natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In this respect the main structural measures of the restructuring plan are the reduction of staff from […] to about […], the introduction of improved risk controls and risk management, and the integration of central functions including IT into LBBW.
V tej zvezi so v načrtu prestrukturiranja kot najpomembnejši strukturni ukrepi predvideni zmanjšanje števila zaposlenih od […] na okoli […], uvedba boljšega nadzora in obvladovanja tveganj ter združitev centralnih funkcij (vključno z računalniško obdelavo podatkov) v LBBW.
CAGR 2007 - 12 = Compound annual growth rate in the period 2007 to 2012.
CAGR 2007–12 = skupna letna stopnja rasti za obdobje od 2007 do 2012.
In the meantime it has been decided that this activity will be transferred to the LBBW bank in Saxony.
Medtem je bilo sklenjeno, da se to področje prenese na podružnico LBBW na Saškem.
Rating issued in December 2007.
Bonitetna ocena iz decembra 2007.
Commission Decision in Case C 28/02 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 14.5.2005, p. 1).
Odločba Komisije v zadevi C28/02. Bankgesellschaft Berlin (UL L 116, 14.5.2005, str. 1).
‘Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bietet der Europäischen Kommission in Abstimmung mit der Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW) die nachfolgend unter a. – c. abschließend angeführten Ausgleichsmaßnahmen an:a.
„Vlada Zvezne republike Nemčije ponuja Evropski komisiji v soglasju z Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW) v nadaljevanju pod a. – c. navedene izravnalne ukrepe:(a) Naslednje udeležbe banke Sachsen LB, ki so ob združitvi prešle na LBBW, se v skladu z naslednjimi določbami prodajo ali likvidirajo:Sachsen LB Europe plc se proda ali likvidira do […].Delež v East Merchant GmbH se proda do […].[…].(b) Vlada Zvezne republike Nemčije zagotavlja, da se Sachsen Bank, ki jo zastopa LBBW, v nobeni od svojih podružnic v zvezni deželi Saška ne bo ukvarjala z lastniškim trgovanjem na svoj račun in svojo odgovornost kot s samostojnim poslovnim področjem, ki presega poslovanje z njenimi strankami na osnovnih poslovnih področjih.
The Commission understands that the caveat that staff might be retained by LBBW if required by law applies to not more than 10 employees and relates to portfolio 1 of EUR 11,8 million which is taken over by LBBW.
Komisija izhaja iz tega, da določba, po kateri bo LBBW prevzela osebje, če bi to morala storiti zaradi zakonskih obveznosti, velja za največ 10 zaposlenih in zadeva portfelj 1 v vrednosti 11,8 mrd EUR, ki ga je prevzela LBBW.
It cannot be excluded that this portfolio is considered a partial transfer of operation which might have the consequence that LBBW is under an obligation to take over the related employees.
Ni mogoče izključiti, da je treba na prenos tega portfelja gledati kot na delni prenos obrata, tako da bi LBBW utegnila biti dolžna prevzeti zadevne zaposlene.
This should, however, not have any impact on the overall effectiveness of the closure of Sachsen LB Europe.
Toda zaprtje Sachsen LB Europe ne bi smelo biti omejeno v svojem učinkovanju.
This activity is profitable and not related to the current crisis in the subprime housing segment, which was triggered by increased lending to higher-risk borrowers with lower income or lesser credit history than prime borrowers.
To poslovno področje je rentabilno in ga ni prizadela tedanja kriza hipotekarnih posojil na stanovanjskem trgu, ki je izbruhnila, ker je bilo podeljeno preveč posojil bolj tveganim posojilojemalcem, ki imajo nižje prihodke ali slabšo boniteto kot prvorazredni posojilojemalci.
‘Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bestätigt, dass […]’.
„Vlada Zvezne republike Nemčije potrjuje, da […]“.
The imputability can be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which the measure was taken.
Pripisljivost izhaja iz vrste kazalnikov, ki so pogojeni s posebnostmi in okoliščinami primera, v katerem je bil sprejet ukrep.
For example, the supervisory boards of the Landesbanken are on a personal level closely affiliated with the State.
Tako obstajajo tesne osebne povezave med nadzornimi sveti deželnih bank in državo.
In addition the action of the banking pool was in this case closely coordinated by Bafin and the Bundesbank.
