natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
IKB is a partner for medium-sized and large enterprises, private and institutional investors, property developers, state development agencies and fund managers.
Na tem področju IKB sodeluje s srednje velikimi in velikimi podjetji, zasebnimi in institucionalnimi vlagatelji, projektanti, podjetji za razvoj podeželja ter investicijskimi skladi.
The projects have a minimum financing requirement of EUR 5 million. As a full-service provider for real-estate investment, IKB also develops comprehensive plans and solutions for new-build developments, as well as for refurbishments or change-of-use projects.
Znesek za financiranje projektov je najmanj 5 milijonov EUR. IKB kot celovit ponudnik za naložbe v nepremičnine razvija tudi celovite pristope in rešitve za novogradnje, sanacijska dela in preurejanje nepremičnin.
It offers real-estate financing services not only in Germany, but in other European countries as well. The foreign activities are focused on Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Storitev za financiranje nepremičnin ne ponuja samo v Nemčiji, temveč tudi v drugih evropskih državah, zlasti v Belgiji, Franciji, Italiji, Luksemburgu, na Nizozemskem, v Španiji in Združenem kraljestvu.
In the initial restructuring plan, which did not include the compensatory measures agreed later, the real-estate financing division showed a sustainable RoE of about [> 5] %.
V prvotnem načrtu prestrukturiranja, v katerega še niso bili vključeni pozneje dogovorjeni izravnalni ukrepi, je bila za to dejavnost navedena donosnost na lastni kapital v višini približno [> 5] %.
Portfolio investments
Portfeljske naložbe
At the beginning of the century, IKB started to expand its investments in international loan portfolios in a wide variety of asset categories.
IKB od začetka tega stoletja pospešeno vlaga v mednarodne kreditne portfelje z različnih naložbenih področij.
The objective of this expansion was to diversify its risk profile with regard to regions and sectors, while simultaneously increasing its earnings in the form of commission income.
Cilj te razširitve je bila razvejitev profila tveganja v zvezi z regijami in gospodarskimi sektorji ter hkrati povečanje prihodkov iz provizij.
By using off-balance-sheet special purpose vehicles to hive off the credit risks, capital could be released and IKB could continue to invest in other asset classes like medium-sized financing or loan portfolios.
S tem ko so bila prek družb, ki niso zajete v bilanci, iz bilance izločena kreditna tveganja, je bilo mogoče sredstva sprostiti, tako da je banka IKB lahko vlagala v druge razrede sredstev, kot so na primer srednjeročna financiranja ali kreditni portfelji.
As will be described further at points 10 et seq., IKB’s significant portfolio investments were at the origin of the crisis.
Iz pojasnil v uvodnih izjavah od 10 naprej je mogoče videti, da so obsežne portfeljske naložbe IKB razlog za njene težave.
As a consequence, IKB has already exited this business.
Zato je IKB medtem že tudi izstopila iz te dejavnosti.
In the year 2006/2007, the various business segments achieved the following results:
V poslovnem letu 2006/2007 so bili na različnih področjih poslovanja doseženi ti rezultati:
Overview of business segments
Pregled področij poslovanja
(EUR million)
(v milijardah EUR)
Operating profit
Dobiček iz poslovanja
Credit volume
Obseg posojil
Structured financing
Strukturirano financiranje
Real estate
Nepremičnine
Portfolio investment
Financiranje z lastniškim kapitalom
Central/consolidation
Osrednje/konsolidacija
Before the crisis IKB had a balance-sheet total of EUR 49,1 billion (on 31 December 2006), increasing to EUR 63,5 billion in the restated accounts when considering all of IKB’s off-balance-sheet activities (on 31 March 2007).
Pred krizo je bila bilančna vsota IKB 49,1 milijarde EUR (stanje na dan 31. decembra 2006), po popravku z upoštevanjem vseh zunajbilančnih dejavnosti IKB pa je narasla na 63,5 milijarde EUR (stanje na dan 31. marca 2007).
The reasons for IKB’s difficulties
Razlogi za težave IKB
IKB’s difficulties are related to the ongoing US subprime crisis, to which IKB and in particular one of its special purpose vehicles, Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation (hereinafter Rhineland), was heavily exposed [5].
Težave IKB so povezane s še vedno trajajočo ameriško krizo zaradi tveganih hipotekarnih kreditov (subprime kriza), zaradi katere sta bili banka IKB in še zlasti ena od njenih namenskih družb, Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Rhineland), izpostavljeni visokim tveganjem [5].
The crisis triggered significant liquidity needs, which Rhineland (in cases where the commercial paper normally used was not fully subscribed) bridged by credit lines provided by commercial banks.
Zaradi krize so nastale likvidnostne težave, ki jih je družba Rhineland (če komercialni zapisi, ki se običajno uporabljajo, ne bi bili v celoti vpisani) premostila s kreditnimi linijami pri poslovnih bankah.
IKB provided liquidity facilities of about EUR 8,1 billion to Rhineland, which invested in structured credit portfolios, which included exposures to US subprime real-estate loans, and refinanced its investments by issuing asset-backed commercial paper.
Banka IKB je družbi Rhineland zagotovila več likvidnostnih posojil v višini približno 8,1 milijarde EUR. Družba Rhineland je vložila v strukturirane kreditne portfelje, k čemur spadajo tudi tveganja zaradi ameriških hipotekarnih kreditov s področja subprime, in refinancirala svoje naložbe z izdajo kratkoročnih vrednostnih papirjev, zavarovanih s premoženjem (Commercial Papers, v nadaljnjem besedilu: CP).
Besides the direct liquidity facilities given to Rhineland, IKB provided indirect protection for Rhineland assets via the so-called Havenrock structure.
Poleg likvidnostnega posojila, ki je bilo neposredno dodeljeno družbi Rhineland, je banka IKB prek tako imenovane strukture Havenrock posredno zagotovila zaščito pred tveganjem za postavke sredstev družbe Rhineland.
IKB also held direct on-balance-sheet portfolio investments (likewise partly in the subprime segment) via subordinated debt instruments in the Rhinebridge structured investment vehicle and in other types of investment portfolios (such as collateralised debt obligations or CDOs).
Poleg tega je imela banka IKB podrejene dolžniške instrumente v strukturiranem naložbenem nosilcu Rhinebridge (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Rhinebridge), v drugih vrstah naložbenih portfeljev (npr. Collateralised Debt Obligations – vrednostni papirji, zavarovani z dolžniškimi instrumenti, CDO), pa tudi neposredne bilančne portfeljske naložbe (delno iz segmenta subprime).
During summer 2007, part of the structured portfolios of Rhineland, Rhinebridge, and the CDOs, which were initially highly ranked, suffered significant downgrading by the rating agencies.
Poleti leta 2007 so bonitetne agencije znatno znižale ocene za dele prvotno zelo visoko ovrednotenih strukturiranih portfeljev Rhinelanda in Rhinebridgea ter CDO.
As a result of the ongoing crisis in the US subprime mortgage market and as a direct consequence of the downgrading of subprime-backed assets by the rating agencies, valuations of certain assets traded in this market segment suffered.
Zaradi trajajoče krize na ameriškem hipotekarnem trgu na področju subprime in neposredno zaradi tega, ker so bonitetne agencije znižale ocene vrednostnih papirjev, zavarovanih s terjatvami subprime, je padla vrednost nekaterim vrednostnim papirjem, s katerimi se trguje v tem tržnem segmentu.
This was the case in particular for Rhineland, whose ability to refinance its investment portfolio in the commercial paper market was therefore threatened.
To je veljalo zlasti za namensko družbo Rhineland, ki je bila v nevarnosti, da svojega naložbenega portfelja ne bo mogla več refinancirati na trgu CP.
Given that the commercial paper market had dried up, it was likely that Rhineland would draw upon the EUR 8,1 billion liquidity facilities provided by IKB, for which no provisions had been made in the latter’s balance sheet.
Glede na mrtev trg CP je bilo verjetno, da bo družba Rhineland črpala likvidnostna posojila v višini 8,1 milijarde EUR, ki jih je zagotovila banka IKB in za katere v bilanci IKB ni bilo predvideno zavarovanje.
Furthermore, the other on-balance sheet portfolio investments, such as Rhinebridge, were subject to considerable fair-value fluctuations which had to be accounted for in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
Poleg tega so bile druge bilančne portfeljske naložbe, kot je Rhinebridge, močno izpostavljene nihanjem poštene vrednosti, ki jih je bilo treba spremljati v skladu z mednarodnimi standardi računovodskega poročanja (International Financial Reporting Standards – IFRS).
The off-balance sheet assets in Rhineland were worth EUR 11,5 billion on 31 March 2007 (and during the crisis).
Pri zunajbilančnih aktivnih postavkah v družbi Rhineland je šlo za sredstva v vrednosti 11,5 milijarde EUR (stanje na dan 31. marca 2007 in tudi med krizo).
First measure — risk shield
Prvi ukrep: zaščita pred tveganjem
On 27 July 2007, the German banking supervisory authority BaFin was informed by a German bank providing liquidity to IKB that it would withdraw the credit line.
Ena od nemških bank, ki je banki IKB dala na voljo kreditno linijo, je 27. julija 2007 zvezni urad za finančni nadzor Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (v nadaljnjem besedilu: urad BaFin) obvestila, da bo to linijo zaprla.
BaFin subsequently called KfW, the Federal Ministry of Finance and other concerned parties and announced that it would close the bank [6] if those parties did not take over the risks for IKB’s Rhineland commitment.
Zaradi tega je urad BaFin obvestil KfW, zvezno ministrstvo za finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen) in druge zainteresirane strani, da bo zaprl IKB [6], če navedene strani ne prevzamejo tveganj, ki izhajajo iz vključenosti IKB v družbo Rhineland.
In addition, it emerged that IKB’s subprime exposure was not limited to Rhineland but also included Rhinebridge and other direct subprime portfolio investments.
Poleg tega se je izkazalo, da postavke subprime IKB niso omejene na družbo Rhineland, temveč so zajemale tudi Rhinebridge in druge portfeljske naložbe subprime.
On 29 July 2007 BaFin, the Federal Ministry of Finance, KfW and the three major German banking associations [7] agreed that KfW would intervene, in coordination with BaFin, by providing a risk shield for IKB.
Urad BaFin, zvezno ministrstvo za finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen), KfW in tri velika nemška kreditna združenja [7] so se 29. julija 2007 dogovorili, da bo KfW v dogovoru z uradom BaFin posredoval in prevzel zaščito pred tveganjem za IKB.
The banking associations agreed to take over 30 % of the risks involved in the risk shield; this was confirmed in writing in an agreement between KfW and the three banking associations on 16 August 2007.
Kreditna združenja so navedla, da so pripravljena prevzeti 30 % tveganj iz zaščite pred tveganjem. To je bilo potrjeno v pisni obliki 16. avgusta 2007 z dogovorom med KfW in temi tremi kreditnimi združenji.
In particular, KfW announced that in order to ensure IKB’s liquidity position it would:
KfW je napovedal naslednje ukrepe za zagotovitev bonitete IKB:
provide a risk shield from Monday 30 July 2007 for all of IKB’s rights (fees) and obligations under the liquidity facilities provided to Rhineland for an amount of EUR 8,1 billion (this has since been reduced to EUR 6,3 billion, mainly because of exchange-rate movements); the formal assumption on 29 July 2007 of the obligations under the liquidity facilities provided to Rhineland will remain until the maturity or sale [8] of the structured credit portfolios; the maturity of such portfolios is generally more than five years,
od ponedeljka, 30. julija 2007, zavarovanje pred tveganjem za vse pravice (provizije) in obveznosti IKB v okviru likvidnostnih sredstev, ki so dana na voljo družbi Rhineland in obsegajo 8,1 milijarde EUR (ta znesek se je predvsem zaradi sprememb menjalnega tečaja medtem znižal na 6,3 milijarde EUR). Formalni prevzem obveznosti iz likvidnostnih sredstev, ki so bila dana na voljo družbi Rhineland, 29. julija 2007 velja do zapadlosti oziroma prodaje [8] strukturiranih kreditnih portfeljev. Običajna doba trajanja takšnih portfeljev je daljša od pet let,
protect IKB against losses of up to EUR 1 billion resulting from Rhinebridge and other on-balance-sheet subprime portfolio investments with a total value of EUR 6,8 billion.
zaščito IKB pred izgubami v višini 1 milijarde EUR zaradi vključenosti v sklad Rhinebridge in v druge bilančne portfeljske naložbe subprime v višini skupaj 6,8 milijarde EUR.
Germany originally estimated that the total expected losses from the risk shield given to IKB by KfW and the banking associations would amount to EUR 3,5 billion (EUR 2,5 billion for Rhineland and Havenrock, and EUR 1 billion for Rhinebridge and other direct subprime portfolio investments [9].
Prvotno je Nemčija pričakovane izgube v okviru zaščite IKB pred tveganji prek KfW in kreditnih združenj ocenila na skupaj 3,5 milijarde EUR (Rhineland in Havenrock: 2,5 milijarde EUR, Rhinebridge in druge portfeljske naložbe subprime: 1 milijarda EUR [9]).
In the original agreement of 29 July 2007, KfW and the banking associations allocated the expected losses from the risk shield as follows:
V prvotnem dogovoru z dne 29. julija 2007 so se KfW in kreditna združenja strinjali, da pričakovane izgube iz zaščite pred tveganjem porazdelijo tako:
KfW bears 70 % of the expected losses in principle, but with no upper limit concerning Rhineland, i.e. KfW bears 100 % of the losses above the amounts determined by the limits of the banking associations’ participation (see below),
KfW načeloma nosi 70 % pričakovanih izgub, vendar brez omejitve tveganja v zvezi z družbo Rhineland; tj. izgube, ki presegajo 30-odstotno udeležbo kreditnih združenj (glej v nadaljevanju), KfW nosi 100-odstotno,
the banking associations bear 30 % of the expected losses, limited to EUR 1 billion.
kreditna združenja prevzamejo 30 % pričakovanih izgub do največjega zneska 1 milijarde EUR.
The risk distribution between KfW and the banking associations applies pari passu within the EUR 1 billion limit of the banking associations’ liability (see recital 18) independently of the distribution of the losses between the different portfolio investments (Rhineland, Rhinebridge or direct investments).
Razdelitev tveganja med KfW in kreditnimi združenji do najvišje jamstvene meje v višini 1 milijarde EUR velja za kreditna združenja (glej uvodno izjavo 18) neodvisno od tega, na kateri postavki zaščite pred tveganjem (Rhineland, Rhinebridge ali neposredna vlaganja) se realizirajo izgube, pri čemer se obremenitev med partnerji izvrši enakovredno v skladu z dogovorjeno razdelitvijo tveganja.
In addition to their participation in the risk shield, the three banking associations agreed to use their influence with their members to ensure that they would reopen the credit lines to IKB that they had closed when the crisis emerged.
Poleg svoje udeležbe pri zaščiti pred tveganjem so tri kreditna združenja navedla, da so pripravljena vplivati na svoje članice, tako da bi znova odprle kreditne linije IKB, ki so bile zaprte ob začetku krize.
Furthermore, the agreement of 16 August 2007 indicates that KfW will, in its role as pool leader, negotiate an appropriate fee for the risk shield and arrange for repayment of all expenses incurred by the banking associations and KfW.
Poleg tega je v dogovoru z dne 16. avgusta 2007 navedeno, da bo banka KfW v svoji vlogi vodje poola izpogajala primerno nadomestilo za ukrepe za zaščito pred tveganjem in sprejela ukrepe za vračilo vseh izdatkov kreditnih združenj in KfW.
While arrangements have been made for the repayment of expenses, the planned fee has been agreed and put in place the former idea was abandoned because it could have been interpreted as a […], which would have needed the approval of […].
Ob tem, ko je bilo v zvezi z vračilom doseženo soglasje in so bili za to sprejeti ustrezni ukrepi, je bilo vprašanje nadomestila opuščeno, saj bi bilo to mogoče razlagati kot vprašanje […], ki bi zahtevalo odobritev […].
The 30 % loss participation by the banking associations is distributed as follows between the associations:
Delež tveganja v višini 30 %, ki so ga prevzela združenja, je bil med njimi razdeljen tako:
50 % (BdB),
50 % prevzame združenje Bundesverband deutscher Banken (BdB),
16,7 % (BVR),
16,7 % prevzame združenje Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken (BVR),
33,3 % (DSGV).
33,3 % prevzame združenje Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband (DSGV).
BdB took a 50 % share because in the event of IKB’s insolvency, the private banks’ deposit guarantee fund would guarantee each individual account up to 30 % of IKB’s liable equity held by private and wholesale customers (about EUR 662 million per account on 26 September 2007) [10].
Združenje BdB je prevzelo 50-odstotni delež, ker so bila sredstva vsakega posameznika ali podjetja, ki je stranka, v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti IKB zavarovana s skladi zajamčenih vlog pri zasebnih bankah do višine 30 % zadevnega rizičnega lastnega kapitala IKB (približno 662 milijonov EUR na stranko na dan 26. septembra 2007) [10].
The second measure — ancillary risk shield
Drugi ukrep: dodatna zaščita pred tveganjem
Owing to a further deterioration of the financial markets, the risk shield granted in relation to IKB’s costs under the Havenrock structure was fully called on and therefore proved to be insufficient.
Glede na nadaljnje poslabšanje položaja na finančnih trgih je bila zaščita pred tveganjem za izgube IKB v okviru strukture Havenrock v celoti terjana in se je izkazala za nezadostno.
Further loss-covering measures were needed in order to ensure IKB’s continued existence.
Za zagotovitev nadaljevanja poslovanja IKB so bili potrebni dodatni ukrepi za pokritje izgub.
On 30 November 2007, KfW and the banking associations covered additional risks estimated at EUR 350 million (USD 440 million) related to IKB’s credit lines in the Havenrock structure.
KfW in kreditna združenja so 30. novembra 2007 v zvezi s kreditnimi linijami v strukturi Havenrock banke IKB zavarovali dodatna tveganja v višini približno 350 milijonov EUR (440 milijonov USD).
KfW covered EUR 150 million, of which EUR 54,3 million took the form of a convertible bond, which IKB converted into shareholder equity on 14 February 2008 (effective on 28 February 2008), thereby increasing KfW’s share in IKB to 43 %.
Od tega je KfW zavaroval 150 milijonov EUR – 54,3 milijona EUR v obliki zamenljivih vrednostnih papirjev, ki jih je 14. februarja 2008 (z začetkom veljavnosti 28. februarja 2008) KfW zamenjal za delnice, da je povišal svoj delež v IKB na 43 %.
A further EUR 150 million was provided by BdB and EUR 50 million by BVR and DGSV.
Združenje BdB je prevzelo dodatnih 150 milijonov EUR, združenji BVR in DSGV pa dodatnih 50 milijonov EUR.
The third measure — capital injection and KfW loan
Tretji ukrep: kapitalski vložek in posojila KfW
In February 2008 the German government mandated KfW to provide an additional EUR 2,3 billion to IKB.
Zvezna vlada je februarja 2008 družbi KfW naročila, naj banki IKB zagotovi dodatnih 2,3 milijarde EUR.
EUR 1,05 billion was provided by way of loans, the repayment of which was immediately waived, subject however to a better fortune clause, under which KfW would receive repayment if IKB made profits again in the coming years.
Sredstva v višini 1,05 milijarde EUR so bila zagotovljena v obliki posojil, za katera je bila neposredno izdana podreditev terjatev in za katera obstaja „klavzula o izboljšanju stanja“, v skladu s katero bo IKB povrnila zneske, ko bo v prihodnjih letih spet imela dobiček.
The measures were needed in order to inject own capital into the bank so as to prevent IKB breaching the minimum capital ratios under banking solvency rules.
Ukrepi so bili nujni za vložek kapitala v banko in s tem se je preprečilo, da bi temeljni kapital IKB padel pod zakonsko določen prag.
Moreover, the German financial regulator BaFin demanded that KfW give an ultimately unlimited capital increase guarantee, KfW declared itself ready to provide a capital injection of EUR 1,25 billion.
Poleg tega je urad BaFin od KfW zahteval zagotovilo o povečanju kapitala v neomejeni višini.
The arrangements for this procedure for the capital increase were in principle made in August, but the actual implementation depends on a positive Commission decision and will thus take place only after such a decision.
KfW je navedel, da je pripravljen zagotoviti dodatno financiranje v obliki kapitalskega vložka v višini 1,25 milijarde EUR. Ukrepi za to krepitev kapitala so bili načeloma sprejeti avgusta 2008, vendar se lahko dejansko povečanje kapitala izvede šele, ko bi Komisija izdala pozitivno odločbo.
The capital increase has therefore not yet taken effect.
Krepitev kapitala tako še ni bila izvedena.
After the capital increase, KfW’s participation in IKB would increase to about 90,8 %.
Po krepitvi kapitala bi delež KfW v IKB zajemal približno 90,8 %.
KfW’s third measure was assisted by the German government, which made EUR 1,2 billion available to KfW, and by the banking associations, which provided EUR 300 million.
Tretji ukrep KfW so podprli zvezna vlada s sredstvi v višini 1,2 milijarde EUR, ki je ta sredstva zagotovila KfW, in kreditna združenja s sredstvi v višini 300 milijonov EUR.
Liquidity provision
Zagotovitev likvidnosti
The second framework facility of 18 July 2008 was provided at Euribor plus [> 100] bps against [> 100] % collateral.
Drugi okvirni vir z dne 18. julija 2008 je bil zagotovljen z obrestno mero euribor plus [> 100] osnovnih točk s [> 100]-odstotnim zavarovanjem.
The collateralisation was set at the indicated level in order to ensure that the collateral would still be enough to cover the loan even in the worst-case scenario.
Tako visoko zavarovanje kreditov bi moralo zagotoviti, da bodo zavarovanja tudi v najslabšem primeru zadostovala za pokritje kredita.
IKB also obtained liquidity facilities from other banks.
Tudi druge banke so IKB zagotovile likvidnostna posojila.
Amongst them are [a large US bank] and [another large US bank], for EUR [> 0,75] billion on a monthly basis, provided at Euribor plus [> 100]-[> 100] bps against collateral of [> 100]-[> 100] %, [a German regional bank] for up to EUR [> 250] million for one year at an interest rate of Euribor plus [> 90]-[> 100] bps against collateral of [> 100]-[> 100] %, and [another German regional bank] for up to EUR [> 500] million for one year at Euribor plus [> 50] bps and corresponding collateral.
Tako sta [velika ameriška banka] in [druga velika ameriška banka] dali IKB na voljo likvidnostna sredstva v višini [> 0,75] milijarde EUR mesečno po obrestni meri euribor plus [< 100] do [< 100] osnovnih točk z zavarovanjem v višini od [> 100] % do [> 100] %. Banka IKB je poleg tega imela dostop do likvidnostnega posojila v višini do [> 250] milijonov EUR, ki ga je [nemška deželna banka] zagotovila za obdobje enega leta po obrestni meri euribor plus [> 90] do [> 100] osnovnih točk z zavarovanjem v višini od [> 100] % do [> 100] %. Pri [drugi nemški deželni banki] je bilo na voljo dodatno likvidnostno posojilo v višini [> 500] milijonov EUR za obdobje enega leta z obrestno mero euribor plus [> 50] osnovnih točk z ustreznim zavarovanjem.
Increased losses during the restructuring
Rast izgub med prestrukturiranjem
The expected losses covered by the risk shield for off-balance-sheet assets in Rhineland increased from the original estimate of EUR 2,5 billion in a worst-case scenario to EUR 7,0 billion [11].
Pričakovane izgube, ki naj bi jih pokrila zaščita pred tveganjem za zunajbilančne aktivne postavke v družbi Rhineland, so narasle s prvotno ocenjenih 2,5 milijarde EUR (v najslabšem primeru) na 7 milijard EUR [11].