natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The local market rules, and in particular the indispensability and dominant position of any market player (being in the case of the Czech Republic the operator CEZ) can also lead to defining a narrower market.
Zaradi pravil lokalnega trga ter zlasti nepogrešljivosti in prevladujočega položaja katerega koli akterja na trgu (v primeru Češke je to gospodarski subjekt CEZ) se lahko opredeli tudi manjši trg.
In this context, it must be noted that according to the reply of the Czech authorities of 9 October 2008, the overwhelming share of the growing volume of the PXE, stems from transactions involving CEZ.
V zvezi s tem je treba omeniti, da glede na odgovor čeških organov z dne 9. oktobra 2008 večji delež rastočega PXE izhaja iz transakcij, pri katerih sodeluje CEZ.
Furthermore, the Commission has also analysed in its Energy Sector Inquiry [5], with regards to possible geographical market definitions going beyond the national scope, whether certain countries in Central Europe could be part of possible pairs of relevant markets.
Razen tega je Komisija v svoji preiskavi energetskega sektorja [5] v zvezi z mogočimi geografskimi opredelitvami trga, ki sega prek nacionalnega ozemlja, analizirala tudi, ali so lahko nekatere države v Srednji Evropi del mogočih parov zadevnih trgov.
For the Austria-Germany country pair, the size of the main operator in Austria coupled with internal Austrian network congestion prevented the Commission from concluding that there would be a larger than national relevant market.
Za par držav Avstrija-Nemčija je velikost največjega gospodarskega subjekta v Avstriji skupaj s prezasedenostjo avstrijskih notranjih omrežij Komisiji preprečevala sklep, da bi bil zadevni trg večji od nacionalnega.
Similarly, in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the respective size of the dominant operators and their indispensability to meet demand lead to the conclusion that even those two country pairs are not part of one and the same relevant geographic market.
Podobno se je v primeru Češke in Slovaške zaradi velikosti prevladujočih gospodarskih subjektov in njihove nepogrešljivosti pri zadovoljevanju povpraševanja sklenilo, da celo ta dva para držav nista del enega in istega geografskega trga.
In addition, the Commission has recently examined the Austrian and the Polish electricity production markets and found them to be national in geographical scope [6].
Poleg tega je Komisija nedavno preverila avstrijski in poljski trg za proizvodnjo električne energije ter ugotovila, da sta v geografskem smislu nacionalna [6].
Finally, in its recent antitrust Decision C(2008) 7367 of 26 November 2008 against E.ON concerning the German wholesale market [7], the Commission has considered the latter to be national in scope, without neighbouring countries (neither to the west, nor the east) being part of a broader geographic market.
Nazadnje je Komisija v svoji nedavni protimonopolni odločbi C(2008) 7367 z dne 26. novembra 2008 proti E.ON v zvezi z nemškim veleprodajnim trgom [7] odločila, da je slednja družba po obsegu nacionalna, pri čemer sosednje države (ne na zahodu ne na vzhodu) niso del širšega geografskega trga.
Consequently, the existence of a regional market should be rejected.
Zaradi tega je treba zavrniti obstoj regionalnega trga.
This is also consistent with the statement by the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition that ‘in assessing the (application pursuant to Article 30), the Bureau, taking into account its existing investigation, started from the presumption that the relevant market of production of electricity should be, from the geographical standpoint, defined by the territory of the Czech Republic.’
To je tudi v skladu z izjavo češkega urada za varstvo konkurence, da „je urad pri ocenjevanju (uporabe v skladu s členom 30), ob upoštevanju svoje obstoječe preiskave, izhajal iz predpostavke, da je treba zadevni trg za proizvodnjo električne energije z geografskega stališča določiti na ozemlju Češke republike“.
In view of the facts set out in recitals 9 and 10 above, the territory of the Czech Republic should therefore be considered to constitute the relevant market for the purposes of evaluating the conditions laid down in Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC.
Ob upoštevanju dejstev iz uvodnih izjav 9 in 10 je treba ozemlje Češke republike obravnavati kot ustrezen trg za namene ocenjevanja pogojev iz člena 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES.
As it results from a constant practice [8] in respect of Commission Decisions pursuant to Article 30, the Commission considered that, in respect of electricity generation, ‘one indicator for the degree of competition on national markets is the total market share of the biggest three producers’.
Kot izhaja iz stalne prakse [8] v zvezi z odločbami Komisije na podlagi člena 30, je Komisija menila, da je v zvezi s proizvodnjo električne energije „eden od pokazateljev stopnje konkurence na nacionalnih trgih […] skupni tržni delež treh največjih proizvajalcev“.
According to ‘Table 6: Wholesale Market Position’, p. 12 et seq. of ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Accompanying document to the Report on Progress in Creating the Internal Gas and Electricity Market’ [9], the shares of the three largest generators amounted to 69,4 % of electricity production in 2006 and rising to 73,9 % in 2007.
V skladu s„Preglednico 6: Razmere na veleprodajnem trgu“, str. 12 „delovnega dokumenta služb Komisije: Spremni dokument k poročilu Napredek pri oblikovanju notranjega trga plina in električne energije“ [9], so deleži treh največjih proizvajalcev leta 2006 znašali 69,4 % proizvodnje električne energije, pri čemer so leta 2007 narasli na 73,9 %.
