natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The competent authorities of Italy informed the Air Safety Committee of their readiness to put in place this programme without delay, so as to enable the ACAA to exercise effectively the oversight of the air carriers under its regulatory control until such time the ACAA has the necessary qualified staff to do so independently.
Pristojni organi Italije so obvestili Odbor za varnost v civilnem letalstvu o njihovi pripravljenosti, da nemudoma pripravijo program, ki bo ACAA omogočil učinkovito opravljanje nadzora nad letalskimi prevozniki, ki so pod njihovim regulativnim nadzorom, dokler ne bodo imeli ACAA potrebnega usposobljenega osebja in bodo to nalogo lahko opravljali sami.
In the light of these developments, it is assessed that, on the basis of the common criteria, that no further are measures needed at that stage.
Glede na to se ocenjuje, da na podlagi skupnih meril na tej stopnji niso potrebni nadaljnji ukrepi.
Member States will however verify effective compliance with the relevant safety standards through the prioritisation of ramp inspections on aircraft of air carriers certified in Albania pursuant to Regulation No 351/2008.
Vendar bodo države članice v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 351/2008 preverjale dejansko izpolnjevanje ustreznih varnostnih standardov s prednostno razvrstitvijo preverjanj na ploščadi, ki jih je treba opraviti na zrakoplovih letalskih prevoznikov, certificiranih v Albaniji.
The Commission and the Air Safety Committee encourage Albania to make decisive progress in the build up of the technical and administrative capacity of ACAA and invites ACAA to cooperate fully and transparently with ICAO and EASA in order to demonstrate quick and substantial progress in the implementation of adequate corrective action plans to remedy all deficiencies identified.
Komisija in Odbor za varnost v zračnem prometu spodbujata Albanijo k pospešeni izgradnji tehničnih in upravnih zmogljivosti ACAA, ACAA pa pozivata k tesnemu in preglednemu sodelovanju z ICAO in EASA, s čimer bi se dosegel hiter in oprijemljiv napredek pri izvajanju ustreznih akcijskih načrtov popravnih ukrepov za odpravo ugotovljenih pomanjkljivosti.
The Commission and the Air Safety Committee will reassess the situation in due time.
Komisija in Odbor za varnost v zračnem prometu bosta v ustreznem času ponovno ocenila stanje.
As per Regulation (EC) No 273/2010 [9] TAAG Angolan Airlines certified in Angola is allowed to operate in the EU only with four aircraft of type Boeing 737-700 with registration marks D2-TBF, D2-TBG, D2-TBH and D2-TBJ and with three aircraft of type Boeing 777-200 with registration marks D2-TED, D2-TEE, D2-TEF.
Na podlagi Uredbe (ES) št. 273/2010 [9] lahko TAAG Angolan Airlines, certificiran v Angoli, opravlja lete v EU le s štirimi zrakoplovi vrste Boeing 737-700 z registrskimi oznakami D2-TBF, D2-TBG, D2-TBH in D2-TBJ ter s tremi zrakoplovi vrste Boeing 777-200 z registrskimi oznakami D2-TED, D2-TEE in D2-TEF.
TAAG informed that following the renewal of its fleet the aircraft of type Boeing B747 were completely phased out and replaced in June/July 2011 by two aircraft of type Boeing 777-300 with registration mark D2-TEG and D2-TEH; TAAG requested these aircraft to be equally allowed to fly in the EU.
TAAG je sporočil, da je bila po obnovi njegove flote postopoma povsem ustavljena uporaba zrakoplovov vrste Boeing B747, ti pa so bili junija in julija 2011 nadomeščeni z dvema zrakoplovoma vrste Boeing 777-300 z registrskima oznakama D2-TEG in D2-TEH; TAAG je za ta zrakoplova zaprosil za dovoljenje opravljanja letov v EU.
The competent authorities of Angola (INAVIC) confirmed to the Air Safety Committee and provided evidence that the extension of TAAG’s fleet to the aircraft of type B777-300 was duly approved; INAVIC also stated that the air carrier is subject to continuous oversight, and that no safety concern has been identified in the course of this surveillance.
Pristojni organi Angole (INAVIC) so Odboru za varnost v zračnem prometu potrdili, da je bilo povečanje flote TAAG z zrakoplovi vrste B777-300 ustrezno potrjeno, in so o tem zagotovili dokaze. INAVIC so tudi izjavili, da se nad tem letalskim prevoznikom izvaja stalni nadzor ter da med pregledi ni bila ugotovljena nobena varnostna pomanjkljivost.
With regard to the incident that occurred in December 2010 over Lisbon and Lunad, the on-going investigations by the competent authorities have not revealed deficiencies in the operations or maintenance of TAAG nor led to specific recommendations to the company.
V zvezi z incidentom, ki se je zgodil decembra 2010 nad Lizbono in Luando, preiskave, ki še potekajo, niso pokazale na pomanjkljivosti pri letalski dejavnosti ali vzdrževanju s strani TAAG in na njihovi podlagi niso bila pripravljena posebna priporočila za letalskega prevoznika.
The competent authorities of Portugal reported that no safety concern had been identified in the ramp inspections carried out in Portugal on aircraft operated by TAAG.
Pristojni organi Portugalske so sporočili, da ni bila ugotovljena nobena varnostna pomanjkljivost preverjanja na ploščadi zrakoplova TAAG, ki je bilo izvedeno na Portugalskem.
On the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that TAAG should be allowed to operate into the EU the additional two aircraft of type Boeing B777-300ER with registration marks D2-TEG and D2-TEH that should be consequently added to Annex B. The operations of this carrier into the European Union should continue to be subject to appropriate verification of effective compliance with the relevant safety standards through the prioritisation of ramp inspections to be carried out on aircraft of this air carrier pursuant to Regulation No 351/2008.
Na podlagi skupnih meril se ocenjuje, da se TAAG dovoli opravljanje letov v EU z dvema dodatnima zrakoplovoma vrste Boeing B777-300ER z registrskima oznakama D2-TEG in D2-TEH, ki ju je treba dodati v Prilogo B. Opravljanje letov tega prevoznika v Evropsko unijo mora biti še naprej predmet ustreznega preverjanja dejanske skladnosti z zadevnimi varnostnimi standardi, in sicer s prednostno razvrstitvijo preverjanj na ploščadi, ki jih je treba opraviti na zrakoplovih tega letalskega prevoznika v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 351/2008.
Following the analysis by EASA of the results of SAFA ramp checks [10] carried out on aircraft operated into the EU by the air carrier Al Wafeer Air certified in Saudi Arabia, revealing repetitive serious non compliances with international safety standards, the Commission entered on 5 August 2011 into formal consultations with the competent authorities of Saudi Arabia.
EASA je analizirala rezultate preverjanj na ploščadi SAFA [10], ki so bili izvedeni na zrakoplovih, s katerimi lete v EU opravlja letalski prevoznik Al Wafeer Air, certificiran v Savdski Arabiji, in ugotovljene so bile ponavljajoče se resne neskladnosti z mednarodnimi varnostnimi standardi, zato je Komisija 5. avgusta 2011 začela uradna posvetovanja s pristojnimi organi Savdske Arabije.
These informed on 14 September that the AOC of Al Wafeer Air had been suspended and provided assurance that the operations would not be allowed to resume without ensuring the deficiencies identified in the course of the SAFA programme have been remedied.
Ti so 14. septembra sporočili, da je bilo spričevalo letalskega prevoznika Al Wafeer Air začasno preklicano, in so zagotovili, da ponovno opravljanje letov ne bo dovoljeno pred odpravo pomanjkljivosti, ugotovljenih med izvajanjem programa SAFA.
The Commission will continue its consultations with the competent authorities of Saudi Arabia to follow-up that case.
Komisija bo še naprej nadaljevala posvetovanja s pristojnimi organi Savdske Arabije in tako spremljala ta primer.
In their reply of 17 September 2011, the competent authorities of Pakistan (PCAA) provided information concerning actions taken by them to address the detected non-compliances.
Pristojni organi Pakistana (PCAA) so v odgovoru z dne 17. septembra 2011 zagotovili informacije o ukrepih, ki so jih sprejeli za odpravo ugotovljenih neskladnosti.
The response included details of a corrective action plan (CAP), produced by PIA, which set out 15 specific actions the air carrier planned to take, the majority of which were due to have been completed by 30 October 2011.
Odgovor je vključeval podrobne podatke o akcijskem načrtu popravnih ukrepov, ki ga je pripravil PIA in vključuje 15 specifičnih ukrepov, ki jih je letalski prevoznik nameraval izvesti; večina naj bi se izvedla do 30. oktobra 2011.
On 31 October 2011 the PCAA updated the Commission on the progress made by PIA in completing their corrective action plan, and on actions carried out by the PCAA.
Dne 31. oktobra 2011 so PCAA obvestili Komisijo o napredku PIA pri izpolnjevanju akcijskega načrta popravnih ukrepov ter o ukrepih, ki so jih izvedli PCAA.
Member States encourage the Commission to pursue its consultation with the competent authorities of Pakistan and with the air carrier with a view to ensuring that any corrective and remedial actions are sustainable in the long term.
Države članice spodbujajo Komisijo k nadaljevanju posvetovanj s pristojnimi organi Pakistana in z letalskim prevoznikom za zagotovitev, da bodo popravni ukrepi dolgoročno trajnostni.
To that end member States shall continue to verify the effective compliance with relevant safety standards through the prioritisation of ramp inspections to be carried out on aircraft of this carrier pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 351/2008 in order to confirm, or otherwise, the effectiveness of PIA's remedial actions.
Zato bodo države članice še naprej preverjale dejansko izpolnjevanje ustreznih varnostnih standardov s prednostnimi pregledi na ploščadi, ki jih je treba opraviti na zrakoplovih tega letalskega prevoznika v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 351/2008, da se zagotovi učinkovitost popravnih ukrepov PIA.
Should however these inspection reveal that PIA actions have failed to address the identified safety concerns, the Commission will have no choice but to act to contain any risks to safety.
Če pa bodo ti pregledi pokazali, da ukrepi PIA niso odpravili ugotovljenih varnostnih pomanjkljivosti, bo Komisija prisiljena ukrepati za preprečitev tveganja za varnost.
Following two subsequent regular analyses of SAFA inspection data by EASA where various air carriers licensed in the Russian Federation continue to show results from SAFA inspections of greater than one major finding per inspection as well as the fact that some of these air carriers experienced fatal accidents in 2011, the Commission held consultations with the competent authorities of the Russian Federation (Federal Air Transport Agency of the Russian Federation – FATA) in the margins of the EU-Russia Aviation Summit organised in St. Petersburg on 12 and 13 October 2011.
Ker je bila po dveh zaporednih rednih analizah podatkov pregledov SAFA s strani EASA za več letalskih prevoznikov, licenciranih v Ruski federaciji, ugotovljena več kot ena večja pomanjkljivost na posamezen pregled ter glede na dejstvo, da so bili nekateri izmed teh letalskih prevoznikov v letu 2011 udeleženi v nesreči s smrtnimi žrtvami, se je Komisija posvetovala s pristojnimi organi Ruske federacije (Federal Air Transport Agency of the Russian Federation – FATA) v okviru vrha EU-Rusija o letalstvu, ki je bil 12. in 13. oktobra 2011 organiziran v Sankt Petersburgu.
In order to provide detailed information regarding the safety performance of air carriers operating into the Union and the safety of operations of certain types of aircraft involved in fatal accidents of Russian air carriers in the Russian Federation in 2010 and 2011 further consultations were held with these authorities on 27 October.
Da bi se zagotovile podrobne informacije o varnosti letalskih prevoznikov, ki letijo v Unijo, in varnosti opravljanja dejavnosti določenih vrst zrakoplovov, udeleženih v nesrečah s smrtnimi žrtvami v letih 2010 in 2011, ruskih letalskih prevoznikov, so 27. oktobra potekala nadaljnja posvetovanja s temi organi.
Also during these consultations, two air carriers certified by these authorities VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES) and TATARSTAN AIRLINES were heard by the Commission, EASA, Eurocontrol and a Member State.
Tudi med temi posvetovanji so dva letalska prevoznika, VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES) in TATARSTAN AIRLINES, ki so ju certificirani ti organi, zaslišali Komisija, EASA, Eurocontrol in ena država članica.
During these consultations FATA informed that certain types of aircraft – Tupolev TU-134 and Tupolev TU-154B-2 and TU-154M operated by certain Russian air carriers were subject to various measures involving their continuing airworthiness, mandatory airworthiness information of equipment fitted thereon, as well as procedures for their operations.
Med temi posvetovanji so FATA obvestili, da so bile določene vrste zrakoplovov, Tupoljev TU-134 ter Tupoljev TU-154B-2 in TU-154M, s katerimi so dejavnosti opravljali določeni ruski letalski prevozniki, predmet različnih ukrepov glede njihove stalne plovnosti, obveznih informacij o plovnosti za opremo, uporabljeno na njih, ter postopkov za njihovo opravljanje dejavnosti.
FATA also informed the Commission that certain equipment mandatory for international flights (GPWS/TAWS) were made obligatory also for domestic flights within the Russian Federation as of 1 January 2012.
FATA so tudi obvestili Komisijo, da bo določena oprema, obvezna za mednarodne lete (GPWS/TAWS), s 1. januarjem 2012 postala obvezna tudi za domače lete znotraj Ruske federacije.
At the meeting of the Air Safety Committee on 8 November 2011 FATA informed of the following enforcement measures taken on air carriers under their regulatory control:
Na srečanju Odbora za varnost v zračnem prometu 8. novembra 2011 so FATA obvestili o naslednjih izvršilnih ukrepih za letalske prevoznike, ki so pod njihovim regulativnim nadzorom:
The following 12 air carriers operating commercial air transport into the Union had had their AOCs revoked:
spričevala naslednjih 12 letalskih prevoznikov, ki so opravljali komercialne zračne prevoze v Unijo, so bila preklicana: 2nd Aviation Unit Sverdlovsk (označevalnik ICAO UKU), preklic 2.
2nd Aviation Unit Sverdlovsk (ICAO designator UKU) revocation on 2.03.2011, MOSKVA (ICAO designator MOA) revocation on 23.03.2011, AVIAL NB (ICAO designator NVI), revocation on 15.07.2011, AVIAENERGO (ICAO designator ERG), revocation on 18.07.2011, CONTINENT (ICAO designator CNE) revocation on 2.08.2011 in connection with statements by the operators concerned;
2011, MOSKVA (označevalnik ICAO MOA), preklic 23. 3. 2011, AVIAL NB (označevalnik ICAO NVI), preklic 15. 7. 2011, AVIAENERGO (označevalnik ICAO ERG), preklic 18. 7. 2011, CONTINENT (označevalnik ICAO CNE) preklic 2. 8. 2011 v povezavi z izjavami zadevnih letalskih prevoznikov;
RUSAIR (ICAO designator CGI) revocation on 13.07.2011 on the basis of facts following the accident on 20.06.2011 of the aircraft of type TU-134 operated by the air carrier;
RUSAIR (označevalnik ICAO CGI), preklic 13. 7. 2011 na podlagi dejstev, ugotovljenih po nesreči 20. 6. 2011 zrakoplova vrste TU-134, ki ga je upravljal letalski prevoznik;
YAK SERVICE (ICAO designator AKY) revocation on 23.09.2011 the basis of the facts following the accident on 7 September 2011 of the aircraft of type YAK-42 operated by the air carrier and the results of an inspection carried out on the air carrier by FATA on 22.09.2011;
YAK SERVICE (označevalnik ICAO AKY), preklic 23. 9. 2011 na podlagi dejstev, ugotovljenih po nesreči 7. septembra 2011 zrakoplova vrste YAK-42, ki ga je upravljal letalski prevoznik, in izsledkov pregleda letalskega prevoznika, ki so ga 22. 9. 2011 izvedli FATA;
AEROSTARZ (ICAO designator ASE), revocation on 28.10.2011, AVIANOVA (ICAO designator VNV), revocation on 10.10.2011, KAVMINVODYAVIA (ICAO designator MVD) revocation on 27.09.2011 following the results of inspections carried out on these air carriers by FATA on 20.10.2011, 4.10.2011 and 27.09.2011 respectively;
