natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Nor does the derogation provided for in Article 107(3)(a) apply, which authorises aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment because the measure is not conditional on realising any type of activity in specific regions [71].
Prav tako se ne uporablja izjema iz člena 107(3)(a), na podlagi katere lahko pomoč spodbuja gospodarski razvoj območij, kjer je življenjska raven izredno nizka ali kjer je podzaposlenost velika, saj ukrep, ki se ocenjuje, ni pogojen s prejemniki, ki opravljajo kakršno koli dejavnost na območjih s posebnimi okoliščinami [71].
In the same way, the contested measure cannot be regarded as promoting the execution of a project of common European interest or remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of Greece, as provided for in Article 107(3)(b).
Na enak način spornega ukrepa ni mogoče šteti za ukrep pospeševanja izvedbe projekta skupnega evropskega interesa ali odpravljanja resne motnje v gospodarstvu Grčije, kakor predvideva člen 107(3)(b).
Nor does it have as its object the promotion of culture and heritage conservation as provided for in Article 107(3)(d).
Prav tako namen ukrepa ni pospeševanje kulture in ohranjanja kulturne dediščine iz člena 107(3)(d).
Finally, the contested measure shall be examined in the light of Article 107(3)(c), which provides for the authorisation of aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such an aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent that is contrary to the common interest.
Sporni ukrep je treba nenazadnje preučiti tudi v smislu člena 107(3)(c), ki predvideva odobritev pomoči za pospeševanje razvoja nekaterih gospodarskih dejavnosti, kadar taka pomoč ne škoduje trgovinskim pogojem v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
In this respect, however, it is noted that the contested measure does not fall under any of the applications of this subparagraph which the Commission has promulgated, or under any of the frameworks or guidelines, which define the conditions to consider certain types of aid compatible with the internal market.
Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da sporni ukrep ne spada v nobenega od primerov, v katerih je Komisija odobrila uporabo te točke, ali v okvir katere koli smernice ali okvira, ki določajo okoliščine, v katerih se lahko določene vrste pomoči štejejo za združljive z notranjim trgom.
The contested measure constitutes operating aid that artificially reinforces the competitive position of certain undertakings over other similar undertakings and is not conditional upon the realisation by the beneficiaries of any specific action aiming at the achievement of policy objectives of common interest.
Sporni ukrep pomeni pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, ki umetno krepi konkurenčni položaj nekaterih podjetij v primerjavi z drugimi podobnimi podjetji in ki ni odvisna od uspešnosti katerega koli posebnega ukrepa upravičencev, namenjenega doseganju političnih ciljev skupnega interesa.
As a general rule, operating aid does not fall within the scope of Article 107(3)(c) since it distorts competition in the sectors in which it is granted and is at the same time incapable, by its very nature, of achieving any of the objectives laid down in that provision [72].
Praviloma pomoč za tekoče poslovanje ne izpolnjuje zahtev iz člena 107(3)(c), ker izkrivlja konkurenco v sektorjih, v katerih je dodeljena, in, po svoji naravi, ni sposobna doseči katerega koli izmed ciljev, določenih v zadevni določbi [72].
Although exceptionally such aid may be granted in regions eligible under the derogation in Article 107(3)(a) of the TFEU and although certain regions of Greece are so eligible, the Commission has severe doubts whether the conditions for compatibility of such operating aid are met in the current case.
Čeprav se taka pomoč izjemoma lahko dodeli na območjih, ki so upravičena v skladu z izjemo iz člena 107(3)(c) PDEU, in čeprav so nekatera območja v Grčiji upravičena, Komisija resno dvomi, da so zahteve, v skladu s katerimi bi se taka pomoč za tekoče poslovanje lahko štela za združljivo, v tem primeru izpolnjene.
In line with the standard practice of the Commission, such aid cannot not be considered compatible with the internal market, as it does neither facilitate the development of any activities or economic areas nor it is limited in time, digressive or proportionate to what is necessary to remedy to a specific economic handicap of the areas concerned.
Po običajni praksi Komisije se taka pomoč ne more šteti za združljivo z notranjim trgom, ker ne pospešuje razvoja katere koli dejavnosti ali gospodarskega območja, ni časovno omejena, ni načrtovano postopno zmanjšanje in ni sorazmerna s tistim, kar je potrebno za odpravo določene gospodarske ovire zadevnih območij.
In light of the above, it must be concluded that the measure under review is incompatible with the internal market.
Treba je skleniti, da zadevni ukrep ni združljiv z notranjim trgom.
