natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The decision imposing a fine shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by a qualified majority to reject the Commission’s recommendation within 10 days of the Commission’s adoption thereof.
Šteje se, da Svet sklep o globi sprejme, razen če s kvalificirano večino zavrne priporočilo Komisije v desetih dneh od dneva, ko ga je Komisija sprejela.
The Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within 10 days of adoption of the Council’s decision under Article 126(8) TFEU referred to in paragraph 1, recommend that the Council reduce the amount of the fine or cancel it.
Komisija lahko zaradi izjemnih ekonomskih okoliščin ali na podlagi utemeljene prošnje zadevne države članice, naslovljene na Komisijo v desetih dneh po sprejetju sklepa Sveta v skladu s členom 126(8) PDEU iz odstavka 1, Svetu priporoči znižanje zneska globe ali njen preklic.
If the Member State has lodged a non-interest-bearing deposit with the Commission in accordance with Article 5, the non-interest-bearing deposit shall be converted into the fine.
Če je država članica pri Komisiji položila brezobrestni depozit v skladu s členom 5, se ta brezobrestni depozit spremeni v globo.
If the amount of a non-interest-bearing deposit lodged in accordance with Article 5 exceeds the amount of the fine, the excess shall be returned to the Member State.
Če znesek brezobrestnega depozita, položenega v skladu s členom 5, presega znesek globe, se razlika vrne državi članici.
If the amount of the fine exceeds the amount of a non-interest-bearing deposit lodged in accordance with Article 5, or if no non-interest-bearing deposit has been lodged, the Member State shall make up the shortfall when it pays the fine
Če znesek globe presega znesek brezobrestnega depozita, položenega v skladu s členom 5, oziroma če brezobrestni depozit ni bil položen, država članica poravna razliko pri plačilu globe.
Return of non-interest-bearing deposits
Vračilo brezobrestnih depozitov
If the Council, acting under Article 126(12) TFEU, decides to abrogate some or all of its decisions, any non-interest-bearing deposit lodged with the Commission shall be returned to the Member State concerned.
Če Svet v skladu s členom 126(12) PDEU odloči, da razveljavi nekatere ali vse svoje sklepe, se brezobrestni depozit, položen pri Komisiji, vrne zadevni državi članici.
SANCTIONS CONCERNING THE MANIPULATION OF STATISTICS
SANKCIJE ZA IZKRIVLJANJE STATISTIČNIH PODATKOV
Sanctions concerning the manipulation of statistics
Sankcije za izkrivljanje statističnih podatkov
The Council, acting on a recommendation by the Commission, may decide to impose a fine on a Member State that intentionally or by serious negligence misrepresents deficit and debt data relevant for the application of Articles 121 or 126 TFEU, or for the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU.
Svet lahko na priporočilo Komisije odloči, da bo naložil globo državi članici, ki je namenoma ali zaradi hude malomarnosti napačno prikazala podatke o primanjkljaju in dolgu, ki so pomembni za uporabo členov 121 in 126 PDEU ali za uporabo Protokola o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, priloženega PEU in PDEU.
The fines referred to in paragraph 1 shall be effective, dissuasive and proportionate to the nature, seriousness and duration of the misrepresentation.
Globe iz odstavka 1 so učinkovite, odvračalne in sorazmerne z vrsto in resnostjo napačnega prikazovanja ter njegovim trajanjem.
The amount of the fine shall not exceed 0,2 % of GDP of the Member State concerned.
Znesek globe ne presega 0,2 % BDP zadevne države članice.
The Commission may conduct all investigations necessary to establish the existence of the misrepresentations referred to in paragraph 1.
Komisija lahko opravi vse potrebne preiskave, da ugotovi obstoj napačnega prikazovanja iz odstavka 1.
It may decide to initiate an investigation when it finds that there are serious indications of the existence of facts liable to constitute such a misrepresentation.
Komisija se lahko odloči za začetek preiskave, ko ugotovi, da obstaja resen sum o obstoju dejstev, ki bi se lahko izkazala za takšno napačno prikazovanje.
The Commission shall investigate the putative misrepresentations taking into account any comments submitted by the Member State concerned.
Komisija razišče domnevno napačno prikazovanje, ob tem pa upošteva vse pripombe zadevne države članice.
In order to carry out its tasks, the Commission may request the Member State to provide information, and may conduct on-site inspections and accede to the accounts of all government entities at central, state, local and social-security level.
Komisija lahko z namenom opravljanja svoje naloge od države članice zahteva informacije, in lahko opravi inšpekcijske preglede na kraju samem ter ima vpogled v račune vseh vladnih organov na centralni, regionalni in lokalni ravni ter na področju socialne varnosti.
If the law of the Member State concerned requires prior judicial authorisation for on-site inspections, the Commission shall make the necessary applications.
Če zakonodaja zadevne države članice za opravljanje inšpekcijskih pregledov na kraju samem zahteva predhodno dovoljenje, Komisija zaprosi za potrebna dovoljenja.
Upon completion of its investigation, and before submitting any proposal to the Council, the Commission shall give to the Member State concerned the opportunity of being heard in relation to the matters under investigation.
Komisija ob zaključku preiskave in pred predložitvijo kakršnega koli predloga Svetu zadevni državi članici ponudi možnost zagovora v zvezi z vsebino preiskave.
The Commission shall base any proposal to the Council only on facts on which the Member State concerned has had the opportunity to comment.
Komisija svoj predlog Svetu zasnuje samo na dejstvih, ki jih je imela zadevna država članica možnost komentirati.
The Commission shall fully respect the rights of defence of the Member State concerned during the investigations.
Komisija med preiskavo v celoti spoštuje pravice do obrambe zadevne države članice.
The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 11 concerning:
Na Komisijo se prenese pooblastilo za sprejetje delegiranih aktov v skladu s členom 11, glede:
detailed criteria establishing the amount of the fine referred to in paragraph 1;
podrobnih meril za določanje zneska globe iz odstavka 1;
detailed rules concerning the procedures for the investigations referred to in paragraph 3, the associated measures and the reporting on the investigations;
podrobnih pravil o postopkih preiskav iz odstavka 3 ter povezanih ukrepov in poročanja o preiskavah;
detailed rules of procedure aimed at guaranteeing the rights of the defence, access to the file, legal representation, confidentiality and provisions as to timing and the collection of the fines referred to in paragraph 1.
podrobnih pravil, namenjenih jamčenju pravic do obrambe, dostopa do spisa, pravnega zastopanja, zaupnosti in določb o rokih in načinu pobiranja glob iz odstavka 1.
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Council imposing fines under paragraph 1.
Sodišče Evropske unije je neomejeno pristojno za sodno presojo sklepov, s katerimi Svet naloži globo v skladu z odstavkom 1.
It may annul, reduce or increase the fine so imposed.
Naloženo globo lahko prekliče, zniža ali zviša.
ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE OF THE SANCTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE INTEREST AND FINES
UPRAVNI ZNAČAJ SANKCIJ IN PORAZDELITEV OBRESTI IN GLOB
Administrative nature of the sanctions
Upravni značaj sankcij
The sanctions imposed pursuant to Articles 4 to 8 shall be of an administrative nature.
Sankcije, naložene v skladu s členi 4 do 8, so upravnega značaja.
Distribution of the interest and fines
Porazdelitev obresti in glob
The interest earned by the Commission on deposits lodged in accordance with Article 5 and the fines collected in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility.
Obresti, ki jih Komisija zbere iz depozitov, položenih v skladu s členom 5, in glob, pobranih v skladu s členoma 6 in 8, tvorijo drug prihodek iz člena 311 PDEU in se dodelijo evropskemu instrumentu za finančno stabilnost.
When the Member States whose currency is the euro create another stability mechanism to provide financial assistance in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, the interest and the fines shall be assigned to that mechanism.
Ko države članice, katerih valuta je euro, za ohranitev stabilnosti celotnega euroobmočja vzpostavijo drug mehanizem za stabilnost za zagotovitev finančne pomoči, se obresti in globe dodelijo temu mehanizmu.
The delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than 3 months before the end of each period.
Prenos pooblastila se samodejno podaljša za enako obdobje, razen če Evropski parlament ali Svet ne nasprotuje temu podaljšanju najpozneje tri mesece pred koncem vsakega obdobja.
The delegation of power referred to in Article 8(4) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council.
Pooblastilo iz člena 8(4) lahko kadar koli prekliče Evropski parlament ali Svet.
It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein.
Odločitev začne veljati dan po njeni objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije ali na poznejši datum, ki je v njej naveden.
As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.
Takoj ko Komisija sprejme delegirani akt, o tem istočasno obvesti Evropski parlament in Svet.
A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 8(4) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of 2 months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object.
Delegirani akt, sprejet v skladu s členom 8(4), začne veljati le, če niti Evropski parlament niti Svet ne nasprotuje delegiranemu aktu v roku dveh mesecev od uradnega obvestila Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu o tem aktu, ali če sta pred iztekom tega roka tako Evropski parlament kot Svet obvestila Komisijo, da mu ne bosta nasprotovala.
Voting in the Council
Glasovanje v Svetu
For the measures referred to in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 8, only members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is the euro shall vote, and the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.
V zvezi z ukrepi iz členov 4, 5, 6 in 8 glasujejo samo člani Sveta, ki predstavljajo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, pri čemer se ne upošteva glasu člana Sveta, ki predstavlja zadevno državo članico.
A qualified majority of the members of the Council referred to in paragraph 1 shall be defined in accordance with point (b) of Article 238(3) TFEU.
Kvalificirana večina članov Sveta iz odstavka 1 se določi v skladu s točko (b) člena 238(3) PDEU.
By 14 December 2014 and every 5 years thereafter, the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation.
Komisija do 14. december 2014 ter nato vsakih pet let objavi poročilo o uporabi te uredbe.
That report shall evaluate, inter alia:
V poročilu med drugim oceni:
the effectiveness of this Regulation, including the possibility to enable the Council and the Commission to act in order to address situations which risk jeopardising the proper functioning of the monetary union;
učinkovitost te uredbe, vključno z možnostjo, da se Svetu in Komisiji omogoči, da ukrepata pri reševanju razmer, ki bi lahko ogrozile dobro delovanje monetarne unije,
the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of economic performances of the Member States in accordance with the TFEU.
napredek pri zagotavljanju tesnejše uskladitve ekonomskih politik ter trajnostne konvergence ekonomskih učinkov držav članic v skladu s PDEU.
Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a proposal for amendments to this Regulation.
Po potrebi se poročilu priloži predlog za spremembo te uredbe.
The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council.
Poročilo se pošlje Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu.
Before the end of 2011 the Commission shall present a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the possibility of introducing euro-securities.
Komisija pred koncem leta 2011 Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu predstavi poročilo o možnosti uvedbe „euro-vrednostnih papirjev“.
OJ C 218, 23.7.2011, p. 46.
UL C 218, 23.7.2011, str. 46.
Position of the European Parliament of 28 September 2011 (not yet published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of 8 November 2011.
Stališče Evropskega parlamenta z dne 28. septembra 2011 (še ni objavljeno v Uradnem listu) in odločitev Sveta z dne 8. novembra 2011.
The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 8(4) shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of 3 years from 13 December 2011.
Pooblastilo za sprejemanje delegiranih aktov iz člena 8(4) se prenese na Komisijo za obdobje treh let od 13. december 2011.
The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than 9 months before the end of that 3-year period.
Komisija pripravi poročilo o prenesenem pooblastilu najpozneje devet mesecev pred koncem triletnega obdobja.
Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Uredba (EU) št. 1174/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta
on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area
o izvršilnih ukrepih za odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v euroobmočju
The improved economic governance framework should rely on several interlinked and coherent policies for sustainable growth and jobs, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus upon developing and strengthening the internal market, fostering international trade and competitiveness, a European Semester for strengthened coordination of economic and budgetary policies, an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficits (the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances, minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, and enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macroprudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board.
Izboljšan okvir ekonomskega upravljanja bi moral temeljiti na več medsebojno povezanih in usklajenih politikah za trajnostno rast in delovna mesta, zlasti na strategiji Unije za rast in delovna mesta, s posebnim poudarkom na razvoju in krepitvi notranjega trga, spodbujanju mednarodne trgovine in konkurenčnosti, evropskem semestru za okrepljeno usklajevanje ekonomskih in proračunskih politik, učinkovitem okviru za preprečevanje in zmanjšanje čezmernega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja (Pakt za stabilnost in rast), trdnem okviru za preprečevanje in odpravljanje makroekonomskih neravnotežij, minimalnih zahtevah za nacionalne proračunske okvire in okrepljeni ureditvi finančnih trgov in nadzoru nad njimi, vključno z makrobonitetnim nadzorom Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja.
Reliable statistical data is the basis for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances.
Zanesljivi statistični podatki so osnova za nadzor nad makroekonomskimi neravnotežji.
In order to guarantee sound and independent statistics, Member States should ensure the professional independence of national statistical authorities, consistent with the European statistics code of practice as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics [4].
Da bi zagotovili zanesljivo in neodvisno statistiko, bi morale države članice zagotoviti strokovno neodvisnost nacionalnih statističnih organov, skladno z Evropskim statističnim kodeksom ravnanja, kakor je določeno v Uredbi (ES) št. 233/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2009 o evropski statistiki [4].
In addition, the availability of sound fiscal data is also relevant for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances.
Poleg tega je razpoložljivost zanesljivih javnofinančnih podatkov tudi pomembna za nadzor nad makroekonomskimi neravnotežji.
This requirement should be guaranteed by the rules provided in this regard by Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area [5], in particular its Article 8.
Ta pogoj bi bilo treba zagotoviti s pravili, določenimi v ta namen v Uredbi (EU) št. 1173/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. novembra 2011 o učinkovitem izvrševanju proračunskega nadzora v euroobmočju [5], zlasti v njenem členu 8.
The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union should be developed in the context of the broad economic policy guidelines and the employment guidelines, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound and sustainable public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.
Usklajevanje ekonomskih politik držav članic v Uniji bi bilo treba oblikovati v okviru širših smernic ekonomskih politik in smernic zaposlovanja, kakor je določeno v Pogodbi o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU), pri tem pa bi bilo treba upoštevati vodilna načela stabilnih cen, zdravih in vzdržnih javnih financ in monetarnih pogojev ter uravnotežene plačilne bilance.
In particular, surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to include a more detailed and formal framework to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and to help the Member States affected to establish corrective plans before divergences become entrenched and before economic and financial developments take a durable turn in an excessively unfavourable direction.
Zlasti bi bilo treba nadzor ekonomskih politik držav članic razširiti prek proračunskega nadzora, da bi vključeval bolj podroben in formalen okvir za preprečevanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij, prizadetim državam članicam pa bi pomagal, da izdelajo popravljalne načrte, preden se razlike utrdijo in preden se ekonomska in finančna gibanja trajno obrnejo v pretirano neugodno smer.
Such broadening of the surveillance of economic policies should take place in parallel with a deepening of fiscal surveillance.
Takšna širitev nadzora ekonomskih politik bi morala sovpadati s poglabljanjem fiskalnega nadzora.
To help correct such excessive macroeconomic imbalances, it is necessary to lay down a detailed procedure in legislation.
Za odpravljanje takih čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij je treba v zakonodaji podrobno določiti postopek.
It is appropriate to supplement the multilateral surveillance procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 121 TFEU with specific rules for the detection of macroeconomic imbalances as well as the prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the Union.
Primerno je, da se postopek večstranskega nadzora iz odstavkov 3 in 4 člena 121 PDEU dopolni s posebnimi pravili za odkrivanje makroekonomskih neravnotežij, kakor tudi za preprečevanje in odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v Uniji.
It is essential that the procedure be embedded in the annual multilateral surveillance cycle.
Bistveno je, da je postopek del letnega cikla večstranskega nadzora.
Strengthening economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
Krepitev ekonomskega upravljanja bi morala vključevati tesnejše in pravočasnejše vključevanje Evropskega parlamenta in nacionalnih parlamentov.
While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of the dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State which is the subject of a Council decision imposing an interest-bearing deposit or an annual fine in accordance with this Regulation.
Kljub temu, da so sogovorniki Evropskega parlamenta v okviru dialoga ustrezne institucije Unije in njihovi predstavniki, lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta ponudi državi članici, na katero je naslovljen sklep Sveta, ki naloži obrestni depozit ali letno globo v skladu s to uredbo, možnost sodelovanja pri izmenjavi mnenj.
The Member State's participation in such an exchange of views is voluntary.
Udeležba države članice pri takšni izmenjavi mnenj je prostovoljna.
The Commission should have a stronger role in the enhanced surveillance procedure as regards assessments that are specific to each Member State, monitoring, on-site missions, recommendations and warnings.
Komisija bi morala imeti v postopku okrepljenega nadzora močnejšo vlogo v zvezi z ocenami, specifičnimi za posamezno državo članico, spremljanjem, misijami na kraju samem, priporočili in opozorili.
Enforcement of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [6] should be strengthened by establishing interest-bearing deposits in case of non-compliance with the recommendation to take corrective action.
Izvajanje Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. novembra 2011 o preprečevanju in odpravljanju makroekonomskih neravnotežij [6] bi bilo treba okrepiti z uvedbo obrestnih depozitov v primeru neupoštevanja priporočila v zvezi s sprejemom popravljalnih ukrepov.
Such deposits should be converted into an annual fine in the case of continued non-compliance with the recommendation to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the same imbalances procedure.
Ti depoziti bi se morali spremeniti v letno globo v primeru ponavljajočega se neupoštevanja priporočila v zvezi z odpravljanjem čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v okviru istega postopka v zvezi s čezmernim neravnotežjem.
Those enforcement measures should be applicable to Member States whose currency is the euro.
Ti izvršilni ukrepi bi se morali uporabiti za države članice, katerih valuta je euro.
In the case of failure to comply with Council recommendations, the interest-bearing deposit or the fine should be imposed until the Council establishes that the Member State has taken corrective action to comply with its recommendations.
V primeru neupoštevanja priporočil Sveta bi se moral naložiti obrestni depozit ali globa, dokler Svet ne ugotovi, da je država članica sprejela popravljalne ukrepe za izpolnitev njegovega priporočila.
Moreover, repeated failure of the Member State to draw up a corrective action plan to address the Council recommendation should also be subject to an annual fine as a rule, until the Council establishes that the Member State has provided a corrective action plan that sufficiently addresses its recommendation.
Poleg tega bi morala država članica, ki večkrat ne pripravi načrt popravljalnih ukrepov za upoštevanje priporočila Sveta, praviloma plačevati letno globo, dokler Svet ne ugotovi, da je država članica pripravila načrt popravljalnih ukrepov, s katerim ustrezno izpolnjuje njegovo priporočilo.