natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The agreements are negotiated and facilitated by so-called media agencies.
Pogajanja in sklenitev teh sporazumov so delo tako imenovanih agencij za medije.
In 1997, TV2 took the strategic decision not to expand capacity utilisation but to increase its prices in 1998.
Leta 1997 je TV2 sprejela strateško odločitev, da ne bo povečala izkoriščenosti svojih zmogljivosti, ampak bo namesto tega leta 1998 zvišala svoje cene.
Another price increase was made in 1999.
Drugo zvišanje cen se je izvedlo leta 1999.
The Danish authorities contend that by 1999 the competitive situation had become so intense that TV2 suffered as a result of the price increase and its advertising revenue fell by around 10 % from the previous year.
Danske oblasti trdijo, da je postala konkurenca do leta 1999 tako intenzivna, da je imela TV2 škodo zaradi zvišanja cen, zato so prihodki TV2 iz oglaševanja od prejšnjega leta padli za približno 10 %.
Despite the price increase, its advertising revenue and capacity utilisation dropped back to the 1999 level.
Kljub zvišanim cenam so se njeni prihodki iz oglaševanja in izkoriščenost njenih zmogljivosti zmanjšali na raven iz leta 1999.
In 2002, TV2 cut prices yet again and experienced a slight drop in total turnover.
Leta 2002 je TV2 znova znižala cene in imela nekoliko nižji celotni promet.
In this connection, the Commission notes the following.
V zvezi s tem je Komisija ugotovila naslednje.
On the one hand, the Commission takes note that in its judgment [47], the Court stated that ‘(…) conceivably, the above procedure for determining the amount of licence fee income payable to TV2 was objective and transparent given, in particular, that it involved the Danish Parliament, that it was based on economic analyses prepared by a firm of auditors assisted by a follow-up group of experts in which TV2’s competitors participated, and that those analyses were published, as were TV2’s annual accounts. Accordingly, it cannot be ruled out that a serious analysis of that procedure might lead to the conclusion that, even before the Altmark conditions were laid down by the Court of Justice, the Kingdom of Denmark had, in essence, complied with the second of those conditions’. The Court also held that ‘the amount of the licence fee income payable to TV2 was calculated on the basis of the specific assumption that TV2 would continue to benefit from those other State measures’ [48] (i.e. tax exemption, etc.).
Po eni strani Komisija upošteva, da je Sodišče v svoji sodbi [47] navedlo, da „[…] ni mogoče izključiti, da bi zgoraj navedena podrobna pravila o določitvi zneska naročnine, ki pripade postaji TV2, lahko bila objektivna in pregledna podrobna pravila, če bi vključevala med drugim intervencijo danskega parlamenta, če bi se opirala na ekonomske analize, ki bi jih pripravila revizorska družba ob pomoči stalne skupine strokovnjakov, v kateri bi sodelovali konkurenti postaje TV2, in če bi bile te analize objavljene, tako kot letni obračuni postaje TV2. Ni torej mogoče izključiti, da bi natančna analiza teh podrobnih pravil morda pripeljala do sklepa, da je Kraljevina Danska, celo preden je Sodišče določilo pogoje Altmark, v bistvu zagotovila upoštevanje drugega od teh pogojev.“ Sodišče je tudi trdilo, da „je bil znesek naročnin, ki pripade postaji TV2 […], izračunan pravzaprav ob domnevi, da se ohranijo ti drugi državni ukrepi v prid tej RTV-postaji“ [48] (npr. oprostitev od plačevanja davka itd.).
In August 1995, in response to the National Audit Office proposal that TV2 should be given a capital injection, the Ministry of Finance stated that ‘[b]oth when establishing new undertakings and when converting existing state-owned undertakings, the undertaking must have the necessary capital base. But at the same time the State must not make too large an injection of capital, firstly because this would signify an unnecessary expense for the State and secondly because it could give the undertaking an unfair competitive advantage. The undertaking must be neither under- nor over-capitalised’. On this basis the Danish State considered that capital should be built up in TV2.
