natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Further, even if Chapter 4 could be applied by analogy, the exemption mechanism would not be compatible with it, for the following reasons.
Tudi če bi se poglavje 4 lahko uporabljalo po analogiji, mehanizem oprostitve z njim ne bi bil združljiv zaradi naslednjih razlogov.
The measure was not limited to a period of 10 years.
Ukrep ni omejen na obdobje 10 let.
In current market conditions price elasticity was sufficient to ensure that any increase in the production costs of the industries concerned (such as paper and steel) could be passed on to consumers; this meant that the exemption mechanism did not meet the condition in point 158(c) of the Guidelines.
V sedanjih tržnih pogojih je cenovna elastičnost zadostna za zagotovitev, da bi se lahko vsako povečanje stroškov proizvodnje za zadevne industrije (kot sta papir in jeklo) preneslo na odjemalce; to pomeni, da mehanizem oprostitve ne izpolnjuje pogoja iz točke 158(c) Smernic.
The exemption was not proportional, because energy-intensive consumers were not required to consume green electricity, so that the movement of renewable energy prices towards market price level would be delayed.
Oprostitev ni bila sorazmerna, ker se od energetsko intenzivnih odjemalcev ne zahteva, da uporabljajo električno energijo iz obnovljivih virov, zaradi česar bi bil premik cen obnovljive energije proti ravni tržnih cen zapoznel.
SMEs and households alone had to pay for the extra costs of producing green electricity, although they consumed only small volumes of energy.
MSP in gospodinjstva morajo sama kriti dodatne stroške proizvodnje električne energije iz obnovljivih virov, čeprav uporabljajo le majhne količine energije.
The exemption mechanism consequently also failed to meet the condition in point 159(a) of the Guidelines.
Mehanizem oprostitve zato tudi ne izpolnjuje pogoja iz točke 159(a) Smernic.
Nor were there any agreements of the kind referred to in 159(c) of the Guidelines by which large energy consumers committed themselves to achieve the objectives of the Act.
Prav tako ni sklenjenih nobenih sporazumov v skladu s točko 159(c) Smernic, s katerimi bi se veliki odjemalci energije zavezali k doseganju ciljev zakona.
Finally, the exemption mechanism for large consumers did not contribute to energy efficiency or environmentally friendly use of energy, but on the contrary excepted those consumers from any share in achieving EU-wide environmental objectives.
Nazadnje, mehanizem oprostitve za velike odjemalce ne prispeva k energetski učinkovitosti ali okolju prijazni uporabi energije, ampak ravno nasprotno te odjemalce izvzema iz vsake udeležbe pri doseganju okoljskih ciljev po vsej EU.
Section 22 of the Act was consequently an operational aid measure sui generis, which did not produce any environmental benefit and did not fall under the Environmental Aid Guidelines.
Oddelek 22 zakona je zato operativni ukrep pomoči sui generis, ki ne ustvarja nobene okoljske koristi in ne spada v okvir smernic o pomoči za varstvo okolja.
Since this aid was not limited in time, and was not scheduled to decrease over time, and since it distorted competition mainly at the expense of SMEs, it should not be authorised.
Ker ta pomoč ni časovno omejena in zanjo ni predvideno, da bi se sčasoma zmanjšala, ter ker izkrivlja konkurenco predvsem na račun MSP, ne sme biti odobrena.
The Commission has examined the notified measure in the light of Articles 107 ff. of the TFEU and Articles 61 ff. of the EEA Agreement [27].
Komisija je priglašeni ukrep preučila glede na člen 107 in naslednje člene PDEU ter člen 61 in naslednje člene Sporazuma EGP [27].
It also contains a provision by which energy-intensive businesses can — under certain conditions — be partially exempted from the obligation to pay the feed-in tariff.
Vsebuje tudi določbo, v skladu s katero so lahko energetsko intenzivne dejavnosti – pod nekaterimi pogoji – delno oproščene obveznosti plačila zagotovljene odkupne cene.
In its decision of 22 July 2009 the Commission accepted that the feed-in tariffs for the benefit of green electricity producers constituted State aid compatible with the internal market, but it expressed doubts as to whether the exemption mechanism was compatible with the State aid rules, and accordingly opened a formal investigation into this aspect of the Act.
V svoji odločitvi z dne 22. julija 2009 je Komisija potrdila, da so zagotovljene odkupne cene v korist proizvajalcev električne energije iz obnovljivih virov pomenile državno pomoč, ki je združljiva z notranjim trgom, vendar je izrazila dvome o tem, ali je mehanizem oprostitve združljiv s pravili glede državnih pomoči, in je zato začela formalno preiskavo v zvezi s tem vidikom zakona.
In the decision of 22 July 2009 the Commission approved the support for producers of green electricity as compatible State aid, but it did not take a final position on the question whether the exemption of energy-intensive businesses from the purchase obligation constituted State aid, and if so whether this exemption mechanism was compatible with the State aid rules.
Komisija je v odločitvi z dne 22. julija 2009 odobrila podporo za proizvajalce električne energije iz obnovljivih virov kot združljivo državno pomoč, vendar ni predstavila končnega stališča o vprašanju, ali oprostitev energetsko intenzivnih dejavnosti podjetij od obveznosti nakupa pomeni državno pomoč in, če je temu tako, ali je ta mehanizem oprostitve združljiv s predpisi o državni pomoči.
These questions have been considered in the formal investigation that has led up to the present Decision.
Ta vprašanja so bila obravnavana v formalni preiskavi, na kateri temelji ta sklep.
As explained below, however, the finding in the decision of 22 July 2009 that the funds channelled through OeMAG to green electricity producers are State resources is important for the determination of the presence of State resources in the mechanism that exempts energy-intensive businesses from contributing to these funds.
Kot je pojasnjeno spodaj, pa je ugotovitev iz odločitve z dne 22. julija 2009, da so sredstva, ki jih proizvajalci električne energije iz obnovljivih virov prejemajo prek družbe OeMAG, državna sredstva, pomembna za ugotovitev obstoja državnih sredstev v mehanizmu, ki energetsko intenzivne dejavnosti oprošča prispevanja k tem sredstvom.
Presence of State aid
Obstoj državne pomoči
A measure constitutes State aid caught by Article 107(1) TFEU if: first, it confers an advantage on the recipients; second, it is financed by the State or through State resources; third, it favours selected undertakings or economic activities; and, fourth, it has the potential to affect trade between Member States and to distort or threaten to distort competition in the internal market.
Ukrep pomeni državno pomoč iz člena 107(1) PDEU, če: pomeni prednost za prejemnike; ga financira država ali se financira iz državnih sredstev; daje prednost izbranim podjetjem ali gospodarskim dejavnostim; lahko prizadene trgovino med državami članicami in izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljal konkurenco na notranjem trgu.
Where the possible advantage results from an exemption or a partial exemption from a regulatory charge, the only question to be determined is whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU in comparison with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question [29].
Če morebitna prednost izhaja iz oprostitve ali delne oprostitve od regulativne dajatve, je potreben odgovor le na eno vprašanje, in sicer, ali je državni ukrep v okviru posamezne zakonsko predpisane sheme takšen, da v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU daje prednost posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji, ki so v pravnem in dejanskem položaju, primerljivem glede na cilj zadevnega ukrepa [29].
In the present case, the objective pursued by the measure in question is to raise revenue from electricity users in order to finance the production of electricity from renewable sources.
V tem primeru je cilj zadevnega ukrepa povečati prihodek od uporabnikov električne energije, da se financira proizvodnja električne energije iz obnovljivih virov.
Energy-intensive businesses are in the same factual and legal situation as all other electricity users, as they all consume electricity and purchase their electricity from electricity suppliers, which in turn have the obligation to purchase a certain amount of renewable electricity at a price fixed by legislation (the ‘clearing price’ (Verrechnungspreis)).
Energetsko intenzivne dejavnosti so v enakem dejanskem in pravnem položaju kot vsi drugi uporabniki električne energije, ker vsi uporabljajo električno energijo in jo kupujejo od dobaviteljev električne energije, ki pa imajo obveznost nakupa določene količine električne energije iz obnovljivih virov po ceni, ki jo določa zakonodaja („transferna cena“ (Verrechnungspreis)).
In the absence of the exemption mechanism, energy-intensive businesses would have to pay their electricity suppliers the additional costs of green electricity as shown in their electricity bill. This is the way in which electricity suppliers pass on the additional costs resulting from their obligation to purchase green electricity from the settlement centre.
Brez mehanizma oprostitve bi morale energetsko intenzivne dejavnosti svojim dobaviteljem električne energije plačevati dodatne stroške električne energije iz obnovljivih virov, kot je prikazano na njihovem računu za električno energijo. Tako dobavitelji električne energije prenesejo dodatne stroške, ki nastanejo zaradi njihove obveznosti nakupa električne energije iz obnovljivih virov od centra za obračun in poravnavo.
Other electricity users that are in the same factual and legal situation, as they all purchase electricity, do not enjoy this possibility.
