natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Consequently, by letter of 16 February 2000 addressed to the Spanish authorities, the Commission decided to initiate the formal investigation procedure [5] laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 88(2) of the Treaty in order to partially revoke the Decision of 1998 (hereinafter the second initiation of the procedure).
Zato je v pismu, ki ga je poslala španskim oblastem dne 16. februarja 2000, sprožila formalni preiskovalni postopek [5], ki ga določa prvi pododstavek člena 88(2) Pogodbe s ciljem, da delno razveljavi Odločbo iz leta 1998 (v nadaljevanju: ponovna sprožitev postopka).
By letter of 21 March 2000, Spain sent its comments to the Commission on the decision concerning the second initiation of the procedure.
Španija je v dopisu z dne 21. marca 2000 Komisiji posredovala svoje mnenje glede odločitve o ponovni sprožitvi postopka.
In the light of the comments made by the Spanish authorities and interested parties after the second initiation of the procedure, the Commission terminated the formal investigation procedure on 20 September 2000 by means of Commission Decision 2001/43/EC [6] (hereinafter the Decision of 2000), concluding that the measures granted to SNIACE did not constitute State aid pursuant to the Tubacex judgment.
Komisija je, ob upoštevanju pripomb španskih oblasti in zainteresiranih strani glede ponovne sprožitve postopka, zaključila formalni preiskovalni postopek dne 20. septembra 2000 z Odločbo Komisije 2001/43/ES [6] (v nadaljevanju: Odločba z leta 2000) in presodila, da, ob upoštevanju sodbe Tubacex pomoč, ki jo je prejemalo podjetje SNIACE, ne predstavlja državne pomoči.
The Decision of 1998 was partially amended pursuant to the Decision of 2000, whereby the first paragraph of Article 1 was replaced and Article 2 revoked.
Skladno z Odločbo iz leta 2000 je bila delno spremenjena Odločba iz leta 1998, kjer je bil prvi pododstavek člena 1 zamenjan in člen 2 izbrisan.
In its Decision of 2000, the Commission considered that the public creditors, by applying the legal interest rate, had sought to maximise their prospects of recovering the sums due to them without suffering any financial loss. In the Commission’s opinion, ‘Spain acted as a hypothetical private creditor would have done, vis-a-vis SNIACE.’
V Odločbi iz leta 2000 je Komisija presodila, da so javni upniki, s tem ko so uporabljali zakonito obrestno mero, skušali kar najbolj povečati svoje možnosti, da bi si zagotovili vračilo zneska, ki jim ga je dolgovalo podjetje brez finančne izgube.
In the light of the Decision of 2000, the undertaking Lenzing brought an action against the Decision of 2000 before the Court of First Instance.
Na podlagi Odločbe iz leta 2000 je podjetje Lenzing na prvostopenjsko sodišče vložilo tožbo zoper Odločbo iz leta 2000.
The Court of First Instance annulled the Decision of 2000 in its judgment of 21 October in Case T-36/99 [8] because the Commission made a manifest error of assessment when applying the private creditor behaviour test to the public creditor.
Prvostopenjsko sodišče je razveljavilo sodbo z dne 21. oktobra v zadevi T-36/99 [8] z Odločbo iz leta 2000 zaradi izkazane napačne presoje glede kriterija ravnanja javnega upnika kot zasebnega upnika.
The Court of Justice confirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance [9].
Sodišče je potrdilo sodbo prvostopenjskega sodišča [9].
As a result of that annulment, the second formal investigation procedure is still open.
Zaradi te razveljavitve še vedno poteka formalni preiskovalni postopek.
By letters of 3 December 2004, 13 May 2005, 18 July 2005 and 7 August 2008, the Commission requested additional information from the Spanish authorities, which was provided by letters of 28 February 2005, 4 July 2005, 29 September 2005, 10 September 2008 and 15 September 2008.
Na podlagi dopisov z dne 3. decembra 2004, 13. maja 2005, 18. julija 2005 in 7. avgusta 2008 je Komisija španskim oblastem nudila dodatne informacije, ki jih je posredovala v dopisih z dne 28. februarja 2005, 4. julija 2005, 29. septembra 2005, 10. septembra 2008 in 15. septembra 2008.
SNIACE’s turnover in 2007 was EUR 15 million.
Promet podjetja SNIACE je v letu 2007 dosegel 15 milijonov EUR.
FOGASA and the TGSS concluded debt repayment and rescheduling agreements with SNIACE as described in recitals 15 to 21.
Sklad FOGASA in TGSS sta s podjetjem SNIACE podpisala sporazume o vračilu in reprogramiranju dolgov, ki so opisani v uvodnih izjavah od 15 do 21.
Agreements concluded with FOGASA
Sporazumi, podpisani s skladom FOGASA
FOGASA is an autonomous body answerable to the Ministry of Employment and Immigration which is financed by contributions from undertakings.
Sklad FOGASA je neodvisni organ Ministrstva za delo in priseljevanje, ki se financira s prispevki podjetij.
Its main function, according to the first subparagraph of Article 33(1) of the Workers’ Statute, is to pay ‘to workers the remuneration owed to them in the event of insolvency or administration of their employers’.
Skladno z določili prvega pododstavka člena 33(1) Statuta delavcev, je njegova glavna naloga omogočiti kritje plač, ki še niso bile izplačane delavcem zaradi nelikvidnosti ali stečajnega postopka.
Under paragraph 4 of Article 33, FOGASA is required to subrogate itself to the rights and actions of workers in order to obtain repayment of the sums advanced.
Člen 33(4) zavezuje sklad FOGASA, da v zameno za povrnitev dolga prevzame pravice delavcev.
Under the provisions of Royal Decree 505/85 of 6 March 1985 [10], FOGASA may conclude repayment agreements relating to the sums advanced to workers in payment of wages and compensation in order to assist the recovery of sums due, which will bear interest at the statutory rate in force.
Skladno z določili Kraljevega odloka št. 505/85 z dne 6. marca 1985 [10], lahko sklad FOGASA sklene sporazum o vračilu dolgov po načelu podeljevanja plač in odškodnin delavcem z namenom, da zagotovi vračilo ustreznih zneskov, ki so določeni na podlagi veljavne zakonite obrestne mere.
FOGASA concluded two debt repayment agreements with SNIACE on 5 November 1993 and 31 October 1995.
Sklad FOGASA je s podjetjem SNIACE sklenil sporazum o vračilu dolgov dne 5. novembra 1993 in 31. oktobra 1995.
In the first case the sum owed was ESP 1362708700 (including interest) and in the second it was ESP 339459878 (including interest).
V prvem primeru je šlo za znesek v višini 1362708700 pezet (skupaj z obrestmi), v drugem pa za 339459878 pezet (skupaj z obrestmi).
The first agreement, of 5 November 1993 (hereinafter the FOGASA I agreement), related to the amounts paid by FOGASA in wages and compensation that SNIACE owed to its staff.
Namen prvega sporazuma z dne 5. novembra 1993 (v nadaljevanju: sporazum FOGASA I) je bila določitev višine podeljenega zneska s strani Sklada FOGASA glede ustreznih plač in odškodnin, ki jih je SNIACE dolgovalo svojim zaposlenim.
The debt amounted to ESP 897652759, to which interest at a rate of 10 % amounting to ESP 465055911 had to be added, making a total of ESP 1362708700.
Dolg je znašal 897652759 pezet, k temu pa je potrebno prišteti še obresti v višini 465055911 pezet po 10-odstotni obrestni meri, kar je skupaj znašalo 1362708700 pezet.
The debt was linked to mortgaging of SNIACE’s assets and was to be repaid in accordance with a schedule, which was renegotiated on 18 March 1999, setting out the amounts in pesetas (ESP) as follows:
Dolg je bil vezan na hipoteko za delnice podjetja SNIACE in ga je bilo potrebno povrniti skladno z načrtom, ki je bil določen po pogajanjih z dne 18. marca 1999 v španskih pezetah (ESP) na naslednji način:
The FOGASA I agreement
Sporazum FOGASA I
Initial agreement of 5 November 1993
Prvotni sporazum z dne 5. novembra 1993
Renegotiated agreement of 18 March 1999
Sporazum po pogajanjih z dne 18. marca 1999
The second agreement of 31 October 1995 (hereinafter the FOGASA II agreement) related to the amounts that FOGASA had continued to pay after the agreement of 5 November 1993 in wages and compensation that SNIACE owed to its staff.
Namen drugega sporazuma z dne 31. oktobra 1995 (v nadaljevanju: Sporazum FOGASA II) je bila določitev zneska, ki ga je sklad FOGASA plačeval po sporazumu z dne 5. novembra 1993 glede ustreznih plač in odškodnin, ki jih je SNIACE dolgovalo svojim zaposlenim.
The new debt amounted to ESP 229424860, to which interest at a rate of 9 % amounting to ESP 110035018 had to be added, making a total of ESP 339459878.
Dolg je znašal 229424860 pezet, k temu pa je potrebno prišteti še obresti v višini 110035018 pezet po 9-odstotni obrestni meri, kar je skupaj znašalo 339459878 pezet.
The debt was linked to mortgaging of SNIACE’s assets and was to be repaid in accordance with a schedule that was renegotiated on 18 March 1999 that set out the amounts in pesetas (ESP) as follows:
Dolg je bil vezan na hipoteko za delnice podjetja SNIACE in ga je bilo potrebno povrniti skladno z načrtom, ki je bil določen po pogajanjih z dne 18. marca 1999 v španskih pezetah (ESP) na naslednji način:
The FOGASA II agreement
Sporazum FOGASA II
Initial agreement of 31 October 1995
Prvotni sporazum z dne 31. oktobra 1995
Under Article 20 of the General Law on Social Security [11], the TGSS may agree to the deferment or payment in instalments of the social security contributions owed and surcharges relating to those contributions.
TGSS lahko, skladno z določilom člena 20 Splošnega zakona o socialnem zavarovanju, odredi odložitev ali porazdelitev plačila prispevkov za socialno zavarovanje [11], kot tudi vseh dodatnih davkov na te prispevke.
Article 27 of that Law states that surcharges for payments outside the time limit must be added to the deferred debt.
Člen 27 istega zakona določa, da je potrebno dodatne davke, ki bi bili plačani zunaj določenega roka, prišteti k odloženim obrokom plačil.
The agreement of 8 March 1996, as amended by the agreements of 7 May 1996 and 30 September 1997, provided for the rescheduling of the debt payment to a total amount of ESP 3510387323 plus accrued interest, which, at a rate of 7,5 %, amounted to ESP 615056349.
Sporazum z dne 8. marca 1996, spremenjen s sporazumi z dne 7. maja 1996 in 30. septembra 1997 določa reprogramiranje dolgov v skupnem znesku 3510387323 pezet skupaj s povišanimi obrestmi, ki so narasle na 615056349 pezet po 7,5-odstotni obrestni meri.
REASONS THAT LED TO INITIATION OF THE PROCEDURE
RAZLOGI, KI SO PRIVEDLI DO PONOVNE SPROŽITVE POSTOPKA
In its decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission considered that the Court of Justice’s analysis in the Tubacex case was fully applicable to the measures in question in the Decision of 1998 and, therefore, that that decision should be partially revoked and the agreements concluded between SNIACE and the public creditors should be reassessed.
Pri svoji odločitvi o ponovni sprožitvi postopka je Komisija ugotovila, da se analiza, ki jo je pripravilo Sodišče v zadevi „Tubacex“, lahko v celoti uporabi za ukrepe, ki so bili predmet Odločbe iz leta 1998, in da je zaradi tega potrebno delno razveljaviti omenjeno odločbo in ponovno presoditi o sporazumih med podjetjem SNIACE in javnimi upniki.
Indeed, in the light of the Tubacex judgment, the Commission expressed some doubts concerning the measures implemented by the public creditors:
Tako je Komisija glede na Sodbo „Tubacex“ izrazila nekaj pomislekov o ukrepih, ki jih izvajajo javni upniki:
firstly, concerning the presence of elements constituting State Aid in the measures deemed incompatible in the Decision of 1998 and, if so, their compatibility; and
prvič, glede prisotnosti sestavnih delov državne pomoči v ukrepih, ki se skladno z Odločbo iz leta 1998 smatrajo za nezdružljive, in posledično glede njihove združljivosti, in
secondly, concerning the behaviour of a private creditor who, in a comparable situation, would have demanded a higher interest rate than that required by the public creditors.
drugič, glede ravnanja zasebnega upnika, ko se znajde v primerljivem položaju, in bi moral zahtevati višjo obrestno mero kot javni upniki.
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
MNENJE ZAINTERESIRANE STRANI
No comments were submitted by interested parties.
Zainteresirana stran ni podala svojega mnenja.
SPAIN’S COMMENTS
MNENJE ŠPANIJE
The Spanish Government submitted its comments by letter of 21 March 2000.
Španska vlada je svoje mnenje izrazila v pismu z dne 21. marca 2000.
The Spanish authorities disagree with the Commission’s decision to open the formal investigation procedure, inasmuch as in their view the investigation procedure was not necessary to carry out the envisaged partial revocation of the Decision of 1998.
Španske oblasti se ne strinjajo z odločitvijo Komisije, da ponovno sproži formalni preiskovalni postopek, saj ta postopek po njihovem mnenju ni potreben za izvršitev predvidene delne razveljavitve Odločbe iz leta 1998.
As regards the rescheduling agreement between SNIACE and the TGSS, the Spanish authorities do not share the Commission’s view that ‘it seems probable that, in the case of out-of-court agreements concerned with or having the effect of rescheduling pre-existing debts, the creditor would seek to obtain from the debtor a rate of interest on arrears that would be higher than the legal interest rate as compensation for not pursuing the recovery of the debt by legal means’.
Kar zadeva sporazum o reprogramiranju med podjetjem SNIACE in TGSS, se španske oblasti ne strinjajo z mnenjem Komisije, kateri se „zdi običajno, da v zunajsodnih sporazumih s ciljem reprogramiranja predhodno obstoječih dolgov javni upnik skuša od dolžnika pridobiti višjo zamudno obrestno mero, kot je zakonita obrestna mera, zato da bi se pri povračilu dolgov izognil sodišču“.
On the contrary, they claim that, owing to the financial situation of the company as well as the cost, duration and uncertainty inherent in legal proceedings, out-of-court agreements would frequently lead to agreeing an interest rate lower than the legal interest rate.
Nasprotno navajajo, da zaradi finančnega položaja podjetja kot tudi zaradi stroškov, trajanja in negotovosti, ki so značilni za sodne postopke, zunajsodni sporazumi pripeljejo do sporazuma o nižji obrestni meri od zakonite obrestne mere.
Thus, the Spanish authorities reiterate their argument that the granting of a deferment applying the legal interest rate protects the interests of the social security system, in terms of recovering debts, better than any other form of action that a private creditor could have taken.
Zato španske oblasti ponavljajo svojo utemeljitev, da sporazum o odložitvi z uporabo zakonite obrestne mere ščiti interese sistema socialnega zavarovanja s ciljem vračila dolgov, bolj kot katera koli druga oblika postopka, ki bi jo lahko uporabil zasebni upnik.
The Spanish Government also recalls that while a private creditor can agree any interest rate with the debtor, the Social Security authorities are bound by Article 20 of the General Law on Social Security, which lays down that the legal interest rate is to be applied in the debt rescheduling agreements.
Prav tako španska vlada navaja, da se zasebni upnik lahko dogovori z dolžnikom za kakršno koli obrestno mero, medtem ko morajo organi za socialno zavarovanje spoštovati določilo člena 20 Splošnega zakona o socialnem zavarovanju, ki določa, da je potrebno pri sporazumih o reprogramiranju dolgov uporabiti zakonito obrestno mero.
In its decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission considered that the comparison of the terms contained in the private creditors’ agreement of October 1996 with the terms of the rescheduling agreement between the social security authorities and SNIACE might not be the correct way of applying the ‘private creditor’ test, as defined by the Court of Justice.
Pri svoji odločitvi o ponovni sprožitvi postopka je Komisija menila, da primerjava pogojev iz sporazuma z zasebnimi upniki iz oktobra 1996 s pogoji iz sporazuma o reprogramiranju med TGSS in podjetjem SNIACE morda ni ustrezen način z uporabo kriterija „zasebni upnik“, kot ga definira Sodišče.
In this regard, the Spanish authorities stated that, due to legal obligations of the public administration, the situation of public creditors could not be treated in the same way as the situation of private creditors.
V zvezi s tem so španske oblasti izjavile, da zaradi zakonskih obveznosti javne uprave položaja javnih upnikov ni mogoče primerjati z zasebnimi upniki.
However, they emphasised that, in spite of the differences, the terms and conditions of the agreements between the social security authorities and SNIACE, on the one hand, and between FOGASA and SNIACE, on the other hand, were stricter than the terms reached in the private creditors’ agreement.
Vseeno so poudarili, da so kljub razlikam pogoji in določila v sporazumih med TGSS in podjetjem SNIACE po eni strani, in sporazumih med skladom FOGASA in podjetjem SNIACE po drugi strani, bolj strogi kot pogoji, določeni v sporazumu med zasebnimi upniki.
Finally, the Spanish authorities reiterated the views expressed in the procedure which led to the Decision of 1998.
Nazadnje so španske oblasti ponovile svoj vidik, ki so ga izpostavile v postopku, ki se je zaključil z Odločbo iz leta 1998.
ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE SECOND INITIATION OF THE PROCEDURE
O UPRAVIČENOSTI PONOVNE SPROŽITVE POSTOPKA
The Spanish authorities maintain that it was not necessary to initiate a new formal investigation procedure to resolve the case and that respect for the rights of interested parties was not a sufficient reason for doing so.
Španske oblasti so mnenja, da nov formalni preiskovalni postopek ni potreben za razrešitev tožbe in da spoštovanje pravic zainteresirane strani ni dovolj velik razlog za tako dejanje.
For its part, the Commission considers that the Tubacex judgment was sufficiently relevant for the Spanish authorities and the interested parties to be informed of it.
Po drugi strani Komisija meni, da bi Sodba „Tubacex“ predstavljala dovolj pomemben element, da bi bilo o informaciji potrebno obvestiti španske oblasti in zainteresirano stran.
Indeed, that judgment could alter the assessment criteria as laid down in the decision to initiate the procedure of 7 November 1997.
Omenjena sodba bi namreč lahko spremenila ocenjevalne kriterije, kot so bili navedeni v odločbi o ponovni sprožitvi postopka z dne 7. novembra 1997.
DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF AID FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 87(1) OF THE TREATY
DOLOČITEV OBSTOJA POMOČI V SMISLU ČLENA 87(1) POGODBE
In the second initiation of the procedure, the Commission raised the question of whether the agreements concluded between SNIACE and its public creditors included State Aid and, if so, whether they could be declared compatible.
Pri ponovni sprožitvi postopka se je Komisija spraševala, ali sporazumi med podjetjem SNIACE in javnimi upniki vključujejo državno pomoč in, če je tako, ali je ta lahko združljiva.
The Tubacex judgment allows State interventions in the form of debt rescheduling to be considered as not constituting State Aid if they fulfil the criteria laid down in that judgment (see recital (4))
Sodba „Tubacex“ dovoljuje razumevanje, da javni posegi v obliki reprogramiranja dolgov ne predstavljajo državne pomoči, če izpolnjujejo kriterije, določene v omenjeni sodbi (glej uvodno izjavo 4)
In the judgment in Case T-36/99 annulling the Decision of 2000, the Court of First Instance rejected the grounds on which the Commission had considered that the TGSS and FOGASA had behaved as a private creditor would have done.
V sodbi o zadevi T-36/99, ki razveljavlja Odločbo 2000, je prvostopenjsko sodišče zavrnilo razloge, ki jih je Komisija predstavila kot podlago za to, da sta TGSS in FOGASA ravnala kot zasebna upnika.
For that purpose, and in the light of the judgment of the Court of First Instance, the following should be verified:
Zaradi tega in upoštevajoč sodbo prvostopenjskega sodišča je potrebno preveriti:
the situation of the public creditors compared with that of the private creditors;
položaj javnih upnikov v primerjavi z zasebnimi upniki;
the situation of the Banco Español de Crédito (hereinafter Banesto), a private creditor, compared with that of the TGSS and that of FOGASA;
položaj Španske kreditne banke (v nadaljevanju: Banesto), ki je zasebni upnik, v primerjavi s TGSS in skladom FOGASA;
the prospects of recovering the total sums owed to the TGSS and FOGASA without suffering any financial loss, and
možnost vračila celotnega zneska dolga TGSS in skladu FOGASA brez finančnih izgub in
SNIACE’s prospects of future profitability and viability.
možnost ustvarjanja dobička in sposobnosti za preživetje podjetja SNIACE v prihodnosti.
