natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Later, ABN AMRO Group and the Dutch State agreed that ABN AMRO Group’s dividend policy would be based on a dividend payout ratio of 40 % as described in recital 75.
Kasneje sta se skupina ABN AMRO in Nizozemska dogovorili, da bo dividendna politika skupine ABN AMRO temeljila na izplačilu dividend v višini 40 %, kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 75.
The Dutch State and ABN AMRO N include in their peer list of 1 September 2008: […].
Nizozemska in ABN AMRO N v svojem seznamu enakovrednih podjetij z dne 1. septembra 2008 vključujeta: […].
The Dutch State and ABN AMRO N refer in that regard to SNS, DSB and insurers such as Aegon.
Nizozemska in ABN AMRO N se s tem v zvezi sklicujeta na banki SNS in DSB ter zavarovalnice, kot je Aegon.
The replicating portfolio methodology is based upon a model reflecting how long deposits and savings are on average kept at the bank.
Metoda replikacijskega portfelja temelji na modelu, ki kaže, kako dolgo so depoziti in prihranki v povprečju hranjeni na banki.
The methodology is based on the historical pattern of deposits and withdrawals and is continuously updated.
Metoda temelji na preteklem vzorcu depozitov in dvigov ter se stalno posodablja.
Application of that methodology assumes short-term deposits and savings to be invested by the bank in a virtual portfolio consisting of short-term deposits but also longer-term investments.
Uporaba te metode predvideva kratkoročne depozite in prihranke, ki jih bo banka vložila v navidezni portfelj, sestavljen iz kratkoročnih depozitov in dolgoročnih naložb.
The method results in a savings’ margin which is not solely dependant on EURIBOR rates but also on yields of longer-term investments on a longer-term basis.
Rezultat je stopnja prihrankov, ki ni odvisna samo od obrestnih mer EURIBOR, ampak tudi od donosa dolgoročnih naložb v daljšem času.
OJ C 80, 3.4.2009, p 8.
UL C 80, 3.4.2009, str. 8.
In its Communication to the Dutch Parliament of 6 October 2008, the Dutch State indicated itself that it had evaluated other options such as a sale of FBN and/or ABN AMRO N – or parts of those companies – to a solid buyer, but it had concluded that given the market circumstances and the short notice, these options were not feasible and not sufficient to preserve stability of FBN and ABN AMRO N.See full text on: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/kredietcrisis/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2009/03/10/staatsdeelnemingen-fortis-en-abn-amro.html.
V svojem sporočilu nizozemskemu parlamentu z dne 6. oktobra 2008 je Nizozemska sama navedla, da je ocenila druge možnosti, kot je prodaja banke FBN in/ali banke ABN AMRO N – ali delov podjetij – zanesljivemu kupcu, vendar je sklenila, da te možnosti zaradi tržnih razmer in kratkega roka niso izvedljive in ne zadoščajo za ohranitev stabilnosti bank FBN in ABN AMRO N.Celotno besedilo je na voljo na povezavi: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/kredietcrisis/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2009/03/10/staatsdeelnemingen-fortis-en-abn-amro.html.
That evaluation is confirmed by comments of the Dutch Minister of Finance who has consistently argued that the Dutch State primarily intervened for financial stability reasons.
To oceno so potrdile pripombe nizozemskega finančnega ministra, ki je vztrajno trdil, da je Nizozemska posredovala predvsem zaradi finančne stabilnosti.
He added that it was not the first goal of the Dutch State to earn its investment back, but only its ambition.
Dodal je, da vračilo te naložbe ni bil prvi cilj Nizozemske, ampak samo njena želja.
Also FBN indicated in its marketing material for debt investors, that the State ownership was a favourable element ‘providing confidence to depositors and creditors’; Roadshow presentation April 2009 page 3, penultimate bullet point; Roadshow presentation June 2009 (Paris), page 3, penultimate bullet point; Roadshow presentation July 2009 (Madrid), page 3, penultimate bullet point (all publicly available on the company’s website: http://www.abnAMRO.com/en/investor-relations/latest-presentations/index.html).