Poleg tega je v tem primeru skupina bank ravnala po skrbnem dogovoru z BaFin in Bundesbank.
Commission Decision of 27 June 2007 in Case C 50/06 BAWAG (OJ L 83, 26.3.2008, p. 7, paragraph 127).
Odločba Komisije v zadevi C 50/2006 z dne 27.6.2007, BAWAG (UL L 83 z dne 26. marca 2008, str. 7, točka 127).
EUR […] billion (value of Sachsen LB according to […] valuation as commissioned by LBBW) minus EUR […] million (realised losses in 2007) minus EUR […] million (up-front payment for losses in the transferred investment portfolio 1) = EUR 328 million.
[…] mrd EUR (vrednost podjetja Sachsen LB, ki jo je ugotovil […] v analizi, ki jo je izvedel po naročilu LBBW) minus […] mio. EUR (izgube leta 2007) minus […] mio EUR (predplačilo) = 328 mio EUR.
The Commission notes that the guarantee, although prima facie granted for securing the refinancing of the Super SIV, was in fact aid to Sachsen LB because it enabled the sale of Sachsen LB.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je šlo pri jamstvu prima facie, namenjenemu zavarovanju refinanciranja Super-SIV, za pomoč banki Sachsen LB, ker je bila z jamstvom omogočena prodaja banke Sachsen LB.
Without the creation of the Super SIV, which was in turn only possible with the guarantee, the sale of Sachsen LB would have been impossible.
Brez ustanovitve Super-SIV, ki je bila mogoča samo ob jamstvu, ne bi bilo prodaje banke Sachsen LB.
The guarantee does, however, remain with the Super SIV and thus does not grant an advantage to LBBW, because the Super SIV is not transferred to LBBW.
Ker pa je jamstvo vezano na Super-SIV, ki ne bo prenesen na LBBW, banki LBBW ni bila dodeljena ugodnost.
Commission Decision in Case C 28/02 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 14.5.2005, p. 1, paragraph 140).
Odločba Komisije v zadevi C 28/02. Bankgesellschaft Berlin (UL L 116, 14.5.2005, str. 1, točka 140).
See Commission Decision of 27 June 2007 in Case C 50/06 BAWAG (not yet published, paragraph 155).
Glej Odločbo Komisije z dne 27.6.2007 v zadevi C 50/06, Bawag (še neobjavljena, točka 155).
Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Hytasa [1994] ECR I-4103 (paragraph 22).
Vezane zadeve C-278/92, C-279/92 in C-280/92, Hytasa, Recueil 1994, I-4103 (točka 22).
See Case C-334/99 Gröditzer Stahlwerke [2003] ECR I-1139, paragraphs 133 et seq. and Commission Decision of 30 April 2008 in Case C 56/08 Bank Burgenland (not yet published).
Glej zadevo C-334/99, Gröditzer Stahlwerke, Recueil 2003, I-1139, točka 133 in naslednje, ter Odločbo Komisije z dne 30. aprila 2008 v zadevi C 56/08, Bank Burgenland (še neobjavljena).
See Commission Decision of 30 April 2008 in Case C 56/08 Bank Burgenland (not yet published).
Glej Odločbo Komisije z dne 30. aprila 2008 v zadevi C 56/08, Bank Burgenland (še neobjavljena).
In any event, Gewährträgerhaftung would only become relevant once the bank declares that it is not in a position to honour its liabilities, i.e. once it declares its insolvency.
Državna jamstva za nemške javne banke (Gewährträgerhaftung) bi se tako in tako unovčila šele, ko banka izjavi, da ne more več izpolnjevati svojih obveznosti, to je, ko razglasi plačilno nesposobnost.
The transaction at issue therefore seems to provide Sachsen LB with an additional advantage since not only does it protect creditors but it is also ensuring the survival of the bank.
Zdi se, da je Sachsen LB z obravnavano transakcijo zato dobila dodatno ugodnost, saj ne ščiti samo upnikov, ampak zagotavlja tudi preživetje banke.
See Commission Decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/08 Rescue aid to WestLB (not yet published).
Glej Odločbo Komisije z dne 30. aprila 2008 v zadevi NN 25/08, pomoč za reševanje WestLB (še neobjavljena).
