natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Under Directive 2004/49/EC the responsibility for meeting these requirements lies with the IM or the RU for their respective subsystems, without prejudice to the responsibilities of other actors (Article 4.4 of Directive 2004/49/EC).
V skladu z Direktivo 2004/49/ES so za izpolnjevanje teh zahtev odgovorni UI ali PŽP, vsak za svoje podsisteme, brez poseganja v odgovornosti drugih udeležencev (člen 4.4 Direktive 2004/49/ES).
NSAs can check compliance with these requirements when granting safety certificates and safety authorisations to RUs and IMs (Articles 10, 11 and 16 of Directive 2004/49/EC).
NVO lahko preverijo skladnost s temi zahtevami pri odobritvi varnostnih spričeval in varnostnih pooblastil za PŽP in UI (členi 10, 11 in 16 Direktive 2004/49/ES).
An exception to that dividing line applies in relation to operation and maintenance rules, see Section 5.2.2.
Razmejitev ne velja za predpise v zvezi z upravljanjem in vzdrževanjem, glejte oddelek 5.2.2.
From a general point of view Directive 2008/57/EC regulates the technical characteristics (mainly design, production and final testing) of the subsystems and vehicles and the process of their authorisation for placing in service and Directive 2004/49/EC regulates the entities that use, operate and maintain them, as shown in the following diagram.
Direktiva 2008/57/ES na splošno ureja tehnične značilnosti (v glavnem projektiranje, proizvodnjo in končno preskušanje) podsistemov in vozil ter postopek izdajanja dovoljenj za začetek njihovega obratovanja, Direktiva 2004/49/ES pa ureja subjekte, ki jih uporabljajo, upravljajo in vzdržujejo, kot je prikazano v spodnjem diagramu.
In the diagram hereinabove:
V zgornjem diagramu:
‘NNTR’ means ‘national technical rules notified in accordance with Article 17’, but includes as well rules for open points, derogations and where required specific cases,
„PNTP“ pomeni „nacionalne tehnične predpise, priglašene v skladu s členom 17“, vendar vključuje tudi predpise za odprte točke, odstopanja in, kadar je ustrezno, posebne primere.
‘RA according to CSM’ means ‘risk assessment following the CSM’ and is related to the aspects of technical compatibility and safe integration which are relevant to the essential requirements but are not covered by TSIs or NNTR,
„OT v skladu s SVM“ pomeni „oceno tveganja na podlagi SVM“ in se nanaša na vidike tehnične združljivosti in varne vključitve, ki ustrezajo bistvenim zahtevam, vendar niso vključeni v TSI ali PNTP.
technical characteristics and operational/maintenance rules linked to the design can be extracted from the process of authorisation and are part of the technical file,
Tehnične značilnosti in predpisi v zvezi z upravljanjem/vzdrževanjem, povezani s projektiranjem, se lahko izključijo iz procesa odobritve in so del tehnične dokumentacije.
the return of experience is the process by which technical characteristics need to be modified as a result of real operation and maintenance of subsystems/vehicles.
Izmenjava izkušenj je proces, s katerim je treba spreminjati tehnične značilnosti na podlagi dejanskega delovanja in vzdrževanja podsistemov/vozil.
The management of change is part of the SMS of IMs and RUs, as explained in the next two Sections.
Upravljanje sprememb je del SVU upravljavcev infrastrukture in prevoznikov v železniškem prometu, kot je razloženo v naslednjih dveh oddelkih.
In accordance with Article 15(2) of Directive 2008/57/EC, MS check that the subsystems comply with the provisions on operation and maintenance that relate to the design operation state before they are placed in service.
DČ v skladu s členom 15(2) Direktive 2008/57/ES preverijo, ali so podsistemi skladni z določbami o upravljanju in vzdrževanju, ki se nanašajo na stanje načrtovanega delovanja podsistemov, preden začnejo obratovati.
This means that there is a need to check, before issuing an authorisation for placing in service, that the subsystems will be able to be operated and maintained according to the operating and maintenance rules specified in the relevant TSI.
