natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As regards Alcoa, Italy submits that the original Alumix tariff laid down in the 1995 Decree was declared by the Commission not to constitute State aid on the ground that it was objectively related to the smelter’s consumption patterns and reflected the specificities of energy supply and demand in the regions concerned.
Italija trdi, da je Komisija v zvezi z družbo Alcoa razglasila, da prvotna cena Alumix iz odloka iz leta 1995 ne pomeni državne pomoči, ker je objektivno povezana z vzorci porabe talilnic ter upošteva značilnosti oskrbe z energijo in povpraševanja v zadevnih regijah.
According to Italy, the 2004 Decree is based on the same factual elements which led the Commission to conclude that there was no State aid, while also taking into account the current crisis in the metal sector in Sardinia.
Italija meni, da odlok iz leta 1994 temelji na dejstvih, na podlagi katerih je Komisija ugotovila, da ne gre za državno pomoč, pri čemer se je upoštevala tudi takratna kriza v sektorju kovin na Sardiniji.
The difference between the old and the new system, in its view, only concerns the tariff structure.
Po njenem mnenju je razlika med starim in novim sistemom povezana le s strukturo cen.
Italy maintains that these changes became necessary following the launch of the internal energy market and in order to guarantee tariff neutrality.
Italija trdi, da so bile te spremembe potrebne po vzpostavitvi notranjega trga z električno energijo in za zagotavljanje nevtralnosti cen.
More particularly, Italy submits that the Alcoa tariff does not fall under the prohibition of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty because it does not involve the transfer of State resources and is unable to distort competition and affect intra-community trade.
Italija zlasti trdi, da cena za družbo Alcoa ni zajeta v prepoved iz člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, ker ne vključuje prenosa državnih sredstev ter ne more izkrivljati konkurence in vplivati na trgovino znotraj Skupnosti.
As regards the involvement of State resources, Italy maintains that the tariff system is entirely comparable with the arrangement which was declared by the Court not to involve State resources in the PreussenElektra case.
Kar zadeva uporabo državnih sredstev, Italija meni, da je sistem cen v celoti primerljiv z ureditvijo, za katero je Sodišče v zadevi PreussenElektra razglasilo, da ne vključuje državnih sredstev.
The Equalisation Fund, as the technical accounting body for the system, cannot freely dispose of the financial resources it handles.
Izravnalni sklad kot tehnični računovodski organ sistema ne more prosto razpolagati s finančnimi sredstvi, s katerimi upravlja.
The fact that the AEEG and the Ministry of Finance exercise a measure of control over the Equalisation Fund’s activities does not mean that the State is in a position to dispose freely of those resources.
Dejstvo, da AEEG in ministrstvo za finance izvajata ukrep nadzora nad dejavnostmi izravnalnega sklada, ne pomeni, da lahko država prosto razpolaga s temi sredstvi.
As for the impact on intra-community trade, Italy’s line of reasoning is identical to Alcoa’s (see recitals 86 to 90).
Kar zadeva vpliv na trgovino znotraj Unije, se Italija strinja z mnenjem družbe Alcoa (glej uvodne izjave 86 do 90).
The Sardinian tariff is compatible with regional aid rules
Cena za Sardinijo je združljiva s pravili o regionalni pomoči
According to Italy, the tariff applicable in Sardinia can in any event be considered compatible with the common market as regional aid, in view of the following.
Italija meni, da je mogoče ceno za Sardinijo v vsakem primeru obravnavati kot regionalno pomoč, ki je združljiva s skupnim trgom, glede na naslednje ugotovitve.
The imperfections of the market for electricity in Sardinia constitute a regional handicap, which the tariff seeks to alleviate.
Nepopolnost trga z električno energijo na Sardiniji je regionalna ovira, ki naj bi se ublažila z zadevno ceno.
The tariff has positive repercussions on employment and the maintenance of the social and economic fabric of the island.
Cena pozitivno vpliva na zaposlovanje ter ohranjanje socialne in ekonomske strukture na otoku.
It is proportionate to the disadvantages faced by the beneficiary, and is short-term and transitional.
Sorazmerna je s pomanjkljivostmi upravičenca ter je kratkoročna in prehodna.
No State aid
Ne gre za državno pomoč
Italy did not deem it necessary under the State aid rules to notify the extension of the tariff provided for by Article 11(11) of Law No 80/2005 on the ground that the measure still does not constitute State aid.
Italija je menila, da v skladu s pravili o državni pomoči podaljšanja veljavnosti cene iz člena 11(11) zakona št. 80/2005 ni treba priglasiti, ker zadevni ukrep še vedno ne pomeni državne pomoči.
Indeed Italy considers that the prolongation of a measure that is not State aid is different from the prolongation of an aid measure, in that only the latter can be viewed as new aid.
Italija meni, da se podaljšanje veljavnosti ukrepa, ki ni državna pomoč, razlikuje od podaljšanja ukrepa pomoči, ker se lahko podaljšanje ukrepa pomoči obravnava kot nova pomoč.
Italy substantiates this claim by referring to the paragraph in the Alumix decision in which the Commission declares that ‘the restructuring and the restoration of Alumix’s operations to viability ensures that the development of those areas is not short-lived but rather a long-term one’.
Italija je to trditev utemeljila s sklicevanjem na odstavek iz odločbe Alumix, v katerem Komisija določa, da „se s prestrukturiranjem in ponovno vzpostavitvijo sposobnosti preživetja dejavnosti družbe Alumix zagotavlja dolgoročen in ne kratkoročen razvoj zadevnih območij“.
No advantage, no State resources and no impact on trade
Neobstoj prednosti, državna sredstva niso vključena in ni vpliva na trgovino
Italy maintains that the tariff does not entail an advantage, based on the same considerations developed by Alcoa and outlined in recitals 80 to 85, does not have an impact on trade (see recitals 86 to 90) or involve the transfer of State resources (see recital 115).
Italija trdi, da cena ne pomeni prednosti na podlagi ugotovitev, ki jih je oblikovala družba Alcoa in ki so opisane v uvodnih izjavah 80 do 85, ne vpliva na trgovino (glej uvodne izjave 86 do 90) in ne vključuje prenosa državnih sredstev (glej uvodno izjavo 115).
Italy refers to the overcapacity in electricity generation prevailing in Sardinia and underlines that, in such a situation, Alcoa would normally have significant bargaining power and would obtain a competitive price only slightly higher than the marginal production cost of the generator.
Italija se sklicuje na presežno zmogljivost proizvodnje električne energije na Sardiniji in poudarja, da bi imela družba Alcoa v takih okoliščinah običajno veliko pogajalsko moč in bi dosegla konkurenčno ceno, ki bi bila le malo višja od mejnih proizvodnih stroškov proizvajalca.
The fact that this is not possible in Sardinia is due, according to Italy, to the behaviour of the dominant operator which can set the price in Sardinia and has no commercial interest in selling at a lower price, knowing that Alcoa cannot purchase the electricity it needs anywhere else.
Dejstvo, da to na Sardiniji ni mogoče, je po mnenju Italije posledica ravnanja prevladujočega nosilca dejavnosti, ki lahko določi ceno na Sardiniji in nima poslovnega interesa za prodajo po nižji ceni, ker se zaveda, da družba Alcoa ne more kupiti električne energije nikjer drugje.
Moreover, in a duopoly situation (ENEL and ENDESA, now E.ON [57], both operators may have an interest in charging a price which is higher than the economically optimal price, in order to avoid setting ‘a bad precedent’ in the rest of Italy.
Poleg tega je lahko v duopolnem položaju v interesu obeh nosilcev dejavnosti (ENEL in ENDESA, zdaj E.ON [57], da zaračunavata ceno, ki je višja od ekonomsko optimalne cene, da bi preprečila „slab zgled“ za ostalo Italijo.
