natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission finds, after an assessment of legal basis for the regulated prices in force during the period 1995-2002, that it cannot be inferred with certainty from the legislative provisions how the competent authorities decided the composition of the regulated prices on an ex-ante basis.
Komisija po oceni pravne podlage za regulirane cene, ki so bile veljavne v obdobju 1995–2002, ugotavlja, da na podlagi zakonodajnih določb ni mogoče z gotovostjo sklepati, kako so pristojni organi naknadno odločali o sestavi reguliranih cen.
In particular, it cannot be proven in this case with certainty that when the competent authorities fixed the regulated prices at such a level that ultimately covered the shifted costs de facto, they unequivocally earmarked in their decisions a share of the regulated price to precisely cover the amount of claimed burdens from the non-price regulated services.
V tem primeru zlasti ni mogoče z gotovostjo sklepati, da so pristojni organi, ko so določili regulirane cene na ravni, ki je dejansko krila prenesene stroške, v svojih odločitvah nedvomno določili delež regulirane cene za kritje zneska navedenih obremenitev iz storitev brez reguliranih cen.
Unlike the 2002, 2007 and 2011 price cap decisions where those burdens are explicitly acknowledged and approved by the Postal regulator, that earlier de facto coverage could have been due to considerations of the competent pricing authorities as regards the evolution of other cost components or the development of other business variables.
V nasprotju s sklepi o najvišjih cenah iz let 2002, 2007 in 2011, v katerih je poštni regulator izrecno priznal in odobril te obremenitve, je bilo lahko to prejšnje dejansko kritje rezultat premislekov pristojnih organov glede določanja cen v zvezi z razvojem drugih stroškovnih komponent ali trenda pri drugih poslovnih spremenljivkah.
That earlier de facto coverage is therefore in this case not sufficient to quantify exactly and with certainty to which extent the competent authorities have increased the regulated price to take account of the claimed burdens for the non-price regulated services.
V tem primeru zato to prejšnje dejansko kritje ne zadošča za natančno in zanesljivo oceno, v kolikšni meri so pristojni organi zvišali regulirano ceno, da bi upoštevali navedene obremenitve za storitve, ki niso cenovno regulirane.
Deutsche Post's contribution since 2003
Prispevek podjetja Deutsche Post od leta 2003
The PostG 1997 allows Deutsche Post to request that, when the regulator is setting the allowed level of revenues from the exclusive right and the regulated services, the regulator includes into the costs to be recovered from consumers, inter alia, the ‘excess social burden’ as well as the costs for the efficient provision of the universal service.
Na podlagi zakona PostG iz leta 1997 lahko podjetje Deutsche Post od regulatorja, ko le-ta določa dovoljeno raven prihodkov od izključne pravice in reguliranih storitev, zahteva, naj v stroške, ki jih morajo stranke povrniti, med drugim vključi „dodatno obremenitev zaradi stroškov za socialno varnost“ in stroške za učinkovito zagotavljanje univerzalne storitve.
Deutsche Post was still authorised to recover the entire burden by making use of its dominant position.
Podjetje Deutsche Post je s svojim prevladujočim položajem še vedno lahko povrnilo celotno obremenitev.
In that regard, it does not make a difference whether the regulator exercises control ex ante or ex post.
Zato je popolnoma vseeno, ali regulator izvaja predhodni ali naknadni nadzor.
The Postal regulator has consistently approved Deutsche Post's claim that the burden #2 on incurred social costs in excess of the regulatory contribution rate should be refinanced by the price-regulated revenues.
Poštni regulator je vedno odobril zahtevo podjetja Deutsche Post glede refinanciranja obremenitve št. 2 (dejanski stroški za socialno varnost, ki presegajo predpisani prispevek) iz cenovno reguliranih prihodkov.
Thus for 2001, to determine the excess social costs (burden #2), the incurred social contributions of Deutsche Post for its civil servants of [40 to 45 %] of the incurred wages [88] were compared to the regulatory benchmark.
