natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission also expressed concern that the measure might have the effect of reducing the level of taxation applicable to electricity.
Komisija je izrazila tudi zaskrbljenost glede tega, da bi se lahko zaradi ukrepa znižala raven obdavčitve za električno energijo.
Any such reduction would have to have a legal basis in Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity [20].
Pravna podlaga za tako morebitno znižanje bi morala temeljiti na Direktivi Sveta 2003/96/ES z dne 27. oktobra 2003 o prestrukturiranju okvira Skupnosti za obdavčitev energentov in električne energije [20].
In its decision of 27 April 2006 opening the formal investigation, the Commission classified the 2005 tariff scheme as new operating aid.
Komisija je v svoji odločitvi z dne 27. aprila 2006, s katero je sprožila uradno preiskavo, shemo cen iz leta 2005 opredelila kot novo pomoč za tekoče poslovanje.
The Commission considered whether the preferential tariff could be authorised as regional operating aid on the basis of the Regional Aid Guidelines, since Sardinia was to be an assisted region within the scope of Article 107(3)(a) TFEU until the end of 2006.
Komisija je preučila, ali bi bila ugodnejša cena na podlagi smernic o regionalni pomoči lahko odobrena kot regionalna pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, glede na to, da je bila do konca leta 2006 Sardinija območje, ki je prejemalo pomoč in ki spada na področje uporabe člena 107(3)(a) PDEU.
Despite Italy’s insistence that high electricity prices in Sardinia handicapped the development of the island, the Commission took the view that Italy had not shown that prices were significantly higher in Sardinia, either on average or specifically for energy-intensive users [21].
Komisija je kljub vztrajanju Italije pri tem, da so visoke cene električne energije na Sardiniji pomenile oviro za razvoj otoka, ugotovila, da Italija ni dokazala obstoja znatno višjih cen na Sardiniji na povprečni ravni ali zlasti za energetsko intenzivne uporabnike [21].
The Commission pointed out that the overcapacity that existed in electricity generation in Sardinia could only have the effect of encouraging power generators to sell electricity at the lowest possible price, until such time as the completion of the interconnection projects, which was scheduled for 2010, enabled them to export power from Sardinia.
Komisija je pojasnila, da bi lahko presežna zmogljivost proizvodnje električne energije na Sardiniji samo spodbudila proizvajalce električne energije, da električno energijo prodajajo po najnižji možni ceni do takrat, ko bi jim dokončanje projektov za povečanje medsebojnih elektroenergetskih povezav, načrtovano za leto 2010, omogočilo, da električno energijo izvažajo s Sardinije.
Besides, Italy had not explained why higher prices should be regarded as a regional handicap, or how the tariff would contribute to regional development.
Sicer pa Italija ni pojasnila, zakaj bi bilo treba višje cene obravnavati kot regionalno oviro ali kako naj bi cena prispevala k regionalnemu razvoju.
The Commission accordingly doubted whether the aid was necessary.
Komisija je v skladu s tem dvomila, ali je bila pomoč potrebna.
The Commission also doubted whether ad hoc aid of this kind was proportional to the regional disadvantages, in particular in view of the method used to calculate the preferential price, which bore no relation to the prices charged in the rest of Italy but was based on the average prices charged in Europe to energy-intensive users.
Poleg tega je Komisija dvomila, da je taka ad hoc pomoč sorazmerna z regionalnimi ovirami, zlasti ob upoštevanju metode za izračun ugodnejše cene, ki ni bila povezana s cenami drugod po Italiji, ampak je temeljila na povprečnih cenah, ki so jih v Evropi plačevali energetsko intenzivni uporabniki.
The Commission noted that the duration of the measure exceeded five years, which was usually the maximum period for which regional operating aid would be authorised, and that the aid was not degressive in real terms, in view of the 4 % cap imposed on increases in the tariff.
Komisija je ugotovila, da je ukrep veljal več kot pet let, kar je običajno najdaljše obdobje, za katero je odobrena regionalna pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, in da se pomoč dejansko ni postopno zmanjševala, glede na to, da naj bi se cene povečale za največ 4 %.
As regards the period covered by the Guidelines on National Regional Aid 2007–2013 [22], the Commission noted that Sardinia would cease to qualify for aid under Article 107(3)(a) TFEU, and in particular for operating aid.
Kar zadeva obdobje, zajeto v smernice o državni regionalni pomoči za 2007–2013 [22], je Komisija ugotovila, da Sardinija ne bi bila več upravičena do regionalne pomoči v skladu s členom 107(3)(a) PDEU in zlasti do pomoči za tekoče poslovanje.
The Guidelines would allow a two-year transitional period for the linear phasing-out of existing operating aid schemes, but it did not seem appropriate to allow new operating aid to be introduced for a few months and then phased out, especially given the doubts expressed and the distortive nature of the aid.
V skladu s smernicami bi se lahko odobrilo dveletno prehodno obdobje za linearno postopno opuščanje obstoječih shem pomoči za tekoče poslovanje, vendar se ni zdelo primerno dovoliti uvedbe nove pomoči za tekoče poslovanje za nekaj mesecev, ki bi se jo nato opustilo, zlasti glede na izražene pomisleke in izkrivljajočo naravo pomoči.
In conclusion, the Commission doubted whether the preferential tariff for Portovesme, ILA, Eurallumina and Syndial could be authorised either as regional aid or on any other grounds, which Italy had in any event failed to identify.
Na koncu je Komisija izrazila pomisleke glede odobritve ugodnejše cene za družbe Portovesme, ILA, Eurallumina in Syndial v obliki regionalne pomoči ali na podlagi katerih koli drugih razlogov, ki jih Italija v nobenem primeru ni opredelila.
As regards Eurallumina, the Commission observed that the company had not yet reimbursed unlawful and incompatible State aid it had received [23], and that under the rule in Deggendorf [24] it consequently could not receive aid under any new measure.
Glede družbe Eurallumina je Komisija ugotovila, da družba še ni povrnila nezakonite in nezdružljive pomoči, ki jo je prejela [23], in da na podlagi sodbe v zadevi Deggendorf [24] zato ne more prejeti pomoči na podlagi katerega koli novega ukrepa.
In response to the Commission’s invitation to submit comments on the 2004 decision to open the in-depth investigation, observations were received from the original complainant, several of the beneficiaries (Portovesme, Eurallumina and Alcoa), and other interested parties.
Na poziv Komisije v zvezi s predložitvijo pripomb glede odločitve iz leta 2004 o sprožitvi podrobne preiskave so bile prejete pripombe prvotnega pritožnika, več upravičencev (Portovesme, Eurallumina in Alcoa) in drugih zainteresiranih strani.
Only the observations relevant to the preferential tariff for Portovesme, ILA and Eurallumina are summarised here.
V nadaljevanju so povzete le pripombe v zvezi z ugodnejšo ceno za družbe Portovesme, ILA in Eurallumina.
The observations made by Alcoa are not included, as they are comprehensively addressed in the final decision specifically concerning that company [25].
Pripombe, ki jih je predložila družba Alcoa, niso vključene, saj so v celoti obravnavane v dokončnem sklepu, ki se nanaša samo na to družbo [25].
Observations submitted by Portovesme
Pripombe družbe Portovesme
Portovesme argued that the preferential tariff addressed a market failure, namely the failure of the recently liberalised Sardinian electricity market to deliver competitive prices owing to the market power of the incumbent operators.
Družba Portovesme je trdila, da je ugodnejša cena namenjena odpravi nedelovanje trga, in sicer nezmožnosti nedavno liberaliziranega trga z električno energijo na Sardiniji, da zagotovi konkurenčne cene zaradi velike tržne moči prvotnih nosilcev dejavnosti.
