natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The arrangements for adjusting instalments also provide for additional payments to be made by the State.
V ureditvi za prilagoditev obrokov so določena tudi morebitna dodatna plačila, ki jih opravi država.
Subsequent agreements also provide for penalties if the basic number of crossings that have not been made by SNCM in the course of the year exceeds 2 % of the basic number of crossings provided for in the agreement.
V naknadno sklenjenih pogodbah so določene tudi kazni, če med letom število osnovnih povezav, ki jih SNCM ni opravila, presega 2 % števila osnovnih povezav, določenih v pogodbi.
The awarding authority may also notify SNCM that it is withholding the lump-sum payment for territorial continuity in the case of significant incidents causing the interruption of the public service.’
Organ, ki podeljuje koncesije, lahko družbo SNCM tudi obvesti, da bo zadržal pavšalno plačilo za ozemeljsko kontinuiteto v primeru večjih incidentov, ki povzročijo prekinitev opravljanja javne službe.“
In recital 82 of that decision, the Commission states that the second part of clause IV stipulates that ‘should economic conditions and, in particular, operational costs and traffic levels that have served as the basis for calculating the subsidy deteriorate substantially, SNCM and the OTC will get together to study the measures to be implemented regarding the service, fares or raising of the amount of the award in order to re-establish the financial equilibrium of the company’.
Komisija v točki 82 iste odločbe navaja, da je v drugem delu te točke IV določeno, da „če bi se gospodarski pogoji in zlasti stroški poslovanja ter ravni prometa, ki so bili podlaga za izračun subvencije, bistveno poslabšali, se bosta SNCM in OTC sestala in skupaj proučila ukrepe, ki jih je treba izvesti v zvezi s povezavami, cenami ali popravkom zneska subvencije navzgor, da se znova vzpostavi finančno ravnovesje družbe“.
In the light of the foregoing, and as it concluded in its 2001 decision, the Commission is of the opinion that the compensation of EUR 53,48 million paid by the State is not a lump sum because of the mechanism serving to offset the financial imbalance which is connected to the disparity between the actual operational costs and the costs which served as the basis for calculating the subsidy.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno in kot je ugotovila v Odločbi iz leta 2001, Komisija meni, da nadomestilo v višini 53,48 milijona EUR, ki ga je izplačala država, ni pavšalno zaradi mehanizma, ki omogoča izravnavo finančnega neravnovesja, izhajajočega iz neskladnosti med dejanskimi stroški poslovanja in stroški, ki so bili podlaga za izračun subvencije.
Matching of the compensation to the public service costs
Ujemanje nadomestil s stroški javne službe
As noted by the Commission in its decision of 2001, the financial compensation received at the time of the application of the five-year agreements of 1991 and 1996 did not enable SNCM to make good fully the losses related to its public service obligations.
Kot je Komisija ugotovila v Odločbi iz leta 2001, finančna nadomestila, ki so bila v tistem času prejeta na podlagi petletnih pogodb iz leta 1991 in leta 1996, družbi SNCM niso omogočila, da bi v celoti poravnala izgube, povezane z obveznostmi javne službe.
The Commission estimated that that undercompensation amounted to EUR 53,48 million.
Komisija je ocenila, da je to prenizko nadomestilo znašalo 53,48 milijona EUR.
The Commission concludes that the sum of EUR 53,48 million paid by the State is equal to the undercompensation noted for the 1991-2001 period and is consequently appropriate in the light of the net costs caused by the public service task entrusted to SNCM.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je znesek v višini 53,48 milijona EUR, ki ga je izplačala država, enak premajhnemu nadomestilu, ugotovljenemu za obdobje 1991–2001, in je torej ustrezen glede na neto stroške, povzročene z nalogo javne službe, ki jo je morala opravljati družba SNCM.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission takes the view that the measure in question constitutes State aid which is compatible with the common market in accordance with Article 86(2) EC.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno Komisija meni, da je zadevni ukrep državna pomoč, ki je združljiva s skupnim trgom na podlagi člena 86(2) ES.
Since the measure was implemented on 14 November 2003, the Commission finds that that State aid was unlawful.
Ker je bil ukrep izveden 14. novembra 2003, Komisija ugotavlja, da je ta državna pomoč nezakonita.
The disposal of SNCM at a negative sale price of EUR 158 million
Prodaja družbe SNCM po negativni prodajni ceni 158 milijonov EUR
In the present case, the Commission must examine whether the capital contribution of the State of EUR 158 million prior to the sale of SNCM to private purchasers, that is to say ultimately the negative sale price of the undertaking for an equivalent amount, does not contain aid elements.
