natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In this case, the casinos Corfu, Mont Parnès and Thessaloniki (as well as Rhodes casino, until 1999 [50]), benefit from an advantage similar to a reduction in the tax base, since, as previously explained, ad hoc provisions specific to these casinos set the tax which they must pay per admission at a lower level compared to that imposed on other casinos.
V tem primeru so igralnica na Krfu, igralnica Mont Parnès in igralnica v Solunu (ter do leta 1999 tudi igralnica na Rodosu) [50] deležne koristi, podobne znižanju davčne osnove, saj, kot je bilo pojasnjeno, za te igralnice obstajajo posebne določbe, v skladu s katerimi je davek, ki ga plačujejo na osebo, določen na stopnji, ki je nižja od stopnje za druge igralnice.
The Greek authorities observed that the direct beneficiary of a lower tax burden is the customer.
Grški organi so ugotovili, da je neposredni upravičenec nižje davčne obremenitve stranka.
However, even if it could be argued that the customer is also a beneficiary of a reduced tax burden per admission, since he pays a total lower price, this fact does not preclude the measure from providing an advantage to the relevant undertakings, in this case the beneficiary casinos, since they have to pay a lower amount of fiscal charges per customer received.
Vendar čeprav bi bilo mogoče trditi, da so stranke deležne tudi ugodnosti zaradi znižane davčne obremenitve na vstopnino, saj plačajo nižjo skupno ceno, to ne preprečuje zagotavljanja prednosti zadevnim podjetjem, v tem primeru upravičenim igralnicam, saj plačujejo nižji davek na stranko.
In fact, as shown in fiscal cases, derogations from taxes nominally paid by the consumer but collected by the supplier may potentially constitute State aid, as may other incentives to consumers to purchase particular products and services [51].
V davčnih primerih se je izkazalo, da oprostitev davkov, ki jih nominalno plača potrošnik, vendar pobere ponudnik storitev, lahko pomeni državno pomoč, kar velja tudi za druge spodbude potrošnikom za nakup določenega blaga in storitev [51].
In line with past practice [52], the Commission believes that reductions in taxes on consumers can constitute State aid to undertakings when the reduction is conditional on the use of a particular good or service from a particular undertaking.
V skladu s preteklo prakso Komisija meni, da znižanja davkov na potrošnike lahko pomenijo državno pomoč za podjetja, če je znižanje pogojeno z uporabo določenega blaga ali storitev, ki jih zagotavlja določeno podjetje [52].
The argument that the direct beneficiary is the customer is not therefore an obstacle to a finding of State aid.
Tako argument, da je neposredni upravičenec stranka, ni ovira za ugotovitev državne pomoči.
Furthermore, given the customary commercial practice followed by casinos in Greece to waive the price of the admission tickets while paying to the State the admission tax (80 % of the face value of the admission tickets), the advantageous effect of the fiscal discrimination in favour of the public casinos is further reinforced, since the cost of the admission is notably higher for the private casinos with a higher admission tax of EUR 12 than for the public ones that only have to finance EUR 4,8 out of total revenue of their business.
Poleg tega je glede na običajno poslovno prakso igralnic v Grčiji, da se odrečejo ceni vstopnice, čeprav državi plačajo davek na vstopnino (80 % nominalne vrednosti vstopnice), prednost, dodeljena javnim igralnicam z davčno diskriminacijo, celo večja, saj so stroški sprejema stranke precej višji za zasebne igralnice, kjer je davek, ki ga je treba plačati za vstopnino, 12 EUR, kot za javne igralnice, ki morajo financirati samo 4,80 EUR od skupnega prihodka svojega poslovanja.
The Greek authorities claimed that the practice of the beneficiary casinos of granting free admission on certain week days is exceptional.
Grški organi trdijo, da je praksa omogočanja prostega vstopa v upravičene igralnice ob določenih dnevih v tednu zgolj izjema.
It remains the case that it is specifically provided for in the national law (Ministerial Decree of 1995).
Vendar pa je izrecno določena v nacionalni zakonodaji (ministrski odlok iz leta 1995).
The Commission has evidence that, contrary to the argument made by Greece that such a practice is reserved for VIPs or famous customers, according to publicly available information (for example, leaflets offering free access distributed in newspapers and on the Internet), free admission is granted to any and all customers, on certain days a week, every week, as a customary practice (e.g. Thessaloniki Casino, advertises on its Internet page that it grants continuous free admission from Sunday to Thursday [53]).
