natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This high internal rate of return derives from the fact that the calculation does not take into account the investments made to date by ISD Polska (in particular the capital injection into Gdańsk Shipyard of PLN 305 million), but is based on revenue from steel structure production since 2009.
Ta visoka notranja stopnja donosa izhaja iz dejstva, da v izračunu niso upoštevane dosedanje naložbe družbe ISD Polska (zlasti dokapitalizacija ladjedelnice Gdańsk v višini 305 milijonov PLN), ampak temelji na prihodkih od proizvodnje jeklenih konstrukcij od leta 2009.
In addition, the company argues that this high internal rate of return is caused by synergies between the yard and the ISD group, thanks to which significant revenue from the yard’s assets can be guaranteed even with limited investments.
Poleg tega družba trdi, da je ta visoka notranja stopnja donosa posledica sinergije med ladjedelnico in skupino ISD, ki zagotavlja znatne prihodke od sredstev ladjedelnice tudi z omejenimi naložbami.
According to the plan’s financial projections, the discounted pay-back (taking into account the changing value of money over time) will be achieved in […] years after the entry of the investor i.e. in 2017.
V skladu s finančnimi napovedmi iz načrta bo diskontirana doba povračila (ob upoštevanju spreminjajoče se vrednosti denarja skozi čas) dosežena v […] letih po vstopu vlagatelja, tj. leta 2017.
This calculation takes into account only the investor’s financial exposure (PLN […] million: capital injection of PLN 305 million and PLN […] million for the purchase of existing shares).
Ta izračun upošteva le finančno izpostavljenost vlagatelja ([…] milijonov PLN: dokapitalizacija v višini 305 milijonov PLN in […] milijonov PLN za nakup obstoječih delnic).
The Polish authorities provided this information in their letter of 13 July 2007.
Poljski organi so te informacije predložili v svojem dopisu z dne 13. julija 2007.
Furthermore, the information regarding State aid for Gdańsk Shipyard presented in the 2009 Restructuring Plan included the Treasury guarantee.
Poleg tega so informacije o državni pomoči za ladjedelnico Gdańsk, predstavljene v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009, vključevale jamstvo finančnega ministrstva.
Measure 17 in Table 4 is a guarantee provided to Gdańsk Shipyard by the IDA for a restructuring credit granted by NORD/LB Bank Polska S.A. The guarantee was granted in line with the agreement of 17 August 2005.
Ukrep št. 17 iz tabele 4 je jamstvo, ki ga je ladjedelnici Gdańsk zagotovila ARP za kredit za prestrukturiranje, ki ga je odobrila družba NORD/LB Bank Polska S.A. Jamstvo je bilo dodeljeno v skladu s sporazumom z dne 17. avgusta 2005.
In their submission of 9 January 2008 the Polish authorities claimed that this measure was included in Part A of Annex II to the opening decision as measure No 7, i.e. it was one of the measures granted before accession and not applicable after accession.
Poljski organi so v svojih navedbah z dne 9. januarja 2008 trdili, da je bil ta ukrep vključen v del A Priloge II k odločitvi o začetku formalnega postopka preiskave kot ukrep št. 7, tj. eden od ukrepov, ki so bili dodeljeni pred pristopom in po pristopu niso veljali.
Its initial role was to serve as a vehicle for the consolidation of the three largest shipyards in Poland, a project abandoned in 2006.
Njena prvotna vloga je bila služiti kot mehanizem za konsolidacijo treh največjih ladjedelnic na Poljskem, vendar je bil ta projekt leta 2006 opuščen.
According to the information provided by Poland in 2006 [24], KPS was to be financed by a capital injection from the IDA, by a contribution in kind (shares in third companies) provided by the Agency and by a revolving bank loan guaranteed by the Agency, which was specifically earmarked as financial aid for the shipyards.
V skladu z informacijami, ki jih je Poljska predložila leta 2006 [24], naj bi se KPS financirala z dokapitalizacijo s strani ARP, prispevkom v naravi (delnice v tretjih družbah), ki bi ga zagotovila agencija, in obnovljivim bančnim posojilom, ki ga je jamčila agencija in je bil posebej določen kot finančna pomoč za ladjedelnice.
Table 4 also includes Gdańsk Shipyard’s outstanding public-law liabilities as presented by the Polish authorities in their submission of 9 January 2008 and in the annex to the 2009 Restructuring Plan.
Tabela 4 vključuje tudi neporavnane javnopravne obveznosti ladjedelnice Gdańsk, kot so jih predstavili poljski organi v svojem dopisu z dne 9. januarja 2008 in v Prilogi k načrtu prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009.
Poland confirmed in that letter that Gdańsk Shipyard had not been settling its public law liabilities regularly.
Poljska je v navedenem dopisu potrdila, da ladjedelnica Gdańsk ni poravnala svojih javnopravnih obveznosti.
The list of guarantees from which the yard benefited was submitted by Poland by letter of 11 July 2007.
Seznam jamstev, od katerih je ladjedelnica imela koristi, je Poljska predložila z dopisom z dne 11. julija 2007.
The Polish authorities indicated that although these guarantees were formally granted to Gdynia Shipyard Group, they were used for the production of vessels at Gdańsk Shipyard.
Poljski organi so navedli, da so bila ta jamstva uradno dodeljena skupini Gdynia, vendar so bila uporabljena za proizvodnjo plovil v ladjedelnici Gdańsk.
In particular, the Commission maintains that it is competent to assess whether the measures indicated in part B of Annex II to the decision to open the formal investigation are compatible with the common market.
Komisija vztraja zlasti pri tem, da je pristojna oceniti, ali so ukrepi iz dela B Priloge II k odločitvi o začetku formalne preiskave združljivi s skupnim trgom.
The Commission nevertheless notes that some of these measures have been abandoned (measures 23-25 of part B of Annex II to the decision to open the formal investigation).
Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da so bili nekateri od teh ukrepov opuščeni (ukrepi št. 23–25 iz dela B Priloge I k odločitvi o začetku formalne preiskave).
Measures 24-25 of part B of Annex II to the decision to open the formal investigation
Ukrepa št. 24 in 25 iz dela B Priloge II k odločitvi o začetku formalne preiskave
Lastly, the Commission notes that neither Poland nor Gdynia Shipyard Group has contested its conclusion that measures 24-25 of part B of Annex II to the decision to open the formal investigation constituted new aid and thus fall under the remit of the Commission under Article 88 of the EC Treaty.
Komisija ugotavlja, da niti Poljska niti skupina Gdynia nista nasprotovali njeni sklepni ugotovitvi, da sta ukrepa št. 24 in 25 iz dela B Priloge II k odločitvi o začetku formalne preiskave pomenila novo pomoč ter sta zato v skladu s členom 88 Pogodbe ES v pristojnosti Komisije.
The information provided by the Polish authorities [35] clearly indicates that Gdańsk Shipyard has important public-law arrears dating back as far as 2004.
Informacije, ki so jih predložili poljski organi [35], jasno kažejo, da ima ladjedelnica Gdańsk pomembne dolgove po javnem pravu celo iz leta 2004.
These are presented in Table 4 as measures 18 and 19.
Ti dolgovi so v tabeli 4 predstavljeni kot ukrepa št. 18 in 19.
The Commission notes that employment has already been reduced by [… more than 20] % since 2006.
Komisija ugotavlja, da se je število zaposlenih od leta 2006 že zmanjšalo za [… več kot 20] %.
The average monthly wage in 2008 in direct production has increased by [… more than 20] % since 2005.
Povprečna mesečna plača v neposredni proizvodnji je bila leta 2008 za [… več kot 20] % višja kot leta 2005.
The plan provides for further wage increases: by […] % in 2009, […] % in 2010, […] % in 2011 and […] % in 2012, while also recognising that, as a result of the economic downturn and the closures of shipyards in Gdynia and Szczecin, the financial expectations of workers have decreased.
Načrt določa dodatna povišanja plače: leta 2009 za […] %, leta 2010 za […] %, leta 2011 za […] % in leta 2012 za […] %, čeprav priznava tudi, da so se zaradi gospodarskega upada in zaprtja ladjedelnic v krajih Gdynia in Szczecin finančna pričakovanja delavcev zmanjšala.
The Commission also notes that the yard commenced restructuring as early as 2002.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da je ladjedelnica začela prestrukturiranje že leta 2002.
In its decision to open the formal investigation, the Commission noted that aid granted to the yard before accession needed to be taken into account when assessing whether State aid granted after Poland’s accession to the EU had been limited to the minimum necessary.
V svoji odločitvi o začetku formalne preiskave je Komisija ugotovila, da je treba pomoč, dodeljeno ladjedelnici pred pristopom, upoštevati pri oceni, ali je bila državna pomoč, dodeljena po pristopu Poljske k EU, omejena na najnižji potrebni znesek.
See also Commission Decision of 18 July 2007 in case N 105/07, Guarantee scheme for export contracts, summary notice in OJ C 214, 13.9.2007.
Glej tudi Odločbo Komisije z dne 18. julija 2007 v zadevi N 105/07, Jamstvena shema za izvozne pogodbe, povzetek v UL C 214, 13.9.2007.
By this decision the Commission approved as free of State aid the guarantee scheme run by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation for companies which are not in financial difficulty.
S to odločbo je Komisija potrdila, da jamstvena shema, ki jo družba Export Credit Insurance Corporation izvaja za družbe, ki niso v finančnih težavah, ne vsebuje državne pomoči.
Following intensive correspondence between the Commission, the Polish authorities and ISD Polska, on 8 May 2009 the Commission received the final restructuring plan for Gdańsk Shipyard, entitled ‘Restructuring Plan for Gdańsk Shipyard. Revised version of the plan of 5 December 2008’ and dated 7 May 2009 (‘the 2009 Restructuring Plan’).
Po intenzivnem dopisovanju med Komisijo, poljskimi organi in družbo ISD Polska je Komisija 8. maja 2009 prejela končni načrt prestrukturiranja za ladjedelnico Gdańsk z dne 7. maja 2009 z naslovom „Načrt prestrukturiranja za ladjedelnico Gdańsk – Spremenjena različica načrta z dne 5. decembra 2008“ (v nadaljnjem besedilu: načrt prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009).
advancing the date for the payment of the second instalment of the restructuring aid granted for the marketing year 2009/2010 under Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2006
o določitvi zgodnejšega datuma za plačilo drugega obroka pomoči za prestrukturiranje, dodeljenega za tržno leto 2009/2010 v skladu z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 320/2006
(notified under document C(2010) 1710)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2010) 1710)
Since the necessary financial resources are available in the restructuring fund referred to in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 320/2006, Member States should be given the possibility to advance the date for the payment of the second instalment of the restructuring aid granted in the marketing year 2009/2010 to undertakings, growers and machinery contractors which renounced their quota as of 1 October 2009 to the date of the payment of the first instalment,
Glede na to, da so v skladu za prestrukturiranje potrebni finančni viri iz člena 1 Uredbe (ES) št. 320/2006 na voljo, se državam članicam da možnost, da datum izplačila drugega obroka iz sklada za prestrukturiranje, dodeljenega za tržno leto 2009/2010 za podjetja, pridelovalce in upravljavce strojev, ki so se odpovedali svoji kvoti od 1. oktobra 2009 do dne plačila prvega obroka, prestavijo vnaprej –
By way of derogation from Article 10(4) of Regulation (EC) No 320/2006, Member States may pay 100 % of the restructuring aid provided for in Article 3 of that Regulation in respect of the marketing year 2009/2010 in one instalment.
Z odstopanjem od člena 10(4) Uredbe (ES) št. 320/2006 lahko države članice izplačajo 100 % pomoči za prestrukturiranje iz člena 3 navedene uredbe za tržno leto 2009/2010 v enem samem obroku.
In such case, the payment shall be due in June 2010.
V takem primeru je rok za plačilo junija 2010.
Member States shall inform the Commission by 31 March 2010 if they want to make use of the possibility provided for in the first paragraph.
Države članice morajo Komisijo do 31. marca 2010 obvestiti, ali bodo uporabile možnost iz prvega odstavka.
of 23 March 2010
z dne 23. marca 2010
amending Decision 2006/109/EC by accepting three offers to join the joint price undertaking accepted in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain castings originating in the People’s Republic of China
o spremembi Sklepa 2006/109/ES s sprejemom treh ponudb za pridružitev k skupni cenovni zavezi, sprejeti v zvezi s protidampinškim postopkom glede uvoza nekaterih ulitkov s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community [1] (the ‘basic Regulation’), and in particular Articles 8 and 11(3) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1225/2009 z dne 30. novembra 2009 o zaščiti proti dampinškemu uvozu iz držav, ki niso članice Evropske skupnosti [1] („osnovna uredba“), ter zlasti člena 8 in člena 11(3) Uredbe,
The Council, by Regulation (EC) No 1212/2005 [2] (the definitive Regulation), imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain castings originating in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Svet je z Uredbo (ES) št. 1212/2005 [2] („dokončna uredba“) uvedel dokončno protidampinško dajatev na uvoz nekaterih ulitkov s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske („LRK“).
This Regulation was last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 500/2009 [3].
Uredba je bila nazadnje spremenjena z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 500/2009 [3].
The Commission, by Decision 2006/109/EC [4] accepted a joint price undertaking from the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronics Products (CCCME) together with 20 cooperating Chinese companies or cooperating groups of companies.
Komisija je s Sklepom 2006/109/ES [4] sprejela skupno cenovno zavezo kitajske gospodarske zbornice za uvoz in izvoz strojev ter elektronskih izdelkov (China Chamber of Commerce for Import & Export of Machinery & Electronic Products –„CCCME“) skupaj z dvajsetimi sodelujočimi kitajskimi družbami ali sodelujočimi skupinami družb.
This Decision was amended by Commission Decision 2008/437/EC [5].
Ta sklep je bil spremenjen s Sklepom Komisije 2008/437/ES [5].
The definitive Regulation gives the possibility to new Chinese exporting producers to be granted the same treatment as the cooperating companies in the original investigation, on the condition that these producers have been granted the new exporting producer treatment (NEPT) in accordance with Article 1(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1212/2005.
Dokončna uredba novim kitajskim proizvajalcem izvoznikom omogoča, da se jih obravnava enako kot sodelujoče družbe v prvotni preiskavi, pod pogojem, da je bil tem proizvajalcem v skladu s členom 1(4) Uredbe (ES) št. 1212/2005 odobren status novega proizvajalca izvoznika („SNPI“).
Following three requests for NEPT based on Article 1(4) of the definitive Regulation, the Council, by Regulation (EC) No 426/2008 [6] amended the definitive Regulation and assigned an individual duty rate of 28,6 % to the exporting producers HanDan County Yan Yuan Smelting and Casting Co., Ltd (HanDan), XianXian Guozhuang Precision Casting Co., Ltd (XianXian) and Wuxi Norlong Foundry Co., Ltd (Norlong).
Svet je po treh zahtevkih za SNPI na podlagi člena 1(4) dokončne uredbe z Uredbo (ES) št. 426/2008 [6] spremenil dokončno uredbo in določil individualno stopnjo dajatve v višini 28,6 % za proizvajalce izvoznike HanDan County Yan Yuan Smelting and Casting Co., Ltd („HanDan“), XianXian Guozhuang Precision Casting Co., Ltd („XianXian“) in Wuxi Norlong Foundry Co., Ltd („Norlong“).
Following a request for NEPT based on Article 1(4) of the definitive Regulation, the Council, by Regulation (EC) No 282/2009 [7] amended the definitive Regulation and assigned and individual duty rate of 28,6 % to the exporting producer Weifang Stable Casting Co., Ltd (Weifang).
Svet je po zahtevku za SNPI na podlagi člena 1(4) dokončne uredbe z Uredbo (ES) št. 282/2009 [7] spremenil dokončno uredbo in določil individualno stopnjo dajatve v višini 28,6 % za proizvajalca izvoznika Weifang Stable Casting Co., Ltd („Weifang“).
It is recalled that all four exporting producers received individual treatment (IT) during the NEPT investigation.
Treba je opozoriti, da je bila za vse štiri proizvajalce izvoznike med preiskavo za odobritev SNPI uporabljena individualna obravnava („IO“).
Two of the four above-mentioned exporting producers granted NEPT (XianXian and Weifang) submitted together with the CCCME formal offers to join the joint liability undertaking accepted by the Commission.
Dva od omenjenih štirih proizvajalcev izvoznikov, ki jima je bil odobren SNPI, in sicer XianXian in Weifang, sta skupaj s CCCME predložila uradni ponudbi za pridružitev k skupni zavezi, ki jo je sprejela Komisija.
On 10 June 2009, the Commission, by a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union [8], initiated a partial interim review of the definitive measures.
Komisija je 10. junija 2009 z obvestilom v Uradnem listu Evropske unije [8] začela delni vmesni pregled dokončnih ukrepov.
The review is limited in scope to the examination of the form of the measures and in particular to the examination of the acceptability and workability of undertakings offered by exporting producers in the PRC.
Pregled je bil omejen na preučitev oblike ukrepov in zlasti na preučitev sprejemljivosti in izvedljivosti zavez, ki jih ponujajo proizvajalci izvozniki v LRK.
After the initiation of the partial interim review of the measures, yet another exporting producer granted NEPT, HanDan, submitted within the deadline, together with the CCCME a formal offer to join the joint liability undertaking accepted by the Commission.
Po začetku delnega vmesnega pregleda ukrepov je proizvajalec izvoznik HanDan, ki mu je bil odobren SNPI, v predpisanem roku skupaj s CCCME predložil uradno ponudbo za pridružitev k skupni zavezi, ki jo je sprejela Komisija.
Another exporting producer granted NEPT, Norlong, submitted that it does not wish to adhere to the joint undertaking accepted by the Commission, but offered, within the deadline, a separate undertaking.
Proizvajalec izvoznik Norlong, ki mu je bil odobren SNPI, je navedel, da se ne želi pridružiti skupni zavezi, ki jo je sprejela Komisija, temveč je v predpisanem roku ponudil ločeno zavezo.
On 15 December 2009, the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to accept the offers to join the joint price undertaking submitted by CCCME and HanDan, by CCCME and XianXian and by CCCME and Weifang and to reject the undertaking offered by Norlong were disclosed to interested parties.
Zainteresiranim strankam so bila 15. decembra 2009 razkrita bistvena dejstva in premisleki, na podlagi katerih naj bi se sprejele ponudbe za pridružitev skupni cenovni zavezi, ki so jo predložili CCCME in HanDan, CCCME in XianXian ter CCCME in Weifang, ter zavrnila zaveza, ki jo je ponudila družba Norlong.
They were given the opportunity to comment.
Strankam je bila dana možnost, da predložijo pripombe.
Their comments have been assessed before taking a final decision.
Njihove pripombe so bile preučene pred sprejemom končne odločitve.
UNDERTAKING OFFERS
PONUDBE ZAVEZ
With regard to the undertaking offer submitted by CCCME together with Handan, XianXian and Weifang, it is noted that they are identical to the collective undertaking offer accepted by Decision 2006/109/EC and thus the CCCME and the three exporting producers undertake to ensure that the product concerned is exported at or above a minimum import price (MIP) set at a level that eliminates the injurious effect of dumping.
V zvezi s ponudbo zaveze, ki jo je predložila CCCME skupaj z družbami HanDan, XianXian in Weifang, je treba opozoriti, da je identična ponudbi skupne zaveze, sprejete s Sklepom 2006/109/ES, ter se zato CCCME in trije proizvajalci izvozniki zavežejo, da bodo zagotovili izvoz zadevnega izdelka po najnižji uvozni ceni („MIP“) ali višji ceni, določeni na ravni, ki odpravlja škodljive učinke dampinga.
It is recalled that the undertaking includes the indexation of the minimum import price of the product concerned in accordance with public international quotations for its main raw material, i.e. pig iron, given that casting prices vary significantly depending on the prices of pig iron.
Treba je opozoriti, da zaveza vključuje indeksacijo najnižje uvozne cene zadevnega izdelka v skladu z javnimi mednarodnimi kotacijami za njegove glavne surovine, tj. surovo železo, glede na to, da se cene ulitkov, odvisno od cene surovega železa, znatno razlikujejo.
In addition, a further investigation showed that there are no company specific reasons that would call for a refusal of the offer submitted by CCCME together with HanDan, XianXian and Weifang.
Poleg tega je nadaljnja preiskava pokazala, da ni razlogov, specifičnih za družbo, zaradi katerih bi se zavrnila ponudba, ki jo je predložila CCCME skupaj z družbami HanDan, XianXian in Weifang.
In view of the foregoing, and as the companies received an individual duty rate, the Commission considers that it can accept the undertaking offer made by CCCME and the exporting producers.
Zaradi navedenega in ker so družbe prejele individualno stopnjo dajatve, Komisija meni, da lahko sprejme ponudbo zaveze, ki so jo predložili CCCME in proizvajalci izvozniki.
Moreover, the regular and detailed reports which the CCCME and the companies undertake to provide to the Commission will allow effective monitoring.
Poleg tega bodo učinkovito spremljanje omogočila redna in podrobna poročila, glede katerih so se CCCME in družbe zavezale, da jih bodo zagotovile Komisiji.
It is, therefore, considered that the risk of circumventing the undertaking is limited.
Zato se šteje, da je tveganje izogibanja omejeno.
With regard to the separate undertaking offered by Norlong, it should be recalled that the original undertaking accepted by Decision 2006/109/EC was a joint liability undertaking of 20 companies together with the CCCME.
V zvezi z ločeno zavezo, ki jo je ponudila družba Norlong, je treba opozoriti, da je bila prvotna zaveza, sprejeta s Sklepom 2006/109/ES, skupna zaveza 20 družb in CCCME.
The fact that it was offered as a joint undertaking contributed in a decisive manner to its acceptability by the Commission given that it increased the practicability and improved the control of the respect of the obligations deriving from the undertaking, all of this being necessary in view of the great number of exporting producers involved.
Dejstvo, da je bila zaveza ponujena kot skupna, je Komisijo prepričalo v njeno sprejemljivost, saj se je s tem povečala praktičnost in izboljšal nadzor obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz zaveze, vse to pa je bilo potrebno zaradi velikega števila sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov.
Norlong argued that the Commission had already accepted in the past at least one individual undertaking from a company which had not been granted market economy treatment (MET) but only individual treatment [9], as is the case of Norlong.
Družba Norlong je trdila, da je Komisija v preteklosti že sprejela vsaj eno individualno zavezo od družbe, ki ji ni bila odobrena tržnogospodarska obravnava („TGO“), temveč le individualna obravnava [9], kakor je v primeru družbe Norlong.
However, it should be emphasized that the situation in the case referred to by Norlong is different from the situation in the original undertaking accepted by Decision 2006/109/EC: in the case referred to by Norlong, only one undertaking offer of one exporting producer was finally accepted.
Vendar je treba poudariti, da se situacija v primeru, na katero se sklicuje družba Norlong, razlikuje od situacije v prvotni zavezi, ki je bila sprejeta s Sklepom 2006/109/ES; v primeru, na katerega se sklicuje družba Norlong, je bila na koncu sprejeta le ena ponudba zaveze enega proizvajalca izvoznika.
It should also be recalled that that undertaking was subsequently withdrawn by the Commission because of numerous breaches found, including cross-compensation schemes [10].
Treba je opozoriti tudi na to, da je Komisija pozneje umaknila zavezo zaradi številnih ugotovljenih kršitev, vključno s shemami navzkrižnih kompenzacij [10].