natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As for the method proposed by Alcoa to assess the existence of an advantage (whether the special price is lower than the price prevailing in a fully competitive market), it must first be noted that this line of reasoning has already been rejected in the Court’s judgment (paragraph 71 of the judgment).
Kar zadeva metodo, ki jo predlaga družba Alcoa za oceno obstoja prednosti (ali je posebna cena nižja od cene, ki prevladuje na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu), je treba najprej poudariti, da je bilo tako razmišljanje v sodbi Sodišča že zavrnjeno (točka 71 sodbe).
Neither the Community courts nor the Commission take into account, in their assessment of the existence of an advantage, the conditions that would prevail in a hypothetical, better functioning market.
Sodišča Unije in Komisija v svojih ocenah obstoja prednosti ne upoštevajo pogojev, ki bi prevladovali na hipotetičnem, bolje delujočem trgu.
The conditions prevailing on the actual markets concerned are consistently taken as the reference framework, as shown, for example, in the Dutch glasshouse growers case [64], in which the Commission applied the market economy operator test to assess the existence of an advantage in certain gas prices.
Pogoji, ki prevladujejo na dejanskih zadevnih trgih, se dosledno obravnavajo kot referenčni okvir, kot se je izkazalo na primer v zadevi nizozemskih pridelovalcev v rastlinjakih [64], v kateri je Komisija za oceno obstoja prednosti pri nekaterih cenah plina uporabila preskus nosilcev dejavnosti v tržnem gospodarstvu.
Moreover, Alcoa’s argument implies that, where a market does not function properly, it would be justified for a Member State to set prices which simulate conditions of effective competition.
Poleg tega trditev družbe Alcoa pomeni, da bi lahko država članica v primeru neustreznega delovanja trga upravičeno določila cene, ki spodbujajo pogoje učinkovite konkurence.
The reasoning is that if a fully competitive market is taken as a reference framework, the prices thus set by the State will not confer any advantage.
Obrazložitev je, da cene, ki jih na tak način določi država, ne zagotavljajo nobene prednosti, če se kot referenčni okvir upošteva popolnoma konkurenčen trg.
This line of reasoning runs counter to the settled principle of Community case-law according to which ‘the fact that a Member State seeks to approximate, by unilateral measures, conditions of competition in a particular sector of the economy to those prevailing in other Member States cannot deprive the measures in question of their character as aid’ [65].
Tako razmišljanje je v nasprotju z ustaljenim načelom sodne prakse Unije, v skladu s katero „dejstvo, da si država članica z enostranskimi ukrepi prizadeva približati pogoje konkurence v nekem gospodarskem sektorju pogojem konkurence, ki veljajo v drugih državah članicah, zadevnim ukrepom ne more odvzeti značaja državne pomoči“ [65].
The Commission considers that the above principle applies equally to situations where a Member State seeks to approximate conditions of competition to those prevailing in a fully competitive market.
Komisija meni, da se navedeno načelo enakovredno uporablja za okoliščine, v katerih si država članica prizadeva približati pogoje konkurence pogojem, ki prevladujejo na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu.
Alcoa maintains, however, that this is the very method developed by the Commission in the Alumix case.
Družba Alcoa kljub temu trdi, da je to metoda, ki jo je Komisija oblikovala v zadevi Alumix.
The Commission recalls that the method followed in Alumix addressed a very specific situation.
Komisija opozarja, da je metoda, ki se je upoštevala v zadevi Alumix, obravnavala poseben položaj.
In Alumix, the tariff was allowed by ENEL, the then fully State-owned monopoly, in an electricity market which had yet to be liberalised [66].
V zadevi Alumix je ceno odobrila družba ENEL, ki je takrat imela monopol na trgu z električno energijo, ki še ni bil liberaliziran, in je bila v celoti v državni lasti [66].
In that situation, the Commission had to ascertain whether ENEL was selling at an artificially low price or behaving like a rational market economy operator.
V takih okoliščinah je Komisija morala preveriti, ali je družba ENEL prodajala po umetno nizki ceni ali pa je ravnala kot razumna nosilka dejavnosti v tržnem gospodarstvu.
Given the monopoly over electricity generation and supply held by ENEL, there was no competitive market price to which the Commission could refer to assess the existence of an advantage.
Ob upoštevanju monopola družbe ENEL nad proizvodnjo električne energije in oskrbo z električno energijo ni bilo nobene konkurenčne tržne cene, na katero bi se lahko Komisija sklicevala pri oceni obstoja prednosti.
Therefore, the Commission devised a method to identify the lowest theoretical market price at which a rational supplier would be prepared to sell to its ‘best customer’ (largest consumer with flat consumption profiles) in the specific circumstances of market in Sardinia and Veneto: a rational supplier would seek to cover at least its marginal production costs, plus a fraction of its fixed costs.
Zato je Komisija pripravila metodo za opredelitev najnižje teoretične tržne cene, po kateri bi bil razumen dobavitelj pripravljen prodajati svojemu „najboljšemu odjemalcu“ (največji porabnik z nizko porabo) v določenih okoliščinah trga na Sardiniji in v Benečiji: razumen dobavitelj bi si prizadeval za kritje vsaj mejnih proizvodnih stroškov in dela fiksnih stroškov.
However, this method cannot be applied across-the-board and out of its original context, in a situation where prices are no longer set by a State-owned monopoly but are freely negotiated on the market, and the Alcoa price can no longer be construed as an ordinary business transaction, but is clearly a subsidised tariff.
Vendar se ta metoda ne more uporabljati splošno in zunaj njenega prvotnega okvira v okoliščinah, v katerih cene ne določa več monopol v državni lasti, ampak se o njej prosto dogovarja na trgu, pri čemer cene za družbo Alcoa ni mogoče več obravnavati kot običajno poslovno transakcijo, ampak gre za jasno subvencionirano ceno.
Following the developments described above in recitals 39 to 43, the scheme no longer constitutes a tariff in the strict sense, as it is no longer a price charged by Alcoa’s supplier ENEL, or a net price financed by ENEL, but a ‘final price’ resulting from the repayment from the Equalisation Fund and the price paid to Alcoa’s supplier.
Glede na razvoj iz uvodnih izjav 39 do 43 shema ne pomeni več cene v ožjem smislu, ker ni več cena, ki jo kot dobaviteljica družbe Alcoa zaračunava družba ENEL, ali neto cena, ki jo financira družba ENEL, ampak gre za „končno ceno“, ki izhaja iz vračila iz izravnalnega sklada in cene, plačane dobaviteljici družbe Alcoa.
Therefore, the analysis developed in the Alumix decision, which examined ENEL’s behaviour, is manifestly devoid of any relevance whatsoever, as was borne out by the Court’s judgment, particularly in paragraph 132 thereof.
Zato analiza, oblikovana v odločbi Alumix, v kateri se je preučilo ravnanje družbe ENEL, očitno nima nikakršnega pomena, kot je bilo to potrjeno v sodbi Sodišča, zlasti v točki 132 te sodbe.
Since the Alumix criteria are irrelevant for the purpose of establishing whether the current tariff arrangement confers an advantage on Alcoa, the calculations provided by Italy and Alcoa which purport to demonstrate that the price still fulfils the Alumix criteria, in that it covers ENEL’s marginal production costs are equally irrelevant.
Ker merila Alumix niso bistvena pri ugotavljanju, ali daje sedanji dogovor o ceni prednost družbi Alcoa, izračuni Italije in družbe Alcoa, ki kažejo na to, da cena še vedno izpolnjuje merila Alumix, ker krije mejne proizvodne stroške družbe ENEL, prav tako niso bistveni.
In any event, the Commission considers that the calculations provided by Italy and Alcoa do not accurately reflect the price that Alcoa would ‘normally’ pay on a perfectly competitive market, even assuming — which is denied — that the generator’s marginal production cost could be taken as an appropriate benchmark.
Komisija v vsakem primeru meni, da izračuni, ki sta jih predložili Italija in družba Alcoa, ne prikazujejo točne cene, ki bi jo družba Alcoa „običajno“ plačala na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu tudi ob predpostavki, da bi se lahko mejni proizvodni stroški proizvajalca upoštevali kot ustrezno merilo, kar se zanika.
In particular, the minimum IPEX price quoted by Alcoa as representative of what Alcoa would ‘normally’ pay in a perfect market (EUR 20) corresponds to the marginal production costs of baseload plants (the cheapest plants).
Zlasti najnižja cena IPEX, ki jo družba Alcoa navaja kot reprezentativno za ceno, ki bi jo sama „običajno“ plačala na popolnem trgu (20 EUR), ustreza mejnim proizvodnim stroškom elektrarn z osnovno obremenitvijo (najcenejše elektrarne).
However, electricity from baseload plants is sold at a low price only during off-peak hours [67].
Vendar se električna energija iz elektrarn z osnovno obremenitvijo prodaja po nizki ceni le v času manjše porabe [67].
At peak times, all electricity generated (including that by baseload plants) is sold at a much higher price, since it will be set by a marginal plant which is a mid-merit or peak plant [68].
V času večje porabe se vsa proizvedena električna energija (vključno z energijo elektrarn z osnovno obremenitvijo) prodaja po bistveno višji ceni, ker jo bo določila mejna elektrarna, ki je srednje velika ali največja elektrarna [68].
Alcoa consumes electricity not only during off-peak hours but 24 hours a day.
Družba Alcoa porablja električno energijo 24 ur na dan, ne le v času manjše porabe.
In Sardinia, where no gas is available, coal-fired plants are price-setting for 80 % of the year, whereas oil-fired plants are price-setting for the remaining 20 % of the year.
Na Sardiniji, kjer plin ni na voljo, elektrarne na premog določajo cene za 80 % leta, naftne elektrarne pa določajo cene za preostalih 20 % leta.
Even using Alcoa’s very conservative estimates of marginal costs for coal (EUR 20/MWh) and oil (EUR 60/MWh) a time-weighted average would be in the region of EUR 28/MWh, which is higher than the EUR 26/MWh Alcoa is currently paying.
Tudi z uporabo zelo previdnih ocen mejnih stroškov družbe Alcoa za premog (20 EUR/MWh) in nafto (60 EUR/MWh) bi bilo časovno tehtano povprečje v regiji 28 EUR/MWh, kar je več, kot trenutno plačuje družba Alcoa, tj. 26 EUR/MWh.
Therefore, the Commission considers that, at least for Sardinia, the Alcoa tariff is below the marginal production costs of electricity generators, and that it would not, in any event, comply with the Alumix criteria, supposing — which is denied — that they were relevant.
Zato Komisija meni, da je vsaj za Sardinijo cena za družbo Alcoa nižja od mejnih proizvodnih stroškov proizvajalcev električne energije in da v nobenem primeru ni v skladu z merili Alumix ob predpostavki, da so ta merila ustrezna, kar se zanika.
Alcoa and Italy contend that the Commission is wrong in proposing to use average IPEX prices as a proxy for the market price that large industrial customers would normally pay in the regions concerned (see recital 83).
Družba Alcoa in Italija trdita, da Komisija ni imela prav, ko je predlagala uporabo povprečnih cen IPEX kot približek za tržno ceno, ki bi jo veliki industrijski odjemalci običajno plačali v zadevnih regijah (glej uvodno izjavo 83).
The Commission suggested that differences in average IPEX prices between regions could be representative of differences in bilateral prices.
Komisija meni, da bi bile lahko razlike v povprečnih cenah IPEX med regijami reprezentativne za razlike v dvostranskih cenah.
By contrast, the Commission never suggested that average IPEX prices could be a proxy for the market price Alcoa might have obtained.
Nasprotno Komisija ni nikoli predlagala, da bi bile lahko cene IPEX približek tržne cene, ki bi jo lahko dosegla družba Alcoa.
In the case at hand it is not necessary to resort to a proxy.
V zadevnem primeru uporaba približka ni nujna.
Alcoa established a contract with ENEL at a nominal price roughly equivalent, according to available information, to the standard tariff charged by ENEL for high voltage consumption sites.
Glede na informacije, ki so na voljo, je družba Alcoa sklenila pogodbo z družbo ENEL po nominalni ceni, ki je približno ustrezala standardni ceni, ki jo je družba ENEL zaračunavala odjemalcem električne energije visoke napetosti.
This contract is the benchmark against which to assess and quantify the advantage enjoyed by the company.
Ta pogodba je merilo, na podlagi katerega se ocenjuje in količinsko opredeljuje prednost družbe.
In conclusion, the tariff mitigates the charges which arise from the contract and which should normally be included in the company’s budget, and therefore, in line with well-established case-law, the measure confers an economic advantage on Alcoa [69].
S ceno se torej ublažijo dajatve, ki izvirajo iz pogodbe in bi se morale običajno vključiti v proračun družbe, zato ukrep v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso pomeni gospodarsko prednost za družbo Alcoa [69].
The Commission considers that the advantage equals the compensatory contributions paid out by the Equalisation Fund, covering the difference between the contractual price and the preferential price.
Komisija meni, da se prednost izravna s kompenzacijskimi prispevki, ki se plačajo iz izravnalnega sklada in krijejo razliko med pogodbeno ceno in ugodnejšo ceno.
This conclusion holds for Alcoa’s two smelters in Sardinia and Veneto.
Ta sklepna ugotovitev velja za dve talilnici družbe Alcoa na Sardiniji in v Benečiji.
Since preferential electricity tariffs in Italy are granted exclusively to Alcoa and a few other undertakings located in Sardinia, the advantage they confer is a selective one.
Ker so se ugodnejše cene električne energije v Italiji dodelile izključno družbi Alcoa in nekaterim drugim družbam na Sardiniji, je zagotovljena prednost selektivna.
It is settled case-law that an advantage can be qualified as State aid under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty only if it is granted directly or indirectly through State resources [70] and is imputable to the State [71].
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso se lahko prednost opredeli kot državna pomoč v skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES le, če je odobrena neposredno ali posredno iz državnih sredstev [70] in je zanjo odgovorna država [71].
As described in recital 43 the tariff under challenge is financed by means of a parafiscal charge collected by the Equalisation Fund via the A4 component of the electricity tariff.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 43, se izpodbijana cena financira iz drugih dajatev, ki jih izravnalni sklad pobere na podlagi sestavnega dela A4 cene za električno energijo.
This charge is obligatory, being imposed by means of decision of the AEEG implementing national legislation.
Ta dajatev je obvezna, saj je določena z odločbo organa AEEG, s katero se izvaja nacionalna zakonodaja.
The Equalisation Fund is a public body established by law, which carries out its functions on the basis of precise instructions laid down in the decisions of the AEEG.
Izravnalni sklad je z zakonom določen javni organ, ki svoje funkcije izvaja na podlagi natančnih navodil, ki so določena v odločbah organa AEEG.
It is also settled case-law that the yield of a levy which is obligatory under national law and is paid to a body established by law constitutes State resources within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty when it is earmarked for the funding of a measure which fulfils the other criteria of that Article [72].
Prav tako v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso pomeni donos dajatve, ki je obvezna v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo in se plačuje z zakonom določenemu javnemu organu, državna sredstva v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe, kadar je namenjena financiranju ukrepa, ki izpolnjuje druga merila tega člena [72].
Italy and Alcoa rely on the judgments in PreussenElektra [73] and Pearle [74] to substantiate the thesis that the measure at hand is not financed through State resources.
Italija in družba Alcoa se pri utemeljitvi trditve, da se zadevni ukrep ne financira iz državnih sredstev, sklicuje na sodbi v zadevah PreussenElektra [73] in Pearle [74].
Both parties claim that the funds required to finance the tariff are transferred by private entities (electricity consumers) to a private entity (Alcoa), the role of the State being confined to the adoption of a law mandating payment of the required sums, with no discretion to dispose of the funds other than in the implementation of the statutory scheme.
Obe stranki trdita, da so potrebna sredstva za financiranje cene zasebni subjekti (odjemalci električne energije) prenesli na zasebni subjekt (družba Alcoa), pri čemer je vloga države omejena na sprejetje zakona, ki določa plačilo zahtevanih zneskov, pri čemer je mogoče s sredstvi razpolagati le z izvajanjem predpisane sheme.
In particular, according to Italy and Alcoa, the Equalisation Fund cannot exercise any control over the funds and is merely an accounting intermediary.
Zlasti po mnenju Italije in družbe Alcoa izravnalni sklad ne more nadzirati sredstev in je le računovodski posrednik.
In the PreussenElektra case, the Court considered that a purchase obligation imposed on private electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity from renewable sources at minimum prices higher than the real economic value of that type of electricity did not constitute State aid because the measure did not involve any direct or indirect transfer of State resources.
V zadevi Preussen-Elektra je Sodišče ocenilo, da obveznost nakupa električne energije iz obnovljivih virov po minimalnih cenah, višjih od dejanske tržne vrednosti te vrste električne energije, ki velja za zasebna podjetja za oskrbo z električno energijo, ni bila državna pomoč, saj ukrep ni vseboval neposrednega ali posrednega prenosa državnih sredstev.
According to Italy and Alcoa, the present case is comparable to PreussenElektra in that the funds are also transferred from private entities (electricity consumers) to a private entity (Alcoa), with the State exercising no control over the resources in question.
Po mnenju Italije in družbe Alcoa je ta zadeva primerljiva z zadevo PreussenElektra, saj so se sredstva prav tako prenesla od zasebnih subjektov (odjemalci električne energije) k zasebnemu subjektu (družba Alcoa), pri čemer država ne nadzira zadevnih sredstev.
The Commission recalls that, in PreussenElektra, the resources required to finance the measure were provided directly by the electricity suppliers to the producers of renewable energies without transiting through any public body.
Komisija opozarja, da so v zadevi PreussenElektra potrebna sredstva za financiranje ukrepa proizvajalcem električne energije iz obnovljivih virov energije neposredno zagotovili dobavitelji električne energije, pri čemer ni sodeloval noben javni organ.
Within that system, the sums to be transferred could never be at the disposal of the Member State’s authorities.
V okviru tega sistema organi držav članic ne morejo nikoli razpolagati z zneski, ki jih je treba prenesti.
In the case at hand, however, the monies transit through a public body, the Equalisation Fund, before being channelled to the final beneficiary.
V zadevnem primeru se denarna sredstva kljub temu prenesejo prek javnega organa, tj. izravnalnega sklada, preden se izplačajo končnemu upravičencu.
Therefore, the PreussenElektra case-law addresses different factual circumstances and is not relevant to the present case.
Zato sodna praksa PreussenElektra obravnava različne dejanske okoliščine in za to zadevo ni pomembna.
The judgment in Pearle provides guidance of more direct relevance to this case.
Sodba v zadevi Pearle zagotavlja smernice, ki so bolj neposredno pomembne za to zadevo.
However, the Commission’s interpretation of it differs from that put forward by Italy and Alcoa.
Vendar se razlaga Komisije razlikuje od razlage, ki sta jo predložili Italija in družba Alcoa.
In Pearle, the Court found that, under certain specific conditions, the resources of a levy which transit through a public body do not constitute State resources.
V zadevi Pearle je Sodišče ugotovilo, da se v nekaterih določenih pogojih sredstva dajatve, ki se prenesejo prek javnega organa, ne štejejo za državna sredstva.
In Pearle, the measures were financed entirely by an economic sector at the sole initiative of that sector.
V zadevi Pearle so se ukrepi v celoti in na lastno pobudo financirali iz gospodarskega sektorja.
The monies were collected via a parafiscal levy transiting through a public body which could not, at any time, dispose of the funds.
Denarna sredstva so se zbrala na podlagi drugih dajatev prek javnega organa, ki nikoli ne more razpolagati s sredstvi.
In addition, there was a correspondence between the entities which paid the levy and those which received the benefits of the measure.
Poleg tega so obstajali dopisi med subjekti, ki so plačali dajatev, in subjekti, ki so bili upravičeni do ugodnosti na podlagi ukrepa.
Italy and Alcoa consider that the key criterion in Pearle is whether the State has a right to dispose of the funds otherwise than in implementation of the statutory scheme.
Italija in družba Alcoa menita, da je ključno merilo v zadevi Pearle to, ali ima država pravico do razpolaganja s sredstvi kako drugače kot z izvajanjem predpisane sheme.
They contend that the Equalisation Fund does not have any discretion in the disbursement of the funds, which are earmarked for the financing of the tariffs and never come within ‘the perimeter of public finance’.
Nasprotujeta trditvi, da izravnalni sklad nima nobene diskrecijske pravice pri črpanju sredstev, ki so namenjena financiranju cen in niso nikoli del „obsega javnih financ“.
Therefore, according to Italy and Alcoa, the State cannot freely dispose of the funds, which consequently do not constitute State resources.
Zato po mnenju Italije in družbe Alcoa država ne more prosto razpolagati s sredstvi, ki niso državna sredstva.
As a preliminary remark, it should be pointed out that, while some of the Pearle criteria may be subjectively viewed as more central than others, there is no such thing as a ‘key criterion’ in Pearle.
Najprej je treba poudariti, da v zadevi Pearle„ključno merilo“ ne obstaja, medtem ko je mogoče nekatera merila v tej zadevi subjektivno obravnavati kot bolj osrednja od drugih.
The conditions enumerated in the judgment are cumulative.
Pogoji, navedeni v sodbi, so kumulativni.
This is also the interpretation given by the Court of First Instance in Earl Salvat [75], where it examined a parafiscal levy challenged in that case in the light of each and every one of the Pearle criteria.
Sodišče prve stopnje je enako razlago navedlo v zadevi Earl Salvat [75], v kateri je preučilo izpodbijane druge dajatve v tej zadevi glede na vsako posamezno merilo iz zadeve Pearle.
Before examining the role played by the Equalisation Fund, the Commission has ascertained whether any of the other criteria enumerated in Pearle are met.
Komisija je pred preučitvijo vloge izravnalnega sklada ugotavljala, ali je izpolnjeno katero od drugih meril iz zadeve Pearle.
It is clear that, unlike in Pearle, the Alcoa tariff was established at the initiative of the State, not at the initiative of an economic sector.
Jasno je, da je bila cena za družbo Alcoa za razliko od zadeve Pearle določena na pobudo države in ne na pobudo gospodarskega sektorja.
Moreover, in Pearle the beneficiaries of the measure were also the sole contributors of the resources, so that the intervention of the public body did not tend to create an advantage which would constitute an additional burden for the State.
Poleg tega so upravičenci ukrepa v zadevi Pearle tudi edini prispevali sredstva, zato poseganje javnega organa ni pomenilo prednosti, ki bi dodatno obremenila državo.
In the case at hand, the beneficiary Alcoa does not bear the financial burden of the levy, which rests solely on electricity consumers.
V zadevnem primeru upravičenec, tj. družba Alcoa, ne nosi finančnega bremena dajatve, ki ga nosijo izključno odjemalci električne energije.