natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The figures for 2009 are incomplete, inasmuch as they reflect only the payments made in January 2009, whereas Alcoa continued to receive payments over the following months.
Podatki za leto 2009 so nepopolni, ker vključujejo le plačila iz januarja 2009, čeprav je družba Alcoa v naslednjih mesecih še naprej prejemala plačila.
(in EUR)
(v EUR/MWh)
Fusina, Veneto
Fusina, Benečija
Portovesme, Sardinia
Portovesme, Sardinija
The Commission’s decision to initiate formal investigation proceedings was based on the following grounds:
Odločitev Komisije, da sproži formalni postopek preiskave, je temeljila na naslednjih utemeljitvah:
The Commission classified the tariffs introduced by the 2004 Decree as operating aid and assessed whether such aid could be authorised on the basis of the regional aid guidelines [34], since in 2004 Sardinia was an assisted region pursuant to Article 87(3)(a) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je cene, uvedene z odlokom iz leta 2004, opredelila kot pomoč za tekoče poslovanje in ocenila, ali bi se lahko taka pomoč odobrila na podlagi smernic o regionalni pomoči [34], glede na to, da je bila Sardinija leta 2004 območje, ki je prejemalo pomoč v skladu s členom 87(3)(a) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission expressed doubts on the possibility of authorising the aid on that basis, since such ad hoc aid, granted to a limited number of undertakings, did not seem to promote regional development.
Komisija je izrazila pomisleke o možnosti odobritve pomoči na tej podlagi, ker se zdi, da taka ad hoc pomoč, odobrena omejenemu številu podjetij, ne spodbuja regionalnega razvoja.
As for the specific case of Alcoa, the Commission pointed out that the new tariff appeared to differ from the Alumix tariff in that the Alumix tariff had been granted by ENEL, Italy’s electricity supply monopoly, whereas the new tariff involved the selective intervention of the State to compensate for the difference between a market price agreed with an electricity producer and the preferential price fixed in 1996.
Komisija je v zvezi s posebnim primerom družbe Alcoa izpostavila, da se zdi, da se je nova cena razlikovala od cene Alumix, ker je ceno Alumix odobrila družba ENEL, tj. monopolni dobavitelj električne energije v Italiji, medtem ko je nova cena vključevala posamično posredovanje države, da bi se nadomestila razlika med tržno ceno, dogovorjeno s proizvajalcem električne energije, in ugodnejšo ceno, določeno leta 1996.
In addition, the Commission wondered whether the measure might have the effect of reducing the level of taxation applicable to the company.
Poleg tega je Komisijo zanimalo, ali bi se lahko zaradi ukrepa znižala raven obdavčitve za družbo.
Such a reduction would have to derive its legal basis from Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity [35].
Pravna podlaga za tako znižanje bi morala temeljiti na Direktivi Sveta 2003/96/ES z dne 27. oktobra 2003 o prestrukturiranju okvira Skupnosti za obdavčitev energentov in električne energije [35].
The 2006 Decision to open formal investigation proceedings focused on the Alcoa tariff [36].
Odločitev o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave iz leta 2006 se je osredotočala na ceno za družbo Alcoa [36].
Therefore, the Commission considered it necessary to re-examine the presence of State aid in the Alcoa tariff.
Zato je Komisija menila, da je treba ponovno preveriti, ali cena za družbo Alcoa pomeni državno pomoč.
The Commission took the view that the tariff constituted State aid, on the grounds that (a) the reduction of the electricity tariff constituted an economic advantage; (b) the decision to grant the tariff was taken by the Italian authorities and was financed by a transfer of State resources in the form of a parafiscal levy; (c) the measure threatened competition; and (d) the measure had an impact on intracommunity trade, given that aluminium was extensively traded on world markets.
Komisija je menila, da je cena pomenila državno pomoč z utemeljitvijo, da (a) je znižanje cene za električno energijo pomenilo gospodarsko prednost; (b) odločitev o odobritvi cene so sprejeli italijanski organi in se je financirala s prenosom državnih sredstev v obliki drugih dajatev; (c) ukrep je ogrozil konkurenco; in (d) ukrep je vplival na trgovino znotraj Skupnosti, glede na to, da se je z aluminijem veliko trgovalo na svetovnih trgih.
The Commission regarded the measure as operating aid.
Komisija je obravnavala ukrep kot pomoč za tekoče poslovanje.
The Commission also stated that the previous finding that the Alumix tariff did not constitute State aid did not mean that the new measure constituted existing aid.
Komisija je prav tako navedla, da prejšnja ugotovitev, da cena Alumix ni državna pomoč, ne pomeni, da se nov ukrep šteje za obstoječo pomoč.
The Commission approval of the Alumix tariff, based on the economic assessment of the circumstance prevailing at that moment, was limited in time and could not cover the extension of the tariff provided for by Law No 80/2005.
Odločitev Komisije o odobritvi cene Alumix, ki je temeljila na gospodarski oceni okoliščin v zadevnem obdobju, je bila časovno omejena in ne bi mogla zajemati podaljšanja veljavnosti cene iz zakona št. 80/2005.
As regards compatibility, the Commission assessed whether the preferential tariff could be authorised on the basis of the guidelines on national regional aid.
V zvezi z združljivostjo je Komisija ocenila, ali bi se lahko ugodnejša cena odobrila na podlagi smernic o nacionalni regionalni pomoči.
As far as the Veneto plant was concerned, the Commission noted that it was not located in a region eligible for aid under Article 87(3)(a) of the EC Treaty, and as such did not qualify for regional aid.
Kar zadeva obrat v Benečiji, je Komisija ugotovila, da sedež obrata ni v regiji, ki je upravičena do pomoči v skladu s členom 87(3)(a) Pogodbe ES, zato obrat ni upravičen do regionalne pomoči.
Sardinia was an assisted region pursuant to Article 87(3)(a) until the end of 2006.
Sardinija je bila območje, ki je prejemalo pomoč v skladu s členom 87(3)(a) do konca leta 2006.
However, the Commission expressed doubts as to the possibility of authorising the measure on the basis of the guidelines on national regional aid [37] covering that period.
Vendar je Komisija izrazila pomisleke v zvezi z možnostjo odobritve ukrepa na podlagi smernic o nacionalni regionalni pomoči [37] za zadevno obdobje.
Despite Italy’s insistence that high electricity prices in Sardinia constituted a handicap for the development of the island, the Commission found that Italy had not demonstrated the existence of significantly higher prices in Sardinia, either on average or, specifically, for energy-intensive undertakings (Italy did not provide data on the bilateral contracts established between energy-intensive companies and their suppliers, arguing that such data were not publicly available).
Komisija je kljub vztrajanju Italije pri tem, da so visoke cene električne energije na Sardiniji pomenile oviro za razvoj otoka, ugotovila, da Italija ni dokazala obstoja znatno višjih cen na Sardiniji na povprečni ravni ali zlasti za energetsko intenzivna podjetja (Italija ni predložila podatkov o dvostranskih pogodbah med energetsko intenzivnimi podjetji in njihovimi dobavitelji, ker je trdila, da ti podatki niso javno dostopni).
In addition, Italy did not explain why higher prices constituted a regional handicap, or how the tariff contributed to regional development.
Poleg tega Italija ni pojasnila, zakaj so bile višje cene regionalna ovira ali kako je ta cena prispevala k regionalnemu razvoju.
The Commission recalled that in case C 34/02 [38], it had not accepted that the lack of energy connections in Sardinia should be considered a handicap for the development of SMEs in the region (and had reached a negative decision).
Komisija je izpostavila, da se v zadevi C 34/02 [38] ni strinjala, da je treba pomanjkanje energetskih povezav na Sardiniji obravnavati kot oviro za razvoj malih in srednje velikih podjetij v regiji (ter sprejela negativno odločitev).
The Commission therefore expressed doubts as to the necessity of the aid.
Zato je Komisija izrazila pomisleke v zvezi z nujnostjo pomoči.
The Commission further doubted that such ad hoc aid was proportional to the regional handicaps, bearing in mind in addition the method used to calculate the preferential price, which bore no relation to prices practised in the rest of Italy.
Poleg tega je Komisija dvomila, da je taka ad hoc pomoč sorazmerna z regionalnimi ovirami, pri čemer je treba upoštevati tudi metodo za izračun ugodnejše cene, ki ni bila povezana s cenami drugod po Italiji.
The Commission noted that the aid was not degressive in real terms, in view of the 4 % cap imposed on the tariff increases.
Komisija je ugotovila, da se pomoč dejansko ni postopno zmanjševala, glede na to, da naj bi se cene povečale za največ 4 %.
Turning to the period covered by the guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013 [39], the Commission noted that Sardinia would cease to qualify for regional aid under Article 87(3)(a) of the EC Treaty, and in particular for operating aid.
Kar zadeva obdobje, zajeto v smernice o državni regionalni pomoči za 2007–2013 [39], je Komisija ugotovila, da Sardinija ne bi bila več upravičena do regionalne pomoči v skladu s členom 87(3)(a) Pogodbe ES in zlasti do pomoči za tekoče poslovanje.
It considered that, while a two-year transitional period could be authorised, under the guidelines for the linear phasing-out of existing operating aid schemes, it did not seem appropriate to allow new operating aid to be introduced for a few months with a programmed phasing-out, bearing in mind in addition the doubts expressed and the distortive nature of the aid.
Čeprav bi se lahko v skladu s smernicami odobrilo dveletno prehodno obdobje za linearno postopno opuščanje obstoječih shem pomoči za tekoče poslovanje, je Komisija menila, da ni primerno dovoliti uvedbe nove pomoči za tekoče poslovanje za nekaj mesecev z načrtovanim postopnim opuščanjem ob upoštevanju izraženih pomislekov in izkrivljenosti pomoči.
In conclusion, the Commission expressed doubts as to the possibility of authorising the preferential tariff for Alcoa, either as regional aid, or on any other grounds, which Italy had in any event failed to identify.
Na koncu je Komisija izrazila pomisleke v zvezi z možnostjo odobritve ugodnejše cene za družbo Alcoa v obliki regionalne pomoči ali na podlagi katerih koli drugih razlogov, ki jih Italija v nobenem primeru ni opredelila.
Alcoa’s challenge to the 2006 decision to initiate proceedings
Izpodbijanje odločitve o sprožitvi postopka iz leta 2006 s strani družbe Alcoa
The 2006 Decision to initiate proceedings was challenged by Alcoa before the Court of First Instance.
Družba Alcoa je izpodbijala odločitev o sprožitvi postopka iz leta 2006 pri Sodišču prve stopnje.
On 25 March 2009, the Court handed down its judgment (hereinafter ‘the Court’s judgment’) upholding the Decision and rejecting Alcoa’s arguments in their entirety [40].
Sodišče je 25. marca 2009 sprejelo odločbo (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba Sodišča), s katero je potrdilo odločitev in v celoti zavrnilo trditve družbe Alcoa [40].
OBSERVATIONS SUBMITTED BY INTERESTED PARTIES
PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANI
The Commission’s invitation to submit comments on the two decisions to open in-depth investigations prompted reactions from Alcoa and from third parties concerned.
Na poziv Komisije v zvezi s predložitvijo pripomb glede dveh odločitev o sprožitvi podrobnih preiskav so se odzvale družba Alcoa in zainteresirane tretje osebe.
Only the observations relevant to the Alcoa tariff are summarised here.
V nadaljevanju so povzete le pripombe v zvezi s ceno za družbo Alcoa.
Observations submitted by Alcoa
Pripombe družbe Alcoa
According to Alcoa, the tariff is meant to address a market failure, namely the failure of the recently liberalised electricity market to deliver competitive prices due to the significant market power of incumbent operators.
Po mnenju družbe Alcoa je bila cena namenjena odpravi nedelovanja trga, in sicer nezmožnosti nedavno liberaliziranega trga z električno energijo, da zagotovi konkurenčne cene zaradi velike tržne moči prvotnih nosilcev dejavnosti.
This market failure is said to be particularly evident in Sardinia.
To nedelovanje trga naj bi bilo zlasti očitno na Sardiniji.
In such circumstances, there is alleged to be a need for regulatory action, including action in the form of tariff arrangements, to accompany the transition from a monopoly to full competition.
V takih okoliščinah bi bilo treba sprejeti regulativne ukrepe, vključno z ukrepom v obliki dogovorov o ceni, ki bi spremljal prehod z monopolnega položaja k pravi konkurenci.
Alcoa’s legal analysis insists on the fact that the tariff does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, since the circumstances which justified the 1996 Alumix decision that no aid was involved are still valid.
Družba Alcoa v svoji pravni analizi vztraja, da cena ne pomeni pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, ker se okoliščine, na podlagi katerih je bilo z odločbo Alumix iz leta 1996 določeno, da pomoči ni bilo, še niso spremenile.
In particular, the tariff does not confer an advantage, its financing method does not involve a transfer of State resources and, considering the peculiarities of trade in primary aluminium, the tariff does not affect intra-community trade or distort competition.
Cena zlasti ne zagotavlja prednosti, njena metoda financiranja ne vključuje prenosa državnih sredstev in, ob upoštevanju značilnosti trgovine s primarnim aluminijem, cena ne vpliva na trgovino znotraj Skupnosti in ne izkrivlja konkurence.
Alcoa further claims that, even if the measure were to be classified as State aid, the Sardinian tariff would be compatible under regional aid rules.
Poleg tega družba Alcoa navaja, da bi bila cena za Sardinijo združljiva s pravili o regionalni pomoči, tudi če bi se ukrep opredelil kot državna pomoč.
Alcoa submits that the tariff addresses a market failure, that it does not constitute State aid, that in any event it would constitute existing rather than new aid and that its recovery is precluded by the principle of legitimate expectations.
Družba Alcoa meni, da je zadevna cena namenjena odpravi nedelovanja trga, da ne pomeni državne pomoči, da bi v vsakem primeru pomenila obstoječo in ne novo pomoč ter da je njeno vračilo v nasprotju z načelom upravičenih pričakovanj.
Alcoa provides ample background information on aluminium production and trade.
Družba Alcoa je predložila izčrpne osnovne podatke o proizvodnji aluminija in trgovini z aluminijem.
Aluminium smelting is the most energy intensive of all industrial processes (with consumption of 15 kWh/kg of aluminium produced).
Taljenje aluminija je energetsko najintenzivnejši proizvodni proces (pri katerem poraba znaša 15 kWh na kilogram proizvedenega aluminija).
Total primary aluminium production worldwide in 2006 was approximately 33,7 million tonnes, of which only 4,5 million were produced within the EEA.
Skupna svetovna proizvodnja primarnega aluminija leta 2006 je bila približno 33,7 milijona ton, pri čemer je bilo le 4,5 milijona ton proizvedenega v EGP.
The EU-25 and the EEA are significant net importers of primary aluminium.
EU-25 in EGP so pomembni neto uvozniki primarnega aluminija.
In 2006 the EU-25 imported 4,7 million tonnes and imports are expected to rise to 5,5 million tonnes in 2010.
Leta 2006 je EU-25 uvozila 4,7 milijona ton, pri čemer naj bi se uvoz leta 2010 povečal na 5,5 milijona ton.
In 2006 the aluminium industry in the EU employed 106000 [41] directly and provided employment to about another 300000 indirectly.
V industriji aluminija v EU je bilo leta 2006 neposredno zaposlenih 106000 [41] ljudi, posredno pa še dodatnih 300000 ljudi.
At the time when Alcoa submitted its comments a total of 22 primary aluminium smelters were operating within the EU-25 (31 in the EEA), all at full capacity.
Ko je družba Alcoa predložila svoje pripombe, je v EU-25 s polno zmogljivostjo delovalo skupaj 22 talilnic primarnega aluminija (31 v EGP).
Primary aluminium is a commodity, and its world reference price is established in the London Metal exchange.
Primarni aluminij je bazični proizvod, pri čemer njegovo svetovno referenčno ceno določa Londonska borza kovin.
The two Italian smelters in Fusina and Portovesme produce approximately 200000 tonnes.
Italijanski talilnici v krajih Fusina in Portovesme proizvedeta približno 200000 ton.
According to Alcoa, this limited output is incapable of affecting primary aluminium prices.
Po mnenju družbe Alcoa ta omejena proizvodnja ne more vplivati na cene primarnega aluminija.
Power supply arrangements are indispensable
Dogovori o oskrbi z električno energijo so nujni
Electricity is the principal cost item in the production of primary aluminium.
Električna energija je glavni strošek pri proizvodnji primarnega aluminija.
According to Alcoa, smelters can operate only if long-term supply arrangements can be entered into with electricity producers.
Družba Alcoa meni, da lahko talilnice delujejo le, če se lahko sklenejo dolgoročni dogovori o oskrbi s proizvajalci električne energije.
Cost-based long-term agreements can still be offered by willing sellers in the present day, as illustrated by the agreement concluded by Alcoa in Iceland [42].
Voljni prodajalci lahko še vedno zagotavljajo sklepanje dolgoročnih sporazumov, ki temeljijo na stroških, kot je na primer sporazum družbe Alcoa na Islandiji [42].
However, according to Alcoa, in the absence of cost-based contractual arrangements, smelters are forced to shut down.
Vendar morajo talilnice brez pogodbenih dogovorov, ki temeljijo na stroških, po mnenju družbe Alcoa zaustaviti proizvodnjo.
Since 2003, three smelters within the EU-25 have been closed for this reason and more closure plans have been announced.
Zato so se od leta 2003 zaprle tri talilnice v EU-25, napovedanih pa je še več zaprtij.
Alcoa concludes that, without the tariff extension, it would be forced to shut down the two Italian plants in Fusina, Veneto, and Portovesme, Sardinia, immediately.
Družba Alcoa ugotavlja, da bi morala takoj zapreti italijanska obrata v kraju Fusina v Benečiji in v kraju Portovesme na Sardiniji, če se veljavnost cene ne bi podaljšala.
Alcoa points out that the governments of several Member States are encouraging the establishment of cost-based long-term supply contracts between energy-intensive industrial consumers and power generators, in view of the fact that electricity markets are not functioning properly.
Družba Alcoa izpostavlja, da vlade več držav članic spodbujajo sklepanje dolgoročnih pogodb o oskrbi, ki temeljijo na stroških, in sicer med energetsko intenzivnimi industrijskimi odjemalci in proizvajalci električne energije, ob upoštevanju dejstva, da trgi z električno energijo ne delujejo pravilno.
These solutions are considered necessary as interim measures to ensure fair pricing and prevent industry closures.
Obravnava se, da so te rešitve potrebne kot začasni ukrepi za zagotavljanje poštenega oblikovanja cen in preprečevanje zapiranja družb.
Alcoa provides a brief description of measures adopted by: Finland (consortia investing in a new nuclear reactor, with off-take rights at a price pegged to production costs), Germany (discount of 35-50 % on transmission costs, plus a reduction in charges related to renewable energies for large industrial users), Spain (regulated tariffs), France (consortia of large users investing in new nuclear power plants, regulated ‘return’ tariffs), Sweden (consortia for investments in new power plants) and Belgium (purchasing consortium).
Družba Alcoa je predložila kratek opis ukrepov, ki so jih sprejele Finska (naložbe konzorcijev v nov jedrski reaktor s pravico odjema po ceni, vezani na proizvodne stroške), Nemčija (35–50-odstotni popust pri stroških prenosa, skupaj z znižanjem dajatev v zvezi z obnovljivo energijo za velike industrijske odjemalce), Španija (regulirane cene), Francija (naložbe konzorcijev velikih odjemalcev v nove jedrske elektrarne, regulirane cene „za vrnitev“), Švedska (konzorciji za naložbe v nove jedrske elektrarne) in Belgija (nakupni konzorcij).
Alcoa underlines that the Commission itself has recognised, in the energy sector inquiry [43], that electricity markets in Europe are not functioning properly.
Družba Alcoa izpostavlja, da je Komisija v raziskavi energetskega sektorja [43] sama ugotovila, da trgi z električno energijo v Evropi ne delujejo pravilno.
Alcoa also lists a number of initiatives taken or announced by the Commission in the energy sector, such as the work of the High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment [44].
Alcoa je navedla tudi več pobud, ki jih je sprejela ali napovedala Komisija na energetskem sektorju, kot je delo Skupine na visoki ravni za konkurenčnost, energijo in okolje [44].
The tariff is not State aid
Cena ni državna pomoč
Alcoa submits that the tariff is not State aid because: (a) there has been no significant change in the circumstances that led the Commission to conclude that the Alumix tariff did not confer an advantage; in particular, the price paid by Alcoa continues to be consistent with the parameters specified by the Commission in the Alumix decision; (b) the measure neither distorts competition nor affects intra-Community trade; and (c) according to the relevant case-law of the Community courts, the measure does not involve the transfer of State resources.
Alcoa meni, da cena ni državna pomoč, ker (a) se okoliščine niso bistveno spremenile, na podlagi česar bi Komisija ugotovila, da cena Alumix ni pomenila prednosti; zlasti je cena, ki jo plačuje družba Alcoa, še vedno skladna z določbami Komisije iz odločbe Alumix; (b) ukrep ne izkrivlja konkurence in ne vpliva na trgovino znotraj Unije; ter (c) v skladu z zadevno sodno prakso sodišč Skupnosti ukrep ne vključuje prenosa državnih sredstev.
No advantage
Neobstoj prednosti
Alcoa claims that, in assessing the existence of an advantage, the crucial issue is whether the price paid by Alcoa is lower than a normal market price.
Alcoa navaja, da je pri oceni obstoja prednosti ključno vprašanje, ali je cena, ki jo plačuje Alcoa, nižja od običajne tržne cene.
Alcoa contends that the special price is equivalent to what the company would have paid under normal market conditions, that is in a fully competitive market.
Alcoa trdi, da je posebna cena enaka ceni, ki bi jo moralo plačati podjetje v normalnih tržnih pogojih, to je na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu.
In the Alumix case, the Commission had come to the conclusion that, in a fully competitive market, a private electricity supplier would sell power to its best customers at the marginal cost plus some small contribution to fixed costs, and that the State could set tariffs based on the same criteria.
Komisija je v zadevi Alumix sklenila, da bi na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu zasebni dobavitelj električne energije prodajal energijo svojim najboljšim odjemalcem po mejnih stroških skupaj z majhnim prispevkom k fiksnim stroškom, in da bi lahko država določila cene na podlagi enakega merila.
According to Alcoa, the test to be applied in the present case is whether the prices paid by Alcoa have been higher or lower than its power supplier’s marginal costs (plus some contribution to fixed costs).
Alcoa meni, da je treba v tem primeru preveriti, ali so bile cene, ki jih je plačevala družba Alcoa, višje ali nižje od mejnih stroškov njenega dobavitelja električne energije (skupaj s prispevkom k delu fiksnih stroškov).
Alcoa submits calculations to support its case.
Alcoa je predložila izračune, da bi dokazala svoje navedbe.
Special tariff applied to Alcoa at Portovesme
Posebna cena za družbo Alcoa v kraju Portovesme
Minimum Sardinia region pool price (IPEX)
Najnižja kartelna cena v deželi Sardinija (IPEX)
Special tariff applied to Alcoa at Fusina
Posebna cena za družbo Alcoa v kraju Fusina
Minimum Northern Italy region pool price
Najnižja kartelna cena v regiji severne Italije (IPEX)