natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It should also be pointed out that the conclusions of specialised bodies such as the High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment [74], which have been cited in the course of the proceedings, do not suggest that special State aid should be granted to address the competitiveness issues raised by high energy prices, but instead defend the need for full compliance with the applicable State aid rules [75].
Prav tako je treba poudariti, da ugotovitve strokovnih organov, kot je Skupina na visoki ravni za konkurenčnost, energijo in okolje [74], ki so bile citirane med postopkom, ne predlagajo, da je treba odobriti posebno državno pomoč za odpravo težav v zvezi s konkurenčnostjo, ki so nastale zaradi visokih cen energije, ampak da je treba zagovarjati potrebo po popolnem izpolnjevanju veljavnih pravil o državni pomoči [75].
In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the disputed 2004 and 2005 tariffs do not qualify for any of the exemptions in Article 107 TFEU.
Komisija ob upoštevanju navedenega meni, da sporne cene iz leta 2004 in 2005 ne izpolnjujejo pogojev za nobeno od oprostitev iz člena 107 PDEU.
The exemptions in Article 107(2) TFEU are not applicable, since the aid is not of a social character, is not designed to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, and was not granted to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by the division of Germany.
Oprostitve iz člena 107(2) PDEU se ne uporabljajo, ker pomoč ni socialnega značaja, ni namenjena povrnitvi škode zaradi naravnih nesreč ali izjemnih dogodkov in ni bila dodeljena za nadomestilo gospodarske škode zaradi delitve Nemčije.
The exemptions in Article 107(3)(b) and (d) TFEU are also inapplicable, since the measure is not aimed at promoting the execution of an important project of common European interest, or remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State, or promoting culture and heritage conservation.
Oprostitve iz člena 107(3)(b) in (d) PDEU se prav tako ne uporabljajo, ker ukrep ni namenjen pospeševanju izvedbe pomembnega projekta skupnega evropskega interesa ali odpravljanju resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice ali pospeševanju kulture in ohranjanju kulturne dediščine.
Turning to the exemption in Article 107(3)(a) TFEU, the analysis carried out above in recitals 160 to 187 demonstrates that the tariff cannot be approved as aid aimed at promoting the economic development of an area where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious unemployment.
Kar zadeva oprostitev iz člena 107(3)(a) PDEU, analiza, izvedena zgoraj v uvodnih izjavah 160 do 187, kaže, da cene ni mogoče odobriti kot pomoč za pospeševanje gospodarskega razvoja območij, kjer je življenjska raven izjemno nizka ali kjer obstaja velika brezposelnost.
With respect to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, operating aid does not qualify for this exemption in principle, as indicated in recitals 155 to 158, and the Commission has not been able to identify any specific circumstances which might justify the granting of such aid in this case.
Kar zadeva člen 107(3)(c) PDEU, pomoč za tekoče poslovanje ne izpolnjuje pogojev za načelno oprostitev, kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 155 do 158, in Komisija ni mogla opredeliti morebitnih posebnih okoliščin, ki bi lahko upravičile dodelitev pomoči v tem primeru.
The Commission therefore considers that both the 2004 and the 2005 tariffs are incompatible with the internal market.
Zato Komisija meni, da cene iz leta 2004 in iz leta 2005 niso združljive z notranjim trgom.
Having drawn this conclusion, the Commission does not need to examine the possible cumulative effect of the new aid and the old incompatible aid referred to in recital 31 in the light of the Deggendorf judgment.
V skladu s sodbo v zadevi Deggendorf Komisiji pri oblikovanju tega sklepa ni treba preučiti morebitnega kumulativnega učinka nove pomoči in stare nezdružljive pomoči iz uvodne izjave 31.
Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 states that in cases of unlawful aid which is not compatible with the internal market effective competition must be restored, unless recovery would be contrary to a general principle of Community law.
Člen 14(1) Uredbe št. 659/1999 določa, da je treba v primerih nezakonite pomoči, ki ni združljiva s skupnim trgom, ponovno vzpostaviti učinkovito konkurenco, razen če bi bilo vračilo v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava Skupnosti.