To pomeni, da je treba pred izdajo dovoljenja za začetek obratovanja preveriti, ali se bodo lahko podsistemi upravljali in vzdrževali v skladu s predpisi v zvezi z upravljanjem in vzdrževanjem, ki so določeni v ustrezni TSI.
TSIs on operation and traffic management are also developed and adopted under Directive 2008/57/EC but, as they cover a non-structural subsystem there is no need for authorisation of that subsystem.
Tudi TSI o vodenju in upravljanju prometa so oblikovane in sprejete v skladu z Direktivo 2008/57/ES, vendar zajemajo nestrukturni podsistem, zato zanj ni potrebno dovoljenje.
All specifications relating to operational requirements that should be defined at the design operating state (e.g. braking characteristics, horns on driving vehicles) are covered by the structural TSIs.
Vse specifikacije v zvezi z zahtevami glede upravljanja, ki morajo biti opredeljene v stanju načrtovanega delovanja (npr. zavorne značilnosti, hupe na motornih vozilih), so zajete v strukturnih TSI.
The Operations and Traffic Management TSI (OPE TSI) describes the requirements for ‘the procedures and related equipment enabling a coherent operation of the different structural subsystems’ (Annex II).
TSI o vodenju in upravljanju prometa (VUP TSI) opisuje zahteve za „postopke in dodatno opremo, ki omogoča usklajeno obratovanje raznih strukturnih podsistemov“ (Priloga II).
It does not relate to the obligations in respect of the authorisation of the design operating state which is obtained by an applicant (e.g. a manufacturer) but to the harmonised procedures that are necessary to ensure the consistent operation of the respective parts of the railway system which is carried out by the IMs and RUs under their SMSs.
TSI ni povezana z obveznostmi glede dovoljenja za stanje načrtovanega delovanja, ki ga dobi prosilec (npr. proizvajalec), ampak z usklajenimi postopki, ki so potrebni za zagotovitev usklajenega upravljanja ustreznih delov železniškega sistema, ki ga izvajajo UI in PŽP v skladu z ustreznimi SVU.
One of the primary purposes of the OPE TSI is to harmonise the division of operational responsibilities between IMs and RUs which would otherwise need to be covered by a highly complex set of multilateral cooperation agreements.
Eden od temeljnih namenov VUP TSI je uskladitev razdelitve operativnih nalog med UI in PŽP, ki bi drugače morale biti zajete v zelo obsežnem nizu večstranskih sporazumov o sodelovanju.
All the requirements that are relevant to maintenance and necessary for implementing the essential requirements in order to achieve interoperability are included in the structural TSIs, based on the technical characteristics of the subsystem.
Vse zahteve, ki so pomembne za vzdrževanje in potrebne za izvajanje bistvenih zahtev za uresničitev interoperabilnosti, so vključene v strukturne TSI na podlagi tehničnih značilnosti podsistema.
On that basis the applicant delivers preliminary maintenance and operation documentation that has to be included in the technical file of the relevant subsystem.
V skladu s tem prosilec predloži predhodno dokumentacijo o vzdrževanju in upravljanju, ki mora biti vključena v tehnično dokumentacijo za ustrezni podsistem.
The technical file is an essential starting reference for the ongoing management of maintenance and includes the initial operation and maintenance manuals.
Tehnična dokumentacija je bistvena izhodiščna referenca za tekoče upravljanje in vzdrževanje ter vključuje priročnike o začetku uporabe in vzdrževanju.
After the placing in service it is the responsibility of the RU or IM in conjunction with an ECM, to continuously review maintenance interventions and amend this information to ensure that it reflects the duty cycle and return of experience (Article 4 and Article 9 of Directive 2004/49/EC).
Po začetku obratovanja je PŽP ali UI, skupaj s SOV, odgovoren za stalno pregledovanje vzdrževalnih del in spreminjanje teh informacij, tako da izražajo obratovalni cikel in izmenjavo izkušenj (člena 4 in 9 Direktive 2004/49/ES).
