natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In 2002/2003, SNCB therefore had to decide whether it was cheaper overall to finance the restructuring of IFB (which involved the divestiture of the subsidiaries in France and the continuation of activities in Belgium) or to file for IFB’s bankruptcy.
V letih 2002/2003 se je SNCB torej morala odločiti, ali je, v celoti gledano, ceneje financirati prestrukturiranje IFB (kar je vključevalo umik iz hčerinskih družb v Franciji in nadaljevanje dejavnosti v Belgiji) ali je ceneje uvesti stečajni postopek za IFB.
It is appropriate to establish first of all the cost to SNCB of each one of these two scenarios, i.e. the restructuring and the liquidation of IFB.
Zato je najprej treba določiti, kakšni bi bili za SNCB stroški scenarija prestrukturiranja in scenarija likvidacije IFB.
Cost of restructuring IFB
Stroški prestrukturiranja IFB
In the first scenario, SNCB commits EUR 95,3 million to the financing of the restructuring of IFB by waiving the recovery of receivables which are converted into capital.
Po prvem scenariju SNCB nameni 95,3 milijona EUR za financiranje prestrukturiranja IFB, s tem ko se odpove izterjavi terjatev, ki se pretvorijo v kapital.
On completion of the restructuring, it owns 100 % of a business the value of which is estimated to be EUR 31 million, but having EUR 34,2 million in provisions, and EUR 15 million of financial debts (excluding debts to SNCB), and therefore having a net enterprise value of EUR – 18 million. The Commission considers these estimates, based on recognised methods, to be realistic.
Po prestrukturiranju ima v lasti 100-odstotni delež podjetja, katerega vrednost je ocenjena na 31 milijonov EUR, vendar ima 34,2 milijona EUR rezervacij in 15 milijonov EUR finančnih dolgov (poleg dolgov do SNCB), torej je neto vrednost podjetja -18 milijonov EUR. Komisija meni, da so te ocene, ki temeljijo na priznanih metodah, realistične.
The Commission notes therefore that, if IFB had been sold, SNCB would only have been able to obtain a negative sale price.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da bi družba SNCB lahko prodala IFB samo za negativno prodajno ceno.
Hypothetical cost of the liquidation of IFB
Hipotetični stroški likvidacije IFB
In the second scenario, SNCB also waives the recovery of its EUR 95 million of receivables. Belgium estimates furthermore that, based on information available at the time of the finalisation the framework agreement of 7 April 2003, the liquidation of IFB’s Belgian activities would have obliged SNCB to bear an additional cost of between EUR 70,6 and EUR 161,8 million. This amount would correspond to the sums which could normally have been recovered by the liquidation of assets (EUR 37,5 million), from which the costs brought about by the liquidation of IFB’s liabilities (EUR 67 to EUR 76,9 million) and the cost of SNCB personnel made redundant (EUR 41,1 to EUR 122,4 million) following the cessation of IFB’s activities are deducted.
Po drugem scenariju se SNCB prav tako odpove izterjavi terjatev v višini 95 milijonov EUR. Poleg tega Belgija na podlagi podatkov, ki so bili na voljo ob sklenitvi okvirne pogodbe 7. aprila 2003, ocenjuje, da bi likvidacija belgijskih dejavnosti IFB prisilila SNCB, da krije dodatne stroške med 70,6 in 161,8 milijona EUR. Ta znesek naj bi ustrezal zneskom, ki bi jih praviloma lahko povrnili z likvidacijo sredstev (37,5 milijona EUR), od katerih se odštejejo stroški likvidacije obveznosti IFB (od 67 do 76,9 milijona EUR) in stroški zaposlenih pri SNCB, ki bi po ukinitvi dejavnosti IFB postali presežni delavci (od 41,1 do 122,4 milijona EUR).
The Commission does not agree with this analysis.
Komisija se s to analizo ne strinja.
First of all, it contests that SNCB would have had to meet the total cost of IFB’s liabilities.
