natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
All the above points confirm that the four banks are controlled by the government and exercise government authority in a manner that their actions can be attributed to the State.
Vse navedene točke potrjujejo, da navedene štiri banke nadzoruje vlada in da banke izvajajo vladna pooblastila na način, ki omogoča, da se njihova dejanja pripišejo državi.
The Commission also sought to investigate the difference between the Policy banks (according to available information these are the Export-Import Bank of China, the China Development Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank of China) and State Owned Commercial banks.
Namen Komisije je bil tudi raziskati razlike med političnimi bankami (glede na razpoložljive informacije so to Kitajska izvozno-uvozna banka, Kitajska razvojna banka in Kitajska kmetijska razvojna banka) in državnimi komercialnimi bankami.
The Commission requested clarifications on these two different types of financial institutions.
Komisija je zahtevala pojasnila glede teh dveh različnih vrst finančnih ustanov.
The GOC submitted that the Policy banks do not have any written legal provisions regulating their sector, given that the Chinese authorities are currently drafting a law on Policy banks.
Kitajska vlada je navedla, da za politične banke ni nobenih pisnih pravnih določb, ki bi urejale njihov sektor, glede na to, da kitajski organi trenutno sestavljajo zakon o političnih bankah.
It was also argued that one Policy bank (namely the China Development Bank) should not be considered as a Policy bank since it has become a shareholding company and is in a transitional period.
Trdila je tudi, da se ene politične banke (namreč Kitajske razvojne banke) ne bi smelo šteti za takšno politično banko, saj je postala delniška družba in je v prehodnem obdobju.
Information submitted confirms that policy banks are treated differently to State Owned Commercial banks.
Predložene informacije potrjujejo, da so politične banke obravnavane drugače kot državne komercialne banke.
Despite the lack of any rules governing the Policy banks sector or the way these banks act in the Chinese financial market, it appears from the PBOC circulars, where they are mentioned explicitly, that Policy banks have a special status as compared to the State Owned Commercial banks.
Čeprav ni pravil, ki bi urejala sektor političnih bank in način, kako te banke delujejo na kitajskem finančnem trgu, je iz okrožnic Ljudske banke Kitajske razvidno, da imajo politične banke v primerjavi z državnimi komerciačnimi bankami poseben status.
As to the status of the China Development Bank, the Chinese State (through the Chinese Ministry of Finance) holds more than 50 % of the bank's shares and thus its transformation into a share-holding company has no impact on the government control.
Glede statusa Kitajske razvojne banke je treba opozoriti, da ima kitajska država (prek kitajskega ministrstva za finance) več kot 50 % delnic banke in zato njeno preoblikovanje v delniško družbo nima nobenega učinka na nadzor vlade.
Another factor that creates a distortion on the Chinese financial market is the role played by the PBOC in setting the specific limits on the way interest rates are set and fluctuate.
Še en dejavnik, ki izkrivlja kitajski finančni trg, je vloga, ki jo ima Ljudska banka Kitajske pri določanju posebnih omejitev glede načina določanja obrestnih mer in njihovega nihanja.
Indeed, the investigation established that the PBOC has specific rules regulating the way interest rates float in China.
Dejansko je preiskava pokazala, da ima Ljudska banka Kitajske posebna pravila, ki urejajo način, kako se na Kitajskem spreminjajo obrestne mere.
According to the information available, these rules are set out in the PBOC's Circular on the Issues about the Adjusting Interest Rates on Deposits and Loans-Yinfa (2004) No 251 (‘Circular 251’).
Glede na razpoložljive informacije so ta pravila določena v Okrožnici Ljudske banke Kitajske o vprašanjih glede prilagajanja obrestnih mer vlog in posojil – Yinfa (2004) št. 251 („okrožnica št. 251“).
Financial institutions are requested to provide loan rates within a certain range of the benchmark loan interest rate of the PBOC.
Finančne ustanove morajo zagotoviti obrestne mere posojil znotraj določenega razpona referenčne obrestne mere posojil Ljudske banke Kitajske.
For commercial bank loans and policy bank loans managed commercially there is no upper limit range but only a lower limit range.
Za posojila komercialnih bank in posojila političnih bank, ki se upravljajo komercialno, ni zgornje omejitve obsega, ampak samo spodnja omejitev obsega.
For urban credit cooperatives and rural credit cooperatives there are both upper and lower limit ranges.
Za mestne kreditne zadruge in podeželske kreditne zadruge sta določeni zgornja in spodnja omejitev obsega.
For preferential loans and loans for which the State Council has specific regulations the interest rates do not float upwards.
Pri preferenčnih posojilih in posojilih, za katera ima državni svet posebna pravila, se obrestne mere ne spreminjajo navzgor.
The Commission sought clarifications from the GOC on the definition and wording stated in the Circular 251 as well as to its preceding legislation (Circular of PBOC concerning expansion of Financial Institution's Loan Interest Rate Float Range – YinFa [2003] No. 250).
Komisija je od kitajske vlade zahtevala pojasnila glede opredelitve in ubeseditve v okrožnici št. 251 ter v njeni prejšnji zakonodaji (Okrožnica Ljudske banke Kitajske glede povečanja razpona spreminjanja obrestne mere posojil finančnih institucij – Yinfa [2003] št. 250).
The GOC explained that those Circulars formed part of the marketization reform of interest rates in China but gave no further explanation.
Kitajska vlada je pojasnila, da sta bili navedeni okrožnici del marketizacijske reforme obrestnih mer na Kitajskem, vendar ni predložila nobenih dodatnih pojasnil.
The GOC was also asked to explain what are the preferential loans and other loans specified by the State Council.
Komisija je od kitajske vlade tudi zahtevala, da pojasni, kaj so preferenčna posojila in druga posojila, ki jih je opredelil državni svet.
GOC argued that the wording of the relevant Chinese text refers to an assumption of other loans specified by the State Council.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da se vsebina ustreznega kitajskega besedila nanaša na predpostavko o drugih posojilih, ki jih je opredelil državni svet.
No other explanation or relevant documentation was provided by the GOC to explain why preferential loans are defined in the Chinese legislation.
Kitajska vlada ni predložila nobene druge razlage ali ustrezne dokumentacije, ki bi pojasnila, zakaj so preferenčna posojila opredeljena v kitajski zakonodaji.
As to the other types of loan, even if one accepts the argument of the GOC, it is unclear why the legislator felt it necessary to introduce the possibility of other loans set out by the State Council.
Glede drugih vrst posojil, tudi v primeru, če bi bil argument kitajske vlade sprejet, ni jasno, zakaj je zakonodajalec menil, da mora uvesti možnost drugih posojil, ki jih je določil državni svet.
The Commission also requested clarifications on the existence of policy loans managed commercially, as mentioned in Circular 251.
Komisija je zahtevala pojasnilo tudi glede obstoja posojil, s katerimi se upravlja komercialno, kot je omenjeno v okrožnici 251.
No explanation or any evidence was provided by the GOC on this matter.
Glede tega kitajska vlada ni predložila nobenega pojasnila ali dokaza.
The GOC was also requested to provide any updates or subsequent legislation issued on the aforesaid Circulars in relation to the loan policy of commercial and policy banks but no such information was provided.
Komisija je od kitajske vlade tudi zahtevala, da predloži morebitne dopolnitve ali naknadno zakonodajo, ki so bile za navedeni okrožnici izdane v zvezi s posojilno politiko komercialnih in političnih bank, vendar ni predložila nobenih takih informacij.
Finally it is noted that no other data or statistics concerning the structure of the Chinese banking system was provided by the GOC.
Nazadnje je treba opozoriti, da kitajska vlada ni zagotovila nobenih drugih podatkov ali statističnih podatkov glede strukture kitajskega bančnega sistema.
On the basis of recitals (74) to (88) above and taking account of the lack of Chinese cooperation (and in the light of the considerations in recital (90) below), the Commission concludes that, the financing market in China is distorted by government intervention and interest rates charged by non-government banks and other financial institutions are likely to be aligned with government rates.
Na podlagi uvodnih izjav (74) do (88) in ob upoštevanju pomanjkanja sodelovanja Kitajske (ter upoštevanju ugotovitev iz uvodne izjave (90)), je Komisija sklenila, da trg financiranja na Kitajskem izkrivljajo posegi vlade in obrestne mere, ki jih zaračunavajo nevladne banke in druge finančne ustanove, bodo verjetno prilagojene vladnim obrestnim meram.
Therefore, the interest rates charged by non-governmental banks and other financial institutions cannot be considered as appropriate commercial benchmarks when determining whether government loans confer a benefit.
Zato obrestnih mer, ki jih zaračunavajo nevladne banke in druge finančne ustanove, ni mogoče šteti za ustrezne referenčne obrestne mere pri ugotavljanju, ali vladna posojila prinašajo korist.
Financial Contribution
Finančni prispevki
Furthermore, having regard to the totality of the evidence, it is concluded that the vast majority of loans to the two co-operating producers are provided by policy or other state-owned banks which are considered to be public bodies because of their close relationship to the government.
Poleg tega je ob upoštevanju vseh dokazov sklenjeno, da večino posojil dvema sodelujočima proizvajalcema izvoznikoma zagotavljajo politične ali druge državne banke, za katere se šteje, da so javni organi zaradi njihove tesne povezave z vlado.
They are more than 50 % state-owned and are thus considered controlled by the government.
So v več kot 50-odstotni lasti države in zato se zanje šteje, da jih nadzoruje vlada.
There is further evidence that these banks effectively exercise government authority since as it is explained in recital (65) there is a clear intervention by the State (i.e. PBOC) in the way commercial banks take decisions on interest rates for loans granted to Chinese companies while in some cases as explained in recital (83) companies were attributed quasi automatically the lowest possible rate within the limits set by the State.
Obstajajo nadaljnji dokazi o tem, da te banke dejansko izvajajo vladna pooblastila, saj, kot je razloženo v uvodni izjavi (65), država (tj. Ljudska banka Kitajske) očitno posega v način, kako komercialne banke odločajo o obrestnih merah za posojila, ki jih odobrijo kitajskim podjetjem, medtem ko je bila v nekaterih primerih, kot je razloženo v uvodni izjavi (83), podjetjem skoraj samodejno dodeljena najnižja možna obrestna mera v mejah, ki jih je določila država.
In these circumstances, the lending practices of these entities are directly attributable to the government.
V teh okoliščinah je mogoče posojilno prakso teh subjektov neposredno pripisati vladi.
The fact that banks exercise government authority is also confirmed by the way the 2007 Papermaking Plan, Decision 40 and Article 34 of the Law on Commercial Banks act with respect to the fulfilment of the government industrial policies (see recitals (74) to (81) above).
Dejstvo, da banke izvajajo vladna pooblastila, potrjuje tudi način, kako načrt za industrijo papirja 2007, sklep št. 40 in člen 34 Zakona o komercialnih bankah delujejo glede izvajanja vladnih industrijskih politik (glej uvodne izjave (74) do (81)).
There is also a great deal of circumstantial evidence, supported by objective studies and reports, that a large amount of government intervention is still present in the Chinese financial system (see recital (312) below).
Obstaja tudi veliko posrednih dokazov, podprtih z objektivnimi raziskavami in poročili, da so v kitajskem finančnem sistemu še vedno prisotni številni posegi vlade (glej uvodno izjavo (312)).
Finally, China failed to provide information which would have enabled a greater understanding of the state-owned banks’ relationship with government (see recitals (68) to (70) and recital (84) to (86) above) Thus, in the case of loans provided by policy or other state-owned banks, the Commission concludes that there is a financial contribution to the coated paper producers in the form of a direct transfer of funds from the government within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation.
Nazadnje, Kitajska ni zagotovila informacij, ki bi omogočale boljše razumevanje povezave med državnimi bankami in vlado (glej uvodne izjave (68) do (70) in uvodne izjave (84) do (86)). Zato je Komisija v primeru posojil, ki so jih dodelile politične ali druge državne banke, sklenila, da gre za finančni prispevek proizvajalcem premazanega papirja v obliki neposrednega prenosa sredstev vlade v smislu člena 3(1)(a)(i) osnovne uredbe.
Benefit
Ugodnosti
There is a benefit according to Articles 3(2) and 6(b) of the basic Regulation to the extent that the government loans are granted on terms more favourable than the recipient could actually obtain on the market.
V skladu s členom 3(2) in členom 6(b) osnovne uredbe obstajajo ugodnosti glede na to, da so vladna posojila dodeljena pod pogoji, ugodnejšimi od tistih, ki bi jih prejemnik dejansko lahko pridobil na trgu.
Since it has been established that non-government loans in China do not provide an appropriate market benchmark, this has been constructed using the method described in recitals (96) to (102) below.
Ker je bilo ugotovljeno, da nevladna posojila na Kitajskem ne zagotavljajo ustrezne referenčne vrednosti, je bila ta oblikovana z metodami, opisanimi v uvodnih izjavah (96) do (102).
The GOC was asked to provide information on the eligibility criteria for obtaining this subsidy and on the use of the subsidy, in order to determine the extent to which access to the subsidy is limited to certain enterprises and whether it is specific according to Article 4 of the basic Regulation.
Komisija je od kitajske vlade zahtevala, da zagotovi informacije o merilih za upravičenost do pridobitve te subvencije in uporabi subvencije, da bi lahko ugotovila, v kolikšni meri je dostop do subvencije omejen na določena podjetja in ali je subvencija specifična v skladu s členom 4 osnovne uredbe.
The GOC provided no such information.
Kitajska vlada teh informacij ni zagotovila.
The Commission, mindful of the requirement of Article 4(5) of the basic Regulation that any determination of specificity shall be ‘clearly substantiated’ on the basis of positive evidence, therefore had to base its findings on the facts available in accordance with Article 28 of the basic Regulation.
Komisija je morala zato ob upoštevanju člena 4(5) osnovne uredbe, ki navaja, da je treba vsako določitev specifičnosti „jasno utemeljiti“ na podlagi trdnih dokazov, svoje ugotovitve utemeljiti na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev v skladu s členom 28 osnovne uredbe.
It is noted that Article 28(6) states that ‘If an interested party does not cooperate, or cooperates only partially, so that relevant information is thereby withheld, the result may be less favourable to the party than if it had co-operated’.
Opomniti je treba, da člen 28(6) navaja: „Če zainteresirana stranka ne sodeluje ali sodeluje samo delno, tako da zadržuje pomembne informacije, je lahko izid za to stranko manj ugoden, kakor bi bil, če bi sodelovala“.
The facts considered included the following:
Dejstva, ki so bila upoštevana, vključujejo:
The evidence of specificity submitted by the complainant.
dokaz o specifičnosti, ki ga je predložil pritožnik;
The findings (see recitals (77) and (78)) that specific subsidies are channelled to the papermaking industry through a specific sectoral plan i.e. the Papermaking Plan.
ugotovitve (glej uvodni izjavi (77) in (78)), da so specifične subvencije usmerjene v industrijo za izdelavo papirja prek določenega sektorskega načrta, tj. načrta za industrijo za izdelavo papirja;
The evidence (see recital (76)) that the papermaking industry is an ‘encouraged industry’ (Decision No. 40).
dokaz (glej uvodno izjavo (76)), da je industrija za izdelavo papirja „spodbujana industrija“ (sklep št. 40);
The provisions of Article 34 of the Law on Commercial Banks [2003] No. 13 (see recital (79)) stipulating that commercial banks shall carry out their loan business upon the needs of the national economy and the social development and in the spirit of the state industrial policies i.e. in this particular case in the spirit of the Papermaking Plan.
določbe člena 34 Zakona o komercialnih bankah [2003] št. 13 (glej uvodno izjavo (79)), ki določa, da komercialne banke izvajajo svoje posojilno poslovanje na podlagi potreb nacionalnega gospodarstva in socialnega razvoja ter v duhu državnih industrijskih politik, tj. v tem določenem primeru v duhu načrta za industrijo za izdelavo papirja;
The findings (see recital (81)) that the Chinese state planning system directs banks to provide loans to the papermaking industry and companies are considered of high credit rating because they qualify for specific policy plans.
ugotovitve (glej uvodno izjavo (81)), da kitajski sistem državnega načrtovanja bankam nalaga zagotavljanje posojil industriji za izdelavo papirja in da se za podjetja šteje, da imajo visoko bonitetno oceno, ker izpolnjujejo pogoje za posebne načrte politike.
In the light of the above, and in the absence of any cooperation by the GOC, the available evidence indicates that subsidies granted to companies in the paper industry are not generally available and are therefore specific under Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega in pomanjkanju sodelovanja kitajske vlade razpoložljivi dokazi kažejo, da subvencije, ki so odobrene podjetjem v papirni industriji, niso splošno dostopne in so zato specifične v skladu s členom 4(2)(a) osnovne uredbe.
In the light of the GOC's non-cooperation, there is nothing to suggest that eligibility for the subsidy is based on objective criteria or conditions under Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation.
Zaradi pomanjkanja sodelovanja kitajske vlade ni ničesar, kar bi kazalo na to, da upravičenost do subvencije temelji na objektivnih merilih ali pogojih iz člena 4(2)(b) osnovne uredbe.
Accordingly, the financing of the papermaking industry should be considered a subsidy.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega je treba financiranje industrije za izdelavo papirja obravnavati kot subvencijo.
In view of the existence of a financial contribution, a benefit to the exporting producers and specificity, this subsidy should be considered countervailable.
Zaradi obstoja finančnega prispevka, ugodnosti za proizvajalce izvoznike in specifičnosti se lahko za to subvencijo uvedejo izravnalni ukrepi.
The amount of countervailable subsidy is calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipients, which is found to exist during the IP.
