natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It claims that there is an objective difference between undertakings in difficulty which are in need of restructuring and other undertakings, and that this objective difference justifies different treatment of undertakings in difficulty which are acquired in view of restructuring.
Trdi, da obstaja objektivna razlika med podjetji v težavah, v katerih je potrebno prestrukturiranje, in drugimi podjetji ter da ta objektivna razlika upravičuje različno obravnavanje podjetij v težavah, ki so prevzeta z namenom prestrukturiranja.
The German authorities base their argument on three considerations.
Nemške oblasti utemeljujejo svoj argument s tremi premisleki.
Firstly, whereas financially sound undertakings have a choice between seeking finance on the capital markets and looking for an undertaking to acquire them, undertakings in difficulty only have the latter option, as they will not be able to raise debt on the capital market or obtain a bank loan.
Prvič, medtem ko lahko finančno trdna podjetja izbirajo, ali bodo poiskala finančno pomoč na trgih kapitala ali našla podjetje, ki jih bo prevzelo, imajo podjetja v težavah na voljo samo drugo možnost, saj se jim ne bo uspelo zadolžiti na trgu kapitala ali pridobiti posojila.
As a result, undertakings in difficulty will systematically forfeit the possibility of carrying forward their losses, whereas healthy undertakings always have the choice between debt financing and looking for a buyer.
Podjetja v težavah bodo zato sistematično izgubila pravico do prenosa svojih izgub, medtem ko lahko stabilna podjetja vedno izbirajo med posojilom in iskanjem kupca.
Secondly, the ratio legis of §8c(1) KStG, i.e. preventing trade in empty-shell companies with accumulated losses, does not require the exclusion of loss carry-forward in situations where the acquisition is for the purpose of restructuring rather than simply tax optimisation.
Drugič, ratio legis člena 8c(1) KStG, tj. preprečevanje poslovanja v slamnatih podjetjih z nakopičenimi izgubami, ne zahteva izključitve prenosa izgub v primerih, kadar je namen prevzema prestrukturiranje in ne le optimizacija davkov.
Without the restriction of §8c(1a) KStG to acquisitions of undertakings in financial difficulty in view of restructuring, i.e. if other acquisitions were also included, the ratio legis could no longer be maintained.
Brez omejitve člena 8c(1a) KStG na prevzeme podjetij v finančnih težavah z vidika prestrukturiranja, tj. če bi bili vključeni tudi drugi prevzemi, načelo ratio legis ne bi več veljalo.
Thirdly, the purpose of §8c(1) KStG is to ensure that the sale price of stakes in undertakings is based solely on the economic value of the undertaking and that the value of accumulated losses for tax optimisation does not affect the sale price.
Tretjič, namen člena 8c(1) KStG je zagotoviti, da prodajna cena deležev v podjetjih temelji izključno na ekonomski vrednosti podjetja in da nanjo ne vpliva vrednost nakopičenih izgub za optimizacijo davkov.
In the case of the acquisition of an undertaking in difficulty in view of restructuring, however, the possible value of accumulated losses plays no particular role.
V primeru prevzema podjetja v težavah zaradi prestrukturiranja pa morebitna vrednost nakopičenih izgub nima posebnega pomena.
To substantiate this argument, Germany points out that accountants do not attach any value, in commercial group accounts, to potential carried-forward losses of an ailing undertaking.
Nemčija ta argument utemeljuje s pojasnilom, da računovodje v računovodskih izkazih poslovnih skupin ne pripisujejo nikakršne vrednosti potencialnim prenesenim izgubam podjetja v težavah.
For these three reasons taken together, Germany considers that, even if §8c(1a) KStG were prima facie selective, it is in any event justified by the nature and overall structure of the German corporate tax system.
Zaradi vseh treh razlogov skupaj Nemčija meni, da člen 8c(1a) KStG, četudi bi bil prima facie selektiven, v vsakem primeru upravičujeta narava in celotna struktura nemškega sistema obdavčenja pravnih oseb.
