natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Based on Commission precedents [5], the following relevant product markets could be distinguished in the electricity sector: (i) generation and wholesale supply; (ii) transmission; (iii) distribution and (iv) retail supply.
Na podlagi precedensov Komisije [5] se lahko na elektroenergetskem sektorju razlikujejo naslednji upoštevni trgi proizvodov: (i) proizvodnja in veleprodaja električne energije; (ii) posredovanje; (iii) distribucija in (iv) maloprodaja.
Consequently, CVA’s request should be analysed independently in respect of production and wholesale supply on the one hand and retail on the other.
Posledično je treba zahtevo podjetja CVA analizirati neodvisno glede na proizvodnjo in veleprodajo na eni ter maloprodajo na drugi strani.
Production and wholesale supply of electricity
Proizvodnja in veleprodaja električne energije
As recalled in recital 2 above, the request submitted by CVA concerns production and wholesale of electricity, in the entire territory of the Italian Republic, or alternatively in the Macro-zone North.
Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (2), zahteva podjetja CVA zadeva proizvodnjo in veleprodajo električne energije na celotnem ozemlju Italijanske republike ali alternativno v severnem makro območju.
According to the available information [6], the national territory of Italy should, due to congestions on links between different zones whose prices are almost perfectly correlated, be considered to be constituted by four regional geographical markets as far as the production and wholesale supply of electricity is concerned: Macro-zone North, Macro-zone Centre South [7], Macro-zone Sicily [8] and Sardinia.
V skladu z informacijami [6], ki so na voljo, je lahko nacionalno ozemlje Italije zaradi prenasičenosti povezav med različnimi območji, katerih cene so skoraj popolnoma skladne, sestavljeno iz štirih regionalnih geografskih trgov kar se tiče proizvodnje in veleprodaje električne energije: severno makro območje, osrednje južno makro območje [7], makro območje Sicilija [8] in Sardinija.
The Italian Authorities have confirmed that the delimitation of Macro-zone North remains valid as a relevant market; adding, however, that changes are ongoing so that the delimitation between the remainder of the macro-zones is not clear for the time being, pending extensive inquiries, a definitive evaluation of the state of competition on these geographical markets is therefore currently not possible.
Italijanski organi so potrdili, da so meje severnega makro območja še vedno veljavne kot upoštevni trg in dodali, da spremembe še vedno potekajo, zato so meje med ostalimi makro območji trenutno nejasne in odvisne od obširnih preiskav, dokončna ocena stanja konkurence na teh geografskih trgih zato trenutno še ni mogoča.
On the basis of the above, and considering also that, incidentally, the power plants of CVA are all located in the Macro-zone North, the present Decision will, for the purposes of evaluating the conditions laid down in Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC, limit itself to an examination of the competitive situation existing within the territory of Macro-zone North in respect of production and wholesale supply of electricity.
Glede na zgoraj omenjeno in ob upoštevanju dejstva, da elektrarne podjetja CVA mimogrede niso v severnem makro območju, se bo trenutni sklep za namene ocenjevanja stanj, določenih v členu 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES, omejil na preiskavo konkurenčne situacije na ozemlju severnega makro območja v zvezi s proizvodnjo in veleprodajo električne energije.
Although Macro-zone North forms a relevant market on its own, it can, however, not be seen as being completely isolated from the surrounding countries and the other regions.
Čeprav je severno makro območje pomemben samostojni trg, ga ni mogoče smatrati kot popolnoma izoliranega od sosednjih držav in drugih regij.
As it results from a constant practice [9] in respect of Commission Decisions pursuant to Article 30, the Commission considered that, in respect of electricity generation, ‘one indicator for the degree of competition on national markets is the total market share of the biggest three producers’.
Kot izhaja iz stalne prakse [9] glede na odločbe Komisije na podlagi člena 30, je Komisija menila, da je v zvezi s proizvodnjo električne energije „eden od pokazateljev stopnje konkurence na nacionalnih trgih skupni tržni delež treh največjih proizvajalcev“.
According to the Italian Authorities, for 2009, the share of the three largest generators in Macro-zone North is indicated as 49,7 %.
Italijanski organi trdijo, da je za leto 2009 delež treh največjih proizvajalcev v severnem makro območju znašal 49,7 %.
This level of concentration, encompassing the total market share of the largest three generators, is lower than the level (52,2 %) referred to in Decision 2008/585/EC in respect of Austria, as well as being lower than the level (58 % of gross production) referred to in Decision 2008/741/EC in the case of Poland, and much lower than the respective levels referred to in Decisions 2006/422/EC and 2007/706/EC concerning, respectively Finland (73,6 %) and Sweden (86,7 %).
