natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Moreover, in the majority of countries analysed there are relevant tax barriers to cross-border mergers.
Poleg tega v večini analiziranih držav obstajajo upoštevne davčne ovire za čezmejne združitve.
In this sense, if it were possible (quod non) to implement a cross-border merger, in the majority of the countries analysed unrealised capital gains would be taxed immediately at target-company and/or shareholder level, and indirect taxes would also be applicable as in any other completed transfer.
Če bi bilo v tem smislu mogoče (quod non) izvesti čezmejno združitev, bi se v večini analiziranih držav nerealizirani kapitalski dobički takoj obdavčili na ravni ciljne družbe in/ali delničarjev, pri čemer bi se naložili tudi posredni davki kot pri katerem koli drugem dokončanem prenosu.
The accompanying reports reflect this situation in detail in the following countries:
Priložena poročila podrobno opisujejo ta položaj v naslednjih državah:
In Argentina, the Law on Income Tax does not allow a cross-border merger to be treated as a ‘tax-free reorganisation’, as specifically confirmed by the AFIP (Argentina’s national tax authority) in a number of rulings, meaning that the target company would be liable for income tax (and its shareholders, regardless of the provisions of the Spain-Argentina Double Taxation Treaty, as will be detailed below) on the unrealised capital gains, as well as indirect taxes applicable to the transaction in Argentina: Value Added Tax, Impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos, Impuesto de Sellos (stamp duty), etc.,
v Argentini zakon o davku od dohodkov ne dovoljuje, da bi se čezmejne združitve obravnavale kot „prestrukturiranje z oprostitvijo davka“, kot je uprava AFIP (argentinski državni davčni organ) posebej potrdila v več odločbah; to pomeni, da bi ciljna družba morala plačati davek od dohodka (in tudi njeni delničarji ne glede na določbe sporazuma med Španijo in Argentino o dvojnem obdavčevanju, kot bo podrobno navedeno spodaj) na podlagi nerealiziranih kapitalskih dobičkov in posredne davke, ki se naložijo za transakcijo v Argentini, kot so davek na dodano vrednost, Impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos, Impuesto de Sellos (kolek) itd.;
In Australia, all ‘amalgamation’ transactions are subject to Australian taxes for both the company transferring its assets and liabilities (the dissolved company) and for its shareholders,
v Avstraliji v vseh transakcijah „pripojitve“ avstralski davki veljajo za družbo, ki prenaša sredstva in obveznosti (družba, ki je prenehala poslovati), ter za njene delničarje;
In Brazil, these transactions would be subject to the general tax regime for transfers, with respect to all Brazilian taxes, for both the target company and its shareholders.
v Braziliji bi pri teh transakcijah za ciljno družbo in njene delničarje v zvezi z vsemi brazilskimi davki veljal splošni davčni režim za prenose.
The special regime provided by Article 21 of Law 9.249/95 is applicable only to mergers of Brazilian companies,
Poseben režim, določen v členu 21 zakona št. 9249/95, velja le za združitve brazilskih družb;
In Canada, the only similar operations to cross-border mergers requires the target company to be liquidated and is therefore subject to all applicable Canadian taxes,
v Kanadi se za operacije, podobne čezmejnim združitvam, zahteva likvidacija ciljne družbe, zato se zanje uporabljajo vsi veljavni kanadski davki;
In Chile, cross-border mergers would be taxed under the general tax rules for mergers.
v Čilu bi bile čezmejne združitve obdavčene na podlagi splošnih davčnih pravil za združitve.
Under the Law on Income Taxes, all the profits of the dissolved company would be taxed at 35 % and its shareholders would pay 17 % or 35 % tax on the realised gain, provided they obtained an increase in value for tax purposes.
V skladu z zakonom o davku od dohodkov bi bili vsi dobički družbe, ki je prenehala poslovati, obdavčeni po 35-odstotni stopnji, pri čemer bi delničarji plačali 17 % ali 35 % davka na realizirani dobiček, če se je za davčne namene povečala vrednost.
The dissolution of the target company would also be previously inspected by the Chilean tax authorities, which is an additional obstacle that discourages and could significantly delay the completion of such transactions,
Poleg tega bi prenehanje ciljne družbe pred tem pregledali čilski davčni organi, kar je dodatna ovira, ki odvrača in bi lahko povzročila znatne zamude pri dokončanju takih transakcij;
In Colombia, no merger transaction gives rise to income tax (Article 14.1 of the Estatuto Tributario) or value added tax (Article 428.2 of the Estatuto Tributario) for the dissolved company.
v Kolumbiji se pri transakciji združitve ne zahteva plačilo davka od dohodkov (člen 14.1 Estatuto Tributario) ali davka na dodano vrednost (člen 428.2 Estatuto Tributario) za družbo, ki je prenehala poslovati.
However, in view of the absence of legal provisions governing the tax treatment of shareholders, the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs (Ruling number 053516, 6 July 2009) has stipulated that shareholders obtain a taxable capital gain if the market value of the shares, cash or other assets received is higher than the acquisition cost of the shares received as a result of the merger,
Vendar je direktorat za državne davke in carino (odločba št. 053516 z dne 6. julija 2009) zaradi neobstoja pravnih določb o davčni obravnavi delničarjev določil, da delničarji pridobijo obdavčljiv kapitalski dobiček, če je tržna vrednost deležev, gotovine ali drugih prejetih sredstev višja od stroškov prevzema deležev, pridobljenih zaradi združitve;
In the United States, there are certain material adverse US federal income tax consequences for a US corporation (USCo) and its US shareholders, as detailed in the US report, that could result from a merger of a USCo with and into a foreign corporation (ForCo) with the ForCo surviving.
kot je podrobno navedeno o poročilu o ZDA, v Združenih državah za ameriško družbo in njene ameriške delničarje obstajajo nekatere negativne materialne posledice v obliki ameriškega zveznega davka od dohodkov, ki bi lahko nastale pri združitvi ameriške družbe s tujo družbo ali pripojitvi k tej družbi, pri čemer tuja družba ne preneha obstajati.
Because of concerns that the US tax authorities have about US corporations moving offshore to minimise their US federal income tax liability, the rules that allow a merger of two USCos to be tax-free are often rendered inapplicable in the case of a merger of a USCo into a ForCo.
Zaradi pomislekov ameriških davčnih organov glede ameriških družb, ki svoje dejavnosti selijo v tujino za čim večje zmanjšanje svojih obveznosti za plačilo ameriškega zveznega davka od dohodka, se pravila, ki dovoljujejo oprostitev davka pri združitvi dveh ameriških družb, pogosto ne morejo uporabiti v primeru združitve ameriške družbe s tujo družbo.
Although good business reasons may exist to undertake a cross-border merger, shareholders of US corporations often oppose such mergers because of the punitive US tax regimes that could result from the merger,
Čeprav lahko obstajajo dobri poslovni razlogi za izvedbo čezmejne združitve, delničarji ameriških družb takim združitvam pogosto nasprotujejo zaradi kaznovalnih ameriških davčnih režimov, ki so lahko posledica združitve;
In Morocco, a cross-border merger gives rise to tax for the company dissolved and its shareholders, in respect of all applicable Moroccan taxes, since the special regime provided by Article 162 of the General Tax Code (Code Général des Impôts) is applicable only to Moroccan companies subject to income tax, as specified in the Code.
v Maroku se v skladu z vsemi veljavnimi maroškimi davki pri čezmejni združitvi davek naloži družbi, ki je prenehala poslovati, in njenim delničarjem, saj se posebni režim iz člena 162 splošnega davčnega zakonika (Code Général des Impôts) uporablja le za maroške družbe, ki so zavezane plačevanju davka od dohodkov, kot je določeno v zakoniku.
Moreover, as in the case of Chile, the winding up of a Moroccan company always requires an audit to be carried out beforehand, entailing an additional obstacle to such merger that could also significantly delay execution,
Poleg tega je enako kot v Čilu ob likvidaciji maroške družbe predhodno vedno treba opraviti revizijo, kar pomeni dodatno oviro za tako združitev, ki lahko povzroči tudi znatne zamude pri izvedbi;
In Mexico, the merger of a Mexican company with a foreign company will give rise to Mexican income tax for the merging company (the wording of the Mexico-Spain Double Taxation Treaty must also be considered for these purposes, as will be explained below) and to other taxes applicable to all transfers of goods or rights: flat-rate business tax (Impuesto Empresarial a Tasa Única — IETU), value added tax (IVA), local taxes on property transfers (ISAI), etc. Article 14-b of the Federal Tax Code allows the application of a tax neutrality regime only to mergers involving companies resident in Mexico.
v Mehiki se ob združitvi mehiške družbe s tujo družbo za družbo, ki se združuje (v ta namen je treba upoštevati tudi besedilo sporazuma med Mehiko in Španijo o dvojnem obdavčevanju, kot bo pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju), zaračunajo mehiški davek od dohodkov in drugi davki, ki veljajo za vse prenose blaga ali pravic, kot so pavšalni davek na dohodek (Impuesto Empresarial a Tasa Única – IETU), davek na dodano vrednost (IVA), lokalni davki na prenos premoženja (ISAI) itd. Člen 14-b zveznega davčnega zakonika uporabo sistema davčne nevtralnosti dovoljuje le za združitve, ki vključujejo družbe s sedežem v Mehiki.
As regards the target company’s shareholders, Articles 1 and 179 of the Law on Income Tax stipulate that non-residents are also required to pay this tax on assets acquired by the merging company as a consequence of the merger,
Kar zadeva delničarje ciljne družbe, člena 1 in 179 zakona o davku od dohodkov določata, da morajo tudi nerezidenti plačati ta davek na premoženje, ki ga je družba, ki se združuje, prevzela zaradi združitve;
In Peru, if a cross-border merger could be completed, this would be treated as a sale for tax purposes and any gain would be taxed at 30 % in the dissolved company.
če bi bilo v Peruju mogoče izvesti čezmejno združitev, bi se to obravnavalo kot prodaja za davčne namene, pri čemer bi se morebitni dobiček za družbo, ki je prenehala, obdavčil po 30-odstotni stopnji.
The shareholders would pay tax on the profits on liquidation, on the portion that exceeded the par value of the shares plus the additional capital premium.
Delničarji bi plačali davek od dobička ob likvidaciji za delež, ki je presegel nominalno vrednost delnic, čemur se prišteje dodatna kapitalska premija.
The merger would also be subject to indirect taxes (basically the General Sales Tax (IGV)) at the rate of 19 % of the transfer value.
Za združitev bi se uporabljali tudi posredni davki (zlasti splošni prometni davek (IGV)) po stopnji v višini 19 % vrednosti prenosa.
This regime has been specifically confirmed by the Peruvian Tax Administration, on a binding basis, in its Report of 229-2005-SUNAT/2B0000 (28 September 2005),
Ta režim je na zavezujoči ravni perujska davčna uprava posebej potrdila v poročilu št. 229-2005-SUNAT/2B0000 (28. september 2005);
Finally, in Venezuela, if the merger could be completed from a commercial viewpoint, it would give rise to applicable Venezuelan taxes for the target company and its shareholders, as reported by the Venezuelan law firm in its report.
nazadnje, če bi bilo v Venezueli z gospodarskega vidika mogoče izvesti združitev, bi se za ciljno družbo in njene delničarje uporabili veljavni venezuelski davki, kot je v poročilu navedla venezuelska odvetniška pisarna.
It should also be noted that none of the Double Taxation Treaties signed by Spain include additional specific advantages for cross-border mergers, as compared to other countries’ Double Taxation Treaties based on the OECD Model Convention.
Prav tako je treba opozoriti, da nobeden od sporazumov o dvojnem obdavčevanju, ki jih je podpisala Španija, v primerjavi s sporazumi drugih držav o dvojnem obdavčevanju, ki temeljijo na vzorčnem sporazumu OECD, ne vključuje dodatnih posebnih ugodnosti za čezmejne združitve.
However, in addition to further explanations below regarding the Double Taxation Treaties signed between Spain and Argentina and Mexico, some treaties provide for the possibility of charging tax in the State of origin of the transfer (including, for the purposes of this analysis, a transfer that is the consequence of the amortisation of shares in a merger) of significant shareholdings in companies domiciled in that State.
Vendar poleg dodatnih pojasnil v nadaljevanju v zvezi s sporazumi o dvojnem obdavčevanju, podpisanimi med Španijo ter Argentino in Mehiko, nekateri sporazumi vključujejo možnost, da se davek zaračuna v državi, iz katere izhaja prenos (vključno s, za namene te analize, prenosom, ki je posledica amortizacije deležev pri združitvi) znatnega deleža v družbah s sedežem v tej državi.
In this regard, Spain has departed from the OECD’s general approach to the taxation of capital gains from the sale by a resident of one Contracting State of stocks and shares in companies of another Contracting State (whether or not the sale takes place in the context of a merger).
V zvezi s tem Španija odstopa od splošnega pristopa OECD k obdavčitvi kapitalskih dobičkov od prodaje delnic in deležev v družbah ene države podpisnice, ki jo opravi rezident druge države podpisnice (ne glede na to, ali se prodaja izvede v okviru združitve ali ne).
The OECD’s general approach is to assign this tax authority exclusively to the transferor’s State of residence (in this case Spain).
Splošni pristop OECD je, da se davčno pristojnost pripiše izključno državi stalnega prebivališča prenosnika (v tem primeru Španiji).
However, in accordance with Spain’s Reservations included in the Commentary on Article 13 of the OECD’s Model Convention (point 45), and in accordance with the bilateral agreements concluded, the treaties generally stipulate shared taxation for Spain and the State of residence of the company whose shares are sold (in this case, as a consequence of the amortisation of shares in a merger), in cases in which the shareholding is ‘substantial’ (of the States analysed here, this applies to the Treaties with Argentina, Australia, Chile, India, China, United States and Morocco).
Vendar je v skladu s pridržki Španije iz komentarja o členu 13 vzorčnega sporazuma OECD (točka 45) in sklenjenimi dvostranskimi sporazumi v pogodbah običajno določena deljena obdavčitev za Španijo in državo, v kateri ima sedež družba, katere deleži se prodajo (v tem primeru zaradi amortizacije deležev pri združitvi), kadar je delež „znaten“ (med v tem dokumentu analiziranimi državami to velja za sporazume z Argentino, Avstralijo, Čilom, Indijo, Kitajsko, Združenimi državami in Marokom).
Nonetheless, in the respective Protocols to the Treaties concluded with two of these countries (specifically, the Protocols to the Treaties signed with Mexico and Argentina), one interpretation is that [1], when the transfer forms part of a cross-border merger between companies of the same group, it is permitted to apply a tax deferral scheme to the capital gains in the State of origin.
Kljub temu se v protokolih k sporazumoma, sklenjenima z dvema od teh držav (natančneje, protokolih k sporazumoma, podpisanima z Mehiko in Argentino) ena od razlag glasi, da [1] če je prenos del čezmejne združitve med družbama iz iste skupine, je za kapitalski dobiček v državi izvora dovoljeno uporabiti shemo odloga plačila davkov.
In the case of the specific clause in the Protocol to the Double Taxation Treaty signed between Spain and Argentina, the interpretation by law firm of this country, in line with existing doctrine, is that this clause does not allow the application of the Argentinian tax deferral scheme to a cross-border merger of a Spanish and an Argentinian company.
Glede posebne določbe v protokolu k sporazumu o dvojnem obdavčevanju, podpisanemu med Španijo in Argentino, se razlaga odvetniške pisarne iz te države v skladu z obstoječo doktrino glasi, da ta določba ne dovoljuje uporabe argentinskega sistema odloga plačila davkov za čezmejno združitev španske in argentinske družbe.
In the case of the clause in the Protocol to the Double Taxation Treaty signed between Spain and Mexico, the law firm of this country also regards as very doubtful the interpretation that the said clause is applicable to a cross-border merger of a Spanish and a Mexican company and, if it were acceptable (which seems unlikely), this circumstance could, in some cases, even result in a tax cost that is higher than the cost to be deferred, since the ‘deferred’ tax would pay the ‘frozen’ taxes irrespective of the existence of actual economic income (and even if the transfer gave rise to a definitive loss).
Glede določbe v protokolu k sporazumu o dvojnem obdavčevanju, podpisanemu med Španijo in Mehiko, odvetniška pisarna iz te države meni tudi, da je zelo dvomljiva razlaga, da se navedena določba lahko uporablja za čezmejno združitev španske in mehiške družbe, pri čemer bi lahko ta okoliščina, če bi bila sprejemljiva (kar se ne zdi verjetno), v nekaterih primerih povzročila celo davčne stroške, ki bi bili višji od stroškov, ki naj bi se odložili, saj bi se z „odloženim“ davkom plačali „zamrznjeni“ davki ne glede na obstoj dejanskega gospodarskega dohodka (tudi če bi pri prenosu nastala dokončna izguba).
In any case, it must be borne in mind that the above-mentioned Protocols to the Double Taxation Treaties do not affect the indirect taxes applicable to these transactions in each jurisdiction.
V vsakem primeru je treba upoštevati, da zgoraj navedeni protokoli k sporazumom o dvojnem obdavčenju ne vplivajo na posredne davke, ki se v vsaki državi uporabljajo za te transakcije.
Finally, as evidence of the fact that the above-mentioned tax, legal and de facto obstacles are real, it should be noted that, in general, as described in the different reports on the countries analysed, there have been no cross-border mergers in those jurisdictions.
Nazadnje, kot dokaz dejstva, da so zgoraj navedene davčne, pravne in dejanske ovire resnične, je treba navesti, da na splošno, kot je opisano v različnih poročilih o analiziranih državah, tam ni bilo čezmejnih združitev.
This interpretation is questionable since these clauses refer rather to mergers involving companies resident in one Contracting State that own assets in the other Contracting State and which, if the clauses did not exist, would be taxed in that State, whereas, by contrast, the taxes in the State of residence would be deferred under a tax deferral regime.
Ta razlaga je vprašljiva, ker se te določbe sklicujejo predvsem na združitve, ki vključujejo družbe s sedežem v eni državi podpisnici, ki imajo v lasti premoženje v drugi državi podpisnici in bi bile ob neobstoju teh določb obdavčene v tej državi, medtem ko bi se v nasprotju s tem davki v državi sedeža na podlagi sistema odloga plačila davka odložili.
Article 12(5) TRLIS, within Article 12 TRLIS ‘Value adjustments: loss of value of assets’, entered into force on 1 January 2002.
Člen 12(5) TRLIS, ki je del člena 12 TRLIS „Popravki vrednosti: izguba vrednosti sredstev“, je začel veljati 1. januarja 2002.
It essentially provides that a company which is taxable in Spain may deduct from its taxable income the financial goodwill deriving from the acquisition of a shareholding of at least 5 % of a foreign company, in yearly instalments, over not less than the 20 years following the acquisition.
Člen v bistvu določa, da lahko družba, ki je v Španiji obdavčljiva, od svojega obdavčljivega dohodka odšteje finančno dobro ime, ki izhaja iz prevzema vsaj 5-odstotnega deleža tuje družbe, in sicer v letnih obrokih v obdobju vsaj 20 let po prevzemu.
These descriptions have to be read more broadly in the context of the following statement by the Spanish authorities [28]: ‘the Spanish tax system thus provides for different tax schemes, as in the case of shareholding acquisitions in foreign companies compared with acquisitions in Spanish companies (impossible to undertake merger operations, risk assumption, etc.), in order to achieve the tax neutrality sought by the Spanish domestic legislation and EU law itself and also in order to ensure that the Spanish tax system is consistent and efficient’. According to those authorities and the 30 interested parties, the barriers described in the reports make business combinations between companies from different Member States impossible.
Te opise je treba širše razlagati ob upoštevanju naslednje trditve španskih organov [28]: „španski davčni sistem tako zagotavlja različne davčne sheme, kot v primeru prevzemov deležev v tujih družbah v primerjavi s prevzemi v španskih družbah (izvajanje operacij združitev, prevzema tveganja itd. ni mogoče), za doseganje davčne nevtralnosti, za katero si prizadevata španska domača zakonodaja in samo pravo EU, ter tudi za zagotavljanje usklajenosti in učinkovitosti španskega davčnega sistema.“ Po mnenju teh organov in 30 zainteresiranih strani ovire, opisane v poročilih, onemogočajo poslovne združitve med družbami iz različnih držav članic.
There is a clear parallel between the case at hand and the circumstances which led to the Court of Justice judgment of 15 July 2004 [36].
Med zadevnim primerom in okoliščinami, ki so vodile k sodbi Sodišča z dne 15. julija 2004 [36], obstajajo jasne podobnosti.
Despite the arguments put forward by the Spanish authorities that the contested measure in the latter case is not selective because Article 37 TRLIS applies to all Spanish undertakings that invest internationally, the Court concluded that the measure constituted State aid since it was limited to one category of undertakings, namely undertakings making certain international investments.
Kljub argumentom španskih organov, da sporni ukrep v zadnjenavedenem primeru ni selektiven, ker se člen 37 TRLIS uporablja za vse španske družbe z mednarodnimi naložbami, je Sodišče sklenilo, da je ukrep pomenil državno pomoč, ker je bil omejen le na eno kategorijo družb, in sicer na družbe z določenimi mednarodnimi naložbami.
This analysis focused on those non-EU countries with which Spain maintains close economic relations and which were therefore selected according to their importance in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) between 1 January 2002 and 1 June 2009.
Ta analiza se je osredotočila na tiste države zunaj EU, s katerimi Španija ohranja tesne gospodarske odnose in so bile zato izbrane glede na njihov pomen v smislu neposrednih tujih naložb med 1. januarjem 2002 in 1. junijem 2009.
Of these non-EU countries, the Commission focused its analysis on the countries likely to yield a greater number of individual applications of the contested measure: United States of America (EUR 35 billion FDI), Mexico (EUR 18 billion FDI), Argentina (EUR15 billion FDI) and Brazil (EUR 13 billion FDI).
Med temi državami zunaj EU je Komisija analizo osredotočila na države, za katere je verjetno večje število individualnih uporab spornega ukrepa: Združene države Amerike (35 milijard EUR neposrednih tujih naložb), Mehika (18 milijard EUR neposrednih tujih naložb), Argentina (15 milijard EUR neposrednih tujih naložb) in Brazilija (13 milijard EUR neposrednih tujih naložb).