natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In such cases the depositary functions should be part of professional or business activities in respect of which the appointed entity is subject to mandatory professional registration recognised by law or to legal or regulatory provisions or rules of professional conduct and can provide sufficient financial and professional guarantees to enable it to perform effectively the relevant depositary functions and meet the commitments inherent in those functions.
V takih primerih bi morale biti naloge depozitarja del poklicnih ali poslovnih dejavnosti, zaradi katerih je imenovan subjekt zavezan k zakonsko priznani obvezni poslovni registraciji oziroma pravnim ali ureditvenim predpisom ali pravilom strokovnega ravnanja in lahko zagotovi zadostna finančna in strokovna jamstva za učinkovito opravljanje zadevnih nalog depozitarja in izpolnjevanje zavez, povezanih s temi nalogami.
This takes account of current practice for certain types of closed-ended funds.
Pri tem se upošteva obstoječa praksa za nekatere vrste skladov zaprtega tipa.
However, for all other AIFs, the depositary should be a credit institution, an investment firm or another entity permitted under Directive 2009/65/EC, given the importance of the custody function.
Glede na pomembnost naloge hrambe pa bi moral biti za vse druge AIS depozitar kreditna institucija, investicijsko podjetje ali drug subjekt, ki ga dovoljuje Direktiva 2009/65/ES.
For non-EU AIFs only, it should also be possible for the depositary to be a credit institution or any other entity of the same nature as the entities referred to in this recital as long as it is subject to effective prudential regulation and supervision which have the same effect as Union law and are effectively enforced.
Samo za ne-EU AIS bi lahko bil depozitar tudi kreditna institucija ali kateri koli drugi subjekt, ki je iste vrste kot subjekti iz te uvodne izjave, če za ta subjekt veljajo učinkovita pravila varnega in skrbnega poslovanja in nadzor, ki imajo enak učinek kot pravo Unije, in ki se učinkovito izvajajo.
The depositary should have its registered office or a branch in the same country as the AIF.
Depozitar bi moral imeti svoj sedež ali podružnico registrirano v isti državi kot AIS.
It should be possible for a non-EU AIF to have a depositary established in the relevant third country only if certain additional conditions are met.
Za ne-EU AIS bi bilo treba zagotoviti, da ima lahko depozitar svoj sedež v zadevni tretji državi samo, če so izpolnjeni nekateri dodatni pogoji.
On the basis of the criteria set out in delegated acts, the Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing measures, stating that prudential regulation and supervision of a third country have the same effect as Union law and are effectively enforced.
Na podlagi meril, določenih v delegiranih aktih, bi morala Komisija imeti pristojnost, da sprejme izvedbene ukrepe, v katerih navede, da imajo pravila varnega in skrbnega poslovanja in nadzor v tretji državi enak učinek, kot po pravu Unije, in da se učinkovito izvajajo.
Further, the mediation procedure set out in Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 should apply in the event that competent authorities disagree on the correct application of the other additional conditions.
Poleg tega bi moral v primeru, da se pristojni organi ne strinjajo glede pravilne uporabe drugih dodatnih pogojev, veljati postopek posredovanja iz člena 19 Uredbe (EU) št. 1095/2010.
Alternatively, for non-EU AIFs, the depositary should also be able to be established in the home Member State or in the Member State of reference of the AIFM managing the AIF.
Depozitar bi lahko imel za ne-EU AIS sedež tudi v matični državi članici oziroma v referenčni državi članici UAIS, ki upravlja AIS.
The Commission is invited to examine the possibilities of putting forward an appropriate horizontal legislative proposal that clarifies the responsibilities and liabilities of a depositary and governs the right of a depositary in one Member State to provide its services in another Member State.
Komisijo se povabi, da preuči možnost, da poda ustrezen horizontalen zakonodajni predlog, v katerem bi pojasnila odgovornosti in obveznosti depozitarja ter uredila pravico depozitarja v eni državi članici, da opravlja svoje storitve v drugi državi članici.
The depositary should be responsible for the proper monitoring of the AIF’s cash flows, and, in particular, for ensuring that investor money and cash belonging to the AIF, or to the AIFM acting on behalf of the AIF, is booked correctly on accounts opened in the name of the AIF or in the name of the AIFM acting on behalf of the AIF or in the name of the depositary acting on behalf of the AIF for the safe-keeping of the assets of the AIF, including the holding in custody of financial instruments that can be registered in a financial instruments account opened in the depositary’s books and all financial instruments that can be physically delivered to the depositary, and for the verification of ownership of all other assets by the AIF or the AIFM on behalf of the AIF.