It should also be noted that the management of change is part of the SMS of IMs and RUs.
Prav tako je treba poudariti, da je obvladovanje spremembe del SVU UI in PŽP.
Pursuant to Directive 2004/49/EC, when carrying out their duties and fulfilling their responsibilities, IMs and RUs implement a SMS, that fulfils the EU and national requirements and contains common elements.
V skladu z Direktivo 2004/49/ES UI in PŽP pri izvajanju svojih nalog in izpolnjevanju obveznosti uporabljajo SVU, ki je skladen z zahtevami EU in nacionalnimi zahtevami ter vsebuje skupne elemente.
The processes for ensuring the safe operation (including use and maintenance) of vehicles/subsystems are covered by the SMS of the RU (for vehicles) and IM (for networks).
Procesi za zagotovitev varnega obratovanja (vključno z uporabo in vzdrževanjem) vozil/podsistemov so zajeti v SVU PŽP (za vozila) in UI (za omrežja).
One of the purposes of the safety certificate and the safety authorisation respectively is to provide evidence that the RU and IM has established its SMS and can meet the essential requirements laid down in TSIs during the operation of the relevant subsystems.
Eden od namenov varnostnega spričevala in varnostnega pooblastila je zagotoviti dokaz, da sta PŽP in UI vzpostavila vsak svoj SVU ter da lahko pri upravljanju ustreznih podsistemov izpolnjujeta bistvene zahteve, določene v TSI.
The safety certificates and the safety authorisations are revised at regular intervals, which is not the case of the authorisation for placing in service.
Varnostna spričevala in pooblastila se pregledujejo redno, kar pa na velja za dovoljenje za začetek obratovanja.
However, the authorisation for placing in service always remains valid, except in the event of any substantial change affecting the design operating state (technical characteristics) that could occur, for example in the case of renewal or upgrade, depending on the extent of the works.
Dovoljenje za začetek obratovanja vedno ostane veljavno, razen v primeru bistvene spremembe, ki vpliva na stanje načrtovanega delovanja (tehnične značilnosti) in se lahko pojavi na primer pri obnovi ali nadgradnji, odvisno od obsega del.
Thus, changes to an RU operation are regulated by the Directive 2004/49/EC, and changes to the design operating state of a vehicle or subsystem are regulated by the authorisation process in accordance with Directive 2008/57/EC.
Tako so spremembe upravljanja PŽP urejene v Direktivi 2004/49/ES, spremembe stanja načrtovanega delovanja vozila ali podsistema pa so urejene s procesom odobritve v skladu z Direktivo 2008/57/ES.
Technical compatibility is one of the ‘essential requirements’ which must be met by ‘the rail system, subsystems and interoperability constituents including interfaces’ (Article 4).
Tehnična združljivost je ena od „bistvenih zahtev“, ki jih morajo izpolnjevati „železniški sistem, podsistemi in komponente interoperabilnosti, vključno z vmesniki“ (člen 4).
Technical compatibility is defined in Annex III to Directive 2008/57/EC: ‘The technical characteristics of the infrastructure and fixed installations must be compatible with each other and with those of the trains to be used on the rail system’.
Tehnična združljivost je opredeljena v Prilogi III Direktive 2008/57/ES: „Tehnične značilnosti infrastrukture in fiksnih naprav morajo biti združljive med seboj in z značilnostmi vlakov, ki se bodo uporabljali v vseevropskem železniškem sistemu“.
It is also specified for different structural subsystems (Annex III points 2.2.3, 2.3.2 and 2.4.3).
Tehnična združljivost je določena tudi za različne strukturne podsisteme (Priloga III, točke 2.2.3, 2.3.2 in 2.4.3).
In addition, Annex I Section 3 identifies technical compatibility as a cornerstone for quality of services, performance, safety and costs of the rail system.
Poleg tega oddelek 3 Priloge I opredeljuje tehnično združljivost kot temelj za kakovost storitev, uspešnost, varnost in stroške železniškega sistema.
A RU operating a train will need to know whether the particular route is capable of supporting the operation of its train, i.e. whether it is technically compatible.
PŽP, ki upravlja vlak, mora vedeti, ali lahko določena proga podpira uporabo njegovega vlaka, tj. ali je tehnično združljiva.
As a consequence, TSIs contain the specifications necessary for the subsystem and its interfaces to be interoperable and meet the essential requirements (including that of technical compatibility).
Zato TSI vsebujejo specifikacije, ki so potrebne za interoperabilnost podsistema in njegovih vmesnikov ter njihovo skladnost z bistvenimi zahtevami (vključno z zahtevami glede tehnične združljivosti). Če torej obstajajo in se uporabljajo ustrezne TSI, je treba preverjanje tehnične združljivosti izvajati v skladu s TSI.
Where there is no relevant TSI covering the essential requirement of technical compatibility (e.g. the interface to legacy signalling/train protection systems, non-TSI conform infrastructure, energy, and CCS subsystems) national rules apply.
Če ne obstaja ustrezna TSI, ki bi vsebovala bistveno zahtevo glede tehnične združljivosti (npr. vmesnik za že obstoječe sisteme signalizacije/zaščitne sisteme vlaka, podsistemi za infrastrukturo, energijo in VUS, ki niso skladni s TSI), se uporabljajo nacionalni predpisi.
This means that until the interfaces to all parts of the network are all covered by the TSIs, MS should put in place rules that specify any requirements in addition to those in TSIs that are necessary for technical compatibility between vehicles and non-TSI conform parts of the network for which they are responsible.
To pomeni, da morajo DČ, dokler v TSI niso zajeti vsi vmesniki za vse dele omrežja, zagotoviti predpise, ki poleg zahtev v TSI določajo tudi zahteve, potrebne za tehnično združljivost vozil z deli omrežja, ki niso skladni s TSI, za katere so odgovorne.
This will include, for example, the legacy requirements for on-board train protection systems so that vehicle on-board CCS systems may be designed, installed and verified as being able to read and react to signals from the line-side transponders of the legacy system.
To na primer vključuje že obstoječe zahteve za zaščitne sisteme vlaka, da se lahko sistemi VUS na vozilu oblikujejo, vzpostavijo in preverijo, tako da lahko prejemajo signale transponderjev že obstoječega sistema ob progi in se odzivajo nanje.
It is possible in the transition phase that some MS may not yet have met the requirement to have put in place a full set of transparent national rules (Article 17) to cover the vehicle-network interface when there is no relevant TSI, to the same level of detail as the TSIs.
V prehodnem obdobju se lahko zgodi, da nekatere DČ še ne bode izpolnjevale zahteve glede vzpostavitve celovitega niza preglednih nacionalnih predpisov (člen 17), ki naj bi v primeru, da ustrezna TSI ne obstaja, opredeljevali vmesnik med vozilom in omrežjem enako natančno, kot TSI.
This may be because the specification of these interfaces, which is so necessary in order to preserve existing levels of national interoperability, have in the past been covered by the internal rules of the national railway companies.
To se lahko zgodi zaradi tega, ker je bila specifikacija teh vmesnikov, ki je potrebna za ohranitev obstoječih ravni nacionalne interoperabilnosti, v preteklosti zajeta v notranjih predpisih nacionalnih železniških podjetij.
In such case, the use of risk assessment methods to demonstrate technical compatibility based on the second and third principles of the CSM on RA is not recommended because this may lead to incompatibility of interface specifications between projects and loss of interoperability.
V takem primeru ni priporočljiva uporaba metod za oceno tveganja za ugotovitev tehnične združljivosti na podlagi drugega in tretjega načela SVM za OT, ker lahko to povzroči nezdružljivost specifikacij vmesnikov med projekti in izgubo interoperabilnosti.
Conclusion: Technical compatibility at the interface between network and vehicles is crucial for safety.
Sklep: tehnična združljivost vmesnika med omrežjem in vozili je bistvena za varnost.
Although the safety aspect of such interface could be proven through the 2o and 3o principle of the CSM on risk assessment, it is necessary, for interoperability reasons, that technical compatibility is proven on the basis of a rule-based approach (1o principle of the CSM on RA), including EU harmonised rules such as TSIs or ENs, or, where such rules does not yet exist, on the basis of notified national rules.
Čeprav je mogoče varnostni vidik takega vmesnika dokazati na podlagi 2. in 3. načela SVM za oceno tveganja, je treba tehnično združljivost za namene interoperabilnosti dokazati na podlagi pristopa, ki temelji na predpisih (1. načelo SVM za OT), ki vključujejo usklajene predpise EU, kot so TSI ali EN, ali, če taki predpisi še ne obstajajo, na podlagi priglašenih nacionalnih predpisov.
To this end and as a general rule, the following needs to be demonstrated:
V ta namen mora biti praviloma dokazano naslednje:
for the placing in service of an individual subsystem, the safe integration between this subsystem and all other subsystems in which it is integrated,
za začetek obratovanja posameznega podsistema varna vključitev tega podsistema v vse druge podsisteme, v katere se vključuje,
for the placing in service of a vehicle, the safe integration between the vehicle’s relevant subsystems (only in the case of the first authorisation) and the safe integration between the vehicle and the network concerned.
za začetek obratovanja vozila varna vključitev ustreznih podsistemov vozil (le v primeru prvega dovoljenja) in varna vključitev vozila v zadevno omrežje.
However the safe integration checks are not required in all circumstances; for example, in the case of vehicles and under specific conditions, Chapter V of the Directive 2008/57/EC has removed such obligations in the case of vehicles already authorised in one MS and operated in another MS.
Vendar preverjanja varne vključitve niso potrebna v vseh razmerah; za vozila in v skladu s posebnimi pogoji je bila na primer v Poglavju V Direktive 2008/57/ES ta obveznost izvzeta za vozila, ki so že bila odobrena v eni DČ in so se uporabljala v drugi DČ.
Safe integration is part of the essential requirements (Article 15(1)).
Varna vključitev je del bistvenih zahtev (člen 15(1)).
Therefore it is covered, as a general rule, by TSIs or national rules (Article 17).
Zato je praviloma zajeta v TSI ali nacionalnih predpisih (člen 17).
When demonstrating safe integration by applying the CSM on RA, the applicant will have:
Pri ugotavljanju varne vključitve z uporabo SVM za OT se bo moral prosilec:
to refer to either the TSIs requirements or the national rules, by application of the first risk acceptance principle ‘use of codes of practices’, or
sklicevati bodisi na zahteve TSI bodisi na nacionalne predpise, in sicer z uporabo prvega načela sprejemljivosti tveganja „uporaba kodeksa praks“, ali
if the subject is not covered by the TSI and national rules, to perform an explicit risk estimation or a similarity study to identify the missing requirements (third and second risk acceptance principles of the CSM on RA) which should be made public, so that what the NSA accepts is made transparent.
če subjekt ni vključen v TSI in nacionalne predpise, bo moral prosilec izvesti izrecno oceno tveganja ali študijo podobnosti, da bo ugotovil manjkajoče zahteve (tretje in drugo načelo sprejemljivosti tveganja SVM za OT), ki jih mora objaviti za zagotovitev preglednosti odločitev, ki jih sprejme NVO.
As stated in the CSM on RA, the application of the CSM on RA for safe integration must not lead to requirements that are contradictory to those laid down in the TSIs.
Kot je navedeno v SVM za OT, uporaba SVM za OT za varno vključitev ne sme privesti do zahtev, ki nasprotujejo zahtevam, določenim v TSI.
By analogy, this also applies to national rules.
Po analogiji to velja tudi na nacionalne predpise.
This means that, where there are TSI requirements or national rules, they remain mandatory.
To pomeni, da v primeru, ko obstajajo zahteve TSI ali nacionalni predpisi, ti ostanejo obvezni.
If this were not the case, interoperability would never be achieved.
Če ne bi bilo tako, nikoli ne bi bilo mogoče doseči interoperabilnosti.
Conclusions:
Sklepi:
in the case that the interface between a vehicle and a network is covered by either a TSI requirement or a national rule, the applicant considers it as a code of practice and the hazard(s) for which requirements have been identified in such TSI or national rule, are considered as checked through the fulfilment of the requirements of either the TSI or the national rule.
Če je vmesnik med vozilom in omrežjem vključen v zahtevo TSI ali nacionalni predpis, ga prosilec obravnava kot kodeks prakse, tveganje(-ja), v zvezi s katerim(-i) so bile določene zahteve v taki TSI ali takem nacionalnem predpisu, pa se šteje(-jo) za preverjeno(-na) na podlagi izpolnjevanja zahtev bodisi TSI bodisi nacionalnega predpisa.
This means that if the requirements of the TSI or the national rule cover the essential requirement of safety (i.e. all relevant hazards), the safe integration is demonstrated through the implementation of the TSI or the national rule,
Če torej zahteve TSI ali nacionalnega predpisa vključujejo bistveno zahtevo glede varnosti (tj. vsa pomembna tveganja), se varna vključitev ugotovi na podlagi izvajanja TSI ali nacionalnega predpisa
if there are hazards for which requirements are not covered in TSI or national rules this indicates that the TSI or national rules do not fully meet the essential requirements and the deficiency must be addressed according to Art 7.
Če obstajajo tveganja, za katera zahteve niso vključene v TSI ali nacionalne predpise, to pomeni, da TSI ali nacionalni predpisi ne izpolnjujejo bistvenih zahtev v celoti in je treba pomanjkljivost obravnavati v skladu s členom 7.
These ‘missing requirements’ should be considered in future revisions of TSIs in order to progressively arrive at a full coverage of the interoperable interfaces by TSIs.
Te „manjkajoče zahteve“ je treba obravnavati v prihodnjih revizijah TSI, da se postopno doseže celotna pokritost interoperabilnih vmesnikov v TSI.
In the meantime the risks are managed by the applicant by comparison with a reference system or an explicit risk analysis according to the CSM on RA regulation,
Do takrat pa tveganja upravlja prosilec s primerjavo z referenčnim sistemom ali izrecno analizo tveganja v skladu s predpisom o SVM za OT
for the sake of interoperability, it is necessary that technical compatibility and safe integration between vehicle and network are demonstrated on a rule based approach.
Za namene interoperabilnosti morata biti tehnična združljivost vozila z omrežjem in varna vključitev vozila v omrežje ugotovljeni na podlagi pristopa, ki temelji na predpisih.
To that end, TSI should cover exhaustively both aspects.
V ta namen mora TSI natančno obravnavati oba vidika.
It should be noted that all the requirements for authorisation to place into service are included in Directive 2008/57/EC and that both 2008/57/EC and 2004/49/EC Directives are complied with simultaneously.
Poudariti je treba, da so vse zahteve v zvezi z dovoljenjem za začetek obratovanja vključene v Direktivo 2008/57/ES ter da se direktivi 2008/57/ES in 2004/49/ES upoštevata hkrati.
if requirements are necessary to maintain the existing level of safety under Directive 2004/49/EC over and above those foreseen in the TSIs then so as not to restrict movement of TSI conform trains, they should:
Če so za vzdrževanje obstoječe ravni varnosti v skladu z Direktivo 2004/49/ES potrebne zahteve, ki presegajo tiste, ki so predvidene v TSI, ne smejo omejevati pretoka vlakov, ki so skladni s TSI, pri čemer je treba zagotoviti naslednje:
take the form of requirements on infrastructure or operations (to be included in the relevant TSIs as a duly justified specific case), or
zahteve morajo imeti obliko zahtev glede infrastrukture ali upravljanja (ki se vključijo v zadevne TSI kot ustrezno utemeljen posebni primer) ali
if a vehicle related measure is unavoidable it should be included in the TSI as a duly justified specific case,
če je ukrep v zvezi z vozilom neizogiben, mora biti ta ukrep vključen v TSI kot ustrezno utemeljen posebni primer.