natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In order to enhance national ownership of the SGP, national budgetary frameworks should be fully aligned with the objectives of multilateral surveillance in the Union, and, in particular, with the European Semester.
Da bi povečali nacionalno lastništvo Pakta za stabilnost in rast, bi morali biti nacionalni proračunski okviri popolnoma usklajeni s cilji večstranskega nadzora v Uniji, zlasti z evropskim semestrom.
In line with the legal and political arrangements of each Member State, national parliaments should be duly involved in the European Semester and in the preparation of stability programmes, convergence programmes and national reform programmes in order to increase the transparency and ownership of, and accountability for the decisions taken.
V skladu s pravnimi in političnimi ureditvami vsake države članice bi morali biti nacionalni parlamenti ustrezno vključeni v evropski semester in v pripravo programov za stabilnost, programov za konvergenco ter nacionalnih programov reform, da bi povečali preglednost, lastništvo in odgovornost glede sprejetih odločitev.
Where appropriate, the Economic and Financial Committee, the Economic Policy Committee, the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee should be consulted within the framework of the European Semester.
Po potrebi bi se moralo v okviru evropskega semestra posvetovati z Ekonomsko-finančnim odborom, Odborom za ekonomsko politiko, Odborom za zaposlovanje in Odborom za socialno zaščito.
Relevant stakeholders, in particular the social partners, should be involved, within the framework of the European Semester, on the main policy issues where appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of the TFEU and national legal and political arrangements.
Po potrebi so v okvir evropskega semestra pri glavnih vprašanjih vključene zadevne interesne skupine, zlasti socialni partnerji, v skladu z določbami PDEU ter nacionalnimi pravnimi in političnimi ureditvami.
Adherence to the medium-term objective for budgetary positions should allow Member States to have a safety margin with respect to the 3 % of GDP reference value in order to ensure sustainable public finances, or rapid progress towards sustainability, while leaving room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking into account the need for public investment.
Usklajevanje proračunskih stanj s srednjeročnim proračunskim ciljem bi moralo državam članicam zagotoviti varnostni razmik do referenčne vrednosti v višini 3 % BDP za zagotovitev vzdržnih javnih financ ali hitrega napredka pri vzdržnosti, obenem pa se ohrani proračunski manevrski prostor, predvsem ob upoštevanju potreb po javnih naložbah.
The medium-term budgetary objective should be updated regularly on the basis of a commonly agreed method reflecting appropriately the risks of explicit and implicit liabilities for public finance, as embodied in the aims of the SGP.
Srednjeročni proračunski cilj bi bilo treba redno posodabljati na podlagi skupno dogovorjene metodologije, ki ustrezno odraža tveganja dejanskih in implicitnih obveznosti za javne finance, v skladu s cilji Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
The obligation to achieve and maintain the medium-term budgetary objective needs to be put into operation, through the specification of principles for the adjustment path towards the medium-term objective.
Za doseganje in ohranjanje srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja je treba opredeliti načela glede prilagoditvene poti za uresničenje srednjeročnega cilja.
Those principles should, inter alia, ensure that revenue windfalls, namely revenues in excess of what can normally be expected from economic growth, are allocated to debt reduction.
Ta načela bi morala med drugim zagotoviti, da bodo izredni prihodki, zlasti prihodki, ki presegajo običajno pričakovane prihodke zaradi gospodarske rasti, namenjeni zmanjšanju dolga.
The obligation to achieve and maintain the medium-term budgetary objective should apply to all Member States.
Obveznost doseganja in ohranjanja srednjeročnega cilja bi morala veljati za vse države članice.
Sufficient progress towards the medium-term budgetary objective should be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures.
Zadosten napredek pri doseganju srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja bi bilo treba oceniti na podlagi celovite ocene s strukturnim saldom kot referenco, vključno z analizo odhodkov po odbitku diskrecijskih ukrepov na strani prihodkov.
In this regard, and as long as the medium-term budgetary objective is not achieved, the growth rate of government expenditure should normally not exceed a reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth, with increases in excess of that norm being matched by discretionary increases in government revenues and discretionary revenue reductions being compensated by reductions in expenditure.
V povezavi s tem in dokler srednjeročni proračunski cilj ni dosežen, stopnja rasti javnofinančnih odhodkov v običajnih okoliščinah ne bi smela preseči referenčne srednjeročne stopnje potencialne rasti BDP, pri čemer se presežki nad to mejo izravnavajo z diskrecijskim povečanjem državnih prihodkov, diskrecijsko zmanjšanje prihodkov pa se nadomesti z zmanjšanjem odhodkov.
The reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth should be calculated according to a commonly agreed method.
Referenčno srednjeročno stopnjo potencialne rasti BDP bi bilo treba izračunati v skladu s skupno dogovorjeno metodologijo.
The Commission should make public the calculation method for those projections and the resulting reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth.
Komisija bi morala objaviti metodo izračuna teh napovedi in na njeni podlagi izračunano referenčno srednjeročno stopnjo potencialne rasti BDP.
The potentially very high variability of investment expenditure should be taken into account, especially in the case of small Member States.
Zlasti pri majhnih državah članicah bi bilo treba upoštevati potencialno zelo veliko spremenljivost investicijskih odhodkov.
A faster adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective should be required for Member States faced with a debt level exceeding 60 % of GDP, or with pronounced risks in terms of overall debt sustainability.
Od držav članic, katerih raven dolga presega 60 % BDP, ali držav članic z izrazitim tveganjem glede splošne vzdržnosti dolga bi bilo treba zahtevati hitrejše prilagajanje srednjeročnim proračunskim ciljem.
A temporary departure from the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective should be allowed, when it results from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned, which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or in case of severe economic downturn for the euro area or the Union as a whole, provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium-term, in order to facilitate economic recovery.
Da se omogoči oživitev gospodarstva, bi bilo treba dovoliti začasen odklon od prilagoditvene poti za doseganje srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja, če ga povzroči izreden dogodek, na katerega zadevna država članica ne more vplivati in ki ima pomembne posledice za finančno stanje sektorja države, ali nastane zaradi resnega gospodarskega upada v euroobmočju ali celotni Uniji, pod pogojem, da to srednjeročno ne ogrozi fiskalne vzdržnosti.
The implementation of major structural reforms should also be taken into account in allowing a temporary departure from the medium-term budgetary objective or the appropriate adjustment towards it, on condition of maintaining a safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value.
Pri odobritvi začasnega odklona od srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali od ustreznega prilagajanja temu cilju bi bilo treba upoštevati tudi izvajanje pomembnih strukturnih reform, pod pogojem, da se ohrani ustrezen varnostni razmik do referenčne vrednosti primanjkljaja.
Special attention should be paid in this context to systemic pension reforms, where the departure should reflect the direct incremental cost of the diversion of contributions from the publicly managed to the fully funded pillar.
Posebno pozornost bi bilo treba v zvezi s tem nameniti sistemskim pokojninskim reformam, pri katerih bi moral odklon odražati neposredne dodatne stroške zaradi preusmeritve prispevkov iz javno financiranega stebra v steber, ki je v celoti naložben.
Measures transferring the assets of the fully funded pillar back to the publicly managed pillar should be considered one-off and temporary in nature and hence excluded from the structural balance used for assessing progress towards the medium-term budgetary objective.
Ukrepi, na podlagi katerih bi se sredstva iz stebra, ki je v celoti naložben, prenesla nazaj v javno financirani steber, bi se morali šteti za enkratne in začasne ter bi morali biti izključeni iz strukturnega salda, ki se uporablja za ocenjevanje napredka pri doseganju srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja.
In the event of a significant deviation from the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective, a warning should be addressed by the Commission to the Member State concerned, to be followed within 1 month by an examination of the situation by the Council and a recommendation for the necessary adjustment measures.
V primeru znatnega odklona od prilagoditvene poti za dosego srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja bi morala Komisija zadevni državi članici poslati opozorilo, Svet pa bi moral nato v roku enega meseca preučiti položaj in izdati priporočilo o sprejetju potrebnih prilagoditvenih ukrepov.
The recommendation should set a deadline of no more than 5 months for addressing the deviation.
V priporočilu bi moral biti določen največ petmesečni rok za odpravo odklona.
The Member State concerned should report to the Council on the action taken.
Zadevna država članica bi morala o sprejetih ukrepih poročati Svetu.
If the Member State concerned fails to take appropriate action within the deadline set by the Council, the Council should adopt a decision establishing that no effective action has been taken and should report to the European Council.
Če zadevna država članica v roku, ki ga določi Svet, ne sprejme ustreznih ukrepov, bi moral Svet sprejeti sklep, da niso bili sprejeti učinkoviti ukrepi, in o tem poročati Evropskemu svetu.
It is important that failures by Member States to take appropriate action are established in due time, in particular where the failure persists.
Pomembno je, da se v doglednem času ugotovi, da države članice niso sprejele ustreznih ukrepov, zlasti, če takšno stanje traja dlje časa.
The Commission should be able to recommend to the Council to adopt revised recommendations.
Komisija bi lahko Svetu priporočila, naj sprejme revidirana priporočila.
The Commission should be able to invite the ECB to participate in a surveillance mission for euro area Member States and for Member States that are participating in the Agreement of 16 March 2006 between the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the Member States outside the euro area laying down the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union [9] (ERM2), when appropriate.
Komisija bi lahko po potrebi pozvala ECB naj sodeluje pri nadzornih misijah v državah članicah euroobmočja in državah članicah, ki sodelujejo v Sporazumu z dne 16. marca 2006 med Evropsko centralno banko in nacionalnimi centralnimi bankami držav članic zunaj euroobmočja o določitvi operativnih postopkov za mehanizem deviznih tečajev v tretji fazi ekonomske in monetarne unije [9] (v nadaljevanju: „MMT2“).
The Commission should report to the Council on the outcome of the mission and, if appropriate, should be able to decide to make its findings public.
Komisija bi morala o izidih misije poročati Svetu in bi lahko po potrebi sklenila, da bo svoje ugotovitve objavila.
The power to adopt individual decisions establishing non-compliance with the recommendations adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 121(4) TFEU establishing policy measures in case a Member State significantly deviates from the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective should be conferred on the Council.
Svetu bi bilo treba dodeliti pristojnosti za sprejetje posameznih sklepov, s katerimi se razglasi neupoštevanje priporočil Sveta, sprejetih na podlagi člena 121(4) PDEU o oblikovanju ukrepov politik v primeru, da država članica znatno odstopa od prilagoditvene poti za dosego srednjeročnega cilja.
As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council, as provided for in Article 121(1) TFEU, those individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the referred recommendations adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 121(4) TFEU.
Ti sklepi so kot del usklajevanja ekonomskih politik držav članic v Svetu v skladu s členom 121(1) PDEU nadaljevanje navedenih priporočil, ki jih Svet sprejme v skladu s členom 121(4) PDEU.
The suspension of the voting rights of the members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is not the euro for adoption by the Council of a decision establishing non-compliance with the recommendations addressed to a Member State whose currency is the euro on the basis of Article 121(4) TFEU, is a direct consequence of such decision being an integral follow-up of that recommendation and the provision in Article 139(4) TFEU reserving the right to vote on such recommendations to the Member States whose currency is the euro.
Začasna ukinitev glasovalnih pravic članom Sveta, ki zastopajo države članice, katerih valuta ni euro, pri sprejemanju sklepa Sveta o neupoštevanju priporočil na podlagi člena 121(4) PDEU, namenjenih državam članicam, katerih valuta je evro, je neposredna posledica tega, da je sklep nadaljevanje priporočila in določbe člena 139(4) PDEU, ki glasovalno pravico o tovrstnih priporočilih omejuje na države članice, katerih valuta je euro.
In order to ensure compliance with the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union for Member States whose currency is the euro, a specific enforcement mechanism should be established on the basis of Article 136 TFEU for cases of significant deviation from the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective.
Za zagotovitev, da bodo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, upoštevale okvir Unije za proračunski nadzor, bi bilo treba vzpostaviti poseben izvedbeni mehanizem na podlagi člena 136 PDEU za primere znatnega odklona od prilagoditvene poti k srednjeročnemu proračunskemu cilju.
References contained in Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 should take account of the new Article numbering of the TFEU.
Pri sklicevanjih v Uredbi (ES) št. 1466/97 bi bilo treba upoštevati novo številčenje členov v PDEU.
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 should therefore be amended accordingly,
Uredbo (ES) št. 1466/97 bi bilo zato treba ustrezno spremeniti –
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 is hereby amended as follows:
Uredba (ES) št. 1466/97 se spremeni:
This Regulation sets out the rules covering the content, the submission, the examination and the monitoring of stability programmes and convergence programmes as part of multilateral surveillance by the Council and the Commission so as to prevent, at an early stage, the occurrence of excessive general government deficits and to promote the surveillance and coordination of economic policies thereby supporting the achievement of the Union's objectives for growth and employment.’.
Ta uredba določa pravila glede vsebine, predložitve, preverjanja in spremljanja programov za stabilnost in programov za konvergenco v okviru večstranskega nadzora Sveta in Komisije, zato da se v zgodnji fazi prepreči pojav čezmernega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja ter pospeši nadziranje in usklajevanje ekonomskih politik, s čimer se podpira uresničevanje ciljev Unije glede rasti in zaposlovanja.“;
“participating Member States” means those Member States whose currency is the euro;
‚sodelujoče države članice‘ pomeni tiste države članice, katerih valuta je euro, in
“non-participating Member States” means Member States other than those whose currency is the euro.’.
‚nesodelujoče države članice‘ pomeni države članice ki niso tiste, katerih valuta je euro.“;
The following section is inserted:
vstavi se naslednji oddelek:
‘SECTION 1-A
„ODDELEK 1-A
EUROPEAN SEMESTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION
EVROPSKI SEMESTER ZA USKLAJEVANJE EKONOMSKIH POLITIK
Article 2-a
Člen 2-a
In order to ensure closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the economic performance of the Member States, the Council shall conduct multilateral surveillance as an integral part of the European Semester for economic policy coordination in accordance with the objectives and requirements set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Za zagotavljanje tesnejše uskladitve ekonomskih politik in trajnostne konvergence ekonomskih učinkov držav članic Svet izvaja večstranski nadzor kot sestavni del evropskega semestra za usklajevanje ekonomskih politik v skladu s cilji in zahtevami iz Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU).
The European Semester shall include:
2. Evropski semester vključuje:
the formulation, and the surveillance of the implementation, of the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union (broad economic policy guidelines) in accordance with Article 121(2) TFEU;
oblikovanje in nadziranje izvajanja širših smernic ekonomskih politik držav članic in Unije (širše smernice ekonomskih politik) v skladu s členom 121(2) PDEU;
the formulation, and the examination of the implementation, of the employment guidelines that must be taken into account by Member States in accordance with Article 148(2) TFEU (employment guidelines);
oblikovanje in preverjanje izvajanja smernic za zaposlovanje, ki jih morajo države članice upoštevati v skladu s členom 148(2) PDEU (smernice za zaposlovanje);
the submission and assessment of Member States' stability or convergence programmes under this Regulation;
predložitev in oceno programov za stabilnost ali konvergenco držav članic na podlagi te uredbe;
the submission and assessment of Member States' national reform programmes supporting the Union's strategy for growth and jobs and established in line with the guidelines set out in point (a) and (b) and with the general guidance to Member States issued by the Commission and the European Council at the beginning of the annual cycle of surveillance;
predložitev in oceno nacionalnih programov reform držav članic, ki podpirajo strategijo Unije za rast in delovna mesta ter ki so vzpostavljeni v skladu s smernicami iz točk a) in b) ter splošnimi usmeritvami za države članice, ki sta jih izdala Komisija in Evropski svet na začetku letnega cikla nadzora;
the surveillance to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.
nadzor za preprečevanje in odpravljanje makroekonomskih neravnotežij iz Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. novembra 2011 o preprečevanju in odpravljanju makroekonomskih neravnotežij.
In the course of the European Semester, in order to provide timely and integrated policy advice on macrofiscal and macrostructural policy intentions, the Council shall, as a rule, following the assessment of these programmes on the basis of recommendations from the Commission, address guidance to the Member States making full use of the legal instruments provided under Articles 121 and 148 TFEU, and under this Regulation and Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.
Da se v okviru evropskega semestra zagotovi pravočasno in integrirano svetovanje glede namer makrofiskalnih in makrostrukturnih politik Svet, praviloma po oceni teh programov na podlagi priporočil Komisije, državam članicam posreduje usmeritve, pri čemer celovito upošteva pravne instrumente iz členov 121 in 148 PDEU ter iz te uredbe in Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011.
Member States shall take due account of the guidance addressed to them in the development of their economic, employment and budgetary policies before taking key decisions on their national budgets for the succeeding years.
Države članice upoštevajo te usmeritve pri oblikovanju svoje ekonomske, zaposlovalne in proračunske politike pred sprejetjem bistvenih odločitev glede nacionalnega proračuna za naslednja leta.
Progress shall be monitored by the Commission.
Komisija spremlja napredek.
Failure by a Member State to act upon the guidance received may result in:
Če država članica ne upošteva prejetih usmeritev, temu lahko sledijo:
further recommendations to take specific measures;
dodatna priporočila za sprejetje posebnih ukrepov;
a warning by the Commission under Article 121(4) TFEU;
opozorilo Komisije v skladu s členom 121(4) PDEU;
measures under this Regulation, Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 or Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.
ukrepi v skladu s to uredbo, Uredbo (ES) št. 1467/97 ali Uredbo (EU) št. 1176/2011.
Implementation of the measures shall be subject to reinforced monitoring by the Commission and may include surveillance missions under Article -11 of this Regulation.
Komisija nad izvajanjem ukrepov opravlja okrepljen nadzor, ki lahko vključuje nadzorne misije iz člena -11 te uredbe.
The European Parliament shall be duly involved in the European Semester in order to increase the transparency and ownership of, and the accountability for the decisions taken, in particular by means of the economic dialogue carried out pursuant to Article 2-ab of this Regulation.
Da bi povečali preglednost, lastništvo in odgovornost za sprejete odločitve, Evropski parlament ustrezno sodeluje v evropskem semestru zlasti preko ekonomskega dialoga, izvedenega v skladu s členom 2-ab te uredbe.
The Economic and Financial Committee, the Economic Policy Committee, the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee shall be consulted within the framework of the European Semester where appropriate.
V okviru evropskega semestra se po potrebi posvetuje z Ekonomsko-finančnim odborom, Odborom za ekonomsko politiko, Odborom za zaposlovanje in Odborom za socialno zaščito.
Relevant stakeholders, in particular the social partners, shall be involved within the framework of the European Semester, on the main policy issues where appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of the TFEU and national legal and political arrangements.
Po potrebi so v okvir evropskega semestra pri glavnih vprašanjih vključene tudi zadevne interesne skupine, zlasti socialni partnerji, v skladu z določbami PDEU ter nacionalnimi pravnimi in političnimi ureditvami.
The President of the Council, and the Commission in accordance with Article 121 TFEU, and, where appropriate, the President of the Eurogroup, shall report annually to the European Parliament and to the European Council on the results of the multilateral surveillance.
V skladu s členom 121 PDEU predsednik Sveta in Komisija ter po potrebi tudi predsednik Euroskupine letno poročajo Evropskemu parlamentu in Evropskemu svetu o rezultatih večstranskega nadzora.
These reports should be a component of the Economic Dialogue referred to in Article 2-ab of this Regulation.
To poročanje bi moralo biti sestavni del ekonomskega dialoga iz člena 2-ab te uredbe.
‘SECTION 1-Aa
„ODDELEK 1-AA
Article 2-ab
Člen 2-ab
In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss:
Za okrepitev dialoga med institucijami Unije, zlasti Evropskim parlamentom, Svetom in Komisijo, ter za zagotovitev večje preglednosti in odgovornosti lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta povabi predsednika Sveta, Komisijo in po potrebi predsednika Evropskega sveta ali predsednika Euroskupine, da nastopijo pred odborom in razpravljajo o: