natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In such a case, where the facts indicate that Article 296 does not apply, Greece should have explained why it nevertheless considers that these excess advance payments have contributed to its security.
V takšnem primeru, ko dejstva kažejo, da se člen 296 ne uporablja, bi morala Grčija pojasniti, zakaj kljub temu meni, da je presežek teh predplačil prispeval k njeni varnosti.
Since it was not done, the Commission concludes that these advance payments, in the period during which they were not necessary for the execution of the military contracts concerned, do not fall within the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Ker tega ni storila, Komisija ugotavlja, da ta predplačila iz obdobja, v katerem niso bila potrebna za izvrševanje zadevnih vojaških naročil, ne spadajo na področje uporabe člena 296 Pogodbe.
Since the advance payments have initially been used for financing all the activities of the yards, the Commission considers that 75 % of these advance payments has financed military activities and 25 % has financed civil activities.
Ker so bila predplačila sprva uporabljena za financiranje vseh dejavnosti ladjedelnice, Komisija meni, da so se s 75 % teh predplačil financirale vojaške dejavnosti, 25 % pa jih je bilo namenjenih financiranju civilnih dejavnosti.
In other words, during at least one year 25 % of EUR 81,3 million and 25 % of EUR 40 million fell under State aid rules.
Z drugimi besedami, vsaj v teku enega leta so za 25 % od 81,3 milijona EUR in 25 % od 40 milijonov EUR veljala pravila o državni pomoči.
These excessive advance payments constitute interest-free loans granted by the State.
Ta presežek predplačil pomeni brezobrestna posojila, ki jih je odobrila država.
They therefore convey a selective advantage to HSY.
S tem se torej podjetju HSY omogoča selektivna prednost.
One could argue that if the State purchases products in a way which would be acceptable for a private firm, the purchase contract — including its terms like the advance payments — can not convey a selective advantage to the producer.
Mogoče bi bilo trditi, da prodajna pogodba – vključno z vsemi pogoji, kot so predplačila – proizvajalcu ne more dajati selektivne prednosti, če država kupi proizvode na način, ki bi bil sprejemljiv za zasebno podjetje.
However, in the framework of the military contracts awarded to HSY, the State has never behaved in a way acceptable for a private firm wanting to purchase goods.
Vendar pa v okviru vojaških naročil, ki so bila oddana podjetju HSY, država ni nikoli ravnala na način, ki bi bil sprejemljiv za zasebno podjetje, ki bi želelo kupiti blago.
In particular, a private firm would have sought to pay the lowest price possible by considering all potential suppliers in the world.
Zasebno podjetje bi zlasti poskušalo plačati najnižjo možno ceno upoštevajoč vse potencialne dobavitelje na svetu.
Conversely, Greece has always limited its choices to suppliers active in Greece (or to consortia having a member active in Greece), in order to support employment in Greece and in order to maintain capacity of production of military products in Greece.
Grčija pa je svojo izbiro vedno omejevala na dobavitelje, ki delujejo v Grčijo (ali na konzorcije, ki imajo člana, ki deluje v Grčiji), da bi tako podpirala zaposlovanje v Grčiji in ohranila zmogljivost proizvodnje vojaških proizvodov v Grčiji.
A private firm would therefore not have concluded these purchase contracts.
Zasebno podjetje zato ne bi nikoli sklenilo takšnih prodajnih pogodb.
In addition, a private firm would not have accepted to make advance payments exceeding what was needed to execute its orders, but would have tried to limit advance payments as much as possible.
Poleg tega zasebno podjetje ne bi privolilo v predplačila, ki bi bila višja od zneska, potrebnega za izvrševanje naročil, temveč bi poskusilo predplačila čim bolj omejiti.
In these circumstances, the Commission considers these excessive advance payments as an interest-free loan.
Glede na okoliščine Komisija meni, da ta previsoka predplačila pomenijo brezobrestno posojilo.
The aforementioned documents shows that at least during one year these funds have been used for other activities than the execution of the contracts concerned.
Zgoraj navedeni dokumenti kažejo, da so bila ta sredstva vsaj v teku enega leta uporabljena za druge dejavnosti in ne za izvrševanje zadevnih naročil.
