natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Measure C provides FBN with capital, which allowed it to comply with the minimum regulatory requirements of the financial supervisor.
Ukrep C banki FBN zagotavlja kapital, ki ji je omogočil, da je izpolnila minimalne regulativne zahteve finančnega nadzornega organa.
The Dutch State converted Tier 2 debt instruments with a nominal value of EUR 1,35 billion into an equivalent amount of Tier 1 capital.
Nizozemska je dolžniške instrumente drugega reda z nominalno vrednostjo v višini 1,35 milijarde EUR pretvorila v enakovreden znesek kapitala prvega reda.
That conversion leads to the same cash flows as a scenario in which FBN had repurchased the Tier 2 instruments owned by the State at par, followed by capital increase of the same amount.
Ta pretvorba je vodila v enake denarne tokove kot v scenariju, v katerem je banka FBN po nominalni vrednosti odkupila instrumente drugega reda v državni lasti, čemur je sledilo povečanje kapitala za enak znesek.
By analogy with recital 250, the Commission could accept that the market value of the debt instruments waived by the Dutch State was below par. Taking into account discounts of similar instruments of peer banks, a discount of EUR [135 - 405] million (or [10 - 30] %) is justified.
Po analogiji z uvodno izjavo 250 se Komisija lahko strinja, da je bila tržna vrednost dolžniških instrumentov, ki jih je Nizozemska odpisala, pod nominalno vrednostjo. Ob upoštevanju diskontov pri podobnih instrumentih enakovrednih bank je diskont v višini [135 – 405] milijonov EUR (ali [10 – 30] %) upravičen.
In other words, FBN indirectly paid EUR [135 - 405] million too much to the Dutch State by implicitly buying back the instruments at par. The aid amount would therefore be EUR [0,945 - 1,215] billion, rather than EUR 1,35 billion.
Banka FBN je torej s tem, ko je posredno kupila instrumente po nominalni vrednosti, posredno plačala [135 – 405] milijonov EUR preveč. Tako bi znesek pomoči namesto 1,35 milijarde EUR znašal [0,945 – 1,215] milijarde EUR.
The Dutch State’s claim that the measure is in line with the MEIP cannot be accepted.
Trditve Nizozemske, da je ukrep v skladu z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu, ni mogoče sprejeti.
The measure follows other measures contaminated by State aid as explained in recitals 235 to 242, so that the MEIP does not apply.
Ukrep sledi drugim ukrepom, ki so vsebovali državno pomoč, kot je razloženo v uvodnih izjavah 235 do 242, tako da načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu ne velja.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measure C constitutes State aid for an amount of EUR [0,945 - 1,215] billion as it provides FBN with an advantage in the form of extra capital.
Zato je treba skleniti, da ukrep C pomeni državno pomoč v višini [0,945 – 1,215] milijarde EUR, saj banki FBN zagotavlja prednost v obliki dodatnega kapitala.
Measure D: Cash Payments to other consortium members
Ukrep D: gotovinska plačila drugim članom konzorcija
With respect to the payments to the other consortium members, the Commission has concluded that the payments are indeed part of CSA-related obligations.
Glede plačil drugim članom konzorcija je Komisija sklenila, da so plačila dejansko del obveznosti, povezanih s sporazumom delničarjev konzorcija.
The consortium members had anticipated that some unexpected issues would show up during the separation process and the CSA describes the procedures to be used to settle those issues.
Člani konzorcija so predvidevali, da se bodo med postopkom ločitve pojavile nekatere nepričakovane težave, sporazum delničarjev konzorcija pa opisuje postopke, ki jih je treba uporabiti za rešitev teh težav.
The Commission has found no evidence that the payments of the Dutch State to the other consortium members led to an extra transfer of net assets to ABN AMRO N or to any other advantage for the company.
Komisija ni našla nobenega dokaza, da so plačila Nizozemske drugim članom konzorcija prispevala k dodatnemu prenosu neto sredstev banki ABN AMRO N ali h kateri koli drugi prednosti za podjetje.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measure D does not constitute State aid as Measure D was a CSA-obligation of the State and not of ABN AMRO N. The Measure implied no selective advantage to ABN AMRO N.
Zato je treba skleniti, da ukrep D ne pomeni državne pomoči, saj v skladu s sporazumom delničarjev konzorcija ni bil obveznost banke ABN AMRO N, ampak obveznost države. Ukrep ni pomenil selektivne prednosti za banko ABN AMRO N.
Measure E: State guarantee on debt to sort out cross liabilities
Ukrep E: državno jamstvo na dolg za rešitev navzkrižnih obveznosti
The Commission has come to the conclusion that the cross liabilities are to a large extent linked to the specific separation context of ABN AMRO N from its parent company ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV).
Komisija je sklenila, da so navzkrižne obveznosti v veliki meri povezane s posebnim okvirom ločitve banke ABN AMRO N od njenega matičnega podjetja ABN AMRO Bank (zdaj RBS NV).
Under Dutch company law, Deutsche Bank as the purchaser of New HBU remains liable for debts of ABN AMRO Bank if the latter does not meet its obligations.
Pa pravu družb Nizozemske banka Deutsche Bank kot kupec podružnice New HBU ostaja odgovorna za dolgove banke ABN AMRO N, če slednja ne izpolni svojih obveznosti.
Therefore Deutsche Bank wants to be indemnified for the risk it runs towards ABN AMRO Bank.
Zato želi biti banka Deutsche Bank odškodovana za tveganje v zvezi z ABN AMRO Bank.
If ABN AMRO N had not been separated from ABN AMRO Bank, those cross liabilities between New HBU and ABN AMRO Bank would not have existed.
Če banka ABN AMRO N ne bi bila ločena od ABN AMRO Bank, ne bi bilo teh navzkrižnih obveznosti med New HBU in ABN AMRO Bank.
The Dutch State therefore provides a guarantee on a cross liability which exists exclusively because of the separation of ABN AMRO N. The Dutch State does not provide a guarantee on the cross liability between New HBU and ABN AMRO N.
Nizozemska zato zagotavlja jamstvo na navzkrižno obveznost, ki je nastala izrecno zaradi ločitve banke ABN AMRO N. Nizozemska ne zagotavlja jamstva na navzkrižne obveznosti med New HBU in ABN AMRO N.
Therefore, it should be concluded that it can be accepted that Measure E does not constitute State aid as the separation of ABN AMRO N from ABN AMRO Bank is an obligation of the Dutch State under the CSA.
Zato je treba skleniti, da je mogoče sprejeti, da ukrep E ne pomeni državne pomoči, saj je v skladu s sporazumom delničarjev konzorcija ločitev banke ABN AMRO N od ABN AMRO Bank obveznost nizozemske države.
Quantification of the State aid
Količinska opredelitev državne pomoči
ABN AMRO Group (or FBN and ABN AMRO N before the merger) have benefitted from recapitalisation aid, which is situated in a range between EUR 4,2 billion and EUR 5,45 billion. That amount translates into a range of 2,75 %-3,5 % when compared to ABN AMRO Group’s risk-weighted assets.
Skupina ABN AMRO (ali banki FBN in ABN AMRO N pred združitvijo) je imela korist od pomoči v obliki dokapitalizacije, ki se je gibala med 4,2 milijarde EUR in 5,45 milijarde EUR. Ta znesek v primerjavi s tveganjem prilagojenih sredstev skupine ABN AMRO N pomeni 2,75–3,5 %.
The Commission observes that FBN also benefited from a very sizeable amount of liquidity aid, both in relative and in absolute terms.
Komisija je ugotovila, da je imela banka FBN korist tudi od zelo velikega zneska likvidnostne pomoči, tako v relativnem kot absolutnem smislu.
State aid: Summary table of recapitalisation aid and liquidity aid
Državna pomoč: zbirna preglednica pomoči v obliki dokapitalizacije in likvidnostne pomoči
Recapitalisation aid
Pomoč v obliki dokapitalizacije
(all figures in EUR billion)
(vsi zneski so v milijardah EUR)
State aid min
Najnižja državna pomoč
State aid max
Najvišja državna pomoč
RWA of the combined entity FBN-ABN AMRO N
TPS združenega subjekta FBN-ABN AMRO N
min % of RWA
najnižji % TPS
max % of RWA
najvišji % TPS
Measure Z: Dutch State acquires AA from FBN
Ukrep Z: Nizozemska kupi AA od FBN
Measure B3: Separation costs (prudential margin)
Ukrep B3: stroški ločitve (smotrna razlika)
Measure B4: Capital shortage related to HBU sale
Ukrep B4: kapitalski primanjkljaj zaradi prodaje New HBU
Measure B5: Integration costs
Ukrep B5: stroški integracije
Measure C: Tier 2 ==> Tier 1 conversion
Ukrep C: pretvorba kapitala drugega reda v kapital prvega reda
Total recapitalisation aid
Pomoč v obliki dokapitalizacije skupaj
Funding/Liquidity aid
Znesek financiranja/likvidnostna pomoč
Measure Y1: Short-term liquidity facility
Ukrep Y1: kratkoročno likvidnostno posojilo
Measure Y2: Long-term loans
Ukrep Y2: dolgoročna posojila
Issue of new debt instrument guaranteed under the Dutch guarantee scheme
Izdaja novih dolžniških instrumentov, zajamčenih v okviru nizozemskega sistema zajamčenih vlog
Total funding/liquidity aid
Znesek financiranja / likvidnostne pomoči skupaj
71,7 (or 52,9 when corrected for double counting) [116]
71,7 (ali 52,9 po popravku zaradi dvojnega štetja) [116]
Compatibility of the different aid measures
Združljivost različnih ukrepov pomoči
Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the internal market if it is intended ‘to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’.
Komisija lahko na podlagi člena 107(3)(b) PDEU razglasi pomoč za združljivo s skupnim trgom, če je namenjena „odpravljanju resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice“.
In respect of the Dutch economy the risk for serious disturbance was confirmed in the Commission’s various approvals of the measures undertaken by the Dutch authorities to combat the financial crisis such as the Guarantee Scheme.
V zvezi z nizozemskim gospodarstvom je bilo to potrjeno v različnih soglasjih, ki jih je Komisija dala za ukrepe nizozemskih organov za boj proti finančni krizi, kot je sistem zajamčenih vlog.
In this regard, it is however important to underline that the Court of First Instance has emphasised that Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty should be applied restrictively [117], so that the economic disturbance should affect the entire Member State and not just be of a regional dimension.
S tem v zvezi je treba poudariti, da je sodišče prve stopnje poudarilo, da je treba člen 107(3)(b) Pogodbe uporabljati omejeno [117] in da mora gospodarska motnja vplivati na celotno državo članico, ne pa samo na njen del.
The Commission notes that ABN AMRO N and FBN are leading Dutch banks with a nation-wide branch network and top market positions in a wide range of segments on the Dutch retail and SME banking market.
Komisija ugotavlja, da sta banki ABN AMRO N in FBN vodilni nizozemski banki z mrežo podružnic po vsej državi in najboljšim položajem na trgu v številnih segmentih nizozemskega bančnega trga na področju poslovanja s prebivalstvom in z MSP.
In the context of the various uncertainties surrounding the recovery from the global financial and economic crisis, the discontinuity of those banks would create a serious disturbance for the Dutch economy and therefore State aid from the Dutch government can be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty.
V okviru različnih negotovosti, ki so vplivale na okrevanje po svetovni finančni in gospodarski krizi, bi prenehanje poslovanja teh dveh bank pomenilo resno motnjo za nizozemsko gospodarstvo, zato se lahko državno pomoč nizozemske vlade oceni na podlagi člena 107(3)(b) Pogodbe.
The Commission set out more details on the compatibility of specific measures in its Banking Communication, Recapitalisation Communication and Impaired Asset Communication, and on the required restructuring in its Restructuring Communication.
Komisija je več podrobnosti glede združljivosti posebnih ukrepov navedla v svojem sporočilu o bančništvu, sporočilu o dokapitalizaciji in sporočilu o oslabljenih sredstvih, glede zahtevanega prestrukturiranja pa v svojem sporočilu o prestrukturiranju.
The individual measures should be tested against the relevant Communications of the Commission.
Posamezne ukrepe je treba preskusiti glede na zadevna sporočila Komisije.
The capital relief instrument does not cover impaired assets and is de facto a proxy for a recapitalisation measure.
Instrument za razbremenitev kapitala ne krije oslabljenih sredstev in je dejansko nadomestek za ukrep dokapitalizacije.
The general principles behind the Impaired Asset Communication should however hold also for the capital relief instrument to be in line with the internal market.
Splošna načela sporočila o oslabljenih sredstvih bi morala veljati tudi za instrument za razbremenitev kapitala, ki mora biti v skladu z notranjim trgom.
In order to maintain a level playing field, the Commission had to check whether the CRI was not used to shift expected losses on the portfolio to the State.
Da bi ohranila enake konkurenčne pogoje, je morala Komisija preveriti, ali instrument za razbremenitev kapitala ni bil uporabljen za prenos pričakovanih izgub pri portfelju na državo.
Measure A should also contain sufficient exit incentives and in case the economic situation would deteriorate, ABN AMRO N still had to take some losses via a vertical slice.
Ukrep A bi moral vsebovati tudi zadostne spodbude za izhod, banka ABN AMRO N pa bi morala v primeru, če bi se gospodarski položaj poslabšal, še vedno prevzeti nekaj izgube preko navpičnega prereza.
The liquidity measures (Measures Y1 and Y2) should be judged against the Banking Communication and the recapitalisation measures (and more specifically Measures Z, B4 and B5 as well as the prudential margin of EUR 500 million which was part of Measures B3 and C) against the Recapitalisation Communication.
Likvidnostna ukrepa (ukrepa Y1 in Y2) je treba preučiti glede na sporočilo o bančništvu, ukrepe za dokapitalizacijo (natančneje, ukrepe Z, B4 in B5 ter smotrno razliko v višini 500 milijonov EUR, ki je bila del ukrepov B3 in C) pa glede na sporočilo o dokapitalizaciji.
Compatibility of Measures Y1 and Y2 under the Banking Communication
Združljivost ukrepov Y1 in Y2 v skladu s sporočilom o bančništvu
In order to comply with the Banking Communication, Measures Y1 and Y2 should be well-targeted, proportionate and designed to avoid undue distortions of competition.
Da bi bila ukrepa Y1 in Y2 v skladu s sporočilom o bančništvu, bi morala biti dobro usmerjena in sorazmerna ter oblikovana tako, da ne bi prišlo do neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence.
The Commission repeats the conclusion of recital 51 of the Decision of 8 April 2009 that the measure to cut all the links between FBN and its liquidity-constrained parent Fortis SA/NV was necessary to shelter FBN from the then acute difficulties of its parent company.
Komisija ponavlja sklep iz uvodne izjave 51 odločbe z dne 8. aprila 2009, da je bil ukrep za prekinitev vseh povezav med banko FBN in njenim likvidnostno omejenim matičnim podjetjem Fortis SA/NV nujen za zaščito banke FBN pred takrat velikimi težavami matičnega podjetja.
Therefore, the measures can be considered well-targeted in order to achieve the rescue of FBN.
Zato se za ukrepa lahko šteje, da sta dobro usmerjena in namenjena reševanju banke FBN.
The measures Y1 and Y2 should also be proportionate and not unnecessarily distort competition.
Ukrepa Y1 in Y2 bi morala biti tudi sorazmerna in ne bi smela neupravičeno izkrivljati konkurence.
In that regard, the Commission looks favourably at the pricing system developed by the Dutch State, which aimed to create a level playing field with the Guarantee Scheme (see recital 169).
S tem v zvezi je Komisija naklonjena sistemu oblikovanja cen, ki ga je razvila Nizozemska in je namenjen oblikovanju enakih konkurenčnih pogojev s sistemom zajamčenih vlog (glej uvodno izjavo 169).
In respect of guarantee schemes, the Commission has consistently requested Member States to charge a premium of at least 50 basis points for guarantees longer than 3 months (and not longer than 12 months).
V zvezi s sistemom zajamčenih vlog je Komisija od držav članic večkrat zahtevala, naj zaračunajo premijo vsaj 50 bazičnih točk za jamstva, daljša od treh mesecev (in krajša od 12 mesecev).
The Commission found that the Dutch State did not consistently ask EURIBOR + 50 basis points for loans of longer than 3 months.
Komisija je ugotovila, da Nizozemska ni vedno zahtevala obrestne mere EURIBOR + 50 bazičnih točk za posojila, daljša od treh mesecev.
Therefore, the Commission can only declare Measure Y1 compatible with the internal market on the condition that a corrective payment of EUR 18,2 million is made to ensure that loans with a maturity of more than 3 months are effectively remunerated at EURIBOR + 50 basis points.
Zato lahko Komisija ukrep Y1 razglasi za združljiv z notranjim trgom samo pod pogojem, da se izvede korekcijsko plačilo v višini 18,2 milijona EUR, s čimer se zagotovi, da so posojila z zapadlostjo več kot tri mesece učinkovito poplačana po obrestni meri EURIBOR + 50 bazičnih točk.
The Commission notes positively that all the liquidity facilities were repaid and ended in June 2009.
Komisija z zadovoljstvom ugotavlja, da so bila vsa likvidnostna posojila poplačana in zaključena junija 2009.
With respect to Measure Y2, the Commission observes that since the Dutch State did not change the interest rate and maturity of the loans, FBN benefitted from relatively cheap loans, which could distort competition.
V zvezi z ukrepom Y2 Komisija ugotavlja, da Nizozemska ni spremenila obrestne mere in roka zapadlosti posojil, zaradi česar je imela banka FBN korist od razmeroma poceni posojil, kar bi lahko izkrivljalo konkurenco.
Therefore, the Commission can only declare the measure compatible with the Banking Communication if all the conditions set out later in this Decision and more specifically the measures to limit distortions of competition are correctly implemented.
Zato lahko Komisija ukrep razglasi za združljiv s sporočilom o bančništvu samo, če bodo vsi pogoji, ki so določeni v nadaljevanju tega sklepa, in natančneje, ukrepi za omejitev izkrivljanja konkurence, ustrezno izvedeni.
Compatibility of Measures Z, B3 (namely EUR 500 million), B4 and B5 and C under the Recapitalisation Communication
Združljivost ukrepov Z, B3 (tj. 500 milijonov EUR), B4 in B5 ter C v skladu s sporočilom o dokapitalizaciji
The Commission has concluded that the measures concerned were put in place to sort out a genuine need and represented the minimum necessary to fully restore the viability of the companies concerned.
Komisija je sklenila, da so bili zadevni ukrepi vzpostavljeni z namenom, da uredijo dejansko potrebo, in predstavljajo najnižjo možno pomoč, potrebno za popolno ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja zadevnih podjetij.
With respect to remuneration, the Commission observed that the State was already the owner of 100 % of the ordinary shares of FBN (and indirectly of 100 % of ABN AMRO N).
V zvezi s povračilom je Komisija ugotovila, da je država že 100-odstotni lastnik navadnih delnic banke FBN (in posredno 100-odstotni lastnik delnic banke ABN AMRO N).
All those measures were indispensable to preserve the value of that shareholding.
Vsi ti ukrepi so bili nujni za ohranitev vrednosti tega poslovnega deleža.
ABN AMRO Group will realise a RoE of approximately […] % in 2013, which indicates that thanks to all the State interventions, a viable and profitable entity has been created.
Skupina ABN AMRO bo v letu 2013 realizirala kapitalski donos v višini približno […] %, kar kaže, da je bil zahvaljujoč vsem posredovanjem države ustvarjen poslovno uspešen in dobičkonosen subjekt.
All the available valuations of ABN AMRO Group are well above the sum of the aid in measures Z, B3, B4, B5 and C (namely between EUR 4,2 billion and EUR 5,45 billion).
Vse razpoložljive ocene skupine ABN AMRO so precej višje od zneska pomoči v ukrepih Z, B3, B4, B5 in C (tj. med 4,2 in 5,45 milijarde EUR).
Thus the State will receive an appropriate remuneration on the aid granted to ABN AMRO N and FBN [118].
Zato bo država prejela ustrezno povračilo za pomoč, dodeljeno bankama ABN AMRO N in FBN [118].
In view of the above, the Commission has concluded that Measures Z, B3, B4, B5 and C are compatible with the Recapitalisation Communication if the conditions set out later in this Decision are correctly implemented.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega je Komisija sklenila, da so ukrepi Z, B3, B4, B5 in C združljivi s sporočilom o dokapitalizaciji, če bodo pogoji, ki so določeni v nadaljevanju tega sklepa, ustrezno izvedeni.
Compatibility of the capital relief instrument with the principles set forward in the Impaired Asset Communication
Združljivost instrumenta za razbremenitev kapitala z načeli, določenimi v sporočilu o oslabljenih sredstvih
The Commission acknowledges that the capital relief instrument put in place by the Dutch State differs from the traditional impaired asset measures evaluated in other cases.
Komisija priznava, da se instrument za razbremenitev kapitala, ki ga je vzpostavila Nizozemska, razlikuje od običajnih ukrepov v zvezi z oslabljenimi sredstvi, ki so ocenjeni v drugih zadevah.
While other impaired asset measures sought to relieve banks from impaired assets, the portfolio protected by the CRI is a traditional Dutch mortgage portfolio of which neither ABN AMRO N nor external experts expected the performance to deteriorate to a significant extent.
Medtem ko je bil namen drugih ukrepov v zvezi z oslabljenimi sredstvi razbremeniti banke oslabljenih sredstev, je portfelj, zaščiten z instrumentom za razbremenitev kapitala, običajen nizozemski hipotekarni portfelj, pri katerem niti banka ABN AMRO N niti zunanji strokovnjaki niso pričakovali, da se bo poslovni izid močno poslabšal.
The Commission observes that a traditional recapitalisation at the level of ABN AMRO N was not opportune for the Dutch State, because it was not a separate legal entity at the relevant moment and the Dutch State would not have been in a position to ring-fence its capital contribution, which could have had negative consequences especially in distress scenarios.
Komisija je ugotovila, da običajna dokapitalizacija na ravni banke ABN AMRO N Nizozemski ni koristila, ker v zadevnem trenutku banka ni bila ločen pravni subjekt in Nizozemska ni mogla ločiti svojega kapitalskega prispevka, kar bi lahko imelo negativne posledice zlasti v scenarijih povečanih težav.
Moreover, private capital relief instruments were not feasible given the size of the transaction and the complexities related to the separation of ABN AMRO Bank NV, the parent company of ABN AMRO N and ABN AMRO Z.
Poleg tega zaradi obsega transakcije in zahtevnosti, povezanih z ločitvijo ABN AMRO Bank NV, matičnega podjetja ABN AMRO N in ABN AMRO Z, zasebni instrumenti za razbremenitev kapitala niso bili izvedljivi.
Given that particular background, the Commission can accept that the CRI is an alternative to a traditional capital increase rather than a protection against toxic assets and is therefore a necessary and appropriately targeted measure to sort out the specific capital problem of ABN AMRO Z.
Komisija lahko glede na navedeno sprejme, da je instrument za razbremenitev kapitala alternativa običajnemu povečanju kapitala in ne zaščita pred slabo aktivo, ter ga zato šteje za nujen in ustrezno usmerjen instrument, namenjen reševanju določene težave s kapitalom podjetja ABN AMRO Z.
In spite of the fact that the measure is mainly a proxy measure for a recapitalisation, the measure should be consistent with other capital relief schemes, thereby protecting the internal market as explained in recital 284.
Kljub temu, da je ukrep v glavnem nadomestni ukrep za dokapitalizacijo, bi moral biti v skladu z drugimi shemami razbremenitve kapitala in s tem ščititi notranji trg, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 284.
The Commission has concluded that the Dutch State has provided sufficient evidence to show that the valuation was such that ABN AMRO N or its legal successor will bear the expected losses.
Po mnenju Komisije je Nizozemska predložila dovolj dokazov, ki kažejo, da je bilo vrednotenje tako, da bo pričakovane izgube pokrila banka ABN AMRO N ali njen pravni naslednik.