natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In a situation presenting ‘a particular risk’ the Commission notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates indicates that the adequate reference point to determine the existence and the amount of State aid is the reference rate for Greece (i.e. ATHIBOR plus 300 basis points until 31 December 2000 and 5 year EUR swap rate plus 75 basis points from 1 January 2001) increased by a risk premium of at least 400 basis points (i.e. this means ATHIBOR plus at least 700 bps until 31 December 2000 and 5 year EUR swap rate plus at least 475 bps from 1 January 2001).
V zvezi s položajem, ki predstavlja „posebno tveganje“, je v Obvestilu Komisije o metodi določanja referenčnih obrestnih mer in diskontnih stopenj navedeno, da je ustrezna referenčna točka za ugotovitev obstoja in višine državne pomoči referenčna obrestna mera za Grčijo (tj. ATHIBOR, povečan za 300 bazičnih točk do 31. decembra 2000 in petletna menjalna obrestna mera v evrih, povečana za 75 bazičnih točk od 1. januarja 2001), povečana za premijo za tveganje v višini najmanj 400 bazičnih točk (tj. ATHIBOR, povečan za najmanj 700 bazičnih točk do 31. decembra 2000 in petletna menjalna obrestna mera v eurih, povečana za najmanj 475 bazičnih točk od 1. januarja 2001).
As regards guarantees on loans, the Commission will assess the existence of aid on the basis of the same method, i.e. by comparing the total cost of the guaranteed loan (i.e. interest rate paid by HSY to the bank plus guarantee premium paid by HSY to the guarantor) with the cost which HSY would have supported if it had concluded this loan on the market (i.e. reference rate for Greece plus at least 400 basis points).
V zvezi s posojilnimi poroštvi bo Komisija opravila oceno obstoja pomoči na podlagi iste metode, tj. s primerjavo skupnega stroška posojila s poroštvom (npr. obrestna mera, ki jo je podjetje HSY plačalo banki, povečana za poroštveno premijo, ki jo je podjetje HSY plačalo poroku) in stroškov, ki bi jih podjetje HSY nosilo, če bi to posojilo sklenilo na trgu (tj. referenčna obrestna mera za Grčijo, povečana za najmanj 400 bazičnih točk).
Evolution from 1997
Razvoj od leta 1997
As will be explained below, the Commission can not exclude that until 30 June 1999 HSY was still able to borrow from the market at the interest rate such as defined in the previous section.
Kot bo pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, Komisija ne more zanemariti dejstva, da si je podjetje HSY do 30. junija 1999 še vedno lahko izposojalo sredstva na trgu po obrestni meri, ki je opredeljena v prejšnjem oddelku.
The first shipbuilding contract that the yard succeeded to conclude concerned the construction of two ferries for Strintzis.
Prva pogodba za gradnjo ladij, ki jo je ladjedelnica uspela skleniti, se je nanašala na gradnjo dveh trajektov za podjetje Strintzis.
In July 1999, the Greek navy awarded the construction of three submarines to HSY and HDW.
Julija 1999 je Grška mornarica pri podjetjih HSY in HDW naročila gradnjo treh podmornic.
The three submarines were planned to be constructed over nearly 10 years and the total contract was amounting to around GRD 350 billion (EUR 1 billion), of which around three quarters would go to HDW, which was due to supply the machinery, pressure components and sensitive electronics systems.
Tri podmornice naj bi se po načrtih gradile skoraj več kot deset let, skupna vrednost pogodbe pa je znašala približno 350 milijard GRD (1 milijardo EUR), od katere naj bi približno tri četrtine pripadle podjetju HDW, ki je moralo dobaviti strojno opremo, tlačne sestavne dele in občutljive elektronske sisteme.
In addition, the first submarine was to be constructed at HDW’s yard in Kiel.
Poleg tega je bilo načrtovano tudi, da bi se prva podmornica zgradila v ladjedelnici podjetja HDW v Kielu.
Therefore this project would not generate a lot of activities and income for HSY during the first years.