Ministrstvo za finance je avgusta 1995 v svojem odgovoru na predlog državnega urada za revizijo, da se TV2 zagotovi kapitalska injekcija, navedlo, da „mora imeti podjetje tako pri ustanavljanju novih podjetij kot pri preoblikovanju obstoječih državnih podjetij potrebno kapitalsko osnovo. Hkrati pa država ne sme vložiti preveč kapitala, prvič zato, ker bi to kazalo na nepotreben izdatek za državo, in drugič, ker bi lahko dalo podjetju nepravično konkurenčno prednost. Podjetje ne sme biti niti preveč niti premalo kapitalizirano.“ Na podlagi tega je danska država menila, da je treba kapital TV2 povečati.
With regard to what was stated in recital 198 above, it should be noted that TV2 also performs a number of commercial activities. These are fairly marginal compared with TV2’s overall activities.
Glede na navedbe iz uvodne izjave 198 je treba upoštevati, da TV2 izvaja tudi številne komercialne dejavnosti.
As the Court stated in paragraph 43 of its order, ‘[a]lthough the specific circumstances of the present case prompted the Commission to adopt two decisions [the annulled recovery and recapitalisation decisions], it is apparent that those decisions constitute two aspects of the same legal issue relating to the classification as State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC and, if so, to the determination of their compatibility with the common market, of the measures implemented by the Kingdom of Denmark for TV2 and subsequently TV2 A/S. The annulment of Decision 2006/217/EC therefore entails for the Commission a fresh examination of all the measures implemented by the Kingdom of Denmark for TV2 and subsequently TV2 A/S’. Because of their close link due to the recovery issue, the 2004 recapitalisation measures in favour of TV2 should be seen in conjunction with the State aid granted between 1995 and 2002 so as to ensure that there is no risk of TV2 receiving overcompensation.
Kot je navedlo Sodišče v odstavku 43 svojega sklepa, je „[k]ljub temu, da so posebne okoliščine pričujoče zadeve Komisijo spodbudile, da je sprejela dve odločbi [odločbi o izterjavi in o dokapitalizaciji], […] očitno, da ti odločbi predstavljata dva vidika istega pravnega vprašanja glede ukrepov Kraljevine Danske za TV2 in posledično TV2 A/S v zvezi z opredelitvijo, ali gre za državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) ES, in, če je tako, v zvezi z določitvijo njune združljivosti s skupnim trgom. Razglasitev ničnosti Odločbe št. 2006/217 zato Komisiji nalaga nov pregled vseh ukrepov, ki jih je Kraljevina Danska izvedla za TV2 in posledično TV2 A/S.“ Zaradi njune tesne povezanosti, ki je posledica vprašanja o vračilu, je treba ukrepe za dokapitalizacijo za leto 2004 v korist TV2 obravnavati skupaj z državno pomočjo, dodeljeno med letoma 1995 in 2002, da se zagotovi, da ni tveganja glede tega, da bi TV2 prejela prekomerno nadomestilo.
It stated that ‘[a]lthough the specific circumstances of the present case prompted the Commission to adopt two decisions, it is apparent that those decisions constitute two aspects of the same legal issue relating to the classification as State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC and, if so, to the determination of their compatibility with the common market, of the measures implemented by the Kingdom of Denmark for TV2 and subsequently TV2 A/S’ [11]. The annulment of the recovery decision therefore called for a ‘fresh examination of all the measures implemented by the Kingdom of Denmark for TV2’. The order was not appealed.
V njej je navedeno, da je „[k]ljub temu, da so posebne okoliščine pričujoče zadeve Komisijo spodbudile, da je sprejela dve odločbi, […] očitno, da ti odločbi predstavljata dva vidika istega pravnega vprašanja glede ukrepov Kraljevine Danske za TV2 in posledično TV2 A/S [11]v zvezi z opredelitvijo, ali gre za državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) ES, in, če je tako, v zvezi z določitvijo njune združljivosti s skupnim trgom.“ Razglasitev ničnosti odločbe o izterjavi je zato zahtevala „nov pregled vseh ukrepov, ki jih je Kraljevina Danska izvedla za TV2.“ Zoper sklep ni bila vložena pritožba.
