natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The 2007 letter stipulated that an appropriate VPP should enable around 25 % of Sardinian electricity demand to be covered by the virtual generating capacity of third party suppliers for a period of at least five years.
V dopisu iz leta 2007 je bilo navedeno, da mora ustrezna virtualna elektrarna omogočiti, da se približno 25 % povpraševanja po električni energiji na Sardiniji zadovolji z virtualno proizvodno zmogljivostjo tretjih dobaviteljev za obdobje vsaj petih let.
The letter further suggested that the Directorate-General for Competition should rapidly start to work together with the Italian authorities in order to determine the practicalities of the VPP.
V dopisu je bilo poleg tega predlagano, da mora generalni direktorat za konkurenco hitro začeti sodelovati z italijanskimi organi, da bi se določili praktični vidiki virtualne elektrarne.
With considerable delay, on 9 July 2009, Italy adopted the legislative provisions necessary to grant the AEEG the power to establish such a mechanism.
Italija je z veliko zamudo 9. julija 2009 sprejela zakonodajne določbe, ki so potrebne za dodelitev pooblastila organu AEEG za vzpostavitev takega mehanizma.
On 17 August 2009, the AEEG adopted Decision ARG/elt 115/09 laying down the provisions for implementing the VPP.
AEEG je 17. avgusta 2009 sprejel odločbo ARG/elt 115/09, ki vključuje določbe o vzpostavitvi virtualne elektrarne.
Description of the Italian VPP
Opis italijanske virtualne elektrarne
Pursuant to the detailed rules established by the AEEG, both ENEL and E.ON are to release virtual generating capacity to operators which have no ties with either company.
ENEL in E.ON morata v skladu s podrobnimi pravili, ki jih je določil AEEG, prepustiti virtualno proizvodno zmogljivost nosilcem dejavnosti, ki niso povezani z nobeno od teh dveh družb.
The capacity to be released (225 MW by ENEL and 150 MW by E.ON) was determined in relation to the respective unilateral market power of each of the two dominant operators.
Zmogljivost, ki naj bi se sprostila (225 MW ENEL in 150 MW E.ON), se je določila glede na zadevno enostransko tržno moč posameznega prevladujočega nosilca dejavnosti.
The VPP is to cover at least 25 % of electricity demand in Sardinia and will last for five years, until the infrastructure projects currently under way to enhance electricity interconnection between Sardinia and mainland Italy have been completed.
Virtualna elektrarna mora zadovoljiti vsaj 25 % povpraševanja po električni energiji na Sardiniji in se bo ohranila pet let, tj. do dokončanja sedanjih infrastrukturnih projektov za povečanje elektroenergetskih povezav med Sardinijo in celinsko Italijo.
Participation in the contract award procedures is to be open to market operators active in the sale to end-users.
Sodelovanje v postopku oddaje javnega naročila se mora omogočiti udeležencem na trgu, ki prodajajo končnim uporabnikom.
The products on offer will be of one-year and/or five-year maturities.
Rok zapadlosti za ponujene proizvode bo eno leto in/ali pet let.
Contract awards will be for the period from 1 January 2010 onwards.
Naročila se bodo oddala za obdobje od 1. januarja 2010.
In view of the physical constraints on the electricity network in Sardinia, the Italian VPP has been designed as a financial instrument [118].
Italijanska virtualna elektrarna je bila glede na fizične omejitve elektroenergetskega omrežja na Sardiniji oblikovana kot finančni instrument [118].
Under this type of VPP, the purchasers are not obliged physically to sell the electricity thus awarded to end-users.
Pri takih virtualnih elektrarnah kupcem ni treba fizično prodajati električne energije, ki se na tak način dodeli končnim uporabnikom.
They benefit from financial settlement whenever the price paid on the day-ahead market exceeds a certain threshold.
Kupci so upravičeni do finančne poravnave, kadar cena, plačana na dnevnem trgu, presega določen prag.
The advantage of owning VPP capacity for an existing operator or a new entrant which wants to expand its client base lies in the fact that the VPP can be used as a hedging instrument for (other) physical transactions carried out.
Prednost lastništva zmogljivosti virtualne elektrarne za obstoječega nosilca dejavnosti ali novega udeleženca na trgu, ki želi razširiti svoj krog odjemalcev, je dejstvo, da se lahko virtualna elektrarna uporabi kot instrument za zavarovanje pred tveganji za (druge) opravljene fizične transakcije.
The beneficial effect for competition of this type of VPP lies in the fact that the dominant operators are deprived of the incentive to use their market power to maintain prices in the day-ahead market at high levels, insofar as any benefit derived from such a strategy will be transferred to the VPP purchasers.
Take virtualne elektrarne ugodno vplivajo na konkurenco, ker ne spodbujajo prevladujočih nosilcev dejavnosti, da bi uporabili svojo tržno moč za ohranitev visokih cen na dnevnem trgu, ker bi se vse ugodnosti, pridobljene s tako strategijo, prenesle na kupce virtualnih elektrarn.
Compatibility of the tariff on the basis of the VPP
Združljivost cene na podlagi virtualne elektrarne
Although the VPP is expected to have a beneficial effect on competition in the Sardinian electricity market, and despite the proposal made in January 2007, the Commission has come to the conclusion that, in this instance, the VPP cannot constitute sufficient basis to render the aid compatible for a transitional period following the establishment of the VPP and much less so for the period before the VPP is set up, for the reasons set out in detail below.
Komisija je kljub temu, da naj bi virtualna elektrarna ugodno vplivala na konkurenco na trgu z električno energijo na Sardiniji, in kljub predlogu iz januarja 2007 sklenila, da v tem primeru virtualna elektrarna ne more biti zadostna podlaga, da bi bila pomoč združljiva v prehodnem obdobju po vzpostavitvi virtualne elektrarne in še manj v obdobju pred vzpostavitvijo virtualne elektrarne zaradi razlogov, navedenih v nadaljevanju.
The Commission does not deny that, in exceptional circumstances, a remedy consisting of ‘market liberalisation’ (or better, in this case, a structural measure designed to enhance competition in a market which remains highly concentrated although legally open to competition) may provide a basis for the compatibility of State aid.
Komisija ne zanika, da se lahko v izjemnih okoliščinah s pravnim sredstvom, ki vključuje „liberalizacijo trga“ (ali v tem primeru bolje strukturni ukrep, namenjen krepitvi konkurence na trgu, ki je še vedno zelo koncentriran, čeprav je pravno odprt za konkurenco), zagotovi podlaga za skladnost državne pomoči.
In this specific case, the Commission has taken into consideration the nature of the problem of competition in the Sardinian electricity market [119], the causal link between this problem and the aid, and the effectiveness of the VPP as a corrective instrument.
Komisija je v tem posebnem primeru upoštevala naravo težav v zvezi s konkurenčnostjo na trgu z električno energijo na Sardiniji [119], vzročno povezavo med temi težavami in pomočjo ter učinkovitost virtualne elektrarne kot korektivnega instrumenta.
The fact that electricity interconnection is insufficient in the island is not a liberalisation problem, but rather a corollary of its geographic location.
Dejstvo, da so elektroenergetske povezave na otoku nezadostne, ni posledica liberalizacije, ampak geografskega položaja otoka.
Numerous EU countries include islands and almost all Member States possess islands with which electricity interconnection is insufficient or non-existent.
Več držav EU ima otoke, pri čemer imajo skoraj vse države članice otoke z nezadostnimi elektroenergetskimi povezavami ali brez elektroenergetskih povezav.
The cost structure of the generation portfolio is not directly linked to how the electricity market works or to the exercise of market power by dominant operators.
Stroškovna struktura proizvodnega portfelja ni neposredno povezana z načinom delovanja trga z električno energijo ali uveljavljanjem tržne moči prevladujočih nosilcev dejavnosti.
Instead, it results from the availability of primary energy resources and the other physical and geographical constraints which condition investment decisions by generating companies.
Temelji na razpoložljivosti primarnih virov energije ter drugih fizičnih in geografskih omejitvah, ki pogojujejo odločitve proizvodnih podjetij o naložbah.
Lastly, a highly concentrated market structure is probably the rule rather than an exception on islands.
Nazadnje, visoko koncentrirana tržna struktura je verjetno pravilo in ne izjema na otokih.
Therefore, the only competition issue which can be shown to exist is the duopoly, insofar as it potentially encourages the dominant operators to set high prices.
Zato je edina težava v zvezi s konkurenčnostjo, katere obstoj se lahko dokaže, duopol, ker lahko spodbuja prevladujoče nosilce dejavnosti, da določajo visoke cene.
This, however, is only one of the factors contributing to the high level of prices in Sardinia.
Vendar je to le eden od dejavnikov, ki prispeva k visokim cenam na Sardiniji.
Second, the Commission has looked into the existence of a causal link between the preferential tariffs and conditions in the Sardinian market.
Komisija je preučila tudi vzročno povezavo med ugodnejšimi cenami in pogoji na trgu na Sardiniji.
These tariffs were never intended to address the competition situation in Sardinia, given that the Sardinian tariffs which Italy notified provided relief only to a restricted circle of consumers, who were in fact those with the greatest bargaining power.
Te cene niso bile nikoli namenjene obravnavi konkurenčnega položaja na Sardiniji, glede na to, da so cene na Sardiniji, ki jih je priglasila Italija, pomenile razbremenitev le za omejen krog odjemalcev, ki so imeli dejansko največjo pogajalsko moč.
Italy itself has acknowledged that the purpose of the Alcoa tariff was to bring the price paid by Alcoa in Sardinia into line with those offered to aluminium producers in other European countries.
Italija je sama priznala, da je bil namen cene za družbo Alcoa uskladitev cene, ki jo je plačevala družba Alcoa na Sardiniji, s cenami, zagotovljenimi proizvajalcem aluminija v drugih evropskih državah.
If anything, the aid concerned may have exacerbated the situation resulting from the duopoly in generation.
Zadevna pomoč bi lahko okoliščine, ki so nastale zaradi duopola pri proizvodnji, le poslabšala.
With the system of compensatory payments which constitutes the measure at hand, Alcoa had no incentive to draw on its own power as a purchaser to reduce its electricity costs, since Alcoa’s interest in obtaining electricity at the lowest cost was met by the compensatory payments, and not by the exertion of Alcoa’s own bargaining power on the retail market as a major electricity consumer in Sardinia.
Alcoa s sistemom kompenzacijskih plačil, ki pomeni zadevni ukrep, ni nameravala izkoristiti svoje moči kot kupec, da bi znižala stroške električne energije, ker je bil interes družbe Alcoa pri pridobivanju električne energije po najnižji ceni izpolnjen s kompenzacijskimi plačili in ne z uporabo pogajalske moči družbe Alcoa na maloprodajnem trgu kot glavnega odjemalca električne energije na Sardiniji.
By reducing the incentive for Alcoa to seek sources of supply other than those offered by the incumbent operator, the compensatory payments may, to a certain extent, have had a negative influence on competition in the retail market to the detriment of all electricity consumers, insofar as they tended to bolster the financial position of the incumbent.
Kompenzacijska plačila lahko z manjšimi spodbudami za družbo Alcoa, da išče druge vire dobave poleg obstoječega nosilca dejavnosti, do neke mere negativno vplivajo na konkurenco na maloprodajnem trgu v škodo vsem odjemalcem električne energije, ker se zdi, da krepijo finančni položaj prvotnega dobavitelja.
Third, the expected beneficial impact of the VPP on actual competitive conditions in Sardinia does not appear to be proportional to the scope and intensity of the aid granted.
Poleg tega se zdi, da pričakovani ugodni vpliv virtualne elektrarne na dejanske konkurenčne pogoje na Sardiniji ni sorazmeren z obsegom in intenzivnostjo odobrene pomoči.
The effects of the remedy on the Sardinian market would appear to be fairly limited.
Zdi se, da bi bili vplivi tega pravnega sredstva na trg na Sardiniji precej omejeni.
It will have an impact only on the behaviour of the dominant operators, given that a financial VPP such as that set up by Italy cannot have an effect on interconnection or on generating costs and, unlike a tolling agreement, it is not designed to lead to a change in the market structure in terms of the generating mix.
Vplivalo bo le na ravnanje prevladujočih nosilcev dejavnosti, glede na to, da finančna virtualna elektrarna, kot je virtualna elektrarna, ki jo je vzpostavila Italija, ne more vplivati na medsebojno povezovanje ali stroške proizvodnje in, za razliko od sporazuma o podizvajanju, ni namenjena spremembi tržne strukture v smislu proizvodne mešanice.
Fourth, the aid distorts competition in the primary aluminium market, while the VPP will lead to some improvement in terms of competition in a different market, the electricity sector.
Pomoč izkrivlja konkurenco na trgu primarnega aluminija, medtem ko bo virtualna elektrarna prinesla nekaj izboljšav v smislu konkurence na drugem trgu, tj. sektorju električne energije.
By its nature, the VPP is not capable of having a direct impact on the aluminium market.
Virtualna elektrarna zaradi svoje narave ne more neposredno vplivati na trg aluminija.
Conclusions on the compatibility of the aid (Veneto and Sardinia)
Sklepne ugotovitve v zvezi z združljivostjo pomoči (Benečija in Sardinija)
In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the tariff applied to Alcoa’s smelters in Veneto and Sardinia cannot benefit from any of the derogations laid down in Article 87 of the EC Treaty.
Komisija glede na navedeno meni, da cena, ki se je uporabljala za talilnici družbe Alcoa v Benečiji in na Sardiniji, ne morejo biti upravičene do nobenega odstopanja iz člena 87 Pogodbe ES.
The derogations in Article 87(2) are not applicable, since the aid is not of a social character, is not designed to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences and was not granted to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by the division of Germany.
Odstopanja iz člena 87(2) se ne uporabljajo, ker ne gre za pomoč socialnega značaja, ker pomoč ni namenjena za povrnitev škode zaradi naravnih nesreč ali izjemnih dogodkov in ker pomoč ni bila dodeljena za nadomestilo gospodarske škode zaradi delitve Nemčije.
The derogations in Article 87(3)(b) and (d) are also inapplicable, since the measure is not aimed at promoting the execution of an important project of common European interest or remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State nor at promoting culture and heritage conservation.
Odstopanja iz člena 87(3)(b) in (d) se prav tako ne uporabljajo, ker ukrep ni namenjen pospeševanju izvedbe pomembnega projekta skupnega evropskega interesa ali odpravljanju resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice ali pospeševanju kulture in ohranjanju kulturne dediščine.
As for the derogation in Article 87(3)(a), the analysis carried out above in recitals 220 to 240 demonstrates that the tariff cannot be approved as aid aimed at promoting the economic development of an area where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious unemployment.
Kar zadeva odstopanje v členu 87(3)(a), analiza, izvedena zgoraj v uvodnih izjavah 220 do 240, kaže na to, da cene ni mogoče odobriti kot pomoč za pospeševanje gospodarskega razvoja območij, kjer je življenjska raven izjemno nizka ali kjer je veliko brezposelnosti.
With respect to Article 87(3)(c), the analysis shows that the tariff, even coupled with a VPP, cannot be considered compatible on the basis of that derogation (see in particular recitals 216, 217, 241 to 245 and 253 to 259).
Kar zadeva člen 87(3)(c), analiza kaže, da cene, čeprav je povezana z virtualno elektrarno, ni mogoče šteti za združljivo na podlagi navedenega odstopanja (glej zlasti uvodne izjave 216, 217, 241 do 245 in 253 do 259).
Therefore the extension of the preferential tariff in favour of Alcoa introduced by Article 11(11) of Law No 80/2005 and by the 2004 Decree (insofar as the same measure may have resulted from the application of said Decree over the January 2006-July 2007 period) should be declared incompatible with the common market.
Zato je treba podaljšanje veljavnosti ugodnejše cene za družbo Alcoa, ki je bila uvedena s členom 11(11) zakona št. 80/2005 in z odlokom iz leta 2004 (ker bi lahko isti ukrep temeljil na uporabi navedenega odloka v obdobju od januarja 2006 do julija 2007), razglasiti za nezdružljivo s skupnim trgom.
Pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, in cases of unlawful aid which is not compatible with the common market, effective competition should be restored without delay, unless recovery would be contrary to a general principle of Community law.
V primerih nezakonite pomoči, ki ni združljiva s skupnim trgom, je treba v skladu s členom 14(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 takoj vzpostaviti neizkrivljeno konkurenco, razen če bi bilo vračilo v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava Unije.
Legitimate expectations and other general principles of Community law which may prevent recovery
Upravičena pričakovanja in druga splošna načela prava Skupnosti, ki lahko preprečijo vračilo
According to settled case-law, when aid has been granted without prior notification pursuant to Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, the recipient of the aid cannot have a legitimate expectation that its grant is lawful [120].
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso prejemnik pomoči ne more upravičeno pričakovati, da je pomoč zakonita [120], če je bila pomoč dodeljena brez predhodne priglasitve v skladu s členom 88(3) Pogodbe ES.
A diligent undertaking is very well capable of establishing if the notification procedure has been followed and if the aid is lawful.
Skrbno podjetje je popolnoma sposobno ugotoviti, ali se je upošteval postopek priglasitve in ali je pomoč zakonita.
However, a recipient of unlawful aid is not precluded from relying on exceptional circumstances on the basis of which it had legitimately assumed the aid to be lawful and thus declining to refund that aid [121].
Vendar pa se prejemniku nezakonite pomoči ne prepreči sklicevanje na izjemne okoliščine, na podlagi katerih je upravičeno domneval, da je pomoč zakonita, in je zato zavrnil vračilo te pomoči [121].
On the other hand, if ‘a prudent and discriminating trader could have foreseen the adoption of a Community measure likely to affect his interests, he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted’ [122].
Na drugi strani je določeno: „če premišljen in dobro poučen gospodarski subjekt lahko predvidi sprejetje ukrepa Skupnosti, ki bo vplival na njegove interese, se na to načelo ne more sklicevati, če je bil ta ukrep sprejet“ [122].
The Commission has examined whether the exceptional circumstances alleged by Alcoa, which are linked to the existence of the Alumix decision, may have led it to entertain such legitimate expectations.
Komisija je preučila, ali bi lahko imele družbe zaradi izjemnih okoliščin, ki jih navaja družba Alcoa in so povezane z odločbo Alumix, taka upravičena pričakovanja.
The Court has consistently held that legitimate expectations can arise from only precise, unconditional and concordant assurances, given by the Community institutions, of such a nature as to give rise to a justified expectation that the measure was not aid or was lawful [123].
Sodišče je v vseh primerih odločilo, da lahko zakonita pričakovanja temeljijo le na natančnih, brezpogojnih in skladnih zagotovilih institucij Skupnosti, ki so zaradi svoje narave vzrok za upravičeno pričakovanje, da ukrep ni pomoč ali da je ukrep zakonit [123].
Alcoa submits that, even if the current scheme was not to be considered as ‘existing aid’, Alcoa could still claim legitimate expectations, because it had relied upon the Alumix finding that there was no aid when it purchased Alumix and decided to make further investments in the two smelters.
Družba Alcoa trdi, da bi se lahko vseeno sklicevala na upravičena pričakovanja, čeprav se sedanja shema ne bi štela za „obstoječo pomoč“, ker se je sklicevala na ugotovite iz odločbe Alumix, da ob nakupu družbe Alumix pomoči ni bilo, in se je odločila za nadaljnje naložbe v obe talilnici.
Alcoa also cites as a precedent the Commission decision on tax-free treatment for steel companies setting up establishments abroad [124] (see recital 97 above).
Družba Alcoa kot precedens prav tako navaja odločbo Komisije o davčnih oprostitvah za jeklarske družbe pri ustanovitvi podjetij v tujini [124] (glej uvodno izjavo 97 zgoraj).
In that Commission decision, which concerned the tax-free treatment granted by France to steel companies, the provisions on existing aid could not be applied directly, since aid to the steel sector was governed by the ECSC Treaty, which did not recognise the concept of existing aid.
V navedeni odločbi Komisije, ki obravnava davčne oprostitve Francije za jeklarske družbe, določb o obstoječi pomoči ni bilo mogoče uporabiti neposredno, ker je pomoč jeklarskemu sektorju določala Pogodba o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za premog in jeklo, ki ne priznava pojma obstoječe pomoči.
The Commission recognised the beneficiaries’ legitimate expectations by applying, by analogy, the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty, and accordingly did not order the recovery of the aid.
Komisija je priznala upravičena pričakovanja upravičencev s smiselno uporabo zadevnih določb iz Pogodbe ES in v skladu s tem ni odredila vračila pomoči.
However, the case was in substance similar to the Belgian Coordination Centres case, in that the Commission had changed its appraisal of a measure previously classified as not comprising aid without that measure having been altered by the Member State.
Vendar je bila zadeva vsebinsko podobna zadevi belgijskih centrov za usklajevanje, ker je Komisija spremenila svojo presojo v zvezi z ukrepom, ki ga je pred tem opredelila kot ukrep, ki ne vključuje pomoči, pri čemer država članica zadevnega ukrepa ni spremenila.
The considerations developed in recital 210 meant that the Commission must dismiss the claim that the cited decision can be taken as a basis to acknowledge legitimate expectations on the part of Alcoa.
Komisija mora zaradi pripomb iz uvodne izjave 210 zavrniti trditev, da se lahko navedena odločba uporabi kot podlaga za priznavanje upravičenih pričakovanj družbe Alcoa.
As regards the relevance attributed by Alcoa to the Alumix decision, it should be pointed out that that decision could give the beneficiary a legitimate expectation that the tariff arrangement assessed therein did not constitute aid only until 31 December 2005.
Kar zadeva pomembnost, ki jo je družba Alcoa pripisala odločbi Alumix, je treba izpostaviti, da bi lahko upravičenec na podlagi te odločbe upravičeno pričakoval, da dogovor o ceni, obravnavan v navedeni odločbi, ni pomenil pomoči le do 31. decembra 2005.
No legitimate expectations can, however, be derived from the Alumix decision in respect of the extension in time of the tariff provided for by Article 11(11) of Law No 80/2005.
Vendar nobeno upravičeno pričakovanje ne more temeljiti na odločbi Alumix v zvezi s podaljšanjem veljavnosti cene iz člena 11(11) zakona št. 80/2005.
Alcoa could not legitimately have entertained the expectation that the 2005 measure, which prolonged the tariff until 2010, would likewise automatically qualify as not constituting aid.
Alcoa ne bi mogla upravičeno pričakovati, da bi bil ukrep iz leta 2005, s katerim se je veljavnost cene podaljšala do leta 2010, prav tako samodejno upravičen kot ukrep, ki ne pomeni pomoči.
Faced with a measure which had been (a) substantially amended and (b) extended in time, a prudent beneficiary should have verified that the aid was lawful.
Glede na to, da se je ukrep (a) znatno spremenil in (b) da se je podaljšala njegova veljavnost, bi moral preudaren upravičenec preveriti, ali je pomoč zakonita.