natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, it should be without prejudice to any liability that that Member State might incur in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union if its supervisory authorities fail to take the action required by the Authority.
Prav tako ne bi smeli posegati v odgovornosti države članice, ki bi lahko nastale v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča Evropske unije, če njeni nadzorni organi ne sprejmejo ukrepov, ki jih zahteva Organ.
In order to ensure efficient and effective supervision and a balanced consideration of the positions of the competent authorities in different Member States, the Authority should be able to settle disagreements in cross-border situations between those competent authorities with binding effect, including within colleges of supervisors.
Za zagotovitev uspešnega in učinkovitega nadzora ter uravnoteženega upoštevanja položaja pristojnih organov v različnih državah članicah bi moral imeti Organ možnost reševanja sporov v čezmejnih primerih med temi pristojnimi organi, tudi v kolegijih nadzornih organov, pri čemer bi imele njegove odločitve zavezujoč učinek.
A conciliation phase should be provided for during which the competent authorities may reach an agreement.
Omogočiti bi bilo treba spravni postopek, med katerim lahko pristojni organi dosežejo sporazum.
The Authority’s competence should cover disagreements on the procedure or content of an action or inaction by a competent authority of a Member State in cases specified in the legally binding Union acts referred to in this Regulation.
Pristojnost Organa bi morala zajemati spore v zvezi s postopkom ali vsebino ukrepanja ali neukrepanja pristojnega organa države članice v primerih, opredeljenih v pravno zavezujočih aktih Unije iz te uredbe.
In such a situation, one of the supervisors involved should be entitled to refer the issue to the Authority, which should act in accordance with this Regulation.
V takem primeru bi lahko bil eden od vključenih nadzornikov upravičen postaviti vprašanje Organu, ki bi moral delovati v skladu s to uredbo.
The Authority should be empowered to require the competent authorities concerned to take specific action or to refrain from action in order to settle the matter in order to ensure compliance with Union law, with binding effects for the competent authorities concerned.
Organu bi bilo potrebno dodeliti pooblastila, da od zadevnih pristojnih organov zahteva, da izvedejo določene ukrepe ali da ne ukrepajo, da bi razrešili zadevo in zagotovili spoštovanje prava Unije z zavezujočimi učinki za zadevne pristojne organe.
If a competent authority does not comply with the settlement decision addressed to it, the Authority should be empowered to adopt decisions directly addressed to financial institutions in areas of Union law directly applicable to them.
Če pristojni organ ne ravna v skladu z odločitvijo glede rešitve spora, ki je naslovljena nanj, bi bilo treba Organu dodeliti pooblastila, da sprejme odločitve, neposredno naslovljene na finančne institucije, na tistih področjih, kjer se pravo Unije zanje neposredno uporablja.
The power to adopt such decisions should apply only as a last resort and then only to ensure the correct and consistent application of Union law.
Pooblastilo za sprejemanje takih odločitev bi bilo treba uporabiti le v skrajnih primerih in le za zagotavljanje pravilne in dosledne uporabe prava Unije.
In cases where the relevant Union legislation confers discretion on Member States’ competent authorities, decisions taken by the Authority cannot replace the exercise in compliance with Union law of that discretion.
V primerih, ko ustrezna zakonodaja Unije podeljujejo diskrecijo pristojnim organom držav članic, odločitve, ki jih sprejme Organ, ne morejo nadomestiti izvajanja te diskrecije v skladu s pravom Unije.
The crisis has proven that the current system of cooperation between national authorities whose powers are limited to individual Member States is insufficient as regards financial institutions that operate across borders.
Kriza je pokazala, da sedanji sistem sodelovanja med nacionalnimi organi, katerih pristojnosti so omejene na posamezne države članice, ni zadosten pri finančnih institucijah, ki delujejo čezmejno.
Expert Groups set up by Member States to examine the causes of the crisis and make suggestions to improve the regulation and supervision of the financial sector have confirmed that the current arrangements are not a sound basis for the future regulation and supervision of cross-border financial institutions across the Union.
Skupine strokovnjakov, ki so jih vzpostavile države članice, da bi preučile razloge za krizo in predlagale izboljšave regulacije in nadzora finančnega sektorja, so potrdile, da sedanja ureditev ni dobra podlaga za prihodnjo regulacijo čezmejnih finančnih institucij v Uniji in nadzor nad njimi.
As the de Larosière Report indicates, ‘[i]n essence, we have two alternatives: the first “chacun pour soi” beggar-thy-neighbour solutions; or the second – enhanced, pragmatic, sensible European cooperation for the benefit of all to preserve an open world economy.
Kakor je navedeno v de Larosièrovem poročilu, „imamo pravzaprav na voljo dve alternativi: prva je ‚vsak zase‘ ali prosi za pomoč soseda, ali druga alternativa, ki je okrepljeno, pragmatično in premišljeno evropsko sodelovanje v korist vseh, da bi ohranili odprto svetovno gospodarstvo.
This will bring undoubted economic gains’.
To bi nedvomno prineslo gospodarske koristi“.
Colleges of supervisors play an important role in the efficient, effective and consistent supervision of financial institutions operating across borders.
Kolegiji nadzornikov imajo pomembno vlogo pri učinkovitem, uspešnem in doslednem nadzoru nad finančnimi institucijami, ki delujejo čezmejno.
The Authority should contribute to promoting and monitoring the efficient, effective and consistent functioning of the colleges of supervisors and, in that respect, have a leading role in ensuring the consistent and coherent functioning of colleges of supervisors for cross-border financial institutions across the Union.
Organ bi moral spodbujati in nadzorovati učinkovito, uspešno in dosledno delovanje kolegijev nadzornikov in v zvezi s tem imeti vodilno vlogo pri zagotavljanju doslednega in skladnega delovanja kolegijev nadzornikov za čezmejne finančne institucije po vsej Uniji.
The Authority should therefore have full participation rights in colleges of supervisors with a view to streamlining the functioning of and the information exchange process in the colleges of supervisors and to foster convergence and consistency across colleges in the application of Union law.
Zato bi moral imeti Organ polnopravno pravico do udeležbe v kolegijih nadzornikov, da se racionalizira delovanje kolegijev nadzornikov in proces izmenjave informacij znotraj njih ter okrepi približevanje in usklajenost kolegijev pri uporabi prava Unije.
As the de Larosière Report states, ‘competition distortions and regulatory arbitrage stemming from different supervisory practices must be avoided, because they have the potential of undermining financial stability – inter alia by encouraging a shift of financial activity to countries with lax supervision.
Kakor je navedeno tudi v de Larosièrovem poročilu, bi se bilo treba „izogniti ovirani konkurenci in regulativni arbitraži zaradi različnih nadzornih praks, saj lahko ogrozita finančno stabilnost – med drugim s spodbuditvijo prenosa finančnih dejavnosti v države, kjer je nadzor bolj ohlapen.
The supervisory system has to be perceived as fair and balanced’.
Nadzorni sistem bi moral biti razumljen kot pravičen in uravnotežen“.
Convergence in the fields of crisis prevention, management and resolution, including funding mechanisms, is necessary in order to ensure the internalisation of costs by the financial system and the ability of public authorities to resolve failing financial institutions whilst minimising the impact of failures on the financial system, reliance on taxpayer funds to bail out banks and the use of public sector resources, limiting damage to the economy, and coordinating the application of national resolution measures.
Konvergenca na področju preprečevanja, upravljanja in sanacije kriz, vključno z mehanizmi financiranja, je potrebna za zagotovitev, da bi finančni sistem internaliziral stroške in bi lahko javni organi sanirali finančne institucije v težavah in hkrati čim bolj zmanjšali vpliv težav na finančni sistem, odvisnost od davkoplačevalskih sredstev za sanacijo bank in uporabo sredstev javnega sektorja, omejili škodo za gospodarstvo in uskladili uporabo nacionalnih ukrepov za sanacijo.
In this regard it is imperative to develop a common set of rules on a complete set of tools for the prevention and resolution of failing banks, to deal in particular with the crisis of large, cross-border or interconnected institutions, and the need to confer additional relevant powers to the Authority should be assessed as well as how banks and savings institutions could prioritise the protection of savers.
V tej zvezi je nujno oblikovati skupna pravila za celoten sveženj instrumentov za preprečevanje in saniranje bank v težavah, ki obravnavajo zlasti velike, čezmejne ali medsebojno povezane institucije v krizi, potrebna pa je tudi ocena, ali bi bilo treba na Organ prenesti dodatna ustrezna pooblastila ter kako bi lahko banke in hranilnice dale prednost zaščiti varčevalcev.
In the current review of Directive 94/19/EC and Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes [26], the Commission’s intention to pay special attention to the need to ensure further harmonisation throughout the Union is noted.
V trenutnem pregledu Direktive 94/19/ES in Direktive 97/9/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 3. marca 1997 o odškodninskih shemah za vlagatelje [26] je opazna namera Komisije, da še posebno pozornost nameni potrebi po zagotavljanju nadaljnjega usklajevanja po vsej Uniji.
In the insurance sector, the Commission’s intention to examine the possibility of introducing Union rules protecting insurance policy holders in case of a failing insurance company is also noted.
V zavarovalniškem sektorju je opazna tudi namera Komisije, da preuči možnost uvedbe pravil Unije za zaščito zavarovancev v primeru zavarovalnice, ki je v težavah.
The ESAs should play an important role in those areas and appropriate powers concerning the European guarantee scheme systems should be conferred upon them.
ESA bi morali imeti pomembno vlogo na teh področjih, nanje pa bi bilo treba prenesti ustrezna pooblastila v zvezi z evropskimi sistemi jamstvenih shem.
The delegation of tasks and responsibilities can be a useful instrument in the functioning of the network of supervisors in order to reduce the duplication of supervisory tasks, to foster cooperation and thereby streamline the supervisory process, as well as to reduce the burden imposed on financial institutions.
Prenos nalog in odgovornosti je lahko uporaben instrument za delovanje mreže nadzornikov, da se zmanjša podvajanje nadzornih nalog, okrepi sodelovanje ter s tem racionalizira nadzorni postopek, ter da se zmanjša obremenitev finančnih institucij.
This Regulation should therefore provide a clear legal basis for such delegation.
Zato bi morala ta uredba zagotoviti jasno pravno podlago za tak prenos.
Whilst respecting the general rule that delegation should be allowed, Member States should be able to introduce specific conditions for the delegation of responsibilities, for example, regarding information about, and the notification of, delegation arrangements.
Ob upoštevanju splošnega pravila, da bi moral biti prenos dovoljen, bi bilo treba državam članicam omogočiti, da uvedejo posebne pogoje za prenos pristojnosti, kot npr. v zvezi z informacijami in uradnim obveščanjem o ureditvah za prenos.
Delegation of tasks means that tasks are carried out by the Authority or by a national supervisory authority other than the responsible authority, while the responsibility for supervisory decisions remains with the delegating authority.
Prenos nalog pomeni, da naloge namesto odgovornega organa izvaja Organ ali nacionalni nadzorni organ, medtem ko je za nadzorne odločitve še vedno odgovoren organ, ki je naloge prenesel.
By the delegation of responsibilities, the Authority or a national supervisory authority (the delegate) should be able to decide upon a certain supervisory matter in its own name in lieu of the delegating authority.
Prenos odgovornosti pomeni, da bi moral imeti Organ ali nacionalni nadzorni organ, na katerega se prenesejo naloge, možnost sam odločati o posameznem vprašanju v zvezi z nadzorom namesto organa, ki je nanj prenesel naloge.
Delegations should be governed by the principle of allocating supervisory competence to a supervisor which is best placed to take action in the subject matter.
Prenose bi moralo urejati načelo, da se pristojnost za nadzor dodeli nadzorniku, ki je najbolj primeren za sprejemanje ukrepov na tem področju.
A reallocation of responsibilities would be appropriate, for example, for reasons of economies of scale or scope, of coherence in group supervision, and of optimal use of technical expertise among national supervisory authorities.
Prerazporeditev odgovornosti bi bila ustrezna na primer zaradi ekonomije obsega, usklajenosti pri skupinskem nadzoru in optimalne uporabe tehničnega strokovnega znanja v nacionalnih nadzornih organih.
Decisions by the delegate should be recognised by the delegating authority and by other competent authorities as determinative if those decisions are within the scope of the delegation.
Odločitve organa, na katerega se prenesejo naloge, bi morali organ, ki je naloge prenesel, in drugi pristojni organi priznati kot dokončne, če so te odločitve v okviru pooblastil, ki jih daje prenos.
Relevant Union legislation could further specify the principles for the reallocation of responsibilities upon agreement.
Z ustrezno zakonodajo Unije bi se lahko nadalje opredelila načela za prerazporeditev odgovornosti na podlagi sporazuma.
The Authority should facilitate and monitor delegation agreements between national supervisory authorities by all appropriate means.
Organ bi moral na vse ustrezne načine omogočiti in nadzorovati sporazume o prenosu pooblastil med nacionalnimi nadzornimi organi.
It should be informed in advance of intended delegation agreements, in order to be able to express an opinion where appropriate.
Vnaprej bi ga bilo treba obvestiti o nameravanih sporazumih o prenosu pooblastil, da bi lahko po potrebi podal mnenje.
It should centralise the publication of such agreements to ensure timely, transparent and easily accessible information about agreements for all parties concerned.
Objavo takih sporazumov bi bilo treba centralizirati za zagotovitev pravočasnih, preglednih in enostavno dostopnih informacij o sporazumih za vse zadevne strani.
It should identify and disseminate best practices regarding delegation and delegation agreements.
Poleg tega bi moral tudi zbirati in razširjati primere dobrih praks na področju prenosa nalog in sporazumov o prenosu.
The Authority should actively foster supervisory convergence across the Union with the aim of establishing a common supervisory culture.
Organ bi moral dejavno spodbujati konvergenco nadzora po vsej Uniji s ciljem vzpostavitve skupne kulture na področju nadzora.
Peer reviews are an efficient and effective tool for fostering consistency within the network of financial supervisors.
Medsebojni strokovni pregledi so uspešno in učinkovito orodje za spodbujanje skladnosti v mreži finančnih nadzornikov.
The Authority should therefore develop the methodological framework for such reviews and conduct them on a regular basis.
Zato bi moral Organ oblikovati metodološki okvir za take preglede in jih redno izvajati.
Reviews should focus not only on the convergence of supervisory practices, but also on the capacity of supervisors to achieve high-quality supervisory outcomes, as well as on the independence of those competent authorities.
Pregledi ne bi smeli biti osredotočeni le na približevanje nadzornih praks, ampak tudi na sposobnost nadzornikov, da pri nadzoru dosežejo visoko kakovost rezultatov, kot tudi neodvisnost teh pristojnih organov.
The outcome of peer reviews should be made public with the agreement of the competent authority subject to the review.
Rezultati medsebojnih strokovnih pregledov bi se morali javno objaviti s privoljenjem pristojnega organa, ki se ga pregleduje.
Best practices should also be identified and made public.
Prav tako bi bilo treba opredeliti in objaviti najboljše prakse.
The Authority should actively promote a coordinated Union supervisory response, in particular to ensure the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets and the stability of the financial system in the Union.
Organ bi moral dejavno spodbujati usklajen odziv Unije v zvezi z nadzorom, zlasti da zagotovi pravilno delovanje in integriteto finančnih trgov ter stabilnost finančnega sistema v Uniji.
In addition to its powers for action in emergency situations, the Authority should therefore be entrusted with a general coordination function within the ESFS.
Zato bi bilo treba Organu poleg pooblastil za ukrepanje v izrednih razmerah dodeliti tudi splošno funkcijo usklajevanja znotraj ESFS.
The smooth flow of all relevant information between competent authorities should be a particular focus of the Authority’s actions.
Ukrepi Organa bi morali biti osredotočeni zlasti na neprekinjen pretok vseh ustreznih informacij med pristojnimi organi.
In order to safeguard financial stability it is necessary to identify, at an early stage, trends, potential risks and vulnerabilities stemming from the micro-prudential level, across borders and across sectors.
Za zaščito finančne stabilnosti je treba zgodaj opredeliti čezmejne in medsektorske trende, morebitna tveganja in ranljivosti, ki izhajajo iz mikrobonitetne ravni.
The Authority should monitor and assess such developments in the area of its competence and, where necessary, inform the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the other European Supervisory Authorities and the ESRB on a regular and, as necessary, on an ad hoc basis.
Organ bi moral v okviru svoje pristojnosti spremljati in oceniti takšen razvoj ter redno ali po potrebi priložnostno obveščati Evropski parlament, Svet, Komisijo, druge Evropske nadzorne organe in ESRB, kadar bi bilo to potrebno.
The Authority should also, in cooperation with the ESRB, initiate and coordinate Union-wide stress tests to assess the resilience of financial institutions to adverse market developments, and it should ensure that an as consistent as possible methodology is applied at the national level to such tests.
Organ bi moral v sodelovanju z ESRB dati pobudo in usklajevati tudi stresne teste po vsej Uniji, s katerimi se oceni prilagodljivost finančnih institucij na neugodne razmere na trgu, in zagotoviti, da se na nacionalni ravni za take teste uporablja čim bolj usklajena metodologija.
In order to perform its functions properly, the Authority should conduct economic analyses of the markets and the impact of potential market developments.
Da bi Organ lahko ustrezno opravljal svoje naloge, bi moral izvajati ekonomske analize trgov in učinke morebitnega razvoja trga.
Given the globalisation of financial services and the increased importance of international standards, the Authority should foster dialogue and cooperation with supervisors outside the Union.
Zaradi globalizacije finančnih storitev in vse večjega pomena mednarodnih standardov bi moral Organ spodbujati dialog in sodelovanje z nadzorniki zunaj Unije.
It should be empowered to develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with the supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries and with international organisations, while fully respecting the existing roles and respective competences of the Member States and the Union institutions.
Pooblaščen bi moral biti za razvijanje stikov in sprejemanje upravnih dogovorov z nadzornimi organi in upravami tretjih držav ter mednarodnimi organizacijami, pri čemer se v celoti upoštevajo obstoječe vloge in pristojnosti držav članic in institucij Unije.
Participation in the work of the Authority should be open to countries which have concluded agreements with the Union whereby they have adopted and are applying Union law, and the Authority should be able to cooperate with third countries which apply legislation that has been recognised as equivalent to that of the Union.
V Organu bi morale imeti možnost sodelovati tudi države, ki so z Unijo sklenile sporazume, s katerimi so sprejele pravo Unije ter ga uporabljajo, Organ pa bi moral imeti možnost sodelovanja s tretjimi državami, ki uporabljajo zakonodajo, ki je bila priznana kot enakovredna zakonodaji Unije.
The Authority should serve as an independent advisory body to the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission in the area of its competence.
Organ bi moral v okviru svoje pristojnosti delovati kot neodvisno svetovalno telo Evropskega parlamenta, Sveta in Komisije.
Without prejudice to the competencies of the competent authorities concerned, the Authority should be able to provide its opinion on the prudential assessment of mergers and acquisitions under Directive 2006/48/EC, as amended by Directive 2007/44/EC [27] in those cases in which that Directive requires consultation between competent authorities from two or more Member States.
Brez poseganja v pristojnosti zadevnih pristojnih organov bi moral imeti Organ možnost, da predloži svoje mnenje glede ocene varnega in skrbnega poslovanja pri združitvah in pripojitvah na podlagi Direktive 2006/48/ES, kakor je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 2007/44/ES [27], v tistih primerih, v katerih se v skladu s to direktivo zahteva posvetovanje med pristojnimi organi iz dveh ali več držav članic.
In order to carry out its duties effectively, the Authority should have the right to request all necessary information.
Organ bi moral imeti za učinkovito opravljanje svojih nalog pravico, da zahteva vse potrebne informacije.
To avoid the duplication of reporting obligations for financial institutions, that information should normally be provided by the national supervisory authorities which are closest to the financial markets and institutions and should take into account already existing statistics.
Da se prepreči podvajanje obveznosti poročanja za finančne institucije, bi morali te informacije običajno zagotoviti nacionalni nadzorni organi, ki so najbliže finančnim trgom in institucijam in bi morali upoštevati že obstoječe statistične podatke.
However, as a last resort, the Authority should be able to address a duly justified and reasoned request for information directly to a financial institution where a national competent authority does not or cannot provide such information in a timely fashion.
Vendar bi moral imeti Organ pristojnost, da v skrajni sili naslovi ustrezno utemeljeno zahtevo po informacijah neposredno na finančno institucijo, če nacionalni pristojni organ takih informacij ne zagotovi ali jih ne more zagotoviti pravočasno.
Member States’ authorities should be obliged to assist the Authority in enforcing such direct requests.
Določiti bi bilo treba obveznost organov držav članic, da Organu pomagajo pri uveljavljanju takih neposrednih zahtev.
In that context, the work on common reporting formats is essential.
V tem okviru je delo v zvezi s skupnimi oblikami poročanja bistvenega pomena.
The measures for the collection of information should be without prejudice to the legal framework of the European Statistical System and the European System of Central Banks in the field of statistics.
Ukrepi za zbiranje informacij ne bi smeli posegati v pravni okvir na področju statističnih podatkov Evropskega statističnega sistema in Evropskega sistema centralnih bank.