natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to the Dutch State, the contract between Fortis Bank SA/NV and FBN was a normal market contract between private market actors.
Po mnenju Nizozemske je bila pogodba med Fortis Bank SA/NV in banko FBN običajna tržna pogodba med akterji na zasebnem trgu.
The Dutch State argued that – because it had replaced a market economy investor – its behaviour was automatically in line with the MEIP.
Nizozemska je trdila, da je bilo – ker je zamenjala vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu – njeno ravnanje samodejno v skladu z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
As such, the Dutch State considered it did not have to justify why rates could have been higher or why it should have replaced those long-term loans by shorter-term loans [77].
Zato se Nizozemski utemeljevanje, zakaj bi lahko bile obrestne mere višje ali zakaj bi morala dolgoročna posojila zamenjati s kratkoročnimi, ni zdelo potrebno [77].
The Dutch State also argued that it was quite common for companies, when pursuing acquisitions, to simultaneously provide liquidity to newly-acquired subsidiaries.
Nizozemska je tudi trdila, da je za podjetja pri nakupih precej običajno, da hkrati zagotovijo likvidnost novo pridobljenim podružnicam.
As to whether direct or indirect State aid had been provided to ABN AMRO N, the Dutch State denied that ABN AMRO N received funding from the Dutch State or FBN.
Glede tega, ali je bila banki ABN AMRO N zagotovljena neposredna ali posredna pomoč, je Nizozemska zanikala, da bi Nizozemska ali banka FBN banki ABN AMRO N zagotovila financiranje.
The Dutch State explained that ABN AMRO N, with its large retail and private banking franchise, had sufficient funding of its own.
Nizozemska je pojasnila, da je imela banka ABN AMRO N s svojo veliko franšizo na področju poslovanja s prebivalstvom in zasebnega bančništva dovolj lastnih sredstev.
With respect to Measure Z, the Dutch State claimed that the transaction price of EUR 6,5 billion was a fair market price.
Glede ukrepa Z je Nizozemska trdila, da je bila cena transakcije v višini 6,5 milijarde EUR poštena tržna cena.
It underlined that the price was between the ‘current market conditions’ valuation of EUR [4 - 6,5] billion and the ‘through the cycle’ valuation of EUR [6,5 - 9] billion as calculated by its external valuation expert at the beginning of October 2008 (prior to the 3 October 2008 transaction).
Poudarila je, da je bila cena med oceno „sedanjih tržnih pogojev“ v višini [4 – 6,5] milijarde EUR in oceno „skozi cikel“ v višini [6,5 – 9] milijarde EUR, kot je izračunal njen zunanji strokovnjak za vrednotenje v začetku oktobra 2008 (pred transakcijo dne 3. oktobra 2008).
ABN AMRO N, by contrast, with its stable retail and commercial bank profile, was fundamentally different to other banks.
Nasprotno pa je bila banka ABN AMRO N s svojim stabilnim profilom na področju poslovanja s prebivalstvom in komercialnega bančništva bistveno drugačna od drugih bank.
Given that context, the Dutch State argued that a price correction by analogy to other banks made no sense.
Glede na to je Nizozemska trdila, da popravek cene po analogiji glede na druge banke ni bil smiseln.
The Dutch State also underlined that the other consortium members, and in particular RBS, had to approve the transaction and that […].
Nizozemska je tudi poudarila, da so morali drugi člani konzorcija, in zlasti banka RBS, odobriti transakcijo in da […].
The Dutch State also refers to points (166) and (177) of the preliminary report of experts to the General Shareholders’ Meeting of Fortis SA/NV on 11 February 2009 in Brussels [79], claiming that those points support the Dutch State’s argument that it paid a fair price for FBN, ABN AMRO N, Fortis Insurance and Fortis Corporate Insurance on 3 October 2008, which constitutes therefore a valid reference price for the sale of December 2008.
