natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
At its meeting of 19 and 20 March 2009, the European Council agreed on the need to improve the regulation and supervision of financial institutions within the Union and to use the de Larosière Report as a basis for action.
Evropski svet se je na seji 19. in 20. marca 2009 dogovoril o potrebi po izboljšanju regulacije in nadzora na področju finančnih institucij v Uniji ter da bo de Larosièrovo poročilo podlaga za ukrepanje.
In its Communication of 27 May 2009 entitled ‘European Financial Supervision’, the Commission suggested a series of reforms to the current arrangements for safeguarding financial stability at the Union level, in particular including the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) responsible for macro-prudential oversight.
Komisija je v sporočilu z dne 27. maja 2009 z naslovom „Evropski finančni nadzor“ predlagala vrsto reform sedanjih ureditev za varovanje finančne stabilnosti na ravni Unije, ki vključujejo zlasti ustanovitev Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (ESRB), odgovornega za makrobonitetni nadzor.
The support provided by the ECB to the ESRB, as well as the tasks assigned to the ESRB, should be without prejudice to the principle of the independence of the ECB in the performance of its tasks pursuant to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Podpora, ki jo ECB zagotavlja ESRB in naloge, dodeljene ESRB ne bi smele posegati v načelo neodvisnosti ECB pri izvajanju njenih nalog v skladu s Pogodbo o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU).
Given the integration of international financial markets and the contagion risk of financial crises, there is a need for a strong commitment on the part of the Union at the global level.
Zaradi povezovanja mednarodnih finančnih trgov in razširjenega tveganja finančne krize mora biti Unija izredno dejavna na svetovni ravni.
The ESRB should draw expertise from a high-level scientific committee and take on all the global responsibilities required in order to ensure that the voice of the Union is heard on issues relating to financial stability, in particular by cooperating closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which are expected to provide early warnings of macro-prudential risks at the global level, and the partners of the Group of Twenty (G-20).
ESRB bi moral uporabiti strokovno znanje znanstvenega odbora na visoki ravni in prevzeti vse globalne odgovornosti, ki so potrebne, da se sliši glas Unije v zvezi z vprašanji finančne stabilnosti, zlasti s tesnim sodelovanjem z Mednarodnim denarnim skladom (MDS) in Odborom za finančno stabilnost (FSB), od katerih se pričakuje, da bosta zagotovila zgodnja opozorila makrobonitetnih tveganj na svetovni ravni, ter z vsemi partnerji skupine G-20.
The ESRB should contribute, inter alia, towards implementing the recommendations of the IMF, the FSB and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to the G-20.
ESRB bi moral med drugim sodelovati pri izvajanju priporočil MDS, FSB in Banke za mednarodne poravnave (BIS) skupini G-20.
The report of the IMF, the BIS and the FSB, of 28 October 2009, presented to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, entitled ‘Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations’ also states that the assessment of systemic risk is likely to vary depending on the economic environment.
Poročilo MDS, BIS in FSB z dne28. oktobra 2009, predloženo finančnim ministrom skupine G-20 in guvernerjem centralnih bank, z naslovom „Smernice za ocenjevanje sistemske pomembnosti finančnih institucij, trgov in instrumentov: uvodne misli“ prav tako navaja, da se ocena sistemskega tveganja lahko razlikuje glede na gospodarsko okolje.
It will also be conditioned by the financial infrastructure and crisis management arrangements and the capacity to deal with failures when they occur.
Ocene bodo prav tako odvisne od finančne infrastrukture in ukrepov kriznega upravljanja ter sposobnosti obvladovanja motenj, ko se te pojavijo.
Financial institutions may be systemically important for local, national or international financial systems and economies.
Finančne institucije so lahko sistemsko pomembne za lokalne, nacionalne ali mednarodne finančne sisteme in gospodarstva.
The key criteria helping to identify the systemic importance of markets and institutions are size (the volume of financial services provided by the individual component of the financial system), substitutability (the extent to which other components of the system can provide the same services in the event of failure) and interconnectedness (linkages with other components of the system).
Ključna merila, ki pomagajo ugotavljati sistemsko pomembnost trgov in institucij, so velikost (obseg finančnih storitev, ki jih zagotavlja posamezni sestavni del finančnega sistema), nadomestljivost (zmožnost drugih sestavnih delov sistema, da zagotovijo iste storitve v primeru motenj) in medsebojna povezanost (povezave z drugimi sestavnimi deli sistema).
An assessment based on those three criteria should be supplemented by a reference to financial vulnerabilities and the capacity of the institutional framework to deal with financial failures and should consider a wide range of additional factors such as, inter alia, the complexity of specific structures and business models, the degree of financial autonomy, intensity and scope of supervision, transparency of financial arrangements and linkages that may affect the overall risk of institutions.
Oceno, ki je opravljena na podlagi teh treh meril, bi bilo treba dopolniti s šibkimi točkami v finančnem sistemu in zmožnostjo institucionalnega okvira za obvladovanje finančnih motenj, in bi morala upoštevati tudi mnoge druge dejavnike, kot so med drugim kompleksnost posebnih struktur in poslovnih modelov, stopnjo finančne neodvisnosti, intenzivnost in obseg nadzora, preglednost finančnih ureditev in povezave, ki bi lahko vplivale na splošno tveganje institucij.
The ESRB’s task should be to monitor and assess systemic risk in normal times for the purpose of mitigating the exposure of the system to the risk of failure of systemic components and enhancing the financial system’s resilience to shocks.
Naloga ESRB bi morala biti spremljanje in ocenjevanje sistemskega tveganja v običajnih razmerah, da se ublaži izpostavljenost sistema nevarnosti odpovedi sistemskih sestavnih delov ter okrepi odpornost finančnega sistema proti pretresom.
In that respect, the ESRB should contribute to ensuring financial stability and mitigating the negative impacts on the internal market and the real economy.
V zvezi s tem bi moral ESRB prispevati k zagotavljanju finančne stabilnosti ter ublažitvi negativnih posledic na notranjem trgu in realnem gospodarstvu.
In order to accomplish its objectives, the ESRB should analyse all the relevant information.
Za uresničitev svojih ciljev bi moral ESRB analizirati vse zadevne informacije.
The present arrangements of the Union place too little emphasis on macro-prudential oversight and on inter-linkages between developments in the broader macroeconomic environment and the financial system.
V sedanji ureditvi Unije je dan premajhen poudarek na makrobonitetni nadzor in na medsebojne povezave med razvojem širšega makroekonomskega okolja in finančnega sistema.
Responsibility for macro-prudential analysis remains fragmented, and is conducted by various authorities at different levels with no mechanism to ensure that macro-prudential risks are adequately identified and that warnings and recommendations are issued clearly, followed up and translated into action.
Odgovornost za makrobonitetno analizo je razdrobljena, izvajajo jo različni organi na različnih ravneh, pri čemer ni mehanizma, s katerim bi zagotovili, da se makrobonitetna tveganja ustrezno prepozna ter da se izdajo jasna opozorila in priporočila, ki se nato upoštevajo in udejanijo.
A proper functioning of Union and global financial systems and the mitigation of threats thereto require enhanced consistency between macro- and micro-prudential supervision.
Pravilno delovanje Unije in globalnih finančnih sistemov ter blažitev nevarnosti, ki jim pretijo, zahtevajo večjo usklajenost med makro- in mikrobonitetnim nadzorom.
A newly designed system of macro-prudential oversight requires credible and high-profile leadership.
Novo oblikovani sistem makrobonitetnega nadzora zahteva verodostojno in visoko strokovno usposobljeno vodstvo.
Therefore, given its key role and its international and internal credibility, and in the spirit of the recommendations of the de Larosière Report, the President of the ECB should be the Chair of the ESRB for a first term of 5 years following the entry into force of this Regulation.
Glede na njegovo ključno vlogo ter njegovo mednarodno in notranjo verodostojnost, kakor tudi v duhu priporočil de Larosièrovega poročila, bi moral predsednik ECB v prvih petih letih po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe predsedovati ESRB.
In addition, the accountability requirements should be increased and the ESRB bodies should be able to draw on a wide range of experience, backgrounds and opinions.
Poleg tega bi bilo treba poostriti zahteve glede odgovornosti, organi ESRB pa bi morali biti sposobni črpati iz bogatih izkušenj, strokovnega znanja in mnenj.
The de Larosière Report also states that macro-prudential oversight is not meaningful unless it can somehow impact on supervision at the micro level whilst micro-prudential supervision cannot effectively safeguard financial stability without adequately taking account of macro-level developments.
