natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To ensure equal treatment between Member States, the interest-bearing deposit and the fine should be identical for all Member States whose currency is the euro and equal to 0,1 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Member State concerned in the preceding year.
Za zagotovitev enake obravnave držav članic bi morala biti obrestni depozit in globa enaka za vse države članice, katerih valuta je euro, in znašati 0,1 % bruto domačega proizvoda (BDP) zadevne države članice v predhodnem letu.
The Commission should be able to recommend reducing the amount of a sanction or cancelling it on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances.
Komisija bi morala imeti v primeru izjemnih ekonomskih okoliščin možnost priporočiti zmanjšanje višine sankcij ali jih preklicati.
The procedure for applying sanctions to those Member States which fail to take effective measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances should be construed in such a way that the application of the sanctions to those Member States would be the rule and not the exception.
Postopek za uporabo sankcij za tiste države članice, ki niso sprejele učinkovitih ukrepov za odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij, bi moral biti oblikovan tako, da bi bila uvedba sankcij za navedene države članice pravilo in ne izjema.
Fines referred to in this Regulation should constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and should be assigned to stability mechanisms to provide financial assistance, created by Member States whose currency is the euro in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole.
Globe iz te uredbe bi morale pomeniti druge prihodke iz člena 311 PDEU in bi se morali dodeliti mehanizmom za stabilnost za zagotavljanje finančne pomoči, ki jih vzpostavijo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, da bi zaščitile stabilnost celotnega euroobmočja.
The power to adopt individual decisions for the application of the sanctions provided for in this Regulation should be conferred on the Council.
Svetu bi bilo treba dodeliti pristojnosti za sprejemanje posameznih sklepov za uporabo sankcij, predvidenih s to uredbo.
As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as provided for in Article 121(1) TFEU, those individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 121 TFEU and Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.
Ti posamezni sklepi so kot del usklajevanja ekonomskih politik držav članic v Svetu v skladu s členom 121(1) PDEU ključna dopolnitev ukrepov, ki jih Svet sprejme v skladu s členom 121 PDEU in Uredbo (EU) št. 1176/2011.
Since this Regulation contains general rules for the effective enforcement of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6) TFEU.
Ker ta uredba vsebuje splošna pravila za učinkovito izvajanje Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011, bi se morala sprejeti v skladu z rednim zakonodajnim postopkom iz člena 121(6) PDEU.
Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the effective enforcement of the correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the deep trade and financial interlinks between Member States and the spill-over effects of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole, and can therefore be better achieved at the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.
Ker cilja te uredbe, in sicer učinkovitega izvajanja odpravljanja čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v euroobmočju, države članice zaradi tesnih medsebojnih trgovinskih in finančnih povezav ter prelivanja učinkov nacionalnih ekonomskih politik na Unijo in celotno euroobmočje ne morejo zadovoljivo doseči in ker se ta cilj lažje doseže na ravni Unije, lahko Unija sprejme ukrepe v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji.
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective,
V skladu z načelom sorazmernosti iz navedenega člena ta uredba ne presega tistega, kar je potrebno za doseganje navedenega cilja –
This Regulation lays down a system of sanctions for the effective correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.
Ta uredba določa sistem sankcij za učinkovito odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v euroobmočju.
For the purposes of this Regulation, the definitions set out in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 shall apply.
Za namene te uredbe se uporabljajo opredelitve pojmov iz člena 2 Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011.
In addition, the following definition shall apply:
Poleg tega se uporablja naslednja opredelitev:
‘exceptional economic circumstances’ means circumstances where an excess of a government deficit over the reference value is considered exceptional within the meaning of the second indent of point (a) of Article 126(2) TFEU and as specified in Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [7].Article 3
„izjemne ekonomske okoliščine“ pomeni razmere, v katerih se presežek javnofinančnega primanjkljaja nad referenčno vrednostjo šteje za izjemnega v smislu druge alinee točke (a) člena 126(2) PDEU in kakor je določeno v Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 1467/97 z dne 7. julija 1997 o pospešitvi in razjasnitvi izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem [7].Člen 3
An interest-bearing deposit shall be imposed by a Council decision, acting on a recommendation from the Commission, if a Council decision establishing non-compliance is adopted in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, where the Council concludes that the Member State concerned has not taken the corrective action recommended by the Council.
Svet na priporočilo Komisije s sklepom naloži obrestni depozit, če je v skladu s členom 10(4) Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 sprejet sklep Sveta o ugotovitvi neupoštevanja priporočil, v katerem Svet ugotovi, da zadevna država članica ni sprejela popravljalnih ukrepov, priporočenih s strani Sveta.
An annual fine shall be imposed by a Council decision, acting on a recommendation by the Commission, where:
Svet na priporočilo Komisije s sklepom naloži letno globo, če:
two successive Council recommendations in the same imbalance procedure are adopted in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 and the Council considers that the Member State has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan; or
sta bili v skladu s členom 8(3) Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 v istem postopku v zvezi s čezmernim neravnotežjem sprejeti dve zaporedni priporočili ter Svet meni, da je država članica predložila nezadosten načrt popravljalnih ukrepov; ali
two successive Council decisions in the same imbalance procedure are adopted establishing non-compliance in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.
sta bila v skladu s členom 10(4) Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 v istem postopku v zvezi s čezmernim neravnotežjem sprejeta dva zaporedna sklepa Sveta o neupoštevanju priporočil.
In this case, the annual fine shall be imposed by means of converting the interest-bearing deposit into an annual fine.
V tem primeru se letna globa naloži tako, da se obrestni depozit spremeni v letno globo.
The decisions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the recommendation within 10 days of its adoption by the Commission.
Šteje se, da je Svet sklepa iz odstavkov 1 in 2 sprejel, razen če se v desetih dneh od dneva, ko je Komisija sprejela priporočilo, s kvalificirano večino ne odloči za zavrnitev priporočila.
The Council may decide, by qualified majority, to amend the recommendation.
Svet se lahko s kvalificirano večino odloči priporočilo spremeniti.
The Commission's recommendation for a Council decision shall be issued within 20 days of the conditions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 being met.
Priporočilo Komisije za sklep Sveta se izda v roku dvajsetih dni po izpolnitvi pogojev iz odstavkov 1 in 2.
The interest-bearing deposit or the annual fine recommended by the Commission shall be 0,1 % of the GDP in the preceding year of the Member State concerned.
Obrestni depozit ali letna globa, ki jo priporoči Komisija, znaša 0,1 % BDP zadevne države članice v predhodnem letu.
By derogation from paragraph 5, the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within 10 days of the conditions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 being met, propose to reduce or cancel the interest-bearing deposit or the annual fine.
Komisija lahko z odstopanjem od odstavka 5 zaradi izjemnih ekonomskih okoliščin ali na podlagi utemeljene prošnje zadevne države članice, naslovljene na Komisijo v desetih dneh od izpolnitve pogojev iz odstavkov 1 in 2, predlaga zmanjšanje ali preklic obrestnega depozita ali letne globe.
If a Member State has constituted an interest-bearing deposit or has paid an annual fine for a given calendar year and the Council thereafter concludes, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 that the Member State has taken the recommended corrective action in the course of that year, the deposit paid for that year together with the accrued interest or the fine paid for that year shall be returned to the Member State pro rata temporis.
Če je država članica položila obrestni depozit ali plačala letno globo za določeno koledarsko leto in Svet pozneje v skladu s členom 10(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 ugotovi, da je država članica v zadevnem letu sprejela priporočene popravljalne ukrepe, se depozit skupaj z obrestmi ali globa, plačana za zadevno leto, vrneta državi članici sorazmerno glede na čas.
Allocation of the fines
Dodelitev glob
Fines referred to in Article 3 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility.
Globe iz člena 3 te uredbe pomenijo druge prihodke iz člena 311 PDEU in se dodelijo evropskemu instrumentu za finančno stabilnost.
When the Member States whose currency is the euro create another stability mechanism to provide financial assistance in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, those fines shall be assigned to that mechanism.
Kadar države članice, katerih valuta je euro, vzpostavijo drug mehanizem za stabilnost za zagotavljanje finančne pomoči, da se zagotovi stabilnost celotnega euroobmočja, se globe dodelijo temu mehanizmu.
For the measures referred to in Article 3, only members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is the euro shall vote, and the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.
V zvezi z ukrepi iz člena 3 glasujejo samo člani Sveta, ki predstavljajo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, ob tem se ne upošteva glas člana Sveta, ki predstavlja zadevno državo članico.
In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss decisions taken pursuant to Article 3.
Za okrepitev dialoga med institucijami Unije, zlasti Evropskim parlamentom, Svetom in Komisijo, ter za zagotovitev večje preglednosti in odgovornosti lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta povabi predsednika Sveta, Komisijo in po potrebi predsednika Evropskega sveta ali predsednika Euroskupine, da nastopijo pred odborom in razpravljajo o sklepih, sprejetih v skladu s členom 3.
That report shall evaluate, inter alia:
V tem poročilu sta med drugim ocenjena tudi:
the effectiveness of this Regulation;
učinkovitost te uredbe,
the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of economic performances of the Member States in accordance with the TFEU.
doseženi napredek pri zagotavljanju tesnejše uskladitve ekonomskih politik in trajnostne konvergence ekonomskih učinkov držav članic v skladu s PDEU.
Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a proposal for amendments to this Regulation.
Po potrebi se poročilu priložijo predlogi za spremembo te uredbe.
The Commission shall send the report and any accompanying proposals to the European Parliament and to the Council.
Komisija poročilo in vse priložene predloge pošlje Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu.
OJ C 218, 23.7.2011, p. 53.
UL C 218, 23.7.2011, str. 53.
Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Uredba (EU) št. 1175/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies
o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 1466/97 o okrepitvi nadzora nad proračunskim stanjem ter o nadzoru in usklajevanju gospodarskih politik
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 121(6) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije in zlasti člena 121(6) Pogodbe,
The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.
Usklajevanje ekonomskih politik držav članic, kakor je določeno v Pogodbi o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU), bi moralo vključevati skladnost z vodilnimi načeli stabilnih cen, zdravih javnih financ in monetarnih pogojev ter uravnotežene plačilne bilance.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) initially consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [3], Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [4] and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the Stability and Growth Pact [5].
Pakt za stabilnost in rast so prvotno sestavljale Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1466/97 z dne 7. julija 1997 o okrepitvi nadzora nad proračunskim stanjem ter o nadzoru in usklajevanju gospodarskih politik [3], Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1467/97 z dne 7. julija 1997 o pospešitvi in razjasnitvi izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem [4] ter resolucija Evropskega sveta z dne 17. junija 1997 o Paktu za stabilnost in rast [5].
Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97 were amended in 2005 by Regulations (EC) No 1055/2005 [6] and (EC) No 1056/2005 [7] respectively.
Uredbi (ES) št. 1466/97 in (ES) št. 1467/97 sta bili leta 2005 spremenjeni z uredbama (ES) št. 1055/2005 [6] oziroma (ES) št. 1056/2005 [7].
In addition, the Council Report of 20 March 2005 on ‘Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’ [8] was adopted.
Poleg tega je bilo sprejeto poročilo Sveta z dne 20. marca 2005 o izboljšanju izvajanja Pakta za stabilnost in rast [8].
The SGP is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union's objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
Pakt za stabilnost in rast temelji na cilju zdravih javnih financ kot sredstvu za izboljšanje pogojev za stabilnost cen in za močno trajnostno rast, podprto s finančno stabilnostjo, s čimer podpira uresničevanje ciljev Unije za trajnostno rast in delovna mesta.
The preventive part of the SGP requires that Member States achieve and maintain a medium-term budgetary objective and submit stability and convergence programmes to that effect.
Preventivni del Pakta za stabilnost in rast zahteva, da države članice dosežejo in vzdržujejo srednjeročne proračunske cilje ter v ta namen predložijo programe za stabilnost in konvergenco.
It would benefit from more stringent forms of surveillance in order to ensure Member States' consistency and compliance with the Union's budgetary coordination framework.
Koristile bi mu strožje oblike nadzora, da se zagotovi da države članice dosledno spoštujejo okvir Unije za proračunsko usklajevanje.
The content of the stability and convergence programmes as well as the procedure for their examination should further be developed both at national and at the level of the Union in the light of the experience gained with the implementation of the SGP.
Vsebino programov za stabilnost in za konvergenco ter postopek za njihovo ocenjevanje bi bilo treba glede na izkušnje, zbrane pri izvajanju Pakta za stabilnost in rast, dodatno razviti na nacionalni ravni in na ravni Unije.
The budgetary targets in the stability and convergence programmes should explicitly take into account the measures adopted in line with the broad economic policy guidelines, the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States and the Union and, in general, the national reform programmes.
Pri proračunskih ciljih v programih za stabilnost in konvergenco bi bilo treba izrecno upoštevati ukrepe, sprejete v skladu s širšimi smernicami ekonomskih politik, smernicami za zaposlovanje držav članic in Unije ter na splošno z nacionalnimi programi reform.
The submission and assessment of stability and convergence programmes should be made before key decisions on the national budgets for the succeeding years are taken.
Programe za stabilnost in konvergenco bi bilo treba predložiti in oceniti pred sprejetjem bistvenih odločitev o nacionalnih proračunih za prihodnja leta.
Therefore, an appropriate deadline for submission of the stability and convergence programmes should be established.
Zato bi bilo treba določiti primeren rok za predložitev programov za stabilnost in konvergenco.
Taking into account the specificities of the budgetary year of the United Kingdom, special provisions for the date for submission of its convergence programmes should be established.
Ob upoštevanju posebnosti proračunskega leta Združenega kraljestva bi bilo treba uvesti posebne določbe glede roka, do katerega naj Združeno kraljestvo predloži svoj program za konvergenco.
Experience gained and mistakes made during the first decade of the economic and monetary union show a need for improved economic governance in the Union, which should be built on a stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust framework at the level of the Union for the surveillance of national economic policies.
Pridobljene izkušnje in storjene napake v prvem desetletju ekonomske in monetarne unije kažejo potrebo po izboljšanju ekonomskega upravljanja v Uniji, ki bi moralo temeljiti na močnejšem nacionalnem lastništvu skupno dogovorjenih pravil in politik ter na trdnejšem okviru nadzora nad nacionalnimi ekonomskimi politikami na ravni Unije.
The improved economic governance framework should rely on several interlinked and coherent policies for sustainable growth and employment, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus on developing and strengthening the internal market, fostering international trade and competitiveness, a European Semester for strengthened coordination of economic and budgetary policies (European Semester), an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficits (the SGP), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances, minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, and enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macroprudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board.
Izboljšan okvir ekonomskega upravljanja bi moral temeljiti na več medsebojno povezanih in usklajenih politikah za trajnostno rast in zaposlovanje, zlasti na strategiji Unije za rast in delovna mesta, s posebnim poudarkom na razvoju in krepitvi notranjega trga, spodbujanju mednarodne trgovine in konkurenčnosti, evropskem semestru za okrepljeno usklajevanje ekonomskih in proračunskih politik (evropski semester), učinkovitem okviru za preprečevanje in zmanjševanje čezmernega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja (Pakt za stabilnost in rast), trdnem okviru za preprečevanje in odpravljanje makroekonomskih neravnotežij, minimalnih zahtevah za nacionalne proračunske okvire in okrepljeni ureditvi finančnih trgov in nadzoru nad njimi, vključno z makrobonitetnim nadzorom Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja.
The SGP and the complete economic governance framework complement and support the Union strategy for growth and jobs.
Pakt za stabilnost in rast ter celoten okvir ekonomskega upravljanja bi moral dopolnjevati in podpirati s strategijo Unije za rast in delovna mesta.
Interlinks between the different strands should not provide for exemptions from the provisions of the SGP.
Medsebojne povezave različnih delov ne bi smele omogočati izjem od določb Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
The strengthening of economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
Krepitev ekonomskega upravljanja bi morala vključevati tesnejše in pravočasnejše vključevanje Evropskega parlamenta in nacionalnih parlamentov.
While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of the dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State which is the subject of a Council recommendation in accordance with Article 6(2) or Article 10(2).
Kljub temu, da so sogovorniki Evropskega parlamenta v okviru dialoga ustrezne institucije Unije in njihovi predstavniki, lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta ponudi državi članici, na katero je naslovljeno priporočilo Sveta v skladu s členom 6(2) ali členom 10(2), možnost sodelovanja pri izmenjavi mnenj.
The stability and convergence programmes and the national reform programmes should be prepared in a coherent manner and the timing of their submissions should be aligned.
Programi za stabilnost in konvergenco ter nacionalni programi reform bi morali biti pripravljeni skladno, uskladiti pa bi bilo treba tudi roke za njihovo predložitev.
Those programmes should be submitted to the Council and to the Commission.
Ti programi bi morali biti predloženi Svetu in Komisiji.
They should be made public.
Morali bi biti objavljeni.
Under the European Semester the policy surveillance and coordination cycle starts early in the year with a horizontal review in which the European Council, based on input from the Commission and the Council, identifies the main challenges facing the Union and the euro area and gives strategic guidance on policies.
V okviru evropskega semestra se ciklus nadzora nad politikami in njihovega usklajevanja začne na začetku leta s horizontalnim pregledom, v skladu s katerim Evropski svet na podlagi informacij Komisije in Sveta opredeli glavne izzive Unije in euroobmočja ter poda strateške usmeritve o politikah.
Discussion should also take place in the European Parliament at the beginning of the annual cycle of surveillance in due time before the discussion takes place in the European Council.
Na začetku letnega nadzornega cikla bi morale potekati tudi razprave v Evropskem parlamentu, in sicer pravočasno pred začetkom razprave v Evropskem svetu.
When preparing their stability or convergence programmes and national reform programmes, Member States should take into account the horizontal guidance by the European Council.
Države članice bi morale pri pripravi programov za stabilnost ali konvergenco ter nacionalnih programov reform upoštevati horizontalne usmeritve Evropskega sveta