Portovesme claimed that ENEL and Endesa (whose power generation assets in Sardinia were subsequently sold to E.ON) formed a duopoly, and artificially kept electricity prices in Sardinia in line with average Italian prices, whereas in fact Sardinian prices should be much lower, especially for large electricity consumers, given the overcapacity in electricity generation, which ought to encourage generators to sell at competitive prices.
Družba Portovesme je trdila, da sta družbi ENEL in Endesa (njuna sredstva za proizvodnjo električne energije so bila pozneje prodana družbi E.ON) oblikovali duopol in umetno vzdrževali cene električne energije na Sardiniji v skladu s povprečnimi italijanskimi cenami, dejansko pa bi morale biti glede na presežno zmogljivost proizvodnje električne energije, ki bi morala proizvajalce spodbujati k prodaji po konkurenčnih cenah, cene na Sardiniji zlasti za velike odjemalce električne energije precej nižje.
Portovesme contended that the preferential price enjoyed corresponded to the price the company would have obtained under normal market conditions, i.e. if the electricity market functioned correctly.
Družba Portovesme je trdila, da je bila ugodnejša cena, do katere je bila upravičena, enaka ceni, ki bi jo družba plačevala v normalnih tržnih pogojih, tj. če bi trg z električno energijo deloval pravilno.
According to Portovesme, the compensatory payments received from the Equalisation Fund (amounting to EUR 37 per MWh) brought the price paid by Portovesme into line with power prices paid by its competitors, and did not distort competition, since all EU zinc producers paid equivalent prices, and the measure merely offset the competitive disadvantage suffered by the company as a result of Sardinia’s structural problems (which included the absence of natural gas).
Po mnenju družbe Portovesme so kompenzacijska plačila, ki jih je družba prejela od izravnalnega sklada (znašala so 37 EUR/MWh), uskladila cene, ki jih je plačevala družba Portovesme, s cenami električne energije, ki so jih plačevali konkurenčni ponudniki družbe, in niso izkrivljala konkurence, saj so vsi proizvajalci cinka v EU plačevali enake cene, ukrep pa je samo izravnal neugoden konkurenčni položaj, v katerem se je znašla družba zaradi strukturnih težav Sardinije (vključno s pomanjkanjem zemeljskega plina).
Metals like zinc, aluminium and lead were commodities for which there was one world price, arrived at on the London Metal Exchange.
Kovine, kot so cink, aluminij in svinec, so blago, za katero obstaja samo ena svetovna cena, ki jo določa Londonska borza kovin.
Variations in local production costs did not translate into differences in world prices.
Nihanja lokalnih proizvodnih stroškov ne pomenijo različnih svetovnih cen.
In particular, Portovesme’s zinc production was so small (at less than 1 % of world production) that it could not affect the world price.
Zlasti proizvodnja cinka družbe Portovesme je bila tako majhna (manj kot 1 % svetovne proizvodnje), da ni mogla vplivati na svetovno ceno.
Without the tariff Portovesme would have to close its plant, but the closure would not benefit other EU zinc producers, who would not be in a position to increase output, and the gap would be filled by imports from third countries.
Brez ugodnejše cene bi morala družba Portovesme zapreti obrat, vendar pa zaprtje ne bi koristilo drugim proizvajalcem cinka v EU, ki ne bi mogli povečati proizvodnje, tako da bi vrzel zapolnili z uvozom iz tretjih držav.
Portovesme concluded that the preferential tariff did not affect competition or trade in the EU.
Družba Portovesme je ugotovila, da ugodnejša cena ni vplivala na konkurenco ali trgovino v EU.
Moreover, according to Portovesme, the compensatory payments from the Equalisation Fund did not involve State resources, since the Equalisation Fund merely redistributed private funds which came from electricity end-users.
Poleg tega, po mnenju družbe Portovesme, kompenzacijska plačila iz izravnalnega sklada niso vključevala državnih sredstev, saj je izravnalni sklad samo prerazporedil zasebna sredstva, prejeta od končnih uporabnikov električne energije.
Portovesme noted that power off-take by energy-intensive industries was important to ensure security and continuity of supply in Sardinia, and to avoid inefficiencies in power generation which would lead to higher electricity costs for end-users.
Družba Portovesme je pojasnila, da je odjem električne energije s strani energetsko intenzivnih sektorjev pomemben za zagotavljanje varnosti in neprekinjene dobave na Sardiniji ter preprečevanje neučinkovitosti pri proizvajanju električne energije, ki bi povzročila višje stroške električne energije za končne uporabnike.
Finally, the company points out that, if it was obliged to close down its plant, the consequences for Sardinia’s production base would be very serious, as 790 direct jobs and 500 indirect jobs would be lost.
Nazadnje je družba poudarila, da bi bile v primeru, če bi morala zapreti obrat, posledice za proizvodno osnovo Sardinije zelo resne, saj bi bilo izgubljenih 790 neposrednih in 500 posrednih delovnih mest.
Observations submitted by Eurallumina
Pripombe družbe Eurallumina
Eurallumina argued that alumina production costs in Europe were higher than in other regions of the world, owing mainly to higher electricity and fuel prices and to the cost of transporting bauxite [26].
Družba Eurallumina je trdila, da so stroški proizvodnje aluminijevega oksida v Evropi višji od proizvodnih stroškov v drugih regijah sveta, predvsem zaradi višjih cen električne energije in goriva ter stroškov za prevoz boksita [26].
The higher costs could not be passed on in the form of higher prices, since the price of alumina was set on the London Metal Exchange and individual producers had no influence over it.
Višjih stroškov ne bi mogli prenesti naprej v obliki višjih cen, saj ceno aluminijevega oksida določa Londonska borza kovin in posamezni proizvajalci nanjo nimajo vpliva.
European alumina production therefore suffered from a competitive disadvantage compared with the rest of the world.
Evropska proizvodnja aluminijevega oksida je zato v primerjavi s preostalim svetom v neugodnem konkurenčnem položaju.
In addition to the general problems affecting European alumina refineries, Eurallumina also pointed to specific Sardinian problems that prevented local industries from reaping the benefits of electricity market liberalisation, notably the market power of incumbent electricity operators (see Portovesme’s observations in recital 55 above).
Poleg splošnih težav, ki vplivajo na rafinerije aluminijevega oksida, je družba Eurallumina poudarila tudi težave, ki so značilne za Sardinijo in so lokalnim industrijam preprečile izkoriščanje prednosti liberalizacije trga z električno energijo, predvsem veliko tržno moč prvotnih nosilcev dejavnosti (glej pripombe družbe Portovesme v uvodni izjavi 55).
Eurallumina also contended that the absence of natural gas was a specific handicap for the production of alumina in Sardinia, as the large quantities of steam required for the process had to be obtained using more expensive heavy oil.
Družba Eurallumina je tudi trdila, da je pomanjkanje zemeljskega plina posebna ovira za proizvodnjo aluminijevega oksida na Sardiniji, saj je bilo treba velike količine pare, potrebne za postopek, ustvariti z dražjim težkim oljem.
According to Eurallumina, after liberalisation the market power of electricity generators in Sardinia led to an increase in electricity prices: without the tariff, Eurallumina would have had to pay EUR 65,95 per MWh for its electricity supplies, as against the EUR 44 per MWh it used to pay before liberalisation.
Po mnenju družbe Eurallumina je po liberalizaciji tržna moč proizvajalcev električne energije na Sardiniji povzročila zvišanje cen električne energije: brez ugodnejše cene bi morala družba Eurallumina za dobavo električne energije plačevati 65,95 EUR/MWh, v primerjavi s 44 EUR/MWh, ki jih je plačevala pred liberalizacijo.
The 2004 tariff brought the price down to EUR 35 per MWh.
Cene iz leta 2004 so to ceno znižale na 35 EUR/MWh.
Like Portovesme, Eurallumina contended that, if it was forced to go out of business, other EU alumina producers would not be able to step in, as they already worked at maximum capacity, and the gap would be filled by imports from third countries.
Tako kot družba Portovesme je tudi družba Eurallumina trdila, da v primeru, če bi morala prenehati z delovanjem, drugi proizvajalci aluminijevega oksida ne bi mogli nadomestiti njene proizvodnje, saj so že delovali s polno zmogljivostjo, tako da bi vrzel zapolnili z uvozom iz tretjih držav.
Closure would lead to the loss of 400 direct jobs and 250 indirect jobs [27].
Zaprtje bi povzročilo izgubo 400 neposrednih in 250 posrednih delovnih mest [27].
Given that it was the sole supplier of alumina for Alcoa’s smelter, Eurallumina considered that the closure of its alumina plant might also jeopardise Alcoa’s viability in Sardinia.
Glede na to, da je bila družba Eurallumina edini dobavitelj aluminijevega oksida za talilnico družbe Alcoa, je menila, da bi zaprtje njene tovarne aluminijevega oksida lahko ogrozilo tudi sposobnost preživetja družbe Alcoa na Sardiniji.
Eurallumina concluded that the tariff introduced by the 2004 Decree was necessary pending the development of the new infrastructure that would remove the main factors of competitive disadvantage affecting Sardinian industry.
Družba Eurallumina je ugotovila, da je bila cena, uvedena z odlokom iz leta 2004, potrebna zaradi razvoja nove infrastrukture, ki bi odstranila glavne dejavnike neugodnega konkurenčnega položaja, ki vpliva na industrijo Sardinije.
Observations submitted by other interested parties
Pripombe drugih zainteresiranih strani
A competitor of Portovesme — the same company that had originally brought the case to the Commission’s attention — wrote to the Commission again after the opening of the formal investigation.
Konkurenčni ponudnik družbe Portovesme – ista družba, ki je Komisijo prvotno obvestila o zadevi – je ponovno pisal Komisiji po sprožitvi uradne preiskave.
It submitted an analysis of the 2004 preferential tariff in which it concluded that the tariff constituted unlawful State aid.
Predložil je analizo ugodnejše cene iz leta 2004, s katero je ugotovil, da cena pomeni nezakonito državno pomoč.
The disputed tariff scheme was fundamentally different from the Alumix tariff granted to Alcoa: it was impossible to take the view that it did not constitute State aid.
Sporna shema cen se je bistveno razlikovala od cene Alumix, ki je bila odobrena družbi Alcoa: ni bilo mogoče zavzeti stališča, da ne pomeni državne pomoči.
The aid must be held incompatible with the common market, as it could not be approved either as regional operating aid or as restructuring aid.
Pomoč mora biti razglašena za nezdružljivo s skupnim trgom, saj je ni bilo mogoče odobriti kot regionalno pomoč za tekoče poslovanje ali kot pomoč za prestrukturiranje.
Solvay Chimica Italia and Solvay Chimica Bussi, who operate in the chlorine-soda industry, sent observations on the 2004 tariffs in July 2005, after the expiry of the one-month deadline for submitting comments in response to the decision to open the formal investigation.
Družbi Solvay Chimica Italia in Solvay Chimica Bussi, ki proizvajata klorove preparate, sta pripombe glede cen iz leta 2004 poslali julija 2005, po izteku enomesečnega roka za predložitev pripomb na odločitev o sprožitvi uradne preiskave.
Despite the delay, these companies asked to be considered interested parties.
Kljub zamudi sta ti družbi prosili, da se obravnavata kot zainteresirani strani.
In their observations they submitted that both the 2004 and the 2005 tariffs constituted unlawful and incompatible State aid.
V svojih pripombah sta navedli, da cene iz leta 2004 in cene iz leta 2005 pomenijo nezakonito in nezdružljivo državno pomoč.
Observations submitted by Italy
Pripombe Italije
Italy argued that that the electricity market in the EU was not yet fully competitive, as the Commission had itself acknowledged in its fourth Annual Report on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market [28].
Italija je trdila, da trg z električno energijo v EU še ni popolnoma konkurenčen, kar je priznala tudi Komisija v svojem četrtem letnem poročilu o uresničevanju notranjega trga s plinom in električno energijo [28].
Undertakings, in particular energy-intensive ones, were unable to choose their suppliers freely and to procure electricity on comparable terms in the various Member States.
Podjetja, zlasti energetsko intenzivna podjetja, niso mogla prosto izbirati svojih dobaviteljev in dobiti električne energije pod primerljivimi pogoji v različnih državah članicah.
These difficulties were not related to the undertakings’ own entrepreneurship, but were the result of the structural deficiencies of energy markets.
Te težave niso bile povezane s podjetništvom družb, ampak so bile rezultat strukturnih pomanjkljivosti trgov z električno energijo.
The current situation in the EU energy market had negative effects on free competition in the product markets of energy-intensive users.
Sedanji položaj na trgu EU z električno energijo je imel negativne učinke na svobodno konkurenco na proizvodnih trgih energetsko intenzivnih uporabnikov.
In Italy, despite the liberalisation of the sector, there were particular structural deficiencies, such as insufficient interconnection between the different parts of the national grids and a concentrated market structure.
Italija je imela kljub liberalizaciji sektorja določene strukturne pomanjkljivosti, kot sta nezadostno medsebojno povezovanje med različnimi deli nacionalnih omrežij in koncentrirana tržna struktura.
In these circumstances, liberalisation had not translated into better prices for energy-intensive users.
V teh okoliščinah liberalizacija ni povzročila ugodnejših cen za energetsko intenzivne uporabnike.
The problems were particularly acute in Sardinia, where interconnection was limited.
Težave so bile zlasti velike na Sardiniji, kjer je povezovanje omejeno.
Italy submitted, therefore, that a special tariff system reflecting demand profiles should be considered justified, as a regulatory measure that simulated the mechanisms that would be at play in a fully competitive market.
Zato je Italija trdila, da je treba sistem posebnih cen, pri katerem se upoštevajo značilnosti povpraševanja, obravnavati kot upravičen regulativni ukrep, ki spodbuja mehanizme, ki bi bili na voljo na popolnoma konkurenčnem trgu.
The measure restored the level playing field between energy-intensive undertakings operating in different Member States, eliminating the geographical disadvantages which affect undertakings located in Sardinia.
Ukrep je ponovno vzpostavil enake konkurenčne pogoje za energetsko intenzivna podjetja, ki delujejo v različnih državah članicah, saj je odpravil geografske pomanjkljivosti, ki so vplivale na družbe na Sardiniji.
The scheme anticipated the expected effects of the liberalisation process.
Shema je predvidela pričakovane učinke procesa liberalizacije.
According to Italy, similar measures were implemented in other Member States, where energy-intensive users benefited as a result of regulated electricity tariffs.
Po mnenju Italije so bili podobni ukrepi uvedeni v drugih državah članicah, kjer so imeli energetsko intenzivni uporabniki korist zaradi reguliranih cen električne energije.
According to Italy, the 2004 decree pursued two further objectives: to support employment in Sardinia, which was concentrated in the metals sector, and to maintain a sufficient level of demand for power generation in Sardinia, which suffered from overcapacity.
Po mnenju Italije je odlok iz leta 2004 sledil še dvema ciljema: podpori zaposlovanja na Sardiniji, ki je bilo koncentrirano v sektorju kovin, in ohranjanju dovolj visoke ravni povpraševanja po proizvodnji električne energije na Sardiniji, ki je imela težave s presežno zmogljivostjo.
Italy contended that the new tariff scheme was equivalent, de facto, to the Alumix tariff, which the Commission had found did not constitute State aid.
Italija je trdila, da je nova shema cen dejansko enaka ceni Alumix, za katero je Komisija ugotovila, da ne pomeni državne pomoči.