natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In order to prove the existence of a State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, it is necessary to show that the State did not behave as a market economy investor would have behaved in similar circumstances.
Da bi se dokazal obstoj državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe, je treba pokazati, da država ni ravnala tako, kot bi v podobnih okoliščinah ravnal vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva.
In this respect, Greece, HSY and TKMS/GNSH claim that in similar circumstances a market economy investor would have accepted to issue this guarantee in favour of HDW/Ferrostaal.
Na podlagi tega Grčija, podjetje HSY in podjetji TKMS/GNSH trdijo, da bi v podobnih okoliščinah vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva privolil v izdajo takšnega poroštva v korist konzorcija HDW/Ferrostaal.
They argue that the test of the market economy investor should be applied at the level of ETVA, which was the legal entity which sold HSY, and at the level of the Greek government, which was the seller of ETVA.
Trdijo namreč, da bi bilo treba opraviti preizkus z vlagateljem iz tržnega gospodarstva, in sicer na ravni banke ETVA, ki je bila pravni subjekt, ki je prodal podjetje HSY, ter na ravni grške vlade, ki je prodajala banko ETVA.
The Commission recalls that, as has been indicated in section 3.2 of the present decision, when ETVA purchased HSY and directly thereafter injected capital to keep it alive, it did not acted as a market economy investor but as a public authority granting aid to keep alive a firm deemed important for the Greek economy.
Komisija opozarja, da banka ETVA, kot je navedeno v oddelku 3.2 te odločbe, v času, ko je kupila podjetje HSY in takoj zatem zagotovila kapital, da je ohranila njegovo poslovno sposobnost, ni ravnala kot vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva, temveč kot javni organ, ki je odobril pomoč za ohranitev poslovne sposobnosti podjetja, ki je bilo pomembno za grško gospodarstvo.
Therefore, no market economy investor would have found itself in the situation of ETVA.
Na podlagi tega se torej noben vlagatelj tržnega gospodarstva ne bi znašel v položaju, v katerem se je znašla banka ETVA.
No market economy investor would have found itself in the situation of selling these shares of HSY.
Noben vlagatelj tržnega gospodarstva se ne bi znašel v položaju, da bi moral prodati te delnice podjetja HSY.
Therefore, the Commission considers that the market economy investor test can not be used in the present case to justify the fact that the State is putting additional State resources at risk (by granting the guarantee).
Zato Komisija meni, da preizkusa z vlagateljem iz tržnega gospodarstva v tem primeru ni mogoče uporabiti za utemeljitev dejstva, da država povzroča dodatno tveganje državnim sredstvom (z odobritvijo poroštva).
Even if nevertheless one considers that the market economy investor test should be applied, the Commission considers that if the State had been a private firm acting under normal market conditions, it would not have accepted to grant the guarantee.
Tudi če bi veljalo, da bi bilo treba uporabiti preizkus z vlagateljem iz tržnega gospodarstva, Komisija meni, da država ne bi privolila v odobritev poroštva, če bi bila zasebno podjetje, ki bi delovalo pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji.
Each of the three following points is alone sufficient to prove this.
To dokazuje že vsaka izmed naslednjih treh točk.
First, the Commission observes that ETVA (and the State through ETVA), whereas it had only a 51 % shareholding in HSY (the remaining 49 % were owned by the employees), promised to pay to the purchaser of HSY (i.e. HDW/Ferrostaal) 100 % of any aid that would be recovered from HSY.
Prvič, Komisija ugotavlja, da je banka ETVA (in država prek banke ETVA), ki je imela samo 51-odstotni delež v podjetju HSY (preostali 49-odstotni delež je bil v lasti zaposlenih, obljubila, da bo kupcu podjetja HSY (tj. konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal) plačala 100-odstotni znesek za vsako pomoč, ki bi jo podjetje HSY povrnilo.
A market economy investor would not have accepted to give an indemnification amounting to 100 % of the damage suffered by the company sold.
Vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva ne bi privolil v izplačilo 100-odstotne odškodnine za škodo, ki bi jo utrpelo prodano podjetje.
In certain circumstances, a market economy investor may accept to take responsibility for certain future liabilities of the firm sold, but only in a proportion equal to its shareholding, which was 51 % in the present case.
V nekaterih okoliščinah bi vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva lahko privolil, da bo prevzel odgovornost za nekatere prihodnje obveznosti prodanega podjetja, vendar zgolj sorazmerno s svojim deležem, kar je v tem primeru 51 %.
A market economy investor would have asked the other shareholders to assume responsibility for the remaining 49 % of the liabilities concerned.
Vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva bi druge delničarje prosil, da prevzamejo odgovornost za preostalih 49 % zadevnih obveznosti.
By accepting to support 100 % of potentially huge liabilities (it is recalled that the contract does not define a ceiling for the indemnification payments) of the firm sold, ETVA made a gift to the other shareholders of HSY (i.e. the employees).
S privoljenjem v 100-odstotno podporo potencialno velikih obveznosti (opozoriti je treba, da v pogodbi ni določena zgornja meja pri izplačilu odškodnin) prodanega podjetja je banka ETVA drugim delničarjem podjetja HSY (tj. zaposlenim) dala darilo.
A market economy investor would not have accepted to make such a gift by assuming potentially huge liabilities of the sold firm in a proportion exceeding by far its shareholding.
Vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva na takšno darilo s prevzemom potencialno visokih obveznosti prodanega podjetja, ki bi precej presegale njegov delež, ne bi pristal.
Therefore, from the mere fact that the indemnification guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal amounts to 100 % (i.e. instead of 51 %) of the aid that could be recovered from HSY, it can be concluded that no market economy investor would have provided such a guarantee.
Torej je mogoče iz samega dejstva, da odškodninsko poroštvo banke ETVA konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal znaša 100 % (t.j. namesto 51 %) pomoči, ki bi jo podjetje HSY moralo povrniti, ugotoviti, da takšnega poroštva ne bi odobril noben vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva.
Second, Greece, HSY and TKMS/GNSH claim that the net proceeds (i.e. revenues minus costs) were higher in case of sale of HSY — including the expected payments due under of the guarantee — than if HSY would have been liquidated.
Drugič, Grčija, podjetje HSY in podjetji TKMS/GNSH trdijo, da so bili čisti prihodki (tj. dohodki, pomanjšani za stroške) višji v primeru prodaje podjetja HSY – vključno s pričakovanimi plačili, dolgovanimi v okviru poroštva –, kot bi bili, če bi bilo podjetje HSY likvidirano.
TKMS/GNSH supports its claim by means of the second Deloitte report.
Podjetji TKMS/GNSH podpirata svojo trditev z drugim poročilom revizijske hiše Deloitte.
This report compares the net costs in the two scenarios.
To poročilo primerja skupne stroške v dveh scenarijih.
This analysis is done at the level of ETVA and then at the level of the State.
Analiza je opravljena na ravni banke ETVA, potem pa še na ravni države.
The Commission considers that applying the test at the level of ETVA is a misuse of this test.
Komisija meni, da bi uporaba preizkusa na ravni banke ETVA pomenila zlorabo tega preizkusa.
Indeed, as discussed in section 3.2 of the present decision, the privatisation was decided and financially supported — see for instance the State aid included in Law 2941/2001 — by the government and ETVA has never been in the position of an independent economic unit free to design the sale of HSY in a way maximising its revenues and minimising its losses.
Kot je navedeno v oddelku 3.2 te odločbe, se je za privatizacijo dejansko odločila in jo finančno podprla – glej na primer državno pomoč, vključeno v Zakon 2941/2001 – vlada, banka ETVA pa ni bila nikoli v položaju neodvisne gospodarske enote, ki bi lahko sama načrtovala prodajo podjetja HSY tako, da bi se njen dohodek kar najbolj povečal, njene izgube pa kar najbolj zmanjšale.
It is therefore the intervention of the State as a whole that must be scrutinised and not the behaviour of one of its parts.
Zato je treba temeljito preiskati poseg države kot celote in ne ravnanja enega izmed njenih delov.
If the test is nevertheless applied at the level of ETVA, one has to compare the net proceeds (i.e. revenues minus costs) for ETVA in case of liquidation of HSY and in case of sale of HSY.
Če bi se preizkus na ravni banke ETVA kljub temu uporabil, bi morali primerjati neto prihodke (tj. dohodke, pomanjšane za stroške) banke ETVA tako v primeru likvidacije kot v primeru prodaje podjetja HSY.
In the case of liquidation of HSY, it has to be established what would be the costs incurred by ETVA.
V primeru likvidacije podjetja HSY bi bilo treba ugotoviti, kolikšne stroške bi to povzročilo banki ETVA.
TKMS/GNSH claims that the loss would amount at least to the loans and guarantees granted by ETVA to HSY and which were not counter-guaranteed by the State.
Podjetji TKMS/GNSH trdita, da bi izguba znašala vsaj toliko, kot bi znašala posojila in poroštva, ki bi jih banka ETVA odobrila podjetju HSY in za katera država ne bi dala posrednega poroštva.
The Commission observes however that none of these loans and guarantees constitutes a normal cost of winding up a firm.
Vendar pa Komisija ugotavlja, da niti eno izmed teh posojil in poroštev ne predstavlja običajnega stroška likvidacije podjetja.
Indeed, all these loans and guarantees have been granted by ETVA as public authority because either they constituted State aid to the civil activities or they were measures to protect the security of Greece in accordance with Article 296 of the Treaty.
Banka ETVA je dejansko vsa ta posojila in poroštva odobrila kot javni organ, saj so ali predstavljala državno pomoč za civilne dejavnosti ali pa ukrepe za zaščito varnosti Grčije v skladu s členom 296 Pogodbe.
These loans and guarantees can therefore not be taken into account when applying the market economy vendor test.
Ta posojila in poroštva se zato ne morejo upoštevati pri uporabi preizkusa s prodajalcem iz tržnega gospodarstva.
Consequently, it turns out that ETVA as a market economy operator would have had no significant cost to support in case of liquidation of HSY.
Na podlagi tega se zdi, da banka ETVA kot nosilec dejavnosti iz tržnega gospodarstva ne bi morala kriti velikega stroška v primeru likvidacije podjetja HSY.
In case of sale of HSY, ETVA received the sale price of EUR 6 million. As regards the costs incurred in case of sale of HSY, ETVA had to issue the guarantee currently analysed, which was unlimited in size and therefore entailed potential payments of tens or even hundreds of millions of Euro.
Pri prodaji podjetja HSY je banka ETVA prejela znesek prodajne cene v višini 6 milijonov EUR. Kar zadeva stroške, ki so nastali pri prodaji podjetja HSY, je morala banka ETVA izdati poroštvo, ki je predmet trenutne analize, ki je bilo neomejeno v obsegu in je zato imelo za posledico potencialna plačila v višini več deset ali celo več sto milijonov EUR. Pri primerjavi dveh scenarijev se je izkazalo, da bi vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva ladjedelnico rajši likvidiral.
Comparing the two scenarios, it turns out that a market economy investor would have preferred to liquidate the yard.
Banka ETVA torej ni ravnala kot vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva.
There were no large costs for the State in its capacity as entrepreneur/owner in case of liquidation of HSY since all the loans and guarantees granted by the State (directly or via ETVA) to HSY have been granted by the State as public authority, because either they constituted State aid to the civil activities or measures to protect the security of Greece in accordance with Article 296 of the Treaty.
Država v vlogi podjetnice/lastnice pri likvidaciji podjetja HSY ni utrpela nikakršnih visokih stroškov, saj je vsa posojila in poroštva, ki jih je država (neposredno ali prek banke ETVA) odobrila podjetju HSY, odobrila kot javni organ, ker so bodisi predstavljala državno pomoč, namenjeno civilnim dejavnostim, ali ukrepe za zaščito varnosti Grčije v skladu s členom 296 Pogodbe.
Greece, HSY and TKMS/GNSH claim that the risks of HSY having to reimburse State aid were very limited, since at that time there were no ongoing investigations by the Commission.
Grčija, podjetje HSY in podjetji TKMS/GNSH trdijo, da je bilo tveganje, da bo moralo podjetje HSY povrniti državno pomoč, zelo omejeno, saj v tistem času Komisija ni opravljala nobenih preiskav.
They therefore claim that the risk for ETVA and the State of having to pay indemnification under the guarantee was small.
Zaradi tega trdijo, da je bilo tveganje za banko ETVA in državo, da bosta morali plačati odškodnino iz jamstva, zelo majhno.
The Commission can not accept this claim.
Komisija te trditve ne more sprejeti.
It is akin to claim that, since Greece over the prior years had succeeded to hide the grant of unlawful and incompatible State aids to HSY and the misuses of aid previously approved by the Commission, it was allowed to grant this guarantee.
Podobna temu je tudi trditev, da je bila odobritev tega poroštva dovoljena, saj je Grčija v predhodnih letih uspela prikriti nezakonite in nezdružljive državne pomoči, odobrene podjetju HSY, ter zlorabe pomoči, ki jo je pred tem odobrila Komisija.
As a subsidiary ground, the Commission observes that HDW/Ferrostaal insisted to receive this guarantee and was not ready to sign the closing of the sale of HSY before receiving the guarantee.
V dopolnitev temu Komisija opaža, da je konzorcij HDW/Ferrostaal vztrajal pri prejemu tega poroštva in ni bil pripravljen podpisati zaključka prodaje podjetja HSY, dokler poroštva ne prejme.
The importance attached to the guarantee by HDW/Ferrostaal proves that this private investor considered that the probability that HSY would have to reimburse State aid was not small.
Pomen, ki ga je konzorcij HDW/Ferrostaal pripisoval poroštvu, dokazuje, da je ta zasebni vlagatelj menil, da verjetnost, da bo podjetje HSY moralo povrniti državno pomoč, ni bila majhna.
The fact that, from the beginning of the privatisation procedure, Greece committed to grant such a guarantee to the highest bidder proves also that Greece considered that a private investor would find such a guarantee very important (a condition sine qua non, according to Greece’s letter of 23 May 2005 quoted in footnote 148 of the present decision and according to the second Deloitte report), which can only be the case if a private investor considers that the probability of recovery is not very limited.
Dejstvo, da je Grčija že na začetku postopka privatizacije obljubila, da bo takšno poroštvo odobrila najboljšemu ponudniku, dokazuje tudi, da je Grčija menila, da bo zasebni vlagatelj takšno poroštvo štel za zelo pomembno (osnovni pogoj v skladu z dopisom Grčije z dne 23. maja 2005, naveden v opombi 148 te odločbe, ter v skladu z drugim poročilom revizijske hiše Deloitte), kar je mogoče samo, kadar zasebni vlagatelj meni, da verjetnost povračila ni tako zelo majhna.
The Commission also observes that in this context where the amount of aid which could be recovered from HSY was difficult to estimate, a market economy vendor selling HSY would have at least introduced in the sale contract a ceiling limiting the potential payment to the purchaser.
Komisija ugotavlja tudi, da bi v primeru, ko je znesek pomoči, ki ga bo podjetje HSY mogoče moralo povrniti, težko oceniti, prodajalec iz tržnega gospodarstva, ki bi prodajal podjetje HSY, v prodajni pogodbi opredelil vsaj zgornjo mejo, ki bi pri kupcu omejila potencialno plačilo.
A market economy vendor would not have accepted to run the risk of having to pay hundreds of millions of Euros, even if it were accepted that the probability of such a high payment could be very low.
Prodajalec iz tržnega gospodarstva ne bi pristal na tveganje, da bo moral plačati več sto milijonov EUR, tudi če bi bilo dogovorjeno, da bo verjetnost tako visokega plačila zelo nizka.
Therefore, the fact that no ceiling was introduced in the guarantee constitutes an additional proof that ETVA and the State did not behave in a way acceptable to a market economy operator.
Zaradi tega dejstvo, da pri poroštvu ni bila določena nobena zgornja meja, predstavlja dodatni dokaz, da banka ETVA in država nista ravnali na način, ki bi bil sprejemljiv za nosilca dejavnosti iz tržnega gospodarstva.
Third, when assessing whether the State acted as a market economy investor, it is necessary to take into account the entire intervention of the State.
Tretjič, pri oceni, ali je država ravnala kot vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva, je treba upoštevati celotno posredovanje države.
In the present case, the State has granted several large aids to facilitate the privatisation of HSY (i.e. the State aid included in Law 2941/2001.
V tem primeru je država odobrila več visokih pomoči, da bi pospešila privatizacijo podjetja HSY (tj. državna pomoč, navedena v Zakonu 2941/2001.
It notably repaid to the workers of HSY the amount of EUR 4,3 million they had invested in the framework of the three capital increases of HSY.
Predvsem je delavcem podjetja HSY povrnila znesek v višini 4,3 milijona EUR, ki so ga vložili v okviru treh dokapitalizacij podjetja HSY.
This measure, which aimed at ensuring that the employees would not hinder the sale of HSY, would have been unacceptable to a market economy investor, among others since there was no contractual obligation to do it and since in addition the employees still owed EUR 24 million to ETVA as purchase price for the shares.
Ta ukrep, s katerim se je želelo zagotoviti, da zaposleni ne bodo ovirali prodaje podjetja HSY, bi bil nesprejemljiv za vlagatelja iz tržnega gospodarstva med drugim tudi zato, ker zanj ni bilo nobene pogodbene obveznosti in ker so poleg tega zaposleni še vedno dolgovali 24 milijonov EUR banki ETVA za nakup delnic.
Finally, the State asked the bidders to pay a part of the purchase price of HSY in the form of a capital increase.
Država je na koncu prosila ponudnike, da plačajo del nakupne cene podjetja HSY v obliki dokapitalizacije.
All these elements illustrate that during the sale of HSY, the State did not behave with the objective of maximising its revenues and minimising its costs, but with the goal of facilitating the sale of HSY and the continuation of the yard’s operations.
Vsi ti elementi kažejo, da država med prodajo podjetja HSY ni ravnala v nameri, da bi čim bolj povečala dohodek in čim bolj zmanjšala stroške, temveč je želela pospešiti prodajo podjetja HSY ter nadaljevanje dejavnosti ladjedelnice.
Therefore, during the sale of HSY, the Greek State did not act as a market economy investor.
Zato med prodajo podjetja HSY grška država ni ravnala kot vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva.
On the basis of each of the three foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes that a market economy investor would not have granted the guarantee.
Na podlagi vsake izmed predhodnih ocen Komisija ugotavlja, da vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva poroštva ne bi odobril.
As regards the existence of an advantage and the identification of the beneficiary, the Commission considers that no investor would have purchased the entire HSY (i.e. including the civil activities) without the guarantee.
Kar zadeva obstoj prednosti in opredelitev upravičenca, Komisija meni, da noben vlagatelj ne bi bil pripravljen kupiti celotnega podjetja HSY (tj. vključno s civilnimi dejavnostmi) brez poroštva.
This conclusion that such a guarantee was necessary to find a purchaser for HSY is logic since an investor performing a due diligence of HSY would have found that HSY had benefited of several measures which could constitute aid of which the recovery could be asked by the Commission.
Ta ugotovitev, da je bilo takšno poroštvo potrebno, da bi se našel kupec za podjetje HSY, je logična, saj bi vlagatelj, ki bi v podjetju HSY ravnal s poslovno skrbnostjo, ugotovil, da je podjetje HSY imelo korist od več ukrepov, ki bi lahko predstavljali pomoč, katere povračilo bi Komisija lahko zahtevala.
Contrary to this conclusion, Elefsis claims that this guarantee was not necessary and claims in particular that it would have been ready to purchase HSY without such a guarantee, what is illustrated by the fact that, in its bid for the purchase of HSY, it did not put this guarantee as a condition for purchasing HSY.
