natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The publicly owned establishment IFP is registered in the Nanterre Trade and Companies Register (‘RCS’) under number B 775 729 155 and its registered office is located in Rueil-Malmaison [150].
oseba javnega prava IFP je vpisana v register gospodarskih družb (v nadaljnjem besedilu: RGD) v Nanterru pod številko B 775 729 155, sedež pa ima v občini Rueil-Malmaison [150].
IFP owns two establishments in France, in Solaize [151] and Pau [152] respectively.
Oseba javnega prava IFP ima dve podjetji v Franciji, in sicer v občinah Solaize [151] in Pau [152];
Axens is registered in the Nanterre RCS under number B 599 815 073 and its registered office is also located in Rueil-Malmaison, but at a different address from its parent [153].
družba Axens je vpisana v RGD v Nanterru pod številko B 599 815 073, sedež pa ima prav tako v občini Rueil-Malmaison, vendar na drugem naslovu [153] kot njena matična družba.
Its operating centres are also located in different sites from those of its parent, mostly outside France: in the United States, in Houston, Texas; Princeton, New Jersey; Savannah, Georgia; and Calvert City, Kentucky; in Canada, in Brockville, Ontario: in China, in Beijing; in Japan, in Tokyo; in India, in New Delhi; in Bahrain; and in Russia, in Moscow.
Tudi poslovalnice ima drugje kot njena matična družba, najpogosteje zunaj Francije, in sicer v Združenih državah v Houstonu (Teksas), Princetonu (New Jersey), Savannahu (Georgia) in Calvert Cityju (Kentucky), v Kanadi v Brockvillu (Ontario), na Kitajskem v Pékingu, na Japonskem v Tokiu, v Indiji v New Delhiju, v Bahrajnu in v Rusiji v Moskvi;
Beicip-Franlab is registered in the Nanterre RCS under number B 679 804 047, and its registered office is also located in Rueil-Malmaison, but at a different address from its parent and Axens [154].
družba Beicip-Franlab je vpisana v RGD v Nanterru pod številko B 679 804 047, sedež pa ima prav tako v občini Rueil-Malmaison, vendar na drugem [154] naslovu kot njena matična družba in družba Axens.
It has subsidiaries and offices in a large number of countries in the world, in particular in Bahrain; in Abu Dhabi; in Tripoli in Libya; in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia; in Houston, Texas, in the United States; in Villahermosa in Mexico; in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil; and in Moscow in Russia.
Hčerinske družbe in pisarne ima v številnih državah po svetu, zlasti v Bahrajnu, v Abu Dabiju, v Libiji v Tripoliju, v Maleziji v Kuala Lumpurju, v Združenih državah v Houstonu (Teksas), v Mehiki v Villahermosi, v Braziliji v Rio de Janeiru in v Rusiji v Moskvi;
Prosernat is registered in the Nanterre RCS under number B 315 251 330 and its registered office is located in Puteaux [155].
družba Prosernat je vpisana v RGD v Nanterru pod številko B 315 251 330, sedež pa ima v občini Puteaux [155].
The company states [156] that it is present in some twenty countries throughout the world, including in South America (Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela), Europe (United Kingdom, Italy, and Norway), North Africa (Algeria and Egypt), the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar), Iran, Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States and South-East Asia.
Družba navaja [156], da deluje v približno dvajsetih državah po svetu, med drugim v Južni Ameriki (v Argentini, Braziliji, Venezueli), Evropi (v Veliki Britaniji, Italiji, na Norveškem), Severni Afriki (v Alžiriji, Egiptu), zalivskih državah (v Saudovi Arabiji, Združenih arabskih emiratih, Kuvajtu, Omanu, Katarju), Iranu, Rusiji in Skupnosti neodvisnih držav ter Jugovzhodni Aziji.
In addition, in this case, the economic activities engaged in by each of the subsidiaries are real, so that the companies cannot reasonably be classified as fictitious, especially as the Court of Cassation is very exacting when it comes to categorising a legal person as ‘fictitious’ [157].
Poleg tega so v obravnavanem primeru gospodarske dejavnosti vsake hčerinske družbe resnične, tako da jih seveda ni mogoče opredeliti kot fiktivne, zlasti ker je kasacijsko sodišče, kot kaže, zelo zahtevno pri opredelitvi pravne osebe kot „fiktivne“ [157]:
Axens, set up in 2001, engages in an economic activity in the market for catalysts and technologies for the refining and petrochemicals industries, for which it employs more than 600 people and through which it achieves an annual turnover of approximately EUR 300 million.
družba Axens, ustanovljena leta 2001, dejansko izvaja gospodarsko dejavnost na trgu katalizatorjev in tehnologij za industrijske panoge na področju rafiniranja in petrokemičnih izdelkov, v kateri zaposluje več kot 600 oseb in s katero ustvari letni promet približno 300 milijonov EUR;
Beicip-Franlab, set up in 1967, engages in a real activity in the publication and distribution of exploration-deposits software and in consultancy and advisory services.
dejanska dejavnost družbe Beicip-Franlab, ustanovljene leta 1967, je izdajanje in razširjanje programske opreme na področju „raziskav in nahajališč“ ter izvajanje študij in svetovanje.
This activity involves over 100 employees and provides an annual turnover of approximately EUR 40 million.
V tej dejavnosti je več kot sto zaposlenih, njen letni promet pa je približno 40 milijonov EUR;
Prosernat, acquired in 2001, provides consultancy and other services and supplies gas treatment and sulphur recovery plants.
dejavnost družbe Prosernat, pridobljene leta 2001, so študije in storitve ter proizvodnja naprav za predelavo plina in razžvepljevanje.
The company employs about 70 people to carry out this activity and has a turnover of approximately EUR 50 million.
V podjetju je za izvajanje navedene dejavnosti približno 70 zaposlenih, promet pa znaša približno 50 milijonov EUR.
Leaving aside the question of mismanagement, which will be examined in recitals 161 to 164, it is clear from the above that the extremely limited cases in which the case-law gives a parent company vicarious liability for its subsidiaries – the subsidiary is a fictitious legal entity or the assets of the subsidiary and the parent company are inseparable – are clearly not fulfilled in this case.
Iz zgoraj navedenega je razvidno, da razen v primeru napak pri upravljanju, kar bomo preučili v uvodnih izjavah od 161 do 164, izredno redki primeri – kot sta fiktivnost hčerinske družbe kot pravne osebe ali združitev premoženja hčerinske in matične družbe –, ki so določeni v sodni praksi za uveljavljanje odgovornosti matične družbe za njene hčerinske družbe, v obravnavanem primeru zagotovo niso izpolnjeni.
Consequently, the Commission considers that if IFP’s subsidiaries Axens, Beicip-Franlab and Prosernat were to be wound up the conditions for automatically holding IFP liable would not be met.
Zato Komisija meni, da niso izpolnjeni pogoji za samodejno ugotavljanje odgovornosti osebe javnega prava IFP v primeru likvidacije njenih hčerinskih družb Axens, Beicip-Franlab in Prosernat.
Liability for mismanagement of the subsidiary by the parent
Odgovornost matične družbe za protipravno upravljanje hčerinske družbe
A fault in the exercise of supervision over a subsidiary may traditionally render the parent company liable [158].
V primeru protipravnega izvajanja nadzora nad hčerinsko družbo se lahko običajno uveljavlja odgovornost matične družbe [158].
Where the parent has committed a fault in the supervision that it has to exercise over the management of its subsidiaries, ‘especially in the case of groups of companies, the case-law allows the parent company to be held liable’ [159].
Če je zadnjenavedena storila napake pri nadzoru, ki ga mora izvajati nad upravljanjem svojih hčerinskih družb, je „v skladu s sodno prakso zlasti za skupine družb dovoljeno ugotavljanje odgovornosti matične družbe“ [159].
According to the literature, mismanagement by a parent company which has acted as de jure or de facto manager of a subsidiary in difficulty may render it liable if the subsidiary is wound up [160]: the parent company may be held liable as a shareholder of the subsidiary [161] if faults that originated the controlled company’s difficulties can be imputed to it [162].
V primeru napak pri upravljanju matične družbe, ki je delovala kot pravni ali dejanski upravitelj hčerinske družbe v težavah, se lahko v skladu s pravnimi teoretiki v primeru likvidacije uveljavlja njena odgovornost [160]. Matična družba se namreč lahko kot družbenica hčerinske družbe [161] šteje za odgovorno, če se ji lahko pripišejo krivdna ravnanja, zaradi katerih se je nadzorovana družba znašla v težavah [162].
Ordinary law therefore provides for the liability of managers in relation to their company, its shareholders or its creditors [163].
Upravitelji so torej v skladu z občim pravom odgovorni za svojo družbo, njene družbenike ali upnike [163].
In the case of a group, the creditors of a subsidiary which has suspended payments will try to demonstrate that the parent company has assumed the role of manager of the subsidiary, de jure or de facto [164].
Upniki katere od hčerinskih družb, katerih plačila so bila ustavljena, bodo poskušali v primeru skupine dokazati, da je bila matična družba – pravni ali dejanski [164] – upravitelj hčerinske družbe.
Liability of a parent for its subsidiary on the basis of a fault committed by the parent is therefore provided for in particular by the law governing collective proceedings [165], and more specifically in the context of actions for liability for insufficient assets [166], on condition that the parent has acted as the manager [167] of its subsidiary.
Zato krivdna odgovornost matične družbe za hčerinsko družbo določa zlasti pravo kolektivnih postopkov [165], in sicer v okviru tožbe na ugotovitev odgovornosti za nezadostnost sredstev [166], če navedena družba ravna kot upravitelj [167] svoje hčerinske družbe.
However, for the parent company to be held liable for fault, it is necessary to provide proof of such fault, and above all of a causal link between this and the damage suffered y reason of the conduct of the subsidiary [168].
Da pa bi se krivdna odgovornost matične družbe uveljavljala, je treba predložiti dokaz za tako krivdo, zlasti za vzročno zvezo med krivdo in škodo zaradi ravnanja hčerinske družbe [168].
In any event, it is clear from the above that legal actions of this case are never actions seeking the enforcement of a guarantee, since they are always based on a fault committed by the parent company.
Iz zgoraj navedenega je vsekakor razvidno, da tako uveljavljanje krivdne odgovornosti nikakor niso jamčevalni zahtevki, ker vedno temeljijo na krivdni odgovornosti matične družbe.
Therefore such actions do not demonstrate the existence of a general principle of vicarious liability of a parent company for its subsidiaries, a principle which would be contrary to the principle of the limitation of a shareholder’s liability to the initial contribution made to the company, apart from cases where the company is a fictitious entity or where its assets are inseparable form those of its parent company, which can be ruled out here.
Zato na podlagi takih zahtevkov ni mogoče določiti splošnega načela odgovornosti matične družbe za hčerinske družbe, ki bi bilo v nasprotju z načelom omejitve odgovornosti delničarja na prvotne vložke delniških družb, razen če bi bile te delniške družbe fiktivni subjekti ali bi bilo njihovo premoženje združeno s premoženjem matične družbe, kar se lahko v obravnavanem primeru izključi.
To sum up, it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Cassation that the principle of liability of a parent company for mismanagement of a subsidiary does not in any way provide a mechanism equivalent to a guarantee.
Nazadnje je iz sodne prakse kasacijskega sodišča razvidno, da uporaba načela krivdne odgovornosti matične družbe pri upravljanju hčerinske družbe nikakor ni podobna mehanizmu, enakovrednemu sistemu poroštva.
Recent plans for reform of vicarious liability
Nedavni predlogi reforme odgovornosti za dejanja druge osebe
According to the findings of a recent parliamentary information report [169], in the present state of the law it appears, therefore, that ‘the approaches taken in the case-law throw into relief the obstacle which legal personality places in the way of the assignment of liability’ (emphasis added) [170].
V sedanjem stanju prava se torej v skladu z ugotovitvami nedavnega informativnega parlamentarnega poročila [169] zdi, da se pri „rešitvah iz sodne prakse poudarja ovira, ki jo pomeni status pravne osebe za pripis odgovornosti“ [170] (poudarek dodan).
This obstacle seems to be so critical that three has recently been debate in France on the advisability of a reform of the Civil Code which would extend vicarious liability to situations of economic dependence [171] (with special reference to the relationships of the subsidiaries of a group with their parent company).
Ta ovira se zdi tako nepreklicna, da se je v Franciji nedavno vnela razprava o primernosti reforme civilnega zakonika, s katero bi se odgovornost za dejanja drugih oseb [171] (zlasti v odnosih hčerinskih družb v skupini z matično družbo) razširila na položaje gospodarske odvisnosti.
Certain consumer associations [172] mentioned in the parliamentary report cited above seem in particular to deplore the fact that the technique of converting units into subsidiaries allows certain entities, in the event of later litigation involving the liability of a subsidiary, to rely on the legal partitioning of the companies of the group even though in their commercial dealings they have presented the image of a group of perfectly integrated companies offering a range of services.
Zdi se, da nekatera združenja potrošnikov [172] iz zgoraj navedenega parlamentarnega poročila posebno obžalujejo, da tehnika „hčerinjenja“ družb nekaterim subjektom v primeru poznejšega spora omogoča, da se sklicujejo na pravno razdrobljenost družb v skupini, če gre za odgovornost hčerinske družbe, čeprav je v komercialnih ponudbah poudarjena podoba skupine družb, ki so povsem povezane in ponujajo paket storitev.
Article 1355 of the Catala preliminary draft [173] recently proposed the introduction of a new basis for vicarious liability which would call into question the principle of the legal autonomy of subsidiaries:
V členu 1355 predhodnega predloga Catala [173] je bila nedavno predlagana uvedba nove podlage za odgovornost za dejanja drugih oseb, s katero bi se omajalo načelo pravne samostojnosti hčerinskih družb:
‘Article 1355
„Člen 1355
A person shall be liable automatically for the damage caused by those whose way of life he regulates, or whose activity he organises, directs or controls in his own interest …’
Kdor ureja način življenja in organizira delovanje tistih, ki so povzročili škodo, mu daje okvir in ga nadzira v lastnem interesu, je polnopravno odgovoren za to škodo. […]“
The comments made by the authors of this preliminary draft clarify the innovations proposed with regard to non-contractual vicarious liability.
V pripombah avtorjev navedenega predhodnega predloga so pojasnila o novostih, predlaganih v navedenem besedilu v zvezi z nepogodbeno odgovornostjo za dejanja drugih oseb.
The legislation would add as a possible basis ‘the act of directing and organising the activity of others in the personal interest of the person exercising such control’ [174], which would make quite a profound change to the present legal position, especially as the liability would henceforth be strict: it would not be ‘subject to proof of a fault on the part of the person responsible, but rather to proof of an act that might have rendered the direct author personally liable if he had not acted under the control of others’ [175].
Z njegovim sprejetjem bi bilo kot mogoča podlaga dodano „dejstvo, da se daje okvir dejavnosti druge osebe in se jo organizira v osebnem interesu tistega, ki izvaja nadzor“ [174], kar bi temeljito spremenilo sedanje stanje prava, zlasti ker bi bile te odgovornosti odslej stroge: pri njih ne bi bilo „treba dokazati krivde odgovorne osebe, temveč bi bilo treba dokazati dejanje, na podlagi katerega bi se lahko uveljavljala osebna odgovornost neposrednega povzročitelja, če ne bi ravnal pod nadzorom druge osebe“ [175].
The second paragraph of Article 1360 of the preliminary draft defines this principle in the case of the liability of the parent company of a group of companies in relation to its subsidiaries:
V odstavku 2 člena 1360 predhodnega predloga je to načelo uporabljeno za primer odgovornosti matične družbe skupine družb za njene hčerinske družbe:
‘Article 1360
„Člen 1360
Likewise, a person shall also be liable where he controls the economic activity or assets of a professional person who is in a situation of dependence even though acting for his own account, if the victim shows that the act giving rise to the damage is related to the exercise of control.
[…] Odgovoren je tudi tisti, ki nadzira gospodarsko ali premoženjsko dejavnost strokovnjaka v odvisnem položaju, čeprav deluje za svoj račun, če žrtev ugotovi, da je škodni dogodek povezan z izvajanjem nadzora.
This shall apply in particular to parent companies in respect of damage caused by their subsidiaries, and to licensors for damage caused by their licensees’ (emphasis added.)
To velja zlasti za matične družbe za škodo, ki so jo povzročile njihove hčerinske družbe, ali koncedente za škodo, ki so jo povzročili njihovi koncesionarji.“ (poudarek dodan)
It is clear from the above, a contrario, that in the present state of French law, vicarious liability of the parent company for its subsidiary requires proof that the parent committed a fault affecting the subsidiary.
Iz navedenega je razvidno, da nasprotno v sedanjem stanju francoskega prava uveljavljanje odgovornosti matične družbe za njeno hčerinsko družbo vsekakor predpostavlja, kot je prikazano zgoraj, da se predloži dokaz o krivdi prve v položaju druge.
As regards foreseeable developments in French positive law, the Commission notes that the reform contemplated on this point seems to have been abandoned: in the context of the parliamentary report cited above, the working party of the Senate Legal Affairs Committee declared itself against any legislative provision ‘establishing the existence of strict liability by reason of a state of economic dependence’ (Recommendation No 19).
Komisija je v zvezi s predvidenim razvojem francoskega pozitivnega prava seznanjena s tem, da se zdi, da je bila reforma, načrtovana v zvezi s tem, opuščena. Delovna skupina odbora za zakonodajo se namreč v okviru zgoraj navedenega parlamentarnega poročila ni strinjala z nikakršno „uvedbo obstoja nekrivdne odgovornosti zaradi gospodarske odvisnosti“ (Priporočilo št. 19).
Moreover, a reform along these lines no longer seems to be on the agenda: in particular, it does not appear in Bill No 657 on the reform of civil liability [176] presented during the ordinary session 2009-2010 (registered at the office of the President of the Senate on 9 July 2010).
Poleg tega se zdi, da tovrstna reforma ni več na dnevnem redu: ni je zlasti v predlogu zakona št. 657 o reformi civilne odgovornosti [176], predstavljenem med rednim zasedanjem 2009–2010 (evidentiranim pri predsedstvu senata 9. julija 2010).
In conclusion, whereas the State is liable in the event of default of a publicly owned establishment, by a mechanism which, especially in view of its automatic character, has all the features of a guarantee, there is in the current state of French law no implicit and automatic liability of parent companies for the actions of subsidiaries governed by private law under compulsory winding up.
Skratka, v nasprotju z odgovornostjo države v primeru neizpolnjevanja obveznosti njenih oseb javnega prava, ki ima značilnosti mehanizma poroštva (zlasti) zaradi svoje samodejnosti, v sedanjem stanju francoskega prava ni implicitnega in samodejnega ugotavljanja odgovornosti matičnih družb za ravnanje njihovih hčerinskih družb zasebnega prava, ki so v postopku likvidacije.
Creditors of IFP’s subsidiaries have no guarantee of the continued existence of the subsidiaries and/or their obligations
Upniki hčerinskih družb osebe javnega prava IFP nimajo poroštva za ohranitev njihovega obstoja in/ali njihovih obveznosti
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that if, as public limited companies, the IFP subsidiaries were to be wound up and their existence terminated, their rights and obligations would disappear at the same time.
Komisija lahko na podlagi zgoraj navedenega sklepa, da bi pravice in obveznosti hčerinskih družb osebe javnega prava IFP prenehale obstajati, če bi te družbe kot delniške družbe po postopku likvidacije prenehale obstajati.
Admittedly their controlling shareholder, the publicly owned establishment IFP, would have the option of a prior capital injection [177] to avoid their winding up.
Njihov kontrolni delničar, oseba javnega prava IFP, bi lahko seveda v takih okoliščinah predhodno vložil dodatni kapital [177], da bi preprečil njihovo prenehanje – likvidacijo.
Such a capital contribution could then ensure the continuation the claims against the subsidiaries held by third parties.
S tako vložitvijo sredstev bi se torej lahko zagotovila ohranitev terjatev, ki jih imajo tretje osebe do navedenih hčerinskih družb.
However, that would be a strategic choice on the part of the publicly owned establishment and not a legal obligation automatically imposed on it.
Vendar bi tedaj šlo za strateško odločitev osebe javnega prava, ne pa za zakonsko obveznost, ki bi samodejno veljala zanjo.
Moreover, such a choice would be subject to the strict framework of State aid law: if the capital injection was not the behaviour of a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions, it would have to be notified to the Commission by the French authorities and await the Commission’s prior vetting (and approval).
Taka odločitev bi bila poleg tega strogo urejena s pravom državnih pomoči: če navedeno posredovanje s kapitalom ne bi bilo utemeljeno z ravnanjem zasebnega vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu, bi ga morala predhodno preveriti (in odobriti) Evropska komisija po priglasitvi francoskih organov.
The Commission therefore concludes that in the event of winding up, the creditors of IFP’s subsidiaries have no certainty regarding the settlement of their claims.
Komisija zato lahko sklepa, da upniki hčerinskih družb osebe javnega prava IFP v primeru postopka likvidacije nimajo nobenega zagotovila, da bodo njihove terjatve poplačane.
Conclusion regarding the lack of a State guarantee covering the private-law subsidiaries of the publicly owned establishment IFP
Sklepna ugotovitev o neobstoju državnega poroštva za hčerinske družbe zasebnega prava, ki pripadajo osebi javnega prava IFP
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that, in contrast to the creditors of the publicly owned establishment IFP, the creditors of the private-law subsidiaries of the IFP group do not have a guarantee either of the payment of their individual claims or of the continued existence of these companies in the event of winding up.
Komisija lahko na podlagi zgoraj navedenega sklepa, da upniki hčerinskih družb zasebnega prava, ki pripadajo skupini IFP, v nasprotju z upniki osebe javnega prava IFP nimajo poroštva za poplačilo svojih individualnih terjatev niti za ohranitev obstoja navedenih delniških družb v primeru likvidacije.
These private-law subsidiaries are not covered by the unlimited guarantee enjoyed by IFP by virtue of its legal form as a publicly owned establishment.
Iz tega izhaja, da hčerinske družbe zasebnega prava niso krite z neomejenim poroštvom, ki ga ima oseba javnega prava IFP zaradi svojega statusa.
The Commission bases its analysis on the fact that the creditors of the IFP subsidiaries governed by private law:
Komisija utemeljuje analizo s tem, da za upnike hčerinskih družb zasebnega prava, ki pripadajo osebi javnega prava IFP, velja naslednje:
remain subject to the ordinary-law procedures regarding the administration and winding up of undertakings;
zanje še naprej veljajo postopki občega prava s področja sanacije in sodne likvidacije podjetij;