natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For both Sardinia and Veneto, Alcoa uses the minimum IPEX pool prices (EUR 20,2 and EUR 21,0 MWh in 2005 and 2006) as a proxy for the marginal costs of generators, since no supplier would sell energy on spot markets at prices lower than their marginal costs and thus minimum spot prices are be higher than marginal generation costs.
Alcoa uporablja za Sardinijo in Benečijo najnižje kartelne cene IPEX (20,2 EUR leta 2005 in 21,0 EUR/MWh leta 2006) kot približek za mejne stroške proizvajalcev, ker noben dobavitelj ne bi prodajal energije na trgih za promptne nakupe po cenah, nižjih od mejnih stroškov, zato morajo biti najnižje promptne cene višje od mejnih proizvodnih stroškov.
Confirmation of the reliability of the minimum prices indicated above can be provided, according to the company, by comparing them with the standard marginal costs for coal-fired power plants, which Alcoa estimates at EUR 20/MWh.
Zanesljivost najnižjih cen, navedenih zgoraj, se lahko po mnenju družbe potrdi s primerjavo teh cen s standardnimi mejnimi stroški za elektrarne na premog, ki jih Alcoa ocenjuje na 20 EUR/MWh.
To summarise, according to Alcoa, in Veneto as well as in Sardinia the methodologies set out in recitals 80 and 81 confirm that the prices paid by Alcoa are consistent with the criteria laid down in the Alumix decision.
To pomeni, da po mnenju družbe Alcoa metodologije iz uvodnih izjav 80 in 81 za Benečijo in Sardinijo potrjujejo, da so cene, ki jih je plačevala Alcoa, v skladu z merili iz odločbe Alumix.
Alcoa disputes what it sees as the use by the Commission of average IPEX prices as the benchmark for assessing the existence of an advantage.
Alcoa meni, da Komisija uporablja povprečne cene IPEX kot merilo za ocenjevanje obstoja prednosti, s čimer se ne strinja.
Alcoa asserts that the average IPEX price is not representative of the price paid by a large industrial consumer like Alcoa, which consumes electricity 24 hours a day and which instead of purchasing it on the spot market concludes long-term bilateral supply contracts.
Alcoa trdi, da povprečna cena IPEX ni reprezentativna cena, ki jo plačujejo veliki industrijski odjemalci, kot je Alcoa, ki porablja električno energijo 24 ur na dan in ki namesto nakupa električne energije na trgu za promptne nakupe sklepa dolgoročne dvostranske dobavne pogodbe.
In addition, Alcoa submits that ENEL enjoys a dominant position in the supply of electricity almost everywhere in Italy.
Poleg tega Alcoa navaja, da ima ENEL prevladujoč položaj pri dobavi električne energije skoraj povsod po Italiji.
In Sardinia, in particular, ENEL is shielded from competition by non-Sardinian suppliers as a result of the limited capacity of the interconnector between Sardinia and the Italian mainland.
Zlasti na Sardiniji je ENEL zaščiten pred konkurenco nesardinskih dobaviteljev zaradi omejene zmogljivosti povezovalnih daljnovodov med Sardinijo in celinsko Italijo.
Therefore, in Italy neither the spot market nor the market for long-term supply agreements is for the time being characterised by a truly competitive structure.
Zato za zdaj trg za promptne nakupe in trg za dolgoročne dobavne sporazume v Italiji nista resnično konkurenčna.
The prices charged by ENEL to Alcoa do not, therefore, reflect the prices that would normally prevail in a fully competitive market, either in Sardinia or in Veneto.
Cene, ki jih zaračunava ENEL družbi Alcoa, zato niso cene, ki bi se običajno zaračunavale na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu na Sardiniji ali v Benečiji.
In conclusion, Alcoa contends that the prices it has been paying in Italy still fully comply with the criteria laid down by the Commission in the Alumix decision, and accurately reflect what would happen if the market functioned properly.
Alcoa trdi, da so cene, ki jih družba plačuje v Italiji, še vedno v celoti v skladu z merili, ki jih je določila Komisija v odločbi Alumix, in da so natančno take, kot bi bile, če bi trg ustrezno deloval.
Alcoa is not, therefore, the beneficiary of an advantage which it could not obtain in a fully competitive market.
Zato Alcoa ni imela prednosti, ki je ne bi mogla pridobiti na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu.
No impact on trade
Ni vpliva na trgovino
Alcoa submits that the tariff does not have an impact on intra-Community trade and cannot distort competition.
Alcoa trdi, da cena ne vpliva na trgovino znotraj Unije in da ne more izkrivljati konkurence.
The price of primary aluminium is set in the London Metal Exchange, and variations in local production costs do not translate into differences in prices.
Ceno primarnega aluminija določa Londonska borza kovin, pri čemer odstopanja pri lokalnih proizvodnih stroških ne pomenijo drugačnih cen.
Italy’s primary aluminium output is so low, according to Alcoa, that it has no potential for affecting world prices.
Obseg proizvodnje primarnega aluminija v Italiji je po mnenju družbe Alcoa tako majhen, da ne more vplivati na svetovne cene.
Demand for primary aluminium in the EU-25 has grown steadily (with a 42 % increase in the level of demand between 1996 and 2005).
Povpraševanje po primarnem aluminiju v EU-25 se stalno povečuje (obseg povpraševanja se je od leta 1996 do leta 2005 povečal za 42 %).
European output, however, has not kept pace.
Vendar se evropska proizvodnja temu ni prilagajala.
Alcoa contends that, if the aluminium industry in Italy disappeared, no new Italian or EU entrant could replace the capacity shut down in Italy, as EU plants are already working at full capacity, and no existing producer or new entrant would have an incentive to increase its capacity, given that the long-term prospects as regards future availability of affordable power are uncertain.
Če industrije aluminija v Italiji ne bi bilo, po mnenju družbe Alcoa noben nov italijanski udeleženec na trgu ali udeleženec iz EU ne bi mogel nadomestiti zmanjšanja zmogljivosti v Italiji, ker obrati EU že zdaj delujejo s polno zmogljivostjo in noben obstoječi proizvajalec ali nov udeleženec na trgu ne bi bil pripravljen povečati zmogljivosti, glede na to, da so dolgoročne napovedi zvezi z razpoložljivostjo dostopnih cen energije v prihodnosti negotove.
Moreover, Alcoa claims that the interests of other European producers are not threatened by the continuation of the Italian tariff schemes, since they ensure an electricity price which is only marginally lower than the weighted average paid by primary aluminium producers in the EU-25.
Poleg tega Alcoa trdi, da interesi drugih evropskih proizvajalcev niso ogroženi zaradi ohranitve italijanskih cenovnih shem, ker zagotavljajo ceno električne energije, ki je le nekoliko nižja od tehtanega povprečja, ki ga plačujejo proizvajalci aluminija v EU-25.
Comparison of average smelter tariffs
Primerjava povprečnih cen za talilnice
Italian weighted average smelter tariff
Tehtana povprečna cena za talilnice v Italiji
EU-25 weighted average smelter tariff
Tehtana povprečna cena za talilnice v EU-25
EEA weighted average smelter tariff
Tehtana povprečna cena za talilnice v EGP
World weighted average smelter tariff
Svetovna tehtana povprečna cena za talilnice
No State resources
Državna sredstva niso vključena
Alcoa relies on the PreussenElektra [45] and Pearle [46] case-law to substantiate its thesis that the measure at hand is not financed through State resources.
Alcoa se pri utemeljitvi svoje trditve, da zadevni ukrep ni financiran iz državnih sredstev, sklicuje na sodno prakso v zadevah PreussenElektra [45] in Pearle [46].
Alcoa claims that the funds required to finance the tariff are transferred by private entities (electricity consumers) to a private entity (Alcoa): the role of the State is confined to the adoption of a law mandating payment of the required sums, with no discretion to dispose of the funds otherwise than in the implementation of the statutory scheme.
