natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to Article 87(1) of the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market.
V skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe je pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom, če prizadene trgovino med državami članicami.
The scheme under examination meets this definition, not only because it is financed from State resources (by granting excise duty exemptions, the State forgoes specific revenue that it could otherwise have collected), but also because it favours certain undertakings (undertakings in the agricultural sector and, within that sector, those practising glasshouse growing) and could affect trade or distort competition, given Italy’s position in the area of agricultural production in glasshouses (for example, in terms of the surface area of glasshouses given over to the production of fresh vegetables, in 2000 and 2003 Italy occupied second place among producer countries in the European Union; in 2000 and 2001 Italy was the largest vegetable producer in the European Union and, lastly, in the period to which the relevant procedures relate, Italy was the second largest European country in terms of the surface area given over to glasshouse growing).
Obravnavana shema ustreza tej definiciji, ne le, ker se financira iz državnih sredstev (s tem, ko država odobri oprostitve od plačila trošarin, se odpove določenim sredstvom, ki bi jih sicer lahko izterjala), temveč tudi, ker daje prednost posameznim podjetjem (podjetjem v kmetijstvu in v okviru tega podjetjem, ki se ukvarjajo s pridelavo v rastlinjakih) in lahko prizadene trgovino ter izkrivlja konkurenco zaradi položaja Italije pri pridelavi v rastlinjakih (v letih 2000 in 2003 je bila na primer Italija na drugem mestu med državami pridelovalkami v Uniji glede na površino rastlinjakov, namenjeno pridelavi svežih vrtnin; v letih 2000 in 2001 je bila Italija prva pridelovalka vrtnin v Uniji in končno, v obdobju, na katerega se nanašajo postopki, ki še niso končani, je bila Italija druga evropska država glede na površino, namenjeno pridelavi v rastlinjakih).
While the matter was being examined, the Italian authorities used a series of arguments to defend their position that the scheme did not contain elements of State aid:
Italijanski organi so med preučevanjem dokumentacije navedli več trditev v zagovor svojemu stališču, na podlagi katerega shema ne vsebuje oblik državne pomoči:
on the basis of the political agreement reached by the Council and the Commission at the Ecofin Council on 19 March 2003, derogations from a general [tax] system or differences within it that were justified by the nature or general characteristics of the tax system did not constitute State aid. Furthermore, in Italy the exemptions were consistent with the Italian tax system because they were applicable to all products grown in glasshouses and because the quantities of fuel exempted from excise duties were apportioned on the basis of the activity carried out,
na podlagi političnega dogovora, ki sta ga sprejela Svet in Komisija na zasedanju Sveta ECOFIN dne 19. marca 2003, odstopanja od [davčne] sheme ali spremembe v okviru te, ki jih upravičujejo narava ali splošne značilnosti davčne sheme, ne vključujejo državnih pomoči, poleg tega se oprostitve v Italiji izvajajo v smislu davčnega sistema, ker veljajo za vse pridelke v rastlinjakih in ker so količine goriva, ki so oproščene plačila trošarine, porazdeljene glede na vrsto dejavnosti,
on the basis of the estimates and data available, the scheme in question ‘was not detrimental to the proper functioning of the internal market and would not result in distortions of competition’ (see recitals 30 and 31),
obravnavana shema na podlagi ocen in razpoložljivih podatkov „ni škodljiva za pravilno delovanje notranjega trga in nima za posledico izkrivljanja konkurence“ (glej uvodni izjavi 30 in 31),
the exemptions were neither selective nor such as to distort competition.
oprostitve niso selektivne in ne izkrivljajo konkurence.
It must first of all be stressed that no political agreement can change the concept of aid as defined objectively in the Treaty.
Treba je zlasti poudariti, da noben politični dogovor ne more spremeniti koncepta pomoči, ki je objektivno opredeljen v Pogodbi.
As for the argument that the exemptions are justified by the nature or general characteristics of the tax system, the Commission takes the view that specific excise duty exemptions limited to a given type of production (in the present case, glasshouse growing, which received higher exemptions than growing outdoors) cannot be justified by the nature and logic of the tax system when Community law requires, in principle, the Member States to impose excise duties [10].
