natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This Regulation should therefore be without prejudice both to Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics [28] and to Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank [29].
Zato ta uredba ne bi smela posegati niti v Uredbo (ES) št. 223/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2009 o evropski statistiki [28] niti v Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 2533/98 z dne 23. novembra 1998 o zbiranju statističnih informacij s strani Evropske centralne banke [29].
Close cooperation between the Authority and the ESRB is essential to give full effectiveness to the functioning of the ESRB and the follow-up to its warnings and recommendations.
Tesno sodelovanje med Organom in ESRB je bistveno za popolnoma učinkovito delovanje ESRB ter spremljanje nadaljnjega ukrepanja na podlagi njegovih opozoril in priporočil.
The Authority and the ESRB should share any relevant information with each other.
Organ in ESRB bi si morala vzajemno posredovati vse pomembne informacije.
Data related to individual undertakings should be provided only upon reasoned request.
Podatke, povezane s posameznimi podjemi, bi bilo treba zagotoviti le na podlagi obrazložene zahteve.
Upon receipt of warnings or recommendations addressed by the ESRB to the Authority or a national supervisory authority, the Authority should ensure follow-up as appropriate.
Organ bi moral po prejemu opozoril ali priporočil, ki jih ESRB naslovi na Organ ali nacionalni nadzorni organ, po potrebi zagotoviti nadaljnje spremljanje.
The Authority should consult interested parties on regulatory or implementing technical standards, guidelines and recommendations and provide them with a reasonable opportunity to comment on proposed measures.
Organ bi se moral z zainteresiranimi stranmi posvetovati o regulativnih ali izvedbenih tehničnih standardih, smernicah in priporočilih ter jim zagotoviti primerne možnosti, da predložijo pripombe k predlaganim ukrepom.
Before adopting draft regulatory or implementing technical standards, guidelines and recommendations, the Authority should carry out an impact study.
Pred sprejetjem osnutkov regulativnih ali izvedbenih tehničnih standardov, smernic in priporočil bi moral Organ izvesti oceno učinka.
For reasons of efficiency, a Banking Stakeholder Group should be used for that purpose, and should represent, in balanced proportions, Union credit and investment institutions, representing the diverse models and sizes of financial institutions and businesses, including, as appropriate, institutional investors and other financial institutions which themselves use financial services; small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); trade unions; academics; consumers; and other retail users of banking services.
Zaradi učinkovitosti bi bilo treba v ta namen uporabiti interesno skupino za bančništvo, v kateri bi bili sorazmerno zastopani: kreditne institucije in investicijske družbe v Uniji, ki zastopajo različne modele v gospodarstvu in različno velike finančne institucije in podjetja, vključno, kot je ustrezno, institucionalne vlagatelje in druge finančne institucije, ki same uporabljajo finančne storitve, mala in srednja podjetja (MSP), sindikati, akademiki ter potrošniki in drugi zasebni uporabniki bančnih storitev.
The Banking Stakeholder Group should work as an interface with other user groups in the financial services area established by the Commission or by Union legislation.
Interesna skupina za bančništvo bi morala delovati kot povezovalni člen z drugimi skupinami uporabnikov na področju finančnih storitev, ki jih ustanovi Komisija ali so določene z zakonodajo Unije.
Members of the Banking Stakeholder Group representing non-profit organisations or academics should receive adequate compensation in order to allow persons that are neither well-funded nor industry representatives to take part fully in the debate on financial regulation.
Člani interesne skupine za bančništvo, ki zastopajo neprofitne organizacije ali akademike, bi morali prejeti ustrezno nadomestilo, da bi osebam, ki nimajo dovolj finančnih sredstev in tudi niso predstavniki industrije, omogočili polno udeležbo v razpravah o finančni ureditvi.
Member States have a core responsibility for ensuring coordinated crisis management and preserving financial stability in crisis situations, in particular with regard to stabilising and resolving individual failing financial institutions.
Države članice imajo ključno odgovornost za zagotavljanje usklajenega kriznega upravljanja in za ohranjanje finančne stabilnosti v kriznih razmerah, zlasti v zvezi s stabilizacijo in reševanjem posameznih finančnih institucij v težavah.
