natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
TFS made capital interventions in WRJ-Serwis in December 2003 with the objective of obtaining a majority shareholding in the company in order to gain control over the WRJ project.
TFS je decembra 2003 v WRJ-Serwisu izvedel kapitalsko posredovanje z namenom pridobiti večinski delež v podjetju in s tem nadzor nad projektom WRJ.
By decision of December 2003, the shareholders of WRJ-Serwis agreed that TFS could acquire shares in the company.
S sklepom iz decembra 2003 so se delničarji WRJ-Serwisa strinjali, da lahko TFS pridobi delež v podjetju.
The shares had a nominal value of PLN 7910000.
Delež je imel nominalno vrednost 7910000 PLN.
TFS acquired the shares mainly in exchange for receivables due to TFS from Huta Jedność.
TFS je delež pridobil predvsem v zameno za terjatve TFS-ja do Huta Jedność.
Those receivables were transferred to WRJ-Serwis.
Te terjatve so bile prenesene na WRJ-Serwis.
TFS also paid for the shares in cash (PLN 890000) and with a contribution in kind (metal chips of Huta Jedność for further processing; transfer value PLN 450000).
TFS je za deleže plačal tudi v gotovini (890000 PLN) ter s prispevkom v naravi (kovinski odkruški podjetja Huta Jedność za nadaljnjo predelavo; prenosna vrednost 450000 PLN).
Simultaneously with TFS, shares in the increased share capital were taken up by one of the existing shareholders, PIW Enpol Sp. z o.o., and a new shareholder, Commplex Sp. z o.o.
Hkrati s TFS sta deleže v povečanem osnovnem kapitalu pridobila tudi eden od obstoječih delničarjev, PIW Enpol Sp. z o.o., in novi delničar, Commplex Sp. z o.o.
(both private companies).
(zasebni podjetji).
The companies acquired the shares by assigning receivables due from Huta Jedność to WRJ-Serwis.
Podjetji sta deleže pridobili z odstopom terjatev WRJ-Serwisa do Huta Jedność.
As described in recital 3, the Commission decided on 23 October 2007 to open a formal investigation procedure (‘the opening decision’).
Kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 3, se je Komisija 23. oktobra 2007 odločila, da bo sprožila formalni postopek preiskave („odločitev o sprožitvi postopka“).
In the opening decision the Commission first expressed its view that it was competent to decide on the case and that the measures in question constituted State aid that was not compatible with the Internal Market.
V odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka je Komisija najprej izrazila mnenje, da je pristojna za odločanje o primeru ter da zadevni ukrepi pomenijo državno pomoč, ki ni združljiva z notranjim trgom.
Applicable law and Commission competence
Veljavna zakonodaja in pristojnost Komisije
In the opening decision, the Commission took the view that Articles 107 and 108 TFEU (then Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty) did not normally apply to aid granted before accession which was no longer applied after accession.
V odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka je Komisija izrazila mnenje, da člena 107 in 108 PDEU (takrat člena 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES) običajno nista veljala za pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena pred pristopom in se po pristopu ni več uporabljala.
As regards whether tube producers such as WRJ and WRJ-Serwis are part of the ‘steel industry’ for the purposes of Protocol No 8, the Commission considered the following: Protocol No 8 was based on the national restructuring programme (Restructuring and Development Plan for the Polish Iron and Steel Industry, (‘the NRP’)).
V zvezi z vprašanjem, ali so proizvajalci cevi, kakršna sta WRJ in WRJ-Serwis, del „jeklarske industrije“ za namene Protokola št. 8, je bila Komisija naslednjega mnenja: Protokol št. 8 je temeljil na nacionalnem programu prestrukturiranja (Načrt za prestrukturiranje in razvoj poljske železarske in jeklarske industrije („NPP“)).
The scope of the NRP and Protocol No 8 was not limited to the scope of Annex I of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC Treaty’), but also covered certain steel sectors such as seamless tubes and large welded tubes.
Obseg NPP in Protokola št. 8 ni bil omejen na obseg Priloge I k Pogodbi o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za premog in jeklo („PESPJ“), temveč je zajemal tudi nekatere jeklarske sektorje, kot so brezšivne cevi in široke varjene cevi.