V nasprotju s to ugotovitvijo podjetje Elefsis trdi, da to poroštvo ni bilo potrebno, zlasti pa zatrjuje, da bi bilo samo pripravljeno kupiti podjetje HSY brez takšnega poroštva, kar je razvidno iz dejstva, da v svoji ponudbi za nakup podjetja HSY tega poroštva ni opredelilo kot pogoj za nakup podjetja HSY.
The Commission considers that Elefsis’ claim lacks credibility.
Komisija meni, da je trditev podjetja Elefsis premalo verodostojna.
The Commission first recalls that, even if this it was true that Elefsis did not request such a guarantee in its bid, it does not prove that, if Elefsis had been selected as the preferred bidder, it would not have requested this guarantee at a later stage of the negotiation with the seller.
Komisija najprej opozarja, da tudi če bi bilo res, da podjetje Elefsis v svoji ponudbi ni zahtevalo takšnega jamstva, to ne dokazuje, da podjetje Elefsis ne bi zahtevalo poroštva v kasnejši fazi pogajanj s prodajalcem, če bi bilo izbrano kot prednostni ponudnik.
This is very likely that Elefsis would have done so.
Podjetje Elefsis pa bi to najverjetneje storilo.
Indeed, as soon as HSY was sold to HDW/Ferrrostaal, Elefsis started to file complaints with the Commission, claiming that HSY had benefited from several and large aid measures that the Commission should recover.
Takoj ko je bilo podjetje HSY prodano konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal, je podjetje Elefsis dejansko začelo vlagati pritožbe na Komisijo, v katerih je trdilo, da je imelo podjetje HSY korist od več obsežnih ukrepov pomoči, ki bi jih Komisija morala izterjati.
An investor convinced that a firm has received tens of millions of Euro of incompatible aid will not himself take the risk of purchasing this firm, except if he receives a guarantee.
Vlagatelj, ki je prepričan, da je podjetje prejelo več deset milijonov EUR nezdružljive pomoči, sam ne bo tvegal z nakupom podjetja, razen če ne prejme poroštva.
The Commission therefore dismisses Elefsis’ claim and considers that without this guarantee no market economy investor would have purchased the entire HSY, i.e. HSY including the civil activities.
Komisija zato zavrača trditev podjetja Elefsis in meni, da noben vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva brez takšnega poroštva ne bi kupil podjetja HSY v celoti, tj. podjetja HSY vključno s civilnimi dejavnostmi.
As indicated earlier, if HSY had not been sold, Greece could have continued to support the military activities on the basis of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Kot je bilo že navedeno, če podjetje HSY ne bi bilo prodano, bi Grčija lahko še naprej podpirala vojaške dejavnosti na podlagi člena 296 Pogodbe.
Conversely, because of Article 87 of the Treaty, Greece would not have been allowed to provide financial support to the civil activities.
Nasprotno pa zaradi člena 87 Pogodbe Grčija ne bi mogla zagotoviti finančne podpore za civilne dejavnosti.
Besides the ship repair activity, the three main civil contracts performed during these years were the contracts with ISAP, OSE and Strintzis.
Poleg dejavnosti popravila ladij so bile tri glavne pogodbe na nevojaškem področju, ki so se izvrševale v teh letih, pogodbe s podjetji ISAP, OSE in Strintzis.
As has been explained in the present decision (see description and assessment of measure E12c), the contracts with ISAP and OSE were executed with significant delays, forcing HSY to pay high penalties and to provide rolling stock for free, what also represented a high cost for HSY.
Kot je bilo pojasnjeno v tej odločbi (glej opis in oceno ukrepa E12c), so se pogodbe s podjetjema ISAP in OSE izvršile s precejšnjo zamudo, kar je podjetje HSY prisililo, da plača visoke kazni in zagotovi železniški vozni park brezplačno, to pa je spet pomenilo visok strošek za podjetje HSY.
It is therefore clear that these contracts were highly loss-making.
Zato je jasno, da so te pogodbe ustvarile zelo visoko izgubo.