natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The company was obliged to report a net loss of EUR 16,8 billion on its stake in RFS Holdings and the sale thereof and it also incurred an impairment of EUR 922 million (net of taxes) in its division Prime Fund Solutions due to the Madoff fraud [34].
Podjetje je moralo poročati o čisti izgubi v višini 16,8 milijarde EUR pri svojem deležu v RFS Holdings in njegovi prodaji, v svojem oddelku Prime Fund Solutions pa je zaradi Madoffove goljufije [34] utrpelo tudi oslabitev v višini 922 milijonov EUR (neto brez davka).
Net underlying profit, excluding those elements, came in to EUR 604 million, almost exclusively realised in the first half of 2008.
Čisti osnovni dobiček brez teh elementov je znašal 604 milijone EUR in je bil skoraj v celoti realiziran v prvi polovici leta 2008.
ABN AMRO Group
Skupina ABN AMRO
ABN AMRO Group, which was created following the merger between FBN and ABN AMRO Bank (that is to say ABN AMRO N activities) on 1 July 2010 groups all the activities of FBN and ABN AMRO N in two separate BUs, ‘Retail and Private banking’ and ‘Commercial and Merchant banking’.
Skupina ABN AMRO, ki je bila ustanovljena po združitvi banke FBN in banke ABN AMRO Bank (tj. dejavnosti banke ABN AMRO N) 1. julija 2010, združuje vse dejavnosti banke FBN in banke ABN AMRO N v dveh ločenih poslovnih enotah, „bančno poslovanje s prebivalstvom in zasebno bančništvo“ ter „komercialno bančništvo in poslovanje s podjetji“.
The group had a 2008 pro forma operating income of EUR 7,15 billion and pro forma total assets of EUR 360 billion. According to the latest figures [36], ABN AMRO Group has total IFRS [37] equity of EUR 11,7 billion.
Skupina je imela v letu 2008 pro forma prihodke od poslovanja v višini 7,15 milijarde EUR in pro forma celotna sredstva v višini 360 milijard EUR. V skladu z najnovejšimi podatki [36] ima skupina ABN AMRO po MSRP [37] skupni lastniški kapital v višini 11,7 milijarde EUR.
ABN AMRO Group is well diversified with EUR 4,2 billion operating income in ‘Retail and Private banking’ and EUR 2,8 billion operating income in ‘Commercial and Merchant banking’.
Skupina ABN AMRO je dobro razpršena, saj ima 4,2 milijarde EUR prihodka od poslovanja oddelka za bančno poslovanje s prebivalstvom in zasebno bančništvo ter 2,8 milijarde EUR prihodka od poslovanja oddelka za komercialno bančništvo in poslovanje s podjetji.
Geographically, the bulk of ABN AMRO Group’s revenues (namely [65 - 95] % of the total) originates in the Netherlands.
Z geografskega vidika večina prihodkov skupine ABN AMRO (tj. [65 – 95] % skupnega prihodka) izhaja iz Nizozemske.
In ‘Retail and Private banking’, the integrated ABN AMRO Group has market shares of [15 - 20] % and [15 - 20] % [38] in respectively ‘mass retail’ and ‘preferred banking’ [39], which makes it third-largest on the Dutch banking market in terms of market share.
V segmentu poslovanja s prebivalstvom in zasebnega bančništva ima integrirana skupina ABN AMRO tržni delež [15 – 20] % in [15 – 20] % [38] na področju „masovne prodaje na drobno“ oziroma „prednostnega bančništva“ [39], zaradi česar je glede na tržni delež na nizozemskem bančnem trgu tretja po velikosti.
In private banking (branded ABN AMRO Mees Pierson), ABN AMRO Group is by far the largest in the Dutch market with a market share of approximately [30 - 40] % [40].
V segmentu zasebnega bančništva (z blagovno znamko ABN AMRO Mees Pierson) je skupina ABN AMRO na nizozemskem trgu s tržnim deležem približno [30 – 40] % [40] daleč največja.
In ‘Commercial and Merchant banking’, the market share of ABN AMRO Group is around [15 - 25] % [41].
V segmentu komercialnega bančništva in poslovanja s podjetji znaša tržni delež skupine ABN AMRO okoli [15 – 25] % [41].
ABN AMRO Group no longer includes New HBU and the factoring activities of IFN which were divested in the framework of the Merger Remedy on 1 April 2010.
Skupina ABN AMRO ne vključuje več podružnice New HBU in dejavnosti podružnice IFN na področju odkupa terjatev, saj so bile 1. aprila 2010 odprodane v okviru korektivnega ukrepa v zvezi z združitvijo.
As part of the restructuring process, two small divisions of FBN (namely Intertrust and Prime Fund Solutions (‘PFS’)) were also divested and are no longer part of the ABN AMRO Group.
V tem procesu prestrukturiranja sta bila odprodana tudi majhna oddelka banke FBN (tj. Intertrust in Prime Fund Solutions (v nadaljnjem besedilu: oddelek PFS), ki nista več del skupine ABN AMRO.
In September 2009, FBN (and its partner Banque Générale du Luxembourg (‘BGL’) [42] sold Intertrust to private equity specialist Waterland. Intertrust is one of the largest players in global trust and corporate management. It employs 1000 experts in 19 countries and has operating income and RWA of respectively EUR […] million and EUR […] million.
(73) Septembra 2009 sta banka FBN (in njen partner Banque Générale du Luxembourg (v nadaljnjem besedilu: BGL) [42] prodala Intertrust podjetju Waterland, ki je specializirano za zasebni kapital. Intertrust je eden izmed največjih akterjev na področju upravljanja globalnih skladov in podjetij. Zaposluje 1000 strokovnjakov v 19 državah, prihodki iz poslovanja in TPS pa znašajo […] milijonov EUR oziroma […] milijonov EUR.
In May 2010, FBN also announced the sale of PFS to Credit Suisse.
Banka FBN je maja 2010 napovedala tudi prodajo oddelka PFS banki Credit Suisse.
PFS provides fund services to the alternative asset management industry including, for example, administration, banking, custody and financing.
Oddelek PFS nudi storitve skladov panogi upravljanja alternativnih sredstev, med katere sodijo upravljanje, bančništvo, skrbništvo in financiranje.
Its customers range from boutique asset managers to large global institutions such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds.
Med njegove stranke sodijo tako majhni upravitelji premoženja kot velike svetovne institucije, kot so pokojninski skladi in državni naložbeni skladi.
On 4 March 2011, ABN AMRO Group published its results for the fiscal year 2010, showing a net loss of EUR 414 million. Excluding separation and integration costs, ABN AMRO Group reported an underlying profit of EUR 1077 million. As at 31 December 2010, ABN AMRO Group’s Core Tier 1, Tier 1 and total capital ratio were 10,4 %, 12,8 % and 16,6 % respectively.
Skupina ABN AMRO je 4. marca 2011 objavila svoje rezultate za poslovno leto 2010, ki so pokazali izgubo v višini 414 milijonov EUR. Brez stroškov ločitve in integracije je skupina ABN AMRO zabeležila osnovni dobiček v višini 1077 milijonov EUR. 31. decembra 2010 so osnovni kapital prvega reda, kapital prvega reda in skupni kapitalski deleži skupine ABN AMRO znašali 10,4 %, 12,8 % oziroma 16,6 %.
In consultation with the Dutch State, ABN AMRO Group established a dividend policy targeting a dividend payout of 40 % of the reported annual profit.
Skupina ABN AMRO je po posvetovanju z Nizozemsko oblikovala dividendno politiko, namenjeno izplačilu 40 % zabeleženega letnega dobička.
Description of the Restructuring Plan of December 2009 and the updated Restructuring Plan of November 2010
Opis načrta prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 in posodobljenega načrta prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010
A merger between FBN and ABN AMRO N is central to the business concept developed in the December 2009 Restructuring Plan. ABN AMRO Group, the new bank emerging from the December 2009 Restructuring Plan, will focus on the mid-market segment in the Netherlands [44] and will be active in ‘Retail and Private Banking’ and ‘Commercial and Merchant Banking’.
Osrednji del poslovnega koncepta, razvitega v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009, je združitev bank FBN in ABN AMRO N. Skupina ABN AMRO, nova banka, nastala na podlagi načrta prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009, se bo osredotočila na srednji segment trga na Nizozemskem [44] ter bo dejavna na področjih bančnega poslovanja s prebivalstvom in zasebnega bančništva ter komercialnega bančništva in poslovanja s podjetji.
The December 2009 Restructuring Plan starts from the diagnosis that the capital needs were not related to the underlying performance of FBN and ABN AMRO N, but rather to the need to finance their respective separation from their parent companies and the up-front integration costs of the merger.
Načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 izhaja iz ugotovitve, da potrebe po kapitalu niso bile povezane z uspešnostjo bank FBN in ABN AMRO N, ampak s potrebo po financiranju njune ločitve od matičnih podjetij in vnaprejšnjih stroškov integracije zaradi združitve.
In a counterfactual scenario without State aid, the December 2009 Restructuring Plan acknowledges that, without the coordinated effort of the Benelux governments, Fortis SA/NV would have collapsed, which would also have dragged down FBN and ABN AMRO N.
V scenariju nasprotnih dejstev brez državne pomoči načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 priznava, da bi holding Fortis SA/NV brez usklajenega prizadevanja vlad držav Beneluksa razpadel, kar bi za seboj potegnilo tudi banki FBN in ABN AMRO N.
The December 2009 Restructuring Plan contains financial projections for the period 2009-2012 with a divisional breakdown into Retail Banking, Private Banking NL, Private Banking International and Commercial & Merchant Banking.
Načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 vsebuje finančne napovedi za obdobje 2009–2012 s členitvijo na oddelke Retail Banking, Private Banking NL, Private Banking International in Commercial & Merchant Banking.
Specifically for 2012, ABN AMRO Group has also calculated a ‘run-rate’ profit, which excludes transition costs and assumes that cost synergies were already accounted for the full year.
Za leto 2012 je skupina ABN AMRO izračunala t. i. „run-rate profit“ (gre za ekstrapolacijo tekočih rezultatov, ki se razširijo na določeno obdobje, v tem primeru na leto 2012), dobiček, ki ne zajema stroškov prehoda in predvideva, da so bili stroški sinergije že upoštevani za celotno leto.
Those projections were provided for a base case scenario and a worst case scenario.
Te napovedi so bile narejene za osnovni scenarij in najslabši možni scenarij.
On 8 November 2010 in, the Dutch State updated the December 2009 Restructuring Plan’s financial projections for the period until 2012, including additional projections for 2013 in the November 2010 Restructuring Plan.
Nizozemska je 8. novembra 2010 posodobila finančne napovedi načrta prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 za obdobje do leta 2012, vključno z dodatnimi napovedmi za leto 2013 iz načrta prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010.
Base case scenario
Osnovni scenarij
In the base case scenario, the Dutch State starts from the assumption that business volumes will grow in line with inflation.
V osnovnem scenariju Nizozemska izhaja iz domneve, da se bo obseg poslovanja povečeval v skladu z inflacijo.
Personnel costs are assumed to rise by [1 - 6] % per annum and other costs by a more moderate [1 - 5] % per annum The Dutch State also anticipates that ABN AMRO Group’s loan loss provisions will start to decrease from the high level reported in 2009.
Predvideno je, da se bodo stroški dela povečali za [1 – 6] % na leto, drugi stroški pa za zmernejših [1 – 5] % na leto. Nizozemska tudi predvideva, da se bodo rezervacije za izgube pri posojilih skupine ABN AMRO, ki so bile v letu 2009 precej visoke, začele zniževati.
In the base case scenario in the November 2010 Restructuring Plan, ABN AMRO Group realises a negative net result of EUR […] million in 2010 before returning to profits from 2011 on (that is, EUR […] million profit in 2011).
V osnovnem scenariju načrta prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010 skupina ABN AMRO v letu 2010 realizira negativni čisti poslovni izid v višini […] milijonov EUR, nato pa od leta 2011 ponovno posluje z dobičkom (tj. v letu 2011 z dobičkom v višini […] milijonov EUR).
In 2012 and 2013, it is expected that ABN AMRO Group’s net profits increase to respectively EUR […] million and EUR […] million, translating in a Return on Equity [45] (‘RoE’) of around […] %.
Za leti 2012 in 2013 se pričakuje, da bo čisti dobiček skupine ABN AMRO narasel na […] milijonov EUR oziroma […] milijonov EUR, kar pomeni kapitalski donos [45] v višini približno […] %.
The improvement of the ABN AMRO Group’s profitability is driven by better operating income (which should recover after the weak 2009 figure), the cost-cutting programme which at cruise speed should lower costs by EUR 1,1 billion pre-tax per annum and a normalisation of loan loss provisions after a peak in 2009.
Izboljšanje dobičkonosnosti skupine ABN AMRO spodbujajo večji prihodki iz poslovanja (ki bi se morali po nizkih številkah leta 2009 povečati), program za znižanje stroškov, ki bi moral ob normalnem delovanju znižati stroške za 1,1 milijarde EUR pred obdavčitvijo na leto, in normalizacija rezervacij za izgube pri posojilih po najvišji vrednosti v letu 2009.
In 2013, ABN AMRO Group’s cost-income ratio is projected to be […] %.
Po napovedih bo leta 2013 razmerje med stroški in prihodki skupine ABN AMRO […] %.
2009 (Actual)
2009 (dejansko)
2012 run rate (E)
2012 „run rate“ (O)
Operating income
Prihodki od poslovanja
Net fee & comm. income
Čisti prihodki od provizij in pristojbin
Operating expenses
Odhodki iz poslovanja
Op. exp. – business as usual
Odhodki iz poslovanja – poslovanje brez sprememb
Op exp. – transition
Odhodki iz poslovanja – prehodnega
Loan impairments
Oslabitve posojil
Profit before taxes
Dobiček pred odbitkom davka
Taxes and minorities
Davki in manjšinske obveznosti
Underlying net profit
Čisti osnovni dobiček
(ex transition costs)
(prej stroški prehoda)
Worst case scenario
Najslabši možni scenarij
Under the worst case scenario in the November 2010 Restructuring Plan, the Dutch State started from more conservative assumptions than under the base case scenario.
V najslabšem možnem scenariju v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010 je Nizozemska izhajala iz previdnejših domnev kot v osnovnem scenariju.
It used interest margins which were 7,5 % lower than in the base case, more cautious forecasts for commissions & fees (growth of 4 % per annum as opposed to 7 % in the base case), lower synergies (impact of – EUR […] million on 2013 profit) and 15 % lower recovery rate of loan loss provisions (impact of – EUR […] million on 2013 profit).
Uporabila je obrestne marže, ki so bile 7,5 % nižje kot v osnovnem scenariju, bolj previdne napovedi glede provizij in pristojbin (4-odstotna letna rast v primerjavi s 7-odstotno v osnovnem scenariju), nižje sinergije (vpliv – […] milijonov EUR na dobiček v letu 2013) in 15 % nižjo stopnjo vračila rezervacij za izgube pri posojilih (vpliv – […] milijonov EUR na dobiček v letu 2013).
While, those more conservative figures would lead to lower results, ABN AMRO Group would still be able to post a profit.
Čeprav te previdnejše številke vodijo v slabše rezultate, bi skupina ABN AMRO še vedno imela dobiček.
The worst case scenario foresees an underlying net profit of EUR […] million and EUR […] million in respectively 2012 and 2013 (which compares to respectively EUR […] million and EUR […] million in the base case scenario).
Najslabši možni scenarij napoveduje čisti osnovni dobiček v višini […] milijonov EUR in […] milijonov EUR v letu 2012 oziroma 2013 (v primerjavi z […] milijoni EUR in […] milijoni EUR v osnovnem scenariju).
Exit
Izhod
In its December 2009 Restructuring Plan, the Dutch State also touched upon its exit strategy, underlining that it does not have the intention to remain a long-term investor in ABN AMRO Group.
V svojem načrtu prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 je Nizozemska obravnavala tudi svojo izhodno strategijo, pri čemer je poudarila, da ne namerava ostati dolgoročni vlagatelj v skupino ABN AMRO.
By letter of 20 August 2010, the Dutch State provided the Commission with more details on its exit strategy.
Nizozemska je z dopisom z dne 20. avgusta 2010 Komisiji predložila več podrobnosti o tej strategiji.
The Dutch State explained that it is contemplating a placement in the form of an IPO [47], but is keeping open other options such as a private sale to an investor or market participant.
Nizozemska je pojasnila, da načrtuje ponudbo v obliki IPO [47], odprte pa so tudi druge možnosti, kot je zasebna prodaja vlagatelju ali udeležencu na trgu.
It is the Dutch State’s intention to reduce its stake in ABN AMRO Group up to a maximum of [25 - 65] %, preferably before the end of [2014 - 2018].
Nizozemska namerava zmanjšati svoj delež v skupini ABN AMRO na največ [25 – 65] %, po možnosti pred koncem leta [2014 – 2018].
Ultimately, the Dutch State is fully committed to a complete exit.
Na koncu je Nizozemska pripravljena, da se v celoti umakne.
The final decision on the IPO rests with the Dutch Minister of Finance and will depend on market circumstances, the ‘IPO readiness’ of ABN AMRO Group and the expected proceeds.
Končno odločitev glede prve javne ponudbe bo sprejel finančni minister, odvisna pa bo od tržnih razmer, „pripravljenosti“ skupine ABN AMRO na prvo javno ponudbo in pričakovanih prihodkov.
On 24 January 2011, the Dutch government also publicly set out its exit strategy [48].
24. januarja 2011 je nizozemska vlada svojo izhodno strategijo tudi javno objavila [48].
Capital Adequacy
Kapitalska ustreznost
The December 2009 Restructuring Plan (and also the updated November 2010 Restructuring Plan) show that – after implementation of all the State aid measures- ABN AMRO Group is sufficiently capitalised.
Načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 (in posodobljeni načrt prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010) kaže, da je – po uvedbi vseh ukrepov državne pomoči – skupina ABN AMRO dovolj kapitalizirana.
During the restructuring period, the projected Tier 1 ratios should stay comfortably above […] % between 2009 and 2012, to increase further to […] % in 2013.
Med obdobjem prestrukturiranja bi morali napovedani deleži kapitala prvega reda v letih med 2009 in 2012 ostati dejansko višji od […] % in se v letu 2013 še povečati na […] %.
Divestments
Odprodaja
In its December 2009 Restructuring Plan, the Dutch State explains that ABN AMRO Group has already divested a number of businesses.
V svojem načrtu prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 je Nizozemska pojasnila, da je skupina ABN AMRO že odprodala številne dejavnosti.
Apart from the sale of New HBU and IFN during the Merger Remedy process, ABN AMRO N and FBN also divested Intertrust and PFS.
Poleg prodaje podružnic New HBU in IFN v okviru korektivnega ukrepa v zvezi z združitvijo sta banki ABN AMRO N in FBN odprodali tudi Intertrust in oddelek PFS.
Compared to ABN AMRO Group, Intertrust and PFS jointly represent [0 - 5] %, [0 - 5] % and [0 - 5] % in terms of its projected total operating income, costs and RWA respectively.
V primerjavi s skupino ABN AMRO predstavljata Intertrust in oddelek PFS skupaj [0 – 5] %, [0 – 5] % in [0 – 5] % napovedanih skupnih prihodkov iz poslovanja, stroškov oziroma TPS.
During the restructuring process, FBN also made an acquisition to correct a misalignment resulting from the break-up of Fortis SA/NV.
Med procesom prestrukturiranja je banka FBN izpeljala tudi nakup, da bi popravila neskladnost zaradi razdružitve holdinga Fortis SA/NV.
FBN was the legal owner of the BU Brokerage, Clearing and Custody and all the offices related to that business except for the Chicago office, which had remained part of Fortis Bank SA/NV.
Banka FBN je bila pravni lastnik PE Brokerage, Clearing and Custody in vseh uradov, povezanih s tem poslom, razen urada v Chicagu, ki je ostal del Fortis Bank SA/NV.
To correct that separation-linked misalignment, FBN acquired the Chicago branch of Fortis Clearing Americas from Fortis Bank SA/NV on 31 July 2009 for a price of approximately USD […] million.
Da bi popravila neskladnost, nastalo zaradi ločitve, je banka FBN 31. julija 2009 kupila podružnico banke Fortis Clearing Americas v Chicagu od Fortis Bank SA/NV za približno […] milijonov USD.
To identify the individual State aid measures, the Commission uses in this Decision the same letter codes as in its Decision of 5 February 2010.
Za namene opredelitve posameznih ukrepov državne pomoči Komisija v tem sklepu uporablja enake črkovne kode, kot jih je uporabila v sklepu z dne 5. februarja 2010.
Measures covered by the Decision of 8 April 2009
Ukrepi, zajeti v odločbi z dne 8. aprila 2009
On 3 October 2008, the Dutch State acquired FBN (including ABN AMRO N) from Fortis SA/NV for EUR 12,8 billion (‘Measure X’).
Nizozemska je 3. oktobra 2008 od holdinga Fortis SA/NV kupila banko FBN (vključno z banko ABN AMRO N) za 12,8 milijarde EUR (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ukrep X).
The Commission did not open the procedure in respect of that measure, which as such did not provide State aid to FBN, even if it was part of a transaction providing State aid to FBN (see recital 32 of the Decision of 8 April 2009).
Komisija glede tega ukrepa ni začela postopka, saj sam po sebi banki FBN ni zagotovil državne pomoči, čeprav je bil del transakcije, ki je banki FBN zagotovila državno pomoč (glej uvodno izjavo 32 odločbe z dne 8. aprila 2009).
At the time of the FBN’s acquisition by the Dutch State, FBN depended heavily on Fortis Bank SA/NV for its funding.
V času, ko je banko FBN kupila Nizozemska, je bila banka glede financiranja močno odvisna od Fortis Bank SA/NV.
To ensure full separation of FBN from Fortis Bank SA/NV, it was necessary for the Dutch State to end the funding relationship between FBN and Fortis Bank SA/NV.
Da bi zagotovila popolno ločitev banke FBN od Fortis Bank SA/NV, je morala Nizozemska prekiniti povezavo med banko FBN in Fortis Bank SA/NV, ki je temeljila na financiranju.
To cut the existing links, the Dutch State granted FBN a short-term liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion (‘Measure Y1’) on 3 October 2008.
Da bi prekinila obstoječo povezavo, je Nizozemska banki FBN 3. oktobra 2008 odobrila kratkoročno likvidnostno posojilo v višini 45 milijard EUR (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ukrep Y1).
That liquidity facility allowed FBN to repay to Fortis Bank SA/NV short-term loans of EUR 34 billion. The Dutch State also replaced Fortis Bank SA/NV as a lender of long-term loans to FBN for a nominal amount of EUR 16,1 billion in a so-called ‘novation’ (‘Measure Y2’) [49].
To likvidnostno posojilo je banki FBN omogočilo, da je Fortis Bank SA/NV odplačala kratkoročna posojila v višini 34 milijard EUR. Nizozemska je zamenjala Fortis Bank SA/NV tudi v vlogi posojilodajalca dolgoročnih posojil banki FBN v nominalnem znesku 16,1 milijarde EUR za t. i. „prenovitev“ (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ukrep Y2) [49].
In the period between 6 October 2008 and 23 October 2008, the Dutch State provided FBN short-term funding at EONIA [50] (for overnight lending with a maximum amount of EUR 5 billion) or EURIBOR [51] (for longer-term liquidity with a maximum amount of EUR 40 billion) without any extra spread.
V obdobju med 6. oktobrom 2008 in 23. oktobrom 2008 je Nizozemska banki FBN zagotovila kratkoročno financiranje po obrestni meri EONIA [50] (za posojilo čez noč v višini največ 5 milijard EUR) ali obrestni meri EURIBOR [51] (za dolgoročno likvidnost v višini največ 40 milijard EUR) brez dodatne razlike.
After 23 October 2008, there was a short period (until 5 November 2008) during which the Dutch State applied EONIA + 50 basis points and EURIBOR + 50 basis points.
Po 23. oktobru 2008 je bilo krajše obdobje (do 5. novembra 2008), med katerim je Nizozemska uporabljala obrestno mero EONIA + 50 bazičnih točk in obrestno mero EURIBOR + 50 bazičnih točk.
During that second period, that arrangement was still for maximum amounts of EUR 5 billion for overnight liquidity and EUR 40 billion for longer-term liquidity.
Med tem drugim obdobjem je bil dogovor še vedno za najvišja zneska 5 milijard EUR za likvidnost čez noč in 40 milijard EUR za dolgoročno likvidnost.
In the period between 5 November 2008 and 1 March 2009, the Dutch State changed the remuneration to EONIA + 25 basis points for overnight loans, EURIBOR + 25 basis points for loans with a maturity [52] of less than 3 months and EURIBOR + 50 basis points for loans with a maturity of more than 3 months [53].
V obdobju med 5. novembrom 2008 in 1. marcem 2009 je Nizozemska uporabljala obrestno mero EONIA + 25 bazičnih točk za posojila čez noč, obrestno mero EURIBOR + 25 bazičnih točk za posojila z zapadlostjo [52] manj kot tri mesece in obrestno mero EURIBOR + 50 bazičnih točk za posojila z zapadlostjo več kot tri mesece [53].