natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
CDS-protection on a EUR 34,5 billion portfolio (having a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion)
zaščita 34,5 milijarde EUR vrednega portfelja z zamenjavo kreditnega tveganja (z učinkom razbremenitve kapitala v višini 1,7 milijarde EUR)
Filling the capital shortage of ABN AMRO Z
odprava kapitalskega primanjkljaja ABN AMRO Z
ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) and moved to ABN AMRO II (now ABN AMRO Bank) on separation date
ABN AMRO Bank (zdaj RBS NV) in prenesen na ABN AMRO II (zdaj ABN AMRO Bank) na datum ločitve
Measure B1
Ukrep B1
Measure B2
Ukrep B2
First tranche of separation costs
prva tranša stroškov ločitve
ABN AMRO Bank NV (now RBS NV) and moved to ABN AMRO II (now ABN AMRO Bank on separation)
ABN AMRO Bank NV (zdaj RBS NV) in prenesen na ABN AMRO II (zdaj ABN AMRO Bank) ob ločitvi
Additional capital measures notified in January 2010
Dodatni ukrepi v zvezi s kapitalom, priglašeni januarja 2010
Measure B3
Ukrep B3
Second tranche of separation costs and prudential margin of EUR 0,5 billion
druga tranša stroškov ločitve in smotrna razlika v višini 0,5 milijarde EUR
EUR 967 million paid to ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) and then moved to ABN AMRO II (now ABN AMRO Bank) on separation, the remainder directly paid to ABN AMRO II
967 milijonov EUR je bilo plačanih ABN AMRO Bank (zdaj RBS NV) in nato prenesenih na ABN AMRO II (zdaj ABN AMRO Bank) ob ločitvi, ostanek je bil neposredno plačan ABN AMRO II
Measure B4
Ukrep B4
Capital impact from sale of new HBU
učinek na kapital zaradi prodaje New HBU
Measure B5
Ukrep B5
Integration costs
stroški integracije
Exchange Tier 2 into common equity
zamenjava kapitala drugega reda v navadni lastniški kapital
Tier 1 shortage at the level of FBN
primanjkljaj kapitala prvega reda na ravni FBN
Measure D
Ukrep D
Cash payment to consortium partners
plačilo partnerjem konzorcija z denarnimi sredstvi
Payment obligations resulting from the CSA
plačilne obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz SDK
Other consortium partners/ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV)
drugi partnerji konzorcija / ABN AMRO Bank (zdaj RBS NV)
Measure E
Ukrep E
Guarantee on liabilities of EUR 950 million
jamstvo na obveznosti v višini 950 milijonov EUR
Cross liabilities resulting from sale of new HBU
navzkrižne obveznosti zaradi prodaje New HBU
ABN AMRO II (now ABN AMRO Bank)
ABN AMRO II (zdaj ABN AMRO Bank)
GROUNDS TO OPEN
RAZLOGI ZA ZAČETEK POSTOPKA
Grounds to open in the Decision of 8 April 2009
Razlogi za začetek postopka v odločbi z dne 8. aprila 2009
In the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission opened proceedings because it had grounds to believe that Measures Y1, Y2 and Z [66] represented State aid in favour of FBN and ABN AMRO N. The Commission believed that those measures allowed FBN and ABN AMRO N to stay on the market and pursue their activities.
V odločbi z dne 8. aprila 2009 je Komisija začela postopek, ker je imela razloge za domnevo, da ukrepi Y1, Y2 in Z [66] pomenijo državno pomoč v korist bank FBN in ABN AMRO N. Komisija je menila, da so ti ukrepi omogočili bankama FBN in ABN AMRO N, da ostaneta na trgu in nadaljujeta s svojimi dejavnostmi.
It had reasons to believe that those measures were selectively advantageous to FBN and ABN AMRO N.
Utemeljeno je domnevala, da so ti ukrepi bankama FBN in ABN AMRO N zagotavljali selektivno prednost.
In recitals 29 and 30 of the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission noted that Measures X, Y1 and Y2 were part of the same sale contract, which aimed at separating FBN from the rest of the Fortis SA/NV.
