natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Electricity prices in Italy are generally high, due to a generation mix based largely on fossil fuels (essentially gas), the absence of nuclear capacity and congestion on the interconnectors with the rest of Europe.
Cene električne energije v Italiji so na splošno visoke zaradi proizvodne mešanice, ki temelji zlasti na fosilnih gorivih (zlasti plinu), neobstoja jedrske zmogljivosti in prezasedenosti povezovalnih daljnovodov z ostalo Evropo.
In 2008 and 2009, average regional prices in Sardinia began to rise again.
Povprečne regionalne cene na Sardiniji so se leta 2008 in 2009 spet začele povečevati.
In the first half of 2009, prices in Sardinia continually remained above the national average (with an average price of EUR 106,60 MW/h compared with a PUN of EUR 60,50 MW/h).
Cene na Sardiniji so bile v prvi polovici leta 2009 stalno nad nacionalnim povprečjem (pri čemer je bila povprečna cena 106,60 EUR/MWh v primerjavi z nacionalno povprečno ceno 60,50 EUR/MWh).
In view of the above, the Commission considers that the extension of the tariff at issue cannot be considered compatible as regional aid under the 1998 guidelines on national regional aid.
Komisija ob upoštevanju navedenega meni, da se podaljšanje veljavnosti zadevne cene ne more šteti za združljivo kot regionalna pomoč v skladu s smernicami o nacionalni regionalni pomoči iz leta 1998.
Since Sardinia has ceased to be assisted pursuant to Article 87(3)(a) for the whole of the 2007-2013 period, it is not necessary to examine the compatibility of the aid in the light of the guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013.
Ker Sardinija ni več območje, ki prejema pomoč v skladu s členom 87(3)(a) v celotnem obdobju 2007–2013, ni treba preveriti združljivosti pomoči ob upoštevanju smernic o nacionalni regionalni pomoči za 2007–2013.
The practicalities of the VPP are in line with the criteria established in the 2007 letter.
Praktični vidiki virtualne elektrarne so v skladu z merili iz dopisa iz leta 2007.
The tariff is to be abolished three months after the launch of the VPP and by 31 December 2009 at the latest.
Ceno je treba odpraviti tri mesece po vzpostavitvi virtualne elektrarne in najpozneje do 31. decembra 2009.
Article 2 of the 1995 Decree reads: ‘The treatment of surcharges laid down in CIP [Commissione Interministeriale Prezzi or Interministerial Price Committee] resolution No 13 of 24 July 1992 and subsequent amendments, applying to all [electricity] supplies for the production of primary aluminium, but limited to the plants existing at the time of the entry into force of the present Decree, shall be abolished from 31 December 2005.
Člen 2 odloka iz leta 1995 določa: „obravnava dodatnih dajatev iz resolucije medresorskega odbora za cene [Commissione Interministeriale Prezzi] št. 13 z dne 24. julija 1992 in njenih poznejših sprememb, ki se uporablja za vso oskrbo [z električno energijo] pri proizvodnji primarnega aluminija, vendar le za obrate, ki so bili ob začetku veljavnosti tega odloka že ustanovljeni, se odpravi 31. decembra 2005.
After this date, the tariff treatment shall be brought into line with that for all customers’.
Po tem datumu bo cenovna obravnava usklajena z obravnavo vseh odjemalcev.“
This is the wording of Article 1 of the 2004 Decree.
To je besedilo iz člena 1 odloka iz leta 2004.
It also covered Alcoa’s Fusina smelter, even though that smelter was not located in an insular area devoid of connections to the energy networks.
Zajemalo je tudi talilnico družbe Alcoa v Fusini, čeprav se ta talilnica ne nahaja na otoku brez povezav z elektroenergetskimi omrežji.
In fact, according to Italy, the 2004 Decree was never applied to Alcoa, since the company could continue to benefit from the tariff until 1 December 2005 on the basis of the 1995 Decree.
Italija je dejansko navedla, da odlok iz leta 2004 ni nikoli veljal za družbo Alcoa, ker je bila družba do decembra 2005 še naprej upravičena do cene na podlagi odloka iz leta 1995.
It is not for the Commission to interpret Italian law in order to establish whether this is the case or not, as only Italian courts can provide definitive guidance on this point.
Komisija ni odgovorna za razlaganje italijanskega prava, da bi ugotovila, ali gre za to zadevo ali ne, saj lahko v zvezi s tem končne smernice zagotovijo le italijanska sodišča.
On the basis of the information available, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure at issue is comparable with the one assessed and approved by the Commission in 1996.
Komisija na podlagi dostopnih informacij dvomi, ali je zadevni ukrep primerljiv z ukrepom, ki ga je Komisija ocenila in odobrila leta 1996.
The tariffs were introduced by Article 1 of the Prime Ministerial Decree of 6 February 2004.
Cene so bile uvedene s členom 1 odloka predsednika vlade z dne 6. februarja 2004. Odlok je imel dva različna vpliva: (a) uvedel je ugodnejše cene električne energije za družbe Portovesme s.r.l.
The Decree had two distinct effects: (a) it introduced preferential electricity tariffs for the companies Portovesme Srl [2], ILA [3] and Euroallumina [4]; and (b) it prolonged the existing preferential tariff for Alco Transformazioni (a producer of primary aluminium, hereinafter ‘Alcoa’).
[2], ILA [3] in Euroallumina [4]; ter (b) podaljšal veljavno ugodnejšo ceno za družbo Alcoa Transformazioni (proizvajalec primarnega aluminija, v nadaljnjem besedilu: Alcoa).
The meeting was held on 9 December 2008.
Srečanje je poteklo 9. decembra 2008.
By letters dated 19 December 2008 and 19 May 2009, Italy provided additional information.
Italija je z dopisoma z dne 19. decembra 2008 in 19. maja 2009 predložila dodatna pojasnila.
The tariff was originally introduced for a period of 10 years (ending on 31 December 2005) in the context of a privatisation operation.
Cena je bila na začetku uvedena za obdobje 10 let (ki naj bi se končalo 31. decembra 2005) v okviru privatizacije.
That tariff was cleared under the State aid rules in a Commission decision which held that it did not constitute State aid.
Zadevna cena je bila odobrena v skladu s pravili o državni pomoči z odločbo Komisije, v kateri je bilo določeno, da cena ne pomeni državne pomoči.
Italy established the AEEG in 1995 [13].
Italija je ustanovila organ AEEG leta 1995 [13].
The AEEG is entrusted with a wide range of regulatory tasks and has far-reaching powers.
AEEG opravlja zelo različne regulativne naloge in ima obsežna pooblastila.
The management of surcharges and other contributions in the electricity sector is entrusted to the Equalisation Fund, a public body established by Legislative Decree No 98 of 26 January 1948.
Dodatne dajatve in druge prispevke v sektorju električne energije upravlja izravnalni sklad, tj. javni organ, ki je bil ustanovljen z zakonskim odlokom št. 98 z dne 26. januarja 1948.
The Equalisation Fund acts on instructions from the AEEG.
Izravnalni sklad deluje v skladu z navodili organa AEEG.
In 2000 Italy decided to include the Alumix tariff among the ‘general charges of the electricity system’ [25].
Italija se je leta 2000 odločila, da bo vključila ceno Alumix med „splošne dajatve elektroenergetskega sistema“ [25].
This new status led to the first significant change in the financing mechanism of the Alumix tariff.
Zaradi tega novega statusa se je prvič znatno spremenil finančni mehanizem cene Alumix.
The Commission noted that the regulatory framework and market conditions that had prevailed at the time of the Alumix decision were very different from those prevailing in the period covered by the opening decision.
Komisija je ugotovila, da so bili regulativni okvir in tržni pogoji ob sprejetju odločbe Alumix zelo drugačni od okvira in pogojev v obdobju, zajetem v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka.
In particular, the electricity market had now been liberalised and the administration of the scheme had been handed over to the Equalisation Fund.
Zlasti je bil trg z električno energijo zdaj liberaliziran, pri čemer se je upravljanje sheme preneslo na izravnalni sklad.
Alcoa further argues that, even if a change in circumstances had occurred, the company would still be entitled to ‘existing aid’ treatment, on the basis of Article 1(b)(v), first sentence, of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 [47] (measures which have become aid owing to the evolution of the common market).
Po mnenju družbe Alcoa bi bilo podjetje tudi v primeru spremembe okoliščin še vedno upravičeno do obravnave pomoči kot „obstoječa pomoč“ na podlagi prvega stavka člena 1(b)(v) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 [47] (ukrepi, ki so postali pomoč zaradi razvoja skupnega trga).
It says this is confirmed by the Belgian Coordination Centres case-law [48].
Družba Alcoa navaja, da to potrjuje sodna praksa v zadevi belgijskih centrov za usklajevanje [48].
Like Alcoa, Italy also maintains that the Alumix decision was not limited in time.
Italija se strinja z družbo Alcoa, da je bila odločba Alumix časovno neomejena.
It says this was intentional and shows that the Commission itself acknowledged that the tariff would need to be a long-term measure.
Italija navaja, da je bilo to narejeno namerno in ugotavlja, da je Komisija sama priznala, da bi morala biti cena dolgoročni ukrep.
Italy, moreover, submits that the economic underpinnings of the Alumix decision have remained unchanged over the years.
Italija poleg tega meni, da se gospodarski temelji odločbe Alumix z leti niso spremenili.
Therefore, there was nothing new in the extension of the tariff and it cannot be taken to constitute new aid.
Zato pri podaljšanju veljavnosti cene ni bilo sprememb in se to ne more šteti kot nova pomoč.
This infrastructure is currently in the construction phase.
Ta infrastruktura je zdaj v fazi gradnje.
Therefore, Italy submits that the tariffs must remain in place until it has been completed.
Italija zato meni, da morajo cene ostati nespremenjene, dokler gradnja ne bo končana.
As regards the temporal scope of the 2006 investigation, the Commission notes that, in this case, there is no overlap between the Alumix scheme, which expired in December 2005, and the challenged prolongation of the tariff, which took effect on 1 January 2006 (see recital 48).
Kar zadeva časovni okvir preiskave iz leta 2006, Komisija ugotavlja, da v tem primeru ni prekrivanja med shemo Alumix, ki se je iztekla decembra 2005, in izpodbijanim podaljšanjem veljavnosti cene, ki je začelo veljati 1. januarja 2006 (glej uvodno izjavo 48).
This is borne out by paragraph 132 of the Court’s judgment.
To potrjuje točka 132 sodbe Sodišča.
Further, if Alcoa’s proposal was followed, subsidies granted by Member States to fill the gap between a price freely negotiated between two market operators and the theoretical price at which agreement might have been arrived at in conditions of full competition would not constitute State aid.
Če bi se poleg tega predlog družbe Alcoa upošteval, subvencije, ki jih države članice dodelijo za zapolnitev vrzeli med ceno, prosto dogovorjeno med dvema udeležencema na trgu, in teoretično ceno, za katero bi se lahko sklenil dogovor pod pogoji popolne konkurence, ne bi pomenile državne pomoči.
This would defeat the very purpose of State aid control.
S tem bi se onemogočil glavni namen nadzora državne pomoči.
However, for the sake of completeness, since the electricity sector was liberalised for business end-users after the approval of the original Alumix tariff, which did not constitute aid, the Commission has examined the question of whether liberalisation might be relevant to the classification of the tariff as existing or new aid.
Vendar je Komisija zaradi celovitosti in ker je bil sektor električne energije liberaliziran za poslovne končne uporabnike po odobritvi prvotne cene Alumix, ki ni pomenila pomoči, preučila vprašanje, ali bi lahko bila liberalizacija pomembna za opredelitev cene kot obstoječa ali nova pomoč.
Alcoa submits that this is not the case.
Družba Alcoa meni, da temu ni tako.
The decision’s findings, therefore, have to be interpreted as running until 2005 only.
Zato je treba obravnavati, da so ugotovitve iz odločbe veljavne le do leta 2005.
This was clearly acknowledged by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 105 and 106 of its judgement upholding the 2006 decision to initiate proceedings [96].
To je jasno priznalo Sodišče prve stopnje v točkah 105 in 106 svoje sodbe, ki potrjuje odločitev o sprožitvi postopka iz leta 2006 [96].
Sardinia suffers from a situation of excess generation capacity, especially in the high-cost segment (oil-fired plants), owing to the government’s aborted plans to concentrate Italy’s heavy industry on the island.
Sardinija ima težave s presežno proizvodno zmogljivostjo, zlasti v segmentu z visokimi stroški (naftne elektrarne), ker je vlada opustila svoje načrte o koncentraciji težke industrije na otoku.
This led to overinvestment by ENEL in generation plants.
Zato je ENEL preveč vlagal v proizvodne obrate.
First, as regards the nature of the problem of competition in Sardinia, the following should be noted.
Kar zadeva naravo težav v zvezi s konkurenčnostjo na Sardiniji, je treba navesti naslednje.
The high prices in Sardinia are the consequence of a combination of factors: insufficient interconnection, the cost structure of the local generation portfolio and the market power of the two principal generators.
Razlogi za visoke cene na Sardiniji so med drugim nezadostno medsebojno povezovanje, stroškovna struktura lokalnega proizvodnega portfelja in tržna moč dveh glavnih proizvajalcev.
The 2006 Decision to open formal investigation proceedings also concerned Terni.
Odločitev o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave iz leta 2006 je vključevala tudi družbo Terni.
However, the Terni and Alcoa tariffs were assessed separately.
Vendar so se cene za družbo Terni in družbo Alcoa obravnavale ločeno.
In 1996, ENEL was the only producer and distributor of energy in Italy and the reduced electricity tariff granted by ENEL to Alcoa for the benefit of Alumix SpA was compared to ENEL’s average marginal production cost for electricity for the period concerned.
Leta 1996 je bila družba ENEL edina proizvajalka in distributerka energije v Italiji in nižja cena električne energije, ki jo je družba ENEL odobrila družbi Alcoa v korist družbi Alumix s.p.a., se je primerjala s povprečnimi mejnimi proizvodnimi stroški družbe ENEL za električno energijo v zadevnem obdobju.
The Italian authorities replied by letters dated 6 February 2004 and 9 June 2004.
Italijanski organi so odgovorili z dopisoma z dne 6. februarja 2004 in 9. junija 2004.
Further clarifications were submitted by Italy by letter dated 20 September 2004.
Italija je predložila dodatna pojasnila z dopisom z dne 20. septembra 2004.
Italy submitted observations by letter dated 25 October 2006.
Italija je predložila svoje pripombe z dopisom z dne 25. oktobra 2006.
Further information was submitted by letters dated 9 November 2006 and 7 December 2006.
Dodatna pojasnila je predložila z dopisoma z dne 9. novembra 2006 in 7. decembra 2006.
Article 11(11) of Law No 80/2005 reads as follows: ‘In order to allow the development and the restructuring of production of the companies concerned, the application of favourable tariff conditions for the supply of electricity, provided by Article 1(1)(c) of Decree Law No 25 of 18 February 2003, as converted, with amendments, into Law No 83 of 17 April 2003, is prolonged until the end of 2010, based on the tariff conditions applicable as of 31 December 2004’. The provision of Decree Law No 25/03 referred to the characterisation of the Alcoa tariff as a general system charge.
Člen 11(11) zakona št. 80/2005 določa: „da se omogočita razvoj in prestrukturiranje proizvodnje zadevnih podjetij, se uporaba ugodnejših cenovnih pogojev za dobavo električne energije, ki jo določa člen 1(1)(c) zakonskega odloka št. 25 z dne 18. februarja 2003, kakor je bil spremenjen v zakon št. 83 z dne 17. aprila 2003, podaljša do konca leta 2010 na podlagi cenovnih pogojev, ki se uporabljajo od 31. decembra 2004.“ V določbi iz zakonskega odloka št. 25/03 je bila cena za družbo Alcoa opredeljena kot splošne sistemske dajatve.
By letter dated 20 February 2007, the Commission requested further information on the tariff scheme.
Z dopisom z dne 20. februarja 2007 je Komisija pozvala Italijo, naj predloži dodatna pojasnila o shemi cene.
That information was provided by Italy by letters dated 10 and 14 May 2007 respectively.
Italija je ta pojasnila predložila z dopisoma z dne 10. in 14. maja 2007.
The Commission also received comments from other interested parties.
Komisija je prav tako prejela pripombe od drugih zainteresiranih strani.
By letter dated 22 March 2005, it forwarded those comments to Italy, which was given the opportunity to respond.
Komisija je z dopisom z dne 22. marca 2005 o zadevnih pripombah obvestila Italijo, ki je imela možnost, da nanje odgovori.
Further clarifications were requested by letter dated 22 August 2006.
Komisija je zahtevala dodatna pojasnila z dopisom z dne 22. avgusta 2006.
Italy replied by letter dated 28 September 2006.
Italija je odgovorila z dopisom z dne 28. septembra 2006.
Therefore, a representative price that would reflect perfect competition plausibly would have to be a time-weighted average.
Zato bi morala biti reprezentativna cena, ki bi verodostojno izražala popolno konkurenco, časovno tehtano povprečje.
This average should include some elements of low prices for baseload times but also some elements of high prices for peak times.
To povprečje mora vključevati nekatere elemente nizkih cen za obdobja osnovne obremenitve, vendar tudi elemente visokih cen za obdobje večje porabe.
In its submission, Alcoa claims that, even assuming (hypothetically) that the tariff might have become aid, it would have done so through a change of market conditions or other external circumstances, i.e. due to the evolution of the common market.
Družba Alcoa v svoji predložitvi navaja, da tudi če bi (hipotetično) cena morda postala pomoč, bi se to zgodilo zaradi spremembe tržnih pogojev ali drugih zunanjih okoliščin, npr. zaradi razvoja skupnega trga.
This would warrant classification as existing aid.
To bi utemeljilo opredelitev ukrepa kot obstoječa pomoč.
The Alumix decision was based on the Decree of 19 December 1995, which established the tariff for a period of 10 years.
Odločba Alumix je temeljila na odloku z dne 19. decembra 1995, ki je določil ceno za 10 let.
It explicitly stipulated that the tariff would be abolished after 31 December 2005.
Odlok izrecno določa, da naj bi se cene odpravile po 31. decembru 2005.
In a letter dated 19 January 2007 (hereinafter ‘the 2007 letter’), the staff of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition explored the idea of transitional measures for the phasing-out of the tariff in Sardinia.
Z dopisom z dne 19. januarja 2007 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dopis iz leta 2007) je osebje generalnega direktorata za konkurenco Komisije preučilo zamisel o prehodnih ukrepih za postopno opuščanje cene na Sardiniji.
The situation prevailing in the Sardinian market, due in part to its isolation, the limited interconnection capacity with mainland Italy and the unfavourable competitive conditions, appeared to warrant, on an exceptional basis, the approval of an operating aid in the form of a preferential tariff for a transitional phasing-out period of around two years [115], in exchange for the adoption of measures to bolster competition in the Sardinian market by way of the establishment of a virtual power plant or VPP [116].
Prevladujoče okoliščine na trgu na Sardiniji, delno zaradi njene osamljene lege, omejena zmogljivost medsebojnega povezovanja s celinsko Italijo in neugodni konkurenčni pogoji naj bi bili izjemoma razlog za odobritev pomoči za tekoče poslovanje v obliki ugodnejše cene za približno dveletno prehodno obdobje opuščanja [115] v zameno za sprejetje ukrepov za krepitev konkurence na trgu na Sardiniji z vzpostavitvijo virtualne elektrarne [116].
In Sardinia, E.ON can set the price for 67 % of the hours, ENEL for 29 % of the hours. If adjacent zones are also considered, ENEL is price-setting in the macrozone Macrosud-Sardegna for 63 % of the hours. However, in the region MacroSud, ENEL is price-setting for 100 % of the hours.
Na Sardiniji lahko E.ON določi ceno za 67 % ur, ENEL pa za 29 % ur. Če se upoštevajo tudi sosednja območja, ENEL določa ceno na makroobmočju Macrosud-Sardegna za 63 % ur. Vendar v regiji MacroSud ENEL določa ceno za 100 % ur.
Council Decision 2010/461/CFSP
Sklep Sveta 2010/461/SZVP
on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
o podpori dejavnostim Pripravljalne komisije Organizacije pogodbe o celoviti prepovedi jedrskih poskusov (CTBTO) za povečanje zmogljivosti za opazovanje in preverjanje ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 26(2) and 31(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o Evropski uniji in zlasti členov 26(2) in 31(1) Pogodbe,
On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Strategy), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the European Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
Evropski svet je 12. decembra 2003 sprejel Strategijo EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje (Strategija); poglavje III Strategije vsebuje seznam ukrepov, ki jih je treba za boj proti širjenju tovrstnega orožja sprejeti v Evropski uniji pa tudi v tretjih državah.
The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).
Unija dejavno izvaja Strategijo in uveljavlja ukrepe iz poglavja III Strategije, zlasti s finančno podporo za posebne projekte, ki jih izvajajo večstranske institucije, kot je to začasni tehnični sekretariat Organizacije pogodbe o celoviti prepovedi jedrskih poskusov (CTBTO).
That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Navedeno skupno stališče med drugim poziva k spodbujanju držav k podpisu in ratifikaciji Pogodbe o celoviti prepovedi jedrskih poskusov (CTBT).
The States Signatories of the CTBT have decided to establish a Preparatory Commission, endowed with legal capacity, and which has standing as an international organisation, for the purpose of carrying out the effective implementation of the CTBT, pending the establishment of the CTBTO.
Države podpisnice CTBT so se odločile, da ustanovijo Pripravljalno komisijo, ki bo do ustanovitve CTBTO imela pravno sposobnost z namenom učinkovitega izvajanja CTBT.
The early entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT and the strengthening of the monitoring and verification system of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO are important objectives of the Strategy.
Čimprejšnji začetek veljavnosti in vsesplošna uporaba CTBT ter krepitev sistema opazovanja in preverjanja Pripravljalne komisije CTBTO so pomembni cilji Strategije.
In this connection, the nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in October 2006 and May 2009 further underlined the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT and the need for an accelerated building-up and strengthening of the CTBT monitoring and verification system.
V tej zvezi sta jedrska poskusa, ki ju je izvedla Demokratična ljudska republika Koreja oktobra 2006 in maja 2009, še dodatno potrdila, da bi morala CTBT začeti veljati čim prej ter da bi bilo treba pospešeno nadgraditi in okrepiti sistem opazovanja in preverjanja v okviru CTBT.