natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
First, if ABN AMRO Group wants to become cost-efficient with an acceptable cost-income ratio, it is crucial that ABN AMRO Group implements the projected synergies (namely EUR 1,1 billion pre-tax which compares to a 2013 net profit of […] billion EUR).
Prvič, če želi skupina ABN AMRO postati stroškovno učinkovita s sprejemljivim razmerjem med stroški in prihodki, je bistvenega pomena, da izvede napovedane sinergije (namreč 1,1 milijarde EUR pred obdavčitvijo, kar je primerljivo s čistim dobičkom v višini […] milijard EUR v letu 2013).
The Commission also noted that the December 2009 Restructuring Plan did not yet include financial projections for a worst case scenario as required by point (13) of the Restructuring Communication.
Komisija je tudi navedla, da načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 še ne zajema finančnih napovedi za najslabši možni scenarij, kot je to zahtevano v točki (13) sporočila o prestrukturiranju.
Therefore, the Commission asked for such worst case financial projections, allowing it to verify how ABN AMRO Group would perform in more stressful market conditions.
Zato je Komisija zaprosila za te finančne napovedi za najslabši možni scenarij, ki bi ji omogočile, da preveri, kako uspešna bi bila skupina ABN AMRO v težjih tržnih pogojih.
The Commission also observed that the December 2009 Restructuring Plan contained little information on smaller sub-divisions, so that the Commission could not judge whether all viability issues at that level had been sufficiently addressed.
Komisija je tudi ugotovila, da načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 vsebuje malo informacij o manjših pododdelkih, tako da ni mogla oceniti, ali so bila vsa vprašanja v zvezi z uspešnim poslovanjem na tej ravni obravnavana v zadostni meri.
More specifically, the Commission doubted whether viability of PFS, a division of FBN, which reported major Madoff-related losses in 2008, was sufficiently guaranteed.
Natančneje, Komisija je imela pomisleke glede tega, ali je uspešno poslovanje PFS, oddelka banke FBN, ki je v letu 2008 zabeležil velike izgube zaradi Madoffove goljufije, ustrezno zagotovljeno.
Aid limited to the minimum necessary/own contribution
Pomoč, omejena na najmanjši možni znesek / lastni prispevek
The Commission questioned whether the State aid was limited to the minimum necessary to restore the viability of ABN AMRO Group.
Komisijo je zanimalo, ali je bila državna pomoč omejena na najmanjši možni znesek, potreben za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja skupine ABN AMRO.
In that respect, it noted that ABN AMRO Group had indicated that it wished to make small add-on acquisitions, which it deemed necessary to rebuild product competences lost during the separation processes from Fortis SA/NV and ABN AMRO Holding.
Glede tega je ugotovila, da je skupina ABN AMRO navedla, da želi kupiti manjše dodatne dejavnosti, za katere je menila, da so nujne za ponovno vzpostavitev bančnih storitev, ki jih je izgubila med procesom ločitve od holdinga Fortis SA/NV in holdinga ABN AMRO Holding.
In the Decision of 5 February 2010, the Commission argued that State aid should not be used to finance acquisitions or new investments unless essential for restoring the viability of an undertaking.
V sklepu z dne 5. februarja 2010 je Komisija trdila, da se državna pomoč ne bi smela uporabljati za financiranje prevzemov ali novih naložb, razen če so nujne za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja podjetja.
The Commission asked the Dutch State to shed more light on the acquisition policy of ABN AMRO Group and to provide it with, inter alia, a detailed list of activities that ABN AMRO Group needed to rebuild for viability reasons.
Komisija je od Nizozemske zahtevala, da pojasni politiko prevzemov skupine ABN AMRO in jo zagotovi z, med drugim, podrobnim seznamom dejavnosti, ki jih skupina ABN AMRO potrebuje za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja.
The Commission also doubted whether all hybrid capital providers of FBN and ABN AMRO N had paid their share of the restructuring.
Komisija je imela pomisleke tudi glede tega, ali so vsi ponudniki hibridnega kapitala bank FBN in ABN AMRO plačali svoj delež prestrukturiranja.