Ta raven koncentracije, ki vključuje celotni del trga treh največjih proizvajalcev, je nižja od ravni (52,2 %) iz Odločbe 2008/585/ES glede na Avstrijo ter nižja od ravni (58 % bruto proizvodnje) iz Odločbe 2008/741/ES v primeru Poljske in dosti nižja od ravni iz odločb 2006/422/ES in 2007/706/ES v zvezi s Finsko (73,6 %) oz. Švedsko (86,7 %).
It is however noted that the level is higher than the corresponding percentage, 39, to which Decisions 2006/211/EC and 2007/141/EC refer to for the UK.
Vseeno pa se upošteva, da so ravni koncentracije višje od ustreznega odstotka (namreč od 39 %), na katerega se sklicujeta odločbi 2006/211/ES in 2007/141/ES za Združeno kraljestvo.
Nevertheless this level is considered satisfactorily low, and therefore could be taken as an indication of a certain degree of direct exposure to competition as regards production and wholesale supply of electricity in the Macro-zone North.
Kljub temu pa je ta raven zadovoljivo nizka in se zato lahko upošteva kot pokazatelj določene stopnje neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci v zvezi s proizvodnjo in veleprodajo električne energije v severnem makro območju.
Moreover, Italy has also substantial imports of electricity, in 2008 of the order of more than 42997 GWh.
Poleg tega ima Italija tudi precejšen uvoz električne energije, v letu 2008 več kot 42997 GWh.
Italy is a net importer and imported electricity accounting for approximately 13,43 % of its total needs [10].
Italija je neto uvoznik in uvožena električna energija znaša približno 13,43 % njenih celotnih potreb [10].
As confirmed by the Italian Authorities [11], the imports have a pro-competitive effect, notably in the Macro-zone North.
Kot so potrdili italijanski organi [11], ima uvoz prokonkurenčni učinek, zlasti v severnem makro območju.
Although this effect is conditioned by the technical limitation of the interconnection with other countries, it is expected that, in view of the new legislation in place [12], the situation would improve further.
Čeprav je ta učinek pogojen s tehničnimi omejitvami medsebojne povezave z drugimi državami, se glede na novo zakonodajo [12] pričakuje, da se bo situacija dodatno izboljšala.
There is therefore a certain degree of constraint on the pricing behaviour of the leading producers in Macro-zone North through imports of electricity from outside the Italian territory.
Zato zaradi uvoza električne energije iz tujine obstaja določena omejenost pri določanju cen vodilnih proizvajalcev v severnem makro območju.
These factors should therefore be taken as an indication of a certain degree of direct exposure to competition from other EU Member States, as regards production and wholesale supply of electricity in Macro-zone North.
Te dejavnike je treba zato upoštevati kot pokazatelje določene stopnje neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci iz drugih držav članic EU, kar zadeva proizvodnjo in veleprodajo električne energije v severnem makro območju.
The Commission Communication of 11 March 2010‘Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market’ [13] revealed that the three biggest generators still control more than 75 % of the generation capacity in 14 Member States.
Sporočilo Komisije z dne 11. marca 2010„Poročilo o napredku pri oblikovanju notranjega trga plina in električne energije“ iz leta 2010 [13] je razkrilo, da trije največji proizvajalci še vedno upravljajo več kot 75 % proizvodne zmogljivosti v 14 državah članicah.
However, the report places the Italian electricity market in the category of ‘moderately concentrated’ markets [14], whereby the Herfindahl-Hirchman Index (HHI) has lower values compared to the other categories.
Vseeno pa je glede na poročilo italijanski trg električne energije v kategoriji trgov z „zmerno koncentracijo“ [14], pri čemer ima indeks Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) v primerjavi z drugimi kategorijami nižje vrednosti.
Given that the competition pressure is felt even more in the Macro-zone North than in the rest of the zones, the degree of concentration can be considered as an indication of direct exposure to competition of electricity production and wholesale in the Macro-zone North.
Glede na to, da se pritisk konkurence bolj občuti v severnem makro območju kot pa v ostalih območjih, je lahko stopnja koncentracije pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci proizvodnje in veleprodaje električne energije v severnem makro območju.
Furthermore, even though they represent a small part of the total amount of electricity produced and/or consumed in a Member State, the functioning of the balancing mechanisms should also be considered as an additional indicator.
Poleg tega je treba delovanje izravnalnih mehanizmov, čeprav predstavljajo majhen del skupne količine električne energije, proizvedene in/ali potrošene v državi članici, prav tako šteti za dodatni pokazatelj.
According to the available information, the workings of the balancing mechanism — in particular the markets based pricing and the well-developed intra-day market — are such that it does not constitute an obstacle to electricity production being subject to direct exposure to competition.
V skladu z razpoložljivimi informacijami je delovanje izravnalnih mehanizmov – zlasti tržno določanje cen in dobro razvit enodnevni trg – takšno, da ne predstavlja ovire neposrednemu izpostavljanju proizvodnje električne energije konkurenci.
Retail supply of electricity
Maloprodaja električne energije
As regards retail supply, a further distinction of the relevant product market could be made between: (A) retail supply to industrial customers connected to the medium, high and very high voltage grid and (B) retail supply to smaller industrial, commercial and domestic customers connected to the low-voltage grid.
Glede maloprodaje se lahko relevantni proizvodni trg dodatno razdeli na: (A) maloprodajo industrijskim odjemalcem, povezanim s srednjo, visoko in zelo visoko napetostno mrežo in (B) maloprodajo manjšim industrijskim, komercialnim in domačim odjemalcem, povezanim z nizkonapetostnim omrežjem.
These markets shall be analysed further separately.
Ta trga je treba dodatno analizirati ločeno.
Retail supply of electricity to end customers connected to the medium, high and very high voltage grid
Maloprodaja električne energije končnim odjemalcem, povezanim s srednjenapetostno, visokonapetostno in zelo visokonapetostno mrežo
As confirmed by the Italian Authorities, the market for retail supply of electricity to end customers connected to the medium, high and very high voltage grid is national in scope.
Kot so potrdili italijanski organi, je trg maloprodaje električne energije končnim odjemalcem, povezanim s srednjenapetostno, visokonapetostno in zelo visokonapetostno mrežo, po obsegu nacionalen.
According to the available information [15], the aggregate market shares of the three largest retailers of electricity to end customers connected to the medium, high and very high voltage grid amounts to 43,89 %, which is a satisfactorily low level [16] and it should be taken as an indication of direct exposure to competition.
Glede na informacije [15], ki so na voljo, skupni tržni delež treh največjih prodajalcev električne energije na drobno končnim odjemalcem, povezanim s srednjo, visoko in zelo visokonapetostno mrežo, znaša 43,89 %, kar je zadovoljivo nizka stopnja [16] in se mora razumeti kot pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci.
The number of customers switching supplier may therefore serve as an indicator of price competition and, thus, indirectly, ‘a natural indicator of the effectiveness of competition.
Število odjemalcev, ki menjajo dobavitelje, je lahko zato pokazatelj cenovne konkurence in posredno „naravni pokazatelj učinkovitosti konkurence.
If few customers are switching, there is likely to be a problem with the functioning of the market, even if the benefits from the possibility of renegotiating with the historical supplier should not be ignored’ [17].
Če prestopa malo odjemalcev, verjetno obstaja problem pri delovanju trga, čeprav ne smemo pozabiti na koristi, ki jih prinaša možnost ponovnega pogajanja s prejšnjim dobaviteljem“ [17].
According to the latest available information [18], switching rates by eligible point in 2008 amount to 32,50 % for large industrial customers and to 32,80 % for medium sized industry in Italy.
Glede na zadnje razpoložljive informacije [18] je v Italiji delež odjemalcev, ki so v letu 2008 zamenjali ponudnika 32,50 % za velike industrijske odjemalce in 32,80 % za srednje industrijske odjemalce.
While lower than the degree of switching in e.g. Austria, where the degree of switching for large and very large industrial customers amounted to 41,5 % [19], the degree of switching in Italy is still considerable, involving nearly one third of the large and medium sized industrial customers.
Čeprav je število menjav majhno glede na npr. Avstrijo, kjer se je stopnja menjav velikih in zelo velikih industrijskih odjemalcev povzpela na 41,5 % [19], je stopnja menjav v Italiji kljub temu precejšnja, saj vključuje skoraj eno tretjino velikih in srednjih industrijskih odjemalcev.
Furthermore, the retail market to end customers connected to the medium, high and very high voltage grid is not subject to regulated prices.
Poleg tega trg maloprodaje končnim odjemalcem, povezanim s srednjenapetostno, visokonapetostno in zelo visokonapetostno mrežo ni podvržen reguliranim cenam.
