natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Lufthansa expects the European markets to remain in recession in 2009, possibly 2010 and maybe even longer, with a corresponding effect on the business and planned restructuring of Austrian Airlines.
Lufthansa naj bi pričakovala recesijo evropskih trgov leta 2009, mogoče leta 2010 in morebiti tudi po letu 2010, kar bi ustrezno vplivalo na poslovanje in načrtovano prestrukturiranje Austrian Airlines.
Having said this, Lufthansa is of the opinion that the planned restructuring can restore the long-term viability of Austrian Airlines, with break-even depending in particular on the length and depth of the recession.
Kljub temu naj bi menila, da se s predvidenim prestrukturiranjem lahko obnovi dolgoročna sposobnost preživetja Austrian Airlines, pri čemer naj bi bila dosega praga donosnosti odvisna zlasti od trajanja in intenzivnosti recesije.
As things stand, it is apparent that Austrian Airlines will continue to sustain […].
Pri sedanjem stanju stvari naj bi bilo očitno, da bi Austrian Airlines v naslednjih […] utrpel […].
As regards the price to be paid, Lufthansa states that the conditions set in the privatisation mandate had no impact on the price it was willing to pay for Austrian Airlines.
Lufthansa glede cene, ki jo je treba plačati, navaja, da naj pogoji, določeni v pooblastilu za privatizacijo, ne bi vplivali na ceno, ki naj bi jo bila pripravljena plačati za Austrian Airlines.
Furthermore, these conditions did not deter bidders from participating in the tender process when compared with a private auction.
Poleg tega naj ti pogoji v primerjavi z zasebno dražbo nobenemu ponudniku ne bi preprečili, da sodeluje pri razpisu.
Lufthansa also argues that the difference between the price offered to the floating shareholders and the price to be paid to ÖIAG does not involve State aid.
Lufthansa navaja še, da naj razlika med ceno, ponujeno lastnikom delnic v prostem obtoku, in ceno, ki jo je treba plačati ÖIAG, ne bi obsegala državne pomoči.
The price to be paid to ÖIAG is made up of a fixed price of EUR 366268,75 and a debtor warrant (Besserungsschein) whose value depends on the operational performance of Austrian Airlines and the price development of Lufthansa shares.
Cena, ki jo je treba plačati ÖIAG, naj bi bila sestavljena iz fiksne cene v višini 366268,75 EUR in naloga za plačilo dolgov, katerega vrednost naj bi bila odvisna od poslovne uspešnosti Austrian Airlines in rasti borznega tečaja delnic Lufthanse.
The maximum payment under the debtor warrant is EUR 4,48 per share.
Največje mogoče plačilo iz naloga za plačilo dolgov naj bi bilo 4,48 EUR na delnico.
The price to be paid to the floating shareholders is determined by Section 26 of the Austrian Takeover Act and is EUR 4,49 per outstanding share.
Cena, ki jo je treba plačati lastnikom delnic v prostem obtoku, naj bi se določila v skladu s členom 26 avstrijskega zakona o prevzemih. Ta cena naj bi bila 4,49 EUR na neplačano delnico.
Lufthansa stated that it would make no economic sense to oblige the highest bidder to offer a price corresponding to the share price.
Lufthansa je navedla, da naj ne bi bilo gospodarsko smiselno najvišjega ponudnika zavezati k temu, da ponudi ceno, ki naj bi ustrezala delniškemu tečaju.
If the State had chosen to offer all of its shares on the stock exchange, the share price would have plummeted.
Če bi se država odločila na borzi ponuditi vse svoje deleže, bi delniški tečaj močno padel.
The minimum takeover bid price is based on an average of historical share prices (see above).
Najnižja ponudbena cena za prevzem naj bi temeljila na povprečnem tečaju delnice v preteklosti (glej zgoraj).
It therefore does not necessarily reflect the real value of the shares, either at the time of the takeover bid itself or at the time of privatisation.
Zato naj ne bi niti v času prevzemne ponudbe niti v času privatizacije nujno izražala prave vrednosti deležev.
