natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In these circumstances it is considered that there is no market in China and, in accordance with Article 6(d)(ii) of the basic Regulation, the use of an external benchmark for measuring the amount of benefit is warranted.
V teh okoliščinah se šteje, da na Kitajskem ni trga in je, v skladu s členom 6(d)(ii) osnovne uredbe, odobrena uporaba zunanje referenčne vrednosti za ocenjevanje zneska ugodnosti.
Given that the GOC did not cooperate and failed to submit any proposal for an external benchmark the Commission had to resort to facts available in order to establish an appropriate external benchmark.
Glede na to, da kitajska vlada ni sodelovala in ni predložila predloga za zunanjo referenčno vrednost, je morala Komisija, da bi določila ustrezno zunanjo referenčno vrednost, uporabiti razpoložljiva dejstva.
In this respect it is considered appropriate to use information from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matscu (Chinese Taipei), hereafter mentioned as ‘Taiwan’, as an appropriate benchmark.
Glede tega se zdi primerno, da se kot ustrezno referenčno vrednost uporabi informacije iz ločenega carinskega območja Tajvan, Penghu, Kinmen in Matsu (kitajski Tajpej), v nadaljnjem besedilu „Tajvan“.
The Commission considers that the land prices in Taiwan offers the best proxy to the areas in China where the cooperating exporting producers are based.
Komisija meni, da so cene zemljišč na Tajvanu najboljši približek za območja na Kitajskem, kjer imajo sedež sodelujoči proizvajalci izvozniki.
All the exporting producers are located in the east part of China, in developed high-GDP areas in provinces with a high population density surrounding Shanghai.
Vsi proizvajalci izvozniki so v vzhodnem delu Kitajske, v razvitih območjih z visokim BDP in provincah z gosto poseljenimi območji okrog Šanghaja.
The benefit conferred on the recipients is calculated by taking into consideration the difference between the amount paid by each company for land-use rights and the amount that should have been normally paid on the basis of the Taiwanese benchmark.
Ugodnost za prejemnike se izračuna z upoštevanjem razlike med zneskom, ki ga je vsako podjetje plačalo za pravice do uporabe zemljišč, in zneskom, ki bi moral biti običajno plačan na podlagi tajvanske referenčne vrednosti.
In doing this calculation, the Commission used the average land price per square meter established in Taiwan corrected for currency depreciation as from the dates of the respective land-use right contracts.
Pri izračunu je Komisija uporabila povprečno ceno zemljišča na kvadratni meter, ki je bila ugotovljena za Tajvan in popravljena zaradi zmanjševanja vrednosti valute od datumov zadevnih pogodb za pravice do uporabe zemljišč.
The information concerning industrial land prices was retrieved from the website of the Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan.
Informacije glede cen industrijskih zemljišč so bile pridobljene na spletni strani industrijskega urada tajvanskega ministrstva za gospodarske zadeve.
The currency depreciation was calculated on the basis of inflation rates for Taiwan as published by the IMF in its 2009 World Economic Outlook.
Zmanjševanje vrednosti valute je bilo izračunano na podlagi inflacijskih stopenj za Tajvan, kot jih je Mednarodni denarni sklad objavil v svojih svetovnih gospodarskih napovedih (World Economic Outlook) za leto 2009.
In accordance with Article 7(3) of the basic Regulation this subsidy amount (numerator) has been allocated to the IP using the normal life time of the land-use right for industrial use land in China, i.e. 50 years.
V skladu s členom 7(3) osnovne uredbe je bil ta znesek subvencije (števec) dodeljen za OP z uporabo običajne življenjske dobe pravice do uporabe zemljišč za uporabo industrijskih zemljišč na Kitajskem, tj. 50 let.
This amount has then been allocated over the total sales turnover of the co-operating exporting producers during the IP, because the subsidy is not contingent upon export performance and was not granted by reference to the quantities manufactured, produced, exported or transported.
Ta znesek je bil nato dodeljen za skupni prihodek sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov od prodaje v OP, ker subvencija ni odvisna od opravljenega izvoza in ni bila dodeljena glede na izdelane, proizvedene, izvožene ali prevožene količine.
The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the IP for the cooperating exporting producers amounts to 2,81 % for APP companies and 0,69 % for Chenming companies.
Stopnja subvencije za to shemo med OP za sodelujoče proizvajalce izvoznike znaša 2,81 % za podjetja skupine APP in 0,69 % za podjetja skupine Chenming.
Schemes mentioned in the complaint but not assessed
Sheme, navedene v pritožbi, ki niso bile ocenjene
It was found that the cooperating exporting producers did not benefit from this scheme during the IP.
Ugotovljeno je bilo, da sodelujoči proizvajalci izvozniki v OP niso koristili ugodnosti te sheme.
Therefore there was no need to asses whether this scheme is countervailable or not.
Zato ni bilo treba oceniti, ali se za to shemo lahko uvedejo izravnalni ukrepi.
COMMENTS OF PARTIES IN RELATION TO SUBSIDISATION
PRIPOMBE STRANI V ZVEZI S SUBVENCIONIRANJEM
The GOC, two groups of cooperating exporting producers (APP and Chenming) and the EU complainant submitted comments on the definitive disclosure.
Kitajska vlada, dve skupini sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov (APP in Chenming) in pritožnik EU so predložili pripombe glede končnega razkritja.
The EU complainant supported the findings of the Commission.
Pritožnik EU je podprl ugotovitve Komisije.
The GOC, APP and Chenming disputed the findings of the Commission.
Kitajska vlada, APP in Chenming so ugotovitvam Komisije nasprotovali.
To the extent that arguments have already been fully addressed in the definitive disclosure they are not repeated in this Regulation.
Če so bili argumenti že v celoti obravnavani v končnem razkritju, se v tej uredbi ne ponavljajo.
ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO DOUBLE REMEDY
TRDITVE V ZVEZI Z DVOJNO POMOČJO
The GOC argued that the proposal for countervailing measures amounts to a double remedy.
Kitajska vlada je trdila, da predlog za izravnalne ukrepe pomeni dvojno pomoč.
It was submitted that under the EU practice in anti-dumping investigations against China normal value is determined by reference to data obtained from producers in a third market-economy country.
Navedeno je bilo, da je v skladu s prakso EU v protidampinških preiskavah proti Kitajski normalna vrednost določena s sklicevanjem na podatke, pridobljene od proizvajalcev v tretji državi s tržnim gospodarstvom.
Thus, in such cases countervailing duties would provide a double remedy to address the same matter since the anti-dumping duties effectively ‘offset’ any subsidy allegedly granted to Chinese companies.
Zato so v takih primerih izravnalne dajatve dvojna pomoč za obravnavo iste zadeve, saj protidampinške dajatve učinkovito „izravnajo“ vsako subvencijo, domnevno podeljeno kitajskim podjetjem.
APP claimed that if the normal value is based on domestic sales in the analogue country, the rejection of the MET claim and the use of non-subsidised normal value have the effect of increasing the duty by the amount of subsidisation and the subsidies would be counted twice.
APP je trdila, da če normalna vrednost temelji na domači prodaji v primerljivi državi, imata zavrnitev zahtevka za TGO in uporaba nesubvencionirane normalne vrednosti učinek povečanja dajatve za znesek subvencioniranja in subvencije bi bile štete dvakrat.
GOC submitted that the same alleged distortions have already been addressed in the parallel anti-dumping proceedings.
Kitajska vlada je navedla, da so bila ista domnevna izkrivljanja obravnavana že v vzporednem protidampinškem postopku.
GOC also submitted that that the practice of the Commission is in violation of EU and WTO law and that the Commission should either terminate the CVD proceedings or grant MET to the co-operating exporting producers in the parallel anti-dumping proceedings.
Navedla je tudi, da praksa Komisije krši pravo EU in STO in da bi morala Komisija prekiniti postopek izravnalnih dajatev ali pa sodelujočim proizvajalcem izvoznikom v vzporednem protidampinškem postopku odobriti TGO.
The GOC also submitted that it does not accept the Commission's argument that there is no double counting by virtue of the injury margin that is lower than the dumping margin.
Kitajska vlada je tudi navedla, da ne sprejema argumenta Komisije, da ni dvojnega štetja na podlagi stopnje škode, ki je nižja od stopnje dampinga.
Finally the GOC argued that on the basis of the findings of the WTO Appellate Body on the US – PRC dispute DS379 [9] with respect to double remedy the current proceedings should be terminated.
Nazadnje je kitajska vlada trdila, da bi moral biti na podlagi ugotovitev pritožbenega organa STO v zadevi ZDA – LRK DS379 [9] glede dvojnega popravljalnega učinka sedanji postopek prekinjen.
Those claims had to be rejected.
Te trditve je bilo treba zavrniti.
In this respect it is noted that double remedy does not play any role in these proceedings.
S tem v zvezi je treba opozoriti, da dvojna pomoč v tem postopku nima nobene vloge.
Whether or not the simultaneous imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties in the case of a non-market economy can lead to a potential ‘double remedy’, this situation, by definition, could only occur where there is a cumulation of the dumping margin and the amount of subsidy i.e. where the combined level of two types of duty exceeds the higher of the dumping margin or the amount of subsidy.
Ne glede na to, ali bi lahko sočasno izvajanje protidampinških in izravnalnih dajatev v primeru netržnega gospodarstva vodilo do morebitne „dvojne pomoči“ ali ne, se lahko tak primer praviloma pojavi samo, če pride do kumulacije stopnje dampinga in zneska subvencije, tj. če sta združeni stopnji dveh vrst dajatev višji od stopnje dampinga ali zneska subvencije (kar koli je višje).
As will be explained below, this is not the case here.
Kot bo razloženo v nadaljevanju, v tem primeru do tega ni prišlo.
First of all it is recalled that the EU is applying the lesser duty rule when imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same product.
Najprej je treba opozoriti, da EU pri uvajanju protidampinških in izravnalnih dajatev za isti izdelek uporablja pravilo nižje dajatve.
In other words in EU investigations the Commission establishes the level of dumping, subsidization and injury caused to the Union industry.
Z drugimi besedami, v preiskavah EU Komisija ugotavlja stopnjo dampinga, subvencioniranja in škode, povzročene industriji Unije.
The level of duties can never be higher than the injury margin and the injury margin here is the same for both proceedings.
Stopnja dajatev nikoli ne more biti višja od stopnje škode in stopnja škode v tem primeru je enaka za oba postopka.
In the parallel anti-dumping proceedings the Commission established a margin of dumping that is much higher than the injury margin.
V vzporedni protidampinški preiskavi je Komisija ugotovila stopnjo dampinga, ki je precej višja od stopnje škode.
In line with the lesser duty rule the Commission proposed the imposition of measures that are based on the injury margin (see Council Regulation (EU) No 451/2011 of 6 May 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of coated fine paper originating in the People's Republic of China [10]).
V skladu s pravilom nižje dajatve je Komisija predlagala uvedbo ukrepov, ki temeljijo na stopnji škode (glej Uredbo Sveta (EU) št. 451/2011 z dne 6. maja 2011 o uvedbi dokončne protidampinške dajatve in dokončnem pobiranju začasne dajatve, uvedene na uvoz premazanega finega papirja s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske [10].
Thus the subsidy margin found in the current ant-subsidy investigation will not provide any additional protection to the Union industry as compared to the dumping margin because the anti-dumping duty will already be capped by the injury margin.