Depozitar bi moral biti odgovoren za ustrezno spremljanje denarnih tokov AIS in zlasti za zagotavljanje pravilnega knjiženja denarnih sredstev in gotovine investitorja in AIS oziroma po potrebi UAIS, ki deluje v imenu AIS, na računu, odprtem na ime AIS ali UAIS, ki deluje v imenu AIS, ali depozitarja, ki deluje v imenu AIS za varno hrambo sredstev AIS, vključno s hrambo finančnih instrumentov, ki jih je mogoče registrirati na račun finančnih instrumentov, odprtem v knjigah depozitarja, in vsemi finančnimi instrumenti, ki so lahko fizično dostavljeni depozitarju, ter za preverjanje lastništva vseh drugih sredstev AIS ali UAIS, ki deluje v imenu AIS.
When ensuring investor money is booked in cash accounts, the depositary should take into account the principles set out in Article 16 of Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive [11].
Pri zagotavljanju, da so denarna sredstva vlagatelja knjižena na gotovinskem računu, bi moral depozitar upoštevati načela iz člena 16 Direktive Komisije 2006/73/ES z dne 10. avgusta 2006 o izvajanju Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z organizacijskimi zahtevami in pogoji poslovanja investicijskih družb ter opredeljenimi izrazi za namene navedene direktive [11].
A depositary should act honestly, fairly, professionally, independently and in the interest of the AIF or of the investors of the AIF.
Depozitar bi moral ravnati pošteno, pravično, strokovno, neodvisno in v interesu AIS oziroma vlagateljev AIS.
It should be possible for a depositary to delegate the safe-keeping of assets to a third party which, in its turn, should be able to delegate that function.
Depozitar bi varno hrambo sredstev lahko prenesel na tretjo osebo, ki bi lahko sama prenesla naprej opravljanje te naloge.
However, delegation and sub-delegation should be objectively justified and subject to strict requirements in relation to the suitability of the third party entrusted with the delegated function, and in relation to the due skill, care and diligence that the depositary should employ to select, appoint and review that third party.
Vendar pa bi morala biti prenos in nadaljnji prenos objektivno utemeljena, zanju pa bi morale veljati stroge zahteve o ustreznosti tretje osebe, na katero je naloga prenesena in o potrebni strokovnosti, skrbnosti in vestnosti, s katerimi mora depozitar izbrati, imenovati in oceniti to tretjo osebo.
A third party to whom the safe-keeping of assets is delegated should be able to maintain a common segregated account for multiple AIFs, a so-called ‘omnibus account’.
Tretji osebi, na katero je bila prenesena varna hramba sredstev, bi moralo biti omogočeno, da za več AIS ohrani skupni ločeni račun, tako imenovani „zbirni račun“.
Entrusting the custody of assets to the operator of a securities settlement system as designated for the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems [12] or entrusting the provision of similar services to third-country securities settlement systems should not be considered to be a delegation of custody functions.
Primera, ko se po sistemu poravnave vrednostnih papirjev zaupa hramba sredstev upravljavcu sistema poravnave vrednostnih papirjev, kot je določen za namene Direktive 98/26/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. maja 1998 o dokončnosti poravnave pri plačilih in sistemih poravnave vrednostnih papirjev [12], ali ko se po sistemu poravnave vrednostnih papirjev tretjih držav zagotavljajo podobne storitve, se ne bi smela obravnavati za prenos nalog hrambe.
The strict limitations and requirements to which the delegation of tasks by the depositary is subject should apply to the delegation of its specific functions as a depositary, namely the monitoring of the cash flow, the safe-keeping of assets and the oversight functions.
Stroge omejitve in zahteve, določene za prenos nalog depozitarja, bi se morale uporabljati za prenos njegovih posebnih nalog depozitarja, in sicer spremljanje denarnega toka, varna hramba sredstev in nadzorne naloge.
Delegation of supporting tasks that are linked to its depositary tasks, such as administrative or technical functions performed by the depositary as a part of its depositary tasks, is not subject to the specific limitations and requirements set out in this Directive.
Posebne omejitve in zahteve, določene v tej direktivi, ne veljajo za prenos pomožnih nalog v zvezi z nalogami depozitarja, kot so upravne in tehnične naloge, ki jih depozitar opravlja kot del svojih nalog depozitarja.
This Directive also takes account of the fact that many AIFs, and in particular hedge funds, currently make use of a prime broker.
V tej direktivi je upoštevano tudi dejstvo, da se številni AIS in zlasti hedge skladi trenutno poslužujejo glavnega borznega posrednika.
This Directive ensures that AIFs may continue to use the function of prime brokers.
Ta direktiva zagotavlja, da lahko AIS še naprej uporabljajo glavne borzne posrednike.
However, unless it has functionally and hierarchically separated the performance of its depositary functions from its tasks as prime broker and the potential conflicts of interest are properly identified, managed and disclosed to the investors of the AIF, no prime broker should be appointed as a depositary, since prime brokers act as counterparties to AIFs and therefore cannot at the same time act in the best interest of the AIF as is required of a depositary.
Vendar razen v primeru, ko so naloge depozitarja funkcionalno in hierarhično ločene od njegovih nalog glavnega borznega posrednika in so morebitna nasprotja interesov ustrezno ugotovljena, obravnavana, in razkrita, vlagateljem AIS, noben glavni borzni posrednik ne bi smel biti imenovan za depozitarja, saj so glavni borzni posredniki nasprotne stranke AIS in zato ne morejo hkrati ravnati v najboljšem interesu AIS, kakor se to zahteva od depozitarja.
Depositaries should be able to delegate custody tasks to one or more prime brokers or other third parties.
Depozitarji bi morali imeti možnost, da naloge hrambe zaupajo enemu ali večim glavnim borznim posrednikom ali drugim tretjim strankam.
In addition to the delegated custody tasks prime brokers should be allowed to provide prime brokerage services to the AIF.
Glavni borzni posredniki bi morali imeti možnost, da poleg zaupanih nalog hrambe AIS nudijo storitve glavnega borznega posrednika.
Those prime brokerage services should not form part of the delegation arrangement.
Storitve glavnega borznega posrednika ne bi smele biti del ureditve prenosa.
The depositary should be liable for the losses suffered by the AIFM, the AIF and the investors.
Depozitar bi moral odgovarjati za izgube, ki jih utrpijo UAIS, AIS in vlagatelji.
This Directive distinguishes between the loss of financial instruments held in custody, and any other losses.
Ta direktiva razlikuje med izgubo finančnih instrumentov, ki se jih hrani, in drugimi izgubami.
In the case of a loss other than of financial instruments held in custody, the depositary should be liable in the case of intent or negligence.
V primeru, da ne gre za izgubo finančnih instrumentov, ki se jih hrani, bi depozitarji morali odgovarjati v primeru naklepa ali malomarnosti.
Where the depositary holds assets in custody and those assets are lost, the depositary should be liable, unless it can prove that the loss is the result of an external event beyond its reasonable control, the consequences of which would have been unavoidable despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary.
Če depozitar hrani sredstva in se ta sredstva izgubijo, bi depozitar moral odgovarjati, razen če lahko dokaže, da je izguba rezultat zunanjega dogodka, ki ga razumno ni mogel nadzorovati, posledice pa so bile ne glede na vsa razumna prizadevanja neizogibne.
In this context, a depositary should not, for example, be able to rely on internal situations such as a fraudulent act by an employee to discharge itself of liability.
V tem okviru se depozitar ne bi mogel sklicevati, na primer, na določene notranje situacije, kot je denimo goljufivo ravnanje zaposlenega, da bi se rešil odgovornosti.
Where the depositary delegates custody tasks and the financial instruments held in custody by a third party are lost, the depositary should be liable.
Kadar depozitar prenese naloge hrambe in se finančni instrumenti v hrambi tretje stranke izgubijo, bi moral odgovarjati depozitar.
However, provided that the depositary is expressly allowed to discharge itself of liability subject to a contractual transfer of such liability to that third party, pursuant to a written contract between the depositary and the AIF or the AIFM acting on behalf of the AIF, in which such a discharge is objectively justified, and that the third party can be held liable for the loss based on a contract between the depositary and the third party, the depositary should be able to discharge itself of liability if it can prove that it has exercised due skill, care and diligence and that the specific requirements for delegation are met.
