natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Therefore, the Pearle case-law cannot validly be relied upon irrespective of whether merit can be found in Alcoa’s and Italy’s argument concerning the role of the Equalisation Fund as a mere accounting intermediary.
Zato se ni mogoče veljavno sklicevati na sodno prakso Pearle ne glede na to, ali je trditev družbe Alcoa in Italije o vlogi izravnalnega sklada le kot računovodskega posrednika ustrezna.
Turning now to the Equalisation Fund, the Commission recalls that, according to settled case-law, ‘no distinction should be made between cases where the aid is granted directly by the State, and cases where it is granted by a public or private body designated or established by the State’ [76].
V zvezi z izravnalnim skladom Komisija opozarja, da se v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso „ne sme razlikovati med zadevami, v katerih pomoč neposredno dodeli država, in zadevami, v katerih pomoč dodeli javni ali zasebni organ, ki ga imenuje ali ustanovi država“ [76].
Therefore, the public or private status of the Equalisation Fund is not determinant for the purpose of applying the State aid rules.
Zato javni ali zasebni status izravnalnega sklada ni odločilen za namene uporabe pravil o državni pomoči.
The fact that the Equalisation Fund is a public body does not automatically imply that Article 87 of the EC Treaty is applicable [77]; similarly, the intervention of a private body would not in itself preclude application of that Article [78].
Dejstvo, da je izravnalni sklad javni organ, samodejno ne pomeni veljavnosti člena 87 Pogodbe ES [77]; podobno tudi poseganje zasebnega organa samo po sebi ne bi izključevalo uporabe navedenega člena [78].
However, the analysis cannot be limited to the powers of the Equalisation Fund in its quality as a public body.
Analiza se kljub temu ne more omejiti na pristojnosti izravnalnega sklada kot javnega organa.
What should be ascertained is rather whether, more generally, the State, either directly or through any other body designated by it, can exercise control over the funds used to finance the tariff.
Namesto tega je treba ugotoviti, ali lahko država na splošno neposredno ali posredno prek drugega organa, ki ga imenuje, nadzoruje sredstva, ki so namenjena financiranju cene.
The same test would have to be applied if the Equalisation Fund was a private body.
Enak preskus bi se moral uporabiti, če bi bil izravnalni sklad zasebni organ.
The recent judgement of the Court of Justice in the Essent [79] case provides definitive guidance on this point.
Nedavna sodba Sodišča v zadevi Essent [79] navaja v zvezi s tem dokončne smernice.
In Essent, the Netherlands had introduced by law a surcharge on electricity prices.
V zadevi Essent je Nizozemska z zakonom uvedla dodatno dajatev za cene električne energije.
The surcharge was paid by electricity consumers to network operators, which in turn transferred the monies to a designated company, SEP. SEP had no discretion in the management of the funds and operated under close control by the authorities.
Dodatno dajatev so odjemalci električne energije plačevali upravljavcem omrežij, ki so v zameno denarna sredstva prenesli na imenovano družbo SEP. Ta ni imela diskrecijske pravice pri upravljanju sredstev in je delovala pod natančnim nadzorom organov.
The Court came to the conclusion that the proceeds of the surcharge constituted State resources, because the surcharge on the price of electricity was imposed by national law, and therefore constituted a charge and SEP was not entitled to use the proceeds from the charge for purposes other than those provided by the law, so that the monies remained under public control and were thus available to the national authorities.
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so prihodki zaradi dodatne dajatve državna sredstva, ker je bila dodatna dajatev za ceno električne energije uvedena z nacionalnim zakonom in je zato pomenila dajatev, družba SEP pa je bila upravičena do uporabe prihodkov iz dajatev le za namene, ki jih določa zakon, tako da so denarna sredstva ostala pod javnim nadzorom in so bila tako na voljo nacionalnim organom.
The Court considered that this was sufficient for such monies to be characterised as State resources.