Given the substantial market power retained by the former monopoly, ENEL [58], Italy comes to the conclusion that there is no substantial difference between the price granted to Alcoa in a monopoly situation (approved by the Commission in Alumix) and the tariff applicable in the current, highly imperfect, market conditions.
Italija glede na veliko tržno moč nekdanjega monopola družbe ENEL [58] ugotavlja, da ni bistvene razlike med ceno, odobreno družbi Alcoa v monopolnih okoliščinah (ki jo je odobrila Komisija v odločbi Alumix), in ceno, ki se uporablja v sedanjih, zelo nepopolnih tržnih pogojih.
Italy also disputes the reference to average IPEX prices on the same grounds as those described above in recital 83.
Italija prav tako spodbija sklicevanje na povprečne cene IPEX, pri čemer so njeni razlogi enaki kot v uvodni izjavi 83 zgoraj.
The measure is not unlawful
Ukrep ni nezakonit
It is also, in its view, incorrect to classify the measure as unlawful aid.
Italija tudi meni, da je opredelitev ukrepa kot nezakonita pomoč nepravilna.
The tariff is justified
Cena je utemeljena
Italy contends that, in its assessment, the Commission should also take into account the conclusions of the first report of the High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment, which singled out two new factors which have constrained aluminium production in recent years, namely the globalisation of the reference market for aluminium and the launch of the internal market for energy.
Italija trdi, da mora Komisija v svoji oceni upoštevati sklepe prvega poročila skupine na visoki ravni za konkurenčnost, energijo in okolje, ki je opozorila na dva nova dejavnika, zaradi katerih je bila proizvodnja aluminija v zadnjih letih omejena, to sta globalizacija referenčnega trga aluminija in vzpostavitev notranjega energetskega trga.
Italy points out that the other circumstances which the Commission took into account in the Alumix decision have also remained unchanged, notably the specific consumption patterns of aluminium smelters and the insufficient degree of liberalisation of the electricity market.
Italija poudarja, da se druge okoliščine, ki jih je Komisija upoštevala v odločbi Alumix, prav tako niso spremenile, zlasti posamezni vzorci porabe talilnic aluminija in nezadostna stopnja liberalizacije trga z električno energijo.
Italy contends that, pending the full liberalisation of the market, it is necessary to prolong the preferential electricity tariffs and any similar instruments introduced by other Member States in order to safeguard and enhance the competitiveness of European industry.
Italija trdi, da je treba do popolne liberalizacije trga podaljšati veljavnost ugodnejših cen električne energije in vseh podobnih instrumentov, ki so jih uvedle druge države članice zaradi zaščite in krepitve konkurenčnosti evropske industrije.
The only long-term solution to reduce the cost of electricity is, according to Italy, the construction of adequate infrastructure in electricity generation and interconnection, which will effectively open the market to new entrants.
Po mnenju Italije je edina dolgoročna rešitev za znižanje stroškov električne energije izgradnja ustrezne infrastrukture na področju proizvodnje električne energije in medsebojno povezovanje, s čimer se bo trg dejansko odprl novim udeležencem na trgu.
Italy points to the GALSI gas pipeline which will bring Algerian natural gas to Europe via Sardinia and the SAPEI marine cable system which will enhance interconnection with the Italian mainland.
Italija poudarja pomen plinovoda GALSI, prek katerega bo alžirski zemeljski plin dostopen Evropi prek Sardinije, in morskega kabelskega sistema SAPEI, s čimer se bo okrepila medsebojna povezanost s celinsko Italijo.
Italy also emphasises that the present case cannot be compared to case C 34/02, which was cited in the opening decision in 2006 to suggest that the Commission had already found that a lack of electrical interconnection capacity did not constitute a regional handicap for Sardinia.
Italija prav tako poudarja, da se ta zadeva ne more primerjati z zadevo C 34/02, navedeno v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka iz leta 2006, na podlagi katere bi bilo mogoče sklepati, da je Komisija že ugotovila, da pomanjkanje zmogljivosti elektroenergetskih povezav ni pomenilo regionalne ovire za Sardinijo.
According to Italy, the case cited concerned aid for SMEs, which are not large energy users and therefore are less liable to suffer from the lack of adequate energy infrastructure and the imperfection of the electricity market in Sardinia than undertakings like Alcoa.
Po mnenju Italije naveden primer zadeva pomoč za mala in srednje velika podjetja, ki niso veliki porabniki energije in bi jih zato pomanjkanje ustrezne energetske infrastrukture in pomanjkljivosti trga z električno energijo na Sardiniji manj prizadelo kot podjetja, kot je Alcoa.
Italy also points out that the High Level Group is aware of the need to retain on the territory of the EU energy-intensive industries, such as the ferrous and non-ferrous metal industry [59], by improving their competitiveness and in particular by favouring their access to electricity at competitive prices.
Italija prav tako poudarja, da se Skupina na visoki ravni zaveda potrebe po ohranitvi energetsko intenzivne industrije na ozemlju EU, kot sta železarska industrija in barvna metalurgija [59], ker si prizadeva izboljšati njeno konkurenčnost in zlasti spodbuja dostop do električne energije po konkurenčnih cenah.
Italy provides a detailed description of the measures adopted by other Member States, notably Germany, Spain, France, Finland and Greece, to reduce the electricity costs of energy-intensive industries and stave off their relocation outside the EU.
Italija natančno opisuje ukrepe, ki so jih za zmanjšanje stroškov električne energije energetsko intenzivne industrije in preprečitev njihove selitve zunaj EU sprejele druge države članice, zlasti Nemčija, Španija, Francija, Finska in Grčija.
Italy points out that, while such measures may take different forms, they produce the same economic effects as the Italian preferential tariff, and emphasises that it would be desirable for the EU to harmonise such measures, so as to create a level playing field between European industries and their competitors in third countries.
Italija opozarja, da imajo lahko taki ukrepi, ki so lahko različnih oblik, enake gospodarske učinke, kot jo ima italijanska ugodnejša cena, in poudarja, da bi bila zaželena uskladitev takih ukrepov s strani EU, da bi se vzpostavili enaki konkurenčni pogoji za evropsko industrijo in njene konkurenčne ponudnike v tretjih državah.
However, in the short term, the measures adopted by Italy should not be viewed as aid and should be assessed by the same yardstick as those introduced by other Member States.
Kljub temu se kratkoročno ukrepi, ki jih je sprejela Italija, ne smejo obravnavati kot pomoč in se morajo oceniti z uporabo enakega merila, na podlagi katerega so se ocenili ukrepi, ki so jih uvedle druge države članice.
Temporal and material scope of the investigation
Časovni okvir in vsebinsko področje uporabe preiskave
As a preliminary step, the Commission considers it necessary to clarify the temporal and material scope of the investigation as defined in the opening decisions.
Kot predhoden ukrep Komisija meni, da je treba pojasniti časovni okvir in vsebinsko področje uporabe preiskave, kot je določeno v odločitvah o sprožitvi postopka.
The 2004 proceedings (case C 38/A/04)
Postopek iz leta 2004 (zadeva C 38/A/04)
The need for such clarification arises from the fact that, when the 2004 Decree entered into force in April 2004, Alcoa’s preferential tariff was covered by a State aid approval (the Alumix decision) until December 2005 [60].
To pojasnilo je potrebno zaradi dejstva, da se je ob začetku veljavnosti odloka iz leta 2004, tj. aprila 2004, ugodnejša cena za družbo Alcoa krila z odobritvijo državne pomoči (odločba Alumix) do decembra 2005 [60].
Given the temporal overlap between the Alumix scheme and the provisions attacked in 2004, it is necessary to clarify whether the 2004 opening decision challenged the extension in time of the Alcoa tariff beyond the original duration of the Alumix scheme (from 1 January 2006 onwards) or whether it also called into question the Alumix scheme itself over the period April 2004-December 2005 due to the changes in its financing mechanism.
