natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Fo-value 3 is equivalent to 3 minutes heating at 121 °C (reduction of the bacterial load of one billion spores in each 1000 cans to one spore in 1000 cans).
Vednost Fo 3 je enakovredna 3 minutam segrevanja na 121 °C (zmanjšanje bakterijske obremenitve ene milijarde spor v vsaki od 1000 pločevink do ene spore v tisoč pločevinkah).
Pursuant to Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 read in conjunction with Annex IV thereto, Denmark may continue to prohibit the use of certain categories of food additives, including preservatives, in the traditional Danish ‘Kødboller’ (meatballs) and Traditional Danish ‘Leverpostej’ (liver paté).
V skladu s členom 20 Uredbe (ES) št. 1333/2008 v povezavi s Prilogo IV k Uredbi lahko Danska še naprej prepoveduje uporabo nekaterih kategorij dodatkov za živila, vključno s konzervansi, v tradicionalnih danskih mesnih kroglicah „Kødboller“ in tradicionalni jetrni pašteti „Leverpostej“.
OJ C 7, 13.1.2010, p. 1.
UL C 7, 13.1.2010, str. 1.
In addition, the Commission received comments from Latvia and Lithuania on 1 March 2010 and 25 March 2010 respectively, i.e. outside the time limit fixed by the Commission.
Poleg tega je Komisija 1. marca 2010 in 25. marca 2010 prejela mnenje Latvije in Litve, tj. po roku, ki ga je določila Komisija.
Scientific Opinion on nitrite in meat products of the EFSA Panel on Food Additives and Nutrient Sources added to Food, EFSA Journal 2010, 8(3):1538.
Znanstveno mnenje o nitritih v mesnih izdelkih Sveta EFSA za živilske aditive in hranilne vire, dodane živilom, The EFSA Journal 2010, 8(3):1538.
In its Opinion adopted on 11 March 2010 [18], the EFSA Panel on Food Additives and Nutrient Sources added to Foods (ANS Panel) concluded that the data provided by the Danish authorities do not provide a basis to revise the ‘acceptable daily intake’ (ADI) of 0,07 mg/kg bw/day for nitrite, established by the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) in 2002.
Svet EFSA za živilske aditive in hranilne vire, dodane živilom, je 11. marca 2010 [18] sprejel mnenje, v katerem je sklenil, da podatki, ki so jih predložili danski organi, ne zagotavljajo osnove za ponovno preučitev „sprejemljivega dnevnega vnosa“ (ADI) za nitrit, in sicer 0,07 mg/kg telesne teže/dan, ki ga je leta 2002 določil Skupni strokovni odbor FAO/WHO za aditive v živilih (JECFA).
It also noted that this ADI might be exceeded by children.
Prav tako je poudaril, da otroci lahko presežejo ADI.
With regard to the effects of nitrites/nitrates on the microbiological safety of meat products, the ANS Panel noted that this had been addressed in the Opinion of EFSA Scientific Panel on Biological Hazards of 26 November 2003.
V zvezi z učinki nitritov/nitratov na mikrobiološko varnost mesnih izdelkov Svet EFSA navaja, da je to bilo obravnavano v mnenju Znanstvenega odbora EFSA za biološka tveganja z dne 26. novembra 2003.
In that Opinion, it was stated that several factors contribute to the safety of meat products (cooking process, salt/concentration, water activity etc. and that the ingoing amount of nitrites is important for microbiological safety, which is why ingoing amounts should be controlled (rather than the residual amount).
V skladu z navedenim mnenjem k varnosti mesnih izdelkov prispevajo različni dejavniki (postopek obdelave, sol/koncentracija, aktivnost vode itd.) in da je dodana količina nitritov pomembna za mikrobiološko varnost, zaradi česar je treba nadzorovati dodane količine (namesto količine ostanka).
on aid scheme C 61/03 (ex NN 42/01) implemented by Italy for the aeronautical industry
o programu državne pomoči C 61/03 (ex NN 42/01) Italije za letalsko industrijo
(notified under document C(2009) 8097)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2009) 8097)
The measure under assessment concerns individual aid for two R&D projects in the aeronautical industry (A139/AB139 and BA609).
Ukrep, glede katerega se izvaja ocena, je povezan z individualno pomočjo za projekte za raziskave in razvoj v letalski industriji (A139/AB139 in BA609).
The aid was granted by Italy on the basis of Act No 808/1985 ‘Interventi per lo sviluppo e l’accrescimento di competitività delle industrie operanti nel settore aeronautico (Measures to develop and boost the competitiveness of the aeronautical industry)’ (hereinafter ‘Act 808/85’).
Pomoč je dodelila Italija na podlagi Zakona št. 808/1985 „Interventi per lo sviluppo e l'accrescimento di competitività delle industrie operanti nel settore aeronautico“ (ukrepi za razvoj in okrepitev konkurenčnosti letalske industrije) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Zakon št. 808/85).
On 1 October 2003, following the submission of a complaint and after evaluation by independent experts, the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure (hereinafter ‘the first opening decision’) with regard to six aid schemes for R&D projects that had not been individually notified by Italy.
oktobra 2003, po predložitvi pritožbe in po oceni neodvisnih strokovnjakov, je Komisija začela formalni postopek preiskave (v nadaljnjem besedilu: prva odločitev o sprožitvi postopka) v zvezi s šestimi progami državne pomoči za projekte za raziskave in razvoj, ki jih Italija ni posamično priglasila.
For the six cases, the Commission raised doubts about their compatibility with the rules applicable to R&D aid [4].
Komisija je v vseh šestih zadevah izrazila pomisleke o združljivosti s pravili, ki urejajo pomoč za raziskave in razvoj [4].
By decision of 22 June 2005 [5], the Commission decided to extend the scope of the procedure (hereinafter the ‘second opening decision’) to the entire application of Act 808/85, including projects that Italy claimed to fall within the scope of Article 296.
Komisija je z odločitvijo z dne 22. junija 2005 [5] razširila postopek („druga odločitev o sprožitvi postopka“) na celotno uporabo Zakona št. 808/85, vključno s projekti, za katere je Italija trdila, da spadajo v področje uporabe člena 296.
On 12 October 2005 the second decision was published [6].
oktobra 2005 je bila objavljena druga odločitev o sprožitvi postopka. [6].
By letter of 17 June 2005, the Italian authorities pointed out that the scope of the two opening decisions touched on issues that were sensitive for national security.
Italijanski organi so v dopisu z dne 17. junija 2005 navedli, da področje uporabe obeh odločitev o sprožitvi postopka vključuje občutljiva vprašanja glede nacionalne varnosti.
The Commission replied to the letter of 17 June 2005 by letter of 15 July 2005, in which it stated that the Commission’s investigations would be confined to civil aspects and that the purpose of assessing projects that were a matter of national security was precisely to exclude them from the scope of the final decision.
Komisija je na dopis z dne 17. junija 2005 odgovorila z dopisom z dne 15. julija 2005 in v njem navedla, da bo preiskava Komisije omejena na civilne vidike in da je namen ocene projektov, ki so stvar nacionalne varnosti, prav ta, da se izključijo iz končne odločitve.
On 11 March 2008, the Commission adopted Decision 2008/806/EC on several individual R&D projects financed by Italy.
marca 2008 je Komisija sprejela Odločbo 2008/806/ES o več posameznih projektih za raziskave in razvoj, ki jih je financirala Italija.
Paragraph 419 of Decision 2008/806/EC reads as follows: ‘The Commission cannot reach a conclusion, however, on the two projects regarding whose military character it expressed doubts in the second initiating decision.
Odstavek 419 Odločbe 2008/806/ES se glasi: „Kljub temu Komisija ne more sprejeti sklepa glede dveh projektov, pri katerih je v drugi odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka izrazila pomisleke v zvezi z vojaškim značajem projekta.
The Commission reserves the right to ask Italy for further information on these projects with a view to a decision in the near future.’
Komisija si pridržuje pravico, da od Italije zahteva dodatne informacije o teh projektih z namenom sprejetja odločbe v bližnji prihodnosti.“
In several of the letters submitted to the Commission during the examination procedure, the Italian authorities also included references to the above two projects.
V več dopisov, ki jih je Komisija prejela med postopkom preverjanja, je Italija vključila tudi sklice na zgoraj omenjena projekta.
By letter of 24 April 2007, the Italian authorities provided two detailed memos on the two projects.
Z dopisom z dne 24. aprila 2007 je Italija predložila dva podrobnejša zapiska o obeh projektih.
On 4 May 2007, a meeting took place at the premises of the Italian Permanent Representation to the European Union, where the Italian authorities allowed a delegation from the Commission to consult documents on the two projects, which were classified for national security reasons.
maja 2007 je bilo v prostorih italijanskega stalnega predstavništva pri EU organizirano srečanje, na katerem so italijanski organi delegaciji Komisije omogočili pregled dokumentov o obeh projektih, ki sta bila zaradi nacionalne varnosti tajna.
The Commission requested additional information on the two projects by letter of 5 May 2008.
Komisija je z dopisom z dne 5. maja 2008 zahtevala dodatne informacije o obeh projektih.
Italy submitted information on the two projects on 9 July 2008.
Italija je informacije o projektih predložila dne 9. julija 2008.
On 29 September 2008, the Italian authorities hosted a site visit for two Commission officials at the military base of […] [7] where the BA609 is undergoing tests and at the head offices of AgustaWestland in Cascina Costa (in the province of Varese).
septembra 2008 je Italija sprejela dva uradnika Komisije, ki sta obiskala vojaško oporišče […] [7], kjer preskušajo BA609, ter sedež podjetja AgustaWestland v Cascina Costi (v pokrajini Varese).
By letter of 7 October 2008, Italy provided a record of the site visit, with a detailed list of the military facilities visited and the evidence provided about the project under assessment.
Z dopisom z dne 7. oktobra 2008 je Italija predložila zapis o obisku na kraju samem s podrobnim seznamom obiskanih vojaških objektov in dokazilom o projektu, ki se ocenjuje.
By letter of 9 October 2008, Italy announced that it would be submitting further documentation on the projects.
Z dopisom z dne 9. oktobra 2008 je Italija sporočila, da bo predložila nadaljnjo dokumentacijo o projektih.
It also stated its willingness to continue its collaboration with the Commission, even if the projects were relevant for national security purposes and thus fell within the scope of Article 296.
Italija je navedla tudi, da je še naprej pripravljena sodelovati s Komisijo, četudi bi bila projekta pomembna za namene nacionalne varnosti in bi zato spadala v področje uporabe člena 296.
By letter of 29 October 2008, Italy provided additional information on the BA609 project.
Z dopisom z dne 29. oktobra 2008 je Italija predložila dodatne informacije o projektu BA609.
By letters of 31 March, 7 May and 24 July 2009, Italy submitted further information on the project under way involving the BA609, including the latest financial developments.
Z dopisi z dne 31. marca, 7. maja in 24. julija 2009 je Italija predložila nadaljnje informacije o tekočem projektu, ki je zajemal BA609, vključno z najnovejšim finančnim razvojem.
The Commission replied by letter of 22 April 2009.
Komisija je odgovorila z dopisom z dne 22. aprila 2009.
REASONS FOR OPENING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION
RAZLOGI ZA ZAČETEK FORMALNE PREISKAVE
In the second opening decision, the Commission expressed serious doubts that the AB139 (or A139, hereinafter ‘A139’) and BA609 projects could be classified as military as the Italian authorities claimed.
V drugi odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka je Komisija izrazila resne dvome, da je projekta AB139 (ali A139, v nadaljnjem besedilu: A139) in BA609 mogoče označiti kot vojaška, kot je trdila Italija.
As regards the A139 project, the Commission noted for instance that AgustaWestland’s website [8] gave the following list of applications for this product: Emergency Medical Service, Fire Fighting, Harbour Pilot Shuttle, Law Enforcement, Offshore, Search and Rescue, and VIP/Corporate.
V zvezi s projektom A139 je Komisija na primer navedla, da je spletna stran podjetja AgustaWestland [8] navajala naslednji seznam uporabe tega izdelka: nujna medicinska pomoč, protipožarna obramba, vodenje v pristanišče, izvajanje zakonodaje, dejavnosti na morju, iskanje in reševanje ter storitve za potrebe močnih in uglednih podjetij.
The Commission considered that none of these applications was military.
Komisija je izrazila mnenje, da ne gre za uporabo v vojaške namene.
As regards the BA609, the Commission noted for instance that Bell Agusta’s website [9] contained a list of Frequently Asked Questions, where, to the question ‘Does the BA609 carry both civil and military configurations?’, the company replied ‘The BA609 is currently being planned in civil configurations only.
V zvezi z BA609 je Komisija na primer navedla, da spletna stran za helikopter Bell Agusta [9] vsebuje seznam pogosto zastavljenih vprašanj, na kateri je podjetje na vprašanje „Ali ima BA609 tako civilno kot tudi vojaško konfiguracijo?“ odgovorilo: „BA609 je trenutno načrtovan le v civilni konfiguraciji.
The closest to a military configuration would be the SAR [Search and Rescue] configuration for the Coast Guard type aircraft.
Najbližje vojaški konfiguraciji je konfiguracija SAR [iskanje in reševanje] za zrakoplove za obalno stražo.
No military configurations are available at this time’.
Trenutno vojaške konfiguracije niso na voljo“.
Based on the information available when Decision 2008/806/EC was taken, the Commission was still unable to reach a conclusion on the two projects.
Na podlagi informacij, ki so bile na voljo v času sprejetja odločbe 2008/806/ES, Komisija še vedno ni mogla sprejeti odločitve v zvezi z obema projektoma.
It reserved the right to put further questions to Italy in order to clarify certain aspects of the projects before taking a decision.
Komisija si je pridržala pravico, da Italiji zastavi dodatna vprašanja, z namenom razjasnitve nekaterih vidikov projektov pred sprejetjem odločbe.
Therefore, it excluded the two projects from the scope of that decision.
Zato je iz takratne odločbe izključila ta dva projekta.
COMMENTS BY THIRD PARTIES ON THE TWO PROJECTS
PRIPOMBE TRETJIH OSEB GLEDE TEH DVEH PROJEKTOV
The observations submitted by an anonymous third party (hereinafter ‘third party’) after the second opening decision and during the proceeding contained a number of specific comments on the two projects under assessment.
Ugotovitve, ki jih je predložila anonimna tretja oseba (v nadaljnjem besedilu: tretja oseba) po drugi odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka in med postopkom samim, so vsebovale več specifičnih pripomb o obeh projektih, ki sta bila predmet ocene.
The third party doubted that the two projects under assessment could be considered military.
Tretja oseba je izrazila dvom, da je oba projekta, ki sta predmet ocene, mogoče označiti kot vojaška.
In its view, the AW139 was a purely civil helicopter because it had no military application.
Po mnenju tretje osebe je bil AW139 popolnoma civilni helikopter, saj se ni uporabljal v vojaške namene.
The fact that a few helicopters had been bought by armies in various parts of the world did not alter the civil nature of the AW139.
Zaradi dejstva, da so nekaj helikopterjev kupile vojske iz različnih delov sveta, se civilna narava helikopterja AW139 ni spremenila.
The third party noted that the distinction between military and civil helicopters is made at the certification stage, usually when the project is first certified.
Tretja oseba je navedla, da se razlikovanje med vojaškimi in civilnimi helikopterji določi v času certificiranja, običajno takrat, ko je projekt prvič potrjen.
It added that the typical characteristics of military programmes would involve a phase for defining military specifications; a development contract with the Ministry of Defence; and an industrialisation contract with the Ministry of Defence.
Tretja oseba je dodala, da vojaški programi običajno vključujejo fazo določitve vojaških specifikacij, pogodbo za razvoj, sklenjeno z ministrstvom za obrambo, in pogodbo za industrializacijo, prav tako sklenjeno z ministrstvom za obrambo.
According to the third party such steps would be public and referred to in the national defence budget.
Po navedbah tretje osebe bi te faze bile javne in omenjene v državnem proračunu za obrambo.
As regards the BA609, the third party quoted the public information provided by Agusta, which at that time only mentioned civil applications for the tilt-rotor.
V zvezi z BA609 je tretja oseba citirala javne informacije, ki jih je dala na voljo družba Agusta, ki so v tistem času navajale le civilne uporabe za premični rotor.
The third party also submitted that to develop the two projects Agusta needed substantial sums of money, which it could only have obtained as a result of generous state support.
Tretja oseba je tudi navedla, da je družba Agusta za razvoj obeh projektov potrebovala znatne količine denarja, ki pa jih je lahko pridobila le v obliki velikodušne državne podpore.
In particular, the third party argued that an investment of at least EUR 700 million would have been needed to develop the A139. The third party further argued that Agusta’s participation in the joint project with Bell on the BA609 would have cost at least EUR 200 million.
Tretja oseba je zlasti navajala, da je bila za razvoj A139 potrebna naložba v višini najmanj 700 milijonov EUR. Tretja oseba je nadalje navedla, da bi sodelovanje družbe Agusto v skupnem projektu z družbo Bell za izdelavo BA609 stalo najmanj 200 milijonov EUR.
The third party maintained that, according to the information available to the public, Agusta’s R&D expenditure did not cover these costs.
Tretja oseba je vztrajala, da po javno dostopnih informacijah izdatki za raziskave in razvoj družbe Agusta niso krili teh stroškov.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECTS BY ITALY
OPIS PROJEKTOV S STRANI ITALIJE
In the second opening decision the Commission raised doubts whether the two projects brought to its attention — A139 and BA609 — could be classified as military, as the Italian authorities claimed.
V drugi odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka je Komisija izrazila resne dvome, da je projekta A139 in BA609, o katerih je bila obveščena, mogoče označiti kot vojaška, kot je trdila Italija.
As indicated in Decision 2008/806/EC, the Commission was unable to reach a conclusion on the two projects on the basis of the information available to it.
Kot je navedeno v odločbi 2008/806/ES, Komisija na podlagi informacij, ki so ji bile na voljo, ni mogla sprejeti nobene odločitve v zvezi s projektoma.
The beneficiary of the projects under assessment is Agusta [10], a member of the Finmeccanica group.
Upravičenec projektov, ki sta predmet ocene, je družba Agusta [10], članica skupine Finmeccanica.
Agusta specialises in helicopters.
Družba Agusta je specializirana za helikopterje.
In its submissions, Italy indicated that its observations were presented together with Finmeccanica.
V svojih pripombah je Italija navedla, da so njene pripombe podane v sodelovanju z družbo Finmeccanica.
First, it is worth recalling that the Italian Government has used Act 808/85 to fund projects in both the civil and the military field.
Najprej je treba opomniti, da je italijanska vlada Zakon št. 808/85 uporabljala za financiranje projektov na civilnem in vojaškem področju.
According to the figures provided by the Italian authorities (recitals 171-172 of Decision 2008/806/EC), out of a total of some EUR 3 billion, EUR 1311 million had been used for projects relating to national security.
V skladu s podatki, ki jih je predložila Italija (uvodni izjavi 171 in 172 Odločbe 2008/806/ES), je bilo od skupno približno 3 milijard EUR 1311 milijonov EUR porabljenih za projekte, povezane z nacionalno varnostjo.
Italy also provided a table listing the programmes relating to national security that were funded under this scheme.
Italija je predložila tudi preglednico s programi, povezanimi z nacionalno varnostjo, ki so bili financirani po tej shemi.
The use of a civil law for military projects explains why some projects are not mentioned in the national defence budget.
Uporaba civilnega prava za vojaške projekte pojasnjuje, zakaj nekateri projekti niso omenjeni v državnem proračunu za obrambo.
In particular, Italy claimed that the support granted to the two projects was justified on the grounds of national security objectives and it invoked Article 296 of the EC Treaty.
Zlasti je Italija navajala, da je podpora, dodeljena za ta dva projekta, upravičena zaradi ciljev nacionalne varnosti, ter se sklicevala na člen 296 Pogodbe ES.
The Italian authorities showed the Commission the official request for a feasibility study dated […], with the military requirements.
Italija je Komisiji pokazala uradno zahtevo za študijo izvedljivosti z dne […], z vojaškimi zahtevami.
They also showed the technical specifications for the military helicopter, dated […].
Italija je pokazala tudi tehnične specifikacije za vojaški helikopter z dne […].
Italy indicated that the work carried out by Agusta until 1999 consisted of providing the initial design and the technical feasibility solutions needed to comply with the request for a tactical transport helicopter for combat support.
Italija je navedla, da je delo družbe Agusta do leta 1999 zajemalo zagotavljanje prvotne zasnove in rešitev tehnične izvedljivosti, potrebnih za uskladitev z zahtevo za taktični transportni helikopter za podporo bojnemu delovanju.
It carried out tests and validation activities on a demonstrator, such as: […] (in 1998) and […] (in 1999).
Družba Agusta je izvedla preskuse in dejavnosti validacije na demonstratorju, na primer: […] (l. 1998) in […] (l. 1999).
In 2000, according to Italy, the activities continued with […].
Leta 2000 so se po besedah Italije dejavnosti nadaljevale s/z […].
According to the Italian authorities the project funded under Act 808/85 ended with the development of a military demonstrator.
Po navedbah Italije se je projekt, financiran po Zakonu št. 808/85, zaključil z razvojem vojaškega demonstratorja.
Financial support to the A139 project
Finančna podpora za projekt A139
Amount awarded per year
Znesek, dodeljen za vsako leto
Combined total
Skupni seštevek
Italy’s explanation for the delays in the development of the military helicopter was that the precise operational needs for the A139 were further adjusted by the Ministry of Defence to take into account the experience of military peace-keeping missions abroad (Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Timor, and Kosovo).
Italija je zamude pri razvoju vojaškega helikopterja pojasnjevala s tem, da je natančne operativne potrebe za A139 dodatno prilagajalo ministrstvo za obrambo z namenom upoštevanja izkušenj iz vojaških mirovnih misij v tujini (Albaniji, Bosni, Makedoniji, Timorju in na Kosovu).
These adjustments concerned […].
Te prilagoditve so zadevale […].
Italy further indicated that the A139 was intended to replace the existing fleet of Bell 212, 205 and 412 helicopters.
Italija je nadalje navedla, da je bil A139 namenjen nadomestitvi obstoječe flote helikopterjev Bell 212, 205 in 412.
However, Italy added that the events of 11 September 2001 had forced it to rethink its planning, in order to have […].
Vendar pa je Italija dodala, da so dogodki 11. septembra 2001 botrovali ponovnemu razmisleku o načrtovanju, z namenom […].
According to Italy, the A139 project was different from the subsequent AW139 civil helicopter.
Po navedbah Italije se je projekt A139 razlikoval od naslednjega civilnega helikopterja AW139.
Instead, the A139 project under examination by the Commission was at the basis of the development of the AW149 military helicopter.
Tako je bil projekt A139, ki je predmet pregleda Komisije, podlaga za razvoj vojaškega helikopterja AW149.
the spill-over effects in terms of know-how between the two helicopters are very limited because they are fundamentally different aircraft.
ima vse značilnosti civilnega helikopterja,
The following table was compiled from the information provided by Italy.
ima vse značilnosti vojaškega helikopterja,