natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To align incentives further, a substantial portion of variable remuneration of all staff members covered by those requirements should consist of shares, share-linked instruments of the credit institution or investment firm, subject to the legal structure of the credit institution or investment firm concerned or, in the case of a non-listed credit institution or investment firm, other equivalent non-cash instruments and, where appropriate, other long-dated financial instruments that adequately reflect the credit quality of the credit institution or investment firm.
Da bi dodatno uskladili spodbude, bi moral biti precejšen del variabilnih prejemkov vseh zaposlenih, ki ga zajemajo te zahteve, sestavljen iz delnic, z delnicami povezanih instrumentov kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja, glede na pravno strukturo zadevne kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja oziroma drugih enakovrednih nedenarnih instrumentov v primeru kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja, ki ne kotira na borzi, in, kjer je to ustrezno, drugih dolgoročno datiranih instrumentov, ki v zadostni meri odsevajo kreditno kvaliteto kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.
It should be possible for such instruments to include a capital instrument which, where the institution is subject to severe financial problems, is converted into equity or otherwise written down.
Omogočeno bi moralo biti, da je med takšnimi instrumenti tudi instrument kapitala, ki se v primeru resnih finančnih težav institucije preoblikuje v lastniški kapital ali kako drugače odpiše.
In cases where the credit institution concerned does not issue long-dated financial instruments, it should be permitted to issue the substantial portion of variable remuneration in shares and share-linked instruments and other equivalent non-cash instruments.
V primerih, ko zadevna kreditna institucija ne izda dolgoročno datiranih finančnih instrumentov, bi morala imeti dovoljenje, da izda precejšnji delež variabilnih prejemkov v delnicah, z delnicami povezanih instrumentih ter v drugih enakovrednih nedenarnih instrumentih.
The Member States or their competent authorities should be able to place restrictions on the types and designs of those instruments or prohibit certain instruments, as appropriate.
Državam članicam ali njihovim pristojnim organom bi moralo biti omogočeno, da omejijo vrste in oblike teh instrumentov ali pa po potrebi prepovedo določene instrumente.
To minimise incentives for excessive risk-taking, variable remuneration should constitute a balanced proportion of total remuneration.
Da bi čim bolj zmanjšali spodbude za pretirano prevzemanje tveganja, bi morali variabilni prejemki predstavljati uravnotežen delež skupnih prejemkov.
It is essential that an employee’s fixed salary represents a sufficiently high proportion of his total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible variable remuneration policy, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration.
Izjemno pomembno je, da fiksna plača zaposlenega predstavlja dovolj visok delež njegovih skupnih prejemkov, da se omogoči izvajanje politike povsem prilagodljivih variabilnih prejemkov, vključno z možnostjo, da se variabilnih prejemkov ne izplača.
In order to ensure coherent remuneration practices throughout the sector, it is appropriate to specify certain clear requirements.
Da se zagotovi skladna plačna praksa v celotnem sektorju, je ustrezno določiti nekatere jasne zahteve.
Guaranteed variable remuneration is not consistent with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle and should, as a general rule, be prohibited.
Zajamčeni variabilni prejemki niso skladni z ustreznim upravljanjem s tveganji ali načelom plačila po učinku in bi morali biti na splošno prepovedani.
A substantial portion of the variable remuneration component, such as 40 to 60 %, should be deferred over an appropriate period of time.
Znaten delež variabilne sestavine prejemka, kot je 40 do 60 %, bi bilo treba odložiti za ustrezno obdobje.
That portion should increase significantly with the level of seniority or responsibility of the person remunerated.
Ta delež bi bilo treba občutno povečati glede na dolžino izkušenj ali stopnjo odgovornosti osebe, ki prejme prejemek.
Moreover, a substantial portion of the variable remuneration component should consist of shares, share-linked instruments of the credit institution or investment firm, subject to the legal structure of the credit institution or investment firm concerned or, in the case of a non-listed credit institution or investment firm, other equivalent non-cash instruments and, where appropriate, other long-dated financial instruments that adequately reflect the credit quality of the credit institution or investment firm.