Nasprotuje temu, da bi družba SNCB morala plačati vse obveznosti IFB.
Furthermore, it contests the amount of the additional cost calculated by Belgium.
Poleg tega nasprotuje dodatnim socialnim stroškom, ki jih je izračunala Belgija.
SNCB’s responsibility for IFB’s liabilities
Odgovornost SNCB za obveznosti IFB
Contrary to what Belgium claims, the fact that IFB has negative net assets (value of the recovery of assets, minus the value of the current liabilities) does not mean that, in the event of bankruptcy, SNCB would have had to bear the corresponding excess liabilities.
V nasprotju s tem, kar trdi Belgija, dejstvo, da je družba IFB imela negativno neto vrednost sredstev (razlika med vrednostjo povrnjenih sredstev in izterljivimi obveznostmi), še ne pomeni, da bi v primeru stečaja družba SNCB morala nositi ustrezni presežek obveznosti.
The Commission points out that, in principle, a company like IFB responds to its obligations with its own capital assets.
Komisija opozarja, da načeloma družba, kot je IFB, za svoje obveznosti odgovarja s svojim premoženjem.
The shareholders’ responsibility for the company’s obligations does not normally go beyond the latter’s capital stock and therefore does not affect the individual capital of the various shareholders.
Odgovornost delničarjev za obveznosti družbe običajno ne presega njenega osnovnega kapitala in torej ne posega v lastna sredstva različnih delničarjev.
In the hypothetical case of IFB’s bankruptcy, SNCB would therefore have lost its capital stock, but it would not have had to repay the other IFB creditors.
Ob predpostavki stečaja IFB, bi družba SNCB izgubila osnovni kapital, ne bi pa morala poplačati druge upnike IFB.
A priori, the cost of IFB’s bankruptcy to SNCB, acting as a shareholder, would therefore have been zero, and not the EUR 29,5 to EUR 39,4 million as maintained by the Belgian authorities.
A priori bi bili stroški stečaja IFB za SNCB, ki bi ravnala kot delničar, enaki nič, ne pa med 29,5 in 39,4 milijona EUR, kot trdijo belgijski organi.
In its decision-making process, the Commission recognises, however, that a business placed in SNCB’s situation would have been obliged to support some costs in capacities other than that of shareholder [47].
Komisija v praksi odločitev vendarle priznava, da bi bilo podjetje v položaju, v kakršnem je SNCB, lahko prisiljeno nositi stroške iz drugih naslovov in ne iz naslova delničarja.
In this case, costs are notably as follows:
V tem primeru so to predvsem naslednji stroški:
As a creditor, SNCB will lose its receivables from IFB, at least in proportion to its share in IFB’s liabilities not covered by the assets; the Commission can accept that, taking SNCB’s role in IFB’s liquidation into account, this risk could be assessed as being up to the total amount of receivables held by SCNB in IFB, i.e. EUR 95 million,
kot upnik bo SNCB izgubila svoje terjatve do IFB, vsaj sorazmerni delež obveznosti, za katere ni kritja v premoženju; Komisija lahko sprejme, da se ob upoštevanju vloge SNCB pri likvidaciji IFB to tveganje lahko oceni na znesek do skupnega zneska terjatev, ki jih ima SNCB do IFB, to je 95 milijonov EUR;
The Commission would be able to accept that, in order to save its reputation, it would have been advisable for SNCB, as the parent company, to take back some of the unpaid debts to IFB’s suppliers who are also suppliers to SNCB.
Komisija bi lahko sprejela, da bi bilo za SNCB kot matično družbo, ki rešuje svoj ugled, pametno prevzeti del neplačanih dolgov IFB do dobaviteljev, ki so tudi dobavitelji SNCB.
It is necessary therefore to estimate the maximum amount which SNCB would have been led to bear in this capacity.
Zato je torej treba oceniti najvišji znesek iz tega naslova, ki bi ga SNCB lahko bila prisiljena kriti.