In the present case, only the 2004 tariffs (Case C 38/A/04) are subject to recovery, since the 2005 tariffs (Case C 13/06) have not been implemented.
V obravnavanem primeru vračilo velja samo za cene iz lete 2004 (zadeva C 38/A/04), saj cene iz leta 2005 (zadeva C 13/06) niso bile uvedene.
Legitimate expectations and other general principles of Community law which might prevent recovery
Upravičena pričakovanja in druga splošna načela prava Skupnosti, ki lahko preprečijo vračilo
According to settled case-law, when aid has been granted without prior notification under Article 108(3) TFEU the recipient of the aid cannot have a legitimate expectation that its grant is lawful [76].
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso prejemnik pomoči ne more upravičeno pričakovati, da je pomoč zakonita, če je bila pomoč dodeljena brez predhodne priglasitve v skladu s členom 108(3) PDEU [76].
A diligent undertaking should be able to establish whether the notification procedure has been followed and whether the aid is lawful.
Skrbno podjetje mora biti sposobno ugotoviti, ali se je upošteval postopek priglasitve in ali je pomoč zakonita.
However, a recipient of illegally granted aid is not precluded from relying on exceptional circumstances on the basis of which it had legitimately assumed the aid to be lawful, and thus declining to refund that aid [77].
Vendar pa se prejemniku nezakonito odobrene pomoči ne prepreči sklicevanje na izjemne okoliščine, na podlagi katerih je upravičeno domneval, da je pomoč zakonita, in je zato zavrnil vračilo te pomoči [77].
The beneficiaries of the 2004 tariffs have not made any submissions in this respect, nor has the Commission identified any exceptional circumstances which might have led the beneficiaries to entertain any legitimate expectation.
Upravičenci do cen iz leta 2004 niso predložili nobenih pripomb s tem v zvezi in Komisija ni opredelila nobenih izjemnih okoliščin, zaradi katerih bi upravičenci lahko imeli upravičena pričakovanja.
In this situation, a prudent recipient should have verified that the new measure was lawful.
V tem primeru bi moral premišljen prejemnik preveriti, ali je nov ukrep zakonit.
The Commission further considers that recovery would not breach any other general principle of Community law.
Komisija nadalje meni, da vračilo ne bi kršilo nobenega drugega splošnega načela prava Skupnosti.
All incompatible aid received by Portovesme, ILA and Eurallumina under Article 1 of the 2004 Decree must be recovered, with interest, in accordance with Chapter V of Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [79].
Vse zneske nezdružljive pomoči, ki so jih prejele družbe Portovesme, ILA in Eurallumina v skladu s členom 1 odloka iz leta 2004, je treba vrniti z obrestmi v skladu s poglavjem V Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 794/2004 z dne 21. aprila 2004 o izvajanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES [79].
The purpose of recovery is to restore the recipients to the competitive position they occupied before the grant of the incompatible aid by eliminating the undue advantage conferred by it.
Namen vračila je ponovna vzpostavitev konkurenčnega položaja prejemnikov, ki so ga imeli pred dodelitvijo nezdružljive pomoči, z ukinitvijo neupravičene ugodnosti, ki so jo s tem pridobili.
In the case at hand, the advantage conferred is equal to the difference between the preferential tariff and the electricity price the beneficiaries would have paid on the market in the absence of the disputed tariffs.
V zadevnem primeru je pridobljena ugodnost enaka razliki med ugodnejšo ceno in ceno električne energije, ki bi jo upravičenci plačali na trgu, če ne bi bilo spornih cen.
All the companies concerned were purchasing electricity on the basis of bilateral contracts at the time the tariffs were introduced.
Vse zadevne družbe so v času uvedbe cen kupovale električno energijo na podlagi dvostranskih dogovorov.
The State intervened to subsidise the contractually agreed price by making compensatory payments.
Država je posredovala in pogodbeno dogovorjeno ceno subvencionirala s kompenzacijskimi plačili.