According to the opening decision, firstly, this interpretation was in line with the definition of the steel industry under the EU State aid rules, namely the definition in Annex B to the Multisectoral Framework [5].
V skladu z odločitvijo o sprožitvi postopka je, prvič, ta razlaga bila v skladu z opredelitvijo jeklarske industrije po pravilih EU glede državnih pomoči, in sicer opredelitvijo v Prilogi B k Večsektorskemu okviru [5].
Secondly, this followed from the NRP, of which half of the beneficiaries were tube producers.
Drugič, to je sledilo iz NPP, katerega polovica upravičencev je bilo proizvajalcev cevi.
Indeed, Huta Jedność, the predecessor of WRJ and WRJ-Serwis, participated in the restructuring programme process and was explicitly mentioned in the draft NRP several times, but was in the end not considered as a potential beneficiary, as at the time there were plans to wind it up following its bankruptcy in 2002.
Huta Jedność, predhodnik WRJ in WRJ-Serwisa, je sodeloval v programu prestrukturiranja in je bil večkrat izrecno naveden v osnutku NPP, vendar na koncu ni obveljal kot potencialni upravičenec, saj so takrat obstajali načrti za njegovo zaprtje po stečaju leta 2002.
As a result, the Commission took the view that the prohibition on awarding aid not caught by the NRP and Protocol No 8 applied to Huta Jedność, WRJ and WRJ-Serwis.
Zato je bila Komisija mnenja, da je prepoved dodeljevanja pomoči, ki ni bila zajeta v NPP in Protokolu št. 8, veljala za Huta Jedność, WRJ in WRJ-Serwis.
As regards the investments made in WRJ by TFS and the security given to the company by TFS, the Commission expressed strong doubts that they would have met the requirements of the market economy investor principle.
V zvezi z naložbami TFS v WRJ in zavarovanjem, ki ga je TFS dal podjetju, je Komisija izrazila velike dvome, da so bile izpolnjene zahteve po načelu vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji.
WRJ was facing difficulties at the time the measures were taken and would not have itself been able to raise the funds on the capital market.
WRJ se je v času dodelitve ukrepa soočal s težavami in sam ne bi uspel zbrati sredstev na trgu kapitala.
The Commission also doubted that there would have been a sufficient return on investment.
Komisija je tudi podvomila, da bi naložba prinesla zadosten donos.
Lastly, it took the view that the investments could hardly be justified by the fact that TFS intended to privatise WRJ at a later date.
Na koncu je izrazila mnenje, da bi naložbe le stežka upravičili z dejstvom, da je nameraval TFS WRJ pozneje privatizirati.
As regards the investments made in WRJ-Serwis by TFS, the Commission expressed doubts that they would have met the requirements of the market economy investor principle.
V zvezi z naložbami TFS-ja v WRJ-Serwis je Komisija dvomila, da so naložbe izpolnile zahteve načela vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji.
The Commission noted that the company was in difficulty in 2003 and therefore considered it doubtful that the investments had promised a reasonable return.
Komisija je navedla, da je bilo podjetje leta 2003 v težavah, in zato izrazila dvom, da so naložbe zagotavljale primerno donosnost.
The Commission could not identify any grounds on which the potential State aid could have been declared compatible, as investment or restructuring aid to the steel sector between 1997 and 2006 was prohibited under Protocol No 8 and hence under the EU State aid rules.
Komisija ni uspela opredeliti nobene podlage, na kateri bi bilo morebitno državno pomoč mogoče označiti kot združljivo, saj je bila pomoč za naložbe oziroma pomoč za prestrukturiranje za jeklarski sektor med letoma 1997 in 2006 prepovedana s Protokolom št. 8 in s tem tudi s pravili EU glede državnih pomoči.
COMMENTS FROM POLAND ON THE OPENING DECISION
PRIPOMBE POLJSKE NA ODLOČITEV O SPROŽITVI POSTOPKA
Poland considers that generalisations should not be made on the basis of Protocol No 8, which constitutes an exception to the non-intervention rule concerning State aid before accession.