In this respect, Belgium itself estimates that the additional costs borne by SNCB in this capacity ought not to exceed EUR 13 million. In reality, the actual additional costs could have been less, as IFB’s creditors would have first of all recovered part of their receivables from IFB’s liquidation, and would only have been recompensed by SNCB for the amount of the balance.
V zvezi s tem Belgija ocenjuje, da dodatni stroški iz tega naslova, ki bi jih nosila družba SNCB, ne bi smeli presegati 13 milijonov EUR. V resnici bi bili dodatni stroški lahko nižji, ker bi upnikom IFB najprej povrnili del terjatev iz likvidacije IFB, tako da bi družba SNCB krila samo razliko.
The Commission considers that in principle a private investor in a market economy, who has to decide between financing of the restructuring of its subsidiary and its bankruptcy, might be minded to take into account the cost of a reduction in its personnel, if that reduction in personnel were a direct and inevitable consequence of the bankruptcy of its subsidiary.
Komisija meni, da načeloma zasebni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, ki se mora odločiti med financiranjem prestrukturiranja hčerinske družbe in uvedbo stečajnega postopka, lahko upošteva stroške zmanjšanja števila zaposlenih, če je to zmanjšanje neposredna in neizogibna posledica stečaja hčerinske družbe.
Belgium concludes that IFB’s bankruptcy would have left SNCB with an overstaffing situation of 530 employees, 50 of whom were seconded to IFB, and 480 of whom were employees within SNCB in areas dependent upon the IFB’s activities.
Zaključek Belgije je, da bi uvedba stečajnega postopka IFB povzročila, da bi bilo v SNCB 530 presežnih delavcev, od teh 50 napotenih v IFB, 480 pa zaposlenih pri SNCB za dejavnosti, katerih nadaljevanje je bilo odvisno od dejavnosti IFB.
The reduction of SNCB’s personnel by 530 employees would have led to costs of EUR 122,4 million, which is EUR 230000 per employee.
Zmanjšanje števila zaposlenih pri SNCB za 530 zaposlenih bi povzročilo stroške v višini 122,4 milijona EUR ali 230000 na zaposlenega.
The details of this calculation are explained in part 3 of this decision.
Podroben izračun je opisan v delu 3 te odločbe.
The Commission considers that it is not realistic to consider that SNCB would only have been able to recover 21 % of the traffic previously generated by IFB.
Komisija meni, da ni realistično pričakovati, da bi SNCB prevzela samo 21 % prometa, ki ga je pred tem ustvarila IFB.
First of all, as Belgium recognised in its reply to the decision initiating the procedure, the markets in which IFB is active are booming (11 % growth for freight transhipment, 12 % growth for combined transport).
Najprej, kot priznava Belgija v odgovoru na odločbo o sprožitvi postopka, so trgi, na katerih deluje IFB, zelo uspešni (11-odstotna rast za pretovarjanje, 12-odstotna rast za kombinirani prevoz).
Consequently, it would appear probable that IFB’s competitors would have purchased IFB’s assets in order to continue its activities.
Zato se zdi verjetno, da bi konkurenti IFB kupili premoženje IFB, da bi nadaljevali njene dejavnosti.
Under this assumption, the purchaser of IFB would have needed rail freight transport services.
Ob tej predpostavki bi kupec IFB potreboval storitve železniškega prevoza blaga.
In view of SNCB’s very strong position in the international transport market for goods leaving Belgium, and its monopoly (until 1 January 2007) of the national goods transport market within Belgium, the Commission considers that the buyer of IFB would have chosen SNCB as its rail carrier, at least for a significant part of its requirements.
Glede na močan položaj SNCB na trgu mednarodnega prevoza blaga iz Belgije in monopolni položaj (do 1. januarja 2007) na nacionalnem trgu prevoza blaga v Belgiji Komisija meni, da bi kupec IFB vsaj za velik del svojih potreb izbral SNCB kot železniškega prevoznika.
Consequently, even under the assumption of IFB’s bankruptcy, SNCB would have been able to recover a very large proportion of the rail traffic generated by IFB.
Zato bi SNCB tudi v primeru stečaja IFB lahko ponovno pridobila večji del železniškega prometa, ki ga je ustvarila družba IFB.
Furthermore, the Commission observes that the rail transport markets are in growth.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da trgi železniškega prevoza rastejo.
Consequently, it would appear reasonable to assume that SNCB would have grown at the same rate as the market, which would have allowed it to reintegrate the 50 employees released from IFB as needs arose.
Zato se zdi upravičeno predpostavljati, da bi družba SNCB rasla enako hitro kot trg, kar bi ji omogočilo, da postopoma ponovno vključi 50 zaposlenih, napotenih v IFB.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that Belgium has not convincingly demonstrated that SNCB would have had an overstaffing situation of 480 employees under the assumption of IFB’s bankruptcy, and that it would not have been able to reintegrate the 50 employees seconded to IFB.
Na koncu Komisija meni, da Belgija ni uspela prepričljivo dokazati, da bi imela družba SNCB v primeru stečaja IFB 480 presežnih delavcev in da ne bi mogla ponovno vključiti 50 zaposlenih, ki so bili napoteni v IFB.
On the basis of information communicated by Belgium, the Commission considers that, in the second scenario, SNCB (as in the first scenario) would also waive the recovery of its debts up to a maximum of EUR 95,3 million and beyond this, bear a maximum cost of EUR 13 million.
Na podlagi podatkov, ki jih je posredovala Belgija, Komisija meni, da se po drugem scenariju (kot po prvem) SNCB prav tako odpove povračilu terjatev v višini do 95,3 milijona EUR in poleg tega nosi stroške največ v višini 13 milijonov EUR.
With SNCB waiving its receivables from IFB up to EUR 95,3 million in both scenarios, Belgium has not demonstrated that, by opting for the first scenario (financing of the restructuring), resulting in SNCB owning a business with a negative value estimated at EUR – 18 million, SNCB has made an informed economic choice as opposed to the second scenario of liquidation, in which the only proven additional costs within the context of this procedure are estimated to be a maximum of EUR 13 million.
Ker se SNCB po obeh scenarijih odpove terjatvam do IFB v višini 95,3 milijona EUR, Belgija ni dokazala, da bi se SNCB z izbiro prvega scenarija (financiranje prestrukturiranja), po katerem bi družba SNCB imela v lasti podjetje z negativno vrednostjo, ocenjeno na – 18 milijonov EUR, odločila za ekonomsko premišljeno izbiro v primerjavi z drugim scenarijem likvidacije, po katerem so edini dodatni stroški, dokazani v okviru tega postopka, ocenjeni na največ 13 milijonov EUR.
The Commission concludes that Belgium has not demonstrated that SNCB acted like a private investor in a market economy by taking the decision, imputable to the Belgian State, to finance the restructuring and the continuation of IFB’s activities in Belgium and the divestiture of IFB’s activities in France.
Komisija sklepa, da Belgija ni dokazala, da je družba SNCB ravnala kot zasebni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, s tem ko je sprejela odločitev, ki jo je mogoče pripisati Belgiji, da bo financirala prestrukturiranje in nadaljevanje dejavnosti IFB v Belgiji in da bo umaknila naložbe v dejavnosti IFB v Franciji.
Distortion of competition and effect on transactions between Member States
Izkrivljanje konkurence in vpliv na trgovino med državami članicami
The Commission must analyse the market situation concerned and the market sectors of the beneficiaries of this market, together with the impact which the financial support would have on competition [48].
Komisija mora preučiti položaj na zadevnem trgu, tržne deleže prejemnikov na njem in vpliv finančne pomoči na stanje konkurence [48].
In this case, the financial support was awarded to a business active in markets open to competition, which is in a situation of competition with other operators in several Member States, as demonstrated in section 2 of this decision.
V tem primeru je bila finančna pomoč dodeljena podjetju, ki deluje na trgih, odprtih za konkurenco, in konkurira z drugimi udeleženci iz več držav članic, kot je prikazano v delu 2 te odločbe.