Grčija je trdila, da je ta praksa rezervirana za VIP goste ali slavne osebe, vendar ima Komisija dokaze v obliki javno dostopnih informacij, kot so letaki za prost vstop v časopisih in na internetu, ki dokazujejo, da je prost vstop ob določenih dnevih v tednu, vsak teden, omogočen vsem strankam in da je to običajna praksa (igralnica v Solunu je na primer na svoji spletni strani oglaševala, da omogoča prost vstop od nedelje do četrtka) [53].
The practice of free admission does not appear to be exceptional among the beneficiary casinos.
Tako se zdi, da med upravičenimi igralnicami praksa prostega vstopa ni izjema.
As concerns the argument made by Greece that this practice is contrary to national tax law, the Commission reminds that the permission to grant free entrance is expressly provided for in the national law concerning casinos, and it manifestly is applied by the beneficiary casinos.
Grčija trdi, da je ta praksa v nasprotju z nacionalno davčno zakonodajo; Komisija poudarja, da je dovoljenje za omogočanje prostega vstopa izrecno določeno v nacionalni zakonodaji v zvezi z igralnicami in upravičenci ga očitno izkoriščajo.
As to the argument that the expenditure from paying 80 % of the ticket price to the State from own resources is not recognised as productive expenditure and cannot be deducted from the company’s revenues under Greek tax law, thus exposing the company applying this practice to substantial tax burdens, the Commission observes that this argument actually favours the arguments made by the complainant, as to the fact that because of the significant tax burden resulting from the payment of the tax out of own revenues, a private casino cannot in practice afford to grant free admission, and thus reinforces the argument that this constitutes an advantage to the lower priced casinos.
Grčija trdi, da 80 % cene vstopnice, ki jih igralnica plača državi iz lastnih sredstev, ni priznanih kot produktivni izdatek in ga po grški davčni zakonodaji ni mogoče odšteti od prihodkov igralnice, tako da se igralnica, ki izvaja to prakso, izpostavlja znatni davčni obremenitvi. Komisija ugotavlja, da taka obrazložitev dejansko podpira trditev pritožnika, da si zasebna igralnica zaradi znatne davčne obremenitve, ki je posledica plačevanja davka iz lastnega prihodka, dejansko ne more privoščiti, da bi odobrila prost vstop; tako podpira trditev, da je igralnicam z nižjimi cenami dodeljena prednost.
On the one hand, the setting by regulation of the prices of tickets, including the admission tax, at a lower level for certain casinos, makes them more attractive for customers, thus (i) deviating demand from the pattern that would prevail if casinos would compete only on their own merits based on the individual scope and quality of the services offered and (ii) all other things equal, increasing artificially their level of admissions.
Po drugi strani pa so zaradi dejstva, da so organi za nekatere igralnice določili nižje cene vstopnic, vključno z davkom na vstopnino, te igralnice bolj privlačne za stranke in to (i) odvrača zahtevo od vzorca, ki bi prevladal, če bi igralnice konkurirale samo na podlagi svojih lastnih prednosti, individualnega obsega in kakovosti nudenih storitev, ter (ii) ob enakih pogojih umetno povečuje njihovo število obiskovalcev.
On the other hand, as previously explained, the revenues from admissions are only a limited proportion of the total revenues that a customer attracted by a casino generates for the undertaking and out of which the casinos have to pay the admission tax.
Po drugi strani, kot je bilo pojasnjeno, je prihodek od vstopnin samo majhen del skupnih prihodkov, ki ga stranka igralnice ustvari za podjetje in od katerega mora igralnica plačati davek na vstopnino.
Finally, it is to be noted that the existence of advantage in the fiscal discrimination is even recognised by the relevant national provisions themselves.
Dejstvo, da davčna diskriminacija zagotavlja prednost, priznavajo tudi ustrezne nacionalne določbe.
As described by the Greek authorities, the subjection of the casino of Thessaloniki to the regime of lower priced admission tickets and (lower) tax is made on the basis of a Law of 1953 which grants to undertakings established with foreign capital the most favourable treatment granted to national undertakings.
Kot so poročali grški organi, je igralnici v Solunu dovoljeno, da zaračunava nižjo vstopnino in da plačuje nižji davek na podlagi zakonodajnega odloka iz leta 1953, po katerem so podjetja, ustanovljena s tujim kapitalom, upravičena do najugodnejše obravnave, ki so je deležna domača podjetja.
It can be observed that although the Greek authorities maintain that the said regime is not advantageous, this Law is nevertheless applied by the Greek authorities to the Thessaloniki casino on grounds that it is the most favourable treatment to national undertakings, by contrast with the more onerous one applied to other private casinos.