Tudi banka FBN je v svojem tržnem gradivu za vlagatelje navedla, da je državno lastništvo pozitiven element, ki „vlagateljem in upnikom vliva zaupanje“; vir: Roadshow presentation, april 2009, stran 3, predzadnja točka; Roadshow presentation, junij 2009 (Pariz), stran 3, predzadnja točka; Roadshow presentation, julij 2009 (Madrid), stran 3, predzadnja točka (vse predstavitve so javno dostopne na spletni strani podjetja: http://www.abnAMRO.com/en/investor-relations/latest-presentations/index.html).
For comparison, at the end of 2008 FBN’s total assets amounted to EUR 185 billion, so the liquidity facility represented roughly 25 % of the total balance sheet.
Za primerjavo naj navedemo, da so ob koncu leta 2008 skupna sredstva banke FBN znašala 185 milijard EUR, tako da je likvidnostno posojilo znašalo približno 25 % skupne bilance stanja.
FBN issued State-guaranteed instruments for a total amount of EUR 18,8 billion.
Banka FBN je izdala instrumente z državnim jamstvom v skupnem znesku 18,8 milijarde EUR.
Case T-11/95 BP Chemicals Ltd v Commission [1998] ECR II-3235.
Zadeva T-11/95 BP Chemicals proti Komisiji, Recueil 1998, str. II-3235.
See also other banking cases such as Northern Rock, OJ L 112, 5.5.2010, p. 38 and Bank of Ireland, JO C 40, 9.2.2011, p. 9.
Glej tudi druge zadeve, povezane z bančništvom, kot npr. Northern Rock, UL L 112, 5.5.2010, str. 38 in Bank of Ireland, UL C 40, 9.2.2011, str. 9.
At the end of 2008, FBN’s loan-to-deposit ratio stood at 237 %.
Ob koncu leta 2008 je bilo razmerje banke FBN med posojili in vlogami 237 %.
The participation was still accounted for some EUR 24 billion.
Udeležba je bila še vedno knjižena v višini približno 24 milijard EUR.
See for instance […] comments and also comments from the Minister of Finance in a letter to the Dutch Parliament dated 19 November 2009: ‘A standalone scenario would create little value. FBN has been able to show good profit figures in the past years but is considered to be too small to grow in the long term and to remain competitive. ABN AMRO II has a sufficiently large market share in retail banking but misses commercial customers after the separation.’ (original text in Dutch, translated by the Commission) The full text is available on the following Internet link: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2009/11/20/ec-remedy-en-herkapitalisatie-abn-amro-en-fortis-bank-nederland.html)
Glej na primer pripombe […] in pripombe finančnega ministra v dopisu nizozemskemu parlamentu z dne 19. novembra 2009: „Samostojen scenarij ne bi ustvaril velike vrednosti. Banka FBN je v preteklih letih prikazala podatke o visokem dobičku, vendar je dolgoročno premajhna za rast in za to, da ostane konkurenčna. ABN AMRO II ima dovolj velik tržni delež na področju poslovanja s prebivalstvom, vendar po tej ločitvi nima dovolj gospodarskih subjektov“ (prvotno besedilo v nizozemščini, prevod s strani Komisije). Besedilo je v celoti na voljo na naslednji povezavi: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2009/11/20/ec-remedy-en-herkapitalisatie-abn-amro-en-fortis-bank-nederland.html).
See […] due diligence report: Volume 2 Fortis Bank Netherlands page 44 and volume 5 on Subject Matter Memos page 65 and following.
Glej poročilo o skrbnem pregledu poslovanja […]: Zvezek 2 Fortis Bank Netherlands, stran 44 in zvezek 5 Dopisi o vsebini, stran 65 in naslednje.
The Commission observes that no private investor made a bid for ABN AMRO N. The Commission learnt that ING looked into the file but decided after careful consideration that a transaction would not meet its financial requirements.
Komisija je ugotovila, da noben zasebni vlagatelj ni dal ponudbe za banko ABN AMRO N. Komisija je ugotovila, da je banka ING pregledala dokumentacijo, vendar se je po tehtnem premisleku odločila, da transakcija ne bi izpolnila njenih finančnih zahtev.
The company underlined that its ultimate responsibility is to its shareholders (which is obviously an important difference compared with the Dutch State, which also has to take into account the public interest).