Ta projekt torej v prvih letih podjetju HSY ne bi zagotovil veliko dejavnosti in prihodka.
In view of the failure to build a large and profitable order book in 1997, 1998 and in the first months of 1999, the management and any investor having analysed the situation of the yard must have realised at the latest in the first months of 1999 that the yard would not have a sufficient level of activity in 1999 and 2000 to cover its costs and that in these years the yard would record large losses reducing its net equity to a small amount.
Glede na to, da v letih 1997 in 1998 ter v prvih mesecih leta 1999 obsežna in donosna knjiga naročil ni bila sestavljena, je vodstvo skupaj z morebitnimi vlagatelji najpozneje v prvih mesecih leta 1999 na podlagi analize položaja ladjedelnice zagotovo spoznalo, da ladjedelnica v letih 1999 in 2000 ne bo ustvarila zadostnega obsega dejavnosti, da bi lahko pokrila stroške, in da bo v teh letih ladjedelnica zabeležila velike izgube, ki bodo njen neto lastniški kapital zmanjšale na majhen znesek.
In these circumstances a return to viability could not be expected anymore.
V teh okoliščinah obnovitve sposobnosti preživetja ni bilo več mogoče pričakovati.
As a subsidiary element, the Commission notes that the first report performed by the Greek authorities regarding the implementation of the investment plan showed that on 30 June 1999 only a small part of the plan had been completed.
V dopolnilo temu Komisija ugotavlja, da je iz prvega poročila, ki so ga izdelali grški organi v zvezi z izvajanjem naložbenega načrta, razvidno, da je bil 30. junija 1999 dovršen samo majhen del tega načrta.
Therefore, besides the commercial setbacks, the modernisation of the facilities was slow.
Zato je ob poslovnih ovirah posodobitev obratov potekala počasi.
Finally, the Commission notes that the looming financial difficulties caused a dispute between the independent management team of the yard (i.e. Brown & Root, which was appointed in September 1996) and the employees/shareholders.
Komisija ugotavlja tudi, da so grozeče finančne težave povzročile spor med neodvisno vodstveno ekipo ladjedelnice (tj. Brown & Root, ki je bila imenovana septembra 1996) in zaposlenimi/delničarji.
In particular, the management insisted on the necessity to carry out additional workforce reduction due to the low level of activity.
Vodstvo je zlasti vztrajalo na potrebi po dodatnem zmanjšanju delovne sile zaradi majhnega obsega dejavnosti.
The union leaders opposed to such a reform and succeeded in getting the management team ousted.
Vodje sindikatov so takšni reformi nasprotovali in so uspeli vodstvo odstraniti.
Such an event, creating management discontinuity and illustrating the difficulty to implement sufficient reforms in the yard, was an additional element which would have deterred a market economy investor to lend money to HSY.
Takšne okoliščine, v katerih je prišlo do prekinitve delovanja vodstva in ki kaže na težave pri izvajanju ustreznih reform v ladjedelnici, so bile samo dodaten element, ki bi vlagatelja iz tržnega gospodarstva odvrnil od namere, da podjetju HSY posodi denar.
From the foregoing, the Commission concludes that from 30 June 1999 it was not reasonable anymore to expect a return to viability.
Na podlagi navedenega Komisija ugotavlja, da po 30. juniju 1999 obnovitve sposobnosti preživetja ni bilo več upravičeno pričakovati.
Consequently, the Commission considers that from that date no bank would have accepted to lend to the yard anymore, even at high interest rates, and no bank would have accepted to grant a guarantee anymore, even in exchange of a high guarantee fee.
Komisija zato meni, da po tem datumu nobena banka ladjedelnici ne bi več odobrila ne posojila – niti po visoki obrestni meri –, ne poroštva – niti v zameno za plačilo visoke poroštvene premije.
Since HSY would not have received a loan or guarantee from the market, any loan or guarantee granted after 30 June 1999 automatically constitutes aid.
