natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To continue the business operation of Austrian Airlines, it is therefore necessary to retain its headquarters in Austria.
Za nadaljevanje poslovanja Austrian Airlines naj bi bilo zato treba njegovo centralo za odločanje pustiti v Avstriji.
The Austrian authorities state that, in the case of previous mergers in the aviation sector (SWISS/Sabena and Air France/KLM), comparable models were chosen to obtain an operating licence.
Avstrijski organi navajajo, da naj bi bili pri predhodnih združevanjih v letalskem sektorju – SWISS/Sabena in Air France/KLM – izbrani primerljivi modeli za pridobitev operativne licence.
The model is therefore a structure known and accepted in the sector.
Model naj bi bil zato znana in sprejeta struktura v tej panogi.
Given the legal framework, none of the bidders for Austrian Airlines questioned that the headquarters should remain in Austria and this fact was therefore taken into account accordingly in the acquisition concepts and had no influence on the purchase price.
Zaradi regulativnega okvira naj ne bi nihče od ponudnikov za Austrian Airlines dvomil o dejstvu, da je treba centralo za odločanje ohraniti v Avstriji, tako da naj bi bilo to dejstvo v prevzemnih konceptih ustrezno upoštevano in naj ne bi vplivalo na nakupno ceno.
Ensuring an Austrian core shareholder structure of 25 % plus one share
Ohranitev avstrijske strukture glavnega delničarja v višini 25 % in ene delnice
The Austrian authorities point out that this condition was based on the requirements of bilateral aviation agreements as provided for by Austrian law.
Avstrijski organi opozarjajo, da naj bi ta pogoj temeljil na zahtevah dvostranskih sporazumov o letalskih prevozih v skladu z avstrijskim pravom.
Retaining take-off, landing and route rights under bilateral aviation agreements is, in many cases, linked to the exercise of substantial ownership rights and effective control by persons of a certain nationality.
Pogoj za ohranitev pravic do vzleta, pristanka in linij naj bi bil na podlagi dvostranskih sporazumov o letalskih prevozih v številnih primerih izvrševanje substancialnih lastninskih pravic in dejanski nadzor oseb določene narodnosti.
For an Austrian-registered airline, substantial ownership means that Austrian citizens or Austrian undertakings must own the majority of the airline for the bilateral aviation agreements to remain applicable.
V primeru letalskega prevoznika, ki je registriran v Avstriji, naj bi substancialno lastništvo pomenilo, da morajo biti za nadaljnjo veljavnost dvostranskih sporazumov o letalskih prevozih večinski lastniki letalskega prevoznika avstrijski državljani ali avstrijska podjetja.
If Austrian majority ownership no longer exists, the third country may revoke the take-off, landing and route rights.
Če večinsko lastništvo ni več avstrijsko, naj bi tretja država lahko odvzela pravice do vzleta, pristanka in linij.
Section 9(2) of the ÖIAG Act states that ÖIAG must retain such influence within the framework of the management of its shareholding to allow it, either on the basis of holding a stake of 25 % plus one share in the voting share capital or on the basis of rights or contracts with third parties, to participate in decisions taken by the General Assembly, which, under the Stock Corporation Act, require at least a three-quarters majority.
Na podlagi člena 9(2) Zakona o ÖIAG (ÖIAG-Gesetz) naj bi moral ÖIAG v okviru svoje udeležbe pri upravljanju ohraniti vsak vpliv, ki mu omogoča, da na podlagi udeležbe v višini 25 % in ene delnice v osnovnem kapitalu z glasovalno pravico ali na podlagi pravic ali pogodb s tretjimi osebami soodloča o sklepih skupščine, za katere je v skladu z zakonom o delnicah potrebna vsaj tričetrtinska večina.
On the basis of the privatisation mandate, ÖIAG was faced with a choice between reducing its shareholding in Austrian Airlines to 25 % plus one share and accepting a transaction structure from bidders which would guarantee an Austrian core shareholder structure of 25 % plus one share.
Na podlagi pooblastila za privatizacijo naj bi se ÖIAG moral odločiti, da zmanjša svojo udeležbo v Austrian Airlines na 25 % in eno delnico ali da od ponudnikov sprejme strukturo transakcije, ki zagotavlja avstrijsko strukturo glavnega delničarja v višini 25 % in ene delnice.
Accordingly, at the meetings that took place with the bidders, they were invited to propose such transaction structures.
Skladno s tem naj bi se ponudniki v pogovorih pozvali, naj predlagajo take strukture transakcije.
None of the bidders raised fundamental objections to the structure.
Nihče od ponudnikov načeloma naj ne bi ugovarjal tej strukturi.
Austria is of the opinion that the takeover of Austrian Airlines by non-Austrians would result in the cancellation of certain bilateral agreements and therefore in the loss of take-off and landing rights and flight rights for routes operated by Austrian Airlines under those international agreements.
Avstrija trdi, da bi bili določeni dvostranski sporazumi razveljavljeni in bi bile tako izgubljene pravice do vzleta in pristanka ter poletov na progah Austrian Airlines, ki so določene v teh mednarodnopravnih sporazumih, če bi Austrian Airlines prevzeli neavstrijski državljani.
Austrian Airlines’ business model, which is based on transport routes to non-Community countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, means that such bilateral agreements are of essential economic importance.
Zaradi poslovnega modela Austrian Airlines, ki naj bi temeljil na povezavah z državami zunaj Skupnosti v srednji in vzhodni Evropi ter državami na srednjem vzhodu in v osrednji Aziji, naj bi bil gospodarski pomen takih dvostranskih sporazumov bistven.
However, as the privatisation mandate provided for the divestiture of all of ÖIAG’s shares, it was only on the basis of the transaction structure proposed by all bidders (an Austrian registered private foundation) that ÖIAG was able to sell its shares in Austrian Airlines while retaining, for the airline, the valuable traffic rights in question and carrying out a complete privatisation.
Ker naj bi bila v pooblastilu za privatizacijo predvidena odsvojitev celotne udeležbe ÖIAG, naj bi lahko ÖIAG samo na podlagi transakcijske strukture (zasebna ustanova, registrirana v Avstriji), ki jo predlagajo vsi ponudniki, prodal svoje deleže v Austrian Airlines in hkrati pridobil zadevne dragocene pravice za opravljanje poletov za letalskega prevoznika ter izvedel celotno privatizacijo.
The Austrian authorities are of the opinion that requiring an Austrian core shareholder structure was essential in order to retain key rights and had no impact on the price achieved.
Avstrijski organi menijo, da se pogoju avstrijske strukture glavnega delničarja ni bilo mogoče odpovedati, če naj bi se ohranile bistvene pravice, in da naj ta pogoj ne bi imel nobenega vpliva na doseženo ceno.
The solution put in place to address this issue is similarly cost neutral.
Rešitev, sprejeta za rešitev tega vprašanja, naj bi bila enako stroškovno nevtralna.
Creating a committee to protect Austria’s interests
Ustanovitev odbora za varstvo avstrijskih lokalnih interesov
The Austrian authorities submit that this type of committee, which is not involved in the decision-making processes of Austrian Airlines, is commonly found in the industry and has never yet been objected to by the Commission in comparable cases [18].
Avstrijski organi navajajo, da naj bi bil tak odbor, ki ni udeležen v odločanju Austrian Airlines, v tej panogi sploh nekaj običajnega, čemur naj Komisija v primerljivih primerih ne bi nikoli ugovarjala.
There can be no influence on the purchase price, as the body in question has only an advisory character and has no de jure or de facto influence on the company.
Vpliv na nakupno ceno naj ne bi bil mogoč, saj naj bi bil zadevni odbor samo posvetovalne narave in naj ne bi imel pravnega ali dejanskega vpliva na podjetje.
In particular, the body has no veto or codetermination rights.
Odbor naj zlasti ne bi imel pravice veta ali soodločanja.
Furthermore, the requirement for such a committee to be set up was not raised as problematic by any of the bidders in the privatisation process.
Nihče od ponudnikov v postopku privatizacije naj poleg tega zahteve po takem odboru ne bi označil kot sporne.
The purchase price corresponds to the market price
Nakupna cena je tržna cena
The Austrian authorities submit that, in the current economic situation, only a negative purchase price could be achieved.
Avstrijski organi navajajo, da je bilo v sedanjem gospodarskem položaju mogoče doseči samo negativno nakupno ceno.
In addition to the shares to be bought from the State, Lufthansa wishes to buy the free float to take control of the whole undertaking.
Lufthansa želi poleg delnic, ki jih mora pridobiti od države, za nadzor celotnega podjetja pridobiti tudi delnice v prostem obtoku.
The price of the free float in such a takeover offer is legally determined under the Austrian Takeover Act.
Cena deležev v prostem obtoku naj bi se pri taki prevzemni ponudbi pravno določila na podlagi avstrijskega zakona o prevzemih (Übernahmegesetz).
In the opinion of the Austrian authorities, the valuation of the State’s shareholding must be seen in the light of the total purchase price of the transaction, which is made up of the purchase price achieved by ÖIAG in the bidding process and the costs of the takeover of the free float in accordance with the law.
Avstrijski organi menijo, da je treba oceno državnih deležev videti ob upoštevanju celotne nakupne cene transakcije, ki izhaja iz nakupne cene, ki jo je ÖIAG dosegel v razpisnem postopku, in stroškov prevzema deležev v prostem obtoku na podlagi zakonskih določb.
The Austrian Takeover Act stipulates that the takeover price must correspond to at least the average stock market price for the stock concerned, weighted according to the respective trading volumes, over the six months preceding the day on which the intention to submit an offer was publicly announced [20].
V skladu z avstrijskim zakonom o prevzemih mora prevzemna cena ustrezati vsaj povprečnemu borznemu tečaju zadevnega udeležbenega vrednostnega papirja v zadnjih šestih mesecih pred dnem objave namena o oddaji ponudbe, ponderiranemu v skladu s konkretnim obsegom trgovanja [20].
The takeover price offered by Lufthansa to the free-float shareholders is EUR 4,49 and is thus in line with the requirements of the Austrian Takeover Act.
Prevzemna cena, ki jo je Lufthansa ponudila lastnikom delnic v prostem obtoku, je 4,49 EUR in tako izpolnjuje zahteve avstrijskega zakona o prevzemih.
In the opinion of the Austrian authorities, the takeover price in the takeover offer is distorted. It does not reflect the true economic value of Austrian Airlines but results from the provisions of the Takeover Act [21].
Avstrijski organi menijo, da je prevzemna cena iz ponudbe o prevzemu izkrivljena in ne odseva prave gospodarske vrednosti Austrian Airlines, temveč izhaja iz določb zakona o prevzemih.
These large fluctuations in Austrian Airlines’ share price are the result of speculation, and there is no correlation whatsoever with the actual value of the company.
Ta močna nihanja tečaja delnic Austrian Airlines naj bi bila rezultat špekulacij in naj ne bi bila nikakor povezana z dejansko vrednostjo podjetja.
Another reason why Lufthansa had to make an attractive offer to the floating shareholders was that Lufthansa is aiming to obtain full control of Austrian Airlines.
Drugi razlog, zaradi katerega naj bi morala Lufthansa lastnikom delnic v prostem obtoku dati privlačno ponudbo, naj bi bilo dejstvo, da naj bi Lufthansa nameravala doseči absolutni nadzor nad Austrian Airlines.
Lufthansa intends to acquire 90 % of Austrian Airlines, as reaching this threshold will enable a ‘squeeze out’ and hence a takeover of 100 % of the business shares.
Lufthansa naj bi nameravala pridobiti 90 % Austrian Airlines, saj naj bi dosega tega praga omogočala „squeeze out“ (iztisnitev) in s tem prevzem 100-odstotnega poslovnega deleža.
It would be easier for Lufthansa to implement its plans as sole shareholder, as the decision-making process would be easier.
Če bi bila Lufthansa edina delničarka, bi lažje uresničevala svoje načrte, saj bi bilo sprejemanje odločitev preprostejše.
Furthermore, Lufthansa would retain all the benefits of its planned investments.
Poleg tega bi koristila vse prednosti načrtovanih naložb.
The Austrian authorities point out that selling at a negative purchase price is permissible under Community law.
Avstrijski organi opozarjajo, da naj bi bila prodaja po negativni nakupni ceni v skladu s pravom Skupnosti dovoljena.
The Commission has confirmed in several decisions [22] that a ‘symbolic’ or ‘negative’ purchase price that is the result of a privatisation process complying with the requirements of the XXIIIrd Competition Report or is based on a value appraisal is not deemed to be State aid.
Komisija naj bi v več odločbah [22] potrdila, da se „simbolične“ ali „negativne“ nakupne cene, ki je rezultat postopka privatizacije, ki izpolnjuje zahteve XXIII. poročila o konkurenci ali temelji na oceni, ne sme obravnavati kot državno pomoč.
In the opinion of the Austrian authorities, the price offered by Lufthansa is the maximum achievable market price.
Avstrijski organi menijo, da je cena, ki jo je ponudila Lufthansa, najvišja cena, ki jo je mogoče doseči na trgu.
It should also be remembered that both Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines are members of the Star Alliance.
Pomisliti naj bi bilo treba tudi na to, da sta Lufthansa in Austrian Airlines člana Star Alliance.
Bidders that are not part of the Star Alliance (Air France/KLM and S7) would therefore have had to factor the additional cost of changing alliance into their offer.
Ponudniki, ki niso člani Star Alliance (Air France/KLM in S7), bi zato morali v ponudbo vključiti dodatne stroške menjave zveze letalskih ponudnikov.
The Austrian authorities submit that these costs could amount to EUR […].
Avstrijski organi navajajo, da bi ti stroški lahko znašali […] EUR.
The Austrian authorities go on to state that the offer submitted by S7 (although not binding) foresaw a […] price. They stress that, based on past Commission decisions [23], a competitor’s offer constitutes a good benchmark for calculating the market value of a company.
Avstrijski organi navajajo še, da je bila v (čeprav nezavezujoči) ponudbi, ki jo je predložil S7, določena cena […], in poudarjajo, da naj bi bila v skladu s prakso odločanja Komisije [23] ponudba konkurenta dober kazalnik za izračun tržne vrednosti podjetja.
In relation to the debtor warrant, the authorities explain that the maximum disbursement amount under the warrant is EUR 164,1 million, made up of […] [24].
Avstrijski organi glede naloga za plačilo dolgov pojasnjujejo, da naj bi maksimalno plačilo iz tega naloga znašalo 164,1 milijona EUR in […] [24].
ÖIAG acted as market economy investor
Ravnanje ÖIAG kot vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu
In the opinion of the Austrian authorities, ÖIAG’s decision to sell Austrian Airlines for a negative purchase price would also have been taken by a private investor [25] guided by the prospects of longer term profitability, as the negative purchase price was significantly less costly than the alternative scenarios.
Avstrijski organi menijo, da bi odločitev ÖIAG o prodaji Austrian Airlines po negativni nakupni ceni sprejel tudi zasebni vlagatelj [25], ki ima za cilj dolgoročnejšo sposobnost preživetja, saj naj bi negativna nakupna cena povzročila precej nižje stroške kot drugi mogoči scenariji.
The insolvency of Austrian Airlines would have led to significant losses in the value of other holdings of the Republic of Austria.
Stečaj Austrian Airlines bi povzročil večje izgube vrednosti drugih udeležb Republike Avstrije.
Furthermore, ÖIAG would have had to bear the costs of a social plan.
Poleg tega bi moral ÖIAG nositi stroške socialnega načrta.
The other conceivable alternative scenarios, i.e. a controlled winding-up of Austrian Airlines or continuation on a stand-alone basis, would also have led to costs higher than the negative purchase price.
Drugi mogoči scenariji, ki si jih je mogoče zamisliti, to sta nadzorovana likvidacija Austrian Airlines ali nadaljevanje ob ohranitvi samostojnosti, bi prav tako povzročili stroške, ki bi bili višji od negativne nakupne cene.
Costs relating to the insolvency of Austrian Airlines
Stroški stečaja Austrian Airlines
In the opinion of the Austrian authorities, the costs incurred by ÖIAG as a result of the insolvency of Austrian Airlines would have been considerably higher than the negative purchase price. The insolvency of Austrian Airlines could have provoked a massive drop in the value of other State holdings.
Avstrijski organi menijo, bi bili stroški ÖIAG, ki bi bili posledica stečaja Austrian Airlines, precej višji od negativne nakupne cene: stečaj bi lahko povzročil masivno izgubo vrednosti drugih državnih udeležb.
The Austrian authorities cite an analysis conducted by Merrill Lynch, according to which the insolvency of Austrian Airlines could have resulted in the deterioration of the ratings of other State-owned ‘sister companies’, leading to higher refinancing costs and share price losses.
Avstrijski organi navajajo analizo, ki jo je izvedlo podjetje Merrill Lynch, na podlagi katere bi stečaj Austrian Airlines lahko poslabšal boniteto drugih „sestrskih podjetij“ v državni lasti, posledica česar bi bili višji stroški refinanciranja in izgube vrednosti delniških tečajev.
The ‘sister companies’ would be affected by an expected downgrading of their ratings regardless of the fact that ÖIAG has only a minority shareholding in Austrian Airlines [26].
Pričakovano znižanje stopnje bonitete naj bi „sestrskim podjetjem“ škodovalo, ne glede na to, da ima ÖIAG samo manjšinsko udeležbo v Austrian Airlines [26].
Such share price losses do not stem from legal or voluntarily assumed obligations but are direct consequences of the insolvency of Austrian Airlines.
Take izgube vrednosti delniških tečajev naj ne bi izhajale iz pravnih ali prostovoljno prevzetih obveznosti, temveč naj bi bile neposredne posledice stečaja Austrian Airlines.
The Austrian authorities are therefore of the opinion that a private investor would also provide a subsidiary with capital if the share price losses to be expected exceed the costs incurred by avoiding the insolvency of that subsidiary.
Avstrijski organi zato menijo, da bi tudi zasebni vlagatelj zagotovil kapital hčerinskemu podjetju, če bi obseg pričakovanih izgub vrednosti tečajev presegel stroške, ki bi nastali s preprečitvijo stečaja hčerinskega podjetja.
According to the analysis conducted by Merrill Lynch, such losses in value could amount to approximately EUR […] for ÖIAG’s holdings (OMV AG, Post AG, Telekom Austria AG) alone. […] In view of the above, it is likely that the overall share price losses for the beneficial owner, namely the Republic of Austria (EUR […]), would greatly exceed the negative purchase price.
Na podlagi analize, ki jo je izvedel Merrill Lynch, bi samo udeležbe ÖIAG (OMV AG, Post AG, Telekom Austria AG) lahko izgubile vrednost v višini približno […] EUR. […] Glede na to naj bi bilo verjetno, da bi skupne izgube vrednosti delniških tečajev gospodarskega lastnika, Republike Avstrije (v višini […] EUR), precej presegle negativno nakupno ceno.
The Austrian authorities argue that rating agencies stress the fact that subsidiaries’ credit ratings benefit from the ownership support of their private parent company.
Bonitetne agencije so v skladu z navedbami avstrijskih organov poudarile dejstvo, da naj bi bila podpora lastnikov zasebne matične družbe v korist boniteti njenih hčerinskih podjetij.
The example they provide is the fact that Hypovereinsbank’s rating was increased by three notches to reflect its 100 % ownership by UniCredit.
Primer, ki ga navajajo, je zvišanje stopnje bonitete Hypovereinsbank za tri stopnje, ki naj bi kazalo 100-odstotno lastništvo s strani UniCredit.
In addition, they provide further examples of cases in which a rating downgrade of the parent company has led to a corresponding downgrade for its subsidiaries (see table below).
Poleg tega navajajo druge primere, v katerih naj bi znižanje stopnje bonitete matičnega podjetja povzročilo ustrezno znižanje stopnje bonitete hčerinskih podjetij (glej spodnjo preglednico).