Komisija mora v obravnavanem primeru proučiti, ali kapitalski vložek države v višini 158 milijonov EUR pred prodajo družbe SNCM zasebnim kupcem, to je in fine negativna prodajna cena podjetja v enakovrednem znesku, ne vsebuje elementov državne pomoči.
An open, transparent and non-discriminatory public selection procedure at the end of which the State disposes of the undertaking after a prior recapitalisation (for an amount greater than the sale price) does not necessarily exclude the presence of aid, capable of benefiting both the privatised undertaking and the puurchaser of that undertaking.
Odprt, pregleden in nediskriminacijski javni postopek izbire, po koncu katerega država proda podjetje po predhodni finančni sanaciji (v znesku, višjem od prodajne cene), ne omogoča nujno izključitve prisotnosti pomoči, ki bi lahko koristila hkrati privatiziranemu podjetju in njegovemu kupcu.
Legal framework
Referenčni pravni okvir
In order to determine whether an undertaking has obtained an economic advantage from a capital contribution from the State, the Commission generally applies the criterion of the private investor in a market economy principle (the private investor principle).
Da bi Komisija preverila, ali je podjetje pridobilo gospodarsko prednost na podlagi kapitalskega vložka države, načeloma uporabi merilo „zasebnega vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu“ (v nadaljnjem besedilu: merilo zasebnega vlagatelja).
The private investor criterion comes from the principle of equal treatment between the public and private sectors which follows from Article 295 of the EC Treaty.
Merilo zasebnega vlagatelja izvira iz načela enake obravnave javnega in zasebnega sektorja, ki izhaja iz člena 295 Pogodbe ES.
According to that principle, the capital made available to the undertaking, directly or indirectly, in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions, cannot be classified as State aid.
V skladu s tem načelom kapital, ki ga država posredno ali neposredno da na voljo podjetju v okoliščinah, ki ustrezajo običajnim tržnim razmeram, ne more veljati za državno pomoč.
To that end, the Commission may assess, inter alia, whether the supplier of the resources has acted like a private investor pursuing structural, global or sectoral policies and influenced by prospects of long-term profitability.
V ta namen lahko Komisija zlasti oceni, ali je tisti, ki je priskrbel sredstva, ravnal kot zasebni vlagatelj, ki sledi globalni ali sektorski strukturni politiki in ga vodijo obeti dolgoročne donosnosti vloženih sredstev.
The validity of that approach has been recognised by the Community judicature in several cases.
Veljavnost tega pristopa je v več zadevah priznalo sodišče Skupnosti.
According to settled case-law, when injections of capital by a public investor disregard any prospect of profitability, even in the long term, such provision of capital constitutes State aid.
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso kapitalski vložek javnega vlagatelja brez kakršnega koli obeta dobička, tudi dolgoročnega, pomeni državno pomoč.
The Community judicature have also laid down that a private investor pursuing a structural policy, whether general or sectoral, and guided by prospects of viability in the long term could not reasonably allow itself, after years of continuous losses, to make a contribution of capital which, in economic terms, proves to be not only costlier than selling the assets, but is moreover linked to the sale of the undertaking, which removes any hope of profit, even in the longer term.
Sodišče Skupnosti je tudi odločilo, da si zasebni vlagatelj, ki sledi globalni ali sektorski strukturni politiki in ga vodijo obeti dolgoročne donosnosti, ne more razumno dovoliti, da po letih neprekinjenih izgub izvede kapitalski vložek, ki je, gospodarsko gledano, ne samo dražji od likvidacije sredstev, ampak je med drugim povezan s prodajo podjetja, kar odvzame vsako upanje na dobiček, tudi dolgoročno.
Specifically, in its Gröditzer judgment, the Court held that, in order to establish whether the privatisation of an undertaking for a negative sale price involves elements of State aid, ‘it is necessary to assess whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor of a dimension comparable to that of the bodies managing the public sector could have been prevailed upon to make capital contributions of the same size in connection with the sale of that undertaking or whether it would instead have chosen to wind it up’.
Natančneje, Sodišče je v sodbi Gröditzer razsodilo, da je treba za določitev, ali privatizacija podjetja po negativni prodajni ceni vsebuje elemente pomoči: „presoditi, ali bi se v podobnih okoliščinah zasebni vlagatelj velikosti, ki jo je mogoče primerjati z velikostjo organov, ki upravljajo javni sektor, lahko odločil za tako velike kapitalske vložke na podlagi prodaje navedenega podjetja ali bi se odločil za njegovo likvidacijo“.