Poljska meni, da ne gre posploševati na podlagi Protokola št. 8, ki predstavlja izjemo k pravilu o neposredovanju v zvezi z državno pomočjo pred pristopom.
Firstly, it points out that tube producers and their products were not included in Annex I to Protocol 2 to the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part [6] (‘Protocol 2 to the Europe Agreement’) and therefore did not fall within the scope of its application.
Prvič, Poljska poudarja, da proizvajalci cevi in njihovi izdelki niso bili zajeti v Prilogo I k Protokolu 2 k Evropskemu sporazumu med Republiko Poljsko na eni strani ter Evropskimi skupnostmi in njihovimi državami članicami na drugi strani [6] („Protokol 2 k Evropskemu sporazumu“) in zato ne spadajo v področje njene uporabe.
Secondly, the prohibition on granting State aid to tube producers in the Member States was introduced on 24 July 2002, when Annex B to the Multisectoral Framework, which defined the scope of the term ‘steel industry’, entered into force.
Drugič, prepoved dodeljevanja državne pomoči proizvajalcem cevi v državah članicah je bila uvedena 24. julija 2002, ko je začela veljati Priloga B k Večsektorskemu okviru, ki je opredelil pomen izraza „jeklarska industrija“.
According to that definition, the seamless tube and large welded tube sector were part of the ‘steel industry’.
V skladu s to opredelitvijo sta sektorja brezšivnih cevi in širokih varjenih cevi del „jeklarske industrije“.
Accordingly, the NRP approved by the Commission in 2003 and Protocol No 8 also included tube producers.
Tako sta NPP, ki ga je Komisija odobrila leta 2003, in Protokol št. 8 prav tako zajemala proizvajalce cevi.
Previously, when the ECSC Treaty was applicable, the tube sector had been excluded.
Prej, ko je veljala PESPJ, je bil sektor cevi izključen.
Poland concludes that Protocol No 8 has to be interpreted in such a way that before 24 July 2002 aid granted to tube producers was not subject to the Commission’s control (as with any other interventions which occurred before the Accession Treaty entered into force).
Poljska je sklenila, da je treba Protokol št. 8 razlagati tako, da pred 24. julijem 2002 pomoč, dodeljena proizvajalcem cevi, ni bila predmet nadzora Komisije (tako kot tudi ne druga posredovanja pred začetkom veljavnosti Pristopne pogodbe).
After that date, the tube producers were subject to the said restrictions.
Po tem datumu so za proizvajalce cevi veljale navedene omejitve.
As regards the beneficiaries’ awareness, Poland points out that WRJ-Serwis can be classified as a steel producer only as of 2004, when it started to use the drawing mill facilities, and that prior to that date, state interventions could not be regarded as constituting State aid to the steel industry.
V zvezi z upravičenci Poljska poudarja, da je WRJ-Serwis mogoče opredeliti kot proizvajalca jekla šele od leta 2004, ko je začel uporabljati zmogljivosti jeklovleke, in da pred tem datumom državnih intervencij ni mogoče označiti kot državne pomoči jeklarski industriji.
Lastly, Poland emphasises that the WRJ project is not a continuation of the fomer Huta Jedność project.
Poljska na koncu poudarja, da projekt WRJ ni nadaljevanje nekdanjega projekta Huta Jedność.
In addition, Poland claims that TFS, although controlled by the Treasury, is operating on market terms to generate profits.
Poleg tega Poljska trdi, da TFS, čeprav je pod nadzorom zakladnice, deluje pod tržnimi pogoji z namenom ustvarjanja dobička.
The actions it took as regards WRJ and WRJ-Serwis did not result from any particular control or supervision by the state.
Ukrepi, ki jih je sprejel v zvezi z WRJ in WRJ-Serwisom, niso bili posledica posebne kontrole ali nadzora s strani države.
Accordingly, the Treasury did not necessarily exercise control within the meaning of the Stardust Marine judgement [7].
Zato zakladnica ni nujno izvedla nadzora v smislu sodbe Stardust Marine [7].
