumes itself.
Kadar NRO ugotovijo, da je obveznost zagotavljanja reguliranih veleprodajnih vložkov na podlagi EoI nesorazmerna, bi bilo treba uporabiti model EoO, ki zagotavlja, da so veleprodajni vložki, zagotovljeni alternativnim operaterjem – ki ne uporabljajo enakih sistemov in procesov – po funkcionalnosti in ceni primerljivi tistim, ki jih vertikalno povezan operater s pomembno tržno močjo porabi sam.
A decision to impose EoI, where appropriate, justified and proportionate and following consultation in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC, is a non-discrimination obligation under Article 10 of Directive 2002/19/EC, without prejudice to: (i) the potential imposition of an obligation for functional separation under Article 13a of Directive 2002/19/EC where an NRA concludes that the appropriate obligations (including non-discrimination obligations such as EoI) have failed to achieve effective competition; (ii) any voluntary separation in accordance with Article 13b of Directive 2002/19/EC; and (iii) an analysis of the conditions of competition in the areas covered by the joint deployment of fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) networks, which is recommended in point 28 of Recommendation 2010/572/EU.
Odločitev o uvedbi EoI, kadar je to primerno, utemeljeno in sorazmerno ter po posvetovanju v skladu s členoma 6 in 7 Direktive 2002/21/ES, je obveznost nediskriminacije v skladu s členom 10 Direktive 2002/19/ES, ki ne posega v (i) možno uvedbo obveznosti funkcionalnega ločevanja v skladu s členom 13a Direktive 2002/19/ES, kadar NRO ugotovi, da ustrezne obveznosti (vključno z obveznostmi nediskriminacije, kot je EoI) niso dosegle učinkovite konkurence; (ii) morebitno prostovoljno ločevanje v skladu s členom 13b Direktive 2002/19/ES in (iii) analizo pogojev konkurence na območjih, ki so zajeta v skupno uporabo omrežij optike do doma (FTTH), ki je priporočena v točki 28 Priporočila 2010/572/EU.
Volume discounts and/or long-term access pricing agreements are an important tool to foster NGA investment, in particular where take-up by consumers is still low, and can be compatible with an EoI and EoO approach.
Količinski popusti in/ali dolgoročni sporazumi o oblikovanju cen dostopa so pomembno orodje za spodbujanje naložb v omrežja NGA, zlasti kjer so med potrošniki še slabo uveljavljena, in so lahko združljivi s pristopom EoI in EoO.
However, in order to ensure that market entry by efficient competitors is possible, NRAs should accept volume discounts by SMP operators to their own downstream businesses, for example their retail arm, only if they do not exceed the highest volume discount offered in good faith to third party access seekers.
Vendar pa bi smeli NRO, da bi zagotovili možnost vstopa na trg učinkovitim konkurentom, sprejeti količinske popuste operaterjev s pomembno tržno močjo za njihova lastna podjetja na koncu prodajne verige, na primer njihovo maloprodajno enoto, le, če ne presegajo najvišjega količinskega popusta, v dobri veri ponujenega tretji stranki, ki želi imeti dostop.
Equally, NRAs should accept long-term access pricing agreements by SMP operators to their own downstream businesses, e.g. its retail arm, only if they do not exceed the highest discount for long-term access that has been offered in good faith to third party access seekers.
Prav tako bi smeli NRO sprejeti dolgoročne sporazume o oblikovanju cen dostopa operaterjev s pomembno tržno močjo, sklenjene z njihovimi lastnimi podjetji na koncu prodajne verige, npr. njihovo maloprodajno enoto, le, če ne presegajo največjega popusta za dolgoročni dostop, v dobri veri ponujenega tretji stranki, ki želi imeti dostop.
Ensuring technical replicability of the SMP operator’s new retail offers as a minimum
Zagotavljanje najmanj tehnične ponovljivosti nove maloprodajne ponudbe operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo
Independently of the exact equivalence concept imposed by the NRA, where the NRA decides that a non-discrimination obligation under Article 10 of Directive 2002/19/EC is appropriate, proportionate and objectively justified, it is important for a level playing field to ensure that alternative access seekers can technically replicate the retail offer of the SMP operator on the basis of the regulated wholesale input they receive.