Sodišče je menilo, da to zadostuje za opredelitev takih denarnih sredstev kot državna sredstva.
The similarities with the case at hand are evident.
Podobnosti z zadevnim primerom so jasne.
The surcharge on the electricity price used to finance the Alcoa tariff is imposed, as in Essent, by law.
Dodatna dajatev za ceno električne energije, namenjena financiranju cene za družbo Alcoa, je zakonsko določena, tako kot v zadevi Essent.
The Equalisation Fund plays the same role as SEP, as it centralises and manages the proceeds of the parafiscal charge, and is subject to the same constraints, as it cannot use the proceeds from the charge for purposes other than those provided by law (the financing of preferential tariffs).
Izravnalni sklad ima enako vlogo kot družba SEP, saj centralizira in upravlja prihodke od drugih dajatev, zanjo pa veljajo enake omejitve, ker lahko prihodke od dajatev uporablja le za namene, ki jih določa zakon (financiranje ugodnejših cen).
The State is capable of controlling and orienting the use of the resources at issue: the Equalisation Fund discharges its accounting functions on precise instructions from the AEEG, which acts within its statutory regulatory powers and/or in implementation of national legislation (see recitals 26 and 27 above).
Država lahko nadzoruje in usmerja uporabo zadevnih sredstev: izravnalni sklad opravlja računovodske funkcije po natančnih navodilih organa AEEG, ki deluje v okviru svojih regulativnih pooblastil in/ali v skladu z izvajanjem nacionalne zakonodaje (glej uvodni izjavi 26 in 27 zgoraj).
Therefore, the resources handled by the Equalisation Fund remain under public control at all times.
Zato so sredstva, za katera skrbi izravnalni sklad, vedno pod javnim nadzorom.
This analysis is consistent with the Commission’s decision on the Italian stranded costs case [80], in which it characterised as State resources the monies administered by the Equalisation Fund in the A6 account.
Ta analiza je v skladu z odločbo Komisije v zadevi Italije o nasedlih naložbah [80], v kateri so denarna sredstva, ki jih upravlja izravnalni sklad na računu A6, opredeljena kot državna sredstva.
In any event, the categorisation as State resources of the monies administered by the Equalisation Fund was borne out incontrovertibly by the recent judgment of the Court of First Instance in the Iride case [81].
V vsakem primeru je opredelitev, da so denarna sredstva, ki jih upravlja izravnalni sklad, državna sredstva, nedvomno potrjena v nedavni sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje v zadevi Iride [81].
Italy’s Court of Cassation had already ruled (judgment No 11632/03 of 3 April 2003) that the legal personality of the Equalisation Fund was not separate from that of the Italian State, and that the monies transferred to the Equalisation Fund should be considered as State property, even if they derived from private entities and were intended for private undertakings.
Italijansko kasacijsko sodišče je že razsodilo (sodba št. 11632/03 z dne 3. aprila 2003), da pravni osebi izravnalnega sklada in italijanske države nista ločeni ter da je treba denarna sredstva, prenesena v izravnalni sklad, obravnavati kot državno lastnino, tudi če izhajajo od zasebnih subjektov in so namenjena zasebnim podjetjem.
In the Iride case, the applicants Iride SpA and Iride Energia SpA brought an action in the Court of First Instance challenging a decision whereby the Commission had categorised as State resources the sums administered by the Equalisation Fund in the A6 account.
V zadevi Iride sta družbi Iride s.p.a. in Iride Energia s.p.a. vložili tožbo pri Sodišču prve stopnje, s katero sta izpodbijali odločbo, s katero je Komisija med državna sredstva uvrstila zneske, ki jih upravlja izravnalni sklad na računu A6.
The arguments put forward by the applicants were very similar to those of Alcoa.
Trditve, ki sta jih predložili vložnici, so zelo podobne trditvam družbe Alcoa.