An exception may, however, be made from the restriction as to form of rescue aid in the banking sector See the footnote to point 25(a) of the Guidelines, which states that, notwithstanding this, aid granted in a form other than loan guarantees or loans fulfilling the conditions in point 25(a) should fulfil the general principles of rescue aid and cannot consist in structural financial measures related to the bank’s own funds.
Pri pomočeh za reševanje v bančnem sektorju se lahko naredi izjema. Glej opombo k točki 25(a) Smernic, kjer je rečeno, da mora pomoč, dodeljena v drugačni obliki kot v obliki poroštev za posojilo ali v obliki posojil, ki izpolnjuje pogoje iz točke 25(a) Smernic, izpolnjevati splošna načela pomoči za reševanje in ne sme predstavljati strukturnih finančnih ukrepov v zvezi z lastnimi sredstvi banke.
See Commission Decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/07 Northern Rock (not yet published, paragraph 43) and Commission Decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/08 Rescue aid to WestLB (not yet published).
Glej Odločbo Komisije z dne 5. decembra 2007 v zadevi NN 70/07, Northern Rock (še neobjavljena, točka 43), in Odločbo Komisije z dne 30. aprila 2008 v zadevi NN 25/08, Pomoč za reševanje WestLB (še neobjavljena).
The provision of liquidity by banks was also assessed in the Commission Decision in Case C 58/03 Alstom (OJ L 150, 10.6.2005, p. 24, paragraph 216).
Zagotovitev likvidnostnega posojila, ki so ga dale banke, je bila tudi predmet preiskovalnega postopka, ki je privedel do Odločbe Komisije v zadevi C 58/03, Alstom (UL L 150, 10.6.2005, str. 24, točka 216).
Commission Decision of 12 September 2007 in Case C 54/06 Bison Bial (OJ L 46, 21.2.2008, p. 41, paragraphs 62 et seq.).
Odločba Komisije z dne 12. septembra 2007 v zadevi C 54/06, Bison Bial (UL L 46, 21.2.2008, str. 41, točka 62 in naslednje).
However, the Commission has accepted in the past in restructuring cases that parts of a loan which were not covered by a guarantee could be considered an own contribution.
Vendar je Komisija v prejšnjih primerih refinanciranja sprejela, da se deli posojila, ki niso bili pokriti z jamstvom, lahko štejejo za lastni prispevek.
See Commission Decision of 7 March 2007 in Case C 10/06 Cyprus Airways (OJ L 49, 22.2.2008, p. 25, paragraph 139).
V zvezi s tem glej Odločbo Komisije z dne 7.3.2007 v zadevi C 10/06, Cyprus Airways (UL L 49, 22.2.2008, str. 25, točka 139).
See Commission Decision in Case C 58/03 Alstom (OJ L 150, 10.6.2005, p. 24, paragraph 201).
Glej Odločbo Komisije v zadevi C 58/03, Alstom, UL L 150, 10.6.2005, str. 24, točka 201.
The case originated as an ex officio request for information sent to Germany on 21 August 2007.
Zadeva se je začela z zahtevo za informacije, ki je bila 21. avgusta 2007 po uradni dolžnosti naslovljena na Nemčijo.
By letter of 21 January 2008 Germany notified the measures as ‘no aid’ for reasons of legal certainty and indicated as a precaution that the measures should in any event qualify as rescue and restructuring aid compatible with the common market.
Z dopisom z dne 21. januarja 2008 je Nemčija zaradi pravne varnosti priglasila ukrepe, za katere pa meni, da niso pomoč, ter iz previdnosti pojasnila, da je ukrepe vsekakor treba razglasiti za pomoč za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, ki je združljiva s skupnim trgom.
Germany submitted its own comments after the opening of the formal investigation procedure on 28 March and 10, 16, 23 and 30 April 2008.
Po sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave je Nemčija 28. marca ter 10., 16., 23. in 30. aprila 2008 predložila svoje pripombe.
One observation from a third party was received on 16 April 2008.
aprila 2008 je bila predložena pripomba tretje strani.
In the course of the ongoing crisis in the US subprime mortgage market, the three major rating agencies downgraded a huge part of assets backed by mortgages which ranged from A + to BB, to as low as CCC because of high default and foreclosure rates. This immediately had a negative impact on the valuations of these ABSs.
V nadaljnjem obdobju te krize so največje tri bonitetne agencije velikemu delu hipotekarno zavarovanih vrednostnih papirjev, ki so imeli dotlej bonitetno oceno od A + do BB, na podlagi visokih stopenj tveganja neplačila in prisilne izvršbe znižale bonitetno oceno, v določenih primerih celo na CCC, kar je nemudoma poslabšalo oceno papirjev ABS.
In August 2007 it was unable to refinance itself any longer and needed liquidity of up to EUR 17,1 billion. Sachsen LB was not able to provide the credit facilities it had pledged.
Ko sklad Ormond Quay avgusta 2007 ni več mogel refinancirati svojih investicij, je njegov likvidnostni primanjkljaj znašal 17,1 milijarde EUR. Banka Sachsen LB ni mogla zagotoviti obljubljenih kreditov.
Fire sales [4] of assets in depressed market conditions would have led to considerable losses for Sachsen LB and would have resulted in the insolvency of the bank. For this reason various measures were taken.
Ker so prisilne razprodaje [4] vrednostnih papirjev pod tako slabimi tržnimi pogoji pomenile velike izgube za Sachsen LB, navsezadnje pa bi povzročile stečaj banke, so bili sprejeti različni ukrepi.
Sachsen LB had in 2006 a group balance-sheet total of EUR 67,8 billion and own capital of EUR 880 million. Sachsen LB acted as central bank to Saxony’s savings banks.
Leta 2006 je bilančna vsota koncerna Sachsen LB znašala 67,8 milijarde EUR, lastniški kapital pa 880 milijonov EUR. Banka Sachsen LB je bila osrednja institucija hranilnic v zvezni deželi Saški.
On 26 August 2007 Sachsen LB was sold with effect from 1 January 2008 to LBBW.
avgusta 2007 je bila banka Sachsen LB prodana banki LBBW z učinkom od 1. januarja 2008.
On 7 March 2008 the takeover by LBBW was finalised and Sachsen LB was subsequently integrated into LBBW.
Ko je banka LBBW 7. marca 2008 dokončala postopek prevzema, je bila banka Sachsen LB integrirana v LBBW.
Due to these pre-negotiations it was possible for negotiations on the sale of Sachsen LB to progress swiftly on 23 August 2007, i.e. one week after the signing of the pool contract, when Sachsen LB recorded losses of EUR 250 million as described in detail in the opening decision [9]. Since the losses in Sachsen LB’s structured finance portfolio would have implied a further decrease in Sachsen LB’s equity, approaching the minimum regulatory capital requirements, the shareholders of Sachsen LB had to find a sustainable solution for the bank.
Zaradi teh predhodnih pogajanj so pogajanja o prodaji banke Sachsen LB dne 23. avgusta 2007 hitro napredovala, torej le en teden po podpisu meddeželnega sporazuma o črpanju sredstev, ko je, kot je izčrpno prikazano v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka [9], banka Sachsen LB poslovala z izgubo v višini 250 milijonov EUR. Izgube pri strukturiranem finančnem portfelju Sachsen LB bi povzročile nadaljnjo porabo lastniškega kapitala Sachsen LB, kar bi na določeni točki povzročilo, da ne bi bilo več mogoče zagotoviti upoštevanja pravil bančnega nadzora, da so bančne transakcije podprte z lastnimi sredstvi, zato sta delničarja banke Sachsen LB morala najti gospodarsko sprejemljivo rešitev.
On 26 August 2007 a sales agreement was signed which stipulated that Sachsen LB would be sold with effect from 1 January 2008 to LBBW.
Pogodba (v nadaljevanju: temeljni sporazum) o prodaji banke Sachsen LB banki LBBW na dan 1. januarja 2008 je bila podpisana 26. avgusta 2007.
However, the agreement envisaged that the price to be paid should be determined by an evaluation of an independent expert which should take place after the current financial market crisis had been overcome, which was then envisaged for the end of 2007.
V skladu s tem temeljnim sporazumom naj bi se nakupna cena določila na podlagi ocene neodvisnega izvedenca, ki naj bi bila opravljena po premostitvi krize na finančnem trgu, kar se je takrat pričakovalo za konec leta 2007.
In the sales agreement a minimum price of EUR 300 million by way of shares in LBBW was determined.
V sporazumu je bila določena najnižja nakupna cena v višini 300 milijonov EUR v obliki deležev banke LBBW.
