natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As regards the non-payment of SNCB’s invoices by IFB, the Belgian authorities consider that SNCB’s Management Board were not informed of the fact the IFB was no longer settling SNCB’s invoices until December 2002, i.e. when it had decided in principle to increase IFB’s capital.
V zvezi s podatkom, da družba IFB ni plačevala računov SNCB, belgijski organi menijo, da upravni odbor SNCB ni bil obveščen o neplačevanju računov s strani IFB do decembra 2002, to je do trenutka, ko je sprejel odločitev o načelnem povečanju kapitala IFB.
The Belgian authorities consider furthermore that the action or lack of action by the Management Board, by the executive committee and by the Chief Executive are not attributable to the Belgian State, either before or after the conclusion of the framework agreement.
Poleg tega belgijski organi menijo, da ukrepanja ali neukrepanja upravnega odbora, izvršnega odbora ali generalnega direktorja ni mogoče pripisati Belgiji, ne glede na to, ali je to bilo pred ali po podpisu okvirne pogodbe.
They argue that there is no involvement of the Belgian State whatsoever (in the sense of the ‘Stardust Marine’ case-law) in SNCB’s decision-making process concerning the taking of measures in respect of IFB.
Kot utemeljitev navajajo, da Belgija nikakor ni vpletena (v smislu sodne prakse „Stardust Marine“) v postopek odločanja SNCB v zvezi z odobritvijo ukrepov v korist IFB.
According to the Belgian authorities, the measures taken by SNCB in respect of IFB are measures concerning an SNCB subsidiary which does not itself undertake public tasks and which is no longer associated with the performance of public tasks by SNCB.
Po mnenju belgijskih organov so ukrepi, ki jih je družba SNCB namenila IFB, ukrepi za hčerinsko družbo SNCB, ki sama ne izvaja nalog javne službe in tudi ne sodeluje pri izvajanju nalog javne službe SNCB.
IFB’s activities are therefore solely commercial activities, outside of any public tasks.
Dejavnosti IFB naj bi torej bile izključno poslovne dejavnosti, ločene od nalog javne službe.
Thus, still according to the Belgian authorities, they are not subject to State control as the Belgian authorities are required to respect SNCB’s independence as regards matters which are not public tasks.
Tako po mnenju belgijskih organov te dejavnosti ne spadajo pod državni nadzor, ker morajo belgijski organi v stvareh, ki se ne nanašajo na naloge javne službe, spoštovati neodvisnost SNCB.
As regards the role of the Government Commissioner, the Belgian authorities say that the IFB file was never submitted to them and that, therefore, they were not competent to intervene, given that the Government Commissioner did not express comments at any stage on the measures taken in respect of IFB and that he also did not intend to take any action whatsoever.
V zvezi z vlogo vladnega komisarja belgijski organi pravijo, da o spisu IFB niso bili obveščeni in zato niso mogli posredovati, ker vladni komisar ni nikdar imel pripomb na ukrepe za IFB in ni vložil nobene pritožbe.
Furthermore, they maintain that they did not intervene in any way in SNCB’s decision-making process concerning IFB, or during the period preceding the conclusion of the framework agreement, or during the subsequent period.
Še več, belgijski organi trdijo, da nikakor niso posegli v postopek odločanja SNCB o IFB, ne pred ne po sklenitvi okvirne pogodbe.
As regards the three items identified by the Commission in the letter initiating the procedure (points 143 to 150), namely the submission of the restructuring plan for approval by the Belgian State, the press articles demonstrating a strong influence by the Belgian Government on SNCB during the year 2003, and the scope, contents and the terms of the framework agreement, the Belgian authorities consider that these factors are not sufficient to establish responsibility in the sense of the Stardust Marine case-law.
V zvezi s tremi kazalci, ki jih je Komisija navedla v dopisu o sprožitvi postopka (točke od 143 do 150), to so predložitev načrta za prestrukturiranje Belgiji v odobritev, prispevki v medijih, ki kažejo na velik vpliv belgijske vlade na SNCB v letu 2003, ter obseg, vsebina in pogoji okvirne pogodbe, belgijski organi menijo, da ti znaki niso zadosten dokaz za vpletenost v smislu sodne prakse Stardust Marine.
regards the approval of the restructuring plan by the Belgian State, the Belgian authorities consider that this provision of the framework agreement did not in any way aim to grant the Belgian authorities such competence as to be able to judge the contents of the restructuring plan, but was inspired by the fact that SNCB wanted the restructuring plan, like the framework agreement, to be communicated to the Commission.
Belgijski organi glede odobritve načrta za prestrukturiranje s strani Belgije menijo, da ni bil namen te določbe okvirne pogodbe, da belgijskim organom podeli karšne koli pristojnosti za presojanje vsebine načrta za prestrukturiranje, pač pa je posledica dejstva, da je SNCB želela, da se načrt za prestrukturiranje in okvirna pogodba posredujeta Komisiji.
As regards the press articles, the Belgian Government considers that these do not contain any indication of intervention by the Belgian Government in this case, for the following reasons:
V zvezi s prispevki v medijih belgijska vlada meni, da ne vsebujejo nobene navedbe njenega poseganja v to zadevo, ker:
In the article which appeared in La Libre Belgique on 19 May 2003, SNCB’s press department explains that the Commission had not yet been asked to give the green light for the IFB case, since ‘the federal authority still has to speak’.
je v članku v La Libre Belgique 19. maja 2003 tiskovna služba SNCB pojasnila, da Komisija še ni bila zaprošena za zeleno luč glede spisa IFB, ker „mora svoje povedati zvezna oblast“.
According to the Belgian Government, these comments refer exclusively to the ‘communication’ of the measures in support of IFB by the Belgian State to the Commission,
Po mnenju belgijske vlade se te pripombe nanašajo izključno na „sporočilo“ Belgije Komisiji o ukrepih v korist IFB.
In the article which appeared in La Libre Belgique on 18 December 2002 (in the version published on the website www.cheminots.be), Mr Karel Vinck is quoted as follows: ‘A sufficient financial headroom is required for the management of the company’.
je v članku v La Libre Belgique 18. decembra 2002 (v različici, objavljeni na spletni strani www.cheminots.be) o Karlu Vincku zapisano: „Za vodenje družbe zahteva zadosten manevrski prostor“.
According to the Belgian authorities, this statement exclusively concerns the fulfilment of SNCB’s public tasks, and expresses the idea that the Belgian authorities are competent to agree objectives to be achieved for the fulfilment of the public tasks with SNCB by means of the legal instrument of the management contract, but that the achievement of these objectives is the responsibility and falls within the competence of SNCB’s Management Board.
Po mnenju belgijskih organov naj bi ta izjava zadevala izključno izvajanje nalog javne službe SNCB in naj bi izražala mnenje, da so belgijski organi pristojni, da se s SNCB v zakonsko predvidenem instrumentu, to je v pogodbi o upravljanju, dogovorijo o ciljih, ki jih je treba uresničiti za izvajanje nalog javne službe, vendar pa je uresničevanje teh ciljev v pristojnosti upravnega odbora SNCB.
Finally, the Belgian authorities sent the Commission a written statement by Mr Karel Vinck, Chief Executive of SNCB at the time of the events, confirming the absence of any involvement of the Belgian authorities in the granting, by SNCB to IFB, of the rescue and restructuring measures which are the subject of this dossier.
Nazadnje so belgijski organi Komisiji posredovali pisno izjavo Karla Vincka, takratnega generalnega direktorja SNCB, ki potrjuje, da belgijski organi niso bili vpleteni v zagotovitev ukrepov reševanja in prestrukturiranja IFB s strani SNCB, ki so predmet tega spisa.
Such a letter, signed by Mr Vinck on 17 November 2006, was received by the Commission on 5 December 2006.
Tako pismo, ki ga je Vinck podpisal 17. novembra 2006, je Komisija prejela 5. decembra 2006.
As regards the scope, contents and terms of the framework agreement, the Belgian authorities repeat their position that, even if the restructuring measures are important for the future of IFB, the Belgian authorities do not have the power of approval, authority to control the basis issue, or the right to be consulted in this case.
V zvezi z obsegom, vsebino in pogoji okvirne pogodbe belgijski organi ponavljajo svoje stališče, da – čeprav gre za ukrepe prestrukturiranja, ki so pomembni za prihodnost IFB – v tej zadevi nimajo pooblastil za odobritev, za nadzor vsebine in izražanje mnenja.
