natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Such a write-down would not be possible in this case for accounting reasons without changing the structure of the transaction, as the structured securities are protected from potential losses through the asset relief measure.
V tem primeru tak odpis zaradi računovodskih razlogov ne bi bil mogoč, ne da bi spremenili strukturo transakcije, saj so strukturirani vrednostni papirji z ukrepom pomoči zaščiteni pred morebitnimi izgubami.
Consequently the transfer value is above the real economic value.
Tako je vrednost ob prenosu višja od dejanske gospodarske vrednosti.
In the event of an assumption of risk above the real economic value the criterion laid down in the Impaired Assets Communication of full ex ante burden sharing will not be fulfilled.
Ob prevzemu tveganja nad dejansko gospodarsko vrednostjo merilo popolne predhodne porazdelitve bremena, določene v sporočilu o oslabljenih sredstvih, ni izpolnjeno.
Consequently the aid element in the asset relief measure is correspondingly larger and can only be approved if the measure is accompanied by the introduction of conditions allowing the recovery of this additional aid at a later stage (e.g. by means of a claw-back mechanism) or far-reaching restructuring (cf. paragraph 41 and section 5.2 of the Impaired Assets Communication).
Zato je element pomoči v ukrepu pomoči ustrezno višji in ga je mogoče odobriti le, če ukrep vsebuje določbe, ki omogočajo poznejšo terjatev vračila teh dodatnih pomoči (npr. prek mehanizma za vračilo neupravičeno prejetih sredstev), ali predvideva obsežno prestrukturiranje (glej točko 41 in razdelek 5.2 sporočila o oslabljenih sredstvih).
With a claw-back mechanism the beneficiary bank normally repays the advantage arising from the higher assumption of risk at a later stage, i.e. it would have to repay the entire amount secured by the guarantee which exceeds the real economic value.
Pri mehanizmu za vračilo neupravičeno prejetih sredstev banka upravičenka običajno pozneje vrne prednost, ki izhaja iz večjega prevzetega tveganja, kar pomeni, da bi morala vrniti celoten znesek, zavarovan z jamstvom, ki presega dejansko gospodarsko vrednost.
If no full recovery (claw-back) is possible, far-reaching compensatory measures must be provided for.
Če ni mogoče terjati celotnega vračila, je treba predvideti daljnosežne izravnalne ukrepe.
In the case of a guarantee the recovery can be achieved through an appropriate compensation for the amount exceeding the real economic value.
Pri jamstvu je mogoče poravnanje terjatve zagotoviti s primernim povračilom zneska, ki presega dejansko gospodarsko vrednost.
In the present case a compensation of 10 % p.a. is paid for the guarantee of EUR 1,5 billion.
V obravnavanem primeru se za jamstvo, ki presega 1,5 milijarde EUR, plača 10-odstotno povračilo letno.
This compensation covers both the advantage arising from the capital relief for the guaranteed EUR billion 1,5 (current compensation rate 6,25 %) and the increase by 3,75 % (resulting in an overall amount of EUR 56,25 million p.a.) [19].
To povračilo pokrije prednost, ki izhaja iz razbremenitve kapitala, za zajamčene 1,5 milijarde EUR (takratna stopnja povračila 6,25 %), pa tudi povišanje za 3,75 % (tako da je skupni znesek 56,25 milijona EUR letno) [19].
At first sight this increase may appear low.
Na prvi pogled se zdi to povišanje morda majhno.
As it is unclear when the potential losses determined by the Commission will occur, it may be that the fee payments will be sufficient to cover all the losses that may arise.
Ker ni jasno, kdaj bodo nastale potencialne izgube, ki jih je ugotovila Komisija, se lahko zgodi, da bodo plačila premij skupaj zadoščala za pokritje vseh morebiti nastalih izgub.
The increase in the compensation consequently contributes to dispelling the Commission’s original doubts regarding burden sharing.
