natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As for the developments after 30 May 2008 to which the Italian authorities refer in their letters and, more precisely, the contract concluded on 9 and 10 June 2008 between Alitalia and Intesa Sanpaolo, it is sufficient to point out that, for the purposes of assessing the measure in question, account must be taken of the circumstances prevailing as at the time when it was granted.
Kar zadeva dogajanje po 30. maju 2008, na katero se italijanski organi sklicujejo v svojih dopisih, in zlasti pogodbo, ki sta jo družbi Alitalia in Intesa Sanpaolo sklenili 9. in 10. junija 2008, je dovolj spomniti, da je treba za oceno zadevne pomoči upoštevati prevladujoče okoliščine ob njeni odobritvi.
In any case, the Commission would point out that the fact that Alitalia charged Intesa Sanpaolo in June 2008 with seeking a solution for privatisation of the company cannot be considered as a sure and immediate prospect of takeover of the company, as there was no certainty as at that date as to the success of the task assigned to Intesa Sanpaolo.
Komisija vsekakor opozarja, da v tem, da je družba Alitalia junija 2008 družbi Intesa Sanpaolo zaupala nalogo, spodbujati privatizacijo družbe in najti rešitev zanjo, ni mogoče videti zanesljive in takojšnje možnosti za odkup družbe, ker so bile takrat možnosti za uspeh naloge, zaupane družbi Intesa Sanpaolo, povsem negotove.
It should also be pointed out here that, when the measure in question was granted by the Italian State, none of Alitalia’s private shareholders took action to support it alongside the State, in order to enable it to handle its immediate liquidity need.
V tem smislu je treba sicer spomniti, da ko je Italija odobrila zadevno pomoč, noben zasebni delničar družbe Alitalia ni pomagal družbi hkrati z državo, da bi ji omogočil kritje takojšnjih potreb po likvidnih sredstvih.
The almost simultaneous occurrence of withdrawal of the aforementioned takeover bid and granting of the loan by the Italian Government, the absence of other recovery prospects at the time of granting and the absence of financial intervention from Alitalia’s private shareholders alongside that of the Italian State reinforce the conclusion that a shareholder of comparable size would not have agreed to grant this loan, given the seriousness of the situation.
Skorajšnja sočasnost umika zgoraj navedene ponudbe za odkup in odobritve navedenega posojila s strani italijanske vlade, neobstoj druge možnosti prevzema ob njegovi odobritvi ter neobstoj finančne pomoči zasebnih delničarjev družbe Alitalia hkrati s pomočjo Italije potrjujejo ugotovitev, da primerljivo velik delničar zaradi resnosti položaja ne bi privolil v odobritev tega posojila.
The Commission also believes that, given Alitalia’s very precarious financial situation, such a private investor would not have agreed to grant it any loan, much less a loan the value of which could be counted as part of its capital, which, in the event of liquidation of the company, would not be reimbursed until after all the other creditors had been paid off, jointly and in proportion to the share capital (see Article 4(4) of Decree-Law No 93).
Komisija sicer meni, da tak zasebni vlagatelj zaradi resno ogroženega finančnega položaja družbe Alitalia ne bi privolil v odobritev nikakršnega posojila tej družbi in sploh pa ne posojila, katerega znesek naj bi se vključil v lastniški kapital in ki bo tako v primeru likvidacije družbe povrnjen sorazmerno z lastniškim kapitalom šele po poplačilu vseh drugih upnikov (glej člen 4(4) zakonskega odloka št. 93).
Use of the loan initially granted to fill the gap in Alitalia’s capital further strengthens the Commission’s analysis that the measure in question constitutes State aid.
Dodelitev posojila, ki je bilo najprej odobreno za dopolnitev kapitala družbe Alitalia, nadalje potrjuje analizo Komisije, da gre pri zadevni pomoči za državno pomoč.
In the light of all the foregoing, the Commission believes that, by granting Alitalia the measure in question worth EUR 300 million, the Italian State has not acted as a prudent shareholder pursuing a structural policy — whether general or sectoral — guided by longer term prospects of profitability on the capital invested than those of an ordinary investor [36].
Komisija na podlagi zgoraj navedenih dejstev meni, da Italija, s tem ko je družbi Alitalia odobrila zadevno pomoč v višini 300 milijonov EUR, ni ravnala kot osveščeni delničar, ki vodi strukturno, globalno ali sektorsko politiko ter ga usmerjajo možnosti dolgoročnejše rentabilnosti vloženega kapitala, kot to velja za navadne vlagatelje [36].