The amounts to be recovered are therefore equal to the compensatory payments received by the recipients over the period concerned (see recital 30).
Zneski, ki jih je treba vrniti, so zato enaki kompenzacijskim plačilom, ki so jih prejemniki prejeli v obravnavanem obdobju (glej uvodno izjavo 30).
The Commission finds that both the 2004 and the 2005 tariffs constitute operating aid which is not eligible for any exemption from the general prohibition of State aid under the EC Treaty, and is therefore incompatible with the internal market.
Komisija meni, da cene iz leta 2004 in cene iz leta 2005 pomenijo pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, ki ni upravičena do nobene izjeme od splošne prepovedi državne pomoči v skladu s Pogodbo ES in zato ni združljiva z notranjim trgom.
In the case of the 2004 tariffs, which were unlawfully implemented in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU, all payments of outstanding aid must be cancelled, while the aid already paid must be recovered.
V primeru cen iz leta 2004, ki so bile nezakonito uvedene v nasprotju s členom 108(3) PDEU, je treba preklicati vsa plačila neplačane pomoči, že izplačano pomoč pa je treba vrniti.
The amount to be recovered corresponds to the sum of all compensatory payments made by the Equalisation Fund to Portovesme, ILA and Eurallumina.
Znesek, ki ga je treba vrniti, ustreza seštevku vseh kompenzacijskih plačil iz izravnalnega sklada za družbe Portovesme, ILA in Eurallumina.
The 2005 tariffs, which were duly notified by Italy as required by Article 108(3) TFEU, must not be applied,
Cene iz leta 2005, ki jih je Italija ustrezno priglasila, kot to zahteva člen 108(3) PDEU, ne smejo biti uvedene –
The State aid which Italy plans to grant to Portovesme Srl, Eurallumina SpA, ILA SpA and Syndial SpA under Article 11(12) of Decree-Law No 35 of 14 March 2005, converted into statute by Law No 80/2005 of 14 May 2005, is incompatible with the internal market.
Državna pomoč, ki jo Italija namerava dodeliti družbam Portovesme Srl, Eurallumina SpA, ILA SpA in Syndial SpA na podlagi člena 11(12) zakonskega odloka št. 35 z dne 14. marca 2005, spremenjenim v zakon št. 80/2005 z dne 14. maja 2005, je nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom.
The aid may accordingly not be granted.
Iz tega razloga se pomoč ne sme dodeliti.
The State aid unlawfully granted by Italy in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU, on the basis of Article 1 of the Prime Ministerial Decree of 6 February 2004, amounting to EUR 12845892,82 for Portovesme Srl, EUR 5208152,05 for Eurallumina SpA, and EUR 291120,27 for ILA SpA, is incompatible with the internal market.
Državna pomoč, ki jo je Italija nezakonito dodelila v nasprotju s členom 108(3) PDEU na podlagi člena 1 odloka predsednika vlade z dne 6. februarja 2004, ki znaša 12845892,82 EUR za družbo Portovesme Srl, 5208152,05 EUR za družbo Eurallumina SpA in 291120,27 EUR za družbo ILA SpA, je nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom.
Italy shall recover the aid referred to in Article 2 from the beneficiaries.
Upravičenci Italiji povrnejo pomoč iz člena 2.
Italy shall cancel all future payments of the aid referred to in Article 2 with effect from the date of adoption of this Decision.
Italija prekliče vsa prihodnja plačila pomoči iz člena 2 z začetkom od datuma sprejetja tega sklepa.
Italy shall ensure that this Decision is implemented within 4 months following the date of notification of this Decision.
Italija zagotovi, da se ta sklep izvede v štirih mesecih od datuma njegove priglasitve.
Italy shall keep the Commission informed of the progress of the national measures taken to implement this Decision until recovery of the aid referred to in Article 2 has been completed.
Italija obvešča Komisijo o napredku glede sprejetih nacionalnih ukrepov za izvajanje tega sklepa, dokler se vračanje pomoči iz člena 2 ne konča.