V uvodnih izjavah 29 in 30 odločbe z dne 8. aprila 2009 je Komisija ugotovila, da so ukrepi X, Y1 in Y2 del iste prodajne pogodbe, ki je bila namenjena ločitvi banke FBN od preostalega holdinga Fortis SA/NV.
The Decision of 3 December 2008 already concluded that by entering in that contract on 3 October 2008, the Dutch State had not acted as a normal investor in a market economy.
V odločbi z dne 3. decembra 2008 je že bilo ugotovljeno, da s podpisom te pogodbe 3. oktobra 2008 Nizozemska ni ravnala kot običajni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu.
In recital 33 of the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission argued that Measure Y1 was apparently advantageous to FBN as it had received an amount of funding, which it could not have found on the markets, the markets being at the time in complete disarray.
V uvodni izjavi 33 odločbe z dne 8. aprila 2009 je Komisija menila, da je ukrep Y1 pomenil očitno prednost za banko FBN, ker je prejela znesek financiranja, ki ga na trgih ne bi prejela, saj so bili trgi v tistem času popolnoma neurejeni.
Keeping in mind those extreme market circumstances, the Commission also doubted that the interest rates required by the Dutch State would have been acceptable to a private investor.
Ob upoštevanju teh skrajnih tržnih razmer je imela Komisija pomisleke tudi glede tega, ali so bile obrestne mere, ki jih je zahtevala Nizozemska, sprejemljive za zasebnega vlagatelja.
The Commission also noted that the solidity of its new funding provider seemed advantageous to FBN.
Komisija je tudi ugotovila, da je zanesljivost njenega novega financerja za banko FBN predstavljala prednost.
FBN was no longer dependent on a liquidity-constrained company in distress like Fortis SA/NV but received its funding from the Dutch State.
Banka FBN ni bila več odvisna od likvidnostno omejenega podjetja v težavah, kot je bil holding Fortis SA/NV, ampak je sredstva prejemala od Nizozemske države.
The Commission doubted that Measure Y1 was compatible with the Communication from the Commission – The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (the ‘Banking Communication’) [67] as it was neither proportional nor limited to the minimum necessary.
Komisija je imela pomisleke glede tega, ali je ukrep Y1 skladen s sporočilom Komisije – Uporaba pravil o državni pomoči za ukrepe v zvezi s finančnimi institucijami v okviru trenutne svetovne finančne krize (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporočilo o bančništvu) [67], saj pomoč ni bila niti sorazmerna niti omejena na najnižji potreben znesek.
More specific concerns were raised in recital 52 of the Decision of 8 April 2009 on the compatibility of the following elements: (1) the remuneration that FBN paid, (2) the maximum period during which FBN could benefit from funding, (3) the maximum maturity of instruments concerned and (4) the volume of the liquidity facility.
Podrobnejša vprašanja so bila izpostavljena v uvodni izjavi 52 odločbe z dne 8. aprila 2009 glede združljivosti naslednjih elementov: (1) obrestovanja, ki ga je plačala banka FBN, (2) najdaljšega obdobja, v katerem je imela banka FBN lahko korist od financiranja, (3) najdaljše dobe zapadlosti zadevnih instrumentov in (4) obsega likvidnostnega posojila.
The Commission also indicated that Measure Y2 could contain elements of State aid if Fortis Bank SA/NV was at the time of the acquisition in a position to request the immediate redemption of the long-term loans should the ownership of FBN change.
Komisija je tudi navedla, da bi lahko ukrep Y2 vseboval elemente državne pomoči, če bi bila Fortis Bank SA/NV v času nakupa v položaju, da v primeru spremembe lastništva banke FBN zahteva takojšnjo poravnavo dolgoročnih posojil.
If there was indeed an ownership-related redemption clause, Measure Y2 allowed FBN to benefit from long-term loans at pre-crisis interest rates.
Če bi dejansko obstajala klavzula glede odkupa, povezana z lastništvom, bi ukrep Y2 banki FBN omogočil, da ima korist od dolgoročnih posojil po obrestnih merah pred finančno krizo.
Measure Y2 implied that FBN was not obliged to find alternative funding at the prevailing market conditions at that time.
Ukrep Y2 je pomenil, da banki FBN ni bilo treba iskati drugega financiranja v takrat prevladujočih tržnih pogojih.