Accordingly, the maximum price per share paid to ÖIAG (fixed price plus the minimum amount under the debtor warrant) corresponds to the price per share paid to the other shareholders under the takeover bid.
V skladu s tem naj bi bila najvišja cena za delnico, ki naj bi se plačala ÖIAG (fiksna cena s pribitkom najnižjega zneska iz naloga za plačilo dolgov), cena za delnico, ki naj bi se v okviru prevzemne ponudbe plačala drugim delničarjem.
Although ÖIAG may be receiving a lower price per share than other shareholders for its stake in Austrian Airlines, this does not amount to State aid, as the price paid to ÖIAG corresponds to the market value.
Čeprav naj bi ÖIAG za svojo udeležbo v Austrian Airlines mogoče dobil tudi nižjo ceno za delnico kot drugi delničarji, naj to ne bi pomenilo državne pomoči, saj naj bi bila cena, plačana ÖIAG, tržna cena.
Lufthansa states that it was the only undertaking in the sales process to submit a valid final bid.
Lufthansa opozarja, da naj bi bila edino podjetje v prodajnem postopku, ki naj bi predložilo veljavno končno ponudbo.
By definition, Lufthansa is therefore the highest bidder.
Zato naj bi bila po definiciji najvišji ponudnik.
The result of an open tender sales process must be assumed to be the market price.
Rezultat odprtega konkurenčnega prodajnega postopka bi moral veljati kot tržna cena.
[…] However, Austrian Airlines’ long-term viability can be restored only if the revised restructuring plan — and further cost-cutting measures yet to be negotiated — can be implemented as envisaged and thereby bring about the necessary cost reductions.
[…] Vendar naj bi se dolgoročna sposobnost preživetja Austrian Airlines lahko obnovila samo, če naj bi bilo mogoče spremenjeni načrt za prestrukturiranje in druge ukrepe za znižanje stroškov, o katerih se je treba še pogoditi, izvesti, kot je bilo predvideno, in bi se s tem lahko dosegli potrebni prihranki pri stroških.
Lufthansa submits that the restructuring aid amount (EUR 500 million) is the absolute minimum required to re-establish the long-term viability of Austrian Airlines.
Lufthansa navaja, da naj bi bil znesek pomoči za prestrukturiranje (500 milijonov EUR) najnižji znesek, potreben za obnovo dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja Austrian Airlines.
Further deterioration in the Austrian and global aviation markets has […].
Nadaljnje poslabšanje avstrijskega in svetovnega letalskega trga naj bi […].
Regarding compensatory measures, Lufthansa stresses the fact that Austrian Airlines has already significantly reduced its capacity over the last few years.
Lufthansa glede izravnalnih ukrepov poudarja, da naj bi Austrian Airlines svojo zmogljivost v zadnjih letih že precej zmanjšal.
In any event, Lufthansa submits that Austrian Airlines and Lufthansa will bear a considerable share of the overall restructuring costs, amounting to some EUR […] or approximately 68 % of the total restructuring costs of EUR […].
Navaja še, da naj bi Austrian Airlines in Lufthansa v vsakem primeru nosila pomemben del skupnih stroškov prestrukturiranja, ki naj bi znašal […] EUR od skupno […] EUR stroškov prestrukturiranja ali približno 68 % teh stroškov.
Ryanair operates 11 routes between 4 Austrian airports (Salzburg, Linz, Graz and Klagenfurt) and destinations in other EU countries, including Germany.
Ryanair upravlja 11 prog med štirimi avstrijskimi letališči (Salzburgom, Linzem, Gradcem in Celovcem) in cilji v drugih državah EU, med drugim Nemčijo.
Ryanair states that it is therefore a competitor of both Austrian Airlines and Lufthansa.
Ryanair navaja, da naj bi bil zato konkurent Austrian Airlines in tudi Lufthanse.
Ryanair began its observations of 9 April 2009 by stating that, in its opinion, the initiation of formal investigation proceedings was justified, but the Commission’s call for comments provided insufficient data.
Ryanair je v uvodu svojih pripomb z dne 9. aprila 2009 navedel, da naj bi bila po njegovem mnenju sprožitev formalnega postopka preiskave upravičena, vendar naj v pozivu Komisije k predložitvi pripomb ne bi bilo sporočeno dovolj podatkov.