Alcoa trdi, da se sredstva za financiranje cene prenesejo od zasebnih subjektov (odjemalcev električne energije) k zasebnemu subjektu (Alcoa): vloga države je omejena na sprejetje zakona, ki določa plačilo zahtevanih zneskov, pri čemer je mogoče s sredstvi razpolagati le, če se izvaja predpisana shema.
In particular, according to Alcoa, the Equalisation Fund cannot exercise any control over the funds and is a mere accounting intermediary.
Po mnenju družbe Alcoa zlasti izravnalni sklad ne more nadzirati sredstev in je le računovodski posrednik.
Existing rather than new aid
Obstoječa in ne nova pomoč
Alcoa further submits that, even if one were to consider that the tariff constituted State aid, it would constitute ‘existing aid’ rather than ‘new aid’.
Poleg tega družba Alcoa navaja, da bi šlo za „obstoječo“ in ne „novo“ pomoč, tudi če bi se obravnavalo, da je cena pomenila državno pomoč.
Alcoa continued to pay the same net price after the reforms and that price did not confer an advantage on the buyer of such energy, as recognised in the Alumix decision.
Alcoa je po reformah še naprej plačevala enako neto ceno, pri čemer ta cena ni pomenila prednosti za kupca take energije, kot je bilo priznano v odločbi Alumix.
Therefore, the reforms did not constitute a ‘change in circumstances’ such as would strip the Alumix decision of its validity.
Zato reforme niso pomenile „spremembe okoliščin“, zaradi katerih odločba Alumix ne bi bila več veljavna.
As for the role entrusted to the Equalisation Fund, according to Alcoa the change was of a purely administrative nature and did not affect the substance of the mechanism.
Kar zadeva vlogo izravnalnega sklada, Alcoa meni, da je bila sprememba le upravna in da ni vplivala na vsebino mehanizma.
In that case, the Court ruled that, once it had been determined that a particular aid scheme did not constitute State aid, the only way for the Commission to reassess its position was to follow the rules on existing aid, and the effect of reassessment could thus be valid only in the future.
Sodišče je v tej zadevi razsodilo, da lahko Komisija po ugotovitvi, da neka shema pomoči ne pomeni državne pomoči, ponovno oceni svoje stališče le, če pri tem upošteva pravila o obstoječi pomoči, pri čemer ima lahko ponovna presoja vpliv le v prihodnosti.
In Alcoa’s view, it is irrelevant that the liberalisation of the energy markets occurred after the Commission adopted the Alumix decision, since liberalisation did not affect the reasoning for the finding that no aid was involved (the fact that prices covered marginal costs), and could not lead to a change in the nature of the measure.
Po mnenju družbe Alcoa ni pomembno, da so se energetski trgi liberalizirali, potem ko je Komisija sprejela odločbo Alumix, ker liberalizacija ni vplivala na razloge za ugotovitev, da ni šlo za pomoč (dejstvo, da so cene zajemale mejne stroške), in ne bi mogla spremeniti narave ukrepa.
Therefore, the Commission cannot rely on Article 1(b)(v), second sentence, of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 [49] to declare the measure to be ‘new aid’.
Zato se Komisija pri opredelitvi ukrepa kot „nova pomoč“ ne more sklicevati na drugi stavek člena 1(b)(v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 [49].
Moreover, even if it were to be assumed that liberalisation did play a role, Alcoa submits, on the basis of the judgment in Alzetta [50], that the Commission would be precluded from relying on Article 1(b)(v), second sentence, of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Poleg tega Alcoa trdi, da se Komisija na podlagi sodbe v zadevi Alzetta [50] ne bi mogla sklicevati na drugi stavek člena 1(b)(v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999, tudi če bi se obravnavalo, da je liberalizacija imela vpliv.
In addition, the liberalisation of the electricity market occurred prior to the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Poleg tega se je trg z električno energijo liberaliziral pred sprejetjem Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999.
Therefore, the Regulation cannot apply to measures in the electricity sector even if they have become aid measures as a result of the liberalisation, and such measures are governed instead by Article 1(b)(v), first sentence, of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (existing aid) and by the Court’s case-law in Alzetta.
Zato se Uredba ne more uporabljati za ukrepe v sektorju električne energije, tudi če ti ukrepi postanejo ukrepi pomoči zaradi liberalizacije, pri čemer namesto tega take ukrepe urejata prvi stavek člena 1(b)(v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 (obstoječa pomoč) in sodna praksa Sodišča v zadevi Alzetta.
Alcoa further submits that, even if the current scheme were not considered to be existing aid, the company would, in any event, be entitled to rely on legitimate expectations, in view of the substantial investments carried out by Alcoa in both plants on the assumption that the tariff did not constitute aid and the existence of precedents in the Commission’s decision-making practice which show a certain margin of discretion in treating aid as existing aid, in particular the Commission’s decision on tax-free provisions for setting up establishments abroad [51].
Alcoa poleg tega trdi, da bi bila družba, tudi če se sedanja shema ne bi obravnavala kot obstoječa pomoč, v vsakem primeru upravičena do uveljavljanja upravičenih pričakovanj, glede na znatne naložbe družbe Alcoa v oba obrata ob predpostavki, da cena ne pomeni pomoči, in glede na predhodne primere v praksi sprejemanja odločitev Komisije, ki kažejo na določen manevrski prostor pri obravnavi pomoči kot obstoječa pomoč, zlasti odločba Komisije o davčnih oprostitvah pri ustanovitvi podjetij v tujini [51].
Compatibility of the Sardinian tariff as regional aid
Združljivost cene za Sardinijo z regionalno pomočjo
Alcoa maintains that, in any event, as far as the Sardinian plant is concerned, the challenged measure complies with the requirements for benefiting from regional aid.
Alcoa trdi, da je, kar zadeva obrat na Sardiniji, izpodbijani ukrep v vsakem primeru v skladu z zahtevami v zvezi z upravičenostjo do regionalne pomoči.
Alcoa describes the regional handicaps of Sardinia and the problems of energy-intensive industries, arising from Sardinia’s lack of interconnection in terms of energy supply and the existence of an ENEL/ENDESA duopoly which distorts the normal competitive process and keeps prices high even for large users.
Alcoa opisuje regionalne ovire na Sardiniji in težave energetsko intenzivnih industrij, ki so nastale zaradi pomanjkanja medsebojnega povezovanja v smislu oskrbe z energijo ter duopola družb ENEL/ENDESA, ki izkrivlja običajen konkurenčni proces in ohranja visoke cene tudi za velike odjemalce.
The tariff is said to seek to remedy this handicap.
Z ugodnejšo ceno naj bi se ta ovira odpravila.
Alcoa points out that the shutdown of the smelters would have the direct effect of destroying 2500 jobs.
Alcoa izpostavlja, da bi z zaprtjem talilnic delo neposredno izgubilo 2500 ljudi.
However, there would be an indirect effect on thousands more, because of Alcoa’s position as one of the key employers in the region.
Vendar bi to posredno vplivalo še na več tisoč ljudi, ker ima družba Alcoa položaj enega od ključnih delodajalcev v regiji.
The impact would be even more dramatic in the case of a sudden shutdown, as opposed to a gradual phasing-out of activities.
Vpliv bi bil v primeru nenadnega zaprtja še večji kot v primeru postopnega opuščanja dejavnosti.
Alcoa contends that the tariff meets the criteria of proportionality in that it is limited to what is necessary to address the market failure (the absence of a competitive market in Sardinia) and the price is in line with the weighted average of the electricity prices paid by other smelters in the EU-25.
Alcoa trdi, da cena izpolnjuje merilo sorazmernosti, ker je omejena na nujne ukrepe pri odpravi nedelovanja trga (neobstoj konkurenčnega trga na Sardiniji), in je v skladu s tehtanim povprečjem cen električne energije, ki jih plačujejo druge talilnice v EU-25.
In Alcoa’s view, the lack of degressivity is not proven.
Po mnenju družbe Alcoa ni dokazano, da se cena postopno ne zmanjšuje.
Degressivity should be assessed by reference to the suppliers’ marginal costs, and the Commission would have to show an increase in such costs in order to demonstrate that the tariff is not degressive.
Postopno zmanjševanje bi se moralo oceniti glede na mejne stroške dobaviteljev, pri čemer bi morala Komisija dokazati povečanje takih stroškov, s čimer bi dokazala, da se cena postopno ne zmanjšuje.
As regards the 4 % cap on the increase of the tariff, contested by the Commission on the ground that it does not ensure degressivity, Alcoa contends that it is normal that the price should be fixed for a certain period.
Kar zadeva povečanje cene za največ 4 %, kar je Komisija izpodbijala, ker ne zagotavlja postopnega zmanjševanja, Alcoa trdi, da je običajno treba ceno določiti za določeno obdobje.
Further, a cap should reflect a normal trend, and should not take into account abnormal events, such as an the exceptional rise in oil prices.
Poleg tega mora zgornja meja izražati običajen razvoj in ne sme upoštevati izrednih dogodkov, kot je izjemna podražitev cen nafte.
Alcoa also notes that degressivity has been accepted by the Commission in cases where a benefit was maintained for four to five years, and then decreased progressively [52].
Alcoa prav tako ugotavlja, da Komisija ni sprejela postopnega zmanjševanja, kadar se je ugodnost pridobila za štiri do pet let in se nato postopno zmanjšala [52].
In Alcoa’s view, the tariff is transitory, since it is set to last until the interconnection problem with the mainland is eliminated (presumably in 2010).
Po mnenju družbe Alcoa je cena prehodna, ker naj bi se ohranila do odprave težav v zvezi z medsebojnim povezovanjem s celino (predvidoma leta 2010).
In addition, the Commission’s argument that the measure has been in force for more than five years is without merit, since until now the tariff has not constituted aid.
Poleg tega je trditev Komisije, da je veljavnost ukrepa daljša od petih let, brez osnove, ker do zdaj cena ni pomenila pomoči.
Finally, Alcoa contends that the 2007 guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013 [53] are not applicable in substance, since the tariff was granted before 2007 and must therefore be assessed in accordance with the 1998 guidelines on national regional aid [54], as specified in the transitional provisions of the 2007 guidelines.
Na koncu Alcoa trdi, da se smernice iz leta 2007 o državni regionalni pomoči za 2007–2013 [53] vsebinsko ne uporabljajo, ker je bila cena odobrena pred letom 2007 in jo je zato treba oceniti v skladu s smernicami o državni regionalni pomoči iz leta 1998 [54], kot je določeno v prehodnih določbah smernic iz leta 2007.
Observations submitted by third parties
Pripombe tretjih oseb
A competitor of Portovesme Srl [55] submitted an analysis of the Alumix tariff, concluding that all the preferential tariffs introduced by Italy in Sardinia on the basis of the 2004 Decree constitute unlawful State aid which cannot be approved as regional operating aid and should be declared incompatible.
Konkurenčni ponudnik družbe Portovesme s.r.l. [55] je predložil analizo cene Alumix, na podlagi katere je bilo ugotovljeno, da vse ugodnejše cene, ki jih je uvedla Italija na Sardiniji na podlagi odloka iz leta 2004, pomenijo nezakonito državno pomoč, ki je ni mogoče odobriti kot regionalno pomoč za tekoče poslovanje in jo je treba razglasiti za nezdružljivo.
Two associations of aluminium producers submit that the tariffs are necessary to prevent the relocation of the industry outside the EU until long-term solutions can be found.
Dve združenji proizvajalcev aluminija trdita, da so cene potrebne zaradi preprečitve selitve industrije zunaj EU, dokler se ne bodo našle dolgoročne rešitve.
The competitor of Portovesme Srl referred to in recital 105 asked the Commission to take account of its contribution on case C 13/06 [56] in the assessment of this case as well.
Konkurenčni ponudnik družbe Portovesme s.r.l. iz uvodne izjave 105 je pozval Komisijo, naj pri oceni te zadeve upošteva tudi njegov prispevek v zadevi št. C 13/2006 [56].
Again, the company concludes that the tariffs should be declared incompatible.
Poleg tega družba ponovno ugotavlja, da je treba cene razglasiti za nezdružljive.
Italy asked the Commission to disregard the submission as irrelevant, since Case C 13/06 does not deal with the same subject matter: the measures investigated under case C 13/06 constitute new aid, whereas the Alcoa tariff is the prolongation of an existing measure.
Italija je pozvala Komisijo, naj to predložitev obravnava kot nepomembno, ker zadeva C 13/06 ne obravnava iste teme: ukrepi, obravnavani v zadevi C 13/06, pomenijo novo pomoč, medtem ko pomeni cena za družbo Alcoa podaljšanje veljavnosti obstoječega ukrepa.
Moreover, the third party in question is not an aluminium producer and is not concerned by the measure in favour of Alcoa.
Poleg tega zadevna tretja oseba ni proizvajalka aluminija in je ukrep za družbo Alcoa ne zadeva.
The Commission cannot accept Italy’s request.
Komisija ne more sprejeti zahteve Italije.
The fact that the Alcoa tariff has a historical background different from those of the other tariffs does not make the observations at issue irrelevant, insofar as they address relevant questions such as the State aid character of the Sardinian electricity tariffs, their contribution to regional development and their impact on competition.
Dejstvo, da je zgodovinska podlaga cene za družbo Alcoa drugačna od zgodovinskih podlag drugih cen, ne pomeni, da so pripombe nepomembne, ker obravnavajo zadevna vprašanja, na primer, ali cene električne energije za Sardinijo pomenijo državno pomoč, kakšen je njihov prispevek k regionalnemu razvoju in kakšen je njihov vpliv na konkurenco.
In addition, in the framework of an investigation pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty a third party does not have to be affected directly and individually by the measure on which observations are submitted.
Poleg tega v okviru preiskave v skladu s členom 88(2) Pogodbe ES ni treba, da ukrep, v zvezi s katerim so predložene pripombe, neposredno in posamezno vpliva na tretjo osebo.
OBSERVATIONS SUBMITTED BY ITALY
PRIPOMBE ITALIJE
The tariff addresses a market failure
Cena je namenjena odpravi nedelovanja trga
Italy points out that the electricity market in the EU is not yet fully competitive, as recognised by the Commission itself.
Italija izpostavlja, da trg z električno energijo v EU še ni popolnoma konkurenčen, kar je priznala tudi Unija.
Undertakings, in particular energy-intensive ones, are unable to procure electricity on comparable terms in the various Member States.
Podjetja, zlasti energetsko intenzivna podjetja, ne morejo dobiti električne energije pod primerljivimi pogoji v različnih državah članicah.
In Italy, despite the liberalisation of the sector, there are structural deficiencies (such as insufficient interconnection) which translate into high energy prices and a concentrated market structure which makes it difficult for eligible customers to select their electricity supplier.
Italija ima kljub liberalizaciji sektorja strukturne pomanjkljivosti (kot je nezadostno medsebojno povezovanje), zaradi katerih so cene energije visoke, in koncentrirano tržno strukturo, zaradi česar upravičeni odjemalci težko izberejo svojega dobavitelja električne energije.
The problems are particularly acute in Sardinia, where only two suppliers exist.
Težave so zlasti velike na Sardiniji, kjer sta le dva dobavitelja.
Therefore, Italy submits that a special tariff system reflecting demand profiles should be considered justified as a regulatory measure simulating the mechanisms that would be at play in a fully competitive market.
Zato Italija trdi, da je treba sistem posebnih cen, pri katerem se upoštevajo značilnosti povpraševanja, obravnavati kot upravičen regulativni ukrep, ki spodbuja mehanizme, ki bi bili na voljo na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu.
This intervention allegedly restores the level playing field between energy-intensive undertakings operating in different Member States.
S tem ukrepom naj bi se ponovno vzpostavili enaki konkurenčni pogoji za energetsko intenzivna podjetja, ki delujejo v različnih državah članicah.