Principle of a private investor in a market economy
Načelo zasebnega vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu
Belgium considers that, following the reasoning developed by the Commission in the ABX Logistics [15] decision, the Commission should analyse separately, on the one hand, the funds which SNCB awarded to IFB to finance the divestiture of its French subsidiaries and, on the other hand, the funds which SNCB granted to IFB to finance the pursuit of its activities in Belgium.
Belgija meni, da mora Komisija v skladu s svojo utemeljitvijo v odločbi o ABX Logistics [15] ločeno analizirati sredstva, ki jih je družba SNCB dodelila IFB za financiranje umika iz francoskih hčerinskih družb, in sredstva, ki jih je družba SNCB dodelila IFB za nadaljevanje njenih dejavnosti v Belgiji.
Divestiture of French shareholdings
Dezinvestiranje francoskih kapitalskih udeležb
In the ABX Logistics decision, the Commission is said to have confirmed that, since ABX France was not in a position to support the costs of disinvestment itself, SNCB would be acting as would a ‘private investor in a market economy’ in taking charge of these costs.
V odločbi o ABX Logistics naj bi Komisija potrdila, da družba ABX France ni mogla sama nositi stroškov umika, zato je družba SNCB ravnala, kot bi ravnal „preudaren zasebni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu“ in prevzela te stroške.
Belgium considers the same conclusion applies as regards the cost of divestiture, for IFB, of its French shareholdings.
Belgija meni, da je treba priti do enakega zaključka pri stroških IFB za dezinvestiranje njenih francoskih kapitalskih udeležb.
It is attempting to show that, for each one of these companies, IFB opted for the least expensive method.
Poskuša dokazati, da se je družba IFB za vsako od teh družb odločila za najcenejšo rešitev.
As regards Acimar, Belgium has provided the following table:
Z zvezi z Acimarjem je Belgija poslala naslednjo razpredelnico:
Acimar — judicial administration followed by liquidation
Acimar – Prisilna poravnava in nato likvidacija
Financial situation in 2002
Financni položaj v letu 2002
Total balance (31.12)
Bilanc na vsota (31.12.)
Net worth (31.12)
Lastni kapital (31.12.)
Cost of alternatives
Stroški drugih možnosti
Performance of contract
Gennemførelse af kontrakt
Judicial administration
Betalingsstandsning
Cash drain 1.1.2003-31.12.2005
Odliv denarnih sredstev 1.1.2003–31.12.2005
Capital depreciation debts 31.12.2002
Izguba vrednosti terjatev 31.12.2002
The attempts of the business during the year 2002 to obtain a revision of the contractual conditions failed; the duration of the contract was until 31.12.2005.
Poskusi v letu 2002, da bi dosegli spremembo pogodbenih pogojev, niso uspeli; pogodba je veljala do 31.12. 2005
The performance of the contract implied an important annual cash drain.
Izvajanje pogodbe je pomenilo velik letni odliv denarnih sredstev
In these circumstances, a request for judicial settlement was the least expensive solution.
V teh okoliščinah je bila zahteva za prisilno poravnavo najcenejša oblika.
During the settlement period, the operating losses were financed by the client.
V obdobju prisilne poravnave je izgube iz poslovanja krila stranka
Acimar ceased trading on 1.9.2003.
Acimar je prenehal opravljati dejavnosti 1.9.2003
As regards NFTI-ou, Belgium has provided the following table:
Z zvezi z NFTI-ou je Belgija poslala naslednjo razpredelnico:
NFTI-ou — Handover
NFTIou – Prenos
Partial sale
Vente partielle
Increase in capital + repayment to ING credit
Povecanje kapitala + povracilo posojila ING
Settlement plan
Sanacijski načrt
Actual cash drain (CH annual of EUR – 3,7 million) (100 % letter of intent)
Diskontirani odliv denarnih sredstev (CH – 3,7 milijona EUR na leto) (100 % pismo o nameri)
Capital depreciation of shareholding
Izguba vrednosti deleža
Capital depreciation of debts 31.12.2002
Izguba vrednosti terjatev 31.12.2002
Sale price (EUR 1) – 30 % shareholding
Prodajna cena (1 EUR) – 30-odstotni delež
On the basis of a ‘letter of intent’, IFB was obliged to make contributions to the current account.