Council Decision 2011/845/CFSP
Sklep Sveta 2011/845/SZVP
of 16 December 2011
z dne 16. decembra 2011
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 and Article 31(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o Evropski uniji ter zlasti člena 29 in člena 31(1) Pogodbe,
On 17 November 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/694/CFSP concerning the temporary reception by Member States of the European Union of certain Palestinians [1], which provided for an extension of the validity of their national permits for entry into, and stay in, the territory of the Member States referred to in Common Position 2002/400/CFSP of 21 May 2002 concerning the temporary reception by Member States of the European Union of certain Palestinians [2] for a further period of 12 months.
Svet je 17. novembra 2010 sprejel Sklep 2010/694/SZVP o začasnem sprejemu določenih Palestincev s strani držav članic Evropske unije [1], ki je določil podaljšanje veljavnosti njihovih nacionalnih dovoljenj za vstop in bivanje na ozemlju držav članic iz Skupnega stališča Sveta 2002/400/SZVP z dne 21. maja 2002 o začasnem sprejemu nekaterih Palestincev v države članice Evropske unije [2] za nadaljnje obdobje 12 mesecev.
The Council shall evaluate the application of Common Position 2002/400/CFSP within six months of the adoption of this Decision.
Svet oceni uporabo Skupnega stališča 2002/400/SZVP v roku 6 mesecev od sprejetja tega sklepa.
Done at Brussels, 16 December 2011.
V Bruslju, 16. decembra 2011
OJ L 303, 19.11.2010, p. 13.
UL L 303, 19.11.2010, str. 13.
Political and Security Committee Decision ATALANTA/5/2011
Sklep ATALANTA/5/2011 Političnega in varnostnega odbora
(2011/846/CFSP)
(2011/846/SZVP)
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 38 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o Evropski uniji in zlasti tretjega pododstavka člena 38 Pogodbe;
Having regard to Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [1], and in particular Article 10 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Skupnega ukrepa Sveta 2008/851/SZVP z dne 10. novembra 2008 o vojaški operaciji Evropske unije kot prispevku k odvračanju, preprečevanju in zatiranju piratstva in oboroženih ropov pred somalsko obalo [1] ter zlasti člena 10 Skupnega ukrepa;
Having regard to Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2009 [2] and to Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2009 [3], and the addendum thereto [4],
ob upoštevanju Sklepa Atalanta/2/2009 Političnega in varnostnega odbora [2] in Sklepa Atalanta/3/2009 Političnega in varnostnega odbora [3] ter Dodatka k Sklepu Atalanta/3/2009 Političnega in varnostnega odbora [4];
Following the offer by Serbia to contribute to operation Atalanta, the recommendation by the EU Operation Commander and the advice by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the contribution from Serbia should be accepted.
Na podlagi ponudbe Srbije za prispevek k operaciji Atalanta, priporočila poveljnika operacije EU in Vojaškega odbora Evropske unije (VOEU) bi bilo prispevek Srbije treba sprejeti.
In accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications,
V skladu s členom 5 Protokola št. 22 o stališču Danske, ki je priložen Pogodbi o Evropski uniji in Pogodbi o delovanju Evropske unije, Danska ne sodeluje pri pripravi in izvajanju sklepov in ukrepov Unije, ki zadevajo obrambo –
Following the Force Generation and Manning Conferences and the recommendations by the EU Operation Commander and the European Union Military Committee, the contributions from Norway, Croatia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Serbia shall be accepted for the EU military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta).’.
Na podlagi konferenc o oblikovanju in popolnjevanju sil ter priporočil poveljnika operacije EU in vojaškega odbora Evropske unije se sprejmejo prispevki Norveške, Hrvaške, Črne gore, Ukrajine in Srbije za vojaško operacijo EU kot prispevek k odvračanju, preprečevanju in zatiranju piratstva in oboroženih ropov pred somalsko obalo (Atalanta).“
Montenegro,
Črna gora
Serbia.’
Srbija“
Council Implementing Decision 2011/847/CFSP
Izvedbeni sklep Sveta 2011/847/SZVP
implementing Decision 2010/639/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus
o izvajanju Sklepa 2010/639/SZVP o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Belorusiji
Having regard to Council Decision 2010/639/CFSP of 25 October 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus [1], and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Sklepa Sveta 2010/639/SZVP z dne 25. oktobra 2010 o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Belorusiji [1] in zlasti člena 4(1) Sklepa,
On 25 October 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/639/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus.
Svet je 25. oktobra 2010 sprejel Sklep 2010/639/SZVP o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Belorusiji.
In view of the gravity of the situation in Belarus, additional persons should be included in the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in Annex IIIA to Decision 2010/639/CFSP.
Glede na resnost razmer v Belorusiji bi bilo treba na seznam oseb in subjektov iz Priloge IIIA k Sklepu 2010/639/SZVP, za katere veljajo omejevalni ukrepi, uvrstiti še nekatere druge osebe.
Annex IIIA to Decision 2010/639/CFSP should be amended accordingly,
Prilogo IIIA k Sklepu 2010/639/SZVP bi bilo treba ustrezno spremeniti –
The persons listed in the Annex to this Decision shall be added to the list set out in Annex IIIA to Decision 2010/639/CFSP.
Osebe s seznama iz Priloge k temu sklepu se dodajo na seznam iz Priloge IIIA k Sklepu 2010/639/SZVP.
Address: Department of law of administration of Pervomaysky district Chornogo K. 5 office 417
Naslov: Department of law of administration of Pervomaysky district Chornogo K. 5 office 417
Judge of the Pervomaiski District Court of Minsk.
Sodnik okrožnega sodišča Pervomajski v Minsku.
On 24 November 2011 he sentenced Ales Byalyatski, one of the most prominent human rights defenders, Chief of the Belarusian HR Centre “Vyasna”, Vice President of FIDH.
24. novembra 2011 je obsodil Alesa Bjaljackega, enega najuglednejših zagovornikov človekovih pravic, vodjo beloruskega centra za človekove pravice „Vjasna“ in podpredsednika FIDH.
The trial was conducted in a way that was a clear violation of the Code of Penal Procedure.
Potek sojenja je očitno kršil zakon o kazenskem postopku.
Byalyatski was active in defending and providing assistance to those who suffered from repression in relation with the 19 December 2010 elections and the crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition.
Bjaljacki je dejavno branil žrtve represije, povezane z volitvami 19. decembra 2010, ter nasilja nad civilno družbo in demokratično opozicijo in jim pomagal.
Saikouski Uladzimir
Sajkovski Uladzimir (Saikouski Uladzimir)
Saikovski Vladimir
Sajkovski Vladimir
He dealt with the trial of Ales Byalyatski, one of the most prominent human rights defenders, Chief of the Belarusian HR Centre “Vyasna”, Vice President of FIDH.
Sodeloval je na sojenju Alesu Bjaljackemu, enemu najuglednejših zagovornikov človekovih pravic, vodji beloruskega centra za človekove pravice „Vjasna“ in podpredsedniku FIDH.
The accusation presented by the prosecutor in the trial had a clear and imminent political motivation and was a clear violation of the Code of Penal Procedure.
Obtožnica, ki jo je na tem sojenju vložil tožilec, je bila očitno in neposredno politično motivirana ter je očitno kršila zakon o kazenskem postopku.
Byalyatski was active in defending and providing assistance to those who suffered from repression in relation with the 19 December 2010 elections and the crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition.’
Bjaljacki je dejavno branil žrtve represije, povezane z volitvami 19. decembra 2010, ter nasilja nad civilno družbo in demokratično opozicijo in jim pomagal.“
Bandarenka Siarhei Uladzimiravich
Bandarenka Sjargej Uladzimiravič (Bandarenka Siarhei Uladzimiravich)
Bondarenko Sergei Vladimirovich
Bondarenko Sergej Vladimirovič (Bondarenko Sergei Vladimirovich)
Council Implementing Decision 2011/848/CFSP
Izvedbeni sklep Sveta 2011/848/SZVP
implementing Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo
o izvajanju Sklepa Sveta 2010/788/SZVP o omejitvenih ukrepih proti Demokratični republiki Kongo
Having regard to Council Decision 2010/788/CFSP of 20 December 2010 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo [1], and in particular Article 6 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Sklepa Sveta 2010/788/SZVP z dne 20. decembra 2010 o omejitvenih ukrepih proti Demokratični republiki Kongo [1] in zlasti člena 6 Sklepa,
On 20 December 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Svet je 20. decembra 2010 sprejel Sklep 2010/788/SZVP o omejitvenih ukrepih proti Demokratični republiki Kongo.
On 12 October and 28 November 2011, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo updated the list of individuals and entities subject to restrictive measures.
Odbor Varnostnega sveta, ustanovljen v skladu z Resolucijo Varnostnega sveta Združenih narodov 1533 (2004) o Demokratični republiki Kongo, je 12. oktobra in 28. novembra 2011 posodobil seznam posameznikov in subjektov, za katere veljajo omejevalni ukrepi.
The persons listed in the Annex to this Decision shall be added to the list set out in the Annex to Decision 2010/788/CFSP.
Osebe s seznama iz Priloge k temu sklepu se dodajo na seznam iz Priloge k Sklepu 2010/788/SZVP.
Professor Musharaf
Profesor Mušaraf
Alternative date of birth: 1 January 1964
Drug možen datum rojstva: 1. januar 1964
Ntoke Village
vas Ntoke,
Ntenjeru Sub County
podokrožje Ntenjeru,
Kayunga District
območje Kayunga,
Head of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Vodja Zavezniških demokratičnih sil
Commander, Allied Democratic Forces
Poveljnik, Zavezniške demokratične sile.
According to open-source and official reporting, including the UNSC DRC Sanctions Committee’s Group of Experts’ reports, Jamil Mukulu is the military leader of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a foreign armed group operating in the DRC that impedes the disarmament and voluntary repatriation or resettlement of ADF combatants, as described in paragraph 4(b) of resolution 1857 (2008).
Iz javno dostopnih virov in uradnih poročil, tudi iz poročil strokovne skupine Odbora VS ZN za sankcije v DR Kongo, izhaja, da je Jamil Mukulu vojaški vodja Zavezniških demokratičnih sil, tuje oborožene skupine, ki deluje v DR Kongo ter ovira razoroževanje in prostovoljno vračanje oziroma ponovno naseljevanje borcev Zavezniških demokratičnih sil, kar je navedeno tudi v odstavku 4(b) Resolucije 1857 (2008).
The UNSC DRC Sanction Committee’s Group of Experts has reported that Jamil Mukulu has provided leadership and material support to the ADF, an armed group operating in the territory of the DRC.
Strokovna skupina Odbora VS ZN za sankcije v DR Kongo je poročala, da je Jamil Mukulu vodil in zagotavljal materialno podporo Zavezniškim demokratičnim silam, oboroženi skupini, ki deluje na ozemlju DR Kongo.
According to multiple sources including the UNSC DRC Sanctions Committee’s Group of Experts’ reports, Jamil Mukulu has also continued to exercise influence over the policies, provided financing, and maintained direct command and control over the activities of ADF forces in the field, including overseeing links with international terrorist networks.
Iz več virov, tudi iz poročil strokovne skupine Odbora VS ZN za sankcije v DR Kongo, izhaja, da je Jamil Mukulu stalno vplival na politiko, zagotavljal finančno podporo ter neposredno poveljeval in nadziral dejavnosti Zavezniških demokratičnih sil na terenu, nadziral je tudi naveze z mednarodnimi terorističnimi mrežami.
4 April 1976
4. april 1976
Walikale Territory
Ozemlje Walikale,
Commander-in-Chief, Nduma Defence of Congo, Mayi Mayi Sheka group
Glavni poveljnik, Obramba Konga Nduma, skupina Mayi Mayi Sheka
Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, Commander-in-Chief of the political branch of the Mayi Mayi Sheka, is the political leader of a Congolese armed group that impedes the disarmament, demobilisation, or reintegration of combatants.
Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, glavni poveljnik politične veje skupine Mayi Mayi Sheka, je politični vodja kongovske oborožene skupine, ki ovira razoroževanje, demobilizacijo oziroma ponovno vključevanje borcev.
The Mayi Mayi Sheka is a Congo-based militia group that operates from bases in Walikale territory in eastern DRC.
Skupina Mayi Mayi Sheka je kongovska milica z bazo na ozemlju Walikale v vzhodnem delu DR Kongo.
The Mayi Mayi Sheka group has carried out attacks on mines in eastern DRC, including taking over the Bisiye mines and extorting from locals.
Skupina Mayi Mayi Sheka je izvedla napade na rudnike v vzhodnem delu DR Kongo ter prevzela rudnike Bisiye in jih odvzela lokalnim prebivalcem.
Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka has also committed serious violations of international law involving the targeting of children.
Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka je tudi huje kršil mednarodno pravo z dejanji, katerih tarča so otroci.
Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka planned and ordered a series of attacks in Walikale territory from 30 July to 2 August 2010, to punish local populations accused of collaborating with Congolese government forces.
V obdobju od 30. julija do 2. avgusta 2010 je Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka načrtoval in naročil več napadov na ozemlju Walikale, da bi kaznoval lokalne prebivalce, ki naj bi sodelovali s kongovskimi vladnimi silami.
In the course of the attacks, children were raped and were abducted, subjected to forced labour and subjected to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.
V napadih so bili otroci posiljeni in ugrabljeni za opravljanje prisilnega dela, deležni pa so bili okrutnega, nečloveškega ali poniževalnega ravnanja.
The Mayi Mayi Sheka militia group also forcibly recruits boys and holds children in their ranks from recruitment drives.
Milica Mayi Mayi Sheka tudi prisilno rekrutira dečke in na podlagi rekrutiranja zadržuje otroke v svojih vrstah.
Political and Security Committee Decision EULEX/2/2011
Sklep Političnega in varnostnega odbora EULEX/2/2011
(2011/849/CFSP)
(2011/849/SZVP)
Pursuant to Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is authorised, in accordance with Article 38 of the Treaty, to take the relevant decisions for the purpose of exercising political control and strategic direction of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), including the decision to appoint a Head of Mission.
Na podlagi Skupnega ukrepa 2008/124/SZVP je Politični in varnostni odbor (PVO) v skladu s členom 38 Pogodbe pooblaščen za sprejemanje ustreznih odločitev glede političnega nadzora in strateškega vodenja misije Evropske unije za krepitev pravne države na Kosovem (EULEX KOSOVO), vključno z odločitvijo o imenovanju vodje misije.
On 8 June 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/322/CFSP [3] extending the duration of EULEX KOSOVO until 14 June 2012.
Svet je 8. junija 2010 sprejel Sklep 2010/322/SZVP [3], s katerim je podaljšal trajanje EULEX KOSOVO do 14. junija 2012.
By Decision 2010/431/CFSP [4], following a proposal by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), the PSC appointed Mr Xavier BOUT DE MARNHAC as Head of Mission of EULEX KOSOVO with effect from 15 October 2010.
PVO je na predlog visokega predstavnika Unije za zunanje zadeve in varnostno politiko (VP) s Sklepom 2010/431/SZVP [4] za vodjo misije EULEX KOSOVO od 15. oktobra 2010 imenoval Xavierja BOUTA DE MARNHACA.