natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
FMS-WM was created by a board decision of 8 July 2010 in accordance with the German Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz [Financial Market Stabilisation Fund Act] (§ 8a of the FMStFG).
Slaba banka FMS-WM je bila ustanovljena s sklepom odbora z dne 8. julija 2010 v skladu z nemškim Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz [Zakon o skladu za stabilizacijo finančnega trga] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: FMStFG) (člen 8a FMStFG).
It manages assets and derivatives of the HRE group that it has taken over because they were either non-strategic or contained an unacceptable risk and capital burden.
Upravlja s sredstvi in izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti skupine HRE, ki jih je prevzela, ker so bili nestrateški ali pa so vsebovali nesprejemljivo tveganje ali kapitalsko breme.
FMS-WM acts independently of HRE and benefits from an obligation on the part of SoFFin to compensate losses (‘Verlustausgleichspflicht’).
Banka FMS-WM deluje neodvisno od banke HRE in je zaščitena z obveznostjo sklada SoFFin, da nadomesti izgube („Verlustausgleichspflicht“).
However, FMS-WM does not have a banking licence.
Vendar banka FMS-WM nima dovoljenja za opravljanje bančnih storitev.
As a result, many of the HRE assets could only be synthetically transferred; a variety of ‘transfer’ mechanisms, depending on the specific circumstances, were devised to obtain a similar regulatory capital relief effect for PBB and the HRE group.
Zato so lahko bila številna sredstva banke HRE prenesena samo umetno; načrtovani so bili različni mehanizmi za „prenos“, odvisni od posebnih okoliščin, da bi ohranili podoben učinek razbremenitve regulatornega kapitala za banko PBB in skupino HRE.
The transferred non-strategic assets also included those that could not be used as collateral for covered bonds.
Prenesena nestrateška sredstva so obsegala tudi tista, ki jih ni bilo mogoče uporabiti kot dodatno jamstvo za krite obveznice.
As laid down in the IAC, Germany also commissioned an external expert to perform an independent valuation.
Kot je določeno v Sporočilu o oslabljenih sredstvih, je Nemčija prav tako pooblastila zunanjega strokovnjaka, ki je izvedel neodvisno oceno.
The portfolio included about EUR 30 billion of commercial real estate loans, which are geographically diversified and composed mainly of financing of office buildings and shopping centres.
Portfelj je obsegal približno 30 milijonov EUR komercialnih nepremičninskih kreditov, ki so geografsko razpršeni ter sestavljeni v glavnem iz financiranja poslovnih stavb in nakupovalnih središč.
They are of a relatively short duration (three years) but of inferior credit quality.
Njihovo trajanje je razmeroma kratko (tri leta), vendar je njihova kreditna kakovost nizka.
The non-commercial real estate part of the portfolio was composed of public sector finance or bonds and loans to public entities or utilities.
Del portfelja, povezan z nekomercialnimi nepremičninami, je bil sestavljen iz financiranja javnega sektorja ali obveznic in posojil javnim subjektom ali gospodarskim javnim službam.
Most of that business consisted of standard bonds (‘plain vanilla bonds’), but it also included EUR 31 billion of ‘structured credit instruments’ and another EUR 30 billion of public sector loans.
Večina tega posla je bila sestavljena iz standardnih obveznic (navadnih obveznic), vendar je obsegal tudi 31 milijard EUR „strukturiranih kreditnih instrumentov“ in nadaljnjih 30 milijard EUR posojil javnemu sektorju.
The quality of the assets in this part of the portfolio was significantly better than that of the commercial real estate loans.
Kakovost sredstev v tem delu portfelja je bila precej boljša od kakovosti komercialnih nepremičninskih kreditov.
However, due to their long maturities and with the market credit spread widening since acquisition, the securities suffered from a significant discount in terms of market price.
Vendar se je zaradi njihove dolge zapadlosti in zaradi tega, ker se je kreditni razmik na trgu od prevzema naprej večal, tržna cena vrednostnih papirjev precej zmanjšala.
