natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Intra-Community acquisitions shall mean shareholding acquisitions, which meet all the relevant conditions of Article 12(5) TRLIS, in a target company which is formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and has its registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community.
prevzemi znotraj Skupnosti pomenijo prevzeme deležev, ki izpolnjujejo vse zadevne pogoje iz člena 12(5) TRLIS, v ciljni družbi, ki je oblikovana v skladu z zakonodajo države članice in ima registrirani sedež, glavno upravo ali glavno poslovalnico v Skupnosti;
Extra-Community acquisitions shall mean shareholding acquisitions, which meet all the relevant conditions of Article 12(5) TRLIS, in a target company which has not been formed in accordance with the law of a Member State or does not have its registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community.
prevzemi zunaj Skupnosti pomenijo prevzeme deležev, ki izpolnjujejo vse zadevne pogoje iz člena 12(5) TRLIS, v ciljni družbi, ki ni bila oblikovana v skladu z zakonodajo države članice ali nima registriranega sedeža, glavne uprave ali glavne poslovalnice v Skupnosti.
In the initiating Decision, the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the Treaty in respect of the measure in question because it appeared to fulfil all the conditions for being considered State aid under Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Komisija je z odločitvijo o sprožitvi postopka začela formalni postopek preiskave, kot ga določa člen 88(2) Pogodbe, v zvezi z zadevnim ukrepom, ker se je zdelo, da izpolnjuje vse pogoje, da šteje za državno pomoč v skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe.
The Commission also had doubts as to whether the measure at issue could be considered compatible with the common market, as none of the exceptions provided for in Article 87(2) and (3) seemed applicable.
Komisija je prav tako dvomila, ali je mogoče zadevni ukrep obravnavati kot združljiv s skupnim trgom, ker se zdi, da se ne uporablja nobena izjema iz člena 87(2) in (3).
In particular, the Commission considered that the measure in question departed from the ordinary scope of the Spanish corporate tax system, which is the tax system of reference.
Komisija je zlasti menila, da se je zadevni ukrep razlikoval od običajnega področja uporabe španskega sistema o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ki je referenčni davčni sistem.
The Commission also held that the tax amortisation of the financial goodwill resulting from the acquisition of a 5 % shareholding in a foreign target company seemed to constitute an exceptional incentive.
Po mnenju Komisije se je prav tako zdelo, da davčna amortizacija finančnega dobrega imena, ki izhaja iz prevzema 5-odstotnega deleža v tuji ciljni družbi, pomeni izjemno spodbudo.
The Commission observed that the tax amortisation was available only to a specific category of undertakings, namely undertakings which acquire certain shareholdings, amounting to at least 5 % of the share capital of a target company, and only in respect of foreign target companies subject to the criteria under Article 21(1) TRLIS.
Komisija je ugotovila, da je bila davčna amortizacija na voljo le posebni kategoriji družb, in sicer družbam, ki prevzamejo nekatere deleže, ki znašajo vsaj 5 % kapitalskega deleža ciljne družbe, in le v zvezi s tujimi ciljnimi družbami, za katere veljajo merila iz člena 21(1) TRLIS.
The Commission also underlined that in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, a tax reduction favouring only exports of national products constitutes State aid [15].
Komisija je prav tako poudarila, da znižanje davka, ki daje prednost le izvozu nacionalnih proizvodov, v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti pomeni državno pomoč [15].
The measure in question therefore seemed selective.
Zadevni ukrep se je torej zdel selektiven.
In this context, the Commission also considered that the selective advantage did not appear to be justified by the inherent nature of the tax system.
V zvezi s tem je Komisija prav tako menila, da se zaradi značilnosti davčnega sistema selektivna prednost ni zdela utemeljena.
In particular, it considered that the differentiation created by the measure at issue, which departed from the general rules of the Spanish accounting and tax systems could not be justified by reasons linked to technicalities of the tax system.
Zlasti je menila, da razlikovanja zaradi zadevnega ukrepa, ki izhaja iz splošnih predpisov španskega računovodskega in davčnega sistema, ni mogoče utemeljiti z razlogi, ki so povezani s tehničnimi podrobnostmi davčnega sistema.
Indeed, goodwill can only be deducted in the case of a business combination or transfer of assets, except under the provisions of the measure at issue.
Dobro ime je seveda mogoče odšteti le v primeru poslovne združitve ali prenosa sredstev, razen pod pogoji zadevnega ukrepa.
The Commission also considered that it was disproportionate for the measure in question to claim to attain the neutrality objectives pursued by the Spanish system because it is limited solely to the acquisition of significant shareholdings in foreign companies.
