natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As indicated in recital 50 of the Decision of 3 December 2008, the Commission cannot accept that the MEIP is satisfied for the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 by which the Dutch State acquired FBN (including ABN AMRO N) for EUR 12,8 billion and also provided FBN with a very large amount of funding.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 50 odločbe z dne 3. decembra 2008, Komisija ne more sprejeti, da je bilo pri celovitih transakcijah z dne 3. oktobra 2008, s katerimi je Nizozemska kupila banko FBN (vključno z banko ABN AMRO N) za 12,8 milijarde EUR in banki FBN zagotovila tudi precejšen znesek financiranja, zadoščeno načelu vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
Given the then prevailing market circumstances, no buyer would have been able and willing to offer as much to save FBN [97].
Glede na takrat prevladujoče tržne razmere noben kupec ne bi mogel in hotel ponuditi takega zneska za reševanje banke FBN [97].
Moreover, additional information submitted by the Dutch State confirmed that, on 3 October 2008, the Dutch State also agreed to indemnify Fortis SA/NV for its CSA-obligations.
Poleg tega so dodatne informacije, ki jih je predložila Nizozemska, pokazale, da je Nizozemska 3. oktobra 2008 tudi privolila, da bo poravnala obveznosti holdinga Fortis SA/NV, ki izhajajo iz sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija.
That CSA-agreement would have rendered the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 even less acceptable to a market economy investor.
Zaradi sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija bi bile celovite transakcije z dne 3. oktobra 2008 za vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu še manj sprejemljive.
Without appropriate due diligence, no investor would have taken over the obligations of Fortis SA/NV under the CSA, which resulted in major liabilities at a later stage (of which the Dutch State was already partially aware on 3 October 2008).
Brez ustreznega skrbnega poslovanje noben vlagatelj ne bi prevzel obveznosti holdinga Fortis SA/NV, ki so izhajale iz sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija in zaradi katerih so kasneje nastale precejšnje obveznosti (ki se jih je Nizozemska 3. oktobra 2008 že delno zavedala).
For the Dutch State, the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 were necessary to avoid large negative spill-over effects into the Dutch banking system and economy [98].
Za Nizozemsko so bile celovite transakcije z dne 3. oktobra 2008 nujne za preprečitev negativnih učinkov prelivanja na nizozemski bančni sistem in gospodarstvo [98].
A market economy investor typically does not take such spill-over effects into account.
Vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu običajno ne upošteva takih učinkov prelivanja.
The willingness to avoid a serious disruption of the Dutch banking system and economy also explains why the Dutch State took its decisions so rapidly.
Želja, da bi se izognila resni motnji nizozemskega bančnega sistema in gospodarstva, tudi pojasni, zakaj je Nizozemska odločitev sprejela tako hitro.
A market economy investor would have taken much more time to evaluate the potential need for additional capital injections and would also have investigated the financials of the companies in more detail.
Vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu bi si vzel precej več časa za oceno morebitne potrebe po dodatnih kapitalskih injekcijah, prav tako pa bi podrobneje preučil finančno stanje podjetij.
As a result, a market economy investor – with sufficient time to carry out a proper due diligence – would have had a better view on follow-up investments and would have taken that information into account in its valuation.
Zato bi imel vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, ki bi imel dovolj časa za izvedbo ustreznega skrbnega pregleda poslovanja, boljši pregled nad nadaljnjimi naložbami in bi te informacije upošteval pri svoji oceni.
The Dutch State having to act swiftly to preserve financial stability in the Netherlands, could not behave like a market economy investor and take more time to consider the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 and the CSA-related obligations in further depth.
Nizozemska je morala ukrepati hitro, da bi ohranila finančno stabilnost na Nizozemskem, zato se ni mogla obnašati kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu in si vzeti več časa za podrobnejšo preučitev celovitih transakcij z dne 3. oktobra 2008 in obveznosti, povezanih s sporazumom delničarjev konzorcija.
Therefore, the Commission confirms its assessment that the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 were not in line with the MEIP (that conclusion was already made in the Decision of 3 December 2008, which considered those transactions to be State aid to Fortis Bank SA/NV).
Zato Komisija potrjuje svojo oceno, da celovite transakcije z dne 3. oktobra 2008 niso bile v skladu z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu (ta sklep je bil sprejet že v odločbi z dne 3. decembra 2008, v kateri so bile te transakcije upoštevane kot državna pomoč za Fortis Bank SA/NV.
As regards the existence of an advantage, the measures of 3 October 2008 taken together allowed the separation of FBN and ABN AMRO N from Fortis SA/NV and therefore conferred an important selective advantage on FBN, which was highly integrated in Fortis Bank SA/NV and in particular relied heavily on the latter for funding.
Glede obstoja prednosti so skupni ukrepi z dne 3. oktobra 2008 omogočili ločitev bank FBN in ABN AMRO N od holdinga Fortis SA/NV, zato so pomenili pomembno selektivno prednost za banko FBN, ki je bila močno integrirana v Fortis Bank SA/NV in od nje močno odvisna zlasti glede financiranja.
In the December 2009 Restructuring Plan (see also recital 78), the Dutch State admitted that, had it not intervened, FBN would have been dragged down by Fortis SA/NV.
V načrtu prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 (glej tudi uvodno izjavo 78) je Nizozemska priznala, da bi, če ne bi posredovala, holding Fortis SA/NV za seboj potegnil banko FBN.
Without the State aid measures, FBN would have remained exposed to the liabilities of Fortis SA/NV, which was on the verge of bankruptcy, and that exposure would have substantially hindered FBN’s activities.
Brez ukrepov državne pomoči bi obveznosti holdinga Fortis SA/NV, ki je bil na robu stečaja, vplivale na banko FBN, zaradi česar bi bile dejavnosti banke FBN ovirane.
By ring-fencing its activities from Fortis SA/NV, FBN was able to avoid to a large extent the problems and costs typical of a (financial) company in distress (for example higher funding costs, worse payment conditions from suppliers and counterparties, higher personnel costs to retain staff, reduction of activities and risk-weighted assets to preserve capital) [99].
Z ločitvijo njenih dejavnosti od holdinga Fortis SA/NV se je banka FBN v veliki meri izognila težavam in stroškom, ki so običajni za (finančno) podjetje v težavah (npr. višji stroški financiranja, slabši plačilni pogoji s strani dobaviteljev in nasprotnih strank, višji stroški za ohranitev zaposlenih, zmanjšanje dejavnosti in tveganju prilagojenih sredstev za ohranitev kapitala) [99].
Although ABN AMRO N remained on an operational level a separate company, the Dutch State feared contamination resulting from the fact that markets might associate ABN AMRO N with its future owner Fortis SA/NV.
Čeprav je banka ABN AMRO N z vidika poslovanje ostala ločeno podjetje, je Nizozemsko skrbel slab vpliv, ki bi nastal, če bi trgi banko ABN AMRO N povezovali z bodočim lastnikom holdingom Fortis SA/NV.
Measure Y1 – an important component of the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 – also provided a major advantage to FBN, especially given the size of the transaction and the then prevailing market circumstances.
Ukrep Y1 – pomemben del celovitih transakcij z dne 3. oktobra 2008 – je prav tako pomenil precejšnjo prednost za banko FBN, zlasti glede na obseg transakcije in takrat prevladujoče tržne razmere.
The large liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion [100] was provided when wholesale markets were virtually closed, particularly for large amounts and for companies with a relatively high loan-to-deposit ratio such as FBN.
Visoko likvidnostno posojilo v znesku 45 milijard EUR [100] je bilo zagotovljeno v času, ko so bili denarni trgi tako rekoč zaprti, zlasti za večje zneske in podjetja z razmeroma visokim razmerjem med posojili in vlogami, kot je bila banka FBN.
The fact that such a high amount of liquidity was not readily available on the market is confirmed by the fact that FBN needed several quarters to replace the short-term liquidity facility by other sources of funding.
To, da tako visok znesek likvidnosti ni bil na voljo na trgu, potrjuje dejstvo, da je banka FBN potrebovala več četrtletij, da je kratkoročno likvidnostno posojilo nadomestila z drugimi viri financiranja.
In the end, FBN repaid all the short-term funding from the Dutch State in June 2009, 9 months after the liquidity aid was granted.
Na koncu je banka FBN vso kratkoročno financiranje s strani Nizozemske poplačala junija 2009, devet mesecev po dodelitvi likvidnostne pomoči.
The refinancing was partly done via State-guaranteed debt issues [101].
Refinanciranje je bilo delno izvedeno preko izdaje obveznic z državnim jamstvom [101].
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measure Y1 constitutes State aid as it provided FBN with an advantage in the form of funding which it could not have found on the market in the then prevailing market circumstances.
Zato je mogoče sklepati, da ukrep Y1 pomeni državno pomoč, saj je banki FBN zagotovil prednost v obliki financiranja, ki ga ne bi mogla pridobiti na trgu v takrat prevladujočih tržnih razmerah.
With respect to Measure Y2, the novation of long-term loans made by Fortis Bank SA/NV, the Commission considers that measure provides a selective advantage to FBN.
Glede ukrepa Y2, prenovitve dolgoročnih posojil s strani Fortis Bank SA/NV, Komisija meni, da je ukrep banki FBN zagotovil selektivno prednost.
The information submitted by the Dutch State shows that Fortis Bank SA/NV was entitled to immediate repayment of the fixed-rate long-term loans (with a nominal value of EUR 7,9 billion) because of the ownership change at the level of FBN.
Informacije, ki jih je predložila Nizozemska, kažejo, da je bila zaradi spremembe lastništva na ravni banke FBN Fortis Bank SA/NV upravičena do takojšnjega poplačila dolgoročnih posojil s stalno obrestno mero (z nominalno vrednostjo v višini 7,9 milijarde EUR).
Thanks to Measure Y2, FBN did not have to find new funding on the market in order to repay those long-term loans.
Da bi lahko poplačala ta dolgoročna posojila, banki FBN zaradi ukrepa Y2 ni bilo treba iskati novih virov financiranja na trgu.
It could continue to benefit from the existing loans at pre-crisis rates.
Lahko je še naprej koristila obstoječa posojila po obrestnih merah pred finančno krizo.
By accepting the novation, the Dutch State provided FBN with long-term debt at pre-crisis interest rates.
S tem, ko je sprejela prenovitev, je Nizozemska banki FBN zagotovila dolgoročni dolg po obrestnih merah pred finančno krizo.
A market economy investor would not have provided these loans at pre-crisis interest rates but would have negotiated interest rates which would better reflect the then prevailing market circumstances, especially since it concerned loans for a sizeable amount.
Vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu teh posojil ne bi zagotovil po obrestnih merah pred finančno krizo, ampak bi s pogajanji dosegel obrestne mere, ki bi bolje odražale takrat prevladujoče tržne razmere, še zlasti, ker so bila posojila precej visoka.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measure Y2 constitutes State aid to FBN as it provided a selective advantage to FBN in the form of a loan at pre-crisis rates.
Zato je treba skleniti, da ukrep Y2 pomeni državno pomoč banki FBN, saj ji je zagotovil selektivno prednost v obliki posojila po obrestnih merah pred finančno krizo.
The Dutch State did not try to bring the interest rates of the redeemable loans in line with post-crisis interest rates, thereby not behaving like a market economy investor.
Nizozemska obrestnih mer odplačljivih posojil ni poskušala uskladiti z obrestnimi merami po finančni krizi, zato ni ravnala kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu.
The Commission has received sufficient information to conclude that ABN AMRO N did not receive funding through Measures Y1 and Y2.
Komisija je prejela dovolj informacij za sklep, da banka ABN AMRO N prek ukrepov Y1 in Y2 ni prejela sredstev.
It therefore did not draw an advantage from those measures.
Zato od teh ukrepov ni imela koristi.
Thus, the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 are not in line with the MEIP and provide FBN with a selective advantage.
Celovite transakcije z dne 3. oktobra 2008 niso v skladu z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu in banki FBN zagotavljajo selektivno prednost.
Those measures allowed FBN to stay on the market and to pursue its activities, without further contamination from the problems of its parent company.
Ti ukrepi so banki FBN omogočili, da je ostala na trgu in nadaljevala svoje dejavnosti, ne da bi pri tem nanjo še naprej vplivale težave njenega matičnega podjetja.
FBN also received a very large amount of funding aid which was not available on the market on such a short notice.
Banka FBN je prejela tudi zelo visok znesek financiranja, ki v tako kratkem roku na trgu ni bil na voljo.
Measures Y1 and Y2 therefore do constitute State aid while, as laid down in recital 32 of the Decision of 8 April 2009, Measure X as such does not constitute State aid to FBN but is part of a wider transaction – the separation of FBN from Fortis Bank SA/NV – which involved State aid to FBN.
Ukrepa Y1 in Y2 zato pomenita državno pomoč, medtem ko ukrep X, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 32 odločbe z dne 8. aprila 2009, sam po sebi ne pomeni državne pomoči banki FBN, ampak je del obsežnejše transakcije – ločitve banke FBN od Fortis Bank SA/NV, ki je vključevala državno pomoč banki FBN.
Applicability of the MEIP for the measures implemented after the initial aid of 3 October 2008
Uporabnost načela vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu za ukrepe, izvedene po prvotni pomoči z dne 3. oktobra 2008
However, based on the chronology of the measures (I), the common purpose of the measures (II) and the situation of the companies at the time of each measure (III), the Commission concludes that they are not sufficiently distinct to be judged against the MEIP independently.
Vendar je Komisija glede na časovno zaporedje ukrepov (I), skupni namen ukrepov (II) in položaj podjetij v času uvedbe vsakega od ukrepov (III) sklenila, da se ukrepi ne razlikujejo dovolj, da bi se glede na načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu obravnavali posamezno.
The Commission considers all measures to be part of one lengthy restructuring process [102], [103].
Komisija meni, da so vsi ukrepi del enega samega dolgotrajnega procesa prestrukturiranja [102], [103].
The chronology of measures (I) described earlier in section 2.1 and section 2.4 in this Decision shows that all measures are interrelated and were taken in a short period of time.
Časovno zaporedje ukrepov (I), ki je opisano v oddelku 2.1 in oddelku 2.4 tega sklepa, kaže, da so vsi ukrepi med seboj povezani in da so bili sprejeti v kratkem časovnem obdobju.
In addition, the merger-related measures are clearly linked to the preceding interventions.
Poleg tega so ukrepi, povezani z združitvijo, jasno povezani s prej izvedenimi posredovanji.
When the Dutch State decided on 21 November 2008 – slightly more than 6 weeks after the rescue intervention of 3 October 2008 – to merge FBN and ABN AMRO N, it could only do so because it had just rescued the two companies from bankruptcy.
Ko se je Nizozemska 21. novembra 2008 – dobrih šest tednov po posredovanju dne 3. oktobra 2008 – odločila, da bo združila banki FBN in ABN AMRO N, je to lahko storila samo zato, ker je ti dve podjetji pravkar rešila pred stečajem.
In other words, in a counterfactual scenario without the 3 October 2008 intervention, implementing the merger would not have been an option as either the two companies would no longer have existed or they would have been present only in a substantially reduced form which would have lead to a much smaller and less attractive merged entity, which the Dutch State also admits in its December 2009 Restructuring Plan (see recital 78).
Z drugimi besedami, v scenariju nasprotnih dejstev brez posredovanja dne 3. oktobra 2008 izvedba združitve ne bi bila mogoča, saj teh dveh podjetij ne bi bilo več ali pa bi bili podjetji prisotni samo v precej okrnjeni obliki, zaradi česar bi bil združeni subjekt precej manjši in manj zanimiv, kar priznava tudi Nizozemska v svojem načrtu prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 (glej uvodno izjavo 78).
All the measures had the common objective (II) of fully restoring the viability of FBN and ABN AMRO N. Immediately after the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008, it was clear that the Dutch State had merely stabilised the situation, with important operational problems still awaiting resolution, notably because of the separation of each entity from its former parent.
Vsi ukrepi so imeli skupni cilj (II), in sicer v celoti ponovno vzpostaviti uspešno poslovanje bank FBN in ABN AMRO N. Takoj po celovitih transakcijah z dne 3. oktobra 2008 je bilo jasno, da je Nizozemska samo stabilizirala položaj, pomembne težave v zvezi s poslovanjem pa so še čakale na rešitev, predvsem zaradi ločitve teh dveh pravnih subjektov od njunih nekdanjih matičnih podjetij.
Moreover, the merger was a measure needed to achieve that common goal, to fully restore viability.
Poleg tega je bila združitev ukrep, ki je bil potreben za dosego tega skupnega cilja, popolno ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja.
On a stand-alone basis, FBN’s funding position was weak as it had a relatively small retail franchise and depended to a large extent on wholesale funding [104].
Na solo osnovi je bila banka v slabem položaju, saj je imela razmeroma majhno franšizo na področju poslovanja s prebivalstvom in je bila v veliki meri odvisna od financiranja pravnih oseb [104].
ABN AMRO N had lost important product competences and a large part of its international network.
Banka ABN AMRO N je izgubila pomembne bančne storitve in velik del svoje mednarodne mreže.
Both companies faced operational issues related to, for example IT, tax and risk management and it was also uncertain whether they had sufficient scale in all the businesses in which they were active.
Obe podjetji sta se soočali z operativnimi težavami, povezanimi z, na primer, upravljanjem IT, davkov in tveganj, prav tako pa ni bilo gotovo, ali imata zadosten obseg v vseh dejavnostih, v katerih sta delovali.
The Dutch State looked at a number of alternatives and quickly decided that a merger in combination with additional capital increases was the best way to fully restore viability.
Nizozemska je preučila številne možnosti in se hitro odločila, da je združitev skupaj z dodatnim povečanjem kapitala najboljša možnost za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja.
In a merger scenario, the deposit-rich retail activities of ABN AMRO N compensated for the weak funding position of FBN, while FBN could bring larger size and international branches to ABN AMRO N. Moreover, the combined entity was in a better position to tackle practical problems and could also benefit from additional economies of scale.
V scenariju združitve so bile dejavnosti banke ABN AMRO N na področju poslovanja s prebivalstvom, kjer je bilo veliko depozitov, nadomestilo za slabo stanje sredstev banke FBN, banka FBN pa je banki ABN AMRO N prinesla velikost in mednarodne podružnice. Poleg tega je bil združeni subjekt v boljšem položaju za reševanje praktičnih težav, korist pa je lahko imel tudi od dodatnih ekonomij obsega.
The merger avoided having to rebuild each entity separately.
Z združitvijo ni bilo treba obnoviti vsakega subjekta posebej.
With respect to the situation of the companies at the time of each measure (III), the Commission notes that the viability of the companies was only fully restored once all the measures were implemented.
Glede položaja, v katerem sta bili podjetji v času uvedbe vsakega ukrepa (III), Komisija meni, da je bilo uspešno poslovanje v celoti ponovno vzpostavljeno šele po uvedbi vseh ukrepov.
They were not viable at an intermediate stage, such as on 21 November 2008 when the decision to merge was taken.
Podjetji nista uspešno poslovali v vmesnem obdobju, na primer dne 21. novembra 2008, ko je bila sprejeta odločitev o združitvi.
In that regard, the Commission underlines that at the end of December 2008, and so after the decision to merge, FBN threatened to fall below the minimum capital requirements of the DNB, because it had to take a write-down on ABN AMRO N. ABN AMRO N was still in the books of FBN for a valuation which was no longer realistic [105] after the valuation used in Measure X and therefore a write-down had become inevitable.
S tem v zvezi Komisija poudarja, da je banki FBN konec decembra 2008, torej po odločitvi glede združitve, grozilo, da bo padla pod minimalne kapitalske zahteve organa DNB, ker je morala odpisati banko ABN AMRO N. Banka ABN AMRO N je bila še vedno knjižena v knjigah banke FBN za oceno, ki po oceni, uporabljeni za ukrep Z, ni bila več realna [105], zaradi česar je bil odpis neizogiben.
In order to sort out FBN’s capital problem, the Dutch State acquired ABN AMRO N from FBN for EUR 6,5 billion and took further corrective capital action at the end of 2009 with the conversion of Tier 2 capital into Tier 1 capital (see recital 121 and footnote 52 of this Decision).
Da bi uredila težave banke FBN s kapitalom, je Nizozemska za 6,5 milijarde EUR od banke FBN odkupila banko ABN AMRO N in konec leta 2009 sprejela nadaljnje korektivne ukrepe v zvezi s kapitalom ter kapital drugega reda pretvorila v kapital prvega reda (glej uvodno izjavo 121 in opombo 52 tega sklepa).
Declarations of the Dutch State, […] and […] confirm that FBN and ABN AMRO N still faced important viability-related issues after the 3 October 2008 integrated transactions [106].
Izjave Nizozemske, […] in […] potrjujejo, da sta se banki po celovitih transakcijah z dne 3. oktobra 2008 še vedno soočali s pomembnimi težavami, povezanimi z uspešnim poslovanjem [106].
The Commission also observes that the Dutch State only submitted a full-fledged restructuring plan once all the measures were decided, which indicates that viability was only then fully restored.
Komisija je tudi ugotovila, da je Nizozemska celovit načrt prestrukturiranja predložila šele, ko je bilo odločeno o vseh ukrepih, kar pomeni, da je bilo uspešno poslovanje šele takrat v celoti ponovno vzpostavljeno.
During the procedure, the Commission asked repeatedly for a detailed restructuring plan (see for instance recital 137), which was indispensable to evaluate whether the viability of an aided company has been fully restored.
Med postopkom je Komisija večkrat zaprosila za podroben načrt prestrukturiranja (glej na primer uvodno izjavo 137), ki je bil nujen za oceno, ali je bilo uspešno poslovanje podjetja, ki je prejelo pomoč, v celoti ponovno vzpostavljeno.
The Dutch State submitted on 4 December 2009 the December 2009 Restructuring Plan but that first plan still lacked important elements mentioned in the Restructuring Communication such as financial projections for a worst case scenario.
Nizozemska je 4. decembra 2009 predložila načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009, vendar so v prvem načrtu še vedno manjkali pomembni elementi, navedeni v sporočilu o prestrukturiranju, npr. finančne napovedi za najslabši možni scenarij.
According to it the transition management team of ABN AMRO Group needed time to prepare a plan and could not have a complete view on the future shape of the group before the merger was implemented.
Po mnenju Nizozemske je skupina za upravljanje prehoda skupine ABN AMRO potrebovala čas za pripravo načrta in pred izvedbo združitve ni imela popolnega pregleda nad obliko skupine v prihodnosti.
Existence of an advantage and conclusion on the existence of aid for the measures implemented after integrated transactions of 3 October 2008
Obstoj prednosti in sklep o obstoju pomoči za ukrepe, uvedene po celovitih transakcijah z dne 3. oktobra 2008
Measure of 24 December 2008 (Measure Z)
Ukrep z dne 24. decembra 2008 (ukrep Z)