natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Lastly, the Commission notes that this concept includes some notion of urgency which is incompatible with the time-consuming cycle of tendering and negotiating the PPAs.
Komisija nazadnje ugotavlja, da ta koncept deloma vključuje nujnost, kar pa ni združljivo z razpisom in pogajanji v zvezi s pogodbami PNE, za katere je potrebnega veliko časa.
In view of the above, the Commission concludes that the aid does not qualify for the derogation enshrined in Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija na podlagi navedenega ugotavlja, da pomoč ni upravičena do odstopanja iz člena 87(3)(b) Pogodbe ES.
Article 87(3)(d) of the EC Treaty states that aid to promote culture and heritage conservation may be declared compatible with the EC Treaty where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest.
Člen 87(3)(d) Pogodbe ES določa, da se pomoč za pospeševanje kulture in ohranjanja kulturne dediščine lahko razglasi za združljivo s Pogodbo ES, kadar taka pomoč ne škoduje trgovinskim pogojem in konkurenci v Skupnosti v obsegu, ki je v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
This Article obviously does not apply to the PPAs.
Ta člen se očitno ne uporablja za pogodbe PNE.
Article 87(3)(c) provides for the authorisation of state aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Člen 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES določa, da se lahko odobri državna pomoč za pospeševanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih dejavnosti ali določenih gospodarskih območij, kadar taka pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
The Commission has developed several guidelines and communications that explain how it will apply the derogation contained in this Article.
Komisija je pripravila več smernic in sporočil, ki pojasnjujejo, kako bo uporabljala odstopanje, ki ga vsebuje ta člen.
The interested parties have invoked the application of the Regional Guidelines and of the Environmental Guidelines.
Zainteresirane stranke se sklicujejo na uporabo regionalnih smernic in okoljskih smernic.
Recitals 300 to 304 indicate the reasons why the aid cannot be deemed compatible with the common market in application of the Regional Guidelines.
V uvodnih izjavah od 300 do 304 so navedeni razlogi, zaradi katerih pomoči ni mogoče šteti za združljivo s skupnim trgom na podlagi regionalnih smernic.
The Commission notes that the Environmental Guidelines, like the Regional Aid Guidelines, primarily allow investment aid.
Komisija ugotavlja, da okoljske smernice, tako kot regionalne smernice, dovoljujejo predvsem pomoč za naložbe.
Operating aid is limited to specific objectives.
Pomoč za tekoče poslovanje je omejena na posebne cilje.
The first is aid for the management of waste and for energy saving (section E.3,1), which is limited to a maximum duration of 5 years.
Prvi je pomoč za ravnanje z odpadki in za varčevanje z energijo (oddelek E.3.1), katere trajanje je omejeno na največ 5 let.
The second is aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions (section E.3.2).
Drugi je pomoč v obliki zmanjšanja davkov ali davčnih oprostitev (oddelek E.3.2).
The third is aid for renewable energy sources (section E.3.3).
Tretji je pomoč za obnovljive vire energije (oddelek E.3.3).
Clearly, none of these provisions apply in the present case.
V tem primeru se očitno ne uporablja nobena od teh določb.
The fourth and last type of operating aid that can be authorised is aid for the combined production of power and heat (section E.3.4).
Četrta, zadnja vrsta pomoči za tekoče poslovanje, ki se lahko odobri, je pomoč za kombinirano proizvodnjo električne energije in toplote (oddelek E.3.4).
Some of the generators concerned produce heat and power.
Nekateri zadevni proizvajalci proizvajajo toploto in električno energijo.
However, neither Poland nor any of the concerned producers has demonstrated that these plants fully meet the efficiency criteria laid down in the Environmental Guidelines.
Vendar pa Poljska in zadevni proizvajalci niso dokazali, da te elektrarne v celoti izpolnjujejo merila učinkovitosti, določena v okoljskih smernicah.
Indeed, Poland has provided the Commission with data showing that only a limited part of the production could be deemed to meet these efficiency criteria.
Poljska je Komisiji dejansko predložila podatke, ki kažejo, da je samo omejen del proizvodnje mogoče obravnavati, kot da izpolnjuje ta merila učinkovitosti.
In the Commission's view, this means that aid that covers the whole production of the entities in question cannot be authorised on the basis of these provisions.
Po mnenju Komisije to pomeni, da na podlagi teh določb ni mogoče odobriti pomoči, ki obsega vso proizvodnjo zadevnih subjektov.
Of the documents referred to in recital 312, the only one which could apply in the present case is the Stranded Costs Methodology.
Od dokumentov, navedenih v uvodni izjavi 312, bi se v tem primeru lahko uporabljala samo metodologija za nasedle stroške.
The Stranded Costs Methodology concerns aid granted to incumbents that built power plants prior to liberalisation of the electricity sector and that may have difficulties in operating them in a liberalised market.
Metodologija za nasedle stroške zadeva pomoč, dodeljeno prvotnim družbam, ki so zgradile elektrarne pred liberalizacijo sektorja električne energije in imajo morda težave z njihovim upravljanjem na liberaliziranem trgu.
In the decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission raised a number of doubts as to the possibility of PPAs being authorised on the basis of the Stranded Costs Methodology.
Komisija je v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka izrazila več pomislekov o možnosti, da bi se pogodbe PNE odobrile na podlagi metodologije za nasedle stroške.
One of these doubts arose from the fact that the Stranded Costs Methodology indicates that the Commission entertains the most serious misgivings regarding aid that is intended to safeguard all or some of the income pre-dating the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC, without taking strictly into account the eligible stranded costs that might result from the introduction of competition.
Eden od teh pomislekov izhaja iz dejstva, da metodologija za nasedle stroške kaže, da ima Komisija nadvse resne dvome o pomoči, namenjeni zaščiti vseh ali dela prihodkov, ki izhajajo iz obdobja pred začetkom veljavnosti Direktive 96/92/ES, brez strogega upoštevanja upravičenih nasedlih stroškov, ki bi lahko bili posledica uvedbe konkurence.
The PPAs were precisely designed to safeguard most of the income pre-dating the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC obtained by the power generators and the plants concerned.
Pogodbe PNE so bile zasnovane prav za zaščito večine prihodkov iz obdobja pred začetkom veljavnosti Direktive 96/92/ES, ki so jih pridobili zadevni proizvajalci energije in elektrarne.
Furthermore, they concerned plants with a very important share of the market and for a very long duration, largely exceeding the time necessary for a reasonable transition to the market.
Poleg tega so bile povezane z elektrarnami z zelo pomembnim tržnim deležem in bile sklenjene za zelo dolgo obdobje, ki precej presega čas, potreben za primeren prehod na trg.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that the PPAs are incompatible with the criteria laid down in the Stranded Costs Methodology.
Komisija glede na navedeno ugotavlja, da so pogodbe PNE nezdružljive z merili, določenimi v metodologiji za nasedle stroške.
They go against its fundamental principles, which were designed to enable a progressive but genuine transition to the market.
So v nasprotju z njenimi osnovnimi načeli, ki so bila zasnovana za omogočanje postopnega in dejanskega prehoda na trg.
The interested parties have argued that the PPAs could be authorised directly under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da bi lahko bile pogodbe PNE odobrene neposredno na podlagi člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES.
They indicated that PPAs facilitated the development of the Polish energy sector by attracting foreign investment in modern, environmentally-friendly electricity generation capacity.
Navedle so, da so pogodbe PNE omogočile razvoj poljskega energetskega sektorja s privabljanjem tujih naložb v sodobne, okolju prijazne zmogljivosti za proizvodnjo električne energije.
The Commission notes that the two policy objectives mentioned above: i.e. attracting investment and promoting environmentally-friendly electricity generation capacity, are precisely the policy objectives referred to in the Regional Guidelines and the Environmental Guidelines.
Komisija ugotavlja, da sta navedena cilja politik, torej privabljanje naložb in spodbujanje okolju prijaznih zmogljivosti za proizvodnjo električne energije, popolnoma enaka ciljema politik iz regionalnih smernic in okoljskih smernic.
The Commission has analysed the PPAs in the light of these two sets of guidelines and concluded that they are not compatible with these rules.
Komisija je proučila pogodbe PNE ob upoštevanju teh dveh nizov smernic in ugotovila, da niso združljive s temi pravili.
The Commission takes the view that the possibility of invoking Article 87(3)(c) to authorise the PPAs has been exhausted.
Komisija meni, da so možnosti sklicevanja na člen 87(3)(c) za odobritev pogodb PNE izčrpane.
In view of the above, the Commission concludes that the PPAs are incompatible with the common market.
Komisija na podlagi navedenega ugotavlja, da so pogodbe PNE nezdružljive s skupnim trgom.
The specific case of Żarnowiecka Elektrownia Gazowa Sp. z o.o.
Posebni primer družbe Żarnowiecka Elektrownia Gazowa Sp. z o. o.
The PPA with Żarnowiecka Elektrownia Gazowa Sp. z o.o. was terminated by PSE on 17 May 2006, before construction work on the power plant reached the advanced stage.
PSE je prekinil pogodbo PNE z družbo Żarnowiecka Elektrownia Gazowa Sp. z o. o. 17. maja 2006 pred napredno stopnjo gradbenih del na elektrarni.
Given that the power plant was not operational at the time, it did not benefit from the PPA.
Ker elektrarna v tem obdobju ni delovala, ni imela koristi od pogodbe PNE.
It did not, therefore, benefit from any state aid.
Zato torej ni imela koristi od nikakršne državne pomoči.
The Commission therefore takes the view that this PPA did not provide any aid to Żarnowiecka Elektrownia Gazowa Sp. z o.o.
Komisija zato meni, da ta pogodba PNE družbi Żarnowiecka Elektrownia Gazowa Sp. z o. o. ni zagotovila nikakršne pomoči.
With regard to the Act
V zvezi z Zakonom
The Commission has analysed the four cumulative criteria for the existence of state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je analizirala štiri kumulativna merila za obstoj državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
State resources and imputability to the State
Državna sredstva in pripisovanje državi
The Commission has carried out an analysis to determine the source of the funds to be used for the payments provided for in the Act.
Komisija je opravila analizo, da bi ugotovila vir sredstev, ki naj bi se uporabil za plačila, predvidena v Zakonu.
It concluded that these funds would be the proceeds of a parafiscal levy established by virtue of the same Act.
Ugotovila je, da bi bila ta sredstva prihodek iz davku podobne dajatve, uvedene na podlagi istega zakona.
The levy is imposed on all consumers (Article 8 of the Act), the amount thereof being contingent on the size and characteristics of their connection to the grid (Articles 10 and 11 of the Act).
Dajatev se zaračuna vsem odjemalcem (člen 8 Zakona), njen znesek pa je odvisen od velikosti in lastnosti njihovega priključka v omrežje (člena 10 in 11 Zakona).
The amount of the levy is established by the URE (Article 12 of the Act).
Znesek dajatve določi URE (člen 12 Zakona).
The proceeds of the levy collected by suppliers are paid into an account in the name of Zarządca Rozliczeń S.A. This is a special purpose company, fully owned and controlled by the State, founded under Chapter 7 of the Act.
Prihodki od dajatve, ki jih poberejo dobavitelji, se vplačajo na račun na ime družbe Zarządca Rozliczeń S. A. To je družba s posebnim namenom v celoti v lasti in pod nadzorom države, ustanovljena v skladu s poglavjem 7 Zakona.
Zarządca Rozliczeń S.A uses the funds to make payments to eligible generators pursuant to Chapter 4 of the Act, under the administrative supervision of URE.
Družba Zarządca Rozliczeń S. A. ta sredstva pod upravnim nadzorom URE uporabi za izplačila upravičenim proizvajalcem v skladu s poglavjem 4 Zakona.
The Commission has analysed the characteristics of this levy in the light of its decision-making practice and Court of Justice case-law.
Komisija je proučila značilnosti te dajatve ob upoštevanju svoje prakse odločanja in sodne prakse Sodišča.
It made the following observations.
Sprejela je naslednje ugotovitve.
First, the levy is a mandatory contribution which is imposed on all consumers by the state.
Prvič, dajatev je obvezni prispevek, ki ga država naloži vsem odjemalcem.
Second, the proceeds of the levy are paid into an account in the name of Zarządca Rozliczeń S.A. Of the seven members of Zarządca Rozliczeń S.A's supervisory board, four, including the Chairman, are nominated by ministers, two are nominated by presidents of public bodies (URE and the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection) and one is nominated by the General Assembly of Shareholders, i.e. by PSE.
Drugič, prihodki od dajatve se vplačajo na račun na ime družbe Zarządca Rozliczeń S. A. Štiri od sedmih članov nadzornega sveta družbe Zarządca Rozliczeń S. A., vključno s predsednikom, imenujejo ministri, dva imenujeta predsednika javnih organov (URE in Urad za varstvo konkurence in potrošnikov), enega pa generalna skupščina delničarjev, torej PSE.
The Commission concludes that Zarządca Rozliczeń S.A is fully under state control.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je družba Zarządca Rozliczeń S. A. popolnoma pod državnim nadzorom.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Zarządca Rozliczeń S.A operates under the aegis of URE, which is a state body.