Za določitev dodatnih stroškov za socialno varnost (obremenitev št. 2) za leto 2001 je bila narejena primerjava med dejanskimi prispevki podjetja Deutsche Post za socialno varnost za njegove javne uslužbence v višini [40–45 %] dejanskih plač [88] in regulativno referenčno vrednostjo.
That benchmark consists of the employers' share of social contribution, accident insurance and supplementary pension insurance, which together total [20 to 25 %] of the incurred wages.
Ta referenčna vrednost je sestavljena iz deleža prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki ga plača delodajalec, nezgodnega zavarovanja in dodatnega pokojninskega zavarovanja, ki skupaj znašajo [20–25 %] dejanskih plač.
That difference between the two rates of [15 to 20 %] of the incurred civil servant wage was included in burden #2 and covered by the price-regulated revenues (see Table 2).
Razlika med obema stopnjama v višini [15–20 %] dejanske plače javnega uslužbenca je bila vključena v obremenitev št. 2 in krita iz prihodkov z reguliranimi cenami (glej preglednico 2).
From an economic point of view, Deutsche Post therefore does not bear a rate of 33 % of the incurred wages as wage-based social security contributions, but only a rate of [20 to 25 %].
Z ekonomskega vidika torej pri prispevkih za socialno varnost na podlagi plač podjetje Deutsche Post ne krije stopnje v višini 33 % dejanskih plač, ampak samo [20–25 %].
Since 2003, the remainder has been borne by captive consumers, who pay tariffs calculated to cover Deutsche Post's social costs for the services for which Deutsche Post had an exclusive right until 2007, respectively for the universal services for which Deutsche Post enjoys a dominant position.
Od leta 2003 preostanek krijejo lastne stranke podjetja, ki plačujejo cene, izračunane tako, da krijejo stroške podjetja Deutsche Post za socialno varnost za storitve, za katere je imelo podjetje izključno pravico do leta 2007, in za univerzalne storitve, pri katerih ima podjetje Deutsche Post prevladujoč položaj.
In order to compare the rate applied to the incurred wages to the level of social security contributions of a competitor, it is then still necessary to convert the incurred wage into the gross wage of the civil servants.
Da bi lahko primerjali stopnjo, uporabljeno za dejanske plače, in stopnjo prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki jo plačujejo konkurenti, je treba dejansko plačo spremeniti v bruto plačo javnih uslužbencev.
The incurred wage corresponds to between [85 % and 90 %] of the civil servants' gross wage [89].
Dejanska plača znaša med [85 % in 90 %] bruto plače javnih uslužbencev [89].
On that basis, [20 to 25 %] of incurred wages corresponds to [17,5 to 22,5 %] of the gross wage.
[20–25 %] dejanske plače torej ustreza [17,5–22,5 %] bruto plače.
As a result of the limitation of Deutsche Post's contribution to the Pension Fund at 33 % and the approval, by the Postal regulator, of burden #2, Deutsche Post thus pays a level of wage-based social security contributions of [17,5 to 22,5 %] of the gross wage of the civil servants.
Zaradi omejitve prispevka podjetja Deutsche Post za pokojninski sklad na 33 % in odobritve obremenitve št. 2 s strani poštnega regulatorja podjetje Deutsche Post torej plačuje stopnjo prispevkov za socialno varnost na podlagi plač v višini [17,5–22,5 %] bruto plače javnih uslužbencev.
The period 1995-2002
Obdobje 1995–2002
In the period 1995-2002 the revenues from the tariffs applied by Deutsche Post in the reserved sector considerably reduced the actual economic burden of the contribution made by it to cover its social costs.
V obdobju 1995–2002 so prihodki od cen, ki jih je podjetje Deutsche Post uporabljalo v rezerviranem sektorju, precej zmanjšali dejansko ekonomsko breme njegovega prispevka za kritje njegovih stroškov za socialno varnost.
However, in the absence of an earmarked element of the tariff, the Commission can only establish that the level of Deutsche Post's contribution remained below the benchmark rate.
Vendar pa lahko Komisija zaradi pomanjkanja namenskega elementa cen ugotovi samo, da je stopnja prispevka podjetja Deutsche Post ostala pod referenčno stopnjo.
The Commission is unable to calculate the exact difference between those two levels, nor to devise a method that would enable the Member State to do so.
Komisija ne more izračunati natančne razlike med tema dvema stopnjama ali določiti metode, ki bi državi članici to omogočila.
The period since 2003
Obdobje po letu 2003
In order to compare the regulatory contribution rate to the benchmark rate, it must be noted that the regulatory contribution rate is based on the incurred civil servants' wages that are a too low wage base compared to the private employees' gross wage.
Pri primerjavi predpisanega prispevka z referenčno stopnjo je treba opozoriti, da predpisani prispevek temelji na dejanskih plačah javnih uslužbencev, ki so v primerjavi z bruto plačami zasebnih uslužbencev prenizke.
The regulatory contribution rate needs therefore to be recalculated as a percentage of civil servants' gross wage.
Predpisani prispevek je torej treba izračunati kot odstotek bruto plače javnih uslužbencev.
Carrying out the comparison for 2006, the non-price regulated services have effectively carried social contributions of [17,5 to 22,5 %] of the civil servants' gross wage (respectively [20 to 25 %] of the incurred civil servants' wage) compared to the benchmark rate of 33,5 %.
Primerjava za leto 2006 kaže, da so storitve, ki niso cenovno regulirane, v primerjavi z referenčno stopnjo v višini 33,5 % dejansko krile prispevke za socialno varnost v višini [17,5–22,5 %] bruto plače javnih uslužbencev ([20–25 %] dejanskih plač javnih uslužbencev).
In terms of social contribution rates, Deutsche Post has therefore benefited from a comparative advantage of [10 to 15 %] of the civil servants' gross wages in 2006.
Pri prispevkih za socialno varnost je imelo podjetje Deutsche Post v letu 2006 torej korist od primerjalne prednosti v višini [10–15 %] bruto plače javnih uslužbencev.
Comparison of the regulatory contribution rate and the benchmark rate for DP's social contribution in 2006
Primerjava predpisanega prispevka z referenčno stopnjo za prispevke podjetja Deutsche Post za socialno varnost v letu 2006
Social contribution rate
Prispevek za socialno varnost
Benchmark rate for DP's social contribution charge
Referenčna stopnja za stroške podjetja Deutsche Post za prispevke za socialno varnost
in percentage of
kot odstotek
Private employee's gross wage
bruto plače zasebnih uslužbencev
Civil servant's gross wage
bruto plače javnih uslužbencev
Employer's share
Delež, ki ga plača delodajalec
Nursing insurance
Zavarovanje za oskrbo
Unemployment insurance
Zavarovanje za primer brezposelnosti
Employee's share
Delež, ki ga plača uslužbenec
Contribution rate
Stopnja prispevka
Table 7 shows that the benchmark level for Deutsche Post amounts to 33,5 % of the civil servants' gross wage and is [10 to 15] percentage points higher than the level which Deutsche Post has de facto borne.
Iz preglednice 7 je razvidno, da referenčna stopnja za podjetje Deutsche Post znaša 33,5 % bruto plače javnih uslužbencev in je za [10–15] odstotnih točk višja od stopnje, ki jo je podjetje Deutsche Post dejansko krilo.
The difference of [10 to 15] percentage points for 2006 goes beyond the nominal difference of [8 to 13]% between the benchmark rate of 33,5 % and the regulatory contribution rate of [20 to 25]%.
Razlika [10–15] odstotnih točk za leto 2006 je višja od nominalne razlike v višini [8–13] % med referenčno stopnjo v višini 33,5 % in predpisanim prispevkom v višini [20–25] %.
The difference includes a top-up of [2 to 3] percentage points that accounts for fact that the nominal regulatory contribution rate of [20 to 25]% has been inappropriately based on the incurred civil servants' wage and not on the civil servants' gross wage that is equivalent to the private employees' gross wage.
V razliko so vključene dodatne [2–3] odstotne točke, s katerimi je upoštevano dejstvo, da nominalni predpisani prispevek v višini [20–25] % nepravilno temelji na dejanski plači javnih uslužbencev in ne na njihovi bruto plači, ki je enaka bruto plači zasebnih uslužbencev.
Preliminary conclusion on necessity and proportionality
Predhodna sklepna ugotovitev glede nujnosti in sorazmernosti
The pension subsidy, which covers the funding need of the Pension fund that goes beyond the contribution of 33 % of incurred wages of Deutsche Post's civil servants, is neither necessary nor proportionate, for the following reasons:
Subvencija za pokojnine, ki krije potrebe po financiranju pokojninskega sklada, ki presega prispevek v višini 33 % dejanskih plač javnih uslužbencev podjetja Deutsche Post, ni niti nujna niti sorazmerna, ker:
Between 1995 and 2002 Deutsche Post actually bore costs below the benchmark level, but the exact difference cannot be determined.
je podjetje Deutsche Post v obdobju 1995–2002 dejansko krilo stroške, nižje od referenčne stopnje, vendar natančne razlike ni mogoče določiti;
Since 2003 Deutsche Post has on average only borne costs of about [17,5 to 22,5]% of the civil servants' gross compared to the average benchmark rate of 32 % of the civil servants' gross wage; the remainder has been born by the consumer, because the revenues authorised under the price cap include the burden on excess social costs which cover the remaining [10 to 15 %] of civil servants' gross wage.
je podjetje Deutsche Post od leta 2003 v povprečju krilo stroške v višini približno [17,5–22,5] % bruto plač njegovih javnih uslužbencev v primerjavi s povprečno referenčno stopnjo v višini 32 % bruto plače javnih uslužbencev; preostale stroške so pokrile stranke, ker prihodki, odobreni v okviru zamejitve cen, vključujejo obremenitev za dodatne stroške za socialno varnost, ki krijejo preostalih [10–15] % bruto plače javnih uslužbencev.
The difference in the rates since 2003 comes from two effects:
Razlika v stopnjah od leta 2003 je nastala zaradi dveh dejavnikov:
The level of wage-based social security charges which is borne by undertakings in the mail/parcel sector is 41 % of gross wages.
Stopnja prispevkov za socialno varnost na podlagi plač, ki jo krijejo podjetja v sektorju pošte/paketov, je 41 % bruto plače.
In order to compare it to the level that Deutsche Post pays for its civil servants, it is necessary to make a correction taking into account the fact that the civil servants bear 30 % to 50 % of their health and nursing care expenditures.
Da bi jo lahko primerjali s prispevkom za socialno varnost, ki ga podjetje Deutsche Post plačuje za svoje uslužbence, je treba narediti popravek ob upoštevanju, da javni uslužbenci plačujejo 30–50 % svojih stroškov za zdravstveno varstvo in oskrbo.
That contribution by the civil servants is equivalent to the employees' share of health and nursing care expenditures of 7,5 % of gross wages.
Ta prispevek javnih uslužbencev je enak deležu stroškov za zdravstveno varstvo in oskrbo, ki jih plačujejo uslužbenci, v višini 7,5 % bruto plače.
The contribution of Deutsche Post is calculated based on the incurred wage, not on the gross wage of the civil servants.
Prispevek podjetja Deutsche Post je izračunan na podlagi dejanske plače javnih uslužbencev namesto na podlagi njihove bruto plače.
The benchmark rate for Deutsche Post's civil servants is therefore 33,5 % of gross wages.
Referenčna stopnja za javne uslužbence podjetja Deutsche Post je torej 33,5 % bruto plače.
The relief that goes beyond that level is in principle neither necessary nor proportionate.
Pomoč, ki presega ta odstotek, dejansko ni niti nujna niti sorazmerna.
For the period 1995-2002 it is impossible to determine the exact part of the relief that goes beyond what can be accepted as necessary and proportionate.
Za obdobje 1995–2002 ni mogoče določiti natančnega deleža pomoči, ki presega tisto, kar se lahko šteje za nujno in sorazmerno.
Since 2003 that part corresponds to [10 to 15 %] of gross wages.
Od leta 2003 ta delež znaša [10–15 %] bruto plače.
Impact of the particular competitive and regulatory environment on necessity and proportionality
Učinek posebnega konkurenčnega in regulativnega okolja na nujnost in sorazmernost
The assessment of the necessity and the proportionality of the pension subsidy has, however, to take into consideration the particular competitive and regulatory environment.
Pri oceni nujnosti in sorazmernosti subvencije za pokojnine je treba upoštevati posebno konkurenčno in regulativno okolje.
As explained in Section II.2.1, Deutsche Post enjoyed until 31 December 2007 an exclusive right for certain letter services.
Kot je bilo pojasnjeno v oddelku II.2.1 je imelo podjetje Deutsche Post do 31. decembra 2007 izključno pravico za določene storitve dostave pisemskih pošiljk.
As long as and to the extent that Deutsche Post enjoyed an exclusive right for certain letter services, its competitors could not compete for that part of the postal market.
Dokler je imelo podjetje Deutsche Post izključno pravico do nekaterih pisemskih storitev, njegovi konkurenti v zadevnem delu poštnega trga niso mogli nuditi svojih storitev.
Therefore, the fact that for the civil servants who were in charge of the services falling under the exclusive right the Postal regulator allowed Deutsche Post to fully refinance all incurred social costs beyond the level of wage-based social security contributions of its competitors through increased regulated prices was unlikely to affect trade to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Dejstvo, da je poštni regulator podjetju Deutsche Post dovolil, da preko povišanih reguliranih cen v celoti refinancira del stroškov za socialno varnost za javne uslužbence, ki so nastali zaradi zagotavljanja rezerviranih storitev, in sicer nad stopnjo prispevkov za socialno varnost na podlagi plač, ki jo plačujejo njegovi konkurenti, na trgovino ni moglo vplivati v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
The rationale for the universal service obligation is that in a competitive market, postal operators will not offer certain services in rural and remote areas, or only at prices that are not affordable.
Utemeljitev za obveznost univerzalne storitve je, da na konkurenčnem trgu poštni operaterji določenih storitev ne bodo nudili na podeželju in odročnih območjih ali pa samo po nedostopnih cenah.
Therefore, Article 4 of Directive 97/67/EC obliges Member States to ensure that users enjoy the right to a universal service involving the permanent provision of a postal service of specified quality at all points in their territory at affordable prices for all users.
Člen 3 Direktive 97/67/ES zato določa, da mora vsaka država članica zagotoviti, da lahko uporabniki koristijo pravico do univerzalne storitve, ki vključuje stalno izvajanje poštnih storitev predpisane kakovosti na vseh točkah dostopa na njihovem ozemlju po dostopnih cenah za vse uporabnike.
The German national legislation places in that regard a particular burden on any postal operator which enjoys a dominant position on a market which falls within the remit of the universal services.
Glede tega nemška zakonodaja za vsakega poštnega operaterja, ki ima prevladujoč položaj na trgu, ki sodi v okvir obveznosti univerzalne storitve, določa posebno obveznost.
Pursuant to § 2 PDLV [91], such an operator has to offer its services on the same conditions to all users.
V skladu s členom 2 uredbe PDLV [91] morajo takšni operaterji storitve na tem trgu vsem uporabnikom nuditi pod enakimi pogoji.
Up to now, only Deutsche Post has enjoyed such a dominant position and has been subject to that obligation.
Do zdaj je imelo podjetje Deutsche Post prevladujoč položaj in je moralo spoštovati to obveznost.
Since its incorporation, Deutsche Post has not received any State aid as compensation for universal service obligations.
Od privatizacije podjetje Deutsche Post ni prejelo nobene državne pomoči kot nadomestilo za zagotavljanje univerzalnih storitev.