Tako povišanje povračila pripeva k odpravi prvotnega dvoma Komisije glede porazdelitve bremena.
In addition the scale and extent of the restructuring to be carried out by the bank and the compensating measures should sufficiently compensate for any inadequacies in the prescribed recovery.
Poleg tega bi lahko obseg in domet prestrukturiranja, ki ga je obljubila banka, in izravnalni ukrepi zadostno nadomestili morebitne pomanjkljivosti predpisane terjatve vračila.
The Commission’s doubts regarding appropriate burden sharing could be dispelled on this point.
V tej točki je lahko Komisija ovrgla pomisleke glede ustrezne porazdelitve bremena.
As the real economic value of the Sealink portfolio has been confirmed, no adjustments are necessary for this part of the arrangement.
Ker je bila dejanska vrednost portfelja SEALINK potrjena, niso potrebne prilagoditve za ta del.
Compensation
POVRAČILO
In its opening decision the Commission established that the compensation paid by the beneficiary bank takes adequate account of the risk of future losses which exceeds the risk expressed in the real economic value in accordance with the Impaired Assets Communication.
Komisija je v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka ugotovila, da povračilo, ki ga je plačala banka upravičenka, primerno upošteva tveganje prihodnjih izgub, ki presegajo tveganje, izraženo v dejanski gospodarski vrednosti v skladu s sporočilom o oslabljenih sredstvih.
The compensation was calculated on the basis of an interest rate, which would have been used as a basis for a corresponding recapitalisation, in which the equity capital relief effect was used as a yardstick in accordance with the Impaired Assets Communication.
Povračilo je bilo izračunano na podlagi obrestne mere, ki je bila podlaga za ustrezno dokapitalizacijo, pri čemer je bil v skladu s sporočilom o oslabljenih sredstvih kot merilo uporabljen kapitalski učinek pomoči.
In view of the equity capital relief effect the compensation should however be reduced by 0,75 % to 6,25 % p.a.
Glede na kapitalski učinek pomoči pa bi bilo treba povračilo znižati za 0,75 % na 6,25 %.
As according to the Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 20 November 2008 on recapitalisation measures a difference of 1,5 % exists between the price of tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital, a reduction of 150 basis points is appropriate [22].
Ker se v skladu s priporočilom Evropske centralne banke z dne 20. novembra 2008 glede ukrepov dokapitalizacije cena za temeljni in cena za sekundarni kapital razlikujeta za 1,5 %, je primerno znižanje za 150 bazičnih točk [22].
If according to the Recapitalisation Communication 7 % can be regarded as appropriate compensation for tier 1 capital without the supply of liquidity, the tier 2 capital should then be compensated for at a rate of 5,5 %.
Če bi v skladu s sporočilom o dokapitalizaciji obveljalo, da je 7 % ustrezno povračilo za temeljni kapital brez likvidnostne injekcije, potem bi bilo treba sekundarni kapital povrniti po stopnji 5,5 %.
The average of both rates is 6,25 %.
Srednja vrednost obeh stopenj je 6,25 %.
On the basis of the above considerations LBBW has to pay a capital relief effect of EUR 4,476 billion at 6,25 % p.a., which corresponds to an amount of EUR 279,75 million p.a.
Na podlagi zgornjih premislekov mora LBBW povrniti kapitalski učinek pomoči v znesku 4,476 milijarde EUR po 6,25 % letno, kar ustreza znesku 279,75 milijona EUR letno.
Together with the recovery amount of EUR 56,24 million this produces a compensation amount of EUR 336 million p.a. which, in view of the aspects explained above, is proportionate.
Skupaj s terjanim vračilom v znesku 56,24 milijona EUR znaša to povračilo 336 milijonov EUR letno, kar je sorazmerno glede na zgoraj razloženo.
Compatibility of the restructuring aid with the internal market
Združljivost pomoči za prestrukturiranje z notranjim trgom
The Commission has to examine the continuation of all the current rescue measures as restructuring aid.