The Commission therefore considers them equivalent to a one-year loan free of any interest.
Komisija zato meni, da so ta sredstva enakovredna enoletnemu posojilu brez kakršnih koli obresti.
In accordance with the analysis of the creditworthiness of HSY laid down in section 3.1 of the present decision, the amount of aid included in these loans granted after 30 June 1999 is equal to the reference rate for Greece plus 600 basis points.
V skladu z analizo kreditne sposobnosti podjetja HSY iz oddelka 3.1 te odločbe, je znesek pomoči, vključen v ta posojila, ki so bila odobrena po 30. juniju 1999, enak referenčni obrestni meri za Grčijo, povečani za 600 bazičnih točk.
The Commission has not found a basis on which this aid could be found compatible.
Komisija ni ugotovila, na kakšni podlagi bi bila lahko ta pomoč združljiva.
Since this aid supports the general operation of the yard, it seems to be operating aid, but, as already explained in the assessment of prior measures, this yard was not entitled to receive operating aid in 1999, 2000 or 2001.
Ker pomoč podpira splošno poslovanje ladjedelnice, se zdi, da predstavlja pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, vendar, kot je bilo pojasnjeno v oceni predhodnih ukrepov, ta ladjedelnica v letih 1999, 2000 ali 2001 do pomoči za tekoče poslovanje ni bila upravičena.
Since the aid is unlawful and incompatible, it must be recovered.
Ker je pomoč nezakonita in nezdružljiva, jo je treba povrniti.
As regards the separation of accounts, the Commission will deal with this issue at the end of the present decision.
Komisija bo vprašanje o ločitvi računov obravnavala na koncu te odločbe.
Indemnifying clause in favour of HDW/Ferrostaal in the case where aid would be recovered from HSY (measure E18c)
Odškodninska določba v korist konzorcija HDW/Ferrostaal v primeru izterjave pomoči od podjetja HSY (ukrep E18c)
The extension decision indicates that the Greek State promised to indemnify the purchaser of HSY (i.e. HDW/Ferrostaal) in case incompatible aid granted before and at the time of the privatisation was recovered from HSY.
V odločbi o podaljšanju postopka je navedeno, da je grška država obljubila izplačati odškodnino kupcu podjetja HSY (tj. konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal), v kolikor bi podjetje HSY povrnilo nezdružljivo pomoč, odobreno pred in med privatizacijo.
From a legal point of view, this guarantee was granted through a two steps mechanism:
S pravnega vidika je bilo to poroštvo zagotovljeno s pomočjo dvodelnega mehanizma:
On the one hand, ETVA granted a guarantee to the purchaser of HSY (i.e. HDW/Ferrostaal).
na eni strani je banka ETVA dala poroštvo kupcu podjetja HSY (tj. konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal).
According to this indemnification guarantee, ETVA would indemnify HDW/Ferrostaal for any aid recovered from HSY.
V skladu s tem odškodninskim poroštvom bi banka ETVA izplačala odškodnino konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal za vsako pomoč, ki bi jo podjetje HSY povrnilo.
The extension decision underlines that in the Agreement for the sale of the share of HSY (hereinafter ‘HSY SPA’) concluded between ETVA and HDW/Ferrostaal on 11 October 2001, ETVA, which was at that moment still under the control of the State, already promised to provide this guarantee to HDW/Ferrostaal.
V odločbi o podaljšanju postopka je poudarjeno, da je v sporazumu o prodaji deleža podjetja HSY (v nadaljnjem besedilu: HSY SPA), sklenjenem 11. oktobra 2001 med banko ETVA in konzorcijem HDW/Ferrostaal, banka ETVA, ki je bila v tistem času še vedno pod nadzorom države, konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal že obljubila poroštvo.
The guarantee granted by ETVA seems therefore imputable to the State,
Poroštvo, ki ga je odobrila banka ETVA, je torej mogoče pripisati državi;
On the other hand, the State provided a guarantee to the purchaser of 57,7 % of the shares of ETVA (i.e. Piraeus Bank).
na drugi strani je država dala poroštvo kupcu 57,7 % delnic banke ETVA (tj. banki Piraeus Bank).
According to this indemnification guarantee, the State would pay to Piraeus Bank 100 % of any amount paid by ETVA to the purchaser of HSY as a consequence of an indemnification guarantee granted by ETVA to the purchaser of HSY.
V skladu z odškodninskim poroštvom bi morala država banki Piraeus Bank plačati 100 % vsakega zneska, ki ga je banka ETVA plačala kupcu podjetja HSY na podlagi odškodninskega poroštva, ki ga je banka ETVA odobrila kupcu podjetja HSY.
The following graph illustrates the structure of the two steps guarantee, such a described in the extension decision (the continuous lines indicate the indemnification flows under each of the two steps of the guarantee, while the dotted line indicates the ownership after the closing of the sale of HSY and of 57,7 % of the shares of ETVA).
Spodnji grafikon ilustrira strukturo dvodelnega poroštva, kot je opisano v odločbi o podaljšanju postopka (neprekinjene črte označujejo odškodninske tokove pri vsakem izmed dveh delov poroštva, medtem ko črtkana črta označuje lastništvo po zaključku prodaje podjetja HSY in 57,7 % delnic banke ETVA).
Greek government
Grška vlada
(Seller of ETVA)
(prodajalka banke ETVA)
(Purchaser of ETVA)
(kupec banke ETVA)
(Seller of HSY)
(prodajalka podjetja HSY)
(Purchaser of HSY)
(kupec podjetja HSY)
The extension decision indicates that a private seller would not have given such a guarantee because it is not limited in time or amount.
V odločbi o podaljšanju postopka je navedeno, da zasebni prodajalec takšnega poroštva ne bi odobril, ker ni omejeno ne v času ne v znesku.
In addition, a market economy shareholder would have preferred to let HSY go bankrupt and be liquidated rather than selling it in these circumstances.
Poleg tega bi delničar iz tržnega gospodarstva rajši videl, da bi šlo podjetje HSY v stečaj ali da bi bilo likvidirano, kot da bi ga prodal v teh okoliščinah.
Indeed, the sale price received by the State was only EUR 6 million and the indemnity payments that the State should have expected to make under the guarantee were much larger.
Prodajna cena, ki jo je prejela država, je dejansko znašala samo 6 milijonov EUR, odškodnina, za katero bi država morala pričakovati, da jo bo plačala na podlagi tega poroštva, pa je bila veliko večja.
Whereas the legal beneficiary of the two steps guarantee is HDW/Ferrostaal, the extension decision indicates that HSY is the real beneficiary of the whole mechanism.
Medtem ko je zakoniti upravičenec do dvodelnega jamstva konzorcij HDW/Ferrostaal, je v odločbi o podaljšanju postopka navedeno, da je dejanski upravičenec celotnega mehanizma podjetje HSY.
Without such State indemnifying provision, no investor would have been ready to purchase HSY.
Brez takšne državne odškodninske določbe noben vlagatelj ne bi bil pripravljen kupiti podjetja HSY.
The Greek State explicitly recognised this fact.
Grška država je to dejstvo jasno priznala.
Therefore, it is likely that without such a guarantee HSY would have remained unsold and unable to face its financial difficulties, and would have gone bankrupt.
Zato je verjetno, da brez takšnega poroštva podjetje HSY ne bi bilo prodano in ne bi moglo rešiti svojih finančnih težav, zato bi šlo v stečaj.
The extension decision also indicates that such a guarantee seems incompatible per se as it impairs the ‘effet utile’ of any recovery decision.
V odločbi o podaljšanju postopka je navedeno tudi, da je takšno poroštvo samo po sebi verjetno nezdružljivo, saj zmanjšuje polni učinek vsake odločbe o povrnitvi.
Elefsis claims, in accordance with the Commission’s initial assessment, that no private seller would have granted such an unlimited guarantee.
Podjetje Elefsis v skladu s prvotno oceno Komisije trdi, da takšnega neomejenega poroštva ne bi odobril noben zasebni prodajalec.
As regards the Commission’s claim that no investor would have been ready to purchase the yard without such a provision, Elefsis contests it since Elefsis, who participated in the tender procedure and wanted to buy HSY, did not put that condition in its bid for HSY and was ready to purchase HSY without such a guarantee.
Podjetje Elefsis izpodbija trditev Komisije, da noben vlagatelj ne bi bil pripravljen kupiti ladjedelnice brez takšne določbe, saj prav podjetje Elefsis, ki se je vključilo v razpisni postopek in želelo kupiti podjetje HSY, v svoji ponudbi za nakup podjetja HSY tega pogoja ni navedlo in je bilo pripravljeno kupiti podjetje HSY brez takšnega poroštva.
According to Elefsis, the guarantee was exclusively granted to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Po besedah podjetja Elefsis je bilo poroštvo odobreno izključno konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal.
The latter and HSY are therefore the beneficiaries of the guarantee.
Upravičenca do poroštva sta torej konzorcij in podjetje HSY.
Piraeus Bank, which commented only on that measure because it is the only one in which it is directly involved, provides several documents showing that ETVA already agreed to grant the indemnifying clause in favour of HDW/Ferrostaal at the time of conclusion of HSY’s SPA in October 2001, at a time when ETVA was still controlled by the State.
Banka Piraeus Bank, ki je predložila svoje pripombe samo v zvezi z navedenim ukrepom, saj je ta edini, v katerega je neposredno vpletena, je posredovala nekaj dokumentov, ki kažejo, da je banka ETVA privolila v odobritev odškodninske določbe v korist konzorcija HDW/Ferrostaal že v času sklenitve sporazuma HSY SPA oktobra 2001, torej v času, ko je bila banka ETVA še pod nadzorom države.
Piraeus Bank produces contracts, documents and press articles illustrating that the privatisation procedure of HSY was managed by the State.
Banka Piraeus Bank je posredovala pogodbe, dokumente in časopisne članke, ki kažejo, da je postopek privatizacije podjetja HSY vodila država.
The agreement between the Greek government and Piraeus Bank, dated 20 March 2002, provides that, even though Piraeus Bank became the majority shareholder of ETVA, the privatisation process of HSY would continue to be managed by the State.
V sporazumu med grško vlado in banko Piraeus Bank z dne 20. marca 2002 je navedeno, da tudi če bi banka Piraeus Bank postala večinska lastnica banke ETVA, bi postopek privatizacije podjetja HSY še vedno vodila država.
Finally, Piraeus Bank shows that in the invitation to tender sent to potential bidders in July 2001, it was already explicitly stipulated that in the event that a recovery is imposed on HSY pursuant to a potential breach of the EU regulations regarding State aid, the highest bidder will not be responsible for the payment of such a recovery.
Banka Piraeus Bank pojasnjuje, da je bilo v javnem razpisu, poslanem potencialnim ponudnikom julija 2001, že izrecno določeno, da v primeru, da bi povrnitev moralo opraviti podjetje HSY na podlagi potencialne kršitve predpisov EU v zvezi z državno pomočjo, najboljši ponudnik ne bi bil dolžan opraviti tega povračila.
TKMS/GNSH indicates that during the negotiations with ETVA for the purchase of HSY, it became clear that HSY had received some financial support from the Greek State.
Podjetji TKMS/GNSH navajata, da je bilo v času pogajanj z banko ETVA o nakupu podjetja HSY jasno, da je podjetje HSY prejelo določeno finančno podporo od grške države.
However, neither the extent of these measures nor the precise circumstances under which they had been taken was known to the potential buyers.
Vendar pa potencialni kupci niso bili seznanjeni ne z obsegom teh ukrepov ne z natančnimi okoliščinami, v katerih so bili ti ukrepi sprejeti.
During the bidding process the buyers received very little information on the various measures which are now subject of the present procedure.
V teku postopka za oddajo ponudb so kupci prejeli zelo malo informacij o različnih ukrepih, ki so zdaj predmet te odločbe.
In other words, for the buyers the possible State aid implications of HSY were not quantifiable.
Z drugimi besedami, kupci niso mogli oceniti možnih posledic državne pomoči za podjetje HSY.