The Commission was concerned that, for instance, the preferred shareholders of FBN [70] had not sufficiently contributed to ensure that the intervention of the Dutch State was not limited to the minimum necessary.
Komisijo je skrbelo, da, na primer, prednostni delničarji banke FBN [70] niso prispevali dovolj in zato niso zagotovili, da je posredovanje Nizozemske omejeno na najmanjšo potrebno pomoč.
Also in terms of duration, the State aid should be limited to the minimum necessary.
Tudi glede trajanja bi morala biti državna pomoč omejena na najmanjšo potrebno.
In that regard, the Commission observed that a number of measures were needed to address temporary problems, but the Commission doubted whether the Dutch State had taken sufficient steps ensuring that the measures would be unwound once they were no longer necessary.
Glede tega je Komisija ugotovila, da so za reševanje začasnih težav potrebni številni ukrepi, vendar je imela pomisleke glede tega, ali je Nizozemska sprejela zadostne ukrepe za zagotovitev, da bodo ukrepi potem, ko ne bodo več potrebni, odpravljeni.
With regard to Measure A, the Commission observed that the CRI would become unattractive once ABN AMRO N was allowed to implement Basel II requirements.
Glede ukrepa A je Komisija ugotovila, da bi instrument za razbremenitev kapitala po dovoljenju banki ABN AMRO N, da uvede zahteve Basla II, postal nezanimiv.
Although the CRI contained call features allowing for an early termination of the contract, the Commission observed that there was no clear timetable for the Dutch State’s exit.
Čeprav je instrument za razbremenitev kapitala vseboval nakupne opcije, ki omogočajo predčasno prekinitev pogodbe, je Komisija ugotovila, da ni jasno začrtanega časovnega razporeda za izhod Nizozemske.
Also with regard to the prudential margin of EUR 500 million, the Commission noted that the intention was that ABN AMRO Group replaced that amount by self-financed capital.
Glede smotrne razlike v višini 500 milijonov EUR je Komisija ugotovila, da je bil namen tega, da je skupina ABN AMRO ta znesek zamenjala s kapitalom, financiranim iz lastnih sredstev.
Again the Commission observed that there was no indication whatsoever on timing.
Komisija je ponovno ugotovila, da glede časovnega razporeda ni nobene navedbe.
With respect to the integration costs of EUR 1,2 billion (namely Measure B5), the Commission observed that the Dutch State claimed that these would lead to important synergies of EUR 1,1 billion (pre-tax) per year, which could in principle be used to repay the State aid.
Glede stroškov integracije v višini 1,2 milijarde EUR (tj. ukrepa B5) je Komisija ugotovila, da je Nizozemska trdila, da bodo povzročili pomembne sinergije v višini 1,1 milijarde EUR (pred obdavčitvijo) na leto, ki bi se načeloma lahko uporabile za vračilo državne pomoči.
Yet, the Commission observed that the Dutch State had not put in place a mechanism ensuring such a repayment.
Vendar je Komisija ugotovila, da Nizozemska še ni vzpostavila mehanizma, ki bi zagotovil tako vračilo.
On the capital needs related to the sale of New HBU, the Commission concluded that the capital requirements related to the credit umbrella would decline rapidly as loans would gradually mature.
Glede potreb po kapitalu, povezanih s prodajo podružnice New HBU, je Komisija sklenila, da se bodo po postopnem zapadanju posojil kapitalske zahteve, povezane s kreditno zaščito, precej zmanjšale.
Again, the Commission underlined that the State aid should be repaid once it was no longer necessary.
Komisija je ponovno poudarila, da bi morala biti državna pomoč, ko ne bo več potrebna, povrnjena.
Limitation of distortions of competition
Omejitev izkrivljanja konkurence
In terms of distortion of competition, the Commission noted that the capital needs of FBN and ABN AMRO N stemmed to a certain extent from their separation of their former parent companies and from upfront integration costs, and not from excessive risk-taking or mismanagement within FBN and ABN AMRO N themselves. Against that background, the Commission concluded that further divestments were unlikely to be necessary.
Glede izkrivljanja konkurence je Komisija ugotovila, da kapitalske zahteve bank FBN in ABN AMRO N v določeni meri izvirajo iz njune ločitve od nekdanjih matičnih podjetij in vnaprejšnjih stroškov integracije, ne pa iz prekomernega tveganja ali slabega upravljanja znotraj bank FBN in ABN AMRO N. V teh okoliščinah je Komisija sklenila, da nadaljnja odprodaja verjetno ne bo več potrebna.
At the same time however, the Commission expressed doubts that the December 2009 Restructuring Plan contained sufficient behavioural measures to ensure that FBN and ABN AMRO N would not use the State aid to grow at the expense of their competitors, for example by implementing an unsustainable pricing policy or acquiring other financial institutions, which could weaken the incentives of non-beneficiaries to compete, invest and innovate and could discourage entry in the Dutch banking market.
Hkrati pa je Komisija izrazila pomisleke glede tega, da načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 vsebuje zadostne ukrepe v zvezi z ravnanjem, ki bi zagotovili, da banki FBN in ABN AMRO N državne pomoči ne bi uporabili za rast na račun njunih konkurentov, na primer z uvedbo netrajnostne politike oblikovanja cen ali s prevzemom drugih finančnih institucij, kar bi lahko oslabilo spodbude za konkuriranje, naložbe in inovativnost podjetij, ki ne prejemajo pomoči, in odvračalo od vstopa na nizozemski bančni trg.
In terms of exit, the Commission argued that it would be helpful if the Dutch State developed and clearly communicated an exit strategy.
Glede izhoda je Komisija trdila, da bi bilo koristno, če bi Nizozemska razvila in jasno sporočila izhodno strategijo.
Indeed, the repeated and massive interventions of the Dutch State could be perceived by depositors as a sign of its permanent support.
Dejansko bi lahko vlagatelji ponavljajoča se in obsežna posredovanja nizozemske države razumeli kot znak njene stalne podpore.
First set of comments from Van Lanschot (letter of 6 May 2009)
Prvi sklop pripomb banke Van Lanschot (dopis z dne 6. maja 2009)
The complainant argued that thanks to the State aid and State ownership, FBN and ABN AMRO N (including their subsidiaries such as MoneYou and Mees Pierson) offered unsustainably high interest rates on individual savings and deposit accounts, thereby destabilising the Dutch banking market.
Pritožnik je trdil, da sta banki FBN in ABN AMRO N (vključno s podružnicami, kot sta MoneYou in Mees Pierson) zaradi državne pomoči in državnega lastništva nudili netrajnostno visoke obrestne mere za osebne varčevalne in depozitne račune, s čimer sta destabilizirali nizozemski bančni trg.
The complainant believed that interest rates offered by FBN and ABN AMRO N were loss-making.
Pritožnik je menil, da obrestne mere, ki sta jih nudili banki FBN in ABN AMRO N, prinašajo izgubo.
In that regard, it referred to the fact that EURIBOR rates declined from 5 % in September 2008 to less than 2 % in January/February 2009, while interest rates offered by FBN and ABN AMRO N on savings accounts actually rose.
Glede tega se je skliceval na dejstvi, da so obrestne mere EURIBOR padle s 5 % septembra 2008 na manj kot 2 % januarja/februarja 2009, obrestne mere, ki sta jih nudili banki FBN in ABN AMRO N za varčevalne račune, pa so se dejansko zvišale.
The complainant also points at the specificities in the Dutch private banking market when compared to the retail banking market, which tend to increase the distortive effect of the measures taken.
Pritožnik je opozoril tudi na posebnosti nizozemskega zasebnega bančnega trga v primerjavi s trgom bančnega poslovanja s prebivalstvom, ki povečujejo učinek izkrivljanja sprejetih ukrepov.
Saving amounts in private banking are on average larger than in retail banking.
Zneski varčevanja so v zasebnem bančništvu v povprečju večji kot v bančnem poslovanju s prebivalstvom.
For low savings amounts, customers care less about their bank’s risk profile as they are protected by the Dutch Deposit Guarantee Scheme (up to an amount of EUR 100000).
Pri nizkih zneskih varčevanja je za stranke profil tveganja njihove banke manj pomemben, saj jih ščiti nizozemski sistem zajamčenih vlog (do zneska v višini 100000 EUR).
Risk awareness increases however once that threshold is passed, which is rather common in private banking.
Ko je ta prag presežen, kar je v zasebnem bančništvu precej običajno, pa je zavedanje tveganja večje.
The complainant also argued that FBN and ABN AMRO N benefit from an implicit State guarantee.
Pritožnik je tudi trdil, da imata banki FBN in ABN AMRO N korist od implicitnega državnega jamstva.
It argued that customers of FBN and ABN AMRO N are convinced that the Dutch State will not allow State-owned banks to go bankrupt.
Trdil je, da so stranke bank FBN in ABN AMRO N prepričane, da država ne bo dovolila stečaja bank v državni lasti.
The complainant – which weathered the crisis without State aid – underlined that it was severely affected by FBN and ABN AMRO N distortive behaviour as it relied traditionally to an important extent on the Dutch savings market to fund its assets [71].
Pritožnik, ki je krizo prebrodil brez državne pomoči, je poudaril, da je nanj izredno vplivalo izkrivljajoče ravnanje bank FBN in ABN AMRO N, saj se je v precejšnji meri glede financiranja sredstev kot običajno zanašal na nizozemski varčevalni trg [71].
In absolute figures, the complainant had savings & deposits of EUR 15 billion, which implied that a 1 % increase in interest rates could cost the company approximately EUR 150 million per year [72].
V absolutnih številkah je imel pritožnik varčevanja in vloge v višini 15 milijard EUR, kar je pomenilo, da bi lahko 1-odstotno zvišanje obrestnih mer podjetje stalo približno 150 milijonov EUR na leto [72].
In addition to that cost increase, there was also a volume effect as Van Lanschot lost customers.
Poleg povečanja stroškov je prišlo tudi do učinka količine, saj je banka Van Lanschot izgubila stranke.
Follow-up comments of Van Lanschot (letters of 21 and 28 August 2009)
Nadaljnje pripombe banke Van Lanschot (dopisa z dne 21. in 28. avgusta 2009)
According to the complainant, the unusual behaviour of FBN and ABN AMRO N persisted over the summer months of 2009.
Po mnenju pritožnika se je neobičajno ravnanje bank FBN in ABN AMRO N nadaljevalo v poletnih mesecih leta 2009.
As an additional argument, the complainant referred to unusually large volume and market share changes in the traditionally stable Dutch savings market.
Kot dodatni argument se je pritožnik skliceval na neobičajno velike spremembe obsega in tržnega deleža na običajno stabilnem nizozemskem varčevalnem trgu.
In that regard, the complainant pointed to FBN and ABN AMRO N press releases which reported deposit inflows of respectively EUR 9 billion and EUR 21 billion in the first half of 2009 [73].
S tem v zvezi je pritožnik navedel obvestila za javnost bank FBN in ABN AMRO N, v katerih je bil naveden priliv vlog v višini 9 milijard EUR oziroma 21 milijard EUR v prvi polovici leta 2009 [73].
The complainant deemed those figures to be sizeable given the fact that the total Dutch savings market is worth approximately EUR 287 billion.
Pritožnik je menil, da so te številke velike, glede na to, da je skupni nizozemski varčevalni trg vreden približno 287 milijard EUR.
As another illustration of unusual pricing, the complainant referred to the fact that savings interest rates in neighbouring countries such as Belgium, France and Germany had followed the decline in EURIBOR rates, while Dutch savings interest rates had remained stubbornly high.
Kot drug primer neobičajnega oblikovanja cen je pritožnik navedel dejstvo, da so varčevalne obrestne mere v sosednjih državah, kot so Belgija, Francija in Nemčija, sledile padcu obrestnih mer EURIBOR, nizozemske varčevalne obrestne mere pa so vztrajno ostajale visoke.
Comments from ABN AMRO Bank (letter of 6 July 2009)
Pripombe ABN AMRO Bank (dopis z dne 6. julija 2009)
Commenting on the Decision of 8 April 2009 launching the formal investigation procedure, ABN AMRO Bank (i.e. the parent company of ABN AMRO N) provided more information on its funding position and funding strategy.
S pripombami na odločbo z dne 8. aprila 2009, s katero je Komisija sprožila formalni postopek preiskave, je ABN AMRO Bank (tj. matično podjetje banke ABN AMRO N) zagotovila več informacij o svojem stanju sredstev in svoji strategiji financiranja.
ABN AMRO Bank denied it had benefitted – directly or indirectly – from any funding aid given to FBN (Measures Y1 and Y2).
ABN AMRO bank je zanikala, da bi imela – neposredno ali posredno – korist od kakršnega koli financiranja banke FBN (ukrepa Y1 in Y2).
ABN AMRO Bank pointed out that it had not needed help to fund itself throughout the crisis thanks to its diversified funding strategy.
ABN AMRO Bank je poudarila, da zaradi svoje razpršene strategije financiranja v času krize ni potrebovala nobene pomoči za lastno financiranje.
It also underlined that its liquidity statistics remained well within regulatory limits and within its own internal limits as well.
Poudarila je tudi, da je njena statistika likvidnosti ostala v okviru zakonsko predpisanih omejitev in tudi v okviru njenih notranjih omejitev.
COMMENTS FROM THE DUTCH STATE
PRIPOMBE NIZOZEMSKE
Comments from the Dutch State on the Decision of 8 April 2009
Pripombe Nizozemske na odločbo z dne 8. aprila 2009
The Dutch State acknowledged that FBN had been able to pursue its activities because of its acquisition by the State [74], but it argued that the acquisition was in line with the so-called ‘market economy investor principle’ (MEIP).
Nizozemska je priznala, da je banka FBN lahko še naprej opravljala svoje dejavnosti zaradi tega, ker jo je kupila država [74], vendar je trdila, da je bila pridobitev v skladu s t. i. „načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu“ (MEIP).
As a result, according to the Dutch State there was no selective advantage and consequently no State aid.
Zato po mnenju Nizozemske ni bilo selektivne prednosti in posledično tudi ne državne pomoči.
The Dutch State claimed that – even though the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 were primarily meant to prevent the destabilisation of FBN and ABN AMRO N and the Dutch banking system in general – by purchasing participations in FBN and ABN AMRO N it aimed to make a positive long-term return.
Nizozemska je trdila, da je z nakupom udeležb v bankah FBN in ABN AMRO N kljub temu, da so bile celovite transakcije z dne 3. oktobra 2008 prvotno namenjene preprečevanju destabilizacije bank FBN in ABN AMRO N ter nizozemskega bančnega sistema na splošno, načrtovala pozitiven dolgoročni donos.
The Dutch State underlined that the price for FBN (including ABN AMRO N) was within the valuation range of its external valuation expert.
Nizozemska je poudarila, da je bila cena za FBN (vključno z ABN AMRO N) v okviru ocene, ki jo je podal njen zunanji strokovnjak za vrednotenje.
The Dutch State claimed that it had paid a fair market price for FBN but it pointed out that even if it overpaid, that payment would have been State aid to Fortis SA/NV (which was the selling company) and not State aid to FBN.
Nizozemska je trdila, da je plačala pošteno tržno ceno za banko FBN, vendar je poudarila, da bi bilo tudi v primeru preplačila to plačilo državna pomoč holdingu Fortis SA/NV (podjetje, ki je prodalo banko FBN) in ne državna pomoč banki FBN.
With respect to Measure Y1, the Dutch State claimed that it provided short-term funding to FBN at market conditions.
Glede ukrepa Y1 je Nizozemska trdila, da je banki FBN zagotovila kratkoročno financiranje po tržnih pogojih.
It argued that before the crisis FBN received funding from its parent company at EONIA or EURIBOR rates without any extra spread.
Trdila je, da je banka FBN pred krizo prejela sredstva od svoje matične družbe po obrestnih merah EONIA ali EURIBOR brez dodatne razlike.
The Dutch State argued that the pricing it applied (as described in recital 96) was in line with market practice.