Application to the present case
Uporaba v obravnavanem primeru
In the light of the foregoing, in order to determine the aid nature of the measure in question, the Commission must ‘assess whether the solution chosen by the State is, both in absolute terms and compared with any other solution including that of non-intervention, the least costly, which would lead, if that were the case, to the conclusion that the State has acted like a private investor’.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno mora Komisija, da bi določila naravo pomoči zadevnega ukrepa, „oceniti, ali je rešitev, ki jo je izbrala država, absolutno in v primerjavi s katero koli drugo rešitvijo, vključno z neposredovanjem, najcenejša, kar bi, če bi to držalo, privedlo do ugotovitve, da je država ravnala kot zasebni vlagatelj“.
Observance of the principle of the private shareholder in a market economy
Upoštevanje načela zasebnega delničarja v tržnem gospodarstvu
In that context, it must be noted that large groups of undertakings currently cannot, when they close sites or wind up subsidiaries, disregard the social consequences which such closures or liquidations involve.
V tem smislu je treba navesti, da danes velike skupine podjetij, ki zaprejo obrate ali likvidirajo hčerinske družbe, ne morejo prezreti socialnih posledic takih zaprtij ali likvidacij.
Accordingly, more often than not they carry out social plans which may include measures for the redeployment of staff, assistance in finding work, redundancy payments and even action at the local economic level, which go beyond the requirements of statutory provisions and collective agreements.
Zato najpogosteje izvajajo socialne načrte, ki lahko vključujejo prekvalifikacijo osebja, pomoč pri iskanju zaposlitve, odpravnine in celo ukrepe v lokalni gospodarski strukturi, ki presegajo to, kar je določeno z zakonodajo in kolektivnimi pogodbami.
In the present case, the Commission notes that SNCM is a company controlled by the State through CGMF (Compagnie Maritime Générale et Financière).
V obravnavanem primeru Komisija ugotavlja, da je SNCM družba, ki jo država nadzira prek skupine CGMF (Compagnie Maritime Générale et Financière).
The Commission takes the view that, in the event of SNCM’s liquidation, such measures would have been introduced which exceeded any statutory obligations with the aim of avoiding harming the brand image of the holding company to which it belongs and its ultimate shareholder.
Komisija meni, da bi bili v primeru likvidacije družbe SNCM taki ukrepi izvedeni poleg zakonskih obveznosti, da ne bi očrnili ugleda holdinga, ki mu pripada, in njenega končnega delničarja.
The Commission notes that the spectre of the liquidation of the undertaking in 2004 gave rise to major incidents of social unrest.
Komisija opozarja, da je grožnja likvidacije podjetja leta 2004 sprožila številne in velike socialne nemire.
The violent social unrest of September 2004, for example, brought SNCM’s fleet to a standstill for 16 days.
Velik socialni konflikt septembra 2004 je na primer za 16 dni blokiral ladjevje družbe SNCM.
The Commission adds that the French authorities provided figures to show that the industrial action of 2004, by tarnishing the brand image of the holding company with customers, was considerably detrimental to the number of passengers transported by SNCM and therefore to the undertaking’s turnover.
Komisija dodaja, da so francoski organi s številkami dokazali, da so leta 2004 ta socialna gibanja, ki so pri strankah očrnila ugled holdinga, ki mu SNCM pripada, zelo škodila družbi SNCM v smislu števila prepeljanih potnikov in posledično, ustvarjenega prometa.
The Commission points out, moreover, that as a result of the adverse effect of the social climate in the summer of 2004 on SNCM’s financial situation, the shareholder of the undertaking implemented a social plan in spring 2005 which was suspended in April 2005, in consultation with the unions.
Komisija poleg tega poudarja, da je zaradi škodljivega socialnega ozračja poleti leta 2004, ki je škodovalo finančnemu položaju družbe SNCM, delničar podjetja spomladi leta 2005 izdelal socialni načrt, ki je bil aprila 2005 odložen v soglasju s sindikati.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission takes the view that it has been established that, in the event of a liquidation of SNCM, the CGMF group’s failure to take responsibility for the additional redundancy payments would certainly damage the brand image of the holding company to which it belongs and its ultimate shareholder.
Na podlagi zgoraj navedenega je po mnenju Komisije nedvomno, da bi zagotovo škodovalo ugledu holdinga, ki mu družba pripada, in njenega končnega delničarja, če v primeru likvidacije družbe SNCM skupina CGMF ne bi prevzela dodatnih odpravnin.
Therefore the Commission is of the view that the costs associated with those measures must be included in the calculation of the costs of a liquidation.
Komisija zato meni, da je treba stroške, povezane s temi ukrepi, vključiti v izračun stroškov likvidacije.
