natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The information submitted by the Danish authorities shows that DSB recorded after-tax profits of DKK 670 million in 2007 and DKK 542 million in 2008, respectively DKK 227 million and DKK 97 million more than the figures envisaged in the forward budget for those 2 years [46].
Podatki, ki so jih predložili danski organi, kažejo, da je bil dobiček po obdavčitvi družbe DSB 670 milijonov DKK leta 2007 in 542 milijonov DKK leta 2008, torej je bil za 227 oziroma za 97 milijonov DKK večji kot v predvidenem proračunu za ti leti.
Over the whole period 1999-2008, the Commission therefore estimates DSB’s surplus profits to be DKK 3,039 billion more than envisaged in the original budget.
Komisija tako za celotno obdobje 1999–2008 presežek dobička v primerjavi s prvotnimi proračuni DSB ocenjuje na 3,039 milijarde DKK.
The Commission considers that those surpluses show that the contractual payments exceeded the level that was necessary to cover the costs incurred in discharging a public service obligation plus a reasonable profit.
Komisija meni, da ti presežki pomenijo, da so pogodbena plačila presegla to, kar je potrebno za kritje stroškov, nastalih z izpolnjevanjem obveznosti javne službe in povečanih za razumni dobiček.
The Commission observes, however, that, according to the Danish authorities, those surplus profits did not lead to an accumulation of capital for DSB beyond what was initially envisaged in the 10-year forward budget.
Komisija vseeno opozarja, da ti presežki dobička po mnenju danskih organov ne bi privedli do kopičenja kapitala za DSB, ki bi preseglo to, kar je bilo prvotno predvideno v predvidenem proračunu.
The Danish authorities argue that part of the surplus profits was paid back to the Danish State in the form of dividends.
Danski organi namreč trdijo, da je bil del presežka dobička vrnjen državi v obliki dividend.
In 2008, DSB also paid the Danish State DKK 359 million, or approximately DKK 150 million more than was envisaged in the 10-year forward budgets [47].
DSB je leta 2008 državi nakazala tudi 359 milijonov DKK oziroma približno 150 milijonov DKK več, kot je bilo predvideno v predvidenih proračunih.
The Commission notes that the Danish State collected around DKK 3,65 billion in additional dividends between 1999 and 2008.
Komisija skupno ugotavlja, da je Danska med letoma 1999 in 2008 prejela približno 3,65 milijarde DKK dodatnih dividend.
Contrary to what the Danish authorities claim, the Commission considers that the dividend policy cannot be equated with a refund clause which makes it possible to adjust compensation for the fulfilment of a public service obligation and to prevent overcompensation.
V nasprotju s tem, kar trdijo danski organi, Komisija meni, da dividendne politike ni mogoče enačiti s klavzulo o vračilu, ki omogoča prilagoditev nadomestil za opravljanje obveznosti javne storitve in preprečevanje čezmernih nadomestil.
The collecting of dividends does not meet in a structural manner the requirements laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 and, in particular, its Annex.
Izplačilo dividend ni strukturen odziv na zahteve, opredeljene v Uredbi (ES) št. 1370/2007in zlasti v Prilogi k tej uredbi.
The collection of dividends depends on the decision taken by the shareholders of the undertaking and does not have the automatic nature required in order to avoid overcompensation.
Izplačilo dividend je namreč odločitev delničarjev podjetja in ne ponuja zahtevanega avtomatizma za preprečevanje čezmernih nadomestil.
In addition, dividends are generally collected later in the year compared with the compensation corrections which take place at the end of the financial year.
Dividende se poleg tega običajno izplačajo pozneje med letom v primerjavi s popravki nadomestil, ki morajo biti izvedena konec poslovnega leta.
In the circumstances of the present case, the Commission recognises that the Danish State, during the period 1999-2008, collected additional dividends (compared with what had been budgeted initially) of an overall amount which clearly exceeds DSB’s surplus profits.
Komisija v okoliščinah te zadeve priznava, da je Danska v obdobju 1999–2008 prejela dodatne dividende (v primerjavi s tem, kar je bilo predvideno v proračunu) v skupnem znesku, ki močno presega znesek presežkov dobička družbe DSB.
The Commission notes that the additional dividends collected by Denmark are around 20 % greater than DSB’s surplus profits.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so dodatne dividende, ki jih je prejela država, za približno 20 % višje od presežkov dobička družbe DSB.
In general, the Commission notes that, in accounting terms, the collection of dividends takes place after the determination of the results and does not usually allow overcompensation to be avoided.
Komisija na splošno ugotavlja, da se na računovodski ravni dividende izplačajo po določitvi dobička, s tem izplačilom pa običajno ni mogoče preprečiti čezmernih nadomestil.
The Commission is thus obliged to note that by collecting dividends from the undertaking, 100 % of which it owns, the Danish State in reality corrected DSB’s surplus situation in such a way that the latter was not overcompensated in practice.
Vendar mora Komisija ugotoviti, da je Danska v resnici s prejemom dividend od podjetja, ki je v njeni lasti, v celoti popravila presežni položaj družbe DSB, tako da ta dejansko ni prejela čezmernih nadomestil.
The economic effects of the surplus profits in excess of the 6 % initially envisaged were neutralised by the collection of dividends, and DSB was not able to use these surplus profits to increase its equity capital or to benefit financially.
Ekonomski učinki presežkov dobička, ki so presegli prvotno predvidenih 6 %, so bili namreč nevtralizirani z izplačilom dividend, DSB pa jih ni mogla uporabiti za povečanje lastniškega kapitala ali za obogatitev.
Results of DSB SV
Poslovni izid DSB SV (v mio. DKK)
Real passenger revenue
Prihodki od potnikov
Contractual payments
Pogodbena plačila
Real costs
Dejanski stroški
Real operating results, after tax
Dejanski dobiček iz poslovanja po obdavčitvi
Dividends paid
Izplačane dividende
Dividends initially forecast
Prvotno predvidene dividende
Real additional dividends
Dejanske dodatne dividende
The Commission stresses that this conclusion concerns DSB SV, in so far as the results of DSB S-tog a/s are included in the parent company’s group accounts and dividend policy is determined at the level of that body.
Komisija poudarja, da se ta ugotovitev nanaša na DSB SV, ker je dobiček DSB S-tog a/s konsolidiran na ravni matične družbe in ker je dividendna politika določena na ravni tega poslovnega subjekta.
However, the Commission emphasises that this reasoning does not make it possible to guarantee the absence of overcompensation over the entire term of the public transport service contracts.
Komisija vseeno poudarja, da s tem sklepanjem ni mogoče zagotoviti, da med celotnim trajanjem pogodb o izvajanju javne službe prevoza trajno ni čezmernih nadomestil.
It is based on an empirical and detailed examination of DSB’s accounts over the period in question, but does not offer a structural solution concerning the necessary annual adjustments of the level of public service compensation.
Sklepanje temelji na empirični in podrobni preučitvi računovodskih izkazov družbe DSB za preteklo obdobje, vendar ne ponuja strukturne rešitve glede potrebnih letnih prilagoditev ravni nadomestil za javne storitve.
In this regard, the Commission points out that the Danish authorities are considering amending the current public transport service contracts in order to introduce a refund mechanism.
Komisija glede tega opozarja, da nameravajo danski organi spremeniti tekoče pogodbe o izvajanju javne službe prevoza, da bi uvedli mehanizem vračila.
The refund mechanism described above (see recitals 222-240) should make it possible to correct the amount of the contractual payments on the basis of an accounting formula.
Zgoraj opisani mehanizem vračila (glej uvodne izjave od 222 do 240) mora omogočiti popravek zneska pogodbenih plačil na podlagi računovodske enačbe.
Under such a mechanism, any surplus would thus be paid back to the State on the basis of the end-of-year accounts, thus ensuring that DSB’s return on equity remains within the limits specified by the State.
V skladu s takim mehanizmom bi bila takó morebitna preplačila vrnjena državi na podlagi računovodskih izkazov ob koncu poslovnega leta, in sicer zaradi zagotavljanja, da donosnost lastniškega kapitala družbe DSB ostane v mejah, ki jih je določila država.
The refund mechanism provides for an adjustment of the contractual payments at the end of the financial year (see recital 227).
Mehanizem vračila namreč predvideva prilagoditev pogodbenih plačil ob koncu poslovnega leta (glej točko 227).
Its application will lead to a reduction in the gross contractual payments in order to maintain a level of reasonable profit set at a 6 % return on equity in accordance with the following formula:
Njegova uporaba pomeni bruto zmanjšanje pogodbenih plačil zaradi ohranitve ravni razumnega dobička, določenega na 6-odstotni donosnosti lastniškega kapitala v skladu s to enačbo:
The Commission is of the opinion that this refund mechanism complies with the requirements set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, and those in the Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation [48].
Komisija meni, da ta mehanizem vračila izpolnjuje zahteve, opredeljene v Prilogi k Uredbi (ES) št. 1370/2007in tudi v Okviru Skupnosti za državne pomoči v obliki nadomestila za javne storitve.
The Commission notes that such a system is comparable to the checks described in Section 3 of that framework.
Ugotavlja namreč, da je tak sistem primerljiv z nadzori, opisanimi v oddelku 3 tega okvira.
It also points out that the basic level of reasonable profit would remain fixed at a 6 % return on equity, which it regards as a reasonable level for this type of activity, taking account of the levels achieved by DSB’s current domestic competitors as indicated by DKT.
Opozarja še, da bi raven osnovnega razumnega dobička ostala določena na 6-odstotni donosnosti lastniškega kapitala, kar se ji zdi razumna raven za to vrsto dejavnosti ob upoštevanju ravni, ki jih dosegajo sedanji domači konkurenti družbe DSB, kot je navedlo združenje DKT.
The Commission also notes that this mechanism includes corrections concerning efficiency and qualitative improvements.
Komisija še ugotavlja, da ta mehanizem vključuje popravke glede učinkovitosti in količinskih izboljšanj.
The mechanism under consideration provides for a modulation of the gross reduction to enable DSB to retain part of the saved costs per passenger-kilometre and part of the increase in revenue due to increases in the number of passengers measured in passenger-kilometres (see recital 228).
V načrtovanem mehanizmu je namreč predvidena prilagoditev bruto zmanjšanja, da bi DSB lahko obdržala del od znižanja stroškov na potniški kilometer in povečanja števila potnikov, merjenega v potniških kilometrih (glej uvodno izjavo 228).
These corrections are applied according to the following formula:
Ti popravki se uporabljajo na podlagi te enačbe:
Refund mechanism = gross reduction – corrections (Cost Δ.
Mehanizem vračila = bruto znižanje – popravki (stroški Δ.
The Commission also notes that the parameters for determining the net reduction and thus taking these corrections into account are predetermined and quantified (see recital 229).
Komisija ugotavlja še, da so parametri za določitev neto zmanjšanja in torej upoštevanje teh popravkov vnaprej določeni in kvantificirani (glej uvodno izjavo 229).
The refund mechanism can be modulated as follows:
Mehanizem vračila se namreč lahko prilagodi tako:
Cost Δ. if DSB has reduced its costs (per passenger-kilometre) compared with the average cost over the past 4 years, that improvement will be calculated as follows: differential in cost per passenger-kilometre (as a percentage) compared with the average cost over the last 4 years multiplied by a total cost basis, and
stroški Δ če je DSB znižala svoje stroške (na potniški kilometer) v primerjavi s povprečnimi stroški zadnjih štirih let, se bo to izboljšanje izračunalo tako: razlika v stroških na potniški kilometer (v odstotkih) v primerjavi s povprečnimi stroški zadnjih štirih let, pomnoženimi z osnovo skupnih stroškov; in
Pas.km Δ if the number of passengers increases, the increase in passenger traffic measured in passenger-kilometres will be multiplied by DKK 0,80, and the gross reduction will also be reduced by that amount [49].
potniški km Δ če se število potnikov poveča, se bo povečanje potniškega prometa, merjeno v potniških kilometrih, pomnožilo z 0,80 DKK, bruto zmanjšanje pa se bo tudi zmanjšalo za ta znesek. [49].
The Commission points out that those corrections comply with paragraph 7 of the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, which provides that:
Komisija opozarja, da so ti popravki v skladu s točko 7 Priloge k Uredbi (ES) št. 1370/2007, v kateri je določeno, da:
‘The method of compensation must promote the maintenance or development of effective management by the public service operator, which can be the subject of an objective assessment, and the provision of passenger transport services of a sufficiently high standard’.
„Način nadomestila mora spodbujati ohranitev ali razvoj učinkovitega poslovodenja s strani izvajalca javne službe, ki se ga lahko objektivno oceni, in opravljanja dovolj kakovostnih storitev potniškega prevoza.“
In this case, the correction envisaged, based on the increase in passenger numbers and the decrease in unit costs, suitably expresses the concepts of improvements in effective management and quality of the service provided.
V tej zadevi predvideni popravek, ki temelji na povečanju števila potnikov in znižanju stroškov na enoto, primerno izraža pojma izboljšanja učinkovitega poslovodenja in kakovosti opravljene storitve.
However, the Commission considers that each of these corrections can be made only in so far as each of the parameters adopted also shows an improvement compared with the results obtained previously on those parameters.
Komisija vseeno meni, da je vsak popravek mogoče izvesti le, če vsak uporabljen parameter prikazuje tudi izboljšanje v primerjavi z rezultati, dobljenimi prej na podlagi teh parametrov.
This restriction is necessary in order to avoid, in the event of a substantial improvement in one parameter, a bonus being obtained by virtue of the other parameter even though the second parameter shows only a below-forecast improvement.
Ta omejitev je namreč potrebna za preprečitev, da se v primeru velikega izboljšanja enega od parametrov pridobi olajšava za drug parameter, čeprav ta kaže le manjše izboljšanje od predvidenega.
Finally, the refund mechanism is supplemented by setting an upper limit intended to ensure that the level of profit does not exceed the level of what is considered a reasonable profit according to the following formula (see recitals 233-237):
Nazadnje, mehanizem vračila je dopolnjen z določitvijo zgornje meje, da raven dobička ne bi presegla ravni razumnega dobička v skladu z naslednjo enačbo (glej uvodne izjave od 233 do 237):
The corrections applied to take account of efficiency gains and/or the improvement in the quality of the service will allow the reasonable profit to be varied between 6 % and 12 %, with an annual cap set at 10 % over 3 years, on the basis of objective criteria (see recitals 235-237).
Tako bodo popravki, uporabljeni za upoštevanje povečanja učinkovitosti in/ali izboljšanja kakovosti storitve, omogočili spreminjanje razumnega dobička med 6 in 12 % z letno zgornjo mejo 10 % v triletnem obdobju na podlagi objektivnih meril (glej uvodne izjave od 235 do 237).
The Commission considers that, within this range, the profit granted by Denmark to DSB in the context of its public service activities remains reasonable if it is limited to 10 % over 3 years.
Komisija meni, da dobiček, ki ga Danska odobri družbi DSB v okviru njenih dejavnosti javne službe, v tem razponu ostane razumen, zlasti ker je omejen na 10 % v triletnem obdobju.
The Commission’s conclusion is based on a range of indications based on the information available to it in order to assess whether the level of profit is reasonable.
Ugotovitev Komisije temelji na svežnju dokazov na podlagi informacij, ki jih ima na voljo za oceno razumnosti ravni dobička.
That analysis also shows that some rail undertakings had low or even negative levels of economic profitability during the period (PKP, Eurostar, NSB).
Ta analiza še kaže, da so nekatera železniška podjetja v tem obdobju imela majhno, celo negativno gospodarsko donosnost (PKP, Eurostar, NSB).
According to the study, several undertakings on the other hand had levels of economic profitability close to DSB’s level of a 3 % ROA (SNCB: 2 %, SNCF: 2 %, Trenitalia 3 %) or indeed a great deal higher than it (Arriva Tog a/s 21,3 %, Chiltern Railways 16,1 %, Arriva Trains Wales 16 %, Great North Eastern Railway 12,2 %, DB Regio AG 12 %).
Glede na to raziskavo pa je, nasprotno, več podjetij imelo podobne ravni donosnosti (SNCB 2 %, SNCF 2 %, Trenitalia 3 %) in celo precej večje (Arriva Tog a/s 21,3 %, Chiltern Railways 16,1 %, Arriva Trains Wales 16 %, Great North Eastern Railway 12,2 %, DB Regio AG 12 %) od 3-odstotnega ROA družbe DSB.
The Commission also relies on its decision-making practice in the area of services of general economic interest [52].
Komisija se opira tudi na svojo prakso odločanja na področju storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena. [52].
The Commission’s assessment also takes account of the fact that DSB assumes part of the risk associated with that activity, since the contractual payments are fixed in advance and cannot be increased in the event of a shortfall compared with the forecasts reflecting a deterioration in DSB’s performance caused, for example, by an unintended rise in costs or a drop in the company’s receipts.
Poleg tega je Komisija pri oceni upoštevala dejstvo, da DSB nosi del tveganja, povezanega s to dejavnostjo, ker so pogodbena plačila določena vnaprej in jih ni mogoče povečati v primeru negativnega odstopanja od napovedi, ki kažejo poslabšanje uspešnosti družbe DSB, ki bi bilo na primer posledica višjih stroškov ali zmanjšanja prihodkov podjetja.
The Commission notes that, since the company is exposed to a risk in terms of its profitability and has no guarantee that the 6 % contractual profitability will be achieved, it appears appropriate to encourage it to make efficiency gains and, in so doing, to allow it to retain part of the resulting profits, including profits beyond that contractual level, within the range referred to above.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je podjetje zaradi svoje izpostavljenosti negativnemu tveganju glede donosnosti, ki mu ne daje zagotovila, da bo dosežena pogodbena 6-odstotna donosnost, primerno spodbujati k povečevanju učinkovitosti in mu s tem omogočiti, da ohrani delež tako ustvarjene donosnosti tudi, ko bo presegel to pogodbeno raven, in to v okviru zgoraj navedenega razpona.
Finally, the Commission notes on the basis of the Danish authorities’ empirical investigation that the application of this refund mechanism in the past would have led to levels of return on equity for DSB in the period 2004-08 ranging between 8,8 % and 11,9 % and that it would have entailed a refund of DKK 38 million for 2006 taking into account the ‘10 % over 3 years rule’ (see recitals 238-240).
Nazadnje, Komisija na podlagi empiričnega prikaza, ki so ga pripravili danski organi, opozarja, da bi uporaba tega mehanizma vračila v preteklosti povzročila, da bi bila donosnost lastniškega kapitala družbe DSB v obdobju 2004–2008 med 8,8 in 11,9 % in da bilo potrebno vračilo 38 milijonov DKK v letu 2006 ob upoštevanju pravila 10 % v triletnem obdobju (glej uvodne izjave od 238 do 240).
Consequently, the Commission concludes that DSB’s surplus profits show that the contractual payments exceeded the level that was necessary to compensate for the costs incurred in discharging a public service obligation under all the public service contracts plus a reasonable profit.
Komisija zato sklene, da presežki dobička družbe DSB kažejo, da so pogodbena plačila presegla to, kar je potrebno za kritje stroškov, nastalih z izpolnjevanjem obveznosti javne službe in povečanih za razumni dobiček.
In the present case, the Commission considers that the collection of additional dividends of an amount clearly in excess of that surplus made it possible to avoid overcompensation of DSB.
Komisija meni, da je bilo mogoče z izplačilom dodatnih dividend v precej višjem znesku od teh presežkov dejansko preprečiti, da bi DSB prejela čezmerna nadomestila.
Although the Commission concludes that there was no overcompensation in this case, it makes its conclusion dependent on the implementation of the refund mechanism as described in this Decision and specified in recital 356 above.
Čeprav Komisija sklene, da v tej zadevi ni bilo čezmernih nadomestil, ta sklep pogojuje z izvajanjem mehanizma vračila, kot je opisan v tem sklepu in natančno opredeljen v uvodni izjavi 356 zgoraj.
The Commission points out that it is not in dispute that the delivery of rolling stock provided for under the public transport service contracts by the manufacturer Ansaldobreda was subject to substantial delay.
Komisija opozarja, da ni sporno, da so pri dobavi voznega parka, predvideni v pogodbah o izvajanju javne službe prevoza, od proizvajalca AnsaldoBreda nastale velike zamude.
To fulfil its obligations, DSB used rented rolling stock, which was the subject of additional contracts with the Danish Ministry of Transport.
Da bi družba DSB izpolnila svoje obveznosti, je uporabila najeti vozni park, zaradi česar so bile z danskim ministrstvom za promet sklenjene dodatne pogodbe.
The Commission points out that, under the public service contracts concluded between the Danish Ministry of Transport and DSB, the latter was to bear the costs corresponding to the depreciation of the trains and interest, and that those costs were covered by the contractual payments.
Komisija opozarja, da je DSB na podlagi pogodb o izvajanju javne službe, ki jih je sklenila z danskim ministrstvom za promet, imela stroške, ki ustrezajo amortizaciji vlakov in obrestim, in da so bili ti stroški pokriti s pogodbenimi plačili.
The Commission therefore considers that three aspects should be distinguished.
Komisija zato meni, da je treba razlikovati med tremi vidiki.
First, the Commission points out that, in the context of the public transport service contract for 2000-04, the consequences of the delays were not taken fully into account in the calculation of the contractual payments.
Prvič, Komisija v okviru pogodbe o izvajanju javne službe prevoza za obdobje 2000–2004 ugotavlja, da se posledice zamud niso v celoti upoštevale pri izračunu pogodbenih plačil.
The Danish authorities have acknowledged that this resulted in a positive effect of DKK 154 million.
Danski organi so priznali, da je to imelo pozitiven učinek v višini 154 milijonov DKK.
DKK 50 million of that figure was paid back to the State in the form of a voluntary reduction in the contractual payments.
Od tega zneska je bilo 50 milijonov vrnjenih državi v obliki prostovoljnega zmanjšanja pogodbenih plačil.
The Commission consequently considers that DSB received contractual payments of DKK 104 million corresponding to costs which it did not incur.
Komisija zato meni, da je DSB prejela pogodbena plačila v višini 104 milijonov DKK, ki ustrezajo stroškom, ki jih ni imela.
In this respect, the Commission considers that it cannot be argued that this sum constituted (partial) compensation for the economic losses suffered by DSB in connection with the delays.
Komisija glede tega meni, da se ni mogoče sklicevati na dejstvo, da je bila s tem zneskom (delno) nadomeščena gospodarska škoda, ki jo je DSB utrpela zaradi zamud.
The question of the harm suffered by DSB concerns the performance of the delivery contract between DSB and its supplier, which could be the subject of settlement procedures (out of court, by arbitration or by litigation).
Škoda, ki jo je utrpela DSB, je namreč posledica izvajanja pogodbe o dobavi, ki jo je DSB sklenila z dobaviteljem in je lahko predmet postopkov poravnave (sporazumne, arbitražne ali sodne).