Na podlagi „pisma o nameri“ je IFB morala nakazovati sredstva na tekoči račun.
IFB guaranteed security for a bank loan to NFTIou for which repayment has been requested by ING.
IFB je bila porok za bancno posojilo družbe NFTIou, za katerega je ING zahtevala vračilo
Belgium informed the Commission that filing for bankruptcy for NFTI-ou had never been envisaged, given that the continuation of business by NFTI-ou offered the prospect of profitability.
Belgija je sporočila Komisiji, da uvedba stečajnega postopka za NFTI-ou nikdar ni bila predvidena, ker je nadaljevanje dejavnosti NFTI-ou obetalo donosne možnosti.
According to Belgium, the sale of IFB’s shareholding of 30 % to CMA-CGM on 2 November 2006 […] and the full recovery of the sums awarded in the form of advances to the current account demonstrate the viability of this company.
Po mnenju Belgije prodaja 30-odstotnega deleža IFB podjetju CMA-CGM 2. novembra 2006 […] in celotno vračilo posojil, odobrenih v obliki predplačil na tekoči račun, dokazujeta sposobnost preživetja družbe.
As regards IFB France, which subsequently became AGEP, Belgium has provided the following table:
V zvezi z IFB France, ki je postala AGEP, je Belgija poslala naslednjo razpredelnico:
IFB France (AGEP) — Cession a NFTI-ou
IFB France (AGEP) – Prenos na NFTI-ou
Transfer NFTI-ou
Prenos NFTIou
Relinquishing of debts
Odpis terjatev
Capital depreciation on shareholding
Izguba vrednosti dele ža
Capital appreciation on completion of asset transfer
Kapitalski dobicek od prenosa delnic
Asset deficiency (14 FTE)
Socialne obveznosti (14 EPDC)
Faced with the risk of forced liquidation or of voluntary liquidation, IFB negotiated with PAD the transfer of title of IFB France to NFTI-ou by the means of the abandonment of debt by IFB.
Sprico tveganja prisilne likvidacije ali stecaja se je IFB dogovorila s PAD za prenos vrednostnih papirjev IFB France na NFTIou v zameno za odpis terjatev IFB
The liquidation of the company would have led to greatly increased costs (capital depreciation on shareholdings, risk of coverage of liabilities as representing founder and/or sole director).
Likvidacija družbe bi povzrocila veliko višje stroške (izguba vrednosti deleža, tveganje kopicenja obveznosti zaradi vloge ustanovitelja in/ali edinega dejanskega vodje)
As regards Dry Port Dunkerque, Belgium has provided the following table:
Z zvezi z Dry Port Dunkerque je Belgija poslala naslednjo razpredelnico:
Dry Port Dunkerque (DPD) — Liquidation with partial sale
Dry Port Dunkerque (DPD) – Likvidacija z delno prodajo
Liquidation with partial sale of assets
Likvidacija z delno prodajo premoženja
Actual cash drain (Actual CH of EUR – 0,5 million) (100 % lettrer of intent)
Diskontirani odliv denarnih sredstev (CH – 0,5 milijona EUR na leto) (100 % pismo o nameri)
Capital depreciation of debts
Izguba vrednosti terjatev
A letter of intent obliges IFB to make contributions to the current account in order to cover the operational losses of DPD.
Pismo o nameri je zavezovalo IFB, da je nakazovala sredstva na tekoci racun za pokrivanje izgub iz poslovanja DPD
After the divestiture in NFTI-ou, a buyer for the shareholding in DPD was sought but could not be found.
Po dezinvesticiji NFTIou so iskali kupca za delež v DPD, vendar ga niso našli
IFB negotiated the volontary liquidation of DPD, by means of a nominal sum for the shareholding of 8,6 % in NFTI-ou.
IFB je v pogajanjih dosegla sporazumno likvidacijo DPD v zameno za odstop 8,6-odstotnega deleža v NFTIou za simbolicno ceno
As regards SSTD, Belgium provided the following table:
Z zvezi s SSTD je Belgija poslala naslednjo razpredelnico:
Context:
Ozadje:
IFB owns a shareholding of 50 %.
družba IFB je imela 50-odstotni delež
SSTD had profitable activities which continued until the beginning of 2005.
