natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
When performing such examination and prior the approval SASAC must consider, inter alia, whether or not this plan complies with the national development planning and industrial policies and whether or not it complies with the strategic adjustment of the layout and structure of the State-owned economy [12].
Pri tej preiskavi in pred odobritvijo takega načrta je komisija SASAC med drugim dolžna preučiti, ali je ta načrt skladen s politikami načrtovanja nacionalnega razvoja in industrije ter ali je v skladu s strateško prilagoditvijo ureditve in strukture gospodarstva v državni lasti [12].
The concrete examples of the implementation of the measures described in the plans such as the relocation of the Capital Steel Corporation [13] or numerous mergers of steel enterprises [14] show that the plans are not only indicative documents which serve as guidelines but they result in concrete actions by the state-owned steel enterprises orchestrated by the government (represented by the NDRC and State Council).
Konkretni primeri izvajanja ukrepov, opisani v načrtih, kot so premestitev družbe Capital Steel Corporation [13] ali številne združitve jeklarskih družb [14], kažejo, da ti načrti niso samo okvirni dokumenti, ki se uporabljajo kot smernice, ampak da imajo za svojo posledico konkretne ukrepe jeklarskih družb v državni lasti, ki jih usmerja vlada (ki jo predstavljata agencija NDRC in državni svet).
All of the specific actions described in the above recitals must be followed and executed by the enterprises covered by the plans.
Posebne ukrepe, opisane v uvodnih izjavah zgoraj, so dolžne spremljati in izvajati družbe, zajete v načrtih.
It is concluded that through this direct government involvement in steel enterprises' commercial behaviour, the state-owned steel enterprises act like an arm of the government in performing governmental functions which subsequently lead to the fulfilment of goals and targets set in the plans.
Sklenjeno je bilo, da jeklarske družbe v državni lasti prek te neposredne vključenosti vlade v njihovo gospodarsko ravnanje delujejo kot roka vlade pri izvajanju njenih nalog, kar posledično pripelje do izpolnitve začrtanih splošnih ciljev in ciljnih količin.
Government control of SOEs
Nadzor družb v državni lasti s strani vlade
Having established that SOEs are performing government functions, the question remains as to whether they exercise government authority in doing so.
Po ugotovitvi, da družbe v državni lasti opravljajo naloge vlade, je treba odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali pri tem izvajajo pooblastilo vlade.
In this regard, a key question is whether they are meaningfully controlled by the government [15].
Glede tega je ključno vprašanje, ali so te družbe smiselno pod nadzorom vlade [15].
If this is the case, it is reasonable to determine, in the light of all the relevant evidence, that SOEs act as an arm of government and effectively implement policy set out in the plans above.
Če gre za to, je v luči vseh ustreznih dokazov utemeljeno ugotoviti, da družbe v državni lasti delujejo kot roka vlade in dejansko izvajajo politiko iz navedenih načrtov.
The governmental control described below indicates that SOEs possess, exercise or are vested with governmental authority.
Nadzor vlade, opisan spodaj, kaže, da družbe v državni lasti imajo in izvajajo pooblastilo vlade, ali jim je to zaupano.
Control can be exercised, inter alia, through government ownership, administrative regulation and involvement of SASAC, boards of directors, government plans.
Nadzor je mogoče izvajati, med drugimi, prek vladnega lastništva, pravne ureditve upravljanja in vloge SASAC, upravnih odborov, državnih načrtov.
Government ownership
Vladno lastništvo
As already mentioned in the section above concerning non-cooperation (recitals (46) to (48)), GOC did not provide the requested information on the ownership structure of the producers of HRS and CRS in China.
Kot je že zgoraj navedeno v oddelku o nesodelovanjem (v uvodnih izjavah od (46) do (48)), kitajska vlada ni zagotovila zahtevanih informacij o lastniški strukturi proizvajalcev VVJ in HVJ na Kitajskem.
With the reply to the questionnaire the GOC submitted a list of 54 companies in which the GOC is the largest shareholder, but during the verification visit it claimed that the list is not correct and also includes privately owned companies.
Kitajska vlada je z izpolnjenim vprašalnikom predložila seznam 54 družb, v katerih je vlada največji delničar, med preveritvenim obiskom pa je trdila, da ta seznam ni pravilen in da vključuje tudi družbe v zasebni lasti.
The GOC did not correct the list and also did not specify which of the companies are privately owned and which are owned by the GOC.
Kitajska vlada tega seznam ni popravila in tudi ne natančno navedla, katere družbe so v zasebni lasti in katere v lasti kitajske vlade.
Because of the non-cooperation the Commission had to look at other evidence on the file and publicly available information.
Zaradi tega nesodelovanja je Komisija morala preučiti druge dokaze v spisu in javno dostopne informacije.
The complainant provided evidence that the major HRS and CRS producers are state owned and submitted detailed information in this respect in Annex 10 to the complaint [16].
Pritožnik je o tem, da so glavni proizvajalci VVJ in HVJ v državni lasti, predložil dokaze in podrobne informacije v Prilogi 10 k pritožbi [16].
Also other publicly available information [17] confirms that the GOC has ownership stake in many of the producers of HRS and CRS.
Tudi druge javno dostopne informacije [17] potrjujejo, da ima kitajska vlada lastniški delež v številnih proizvajalcih VVJ in HVJ.
Taking into account all the information on the file it is reasonable to conclude that the GOC has a significant ownership stake in many of the Chinese HRS and CRS producers.
Ob upoštevanju vseh informacij iz spisa je ugotovitev, da ima kitajska vlada pomemben lastniški delež v številnih kitajskih proizvajalcih VVJ in HVJ, utemeljena.
Administrative regulation and involvement of SASAC
Pravna ureditev upravljanja in vloga SASAC
SASAC performs the responsibilities of the State as an investor and manages the state-owned assets under its supervision.
Komisija SASAC izvaja pristojnosti države kot vlagateljice in upravlja premoženje v državni lasti pod njenim nadzorom.
It is noted that although the GOC in its response to the questionnaire and subsequent submissions claimed that SASAC is not involved in the commercial operations of SOEs and supported this claim with reference to Article 7 of the Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of State-owned Assets of Enterprises [18], other articles of the same law and also other evidence on file [19] suggest otherwise.
Čeprav je kitajska vlada v svojem izpolnjenem vprašalniku in poznejših stališčih zatrjevala, da komisija SASAC v poslovne dejavnosti družb v državni lasti ni vključena, in to trditev podprla s sklicevanjem na člen 7 Začasnih ukrepov za nadzor in upravljanje državnega premoženja v družbah [18], je treba opozoriti, da drugi členi tega zakona in tudi drugi dokazi v spisu [19] temu nasprotujejo.
In fact, the GOC reply to the anti-subsidy questionnaire shows that SASAC, authorised by the State Council, appoints and removes the top executives of the supervised enterprises, and evaluates their performances through legal procedures.
Pravzaprav kaže odgovor kitajske vlade na protisubvencijski vprašalnik, da SASAC s pooblastilom državnega sveta imenuje in odstavlja najvišje vodilne delavce nadzorovanih družb in ocenjuje njihovo delovno uspešnost prek pravnih postopkov.
It is also responsible for urging the supervised enterprises to carry out the guiding principles and policies, has responsibility for the fundamental management of the state-owned assets of enterprises and directs and supervises the management work of local state-owned assets according to the law.
Ta komisija je odgovorna tudi za spodbujanje nadzorovanih družb k izvajanju usmeritvenih načel in politik, nosi odgovornosti za osnovno upravljanje državnega premoženja v družbah ter usmerja in nadzoruje delo z upravljanjem lokalnega premoženja v državni lasti v skladu z zakonom.
In fact, all the evidence suggests that the careers of SOE managers depend on SASAC.
Pravzaprav vsi dokazi kažejo, da so kariere poslovodnih delavcev družb v državni lasti odvisne od komisije SASAC.
These circumstances show that he SASAC clearly is vested with Governmental authority.
Te razmere kažejo, da je komisiji SASAC očitno zaupano pooblastilo vlade.
Board of directors
Upravni odbori
The composition of the Boards of SOEs also demonstrates the high level of control by the GOC of the SOEs.
Tudi sestava odborov družb v državni lasti dokazuje visoko stopnja nadzora kitajske vlade nad družbami v državni lasti.
The evidence on file [21] shows that many of the members of boards of directors and boards of supervisors hold or held in the past government and/or party functions and that their selection is strongly influenced by governmental authorities such as SASAC or Communist Party of China (CCP).
Dokazi v spisu [21] kažejo, da so, ali so bili, številni člani odborov direktorjev in nadzornih odborov vladni ali strankarski funkcionarji ter da na njihov izbor zelo vplivajo vladni organi, kot sta komisija SASAC ali Komunistična partija Kitajske (KPK).
Government plans
Načrti vlade
The GOC's policies, interests and goals concerning steel industry are set in various governmental plans on central and also sub-central level, The SOEs are encouraged to follow these policies (the non-compliant companies are even subject to sanctions) and from the recent actions of some major steel SOEs in China it is obvious that these policies are adhered to and the steel SOEs are working towards reaching the targets and goals set in the plans.
Politike, interesi in cilji kitajske vlade v zvezi z industrijo jekla so začrtani v različnih načrtih vlade na centralni in podcentralni ravni. Družbe v državni lasti se spodbuja, da te politike uveljavijo (družbe, ki tega ne upoštevajo, so deležne celo sankcij), iz nedavnih ukrepov nekaterih glavnih jeklarskih družb v državni lasti na Kitajskem pa je očitno, da se te politike upoštevajo, jeklarske družbe v državni lasti pa delujejo usklajeno za doseganje začrtanih ciljnih količin in splošnih ciljev.
According to the Twelfth 5 Year Development Plan for the Steel Industry only the "enterprises that comply with the nation's policies for the iron and steel industry and the Standards and Conditions for Production and Operation of the iron and steel industry play a primary role in merging and reorganization." [22]
V skladu z dvanajstim petletnim načrtom razvoja industrije jekla je samo „družbam, ki upoštevajo nacionalne politike za industrijo železa in jekla ter standarde in pogoje za proizvodnjo in delovanje industrije železa in jekla, namenjena osrednja vloga pri združevanju in reorganizaciji“ [22].
A number of provincial and local level plans also mention specific SOEs and set goals and targets for them.
Številni načrti na provincialni in lokalni ravni omenjajo tudi točno določene družbe v državni lasti in zanje opredeljujejo splošne ciljne ter ciljne količine.
The complainant provided extracts from these plans [23].
Pritožnik je predložil izvlečke iz teh načrtov [23].
All these plans were requested from the GOC in the questionnaire and in the deficiency letter for the purpose of verification and clarification but the GOC decided not to provide them.
Z vprašalnikom in pozivom k dopolnitvi se je od kitajske vlade zahtevalo, da te načrte predloži za namene preveritve in pojasnitve, vendar pa se je ta odločila, da jih ne zagotovi.
It is however noted that the GOC did not dispute the accuracy of these citations during the proceeding.
Treba pa je omeniti, da kitajska vlada med postopkom ni oporekala točnosti teh navedb.
Moreover, companies mentioned in the provincial and local plans admit their cooperation with authorities and describe how they act or acted in the past in line with the plans [24].
Poleg tega družbe, omenjene v provincialnih in lokalnih načrtih, priznavajo svoje sodelovanje z organi in opisujejo, kako delujejo ali so delovale v skladu z načrti [24].
Although the GOC claims that some of the above plans are only indicative, not binding and are supposed to serve merely as a guidance, this allegation is not supported by other evidence on file.
Čeprav kitajska vlada zatrjuje, da so nekateri zgoraj navedeni načrti samo okvirni, nezavezujoči in naj bi služili samo kot smernice, te trditve ne podpirajo drugi dokazi v spisu.
On the contrary, many laws and regulations which certainly are legally binding [25] make the state development plans and industrial policies obligatory for the SOEs.
Nasprotno, številni zakoni in predpisi, ki so zagotovo pravno zavezujoči [25], družbe v državni lasti zavezujejo k državnim načrtom razvoja in industrijskim politikam.
The GOC formulates the goals and targets for the iron and steel industry through the 5-year plans and other relevant official documents and achieves these goals via the functions and activities described therein.
Kitajska vlada oblikuje splošne cilje in ciljne količine za industrijo železa in jekla prek petletnih načrtov in drugih ustreznih uradnih dokumentov in te cilje izpolni prek nalog in dejavnosti, opisanih v teh dokumentih.
Since these plans and documents are formulated by departments of the Chinese Government such as National Council or NDRC the functions and activities to which they refer should be considered governmental.
Ker te načrte in dokumente oblikujejo oddelki kitajske vlade, kot sta narodni svet ali agencija NDRC, je treba naloge in dejavnosti, na katere se sklicujejo, šteti za vladne.
Since as described above the steel SOEs are obliged to follow the plans and policies they act as an arm of the government and, since the government exercises meaningful control over them, they are in fact exercising government authority.
Ker so jeklarske družbe v državni lasti zavezane delovati v skladu s temi načrti in politikami, kot je to opisano zgoraj, delujejo kot podaljšana roka vlade, ker pa so te družbe pod bistvenim nadzorom vlade, dejansko izvajajo pooblastila vlade.
In view of the lack of cooperation from the GOC, the scope of those entities which are considered "public bodies" was not defined to the full extent.
Zaradi pomanjkljivega sodelovanja kitajske vlade ni bil popolnoma določen obseg tistih subjektov, za katere se šteje, da so „javni organi“.
In any event, any SOE in which the government is the majority or the largest shareholder is a public body.
Kakor koli, javni organ je vsaka družba v državni lasti, v kateri je vlada večinski ali največji delničar.
Entities in which the government has no shareholding are private bodies.
Subjekti, v katerih vlada nima deleža, so zasebni organi.
Having that said, there is no need to draw a bright line between public and private bodies here, since in recitals (85) to (98) below, it is demonstrated that all private bodies in the steel sector are entrusted and directed by the State and so, for all relevant purposes, behave in the same way as public bodies.
Glede na navedeno tu ni treba začrtati vidne ločnice med javnimi in zasebnimi organi, saj uvodne izjave od (85) do (98) kažejo, da država ukazuje in zaupa naloge vsem zasebnim organom v jeklarskem sektorju, zato v vseh zadevnih ozirih ravnajo enako kot javni organi.
Benefit (public bodies)
Ugodnosti (javni organi)
In order to assess whether there is a benefit in accordance with Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation, it is necessary to compare the prices of HRS and CRS paid by the exporting producers concerned to the relevant benchmark.
Za oceno, ali je bila dodeljena ugodnost v smislu člena 3(2) osnovne uredbe, je treba primerjati cene VVJ in HVJ, ki so jih plačali zadevni proizvajalci izvozniki, z ustrezno referenčno vrednostjo.
The AB report confirmed that in a case where the market of the country of provision is distorted by the role of the government, the use of external benchmarks was permitted.
Poročilo PO je pritrdilo mnenju, da je uporaba zunanjih referenčnih vrednosti dovoljena v primeru, ko je zaradi vloge vlade izkrivljen trg v državi, v kateri se dobava opravi.
It also noted that "where the government is the predominant supplier, it is likely that private prices will be distorted, but a case-by-case analysis is still required" [26].
Ugotovljeno je bilo tudi, da „kadar je vlada glavni dobavitelj, bodo cene zasebnih subjektov izkrivljene, vendar pa je tudi v takih primerih treba analizirati vsak posamezni primer“ [26].
The AB also stated that:
PO je izjavil tudi, da:
"… we are not suggesting that there is a threshold above which the fact that the government is the predominant supplier in the market alone becomes sufficient to establish price distortion, but clearly, the more predominant a government's role in the market is, the more likely this role will result in the distortion of private prices" [27].
„[…] ne trdimo, da je nek prag, ob prestopu katerega se zgolj dejstvo, da je vlada glavni dobavitelj na trgu, šteje za zadosten dokaz izkrivljanja cen, ampak da se z rastjo prevladujoče vloge vlade na trgu jasno povečuje tudi verjetnost, da ta vloga privede do izkrivljenih cen zasebnikov“ [27].
The AB further stated that:
PO je v nadaljevanju izjavil, da:
"when the government is a "significant" supplier, evidence pertaining to factors other than government market share will be needed, as the government's role as a significant supplier cannot, on its own, prove distortion of private prices".
„kadar je vlada „pomemben“ dobavitelj, je treba predložiti dokaze, ki se tičejo dejavnikov, ki so različni od tržnega deleža vlade, saj vloga vlade kot pomembnega dobavitelja sama po sebi ne dokazuje izkrivljanja cen zasebnikov“.
Therefore, the first question to be answered is whether the government share of the production of HRS and CRS in China is predominant or merely significant.
Zato je najprej treba odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali je delež vlade v proizvodnji VVJ in HVJ na Kitajskem prevladujoč ali le pomemben.
The Commission requested from the GOC information on the market of HRS and CRS in respect to the proportion of output of HRS and CRS produced by the SOEs and private companies but the GOC did not submit any relevant information in this respect [28].
Komisija je od kitajske vlade zahtevala informacije o trgu VVJ in HVJ v zvezi z deležem proizvedenih količin VVJ in HVJ, ki ga proizvedejo družbe v državni lasti in zasebne družbe, vendar kitajska vlada o tem ni predložila nobenih ustreznih informacij [28].
The Commission used other information available [29] concerning this issue on the basis of which it was established that at least 63 % of HRS in China is produced by steel SOEs.
Komisija je glede tega vprašanja uporabila druge dostopne informacije [29], na podlagi katerih je ugotovila, da jeklarske družbe v državni lasti proizvedejo najmanj 63 % VVJ na Kitajskem.
It is important to note that this 63 % share of SOEs was arrived at after very conservative analysis and represents the absolute minimum figure.
Pomembno je omeniti, da je bil ta 63-odstotni delež družb v državni lasti izračunan po zelo konservativni oceni in predstavlja absolutno najmanjšo mogočo vrednost.
The fact that many of the allegedly private suppliers reported by the exporters seem to be trading companies (which may well have purchased from the product from SOEs), the non-cooperation of the GOC (see recitals (46) to (48) above) and findings of other investigating authorities (see footnote 32) leads to the conclusion that the real share of SOEs on the HRS market is much higher.
Glede na dejstvo, da se zdi, da so številni domnevno zasebni dobavitelji, o katerih so poročali izvozniki, trgovske družbe (ki so izdelek po vsej verjetnosti kupile od družb v državni lasti), je na podlagi nesodelovanja kitajske vlade (glej uvodne izjave od (46) do (48)) in ugotovitev drugih preiskovalnih organov (glej opombo 32) mogoče sklepati, da je realni delež družb v državni lasti na trgu VVJ še veliko večji.
Also the strong involvement of the GOC in this sector HRS market (see recitals (85) to (94) below) limits the manoeuvring of the private operators.
Močna vloga kitajske vlade v tem sektorju trga VVJ (glej uvodne izjave od (85) do (94)) omejuje tudi možnost delovanja zasebnih subjektov.
Taking the above into consideration it was established that the SOEs are predominant in the HRS market in China.