Komisija mora preveriti nadaljevanje vseh dosedanjih ukrepov reševanja v obliki pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
Examination of whether the restructuring aid is compatible with the internal market is carried out against the background of the financial crisis on the basis of the Commission’s Restructuring Communication.
Preverjanje, ali je pomoč za prestrukturiranje združljiva z notranjim trgom, ob upoštevanju finančne krize temelji na sporočilu Komisije o prestrukturiranju.
Although in previous decisions reference was made to the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [23], the Commission has clarified in paragraph 49 of the Restructuring Communication that all aid which is notified to the Commission on or before 31 December 2010 will be examined as restructuring aid for banks on the basis of the Restructuring Communication rather than the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.
Čeprav prejšnje odločbe vsebujejo sklicevanja na Smernice Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah [23], je Komisija v točki 49 sporočila o prestrukturiranju pojasnila, da bo vse ukrepe pomoči, ki ji bodo priglašeni do vključno 31. decembra 2010, preverjala kot ukrepe pomoči za prestrukturiranje bank na podlagi sporočila o prestrukturiranju in ne na podlagi Smernic Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah.
As regards the necessity and range of a restructuring, it is not laid down in the Restructuring Communication under what conditions a bank may have to submit a restructuring plan, but reference is made to previous communications concerning this.
Glede potrebnosti in obsega prestrukturiranja v sporočilu o prestrukturiranju ni določeno, pod katerimi pogoji mora banka v danem primeru predložiti načrt prestrukturiranja, temveč se glede tega sklicuje na prejšnja sporočila.
The Commission holds the view that LBBW needs comprehensive restructuring as the aid prevented the closure of the bank by the banking supervisory authority and all in all corresponded to more than 2 % of the bank’s total impaired assets.
Po mnenju Komisije je LBBW potrebovala obsežno prestrukturiranje, saj je pomoč preprečila, da bi banko zaprli na podlagi bančnega nadzora, in je v celoti ustrezala več kot 2 % celotnega portfelja tveganih sredstev banke.
This view is in accord with paragraph 4 of the Restructuring Communication and paragraph 55 of the Impaired Assets Communication.
To mnenje je skladno s točko 4 sporočila o prestrukturiranju in točko 55 sporočila o oslabljenih sredstvih.
Under the Restructuring Communication it must first be explained in the restructuring plan that the restructuring process which the beneficiary bank is subjected to is suitable to ensure the return to long-term viability.
V skladu s sporočilom o prestrukturiranju mora biti v načrtu prestrukturiranja najprej razloženo, da je proces prestrukturiranja, uporabljen za banko upravičenko, primeren, da se zagotovi ponovna vzpostavitev dolgoročno uspešnega poslovanja.
Secondly the amount of the aid must be limited to the minimum absolutely necessary and both the beneficiary and its shareholders should as far as possible participate in the restructuring with their own funds.
Poleg tega mora znesek pomoči ostati omejen na nujno potrebni minimum, upravičenka in njeni imetniki deležev pa morajo v prestrukturiranju v čim večji meri sodelovati z lastnimi sredstvi.
Measures must be taken in order to limit distortions of competition which arise as a result of the fact that the market power of the beneficiary is artificially supported and in order to ensure the maintenance of a competitive banking sector.
Treba je sprejeti ukrepe, da se omejijo izkrivljanja konkurence, ki nastanejo zaradi umetnega podpiranja tržne moči upravičenke, in da se zagotovi ohranitev konkurenčnega bančnega sektorja.
In addition questions relating to monitoring and procedural issues need to be clarified.
Poleg tega je treba pojasniti vprašanja nadzora in postopkovnih vidikov.
Restoration of long-term viability
Ponovna vzpostavitev dolgoročno uspešnega poslovanja
In an assessment of a restructuring plan under competition law the Commission ensures that the bank is in a position to restore its long-term viability without State aid (section 2 of the Restructuring Communication).
S presojo konkurenčnosti načrta prestrukturiranja Komisija zagotavlja, da je banka zmožna ponovno vzpostaviti dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje brez državne pomoči (razdelek 2 sporočila o prestrukturiranju).
According to the Restructuring Communication long-term viability is ensured if the restructured bank is able to compete in the marketplace for capital on its own merits in compliance with relevant regulatory requirements.
V skladu s sporočilom o prestrukturiranju je dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje zagotovljeno, ko je prestrukturirana banka na podlagi lastne moči in v skladu z upoštevnimi merili varnega poslovanja sposobna samostojno konkurirati za kapital na trgu.
This involves the bank being able to cover all its costs und provide an appropriate return on equity, taking into account the risk profile of the bank.
To pomeni, da je banka sposobna kriti vse stroške in zagotoviti ustrezno donosnost lastnega kapitala ob upoštevanju svojega profila tveganja.
Long-term viability also requires that any State aid received is either redeemed over time, as anticipated at the time the aid is granted, or is remunerated according to normal market conditions, thereby ensuring that any form of additional State aid is terminated.
Pri dolgoročno uspešnem poslovanju se tudi zahteva, da se vsaka prejeta državna pomoč sčasoma odplača, kot je predvideno ob dodelitvi pomoči, ali pa se zanjo plača nadomestilo po običajnih tržnih pogojih, s čimer se zagotovi prenehanje vseh oblik dodatne državne pomoči.
The restoration of viability should above all be achieved through internal measures and on the basis of a credible restructuring plan.
Dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje naj bi ponovno vzpostavili z notranjimi merili in na podlagi kredibilnega načrta prestrukturiranja.
Furthermore the restructuring plan should identify the causes of the bank’s difficulties and the bank’s own weaknesses and outline how the proposed restructuring measures remedy the bank’s underlying problems.
Poleg tega mora načrt prestrukturiranja opredeliti vzroke za težave banke in njene lastne slabosti ter opisati, kako bi se lahko lotili reševanja njenih problemov.
Restructuring requires a withdrawal from activities which would remain structurally loss-making in the medium term.
Prestrukturiranje zahteva, da se opustijo vse dejavnosti, ki bi srednjeročno zaradi strukturnih razlogov še naprej ustvarjale izgubo.
Firstly the restructuring initiated by LBBW on the basis of the restructuring plan submitted by Germany seems appropriate to restore LBBW’s viability.
Prvič, prestrukturiranje, ki ga je LBBW uvedla na podlagi načrta prestrukturiranja, ki ga je predložila Nemčija, se zdi primerno za ponovno vzpostavitev dolgoročno uspešnega poslovanja LBBW.
In the restructuring plan a tier 1 capital ratio of [9-11] % and a return on equity of [10-12] % are estimated for 2013.
V načrtu prestrukturiranj se za leto 2013 načrtujeta [9–11]-odstotni delež temeljnega kapitala in [10–12]-odstotna donosnost lastnega kapitala.
These figures – even under extreme stress conditions – would lie far above the regulatory level and would correspond to the market’s expectations of a bank with the risk profile of LBBW.
Te številke – razen v pogojih izjemnih položajev – precej presegajo predpisano stopnjo z vidika varnega poslovanja in ustrezajo pričakovanjem, ki jih trg pričakuje od banke s profilom, kot ga ima LBBW.
LBBW’s liquidity proved to be stable during the crisis and the bank still has sufficient liquidity reserves.
Med krizo se je likvidnost LBBW izkazala za stabilno in banka ima še vedno na voljo dovolj likvidnostnih rezerv.
Future financing and financial costs have been examined.
Preverjeni so bili prihodnje financiranje in stroški financiranja.
Even with the application of the pessimistic LBBW scenario the bank would not need any further aid, the tier 1 capital ratio would not fall below 7,0 % during the restructuring and the tier 1 capital ratio would be [9-10] % in 2013, but the return on equity would only be [6-7] %.
Banka niti po pesimističnem scenariju za LBBW ne bi potrebovala nadaljnje pomoči, delež temeljnega kapitala med prestrukturiranjem ne bi padel pod 7,0 %, leta 2013 bi njegov delež znašal [9–10] %, donosnost lastnega kapitala pa bi bila [6–7] %.
Even if the risk costs and the impaired assets were to rise further, the bank would still meet the regulatory requirements for capital resources.
Čeprav bi se stroški tveganja in tvegana sredstva še naprej povečevali, bi banka kljub temu izpolnjevala zahteve glede kapitalske ustreznosti za varno poslovanje.
LBBW’s revised business model is a decisive factor in ensuring that the restoration of viability is realistic.
Predelani poslovni model LBBW je odločilen dejavnik za zagotovitev realne možnosti ponovne vzpostavitve uspešnega poslovanja.
LBBW is to be converted into a commercial bank with a clear focus on German SMEs and private customers which makes a number of corporate finance and selected investment banking products available to some of its customers (corporate customers and savings banks.
LBBW naj bi se preoblikovala v poslovno banko, ki je jasno osredotočena na srednje velika podjetja in zasebne stranke ter delu svojih strank (podjetjem in hranilnicam) zagotavlja vrsto storitev podjetniškega financiranja in finančnega svetovanja ter izbranih produktov v investicijskem bančništvu.
Its offering comprises good products which are used by a broad range of customers (these include bank relationships of many years).
Njena ponudba obsega dobro uvedene produkte, ki jih uporablja široka baza strank (sem štejejo tudi dolgoletna razmerja z matično banko).
This should form a good basis for a sound commercial banking business and opportunistic transactions driven by the capital markets are in this way to be reduced.
To bi lahko bila dobra podlaga za zanesljivo komercialno bančništvo, kar bi omogočilo ukinitev preračunljivih poslov, ki temeljijo na kapitalskem trgu.
The Commission examined the credibility of the restructuring plan on the basis of LBBW’s business results and up-to-date LBBW reports (including results in the management information system and risk management reports).
Komisija je kredibilnost načrta prestrukturiranja preverila na podlagi dosedanjih poslovnih rezultatov LBBW in aktualnih poročil LBBW (vključno z rezultati v poslovodnem informacijskem sistemu in poročili o upravljanju tveganj).
In addition the Commission based its decision on risk assessments which were undertaken by the competent supervisory authority in accord with the detailed European directives and on reports by rating agencies.
Poleg tega se je oprla na vrednotenja tveganj, ki so jih opravili pristojni nadzorni organi v skladu z upoštevnimi evropskimi direktivami, in na poročila bonitetnih agencij.
Planning and underlying assumptions were investigated for their compatibility with the most recent economic forecasts and with scenarios which the Commission had also referred to in other aid cases.
Komisija je preverila načrtovanje in izhodiščne predpostavke glede združljivosti z najnovejšimi gospodarskimi napovedmi in scenariji, ki jih je uporabila tudi v drugih zadevah o državni pomoči.
The restructuring plan takes account of the detailed information currently available and takes into account the fact that forecasts concerning future development can only be made to a limited extent.
Načrt prestrukturiranja upošteva trenutno razpoložljive upoštevne informacije in dejstvo, da so izjave o prihodnjem razvoju mogoče le v omejeni meri.
The assumptions concerning the further development of risks, results and capital basis appear sufficiently pessimistic.
Predpostavke o nadaljnjem razvoju tveganj, rezultatov in kapitalske osnove se zdijo dovolj pesimistične.
The risks arising from the large and relatively concentrated loan book – i.e. the greatest risks after the risk in connection with investment in structured securities – were limited by the asset relief measure and consequently treated appropriately.
Tveganja, ki izhajajo iz obsežnega in relativno koncentriranega kreditnega poslovanja (tudi tista, povezana z naložbami v strukturirane vrednostne papirje, ki so dejansko še največja), so bila z ukrepom pomoči zamejena in tako ustrezno obravnavana.
