natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to the majority of stakeholders involved in the consultation prior to the adoption of this Regulation, the overwhelming majority of Member States and the impact assessment carried out by the Commission, a common auctioning infrastructure where a common auction platform conducts the auctions best achieves the overarching objectives of the review of Directive 2003/87/EC.
Večina zainteresiranih strani, vključenih v posvetovanje pred sprejetjem te uredbe, prevladujoča večina držav članic in ocena učinka, ki jo je izvedla Komisija, podpirajo mnenje, da je skupna dražbena infrastruktura, v kateri se dražbe izvajajo prek skupnega dražbenega sistema, najboljša možnost za dosego glavnih ciljev iz pregleda Direktive 2003/87/ES.
Such an approach avoids any distortions of the internal market.
Takšen pristop preprečuje kakršna koli izkrivljanja notranjega trga.
It allows for the highest degree of economic efficiency and permits allowances to be allocated through auctioning on the basis of fully harmonised conditions within the Union.
Omogoča najvišjo stopnjo gospodarske učinkovitosti in dodeljevanje pravic s prodajo na dražbi na osnovi popolnoma usklajenih pogojev znotraj Unije.
Moreover, conducting the auctions by means of a common auction platform best strengthens the carbon price signal required for economic operators to make the investment decisions necessary to achieve abatement of greenhouse gas emissions at least cost.
Poleg tega izvajanje dražb prek skupnega dražbenega sistema krepi signal glede cene ogljika, ki ga gospodarski subjekti potrebujejo za sprejemanje naložbenih odločitev, potrebnih za zmanjšanje emisij toplogrednih plinov z najnižjimi stroški.
According to the majority of stakeholders involved in the consultation prior to the adoption of this Regulation, the overwhelming majority of Member States and the impact assessment carried out by the Commission, a common auctioning infrastructure where a common auction platform conducts the auctions also best achieves the objectives in Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.
Večina zainteresiranih strani, vključenih v posvetovanje pred sprejetjem te uredbe, prevladujoča večina držav članic in ocena učinka, ki jo je izvedla Komisija, podpirajo mnenje, da je skupna dražbena infrastruktura, v kateri se dražbe izvajajo prek skupnega dražbenega sistema, tudi najboljša možnost za dosego ciljev iz člena 10(4) Direktive 2003/87/ES.
Such an approach is the most cost-effective means of auctioning allowances without an undue administrative burden that would necessarily ensue from using multiple auctioning infrastructures.
Tak pristop je stroškovno najbolj učinkovit način za prodajo pravic na dražbi brez neupravičene administrativne obremenitve, ki bi zagotovo nastale, če bi se uporabljalo več dražbenih infrastruktur.
It best provides for open, transparent and non-discriminatory access to the auctions, both de jure and de facto.
Pravno in dejansko najbolje zagotavlja odprt, pregleden in nediskriminatoren dostop do dražb.
Such a common approach would ensure the predictability of the auction calendar and best strengthens the clarity of the carbon price signal.
Takšen skupni pristop bi zagotovil predvidljivost časovnega razporeda dražb in najbolj okrepil jasnost signala glede cene ogljika.
A common auctioning infrastructure is particularly important for providing equitable access to small and medium-sized enterprises covered by the emissions trading scheme and access to small emitters.
Skupna dražbena infrastruktura je zlasti pomembna za zagotavljanje enakovrednega dostopa malim in srednje velikim podjetjem, vključenim v sistem za trgovanje z emisijami, ter za zagotavljanje dostopa malim onesnaževalcem.
Indeed, the cost of becoming familiar and registering with, as well as participating in, more than one auction platform would be particularly burdensome for such companies.
Spoznavanje več kot enega dražbenega sistema ter registracija in sodelovanje v njem bi bili namreč za takšna podjetja posebno obremenjujoči.
A common auction platform facilitates the widest participation from across the Union and, thereby, best mitigates the risk of participants undermining the auctions by using them as a vehicle for money laundering, terrorist financing, criminal activity or market abuse.
Skupni dražbeni sistem omogoča najširši izbor udeležencev iz vse Unije, s čimer najbolje zmanjšuje tveganje, da bi udeleženci ogrozili dražbe, tako da bi jih izkoriščali za pranje denarja, financiranje terorizma, kriminalne dejavnosti ali zlorabe trga.
Nevertheless, to mitigate any risk of reduced competition in the carbon market, this Regulation provides for the possibility for Member States to opt-out of the common auction platform by appointing their own auction platforms subject to the listing of these opt-out platforms in an Annex to this Regulation.
