natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The labels shall bear the following text: “MACHINE No … (sequence of machines) OF … (total number of machines in respective power band) WITH ENGINE No … WITH TYPE-APPROVAL (Dir. 97/68/EC) No …”;
Oznake vsebujejo naslednje besedilo: „STROJ ŠT. … (serija strojev) OD … (skupno število strojev v posamezni kategoriji moči motorja) Z MOTORJEM št. … S HOMOLOGACIJO (Direktiva 97/68/ES) št. …“;
a sample of the supplementary label to be affixed on the engine bearing the text referred to in Section 2.2.
vzorec dodatne oznake, ki se pritrdi na motor, z besedilom iz oddelka 2.2.
The OEM shall provide the approval authority with any necessary information connected with the implementation of the flexibility scheme that the approval authority may request in order to make a decision.
Proizvajalec originalne opreme homologacijskemu organu predloži vse potrebne informacije o izvajanju sistema prožnosti, ki jih homologacijski organ lahko zahteva za sprejetje odločitve.
The OEM shall provide any requesting approval authority in the Member States with any information that the approval authority requires in order to confirm that engines claimed to be, or labelled as being, placed on the market under the flexibility scheme are properly so claimed or labelled.’.
Proizvajalec originalne opreme vsakemu homologacijskemu organu v državah članicah na zahtevo predloži vse informacije, ki jih ta organ zahteva, da potrdi, ali so motorji, dani na trg v okviru sistema prožnosti, ustrezno označeni.“
Directive 2011/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
Direktiva 2011/89/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta
amending Directives 98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2006/48/EC and 2009/138/EC as regards the supplementary supervision of financial entities in a financial conglomerate
o spremembah direktiv 98/78/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2006/48/ES in 2009/138/ES glede dopolnilnega nadzora finančnih subjektov v finančnem konglomeratu
Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate [3] provides competent authorities in the financial sector with supplementary powers and tools for the supervision of groups composed of many regulated entities, which are active in different sectors of the financial markets.
Direktiva 2002/87/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. decembra 2002 o dopolnilnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij, zavarovalnic in investicijskih družb v finančnem konglomeratu [3] pristojnim organom v finančnem sektorju zagotavlja dopolnilna pooblastila in orodja za nadzor skupin, sestavljenih iz veliko reguliranih subjektov, ki so aktivni v različnih sektorjih finančnih trgov.
Such groups (financial conglomerates), are exposed to risks (group risks) which include: the risks of contagion, where risks spread from one end of the group to another; risk concentration, where the same type of risk materialises in various parts of the group at the same time; the complexity of managing many different legal entities; potential conflicts of interest; and the challenge of allocating regulatory capital to all the regulated entities which are part of the financial conglomerate, thereby avoiding the multiple use of capital.
Te skupine (finančni konglomerati), so tako izpostavljene tveganjem (tveganja skupine), ki zajemajo: tveganje medsebojnih negativnih vplivov, ki vključuje širjenje tveganj z enega dela skupine na drugega; koncentracijo tveganj, kjer se istočasno uresničuje ista vrsta tveganja v različnih delih skupine; zapletenost upravljanja več različnih pravnih subjektov in morebitna navzkrižja interesov ter izziv dodeljevanja regulatornega kapitala vsem reguliranim subjektom, ki so del finančnega konglomerata, ob preprečevanju večkratne uporabe kapitala.
Financial conglomerates should therefore be subject to supervision supplementary to supervision on a stand alone, consolidated or group basis, without duplicating or affecting the group and regardless of the legal structure of the group.
Dopolnilni nadzor se mora v finančnih konglomeratih uporabljati poleg nadzora na posamični osnovi, konsolidirani ali skupinski osnovi, brez podvajanja ali vplivanja na skupino, ne glede na pravno strukturo skupine.
It is appropriate to ensure consistency between the aims of Directive 2002/87/EC, on the one hand, and Council Directives 73/239/EEC [4] and 92/49/EEC [5] and Directives 98/78/EC [6], 2002/83/EC [7], 2004/39/EC [8], 2005/68/EC [9], 2006/48/EC [10], 2006/49/EC [11], 2009/65/EC [12], 2009/138/EC [13] and 2011/61/EU [14] of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the other, in order to enable appropriate supplementary supervision of insurance and banking groups, including where they are part of a mixed financial holding structure.