Kar zadeva utemeljitev, na podlagi katere naj bi bile oprostitve upravičene zaradi narave ali splošnih značilnosti davčnega sistema, Komisija meni, da posebne oprostitve plačila trošarin, omejene na določene pridelke (v danem primeru so bili pridelki v rastlinjakih upravičeni do večjih oprostitev v primerjavi s pridelki na prostem), ne morejo biti upravičene zaradi narave in logike davčnega sistema, ko pravo Skupnosti od držav članic načeloma zahteva, da morajo nalagati trošarinske stopnje [10].
The same consideration applies when Community law does not provide for the exemptions in question to be granted.
Enaka utemeljitev velja, kadar pravo Skupnosti ne predpisuje odobritve takih oprostitev.
The argument that the exemptions are valid for all products grown in glasshouses is not relevant in this case, since entire branches of the agricultural production sector received lower exemptions than those granted to glasshouse growers and if, as the Italian authorities assert, the quantities of exempted fuel were apportioned on the basis of the activity carried out, the logic of the tax system would have required the exemption to be the same for all activities based on the use of diesel.
Utemeljitev, na podlagi katere oprostitve veljajo za vse pridelke v rastlinjakih, v danem primeru ni primerna, saj so bile celotne kmetijske panoge upravičene do nižjih oprostitev od tistih, ki so bile odobrene pridelovalcem v rastlinjakih, in če se oproščene količine goriva razdelijo na podlagi dejavnosti, je logika davčnega sistema po trditvah italijanskih organov narekovala, da bi morala biti oprostitev enaka za vse dejavnosti, ki temeljijo na uporabi plinskega olja.
The issue of selectivity has already been examined in recital 58 above.
Vprašanje selektivnosti je bilo obravnavano že v uvodni izjavi 58 te obrazložitve.
As regards the judgment in Case T-233/04, the Commission notes, in the light of recitals 25 and 26 above, that, while it is true that operators in the agricultural sector who use diesel have been able to enjoy exemptions, glasshouse growers have nevertheless received higher exemptions.
Kar zadeva sklicevanje na sodbo v zadevi T 233-04 ter ob upoštevanju uvodnih izjav 25 in 26 Komisija ugotavlja, da so, če so pridelovalci, ki uporabljajo plinsko olje v kmetijstvu, res bili oproščeni plačila davka, lahko pridelovalci v rastlinjakih vendarle uživali precej večje oprostitve.
All operators are in a comparable financial situation, since they use diesel for production and are therefore affected to the same degree by the objective of the measure (alleviation of the effects of the increase in oil prices), regardless of their legal status.
Vsi pridelovalci so bili dejansko v enakem položaju, ker so pri pridelavi uporabljali plinsko olje in so bili zato enako zajeti v cilju ukrepa (zmanjšanje vplivov rasti cen naftnih proizvodov) ne glede na svoj pravni status.
The fact that, in a comparable situation, some operators have been able to enjoy higher exemptions than others demonstrates that the scheme includes an element of selectivity.
Dejstvo, da so v enakem položaju nekateri uživali večje oprostitve od drugih, dokazuje, da shema vsebuje element selektivnosti.
The Commission rejects the Italian authorities’ arguments that the scheme dues not jeopardise the proper functioning of the internal market and does not result in distortions of competition:
Komisija zavrača trditve italijanskih organov, kar zadeva utemeljitev, da shema ni škodljiva za pravilno delovanje trga in ne povzroča izkrivljanja konkurence. Dejansko:
In any event, it is sufficient that aid strengthens the competitive position of an undertaking as compared to that of other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade for it to be likely to result in distortions of competition and affect intra-Community trade [11].
V vsakem primeru je dovolj, da pomoč okrepi konkurenčni položaj podjetja v primerjavi z drugimi konkurenčnimi podjetji v trgovinski dejavnosti v Skupnosti, da ta pomoč povzroča izkrivljanje konkurence in vpliva na trgovanje v Skupnosti [11].
This is true in the matter under examination, since the exemption favours Italian undertakings growing agricultural products in glasshouses over undertakings operating in the same sector in the other Member States.(65) The Italian authorities also asserted, in reply to the initial opening of the procedure, that the aid in question did not constitute State aid but that it should be examined in the light of the provisions of Directives 92/81/EEC and 2003/96/EC.
To se dogaja tudi v obravnavanem primeru, saj odobrena oprostitev daje prednost italijanskim podjetjem, ki se ukvarjajo s kmetijsko pridelavo v rastlinjakih, v primerjavi s podjetji v istem sektorju v drugih državah članicah.(65) Italijanski organi so v odgovoru na začetek prvega postopka trdili še, da omenjene pomoči niso državne pomoči, temveč jih je treba obravnavati na podlagi določb direktiv 92/81/EGS in 2003/96/ES.