In order to avoid being exposed to any risks from past or present aid, HDW/Ferrostaal insisted that approval or a comfort letter/negative clearance should be obtained from the Commission for past aid measures.
Da ne bi bil izpostavljen kakršnim koli tveganjem zaradi preteklih ali trenutnih pomoči, je konzorcij HDW/Ferrostaal vztrajal, da je treba od Komisije pridobiti odobritev ali priporočilno pismo/negativno potrdilo v zvezi s preteklimi ukrepi pomoči.
Should this not be possible, the buyer would suggest an acceptable form of guarantee to the seller.
Če to ne bi bilo mogoče, bi kupec prodajalcu predlagal sprejemljivo obliko poroštva.
Following contacts with the Commission, it became clear that it would not be ready to issue such a comfort letter/negative clearance.
Na podlagi stikov s Komisijo je postalo jasno, da slednja ni pripravljena izdati takšnega priporočilnega pisma/negativnega potrdila.
In the merger decision approving the acquisition of HSY by HDW/Ferrostaal, the Commission itself acknowledges that the extent of the subsidies was not known.
V odločbi o združitvi, s katero je odobren prevzem podjetja HSY s strani konzorcija HDW/Ferrostaal, Komisija sama priznava, da obseg subvencij ni bil znan.
In these circumstances, the indemnifying clause was agreed upon on 31 May 2002 as an Addendum to the HSY SPA, whereby ETVA as vendor of HSY guaranteed to make up for any financial loss the buyer would suffer in case of recovery of aid from HSY.
V teh okoliščinah je bila odškodninska določba dogovorjena 31. maja 2002 kot dopolnilo k HSY SPA, v skladu s katero je banka ETVA kot prodajalka podjetja HSY zagotovila, da bo nadomestila morebitno finančno izgubo, ki bi jo kupec lahko utrpel v primeru povrnitve pomoči s strani podjetja HSY.
TKMS/GNSH concludes that no investor would have agreed to buy HSY without such a guarantee.
Podjetji TKMS/GNSH ugotavljata, da noben vlagatelj ne bi privolil v nakup podjetja HSY brez takšnega poroštva.
This claim was also confirmed by the second Deloitte report, which was submitted by TKMS/GNSH in June 2007.
To trditev potrjuje tudi drugo poročilo revizijske hiše Deloitte, ki sta ga podjetji TKMS/GNSH predložili junija 2007.
TKMS/GNSH considers that the measure is not imputable to the State since it was granted by ETVA at a time when it was not under the control of the State anymore.
Podjetji TKMS/GNSH menita, da tega ukrepa ni mogoče pripisati državi, saj ga je odobrila banka ETVA, ko ni bila več pod nadzorom države.
Indeed, on the basis of HSY’s SPA concluded in October 2001, there was no contractual obligation for ETVA to indemnify GNSH.
Na podlagi HSY SPA, sklenjenega oktobra 2001, banka ETVA dejansko ni bila več pogodbeno zavezana, da izplača odškodnino podjetju GNSH.
The probability that the guarantee would have to be paid out was relatively low.
Možnost, da bi bilo poroštvo treba izplačati, je bila razmeroma majhna.
Conversely, if the yard was liquidated, the losses on the loans and guarantees granted to HSY would represent much larger amounts (The calculation justifying this claim was provided in the second Deloitte report submitted by TKMS/GNSH).
Nasprotno, če bi bila ladjedelnica likvidirana, bi izgube iz posojil in poroštev, odobrenih podjetju HSY, predstavljale veliko večje zneske (izračun, ki utemeljuje to trditev, je bil določen v drugem poročilu revizijske hiše Deloitte, ki sta ga predložili podjetji TKMS/GNSH).
In addition, TKMS/GNSH considers that the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank on 20 March 2002 provides that the State would pay indemnification to Piraeus Bank amounting to only 57,7 % of any amount paid by ETVA to the purchaser of HSY (i.e. HDW/Ferrostaal).
Poleg tega podjetji TKMS/GNSH menita, da poroštvo, ki ga je država 20. marca 2002 odobrila banki Piraeus Bank, predvideva, da bo država plačala odškodnino banki Piraeus Bank v višini samo 57,7 % katerega koli zneska, ki bi ga banka ETVA plačala kupcu podjetja HSY (tj. konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal).
Conversely, the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal on 31 May 2002 provides that ETVA would pay indemnification to HDW/Ferrostaal amounting to 100 % of any aid recovered from HSY.
Nasprotno, poroštvo, ki ga je banka ETVA 31. maja 2002 odobrila konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal, predvideva, da bo banka ETVA plačala odškodnino konzorciju HDW/Ferrostaal v 100-odstotnem znesku vsake pomoči, izterjane od podjetja HSY.
TKMS/GNSH fails to see why such an indemnifying provision could constitute a circumvention of the recovery of aid.
Podjetji TKMS/GNSH ne moreta razumeti, kako bi takšna odškodninska določba lahko pomenila izogibanje povrnitvi pomoči.
Indeed, if aid would be recovered from HSY, the State would not indemnify HSY, but the purchaser of HSY (i.e. TKMS/GNSH, which is the successor of HDW/Ferrostaal).
Če bi podjetje HSY pomoč povrnilo, država dejansko ne bi izplačala odškodnine podjetju HSY, temveč njegovemu kupcu (tj. podjetjema TKMS/GNSH, ki sta naslednika konzorcija HDW/Ferrostaal).
TKMS/GNSH also considers that the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank could constitute aid to Piraeus Bank and ETVA.
Podjetji TKMS/GNSH menita tudi, da bi poroštvo, ki ga je država odobrila banki Piraeus Bank, lahko predstavljalo pomoč banki Piraeus Bank in banki ETVA.
According to Greece and HSY, the indemnifying clause is not an aid.
Po besedah Grčije in podjetja HSY odškodninska določba ne pomeni pomoči.
First, it is not imputable to the State since it was granted by ETVA Bank, at a time when it was not under State control anymore.
Prvič, državi je ni mogoče pripisati, saj jo je odobrila banka ETVA, ko ni bila več pod nadzorom države.
Second, Greece and HSY claim that the Greek State acted as a market investor when it sold its stake in HSY as the main shareholder of ETVA.
Drugič, Grčija in podjetje HSY trdita, da je grška država ravnala kot tržni vlagatelj, ko je prodala svoj delež v podjetju HSY kot glavna delničarka banke ETVA.
The guarantee granted to the purchaser by the vendors of HSY is a standard and normal condition in commercial agreements.
Poroštvo, ki so ga kupcu odobrili prodajalci podjetja HSY, je standarden in običajen pogoj v poslovnih sporazumih.
Indeed, Greece recalls that it did not provide a guarantee to HSY with regard to the liability to repay unlawful State aid, but to the buyer of HSY.
Grčija dejansko opozarja, da poroštva podjetju HSY ni zagotovila v zvezi z odgovornostjo do povračila nezakonite državne pomoči, temveč ga je odobrila kupcu podjetja HSY.
Such indemnification burdens the vendor regardless of whether it is included as a clause in the commercial agreement or not.
Takšna odškodnina obremenjuje prodajalca, ne glede na to, ali je v poslovni sporazum vključena kot določba ali ne.
The Commission’s statement that the Greek State knew or should have known about the considerable number of further potentially unlawful and incompatible State aid measures and that the amounts would have to be recovered and thus trigger the indemnifying clause is without basis.
Izjava Komisije, da je grška država vedela ali bi morala vedeti za veliko število naknadnih potencialno nezakonitih in nezdružljivih ukrepov državne pomoči in da bo treba te zneske povrniti, kar bo sprožilo odškodninsko določbo, je tako neutemeljena.
In the period in which the indemnifying clause was provided, there was no Commission decision ruling that HSY had received unlawful State aid.
V obdobju, v katerem je bila odškodninska določba opredeljena, Komisija ni izdala nikakršne odločbe, v skladu s katero naj bi podjetje HSY prejelo nezakonito državno pomoč.
In addition, the closure and liquidation of HSY would have been more costly to the State, taking account the social cost.
Poleg tega bi zaprtje in likvidacija podjetja HSY bili veliko dražji za državo glede na dejanske socialne stroške.