For the services for which it enjoys a dominant position, the Postal regulator has, however, approved increased regulated prices to finance the costs of ensuring the universal service.
Vendar pa prejema nadomestilo za stroške, ki nastanejo na podlagi zajamčenih univerzalnih storitev, iz prihodkov cenovno reguliranih storitev, pri katerih ima prevladujoč položaj.
When assessing the proportionality and necessity of the pension subsidy, the Commission considers it appropriate to take that fact into account.
Komisija meni, da je treba to upoštevati pri ocenjevanju sorazmernosti in nujnosti subvencije za pokojnine.
The Commission concludes therefore that for the civil servants' social costs that have been incurred for the provision of the price-regulated services, which fall under the universal service obligation and for which Deutsche Post has enjoyed a dominant position, the fact that the Postal regulator has approved a full pass-on of those social costs through higher regulated prices — even if those social costs go beyond the level that is normally assumed by competitors — does not affect trade to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Komisija je tako ugotovila, da glede stroškov za socialno varnost za javne uslužbence, ki so nastali zaradi zagotavljanja cenovno reguliranih storitev, ki sodijo v obveznost univerzalnih storitev in pri katerih je imelo podjetje Deutsche Post prevladujoč položaj, dejstvo, da je poštni regulator odobril financiranje teh stroškov za socialno varnost v celoti preko višjih reguliranih cen – tudi če ti stroški presegajo stopnjo, ki jo običajno plačujejo konkurenti – ne vpliva na trgovino v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
That conclusion is based on the particular competitive and regulatory environment in which those services are performed.
Ta sklep temelji na posebnem konkurenčnem in regulativnem okolju, v katerem se te storitve zagotavljajo.
Therefore, it cannot be extended to cover other sectors.
Zato ga ni mogoče razširiti na druge sektorje.
It can therefore be concluded that, from 2003 onwards, Deutsche Post has assumed for the civil servants working for its non-price regulated services a level of wage-based social security contributions that has been 11 to 14 percentage points below the level that competitors have paid.
Zato je mogoče skleniti, da je podjetje Deutsche Post od leta 2003 za javne uslužbence, ki opravljajo storitve, ki niso cenovno regulirane, plačevalo prispevke za socialno varnost na podlagi plač, ki so bili za 11–14 odstotnih točk nižji od prispevkov njegovih konkurentov.
Comparative advantage in social contribution rate with non-price regulated services (contribution rates in percentage of civil servants' gross wage)
Primerjalna prednost glede na prispevek za socialno varnost v primerjavi s storitvami, ki niso cenovno regulirane (prispevki kot odstotek bruto plače javnih uslužbencev)
That lower level of contributions is neither necessary nor proportionate to attain the objective of a gradual market opening in postal services.
Nizki prispevki za socialno varnost niso niti nujni niti sorazmerni za doseganje cilja postopnega odprtja trga v poštnih storitvah.
On the markets concerned, Deutsche Post is in fierce competition with other undertakings.
Na zadevnih trgih je podjetje Deutsche Post v hudi konkurenci z drugimi podjetji.
The Commission therefore considers that the lower level of contributions affects trade to an extent contrary to the common interest and cannot be declared compatible with the internal market.
Komisija zato meni, da nižji prispevki vplivajo na trgovino v obsegu, ki je v nasprotju s skupnim interesom, in jih ni mogoče razglasiti za združljive z notranjim trgom.
The incompatible share of the pension subsidy for the period since 1 January 2003 is calculated as the difference between the benchmark rate and regulatory contribution rate based on the civil servants' gross wage sum in the non-price regulated services according to the formula below:
Nezdružljiv del subvencije za pokojnine za obdobje od 1. januarja 2003 je izračunan kot razlika med referenčno stopnjo in predpisanim prispevkom, pomnožena s celotnimi bruto plačami javnih uslužbencev, ki delajo v storitvah, ki niso cenovno regulirane, v skladu z naslednjo formulo: