natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission only authorised such pricing based on Portugal’s commitment to submit a restructuring plan which would, in the longer term, adequately address this advantage.The fact that Portugal had not submitted the restructuring plan despite being formally reminded to do so by the letter dated 6 October 2009.
Komisija je tako določitev višine garancije odobrila le na podlagi zaveze Portugalske, da bo predložila načrt za prestrukturiranje, ki bi dolgoročno ustrezno obravnaval to ugodnost.Dejstvo, da Portugalska ni predložila načrta za prestrukturiranje, čeprav je bila na to uradno opozorjena z dopisom z dne 6. oktobra 2009.
The extension of the guarantee (on 5 June 2009) beyond the 6 months initially approved by the Commission.
Podaljšanje garancije (5. junija 2009) prek obdobja šestih mesecev, ki ga je Komisija prvotno odobrila.
OBSERVATIONS FROM PORTUGAL
PRIPOMBE PORTUGALSKE
In their comments on the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, the Portuguese authorities argued that they were not unaware of the commitment they undertook vis-à-vis the Commission to deliver a plan for the restructuring of BPP.
Portugalski organi so v pripombah o začetku formalnega postopka preiskave trdili, da so se zavedali zaveze do Komisije, da predložijo načrt za prestrukturiranje banke BPP.
However, according to their submission of 13 April 2010, the ultimate responsibility for presenting the restructuring plan rested with BPP (with approval by the Bank of Portugal) and the responsibility of the Portuguese State was only to transmit the plan to the Commission.
Glede na njihovo stališče z dne 13. aprila 2010 je bila za predložitev načrta za prestrukturiranje na zadnji stopnji odgovorna banka BPP (z odobritvijo Banke Portugalske), država Portugalska pa je bila odgovorna samo za to, da načrt pošlje Komisiji.
The Portuguese authorities did not present the restructuring plan to the Commission simply because the plan presented by BPP was not approved by the Bank of Portugal.
Portugalski organi načrta za prestrukturiranje Komisiji niso predložili preprosto zato, ker načrta, ki ga je predložila banka BPP, Banka Portugalske ni odobrila.
The injunction laid down in the Commission Decision of 10 November 2009 could not therefore be fulfilled, notwithstanding the political efforts by the Portuguese State to ensure that BPP actually met its obligations vis-à-vis the Bank of Portugal, the State and, ultimately, the Commission.
Zato odredbe o predložitvi podatkov, določene v Odločbi Komisije z dne 10. novembra 2009, ni bilo mogoče izpolniti, kljub političnim prizadevanjem portugalske države zagotoviti, da bi banka BPP dejansko izpolnila svoje obveznosti do Banke Portugalske, države in na koncu Komisije.
As regards the State aid to BPP, Portugal argues that it was, and is, compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU insofar as it was granted to guarantee the stability of the national financial system, by analogy with what was happening in the European context.
Glede državne pomoči banki BPP Portugalska trdi, da je le-ta bila in je združljiva z notranjim trgom na podlagi člena 107(3)(b) PDEU, kolikor je bila dodeljena za zagotovitev stabilnosti nacionalnega finančnega sistema, po analogiji s tem, kar se je dogajalo v evropskem okviru.
As regards the extensions of the State guarantee on the EUR 450 million loan, Portugal argues that they did not constitute new State aid as there was no change to the situation underlying the Commission’s approval of the State aid measure.
Glede podaljšanj državne garancije za posojilo v višini 450 milijonov EUR Portugalska trdi, da niso nova državna pomoč, ker se položaj, ki je bil podlaga za to, da je Komisija odobrila ukrep državne pomoči, ni spremenil.
The State guarantee, extended twice, remained unaltered in its conditions: (i) there was no increase in the value of the loan; (ii) there was no modification to the obligations met by the loan [12]; (iii) under the guarantee contract, the guarantee would only expire thirty days after the date of the last payment of capital and interest and the Commission was aware that the loan agreement was for 2 years [13].
Pogoji državne garancije, ki je bila podaljšana dvakrat, se niso spremenili: (i) vrednost posojila se ni povišala; (ii) obveznosti, ki jih posojilo izpolnjuje, se niso spremenile [12]; (iii) na podlagi pogodbe o garanciji bi garancija prenehala veljati šele trideset dni po dnevu zadnjega plačila kapitala in obresti in Komisija je vedela, da je bila posojilna pogodba za dve leti [13].