Še več, precejšen delež variabilne sestavine prejemka bi moral biti sestavljen iz delnic, z delnicami povezanih instrumentov kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja, glede na pravno strukturo zadevne kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja oziroma, v primeru kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja, ki ne kotira na borzi, drugih enakovrednih nedenarnih instrumentov, in, kjer je to ustrezno, dolgoročno datiranih finančnih instrumentov, ki primerno odsevajo kreditno kvaliteto kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.
In that context, the principle of proportionality is of great importance since it may not always be appropriate to apply those requirements in the context of small credit institutions and investment firms.
V tem smislu ima načelo sorazmernosti velik pomen, saj morda ni vedno primerno uporabiti te zahteve, kadar gre za majhne kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja.
Taking into account the restrictions that limit the amount of variable remuneration payable in cash and payable upfront, the amount of variable remuneration which can be paid in cash or cash equivalent not subject to deferral should be limited in order to further align the personal objectives of staff with the long-term interest of the credit institution or investment firm.
Ob upoštevanju omejitev, s katerimi je omejen znesek variabilnega prejemka, ki ga je mogoče izplačati v gotovini in vnaprej, bi bilo treba omejiti znesek variabilnega prejemka, ki ga je mogoče izplačati v gotovini ali v gotovini enakovredni obliki in brez odloga, da se dodatno uskladijo osebni cilji zaposlenih z dolgoročnimi interesi kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.
Credit institutions and investment firms should ensure that the total variable remuneration does not limit their ability to strengthen their capital base.
Kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja bi morali zagotoviti, da skupni variabilni prejemki ne bodo omejevali njihove sposobnosti za okrepitev njihove kapitalske osnove.
The extent to which capital needs to be built up should be a function of the current capital position of the credit institution or investment firm.
Obseg, v katerem je treba povečati kapital, bi moral biti funkcija sedanjega kapitalskega položaja kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.
In that context, Member States’ competent authorities should have the power to limit variable remuneration, inter alia, as a percentage of total net revenue when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base.
V tem smislu bi morali imeti pristojni organi države članice pooblastilo za omejitev variabilnih prejemkov, med drugim kot odstotek skupnih neto prihodkov, če niso v skladu z ohranjanjem trdne kapitalske osnove.
Credit institutions and investment firms should require their staff to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.
Kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja bi morala od svojih zaposlenih zahtevati, da ne bodo uporabljali osebnih strategij varovanja pred tveganjem ali zavarovanj, da bi se izognili učinkom uravnavanja tveganja, ki izhajajo iz njihove ureditve prejemkov.
Regarding entities that benefit from exceptional government intervention, priority should be given to building up their capital base and providing for recovery of taxpayer assistance.
Za subjekte, ki imajo korist od izrednih posegov vlade, bi morala biti prednostna naloga vzpostavitev njihove kapitalske osnove in povrnitev pomoči davkoplačevalcev.
Any variable remuneration payments should reflect those priorities.
Te prednostne naloge bi se morale odražati v vseh plačilih variabilnih prejemkov.
The principles regarding sound remuneration policies set out in the Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector [7] are consistent with and complement the principles set out in this Directive.
Načela glede učinkovite politike prejemkov, navedena v Priporočilu Komisije z dne 30. aprila 2009 o plačnih politikah v sektorju finančnih storitev [7], so v skladu z načeli iz te direktive in jih dopolnjujejo.
The provisions on remuneration should be without prejudice to the full exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Treaties, in particular Article 153(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), general principles of national contract and labour law, legislation regarding shareholders’ rights and involvement and the general responsibilities of the administrative and supervisory bodies of the institution concerned, as well as the rights, where applicable, of the social partners to conclude and enforce collective agreements, in accordance with national law and customs.
Določbe o prejemkih ne bi smele posegati v celovito izvajanje temeljnih pravic, zagotovljenih s Pogodbami in zlasti s členom 153(5) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU), splošnimi načeli nacionalnega delovnega in pogodbenega prava, z zakonodajo o pravicah in udeležbi delničarjev ter s splošno odgovornostjo upravnih in nadzornih organov zadevne institucije, pa tudi v pravice, kjer je to primerno, socialnih partnerjev, da sklepajo in izvajajo kolektivne pogodbe v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo in običaji.