Ker podjetje HSY na trgu ne bi moglo dobiti posojila ali poroštva, vsako posojilo ali poroštvo, odobreno po 30. juniju 1999, avtomatično pomeni pomoč.
If found incompatible and still outstanding, any guarantee has to be stopped immediately, and any loan has to be immediately reimbursed.
Če se ugotovi, da sta posojilo in poroštvo nezdružljiva ter še vedno neporavnana, je treba poroštvo takoj preklicati, posojilo pa takoj povrniti.
The reimbursement — following the normal time schedule laid down in the loan contract and following from the present decision — of any loan granted after 30 June 1999 is however not sufficient to restore the initial situation since until the reimbursement date HSY has had at its disposal a financing that it normally would not have obtained from the market.
Povračilo vsakega posojila v skladu z običajnim terminskim načrtom, določenim v posojilni pogodbi, in v skladu s to odločbo, odobrenega po 30. juniju 1999, pa ne zadostuje za obnovitev začetnega položaja, saj je podjetje HSY do datuma povračila imelo na voljo finančna sredstva, ki jih sicer na trgu ne bi moglo pridobiti.
In order to restore the initial situation, this advantage, of which the size can only be approximated by using the interest rate of a very risky loan, should therefore also be recovered.
Za namen obnovitve začetnega položaja bi bilo torej treba obnoviti tudi to prednost, katere obseg je mogoče približno oceniti samo z uporabo obrestne mere zelo tveganega posojila.
Therefore, for the period running from the pay-out of the loan to HSY until the reimbursement by HSY, the Commission has to order the recovery the difference between the interest rate actually paid by HSY and an interest rate theoretically adequate for a loan presenting a very high risk.
Zato mora Komisija za obdobje od izplačila posojila podjetju HSY do njegovega povračila s strani podjetja HSY odrediti povračilo razlike med obrestno mero, ki jo je podjetje HSY dejansko plačalo, in obrestno mero, ki je teoretično ustrezna posojilu, ki predstavlja zelo visoko tveganje.
In order to determine the latter interest rate, the Commission notes that the Commission notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates indicates that the risk premium may be higher than 400 basis points above the reference rate ‘if no private bank would have agreed to grant the relevant loan’, which is the situation in the present case.
Komisija za namen določitve slednje obrestne mere opozarja, da je v Obvestilu Komisije o metodi določanja referenčnih obrestnih mer in diskontnih stopenj navedeno, da bi bila lahko premija za tveganje višja od 400 bazičnih točk nad referenčno obrestno mero, „če nobena zasebna banka ne bi privolila v odobritev ustreznega posojila“, kar velja v tem primeru.
In several decisions, the Commission has considered that a premium of 600 basis points above the reference rate was adequate minimum to reflect a situation containing a high risk.
Komisija je v več odločbah izrazila mnenje, da bi najnižjo vrednost, s katero bi se odrazil položaj, za katerega je značilno visoko tveganje, predstavljala premija v višini 600 bazičnih točk nad referenčno obrestno mero.
The Commission considers that this constitutes the minimum for loans in the present situation.
Komisija meni, da v tem položaju to predstavlja najnižjo vrednost za posojila.
As regards State guarantees granted after 30 June 1999, the Commission will use the same approach: for the period for the pay-out of the guaranteed loan until the termination of the guarantee — whether following the normal calendar laid down in the guarantee contract or following from the present decision — the Commission will order the recovery of the difference between the cost of the guaranteed loan (interest rate paid to the bank plus guarantee premium paid) and the reference rate for Greece increased by 600 basis points.
Komisija bo v zvezi z državnimi poroštvi, odobrenimi po 30. juniju 1999, uporabila isti pristop: za obdobje od izplačila posojila s poroštvom do izteka poroštva – bodisi v skladu z običajnim časovnim razporedom, določenim v pogodbi o poroštvu, bodisi v skladu s to odločbo – bo Komisija odredila povračilo razlike med stroški posojila s poroštvom (obrestna mera, izplačana banki, povečana za plačano poroštveno premijo) in referenčno obrestno mero za Grčijo, povečano za 600 bazičnih točk.
In order to underpin its claim that the loans and guarantees granted by the State and ETVA could have been granted at the same terms by a private bank, HSY has submitted the first Deloitte report.
Da bi podprlo svojo trditev, da bi posojila in poroštva, ki sta jih odobrili država in banka ETVA, lahko pod enakimi pogoji odobrile tudi zasebne banke, je podjetje HSY predložilo prvo poročilo revizijske hiše Deloitte.
In the section 5 of this report, Deloitte analyses the creditworthiness of HSY in 1999 and in the following years.
V oddelku 5 tega poročila revizijska hiša Deloitte analizira kreditno sposobnost podjetja HSY v letu 1999 in naslednjih letih.
It concludes that ‘the Company could have alternatively borrowed or received letters of guarantee from another non-affiliated financial institution (i.e. with no other relationship, apart from the regular commercial collaboration) during the period under examination’.
Ugotovljeno je, da bi „podjetje v analiziranem obdobju lahko najelo posojilo ali pridobilo izjave o poroštvu tudi od drugih nepovezanih finančnih ustanov (tj. samo v okviru običajnega poslovnega sodelovanja).“.
The Commission observes that the report does not explain how this conclusion can be reconciled with the fact that HSY’s attempts to raise funds from other financial institutions have failed.
Komisija meni, da poročilo ne pojasnjuje, kako se ta sklep ujema z dejstvom, da je bilo podjetje HSY neuspešno, ko je poskušalo pridobiti sredstva od drugih finančnih ustanov.
In addition, the Commission notes that the analysis contains a series of errors, which significantly bias the conclusion.
Poleg tega Komisija opozarja, da analiza vsebuje niz napak, ki bistveno vplivajo na sam sklep.
Intra-group analysis
Analiza v skupini
All the loans and guarantees subject to the current procedure were granted by ETVA or by the State.
Vsa posojila in poroštva, ki so predmet tega postopka, sta odobrili bodisi banka ETVA bodisi država.
The Greek authorities claim that since ETVA and the Greek State (through ETVA) were shareholders of HSY, the loans and guarantees could be seen as intra-group transactions.
Grški organi trdijo, da je ta posojila in poroštva mogoče šteti za transakcije v skupini, saj sta banka ETVA in grška država (prek banke ETVA) delničarki podjetja HSY.
In this context, Greece makes two claims:
V tem okviru Grčija trdi:
First, that it is normal for a mother company to lend at favourable conditions to its subsidiary.
prvič, da je za matično podjetje povsem običajno, da svoji podružnici odobri posojila po ugodnih pogojih.
Indeed, the advantage granted to the subsidiary increases the value of the shares held by the mother company.
Prednost, ki je omogočena podružnici, dejansko povečuje vrednost delnic, ki so v lasti matičnega podjetja.
Therefore, even if the Commission would consider that ETVA and the State granted loans and guarantees at a price below the market price, this would have been acceptable to a market economy investor in a similar situation.
Tudi če bi Komisija menila, da sta banka ETVA in država odobrili posojila in poroštva po ceni, ki je nižja od tržne cene, bi bilo to v podobnih okoliščinah sprejemljivo za vlagatelja iz tržnega gospodarstva.
Consequently, these loans and guarantees would not constitute aid,
Zato ta posojila in poroštva ne bi pomenila pomoči.
Second, it is normal for a mother company to lend to its subsidiary in difficulty.
Drugič, povsem običajno je, da matično podjetje odobri posojilo podružnici v težavah.
Indeed, such lending aims at preserving the value of the shareholding held by the mother company.
Namen takšnega posojila je dejansko ohranitev vrednosti deleža matičnega podjetja.
Therefore, even if the Commission should consider that no private bank would have lend to HSY during a certain period because the yard’s situation was too bad, loans and guarantees granted by ETVA and by the State should nevertheless be considered as acceptable for a private investor in similar circumstances.