Po mnenju Komisije je prav tako nesorazmerno za zadevni ukrep trditi, da je dosegal cilje nevtralnosti, za katere si prizadeva španski sistem, ker je omejen zgolj na prevzem znatnih deležev v tujih družbah.
In addition, the Commission considered that the measure at issue implied the use of State resources as it involved foregoing tax revenue by the Spanish Treasury.
Poleg tega je Komisija menila, da je zadevni ukrep povzročil uporabo državnih sredstev, ker je vključeval navedene davčne prihodke španske državne blagajne.
Finally, the measure could distort competition in the European business acquisition market by providing a selective economic advantage to Spanish companies engaged in the acquisition of a significant shareholding in foreign companies.
Nazadnje, ukrep bi lahko z zagotavljanjem selektivne gospodarske prednosti španskim družbam, ki so vključene v prevzemanje znatnih deležev v tujih družbah, izkrivljal konkurenco na evropskem trgu poslovnih združitev.
Nor did the Commission find any grounds for considering the measure compatible with the common market.
Komisija prav tako ni ugotovila nobenih razlogov za obravnavo ukrepa kot združljivega s skupnim trgom.
The Commission therefore concluded that the measure in question could constitute incompatible State aid.
Zato je Komisija sklenila, da bi lahko zadevni ukrep pomenil nezdružljivo državno pomoč.
This being the case, recovery should take place according to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty.
V tem primeru je treba pomoč vrniti v skladu s členom 14 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES.
The Commission accordingly invited the Spanish authorities and interested parties to submit their observations as to the possible presence of legitimate expectations or any other general principle of Community law which would permit the Commission to exceptionally waive recovery pursuant to the second sentence of Article 14(1) of the above Council Regulation.
V skladu s tem je Komisija pozvala španske organe in zainteresirane strani, naj predložijo pripombe glede mogočih upravičenih pričakovanj ali katerega koli drugega splošnega načela prava Skupnosti, ki bi Komisiji izjemoma omogočal oprostitev vračila pomoči v skladu z drugim stavkom člena 14(1) navedene uredbe Sveta.
COMMENTS FROM THE SPANISH AUTHORITIES AND INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES
PRIPOMBE ŠPANSKIH ORGANOV IN ZAINTERESIRANIH TRETJIH STRANI
The Commission received comments from the Spanish authorities [16] and from 32 interested third parties [17], eight of which were associations.
Komisija je prejela pripombe španskih organov [16] in dvaintridesetih zainteresiranih tretjih strani [17], od tega od osmih združenj.
In short, the Spanish authorities consider that Article 12(5) TRLIS constitutes a general measure and not an exception to the Spanish tax system since this provision allows the amortisation of an intangible asset, which applies to any taxpayer who acquires a significant shareholding in a foreign company.
Na kratko, španski organi menijo, da je člen 12(5) TRLIS splošni ukrep, in ne izjema v španskem davčnem sistemu, saj ta določba omogoča amortizacijo neopredmetenega sredstva, ki velja za vsakega davčnega zavezanca, ki prevzame znatni delež v tuji družbi.
In the light of Commission practice and the relevant case-law, the Spanish authorities conclude that the contested measures cannot be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty.
Glede na prakso Komisije in zadevno sodno prakso španski organi sklepajo, da izpodbijanih aktov ni mogoče šteti za državno pomoč v smislu člena 87 Pogodbe.
In addition, the Spanish authorities consider that a different conclusion would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty.
Poleg tega menijo, da bi bil drugačen sklep v nasprotju z načelom pravne varnosti.
The Spanish authorities also contest the competence of the Commission to challenge this general measure as they consider that the Commission cannot use State aid rules as the basis for harmonising tax issues.
Španski organi prav tako ugovarjajo pristojnosti Komisije, da nasprotuje temu splošnemu ukrepu, ker menijo, da Komisija ne more uporabiti pravil o državni pomoči kot podlago za uskladitev davčnih vprašanj.
In general, 30 interested third parties (hereinafter the 30 interested parties) support the views of the Spanish authorities, whereas another two third parties (hereinafter the two parties) consider that Article 12(5) TRLIS constitutes an unlawful State aid measure incompatible with the common market.
Na splošno, trideset zainteresiranih tretjih strani (v nadaljnjem besedilu: trideset zainteresiranih strani) podpira stališča španskih organov, medtem ko dve tretji strani (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dve strani) menita, da člen 12(5) TRLIS pomeni nezakonit ukrep državne pomoči, ki ni združljiv s skupnim trgom.
Hence the arguments of the 30 interested parties will be presented together with the position of the Spanish authorities, while the arguments of the two parties will be described separately.
Zato bodo argumenti tridesetih zainteresiranih strani predstavljeni skupaj s stališčem španskih organov, argumenti dveh strani pa bodo opisani ločeno.
Comments from the Spanish authorities and the 30 interested parties
Pripombe španskih organov in tridesetih zainteresiranih strani
As an opening comment, the Spanish authorities stress that direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States.
Španski organi v uvodni pripombi poudarjajo, da so države članice pristojne za neposredno obdavčitev.
Therefore, the Commission’s action in this field should comply with the subsidiarity principle in Article 5 of the Treaty.
Zato mora biti ukrep Komisije na tem področju v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 Pogodbe.
Moreover, the Spanish authorities recall that Articles 3 and 58(1)(a) of the Treaty allow Member States to establish different tax systems according to the location of the investment or the tax residence of the taxpayer, without this being considered a restriction on the free movement of capital.
Poleg tega španski organi opozarjajo, da člen 3 in člen 58(1)(a) Pogodbe omogočata državam članicam, da glede na lokacijo naložbe ali davčni domicil davčnega zavezanca oblikujejo različne davčne sisteme, pri čemer se to ne obravnava kot omejitev prostega pretoka kapitala.
The 30 interested parties also maintain that a negative Commission decision would breach the principle of national fiscal autonomy laid down in the Treaty, as well as Article 56 of the Treaty, which prohibits restrictions on the free movement of capital.
Trideset zainteresiranih strani je prav tako vztrajalo, da bi negativna odločitev Komisije kršila načelo nacionalne davčne avtonomije, določeno v Pogodbi, in tudi člen 56 Pogodbe, s katerim se prepovedujejo omejitve prostega pretoka kapitala.
The measure at issue does not constitute State aid
Zadevni ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči
The Spanish authorities and the 30 interested parties consider that the measure at issue does not to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty since: (i) it does not confer an economic advantage; (ii) it does not favour certain undertakings; and (iii) it does not distort or threaten to distort competition between Member States.
Španski organi in trideset zainteresiranih strani menijo, da zadevni ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe, ker: (i) ne dodeljuje gospodarske prednosti; (ii) ne daje prednosti nekaterim družbam; niti (iii) ne izkrivlja ali ne bi mogel izkrivljati konkurence med državami članicami.
In line with the logic of the Spanish tax system, they maintain that the measure at issue should be considered a general measure that applies indiscriminately to any type of company and activity.
V skladu z logiko španskega davčnega sistema vztrajajo, da je treba zadevni ukrep obravnavati kot splošen ukrep, ki se brez razlikovanja uporablja za vse vrste družb in dejavnosti.
The measure at issue does not confer an economic advantage
Zadevni ukrep ne daje gospodarske prednosti
Contrary to the Commission’s position as expressed in the initiating Decision, the Spanish authorities maintain that Article 12(5) TRLIS does not constitute an exception to the Spanish corporate tax system since: (i) the Spanish accounting system is not an appropriate point of reference to substantiate the existence of an exception to the tax system; and (ii) even if it were, the characterisation of financial goodwill as a depreciable asset over time has historically been a general feature of the Spanish accounting and corporate tax systems.
Španski organi v nasprotju s stališčem Komisije iz odločitve o sprožitvi postopka vztrajajo, da člen 12(5) TRLIS ne pomeni izjeme v španskem sistemu o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ker: (i) španski računovodski sistem ni primerna referenca za dokazovanje obstoja izjeme v davčnem sistemu; in (ii) čeprav bi veljalo nasprotno, je postala označitev finančnega dobrega imena kot amortizacijskega sredstva sčasoma splošna značilnost španskega računovodskega sistema in sistema o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb.
Firstly, because of the lack of harmonisation of accounting rules, the accounting result cannot serve as a reference point for establishing the exceptional nature of the measure at issue.
Prvič, računovodski rezultat zaradi neusklajenosti računovodskih pravil ne more biti referenca za ugotavljanje izjemnosti zadevnega ukrepa.
Indeed, in Spain, the tax base is calculated on the basis of the accounting result, adjusted according to tax rules.
Seveda se v Španiji davčna osnova izračuna na podlagi računovodskega rezultata, ki se prilagodi glede na davčne predpise.
Therefore, in the case at hand, accounting considerations cannot, in Spain’s view, serve as a reference point for a tax measure.