SSTD je imela donosno dejavnost, ki se je nadaljevala do začetka leta 2005
At the end of 2004, SSTD lost its main client (representing 40 % of its turnover).
Konec leta 2004 je SSTD izgubila največjo stranko (ki je predstavljala 40 % njenega prometa)
This loss led to the decision to sell the shareholding in SSTD.
Ta izguba je pripeljala do odločitve o prodaji deleža SSTD
The sale of the shareholding was intervened at the beginning of 2005 and was completed with a negligible capital appreciation (positive but negligible impact on the borrowing requirements).
Delež je bil prodan v začetku leta 2005 z zanemarljivim kapitalskim dobičkom od prodaje (pozitiven, vendar zanemarljiv vpliv na potrebe po financiranju)
The Belgian authorities concluded that IFB chose the least costly solution as regards the French subsidiaries.
Belgijski organi iz tega sklepajo, da je IFB za francoske hčerinske družbe izbrala najcenejšo rešitev.
Restructuring and continuation of IFB’s activities in Belgium
Prestrukturiranje in nadaljevanje dejavnosti IFB v Belgiji
As regards the financing of the restructuring and the continuation of IFB’s activities in Belgium, Belgium considered that SNCB also behaved as an informed private creditor/investor in a market economy would have done, as the financial result of the alternative — the cessation of activities in Belgium — would have been, for SNCB, much less attractive and much more costly.
Belgija v zvezi s financiranjem prestrukturiranja in nadaljevanja dejavnosti IFB v Belgiji meni, da je družba SNCB prav tako ravnala, kot bi ravnal preudaren zasebni upnik/vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, ker bi bil za SNCB alternativni finančni rezultat – ukinitev dejavnosti v Belgiji – precej manj privlačen, saj bi bil dražji.
Belgium presented the following calculations to illustrate the alleged cost of the liquidation of IFB’s activities in Belgium and the alleged cost of remaining in business, subject to the capital increase.
Belgija je predstavila naslednje izračune za ponazoritev stroškov likvidacije dejavnosti IFB v Belgiji in stroškov nadaljevanja dejavnosti s povečanjem kapitala, na katere se sklicuje.
Net cost to SNCB if IFB had gone bankrupt in 2003
Neto stroški za SNCB v primeru stečaja IFB leta 2003
For the tangible fixed assets, Belgium retained an amount of EUR 6,9 million. To justify this calculation, Belgium refers to the study ‘Bankruptcy auctions: costs, debt recovery, and firm survival’ [17], which concludes that the rate of recovery of the bundle of debts in a bankruptcy scenario is on average 33 %.
Belgija za opredmetena osnovna sredstva določi znesek 6,9 milijona EUR. Pri utemeljevanju izračuna se Belgija sklicuje na študijo „Bankruptcy auctions: costs, debt recovery, and firm survival“ [17], v kateri je bilo ugotovljeno, da je stopnja izterjave vseh terjatev v primeru stečaja v povprečju 33-odstotna.
When calculating the assets recovered, Belgium applied this rate to the tangible fixed assets which appeared in IFB’s balance sheet totalling EUR 20,9 million (excluding the fixed assets under construction of EUR 1,9 million, for which a zero rate of recovery was used).
Pri izračunu povrnjenih sredstev je Belgija uporabila to stopnjo za opredmetena osnovna sredstva iz bilance stanja IFB v skupnem znesku 20,9 milijona EUR (razen za osnovna sredstva v gradnji v vrednosti 1,9 milijona EUR, za katera je uporabila 0-odstotno stopnjo izterjave).
For the financial fixed assets (shareholdings), Belgium assumed a value of EUR 1,9 million, which corresponds to their complete accounting value on the IFB balance sheet on 31 December 2002.
Za finančne naložbe (kapitalske udeležbe) je Belgija kot izhodišče vzela vrednost 1,9 milijona EUR, ki ustreza njihovi skupni računovodski vrednosti iz bilance stanja IFB na dan 31. decembra 2002.