Ne glede na koncept natančne enakovrednosti, ki ga uvede NRO, pri čemer se odloči, da je obveznost nediskriminacije iz člena 10 Direktive 2002/19/ES ustrezna, sorazmerna in objektivno utemeljena, je treba za enake konkurenčne pogoje zagotoviti, da alternativni subjekti, ki želijo imeti dostop, na podlagi reguliranega veleprodajnega vložka, ki ga prejmejo, lahko tehnično ponovijo maloprodajno ponudbo operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo.
While NRAs do not need to prescribe in detail the exact design of the relevant wholesale access products, they should ensure that a technical replicability test for a new retail service or bundle is carried out, ensuring that a number of factors are examined.
Čeprav ni nujno, da NRO podrobno predpišejo natančno zasnovo ustreznih veleprodajnih proizvodov dostopa, pa bi morali poskrbeti, da se izvede preskus tehnične ponovljivosti za novo maloprodajno storitev ali sveženj, pri čemer bi morali zagotoviti, da se preuči več dejavnikov.
When carrying out the technical replicability test or assessing the results of the test carried out by the SMP operator, NRAs should also take into account the risk of monopolisation of the downstream market through the new offer and the impact on innovation.
Pri opravljanju preskusa tehnične ponovljivosti ali ocenjevanju rezultatov preskusa, ki ga je opravil operater s pomembno tržno močjo, bi morali NRO upoštevati tudi tveganje glede monopolizacije podrejenega trga zaradi nove ponudbe in vpliva na inovacije.
For example, the relevant wholesale access product should be available to access seekers within a reasonable time prior to the launch of a corresponding retail offer by the SMP operator to avoid any undue timing advantage for the SMP operator taking into account the need for an efficient alternative operator to develop and adapt its own systems and processes in order to be able to offer a competitive new retail service.
Na primer, ustrezni veleprodajni proizvod dostopa bi moral biti tistim, ki želijo imeti dostop, na voljo v razumnem času, preden operater s pomembno tržno močjo uvede ustrezno maloprodajno ponudbo, da se prepreči neupravičena časovna prednost operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo, ob upoštevanju potrebe učinkovitega alternativnega operaterja po razvoju in prilagoditvi lastnih sistemov in procesov, da bi lahko ponudil konkurenčno novo maloprodajno storitev.
Given the importance for competition of ensuring technical replicability, it is crucial that the regulated SMP provider ensures technical replicability of new retail offers before their launch and at all times thereafter.
Ob upoštevanju pomembnosti zagotavljanja tehnične ponovljivosti za konkurenco je ključnega pomena, da regulirani ponudnik s pomembno tržno močjo zagotovi tehnično ponovljivost nove maloprodajne ponudbe, preden jo uvede in od takrat naprej v vsakem trenutku.
Consequently, a technical replicability test may be carried out prior to and after the launch of a new retail offer, depending on when the NRA finds it appropriate.
Zato se lahko preskus tehnične ponovljivosti opravi pred uvedbo ali po uvedbi nove maloprodajne ponudbe, glede na to, kdaj je to primerno po mnenju NRO.
For example, when an NRA’s ability to make public the SMP operator’s business data is limited by confidentiality rules under its national law, the NRA may choose to conduct the technical replicability test after the launch of the retail services.
Na primer, kadar je možnost, da NRO objavi poslovne podatke operaterja s pomembno tržno močjo, omejena zaradi pravil o varovanju zaupnosti v skladu z nacionalnim pravom, se lahko NRO odloči opraviti preskus tehnične ponovljivosti po uvedbi maloprodajnih storitev.
COMPLIANCE MONITORING OF NON-DISCRIMINATION OBLIGATIONS
SPREMLJANJE SKLADNOSTI OBVEZNOSTI NEDISKRIMINACIJE
Key Performance Indicators
Ključni kazalniki uspešnosti