natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Stabilisation of liquidity position: The strategy of Citadele banka is to develop a sustainable, low-risk funding model by reducing reliance on wholesale financing, lengthening the maturity profile and diversifying the sources of funding through increasing the proportion of longer-term customer deposits in Citadele banka’s funding base.
Utrditev likvidnostnega položaja: Strategija banke Citadele je razviti trajnosten model financiranja z nizko stopnjo tveganja, in sicer z zmanjšanjem odvisnosti od financiranja podjetij, podaljšanjem profila zapadlosti in razširitvijo virov financiranja s povečanjem deleža dolgoročnejših depozitov strank pri financiranju banke Citadele.
The deposits in Citadele banka are not subject to withdrawal restrictions imposed by the Latvian regulator.
Za depozite pri banki Citadele ne veljajo omejitve dvigovanja, ki jih je naložil latvijski regulator.
Return to profitability in the core segment by 2011: Citadele banka plans to decrease administrative costs and personnel expenses as well as other administrative costs.
Ponovna vzpostavitev dobičkonosnosti v glavnem segmentu do leta 2011: Banka Citadele načrtuje znižanje stroškov poslovanja in stroškov osebja ter drugih stroškov poslovanja.
That decrease will be achieved through […] cuts in personnel expenses as well as by reviewing different processes within Citadele banka.
To znižanje bo doseženo z […] znižanjem stroškov osebja in s pregledom različnih postopkov v banki Citadele.
In order to reduce its operational costs and become financially stable, Citadele banka will continue steps already initiated by Parex banka to rebuild the cost structure through optimisation of the branch network, […] and other cost-saving measures.
Da bi banka Citadele znižala stroške poslovanja in dosegla finančno stabilnost, bo nadaljevala pot, ki jo je začrtala že banka Parex, in preoblikovala stroškovno strukturo z optimizacijo mreže poslovnih enot […] in drugimi varčevalnimi ukrepi.
Cost-cutting will be supplemented with various income increasing initiatives and focus on asset quality management in order to improve return on equity (hereinafter, ‘ROE’).
Zniževanje stroškov bo dopolnjeno z različnimi dejavnostmi povečevanja prihodkov, osredotočeno pa bo na upravljanje kakovosti sredstev z namenom povečati donosnost lastniškega kapitala.
A more solid capital structure would be established with equity/total assets ratio of [between 8 and 14] % in 2015.
Trdnejša kapitalska struktura naj bi bila vzpostavljena z [med 8- in 14]-odstotnim razmerjem med lastniškim kapitalom in vsemi sredstvi v letu 2015.
Table 3
Preglednica 3 Glavni kazalniki finančne uspešnosti banke Citadele po osnovnem scenariju za obdobje 2010-2014 Ocena za obdobje avg-dec 2010 Ocena za leto 2011 Ocena za leto 2012 Ocena za leto 2013
The main financial performance indicators of Citadele banka in the base case for the years 2010-2014
Ocena za leto 2014
Impairments/net loans
Oslabitve/neto posojila
Net Income (Loss), in LVL million
Neto prihodki (izguba), v milijonih LVL
[loss]
[izguba]
[profit]
[dobiček]
Total assets (LVL million)
Sredstva skupaj (v milijonih LVL)
Deposits/total assets
Depoziti/sredstva skupaj
Loans/customer deposits
Posojila/depoziti strank
Equity/total assets
Lastniški kapital/sredstva skupaj
CAR
Količnik kapitalske ustreznosti
The plan shows that in the worst case scenario the capital ratios for Citadele banka and for the whole consolidated group remain well above the minimum regulatory requirements.
Iz načrta je razvidno, da bi po najslabšem možnem scenariju kapitalski deleži banke Citadele in celotne konsolidirane skupine še vedno precej presegali minimalne regulativne zahteve.
Table 4 illustrates the main financial performance indicators of Citadele banka for the years 2010-2014 in the worst case scenario.