Podjetje je poudarilo, da je njegova glavna odgovornost tista, ki jo ima do svojih delničarjev (kar je pomembna razlika v primerjavi z nizozemsko državo, ki mora upoštevati tudi javni interes).
See press release of 29 September 2008: http://www.ing.com/group/showdoc.jsp?docid=343126_EN&menopt=prm
Glej sporočilo za javnost z dne 29. septembra 2008: http://www.ing.com/group/showdoc.jsp?docid=343126_EN&menopt=prm
The current market conditions valuation was based on two valuation approaches: a price/earnings peer analysis and a discounted dividend approach.
Ocena sedanjih tržnih pogojev je temeljila na dveh pristopih: analizi cene/dobička enakovrednih podjetij in pristopu diskontiranih dividend.
Both valuation approaches led to a valuation of EUR [4 - 6,5] billion (see page 7 of the […] valuation report).
Rezultat obeh pristopov je bila ocena v višini [4–6,5] milijarde EUR (glej stran 7 poročila o vrednotenju […]).
There is no reason whatsoever to increase the value of ABN AMRO N by the synergies of a potential merger which the Dutch State already owned since the 3 October 2008 transaction.
Ni razloga za povečanje vrednosti banke ABN AMRO N s sinergijami morebitne združitve, ki so bile od transakcije z dne 3. oktobra 2008 že v lasti Nizozemske.
Measure Z removed ABN AMRO N from the balance sheet of FBN and there was no other potential investor who could realise the same amount of synergies and would be willing to incorporate such synergies in its bid price either.
Z ukrepom Z je bila banka ABN AMRO N izključena iz bilance stanja banke FBN, ni pa bilo nobenega morebitnega vlagatelja, ki bi lahko realiziral enak obseg sinergij in bi bil pripravljen te sinergije vključiti v ceno svoje ponudbe.
Therefore, the Dutch State as a market economy investor trying to make acquisition at the lowest possible price would not include those synergies in its bid price.
Zato Nizozemska kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, ki poskuša nakup izvesti po najnižji možni ceni, teh sinergij ne bi vključila v ceno svoje ponudbe.
Moreover, as a subsidiary argument, it should be underlined that the transaction mainly meant to keep FBN’s capital ratios above the minimum required levels.
Poleg tega je treba kot dodaten argument poudariti, da je bila transakcija namenjena predvsem ohranjanju kapitalskih deležev banke FBN nad minimalnimi zahtevanimi ravnmi.
FBN’s capital position was indeed very vulnerable and the company was not in a position to pre-finance the merger itself.
Stanje kapitala banke FBN je bilo zelo občutljivo, podjetje pa ni bilo sposobno samo vnaprej financirati združitve.
In a scenario without Measure Z, FBN would have run in financial difficulties and it would have been impossible to realise the merger and the associated synergies itself.
V scenariju brez ukrepa Z bi bila banka FBN v finančnih težavah in ne bi mogla sama izvesti združitve ter s tem povezanih sinergij.
Several banks have bought back their own subordinated debt at a significant discount during the current financial crisis (so-called ‘liabilities management’), thereby being able to create core Tier 1 proportionate to the discount.
Več bank je med sedanjo finančno krizo odkupilo svoj lasten podrejeni dolg s precejšnjim diskontom (t. i. „upravljanje z obveznostmi“), zaradi česar so lahko ustvarile kapital prvega reda, sorazmeren z diskontom.
‘The banks together are stronger than alone. The banks have qualities which are very complementary. ABN AMRO has good retail and SME services and Fortis has good internal merchant qualities. Because Fortis SA/NV disappeared, both banks had to do new investments. These investments can better be done once than twice.’ (original text in Dutch, translation by Commission) (source: ‘Vragen over de ingeslagen richting voor de bedrijven en de besluitvorming daartoe, het beloningsbeleid en de toekomstige rol van de Staat in deze bedrijven’, press release explaining the decision of the Dutch State of 21 November 2008 to merge FBN and ABN AMRO N).
„Ti dve banki sta skupaj močnejši kot pa vsaka zase. Banki imata dejavnosti, ki se zelo lepo dopolnjujejo. Banka ABN AMRO ima dobre storitve na področju poslovanja s prebivalstvom in MSP, Fortis pa je dober na področju trgovanja na notranjem trgu. Ker holding Fortis SA/NV ne obstaja več, morata obe banki izvesti nove naložbe. Namesto dvakrat je te naložbe bolje izvesti samo enkrat.“ (izvirno besedilo v nizozemščini, prevod s strani Komisije) (vir: „Vragen over de ingeslagen richting voor de bedrijven en de besluitvorming daartoe, het beloningsbeleid en de toekomstige rol van de Staat in deze bedrijven“, obvestilo za javnost, v katerem je pojasnjena odločitev Nizozemske z dne 21. novembra 2008 glede združitve bank FBN in ABN AMRO N).
A report of the Dutch Court of Auditors makes some remarks on the calculations of the State (see weblink: http://www.rekenkamer.nl/Actueel/Onderzoeksrapporten/Bronnen/2009/12/Verkoop_onderdelen_ABN_AMRO_als_EC_remedy/Rapport_Verkoop_onderdelen_ABN_AMRO_als_EC_remedy).
V poročilu nizozemskega računskega sodišča je podanih nekaj pripomb na izračune države (glej spletno povezavo: http://www.rekenkamer.nl/Actueel/Onderzoeksrapporten/Bronnen/2009/12/Verkoop_onderdelen_ABN_AMRO_als_EC_remedy/Rapport_Verkoop_onderdelen_ABN_AMRO_als_EC_remedy).
Combined RWA of the two entities (namely FBN and ABN AMRO N) at the end of 2008.
Združena tveganju prilagojena sredstva (TPS) dveh subjektov (tj. FBN in ABN AMRO N) konec leta 2008.
Combined RWA of the two entities (namely FBN and ABN AMRO N) at the end of 2009.
Združena tveganju prilagojena sredstva (TPS) dveh subjektov (tj. FBN in ABN AMRO N) konec leta 2009.
The State-guaranteed debt was used to repay the funding drawn under the short-term liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion. In other words, those two measures were not in place at the same time, but followed one after the other.
Dolg z državnim jamstvom je bil uporabljen za povračilo sredstev, pridobljenih v okviru kratkoročnega likvidnostnega posojila v višini 45 milijard EUR. Ta dva ukrepa torej nista bila vzpostavljena hkrati, ampak eden za drugim.
The correction for double-counting takes that into account.
Popravek zaradi dvojnega štetja upošteva to dejstvo.
See Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167.
Glej združeni zadevi T-132/96 in T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen in Volkswagen AG proti Komisiji, Recueil 1999, str. II-3663, točka 167.
That evaluation does not entail that the State will also earn a remuneration on the sums paid on 3 October 2008 to acquire FBN and ABN AMRO N, which are not counted as aid in this Decision.
Ta ocena ne pomeni, da bo država zaslužila tudi povračilo za zneske, plačane 3. oktobra 2008 za nakup bank FBN in ABN AMRO N, ki v tem sklepu ne pomenijo državne pomoči.
See also point (12) of the Restructuring Communication.
Glej tudi točko (12) sporočila o prestrukturiranju.
See Case T-17/03 Schmitz-Gotha Fahrzeugwerke GmbH v Commission [2006] ECR II-1139.
Glej zadevo T-17/03, Schmitz-Gotha Fahrzeugwerke GmbH proti Komisiji, ZOdl. 2006, str. II-1139.
When banks are faced with bad loans in their loan portfolio, the restructuring of those loans sometimes requires solutions such as converting debt into equity.
Kadar imajo banke v svojem portfelju posojil slaba posojila, prestrukturiranje teh posojil včasih zahteva rešitve kot je pretvorba dolga v kapital.
Those situations are considered to be normal banking practice and are not covered by the acquisition ban.
Taki primeri so običajna bančna praksa in niso zajeti v prepoved prevzemov.
The Commission has accepted one exception.
Komisija je sprejela eno izjemo.
One of the hybrid instruments of FBN, the so-called FCC-instrument (FCC instrument: EUR 87,5 million, 6,25 % non-cumulative non-voting perpetual class A series I preference shares issued by Fortis Capital Company Ltd), was issued at the time when Fortis SA/NV was still one integrated group and the prospectus clearly stipulated that coupons on the instruments were also triggered by dividends paid by Fortis SA/NV (now renamed Ageas).
