natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On 23 March 2010, the Commission received a reply by the Dutch State – which had asked for a deadline extension – to the Decision of 5 February 2010.
Komisija je 23. marca 2010 prejela odgovor Nizozemske na sklep z dne 5. februarja 2010, v katerem je zaprosila za podaljšanje roka.
The Dutch State also provided extra information on the December 2009 Restructuring Plan of the new ABN AMRO Group with, inter alia, financial projections for a worst case scenario.
Nizozemska je predložila tudi dodatne informacije glede načrta prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 za skupino ABN AMRO, ki so vsebovale tudi finančne napovedi za najslabši možni scenarij.
On the same day, the Commission sent an electronic mail with follow-up questions, which were answered on 9 June 2010.
Istega dne je Komisija poslala elektronsko pošto z nadaljnjimi vprašanji, odgovor nanje pa je prejela 9. junija 2010.
On 8 November 2010, the Dutch State sent an update (‘the November 2010 Restructuring Plan’) – dated 29 October 2010 – of ABN AMRO Group’s restructuring plan of 4 December 2009.
Nizozemska je 8. novembra 2010 poslala posodobitev (v nadaljnjem besedilu: načrt prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010) – z datumom 29. oktober 2010 – načrta prestrukturiranja skupine ABN AMRO z dne 4. decembra 2009.
On 10 January 2011, the Dutch State sent a document explaining how the ABN AMRO Group updated forecasts of 8 November 2010 compared to the original forecasts of 4 December 2009.
Nizozemska je 10. januarja 2011 poslala dokument, v katerem je pojasnila, kako je skupina ABN AMRO posodobila napovedi z dne 8. novembra 2010 v primerjavi s prvotnimi napovedmi z dne 4. decembra 2009.
On 3 October 2008, the Dutch State acquired FBN from Fortis Bank SA/NV for EUR 12,8 billion. As a result of that acquistion, the Dutch State also became the indirect owner of ABN AMRO N, since FBN was – within Fortis Bank SA/NV – the legal owner of ABN AMRO N. On 3 October 2008, the Dutch State also committed itself to indemnify Fortis SA/NV for any charge Fortis SA/NV would face as a consequence of its continued presence in the CSA.
Nizozemska je 3. oktobra 2008 od Fortis Bank SA/NV kupila banko FBN za 12,8 milijarde EUR. Zaradi tega odkupa je Nizozemska postala tudi posredni lastnik banke ABN AMRO N, saj je bila banka FBN – v okviru Fortis Bank SA/NV – pravni lastnik banke ABN AMRO N. Nizozemska se je 3. oktobra 2008 tudi obvezala, da bo holdingu Fortis SA/NV poravnala morebitne stroške, ki bi jih imel zaradi nadaljnje prisotnosti v SDK.
RWA [21]
TPS [21]
RWA
TPS
In 2009, FBN realised a net profit of EUR 406 million, helped by two exceptional gains (a EUR 362,5 million cash settlement with Fortis Capital Company) and a Madoff-related recovery of provisions of EUR 16 million.
V letu 2009 je banka FBN realizirala čisti dobiček v višini 406 milijonov EUR, pri čemer sta ji pomagala dva izredna dobička (denarna poravnava s podjetjem Fortis Capital Company v višini 362,5 milijona EUR in z Madoffom povezano vračilo rezervacij v višini 16 milijonov EUR).
Net underlying profit decreased to EUR 27 million [35] (from EUR 604 million in 2008).
Čisti osnovni dobiček se je zmanjšal na 27 milijonov EUR [35] (s 604 milijona EUR v letu 2008).
PFS was responsible for the EUR 922 million post-tax provision related to the Madoff-fraud which FBN registered in 2008.
Oddelek PFS je bil odgovoren za 922 milijonov EUR vredno rezervacijo po obdavčitvi, povezano z Madoffovo goljufijo, ki jo je banka FBN evidentirala v letu 2008.
PFS has income of EUR […] million and RWA of EUR […] million.
PFS ima prihodke v višini […] milijonov EUR in TPS v višini […] milijonov EUR.
The Dutch State provided the Commission with the December 2009 Restructuring Plan on 4 December 2009.
Nizozemska je načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 Komisiji predložila 4. decembra 2009.
Further information was provided in March 2010 [43].
Dodatne informacije je zagotovila marca 2010 [43].
In its letter of 20 August 2010, the Dutch State indicates that a first stake of between [0 - 50] - [10 - 60] % might be made available for an IPO in […] at the earliest, followed by a secondary offering of another [0 - 50] - [10 - 60] % in 2015.
Nizozemska v svojem dopisu z dne 20. avgusta 2010 navaja, da bo za prvo javno ponudbo morda na voljo prvi delež med [0 – 50] - [10 – 60] % najprej leta […], ki ji bo sledila druga ponudba [0 – 50] – [10 – 60] % leta 2015.
The Dutch State wants to earn back its initial investment increased by its cost of funding of [2 - 5] %.
Nizozemska želi povrniti svojo prvotno naložbo, ki se je zaradi stroškov financiranja povečala za [2 – 5] %.
The short-term liquidity facility covered by Measure Y1 remained in place until the end of June 2009.
Kratkoročno likvidnostno posojilo, zajeto v ukrepu Y1, se je izvajalo do konca junija 2009.
While that measure was in place the remuneration changed a number of times.
V času veljavnosti ukrepa se je obrestovanje nekajkrat spremenilo.
Some of the measures covered by the Decision of 5 February 2010 [56] were notified to the Commission in July 2009 and the remainder in January 2010.
Nekateri ukrepi, zajeti v sklepu z dne 5 februarja 2010 [56], so bili Komisiji priglašeni julija 2009, preostali ukrepi pa januarja 2010.
In July 2009, the Dutch State notified a capital relief instrument or ‘CRI’ (‘Measure A’ with a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion), a Mandatory Convertible Security (‘MCS’) of EUR 500 million (‘Measure B1’) and a second MCS-tranche of EUR 300 million (‘Measure B2’).
Nizozemska je julija 2009 priglasila instrument za razbremenitev kapitala ali „CRI“ (capital relief instrument) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ukrep A, ki ima učinek razbremenitve kapitala v višini 1,7 milijarde EUR), izdajo obvezno zamenljivega vrednostnega papirja (mandatory convertible security, v nadaljnjem besedilu: MCS) v vrednosti 500 milijonov EUR (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ukrep B1) in drugo tranšo MCS v višini 300 milijonov EUR (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ukrep B2).
On 15 October 2010, ABN AMRO Bank and the Dutch State announced that the CRI would be terminated as of 30 October 2010.
ABN AMRO Bank in Nizozemska sta 15. oktobra 2010 naznanili prenehanje instrumenta za razbremenitev kapitala 30. oktobra 2010.
Indeed, as ABN AMRO Bank had in the meantime implemented the Basel II requirements, the CRI had become less interesting and less necessary [58].
Ker je ABN AMRO Bank med tem izvedla zahteve Basla II, je postal instrument za razbremenitev kapitala manj zanimiv in manj nujen [58].
That MCS was categorised as hybrid Tier 1 capital, it carried a coupon of 10 % and automatically converted into shares of ABN AMRO II at the time of the separation of ABN AMRO N from ABN AMRO Bank.
Ta MCS je bil opredeljen kot hibridni kapital prvega reda, imel je kupon v vrednosti 10 %, v času ločitve banke ABN AMRO N od ABN AMRO Bank pa se je samodejno pretvoril v deleže ABN AMRO II.
From that moment on, it qualified as core Tier 1 capital.
Od takrat naprej je bil vrednoten kot osnovni kapital prvega reda.
The Dutch State provided that extra capital by converting Tier 2 debt with a nominal value of EUR 1,35 billion into Tier 1 capital.
Nizozemska je zagotovila dodatni kapital tako, da je dolg drugega reda z nominalno vrednostjo 1,35 milijarde EUR pretvorila v kapital prvega reda.
Consequently, the transaction did not involve any new cash [63].
Zato pri transakciji niso bila potrebna nova denarna sredstva [63].
The column ‘Reason’ is the same as that in Table 1 at point (57) of the Decision of 5 February 2010.
Stolpec z naslovom „Razlog“ je enak kot v preglednici 1 točke (57) sklepa z dne 5. februarja 2010.
As indicated in recital 110, following the separation of ABN AMRO N with ABN AMRO Bank on 6 February 2010, the measures and the objectives of the measures were reshuffled.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 110, so bili ukrepi in cilji ukrepov po ločitvi ABN AMRO N od ABN AMRO Bank 6. februarja 2010 prerazporejeni.
MCS
obvezno zamenljiv vrednostni papir (MCS)
Second, as indicated in recital 118 of the Decision of 5 February 2010, it was also of crucial importance for the viability of ABN AMRO Group that it would be able to improve its net interest margin from the low levels of FBN and ABN AMRO N in the second half of 2008 and the first half of 2009.
Drugič, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 118 sklepa z dne 5. februarja 2010, je bilo za uspešno poslovanje skupine ABN AMRO bistvenega pomena, da bi lahko svojo čisto obrestno maržo zvišala z nizkih ravni bank FBN in ABN AMRO N v drugi polovici leta 2008 in prvi polovici leta 2009.
In its Decision of 5 February 2010, the Commission indicated that it needed more details on those issues, so as to evaluate whether long-term viability had truly been restored.
V svojem sklepu z dne 5. februarja 2010 je Komisija navedla, da potrebuje več podatkov glede teh vprašanj, da bi lahko ocenila, ali je bilo dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje dejansko ponovno vzpostavljeno.
As regards to the fact that the acquisition (Measure Z) took place two and a half months after that valuation was made, the Dutch State believed that no corrections were necessary since uncertainties were already reflected in the early October 2008 valuation [78].
Glede tega, da je bil nakup (ukrep Z) opravljen dva meseca in pol po tej oceni, je Nizozemska menila, da niso bili potrebni nobeni popravki, saj so bile negotovosti že zajete v oceni iz začetka oktobra 2008 [78].
The Dutch State also argued that investment banking and toxic assets were usually at the basis of confidence problems in other banks, translating into important share price declines for those banks.
Nizozemska je trdila tudi, da sta bila naložbeno bančništvo in slaba aktiva običajno temelj težav z zaupanjem v drugih bankah, kar se je za te banke pokazalo v obliki velikih padcev cene delnic.
The opening balance of ABN AMRO Z was already a negative EUR 7,4 billion on 3 October 2008 and the share of Fortis SA/NV therein was approximately EUR 2,5 billion. With respect to the sources of the capital shortfall, the Dutch State admitted that there had been a transfer of EUR 1 billion worth of Unicredito shares from ABN AMRO Z to the operational tracking shares (including approximately EUR 300 million to ABN AMRO N), but it provided information showing that the Unicredito share transfer took place in February 2008, well before the Dutch State intervened.
Začetna bilanca stanja ABN AMRO Z je bila 3. oktobra 2008 že negativnih 7,4 milijarde EUR, delež holdinga Fortis SA/NV pri tem pa je bil približno 2,5 milijarde EUR. Glede virov kapitalskega primanjkljaja je Nizozemska priznala, da je bil izveden prenos delnic banke Unicredito v vrednosti 1 milijarde EUR od ABN AMRO Z na operativne „tracking shares“ (vključno s približno 300 milijoni EUR banki ABN AMRO N), vendar je predložila informacije, ki kažejo, da je bil prenos delnic banke Unicredito izveden februarja 2008, kar je precej pred posredovanjem Nizozemske.
Therefore the Unicredito share transfer could not be considered as State aid.
Zato prenosa delnic banke Unicredito ni mogoče šteti za državno pomoč.
The Dutch State explained that the separation costs (namely Measures B2 and B3) were the result of the CSA, to which the Dutch State was de facto a party since 3 October 2008.
Nizozemska je pojasnila, da so stroški ločitve (tj. ukrepa B2 in B3) nastali zaradi sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija, saj je bila Nizozemska dejansko pogodbenica tega sporazuma od 3. oktobra 2008.
According to the terms of the CSA, the State –as opposed to ABN AMRO N – was obliged to split ABN AMRO Holding in three parts.
V skladu s pogoji sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija je morala država – v nasprotju z banko ABN AMRO N – razdeliti ABN AMRO Holding na tri dele.
The Dutch State supported its claim by referring to the fact that ABN AMRO Asset Management had already been separated and integrated within Fortis SA/NV at the time of the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008.
Nizozemska je podprla svojo trditev s sklicevanjem na dejstvo, da je bilo upravljanje sredstev ABN AMRO v času celovitih transakcij z dne 3. oktobra 2008 že ločeno in vključeno v holding Fortis SA/NV.
The Dutch State also underlined that the Commission had obliged it to implement a merger remedy to resolve outstanding concentration problems and that it inherited from Fortis SA/NV the New HBU Merger Remedy.
Nizozemska je tudi poudarila, da ji je Komisija naložila zavezo glede izvedbe korektivnega ukrepa v zvezi z združitvijo, da bi rešila preostale težave s koncentracijo, ter da je od holdinga Fortis SA/NV prevzela korektivni ukrep v zvezi z združitvijo za podružnico New HBU.
The Dutch State also commented on the pricing strategy of MoneYou, the Internet brand of ABN AMRO N, which was introduced in the market in September 2008.
Nizozemska je predložila pripombe tudi glede strategije oblikovanja cen MoneYou, internetne znamke banke ABN AMRO N, ki je bila na trg uvedena septembra 2008.
The Dutch State argued that MoneYou is a dedicated Internet product, which differed considerably from more traditional products in terms of cost base and service level.
Nizozemska je trdila, da je MoneYou namenski internetni proizvod, ki se glede stroškovne osnove in ravni storitev precej razlikuje od bolj običajnih proizvodov.
The necessary completions arrived on 23 March 2010.
Zahtevane dopolnitve je Komisija prejela 23. marca 2010.
The Dutch State replied to earlier requests made by the Commission for a restructuring plan that the merger between FBN and ABN AMRO N played a crucial role in the restructuring of those companies.
Nizozemska je na prejšnje zahteve Komisije glede načrta prestrukturiranja odgovorila, da je imela združitev bank FBN in ABN AMRO N pomembno vlogo pri prestrukturiranju teh podjetij.
Given that background, it is necessary to adjust the 3 October 2008‘current market conditions’ valuation downwards to obtain a reasonable estimate of the value of ABN AMRO N on 14 December 2008.
Glede na to je treba vrednotenje „sedanjih tržnih pogojev“ z dne 3. oktobra 2008 popraviti navzdol, da bi dobili razumno oceno vrednosti banke ABN AMRO N na dan 14. decembra 2008.
Applying the observed percentage declines of the Euro Stoxx 50 index and the Euro Stoxx Banks index (22,2 % and 45,3 %) leads to a market price range for December 2008 of between EUR [2,2 - 3,6] billion and EUR [3,1 - 5,1] billion (namely [4 - 6,5] billion EUR decreased by 22,2 % and by 45,3 %) [110].
Z uporabo opaženega padca odstotka indeksa EURo Stoxx 50 in indeksa EURo Stoxx Banks (22,2 % in 45,3 %) je cenovni razpon tržne cene za december 2008 med [2,2 – 3,6] milijarde EUR in [3,1 – 5,1] milijarde EUR (tj. [4 – 6,5] milijarde EUR, znižanih za 22,2 % in za 45,3 %) [110].
Under the CSA, it was a contractual obligation of the Dutch State as a successor of Fortis SA/NV to resolve ABN AMRO Z’s capital shortages. Therefore, the measure does not represent a selective advantage to ABN AMRO N and does not relieve it of costs it would normally have borne.
V skladu s sporazumom delničarjev konzorcija je bila pogodbena obveznost Nizozemske kot naslednika holdinga Fortis SA/NV, da odpravi kapitalski primanjkljaj ABN AMRO Z. Zato ukrepi ne pomenijo selektivne prednosti za banko ABN AMRO N in je ne razbremenjujejo stroškov, ki bi jih sicer imela.
The Commission observes that there was no contractual or economic obligation to merge FBN and ABN AMRO N when the Dutch State acquired those companies.
Komisija ugotavlja, da v času nakupa banke FBN in banke ABN AMRO N ni bilo nobene pogodbene ali gospodarske obveznosti glede združitve teh dveh podjetij.
The asset management division of ABN AMRO N had indeed been integrated within Fortis Bank SA/NV, but that division is not a must-have business for banks as many other banks source their asset management products from specialised external providers.
Oddelek banke ABN AMRO N za upravljanje premoženja je bil dejansko vključen v Fortis Bank SA/NV, vendar ta oddelek za banke ni nujen del poslovanja, saj številne banke svoje proizvode za upravljanje s premoženjem pridobivajo od specializiranih zunanjih ponudnikov.
If the Dutch State had not converted its Tier 2 capital into Tier 1 capital, FBN would have had to discontinue its operations or would have been obliged to look for alternative solutions, such as reducing its RWA to free up Tier 1 capital.
Če Nizozemska svojega kapitala drugega reda ne bi pretvorila v kapital prvega reda, bi morala banka FBN prenehati opravljati svoje dejavnosti ali pa poiskati drugačne rešitve, kot je zmanjšanje njenih tveganju prilagojenih sredstev, da bi sprostila kapital prvega reda.
Thanks to the measure, FBN ended up with more capital and in a stronger competitive position than in a ‘no aid’ scenario.
Zaradi tega ukrepa je banka FBN pridobila več kapitala in boljši konkurenčni položaj kot v scenariju „brez pomoči“.
Therefore, the December 2009 Restructuring Plan and the updated November 2010 Restructuring Plan can only be declared compatible with the viability requirements of the Restructuring Communication on the condition that ABN AMRO Group will strive to realise the updated net interest revenues set out in the November 2010 Restructuring Plan.
Zato se lahko načrt prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 in posodobljeni načrt prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010 razglasita za združljiva z zahtevami glede uspešnega poslovanja iz sporočila o prestrukturiranju samo pod pogojem, da si skupina ABN AMRO prizadeva realizirati posodobljene čiste prihodke od obresti, določene v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010.
ABN AMRO Group should report on its progress to the Commission on a regular basis – at least every quarter.
Skupina ABN AMRO mora o tem napredku redno poročati Komisiji – vsaj vsako četrtletje.
A detailed assessment of ABN AMRO Group’s December 2009 Restructuring Plan (and the updated November 2010 Restructuring Plan) allows the Commission to conclude that in approximately 2 years’ time, ABN AMRO Group should have restored its viability as is illustrated by an acceptable RoE of approximately […] % in respectively 2012 and 2013.
Podrobna ocena načrta prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009 (in posodobljenega načrta prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010) skupine ABN AMRO Komisiji omogoča sklep, da bi morala skupina ABN AMRO v približno dveh letih ponovno vzpostaviti uspešno poslovanje, kot to prikazuje ustrezen kapitalski donos v višini približno […] % v letu 2012 oziroma 2013.
Against that background, a hybrid coupon and hybrid call ban of 2 years [123] seems to provide appropriate burden-sharing from the company’s capital holders [124].
Glede na navedeno se zdi, da dveletna prepoved plačila kuponov na hibridne instrumente in nakupa hibridnega instrumenta [123] zagotavlja ustrezno porazdelitev bremena delničarjev podjetja [124].
ABN AMRO Group must aim to achieve the net interest revenues as presented to the Commission on 8 November 2010.
Cilj skupine ABN AMRO morajo biti čisti prihodki od obresti, kot so bili predstavljeni Komisiji 8. novembra 2010.
ABN AMRO Group should therefore take appropriate action as soon as it observes that it undershoots its projections, especially when the latter is due to low interest margins.
Skupina ABN AMRO mora zato sprejeti ustrezne ukrepe takoj, ko ugotovi, da ne dosega svojih napovedi, zlasti, če se to zgodi zaradi nizkih obrestnih marž.
ABN AMRO Group shall use its best efforts to achieve the projections (including net interest revenues) submitted to the Commission in the December 2009 Restructuring Plan, as updated by the November 2010 Restructuring Plan.
Skupina ABN AMRO poskuša po svojih najboljših močeh doseči napovedi (vključno s čistimi prihodki od obresti), predložene Komisiji v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009, kakor je bil posodobljen z načrtom prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010.
The November 2010 projections shall be achieved, at ABN AMRO Group’s consolidated level.
Napovedi iz načrta prestrukturiranja iz novembra 2010 se dosežejo na konsolidirani ravni skupine ABN AMRO.
By 30 June 2011 at the latest, ABN AMRO Group shall pay to the Netherlands an adjusted interest rate on the loans identified in the electronic mail from the Commission to the Dutch State dated 24 June 2010.
Skupina ABN AMRO najkasneje do 30. junija 2011 Nizozemski plača prilagojeno obrestno mero za posojila, opredeljena v elektronski pošti, ki jo je Komisija poslala Nizozemski 24. junija 2010.
The amounts adjusted with interest come to EUR 18152722.
Zneski, popravljeni za obresti, znašajo 18152722 EUR.
The pre-financial crisis structure of Fortis SA/NV – which is relatively complex – is described in point (6) of the Decision of 3 December 2008.
Struktura holdinga Fortis SA/NV pred finančno krizo je precej zapletena in je opisana v točki (6) Odločbe z dne 3. decembra 2008.
The holding company Fortis SA/NV had grouped its banking activities in the legal entity Fortis Bank SA/NV.
Holding Fortis SA/NV je svoje bančne dejavnosti združil v pravnem subjektu Fortis Bank SA/NV.
Net interest income fell from EUR 3223 million (2008) to EUR 2994 million (2009) due mainly to interest margin pressure in the first half of 2009.
Čisti prihodek od obresti se je s 3223 milijonov EUR (leto 2008) zmanjšal na 2994 milijonov EUR (leto 2009), v glavnem zaradi pritiska na obrestne marže v prvi polovici leta 2009.
Non-interest income decreased by EUR 61 million or 3 % to EUR 1905 million and loan impairments increased from EUR 776 million in 2008 to EUR 1172 million in 2009 (source: FY 2009 result press release of 26 March 2010).
Neobrestni prihodki so se zmanjšali za 61 milijonov EUR oziroma 3 % na 1905 milijonov EUR, oslabitve posojil pa so se s 776 milijonov EUR v letu 2008 povečale na 1172 milijonov EUR v letu 2009 (vir: Sporočilo za javnost za finančno leto 2009 z dne 26. marca 2010).
While total expenses decreased from EUR 2010 million in 2008 to EUR 1827 million in 2009, impairments increased from EUR 331 million in 2008 to EUR 412 million in 2009.
Medtem ko so se skupni izdatki z 2010 milijonov EUR v letu 2008 zmanjšali na 1827 milijonov EUR v letu 2009, so se oslabitve povečale s 331 milijonov EUR v letu 2008 na 412 milijonov EUR v letu 2009.
Other elements influencing the results were the profit on the sale of Intertrust (EUR 81 million), provisions related to the bankruptcy of the Dutch bank DSB (EUR 15 million) and separation and integration costs (EUR 66 million).
Drugi elementi, ki so vplivali na rezultate, so bili dobiček od prodaje podjetja Intertrust (81 milijonov EUR), rezervacije, povezane s stečajem nizozemske banke DSB (15 milijonov EUR) ter stroški ločitve in integracije (66 milijonov EUR).
In a letter dated 17 December 2009 and registered on 5 January 2010, the DNB wrote to the Commission that it had informed FBN on 3 September 2009 on the results of its ‘Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 2009’.
V dopisu z dne 17. decembra 2009, evidentiranim 5. januarja 2010, je organ DNB Komisiji napisal, da je banko FBN 3. septembra 2009 obvestil o rezultatih svojega poročila „Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 2009“.
The DNB decided […] – that FBN had a Tier 1 capital shortage of 1,26 billion EUR as of 31 December 2008. Simultaneously, the DNB also set FBN’s minimum Tier 1 ratio at […] %.
Organ DNB je odločil […] – da ima banka FBN od 31. decembra 2008 primanjkljaj kapitala prvega reda v višini 1,26 milijarde EUR. Hkrati je organ DNB določil minimalni delež kapitala prvega reda banke FBN v višini […] %.
Van Lanschot’s net profit figures were EUR 215,4 million, EUR 30,1 million and EUR 14,8 million in respectively 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Čisti dobiček banke Van Lanschot je znašal 215,4 milijona EUR, 30,1 milijona EUR in 14,8 milijona EUR v letih 2007, 2008 oziroma 2009.
In the first half of 2010, the company reported a net profit of EUR 20,3 million.
V prvi polovici leta 2010 je podjetje zabeležilo čisti dobiček v višini 20,3 milijona EUR.