The Commission’s experts found that, in contrast to some other State aid cases, the complex commercial real estate loans and structured credit assets categories (mainly consisting of student loan backed securities, public sector asset backed securities and EUR 5 billion in a total return swap investment) were overall safe.
Strokovnjaki Komisije so ugotovili, da sta v nasprotju z nekaterimi drugimi primeri državne pomoči kategoriji sestavljenih komercialnih nepremičninskih kreditov in strukturiranih kreditnih sredstev (ki v glavnem obsegajo varnostne papirje, zavarovane s študentskimi posojili, varnostne papirje, zavarovane s premoženjem javnega sektorja, in 5 milijard EUR v obliki naložbe v zamenjavo skupnih donosov) na splošno varni.
They expected only limited losses on those categories, albeit higher than estimated by Germany’s experts, mainly due to the valuation of cash bonds in the Halcyon/Pegasus structures as well as the negative basis and the implicit funding cost in the total return swaps.
Pri teh kategorijah so pričakovali samo omejene izgube, čeprav višje od izgub, kot so jih ocenili strokovnjaki Nemčije, v glavnem zaradi vrednotenja denarnih obveznic v strukturah Halcyon/Pegasus ter negativne osnove in implicitnega stroška financiranja pri zamenjavi skupnih donosov.
By contrast, the ‘plain vanilla’ bonds were transferred at an asset swap level close to parity, considerably above their REV. In addition, they belonged to markets that were not particularly impaired, so that their REV should in fact be close to their market value.
Nasprotno pa so bile navadne obveznice prenesene po stopnji zamenjave sredstev blizu tečaja, precej nad svojo realno ekonomsko vrednostjo. Poleg tega so spadale na trge, ki niso bili zelo oslabljeni, tako da bi morala biti njihova realna ekonomska vrednost dejansko blizu njihovi tržni vrednosti.
As a result, the Commission’s experts concluded that the REV of that part of the portfolio would be considerably below the value at which HRE transferred it to FMS-WM.
Zato so strokovnjaki Komisije ugotovili, da bi bila realna ekonomska vrednost zadevnega dela portfelja precej nižja od vrednosti, po kateri jo je banka HRE prenesla na banko FMS-WM.
For the derivatives portfolio, the Commission’s experts largely agreed with the findings of Germany’s experts.
Glede portfelja izvedenih finančnih instrumentov so se strokovnjaki Komisije v glavnem strinjali z ugotovitvami strokovnjakov Nemčije.
In addition, they estimated the countervalue of the credit risk to be slightly higher than the level found by Germany’s experts and incorporated some findings from their sample as well as a general ‘operational risk’ charge, motivated by prudent assumptions surrounding shortcomings in the overall hedge effectiveness.
Poleg tega so protivrednost kreditnega tveganja ocenili kot nekoliko višjo od stopnje, ki so jo ugotovili strokovnjaki Nemčije, ter vključili nekatere ugotovitve, do katerih so prišli na podlagi svojega vzorca, in splošno zahtevo za „operativno tveganje“, ki so jo spodbudile preudarne predpostavke glede pomanjkljivosti splošne uspešnosti varovanja pred tveganjem.
The table below summarises the findings of the Commission’s experts:
V spodnji preglednici so povzete ugotovitve strokovnjakov Komisije:
Notional value
Nominalna vrednost
Transfer value (TV)
Vrednost ob prenosu (VP)
(Germany’s figures)
(številke Nemčije)
(Commission’s experts’ figures)
(številke strokovnjakov Komisije)
Divergence
Odstopanje
(Commission v Germany)
(Komisija proti Nemčiji)
Structured Credit
Strukturirani kredit
CRE loans
Komercialni nepremičninski krediti
Non-CRE loans
Nekomercialni nepremičninski krediti
Grounds for initiating and extending the in-depth investigation
Razlogi za začetek in podaljšanje podrobne preiskave
On 7 May 2009, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into State aid measures for HRE, mainly based on doubts regarding HRE’s viability, in particular in the light of HRE’s refinancing strategy and needs.