AEROSTARZ (označevalnik ICAO ASE), preklic 28. 10. 2011, AVIANOVA (označevalnik ICAO VNV), preklic 10. 10. 2011, KAVMINVODYAVIA (označevalnik ICAO MVD), preklic 27. 9. 2011 na podlagi izsledkov pregledov teh letalskih prevoznikov, ki so jih opravili FATA 20. 10. 2011, 4. 10. 2011 oz. 27. 9. 2011;
SKY EXPRESS (ICAO designator SXR) revocation on 31.10.2011 following industrial indicators, the financial condition of the air carrier and the results of an inspection carried out on the air carrier by FATA on 6.10.2011;
SKY EXPRESS (označevalnik ICAO SXR), preklic 31. 10. 2011 na podlagi sektorskih kazalnikov, finančnega stanja letalskega prevoznika in izsledkov pregleda letalskega prevoznika, ki so ga 6. 10. 2011 izvedli FATA;
AERORENT (ICAO designator NRO) revocation on 07.11.2011 following no compliance with certification requirements and the results of the inspection carried out by FATA on 27.09.2011;
AERORENT (označevalnik ICAO NRO), preklic 7. 11. 2011 zaradi neupoštevanja neupoštevanju certifikacijskih zahtev in izsledkov pregleda, ki so ga 27. 9. 2011 izvedli FATA;
The following 6 air carriers operating commercial air transport into the Union had their AOCs modified with the imposition of operating restrictions by order of FATA on 2 November 2011:
spričevala naslednjih 6 letalskih prevoznikov, ki opravljajo komercialne zračne prevoze v Unijo, so bila spremenjena na podlagi odloka FATA z dne 2. novembra 2011, ki jim nalaga omejitve pri opravljanju dejavnosti:
AVIASTAR-TU, UTAIR-CARGO, TATARSTAN AIRLINES, DAGHESTAN, YAKUTIA and VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES).
AVIASTAR-TU, UTAIR-CARGO, TATARSTAN AIRLINES, DAGHESTAN, YAKUTIA in VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES).
As regards the performance of certain operators - Yakutia and Tatarstan Airlines- whose operations have been continuously monitored since 2007 and which had been heard by the Commission and members of the Air Safety Committee in April 2008, the Commission drew the attention of FATA to the results of the analysis by EASA of the SAFA ramp checks which indicates that certain airworthiness and operations related weaknesses have not been effectively addressed by previous corrective and remedial actions.
Kar zadeva delovanje določenih letalskih prevoznikov, Yakutia in Tatarstan Airlines, katerih dejavnosti so bile pod neprekinjenim nadzorom od leta 2007 in ki sta bila aprila 2008 zaslišana s strani Komisije in članov Odbora za varnost v zračnem prometu, je Komisija opozorila FATA na izsledke analize EASA preverjanj na ploščadi, opravljenih v okviru programa SAFA, ki kaže, da določene pomanjkljivosti glede plovnosti in opravljanja dejavnosti niso bile v zadostni meri odpravljene s predhodnimi popravnimi ukrepi.
FATA informed that it had requested the competent regional authorities responsible for the oversight of these air carriers to investigate the results of the SAFA inspections and to ensure that appropriate corrective measures were implemented by these air carriers to resolve any detected deficiencies.
FATA so sporočili, da so pristojne regionalne organe, odgovorne za nadzor nad tema letalskima prevoznikoma, zaprosili, naj preučijo izsledke pregledov SAFA in zagotovijo, da ta letalska prevoznika izvedeta ustrezne popravne ukrepe za odpravo ugotovljenih pomanjkljivosti.
Both air carriers were heard by the Air Safety Committee on 8 November 2011 whereby they made presentations showing that they had resolved the findings raised previously during SAFA ramp inspections.
Oba letalska prevoznika sta bila 8. novembra 2011 zaslišana s strani Odbora za varnost v zračnem prometu in sta pripravila predstavitev, s katero sta pokazala, da sta odpravila pomanjkljivosti, ugotovljene med pregledi na ploščadi v okviru SAFA.
Both air carriers stated that they had stopped operations into the Union following the decision of FATA of November 2, 2011.
Oba letalska prevoznika sta izjavila, da sta po sklepu FATA z dne 2. novembra 2011 ustavila opravljanje prevozov v Unijo.
As regards the air carrier VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES), the Commission drew the attention of FATA to two issues which raised concerns about the effective compliance of the air carrier with relevant safety standards, namely the correspondence by the competent authorities of France addressed to FATA following an inspection at a French airport [13] which resulted into numerous significant and serious findings affecting the safety of operations and leading to the grounding of the aircraft and the restriction imposed by these authorities for the return flight (ferry flight) and the revocation on 24 May 2011 of the maintenance approval issued to that air carrier by EASA (EASA 145.0410) following its suspension on 24 September 2010 in view of the failure of VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES) to resolve adequately the findings in accordance with the relevant legislation [14].
Komisija je glede letalskega prevoznika VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES) opozorila FATA na dve vprašanji, ki vzbujata pomisleke glede učinkovitega upoštevanja zadevnih varnostnih standardov s strani letalskega prevoznika in izhajata iz dopisa pristojnih organov Francije, naslovljenega na FATA po pregledu na francoskem letališču [13], s katerim so bile ugotovljene številne velike in resne pomanjkljivosti, ki vplivajo na varnost opravljanja dejavnosti in so bile razlog za prepoved letenja zrakoplova in omejitve, ki so jih ti organi naložili za povratni let, ter preklic 24. maja 2011 odobritve za vzdrževanje, ki jo je temu letalskemu prevozniku izdala EASA (EASA 145.0410), po začasnem preklicu 24. septembra 2010 zaradi neprimerne odprave pomanjkljivosti s strani VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES) v skladu z zadevno zakonodajo [14].
The unresolved findings which led to the revocation of the maintenance approval confirmed deficiencies in the area of airworthiness raised during various SAFA inspections at Union airports [15] notably those affecting undetected defects or damages and known defects or damages left without assessment or monitoring and damages or defected outside acceptable maintenance limits.
Neodpravljene pomanjkljivosti, zaradi katerih je bila preklicana odobritev za vzdrževanje, so potrdile težave na področju plovnosti, ki so bile ugotovljene med različnimi pregledi SAFA na letališčih Unije [15], zlasti tiste v zvezi z neodkritimi napakami ali poškodbami in znanimi napakami ali poškodbami, ki niso bile predmet ocenjevanja ali nadzora, ter napakami ali poškodbami zunaj sprejemljivih omejitev vzdrževanja.
During its presentation in the Air Safety Committee VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES) did not show that the air carrier has in place a functioning safety management system which ensures that the operator is capable of correctly identifying, evaluating, managing and controlling risks in an appropriate manner to ensure that it operates safely.
Med predstavitvijo v Odboru za varnost v zračnem prometu VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES) ni pokazal, da ima vzpostavljen delujoč sistem za upravljanje varnosti, ki zagotavlja, da je prevoznik zmožen pravilno ugotavljati, oceniti, upravljati in nadzirati tveganje za zagotovitev varnega opravljanja dejavnosti.
VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES) stated that it had stopped operations into the Union following the decision of FATA of November 2, 2011.
VIM AVIA (VIM AIRLINES) je izjavil, da je po sklepu FATA z dne 2. novembra 2011 ustavil opravljanje prevozov v Unijo.
In the light of this information the Commission was compelled to request urgent clarifications from FATA with a view to receiving assurances that the various enforcement measures (revocation of AOCs and imposition of operating restrictions) vis-à-vis Russian air carriers were effectively complied with.
Na podlagi teh informacij je bila Komisija prisiljena od FATA zahtevati takojšnje pojasnilo za pridobitev zagotovila, da se različni izvršilni ukrepi (preklic spričevala in omejitve pri opravljanju dejavnosti) v zvezi z ruskimi letalskimi prevozniki učinkovito izvajajo.