Decisions by the Authority in emergency or settlement situations affecting the stability of a financial institution should not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of Member States.
Odločitve, ki jih Organ sprejme v izrednih razmerah ali v primerih reševanja sporov in vplivajo na stabilnost finančne institucije, ne bi smele vplivati na fiskalne pristojnosti držav članic.
A mechanism should be established whereby Member States may invoke this safeguard and ultimately bring the matter before the Council for a decision.
Vzpostaviti bi bilo treba mehanizem, s katerim bi se lahko države članice sklicevale na ta zaščitni ukrep in bi zadevo na koncu predale Svetu, ki bi sprejel odločitev.
However, that safeguard mechanism should not be abused, in particular in relation to a decision taken by the Authority which does not have a significant or material fiscal impact, such as a reduction of income linked to the temporary prohibition of specific activities or products for consumer protection purposes.
Vendar ta zaščitni mehanizem ne bi smel biti zlorabljen, zlasti v zvezi z odločitvijo Organa, ki nima bistvenega ali vsebinskega fiskalnega vpliva, kot je zmanjšanje prihodkov, povezano z začasno prepovedjo posebnih dejavnosti ali produktov zaradi varstva potrošnikov.
When taking decisions under the safeguard mechanism, the Council should vote in accordance with the principle where each member has one vote.
Pri odločanju na podlagi zaščitnega mehanizma bi moral Svet glasovati v skladu z načelom, po katerem ima vsak član en glas.
It is appropriate to confer on the Council a role in this matter given the particular responsibilities of the Member States in this respect.
Primerno je, da se zaradi posebnih pristojnosti držav članic v zvezi s tem Svetu dodeli vloga na tem področju.
Given the sensitivity of the issue, strict confidentiality arrangements should be ensured.
Zaradi občutljivosti vprašanja bi bilo treba zagotoviti strogo zaupnost.
In its decision-making procedures, the Authority should be bound by Union rules and general principles on due process and transparency.
Organ bi morala pri postopkih odločanja zavezovati pravila in splošna načela Unije o ustreznem postopanju in preglednosti.
The right of the addressees of the Authority’s decisions to be heard should be fully respected.
V celoti bi bilo treba upoštevati pravico naslovnikov odločitev Organa, da podajo izjavo.
The Authority’s acts should form an integral part of Union law.
Akti Organa bi morali biti sestavni del prava Unije.
A Board of Supervisors composed of the heads of the relevant competent authorities in each Member State, and chaired by the Chairperson of the Authority, should be the principal decision-making organ of the Authority.
Odbor nadzornikov, ki ga sestavljajo vodje ustreznih pristojnih organov iz vsake države članice in mu predseduje predsednik Organa, bi moralo biti glavno telo odločanja Organa.
Representatives of the Commission, the ESRB, the European Central Bank, the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) should participate as observers.
Predstavniki Komisije, ESRB, Evropske centralne banke, Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) in Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) bi morali sodelovati kot opazovalci.
Members of the Board of Supervisors should act independently and only in the Union’s interest.
Člani odbora nadzornikov bi morali delovati neodvisno in samo v interesu Unije.
As a general rule, the Board of Supervisors should take its decisions by simple majority in accordance with the principle where each member has one vote.
Odbor nadzornikov bi moral svoje odločitve praviloma sprejemati z navadno večino, v skladu z načelom, po katerem ima vsak član en glas.
However, for acts of a general nature, including those relating to regulatory and implementing technical standards, guidelines and recommendations, for budgetary matters as well as in respect of requests by a Member State to reconsider a decision by the Authority to temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial activities, it is appropriate to apply the rules of qualified majority voting as laid down in Article 16(4) of the Treaty on European Union and in the Protocol (No 36) on transitional provisions annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Vendar je za splošne akte, vključno s tistimi v zvezi z regulativnimi in izvedbenimi tehničnimi standardi, smernicami in priporočili, za proračunske zadeve in za zahteve držav članic, da se ponovno preuči odločitev Organa, da začasno prepove ali omeji nekatere finančne dejavnosti, primerno uporabiti pravila o glasovanju s kvalificirano večino, kakor so določena v členu 16(4) Pogodbe o Evropski uniji in Protokolu (št. 36) o prehodni ureditvi, ki je priložen Pogodbi o Evropski uniji in Pogodbi o delovanju Evropske unije.
Cases concerning the settlement of disagreements between national supervisory authorities should be examined by a restricted, objective panel, composed of members who neither are representatives of the competent authorities which are party to the disagreement nor have any interest in the conflict or direct links to the competent authorities concerned.
Primere v zvezi z reševanjem sporov med nacionalnimi nadzornimi organi bi moral preučiti ožji, objektivna skupina, sestavljen iz članov, ki niso niti predstavniki pristojnih organov, udeleženih v sporu, niti nimajo nikakršnega interesa v sporu ali neposredne povezave z zadevnimi pristojnimi organi.
The composition of the panel should be appropriately balanced.
Sestava odbora bi morala biti ustrezno uravnotežena.
The decision taken by the panel should be approved by the Board of Supervisors by simple majority in accordance with the principle where each member has one vote.
Odločitev odbora bi moral odobriti odbor nadzornikov z navadno večino in v skladu z načelom, po katerem ima vsak član en glas.
However, with regard to decisions taken by the consolidating supervisor, the decision proposed by the panel could be rejected by members representing a blocking minority of the votes as defined in Article 16(4) of the Treaty on European Union and in Article 3 of the Protocol (No 36) on transitional provisions.
Toda ob upoštevanju odločitev, ki jih sprejme konsolidacijski nadzornik, bi lahko odločitev, ki jo predlaga skupina, zavrnili člani, ki predstavljajo manjšino, ki lahko prepreči sprejetje odločitve, kakor je opredeljeno v členu 16(4) Pogodbe o Evropski uniji in členu 3 Protokola (št. 36) o prehodni ureditvi.
A Management Board, composed of the Chairperson of the Authority, of representatives of national supervisory authorities and of the Commission, should ensure that the Authority carries out its mission and performs the tasks assigned to it.
Upravni odbor, ki ga sestavljajo predsednik Organa, predstavniki nacionalnih nadzornih organov in Komisije, bi moral zagotoviti, da Organ opravlja svoje poslanstvo in izvaja naloge, ki so mu bile dodeljene.
The Management Board should be entrusted with the necessary powers, inter alia, to propose the annual and multi-annual work programme, to exercise certain budgetary powers, to adopt the Authority’s staff policy plan, to adopt special provisions on the right to access to documents and to propose the annual report.
Upravnemu odboru bi bilo treba dodeliti potrebna pooblastila, med drugimi, da bi predlagal letni in večletni delovni program, izvajal nekatera proračunska pooblastila, sprejel načrt kadrovske politike Organa, sprejel posebne določbe o pravici dostopa do dokumentov in predlagal letno poročilo.
The Authority should be represented by a full-time Chairperson, appointed by the Board of Supervisors, on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge of financial institutions and markets, and of experience relevant to financial supervision and regulation, following an open selection procedure organised and managed by the Board of Supervisors assisted by the Commission.
Organ bi moral zastopati predsednik, zaposlen s polnim delovnim časom, ki bi ga imenoval odbor nadzornikov na podlagi dosežkov, znanja in spretnosti, poznavanja finančnih institucij in trgov ter izkušenj, pomembnih za finančni nadzor in pravno ureditev, in sicer z odprtim izbirnim postopkom, ki bi ga ob pomoči Komisije organiziral in vodil odbor nadzornikov.
For the designation of the first Chairperson of the Authority, the Commission should, inter alia, draw up a shortlist of candidates on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge of financial institutions and markets, and experience relevant to financial supervision and regulation.
Za imenovanje prvega predsednika Organa bi morala Komisija med drugim pripraviti ožji seznam kandidatov na podlagi dosežkov, znanja in spretnosti, poznavanja finančnih institucij in trgov ter izkušenj, pomembnih za finančni nadzor in pravno ureditev.
For the subsequent designations, the opportunity of having a shortlist drawn up by the Commission should be reviewed in a report to be established pursuant to this Regulation.