Nizozemska je opozorila tudi na točki (166) in (177) predhodnega poročila strokovnjakov, predloženega na skupščini delničarjev holdinga Fortis SA/NV 11. februarja 2009 v Bruslju [79], in trdila, da ti točki podpirata trditev Nizozemske, da je 3. oktobra 2008 plačala pošteno ceno za banko FBN, banko ABN AMRO N, Fortis Insurance in Fortis Corporate Insurance, kar zato pomeni veljavno referenčno ceno za prodajo decembra 2008.
The Dutch State implemented Measure Z by waiving claims it had towards FBN.
Nizozemska je ukrep Z uvedla z odpovedjo terjatvam, ki jih je imela do banke FBN.
Furthermore, the Dutch State claimed that the Commission – if it were to come to the conclusion that Measure Z implied State aid – should apply a correction.
Poleg tega je Nizozemska trdila, da bi morala Komisija – če bi sklenila, da je ukrep Z pomenil državno pomoč – uporabiti popravek.
Since similar instruments of other banks were trading at a substantial discount to par [80], it was logical that the market value of the debt instruments waived by the Dutch State was also below par. In other words, the prevailing market circumstances suggested that the Dutch State was not entitled to par value but to a lower market value.
Ker so podobni instrumenti drugih bank trgovali z znatnim diskontom na nominalno vrednost [80], je bilo logično, da je bila tržna vrednost dolžniških instrumentov, katerim se je Nizozemska odpovedala, prav tako pod nominalno vrednostjo. Z drugimi besedami, prevladujoče tržne razmere so kazale, da Nizozemska ni upravičena do nominalne vrednosti, ampak do nižje tržne vrednosti.
The Dutch State argued that, taking into account the then prevailing market circumstances, it was only entitled to a market value of EUR [4,55 - 5,85] billion (so the par value of the loans of EUR 6,5 billion corrected for a market discount of EUR [0,65 - 1,95] billion).
Nizozemska je trdila, da je bila ob upoštevanju takrat prevladujočih tržnih razmer upravičena samo do tržne vrednosti v višini [4,55 – 5,85] milijarde EUR (torej al pari vrednosti posojil v višini 6,5 milijarde EUR, popravljene za tržni diskont v višini [0,65 – 1,95] milijarde EUR).
On 18 June 2009, the Dutch Ministry of Finance forwarded to the Commission the evaluation of FBN by DNB as requested in the Decision of 8 April 2009. […] [81], [82], [83]
Nizozemsko ministrstvo za finance je 18. junija 2009 Komisiji poslalo oceno banke FBN s strani organa DNB, kot je bilo zahtevano v odločbi z dne 8. aprila 2009 […] [81], [82], [83]
DNB also informed the Commission on […] ABN AMRO N by letter of 20 January 2010. […]
Organ DNB je Komisijo z dopisom z dne 20. januarja 2010 obvestil tudi o […] banke ABN AMRO N. […]
Comments from the Dutch State on the Decision of 5 February 2010
Pripombe Nizozemske na sklep z dne 5. februarja 2010
In general, the Dutch State argued that the measures taken did not constitute State aid because the measures:
Na splošno je Nizozemska trdila, da sprejeti ukrepi niso pomenili državne pomoči, ker:
did not benefit ABN AMRO N nor FBN,
od ukrepov ni imela koristi niti banka ABN AMRO N niti banka FBN,
were necessary to separate ABN AMRO N and FBN from their respective former parent companies and followed from contractual obligations of the Dutch State as successor to Fortis SA/NV in the CSA, or
so bili ukrepi potrebni zaradi ločitve bank ABN AMRO N in FBN od njunih zadevnih nekdanjih matičnih družb in so izhajali iz pogodbenih obveznosti Nizozemske kot naslednika holdinga Fortis SA/NV v sporazumu delničarjev konzorcija ter
were economically rational from the viewpoint of a private investor.
so bili ukrepi z vidika zasebnega vlagatelja gospodarsko smiselni.
The Dutch State argued that the Commission should apply the MEIP to every individual measure that the Dutch State had taken.
Nizozemska je trdila, da bi morala Komisija načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu uporabiti za vsak posamezen ukrep, ki ga je sprejela Nizozemska.