Drugi uporabniki električne energije, ki so v enakem dejanskem in pravnem položaju, ker vsi kupujejo električno energijo, nimajo te možnosti.
The exemption mechanism consequently favours energy-intensive businesses in comparison with all other electricity consumers.
Zato mehanizem oprostitve daje prednost energetsko intenzivnim dejavnostim v primerjavi z vsemi drugimi odjemalci električne energije.
On the basis of an exemption granted by E-Control, energy-intensive businesses are entitled to ask not to be supplied with green electricity, and the electricity suppliers are prohibited, by law, from passing on to the exempted undertakings any costs they incur as a result of their obligation to buy green electricity from the settlement centre.
Na podlagi oprostitve, ki jo je odobrila družba E-Control, energetsko intenzivne dejavnosti lahko zaprosijo, da se jim ne dobavlja električna energija iz obnovljivih virov, medtem ko za dobavitelje električne energije velja zakonska prepoved, da na oproščena podjetja prenesejo kakršne koli stroške, ki nastanejo zaradi njihove obveznosti, da kupujejo električno energijo iz obnovljivih virov od centra za obračun in poravnavo.
Instead, energy-intensive businesses pay the equivalent of 0,5 % of their net production value to the centre.
Namesto tega energetsko intenzivne dejavnosti centru plačajo nadomestilo v višini 0,5 % svoje neto vrednosti proizvodnje.
The effect of the exemption mechanism, therefore, is to cap the contribution of energy-intensive industries to the revenues of the centre at a certain level.
Zato mehanizem oprostitve učinkuje tako, da omejuje prispevek energetsko intenzivnih panog prihodkom centra na določeni ravni.
They are thus partially exempt by law from a charge which they would have had to bear under normal market conditions.
Tako so te delno zakonsko oproščene dajatev, ki bi jih morale plačevati pri običajnih tržnih pogojih.
The exemption mechanism consequently confers an advantage on the undertakings which are eligible for it.
Zato mehanizem oprostitve pomeni prednost za podjetja, ki so do njega upravičena.
According to Austria, the relief may amount to a total of up to EUR 44 million annually [30].
Po mnenju Avstrije lahko pomoč znaša do skupno 44 milijonov EUR na leto [30].
The measure thus constitutes an advantage to these energy-intensive businesses.
Tako ukrep pomeni prednost za takšne energetsko intenzivne dejavnosti.
It is settled case-law that an advantage can be categorised as State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU only if it is granted directly or indirectly through State resources and the use made of the resources is imputable to the State [31].(60) In that regard Austria puts forward a twofold argument.
Na podlagi ustaljene sodne prakse se lahko prednost opredeli kot državna pomoč v skladu s členom 107(1) PDEU le, če je odobrena neposredno ali posredno iz državnih sredstev in je uporabo sredstev mogoče pripisati državi [31].(60) V zvezi s tem Avstrija navaja dvojno utemeljitev.
First, the funds under the control of OeMAG do not constitute State resources.
Prvič, sredstva pod nadzorom družbe OeMAG ne pomenijo državnih sredstev.
Second, even if the funds under the control of OeMAG do constitute State resources, the reduction in OeMAG’s revenues due to the exemption mechanism does not reduce State resources, because there is no involvement of the State at the level below OeMAG (i.e. at the level of the energy-intensive consumers and electricity distributors).
Drugič, tudi če sredstva pod nadzorom družbe OeMAG pomenijo državna sredstva, se z zmanjšanjem prihodkov OeMAG zaradi mehanizma oprostitve državna sredstva ne zmanjšajo, ker država na ravni pod družbo OeMAG (tj. na ravni energetsko intenzivnih odjemalcev in distributerjev električne energije) ni vključena.
The Commission observes that the exemption mechanism for energy-intensive businesses reduces the revenues of the settlement centre — OeMAG — as the electricity suppliers are not obliged to purchase green electricity for those energy-intensive businesses that have been granted an exemption, and the direct payment made to OeMAG by the energy-intensive businesses is lower than what OeMAG would have received had the energy-intensive businesses not been exempted.
Komisija ugotavlja, da mehanizem oprostitve za energetsko intenzivne dejavnosti zmanjšuje prihodke centra za obračun in poravnavo, tj. družbe OeMAG, ker dobavitelji električne energije niso zavezani k nakupu električne energije iz obnovljivih virov za tiste energetsko intenzivne dejavnosti, ki jim je bila odobrena oprostitev, in da je neposredno plačilo energetsko intenzivnih dejavnosti družbi OeMAG nižje od plačila, ki bi ga družba OeMAG prejela, če energetsko intenzivnim dejavnostim ne bi bila odobrena oprostitev.
Accordingly, the Commission needs to establish whether the resources which on the basis of the Green Electricity Act are under the control of the settlement centre, that is OeMAG, constitute State resources.
V skladu s tem mora Komisija določiti, ali sredstva, ki so na podlagi zakona o električni energiji iz obnovljivih virov pod nadzorom centra za obračun in poravnavo, tj. družbe OeMAG, pomenijo državno pomoč.
If that is the case, the measure under assessment leads to a reduction in State revenue, and is therefore financed from State resources.
V tem primeru se zaradi ukrepa, ki se ocenjuje, zmanjšajo državni prihodki, kar pomeni, da se financira iz državnih sredstev.
In the Essent case [32], SEP, an undertaking owned by a number of Dutch electricity generating companies, had been entrusted by the State with a public service obligation to collect revenues from a surcharge imposed on the users of the electricity grid.
V zadevi Essent [32] je država podjetje SEP, ki je v lasti več nizozemskih družb za proizvodnjo električne energije, pooblastila za obveznost javnih služb, in sicer pobiranje prihodkov od doplačila, uvedenega za uporabnike električnega omrežja.
The law allowed SEP to use the revenues of the surcharge only for the purpose set out in the law, that is to say in order to defray stranded costs incurred by the electricity undertakings in the context of the liberalisation of the electricity market.
Zakonodaja podjetju SEP dovoljuje uporabo prihodkov od doplačila le za namen, ki ga določa zakonodaja, to je za kritje nasedlih stroškov elektroenergetskih podjetij, ki so nastali v okviru liberalizacije trga električne energije.
The Court of Justice found that the surcharge collected by SEP constituted a State resource, because the following conditions were met:
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da doplačilo, ki ga pobira podjetje SEP, pomeni državno pomoč, ker so izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji:
the surcharge was a charge imposed upon private entities by an act of public authority (paragraphs 47–66 of the judgment);
doplačilo je bila dajatev, ki je bila z aktom javnega organa uvedena za zasebne subjekte (točke 47–66 sodbe);
the State had given SEP the task of operating an economic service of general interest, namely the task of collecting the charge (paragraph 68);
država je podjetje SEP pooblastila za upravljanje gospodarske službe v splošnem interesu, in sicer pobiranje dajatve (točka 68);
SEP was not entitled to use the proceeds from the charge for purposes other than those provided for by the law, and it was strictly monitored in carrying out its task (paragraph 69).
podjetje SEP ni moglo uporabljati prihodka od dajatve za druge namene, razen za tiste, ki so določeni v zakonu, pri čemer je bilo pri izvajanju svoje naloge strogo nadzorovano (točka 69).
The judgment made it clear that the measure in question differed from that considered in PreussenElektra, because there ‘the undertakings had not been appointed by the State to manage a State resource, but were bound by an obligation to purchase by means of their own financial resources’ [33].
V sodbi je jasno navedeno, da se obravnavani ukrep razlikuje od ukrepa, obravnavanega v zadevi PreussenElektra, ker v navedenem primeru „država podjetij ni pooblastila za upravljanje državnih sredstev, ampak so imela podjetja obveznost nakupa z lastnimi finančnimi sredstvi“ [33].
In its opening decision of 22 July 2009 the Commission observed that OeMAG had been set up and licensed by the Austrian State, and in its founding documents had been given the task of administering the resources needed to support green electricity.
Komisija je v svoji odločitvi o začetku postopka z dne 22. julija 2009 ugotovila, da je družbo OeMAG ustanovila Republika Avstrija, ki ji je tudi izdala dovoljenje, pri čemer je bila družbi v dokumentih o ustanovitvi dodeljena naloga upravljanja sredstev, potrebnih za podporo električne energije iz obnovljivih virov.
The Commission concluded that the fact that OeMAG was private was not enough to show that the measure did not involve State aid.
Komisija je ugotovila, da dejstvo, da je družba OeMAG zasebna, ni zadosten dokaz, da ukrep ni vključeval državne pomoči.
In particular, the notified measure was not comparable to the scheme in PreussenElektra.
Priglašeni ukrep zlasti ni bil primerljiv s shemo iz zadeve PreussenElektra.
The PreussenElektra case was concerned with relations between private undertakings, without the involvement of any intermediate body, whereas the Green Electricity Act in Austria had given OeMAG the task of collecting and distributing the funds intended for the generation of green electricity.
Zadeva PreussenElektra se je nanašala na odnose med zasebnimi podjetji brez sodelovanja kakršnega koli posredniškega telesa, medtem ko je bila družbi OeMAG v skladu z zakonom o električni energiji iz obnovljivih virov v Avstriji dodeljena naloga zbiranja in razporejanja sredstev za proizvodnjo električne energije iz obnovljivih virov.
The Court also distinguished the Essent case from the cases of Pearle and PreussenElektra: in Pearle, the funds collected by a professional body were used not for a policy decided by the public authorities, but for a private advertisement campaign; while in PreussenElektra, private electricity undertakings which were required to purchase renewable electricity at a fixed price were using their own resources, and not the proceeds of a charge they had collected on behalf of the State (paragraphs 72–74).
Sodišče je prav tako razlikovalo med zadevo Essent ter zadevama Pearle in PreussenElektra: v zadevi Pearle se sredstva, ki jih je pobirala poklicna organizacija, niso uporabila za politiko, ki so jo določili javni organi, ampak za zasebno oglaševalsko akcijo; v zadevi PreussenElektra pa so zasebna elektroenergetska podjetja, ki so morala kupovati električno energijo iz obnovljivih virov po fiksni ceni, uporabljala lastna sredstva in ne prihodka od dajatve, ki so jo pobirala v imenu države (točke 72–74).
In the present case, therefore, the Commission must assess whether OeMAG has been designated by the State to collect and administer a charge, as SEP was, or whether it is using its own funds, as the undertakings in PreussenElektra were [34].
Zato mora Komisija v tem primeru oceniti, ali je družbo OeMAG tako kot podjetje SEP za pobiranje in upravljanje dajatve imenovala država oziroma ali družba tako kot podjetja v zadevi PreussenElektra [34] uporablja lastna sredstva.
Presence of a charge: The Commission first needs to establish whether the money collected by OeMAG constitutes a charge.
Prisotnost dajatve: Komisija mora najprej ugotoviti, ali denar, ki ga pobira družba OeMAG, pomeni dajatev.
Sections 10 and 19 of the Green Electricity Act require electricity suppliers to purchase a certain volume of renewable electricity at a price above the market price, called the ‘clearing price’(Verrechnungspreis).
Oddelka 10 in 19 zakona o električni energiji iz obnovljivih virov določata, da morajo dobavitelji električne energije kupiti določeno količino električne energije iz obnovljivih virov po ceni, ki je višja od tržne cene, tj. po „transferni ceni“ (Verrechnungspreis).
Section 22b of the Act states that the level of the clearing price is to be set annually by order of the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Labour, and goes on to lay down default values.
Oddelek 22b zakona navaja, da je treba transferno ceno vsako leto določiti z odločbo zveznega ministra za gospodarske zadeve in delo, ter določa privzete vrednosti.
The difference between the market price for electricity and the clearing price, which is set by an act of public authority, constitutes a charge on electricity.
Razlika med tržno ceno električne energije in transferno ceno, ki se določi z aktom javnega organa, pomeni dajatev za električno energijo.
In the present case the charge is not paid to other market players engaged in ordinary commercial business, as it was in PreussenElektra, which led the Court to find that no State resources were involved.
V tem primeru se dajatev ne plačuje drugim subjektom na trgu, ki izvajajo običajne poslovne dejavnosti, tako kot je bilo v zadevi PreussenElektra, zaradi česar je Sodišče sklenilo, da državna sredstva niso vključena.
Here payments are made to a body that has the specific task of collecting and distributing these funds solely for purposes in the public interest.
Tu se dajatev plača organu, ki ima posebno nalogo zbiranja in razporejanja teh sredstev izključno v namene javnega interesa.
Designation of a private body to collect and administer the charge: The Act provides that the charge is to be levied, not by the State, but by a legal entity that holds a concession to act as a settlement centre.
Imenovanje zasebnega organa za pobiranje in upravljanje dajatve: zakon določa, da dajatve ne obračunava država, ampak pravni subjekt, ki ima koncesijo za opravljanje nalog centra za obračun in poravnavo.
A concession to act as settlement centre for the whole of Austria is currently held by OeMAG.
Koncesijo za opravljanje nalog centra za obračun in poravnavo za celotno Avstrijo ima zdaj družba OeMAG.
The concession gives OeMAG the public service obligation of collecting a charge in the form of the clearing price from all electricity suppliers.
Koncesija nalaga družbi OeMAG obveznost javnih služb, in sicer pobiranje dajatve v obliki transferne cene od vseh dobaviteljev električne energije.