The financial support therefore distorts or threatens to distort competition and threatens to affect or does affect transactions between Member States.
Finančna pomoč torej izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco ter prizadene ali bi lahko prizadela trgovino med državami članicami.
In its letter replying to the initiating of the procedure, the Belgian Government contests the claim that the two criteria in Article 87(1) are fulfilled, as the Commission has not presented any proof establishing such distortions of competition.
Belgijska vlada se v odgovoru na dopis o sprožitvi postopka ne strinja, da sta izpolnjeni merili iz člena 87(1), ker Komisija ni predložila nobenega dokaza za tako izkrivljanje konkurence.
The Commission draws the Belgian authorities’ attention to the fact that Article 87(1) makes reference to a threat of distortion.
Komisija opozarja belgijske organe, da člen 87(1) omenja možnost izkrivljanja konkurence.
Consequently, the Commission does not have to supply proof of a distortion of competition, but must explain in a convincing manner the risk of such distortions, which it has done in the letter initiating the procedure (points 212 and 213) and in this decision.
Zato Komisiji ni treba predložiti dokaza za izkrivljanje konkurence, mora pa prepričljivo razložiti takšno tveganje, kar je storila v dopisu o sprožitvi postopka (točki 212 in 213) in v tej odločbi.
Conclusion: existence of State aid
Sklep: prisotnost državne pomoči
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the financing of the restructuring of IFB (in Belgium) by SNCB and the cessation of its activities in France, in the form of conversion into capital of debts of EUR 95,3 million, constitutes State aid.
Na koncu Komisija meni, da financiranje prestrukturiranja družbe IFB (v Belgiji) in prenehanja njenih dejavnosti v Franciji s strani SNCB v obliki pretvorbe dolgov v višini 95,3 milijona EUR v kapital predstavlja državno pomoč.
Article 87(3)(c) EC provides that ‘the following may be considered to be compatible with the common market: aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.’
Člen 87(3)(c) Pogodbe določa, da „[se kot združljiv[a] s skupnim trgom […] lahko šteje […] pomoč za pospeševanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih dejavnosti ali določenih gospodarskih območij, kadar takšna pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi“.
The aid awarded by Belgium through SNCB could be compatible with the common market by virtue of Article 87(3)(c) as interpreted by the Commission in its 1999 and 2004 guidelines.
Pomoč, ki jo je Belgija dodelila preko SNCB, bi lahko bila združljiva s skupnim trgom v skladu s členom 87(3)(c), kot ga razlaga Komisija v smernicah iz leta 1999 in leta 2004.
Compatibility as rescue aid
Združljivost pomoči za reševanje
Only measures consisting of cash aid may be compatible as rescue aid.
Ukrepi pomoči za reševanje so lahko združljivi s skupnim trgom samo v obliki likvidnostne pomoči.
In this case, the cash aids are the granting of a payment extension, the credit facility and the recoverable advance.
V tem primeru so likvidnostne pomoči odobritev odloga plačila, posojila in predujema, ki ga je treba vrniti.
Firstly, the question arises as to which version of the guidelines is applicable.
Še prej pa se postavlja vprašanje, katera različica smernic se uporabi.
The Commission will apply these guidelines with effect from 10 October until 9 October 2009.
Ob upoštevanju spodnjih določb bo Komisija uporabljala te smernice z učinkom od 10. oktobra 2004 do 9. oktobra 2009. (103)
Notifications registered by the Commission prior to 10 October 2004 will be examined in the light of the criteria in force at the time of the notification.
Priglasitve, ki jih bo Komisija evidentirala pred 10. oktobrom 2004, bodo pregledane v luči kriterijev, ki so se uporabljali v času priglasitve. (104)
The Commission will examine the compatibility with the common market of any rescue or restructuring aid granted without its authorisation and therefore in breach of Article 88(3) of the Treaty on the basis of these guidelines if some or all of the aid is granted after their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Komisija bo preverila združljivost s skupnim trgom kakršne koli pomoči za reševanje ali prestrukturiranje, dodeljene brez njene odobritve in zato v nasprotju s členom 88(3) Pogodbe na podlagi teh smernic, če je del pomoči ali vsa pomoč dodeljena po njihovi objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.
In all other cases it will conduct the examination on the basis of the guidelines which apply at the time the aid is granted.’
V drugih primerih bo pomoč preučila po smernicah, ki so se uporabljale v času dodelitve pomoči.“
The cash aid was granted on 7 April 2003 by the conclusion of a framework agreement between IFB and SNCB.
Likvidnostne pomoči so bile dodeljene 7. aprila 2003 s sklenitvijo okvirne pogodbe med IFB in SNCB.
This grant took place without prior notification to the European Commission and therefore in violation of Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
Dodeljene so bile brez predhodne priglasitve pri Komisiji in zato v nasprotju s členom 88(3) Pogodbe.
The assessment of its compatibility as rescue aid will therefore be based on the 1999 guidelines.
Združljivosti pomoči za reševanje bo torej ocenjena po smernicah iz leta 1999.
Point 23 of the 1999 guidelines defines the following five conditions for rescue aid to be compatible with the common market:
V točki 23 smernic iz leta 1999 je opredeljenih pet pogojev za združljivost pomoči za reševanje s skupnim trgom:
consist of liquidity support in the form of loan guarantees or loans.
likvidnostna pomoč v obliki poroštev za posojila ali posojil.
In both cases, the loan must be granted at an interest rate at least comparable to those observed for loans to healthy firms, and in particular the reference rates adopted by the Commission;
V obeh primerih mora biti posojilo dodeljeno po obrestni meri, ki je primerljiva s tistimi, ki se uporabljajo za posojila dobrim podjetjem, zlasti pa z referenčnimi obrestnimi merami, ki jih je sprejela Komisija;
be linked to loans that are to be reimbursed over a period of not more than twelve months after disbursement of the last instalment to the firm; reimbursement of the loan linked to the rescue aid may possibly be covered by the restructuring aid subsequently approved by the Commission;
povezana s posojili, ki jih je treba vrniti v roku, ki ni daljše od dvanajstih mesecev po izplačilu zadnjega obroka podjetju; vračilo posojila, ki je povezano s pomočjo za reševanje, lahko pokriva pomoč za prestrukturiranje, ki jo pozneje odobri Komisija;
be warranted on the grounds of serious social difficulties and have no unduly adverse “spillover” effects on other Member States;
upravičena na podlagi resnih socialnih težav in ne sme imeti škodljivih učinkov na druge države članice;
be accompanied on notification by an undertaking on the part of the Member State concerned to communicate to the Commission, not later than six months after the rescue aid measure has been authorised, a restructuring plan or a liquidation plan or proof that the loan has been reimbursed in full and/or that the guarantee has been terminated;
ob priglasitvi opremljena z zagotovilom zadevne države članice, da bo Komisiji najpozneje šest mesecev po odobritvi pomoči za reševanje poslala plan prestrukturiranja ali načrt likvidacije ali dokazilo, da je bilo posojilo v celoti povrnjeno in/ali da je poroštvo zaključeno;
be restricted to the amount needed to keep the firm in business for the period during which the aid is authorised (for example, covering wage and salary costs or routine supplies)’.
omejena na znesek, ki je potreben, da lahko podjetje posluje v obdobju, v katerem je odobrena pomoč (na primer za pokrivanje plač ali redne dobave).“
The repayment period provided for in the framework agreement is 12 months.
V okvirni pogodbi je predvideni rok za vračilo dvanajst mesecev.
However, the Belgian Government informed the Commission that the period was tacitly extended between the parties until the time of the capital increase.
Vendar je belgijska vlada obvestila Komisijo, da je bil rok s tihim dogovorom podpisnic podaljšan do povečanja kapitala.