To ugotovitev potrjuje dejstvo, da družba Zarządca Rozliczeń S. A. deluje pod pokroviteljstvom URE, ki je državni organ.
The proceeds of the levy are therefore managed by a body which is completely controlled by the State.
Prihodke od dajatve torej upravlja organ, ki je popolnoma pod državnim nadzorom.
Third, Zarządca Rozliczeń S.A uses the funds raised to make payments to the benefit of certain generators, in accordance with the provisions adopted by the state in the Act.
Tretjič, družba Zarządca Rozliczeń zbrana sredstva uporabi za izplačila v korist določenih proizvajalcev v skladu z določbami, ki jih je v Zakonu sprejela država.
In accordance with the Act, Zarządca Rozliczeń S.A. disburses the funds to power generators to cover stranded costs in the form of advances for such costs for a given year and in the form of annual adjustments.
V skladu z zakonom družba Zarządca Rozliczeń S. A. proizvajalcem energije izplača sredstva za kritje nasedlih stroškov v obliki predplačil za take stroške za določeno leto in v obliki letnih prilagoditev.
From the three observations above, the Commission concludes that the proceeds of the levy constitute state resources.
Komisija na podlagi teh treh ugotovitev sklepa, da so prihodki od dajatve državna sredstva.
The Act provides for payments to the power plants that opt to apply its mechanism.
Zakon predvideva izplačila elektrarnam, ki se odločijo za uporabo njegovega mehanizma.
These power plants will receive the payments in exchange for terminating their PPA with PSE.
Te elektrarne bodo prejela izplačila v zameno za prekinitev svojih pogodb PNE s PSE.
Payments under the Act allow the entitled power plants to alleviate the burden of costs incurred.
Izplačila v skladu z Zakonom upravičenim elektrarnam omogočajo zmanjšanje obremenitve zaradi nastalih stroškov.
The formula for calculating these payments provides in particular for the state to cover the losses associated with certain types of cost, plus depreciation and fuel costs, if the revenue collected on the market is not sufficient for that purpose, subject to certain conditions which are likely to be fulfilled in a normal economic scenario.
Formula za izračun teh izplačil določa predvsem, da država pokrije izgube, povezane z nekaterimi vrstami stroškov, plus stroške amortizacije in goriva, če prihodek s trga ne zadošča za to, pod določenimi pogoji, ki bi bili verjetno izpolnjeni v običajnih gospodarskih okoliščinah.
This implies that state payments cover the costs normally borne by generators under normal market conditions.
To pomeni, da državna izplačila krijejo stroške, ki jih v običajnih tržnih pogojih po navadi nosijo proizvajalci.
These payments therefore constitute an economic advantage.
Ta izplačila torej pomenijo gospodarsko prednost.
The interested parties argue that the payments do not constitute an advantage because they are only fair compensation for the termination of the PPAs.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da izplačila ne pomenijo prednosti, ker so samo primerno nadomestilo za prenehanje pogodb PNE.
This reasoning is based on the premise that the PPAs themselves do not constitute an economic advantage, which is not the case, as was explained in point 7.1.1.
Ta argument temelji na premisi, da same pogodbe PNE ne pomenijo gospodarske prednosti, kar pa v tem primeru ne drži, kot je pojasnjeno v točki 7.1.1.
Since the beneficiaries of the Act are the same power plants that benefit from the PPAs, the same reasoning as set out in recitals 254 to 257 applies.
Ker so upravičenci v skladu z Zakonom iste elektrarne, ki imajo koristi od pogodb PNE, veljajo isti argumenti, kot so navedeni v uvodnih izjavah od 254 do 257.
The Act provides an advantage to many companies operating on the energy production market.
Zakon zagotavlja prednost številnim družbam, ki delujejo na trgu proizvodnje električne energije.
This market is liberalised in the EU.
Ta trg je v EU liberaliziran.
This is especially true for Poland, which is centrally located in Europe and is connected, or easily connectable to, several Member States.
To drži zlasti za Poljsko, ki ima osrednjo lego v Evropi in je povezana ali se zlahka poveže z več državami članicami.
The competitive advantage resulting from the Act may distort competition and affect trade between Member States
Konkurenčna prednost, ki izhaja iz Zakona, bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco in vplivala na trgovino med državami članicami.
In the light of the above, the Commission takes the view that the compensation system provided for in the Act constitutes state aid.
Na podlagi navedenega Komisija meni, da sistem nadomestil, ki ga predvideva Zakon, pomeni državno pomoč.