Čeprav grški organi menijo, da zadevna shema ni koristna, kljub temu uporabljajo to zakonodajo za igralnico v Solunu z utemeljitvijo, da predstavlja najugodnejšo obravnavo, zagotovljeno domačim podjetjem, v nasprotju z bolj zahtevno, ki se uporablja za druge zasebne igralnice.
As concerns the subsidiary remark made by the Greek authorities and Mont Parnès regarding other differences between casinos in terms of various fiscal/regulatory measures, differences which allegedly favour Loutraki (the complainant) and would thus counter-balance the advantages that the beneficiaries enjoy due to the lower price of admission tickets [54], the Commission observes that the ‘offsetting’ of one measure (differences in general taxation) against another (differences in prices for admission tickets and their specific taxation) cannot be accepted as an argument that the measure under assessment does not constitute aid.
Prav tako so grški organi in Mont Parnès opozorili na druge razlike med igralnicami v smislu davka ali ureditvenih ukrepov, ki po njihovem mnenju zagotavljajo korist pritožniku, tj. Loutrakiju, in tako izničijo vse prednosti, ki jih uživajo upravičenci zaradi nižje cene vstopnine [54]; Komisija ugotavlja, da trditve, da bi bilo treba en ukrep (razliko v splošni obdavčitvi) izravnati z drugim (razliko med cenami vstopnic in posebnim davkom na te vstopnice), ni mogoče sprejeti kot argumenta za stališče, da zadevni ukrep ne pomeni pomoči.
In any case, as already mentioned, these aspects are separate and are not subject to the present Decision (see also paragraph 46 herein above).
V vsakem primeru, kot je bilo že navedeno, se ti vidiki razlikujejo od zadevnega ukrepa in ne spadajo v področje uporabe tega sklepa (glej uvodno izjavo 46).
In regard of all the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the measure under assessment, namely the fiscal discrimination produced by the joint effect of a uniform admission tax applied to unequal regulated prices, provides an advantage to the lowered priced casinos.
Komisija je sklenila, da zadevni ukrep, tj. davčna diskriminacija, ustvarjena s skupnim učinkom enotnega davka na vstopnino, ki se uporablja za neenake regulirane cene, zagotavlja korist igralnicam z nižjimi cenami vstopnin.
Presence of State resources and imputability to the State
Državna sredstva in pripisljivost ukrepa državi
The advantage referred to above is imputable to the State and is financed by State resources.
Zgoraj navedeno korist je mogoče pripisati državi in se financira iz državnih sredstev.
As previously explained, the fiscal discrimination is the result of a series of administrative acts, decrees and regulations adopted by the Greek State, among which in particular: the Law 2206/1994; the Ministerial Decision of 1995; the Law 3139/30.4.2003, the Law 2687/1953; the decisions of the General Secretary of EOT (managing the public casinos) issued in accordance with Law 1624/1951 and Decree 4109/1960: EOT decision 535633/21.11.1991, setting the price of admission tickets to the Mont Parnès Casino at 2000 drachmas; EOT decision 508049/24.3.1992 setting the price of admission tickets to the Corfu and Rhodes Casinos at 1500 drachmas (later adjusted for the Corfu Casino to 2000 drachmas by decision 532691/24.11.1997); the licenses granted to each casino under national law and confirming the respective price of admission tickets and the obligation to pay 80 % thereof as applicable to each casino.
Kot je bilo pojasnjeno, je davčna diskriminacija posledica vrste upravnih aktov, odlokov in uredb, ki jih je sprejela grška država, vključno zlasti z: zakonom 2206/1994; ministrskim odlokom iz leta 1995; zakonom 3139 z dne 30. aprila 2003; zakonodajnim odlokom 2687/1953; sklepi generalnega sekretarja EOT (ki upravlja javne igralnice), izdanimi v skladu z zakonom 1624/1951 in odlokom 4109/1960, tj. sklepom EOT 535633 z dne 21. novembra 1991, ki določa vstopnino za igralnico Mont Parnès v višini 2000 GRD, in sklepom EOT 508049 z dne 24. marca 1992, ki določa vstopnino za igralnici na Krfu in Rodosu v višini 1500 GRD (v primeru igralnice na Krfu je cena v skladu s sklepom 532691 z dne 24. novembra 1997 prilagojena na 2000 GRD); ter dovoljenji, izdanimi vsem igralnicam na podlagi nacionalne zakonodaje, ki potrjujejo ustrezno vstopnino in obveznost plačila 80 % cene, ki velja za posamezno igralnico.
Furthermore the fiscal discrimination under assessment is financed by State resources.
Poleg tega se davčna diskriminacija financira iz državnih sredstev.
If the State forgoes revenues which it would otherwise have to collect from an undertaking in normal circumstances, the relevant measure is financed by State resources.
Če se država odreče prihodkom, ki bi jih zbrala od podjetja v normalnih okoliščinah, se zadevni ukrep financira iz državnih sredstev.
In fiscal terms the fiscal advantage in this case results from the artificial reduction for the public casinos of the tax base on which the 80 % admission tax rate sits, from the general EUR 15 to the EUR 6 face value of the admission ticket in the public casinos.
V davčnem smislu korist, zagotovljena javnim igralnicam, v tem primeru izhaja iz umetnega zmanjšanja davčne osnove, na kateri je odmerjen 80-odstotni davek na vstopnino, s splošne nominalne vrednosti vstopnice 15 EUR na 6 EUR za javne igralnice.
In line with the Court’s case-law [55], this discriminatory reduction in tax base leads to a loss of tax revenue for the State, which is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU.
Sodišče je odločilo, da tako diskriminacijsko znižanje davčne osnove vodi v izgubo davčnega prihodka države, ki je enaka porabi državnih sredstev za namene člena 107(1) PDEU [55].
Thus, in general terms, in the case under assessment the Greek State forgoes fiscal revenue from the public casinos in the amount of EUR 7,20 per admission, which corresponds to the difference between the tax of EUR 12 per admission remitted to the State by the private casinos and the tax of EUR 4,80 per admission remitted to the State by the public casinos.
V splošnem se v obravnavanem primeru grška država odreka davčnemu prihodku od javnih igralnic, ki znaša 7,20 EUR na vstopnino, kar pomeni razliko med davkom v višini 12 EUR na vstopnino, ki ga državi plačujejo zasebne igralnice, in davkom v višini 4,80 EUR na vstopnino, ki ga državi plačujejo javne igralnice.
However, some adjustments may be taken into account when evaluating the advantage received by each beneficiary casino (as further described in Section V.4 ‘Quantification and recovery’ herein below – more particularly, it would appear that until 2000 Mont Parnès and Corfu have not paid at all any admission tax to the State, therefore the advantage in that case is at the level of the tax of EUR 12 per admission remitted to the State by the private casinos).
Vendar pa je treba pri ocenjevanju koristi, zagotovljene vsakemu upravičencu, upoštevati določene prilagoditve (podrobneje razložene v oddelku V.4, tj. „Določitev višine pomoči in njena izterjava“: zlasti se je pokazalo, da igralnica Mont Parnès in igralnica na Krfu do leta 2000 državi nista plačali nobenega davka na vstopnino, tako da je v tem primeru korist enaka davku v višini 12 EUR na vstopnino, ki ga državi plačujejo zasebne igralnice).
Greece argued that, as the casinos with a lower price may thereby attract more customers, there is no certainty that the State forgoes revenue.
Grčija je trdila, da ker lahko igralnice, ki zaračunavajo nižjo ceno, s tem privabijo več strank, ni nujno, da se država odreče prihodku.
Greece maintains that therefore the measure would not constitute State aid.
Grčija meni, da zato ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči.
In fact the contention by the Greek authorities is erroneous in that the benchmark against which the Greek authorities test the effects of the fiscal discrimination on the State budget is biased by the advantage built in the measure.
Trditev grških organov je zmotna, saj je merilo, po katerem preskušajo učinke davčne diskriminacije na državni proračun, pristransko, ker je korist sestavni del ukrepa.
The Greek authorities introduce in their reasoning the dynamic effect of a reduction in price that might increase the demand and eventually the tax collected, since the latter is proportionate to the number of admissions.
Pri svoji obrazložitvi so grški organi upoštevali dinamičen učinek znižanja cene, ki bi lahko povečal povpraševanje in s tem pobrani davek, saj je pobrani davek sorazmeren s številom vstopnic.
This comparison is however inaccurate, considering that it is the inequality itself created by the advantage, namely the fact that there is a lower price and the corresponding lower tax burden per admission, which makes the demand increase.
Vendar je ta primerjava napačna, saj korist ustvarja to neenakost, tj. dejstvo, da obstaja nižja cena in s tem nižja davčna obremenitev na vstopnino, kar povečuje povpraševanje.
Anyway the Greek authorities have not provided any proof that the overall tax revenue of the admission tax on casinos is maximised with that pattern of unequal prices.
V vsakem primeru grški organi niso zagotovili nobenega dokaza, da vzorec neenakih cen povečuje kolikor je mogoče skupni davčni prihodek od davka na vstopnino, ki se zaračunava igralnicam.
In fact if the Commission were to follow the reasoning that a lowering of the admission price to EUR 6 produces an increase in tax collection, the tax revenue maximisation would take place at a level where all admission tickets are priced at EUR 6 for all casinos both private and public, contradicting the Greek contention that this point is reached with the fiscal discrimination resulting from the unequal prices.
Če bi Komisija sledila obrazložitvi, da znižanje cene vstopnine na 6 EUR ustvarja povečanje pobranega davka, bi se davčni prihodek še bolj povečal, če bi bila cena vseh vstopnic 6 EUR v vseh igralnicah, javnih in zasebnih, kar je v nasprotju z grško trditvijo, da se ta točka doseže kot rezultat davčne diskriminacije, ki izhaja iz neenakih cen.
Accordingly, the contested advantage is financed through State resources.
V skladu s tem se domnevna korist financira iz državnih sredstev.
According to Article 107(1) of the TFEU, in order to constitute State aid, the measure must be specific or selective in that it favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’.
Da bi ukrep pomenil državno pomoč, mora biti v skladu s členom 107(1) PDEU specifičen ali selektiven tako, da daje prednost „nekaterim podjetjem ali proizvodnji določenega blaga“.
According to the case-law of the Court of Justice [57], ‘as regards the assessment of the condition of selectivity, which is a constituent factor in the concept of State aid, it is clear from settled case-law that Article 87(1) EC [now Article 107(1) of the TFEU] requires assessment of whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to “favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods” in comparison with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the system in question’ [58].
V skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča [57]„glede presoje pogoja selektivnosti, ki je sestavni del pojma državne pomoči, iz ustaljene sodne prakse izhaja, da člen 87(1) ES [zdaj člen 107(1) PDEU] predpisuje, da se v okviru določenega pravnega sistema ugotovi, ali nacionalni ukrep lahko daje prednost ‚posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga‘ v primerjavi z drugimi, ki so glede na cilje, ki jih ta ureditev zasleduje, v dejansko in pravno primerljivem položaju“ [58].
The Court has also held on numerous occasions that Article 107(1) of the TFEU does not distinguish between the causes or the objectives of State aid, but defines them in relation to their effects [59].
Sodišče je večkrat odločilo, da člen 107(1) PDEU ne razlikuje med vzroki oziroma cilji državne pomoči, ampak jih določa glede na njihove učinke [59].
According to the Commission’s practice and the EU case-law concerning fiscal cases, the selective advantage involved may derive from an exception to the tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature or from a discretionary practice on the part of the tax authorities.
Glede na lastno prakso Komisije in sodno prakso EU v davčnih zadevah lahko navedena selektivna prednost izhaja iz izjeme od davčnih predpisov zakonske, nadzorne ali upravne narave, ali iz diskrecijske prakse s strani davčnih organov.
However, the selective nature of a measure may be justified by ‘the nature or general scheme of the system’ [60], in which case the measure may be considered not to constitute State aid.
Vendar pa je mogoče selektivno naravo ukrepa upravičiti z „naravo ali splošno shemo sistema“ in v tem primeru se lahko šteje, da ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči [60].
Firstly, the Commission observes that in the case under review the general tax system is constituted by the regime applicable (in principle) to all casinos, as established by the Law 2206/1994 and the implementing Ministerial Decision of 1995 (as also confirmed by the Greek authorities – see paragraph 19 herein above).
Prvič, Komisija ugotavlja, da je splošni davčni sistem v zadevnem primeru sistem, ki načeloma velja za vse igralnice in ki je določen z zakonom 2206/1994 in izvedbenim ministrskim odlokom iz leta 1995 (kar so potrdili grški organi, glej uvodno izjavo 19).
Secondly, the Commission notes that the measure at issue constitutes a departure from the application of the general tax system.
Drugič, Komisija ugotavlja, da zadevni ukrep pomeni odmik od splošnega davčnega sistema.
As confirmed by the Greek authorities, the special provisions applicable to the public casinos (and the assimilated private casino of Thessaloniki) are considered exceptions from the application of the general provisions of the Law 2206/1994 and the implementing Ministerial Decision of 1995 (see also paragraph 19 and the following herein above).
Kot so potrdili grški organi, se posebne določbe, ki veljajo za javne igralnice (in zasebno igralnico v Solunu), štejejo za izjeme od splošnih določb zakona 2206/1994 in izvedbenega ministrskega odloka iz leta 1995 (glej uvodno izjavo 19 in naslednje).
In consideration of all the above, the Commission considers that the measure is selective.
Komisija zato meni, da je ukrep selektiven.