natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Given that the further investigation showed that the dumping margin for the UAE is also de minimis, it is considered that the effect of those imports cannot be assessed together with dumped imports from Iran.
Ker je nadaljnja preiskava pokazala, da je bila stopnja dampinga za ZAE prav tako enaka stopnji de minimis, se šteje, da učinka navedenega uvoza ni mogoče oceniti skupaj z dampinškim uvozom iz Irana.
Consequently, no cumulative assessment of the imports is made.
Zato kumulativne ocene uvoza ni.
The volume of dumped imports of the product concerned into the EU started from a relatively low level in 2006, but increased gradually until the IP, reaching 55500 tonnes in the IP.
Obseg dampinškega uvoza zadevnega izdelka v EU se je začel 2006 na razmeroma nizki stopnji, vendar je do OP postopoma naraščal in v OP dosegel 55500 ton.
More specifically, imports from Iran more than doubled between 2006 and 2007, before further increasing by over 100 percentage points in 2008 compared to 2007 and almost another 130 percentage points between 2008 and the IP.
Natančneje, uvoz iz Irana se je med letoma 2006 in 2007 več kot podvojil, nato se je leta 2008 v primerjavi z letom 2007 dodatno povečal za več kot 100 odstotnih točk, med letom 2008 in OP pa se je povečal za skoraj 130 odstotnih točk.
Volume of dumped imports from Iran (tonnes)
Obseg dampinškega uvoza iz Irana (v tonah)
Market share of dumped imports from Iran
Tržni delež dampinškega uvoza iz Irana
The market share held by dumped imports from Iran stood at 0,4 % during 2006 and increased steadily by 1,5 percentage points throughout the period considered.
Tržni delež dampinškega uvoza iz Irana je leta 2006 znašal 0,4 % in se je v obravnavanem obdobju enakomerno povečal za 1,5 odstotne točke.
More specifically, it rose by 0,5 percentage points between 2006 and 2007, by further 0,5 percentage points between 2007 and 2008 and by 0,5 percentage points between 2008 and the IP.
Natančneje, med letoma 2006 in 2007 se je povečal za 0,5 odstotne točke, med letoma 2007 in 2008 za dodatne 0,5 odstotne točke, med 2008 in OP pa za 0,5 odstotne točke.
In the IP, the market share of dumped imports from Iran was 1,9 %.
Tržni delež dampinškega uvoza iz Irana je v OP znašal 1,9 %.
The average import price decreased by 11 % in the period considered with the sharpest decline between 2008 and the IP.
Povprečna uvozna cena se je v obravnavanem obdobju znižala za 11 %, pri čemer se je najbolj znižala med letom 2008 in OP.
More specifically, the average price remained stable in 2007 and decreased by 2 percentage points in 2008, before dropping by further 9 percentage points in the IP.
Natančneje, povprečna cena je leta 2007 ostala stabilna in se leta 2008 znižala za 2 odstotni točki, nato pa se je v OP znižala za dodatnih 9 odstotnih točk.
Price of imports from the Iran (EUR/tonne)
Cena uvoza iz Irana (EUR/tona)
Price undercutting
Nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen
Following the provisional disclosure, the Iranian exporter commented that its injury margin was overstated since the weighted average unit sales price established was understated, incorrectly calculating the amount of level of trade adjustment; however, no alternative quantification of the level of trade adjustment was proposed.
Po začasnem razkritju je iranski izvoznik predložil navedbe, da je bila njegova stopnja škode ocenjena previsoko, ker je bilo ugotovljeno tehtano povprečje prodajne cene na enoto ocenjeno prenizko, pri čemer je bil napačno izračunan znesek za prilagoditev stopnje trgovanja. Vendar ni bil predlagan noben drug način ovrednotenja prilagoditve stopnje trgovanja.
Indeed, the basis for the level of trade used for the provisional calculation was a fixed amount per tonne that is a commission charged by the cooperating importing agent and represent around 1 % of the average cif price.
Osnova za stopnjo trgovanja, uporabljeno pri začasnem izračunu, je bil pavšalni znesek na tono, ki je provizija sodelujočega uvoznega agenta in znaša približno 1 % povprečne cene CIF.
No other information is available for such adjustment and the claim is thus rejected.
Za tako prilagoditev ni na voljo nobenih drugih informacij, zato se trditev zavrne.
The same party also claimed that the 2 % rate taken for post-importation costs appeared to be understated.
Ista stran je tudi trdila, da se ji zdi stopnja 2 % za stroške po uvozu ocenjena prenizko.
It is reiterated in this regard that no importer cooperated in this investigation and it was not possible to verify the actual post-importation cost.
Glede tega se ponovno poudari, da pri preiskavi ni sodeloval noben uvoznik in da dejanskega stroška po uvozu ni bilo mogoče preveriti.
Thus, in absence of any other information available, the rate used in previous proceedings was applied.
Ker ni na voljo nobenih drugih informacij, se je uporabila stopnja iz prejšnjih postopkov.
Given the above, it is definitively confirmed that the dumped products originating in Iran sold in the Union undercut the prices of the Union industry by 3,2 %.
Glede na navedeno se dokončno potrdi, da so v Uniji prodajani dampinški izdelki s poreklom iz Irana nelojalno znižali prodajne cene industrije Unije za 3,2 %.
Situation of the Union industry
Položaj industrije Unije
Some interested parties claimed that injury did not exist as given the alleged wrong sample no results could be extrapolated for the total Union industry.
Nekatere zainteresirane strani so trdile, da škode ni, ker glede na domnevni napačni vzorec ni bilo mogoče ekstrapolirati rezultatov za industrijo Unije skupaj.
As an example it was claimed that since one company (not in the sample) had indicated that it was using over 100 % of its capacity it would be a clear sign of no injury.
Trdilo se je na primer, da je navedba ene družbe (ki ni ena od vzorčenih), da uporablja nad 100 % zmogljivosti, jasen znak, da škode ni.
It is noted that the information submitted is an extract of this company’s submission to the stock exchange authorities and not verified.
Opozarja se, da so predložene informacije izvleček iz dokumentacije, ki jo je ta družba predložila borznim organom in niso preverjene.
This information does not square with the information on the file.
Te informacije se ne skladajo z informacijami iz dokumenta protidampinške preiskave.
Moreover, and in any event, the capacity utilisation of one EU producer alone cannot alter the findings of injury concerning almost all other injury indicators for the sampled EU producers and the other EU producers.
Poleg tega uporaba zmogljivosti enega samega proizvajalca EU v nobenem primeru ne more spremeniti ugotovitev o škodi, ki se nanašajo na skoraj vse druge kazalce škode za vzorčene proizvajalce EU in druge proizvajalce EU.
In the absence of any other claims or comments, recitals 63 to 82 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.
Ker drugih trditev in pripomb ni, se potrdijo uvodne izjave 63 do 82 začasne uredbe.
In the absence of any specific comments, the conclusion on injury laid down in recitals 83 to 85 of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.
Ker posebnih pripomb ni, se potrdi sklep o škodi iz uvodnih izjav 83 do 85 začasne uredbe.
The increase in the volume of the dumped imports from Iran by almost five times between 2006 and the IP, and of its corresponding share of the Union market, i.e. by 1,5 percentage points, as well as the undercutting found (3,2 % during the IP) generally coincided with the deterioration of the economic situation of the Union industry.
Obseg dampinškega uvoza iz Irana se je med letom 2006 in OP povečal za skoraj petkrat, pa tudi njegov ustrezni delež na trgu Unije, tj. za 1,5 odstotne točke, in tudi ugotovljeno nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen (3,2 % v OP) je na splošno sovpadalo s poslabšanjem gospodarskega položaja industrije Unije.
Therefore, it can be concluded that dumped imports from Iran had an impact on the injury found to the Union industry.
Zato se lahko sklepa, da je dampinški uvoz iz Irana vplival na ugotovljeno škodo v industriji Unije.
It is important to stress that in the parallel anti-subsidy proceeding, the cumulated subsidised imports from Pakistan, the UAE and Iran were found to cause material injury to the Union industry.
Pomembno je poudariti, da je bilo v vzporednem protisubvencijskem postopku ugotovljeno, da je kumuliran subvencioniran uvoz iz Pakistana, ZAE in Irana povzročil znatno škodo industriji Unije.
On the other hand, given the considerable volumes and the low prices of imports from Korea and Pakistan, it is also confirmed, as stated in recitals 94 and 96 of the provisional Regulation, that those imports contributed to a certain extent to the injury suffered by the Union industry.
Na drugi strani se glede na precejšnji obseg in nizke cene uvoza iz Koreje in Pakistana tudi potrdi, da je navedeni uvoz v določeni meri pripomogel k škodi, ki je nastala industriji Unije, kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 94 in 96 začasne uredbe.
Additionally, in this proceeding, considerable imports from the UAE (around 150000 t) were also undercutting the Union industry prices.
V tem postopku je prodajne cene industrije Unije nelojalno nižal tudi znaten uvoz iz ZAE (približno 150000 ton).
At the same time, the market share of the Iranian imports was below 1 % in 2006 and in 2007 and in the IP it was only close to 2 %, corresponding to 55000 t.
Hkrati je bil tržni delež uvoza iz Irana pod 1 % v 2006 in 2007, v OP pa je bil le blizu 2 %, kar znaša 55000 ton.
It also has to be noted that the undercutting established for the Iranian producer was lower than in the case of non-dumped imports from the UAE.
Treba je tudi opozoriti, da je bilo nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen, ugotovljeno pri iranskem proizvajalcu, nižje od nedampinškega uvoza iz ZAE.
In conclusion, while the above analysis showed that dumped imports originating in Iran have had some negative impact on the situation of the Union industry, this impact, taken in isolation, did not exist to a degree that could be considered material as required by Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation.
Čeprav je navedena analiza pokazala, da je imel uvoz s poreklom iz Irana nekaj negativnega vpliva na položaj industrije Unije, se ugotavlja, da ta vpliv sam po sebi ni dosegel stopnje, ki bi se lahko štela za znatno po členu 3(6) osnovne uredbe.
The investigation has shown that imports of the product concerned from Pakistan and from the UAE were not sold at dumped prices.
Preiskava je pokazala, da se zadevni izdelek, uvožen iz Pakistana in ZAE, ni prodajal po dampinških cenah.
Consequently the proceeding with regard to Pakistan and the UAE shall be terminated without the imposition of measures.
Zato se postopek glede Pakistana in ZAE zaključi brez uvedbe ukrepov.
The investigation has shown that imports of the product concerned from Iran were made at dumped prices and contributed to some extent to the injury suffered by the Union industry.
Preiskava je pokazala, da je uvoz zadevnega izdelka iz Irana potekal po dampinških cenah in do neke mere pripomogel k škodi, ki je nastala industriji Unije.
However, as indicated in recital 59, it was established that the negative impact of the Iranian imports on the situation of the Union industry did not exist to a degree that would enable it to be classified as material.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 59, pa je bilo ugotovljeno, da negativni vpliv iranskega uvoza na položaj industrije Unije ni dosegel stopnje, da bi se ga lahko označilo kot znatnega.
In light of the above, considering the lack of material injury caused by the dumped imports originating in Iran, it is concluded that the proceeding should be terminated without the imposition of measures also with regard to Iran.
Glede na to, da dampinški uvoz s poreklom iz Irana ni povzročil znatne škode, se temu ustrezno ugotavlja, da je postopek tudi glede Irana treba zaključiti brez uvedbe ukrepov.
The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 472/2010 should be released,
Zneski, zavarovani z začasno protidampinško dajatvijo iz Uredbe (EU) št. 472/2010, se sprostijo –
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISON:
SPREJELA NASLEDNJI SKLEP:
The anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene terephthalate having a viscosity number of 78 ml/g or higher, according to the ISO Standard 1628-5, currently falling within CN code 39076020 and originating in Iran, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates is hereby terminated.
Protidampinški postopek v zvezi z uvozom polietilen tereftalata z viskoznostjo 78 ml/g ali več v skladu s standardom ISO 1628-5, trenutno uvrščenega v oznako KN 39076020 in s poreklom iz Irana, Pakistana in Združenih arabskih emiratov, se zaključi.
Regulation (EU) No 472/2010 is hereby repealed.
Uredba (EU) št. 472/2010 se razveljavi.
The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 472/2010 on imports of polyethylene terephthalate having a viscosity number of 78 ml/g or higher, according to the ISO Standard 1628-5, currently falling within CN code 39076020 and originating in Iran and the United Arab Emirates shall be released.
Zneski, zavarovani z začasno protidampinško dajatvijo iz Uredbe (EU) št. 472/2010, uvedeno na uvoz polietilen tereftalata z viskoznostjo 78 ml/g ali več v skladu s standardom ISO 1628-5, trenutno uvrščenega v oznako KN 39076020 in s poreklom iz Irana in Združenih arabskih emiratov, se sprostijo.
Done at Brussels, 28 September 2010.
V Bruslju, 28. septembra 2010
OJ C 208, 3.9.2009, p. 12.
UL C 208, 3.9.2009, str. 12.
OJ L 134, 1.6.2010, p. 4.
UL L 134, 1.6.2010, str. 4.
OJ L 134, 1.6.2010, p. 25.
UL L 134, 1.6.2010, str. 25.
One exporting producer claimed that PET should be subdivided into different product types according to their different viscosity numbers since the viscosity number is essential to determine the different applications for the PET types produced. It was considered that the claim should be accepted and the methodology for calculating the dumping and injury margins was adapted accordingly.
En proizvajalec izvoznik je trdil, da je PET treba razdeliti na različne vrste izdelkov glede na različne viskoznosti, ker je viskoznost bistvena za določitev različnih uporab proizvedenih vrst PET. Štelo se je, da je treba trditev sprejeti, in metodologija za izračun stopnje dampinga in stopnje škode je bila ustrezno prilagojena.
It was also claimed that the sample was not representative since it did not contain any producer that is selling to a related PET processor in sufficient quantities. As a result, the institutions allegedly could not assess the real supply capability of the Union industry and did not take into account the Union industry’s conflict of interest.
Trdile so tudi, da vzorec ni bil reprezentativen, ker ni vseboval nobenega proizvajalca z zadostno količino prodaje povezanemu predelovalcu PET. Zato naj institucije ne bi mogle oceniti realne dobavne zmožnosti industrije Unije in naj ne bi upoštevale navzkrižja interesov industrije Unije.
on the recognition of the legal and supervisory framework of Japan as equivalent to the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit rating agencies
o priznavanju pravnega in nadzornega okvira Japonske za enakovrednega zahtevam Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o bonitetnih agencijah
(notified under document C(2010) 6418)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2010) 6418)
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies [1], and in particular Article 5(6) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o bonitetnih agencijah [1] in zlasti člena 5(6) Uredbe,
On 12 June 2009 the Commission granted a mandate to the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) requesting their technical advice with regard to the technical assessment of the legal and supervisory framework of Japan in respect of credit rating agencies.
Komisija je 12. junija 2009 podelila mandat Odboru evropskih zakonodajalcev za vrednostne papirje (CESR – Committee of European Securities Regulators) in ga prosila za tehnični nasvet v zvezi s tehnično oceno pravnega in nadzornega okvira Japonske v zvezi z bonitetnimi agencijami.
In its advice delivered on 21 May 2010, CESR suggested that the Japanese legal and supervisory framework in respect of credit rating agencies be considered equivalent to the Regulation.
CESR je v svojem priporočilu, ki ga je poslal 21. maja 2010, predlagal, da se japonski pravni in nadzorni okvir v zvezi z bonitetnimi agencijami šteje za enakovrednega Uredbi.
Pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 5(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, the fulfilment of three conditions needs to be assessed in order to consider a third country legal and supervisory framework equivalent to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.
V skladu z drugim pododstavkom člena 5(6) Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 je treba oceniti izpolnjevanje treh pogojev, da se pravni in nadzorni okvir tretje države lahko obravnava kot okvir, enakovreden zahtevam Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009.
According to the first condition, credit rating agencies in the third country must be subject to authorisation or registration and are subject to effective supervision and enforcement on an ongoing basis.
V skladu s prvim pogojem morajo imeti bonitetne agencije v tretji državi dovoljenje oziroma biti registrirane ter so predmet stalnega učinkovitega nadzora in izvrševanja.
The Japanese legal and supervisory framework for credit rating agencies consists of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (Act No 25 of 1948) related to the Regulation of Credit Ratings Agencies; the Cabinet Office Ordinance on Financial Instruments Business (Ordinance No 52 of 2007) related to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies; the Cabinet Office Ordinance on Definitions under Article 2 of the and Exchange Act (Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance No 14 of 1993) related to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies, as well as the Comprehensive Guidelines for Supervision of Financial Instruments Business Operators (Supplement) and the Guidelines for Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies.
Japonski pravni in nadzorni okvir za bonitetne agencije sestavljajo Zakon o finančnih instrumentih in izmenjavi (zakon št. 25 iz leta 1948) v zvezi z urejanjem bonitetnih agencij; odloka vladnega urada o poslih s finančnimi instrumenti (odlok št. 52 iz leta 2007) v zvezi z urejanjem bonitetnih agencij; odlok vladnega urada o opredelitvah v skladu s členom 2 Zakona o finančnih instrumentih in izmenjavi (odlok ministrstva za finance št. 14 iz leta 1993) v zvezi z urejanjem bonitetnih agencij in celovite smernice za nadzor operaterjev poslov s finančnimi instrumenti (priloga) in smernice za nadzor bonitetnih agencij.
In June 2009, the Japanese Parliament (the Diet) passed legislation introducing a new regulatory framework for credit rating agencies, which was followed by the release in December 2009 of Cabinet Orders and Cabinet Office Ordinances laying out the details of the terms and conditions of this framework.
Japonski parlament (državni zbor) je junija 2009 sprejel zakonodajo o uvedbi novega regulativnega okvira za bonitetne agencije, decembra 2009 pa je sledila izdaja vladnih odredb in odlokov vladnega urada o določitvi podrobnosti pogojev tega okvira.
The framework, which became effective in April 2010, requires a credit rating agency to be registered with the Financial Services Agency of Japan (JFSA) in order for its credit ratings to be used for regulatory purposes in Japan and imposes legally binding obligations on credit rating agencies and their supervision on an ongoing basis.
V skladu z okvirom, ki je začel veljati aprila 2010, mora biti bonitetna agencija registrirana pri agenciji za finančne storitve Japonske (JFSA), da se bodo njene bonitetne ocene uporabljale v regulatorne namene na Japonskem, okvir pa nalaga tudi stalne pravno zavezujoče obveznosti za bonitetne agencije in njihov nadzor.
The JFSA is endowed with a wide and comprehensive range of powers and is able to take a number of measures, including sanctions, against credit rating agencies for breach of the provisions of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act related to the Regulation of Credit Ratings Agencies.
JFSA ima obsežna in celovita pooblastila ter lahko sprejme vrsto ukrepov, vključno s sankcijami proti bonitetnim agencijam zaradi kršitve določb Zakona o finančnih instrumentih in izmenjavi v zvezi z urejanjem bonitetnih agencij.
According to the second condition, credit rating agencies in the third country must be subject to legally binding rules which are equivalent to those set out in Articles 6 to 12 and Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.
Glede na drugi pogoj morajo bonitetne agencije v tretji državi upoštevati pravno zavezujoča pravila, enaka tistim iz členov od 6 do 12 in Priloge I Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009.
The Japanese regime is based on: the duty of good faith, the obligation of a credit rating agency to establish operational control systems for the fair and appropriate performance of the credit rating business through a large number of detailed and prescriptive requirements, extensive provisions in relation to avoidance, management and disclosure of conflicts of interests, and the duty to record and disclose information both to the JFSA and the public.
Japonska ureditev temelji na: poštenosti, obveznosti bonitetne agencije, da vzpostavi operativni nadzorni sistem za pošteno in ustrezno izvajanje dejavnosti bonitetnega ocenjevanja na podlagi velikega števila natančnih in predpisanih zahtev, obsežnih določb v zvezi s preprečevanjem, upravljanjem in razkritjem nasprotij interesov ter obveznosti evidentiranja in razrivanja informacij JFSA in javnosti.
The Japanese framework meets the objectives of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 in respect of the management of conflicts of interest, the organisational processes and procedures that a credit rating agency needs to have in place, the quality of ratings and of rating methodologies, the disclosure of credit ratings and the general and periodic disclosure of credit rating activities.
Japonski okvir izpolnjuje cilje Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 v zvezi z upravljanjem nasprotij interesov, organizacijskimi procesi in postopki, s katerimi mora bonitetna agencija razpolagati, kakovostjo ocen in metodologijo ocenjevanja, razkritjem bonitetnih ocen ter splošnimi in rednimi razkritji dejavnosti bonitetnega ocenjevanja.
Therefore, the Japanese framework provides for equivalent protections in terms of integrity, transparency, good governance of credit rating agencies and reliability of the credit rating activities.
Zato japonski okvir zagotavlja ustrezno zaščito v smislu integritete, preglednosti, dobrega vodenja bonitetnih agencij in zanesljivosti dejavnosti bonitetnega ocenjevanja.
According to the third condition, the regulatory regime in the third country must prevent interference by the supervisory authorities and other public authorities of that third country with the content of credit ratings and methodologies.
Glede na tretji pogoj mora regulatorna ureditev v tej tretji državi preprečiti poseganje nadzornih organov in drugih javnih organov te tretje države v vsebino bonitetnih ocen in metodologij.
In this respect, the JFSA is prohibited by law from interfering with the substance of credit ratings and credit rating methodologies.
Zato je JFSA z zakonom prepovedala poseganje v vsebino bonitetnih ocen in metodologij bonitetnih ocen.
In view of the factors examined, the conditions laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 5(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 can be considered to be met by the Japanese legal and supervisory framework for credit rating agencies.
Glede na preučene dejavnike se lahko šteje, da japonski pravni in nadzorni okvir za bonitetne agencije izpolnjuje pogoje iz drugega pododstavka člena 5(6) Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009.