Znesek subvencije, proti kateri se lahko uvedejo izravnalni ukrepi, se izračuna glede na ugodnosti za prejemnike, ki so bile ugotovljene v OP.
According to Article 6(b) of the basic Regulation, the benefit conferred on the recipients is considered to be the difference between the amount that the company pays on the government loan and the amount that the company would pay for a comparable commercial loan obtainable on the market.
V skladu s členom 6(b) osnovne uredbe se kot ugodnosti za prejemnike šteje razlika med zneskom, ki ga podjetje plača na vladno posojilo, in zneskom, ki bi ga podjetje plačalo za primerljivo komercialno posojilo, ki bi ga pridobilo na trgu.
As explained above, since the loans provided by Chinese banks reflect substantial government intervention in the banking sector and do not reflect rates that would be found in a functioning market, an appropriate market benchmark has been constructed using the method described below.
Kot je bilo razloženo, ker posojila, ki jih zagotavljajo kitajske banke, odražajo znatno poseganje vlade v bančni sektor in ne odražajo obrestnih mer delujočega trga, je bila ustrezna referenčna vrednost oblikovana z metodami, opisanimi v nadaljevanju.
Furthermore, due to the lack of cooperation by the GOC, the Commission has also resorted to facts available in order to establish an appropriate benchmark interest rate.
Poleg tega je Komisija, da bi določila ustrezno referenčno obrestno mero, zaradi pomanjkanja sodelovanja kitajske vlade uporabila razpoložljiva dejstva.
When constructing an appropriate benchmark, it is considered reasonable to apply Chinese interest rates, adjusted to reflect normal market risk.
Pri oblikovanju ustrezne referenčne vrednosti se zdi razumno, da se uporabijo kitajske obrestne mere, prilagojene tako, da odražajo običajno tržno tveganje.
Indeed, in a context where the exporters’ current financial state has been established in a distorted market and there is no reliable information from the Chinese banks on the measurement of risk and the establishment of credit ratings, it is considered necessary not to take the creditworthiness of the Chinese exporters at face value, but to apply a mark-up to reflect the potential impact of the Chinese distorted market on their financial situation.
Pravzaprav se zdi v primeru, ko je tekoče finančno stanje izvoznikov ugotovljeno na izkrivljenem trgu in kitajske banke ne predložijo nobenih zanesljivih informacij glede meritev tveganja in določanja bonitetne ocene, nujno, da se ne upošteva kreditna sposobnost kitajskih izvoznikov po nominalni vrednosti, ampak se doda pribitek, ki odraža morebitni učinek kitajskega izkrivljenega trga na njihov finančni položaj.
With respect to the above as explained in recitals (68) to (72) both GOC and the cooperating exporting producers were requested to provide information on the lending policies of the Chinese banks and the way loans were attributed to the exporting producers.
Glede na navedeno, kot je razloženo v uvodnih izjavah (68) do (72), je Komisija od kitajske vlade in sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov zahtevala, da predložijo informacije o posojilnih politikah kitajskih bank in načinu, kako so posojila proizvajalcem izvoznikom dodeljena.
Parties failed to provide such information although repeatedly requested to do so.
Strani kljub večkratnim zahtevam teh informacij nista predložili.
Accordingly in view of this lack of cooperation and the totality of facts available, and in line with the provisions of Article 28(6) of the basic Regulation, it is deemed appropriate to consider that all firms in China would be accorded the highest grade of ‘Non-investment grade’ bonds only (BB at Bloomberg) and apply the appropriate premium expected on bonds issued by firms with this rating to the standard lending rate of the People's Bank of China.
Glede na pomanjkanje sodelovanja in vse razpoložljive informacije ter v skladu z določbami člena 28(6) osnovne uredbe se zdi primerno upoštevati, da bi vsa podjetja na Kitajskem dobila samo obveznice najvišje ocene „stopnja nevlaganja“ (BB pri Bloombergu), in uporabiti ustrezno premijo, pričakovano za obveznice, ki jih izdajo podjetja s to oceno, za običajno obrestno mero Ljudske banke Kitajske.
For loans received in foreign currency, the Commission applies the appropriate premium expected on bonds issued by firms with this rating to the standard lending rate as mentioned in the relevant Chinese loan contracts (LIBOR rate).
Za posojila, dodeljena v tuji valuti, Komisija ustrezno premijo, pričakovano za obveznice, ki jih izdajo podjetja s to oceno, uporabi za standardno obrestno mero, kot je navedeno v ustreznih kitajskih posojilnih pogodbah (obrestna mera LIBOR).