As for the non-notification of the extensions of the State guarantee, the Portuguese authorities argue that the renewal of the loan agreement was not dependent on the Portuguese State but on the bank syndicate and BPP, and that failure to extend the guarantee would have led to the same negative repercussions for the Portuguese financial system that had fully justified the Commission’s approval of the State aid measure.
Glede nepriglasitve podaljšanj državne garancije portugalski organi trdijo, da podaljšanje posojilne pogodbe ni bilo odvisno od portugalske države, ampak od bančnega konzorcija in banke BPP in da bi nepodaljšanje garancije imelo za portugalski finančni sistem enako negativne posledice kot so bile posledice, ki so povsem utemeljile odobritev ukrepa državne pomoči s strani Komisije.
Furthermore, Portugal considers that the extensions of the guarantee were automatic under the contract regulating the loan agreement, although they were formalised nonetheless for reasons of legal certainty vis-à-vis the bank syndicate.
Nadalje Portugalska meni, da so bila podaljšanja samodejna na podlagi pogodbe, ki ureja posojilno pogodbo, čeprav so bila vseeno formalizirana zaradi pravne varnosti glede bančnega konzorcija.
Further, according to the Portuguese authorities, the extensions (even if they are considered to constitute new aid) did not give rise to an economic advantage, because BPP was not, in practice, operating, at least from 1 December 2008 onward.
Poleg tega po trditvah portugalskih organov podaljšanja (tudi če se štejejo za novo pomoč) niso povzročila gospodarske prednosti, ker banka BPP v praksi ni poslovala vsaj od 1. decembra 2008 dalje.
In its observations on the comments of the interested parties (see below), the Portuguese authorities stated that the EUR 450 million loan was used in a transparent way in order to avoid systemic contagion and to meet BPP’s liabilities as registered in the balance sheet on 24 November 2008.
Portugalski organi so v svojih stališčih o pripombah zainteresiranih strani (glej spodaj) navedli, da je bilo posojilo v višini 450 milijonov EUR porabljeno na pregleden način, da se prepreči širjenje negativnih vplivov po sistemu in izpolnijo obveznosti banke BPP, kot so vpisane v bilanco stanja 24. novembra 2008.
The Portuguese authorities also observe that Portugal will assert its rights over the collateral attached to the guarantee as part of BPP’s liquidation proceedings.
Portugalski organi tudi ugotavljajo, da bo Portugalska uveljavljala svoje pravice do zavarovanja, povezanega z garancijo, kot del postopka likvidacije banke BPP.
In view of its status as a privileged creditor of BPP, Portugal is confident that it will be able to recoup the full amount of EUR 450 million it disbursed to the creditor banks.
Portugalska je prepričana, da bo zato, ker ima položaj privilegiranega upnika banke BPP, lahko povrnila celoten znesek 450 milijonov EUR, ki ga je izplačala bankam upnicam.
In this respect, the Portuguese authorities note that the value of the collateral was, as of 7 May 2010, more than 20 % higher than the total amount of the guaranteed loan.
V tej zvezi portugalski organi ugotavljajo, da je bila vrednost zavarovanja po stanju na dan 7. maja 2010 več kot 20 % višja od skupnega zneska posojila z garancijo.
As regards the State’s commitment to compensate losses up to EUR 250000 of Absolute Return clients who joined the FEI, Portugal argues that this commitment does not constitute State aid since: (i) it does not entail the transfer of any State resources to the FEI’s management company or to any other body active on the market; (ii) it is a regular and accepted mechanism that is a logical extension of the system for compensating investors; (iii) it does not entail any economic advantage for investors, to whom it is directed generically and in exclusive terms, in accordance with national and European legal requirements, or any distortion of competition on the market or in relations between Member States.
Glede zaveze države nadomestiti izgube do višine 250000 EUR, ki jih imajo stranke absolutnega donosa, ki so se pridružile FEI, Portugalska trdi, da ta zaveza ni državna pomoč, ker (i) ne povzroča prenosa državnih sredstev na družbo za upravljanje FEI ali na kakšen drug organ, dejaven na trgu, (ii) je reden in sprejet mehanizem, ki je logično nadaljevanje sistema za povračilo škode vlagateljem, (iii) ne povzroča gospodarske prednosti za vlagatelje, na katere je usmerjena na splošno in izključno, v skladu z nacionalnimi in evropskimi pravnimi zahtevami, ali kakršnegakoli izkrivljanja konkurence na trgu ali v odnosih med državami članicami.
Furthermore, Portugal argues that actual payments to FEI clients following this commitment will be minimal, if indeed any are made at all.