Moreover, since Fortis Bank SA/NV had the right to ask for redemption, the Dutch State choice to provide of long-term loans rather than short-term loans could be questioned.
Poleg tega je odločitev Nizozemske, da namesto kratkoročnih posojil zagotovi dolgoročna posojila, vprašljiva, saj je imela Fortis Bank SA/NV pravico, da zahteva odkup.
Therefore, in the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission voiced concerns that Measure Y2 contained State aid for a longer-term period than was strictly necessary.
Zato je v odločbi z dne 8. aprila 2009 Komisija izrazila zaskrbljenost, da je ukrep Y2 vseboval državno pomoč za daljše obdobje, kot je bilo nujno potrebno.
To be in a position to evaluate the State aid implications of Measure Y2, the Commission requested the Dutch State to provide more information on the contractual early redemption terms of the long-term loan contracts.
Da bi lahko ocenila posledice ukrepa Y2 v zvezi z državno pomočjo, je Komisija od Nizozemske zahtevala, da predloži več informacij o pogodbenih pogojih dolgoročnih posojilnih pogodb v zvezi s predčasnim odkupom.
In recital 54 of the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission also doubted whether the Dutch State had taken sufficient measures to limit undue distortions of competition, in line with point (27) of the Banking Communication.
V uvodni izjavi 54 odločbe z dne 8. aprila 2009 je Komisija izrazila pomisleke tudi glede tega, ali je Nizozemska izvedla zadostne ukrepe, da bi omejila neupravičeno izkrivljanje konkurence, v skladu s točko (27) sporočila o bančništvu.
The Commission was also concerned that ABN AMRO N had – potentially indirectly – benefited from the liquidity measures provided to FBN.
Komisijo je tudi skrbelo, da je imela banka ABN AMRO N – morda posredno – korist od likvidnostnih ukrepov, zagotovljenih banki FBN.
Therefore, it asked the Dutch State to provide more information on ABN AMRO N’s funding position and funding strategy.
Zato je Komisija od Nizozemske zahtevala, da zagotovi več informacij o stanju sredstev banke ABN AMRO N in njeni strategiji financiranja.
With respect to Measure Z, the Commission doubted that the Dutch State paid FBN the market price for the acquisition of ABN AMRO N. The Commission observed that the Dutch State paid more than the 3 October 2008‘current market conditions’ valuation of the Dutch State’s own valuation expert […] in its report which was mentioned in recital 2.
V zvezi z ukrepom Z je Komisija izrazila pomisleke glede tega, da je Nizozemska banki FBN plačala tržno ceno za nakup banke ABN AMRO N. Komisija je ugotovila, da je Nizozemska plačala več, kot je bilo navedeno v oceni „sedanjih tržnih pogojev“ z dne 3. oktobra 2008 nizozemskega državnega strokovnjaka za vrednotenje […] iz njegovega poročila, navedenega v uvodni izjavi 2.
Moreover, the Commission observed that the Dutch State had not applied a correction factor to reflect the stock market decline that occurred between October and December 2008 and which was especially pronounced for bank stocks.
Poleg tega je Komisija ugotovila, da Nizozemska ni uporabila korekcijskega faktorja, ki bi odražal zmanjšanje prometa na borznem trgu med oktobrom in decembrom 2008, ki je bil občuten predvsem za delnice bank.
If the Dutch State overpaid when buying ABN AMRO N, Measure Z was equivalent to State aid helping to recapitalise FBN.
Če je Nizozemska preplačala nakup banke ABN AMRO N, je ukrep Z pomenil državno pomoč za dokapitalizacijo banke FBN.
In general, the Commission also observed in the Decision of 8 April 2009 that the Dutch State had not yet submitted an evaluation of FBN and ABN AMRO N by the DNB.
Na splošno je Komisija v odločbi z dne 8. aprila 2009 tudi ugotovila, da Nizozemska še ni predložila ocene bank FBN in ABN AMRO N organa DBN.
Nor had the Dutch State provided a viability plan or a restructuring plan with detailed financial projections.
Prav tako država ni predložila načrta za uspešno poslovanje ali načrta prestrukturiranja s podrobnimi finančnimi napovedmi.
