natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
An alternative solution could have been e.g. to consolidate the mark-to-market losses and to obtain additional capital from the owners of Sachsen LB for the corresponding amount (estimated to be about EUR […(0,5-1,5)] billion), before selling the bank to LBBW.
Alternativno bi bilo na primer mogoče razmisliti, da bi se pred prodajo banke Sachsen LB banki LBBW konsolidirale izgube Mark-to-Market in bi se ustrezno vložil dodatni kapital lastnikov banke Sachsen LB (ocena: [… (0,5–1,5)] milijarde EUR).
Instead of incurring the mark-to-market losses, the preferred solution was for the Free State of Saxony to provide a state guarantee on a portfolio of structured investments.
Namesto da bi zvezna dežela Saška izgube Mark-to-Market vzela v zakup, je raje zagotovila državno jamstvo za portfelj s strukturiranimi investicijami.
The final agreement identified the entire structured investments of Sachsen LB and divided them into two portfolios.
V tem dokončnem sporazumu so vse strukturirane investicije banke Sachsen LB navedene in razdeljene v dva portfelja.
In this way only structured portfolio investments [13] with a refinancing requirement of about EUR 11,8 billion remained in Sachsen LB and thus were sold to LBBW.
Te postavke kapitalskega trga so bile prenesene v novoustanovljeni, lastni posebni naložbeni nosilec (tako imenovani „Super-SIV“), tako da so pri Sachsen LB ostale samo strukturirane portfeljske investicije [13], katerih refinanciranje je zahtevalo približno 11,8 milijarde EUR, in te investicije so bile prodane banki LBBW.
In order to cover potential losses from these investments, an amount of EUR 500 million was deducted from the sales price.
Zaradi zaščite pred tveganji pri teh investicijah je bil od prodajne cene odbit znesek 500 milijonov EUR.
The Super SIV is an investment vehicle which was created for the purpose of transferring structured investment portfolios with a low mark-to-market value out of Sachsen LB before the sale with the intention of holding them until maturity.
Super-SIV je bil ustanovljen, da bi strukturirane investicijske portfelje z nizko vrednostjo Mark-to-Market pred prodajo izločili iz Sachsen LB in zadržali do končne zapadlosti.
In order to transfer the portfolio into the Super SIV its refinancing needed to be organised.
Za prenos portfelja v Super-SIV je bilo treba zagotoviti refinanciranje.
This was provided partly by LBBW (junior tranche) and partly by the other Landesbanken (senior tranche).
To je deloma prevzela banka LBBW (podrejena tranša), deloma pa druge deželne banke (nadrejena tranša).
In order to avoid consolidation of the Super SIV in the LBBW balance sheet, LBBW’s participation had to remain below 50 %.
Da bi preprečili konsolidacijo naložbenega nosilca Super-SIV v bilanci banke LBBW, bi morala biti udeležba banke LBBW pod 50 %.
Following intensive negotiations, the Landesbanken took over 50 % of the refinancing of the Super SIV but only agreed to participate in the refinancing on condition that in case of losses their financing ranked above the financing provided by LBBW.
Po intenzivnih pogajanjih so deželne banke prevzele 50 % vrednosti refinanciranja za Super-SIV, postavile pa so tudi pogoj, da bo njihovo financiranje v primeru izgub imelo prednost pred financiranjem prek banke LBBW.
LBBW, in turn, requested, in order to limit its risk to a normal commercial level, a guarantee by the Free State of Saxony covering any realistically assumed potential losses.
Banka LBBW pa je zahtevala jamstvo od zvezne dežele Saške, ki naj bi krila vse realno predvidljive potencialne izgube, da bi svoje tveganje omejila na normalno poslovno tveganje.
The aim was to cover the portfolio from any possible losses that might occur if held to maturity.
Cilj je bil zaščititi portfelj pred mogočimi izgubami, če bi bil zadržan do končne zapadlosti.
These losses would correspond to a risk of default.
Te izgube bi ustrezale tveganju neplačila.
The Free State of Saxony finally agreed to grant a guarantee to the amount of EUR 2,75 billion for losses from the Super SIV.