Nevertheless it is assumed that even under standardised conditions the LBBW’s risk costs will remain twice as high as the previous risk management and they will correspond to the risk costs of its peers.
Vendar se izhaja iz dejstva, da bodo stroški tveganja LBBW tudi v normaliziranih okoliščinah ostali dvakrat višji od dosedanje zaščite pred tveganji in bodo ustrezali stroškom tveganj konkurentov.
In addition the restructuring plan does not assume a rapid recovery, but rather a considerable rise in risks and loan losses.
Načrt prestrukturiranja poleg tega ne predvideva hitrega okrevanja, temveč nasprotno znatno povečanje tveganj in izgub iz posojil.
The restructuring plan takes account of these aspects both through a higher risk management and with higher regulatory capital requirements due to risk migration and higher losses on results.
Načrt prestrukturiranja upošteva te vidike z večjo zaščito pred tveganji in višjimi zahtevami glede lastnega kapitala na podlagi migracij tveganj in višjih izgub zaradi neplačil.
This is the result of the joint calculations of the LBBW offices for risk management and lending and consequently the result of a combination of a model-based approach and the estimates of experts.
To je rezultat skupnih izračunov vseh poslovalnic LBBW glede upravljanja tveganj in dajanja posojil ter tako rezultat kombinacije zasnove, ki temelji bolj na modelu, in ocene strokovnjakov.
While a slower recovery emerges from the models and, contrary to the estimates of the experts, a higher likelihood of losses is assumed, the experts hold the view that the losses are estimated as being too low in the models.
Medtem ko iz modelov izhaja počasnejše okrevanje in zato v nasprotju z oceno strokovnjakov predvidevajo v celoti večjo verjetnost neplačila, pa strokovnjaki menijo, da so izgube na podlagi neplačil, predvidene v modelih, ocenjene prenizko.
The figures of both sides were adjusted accordingly.
Podatki obeh strani so bili ustrezno očiščeni.
Furthermore both the historical comparisons and a comparison of the current plan parameters demonstrate a high degree of consistency with external economic indicators and show that the economic downturn effects have been taken into account in the plan.
Poleg tega je tako iz zgodovinskih primerjav kot iz primerjav sedanjih načrtov razvidna visoka stopnja konsistentnosti z zunanjimi kazalniki poslovnega cikla in gospodarskimi kazalniki ter je mogoče razbrati, da so bili pri načrtovanju upoštevani učinki recesije v poslovnem ciklu.
It can also be seen from the restructuring plan that the risk costs for new business and loans will be considerably lower than up to now as the risks may be considerably reduced by the restructuring and the credit quality in the core business will be better.
Dalje iz načrta prestrukturiranja izhaja, da bodo stroški tveganja za nove posle in posojila znatno nižji kot doslej, saj bo mogoče tveganja s prestrukturiranjem precej zmanjšati, kreditna boniteta v osnovni dejavnosti pa bo boljša.
Thus, no further investments will be made in structured securities.
Tako se sploh ne bo več vlagalo v strukturirane vrednostne papirje.
The portfolios containing the greatest risk were the subject of asset relief measures which may be considered to be sufficient according to the Commission’s investigation results.
Z največjim tveganjem obremenjeni portfelji so bili predmet ukrepov pomoči, ki na podlagi rezultatov preverjanja Komisije lahko veljajo za zadostne.
No further losses should therefore be expected concerning these.
Zato glede tega ni pričakovati nadaljnjih izgub.
Nevertheless LBBW expects a considerable rise in risk costs for the restructuring phase, where it is assumed that these costs will be higher than the current risk management.
Vendar LBBW v fazi prestrukturiranja pričakuje precejšnje povečanje stroškov tveganja, pri čemer se predvideva, da bodo ti stroški višji od dosedanje zaščite pred tveganji.