The criteria laid down in the Tubacex judgment and in the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-36/99 are cumulative.
Kriteriji, navedeni v sodbi „Tubacex“ in sodbi prvostopenjskega sodišča v zadevi T-36/99, se lahko združijo.
As soon as the measures taken by the public creditors do not fulfil at least one of them, the Commission must discard the private creditor principle.
Od trenutka, ko določila, ki jih vzpostavijo javni upniki, ne izpolnjujejo najmanj enega izmed teh kriterijev, mora Komisija izključiti načelo zasebnega upnika.
AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITH FOGASA
SPORAZUMI, PODPISANI S SKLADOM FOGASA
Unlike the facts that gave rise to the Tubacex judgment, the two agreements with FOGASA were concluded approximately two years apart and related to different debts.
Nasprotno od dejstev, ki so bila podlaga za sodbo „Tubacex“, sta bila sporazuma s skladom FOGASA podpisana dve leti kasneje in sta obravnavala drugačne dolgove.
The Commission considers that they do not constitute a single agreement.
Komisija meni, da ne gre za en sam sporazum.
When the second agreement was concluded, FOGASA did not try to combine them into one agreement covering all the amounts owed.
Sklad FOGASA po podpisu drugega sporazuma prav tako ni skušala združiti obeh sporazumov v enega, ki bi obravnaval skupni znesek dolga.
FOGASA only unified outstanding debts by means of the agreement of 18 March 1999 [12], that is to say, four years after the second agreement was concluded between FOGASA and SNIACE.
FOGASA je le poenotila še ne povrnjene dolgove s sporazumom z dne 18. marca 1999 [12], torej štiri leta po podpisu drugega sporazuma med skladom FOGASA in podjetjem SNIACE.
For the purposes of this assessment, the Commission will first analyse the FOGASA I agreement and then the FOGASA II agreement, taking into account the criteria applicable to private creditors.
Za namen te ocene je Komisija najprej preučila sporazum FOGASA I in nato sporazum FOGASA II z upoštevanjem kriterijev, ki veljajo za zasebne upnike.
FOGASA I Agreement
Sporazum FOGASA I
SNIACE and FOGASA concluded the first debt rescheduling agreement on 5 November 1993 for the amount of ESP 1362708700 (including interest).
Podjetje SNIACE in sklad FOGASA sta sklenila prvi sporazum o reprogramiranju dolgov dne 5. novembra 1993 v znesku 1362708700 pezet (skupaj z obrestmi).
The agreement was concluded after FOGASA paid the wages and compensation that SNIACE owed to its staff.
Sporazum je bil podpisan potem, ko je sklad FOGASA izplačal plače in odškodnine, ki jih je podjetje SNIACE dolgovalo svojim zaposlenim.
For the purposes of its analysis, the Commission must distinguish between the time when the agreement was concluded (ex-ante analysis) and the time when it was implemented (ex-post analysis).
Pri preučevanju mora Komisija razlikovati med trenutkom podpisa sporazuma (analiza ex-ante) in trenutkom izvršitve sporazuma (analiza ex-post).
In fact, it could be the case that, after analysing an agreement in terms of its characteristics at the time when it was concluded, the conclusion is reached that the agreement does not contain aid, and that its implementation, in different circumstances from those initially envisaged, alters that initial opinion and the conclusion is reached that it does contain aid.
Lahko bi se tudi zgodilo, da bi se po preučitvi sporazuma v smislu njegovih lastnih značilnosti v trenutku podpisa ugotovilo, da omenjeni sporazum ne vključuje pomoči, po preučitvi njegove izvršitve pod drugačnimi pogoji od začetnih, pa bi se prvotno mnenje spremenilo in bi ugotovili, da sporazum vključuje pomoči
Assessment of the FOGASA I agreement at the time of its conclusion
Ocena sporazuma FOGASA I v trenutku podpisa