natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Lastly, BA pointed out that, as this commercial strategy was characterised by non-essential expenses being incurred, it could not be guaranteed that the aid in question was limited to the amount needed to keep the company in business for the period for which it was authorised, as this amount had to be based on the liquidity needs of the company stemming from losses (paragraph 25(d) of the 2004 guidelines).
Nazadnje družba BA trdi, da ker so za to poslovno strategijo značilni nebistveni izdatki, ni mogoče zagotoviti, da bo zadevna pomoč omejena na znesek, potreben za delovanje podjetja v obdobju, za katero je pomoč odobrena, saj mora potrebna količina temeljiti na likvidnostnih potrebah podjetja, ki želi preprečiti nadaljnje dolgove (točka 25(d) smernic iz leta 2004).
Ryanair criticised the Commission for not having already demanded the immediate suspension of the measure and asked that Alitalia be required to immediately repay the EUR 300 million that had already been granted to it by Italy.
Družba Ryanair očita Komisiji, da ni že zahtevala takojšnje začasne odložitve zadevne pomoči, in zahteva, naj se od družbe Alitalia zahteva takojšnje vračilo 300 milijonov EUR, ki ji jih je odobrila Italija.
Ryanair also stressed that, contrary to the claims of the Italian authorities, no motive of public order and territorial continuity could be invoked to justify the granting of the measure in question to Alitalia.
Družba Ryanair tudi poudarja, da se v nasprotju s trditvami italijanskih organov ni mogoče sklicevati na noben razlog javnega reda in prometne povezanosti, da bi upravičili odobritev zadevne pomoči družbi Alitalia.
In this context, Ryanair referred to the reduction in Alitalia’s market share on certain routes.
Ryanair se v zvezi s tem sklicuje na zmanjšanje tržnih deležev družbe Alitalia na nekaterih progah.
By contrast, the European Travel Agents’ and Tour Operators’ Associations (ECTAA) and the Guild of European Business Travel Agents (GEBTA) considered that granting the measure in question aimed at preventing Alitalia’s bankruptcy was likely to protect consumers in the absence of legislation protecting passengers in the event of the company going bankrupt.
The European Travel Agents’ and Tour Operators’ Associations (ECTAA) in The Guild of European Business Travel Agents (GEBTA) nasprotno menita, da odobritev zadevne pomoči lahko pripomore k varstvu potrošnikov, ker je njen namen preprečiti stečaj družbe Alitalia, saj v primeru takega stečaja družbe ni zakonodaje o varstvu potrošnikov.
ECTAA and GEBTA added that granting the loan in question was the only reasonable solution to avoid Alitalia going bankrupt and to help it in its privatisation process.
ECTAA in GEBTA dodajata, da je bila odobritev zadevnega posojila edina razumna rešitev, da bi preprečili stečaj družbe Alitalia in ji pomagali v postopku privatizacije.
Given the prospects for relaunching the company reported in the press, granting this loan was economically justified in order to lead to a complete restructuring of Alitalia with a view to future profits.
Ob upoštevanju možnosti oživitve družbe, o katerih je poročal tisk, bi bila odobritev tega posojila ekonomsko upravičena, da bi se lahko začelo popolno prestrukturiranje družbe Alitalia, da bi ta lahko v prihodnosti imela dobiček.
SUMMARY OF PAST COMMISSION DECISIONS CONCERNING ALITALIA
SEZNAM ODLOČB KOMISIJE O DRUŽBI ALITALIA
For the purposes of analysing the measure in question, it is worth recalling here that the Commission has previously taken the following Decisions in relation to Alitalia:
V tem smislu in za potrebe analize zadevnega ukrepa je treba spomniti, da je Komisija v zvezi z družbo Alitalia pred tem sprejela naslednje odločbe:
Commission Decision of 15 July 1997 concerning the recapitalisation of Alitalia [11]: in this Decision, the Commission considered that, subject to certain undertakings being met, the recapitalisation of Alitalia in the form of a capital injection of 2750 billion Italian lire was State aid compatible with the common market under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.
Odločbo Komisije z dne 15. julija 1997 o dokapitalizaciji Alitalie [11]: Komisija je v njej odločila, da je dokapitalizacija družbe Alitalia v obliki kapitalske naložbe v vrednosti 2750 milijard ITL ob upoštevanju nekaterih obveznosti državna pomoč, ki je združljiva s skupnim trgom v skladu s členom 87(3)(c) Pogodbe;
Commission Decision of 18 July 2001 concerning the recapitalisation of Alitalia [12]: since its Decision of 15 July 1997 had been annulled by the Court of First Instance [13], the Commission adopted a new Decision concerning the same recapitalisation.
Odločbo Komisije z dne 18. julija 2001 o dokapitalizaciji Alitalie [12]: ker je Sodišče prve stopnje razveljavilo [13] odločbo z dne 15. julija 1997, je Komisija sprejela novo odločbo o isti dokapitalizaciji.
In this Decision, the Commission reached the same conclusion as in its Decision of 15 July 1997, namely that the recapitalisation of Alitalia was State aid compatible with the common market [14].Commission Decision of 19 June 2002, C 54/96 and N 318/02 — Third instalment of aid for the restructuring of Alitalia approved by the Commission on 18 July 2001 and new recapitalisation of EUR 1,4 billion [15]: with this Decision, the Commission approved the abovementioned third instalment (EUR 129 million) and considered that the new recapitalisation was not State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.Commission Decision of 20 July 2004, N 279/04 — Urgent measures in support of the restructuring and relaunch of Alitalia (rescue aid) [16]: with this Decision, the Commission authorised rescue aid in the form of a State guarantee for a bridging loan of EUR 400 million [17].
V njej je ugotovila enako kot v odločbi z dne 15. julija 1997, in sicer da je dokapitalizacija družbe Alitalia državna pomoč, ki je združljiva s skupnim trgom [14];Odločbo Komisije z dne 19. junija 2002, C 54/96 in N 318/02 – Tretja tranša pomoči za prestrukturiranje za družbo Alitalia, ki jo je Komisija odobrila 18. julija 2001, in nova dokapitalizacija v višini 1,4 milijarde EUR [15]: Komisija je s to odločbo odobrila zgoraj navedeno tretjo tranšo (129 milijonov EUR) in ugotovila, da nova dokapitalizacija ni državna pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe;Odločbo Komisije z dne 20. julija 2004, N 279/04 – Nujni ukrepi za preoblikovanje in ponovno oživitev podjetja Alitalia (pomoč za reševanje) [16]: Komisija je s to odločbo odobrila pomoč za reševanje v obliki državnega poroštva za premostitveno posojilo v višini 400 milijonov EUR [17];
Commission Decision 2006/176/EC of 7 June 2005 on Alitalia’s industrial restructuring plan [18]: in this Decision, the Commission considered that the measures in question did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.7.
Odločbo Komisije 2006/176/ES z dne 7. junija 2005 o industrijskem načrtu prestrukturiranja Alitalie [18]: Komisija je na koncu menila, da zadevni ukrepi niso državna pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe.7.
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURE IN THE LIGHT OF ARTICLE 87(1) OF THE TREATY
OCENA UKREPA V SKLADU S ČLENOM 87(1) POGODBE
Following the formal investigation procedure initiated on the basis of Article 88(2) of the Treaty, and taking account of the arguments submitted in this connection by the Italian authorities and the interested parties, the Commission believes that the measure in question, namely the EUR 300 million loan granted to Alitalia, the value of which can be counted as part of the company’s capital, constitutes State aid which is incompatible with the common market within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty and unlawful within the meaning of Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
Komisija po formalnem postopku preiskave, sprožene na podlagi člena 88(2) Pogodbe, in ob upoštevanju argumentov, ki so jih predložile Italija in zainteresirane strani, meni, da je zadevni ukrep, in sicer posojilo v višini 300 milijonov EUR, ki je odobreno družbi Alitalia in se lahko vključi v lastniški kapital družbe, državna pomoč, ki je nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe in nezakonita v smislu člena 88(3) Pogodbe.
According to Article 87(1) of the Treaty, ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market’.
V skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe „je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom, kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami“.
Classifying a national measure as State aid presupposes that the following cumulative conditions are met: 1. the measure in question confers an advantage through State resources; 2. the advantage is selective; and 3. the measure distorts or threatens to distort competition and is capable of affecting trade between Member States [19].
Za opredelitev nacionalnega ukrepa kot državne pomoči morajo biti izpolnjeni naslednji kumulativni pogoji, in sicer: 1. zadevni ukrep daje prednost pomoči iz državnih sredstev, 2. ta ugodnost je selektivna ter 3. zadevni ukrep izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljal konkurenco in lahko prizadene trgovino med državami članicami [19].
It is appropriate to set out the factors which allow the Commission to consider, at this stage, that the measure in question satisfies these cumulative conditions.
Treba je navesti razloge, zakaj je Komisija na tej stopnji sklepala, da zadevna pomoč izpolnjuje te kumulativne pogoje.