Primerno je zagotoviti skladnost med cilji Direktive 2002/87/ES na eni strani in direktiv Sveta 73/239/EGS [4] in 92/49/EGS [5] ter direktiv 98/78/ES [6], 2002/83/ES [7], 2004/39/ES [8], 2005/68/ES [9], 2006/48ES [10], 2006/49/ES [11], 2009/65/ES [12], 2009/138/ES [13] in 2011/61/EU [14] Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta na drugi strani, da se omogoči ustrezen dopolnilen nadzor zavarovalnih in bančnih skupin, tudi kadar so del strukture mešanega finančnega holdinga.
It is necessary that financial conglomerates are identified throughout the Union according to the extent to which they are exposed to group risks, on the basis of common guidelines to be issued by the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [15] (EBA), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [16] (EIOPA) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [17] (ESMA) in accordance with Article 56 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, through the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (Joint Committee).
Finančni konglomerati morajo biti prepoznani po celotni Uniji glede na obseg izpostavljenosti tveganjem skupine, na podlagi skupnih smernic, ki jih bodo izdali Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski bančni organ), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [15], (EBA), Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1094/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [16], (EIOPA) in Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1095/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta [17], (ESMA) v skladu s členom 56 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010, Uredbe (EU) št. 1094/2010 in Uredbe (EU) št. 1095/2010 in v sodelovanju s Skupnim odborom evropskih nadzornih organov (Skupni odbor).
It is also important that the requirements regarding the waiving of the application of supplementary supervision are applied in a risk-based manner in accordance with those guidelines.
Pomembno je tudi, da so zahteve v zvezi z opustitvijo uporabe dopolnilnega nadzora uporabljene na podlagi tveganja v skladu s temi smernicami.
This is of particular importance in the case of the larger, internationally operating financial conglomerates.
To je še posebej pomembno v primeru večjih mednarodnih finančnih konglomeratov.
The comprehensive and adequate monitoring of group risks in large, complex, internationally operating financial conglomerates, as well as the supervision of the group-wide capital policies of such groups, is only possible when competent authorities gather supervisory information and plan supervisory measures beyond the national scope of their mandate.
Celovito in ustrezno spremljanje tveganja skupine v velikih, zapletenih, mednarodnih finančnih konglomeratih ter nadzor njihovih politik glede kapitala na ravni skupine sta možna samo, če pristojni organi zberejo nadzorne informacije in načrtujejo nadzorne ukrepe, ki presegajo nacionalno področje uporabe njihovega mandata.
It is therefore necessary that competent authorities coordinate supplementary supervision on internationally operating financial conglomerates among the competent authorities which are regarded as most relevant for the supplementary supervision of a financial conglomerate.
Zato je pomembno, da pristojni organi usklajujejo dopolnilni nadzor mednarodnih finančnih konglomeratov med pristojnimi organi, ki se štejejo za najustreznejše za dopolnilni nadzor konglomerata.
The colleges of financial conglomerates’ relevant competent authorities should act in accordance with the supplementary nature of Directive 2002/87/EC, and as such should not duplicate or replace but should, rather, add value to the activities of existing colleges relevant to the banking and insurance subgroups within those financial conglomerates.
Kolegij ustreznih pristojnih organov finančnega konglomerata bi moral delovati v skladu z dopolnilno naravo Direktive 2002/87/ES in kot tak ne bi smel podvajati ali nadomeščati, temveč dodati vrednost obstoječim kolegijem za bančno in zavarovalno podskupino v finančnem konglomeratu.
A college should be set up for a financial conglomerate only where neither a banking nor an insurance sectoral college is in place.
Kolegij finančnega konglomerata bi se moral ustanoviti le, kadar kolegij ne obstaja ne v bančnem ne v zavarovalnem sektorju.
In order to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight, it is necessary that the legal structure and the governance and organisational structure, including all regulated entities, non-regulated subsidiaries and significant branches of banks, insurance undertakings and financial conglomerates with cross-border activities, are monitored by EBA, EIOPA, ESMA (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘the ESAs’) and the Joint Committee, as appropriate, and that information is made available to the relevant competent authorities.
Da bi zagotovili ustrezen regulativni nadzor, morajo pravno strukturo ter upravljanje in organizacijsko strukturo, vključno z vsemi reguliranimi osebami, nereguliranimi hčerinskimi podjetji in pomembnimi podružnicami bank, zavarovalnic in finančnih konglomeratov s čezmejnimi dejavnostmi, po potrebi nadzorovati organi EBA, EIOPA, ESMA (v nadaljnjem besedilu skupaj: „ESA“) ter Skupni odbor, informacije pa morajo biti na voljo ustreznim pristojnim organom.
In order to ensure effective supplementary supervision of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate, in particular where the head office of one of its subsidiaries is in a third country, the undertakings to which this Directive applies should include any undertaking, in particular any credit institution which has its registered office in a third country and which would require authorisation if its registered office were in the Union.
Da se zagotovi učinkovit dodaten nadzor nad reguliranimi subjekti v finančnem konglomeratu, zlasti kadar je sedež ene od podrejenih družb v tretji državi, bi med podjetja, za katera se uporablja ta direktiva, morala soditi vsa podjetja, predvsem kreditne institucije, ki imajo registriran sedež v tretji državi in za katera bi bilo potrebno dovoljenje, če bi imela registriran sedež v Uniji.
The supplementary supervision of large, complex, internationally operating financial conglomerates requires coordination throughout the Union, in order to contribute to the stability of the internal market for financial services.
Da dopolnilni nadzor velikih, zapletenih, mednarodnih finančnih konglomeratov prispeva k stabilnosti notranjega trga za finančne storitve, je potrebno usklajevanje po vsej Uniji.
To that end, competent authorities need to agree upon the supervisory approaches to be applied to those financial conglomerates.
V ta namen se morajo pristojni organi dogovoriti glede nadzornih pristopov, ki se uporabljajo pri teh finančnih konglomeratih.
The ESAs should issue, in accordance with Article 56 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, through the Joint Committee, common guidelines for those common supervisory approaches, thus ensuring a comprehensive prudential framework of the supervisory tools and powers available in the banking, insurance, securities and financial conglomerates directives.
Evropski nadzorni organi bi morali v skladu s členom 56 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010, Uredbe (EU) št. 1094/2010 in Uredbe (EU) št. 1095/2010 v sodelovanju s Skupnim odborom izdati skupne smernice za skupne pristope in tako zagotoviti celovit preudarni okvir nadzornih orodij in pooblastil, ki so na voljo v skladu z direktivami na področju bančništva, zavarovalništva, vrednostnih papirjev in finančnih konglomeratov.
The guidelines provided for in Directive 2002/87/EC should reflect the supplementary nature of supervision thereunder, and complement the sector-specific supervision as provided for by Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 98/78/EC, 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC, 2009/138/EC and 2011/61/EU.
Smernice, ki se bodo izdale, kakor je določeno v Direktivi 2002/87/ES, bi morale odražati dopolnilno naravo navedene direktive in dopolnjevati sektorski nadzor, kakor je navedeno v direktivah 73/239/EGS, 92/49/EGS, 98/78/ES, 2002/83/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES, 2009/138/ES in 2011/61/EU.
There is a genuine need to monitor and control potential group risks, posed to the financial conglomerate, arising from participations in other companies.
Obstaja pristna potreba po spremljanju in nadzoru morebitnih tveganj skupine, ki jim je izpostavljen finančni konglomerat in so posledica sodelovanja z drugimi podjetji.
For those cases where the specific supervisory powers provided for by Directive 2002/87/EC appear to be insufficient, the supervisory community should develop alternative methods to address and appropriately take into account these risks, preferably by work conducted by the ESAs through the Joint Committee.
Za primere, kadar se posebna nadzorna pooblastila iz Direktive 2002/87/ES zdijo nezadostna, bi morala nadzorna skupnost razviti alternativne metode reševanja in ustreznega upoštevanja teh tveganj, po možnosti z delom, ki ga izvajajo ESA v Skupnem odboru.
If a participation is the only element of identification of a financial conglomerate, supervisors should be allowed to assess whether the group is exposed to group risks and waive the need for supplementary supervision, if appropriate.
Če je udeležba edini element identifikacije finančnega konglomerata, bi morali imeti nadzorniki možnost oceniti, ali je skupina izpostavljena tveganjem skupine in opustiti dopolnilni nadzor skupine, če je ustrezno.
With regard to certain group structures, supervisors have been left without powers in the current crisis since the regimes provided for in the relevant directives have forced them to choose either sector-specific or supplementary supervision.
Pri nekaterih strukturah skupin nadzorniki v trenutni krizi niso imeli nobenih pooblastil, saj so zaradi ureditev v ustreznih direktivah morali izbirati med sektorskim ali dopolnilnim nadzorom.
While a complete review of Directive 2002/87/EC should be undertaken in the context of the G20 work on financial conglomerates, the necessary supervisory powers should be provided for as soon as possible.
Čeprav bi bilo treba celoten pregled Direktive 2002/87/ES opraviti v povezavi z delom G20 na področju finančnih konglomeratov, pa je treba čim prej zagotoviti potrebna nadzorna pooblastila.
It is appropriate to ensure consistency between the aims of Directive 2002/87/EC and Directive 98/78/EC.
Primerno je, da se zagotovi skladnost med cilji direktiv 2002/87/ES in 98/78/ES.
Directive 98/78/EC should therefore be amended to define and include mixed financial holding companies.
Zato bi bilo treba Direktivo 98/78/ES spremeniti tako, da bo opredeljevala in vključevala mešane finančne holdinge.
In order to ensure timely coherent supervision, Directive 98/78/EC should be amended, notwithstanding the imminent application of Directive 2009/138/EC, which should be amended to the same effect.
Za zagotovitev pravočasnega doslednega nadzora bi bilo treba Direktivo 98/78/ES spremeniti, ne glede na to, da se bo kmalu začela uporabljati Direktiva 2009/138/ES, ki bi jo bilo treba spremeniti iz istih razlogov.
While stress testing should occur regularly for the banking and insurance subgroups of a financial conglomerate, it is the role of the coordinator appointed in accordance with Directive 2002/87/EC to decide the appropriateness, parameters and timing of a stress test for an individual financial conglomerate as a whole.
Čeprav bi bilo treba teste izjemnih situacij v bančnih in zavarovalniških podskupinah finančnega konglomerata izvajati redno, je naloga koordinatorja, imenovanega v skladu z Direktivo 2002/87/ES, odločiti ustreznost, parametre in trenutek izvedbe testa izjemnih situacij za posamezni finančni konglomerat kot celoto.
For Union-wide stress tests, carried out by the ESAs in a sector-specific context, the role of the Joint Committee should be to ensure that such stress tests occur in a consistent manner across sectors.
Pri testih izjemnih situacij, ki potekajo po vsej Uniji in jih izvajajo ESA v posameznem sektorju, bi morala biti naloga Skupnega odbora zagotoviti, da se testi dosledno izvajajo po vseh sektorjih.
For these reasons, the ESAs, through the Joint Committee, should be able to develop supplementary parameters for Union-wide stress tests, capturing the specific group risks that typically materialise in financial conglomerates and should be able to publish the results of those tests, where permitted by sectoral legislation.
Zaradi tega bi morali imeti ESA prek Skupnega odbora možnost, da za teste izjemnih situacij, ki potekajo po vsej Uniji, razvijejo dodatne parametre, s katerimi zajamejo posebna tveganja skupine, ki se običajno pojavijo v finančnih konglomeratih, ter možnost, da objavijo rezultate navedenih testov, kadar to dopušča sektorska zakonodaja.
Experience from previous Union-wide stress tests should be taken into account.
Upoštevati bi se morale izkušnje, pridobljene pri prejšnjih testih izjemnih situacij po vsej Uniji.
For example, stress tests should take account of liquidity and solvency risks of financial conglomerates.
Testi izjemnih situacij bi morali denimo upoštevati tveganje likvidnosti in solventnosti finančnih konglomeratov.
The Commission should further develop a coherent and conclusive system of supervision of financial conglomerates.
Komisija bi morala nadalje razviti skladen in dokončni sistem nadzorovanja finančnih konglomeratov.
The upcoming complete review of Directive 2002/87/EC should cover non-regulated entities, in particular special purpose vehicles, and should develop a risk-based application of the waivers available to supervisors in determining a financial conglomerate while limiting the use of such waivers.
Prihodnji celotni pregled Direktive 2002/87/ES bi moral zajemati neregulirane osebe, zlasti namenske družbe, in razviti na tveganju temelječo uporabo opustitev, ki so na voljo nadzornikom pri opredelitvi finančnih konglomeratov, hkrati pa zmanjšati njihovo uporabo.
The Commission should consider proposing regulatory action in this field.
Komisija bi morala razmisliti tudi o predlogu regulativnih ukrepov na tem področju.
It is appropriate to ensure consistency between the aims of Directive 2002/87/EC and Directive 2006/48/EC.
Primerno je, da se zagotovi skladnost med cilji Direktive 2002/87/ES in Direktive 2006/48/ES.
Directive 2006/48/EC should therefore be amended to define and include mixed financial holding companies.
Zaradi tega bi bilo treba Direktivo 2006/48/ES spremeniti, da bo opredeljevala in vključevala mešane finančne holdinge.
The restored availability of powers at the mixed financial holding company level implies that certain provisions of Directives 98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2006/48/EC or 2009/138/EC apply simultaneously at that level.
Vnovična razpoložljivost pooblastil na ravni mešanih finančnih holdingov pomeni, da se na tej ravni hkrati uporabljajo nekatere določbe direktiv 98/78/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2006/48/ES ali 2009/138/ES.
Those provisions may be equivalent to each other, especially as regards the qualitative elements of the supervisory review processes.
Te določbe so lahko enakovredne, zlasti kar zadeva kakovostne elemente postopkov nadzornih pregledov.
For example, identical fit and proper requirements for the management of holding companies are provided for by Directives 98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2006/48/EC and 2009/138/EC.
Identične zahteve po spodobnosti in primernosti uprave holdingov so na primer navedene v direktivah 98/78/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2006/48/ES in 2009/138/ES.
To avoid an overlap between those provisions and to ensure the effectiveness of top-level supervision, supervisors should be able to apply a particular provision only once, while complying with the equivalent provision in all other applicable directives.
Da bi se izognili prekrivanju takšnih določb in zagotovili učinkovit nadzor na najvišji ravni, bi morali nadzorniki imeti možnost, da posamezno določbo uporabijo le enkrat, obenem pa upoštevajo enakovredne določbe vseh drugih veljavnih direktiv.
Where provisions do not have identical wording, they should be regarded as equivalent if they are similar in substance, in particular in terms of risk-based supervision.
Kadar besedilo določb ni identično, bi jih bilo treba šteti kot enakovredne, kadar so si podobne po vsebini, zlasti pri nadzoru na osnovi tveganja.
When assessing equivalence, supervisors should check, within colleges, whether, in regard to each applicable directive, the scope is covered and the objectives are achieved, without lowering supervisory standards.
Nadzorniki bi morali pri presoji o enakovrednosti določb v okviru kolegija preveriti, ali je upoštevano področje uporabe in ali so izpolnjeni cilji vsake od veljavnih direktiv, ne da bi pri tem znižali nadzorne standarde.
It should be possible for equivalence assessments to evolve in the course of changing supervisory frameworks and practices.
Pri presojah o enakovrednosti bi morala obstajati možnost, da se razvijajo med spreminjanjem nadzornih okvirov in praks.
Equivalence assessments should therefore be subject to an open, evolutionary process.
Zato morajo biti del odprtega razvojnega procesa.
That process should allow for case-by-case solutions so that all the relevant features of a particular group are taken into account.
Ta proces bi moral omogočati uporabo vsakega primera posebej in pri tem upoštevati vse pomembne značilnosti posamezne skupine.
To ensure consistency within the supervisory framework for a particular group and to obtain a level playing field among all financial conglomerates within the Union, appropriate supervisory cooperation is necessary.
Ustrezno sodelovanje pri nadzoru je ključno za to, da bi po eni strani zagotovili usklajen nadzorni okvir v posamezni skupini, po drugi strani pa enake konkurenčne pogoje vsem finančnim konglomeratom v Uniji.
To that end, the ESAs, through the Joint Committee, should develop guidelines aimed at the convergence of equivalence assessments and work towards issuing binding technical standards.
ESA bi morali v ta namen prek Skupnega odbora pripraviti smernice, namenjene konvergenci ocen o enakovrednosti, in si prizadevati za izdajo zavezujočih tehničnih standardov.
In order to improve the supplementary supervision of financial entities in a financial conglomerate, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should be delegated to the Commission in respect of technical adaptations to be made to Directive 2002/87/EC as regards the definitions, the alignment of terminology and the calculation methods set out in that Directive.
Da bi izboljšali dopolnilni nadzor finančnih subjektov v finančnem konglomeratu, bi bilo treba na Komisijo prenesti pooblastila, da v skladu s členom 290 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije sprejme akte v zvezi s tehnično prilagoditvijo Direktive 2002/87/ES glede opredelitev pojmov, uskladitve terminologije in metod računanja, določenih v navedeni direktivi.