natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Those instruments allow credit institutions to achieve a diversified capital structure and to access a wide range of financial investors.
Ti instrumenti kreditnim institucijam omogočajo doseči raznovrstno strukturo kapitala in dostop do veliko različnih finančnih vlagateljev.
On 28 October 1998, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision adopted an agreement on both the eligibility criteria and limits to inclusion of certain types of hybrid capital instruments in original own funds of credit institutions.
Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor je 28. oktobra 1998 sprejel sporazum o merilih primernosti in omejitvah za vključitev nekaterih vrst hibridnih instrumentov kapitala v temeljna lastna sredstva kreditnih institucij.
It is therefore important to lay down criteria for those capital instruments to be eligible for original own funds of credit institutions and to align the provisions in Directive 2006/48/EC to that agreement.
Zato je pomembno, da se za te hibridne instrumente kapitala določijo merila, na podlagi katerih so primerni za vključitev v temeljna lastna sredstva kreditnih institucij, in da se določbe Direktive 2006/48/ES uskladijo z navedenim sporazumom.
The amendments to Annex XII to Directive 2006/48/EC result directly from the establishment of those criteria.
Spremembe Priloge XII k Direktivi 2006/48/ES izhajajo neposredno iz določitve navedenih meril.
Original own funds referred to in Article 57(a) of Directive 2006/48/EC should include all instruments that are regarded under national law as equity capital, rank pari passu with ordinary shares during liquidation and fully absorb losses on a going-concern basis pari passu with ordinary shares.
Temeljna lastna sredstva iz člena 57(a) Direktive 2006/48/ES bi morala zajemati vse instrumente, ki v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo veljajo za lastniški kapital, so enakovredni navadnim delnicam v likvidaciji in v celoti pokrivajo izgube v času rednega poslovanja enako kot navadne delnice.
It should be possible for those instruments to include instruments providing preferential rights for dividend payment on a non-cumulative basis, provided that they are included in Article 22 of Council Directive 86/635/EEC of 8 December 1986 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions [5], rank pari passu with ordinary shares during liquidation and fully absorb losses on a going-concern basis pari passu with ordinary shares.
Možno je, da ti instrumenti vključujejo instrumente, ki zagotavljajo prednostne pravice za izplačila dividend na nekumulativni podlagi, če so zajeti v členu 22 Direktive Sveta 86/635/EGS z dne 8. decembra 1986 o letnih računovodskih izkazih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih bank in drugih finančnih institucij [5], so enakovredni navadnim delnicam v likvidaciji in v celoti pokrivajo izgube v času rednega poslovanja kot navadne delnice.
Original own funds referred to in Article 57(a) of Directive 2006/48/EC should also include any other instrument under a credit institution’s statutory terms taking into account the specific constitution of mutuals, cooperative societies and similar institutions and which are deemed equivalent to ordinary shares in terms of their capital qualities in particular as regards loss absorption.
Temeljna lastna sredstva iz člena 57(a) Direktive 2006/48/ES bi morala vključevati tudi vse druge instrumente kreditnih institucij, ki so skladni z določbami njihovega statuta, pri čemer se upošteva posebni status vzajemnih družb, zadrug in podobnih institucij, in ki so enaki navadnim delnicam v smislu kvalitete kapitala, zlasti glede pokrivanja izgub.
Instruments that do not rank pari passu with ordinary shares during liquidation or which do not absorb losses on a going-concern basis pari passu with ordinary shares should be included in the category of hybrids referred to in Article 57(ca) of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Instrumenti, ki niso enaki navadnim delnicam v likvidaciji ali ne pokrivajo izgub v času rednega poslovanja enako kot navadne delnice, bi morali biti vključeni v skupino hibridov iz člena 57(ca) Direktive 2006/48/ES.
In order to avoid disruption of markets and to ensure continuity in overall levels of own funds it is appropriate to provide for specific transitional arrangements for the new regime on capital instruments.
Da bi se izognili motnjam trga in zagotovili kontinuiteto splošnih ravni lastnih sredstev, je primerno predvideti posebne prehodne ureditve za nov režim o instrumentih kapitala.
Once recovery is assured, the quality of original own funds should be further enhanced.
Ko bo zagotovljeno okrevanje, bi bilo treba nadalje okrepiti kakovost temeljnih lastnih sredstev.
In this regard, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and the Council together with any appropriate proposals by 31 December 2011.