The Commission concludes from this that, regardless of the use of the relevant funds, the measure in question confers an economic advantage to Alitalia through State resources which it would not have received in normal market conditions [37].
Komisija iz tega sklepa, da zadevna pomoč, ne glede na način uporabe zadevnih sredstev, za Alitalio pomeni gospodarsko prednost iz državnih sredstev, ki je ob običajnih tržnih pogojih ne bi imela [37].
Selective nature of the measure
Selektivnost pomoči
The granting of this loan gives Alitalia an economic advantage of which it is the sole beneficiary.
Odobritev tega posojila omogoča družbi Alitalia gospodarsko prednost, ki je dana samo njej.
Accordingly, the measure in question is selective.
Zadevna pomoč je torej selektivna.
Effect on trade between Member States and distortion of competition
Pogoji, ki vplivajo na trgovino med državami članicami in izkrivljanje konkurence
The Commission considers that the measure in question affects trade between Member States, as it concerns a company whose transport activity, by its very nature, directly concerns trade and covers several Member States.
Komisija meni, da zadevna pomoč vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami, ker zadeva podjetje, katerega prevozna dejavnost po naravi neposredno vpliva na trgovino in zajema številne države članice.
It also distorts or threatens to distort competition within the common market, as it is granted to only one company which is in competition with other Community airlines on its European network, particularly since the entry into force of the third air transport liberalisation package on 1 January 1993 [38].
Poleg tega izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco na skupnem trgu, ker zadeva samo eno podjetje, ki je konkurent drugih skupnostnih letalskih družb v evropskem omrežju, zlasti od začetka veljavnosti tretjega dela liberalizacije zračnega prometa 1. januarja 1993 [38].
Having regard to all of the foregoing, the Commission believes, on the basis of the information it has at this stage, that the measure worth EUR 300 million granted to Alitalia by the Italian State constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Komisija ob upoštevanju zgornjih ugotovitev na podlagi informacij, ki jih ima na tej stopnji, meni, da je pomoč v višini 300 milijonov EUR, ki jo je država Italija odobrila družbi Alitalia, državna pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe.
Classification of the aid measure as unlawful aid
Opredelitev pomoči kot nezakonite pomoči
Under Article 88(3) of the Treaty, Member States must notify any plans to grant or alter aid.
Država članica mora v skladu s členom 88(3) Pogodbe priglasiti vse načrte za dodelitev ali spremembo pomoči.
The Member State concerned may not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision.
Zadevna država članica ne sme izvajati predlaganih ukrepov, dokler v tem postopku ni sprejeta dokončna odločitev.
The Italian Government decided to grant the EUR 300 million loan on 22 April 2008 by means of Decree-Law No 80.
Italijanska vlada je odločitev o odobritvi posojila v višini 300 milijonov EUR sprejela 22. aprila 2008 z zakonskim odlokom št. 80.
However, the Commission notes that this measure was not notified to it by Italy either on the date of adoption of Decree-Law No 80 or on that of adoption of Decree-Law No 93.
Komisija ugotavlja, da ji Italija ni priglasila zadevne pomoči niti na dan sprejetja zakonskega odloka št. 80 niti na dan sprejetja zakonskega odloka št. 93.
Accordingly, the Commission believes that Italy has acted unlawfully in granting the aid in question contrary to Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
Komisija torej meni, da je Italija ravnala nezakonito, ko je zadevno pomoč odobrila v nasprotju s členom 88(3) Pogodbe.
Compatibility of the aid measure with the common market
Združljivost pomoči s skupnim trgom
Since the Commission considers that the measure in question constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, it is necessary to assess whether it is compatible with the common market in the light of the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article.
Ker Komisija meni, da je zadevni ukrep državna pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe, je treba proučiti njeno morebitno združljivost glede na odstopanja, določena v odstavkih 2 in 3 tega člena.
In this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind that the beneficiary of the aid measure is in the air transport sector.
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da upravičenec zadevne pomoči spada v sektor letalskega prometa.
The Commission notes that the exceptions provided for in Article 87(2) of the Treaty, which concern aid of a social character granted to individual consumers, aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences and aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany, are irrelevant in the current context.
Kar zadeva odstopanja iz člena 87(2) Pogodbe v zvezi s socialno pomočjo, dodeljeno posameznim potrošnikom, pomočjo za povrnitev škode, ki so jo povzročile naravne nesreče in drugi izjemni dogodki, ter pomočjo, dodeljeno gospodarstvu nekaterih območij Zvezne republike Nemčije, Komisija ugotavlja, da so v tem primeru neumestna.
As for the exception in Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty, it is sufficient to note that the aid measure in question is not an important project of common European interest and does not seek to remedy a serious disturbance in the Italian economy.
V zvezi z odstopanjem iz člena 87(3)(b) Pogodbe zadostuje ugotoviti, da zadevna pomoč ni pomemben projekt skupnega evropskega interesa in da njen cilj ni odpravljanje resnih motenj v italijanskem gospodarstvu.
Nor does it seek to promote culture and heritage conservation within the meaning of the exception in Article 87(3)(d) of the Treaty.
Poleg tega ni usmerjena k spodbujanju kulture in ohranjanju dediščine v smislu odstopanja iz člena 87(3)(d) Pogodbe.
The Commission takes the view, in relation to the exception provided for in Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty, which authorises aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities where such aid does not affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, that there is no basis for considering that the aid in question is compatible with the common market.
Komisija v zvezi z odstopanjem iz člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe, ki dovoljuje pomoč za pospeševanje razvoja nekaterih dejavnosti, kadar takšna pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnim interesom, meni, da ni dokazov za združljivost zadevne pomoči s skupnim trgom.
Indeed, none of the exceptions provided for in this connection by the Commission’s guidelines on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State aids in the aviation sector [39], as supplemented by the Commission Communication (concerning) Community guidelines on financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing from regional airports [40], appear to apply in the case in point.
Zdi se namreč, da se v obravnavanem primeru ne uporablja nobeno od odstopanj, ki so v zvezi s tem določena s smernicami Komisije o uporabi členov 92 in 93 Pogodbe ES in člena 61 Sporazuma EGP za državne pomoči v letalskem sektorju [39], kot so bile dopolnjene s Sporočilom Komisije o smernicah Skupnosti o financiranju letališč in zagonski državni pomoči letalskim družbam z odhodi z regionalnih letališč [40].
Moreover, although, as an exceptional measure, the Commission has authorised some operating aid schemes in the air transport sector on the basis of the 1998 guidelines on national regional aid, as amended in 2000 [41], to airlines operating from the outermost regions, with a view to offsetting the additional costs arising from the permanent disadvantages facing those regions, as identified in Article 299(2) of the Treaty, this exception is not relevant in the current context.
Poleg tega je Komisija na podlagi smernic o državni regionalni pomoči iz leta 1998, kakor so bile spremenjene leta 2000 [41], izjemoma dovolila nekatere pomoči za dejavnosti v letalskem prometu za letalske proge z najbolj oddaljenih regij, da bi se izravnali dodatni stroški zaradi trajnih pomanjkljivosti teh regij, navedenih v členu 299(2) Pogodbe, vendar ta izjema v teh okoliščinah ne pride v poštev.
The Commission would point out that, in their letters, the Italian authorities did not assert that the aforementioned exemptions were applicable in the case in point.
Kar zadeva navedene izjeme, Komisija ugotavlja, da zanje italijanski organi v svojih dopisih niso trdili, da se uporabljajo v obravnavanem primeru.
As for the Italian authorities’ argument concerning the need to guarantee the public service provided by Alitalia for reasons of public order and territorial continuity, the Commission notes that this unsubstantiated assertion alone is not sufficient to enable it to consider that the aid measure in question is compatible with the common market.
Kar zadeva trditev italijanskih organov, v skladu s katero je treba zaradi javnega reda in prometne povezanosti zagotoviti storitve javnega prometa, ki jih opravlja družba Alitalia, Komisija ugotavlja, da samo na podlagi te neargumentirane trditve zadevne pomoči ne more šteti za združljivo s skupnim trgom.
Firstly, the Commission notes that the Italian authorities have not demonstrated that the measure in question would not have adverse spillover effects in other Member States [42].
Komisija namreč ugotavlja, da – prvič – italijanski organi niso dokazali, da zadevni ukrep ne bi imel neupravičenih učinkov prelivanja na druge države članice [42].
In relation to this point, the Italian authorities merely asserted that the privatisation process and the granting, in this context, of the measure in question was a process of a general nature, since granting of the measure did not enable Alitalia to implement competitive strategies.
Italijanski organi v zvezi s tem trdijo samo, da sta postopek privatizacije in odobritev zadevnega ukrepa v tem smislu splošna postopka, saj odobritev navedene pomoči družbi Alitalia ne omogoča izvajanja konkurenčnih strategij.
The Italian authorities in no way detailed the serious social difficulties justifying granting of the measure in question.
Italijanski organi nikakor niso podrobno navedli resnih socialnih težav, ki upravičujejo odobritev zadevnega ukrepa.
Secondly, the Italian authorities have not given an undertaking to send, not later than six months after the measure has been implemented, either a restructuring plan, a liquidation plan or proof that the loan has been repaid in full [43].
Drugič: italijanski organi niso zagotovili, da bodo najpozneje šest mesecev po izvedbi ukrepa predložili načrt za prestrukturiranje ali načrt za likvidacijo ali dokazilo, da je bilo posojilo v celoti povrnjeno [43].
In their letters, the Italian authorities referred to the existence of both a restructuring plan and a timetable for repayment of the measure in question.
Italijanski organi se v dopisih sklicujejo na obstoj načrta za prestrukturiranje in tudi na obstoj časovnega načrta za vračilo zadevne pomoči.
However, the Italian authorities’ assertion that drafting of the restructuring plan is part of Alitalia’s privatisation process undertaken since 2006 is not sufficient for it to be considered that the Commission has received a formal undertaking concerning sending of an actual plan for restructuring the company within six months of granting of the measure.
Vendar po eni strani iz trditve italijanskih organov, da je izdelava načrta za prestrukturiranje del postopka privatizacije družbe Alitalia, ki se je začel leta 2006, ni mogoče sklepati, da ima Komisija formalno zagotovilo, da bo v šestih mesecih od odobritve ukrepa prejela dejanski načrt za prestrukturiranje družbe.
Moreover, the supposed timetable for repaying the loan set out in Decree-Law No 93 does not allow the Commission to consider that the condition in paragraph 25(c) of the 2004 guidelines has been met.
Po drugi strani Komisija tudi na podlagi domnevnega časovnega načrta za vračilo posojila, na katerega naj bi se skliceval zgoraj navedeni zakonski odlok št. 93, ne more sklepati, da je izpolnjen pogoj iz odstavka 25(c) smernic iz leta 2004.
Indeed, the fact that the loan in question must be repaid as quickly as possible between the 30th day after transfer of Alitalia’s share capital and 31 December 2008 does not allow it to be considered that the Italian authorities have undertaken to send proof of its full repayment within six months of granting of the measure by Decree-Law No 80, i.e. by 23 October 2008 at the latest.
Iz dejstva, da naj bi bilo zadevno posojilo treba vrniti čim prej v obdobju od tridesetega dne po prenosu lastniškega kapitala družbe Alitalia do 31. decembra 2008, namreč ni mogoče sklepati, da so se italijanski organi obvezali, da bodo v šestih mesecih od odobritve ukrepa z zakonskim odlokom št. 80 predložili dokazilo o povrnitvi posojila, to je najpozneje 23. oktobra 2008.
In any case, the Italian authorities glossed over the fact that Article 4(4) of Decree-Law No 93 states that, in the event of liquidation of the company, the amount in question will be repaid only after all the other creditors have been paid off, jointly and in proportion to the share capital, which, if this possibility came about, would undermine any prospect of repayment.
Vsekakor italijanski organi ne upoštevajo dejstva, da je v členu 4(4) zakonskega odloka št. 93 navedeno, da bo v primeru likvidacije družbe zadevni znesek šele po solidarnem poplačilu vseh drugih upnikov vrnjen sorazmerno z lastniškim kapitalom, kar v tem primeru ogroža vsako možnost vračila.
Reference in this Decree-Law to the possibility of liquidation of the company cannot be considered as an undertaking by Italy to send a liquidation plan not later than six months after implementation of the measure.
Poleg tega navedbe možnosti likvidacije družbe v tem odloku ni mogoče šteti za zagotovilo Italije, da bo najpozneje šest mesecev po izvedbi ukrepa predložila načrt za likvidacijo.
Thirdly, the Italian authorities have not demonstrated that the value of the aid in question is justified for the purposes of keeping the company in business (paragraph 25(d) of the 2004 guidelines).
Tretjič: italijanski organi niso dokazali niti, da naj bi bila zadevna pomoč kvantitativno upravičena za namen ohranitve podjetja (odstavek 25(d) smernic iz leta 2004).
Indeed, the Italian authorities merely asserted, in their letters, that the total value of the intervention in favour of Alitalia was strictly necessary and proportional to the aim of safeguarding the survival and assets of the company.
Italijanski organi so v dopisih namreč trdili samo, da je skupni znesek ukrepa v korist družbe Alitalia nujno potreben in sorazmeren s ciljem nadaljnjega obstoja in ohranitve premoženja družbe.
In this context, contrary to the Italian authorities’ assertion, the description of the company’s financial situation in their letter of 30 May 2008 to the Commission does not allow such a conclusion to be drawn.
V teh okoliščinah v nasprotju s trditvami italijanskih organov opis finančnega položaja družbe v njihovem dopisu Komisiji z dne 30. maja 2008 ne omogoča take ugotovitve.
Fourthly, and in any event, it cannot be considered that Alitalia has complied with the condition linked to the ‘one time, last time’ rule [44] — whether the aid is considered rescue aid or restructuring aid.
Četrtič: nikakor ni mogoče šteti, da družba Alitalia izpolnjuje pogoj v zvezi s pravilom o enkratni pomoči [44], naj bo to pomoč za reševanje ali prestrukturiranje.
It should be recalled that, according to the 2004 guidelines, if a company has already received rescue or restructuring aid in the past and if fewer than ten years have passed since granting of the rescue aid, since the end of the restructuring period, or since the end of implementation of the plan, the Commission will not authorise new rescue or restructuring aid.
Opozoriti je namreč treba, da v skladu s smernicami iz leta 2004 Komisija ne dovoli dodelitve nove pomoči za reševanje ali prestrukturiranje, če je podjetje v preteklosti že prejelo pomoč za reševanje ali prestrukturiranje in če je od dodelitve pomoči za reševanje, od konca obdobja prestrukturiranja ali od ustavitve izvajanja načrta preteklo manj kot 10 let.
However, Alitalia has already received restructuring aid which was approved by the Commission by Decision of 18 July 2001 [45] and rescue aid in the form of a State guarantee for a EUR 400 million bridging loan approved by the Commission by Decision of 20 July 2004 [46].
Alitalia pa je že prejela pomoč za prestrukturiranje, ki jo je Komisija odobrila z odločbo z dne 18. julija 2001 [45], in tudi pomoč za reševanje v obliki državnega poroštva za premostitveno posojilo v višini 400 milijonov EUR, ki jo je Komisija odobrila z odločbo z dne 20. julija 2004 [46].
Since ten years have not passed since the latter aid was granted, Alitalia cannot receive the aid in question in the case in point.
Ker od dodelitve te zadnje pomoči ni preteklo 10 let, Alitalia v obravnavanem primeru ne more prejeti zadevne pomoči.
It is nevertheless true that the 2004 guidelines provide for exceptions to the ‘one time, last time’ rule.
Res je, da so v smernicah iz leta 2004 določene izjeme glede uporabe pravila o enkratni pomoči.
However, the Commission notes that the conditions of paragraph 73(a) and (b) have not been met in the case in point.
Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da – po eni strani – pogoja iz točke 73(a) ali (b) v obravnavanem primeru nista izpolnjena.
Moreover, the Italian authorities have not asserted that these exceptions are applicable in the case in point.
Italijanski organi poleg tega niso trdili, da naj bi se ti izjemi uporabljali v obravnavanem primeru.
Furthermore, the Commission believes that the exception provided for in paragraph 73(c) of the 2004 guidelines linked to the existence of exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances for which the company concerned is not responsible does not apply in the case in point.
Kar po drugi strani zadeva izjemo, določeno v točki 73(c) smernic iz leta 2004, povezano z izjemnimi in nepredvidljivimi okoliščinami, za katere podjetje ni odgovorno, Komisija meni, da je v obravnavanem primeru ni mogoče uporabiti.
Indeed, it should be pointed out that, for several years, Alitalia’s financial difficulties have been recurrent, meaning that the difficulties encountered by the company and used to justify granting of the measure cannot be classified as exceptional, unforeseeable and beyond the control of the company.
Opozoriti je namreč treba, da se finančne težave družbe Alitalia že več let ponavljajo, zato težav, s katerimi se srečuje družba in ki upravičujejo odobritev zadevne pomoči, ni mogoče opredelili kot izjemnih in nepredvidljivih, za katere družba ne bi bila odgovorna.
In this context, it is appropriate to refer to the description of Alitalia’s financial situation given in the Commission Decisions of 18 July 2001, 20 July 2004 and 7 June 2005 (previously cited), which refer to the company’s situation as being difficult since 1997 and worrying after 2001 [47].
V teh okoliščinah se je primerno sklicevati na opis finančnega položaja družbe Alitalia v odločbah Komisije z dne 18. julija 2001, 20. julija 2004 in 7. junija 2005, v katerih je opisan težak položaj od leta 1997, nato pa skrb vzbujajoč položaj, v katerem je družba od leta 2001 [47].