natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
BPP is 100 %-owned by the group Privado Holding SGPS (sociedade gestora de participações sociais) S.A. As of 30 June 2008, the majority of the shares of this holding company (51,5 %) were held by 12 shareholders.
Banka BPP je v 100-odstotni lasti skupine Privado Holding SGPS (sociedade gestora de participações sociais) S.A. Od 30. junija 2008 je večino delnic tega holdinga (51,5 %) imelo 12 delničarjev.
In 2009 the Privado Holding group had 187 employees, 148 of whom worked for BPP.
V letu 2009 je imela skupina Privado Holding 187 zaposlenih, od tega jih je 148 delalo v banki BPP.
Financial difficulties of the bank
Finančne težave banke
According to the Portuguese authorities, BPP developed liquidity difficulties owing to the deterioration of the global economic situation, which significantly reduced the bank’s ability to manage its liquidity.
Po trditvah portugalskih organov je banka BPP zašla v likvidnostne težave zaradi poslabšanja svetovnih gospodarskih razmer, kar je precej zmanjšalo zmogljivost banke za obvladovanje svoje likvidnosti.
On 24 November 2008 BPP informed the Portuguese Central Bank (‘Bank of Portugal’) that it risked being unable to meet its payment obligations.
24. novembra 2008 je banka BPP obvestila portugalsko centralno banko („Banko Portugalske“), da obstaja tveganje, da ne bo mogla izpolniti svojih plačilnih obveznosti.
BPP was then allowed to suspend all its payments as from 1 December 2008.
Od 1. decembra 2008 je zato banka BPP lahko začasno opustila vse svoje plačevanje.
On 5 December 2008 BPP received a EUR 450 million loan backed by a State guarantee, under the conditions specified below.
5. decembra 2008 je banka BPP pod spodaj navedenimi pogoji prejela posojilo v višini 450 milijonov EUR, zavarovano z državno garancijo.
The loan and the guarantee covered only BPP’s liabilities as registered in the balance sheet on 24 November 2008 and the loan was to be used only to reimburse depositors and other creditors and not to cover liabilities of other entities of the group.
Posojilo in garancija sta krila samo obveznosti banke BPP, ki so bile 24. novembra 2008 vpisane v bilanco stanja, in posojilo je bilo namenjeno le za poplačilo vlagateljev in drugih upnikov, ne pa za kritje obveznosti drugih subjektov skupine.
The emergency aid measure
Ukrep nujne pomoči
On 5 December 2008 BPP signed a loan agreement (‘the loan agreement’), backed by a State guarantee, for EUR 450 million, with six major Portuguese banks (Banco Comercial Português, S.A., Caixa Geral de Depósitos, S.A., Banco Espírito Santo, S.A., Banco BPI, S.A., Banco Santander Totta, S.A., Caixa Central – Caixa Central de Crédito Agricola Mútuo CRL) (‘the bank syndicate’).
5. decembra 2008 je banka BPP s šestimi velikimi portugalskimi bankami (Banco Comercial Português, S.A., Caixa Geral de Depósitos, S.A., Banco Espírito Santo, S.A., Banco BPI, S.A., Banco Santander Totta, S.A., Caixa Central – Caixa Central de Crédito Agricola Mútuo CRL) („bančni konzorcij“) podpisala posojilno pogodbo („posojilna pogodba“) za posojilo v višini 450 milijonov EUR, zavarovano z državno garancijo.
The loan had a maturity of 6 months, renewable up to 2 years, and bore an interest rate of EURIBOR + 100 basis points.
Zapadlost posojila je bila šest mesecev, z možnostjo obnovitve do dveh let in obrestno mero EURIBOR + 100 baznih točk.
The remuneration for the loan was determined on the basis of the cost of funding for the creditor banks at the time of the transaction.
Povračilo za posojilo je bilo določeno na podlagi stroškov financiranja za banke upnice v času transakcije.
According to the Portuguese authorities, without a State guarantee no lender was willing to finance BPP at a reasonable rate, given its difficult financial situation.
Po trditvah portugalskih organov zaradi težkega finančnega stanja brez državne garancije noben posojilodajalec ni bil pripravljen financirati banke BPP po primerni obrestni meri.
The remuneration for the State guarantee was fixed at 20 basis points, taking into consideration the collateral presented by BPP.
Povračilo za državno garancijo je bilo ob upoštevanju zavarovanja, ki ga je predstavila banka BPP, določeno na 20 baznih točk.
The collateral consists of: (i) first right of pledge on several assets as specified in a contract concluded by Portugal, BPP and Bank of Portugal; and (ii) first mortgage on immovable assets owned by BPP.
Zavarovanje je sestavljeno iz: (i) prednostne zastavne pravice na več sredstev, navedenih v pogodbi, ki so jo sklenile Portugalska, banka BPP in Banka Portugalske; in (ii) prve hipoteke na nepremična sredstva v lasti banke BPP.
This collateral was estimated by the Portuguese authorities to be worth around EUR 672 million when the loan agreement and the guarantee agreement were signed [6].
Portugalski organi so ocenili, da je bila v času podpisa posojilne pogodbe in garancijske pogodbe vrednost tega zavarovanja približno 672 milijonov EUR [6].
The provision of collateral is regulated by an agreement subscribed by the Treasury, BPP and the Bank of Portugal, in which the latter was appointed as custodian and collateral manager on behalf of the Treasury.
Zagotovitev zavarovanja ureja sporazum, ki so ga podpisali zakladnica, banka BPP in Banka Portugalske, v katerem je bila slednja imenovana za skrbnika in upravljavca zavarovanja v imenu zakladnice.
According to the Portuguese authorities, the Portuguese State holds, under national law, privileged and priority rights over the collateral.
Po trditvah portugalskih organov ima portugalska država v skladu z notranjo zakonodajo privilegirane in prednostne pravice nad zavarovanjem.
During the period of validity of the loan covered by the State guarantee, BPP committed not to sell, provide as collateral or otherwise dispose of its present and future assets.
V obdobju veljavnosti posojila, ki ga krije državna garancija, se je banka BPP zavezala, da ne bo prodala, dala kot zavarovanje ali kako drugače odtujila svojih sedanjih in prihodnjih sredstev.
In the context of the Commission’s examination of the emergency aid measure, Portugal committed to provide a restructuring plan for BPP within 6 months of the State intervention (i.e. by 5 June 2009).
V okviru preučitve ukrepa nujne pomoči, ki jo je opravila Komisija, se je Portugalska zavezala, da bo v šestih mesecih od državne intervencije (t. j. do 5. junija 2009) zagotovila načrt za prestrukturiranje banke BPP.
In order to prolong the validity of the guarantee beyond the initial period of 6 months, the Portuguese authorities committed to submit a specific notification to the Commission.
Zaradi podaljšanja veljavnosti garancije preko začetnega šestmesečnega obdobja so se portugalski organi zavezali, da bodo Komisiji predložili posebno priglasitev.
Portugal has not fulfilled the above-mentioned commitments.
Portugalska ni izpolnila zgoraj navedenih zavez.
Extension of the emergency aid measure
Podaljšanje ukrepa nujne pomoči
By e-mail dated 23 June 2009 Portugal informed the Commission that it had taken the decision to extend the State guarantee for a further period of 6 months (Despacho No 13364-A/2009 of the Ministry of Finance of 5 June 2009).
Portugalska je 23. junija 2009 po elektronski pošti obvestila Komisijo, da se je odločila podaljšati državno garancijo za nadaljnjih šest mesecev (Despacho št. 13364-A/2009 Ministrstva za finance z dne 5. junija 2009).
However, Portugal neither notified that extension nor sought the Commission’s approval.
Vendar Portugalska tega podaljšanja ni priglasila niti ni Komisije zaprosila za odobritev.
Since the Commission decision approved the aid only until 5 June 2009, the rescue aid became unlawful on 6 June 2009.
Ker je odločba Komisije pomoč odobrila le do 5. junija 2009, je s 6. junijem 2009 pomoč za reševanje postala nezakonita.
A recovery plan was submitted to the Bank of Portugal by BPP’s administrators on 24 April 2009.
Upravitelji banke BPP so Banki Portugalske sanacijski načrt predložili 24. aprila 2009.
By letter dated 5 June 2009 the Portuguese authorities explained to the Commission that the delay in submitting a restructuring plan for BPP was due to the fact that the recovery and restructuring plan proposed by BPP had not been accepted by the Bank of Portugal.
Portugalski organi so z dopisom z dne 5. junija 2009 Komisiji pojasnili, da je do zamude pri predložitvi načrta za prestrukturiranje banke BPP prišlo zato, ker Banka Portugalske ni sprejela načrta za sanacijo in prestrukturiranje, ki ga je predlagala banka BPP:
On 9 June 2009 the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration published a document entitled ‘Esclarecimento do Ministério das Finanças e da Administração Pública – Decisão relativa ao Banco Privado Português’ (‘Clarifications by the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration – Decision regarding Banco Privado Português’) (hereinafter ‘the document of 9 June 2009’), which stated that the recovery and restructuring plan submitted on 24 April 2009 by BPP to the Bank of Portugal proposed, among other things, a recapitalisation operation with a State contribution of between EUR 150 and 200 million in the form of ordinary shares, preferential shares and supplementary obligations with no return.
9. junija 2009 je Ministrstvo za finance in javno upravo objavilo dokument z naslovom „Esclarecimento do Ministério das Finanças e da Administração Pública - Decisão relativa ao Banco Privado Português“ („Pojasnila Ministrstva za finance in javno upravo – odločitev v zvezi z Banco Privado Português“) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dokument z dne 9. junija 2009), ki navaja, da je načrt za sanacijo in prestrukturiranje, ki ga je 24. aprila 2009 banka BPP predložila Banki Portugalske, med drugim predlagal dokapitalizacijo s prispevkom države v višini 150 do 200 milijonov EUR v obliki navadnih delnic, prednostnih delnic in dodatnih obveznosti brez donosa.
This plan was not accepted as it was considered ‘not to comply with the recapitalisation regulations defined in Law No 63-A/2008, or with the guidance on this topic from the European Union aimed at ensuring compliance with Community competition rules, given that State aid is present in this case’.
Ta načrt ni bil sprejet, ker se je štelo, da „ni skladen s predpisi o dokapitalizaciji, opredeljenimi v Zakonu št. 63-A/2008 in z napotki Evropske unije o tej temi, katerih cilj je zagotoviti spoštovanje pravil Skupnosti o konkurenci, če je v tem primeru prisotna državna pomoč“.
The document of 9 June 2009 also reported that a large number of BPP’s clients had placed their savings under the management of the bank, which had invested them in financial instruments spread over dozens of vehicle companies based in offshore jurisdictions (‘Absolute Return’ instruments).
V dokumentu z dne 9. junija 2009 je bilo navedeno tudi, da je veliko strank banke BPP dalo banki svoje prihranke v upravljanje, banka pa jih je vložila v finančne instrumente, razpršene v desetinah nosilnih podjetij s sedežem v offshore sodnih pristojnostih (instrumenti „absolutnega donosa“).
Despite the risk inherent in these products, BPP had fixed a remuneration rate and had guaranteed all the capital invested by these clients upon maturity.
Kljub tveganju, ki jih ti produkti vsebujejo, je banka BPP določila stopnjo povračila ter ob zapadlosti jamčila za ves kapital, ki so ga te stranke vložile.
This guarantee of return was never communicated to the supervisory authorities; nor was it included and recorded on the bank’s balance sheet.
To jamstvo donosa ni bilo nikoli sporočeno nadzornim organom, niti ni bilo vključeno in vpisano v bilanco stanja banke.
By concealing this liability, the bank’s shareholders were spared from having to inject more capital to meet the legal and regulatory requirements in force.
Ker je bila ta obveznost prikrita, delničarjem banke ni bilo treba vlagati dodatnega kapitala, da bi izpolnili veljavne zakonske in uredbene zahteve.
Additionally, according to the document of 9 June 2009, the investigation by the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários – CMVM) and the Bank of Portugal found serious irregularities that amount to criminal practice on the part of BPP.
Poleg tega je glede na dokument z dne 9. junija 2009 preiskava, ki sta jo opravili Portugalska komisija za trg vrednostnih papirjev (Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários - CMVM) in Banka Portugalske, ugotovila resne nepravilnosti, ki pomenijo kazensko dejavnost banke BPP.
The situation of the Absolute Return investment products
Položaj naložbenih produktov absolutnega donosa
In the document of 9 June 2009, the Portuguese authorities also stated that they were studying with the supervisory authorities a solution to minimise losses for BPP’s clients holding Absolute Return instruments whose investments were jeopardised.
Portugalski organi so v dokumentu z dne 9. junija 2009 navedli tudi, da so skupaj z nadzornimi organi preučili rešitev za zmanjšanje izgub za stranke banke BPP, ki so vlagali v instrumente absolutnega donosa in katerih naložbe so bile ogrožene.
The solution envisaged by the Government would include, among other things, the following features: (1) the creation of a new financial instrument, representative of the current indirect Absolute Return portfolio, to replace the investors’ current positions; (2) the financial instrument would be issued and managed by an entity independent of BPP and owned and managed by national banking institutions.
Rešitev, ki jo je predvidela vlada, bi med drugim imela naslednje značilnosti: (1) oblikovanje novega finančnega instrumenta, predstavnika sedanjega portfelja posrednega absolutnega donosa, ki bi nadomestil sedanje pozicije vlagateljev; (2) finančni instrument bi izdajal in z njim upravljal subjekt, neodvisen od banke BPP in v lasti nacionalnih bančnih institucij, ki bi ga upravljale.
The formal investigation procedure and the second extension of the emergency aid measure
Formalni postopek preiskave in drugo podaljšanje ukrepa nujne pomoči
On 15 July 2009 the Commission invited the Portuguese authorities to urgently submit the restructuring plan for BPP, even in a provisional form, recalling that the rescue aid had become unlawful since 6 June 2009.
Komisija je 15. julija 2009 pozvala portugalske organe, naj nujno predložijo načrt za prestrukturiranje banke BPP, četudi v začasni obliki, in jih ponovno opozorila, da je pomoč za reševanje od 6. junija 2009 nezakonita.
Since the requested plan was not submitted, by letter dated 6 October 2009 the Commission sent an official reminder pursuant to Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Ker zahtevani načrt ni bil predložen, je Komisija z dopisom z dne 6. oktobra 2009 poslala uradni opomin v skladu s členom 5(2) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999.
In the same decision the Commission issued an information injunction requiring Portugal to submit the restructuring plan by 22 December 2009.
V isti odločitvi je Komisija izdala odredbo o predložitvi podatkov, v kateri od Portugalske zahteva, da načrt za prestrukturiranje predloži do 22. decembra 2009.
The Commission decision to initiate the procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union [7].
Odločitev Komisije, da bo sprožila formalni postopek preiskave, je bila objavljena v Uradnem listu Evropske unije [7].
The Commission invited interested parties to submit comments on the aid measure.
Komisija je pozvala vse zainteresirane strani, naj predložijo svoje pripombe glede ukrepa pomoči.
On 3 December 2009 the Portuguese authorities informed the Commission that the State guarantee would be extended for a further 6 months.
Portugalski organi so 3. decembra 2009 Komisijo obvestili, da bo državna garancija podaljšana za nadaljnjih šest mesecev.
According to the Portuguese authorities the State was forced to renew the guarantee as an immediate disruption of BPP would clearly have compromised the solution currently under consideration.
Po trditvah portugalskih organov je bila država prisiljena podaljšati garancijo, ker bi takojšnje oviranje banke BPP jasno ogrožalo trenutno obravnavano rešitev.
Since BPP was obviously in no condition to repay the loan, the banks that had granted the loan to BPP agreed to extend its maturity by another 6 months, without changing the current terms and without additional financing, on the condition that the corresponding State guarantee was also extended.
Ker banka BPP očitno ni bila v stanju, da bi lahko odplačala posojilo, se je šest bank, ki so banki BPP odobrile posojilo, dogovorilo, da zapadlost posojila podaljšajo še za šest mesecev brez spreminjanja trenutnih pogojev in brez dodatnega financiranja pod pogojem, da se podaljša tudi ustrezna državna garancija.
On 5 December 2009 the State guarantee was consequently extended for a further 6 months.
Zato je bila 5. decembra 2009 državna garancija podaljšana za nadaljnjih šest mesecev.
The extension was not notified to the Commission: the Portuguese authorities merely informed the Commission that the guarantee on the loan would be renewed.
Komisija o podaljšanju ni bila uradno obveščena: portugalski organi so Komisijo samo obvestili, da bo garancija za posojilo podaljšana.
On 25 February 2010 the Portuguese authorities sent a letter explaining the elements that the Government considered should provide a basis for a solution to the problems created by BPP for a significant proportion of its clients, namely investors in the Absolute Return investment product.
Portugalski organi so 25. februarja 2010 poslali dopis z opisom elementov, na podlagi katerih bi se po mnenju vlade morale rešiti težave, ki jih je banka BPP povzročila velikemu deležu svojih strank, in sicer vlagateljem v naložbeni produkt absolutnega donosa.
In the same letter the Portuguese authorities informed the Commission that on 11 December 2009 the Government had decided to:
V tem istemu dopisu so portugalski organi Komisijo obvestili, da je 11. decembra 2009 vlada odločila, da:
establish a closed and non-harmonised Special Investment Fund (Fundo Especial de Investimento – FEI), made up of the resources (gross assets and liabilities) held in the Absolute Return investment product, characterised by the following: (a) passive management of the Special Investment Fund; (b) in-kind share subscription; (c) 4-year term with possibility of extension up to a maximum of 10 years by decision of the assembly of shareholders (1 share = 1 vote); (d) voluntary membership of clients;
ustanovi zaprt in neusklajen poseben investicijski sklad (Fundo Especial de Investimento – FEI), ki ga bodo sestavljali viri (bruto aktiva in pasiva) v naložbenem produktu absolutnega donosa, z naslednjimi značilnostmi: (a) pasivno upravljanje posebnega investicijskega sklada; (b) stvarni vpis delnic; (c) štiriletni mandat z možnostjo podaljšanja do največ deset let s sklepom skupščine delničarjev (1 delnica = 1 glas); (d) prostovoljno članstvo strank;
renew the State loan guarantee of EUR 450 million until the Special Investment Fund was established;
podaljša državno garancijo za posojilo v višini 450 milijonov EUR do ustanovitve posebnega investicijskega sklada;
activate the Deposit Guarantee Fund (Fundo de Garantia de Depósitos – FGD), which guarantees repayment in full of the value of the cash credit balances of each depositor, where that value does not exceed EUR 100000, and the Investor Compensation System (Sistema de Indemnização aos Investidores – SII), which guarantees compensation of up to a maximum of EUR 25000 per investor, under the terms laid down by law, and does not involve any State resources;
aktivira sklad zajamčenih vlog (Fundo de Garantia de Depósitos – FGD), ki jamči poplačilo celotne vrednosti denarnih kreditnih saldov vsakemu vlagatelju, če vrednost ne presega 100000 EUR, ter odškodninski sistem za vlagatelje (Sistema de Indemnização aos Investidores – SII), ki jamči odškodnino do 25000 EUR za vsakega vlagatelja pod pogoji, ki jih predpisuje zakon in ne vključuje nobenih državnih sredstev;
grant insurance cover of up to EUR 250000 to clients who joined the FEI, provided they were covered by the FGD and SII criteria; thus, the negative difference, if any, between the client’s revenue – in the form of reimbursements from the FGD and the SII and payments from the FEI – and the nominal value of the investment, up to a ceiling of EUR 250000, at 24 November 2008, is insured by the State.
strankam, ki so se pridružile FEI, dodeli zavarovalno kritje v višini do 250000 EUR, če so zajete v merilih FGD in SII; tako je 24. novembra 2008 morebitno negativno razliko med prihodkom stranke – v obliki povračil iz FGD in SII ter plačil iz FEI – in nominalno vrednostjo naložbe do največ 250000 EUR zavarovala država.
The commitment taken on by the Portuguese State in relation to FEI’s investors, as resulting from its legal system, will be applicable only on the date of the Fund’s extinction, which is 4 years from the date of its establishment – 30 March 2014 [8].
Obveznost, ki jo je v zvezi z vlagatelji FEI prevzela država Portugalska, kakor izhaja iz njenega pravnega sistema, se bo uporabljala šele od dneva izbrisa sklada, kar je štiri leta po njegovi ustanovitvi – 30. marca 2014 [8].
On 1 February 2010 the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM) granted authorisation for the establishment of the FEI as described above, with Privado Fundos – Sociedade Gestora de Fundos de Investimento, S.A. responsible for managing the Fund and Banif – Banco de Investimento, S.A serving as depository for the Fund.
Portugalska komisija za trg vrednostnih papirjev (CMVM) je 1. februarja 2010 dala dovoljenje za ustanovitev zgoraj opisanega FEI, ki ga upravlja Privado Fundos – Sociedade Gestora de Fundos de Investimento, S.A., Banif - Banco de Investimento, S.A pa je depozitar sklada.
The FEI was established on 30 March 2010.
FEI je bil ustanovljen 30. marca 2010.
On 16 April 2010 the Bank of Portugal issued a communication stating that BPP’s banking licence had been revoked by decision of 15 April, given the impossibility of restructuring or recapitalising the bank.
16. aprila 2010 je Banka Portugalske izdala sporočilo, v katerem navaja, da je bilo banki BPP z odločbo z dne 15. aprila odvzeto bančno dovoljenje, ker je banko nemogoče prestrukturirati ali dokapitalizirati.
On 22 April the Bank of Portugal then requested the liquidation of BPP at the competent court (Tribunal de Comércio de Lisboa), presenting at the same time a proposal for the appointment of a liquidation committee.
22. aprila je Banka Portugalske na pristojnem sodišču (Tribunal de Comércio de Lisboa) zahtevala likvidacijo banke BPP in hkrati predstavila predlog za imenovanje likvidacijskega odbora.
The liquidation of BPP follows the Portuguese liquidation rules specifically applicable to banking institutions.
Pri likvidaciji banke BPP se upoštevajo portugalska pravila o likvidaciji, ki veljajo posebej za bančne institucije.
The Portuguese authorities estimate that the various legal steps set out under the relevant legislation mean that the liquidation may take approximately 1 year.
Portugalski organi ocenjujejo, da različni pravni koraki, določeni v skladu z ustrezno zakonodajo, pomenijo, da likvidacija lahko traja približno eno leto.
In its decision of 10 November 2009 initiating the formal investigation procedure, the Commission set out its preliminary assessment and doubts as to the compatibility of the measures at hand with the internal market.
Komisija je v odločitvi z dne 10. novembra 2009 o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave navedla svojo predhodno oceno in dvome o združljivosti obravnavanih ukrepov z notranjim trgom.
The pricing of the guarantee, which was below the level normally required pursuant to the Banking Communication [11].
Določitev višine garancije, ki je nižja od ravni, ki se običajno zahteva na podlagi Sporočila o bančništvu [11].
The Commission doubted that the remuneration was appropriate taking into account the risk.
Komisija je podvomila, da je bilo povračilo ob upoštevanju tveganja primerno.