Moreover, a step-out-clause for LBBW in case the core capital ratio fell below a certain threshold was added.
Poleg tega je bila za primer, da bi temeljni kapital padel pod določen prag, za LBBW v sporazum vključena določba o prilagoditvi.
In order to avoid the consolidation of all the structured investments into LBBW, one portfolio with a nominal value of EUR 17,5 billion [12] was excluded from the sale. These assets were therefore transferred into a newly founded special investment vehicle (the so-called Super SIV).
Da bi preprečili konsolidacijo vseh strukturiranih investicij v LBBW, je bil iz prodaje izločen portfelj s knjigovodsko vrednostjo 17,5 milijarde EUR [12].
The first tranche of just below 50 % (EUR 8,75 billion) was financed by LBBW. The second tranche of just above 50 % (EUR 8,75 billion) was provided by member banks of the Guarantee Fund (Sicherungsreserve, comparable to a deposit and institute guarantee scheme) of the Landesbanken.
Prvo tranšo v višini slabih 50 % (približno 8,75 milijarde EUR) je financirala banka LBBW; drugo tranšo v višini dobrih 50 % (približno 8,75 milijarde EUR) so zagotovile kreditne institucije, ki spadajo v zavarovalno rezervo deželnih bank in centralnih institucij (vrsta jamstvenega združenja članskih institucij za jamstva za vlagatelje in odškodnine za vlagatelje).
Susat & Partner concluded that the value of the bank amounted to EUR […] billion. Simultaneously LBBW asked […] (hereinafter called […]) to cross-check the valuation.
Revizijska družba je ocenila vrednost banke Sachsen LB na […] milijard EUR. Hkrati je banka LBBW naročila […] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: […]), naj to oceno še enkrat preveri.
[…] arrived at the conclusion that Sachsen LB was worth about EUR […] billion. During the ongoing negotiations the parties then agreed to use the value of EUR […] billion for Sachsen LB.
Podjetje […] je v svoji analizi ocenilo vrednost družbe na […] milijard EUR. Med pogajanji so se stranke sporazumele, da bodo za družbo upoštevale vrednost […] milijard EUR.
This was the result of the estimated value of the bank of EUR […] from which were deducted losses of EUR […] million for portfolio 2 realised in 2007 and the agreed EUR 500 million loss set-off for portfolio 1 remaining with Sachsen LB. Including the EUR 250 million up-front payment, LBBW thus paid EUR 578 million to acquire Sachsen LB.
Ta cena je temeljila na oceni vrednosti družbe Sachsen LB, ki je znašala […] EUR, od te vrednosti pa so bile odbite izgube iz leta 2007 v višini […] milijonov EUR za portfelj 2 in dogovorjena vrednost za pokrivanje izgub za portfelj 1, ki je ostal pri Sachsen LB, v višini 500 milijonov EUR. Vključno s predčasno poravnavo z denarjem v višini 250 milijonov EUR je torej banka LBBW za nakup banke Sachsen LB plačala 578 milijonov EUR.
LBBW has produced a restructuring plan for Sachsen LB which originates from the time of the sale of Sachsen LB and which was last modified on 9 April 2008.
LBBW je za banko Sachsen LB sestavila načrt prestrukturiranja, ki sega nazaj v čas prodaje banke Sachsen LB in ki je bil nazadnje spremenjen 9. aprila 2008.
The Commission understands that the restructuring plan commenced with the sale of Sachsen LB, i.e. on 1 January 2008 and covers a restructuring period of four years until the end of 2011.
Po podatkih, s katerimi razpolaga Komisija, načrt prestrukturiranja zajema dobo štirih let, ki se začne s prodajo banke Saschsen LB 1. januarja 2008 in se bo končala z iztekom leta 2011.
This commitment is valid for a period of two years from the date of the Commission’s decision.
Ta obveznost velja za dobo dveh let po sprejemu odločbe Komisije.
The Commission’s investigation could not confirm that the Free State of Saxony sold Sachsen LB for a positive sales price (i.e. received a higher sales price than the funds it provided).
Komisija ni mogla potrditi, da je Zvezna dežela Saška dosegla pozitivno prodajno ceno, to je prodajno ceno, ki bi bila višja od sredstev, ki jih je zagotovila.
While the existence of a positive sales price cannot be disputed as regards the original sales agreement of August 2007, according to which LBBW would have paid at least EUR 300 million plus an up-front cash payment for Sachsen LB, it is no longer the case after the December renegotiations, because the Free State of Saxony has provided a guarantee of EUR 2,75 billion and received in return […] % of the sales price of EUR 328 million (EUR […] million) in cash plus the revenues resulting from the potential provision (nominal value of EUR […(> 90)] million) [29].
Medtem ko ni sporno, da je bila dosežena pozitivna prodajna cena s prvotno kupoprodajno pogodbo iz avgusta 2007, po kateri je LBBW banki Sachsen LB morala plačati najmanj 300 mio EUR in predčasno poravnavo z denarjem, pa to ne drži po poznejših decembrskih pogajanjih, ker je Zvezna dežela Saška dala jamstvo 2,75 mrd EUR in za to prejela […] % prodajne cene v višini 328 mio EUR (to je […] mio EUR) v gotovini in prejemke od garancijske provizije (s knjižno vrednostjo […(> 90)] mio EUR) [29].
Furthermore, the Commission obtained confirmation in the investigation of the view that a market economy investor would, in such unpredictable circumstances, have taken into account at least the bad case scenario of EUR […(> 800)] million of expected losses. The Commission would observe that in reaching this conclusion it is in line with the previous case of Bankgesellschaft Berlin [30].
Nadalje se je v preiskavi potrdila domneva Komisije, da bi v tako nepredvidljivih okoliščinah vlagatelj, ki deluje v tržnem gospodarstvu, izhajal najmanj iz negatinega scenarija s pričakovanimi izgubami […(> 800)] mio EUR. Poleg tega Komisija opozarja na to, da se njena ugotovitev ujema s prejšnjim primerom Bankgesellschaft Berlin [30].
Moreover, the refinancing of the Super SIV by LBBW and the Landesbanken is not comparable to the first measure, which constitutes aid to the benefit of Sachsen LB.
Poleg tega refinanciranje naložbenega nosilca Super-SIV, ki so ga izvedle LBBW in deželne banke, ni primerljivo s prvim ukrepom, pri katerem gre za pomoč v korist Sachsen LB.
The market conditions in December 2007 and in August 2007 were substantially different.
Tržne razmere v decembru 2007 so se v primerjavi z avgustom 2007 občutno spremenile.
There was virtually no investor in August that would have been willing to invest in a conduit such as the Super SIV.
Avgusta 2007 skoraj ni bilo več nobenega vlagatelja, ki bi bil pripravljen vlagati v posebne naložbene sklade (Conduit), kot je Super-SIV.
The risk assumed by the banking pool for a remuneration of […] bps — especially given that there was in reality no one willing to give liquidity to these conduits at the time — was therefore not market conform.
Tveganje, ki ga je prevzela skupina bank proti plačilu […] baznih točk, ni bilo v skladu s tržnim ravnanjem, ker takrat v resnici ni bilo več interesentov, ki bi vlagali v te posebne naložbene sklade.
In December, market conditions had improved, however, and there were again investors buying asset-backed CPs.
Nasprotno pa so decembra vlagatelji zaradi izboljšanih tržnih razmer spet kupovali s sredstvi zavarovane vrednostne papirje.
In addition, the Super SIV has a hold-to-maturity strategy, contrary to the pool of banks which acquired CPs valid for a limited duration and thus certainly not until maturity of most securities.
Povrhu je bil namen naložbenega nosilca Super-SIV obdržati vanj vključene portfelje do dospelosti, medtem ko je skupina bank kupovala CP, ki so bili časovno omejeni in jih zagotovo niso obdržale do roka dospelosti vrednostnih papirjev.
Given that Germany confirmed that the default risk of the underlying assets remains with Sachsen LB, the liquidity facility can be regarded as a six months current account line of maximum EUR 17,1 billion. In other words, the provision of liquidity is similar to a loan from the banking pool to Sachsen LB.
Glede na potrditev Nemčije, da je plačilno tveganje finančnega premoženja za zavarovanje terjatev še vedno na strani banke Sachsen LB, se likvidnostno posojilo lahko šteje za šestmesečni kontokorentni kredit v znesku 17,1 mrd EUR. Z drugimi besedami, zagotovitev likvidnostnega posojila je primerljiva s posojilom, ki bi ga skupina bank odobrila banki Sachsen LB.