natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The 3 remaining counties tendered respectively out 96 % (Copenhagen), 35 % (Ribe) and 21 % (Vyborg) of their lines [17].
Preostala tri okrožja so razpisovala 96 % (Kobenhaven), 35 % (Ribe) in 21 % (Vyborg) svojih linij [17].
Public service contracts in Denmark run for 5 years, some of them foreseeing the option of an extension for another 3 years.
Pogodbe za javna naročila storitev na Danskem trajajo pet let, nekatera omogočajo podaljšanje za dodatna tri leta.
The Danish bus market has been characterised by a process of continued concentration.
Za danski trg avtobusnih prevozov je bil značilen proces neprekinjene koncentracije.
In 1988, more than 400 undertakings were offering bus services, whereas in 2004, only approximately 100 operators remained in business.
Leta 1988 je več kot 400 podjetij nudilo avtobusne storitve, leta 2004 pa je poslovalo le še okoli 100 prevoznikov.
Historically, the Danish Railways, through their bus subsidiary, were the single biggest operator.
Zgodovinsko gledano so bile največji prevoznik Danske železnice s svojo avtobusno podružnico.
The Danish State kept 100 % of the shares in Combus.
Danska država je ohranila 100 % delnic v podjetju Combus.
Combus and its predecessor had throughout the 1990s a market share of 20 % in Denmark.
Podjetje Combus in njegov predhodnik sta v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja imela 20-odstotni tržni delež na Danskem.
In 1997, Arriva Denmark A/S (hereinafter referred to as ‘Arriva’), a subsidiary of the British company Arriva plc, and Connex Denmark A/S (hereinafter referred to as ‘Connex’), a subsidiary of the French company Veolia, entered the Danish bus market through acquisitions [18].
Leta 1997 sta Arriva Denmark a/s (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Arriva), odvisno podjetje britanskega podjetja Arriva plc, in Connex Denmark a/s (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Connex), odvisno podjetje francoskega podjetja Veolia, vstopili na danski trg avtobusnih prevozov prek prevzemov [18].
In 1999 and 2004, the last year for which figures are available, the market shares of the three companies were the following:
V letih 1999 in 2004, ki je zadnje leto, za katerega so na voljo podatki, so bili tržni deleži omenjenih treh podjetij naslednji:
Market shares for Combus, Arriva and Connex in 1999 and 2004
Tržni deleži podjetij Combus, Arriva in Connex v letih 1999 in 2004
Metropolitan Denmark
Prestolnica
Entire country
Celotna država
Entire country excluding Metropolitan Denmark
Celotna država brez prestolnice
For the interpretation of these figures, the following information is necessary: In 2001, Arriva acquired Combus.
Za razlaganje teh podatkov so potrebne naslednje informacije: leta 2001 je podjetje Arriva prevzelo podjetje Combus.
Later the same year, Connex acquired 50 % of the lines initially exploited by Combus from Arriva.
Najpozneje istega leta je podjetje Connex od podjetja Arriva kupilo 50 % linij, ki jih je prvotno uporabljalo podjetje Combus.
In 2004, Arriva further strengthened its position by acquiring the undertaking Wulff Bus A/S, which had a 10 % market share in the province of Jutland.
Leta 2004 je podjetje Arriva dodatno okrepilo svoj položaj s prevzemom podjetja Wulff Bus a/s, ki je imelo 10-odstotni tržni delež v provinci Jutland.
The Danish bus market represents a total volume of appr. DKK 5,5 billions per year.
Skupni promet na danskem trgu avtobusnih prevozov znaša približno 5,5 milijarde DKK na leto.
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF COMBUS
FINANČNE TEŽAVE PODJETJA COMBUS
As explained in the decision to initiate the procedure (recitals 34 and following), Combus had, following its spin-off from the Danish Railways, embarked on an ambitious expansion policy.
Kot pojasnjuje odločitev o sprožitvi postopka (uvodna izjava 34 in naslednje), je podjetje Combus po odcepitvi od Danskih železnic začelo izvajati ambiciozno politiko širitve.
Combus won many new contracts, especially in the Copenhagen area, and increased its turnover by more than 40 % between 1995 and 1999.
Pridobilo je mnogo novih pogodb, zlasti na območju Kobenhavna, in v obdobju 1995–1999 povečalo svoj promet za več kot 40 %.
However, the vast majority of these new contracts turned out to be loss-making.
Toda izkazalo se je, da velika večina teh novih pogodb prinaša izgubo.
As a consequence, Combus got into serious financial difficulties, starting in 1998.
Posledično je podjetje Combus zašlo v resne finančne težave, ki so se začele leta 1998.
The following two tables illustrate these difficulties in both absolute numbers and percentages.
Spodnji dve razpredelnici ponazarjata te težave v absolutnih zneskih in v odstotkih.
Key figures for Combus A/S 1995-2000
Ključni podatki za podjetje Combus A/S 1995–2000
Gross result
Bruto rezultat
Result before interest
Rezultat pred obrestmi
Year's result
Letni rezultat
Operating profit margin
Dobiček iz poslovanja
Profit/capital ratio
Razmerje med dobičkom in kapitalom
Gross margin
Bruto marža
Return on equity
Donosnost lastniškega kapitala
The privatisation of Combus
Privatizacija podjetja Combus
Three periods can be distinguished in the process of privatisation of Combus.
V postopku privatizacije podjetja Combus ločimo med tremi obdobji.
In the period 1995 to 1998, the Danish State pursued the objective of selling only a minority stake of 25 % but this never materialised.
V letih med 1995 in 1998 je danska država težila k cilju prodaje 25-odstotnega manjšinskega deleža, toda do tega ni nikoli prišlo.
Starting at the end of 1998, it launched a first attempt at selling 100 % of the shares.
Konec leta 1998 je prvič poskusila prodati 100 % delnic.
This attempt failed in July 1999.
Ta poskus je spodletel julija 1999.
The Danish government then decided to first restructure and then sell the company.
Nato se danska vlada odločila, da bo podjetje najprej prestrukturirala in ga nato prodala.
This plan resulted in the sale of Combus to Arriva in early 2001.
Rezultat tega načrta je bila prodaja podjetja Combus podjetju Arriva v začetku leta 2001.
Exploration of the sale of a minority stake (1995 to 1998)
Raziskava prodaje manjšinskega deleža (1995 do 1998)
The Act No 232 on DSB Busser A/S of 1995, by which Combus A/S was set up as an independent company, foresaw that the Danish State would sell up to 25 % of the shares in the company until the end of 1998.
Zakon št. 232 o DSB Busser A/S iz leta 1995, na podlagi katerega je bilo ustanovljeno podjetje Combus a/s kot samostojno podjetje, je predvideval, da bo danska država prodala do 25 % delnic v podjetju do konca leta 1998.
To this end, a steering committee was set up, which was composed of representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transport, Combus and external legal and financial advisers.
V ta namen je bil oblikovan usmerjevalni odbor, sestavljen iz predstavnikov Ministrstva za finance, Ministrstva za promet, podjetja Combus ter zunanjih pravnih in finančnih svetovalcev.
The steering committee held a total of 7 meetings, before the work was put on hold in mid 1997.
Usmerjevalni odbor je imel skupaj sedem sestankov, preden se je delo začasno ustavilo sredi leta 1997.
First attempt for a full privatisation (1998 to 1999)
Prvi poskus popolne privatizacije (1998 do 1999)
At the beginning of November 1998, the steering committee resumed its work, now with the instruction to prepare the sale of at least a majority holding in Combus.
V začetku novembra 1998 je usmerjevalni odbor ponovno začel z delom, tokrat z navodili, da pripravi prodajo najmanj večinskega deleža v podjetju Combus.
The committee started out with a financial evaluation of the company.
Odbor je začel s finančnim vrednotenjem podjetja.
