natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Dutch State claimed that the conversion was in the Dutch State’s interest as it was able to convert loans with an average coupon of 2,976 % into equity that, in its view, had an attractive remuneration.
Nizozemska je trdila, da je bila pretvorba v interesu države, saj je lahko pretvorila posojila s povprečnim kuponom v višini 2,976 % v lastniški kapital, ki je imel po njenem mnenju visok donos.
In that regard, the Dutch State referred to ABN AMRO Group’s projected normalised 2012 RoE of approximately […] % as put forward in the December 2009 Restructuring Plan.
Glede tega se je Nizozemska sklicevala na napovedan normiran kapitalski donos skupine ABN AMRO za leto 2012 v višini približno […] %, kot je bilo navedeno v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz decembra 2009.
Should the Commission consider Measure C to be State aid, the Dutch State argued that the Commission should not consider all loans waived as State aid.
Nizozemska je trdila, da če bi Komisija menila, da ukrep C pomeni državno pomoč, Komisija ne bi smela upoštevati vseh posojil, ki se jim je odpovedala, kot državno pomoč.
It explained that the conversion could be broken down in a repayment of Tier 2 capital at par in combination with a core Tier 1 capital injection (with no net cash implications).
Pojasnila je, da se lahko pretvorbo razdeli na plačilo kapitala drugega reda po al pari vrednosti v kombinaciji z injekcijo osnovnega kapitala prvega reda (brez posledic za čista denarna sredstva).
According to the Dutch State, it could not have reasonably expected repayment of Tier 2 capital at par at that time, since comparable instruments of other banks were trading at a substantial discount to par reflecting fragile market circumstances.
Po mnenju Nizozemske država takrat ni mogla razumno pričakovati poplačila kapitala drugega reda po al pari vrednosti, saj so primerljivi instrumenti drugih bank trgovali po znatnem diskontu nominalne vrednosti, ki je odražal nestabilne razmere na trgu.
The Dutch State indicated that a discount of EUR [135 - 405] million was justified, based on comparable figures.
Nizozemska je trdila, da je bil glede na primerljive podatke diskont v višini [135 – 405] milijonov EUR upravičen.
The Dutch State indicated that the payment of EUR 740 million (Measure D) was one of its obligations stemming from the CSA.
Nizozemska je navedla, da je bilo plačilo v višini 740 milijonov EUR (ukrep D) ena od obveznosti, ki so izhajale iz sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija.
Moreover, the Dutch State underlined that there were only payments to the other consortium members and not to ABN AMRO N, so that there was also no State aid provided to ABN AMRO N.
Poleg tega je Nizozemska poudarila, da je izvedla plačila samo drugim članom konzorcija in ne banki ABN AMRO N, tako da tudi ni bilo državne pomoči za banko ABN AMRO N.
Regarding Measure E, the Dutch State argued that ABN AMRO II did not benefit from the counter-indemnity (described in recital 126), but that Measure E merely put ABN AMRO II in a position to provide a counter-indemnity to Deutsche Bank.
Glede ukrepa E je Nizozemska trdila, da ABN AMRO II ni imela koristi od jamstva povračila odškodnine (opisanega v uvodni izjavi 126), ampak je ukrep E ABN AMRO II omogočil samo, da je lahko zagotovila jamstvo povračila odškodnine banki Deutsche Bank.
It claimed that the counter-indemnity could not be used by the bank for development of new business and would therefore not give rise to any distortion of competition.
Trdila je, da banka jamstva povračila odškodnine ni mogla uporabiti za razvoj novih dejavnosti, zato ni povzročilo izkrivljanja konkurence.
The Dutch State considered the counter-indemnity to be in line with the Commission’s Recapitalisation Communication.
Nizozemska je menila, da je jamstvo povračila odškodnine v skladu s sporočilom Komisije o dokapitalizaciji.
The Dutch State underlined that it had based its pricing on the ECB Recapitalisation Recommendation.
Nizozemska je poudarila, da je svoje cene oblikovala na podlagi priporočila ECB za dokapitalizacijo.
The Dutch State also commented on the Commission’s suspicion that the preferred shareholders of FBN [90] had not sufficiently contributed in terms of burden-sharing.
Nizozemska je predložila pripombe tudi glede dvomov Komisije glede tega, ali so prednostni delničarji banke FBN [90] prispevali dovolj k porazdelitvi bremena.
The Dutch State explained that the investors in preferred shares had not received dividends in 2008 (neither in cash nor in accrual) and that preferred shares were trading below par. The Dutch State added that FBN’s ability to pay or reserve fixed dividends in the future depended on FBN having sufficient IFRS profits.
Nizozemska je pojasnila, da vlagatelji v prednostne delnice niso prejeli dividend v letu 2008 (niti v denarnih sredstvih niti v prirastu) in da se je s prednostnimi delnicami trgovalo pod nominalno vrednostjo. Nizozemska je dodala, da je zmožnost banke FBN, da v prihodnosti plača ali rezervira fiksne dividende, odvisna od tega, ali bo imela banka FBN dovolj dobička po MSRP.
The Dutch State noted that the dividend clause governing the FBN preferred shares included so-called dividend stopper/pusher language [91] and that the uncertainty around the dividend policy of the ABN AMRO Group reduced the comfort that the investors in preferred shares could derive from the dividend stopper/pusher language.
Nizozemska je ugotovila, da klavzula o dividendah, ki ureja prednostne delnice banke FBN, vsebuje ubeseditev, po kateri izplačila donosov morajo/ne smejo biti izvršena (t. i. „dividend stopper/pusher“) [91] in da je negotovost v zvezi z dividendno politiko skupine ABN AMRO zmanjšala razliko, ki bi jo vlagatelji v prednostne delnice lahko prejeli zaradi ubeseditve, po kateri izplačila donosov morajo/ne smejo biti izvršena.
As to whether capital would be repaid once the (temporary) capital needs disappear, the Dutch State argued that it intended to use the dividend policy of ABN AMRO Group in such a way that ABN AMRO Group would not have any excess capital which could result in a distortion of competition [92].
Glede tega, ali bo kapital potem, ko ne bo več (začasnih) potreb po kapitalu, povrnjen, je Nizozemska trdila, da je nameravala dividendno politiko skupine ABN AMRO uporabiti tako, da skupina ABN AMRO ne bo imela presežnega kapitala, zaradi katerega bi lahko prišlo do izkrivljanja konkurence [92].
Concerning distortions of competition, the Dutch State indicated that it did not agree with the Commission’s position that ABN AMRO N and FBN were reinforced in the Netherlands as a result of the merger nor that such a development threatened to create undue distortions of competition.
Glede izkrivljanja konkurence je Nizozemska navedla, da se ne strinja z mnenjem Komisije, da sta bili zaradi združitve banki FBN in ABN AMRO N na Nizozemskem okrepljeni, niti z mnenjem, da bi zaradi takega razvoja dogodkov lahko prišlo do neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence.
It rather believed the contrary and pointed in that regard to the fact that the separation of FBN and ABN AMRO N from their respective parent companies and the subsequent merger were very labour-intensive and implied that the management of FBN and ABN AMRO N could dedicate less time to the day-to-day commercial business and therefore it argued that the separation and the subsequent merger had a negative impact on the competitive position of FBN and ABN AMRO N (or ABN AMRO Group post-merger).
Njeno mnenje je bilo ravno nasprotno, s tem v zvezi pa je poudarila dejstvo, da sta bili ločitev bank FBN in ABN AMRO N od njunih zadevnih matičnih podjetij in kasnejša združitev zelo delovno intenzivni, in navedla, da bi lahko vodstvo bank FBN in ABN AMRO N posvetilo manj časa vsakodnevnim poslovnim dejavnostim, zaradi česar je trdila, da sta imeli ločitev in kasnejša združitev negativen učinek na konkurenčnost bank FBN in ABN AMRO N (oziroma, po združitvi, skupino ABN AMRO).
Comments from the Dutch State on the comments of interested parties
Pripombe Nizozemske na pripombe zainteresiranih strani
Comments from the Dutch State on the complainant’s letter of 6 May 2009
Pripombe Nizozemske na dopis pritožnika z dne 6. maja 2009
In general, the Dutch State underlined that in its view the measures in favour of FBN and ABN AMRO N did not meet the Union definition of State aid and therefore did not have distortive effects.
Na splošno je Nizozemska poudarila, da ukrepi v korist bank FBN in ABN AMRO N po njenem mnenju niso izpolnili opredelitve Unije glede državne pomoči in zato niso imeli izkrivljajočih učinkov.
It considered the market behaviour of FBN and ABN AMRO N on the savings and deposit market to be in line with that of a rational market player protecting its commercial interests.
Menila je, da je tržno ravnanje bank FBN in ABN AMRO N na varčevalnem in depozitnem trgu v skladu z ravnanjem razumnega akterja na trgu, ki ščiti svoje poslovne interese.
The Dutch State believed that the interest rates offered by FBN and ABN AMRO N were not distortive.
Nizozemska je menila, da obrestne mere, ki sta jih nudili banki FBN in ABN AMRO N, niso izkrivljajoče.
As a result, it argued that there was no infringement of Union competition law.
Zaradi tega je trdila, da ni prišlo do kršitve konkurenčnega prava Unije.
The Dutch State presented a number of comparative tables with interest rates offered on specific deposit and savings products.
Nizozemska je predložila številne primerjalne preglednice z obrestnimi merami, ki so veljale za posebne depozitne in hranilne instrumente.
The Dutch State denied that FBN and ABN AMRO N were consistently offering the highest interest rates, especially when compared to smaller Dutch banks like SNS, NIBC and DSB.
Nizozemska je zanikala, da sta banki FBN in ABN AMRO N vedno nudili najvišje obrestne mere, zlasti v primerjavi z manjšimi nizozemskimi bankami, kot so SNS, NIBC in DSB.
The Dutch State also pointed out that interest rates on savings accounts were already high in the Netherlands before the financial crisis, partly due to the behaviour of smaller banks with an aggressive pricing policy.
Nizozemska je tudi poudarila, da so bile obrestne mere na varčevalne račune na Nizozemskem visoke že pred finančno krizo, delno zaradi ravnanja manjših bank z agresivno politiko oblikovanja cen.
The Dutch State believed that during the financial crisis banks tried to protect their savings franchises by offering relatively high interest rates on savings products for customers.
Nizozemska je menila, da so skušale banke med finančno krizo zavarovati svoje varčevalne franšize z nudenjem razmeroma visokih obrestnih mer na varčevalne instrumente za stranke.
The Dutch State indicated that MoneYou had to build up brand recognition in the first 6 months of its existence and therefore had to offer interest rates which were mostly slightly lower or equal than those offered by similar Internet-banking marketplayers [93].
Nizozemska je navedla, da je morala znamka MoneYou v prvih šestih mesecih obstoja pridobiti prepoznavnost in je morala zato nuditi obrestne mere, ki so bile večinoma nekoliko nižje od tistih, ki so jih nudili podobni akterji v internetnem bančništvu, ali enake [93].
From the second quarter of 2009 onwards, the interest rates offered by MoneYou were lowered and MoneYou positioned itself within the so-called mid-tier segment [94].
Od druge četrtine leta 2009 naprej so bile obrestne mere, ki jih je nudila MoneYou, nižje, znamka MoneYou pa se je uveljavila v t. i. srednjem segmentu (mid-tier segment) [94].
With respect to MoneYou, the Dutch State added that it only raised limited volumes of funds (namely EUR [0 - 5] billion), representing roughly [0 - 5] % of total volume on the Dutch savings market.
Glede MoneYou je Nizozemska dodala, da je prejela samo omejen obseg sredstev (tj. [0 – 5] milijard EUR), kar je predstavljalo približno [0 – 5] % skupnega obsega na nizozemskem varčevalnem trgu.
The Dutch State added that ex-Van Lanschot customers only represented a small part of MoneYou’s business (namely [0 - 5000] accounts or [0 - 5] % of MoneYou’s accounts).
Nizozemska je dodala, da so nekdanje stranke banke Van Lanschot predstavljale samo majhen delež posla MoneYou (tj. [0 – 5000] računov ali [0 – 5] % računov MoneYou).
The Dutch State also denied that ABN AMRO N and FBN were solely relying on the Dutch savings market to fund themselves.
Nizozemska je tudi zanikala, da sta banki ABN AMRO N in FBN glede lastnega financiranja odvisni samo od nizozemskega varčevalnega trga.
The Dutch State provided new information showing that ABN AMRO N had issued a covered bond of EUR 2 billion on 6 July 2009 and that FBN had issued EUR 15,5 billion of State-guaranteed debt instruments. According to the Dutch State, the complainant’s allegations were incorrect and premature.
Nizozemska je predložila nove informacije, ki so pokazale, da je banka ABN AMRO N 6. julija 2009 izdala krito obveznico v vrednosti 2 milijard EUR in da je banka FBN izdala dolžniške instrumente z državnim jamstvom v vrednosti 15,5 milijarde EUR. Po mnenju Nizozemske so bile navedbe pritožnika napačne in preuranjene.
It indicated that FBN just needed some time to set up treasury operations and issue State-guaranteed debt instruments.
Navedla je, da je banka FBN samo potrebovala nekaj časa, da je vzpostavila zakladniško poslovanje in izdala dolžniške instrumente z državnim jamstvom.
The Dutch State also indicated that deposits and saving products are also important to establish a customer relationship and have a different and broader purpose than that of other funding instruments.
Nizozemska je tudi navedla, da so depoziti in varčevalni instrumenti pomembni tudi za vzpostavitev odnosa s strankami ter imajo drugačen in širši namen kot drugi instrumenti financiranja.
In that regard, the Dutch State pointed out that a loss in a bank’s savings and deposits market share could lead to market share losses in other banking products.
Glede tega je Nizozemska poudarila, da bi lahko izguba deleža banke na varčevalnem in depozitnem trgu povzročila izgubo tržnega deleža pri drugih bančnih instrumentih.
The Dutch State also denied that the consumers and market participants perceived ABN AMRO N and FBN as safer banks than competitors.
Nizozemska je tudi zanikala, da sta bili po mnenju strank in udeležencev na trgu banki ABN AMRO N in FBN varnejši od konkurenčnih bank.
It referred to the ratings of FBN and ABN AMRO N at rating agencies, which were below the AAA-rating of Rabobank for example.
Sklicevala se je na bonitetne ocene bank FBN in ABN AMRO N pri bonitetnih agencijah, ki so bile nižje od, na primer, ocene banke Rabobank z oceno AAA.
Its relative CDS-spreads told a similar story.
Podobno je bilo z razponi kreditnih zamenjav.
The Dutch State also believed that the State-ownership did not make ABN AMRO N or FBN more secure in the eyes of consumers and market participants.
Nizozemska je tudi menila, da po mnenju strank in udeležencev na trgu banka FBN ali banka ABN AMRO N zaradi državnega lastništva ni bila varnejša.
In that regard, it pointed out that the many ad-hoc State interventions had shown that the Dutch State would, if possible, intervene with respect to any privately-owned bank.
Glede tega je poudarila, da so številna ad hoc posredovanja države pokazala, da bi Nizozemska, če bi bilo to mogoče, posredovala pri kateri koli banki v zasebni lasti.
Consequently, it believed that de facto there was no perceived difference between the security offered by Dutch privately-owned banks compared with that of Dutch State-owned banks.
Zaradi tega je menila, da dejansko ni nobene opazne razlike med varnostjo, ki jo nudijo nizozemske banke v zasebni lasti, in varnostjo bank v državni lasti Nizozemske.
To calculate whether interest rates offered on savings products were loss-making, the Dutch State argued that they should not be compared with EURIBOR rates but rather with rates resulting from the so-called ‘replicating portfolio methodology’ [95].
Glede izračuna, ki bi pokazal, ali so obrestne mere za varčevalne instrumente prinašale izgubo, je Nizozemska trdila, da se jih ne sme primerjati z obrestnimi merami EURIBOR, ampak z obrestnimi merami, ki izhajajo iz t. i. „metode replikacijskega portfelja“ [95].
Using that methodology, the Dutch State acknowledged that for some products, there was a temporary negative margin.
Nizozemska, ki je uporabila to metodo, je priznala, da je bila stopnja pri nekaterih proizvodnih začasno negativna.
However, it argued that it was rational market behaviour and in line with market behaviour of (privately-owned) competitors at that precise point in time.
Vendar je trdila, da je bilo to v tistem trenutku razumno tržno ravnanje in v skladu s tržnim ravnanjem konkurentov (v zasebni lasti).
Comments from the Dutch State on the complainant’s arguments of 21 and 28 August 2009
Pripombe Nizozemske na trditve pritožnika z dne 21. in 28. avgusta 2009
The Dutch argued that its earlier comments summarized in recitals 206 to 211 concerning the complainant were still valid.
Nizozemska je trdila, da njene prejšnje pripombe, povzete v uvodnih izjavah 206 do 211 v zvezi s pritožnikom, še vedno držijo.
In addition, the Dutch State noted that the complainant’s claim that ABN AMRO N and FBN market share had increased was based on flawed statistics.
Poleg tega je Nizozemska ugotovila, da je trditev pritožnika glede povečanja tržnega deleža bank ABN AMRO N in FBN temeljila na napačni statistiki.
With respect to the alleged EUR 21 billion increase in deposits collected by ABN AMRO N, the Dutch State argued that only EUR 5,1 billion was due to Dutch retail savings with the rest mainly due to corporate customer savings and foreign deposits.
Glede domnevnega povečanja depozitov v znesku 21 milijard EUR, ki jih je zbrala banka ABN AMRO N, je Nizozemska trdila, da je bilo od tega samo 5,1 milijarde EUR nizozemskih hipotekarnih posojil za prebivalstvo, ostalo pa so bili v glavnem hipotekarna posojila podjetjem in tuji depoziti.
The Dutch State also provided data, showing that a large part of FBN’s volume increase of deposits and savings stemmed from corporate banking as opposed to retail and private banking.
Nizozemska je predložila tudi podatke, ki kažejo, da je večina povečanega obsega depozitov in prihrankov izhajala iz bančnega poslovanja s podjetji in ne iz poslovanja s prebivalstvom in zasebnega bančništva.
The Dutch State observed that that Dutch customers had invested more into their savings because of the uncertain macroeconomic environment.
Nizozemska je ugotovila, da so nizozemske stranke več vlagale v svoje prihranke zaradi negotovega makroekonomskega okolja.
It pointed to data of the Central Bureau of Statistics (‘CBS’) which indicated that savings increased by 7,7 % year-on-year in the first half of 2009.
Opozorila je na podatke Glavnega statističnega urada (v nadaljnjem besedilu: CBS), ki so kazali, da so se v prvi polovici leta 2009 na medletni ravni prihranki povečali za 7,7 %.
Comments from the Dutch State on the comments of ABN AMRO Bank
Pripombe Nizozemske glede pripomb ABN AMRO Bank
The Dutch State confirmed that it had not provided a liquidity facility to ABN AMRO N, thereby broadly confirming ABN AMRO Bank’s arguments.
Nizozemska je potrdila, da banki ABN AMRO N ni zagotovila likvidnostnega posojila, s čimer je na splošno potrdila trditve ABN AMRO Bank.
Article 107(1) of the Treaty provides that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
Člen 107(1) Pogodbe določa, da je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom, kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami.
It follows that a State measure qualifies as State aid if it meets the following four (cumulative) criteria:
Iz tega sledi, da državni ukrep pomeni državno pomoč, če izpolnjuje naslednja štiri (kumulativna) merila:
State resources;
državna sredstva,
selective advantage;
selektivna prednost,
distortive impact on competition; and
izkrivljajoč učinek na konkurenco in
impact on trade between Member States.
vpliv na trgovino med državami članicami.
The first criterion is met for Measures (Y1) to (E) in Table 4 in recital 128 as all those Measures are directly financed from the Dutch State’s resources.
Ukrepi (Y1) do (E) v preglednici 4 iz uvodne izjave 128 vsi izpolnjujejo prvo merilo, saj so vsi ti ukrepi neposredno financirani iz državnih sredstev Nizozemske.
Whether a measure constitutes a selective advantage to FBN, ABN AMRO N or ABN AMRO Group post-merger (the second criterion) is analysed in the recitals 220 to 278, examining each measure separately.
Vprašanje, ali ukrep pomeni selektivno prednost banki FBN, banki ABN AMRO N ali skupini ABN AMRO po združitvi (drugo merilo), je obravnavano v uvodnih izjavah 220 do 278, pri čemer je vsak ukrep obravnavan ločeno.
If a selective advantage exists in this case, the third and fourth criteria would also be fulfilled.
Če v tem primeru obstaja selektivna prednost, sta izpolnjena tudi tretje in četrto merilo.
All the measures distort or threaten to distort competition as they place FBN, ABN AMRO N or ABN AMRO Group after the merger in a beneficial position vis-à-vis other competing banks (third criterion).
Vsi ukrepi izkrivljajo ali bi lahko izkrivljali konkurenco, saj je banka FBN, banka ABN AMRO N ali skupina ABN AMRO po združitvi v ugodnejšem položaju kot druge konkurenčne banke (tretje merilo).
Moreover, the measures also have an impact on trade between Member States.
Poleg tega ukrepi vplivajo tudi na trgovino med državami članicami.
FBN, ABN AMRO N and ABN AMRO Group post-merger are internationally-oriented banks with activities outside the Netherlands while also competing in their home market with subsidiaries of foreign banks (fourth criterion).
Banka FBN, banka ABN AMRO N in skupina ABN AMRO po združitvi so mednarodno usmerjene banke z dejavnostmi zunaj Nizozemske, hkrati pa na svojem domačem trgu konkurirajo podružnicam tujih bank (četrto merilo).
Measures Y1 and Y2 of 3 October 2008
Ukrepa Y1 in Y2 z dne 3. oktobra 2008
It is appropriate to recall that this Decision assesses only potential aid to FBN, ABN AMRO N or ABN AMRO Group post-merger.
Opozoriti je treba, da ta sklep ocenjuje samo morebitno pomoč banki FBN, banki ABN AMRO N ali skupini ABN AMRO po združitvi.
Potential aid to Fortis Bank SA/NV arising out of Measures Y1 and Y2 was assessed in the Decision of 3 December 2008.
Morebitna pomoč Fortis Bank SA/NV, ki je izhajala iz ukrepov Y1 in Y2, je bila ocenjena v odločbi z dne 3. decembra 2008.
As indicated in recital 52 of the Decision of 3 December 2008 [96] and in the initial aid assessment of those measures in the Decision of 8 April 2009, the measures taken on 3 October 2008 (namely Measures X, Y1 and Y2) are inextricably linked.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 52 odločbe z dne 3. decembra 2008 [96] in prvotni oceni pomoči teh ukrepov v odločbi z dne 8. aprila 2009, so ukrepi, ki so bili sprejeti 3. oktobra 2008 (tj. ukrepi X, Y1 in Y2) tesno povezani.
The Dutch State separated FBN and ABN AMRO N from their liquidity-constrained parent by means of the acquisition of FBN but, in order to fully insulate FBN from its parent’s liquidity problems, the Dutch State also had to assume the role of funding provider of FBN.
Nizozemska je banki FBN in ABN AMRO N ločila od njunih likvidnostno omejenih matičnih podjetij s pridobitvijo banke FBN, vendar je morala Nizozemska, da bi Banko FBN popolnoma ločila od težav z likvidnostjo njenega matičnega podjetja, prevzeti tudi vlogo financerja banke FBN.
That goal translated into Measures Y1 and Y2.
Zato sta bila uvedena ukrepa Y1 in Y2.
In addition, on 3 October 2008 the Dutch State took over Fortis SA/NV’s CSA-obligations.
Poleg tega je 3. oktobra 2008 Nizozemska prevzela obveznosti holdinga Fortis SA/NV, ki so izhajale iz sporazuma delničarjev konzorcija.