Vendar bi se lahko pod pogojem, da je depozitarju s pisno pogodbo med depozitarjem in AIS ali UAIS, ki deluje v imenu AIS, v kateri je ta razrešitev objektivno utemeljena, izrecno dovoljeno, da se reši odgovornosti, pod predhodnim pogojem pogodbenega prenosa odgovornosti na tretjo stranko, in da je mogoče od tretje stranke dejansko zahtevati, da odgovarja za izgubo na podlagi pogodbe med depozitarjem in tretjo stranko, depozitar rešil odgovornosti, če lahko dokaže, da je svoje naloge opravljal s primerno skrbnostjo in da so izpolnjeni posebni pogoji za prenos.
By imposing the requirement of a contractual transfer of liability to the third party, this Directive intends to attach external effects to such contract, making the third party directly liable to the AIF, or to the investors of the AIF, for the loss of the financial instruments held in custody.
Z naložitvijo zahteve pogodbenega prenosa odgovornosti na tretjo stranko namerava ta direktiva taki pogodbi dati zunanje učinke, in sicer tako, da tretja stranka neposredno odgovarja AIS ali vlagateljem AIS za izgubo finančnih instrumentov, ki jih hrani.
Further, where the law of a third country requires that certain financial instruments be held in custody by a local entity and there are no local entities that satisfy all depositary delegation requirements, the depositary should be able to discharge itself of liability provided that: the rules or instruments of incorporation of the AIF concerned expressly allow for such a discharge; the investors have been duly informed of that discharge and the circumstances justifying the discharge prior to their investment; the AIF or the AIFM on behalf of the AIF instructed the depositary to delegate the custody of such financial instruments to a local entity; there is a written contract between the depositary and the AIF or the AIFM acting on behalf of the AIF, which expressly allows such a discharge; and there is a written contract between the depositary and the third party which expressly transfers the liability of the depositary to that third party and makes it possible for the AIF, or the AIFM acting on behalf of the AIF, to make a claim against the third party in respect of the loss of financial instruments or for the depositary to make such a claim on their behalf.
Nadalje, če pravo tretje države zahteva, da nekatere finančne instrumente hranijo lokalni subjekti in lokalnih subjektov, ki bi izpolnjevali zahteve za prenos nalog depozitarja ni, se bi depozitar lahko rešil odgovornosti, če: pravila upravljanja sklada ali statut zadevnega AIS izrecno omogočajo tako razrešitev; so bili vlagatelji pred samo naložbo obveščeni o tej razrešitvi in okoliščinah, ki jo upravičujejo; je AIS ali UAIS v imenu AIS depozitarju naročil, naj hrambo finančnih instrumentov prenese na lokalni subjekt; obstaja pisna pogodba med depozitarjem in AIS ali UAIS, ki deluje v imenu AIS, ki izrecno dovoljuje tako razrešitev; in če obstaja pisna pogodba med depozitarjem in tretjo stranko, ki izrecno prenaša odgovornost z depozitarja na to tretjo stranko in omogoča, da AIS ali UAIS, ki deluje v imenu AIS, pri tretji stranki vloži zahtevek v zvezi z izgubo finančnih instrumentov, ali da depozitar vloži tako zahtevo v njunem imenu.
This Directive should be without prejudice to any future legislative measures with respect to the depositary in Directive 2009/65/EC, because UCITS and AIFs are different both in the investment strategies they follow and in the type of investors for which they are intended.
Ta direktiva ne bi smela posegati v noben prihodnji zakonodajni ukrep v zvezi z depozitarjem v Direktivi 2009/65/ES, saj se KNPVP in AIS razlikujeta tako po naložbenih strategijah, ki jih dovoljujeta, kot po vrsti vlagateljev, katerim sta namenjena.
An AIFM should, for each of the EU AIFs it manages and for each of the AIFs it markets in the Union, make available an annual report for each financial year no later than 6 months following the end of the financial year in accordance with this Directive.
UAIS bi morali za vsak EU AIS, ki ga upravljajo, in za vsak AIS, ki ga tržijo v Uniji, v šestih mesecih po koncu poslovnega leta dati na voljo letno poročilo za vsako poslovno leto, v skladu s to direktivo.
That 6-month period should be without prejudice to the right of the Member States to impose a shorter period.
Rok šestih mesecev ne bi smel posegati v pravico držav članic, da določijo krajši rok.
Given that it is possible for an AIFM to employ leverage and, under certain conditions, to contribute to the build up of systemic risk or disorderly markets, special requirements should be imposed on AIFMs employing leverage.
Glede na to je mogoče, da UAIS uporabljajo finančni vzvod in da lahko pod določenimi pogoji prispevajo k nastanku sistemskega tveganja ali neurejenih trgov, bi bilo treba UAIS, ki uporabljajo finančni vzvod, naložiti posebne zahteve.
The information needed to detect, monitor and respond to those risks has not been collected in a consistent way throughout the Union, and shared across Member States so as to identify potential sources of risk to the stability of financial markets in the Union.
Informacije, potrebne za odkrivanje, spremljanje in odzivanje na ta tveganja, v Uniji še niso bile zbrane in izmenjane med državami članicami, da bi bilo mogoče opredeliti potencialne vire tveganja za stabilnost finančnih trgov v Uniji.
To remedy that situation, special requirements should apply to AIFMs which employ leverage on a substantial basis at the level of the AIF.
Da bi popravili to stanje, bi morali za UAIS, ki znatno uporabljajo finančni vzvod na ravni AIS, veljati posebne zahteve.
Such AIFMs should be required to disclose information regarding the overall level of leverage employed, the leverage arising from borrowing of cash or securities and the leverage arising from positions held in derivatives, the reuse of assets and the main sources of leverage in their AIFs.
Za take UAIS bi moralo biti obvezno, da razkrijejo informacije o skupni ravni uporabljenega vzvoda, vzvodu, pridobljenem z izposojo gotovine ali vrednostnih papirjev, in vzvodu, ki izvira iz položaja v izvedenih finančnih instrumentih, ponovne uporabe sredstev in glavnih virov vzvodov v njihovih AIS.
Information gathered by competent authorities should be shared with other authorities in the Union, with ESMA and with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board [13] so as to facilitate a collective analysis of the impact of the leverage of AIFs managed by AIFMs on the financial system in the Union, as well as a common response.
Pristojni organi, ki zbirajo informacije, bi si jih morali izmenjevati z drugimi organi v Uniji, z ESMA in z Evropskim odborom za sistemska tveganja (ESRB), ustanovljenim z Uredbo (EU) št. 1092/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o makro-bonitetnem nadzoru nad finančnim sistemom Unije in ustanovitvi Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja [13], da se pospeši skupna analiza vpliva finančnega vzvoda AIS, ki jih upravlja UAIS, na finančni sistem v Uniji in tudi skupni odziv na to.
If one or more AIFs managed by an AIFM could potentially constitute an important source of counterparty risk to a credit institution or other systemically relevant institutions in other Member States, such information should also be shared with the relevant authorities.
Če bi lahko en ali več AIS, ki jih upravljajo UAIS, potencialno pomenili pomemben vir tveganja izpostavljenosti do kreditne institucije ali druge sistemsko pomembne institucije v drugih državah članicah, bi bilo treba tudi te informacije izmenjati z zadevnimi organi.
In order to ensure a proper assessment of the risks induced by the use of leverage by an AIFM with respect to the AIFs it manages, the AIFM should demonstrate that the leverage limits for each AIF it manages are reasonable and that it complies with those limits at all times.
Da bi se zagotovila ustrezna ocena tveganj, ki ga povzroča uporaba finančnega vzvoda s strani UAIS v zvezi s AIS, ki jih upravlja, bi moral UAIS kadar koli dokazati, da so omejitve vzvodov za vsak AIS, ki ga upravlja, razumne, in da UAIS dokaže, kako se drži teh omejitev.
Where the stability and integrity of the financial system may be threatened, the competent authorities of the home Member State of the AIFM should be able to impose limits to the level of leverage that an AIFM can employ in AIFs under its management.
Kadar bi stabilnost in integriteta finančnega sistema utegnili biti ogroženi, bi bilo treba pristojnim organom v matični državi članici UAIS omogočiti, da omejijo raven finančnega vzvoda, ki bi ga lahko UAIS uporabil v AIS.
ESMA and the ESRB should be informed about any actions taken in this respect.
ESMA in ESRB bi bilo treba obvestiti o vseh ukrepih, sprejetih v zvezi s tem.
It is also considered necessary to allow ESMA, after taking into account the advice of the ESRB, to determine that the leverage used by an AIFM or by a group of AIFMs poses a substantial risk to the stability and the integrity of the financial system and to issue advice to competent authorities specifying the remedial measures to be taken.
Nujno je tudi, da se dovoli ESMA, da ob upoštevanju nasveta ESRB odloči, da finančni vzvod, ki ga uporablja UAIS ali skupina UAIS, predstavlja znatno tveganje za stabilnost in celovitost finančnega sistema in da pristojnim organom izda priporočilo, v katerem določi popravne ukrepe, ki jih je treba sprejeti.