Portugalska tudi trdi, da bodo dejanska izplačila strankam FEI po tej zavezi minimalna, če bodo sploh izplačana.
The Portuguese authorities consider the EUR 250000 insurance cover to be a measure to instil confidence in FEI clients, which however will not lead to actual disbursement in most scenarios.
Portugalski organi menijo, da je zavarovalno kritje v višini 250000 EUR ukrep za krepitev zaupanja v stranke FEI, ki pa v večini scenarijev sploh ne bo povzročilo dejanskih izplačil.
Under a conservative scenario, based on the assumption that the assets in the FEI deteriorate further from their value in October 2009 over the next 4 years, Portugal calculates that the maximum disbursement per client would be approximately EUR 68000. In more favourable scenarios, there would be no disbursement at all.
V konzervativnem scenariju, ki temelji na predpostavki, da se vrednost sredstev FEI v naslednjih štirih letih še poslabša od vrednosti v oktobru 2009, Portugalska računa, da bi bilo najvišje izplačilo na stranko približno 68000 EUR. V bolj ugodnih scenarijih pa izplačila sploh ne bi bilo.
OBSERVATIONS FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
PRIPOMBE OSTALIH ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANI
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Commission Decision of 10 November 2009 to open the formal investigation procedure, the Commission received comments, on 6 April 2010, from duly identified third parties who wished to remain anonymous.
Na podlagi člena 6 Odločbe Komisije z dne 10. novembra 2009 o začetku formalnega postopka preiskave je Komisija 6. aprila 2010 prejela pripombe ustrezno identificiranih tretjih strani, ki so želele ostati anonimne.
In their comments on the initiation of the formal investigation procedure the interested parties pointed out that none of the conditions under which the State guarantee on the loan was granted (maximum duration of 6 months and the submission of a restructuring plan) had been respected.
Zainteresirane strani so v svojih pripombah o začetku formalnega postopka preiskave poudarile, da ni bil spoštovan noben pogoj, pod katerim je bila izdana državna garancija za posojilo (trajanje največ šest mesecev in predložitev načrta za prestrukturiranje).
Therefore, according to the observations submitted, the aid was illegal and the Commission should order Portugal to discontinue the guarantee.
Zato je glede na predložene pripombe pomoč nezakonita in Komisija bi morala Portugalski odrediti, naj prekine garancijo.
Moreover, the EUR 450 million, instead of being used for the restructuring of the bank, was used to reimburse certain clients of BPP, penalising all the others.
Poleg tega 450 milijonov EUR ni bilo porabljenih ta prestrukturiranje banke, ampak za poplačilo nekaterih strank banke BPP, vsi drugi pa so bili oškodovani.
Article 107(1) TFEU states:
V členu 107(1) PDEU je določeno:
‘Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.’
„Razen če ta pogodba ne določa drugače, je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom, kolikor škodi trgovini med državami članicami.“
In order for Article 107(1) TFEU to be applicable, there needs to be an aid measure imputable to the State which is granted through State resources, affects trade between Member States and distorts competition in the internal market by conferring a selective advantage on certain undertakings.
Člen 107(1) PDEU se lahko uporablja, če se ukrep pomoči, za katerega je odgovorna država, dodeli iz državnih sredstev, prizadene trgovino med državami članicami in izkrivlja konkurenco na notranjem trgu z dajanjem selektivne gospodarske prednosti posameznim podjetjem.
The State guarantee on the EUR 450 million loan
Državna garancija za posojilo v višini 450 milijonov EUR
The Commission recalls that it has already established in the Rescue Aid Decision of 13 March 2009 that the State guarantee constitutes State aid [15].
Komisija opozarja, da je že v Odločbi o pomoči za reševanje z dne 13. marca 2009 ugotovila, da državna garancija pomeni državno pomoč [15].
The measure is financed through State resources as it consists of a State guarantee granted by Portugal.
Ukrep se financira iz državnih sredstev, ker vključuje državno garancijo, ki jo je odobrila Portugalska.
Indeed, the reimbursement made by the Portuguese State to the bank syndicate on 13 May 2010 (see recital 42 above) clearly demonstrates that State resources were involved.
Povračilo portugalske države bančnemu konzorciju z dne 13. maja 2010 (glej uvodno izjavo 42 zgoraj) jasno dokazuje, da so bila vključena državna sredstva.
As also already established in the Rescue Aid Decision of 13 March 2009 [16], the State guarantee allowed BPP to obtain better financial conditions for the loan obtained than those normally available in the market for companies in similar circumstances, in the unlikely event, as admitted by the Portuguese authorities, that such loans would have been available at all.
Kot je bilo že ugotovljeno v Odločbi o pomoči za reševanje z dne 13. marca 2009 [16], je garancija banki BPP omogočila za posojilo pridobiti boljše finančne pogoje kot so običajno na voljo na trgu za gospodarske družbe v podobnih okoliščinah in kot so priznali portugalski organi je zelo majhna verjetnost, da bi bila taka posojila sploh na voljo.
This remuneration was considered appropriate only for the rescue phase, subject to the submission of a restructuring plan before 5 June 2009.
Povračilo se je štelo kot primerno samo v fazi reševanja pod pogojem, da se do 5. junija 2009 predloži načrt za prestrukturiranje.
Unlike other banks, which did not benefit from the State guarantee on loans, BPP obtained an economic advantage in that the fee charged for the State guarantee was clearly below the market level.
Za razliko od drugih bank, ki niso bile deležne državne garancije za posojila, je banka BPP imela gospodarsko prednost, ker je bila pristojbina, zaračunana za državno garancijo, očitno pod tržno ravnjo.
The argument put forward by the Portuguese authorities that BPP was not operating in the market after 1 December 2008 cannot be accepted.
Trditve portugalskih organov, da banka BPP po 1. decembru 2008 ni poslovala na trgu, ni mogoče sprejeti.
Given that BPP’s banking licence was only revoked by the Bank of Portugal on 15 April 2010, BPP could have entered or re-entered the market at short notice.
Glede na to, da je Banka Portugalske banki BPP bančno dovoljenje odvzela šele 15. aprila 2010, bi banka BPP lahko v zelo kratkem času vstopila ali ponovno vstopila na trg.
Indeed, recovery plans for BPP submitted between December 2008 and April 2009 show the bank’s potential to continue exercising an economic activity as a consequence of the rescue measure.
Načrti za sanacijo banke BPP, predloženi od decembra 2008 do aprila 2009, kažejo možnost, da bi banka zaradi sanacijskega ukrepa lahko nadaljevala z opravljanem gospodarske dejavnosti.
Given BPP’s activities and position in national and international financial markets, this advantage potentially affects competition and trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Zaradi dejavnosti in položaja banke BPP na nacionalnih in mednarodnih finančnih trgih ta prednost lahko vpliva na konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU.
Only from 15 April 2010, with the revocation of the banking licence, did BPP lose any ability to re-enter the market and to potentially distort competition and affect trade between Member States.
Banka BPP je šele od 15. aprila 2010, ko ji je bilo odvzeto bančno dovoljenje, izgubila zmožnost ponovnega vstopa na trg in s tem možnost izkrivljanja konkurence in vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the State guarantee conferred an economic advantage on BPP through the use of State resources imputable to Portugal.
Na podlagi zgoraj navedenega Komisija ugotavlja, da je državna garancija banki BPP zagotovila gospodarsko prednost z uporabo državnih sredstev, za katero je odgovorna Portugalska.
This advantage is liable to affect competition and trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Ta prednost lahko prizadene konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU.
The measure therefore constitutes State aid.
Ukrep zato pomeni državno pomoč.
The EUR 250000 guarantee for FEI clients
Garancija v višini 250000 EUR za stranke FEI
As described above, the beneficiaries of this measure are the clients of BPP who invested in the Absolute Return products and opted to join the FEI.
Kakor je opisano zgoraj, so upravičenci do tega ukrepa stranke banke BPP, ki so vlagale v produkte absolutnega donosa in se odločile, da se pridružijo FEI.
Without the solution implemented by Portugal, FEI clients would risk not being reimbursed or, more likely, being reimbursed a lesser amount than under the guarantee.
Brez rešitve, ki jo je izvedla Portugalska, stranke FEI lahko ne bi dobile povračila ali pa bi bil znesek povračila nižji kot na podlagi garancije.
According to Portugal’s own estimates, it is likely that their return as FEI clients is increased by the guarantee.
Po lastni oceni Portugalske je verjetno, da je donos za stranke FEI zaradi garancije večji.
Therefore FEI clients have received an advantage from the measure.
Zato so stranke FEI zaradi ukrepa imele prednost.
However, the simple fact of depositing funds does not necessarily constitute a commercial activity within the meaning of State aid rules, and indeed, according to the submission made by Portugal, the majority of the FEI participants are individuals who are not undertakings.
Vendar deponiranje sredstev ne pomeni nujno gospodarske dejavnosti v smislu pravil glede državne pomoči in po ugotovitvah Portugalske je večina udeležencev FEI posameznikov, ki niso podjetja.
However, insofar as the FEI amounts covered by the State guarantee serve to benefit undertakings, they may constitute State aid.
Kolikor pa zneski FEI, ki jih krije državna garancija, zagotavljajo prednost podjetjem, so lahko državna pomoč.
Nevertheless, the figures provided by Portugal clearly show that disbursement by the State will be well below the de minimis threshold of EUR 200000 over 3 years [17], once account is taken of the cover provided by the Investor Compensation System and by the Deposit Guarantee Fund as well as of the likely value that, under prudent assumptions, the investors will recover from the underlying assets.
Vendar številke, ki jih je posredovala Portugalska, jasno kažejo, da bodo izplačila države v naslednjih treh letih precej nižja od praga de minimis v višini 200000 EUR [17], ko se upoštevajo kritja, ki ga zagotavlja odškodninski sistem za vlagatelje in sklad zajamčenih vlog ter verjetna vrednost, ki jo bodo vlagatelji ob preudarnih predpostavkah izterjali od finančnega premoženja za zavarovanje.
Compatibility pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU
Združljivost na podlagi člena 107(3) PDEU
Portugal argues that the aid element should be assessed on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, which enables the Commission to declare aid compatible with the internal market if it is aimed at remedying ‘a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’.
Portugalska trdi, da je element pomoči treba oceniti na podlagi člena 107(3)(b) PDEU, ki Komisiji omogoča, da razglasi pomoč za združljivo z notranjim trgom, če je namenjena odpravljanje „resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice“.
The Commission recalls that the General Court has stressed that Article 107(3)(b) TFEU needs to be applied restrictively and must tackle a disturbance in the entire economy of a Member State [18].
Komisija opozarja, da je Splošno sodišče poudarilo, da je treba člen 107(3)(b) PDEU uporabljati omejeno in da mora obravnavati motnje v celotnem gospodarstvu države članice [18].
The Commission has already acknowledged that the current global financial crisis can create a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and that measures supporting banks may be considered apt to remedy this disturbance.
Komisija je že potrdila, da trenutna svetovna finančna kriza lahko povzroči resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice in da se lahko šteje, da so ukrepi v podporo bankam primerni za odpravljanje te motnje.
This assessment has been confirmed in the Banking Communication [19], the Recapitalisation Communication [20], the Impaired Asset Communication [21] and the Restructuring Communication [22] adopted by the Commission.
Ta ocena je bila potrjena v Sporočilu o bančništvu [19], Sporočilu o dokapitalizaciji [20], Sporočilu o oslabljenih sredstvih [21] in Sporočilu o prestrukturiranju [22], ki jih je sprejela Komisija.
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU may therefore serve as a legal basis for aid measures taken to address this systemic crisis.
Člen 107(3)(b) PDEU je zato lahko pravna podlaga za ukrepe pomoči, sprejete za reševanje te sistemske krize.
As regards more specifically the Portuguese economy, this was also the appropriate legal basis for the various Commission decisions approving the measures undertaken by the Portuguese authorities to combat the financial crisis, in particular its approval of the Portuguese recapitalisation scheme and the extension thereof, the last such decision dating from March 2010 [23].
Kar natančneje zadeva portugalsko gospodarstvo, pa je bila to tudi ustrezna pravna podlaga za različne odločitve Komisije o odobritvi ukrepov, ki so jih portugalski organi sprejeli za boj proti finančni krizi, zlasti odobritev portugalske sheme dokapitalizacije in podaljšanje te sheme, zadnja taka odločitev je bila sprejeta marca 2010 [23].
As regards the case at hand, the Commission also notes that, in its Rescue Aid Decision, the applicability of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU was assessed and considered to be applicable, as BPP’s failure to comply with its financial obligations could negatively affect the whole Portuguese financial system (see recitals 33 to 45 of the Rescue Aid Decision).
Glede obravnavanega primera Komisija ugotavlja tudi, da je bila v njeni Odločbi o pomoči za reševanje ocenjena uporabnost člena 107(3)(b) PDEU in ugotovljeno je bilo, da se uporablja, ker bi neizpolnjevanje finančnih obveznosti banke BPP lahko negativno vplivalo na celoten portugalski finančni sistem (glede uvodne izjave 33 do 45 Odločbe o pomoči za reševanje).