natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Authority should also prevent regulatory arbitrage and guarantee a level playing field, and strengthen international supervisory coordination, for the benefit of the economy at large, including financial institutions and other stakeholders, consumers and employees.
Organ bi moral prav tako preprečiti regulativno arbitražo in zagotoviti enake konkurenčne pogoje ter okrepiti mednarodno usklajevanje nadzora v korist gospodarstva na splošno, vključno s finančnimi institucijami ter drugimi zainteresiranimi stranmi, potrošniki in zaposlenimi.
Its tasks should also include promoting supervisory convergence and providing advice to the Union institutions in the areas of banking, payments, e-money regulation and supervision, and related corporate governance, auditing and financial reporting issues.
Njegove naloge bi morale vključevati tudi spodbujanje konvergence nadzora, svetovanje institucijam Unije na področju regulacije in nadzora bančništva, plačil in elektronskega denarja ter s tem povezanih vprašanj upravljanja podjetij, revizij in finančnega poročanja.
The Authority should also be entrusted with certain responsibilities for existing and new financial activities.
Organu bi bilo treba podeliti tudi določene pristojnosti za obstoječe in nove finančne dejavnosti.
The Authority should also be able to temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial activities that threaten the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union in the cases specified and under the conditions laid down in the legislative acts referred to in this Regulation.
Prav tako bi moral Organ imeti možnost začasno prepovedati ali omejiti nekatere finančne dejavnosti, ki ogrožajo pravilno delovanje in celovitost finančnih trgov ali stabilnost celotnega finančnega sistema v Uniji oziroma njegovega dela, v primerih, opredeljenih v pogojih, ki jih določajo zakonodajni akti, navedeni v tej uredbi.
If required to make such temporary prohibition in the case of an emergency situation, the Authority should do so in accordance with and under the conditions laid down in this Regulation.
Če se zahteva takšna začasna prepoved v izrednih razmerah, bi moral Organ to storiti v skladu s to uredbo in pod njenimi pogoji.
In cases where a temporary prohibition or restriction of certain financial activities has a cross-sectoral impact, sectoral legislation should provide that the Authority should consult and coordinate its action with, where relevant, the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and with the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), through the Joint Committee.
V primerih, ko ima začasna prepoved ali omejitev nekaterih finančnih dejavnosti medsektorski učinek, bi morala sektorska zakonodaja določati, naj se Organ po potrebi o svojih ukrepih prek Skupnega odbora posvetuje ter jih usklajuje z Evropskim nadzornim organom (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskim nadzornim organom (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge).
The Authority should take due account of the impact of its activities on competition and innovation within the internal market, on the Union’s global competitiveness, on financial inclusion, and on the Union’s new strategy for jobs and growth.
Organ bi moral ustrezno upoštevati učinek svojih dejavnosti na konkurenčnost in inovativnost v okviru notranjega trga, globalno konkurenčnost Unije, finančno vključenost in novo strategijo Unije za delovna mesta in rast.
In order to fulfil its objectives, the Authority should have legal personality as well as administrative and financial autonomy.
Za uresničevanje svojih ciljev bi moral Organ biti pravna oseba ter biti upravno in finančno neodvisen.
Based on the work of international bodies, systemic risk should be defined as a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy.
Na podlagi dela mednarodnih organov bi bilo treba sistemsko tveganje opredeliti kot tveganje za motnje v finančnem sistemu, ki imajo lahko resne negativne posledice za notranji trg in realno gospodarstvo.
All types of financial intermediaries, markets and infrastructures may be potentially systemically important to some degree.
Vse vrste finančnih posrednikov, trgov in infrastrukture so lahko do določene mere sistemsko pomembne.
Cross-border risk includes all risks caused by economic imbalances or financial failures in all or parts of the Union that have the potential to have significant negative consequences for the transactions between economic operators of two or more Member States, for the functioning of the internal market or for the public finances of the Union or any of its Member States.
Čezmejno tveganje vključuje vsa tveganja, ki jih povzročajo gospodarska neravnovesja ali finančne motnje v vseh ali v nekaterih delih Unije, ki bi lahko imele velike negativne posledice za transakcije med nosilci gospodarskih dejavnosti dveh ali več držav članic, za delovanje notranjega trga ali za javne finance v Uniji ali kateri koli njeni državi članici.
The Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment of 2 May 2006 in Case C-217/04 (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union) held that ‘nothing in the wording of Article 95 EC [now Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)] implies that the addressees of the measures adopted by the Community legislature on the basis of that provision can only be the individual Member States.
Sodišče Evropske unije je v sodbi z dne 2. maja 2006 v zadevi C-217/04 (Združeno kraljestvo Velike Britanije in Severne Irske proti Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu Evropske unije) razsodilo: „iz ničesar v besedilu člena 95 ES [zdaj člen 114 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU)] se ne da sklepati, da bi morali biti ukrepi, ki jih je sprejel zakonodajalec Skupnosti na podlagi te določbe, naslovljeni samo na državo članico.
The legislature may deem it necessary to provide for the establishment of a Community body responsible for contributing to the implementation of a process of harmonisation in situations where, in order to facilitate the uniform implementation and application of acts based on that provision, the adoption of non-binding supporting and framework measures seems appropriate’ [15].
Lahko se namreč izkaže, da je, po presoji tega zakonodajalca, nujno ustanoviti organ Skupnosti, katerega naloga je prispevati k uresničitvi postopka usklajevanja v položajih, v katerih se kot primerno kaže sprejetje neobvezujočih spremljevalnih in okvirnih ukrepov zaradi olajševanja enotnega izvajanja in uporabe predpisov, ki temeljijo na tej določbi“ [15].
The purpose and tasks of the Authority – assisting competent national supervisory authorities in the consistent interpretation and application of Union rules and contributing to financial stability necessary for financial integration – are closely linked to the objectives of the Union acquis concerning the internal market for financial services.
Cilj in naloge Organa – pomagati pristojnim nacionalnim nadzornim organom pri dosledni razlagi in uporabi pravil Unije ter prispevati k finančni stabilnosti, potrebni za finančno integracijo – so tesno povezani s cilji pravnega reda Unije v zvezi z notranjim trgom za finančne storitve.
The Authority should therefore be established on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.
Zato bi bilo treba Organ ustanoviti na podlagi člena 114 PDEU.
The following legislative acts lay down the tasks for the competent authorities of Member States, including cooperating with each other and with the Commission: Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions [16], Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions [17] and Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes [18].
Naslednji zakonodajni akti določajo naloge pristojnih organov držav članic, vključno z njihovim medsebojnim sodelovanjem in sodelovanjem s Komisijo: Direktiva 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti kreditnih institucij [16], Direktiva 2006/49/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o kapitalski ustreznosti investicijskih podjetij in kreditnih institucij [17] in Direktiva 94/19/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 30. maja 1994 o sistemih zajamčenih vlog [18].
Existing Union legislation regulating the field covered by this Regulation also includes Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate [19], Directive 98/78/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on the supplementary supervision of insurance undertakings in an insurance group [20], Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds [21], Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions [22], and the relevant parts of Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing [23], of Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services [24] and of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market [25].
Obstoječa zakonodaja Unije, ki ureja področje, zajeto v tej uredbi, vključuje tudi Direktivo 2002/87/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. decembra 2002 o dopolnilnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij, zavarovalnic in investicijskih družb v finančnem konglomeratu [19], Direktivo 98/78/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 27. oktobra 1998 o dopolnilnem nadzoru nad zavarovalnicami v zavarovalniški skupini [20], Uredbo (ES) št. 1781/2006 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 15. novembra 2006 o podatkih o plačniku, ki spremljajo prenose denarnih sredstev [21], Direktivo 2009/110/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti ter nadzoru skrbnega in varnega poslovanja institucij za izdajo elektronskega denarja [22] ter ustrezne dele Direktive 2005/60/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26. oktobra 2005 o preprečevanju uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma [23], Direktive 2002/65/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 23. septembra 2002 o trženju finančnih storitev potrošnikom na daljavo [24] in Direktive 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu [25].
It is desirable that the Authority promote a consistent approach in the area of deposit guarantees to ensure a level playing field and the equitable treatment of depositors across the Union.
Zaželeno je, da Organ spodbuja usklajen pristop na področju zajamčenih vlog za zagotovitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev in enakovredne obravnave vlagateljev po vsej Uniji.
As deposit guarantee schemes are subject to oversight in their Member States rather than regulatory supervision, the Authority should be able to exercise its powers under this Regulation in relation to the deposit guarantee scheme itself and its operator.
Ker so sistemi zajamčenih vlog predmet upravnega nadzora v njihovih državah članicah in ne regulativnega nadzora, bi moral biti Organ sposoben uresničevati svoja pooblastila na podlagi te uredbe v zvezi s sistemom zajamčenih vlog in njegovim upravljavcem.
In accordance with the Declaration (No 39) on Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, the elaboration of regulatory technical standards requires assistance of technical expertise in a form which is specific to the financial services area.
V skladu z izjavo št. 39 o členu 290 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU), ki je priložena Sklepni listini medvladne konference, ki je sprejela Lizbonsko pogodbo, je za pripravo regulativnih tehničnih standardov potrebna pomoč strokovnjakov v takšni obliki, ki je specifična za področje finančnih storitev.
It is necessary to allow the Authority to provide such expertise also on standards or parts of standards that are not based on a draft technical standard that it has elaborated.
Organu je treba omogočiti, da takšno strokovno pomoč zagotovi tudi glede standardov ali delov standardov, ki ne temeljijo na osnutkih regulativnih tehničnih standardov, ki jih je Organ pripravil.
There is a need to introduce an effective instrument to establish harmonised regulatory technical standards in financial services to ensure, also through a single rulebook, a level playing field and adequate protection of depositors, investors and consumers across the Union.
Treba je uvesti učinkovit instrument za določitev usklajenih regulativnih tehničnih standardov na področju finančnih storitev, da se zagotovijo, tudi prek enotnih pravil, enaki konkurenčni pogoji ter ustrezna zaščita vlagateljev, investitorjev in potrošnikov po vsej Uniji.
As a body with highly specialised expertise, it is efficient and appropriate to entrust the Authority, in areas defined by Union law, with the elaboration of draft regulatory technical standards, which do not involve policy choices.
Ker je Organ telo z visoko specializiranimi strokovnjaki, je učinkovito in ustrezno, da se mu na področjih, določenih v pravu Unije, zaupa priprava osnutkov regulativnih tehničnih standardov, ki ne vključuje odločitev politik.
The Commission should endorse those draft regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU in order to give them binding legal effect.
Komisija bi morala potrditi te osnutke regulativnih tehničnih standardov z delegiranimi akti v skladu s členom 290 PDEU, da se jim zagotovi zavezujoč pravni učinek.
They should be subject to amendment only in very restricted and extraordinary circumstances, since the Authority is the actor in close contact with and knowing best the daily functioning of financial markets.
Spreminjati bi jih bilo treba le v zelo omejenem obsegu in v izrednih okoliščinah, saj je Organ v tesnem stiku s finančnimi trgi in je najbolj seznanjen z njihovim vsakodnevnim delovanjem.
Draft regulatory technical standards would be subject to amendment if they were incompatible with Union law, did not respect the principle of proportionality or ran counter to the fundamental principles of the internal market for financial services as reflected in the acquis of Union financial services legislation.
Spremeniti bi jih bilo treba, ko osnutki regulativnih tehničnih standardov ne bi bili združljivi s pravom Unije, ne bi upoštevali načela sorazmernosti ali bi pomenili kršitev temeljnih načel notranjega trga za finančne storitve, kot so odražena v pravnem redu Unije za področje finančnih storitev.
The Commission should not change the content of the draft regulatory technical standards prepared by the Authority without prior coordination with the Authority.
Komisija brez predhodne uskladitve z Organom ne bi smela spremeniti vsebine osnutkov regulativnih tehničnih standardov, ki jih je pripravil Organ.
To ensure a smooth and expeditious adoption process for those standards, the Commission’s decision to endorse draft regulatory technical standards should be subject to a time limit.
Za zagotovitev nemotenega in hitrega postopka za sprejetje teh standardov bi bilo treba Komisiji določiti časovni rok za odločitev o potrditvi osnutkov regulativnih tehničnih standardov.
Given the technical expertise of the Authority in the areas where regulatory technical standards should be developed, note should be taken of the Commission’s stated intention to rely, as a rule, on the draft regulatory technical standards submitted to it by the Authority in view of the adoption of the corresponding delegated acts.
Glede na strokovno znanje Organa na področjih, za katera bi bilo treba razviti regulativne tehnične standarde, bi bilo treba upoštevati namen Komisije, da se bo praviloma zanašala na osnutke regulativnih tehničnih standardov, ki jih bo predložil Organ zaradi sprejetja ustreznih delegiranih aktov.
However, in cases where the Authority fails to submit a draft regulatory technical standard within the time limits set out by the relevant legislative act, it should be ensured that the result of the exercise of delegated power is actually achieved, and the efficiency of the decision-making process be maintained.
Kadar pa Organ osnutka regulativnih tehničnih standardov ne bo predložil v roku, določenem v ustreznih zakonodajnih aktih, bi bilo treba zagotoviti, da se dejansko doseže rezultat izvajanja prenosa pooblastila in da se ohrani učinkovitost postopka sprejemanja odločitev.
In those cases, the Commission should therefore be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards in the absence of a draft by the Authority.
Komisija bi morala v takšnih primerih imeti pooblastila za sprejetje regulativnih tehničnih standardov tudi brez osnutka Organa.
The Commission should also be empowered to adopt implementing technical standards by means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291 TFEU.
Komisiji bi bilo treba tudi dodeliti pristojnosti za sprejemanje izvedbenih tehničnih standardov z izvedbenimi akti v skladu s členom 291 PDEU.
In areas not covered by regulatory or implementing technical standards, the Authority should have the power to issue guidelines and recommendations on the application of Union law.
Organ bi moral imeti na področjih, ki niso zajeta v regulativnih ali izvedbenih tehničnih standardih, pooblastila za izdajanje smernic in priporočil o uporabi prava Unije.
In order to ensure transparency and to strengthen compliance by national supervisory authorities with those guidelines and recommendations, it should be possible for the Authority to publish the reasons for supervisory authorities’ non-compliance with those guidelines and recommendations.
Za zagotovitev preglednosti in okrepitev usklajenosti smernic in priporočil s strani nacionalnih nadzornih organov bi moralo biti mogoče, da Organ objavi razloge zaradi katerih nadzorni organi niso upoštevali navedene smernice in priporočila.
Ensuring the correct and full application of Union law is a core prerequisite for the integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of financial markets, the stability of the financial system, and for neutral conditions of competition for financial institutions in the Union.
Zagotavljanje pravilne in celovite uporabe prava Unije je osnovni pogoj za integriteto, preglednost, učinkovitost in pravilno delovanje finančnih trgov, stabilnost finančnega sistema in nevtralne konkurenčne pogoje za finančne institucije v Uniji.
A mechanism should therefore be established whereby the Authority addresses instances of non-application or incorrect application of Union law amounting to a breach thereof.
Zato bi bilo treba vzpostaviti mehanizem, s katerim bi Organ obravnaval primere neuporabe ali nepravilne uporabe prava Unije, ki pomeni njegovo kršitev.
That mechanism should apply in areas where Union law defines clear and unconditional obligations.
Ta mehanizem bi bilo treba uporabljati na področjih, kjer so s pravom Unije opredeljene jasne in brezpogojne obveznosti.
To allow for a proportionate response to instances of incorrect or insufficient application of Union law, a three-step mechanism should apply.
Da se omogoči ustrezen odziv na primere nepravilne ali nezadostne uporabe prava Unije, bi bilo treba uporabiti tristopenjski mehanizem.
First, the Authority should be empowered to investigate alleged incorrect or insufficient application of Union law obligations by national authorities in their supervisory practice, concluded by a recommendation.
Na prvi stopnji bi bilo treba Organu dodeliti pooblastila za preiskavo domnevno nepravilne ali nezadostne uporabe obveznosti iz prava Unije s strani nacionalnih organov pri njihovi nadzorni praksi, ki jo sklene s priporočilom.
Second, where the competent national authority does not follow the recommendation, the Commission should be empowered to issue a formal opinion taking into account the Authority’s recommendation, requiring the competent authority to take the actions necessary to ensure compliance with Union law.
Na drugi stopnji, kadar pristojni nacionalni organ ne upošteva priporočila, bi morala biti Komisija pooblaščena, da izda uradno mnenje, v katerem upošteva priporočilo Organa in od pristojnega organa zahteva, da sprejme potrebne ukrepe za zagotovitev skladnosti s pravom Unije.
Third, to overcome exceptional situations of persistent inaction by the competent authority concerned, the Authority should be empowered, as a last resort, to adopt decisions addressed to individual financial institutions.
Na tretji stopnji bi bilo treba za obvladovanje izjemnih primerov, ko zadevni pristojni organ dolgo časa ne ukrepa, Organu dodeliti pooblastila, da v skrajnem primeru sprejme odločitve, naslovljene na posamezne finančne institucije.
That power should be limited to exceptional circumstances in which a competent authority does not comply with the formal opinion addressed to it and in which Union law is directly applicable to financial institutions by virtue of existing or future Union regulations.
To pooblastilo bi bilo treba omejiti na izjemne okoliščine, v katerih pristojni organ ne ravna v skladu z uradnim mnenjem, ki je naslovljeno nanj, in v katerih se pravo Unije zaradi obstoječih ali prihodnjih uredb Unije neposredno uporablja za finančne institucije.
Serious threats to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the financial system in the Union require a swift and concerted response at Union level.
Resne grožnje za pravilno delovanje in integriteto finančnih trgov ali stabilnost finančnega sistema v Uniji zahtevajo hiter in usklajen odziv na ravni Unije.
The Authority should therefore be able to require national supervisory authorities to take specific actions to remedy an emergency situation.
Zato bi moral imeti Organ možnost, da od nacionalnih nadzornih organov zahteva sprejetje posebnih ukrepov za izboljšanje stanja v izrednih razmerah.
The power to determine the existence of an emergency situation should be conferred on the Council, following a request by any of the ESAs, the Commission or the ESRB.
Za ugotovitev obstoja izrednih razmer bi bilo treba pooblastiti Svet, in sicer na zahtevo katerega koli izmed ESA, Komisije ali ESRB.
The Authority should be able to require national supervisory authorities to take specific action to remedy an emergency situation.
Organ bi moral imeti možnost, da od nacionalnih nadzornih organov zahteva sprejetje posebnih ukrepov za odpravo izrednih razmer.
The action undertaken by the Authority in this respect should be without prejudice to the Commission’s powers pursuant to Article 258 TFEU to initiate infringement proceedings against the Member State of that supervisory authority for its failure to take such action, and without prejudice to the Commission’s right in such circumstances to seek interim measures in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Ukrepi, ki jih s tem v zvezi sprejme Organ, ne bi smeli posegati v pooblastila Komisije, da v skladu s členom 258 PDEU sproži postopek za ugotavljanje kršitev proti državi članici tega nadzornega organa, ker ni sprejel takšnih ukrepov, pa tudi ne bi smeli posegati v pravico Komisije, da v takšnih razmerah zahteva začasne ukrepe v skladu s poslovnikom Sodišča Evropske unije.