The situation in Italy is therefore satisfactory as far as switching and end-user price control are concerned and should be taken as an indicator of direct exposure to competition.
Stanje v Italiji glede menjav in nadzora nad cenami za končne uporabnike je zato zadovoljivo in mora veljati kot pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci.
Retail supply of electricity to end customers connected to the low voltage grid
Maloprodaja električne energije končnim odjemalcem, povezanim z nizkonapetostno mrežo
As regards the relevant geographical market for retail supply, this has traditionally been considered to be national in scope.
Upoštevni geografski trg za maloprodajo je običajno veljal kot nacionalen po obsegu.
In its application, CVA uses the national market as relevant market for retail supply of electricity.
V tem smislu podjetje CVA uporablja nacionalni trg kot pomemben trg za maloprodajo električne energije.
Based on the assumption that the geographical market is national in scope, and on the information currently available [20], it appears that the level of market concentration for the retail supply of electricity on the Italian market is very high.
V skladu z domnevo, da je geografski trg nacionalen po obsegu, in z informacijami, ki so trenutno na voljo [20], se zdi, da je stopnja koncentracije na trgu za maloprodajo električne energije v Italiji zelo visoka.
The cumulated market shares of the biggest three retailers to customers connected to the low voltage grid is of 79,44 %, of which the largest company holds a share of 71,11 % on its own.
Skupni tržni deleži največjih treh prodajalcev na drobno odjemalcem, povezanim z nizkonapetostno mrežo, je 79,44 %, od česar ima največje podjetje kar 71,11-odstotni delež.
A constant jurisprudence should also be recalled in this context [21], according to which ‘very large market shares are in themselves, save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position.
V zvezi s tem je prav tako treba opozoriti na stalno sodno prakso [21], ki določa, da „so zelo visoki tržni deleži sami po sebi, razen v izjemnih razmerah, dokaz o obstoju prevladujočega položaja.
That is the situation when there is a market share of 50 %’.
To je stanje, ko je tržni delež 50 %“.
Moreover, the retail market in Italy is subdivided into three subcategories, out of which the first two are subject to regulated prices:
Poleg tega je trg maloprodaje v Italiji razdeljen na tri podkategorije, od teh sta prvi dve podvrženi reguliranim cenam:
an enhanced protection service for domestic customers and small companies (with less than 50 employees and a turnover of no more than EUR 10 million) connected to the low voltage grid, and that have not signed a contract for purchases in the free market.
storitev večje zaščite za domače odjemalce in majhna podjetja (z manj kot 50 zaposlenimi in prometom manj kot 10 milijonov EUR), povezana z nizkonapetostno mrežo, in ki niso podpisala pogodbe za nakupe na svobodnem trgu.
Operation of these service is reserved for the company Acquirente Unico SpA (hereinafter the ‘Single buyer’);
Delovanje te storitve je rezervirano za podjetje Acquirente Unico SpA (v nadaljnjem besedilu samostojni kupec);
a safeguarded service for all customers not eligible for the enhanced protection service and that have no contract for purchases on the free market.
varovalna storitev za vse odjemalce, ki niso upravičeni do storitve večje zaščite in ki nimajo pogodbe za nakupe na svobodnem trgu.
This service is delivered by providers selected by the Single buyer through a competitive tender; and
To storitev omogočajo ponudniki, ki jih izbere samostojni kupec s konkurenčno ponudbo, in
the free market, namely the remainder of the retail market.
svobodni trg, in sicer preostanek trga maloprodaje.
These markets should, however, not be considered as independent, relevant markets, for the purpose of the present decision since customers may switch from one subcategory to another and since the prices within all three subcategories are market-based [22].
Ti trgi pa kljub temu niso neodvisni, pomembni trgi za namene tega sklepa, saj lahko odjemalci menjajo podkategorije, cene v vseh treh podkategorijah pa so osnovane na trgu [22].
However, according to the 2009 Annual Report of AEEG, the so-called ‘captive market’ which includes the ‘enhanced protection service’ and the ‘safeguarded service’, accounts for about 36 % of the entire retail market.
Kljub temi pa je po letnem poročilu 2009 AEEG tako imenovani „notranji trg“, ki vključuje „storitev večje zaščite“ in „varovalno storitev“ zajema približno 36 % celotnega trga maloprodaje.
Moreover, according to the same report, the enhanced protection service is characterised by a very strong presence (84,3 %) of one specific supplier, who is also active in the free market.
Poleg tega je glede na to poročilo pri storitvi večje zaščite močno prisoten (84,3 %) en določen dobavitelj, ki je aktiven tudi na svobodnem trgu.
According to the Italian authorities, the costs of switching are perceived by customers to be high and the perceived benefits of switching are seen as low.
Italijanski organi trdijo, da odjemalci dojemajo stroške menjave kot zelo visoke, koristi menjave pa majhne.
This, combined with low prices under the enhanced protection service renders it very difficult for new operators to obtain a sufficient customer-base within this subcategory.
To je v kombinaciji z nizkimi cenami pod storitvijo večje zaščite nove subjekte velika ovira pri pridobivanju dovolj odjemalcev v tej podkategoriji.
This basically results in a competitive advantage for operators under the enhanced protection service which operate also on the free market, given that customers who wish to switch from an enhanced protection service to the free market or vice versa often do so without changing supplier.
To v osnovi pomeni konkurenčno prednost za subjekte pod storitvijo večje zaščite, ki delujejo tudi na svobodnem trgu, glede na to da odjemalci, ki želijo menjati storitev večje zaščite s prostim trgom ali obratno, pogosto to storijo brez menjave dobavitelja.
However, based on the information received from the relevant Italian authorities [23], it can be concluded for the purposes of the present Decision that the geographical market for retail sale of electricity in Italy is not national in scope, as traditionally considered and as assumed by the applicant, but is local in scope, with a territory most often not exceeding the municipal level.
Kljub temu pa se lahko za namene tega sklepa na podlagi prejetih informacij od ustreznih italijanskih organov [23] sklene, da geografski trg za maloprodajo električne energije v Italiji ni nacionalen po obsegu, kot je običajno prepričanje in kot domneva vložnik, ampak je po obsegu lokalen, z območjem, ki najpogosteje ne presega občinske ravni.
In the absence of information on the degree of competition on each of the thus defined local markets for retail supply of electricity to end users connected to the low voltage grid and considering the above-mentioned doubts about the degree of competition in the retail market to customers connected to low voltage grid, seen globally at national level, as discussed in recitals 19 to 22, it is not possible to conclude that the conditions for granting an exemption under Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC to retail supply of electricity to end customers connected to the low voltage grid in Italy, are met.
V odsotnosti informacij o stopnji konkurence na vsakem tako opredeljenem lokalnem trgu za maloprodajo električne energije končnim odjemalcem, povezanim z nizkonapetostno mrežo, in ob upoštevanju omenjenih dvomov glede stopnje konkurence v trgu maloprodaje odjemalcem, povezanim z nizkonapetostno mrežo, iz globalnega in nacionalnega vidika, kot se je razpravljalo v uvodnih izjavah od (19) do (22), ni mogoče sklepati, da so pogoji za odobritev izjeme po členu 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES za maloprodajo električne energije končnim odjemalcem, povezanim z nizkonapetostno mrežo, izpolnjeni.
Directive 2004/17/EC therefore continues to apply when contracting entities award contracts intended to enable the retail supply of electricity to end customers connected to low voltage grid to be carried out in Italy and when they organise design contests for the pursuit of such an activity in Italy.
Zato se Direktiva 2004/17/ES še naprej uporablja v primerih, kadar naročniki oddajo naročila za omogočanje izvajanja maloprodaje električne energije končnim uporabnikom, povezanim z nizkonapetostno mrežo v Italiji, in kadar organizirajo natečaje za izvajanje takšne dejavnosti v Italiji.
In respect of production and wholesale of electricity in the Macro-zone North, the situation can thus be summarised as follows: the aggregate market shares of the three biggest generators is moderately low, and the substantial amount of electricity imported is having a pro-competitive effect on this zone.
Stanje glede proizvodnje in veleprodaje električne energije v severnem makro območju se lahko povzame tako: skupni tržni deleži treh največjih proizvajalcev so sorazmerno nizki in velika količina električne energije, ki se uvaža, ima prokonkurenčni učinek na to območje.
As set out in recital 13, the functioning of the balancing mechanism does not constitute an obstacle to direct exposure to competition of the electricity generation market.
Kot je določeno v uvodni izjavi (13), delovanje izravnalnega mehanizma ne ovira neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci na trgu proizvodnje električne energije.
Consequently it can be considered that all the above factors are indications of direct exposure to competition on the Macro-zone North.
Posledično je treba upoštevati, da vsi ti dejavniki kažejo na neposredno izpostavljenost konkurenci v severnem makro območju.