As regards the capital increases in WRJ and the guarantees provided by TFS, Poland considers that TFS did not inject any significant funds into the WRJ project.
V zvezi s povečanji kapitala v WRJ in garancijami TFS-ja Poljska meni, da TFS ni vložil večjih zneskov v projekt WRJ.
Indeed, the exchange of receivables in return for shares in WRJ was more economically rational than direct enforcement of those receivables.
Dejansko je bila zamenjava terjatev za deleže v WRJ bolj ekonomsko smiselna kot neposredna izterjava zadevnih terjatev.
In addition, at the time of TFS’ investment in WRJ, TFS was in possession of business plans that showed the profitability of the WRJ project.
Poleg tega je imel TFS v času naložbe v WRJ poslovne načrte, ki so nakazovali dobičkonosnost projekta WRJ.
Lastly, the banking syndicate was also willing to provide further financing to WRJ at that time.
V tistem času je bil tudi bančni sindikat pripravljen zagotoviti nadaljnje financiranje WRJ-ju.
Accordingly, TFS acted like a market economy investor.
Zato je TFS ravnal kot vlagatelj pod tržnimi pogoji.
Poland considers the increase of the state guarantee to WRJ to be in line with the market economy investor principle, as it was secured with valuable collateral and WRJ paid a market rate guarantee fee to the Treasury.
Poljska meni, da je zvišanje državne garancije za WRJ v skladu z načelom vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji, saj je bila garancija zavarovana s polnovrednimi zavarovanji, WRJ pa je zakladnici plačal provizijo za garancijo po tržni stopnji.
In addition, the guarantee was contingent on the banks recommencing financing of the WRJ project, which did not take place.
Poleg tega je bila garancija pogojena s tem, da banke ponovno začnejo financirati projekt WRJ, kar pa se ni zgodilo.
Accordingly, the increase in the guarantee was never implemented and Poland considers that no advantage accrued to WRJ.
Zato zvišanje garancije nikoli ni bilo izvedeno in Poljska meni, da WRJ ni bil deležen nobenih prednosti.
The capital intervention in WRJ-Serwis is considered to comply with the market economy investor principle.
Za poseg kapitala v WRJ-Serwis velja, da je skladen z načelom vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji.
Firstly, private shareholders took up shares together with TFS.
Prvič, skupaj s TFS so deleže v podjetju pridobili tudi zasebni delničarji.
Secondly, WRJ-Serwis was not in a difficult financial situation and TFS took the decision in view of the profits to be generated in the future by WRJ-Serwis.
Drugič, WRJ-Serwis ni bil v težki finančni situaciji in TFS je odločitev sprejel zaradi dobičkov, ki naj bi jih v prihodnosti ustvaril WRJ-Serwis.
Finally, TFS was able to assume control over WRJ-Serwis and the property on which the WRJ project was built.
TFS je lahko prevzel nadzor nad WRJ-Serwisom in zemljiščem, na katerem je bil projekt WRJ zgrajen.
As regards the consolidation of WRJ and WRJ-Serwis, Poland argues that this was the only way of enabling the WRJ project to be rapidly taken over and completed by a private investor while also ensuring maximum recovery of the capital so far injected by the state.
V zvezi s konsolidacijo WRJ in WRJ-Serwisa Poljska navaja, da je bil to edini način, da je zasebni vlagatelj projekt WRJ lahko hitro prevzel in ga zaključil, ob hkratnem zagotavljanju kar največjega izkoristka kapitala, ki ga je do takrat vložila država.
The Commission received comments from one interested third party which strongly opposed the subsidies given by Poland.
Komisija je prejela pripombe ene zainteresirane tretje stranke, ki je močno nasprotovala subvencijam, ki jih je dodelila Poljska.
The party recalls that pipes were never products caught by the ECSC Treaty and that the pipe industry had to restructure at its own costs, without having been granted State aid.
Stranka navaja, da cevi niso bile nikoli zajete v PESPJ in da se je morala industrija cevi prestrukturirati na lastne stroške, brez dodelitve državne pomoči.
Acceptance of the aid in this case would harm the European pipe industry.
Sprejetje pomoči v tem primeru bi škodovalo evropski industriji cevi.
The party also states that accepting the aid might jeopardise its attempts to demonstrate that some pipe-importing countries are importing into the EU at dumped or subsidised prices.
Tretja stranka je tudi navedla, da bi sprejetje pomoči lahko ogrozilo prizadevanja v zvezi z dokazovanjem, da nekatere države, ki uvažajo cevi, uvažajo v EU po dampinških ali subvencioniranih cenah.
Lastly, the party argues that the European seamless steel pipe industry was in a special economic situation, with overcapacity in Europe and a need to export large quantities, while imports from China increased in 2007.
Zainteresirana stranka je nazadnje navedla, da je bila evropska industrija brezšivnih jeklenih cevi v posebnem gospodarskem položaju, saj je bil v Evropi presežek teh izdelkov, obstajala je potreba po izvozu velikih količin, hkrati pa se je leta 2007 povečal uvoz iz Kitajske.
POLAND’S COMMENTS ON THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE INTERESTED PARTY
PRIPOMBE POLJSKE GLEDE UGOTOVITEV ZAINTERESIRANE STRANKE
The measures in question were granted before the accession of Poland to the European Union (i.e. before 1 May 2004).
Zadevni ukrepi so bili dodeljeni pred pristopom Poljske k Evropski uniji (tj. pred 1. majem 2004).
In principle, Articles 107 and 108 TFEU do not apply to aid which was granted before accession and which no longer applies after accession [8].
Načeloma člena 107 in 108 PDEU ne veljata za pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena pred pristopom in ki se po pristopu ne uporablja več [8].
By derogation from this general rule, and therefore on an exceptional basis, the Commission is competent to review State aid granted by Poland in the context of the restructuring of its steel industry before accession on the basis of Protocol No 8 to the Accession Treaty.
Z odstopanjem od tega splošnega pravila in torej na izredni osnovi je Komisija pristojna za preverjanje državne pomoči, ki jo je dodelila Poljska v okviru pomoči za prestrukturiranje jeklarske industrije pred pristopom na podlagi Protokola št. 8 k Pristopni pogodbi.
The lex specialis nature of Protocol No 8
Lex specialis Protokola št. 8
Protocol No 8 contains provisions allowing Poland to conclude the restructuring of its steel industry initiated before accession.
Protokol št. 8 vsebuje določbe, ki Poljski omogočajo dokončanje prestrukturiranja jeklarske industrije, ki se je začelo še pred pristopom.
The pre-accession restructuring of the Polish steel sector was carried out on the basis of Protocol 2 to the Europe Agreement, as extended by a decision of the EU-Poland Association Council (‘the Decision of the Association Council’) [9].
Predpristopno prestrukturiranje poljskega jeklarskega sektorja je potekalo na podlagi Protokola 2 k Evropskemu sporazumu, kakor je bil razširjen s Sklepom Pridružitvenega sveta EU-Poljska („Sklep Pridružitvenega sveta“) [9].
Protocol 2 to the Europe Agreement granted Poland a so-called ‘grace period’ of five years, from 1992 to end-1996, during which it was allowed to restructure its ECSC steel sector with State aid.
S Protokolom 2 k Evropskemu sporazumu je bilo Poljski odobreno tako imenovano „dovoljeno obdobje“ petih let, od leta 1992 do konca leta 1996, ko je lahko svoj jeklarski sektor ESPJ prestrukturirala z državno pomočjo.
This grace period was extended by the Decision of the Association Council for a further period of eight years starting on 1 January 1997, or until the accession of Poland to the EU.
To dovoljeno obdobje je bilo s Sklepom Pridružitvenega sveta podaljšano za nadaljnjih osem let s pričetkom 1. januarja 1997 oziroma do pristopa Poljske k EU.
Protocol No 8 allows the Commission to monitor after Poland’s accession State aid granted by Poland to the steel sector on the basis of Protocol 2 to the Europe Agreement (as extended by the Decision of the Association Council) and the NRP.
Protokol št. 8 Komisiji omogoča, da po pristopu Poljske spremlja državne pomoči, ki jih Poljska dodeli jeklarskemu sektorju na podlagi Protokola 2 k Evropskemu sporazumu (kakor je bil razširjen s Sklepom Pridružitvenega sveta) in NPP.
In addition, Protocol No 8 empowers the Commission to recover aid given in breach of Protocol 2 to the Europe Agreement and the NRP.
Poleg tega daje Protokol št. 8 Komisiji pooblastila za izterjavo pomoči, dodeljene v nasprotju s Protokolom 2 k Evropskemu sporazumu in NPP.
Accordingly, Protocol No 8 is lex specialis allowing, on an exceptional basis and by derogation from the general regime, the retroactive monitoring and review of State aid granted by Poland to the Polish steel industry before accession.
V skladu s tem je Protokol št. 8 lex specialis, ki omogoča, izjemoma in z odstopanjem od splošne ureditve, retroaktivno spremljanje in preverjanje državne pomoči, ki jo je Poljska dodelila poljski jeklarski industriji pred pristopom.
This was confirmed by the Court, which held that Protocol No 8 is lex specialis in relation to Articles 107 and 108 TFEU which extends the review of State aid carried out by the Commission pursuant to the TFEU to aid granted for the reorganisation of the Polish steel industry during the period from 1997 to 2003 [11].
To je potrdilo Sodišče, ki je razsodilo, da je Protokol št. 8 lex specialis v zvezi s členoma 107 in 108 PDEU, ki razširja preverjanje državne pomoči, ki ga izvaja Komisija v skladu s PDEU, na pomoč, dodeljeno za reorganizacijo poljske jeklarske industrije med letoma 1997 in 2003 [11].
Scope of the Commission’s retroactive control competence under Protocol No 8
Obseg pristojnosti Komisije za retroaktivni nadzor v skladu s Protokolom št. 8
In the context of this procedure, the Commission must assess whether the exceptional retroactive control competence described in recitals 53 to 56 above also covers measures granted before accession by Poland to tube producers.
V okviru tega postopka mora Komisija oceniti, ali izredna pristojnost za retroaktivni nadzor iz zgornjih uvodnih izjav 53 do 56 zajema tudi ukrepe, dodeljene proizvajalcem cevi pred pristopom Poljske.
To this end, the legal bases applicable to this case, i.e. Protocol No 8, read in conjunction with Protocol 2 to the Europe Agreement and the Decision of the Association Council, must be interpreted with a view to determining whether their provisions cover measures granted to Polish tube producers before accession.
V ta namen je treba pravne podlage, ki veljajo za ta primer, tj. Protokol št. 8, ki se bere skupaj s Protokolom 2 k Evropskemu sporazumu in Sklepom Pridružitvenega sveta, razlagati z namenom določitve, ali njihove določbe zajemajo ukrepe, dodeljene poljskim proizvajalcem cevi pred pristopom.
It is a generally-recognised principle of law that the provisions of lex specialis which derogates from the general regime must be interpreted stricto sensu.
Splošno priznano načelo zakona je, da je treba določbe lex specialis, ki odstopajo od splošne ureditve, razlagati v ožjem pomenu.
A strict interpretation of the above-mentioned legal bases (see recitals 59 to 65 below) leads to the conclusion that the exceptional retroactive control competence of the Commission is limited to pre-accession measures granted to ECSC producers, thereby excluding measures to tube producers.
Ozka razlaga zgoraj navedenih pravnih podlag (glej spodnje uvodne izjave 59 do 65) vodi do zaključka, da je izredna pristojnost Komisije za retroaktivni nadzor omejena na predpristopne ukrepe, dodeljene proizvajalcem ESPJ, s čimer so izključeni ukrepi za proizvajalce cevi.
Interpretation of the legal bases
Razlaga pravnih podlag
Points 12 and 18 of Protocol No 8 lay down the monitoring and retroactive control competences of the Commission with respect to pre-accession aid to the Polish steel industry.
Točki 12 in 18 Protokola št. 8 določata pristojnost Komisije za spremljanje in retroaktivni nadzor v zvezi s predpristopno pomočjo za poljsko jeklarsko industrijo.