Eden od hibridnih instrumentov banke FBN, t. i. instrument FCC (instrument FCC: 87,5 milijona EUR, 6,25 % nekumulativnih neglasovalnih preferenčnih delnic razreda A serije I brez dospetja, ki jih je izdalo podjetje Fortis Capital Company Ltd), je bil izdan v času, ko je bil holding Fortis SA/NV ena integrirana skupina in so napovedi jasno kazale, da kuponi na instrumentih temeljijo na dividendah, ki jih je plačal holding Fortis SA/NV (zdaj preimenovan v Ageas).
For practical reasons, the Commission can accept the hybrid coupon and call ban to start on 10 March 2011 (i.e. after the last forced coupon) to last up to and including 10 March 2013.
Komisija se zaradi praktičnih razlogov lahko strinja s tem, da prepoved plačila kuponov na hibridne instrumente in nakupa hibridnega instrumenta začne veljati 10. marca 2011 (tj. po zadnjem t. i. „prisilnem kuponu“ (forced coupon)) in traja do vključno 10. marca 2013.
The Commission is aware of the fact that dividends paid by ABN AMRO Group to the State – its sole shareholder – could trigger hybrid coupons.
Komisija se zaveda dejstva, da lahko dividende, ki jih je skupina ABN AMRO plačala državi – njenemu edinemu delničarju – vplivajo na hibridne kupone.
The Commission wants to avoid a situation in which ABN AMRO Group would pay marginal dividends to the State in order to circumvent the hybrid coupon ban.
Komisija se želi izogniti položaju, v katerem bi skupina ABN AMRO državi plačala mejne dividende in se tako izognila prepovedi na hibridne kupone.
The Commission does not object to the payment of a sizeable dividend to the State of at least EUR 100 million even if that payment has certain consequences on hybrid coupons because a large dividend hints at restored viability and also helps to keep potential excess capital in check, which helps to limit undue distortions of competition.
Komisija ne nasprotuje plačilu večje dividende državi v višini vsaj 100 milijonov EUR, tudi če bi to plačilo imelo določene posledice za hibridne kupone, ker velika dividenda nakazuje na ponovno vzpostavljeno uspešno poslovanje in ohranja pod nadzorom morebitni presežni kapital, kar pomaga pri omejevanju neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence.
Those last two businesses are managed as separate entities and the Dutch authorities announced in November 2008 that they will not integrate them.
Zadnji našteti dejavnosti sta upravljani ločeno in nizozemski organi so novembra 2008 napovedali, da ju ne bodo integrirali.
In its decisions of 3 December 2008 and 12 May 2009, the Commission observed on that basis and on the basis of other commitments that sufficient measures had been implemented to limit the distortion of competition created by the aid to Fortis SA/NV and Fortis Bank SA/NV.
Na podlagi tega in na podlagi drugih obveznosti je Komisija v svojih odločbah z dne 3. decembra 2008 in 12. maja 2009 ugotovila, da so bili za omejitev izkrivljanja konkurence, nastalega zaradi pomoči za Fortis SA/NV in Fortis Bank SA/NV, uvedeni zadostni ukrepi.
ABN AMRO Group shall not be obliged to cover other financial consequences for the customer, such as for instance costs or damages associated with the (early) liquidation or ending of positions, mortgages, savings deposits, security rights or holdings of the customer and any costs incurred by another financial institution and/or costs incurred by the customer in relation to the entering into of new positions and/or contracts and other financial consequences related to the termination of any and all products and services by the customer.
Skupina ABN AMRO ni zavezana kriti drugih finančnih posledic za stranko, kot so na primer stroški ali odškodnine, povezane s (predčasnim) prenehanjem ali končanjem pozicij, hipotek, varčevalnih depozitov, pravic v zvezi z zavarovanjem sredstev ali naložb stranke in katerih koli stroškov, nastalih pri delu druge finančne ustanove, in/ali stroškov, ki jih je stranka imela zaradi sklenitve novih pozicij in/ali pogodb ter zaradi drugih finančnih posledic, povezanih s prekinitvijo katerega koli ali vseh proizvodov in storitev s strani stranke.
This refers to the segmental breakdown used in the December 2009 Restructuring Plan (see recital 79).
To se nanaša na razdelitev segmenta, uporabljeno v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 (glej uvodno izjavo 79).
In line with the numerical examples that ABN AMRO Group provided to the Commission on 18 November 2010.
V skladu s številčnimi primeri, ki jih je skupina ABN AMRO predložila Komisiji 18. novembra 2010.
On an annual basis, namely intermediary dividend and final dividend.
Na letni osnovi, tj. vmesno in končno dividendo.
On 17 December 2008, the Dutch State informed the Commission of its intention to acquire ABN AMRO N from FBN for EUR 6,5 billion. The acquisition took place on 24 December 2008.
Nizozemska je 17. decembra 2008 obvestila Komisijo o nameri, da od banke FBN odkupi banko ABN AMRO N za 6,5 milijarde EUR. Prevzem je bil izveden 24. decembra 2008.
On 2 February 2009, the Dutch authorities notified that acquisition to the Commission as a measure not constituting State aid for reasons of legal certainty.
Nizozemski organi so 2. februarja 2009 zaradi pravne varnosti priglasili prevzem Komisiji kot ukrep, ki ne pomeni državne pomoči.
The Dutch State asked for a deadline extension on 20 August 2009 and sent a detailed answer to the complaint on 22 September 2009.
Nizozemska je 20. avgusta 2009 zaprosila za podaljšanje roka in 22. septembra 2009 poslala podroben odgovor na pritožbo.
The complainant provided further information by letters of 21 August 2009 and 28 August 2009.
Pritožnik je z dopisoma z dne 21. avgusta 2009 in 28. avgusta 2009 predložil nadaljnja pojasnila.
These letters were forwarded to the Dutch State on 23 September 2009 and the Dutch State replied on 29 October 2009.
Komisija je 23. septembra 2009 dopisa posredovala Nizozemski, ki je nanju odgovorila 29. oktobra 2009.
On 15 May 2009, the Dutch State sent a letter to the Commission answering a number of questions raised in the Decision of 8 April 2009.
Nizozemska je 15. maja 2009 Komisiji poslala dopis, v katerem je odgovorila na številna vprašanja, obravnavana v odločbi z dne 8. aprila 2009.
A detailed reply on substance – for which the Dutch State had asked more time – was sent to the Commission on 11 August 2009.
Podroben odgovor na bistvo zadeve – za katerega je Nizozemska večkrat zaprosila – je bil Komisiji poslan 11. avgusta 2009.
In the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission had invited the Dutch financial supervisor (‘DNB’) to comment on the soundness of FBN and ABN AMRO N respectively. The Commission received the requested information on FBN by letter of 18 June 2009 and an update on 5 January 2010.
V odločbi z dne 8. aprila 2009 je Komisija nizozemski finančni nadzorni organ (v nadaljnjem besedilu: organ DNB) pozvala, naj predloži pripombe glede stabilnosti banke FBN oziroma banke ABN AMRO N. Komisija je zahtevane informacije glede banke FBN prejela z dopisom z dne 18. junija 2009, dopolnjene informacije pa 5. januarja 2010.
The Dutch State also forwarded a letter from DNB on ABN AMRO N on 20 January 2010.
Nizozemska je 20. januarja 2010 posredovala tudi dopis organa DNB glede banke ABN AMRO N.
On 6 July 2009, ABN AMRO Bank – the parent company of ABN AMRO N – sent a letter to the Commission commenting on the Decision of 8 April 2009.
Podjetje ABN AMRO Bank – matično podjetje banke ABN AMRO N – je 6. julija 2009 Komisiji poslalo dopis, v katerem se je odzvalo na odločbo z dne 8. aprila 2009.
That letter was forwarded to the Dutch State on 22 July 2009 and the Dutch State replied on 22 September 2009.
Komisija je 22. julija 2009 ta dopis posredovala Nizozemski, ki je odgovorila 22. septembra 2009.
On 26 November 2009, the Dutch State provided the Commission with a report of […] commenting on the transaction of 24 December 2008.
Nizozemska je 26. novembra 2009 Komisiji predložila poročilo […] s pripombami glede transakcije dne 24. decembra 2008.
The submission also contained some background material explaining […].
Poročilo je vsebovalo tudi nekaj podpornega gradiva, v katerem je bilo razloženo […].