natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The differences between the old and the new scheme were due solely to the new ‘tariff structure’ required by the launch of the liberalised energy market.
Razlike med staro in novo shemo so bile posledica nove „strukture cen“, ki jo je zahtevala vzpostavitev liberaliziranega trga z električno energijo.
Italy submitted that the tariff scheme did not constitute State aid.
Italija je trdila, da shema cen ne pomeni državne pomoči.
As regards the use of State resources, the tariff system was comparable to the arrangement in the PreussenElektra case, which the Court of Justice had held did not involve State resources [29].
Kar zadeva uporabo državnih sredstev, je bil sistem cen primerljiv z ureditvijo v zadevi PreussenElektra, za katero je Sodišče menilo, da ne vključuje državnih sredstev [29].
The Equalisation Fund was a technical body that kept the accounts of the system, and could not dispose freely of the financial resources it handled.
Izravnalni sklad je bil tehnično telo, ki je vodilo račune sistema, in ni mogel prosto razpolagati s finančnimi sredstvi, s katerimi je upravljal.
The fact that the AEEG and the Ministry of Finance exercised a measure of control over the Equalisation Fund’s activities did not mean that the State could freely dispose of those resources.
Dejstvo, da sta AEEG in ministrstvo za finance izvajala ukrep nadzora nad dejavnostmi izravnalnega sklada, ni pomenilo, da lahko država prosto razpolaga s temi sredstvi.
According to Italy, therefore, the resources used to finance the tariff mechanism were entirely private.
Po mnenju Italije so bila zato sredstva, uporabljena za financiranje mehanizma cen, v celoti zasebna.
Italy further submitted that the tariff did not have an impact on trade within the Union, and could not distort competition, for reasons linked to the existence of a world price for the products, which were commodities (see observations submitted by Portovesme, recital 55 above).
Italija je nadalje trdila, da cena ni imela učinka na trgovino znotraj Unije in ni mogla izkrivljati konkurence zaradi razlogov, povezanih z obstojem svetovne cene za proizvode, ki so bili blago (glej pripombe družbe Portovesme, uvodna izjava 55).
Moreover, both EU and Italian production had failed to keep pace with rising demand for the metals concerned.
Poleg tega proizvodnja EU in Italije ni mogla slediti naraščajočemu povpraševanju po zadevnih kovinah.
In 2005 domestic production covered only 12 % of Italian demand for aluminium, 55 % of Italian demand for zinc, and 80 % of Italian demand for lead.
Leta 2005 je domača proizvodnja pokrivala samo 12 % povpraševanja po aluminiju, 55 % povpraševanja po cinku in 80 % povpraševanja po svincu v Italiji.
There was a worsening production deficit for these metals in the EU and in Italy, and demand was increasingly being met by imports from third countries.
Primanjkljaj v proizvodnji teh kovin v EU in Italiji je bil vedno večji, pri čemer so povpraševanju vedno pogosteje zadostili uvozniki iz tretjih držav.
If the metals industry in Italy disappeared, no new EU entrant would replace the capacity shut down in Italy, as EU plants were already working at full capacity, and no existing producer or new entrant would have an incentive to increase capacity, since the long-term prospects for the availability of affordable power were uncertain.
Če industrije aluminija v Italiji ne bi bilo, noben nov udeleženec iz EU na trgu ne bi mogel nadomestiti zmanjšanja zmogljivosti v Italiji, ker obrati EU že zdaj delujejo s polno zmogljivostjo in noben obstoječi proizvajalec ali nov udeleženec na trgu ne bi bil pripravljen povečati zmogljivosti, saj so dolgoročne napovedi glede razpoložljivosti dostopnih cen energije v prihodnosti negotove.
The maintenance in Italy of these production capabilities consequently could not damage competitors.
Ohranitev teh proizvodnih zmogljivosti v Italiji zato ne bi oškodovalo konkurenčnih ponudnikov.
Since the preferential tariff was not lower than the electricity prices paid on average by the companies’ competitors, it did not encourage exports from Sardinia towards other Member States.
Ker ugodnejša cena ni bila nižja od cen električne energije, ki so jih v povprečju plačevali konkurenčni ponudniki družb, ni spodbujala izvoza iz Sardinije v druge države članice.
If the tariff did constitute aid, it would be regional operating aid and would be compatible
Če cena pomeni pomoč, je to regionalna pomoč za tekoče poslovanje in je združljiva
Italy argued that, even if the Commission were to conclude that the measure was indeed State aid, the tariff could be considered compatible with the internal market on the ground that it was regional operating aid, which was admissible in Sardinia on the basis of the exemption in Article 107(3)(a) TFEU.
Italija je trdila, da se cena, četudi bi Komisija sklenila, da ukrep dejansko pomeni državno pomoč, lahko šteje za združljivo z notranjim trgom, ker je to regionalna pomoč za tekoče poslovanje in je na Sardiniji dopustna na podlagi oprostitve iz člena 107(3)(a) PDEU.
According to Italy, the imperfections of the Sardinian electricity market (market concentration, poor interconnection, and overcapacity in electricity generation) and the lack of access to gas infrastructure constituted a regional handicap, and the tariff sought to alleviate that handicap.
Po mnenju Italije nepopolnost trga z električno energijo na Sardiniji (koncentracija trga, slabo povezovanje in presežna zmogljivost proizvodnje električne energije) in pomanjkanje dostopa do infrastrukture za zemeljski plin pomenita regionalno oviro, ki naj bi se ublažila z zadevno ceno.
Electricity prices in Italy were 38 % higher than the EU average for energy-intensive users.
Cene električne energije v Italiji za energetsko intenzivne uporabnike so bile za 38 % višje od povprečnih cen v EU.
This created a competitiveness problem which was exacerbated, in Sardinia, by the shortcomings of the local electricity market and the absence of access to the natural gas grid.
To je ustvarilo težavo na področju konkurenčnosti, ki je na Sardiniji nastala zaradi pomanjkljivosti lokalnega trga z električno energijo in pomanjkanja dostopa do omrežja z zemeljskim plinom.
Italy contended that the measure contributed to regional development because the metals industry made a major contribution to the economy and to employment in Sardinia: the metals industry accounted for 12 % of the employed workforce and for 12,2 % of regional GNP in manufacturing.
Italija je trdila, da je ukrep prispeval k regionalnemu razvoju, ker je sektor kovin veliko prispeval h gospodarstvu in zaposlovanju na Sardiniji: sektor kovin je predstavljal 12 % zaposlene delovne sile in 12,2 % regionalnega BNP v proizvodnji.
The tariff had positive repercussions on employment and the maintenance of the social and economic fabric of the island.
Cena je pozitivno vplivala na zaposlovanje ter ohranjanje družbene in gospodarske strukture na otoku.
According to Italy, the tariff was proportional to the disadvantages faced by the beneficiaries, because it merely aligned the electricity prices paid by Sardinian producers on the average prices paid by their EU competitors.
Po mnenju Italije je bila cena sorazmerna s pomanjkljivostmi, s katerimi so se soočali upravičenci, saj je samo prilagodila cene električne energije, ki so jih plačevali proizvajalci na Sardiniji, povprečnim cenam, ki so jih plačevali konkurenčni ponudniki upravičencev v EU.
The tariff was also short-term and transitional, since it was expected to end upon the completion of infrastructure projects aimed at improving interconnection with the electricity and gas grids (the new SAPEI interconnection cable and the GALSI gas pipeline) [30].
Cena je bila tudi kratkoročna in prehodna, saj naj bi se končala z dokončanjem infrastrukturnih projektov, namenjenih izboljšanju povezav z elektroenergetskimi in plinovodnimi omrežji (novim povezovalnim kablom SAPEI in plinovodom GALSI) [30].
According to Italy, the measure was also degressive, because the preferential price was indexed on the basis of variations in fuel prices, and could only increase or remain unchanged.
Po mnenju Italije se je ukrep tudi postopno zmanjševal, saj je bila ugodnejša cena valorizirana na podlagi nihanj cene goriva in bi se lahko samo zvišala ali ostala nespremenjena.
Portovesme considered that the 2005 tariffs did not distort competition, that they were necessary to ensure the survival of the industries concerned, and that they could be considered compatible as regional aid.
Družba Portovesme je menila, da cene iz leta 2005 niso izkrivljale konkurence, da so bile nujne za zagotavljanje preživetja zadevnih industrij in da se jih kot regionalno pomoč lahko šteje za združljive.
The company’s arguments are similar to those put forward by Italy, to which reference may be made (see recitals 87 to 104).
Trditve družbe so podobne tistim, ki jih je navedla Italija in na katere se je mogoče sklicevati (glej uvodne izjave 87 do 104)).
Eurallumina likewise considered that the 2005 tariffs did not distort competition, were necessary to ensure the survival of the industries concerned, and could be considered compatible as regional aid.
Družba Eurallumina je prav tako menila, da cene iz leta 2005 niso izkrivljale konkurence, da so bile nujne za zagotavljanje preživetja zadevnih industrij in da se jih kot regionalno pomoč lahko šteje za združljive.
The company’s arguments are similar to those put forward by Italy, to which reference may be made.
Trditve družbe so podobne tistim, ki jih je navedla Italija in na katere se je mogoče sklicevati.
The two competitors of Portovesme and Syndial that had submitted observations in Case C 38/B/04 submitted observations in this case too.
Konkurenčna ponudnika družb Portovesme in Syndial, ki sta predložila pripombe v zadevi C 38/B/04, sta predložila pripombe tudi v tej zadevi.
Both of them contended that the disputed measure constituted operating aid which should be considered incompatible with the internal market.
Oba sta trdila, da sporni ukrepi pomenijo pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, ki jo je treba šteti za nezdružljivo z notranjim trgom.
The tariffs are part of a regional support strategy
Cene so del strategije za regionalno pomoč
Italy contended that the 2005 tariffs were very different from the tariffs implemented in 2004, since they were now in line with the requirements of the Regional Aid Guidelines.
Italija je trdila, da so se cene iz leta 2005 zelo razlikovale od cen, uvedenih leta 2004, saj so bile sedaj v skladu z zahtevami smernic o regionalni pomoči.
According to Italy, the tariffs might, on the basis of a superficial assessment, be classified as operating aid, but in reality they were part of an array of measures designed to favour regional development in Sardinia.
Po mnenju Italije se cene na podlagi površne ocene lahko opredelijo kot pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, vendar so dejansko del svežnja ukrepov, naklonjenih regionalnemu razvoju na Sardiniji.
Italy drew attention, in particular, to the close link between the tariffs and the commitment to carry out long-term investments that beneficiaries were requested to give.
Italija je opozorila zlasti na tesno povezavo med cenami in obveznostjo glede izvajanja dolgoročnih naložb, ki so jo morali prevzeti upravičenci.
The suspensive clause making the implementation of the measure subject to authorisation by the Commission testified, according to Italy, to its regional aid character.
Klavzula o odložitvi, zaradi katere je izvajanje ukrepa pogojeno z odobritvijo s strani Komisije, je po mnenju Italije dokaz, da je ukrep regionalna pomoč.
The memorandum of understanding (protocollo d’intesa) signed by the Region and the beneficiaries was the lynchpin of this strategy.
Memorandum o soglasju (protocollo d’intesa), ki sta ga podpisali regija in upravičenci, je nosilni steber te strategije.
It comprised the following:
Obsegal je naslednje:
the productive investments described in the industrial plans submitted by the beneficiaries;
produktivne naložbe, opisane v industrijskih načrtih, ki so jih predložili upravičenci;
the speedy authorisation of energy interconnection infrastructure enabling the beneficiaries to source energy at competitive prices (the GALSI gas pipeline and the SAPEI interconnection cable);
hitro odobritev infrastrukture energetskih povezav, ki bo upravičencem omogočala oskrbo z električno energijo po konkurenčnih cenah (plinovod GALSI in povezovalni kabel SAPEI);
the award of an integrated concession for the exploitation of the Sulcis coalmine and the construction/operation of a new coal-fuelled power plant intended to supply power to the beneficiaries; and
dodelitev integrirane koncesije za izkoriščanje premogovnika v regiji Sulcis in izgradnjo/delovanje nove elektrarne na premog, namenjene za dobavo električne energije upravičencem; in
the preferential tariffs.
ugodnejše cene.
Italy took the view that the tariffs should be seen as a policy instrument aimed at safeguarding sectors threatened by high energy prices, which would otherwise relocate outside Italy and Europe, owing to aggressive competition from non-EU companies with lower production costs.
Italija je menila, da bi bilo treba cene obravnavati kot instrument politike, namenjen zaščiti sektorjev, ki jih ogrožajo visoke cene električne energije in bi se v nasprotnem primeru zaradi agresivne konkurence podjetij, ki niso iz EU in imajo nižje proizvodne stroške, preselili iz Italije in Evrope.
The tariffs were to be applied until the completion of the planned infrastructure and the achievement of a competitive internal market for energy.
Cene naj bi se uporabljale do dokončanja načrtovane infrastrukture in do vzpostavitve konkurenčnega notranjega trga za električno energijo.
The measure was in line with the spirit of regional aid, because it promoted economic growth and employment on an island where energy-intensive production suffered from a competitive disadvantage owing not only to the imperfect state of liberalisation of the electricity market but also to exceptional infrastructural deficiencies in Sardinia as regards interconnection to the national electricity and gas grids.
Ukrep je bil v skladu z duhom regionalne pomoči, saj je spodbujal gospodarsko rast in zaposlovanje na otoku, na katerem je energetsko intenzivna proizvodnja trpela zaradi neugodnega konkurenčnega položaja, nastalega zaradi nepopolnega stanja liberalizacije trga z električno energijo in izrednih infrastrukturnih pomanjkljivosti na Sardiniji v zvezi s povezavo z nacionalnimi elektroenergetskimi in plinovodnimi omrežji.
In support of this integrated approach, Italy cited the First Report of the High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and Environment [31], which found that the liberalisation process in the energy sector had not produced satisfactory results, that better interconnection was necessary, and that long-term supply contracts with predictable prices or partnerships between customers and energy suppliers were desirable.
V podporo temu integriranemu pristopu je Italija navedla prvo poročilo skupine na visoki ravni za konkurenčnost, energijo in okolje [31], ki je ugotovila, da proces liberalizacije v sektorju električne energije ni prinesel zadovoljivih rezultatov, da je potrebna boljša povezanost in da so zaželene dolgoročne dobavne pogodbe s predvidljivimi cenami ali partnerstva med strankami in dobavitelji električne energije.
Italy argued that the measures planned for Sardinia moved in this direction, but that short-term measures such as the tariffs were also needed in order to safeguard the competitiveness of Sardinian industry and ensure its survival until the planned investments were carried out and the structural problems were resolved.
Italija je trdila, da so ukrepi, načrtovani za Sardinijo, delovali v tej smeri, vendar so bili za zaščito konkurenčnosti industrije na Sardiniji in njeno preživetje do izvedbe načrtovanih naložb in rešitve strukturnih težav potrebni tudi kratkoročni ukrepi, kot so bile ugodnejše cene.
The aid offsets a regional disadvantage
Pomoč izravnava regionalne slabosti
Italy contended that it was not possible to compare power prices paid by the Sardinian beneficiaries and average power prices paid by comparable undertakings on the Italian mainland, since energy-intensive undertakings purchased electricity via bilateral contracts which were not in the public domain.
Italija je trdila, da ni mogoče primerjati cen električne energije, ki jih plačujejo upravičenci s Sardinije, s povprečnimi cenami, ki jih plačujejo primerljiva podjetja v celinski Italiji, saj so energetsko intenzivna podjetja električno energijo kupovala preko dvostranskih pogodb, ki niso javno dostopne.
According to Italy, the Commission erred in carrying out a comparison based on prices recorded on power exchanges, since only a marginal part of these undertakings’ energy supplies was procured on exchanges.
Po mnenju Italije je Komisija naredila napako pri izvedbi primerjave na podlagi cen, zabeleženih na borzah električne energije, saj je bil samo manjši del dobave energije teh podjetij pridobljen na borzah.
According to Italy, prices negotiated via bilateral contracts would be favourable to consumers only if the consumers could freely choose their suppliers and source electricity which was produced using competitive technologies.
Po mnenju Italije bi bile cene, dogovorjene preko dvostranskih pogodb, za odjemalce ugodne samo, če bi odjemalci lahko prosto izbirali svoje dobavitelje in dobivali električno energijo, ki je bila proizvedena s konkurenčnimi tehnologijami.
This was not possible in Sardinia, where power generation plants could not produce cheap electricity since they had no access to natural gas.
To na Sardiniji, kjer elektrarne niso mogle proizvajati poceni električne energije, saj niso imele dostopa do zemeljskega plina, ni bilo mogoče.
Besides, new investments in modern power generation were discouraged by the limited electrical interconnection which made it impossible to export electricity.
Poleg tega je od novih naložb v moderno proizvodnjo električne energije odvračala omejena elektroenergetska povezava, zaradi katere električne energije ni bilo mogoče izvažati.
Another factor was market concentration and the role played by incumbent operators.
Drug dejavnik sta bili koncentracija trga in vloga, ki so jo imeli prvotni nosilci dejavnosti.
In these circumstances, according to Italy, there was justification for applying tariffs which stabilised electricity prices until more effective competition was achieved on the electricity market.
V teh okoliščinah je bila, po mnenju Italije, uvedba cen, ki so ohranile cene električne energije, dokler na trgu z električno energijo ni bila dosežena učinkovitejša konkurenca, upravičena.
Italy once again argued that the preferential tariffs simulated the mechanism of a fully competitive market.
Italija je ponovno trdila, da so ugodnejše cene spodbujale mehanizem popolnoma konkurenčnega trga.
As regards the overcapacity in electricity generation which led the Commission to doubt that power prices in Sardinia were higher than on mainland Italy (since overcapacity should rather encourage generators to sell at competitive prices to large consumers — see recital 47), Italy put forward the following arguments.
Glede presežnih zmogljivosti proizvodnje električne energije, zaradi katere je Komisija dvomila, da so bile cene električne energije na Sardiniji višje od cen na celinski Italiji (ker bi presežna zmogljivost morala proizvajalce spodbujati k prodaji velikim odjemalcem po konkurenčnih cenah — glej uvodno izjavo 47), je Italija navedla naslednje trditve.
Sardinian overcapacity in electricity generation could not lead to lower prices for consumers, because in this specific case overcapacity was the result of limited interconnection, which made it necessary to establish a very high power reserve in order to safeguard the continuity of electricity supplies on the island [32].
Presežna zmogljivost proizvodnje električne energije na Sardiniji ni mogla voditi do nižjih cen za odjemalce, ker je v tem določenem primeru presežna zmogljivost nastala zaradi omejenega povezovanja, zaradi česar je bilo treba ustvariti zelo veliko zalogo električne energije za zaščito neprekinjenosti dobave električne energije na otoku [32].
Since this reserve was in any event remunerated via charges imposed on all electricity end-users, power suppliers had no interest in selling the electricity produced using this idle capacity at more competitive prices.
Ker je bila ta zaloga v vsakem primeru poplačana preko dajatev, ki jih morajo plačevati vsi končni uporabniki električne energije, dobavitelji električne energije niso imeli interesa za prodajo električne energije, saj so to neizkoriščeno zmogljivost uporabili po konkurenčnejših cenah.
The aid is proportional
Pomoč je sorazmerna
According to Italy the measure was proportional, because the price fixed by the AEEG for 2005 (see recital 34 above) corresponded to the average price paid in the EU by the beneficiaries’ competitors, which was calculated objectively by the regulator.
Po mnenju Italije je ukrep sorazmeren, ker je bila cena, ki jo je AEEG določil za leto 2005 (glej uvodno izjavo 34), enaka povprečni ceni, ki so jo konkurenčni ponudniki upravičencev plačevali v EU in jo je upravni organ objektivno izračunal.
Italy also pointed out that in Member States with regulated tariffs large industrial consumers paid prices as low as EUR 25 per MWh for their electricity supplies in 2005.
Italija je tudi poudarila, da so veliki industrijski odjemalci v državah članicah z reguliranimi cenami za dobavo električne energije leta 2005 plačevali tudi samo 25 EUR/MWh.
Italy therefore contested the data submitted by the complainants, which in its view were methodologically flawed, in that they overestimated the average electricity prices paid by the beneficiaries’ competitors in the EU.
Zato je Italija izpodbijala podatke, ki so jih predložili pritožniki in so bili po njenem mnenju zbrani na podlagi napačne metodologije, saj so precenili povprečne cene električne energije, ki so jih v EU plačevali konkurenčni ponudniki upravičencev.
The aid is temporary and degressive
Pomoč je začasna in se postopno zmanjšuje
According to Italy, the duration of the scheme, at six years rather than five, was justified by the need to wait for the completion of the energy infrastructure.
Po mnenju Italije je bilo trajanje sheme, in sicer šest namesto petih let, upravičeno zaradi potrebe po čakanju na dokončanje energetske infrastrukture.
Italy also contended that the degressivity requirement was met: the tariffs were degressive because they were adjusted on the basis of the weighted average of variations on the Amsterdam and Frankfurt power exchanges and could only increase but not decrease.
Italija je trdila tudi, da je bila zahteva glede postopnega zmanjševanja izpolnjena: cene so se postopno nižale, saj so bile prilagojene na podlagi tehtanega povprečja nihanj na borzah električne energije v Amsterdamu in Frankfurtu in bi se lahko samo zvišale ali ostale nespremenjene.
The tariffs were pegged to price variations on the power exchanges because, according to Italy, this was an objective benchmark which was broadly representative of trends in energy prices.
Cene so bile vezane na nihanje cen na borzah električne energije, ker je bilo to, po mnenju Italije, objektivno merilo, ki je na splošno reprezentativno za gibanje cen energije.
However, Italy maintained that actual price increases for EU energy-intensive users were generally considerably lower than the increases recorded on exchanges, as such users paid prices agreed through bilateral contracts, or set by the State where there were regulated tariffs, and these prices were less prone to variation.
Vendar je Italija trdila, da so bila dejanska zvišanja cen za energetsko intenzivne uporabnike v EU na splošno znatno nižja od zvišanj, zabeleženih na borzah, saj so ti uporabniki plačevali cene, dogovorjene z dvostranskimi pogodbami, ali cene, ki jih je določila država in so bile regulirane, te cene pa so bile manj podvržene nihanju.