Because neither a viability plan nor a restructuring plan were available, the Commission was unable to determine whether, as a result of Measures X, Y1, Y2 and Z, ABN AMRO N and FBN had sufficient capital and were able to realise an acceptable level of profitability.
Ker nista bila na voljo niti načrt za uspešno poslovanje niti načrt prestrukturiranja, Komisija ni mogla ugotoviti, ali sta imeli banki FBN in ABN AMRO N po izvedbi ukrepov X, Y1, Y2 in Z dovolj kapitala ter sta bili sposobni doseči sprejemljivo raven donosnosti.
Grounds to extend the proceedings in the Decision of 5 February 2010
Razlogi za razširitev postopka v sklepu z dne 5. februarja 2010
Existence of State aid in accordance with Article 107(1) of the Treaty
Obstoj državne pomoči v skladu s členom 107(1) Pogodbe
When on 17 July 2009 and on 15 January 2010, the Dutch State notified extra measures in favour of FBN and ABN AMRO N as measures not constituting State aid, the Commission was concerned that some of these additional measures represented extra State aid to FBN and ABN AMRO N.
Ko je Nizozemska 17. julija 2009 in 15. januarja 2010 priglasila dodatne ukrepe v korist bank FBN in ABN AMRO N kot ukrepe, ki ne pomenijo državne pomoči, je Komisija izrazila pomisleke, da nekateri od teh dodatnih ukrepov pomenijo dodatno državno pomoč bankama FBN in ABN AMRO N.
In the Decision of 5 February 2010, the Commission observed that under the CSA the Dutch State had a number of obligations, which were not obligations of ABN AMRO N. Measures taken by the Dutch State to comply with its obligations under the CSA (and in particular the obligation to bear the cost of ABN AMRO Z and the obligation to separate ABN AMRO N from ABN AMRO Bank) would at first sight not qualify as State aid to ABN AMRO N.
Komisija je v sklepu z dne 5. februarja 2010 ugotovila, da je imela Nizozemska v skladu s sporazumom delničarjev konzorcija številne obveznosti, ki niso bile obveznosti banke ABN AMRO N. Za ukrepe, ki jih je Nizozemska sprejela za izpolnitev obveznosti v skladu s sporazumom delničarjev konzorcija (in zlasti obveznosti glede kritja stroškov banke ABN AMRO Z ter obveznosti glede ločitve banke ABN AMRO N od ABN AMRO Bank), se na prvi pogled zdi, da ne pomenijo državne pomoči banki ABN AMRO N.
The Commission indicated that the Measures A and B1 seemed primarily designed to cover the capital shortage of ABN AMRO Z, but at the same time it was not clear to the Commission whether there was not also an indirect benefit to the economic activities of ABN AMRO N. In that regard, the Commission wanted to know whether ABN AMRO N and ABN AMRO Z – with no separate legal status – were sufficiently ring-fenced vis-à-vis one another.
Komisija je navedla, da sta ukrepa A in B1 v prvi vrsti namenjena kritju kapitalskega primanjkljaja ABN AMRO Z, vendar Komisija ni dobila jasne predstave o tem, ali je bila prisotna tudi posredna korist za gospodarske dejavnosti banke ABN AMRO N. Glede tega je Komisija želela vedeti, ali sta bili ABN AMRO N in ABN AMRO Z – brez ločenega pravnega statusa – dovolj ločeni druga od druge.
The Commission also wanted to receive more information on the reasons behind the capital shortfall of ABN AMRO Z and for instance on the transfer of Unicredito shares from ABN AMRO Z to ABN AMRO N. The Commission also had questions as to the remuneration by ABN AMRO N to ABN AMRO Z for the performance of head office functions.
Komisija je želela tudi več informacij glede razlogov za kapitalski primanjkljaj ABN AMRO Z in, na primer, prenosa delnic banke Unicredito z ABN AMRO Z na ABN AMRO N. Komisija je imela vprašanja tudi glede plačila ABN AMRO N ABN AMRO Z za izvajanje funkcij sedeža podjetja.
The Commission suspected that – at least part of – the undercapitalisation of ABN AMRO Z was linked to the fact that ABN AMRO N did not pay a market price for the head office services of ABN AMRO Z.
Komisija je menila, da bi bil lahko – vsaj del – podkapitaliziranosti ABN AMRO Z povezan s tem, da ABN AMRO N ni plačala tržne cene za storitve sedeža podjetja ABN AMRO Z.
Even though the separation of ABN AMRO N from ABN AMRO Bank is an obligation of the Dutch State under the CSA, the Commission could not exclude that the State recapitalisation financing the separation costs could be State aid.
Čeprav je v skladu s sporazumom delničarjev konzorcija ločitev banke ABN AMRO N od ABN AMRO Bank obveznost Nizozemske, Komisija ni mogla izključiti dejstva, da bi lahko bila dokapitalizacija s strani države, s katero je financirala stroške ločitve, državna pomoč.
The Commission observed that not all costs categorised as separation costs were strictu senso linked to the separation obligations as described in the CSA.
Komisija je ugotovila, da vsi stroški, opredeljeni kot stroški ločitve, v ožjem pomenu niso bili povezani z obveznostmi, povezanimi z ločitvijo, kot je bilo opisano v sporazumu delničarjev konzorcija.
The Commission noticed that the category ‘separation costs’ included an amount of EUR 500 million which was needed to provide ABN AMRO Group with a prudential margin over minimum prudential requirements.
Komisija je ugotovila, da je kategorija „stroški ločitve“ vključevala znesek v višini 500 milijonov EUR, ki jih je skupina ABN AMRO potrebovala za smotrno razliko nad najnižjimi bonitetnimi zahtevami.
The Commission observed that the Dutch State helped FBN and ABN AMRO N to pay the costs related to the merger.
Komisija je ugotovila, da je Nizozemska pomagala bankama FBN in ABN AMRO N pri plačilu stroškov, povezanih z združitvijo.
To resolve concentration problems created by the merger, ABN AMRO N decided to sell IFN and New HBU, which led to a new capital shortfall.
Da bi rešila težave s koncentracijo, nastale zaradi združitve, se je banka ABN AMRO N odločila, da proda podružnici IFN in New HBU, zaradi česar je prišlo do novega kapitalskega primanjkljaja.
The Commission observed that FBN and ABN AMRO N were able to profit from the benefits of the merger (for example merger synergies, the advantages of being a stronger company with higher market shares on the Dutch market, …), while the Dutch State financed the upfront costs.
Komisija je ugotovila, da sta banki FBN in ABN AMRO N lahko izkoristili ugodnosti združitve (na primer sinergije ob združitvi, prednosti zaradi močnejšega podjetja z večjimi tržnimi deleži na nizozemskem trgu …), medtem ko je Nizozemska financirala vnaprejšnje stroške.
In that regard, the Commission observed that there was no legal obligation for the Dutch State to pay those costs since they originated in the decision of the Dutch State of 21 November 2008 to merge FBN and ABN AMRO N and not in the CSA.
S tem v zvezi je Komisija ugotovila, da Nizozemska ni bila pravno obvezana plačevati te stroške, saj so izhajali iz odločitve Nizozemske z dne 21. novembra 2008 glede združitve bank FBN in ABN AMRO N, ne pa iz sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija.
The Commission took note of the fact that the merger and the specific conditions surrounding the separation resulted in cross liabilities (Measure E).
Komisija je upoštevala dejstvo, da so zaradi združitve in posebnih pogojev, povezanih z ločitvijo, nastale navzkrižne obveznosti (ukrep E).
Dutch corporate law implied that ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) and ABN AMRO II remained liable for the debt-holders of New HBU should New HBU (or its new owner Deutsche Bank) fail to fulfil its payment obligations.
Iz nizozemskega korporacijskega prava sledi, da ABN AMRO Bank (zdaj RBS NV) in ABN AMRO II ostaneta odgovorni za imetnike dolžniških instrumentov podružnice New HBU, če le-ta (ali njen novi lastnik, banka Deutsche Bank) ne bi izpolnila svojih plačilnih obveznosti.
New HBU had similar obligations vis-à-vis debt-holders of ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) and ABN AMRO II).
New HBU je imela podobne obveznosti do imetnikov dolžniških instrumentov ABN AMRO bank (zdaj RBS NV) in ABN AMRO II.
The Commission could not exclude that the indemnification solution, which implied that the Dutch State guaranteed the debt-holders of ABN Amro Bank (now RBS NV) at a premium of 200 basis points plus the median CDS-spread, implied State aid.
Komisija ni mogla izključiti, da rešitev v zvezi z nadomestilom, s katero je Nizozemska imetnikom dolžniških instrumentov ABN AMRO Bank (zdaj RBS NV) zagotovila s premijo 200 bazičnih točk plus srednja vrednost razpona kreditnih zamenjav, pomeni državno pomoč.
Compatibility with the Impaired Asset Communication
Združljivost s sporočilom o oslabljenih sredstvih
The Commission also raised concerns about the design of the capital relief instrument (Measure A).
Komisija je izrazila zaskrbljenost tudi glede oblike instrumenta za razbremenitev kapitala (ukrep A).
The Commission acknowledged that Measure A was fundamentally different from other impaired asset measures as it was not put in place to protect ABN AMRO N against further declines in toxic assets with a highly uncertain valuation.
Komisija je priznala, da se ukrep A bistveno razlikuje od ostalih ukrepov v zvezi z oslabljenimi sredstvi, saj ni bil vzpostavljen za zaščito banke ABN AMRO N pred nadaljnjim poslabšanjem slabe aktive z zelo negotovo oceno.
Nevertheless, the Commission considered that to be compatible with the internal market, Measure A should comply with the general principles of the Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector [68] (the ‘Impaired Asset Communication’).
Kljub temu bi moral biti po mnenju Komisije ukrep A, da bi bil združljiv s skupnim trgom, skladen s splošnimi načeli sporočila Komisije o obravnavanju oslabljenih sredstev v bančnem sektorju Skupnosti [68] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporočilo o oslabljenih sredstvih).
More specifically, there should be sufficient evidence of appropriate pricing, meaning that the bank should not transfer expected losses to the State.
Natančneje, moralo bi biti dovolj dokazov o ustreznem oblikovanju cen, kar pomeni, da banka pričakovanih izgub ne bi smela prenašati na državo.
In that regard, the Commission also wanted to understand what impact a number of specific contractual features (for example. the clawback mechanism and the vertical slice) would have on the actual cashflows and pricing.
S tem v zvezi je Komisija želela tudi razumeti, kakšen učinek bi imele številne posebne značilnosti pogodbe (na primer mehanizem povrnitve sredstev in navpični prerez) na dejanske denarne tokove in oblikovanje cen.
Finally, the Commission also doubted that there were insufficient incentives ensuring that ABN AMRO N would terminate the instrument as soon as it was no longer strictly necessary.
Komisija je izrazila pomisleke tudi glede tega, da ni vzpostavljenih dovolj spodbud, ki bi zagotovile, da bo banka ABN AMRO N ukinila instrument takoj, ko ne bo več nujno potreben.
Compatibility with the Restructuring Communication
Združljivost s sporočilom o prestrukturiranju
The Commission doubted whether the December 2009 Restructuring Plan fulfilled the criteria set forward in the Communication for the Commission on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules [69] (the ‘Restructuring Communication’) in terms of viability, burden-sharing and undue distortions of competition.
Komisija je imela pomisleke glede tega, ali je načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 izpolnil merila, določena v sporočilu Komisije o ponovni vzpostavitvi uspešnega poslovanja in oceni ukrepov prestrukturiranja v finančnem sektorju v sedanji krizi na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči [69] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporočilo o prestrukturiranju) glede uspešnega poslovanja, porazdelitve bremena in neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence.
The Commission acknowledged that ABN AMRO Group would at first sight realise sufficient revenues to cover all its operational costs (including impairments) and earn an acceptable return on equity.
Komisija je priznala, da bi na prvi pogled skupina ABN AMRO realizirala zadostne prihodke za kritje vseh svojih stroškov delovanja (vključno z oslabitvami) in pridobila sprejemljiv kapitalski donos.
However, the Commission also noted that the return on equity of ABN AMRO Group depended to a large extent on the realisation of a number of key assumptions.
Vendar je Komisija tudi ugotovila, da je bil kapitalski donos skupine ABN AMRO v veliki meri odvisen od realizacije številnih ključnih predpostavk.