Zato v zadevnem primeru računovodski pomisleki po mnenju Španije ne morejo biti referenca za davčni ukrep.
Secondly, it is incorrect to consider goodwill amortisation not to be within the logic of the Spanish accounting system since both goodwill [18] and financial goodwill [19] can be amortised over periods of up to 20 years.
Drugič, napačno je mnenje, da amortizacija dobrega imena ni v skladu z logiko španskega računovodskega sistema, saj je mogoče dobro ime [18] in finančno dobro ime [19] amortizirati v obdobjih, ki trajajo do največ 20 let.
These empirical rules reflect the loss of value of the underlying assets, whether or not tangible.
V teh empiričnih predpisih se izraža izguba vrednosti osnovnih sredstev, opredmetenih ali ne.
Therefore, Article 12(5) TRLIS does not constitute an exception as it does not depart from the rules on amortisation of goodwill established in the Spanish accounting and tax systems.
Zato člen 12(5) TRLIS ne pomeni izjeme, ker ne izhaja iz teh predpisov o amortizaciji dobrega imena, vzpostavljenega v španskem računovodskem in davčnem sistemu.
Thirdly, the Spanish authorities point out that the measure at issue does not constitute a true economic advantage since, in the case of sale of the acquired shareholding, the amount deducted is recovered by taxation of the capital gain, thus placing the taxpayer in the same situation as if Article 12(5) TRLIS had not been applied.
Tretjič, španski organi poudarjajo, da zadevni ukrep ne pomeni resnične gospodarske prednosti, ker se v primeru prodaje prevzetega deleža odšteti znesek vrne z obdavčenjem kapitalskega dobička, zaradi česar je davčni zavezanec v enakem položaju, kot če se člen 12(5) TRLIS ne bi uporabljal.
Fourthly, the Commission incorrectly refers to Articles 11(4) and 89(3) TRLIS to establish the existence of an advantage.
Četrtič, Komisija se v zvezi z ugotavljanjem obstoja prednosti napačno sklicuje na člen 11(4) in člen 89(3) TRLIS.
In the initiating Decision, the Commission states that neither a business combination nor takeover of the target company is necessary to benefit from Article 12(5) TRLIS.
Komisija je v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka navedla, da za korist iz člena 12(5) TRLIS nista potrebna niti poslovna združitev niti prevzem ciljne družbe.
This statement reflects a misunderstanding of the Spanish tax system since these two Articles do not prevent a group of companies that jointly acquires control of a target company from deducting a corresponding fraction of the goodwill resulting from the operation.
Ta trditev kaže na nerazumevanje španskega davčnega sistema, saj navedena člena skupini družb, ki skupaj prevzamejo nadzor nad ciljno družbo, ne preprečujeta odbitka ustreznega dela od dobrega imena, ki izhaja iz operacije.
Hence, application of these two Articles does not require individual control of the target company in order to benefit from the measure at issue.
Zato za uporabo navedenih členov ni potreben posamezni nadzor nad ciljno družbo, da bi imeli koristi od zadevnega ukrepa.
In this context, it would be inappropriate to consider that Article 12(5) TRLIS offers more favourable treatment than Articles 11(4) or 89(3) TRLIS as regards the controlling position of the beneficiaries.
V zvezi s tem bi bilo neustrezno mnenje, da člen 12(5) TRLIS ponuja ugodnejšo obravnavo od člena 11(4) ali člena 89(3) TRLIS, kar zadeva nadzorni položaj upravičencev.
The Spanish authorities point out that the Commission also incorrectly refers to Article 12(3) TRLIS to establish an alleged advantage under Article 12(5) TRLIS: Article 12(3) applies to situations of depreciation in case of an objective loss recorded by the target company, whereas Article 12(5) TRLIS complements this provision and reflects the loss of value attributable to depreciation of the financial goodwill.
Španski organi poudarjajo, da se Komisija prav tako nepravilno sklicuje na člen 12(3) TRLIS, da bi opredelila domnevno prednost v skladu s členom 12(5) TRLIS. Člen 12(3) se uporablja za primere amortizacije, če je v ciljni družbi evidentirana objektivna izguba, medtem ko se s členom 12(5) TRLIS dopolnjuje ta določba, poleg tega pa se v njem izraža izguba vrednosti, ki se pripiše amortizaciji finančnega dobrega imena.
Fifthly, the Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation [21] (hereinafter the Commission Notice) explicitly states that amortisation rules do not imply State aid.
