natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Secondly, although the Hungarian authorities claim that there are only competitors who operate or are expected to put into operation smaller fields (i.e. producing less than 500 m3 or 200 kt), the Commission observes that even if such smaller fields were subject to the 12 % category, they will still have to pay the Brent mark-up, whenever applicable.
Drugič, čeprav madžarski organi trdijo, da konkurenčne družbe upravljajo ali se od njih pričakuje, da bodo začele upravljati le manjša polja (na katerih se načrpa manj kot 500 m3 ali 200 kt), Komisija ugotavlja, da bodo kljub temu morale plačati pribitek Brent, kjer je primerno, čeprav spadajo takšna manjša polja v kategorijo 12 %.
This could lead to a mining fee of up to 18 %.
Zaradi tega bi lahko rudarska pristojbina znašala tudi do 18 %.
The Commission recalls once again that the effect of the measures is that MOL is not subject to the Brent Clause laid down in the Mining Act for all other operators.
Komisija ponovno opozarja, da je učinek ukrepov takšen, da se za družbo MOL klavzula Brent, ki je v Zakonu o rudarstvu določena za vse druge subjekte, ne uporablja.
Thirdly, as regards the current general market environment in Hungary, there are several mining companies engaged in hydrocarbon extraction activities.
Tretjič, kar zadeva sedanje splošne razmere na madžarskem trgu, opravlja dejavnosti črpanja ogljikovodika več rudarskih družb.
In addition, there are several companies carrying out exploration who might put fields into operation and become MOL’s competitors.
Poleg tega več družb izkorišča ogljikovodike, pri čemer bi te lahko začele upravljati polja in postale konkurenca družbi MOL.
Any new entrants under the authorisation regime will be subject to the statutory mining fee and face competition with MOL, the only company whose mining fields escape the fee applicable under the general authorisation regime and are subject to a lower level of fees.
Vsi novi udeleženci, za katere velja režim podelitev, bodo morali plačevati zakonsko določeno rudarsko pristojbino in konkurirati družbi MOL, edini družbi, ki ji za svoja rudna polja ni treba plačevati veljavne pristojbine v okviru splošnega režima podelitev in zanje plačuje nižje pristojbine.
Fifthly, if hypothetically the Mining Authority had not agreed to the extension for the twelve fields, all other MOL fields under authorisation would have become subject to the considerably higher mining fee as well, which might have meant higher revenues for the State [49].
Petič, če organ za rudarstvo hipotetično ne bi odobril podaljšanja za 12 polj, bi tudi za vsa druga polja družbe MOL v skladu s podelitvijo veljala precej višja rudarska pristojbina, kar bi lahko pomenilo višje prihodke za državo [49].
Moreover, as mentioned in recital 73, the State could have put out a tender for the concession for the twelve fields not granted extension, and could thereby potentially have obtained a higher bid from a competitor.
Poleg tega bi država lahko objavila javni razpis za koncesijo za 12 polj, za katera ni bi bilo odobreno podaljšanje, in bi tako lahko od konkurenčne družbe prejela višjo ponudbo, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 73.
Regarding Hungary’s argument that MOL paid a higher mining fee, namely 12,24 %, in 2006 and 2007, the Commission notes that this is irrelevant.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je argument Madžarske glede tega, da je družba MOL v letih 2006 in 2007 plačevala višjo rudarsko pristojbino, in sicer 12,24 %, nepomemben.
First of all, this was due to the fact that MOL had to pay the stipulated increase in the mining fee (from 12 % to 12,24 %) just as any other company wishing to extend its mining authorisation would have had to.
Razlog za to je dejstvo, da je morala družba MOL plačati določeno povišanje rudarske pristojbine (z 12 % na 12,24 %), kot bi to morala vsaka druga družba, ki bi želela podaljšati dovoljenje za rudarjenje.
In this respect, MOL received the standard treatment and was not put at a disadvantage.
V tem smislu je bila družba MOL standardno obravnavana in ni bila v slabšem položaju.
Neither had the advantage to MOL materialised yet: this ultimately occurred at the time of the first amendment to the Mining Act, i.e. as of 8 January 2008.
Prav tako družba MOL še ni imela prednosti: prednost je dobila s prvo spremembo Zakona o rudarstvu, tj. 8. januarja 2008.
Furthermore, in 2008 MOL paid HUF 28,4 billion and in 2009 HUF 1,9 billion less in mining fees for its producing fields than it would have paid if it had been subject to the Mining Act in force at that time.
Poleg tega je družba MOL leta 2008 plačala 28,4 milijarde HUF in leta 2009 1,9 milijarde HUF manj za rudarske pristojbine za svoja polja, kot bi plačala, če bi se zanjo uporabljal Zakon o rudarstvu, ki je bil takrat v veljavi.
As regards the other payment components under Section 26/A(5) of the Mining Act (i.e. the extension fee and the one-off payment), these were paid in exchange for the extension and not for the right to have fees lower than those applicable to its competitors.
Drugi elementi plačila iz oddelka 26/A(5) Zakona o rudarstvu (tj. pristojbina za podaljšanje in enkratno plačilo) so bili plačani v zameno za podaljšanje in ne za pravico do nižjih pristojbin od tistih, ki veljajo za konkurenčne družbe.
Nor can these payment components be regarded as ‘advance payment’ of mining fees due in later periods.
Ti elementi plačila se prav tako ne morejo šteti za „predplačilo“ rudarskih pristojbin, ki bi jih bilo treba plačati v poznejših obdobjih.
The wording of Section 26/A(5) of the Mining Act is clear in this regard.
Besedilo oddelka 26/A(5) Zakona o rudarstvu je v zvezi s tem jasno.
In particular, it states that ‘the company shall pay a charge if an extension is granted’.
Zlasti je navedeno, da „družba plača takso, če se podaljšanje odobri“.
The two other elements are linked to the number of fields granted extension.
Druga dva elementa sta povezana s številom polj, za katera je bilo odobreno podaljšanje.
Thus Section 26/A(5) of the Mining Act clearly establishes a link between the extension and the payment obligation.
Tako oddelek 26/A(5) Zakona o rudarstvu jasno vzpostavlja povezavo med podaljšanjem in obveznostjo plačila.
According to the case-law, aid given to a company cannot be offset by a charge imposed on the same company which represents a specific and distinct charge without a link with the measure constituting aid [50].
V skladu s sodno prakso pomoči družbi ni mogoče pobotati s takso, ki jo mora ta družba plačati ter predstavlja posebno in ločeno takso ter je ni mogoče povezati z ukrepom, ki pomeni državno pomoč [50].
In the case at issue, as described in recital 85, the other payment components under Section 26/A(5) of the Mining Act represent a charge for the extension which can be regarded as a specific and distinct charge without a link to the subsequent amendment of the statutory fees under the authorisation regime.
V obravnavanem primeru predstavljajo drugi elementi plačila v skladu z oddelkom 26/A(5) Zakona o rudarstvu takso za podaljšanje, ki se lahko šteje za posebno in ločeno takso, ki ni povezana s poznejšimi spremembami zakonsko določenih pristojbin v skladu z režimom podelitev, kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 85.
Finally, the Commission points out that the conclusion of the extension agreement and the subsequent increase in the fees for MOL led to the paradoxical situation that MOL, having failed to start production on time, will be paying lower mining fees for almost all of its fields under authorisation until 2020, whereas its competitors, who have not concluded an extension agreement because they started production on time and are equally subject to the authorisation regime, have to pay higher statutory fees.
Nazadnje, Komisija poudarja, da se je zaradi sklenitve pogodbe o podaljšanju in posledičnega povišanja pristojbin družba MOL znašla v paradoksnem položaju, saj bo zaradi zamude pri začetku izkoriščanja polj do leta 2020 plačevala nižje rudarske pristojbine za skoraj vsa svoja polja v skladu s podelitvijo, medtem ko morajo konkurenčne družbe, ki niso sklenile pogodbe o podaljšanju, ker so pravočasno začele izkoriščati polja, in za katere prav tako velja režim podelitev, plačevati višje zakonsko določene pristojbine.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the measure conferred an advantage on MOL.
Na podlagi navedenega Komisija ugotavlja, da je bila z ukrepom družbi MOL dodeljena prednost.
It shields MOL from bearing costs which it otherwise would have to bear.
Zaradi ukrepa družba MOL nima stroškov, ki bi jih drugače imela.
The combined effect of the extension agreement and the subsequent modification of the Mining Act result in an advantage being conferred on the company.
Skupni učinek pogodbe o podaljšanju in poznejše spremembe Zakona o rudarstvu pomeni prednost za družbo.
The measure involves forgone revenues to which the State would be entitled and is therefore granted from state resources.
Ukrep jasno vključuje izpad prihodkov, do katerih bi bila država upravičena, zato pomeni, da se za ukrep uporabljajo državna sredstva.
Distortion of competition and affect on trade
Izkrivljanje konkurence in vpliv na trgovino
MOL is an integrated oil and gas company and qualifies as an undertaking.