V de Larosièrovem poročilu je tudi navedeno, da makrobonitetni nadzor ni smiseln, če ne more nekako vplivati na nadzor na mikro ravni, medtem ko mikrobonitetni nadzor ne more učinkovito varovati finančne stabilnosti brez ustreznega upoštevanja razvoja na makro ravni.
A European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) should be established, bringing together the actors of financial supervision at national level and at the level of the Union, to act as a network.
Treba bi bilo vzpostaviti Evropski sistem finančnega nadzora (ESFS), ki bi združeval akterje finančnega nadzora tako na nacionalni ravni in na ravni Unije, da bi ti delovali kot mreža.
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation in accordance with Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the parties to the ESFS should cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular to ensure that appropriate and reliable information flows between them.
Na podlagi načela lojalnega sodelovanja v skladu s členom 4(3) Pogodbe o Evropski uniji bi morali udeleženci v ESFS sodelovati z zaupanjem in popolnim vzajemnim spoštovanjem, zlasti da se zagotovi pretok ustreznih in zanesljivih informacij med njimi.
At the level of the Union, the network should comprise the ESRB and three micro-supervisory authorities: the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [11], the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [12], and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [13] (hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘ESAs’).
Na ravni Unije bi morali mrežo sestavljati ESRB in trije nadzorni organi na mikro ravni: Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski bančni organ), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [11], Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1094/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [12] in Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1095/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [13] (v nadaljnjem besedilu s skupnim imenom: ESA).
The Union needs a specific body responsible for macro-prudential oversight across its financial system, which would identify risks to financial stability and, where necessary, issue risk warnings and recommendations for action to address such risks.
Unija potrebuje poseben organ, pristojen za makrobonitetni nadzor nad njenim celotnim finančnim sistemom, ki bi opredelil tveganja za finančno stabilnost ter po potrebi izdajal opozorila o tveganjih in priporočila za ukrepanje v odziv na ta tveganja.
Consequently, the ESRB should be established as a new independent body, covering all financial sectors as well as guarantee schemes.
Posledično bi bilo treba ustanoviti ESRB kot nov neodvisen organ, ki bi spremljal vse finančne sektorje in jamstvene sheme.
The ESRB should be responsible for conducting macro-prudential oversight at the level of the Union and should have no legal personality.
ESRB bi moral biti odgovoren za izvajanje makrobonitetnega nadzora na ravni Unije in ne bi smel imeti pravne osebnosti.
The ESRB should comprise a General Board, a Steering Committee, a Secretariat, an Advisory Scientific Committee and an Advisory Technical Committee.
ESBR bi morali sestavljati splošni odbor, pripravljalni odbor, sekretariat, svetovalni znanstveni odbor in svetovalni tehnični odbor.
The composition of the Advisory Scientific Committee should take into account adequate rules of conflict of interests adopted by the General Board.
Pri sestavi svetovalnega znanstvenega odbora bi bilo treba upoštevati ustrezna pravila o navzkrižju interesov, ki jih je sprejel splošni odbor.
The establishment of the Advisory Technical Committee should take into account existing structures with a view to avoiding any duplication.
Pri ustanovitvi svetovalnega tehničnega odbora bi bilo treba upoštevati obstoječe strukture, da bi se izognili vsakršnemu podvajanju.
The ESRB should issue warnings and, where it deems necessary, recommendations either of a general or a specific nature, which should be addressed in particular to the Union as a whole or to one or more Member States, or to one or more of the ESAs, or to one or more of the national supervisory authorities with a specified timeline for the relevant policy response.
ESRB bi moral izdajati opozorila in po potrebi splošna ali posebna priporočila, ki bi bila naslovljena zlasti na celotno Unijo, eno ali več držav članic, enega ali več ESA ali enega ali več nacionalnih nadzornih organov, in pri tem določiti rok za ustrezen odziv politik.
The ESRB should elaborate a colour code in order to allow interested parties better to assess the nature of the risk.
ESRB bi moral izdelati barvno kodo, s katero bi lahko zainteresirane strani bolje ocenile naravo tveganj.
In order to increase their influence and legitimacy, such warnings and recommendations should also be transmitted, subject to strict rules of confidentiality, to the Council and the Commission and, where addressed to one or more national supervisory authorities, to the ESAs.