As a basis for this evaluation, Combus submitted in mid November 1998 a forecast of its accounting results for 1998 and a forecast for budget figures for the period 1999 to 2001.
Vrednotenje je temeljilo na napovedi računovodskih rezultatov za leto 1998, ki jih je podjetje Combus predložilo sredi novembra 1998, in napovedi proračunskih zneskov za obdobje od leta 1999 do leta 2001.
Based on these submissions, the financial adviser of the government, the Copenhagen office of Alfred Berg Corporate Finance (hereinafter referred to as ‘Alfred Berg’), concluded as follows:
Na podlagi teh predloženih podatkov je finančni svetovalec vlade, kobenhavnski urad Alfred Berg Corporate Finance (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Alfred Berg) sklenil:
‘.… it can be concluded that Combus’ total share capital has a negative market value of hundreds of millions of Danish kroner.
„… sklepamo lahko, da ima skupni osnovni kapital podjetja Combus negativno tržno vrednost v višini nekaj sto milijonov danskih kron.
In addition to the profitability of the primary business having fallen significantly over the last couple of years, the estimated value is further reduced by the significant interest-bearing net debt built up by the company over the same period.
Poleg tega, da je donosnost osnovne dejavnosti v zadnjih nekaj letih bistveno padla, se je ocenjena vrednost še dodatno zmanjšala zaradi precejšnjega obrestovanega neto dolga, ki si ga je podjetje nabralo v istem obdobju.
Most potential buyers understand, however, that financially and economically very weak companies such as Combus are not traded at large negative values as it would then be more appropriate for the vendor to close down the company.
Toda večina potencialnih kupcev se zaveda, da se finančno in gospodarsko zelo šibka podjetja, kot je Combus, ne prodajajo, ko imajo visoko negativno vrednost, saj bi bilo v tem primeru ustrezneje, da prodajalec zapre podjetje.
Against this background we recommend that, in the sales process and the information material being prepared in that connection, the scene must be set, as far as possible, for the price of Combus to be set on the basis of the company’s actual equity capital, minus a discount.
Glede na to ozadje priporočamo, da se v postopku prodaje in priprave informativnega gradiva v zvezi z njo, kolikor je to mogoče, določijo okoliščine, da se cena podjetja Combus določi na podlagi dejanskega lastniškega kapitala podjetja, zmanjšanega za popust.
On this basis and combined with
Na tej podlagi in skupaj s
the potential for operational improvements
potencialom za poslovna izboljšanja
the potential for synergies
potencialom za sinergije
the company’s strategic value by virtue of its large market share in the Danish bus sector
strateško vrednostjo podjetja glede na njegov velik tržni delež v danskem avtobusnem sektorju
it is presumably still conceivable that, despite the continuing deterioration in the company’s financial and economic situation, a buyer can be found for Combus so that the Danish State (“the State”) can dispose of the company with full cover for its creditors.
je predvidoma še vedno mogoče, kljub temu, da se finančni in gospodarski položaj podjetja še vedno slabša, da se bo našel kupec za podjetje Combus, tako da bo lahko danska država (‚država‘) prodala podjetje in povsem poplačala njegove upnike.
It should also be expected that the majority of potential buyers will consider that, in the light of Combus’ very weak capital structure and low profitability, the need for an injection of capital into the company is so great that it would be unprofitable for them to acquire Combus’ total share capital for a positive amount.
Pričakovati je mogoče tudi, da bo večina potencialnih kupcev menila, da je zaradi zelo šibke kapitalske strukture in nizke donosnosti podjetja Combus potreba po dokapitalizaciji podjetja tako velika, da se jim ne bi izplačalo kupiti celotnega osnovnega kapitala podjetja Combus za pozitiven znesek.
The considerable uncertainty therefore surrounding the terms under which the State can dispose of Combus can, however, only be overcome by continuing the ongoing sales process.’