Tako stopnja subvencije, ugotovljena v sedanji protisubvencijski preiskavi, ne bo nudila nobene dodatne zaščite industriji Unije v primerjavi s stopnjo dampinga, ker bo protidampinška dajatev že omejena s stopnjo škode.
Therefore there is no overlap or cumulation of duties in the two parallel proceedings and consequently, even assuming that there is a potential for a double remedy as described in recital (269) above, there can be no requirement by law to ‘offset’ dumping against the subsidy.
Torej se dajatvi v teh dveh vzporednih postopkih ne prekrivata ali kumulirata in tudi ob predpostavki, da obstaja možnost dvojne pomoči, kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi (269), ni nobene zakonske zahteve za „izravnavo“ dampinga glede na subvencijo.
Indeed, the difference between the dumping and injury margins found in the anti-dumping proceedings was much higher than the amount of subsidization found in the present investigation.
Dejansko je bila razlika med stopnjo dampinga in stopnjo škode, ugotovljena v protidampinškem postopku, precej višja od zneska subvencioniranja, ugotovljenega v sedanji preiskavi.
It should be also highlighted that when it comes to the actual composition of the duties to be paid the Commission has a practice to first impose the duty amount resulting from the CVD investigation.
Poudariti je tudi treba, da Komisija, ko pride do dejanske poravnave dajatev, ki jih je treba plačati, običajno najprej uvede znesek dajatve, določen v preiskavi izravnalnih dajatev.
If there is still a gap between the aforementioned duty level and the injury margin, this gap can be filled with the duty resulting from the anti-dumping investigation.
Če še vedno obstaja vrzel med zgoraj navedeno stopnjo dajatve in stopnjo škode, jo je mogoče zapolniti z dajatvijo, določeno v protidampinški preiskavi.
However, this does not mean that there is double counting because the combined level of duties could already have been justified as a result of the anti-dumping investigation alone.
Vendar pa to ne pomeni, da gre za dvojno štetje, ker bi lahko bili združeni stopnji dajatev že upravičeni zaradi same protidampinške preiskave.
Secondly, it should be noted that the remedies proposed by the GOC are not permitted by law since (i) the investigation established the existence of countervailing subsidies that caused material injury to the Union industry and imposition of measures was found to be in the Union interest thus these proceedings cannot be terminated, (ii) not all Chinese parties requested MET in the parallel anti-dumping proceedings, (iii) MET cannot be granted automatically to parties that have not requested and (iv) for those parties where MET was refused this was done because of the serious deficiencies found with respect to Criteria 1, 2 and 3 of Article 2(7)(c) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation.
Drugič, treba je opozoriti, da ukrepi, ki jih je predlagala kitajska vlada, niso dovoljeni z zakonom, saj (i) je bilo v preiskavi ugotovljeno, da obstajajo izravnalne subvencije, ki so industriji Unije povzročile znatno škodo, in da je uvedba ukrepov v interesu Unije, zato tega postopka ni mogoče zaključiti, (ii) v vzporednem protidampinškem postopku TGO niso zahtevale vse kitajske strani, (iii) TGO ni mogoče samodejno odobriti stranem, ki je niso zahtevale in (iv) pri straneh, pri katerih je bila TGO zavrnjena, je bilo to storjeno zaradi resnih pomanjkljivosti, ugotovljenih glede na merila 1, 2 in 3 člena 2(7)(c) osnovne protidampinške uredbe.
ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO USE OF ADVERSE INFERENCES
TRDITVE V ZVEZI Z UPORABO NEGATIVNIH SKLEPOV
The GOC also argued that the Commission used illegally adverse inferences as a result of the insufficient cooperation.
Kitajska vlada je trdila tudi, da je Komisija nezakonito uporabila negativne sklepe zaradi nezadostnega sodelovanja.
In this context, they refer to Article 28(6) of the basic Regulation that inter alia mentions that if an interested party does not cooperate or cooperates partially the result may be less favourable to the party than if it had cooperated.
S tem v zvezi se je sklicevala na člen 28(6) osnovne uredbe, ki med drugim navaja, da če zainteresirana stran ne sodeluje ali sodeluje le delno, je lahko izid za to stran manj ugoden, kot bi bil, če bi sodelovala.
According to the GOC the application of adverse inferences is in violation of Article 12(7) of the SCM Agreement as well as of Annex II of the WTO Anti Dumping Agreement.
Glede na navedbe kitajske vlade uporaba negativnih sklepov krši člen 12(7) Sporazuma SIU in Prilogo II k Protidampinškemu sporazumu STO.
With respect to this point it is noted that the GOC understanding of Article 28(6) of the basic Regulation is groundless.
Glede tega je treba opozoriti, da je mnenje kitajske vlade o členu 28(6) osnovne uredbe neutemeljeno.
The Commission did not impose any ‘adverse inferences’ to the GOC, in that the Commission did not deliberately choose a less favourable outcome for the exporters concerned, nor did it seek to impose a punitive option with regard to the existence of subsidies or amount of countervailing duties.
Komisija ni uvedla nobenih „negativnih sklepov“ za kitajsko vlado, saj ni namerno izbrala manj ugodnega izida za zadevne izvoznike ali iskala možnosti za kaznovanje v zvezi z obstojem subvencij ali zneska izravnalnih dajatev.
The Commission as investigating authority requested a set of information from the GOC within a reasonable period of time.
Komisija je kot preiskovalni organ od kitajske vlade zahtevala sklop informacij v razumnem času.
However, the GOC failed to provide the information deemed necessary for the investigation (e.g. copies of plans, information on banks, the assessment that banks carried out when attributing loans to the cooperating exporting producers, pricing of land-use rights).
Vendar kitajska vlada informacij, potrebnih za preiskavo (npr. izvodov načrtov, informacij o bankah, ocen, ki so jih banke izvedle ob dodelitvi posojil sodelujočim proizvajalcem izvoznikom, informacij o določanju cen pravic do uporabe zemljišč), ni predložila.
Under these circumstances the Commission was forced to use the provisions of Article 28 of the basic Regulation concerning facts available in order to arrive at a representative finding.
V teh okoliščinah je bila Komisija, da bi prišla do reprezentativne ugotovitve, prisiljena uporabiti določbe člena 28 osnovne uredbe, ki se nanašajo na razpoložljiva dejstva.
It is pertinent to underline that this was not done by imposing punitive findings to the GOC.
Primerno je poudariti, da to ni bilo storjeno z namenom kaznovanja kitajske vlade.
By way of example, it is noted that the Commission did not reject information concerning LUR; rather, the GOC did not submit all the required information on the pricing of LUR.
Treba je na primer opozoriti, da Komisija ni zavrnila informacij o pravicah do uporabe zemljišč, ampak kitajska vlada ni predložila vseh zahtevanih informacij o določanju cen pravic do uporabe zemljišč.
In the same way the Commission did not apply any adverse inferences to the GOC with respect to preferential lending to the coated paper industry but had to find the missing information with respect to plans, the role of the banks and the lending policies of the banks to the cooperating exporting producers, since such information was simply not provided by the GOC.
Prav tako Komisija ni uporabila nobenih negativnih sklepov za kitajsko vlado glede preferenčnih posojil industriji premazanega papirja, ampak je morala poiskati manjkajoče informacije o načrtih, vlogi bank in posojilnih politikah bank glede sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov, saj teh informacij kitajska vlada ni zagotovila.
Thus the Commission used whatever information provided by the GOC.
Tako je Komisija uporabila vse informacije, ki jih je zagotovila kitajska vlada.
Whenever information submitted was not sufficient or not found to be probative the Commission had to complement it with other relevant data in order to make its findings.
Kadar predložene informacije niso zadostovale ali je bilo zanje ugotovljeno, da nimajo dokazne vrednosti, jih je morala Komisija, da bi prišla do ugotovitev, dopolniti z drugimi ustreznimi podatki.
In some instances, it cannot be excluded that the result was less favourable to the GOC than if it had fully cooperated but this outcome was not sought by the Commission.
V nekaterih primerih ni mogoče izključiti, da je bil rezultat za kitajsko vlado manj ugoden, kot bi bil, če bi v celoti sodelovala, vendar to ni bil namen Komisije.
The Commission's approach in this case can be contrasted with the manner in which the notion of ‘adverse inferences’ under paragraph 7 of Annex V of the SCM Agreement has been applied by WTO panels.
Pristop Komisije v tem primeru se razlikuje od načina, na katerega so pojem „negativnih sklepov“ v skladu z odstavkom 7 Priloge V k Sporazumu SIU uporabljali odbori STO.
For example, the EC-Aircraft panel applied adverse inferences on two occasions with regard to the Spanish ‘PROFIT’ R&D programme in cases where insufficient data was provided by the EU.
Na primer, odbor za letala ES je negativne sklepe uporabil dvakrat v zvezi s španskim programom za raziskave in razvoj „PROFIT“ v primerih, kjer EU ni predložila zadostnih podatkov.
With regard to both the amount of funding and the issue of de-facto specificity, the panel disregarded the evidence submitted by the EU and substituted the solution proposed by the complainant (the USA) for its findings [11].
V zvezi z zneskom financiranja in vprašanjem dejanske specifičnosti odbor ni upošteval dokazov, ki jih je predložila EU, in je nadomestil rešitev, ki jo je predlagal pritožnik (ZDA), s svojimi ugotovitvami [11].
This was not the case in the present investigation as the Commission did not disregard any data provided by the GOC and simply substitute the solution proposed by the complainant but rather used the totality of information it had available to come to a conclusion.
To se v tej preiskavi ni zgodilo, saj je Komisija upoštevala vse podatke, ki jih je predložila kitajska vlada, in ni enostavno nadomestila rešitve, ki jo je predlagal pritožnik, ampak je za sklep uporabila vse informacije, ki jih je imela na voljo.
In view of the above it is concluded that the aforesaid claims had to be rejected.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega se sklene, da je treba navedene trditve zavrniti.
As the Commission did not use adverse inferences in relation to the GOC or any exporter, the claim that the application of adverse inferences to a government is in violation of the WTO legal provisions is devoid of any purpose.
Ker Komisija v zvezi s kitajsko vlado ali katerim od izvoznikov ni uporabila negativnih sklepov, je trditev, da uporaba negativnih sklepov za vlado krši zakonske določbe STO, brezpredmetna.
This had to be rejected as this allegation is not supported by the actual facts.
To je bilo treba zavrniti, saj ta trditev ni podprta z dejstvi.
The Commission informed the GOC on the provisions of Article 28 and on which cases these provisions may apply in the first letter the GOC received upon the initiation of these proceedings as well as in the last letter the GOC received before the on-the-spot verification visit.
Komisija je kitajsko vlado o določbah člena 28 in v katerih primerih se lahko te določbe uporabljajo obvestila v prvem dopisu, ki ga je kitajska vlada prejela ob začetku postopka, in v zadnjem dopisu, ki ga je kitajska vlada prejela pred preveritvenim obiskom na kraju samem.
Furthermore the GOC was made aware of the consequences of non-cooperation as explained under recital (59) above.
Poleg tega je bila kitajska vlada seznanjena s posledicami nesodelovanja, kot je razloženo v uvodni izjavi (59).
The GOC also claimed that the Commission never requested it to arrange meetings with state-owned banks.
Kitajska vlada je trdila tudi, da Komisija od nje ni nikoli zahtevala, naj se dogovori za sestanke z državnimi bankami.
That claim had to be rejected.
To zahtevo je bilo treba zavrniti.