V preglednici 4 so prikazani glavni kazalniki finančne uspešnosti banke Citadele za obdobje 2010–2014 po najslabšem možnem scenariju.
Table 4
Preglednica 4 Glavni kazalniki finančne uspešnosti banke Citadele po najslabšem možnem scenariju za obdobje 2010-2014 Ocena za obdobje avg-dec 2010 Ocena za leto 2011 Ocena za leto 2012 Ocena za leto 2013
The main financial performance indicators of Citadele banka in the worst case scenario for the years 2010-2014
Ocena za leto 2014
According to the results of a stress testing of Citadele banka (See Table 5) carried out by the Latvian Central Bank, no additional capital would be needed to meet minimum capital requirements by the end of 2015 with the capital adequacy ratio [> 8 %].
Glede na rezultate testiranja izjemnih situacij, ki ga je za banko Citadele (glej preglednico 5) izvedla centralna banka Latvije, za izpolnitev minimalnih kapitalskih zahtev do konca leta 2015 ob količniku kapitalske ustreznosti [> 8 %] ne bi bil potreben dodaten kapital.
The stress testing results for Citadele banka
Rezultati testiranja izjemnih situacij za banko Citadele
New Bank
Nova banka
Additional provisions needed, million LVL
Potrebne dodatne rezervacije, v milijonih LVL
Additional capital needed, million LVL
Potreben dodatni kapital, v milijonih LVL
CAR, %
Količnik kapitalske ustreznosti, v %
Parex banka after the Split
Banka Parex po razcepitvi
After the split Parex banka (including its subsidiaries) will be in […].
Banka Parex (vključno z njenimi hčerinskimi družbami) bo po razcepitvi v […].
Parex banka will thus avoid the need for a fire-sale of a portfolio or a time-pressured realisation of collateral.
Banka Parex se bo tako izognila prisilni prodaji portfelja ali unovčenju zavarovanja pod časovnim pritiskom.
Parex banka will concentrate on working out non-performing loans together with already repossessed real estate assets.
Banka Parex se bo osredotočila na reprogramiranje nedonosnih posojil skupaj z zaseženim nepremičnim premoženjem.
Hence, the main activities of Parex banka are to handle the asset recovery procedures and thereafter manage and sell off assets in an orderly fashion as soon as possible on reasonable terms.
Glavne naloge banke Parex so zato izpeljati postopke za izterjavo sredstev ter nato upravljati in čim prej organizirano razprodati sredstva pod razumnimi pogoji.
Following the split, neither Parex banka nor its subsidiaries will engage in new economic activities unless required for its primary task to manage transferred assets and to sell them.
Po razcepitvi niti banka Parex niti njene hčerinske družbe ne bodo izvajale novih gospodarskih dejavnosti, razen če bo to nujno za njeno glavno nalogo upravljanja prenesenih sredstev in njihove prodaje.
In particular, Parex banka will stop new loan origination.
Banka Parex bo zlasti prenehala z dajanjem novih posojil.
However, it can unbundle certain assets into separate subsidiaries for management (sale) purposes.
Kljub temu lahko nekatera sredstva zaradi upravljanja (prodaje) razdeli med ločene hčerinske družbe.
As regards funding of the CIS leasing companies, Parex will attempt to dispose of these businesses.
Banka Parex bo poskušala prodati tudi lizinške družbe SND, ki jih je financirala.
As mentioned above, no new loans, including leasing, are being made and, if no buyers are found, the existing leasing portfolios are expected to be fully run-down by […].
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, novega dajanja posojil, vključno z lizinškimi posli, ne bo in, če ne bo kupcev, naj bi se obstoječi portfelji lizinških poslov v celoti izčrpali do […].
A significant proportion of the leasing portfolios are […].
Precejšen del portfeljev lizinških poslov so […].
These actions collectively are expected to result in an inflow of liquidity into Parex banka whereby it will start returning the State deposits.
Vsi ti ukrepi naj bi povzročili dotok likvidnostnih sredstev v banko Parex, s katerimi bo ta lahko začela vračati depozite države.
However, the capital invested in the Bank will not be recovered by the State, on the basis of the financial forecasts.
Finančne napovedi pa kažejo, da država ne bo dobila nazaj v banko vloženega kapitala.
The restructuring plan envisages that Parex banka remains capital compliant only until […].
V načrtu prestrukturiranja je predvideno, da bo banka Parex ohranila kapitalsko ustreznost samo do […].
Other measures included in the plan to address competition and burden sharing issues
Drugi ukrepi, vključeni v načrt, za odpravo težav v zvezi s konkurenco in delitvijo bremen
Parex banka has suffered from a continuous deposit run.
Banko Parex je prizadelo nenehno dvigovanje depozitov.
As a result, the deposit base presently is significantly lower than prior to the crisis.
Zato je sedanji obseg depozitov bistveno nižji kot pred krizo.
The lending activities were also significantly constrained due to the lack of funding.
Tudi posojilne dejavnosti so bile zaradi pomanjkanja finančnih sredstev bistveno omejene.
The Latvian authorities commit to cap Citadele banka’s lending and deposit-taking operations in the relevant geographical segments (see section 2.5 below).
Latvijski organi so se zavezali, da bodo v zadevnih geografskih segmentih omejili dejavnosti dajanja posojil in sprejemanja depozitov banke Citadele (glej razdelek 2.5 spodaj).
The capped lending and deposit-taking operations will not allow a higher increase than [between 9 and 13] % on a yearly basis from the already reduced market presence.
Omejene dejavnosti dajanja posojil in sprejemanja depozitov bodo na letni osnovi omogočile največ [med 9 in 13]-odstotno povečanje že tako zmanjšane prisotnosti na trgu.
The restructuring plan envisages the reduction of business activities of Citadele banka compared to Parex banka pre-crisis.
V načrtu prestrukturiranja je predvideno zmanjšanje obsega poslovnih dejavnosti banke Citadele v primerjavi z obsegom dejavnosti banke Parex pred krizo.
That reduction will be partly achieved by divesting certain assets (the performing CIS loans and the wealth management business, if sold separately from Citadele banka).
To zmanjšanje bodo deloma dosegli z odprodajo nekaterih sredstev (donosnih posojil SND in dejavnosti upravljanja premoženja, če bodo prodani ločeno od banke Citadele).
Furthermore, Latvia committed to privatise Citadele banka by 31 December 2014.
Poleg tega se je Latvija zavezala, da bo banko Citadele privatizirala do 31. decembra 2014.
As a result of nationalisation, the former majority shareholders in Parex banka were wiped out (see recital 13).
Na podlagi podržavljenja sta bila nekdanja večinska delničarja banke Parex izločena (glej uvodno izjavo (13)).
Due to the subsequent recapitalisation of Parex banka by the State and the EBRD, the minority shareholders were diluted (from previous 15,2 % to 3,7 % as at 7 July 2010).
Ker sta država in EBOR banko Parex pozneje dokapitalizirali, se je delež manjšinskih delničarjev zmanjšal (s prejšnjih 15,2 % na 3,7 % na dan 7. julija 2010).
THE RESTRUCTURING AID MEASURES
UKREPI POMOČI ZA PRESTRUKTURIRANJE
The final restructuring plan indicates that the existing rescue aid will be extended over the restructuring period and split between the newly created bank, Citadele banka, and Parex banka.
V končnem načrtu prestrukturiranja je navedeno, da bo veljavna pomoč za reševanje dodeljena tudi po obdobju prestrukturiranja in bo razdeljena med novoustanovljeno banko Citadele in banko Parex.
Some additional State aid is planned in addition to that already received.
Poleg že prejete pomoči je načrtovane tudi nekaj dodatne državne pomoči.
Liquidity support
Likvidnostna podpora
The planned liquidity support in the form of State deposits for both Citadele banka and Parex banka will not exceed the amount of LVL 1,5 billion, which was approved as maximum rescue aid in the form of liquidity support for Parex banka before the split [21].
Načrtovana likvidnostna podpora v obliki depozitov države za banki Citadele in Parex ne bo presegla zneska 1,5 milijarde LVL, ki je bil odobren kot najvišja dovoljena pomoč za reševanje v obliki likvidnostne podpore za banko Parex pred razcepitvijo.
In the base case and worst case scenarios State deposits in Citadele banka should be repaid by 2012. In the best case scenario State deposits should be fully repaid by 2011.
Po osnovnem in najslabšem možnem scenariju naj bi bili depoziti države v banki Citadele poplačani do leta 2012, po najboljšem možnem scenariju pa naj bi bili depoziti države v celoti poplačani do leta 2011.
The State deposits in Parex banka remain outstanding at the end of the restructuring period under the base and worst case scenarios.
Depoziti države v banki Parex ob koncu obdobja prestrukturiranja po osnovnem in najslabšem možnem scenariju še vedno niso bili poplačani.
The outstanding balances under different scenarios are shown in Table 6.
Neporavnane obveznosti po različnih scenarijih so prikazane v preglednici 6.
State liquidity measures (outstanding balances at year end)
Likvidnostni ukrepi države (neporavnane obveznosti ob koncu leta)
(LVL million)
v milijonih LVL
Best case
Najboljši možni scenarij
Worst case
Najslabši možni scenarij
case
0Najslabši možni scenarij
The remuneration of the liquidity was fixed in the second rescue Decision on the basis of the European Central Bank Recommendations of 20 October 2008 on government guarantees on bank debt.
Nadomestilo za likvidnostne ukrepe je bilo določeno v drugi odločbi o reševanju, in sicer na podlagi Priporočila Evropske centralne banke z dne 20. oktobra 2008 o državnih poroštvih za bančne dolgove.
According to the restructuring plan, pricing for both Citadele banka and Parex banka will be determined as State funding costs [22] plus a 50 bps add-on fee.
Kot je razvidno iz načrta prestrukturiranja, bo določanje cen za banki Citadele in Parex temeljilo na stroških financiranja države [22] in 50 bazičnih točkah dodatne provizije.
In addition, an incentive fee will be introduced for Citadele banka – starting from April 2011 the fee will be increased by up to 15 bps each quarter as an incentive for the bank to refinance itself on the markets.
Poleg tega bo za banko Citadele uvedena spodbujevalna provizija – od aprila 2011 se bo provizija vsako četrtletje povečala za največ 15 bazičnih točk v spodbudo, da se banka refinancira na trgih.
The projected cost of State liquidity support as compared to that of customer deposits in Citadele banka is shown in Table 7.
Napovedani stroški likvidnostne podpore države v primerjavi s stroški depozitov strank v banki Citadele so prikazani v preglednici 7.
Cost of State deposits in Citadele banka as compared to cost of customer deposits
Stroški depozitov države v banki Citadele v primerjavi s stroški depozitov strank
Cost of liquidity support
Stroški likvidnostne podpore
Cost of customer deposits
Stroški depozitov strank
Guarantees
Poroštva
After the split, the existing guarantees to Parex banka’s syndicated lenders, as approved under the first and second rescue Decisions, will remain in Parex banka along with the syndicated loans.
Po razcepitvi bodo obstoječa poroštva za sindicirane posojilodajalce banke Parex, kot so bila odobrena v prvi in drugi odločbi o reševanju, skupaj s sindiciranimi posojili ostala v banki Parex.
The restructuring plan envisages that they will be terminated by 31 December 2011, without requiring the government to honour its guarantee.
V načrtu prestrukturiranja je predvideno, da bodo prenehala najpozneje 31. decembra 2011, ne da bi morala država uveljaviti poroštvo.
In March 2010, Parex banka signed an agreement with the European Investment Bank (hereinafter ‘EIB’), which will provide a credit line of up to EUR 100 million to be used to provide finance to small and medium-sized enterprises.
Banka Parex je marca 2010 podpisala sporazum z Evropsko investicijsko banko (v nadaljnjem besedilu: EIB) za zagotovitev kreditne linije v višini do 100 milijonov EUR, ki naj bi se uporabila za financiranje malih in srednje velikih podjetij.
The credit line is to be transferred to Citadele banka.
Kreditna linija naj bi se prenesla na banko Citadele.
The EIB requires a State guarantee for this financing as long as Citadele banka remains below investment grade.
EIB za to financiranje zahteva državno poroštvo, dokler bo banka Citadele ostala pod naložbenim razredom.
Citadele banka may also need additional State guarantees or liquidity of up to LVL 88 million (EUR 126 million) in respect of the outstanding Eurobonds, which expire in May 2011.
Banka Citadele bo morda potrebovala tudi dodatna državna poroštva ali likvidnostna sredstva v višini do 88 milijonov LVL (126 milijonov EUR) za neodkupljene euroobveznice, ki zapadejo maja 2011.
The pricing for State guarantees is that approved in the second rescue Decision [23].
Za državna poroštva velja določitev cen, odobrena v drugi odločbi o reševanju.
As regards the pricing of the potential additional State guarantees included in the restructuring plan, it will be benchmarked to the existing State guarantee (1,048 %) plus a step-up add-on fee of 12,5 bps which will be introduced and increased by 12,5 bps at the end of each quarter.
Določitev cen morebitnih dodatnih državnih poroštev, vključenih v načrt prestrukturiranja, bo temeljila na obstoječem državnem poroštvu (1,048 %) skupaj s stopnjujočo se dodatno provizijo v višini 12,5 bazičnih točk, ki bo uvedena in bo konec vsakega četrtletja zvišana za 12,5 bazičnih točk.
Tier 1 capital
Kapital prvega reda
The restructuring plan assumes that the equity capital (Tier 1) already injected into Parex banka during the rescue period will remain in Parex banka.
V načrtu prestrukturiranja je predvideno, da bo lastniški kapital (prvega reda), ki je bil vložen v banko Parex v obdobju reševanja, ostal v banki Parex.
According to the restructuring plan no additional capital will be required from the State except for:
Glede na načrt prestrukturiranja dodaten kapital države ne bo potreben, razen za:
a capitalisation of LVL 103 million by way of conversion of State deposits into equity in Citadele banka at the time of the split.
kapitalizacijo v višini 103 milijone EUR s pretvorbo depozitov države v lastniški kapital banke Citadele ob razcepitvi.
Remuneration of this capital should be achieved through the sale of Citadele banka that Latvia has undertaken to carry out by end of 2014;
Nadomestilo za ta kapital je treba zagotoviti s prodajo banke Citadele, ki naj bi jo Latvija izvedla do konca leta 2014;
and a capitalisation by way of conversion of some of the State deposits and interest on those deposits in Parex banka in the years 2010-2013 up to an amount of maximum LVL 210,7 million in the base case and LVL 218,7 million in the worst case.
in kapitalizacijo s pretvorbo nekaterih depozitov države in obresti od teh depozitov v banki Parex v obdobju 2010–2013 v višini največ 210,7 milijona LVL po osnovnem scenariju in 218,7 milijona LVL po najslabšem možnem scenariju.
The respective amounts of the Tier 1 capital to be provided by the State to Parex banka under different scenarios are shown in Tables 8 and 9.
Posamezni zneski kapitala prvega reda, ki naj bi ga država zagotovila banki Parex po različnih scenarijih, so prikazani v preglednicah 8 in 9.
Projected capitalisation of State deposits in Parex banka
Načrtovana kapitalizacija depozitov države v banki Parex
Deferred/capitalised State Treasury Interest in Parex banka
Odložene/kapitalizirane obresti za sredstva državne zakladnice v banki Parex
Latvia committed that the maximum total amount of capital provided to Parex banka must not exceed LVL 218,7 million and that it shall not provide directly or indirectly any further capital in whatever form to Parex banka after the end of […].
Latvija se je zavezala, da najvišji skupni znesek kapitala, dodeljenega banki Parex, ne bo presegel 218,7 milijona LVL in da po koncu […] banki Parex neposredno ali posredno ne bo zagotovila dodatnega kapitala v nobeni obliki.
The projected repayment of the principal of the State deposits and the interests by Parex banka is shown in Table 10.
Načrtovano poplačilo glavnice depozitov države in obresti s strani banke Parex je prikazano v preglednici 10.
Projected repayment of the principal of the State deposits and the interest by Parex banka
Načrtovano poplačilo glavnice depozitov države in obresti s strani banke Parex
(in LVL million)
v milijonih LVL
Principal repayment of the State deposit
Poplačilo glavnice depozita države
Interest repayment on the State deposit
Poplačilo obresti od depozita države
Tier 2 capital
Kapital drugega reda
The rescue aid in the form of the subordinated loan (Tier 2 capital) will be transferred to Citadele banka.
Pomoč za reševanje v obliki podrejenega posojila (kapital drugega reda) bo prenesena na banko Citadele.
The remuneration was fixed in the second and third rescue Decisions [24] on the basis of the European Central Bank Recommendations of 20 November 2008 for pricing recapitalisation instruments.
Nadomestilo je bilo določeno v drugi in tretji odločbi o reševanju, [24] in sicer na podlagi Priporočil Evropske centralne banke z dne 20. novembra 2008 o določanju cene za rekapitalizacijo.
As of December 2009 fixed interest for the subordinated loan was […] %, after February 2010 it was increased to […] %.
Od decembra 2009 je fiksna obrestna mera za podrejena posojila znašala […] %, po februarju 2010 pa se je zvišala na […] %.
No Tier 2 capital was or will be provided to Parex banka by the State at or after the split.
Država banki Parex ob ali po razcepitvi ni oziroma ne bo zagotovila kapitala drugega reda.
Asset Relief Measure
Ukrep finančne pomoči za oslabljena sredstva
As described in recitals 27-32, certain assets will be transferred from Parex banka to Citadele banka, which will continue some Parex banka activities while non-core and non-performing assets will remain in Parex banka.
Kot je opisano v uvodnih izjavah (27)–(32), bodo nekatera sredstva z banke Parex prenesena na banko Citadele, ki bo nadaljevala nekatere dejavnosti banke Parex, medtem ko bodo sekundarna in nedonosna sredstva ostala v banki Parex.
As regards the value of assets remaining in Parex banka, an assessment on a conservative basis based on the worst case scenario would arrive at losses for the State of LVL [200-400] million and LVL [50-300] million in the base case scenario.
Za sredstva, ki bodo ostala v banki Parex, bi država po zadržanih ocenah na podlagi najslabšega možnega scenarija utrpela izgubo v višini [200-400] milijonov LVL in [50-300] milijonov LVL po osnovnem scenariju.
The losses would correspond to around [20-50] % of the assets’ book value (of LVL 814 million) in the worst case scenario and around […] % in the base case scenario.
Izgube bi znašale približno [20-50] % knjigovodske vrednosti sredstev (v višini 814 milijonov LVL) po najslabšem možnem scenariju in približno […] % po osnovnem scenariju.
If provisioning figures are taken into account the discount on the nominal value of assets would be even bigger.
Po podatkih o rezervacijah bi bilo znižanje nominalne vrednosti sredstev še večje.
The respective estimates of outstanding liabilities and lost State equity after the liquidation of assets in Parex banka are shown in Table 11.
Posamezne ocene neporavnanih obveznosti in izgubljenega državnega kapitala po likvidaciji sredstev v banki Parex so prikazane v preglednici 11.
The outstanding liabilities and lost State equity after the liquidation of assets in Parex banka
Neporavnane obveznosti in izgubljen državni kapital po likvidaciji sredstev v banki Parex
Outstanding State deposit
Nepoplačani depozit države
Recapitalisation by the State
Dokapitalizacija s strani države
COMMITMENTS OF LATVIA
ZAVEZE LATVIJE