Tudi če bi Komisija menila, da v določenem obdobju nobena zasebna banka ne bi odobrila posojila podjetju HSY, ker je položaj ladjedelnice preslab, bi bila lahko posojila in poroštva, ki sta jih odobrili banka ETVA in država, kljub temu v podobnih okoliščinah sprejemljiva za zasebnega vlagatelja.
These loans and guarantees would therefore not constitute aid.
Ta posojila in poroštva torej ne bi pomenila pomoči.
The Commission consider that Greece’s conclusions are not correct.
Komisija meni, da ugotovitve Grčije niso pravilne.
First, the Commission notes the two following elements.
Prvič, Komisija opozarja na naslednja dva elementa.
In first instance, no market economy investor would have found itself in the situation of ETVA.
V prvem primeru se noben vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva ne bi znašel v položaju, v katerem je bila banka ETVA.
Indeed, it is recalled for instance that when ETVA purchased HSY in 1985, it was a development bank, acting upon order of the government, in order to avoid the closure of a company of significant importance for the Greek economy.
Opozoriti je treba, da je bila banka ETVA v času nakupa podjetja HSY leta 1985 dejansko razvojna banka, ki je ravnala na podlagi odredbe vlade, da bi preprečila zaprtje podjetja, ki je imelo velik pomen za grško gospodarstvo.
In order to keep HSY alive, ETVA made in 1986 a capital injection, which was found to constitute aid by the Commission .
Da bi se podjetje HSY ohranilo, je banka ETVA leta 1986 izvršila dokapitalizacijo, za katero je Komisija ugotovila, da pomeni pomoč .
In 1995, ETVA kept ‘a 51 % majority holding’ in HSY because Greece claimed it was ‘justified by defence interest’, in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 90/684/EEC.
Leta 1995 je banka ETVA v skladu s členom 10 Direktive 90/684/EGS ohranila „51-odstotno večinski delež“ v podjetju HSY, ker je Grčija trdila, da je bilo to „upravičeno iz obrambnega interesa“.
In second instance, the Commission observes, when all the measures implemented by the State (including the measures implemented by ETVA, since, as will be demonstrated later in this Decision, they are imputable to the State) in favour of HSY are taken into account — and in particular the repeated and large State aids granted to HSY in the period until 2002 —, it appears clearly that, during the period until 2002, the State has not acted as a market economy investor.
Komisija v drugem primeru ugotavlja, da je po upoštevanju vseh ukrepov, ki jih je v korist podjetja HSY izvedla država (vključno z ukrepi banke ETVA, saj je te, kot bo pokazano pozneje v tej odločbi, mogoče pripisati državi) – in zlasti večkratne in obsežne državne pomoči, odobrene podjetju HSY v obdobju do leta 2002 – povsem očitno, da v obdobju do leta 2002 država ni ravnala kot vlagatelja iz tržnega gospodarstva.
It has constantly provided the large financial support necessary to keep HSY alive, what has been highly costly.
Država je namreč nenehno zagotavljala visoko finančno podporo, potrebno za ohranitev podjetja HSY, kar je bilo izredno drago.
In conclusion, since the State (through ETVA) found itself in the situation of being the shareholder of HSY only because it acted as a public authority willing to preserve the activities of HSY at all costs and since it has never acted like a market economy investor who wants to make money thanks to its shareholding in HSY, the claim that ETVA and the State acted in a way acceptable for a market economy investor because the too low interest rates (or guarantee fee) charged on the financing (loans and guarantees) which they granted to HSY was compensated by an increase of the value of the share of HSY lacks credibility.
Ker se je država (prek banke ETVA) torej znašla v položaju, v katerem je veljala za delničarko podjetja HSY samo zato, ker je ravnala kot javni organ, ki je pripravljen, da za vsako ceno ohrani dejavnosti podjetja HSY, in ker ni nikoli ravnala kot vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva, ki želi ustvariti denar s pomočjo svojega deleža v podjetju HSY, je trditev, da sta banka ETVA in država ravnali na način, ki bi bil sprejemljiv za vlagatelja iz tržnega gospodarstva, neverodostojna, saj so prenizke obrestne mere (ali poroštvene premije), zaračunane za finančna sredstva (posojila in poroštva), ki sta jih odobrili podjetju HSY, nadomestila povečanja vrednosti delnic podjetja HSY.
Since the State (included ETVA) has never acted like an investor trying to make profit but conversely accepted to keep HSY alive at that high price, Greece and HSY should have at least underpinned their claim by a detail analysis showing that, as shareholder of HSY, the State and ETVA could really expect a capital gain (i.e. an increase of the value of the shares) higher than the ‘foregone revenues’ (i.e. the insufficient interest rate or the insufficient guarantee premium).
Ker država (vključno z banko ETVA) ni nikoli ravnala kot vlagatelj, ki želi ustvariti dobiček, ampak je ravno nasprotno privolila v ohranitev podjetja HSY za visoko ceno, bi morali Grčija in podjetje HSY svojo trditev podpreti vsaj s podrobno analizo, ki bi pokazala, da bi država in banka ETVA kot delničarki podjetja HSY lahko dejansko pričakovali kapitalski dobiček (tj. povečanje vrednosti delnic), ki bi bil višji od „prihodkov, ki sta se jim odrekli“ (tj. nezadostne obrestne mere ali nezadostne poroštvene premije).
Since such an analysis has not been provided and since HSY and Greece made that doubtful and hypothetical claim without any supporting evidence, the Commission dismisses without further analysis their claim that the State (including ETVA) acted as a market economy investor since the financing granted at favourable terms triggered an increase of the value of HSY shares which was sufficiently important to compensate the ‘foregone revenues’.
Ker takšna analiza ni bila predložena ter ker sta podjetje HSY in Grčija navedli malo verjetno in hipotetično trditev brez kakršnega koli dokaza, Komisija brez nadaljnje analize zavrača njuno trditev, da je država (vključno z banko ETVA) ravnala kot vlagatelj iz tržnega gospodarstva, saj so finančna sredstva, odobrena pod ugodnimi pogoji, povzročila povečanje vrednosti delnic podjetja HSY, ki je bilo dovolj pomembno, da so se tako nadomestili „prihodki, ki sta se jim odrekli“.
Second, even if the foregoing reasoning were dismissed and the intra-group aspects should be analysed (i.e. the potential increase of the value of HSY’s shares), there are ample evidence that the transactions carried out by ETVA would have not been acceptable for a market economy investor which would have hold a 51 % shareholding in HSY.
Drugič, tudi če je bila prej omenjena trditev zavrnjena in bi bilo treba analizirati vidike v skupini (tj. potencialno povečanje vrednosti delnic podjetja HSY), obstajajo zadostni dokazi o tem, da transakcije, ki jih je izvršila banka ETVA, za vlagatelja iz tržnega gospodarstva, ki bi imel 51-odstotni delež v podjetju HSY, ne bi bile sprejemljive.
At the end of 1995, 49 % of the ownership of HSY was transferred to the employees of HSY.
Konec leta 1995 se je 49-odstotno lastništvo podjetja HSY preneslo na zaposlene v podjetju HSY.
The price that the employees would pay to purchase this 49 % stake was decided at that moment.
Cena, ki so jo zaposleni plačali za nakup tega 49-odstotnega deleža, je bila določena v tistem trenutku.
Therefore, in the following years, when ETVA and the State were providing financing to HSY at a price below what a (non-affiliated) private bank would have charged, 49 % of the increase of the value of HSY resulting from this savings (i.e. HSY was paying lower interest rates) was benefiting the other shareholders of HSY.
Zato je v naslednjih letih, ko sta banka ETVA in država zagotovili finančna sredstva podjetju HSY po ceni, ki je bila nižja od cene, ki bi jo zaračunala (nepovezana) zasebna banka, 49-odstotno povečanje vrednosti podjetja HSY, ki je bilo rezultat tega prihranka (tj. podjetje HSY je plačevalo nižje obrestne mere), šlo v korist drugim delničarjem podjetja HSY.