At the Commission’s request, it shall immediately submit information on the measures already taken and planned to comply with this Decision.
Na zahtevo Komisije takoj predloži vse informacije o že sprejetih in načrtovanih ukrepih za uskladitev s tem sklepom.
OJ C 30, 5.2.2005, p. 7, and OJ C 145, 21.6.2006, p. 8.
UL C 30, 5.2.2005, str. 7 in UL C 145, 21.6.2006, str. 8.
Commission Decision 2010/460/EU of 19 November 2009 on State aid measures C 38/A/04 (ex NN 58/04) and C 36/B/06 (ex NN 38/06) implemented by Italy for Alcoa Trasformazioni (OJ L 227, 28.8.2010, p. 62).
Sklep Komisije 2010/460/ES z dne 19. novembra 2009 o državni pomoči C 38/A/04 (ex NN 58/04) in C 36/B/06 (ex NN 38/06) Italije za Alcoa Trasformazioni, (UL L 227, 28.8.2010, str. 62).
OJ C 145, 21.6.2006, p. 8.
UL C 145, 21.6.2006, str. 8.
For its plants in Portoscuso and San Gavino.
Za obrate v Portoscusu in San Gavinu.
Alumina is an intermediate raw material, obtained from bauxite, which is used for aluminium smelting.
Aluminijev oksid je vmesni material, ki nastane pri obdelavi boksita in se uporablja za taljenje aluminija.
A large part of Eurallumina’s output serves Alcoa’s nearby smelting facilities.
Velik del proizvodnje družbe Eurallumina je namenjen bližnjim talilnicam družbe Alcoa.
The tariff mechanism is described in Article 73 of the consolidated rules for the provision of the services of transmission, distribution, measurement and sale of electricity for the regulatory period 2004–2007 (Testo integrato delle disposizioni per l’erogazione dei servizi di trasmissione, distribuzione, misura e vendita dell’energia elettrica per il periodo di regolazione 2004-2007).
Mehanizem cene je opisan v členu 73 konsolidiranih pravil za zagotavljanje storitev prenosa, distribucijo, merjenje in prodajo elektrike za regulativno obdobje 2004–2007 (Testo integrato delle disposizioni per l’erogazione dei servizi di trasmissione, distribuzione, misura e vendita dell’energia elettrica per il periodo di regolazione 2004–2007).
This document is drawn up and regularly updated by the AEEG.
Ta dokument sestavlja in redno posodablja AEEG.
The Equalisation Fund is a public body established by Legislative Decree No 98 of 26 January 1948; it acts on instruction from the AEEG, and among other things handles the financial flows related to preferential electricity tariffs (collection of levies and payment to final recipients).
Izravnalni sklad je javni organ, ustanovljen z zakonskim odlokom št. 98 z dne 26. januarja 1948; deluje v skladu z navodili organa AEEG in med drugim obravnava finančne tokove, ki so povezani z ugodnejšimi cenami električne energije (pobiranje dajatev in izplačilo končnim upravičencem).
The beneficiaries could also terminate their existing supply contracts and turn directly to the Single Buyer (Acquirente unico), a State-owned body responsible for pooling demand from consumers who wish to be supplied by it and procuring electricity on their behalf on the wholesale electricity market at the best possible price.
Upravičenci so lahko tudi prekinili svoje veljavne dobavne pogodbe in se obrnili neposredno na samostojnega kupca (Acquirente unico), organ v državni lasti, odgovoren za zbiranje povpraševanja strank, ki želijo, da jim dobavlja energijo, in za preskrbo z električno energijo v njihovem imenu na grosističnem trgu električne energije po najugodnejši ceni.
If a beneficiary of the compensatory payments had decided to opt for this system, the State would have taken the Single Buyer price as the reference for the calculation of the compensatory payments.
Če bi se upravičenec do kompenzacijskih plačil odločil za ta sistem, bi država ceno samostojnega kupca vzela kot osnovo za izračun kompenzacijskih plačil.