Particularly concerning the merger-related measures (namely Measures B4 and B5), the Dutch State underlined that the merger was an investment with a positive net present value (‘NPV’) and therefore compatible with the MEIP.
Zlasti glede ukrepov, povezanih z združitvijo (ukrepa B4 in B5), je Nizozemska poudarila, da je bila združitev naložba s pozitivno neto sedanjo vrednostjo (v nadaljnjem besedilu: NSV) in zato v skladu z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
In other words, the Dutch State did not accept the Commission’s preliminary position, as developed in recital 96 of the Decision of 5 February 2010, that the MEIP did not apply to the measures following the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 State, since those measures were part of a larger rescue and restructuring operation.
Z drugimi besedami Nizozemska ni sprejela predhodnega mnenja Komisije, kot je bilo razloženo v uvodni izjavi 96 sklepa z dne 5. februarja 2010, da načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu ne velja za ukrepe, ki so sledili celovitim transakcijam z dne 3. oktobra 2008, ker so bili ti ukrepi del večjega ukrepa reševanja in prestrukturiranja.
The Dutch State acknowledged that the State aid rules imply that the MEIP does not apply when several interconnected capital injections are made in a short time period.
Nizozemska je priznala, da pravila državne pomoči pomenijo, da načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu ne velja, kadar je v krajšem času dodeljenih več med seboj povezanih kapitalskih injekcij.
Nevertheless it argued that this analysis did not hold true for FBN and ABN AMRO N as the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 – in its view – did not contain State aid measures and, in addition, the follow-up measures were not connected to the initial transaction.
Kljub temu je trdila, da ta analiza ne velja za banki FBN in ABN AMRO N, saj celovite transakcije z dne 3. oktobra 2008 – po njenem mnenju – niso pomenile državne pomoči, poleg tega pa nadaljnji ukrepi niso bili povezani s prvotno transakcijo.
The Dutch State argued that the Commission should take into account the very specific circumstances under which the Dutch State was obliged to buy FBN.
Nizozemska je trdila, da bi morala Komisija upoštevati zelo posebne okoliščine, v katerih je morala nizozemska država kupiti banko FBN.
The Dutch State also pointed out that the sale of New HBU had been very burdensome for the Dutch State and for ABN AMRO N with a negative capital impact of EUR 470 million.
Nizozemska je poudarila tudi, da je bila prodaja podružnice New HBU zelo veliko breme za Nizozemsko in banko ABN AMRO N z negativnim učinkom na kapital v višini 470 milijonov EUR.
The Dutch State claimed to have based all its measures on the principles set forward in the Banking Communication [84] and the Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition [85] (the ‘Recapitalisation Communication’).
Nizozemska je trdila, da je vse svoje ukrepe zasnovala na načelih iz sporočila o bančništvu [84] in sporočilu Komisije – Dokapitalizacija finančnih institucij v trenutni finančni krizi: omejitev pomoči na najmanjšo potrebno in zaščitni ukrepi za preprečevanje neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence [85] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporočilo o dokapitalizaciji).
In general, the Dutch State argued that its measures were well-targeted, proportionate to the challenges faced and designed so as to minimise negative spill-over effects to competitors.
Na splošno je Nizozemska trdila, da so njeni ukrepi dobro usmerjeni, sorazmerni z izzivi, s katerimi se soočajo, in oblikovani tako, da kar najbolj zmanjšajo negativne učinke prelivanja na konkurente.
The Dutch State argued Measure A and Measure B1 did not qualify as State aid, since the State was contractually obliged to resolve capital problems faced by ABN AMRO Z. The Dutch State was contractually obliged under the CSA to implement the separation of ABN AMRO Holding.
Nizozemska je trdila, da ukrep A in ukrep B1 ne pomenita državne pomoči, saj je bila država pogodbeno zavezana k rešitvi težav s kapitalom, s katerimi se je soočala ABN AMRO Z. Nizozemska je bila po sporazumu delničarjev konzorcija pogodbeno zavezana, da izvede ločitev holdinga ABN AMRO Holding.
