natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On 18 September 2007, the case was split into part A, concerning the three Terni companies, and part B, with concerning Alcoa.
Zadeva se je 18. septembra 2007 razdelila na del A, v katerem so obravnavane tri družbe naslednice družbe Terni, in del B, ki obravnava družbo Alcoa.
On 20 November 2007, the Commission adopted a negative final decision concerning the Terni companies, ordering recovery of the aid [9].
Komisija je 20. novembra 2007 sprejela končno negativno odločbo v zvezi z družbami Terni, s katero je odredila vračilo pomoči [9].
In the meantime, by letter dated 19 January 2007, the Commission started exploring the idea of transitional measures for the Alcoa tariff scheme in Sardinia, linked to the introduction of a virtual capacity release programme (Virtual Power Plant, hereinafter ‘VPP’).
Medtem je Komisija z dopisom z dne 19. januarja 2007 začela preučevati zamisel o prehodnih ukrepih v zvezi s shemo cen za družbo Alcoa na Sardiniji, ki je povezana z uvedbo virtualnega programa o sprostitvi zmogljivosti (v nadaljnjem besedilu: virtualna elektrarna).
Italy asked for a meeting with the Commission to review possible options for a VPP.
Italija je zahtevala srečanje s Komisijo, da bi se preučile možnosti za virtualno elektrarno.
The main facts of the case
Glavna dejstva zadeve
The aluminium producer Alcoa has, since 1996, benefited from a preferential electricity tariff for its two primary aluminium smelters located in Sardinia (Portovesme) and Veneto (Fusina).
Proizvajalec aluminija Alcoa je od leta 1996 upravičen do ugodnejše cene električne energije za talilnici primarnega aluminija na Sardiniji (Portovesme) in v Benečiji (Fusina).
However, the nature of the tariff was modified over time, and twice prolonged by Italy, in 2004 and again in 2005.
Vendar se je narava cene sčasoma spremenila, pri čemer je Italija veljavnost cene dvakrat podaljšala, in sicer leta 2004 in ponovno leta 2005.
The disputed tariff is subsidised by means of a cash payment by the Equalisation Fund (Cassa Conguaglio per il Settore Elettrico, a public body) [10], reducing the price established contractually between Alcoa and its electricity supplier ENEL.
Sporna cena se subvencionira z gotovinskim plačilom iz izravnalnega sklada (Cassa Conguaglio per il Settore Elettrico, tj. javni organ) [10], s čimer se zniža cena, ki sta jo pogodbeno določila družba Alcoa in njen dobavitelj električne energije ENEL.
The required resources are raised via a parafiscal charge imposed on all electricity consumers by way of component A4 of the electricity bill.
Zahtevana sredstva se zberejo z drugimi dajatvami, ki jih morajo plačati vsi odjemalci električne energije na podlagi sestavnega dela A4 na računu za električno energijo.
The disputed legislative provisions and the regulatory context
Sporne zakonodajne določbe in regulativni okvir
The preferential tariff scheme from which Alcoa benefits is provided for by the respective legislative provisions (2.2.1) and the detailed regulations laid down by the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas (Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica et il Gas — ‘AEEG’) (2.2.2.1).
Shema ugodnejših cen, do katere je upravičena družba Alcoa, je določena v zadevnih zakonodajnih določbah (2.2.1) in podrobnih predpisih, ki jih je določil organ za električno energijo in plin (Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica et il Gas; v nadaljnjem besedilu: AEEG) (2.2.2.1).
The Equalisation Fund is the implementing agency of the scheme (2.2.2.2).
Izravnalni sklad je izvajalska agencija za shemo (2.2.2.2).
The Commission’s analysis of the Alcoa tariff scheme must therefore take account of both the legislative provisions and the Italian regulatory context.
Komisija mora zato pri analizi sheme cen za družbo Alcoa upoštevati zakonodajne določbe in italijanski regulativni okvir.
The legislative provisions
Zakonodajne določbe
The legislative provisions concerned are Article 1 of the Prime Ministerial Decree of 6 February 2004 [11] (hereinafter ‘the 2004 Decree’), as implemented by the relevant regulatory provisions and Article 11(11) of Decree-Law No 35 of 14 March 2005, converted into Law No 80/2005 ‘Urgent Provisions under the Action Plan for Economic, Social and Territorial Development’ (hereinafter ‘Law No 80/2005’) as implemented by the relevant regulatory provisions [12].
Zadevne zakonodajne določbe so člen 1 odloka predsednika vlade z dne 6. februarja 2004 [11] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odlok iz leta 2004), kakor je bil izveden z ustreznimi uredbenimi določbami in členom 11(11) zakonskega odloka št. 35 z dne 14. marca 2005, spremenjenega v zakon št. 80/2005 z naslovom „Nujne določbe v skladu z akcijskim načrtom za gospodarski, socialni in ozemeljski razvoj“ (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zakon št. 80/2005), kakor je bil izveden z ustreznimi uredbenimi določbami [12].
The regulatory context in Italy
Regulativni okvir v Italiji
The AEEG
AEEG
In particular, it sets and updates the electricity tariffs as well as the modalities for the collection of resources required to cover general system charges [14].
Zlasti določa in spreminja cene električne energije ter načine zbiranja sredstev za kritje splošnih sistemskih dajatev [14].
In discharging these functions, the AEEG takes into account the policy indications given by the government as regards the provision of services in the general interest of the country [15].
AEEG pri izvajanju teh nalog upošteva politične smernice vlade v zvezi z zagotavljanjem storitev v splošnem državnem interesu [15].
Acting within the powers attributed to it, the AEEG has, over the years, issued a large number of decisions (delibere) laying down precise modalities for the management of preferential tariff schemes in Italy.
AEEG je v preteklosti v okviru svojih pooblastil sprejel veliko odločb (delibere), ki določajo natančne načine za upravljanje shem ugodnejših cen v Italiji.
The Equalisation Fund
Izravnalni sklad
The context in which the preferential tariff was introduced and its changes over time
Okoliščine, v katerih je bila uvedena ugodnejša cena, in poznejše spremembe teh okoliščin
In order to assess the Alcoa tariff which is the subject of this Decision it is necessary to revisit the context in which it was introduced and its changes over time.
Za oceno cene za družbo Alcoa, ki se obravnava v tem sklepu, je treba ponovno pregledati okoliščine, v katerih je bila ta cena uvedena, in poznejše spremembe teh okoliščin.
Introduction of the tariff: the 1996 Alumix decision
Uvedba cene: odločba Alumix iz leta 1996
In the early 1990s, as part of the liquidation of the State-owned conglomerate EFIM [16], the Italian aluminium producer Alumix was restructured, privatised and sold to Alcoa.
Na začetku devetdesetih let 20. stoletja se je italijanski proizvajalec aluminija Alumix kot del likvidacije konglomerata EFIM [16] v državni lasti prestrukturiral, privatiziral in bil prodan družbi Alcoa.
Alumix operated two primary aluminium smelters, one in Portovesme, Sardinia, and the other in Fusina, Veneto.
Družba Alumix je upravljala dve talilnici primarnega aluminija, eno v kraju Portovesme na Sardiniji in drugo v kraju Fusina v Benečiji.
The acquisition of Alumix by Alcoa was made conditional upon the provision by ENEL, the State-owned electricity supplier, of a preferential tariff for the supply of electricity to the two smelters.
Družba Alcoa je pri nakupu družbe Alumix postavila pogoj, da družba ENEL, tj. dobavitelj električne energije v državni lasti, zagotovi ugodnejšo ceno za dobavo električne energije obema talilnicama.
The preferential tariff for Alcoa was established by the Ministerial Decree of 19 December 1995 (hereinafter ‘the 1995 Decree’).
Ugodnejša cena za družbo Alcoa je bila uvedena z ministrskim odlokom z dne 19. decembra 1995 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odlok iz leta 1995).
The reduced tariff was examined under the State aid rules in the case C 38/92.
Nižja cena se je preverila na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči v zadevi C 38/1992.
In its decision of 4 December 1996 [18] (hereinafter ‘the Alumix decision’), the Commission ruled that it did not constitute State aid on the basis of the considerations summarised below.
Komisija je v odločbi z dne 4. decembra 1996 [18] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba Alumix) odločila, da ugodnejše cene ne pomenijo državne pomoči na podlagi ugotovitev, povzetih v nadaljevanju.
Under the arrangement under consideration, the State set the tariff to be charged to Alcoa, and ENEL, the only supplier of electricity at the time in Italy, provided Alcoa with electricity at the prescribed tariff.
Država je na podlagi obravnavanega dogovora določila ceno za družbo Alcoa, pri čemer je družba ENEL, ki je bila takrat edina dobaviteljica električne energije v Italiji, dobavljala električno energijo družbi Alcoa po določeni ceni.
The prices for both smelters were established for 10 years.
Cene za obe talilnici so bile določene za 10 let.
ENEL was at the time a State-owned body [19] with a monopoly on the supply of electricity.
ENEL je bil takrat organ v državni lasti [19] z monopolom nad dobavo električne energije.
The Commission, therefore, examined whether ENEL was acting like a rational market operator in applying the price set to Alcoa.
Zato je Komisija preverila, ali je ENEL pri uporabi cene za družbo Alcoa deloval kot razumen udeleženec na trgu.
The Commission assessed the electricity supply situation in the two regions concerned over the ten-year period covered by the preferential tariff.
Komisija je ocenila razmere na področju oskrbe z električno energijo v obeh zadevnih regijah v desetletnem obdobju, zajetem v ugodnejšo cenovno obravnavo.
It noted that in Sardinia and Veneto the electricity market was characterised by an overcapacity in electricity generation which was unlikely to disappear in the following ten years.
Ugotovila je, da je za trg z električno energijo na Sardiniji in v Benečiji značilna presežna proizvodnja električne energije, ki se bo verjetno ohranila v naslednjih desetih letih.
It also noted that it was impossible for generators to export electricity from these regions because of insufficient interconnection with mainland Italy in the case of Sardinia and due to lack of demand from neighbouring regions in the case of Veneto [20].
Prav tako je ugotovila, da proizvajalci ne morejo izvažati električne energije iz teh regij zaradi neustreznega medsebojnega povezovanja s celinsko Italijo v primeru Sardinije in zaradi premajhnega povpraševanja v sosednjih regijah v primeru Benečije [20].
In these circumstances, the Commission held that a large industrial client like Alcoa had substantial bargaining power with respect to ENEL, since the closure of the two smelters, which were among ENEL’s best customers in Italy, would entail even greater overcapacity and a worsening cost structure for ENEL.
Komisija je menila, da je imel v teh okoliščinah velik industrijski odjemalec, kot je Alcoa, veliko pogajalsko moč pri družbi ENEL, ker bi zaprtje obeh talilnic, ki sta bili eni od najboljših odjemalcev družbe ENEL v Italiji, pomenilo še dodatno presežno zmogljivost in poslabšanje strukture stroškov za družbo ENEL.
Therefore it was in ENEL’s economic interest to supply the smelters in Portovesme and Fusina with electricity at a particularly low price.
Zato je bila dobava električne energije po znatno nižji ceni za talilnici v krajih Portovesme in Fusina v gospodarskem interesu družbe ENEL.
The Commission considered that a rational electricity supplier would be prepared to sell at a price that covered its average marginal cost of production, calculated on the basis of the actual fuel mix used by power plants in the regions concerned, plus a small contribution towards fixed costs.
Komisija je menila, da bi bil razumen dobavitelj električne energije pripravljen prodajati po ceni, ki bi zajemala povprečne mejne stroške proizvodnje, izračunane na podlagi dejanske mešanice goriva, ki jo uporabljajo elektrarne v zadevnih regijah, skupaj z majhnim prispevkom k fiksnim stroškom.
The price set for Alcoa was shown to comply with these criteria.
Izkazalo se je, da je cena za družbo Alcoa izpolnjevala ta merila.
As for the modest annual increases in the Alcoa price set for the following ten years, the Commission considered them justified by the prediction that ENEL’s marginal cost of production would decrease over the years, thanks to improvements in the fuel mix and generation technologies.
Komisija je v zvezi s skromnimi letnimi povečanji cene za družbo Alcoa za naslednjih deset let menila, da so ta povečanja upravičena zaradi napovedi, da naj bi se mejni stroški proizvodnje družbe ENEL v prihodnosti znižali zaradi izboljšanja mešanice goriv in proizvodnih tehnologij.
The Commission thus concluded that ENEL was behaving like a rational market operator in granting the tariff and the measure was according declared not to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je zato sklenila, da je družba ENEL pri odobritvi cene ravnala kot razumen udeleženec na trgu, in razglasila, da zadevni ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
Transformation of the Alcoa tariff into a ‘general system charge’ and relevant changes in the financing mechanism
Preoblikovanje cene za družbo Alcoa v „splošne sistemske dajatve“ in ustrezne spremembe finančnega mehanizma
In the years immediately following the Alumix decision, the Italian electricity system was restructured with a view to the gradual liberalisation of the EU electricity market [21].
Italijanski elektroenergetski sistem se je v obdobju tik po sprejetju odločbe Alumix prestrukturiral glede na postopno liberalizacijo trga z električno energijo v EU [21].
In 1997 the standard electricity tariff [22] was restructured and divided into tariff components [23].
Standardna cena za električno energijo [22] se je leta 1997 prestrukturirala in razdelila na sestavne dele cene [23].
The Alcoa tariff underwent a first change.
Cena za družbo Alcoa se je prvič spremenila.
The Alumix price, which had been a global figure before the reform, was unbundled into tariff components, so that it would fit within the new standard tariff structure.
Cena Alumix, ki je bila pred reformo skupni znesek, se je razdelila na sestavne dele cene, da bi se prilagodila novi strukturi standardne cene.
The tariff components applicable to Alcoa were reduced in such a way that the end-price corresponded exactly to that of the Alumix decision.
Sestavni deli cene, ki so se uporabljali za družbo Alcoa, so se znižali tako, da je bila končna cena popolnoma enaka ceni iz odločbe Alumix.
At this stage, ENEL, as Italy’s sole electricity supplier, was still granting the tariff directly: it charged Alcoa the Alumix price, and did not receive any separate compensation in respect of its supplies to the undertaking.
V tej fazi je ENEL kot edini dobavitelj električne energije v Italiji še vedno odobril ceno neposredno: družbi Alcoa je zaračunal ceno Alumix, pri čemer ni prejel nobenega ločenega nadomestila za svojo dobavo družbi.
In 1999, when Italy transposed the first EU liberalisation directive [24], ENEL ceased to have a monopoly over electricity supplies in Italy and was split into several entities.
Leta 1999, ko je Italija prenesla prvo direktivo EU o liberalizaciji [24], se je monopol družbe ENEL nad oskrbo z električno energijo v Italiji končal, pri čemer se je družba razdelila na več družb.
While ENEL had previously sold electricity directly to Alcoa at the preferential rate, under the new mechanism [26] ENEL received the full ordinary price charged to large industrial clients, and other electricity customers provided the funds necessary to ensure that Alcoa continued to pay the Alumix price.
Čeprav je družba ENEL v preteklosti prodajala električno energijo neposredno družbi Alcoa po ugodnejši ceni, je na podlagi novega mehanizma [26] družba ENEL prejela celotno običajno ceno, zaračunano velikim industrijskim odjemalcem, pri čemer so drugi odjemalci električne energije zagotovili potrebna sredstva za zagotavljanje, da je družba Alcoa še naprej plačevala ceno Alumix. V praksi se je družbi Alcoa nominalno zaračunala polna cena, pri čemer pa je družba dobila neposredni popust na računu.
In practice, Alcoa was nominally charged the full price, but benefited from a direct discount on its bill. ENEL financed this discount by retaining the proceeds of a newly introduced parafiscal charge by way of component A4 of the electricity tariff which was paid by all users [27].
Družba ENEL je financirala ta popust z ohranitvijo prihodkov od novo uvedenih drugih dajatev na podlagi sestavnega dela A4 cene za električno energijo, ki so jo plačevali vsi odjemalci [27].
In 2002, Alcoa concluded a bilateral contract with ENEL at a nominal price corresponding approximately to the standard tariff charged by the utility for the supply of high-voltage electricity.
Družba Alcoa je leta 2002 sklenila dvostransko pogodbo z družbo ENEL po nominalni ceni, ki je približno ustrezala standardni ceni, ki jo je zaračunavalo to javno podjetje za dobavo električne energije visoke napetosti.
A further significant change occurred in 2004 with the adoption by the AEEG of Decision No 148/04, which entrusted the full administrative management of the tariffs to the Equalisation Fund.
Druga bistvena sprememba se je zgodila leta 2004, ko je AEEG sprejel odločbo št. 148/04, s katero se je upravno poslovodenje cen v celoti preneslo na izravnalni sklad.
Under this system, ENEL no longer retained the proceeds of the A4 component, but transferred them entirely to the Equalisation Fund, which carried out the calculations and reimbursed Alcoa.
Na podlagi tega sistema družba ENEL ni več ohranila prihodkov od sestavnega dela A4, ampak jih je v celoti prenesla na izravnalni sklad, ki je opravil izračune in povrnil stroške družbi Alcoa.
In practice, by this mechanism Alcoa paid the price contractually agreed with ENEL and received ex post from the Equalisation Fund a compensatory contribution enabling it in reality to continue paying the Alumix price.
Družba Alcoa je v praksi z uporabo tega mehanizma plačala ceno, ki je bila pogodbeno dogovorjena z družbo ENEL, in iz izravnalnega sklada naknadno prejela kompenzacijski prispevek, na podlagi katerega je lahko dejansko še naprej plačevala ceno Alumix.
For Alcoa, this new administrative arrangement came into effect in September 2004 and still applies to date [28].
Ta nov upravni dogovor je za družbo Alcoa začel veljati septembra 2004 in se uporablja še danes [28].
The first disputed extension of the Alcoa tariff
Prvo sporno podaljšanje veljavnosti cene za družbo Alcoa
By the 2004 Decree the Italian government extended to 30 June 2007 the preferential electricity tariff established by the Decree of 19 December 1995 for ‘supplies of electricity for the production of aluminium, lead, silver and zinc, limited to plants already in existence at the time of entry into force of the present Decree, located in insular areas having insufficient or no connections to the national electricity and gas networks’ [29].
Italijanska vlada je do sprejetja odloka iz leta 2004 podaljšala ugodnejšo ceno električne energije, ki je bila uvedena z odlokom z dne 19. decembra 1995, do 30. junija 2007, in sicer za „dobavo električne energije za proizvodnjo aluminija, svinca, srebra in cinka, vendar le za obrate, ki so bili ob začetku veljavnosti tega odloka že ustanovljeni in se nahajajo na otoških območjih ter nimajo dovolj povezav z nacionalnimi elektroenergetskimi in plinovodnimi omrežji ali teh povezav sploh nimajo“ [29].
In practice, the 2004 Decree was designed to (a) prolong the existing tariff applicable to Alcoa until June 2007 and (b) extend the same treatment to three other companies located in Sardinia: Portovesme, ILA and Euroallumina.
Odlok iz leta 2004 je bil v praksi namenjen (a) podaljšanju veljavne cene za družbo Alcoa do junija 2007 in (b) podaljšanju enake obravnave za tri druge družbe na Sardiniji: Portovesme, ILA in Euroallumina.
The extension of the Alcoa tariff set out by the 2004 Decree was implemented, at the regulatory level, by AEEG Decision No 148/04/EC which also introduced the changes to the financing mechanism mentioned in recital 43 above.
Podaljšanje veljavnosti cene za družbo Alcoa, ki ga določa odlok iz leta 2004, se je na regulativni ravni izvajalo z odločbo AEEG št. 148/04, s katero so bile prav tako uvedene spremembe finančnega mehanizma iz uvodne izjave 43.
This first prolongation was the subject of the formal investigation proceedings concerning the 2004 Decree opened in Case C 38/04 [30].
To prvo podaljšanje veljavnosti je bilo predmet formalnega postopka preiskave v zvezi z odlokom iz leta 2004, sproženim v zadevi C 38/2004 [30].
According to Italy [31], the 2004 Decree was not implemented with respect to Alcoa, which continued to benefit from the tariff based on its original legal basis, the 1995 Decree.
Italija [31] je navedla, da se odlok iz leta 2004 ni izvajal za družbo Alcoa, ki je bila še naprej upravičena do cene na prvotni pravni podlagi, torej na podlagi odloka iz leta 1995.
The second disputed extension of the Alcoa tariff
Drugo sporno podaljšanje veljavnosti cene za družbo Alcoa
By Article 11(11) of Law No 80/2005, the Italian authorities extended until 2010 the preferential tariff for Alcoa at the tariff conditions in force on 31 December 2004 [32].
Italijanski organi so s členom 11(11) zakona št. 80/2005 podaljšali veljavnost ugodnejše cene za družbo Alcoa do leta 2010 v skladu z veljavnimi cenovnimi pogoji z dne 31. decembra 2004 [32].
In order to determine the price which Alcoa should pay beyond 2005, Law No 80/2005 introduced an indexation mechanism whereby, from 1 January 2006, the preferential price (that is the price set in the Alumix decision for the year 2005) was to increase by 4 % yearly, or, alternatively, by the average percentage increase in the Amsterdam and Frankfurt electricity exchanges [33].
Za določitev cene, ki jo je moralo plačevati podjetje Alcoa po letu 2005, se je z zakonom št. 80/2005 uvedel mehanizem za indeksacijo, na podlagi katerega naj bi se od 1. januarja 2006 ugodnejša cena (to je cena iz odločbe Alumix za leto 2005) povečala za 4 % na leto ali za povprečen odstotek povečanja izmenjave električne energije med Amsterdamom in Frankfurtom [33].
However, after consultations with the beneficiaries, the AEEG gave a different interpretation to the updated mechanism.
Vendar je AEEG po posvetovanju z upravičenci zagotovil drugačno razlago posodobljenega mehanizma.
AEEG Decision No 217/05 stipulated that the annual tariff increase would follow average wholesale prices, but could not increase by more than 4 %.
Odločba AEEG št. 217/05 določa, da naj bi bilo letno povečanje cene usklajeno s povprečnimi veleprodajnimi cenami, pri čemer se te cene ne bi mogle povečati za več kot 4 %.
This updated mechanism resulted de facto in lower annual increases in the preferential tariff compared to what was originally provided for in the legislation.
Zaradi tega posodobljenega mehanizma so se dejansko ugodnejše cene na letni ravni povečale manj, kot je bilo prvotno določeno v zakonodaji.
The second extension was the subject of the formal investigation proceedings opened in Case C 36/06.
Drugo podaljšanje je bilo predmet formalnega postopka preiskave, sproženega v zadevi C 36/06.
When the Commission opened formal investigation proceedings in respect of Article 11(12) of Law No 80/2005, the AEEG, by Decision No 190/06, made payments under Law No 80/2005 conditional upon the provision by Alcoa of a bank or parent company guarantee to cover the risk of recovery of the aid.
Potem ko je Komisija sprožila formalni postopek preiskave v zvezi s členom 11(12) zakona št. 80/2005, je AEEG z odločbo št. 190/06 v skladu z zakonom št. 80/2005 pogojil plačila z določbo, da družba Alcoa zagotovi bančno garancijo ali garancijo matične družbe za kritje tveganja vračila pomoči.
The payments made by the Equalisation Fund to Alcoa over the period from January 2006 to January 2009 are indicated in the table below.
Plačila družbi Alcoa iz izravnalnega sklada v obdobju od januarja 2006 do januarja 2009 so navedena v preglednici spodaj.