As stated in the Opening Decision, in view of the fact that the first acts producing the fiscal discrimination between casinos date from 1994 and 1995, the Commission has considered whether the measure in its entirety represents existing aid in the sense of Article 108(1) of the TFEU.
Kot je navedeno v odločitvi o začetku postopka, prvi zakoni, ki ustvarjajo davčno diskriminacijo med igralnicami, izvirajo iz leta 1994 in 1995, Komisija pa je v skladu s tem preučila, ali ukrep v celoti predstavlja „obstoječo pomoč“ v smislu člena 108(1) PDEU.
As concerns the casino of Thessaloniki, it is noted that it benefits from the fiscal discrimination by assimilation with the casinos of Mont Parnès and Corfu as confirmed in the Presidential decree 290/1995, based on the Law of 1953, as described herein above.
Igralnici v Solunu diskriminacija zagotavlja koristi, saj se obravnava enako kot igralnica Mont Parnès in igralnica na Krfu, kar je bilo potrjeno s predsedniškim odlokom 290/1995, izdanim v skladu z zakonom iz leta 1953, kot je bilo že pojasnjeno.
The regime applicable to Thessaloniki is intimately linked to the regime applicable to Mont Parnès and Corfu.
Režim, ki velja za igralnico v Solunu, je tesno povezan z režimoma, ki veljata za igralnico Mont Parnès in igralnico na Krfu.
As described by the Greek authorities [73], when the issue of the price of admission tickets was raised after 1995, the management of the Thessaloniki casino asked that it be set at the same level as that of the Casino Mont Parnès, i.e. at EUR 6, and this request was accepted, following an opinion from the Legal Council of State (Opinion 631/1997/EC).
Grški organi so poročali, da je bilo po letu 1995 izpostavljeno vprašanje višine vstopnine in direktor igralnice v Solunu je zahteval, da se cena za igralnico v Solunu določi na enaki ravni kot za Mont Parnès, tj. 6 EUR; po pridobitvi mnenja državnega pravnega sveta (mnenje 631/1997/ES) je bila ta zahteva sprejeta [73].
Therefore it can be assumed that, had the treatment of Mont Parnès and Corfu changed in 2003 and had the two casinos passed to EUR 15 at that time, then the treatment of casino Thessaloniki would also have changed.
Zato se lahko predpostavlja, da če bi se obravnava igralnice Mont Parnès in igralnice na Krfu leta 2003 spremenila, tako da bi morali zaračunavati ceno v višini 15 EUR, bi se spremenila tudi obravnava igralnice v Solunu.
However, this was not the case, and the fiscal discrimination was maintained by virtue of national provisions.
Vendar se to ni zgodilo in davčna diskriminacija se je ohranila na podlagi nacionalnih določb.
None of the measures described above, benefiting the beneficiary casinos, were ever notified to nor approved by the Commission, certainly not under the EU State aid rules.
Nobeden od ukrepov, ki zagotavljajo korist nekaterim igralnicam in so opisani zgoraj, ni bil nikoli priglašen ali odobren s strani Komisije, zlasti ne na podlagi pravil EU o državni pomoči.
The Commission recalls that pursuant to Article 15 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules of application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [74], the powers of the Commission to recover aid shall be subject to a limitation period of 10 years.
Člen 15 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES [74] navaja, da imajo pooblastila Komisije za zahtevo po vračilu pomoči desetletni zastaralni rok.
The limitation period shall be suspended for as long as the decision of the Commission is the subject of proceedings pending before the Court of Justice.
Zastaranje se zadrži tako dolgo, dokler je odločba Komisije v postopku pred Sodiščem Evropske unije.
Any aid with regard to which the limitation period has expired, shall be deemed to be existing aid.
Kakršna koli pomoč, pri kateri se je zastaralni rok iztekel, se šteje za „obstoječo pomoč“.
However, pursuant to Article 1(c) of the same regulation, alterations to existing aid constitute new aid.
Vendar v skladu s členom 1(c) iste uredbe kakršna koli sprememba „obstoječe pomoči“ pomeni „novo pomoč“.
The Commission observes that according to the case-law of the EU Courts ‘the limitation period provided for in Article 15 of the Regulation on State aid procedure, which does not in any way express a general principle whereby new aid is transformed into existing aid but merely precludes recovery of aid established more then 10 years before the Commission first intervened’ [75].
Komisija ugotavlja, da v skladu s sodno prakso sodišč EU „zastaralni rok iz člena 15 uredbe o postopkih glede državne pomoči […] nikakor ne izraža splošnega načela, s katerim se nova pomoč spremeni v obstoječo pomoč, ampak zgolj izključuje vračilo pomoči, dodeljene več kot 10 let pred prvim posredovanjem Komisije“ [75].
Therefore, any aid awarded under this measure as of 21 October 1999 (10 years before the day on which the Commission forwarded the complaint to the Greek State and requested information) is new and unlawful aid, which has been put into effect without prior notification or decision of the Commission, subject to the application of Article 15 of the Procedural Regulation as regards recovery (as further described herein below).
Zato je vsaka pomoč, dodeljena na podlagi tega ukrepa na dan 21. oktobra 1999 ali po tem datumu (kar je deset let pred datumom, ko je Komisija posredovala pritožbo grški državi in zahtevala informacije), nova in nezakonita pomoč, ki se je začela uporabljati brez predhodnega obvestila ali sklepa Komisije, ob upoštevanju člena 15 postopkovne uredbe glede vračila, kot je podrobneje pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju.
Quantification and recovery
Določitev višine pomoči in njena izterjava
The contested measure was implemented without having been notified in advance to the Commission in accordance with Article 108(3) of the TFEU.
Sporni ukrep je bil uveden brez predhodne priglasitve Komisiji v skladu s členom 108(3) PDEU.
Therefore, the measure constitutes unlawful aid.
Zato ta ukrep pomeni nezakonito pomoč.
Where unlawfully granted State aid is found to be incompatible with the internal market, the consequence of such a finding is that the aid should be recovered from the recipients, unless this would be contrary to a general principle of law, pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Člen 14 postopkovne uredbe navaja, da če je bila pomoč dodeljena nezakonito in ni združljiva z notranjim trgom, jo morajo upravičenci vrniti, razen če bi bilo to v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava.
Through recovery of the aid, the competitive position that existed before it was granted is restored as far as this is possible.
Vračilo pomoči je namenjeno ponovni vzpostavitvi konkurenčnega položaja, ki je obstajal pred dodelitvijo pomoči, če je to mogoče.
No arguments raised by the Greek authorities or by Mont Parnès justified a general departure from this basic principle.
Nobeden od argumentov, ki so jih izpostavili grški organi ali Mont Parnès, ne upravičuje odklona od tega osnovnega načela.
The Commission observes that Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 provides that ‘the Commission shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of community law’.
Člen 14(1) Uredba (ES) št. 659/1999 določa, da „Komisija ne zahteva vračila pomoči, če bi bilo to v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava Skupnosti“.
The case-law of the Court of Justice and the Commission’s own decision-making practice have, amongst others, established that where, as a result of the Commission’s actions, legitimate expectations exist on the part of the beneficiary of a measure that the aid has been granted in accordance with EU law, then an order to recover the aid would infringe a general principle of EU law [76].
V skladu s sodno prakso in prakso odločanja Komisije vračilo pomoči krši splošno načelo zakonodaje EU, ker upravičenec zaradi ukrepov Komisije upravičeno ocenjuje, da je bila pomoč dodeljena v skladu z zakonodajo EU [76].
In its judgement in Forum 187 [77], the Court stated that ‘the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any person in a situation where a Community authority has caused him to entertain expectations which are justified. However, a person may not plead infringement of the principle unless he has been given precise assurances by the administration. Similarly, if a prudent and alert economic operator could have foreseen the adoption of a Community measure likely to affect his interests, he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted’.
Sodišče je v sodbi v zadevi Forum 187 navedlo, da ima „pravico zahtevati varstvo legitimnega pričakovanja vsak posameznik, ki je v položaju, iz katerega izhaja, da je uprava Skupnosti s tem, da mu je dala natančna zagotovila, ustvarila utemeljena pričakovanja. Vendar se nikakor ni mogoče sklicevati na kršitev tega načela ob pomanjkanju natančnih jamstev, ki naj bi mu jih zagotovila uprava […]. Poleg tega, če lahko razumen in preudaren gospodarski subjekt predvidi sprejetje ukrepa, ki lahko vpliva na njegove interese, se ob njegovem sprejetju na to načelo ne more sklicevati [77]“.
In this respect, as concerns arguments made by the Greek Authorities and Mont Parnès alleging that any recovery of that aid would run counter to the principle of reasonable confidence of the subject of administration, in this case, based on a ruling of the Greek Council of State under national law, the Commission observes that this is a national act taken by a national authority and not an EU authority in the sense of the above cited case-law.
Grški organi in Mont Parnès so trdili, da bi bilo vsako vračilo pomoči v zadevnem primeru v nasprotju z načelom upravičenega zaupanja državljana glede na odločitev grškega državnega sveta v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo; Komisija ugotavlja, da gre za nacionalni ukrep, ki ga je sprejel nacionalni organ, in ne za ukrep, ki bi ga sprejel organ EU v okviru zgoraj navedene sodne prakse.
Furthermore this act was based solely on national law and did not in any way discuss any State aid issue or qualification.
Poleg tega je sodba Sodišča temeljila izključno na nacionalni zakonodaji in ni obravnavala nobenega vprašanja glede državne pomoči ali opredelitve katerega koli ukrepa kot državne pomoči.
In consideration of the above, the Commission cannot waive recovery based on these arguments.
Komisija zato ne more odpraviti vračila na podlagi teh argumentov.
As concerns the arguments made by Greece and Mont Parnès regarding the delayed action undertaken by Loutraki in lodging a complaint with the Commission, in connection with a principle that a right should not be exercised abusively, the Commission observes that delayed action by a complainant cannot in any case preclude from recovering unlawful aid, otherwise as deriving from the 10 years limitation period set forth pursuant to Article 15 of the Procedural Regulation.
Grčija in Mont Parnès sta trdila, da je Loutraki okleval pred vložitvijo pritožbe pri Komisiji in s tem kršil načelo, da se pravice ne sme zlorabljati; Komisija ugotavlja, da oklevanje s strani pritožnika v nobenem primeru ne more preprečiti izterjave nezakonite pomoči, pri čemer se upošteva desetletni zastaralni rok, določen v členu 15 postopkovne uredbe.
Therefore the Commission cannot follow the arguments proposed by the Greek authorities and Mont Parnès in order to exceptionally waive recovery.
Komisija zato ne more sprejeti argumentov, ki so jih za izredno oprostitev vračila predložili grški organi in Mont Parnès.
As described in the present Decision, the Commission observes that it was first through the national acts of 1994 and 1995 that both the requirement to remit 80 % of the value of admissions and the standard price of EUR 15 for the admission tickets for all casinos were set.
Kot je pojasnjeno v tem sklepu, so nacionalni ukrepi iz leta 1994 in 1995 uvedli zahtevo po plačilu 80 % vrednosti vstopnine in standardno ceno vstopnic v višini 15 EUR za vse igralnice.
However, both the requirement to remit 80 % and the standard level of the price of EUR 15 did not apply to the beneficiary casinos although they did apply to other casinos as of 1995 and have been in practice applied as such (all private casinos were licensed during 1995-96 and began implementing the measure, with the only exception of Thessaloniki casino).
Vendar pa za upravičene igralnice ni veljala niti zahteva po plačilu 80 % niti standardna cena v višini 15 EUR, čeprav sta obe zahtevi od leta 1995 veljali za druge igralnice in sta se od takrat uporabljali v praksi (vse zasebne igralnice so prejele dovoljenje leta 1995 oziroma leta 1996 in takrat začele izvajati ukrepe z edino izjemo igralnice v Solunu).
Thus, considering that de facto the fiscal discrimination resulting from the differentiation in prices of admission tickets and the related 80 % payments to the State started as of 1995, the period of implementation of the aid can be considered to begin in 1995.
Ker se je davčna diskriminacija, ki je posledica razlik v cenah vstopnic in s tem povezanih plačil 80 % državi, dejansko začela leta 1995, se lahko šteje, da se je obdobje, v katerem je bila pomoč dodeljena, začelo leta 1995.
In line with the conclusion under Section V.3 herein above (Legality of the aid), the Commission therefore considers that the limitation period of 10 years, provided for in Article 15 of the Procedural Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, applies to any aid awarded before 21 October 1999.
V skladu s sklepom iz oddelka V.3, tj. „Zakonitost pomoči“, Komisija meni, da desetletni zastaralni rok, določen v členu 15 postopkovne uredbe, preprečuje izterjavo kakršne koli pomoči, dodeljene pred 21. oktobrom 1999.
In the calculation of the amount to be recovered account must be taken that as described in the present Decision (see also paragraph 85 herein above), the Greek State forgoes fiscal revenue from the public casinos in the amount of EUR 7,20 per admission, which corresponds to the difference between the tax of EUR 12 per admission remitted to the State by the private casinos and the tax of EUR 4,80 per admission remitted to the State by the public casinos.
Izračun zneska, ki ga je treba vrniti, mora temeljiti na dejstvu, da se grška država, kot je pojasnjeno v tem sklepu (glej tudi odstavek 85), odreka davčnemu prihodku iz javnih igralnic v višini 7,20 EUR na vstopnino, kar je razlika med davkom v višini 12 EUR na vstopnino, ki ga državi plačujejo zasebne igralnice, in davkom v višini 4,80 EUR na vstopnino, ki ga državi plačujejo javne igralnice.
However, certain aspects relating to the individual situation of each casino may be taken into account for the purposes of calculating the amount of the recovery from each casino, as described below:
Vendar je treba pri izračunu zneska, ki ga mora vrniti vsaka igralnica, upoštevati nekatere vidike, povezane s položajem posamezne igralnice, kot je pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju.
As described in this Decision, the requirement under the 1995 Ministerial Decision to remit to the State 80 % of the price of admission tickets was applicable to the casinos of Corfu and Mont Parnès as of the date they were licensed under Law 2206/1994, i.e. in 2003, following Law 3139/2003.
Kot je pojasnjeno v tem sklepu, se zahteva po nakazilu 80 % cene vstopnic državi, uvedena z ministrskim odlokom iz leta 1995, uporablja za igralnico na Krfu in igralnico Mont Parnès od dneva, ko jima je bilo izdano dovoljenje v skladu z zakonom 2206/1994, tj. leta 2003 na podlagi zakona 3139/2003.
However, from the end of 2000 and until their licensing in 2003, ETA started, on a voluntary basis, to remit to the State 80 % of the price of admission tickets (at the level of EUR 6) [78].
Vendar je ETA od konca leta 2000 in do izdaje dovoljenja leta 2003 prostovoljno nakazovala državi 80 % cene vstopnic (cena vstopnic je bila 6 EUR) [78].
From this information given by the Greek authorities, and subject to further observations that the Greek authorities may wish to make (confirming or infirming the above) it can be assumed that until 2000 no payment of the admission tax was made, not even of the reduced tax (of 80 % of EUR 6).
Na podlagi teh informacij, ki so jih predložili grški organi, in ob upoštevanju kakršnih koli nadaljnjih opažanj grških organov (ki potrjujejo zgoraj navedeno ali mu nasprotujejo) je mogoče skleniti, da do leta 2000 ni bil plačan noben davek na vstopnino niti pri znižani ceni (80 % od 6 EUR).
Therefore during that period (21 October 1999-end of 2000) the amount of the recovery should be calculated using the level of EUR 12 (i.e. the full tax paid by the other private casinos, while the public casinos did not pay any tax at all) and multiplying this by the number of tickets issued during that period.
Zato je treba za prvo obdobje (od 21. oktobra 1999 do konca leta 2000) znesek, ki ga je treba vrniti, izračunati tako, da se znesek v višini 12 EUR, ki je celoten davek, ki so ga plačevale zasebne igralnice v času, ko javne igralnice niso plačevale nobenega davka, pomnoži s številom vstopnic, izdanih v tem obdobju.
Therefore the amount of the recovery for this casino should be calculated by multiplying the number of tickets issued (since 21 October 1999) by EUR 7,20.
Znesek, ki ga mora igralnica v Solunu vrniti, se zato izračuna tako, da se število vstopnic, izdanih od 21. oktobra 1999 naprej, pomnoži s 7,20 EUR.
As concerns the calculation of the amount of aid to be recovered, the Commission is not in possession of sufficient data in order to provide an accurate estimation of the amounts to be recovered from each beneficiary casino.
Komisija nima dovolj podatkov, da bi lahko natančno ocenila zneske, ki jih morajo vrniti posamezne upravičene igralnice.
However, no provision of EU law requires the Commission, when ordering the recovery of aid declared incompatible with the internal market, to fix the exact amount of the aid to be recovered.
Vendar nobena določba zakonodaje EU ne določa, da mora Komisija, če zahteva vračilo pomoči, ki je razglašena za nezdružljivo z notranjim trgom, določiti natančen znesek pomoči, ki ga je treba vrniti.
It is sufficient for the Commission’s decision to include information enabling the Member State concerned and the relevant recipient undertaking to work out themselves, without overmuch difficulty, that amount.
Zadostuje, da sklep Komisije vključuje informacije, ki državi članici in podjetju prejemniku omogočajo, da sama, brez večjih težav, izračunata ta znesek.
The Commission is therefore able legitimately to confine itself to declaring that there is an obligation to repay the aid in question and leave it to the national authorities to calculate the exact amounts to be repaid on the basis of the guidance given by the Commission in its decision.
Komisija se lahko zato zakonito omeji na izjavo, da je treba zadevno pomoč povrniti in prepušča nacionalnim organom, da izračunajo natančne zneske, ki jih je treba povrniti, na podlagi navodil, ki jih je Komisija zagotovila v svojem sklepu.
Based on the information submitted by the Member State, the Commission provides herein below the necessary guidance for the recovery.
Na podlagi informacij, ki jih je predložila država članica, Komisija v nadaljevanju zagotavlja potrebna navodila za vračilo.