natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
With regard to the argument that ÖIAG in effect functions as Austrian Airlines’ parent company, the Commission observes that, under Austrian law, in particular the law governing the creation and operation of ÖIAG (Section 11(2) of the ÖIAG Act), ÖIAG and the companies in which it has a stake are prohibited from forming a group.
Komisija glede utemeljitve, da naj bi ÖIAG dejansko deloval kot matično podjetje Austrian Airlines, opozarja, da je v skladu z avstrijskim pravom, in sicer v skladu z zakonom, ki ureja ustanovitev in dejavnost ÖIAG (člen 11(2) zakona o ÖIAG), ustanovitev poslovne skupine med ÖIAG in podjetji, v katerih ima delež, prepovedano.
Moreover, for accounting purposes, ÖIAG does not consolidate the results of companies in which it has shareholdings on to its own balance sheet as a private holding would be expected to.
Poleg tega ÖIAG v svoji bilanci za namen finančnega poročila ne združuje rezultatov podjetij, v katerih ima delež, kot bi se to pričakovalo od zasebnega holdinga.
This is further confirmed by the fact that (i) ÖIAG and the companies in which it has a stake do not appear to form an economic unit for the purposes of European competition law and (ii) under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [42], the Commission does not consider ÖIAG to be a group for the purposes of calculating the turnover thresholds.
To potrjujeta tudi dejstvi da (i) se zdi, da ÖIAG in podjetja, v katerih ima delež, v evropskem konkurenčnem pravu niso gospodarska enota, in (ii) da v skladu z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 z dne 20. januarja 2004 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij („Uredba ES o združitvah“) [42] Komisija ÖIAG za izračun pragov za obseg prometa ne obravnava kot poslovne skupine.
Notwithstanding the social and political pressure that would result from a decision to allow Austrian Airlines to become insolvent, the Commission maintains the view, as expressed in the opening of the proceedings, that any decision by ÖIAG to assume costs relating to a social plan voluntarily in the event of the insolvency of Austrian Airlines would appear to result from the fact that ÖIAG is a State holding company, and a private investor operating a holding company would not assume these costs in similar circumstances.
Komisija ne glede na socialni in politični pritisk, ki bi bil rezultat odločitve o dopustitvi stečaja Austrian Airlines, ostaja pri mnenju, ki ga je izrazila ob sprožitvi postopka, da se zdi, da je odločitev ÖIAG, da bo prostovoljno prevzel stroške socialnega načrta v primeru stečaja Austrian Airlines, posledica dejstva, da je ÖIAG državna holdinška družba, in zasebni vlagatelj, ki upravlja holdinško družbo, v podobnih okoliščinah ne bi prevzel teh stroškov.
It must therefore be concluded that, in the event of the insolvency of Austrian Airlines, the cost to ÖIAG would be nil.
Torej je treba ugotoviti, da bi bili stroški ÖIAG v primeru stečaja Austrian Airlines enaki nič.
While concluding that the sales process established the highest possible market price for Austrian Airlines, the Commission also came to the conclusion that the insolvency of the airline would have been a cheaper option for the State.
Komisija je sicer ugotovila, da je bila s prodajnim postopkom dosežena najvišja mogoča tržna cena za Austrian Airlines, vendar je ugotovila še, da bi bil stečaj letalskega prevoznika stroškovno ugodnejša možnost za državo.
The Commission therefore holds that the amount by which the negative price exceeds the cost of insolvency for the State and ÖIAG must be regarded as State resources granted to Austrian Airlines.
Zato Komisija meni, da je treba znesek, za katerega negativna cena presega stroške stečaja za državo in ÖIAG, obravnavati kot državna sredstva, dodeljena Austrian Airlines.
Since the cost of insolvency to the shareholder is nil, the amount of State aid is the full amount of the negative price, which lies within a range of EUR […] to EUR […], with a maximum aid amount of EUR […].
Ker so stroški stečaja za delničarja enaki nič, je znesek državne pomoči polni znesek negativne cene, ki se giblje od […] do […] EUR, pri čemer je najvišji znesek subvencije […] EUR.
The negative sales price is made up of State resources, as it is granted directly by an entity (ÖIAG) which is wholly owned and controlled by the State.
Negativna nakupna cena obsega državna sredstva, saj jo je neposredno odobril organ (ÖIAG), ki je v celoti v lasti države in ga država nadzira.
It is the result of the privatisation mandate by means of which the Austrian Government authorised ÖIAG to sell all of its shares in Austrian Airlines and is therefore imputable to the State.
Negativna nakupna cena je rezultat pooblastila za privatizacijo, s katerim je avstrijska vlada pooblastila ÖIAG, da odsvoji vse svoje deleže v Austrian Airlines, in jo je zato mogoče pripisati državi.
It is directed at a company (Austrian Airlines) which is in competition with other Community airlines, particularly since the liberalisation of air transport.
Namenjena je podjetju (Austrian Airlines), ki je zlasti od liberalizacije letalskega prometa v konkurenci z drugimi letalskimi prevozniki Skupnosti.
It affects intra-Community trade, since it concerns a company involved in transport between Member States, and distorts competition.
Ovira trgovino v Skupnosti, saj zadeva podjetje, ki je dejavno v prometu med državami članicami, in izkrivlja konkurenco.
Accordingly, the negative sales price is to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Negativno nakupno ceno je zato treba obravnavati kot državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID WITH THE COMMON MARKET
ZDRUŽLJIVOST DRŽAVNE POMOČI S SKUPNIM TRGOM
Having concluded that the negative purchase price constitutes State aid, the Commission must examine its compatibility with the common market.
Potem ko je Komisija ugotovila, da negativna nakupna cena pomeni državno pomoč, mora preveriti združljivost te državne pomoči s skupnim trgom.
It is therefore necessary to examine the compatibility of the aid with the common market in the light of Article 87(2) and (3) of the EC Treaty, which provide for exceptions to the general rule of incompatibility set out in Article 87(1).
Nato mora združljivost državne pomoči s skupnim trgom preiskati glede na člen 87(2) in (3) Pogodbe ES, v katerem so navedene izjeme od splošnih pravil za nezdružljivost s skupnim trgom, določenih v členu 87(1).
In the present case, only the exemption provided for in Article 87(3)(c) may apply.
V obravnavanem primeru pride v poštev samo izjema, določena v členu 87(3)(c).
Under Article 87(3)(c), State aid can be regarded as admissible if it serves to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
V skladu s členom 87(3)(c) se državne pomoči lahko štejejo kot dopustne, če so namenjene pospeševanju razvoja določenih gospodarskih dejavnosti ali določenih gospodarskih območij, kadar take pomoči ne spreminjajo trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
In this respect, the applicable Community framework for deciding on compatibility with the common market comprises both the 2004 Guidelines and the 1994 Aviation Guidelines.
Veljavni okvir Skupnosti za odločitev o združljivosti s skupnim trgom so Smernice iz leta 2004 in Smernice za letalski sektor iz leta 1994.
Compatibility with the common market and possible infringement of internal market rules
Združljivost s skupnim trgom in mogoča kršitev pravil o notranjem trgu
In the opening of the proceedings, the Commission noted that Austria gave ÖIAG a privatisation mandate which imposed a number of conditions.
Komisija je ob sprožitvi postopka ugotovila, da je Avstrija ÖIAG podelila pooblastilo za privatizacijo, v katerem je določila številne pogoje.
In the course of the proceedings, the Commission established that, in the particular circumstances of this case, these conditions were not such as to have a negative impact or indeed any impact on the price that the purchasers were willing to pay.
Komisija je med postopkom ugotovila, da ti pogoji v posebnih okoliščinah tega primera niso bili taki, da bi negativno ali kakor koli vplivali na ceno, ki so jo bili pripravljeni plačati pridobitelji.
However, on the face of it, the conditions of sale requiring the creation of a committee to protect Austria’s interests and the maintenance of an Austrian core shareholder structure and the requirement to maintain the headquarters of Austrian Airlines in Austria could give rise to concerns with regard to Articles 43, 49 and 56 of the EC Treaty concerning freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital.
Vendar bi prodajni pogoji, v skladu s katerimi je bilo treba ustanoviti odbor za varstvo avstrijskih lokalnih interesov in ohraniti avstrijsko strukturo glavnega delničarja, in zahteva po ohranitvi centrale za odločanje Austrian Airlines v Avstriji na prvi pogled lahko vodili do pomislekov glede členov 43, 49 in 56 Pogodbe ES o pravici do ustanavljanja, storitvah ter kapitalu in plačilih.
This raises the question of the extent to which a potential violation of internal market rules should be taken into consideration by the Commission in determining the compatibility of State aid with the common market [43].
Torej se postavlja vprašanje, koliko mora Komisija upoštevati mogočo kršitev pravil o notranjem trgu, ko ocenjuje združljivost državne pomoči s skupnim trgom. [43]
In the present case, the Commission has found that the conditions imposed in the privatisation mandate did not in any way exacerbate the distortion resulting from the negative price, as these conditions had no material effect on the price paid.
Komisija je v obravnavanem primeru ugotovila, da pogoji, določeni v pooblastilu za privatizacijo, izkrivljanja zaradi negativne cene nikakor niso povečali, saj pogoji niso imeli bistvenega učinka na plačano ceno.
In the present case, the conditions relating to the shareholders and the company’s headquarters are linked to bilateral aviation agreements and, in this form, their application does not give rise to discrimination between the potential buyers, as they would all have the same interest in continuing these agreements in order to protect their potential activities.
Pogoji glede delničarjev in centrale za odločanje podjetja so v obravnavanem primeru povezani z dvostranskimi sporazumi o letalskih prevozih in njihova uporaba v tej obliki ne vodi k diskriminaciji morebitnih kupcev, saj bi imel vsak kupec enak interes za nadaljevanje poslovanja, da bi tako zaščitil svoje mogoče dejavnosti.
Consequently, the conditions imposed by the privatisation mandate do not impose additional restrictions beyond those already imposed by the bilateral aviation agreements.
Zato s pogoji, določenimi v pooblastilu za privatizacijo, niso bile določene nobene dodatne omejitve k omejitvam, ki so bile določene že v dvostranskih sporazumih o letalskih prevozih.
There is therefore no reason to take any possible infringement of internal market rules into account when assessing the compatibility of the aid.
Zato ni razloga, da bi pri oceni združljivosti pomoči upoštevali mogočo kršitev pravil o notranjem trgu.
The Commission must therefore assess whether the restructuring plan complies with the provisions of the applicable guidelines.
Komisija mora zato presoditi, ali je načrt za prestrukturiranje skladen z določbami veljavnih smernic.
The basic principle (point 31 of the 2004 Guidelines) is to ‘allow the grant of restructuring aid only in circumstances in which it can be demonstrated that it does not run counter to the Community interest.
V skladu s splošnim načelom (točka 31 Smernic iz leta 2004) se „pomoč za prestrukturiranje odobri le v okoliščinah, v katerih je mogoče prikazati, da ne nasprotuje interesu Skupnosti.
This will only be possible if strict criteria are met, and if it is certain that any distortions of competition will be offset by the benefits flowing from the firm’s survival […] and, in principle, there are adequate compensatory measures in favour of competitors’.
To bo mogoče le v primeru, da so izpolnjeni strogi kriteriji in da obstaja gotovost, da bodo kakršno koli izkrivljanje konkurence nadomestile koristi zaradi preživetja podjetja […] in da načeloma obstajajo zadostni izravnalni ukrepi v korist konkurentov“.
The Guidelines then set out a number of conditions under which restructuring aid may be granted.
V nadaljevanju so v teh smernicah navedeni različni pogoji, pod katerimi se lahko odobrijo pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
Identity and eligibility of the firm
Identiteta in upravičenost do financiranja podjetja
Point 13 of the 2004 Guidelines provides that ‘a firm belonging to or being taken over by a larger business group is not normally eligible for rescue […] except where it can be demonstrated that the firm’s difficulties are intrinsic and are not the result of an arbitrary allocation of costs within the group, and that the difficulties are too serious to be dealt with by the group itself’.
V skladu s točko 13 Smernic „podjetje, ki pripada večji poslovni skupini ali ga je ta skupina prevzela, običajno ni upravičeno do pomoči za […] prestrukturiranje, razen če je mogoče dokazati, da je vzrok težav v podjetju samem in te niso posledica samovoljnega prerazporejanja stroškov v skupini ter da so težave prehude, da bi jih lahko odpravila skupina sama“.
In the opening of the proceedings, the Commission noted that certain complainants had argued that, in the context of the takeover of Austrian Airlines by Lufthansa, Austrian Airlines was not eligible for aid.
Komisija je ob sprožitvi postopka ugotovila, da so nekateri pritožniki trdili, da naj Austrian Airlines v zvezi z njegovim prevzemom s strani Lufthanse ne bi bil upravičen do financiranja.
In this regard, the Commission observes that, although the notified measure envisages that Lufthansa will take over Austrian Airlines, the difficulties in which Austrian Airlines finds itself are not linked to the planned acquisition.
Komisija glede tega opozarja, da priglašeni ukrep pač predvideva, da Lufthansa prevzame Austrian Airlines, težave, s katerimi se srečuje Austrian Airlines, pa niso povezane z načrtovanim prevzemom.
Furthermore, the Austrian authorities have indicated that the reduction in Austrian Airlines’ debt levels (financial restructuring) is the price that Lufthansa is willing to accept for the acquisition, following a transparent and open bidding procedure, and that without this measure the sale would not take place.
Avstrijski organi so poleg tega navedli, da naj bi zmanjšanje dolga Austrian Airlines („finančno prestrukturiranje“) pomenilo ceno, ki naj bi jo bila Lufthansa pripravljena sprejeti za prevzem po preglednem in odprtem ponudbenem postopku, in da prodaje brez tega ukrepa ne bi bilo.
The Commission notes that the Austrian State’s decisions regarding the grant and the agreements signed between ÖIAG and Lufthansa stipulate that Austrian Airlines and not Lufthansa is the beneficiary of the grant and that the grant will be received by Austrian Airlines in the form of a capital increase.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je v odločbah Avstrije o odobritvi sredstev in v sporazumih, ki sta jih podpisala ÖIAG in Lufthansa, določeno, da je prejemnik odobrenih sredstev Austrian Airlines, ne Lufthansa in da Austrian Airlines odobrena sredstva prejme v obliki dokapitalizacije.
The primary effect of the grant will be the survival of a restructured Austrian Airlines.
Glavni učinek odobritve sredstev je preživetje prestrukturiranega Austrian Airlines.
The Commission further notes that Austrian Airlines will not be part of the Lufthansa Group until completion of the sale, so the question of whether Lufthansa could have financially rehabilitated Austrian Airlines using its own capital is moot.
Komisija še ugotavlja, da Austrian Airlines do konca prodaje ni del koncerna Lufthansa, tako da je vprašanje, ali bi Lufthansa z lastnimi sredstvi lahko finančno sanirala Austrian Airlines, nepomembno.
No group relationship exists between Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines based on their existing cooperation.
Že samo sodelovanje med Lufthanso in Austrian Airlines tudi nima koncernske narave.
The Commission can therefore conclude that Austrian Airlines is not part of the Lufthansa Group.
Zato lahko Komisija sklepa, da Austrian Airlines ni del koncerna Lufthansa.
The Commission can therefore conclude that Austrian Airlines is the beneficiary of the aid.
Torej lahko Komisija sklene, da je Austrian Airlines prejemnik pomoči.
During the subsequent investigation, it has not uncovered any elements which would change this view.
Med postopkom preiskave ni odkrila elementov, ki bi dali povod za spremembo te ocene.
In this regard, the Commission can conclude that Austrian Airlines is an undertaking in difficulty within the meaning of the 2004 Guidelines.
Komisija lahko v zvezi s tem sklepa, da je Austrian Airlines podjetje v težavah v smislu Smernic iz leta 2004.
The second condition (as set out in point 35 of the 2004 Guidelines) to be complied with is that the ‘restructuring plan, the duration of which must be as short as possible, must restore the long-term viability of the firm within a reasonable timescale and on the basis of realistic assumptions as to future operating conditions’.
Drugi pogoj (kot je navedeno v točki 35 Smernic iz leta 2004) je, da „[mora] načrt za prestrukturiranje, katerega trajanje mora biti čim krajše, […] obnoviti dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja podjetja v smiselnem časovnem okviru in na podlagi realističnih predvidevanj prihodnjih pogojev poslovanja“.
The 2004 Guidelines (point 37) go on to stipulate that ‘the plan must provide for a turnaround that will enable the company, after completing its restructuring, to cover all its costs including depreciation and financial charges.
V nadaljevanju Smernic iz leta 2004 (točka 37) je navedeno, da „[mora] načrt […] zagotavljati preobrat, ki bo podjetju omogočil, da bo po zaključku prestrukturiranja vse svoje stroške krilo samo, vključno z amortizacijo in finančnimi dajatvami.
The expected return on capital must be enough to enable the restructured firm to compete in the marketplace on its own merits’.
Pričakovan donos kapitala mora biti dovolj velik, da prestrukturiranemu podjetju omogoča samostojno konkuriranje na trgu“.
In the opening of the proceedings, the Commission raised questions regarding the assumptions underlying the restructuring plan submitted.
Komisija je ob sprožitvi postopka postavila vprašanja glede domnev, na katerih je temeljil predloženi načrt za prestrukturiranje.
It also questioned the cost savings and synergies referred to in the plan, given that Austrian Airlines and Lufthansa already enjoy extensive cooperation.
Postavila je tudi vprašanja glede prihrankov pri stroških in sinergij, na katere se nanaša načrt, glede na to, da Austrian Airlines in Lufthansa že intenzivno sodelujeta.
In relation to the fact that Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines already cooperate within the scope of the Star Alliance and in relation to their joint venture, Austria has provided the Commission with information suggesting that integration of enterprises in the aviation sector is significantly greater from an economic point of view in the event of equity participation, resulting in higher cost savings than in partnerships without equity participation.
Avstrija je glede dejstva, da Lufthansa in Austrian Airlines sodelujeta že v okviru Star Alliance, in glede njunega skupnega podjetja Komisiji sporočila informacije, na podlagi katerih je očitno, da je v primeru kapitalske udeležbe združevanje podjetij v letalskem sektorju v gospodarskem smislu precej večje, kar vodi k večjim prihrankom pri stroških kot v primeru partnerstev brez kapitalske udeležbe.
Austria refers to expert studies which estimate cost savings of approximately 1,9 % for purely coordinating partnerships, while joint operational activities result in savings of approximately 5,6 % of overall costs.
Avstrija se sklicuje na strokovne študije, na podlagi katerih naj bi pri partnerstvih, v katerih se samo usklajujejo, dosegli približno 1,9-odstotni prihranek pri stroških, medtem ko naj bi skupno poslovanje vodilo do približno 5,6-odstotnega prihranka pri skupnih stroških.
However, cooperation that is underpinned by equity participation results in cost savings of approximately 11,4 % [45].
Nasprotno naj bi sodelovanje, ki naj bi bilo podprto s kapitalsko udeležbo, vodilo do približno 11,4-odstotnega prihranka pri stroških [45].
The Commission notes that the restructuring plan is based on consolidating the benefits accruing from cost reductions and synergies resulting from the integration of the airline into the Lufthansa Group.
Komisija opozarja, da načrt za prestrukturiranje temelji na okrepitvi prednosti, ki so rezultat zmanjšanja stroškov in sinergij, ki izhajajo iz vključitve letalskega prevoznika v koncern Lufthansa.
This provides for fleet reduction, fleet resizing, production optimisation, cost cutting measures and synergy potentials.
V njem so predvideni zmanjšanje in novo dimenzioniranje flote, optimizacija izdelkov, ukrepi za znižanje stroškov in možnosti sinergije.
[…] The Commission notes that Lufthansa’s later business plan takes into account, as far as possible, the deterioration in the global aviation market and, in particular, in Austrian Airlines’ markets in Central and Eastern Europe.
[…] Komisija ugotavlja, da je v poznejšem poslovnem načrtu Lufthanse, kolikor je mogoče, upoštevano poslabšanje položaja na svetovnem trgu letalskega prometa in zlasti na trgih Austrian Airlines v srednji in vzhodni Evropi.
Lufthansa notes that the economic crisis has meant that prospects are significantly bleaker when compared with the plan from October 2008.
Lufthansa opozarja, da naj bi bile perspektive zaradi gospodarske krize v primerjavi z načrtom iz oktobra 2008 precej slabše.
Lufthansa states that the five-year (2009-13) financial forecasts show that, in the ‘baseline’, ‘realistic case’ and ‘pessimistic case’ scenarios, the company will […] in the short to medium term […].
Lufthansa navaja, da naj bi bilo iz petletnega finančnega načrta (2009–2013) razvidno, da podjetje tako po „osnovnem scenariju“ kot tudi po „realističnem“ ter „pesimističnem scenariju“ kratkoročno do srednjeročno […].
It expects […] that Austrian Airlines will be able to cover its depreciation, aircraft leasing costs and interest from […].
Lufthansa naj bi pričakovala […], da bo Austrian Airlines lahko kril amortizacijo, stroške lizinga letal in stroške obresti od […].
Lufthansa notes that some of the underlying measures […].
Lufthansa opozarja, da nekateri temeljni ukrepi […].
However, in Lufthansa’s opinion, Austrian Airlines’ long-term viability can be restored only if the revised restructuring plan — and further cost cutting measures yet to be negotiated — can be implemented as envisaged and thereby bring about the necessary cost reductions.
Meni, da naj bi se dolgoročna sposobnost preživetja Austrian Airlines lahko obnovila samo, če naj bi bilo mogoče spremenjeni načrt za prestrukturiranje in druge ukrepe za znižanje stroškov, o katerih se je treba še pogoditi, izvesti, kot je bilo predvideno, in bi se s tem lahko dosegli potrebni prihranki pri stroških.
Flight revenues will […] in 2009.
Prihodki od letalskega prometa se bodo leta 2009 za […].
Afterwards, the plan anticipates […] per year, as Austrian Airlines’ markets recover and revenue synergies are harvested.
V načrtu je v nadaljevanju predviden letni […], v obsegu, v katerem si bodo trgi Austrian Airlines opomogli in bo sinergija donosa obrodila sadove.
[…] the company is expected to again reach the flight revenue level of […].
Podjetje naj bi […] pri prihodkih od letalskega prometa spet doseglo raven […].
[…] As such, load factors are estimated […] in 2008 to 2010, recovering only from […] onwards.
[…] Tako se za koeficiente zasedenosti v obdobju od leta 2008 do leta 2010 računa […], kar naj bi se malce izboljšalo šele od […].