Award of aid in accordance with the law
Dodelitev pomoči v skladu z zakonodajo
In addition, under Article 22(4) of the Act, the first instalment of the advance to cover stranded costs is paid to the eligible power generators by the fifth day of the month after a period of 120 days has elapsed, starting on the day on which the early termination of the PPAs took place by virtue of the terminating agreements.
Poleg tega se skladno s členom 22(4) Zakona prvi obrok predplačila za pokritje nasedlih stroškov upravičenim proizvajalcem energije izplača do petega dne v mesecu po izteku 120-dnevnega obdobja, ki se začne na dan, ko na podlagi sporazumov o prenehanju pogodb PNE predčasno prenehajo.
In the light of the above, the date on which the Act enters into force cannot be deemed to be the date on which aid is granted to the power generators, i.e. the date on which the beneficiary received a legally binding aid authorisation.
Glede na navedeno datuma začetka veljavnosti Zakona ni mogoče šteti za datum, na katerega je pomoč dodeljena proizvajalcem energije, torej datum, na katerega je bila upravičencu pravno zavezujoče odobrena pomoč.
The Commission therefore does not take the view that the entry into force of the Act prior to the adoption of this Decision constitutes a failure to comply with the obligation referred to in Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija se zato ne strinja, da začetek veljavnosti Zakona pred sprejetjem te odločbe pomeni neizpolnjevanje obveznosti iz člena 88(3) Pogodbe ES.
Article 87(3)(c) provides for the authorisation of state aid to facilitate the development of certain economic sectors, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Člen 87(3)(c) določa, da se lahko odobri državna pomoč za pospeševanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih sektorjev, kadar taka pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
The Stranded Costs Methodology is designed to analyse aid granted to incumbents in the electricity sector in a context where certain decisions taken by these incumbents prior to liberalisation no longer make business sense after liberalisation.
Metodologija za nasedle stroške je zasnovana za analiziranje pomoči, dodeljene prvotnim družbam v elektroenergetskem sektorju v okoliščinah, v katerih nekatere odločitve, ki so jih te prvotne družbe sprejele pred liberalizacijo, po liberalizaciji niso več poslovno upravičene.
It also addresses the consequences of long-term gas purchase contracts concluded by gas-fired generators.
Nanaša se tudi na posledice dolgoročnih kupoprodajnih pogodb za plin, ki so jih sklenile plinske elektrarne.
The Commission therefore takes the view that the aid falls within the remit of the Stranded Costs Methodology.
Komisija zato meni, da pomoč spada v okvir metodologije za nasedle stroške.
Accordingly, it analysed the aid in the light of the Methodology.
Skladno s tem je pomoč proučila na podlagi te metodologije.
The Stranded Costs Methodology provides for a two-stage assessment of aid earmarked for compensation of stranded costs.
Metodologija za nasedle stroške predvideva dvostopenjsko oceno pomoči, namenjeno nadomestilu za nasedle stroške.
The first stage, which is referred to in section 3 of the Methodology, concerns the definition of eligible costs, which involves in particular calculating the maximum compensation that can be awarded.
Prva stopnja iz oddelka 3 metodologije se nanaša na opredelitev upravičenih stroškov, ki vključuje predvsem izračun najvišjega nadomestila, ki se lahko dodeli.
The second stage, which is dealt with in section 4 of the Methodology, concerns the mechanism for calculating the actual compensation to be paid for the stranded costs, taking the development of competition on the market into account.
Druga stopnja, ki je obravnavana v oddelku 4 metodologije, se nanaša na mehanizem izračuna dejanskega nadomestila, ki se izplača za upravičene stroške, ob upoštevanju razvoja konkurence na trgu.
The Commission first analysed whether the aid met the conditions laid down in 3.1 to 3.12 of the Stranded Costs Methodology.
Komisija je najprej proučila, ali pomoč izpolnjuje pogoje iz točk od 3.1 do 3.12 metodologije za nasedle stroške.
Under point 3.1 of the Stranded Costs Methodology, maximum compensation payments take account only of investments completed before the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC in Poland, i.e. the date on which Poland joined the EU, and of the volume of gas contracted in accordance with the take or pay rule before that date.
V skladu s točko 3.1 metodologije za nasedle stroške se pri najvišjem izplačilu nadomestila upoštevajo samo naložbe, uresničene pred začetkom veljavnosti Direktive 96/92/ES na Poljskem, torej datumom pristopa Poljske k EU, in količina plina, za katero je bila sklenjena pogodba v skladu s pravilom „vzemi ali plačaj“ pred tem datumom.