In order to ensure fast and effective enforcement, the competent authorities should also have the power to impose or apply financial or non-financial penalties or other measures for breach of a requirement under Directive 2006/48/EC, including the requirement to have remuneration policies that are consistent with sound and effective risk management.
Za zagotovitev hitrega in učinkovitega izvajanja bi morali imeti pristojni organi pooblastilo za naložitev ali izvršitev finančnih ali nefinančnih kazni ali drugih ukrepov zaradi kršitve zahteve iz Direktive 2006/48/ES, vključno z zahtevo po skladnosti politik prejemkov z ustreznim in učinkovitim upravljanjem s tveganji.
Those measures and penalties should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
Ti ukrepi in kazni bi morali biti učinkoviti, sorazmerni in odvračilni.
In order to ensure consistency and a level playing field, the Commission should review the adoption and application by the Member States of such measures and penalties on an aggregate basis with regard to their consistency across the Union.
Da bi zagotovili doslednost in enake pogoje delovanja, bi morala Komisija pregledati, kako države članice izvajajo takšne ukrepe in kazni na združeni podlagi, pri tem pa upoštevati njihovo skladnost v Uniji.
In order to ensure effective supervisory oversight of the risks posed by inappropriate remuneration structures, the remuneration polices and practices adopted by credit institutions and investment firms should be included in the scope of supervisory review under Directive 2006/48/EC.
Za zagotovitev učinkovitega nadzorniškega pregleda nad tveganji, ki izhajajo iz neprimernih struktur prejemkov, bi bilo treba politike in prakse prejemkov, ki jih sprejmejo kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja, vključiti v nadzorniški pregled iz Direktive 2006/48/ES.
In the course of that review, supervisors should assess whether those policies and practices are likely to encourage excessive risk-taking by the staff in question.
V okviru tega pregleda bi nadzorniki morali oceniti, ali je verjetno, da te politike in prakse verjetno spodbujajo pretirano tveganje s strani zadevnih zaposlenih.
In addition, CEBS should ensure the existence of guidelines for the assessment of the suitability of the persons who effectively direct the business of a credit institution.
Odbor evropskih bančnih nadzornikov bi moral prav tako zagotoviti smernice za ocenjevanje primernosti oseb, ki dejansko vodijo posle kreditne institucije.
The Commission Green Paper of 2 June 2010 on corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies identifies a series of failures in corporate governance in credit institutions and investment firms that should be addressed.
Zelena knjiga Komisije z dne 2. junija 2010 o korporativnem upravljanju finančnih institucij in politik prejemkov opozarja na vrsto slabosti v korporativnem upravljanju kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij, ki bi se jim bilo treba posvetiti.
Among the solutions identified, the Commission refers to the need to strengthen significantly requirements relating to persons who effectively direct the business of the credit institution who should be of sufficiently good repute and have appropriate experience and also be assessed as to their suitability to perform their professional activities.
Med opredeljenimi rešitvami Komisija izpostavlja potrebo po znatni zaostritvi zahtev v zvezi z osebami, ki dejansko vodijo posle kreditne institucije, saj bi morale te imeti dovolj dober ugled, ustrezne izkušnje, oceniti pa bi bilo treba tudi njihovo primernost za opravljanje strokovnih dejavnosti.
The Green Paper also underlines the need to improve shareholders’ involvement in approving remuneration policies.
Zelena knjiga prav tako poudarja, da je treba povečati vključenost zainteresiranih strani v odobravanje politike prejemkov.
The European Parliament and the Council note the Commission’s intention, as a follow-up, to make legislative proposals, where appropriate, on those issues.
Evropski parlament in Svet sta se seznanila z namero Komisije, da bo v okviru nadaljnjih ukrepov na tem področju pripravila zakonodajne predloge, kjer je to ustrezno.
In order further to enhance transparency as regards the remuneration practices of credit institutions and investment firms, the competent authorities of Member States should collect information on remuneration to benchmark remuneration trends in accordance with the categories of quantitative information that the credit institutions and investment firms are required to disclose under this Directive.
Z namenom nadaljnjega izboljšanja preglednosti v zvezi s prakso prejemkov kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij, bi morali pristojni organi držav članic zbirati informacije o prejemkih za primerjavo trendov prejemkov v skladu s kategorijami kvantitativnih podatkov, ki jih morajo te kreditne institucije in investicijskega podjetja razkriti v skladu s to direktivo.
The competent authorities should provide CEBS with that information in order to enable it to conduct similar assessments at Union level.
Pristojni organi bi morali Odboru evropskih bančnih nadzornikov zagotoviti te informacije, da bi mu omogočile izvajanje podobnih ocen na ravni Unije.
In order to promote supervisory convergences in the assessment of remuneration policies and practices, and to facilitate information collection and the consistent implementation of the remuneration principles in the banking sector, CEBS should elaborate guidelines on sound remuneration policies in the banking sector.
Za spodbujanje približevanja nadzorniških praks pri ocenjevanju politik in praks prejemkov in za olajšanje zbiranja informacij ter dosledno izvajanje načel prejemkov v bančnem sektorju bi moral Odbor evropskih bančnih nadzornikov oblikovati smernice za ustrezne politike prejemkov v bančnem sektorju.
The Committee of European Securities Regulators should assist in the elaboration of such guidelines to the extent that they also apply to remuneration policies for persons involved in the provision of investment services and carrying out of investment activities by credit institutions and investment firms within the meaning of Directive 2004/39/EC.
Odbor evropskih zakonodajalcev za vrednostne papirje bi moral pomagati pri pripravi takšnih smernic, če te veljajo tudi za politike prejemkov za osebe, udeležene pri zagotavljanju investicijskih storitev in izvajanju investicijskih dejavnosti kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij v smislu Direktive 2004/39/ES.
CEBS should conduct open public consultations regarding the technical standards and analyse the potentially related costs and benefits.
Odbor evropskih bančnih nadzornikov bi moral izvesti odprta javna posvetovanja o tehničnih standardih in analizirati morebitne s tem povezane stroške in koristi.
The Commission should be able to make legislative proposals entrusting the European supervisory authority dealing with banking matters and, to the extent it is appropriate, the European supervisory authority dealing with markets and securities matters, as established pursuant to the de Larosière process on financial supervision, with the elaboration of draft technical regulatory and implementing standards to facilitate information collection and the consistent implementation of the remuneration principles in the banking sector to be adopted by the Commission.
Komisija bi morala pripraviti zakonske predloge, s katerimi evropskemu nadzornemu organu, ki se ukvarja z bančništvom in, v ustrezni meri, evropskemu nadzornemu organu, ki se ukvarja s trgi in vrednostnimi papirji, ustanovljenim v skladu z de Larosièrovim postopkom o finančnem nadzoru, zaupa pripravo osnutka regulativnih in izvedbenih tehničnih standardov, ki jih bo sprejela Komisija in s katerimi bi olajšali zbiranje informacij in dosledno izvajanje načel o prejemkih v bančnem sektorju.
Since poorly designed remuneration policies and incentive schemes are capable of increasing to an unacceptable extent the risks to which credit institutions and investment firms are exposed, prompt remedial action and, if necessary, appropriate corrective measures should be taken.
Ker lahko slabo zasnovane politike prejemkov in sistem spodbud do nesprejemljive ravni povečajo tveganja, ki so jim izpostavljene kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja, bi bilo treba sprejeti takojšne sanacijske ukrepe in po potrebi ustrezne ukrepe za odpravo nepravilnosti.
Consequently, it is appropriate to ensure that competent authorities have the power to impose qualitative or quantitative measures on the relevant entities that are designed to address problems that have been identified in relation to remuneration policies in the Pillar 2 supervisory review.
Posledično je primerno zagotoviti, da so pristojni organi pooblaščeni, da glede zadevnih subjektov določijo kvalitativne ali kvantitativne ukrepe, ki so namenjeni rešitvi težav, ugotovljenih v zvezi s politikami prejemkov v nadzorniškem pregledu „stebra 2“.
Qualitative measures available to the competent authorities include requiring the credit institutions and investment firms to reduce the risk inherent in their activities, products or systems, including by introducing changes to their structures of remuneration or freezing the variable parts of remuneration to the extent that they are inconsistent with effective risk management.
Med kvalitativnimi ukrepi, ki so na voljo pristojnim organom, je zahteva za kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja, da zmanjšajo tveganje, povezano z njihovimi dejavnostmi, produkti ali sistemi, vključno z vpeljavo sprememb v njihove strukture prejemkov ali zamrznitvijo variabilnih delov prejemkov, če ti niso skladni z učinkovitim obvladovanjem tveganja.
Quantitative measures include a requirement to hold additional own funds.
Kvantitativni ukrepi vključujejo zahtevo po držanju dodatnih lastnih sredstev.
Good governance structures, transparency and disclosure are essential for sound remuneration policies.
Strukture dobrega upravljanja, preglednost in razkritje so bistveni za ustrezne politike prejemkov.
In order to ensure adequate transparency to the market of their remuneration structures and the associated risk, credit institutions and investments firms should disclose detailed information on their remuneration policies, practices and, for reasons of confidentiality, aggregated amounts for those members of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the credit institution or investment firm.
Za zagotovitev ustrezne preglednosti njihovih struktur prejemkov in povezanega tveganja na trgu, bi morale kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja razkriti podrobne informacije o svojih politikah in praksah prejemkov ter zaradi zaupnosti skupne zneske za tiste zaposlene, katerih poklicne dejavnosti pomembno vplivajo na profil tveganja kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.
That information should be made available to all stakeholders (shareholders, employees and the general public).
Te informacije bi morale biti na voljo vsem zainteresiranim stranem (delničarjem, zaposlenim in širši javnosti).
However, that obligation should be without prejudice to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with the regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [8].
Vendar pa ta obveznost ne bi smela posegati v Direktivo 95/46/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. oktobra 1995 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov [8].
In order to guarantee their full effectiveness and in order to avoid any discriminatory effect in their application, the provisions on remuneration laid down in this Directive should be applied to remuneration due on the basis of contracts concluded before the date of their effective implementation in each Member State and awarded or paid after that date.
Da bi zagotovili njihovo popolno učinkovitost in se izognili diskriminacijskim učinkom pri njihovem izvajanju, bi bilo treba določbe o prejemkih, opredeljene v tej direktivi, uveljaviti za prejemke, zapadle na podlagi pogodb, sklenjenih pred datumom njihovega začetka izvajanja v vsaki državi članici, in dodeljene ali izplačane po tem datumu.
Moreover, in order to safeguard the objectives pursued by this Directive, especially effective risk management, in respect of periods still characterised by a high degree of financial instability, and in order to avoid any risk of circumvention of the provisions on remuneration laid down in this Directive during the period prior to their implementation, it is necessary to apply those provisions to remuneration awarded, but not yet paid, before the date of their effective implementation in each Member State, for services provided in 2010.
Da bi poleg tega obvarovali cilje iz te direktive, zlasti učinkovito upravljanje tveganja, v obdobjih, ki jih še vedno zaznamuje visoka stopnja finančne nestabilnosti, in da bi se izognili kakršnemu koli tveganju zaobitja določb o prejemkih iz te direktive v obdobju pred začetkom izvajanja, je treba, ko gre za storitve, opravljene v letu 2010, te določbe uporabiti za prejemke, ki so sicer že bili dodeljeni, ne pa še izplačani, pred datumom začetka njihovega dejanskega izvajanja v vsaki državi članici.
The review of risks to which the credit institution might be exposed should result in effective supervisory measures.
Pregled tveganj, ki bi jim kreditna institucija lahko bila izpostavljena, bi moral privesti do učinkovitih nadzorniških ukrepov.
It is therefore necessary that further convergence be reached with a view to supporting joint decisions by supervisors and ensuring equal conditions of competition within the Union.
Zato je nujno, da se doseže nadaljnja konvergenca, z namenom podpreti skupne odločitve nadzornikov in zagotoviti enake konkurenčne pogoje znotraj Unije.