Komisija je 7. maja 2009 začela podrobno preiskavo ukrepov državne pomoči za banko HRE, v glavnem na podlagi pomislekov glede uspešnega poslovanja banke HRE, zlasti ob upoštevanju strategije refinanciranja banke HRE in njenih potreb po refinanciranju.
The initial restructuring plan submitted to the Commission on 1 April 2009 only identified external factors as reasons for HRE’s financial problems and targeted a balance sheet reduction of only 25 %, meaning that the refinancing volume would have remained high.
V prvotnem načrtu prestrukturiranja, ki ga je Komisija prejela 1. aprila 2009, so bili kot razlogi za finančne težave banke HRE opredeljeni samo zunanji dejavniki, njegov namen pa je bil zmanjšati bilanco stanja za samo 25 %, kar bi pomenilo, da bi obseg refinanciranja ostal velik.
HRE planned to reduce the group balance sheet by selling assets on the market, not by transferring them to a winding-up institution.
Banka HRE je bilanco stanja skupine nameravala zmanjšati s prodajo sredstev na trgu, ne pa z njihovim prenosom na slabo banko.
One of the core business fields described in the restructuring plan was budget finance activities that generate low margins, and the plan contained very little information on issues that are vital to the restructuring process such as the modification and integration of the IT systems.
Eno od temeljnih poslovnih področij, ki je bilo opisano v načrtu prestrukturiranja, so bile dejavnosti financiranja proračuna z nizko maržo, v načrtu pa je bilo zelo malo informacij o vprašanjih, ki so temeljnega pomena za proces prestrukturiranja, npr. sprememba in integracija sistemov informacijske tehnologije.
At that stage, the Commission also had doubts that there were sufficient measures to limit distortions of competition and sufficient burden-sharing measures.
V tej fazi je imela Komisija pomisleke tudi glede zadostnih ukrepov za omejitev izkrivljanja konkurence in ukrepov za razdelitev bremena.
The in-depth investigation was extended on 13 November 2009 because:
Podrobna preiskava je bila 13. novembra 2009 podaljšana, ker:
the additional State aid measures for HRE, in the form of a capital injection of EUR 2,96 billion (cf. recital 30), a capital injection of EUR 3 billion (cf. recitals 31 and 32), a guarantee of EUR 8 billion (cf. recitals 41 and 42), a guarantee of EUR 10 billion (cf. recitals 43 and 44) and a guarantee of EUR 2 billion [19] for refinancing a possible winding-down solution, plus capital injections amounting to a total of EUR 4 billion (structured as follows: the capital injection of EUR 1,85 billion referred to in recitals 33 and 34 and the capital injection of EUR 2,08 billion discussed in recital 35) had to be covered; and
je bilo treba zajeti dodatne ukrepe državne pomoči za banko HRE v obliki kapitalske injekcije v višini 2,96 milijarde EUR (glej uvodno izjavo 30), kapitalsko injekcijo v višini 3 milijarde EUR (glej uvodni izjavi 31 in 32), jamstvo v višini 8 milijard EUR (glej uvodni izjavi 41 in 42), jamstvo v višini 10 milijard EUR (glej uvodni izjavi 43 in 44) in jamstvo v višini 2 milijardi EUR [19] za refinanciranje morebitne rešitve v obliki prenehanja dejavnosti ter kapitalske injekcije v skupni vrednosti 4 milijarde EUR (sestavljene na naslednji način: kapitalske injekcije v višini 1,85 milijarde EUR iz uvodnih izjav 33 in 34 ter kapitalske injekcije v višini 2,08 milijarde EUR, obravnavane v uvodni izjavi 35) in
the Commission had doubts that the restructuring measures were compatible with the Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules [20] (Restructuring Communication).
je imela Komisija pomisleke glede tega, da so ukrepi prestrukturiranja skladni s Sporočilom Komisije o ponovni vzpostavitvi uspešnega poslovanja in oceni ukrepov prestrukturiranja v finančnem sektorju v sedanji krizi na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči [20] (Sporočilo o prestrukturiranju).
On 24 September 2010 the in-depth investigation was extended once more because:
Podrobna preiskava je bila 24. septembra 2010 še enkrat podaljšana, ker:
the additional State aid measures for HRE, namely a guarantee of EUR 20 billion (cf. recitals 45 and 46), a further guarantee of up to EUR 20 billion (cf. recitals 47 and 48) and the transfer of assets to a winding-up institution (cf. recitals 49 to 57) had to be covered; and
je bilo treba zajeti dodatne ukrepe državne pomoči za banko HRE, in sicer jamstvo v višini 20 milijard EUR (glej uvodni izjavi 45 in 46), nadaljnje jamstvo v višini do 20 milijard EUR (glej uvodni izjavi 47 in 48) ter prenos sredstev na slabo banko (glej uvodne izjave 49 do 57), in
the Commission had doubts regarding the compatibility of the asset relief measure with the IAC, in particular with respect to transparency, valuation, burden sharing and remuneration, and had noted that the restructuring plan had shortcomings with regard to demonstrating the restoration of viability, proper burden sharing and appropriate mitigation of distortions of competition.
je imela Komisija pomisleke glede skladnosti ukrepa finančne pomoči s Sporočilom o oslabljenih sredstvih, zlasti glede preglednosti, vrednotenja, porazdelitve bremena in povračila, ter ugotovila, da so v načrtu prestrukturiranja pomanjkljivosti glede dokazovanja ponovne vzpostavitve uspešnega poslovanja, ustrezne porazdelitve bremena in primerne ublažitve izkrivljanj konkurence.
Main features of the restructuring plan
Glavne značilnosti načrta prestrukturiranja
According to the restructuring plan, HRE — having been freed from its legacy of impaired assets with a nominal value of EUR 210 billion by transferring them to the winding-up institution FMS-WM — will redesign its business activities in such a way that its core bank PBB can carry out its activities based on a stable funding approach and improved internal control systems.
V skladu z načrtom prestrukturiranja bo banka HRE, ki se je rešila predhodnih oslabljenih sredstev z nominalno vrednostjo 210 milijard EUR z njihovim prenosom na slabo banko FMS-WM, preoblikovala svoje poslovne dejavnosti na način, ki bo njeni temeljni banki PBB omogočal izvajanje njenih dejavnosti na podlagi stabilnih virov financiranja in izboljšanih sistemov notranjega nadzora.
Its future activities will be on a considerably smaller scale than HRE’s activities before the crisis, regardless of whether measured in terms of balance sheet size, volume of new business, workforce, branch network or geographical scope.
Njene prihodnje dejavnosti bodo v precej manjšem obsegu kot pred krizo, ne glede na to, ali se upošteva obseg bilance stanja, novih dejavnosti, delovne sile, mreže podružnic ali geografski obseg.
Compared with the situation before the crisis, PBB’s strategic balance sheet size at the end of 2011 — corrected for items that are in run-down mode or have been synthetically transferred to FMS-WM — accounts for approximately 15 % of HRE’s balance sheet size at the end of 2008.
V primerjavi s stanjem pred krizo strateški obseg bilance stanja banke PBB konec leta 2011 – popravljen za postavke, ki so izčrpane ali pa so bile umetno prenesene na banko FMS-WM – obsega približno 15 % bilance stanja banke HRE konec leta 2008.
New business in real estate finance will, for example, be reduced to approximately 30 % of its pre-crisis level (HRE’s new business in commercial real estate finance amounted to EUR 32,1 billion in 2007).
Nove dejavnosti na področju financiranja nepremičnin bodo, na primer, zmanjšane na približno 30 % ravni pred krizo (nove dejavnosti financiranja nepremičnin banke HRE so leta 2007 znašale 32,1 milijarde EUR).
The workforce has been reduced by approximately 30 %, and all the executive board members of HRE who held office before the crisis have been replaced.
Delovna sila je bila zmanjšana za približno 30 % in vsi člani izvršnega odbora banke HRE, ki so bili na položaju pred krizo, so bili zamenjani.