The applicants disputed the reasoning of the Court of Cassation’s ruling, contending that the role of the Equalisation Fund was merely that of an accounting intermediary between private citizens subject to a financial obligation and the beneficiaries of the sums concerned, a role which did not allow the Equalisation Fund to make use of the monies deposited even for a short period of time.
Vložnici sta izpodbijali odločitev kasacijskega sodišča s trditvijo, da ima izravnalni sklad le vlogo računovodskega posrednika med zasebniki s finančnimi obveznostmi in upravičenci zadevnih zneskov, tj. vlogo, v skladu s katero izravnalni sklad ne more niti za kratek čas uporabiti položenih denarnih sredstev.
The applicants likewise claimed the applicability of the PreussenElektra case-law.
Vložnici sta se prav tako sklicevali na uporabo sodne prakse v zadevi PreussenElektra.
In its judgment delivered on 11 February 2009, the Court of First Instance was very clear.
V sodbi z dne 11. februarja 2009 je bilo Sodišče prve stopnje zelo jasno.
After emphasising that it had no jurisdiction to challenge the interpretation of Italian legislation by the Court of Cassation, the Court of First Instance confirmed that the monies held in the Equalisation Fund’s A6 account were to be considered as State resources because, in addition to being State property, they were under constant State control [82].
Najprej je poudarilo, da ni pristojno za izpodbijanje razlage italijanske zakonodaje kasacijskega sodišča, in nato potrdilo, da bi se morala denarna sredstva iz računa A6 izravnalnega sklada šteti kot državna sredstva, ker so poleg tega, da so državna lastnina, pod stalnim nadzorom države [82].
That conclusion concerned the Equalisation Fund’s A6 account, used to finance the stranded costs of Italy’s electricity sector.
Ta ugotovitev zadeva račun A6 izravnalnega sklada, ki se uporablja za financiranje nasedlih naložb sektorja električne energije Italije.
It can, however, logically be extended to the A4 component, which finances the disputed tariff.
Logično se lahko razširi na sestavni del A4, s katerim se financira sporna cena.
The judgment of the Court of Cassation was based on an analysis of the legal personality of the Equalisation Fund, and its finding with respect to State property therefore applies to all of the monies deposited with the Equalisation Fund.
Sodba kasacijskega sodišča temelji na analizi pravne osebe izravnalnega sklada, njegova ugotovitev v zvezi z državnim lastništvom pa zato velja za vsa denarna sredstva izravnalnega sklada.
The same is true of the finding by the Court of First Instance that the State can control the resources administered by the Equalisation Fund.
Enako velja za ugotovitev Sodišča prve stopnje, da lahko država nadzoruje sredstva, s katerimi upravlja izravnalni sklad.
There is no difference between the A6 account and the A4 component other than the purpose of the resources collected (covering stranded costs in the case of the A6 account and financing preferential tariffs in the case of the A4 component).
Razen namena zbranih sredstev (ki zajema nasedle naložbe v primeru računa A6 in financiranje ugodnejših cen v primeru sestavnega dela A4) ni nobene razlike med računom A6 in sestavnim delom A4.
The sums transferred to Alcoa from the A4 component must also therefore be categorised as State resources.
Zneski, preneseni družbi Alcoa iz sestavnega dela A4, se morajo zato opredeliti kot državna sredstva.
In addition to being financed by State resources, the Alcoa tariff is imputable to the State [83], since the legal basis for the measure is laid down in national legislation and in the decisions of the AEEG, which is a public body.
Poleg financiranja iz državnih sredstev je za ceno za družbo Alcoa odgovorna država [83], saj je pravna podlaga za ukrep določena v nacionalni zakonodaji in odločbah organa AEEG, ki je javni organ.
As regards the impact of the measure on trade between Member States and the ensuing distortion of competition, it is undisputed that the aluminium market is fully open to competition.
V zvezi z vplivom ukrepa na trgovino med državami članicami in nastalim izkrivljanjem konkurence je nesporno, da je trg aluminija v celoti odprt za konkurenco.