Link between new and old Sanierungsklausel
Povezava med novo in staro Sanierungsklausel
Germany observes that, with effect from 1 January 2008, §8c KStG replaced a similar rule that was repealed at the same time, namely §8(4) KStG.
Nemčija ugotavlja, da je člen 8c KStG, ki je začel veljati 1. januarja 2008, nadomestil podobno pravilo, ki je bilo istega dne razveljavljeno, namreč člen 8(4) KStG.
Both rules pursue the same objective, i.e. the prevention of trade in empty-shell companies with accumulated losses.
Obe pravili si prizadevata doseči enak cilj, tj. preprečiti poslovanje v slamnatih podjetjih z nakopičenimi izgubami.
Germany notes that the Commission had never expressed any concerns with regard to §8(4) KStG, and that it therefore appears that this rule did not constitute State aid.
Nemčija ugotavlja, da Komisija ni nikoli izrazila zaskrbljenosti v zvezi s členom 8(4) KStG in da se torej zdi, da to pravilo ni predstavljalo državne pomoči.
Germany therefore regards the Commission’s position in this regard as incoherent.
Nemčiji se zato zdi mnenje Komisije v zvezi s to zadevo protislovno.
Similar rules in other tax systems
Podobna pravila v drugih davčnih sistemih
Germany has pointed out that many other Member States have comparable rules to §8c(1a) KStG.
Nemčija je opozorila, da imajo številne druge države članice pravila, ki so primerljiva s členom 8c(1a) KStG.
Examples are Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
Med temi državami so Avstrija, Belgija, Finska, Italija, Luksemburg in Nizozemska.
It notes that the Commission has not taken any action under the State aid rules against these Member States, despite the great similarities between the systems.
Ugotavlja, da Komisija v zvezi s pravili glede državne pomoči proti tem državam članicam ni ukrepala, čeprav so podobnosti med sistemi zelo velike.
In relation to paragraph 34 of the opening decision, which sets out the action the Commission has taken with respect to the French system, Germany stresses that the German system differs from the French system, which is limited to certain sectors of the economy and provides a complete exemption from corporate income tax.
V zvezi z odstavkom 34 odločitve o sprožitvi postopka, v katerem je opisano, kako je Komisija ukrepala glede francoskega sistema, Nemčija poudarja, da se nemški sistem razlikuje od francoskega, ki je omejen na določene gospodarske sektorje in predvideva popolno oprostitev davka od dobička pravnih oseb.
Article 107(1) TFEU lays down that any aid granted by a Member State through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods and affects trade among Members States, is incompatible with the internal market.
Člen 107(1) PDEU določa, da je vsaka pomoč, ki jo v kateri koli obliki dodeli država članica iz državnih sredstev in ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga in ki škodi trgovini med državami članicami, nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom.
State resources and imputability
Državna sredstva in pripisljivost
A measure must be financed through State resources, and the use of State resources must be imputable to the State.
Ukrep je treba financirati iz državnih sredstev, uporabo državnih sredstev pa mora biti mogoče pripisati državi.
A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.
Izguba davčnega prihodka je enakovredna porabi državnih sredstev v obliki davčnih izdatkov.
By allowing companies to reduce their corporate tax burden through loss carry-forward, Germany is foregoing revenue, which constitutes State aid.
S tem ko Nemčija dovoljuje podjetjem, da si znižujejo svojo davčno obremenitev s prenosom izgub, izgublja prihodek, ki pomeni državno pomoč.
The aid is granted by a law, and is therefore imputable to the State.
Pomoč se dodeli po zakonu, zato jo je mogoče pripisati državi.
In addition, the measure must confer a selective advantage on the beneficiary.
Poleg tega mora ukrep prenesti selektivno prednost na upravičenca.
It is settled case-law that the concept of aid covers not only positive benefits, but also action which, in various forms, mitigates the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking [20].
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso pojem pomoči ne zajema le pozitivnih posledic, temveč tudi ukrepe, ki v različnih oblikah ublažijo stroške, ki so običajno vključeni v proračun podjetja [20].
Pursuant to §8c(1) KStG, certain changes in the ownership structure of an undertaking mean the partial or complete forfeiture of the possibility of carrying forward past losses for tax purposes.
V skladu s členom 8c(1) KStG določene spremembe v lastniški strukturi podjetja pomenijo delno ali popolno izgubo možnosti za prenos preteklih izgub za davčne namene.
§8c(1a) KStG creates an exception to that rule where the change in ownership concerns an undertaking in difficulty and takes place for the purpose of restructuring.
Člen 8c(1a) KStG določa izjemo od tega pravila, če se sprememba lastništva nanaša na podjetje v težavah in se izvede za namen prestrukturiranja.
§8c(1a) KStG could therefore grant a selective advantage to companies fulfilling those conditions, since it enables them to set off past losses against future profits for the purpose of calculating their taxable income.
Člen 8c(1a) KStG bi torej lahko priznaval selektivno prednost podjetjem, ki izpolnjujejo te pogoje, saj jim omogoča, da za izračun obdavčljivega dohodka pokrijejo pretekle izgube s prihodnjimi dobički.
As explained in recital 28, Germany argues that §8c(1a) KStG does not constitute such a selective advantage, for three reasons:
Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 28, Nemčija trdi, da člen 8c(1a) KStG ne pomeni takšne selektivne prednosti iz treh razlogov:
§8c(1a) KStG complies with the private market creditor principle (5.2.1);
člen 8c(1a) KStG je skladen z načelom zasebnega upnika v tržnem gospodarstvu (5.2.1);
§8c(1a) KStG is not prima facie selective (5.2.2);
člen 8c(1a) KStG ni selektiven prima facie (5.2.2);
§8c(1a) KStG is justified by the nature and the overall structure of the German tax system (5.2.3).
člen 8c(1a) KStG je upravičen z naravo in celotno strukturo nemškega davčnega sistema (5.2.3).
Germany also points out the similarities between §8c(1a) KStG and its predecessor, §8(4) KStG (see 5.2.4) and that other Member States have similar rules (see 5.2.5).
Nemčija poudarja tudi podobnosti med členom 8c(1a) KStG in njegovim predhodnikom, členom 8(4) KStG (glej točko 5.2.4), ter dejstvo, da imajo druge države članice podobna pravila (glej točko 5.2.5).
Possible application of the private market creditor principle
Možna uporaba načela zasebnega upnika v tržnem gospodarstvu
Germany argues that §8c(1a) KStG complies with the private market creditor principle, because it corresponds to the behaviour of a private market creditor engaged in a long-term contract with a debtor.
Nemčija trdi, da je člen 8c(1a) KStG skladen z načelom zasebnega upnika v tržnem gospodarstvu, ker ustreza vedenju zasebnega upnika v tržnem gospodarstvu, ki je v dolgoročnem pogodbenem razmerju z dolžnikom.
The Commission considers that this claim is ill-founded, for several reasons.
Komisija zavrača to trditev kot neutemeljeno iz več razlogov.
According to the case-law of the Court and the General Court, the private market creditor principle is applicable only if the State acts like an economic operator, but not when it exercises its prerogatives as a public authority [21].
V skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča in Splošnega sodišča se načelo zasebnega upnika uporablja le, če ima država vlogo gospodarskega subjekta, ne pa tudi v primeru, ko uveljavlja svoje pravice kot javni organ [21].
In this case, the State exercises its monopoly of taxation in its capacity as a public authority.
V tem primeru država v vlogi javnega organa izvaja davčni monopol.
The Commission takes the view that the case-law cited by Germany does not alter this assessment.
Komisija meni, da sodna praksa, ki jo navaja Nemčija, te ocene ne spremeni.
§8c(1a) KStG concerns the establishment of a tax debt, whereas the facts that gave rise to the judgments of the Court in Spain v Commission [22] and DMT [23] concerned situations where the administration had the possibility to waive existing tax debts.
Člen 8c(1a) KStG se nanaša na ugotavljanje davčnega dolga, medtem ko so se dejstva, ki so privedla do odločitev Sodišča v zadevah Španija proti Komisiji [22] in DMT [23], nanašala na primere, ko je imela uprava možnost, da opusti obstoječe davčne dolgove.
Therefore, the private market creditor principle is not applicable in this case.
V tem primeru torej načela zasebnega upnika v tržnem gospodarstvu ni mogoče uporabiti.
Secondly, even if it were applicable, which the Commission disputes, the Commission notes that the tax advantage is granted automatically, without a prior assessment of the total losses (which determine the maximum amount of the future tax reductions), the prospects of the beneficiary returning to viability, or whether the debtor has strategic importance.
Drugič, tudi če bi ga bilo mogoče uporabiti, čemur Komisija oporeka, Komisija ugotavlja, da se davčna ugodnost odobri samodejno, brez predhodne ocene skupnih izgub (ki določajo največjo količino za prihodnja znižanja davkov), možnosti upravičenca za ponovno doseganje rentabilnost ali strateške pomembnosti dolžnika.
A private market creditor would not provide, in their general terms and conditions, such an automatic waiver of future debts, without knowing in advance the possible amount of the waiver, the debtor’s financial prospects and its strategic importance.
Zasebni upnik v tržnem gospodarstvu v svojih splošnih pogojih poslovanja ne bi omogočil takšne samodejne opustitve prihodnjih dolgov, če mu ne bi bili vnaprej znani možna količina opustitve, finančne možnosti dolžnika in njegova strateška pomembnost.
Thirdly, the Commission notes that, contrary to a long-term contractual relationship, §8c(1a) KStG does not concern a waiver for existing debts, but a reduction of possible future debts, which might arise once the debtor’s financial health has been restored.
Tretjič, Komisija ugotavlja, da člen 8c(1a) KStG v nasprotju z dolgoročnim pogodbenim razmerjem ne obravnava opustitve obstoječih dolgov, temveč zmanjšanje morebitnih prihodnjih dolgov, ki bi se lahko pojavilo, ko se finančno stanje dolžnika ponovno stabilizira.
In other words, when the State allows the loss carry-forward, there are no outstanding debts.
Z drugimi besedami, če država dovoli prenos dolgov, ni neporavnanih dolgov.
Fourthly, the Commission observes that usually, in the event of insolvency, the debtor’s business is taken over by another company.
Četrtič, Komisija ugotavlja, da v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti podjetje dolžnika običajno prevzame drugo podjetje.
Since the State has a monopoly on taxation, it will be able to collect taxes from the other company.
Ker ima država monopol nad davki, lahko pobere davke od drugega podjetja.
Therefore, a debtor that exits the market will be replaced by another debtor.
Tako torej dolžnika, ki zapusti trg, nadomesti drug dolžnik.
Contrary to a private market creditor, the concept of an existing customer’s loyalty has no bearing on the decision of the State.
V nasprotju z načelom zasebnega upnika v tržnem gospodarstvu načelo zvestobe obstoječih strank ne vpliva na odločitev države.
The Commission concludes that the private market creditor principle is not applicable in this case because the State has acted using its prerogatives in the public policy remit, and not as an economic operator.
Komisija ugotavlja, da v tem primeru načela zasebnega upnika v tržnem gospodarstvu ni mogoče uporabiti, ker je država uveljavljala svoje pristojnosti kot javni organ in ni delovala kot gospodarski subjekt.
Even if the private market creditor principle were applicable in this case, the Commission has shown that a private creditor in a long-term contractual relationship, placed in the same position as the State, would not have adopted a measure comparable to §8c(1a) KStG.
Tudi če bi bilo načelo zasebnih upnikov v tržnem gospodarstvu v tem primeru mogoče uporabiti, je Komisija ugotovila, da zasebni upnik v dolgoročnem pogodbenem razmerju, če bi bil v enakem položaju kot država, ne bi sprejel ukrepa, podobnega členu 8c(1a) KStG.
Prima facie selectivity
Prima facie selektivnost
According to the case-law of the ECJ concerning the selectivity of a tax measure, Article 107(1) TFEU requires assessment of whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a national measure is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued by the scheme, are in a comparable factual and legal situation [24].
V skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti glede selektivnosti davčnega ukrepa člen 107(1) PDEU zahteva oceno, ali nacionalni ukrep po določenem zakonskem sistemu daje prednost „posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga“ v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji ali proizvodnjo blaga, ki so z vidika cilja, za katerega si sistem prizadeva, v primerljivem stvarnem in pravnem položaju [24].
Consequently, when assessing the selectivity of a tax provision, the Commission must first determine the general or ‘usual’ rules applicable to the field of taxation concerned under the existing tax system (‘system of reference’).
Zato mora Komisija pri ocenjevanju selektivnosti davčnega ukrepa najprej določiti splošna ali „običajna“ pravila, ki veljajo na področju obdavčitve znotraj obstoječega davčnega sistema („referenčni sistem“).
It must then determine whether the measure is an exception to the system of reference by differentiating between economic operators who, in the light of the objective pursued by the tax system of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal situation.
Nato mora določiti, ali ukrep odstopa od pravil referenčnega sistema, in sicer s primerjavo gospodarskih subjektov, ki so z vidika cilja, ki si ga prizadeva doseči davčni sistem države članice, v primerljivem stvarnem in pravnem položaju.
System of reference
Referenčni sistem
The Commission is of the opinion that the system of reference is the German corporate income tax system in its present form, and in particular the rules on tax loss carry-forward for companies subject to change in their shareholding, which are laid down in §8c(1) KStG.
Komisija meni, da je referenčni sistem nemški sistem plačevanja davka od dobička pravnih oseb v sedanji obliki in zlasti pravila o prenosu davčnih izgub za podjetja, v katerih se lahko spremeni lastništvo in so navedena v členu 8c(1) KStG.
As described above in recital 10, under this rule unused losses are forfeited entirely if more than 50 % of the ownership rights are transferred to an acquirer; they are forfeited pro rata if, within a period of five years, more than 25 % but less than 50 % of the ownership rights is transferred.
Kot je opisano zgoraj v uvodni izjavi 10, po tem pravilu neizrabljene izgube v celoti zapadejo, če se več kot 50 % lastniških pravic prenese na prevzemnika; če se v obdobju petih let prenese več kot 25 %, vendar manj kot 50 % lastniških pravic, izgube zapadejo sorazmerno.
The Commission therefore concludes that forfeiture of losses is the general rule, i.e. the system of reference, in the case of a change of ownership of a company.
Komisija torej zaključuje, da je zapadlost izgub splošno pravilo, tj. referenčni sistem, v primeru spremembe lastništva podjetja.
The Commission notes that it had already used §8c(1) KStG as a system of reference in a previous case [25].
Komisija ugotavlja, da je člen 8c(1) KStG že uporabila kot referenčni sistem v eni od prejšnjih zadev [25].
There, the Commission declared incompatible with the internal market an exception to §8c(1) KStG allowing companies acquired by venture capital companies to carry forward losses despite the change in ownership.
V tej zadevi je Komisija za nezdružljivo z notranjim trgom razglasila izjemo iz člena 8c(1) KStG, ki podjetjem, ki jih prevzamejo družbe za tvegani kapital, dovolijo prenos izgub kljub spremembi lastništva.