Za naslednja imenovanja bi se morala v poročilu, pripravljenem v skladu s to uredbo, preučiti možnost, da Komisija pripravi ožji seznam kandidatov.
Before the selected person takes up his duties, and up to 1 month after his selection by the Board of Supervisors, the European Parliament should be entitled, after having heard the person selected, to object to his designation.
Evropski parlament bi moral imeti možnost, da po zaslišanju kandidata, ki ga je izbral odbor nadzornikov, nasprotuje imenovanju izbrane osebe, vendar preden ta prevzeme dolžnosti in največ en mesec potem, ko ga je izbral odbor nadzornikov.
The management of the Authority should be entrusted to an Executive Director, who should have the right to participate in meetings of the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board without the right to vote.
Za upravljanje Organa bi bilo treba pooblastiti izvršnega direktorja, ki bi moral imeti pravico do sodelovanja na sejah odbora nadzornikov in upravnega odbora, pri čemer ne bi imel glasovalne pravice.
In order to ensure cross-sectoral consistency in the activities of the ESAs, they should coordinate closely through a Joint Committee and reach common positions where appropriate.
Za zagotovitev medsektorske usklajenosti dejavnosti ESA bi se morali ti tesno usklajevati prek Skupnega odbora in po potrebi sprejeti skupna stališča.
The Joint Committee should coordinate the functions of the ESAs in relation to financial conglomerates and other cross-sectoral matters.
Skupni odbor bi moral usklajevati dejavnosti vseh ESA v zvezi s finančnimi konglomerati in drugimi medsektorskimi vprašanji.
Where relevant, acts also falling within the area of competence of the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) or the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) should be adopted in parallel by the European Supervisory Authorities concerned.
Po potrebi bi moral zadevni Evropski nadzorni organ vzporedno sprejemati tudi akte, ki spadajo na področje pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ali Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge).
The Joint Committee should be chaired for a 12-month term on a rotating basis by the Chairpersons of the ESAs.
Skupnemu odboru bi morali izmenično predsedovati predsedniki vseh ESA po načelu 12-mesečne rotacije.
The Chairperson of the Joint Committee should be a Vice-Chair of the ESRB.
Predsednik Skupnega odbora bi moral biti podpredsednik ESRB.
The Joint Committee should have dedicated staff provided by the ESAs to allow for informal information sharing and the development of a common supervisory culture approach across the ESAs.
Skupni odbor bi moral imeti osebje, ki ga zagotovi ESA, da se omogoči izmenjava neuradnih informacij ter razvoj skupne kulture na področju nadzora v vseh ESA.
It is necessary to ensure that the parties affected by decisions adopted by the Authority may have recourse to the necessary remedies.
Zagotoviti je treba, da stranke, ki jih zadevajo odločitve, ki jih sprejme Organ, lahko uporabijo ustrezna pravna sredstva.
To protect effectively the rights of parties, and for reasons of procedural economy, where the Authority has decision-making powers, parties should be granted a right of appeal to a Board of Appeal.
Za učinkovito zaščito pravic strank in zaradi ekonomičnosti postopka, bi bilo treba strankam zagotoviti pravico do pritožbe pri odboru za pritožbe, kadar ima Organ pristojnosti za sprejemanje odločitev.
For reasons of efficiency and consistency, the Board of Appeal should be a joint body of the ESAs, independent from their administrative and regulatory structures.
Odbor za pritožbe bi moral biti zaradi večje učinkovitosti in usklajenosti skupno telo vseh ESA, neodvisno od njihovih upravnih in pravnih struktur.
The decisions of the Board of Appeal should be subject to appeal before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Proti odločitvi odbora za pritožbe bi se bilo mogoče pritožiti pri Sodišču Evropske unije.
In order to guarantee its full autonomy and independence, the Authority should be granted an autonomous budget with revenues mainly from obligatory contributions from national supervisory authorities and from the General Budget of the European Union.
Organu bi bilo treba za zagotovitev popolne samostojnosti in neodvisnosti dodeliti samostojen proračun, pri čemer bi prihodki izhajali večinoma iz obveznih prispevkov nacionalnih nadzornih organov in splošnega proračuna Evropske unije.
Union financing of the Authority is subject to an agreement by the budgetary authority in accordance with Point 47 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline and sound financial management [30].
Financiranje Unije je pogojeno s sporazumom iz točke 47 Medinstitucionalnega sporazuma z dne 17. maja 2006 med Evropskim parlamentom, Svetom in Komisijo o proračunski disciplini in dobrem finančnem poslovodenju [30].
The Union budgetary procedure should be applicable.
Uporabljati bi se moral proračunski postopek Unije.
The auditing of accounts should be undertaken by the Court of Auditors.
Revizijo zaključnih računov bi moralo opravljati Računsko sodišče.
The overall budget is subject to the discharge procedure.
Za ves proračun se uporablja postopek razrešnice.
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) [31] should apply to the Authority.
Za Organ bi bilo treba uporabljati Uredbo (ES) št. 1073/1999 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 25. maja 1999 o preiskavah, ki jih izvaja Evropski urad za boj proti goljufijam (OLAF) [31].
The Authority should also accede to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities concerning internal investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) [32].
Organ bi moral pristopiti tudi k Medinstitucionalnemu sporazumu z dne 25. maja 1999 med Evropskim parlamentom, Svetom Evropske unije in Komisijo Evropskih skupnosti o notranjih preiskavah Evropskega urada za boj proti goljufijam (OLAF) [32].
In order to ensure open and transparent employment conditions and equal treatment of staff, the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities [33] should apply to the staff of the Authority.
Za zagotovitev odprtih in preglednih pogojev zaposlovanja ter enakega obravnavanja osebja bi bilo treba za osebje Organa uporabljati Kadrovske predpise za uradnike Evropskih skupnosti in pogoje za zaposlitev drugih uslužbencev Evropskih skupnosti [33].
It is essential that business secrets and other confidential information be protected.
Bistveno je, da se zaščitijo poslovne skrivnosti in druge zaupne informacije.
The confidentiality of information made available to the Authority and exchanged in the network should be subject to stringent and effective confidentiality rules.
Za zaupnost informacij, ki se dajejo na razpolago Organu in se izmenjujejo znotraj mreže, bi se morala uporabljati stroga in učinkovita pravila o zaupnosti.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [34] and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [35] are fully applicable to the processing of personal data for the purposes of this Regulation.
Za obdelavo osebnih podatkov za namene te uredbe se v celoti uporabljata Direktiva 95/46/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. oktobra 1995 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov [34] ter Uredba (ES) št. 45/2001 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 18. decembra 2000 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov v institucijah in organih Skupnosti in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov [35].
In order to ensure the transparent operation of the Authority, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [36] should apply to the Authority.
Za zagotovitev preglednega delovanja Organa bi bilo zanj treba uporabljati Uredbo (ES) št. 1049/2001 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 30. maja 2001 o dostopu javnosti do dokumentov Evropskega parlamenta, Sveta in Komisije [36].
Third countries should be allowed to participate in the work of the Authority in accordance with appropriate agreements to be concluded by the Union.
Tretjim državam bi bilo treba omogočiti sodelovanje pri delu Organa v skladu z ustreznimi sporazumi, ki se sklenejo z Unijo.
Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely improving the functioning of the internal market by means of ensuring a high, effective and consistent level of prudential regulation and supervision, protecting depositors and investors, protecting the integrity, efficiency and orderly functioning of financial markets, maintaining the stability of the financial system, and strengthening international supervisory coordination, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.
Ker ciljev te uredbe, in sicer izboljšanja delovanja notranjega trga z zagotovitvijo visoke, učinkovite in usklajene stopnje ureditve varnega in skrbnega poslovanja ter nadzora nad njim, zaščite vlagateljev in investitorjev, zaščite integritete, učinkovitosti in pravilnega delovanja finančnih trgov, ohranjanja stabilnosti finančnega sistema in krepitve mednarodnega usklajevanja nadzora, države članice ne morejo zadovoljivo doseči in ker se te cilje zaradi obsega ukrepov lažje doseže na ravni Unije, lahko Unija sprejme ukrepe v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji.