natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Measure Z was necessary to avoid FBN’s capital ratios falling below the minimum regulatory capital requirements.
Ukrep Z je bil nujen za preprečitev padca kapitalskih deležev banke FBN pod minimalne regulativne kapitalske zahteve.
FBN’s capital problem was due to the high valuation of ABN AMRO N in its accounts.
Težava s kapitalom banke FBN se je pojavila zaradi visokega vrednotenja banke ABN AMRO N v njenih evidencah.
Simulations in […]’s due diligence report show that bringing the book value of ABN AMRO N down to EUR 6,5 billion would lead to Tier 1 and total capital ratios of 3,8 % and 7,6 % respectively for FBN [107].
Simulacije v poročilu o skrbnem pregledu poslovanja […] kažejo, da bi znižanje knjigovodske vrednosti banke ABN AMRO N na 6,5 milijarde EUR za banko FBN prineslo kapital prvega reda in skupne kapitalske deleže v višini 3,8 % oziroma 7,6 % [107].
In other words, there was a risk that FBN would fall below the minimum regulatory ratios requiring a minimum total capital ratio of 8 % (with maximum half of it Tier 2).
Obstajalo je torej tveganje, da banka FBN pade pod minimalne regulativne deleže, ki zahtevajo minimalni skupni kapitalski delež v višini 8 % (z največ polovico kapitala drugega reda).
According to the […]-report, selling ABN AMRO N to the Dutch State for a price of EUR 6,5 billion lifted the Tier 1 and total capital ratios of FBN to respectively 7,8 % and 15,7 %, thereby sorting out FBN’s capital problem and allowing the company to stay on the market.
V skladu s poročilom […] je prodaja banke ABN AMRO N Nizozemski za 6,5 milijarde EUR vplivala na povečanje kapitala prvega reda in skupnih kapitalskih deležev banke FBN na 7,8 % oziroma 15,7 %, s čimer je bila rešena težava banke FBN s kapitalom, podjetje pa je lahko ostalo na trgu.
The measure provided FBN with an advantage in the form of capital it could not have found on the markets.
Ukrep je za banko FBN pomenil prednost v obliki kapitala, ki ga ne bi mogla pridobiti na trgu.
The company was also unable to use internally generated underlying profits to sort out (part of) the problem, partly because it incurred losses of EUR 922 million in 2008 related to the Madoff fraud.
Podjetje za rešitev (dela) težave ni moglo uporabiti notranje ustvarjenega osnovnega dobička, delno zaradi izgub v višini 922 milijonov EUR v letu 2008, povezanih z Madoffovo goljufijo.
Since FBN ran the risk of falling below minimum capital requirements, the measure allowed the company to comply with regulatory requirements and to pursue its activities.
Ker je obstajalo tveganje, da bo banka FBN padla pod minimalne kapitalske zahteve, je ukrep podjetju omogočil, da izpolni regulativne zahteve in nadaljuje z izvajanjem dejavnosti.
The Commission has come to the conclusion that the purchase of ABN AMRO N by the Dutch State did not take place at market conditions for the reasons which follow.
Komisija je ugotovila, da nakup banke ABN AMRO N s strani Nizozemske ni potekal po tržnih pogojih zaradi razlogov, opisanih v nadaljevanju.
A market economy investor [108] with an interest in acquiring ABN AMRO N in December 2008 would have used a market price, taking into account the market conditions at that particular point in time.
Vlagatelj v tržno gospodarstvo [108], ki bi se decembra 2008 zanimal za nakup banke ABN AMRO N, bi uporabil tržno ceno, pri čemer bi upošteval tržne razmere v tistem trenutku.
In the […] report, the Dutch State had two valuations: a ‘through the cycle’ valuation of EUR [5 - 9] billion which assumed a normalisation of the markets and a ‘current market conditions’ valuation of EUR [4 - 6,5] billion which was based on the market conditions in the first days of October 2008 [109].
V poročilu […] je imela Nizozemska dve vrednotenji: vrednotenje „skozi cikel“ v višini [5 – 9] milijard EUR, ki je predvidevalo normalizacijo trgov, in vrednotenje „sedanjih tržnih pogojev“ v višini [4 – 6,5] milijarde EUR, ki je temeljilo na tržnih razmerah v prvih dneh oktobra 2008 [109].
A market economy investor would have used the ‘current market conditions’ valuation as a starting point.
Vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu bi za izhodišče uporabil vrednotenje „sedanjih tržnih pogojev“.
A correction to the ‘current conditions’ market valuation would be needed in any event to take into account the deterioration of the market conditions between 3 October 2008 (namely the date of the […] valuation report) and the actual date when the acquisition of ABN AMRO N by the Dutch State was decided upon.
Za upoštevanje poslabšanja tržnih pogojev med 3. oktobrom 2008 (tj. datumom poročila o vrednotenju […]) in dejanskim datumom, ko je Nizozemska sprejela odločitev o nakupu banke ABN AMRO N, bi bil v vsakem primeru potreben popravek tržnega vrednotenja „sedanjih pogojev“.
In that period, the Euro Stoxx 50 index fell by 22,2 % while the Euro Stoxx Banks index fell by 45,3 %.
V tem obdobju je indeks EURo Stoxx 50 padel za 22,2 %, indeks EURo Stoxx Banks pa za 45,3 %.
The Dutch State’s argument that no correction is needed given ABN AMRO N’s conservative risk profile (namely no toxic assets, good funding position, etc.) cannot be accepted.
Trditve Nizozemske, da glede na konzervativen profil tveganja banke ABN AMRO N (brez slabe aktive, dobro stanje sredstev itd.) popravek ni potreben, ni mogoče sprejeti.
The market decline was widespread, and especially so amongst banking stocks, indicating that it was not so much linked to stock-specifics but rather to worsened economic and financial market conditions and the associated increase in required risk premiums.
Zmanjšanje prometa na trgu je bilo obsežno, zlasti z bančnimi delnicami, kar je kazalo na to, da zmanjšanje prometa ni toliko vezano na posebnosti delnic kot na slabše pogoje na gospodarskem in finančnem trgu in s tem povezanim zvišanjem zahtevane premije za tveganje.
The Commission can accept that, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, a correction should be made to take account of the fact that the Dutch State did not pay the transaction in cash.
Komisija lahko sprejme trditev nizozemskih organov, da bi bilo treba izvesti popravek, ki bi upošteval dejstvo, da Nizozemska transakcije ni plačala z denarnimi sredstvi.
As a result of Measure Y2, the Dutch State owned debt issued by FBN and it then paid FBN for ABN AMRO N by waiving part of that debt with a nominal value of EUR 6,5 billion. Since debt issued by other banks traded at the time at a discount to par, the Commission can accept that the value of the debt instruments waived was below par value.
Zaradi ukrepa Y2 je bila Nizozemska lastnik dolžniškega instrumenta, ki ga je izdala banka FBN, nato pa je banki FBN za banko ABN AMRO N plačala z odpisom dela tega dolga z nominalno vrednostjo 6,5 milijarde EUR. Ker se je z dolgom, ki so ga izdale druge banke, v tistem času trgovalo z diskontom na nominalno vrednost, Komisija lahko sprejme, da je bila vrednost odpisanih dolžniških instrumentov pod nominalno vrednostjo.
Based on available market information, the Commission could accept a correction of [10 - 30] % or EUR [0,65 - 1,95] billion. That would imply an actual transaction price of EUR [4,55 - 5,85] billion (EUR 6,5 billion minus EUR [0,65 - 1,95] billion), rather than EUR 6,5 billion [111].
Na podlagi razpoložljivih tržnih informacij se Komisija lahko strinja s popravkom v višini [10 – 30] % ali [0,65 – 1,95] milijarde EUR. To bi pomenilo dejansko ceno transakcije v višini [4,55 – 5,85] milijarde EUR (6,5 milijarde EUR minus [0,65 – 1,95] milijarde EUR) namesto 6,5 milijarde EUR [111].
The aid amount in Measure Z would then be the difference between the price paid and the market value of ABN AMRO N. It would then be between EUR [0 - 2,75] billion (EUR [4,55 - 5,85] billion minus EUR [3,1 - 5,1] billion) and EUR [0,95 - 3,65]-billion (EUR [4,55 - 5,85] billion minus EUR [2,2 - 3,6] billion).
Znesek pomoči ukrepa Z bi bil zato razlika med plačano ceno in tržno vrednostjo banke ABN AMRO N. Znašal bi med [0 – 2,75] milijarde EUR ([4,55 – 5,85] milijarde EUR minus [3,1 – 5,1] milijarde EUR) in [0,95 – 3,65] milijarde EUR ([4,55 – 5,85] milijarde EUR minus [2,2 – 3,6] milijarde EUR).
The Commission sees no basis to the claims of the Dutch State that its EUR 6.5 billion valuation was convincingly corroborated by the approval of the other consortium members and by a report of […].
Po mnenju Komisije ni podlage za trditve Nizozemske, da je bila njena ocena v višini 6,5 milijarde EUR prepričljivo podprta z odobritvijo ostalih članov konzorcija in s poročilom […].
Overpaying for ABN AMRO N did not affect the other consortium members, which means that their approval of the sale was not an approval of the valuation itself.
Preplačilo za banko FBN AMRO N ni vplivalo na druge člane konzorcija, kar pomeni, da njihova odobritev prodaje ni pomenila odobritve same ocene.
There is also no indication that the consortium members made a new valuation themselves.
Nič ne kaže na to, da so člani konzorcija sami izvedli novo vrednotenje.
The […] letter also does not support the claim of the Dutch State.
Dopis […] prav tako ne podpira trditve Nizozemske.
[…] merely verified the methodology and the process, and its short report cannot be seen as a credible valuation exercise.
[…] je samo preveril metodologijo in postopek, njegovo kratko poročilo pa se ne more šteti za verodostojno izvedbo vrednotenja.
The […] report also used as a basis the price paid by the Dutch State for FBN and ABN AMRO N on 3 October 2008. As set out above, the transaction of 3 October 2008 is not a market-based transaction.
Poročilo […] je za podlago uporabilo ceno, ki jo je Nizozemska 3. oktobra 2008 plačala za banki FBN in ABN AMRO N. Kot je bilo že navedeno, transakcija z dne 3. oktobra 2008 ni tržna transakcija.
A transaction containing aid cannot be used to derive a market price.
Transakcije, ki vključuje pomoč, ni mogoče uporabiti za izpeljavo tržne cene.
The report of the experts working for the shareholders of Fortis SA/NV also does not support the hypothesis that the Dutch State did not overpay.
Poročilo strokovnjakov, ki so delali za delničarje holdinga Fortis SA/NV, prav tako ne podpira domneve, da Nizozemska ni preplačala nakupa.
The report is only a secondary analysis of the valuations and valuation methods that were used during the process and is not a new valuation exercise.
Poročilo je samo sekundarna analiza vrednotenj in metod vrednotenja, ki so bile uporabljene med postopkom in ni nova izvedba vrednotenja.
Moreover, the report should be seen in its context.
Poleg tega je treba poročilo obravnavati v lastnem okviru.
The shareholders of Fortis SA/NV were worried that they received a too low price for the assets acquired by the Dutch State and the report mainly addresses that claim i.e. that the Dutch State paid a too low price.
Delničarje holdinga Fortis SA/NV je skrbelo, da so za sredstva, ki jih je pridobila Nizozemska, prejeli prenizko ceno, poročilo pa v glavnem obravnava to trditev, tj., da je Nizozemska plačala prenizko ceno.
Finally it should also be mentioned that the paragraphs to which the Dutch State refers say nothing on ABN AMRO N in isolation, but only refer to the full package of assets acquired by the Dutch State.
Treba je tudi omeniti, da odstavki, na katere se sklicuje Nizozemska, ne navajajo ničesar o sami banki ABN AMRO N, ampak se nanašajo samo na celoten sveženj sredstev, ki jih je kupila Nizozemska.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measure Z is a State aid measure in favour of FBN as it provides FBN with capital enabling it to remain on the market.
Zato je treba skleniti, da je ukrep Z ukrep državne pomoči v korist banke FBN, saj banki FBN zagotavlja kapital, ki ji omogoča, da ostaja na trgu.
The identified amount of aid is situated in a range between EUR [0 - 2,75] billion and EUR [0,95 - 3,65] billion.
Ugotovljeni znesek pomoči se giblje med [0 – 2,75] milijarde EUR in [0,95 – 3,65] milijarde EUR.
Measure A to cover EUR 1,7 billion of the capital shortfall of ABN AMRO Z
Ukrep A za kritje kapitalskega primanjkljaja ABN AMRO Z v višini 1,7 milijarde EUR
The Commission has concluded that it was the Dutch State’s responsibility – and not that of ABN AMRO N – to cover the capital shortfall of ABN AMRO Z. Since 3 October 2008, the Dutch State was bound by the terms of the CSA.
Komisija je sklenila, da je bilo kritje kapitalskega primanjkljaja ABN AMRO Z odgovornost Nizozemske in ne banke ABN AMRO N. Nizozemsko so od 3. oktobra 2008 zavezovali pogoji sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija.
Consequently, it was obliged to implement the separation of ABN AMRO Holding under the terms described in the CSA.
Zato je morala izvesti ločitev ABN AMRO Holding v skladu s pogoji, opisanimi v sporazumu delničarjev konzorcija.
Since the financial supervisor only allowed the separation process to start once the ABN AMRO Z capital problem was settled, the Dutch State and the other consortium members had no other choice than to fill the capital gap of ABN AMRO Z.
Ker je finančni nadzorni organ začetek postopka ločitve dovolil šele potem, ko ABN AMRO Z reši težave s kapitalom, Nizozemska in drugi člani konzorcija niso imeli druge izbire, kot da zapolnijo kapitalsko vrzel ABN AMRO Z.
ABN AMRO N merely acted as an intermediary in a construction to provide ABN AMRO Z, which has no operational activities, with the necessary capital.
Banka ABN AMRO N je bila samo posrednik pri zagotavljanju potrebnega kapitala ABN AMRO Z, ki nima operativnih dejavnosti.
The Commission has not found evidence of indirect aid to ABN AMRO N. The clarifications provided by the Dutch State confirmed that all meaningful financial transactions between ABN AMRO Z and ABN AMRO N took place at market conditions or before the State intervention of 3 October 2008.
Komisija ni našla nobenega dokaza o posredni pomoči banki ABN AMRO N. Pojasnila, ki jih je predložila Nizozemska, so potrdila, da so vse pomembne transakcije med ABN AMRO Z in ABN AMRO N potekale po tržnih pogojih ali pred posredovanjem države 3. oktobra 2008.
As mentioned in recital 110, the CRI was kept in place after the separation of ABN AMRO II from ABN AMRO Bank to cover the prudential margin of EUR 500 million and the integration costs of EUR 1,2 billion, while cash coming from MCS instruments was injected in ABN AMRO Z. Thus from the date of the separation of ABN AMRO II from ABN AMRO Bank (namely 6 February 2010) (until the end of the CRI in October 2010), the CRI constituted State aid to ABN AMRO II, while the amount of EUR 1,7 billion of MCS the proceeds of which were transferred to ABN AMRO Z ceased to be aid to ABN AMRO N/ABN AMRO II on the same date.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 110, je bil instrument za razbremenitev kapitala po ločitvi ABN AMRO II od ABN AMRO Bank ohranjen, da bi pokril smotrno razliko v višini 500 milijonov EUR in stroške integracije v višini 1,2 milijarde EUR, denarna sredstva, pridobljena z obvezno zamenljivimi vrednostnimi papirji, pa so bila vložena v ABN AMRO Z. Tako je od datuma ločitve ABN AMRO II od ABN AMRO Bank (tj. 6. februarja 2010) (do izteka instrumenta za razbremenitev kapitala oktobra 2010) instrument za razbremenitev kapitala pomenil državno pomoč ABN AMRO II, medtem ko je na isti datum znesek v višini 1,7 milijarde EUR v obvezno zamenljivih vrednostnih papirjih, katerih prihodki so bili preneseni na ABN AMRO Z, prenehal biti državna pomoč za ABN AMRO N/ABN AMRO II.
Those changes therefore do not change the quantity of aid but only the instruments by which the aid was provided and its duration.
Te spremembe torej ne spremenijo obsega pomoči, ampak samo instrumente, preko katerih je bila pomoč zagotovljena, in trajanje pomoči.
That change of form does not raise any issues which need to be considered in the remainder of this Decision.
Zaradi spremembe oblike se ne porajajo vprašanja, ki bi jih bilo treba obravnavati v nadaljevanju tega sklepa.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measure A does not constitute State aid.
Zato je treba skleniti, da ukrep A ne pomeni državne pomoči.
Measure B1 providing EUR 500 million worth of ABN AMRO Z’s capital shortage
Ukrep B1 v vrednosti 500 milijonov EUR za kritje kapitalskega primanjkljaja ABN AMRO Z
Since the CRI did not suffice to cover ABN AMRO Z’s capital shortfall, the Dutch State had to inject extra capital via a MCS.
Ker instrument za razbremenitev kapitala ni zadostoval za kritje kapitalskega primanjkljaja ABN AMRO Z, je morala Nizozemska preko obvezno zamenljivega vrednostnega papirja vložiti dodaten kapital.
The rationale developed in respect of Measure A also applies for Measure B1.
Utemeljitev, oblikovana v zvezi z ukrepom A, velja tudi za ukrep B1.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measure B1 does not constitute State aid, as funding ABN AMRO Z’s capital shortage was an obligation of the Dutch State under the CSA and does not selectively advantage ABN AMRO N.
Zato je treba skleniti, da ukrep B1 ne pomeni državne pomoči, saj je bilo financiranje kapitalskega primanjkljaja ABN AMRO Z obveznost Nizozemske v skladu s sporazumom delničarjev konzorcija in ne pomeni selektivne prednosti za banko ABN AMRO N.
Measures B2 and B3: Recapitalisation to finance separation costs
Ukrepa B2 in B3: dokapitalizacija za financiranje stroškov ločitve
The full amount of EUR 1,08 billion (namely Measures B2 and B3 together) includes general separation costs of EUR 480 million, EUR 90 million of costs related to the set-up of a money market desk and a prudential buffer of EUR 500 million. It is important to distinguish between the prudential buffer of EUR 500 million and the other separation costs of EUR 580 million.
Skupni znesek v višini 1,08 milijarde EUR (tj. ukrepa B2 in B3 skupaj) vključuje splošne stroške ločitve v višini 480 milijonov EUR, stroške, povezane z vzpostavitvijo poslovanja z denarnim trgom, v višini 90 milijonov EUR in smotrno razliko v višini 500 milijonov EUR. Treba je ločiti med smotrno razliko v višini 500 milijonov EUR in drugimi stroški ločitve v višini 580 milijonov EUR.
With respect to the other separation costs, the Commission accepts that the CSA obliged the Dutch State to pursue the split of ABN AMRO Holding in three separate parts, following the CSA guidelines.
Glede drugih stroškov ločitve Komisija sprejema dejstvo, da je bila Nizozemska na podlagi sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija zavezana k nadaljevanju razcepitve ABN AMRO Holding na tri dele po smernicah sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija.
In other words, the separation costs are the consequence of the contractual CSA-obligations of the Dutch State as successor of Fortis SA/NV.
Stroški ločitve so torej posledica pogodbenih obveznosti Nizozemske kot naslednika holdinga Fortis SA/NV, ki izhajajo iz sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija.
On a net basis, ABN AMRO N will not have a better capital position because of that measure, since the Dutch State injects capital which is immediately consumed by separation costs.
Na neto osnovi se zaradi tega ukrepa stanje kapitala banke ABN AMRO N ne bo izboljšalo, saj Nizozemska vlaga kapital, ki se takoj porabi za stroške ločitve.
That reasoning does not however hold good for the prudential margin of EUR 500 million as there was no contractual obligation of the State to provide it.
Ta obrazložitev pa ne velja za smotrno razliko v višini 500 milijonov EUR, saj pogodbene obveznosti državi ne nalagajo, da jo mora zagotoviti.
If the Dutch State had not provided that assistance, ABN AMRO N would have been in a worse financial position and it would have been obliged for instance to reduce its RWA to free up capital.
Če Nizozemska ne bi zagotovila te pomoči, bi bila banka ABN AMRO N v slabšem finančnem položaju in bi morala na primer zmanjšati svoja tveganju prilagojena sredstva, da bi sprostila kapital.
In other words, the prudential margin is a selective advantage which improved ABN AMRO N’s competitive position when compared to a scenario in which the measure had not been implemented.
V primerjavi s scenarijem, v katerem ta ukrep ni bil izveden, je zato smotrna razlika selektivna prednost, ki je izboljšala konkurenčnost banke ABN AMRO N.
Therefore, it should be concluded that, while the general separation costs do not constitute State aid, the prudential margin of EUR 500 million (namely part of Measure B3) does.
Zato je treba skleniti, da medtem ko splošni stroški ločitve ne pomenijo državne pomoči, pa smotrna razlika v višini 500 milijonov EUR (del ukrepa B3) pomeni državno pomoč.
It provides ABN AMRO N with extra capital and represents a selective advantage.
Banki ABN AMRO N je zagotovila dodatni kapital in pomeni selektivno prednost.
Measure B4: Recapitalisation to cover capital shortage related to divestment of New HBU and Measure B5: Recapitalisation to cover integration costs
Ukrep B4: dokapitalizacija za kritje kapitalskega primanjkljaja v zvezi z odprodajo podružnice New HBU in ukrep B5: dokapitalizacija za kritje stroškov integracije
It was the Dutch State itself which decided on 21 November 2008 to merge ABN AMRO N and FBN as it preferred that option over other restructuring alternatives such as a standalone strategy for the two banks, the rapid sale of one or both of the companies or the rapid sale of major subsidiaries.
Nizozemska se je 21. novembra 2008 sama odločila, da bo združila banki ABN AMRO N in FBN, saj se ji je zdela ta možnost boljša od drugih možnosti prestrukturiranja, kot so samostojna strategija za obe banki, hitra prodaja enega ali obeh podjetij ali hitra prodaja velikih podružnic.
FBN and ABN AMRO N could not pay the upfront integration costs of the merger themselves.
Banki FBN in ABN AMRO N vnaprejšnjih stroškov integracije združitve nista mogli plačati sami.
The Commission observes that the Dutch State has defended the merger in public saying that ‘the two banks together are stronger than alone’ [112].
Komisija ugotavlja, da je Nizozemska v javnosti utemeljevala združitev z besedami, da sta „ti dve banki skupaj močnejši kot pa vsaka zase“ [112].
The merger should indeed lead to major advantages in the form of synergies (estimated at EUR 1,1 billion pre-tax per year) and a stronger competitive position (for example higher market shares, better funding base etc.).
Združitev bi dejansko morala prinesti velike prednosti v obliki sinergij (ocenjene so bile na 1,1 milijarde EUR pred obdavčitvijo na leto) in boljšo konkurenčnost (npr. višji tržni deleži, boljša osnova za financiranje itd.).
To get the benefits of the merger, FBN and ABN AMRO N had to incur a variety of costs (namely costs related to the merger remedy, integration costs).
Da bi lahko koristili ugodnosti združitve, sta imeli banki FBN in ABN AMRO N številne stroške (tj. stroške, povezane z ukrepom v zvezi z združitvijo, stroške integracije).
The Dutch State paid those costs via a recapitalisation (at a time when capital was still available only with difficulty), while FBN and ABN AMRO N got all the benefits.
Nizozemska je te stroške plačala prek dokapitalizacije (v času, ko je bilo kapital še vedno težko pridobiti), banki FBN in ABN AMRO N pa sta pridobili vse koristi.
It therefore provides a clear advantage to FBN and ABN AMRO N.
Zato ta ukrep zagotavlja jasno prednost bankama FBN in ABN AMRO N.
According to the Dutch State, the merger has a positive net present value [113].
Po mnenju Nizozemske ima združitev pozitivno neto sedanjo vrednost [113].
However, as is already developed extensively in recitals 235 to 242, the Measures B4 and B5 follow other State aid measures and are part of a larger restructuring plan, so that the MEIP does not apply.
Vendar sta ukrepa B4 in B5, kot je obširno obravnavano v uvodnih izjavah 235 do 242, sledila drugim ukrepom državne pomoči in sta del večjega načrta prestrukturiranja, zato načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu ne velja.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measures B4 and B5 do constitute State aid of respectively EUR 300 million and EUR 1,2 billion. They provide FBN and ABN AMRO N with a selective advantage by providing them capital.
Zato je treba skleniti, da ukrepa B4 in B5 pomenita državno pomoč v višini 300 milijonov EUR oziroma 1,2 milijarde EUR. Bankama FBN in ABN AMRO N sta zagotovila kapital in s tem selektivno prednost.
Measure C: recapitalisation of FBN
Ukrep C: dokapitalizacija banke FBN