Those costs would then be charged to the liquidation value of SNCM in so far as that value were positive and/or paid directly by CGMF/the State as shareholder.
Navedeni stroški bi bili torej odbiti od likvidacijske vrednosti družbe SNCM, če bi bila ta pozitivna in/ali bi jo neposredno prevzela CGMF/država kot delničarka.
The Commission considers that any other solution would overlook the social reality which large groups of undertakings face.
Komisija meni, da bi se s katero koli drugo rešitvijo prezrla družbena resničnost, s katero se danes srečujejo velike skupine podjetij.
To quantify the cost to the shareholder of liquidation, the Commission accepts a minimum amount corresponding only to the additional redundancy payments.
Za kvantifikacijo stroška likvidacije za delničarja Komisija uporabi predpostavko a minima, ki ustreza samo dodatnim odpravninam.
In addition, account is also taken of the fact that the background of liquidation of the undertaking and redundancy of all the staff is not comparable to that of an adjustment in staff numbers enabling continuation of activities as is the case with the reference social plan.
Poleg tega se upošteva tudi dejstvo, da okoliščine likvidacije družbe in odpusta celotnega osebja niso primerljive z okoliščinami prilagoditve zaposlenih, ki omogočajo nadaljevanje dejavnosti, kot je to primer referenčnega socialnega načrta.
The Commission expert carried out a comparative analysis of the figures put forward by the French authorities with social plans implemented in France recently.
Strokovnjak Komisije je opravil primerjalno analizo številk, ki so jih navedli francoski organi, in socialnih načrtov, ki jih je Francija nedavno izvedla.
The Power 8 plan announced by Airbus France in February 2007 forecast a cost of EUR 68000 per employee.
V načrtu Power 8, ki ga je družba Airbus France napovedala februarja 2007, je bil predviden strošek v višini 68000 EUR na zaposlenega.
In 2008, Michelin’s social plan amounted to EUR 157400 per employee.
Strošek socialnega načrta družbe Michelin leta 2008 znaša 157400 EUR na zaposlenega.
As regards dockers, the Commission states that the French Court of Auditors, in its July 2006 public-domain subject report ‘French ports faced with changes on maritime transport: the urgency of action’ notes the total cost per person of the 2004 social plan, namely EUR 145000 per departure to autonomous ports and EUR 209000 per departure from the port of Marseille.
Kar zadeva pristaniške delavce, Komisija pojasnjuje, da računsko sodišče v javnem tematskem poročilu iz julija 2006 z naslovom „Francoska pristanišča nasproti spremembam v pomorskem prevozu: nujnost ukrepanja“ opozarja na skupni strošek na osebo iz socialnega načrta iz leta 2004, to je 145000 EUR na odhod za samostojna pristanišča in 209000 EUR na odhod iz pristanišča Marseille.
The Commission notes that its decision of 17 July 2002 concerning the Société Française de Production illustrates the cost of generosity in the case of privatisation of an undertaking in difficulty.
Komisija opozarja, da njena odločba z dne 17. julija 2002 v zvezi s Société Française de Production omogoča ponazoritev stroška velikodušnosti v primeru privatizacije podjetja v težavah.
Accordingly, the cost to the State of generosity was EUR 43,1 million (that is, EUR 151000 per employee under the plan providing for the departure of 285 employees) in addition to the cost of EUR 5,3 million in legal obligations and obligations in agreements (that is, in total a cost of EUR 169000 per employee).
Tako je velikodušnost državo stala 43,1 milijona EUR (ali 151000 EUR na zaposlenega, saj je bil v načrtu predviden odhod 285 zaposlenih), ki se prištejejo strošku v višini 5,3 milijona EUR iz naslova zakonskih in pogodbenih obveznosti (kar je skupaj strošek v višini 169000 EUR na zaposlenega).
In the light of that comparative analysis, the Commission considers the payment of EUR […] to each employee by way of additional redundancy payments is consistent with the cost per employee laid off under social plans implemented by private shareholders in the same period.
Na podlagi te primerjalne analize Komisija meni, da je predpostavka […] EUR, izplačanih vsakemu zaposlenemu iz naslova dodatnih odpravnin, v skladu s stroškom na odpuščenega zaposlenega iz socialnih načrtov, ki so jih zasebni delničarji izvedli v istem obdobju.
Finally, the Commission considers that a situation in which all of SNCM’s staff are laid off in a liquidation of the undertaking is the most probable situation, in particular because the grant for the public service delegation for the 2007-2013 period had not yet been covered by a call for tenders and, thus, by a final decision.
Nazadnje Komisija meni, da je predpostavka odpusta celotnega osebja družbe SNCM na podlagi likvidacije podjetja najverjetnejša predpostavka, zlasti ker dodelitev PPJS za obdobje 2007–2013 še ni bila predmet javnega razpisa in s tem dokončne odločitve.
Furthermore, in the light of SNCM’s worrying financial situation, it is unlikely that a plan for continued operation had been drawn up so that the undertaking would be put into receivership and redundancies avoided.
Poleg tega je glede na skrb vzbujajoči finančni položaj družbe SNCM dejansko neverjetno, da bi bil načrt nadaljevanja dejavnosti izdelan tako, da bi v podjetju uvedli prisilno upravo in bi se lahko izognili odpuščanjem.
In the light of the foregoing elements, the Commission finds a total amount of EUR […] million which CGMF (the State) had to use for additional redundancy payments.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno Komisija uporabi skupni znesek v višini […] milijonov EUR, ki bi ga CGMF (država) morala nameniti za dodatne odpravnine.
At this stage in the analysis, the Commission must determine the value of the liquidation of SNCM apart from additional redundancy payments.
Na tej stopnji analize mora Komisija določiti likvidacijsko vrednost družbe SNCM brez dodatnih odpravnin.
It is in fact the difference between that liquidation value, to the extent that it is positive, and the additional redundancy payments which must be compared to the negative price resulting from the sale in order to verify whether the State acted as a private investor in a market economy.
Razliko med to likvidacijsko vrednostjo, če je pozitivna, in dodatnimi odpravninami je namreč treba primerjati z negativno ceno prodaje, da bi preverili, ali je država ravnala kot zasebni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu.
In order to do that, the Commission took as a basis the calculation of the revalued net assets.
Pri tem se Komisija opira na izračun revaloriziranih neto sredstev.
According to the revalued net asset method, an asset shortfall is determined when the economic value of the actual assets (generally higher than the net ledger assets) does not cover the economic value of the actual debts.
V skladu z metodo revaloriziranih neto sredstev se nezadostnost sredstev ugotovi, ko ekonomska vrednost realnih sredstev (na splošno višja od neto knjigovodske vrednosti) ne pokrije ekonomske vrednosti realnih dolgov.
In order to determine an asset shortfall in the present case the Commission, with the assistance of its expert, verified as explained above that on 30 September 2005 the value of SNCM’s assets was not sufficient to pay off preferential and non-preferential creditors (including employees as classic debts).
Za ugotovitev nezadostnosti sredstev v obravnavanem primeru je Komisija ob pomoči svojega strokovnjaka potrdila, kot je pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, da na dan 30. septembra 2005 vrednost sredstev družbe SNCM ni zadostovala za poplačilo privilegiranih in neprivilegiranih upnikov (vključno z zaposlenimi na podlagi klasičnih terjatev).
Choice of valuation methodology
Izbira metodologije ocene
The Commission takes the view that the valuation of net assets is a method currently used to value companies in the maritime transport sector.
Komisija meni, da je valorizacija neto sredstev metoda, ki se navadno uporablja za valorizacijo družb v sektorju pomorskega prevoza.
It considers, in addition, that that method is particularly appropriate in SNCM’s case since the reference shareholder’s only alternative to the sale is to put the company into voluntary liquidation.
Meni, da je ta metoda še posebno primerna za položaj družbe SNCM, ker lahko njen glavni delničar poleg prodaje izbere samo še objavo stečaja družbe, ki bi šla v likvidacijo.
As regards other valuation methods, in particular the present value method of unrestricted operating cash flows, the Commission considers that, having regard to the fact that that method presupposes that the company are continues to operate, which is not the case with SNCM, it is irrelevant to the present case.
Kar zadeva druge metode valorizacije, zlasti metodo diskontiranih prostih denarnih tokov, Komisija meni, da glede na dejstvo, da predpostavlja nadaljevanje dejavnosti družbe, kar ne drži za družbo SNCM, ta metoda v obravnavanem primeru ni upoštevna.
The reference date
Referenčni datum
The Commission chose the 30 September 2005 date as the reference date for the valuation of SNCM given that that was the date on which the choice between the acceptance of the takeover offer or the liquidation of the company was actually made, the selection of BCP having been decided on 27 September 2005.
Komisija je uporabila datum 30. september 2005 kot referenčni datum za oceno družbe SNCM, ker je to datum dejansko opravljene izbire med sprejetjem ponudbe za obnovitev ali likvidacijo družbe, pri čemer je bilo o izbiri podjetja BCP odločeno 27. septembra 2005.
The value of SNCM’s assets
Vrednost sredstev družbe SNCM