natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Italy concluded that that the annual 4 % increase applied to the Sardinian tariffs was in line with the increases in energy prices applied to their direct EU competitors.
Italija je ugotovila, da je bilo letno zvišanje za 4 %, uporabljeno za cene na Sardiniji, v skladu z zvišanji cen energije, ki so veljale za njihove neposredne konkurenčne ponudnike v EU.
Italy drew attention to the existence in the EU of measures which had effects equivalent to the disputed preferential tariffs, and argued that all of them should be assessed in the same way, regardless of their form, since their common objective was to ensure the survival of energy-intensive industries in the EU and prevent their relocation outside the national territory.
Italija je opozorila na obstoj ukrepov v EU, ki so imeli učinke, enake spornim ugodnejšim cenam, in trdila, da bi bilo treba vse te ukrepe ne glede na njihovo obliko oceniti na enak način, saj je njihov skupni cilj zagotoviti preživetje energetsko intenzivnih industrij v EU in preprečiti njihovo preseljevanje na območja zunaj državnega ozemlja.
Eligibility of Sardinia for regional aid after 2007
Upravičenost Sardinije do regionalne pomoči po letu 2007
Although from 2007 onwards Sardinia could no longer benefit from regional operating aid, Italy argued that the Regional Aid Guidelines mad provision for a phasing-out of schemes which were ongoing at the time a region ceased to be eligible for the exemption in Article 107(3)(a) TFEU.
Čeprav Sardinija od leta 2007 ni mogla več koristiti regionalne pomoči za tekoče poslovanje, je Italija trdila, da smernice o regionalni pomoči vsebujejo določbo za postopno opuščanje shem, ki so se še izvajale v času, ko regija ni bila več upravičena do oprostitve iz člena 107(3)(a) PDEU.
Italy contended once again that the tariffs did not affect trade between Member States, on the basis of the arguments already set out with respect to aluminium, zinc and lead in recital 76.
Italija je na podlagi trditev glede aluminija, cinka in svinca, že navedenih v uvodni izjavi 76, ponovno navedla, da cene niso vplivale na trgovino med državami članicami.
The same reasoning, Italy maintained, applied to the chemical industry.
Isti razlogi so, po trditvah Italije, veljali za kemično industrijo.
Italy pointed out that in 2003 imports of chemical products into Italy had exceeded exports, and that EU and Italian production had slumped since 2001.
Italija je poudarila, da je uvoz kemičnih proizvodov v Italijo leta 2003 presegel izvoz, in da se je proizvodnja v EU in Italiji od leta 2001 močno zmanjšala.
With specific reference to the production of PVC, which was the main application of chlorine, Italy pointed to a production deficit in the country: in 2002, only 470000 tonnes of PVC had been produced in Italy, while consumption had been 970000 tonnes.
S posebnim sklicevanjem na proizvodnjo PVC, kjer je uporaba klora največja, je Italija opozorila na nezadostno proizvodnjo v državi: leta 2002 je bilo v Italiji proizvedenih samo 470000 ton PVC, medtem ko je poraba znašala 970000 ton.
Existence of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU
Obstoj državne pomoči v skladu s členom 107(1) PDEU
A measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU if the following conditions are all fulfilled: the measure (a) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; (b) is granted by the State or through State resources; (c) is selective; and (d) affects trade between Member States and is liable to distort competition within the EU.
Ukrep pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, če so izpolnjeni vsi naslednji pogoji: ukrep (a) pomeni gospodarsko prednost za upravičenca; (b) odobri ga država ali je odobren iz državnih sredstev; (c) je selektiven ter (d) vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami in lahko izkrivlja konkurenco znotraj EU.
Under the 2004 and 2005 tariff arrangements, the State intervened to subsidise the electricity price negotiated by the beneficiaries with their suppliers.
Na podlagi dogovorov o cenah iz leta 2004 in 2005 je država sodelovala pri subvencioniranju cene električne energije, za katero so se upravičenci dogovorili s svojimi dobavitelji.
In 2005, according to the data provided by Italy, the electricity price negotiated by Syndial with its supplier exceeded EUR 60 per MWh, whereas the tariff would bring it down to EUR 27 per MWh.
V letu 2005 je po podatkih, ki jih je predložila Italija, cena električne energije, za katero se je družba Syndial dogovorila s svojim dobaviteljem, presegla 60 EUR/MWh, ugodnejša cena pa bi to ceno znižala na 27 EUR/MWh.
The rationale of the two measures was that the State would reimburse to the beneficiaries the extra costs they had sustained in order to purchase electricity in Sardinia compared to average prices paid by their EU competitors.
Utemeljitev za ta dva ukrepa je bila, da bo država upravičencem povrnila dodatne stroške, ki so jih imeli z nakupom električne energije na Sardiniji v primerjavi s povprečnimi cenami, ki so jih plačevali njihovi konkurenčni ponudniki v EU.
Portovesme contends that the preferential price corresponds to the price which would prevail in a fully competitive market, and therefore does not provide an advantage.
Družba Portovesme je trdila, da je bila ugodnejša cena enaka ceni, ki bi se zaračunavala na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu, in zato ne zagotavlja prednosti.
The Commission has already rejected this line of reasoning in the Alcoa case, which concerned virtually identical tariffs.
Komisija je tako trditev že zavrnila v zadevi Alcoa, v kateri so bile obravnavane skoraj enake cene.
When assessing the presence of an advantage, neither the Union lawcourts nor the Commission have ever taken into account the conditions that would prevail in a hypothetical market that functioned better.
Sodišča Unije ali Komisija pri ocenjevanju obstoja prednosti niso nikoli upoštevali pogojev, ki bi prevladovali na hipotetičnem, bolje delujočem trgu.
The framework of reference has always been the conditions prevailing on the actual markets concerned [34].
Referenčni okvir so bili vedno pogoji, ki prevladujejo na dejanskih zadevnih trgih [34].
This argument also supposes that where a market was not functioning properly a Member State would be justified in setting prices that simulated conditions of effective competition (see Italy’s comment in recital 72 above).
Ta trditev tudi pomeni, da bi lahko država članica v primeru neustreznega delovanja trga upravičeno določila cene, ki spodbujajo pogoje učinkovite konkurence (glej pripombo Italije v uvodni izjavi 72).
This reasoning cannot be accepted, as it runs counter to the settled principle of EU case-law according to which ‘the fact that a Member State seeks to approximate, by unilateral measures, conditions of competition in a particular sector of the economy to those prevailing in other Member States cannot deprive the measures in question of their character as aid’ [35].
Takšno sklepanje ni sprejemljivo, saj je v nasprotju z ustaljenim načelom sodne prakse EU, v skladu s katero „dejstvo, da si država članica z enostranskimi ukrepi prizadeva približati pogoje konkurence v nekem gospodarskem sektorju pogojem konkurence, ki veljajo v drugih državah članicah, zadevnim ukrepom ne more odvzeti značaja državne pomoči“ [35].
The Commission considers that the same principle applies to situations where a Member State seeks to approximate conditions of competition to those that would prevail in a fully competitive market.
Komisija meni, da se isto načelo uporablja za okoliščine, v katerih si država članica prizadeva približati pogoje konkurence pogojem, ki bi prevladovali na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu.
Italy contends that these tariffs are identical to the Alumix tariff, which the Commission considered not to constitute aid (see recital 74 above), and should likewise be considered free of aid.
Italija trdi, da so te cene enake cenam Alumix, za katere je Komisija menila, da ne pomenijo državne pomoči (glej uvodno izjavo 74), in bi jih bilo prav tako treba obravnavati kot brez elementa pomoči.
The Commission points out that the situation on which the Commission took a position in the Alumix case was very different.
Komisija opozarja, da je bil položaj, glede katerega je Komisija podala stališče v zadevi Alumix, zelo drugačen.
In Alumix, the tariff was granted by ENEL, which at the time was a public body supplying electricity on a monopoly basis in an electricity market which had yet to be liberalised [36].
V zadevi Alumix je ceno odobrila družba ENEL, ki je bila takrat javni organ in je energijo dobavljala na podlagi monopola na trgu z električno energijo, ki še ni bil liberaliziran [36].
Therefore, the Commission devised a method to identify the lowest theoretical market price at which a rational supplier would be prepared to sell to its ‘best customer’.
Zato je Komisija pripravila metodo za opredelitev najnižje teoretične tržne cene, po kateri bi bil razumen dobavitelj pripravljen prodajati svojemu „najboljšemu odjemalcu“.
However, this method cannot be applied in a situation where prices are negotiated by end-users with power suppliers on a liberalised market and are subsidised by compensatory payments ex post.
Vendar te metode ni mogoče uporabiti, kadar se o cenah dogovarjajo končni uporabniki z dobavitelji na liberaliziranem trgu in so s kompenzacijskimi plačili naknadno subvencionirane.
Thus the analysis in the Alumix decision, and the Commission’s findings in that case, are manifestly devoid of relevance here.
Zato analiza v odločbi Alumix in ugotovitve Komisije v tej zadevi v tem primeru očitno nimajo nikakršnega pomena.
This was borne out by the judgment of the Court of First Instance which upheld the decision to open the formal investigation in Alcoa [37] (paragraph 132 of the judgment).
To je bilo potrjeno v sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje, ki je potrdila odločitev o sprožitvi uradne preiskave v zadevi Alcoa [37] (točka 132 sodbe).
In the present case, the market operator principle does not apply.
V tej zadevi načelo udeleženca na trgu ne velja.
The position would have to be assessed in the light of the market operator test if the State sold electricity to the companies concerned, either directly or through a State-owned company, as it did in Alumix.
Položaj bi moral biti ocenjen z upoštevanjem preskusa nosilcev dejavnosti na trgu, če bi država prodajala električno energijo zadevnim podjetjem, in sicer neposredno ali preko podjetja v državni lasti, kot je to storila v zadevi Alumix.
But here the electricity is supplied by private companies.
Vendar v tem primeru električno energijo dobavljajo zasebna podjetja.
There is therefore no need, as there was in Alumix, to examine whether the State’s behaviour has been comparable to that of a rational market operator.
Zato ni treba tako kot v zadevi Alumix preučiti, ali je ravnanje države primerljivo z ravnanjem razumnega udeleženca na trgu.
It must be concluded that the 2004 and 2005 compensatory payment systems mitigate the charges payable under the supply contracts concluded by the beneficiaries, which would normally have to be included in the companies’ budgets.
Treba je skleniti, da je sistem kompenzacijskih plačil iz leta 2004 in 2005 ublažil dajatve, plačljive po dobavnih pogodbah, ki so jih sklenili upravičenci in bi bile običajno vključene v proračun podjetij.
In line with well-established case-law, therefore, the disputed measures confer an economic advantage on the recipients [38].
Zato ukrep v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso pomeni gospodarsko prednost za prejemnike [38].
Since the preferential electricity tariffs in Italy are granted exclusively to undertakings operating existing facilities located in Sardinia and belonging to a closed list of industries identified in the legislative and regulatory instruments that form the legal basis of the measures, the advantage they confer is a selective one.
Ker so ugodnejše cene električne energije v Italiji odobrene izključno družbam z obstoječimi delujočimi obrati na Sardiniji, ki sodijo v zaključen seznam industrij, opredeljenih v zakonodajnih in regulativnih instrumentih, ki tvorijo pravno podlago ukrepov, je zagotovljena prednost selektivna.
It is settled case-law that an advantage constitutes State aid within the scope of Article 87(1) TFEU only if it is granted directly or indirectly through State resources [39] and is imputable to the State [40].
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso prednost pomeni državno pomoč, ki spada na področje uporabe člena 87(1) PDEU samo, če je odobrena neposredno ali posredno iz državnih sredstev [39] in je zanjo odgovorna država [40].
As explained in recital 28, the compensatory payments at issue here are financed by means of a parafiscal charge collected by the Equalisation Fund via the A4 component of the electricity tariff.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 28, so tukaj obravnavana kompenzacijska plačila financirana iz drugih dajatev, ki jih izravnalni sklad pobere na podlagi sestavnega dela A4 cene za električno energijo.
This charge is obligatory, being imposed by means of decisions of the AEEG that implement national legislation.
Ta dajatev je obvezna, saj je določena z odločbami organa AEEG, s katerimi se izvaja nacionalna zakonodaja.
The Equalisation Fund is a public body established by law which carries out its functions on the basis of precise instructions laid down in the decisions of the AEEG.
Izravnalni sklad je z zakonom določen javni organ, ki svoje funkcije izvaja na podlagi natančnih navodil, ki so določena v odločbah organa AEEG.
It is also settled case-law that the yield of a levy which is obligatory under national law and is paid to a body established by law constitutes a State resource within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty when it is earmarked for the funding of a measure which fulfils the other criteria of that Article [41].
Prav tako v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso pomeni donos dajatve, ki je obvezna v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo in se plačuje z zakonom določenemu javnemu organu, državno sredstvo v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe, kadar je namenjen financiranju ukrepa, ki izpolnjuje druga merila tega člena [41].
Italy relies on the judgment of the Court of Justice in PreussenElektra [42] to substantiate the thesis that the measure at hand is not financed through State resources.
Italija se pri utemeljitvi trditve, da se zadevni ukrep ne financira iz državnih sredstev, sklicuje na sodbo v zadevi PreussenElektra [42].
Italy argues that the funds required to finance the tariff are transferred by private parties (electricity consumers) to private parties (the beneficiaries); the role of the State is confined to the enactment of a law requiring payment of the required sums, with no discretion to dispose of the funds other than in the implementation of the statutory scheme.
Italija trdi, da so potrebna sredstva za financiranje cene zasebne stranke (odjemalci električne energije) prenesli na zasebne stranke (upravičence); vloga države je omejena na sprejetje zakona, ki zahteva plačilo zahtevanih zneskov, pri čemer je mogoče s sredstvi razpolagati le z izvajanjem predpisane sheme.
In particular, according to Italy and several of the beneficiaries, the Equalisation Fund cannot exercise any control over the funds, and is merely an accounting intermediary.
Zlasti, po mnenju Italije in več upravičencev, izravnalni sklad ne more nadzirati sredstev in je le računovodski posrednik.
In the PreussenElektra case, the Court held that an obligation imposed on private electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced from renewable energy sources at minimum prices higher than the real economic value of that type of electricity did not constitute State aid, because the measure did not involve any direct or indirect transfer of State resources.
V zadevi Preussen-Elektra je Sodišče menilo, da obveznost nakupa električne energije iz obnovljivih virov po minimalnih cenah, višjih od dejanske tržne vrednosti te vrste električne energije, ki velja za zasebna podjetja za oskrbo z električno energijo, ni bila državna pomoč, saj ukrep ni vseboval neposrednega ali posrednega prenosa državnih sredstev.
The Commission points out that in PreussenElektra the resources required to finance the measure were provided by the electricity suppliers directly to the producers of renewable energies, without transiting through any public body.
Komisija opozarja, da so v zadevi PreussenElektra potrebna sredstva za financiranje ukrepa proizvajalcem električne energije iz obnovljivih virov energije neposredno zagotovili dobavitelji električne energije, pri čemer ni sodeloval noben javni organ.
In that system, the sums to be transferred could never be at the disposal of the Member State’s authorities.
V tem sistemu organi držav članic ne morejo nikoli razpolagati z zneski, ki jih je treba prenesti.
Thus PreussenElektra addresses different factual circumstances, and is not relevant to the present case.
Zato zadeva PreussenElektra obravnava drugačne dejanske okoliščine in za to zadevo ni pomembna.
The judgment in Pearle [43] cannot assist Italy or the beneficiaries either.
Sodba v zadevi Pearle [43] prav tako ne more pomagati Italiji ali upravičencem.
In Pearle, the Court found that, under certain specific conditions, the yield of a levy which transited through a public body did not constitute State resources.
V zadevi Pearle je Sodišče ugotovilo, da se v nekaterih določenih pogojih donos dajatve, ki se prenese preko javnega organa, ne šteje za državna sredstva.
In Pearle, the measures were financed entirely by a particular trade at the sole initiative of the trade itself.
V zadevi Pearle so se ukrepi v celoti in na lastno pobudo financirali iz določene dejavnosti.
The monies were collected via a parafiscal levy transiting through a public body which could not at any time dispose of the funds freely.
Denarna sredstva so se zbrala z drugimi dajatvami prek javnega organa, ki nikoli ne more prosto razpolagati s sredstvi.
In addition, there was a correspondence between the entities which paid the levy and those which received the benefits of the measure.
Poleg tega je obstajala korespondenca med subjekti, ki so plačali dajatev, in subjekti, ki so bili upravičeni do ugodnosti na podlagi ukrepa.
Italy contends that the Equalisation Fund does not have any discretion in the disbursement of the funds, which are earmarked for the financing of the tariffs and never come within ‘the perimeter of public finance’.
Italija nasprotuje trditvi, da izravnalni sklad nima diskrecijske pravice pri črpanju sredstev, ki so namenjena financiranju cen in niso nikoli del „obsega javnih financ“.
Thus the State cannot freely dispose of the funds, and consequently the funds do not constitute State resources.
Tako država ne more prosto razpolagati s sredstvi in zato sredstva niso državna sredstva.
As a preliminary remark, it should be pointed out that, while some of the Pearle criteria may subjectively be viewed as more central than others, there is no such thing as a ‘key criterion’ in Pearle.
Najprej je treba poudariti, da v zadevi Pearle„ključno merilo“ ne obstaja, medtem ko je mogoče nekatera merila v tej zadevi subjektivno obravnavati kot bolj osrednja od drugih.
The tests enumerated in the judgment are cumulative.
Preskusi, navedeni v sodbi, so kumulativni.
This is also the interpretation given by the Court of First Instance in Earl Salvat, where it examined a parafiscal levy challenged in that case in the light of each and every one of the Pearle criteria [44].
Sodišče prve stopnje je enako razlago navedlo v zadevi Earl Salvat, v kateri je preučilo izpodbijane druge dajatve v tej zadevi glede na vsako posamezno merilo iz zadeve Pearle [44].
Before considering the role played by the Equalisation Fund, the Commission has ascertained whether any of the other tests enumerated in Pearle are satisfied.
Komisija je pred preučitvijo vloge izravnalnega sklada ugotavljala, ali je primeren kateri od drugih preskusov iz zadeve Pearle.
It is clear that here, by contrast with the Pearle case, the disputed tariffs were established at the initiative of the State, not at the initiative of an economic sector.
Jasno je, da so bile sporne cene za razliko od zadeve Pearle določene na pobudo države in ne na pobudo gospodarskega sektorja.
In Pearle, moreover, the beneficiaries of the measure were also the sole contributors of the resources used, so that the intervention of the public body did not tend to create an advantage which would constitute an additional burden on the State.
Poleg tega so upravičenci ukrepa v zadevi Pearle tudi edini prispevali sredstva, ki so bila uporabljena, zato poseganje javnega organa ni pomenilo prednosti, ki bi dodatno obremenila državo.
In the case at hand, the beneficiaries do not bear the financial burden of the levy, which rests solely on electricity consumers.
V zadevnem primeru upravičenci ne nosijo finančnega bremena dajatve, ki ga nosijo izključno odjemalci električne energije.
Thus the Pearle judgment cannot validly be relied upon irrespective of whether merit can be found in the argument that the Equalisation Fund is a mere accounting intermediary.
Zato se ni mogoče veljavno zanašati na sodno prakso Pearle ne glede na to, ali je trditev o vlogi izravnalnega sklada le kot računovodskega posrednika ustrezna.
Turning now to the Equalisation Fund itself, the Commission points out that, according to settled case-law, no distinction should be made between cases where the aid is granted directly by the State and cases where it is granted by a public or private body designated or established by the State [45].
V zvezi s samim izravnalnim skladom Komisija opozarja, da se v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso „ne sme razlikovati med zadevami, v katerih pomoč neposredno dodeli država, in zadevami, v katerih pomoč dodeli javni ali zasebni organ, ki ga imenuje ali ustanovi država“ [45].
Thus the public or private status of the Equalisation Fund is not a determining factor for the purpose of applying the State aid rules.
Zato javni ali zasebni status izravnalnega sklada ni odločilen dejavnik za namene uporabe pravil o državni pomoči.
The fact that the Equalisation Fund is a public body does not automatically mean that Article 107 TFEU is applicable [46]; similarly, the intervention of a private body would not in itself preclude application of that Article.
Dejstvo, da je izravnalni sklad javni organ, samodejno ne pomeni veljavnosti člena 107 PDEU [46]; podobno tudi poseganje zasebnega organa samo po sebi ne bi izključevalo uporabe navedenega člena.
However, the analysis cannot be limited to the powers of the Equalisation Fund in its capacity as a public body.
Analiza se kljub temu ne more omejiti na pristojnosti izravnalnega sklada kot javnega organa.
What has to be ascertained, rather, is the more general question whether the State, either directly or through any other body designated by it, can exercise control over the funds used to finance the tariff.
Namesto tega je treba ugotoviti, ali lahko država na splošno neposredno ali posredno prek drugega organa, ki ga imenuje, nadzoruje sredstva, ki so namenjena financiranju cene.
The same test would have to be applied if the Equalisation Fund were a private body.
Enak preskus bi se moral uporabiti, če bi bil izravnalni sklad zasebni organ.
The recent judgment of the Court of Justice in the Essent [47] case provides definitive guidance on this point.
Nedavna sodba Sodišča v zadevi Essent [47] s tem v zvezi navaja dokončne smernice.
The Court came to the conclusion that the proceeds of the surcharge constituted State resources, because the surcharge on the price of electricity was imposed by national law, and therefore constituted a charge, and SEP was not entitled to use the proceeds from the charge for purposes other than those provided by the law, so that the monies remained under public control and were thus available to the national authorities.
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so prihodki zaradi dodatne dajatve državna sredstva, ker je bila dodatna dajatev za ceno električne energije uvedena z nacionalnim zakonom in je zato pomenila dajatev, družba SEP pa je bila upravičena do uporabe prihodkov iz dajatev le za namene, ki jih določa zakon, tako da so denarna sredstva ostala pod javnim nadzorom in so bila tako na voljo nacionalnim organom.