natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It must be concluded that the financial compensation in favour of the State introduced by the 1990 Law for the payment and servicing of the pensions is specific to France Télécom and sui generis.
Ugotoviti je treba, da je protidajatev državi, ki je bila uvedena z zakonom iz leta 1990, za obračunavanje in izplačevanje pokojnin specifična za podjetje France Télécom in da gre za prispevek sui generis.
This compensation has been calculated since 1997 by referring to certain costs borne by the competing undertakings in the sector.
Pri izračunu te protidajatve se od leta 1997 upoštevajo nekateri izdatki konkurenčnih podjetij v zadevnem sektorju.
For the purposes of determining whether the aid is proportionate for achieving the objective, it is therefore appropriate to examine the objective and justified nature of the reference to establish the amount of the compensation adopted in the 1996 Law.
Pri ugotavljanju, ali je pomoč sorazmerna za doseganje zastavljenega cilja, je treba torej preučiti objektivnost in upravičenost reference za določanje višine protidajatve, ki je bila sprejeta z zakonom iz leta 1996.
It should be noted straight away that, in the procedures relating to reductions in retirement costs for civil servant staff of former monopoly operators in the telecommunications sector, OTE in Greece and BT Plc in the United Kingdom, the Commission checked in particular whether these undertakings were subject to equivalent social security costs to those of their competitors to decide the respective compatibility and incompatibility with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU of the State aid granted to the operators in question [63].
Najprej je treba opozoriti, da je Komisija v postopkih v zvezi z zmanjšanjem stroškov, povezanih s pokojninami javnih uslužbencev nekdanjih monopolnih gospodarskih subjektov na področju telekomunikacij, tj. podjetja OTE v Helenski republiki in BT Plc v Združenem kraljestvu, zlasti preverila, ali je bila višina prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki so jih plačevala ta podjetja, enakovredna višini prispevkov konkurenčnih podjetij, ko je odločala o združljivosti oziroma nezdružljivosti državnih pomoči, ki so bile dodeljene zadevnim gospodarskim subjektom, z notranjim trgom v smislu člena 107(3)(c) PDEU [63].
The Commission finds that in the present case, the contributions in full discharge of liabilities paid each year by France Télécom and provided for by the 1996 Law do not enable it to be ensured that the social charges levied are equivalent to those of its competitors.
Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da v zadevnem primeru odvezujoči prispevki, ki jih vsako leto plačuje podjetje France Télécom in so predvideni z zakonom iz leta 1996, ne zagotavljajo plačila prispevkov za socialno varnost, ki bi bili enakovredni prispevkom konkurenčnih podjetij.
The competitively fair rate (hereinafter: ‘TEC’) is not achieved.
Pravična in konkurenčna stopnja ni dosežena.
The exceptional flat-rate contribution is subdivided into two components:
Izredni pavšalni prispevek je razdeljen na dva dela:
firstly, an amount of EUR 3,6 billion corresponding to the provisions set aside by France Télécom up to 1996 in order to defray the future retirement costs of the civil servants foreseen at the time;
na eni strani znesek v višini 3,6 milijarde EUR, ki ustreza rezervacijam, ki jih je oblikovalo podjetje France Télécom do leta 1996, da bi pokrilo predvidene prihodnje stroške za pokojnine javnih uslužbencev,
secondly, an amount of EUR 2,1 billion (hereinafter: the ‘additional amount’), corresponding to both the forecasts of the public authorities and in fact to the net social security costs for paying the pensions which the State would have to defray over a period of 10 years, between 1997 and 2006, on account of the transfer of the cost of the pensions of the civil servants in telecommunications.
na drugi strani znesek v višini 2,1 milijarde EUR (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dodatni znesek), ki ustreza napovedim državnih organov in dejansko tudi neto stroškom za socialno varnost, in sicer za izplačilo pokojnin, ki bi jih morala država kriti v 10-letnem obdobju med letoma 1997 in 2006 zaradi prenosa stroškov za pokojnine javnih uslužbencev na področju telekomunikacij.
The flat-rate sum of EUR 5,7 billion was never intended to compensate for the absence of the competitively fair rate between France Télécom and its competitors, so it would not be justified to weigh this sum against the annual contributions in full discharge of liabilities which were not paid by France Télécom when they would have been necessary to attain a competitively fair rate.
Ker pavšalni znesek v višini 5,7 milijarde EUR ni bil nikoli namenjen nadomestitvi pomanjkanja pravične in konkurenčne stopnje za podjetje France Télécom in njegove konkurente, tega zneska ne bi bilo upravičeno uravnotežiti z letnimi odvezujočimi prispevki, ki jih podjetje France Télécom ni plačalo, čeprav naj bi bili ti potrebni za dejansko doseganje pravične in konkurenčne stopnje.
On the other hand, an examination of the parliamentary debates shows that the additional amount of EUR 2,1 billion was intended to cover this transfer of costs from 1997 to 2006 and, in fact, to eliminate the effects of aid for a 10-year period.
Vendar iz pregleda parlamentarnih razprav izhaja, da je bil dodatni znesek v višini 2,1 milijarde EUR namenjen za kritje tega prenosa stroškov od leta 1997 do leta 2006 in dejansko za odpravo učinkov pomoči v zadevnem 10-letnem obdobju.
In this way, the net financial effort by France Télécom corresponding to this additional amount consisted in financing, for a 10-year period, the additional cost of the reform for the French State.
Tako so se z neto sredstvi podjetja France Télécom, ki ustrezajo temu dodatnemu znesku, v 10-letnem obdobju financirali dodatni stroški, ki jih je imela Francoska republika zaradi reforme.
However, the 1996 Law refers to a one-off exceptional contribution, without the applicable provisions, either of the Finance Law or of the subsequent Decrees, determining an amount arising from the provisions, which should have been deducted from the burden transferred to the State for the duration of this period.
Vendar pa se zakon iz leta 1996 nanaša na en sam izredni prispevek, pri čemer veljavne določbe, in sicer niti določbe finančnega zakona niti določbe poznejših odlokov, ne določajo različnega zneska, ki izhaja iz rezervacij in bi ga bilo treba odšteti od stroškov, prenesenih na državo v času zadevnega obdobja.
Article 6 of the 1996 Law clearly specifies that the exceptional flat-rate contribution is paid in return for the funding by the State of the pensions granted to the civil service staff.
V skladu s členom 6 zakona iz leta 1996 se izredni pavšalni prispevek plača kot protidajatev za stroške pokojnin za javne uslužbence, ki jih je prevzela država.
The amount of this exceptional contribution must therefore be included in its entirety in the analysis of the reform.
Znesek tega izrednega prispevka bi bilo torej treba v celoti upoštevati pri analizi reforme.
As France Télécom, through the payment of this exceptional flat-rate contribution, covered the cost of the retirement pensions of the civil servants in telecommunications and the cost of the compensation between arrangements for a period of about 15 years, the effects of the aid were neutralised.
Ker je podjetje France Télécom s plačilom tega izrednega pavšalnega prispevka pokrilo stroške pokojnin javnih uslužbencev na področju telekomunikacij in stroške nadomestil med sistemi v obdobju približno 15 let, so bili učinki pomoči izravnani.
France Télécom, by paying this exceptional contribution, therefore neutralised the effects of the aid during this period.
Podjetje France Télécom je torej s plačilom tega izrednega prispevka izravnalo učinke pomoči v zadevnem obdobju.
Consequently, it is justified that, during this period, France Télécom is not obliged to fulfil the conditions of compatibility of this aid, and therefore that it does not pay the annual contribution necessary to ensure a competitively fair rate including the non-common risks in respect of the private-law employees.
Zato bi bilo upravičeno, da v tem obdobju podjetju France Télécom ne bi bilo treba izpolnjevati pogojev glede združljivosti te pomoči in mu torej ne bi bilo treba plačati letnega prispevka, potrebnega za zagotovitev pravične in konkurenčne stopnje, vključno s tveganji, ki niso skupna osebam, zaposlenim v skladu z zasebnim pravom.
It is appropriate to return in detail to the stages of this reasoning.
To obrazložitev bi bilo treba podrobneje obravnavati.
The competitively fair rate is not achieved
Pravična in konkurenčna stopnja ni dosežena:
The fact remains that the annual levies in full discharge of liabilities paid by France Télécom since the 1996 reform do not permit a competitively fair rate to be achieved, as emphasised in the decision to initiate the procedure.
Ugotoviti je treba, da odvezujoči letni prispevki, ki jih plačuje podjetje France Télécom od sprejetja reforme iz leta 1996, ne zagotavljajo pravične in konkurenčne stopnje, kot je navedeno v sklepu o začetku postopka.
This results from the fact that the rate applied to France Télécom includes only the contributions corresponding to the common risks of private-sector employees and civil servants and, as a result, excludes the contributions corresponding to the non-common risks, such as unemployment or non-payment of wages in the event of the firm going into receivership or compulsory liquidation.
To izhaja iz dejstva, da stopnja, ki se uporablja za podjetje France Télécom, vključuje le prispevke za tveganja, ki so skupna osebam, zaposlenim v skladu z zasebnim pravom, in javnim uslužbencem, ter v skladu s tem izključuje prispevke za tveganja, ki niso skupna, kot je brezposelnost ali neizplačilo plač v primeru stečajnega postopka ali likvidacije podjetja.
It therefore results from Table 4 that not taking the non-common risks into account in the calculation of the contribution to be paid by France Télécom is reflected in a considerable difference between the compensation paid by France Télécom to the State and what it would pay if the contribution rate were calculated to ensure an entirely level playing field with the bases for the calculation of the costs paid by competitors.
Poleg tega iz preglednice 4 izhaja, da se zaradi neupoštevanja tveganj, ki niso skupna, pri izračunu prispevka, ki ga mora plačati podjetje France Télécom, protidajatev, ki jo podjetje France Télécom plača državi, močno razlikuje od protidajatve, ki bi jo zadevno podjetje plačalo, če bi se stopnja prispevka izračunala z namenom zagotavljanja popolne konkurenčne pravičnosti glede na podlage za izračun stroškov konkurenčnih podjetij.
Consequently, the aid measure resulting from the Law does not comply with the principle of proportionality.
Zato ukrep pomoči, ki izhaja iz zadevnega zakona, ni skladen z načelom sorazmernosti.
For it to comply with this principle and in order to attain the legitimate objective stated of improving the conditions of competition by equalising the calculation methods relating to the costs borne by the undertakings operating on the telecommunications markets concerned in France, the aid granted to France Télécom pursuant to the 1996 Law should have equalised, and should effectively in future equalise, these costs by including those relating to the risks not common to the two categories of staff.
Da bi bila pomoč, dodeljena podjetju France Télécom na podlagi zakona iz leta 1996, skladna s tem načelom in da bi bil izpolnjen zakoniti cilj izboljšanja konkurenčnih pogojev z uskladitvijo metod izračuna v zvezi s stroški, ki jih imajo podjetja, dejavna na zadevnih telekomunikacijskih trgih v Franciji, bi se morala ta pomoč uporabiti za dejansko izenačitev zadevnih stroškov v prihodnosti z vključitvijo stroškov v zvezi s tveganji, ki niso skupna obema kategorijama zaposlenih.
In this respect, France’s argument that the civil servants are not exposed to certain risks and, that as a result, it is not justified to pay a contribution for these risks, cannot be accepted.