Petič, v Obvestilu Komisije o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za ukrepe, ki zadevajo neposredno obdavčitev ustvarjenega dohodka [21] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Obvestilo Komisije) je izrecno navedeno, da pravila o amortizaciji ne pomenijo državne pomoči.
Since the current amortisation coefficient for financial goodwill over a minimum of 20 years is the same as the amortisation coefficient for goodwill, the rule does not constitute an exception to the general tax system.
Pravilo ne pomeni izjeme v splošnem davčnem sistemu, ker je sedanji koeficient amortizacije za finančno dobro ime v obdobju najmanj 20 let enak kot koeficient amortizacije za dobro ime.
Finally, the 30 interested parties also consider that if the measure at issue constituted an advantage, the ultimate beneficiaries would be the target company’s shareholders since they would receive the price paid by the acquiring company benefitting from the measure at issue.
Nazadnje, trideset zainteresiranih strani prav tako meni, da bi bili končni upravičenci delničarji ciljne družbe, če bi zadevni ukrep pomenil prednost, ker bi prejeli ceno, ki jo je plačala prevzemna družba, ki je imela korist od zadevnega ukrepa.
The measure at issue does not favour certain undertakings or production
Zadevni ukrep ne daje prednosti nekaterim družbam ali proizvodnji
Firstly, Spain maintains that Article 12(5) TRLIS is a general measure since it is open to any Spanish company whatever its activity, sector, size, form or other characteristics.
Prvič, Španija vztraja, da je člen 12(5) TRLIS splošni ukrep, ker je dostopen vsem španskim družbam ne glede na njihovo dejavnost, sektor, velikost, obliko ali druge značilnosti.
The only condition for the taxpayer to be able to benefit from the measure at issue is to be tax resident in Spain.
Edini pogoj, da ima lahko davčni zavezanec korist od zadevnega ukrepa, je davčni domicil v Španiji.
The fact that not all taxpayers benefit from the measure in question does not make it selective.
Dejstvo, da vsi davčni zavezanci nimajo koristi od zadevnega ukrepa, ne pomeni, da je ukrep selektiven.
Therefore, Article 12(5) TRLIS is neither de facto nor de jure selective within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Zato člen 12(5) TRLIS ni niti dejansko niti pravno selektiven v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe.
Accordingly, by letter dated 14 July 2008 [22], the Spanish authorities provided data extracted from the 2006 Spanish tax returns which show that all types of companies (SMEs and large undertakings), as well as companies active in different economic sectors, had benefited from the measure at issue.
V skladu s tem so španski organi v dopisu z dne 14. julija 2008 [22] predložili podatke iz španskih davčnih napovedi iz leta 2006, ki dokazujejo, da so vse vrste družb (mala in srednje velika podjetja ter velike družbe) in tudi družbe, dejavne v različnih sektorjih gospodarstva, imele korist od zadevnega ukrepa.
The Spanish authorities also stress that in a recent judgment [23], the Court of First Instance indicated that a limited number of beneficiaries is not sufficient in itself to establish the selectivity of the measure since that group can actually represent all of the undertakings in a particular legal and factual situation.
Španski organi prav tako poudarjajo, da je Sodišče prve stopnje v nedavni sodbi [23] navedlo, da omejeno število upravičencev samo po sebi ne zadostuje za dokaz selektivnosti ukrepa, ker lahko zadevna skupina dejansko predstavlja vse družbe v danem pravnem in dejanskem položaju.
In particular, the Spanish authorities stress that the measure at issue bears similarities with a recent case [24] that the Commission considered to be a general measure and they therefore request the same treatment.
Španski organi zlasti poudarjajo, da je zadevni ukrep podoben nedavni zadevi [24], ki jo je Komisija obravnavala kot splošen ukrep, in zato zahtevajo enako obravnavo.
Secondly, according to the Spanish authorities and the 30 interested parties, in its initiating Decision the Commission mixed up the concept of selectivity and the objective conditions of the measure at issue which refer only to certain transactions (i.e. shareholding in a foreign target company).
Drugič, po mnenju španskih organov in tridesetih zainteresiranih strani je Komisija v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka zamenjala pojem selektivnosti in objektivne pogoje zadevnega ukrepa, ki se nanašajo le na nekatere transakcije (tj. delež v tuji ciljni družbi).
Indeed, the Commission alleges that Article 12(5) TRLIS is selective since the same treatment is not granted to comparable investments in Spanish companies.
Komisija seveda domneva, da je člen 12(5) TRLIS selektiven, ker ni zagotovljena enaka obravnava primerljivih naložb v španskih družbah.