natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On the basis of the abovementioned, the true nature of this guarantee is proven (as a condition necessary to the transaction and common under market rules), as well as its binding character, on the basis of all the procedures preceding privatisation but also of the Sale-Purchase Agreement of the shares of HSY of 11.10.2001 itself, which was subsequently followed by the Sale-Purchase Agreement of the shares of ETVA of 18.10.2001 and the First Amending Act of 18.3.2002 between ETVA and the Greek State.
Vse to dokazuje pravo naravo poroštva (kot pogoj, potreben za transakcijo in običajen v okviru tržnih pravil), kakor tudi njegovo zavezujočo lastnost, na podlagi vseh postopkov, ki so bili opravljeni pred privatizacijo, pa tudi na podlagi Sporazuma o prodaji in nakupu delnic podjetja HSY z dne 11. oktobra 2001, ki sta mu sledila Sporazum o prodaji in nakupu delnic banke ETVA z dne 18. oktobra 2001 ter prvi Akt o spremembi z dne 18. marca 2002 med banko ETVA in grško državo.
The fundamental point, however, is — and this is emphatically stressed — that the condition on the guarantee is included in the entire procedure of denationalisation and is not stipulated for the first time after the conclusion of the contract.
Bistvo pa je – kar je posebej poudarjeno –, da je pogoj v zvezi s poroštvom vključen v celoten postopek denacionalizacije in ni bil prvič naveden po sklenitvi pogodbe.
It does not, therefore, constitute a last-minute “invention”, as the complainant desires to show, whose aim is circumventing the Community Rules on the legality of State aid.
Zato ne predstavlja „izuma“ v zadnjem hipu, kot bi rad prikazal pritožnik, katerega cilj je izogniti se pravilom Skupnosti o zakonitosti državnih pomoči.
The Greek State as a seller of the shares of ETVA ought to, not only at the time of the contract of 18.10.2001, but also according to law, to transfer to Bank Piraeus its shares in ETVA free from any obligation.
Grška država bi morala kot prodajalka delnic banke ETVA ne samo v času sklenitve pogodbe 18. oktobra 2001, temveč tudi v skladu z zakonom na banko Piraeus Bank prenesti svoje delnice banke ETVA brez vsakih obveznosti.
Given that Bank of Piraeus had no involvement in the procedure of the denationalisation of HSY, it should be, according to law and transaction customs, secured against any obligation emanating from the contract of transferring HSY to which it was not participating.
Ker banka Piraeus Bank ni bila nikakor vključena v postopek denacionalizacije podjetja HSY, bi morala v skladu z zakonom in običaji pri transakcijah imeti varščino za vsako obveznost, ki bi izhajala iz pogodbe o prenosu podjetja HSY, pri čemer ni sodelovala.
The Greek State gave it since it had a contractual obligation, acting towards Bank Piraeus as a party to a contract, i.e. as a fiscus, and not as an agent of public power.’The Commission recalls that at the time of that letter, Greece, commenting on Elefsis’ allegation that the guarantee constituted aid to HDW/Ferrostaal, wished to show that this guarantee did not constitute an advantage selectively granted to HDW/Ferrostaal but was offered to all the bidders (including Elefsis) that participated in the privatisation process of HSY.
Grška država ga je izdala, saj je bila pogodbeno zavezana banki Piraeus Bank kot stranki v pogodbi, tj. kot osebni finančnik in ne kot posrednik z javnimi pooblastili.“Komisija opozarja, da je Grčija v času dopisa, v katerem je predložila pripombe v zvezi s trditvami podjetja Elefsis, da poroštvo predstavlja pomoč za konzorcij HDW/Ferrostaal, želela pokazati, da to poroštvo ni pomenilo prednosti, ki bi bila selektivno zagotovljena konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal, temveč je bilo ponujeno vsem ponudnikom (vključno s podjetjem Elefsis), ki so bili udeleženi v postopku privatizacije podjetja HSY.
In its following submissions to the Commission, Greece, realising that the Commission could consider this guarantee as aid to HSY, tried to put in doubt the imputability of the measure to the State by claiming that the guarantee has been concluded not earlier than in May 2002, which is a total contradiction of the claims made in the letter of 23 May 2005.
V svojih naslednjih pripombah, ki jih je predložila Komisiji, je Grčija, potem ko je ugotovila, da bi Komisija lahko to poroštvo ocenila kot pomoč za podjetje HSY, poskusila vzbuditi dvome o možnosti pripisovanja tega ukrepa državi s trditvijo, da je bilo poroštvo dogovorjeno šele maja 2002, kar je v popolnem nasprotju s trditvami, navedenimi v dopisu z dne 23. maja 2005.
As indicated in recital 59 of the present decision, the privatisation was decided by decision No 14/3-1-2001 of the relevant Inter-ministerial Privatisation Committee.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 59 te odločbe, je bila privatizacija odločena z odločbo št. 14/3-1-2001 ustreznega znotrajresorskega Odbora za privatizacijo.
The Commission acknowledges that the wording and the structure of the agreement of 20 March 2002 is confusing.
Komisija priznava, da sta besedilo in struktura sporazuma z dne 20. marca 2002 nejasna.
Article 8.2.4 of the Agreement of 20 March 2002 provides that, in respect of the aid included in Article 3 to 6 of Law 2941/2001 (see recital 33 of the present decision for a description of that law), the State would pay to Piraeus Bank 100 % of the amount which would be paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Člen 8.2.4. sporazuma z dne 20. marca 2002 določa, da bo v zvezi s pomočjo, vključeno v člene 3 do 6 Zakona 2941/2001 (za opis navedenega zakona glej odstavek (33) te odločbe), država banki Piraeus Bank plačala 100-odstotni znesek, ki bi ga banka ETVA plačala konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal.
However, in case of recovery of aid not included in Article 3 to 6 of Law 2941/2001, Article 8.2.4 of the agreement of 20 March 2002 does not apply.
Vendar pa se v primeru povračila pomoči, ki ni vključena v člene 3 do 6 Zakona 2941/2001 člen 8.2.4 sporazuma z dne 20. marca 2002 ne uporablja.
Therefore, Article 8.2.1 would be applicable.
Zato se uporablja člen 8.2.1.
This article provides that the State will pay to Piraeus Bank only 57,7 % of the amount which would be paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Ta člen določa, da bo država plačala banki Piraeus Bank samo 57,7 % zneska, ki bi ga banka ETVA plačala konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal.
However, the Commission observes that Article 8.2.2 of the Agreement indicates that, despite the sale of the majority of the shares of ETVA to Piraeus Bank, it is the State — and not Piraeus Bank/ETVA — that is going to manage the on-going sale of HSY.
Vendar pa Komisija ugotavlja, da je v členu 8.2.2 sporazuma navedeno, da navkljub prodaji večinskega deleža banke ETVA banki Piraeus Bank, je država tista – in ne banka Piraeus Bank/banka ETVA –, ki bo vodila tekočo prodajo podjetja HSY.
This article, and in particular point 8.2.2(d), indicates that the State undertakes that the Purchaser (i.e. Piraeus Bank) will suffer no damage in relation to the privatisation of Hellenic Shipyards.
V tem členu in zlasti v točki 8.2.2.(d) je navedeno, da država jamči, da kupec (tj. banka Piraeus Bank) ne bo utrpel nikakršne škode v zvezi s privatizacijo podjetja Hellenic Shipyards.
Since, as shown by Article 8.2.4 (and by Article 7.4 of the Agreement of 18 December 2001), the agreement was based on the assumption that Piraeus Bank and ETVA would soon merge, the commitment made by the State in Article 8.2.2 would not be respected if it would pay to Piraeus Bank only 57,7 % of the sum paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Ker je sporazum, kot je razvidno iz člena 8.2.4 (in iz člena 7.4 sporazuma z dne 18. decembra 2001), temeljil na predpostavki, da se bosta banka Piraeus Bank in banka ETVA kmalu združili, obljuba, ki jo je država dala v členu 8.2.2, ne bi bila izpolnjena, če bi banki Piraeus Bank plačala samo 57,7 % vsote, ki bi jo banka ETVA plačala konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal.
In order words, in order to implement the commitment made in paragraph 8.2.2 — namely to ensure that Piraeus Bank will not suffer from the sale of HSY — the mechanism laid down in Article 8.2.4 must apply to all cases of recovery of aid, and not only to cases of recovery of aid stemming from Law 2941/2001.
Z drugimi besedami, da bi izpolnila svojo obljubo iz člena 8.2.2 – da bi torej banki Piraeus Bank zagotovila, da slednja ne bo utrpela nobene škode zaradi prodaje podjetja HSY –, se mora mehanizem iz člena 8.2.4 uporabiti v vseh primerih povračila pomoči in ne samo v primeru povračila pomoči, ki izhaja iz Zakona 2941/2001.
This means that even if, contrary to the foregoing conclusion, the agreement of 20 March 2002 had obliged the State to pay to Piraeus Bank only 57,7 % of the amount paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal, this has been modified by the letter of the government of 31 May 2002, which states unambiguously that the mechanism provided in Article 8.2.4 of the Agreement of 20 March 2002 (i.e. 100 % indemnification) applies.
To pomeni, da je bilo, tudi če bi v nasprotju z navedeno ugotovitvijo sporazum z dne 20. marca 2002 zavezoval državo, da banki Piraeus Bank plača samo 57,7 % zneska, ki bi ga banka ETVA plačala konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal, to spremenjeno z dopisom vlade z dne 31. maja 2002, v katerem je jasno navedeno, da se uporablja mehanizem, ki je določen v členu 8.2.4 sporazuma z dne 20. marca 2002 (tj. 100-odstotna odškodnina).
In answer to a precise question by the Commission sent by letter of 12 February 2008, Greece confirmed in its letter of 3 March 2008 that it would be obliged to pay to Piraeus Bank the full (i.e. 100 % and not 57,7 %) amount paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
V odgovor na natančno vprašanje, ki ga je Komisija posredovala z dopisom z dne 12. februarja 2008, je Grčija s svojim dopisom z dne 3. marca 2008 potrdila, da bo banki Piraeus Bank morala plačati celoten znesek (tj. 100 % in ne 57,7 %), ki ga bo banka ETVA plačala konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal.
As indicated in the assessment of measure E7, the employees were the owner of these shares but had not paid the purchase price they should have paid to ETVA.
Kot je navedeno v oceni ukrepa E7, so bili zaposleni lastniki delnic, vendar niso plačali nakupne cene, ki bi jo morali plačati banki ETVA.
See recital 33 of the present decision for a description of that law.
Za opis navedenega zakona glej uvodno izjavo 33 te odločbe.
Case C-334/99, Federal Republic of Germany v Commission, paragraphs 133 to 141.
Zadeva C-334/99, Zvezna republika Nemčija proti Komisiji, odstavki 133 do 141.
In addition, the Commission observes that, to its knowledge, none of the loans and guarantees covered by Article 296 comply with the conditions laid down in section 3.1 of the present decision.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja tudi, da po njenih podatkih ni niti eno izmed posojil in poroštev, ki jih zajema člen 296, skladno s pogoji, določenimi v oddelku 3.1 te odločbe.
They would therefore not have been acceptable to a market economy investor.
Zaradi tega ne bi bila sprejemljiva za vlagatelja iz tržnega gospodarstva.
Taking into account the risk aversion of the economic agents, the sale of HSY would be preferred over the liquidation of HSY only if the statistical expectancy of payments following from the guarantee would be significantly smaller than EUR 6 million.
Ob upoštevanju dejstva, da so se gospodarski subjekti izogibali tveganju, bi imela prodaja podjetja HSY prednost pred likvidacijo podjetja HSY samo, če bi bilo statistično verjetno, da bo plačilo na podlagi poroštva bistveno manjše od 6 milijonov EUR.
This has already been analysed by the Commission in the extension decision, in particular in the description and the assessment of measure 18(a).
Komisija je to že analizirala v odločbi o podaljšanju postopka, zlasti v opisu in oceni ukrepa 18(a).
The Commission also notes that the second Deloitte report indicates: ‘The clause d) above, regarding the allocation of the consideration between an amount destined for a share capital increase and price offered for the acquisition of existing shares, at a set ratio of 2:1, from our experience in similar transactions, is not a very common term.
Komisija opozarja tudi, da je v drugem poročilu revizijske hiše Deloitte: „Klavzula d) zgoraj, ki se nanaša na razporeditev kupnine na znesek, namenjen za povečanje delniškega kapitala, in ponujeno ceno za prevzem obstoječih delnic v določenem razmerju 2:1, po naših izkušnjah iz podobnih transakcij ni zelo pogost pogoj.
See footnote 148.
Glej opombo 148.
The Commission does not claim that a due diligence would have allowed to identify all the measures which have to be recovered according to the present decision, but some of them.
Komisija ne trdi, da bi skrbno ravnanje omogočilo, da bi se prepoznali vsi ukrepi, ki bi jih bilo treba povrniti v skladu s to odločbo, temveč samo nekateri.
In its letter of 21 June 2007, TKMS/GNSH has submitted some due diligence reports performed in 2001 by Arthur Andersen on behalf of HDW/Ferrostaal.
V svojem dopisu z dne 21. junija 2007 sta podjetji TKMS/GNSH predložili nekaj poročil o skrbnem poslovanju, ki jih je leta 2001 sestavil Arthur Andersen v imenu konzorcija HDW/Ferrostaal.
Arthur Andersen indicates in these reports that it is not excluded that HSY has received State aid which should be recovered in the future.
Arthur Andersen v teh poročilih navaja, da ni izključeno, da je podjetje HSY prejelo državno pomoč, ki bi jo bilo treba v prihodnosti povrniti.
In particular, since ETVA and Greece had promised to grant this guarantee in the tender document submitted to the bidders, the fact that this guarantee was not mentioned as a condition in the bid documents submitted by Elefsis would not have prevented it from requesting it later in the negotiation process.
Zlasti ker sta banka ETVA in Grčija v razpisni dokumentaciji, ki je bila predložena ponudnikom, obljubili, da bosta to poroštvo odobrili, dejstvo, da to poroštvo ni bilo omenjeno kot pogoj v dokumentaciji o ponudbi, ki jo je predložilo podjetje Elefsis, slednjemu ne bi preprečilo, da ga zahteva pozneje v procesu pogajanja.
This point is underpinned in the second Deloitte report which claims that, if HDW/Ferrostaal had had to support the risk of having to reimburse State aid received by HSY in the previous years, it would not have purchased HSY.
To točko podpira drugo poročilo revizijske hiše Deloitte, ki trdi, da konzorcij HDW/Ferrostaal ne bi kupil podjetja HSY, če bi moral prevzeti tveganje povrnitve državne pomoči, ki jo je podjetje HSY prejelo v predhodnih letih.
This is clear from the text of the Seventh Shipbuilding Directive and from its structure, in which ‘Investment aid’ is a part of ‘Chapter III Restructuring aid’.
To je razvidno iz besedila sedme Direktive o ladjedelništvu in iz njene strukture, v kateri je „Naložbena pomoč“ del Poglavja III z naslovom „Pomoč za prestrukturiranje“.
See the very large debt waiver mentioned in decision C 10/94, the payment of the closure costs mentioned in decision N 513/01, and all the financial supports provided by the State and falling under Article 296 which were mentioned in the extension decision.
Glej zelo velik odpis dolga, ki je naveden v odločbi C 10/94, plačilo stroškov zaprtja, ki je navedeno v odločbi N 513/01, in vse primere finančne podpore, ki jo je zagotovila država in ki spadajo na področje uporabe člena 296, omenjene v odločbi o podaljšanju postopka.
For instance, as regards State financial support which was provided to HSY without being earmarked to the financing of a precise activity, the Commission has considered that only 25 % of the State support benefited to the civil activities.
Na primer, kar zadeva državno finančno podporo, zagotovljeno podjetju HSY, ne da bi bila namenjena za financiranje točno določene dejavnosti, Komisija meni, da je civilnim dejavnostim prineslo koristi samo 25 % državne podpore.
However, if only 25 % of the State support is recovered, only 6,25 % (i.e. 25 % of 25 %) of the State support would in fact be recovered from the civil activities.
Vendar če je povrnjenih samo 25 % državne pomoči, to pomeni, da bo samo 6,25 % (tj. 25 % od 25 %) državne podpore dejansko povrnjene iz civilnih dejavnosti.
This will not restore the initial situation of the civil activities of HSY, because they received 25 % of the State support and will only reimburse 6,25 %.
S tem se ne bo obnovil izhodiščni položaj civilnih dejavnosti podjetja HSY, saj so prejele 25 % državne podpore, povrnile pa bodo samo 6,25 %.
According to the amended plan, dated November 2002, HSY applied for, and eventually received the approval of the Greek authorities to complete the implementation of the investment plan by 30 June 2004.
V skladu s spremenjenim načrtom iz novembra 2002 je podjetje HSY zaprosilo za dokončanje izvajanja naložbenega načrta do 30. junija 2004, kar so pozneje grški organi tudi odobrili.
Moreover, according to the amended plan, the aid approved by the Commission in 1997, has not yet been paid out to HSY.
Poleg tega, glede na spremenjeni načrt, pomoč, ki jo je Komisija odobrila leta 1997, podjetju HSY še ni bila izplačana.
After having requested and received extensions of the deadline to submit comments, HSY made comments on the opening decision by letter of 18 October 2004.
Podjetje HSY je na podlagi odobrenih odlogov za predložitev pripomb, za katere je zaprosilo, pripombe v zvezi z odločbo o sprožitvi postopka predložilo z dopisom z dne 18. oktobra 2004.
These comments are the same as the ones submitted by Greece on 20 October 2004.
Te pripombe so enake pripombam, ki jih je 20. oktobra 2004 predložila Grčija.
Elefsis, a Greek competitor of HSY, submitted comments by letter of 10 September 2004.
Podjetje Elefsis, grški konkurent podjetja HSY, je predložilo pripombe z dopisom z dne 10. septembra 2004.
These comments were sent to Greece by letters of 16 December 2004 and 23 December 2004, which replied respectively by letters of 20 January 2005 and 26 January 2005.
Te pripombe so bile poslane Grčiji z dopisoma z dne 16. decembra 2004 in 23. decembra 2004, na katera je Grčija odgovorila z dopisoma z dne 20. januarja 2005 oziroma z dne 26. januarja 2005.
These letters were dated 23 May 2002, 28 May 2002, 14 August 2002, 24 April 2003, 3 February 2004, 4 March 2004, 30 June 2004, 8 April 2005, 27 April 2005, 24 May 2005, 10 June 2005, 15 July 2005, 28 July 2005, 13 September 2005, 16 September 2005, 21 October 2005, 12 December 2005, 23 December 2005, 6 January 2006, 10 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 18 January 2006, 23 January 2006, 3 February 2006, 9 February 2006, 23 March 2006, 28 March 2006, 6 April 2006, 20 April 2006, 24 May 2006 and 2 June 2006.
Te pritožbe so bile poslane 23. maja 2002, 28. maja 2002, 14. avgusta 2002, 24. aprila 2003, 3. februarja 2004, 4. marca 2004, 30. junija 2004, 8. aprila 2005, 27. aprila 2005, 24. maja 2005, 10. junija 2005, 15. julija 2005, 28. julija 2005, 13. septembra 2005, 16. septembra 2005, 21. oktobra 2005, 12. decembra 2005, 23. decembra 2005, 6. januarja 2006, 10. januarja 2006, 12. januarja 2006, 18. januarja 2006, 23. januarja 2006, 3. februarja 2006, 9. februarja 2006, 23. marca 2006, 28. marca 2006, 6. aprila 2006, 20. aprila 2006, 24. maja 2006 in 2. junija 2006.
The Commission sent letters to the complainant on 27 June 2002, 22 July 2004 and 12 August 2005.
Komisija je pritožniku odgovorila z dopisi z dne 27. junija 2002, 22. julija 2004 in 12. avgusta 2005.
The Commission asked Greece for information by letters dated 30 January 2003, 30 July 2004, 2 May 2005, 24 May 2005, 24 March 2006, 24 May 2006 and 29 May 2006.
Komisija je z dopisi z dne 30. januarja 2003, 30. julija 2004, 2. maja 2005, 24. maja 2005, 24. marca 2006, 24. maja 2006 in 29. maja 2006 Grčijo zaprosila za informacije.
Greece answered by letters dated 31 March 2003, 21 October 2004, 17 December 2004, 20 June 2005, 25 April 2006, 30 May 2006 and 1 June 2006.
Grčija je odgovorila z dopisi z dne 31. marca 2003, 21. oktobra 2004, 17. decembra 2004, 20. junija 2005, 25. aprila 2006, 30. maja 2006 in 1. junija 2006.
Greek Naval Shipyard Holding (hereafter ‘GNSH’) and TKMS made a joint submission by letter of 30 October 2006.
Podjetji Greek Naval Shipyard Holding (v nadaljnjem besedilu: podjetje GNSH) in TKMS sta skupaj predložili pripombe z dopisom z dne 30. oktobra 2006.
Piraeus Bank submitted comments by letter of 27 October 2006 and — following a meeting with the Commission on 15 November 2007 — by letter of 27 December 2006.
Banka Piraeus Bank je predložila pripombe z dopisom z dne 27. oktobra 2006 in – po srečanju s Komisijo 15. novembra 2007 – z dopisom z dne 27. decembra 2006.
After having requested and received an extension of the deadline to reply, Elefsis submitted comments by letter of 17 November 2006.
Podjetje Elefsis je na podlagi odobrenega odloga za odgovor, za katerega je zaprosilo, pripombe predložilo z dopisom z dne 17. novembra 2006.
By letter of 22 February 2007, the Commission forwarded these comments to Greece, which commented them by letter of 7 March 2007 and 19 March 2007.
Komisija je z dopisom z dne 22. februarja 2007 te pripombe posredovala Grčiji, ki je nanje odgovorila z dopisoma z dne 7. marca 2007 in 19. marca 2007.
By letter of 27 April 2007, the Commission sent to Greece annexes to the comments of third parties which it had omitted in the letter of 22 February.
Z dopisom z dne 27. aprila 2007 je Komisija poslala Grčiji priloge k pripombam tretjih oseb, ki jih je izpustila v dopisu z dne 22. februarja.
In the letter dated 27 April 2007, the Commission also raised several questions to Greece, which replied by letter of 29 June 2007.
Z dopisom z dne 27. aprila 2007 je Komisija postavila Grčiji tudi več vprašanj, na katera je Grčija odgovorila z dopisom z dne 29. junija 2007.
By letter of 23 August 2007, the Commission asked questions to HSY, which replied by letter of 9 October 2007.
Z dopisom z dne 23. avgusta 2007 je Komisija zastavila vprašanja podjetju HSY, ki je nanje odgovorilo z dopisom z dne 9. oktobra 2007.
By letter of 13 November 2007, the Commission requested from Greece further information and forwarded the answers of HSY of 9 October 2007.
Komisija je z dopisom z dne 13. novembra 2007 zaprosila Grčijo za nadaljnje informacije, z dopisom z dne 9. oktobra 2007 pa je odgovore posredovala podjetju HSY.
Greece replied by letters of 4 December 2007 and 14 December 2007.
Grčija je odgovorila z dopisoma z dne 4. decembra 2007 in 14. decembra 2007.
The Commission met the Greek authorities on 16 October 2007 and on 21 January 2008.
Komisija se je sestala z grškimi organi 16. oktobra 2007 in 21. januarja 2008.
The Commission sent additional questions to Greece on 12 February 2008, which replied by letter of 3 March 2008.
Komisija je Grčiji 12. februarja 2008 poslala dodatna vprašanja, na katera je Grčija odgovorila z dopisom z dne 3. marca 2008.
TKMS/GNSH submitted additional comments by letter of 21 June 2007.
Podjetji TKMS/GNSH sta predložili dodatne pripombe z dopisom z dne 21. junija 2007.
The Commission forwarded this letter on 11 September 2007 to Greece, which submitted comments by letter of 11 October 2007.
Komisija je ta dopis 11. septembra 2007 posredovala Grčiji, ki je svoj odgovor predložila z dopisom z dne 11. oktobra 2007.
Following a second meeting held on 9 January 2008 between the Commission and the same persons, TKMS/GNSH made an additional submission by letter of 18 January 2008, which was forwarded to the Greek authorities by letter of 12 February 2008.
Po drugem srečanju Komisije in istih oseb 9. januarja 2008 sta podjetji TKMS/GNSH 18. januarja 2008 predložili dodaten dopis, ki je bil grškim organom posredovan z dopisom z dne 12. februarja 2008.
The Commission met Elefsis on 15 March 2007 and on 7 August 2007.
Komisija se je 15. marca 2007 in 7. avgusta 2007 sestala s podjetjem Elefsis.
Following the latter meeting, Elefsis made additional comments by letter of 8 November 2007, which were submitted to Greece by letter of 17 January 2008.
Po drugem srečanju je podjetje Elefsis predložilo dodatne pripombe z dopisom z dne 8. novembra 2007, ki so bile predložene Grčiji z dopisom z dne 17. januarja 2008.
Greece commented by letter of 15 February 2008.
Grčija je nanje odgovorila z dopisom z dne 15. februarja 2008.