natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Annex VIII A point 4
Priloga VIII A, točka 4
Annex V, Part 3, point 6
Priloga V, del 3, točka 6
Annex VIII A point 5
Priloga VIII A, točka 5
Annex V, Part 3, points 7 and 8
Priloga V, del 3, točki 7 in 8
Annex VIII A point 6
Priloga VIII A, točka 6
Annex V, Part 3, points 9 and 10
Priloga V, del 3, točki 9 in 10
Annex V, Part 3, point 11
Priloga V, del 3, točka 11
Annex VIII B
Priloga VIII B
Annex VIII C
Priloga VIII C
During the period from 1 January 2016 to 30 June 2020, Member States may draw up and implement a transitional national plan covering combustion plants which were granted the first permit before 27 November 2002 or the operators of which had submitted a complete application for a permit before that date, provided that the plant was put into operation no later than 27 November 2003.
Države članice lahko v obdobju od 1. januarja 2016 do 30. junija 2020 izdelajo in izvajajo prehodni nacionalni načrt, v katerega bodo zajete kurilne naprave, ki so pridobile prvo dovoljenje pred 27. novembrom 2002 ali katerih upravljavci so predložili popolno vlogo za dovoljenje pred tem datumom, pod pogojem, da je naprava začela delovati pred 27. novembrom 2003.
For each of the combustion plants covered by the plan, the plan shall cover emissions of one or more of the following pollutants: nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide and dust.
Za vsako od kurilnih naprav iz načrta bodo v njem zajete emisije enega ali več naslednjih onesnaževal: dušikovi oksidi, žveplov dioksid n prah.
the emission limit values for sulphur dioxides, nitrogen oxides and dust set out in the permit for the combustion plant applicable on 31 December 2015, pursuant in particular to the requirements of Directives 2001/80/EC and 2008/1/EC, shall at least be maintained during the remaining operational life of the combustion plant.
mejne vrednosti emisij za žveplov dioksid, dušikove okside in prah, ki so določene v dovoljenju za kurilno napravo, veljavnem 31. decembra 2015, in so zlasti skladne z zahtevami iz direktiv 2001/80/ES in 2008/1/ES, se ohranijo vsaj za preostalo obratovalno dobo kurilne naprave.
Combustion plants with a total rated thermal input of more than 500 MW firing solid fuels, which were granted the first permit after 1 July 1987, shall comply with the emission limit values for nitrogen oxides set out in Part 1 of Annex V; and
Kurilne naprave s skupno nazivno vhodno toplotno močjo več kot 500 MW, ki uporabljajo trdna goriva in ki jim je bilo prvo dovoljenje izdano po 1. juliju 1987, morajo izpolnjevati zahteve glede doseganja mejnih vrednosti emisij za dušikove okside iz dela 1 Priloge V; in
for combustion plants to which Article 31 applies, the sulphur content of the indigenous solid fuel used and the rate of desulphurisation achieved, averaged over each month. For the first year where Article 31 is applied, the technical justification of the non-feasibility of complying with the emission limit values referred to in Article 30(2) and (3) shall also be reported; and
pri kurilnih napravah, za katere se uporablja člen 31, vsebnost žvepla v uporabljenem domačem trdnem gorivu in doseženo stopnjo razžveplanja, izraženo kot povprečje vsakega meseca, Za prvo leto, kadar se uporablja člen 31, je treba poslati tudi tehnično utemeljitev za neizvedljivost spoštovanja mejnih vrednosti emisij iz člena 30(2) in (3); ter
The power to adopt the delegated acts referred to in Article 48(5) and Article 74 shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of 5 years from 6 January 2011.
Pooblastilo za sprejemanje delegiranih aktov iz členov 48(5) in 74 se prenese na Komisijo za obdobje petih let z začetkom 6. januarja 2011.
The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegated power at the latest 6 months before the end of the five-year period.
Komisija pripravi poročilo o pooblastilu najpozneje šest mesecev pred koncem petletnega obdobja.
Article 58 shall apply from 1 June 2015.
Člen 58 se uporablja od 1. junija 2015.
Until that date, substances or mixtures which, because of their content of volatile organic compounds classified as carcinogens, mutagens, or toxic to reproduction under Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008, are assigned or need to carry the hazard statements H340, H350, H350i, H360D or H360F or the risk phrases R45, R46, R49, R60 or R61, shall be replaced, as far as possible, by less harmful substances or mixtures within the shortest possible time.
Do tega datuma, se snovi ali zmesi, za katere so predpisani stavki o nevarnosti H340, H350, H350i, H360D ali H360F ali stavki R45, R46, R49, R60 ali R61 ali morajo biti označeni s temi stavki zaradi deleža hlapnih organskih spojin in ki so v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1272/2008 uvrščeni med kancerogene ali mutagene snovi ali za razmnoževanje strupene snovi, v najkrajšem možnem času nadomestijo z manj škodljivimi snovmi ali zmesmi, kolikor je to mogoče.
Article 59(5) shall apply from 1 June 2015.
Člen 59(5) se uporablja od 1. junija 2015.
Until that date, the emissions of either volatile organic compounds which are assigned or need to carry the hazard statements H340, H350, H350i, H360D or H360F or the risk phrases R45, R46, R49, R60 or R61 or halogenated volatile organic compounds which are assigned or need to carry the hazard statements H341 or H351 or the risk phrases R40 or R68, shall be controlled under contained conditions, as far as technically and economically feasible, to safeguard public health and the environment and shall not exceed the relevant emission limit values set out in Part 4 of Annex VII.
Do tega datuma se emisije bodisi hlapnih organskih spojin, za katere so predpisani stavki o nevarnosti H340, H350, H350i, H360D ali H360F oziroma stavki R45, R46, R49, R60 ali R61 ali morajo biti označeni s temi stavki, bodisi halogeniranih hlapnih organskih spojin, za katere so predpisani stavki o nevarnosti H341 ali H351 oziroma stavki R40 ali R68 ali morajo biti označeni s temi stavki, se nadzirajo v zaprtih pogojih, kolikor je to tehnično in ekonomsko izvedljivo, da se zavaruje zdravje ljudi in okolje, ter ne presegajo ustreznih mejnih vrednosti emisij iz dela 4 Priloge VII.
Point 2 of Part 4 of Annex VII shall apply from 1 June 2015.
Točka 2 dela 4 Priloge VII se uporablja od 1. junija 2015.
Until that date, for emissions of halogenated volatile organic compounds which are assigned or need to carry the hazard statements H341 or H351 or the risk phrases R40 or R68, where the mass flow of the sum of the compounds causing the hazard statements H341 or H351 or the labelling R40 or R68 is greater than, or equal to, 100 g/h, an emission limit value of 20 mg/Nm3 shall be complied with.
Do tega datuma se pri emisijah halogeniranih hlapnih organskih spojin, za katere je predpisan stavek o nevarnosti H341 ali H351 oziroma stavek R40 ali R68 ali morajo biti označene s temi stavki, se upošteva mejna vrednost emisij 20 mg/Nm3, kadar je masni pretok vsote spojin, zaradi katerih je potreben stavek o nevarnosti H341 ali H 351 oziroma oznaka R40 ali R68, večji ali enak 100 g/h.
Average emission limit value (ng/Nm3) for dioxins and furans over a sampling period of a minimum of 6 hours and a maximum of 8 hours. The emission limit value refers to the total concentration of dioxins and furans calculated in accordance with Part 2.
Povprečne mejne vrednosti emisij (ng/Nm3) za dioksine in furane v vzorčevalnem obdobju najmanj 6 in največ 8 ur. Mejna vrednost emisije se nanaša na skupno koncentracijo dioksinov in furanov, ki se izračuna skladno z delom 2.
Prior to determining the routes for the disposal or recycling of the residues, appropriate tests shall be carried out to establish the physical and chemical characteristics and the polluting potential of the residues. Those tests shall concern the total soluble fraction and heavy metals soluble fraction.
Pred določanjem poti za odstranitev ali reciklažo ostankov se opravijo ustrezni preskusi, da se ugotovijo fizikalne in kemijske lastnosti ter onesnaževalni potencial različnih ostankov Ti preskusi se nanašajo na celotno topno frakcijo in topno frakcijo težkih kovin.
Corrigendum to Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control)
Popravek Direktive 2010/75/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o industrijskih emisijah (celovito preprečevanje in nadzorovanje onesnaževanja)
(Official Journal of the European Union L 334 of 17 December 2010)
(Uradni list Evropske unije L 334 z dne 17. decembra 2010) Stran 36, člen 32(1), točka (d): besedilo: „(d) tistih, ki jim ni bila odobrena izjema iz člena 4(4) Direktive 2001/80/ES.“ se glasi: „(d) tistih, ki jim je bila odobrena izjema iz člena 4(4) Direktive 2001/80/ES.“ Stran 37, člen 33(1): besedilo: „1. V obdobju od 1. januarja 2016 do 31. decembra 2023 se lahko kurilnim napravam odobri izvzetje od obveznosti upoštevanja mejnih vrednosti emisij iz člena 30(2) in stopenj razžveplanja iz člena 31, če je to primerno, ter se jih lahko vključi v prehodni nacionalni program iz člena 32, v kolikor so izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji:“ se glasi: „1. V obdobju od 1. januarja 2016 do 31. decembra 2023 se lahko kurilnim napravam odobri izvzetje od obveznosti upoštevanja mejnih vrednosti emisij iz člena 30(2) in stopenj razžveplanja iz člena 31, če je to primerno, ter jih ni treba vključiti v prehodni nacionalni program iz člena 32, v kolikor so izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji:“
On page 41, Article 46(4), second subparagraph:
Stran 41, člen 46(4), drugi pododstavek:
‘… using the results of the measurements set out in point 2 of Part 6 of Annex VI in order to determine the emission levels in the final waste water discharge …’,
„… na podlagi meritev iz točke 2 dela 6 Priloge VI izračuna ustrezne masne bilance, da določi vrednosti emisij na končnem iztoku …“
‘… using the results of the measurements set out in point 3 of Part 6 of Annex VI in order to determine the emission levels in the final waste water discharge …’;
„… na podlagi meritev iz točke 3 dela 6 Priloge VI izračuna ustrezne masne bilance, da določi vrednosti emisij na končnem iztoku …“
on page 50, Article 82(5)(b):
Stran 50, člen 82(5)(b):
7 January 2013, for combustion plants referred to in Article 30(3).’,
7. januarja 2013 za kurilne naprave iz člena 30(3).“
6 January 2013, for combustion plants referred to in Article 30(3).’;
6. januarja 2013 za kurilne naprave iz člena 30(3).“
on page 69, Annex VI, Part 4, point 1:
Stran 69, Priloga VI, del 4, točka 1:
‘Vwaste
„Vodpadki
Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
Direktiva 2010/76/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta
amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies
o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES v zvezi s kapitalskimi zahtevami za trgovalno knjigo in za relistinjenja ter v zvezi z nadzorniškim pregledom politik prejemkov
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 53(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije in zlasti člena 53(1) Pogodbe,
Excessive and imprudent risk-taking in the banking sector has led to the failure of individual financial institutions and systemic problems in Member States and globally.
Pretirano in nepreudarno tveganje v bančnem sektorju je privedlo do propada posameznih finančnih institucij ter sistemskih težav v državah članicah in v svetu.
While the causes of such risk-taking are many and complex, there is agreement by supervisors and regulatory bodies, including the G-20 and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), that the inappropriate remuneration structures of some financial institutions have been a contributory factor.
Razlogi za takšno tveganje so številni in zapleteni, vendar med nadzorniki in regulativnimi organi, vključno z G20 in Odborom evropskih bančnih nadzornikov, obstaja soglasje, da so k temu prispevale tudi neprimerne strukture prejemkov nekaterih finančnih institucij.
Remuneration policies which give incentives to take risks that exceed the general level of risk tolerated by the institution can undermine sound and effective risk management and exacerbate excessive risk-taking behaviour.
Politike prejemkov, ki pospešujejo tveganja, ki presegajo splošno raven tveganj, sprejemljivih za institucijo, lahko ogrozijo ustrezno in učinkovito upravljanje s tveganji ter spodbudijo pretirano tvegano ravnanje.
The internationally agreed and endorsed Financial Stability Board (FSB) Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (the FSB principles) are therefore of particular importance.
Zato so še posebej pomembna mednarodno dogovorjena in podprta načela Odbora za finančno stabilnost („načela FSB“) za vzpostavitev ustrezne prakse nadomestil.
Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions [4] requires credit institutions to have arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms to manage the risks to which they are exposed.
Direktiva 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti kreditnih institucij [4] od kreditnih institucij zahteva uvedbo ureditev, strategij, postopkov in mehanizmov za obvladovanje tveganj, ki so jim izpostavljene.
By virtue of Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions [5], that requirement applies to investment firms within the meaning of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments [6].
Na podlagi Direktive 2006/49/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o kapitalski ustreznosti investicijskih podjetij in kreditnih institucij [5] ta zahteva velja za investicijska podjetja v smislu Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 21. aprila 2004 o trgih finančnih instrumentov [6].
Directive 2006/48/EC requires competent authorities to review those arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms, and to determine whether the own funds held by the credit institution or investment firm concerned ensure a sound management and coverage of the risks to which the institution or firm is or might be exposed.
Direktiva 2006/48/ES od pristojnih organov zahteva, da pregledajo te ureditve, strategije, postopke in mehanizme ter ugotovijo, ali lastna sredstva, ki jih drži zadevna kreditna institucija ali investicijsko podjetje, zagotavljajo ustrezno upravljanje in kritje tveganj, ki jim je ali ki bi jim lahko institucija ali podjetje bilo izpostavljeno.
That supervision is carried out on a consolidated basis in relation to banking groups, and includes financial holding companies and affiliated financial institutions in all jurisdictions.
Navedeni nadzor na ravni bančnih skupin se izvaja na konsolidirani osnovi ter zajema finančne holdinge in odvisne finančne institucije v vseh pravnih redih.
In order to address the potentially detrimental effect of poorly designed remuneration structures on the sound management of risk and control of risk-taking behaviour by individuals, the requirements of Directive 2006/48/EC should be supplemented by an express obligation for credit institutions and investment firms to establish and maintain, for categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on their risk profile, remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with effective risk management.
Za odpravo potencialno škodljivega učinka slabo oblikovanih struktur prejemkov na ustrezno upravljanje s tveganji in nadzor tveganega ravnanja s strani posameznikov bi bilo treba zahteve Direktive 2006/48/ES dopolniti z izrecno obveznostjo za kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja, da za kategorije zaposlenih, katerih poklicne dejavnosti imajo bistven vpliv na njihov profil tveganja, vzpostavijo in vzdržujejo politike prejemkov in prakse, ki so skladne z učinkovitim upravljanjem s tveganji.
Those categories of staff should include at least senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee whose total remuneration, including discretionary pension benefit provisions, takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers.
Te kategorije zaposlenih bi morale zajemati vsaj višje vodstvo, prevzemnike tveganj, osebje zadolženo za kontrolne funkcije in vse zaposlene, ki jih skupni prejemki, vključno z diskrecijskimi določbami glede pokojninskih ugodnostih, uvrščajo v isti tarifni razred kot višje vodstvo in prevzemniki tveganj.
Because excessive and imprudent risk-taking may undermine the financial soundness of credit institutions or investment firms and destabilise the banking system, it is important that the new obligation concerning remuneration policies and practices should be implemented in a consistent manner and should cover all aspects of remuneration including salaries, discretionary pension benefits and any similar benefits.
Ker lahko pretirano in nepreudarno prevzemanje tveganja ogrozi finančno stabilnost kreditnih institucij ali investicijskih podjetij in destabilizira bančni sistem, je pomembno, da bi se nova obveznost glede politik prejemkov in praks dosledno izvajala in zajemala vse vidike prejemkov, vključno s plačami, diskrecijskimi pokojninskimi ugodnostmi in kakršnimi koli podobnimi ugodnostmi.
In that context, discretionary pension benefits should mean discretionary payments granted by a credit institution or investment firm to an employee on an individual basis payable by reference to or expectation of retirement and which can be assimilated to variable remuneration.
V tem kontekstu bi morale diskrecijske pokojninske ugodnosti pomeniti diskrecijska plačila, ki jih kreditna institucija ali investicijsko podjetje odobri zaposlenemu na individualni podlagi in se plačajo na podlagi reference na ali pričakovanja upokojitve in ki jih je mogoče vključiti med variabilne prejemke.
It is therefore appropriate to specify clear principles on sound remuneration to ensure that the structure of remuneration does not encourage excessive risk-taking by individuals or moral hazard and is aligned with the risk appetite, values and long-term interests of the credit institution or investment firm.
Zato je primerno opredeliti jasna načela o ustreznih prejemkih za zagotovitev, da struktura prejemkov ne spodbuja pretiranega prevzemanja tveganja s strani posameznikov ali moralnega hazarda in je usklajena s pripravljenostjo za tveganje, vrednotami in dolgoročnimi interesi kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.
Remuneration should be aligned with the role of the financial sector as the mechanism through which financial resources are efficiently allocated in the economy.
Prejemki bi morali biti usklajeni tudi z vlogo finančnega sektorja kot mehanizma, prek katerega se v gospodarstvu učinkovito dodeljujejo finančna sredstva.
In particular, the principles should provide that the design of variable remunerationpolicies ensures that incentives are aligned with the long-term interests of the credit institution or investment firm and that payment methods strengthen its capital base.
Načela bi morala zlasti poskrbeti, da se pri oblikovanju politik variabilnih prejemkov zagotovi, da so spodbude usklajene z dolgoročnimi interesi kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja in da metode plačevanja krepijo njeno oziroma njegovo kapitalsko osnovo.
Performance-based components of remuneration should also help enhance fairness within the remuneration structures of the credit institution or investment firm.
Sestavine prejemkov, ki temeljijo na uspešnosti, bi morale prav tako spodbujati poštenost v strukturah plačil kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.
The principles should recognise that credit institutions and investment firms may apply the provisions in different ways according to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities and, in particular, that it may not be proportionate for investment firms referred to in Article 20(2) and (3) of Directive 2006/49/EC to comply with all of the principles.
Načela bi morala določati, da lahko kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja določbe uporabijo na različne načine, in sicer glede na njihovo velikost, notranjo organiziranost ter naravo, obseg in kompleksnost njihovih dejavnosti ter zlasti, da uskladitev ne sme biti sorazmerna za investicijska podjetja iz člena 20(2) in (3) Direktive 2006/49/ES.
In order to ensure that the design of remuneration policies is integrated in the risk management of the credit institution or investment firm, the management body, in its supervisory function, of each credit institution or investment firm should adopt and periodically review the principles to be applied.
Za zagotovitev, da se zasnova politik prejemkov upošteva pri upravljanju s tveganji kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja, bi morala uprava vsake kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja, v svoji nadzorni funkciji, sprejeti načela in jih redno pregledovati.
In that context, it should be possible, where applicable and in accordance with national company law, for the management body in its supervisory function to be understood as the supervisory board.
Glede na to bi moralo biti omogočeno, da ima lahko uprava v svoji nadzorni funkciji po potrebi in v skladu z nacionalnim pravom vlogo nadzornega sveta.
Credit institutions and investment firms that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of their activities should be required to establish a remuneration committee as an integral part of their governance structure and organisation.
Od kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij, ki so pomembna v smislu velikosti, notranje organiziranosti ter narave, obsega in kompleksnost svojih dejavnosti, bi bilo treba zahtevati, da kot sestavni del svoje upravljavske in organizacijske strukture ustanovijo komisijo za prejemke.
By 1 April 2013, the Commission should review the principles on remuneration policy with particular regard to their efficiency, implementation and enforcement, taking into account international developments including any further proposals from the FSB and the implementation of the FSB principles in other jurisdictions including the link between the design of variable remuneration and excessive risk-taking behaviour.
Do 1. aprila 2013 bi morala Komisija pregledati načela politike prejemkov s posebno pozornostjo na njihovi učinkovitosti, izvajanju in izvrševanju, pri čemer upošteva mednarodni razvoj dogodkov, vključno s kakršnimi koli dodatnimi predlogi Odbora za finančno stabilnost in izvajanjem načel FSB v drugih pravnih redih, ter tudi povezavo med zasnovo variabilnih prejemkov in pretirano tveganim ravnanjem.
Remuneration policy should aim at aligning the personal objectives of staff members with the long-term interests of the credit institution or investment firm concerned.
Politika prejemkov bi morala biti namenjena uskladitvi osebnih ciljev zaposlenih z dolgoročnimi interesi zadevne kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.
The assessment of the performance-based components of remuneration should be based on longer-term performance and take into account the outstanding risks associated with the performance.
Ocene sestavin prejemkov, ki temeljijo na uspešnosti, bi morale temeljiti na dolgoročni uspešnosti in upoštevati izjemna tveganja, povezana z uspešnostjo.
The assessment of performance should be set in a multi-year framework of at least three to 5 years, in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over the business cycle of the credit institution or investment firm.
Ocene uspešnosti bi bilo treba vključiti v večletni okvir, in sicer za obdobje vsaj treh do petih let, za zagotovitev, da postopek ocenjevanja temelji na dolgoročni uspešnosti in da je dejansko plačilo sestavin prejemkov, ki temeljijo na uspešnosti, porazdeljeno po poslovnem ciklu kreditne institucije ali investicijskega podjetja.