Glede na časovno prekrivanje med shemo Alumix in določbami, izpodbijanimi leta 2004, je treba pojasniti, ali se je z odločitvijo o sprožitvi postopka iz leta 2004 izpodbijalo podaljšanje obdobja veljavnosti cene za družbo Alcoa po koncu prvotnega obdobja veljavnosti sheme Alumix (od 1. januarja 2006) in ali se je izpodbijala samo shema Alumix v obdobju od aprila 2004 do decembra 2005 zaradi sprememb mehanizma financiranja.
A careful reading of the decision itself shows that it challenges, generically, the new tariff scheme introduced by the 2004 Decree in favour of the beneficiaries concerned (Portovesme Srl, ILA Spa, Euroallumina Spa and Alcoa), and cannot be interpreted as challenging the Alumix scheme itself.
S pozornim branjem same odločitve je mogoče ugotoviti, da v korist zadevnim upravičencem (Portovesme s.r.l., ILA s.p.a., Euroallumina s.p.a. in Alcoa) na splošno izpodbija novo shemo cen, uvedeno z odlokom iz leta 2004, ter se ne more razlagati kot odločitev, ki izpodbija samo shemo Alumix.
This conclusion is substantiated by the following observations.
Ta sklep je utemeljen z naslednjimi ugotovitvami.
Firstly, the assessment of the measure under challenge is global and does not distinguish between beneficiaries.
Prvič, ocena ukrepa, ki se izpodbija, je globalna in ne razlikuje med upravičenci.
In particular, Alcoa’s distinct legal position as beneficiary of the authorised Alumix tariff is neither described nor assessed in detail.
Zlasti poseben pravni položaj družbe Alcoa kot upravičenke do odobrene cene Alumix ni niti opisan niti podrobno ocenjen.
Secondly, the Commission’s observations on the substantial difference between the Alumix system and the new tariff scheme [61] set out to demonstrate only that the Alumix findings cannot be extrapolated to the new tariff scheme, given the different financing mechanism.
Drugič, ugotovitve Komisije o veliki razliki med sistemom Alumix in novo shemo cen [61] kažejo le, da ugotovitev Alumix ni mogoče ekstrapolirati na novo shemo cen, če se upošteva različen mehanizem financiranja.
Thirdly, if the 2004 opening decision had intended to challenge the original Alumix scheme, it would have mentioned the legal basis under which the original tariff had been granted (the 1995 Decree) and would have provided some explanation as to why the tariff arrangement as modified by the new regulatory framework curtailed the validity of the Commission’s findings in Alumix before the date of expiry of the scheme.
Tretjič, če bi bil namen odločitve o sprožitvi postopka iz leta 2004 izpodbijati prvotno shemo Alumix, bi bila v odločitvi navedena pravna podlaga, na podlagi katere se je odobrila prvotna cena (odlok iz leta 1995), in bi se zagotovilo pojasnilo, zakaj se je s prvotnim dogovorom o ceni, kot je bil spremenjen z novim ureditvenim okvirom, skrajšala veljavnost ugotovitev Komisije v shemi Alumix pred datumom izteka veljavnosti sheme.
However, at that date the 2004 Decree had been superseded de facto by Law No 80/2005, which took effect on 1 January 2006 (see recitals 48 and 142).
Vendar je na ta datum zakon št. 80/2005, ki je začel veljati 1. januarja 2006 (glej uvodni izjavi 48 in 142), dejansko nadomestil odlok iz leta 2004.
Therefore, the 2004 Decree is, in substance, not relevant to the present investigation.
Zato odlok iz leta 2004 vsebinsko ni pomemben za to preiskavo.
The 2006 proceedings (case C 36/B/06)
Postopek iz leta 2006 (zadeva C 36/B/06)
The wording of the 2006 opening decision does not require any interpretation: it unambiguously calls into question the prolongation of the tariff until 2010 laid down in Law No 80/2005 [62], not the Alumix scheme as such.
Besedilo iz odločitve o sprožitvi postopka iz leta 2006 ne zahteva nobene razlage: nedvoumno se sklicuje na podaljšanje veljavnosti cene do leta 2010, kot je določeno v zakonu št. 80/2005 [62], in ne na shemo Alumix kot tako.
Conclusions on the scope of the decision
Sklepne ugotovitve o področju uporabe odločbe
Since, at 1 January 2006, the 2004 Decree had been superseded by Law No 80/2005, the 2004 Decree is not directly relevant to the investigation.
Ker se je 1. januarja 2006 odlok iz leta 2004 nadomestil z zakonom št. 80/2005, odlok iz leta 2004 ni neposredno pomemben za preiskavo.
The investigation therefore focuses on one substantive measure: the prolongation of the Alcoa tariff from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2010 under Law No 80/2005 read in conjunction with the relevant regulatory provisions adopted by the AEEG.
Preiskava se zato osredotoča na en vsebinski ukrep: podaljšanje veljavnosti cene za družbo Alcoa od 1. januarja 2006 do 31. decembra 2010 v skladu z zakonom št. 80/2005, ki se razlaga skupaj z zadevnimi uredbenimi določbami, ki jih je sprejel organ AEEG.
However, given that there has been only one Alcoa tariff, regardless of the legal basis relied upon to grant it, if Italy were to consider that the 2004 Decree could be relied upon for the period January 2006-June 2007, the findings of the present decision should be considered applicable to the measure introduced by the 2004 Decree [63] as well.
Vendar če bi Italija ob upoštevanju, da gre le za eno ceno za družbo Alcoa ne glede na pravno podlago, po kateri je bila cena odobrena, obravnavala, da bi se lahko sklicevalo na odlok iz leta 2004 za obdobje od januarja 2006 do junija 2007, bi se morale tudi ugotovitve te odločbe šteti kot veljavne za ukrep, ki je bil uveden z odlokom iz leta 2004 [63].
Existence of State aid pursuant to Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty
Obstoj državne pomoči v skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe Es
A measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty if the following conditions are all fulfilled: the measure (a) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; (b) is granted by the State or through State resources; (c) is selective; and (d) has an impact on intra-community trade and is liable to distort competition within the EU.
Ukrep pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, če so izpolnjeni vsi naslednji pogoji: ukrep (a) pomeni gospodarsko prednost za upravičenca; (b) odobri ga država ali je odobren iz državnih sredstev; (c) je selektiven ter (d) vpliva na trgovino v Skupnosti in lahko izkrivlja konkurenco znotraj EU.
Both Italy and Alcoa claim that the tariff is not State aid.
Italija in družba Alcoa trdita, da cena ne pomeni državne pomoči.
As a preliminary remark, the Commission notes that, under the tariff arrangement laid down in Article 11(11) of Law No 80/2005, the State intervenes to maintain an electricity price which is substantially lower than that which Alcoa could obtain (and did obtain) in actual market conditions.
Komisija najprej ugotavlja, da v skladu z dogovorom o ceni, določenem v členu 11(11) zakona št. 80/2005, država sodeluje pri ohranitvi cene električne energije, ki je bistveno nižja od cene, ki bi jo družba Alcoa lahko dosegla (in jo je dosegla) pod dejanskimi tržnimi pogoji.
If Alcoa had been able to obtain this price directly from one of the electricity suppliers in the regions concerned, there would have been no need for State intervention.
Če bi lahko družba Alcoa to ceno dosegla neposredno pri enem od dobaviteljev električne energije v zadevnih regijah, poseganje države ne bi bilo potrebno.
Neither Italy nor Alcoa contests the proposition that, in the regions concerned, actual market prices are higher than the price actually paid by Alcoa thanks to the repayments made by the Equalisation Fund.
Niti Italija niti družba Alcoa ne izpodbijata trditve, da so v zadevnih regijah dejanske tržne cene višje od cene, ki jo je družba Alcoa dejansko plačala zaradi vračil iz izravnalnega sklada.