Da bi povečali vpliv in legitimnost takšnih opozoril in priporočil, bi jih morali posredovati, ob upoštevanju strogih pravil o zaupnosti, tudi Svetu in Komisiji, kadar pa so naslovljena na enega ali več nacionalnih nadzornih organov, pa tudi ESA.
The deliberations of the Council should be prepared by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) in accordance with its role as defined in the TFEU.
Posvetovanja v Svetu bi moral pripraviti Ekonomsko-finančni odbor (EFC) v skladu s svojo vlogo, določeno v PDEU.
In order to prepare the Council’s discussions and provide it with timely policy advice, the ESRB should inform the EFC regularly and should send the texts of any warnings and recommendations as soon as they have been adopted.
Da bi EFC lahko pripravil razpravo za Svet in mu pravočasno zagotovil mnenje, bi moral ESRB redno obveščati EFC in mu poslati besedila vseh opozoril in priporočil takoj po njihovem sprejetju.
The ESRB should also monitor compliance with its warnings and recommendations, based on reports from addressees, in order to ensure that its warnings and recommendations are effectively followed.
ESRB bi moral na podlagi poročil naslovnikov tudi spremljati upoštevanje svojih opozoril in priporočil, da bi zagotovil učinkovito upoštevanje svojih opozoril in priporočil.
Addressees of recommendations should act on them and provide an adequate justification in case of inaction (‘act or explain’ mechanism).
Naslovniki priporočil bi morali ukrepati v skladu s temi priporočili, v primeru neukrepanja pa to ustrezno utemeljiti (mehanizem „ukrepaj ali pojasni“).
If the ESRB considers that the reaction is inadequate, it should inform, subject to strict confidentiality rules, the addressees, the Council and, where appropriate, the European Supervisory Authority concerned.
Če ESRB meni, da odziv ni primeren, bi moral o tem obvestiti, v skladu s strogimi pravili o zaupnosti, naslovnike, Svet in, kadar je primerno, zadevni Evropski nadzorni organ.
The ESRB should decide, on a case-by-case basis and after having informed the Council sufficiently in advance so that it is able to react, whether a recommendation should be kept confidential or made public, bearing in mind that public disclosure can help to foster compliance with the recommendations in certain circumstances.
ESRB bi se moral potem, ko je dovolj zgodaj obvestil Svet, da se lahko ta odzove, za vsak primer posebej odločiti, ali naj priporočilo ostane zaupno ali naj se ga objavi, pri čemer bi moral upoštevati, da lahko javna objava v določenih okoliščinah prispeva k boljšemu upoštevanju priporočil.
If the ESRB detects a risk which could seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the Union’s financial system, it should promptly inform the Council of the situation.
Če ESRB zazna tveganje, ki bi lahko resno ogrozilo pravilno delovanje in integriteto finančnih trgov ali stabilnost celotnega ali dela finančnega sistema Unije, bi moral o teh razmerah nemudoma obvestiti Svet.
If the ESRB determines that an emergency situation may arise, it should contact the Council and provide an assessment of the situation.
Če ESRB oceni, da obstaja verjetnost za nastanek izrednih razmer, bi moral vzpostaviti stik s Svetom in predložiti oceno razmer.
The Council should then assess the need to adopt a decision addressed to the ESAs determining the existence of an emergency situation.
Svet bi moral nato oceniti, ali bi bilo treba sprejeti sklep, naslovljen na ESA, v katerem bi bile opredeljene izredne razmere.
During that process, due protection of confidentiality is of the outmost importance.
Med tem postopkom je izjemno pomembno ustrezno varovanje zaupnosti.
The ESRB should report to the European Parliament and the Council at least annually, and more frequently in the event of widespread financial distress.
ESRB bi moral poročati Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu vsaj enkrat letno, ob morebitnih obsežnejših finančnih težavah pa pogosteje.
Where appropriate, the European Parliament and the Council should be able to invite the ESRB to examine specific issues related to financial stability.
Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu bi bilo treba omogočiti, da po potrebi pozoveta ESRB, naj preuči posebna vprašanja, povezana s finančno stabilnostjo.
The ECB and the national central banks should have a leading role in macro-prudential oversight because of their expertise and their existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability.
