natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The deviation of expenditure developments shall not be considered significant if the Member State concerned has overachieved the medium-term budgetary objective, taking into account the possibility of significant revenue windfalls and the budgetary plans laid out in the convergence programme do not jeopardise that objective over the programme period.
Odklon pri gibanju odhodkov se ne šteje za znaten, če je zadevna država članica presegla srednjeročni proračunski cilj, ob upoštevanju možnosti, da gre za znatne izredne prihodke, in če proračunski načrti, predstavljeni v programu za konvergenco, ne ogrožajo tega cilja v programskem obdobju.
Similarly, the deviation may be left out of consideration when resulting from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or in case of severe economic downturn for the euro area or the Union as a whole, on the condition that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.’.
Odklon se prav tako lahko ne upošteva, če ga povzroči izreden dogodek, na katerega zadevna država članica ne more vplivati in ki ima pomembne posledice za finančno stanje sektorja države, ali nastane zaradi resnega gospodarskega upada v euroobmočju ali celotni Uniji, pod pogojem, da to srednjeročno ne ogrozi fiskalne vzdržnosti.“;
PRINCIPLE OF STATISTICAL INDEPENDENCE
NAČELO STATISTIČNE NEODVISNOSTI
With a view to ensuring that the multilateral surveillance is based on sound and independent statistics, Member States shall ensure the professional independence of national statistical authorities, which shall be consistent with the European statistics code of practice as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European Statistics.
Da se zagotovi, da večstranski nadzor temelji na zanesljivih in neodvisnih statističnih podatkih, države članice zagotovijo strokovno neodvisnost nacionalnih statističnih organov, ki je v skladu z Evropskim statističnim kodeksom ravnanja, kot je določen v Uredbi (ES) št. 223/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2009 o evropski statistiki.
As a minimum this shall require: (a) transparent recruitment and dismissal processes which must be solely based on professional criteria;
To vključuje vsaj: (a) pregledne postopke zaposlovanja in odpuščanja, ki morajo temeljiti izključno na poklicnih merilih;
budgetary allocations which must be made on an annual or a multiannual basis;
proračunska sredstva, ki morajo biti dodeljena na letni ali večletni osnovi;
the date of publication of key statistical information which must be designated significantly in advance.
datum objave ključnih statističnih podatkov, ki mora biti določen precej vnaprej.
‘Article -11
„Člen -11
The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with the relevant authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation.
Komisija zagotavlja redni dialog z ustreznimi organi držav članic v skladu s cilji te uredbe.
To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions for the purpose of the assessment of the economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation.
S tem namenom Komisija zlasti izvaja misij, da bi ocenila ekonomske razmere v državi članici in prepoznala tveganja ali težave pri upoštevanju ciljev te uredbe.
The Commission may undertake enhanced surveillance missions in Member States which are the subject of recommendations issued under Article 6(2) or Article 10(2) for the purposes of on-site monitoring.
Komisija lahko izvaja misije okrepljenega nadzora v državah članicah, za katere veljajo priporočila, izdana v skladu s členom 6(2) ali členom 10(2,) z namenom spremljanja na kraju samem.
The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of those missions.
Zadevne države članice zagotovijo vse potrebne informacije za pripravo in vodenje teh misij.
When the Member State concerned is a participating Member State or a Member State that is participating in ERM2, the Commission may invite representatives of the European Central Bank, if appropriate, to participate in surveillance missions.
Kadar je zadevna država članica sodelujoča država članica ali država članica, ki sodeluje v MMT2, Komisija lahko, če se ji to zdi primerno, k udeležbi pri nadzornih misijah povabi predstavnike Evropske centralne banke.
The Commission shall report to the Council on the outcome of the missions referred to in paragraph 2 and, if appropriate, may decide to make its findings public.
Komisija o rezultatih misij iz odstavka 2 poroča Svetu in se lahko odloči, če je primerno, da svoje ugotovitve objavi.
When organising the missions referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission shall transmit its provisional findings to the Member States concerned for comments.’.
Ko Komisija izvaja misije iz odstavka 2, posreduje svoje začasne ugotovitve zadevni državi članici za pripombe.“;
By 14 December 2014 and every 5 years thereafter, the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation.
Komisija do 14. novembra 2014 in nato vsakih pet let objavi poročilo o izvajanju te uredbe.
That report shall evaluate, inter alia:
Poročilo med drugim oceni:
the effectiveness of this Regulation, particularly whether the provisions governing decision-making have proved sufficiently robust;
učinkovitost uredbe, zlasti ali so se določbe, ki urejajo postopke odločanja, izkazale za dovolj zanesljive;
the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of economic performances of the Member States in accordance with the TFEU.
napredek pri zagotavljanju tesnejše uskladitve ekonomskih politik in trajnostne konvergence ekonomskih učinkov držav članic v skladu s PDEU.
Where appropriate, this report shall be accompanied by a proposal for amendments to this Regulation, including to the decision-making procedures.
Kjer je primerno, se temu poročilu priloži predlog za spremembo te uredbe, med drugim tudi postopkov odločanja.
The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and the Council.’.
Poročilo se posreduje Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu.“;
All references to ‘Article 99 of the Treaty’ shall be replaced throughout the Regulation by references to ‘Article 121 TFEU’.
v celotnem besedili uredbe se vsa sklicevanja na „člen 99 Pogodbe“ se nadomestijo s sklicevanji na „člen 121 PDEU“.
Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 1).
Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1055/2005 z dne 27. junija 2005 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 1466/97 o okrepitvi nadzora nad proračunskim stanjem ter o nadzoru in usklajevanju gospodarskih politik (UL L 174, 7.7.2005, str. 1).
Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 5).
Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1056/2005 z dne 27. junija 2005 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 1467/97 o pospešitvi in razjasnitvi izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem (UL L 174, 7.7.2005, str. 5).
See document 7423/3/05 on http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents.aspx?lang=en.
Glej dokument st7423/3/05 na http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents.aspx?lang=en.
OJ C 73, 25.3.2006, p. 21.
UL C 73, 25.3.2006, str 21.
OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25.’.
UL L 306, 23.11.2011, str. 25.“;
OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 41.’.
UL L 306, 23.11.2011, str. 41.“;
OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164.’.
UL L 87, 31.3.2009, str. 164.“;
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Uredba (EU) št. 1176/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta
on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances
o preprečevanju in odpravljanju makroekonomskih neravnotežij
There is a need to draw lessons from the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union and, in particular, for improved economic governance in the Union built on stronger national ownership.
Na osnovi izkušenj, pridobljenih v prvem desetletju delovanja ekonomske in monetarne unije, je treba predvsem izboljšati ekonomsko upravljanje v Uniji, ki mora temeljiti na močnejšem nacionalnem lastništvu.
The improved economic governance framework should rely on several interlinked and coherent policies for sustainable growth and jobs, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus on developing and strengthening the internal market, fostering international trade and competitiveness, a European Semester for strengthened coordination of economic and budgetary policies (European Semester), an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficits (the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances, minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, and enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macroprudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
Izboljšan okvir ekonomskega upravljanja bi moral temeljiti na več medsebojno povezanih in usklajenih politikah za trajnostno rast in delovna mesta, zlasti na strategiji Unije za rast in delovna mesta, s posebnim poudarkom na razvoju in krepitvi notranjega trga, spodbujanju mednarodne trgovine in konkurenčnosti, evropskem semestru za okrepljeno usklajevanje ekonomskih in proračunskih politik (evropski semester), učinkovitem okviru za preprečevanje in zmanjšanje čezmernega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja (Pakt za stabilnost in rast), trdnem okviru za preprečevanje in odpravljanje makroekonomskih neravnotežij, minimalnih zahtevah za nacionalne proračunske okvire in okrepljeni ureditvi finančnih trgov in nadzoru nad njimi, vključno z makrobonitetnim nadzorom Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (ESRB).
While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of the dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State which is the subject of a Council recommendation or decision in accordance with Article 7(2), Article 8(2) or Article 10(4) of this Regulation.
Kljub temu da so sogovorniki Evropskega parlamenta v okviru dialoga ustrezne institucije Unije in njihovi predstavniki, lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta ponudi državi članici, na katero je naslovljeno priporočilo ali sklep Sveta v skladu s členi 7(2), 8(2) ali 10(4) te uredbe, možnost sodelovanja pri izmenjavi mnenj.
In particular, surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to include a more detailed and formal framework to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and to help the Member States affected to establish corrective plans before divergences become entrenched.
Zlasti bi bilo treba nadzor ekonomskih politik držav članic razširiti prek proračunskega nadzora, da bi vključeval bolj podroben in formalen okvir za preprečevanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij, prizadetim državam članicam pa bi pomagal, da izdelajo popravljalne načrte, preden se razlike utrdijo.
It is appropriate to supplement the multilateral surveillance procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 121 TFEU with specific rules for the detection of macroeconomic imbalances, as well as the prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the Union.
Primerno je, da se postopek večstranskega nadzora iz odstavkov 3 in 4 člena 121 PDEU dopolni s posebnimi pravili za odkrivanje makroekonomskih neravnotežij, kakor tudi za preprečevanje in odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v Uniji.
It is essential that the procedure should be aligned with the annual multilateral surveillance cycle.
Bistveno je, da se postopek uskladi z letnim ciklom večstranskega nadzora.
That procedure should establish an alert mechanism for the early detection of emerging macroeconomic imbalances.
Ta postopek bi moral uvesti opozorilni mehanizem za zgodnje odkrivanje nastajajočih makroekonomskih neravnotežij.
It should be based on the use of an indicative and transparent ‘scoreboard’ comprising indicative thresholds, combined with economic judgement.
Njegova podlaga bi morala biti okvirna in transparentna preglednica, ki vključuje okvirne pragove, v povezavi z ekonomsko presojo.
This judgement should take into account, inter alia, nominal and real convergence inside and outside the euro area.
Ta presoja bi morala med drugim upoštevati nominalno in realno konvergenco v euroobmočju in zunaj njega.
In order to function efficiently as an element of the alert mechanism, the scoreboard should consist of a limited set of economic, financial and structural indicators relevant to the detection of macroeconomic imbalances, with corresponding indicative thresholds.
Da bi preglednica učinkovito delovala kot del opozorilnega mehanizma, bi morala biti sestavljena iz omejenega sklopa ekonomskih, finančnih in strukturnih kazalnikov, bistvenih za odkrivanje makroekonomskih neravnotežij, in ustreznih okvirnih pragov.
The indicators and thresholds should be adjusted when necessary, in order to adapt to the changing nature of macroeconomic imbalances due, inter alia, to evolving threats to macroeconomic stability, and in order to take into account the enhanced availability of relevant statistics.
Kazalniki in pragovi bi se morali po potrebi prilagoditi, da se s tem prilagodijo spreminjajoči se naravi makroekonomskih neravnotežij, med drugim zaradi spreminjajočih se tveganj za makroekonomsko stabilnost, in da se upošteva izboljšana razpoložljivost s tem povezanih statističnih podatkov.
The indicators should not be understood as goals for economic policy in themselves but as tools to take account of the evolving nature of the macroeconomic imbalances within the Union.
Kazalniki naj ne bi predstavljali ciljev ekonomske politike, temveč orodje za spremljanje razvijajoče se narave makroekonomskih neravnotežij v Uniji.
The Commission should closely cooperate with the European Parliament and the Council when drawing up the scoreboard and the set of macroeconomic and macrofinancial indicators for Member States.
Komisija bi morala pri pripravi preglednice ter sklopa makroekonomskih in makrofinančnih kazalnikov za države članice tesno sodelovati z Evropskim parlamentom in Svetom.
The Commission should present suggestions for comments to the competent committees of the European Parliament and of the Council on plans to establish and adjust the indicators and thresholds.
Komisija bi morala predloge o načrtih za določitev in prilagoditev kazalnikov in pragov predstaviti pristojnim odborom Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta, da podajo pripombe.
The Commission should inform the European Parliament and the Council of any changes to the indicators and thresholds and explain its reasons for suggesting such changes.
Komisija bi morala Evropski parlament in Svet obvestiti o spremembah kazalnikov in pragov ter podati razloge za te spremembe.
In developing the scoreboard, due consideration should also be given to catering for heterogeneous economic circumstances, including catching-up effects.
Pri pripravi preglednice bi bilo treba ustrezno upoštevati tudi raznolike ekonomske okoliščine, vključno z učinki zmanjševanja razvojnega zaostanka.
The crossing of one or more indicative thresholds need not necessarily imply that macroeconomic imbalances are emerging, as economic policy-making should take into account interlinks between macroeconomic variables.
Prekoračitev enega ali več okvirnih pragov ne pomeni nujno, da nastajajo makroekonomska neravnotežja, saj bi bilo treba pri oblikovanju ekonomskih politik upoštevati medsebojne povezave med makroekonomskimi spremenljivkami.
Conclusions should not be drawn from an automatic reading of the scoreboard: economic judgement should ensure that all pieces of information, whether from the scoreboard or not, are put in perspective and become part of a comprehensive analysis.
Zaključkov se ne bi smelo narediti na podlagi samodejnega branja preglednice: z ekonomsko presojo bi bilo treba zagotoviti, da se vse informacije – bodisi iz preglednice bodisi ne – obravnavajo v kontekstu in da postanejo del celovite analize.
Based on the multilateral surveillance procedure and the alert mechanism, or in the event of unexpected, significant economic developments that require urgent analysis for the purpose of this Regulation, the Commission should identify the Member States to be subject to an in-depth review.
Komisija bi morala na podlagi postopka večstranskega nadzora in opozorilnega mehanizma ali v primeru nepričakovanih pomembnih gospodarskih gibanj, ki zahtevajo takojšnjo analizo za namene te uredbe, določiti države članice, pri katerih se opravi poglobljen pregled.
The in-depth review should be undertaken without the presumption that an imbalance exists and should encompass a thorough analysis of sources of imbalances in the Member State under review, taking due account of country-specific economic conditions and circumstances and of a wider set of analytical tools, indicators and qualitative information of country-specific nature.
Poglobljen pregled bi bilo treba izvesti brez domneve o obstoju neravnotežja in bi moral zajemati temeljito analizo vzrokov neravnotežij v državi članici v pregledu, ob ustreznem upoštevanju ekonomskih pogojev in okoliščin, specifičnih za posamezno državo članico, ter širšega sklopa analitičnih orodij, kazalnikov in kakovostnih informacij, specifičnih za te države članice.
When the Commission is undertaking the in-depth review, the Member State should cooperate to ensure that the information available to the Commission is as complete and correct as possible.
Država članica bi morala sodelovati s Komisijo, ko ta izvaja poglobljeni pregled, da bi tako zagotovila, da so informacije, ki jih ima Komisija na voljo, kar se da popolne in natančne.
Furthermore, the Commission should give due consideration to any other information which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned is relevant, and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and to the Commission.
Poleg tega bi morala Komisija ustrezno upoštevati vse druge informacije, ki so po mnenju zadevne države članice pomembne ter jih je država članica predložila Svetu in Komisiji.
The in-depth review should be discussed within the Council, and within the Eurogroup for the Member States whose currency is the euro.
O poglobljenem pregledu bi moral razpravljati Svet in Euroskupina, v primeru držav članic, katerih valuta je euro.
The in-depth review should take into account, where appropriate, Council recommendations or invitations addressed to Member States under review adopted in accordance with Articles 121, 126 and 148 TFEU and under Articles 6, 7, 8 and 10 of this Regulation, and the policy intentions of the Member State under review, as reflected in its national reform programmes, as well as international best practices as regards indicators and methodologies.
V poglobljenem pregledu bi se morali po potrebi upoštevati priporočila ali pozivi Sveta, naslovljeni na države članice v pregledu, ki so bili sprejeti v skladu s členi 121, 126 in 148 PDEU in členi 6, 7, 8 in 10 te uredbe ter predvidene politike držav članic v pregledu, kakor so predstavljene v nacionalnih programih reform, kakor tudi mednarodne najboljše prakse glede kazalnikov in metodologij.
When the Commission decides to undertake an in-depth review in the event of significant and unexpected economic developments that require urgent analysis, it should inform the Member States concerned.
Kadar se Komisija v primeru pomembnih in nepričakovanih gospodarskih gibanj, ki zahtevajo takojšnjo analizo, odloči izvesti poglobljen pregled, bi morala o tem obvestiti zadevne države članice.
When assessing macroeconomic imbalances, account should be taken of their severity and their potential negative economic and financial spill-over effects which aggravate the vulnerability of the Union economy and are a threat to the smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union.
Pri ocenjevanju makroekonomskih neravnotežij bi bilo treba upoštevati njihovo resnost ter njihove morebitne negativne učinke ekonomskega in finančnega prelivanja, ki povečujejo ranljivost gospodarstva Unije in ogrožajo nemoteno delovanje ekonomske in monetarne unije.
Actions to address macroeconomic imbalances and divergences in competitiveness are required in all Member States, particularly in the euro area.
Ukrepi za odpravo makroekonomskih neravnotežij in razlik v konkurenčnosti so potrebni v vseh državah članicah, zlasti v euroobmočju.
However, the nature, importance and urgency of the policy challenges may differ significantly depending on the Member States concerned.
Vendar se lahko vrsta, pomen in nujnost izzivov politik med zadevnimi državami članicami znatno razlikujejo.
Given vulnerabilities and the magnitude of the adjustment required, the need for policy action is particularly pressing in Member States showing persistently large current-account deficits and competitiveness losses.
Zaradi ranljivosti in obsega potrebne prilagoditve je ukrepanje politike zlasti nujno v državah članicah, v katerih se vztrajno pojavljajo veliki primanjkljaji na tekočem računu in izguba konkurenčnosti.
Furthermore, in Member States that accumulate large current-account surpluses, policies should aim to identify and implement measures that help strengthen their domestic demand and growth potential.
Prav tako bi morale biti politike v državah članicah, ki imajo velike presežke na tekočem računu, usmerjene v opredelitev in izvajanje ukrepov, ki prispevajo h krepitvi domačega povpraševanja in potenciala rasti.
The economic adjustment capacity and the track record of the Member State concerned as regards compliance with earlier recommendations issued under this Regulation and other recommendations issued under Article 121 TFEU as part of multilateral surveillance, in particular the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union, should also be considered.
Upoštevati bi bilo treba tudi zmožnost zadevnih držav članic za gospodarsko prilagajanje ter njihove rezultate pri upoštevanju prejšnjih priporočil na podlagi te uredbe in drugih priporočil, izdanih na podlagi člena 121 PDEU v okviru večstranskega nadzora, zlasti širših smernic ekonomskih politik držav članic in Unije.
A procedure to monitor and correct adverse macroeconomic imbalances, with preventive and corrective elements, will require enhanced surveillance tools based on those used in the multilateral surveillance procedure.
Postopek za spremljanje in odpravljanje škodljivih makroekonomskih neravnotežij s preprečevalnimi in popravljalnimi elementi bo zahteval boljša orodja za nadzor, ki temeljijo na orodjih, uporabljenih v postopku večstranskega nadzora.