natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In its preliminary analysis, the Commission took the view that the PPAs were likely to provide a competitive advantage to the contracting power generators, which would distort competition and affect trade between Member States.
Komisija je pri predhodni analizi sprejela stališče, da pogodbe PNE verjetno omogočajo konkurenčno prednost proizvajalcem električne energije, ki so jih sklenili, kar lahko izkrivlja konkurenco in vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami.
The Commission expressed the view that PPAs did not constitute existing aid as — on the basis of the Accession Treaty — none of the PPAs was eligible for one of the three categories of aid that were regarded, as of accession, as existing aid within the meaning of Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je menila, da pogodbe PNE niso obstoječa pomoč, saj na podlagi Pristopne pogodbe nobena pogodba PNE ni izpolnjevala pogojev za eno od treh kategoriji pomoči, ki so ob pristopu veljale za obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 88(1) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission stated that, since the PPAs had not been notified to it under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, they constituted unlawful aid within the meaning of Article 1(f) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je navedla, da pogodbe PNE, glede na to, da niso bile priglašene v skladu s členom 88(3) Pogodbe ES, pomenijo nezakonito pomoč v smislu člena 1(f) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES.
The Commission expressed the view that the terms and conditions of the PPAs put power generators which were parties to a PPA in a more advantageous economic situation than other power generators that were not parties to a PPA and companies in other, comparable sectors in which such long-term agreements had not even been offered to market players.
Komisija je menila, da so proizvajalci energije, ki so sklenili pogodbe PNE, zaradi pogojev teh pogodb v ugodnejšem gospodarskem položaju kot drugi proizvajalci energije, ki jih niso sklenili, in družbe v drugih, primerljivih sektorjih, v katerih udeležencem na trgu take dolgoročne pogodbe niso bile ponujene.
The measure was therefore found, on a preliminary basis, to confer a selective advantage to those power generators.
Pri predhodni oceni je bilo torej ugotovljeno, da daje ukrep tem proizvajalcem energije selektivno prednost.
The Commission also noted that the electricity markets had been opened to competition and that electricity had been traded between Member States at least since the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity.
Komisija je tudi navedla, da so bili trgi električne energije odprti za konkurenco in da trgovina z električno energijo med državami članicami poteka vsaj od začetka veljavnosti Direktive 96/92/ES Evropskega Parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. decembra 1996 o skupnih pravilih notranjega trga z električno energijo.
Measures that favour companies in the energy sector in one Member State were therefore regarded as potentially impeding the scope for companies from other Member States to export electricity to that Member State, or favouring exports of electricity to the second group of Member States.
Ukrepi, ki dajejo prednost družbam v energetskem sektorju v eni državi članici, se torej obravnavajo kot možna ovira za družbe iz drugih držav članic pri izvozu električne energije v to državo članico ali kot da dajejo prednost izvozu električne energije v drugo skupino držav članic.
The Commission also expressed the view that this advantage entailed the use of state resources, because the decision to sign the PPAs was a consequence of state policy implemented via the network operator PSE, which was fully state-owned.
Komisija je tudi menila, da je ta prednost povzročila uporabo državnih sredstev, ker je bila odločitev o podpisu pogodb PNE posledica državne politike, ki se je izvajala prek upravljavca omrežja PSE v popolni državni lasti.
Under the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Court of Justice), when a state owned company uses its funds in a way that can be deemed to constitute state action, then these funds should be regarded as state resources within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
V skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti („Sodišče“) velja, da je treba sredstva družbe v državni lasti, ki jih ta uporabi tako, da lahko to šteje za državni ukrep, obravnavati kot državna sredstva v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission therefore concluded that the PPAs probably constituted state aid to the power generators within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je zato sklenila, da pogodbe PNE verjetno pomenijo državno pomoč proizvajalcem energije v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission went on to state that the Stranded Costs Methodology should be used to analyse the state aid received by the power generators.
Komisija je nato navedla, da je treba za analizo državne pomoči, ki so jo prejeli proizvajalci energije, uporabiti metodologijo za nasedle stroške.
On the basis of the documents in its possession at the time, the Commission had doubts as to the PPAs' compatibility with the criteria set out in the Stranded Costs Methodology.
Komisija je imela na podlagi dokumentov, ki so ji bili takrat na voljo, pomisleke o združljivosti pogodb PNE z merili, določenimi v metodologiji za nasedle stroške.
First, the Commission had doubts that the very rules governing a PPA which foreclosed a significant part of the market could be deemed compatible with the fundamental objectives of the Stranded Costs Methodology, i.e. to increase the pace of liberalisation of the sector by granting adequate compensation to incumbents facing unfair competition.
Prvič, Komisija je imela pomisleke o tem, da bi lahko sama pravila, ki urejajo pogodbe PNE in izključujejo precejšen del trga, štela za skladna z osnovnimi cilji metodologije za nasedle stroške, in sicer s pospeševanjem liberalizacije sektorja, tako da se dodeli ustrezno nadomestilo prvotnim družbam, ki se spopadajo z nepošteno konkurenco.
Second, the Commission doubted that the aid element included in PPAs would be compatible with the detailed criteria of the Stranded Costs Methodology as regards the calculation of eligible stranded costs and the attribution of adequate compensation.
Drugič, Komisija je podvomila, da je element pomoči, vključen v pogodbe PNE, skladen s podrobnimi merili metodologije za nasedle stroške, kar zadeva izračun upravičenih nasedlih stroškov in dodelitev ustreznega nadomestila.
Compensation in the event of early termination of PPAs
Nadomestilo ob predčasnem prenehanju pogodb PNE
In the decision to initiate the procedure the Commission used the same reasoning as the one explained above to determine whether the PPAs contained aid elements.
Komisija je v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka uporabila enake argumente, kot so navedeni zgoraj, da bi ugotovila, ali pogodbe PNE vsebujejo elemente pomoči.
It subsequently concluded, on a provisional basis, that aid elements were also present in cases of compensation for the early termination of PPAs.
Nato je sprejela začasno ugotovitev, da gre za elemente pomoči tudi pri primerih nadomestila za predčasno prenehanje pogodb PNE.
The Commission then analysed the compatibility of the aid element of compensation with the criteria set out in the Stranded Costs Methodology.
Komisija je potem analizirala združljivost elementa pomoči v nadomestilu z merili, določenimi v metodologiji za nasedle stroške.
The Commission doubted that the compensation was compatible with the detailed criteria of the Stranded Costs Methodology as regards the calculation of eligible stranded costs and the awarding of adequate compensation.
Komisija je podvomila, da je nadomestilo skladno s podrobnimi merili metodologije za nasedle stroške, kar zadeva izračun upravičenih nasedlih stroškov in dodelitev ustreznega nadomestila.
Following the publication of the decision to initiate the procedure, and within the relevant deadline or, in a few cases, following a deadline extension requested by the interested parties, the Commission received comments from:
Po objavi odločitve o sprožitvi postopka in v ustreznem roku ali v nekaterih primerih po podaljšanju roka, ki so ga zahtevale zainteresirane strani, je Komisija prejela pripombe:
the following banking institutions that provided financing to the electricity generators: Dresdner Bank AG London Branch, Bank Pekao S.A., WestLB AG London Branch and WestLB AG (collectively referred to as ‘the Banks’);
naslednjih bančnih ustanov, ki so zagotovile financiranje proizvajalcem električne energije: Dresdner Bank AG London Branch, Bank Pekao S. A., West LB AG London Branch in WestLB AG (v nadaljnjem besedilu skupaj „banke“);
The comments submitted to the Commission by the parties are very similar, sometimes virtually identical.
Pripombe, ki so jih stranke predložile Komisiji, so si zelo podobne, včasih celo popolnoma enake.
For that reason, instead of describing the comments of each interested party separately, the Commission has grouped them into general categories (see below).
Zaradi tega je Komisija namesto ločenih opisov pripomb posameznih zainteresiranih strank pripombe razvrstila v splošne kategorije (glej spodaj).
Comments on the PPAs
Pripombe o pogodbah PNE
The interested parties argue that PPAs should not be regarded as ‘still applicable after accession’ within the meaning of Annex IV, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1(c) to the Accession Act.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da pogodb PNE ni mogoče obravnavati kot „še vedno veljavnih po pristopu“ v smislu pododstavka 1(c) odstavka 3 Priloge IV k Pristopnemu aktu.
The interested parties argue that measures that were established in accordance with the law prior to accession should not be reviewed by the Commission after accession.
Po trditvah zainteresiranih strank Komisija ukrepov, uvedenih v skladu z zakonodajo pred pristopom, ne bi smela presojati po pristopu.
This is in line with the general principle of non-retroactivity.
To je v skladu s splošnim načelom neveljavnosti za nazaj.
The Community state aid rules were not supposed to apply until accession.
Pravila Skupnosti o državni pomoči naj se ne bi uporabljala do pristopa.
The interested parties refer to previous Commission decisions in which the Commission stated that aid systems which, in their view, were similar to the PPAs, did not apply after accession.
Zainteresirane stranke se sklicujejo na predhodne odločitve Komisije, v katerih je Komisija navedla, da sistemi pomoči, ki so po njihovem mnenju podobni pogodbam PNE, po pristopu niso veljavni.
In their opinion, any aid under PPAs would have been awarded prior to accession.
Po njihovem mnenju naj bi bile vse pomoči v okviru pogodb PNE dodeljene pred pristopom.
Annual payments would still have to be effected but should not be regarded as constituting new aid.
Letne zneske bo treba še izplačati, vendar pa se ne bi smeli obravnavati kot nova pomoč.
PPAs fixed the volume of electricity to be purchased by PSE and the purchase price for the electricity over the period in question.
V pogodbah PNE sta določeni količina električne energije, ki jo bo odkupil PSE, in odkupna cena električne energije za zadevno obdobje.
In the case of certain items at least, prices were calculated in such a way that they could not exceed a level previously agreed between the parties or fluctuations would be limited to a reasonable amount as compared to specified market prices, i.e. the most objective standard possible.
Vsaj za nekatere postavke so bile cene izračunane tako, da ne bi mogle preseči predhodno dogovorjene ravni med strankama ali pa bi bila nihanja omejena na primeren znesek v primerjavi z opredeljenimi tržnimi cenami, torej najbolj objektivnim standardom.
Actual prices were sometimes even lower, in particular because the Polish regulator kept indirect control over them.
Dejanske cene so bile včasih celo nižje, predvsem ker jih je posredno nadzoroval poljski regulativni organ.
As such, the state's maximum exposure was also clearly determined by the PPAs prior to accession.
Tako je bila največja izpostavljenost države tudi jasno določena v pogodbah PNE pred pristopom.
The interested parties argue that, even if one was to admit that the PPAs constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, this state aid should be regarded as existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Po trditvah zainteresiranih strank bi bilo treba, tudi če bi priznali, da so pogodbe PNE državna pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, to državno pomoč obravnavati kot obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 1(b) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999.
The interested parties take the view that a decision determining whether aid awarded prior to accession and continued after accession should be regarded as ‘new aid’ or ‘existing aid’ should not be based solely on Annex IV to the Accession Act.
Zainteresirane stranke menijo, da odločitev o obravnavanju pomoči, ki je dodeljena pred pristopom in se nadaljuje po pristopu, kot „nove pomoči“ ali „obstoječe pomoči“, ne bi smela temeljiti izključno na Prilogi IV k Pristopnemu aktu.
According to the interested parties, if such aid does not qualify as existing aid under Annex IV of the Accession Act, it should still be examined in the light of Article 1(b)(ii) to (v) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Po mnenju zainteresiranih strank bi bilo treba to pomoč, če ne šteje za obstoječo pomoč v skladu s Prilogo IV k Pristopnemu aktu, vseeno obravnavati ob upoštevanju člena 1(b)(ii) do (v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999.
The interested parties argue that Article 1(b)(v) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 applies to the PPAs, and that therefore the PPAs constitute ‘existing aid’.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da se člen 1(b)(v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 uporablja za pogodbe PNE in da so torej pogodbe PNE „obstoječa pomoč“.
The interested parties go on to state that the last sentence of Article 1(b)(v) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 does not apply to the PPAs for three reasons.
Zainteresirane stranke še trdijo, da se zadnji stavek člena 1(b)(v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 za pogodbe PNE ne uporablja zaradi treh razlogov.
First, in the Alzetta Mauro judgment, the Court ruled that aid that existed in a certain market which was initially closed to competition before its liberalisation is to be regarded as existing aid from the time of liberalisation.
Prvič, Sodišče je v sodbi Alzetta Mauro odločilo, da je treba pomoč, ki je obstajala na nekem trgu, najprej zaprtem za konkurenco, pred njegovo liberalizacijo, obravnavati kot obstoječo pomoč od liberalizacije.
According to the interested parties, this judgment is based directly on an interpretation of Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty, and therefore takes precedence over Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da ta sodba temelji neposredno na razlagi člena 88(1) Pogodbe ES in ima torej prednost pred Uredbo (ES) št. 659/1999.