Da bi se zmanjšalo morebitno tveganje za zmanjševanje konkurence na trgu ogljika, ta uredba državam članicam kljub vsemu omogoča možnost, da se odločijo, da ne bodo sodelovale v skupnem dražbenem sistemu, tako da imenujejo svoje lastne dražbene sisteme, pri čemer je treba te samostojne dražbene sisteme navesti na seznamu v prilogi k tej uredbi.
Such listing should be based on a notification of the opt-out platform by the appointing Member State to the Commission.
Osnova za takšno vključitev na seznam bi morala biti, da država članica, ki imenuje samostojni dražbeni sistem, o tem obvesti Komisijo.
However, this possibility inevitably implies less than full harmonisation of the auction process and, therefore, the arrangements put in place in this Regulation should be reviewed within an initial five-year period and in consultation with stakeholders with a view to making any changes deemed necessary in the light of the experience acquired.
Vendar pa ta možnost neizogibno pomeni, da uskladitev dražbenega postopka ne bo popolna, zato bi se morale ureditve, določene v tej uredbi, ponovno pregledati v začetnem petletnem obdobju in ob posvetovanju z zainteresiranimi stranmi, tako da se ob upoštevanju pridobljenih izkušenj izvedejo potrebne spremembe.
Following receipt of a notification in relation to an opt-out platform from a Member State, the Commission should act without undue delay in relation to the listing of that opt-out platform.
Po prejetju priglasitve v zvezi s samostojnim dražbenim sistemom, ki jo pošlje država članica, bi morala Komisija brez nepotrebnega odlašanja ukrepati v zvezi z vključitvijo navedenega samostojnega sistema na seznam.
In addition, it should be possible for a Member State to request the auction monitor to draw up a report about the functioning of the auction platform it intends to appoint, for instance when preparing any amendment of this Regulation to list opt-out auction platforms.
Poleg tega bi moralo biti omogočeno, da država članica nadzornika dražbe zaprosi za sestavo poročila o delovanju dražbenega sistema, ki ga namerava imenovati, na primer ob pripravi kakršnih koli sprememb te uredbe za vključitev samostojnih dražbenih sistemov na seznam.
Moreover, the auction monitor should keep under review the compatibility of all auction platforms with this Regulation and the objectives of Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC and report thereon to the Member States, the Commission and the auction platform concerned.
Nadzornik dražbe bi moral prav tako redno pregledovati skladnost vseh dražbenih sistemov s to uredbo in cilji člena 10(4) Direktive 2003/87/ES ter o tem poročati državam članicam, Komisiji in zadevnemu dražbenemu sistemu.
Such review should include the impact of the auctions on the market position of the auction platforms on the secondary market.
Takšen pregled bi moral vključevati vpliv dražb na tržni položaj dražbenih sistemov na sekundarnem trgu.
To avoid auctioning Member States unwittingly becoming locked-into any auction platform beyond its term of appointment, any contracts appointing an auction platform should contain appropriate provisions requiring an auction platform to hand over of all tangible and intangible assets necessary for the conduct of the auctions by an auction platform’s successor.
Da bi preprečili situacijo, v kateri bi se država članica, ki sodeluje na dražbi, nehote ujela v kateri koli dražbeni sistem po izteku njegovega mandata, bi morale vse pogodbe o imenovanju dražbenega sistema vsebovati ustrezne določbe, ki od dražbenega sistema zahtevajo, da vsa opredmetena in neopredmetena sredstva, potrebna za izvajanje dražb, predajo nasledniku zadevnega dražbenega sistema.
The choices as regards the number of auction platforms and the type of entity that may become an auction platform underpin the provisions adopted in this Regulation for a predictable auction calendar as well as the measures on accessing the auctions, the design of the auctions, and the provisions on the management of collateral, payment and delivery and on auction supervision.
Določbe, sprejete v tej uredbi glede predvidljivega časovnega razporeda dražb, ter ukrepi za dostop do dražb, obliko dražb, določbe o upravljanju zavarovanja s premoženjem, plačilu in dobavi ter nadzoru dražb, temeljijo na odločitvah glede števila dražbenih sistemov in vrste subjekta, ki lahko postane dražbeni sistem.
Such provisions could not be adopted by the Commission in a fully harmonised regulation without knowing the number of auction platforms and the specific capabilities of the entity chosen to conduct the auctions.
Takšnih določb Komisija ni mogla sprejeti v popolnoma usklajeni uredbi, saj ni imela podatkov o številu dražbenih sistemov in posebnih zmogljivostih subjekta, izbranega za izvajanje dražb.
Therefore, the measures adopted in this Regulation are based on auctions being conducted through a common auction platform whilst providing for a procedure to ascertain the number and quality of any other auction platform a Member State may decide to use.
Ukrepi, sprejeti v tej uredbi, zato temeljijo na dražbah, izvajanih prek skupnega dražbenega sistema, ter določajo postopek za ugotavljanje števila in kakovosti vseh drugih dražbenih sistemov, ki se jih lahko odločijo uporabljati države članice.
In view of the constraints outlined in recital (10), it is appropriate for the listing of an opt-out auction platform in an Annex to this Regulation to be made subject to conditions or obligations.
Ob upoštevanju omejitev, opisanih v uvodni izjavi 10, je primerno, da se za vključitev samostojnih dražbenih sistemov na seznam v prilogi k tej uredbi določijo pogoji ali obveznosti.
The listing of an opt-out platform in an Annex to this Regulation is without prejudice to the powers of the Commission to propose the delisting of an auction platform in particular in the event of any breach of this Regulation or the objectives of Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.
Vključitev samostojnega sistema na seznam v prilogi k tej uredbi ne posega v pristojnost Komisije, da predlaga umik dražbenega sistema s seznama, zlasti v primeru kršitev te uredbe ali ciljev člena 10(4) Direktive 2003/87/ES.
In the absence of listing, the auctioning Member State should auction its allowances through the common auction platform.
Kadar samostojni sistem ni vključen na seznam, bi morala država članica, ki sodeluje na dražbi, svoje pravice prodajati na dražbah v skupnem dražbenem sistemu.
The Commission should provide in the Commission regulation adopted pursuant to Article 19(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC for measures suspending the execution of processes pertaining to the auctioning of allowances in circumstances where the opt-out platform is in breach of this Regulation or the objectives of Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.
Komisija bi morala v uredbi Komisije, sprejeti v skladu s členom 19(3) Direktive 2003/87/ES, določiti ukrepe za začasno prekinitev izvajanja postopkov v zvezi z dražbo pravic v okoliščinah, ko samostojni sistem krši to uredbo ali cilje člena 10(4) Direktive 2003/87/ES.
The detailed provisions pertaining to the auction process to be conducted by the opt-out auction platform should be assessed by the Commission and should be subject to consultation of the Committee referred to in Article 23(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny provided for in Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.
Komisija naj ob posvetovanju z odborom iz člena 23(3) Direktive 2003/87/ES oceni podrobne določbe, ki veljajo za dražbeni postopek, ki ga izvaja samostojni dražbeni sistem, v skladu z regulativnim postopkom s pregledom, kot določa člen 10(4) Direktive 2003/87/ES.
Such an assessment is necessary to ensure that the appointment of the opt-out auction platform, conducted at national level by each opting-out Member State, is subject to a similar level of scrutiny as that to which the appointment of the common auction platform is subject under the joint action provided for in this Regulation.
Takšna ocena je potrebna za zagotovitev, da za imenovanje samostojnega dražbenega sistema, ki ga na nacionalni ravni izvaja vsaka država članica, ki ne sodeluje v skupnem dražbenem sistemu, velja podobna stopnja pregleda kot pri imenovanju skupnega dražbenega sistema s skupnim ukrepom, ki ga določa ta uredba.
Member States participating in the joint procurement of the common auction platform will be doing so together with the Commission which will be involved in the entire process.
Države članice, ki sodelujejo v skupnem postopku za oddajo naročil za skupni dražbeni sistem, pri tem sodelujejo s Komisijo, ki bo vključena v celoten postopek.
Moreover, opt-out Member States will be given observer status in the joint procurement process, subject to appropriate terms and conditions agreed by the Commission and participating Member States, in the joint procurement agreement.
Poleg tega bodo države članice, ki ne sodelujejo v skupnem postopku, dobile status opazovalk v skupnem postopku za oddajo naročil v skladu z ustreznimi pogoji, o katerih se dogovorijo Komisija in sodelujoče države članice v sporazumu o skupni oddaji naročil.
This Regulation should apply to the auctioning of allowances covered by Chapter II and Chapter III of Directive 2003/87/EC from, respectively, 1 January 2012 onwards and 1 January 2013 onwards.
Ta uredba bi morala za dražbo pravic iz poglavja II Direktive 2003/87/ES veljati od 1. januarja 2012 dalje, za dražbo pravic iz poglavja III Direktive 2003/87/ES pa od 1. januarja 2013 dalje.
It should also apply to the auctioning of any allowances covered by Chapter III of Directive 2003/87/EC prior to the start of the period from 2013, if necessary to ensure an orderly functioning of the carbon and electricity markets.
Veljati mora tudi za dražbo katerih koli pravic iz poglavja III Direktive 2003/87/ES pred obdobjem, ki se začne leta 2013, če je to potrebno za zagotovitev pravilnega delovanja trga ogljika in trgov z električno energijo.
For reasons of simplicity and accessibility, the allowances auctioned should be available for delivery within five trading days at the latest.
Zaradi ohranitve preprostosti in dostopnosti bi morale biti pravice, ki se prodajajo na dražbi, na voljo za dobavo najpozneje v petih trgovalnih dneh.
Such short-term delivery deadlines would limit any potential negative impact on competition between the auction platforms and trading places in the secondary market for allowances.
Tako kratki roki dobave bi omejili kakršne koli možne negativne vplive konkurence med dražbenimi sistemi in upravljavci sekundarnih trgov s pravicami.
Moreover, short-term delivery deadlines are simpler, encourage wide participation thereby mitigating the risk of market abuse and better ensure accessibility for small and medium-sized enterprises covered by the scheme and small emitters.
Poleg tega so kratki roki dobave enostavnejši, spodbujajo široko udeležbo in tako zmanjšujejo tveganja za zlorabo trga ter bolje zagotavljajo dostop za mala in srednje velika podjetja, vključena v sistem, in za male onesnaževalce.
Rather than providing forwards and futures in the auctions, it is for the market to offer optimal solutions to respond to the demand for allowance derivatives.
Namesto zagotavljanja nestandardiziranih in standardiziranih terminskih pogodb na dražbah je naloga trga, da ponudi optimalne rešitve v odgovor na povpraševanje po izvedenih finančnih instrumentih v zvezi s pravicami do emisije.
It is appropriate to provide for a choice between two-day spot and five-day futures to be made during the process for the appointment of the auction platform to assess the best solution for the optimal auctioned product to be selected.
Primerno je, da se med postopkom imenovanja dražbenega sistema zagotovi možnost izbire med dvodnevno promptno pogodbo in petdnevno standardizirano terminsko pogodbo, tako da se oceni najboljša rešitev za izbiro optimalnega finančnega produkta na dražbi.
Whilst two-day spot is not a financial instrument under Union financial market legislation, five-day futures are financial instruments within the meaning of Union financial market regulation.
Medtem ko dvodnevna promptna pogodba ni finančni instrument v okviru zakonodaje Unije o finančnih trgih, so petdnevne standardizirane terminske pogodbe finančni instrumenti v smislu uredbe o finančnih trgih.
The choice of whether or not the auctioned product should be a financial instrument should be part of the procedures for selecting the auction platform and should be made on the basis of an overall assessment of the costs and benefits of the solutions offered by candidates taking part in the competitive procurement process.
Izbira med tem, ali bi moral biti finančni produkt na dražbi finančni instrument ali ne, bi morala biti del postopka za izbiro dražbenega sistema in bi morala temeljiti na celoviti oceni stroškov in koristi rešitev, ki jih ponudijo kandidati, sodelujoči v postopku konkurenčne oddaje naročil.
This assessment should concern, notably, cost efficiency, equitable access for small and medium-sized enterprises covered by the scheme and small emitters, adequate protections and market supervision.
Ta ocena bi morala zlasti zadevati stroškovno učinkovitost, enakovreden dostop za mala in srednje velika podjetja, vključena v sistem, ter za male onesnaževalce, ustrezne zaščitne ukrepe in nadzor trga.
For as long as the legal measures and technical means necessary to deliver allowances are not in place, it is appropriate to provide for an alternative means of auctioning allowances.
Dokler ne bodo vzpostavljeni pravni ukrepi in tehnična sredstva, potrebni za dobavo pravic, je primerno zagotoviti alternativni način dražbe pravic.
For the purposes of this Regulation, futures differ from forwards in that whilst the former are subject to cash variation margining, the latter are variation margined through non-cash collateral.
Za namene te uredbe se standardizirane terminske pogodbe od nestandardiziranih razlikujejo po tem, da se za prve uporablja gibljivo denarno kritje, druge pa so gibljivo krite s premoženjem.
It is appropriate to provide the Member States with the option of choosing which type of product to use for the auctioning of allowances in line with which margining provisions would best meet their budgetary situation.
Primerno je, da se državam članicam zagotovi možnost odločitve, katero vrsto produkta bodo uporabljale za dražbo pravic, glede na to, katere rezervacije za kritje bi bile najustreznejše v njihovem proračunskem stanju.
If it were necessary to resort to such alternative means of auctioning allowances, futures and forwards would be auctioned on a provisional basis through one or two auction platforms.
Če bi bilo treba uporabiti takšen alternativni način dražbe pravic, bi se standardizirane in nestandardizirane terminske pogodbe začasno prodajale na dražbi prek enega ali dveh dražbenih sistemov.
In view of the desire for simplicity, fairness and cost-efficiency and the need to mitigate the risk of market abuse, auctions should be carried out by means of a single-round, sealed-bid and uniform-price format.
Zaradi želje po preprostem, poštenem in stroškovno učinkovitem postopku ter potrebe po ublažitvi tveganj za zlorabe trga bi bilo treba dražbe izvajati kot zaprte enkratne dražbe z enotno ceno.
Moreover, tied bids should be resolved by means of a random process, as this generates uncertainty for bidders making collusion on the price they are bidding unsustainable.
Poleg tega bi bilo treba izenačene ponudbe razreševati z naključnim postopkom, kar ustvarja negotovost za ponudnike, saj postane tajno dogovarjanje o ceni, ki jo ponujajo, nevzdržno.
The auction clearing price can be expected to be closely aligned to the prevailing secondary market price, whereas an auction clearing price significantly under the prevailing secondary market price is likely to indicate a deficiency of the auction.
Pričakovati je, da bo končna cena na dražbi tesno usklajena s prevladujočo ceno na sekundarnem trgu, medtem ko je končna cena na dražbi, ki je znatno nižja od prevladujoče cene na sekundarnem trgu, lahko znak pomanjkljivosti dražbe.
Allowing such an auction clearing price to prevail could distort the carbon price signal, disturb the carbon market and would not ensure that bidders pay fair value for the allowances.
Če bi dovolili, da prevlada takšna končna cena na dražbi, bi to lahko izkrivilo signal glede cen ogljika, povzročilo motnje na trgu ogljika in onemogočilo zagotovitev, da ponudniki za pravice plačajo pošteno ceno.
Therefore, in such a situation, the auction should be cancelled.
Zato bi bilo treba v takšnem primeru dražbo preklicati.
A relatively high frequency of the auctions is desirable to limit the impact of the auctions on the functioning of the secondary market, whilst ensuring that auctions are large enough to attract sufficient participation.
Zaželena je razmeroma velika pogostost dražb, tako da se omeji njihov vpliv na delovanje sekundarnega trga in hkrati zagotovi, da so dražbe dovolj velike, da pritegnejo zadostno število udeležencev.
A relatively high frequency reduces the risk of market abuse because it decreases the value at stake for bidders in individual auctions and increases their flexibility to make use of later auctions to adjust their trading positions.
Razmeroma velika pogostost dražb omejuje tveganje za zlorabe trga, ker zmanjšuje vrednost, ki jo ponudniki vložijo na posameznih dražbah, in povečuje njihovo prilagodljivost, tako da za popravljanje svojega položaja na trgu uporabijo poznejše dražbe.
For these reasons, this Regulation should provide for a frequency of at least weekly auctions for allowances covered by Chapter III of Directive 2003/87/EC.
Iz teh razlogov bi morala ta uredba zagotoviti vsaj tedensko pogostost dražb za pravice iz poglavja III Direktive 2003/87/ES.
Given the much smaller volume of allowances covered by Chapter II of the same Directive, the appropriate frequency for auctions for these allowances is at least once every two months.
Glede na veliko manjši obseg pravic iz poglavja II iste direktive je primerna pogostost dražb za te pravice najmanj enkrat na dva meseca.
To provide predictability to the secondary market, this Regulation should provide the following rules and procedures.
Da se zagotovi predvidljivost na sekundarnem trgu, mora ta uredba določiti naslednja pravila in postopke.
Secondly, it should provide clear and transparent rules that determine the volume of allowances to be auctioned in each year thereafter.
Poleg tega mora uredba predvideti jasna in pregledna pravila za določitev količine pravic, ki bodo prodane na dražbi vsako naslednje leto.
Thirdly, it should contain rules and procedures to establish for each calendar year a detailed auction calendar, with all relevant information for each individual auction well before the beginning of that calendar year.
Nazadnje mora vsebovati pravila in postopke za to, da se za vsako koledarsko leto že precej pred začetkom zadevnega koledarskega leta določi podroben časovni razpored dražb z vsemi ustreznimi informacijami za vsako posamezno dražbo.
Any subsequent changes to the auction calendar should only be possible in a limited number of prescribed situations.
Kakršne koli naknadne spremembe časovnega razporeda dražb bi morale biti mogoče le v omejenem številu predpisanih situacij.