For the current assets, Belgium proposed the following value estimates:
Za gibljiva sredstva Belgija predlaga naslednje ocene vrednosti:
IFB’s commercial debts: these concern a total of EUR 25,6 million of which EUR 18 million are considered to have been collected, which corresponds to a rate of recovery of 70 % for the short term debts. This rate is based on the average determined in the study ‘Liquidation of Ormet Corporation’ [18],Other IFB debt: this involves a total of EUR 7 million of which EUR 4,5 million are considered to have been to be collected.
komercialne terjatve IFB: gre za skupni znesek 25,6 milijona EUR, od katerih naj bi bilo izterljivih 18 milijonov, kar ustreza 70-odstotni stopnji izterjave za kratkoročne terjatve; ta stopnja temelji na povprečju, določenem v študiji „Liquidation of Ormet Corporation“ [18];druge terjatve IFB: gre za skupni znesek 7 milijonov EUR, od katerih naj bi bilo izterljivih 4,5 milijona.
The amount of EUR 7 million can be broken down into EUR 2,5 million of debts for the subsidiaries DPD and OCHZ, and EUR 4,5 million in VAT.
Znesek 7 milijonov EUR se lahko razdeli na 2,5 milijona terjatev do hčerinskih družb DPD in OCHZ in 4,5 milijona terjatev iz naslova DDV.
A rate of recovery of 100 % is assumed for the VAT debt, and a rate of recovery of 0 % for the two subsidiaries,
Za terjatev iz naslova DDV je predvidena 100-odstotna stopnja izterjave, za hčerinski družbi pa 0-odstotna stopnja izterjave;
Liquid assets and accruals and deferred payments: this involves a total of EUR 6,4 million which is considered to have been recovered in its entirety.
likvidna sredstva in aktivne časovne razmejitve: gre za skupni znesek 6,4 milijona EUR, ki naj bi bil v celoti izterljiv.
The application of this set of rates of recovery gives rise to a total recovery of EUR 37,5 million on the assumption of the bankruptcy/liquidation of IFB, as indicated in diagram 2.
Z uporabo vseh teh stopenj povračila bi v primeru stečaja/likvidacije IFB izterjali skupno 37,5 milijona EUR, kot kaže shema 2.
Diagram 2
Shema 2
Recovery of assets
Izterjava sredstev
Furthermore, the Belgian authorities deducted the amount of the recovery which could be expected for IFB’s liabilities.
Nato belgijski organi od zneska, za katerega se lahko pričakuje, da bo povrnjen, odštejejo obveznosti IFB.
Social liability: an estimated total of EUR 2,9 million for the IFB workforce, after subtraction of SNCB personnel seconded to IFB;
socialne obveznosti: ocenjeni skupni znesek 2,9 milijona EUR za vse zaposlene v IFB brez osebja SNCB, napotenega v IFB;
Taxes, salaries and social security: a total of EUR 1,4 million due but not paid (taken from the balance sheet of 1 January 2003;
davki, plače in socialna varnost: skupaj 1,4 milijona EUR dospelih, a neplačanih obveznosti (iz bilance na dan 1. januarja 2003);
maintenance of terminals: EUR 3,3 million,
vzdrževanje terminalov: 3,3 milijona EUR;
maintenance of logistics operation: EUR 0,9 million,
vzdrževanje za logistično dejavnost: 0,9 milijona EUR;
provisions for personnel restructuring: EUR 1,9 million,
rezervacije za prestrukturiranje osebja: 1,9 milijona EUR;
IFB’s financial debt totalling EUR 15 million. The financial debt of EUR 15 million, contracted with credit institutions […], was guaranteed by IFB’s commercial receivables.
finančni dolg IFB v skupnem znesku 15 milijonov EUR. Finančni dolg v višini 15 milijonov EUR pri kreditnih institucijah […] je bil zavarovan s komercialnimi terjatvami IFB.
For this reason, and with regard to the preservation of SNCB’s credit in the banking market, it is clear that this debt would also have been repaid to the credit institutions before the eventual repayment of SNCB’s receivables;
Zaradi tega in glede na to, da je družba SNCB ohranila posojilo na bančnem trgu, je jasno, da bi se ta dolg vrnil kreditnim institucijam pred morebitnim povračilom terjatev SNCB;