The existence of an advantage conferred through State resources
Obstoj ugodnosti, dodeljene z državnimi sredstvi
It should first be pointed out that the measure in question is a loan, the value of which can be counted as part of Alitalia’s capital [20], directly granted to the company by the Italian State, and thus involving the transfer of State resources.
Po eni strani je treba spomniti, da je zadevna pomoč posojilo, ki se lahko vključi v lastniški kapital družbe Alitalia [20] in ga je Italija neposredno dodelila tej družbi ter torej pomeni prenos državnih sredstev.
Moreover, this measure is the responsibility of the Italian State, since the decision to grant the loan was adopted by the Italian Council of Ministers on 22 April 2008 and supplemented by Decree-Law No 93 of 27 May 2008.
Poleg tega je to pomoč mogoče pripisati državi Italiji, ker je italijanski Svet ministrov 22. aprila 2008 sprejel odločbo o odobritvi posojila, ki je bila dopolnjena z zakonskim odlokom št. 93 z dne 27. maja 2008.
As for whether there is an economic advantage, it should be assessed whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor could have been led to provide a capital injection such as that in the case in point.
Po drugi strani je treba, kar zadeva obstoj gospodarske prednosti, ugotoviti, ali bi se zasebni vlagatelj v podobnih okoliščinah lahko odločil za vplačilo kapitalskega vložka, kot se obravnava v tej zadevi.
Here, the Court has stated that, although the conduct of a private investor with which the intervention of the public investor pursuing economic policy aims must be compared need not be the conduct of an ordinary investor laying out capital with a view to realising a profit in the relatively short term, it must at least be the conduct of a private holding company or a private group of undertakings pursuing a structural policy — whether general or sectoral — and guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term [21].
Sodišče je v zvezi s tem pojasnilo, da se zasebni vlagatelj, čigar udeležbo je treba primerjati z javnim vlagateljem, ki sledi ciljem ekonomske politike, ne obnaša nujno kot običajni vlagatelj, ki vlaga kapital, da bi si v dokaj kratkem času zagotovil donos, ampak najmanj kot zasebni holding ali skupina zasebnih podjetij, ki vodi strukturno, globalno ali sektorsko politiko ter ga usmerjajo možnosti dolgoročnejše rentabilnosti [21].
The Court has also ruled that a private shareholder may reasonably provide the capital necessary to secure the survival of an undertaking which is experiencing temporary difficulties but is capable of becoming profitable again, possibly after restructuring.
Sodišče je tudi razsodilo, da lahko zasebni delničar pametno vloži kapital, potreben za zagotovitev preživetja podjetja, ki ima začasne težave, vendar lahko morda po prestrukturiranju ponovno postane donosno.
However, when injections of capital by a public investor disregard any prospect of profitability, even in the long term, such provision of capital must be regarded as aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty [22].
Kadar kapitalski vložki javnega vlagatelja ne upoštevajo možnosti rentabilnosti, niti dolgoročne, pa je treba take vložke obravnavati kot pomoč v smislu člena 87 Pogodbe [22].
It should also be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, both the existence and the amount of aid must be assessed in the light of the situation prevailing at the time it was granted [23].
Treba je tudi opozoriti, da je treba v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso obstoj in obseg pomoči presojati ob upoštevanju razmer ob njeni odobritvi [23].
In the case in point, for the purposes of applying the private investor criterion and the abovementioned principles, it is necessary to take account of Alitalia’s financial situation and the characteristics of the State intervention in question.
V tem primeru je treba za uporabo merila zasebnega vlagatelja in zgoraj navedenih načel upoštevati finančni položaj družbe Alitalia in značilnosti zadevne državne pomoči.
Alitalia’s financial situation
Finančni položaj družbe Alitalia
With regard to the financial situation of Alitalia, the Commission notes that it was very precarious at the time of granting of the loan in question and adoption of Decree-Law No 93.
Komisija glede finančnega položaja družbe Alitalia ugotavlja, da je bil resno ogrožen ob odobritvi zadevnega posojila in sprejetja zakonskega odloka št. 93.
Indeed, Alitalia recorded consolidated losses of EUR 626 million for the 2006 financial year and EUR 495 million for the 2007 financial year [24].
Družba Alitalia je namreč imela konsolidirano izgubo v višini 626 milijonov EUR v poslovnem letu 2006, v poslovnem letu 2007 pa v višini 495 milijonov EUR [24].
This situation is shown equally clearly by Decree-Law No 80, which states, inter alia, that granting the loan in question should make possible the recovery of the company and allow it to meet its immediate liquidity needs (see recitals 57 and 58 above).
To je jasno razvidno tudi iz zakonskega odloka št. 80, v katerem je predvsem navedeno, da mora odobritev zadevnega posojila omogočiti sanacijo družbe in kritje takojšnjih potreb po likvidnih sredstvih (glej uvodni izjavi 57 in 58).
In their reply of 30 May 2008 to the Commission, the Italian authorities also stated that Decree-Law No 93 was adopted as a result of the worsening financial situation of the company and was intended to enable it to safeguard its value and ensure that it remained in business.
Italijanski organi so poleg tega v odgovoru Komisiji z dne 30. maja 2008 trdili, da je bil zakonski odlok št. 93 sprejet zaradi poslabšanja finančnega položaja družbe ter za zagotovitev ohranjanja vrednosti družbe in nadaljevanja njene dejavnosti.
In this context, they indicated that the measures taken were aimed at ensuring that its losses did not make share capital and reserves fall below the legal limit, thereby preventing insolvency proceedings (procedura concorsuale) and the placing of the company in liquidation.
V tem smislu so navedli, da ukrepi, ki so bili sprejeti, da se zaradi izgub osnovni kapital in rezerve ne bi zmanjšali pod zakonsko določeno mejo ter se zato ne bi začela postopek zaradi insolventnosti („procedura concorsuale“) in likvidacija družbe.
On 3 June 2008, the Italian authorities adopted Decree-Law No 97 [26], which also referred to the financial situation of Alitalia described above and substantiated this analysis.
Italijanski organi so 3. junija 2008 sprejeli zakonski odlok št. 97 [26], ki se tudi sklicuje na zgoraj opisani finančni položaj družbe Alitalia in potrjuje to analizo.
In this context, the Commission also considers it appropriate to point out that Alitalia’s financial situation has worsened since 1997 and been very precarious since 2001, as demonstrated by the description of the company’s financial situation in the Commission Decisions of 18 July 2001, 20 July 2004 and 7 June 2005 (previously cited, see recital 47 above).
Komisiji se zdi v tem smislu tudi primerno opozoriti, da se je finančni položaj družbe Alitalia poslabševal od leta 1997 in je zelo ogrožen od leta 2001, kot dokazuje opis finančnega položaja družbe v odločbah Komisije z dne 18. julija 2001, 20. julija 2004 in 7. junija 2005 (navedenih v uvodni izjavi 47).
The State support measures which the company has benefited from since 1997 provide ample proof that the difficulties encountered by the company for almost ten years have been overcome repeatedly through the intervention of the State as shareholder.
Ukrepi državne podpore, ki jih je bila družba deležna od leta 1997, zadostno dokazujejo, da so se težave, s katerimi se je družba srečevala skoraj 10 let, preprečevale s ponavljajočo se pomočjo javnega delničarja.
Characteristics of the State intervention
Značilnosti državne pomoči
With regard to the conditions for granting of the measure in question, the Commission notes, firstly, that, according to Decree-Law No 80, the interest rate applicable is that indicated in the Commission notice on current State aid recovery interest rates and reference/discount rates for 25 Member States applicable as from 1 January 2008 and, with effect from 1 July 2008, the rate indicated in the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates [28].
Komisija glede pogojev za odobritev zadevne pomoči nadalje ugotavlja, da se v skladu z zakonskim odlokom št. 80 uporablja obrestna mera iz Obvestila Komisije o veljavnih obrestnih merah za vračilo državne pomoči in o referenčnih/diskontnih merah za 25 držav članic, ki veljajo od 1. januarja 2008, od 1. julija 2008 pa obrestna mera iz Sporočila Komisije o spremembi metode določanja referenčnih obrestnih mer in diskontnih stopenj [28].
This rate was increased by 1 % by Decree-Law No 93 [29].
Ta obrestna mera je bila z zakonskim odlokom št. 93 povišana za 1 odstotno točko [29].
With regard to the Commission notice on current State aid recovery interest rates and reference/discount rates for 25 Member States applicable as from 1 July 2008 [30], it is important to note that the rates therein are supposed to reflect the average level of the interest rates in force in the various Member States for medium- and long-term loans (five to ten years) where normal security is provided.
Treba je opozoriti, da obrestne mere iz Obvestila Komisije o veljavnih obrestnih merah za vračilo državne pomoči in o referenčnih/diskontnih merah za 25 držav članic, ki veljajo od 1. julija 2008 [30], lahko odražajo povprečno raven obrestnih mer, ki veljajo v različnih državah članicah za srednje- in dolgoročna posojila (od pet do deset let), zavarovana z navadnimi poroštvi.
The Commission considers that, even increased by 1 %, these rates cannot be considered appropriate, since the financial situation of the company in question is very precarious.
Komisija meni, da teh obrestnih mer, čeprav povišanih za 1 odstotno točko, ni mogoče obravnavati kot primerne za podjetje, katerega finančni položaj je resno ogrožen.
Furthermore, this notice is based on the 1997 Commission notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates [31], which states that ‘the reference rate thus determined is a floor rate which may be increased in situations involving a particular risk (for example, an undertaking in difficulty, or where the security normally required by banks is not provided).
To obvestilo temelji na Obvestilu Komisije o metodi določanja referenčnih/diskontnih mer iz leta 1997 [31], v katerem je navedeno, da je „tako določena referenčna obrestna mera najnižja obrestna mera, ki se lahko poviša v položajih, ki vključujejo posebno tveganje (na primer podjetje v težavah, ali kadar ni dovolj poroštev, ki jih navadno zahtevajo banke).
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, the Commission believes that, even if a private investor in a similar situation to that of the Italian State in the case in point had agreed to granting the measure in question to Alitalia, it would not have accepted the interest rate being that applicable to a company in a normal financial situation, even with a premium of 100 basis points.
Komisija zato na podlagi navedenega meni, da se zasebni vlagatelj, ki bi bil v primerljivem položaju kot Italija v tem primeru, celo če bi se strinjal z dodelitvijo zadevne pomoči družbi Alitalia, ne bi strinjal z uporabo obrestne mere, čeprav povišane za 100 bazičnih točk, ki se uporablja za podjetje v normalnem finančnem položaju.
The Commission notes that the decision of the Italian Government to grant the loan in question was taken on 22 April 2008, following the withdrawal, on the same day, of the bid by the Air France-KLM group to purchase Alitalia [33], and that the adoption of Decree-Law No 93 was motivated by the company’s worsening financial situation.
Komisija nato ugotavlja, da je italijanska vlada odločitev o odobritvi zadevnega posojila sprejela 22. aprila 2008, potem ko je skupina Air France–KLM istega dne umaknila ponudbo za odkup družbe Alitalia, [33] in da je bil razlog za sprejetje zakonskega odloka št. 93 poslabšanje finančnega položaja družbe.
Whatever the reasons for withdrawal of the Air France-KLM bid, which were linked, inter alia, to Alitalia’s financial situation [34], the fact remains that the decision to grant the loan in question immediately followed this decision to withdraw the bid.
Ne glede na razloge skupine Air France–KLM za umik ponudbe, ki so povezani predvsem s finančnim položajem družbe Alitalia, [34] ostaja dejstvo, da je bila odločitev o odobritvi zadevnega posojila sprejeta takoj po tej odločitvi o umiku ponudbe.
In this connection, credence cannot be given to the Italian authorities’ unsubstantiated claim that the non-completion of this deal did not undermine the prospect of privatisation in the absence of evidence demonstrating the reality of such a plan as at the time of granting the measure in question.
V zvezi s tem neargumentirane trditve italijanskih organov, da neizvedba te transakcije ni bila v nasprotju z načrtom privatizacije, ni mogoče sprejeti, ker ni prepričljivih dokazov, da je tak načrt ob odobritvi zadevne pomoči dejansko obstajal.
The attempts to privatise the company to which the Italian authorities refer in their letter of 30 May 2008 and which concern the period between the end of 2006 and the end of 2007 are not enough to demonstrate that a real alternative takeover possibility existed when the measure in question was granted.
Poskusi privatizacije družbe, na katere se italijanski organi sklicujejo v dopisu z dne 30. maja 2008 in ki se nanašajo na obdobje od konca leta 2006 do konca leta 2007, namreč ne morejo dokazati, da je ob odobritvi zadevne pomoči obstajala druga dejanska možnost odkupa.
With regard to the letter from Mr B. Ermolli to Alitalia, to which the Italian authorities referred in their letter of 30 May 2008 and which, in their view, demonstrated the interest of some Italian entrepreneurs and investors in drawing up a plan to relaunch the company, this can no longer be considered to be a prospect of privatisation [35].
Tudi dopisa B. Ermollija družbi Alitalia, na katerega se italijanski organi sklicujejo v dopisu z dne 30. maja 2008 in ki po njihovem mnenju dokazuje interes italijanskih podjetnikov in vlagateljev za pripravo načrta za oživitev družbe, ni mogoče obravnavati kot tako možnost [35].