natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Thirdly, the Italian authorities promised to provide information on the compensatory measures.
Tretjič, italijanski organi so zatrdili, da bodo zagotovili informacije o izravnalnih ukrepih.
Fourthly, Italy stated that the market segments targeted by Legler’s restructuring plan to restore financial viability, described in recital 25, were showing encouraging trends.
Četrtič, italijanski organi so trdili, da je razvoj segmentov trga, katerim je bil namenjen načrt prestrukturiranja za ponovno vzpostavitev finančne sposobnosti preživetja in ki so opisani v uvodni izjavi 25, spodbuden.
The Italian authorities also mentioned the company’s intention to secure private credit lines and a new shareholder to finance part of the plan, and stated that steps had already been taken to that effect.
Italijanski organi so omenili tudi namen podjetja, da zagotovi zasebne kreditne linije in novega delničarja, ki bo financiral del načrta, ter trdili, da so bili s tem v zvezi že sprejeti določeni ukrepi.
Next, in response to the third party’s comments, the Italian authorities pointed out that Legler’s market share in the year 2006 was as little as 0,27 %.
V odgovoru na pripombe tretje strani so italijanski organi poudarili, da je bil tržni delež podjetja Legler v letu 2006 komaj 0,27-odstoten.
In their submissions following the withdrawal of the restructuring plan, the Italian authorities argued that the debt-for-equity swap would not qualify as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, as SFIRS had acted in line with the market economy investor principle.
Po umiku načrta prestrukturiranja so italijanski organi v svojih stališčih trdili, da zamenjava dolga v lastniške deleže ne pomeni državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe, saj je družba SFIRS ravnala v skladu z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
According to the Italian authorities a private investor would have acted in the same way to avoid bankruptcy and recover at least part of his credit in the most effective way, i.e. by converting it into capital and restructuring the company together with a new private investor and a new credit line.
Po mnenju italijanskih organov bi zasebni vlagatelj ravnal enako, da bi se izognil stečaju in povrnil vsaj del posojila na najučinkovitejši način, tj. s pretvorbo dolga v kapital in prestrukturiranjem podjetja skupaj z novim zasebnim vlagateljem in novo kreditno linijo.
Under Article 8(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 [10], the Member State concerned may withdraw the notification within the meaning of Article 2 in due time before the Commission has taken a decision pursuant to Article 4 or 7.
Na podlagi člena 8(1) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 [10] lahko zadevna država članica pravočasno umakne uradno priglasitev v smislu člena 2, preden Komisija sprejme odločitev na podlagi člena 4 ali 7.
In this case, where the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure, the Commission shall close that procedure pursuant to Article 8(2) of the same Regulation.
V tem primeru, ko je Komisija začela uradni postopek preiskave, bo Komisija ta postopek zaključila v skladu s členom 8(2) iste uredbe.
The Commission notes that the direct grant of EUR 13,2 million has not been implemented by Italy and Italy will not pursue this aid project further.
Komisija ugotavlja, da Italija ni izvedla ukrepa neposrednih nepovratnih sredstev v višini 13,2 milijona EUR in da tega projekta pomoči ne bo več izvajala.
As the restructuring plan has been withdrawn, the formal investigation procedure opened on this measure no longer serves any purpose.
Ker je bil načrt prestrukturiranja umaknjen, formalni postopek preiskave, začet zaradi tega ukrepa, ne služi več svojemu namenu.
As the other two notified restructuring measures were unlawfully implemented by Italy, in order to close the formal investigation procedure the Commission must determine whether they constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, and if so, whether this aid is compatible with the internal market.
Ker je Italija druga dva priglašena ukrepa prestrukturiranja izvedla nezakonito, mora Komisija, da bi lahko zaključila formalni postopek preiskave, ugotoviti, ali ta dva ukrepa pomenita državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe in, če pomenita državno pomoč, ali je ta pomoč združljiva z notranjim trgom.
Article 107(1) of the Treaty lays down that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade among Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
Člen 107(1) Pogodbe določa, da je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom, kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami.
Where State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty is to be or was granted to a company in difficulty, the compatibility of this aid must be assessed on the basis of the rescue and restructuring guidelines.
Če je državna pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe dodeljena ali bo dodeljena podjetju v težavah, je treba združljivost te pomoči oceniti na podlagi smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
Consequently, the aid can only be considered compatible on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty if the conditions laid down in the rescue and restructuring guidelines are met.
Zato se lahko pomoč šteje za združljivo na podlagi člena 107(3)(c) Pogodbe samo, če so izpolnjeni pogoji, določeni v smernicah za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
The extension of the rescue aid guarantee for the entire duration of the restructuring period
Podaljšanje jamstva za pomoč za reševanje za celotno obdobje prestrukturiranja
The rescue aid guarantee in the amount of EUR 13 million was not terminated on the expiry of the six-month period for which it had been approved by the Commission, but remained in place after notification of the plan was withdrawn (see recital 17).
Pomoč v obliki jamstva v višini 13 milijonov EUR po izteku šestmesečnega obdobja, za katero ga je odobrila Komisija, ni bila prekinjena, ampak je po umiku načrta ostala veljavna (glej uvodno izjavo 17).
The extension of the rescue aid guarantee was notified as a measure granted from the resources of the competent Ministry, financed from the State budget.
Podaljšanje pomoči v obliki jamstva je bilo priglašeno kot ukrep, dodeljen iz sredstev pristojnega ministrstva in financiran iz državnega proračuna.
Therefore, it was granted from State resources and it is imputable to the State.
Zato je bil dodeljen iz državnih sredstev in ga je mogoče pripisati državi.
The guarantee constitutes a selective advantage as it allowed Legler to access financial resources which it would not have otherwise obtained, given its financial situation.
Jamstvo pomeni selektivno prednost, saj je podjetju Legler omogočilo dostop do finančnih sredstev, ki jih glede na svoj finančni položaj v nasprotnem primeru ne bi pridobilo.
Hence, it relieved Legler from the costs it would otherwise have incurred.
Torej je podjetju Legler odvzelo breme stroškov, ki bi jih sicer imelo.
Furthermore, as Legler was implementing a restructuring process aimed at resuming production, the aid was liable to distort competition in the internal market and to affect trade between Member States.
Ker je podjetje Legler izvajalo proces prestrukturiranja, namenjen ponovnemu zagonu proizvodnje, bi pomoč lahko izkrivljala konkurenco na notranjem trgu in vplivala na trgovino med državami članicami.
The distortive effect of the measure was stressed by a third party, who also pointed out that the sector suffers from overcapacity.
Izkrivljajoč učinek ukrepa je poudarila tretja stran, ki je opozorila tudi na dejstvo, da so za sektor značilne presežne zmogljivosti.
Therefore, the Commission considers that the extension of the rescue aid guarantee, which is also a restructuring measure, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Zato Komisija meni, da podaljšanje pomoči v obliki jamstva, ki je tudi ukrep prestrukturiranja, pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe.
In determining the amount of aid, the Commission recalls paragraph 4.1(a) of the Guarantee Notice [11], which states that ‘for companies in difficulty, a market guarantor, if any, would, at the time the guarantee is granted charge a high premium given the expected rate of default. If the likelihood that the borrower will not be able to repay the loan becomes particularly high, this market rate may not exist and in exceptional circumstances the aid element of the guarantee may turn out to be as high as the amount effectively covered by that guarantee.’
Pri določanju zneska pomoči se je Komisija sklicevala na odstavek 4.1(a) obvestila o poroštvih [11], ki navaja, da „bo tržni porok, če obstaja, podjetjem v težavah v trenutku dodelitve poroštva zaračunal visoko premijo zaradi pričakovane stopnje tveganja neplačila. Če postane verjetnost, da posojilojemalec ne bo mogel odplačati posojila, zelo visoka, mogoče te tržne stopnje ni, v izjemnih okoliščinah pa je lahko element pomoči poroštva celo enak znesku, ki ga dejansko krije navedeno poroštvo.“
In the light of Legler’s severe financial distress at the time the guarantee was granted (increasing losses, decreasing turnover and negative equity as described in recitals 19 to 21 and 52), the Commission considers that it was highly unlikely that the company would have been able to obtain a bank loan on the market without State intervention; therefore, the Commission concludes that the aid amount corresponds to the totality of the loan amount [12].
Ob upoštevanju resnih finančnih težav podjetja Legler v času, ko je bilo poroštvo odobreno (vedno večje izgube, manjši promet in negativen kapital, kot je opisano v uvodnih izjavah 19 do 21 in uvodni izjavi 52), Komisija meni, da je bilo malo verjetno, da bi podjetje lahko dobilo bančno posojilo na trgu brez posredovanja države; zato Komisija ugotavlja, da znesek pomoči ustreza celotnemu znesku posojila [12].
Debt-for-equity swap
Zamenjava dolga v lastniške deleže
The Commission remarks that the swap was implemented by SFIRS, a public entity whose main shareholder, the Region of Sardinia, exerts a dominant influence on its decisions [13].
Komisija je pripomnila, da je zamenjavo izvedla družba SFIRS, ki je javni subjekt, njen glavni delničar, dežela Sardinija, pa močno vpliva na njene odločitve [13].
Italy has never denied this fact.
Italija tega ni nikoli zanikala.
Hence, the Commission concludes that the measure in question is imputable to the State and was granted through State resources.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da je bil zadevni ukrep dodeljen iz državnih sredstev in ga je mogoče pripisati državi.
This measure is also selective as it favours a single company, Legler.
Ukrep je tudi selektiven, saj je namenjen enemu samemu podjetju, podjetju Legler.
Furthermore, as Legler was pursuing a restructuring process aimed at resuming production, the aid was liable to distort competition in the internal market and to affect trade between Member States.
Ker je podjetje Legler izvajalo proces prestrukturiranja, namenjen ponovnemu zagonu proizvodnje, bi pomoč lahko izkrivljala konkurenco na notranjem trgu in vplivala na trgovino med državami članicami.
The potential distortive impact of the measure was also highlighted in the comments submitted by a third party, which also pointed out that the sector suffers from overcapacity.
Morebitni izkrivljajoč učinek ukrepa je v svojih pripombah poudarila tudi tretja stran, ki je opozorila tudi na dejstvo, da je za sektor značilen presežek zmogljivosti.
In its response, Italy argued that the measure in question conferred no advantage on Legler as, in its view, it was in line with the market economy investor principle.
V svojem odgovoru je Italija trdila, da zadevni ukrep podjetju Legler ni zagotavljal nobene prednosti, saj je bil po njenem mnenju v skladu z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
According to settled case-law [14], in order to determine whether Legler received an advantage from State resources it is necessary to consider whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor with characteristics comparable to those of SFIRS would have been willing to carry out a similar debt-for-equity swap, having regard to the information available and developments foreseeable at the date the transaction was implemented.
Da bi ugotovili, ali je imelo podjetje Legler korist od državnih sredstev, je treba v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso [14] preučiti, ali bi bil zasebni vlagatelj, ki je po značilnostih podoben družbi SFIRS, ob upoštevanju podatkov, ki so bili na voljo, in v tistem trenutku pričakovanega razvoja pripravljen izvesti podobno zamenjavo dolga v lastniške deleže.
Firstly, on the basis of Legler’s financial statements, the Commission notes that in 2007 the company had a capital of EUR 1,8 million and a negative equity of EUR - 16,2 million; over the period 2003-2007 losses reached EUR 94,9 million and the company’s situation was clearly deteriorating, with increasing losses and decreasing turnover.
Komisija na podlagi finančnih izkazov ugotavlja, da je imelo podjetje Legler v letu 2007 kapital v višini 1,8 milijona EUR in negativni lastniški kapital v višini – 16,2 milijona EUR; v obdobju 2003–2007 so izgube znašale 94,9 milijona EUR in položaj podjetja se je očitno slabšal, saj so se izgube povečevale, promet pa je upadal.
The Commission also notes that despite the critical financial situation outlined above, SFIRS did not carry out a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis and a risk assessment for the transaction.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da družba SFIRS kljub opisanemu kritičnemu finančnemu stanju za transakcijo ni izvedla celostne analize stroškov in koristi ter ocene tveganja.
In fact, despite numerous requests from the Commission to this effect, the Italian authorities have never submitted a substantiated counterfactual scenario demonstrating that SFIRS’ choice was preferable to the scenario of liquidating Legler.
Dejansko italijanski organi kljub številnih zahtevam Komisije niso predložili utemeljenega scenarija nasprotnih dejstev, ki bi dokazal, da je bila izbira družbe SFIRS boljša od scenarija likvidacije podjetja Legler.
Indeed, similar remarks were made by the Bank of Italy in a report [15] issued after an investigation into SFIRS’ activity.
Podobne pripombe je imela tudi Banka Italije v poročilu, [15] ki ga je izdala po preiskavi dejavnosti družbe SFIRS.
The report criticised SFIRS’ behaviour for the incompleteness of its prior analysis of the debt-for-equity swap and for the inherent contradiction of making an ‘investment’ offering no concrete prospects of recovery.
Poročilo je kritiziralo ravnanje družbe SFIRS zaradi pomanjkljivosti analize zamenjave dolga v lastniške deleže in zaradi protislovnosti njihove „naložbe“, ki ni nudila nobenih dejanskih možnosti za reševanje podjetja.
Irrespective of this assessment, the financial situation of the company was such that no reasonable private investor in a market economy would have entered into a similar transaction.
Ne glede na to oceno je bil finančni položaj podjetja tak, da noben razumen zasebni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu ne bi sodeloval pri podobni transakciji.
In this regard, the Commission also notes that the restructuring plan (piano industriale) notified by the company cannot be considered as a realistic basis for predicting the company’s future performance.
Glede tega Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da načrta prestrukturiranja (piano industriale), ki ga je priglasilo podjetje, ni mogoče upoštevati kot razumno podlago za napoved uspešnosti podjetja v prihodnosti.
The fact alone that the plan covered not all but only a part of the restructuring period, and provided no information on the subsequent progress of the restructuring (see recital 23), clearly shows that such lack of information would have dissuaded any private investor from entering into the transaction in question.
Že samo dejstvo, da je načrt obsegal samo del in ne celo obdobje prestrukturiranja in da ni zagotavljal nobenih informacij glede nadaljnjega napredka prestrukturiranja (glej uvodno izjavo 23), jasno kaže, da bi tako pomanjkanje informacij vsakega zasebnega vlagatelja odvrnilo od sodelovanja v zadevni transakciji.
Second, as to SFIRS’ actual prospects of recovering the money owed to it by Legler, by becoming a shareholder via the debt-for-equity swap SFIRS had actually weakened its claim position, compared with its prior position as a preferential creditor.
Glede izterjave denarja, ki ji ga je dolgovalo podjetje Legler, je imela družba SFIRS boljše možnosti kot prednostni upnik kot takrat, ko je zaradi zamenjave dolga za lastniški kapital postala delničar.
The value and future prospects of SFIRS’ equity investment at the moment of the debt-for-equity swap seemed too limited to counterbalance the risks outlined above, particularly in the light of the company’s critical financial situation.
Vrednost in prihodnje možnosti naložb družbe SFIRS v kapital so bile v času zamenjave dolga v lastniške deleže preveč omejene, da bi izravnale navedena tveganja, zlasti ob upoštevanju kritičnega finančnega položaja podjetja.
This was clearly highlighted by an independent valuation of the company, which gave it the symbolic figure of EUR 1.
To je jasno poudarila neodvisna ocena podjetja, ki mu je dodelila simboličen znesek v višini 1 EUR.
It can be concluded from the above that in carrying out the debt-for-equity swap SFIRS did not act as a private investor operating under normal market conditions.
(5 9) Iz navedenega je mogoče sklepati, da pri zamenjavi dolga v lastniške deleže družba SFIRS ni ravnala kot zasebni vlagatelj v običajnih tržnih razmerah.
A private investor would not have entered into such a transaction without a credible and realistic prior assessment showing that it would be more cost-effective to swap the debt for equity instead of remaining a preferential creditor of the company.
Zasebni vlagatelj pri taki transakciji ne bi sodeloval brez verodostojne in realistične predhodne ocene, ki bi pokazala, da bi bilo namesto tega, da ostane prednostni upnik podjetja, bolj stroškovno učinkovito zamenjati dolg v lastniške deleže.
Hence, by carrying out the debt-for-equity swap, SFIRS granted an advantage to Legler.
Zato je družba SFIRS z zamenjavo dolga v lastniške deleže podjetju Legler zagotovila prednost.
It follows from the foregoing that the debt-for-equity swap constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Iz zgoraj navedenega sledi, da zamenjava dolga v lastniške deleže pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe.
As to calculating the amount of aid, it should be noted that the notion of State aid is limited to aid granted through public resources.
Glede izračuna zneska pomoči je treba opozoriti, da je pojem državne pomoči omejen na pomoč, ki je dodeljena iz javnih sredstev.
The amount of aid must be calculated on the basis of the market value of the debt which SFIRS converted into Legler’s equity.
Znesek pomoči se izračuna na podlagi tržne vrednosti dolga, ki ga je družba SFIRS pretvorila v lastniški kapital podjetja Legler.
Hence, if the total nominal value of Legler’s debt towards SFIRS was EUR 17 million, while on the day before the swap its market value was EUR 450000, the market value of the transaction whereby SFIRS’ converted 85,3 % of its total credit i.e. a nominal value of EUR 14,5 million, into equity, was EUR 383850 (i.e. 85,3 % of EUR 450000).
Če je bila nominalna vrednost dolga podjetja Legler do družbe SFRIS 17 milijonov EUR, dan pred zamenjavo pa je bila njegova tržna vrednost 450000 EUR, je bila tržna vrednost transakcije, pri kateri je družba SFIRS pretvorila 85,3 % skupnega kredita, tj. v nominalni vrednosti 14,5 milijona EUR, v lastniški kapital, 383850 EUR (tj. 85,3 % od 450000 EUR).
Hence, the advantage granted through State resources was EUR 383850. On the other hand, the nominal value of the swapped credit cannot be viewed as an advantage other than in merely accounting terms.
Zato je prednost, dodeljena prek državnih sredstev, znašala 383850 EUR. Po drugi strani pa se nominalna vrednost zamenjanega kredita lahko šteje za prednost samo v računovodskem smislu.
As the two notified measures have been found to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, the Commission has to assess whether this aid is compatible with the internal market.
Ker je bilo za dva priglašena ukrepa ugotovljeno, da pomenita državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe, mora Komisija oceniti, ali je ta pomoč združljiva z notranjim trgom.
The compatibility of the State aid measures in question with the internal market must be assessed on the basis of the rescue and restructuring guidelines.
Združljivost zadevnih ukrepov državne pomoči z notranjim trgom je treba oceniti na podlagi smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
As regards the public guarantee, in order to assess its compatibility a distinction must be made between extension of the rescue aid on one hand, and the provision of State aid in the form of a medium-term guarantee, which is also a restructuring measure (for the duration of the restructuring period) on the other.
Da bi lahko ocenili združljivost javnega jamstva, je treba razločevati med podaljšanjem pomoči na eni strani in zagotavljanjem državne pomoči v obliki srednjeročnega jamstva, ki je prav tako ukrep prestrukturiranja (za trajanje obdobja prestrukturiranja), na drugi strani.
With regard to the extension of the rescue aid, point 26 of the guidelines provides that where the Member State has submitted a restructuring plan within six months of the date of authorisation or, in the case of non-notified aid, of implementation of the measure, the deadline for reimbursing the loan or for putting an end to the guarantee is extended until the Commission reaches its decision on the plan, unless the Commission decides that such an extension is not justified.
Glede podaljšanja pomoči točka 26 smernic navaja, da se, če je država članica predložila načrt za prestrukturiranje v šestih mesecih od datuma odobritve ali v primeru nepriglašene pomoči od izvedbe ukrepa, rok za povrnitev posojila ali prenehanje jamstva podaljša za toliko časa, da Komisija sprejme odločitev o načrtu, razen če Komisija odloči, da tako podaljšanje ni upravičeno.
The notification of the restructuring plan allowed the rescue aid to continue beyond six months.
Ker je bil načrt prestrukturiranja priglašen, je lahko pomoč presegla 6 mesecev.
However, Italy later withdrew this notification.
Vendar pa je Italija pozneje to priglasitev umaknila.
It follows from point 26 of the guidelines that the notification of a restructuring plan is a condition sine qua non for an extension of the rescue aid.
Iz točke 26 smernic sledi, da je priglasitev načrta za prestrukturiranje temeljni pogoj za podaljšanje pomoči za reševanje.
Therefore, if a notified restructuring plan is later withdrawn, the extension allowed for the rescue aid has to be terminated.
Če je torej priglašeni načrt za prestrukturiranje pozneje umaknjen, je treba dovoljeno podaljšanje za pomoč za reševanje prekiniti.
It follows from the Commission’s decision-making practice (cases Ernault [16] and Huta Cynku [17]) that if neither a restructuring plan nor a liquidation plan have been notified to the Commission or, as in the present case, if the restructuring plan has been withdrawn, the extension of the rescue aid in question cannot be maintained beyond the date on which the Member State withdrew notification of the restructuring plan.
Iz prakse odločanja Komisije (zadevi Ernault [16] in Huta Cynku [17]) sledi, da v primeru, ko Komisiji ni priglašen niti načrt prestrukturiranja niti načrt za likvidacijo podjetja, ali, kot v zadevnem primeru, če je načrt za likvidacijo podjetja umaknjen, zadevne pomoči ni mogoče podaljšati preko datuma, na katerega je država članica umaknila priglasitev načrta prestrukturiranja.