In its merger decisions, the Commission has consistently found that the geographical market for primary aluminium is worldwide [84].
Komisija v svojih odločbah o združitvi stalno ugotavlja, da geografski trg primarnega aluminija zajema ves svet [84].
It will be seen in recital 214 that Italy did not notify the extension of the Alcoa tariff.
V uvodni izjavi 214 je navedeno, da Italija ni priglasila podaljšanja veljavnosti cene za družbo Alcoa.
According to settled case-law [85], in the event of aid which has not been notified, the Commission is not obliged to demonstrate the consequences of the measure: ‘If the Commission were required in its decision to demonstrate the real effect of aid which had already been granted, that would immediately favour those Member States which grant aid in breach of the duty to notify laid down in Article 93(3) of the Treaty, to the detriment of those which do notify aid at the planning stage’.
Glede na ustaljeno sodno prakso [85] v primeru nepriglasitve pomoči Komisija ni dolžna dokazati posledic ukrepa: „če bi Komisija morala v odločbi prikazati dejanski vpliv že dodeljene pomoči, bi to povzročilo prednost držav članic, ki pomoči dodelijo s tem, da kršijo obveznost priglasitve iz člena 88(3) Pogodbe ES, v škodo tistih, ki jo o pomočeh obvestijo že na stopnji načrta“.
Consequently, the Commission is required only to demonstrate the possible negative impact of the measure on intra-Community trade and competition.
Zato mora Komisija dokazati le morebitni negativni vpliv ukrepa na trgovino in konkurenco znotraj Unije.
The Commission has considered Alcoa’s and Italy’s argument that the tariff does not have an impact on trade and does not distort competition, since there are no actual trade flows between Member States, it is unlikely that such trade flows will develop in the foreseeable future (see recitals 86 to 88), and due to the peculiarities of the aluminium sector the tariff does not harm Alcoa’s European competitors (see recital 89).
Komisija je obravnavala trditev družbe Alcoa in Italije, da cena ne vpliva na trgovino in ne izkrivlja konkurence, ker med državami članicami ni dejanskih trgovinskih tokov, ker je malo verjetno, da se bodo takšni tokovi razvili v bližnji prihodnosti (glej uvodni izjavi 86 in 88), in ker zaradi posebnosti sektorja aluminija cene ne škodijo evropskim konkurenčnim ponudnikom družbe Alcoa (glej uvodno izjavo 89).
It should be recalled that, in the Commission’s decision-making practice and the case-law of the Court, the absence of actual trade flows has never been accepted as evidence that an aid measure has no impact on intra-Community trade.
Opozoriti je treba, da se v praksi sprejemanja odločitev Komisije in sodni praksi Sodišča odsotnost dejanskih trgovinskih tokov nikoli ni upoštevala kot dokaz, da ukrep pomoči ne vpliva na trgovino znotraj Unije.
The Court has in fact consistently ruled that aid to an undertaking may be such as to affect trade between the Member States and distort competition even if the beneficiary undertaking does not participate in intra-Community trade itself.
Sodišče je dejansko dosledno odločalo, da lahko pomoč podjetju vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami in izkrivlja konkurenco, tudi če podjetje, ki pomoč prejme, ne sodeluje v trgovini znotraj Unije.
Where a Member State grants aid to an undertaking, domestic production may for that reason be maintained or increased, with the result that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of exporting their products to the market in that Member State [86].
Če država članica dodeli pomoč podjetju, se lahko zato domača proizvodnja ohrani ali poveča, zaradi česar imajo podjetja, ustanovljena v drugih državah članicah, manj možnosti za izvoz svojih izdelkov na trg v tej državi članici [86].
Moreover, the pattern of decreasing EU production and increasing imports from third countries, with limited or no trade flows between Member States, is not unusual: it is fact typical of sectors which are experiencing structural difficulties and/or are subject to high competitive pressure.