DNB only allowed the separation of ABN AMRO II to start if all the consortium members had paid their share in the capital shortage of ABN AMRO Z. The Dutch State admitted that it had provided capital to ABN AMRO Z via ABN AMRO N but it underlined that ABN AMRO N only acted as an intermediate vehicle.
Organ DNB je ločitev ABN AMRO II dovolil le v primeru, da so vsi člani konzorcija plačali svoj delež kapitalskega primanjkljaja ABN AMRO Z. Nizozemska je priznala, da je ABN AMRO Z priskrbela kapital prek ABN AMRO N, vendar je poudarila, da je imela ABN AMRO N samo vlogo posrednika.
Ultimately, ABN AMRO N had only passed capital through to ABN AMRO Z and Measure A did not selectively advantage ABN AMRO N.
Preko banke ABN AMRO N je bil kapital dejansko samo posredovan ABN AMRO Z in ukrep A banki ABN AMRO N ni prinesel selektivne prednosti.
As to whether the capital shortage of ABN AMRO Z was the result of selective advantages granted to ABN AMRO N, the Dutch State stated that the consortium members had already ensured at the time of the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holdings by the consortium (see recital 33) that the activities of the different tracking shares (as defined in recital 35) were sufficiently ring-fenced vis-à-vis one another.
Glede tega, ali je kapitalski primanjkljaj ABN AMRO Z nastal zaradi selektivnih prednosti, ki jih je prejela banka ABN AMRO N, je Nizozemska trdila, da so člani konzorcija v času nakupa ABN AMRO Holdings s strani konzorcija (glej uvodno izjavo 33) že zagotovili, da so bile dejavnosti različnih „tracking shares“, kot so opredeljene v uvodni izjavi 35), dovolj ločene druga od druge.
That arrangement meant that there was also a clear distinction between the activities of ABN AMRO N and ABN AMRO Z. It meant for instance that ABN AMRO N had its own corporate governance structure and its own reporting.
Ta dogovor je pomenil, da je obstajala tudi jasna razmejitev dejavnosti ABN AMRO N in ABN AMRO Z. To je pomenilo, na primer, da je imela banka ABN AMRO N svojo strukturo upravljanja podjetja in svoje poročanje.
The Dutch State also drew the Commission’s attention to the fact that ABN AMRO N had separate legal status as of 6 February 2010 [86].
Nizozemska je Komisijo opozorila tudi na dejstvo, da je imela banka ABN AMRO N od 6. februarja 2010 naprej ločen pravni status [86].
The Dutch State also provided evidence that the ABN AMRO Z capital shortfall already existed at the time of the acquisition of 3 October 2008.
Nizozemska je predložila tudi dokaze, da je ABN AMRO Z v času nakupa dne 3. oktobra 2008 že imela kapitalski primanjkljaj.
With respect to the costs borne by ABN AMRO Z related to head office functions, the Dutch State underlined that those costs decreased dramatically after the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding by the consortium members described in recital 33.
Glede stroškov, povezanih z izvajanjem funkcije sedeža podjetja, ki jih je imela ABN AMRO Z, je Nizozemska poudarila, da so se stroški potem, ko so člani konzorcija kupili ABN AMRO Holding, kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 33, precej zmanjšali.
Since the consortium members had no interest in maintaining a large integrated head office, it was logical to keep those costs as low as possible.
Ker člani konzorcija niso imeli interesa, da bi vzdrževali velik integriran sedež podjetja, je bilo logično, da so poskušali stroške čim bolj zmanjšati.
Figures provided by the Dutch State showed that group function costs borne by ABN AMRO Z were EUR [0 - 0,5] billion in 2008 and EUR [0 - 0,2] billion in 2009, which the Dutch State considered to be negligible.
Podatki, ki jih je predložila Nizozemska, kažejo, da so bili skupni stroški delovanja, ki jih je imela ABN AMRO Z, [0 – 0,5] milijarde EUR v letu 2008 in [0 – 0,2] milijarde EUR v letu 2009, kar je bil po mnenju Nizozemske zanemarljiv znesek.