Examples of rating downgrades for subsidiaries following a rating downgrade of a parent company
Primeri znižanja stopnje bonitete hčerinskega podjetja po znižanju stopnje bonitete matičnega podjetja
Parent company
Matična podjetja
Subsidiary
Hčerinska podjetja
Rating downgrade (Standard & Poor’s)
Znižanje stopnje bonitete (Standard & Poor‘s)
22 June 2007
junij 2007
from A to A–
Od A na A–
from A– to BBB+
Od A– na BBB+
18 March 2009
marec 2009
from A+ to A
Od A+ na A
As ÖIAG and its holding companies — Telekom Austria AG, Österreichische Post AG and OMV AG — are widely known in Austria, any impact on industrial peace and brand image would be far-reaching.
Ker naj bi bili ÖIAG in podjetja, v katerih ima ÖIAG udeležbo, to so Telekom Austria AG, Österreichische Post AG in OMV AG, v Avstriji zelo znani, bi imela vsaka kalitev miru v podjetju in vsako škodovanje ugledu blagovne znamke velike posledice.
A private investor finding itself in ÖIAG’s position would therefore assume the costs of a social plan in the event of Austrian Airlines becoming insolvent, even if it were under no legal obligation to do so.
Zasebni vlagatelj v položaju ÖIAG bi zato v primeru stečaja Austrian Airlines prevzel stroške socialnega načrta, tudi če k temu ne bi bil pravno zavezan.
In the opinion of the Austrian authorities, the cost of a hypothetical social plan corresponds to the amount that would arise under this heading in the event of liquidation.
Avstrijski organi menijo, da bi stroški domnevnega socialnega načrta ustrezali znesku, ki bi nastal pod to postavko pri likvidaciji.
On the whole, the employees would therefore not be worse off than in the event of an orderly liquidation with a social plan.
Zato zaposleni skupno ne bi bili na slabšem kot v primeru nadzorovane likvidacije s socialnim načrtom.
The Austrian authorities estimate these voluntary social costs as EUR […] for the Austrian Airlines Group (Austrian Airlines EUR […] and Tyrolean EUR […]) after deduction of the payments made by the Austrian Insolvency Remuneration Fund (see table below).
Avstrijski organi te prostovoljne socialne stroške skupine Austrian Airlines po odbitku plačil avstrijskega sklada za izplačilo plač v primeru stečaja ocenjujejo na […] EUR (Austrian Airlines […] EUR in Tyrolean […] EUR) (glej spodnjo preglednico).
Employee-related liabilities to be assumed by ÖIAG in the event of insolvency of the Austrian Airlines Group
Obveznosti, ki bi jih moral prevzeti ÖIAG za zaposlene v primeru stečaja skupine Austrian Airlines
Employee-related liabilities in the event of insolvency of the Austrian Airlines Group
Obveznosti za zaposlene v primeru stečaja skupine Austrian Airlines
Severance payments in accordance with legal obligations and collective bargaining agreements
Odpravnine v skladu z zakonskimi določbami in kolektivnimi pogodbami
Accrual of annual leave
Regres za letni dopust
Other employee-related costs
Drugi stroški za zaposlene
Social plan
Socialni načrt
Pension claims
Pokojninski zahtevki
Total employee-related liabilities
Skupne obveznosti za zaposlene
Payments by the Austrian Insolvency Remuneration Fund
Plačila avstrijskega sklada za izplačilo plač v primeru stečaja
Total liabilities to be assumed by ÖIAG
Skupne obveznosti, ki bi jih moral prevzeti ÖIAG
Costs of an orderly winding-up of Austrian Airlines
Stroški nadzorovane likvidacije Austrian Airlines
In this regard, the Austrian authorities estimate the total liquidation costs to be in the region of EUR […], of which some EUR […] (estimate based on the average employee-related liabilities) relate to the social plan for former employees.
Avstrijski organi skupne stroške likvidacije ocenjujejo na […] EUR, od katerih se približno […] EUR (ocena na podlagi povprečnih obveznosti za zaposlene) nanaša na socialni načrt za nekdanje zaposlene.
Other costs would result from the dissolution of agreements, of which […].
Drugi stroški naj bi bili posledica razdrtja sporazumov, od katerih naj bi […] zadevalo […].