Ob upoštevanju zgoraj navedenega je bilo ugotovljeno, da imajo družbe v državni lasti na trgu VVJ na Kitajskem prevladujoči delež.
This predominance of SOEs in the HRS market is so considerable that the private producers have no choice but to align their prices with the SOEs, as is demonstrated below.
Ta prevlada družb v državni lasti na trgu VVJ je tako znatna, da zasebni proizvajalci nimajo izbire in morajo svoje cene prilagoditi cenam družb v državni lasti, kot je prikazano spodaj.
With regard to CRS, the reported share of SOEs from the Chinese exporting producers (18 %) was much lower than in the case of HRS, however it was contradicted with other information (see recital (79) below).
V zvezi s HVJ je bil evidentirani delež družb v državni lasti, ki so kitajski proizvajalci izvozniki (18 %), veliko manjši kot v primeru VVJ, vendar temu nasprotujejo druge informacije (glej uvodno izjavo (79)).
In view of non-cooperation from the GOC, the fact that many of the allegedly private suppliers reported by the exporters seem to be trading companies (which may well have purchased from the product from SOEs) and the limitations on commercial activities of private operators caused by the strong involvement of the GOC in this sector (see recitals (85) to (94) below) it is concluded (partly on the basis of facts available (see recital (79) below) within the meaning of Article 28 of the basic Regulation) that SOEs also predominate in the CRS market in China.
Ob upoštevanju nesodelovanja kitajske vlade in dejstva, da se zdi, da so številni domnevno zasebni dobavitelji trgovske družbe (ki so izdelek po vsej verjetnosti kupile od družb v državni lasti), ter omejevanja poslovnih dejavnosti zasebnih subjektov, ki izvira iz močne vloge kitajske vlade v tem sektorju (glej uvodne izjave od (85) do (94)), je bilo sklenjeno (deloma na podlagi razpoložljivih podatkov (glej uvodno izjavo (79)) v smislu člena 28 osnovne uredbe), da družbe v državni lasti prevladujejo tudi na trgu HVJ na Kitajskem.
This conclusion is corroborated by the World Steel Capacity Book, which contradicts the 18 % share reported by the Chinese exporters and shows that more than 70 % of the whole production capacity of CRS in China is state-owned [30].
Ta sklep je podprt tudi v Knjigi svetovnih jeklarskih zmogljivosti, ki nasprotuje 18-odstotnem deležu, o katerem so poročali kitajski izvozniki, in kaže, da je na Kitajskem v državni lasti več kot 70 % vseh proizvodnih zmogljivosti HVJ [30].
The Commission requested information from the GOC on prices of HRS and CRS by state-owned and privately owned companies sold on Chinese market.
Komisija je od kitajske vlade zahtevala informacije o cenah družb v državni in zasebni lasti, ki veljajo za VVJ in HVJ v prodaji na kitajskem trgu.
In the reply to the questionnaire the GOC did not provide any such information.
Kitajska vlada v izpolnjenem vprašalniku ni predložila nobenih takih informacij.
The investigation at the exporters of OCS established that the prices paid by the four exporting producers/groups during the IP for the HRS and CRS sourced from private producers of HRS and CRS or from traders were consistently very close to the prices of SOEs [31].
Preiskava pri izvoznikih jeklenih izdelkov, prevlečenih z organskimi premazi, je pokazala, da so bile cene, ki so jih štirje proizvajalci izvozniki/skupine v OP plačevali za VVJ in HVJ, ki so ga dobavljali zasebni proizvajalci VVJ in HVJ ali pa trgovske družbe, stalno zelo blizu cenam družb v državni lasti [31].
Thus the observed data, together with the predominance of SOEs in this sector, demonstrates that the price of private suppliers effectively tracks the prices paid to SOEs.
Zato zabeleženi podatki in prevlada družb v državni lasti na tem sektorju kažejo, da cene zasebnih dobaviteljev dejansko sledijo cenam, ki se plačajo družbam v državni lasti.