Komisija bi morala v zvezi s tem Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu poročati skupaj z ustreznimi predlogi najpozneje do 31. decembra 2011.
For the purpose of strengthening the crisis management framework of the Community, it is essential that competent authorities coordinate their actions with other competent authorities and, where appropriate, with central banks in an efficient way, including with the aim of mitigating systemic risk.
Za okrepitev okvira kriznega upravljanja Skupnosti je bistveno, da pristojni organi učinkovito usklajujejo svoje ukrepe z drugimi pristojnimi organi in po potrebi s centralnimi bankami, med drugim s ciljem zmanjševanja sistemskega tveganja.
In order to strengthen the efficiency of the prudential supervision of a banking group on a consolidated basis, supervisory activities should be coordinated in a more effective manner.
Zaradi krepitve učinkovitosti bonitetnega nadzora bančne skupine na konsolidirani osnovi bi bilo treba nadzorniške dejavnosti bolj učinkovito usklajevati.
Colleges of Supervisors should therefore be established.
Zato bi bilo treba ustanoviti kolegije nadzornikov.
The establishment of Colleges of Supervisors should not affect the rights and responsibilities of the competent authorities under Directive 2006/48/EC.
Ustanovitev kolegijev nadzornikov ne bi smela vplivati na pravice in odgovornosti pristojnih organov iz Direktive 2006/48/ES.
Their establishment should be an instrument for stronger cooperation by means of which competent authorities reach agreement on key supervisory tasks.
Ustanovitev kolegijev nadzornikov bi morala biti instrument za močnejše sodelovanje, s katerim se pristojni organi sporazumejo o ključnih nadzornih nalogah.
The Colleges of Supervisors should facilitate the handling of ongoing supervision and emergency situations.
Kolegiji nadzornikov bi morali olajšati obravnavo nadzora, ki poteka, in izrednih razmer.
The consolidating supervisor should, in association with the other members of the college, be able to decide to organise meetings or activities that are not of general interest and should therefore be able to streamline the attendance as appropriate.
Konsolidacijski nadzornik bi moral imeti možnost, da se v povezavi z drugimi člani kolegija odloči, da bo organiziral srečanja ali delavnice, ki niso v splošnem interesu, ter tako po potrebi racionalizira prisotnost.
The mandates of competent authorities should take into account, in an appropriate way, the Community dimension.
Mandati pristojnih organov bi morali ustrezno upoštevati razsežnost Skupnosti.
Competent authorities should therefore duly consider the effect of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States concerned.
Pristojni organi bi zato morali ustrezno upoštevati učinek svojih odločitev na stabilnost finančnega sistema v vseh drugih zadevnih državah članicah.
Subject to national law, that principle should be understood as a broad objective for promoting financial stability across the European Union and should not legally bind competent authorities to achieve a specific result.
Odvisno od nacionalne zakonodaje bi se moralo to načelo obravnavati kot širši cilj za spodbujanje finančne stabilnosti v Evropski uniji in od pristojnih organov ne bi smelo zakonsko zahtevati, da dosežejo določen rezultat.
The competent authorities should be able to participate in colleges established for the supervision of credit institutions having their parent in a third country.
Pristojni organi bi morali imeti možnost sodelovati v kolegijih, ustanovljenih za nadzor kreditnih institucij z nadrejeno institucijo v tretji državi.
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors should, where necessary, provide for guidelines and recommendations in order to enhance the convergence of supervisory practices pursuant to Directive 2006/48/EC.
Odbor evropskih bančnih nadzornikov bi moral po potrebi zagotoviti smernice in priporočila, da se poveča konvergenca nadzornih praks v skladu z Direktivo 2006/48/ES.
In order to avoid inconsistencies and regulatory arbitrage, which could result from differences in the approaches and rules applied by the various colleges and the application of discretion by Member States, guidelines on the procedures and rules governing colleges should be developed by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors.
Da ne bi prihajalo do neskladij in regulativne arbitraže zaradi različnih pristopov in pravil, ki jih uporabljajo posamezni kolegiji, in zaradi lastnega preudarka države članice, bi moral Odbor evropskih bančnih nadzornikov pripraviti smernice za postopke in pravilnike za delovanje kolegijev.
Article 129(3) of Directive 2006/48/EC should not change the allocation of responsibilities between competent supervisory authorities on a consolidated, sub-consolidated and individual basis.
Člen 129(3) Direktive 2006/48/ES ne bi smel spreminjati razporeditve odgovornosti med pristojnimi nadzornimi organi na konsolidirani, podkonsolidirani in individualni osnovi.
Information deficits between the home and the host competent authorities may prove detrimental to the financial stability in host Member States.
Pomanjkanje informacij med matičnimi pristojnimi organi in pristojnimi organi gostitelji se lahko izkaže za škodljivo za finančno stabilnost v državah članicah gostiteljicah.
The information rights of host supervisors, in particular in a crisis involving significant branches, should therefore be reinforced.
Zato bi bilo treba okrepiti pravice nadzornikov gostiteljev glede informacij, zlasti v krizi pomembnih podružnic.
For that purpose, the notion of significant branches should be defined.
S tem namenom bi bilo treba opredeliti pojem pomembne podružnice.
The competent authorities should transmit information which is essential for the pursuance of the tasks of central banks and of Ministries of Finance with respect to financial crises and systemic risk mitigation.
Pristojni organi bi morali posredovati informacije, ki so bistvene za opravljanje nalog centralnih bank in ministrstev za finance glede finančnih kriz in zmanjševanja sistemskega tveganja.
The current supervisory arrangements should be subject to further developments.
Sedanjo nadzorno ureditev bi bilo treba nadalje razvijati.
Colleges of Supervisors are a further and important step forward in streamlining European Union’s supervisory cooperation and convergence.
Kolegiji nadzornikov so dodaten in pomemben korak naprej pri usklajevanju nadzornega sodelovanja in zbliževanja v Evropski uniji.
Cooperation between supervisory authorities, dealing with groups and holdings and their subsidiaries and branches, by means of colleges is a phase in a development towards further regulatory convergence and supervisory integration.
Sodelovanje nadzornih organov, ki obravnavajo skupine, holdinge, njihove hčerinske družbe in podružnice, v kolegijih je razvojna stopnja na poti k nadaljnjemu regulativnemu zbliževanju in nadzornemu povezovanju.
Trust between supervisors and respect for their respective responsibilities is essential.
Zaupanje med nadzorniki in spoštovanje njihovih odgovornosti je bistvenega pomena.
In the event of a conflict between members of a college linked to those different responsibilities, neutral and independent advice, mediation and conflict-resolving mechanisms at Community level are essential.
V primeru spora med člani kolegija glede teh različnih odgovornosti so bistvenega pomena nepristranski in neodvisen nasvet ter mehanizmi za mediacijo in reševanje sporov na ravni Skupnosti.
The crisis in international financial markets has demonstrated that it is appropriate to examine further the need for reform of the regulatory and supervisory model of the European Union’s financial sector.
Kriza na mednarodnih finančnih trgih je dokazala, da je primerno nadalje preučiti potrebo po reformi regulativnega in nadzornega modela finančnega sektorja Evropske unije.
The Commission announced in its Communication of 29 October 2008 entitled ‘From financial crisis to recovery: A European framework for action’, that it had set up a group of experts, chaired by Mr Jacques de Larosière (the de Larosière Group), to consider the organisation of European financial institutions to ensure prudential soundness, the orderly functioning of markets and stronger European cooperation on financial stability oversight, early warning mechanisms and crisis management, including the management of cross-border and cross-sectoral risks, and also to look at cooperation between the European Union and other major jurisdictions to help safeguard financial stability at the global level.
Komisija je v svojem sporočilu z dne 29. oktobra 2008 z naslovom „Od finančne krize do okrevanja gospodarstva: evropski okvir za ukrepanje“ objavila, da je ustanovila skupino strokovnjakov, ki ji predseduje Jacques de Larosière (skupina de Larosière) in ki naj bi preučila organizacijo evropskih finančnih institucij, da se zagotovi skrbno in varno poslovanje, urejeno delovanje trgov, tesnejše evropsko sodelovanje pri nadzoru finančne stabilnosti, mehanizem za zgodnje opozarjanje in obvladovanje kriz, vključno z obvladovanjem čezmejnih in medsektorskih tveganj, preučila pa naj bi tudi sodelovanje med Evropsko unijo in drugimi večjimi pravnimi sistemi, da bi prispevali k ohranjanju finančne stabilnosti na svetovni ravni.
In order to achieve the necessary level of supervisory convergence and cooperation at the European Union level, and to underpin the stability of the financial system, further wide-ranging reforms of the regulatory and supervisory model of the European Union’s financial sector are highly needed and should be put forward swiftly by the Commission, with due consideration of the conclusions presented by the de Larosière Group on 25 February 2009.
Da bi dosegli ustrezno raven nadzornega zbliževanja in sodelovanja na ravni Evropske unije ter prispevali k stabilnosti finančnega sistema, so nujno potrebne nadaljnje obsežne reforme regulativnega in nadzornega modela finančnega sektorja Evropske unije, ki bi jih morala hitro pripraviti Komisija, pri tem pa ustrezno upoštevati sklepe, ki jih je 25. februarja 2009 predstavila skupina de Larosière.
By 31 December 2009, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and the Council and propose appropriate legislation needed to tackle the shortcomings identified regarding the provisions related to further supervisory integration, taking into account that a stronger role for a European Union level supervisory system should be achieved by 31 December 2011.
Komisija bi morala do 31. decembra 2009 poročati Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu ter predlagati ustrezno zakonodajo, ki je potrebna za odpravo pomanjkljivosti določb glede nadaljnjega povezovanja nadzornih organov, saj bi bilo treba močnejšo vlogo nadzornega sistema na ravni EU vzpostaviti do 31. decembra 2011.
Excessive concentration of exposures to a single client or group of connected clients may result in an unacceptable risk of loss.
Čezmerne koncentracije izpostavljenosti do posamezne osebe ali skupine povezanih oseb lahko povzročijo nesprejemljivo tveganje nastanka izgub.
Such a situation could be considered prejudicial to the solvency of a credit institution.
Za tako stanje velja, da lahko neugodno vpliva na solventnost kreditne institucije.
The monitoring and control of the large exposures of a credit institution should therefore be an integral part of its supervision.
Spremljanje in kontrola velikih izpostavljenosti kreditne institucije bi zato morala biti sestavni del nadzora kreditne institucije.
The current large exposures regime dates back to 1992.
Trenutni režim velike izpostavljenosti je iz leta 1992.
Therefore, the existing requirements on large exposures set out in Directive 2006/48/EC and in Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions [6] should be reviewed.
Zato bi bilo treba pregledati obstoječe zahteve o velikih izpostavljenostih iz Direktive 2006/48/ES in Direktive 2006/49/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o kapitalski ustreznosti investicijskih podjetij in kreditnih institucij [6].
Since credit institutions in the internal market are engaged in direct competition, the essential rules for the monitoring and control of the large exposures of credit institutions should be further harmonised.
Ker si kreditne institucije na notranjem trgu neposredno konkurirajo, bi bilo treba osnovna pravila za spremljanje in nadziranje velikih izpostavljenosti kreditnih institucij še bolj uskladiti.
In order to reduce the administrative burden on credit institutions, the number of options for Members States as far as large exposures are concerned should be reduced.
Zaradi zmanjšanja upravne obremenitve za kreditne institucije bi bilo treba zmanjšati število opcij, ki jih imajo države članice glede velikih izpostavljenosti.
In determining the existence of a group of connected clients and thus exposures constituting a single risk, it is also important to take into account risks arising from a common source of significant funding provided by the credit institution or investment firm itself, its financial group or its connected parties.
Pri določanju obstoja skupine povezanih oseb in s tem izpostavljenosti, ki predstavljajo eno samo tveganje, je pomembno upoštevati tudi tveganja, ki izhajajo iz pomembnega skupnega vira financiranja, ki ga zagotavlja kreditna institucija ali investicijsko podjetje samo, njena finančna skupina ali njene povezane osebe.
While it is desirable to base the calculation of the exposure value on that provided for the purposes of minimum own funds requirements, it is appropriate to adopt rules for the monitoring of large exposures without applying risk weightings or degrees of risk.
Medtem ko je zaželeno, da izračun vrednosti izpostavljenosti temelji na izračunu, predvidenem za namene zahtev po minimalnih lastnih sredstvih, je primerno sprejeti pravila za spremljanje velikih izpostavljenosti brez uporabe uteži ali stopnje tveganja.
Moreover, the credit risk mitigation techniques applied in the solvency regime were designed with the assumption of a well-diversified credit risk.
Poleg tega so bile tehnike za zmanjševanje kreditnega tveganja, ki se uporabljajo v režimu solventnosti, zasnovane ob predpostavki dobro razpršenega kreditnega tveganja.
In the case of large exposures dealing with single name concentration risk, credit risk is not well-diversified.
V primeru velikih izpostavljenosti, ki obravnavajo tveganje koncentracije za eno samo izpostavljenost (single name), kreditno tveganje ni razpršeno.
The effects of those techniques should therefore be subject to prudential safeguards.
Zato bi bilo treba za učinke teh tehnik uporabljati bonitetne zaščite.
In this context, it is necessary to provide for an effective recovery of credit protection for the purposes of large exposures.
V tej zvezi je treba zagotoviti učinkovito izterjavo kreditnega zavarovanja za namene velikih izpostavljenosti.
Since a loss arising from an exposure to a credit institution or an investment firm can be as severe as a loss from any other exposure, such exposures should be treated and reported in the same manner as any other exposures.
Ker je izguba, ki izhaja iz izpostavljenosti do kreditnih institucij ali investicijskih podjetij, lahko prav tako velika kot izguba zaradi drugih izpostavljenosti, bi bilo treba te izpostavljenosti obravnavati in o njih poročati kot o vseh drugih izpostavljenostih.
However, an alternative quantitative limit has been introduced to alleviate the disproportionate impact of such an approach on smaller institutions.
Da bi zmanjšali nesorazmeren učinek takšnega pristopa na majhne institucije, je bila predvidena alternativna količinska omejitev.
In addition, very short-term exposures related to money transmission including the execution of payment services, clearing, settlement and custody services to clients are exempt to facilitate the smooth functioning of financial markets and of the related infrastructure.
Poleg tega so zelo kratkoročne izpostavljenosti, ki se nanašajo na prenos denarja, vključno z izvrševanjem plačilnih storitev, obračunom, poravnavo in skrbništvom za stranke, izvzete, da se omogoči nemoteno delovanje finančnih trgov in z njimi povezanih infrastruktur.
Those services cover, for example, the execution of cash clearing and settlement and similar activities to facilitate settlement.
Te storitve zajemajo na primer izvajanje kliringa in poravnavo gotovinskih transakcij ter podobne dejavnosti, ki olajšujejo poravnave.
The related exposures include exposures which might not be foreseeable and are therefore not under the full control of a credit institution, inter alia, balances on inter-bank accounts resulting from client payments, including credited or debited fees and interest, and other payments for client services, as well as collateral given or received.
Te izpostavljenosti zajemajo izpostavljenosti, ki jih morda ni mogoče predvideti in jih zato kreditna institucija ne more v celoti nadzorovati, med drugim stanja na medbančnih računih, ki izhajajo iz plačil strank, vključno z v dobro ali v breme knjiženimi provizijami in obrestmi, ter iz drugih plačil za storitve za stranke, kot tudi danih ali prejetih zavarovanj.
The provisions related to external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) under Directive 2006/48/EC should be consistent with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies [7].
Določbe, ki se nanašajo na zunanje bonitetne institucije (ECAI) v okviru Direktive 2006/48/ES, bi morale biti v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o bonitetnih agencijah [7].
In particular, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors should review its guidelines on the recognition of ECAIs to avoid duplication of work and reduce the burden of the recognition process where an ECAI is registered as a credit rating agency (CRA) at Community level.
Predvsem bi moral Odbor evropskih bančnih nadzornikov pregledati svoje smernice za priznanje ECAI, da se bo mogoče izogniti podvajanju dela in zmanjšati breme procesa priznanja, kadar je ECAI registrirana kot agencija za ocenjevanje bonitet (CRA) na ravni Skupnosti.
It is important that the misalignment between the interest of firms that ‘re-package’ loans into tradable securities and other financial instruments (originators or sponsors) and firms that invest in these securities or instruments (investors) be removed.
Treba bi bilo tudi odpraviti neskladnosti med interesi družb, ki posojila preoblikujejo v vrednostne papirje, s katerimi se trguje, in druge finančne instrumente (originatorji ali sponzorji), ter družbami, ki vlagajo v te vrednostne papirje ali instrumente (vlagatelji).
It is also important that the interests of the originator or sponsor and the interests of investors be aligned.
Prav tako je pomembno, da so interesi originatorjev ali sponzorjev in interesi vlagateljev usklajeni.
To achieve this, the originator or sponsor should retain a significant interest in the underlying assets.
Da bi se to doseglo, bi morali originatorji ali sponzorji zadržati pomemben delež v osnovnem premoženju.
It is therefore important for the originators or the sponsors to retain exposure to the risk of the loans in question.
Zato je pomembno, da originatorji ali sponzorji obdržijo izpostavljenost tveganju zadevnih posojil.