Zvezna dežela Saška je naposled izrazila pripravljenost, da zagotovi jamstvo v višini 2,75 milijarde EUR za izgube naložbenega nosilca Super-SIV.
This amount was established during intensive negotiations between LBBW and the Free State of Saxony and based on valuations by investment banks which estimated that in this case the default risks for the refinancing banks was close to zero [14].
Ta znesek je bil po intenzivnih pogajanjih med LBBW in zvezno deželo Saško določen na podlagi posvetovalnih mnenj investicijskih bank, ki ocenjujejo, da naj bi tveganje neplačila za banke, ki zagotavljajo refinanciranje, neznatno [14].
In addition, the final agreement fixed a fee to be paid for the guarantee for the first four years at […] % per year of the amount of the guarantee which has not been used. It will then be reduced to 2/3 of the initial fee for the next 3 years and to 1/3 of the initial fee per year thereafter.
Dodatno je bila v sporazumu o ključnih parametrih določena provizija za jamstvo v višini […] % letno za neuveljavljani del maksimalnega zneska, provizija pa se po štirih letih trajanja jamstva zmanjša za eno tretjino začetne provizije in po sedmih letih trajanja jamstva še za eno tretjino začetne provizije.
This corresponds to EUR […(> 90)] million within 10 years assuming the guarantee is not used.
To ustreza [… (> 90)] milijonom EUR v desetih letih, če se jamstvo ne uveljavi.
As mentioned above, the Super SIV was financed in two tranches.
Kot je omenjeno zgoraj, je bil Super-SIV financiran v dveh tranšah.
In December 2007 the Free State of Saxony commissioned auditors Susat & Partner to assess the value of Sachsen LB as agreed in the sales agreement.
V decembru 2007 je zvezna dežela Saška naročila revizijski družbi Susat & Partner, naj oceni podjetje Sachsen LB, kot je bilo predvideno v prodajni pogodbi.
The final agreement determined the net sales price of Sachsen LB at EUR 328 million, to be paid in cash [15].
V dokončnem sporazumu je bila neto nakupna cena za Sachsen LB določena v višini 328 milijonov EUR, kar je bilo treba plačati v gotovini [15].
The refinancing of the structured investment portfolio transferred to the Super SIV led to the expiry of the Gewährträgerhaftung of the Free State of Saxony for this portfolio.
Z refinanciranjem strukturiranega investicijskega portfelja, prenesenega v Super-SIV, se je državno jamstvo (Gewährträgerhaftung) zvezne dežele Saške za ta portfelj končalo.
THE RESTRUCTURING PLAN
NAČRT PRESTRUKTURIRANJA
According to the plan Sachsen LB AG will be integrated into LBBW, but will continue to exist in the form of a dependent subsidiary (unselbständige Anstalt), named Sachsen Bank.
Po načrtu se Sachsen LB AG vključi v LBBW, vendar ostaja v obliki samostojne ustanove z imenom Sachsen Bank.
This entity will also take over the corporate and private banking business of the existing local retail branches of LBBW in Saxony (BW-Bank).
Ta banka prevzame tudi bančno poslovanje s podjetji in prebivalstvom od obstoječih podružnic LBBW na Saškem (BW-Bank).
However, kinds of business other than corporate and private banking will be taken out of Sachsen LB and transferred to the LBBW branch in Saxony.
Vse preostalo poslovanje, ki ne spada pod poslovanje s podjetji in prebivalstvom, se izloči iz Sachsen LB in prenese na podružnico LBBW na Saškem.
As a result, Sachsen Bank will take over only one of the two legs of Sachsen LB, namely the corporate banking business, as well as the rather underdeveloped private banking business of Sachsen LB, and make it together with the corresponding business of BW-Bank its new second leg.
Sachsen Bank torej prevzame samo eno od obeh področij dejavnosti Sachsen LB, in sicer bančno poslovanje s podjetji in dokaj slabo razvito poslovanje s prebivalstvom, in iz tega razvije skupaj z ustreznim poslovanjem BW-Bank svoje novo področje dejavnosti.
Sachsen Bank will be able to compete in Saxony and outside on its own merits.