Poleg tega vzorec zmanjševanja proizvodnje EU in povečevanja uvoza iz tretjih držav z omejenimi trgovinskimi tokovi med državami članicami ali brez njih ni neobičajen: to je značilno za sektorje, ki se srečujejo s strukturnimi težavami in/ali velikim pritiskom konkurence.
Such sectors are particularly sensitive to measures taken by Member States to improve the competitive position of their domestic industries.
Takšni sektorji so zlasti občutljivi glede ukrepov, ki jih sprejemajo države članice, da bi izboljšale konkurenčni položaj svojih domačih industrij.
The fact that the modest production of primary aluminium in Italy may be unable to affect the reference price is irrelevant.
Dejstvo, da skromna proizvodnja primarnega aluminija v Italiji morda ne bi mogla vplivati na referenčno ceno, ni pomembno.
The existence of a reference price for aluminium which is not easily influenced by conditions of production in a single Member State does not rule out the existence of keen competition between undertakings based in the EEA and selling on the worldwide aluminium market.
Obstoj referenčne cene aluminija, na katero pogoji proizvodnje v eni državi članici ne morejo enostavno vplivati, ne izključuje obstoja velike konkurence med podjetji s sedežem v EGP in prodaje na svetovnem trgu aluminija.
It is conceivable that aid to Alcoa’s Italian smelters does not enable Alcoa to reduce the world price for aluminium and squeeze competitors out of the market, and that other European producers may remain in business as long as they can sell profitably at the world price.
Možno je, da pomoč italijanskim talilnicam družbe Alcoa navedeni družbi ne omogoča znižanja svetovne cene aluminija in izključitve konkurenčnih ponudnikov s trga ter da lahko drugi evropski proizvajalci še naprej poslujejo, dokler lahko z dobičkom prodajajo po svetovni ceni.
However, the profits obtained by Alcoa in Italy thanks to the subsidised electricity tariff strengthen the company’s competitive position in a general sense.
Vendar dobički družbe Alcoa v Italiji zaradi subvencioniranih cen električne energije na splošno krepijo konkurenčni položaj družbe.
For example, accumulated capital reserves can be used to take over competitors and increase market share.
Nakopičene kapitalske rezerve se lahko na primer uporabijo za prevzem konkurenčnih ponudnikov in povečanje tržnega deleža.
Contrary to what Alcoa claims, the fact that the price paid by Alcoa in Italy is comparable to the ‘typical’ electricity price paid in Europe by aluminium smelters cannot be taken as evidence that the interests of other European producers are not threatened by the Italian tariff.
V nasprotju s trditvami družbe Alcoa dejstva, da je cena, ki jo je družba Alcoa plačala v Italiji, primerljiva z „običajno“ ceno električne energije, ki jo talilnice aluminija plačajo v Evropi, ni mogoče šteti za dokaz, da italijanska cena ne ogroža interesov drugih evropskih proizvajalcev.
It was clearly established in Case C-372/97, Italy v Commission [87] that unilateral measures aimed at approximating conditions of competition in a Member States to those prevailing in other Member States do affect trade (and therefore cannot escape classification as aid).
V zadevi C-372/97, Italija proti Komisiji [87], je bilo jasno ugotovljeno, da enostranski ukrepi, namenjeni približanju pogojev konkurence v državah članicah pogojem, ki prevladujejo v drugih državah članicah, vplivajo na trgovino (in jih je zato treba opredeliti kot pomoč).
Moreover, some of the power supply agreements in place in other EU Member States may involve State aid, and the Commission has opened in-depth investigations on several of the measures at issue [88].
Poleg tega lahko nekateri sporazumi o oskrbi z električno energijo, sklenjeni v drugih državah članicah EU, vključujejo državno pomoč, zato je Komisija sprožila temeljne preiskave v zvezi z več zadevnimi ukrepi [88].
Even though this defence has not been brought explicitly by Italy and Alcoa, the Commission considers it useful to recall the principle, well established in case-law [89], that the existence of unlawful aid in some Member States cannot justify the adoption of similar measures by another Member State.
Čeprav Italija in družba Alcoa tega razloga nista izrecno navedli, Komisija meni, da je uporaben, saj opozarja na načelo, ki je dobro uveljavljeno v sodni praksi [89], da obstoj nezakonite pomoči v nekaterih državah članicah ne more utemeljiti sprejetja podobnih ukrepov v drugi državi članici.
Alcoa’s recent decision to build a smelter in Iceland (which is an EEA country) seems to contradict directly Alcoa’s argument that capacity shut down in Italy would not be replaced elsewhere in the EU/EEA.
Zdi se, da je nedavna odločitev družbe Alcoa, da zgradi talilnico na Islandiji (ki je država EGP), neposredno v nasprotju s trditvijo družbe Alcoa, da obrata, ki je bil zaprt v Italiji, ne bo nadomestila drugje v EU/EGP.
Therefore, the conclusion must be drawn that the preferential electricity tariff granted to Alcoa is liable to improve its competitive position vis-à-vis competing undertakings in intra-Community trade.
Zato je treba skleniti, da lahko ugodnejša cena električne energije, odobrena družbi Alcoa, izboljša njen konkurenčni položaj v primerjavi s konkurenčnimi podjetji v trgovini znotraj Unije.
It is settled case-law [90] that in such circumstances intra-Community trade should be considered affected and competition distorted.
Glede na ustaljeno sodno prakso [90] je treba v takšnih okoliščinah obravnavati, da je pomoč vplivala na trgovino znotraj Unije in izkrivila konkurenco.
Conclusions on the existence of aid
Sklepna ugotovitev v zvezi z obstojem pomoči
In the light of the above, the Commission has come to the conclusion that the preferential tariff granted to Alcoa on the basis of Article 11(11) of Law No 80/2005 and of the 2004 Decree (insofar as the same measure may have resulted from the application of the 2004 Decree over the period January 2006-June 2007) constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty and can be authorised only if it qualifies for one of the derogations laid down in the Treaty.
Komisija je ob upoštevanju navedenega sklenila, da ugodnejša cena, odobrena družbi Alcoa na podlagi člena 11(11) zakona št. 80/2005 in odloka iz leta 2004 (če je lahko isti ukrep rezultat uporabe odloka iz leta 2004 v obdobju od januarja 2006 do junija 2007), pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES in jo je mogoče odobriti le, če izpolnjuje pogoje za uporabo enega od odstopanj iz Pogodbe ES.
Classification of the new measure as new or existing aid
Opredelitev novega ukrepa kot nova ali obstoječa pomoč
Paragraph 132 of the Court’s judgment unequivocally confirms the Commission’s preliminary finding that the tariff should be considered as new aid: ‘it must be held that the measure at issue cannot be considered to be existing aid, not only because it covers a period that is different from that examined in the Alumix decision, but also because it consists no longer in ENEL applying the tariff laid down in the 1995 Decree-Law, which was equivalent to a market tariff, but in the grant of a reimbursement by the Equalisation Fund from public resources, in order to offset the difference between the tariff charged by ENEL and that laid down in the 1995 Decree-Law, as extended by the 2005 Decree-Law’.
V točki 132 sodbe Sodišča je nedvoumno potrjena predhodna ugotovitev Komisije, da je treba ceno šteti za novo pomoč: „veljati mora, da zadevnega ukrepa ni mogoče šteti za obstoječo pomoč, ker zajema obdobje, ki se razlikuje od obdobja, preučenega v odločbi Alumix, in tudi ker ne pomeni več, da ENEL uporablja ceno, določeno v zakonskem odloku iz leta 1995, ki je bila enaka tržni ceni, ampak odobritev vračila izravnalnega sklada iz javnih sredstev, da se izravna razlika med ceno, ki jo je zaračunal ENEL, in ceno iz zakonskega odloka iz leta 1995, kakor je bil razširjen z zakonskim odlokom iz leta 2005“.