V zvezi s tem trditve Francije, da javni uslužbenci niso izpostavljeni nekaterim tveganjem in da zato obveznost plačevanja prispevkov za ta tveganja ni upravičena, ni mogoče sprejeti.
Firstly, it is pursuant to State measures that these risks would not arise, so there is no justification for France Télécom to draw a pecuniary advantage.
Prvič, zadevna tveganja naj se ne bi pojavila zaradi državnih ukrepov, zato ne bi bilo upravičeno, da bi podjetje France Télécom pridobilo finančno korist.
For example, it is by virtue of the commitment by the French State to the civil servants still working at France Télécom and on account of the fact that the French State is its own insurer that the risk of non-payment of wages in the event of the firm going into receivership would not arise.
Na primer, tveganje zaradi neizplačila plač v primeru stečaja podjetja naj ne bi nastalo zaradi zaveze, ki jo je sprejela Francoska republika v zvezi z javnimi uslužbenci, zaposlenimi v podjetju France Télécom, in dejstva, da Francoska republika deluje kot lastni zavarovatelj.
However, the possibility of France Télécom filing for bankruptcy, just like a competitor, cannot be ruled out.
Vendar ni mogoče izključiti možnosti, da bi podjetje France Télécom, tako kot katero koli konkurenčno podjetje, prijavilo stečaj.
In both cases, it is not a matter of an advantage supplied to the undertaking, but directly to its employees.
V nobenem od obeh primerov ne gre za prednost, zagotovljeno podjetju, ampak za prednost, zagotovljeno neposredno njegovim zaposlenim.
The guarantee of the payment of wages takes effect after the undertaking has ceased to exist.
Jamstvo za izplačilo plač je bilo zagotovljeno po tem, ko je družba prenehala obstajati.
However, a competing undertaking will have to pay contributions to guarantee the risk of non-payment of wages after its disappearance, in contrast to France Télécom.
Vendar pa bi moralo konkurenčno podjetje plačevati prispevek za kritje tveganja neizplačila plač po njegovem prenehanju delovanja, česar podjetju France Télécom ni treba.
It is therefore not justified to give the latter an advantage, in the form of a lower contribution or, in fact, an exclusion of this risk from the method of calculating the contributions of France Télécom.
Zato prednost v obliki nižjega prispevka ali, tako kot v zadevnem primeru, v obliki izključitve tega tveganja iz izračuna prispevkov, ki jih mora plačevati podjetje France Télécom, ni upravičena.
Then, more fundamentally, the objective itself of the reform introduced in 1996, which does not seem to have been brought to its logical conclusion, is to equalise the conditions of competition with regard to tax and social security payments between all the competitors of the sector, irrespective of the status of their staff and the existence of an actual obligation for France Télécom to affiliate with and subscribe to the competent management bodies.
Poleg tega je bistveno, da je sam cilj reforme iz leta 1996, za katerega se zdi, da ni bil v celoti logično izpeljan, izenačitev konkurenčnih pogojev glede davčnih dajatev in socialnih prispevkov za vsa konkurenčna podjetja v sektorju, in sicer ne glede na status njihovih zaposlenih ter obstoj dejanske obveznosti podjetja France Télécom glede članstva v pristojnih organih za upravljanje in plačevanja prispevkov tem organom.
It is precisely this logic of equalisation of the conditions of competition which would be liable to make the measure examined compatible with the internal market.
Ravno na podlagi te logike ustvarjanja enakih konkurenčnih pogojev bi bilo mogoče obravnavani ukrep razglasiti za združljivega z notranjim trgom.
Whether or not the staff of France Télécom are exposed to such risks is not therefore relevant under this logic.
Vprašanje, ali so zaposleni v podjetju France Télécom izpostavljeni zadevnim tveganjem ali ne, po tej logiki torej ni pomembno.
In conclusion, a reduction in the funding of the pensions with a transfer of the net burden to the State would respect the principle of proportionality only if it allowed a level playing field.
To pomeni, da bi bilo zmanjšanje stroška pokojnin s prenosom neto bremena na državo skladno z načelom sorazmernosti le, če bi omogočilo vzpostavitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev.
However, France Télécom has not been placed in a situation which is fully equivalent to that of the undertakings in the sector as regards wage-based social security contributions, since certain social security contributions and tax payments have not been integrated into the basis of assessment for calculating the annual contribution.
Vendar pa podjetje France Télécom ni bilo v popolnoma enakovrednem položaju z drugimi podjetji v sektorju, zlasti kar zadeva prispevke za socialno varnost na osnovi plač, saj nekateri prispevki za socialno varnost in davki niso bili vključeni v osnovo za izračun letnega prispevka.
It is not justified to compare the insufficiency of the rate of the contribution in full discharge of liabilities applied to France Telecom since 1997 and the exceptional flat-rate contribution paid to the State by France Télécom
Primerjava neustrezne stopnje odvezujočega prispevka, ki se uporablja za podjetje France Télécom od leta 1997, in izrednega pavšalnega prispevka, ki ga je podjetje France Télécom plačalo državi, ni utemeljena
Likewise, contrary to the claims of the French Republic and France Télécom, it is not justified to take into consideration the amount of the exceptional flat-rate contribution of EUR 5,7 billion already paid by France Télécom in 1997 to compare it with the insufficiency of the rate of the contribution in full discharge of liabilities applied to France Télécom.
Prav tako v nasprotju s trditvami Francoske republike in podjetja France Télécom ni utemeljeno upoštevanje zneska izrednega pavšalnega prispevka v višini 5,7 milijarde EUR, ki ga je podjetje France Télécom že plačalo leta 1997, da bi se ta prispevek primerjal z neustrezno stopnjo odvezujočega prispevka, ki se uporablja za podjetje France Télécom.
As a preliminary point, the Commission wishes to recall that, in each situation, it has to establish whether the conditions of application of the derogation provided for in Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU have been fulfilled, without being bound by its earlier decision-making practice, assuming that is established [64].
Komisija želi najprej opozoriti, da mora v vseh okoliščinah ugotoviti, ali so izpolnjeni pogoji za uporabo odstopanja iz člena 107(3)(c) PDEU, pri čemer je ne zavezuje pretekla praksa odločanja, tudi če bi ta obstajala [64].
In any event, the reform examined here displays clear differences, in several respects, from the reform referred to in the La Poste decision [65], which the French authorities attempt to rely on.
V vsakem primeru se obravnavana reforma bistveno in z več vidikov razlikuje od reforme iz odločbe o La Poste [65], na katero so se sklicevali francoski organi.
In fact, contrary to the reform as foreseen by the La Poste decision invoked by the French Republic and France Télécom, the reform of the arrangements for financing the retirement pensions of the civil servant staff of France Télécom occurred on the eve of the opening-up, at Union level, of the markets where France Télécom could operate.
V nasprotju z reformo iz odločbe o La Poste, na katero sta se sklicevala Francoska republika in podjetje France Télécom, je bila reforma načina financiranja pokojnin javnih uslužbencev, zaposlenih v podjetju France Télécom, sprejeta tik pred odprtjem trgov na ravni Unije, na katerih je delovalo podjetje France Télécom.
Moreover, it appears that France Télécom took advantage of this liberalisation by establishing itself in the markets of other Member States, thanks not only to its change of status into a public limited company, but also, in part, from the elimination of retirement pension commitments from its balance sheet and the lower future potential charges resulting from the reform.
Jasno je tudi, da je imelo podjetje France Télécom koristi od te liberalizacije, ker je tako prodrlo na trge drugih držav članic, in to ne le zaradi spremembe svojega statusa v delniško družbo, ampak delno tudi zaradi črtanja obveznosti glede kritja stroškov za pokojnine iz bilance stanja in zaradi morebitnih nižjih stroškov, ki jih bo imelo podjetje v prihodnosti na podlagi reforme.
This reduction in its balance-sheet commitments enabled France Télécom to boost its solvency and borrowing capacity.
Podjetje France Télécom je lahko na podlagi tega zmanjšanja obveznosti v bilanci stanja povečalo svojo plačilno in kreditno sposobnost.
The debt figures, supplied by the complainants in their comments and not contested by the French Republic regarding the amounts, show that the net financial debt of France Télécom rose from EUR 19,2 billion in 1997 to EUR 83 billion in 2002.
Iz podatkov o zadolženosti, ki so jih predložili pritožniki v okviru svojih pripomb, pri čemer Francoska republika teh zneskov ni izpodbijala, izhaja, da se je neto finančni dolg podjetja France Télécom od leta 1997 do leta 2002 povečal z 19,2 milijarde EUR na 83 milijard EUR.
It is true that a dedicated investment policy for expansion on the markets of other Member States, made possible by the liberalisation, may be at the origin of this very substantial increase in financial debt.
Res je, da je lahko razlog za tako veliko povečanje finančnega dolga proaktivna politika glede naložb za namene širitve na trge drugih držav članic, ki jo omogoča liberalizacija.
On the other hand, the group of postal markets on which the French La Poste can operate in the Union is not yet entirely open to competition and would only have to be in 2012, i.e. six years after the reform of financing the pensions of La Poste [66].
Vendar pa vsi poštni trgi v Uniji, na katerih lahko francosko podjetje La Poste deluje, še niso v celoti odprti za konkurenco, pri čemer bodo popolnoma odprti za konkurenco šele leta 2012, tj. šest let po reformi financiranja pokojnin uslužbencev podjetja La Poste [66].
The effect of restricting competition of the aid granted to France Télécom on markets which have been fully opened up is therefore greater than that of the aid to La Poste.
Učinek pomoči, dodeljene podjetju France Télécom, glede omejevanja konkurence na popolnoma odprtih trgih je torej večji od učinka pomoči, dodeljene podjetju La Poste.
Complete parallelism in the conditions necessary for compatibility of the aid is not therefore required, since the competitive situations are separate on markets for which the priority in opening-up at Union level and the contribution to the competitiveness of its economy were also different.
Popolna usklajenost pogojev za združljivost pomoči torej ni potrebna, ker gre za različne konkurenčne razmere na trgih, katerih prednostna naloga glede odprtja na ravni Unije in prispevek gospodarstva h konkurenčnosti sta bila prav tako različna.
As a result, the common interest criterion referred to in Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU need not necessarily be assessed in an identical fashion in the two cases in point.
Iz tega izhaja, da ni nujno, da je merilo skupnega interesa iz člena 107(3)(c) PDEU v obeh primerih ocenjeno na enak način.
In addition, the financial situation of La Poste and, consequently, its capacity for expansion on external markets or for reinforcement on the French market were not comparable to those of France Télécom.
Poleg tega finančni položaj podjetja La Poste in s tem tudi njegova sposobnost za širitev na tuje trge ali za okrepitev njegovega položaja na francoskem trgu nista bila primerljiva s položajem in sposobnostjo za širitev podjetja France Télécom.
As emphasised in the La Poste decision, without the reform of 2006, on account of the changeover to new accounting standards, La Poste had to enter into its accounts a provision for the State liability which it hitherto entered as an off-balance-sheet item for an amount of EUR 76 billion [67].
Kot je navedeno v odločbi o La Poste, bi moralo podjetje La Poste, če reforma iz leta 2006 ne bi bila sprejeta, zaradi začetka uporabe novih računovodskih standardov v svoje računovodske izkaze vključiti rezervacijo za nekdanje zunajbilančne obveznosti do države v višini 76 milijard EUR [67].