This arrangement was designed to minimise the costs of the scheme to the general public, as it discouraged beneficiaries from concluding unfavourable supply contracts with their own power suppliers (which would have resulted in higher compensatory payments).
Ta sistem je bil oblikovan z namenom zmanjšanja stroškov te sheme za splošno javnost, saj je upravičence odvrnil od sklenitve neugodnih dobavnih pogodb z lastnimi dobavitelji električne energije (kar bi se odražalo v višjih kompenzacijskih plačilih).
However, it was optional: the beneficiaries were not required to address themselves to the Single Buyer in order to receive the compensatory payments.
Vendar ni bil obvezen: upravičencem se ni bilo treba obrniti na samostojnega kupca, da bi prejeli kompenzacijska plačila.
The standard Italian electricity tariff, which reflects the mechanism for imputing electricity costs to end-users, is divided into tariff components.
Standardna italijanska cena za električno energijo, ki odraža mehanizem za zaračunavanje stroškov električne energije končnim uporabnikom, je razdeljena na sestavne dele cene.
Each component is designed to finance specific costs.
Vsak sestavni del financira določene stroške.
Component A2, for example, finances the costs of dismantling old nuclear plants, while component A3 finances renewable energy installations.
Sestavni del A2, na primer, financira stroške razstavljanja jedrskih elektrarn, medtem ko sestavni del A3 financira obrate za obnovljivo energijo.
Component A4 financed preferential electricity tariff schemes.
Sestavni del A4 je financiral sheme ugodnejših cen električne energije.
All end-users’ bills share this structure.
Tako so sestavljeni vsi računi končnih uporabnikov.
This term is in all likelihood be understood as referring to the EU/EEA market.
Ta izraz je treba najverjetneje razumeti kot sklicevanje na trg EU/EGP.
This Article extended the Alcoa and Terni tariffs to 2010.
Ta člen je cene za družbi Alcoa in Terni podaljšal do leta 2010.
Case reference R.G. n. 2317/2005.
Sklicevanje na zadevo R.G. št. 2317/2005.
In particular Legislative Decree No 79/1999, which implemented Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (OJ L 27, 30.1.1997, p. 20).
Zlasti zakonski odlok št. 79/1999, s katerim je bila prenesena Direktiva 96/92/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. decembra 1996 o skupnih pravilih notranjega trga z električno energijo (UL L 27, 30.1.1997, str. 20).
Commission Decisions C/2005/4436/06 of 7 December 2005 and C/2007/286/3 of 7 February 2007.
Odločbi Komisije C/2005/4436/06 z dne 7. decembra 2005 in C/2007/286/3 z dne 7. februarja 2007.
OJ C 74, 10.3.1998, p. 9, points 4.15 to 4.17, as amended (OJ C 258, 9.9.2000, p. 5).
UL C 74, 10.3.1998, str. 9. točke 4.15 do 4.17, kakor so bile spremenjene (UL C 258, 9.9.2000, str. 5).
In particular, the Italian authorities argued that prices for energy-intensive users were negotiated bilaterally and were therefore not in the public domain.
Italijanski organi so trdili zlasti, da so cene za energetsko intenzivne uporabnike dogovorjene dvostransko in zato ti podatki niso javno dostopni.
This meant that they were unable to quote electricity prices paid by the beneficiaries and by their competitors in other Italian regions.
To pomeni, da niso mogli navesti cen električne energije, ki so jih plačevali upravičenci in njihovi konkurenti v drugih italijanskih regijah.
Case C 80/01 (alumina case, Commission Decision 2006/323/EC).
Zadeva C 80/01 (zadeva v zvezi z aluminijevim oksidom, Odločba Komisije 2006/323/ES).
The case concerned exemptions from excise duties on heavy oil used for the production of alumina in Sardinia, in Gardanne (France), and in Shannon (Ireland).
Zadeva je obravnavala oprostitve plačila trošarine za mineralna olja, ki se uporabljajo kot gorivo pri proizvodnji aluminijevega oksida na Sardiniji, v regiji Gardanne (Francija) in v regiji Shannon (Irska).
Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-355/95 Textilwerke Deggendorf v Commission [1997] ECR I-2549.
Sodba Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti v zadevi C-355/95 Textilwerke Deggendorf proti Komisiji [1997] Recueil I-2549.
See recital 9 of the present Decision.
Glej uvodno izjavo 9 tega sklepa.
Aluminium ore, the raw material for the production of alumina.
Aluminijeva ruda, surovina za proizvodnjo aluminijevega oksida.
At the time of the drafting of this decision, Eurallumina has been out of production for more than a year, with workers receiving cassa integrazione layoff benefit.
V času oblikovanja tega sklepa družba Eurallumina že več kot leto dni ni delovala, delavci pa so prejemali odpravnino cassa integrazione.
Document COM(2004) 863 final.
Dokument COM(2004) 863 konč.
Case C-379/98 [2001] ECR I-2099.
Zadeva C-379/98 [2001] Recueil I-2099.
First Report of the High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment, ‘Contributing to an integrated approach on competitiveness, energy and environment policies’, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/policy-integration/high-level-group/reference-material/index_en.htm.
Prvo poročilo skupine na visoki ravni za konkurenčnost, energijo in okolje Prispevek k celostnemu pristopu k politikam o konkurenčnosti, energiji in okolju, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/policy-integration/high-level-group/reference-material/index_en.htm.
The High Level Group was a forum in which representatives of the Commission and business leaders took part.
Skupina na visoki ravni je bila forum, v katerem so sodelovali predstavniki Komisije in vodje podjetij.
This high reserve level (80 % of maximum power absorbed by the network) was fixed by Ministerial Decree of 7 August 2000.
Ta visoka raven zaloge (80 % največje obratovalne moči, ki jo porabi omrežje) je bila določena z ministrskim odlokom z dne 7. avgusta 2000.
This figure was obtained by adding to the preferential price of approximately EUR 26 per MWh a compensatory payment of EUR 37 per MWh.
Ta številka je bila dobljena s prištetjem kompenzacijskega plačila v znesku 37 EUR/MWh ugodnejši ceni približno 26 EUR/MWh.
See, for example, the Dutch glasshouse growers case, Commission Decision 85/215/EEC of 13 February 1985 on the preferential tariff charged to glasshouse growers for natural gas in the Netherlands (OJ L 97, 4.4.1985, p. 49).
Glej, na primer, zadevo nizozemskih pridelovalcev v rastlinjakih, Odločba Komisije 85/215/EGS z dne 13. februarja 1985 o ugodnejši ceni, ki se zaračunava pridelovalcem v rastlinjakih na Nizozemskem za zemeljski plin (UL L 97, 4.4.1985, str. 49).
In order to assess the presence of an advantage in certain gas prices in that case, the Commission considered actual market conditions and applied the market economy operator test.
Da bi ocenila obstoj prednosti določenih cen plina v tej zadevi, je Komisija upoštevala dejanske tržne pogoje in uporabila preskus nosilcev dejavnosti v tržnem gospodarstvu.
See, for example, the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-3679, paragraph 67.
Glej na primer sodbo Sodišča v zadevi C-372/97, Italija proti Komisiji [2004], Recueil I-3679, točka 67.
The first liberalisation directive, Directive 96/92/EC, was implemented in Italy by Decree No 79/1999 (see footnote 15).
Prva direktiva o liberalizaciji, Direktiva 96/92/ES se je v Italiji izvajala z odlokom št. 79/1999 (glej opombo 15).
Case T-332/06 Alcoa Trasformazioni [2009] ECR II-29 (appeal pending).
Zadeva T-332/06 Alcoa Trasformazioni [2009] ZOdl II-29 (pritožba v obravnavi).
Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-241/94 France v Commission [1996] ECR I-4551, paragraph 34.
Sodba Sodišča v zadevi C-241/94 Francija proti Komisiji [1996] Recueil I-4551, točka 34.
See for example PreussenElektra, cited above, paragraph 58.
Glej na primer zadevo PreussenElektra, navedeno zgoraj, odstavek 58.