They reached this conclusion on the basis of the argument that the existence of State aid would be ruled out by the simple fact that an EU Directive establishes the possibility of granting tax exemptions.
To so ugotovili na podlagi trditve, da je državna pomoč izključena iz preprostega razloga, ker neka evropska direktiva predvideva možnost, da se odobri oprostitev davkov.
This argument was reiterated in the reply to the information injunction sent to them.
Ta trditev je bila poudarjena v odgovoru na odredbo o predložitvi podatkov, ki jim je bila poslana.
The Commission cannot agree with this argument.
Komisija se ne more strinjati s to trditvijo.
Indeed, the sixth recital to Directive 92/81/EEC permits the Member States ‘to apply on an optional basis […] other exemptions […], where this does not give rise to distortions of competition’.
V Direktivi 92/81/EGS je v šesti uvodni izjavi res pojasnjeno, da je državam članicam primerno dovoliti, da (...) lahko po svoji izbiri uporabijo druge oprostitve […], če to ne povzroči izkrivljanja konkurence.
Furthermore, Article 8(2) of that Directive provides that the Member States may apply total or partial exemptions or reductions ‘without prejudice to other Community provisions’.
Člen 8(2) iste direktive poleg tega določa, da lahko države članice uporabijo popolne ali delne oprostitve „brez poseganja v druge določbe Skupnosti“.
By referring to the existence of a risk of distortions of competition, Directive 92/81/EEC does not rule out the possibility of exemptions constituting State aid.
Ob sklicevanju na tveganje glede izkrivljanja konkurence Direktiva 92/81/EGS ne izključuje možnosti, da so oprostitve lahko državne pomoči.
It is worth recalling that the Commission’ powers concerning State aid are conferred directly by Treaty and that such powers cannot be restricted by a Directive whose purpose is to harmonise a tax at European level.
Omeniti je treba, da so pristojnosti v zvezi z državnimi pomočmi Komisiji dodeljene neposredno po Pogodbi in da te pristojnosti ne morejo biti omejene z direktivo, katere namen je uskladitev davkov na evropski ravni.
In addition, Recitals 15 and 24 of the preamble to Directive 2003/96/EC state that measures aimed at establishing differentiated national rates of taxation must be in line with the rules governing the internal market and competition, so as not to result in distortions of competition.
Poleg tega je v 15. in 24. uvodni izjavi Direktive 2003/96/ES navedeno, da morajo biti ukrepi za uporabo diferenciranih nacionalnih davčnih stopenj v skladu s predpisi notranjega trga in konkurence, da ne pride do izkrivljanja konkurence.
The requirement to apply the rules on competition is confirmed by Article 26 of that Directive, which draws attention to the fact that the measures in question may constitute State aid and, in such cases, must be notified pursuant to Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
Obvezno uporabo pravil o konkurenci potrjuje tudi člen 26 iste direktive, ki opozarja, da zadevni ukrepi lahko pomenijo državno pomoč in jih je v teh primerih treba sporočiti Komisiji na podlagi člena 88(3) Pogodbe ES.
That Article expressly states that information provided to the Commission on the basis of that Directive does not free Member States from the notification obligation pursuant to Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
Zgoraj navedeni člen izrecno določa, da informacije, ki se sporočijo Komisiji na podlagi te direktive, držav članic ne razbremenjujejo obveznosti uradnega obveščanja iz člena 88(3) Pogodbe.
Lastly, the Italian authorities themselves asserted (see recital 39 above) that applying exemptions distorted competition, a characteristic element of State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Nenazadnje italijanski organi trdijo (glej uvodno izjavo 39 te obrazložitve), da uporaba oprostitev izkrivlja konkurenco, kar je značilen element državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe.
In view of all these considerations, the Commission concludes that the excise duty exemptions applied under the scheme in question constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Z upoštevanjem vseh teh ugotovitev Komisija ugotavlja, da oprostitve plačila trošarin, ki se uporabljajo v okviru obravnavane sheme, pomenijo državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe.
However, in the cases provided for in Article 87(2) and (3) of the Treaty, such measures may, by derogation, be considered compatible with the common market.
Kljub temu so v primerih, navedenih v členu 87(2) in (3) Pogodbe, nekateri ukrepi izjemoma združljivi s skupnim trgom.
The derogations under Article 87(2) of the Treaty concern aid of a social character granted to individual consumers, aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences and aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany and do not apply in this case, regardless of the beneficiaries of the scheme.
Odstopanja, navedena v členu 87(2) Pogodbe o socialni pomoči, dodeljeni posameznim potrošnikom, pomoči za povrnitev škode, ki so jo povzročile naravne nesreče ali izjemni dogodki, in pomoči, dodeljeni gospodarstvu nekaterih območij Zvezne republike Nemčije, se ne uporabljajo v danem primeru, ne glede na upravičence sheme.
The Commission is of the view that the derogations under Article 87(3)(a) of the Treaty concerning the development of specific regions do not apply to the scheme in question, since this scheme does not involve aid to promote the economic development of specific regions where the standard of living is abnormally low or in which there is serious underemployment.
Komisija meni, da se odstopanja, predvidena v členu 87(3)(a) Pogodbe glede razvoja nekaterih območij, ne uporabljajo za obravnavano shemo, ker ta ne vsebuje pomoči za pospeševanje gospodarskega razvoja območij, kjer je življenjska raven izjemno nizka ali je podzaposlenost velika.
As for the derogation under Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty, it is sufficient to note that the tax scheme in question is not an important project of common European interest and does not seek to remedy a serious disturbance in the Italian economy.
Kar zadeva odstopanje od člena 87(3)(b) Pogodbe, zadostuje ugotovitev, da obravnavana davčna shema ni pomemben projekt skupnega evropskega interesa in ni namenjena za odpravljanje resne motnje v italijanskem gospodarstvu.
Nor does it seek to promote culture and heritage conservation within the meaning of the derogation under Article 87(3)(d) of the Treaty.
Poleg tega pomoč ni namenjena niti za pospeševanje kulture in ohranjanje kulturne dediščine v smislu odstopanja na podlagi člena 87(3)(d) Pogodbe.
Accordingly, the only derogation that may be invoked is that laid down in Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty, according to which aid may be considered compatible with the common market if it is intended to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, provided that it does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Posledično je edino odstopanje, na katero se je mogoče sklicevati, tisto iz člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe, na podlagi katerega se za združljivo s skupnim trgom lahko šteje pomoč za pospeševanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih dejavnosti ali določenih gospodarskih območij, kadar takšna pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
Since the aid under the scheme in question is non-notified aid, its compatibility with the common market must be analysed in the light of the State aid rules in force when it was granted, as laid down in the Commission notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid [12].
Glede na to, da pomoči iz obravnavane sheme niso priglašene, je treba njihovo združljivost s skupnim trgom analizirati ob upoštevanju pravil o državni pomoči, ki so veljala v času njene odobritve, kot je navedeno v Sporočilu Komisije o določitvi pravil, ki se uporabljajo za oceno nezakonite državne pomoči [12].
While it is true that recital 172 of the new Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007 to 2013 [13] deems some unlawful aid granted after the entry into force of Directive 2003/96/EC to be compatible with the common market, this applies only where the conditions of that Directive have been complied with and there has been no differentiation within the agricultural sector.
Če drži, da so na podlagi uvodne izjave 172 novih Smernic Skupnosti o državni pomoči v kmetijskem in gozdarskem sektorju 2007–2013 [13], v smislu člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe, s skupnim trgom združljive nekatere nezakonite državne pomoči, odobrene od začetka veljavnosti Direktive 2003/96/ES, to velja le, če izpolnjujejo vse ustrezne določbe te direktive in če se v kmetijstvu ni uporabljala diferencirana obdavčitev.
The same applies to aid unlawfully granted on the basis of Directive 92/81/EEC.
Enako velja za nezakonite državne pomoči, odobrene na podlagi Direktive 92/81/EGS.
Article 1(1) of Directive 92/81/EEC provides that ‘Member States shall impose a harmonized excise duty on mineral oils in accordance with this Directive’.
V skladu s členom 1(1) Direktive 92/81/EGS „države članice uvedejo usklajeno trošarino od mineralnih olj v skladu s to direktivo“.
Article 1(2) states that the Member States are to fix their rates in accordance with Council Directive 92/82/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of the rates of excise duty on mineral oils [14].
V drugem odstavku istega člena je navedeno, da države članice določijo svoje stopnje v skladu z Direktivo Sveta 92/82/EGS z dne 19. oktobra 1992 o približevanju trošarinskih stopenj za mineralna olja [14].
Article 5(2) of Directive 92/82/EEC provides for excise duty on gas oil (diesel) of ECU 18 per 1000 litres for gas oil used for stationary motors, plant and machinery used in construction, civil engineering or public works or vehicles intended for use off the road network or which have not been granted authorisation for use mainly on the public road network.
V členu 5(2) Direktive 92/82/EGS je določena trošarina za plinsko olje 18 ekujev na 1000 litrov, če se plinsko olje uporablja za statične delovne stroje, za opremo in stroje v gradbeništvu, za nizke gradnje in za javna dela ali za vozila, ki niso namenjena uporabi na javnih cestah ali ki nimajo dovoljenja za pretežno uporabo na javnih cestah.
Article 2(2) of Directive 92/81/EEC states that ‘mineral oils other than those for which a level of duty is specified in the rates Directive 92/82/EEC shall be subject to excise duty if intended for use, offered for sale or used as heating fuel or motor fuel. The rate of duty to be charged shall be fixed, according to use, at the rate for the equivalent heating fuel or motor fuel’. (The EUR 13 indicated by the Italian authorities (see recital 43 above) is the duty applicable to the equivalent heating fuel or motor fuel, i.e. the duty for heavy oil set at EUR 13 per 1000 kg in Article 6 of the latter Directive.)
V členu 2(2) Direktive 92/81/EGS je navedeno, da so „mineralna olja, razen tistih, za katera je višina trošarine določena v Direktivi 92/82/EGS o trošarinah, zavezana plačilu trošarine, če so namenjena uporabi, dana v prodajo ali uporabljena kot gorivo za ogrevanje ali pogonsko gorivo. Trošarinska stopnja se določi glede na uporabo, po stopnji enakovrednega goriva za ogrevanje ali za pogonsko gorivo“ (znesek 13 eurov, ki so ga navedli italijanski organi v skladu z zgoraj navedeno uvodno izjavo 43, je trošarina po stopnji enakovrednega goriva za ogrevanje ali za pogonsko gorivo oziroma z drugimi besedami trošarina za težko kurilno olje, ki na podlagi člena 6 iste direktive znaša 13 eurov za 1000 kg).
However, Article 8(2) of Directive 92/81/EEC provides that ‘without prejudice to other Community provisions, Member States may apply total or partial exemptions or reductions in the rate of duty to mineral oils used under fiscal control […] exclusively in agricultural and in horticultural works, and in forestry and inland fisheries’.
Vendar člen 8(2) Direktive 92/81/EGS navaja, da „brez poseganja v druge določbe Skupnosti lahko države članice uporabijo popolne ali delne oprostitve ali nižje trošarinske stopnje za mineralna olja, ki se porabijo pod davčnim nadzorom […] izključno pri kmetijskih in hortikulturnih delih ter v gozdarstvu in notranjem ribištvu“.
In accordance with Directive 2003/96/EC, which has been applicable since 1 January 2004 [15], the minimum rate of excise duty on gas oil (diesel) is set at EUR 21 per 1000 litres (Article 9 of the Directive together with Table C in Annex I to the Directive).
V skladu z Direktivo 2003/96/ES, ki se uporablja od 1. januarja 2004 [15], je določena najnižja trošarinska stopnja za plinsko olje za ogrevanje 21 EUR za 1000 l (člen 9 v kombinaciji s tabelo C Priloge I k tej direktivi).
This Directive also contains an analogous provision to that in Article 8(2) of Directive 92/81/EEC, namely Article 15(3), according to which ‘Member States may apply a level of taxation down to zero to energy products and electricity used for agricultural, horticultural or piscicultural works, and in forestry’.
Poleg tega ta direktiva v členu 15(3) vsebuje določbo, ki je enaka tisti iz člena 8(2) Direktive 92/81/EGS, v skladu s katerim „države članice lahko uporabijo nižjo raven obdavčitve, vključno s stopnjo nič, za energente in električno energijo, ki se uporabljajo pri kmetijskih, vrtnarskih ali ribogojniških dejavnostih ter v gozdarstvu“.
Under the two aforementioned Directives, therefore, it was possible to grant total excise duty exemptions.
V skladu z zgoraj navedenima direktivama je tako bilo mogoče odobriti popolne oprostitve plačila trošarine.