natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Court of Justice of the European Union has consistently held that the criterion of trade being affected is met if the recipient firm carries out an economic activity involving trade between Member States.
Sodišče Evropske unije je dosledno menilo, da je merilo negativnega vpliva na trgovino izpolnjeno, če podjetje, ki je prejemnik, izvaja gospodarsko dejavnost, ki zajema trgovino med državami članicami.
Other companies in the internal market also manufacture the same products as Componenta and they are intensively traded between Member States.
Druga podjetja na notranjem trgu tudi proizvajajo enake proizvode kot Componenta, s katerimi živahno trgujejo med državami članicami.
For the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, state resources include local authority resources [6].
Za namene člena 107(1) PDEU državna sredstva vključujejo sredstva lokalnih organov oblasti [6].
Thus the transaction in question, which was financed with Karkkila’s resources, involves state resources within the meaning of Article 107(1).
Zadevna transakcija, ki se je financirala iz sredstev mesta Karkkila, tako vključuje državna sredstva v smislu člena 107(1).
Therefore, any advantage granted to Componenta in the context of the transaction which Componenta would not have received in normal market conditions would fall within the scope of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Zato bi kakršna koli prednost, dodeljena Componenti v okviru transakcije, ki je Componenta ne bi prejela pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji, spadala v področje uporabe člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
It follows that the main question in the case at hand is whether Componenta received a level of payment that it would not have obtained under normal market conditions.
Iz tega sledi, da je glavno vprašanje v zadevnem primeru, ali je Componenta prejela tako plačilo, ki ga ne bi dosegla pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji.
The Commission notes that the redemption clause in the sales contract concluded between Componenta and Karkkila can be seen as an indication that the purchase conditions offered by Karkkila were intended to encourage Componenta to keep its production site in Karkkila and close the blast furnace in Alvesta.
Komisija ugotavlja, da se lahko na podlagi klavzule o ponovnem odkupu v kupoprodajni pogodbi, sklenjeni med Componento in Karkkilo, sklepa, da je bil namen odkupnih pogojev, ki jih je ponudila Karkkila, spodbuditi Componento, naj ohrani proizvodni obrat v Karkkili in zapre plavž v Alvesti.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance [7] held that the deal was conditional but did not specify the consequences.
V sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje [7] je bilo sprejeto mnenje, da je bil posel pogojen, vendar niso bile navedene posledice.
In fact, even if the conditionality hints at the fact that the transaction might have been concluded on favourable terms for Componenta, there is no advantage for Componenta that clearly stems from these clauses.
Čeprav pogojnost namiguje na dejstvo, da je bila transakcija morda sklenjena pod ugodnimi pogoji za Componento, iz teh klavzul pravzaprav ne izhaja nobena jasna prednost za to podjetje.
Indeed, on the one hand, as will be seen below, the price paid to Componenta for the sale of its stake in KK did not exceed the market price and, on the other hand, the Commission did not find any evidence of other advantages that Componenta might have received from those clauses.
Dejansko, kot je navedeno spodaj, cena, plačana Componenti za prodajo njenega deleža v KK, ni presegla tržne cene, Komisija pa tudi ni našla nobenega dokaza o drugih prednostih, ki bi jih lahko pridobila Componenta na podlagi navedenih klavzul.
The Commission therefore assessed whether a market economy investor already holding 50 % of the shares would have acquired full ownership under these conditions.
Komisija je zato presodila, ali bi vlagatelj pod tržnimi pogoji, ki že ima v lasti 50 % delnic, pridobil popolno lastništvo pod temi pogoji.
It is established case law that ‘although the conduct of a private investor, with which the intervention of a public investor pursuing economic policy aims must be compared, need not be the conduct of an ordinary investor laying out capital with a view to realising a profit in the relatively short term, it must at least be the conduct of a private holding company or a private group of undertakings pursuing a structural policy, whether general or sectoral, and guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term’ [8].
Iz uveljavljene sodne prakse izhaja, da „čeprav ravnanje zasebnega vlagatelja, s katerim je treba primerjati intervencijo javnega vlagatelja, ki sledi ciljem ekonomske politike, ni nujno ravnanje običajnega vlagatelja, ki vloži sredstva zaradi njihove donosnosti v bolj ali manj kratkem roku, pa mora biti vsaj ravnanje zasebnega holdinga ali skupine zasebnih podjetij, ki sledijo strukturni politiki, globalni ali sektorski, ter jih vodijo dolgoročne perspektive donosnosti“ [8].
General considerations concerning the value of the shares
Splošne ugotovitve glede vrednosti delnic
The Commission communication on State aid elements in sales of land and buildings by public authorities [9] (hereinafter ‘the Communication’) does not apply directly since the case at hand does not actually concern the sale of land but the purchase of shares in a real estate company.
Sporočilo Komisije o elementih državne pomoči pri prodaji zemljišč in objektov s strani javnih oblasti [9] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporočilo) se ne uporablja neposredno, ker zadevni primer dejansko ne zadeva prodaje zemljišč, temveč nakup delnic v nepremičninskem podjetju.
However, the principles of this communication can apply since the value of KK’s shares is essentially determined by the market value of the land in its portfolio.
Vendar pa se načela iz Sporočila lahko uporabljajo, ker je vrednost delnic podjetja KK v bistvu določena s tržno vrednostjo zemljišč v njegovem portfelju.
Therefore the assessment of the value of the land owned by KK is crucial for establishing the presence of state aid.
Zato je ocena vrednosti zemljišč, ki jih ima v lasti KK, ključna za ugotovitev dodelitve državne pomoči.
In any case, the communication is based on the principle of a private investor operating in a market economy, i.e. the sale of land by the public authorities does not include elements of state aid if it is sold at a price which a private investor would have been able to obtain in normal market conditions.
Sporočilo vsekakor temelji na načelu zasebnega vlagatelja, ki posluje pod tržnimi pogoji, tj. prodaja zemljišč, ki jo izvedejo javne oblasti, ne vključuje elementov državne pomoči, če so ta prodana po ceni, ki bi jo lahko dosegel zasebni vlagatelj pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji.
The Commission considers that the appropriate starting-point of the analysis is the price that a market economy investor owning 50 % of KK’s shares would have been prepared to pay for the acquisition of full ownership.
Komisija meni, da je primerna izhodiščna točka za analizo cena, ki bi jo bil za pridobitev popolnega lastništva pripravljen plačati vlagatelj pod tržnimi pogoji, ki ima v lasti 50 % delnic KK.
A market economy operator would base the calculation of the price it would be prepared to pay on the return it could expect from its investment.
Nosilec dejavnosti pod tržnimi pogoji bi izračunal ceno, ki bi jo bil pripravljen plačati, na podlagi donosa, ki bi ga lahko pričakoval od naložbe.
In the case at hand, Componenta did not try to find another buyer.
V zadevnem primeru Componenta ni poskušala poiskati drugega kupca.
It was in its interest to sell its shares to the other shareholder.
V njenem interesu je bilo, da svoje delnice proda drugemu delničarju.
Indeed, according to the Shareholder Agreement [10] and KK’s Articles of Association [11], Karkkila had the right of first refusal on KK’s shares owned by Componenta and it had the right of redemption, if Componenta tried to sell them to a third party.
Dejansko je imela Karkkila v skladu z delničarskim sporazumom [10] in statutom KK [11] predkupno pravico do delnic KK, ki so v lasti Componente, in pravico do povrnitve, če bi jih Componenta poskusila prodati tretji strani.
These rules were a disincentive for Componenta to seek other buyers.
Ta pravila so Componento odvračala od iskanja drugih kupcev.
Moreover, any other private buyer would have been deterred from buying 50 % of the shares in KK, unless by doing so it would have acquired full control over KK.
Poleg tega noben drugi zasebni kupec ne bi želel kupiti 50 % delnic v KK, razen če bi s tem pridobil popoln nadzor nad KK.
Indeed, any new partner that did not have full control over KK would be bound by KK’s Articles of Association [12], according to which the purpose of KK was to slow down the increase in the price of land and housing in Karkkila to the benefit of the population.
Za vsakega novega partnerja, ki ne bi imel popolnega nadzora nad KK, bi veljal statut KK [12], v skladu s katerim je bil namen KK upočasniti rast cen zemljišč in stanovanj v Karkkili v korist prebivalstva.
The Commission also takes the view that a market economy shareholder acquiring full ownership would take into consideration the financing of the overall investment (EUR 2,37 million for the shares and the loan).
Komisija še meni, da bi delničar pod tržnimi pogoji, ki bi pridobil popolno lastništvo, upošteval financiranje celotne naložbe (2,37 milijona EUR za delnice in posojilo).
With respect to the reimbursement of the shareholder loan, the Commission notes that the assets in KK’s portfolio were estimated at a value of EUR 4,9 million. This value largely covered the outstanding loans of EUR 3,34 million, which means that the loan reimbursement as such did not appear problematic.
Glede vračila posojila delničarjev Komisija ugotavlja, da so bila sredstva v portfelju KK ocenjena na 4,9 milijona EUR. Ta vrednost je zajemala večino neodplačanih posojil v višini 3,34 milijona EUR, kar pomeni, da se vračilo posojila kot tako ni zdelo vprašljivo.
Finland also explained that Karkkila had planned to increase rental income after the transaction in order to cover KK’s financing and operating costs (less than EUR 40000 per year before the transaction).
Finska je še razložila, da je Karkkila načrtovala po transakciji povečati prihodke od najemnin, da bi pokrila stroške financiranja in poslovanja KK (manj kot 40000 EUR na leto pred transakcijo).
If the city became the sole shareholder it would be in a position to change KK’s Articles of Association, which limited its freedom as regards pricing policies.
Če bi mesto postalo edini delničar, bi lahko spremenilo statut KK, ki je omejeval njegovo svobodo glede cenovne politike.
Thus, from a legal viewpoint, there was nothing to prevent the city from raising rental income once it had full ownership of KK.
S pravnega vidika torej ni bilo ničesar, kar bi mestu preprečevalo, da bi povečalo prihodke od najemnin, potem ko bi pridobilo popolno lastništvo nad KK.
The Commission notes that subsequent developments confirm that cost coverage through rental income was a realistic plan.
Komisija ugotavlja, da poznejši dogodki potrjujejo, da je bilo pokrivanje stroškov s prihodki od najemnin uresničljiv načrt.
Karkkila concluded 28 long-term rental agreements, which generated the following revenue:
Karkkila je sklenila 28 dolgoročnih najemnih pogodb, s katerimi so bili ustvarjeni naslednji prihodki:
Rental income after the transaction
Prihodki od najemnin po transakciji
In addition, in return for the free-interest loan, a private investor would have expected an increase in the value of its stake in the company.
Zasebni vlagatelj bi v zameno za brezobrestno posojilo pričakoval še povečanje vrednosti svojega deleža v podjetju.
During the five years preceding the transaction, real estate prices in Karkkila had increased on average by 30 % and by some 10 % between 2005 and 2008.
V petih letih pred transakcijo so se cene nepremičnin v Karkkili zvišale za povprečno 30 %, med letoma 2005 in 2008 pa za približno 10 %.
At the same time, the population of Karkkila was expected to grow by more than 100 people per year until 2025, which, on a conservative estimate, would mean that at least 70 new homes would have to be built in the city every year [13].
Hkrati naj bi se prebivalstvo Karkkile po pričakovanjih do leta 2025 povečevalo za več kot 100 ljudi na leto, kar bi po previdni oceni pomenilo, da bi bilo treba v mestu vsako leto zgraditi najmanj 70 novih stanovanj. [13]
For these reasons, a private investor could expect a significant increase in the value of its stake in KK.
Zaradi teh razlogov bi lahko zasebni vlagatelj pričakoval znatno povečanje vrednosti svojega deleža v KK.
Value of the land
Vrednost zemljišč
As a first step, the Commission assessed whether the share purchase price paid by Karkkila entailed an advantage for Componenta because the seller would have obtained a lower price under normal market conditions.
Komisija je najprej presodila, ali je nakupna cena delnic, ki jo je plačala Karkkila, pomenila prednost za Componento, ker bi prodajalec pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji dosegel nižjo ceno.
Finland indicated the value of KK’s assets as follows [14]:
Finska je navedla naslednjo vrednost sredstev KK [14]:
Value of KK’s assets as calculated by Finland
Vrednost sredstev KK, kot jo je izračunala Finska
Current value of land
Tekoča vrednost zemljišč
Cash and bank deposits
Denarna sredstva in bančni depoziti
Shareholder loan
Posojilo delničarjev
Total debts
Skupaj dolgovi
KK’s net value
Čista vrednost KK
50 % of KK’s net value
50 % čiste vrednosti KK
It became apparent from the data submitted by Finland that the actual market prices vary significantly between different neighbourhoods and residential areas.
Iz podatkov, ki jih je predložila Finska, je razvidno, da se dejanske tržne cene znatno razlikujejo med različnimi soseskami in stanovanjskimi območji.
For that reason, the Commission focused its assessment more closely on the areas concerned.
Zato se je Komisija pri oceni bolj osredotočila na zadevna območja.
The Commission notes that Karkkila embarked on the acquisition of full ownership with a medium- to long-term perspective.
Komisija ugotavlja, da se je Karkkila odločila za pridobitev popolnega lastništva na podlagi srednje- do dolgoročnih pričakovanj.
It is not unusual in the real estate business to expect significant medium- to long-term increases in value, circumstances permitting.
V nepremičninskem sektorju ni nenavadno pričakovati znatna srednje- do dolgoročna povečanja vrednosti, če to omogočajo okoliščine.
Karkkila pursued a long-term investment strategy and sought to generate profits from increased future sales.
Karkkila je izvajala dolgoročno naložbeno strategijo in si prizadevala ustvariti dobiček od povečane prihodnje prodaje.
In the specific situation of Karkkila, Finland demonstrated that Karkkila had valid reasons to expect a major population increase in the medium- to long-term future that would lead to considerable additional housing needs.
Glede na posebne razmere v Karkkili je Finska dokazala, da je imela Karkkila utemeljene razloge za pričakovanje znatnega povečanja števila prebivalcev v srednje- do dolgoročni prihodnosti, ki naj bi povzročilo precejšnje potrebe po dodatnih stanovanjih.
The main reason was that the three municipalities to the north and west of Helsinki — Vihti, Lohja and Hyvinkää — had attracted large numbers of residents, many of them commuters.
Glavni razlog je bil, da so tri občine v severni in zahodni smeri od Helsinkov – Vihti, Lohja in Hyvinkää – privabile veliko prebivalcev, med katerimi je veliko dnevnih migrantov.
As a result, real estate prices grew rapidly and constantly and were not expected to slow down in the near future.
Posledično so cene nepremičnin hitro in stalno naraščale, v bližnji prihodnosti pa se ni pričakovala upočasnitev tega trenda.
In 2003, prices in these neighbouring municipalities were on average 2,5 times higher than in Karkkila.
Leta 2003 so bile cene v teh sosednjih občinah povprečno 2,5-krat višje kot v Karkkili.
Karkkila therefore expected that further price increases would cause people to move to Karkkila as the next logical alternative place to live, even if prices in Karkkila also rose significantly.
Mesto je zato pričakovalo, da se bodo ljudje zaradi prihodnjih zvišanj cen preselili v Karkkilo, ki je naslednji logični možni kraj za bivanje, čeprav so se tudi tam cene precej zvišale.
It did not seem unrealistic to expect real estate prices in Karkkila to double.
Ni se zdelo nerealistično pričakovati, da se bodo cene nepremičnin v Karkkili podvojile.
Although subsequent developments are not directly relevant for an ex-ante analysis of the transaction, the development of real estate prices in the three neighbouring municipalities in the years after the transaction confirmed that the forecast was realistic.
Čeprav poznejši dogodki neposredno ne zadevajo predhodne analize transakcije, so gibanja cen nepremičnin v treh sosednjih občinah v letih po transakciji potrdila, da je bila napoved pravilna.
In some instances, real estate prices were over four times higher than in Karkkila.
V nekaterih primerih so bile cene nepremičnin več kot štirikrat višje kot v Karkkili.
Another reason for expecting Karkkila’s population to rise was the scheduled renovation of the road to Karkkila — it had already been planned at the time of the transaction and was subsequently carried out.
Še en razlog za pričakovanje povečanja števila prebivalcev v Karkkili je bila predvidena obnova ceste do Karkkile – ta se je načrtovala že v času transakcije in se je pozneje tudi izvedla.
The acquisition of full ownership was also driven by official forecasts of population increases.
Na željo po pridobitvi popolnega lastništva so vplivale tudi uradne napovedi o povečanju števila prebivalcev.
An initial study had been published in 2000 by the Uusimaa Regional Council, which estimated that the population of Karkkila would grow by about 9600 inhabitants by 2025 (i.e. about 10 %), and that an additional 600 new homes would be needed.
V prvi študiji, ki jo je regionalni svet Uusimae objavil leta 2000, je bilo ocenjeno, da se bo število prebivalcev Karkkile do leta 2025 povečalo za približno 9600 (tj. približno 10 %) in da bo potrebnih dodatnih 600 novih stanovanj.
This forecast soon proved to be too conservative.
Kmalu pa se je izkazalo, da je ta napoved preveč previdna.
At the time of the transaction, Karkkila expected a much higher population increase resulting in additional housing needs of at least 70 new homes per year.
V času transakcije je Karkkila pričakovala mnogo večje naraščanje prebivalstva, ki naj bi povzročilo potrebe po vsaj 70 novih stanovanjih na leto.
This positive forecast was later confirmed by a further study carried out by the Uusimaa Regional Council on 18 August 2009, according to which the population of Karkkila was expected to grow by 100 inhabitants per year up until 2030, leading to additional housing needs of 70 new homes per year.
To pozitivno napoved je pozneje potrdila dodatna študija, ki jo je regionalni svet Uusimae opravil 18. avgusta 2009 in v skladu s katero naj bi se prebivalstvo Karkkile do leta 2030 povečevalo za 100 prebivalcev na leto, kar naj bi povzročilo potrebe po 70 novih stanovanjih na leto.
In the event, even this second forecast was topped, since 137 new homes were built in 2006 and 95 new homes in 2007.
Dejansko pa je bila celo ta druga napoved presežena, saj je bilo leta 2006 zgrajenih 137, leta 2007 pa 95 novih stanovanj.
It should also be noted that KK was by far the biggest real estate owner in Karkkila.
Poudariti je treba še, da je bil KK daleč največji lastnik nepremičnin v Karkkili.
At the time of the transaction, the actual number of real estate plots included in the portfolio was unclear, as Karkkila intended to divide and reshape some of them (in particular in the Haapala/Uusitalo area).
V času transakcije ni bilo jasno dejansko število parcel, vključenih v portfelj, ker je Karkkila nameravala nekatere med njimi razdeliti in preoblikovati (zlasti v območju Haapala/Uusitalo).
In addition, a higher number of homes per plot can be built on land for terraced housing and even more so on land for tower blocks.
Poleg tega se lahko na zemljiščih, namenjenih za vrstne hiše, zgradi več stanovanj na parcelo, še več pa na zemljiščih, namenjenih za stanovanjske bloke.
The portfolio list submitted by Finland gives fewer than 140 sites for housing (the remainder were earmarked for parks).
Na seznamu portfelja, ki ga je predložila Finska, je navedenih manj kot 140 lokacij za stanovanjske objekte (preostale so bile namenjene za parke).
With estimated housing needs of 70 new homes per year at the time of the transaction, the projected needs for the next 10 years would be 700 new homes and for the next 20 years 1400 new homes.
Glede na ocenjene potrebe po 70 novih stanovanjih na leto v času transakcije bi bile predvidene potrebe za naslednjih 10 let 700 novih stanovanj, za naslednjih 20 let pa 1400 novih stanovanj.
Given that KK had no major competitor in Karkkila, the city of Karkkila could reasonably expect to be able to sell most — if not all — the property in its portfolio.
Ker KK ni imel nobenega večjega konkurenta v Karkkili, je lahko mesto Karkkila razumno pričakovalo, da bo lahko prodalo večino – če ne vsega – premoženja v svojem portfelju.
Finland explained that Karkkila’s strategy was first to improve the value of the land it owned by reshaping and developing it, to wait for the knock-on effects of the general price increase in the area and to sell the land only at a later stage.
Finska je razložila, da je bila strategija Karkkile najprej izboljšati vrednost zemljišč, ki jih je imela v lasti, z njihovim preoblikovanjem in razvojem, počakati na posledični učinek splošnega zvišanja cen na območju in šele nato prodati zemljišča.
In line with this strategy, KK had already refrained from early sales in previous years, which explains the low level of sales in the years preceding the transaction.
V skladu s to strategijo se je KK že vzdržal zgodnje prodaje v prejšnjih letih, kar pojasnjuje majhno prodajo v letih pred transakcijo.
The Commission notes that the land owned by KK was valued differently according to the different types of land, i.e. land for detached houses, for terraced houses, blocks of flats, parks and land for public use.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so bila zemljišča, ki so bila v lasti KK, ovrednotena različno glede na različne vrste zemljišč, tj. zemljišča za samostojne hiše, vrstne hiše, stanovanjske bloke, parke in površine za javno uporabo.
The particular features of each area are described and analysed separately below.
Posebne značilnosti vsakega območja so ločeno opisane in analizirane spodaj.
Asemanranta area
Območje Asemanranta
The land earmarked for tower blocks located in the Asemanranta area is valued at EUR 2358158, i.e. about half of the value of KK’s assets.
Zemljišča v območju Asemanranta, namenjena za stanovanjske bloke, so ocenjena na 2358158 EUR, tj. približno polovico vrednosti sredstev KK.
For the purposes of the transaction, the land was valued at EUR 79,56/m2.
Za namene transakcije je bila vrednost zemljišč ocenjena na 79,56 EUR/m2.
The studies are not fully conclusive in this respect, the main reason being the lack of reference prices in Karkkila.
Študije v zvezi s tem niso popolnoma prepričljive, razlog za to pa je predvsem pomanjkanje referenčnih cen v Karkkili.
In fact, no land for tower blocks had been sold on the market in Karkkila until the transaction.
Dejansko na trgu v Karkkili do transakcije ni bilo prodano nobeno zemljišče za stanovanjske bloke.
The expert study submitted by Finland during the first investigation period (Study A) had indicated a price of EUR 50/m2.
V izvedenski študiji, ki jo je predložila Finska v prvem obdobju preiskave (študija A), je navedena cena 50 EUR/m2.
Finland has now explained that this figure was probably based on the figure used for state-funded social housing in the region and was well below the market price.
Finska je zdaj razložila, da je ta številka verjetno temeljila na številki, uporabljeni za socialna stanovanja v regiji, ki jih financira država, in je bila precej nižja od tržne cene.