Precejšnjo negotovost v zvezi s pogoji, pod katerimi lahko država proda podjetje Combus, pa je mogoče premagati z nadaljevanjem postopka prodaje, ki je v teku.“
Alfred Berg listed the following options as alternatives to the quick sale of Combus A/S:
Podjetje Alfred Berg je kot druge možnosti namesto hitre prodaje podjetja Combus A/S navedlo naslednje možnosti:
carrying out a controlled closure of the company which would, amongst other things, mean the State/DSB taking over all the civil servants who are today seconded to Combus by DSB, and the concomitant financial obligations.
nadzorovano zaprtje podjetja, ki bi med drugim pomenilo, da država/DSB prevzame vse javne uslužbence, ki so danes v podjetje Combus premeščeni s strani podjetja DSB, in hkratne finančne obveznosti.
It is doubtful whether Combus, despite the positive book value of capital and reserves, could be wound up while fully covering the company's creditors, and consequently there is a risk of negative coverage of the State’s handling of the case by lenders, the press etc.
Vprašljivo je, ali je mogoče podjetje Combus kljub pozitivni knjigovodski vrednosti kapitala in rezerv likvidirati in obenem v celoti poplačati njegove upnike, posledično pa obstaja tveganje negativnega poročanja posojilodajalcev in medijev itd. o tem, kako država obravnava zadevo;
continuing ownership in order to carry out a thorough rationalisation and streamlining of Combus and thereby ensure that the company will be profitable within 2-3 years and consequently more saleable.
nadaljnje lastništvo, da se izvede celovita racionalizacija podjetja Combus in s tem zagotovi, da bo podjetje v dveh do treh letih začelo poslovati z dobičkom in ga bo zato mogoče lažje prodati.
Due to the company’s very weak capital structure and large debt burden at this time, this will probably mean the State injecting a nine-figure amount in new equity capital in the short term.
Zaradi zelo šibke kapitalske strukture in obstoječega velikega dolga podjetja bo to verjetno pomenilo, da bo država v kratkem roku povečala lastniški kapital za devetštevilčni znesek.
There is considerable risk in investing in a “turnaround” of Combus, and no guarantee of a positive return on the State’s investment.’
Obstaja precejšnje tveganje pri naložbi v ‚preobrat‘ podjetja Combus in ni zagotovila, da bo država iz te naložbe iztržila pozitiven donos.“
The financial adviser, based on this assessment, gave the following recommendation:
Na podlagi te ocene je finančni svetovalec priporočil:
‘Neither of the two aforementioned alternatives appears immediately attractive, and also depend on the State's attitude to injecting further equity capital into Combus and also assuming the responsibility for carrying out a thorough streamlining of the company.
„Nobena izmed zgoraj omenjenih možnosti na prvi pogled ni privlačna in od države je odvisno, ali bo povečala lastniški kapital podjetja Combus in tudi prevzela odgovornost za izvedbo celovite racionalizacije podjetja.
Alfred Berg therefore recommends that the State continue the ongoing process of selling Combus in order to obtain a more exact picture of which and how relevant aspects (such as trends in results, capital structure, market share, order book, condition of the bus fleet, management resources, potential for operational improvements and synergies etc.) will be given weight by potential buyers in their overall assessment of the company.
Zato podjetje Alfred Berg priporoča, da država nadaljuje s tekočim postopkom prodaje podjetja Combus, da bi pridobila natančnejšo sliko o tem, katerim vidikom (kot so gibanje rezultatov, kapitalska struktura, tržni delež, knjiga naročil, stanje avtobusne flote, viri upravljanja, potencial za poslovna izboljšanja in sinergije itd.) bodo pripisali pomen potencialni kupci pri skupni oceni podjetja in kako.
Should this process not result in a potential buyer being found who appears attractive in relation to the terms in the two aforementioned alternatives, the State will choose the alternative that it considers most financially attractive and politically suitable at the time.’
Če se s tem postopkom ne najde potencialni kupec, ki je privlačnejši od zgoraj omenjenih možnosti, bo država izbrala možnost, za katero meni, da je finančno najprivlačnejša in politično ustrezna v tistem času.“
Following this advice, the Danish parliament adopted in December 1998 an act allowing the State to dispose of all its shares (100 %) in Combus [19].
Na podlagi tega nasveta je danski parlament decembra 1998 sprejel zakon, ki državi dovoljuje, da proda vse svoje delnice (100 %) v podjetju Combus [19].
Alfred Berg then performed a market screening based upon five criteria; the potential buyer should
Podjetje Alfred Berg je nato opravilo pregled trga na podlagi petih meril; potencialni kupec mora
be active within public administration,
biti aktiven znotraj javne uprave,
have a strong financial position,
imeti močan finančen položaj,
have a certain size (defined as ‘operating more than 1000 buses’),
biti določene velikosti (opredeljeno kot „poslovati z več kot 1000 avtobusi“),
have a significant turnover (defined as ‘more than DKK 1 billion’),
imeti velik promet (opredeljeno kot „več kot 1 milijardo DKK“),
be active in similar markets as Combus.
biti aktiven na podobnih trgih kot podjetje Combus.
The outcome of Alfred Berg’s market screening was a list of 12 potential buyers
Na podlagi pregleda trga je podjetje Alfred Berg sestavilo seznam 12 potencialnih kupcev.
The steering committee established then the following time table: Management presentations for 12 pre-selected potential buyers were to be hold in the period 9 to 18 February 1999.
Usmerjevalni odbor je nato oblikoval naslednji časovni okvir: predstavitve uprave za 12 predhodno izbranih potencialnih kupcev naj bi potekale med 9. in 18. februarjem 1999.
The deadline for submitting ‘indications of interest’ was end of February 1999, and the ‘indications of interest’ were to be assessed at the beginning of March 1999.
Rok za predložitev „navedbe interesa“ je bil konec februarja 1999, „navedbe interesa“ pa naj bi ocenili v začetku marca 1999.
Selected buyers were to have access to the data room in the period 10 to 24 March 1999.
Izbrani kupci naj bi imeli dostop do podatkovne sobe med 10. in 24. marcem 1999.
They then had to submit their final offers on 1 April, and on 8 April the steering committee was to choose a final buyer.
Zatem so morali predložiti svoje končne ponudbe 1. aprila, usmerjevalni odbor pa naj bi izbral končnega kupca 8. aprila.
Out of the 12 potential buyers, 7 participated in the management presentation of Combus.
Izmed 12 potencialnih kupcev jih je sedem sodelovalo pri predstavitvi uprave podjetja Combus.
At the presentation, potential buyers received a letter describing the forthcoming acquisition process.
Na predstavitvi so potencialni kupci prejeli pismo, ki opisuje prihodnji postopek nakupa.
Potential buyers were, via this letter, informed that they could get access to Combus’ data and also have additional meetings with the management of Combus, if they wished to do so.
Prek tega pisma so bili potencialni kupci obveščeni, da imajo lahko dostop do podatkov podjetja Combus in da imajo lahko dodatne sestanke z upravo podjetja Combus, če to želijo.
In order to take advantage of these possibilities, potential buyers had to submit an ‘Indication of interest’ by the end of February 1999.
Da bi izkoristili te možnosti, so morali potencialni kupci predložiti „navedbo interesa“ do konca februarja 1999.
Alfred Berg received such indications of interest from 6 pre-selected potential buyers in February 1999.
Podjetje Alfred Berg je februarja 1999 prejelo navedbe interesa od šestih predhodno izbranih potencialnih kupcev.
In March 1999, 2 of these were selected to have access to the data room.
Marca 1999 sta bila dva izbrana za dostop do podatkovne sobe.
After the examination of the data room, both potential buyers reduced their price indications so significantly that they corresponded to a negative market value of several hundreds of millions DKK.
Po pregledu podatkovne sobe sta oba potencialna kupca znižala navedeno ceno tako zelo, da je ustrezala negativni tržni vrednosti več sto milijonov DKK.
Alfred Berg submitted on 9 April 1999 a memo to the steering committee, in which it concluded that Combus A/S could hardly be sold at a positive value.
Podjetje Alfred Berg je 9. aprila 1999 predložilo obvestilo usmerjevalnemu odboru, v katerem ugotavlja, da bo podjetje Combus A/S težko prodati po pozitivni vrednosti.
Against this background, Alfred Berg laid down three alternatives to selling the company:
Glede na to je podjetje Alfred Berg opredelilo tri možnosti prodaje podjetja:
‘Option 1: For the State to continue ownership in order to carry out a thorough rationalisation and streamlining of Combus and thereby ensure that the company will be profitable within 2-3 years and consequently more saleable. Due to the company’s very weak capital structure and large debt burden at this time, this will probably mean the State injecting a nine-figure amount in new equity capital in the short term.
možnost: Država obdrži lastništvo, da izvede celovito racionalizacijo podjetja Combus in s tem zagotovi, da bo podjetje v dveh do treh letih začelo poslovati z dobičkom in ga bo zato lažje prodati. Zaradi zelo šibke kapitalske strukture in obstoječega velikega dolga podjetja bo to verjetno pomenilo, da bo država v kratkem roku povečala lastniški kapital za devetštevilčni znesek.
There is considerable risk in investing in a “turnaround” of Combus, and is no guarantee of a positive return on the State’s investment.
Obstaja precejšnje tveganje pri naložbi v ‚preobrat‘ podjetja Combus in ni zagotovila, da bo država iz te naložbe iztržila pozitiven donos.
Option 2: To carry out a controlled closure of the company and/or hand over the “key” to the company’s creditors.
možnost: Izvedba nadzorovanega zaprtja podjetja in/ali predaja ‚ključa‘ upnikom podjetja.
It is doubtful whether Combus, despite the positive book value of capital and reserves, could be wound up while fully covering the company’s creditors, and consequently there is a risk of negative coverage of the State’s handling of the case by lenders, the press etc.
Vprašljivo je, ali je mogoče podjetje Combus kljub pozitivni knjigovodski vrednosti kapitala in rezerv likvidirati in obenem v celoti poplačati njegove upnike, posledično pa obstaja tveganje negativnega poročanja posojilodajalcev in medijev itd. o tem, kako država obravnava zadevo.
Option 3: Combus separating the daily bus operations into an independent subsidiary.
možnost: Podjetje Combus oddeli vsakodnevno avtobusno dejavnost na samostojno odvisno podjetje.
In other words, the present assets (buses etc.) and liabilities (loans etc.) would be retained in Combus as it stands, whilst the right to the bus contracts etc. would be placed in an [independent] new subsidiary which would then lease the relevant assets (buses etc.) from Combus.
Z drugimi besedami, obstoječa sredstva (avtobusi itd.) in obveznosti (posojila itd.) obdrži podjetje Combus samo, pravica do pogodb o avtobusnem prevozu itd. pa se prenese na [samostojno] novo odvisno podjetje, ki bi nato najelo potrebna sredstva (avtobuse itd.) od podjetja Combus.
An attempt would be made to sell the new subsidiary and use the sale revenue to reduce debt in Combus, which would continue to be 100 % owned by the State.
Novo odvisno podjetje bi poskusili prodati in kupnino uporabiti za zmanjšanje dolga podjetja Combus, ki bi bil še naprej v 100-odstotni lasti države.
An attempt could then be made to reduce the debt still remaining in Combus using the rent from leasing the current assets to the new subsidiary.
Nato bi lahko poskusili zmanjšati preostali dolg podjetja Combus z uporabo prihodkov iz najema obratnih sredstev s strani novega odvisnega podjetja.
This model does not directly provide any security that the company’s creditors will emerge from their commitments with Combus without losses.
Ta model ne daje neposredno nobenega zagotovila, da bodo upniki iz svojih zavez s podjetjem Combus izšli brez izgub.
The creditors are therefore likely to demand some form of State guarantee, etc.’
Zato bodo upniki verjetno zahtevali nekakšno jamstvo države itd.“