Nizozemska je trdila, da so bile uporabljene cene oblikovane (kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 96) v skladu s tržno prakso.
More specifically, it also argued that its pricing system used for the period after 5 November 2008 (with a 50 basis points spread for loans of more than 3 months) was aligned with the Dutch Guarantee Scheme [75].
Natančneje, trdila je tudi, da je bil njen sistem oblikovanja cen, ki ga je uporabljala v obdobju po 5. novembru 2008 (z razliko 50 bazičnih točk za posojila z zapadlostjo več kot tri mesece), usklajen z nizozemskim sistemom zajamčenih vlog [75].
With respect to the period during which FBN’s liquidity facility was made available, the Dutch State explained that it started negotiations on ending the liquidity facility in January 2009 with the aim of ending the liquidity facility as fast as possible.
Glede obdobja, v katerem je bilo na voljo likvidnostno posojilo banke FBN, je Nizozemska pojasnila, da je januarja 2009 začela pogajanja o prekinitvi likvidnostnega posojila z namenom, da likvidnostno posojilo prekine, kakor hitro je mogoče.
With that objective in mind, the Dutch State introduced in March 2009 a new two-step pricing system, which made funding more expensive if it exceeded a pre-defined threshold.
S tem v mislih je Nizozemska marca 2009 uvedla nov dvostopenjski sistem oblikovanja cen, zaradi česar je v primeru prekoračitve prej določenega praga financiranje postalo dražje.
The liquidity facility was already ended on 1 July 2009.
Likvidnostno posojilo je bilo prekinjeno 1. julija 2009.
The Dutch State argued that the maximum maturity of the liquidity provided under the liquidity facility was proportional.
Nizozemska je trdila, da je bila najdaljša doba zapadlosti likvidnosti v okviru likvidnostnega posojila sorazmerna.
In that regard, the Dutch State explained that in the first period (i.e. from 6 to 23 October 2008), it had granted liquidity with a maturity of not more than a few weeks.
Glede tega je Nizozemska pojasnila, da je v prvem obdobju (tj. od 6. do 23. oktobra 2008) odobrila likvidnost z zapadlostjo le nekaj tednov.
When the liquidity facility was subsequently adjusted, the maximum maturity was prolonged to 9 months to avoid redemption peaks.
Ko je bilo likvidnostno posojilo kasneje prilagojeno, je bila najdaljša doba zapadlosti podaljšana na devet mesecev, da bi se izognili najvišjim cenam odkupa
The Dutch State explained that the total volume of the liquidity facility (namely EUR 5 billion overnight and EUR 40 billion longer-term funding) was based on FBN’s real financing needs and was therefore the minimum necessary.
Nizozemska je pojasnila, da je skupni obseg likvidnostnega posojila (tj. 5 milijard EUR za posojila čez noč in 40 milijard EUR dolgoročnih posojil) temeljil na dejanskih finančnih potrebah banke FBN in je bil zato omejen na najmanjši možni znesek.
The short-term liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion took into account the normal volatility of FBN’s cash position and it also allowed FBN to immediately repay approximately EUR 34 billion to Fortis SA/NV.
Kratkoročno likvidnostno posojilo v višini 45 milijard EUR je upoštevalo običajno nestanovitnost gotovinskega stanja banke FBN in je banki FBN tudi omogočilo, da holdingu Fortis SA/NV takoj poplača približno 34 milijard EUR.
With respect to the long-term loans (namely Measure Y2), the Dutch State acknowledged that Fortis Bank SA/NV could have requested the repayment of the fixed-interest rate loans (but not of the variable-rate loans) [76].
Glede dolgoročnih posojil (tj. ukrepa Y2) je Nizozemska priznala, da bi lahko Fortis Bank SA/NV zahtevala poplačilo posojil s stalno obrestno mero (ne pa posojil s spremenljivo obrestno mero) [76].
The Dutch State argued however that it had only replaced Fortis Bank SA/NV leaving all the conditions of the existing contracts unchanged.
Nizozemska pa je trdila, da je zamenjala samo Fortis Bank SA/NV, pri čemer so pogoji obstoječih pogodb ostali nespremenjeni.