natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The surcharge on the electricity price used to finance the tariffs at issue here is imposed, as in Essent, by law.
Dodatna dajatev za ceno električne energije, namenjena financiranju tukaj obravnavanih cen, je zakonsko določena, tako kot v zadevi Essent.
The State is in a position to control and orient the use of the resources: the Equalisation Fund discharges its accounting functions on precise instructions from the AEEG, which acts within its statutory regulatory powers and/or in implementation of national legislation.
Država lahko nadzoruje in usmerja uporabo sredstev: izravnalni sklad opravlja računovodske funkcije po natančnih navodilih organa AEEG, ki deluje v okviru svojih regulativnih pooblastil in/ali v skladu z izvajanjem nacionalne zakonodaje.
Thus the resources handled by the Equalisation Fund remain under public control at all times.
Tako so sredstva, za katera skrbi izravnalni sklad, vedno pod javnim nadzorom.
This analysis is consistent with the Commission’s decision in the Italian stranded costs case, in which it classified as State resources the monies administered by the Equalisation Fund in the A6 account [48].
Ta analiza je v skladu z odločbo Komisije v zadevi Italije o nasedlih naložbah, v kateri so denarna sredstva, ki jih upravlja izravnalni sklad na računu A6, opredeljena kot državna sredstva [48].
The classification as State resources of the monies administered by the Equalisation Fund was borne out in the judgment of the Court of First Instance in the Iride case [49].
Opredelitev, da so denarna sredstva, ki jih upravlja izravnalni sklad, državna sredstva, je bila potrjena v sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje v zadevi Iride [49].
Italy’s Supreme Court of Cassation had already ruled that the legal personality of the Equalisation Fund was not separate from that of the Italian State, and that the monies transferred to the Equalisation Fund should be considered State property, even if they derived from private entities and were intended for private undertakings (judgment No 11632/03 of 3 April 2003).
Italijansko vrhovno kasacijsko sodišče je že razsodilo, da pravni osebi izravnalnega sklada in italijanske države nista ločeni ter da je treba denarna sredstva, prenesena v izravnalni sklad, obravnavati kot državno lastnino, tudi če izhajajo od zasebnih subjektov in so namenjena zasebnim podjetjem (sodba št. 11632/03 z dne 3. aprila 2003).
In the Iride case, the applicants, Iride SpA and Iride Energia SpA, brought an action in the Court of First Instance challenging a decision whereby the Commission had categorised as State resources the sums administered by the Equalisation Fund in the A6 account.
V zadevi Iride sta družbi Iride SpA in Iride Energia SpA vložili tožbo pri Sodišču prve stopnje, s katero sta izpodbijali odločbo, s katero je Komisija med državna sredstva uvrstila zneske, ki jih upravlja izravnalni sklad na računu A6.
The arguments put forward by the applicants were very similar.
Trditve, ki sta jih predložili vložnici, so bile zelo podobne.
They disputed the substance of the Court of Cassation’s ruling, contending that the role of the Equalisation Fund was merely that of an accounting intermediary between private citizens subject to a financial obligation and the beneficiaries of the sums concerned, a role which did not allow the Equalisation Fund to make use of the monies deposited even for a short period of time.
Izpodbijali sta odločitev kasacijskega sodišča s trditvijo, da ima izravnalni sklad le vlogo računovodskega posrednika med zasebniki s finančnimi obveznostmi in upravičenci zadevnih zneskov, tj. vlogo, v skladu s katero izravnalni sklad ne more niti za kratek čas uporabiti položenih denarnih sredstev.
The applicants also claimed that the case-law developed in PreussenElektra was applicable.
Vložnici sta tudi trdili, da velja sodna praksa v zadevi PreussenElektra.
The Court of First Instance, after pointing out that it had no jurisdiction to review the interpretation of Italian legislation by the Court of Cassation, confirmed that the monies held in the Equalisation Fund’s A6 account were to be classified as State resources, because, in addition to being State property, they were under constant State control [50].
Sodišče prve stopnje je poudarilo, da ni pristojno za izpodbijanje razlage italijanske zakonodaje kasacijskega sodišča, in nato potrdilo, da bi se morala denarna sredstva iz računa A6 izravnalnega sklada opredeliti kot državna sredstva, ker so poleg tega, da so državna lastnina, pod stalnim nadzorom države [50].
It can, however, logically be extended to the A4 component, which finances the disputed tariffs.
Logično se lahko razširi na sestavni del A4, s katerim se financira sporne cene.
There is no difference between the A6 account and the A4 component other than the purpose to which the resources are put (covering stranded costs in the case of the A6 account, and financing preferential tariffs in the case of the A4 component).
Razen namena zbranih sredstev (ki zajema nasedle naložbe v primeru računa A6 in financiranje ugodnejših cen v primeru sestavnega dela A4) ni nobene razlike med računom A6 in sestavnim delom A4.
The sums transferred to the Sardinian beneficiaries from the A4 component must therefore also be categorised as State resources.
Zneski, preneseni upravičencem s Sardinije iz sestavnega dela A4, se morajo zato opredeliti kot državna sredstva.
In addition to being financed by State resources, the disputed tariffs are imputable to the State, since the legal basis for the measures is laid down in national legislation and decrees and in the decisions taken by the AEEG, which is a public body, in the exercise of its public authority functions [51].
Poleg financiranja iz državnih sredstev je za sporne cene odgovorna država, saj je pravna podlaga za ukrep določena v nacionalni zakonodaji ter odlokih in odločbah, ki jih je AEEG, javni organ, sprejel pri izvajanju svojih nalog javnega organa [51].
Effect on trade and distortion of competition
Vpliv na trgovino in izkrivljanje konkurence
As regards the effect of the measures on trade between Member States and the ensuing distortion of competition, it is undisputed that the markets concerned (lead, zinc, silver, aluminium and chlorine/soda) are fully open to competition.
V zvezi z vplivom ukrepa na trgovino med državami članicami in nastalim izkrivljanjem konkurence je nesporno, da so zadevni trgi (svinca, cinka, srebra, aluminija in klorovih preparatov) v celoti odprti za konkurenco.
This by itself is enough to establish that the tariffs have an effect on intra-Union trade.
Že to je dovolj za ugotovitev, da cene vplivajo na trgovino znotraj Unije.
Nevertheless, the Commission has considered the argument advanced by the beneficiaries and by Italy that in the metals industry (the argument has not been put forward expressly in respect of chlorine) the tariffs have no effect on trade and do not distort competition because there are no actual trade flows between Member States; no such trade flows are likely to develop, and in view of the particular features of the industry the tariffs do not damage the beneficiaries’ competitors in the Union.
Kljub temu je Komisija obravnavala trditev upravičencev in Italije, da v sektorju kovine (trditev ni bila izrecno predložena v zvezi s klorom) cene ne vplivajo na trgovino in ne izkrivljajo konkurence, ker med državami članicami ni dejanskih trgovinskih tokov; malo je verjetno, da se bodo takšni tokovi razvili in zaradi posebnih značilnosti sektorja cene ne škodijo konkurenčnim ponudnikom upravičencev v Uniji.
In the Commission’s decisions and the judgments of the Court of Justice it has never been accepted that an absence of actual trade flows shows that an aid measure has no effect on intra-Union trade.
V odločitvah Komisije in sodbah Sodišča nikoli ni bilo sprejeto, da odsotnost dejanskih trgovinskih tokov kaže, da ukrep pomoči ne vpliva na trgovino znotraj Unije.
The Court has in fact consistently ruled that aid to an undertaking may be such as to affect trade between the Member States and distort competition even if the beneficiary undertaking does not participate in intra-Union trade itself.
Sodišče je dejansko dosledno odločalo, da lahko pomoč podjetju vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami in izkrivlja konkurenco, tudi če podjetje, ki pomoč prejme, ne sodeluje v trgovini znotraj Unije.
Where a Member State grants aid to an undertaking, domestic production may for that reason be maintained or increased, with the result that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of exporting their products to the market in that Member State [52].
Če država članica dodeli pomoč podjetju, se lahko zato domača proizvodnja ohrani ali poveča, zaradi česar imajo podjetja, ustanovljena v drugih državah članicah, manj možnosti za izvoz svojih izdelkov na trg v tej državi članici [52].
Moreover, the pattern of decreasing EU production, increasing imports from non-Union countries, and limited or no trade flows between Member States is not unusual: indeed it is typical of industries which are experiencing structural difficulties or which are subject to high competitive pressure.
Poleg tega vzorec zmanjševanja proizvodnje EU in povečevanja uvoza iz tretjih držav z omejenimi trgovinskimi tokovi med državami članicami ali brez njih ni neobičajen: to je dejansko značilno za industrije, ki se srečujejo s strukturnimi težavami ali pa so pod velikim pritiskom konkurence.
Such industries are particularly sensitive to measures taken by Member States to improve the competitive position of their domestic industries.
Takšne industrije so zlasti občutljive glede ukrepov, ki jih sprejemajo države članice, da bi izboljšale konkurenčni položaj svojih domačih industrij.
The fact that production of zinc, lead and silver in Italy is too modest to affect the reference price is irrelevant.
Dejstvo, da je proizvodnja cinka, svinca in srebra v Italiji preskromna, da bi vplivala na referenčno ceno, ni pomembno.
The fact that there is a reference price for these metals which is not easily influenced by conditions of production in a single Member State does not mean that there cannot be competition between undertakings based in the EEA and selling on the worldwide metal markets.
Dejstvo, da obstaja referenčna cena za te kovine, na katero pogoji proizvodnje v eni državi članici ne morejo enostavno vplivati, ne izključuje obstoja konkurence med podjetji s sedežem v EGP in prodaje na svetovnih trgih kovin.
It is conceivable that aid to the Sardinian beneficiaries will not enable them to reduce the world price for their products and squeeze competitors out of the market, and that other European producers may remain in business as long as they can sell profitably at the world price.
Možno je, da pomoč upravičencem s Sardinije le-tem ne omogoča znižanja svetovne cene za njihove proizvode in izključitve konkurenčnih ponudnikov s trga ter da lahko drugi evropski proizvajalci še naprej poslujejo, dokler lahko z dobičkom prodajajo po svetovni ceni.
But the profits obtained in Italy thanks to the subsidised electricity tariffs strengthen the companies’ competitive position in a general sense.
Vendar dobički v Italiji zaradi subvencioniranih cen električne energije na splošno krepijo konkurenčni položaj družb.
For example, accumulated capital reserves can be used to take over competitors and to increase market share.
Nakopičene kapitalske rezerve se lahko na primer uporabijo za prevzem konkurenčnih ponudnikov in povečanje tržnega deleža.
This reasoning is all the more relevant considering that some of the beneficiaries belong to multinational companies [53].
Ta razlog je še toliko pomembnejši glede na to, da so nekateri upravičenci del večnacionalnih družb [53].
Contrary to what the beneficiaries claim, the fact that the price paid in Italy in the sectors concerned is comparable to the average electricity price paid in Europe by competing producers cannot be taken as evidence that the interests of other European producers are not threatened by the Italian tariff.
V nasprotju s trditvami upravičencev dejstva, da je cena, ki so jo v zadevnih sektorjih plačali v Italiji, primerljiva s povprečno ceno električne energije, ki jo konkurenčni proizvajalci plačajo v Evropi, ni mogoče šteti za dokaz, da italijanska cena ne ogroža interesov drugih evropskih proizvajalcev.
It was clearly established in Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission that unilateral measures aimed at approximating conditions of competition in a Member State to those prevailing in other Member States do affect trade (and therefore cannot escape classification as aid).
V zadevi C-372/97 Italija proti Komisiji je bilo jasno ugotovljeno, da enostranski ukrepi, namenjeni približanju pogojev konkurence v državi članici pogojem, ki prevladujejo v drugih državah članicah, vplivajo na trgovino (in jih je zato treba opredeliti kot pomoč).
Moreover, some of the power supply agreements in place in other Member States may involve State aid, and the Commission has opened in-depth investigations into several measures of this kind [54].
Poleg tega lahko nekateri sporazumi o oskrbi z električno energijo, sklenjeni v drugih državah članicah EU, vključujejo državno pomoč, zato je Komisija sprožila temeljne preiskave v zvezi z več ukrepi te vrste [54].
Even though this defence has not been put forward expressly by Italy or Alcoa, the Commission considers it useful to draw attention to the well-established principle that the existence of unlawful aid in some Member States cannot justify the adoption of similar measures by another Member State.
Čeprav Italija ali družba Alcoa tega razloga nista izrecno navedli, Komisija meni, da je uporaben, saj opozarja na dobro uveljavljeno načelo, da obstoj nezakonite pomoči v nekaterih državah članicah ne more utemeljiti sprejetja podobnih ukrepov v drugi državi članici.
In any event, the complaints received from the beneficiaries’ competitors provide an indication that the disputed tariffs do raise competition problems and affect trade within the Union.
V vsakem primeru pritožbe, prejete od konkurenčnih ponudnikov upravičencev, kažejo, da sporne cene lahko povzročijo težave glede konkurence in vplivajo na trgovino znotraj Unije.
Moreover, Italy did not notify the 2004 tariffs.
Poleg tega Italija ni priglasila cen iz leta 2004.
According to settled case-law, where aid has not been notified, the Commission is not obliged to demonstrate the actual consequences of the measure on competition and trade between Member States: ‘If the Commission were required in its decision to demonstrate the real effect of aid which had already been granted, that would immediately favour those Member States which grant aid in breach of the duty to notify laid down in Article 93(3) of the [EC] Treaty, to the detriment of those which do notify aid at the planning stage’ [55].
Glede na ustaljeno sodno prakso v primeru, ko pomoč ni priglašena, Komisija ni dolžna dokazati dejanskih posledic ukrepa na konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami: „če bi Komisija morala v odločbi prikazati dejanski vpliv že dodeljene pomoči, bi to povzročilo prednost držav članic, ki pomoči dodelijo s tem, da kršijo obveznost priglasitve iz člena 93(3) Pogodbe [ES], v škodo tistih, ki jo o pomočeh obvestijo že na stopnji načrta“ [55].
The conclusion must be drawn that the disputed preferential electricity tariffs are liable to improve their beneficiaries’ competitive position vis-à-vis competing undertakings in the EU.
Treba je skleniti, da lahko sporne ugodnejše cene električne energije izboljšajo konkurenčni položaj upravičencev v primerjavi s konkurenčnimi podjetji v EU.
It is settled case-law that in such circumstances it must be held that trade between Member States is affected and competition distorted [56].
Glede na ustaljeno sodno prakso mora v takšnih okoliščinah veljati, da je pomoč vplivala na trgovino med državami članicami in izkrivila konkurenco [56].
Conclusions on the presence of aid
Sklepna ugotovitev v zvezi z obstojem pomoči
The Commission concludes that the disputed 2004 and 2005 tariffs constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) TFEU and can be authorised only if they qualify for one of the exemptions provided for in the Treaty.
Komisija je sklenila, da sporne cene iz leta 2004 in 2005 pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) PDEU in jih je mogoče odobriti le, če izpolnjujejo pogoje za eno od oprostitev iz Pogodbe.
This conclusion is consistent with that arrived at in the Alcoa case, which concerned virtually identical tariffs.
Ta sklep je v skladu s sklepom iz zadeve Alcoa, v kateri so bile obravnavane skoraj enake cene.
New aid or existing aid
Nova ali obstoječa pomoč
The situations in which a measure constitutes existing aid are exhaustively enumerated in Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [57].
Primeri, v katerih ukrep pomeni obstoječo pomoč, so izčrpno navedeni v členu 1 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES [57].
It is undisputed that the measures at issue were not put into effect before Italy’s accession to the Union (Article 1(b)(i) of the Regulation), are not deemed to have been authorised owing to the Commission’s failure to take a decision within the prescribed procedural deadlines (Article 1(b)(iii)), and cannot be deemed to be existing aid owing to the expiry of the limitation period (Article 1(b)(iv)).
Nesporno je, da zadevni ukrepi niso začeli veljati pred pristopom Italije k Uniji (člen 1(b)(i) Uredbe), se ne štejejo za odobrene, ker Komisija ni sprejela sklepa v predpisanih postopkovnih rokih (člen 1(b)(iii)), in se ne morejo šteti za obstoječo pomoč zaradi izteka zastaralnega roka (člen 1(b)(iv)).
They did not become aid as a result of the evolution of the common market and without having been altered by the Member State (first sentence of Article 1(b)(v)).
Pomoč niso postali zaradi razvoja skupnega trga ali ne da bi jih država članica spremenila (prvi stavek člena 1(b)(v)).
In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the disputed tariffs constitute new aid.
Komisija ob upoštevanju navedenega meni, da sporne cene pomenijo novo pomoč.
Pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU, Member States must notify any plans to grant or alter aid, and may not put the proposed measures into effect until the notification procedure has resulted in a final decision.
Država članica mora v skladu s členom 108(3) PDEU priglasiti vse načrte za dodelitev ali spremembo pomoči, pri čemer predlaganih ukrepov ne sme izvajati, dokler v postopku priglasitve ni sprejet dokončen sklep.
Since Italy failed to notify Article 1 of the 2004 Decree, the 2004 tariffs constitute unlawful aid.
Ker Italija ni priglasila člena 1 odloka iz leta 2004, cene iz leta 2004 pomenijo nezakonito pomoč.
But Italy did notify Article 11(12) of Law No 80/2005, and refrained from implementing that measure.
Vendar je Italija priglasila člen 11(12) zakona št. 80/2005 in se vzdržala izvajanja tega ukrepa.
It has therefore complied with its obligations under Article 108(3) TFEU.
Zato je spoštovala obveznosti iz člena 108(3) PDEU.
In derogation from the general prohibition on State aid laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU, aid may be declared compatible if it qualifies for one of the exceptions enumerated in the Treaty.
Z odstopanjem od splošne prepovedi državne pomoči iz člena 107(1) PDEU se lahko pomoč razglasi za združljivo, če izpolnjuje pogoje za uporabo ene od izjem iz Pogodbe.
The 2004 and 2005 tariffs constitute operating aid.
Cene iz leta 2004 in 2005 pomenijo pomoč za tekoče poslovanje.
Italy’s claim that the 2005 tariffs should not be considered operating aid because they are part of a regional support strategy and are conditional upon productive investment should be dismissed.
Trditev Italije, da se cen iz leta 2005 ne sme šteti za pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, ker so del strategije za regionalno pomoč in pogojene s produktivno naložbo, je treba zavrniti.
Even though the memorandum of understanding provides that the beneficiaries must carry out certain investments, the aid component in the 2005 preferential tariffs is not a proportion of the eligible expenditure, and is not subject to a maximum aid intensity.
Čeprav memorandum o soglasju določa, da morajo upravičenci izvesti določene naložbe, komponenta pomoči v ugodnejših cenah iz leta 2005 ni del upravičenih izdatkov in zanjo ne velja največja intenzivnost pomoči.
There are no indications that the measure complies with the criteria for investment aid, or that the aid is proportional.
Nobenih dokazov ni, da je ukrep skladen z merili za pomoč za naložbe ali da je pomoč sorazmerna.
Instead, the measure is clearly pegged to electricity consumption and aimed at mitigating electricity procurement costs, which are operating costs incurred by the companies concerned.
Namesto tega je ukrep jasno vezan na porabo električne energije in namenjen blažitvi stroškov naročil, torej operativnih stroškov, ki jih imajo zadevne družbe.
Thus it cannot be construed as investment aid.
Zato ukrepa ni mogoče obravnavati kot pomoč za naložbe.
Operating aid is, in principle, incompatible with the internal market.
Pomoč za tekoče poslovanje načeloma ni združljiva z notranjim trgom.
In Case C-86/89 Italy v Commission, the Court of Justice found ‘that the aid in question, which was granted without any specific conditions and solely according to the quantities used, should be regarded as an operating aid to the undertakings concerned and that, as such, it affected trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’ [58].
Sodišče je v zadevi C–86/89 Italija proti Komisiji ugotovilo, da je treba zadevno pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena brez posebnih pogojev in le v zvezi z uporabljenimi količinami, obravnavati kot pomoč za tekoče poslovanje za zadevne družbe, ter da je kot taka vplivala na pogoje trgovanja v obsegu, ki je v nasprotju s skupnim interesom [58].
In Case T-459/93 Siemens v Commission the Court of First Instance recalled the principle that ‘operating aid, that is to say, aid intended to relieve an undertaking of the expenses which it would itself normally have had to bear in its day-to-day management or its usual activities, does not in principle fall within the scope of Article 92(3) aforesaid [now Article 107(3) TFEU] … According to the relevant case-law, the effect of such aid is in principle to distort competition in the sectors in which it is granted, whilst nevertheless being incapable, by its very nature, of achieving any of the objectives of the aforesaid exceptions’.
Sodišče prve stopnje je tudi v zadevi T-459/93 Siemens proti Komisiji opozorilo na načelo, da „pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, tj. pomoč, ki je namenjena zmanjšanju stroškov podjetja, ki bi jih to običajno moralo nositi v okviru tekočega poslovanja oziroma običajnih dejavnosti, načeloma ne spada v področje uporabe člena 92(3) [zdaj člen 107(3) PDEU] … Glede na ustrezno sodno prakso takšna pomoč načeloma izkrivlja konkurenco v sektorjih, v katerih je dodeljena, pri čemer zaradi svoje narave ne more izpolniti nobenega cilja, določenega z zgoraj navedenimi določbami o odstopanjih“.
In particular, operating aid may be granted for environmental purposes on the basis of the Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection [59].
Zlasti pomoč za tekoče poslovanje za okoljske namene se lahko dodeli na podlagi smernic Komisije o državni pomoči za varstvo okolja [59].
In assisted areas operating aid can also be authorised on an exceptional basis as regional aid.
Za območja, ki prejemajo pomoč, se lahko pomoč za tekoče poslovanje izjemoma odobri tudi kot regionalna pomoč.
The Commission has assessed whether the disputed tariffs might fall into one of these categories.
Komisija je ocenila, ali sporne cene morda ustrezajo kateri od navedenih kategorij.
The Commission observes that the tariffs do not pursue any environmental purpose, and consequently cannot be authorised as environmental aid.
Komisija je ugotovila, da namen cen ni okoljski in jih zato ni mogoče odobriti kot okoljsko pomoč.
Compatibility with the 1998 Regional Aid Guidelines
Združljivost s smernicami o regionalni pomoči iz leta 1998