Sachsen Bank se bo sposobna samostojno obdržati v konkurenčnem boju na Saškem in širše.
The second leg of Sachsen LB, i.e. the capital markets business, will remain in LBBW and will be offered in Saxony by a branch of LBBW.
Poslovanje na kapitalskem trgu kot drugo področje dejavnosti banke Sachsen LB ostaja v LBBW in ga bo na Saškem ponujala podružnica LBBW.
LBBW will also take over back-office functions and will partly function as central bank for the savings banks in Saxony.
LBBW bo prevzela tudi zaledne funkcije in delno nastopala kot centralna banka za saške hranilnice.
The analysis of the restructuring plan regarding the restoration of viability is based on the business activities of Sachsen LB before its integration into LBBW [16].
Izhodiščna točka za analizo načrta prestrukturiranja, kar zadeva ponovno vzpostavitev rentabilnosti, je poslovna dejavnost banke Sachsen LB pred njeno vključitvijo v LBBW [16].
The restructuring includes the outsourcing of the first portfolio into the Super SIV.
Prestrukturiranje zajema prenos prvega portfelja v Super-SIV.
Moreover, the plan indicates as an option by way of compensatory measures the closing down of the whole of Sachsen LB’s Dublin-based subsidiary (Sachsen LB Europe), which was in charge of developing and managing all of Sachsen LB’s internationally structured portfolios.
Poleg tega načrt predvideva kot izravnalni ukrep možnost, da se odpravi odvisna družba Sachsen LB (Sachsen LB Europe) v Dublinu, ki je bila zadolžena za razvoj in upravljanje vseh mednarodno strukturiranih portfeljev banke Sachsen LB.
Therefore, no new international capital market activities will be performed by Sachsen LB.
Zato se Sachsen LB na mednarodnem kapitalskem trgu ne bo ukvarjala z nobenimi novimi posli.
Only the assets of the second portfolio of EUR 11,8 billion remain in LBBW.
Samo vrednostni papirji drugega portfelja v vrednosti 11,8 milijarde EUR ostajajo pri LBBW.
On this basis the projections indicate that the bank will restore its profitability within the restructuring period of four years.
Projekcije na tej podlagi kažejo, da bo banka spet postala rentabilna v štiriletnem obdobju prestrukturiranja.
As proof of viability, Germany provided in essence the following figures:
V dokaz izvedljivosti je Nemčija v glavnem navedla naslednje številke:
Gross revenues (worst case)
Bruto prihodki v mio EUR
(in EUR million)
(najslabši scenarij)
CAGR 2007-2012 [17](in %)
CAGR 2007–2012 [17]v %
Corporate finance
Bančno poslovanje s podjetji
Capital markets [18]
Poslovanje na kapitalskem trgu [18]
Total before synergies
Skupaj pred sinergijami
Revenue synergies (new business model)
Donos sinergij (novi poslovni model)
Total incl. synergies
Skupaj, vključno s sinergijami
Operating income before tax (worst case)
Poslovni izid v mio EUR
Capital markets
Poslovanje na kapitalskem trgu
In addition, Germany indicated that LBBW expects as of 2009 a return on equity for the former Sachsen LB of […(> 8)] % and for the newly created Sachsen Bank of around […(> 15)] %.
Nadalje je Nemčija sporočila, da LBBW od leta 2009 za nekdanjo Sachsen LB računa z donosnostjo na lastni kapital v višini […(> 8)] % in za novo ustanovljeno Sachsen Bank okoli [… (> 15)] %.
THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
FORMALNI POSTOPEK PREISKAVE
In the opening decision the Commission questioned the liquidity support because the measure seemed to confer a selective advantage upon Sachsen LB, it being unlikely that a market economy investor would have granted the credit facility to Sachsen LB on the same conditions as the banking pool.
V odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka je Komisija izrazila pomisleke glede likvidnostnega posojila, saj se zdi, da je banka Sachsen LB s tem ukrepom pridobila selektivno prednost, kajti ni bilo verjetno, da bi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu banki Sachsen LB zagotovil kreditno linijo po istih pogojih kot skupina bank.
The Commission did not, however, rule out the possibility that the measure might constitute rescue aid compatible with the common market.
Vendar Komisija ni izključila, da bi se ukrep lahko štel za s skupnim trgom združljivo pomoč za reševanje.
The Commission further assessed whether the sale of Sachsen LB to LBBW involved state aid.
Komisija je tudi preučila, ali je odstop banke Sachsen LB banki LBBW vseboval državno pomoč.
It raised doubts as to whether the Free State of Saxony had behaved like a market economy investor because liquidation would have been less costly than accepting the sale with the guarantee, and thus the sale might involve state aid elements to Sachsen LB.
Komisija je podvomila, da je Zvezna dežela Saška ravnala kot vlagatelj, ki deluje v tržnem gospodarstvu, ker naj bi bila likvidacija stroškovno ugodnejša od prodaje z dodeljenim jamstvom, in je domnevala, da bi prodaja zato utegnila vsebovati elemente pomoči v korist banke Sachsen LB.
However, it did not express concerns that the sales price was too low and thus involved state aid elements to the buyer (i.e. LBBW).
Pač pa Komisija ni izrazila nobenih pomislekov, da bi bila nakupna cena prenizka in da bi zato vsebovala elemente pomoči v korist kupca (banke LBBW).
Nor did it exclude that the guarantee might constitute restructuring aid compatible with the common market if the conditions of the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring of firms in difficulty [19] (hereinafter called the Guidelines) were met.
Vendar Komisija ni izključila možnosti, da bi jamstvo lahko bilo s skupnim trgom združljiva pomoč za prestrukturiranje, če bi bili izpolnjeni pogoji Smernic Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah [19] (v nadaljevanju: Smernice).
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
PRIPOMBE TRETJIH STRANK
The third party argued that the guarantee granted to the Super SIV constituted state aid, that LBBW’s EUR 391 million contribution to Sachsen LB’s 2007 results and the underwriting of the year’s net loss to the tune of EUR 641,6 million likewise constituted state aid, and that the sales price paid by LBBW to the owners exceeded Sachsen LB’s market value.
Tretja stranka meni, da naj bi bilo jamstvo za Super-SIV državna pomoč, enako naj bi bila državna pomoč doplačilo banke LBBW leta 2007 banki Sachsen LB v znesku 391 milijonov EUR in prevzem letnega primanjkljaja v višini 641,6 milijona EUR, nakupna cena, ki jo je lastnikom plačala LBBW, pa naj bi bila nad tržno ceno banke Sachsen LB.
COMMENTS FROM GERMANY FOLLOWING THE OPENING DECISION
PRIPOMBE NEMČIJE PO ODLOČITVI O SPROŽITVI POSTOPKA
AS REGARDS THE ASSESSMENT OF THE LIQUIDITY MEASURE
PRIPOMBA K PRESOJI O LIKVIDNOSTNEM POSOJILU
Germany argued that the liquidity measure provided by the banking pool would also have been provided by a market investor, because the remuneration the pool banks received for the CPs issued by Ormond Quay was above the market remuneration and thus market conform.
Po mnenju Nemčije bi likvidnostno posojilo, ki ga je zagotovila skupina bank, zagotovil tudi vlagatelj, ki deluje v tržnem gospodarstvu, ker naj bi bilo plačilo, ki naj bi ga banke dobile za nakup CP, ki jih je izdal Ormond Quay, višje od običajnega plačila na tržišču in s tem ustrezno tržnim razmeram.
Moreover, the banking pool would not cover potential losses related to fluctuations in the market price of the ABSs in the conduit.
Poleg tega skupina bank ne bi pokrivala morebitnih izgub zaradi nihanj tržne cene vrednostnih papirjev (ABS), ki jih imajo v skladu Conduit.
Even if the market value of the assets suffered, the default risk would be very low and in the case of a hold strategy the expected losses would be marginal.
Celo pri nazadujoči tržni vrednosti naj bi bilo plačilno tveganje zelo majhno in pri vrednostnih papirjih, ki bi se hranili do zapadlosti v plačilo, bi lahko pričakovali le neznatne izgube.
Furthermore, Germany argued that the banks had acted mainly in order to prevent a general banking crisis triggered by the insolvency of one of its sister Landesbanken.
Nadalje naj bi, po trditvah Nemčije, banke v glavnem poskrbele, da se prepreči, da bi plačilna nesposobnost ene od njihovih sestrskih deželnih bank sprožila splošno bančno krizo.
They had considered it less risky to buy the CPs than to deal with the insolvency of Sachsen LB, in particular if the deposit scheme were to be activated.
V odkupu CP naj bi videle manjše tveganje od tveganja, če bi morale reševati plačilno nesposobnost banke Sachsen LB, še zlasti, če bi uveljavili sistem zaščite vlog.
In addition, Germany pointed out that, even in the absence of a market, market benchmarks could be determined hypothetically.
Poleg tega Nemčija opozarja na to, da bi celo brez trga hipotetično lahko ugotovili tržna merila.
Finally, Germany argued that, if the Commission were to consider the liquidity measure as involving state aid elements, it would in any event qualify as rescue aid compatible with the common market because the CPs provided by the banking pool were, first, similar to a loan, second, in any event not structural, and, third, limited to six months.
Če bi Komisija zagovarjala mnenje, da likvidnostno posojilo vsebuje elemente pomoči, potem bi ga po mnenju Nemčije vsekakor lahko obravnavali kot pomoč za reševanje, združljivo s skupnim trgom, ker naj bi bili CP, ki so jih odkupile banke, primerljivi s posojilom, ki ni strukturne narave in povrhu še časovno omejeno na šest mesecev.
AS REGARDS THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SALE OF SACHSEN LB
PRIPOMBE K PRESOJI O PRODAJI BANKE SACHSEN LB
Concerning the sale of Sachsen LB, Germany argued that the Free State of Saxony had behaved like a market economy vendor.
Po mnenju Nemčije je Zvezna dežela Saška pri prodaji banke Sachsen LB ravnala kot prodajalec, ki deluje v tržnem gospodarstvu.
The purchase price, which was the result of negotiations conducted with several potential buyers and was based on valuations by auditors according to generally acknowledged auditor rules, reflected the fair market value of Sachsen LB.
Prodajna cena naj bi bila rezultat pogajanj z več morebitnimi kupci in naj bi temeljila na ocenitvah, ki naj bi jih izvedle revizijske družbe po priznanih načelih, tako da naj bi izražala pošteno tržno vrednost banke Sachsen LB.
Furthermore, even including the liabilities stemming from the EUR 2,75 billion guarantee granted to the Super SIV, the owners of Sachsen LB had still sold the bank for an overall positive price.
Celo ob upoštevanju obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz 2,75 milijarde EUR jamstva za Super-SIV, naj bi lastniki banke Sachsen LB dosegli skupno pozitivno prodajno ceno za Sachsen LB.
Germany reiterated that three different approaches had been considered in order to determine the risks inherent in the guarantee granted to the Super SIV.
Nemčija ponavlja, da so bili za ocenitev uporabljeni trije različni pristopi, da bi se ocenilo tveganje, povezano z jamstvom za Super-SIV.
The first approach was based on a mark-to-market evaluation as at 30 November 2007 estimating potential losses when selling the investments on that date at about EUR […] billion.
Po prvem pristopu so bile izračunane z mark-to-market (revaloriziranim) ovrednotenjem na dan 30. novembra 2007 morebitne izgube pri prodaji naložb na ta dan po ceni okoli […] mrd.
However, Germany explained that the results of the market value approach were distorted by the fact that there was at that time neither a market for such types of investment, nor the intention to sell them ad hoc given that the investments were to be held until maturity.
EUR. Vendar naj bi bili rezultati tega mark-to-market ovrednotenja izkrivljeni zaradi dejstva, da v tistem trenutku ni bilo niti trga za take naložbe niti namena, da se prodajo ad hoc, saj jih je bilo treba hraniti do dospelosti v plačilo.
The second approach, based on models reflecting potential macroeconomic developments, calculated the potential losses of the portfolio in three different scenarios.
Po drugem pristopu, ki temelji na modelih mogočih makroekonomskih gibanj, so bile izračunane pričakovane izgube za tri scenarije.
The expected losses were estimated at about EUR […(> 800)] million in a bad case, EUR […(< 500)] million in a base case and EUR […(< 200)] million in the best case.
Po teh scenarijih so znašale pričakovane izgube okoli […(> 800)] mio EUR (negativni scenarij), […(< 500)] mio EUR (osnovni scenarij) oz. […(< 200)] mio EUR (najboljši scenarij).
The approach was developed by LBBW and Sachsen LB on the basis of existing internal models.
Ta ocenitveni pristop sta razvili banki LBBW in Sachsen LB na podlagi obstoječih notranjih modelov.
The third approach was based on the rating of the underlying assets.
Tretji pristop je temeljil na ocenitvi finančnega premoženja za zavarovanje terjatev.
According to Germany, nearly all the assets included in the portfolio were AAA rated [20] and no downgrading had occurred.
Skoraj vsi vrednostni papirji naj bi bili po trditvah Nemčije uvrščeni v bonitetni razred AAA [20] in nobenega od teh papirjev bonitetne institucije niso ocenile nižje.
Based on the probability of failure of AAA-rated assets of nearly zero, the expected losses of the portfolio amounted to zero.
Pri verjetnosti neplačila blizu nič pri vrednostnih papirjih v bonitetnem razredu AAA naj bi bile pričakovane izgube portfelja enako skoraj nič.
According to Germany, the total amount of the guarantee, i.e. EUR 2,75 billion, was the result of negotiations between the parties, where LBBW tried to increase it as much as possible to limit its own liability, while the Free State of Saxony tried to reduce the guarantee to a minimum.
Po trditvah Nemčije naj bi bilo jamstvo 2,75 milijarde EUR rezultat pogajanj med udeleženimi strankami, pri čemer je hotela LBBW jamstvo določiti čim višje, da bi omejila svojo odgovornost, medtem ko si je Zvezna dežela Saška prizadevala jamstvo omejiti na minimum.
Germany submitted that the results of all three approaches were available at the time of the negotiations.
Nemčija opozarja, da so bili med pogajanji na voljo izidi vseh treh pristopov.
It explained that the second, i.e. the model, approach was accepted by the negotiating parties as the appropriate way of determining the risks which needed to be covered by the guarantee.
Pogajalske strani naj bi se sporazumele za pristop na podlagi modelov (to je drugi pristop) kot primerno pot za ocenitev tveganj, ki jih je bilo treba pokriti z jamstvom.
Germany provided different scenario calculations to demonstrate that the sale of the bank resulted in a positive price for the owners, even if the base default scenario of the guarantee was considered.
Nemčija je predložila izračune različnih scenarijev, da bi dokazala, naj bi celo ob uveljavitvi jamstva v osnovnem scenariju s prodajo banke dosegli pozitiven iztržek.
It argued that it was the Commission’s constant practice to rely on the base case scenario rather than a worse case scenario [21].
Ustaljena praksa Komisije naj bi bila, da se opre na osnovni scenarij in ne na manj ugoden scenarij [21].
Germany argued that, if the Commission were to consider the sale of the bank as involving state aid elements, it would in any event qualify under the Guidelines as restructuring aid compatible with the common market.
Če bi Komisija zagovarjala mnenje, da prodaja banke vsebuje elemente pomoči, potem bi po mnenju Nemčije prodajo v vsakem primeru po Smernicah lahko obravnavali kot s skupnim trgom združljivo pomoč za prestrukturiranje.
To this end LBBW had provided the abovementioned restructuring plan which indicated how Sachsen LB was to restore its viability.
Za to je LBBW predložila omenjeni načrt prestrukturiranja, iz katerega je razvidno, kako naj bi banka Sachsen LB ponovno postala rentabilna.
Germany claimed that the plan indicated several internal measures, such as staff reductions, measures to improve risk management, integration of segments into LBBW and IT standardisation.
Nemčija trdi, da načrt vsebuje več notranjih ukrepov, kot so zmanjšanje števila zaposlenih, ukrepi za izboljšanje obvladovanja tveganj, združitev segmentov v LBBW in poenotenje elektronske obdelave podatkov.