The reasoning developed in that decision also applies to this case.
Argumenti, ki so se izoblikovali v tem sklepu, prav tako veljajo za to zadevo.
Differentiation between companies in a comparable factual and legal situation in the light of the objective of the tax system
Razlikovanje med podjetji v primerljivem stvarnem in pravnem položaju z vidika cilja davčnega sistema
By way of departure from the reference scenario, §8c(1a) KStG enables companies that are, or are at risk of being, insolvent or over-indebted at the time of their acquisition for the purpose of restructuring to carry forward their losses, provided that certain conditions are met (see recital 14).
Z oddaljevanjem od referenčnega scenarija člen 8c(1a) KStG omogoča družbam, ki so ali bi lahko bile v času prevzema plačilno nesposobne ali prekomerno zadolžene, da za namen prestrukturiranja prenesejo izgube, če izpolnjujejo določene pogoje (glej uvodno izjavo 14)).
Germany argues that the objective of §8c(1a) KStG is to remove a tax obstacle to the restructuring of undertakings in difficulty.
Nemčija trdi, da je cilj člena 8c(1a) KStG odpraviti davčno oviro za prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah.
In the light of the objective of the tax system, only undertakings in difficulty are in a comparable factual and legal situation.
Z vidika cilja davčnega sistema so samo podjetja v težavah v primerljivem stvarnem in pravnem položaju.
Since §8c(1a) KStG applies to all undertakings in difficulty, it is not selective.
Ker člen 8c(1a) KStG velja za vsa podjetja v težavah, ni selektiven.
Germany takes the view that the judgments in DMT [26] and HAMSA [27] support this position.
Nemčija meni, da sodbi v zadevah DMT [26] in HAMSA [27] podpirata to stališče.
Germany contends that the Court and the General Court concluded that the measures in these cases were selective because they required discretionary decisions by the public authorities.
Nemčija trdi, da sta Sodišče in Splošno sodišče odločili, da so ukrepi v teh zadevah selektivni, ker so zahtevali diskrecijske odločitve javnih organov.
It follows a contrario from these judgments that a measure applicable to all undertakings in difficulty, and which does not leave any discretion to the public authorities, is not selective.
Iz teh sodb nasprotno sledi, da ukrep, ki velja za vsa podjetja v težavah in ki ne dopušča diskrecije javnih organov, ni selektiven.
The Commission would point out first that the objective of the tax system must be established at the level of the system of reference rather than at the level of the exception [28].
Komisija je najprej poudarila, da je treba cilj davčnega sistema izoblikovati na ravni referenčnega sistema in ne na ravni izjeme [28].
The objective of the corporate income tax system is to generate revenue for the budget.
Cilj sistema plačevanja davka od dobička pravnih oseb je ustvariti prihodke za proračun.
The question arises whether this objective is taken into account where companies unduly reduce their tax base by using loss carry-forwards from shell companies.
Pojavi se vprašanje, ali se ta cilj upošteva pri podjetjih, ki neupravičeno zmanjšujejo svojo davčno osnovo s prenosi izgub iz slamnatih podjetij.
§8c(1) KStG is intended to prevent companies which change ownership from carrying forward their losses.
Namen člena 8c(1) KStG je preprečevanje prenosa izgub družbam, ki spremenijo lastništvo.
This is clear from the explanatory memorandum to the law which introduced §8c(1) KStG and repealed §8(4) KStG [29].
To je razvidno iz obrazložitvenega memoranduma k zakonu, ki je uvedel člen 8c(1) KStG in razveljavil člen 8(4) KStG [29].
Therefore, all companies which change ownership are, in the light of the objective of the tax system, in a comparable factual and legal situation.
Tako so torej vsa podjetja, ki spremenijo lastništvo, z vidika cilja davčnega sistema v primerljivem stvarnem in pravnem položaju.