Družba MOL je integrirana naftna in plinska družba ter se šteje za podjetje.
It competes with other undertakings which do not benefit from the same advantage.
Konkurira drugim podjetjem, ki nimajo enake prednosti.
Hence, the measure distorts competition.
Zato ukrep izkrivlja konkurenco.
Furthermore, MOL is active in a sector in which trade exists between Member States; the criterion of affecting trade within the Union is also fulfilled.
Poleg tega družba MOL deluje v sektorju, v katerem obstaja trgovina med državam članicami, zato je izpolnjeno tudi merilo vpliva na trgovino znotraj Unije.
Conclusions on the presence of aid
Sklepna ugotovitev o prisotnosti pomoči
On the basis of the arguments set out above, the Commission takes the view that the measure fulfils the criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU.
Na podlagi zgornjih argumentov Komisija meni, da ukrep izpolnjuje merila iz člena 107(1) PDEU.
Under those circumstances, the measure at stake has to be considered state aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
V skladu s tem je treba zadevni ukrep šteti za državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU.
COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID WITH THE INTERNAL MARKET
ZDRUŽLJIVOST POMOČI Z NOTRANJIM TRGOM
Articles 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU provide for exemptions to the general rule that state aid is incompatible with the internal market as stated in Article 107(1).
Člen 107(2) in (3) PDEU določa izjeme od splošnega pravila, da državna pomoč ni združljiva z notranjim trgom, kot je navedeno v členu 107(1).
Below the Commission assesses the compatibility of the measure under those exceptions.
V nadaljevanju Komisija ocenjuje združljivost ukrepa v skladu s temi izjemami.
It should be noted that Hungary did not put forward any arguments as regards compatibility with the internal market.
Opozoriti je treba, da Madžarska ni predložila nobenih argumentov glede združljivosti z notranjim trgom.
Moreover, it should also be noted that the measure results in a reduction of costs which should normally be borne by MOL and must therefore be considered to be operating aid.
Poleg tega je treba opozoriti, da je posledica ukrepa zmanjšanje stroškov, ki bi jih družba MOL praviloma imela, zato se mora ukrep šteti kot pomoč za tekoče poslovanje.
The exemptions in Article 107(2) TFEU do not apply in the present case because this measure does not have a social character, has not been awarded to individual consumers, is not designed to make good damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences and has not been awarded to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of that country.
Izjeme iz člena 107(2) PDEU v tem primeru ne veljajo, ker ukrep nima socialnega značaja, ni dodeljen posameznim potrošnikom, ni pomoč za povrnitev škode, ki so jo povzročile naravne nesreče ali izjemni dogodki, ter ni pomoč, dodeljena gospodarstvu nekaterih območij Zvezne republike Nemčije, ki jih je prizadela delitev te države.
Further exemptions are laid down in Article 107(3) TFEU.
Dodatne izjeme so določene v členu 107(3) PDEU.
Article 107(3)(a) states that ‘aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment’ may be declared compatible with the internal market.
V členu 107(3)(a) je navedeno, da se lahko za združljivo z notranjim trgom razglasi „pomoč za pospeševanje gospodarskega razvoja območij, kjer je življenjska raven izjemno nizka ali kjer je podzaposlenost velika“.
Hungary’s entire territory was regarded as such an area at the time of accession and most of its regions are still eligible for such aid [51].
Ob pristopu se je celotno ozemlje Madžarske obravnavalo kot takšno območje, pri čemer je večina njenih regij še vedno upravičena do takšne pomoči [51].
Compatibility of state aid to assisted areas is governed by the Commission guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013 [52].
Združljivost državne pomoči območjem, ki prejemajo pomoč, urejajo Smernice o državni regionalni pomoči za 2007–2013 [52] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice o regionalni pomoči).
(hereinafter ‘Regional Aid Guidelines’) Under the Regional Aid Guidelines, state aid can in principle be authorised only for investment costs [53].
V skladu s smernicami o regionalni pomoči je lahko državna pomoč načeloma odobrena le za investicijske stroške [53].
As already mentioned above, the aid at issue cannot be regarded as investment aid.
Kot je že bilo navedeno, obravnavane pomoči ni mogoče šteti kot pomoč za naložbe.
As far as operating aid is concerned, the measure does not facilitate the development of any activities or economic areas and it is not limited in time, degressive or proportionate to what is necessary to remedy specific economic handicaps [54].
Kar zadeva pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, ukrep ne pospešuje razvoja nekaterih gospodarskih dejavnosti ali nekaterih gospodarskih območij in ni časovno omejen, degresiven ali sorazmeren s tem, kar je potrebno za odpravo posebnih gospodarskih težav [54].
In view of the above, the Commission concludes that the aid is not eligible for the derogation provided for in Article 107(3)(a) TFEU.
Glede na navedeno Komisija ugotavlja, da za pomoč ne velja odstopanje iz člena 107(3)(a) PDEU.
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU states that ‘aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’ may be declared compatible with the internal market.
V členu 107(3)(b) PDEU je navedeno, da se lahko za združljivo z notranjim trgom razglasi „pomoč za pospeševanje izvedbe pomembnega projekta skupnega evropskega interesa ali za odpravljanje resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice“.
The Commission notes that the aid in question is not designed to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor has the Commission found any evidence that it is designed to remedy a serious disturbance in the Hungarian economy.
Komisija ugotavlja, da zadevna pomoč ni namenjena pospeševanju izvedbe pomembnega projekta skupnega evropskega interesa; prav tako ni našla dokazov, da je namenjena odpravljanju resne motnje v gospodarstvu Madžarske.
In view of the above, the Commission concludes that the aid does not qualify for the derogation laid down in Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
Glede na navedeno Komisija ugotavlja, da pomoč ne izpolnjuje pogojev za odstopanje iz člena 107(3)(b) PDEU.
Article 107(3)(d) TFEU states that aid to promote culture and heritage conservation may be declared compatible with the TFEU where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EU to an extent that is contrary to the common interest.
V členu 107(3)(d) PDEU je navedeno, da se lahko za združljivo z notranjim trgom razglasi pomoč za spodbujanje kulture in ohranjanje kulturne dediščine, kadar takšna pomoč ne škoduje trgovinskim pogojem in konkurenci v EU v obsegu, ki je v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
This obviously does not apply to the current case.
Jasno je, da v tem primeru to ne velja.
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU provides for the authorisation of state aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
V členu 107(3)(c) PDEU je predvidena odobritev državne pomoči za pospeševanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih dejavnosti ali določenih gospodarskih območij, kadar takšna pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
The Commission has produced a number of guidelines and communications that explain how it will apply the derogation contained in Article 107(3) TFEU.
Komisija je pripravila več smernic in sporočil, ki pojasnjujejo, kako bo uporabljala odstopanje iz člena 107(3) PDEU.
However, the Commission considers that because of the nature and characteristics of the aid, the exceptions under these guidelines and communications are not applicable to the present case.
Komisija kljub temu meni, da zaradi narave in značilnosti pomoči izjeme iz teh smernic in sporočil v tem primeru ne veljajo.
Moreover, Hungary has not claimed that the aid could be compatible under those rules.
Poleg tega Madžarska ni trdila, da bi lahko bila pomoč združljiva v skladu z navedenimi pravili.
The aid under assessment thus constitutes incompatible state aid.
Zato pomeni pomoč, ki se ocenjuje, nezdružljivo državno pomoč.
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, ACQUIRED RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION
LEGITIMNA PRIČAKOVANJA, PRIDOBLJENE PRAVICE IN DISKRIMINACIJA
Although the Commission does not dispute the argument that predictability is generally an incentive for investments, it must be noted that, in view of the mandatory nature of the supervision of state aid by the Commission under Article 108 TFEU, undertakings to which aid has been granted may not, in principle, entertain a legitimate expectation that the aid is lawful unless it has been granted in compliance with the state aid procedure [55].
Čeprav Komisija ne nasprotuje argumentu, da je predvidljivost na splošno spodbuda za naložbe, je treba opozoriti, da se glede na obvezen nadzor državne pomoči, ki ga mora Komisija izvajati v skladu s členom 108 PDEU, podjetja, ki jim je bila pomoč odobrena, načeloma ne morejo sklicevati na legitimno pričakovanje, da je pomoč zakonita, razen če je bila odobrena v skladu s postopkom za dodelitev državne pomoči [55].
In this regard, no beneficiary can cite good faith in order to defend acquired rights and avoid recovery [56].
V skladu s tem se ne more noben upravičenec sklicevati na dobro vero, da bi branil pridobljene pravice in se izognil vračilu pomoči [56].
It is true that the Court has repeatedly held that the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any person in a situation where an authority of the European Union has caused him or her to have justified expectations.
Sodišče je večkrat razsodilo, da ima pravico do sklicevanja na načelo varstva legitimnih pričakovanj vsaka oseba v položaju, ko ima zaradi organa Evropske unije legitimna pričakovanja.
However, a person may not plead infringement of the principle unless he or she has been given precise assurances by the administrative body [57].
Vendar oseba ne more navesti kršitve načela, če ji upravni organ ni dal natančnih zagotovil [57].
In the present case, MOL has not been given any assurance by an authority of the EU which could justify a legitimate expectation.
V tem primeru organ EU družbi MOL ni dal nobenih zagotovil, na katerih bi lahko temeljilo legitimno pričakovanje.
It is also true that a recipient of unlawfully granted aid is not precluded from citing exceptional circumstances on the basis of which it had legitimately assumed the aid to be lawful and thus declining to refund that aid.
Dejstvo je, da se prejemniku nezakonito dodeljene pomoči ne preprečuje sklicevanje na izjemne okoliščine, na podlagi katerih je upravičeno domneval, da je pomoč zakonita, in s tem zavrnitev vračila te pomoči.
However, no exceptional circumstances obtain in the present case.
Vendar v tem primeru izjemnih okoliščin ni.
On the contrary, the 2008 amendment to the Mining Act demonstrates that mining companies can in principle not count on there being no changes whatsoever in the law.
Nasprotno, sprememba Zakona o rudarstvu iz leta 2008 dokazuje, da rudarske družbe načeloma ne morejo pričakovati, da ne bo nobenih sprememb zakona.
This proves that authorisation holders have no legitimate expectation or acquired right that the royalty level imposed would remain unaltered throughout the whole duration of their authorisation.
To dokazuje, da imetniki podeljenih pravic nimajo legitimnega pričakovanja ali pridobljene pravice, da se raven licenčnine v celotnem obdobju, za katero je podeljena pravica, ne bo spremenila.
Contrary to what is stated by Hungary and the other interested parties, EU case-law confirms that individuals may not count on no changes ever being made to the law [58].
V nasprotju z navedbami Madžarske in drugih zainteresiranih strani sodna praksa v EU potrjuje, da posamezniki ne morejo pričakovati, da se zakon ne bo nikoli spremenil [58].
Likewise, changes in the law are not precluded by the principle of legal certainty either.
Tudi načelo pravne varnosti ne izključuje sprememb zakona.
As regards the discrimination argument, this has to be dismissed as well.
Prav tako je treba zavrniti trditve o diskriminaciji.
Raising the fee is not discriminatory if applied to everyone, especially since there is no differentiation within the regime, i.e. no distinctions are drawn among the undertakings operating under authorisation.
Zvišanje pristojbine ni diskriminacijsko, če se uporablja za vse, zlasti ker znotraj režima ni razlikovanja, tj. ni razlik med podjetji, ki upravljajo polja v skladu s podelitvijo.
According to the TFEU and the Court of Justice’s established case-law, when it has found aid to be incompatible with the internal market the Commission is competent to decide that the State concerned must abolish or alter it [59].
V skladu s PDEU in uveljavljeno sodno prakso Sodišča Evropske unije je Komisija pristojna za odločitev, ali mora zadevna država pomoč odpraviti ali spremeniti, če ugotovi, da je pomoč nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom [59].
The Court has also consistently held that the obligation on a State to abolish aid regarded by the Commission as being incompatible with the internal market is designed to re-establish the previously existing situation [60].
Sodišče vedno tudi razsodi, da je cilj obveznosti države glede odprave pomoči, ki jo Komisija šteje za nezdružljivo z notranjim trgom, ponovna vzpostavitev prejšnjega stanja [60].
In this context, the Court has established that that objective is attained once the recipient has repaid the amounts granted by way of unlawful aid, thus forfeiting the advantage which it had enjoyed over its competitors on the market, and the situation prior to the payment of the aid has been restored [61].
V zvezi s tem je Sodišče odločilo, da je navedeni cilj dosežen, ko prejemnik povrne znesek, ki mu je bil dodeljen v okviru nezakonite pomoči, s čimer izgubi prednost, ki jo je imel glede na konkurenčne družbe na trgu, ter ko je ponovno vzpostavljeno stanje pred plačilom pomoči [61].
Following that case-law, Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/99 [62] laid down that ‘where negative decisions are taken in respect of unlawful aid, the Commission shall decide that the Member State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary.’.
V skladu s sodno prakso člen 14 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/99 [62] določa, da „če se v primerih nezakonite pomoči sprejmejo negativne odločbe, Komisija odloči, da mora zadevna država članica sprejeti vse potrebne ukrepe, da upravičenec vrne pomoč“.