natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This definition has in any event the sole purpose of limiting the temporal scope of recovery of incompatible aid, and is therefore of no utility at this stage of the assessment.
Edini namen te opredelitve je omejitev časovnega okvira za vračilo nezdružljive pomoči in se zato ne uporablja na tej stopnji ocene.
And therefore the Commission does not need to examine the legal arguments put forward by Alcoa to substantiate this conclusion (see recitals 95 and 96 above).
Zato Komisiji ni treba preučiti pravnih utemeljitev, ki jih je družba Alcoa predložila, da utemelji ta sklep (glej uvodni izjavi 95 in 96 zgoraj).
Judgment in Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium v Commission [2006] ECR I-5479.
Sodba v združenih zadevah C-182/03 in C-217/03, Belgija proti Komisiji, ZOdl. 2006, str. I-5479.
See footnote 48.
Glej opombo 48.
A distinction must be made between the general assessment criteria set out in the Alumix decision and the application of those criteria to a material case.
Razlikovati je treba med splošnimi merili za oceno iz odločbe Alumix in uporabo teh meril v dejanskem primeru.
The general criteria of the Alumix decision hold that, in the absence of alternative market outlets and in order to avoid aggravating a situation of overcapacity, a rational electricity supplier will sell electricity to its best customers at a price covering its marginal costs of production, plus a small contribution to fixed costs.
Splošna merila iz odločbe Alumix predvidevajo, da bo v primeru neobstoja alternativnih prodajnih možnosti in z namenom preprečiti poslabšanje presežne zmogljivosti razumen dobavitelj električne energije prodal električno energijo svojim najboljšim odjemalcem po ceni, ki pokriva njegove mejne stroške proizvodnje z majhnim prispevkom k fiksnim stroškom.
These general criteria remain valid irrespective of the temporal scope of the decision in which they were laid down, and the Commission has no intention of questioning them here.
Ta splošna merila ostajajo veljavna ne glede na časovni okvir odločbe, v kateri so določena, pri čemer jih Komisija na tem mestu ne namerava obravnavati.
See footnote 40.
Glej opombo 40.
Paragraph 105 states: ‘it is very clear both from the application, which states that the tariff that the applicant’s plants paid was authorised by the 1995 Decree-Law, and the very wording of that Decree-Law that the privatisation of [Alumix] requires the support of the Italian Government … in order to define an energy tariff [for the two plants] with ENEL, possibly by agreeing on a future long-term contract (10 years) at prices that are competitive at the European level and that the manner of handling the excess charges [sovrapprezzi] laid down in [IPC decision No 13/92]… is abolished from 31 December 2005 onwards’.
V točki 105 je navedeno: „glede na vlogo, v kateri je navedeno, da se je cena, ki so jo plačevale tovarne pritožnika, odobrila na podlagi zakonskega odloka iz leta 1995, in samo besedilo tega zakonskega odloka je jasno, da je,za privatizacijo [družbe Alumix] potrebna podpora italijanske vlade …, da se z družbo ENEL določi cena električne energije [za dve tovarni], po možnosti z dogovorom o prihodnji dolgoročni pogodbi (10 let) glede cen, ki so konkurenčne na evropski ravni‘, in da se ‚način obračunavanja presežnih stroškov [‚sovrapprezzi‘] iz [odločba IPC št. 13/92] … odpravi z 31. decembrom 2005’“.
Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Joined Cases T-127/99, T-129/99 and T-148/99 Diputación Foral de Álava and others v Commission [2002] ECR II-1275, paragraph 175, cited in paragraph 114 of the Court’s judgment.
Sodba Sodišča prve stopnje v združenih zadevah T-127/99, T-129/99 in T-148/99, Diputación Foral de Álava in drugi proti Komisiji, Recueil 2002, str. II-1275, točka 175, navedeno v točki 114 sodbe Sodišča.
Joined Cases C-15/98 and C-105/99 [2000] ECR I 8855, paragraph 74 of the Opinion.
Združeni zadevi C-15/98 in C-105/99, Recueil 2000, str. I-8855, točka 74 mnenja.
Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraph 111: ‘Accordingly, it is only where the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme that the latter is transformed into a new aid scheme.
Sodba Sodišča prve stopnje v združenih zadevah T-195/01 in T-207/01, Vlada Gibraltarja proti Komisiji, Recueil 2002, str. II-2309, točka 111: „Prvotna shema [se] spremeni v novo shemo pomoči samo takrat, ko sprememba vsebinsko vpliva na prvotno shemo.
There can be no question of such a substantive alteration where the new element is clearly severable from the initial scheme’.
Vsebinske spremembe ni, ko se nova prvina lahko jasno loči od prvotne sheme“.
See judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-86/89 Italy v Commission [1990] ECR I-3891; Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, paragraph 50.
Recueil 1990, str. I-3891; zadeva C-301/87, Francija proti Komisiji, Recueil 1990, str. I-307, točka 50.
See judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-459/93 Siemens v Commission [1995] ECR II-1675, paragraph 48.
Zadeva T-459/93, Recueil 1995, str. II-1675, točka 48.
OJ C 37, 3.2.2001, p. 3, and OJ C 82, 1.4.2008, p. 1.
UL C 37, 3.2.2001, str. 3, in UL C 82, 1.4.2008, str. 1.
Source: Indagine conoscitiva sullo stato della liberalizzazione dei settori dell’energia elettrica e del gas naturale, May 2005.
Vir: Indagine conoscitiva sullo stato della liberalizzazione dei settori dell’energia elettrica e del gas naturale, maj 2005.
Sardinia is currently connected to mainland Italy via a 270 MWh interconnector (SACOI).
Sardinija je zdaj povezana s celinsko Italijo s povezovalnim daljnovodom zmogljivosti 270 MWh (SACOI).
See footnote 43.
Glej opombo 43.
The HHI index in Sardinia varies between 3000 and 3500.
Indeks HHI na Sardiniji je med 3000 in 3500.
In the South zone, however, the HHI is higher.
Vendar je na severnem delu indeks HHI višji.
For example, in 2007 the average wholesale price in Italy (for baseload power on the day-ahead market) on IPEX (Italy’s electricity exchange) was EUR 70,99 per MW/h compared with EUR 37,97 on Germany’s EEX exchange and EUR 40,78 on France’s Powernext exchange.
Leta 2007 je bila na primer povprečna veleprodajna cena v Italiji (za osnovno obremenitev na dnevnem trgu) na borzi IPEX (italijanska borza električne energije) 70,99 EUR/MWh v primerjavi s 37,97 EUR na nemški borzi EEX in 40,78 EUR na francoski borzi Powernext.
2008 Report of the AEEG, based on data from the GME (Gestore del Mercato Elettrico).
Poročilo AEEG iz leta 2008, ki temelji na podatkih družbe GME (Gestore del Mercato Elettrico).
Even supposing that average prices in the EU increase by less than 4 %, the tariff advantage for Alcoa would still increase in absolute terms.
Tudi če predvidevamo, da se povprečne cene v EU povečajo za manj kot 4 %, bi se cenovna ugodnost za družbo Alcoa v absolutnem smislu vseeno povečala.
For example, if the Alcoa price was EUR 30 and the average electricity price in Europe was EUR 60 (advantage: EUR 30), a 3 % increase would mean an Alcoa price of EUR 30,9 versus an average European price of EUR 61,8 (new advantage: EUR 30,9).
Če bi bila na primer cena za družbo Alcoa 30 EUR in bi bila povprečna cena električne energije v Evropi 60 EUR (prednost: 30 EUR), bi 3-odstotno povečanje pomenilo, da bi bila cena za družbo Alcoa 30,9 EUR, povprečna evropska cena pa 61,8 EUR (nova prednost: 30,9 EUR).
For example, in the Third Report of February 2007, the High Level Group states ‘Against this background, the use of incentives, including general purpose subsidies and state aids can be justified as a policy instrument.
Skupina na visoki ravni na primer v tretjem poročilu iz februarja 2007 navaja: „Na tej podlagi se lahko uporaba spodbud, vključno s splošnimi subvencijami in državnimi pomočmi, utemelji kot instrument politike.
They may promote responsible social and environmental behaviour, regional cohesion, sustainable development and cultural diversity.
S spodbudami se lahko spodbujajo odgovorno socialno in okoljsko vedenje, regijska kohezija, trajnostni razvoj in kulturna raznolikost.
However, they should only be used where there is a clear market failure, where subsidies prove to be the appropriate instrument for meeting a well defined common interest objective, and when they do not distort competition or harm the environment… Action is justified when such subsidies undermine other policy objectives such as fighting climate change, the Lisbon Strategy for Jobs and Growth, proper functioning of energy markets, or access to raw materials, without meetingtheir initial objective.’
Vendar se lahko uporabijo le v primeru jasnega nedelovanja trga, kadar se izkaže, da so subvencije primerno sredstvo za izpolnjevanje dobro opredeljenega cilja v skupnem interesu in kadar ne izkrivljajo konkurence ali škodijo okolju.
(http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/environment/hlg/doc_07:third_report_27_02_2007.pdf).
Ukrepanje je upravičeno, kadar take subvencije ogrožajo druge politične cilje, kot je boj proti podnebnim spremembam, lizbonska strategija za rast in delovna mesta, ustrezno delovanje energetskih trgov ali dostop do surovin, pri čemer ne izpolnjujejo svojega prvotnega cilja.“ (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/environment/hlg/doc_07:third_report_27_02_2007.pdf).
Commission Decision of 20 November 2007 on the State aid C 36/A/06 implemented by Italy in favour of ThyssenKrupp, Cementir and Nuova Terni Industrie Chimiche, paragraphs 144 and 145.
Odločba Komisije z dne 20. novembra 2007 o državni pomoči C 36/A/2006 Italije za ThyssenKrupp, Cementir in Nuova Terni Industrie Chimiche, odstavka 144 in 145.
The letter read: ‘We would like to emphasise that it should be clear to all that the gradual withdrawal must be strictly limited to the time required for the VPP to take effect (which we calculate to be around two years) and will be subject to the “one time, last time” condition ’.
V dopisu je navedeno: „Radi bi poudarili, da mora biti vsem jasno, da mora biti postopna odprava strogo omejena na obdobje, ki je potrebno za začetek delovanja virtualne elektrarne (ki naj bi bilo po naših izračunih okrog dve leti), pri čemer bo veljal pogoj enkratnosti pomoči.“
The VPP provides for the release of virtual generation capacity by dominant operators within the framework of contract award procedures.
Z virtualno elektrarno se zagotovi, da prevladujoči dobavitelji sprostijo virtualno proizvodno zmogljivost na podlagi postopkov oddaje javnih naročil.
VPPs are commonly used to promote competition in the wholesale market, insofar as they remove the incentive for the dominant operator to use its market power to maintain prices at a high level in the spot and futures markets.
Virtualne elektrarne se običajno uporabljajo za spodbujanje konkurence na veleprodajnem trgu, ker odpravljajo spodbujanje prevladujočega dobavitelja, da uporabi svojo tržno moč za ohranitev visokih cen na trgu za promptne nakupe in terminskem trgu.
The price paid by the purchaser from the VPP consists of a strike price which typically reflect the variable costs of the generating capacity concerned, plus a premium which is set under the terms of the procurement rules.
Cena, ki jo plača kupec v primeru virtualnih elektrarn, vključuje izvršilno ceno, ki običajno zajema spremenljive stroške zadevne proizvodne zmogljivosti, skupaj s premijo, ki se določi v skladu s pravili o javnih naročilih.
Using the following reasoning: ‘Other undertakings located on the mainland do not appear to be in the same exceptional market circumstances that prevail in Sardinia.
Utemeljitev je bila: „Druga podjetja na celini naj ne bi bila v enakih izjemnih tržnih okoliščinah, ki prevladujejo na Sardiniji.
The Directorate-General for Competition is of the opinion that there is no reason to derogate from the principles on State aid’.
Generalni direktorat za konkurenco meni, da ni razloga za odstopanje od načel o državni pomoči.“
The VPP takes the form of a contract which grants the automatic right to its purchaser to obtain the difference, when positive, between the price paid to generators in Sardinia in the day ahead market and the strike price.
Virtualna elektrarna ima obliko pogodbe, na podlagi katere je kupec samodejno upravičen, da v primeru pozitivne razlike med ceno, ki se plača proizvajalcem na Sardiniji na dnevnem trgu in izvršilno ceno, pridobi to razliko.
The purchaser pays the vendor the premium fixed by the contract awards procedure and receives from the vendor the difference, when positive, between the price on the day-ahead market and the strike price.
Kupec plača prodajalcu premijo, ki je določena s postopkom oddaje naročila, in od prodajalca prejme razliko med ceno na dnevnem trgu in izvršilno ceno, če je ta razlika pozitivna.
To this end, the Commission has based itself on the analysis made by the AEEG in its reports.
Komisija je v zvezi s tem upoštevala analizo iz poročil AEEG.
Judgments of the Court of Justice in Case C-24/95 Alcan Deutschland [1997] ECR I-1591, paragraphs 25, 30 and 31, and in Joined Cases C-183/02 P and C-187/02 Demesa and Territorio histórico de Álava v Commission [2004] ECR I-10609, paragraph 45.
Sodbe Sodišča v zadevi C-24/95, Alcan Deutschland, Recueil 1997, str. I-1591, točke 25, 30 in 31, ter v združenih zadevah C-183/02 P in C-187/02, Demesa in Territorio histórico de Álava proti Komisiji, ZOdl. 2004, str. I-10609, točka 45.
Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-5/89 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-3437, paragraph 16.
Sodba Sodišča v zadevi C-5/89, Nemčija proti Komisiji, Recueil 1990, str. I-3437, točka 16.
See the judgments in Case C-78/77, Lührs [1978] ECR I-169, paragraph 6; Case C-265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens v Commission [1987] ECR I-1155, paragraph 44; and Case T-489/93 Unifruit Hellas v Commission, [1994] ECR II-1201, paragraph 51.
Glej sodbe v zadevi C-78/77, Lührs, Recueil 1978, str I-169, točka 6; zadevi C-265/85, Van den Bergh en Jurgens proti Komisiji, Recueil 1987, str. I-1155, točka 44; in zadevi T-489/93, Unifruit Hellas proti Komisiji, Recueil 1994, str. II-1201, točka 51.
See the Judgments in Case C-265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens v Commission Ibid., paragraph 44; Case C-152/88 Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477, paragraph 26; Case T-290/97 Mehibas Dordtselaan v Commission [2000] ECR II-15, paragraph 59; and Case T-223/00 Kyowa Hakko Kogyo v Commission [2003] ECR II-2553, paragraph 51.
Glej sodbe v zadevi C-265/85, Van den Bergh en Jurgens proti Komisiji, Recueil 1987, str. I-1155, točka 44; zadevi C-152/88, Sofrimport proti Komisiji, Recueil 1990, str. I-2477, točka 26; zadevi T-290/97, Mehibas Dordtselaan proti Komisiji, Recueil 2000, str. II-15, točka 59; in zadevi T-223/00, Kyowa Hakko Kogyo proti Komisiji, Recueil 2003, str. II-2553, točka 51.
See footnote 51.
Glej opombo 50.
The Commission does not possess the data required to carry out an exact calculation of this amount.
Komisija nima potrebnih podatkov za natančen izračun tega zneska.
In the Terni case, the preferential tariff, which was also prolonged by Article 11(11) of Law No 80/2005 was calculated, financed and paid out in substantially the same way as for Alcoa (albeit with a different end-price for the beneficiaries).
V zadevi Terni se je ugodnejša cena, ki se je prav tako podaljšala v skladu s členom 11(11) zakona št. 80/2005, izračunala, financirala in izplačala na zelo podoben način kot za družbo Alcoa (čeprav so imeli upravičenci drugačno končno ceno).
Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-148/04 Unicredito [2005] ECR I-11137.
Sodba Sodišča v zadevi C-148/04, Unicredito, ZOdl. 2005, str. I-11137.
By letter dated 23 December 2005, the Commission asked for additional information, which was provided by the Italian authorities by letter dated 3 March 2006.
Komisija je z dopisom z dne 23. decembra 2005 pozvala Italijo, naj predloži dodatna pojasnila, kar so italijanski organi storili z dopisom z dne 3. marca 2006.
By letter dated 23 December 2005, the Commission requested information from Italy, which replied by letter dated 24 February 2006.
Z dopisom z dne 23. decembra 2005 je Komisija pozvala Italijo, naj predloži informacije, kar Italija storila z dopisom z dne 24. februarja 2006.
The Italian authorities replied by letters dated 16 April 2007 and 5 November 2007.
Italijanski organi so odgovorili z dopisoma z dne 16. aprila 2007 in 5. novembra 2007.
A meeting between the Italian authorities and Commission staff was held on 13 March 2008 and Italy was asked to take a final position by 12 May 2008.
Italijanski organi in osebje Komisije so se sestali 13. marca 2008, pri čemer je bila Italija pozvana, naj sprejme končno stališče do 12. maja 2008.
After asking for an extension to the deadline for taking such a position by letter dated 29 May 2008, Italy submitted further information by letters dated 12 June 2008 and 7 July 2008.
Italija je z dopisom z dne 29. maja 2008 zaprosila za podaljšanje roka za sprejetje takega stališča ter nato predložila dodatna pojasnila z dopisoma z dne 12. junija 2008 in 7. julija 2008.
A further meeting was held on 26 May 2009.
Naslednje srečanje je potekalo 26. maja 2009.
By letters dated 10 July 2009 and 18 August 2009, Italy provided additional information.
Italija je z dopisoma z dne 10. julija 2009 in 18. avgusta 2009 predložila dodatna pojasnila.
In particular, it handles the financial flows related to the preferential electricity tariffs (collection of levies and payment to final beneficiaries).
Zlasti obravnava finančne tokove, ki so povezani z ugodnejšimi cenami električne energije (pobiranje dajatev in izplačilo končnim upravičencem).
This Decree laid down that Alcoa would benefit from the preferential treatment set out in Decision CIP 13/1992 until the end of 2005 [17].
Ta odlok je določal, da je družba Alcoa upravičena do ugodnejšega obravnavanja iz odločbe medresorskega odbora za cene 13/1992 do konca leta 2005 [17].
After that date, the way that Alcoa was treated would be brought into line with that of other electricity customers.
Po tem datumu naj bi se družba Alcoa obravnavala tako kot drugi odjemalci električne energije.
For Sardinia, the tariff was set at ITL 36,3/kWh in 1996, to be gradually increased to reach ITL 39,6/kWh in 2005.
Cena za Sardinijo je bila leta 1996 določena na 36,3 ITL/kWh in naj bi se do leta 2005 postopno povečala na 39,6 ITL/kWh.
For Veneto, the tariff was to reach ITL 39,9/kWh in 2005.
Cena za Benečijo naj bi leta 2005 dosegla 39,9 ITL/kWh.
Converted into euro, these prices range between EUR 18 and EUR 20/MWh.
Te cene v eurih znašajo med 18 EUR in 20 EUR/MWh.
Pursuant to Law No 80/2005, the extension of the tariff was to take effect as of 1 January 2005.
Podaljšanje veljavnosti cene naj bi v skladu z zakonom št. 80/2005 začelo veljati 1. januarja 2005.
However, the date was subsequently changed to 1 January 2006 by AEEG Decision No 286/05/EC on instructions from the national authorities.
Vendar se je datum na podlagi navodil nacionalnih organov z odločbo AEEG 286/05 pozneje spremenil na 1. januar 2006.
In 2004 only 41 % of EU-25 demand was covered by EU-25 production, down from 50 % in 1996.
Proizvodnja v EU-25 je leta 1996 pokrila 50 % povpraševanja v EU-25, leta 2004 pa le še 41 %.
Therefore there is a growing production deficit in the EU, and demand is increasingly being met by imports from non-EU countries.
Zato je proizvodnja v EU vedno bolj nezadostna, pri čemer uvozniki iz držav nečlanic EU vedno pogosteje zadostijo povpraševanju.
Alcoa maintains that the Alumix decision was not limited in time and did not cease to be effective on 31 December 2005.
Alcoa navaja, da je bila odločba Alumix časovno neomejena in da se njena veljavnost ni končala 31 decembra 2005.
In Alcoa’s view, the Commission’s argument that a ‘change of circumstances’ put an end to the effect of the Alumix decision is without merit, since neither the liberalisation of the market, nor the role entrusted to the Equalisation Fund involved any substantial change with respect to the advantage (or, rather, the absence thereof) resulting from the Alumix regime.
Alcoa meni, da je trditev Komisije, da se je s „spremembo okoliščin“ končala veljavnost odločbe Alumix, brez osnove, ker liberalizacija trga in vloga izravnalnega sklada nista vključevali nobenih znatnih sprememb v zvezi s prednostjo (ali neobstojem prednosti) zaradi ureditve Alumix.
The fact that the tariff arrangement did not constitute aid was the reason why Italy did not deem it necessary to notify the 2004 Decree.
Italija je zaradi dejstva, da dogovor o ceni ne pomeni državne pomoči, menila, da ji ni treba priglasiti odloka iz leta 2004.
Italy argues that, at any rate, following the opening of the in-depth investigation, Italy ceased to apply the 2004 Decree in respect of Alcoa.
Italija trdi, da po sprožitvi temeljite preiskave v nobenem primeru ni več uporabljala odloka iz leta 2004 v zvezi z družbo Alcoa.
In particular, the issue of the high cost of electricity for aluminium production in Sardinia and Veneto, acknowledged in the Alumix decision, has not been solved since 1996.
Zlasti vprašanje visokih stroškov električne energije za proizvodnjo aluminija na Sardiniji in v Benečiji, navedeno v odločbi Alumix, ni bilo rešeno od leta 1996.
The permanence of these issues justifies the prolongation of the tariff, which was, in any event, meant to be a long-term measure to favour industrial development.
Trajnost teh vprašanj upravičuje podaljšanje veljavnosti cene, ki je bilo v vsakem primeru mišljeno kot dolgoročen ukrep za spodbujanje industrijskega razvoja.
Therefore, the Commission considers that, as far as Alcoa is concerned, the 2004 opening decision challenged the prolongation of the Alumix scheme after its expiry on 31 December 2005.
Zato Komisija meni, da je v zvezi z družbo Alcoa odločitev o sprožitvi postopka iz leta 2004 izpodbijala podaljšanje sheme Alumix po njenem izteku veljavnosti 31. decembra 2005.
The temporal scope of the 2004 investigation is therefore limited to the period starting on 1 January 2006.
Časovni okvir preiskave iz leta 2004 je tako omejen na obdobje od 1. januarja 2006.
This is, however, a misrepresentation of the reasoning of the 2006 opening decision.
To je vseeno zavajanje v zvezi z razlago odločitve o sprožitvi postopka iz leta 2006.
In that decision, the comparison between average IPEX prices was intended only to justify doubts as to the claim that electricity prices in Sardinia were substantially higher than in other Italian regions.
V navedeni odločitvi je bila primerjava med povprečnimi cenami IPEX namenjena le utemeljitvi pomislekov v zvezi s trditvijo, da so cene električne energije na Sardiniji bistveno višje od cen v drugih italijanskih regijah.
In the Alumix case, the Commission carried out a complex assessment of prices and trends in the electricity sector over 10 years, as shown in the tables which form an integral part of the decision and set the Alcoa tariff until 2005 only.
Komisija je v zadevi Alumix izvedla zapleteno oceno cen in gibanj v sektorju električne energije v 10 letih, kot je prikazano v preglednicah, ki so sestavni del odločbe in določajo ceno za družbo Alcoa le do leta 2005.
Such prices and trends are in the nature of things subject to change, and the Commission could not stated that there would be no State aid indefinitely, especially in view of the progressive liberalisation of the energy markets.
Takšne cene in gibanja se običajno spreminjajo, pri čemer Komisija ni mogla navesti, da državna pomoč nikoli ne bo obstajala, zlasti ob upoštevanju postopne liberalizacije trgov z električno energijo.
The Sardinia Region, however, was eligible for such aid until the end of 2006.
Dežela Sardinija pa je bila do konca leta 2006 upravičena do takšne pomoči.
The Commission has therefore examined whether the preferential tariff for Alcoa’s Portovesme smelter can be authorised under the 1998 guidelines on national regional aid [103].
Komisija je zato preučila, ali se lahko ugodnejša cena za talilnico družbe Alcoa v Portovesmu odobri v skladu s smernicami o nacionalni regionalni pomoči iz leta 1998 [103].
ENEL has considerable market power and has been found by the Italian Competition Authority to have abused this power in 2004-2005.
ENEL ima znatno tržno moč, pri čemer je italijanski organ za konkurenco ugotovil, da je ENEL v obdobju 2004–2005 zlorabil svojo moč.