The non-publication of information considered confidential by the Austrian authorities constituted a procedural flaw.
Neobjava informacij, ki naj bi bile po mnenju avstrijskih organov zaupne, naj bi pomenila napako v postopku.
On the substance of the case, Ryanair is of the opinion that the Austrian authorities have not demonstrated that, from the point of view of a market economy investor, the sale of Austrian Airlines, combined with a cash injection of EUR 500 million, is preferable to its liquidation.
Ryanair glede zadeve meni, da naj avstrijski organi ne bi dokazali, da naj bi bilo treba prodaji Austrian Airlines v povezavi z injekcijo 500 milijonov EUR s stališča vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu dati prednost pred likvidacijo podjetja.
In Ryanair’s opinion, a market economy investor would have preferred the voluntary winding-up or judicial liquidation of Austrian Airlines, or a straight share deal with no preconditions regarding a massive cash injection, to the solution chosen by the Austrian Government.
Ryanair meni, da bi dal vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu prostovoljni ali sodni likvidaciji Austrian Airlines ali preprostemu delniškemu poslu brez pogojev glede velike likvidnostne injekcije prednost pred rešitvijo, ki jo je izbrala avstrijska vlada.
This is demonstrated by the fact that Austrian Airlines’ private shareholders were not prepared to subscribe (in proportion to their shareholding) to the capital increase.
To naj bi dokazovalo dejstvo, da naj zasebni delničarji Austrian Airlines ne bi bili pripravljeni (v sorazmerju svojih deležev) sodelovati pri dokapitalizaciji.
As regards the reasons put forward by the Austrian authorities for not opting for liquidation, in so far as these relate to concerns about the reputation and image of the State-owned holding ÖIAG, Ryanair doubts whether such reasoning could be the primary, or indeed the only, motivation for major business decisions by such an investor.
Ryanair glede razlogov, zakaj niso izbrali likvidacije, ki naj bi jih navedli avstrijski organi, kolikor naj bi se ti razlogi nanašali na pomisleke glede imena in ugleda ÖIAG, ki je v državni lasti, dvomi, da bi taki razlogi lahko bili glavna ali celo edina motivacija za pomembne poslovne odločitve takega vlagatelja.
Ryanair also calls into question whether the price offered by Lufthansa is the market price.
Ryanair dvomi tudi, da je cena, ki jo je ponudila Lufthansa, tržna cena.
In the opinion of Ryanair, the process that led to the selection of Lufthansa as the buyer was not competitive, the deadline for the submission of bids was extremely short (from 13 to 24 August 2008) and Lufthansa, which had prior knowledge of Austrian Airlines’ operations through its participation in the Star Alliance and in joint ventures, had an advantage over other possible buyers.
Meni, da naj postopek izbire Lufthanse za kupca ne bi bil konkurenčen, da naj bi bil rok za vložitev ponudb izjemno kratek (od 13 do 24. avgusta 2008) in naj bi Lufthansa zaradi predznanja o poslovanju Austrian Airlines v okviru njenega članstva v Star Alliance in sodelovanja v skupnih podjetjih imela prednost pred drugimi mogočimi kupci.
By imposing conditions on the sale, the Austrian authorities confused their role as the State and their role as an economic operator.
Avstrijski organi naj bi z določitvijo pogojev za prodajo pomešali svoji vlogi kot država in kot gospodarski udeleženec.
Even if some of those conditions could be considered ‘soft’ conditions, they would still not have been imposed by a market economy investor, as they entail a cost.
Tudi če bi nekatere od teh pogojev lahko obravnavali kot „mile“ pogoje, si jih vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu kljub temu ne bi naložil, ker naj bi povzročili stroške.
Potential bidders would take them seriously and either be discouraged from bidding or lower their price below the market price to factor in the cost of compliance.
Morebitni ponudniki bi jih vzeli resno in bi se vzdržali ponudbe ali pa bi ceno spustili pod tržno ceno, da bi upoštevali stroške izpolnitve pogojev.
Ryanair submits that its expansion in Austria has been hindered by Austrian Airlines’ loss-making presence in the market and its ability to sustain below-cost prices over a long period of time.
Ryanair navaja, da naj bi Austrian Airlines z delovanjem na trgu, s katerim je ustvarjal izgubo, in sposobnostjo dalj časa trajajočega vzdrževanja cen, ki niso pokrile stroškov, oviral njegovo širjenje v Avstriji.
State aid to Austrian Airlines would deprive Ryanair of opportunities for expansion and shift the burden of structural adjustment away from Austrian Airlines to competitive market operators such as Ryanair.
Državne pomoči v korist Austrian Airlines naj bi Ryanair onemogočile širjenje in breme strukturne prilagoditve Austrian Airlines prenesle na konkurenčne tržne akterje, kot je Ryanair.
Once Austrian Airlines has been integrated into the Lufthansa network, it will start feeding traffic into Lufthansa’s Frankfurt and Munich hubs, creating a risk of foreclosure, at least on the routes between Austria and Germany.
Takoj ko naj bi bil Austrian Airlines vključen v mrežo Lufthanse, naj bi začel dovažati promet v vozlišči Lufthanse Frankfurt in München, kar naj bi vsaj na prograh med Avstrijo in Nemčijo ustvarilo nevarnost zapiranja trga.
Air France/KLM began its observations of 14 April 2009 by regretting that the Commission had not carried out a more detailed evaluation of the structure of the sales process.
Air France/KLM je v uvodu svojih pripomb z dne 14. aprila 2009 obžaloval, da naj Komisija ne bi podrobneje ocenila strukture prodajnega procesa.
Air France/KLM points out that, at the start of the process in August 2008, it was a question of privatisation without Austrian Airlines needing to be restructured.
Air France/KLM navaja, da naj bi šlo pri postopku sprva avgusta 2008 za privatizacijo, ne da bi Austrian Airlines potreboval prestrukturiranje.
Air France/KLM is of the opinion that the restructuring proposed by Lufthansa is not a real plan and therefore cannot justify the granting of State aid.
Air France/KLM meni, da naj prestrukturiranje, ki ga je predlagala Lufthansa, ne bi pomenilo pravega načrta in zato naj ne bi moglo upravičiti dodelitve državnih pomoči.
In addition, the ability of the Lufthansa Group to implement these same restructuring measures using its own resources needs to be considered.
Poleg tega naj bi bilo treba razmisliti o sposobnosti koncerna Lufthansa, da iste ukrepe za prestrukturiranje izvede z lastnimi sredstvi.
Air France/KLM participated in the privatisation process and […].
Air France/KLM naj bi se udeležil postopka privatizacije in […].
The tender required bidders to make all shareholders an equivalent offer of the price they were prepared to pay as a cash consideration to all shareholders per Austrian Airlines share and redeem the shares at an amount in accordance with the Austrian legislation on the subject.
Ponudnik naj bi bil v razpisu pozvan, naj vsem delničarjem naredi enakovredno ponudbo s ceno, ki naj bi jo bil ponudnik v gotovini pripravljen plačati vsem delničarjem za delnico Austrian Airlines, in kupi delnice po znesku v skladu z zadevno avstrijsko zakonodajo.
By not submitting an unconditional offer as required, Lufthansa has not complied with the conditions imposed at the start of the process, and acceptance of this offer by ÖIAG should be interpreted as evidence that the process was flawed.
S tem da naj Lufthansa ne bi predložila brezpogojne ponudbe, kot je bilo zahtevano, naj bi kršila pogoje, določene ob začetku postopka, in bi bilo treba dejstvo, da je ÖIAG sprejel to ponudbo, oceniti kot dokaz za to, da naj bi bil postopek pomanjkljiv.
In relation to the conditions imposed in the privatisation mandate, Air France/KLM states, with regard to the ‘Austrian core shareholder’ condition, that, although similar structures had been required in the past, the regulatory landscape has changed since then.
Air France/KLM v zvezi s pogoji, določenimi v pooblastilu za privatizacijo, glede pogoja „ohranitve avstrijske strukture glavnega delničarja“ navaja, da naj bi bile podobne strukture v preteklosti sicer predpisane, da pa naj bi se zakonodajno okolje od takrat spremenilo.
Air France/KLM points out that the Council entrusted the Commission with a mandate to negotiate with all third countries to bring all bilateral air agreements signed with these countries into line with Community law.
Opozarja, da naj bi Svet pooblastil Komisijo, da se za uskladitev vseh dvostranskih sporazumov o letalskih prevozih, sklenjenih s temi državami, s pravom Skupnosti pogaja z vsemi tretjimi državami.
While Air France/KLM recognises that the particular case of Austrian Airlines deserves to be examined more closely, it encouraged the Commission to deal with this issue flexibly, as some of these negotiations with third countries were ongoing.
Priznal naj bi še, da naj bi bilo treba poseben primer Austrian Airlines podrobneje preiskati, a naj bi pozval Komisijo, naj to vprašanje obravnava prilagodljivo, saj naj bi nekatera od teh pogajanj s tretjimi državami še trajala.
Nor is Air France/KLM convinced by the argument that the Austrian State acted as a market economy investor.
Air France/KLM tudi naj ne bi prepričala utemeljitev, da naj bi Avstrija ravnala kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu.
It argues that by accepting a sales price resulting from a flawed process, it has failed to sell its stake in Austrian Airlines under the best possible conditions.
Avstrija naj s tem, da naj bi sprejela prodajno ceno, ki naj bi bila rezultat pomanjkljivega postopka, svoje udeležbe v Austrian Airlines ne bi odsvojila po najboljših mogočih pogojih.
Air France/KLM explains that, after learning of the Austrian Government’s decision to grant financial assistance amounting to EUR 500 million, it informed ÖIAG that […].
Air France/KLM naj bi po objavi odločitve avstrijske vlade o izplačilu finančne pomoči v višini 500 milijonov EUR ÖIAG sporočil, da […].
Air France/KLM questions whether the Commission should also examine whether Austrian Airlines is not already part of the Lufthansa Group, notwithstanding the conditions attached to the acquisition.
Air France/KLM odpira vprašanje, ali naj bi morala Komisija preiskati še, ali naj bi bil Austrian Airlines ne glede na pogoje, povezane s pridobitvijo, že del koncerna Lufthansa.
In relation to the restructuring plan, Air France/KLM calls into question whether this financial aid should be described as restructuring aid at all.
Air France/KLM v zvezi z načrtom za prestrukturiranje dvomi, ali naj bi bilo to finančno pomoč sploh treba imenovati pomoč za prestrukturiranje.
Air France/KLM does not doubt the financial difficulties encountered by Austrian Airlines but insists that the measures are too weak to restructure the company.
Sicer ne dvomi o finančnih težavah, ki jih ima Austrian Airlines, vendar vztraja, da naj bi bili ukrepi prešibki za prestrukturiranje podjetja.
The measures proposed by Lufthansa are measures of the type undertaken in the context of an acquisition, and have been artificially relabelled as a ‘restructuring plan’.
Ukrepi, ki jih je predlagala Lufthansa, naj bi bili ukrepi, ki naj bi se izvajali v povezavi s pridobitvijo podjetja in naj bi bili umetno razglašeni za „načrt za prestrukturiranje“.
These measures do not amount to a plan ([…]) and, in any case, do not justify the granting of State aid.
Iz ukrepov naj ne bi izhajal noben načrt ([…]) in naj nikakor ne bi upravičevali dodelitve državnih pomoči.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Lufthansa would not be able to implement the same restructuring measures with its own resources.
Poleg tega naj ne bi bilo dokazano, da Lufthansa ne bi mogla istih ukrepov za prestrukturiranje izvesti z lastnimi sredstvi.
Air France/KLM wishes to emphasise that, in the current economic climate, the whole aviation sector is facing tremendous pressure, and the Commission must therefore assess the compatibility of the aid proposed by Austria particularly carefully in order to ensure that this aid does not distort competition.
Air France/KLM opozarja, da naj bi bil celotni letalski sektor v zdajšnjem gospodarskem ozračju pod velikim pritiskom in naj bi Komisija zato morala posebno pazljivo oceniti združljivost pomoči, ki jo načrtuje Avstrija, da bi zagotovila, da pomoč ne bi izkrivila konkurence.
NIKI began its observations of 31 March 2009 by stating its opinion that ÖIAG did not act as a market economy investor when it accepted a negative price for its shareholding in Austrian Airlines.
NIKI je v začetku svojih pripomb z dne 31. marca 2009 menil, da naj ÖIAG ne bi ravnal kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, ker naj bi sprejel negativno ceno za svojo udeležbo v Austrian Airlines.
Furthermore, it argues that the sale price does not reflect the market price of Austrian Airlines.
Poleg tega naj prodajna cena ne bi odsevala tržne cene Austrian Airlines.
It is of the opinion that the sale was linked to conditions, such as, for example, negative purchase price and codetermination by the seller in the acquired undertaking, which would, in any event, have been unacceptable to a market economy investor.
Pogoji za prodajo naj bi bili na primer negativna nakupna cena in soodločanje prodajalca v pridobljenem podjetju, kar bi bilo za vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu v vsakem primeru nesprejemljivo.
In relation to the negative sales price, NIKI argues that Lufthansa has actually paid a positive price of EUR 366269 and a warrant worth EUR 162 million to ÖIAG and that the subsidy of EUR 500 million amounts to a condition set by Lufthansa and not a negative sales price.
NIKI v zvezi z negativno nakupno ceno trdi, da naj bi Lufthansa dejansko plačala pozitivno ceno 366269 EUR in nalog za plačilo dolgov, ki naj bi bil za ÖIAG vreden 162 milijonov EUR, subvencija 500 milijonov EUR pa naj bi izpolnjevala enega od pogojev, ki jih je postavila Lufthansa, in naj ne bi pomenila negativne nakupne cene.
NIKI also explains that the share price of the free float noted on the stock exchange reflects a positive company value (a lowest share price of EUR 2,22 in July 2008 and a 6-month average price of EUR 4,49).
NIKI nadaljuje, da naj bi borzni tečaj delnic v prostem obtoku odseval pozitivno vrednost podjetja (najnižji tečaj 2,22 EUR julija 2008 in šestmesečno povprečje 4,49 EUR).
As regards the alternative scenarios, NIKI is critical of ÖIAG’s claim that it is acting as if it were the sole shareholder of Austrian Airlines.
NIKI glede drugih mogočih scenarijev kritizira izjavo ÖIAG, da naj bi ravnal, kot da bi bil edini delničar Austrian Airlines.
NIKI explains that structured liquidation would be possible only with a 75 % majority.
Meni, da bi bila strukturirana likvidacija mogoča samo s 75-odstotno večino.
However, ÖIAG holds only 41,56 % of Austrian Airlines.
Delež ÖIAG v Austrian Airlines pa naj bi bil samo 41,56 %.
NIKI also argues that Austrian Airlines would continue to operate even if it were insolvent.
Navaja še, da bi Austrian Airlines poslovanje nadaljeval tudi v primeru stečaja.
It considers that social plans are voluntary payments which have to be discussed with employees’ representatives.
Socialni načrti naj bi bili prostovoljna plačila, o katerih naj bi bilo treba razpravljati s predstavniki delavcev.
NIKI also fails to see how the insolvency of Austrian Airlines could have an effect on the share prices and ratings of Telekom Austria AG, OMV AG, and Österreichische Post AG.
NIKI naj ne bi mogel razumeti, kako naj bi stečaj Austrian Airlines lahko vplival na delniške tečaje in boniteto Telekom Austria AG, OMV AG in Österreichische Post AG.
It is of the opinion that the public does not see these undertakings as a group.
Meni, da javnost teh podjetij ne obravnava kot poslovne skupine.
These undertakings operate in different sectors, so the insolvency of Austrian Airlines could not have a negative influence on them.
Podjetja naj bi bila dejavna v različnih sektorjih, tako da naj stečaj Austrian Airlines ne bi mogel negativno vplivati nanje.