Second, in any event, given that Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 had not yet entered into force when the electricity market was liberalised under Directive 96/92/EC or when the PPAs were signed, the rules as set out in the Alzetta Mauro judgment applied, not Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Drugič, ker Uredba (ES) št. 659/1999 še ni začela veljati, ko je bil trg električne energije liberaliziran v skladu z Direktivo 96/92/ES ali ko so bile podpisane pogodbe PNE, se v vsakem primeru uporabljajo pravila, določena v sodbi Alzetta Mauro, in ne Uredba (ES) št. 659/1999.
Third, a comparison of the wording of the different categories in Article 1(b) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 leads to the conclusion that Article 1(b)(v) applies only to state aid schemes, since individual aid was not explicitly mentioned.
Tretjič, iz primerjave besedila o različnih kategorijah v členu 1(b) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 je mogoče sklepati, da se člen 1(b)(v) uporablja samo za programe državne pomoči, ker individualna pomoč ni izrecno navedena.
In support of this contention, the interested parties also point to the fact that the PPAs were private-law agreements as opposed to state measures.
V podporo tej trditvi zainteresirane stranke opozarjajo tudi na dejstvo, da so pogodbe PNE pogodbe zasebnega prava v nasprotju z državnimi ukrepi.
According to the interested parties, it would be a perverse outcome if a contract legally and validly concluded before Poland's accession to the EU and liberalisation were to become illegal after accession.
Po mnenju zainteresiranih strank bi bilo sprevrženo, če bi pogodba, ki je bila zakonito in veljavno sklenjena pred pristopom Poljske k EU in liberalizacijo, postala po pristopu nezakonita.
The interested parties take the view that this would be an expansive and retroactive interpretation of the EC Treaty state aid rules which is incompatible with the internationally recognised principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations.
Zainteresirane stranke so menile, da bi šlo pri tem za široko in retroaktivno razlago pravil Pogodbe ES glede državne pomoči, ki ni skladna z mednarodno priznanimi načeli pravne gotovosti in upravičenih pričakovanj.
Imputability of measures to the state
Pripisovanje ukrepov državi
The following comments were submitted by the Banks.
Banke so predložile naslednje pripombe.
The Banks argue that the measure cannot be imputed to the State, but to PSE.
Banke trdijo, da ukrepov ni mogoče pripisati državi, ampak PSE.
Bearing in mind the state of the Polish electricity sector when the PPAs were signed, PSE's only option was to conclude long-term contracts.
Glede na stanje poljskega sektorja električne energije ob podpisu pogodb PNE je bila edina možnost, ki jo je imel PSE, sklenitev dolgoročnih pogodb.
This would also have been the case if PSE had been a privately-owned market operator.
Tako bi bilo tudi, če bi bil PSE udeleženec na trgu v zasebni lasti.
It was therefore in the interest of both the state and the parties to the agreements for the PPAs to be concluded, rather than a case of the state imposing a policy decision on PSE.
Zato je bila sklenitev PPE v interesu države in pogodbenih strank, ne pa odločitev v zvezi s politiko, ki bi jo država naložila PSE.
Most of the interested parties argue that the PPAs do not confer any economic advantage.
Večina zainteresiranih strank trdi, da pogodbe PNE ne prinašajo nikakršne gospodarske prednosti.
The interested parties criticise the Commission's preliminary finding that the prices established under the PPAs are higher than wholesale market prices.
Zainteresirane stranke kritizirajo predhodno ugotovitev Komisije, da so cene, določene v okviru pogodb PNE, višje od cen na trgu na debelo.
According to the interested parties, the Commission did not make it clear in the decision to initiate the procedure which market and which prices the decision referred to.
Po mnenju zainteresiranih strank Komisija v odločitvi v sprožitvi postopka ni jasno navedla, na kateri trg in katere cene se nanaša ta odločitev.
In particular, the Polish Power Exchange was not opened until December 1999, by which time many PPAs had already been concluded.
Predvsem se je poljska borza električne energije odprla šele decembra 1999, ko so bile številne pogodbe PNE že sklenjene.
In the opinion of the interested parties, the interconnectors between Poland and other countries were congested at the time.
Zainteresirane stranke menijo, da so bili povezovalni daljnovodi med Poljsko in drugimi državami v tistem obdobju prezasedeni.
The Commission wrongly referred to a price recorded in Greece in 2003, i.e. in a totally different geographical and temporal context.
Komisija se je napačno sklicevala na ceno, zapisano za Grčijo leta 2003, torej v popolnoma drugačnem geografskem in časovnem okviru.
Energy sold under PPAs cannot be compared with energy sold outside PPAs, even in Poland.
Energije, prodane v okviru pogodb PNE, ni mogoče primerjati z energijo, prodano zunaj pogodb PNE, niti na Poljskem.
The former respect modern environmental standards, while the latter is produced by less environmentally friendly units, which ‘dump’ their surplus capacity at marginal costs, under various mechanisms, none of which ensures prices that cover both fixed and variable costs.
Pri prvi se upoštevajo sodobni okoljski standardi, medtem ko drugo proizvajajo okolju manj prijazni proizvajalci, ki „dampinško prodajajo“ svoje presežne zmogljivosti po mejnih stroških v okviru različnih mehanizmov, od katerih nobeden ne zagotavlja cen, ki bi krile stalne in spremenljive stroške.
Power generators operating outside PPAs were also subsidised and were not required to modernise their equipment, unlike power generators under the PPAs.
Proizvajalci energije, ki delujejo zunaj pogodb PNE, so bili tudi subvencionirani in ni jim bilo treba posodobiti opreme za razliko od proizvajalcev energije v okviru pogodb PNE.
They were in any event not able to produce enough electricity to cover total demand in Poland, in particular in 1997-1998.
Vsekakor niso bili sposobni proizvesti dovolj električne energije, da bi zadovoljili celotno povpraševanje na Poljskem, predvsem v obdobju 1997–1998.
According to the interested parties, PPAs should be analysed in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time when they were concluded, i.e. a centralised, regulated electricity system with a single customer, rather than a liberalised system with a wholesale market.
Po mnenju zainteresiranih strank bi bilo treba pogodbe PNE analizirati glede na prevladujoče okoliščine, takrat ko so bile sklenjene, torej centraliziran, reguliran elektroenergetski sistem z enim odjemalcem in ne liberaliziran sistem s trgom na debelo.
PPAs were the only way to secure investments which met the requirements for the electricity sector in Poland (in particular, modernisation of the whole system, environmental protection and security of supply).
Pogodbe PNE so bile edini način za zavarovanje naložb, ki je izpolnjeval zahteve za sektor električne energije na Poljskem (in sicer posodobitev celotnega sistema, varstvo okolja in zanesljivost oskrbe).
The Banks required PPAs to serve as collateral for their loans.
Banke so zahtevale pogodbe PNE kot zavarovanje za svoja posojila.
Applying the private investor principle meant taking account of these requirements, and the only way of meeting them was PPAs.
Uporaba načela zasebnega vlagatelja je pomenila, da je treba upoštevati te zahteve, in edini način za njihovo izpolnitev so bile pogodbe PNE.
The interested parties note that PPAs impose investment and availability obligations on power generators.
Zainteresirane stranke opozarjajo, da pogodbe PNE nalagajo proizvajalcem energije obveznosti glede vlaganja in razpoložljivosti.
The interested parties argue that PSE's behaviour in signing PPAs should not be analysed in terms of whether it achieved short-term profits but whether it ensured the profitability of long-term investments and — from a network operator's perspective — whether it ensured stable security of supply and discharged its general public service duties.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da ravnanja PSE ob podpisu pogodb PNE ne bi smeli analizirati glede na to, ali je s tem dosegel kratkoročni dobiček, ampak glede na to, ali je zagotovil donosnost dolgoročnih naložb ter – s stališča upravljavca omrežja – ali je zagotovil stabilno zanesljivost oskrbe in izpolnil svoje naloge glede opravljanja javnih storitev.
The interested parties state that the PPAs were concluded by way of a transparent and open tender procedure, which was conducted in a non-discriminatory way and led to the lowest possible price.
Zainteresirane stranke navajajo, da so bile pogodbe PNE sklenjene na podlagi preglednega in javnega razpisnega postopka, ki je bil opravljen nediskriminacijsko in je omogočil najnižjo možno ceno.
According to the interested parties, it follows from Court of Justice case-law that this is in itself sufficient for the granting of an economic advantage to be ruled out.
Po mnenju zainteresiranih strank iz sodne prakse Sodišča sledi, da to že samo po sebi zadošča, da se ovrže dodelitev gospodarske prednosti.