More than 30 participations, one third of which are outside Europe, have already been divested or liquidated, or are in the process of liquidation.
Več kot 30 udeležb, od tega ena tretjina zunaj Evrope, je že bilo odprodanih ali likvidiranih, ali pa so v postopku likvidacije.
Some 26 out of 32 branches have been closed.
Približno 26 od 32 podružnic je bilo zaprtih.
In addition, a multi-year, group-wide transformation project called ‘New Evolution’ with a budget of approximately EUR 180 million has been launched to improve and integrate the IT systems.
Poleg tega se je na ravni skupine začelo izvajanje večletnega projekta preoblikovanja, imenovanega „Nov razvoj“ s proračunom približno 180 milijonov EUR, ki bo izboljšal in integriral sisteme informacijske tehnologije.
PBB will continue two strategic business lines, real estate finance (REF) and public investment finance (PIF).
Banka PBB bo nadaljevala z izvajanjem dveh strateških poslovnih linij, financiranjem nepremičnin in financiranjem javnih naložb.
Both business lines target assets that are eligible for German covered bonds, either in the form of German mortgage bonds (‘Hypothekenpfandbriefe’) or in the form of German public sector bonds (‘öffentliche Pfandbriefe’).
Obe poslovni liniji sta namenjeni sredstvom, ki so upravičena do nemških kritih obveznic v obliki nemških hipotekarnih obveznic („Hypothekenpfandbriefe“) ali v obliki nemških obveznic javnega sektorja („öffentliche Pfandbriefe“).
All other activities, in particular budget finance business, infrastructure finance, capital markets and asset management activities, will be terminated.
Vse druge dejavnosti, zlasti dejavnosti financiranja proračuna, financiranje infrastrukturnih naložb, dejavnosti kapitalskega trga in upravljanja s sredstvi, bodo ukinjene.
The arrangements for the two other subsidiaries of HRE Holding are as follows: DEPFA Bank plc is put into run-down as of the date of notification of this Decision and will not generate any new business.
Dogovor za drugi dve podružnici HRE Holding je, kot sledi: banka DEPFA Bank plc se od datuma uradnega obvestila o tem sklepu obravnava kot izčrpana in ne bo sklepala novih poslov.
The same applies to its subsidiaries.
Enako velja za njene podružnice.
HRE Finance is in liquidation and also not carrying out new business.
HRE Finance je v postopku likvidacije in prav tako ne izvaja novih dejavnosti.
Germany claims that the fundamental decision to pursue a more conservative commercial strategy and to focus on German covered bonds as the primary refinancing source ensures a qualitative improvement of the lending activities because they are subject to the legal framework of the German Pfandbriefgesetz [Pfandbrief Act], which has specific requirements regarding the management, monitoring and control of risks, and provides for protective measures such as limitation of the loan-to-value ratio.
Nemčija trdi, da načelna odločitev za izvajanje bolj konzervativne komercialne strategije in osredotočenost na nemške krite obveznice kot osnovni vir refinanciranja zagotavlja izboljšanje kakovosti dejavnosti na področju posojil, saj zanje velja pravni okvir nemškega Pfandbriefgesetz [zakon o hipotekarnih obveznicah], ki ima posebne zahteve glede upravljanja, spremljanja in nadzorovanja tveganj ter določa zaščitne ukrepe, kot je omejitev razmerja med zneskom posojila in vrednostjo.
That funding strategy considerably reduces HRE’s previous dependency on the interbank money market, which in future is only needed for the warehousing period preceding the issuance of covered bonds.
Ta strategija financiranja precej zmanjša prejšnjo odvisnost banke HRE od medbančnega denarnega trga, ki je v prihodnosti potreben samo še za obdobje skladiščenja pred izdajo kritih obveznic.
The Commission received comments from interested parties, as summarised below:
Komisija je prejela pripombe zainteresiranih strani, kot je povzeto v nadaljevanju:
Summary of comments from Verband deutscher Pfandbriefbanken (vdp) (November 2009):
povzetek pripomb združenja Verband deutscher Pfandbriefbanken (v nadaljnjem besedilu: združenje vdp) (november 2009):
vdp is convinced that a business model which is aligned on Pfandbrief-eligible business is promising and capable of ensuring the long-term viability and profitability of a bank without State guarantees.
združenje vdp meni, da je poslovni model, usmerjen na dejavnosti na področju kritih obveznic, obetaven in zmožen zagotoviti dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja in dobičkonosnost banke brez državnega jamstva;
Summary of comments from Heisse Kursawe Eversheds (November 2009):
povzetek pripomb odvetniške pisarne Heisse Kursawe Eversheds (november 2009):
Heisse Kursawe Eversheds is of the opinion that the State aid violates the rights of certain shareholders, that the planned acquisition of all HRE shares by SoFFin by excluding minority shareholders (squeeze-out) constitutes further State aid, that the squeeze-out is not appropriate aid and that it violates the principle of free movement of capital.
odvetniška pisarna Heisse Kursawe Eversheds meni, da državna pomoč krši pravice določenih delničarjev, da načrtovani prevzem vseh delnic banke HRE s strani sklada SoFFin z izključitvijo manjših delničarjev (izrinjenjem) pomeni nadaljnjo državno pomoč, da to izrinjenje ni ustrezna pomoč in da krši načelo prostega pretoka kapitala;
Summary of comments from Heisse Kursawe Eversheds (February 2010):
povzetek pripomb odvetniške pisarne Heisse Kursawe Eversheds (februar 2010):
In its further comments, Heisse Kursawe Eversheds is of the opinion that the exclusion of the minority shareholders of HRE (squeeze-out) is State aid within the meaning of Article 107 et seq. TFEU, that such State aid violates the freedom of movement of capital, and that State aid for HRE may only be authorised if HRE will be continued on the basis of a sustainable restructuring plan.
odvetniška pisarna Heisse Kursawe Eversheds v svojih nadaljnjih pripombah meni, da je izključitev manjšinskih delničarjev banke HRE (izrinjenje) državna pomoč v smislu člena 107 PDEU in naslednjih členov, da takšna državna pomoč krši prosti pretok kapitala in da se lahko državna pomoč banki HRE odobri samo, če bo banka HRE nadaljevala z dejavnostmi na podlagi trajnostnega načrta prestrukturiranja;
Summary of comments from Bohdan Kalwarowskyj (February 2010):
povzetek pripomb Bohdana Kalwarowskyja (februar 2010):
Mr Kalwarowskyj is of the opinion that, based on the valuation documents of HRE presented in the context of the squeeze-out on 5 October 2009, it is evident that HRE will be viable and profitable, and that SoFFin in cooperation with HRE aims to manipulate the company value downwards.
Kalwarowskyj meni, da je na podlagi dokumentov o oceni banke HRE, ki so bili predloženi v okviru izrinjenja 5. oktobra 2009, očitno, da bo banka HRE uspešno poslovala in da bo dobičkonosna ter da namerava sklad SoFFin v sodelovanju z banko HRE vrednost podjetja spremeniti navzdol.
COMMENTS FROM GERMANY ON THE COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
PRIPOMBE NEMČIJE NA PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANI
On 24 March 2010 the Commission received comments from Germany on the comments from interested parties:
Komisija je 24. marca 2010 prejela pripombe Nemčije na pripombe zainteresiranih strani:
Summary of comments regarding Verband deutscher Pfandbriefbanken (vdp):
Povzetek pripomb glede združenja Verband deutscher Pfandbriefbanken (vdp):
According to Germany, the comments from vdp confirm that the planning of HRE’s business model is based on plausible assumptions.
po mnenju Nemčije pripombe združenja vdp potrjujejo, da načrtovanje poslovnega modela banke HRE temelji na verodostojnih predpostavkah;
Summary of comments regarding Heisse Kursawe Eversheds:
povzetek pripomb glede odvetniške pisarne Heisse Kursawe Eversheds:
Germany is of the opinion that the squeeze-out does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Nemčija meni, da izrinjenje ne pomeni državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU.