natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of that dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State which is the subject of a Council decision taken pursuant to Articles 4, 5 and 6 of this Regulation.
Kljub temu da so sogovorniki Evropskega parlamenta v okviru tega dialoga ustrezne institucije Unije in njihovi predstavniki, lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta ponudi državi članici, na katero je naslovljen sklep Sveta, sprejet v skladu s členi 4, 5 in 6 te uredbe, možnost sodelovanja pri izmenjavi mnenj.
The Member State’s participation in such an exchange of views is voluntary.
Udeležba držav članic pri takšni izmenjavi mnenj je prostovoljna.
Additional sanctions are necessary to make the enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area more effective.
Za učinkovitejše izvrševanje proračunskega nadzora v euroobmočju so potrebne dodatne sankcije.
Those sanctions should enhance the credibility of the fiscal surveillance framework of the Union.
Te sankcije bi morale povečati verodostojnost okvira Unije za fiskalni nadzor.
The rules laid down in this Regulation should ensure fair, timely, graduated and effective mechanisms for compliance with the preventive and the corrective parts of the SGP, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [4] and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [5], where compliance with the budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of the government deficit and government debt criteria.
Pravila, določena v tej uredbi, bi morala zagotoviti poštene, pravočasne, postopne in učinkovite mehanizme za upoštevanje preventivnega in korektivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast, zlasti Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1466/97 z dne 7. julija 1997 o okrepitvi nadzora nad proračunskim stanjem ter o nadzoru in usklajevanju gospodarskih politik [4] in Uredbe Sveta (ES) 1467/97 z dne 7. julija 1997 o pospešitvi in razjasnitvi izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem [5], pri čemer se spoštovanje proračunske discipline ocenjuje na podlagi meril javnofinančnega primanjkljaja in javnega dolga.
Sanctions under this Regulation and based upon the preventive part of the SGP in respect of Member States whose currency is the euro should provide incentives for adjusting to and maintaining the medium-term budgetary objective.
Sankcije iz te uredbe, ki temeljijo na preventivnem delu Pakta za stabilnost in rast, bi morale za države članice, katerih valuta je euro, zagotoviti spodbudo za prilagajanje srednjeročnemu proračunskemu cilju in njegovo ohranjanje.
In order to deter against the misrepresentation, whether intentional or due to serious negligence, of government deficit and debt data, which data is an essential input to economic policy coordination in the Union, fines should be imposed on Member States responsible.
Da bi preprečili napačno prikazovanje podatkov o javnofinančnem primanjkljaju in dolgu, torej bistvenih podatkov za usklajevanje ekonomske politike v Uniji, bodisi namenoma bodisi zaradi hude malomarnosti, bi bilo treba za državo članico, ki je odgovorna za takšno napačno prikazovanje, predvideti globo.
In order to supplement the rules on calculation of the fines for manipulation of statistics as well as the rules on the procedure to be followed by the Commission for the investigation of such actions, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of detailed criteria for establishing the amount of the fine and for conducting the Commission’s investigations.
Za dopolnitev pravil o izračunu globe za izkrivljanje statističnih podatkov ter pravil o postopku, ki mu sledi Komisija pri raziskovanju teh dejanj, bi bilo treba na Komisijo prenesti pooblastila, da v skladu s členom 290 PDEU sprejme akte v zvezi z natančnimi merili za določitev višine globe in za izvajanje preiskav Komisije.
The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and the Council.
Komisija bi morala pri pripravi in oblikovanju delegiranih aktov zagotoviti da so ustrezni dokumenti predloženi Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu istočasno, pravočasno in na ustrezen način.
In respect of the preventive part of the SGP, adjustment and adherence to the medium-term budgetary objective should be ensured through an obligation imposed on a Member State whose currency is the euro that is making insufficient progress with budgetary consolidation to lodge temporarily an interest-bearing deposit.
V preventivnem delu Pakta za stabilnost in rast bi bilo treba prilagajanje srednjeročnemu proračunskemu cilju in njegovo izpolnjevanje zagotoviti prek začasne obveznosti za državo članico, katere valuta je euro, in ki ne dosega zadostnega napredka pri konsolidaciji proračuna, da položi obrestni depozit.
This should be the case when a Member State, including a Member State with a deficit below the 3 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reference value, deviates significantly from the medium-term budgetary objective or the appropriate adjustment path towards that objective and fails to correct the deviation.
To bi moralo veljati v primeru, ko država članica, vključno z državo članico katere primanjkljaj je nižji od referenčne vrednosti 3 % bruto domačega proizvoda (BDP), bistveno odstopa od srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali ustreznega prilagajanja temu cilju in tega odstopanja ne uspe zmanjšati.
The interest-bearing deposit imposed should be released to the Member State concerned together with the interest accrued on it once the Council has been satisfied that the situation giving rise to the obligation to lodge that deposit has come to an end.
Zahtevani obrestni depozit bi bilo treba zadevni državi članici vrniti skupaj z obračunanimi obrestmi, ko Svet potrdi, da so okoliščine, zaradi katerih je bilo treba navedeni depozit položiti, odpravljene.
In respect of the corrective part of the SGP, sanctions for Member States whose currency is the euro should take the form of an obligation to lodge a non-interest-bearing deposit linked to a Council decision establishing the existence of an excessive deficit if an interest-bearing deposit has already been imposed on the Member State concerned in the preventive part of the SGP or in cases of particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the SGP, or the obligation to pay a fine in the event of non-compliance with a Council recommendation to correct an excessive government deficit.
V korektivnem delu Pakta za stabilnost in rast bi morale sankcije za države članice, katerih valuta je euro, imeti obliko obveznosti pologa brezobrestnega depozita na osnovi sklepa Sveta o ugotovitvi obstoja čezmernega primanjkljaja, če je zadevna država članica v okviru preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast že položila obrestni depozit ali v primerih posebej resnih kršitev pravnih obveznosti na področju proračunske politike, določenih v Paktu za stabilnost in rast,obveznosti plačila globe, če priporočilo Sveta za zmanjšanje čezmernega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja ni bilo upoštevano.
In order to avoid the retroactive application of the sanctions under the preventive part of the SGP provided for in this Regulation, they should apply only in respect of the relevant decisions adopted by the Council under Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 after the entry into force of this Regulation.
Da bi preprečili retroaktivno uporabo sankcij v okviru preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast, določenih v tej uredbi, bi se morale sankcije v vsakem primeru uporabljati samo v zvezi z ustreznimi sklepi, ki jih Svet sprejme v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1466/97, po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe.
Similarly, in order to avoid the retroactive application of the sanctions under the corrective part of the SGP provided for in this Regulation, they should apply only in respect of the relevant recommendations and decisions to correct an excessive government deficit adopted by the Council after the entry into force of this Regulation.
Podobno, da bi preprečili retroaktivno uporabo sankcij v okviru korektivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast, določenih v tej uredbi, bi se morale uporabljati samo v zvezi z ustreznimi priporočili in sklepi o zmanjšanju čezmernega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja, ki jih Svet sprejme po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe.
The amount of the interest-bearing deposits, of the non-interest-bearing deposits and of the fines provided for in this Regulation should be set in such a way as to ensure a fair graduation of sanctions in the preventive and corrective parts of the SGP and to provide sufficient incentives for the Member States whose currency is the euro to comply with the fiscal framework of the Union.
Znesek obrestnega depozita, brezobrestnega depozita in globe, določen v tej uredbi, se določi tako, da se zagotovi pravično stopnjevanje sankcij v preventivnem in korektivnem delu Pakta za stabilnost in rast ter da se zagotovijo zadostne spodbude za države članice, katerih valuta je euro, za uskladitev s fiskalnim okvirom Unije.
Fines under Article 126(11) TFEU and as specified in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 are composed of a fixed component that equals 0,2 % of GDP and of a variable component.
Globe, povezane s členom 126(11) PDEU, in določene v členu 12 Uredbe (ES) št. 1467/97, so sestavljene iz nespremenljivega dela, ki znaša 0,2 % BDP, in spremenljivega dela.
Thus, graduation and equal treatment between Member States are ensured if the interest-bearing deposit, the non-interest-bearing deposit and the fine specified in this Regulation are equal to 0,2 % of GDP, that being the amount of the fixed component of the fine under Article 126(11) TFEU.
Stopnjevanje in enaka obravnava med državami članicami sta tako zagotovljena, če obrestni depozit, brezobrestni depozit in globa, določeni v tej uredbi, znašajo 0,2 % BDP, kar je nespremenljivi del globe v skladu s členom 126(11) PDEU.
A possibility should be provided for the Council to reduce or to cancel the sanctions imposed on Member States whose currency is the euro on the basis of a Commission recommendation following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned.
Svet bi moral imeti možnost, da zmanjša ali prekliče sankcije, naložene državam članicam, katerih valuta je euro, in sicer na podlagi priporočila Komisije po prejetju utemeljene prošnje zadevne države članice.
In the corrective part of the SGP, the Commission should also be able to recommend reducing the amount of a sanction or cancelling it on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances.
V korektivnem delu Pakta za stabilnost in rast bi morala tudi Komisija imeti možnost, da priporoči zmanjšanje zneska sankcije ali da jo zaradi izjemnih ekonomskih okoliščin prekliče.
The non-interest-bearing deposit should be released upon correction of the excessive deficit, while the interest on such deposits and the fines collected should be assigned to stability mechanisms to provide financial assistance, created by Member States whose currency is the euro in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole.
Brezobrestni depozit bi se moral sprostiti po zmanjšanju čezmernega primanjkljaja, medtem ko bi se obresti iz teh depozitov in globe morale dodeliti mehanizmom za stabilnost za zagotavljanje finančne pomoči, ki jih vzpostavijo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, da se ohrani stabilnosti celotnega euroobmočja.
The power to adopt individual decisions for the application of the sanctions provided for in this Regulation should be conferred on the Council.
Svetu bi bilo treba dodeliti pristojnost za sprejemanje posameznih sklepov za uporabo sankcij, predvidenih s to uredbo.
As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as provided for in Article 121(1) TFEU, those individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Articles 121 and 126 TFEU and Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97.
Ti posamezni sklepi so kot del usklajevanja ekonomskih politik držav članic v Svetu v skladu s členom 121(1) PDEU nadaljevanje ukrepov, ki jih Svet sprejme v skladu s členoma 121 in 126 PDEU, ter uredbama (ES) št. 1466/97 in (ES) št. 1467/97.
Since this Regulation contains general rules for the effective enforcement of Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97, it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6) TFEU.
Ker ta uredba vsebuje splošna pravila za učinkovito izvajanje uredb (ES) 1466/97 in (ES) 1467/97, bi jo bilo treba sprejeti v skladu z rednim zakonodajnim postopkom iz člena 121(6) PDEU.
Since the objective of this Regulation, namely to create a system of sanctions for enhancing the enforcement of the preventive and corrective parts of the SGP in the euro area, cannot be sufficiently achieved at the level of the Member States, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
Ker cilja te uredbe, in sicer oblikovanja sistema sankcij za okrepitev izvrševanja preventivnega in korektivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast v euroobmočju, države članice ne morejo zadovoljivo doseči, lahko Unija sprejme ukrepe v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji (PEU).
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective,
V skladu z načelom sorazmernosti iz navedenega člena ta uredba ne presega tistega, kar je potrebno za doseganje navedenega cilja.
This Regulation sets out a system of sanctions for enhancing the enforcement of the preventive and corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact in the euro area.
Ta uredba določa sistem sankcij za okrepitev izvrševanja preventivnega in korektivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast v euroobmočju.
This Regulation shall apply to Member States whose currency is the euro.
Ta uredba se uporablja za države članice, katerih valuta je euro.
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:
Za namene te uredbe se uporabljajo naslednje opredelitve pojmov:
‘preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact’ means the multilateral surveillance system as organised by Regulation (EC) No 1466/97;
„preventivni del Pakta za stabilnost in rast“ pomeni sistem večstranskega nadzora, kakor je urejen z Uredbo (ES) št. 1466/97;
‘corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact’ means the procedure for the avoidance of Member States’ excessive deficit as regulated by Article 126 TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97;
„korektivni del Pakta za stabilnost in rast“ pomeni postopek za preprečevanje čezmernega primanjkljaja držav članic, kot je določeno v členu 126 PDEU in Uredbi (ES) št. 1467/97;
‘exceptional economic circumstances’ means circumstances where an excess of a government deficit over the reference value is considered exceptional within the meaning of the second indent of point (a) of Article 126(2) TFEU and as specified in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.
„izjemne ekonomske okoliščine“ pomenijo okoliščine, v katerih presežek javnofinančnega primanjkljaja nad referenčno vrednostjo velja za izjemnega v skladu z drugo alineo točke (a) člena 126(2) PDEU in kot je določeno v Uredbi (ES) št. 1467/97.
ECONOMIC DIALOGUE
EKONOMSKI DIALOG
Economic dialogue
Ekonomski dialog
In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss decisions taken pursuant to Articles 4, 5 and 6 of this Regulation.
Za okrepitev dialoga med institucijami Unije, zlasti Evropskim parlamentom, Svetom in Komisijo, ter za zagotovitev večje preglednosti in odgovornosti lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta pozove predsednika Sveta, Komisijo in po potrebi predsednika Evropskega sveta ali predsednika Euroskupine, da nastopijo pred odborom in razpravljajo o sklepih, sprejetih v skladu s členi 4, 5 in 6 te uredbe.
The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by such decisions to participate in an exchange of views.
Pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta lahko državi članici, ki jo ti sklepi zadevajo, ponudi možnost sodelovanja pri izmenjavi mnenj.
SANCTIONS IN THE PREVENTIVE PART OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
SANKCIJE V PREVENTIVNEM DELU PAKTA ZA STABILNOST IN RAST
Interest-bearing deposits
Obrestni depoziti
If the Council adopts a decision establishing that a Member State failed to take action in response to the Council recommendation referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the Commission shall, within 20 days of adoption of the Council’s decision, recommend that the Council, by a further decision, require the Member State in question to lodge with the Commission an interest-bearing deposit amounting to 0,2 % of its GDP in the preceding year.
Če Svet sprejme sklep, da država članica ni ukrepala glede na njegovo priporočilo iz drugega pododstavka člena 6(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 1466/97, Komisija v 20 dneh po sprejetju sklepa Sveta slednjemu priporoči, da naj z novim sklepom naloži zadevni državi članici polog obrestnega depozita pri Komisiji, ki znaša 0,2 % njenega BDP v predhodnem letu.
The decision requiring a lodgement shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by a qualified majority to reject the Commission’s recommendation within 10 days of the Commission’s adoption thereof.
Šteje se, da Svet sklep o pologu sprejme, razen če s kvalificirano večino zavrne priporočilo Komisije v desetih dneh od dneva, ko ga je Komisija sprejela.
The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may amend the Commission’s recommendation and adopt the text so amended as a Council decision.
Svet lahko s kvalificirano večino spremeni priporočilo Komisije in tako spremenjeno besedilo sprejme kot sklep Sveta.
The Commission may, following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within 10 days of adoption of the Council’s decision establishing that a Member State failed to take action referred to in paragraph 1, recommend that the Council reduce the amount of the interest-bearing deposit or cancel it.
Komisija lahko na podlagi utemeljene prošnje zadevne države članice, naslovljene na Komisijo v desetih dneh po sprejetju sklepa Sveta o neukrepanju države članice iz odstavka 1, Svetu priporoči znižanje zneska obrestnega depozita ali njegov preklic.
The interest-bearing deposit shall bear an interest rate reflecting the Commission’s credit risk and the relevant investment period.
Za obrestni depozit velja obrestna mera, ki odraža kreditno tveganje Komisije in ustrezno naložbeno obdobje.
If the situation giving rise to the Council’s recommendation referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 no longer exists, the Council, on the basis of a further recommendation from the Commission, shall decide that the deposit and the interest accrued thereon be returned to the Member State concerned.
Če so okoliščine, zaradi katerih je bilo oblikovano priporočilo Sveta iz drugega pododstavka člena 6(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 1466/97, odpravljene, Svet na podlagi nadaljnjegapriporočila Komisije odloči, da se depozit in obračunane obresti na depozit vrnejo zadevni državi članici.
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, amend the Commission’s further recommendation.
Svet lahko s kvalificirano večino spremeni to nadaljnje priporočilo Komisije.
SANCTIONS IN THE CORRECTIVE PART OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
SANKCIJE V KOREKTIVNEM DELU PAKTA ZA STABILNOST IN RAST
Non-interest-bearing deposits
Brezobrestni depoziti
If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State which has lodged an interest-bearing deposit with the Commission in accordance with Article 4(1) of this Regulation, or where the Commission has identified particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the SGP, the Commission shall, within 20 days of adoption of the Council’s decision, recommend that the Council, by a further decision, require the Member State concerned to lodge with the Commission a non-interest-bearing deposit amounting to 0,2 % of its GDP in the preceding year.
Če Svet v skladu s členom 126(6) PDEU odloči, da ima država članica, ki je v skladu s členom 4(1) te uredbe pri Komisiji položila obrestni depozit, čezmerni primanjkljaj, ali če je Komisija ugotovila posebej resno neupoštevanje obveznosti na področju proračunske politike, določenih v Paktu za stabilnost in rast, Komisija v 20 dneh po sprejetju sklepa Sveta slednjemu priporoči, da naj z novim sklepom od zadevne države članice zahteva polog brezobrestnega depozita pri Komisiji, ki znaša 0,2 % njenega BDP v predhodnem letu.
The Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within 10 days of adoption of the Council’s decision under Article 126(6) TFEU referred to in paragraph 1, recommend that the Council reduce the amount of the non-interest-bearing deposit or cancel it.
Komisija lahko zaradi izjemnih ekonomskih okoliščin ali na podlagi utemeljene prošnje zadevne države članice, naslovljene na Komisijo v desetih dneh po sprejetju sklepa Sveta v skladu s členom 126(6) PDEU iz odstavka 1, priporoči Svetu znižanje zneska brezobrestnega depozita ali njegov preklic.
The deposit shall be lodged with the Commission.
Depozit se položi pri Komisiji.
If the Member State has lodged an interest-bearing deposit with the Commission in accordance with Article 4, that interest-bearing deposit shall be converted to a non-interest-bearing deposit.
Če je država članica pri Komisiji položila obrestni depozit v skladu s členom 3, se ta obrestni depozit spremeni v brezobrestni depozit.
If the amount of an interest-bearing deposit lodged in accordance with Article 4 and of the interest accrued thereon exceeds the amount of the non-interest-bearing deposit to be lodged under paragraph 1 of this Article, the excess shall be returned to the Member State.
Če znesek obrestnega depozita, položenega v skladu s členom 4 in njegovih obračunanih obresti presega znesek zahtevanega brezobrestnega depozita, ki ga je treba položiti v skladu z odstavkom 1 tega člena, se razlika vrne državi članici.
If the amount of the non-interest-bearing deposit exceeds the amount of an interest-bearing deposit lodged in accordance with Article 4 and the interest accrued thereon, the Member State shall make up the shortfall when it lodges the non-interest-bearing deposit.
Če znesek brezobrestnega depozita presega znesek obrestnega depozita, položenega v skladu s členom 4, in njegovih obračunanih obresti, država članica poravna razliko pri pologu brezobrestnega depozita.
If the Council, acting under Article 126(8) TFEU, decides that a Member State has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, the Commission shall, within 20 days of that decision, recommend that the Council, by a further decision, impose a fine, amounting to 0,2 % of the Member State’s GDP in the preceding year.
Komisija v dvajsetih dneh po tem, ko Svet v skladu s členom 126(8) PDEU odloči, da država članica ni sprejela učinkovitih ukrepov za zmanjšanje svojega čezmernega primanjkljaja, Svetu priporoči, da naj z novim sklepom naloži globo, ki znaša 0,2 % BDP države članice v predhodnem letu.