natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In case the next Regulation becomes applicable before that date, the period of extension should be correspondingly shortened.
Če se naslednja uredba začne uporabljati pred tem datumom, bi bilo treba obdobje podaljšanja ustrezno skrajšati.
Developing countries which fulfil the criteria for being eligible for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) should be able to benefit from the additional tariff preferences under that arrangement if, upon their request by 31 October 2011 or 30 April 2013, the Commission decides to grant them the special incentive arrangement by 15 December 2011 or 15 June 2013 respectively.
Državam v razvoju, ki izpolnjujejo merila za upravičenost do posebnega spodbujevalnega režima za trajnostni razvoj in dobro upravljanje (GSP+), bi se moralo omogočiti uživanje ugodnosti dodatnih tarifnih preferencialov po tem režimu, če jim Komisija na njihovo zahtevo, predloženo do 31. oktobra 2011 ali 30. aprila 2013, dodeli posebni spodbujevalni režim do 15. decembra 2011 oziroma 15. junija 2013.
Developing countries which have already been granted benefits under the special incentive arrangement as a result of Commission Decisions 2008/938/EC of 9 December 2008 on the list of the beneficiary countries which qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 [3], and 2010/318/EU of 9 June 2010 on the beneficiary countries which qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance for the period from 1 July 2010 to 31 December 2011, as provided in Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 [4] should retain that status during the extension of the current scheme.
Države v razvoju, ki so jim bile z Odločbo Komisije 2008/938/ES z dne 9. decembra 2008 o seznamu držav upravičenk, ki so upravičene do posebnega spodbujevalnega režima za trajnostni razvoj in dobro upravljanje, kakor je predvideno v Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 732/2008 [3], in s Sklepom Komisije 2010/318/EU z dne 9. junija 2010 o državah upravičenkah, ki so upravičene do posebnega spodbujevalnega režima za trajnostni razvoj in dobro upravljanje od 1. julija 2010 do 31. decembra 2011, kakor je določeno v Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 732/2008 [4], dodeljene ugodnosti iz posebnega spodbujevalnega režima, bi morale obdržati ta status tudi med podaljšanjem sedanje sheme.
Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Uredba (EU) št. 513/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta
amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies
o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 o bonitetnih agencijah
The final report, published on 25 February 2009, of a High-Level group of experts chaired by Jacques de Larosière under a mandate of the Commission concluded that the supervisory framework of the financial sector within the European Union needed to be strengthened to reduce the risk and severity of future financial crises.
V končnem poročilu, ki ga je 25. februarja 2009 na pooblastilo Komisije objavila skupina strokovnjakov na visoki ravni, ki ji je predsedoval Jacques de Larosière, je bilo ugotovljeno, da je treba okrepiti nadzorni okvir finančnega sektorja v Evropski uniji, da se zmanjša tveganje in resnost prihodnjih finančnih kriz.
It recommended far-reaching reforms to the supervisory structure.
Poročilo je vključevalo priporočila za daljnosežne reforme strukture nadzora.
The group of experts also concluded that a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) should be created, comprising three European Supervisory Authorities – one for the banking sector, one for the insurance and occupational pensions sector and one for the securities and markets sector – and recommended the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council.
Navedena skupina strokovnjakov je ugotovila tudi, da bi bilo treba vzpostaviti evropski sistem finančnih nadzornih organov (ESFS), ki bi ga sestavljali trije evropski nadzorni organi, in sicer za bančni sektor, za sektor zavarovanj in poklicnih pokojnin ter za sektor vrednostnih papirjev in trgov, poleg tega pa je priporočila tudi ustanovitev Evropskega sveta za sistemska tveganja.
In its Communication of 4 March 2009 entitled ‘Driving European Recovery’, the Commission proposed to put forward draft legislation creating the ESFS, and in its Communication of 27 May 2009 entitled ‘European Financial Supervision’, it provided more detail about the possible architecture of such a new supervisory framework, highlighting the specificity of the supervision of credit rating agencies.
Komisija je v svojem sporočilu z dne 4. marca 2009 z naslovom „Spodbujanje okrevanja evropskega gospodarstva“ predlagala pripravo osnutka zakonodajnega akta za vzpostavitev ESFS, v svojem sporočilu z dne 27. maja 2009 z naslovom „Evropski finančni nadzor“ pa je navedla več podrobnosti o možni zgradbi takšnega novega nadzornega okvira in izpostavila specifičnost nadzora bonitetnih agencij.
The European Council, in its conclusions of 19 June 2009, recommended that the ESFS, consisting of a network of national financial supervisors working in tandem with three new European Supervisory Authorities, be established.
(3) Evropski svet je v svojih sklepih z dne 19. junija 2009 priporočil, da se vzpostavi ESFS, sestavljen iz mreže nacionalnih finančnih nadzornih organov, ki bi sodelovali s tremi novimi evropskimi nadzornimi organi.
The ESFS should be aimed at upgrading the quality and consistency of national supervision, strengthening oversight of cross-border groups through the setting up of supervisory colleges and establishing a European single rule book applicable to all financial market participants in the internal market.
ESFS bi moral biti usmerjen v izboljšanje kakovosti in usklajenosti nacionalnega nadzora, krepitev nadzora nad čezmejnimi skupinami z vzpostavitvijo nadzornih kolegijev ter pripravo enotnega evropskega pravilnika, ki bi se uporabljal za vse udeležence finančnega trga na notranjem trgu.
The European Council stressed that a European securities and markets authority should have supervisory powers over credit rating agencies.
Evropski svet je poudaril, da bi moral imeti Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge pooblastila za nadzor nad bonitetnimi agencijami.
Further, the Commission should retain its competence to enforce the Treaties, in particular Chapter I of Title VII of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) regarding the common rules on competition in accordance with the provisions adopted for the implementation of those rules.
Poleg tega bi morala Komisija obdržati pristojnost za uveljavljanje Pogodb, zlasti poglavja I naslova VII Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU) v zvezi s skupnimi pravili o konkurenci v skladu z določbami, sprejetimi za izvajanje teh pravil.
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [4] established the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (ESMA).
Z Uredbo (EU) št. 1095/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [4] se je ustanovil Evropski nadzorni organ (Organ za vrednostne papirje in trge)(ESMA).
The scope of competence of ESMA should be clearly defined so that financial market participants can identify the authority competent in the field of activity of credit rating agencies.
Področje pristojnosti ESMA bi bilo treba jasno opredeliti, tako da bodo lahko udeleženci na finančnem trgu ugotovili, kateri organ je pristojen na področju dejavnosti bonitetnih agencij.
ESMA should be given general competence under Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council [5] regarding matters relating to the registration and ongoing supervision of registered credit rating agencies.
ESMA bi moral imeti v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [5] splošno pristojnost za zadeve v zvezi z registracijo in stalnim nadzorom registriranih bonitetnih agencij.
ESMA should be exclusively responsible for the registration and supervision of credit rating agencies in the Union.
ESMA bi moral imeti izključno pristojnost za registracijo in nadzor bonitetnih agencij v Uniji.
Where ESMA delegates specific tasks to competent authorities, ESMA should continue to be legally responsible.
Če ESMA na pristojne organe prenese posebne naloge, bi moral biti zanje še naprej pravno odgovoren.
The heads and other staff of competent authorities should be involved in the decision-making process within ESMA in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, acting as members of ESMA bodies, such as its board of supervisors or its internal panels.
Vodje in drugo osebje pristojnih organov bi morali kot člani ESMA, na primer odbora nadzornikov ali internih odborov ESMA, sodelovati v procesu odločanja v ESMA v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 1095/2010.)
ESMA should have the exclusive power to conclude cooperation agreements on information exchange with the supervisory authorities of third countries.
ESMA bi moral imeti izključno pristojnost za sklepanje sporazumov o sodelovanju za izmenjavo informacij z nadzornimi organi tretjih držav.
To the extent that competent authorities participate in the decision-making process within ESMA or when executing tasks on behalf of ESMA, they should be covered by those cooperation agreements.
Kolikor pristojni organi sodelujejo v procesu odločanja v ESMA ali če opravljajo naloge v imenu ESMA, bi to moralo biti opredeljeno v teh sporazumih o sodelovanju.
Transparency of information given by the issuer of a rated financial instrument to the appointed credit rating agency could have much potential added value for the functioning of the market and investor protection.
Preglednost informacij, ki jih izdajatelj ocenjevanega finančnega instrumenta posreduje imenovani bonitetni agenciji, bi lahko imela veliko potencialno dodano vrednost za delovanje trga in varstvo vlagateljev.
Consideration should therefore be given on how best to extend the transparency of information underlying the ratings of all financial instruments.
Zato bi bilo treba nameniti pozornost temu, kako bi lahko čim bolj povečali preglednost informacij, ki vplivajo na ocene vseh finančnih instrumentov.
First, disclosing that information to other registered or certified credit rating agencies is likely to reinforce the competition between credit rating agencies, because it could lead, in particular, to an increase in the number of unsolicited ratings.
Kot prvo bi lahko razkritje teh informacij drugim registriranim ali certificiranim bonitetnim agencijam utegnilo povečati konkurenco med tovrstnimi agencijami, saj bi se lahko povečalo število nenaročenih ocen.
The issuing of such unsolicited ratings should promote the use of more than one rating per financial instrument.
Izdajanje takšnih nenaročenih ocen bi vzpodbujalo uporabo več kot ene ocene na finančni instrument.
This is also likely to help avoid possible conflicts of interest, especially under the issuer-pays model, and should enhance the quality of the ratings.
To bi pripomoglo tudi k preprečevanju navzkrižja interesov, zlasti po modelu izdajatelj plača, in bi moralo povečati kakovost ocen.
Second, disclosing that information to the whole market could also increase the ability of investors to develop their own risk analyses by basing their due diligence on that additional information.
Drugič bi lahko razkritje teh informacij vsemu trgu povečalo zmožnost vlagateljev, da bi razvili lastne analize tveganja, saj bi njihova potrebna skrbnost temeljila na teh dodatnih informacijah.
Such disclosure could also lead to decreasing reliance on credit ratings issued by credit rating agencies.
Razkritje bi lahko privedlo do manjšega zanašanja na bonitetne ocene, ki jih izdajo te agencije.
In order to achieve those fundamental objectives, the Commission should assess those issues in greater depth by giving further consideration to the appropriate scope of the disclosure obligation, having regard to the impact on local securitisation markets, further dialogue with interested parties, the monitoring of market and regulatory developments, and experience gained by other jurisdictions.
Da bi izpolnili te temeljne cilje, bi morala Komisija ta vprašanja podrobneje oceniti, s tem, da bi morala nameniti pozornost ustreznemu obsegu obveznosti razkritja, saj vpliva na lokalne trge listinjenja, nadaljevanju dialoga z zainteresiranimi stranmi, spremljanju trga in regulativnega razvoja ter izkušenj iz drugih jurisdikcij.
The Commission's assessment and proposals should allow the definition of new transparency obligations in the manner most appropriate to meet the public interest, and most consistent with the protection of investors.
Ocena in predlogi Komisije bi morali pripomoči k določitvi novih obveznosti glede preglednosti na tak način, da bi bile kar najbolj v skladu z javnim interesom in varstvom vlagateljev.
As credit ratings are used throughout the Union, the traditional distinction between the home competent authority and the other competent authorities and the use of supervisory coordination by colleges are not the most appropriate structure for supervising credit rating agencies.
Ker se bonitetne ocene uporabljajo po vsej Uniji, tradicionalno ločevanje matičnega pristojnega organa od drugih pristojnih organov ter uporaba kolegijskega nadzornega usklajevanja nista najbolj ustrezna za nadzor bonitetnih agencij.
Following the establishment of ESMA, it is no longer necessary to maintain such a structure.
Z ustanovitvijo ESMA ni več potrebe po ohranjanju take strukture.
The registration process should therefore be streamlined and the time limits should be reduced accordingly.
Postopek registracije bi bilo treba zato poenotiti in časovne omejitve ustrezno zmanjšati.
ESMA should be responsible for the registration and ongoing supervision of credit rating agencies, but not for the oversight of the users of credit ratings.
ESMA bi moral biti odgovoren za registracijo in stalni nadzor bonitetnih agencij, ni pa odgovoren za nadzor uporabnikov bonitetnih ocen.
Competent authorities designated under the relevant sectoral legislation for the supervision of credit institutions, investment firms, insurance undertakings, assurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS), institutions for occupational retirement provision and alternative investment funds should therefore remain responsible for the supervision of the use of credit ratings by those financial institutions and entities which are supervised at national level in the context and for the purpose of the application of other financial services directives, and of the use of credit ratings in prospectuses.
Pristojni organi, ki so v skladu z ustrezno področno zakonodajo določeni za nadzor kreditnih institucij, investicijskih podjetij, zavarovalnic, pozavarovalnic, kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov za vlaganja v prenosljive vrednostne papirje (KNPVP), institucij za poklicno pokojninsko zavarovanje in alternativnih investicijskih skladov, bi tako morali ostati odgovorni za nadzor nad tem, kako te finančne institucije in subjekti, ki se nadzirajo na nacionalni ravni v okviru in za namen uporabe drugih direktiv o finančnih storitvah ter za uporabo bonitetnih ocen v prospektih, uporabljajo bonitetne ocene.
There is a need for an effective instrument to establish harmonised regulatory technical standards to facilitate the application of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 in day-to-day practice and to ensure a level playing field and the adequate protection of investors and consumers across the Union.
Obstaja potreba po učinkovitem instrumentu za določitev usklajenih regulativnih tehničnih standardov, da se olajša uporaba Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 v vsakodnevnem delovanju in da se zagotovijo enaki konkurenčni pogoji ter ustrezno varstvo vlagateljev in potrošnikov po vsej Uniji.
As a body with highly specialised expertise, it is efficient and appropriate to entrust ESMA with the development of draft regulatory technical standards.
Ker je ESMA telo z visoko specializiranimi strokovnjaki, je učinkovito in ustrezno, da se mu zaupa priprava osnutka regulativnih tehničnih standardov.
In the field of credit rating agencies, ESMA should submit to the Commission draft regulatory technical standards concerning the information to be provided by a credit rating agency in its application for registration, the information that a credit rating agency must provide for the application for certification and for an assessment of its systemic importance to the financial stability or integrity of financial markets, the presentation of the information, including structure, format, method and period of reporting, that a credit rating agency must disclose, concerning the assessment of compliance of credit rating methodologies with the requirements set out in Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, and the content and format of ratings data periodic reporting to be requested from a credit rating agency for the purpose of ongoing supervision by ESMA.
Na področju bonitetnih agencij bi moral ESMA Komisiji predložiti osnutek regulativnih tehničnih standardov v zvezi z informacijami, ki jih mora bonitetna agencija zagotoviti v svoji vlogi za registracijo, informacijami, ki jih mora bonitetna agencija zagotoviti za vlogo za certificiranje in za oceno njenega sistemskega pomena za finančno stabilnost ali integriteto finančnih trgov, predstavitvijo informacij, vključno s strukturo, obliko, metodo in obdobjem poročanja, ki jih razkrijejo bonitetne agencije, v zvezi z oceno skladnosti metodologij bonitetnega ocenjevanja in zahtev, določenih v Uredbi (ES) št. 1060/2009, ter z vsebino in obliko rednega poročanja o podatkih bonitetnega ocenjevanja, za katere bo zaprošena bonitetna agencija zaradi stalnega nadzora, ki ga bo izvajal ESMA.
In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, those draft regulatory technical standards should be endorsed by the Commission to give them binding legal effect.
Osnutek teh regulativnih tehničnih standardov bi morala v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 1095/2010 sprejeti Komisija, s čimer postanejo pravno zavezujoči.
In developing its draft regulatory technical standards, ESMA should consider and, if appropriate and necessary, update the guidelines already issued by the Committee of European Securities Regulators regarding the content of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.
Pri pripravi svojega osnutka regulativnih tehničnih standardov bi moral ESMA glede na vsebino Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 upoštevati smernice, ki jih je že izdal Odbor evropskih zakonodajalcev za vrednostne papirje ter če je to primerno in potrebno te smernice tudi posodobiti.
In areas not covered by regulatory technical standards, ESMA should have the power to issue and update non-binding guidelines on issues related to the application of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.
ESMA bi moral imeti na področjih, ki niso zajeta v regulativnih tehničnih standardih, pristojnost za izdajo in posodobitev nezavezujočih smernic o vprašanjih, povezanih z uporabo Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009.
In order to carry out its duties effectively, ESMA should be able to require, by simple request or by decision, all necessary information from credit rating agencies, persons involved in credit rating activities, rated entities and related third parties, third parties to whom the credit rating agencies have outsourced operational functions and persons otherwise closely and substantially related or connected to credit rating agencies or credit rating activities.
ESMA bi moral imeti za učinkovito opravljanje svojih nalog pravico, da z enostavnim zahtevkom ali s sprejetjem odločitve zahteva vse potrebne informacije od bonitetnih agencij, oseb, ki so vključene v dejavnosti bonitetnega ocenjevanja, ocenjevanih subjektov in povezanih tretjih oseb, tretjih oseb, ki so jim bonitetne agencije oddale v zunanje izvajanje operativne funkcije, in ostalih oseb, ki so drugače tesno in pomembno povezane z bonitetnimi agencijami ali dejavnostmi bonitetnega ocenjevanja.
The latter group of persons should cover, for instance, the staff of a credit rating agency who are not directly involved in rating activities but who, due to their function within the credit rating agency, may hold important information on a specific case.
Slednja skupina oseb bi morala na primer obsegati tisto osebje bonitetne agencije, ki ni neposredno udeleženo v dejavnostih bonitetnega ocenjevanja, zaradi svoje funkcije v bonitetni agenciji pa ima lahko pomembne informacije o posameznem primeru.
Firms which have provided services to the credit rating agency may also fall into that category.
V to kategorijo lahko spadajo tudi podjetja, ki opravljajo storitve za bonitetno agencijo.
Undertakings using the credit ratings should not fall into that category.
Podjetja, ki uporabljajo bonitetne ocene, ne bi smela spadati v to kategorijo.
If ESMA requires such information by simple request, the addressee is not obliged to provide the information but, in the event that it does so voluntarily, the information provided should not be incorrect or misleading.
Če ESMA takšne informacije zahteva z enostavnim zahtevkom, oseba, od katere se te informacije zahtevajo, informacij ni obvezana zagotoviti, vendar v primeru prostovoljnega odgovora na zahtevek zagotovljene informacije ne bi smele biti napačne ali zavajajoče.
Such information should be made available without delay.
Te informacije bi morale biti dane na voljo brez odlašanja.
In order to exercise its supervisory powers effectively, ESMA should be able to conduct investigations and on-site inspections.
ESMA bi moral imeti za učinkovito izvajanje svojih nadzornih pooblastil pravico, da opravlja preiskave in inšpekcijske preglede na kraju samem.
The competent authorities should communicate any information required pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 and assist and cooperate with ESMA.
Pristojni organi bi morali ESMA sporočiti vse informacije, zahtevane v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009 ter mu pomagati in z njim sodelovati.
ESMA and the competent authorities should also cooperate closely with the sectoral competent authorities responsible for supervision of the undertakings referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.
ESMA in pristojni organi bi morali poleg tega tesno sodelovati s pristojnimi področnimi organi, odgovornimi za nadzor podjetij iz člena 4(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009.
ESMA should be able to delegate specific supervisory tasks to the competent authority of a Member State, for instance where a supervisory task requires knowledge and experience with respect to local conditions, which are more easily available at national level.
ESMA bi moral biti omogočen prenos določenih nadzornih nalog na pristojni organ države članice, na primer če nadzorna naloga zahteva znanje in izkušnje v zvezi z lokalnimi razmerami, ki so lažje dostopni na nacionalni ravni.
The kind of tasks that it should be possible to delegate include the carrying out of specific investigatory tasks and on-site inspections.
Vrsta nalog, ki bi se jih lahko preneslo, vključujejo opravljanje določenih preiskovalnih nalog in inšpekcijskih pregledov na kraju samem.
Prior to the delegation of tasks, ESMA should consult the relevant competent authority about the detailed conditions relating to such delegation of tasks, including the scope of the task to be delegated, the timetable for the performance of the task, and the transmission of necessary information by and to ESMA.
Pred prenosom nalog bi se moral ESMA posvetovati z ustreznim pristojnim organom o podrobnih pogojih v zvezi s takšnim prenosom nalog, vključno z obsegom naloge, ki bo prenesena, časovnim okvirom za njeno izvedbo ter posredovanjem potrebnih informacij ESMA in s strani ESMA.
ESMA should compensate the competent authorities for carrying out a delegated task in accordance with a regulation on fees to be adopted by the Commission by means of a delegated act.
ESMA bi moral pristojnim organom za izvajanje prenesene naloge izplačati nadomestilo v skladu z uredbo o pristojbinah, ki jo sprejme Komisija z delegiranim aktom.
ESMA should not be able to delegate the power to adopt decisions on registration.
ESMA ne bi smel prenesti pristojnosti glede sprejetja odločitev o registraciji.