Vodilno vlogo pri makrobonitetnem nadzoru bi morale imeti ECB in nacionalne centralne banke zaradi njihovega strokovnega znanja in obstoječih obveznosti na področju finančne stabilnosti.
National supervisors should be involved in providing their specific expertise.
Nacionalni nadzorniki bi morali biti vključeni z zagotavljanjem svojih posebnih znanj.
The participation of micro-prudential supervisors in the work of the ESRB is essential to ensure that the assessment of macro-prudential risk is based on complete and accurate information about developments in the financial system.
Sodelovanje mikrobonitetnih nadzornikov pri delu ESRB je bistvenega pomena za zagotavljanje, da ocena makrobonitetnega tveganja temelji na popolnih in točnih informacijah o razvoju finančnega sistema.
Accordingly, the chairpersons of the ESAs should be members with voting rights.
V skladu s tem bi morali biti predsedniki ESA člani z glasovalno pravico.
One representative of the competent national supervisory authorities of each Member State should attend meetings of the General Board, without voting rights.
Na sejah splošnega odbora bi moral biti prisoten en predstavnik pristojnih nacionalnih nadzornih organov iz vsake države članice, in sicer kot član brez glasovalne pravice.
In a spirit of openness, 15 independent persons should provide the ESRB with external expertise through the Advisory Scientific Committee.
V duhu odprtosti bi moralo 15 neodvisnih oseb za ESRB prek svetovalnega znanstvenega odbora zagotavljati zunanjo strokovno podporo.
The participation of a Member of the Commission in the ESRB will help to establish a link with the macroeconomic and financial surveillance of the Union, while the presence of the President of the EFC will reflect the role of Member States’ ministries responsible for finance and the Council in safeguarding financial stability and performing economic and financial oversight.
Sodelovanje člana Komisije v ESRB bo prispevalo k vzpostavitvi povezave z makroekonomskim in finančnim nadzorom v Uniji, medtem ko bo prisotnost predsednika EFC odražala vlogo ministrstev držav članic, pristojnih za finance in Sveta pri varovanju finančne stabilnosti in izvajanju ekonomsko-finančnega nadzora.
It is essential that the members of the ESRB perform their duties impartially and consider only the financial stability of the Union as a whole.
Bistvenega pomena je, da člani ESRB opravljajo svoje dolžnosti nepristransko in presojajo samo finančno stabilnost Unije v celoti.
Where consensus cannot be reached, voting on warnings and recommendations within the ESRB should not be weighted and decisions should, as a rule, be taken by simple majority.
Če ni mogoče doseči soglasja, se glasovanje o opozorilih in priporočilih v ESRB ne bi smelo ponderirati, odločitve pa bi se morale praviloma sprejemati z navadno večino.
The interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets implies that the monitoring and assessment of potential systemic risks should be based on a broad set of relevant macroeconomic and micro-financial data and indicators.
Medsebojna povezanost finančnih institucij in trgov pomeni, da bi moralo spremljanje in ocenjevanje možnih sistemskih tveganj temeljiti na širokem nizu pomembnih makroekonomskih in mikrofinančnih podatkov ter kazalcev.
Those systemic risks include risks of disruption to financial services caused by a significant impairment of all or parts of the Union’s financial system that have the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy.
Ta sistemska tveganja vključujejo tveganja za motnje finančnih storitev, ki jih povzroča veliko slabše delovanje celotnega finančnega sistema Unije ali njegovih delov, kar ima lahko resne negativne posledice za notranji trg in realno gospodarstvo.
Any type of financial institution and intermediary, market, infrastructure and instrument has the potential to be systemically significant.
Sistemsko pomembne so lahko vse vrste finančnih institucij, posrednikov, trgov, infrastrukture in instrumentov.
The ESRB should therefore have access to all the information necessary to perform its duties while preserving the confidentiality of that information as required.
Zato bi moral ESRB imeti dostop do vseh informacij, ki so potrebne za opravljanje njegovih nalog, in pri tem v skladu z zahtevami ohranjati zaupnost informacij.
The measures for the collection of information set out in this Regulation are necessary for the performance of the tasks of the ESRB and should be without prejudice to the legal framework of the European Statistical System in the field of statistics.
Ukrepi za zbiranje informacij iz te uredbe so potrebni za opravljanje nalog ESRB in ne bi smeli posegati v pravni okvir Evropskega statističnega sistema na področju statistike.