The Dutch State also underlined that it incurred the obligation to absorb those costs when it replaced Fortis SA/NV as a party to the CSA, following the acquisition of FBN (including ABN AMRO N) on 3 October 2008.
Nizozemska je tudi poudarila, da je morala potem, ko je zamenjala holding Fortis SA/NV kot pogodbenico v sporazumu delničarjev konzorcija po prevzemu banke FBN (vključno z banko ABN AMRO N) 3. oktobra 2008, prevzeti te stroške.
Should the Commission consider Measure A as State aid, the Dutch State argued that the Impaired Asset Communication [87] should not apply.
Nizozemska je trdila, da če bi se Komisija odločila, da ukrep A pomeni državno pomoč, sporočilo o oslabljenih sredstvih [87] ne bi smelo veljati.
According to the Dutch State, there was no uncertainty on the valuation of the protected assets, which therefore could not be considered ‘impaired’ in the sense used in the Communication.
Po mnenju Nizozemske ni bilo nobene negotovosti glede ocene zaščitenih sredstev, zato se jih ni moglo šteti za „oslabljena“ v smislu, uporabljenem v sporočilu.
Should the Commission not share its point of view, the Dutch government contended that ABN AMRO N’s CDS still complied with the general principles of that Communication.
Nizozemska vlada je trdila, da četudi se Komisija ne bi strinjala z njenim mnenjem, so bile kreditne zamenjave banke ABN AMRO N še vedno v skladu s splošnimi načeli tega sporočila.
Moreover, it argued that the credit protection instrument was necessary and proportional, while keeping competition distortions to the minimum.
Poleg tega je trdila, da je bil instrument kreditnega zavarovanja nujen in sorazmeren, hkrati pa je kar najmanj izkrivljal konkurenco.
The Dutch State asserted that the remuneration of the CRI – a 10 % return of the freed up capital – was sufficiently high.
Nizozemska je trdila, da je bilo obrestovanje instrumenta za razbremenitev kapitala – 10-odstotni donos na sproščeni kapital – dovolj visoko.
It also provided evidence that the first loss tranche of 20 basis points was substantially higher than the expected loss.
Predložila je tudi dokaze, da je bila tranša prve izgube v višini 20 bazičnih točk precej višja kot pričakovana izguba.
The Dutch State contended that historical losses (namely [0 - 15] basis points) and 2010 projected losses (namely [0 - 30] basis points) on the mortgage portfolio of ABN AMRO N provided a good forecast for a range of future expected losses.
Nizozemska je trdila, da so bile pretekle izgube (tj. [0 – 15] bazičnih točk) in izgube, napovedane za leto 2010 (tj. [0 – 30] bazičnih točk) na hipotekarni portfelj banke ABN AMRO N dobra napoved za številne izgube, pričakovane v prihodnosti.
Also market information from rating reports [88] confirmed that the first tranche loss exceeded expected losses.
Tudi tržne informacije iz poročil o bonitetni oceni [88] so potrdile, da je tranša prve izgube presegla pričakovane izgube.
The Dutch State also referred to a document of the investment bank […], which simulated how the Dutch State cashflows could evolve under different stress scenarios.
Nizozemska se je sklicevala tudi na dokument investicijske banke […], ki je simulirala, kako bi se lahko denarni tokovi Nizozemske razvili v različnih scenarijih izjemnih situacij.
The Dutch State also believed that the CRI contained sufficient exit incentives.
Nizozemska je tudi menila, da je instrument za razbremenitev kapitala vseboval zadostne spodbude za izhod.
The Dutch State drew the Commission’s attention to the calls included in the CRI and to the fact that the CRI would become rather unattractive once ABN AMRO Group was allowed to operate under Basel II requirements.
Nizozemska je Komisijo opozorila na nakupne opcije, ki so bile vključene v instrument za razbremenitev kapitala, in na dejstvo, da bi instrument za razbremenitev kapitala postal precej nezanimiv, ko bi skupina ABN AMRO lahko delovala v skladu z zahtevami Basla II.
Against that background, the Dutch State believed that ABN AMRO N would probably call the CRI in January 2011, when the transition to Basel II requirements was expected to result in a reduction of the freed up capital.
Zaradi tega je Nizozemska menila, da bo ABN AMRO N instrument za razbremenitev kapitala verjetno kupil januarja 2011, ko bo prehod na zahteve Basla II predvidoma povzročil zmanjšanje sproščenega kapitala.
The Dutch State denied that those costs provided ABN AMRO N with a benefit and it also explained that it paid for the separation costs as it was the State’s contractual obligation to implement the separation.
Nizozemska je zanikala, da bi ti stroški banki ABN AMRO N prinesli koristi, in pojasnila tudi, da je plačala stroške ločitve, saj je bila pogodbena obveznost države, da izvede ločitev.
With respect to the prudential margin of EUR 500 million – also categorised under separation costs -, the Dutch State argued it was common banking practice.
Glede smotrne razlike v višini 500 milijonov EUR, ki je bila prav tako opredeljena kot strošek ločitve, je Nizozemska trdila, da je bila to običajna bančna praksa.
Banks cannot operate with only the minimum required capital but need an additional comfort margin.
Banke ne morejo poslovati samo z najnižjim zahtevanim kapitalom, ampak potrebujejo dodatna sredstva za lažje poslovanje.
Otherwise, should banks face – even a small – setback, they would immediately run into financial trouble.
V nasprotnem primeru bi banke, če bi se soočale – tudi z manjšimi – težavami, takoj zašle v finančne težave.
The Dutch State indicated, however, that its contribution to the prudential margin should be temporary and that, in the longer-term, ABN AMRO N should generate the prudential margin itself without any help by the Dutch State.
Vendar je Nizozemska navedla, da naj bi bil ta prispevek k smotrni razliki začasen in da bi morala banka ABN AMRO N dolgoročno sama ustvariti to smotrno razliko, brez kakršne koli pomoči nizozemske države.
With respect to Measure B4, the Dutch State argued that the measure did not constitute State aid.
Glede ukrepa B4 je Nizozemska trdila, da ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči.
The Dutch State argued that the decision to merge both banks was already taken and partly implemented when it acquired FBN.
Nizozemska je trdila, da je bila odločitev glede združitve obeh bank v času, ko je kupila banko FBN, že sprejeta in delno izvedena.
The Dutch State also indicated that ultimately ABN AMRO N’s financial means would not increase and therefore it defended the position that Measure B4 did not constitute State aid.
Nizozemska je tudi navedla, da se na koncu finančna sredstva banke ABN AMRO N niso povečala, in je zato zagovarjala stališče, da ukrep B4 ne pomeni državne pomoči.
The Dutch State indicated that the State funds granted to finance integration costs (Measure B5) should be seen as a rational investment, leading to healthy returns in the form of synergies.
Nizozemska je navedla, da bi bilo treba državna sredstva, odobrena za financiranje stroškov integracije (ukrep B5), šteti za razumno naložbo, ki vodi k zdravi donosnosti v obliki sinergij.
The Dutch government estimated those synergies at around EUR 1,1 billion a year (pre-tax), while the upfront integration costs amount to EUR 1,2 billion (after-tax).
Nizozemska vlada je te sinergije ocenila na približno 1,1 milijarde EUR na leto (pred obdavčitvijo), medtem ko so vnaprejšnji stroški integracije znašali 1,2 milijarde EUR (po obdavčitvi).
According to the Dutch State, the total NPV of the merger (taking into account synergies, integration costs and the cost of the Merger Remedy) should amount to a positive EUR 2,88 billion [89].
Po mnenju Nizozemske bi morala neto sedanja vrednost združitve (ob upoštevanju sinergij, stroškov integracije in stroškov korektivnega ukrepa v zvezi z združitvijo) znašati pozitivnih 2,88 milijarde EUR [89].
According to the Dutch State, the conversion of Tier 2 into Tier 1 capital (Measure C) did not selectively advantage FBN.
Po mnenju Nizozemske pretvorba kapitala drugega reda v kapital prvega reda (ukrep C) ni pomenil selektivne prednosti za banko FBN.