According to the information given by the Czech authorities in their answer of 9 October 2008, the dominant company held almost 70 % of the total installed capacity, and the second and third largest held respectively 3,5 and 3 %.
Po podatkih, ki so jih češki organi navedli v odgovoru z dne 9. oktobra 2008, je prevladujoče podjetje imelo skoraj 70 % vseh nameščenih zmogljivosti, pri čemer sta imela drugo in tretje največje podjetje po 3,5 in 3 %.
These levels of concentration, encompassing the total market share of the largest three generators, are higher than the corresponding percentage, 39, to which Commission Decisions 2006/211/EC [10] and 2007/141/EC [11] refer to for the UK.
Te stopnje koncentracije, ki vključujejo skupni tržni delež treh največjih proizvajalcev, so višje od zadevnega odstotka, tj. 39 %, na katerega se za Združeno kraljestvo sklicujeta odločbi 2006/211/ES [10] in 2007/141/ES [11].
They are also significantly higher than the level (52,2 %) referred to in Commission Decision 2008/585/EC [12] in respect of Austria, as well as being higher than the level (58 % of gross production) referred to in Commission Decision 2008/741/EC [13] in the case of Poland.
Prav tako so znatno višje od stopnje (52,2 %) iz Odločbe 2008/585/ES [12] v zvezi z Avstrijo, prav tako so tudi višje od stopnje (58 % bruto proizvodnje) iz Odločbe Komisije 2008/741/ES [13] v primeru Poljske.
The Czech levels of concentration of the largest three operators are finally similar to or lower than the corresponding levels referred to in Commission Decisions 2006/422/EC [14] and 2007/706/EC [15] concerning, respectively Finland (73,6 %) and Sweden (86,7 %).
Češke stopnje koncentracije treh največjih gospodarskih subjektov so končno podobne ustreznim stopnjam iz odločb 2006/422/ES [14] in 2007/706/ES [15] za Finsko (73,6 %) in Švedsko (86,7 %) ali so nižje od njih.
There is, however, an important difference between the Czech case on the one hand and the Swedish and Finnish on the other hand.
Vendar obstaja pomembna razlika med Češko na eni strani ter Finsko in Švedsko na drugi.
Notably, in the Czech Republic there is a single dominant operator with the other two largest producers having market shares that are smaller by a factor of 20 (3 % being the lowest share and almost 70 % the highest).
Na Češkem prevladuje predvsem en gospodarski subjekt, pri čemer imata druga dva največja proizvajalca tržna deleža, ki sta manjša za faktor dvajset (najnižji delež je 3 %, najvišji pa skoraj 70 %).
In Finland the corresponding figures show that the operator with an 18,3 % market share was lowest among the top three and one with a 33,7 % market share the highest.
Na Finskem ustrezne številke kažejo, da je bil gospodarski subjekt z 18,3-odstotnim tržnim deležem najmanjši med prvimi tremi, medtem ko je bil tisti s 33,7-odstotnim tržnim deležem največji.
Similarly, for Sweden there exists a range between 17,4 % as the lowest and 47,1 % as the highest.
Podoben razpon se pojavlja tudi na Švedskem, pri čemer je najnižji delež 17,4 % in najvišji 47,1 %.
A constant jurisprudence should also be recalled in this context [16], according to which ‘very large market shares are in themselves, save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position.
V zvezi s tem je prav tako treba opozoriti na stalno sodno prakso [16], ki določa, da „so zelo visoki tržni deleži sami po sebi, razen v izjemnih razmerah, dokaz o obstoju prevladujočega položaja.
That is the situation when there is a market share of 50 %’.
To je položaj, ko je tržni delež 50 %“.
The level of electricity imports into the Czech Republic amounts to slightly more than 11 % of its total demand [17], which, while higher than the share of electricity imports into Poland, reaches less than half of the share in the case of Austria [18] [19].
Stopnja uvoza električne energije na Češko znaša nekaj več kot 11 % celotnega povpraševanja [17], ki je sicer višje od deleža uvoza električne energije na Poljsko, vendar dosega manj kot polovico deleža v primeru Avstrije [18] [19].
Also in the Swedish and Finnish cases, the high levels of concentration of the three largest producers are ‘offset’ by the ‘competitive pressure on the […] market deriving from the potential to import electricity from outside […]’ [20].
Tudi v primeru Švedske in Finske se visoke stopnje koncentracije treh največjih proizvajalcev „izravnajo“ s „[…] pritisk(-om) konkurence, ki izhaja iz možnosti, da se električno energijo pridobi zunaj […]“ [20].
It is therefore difficult to find that there would be a substantial competitive pressure from imported electricity in the Czech Republic and the fact that there would be transport capacity to raise the level of imports substantially is only theoretical, given that the Czech Republic has been a net exporter each year since at least 2003 and will continue to be so in the mid-term.
Zato je na Češkem težko ugotoviti obstoj precejšnjega konkurenčnega pritiska zaradi uvožene električne energije, poleg tega je trditev o obstoju prevozne zmogljivosti, ki bi znatno povečala stopnjo uvoza, le teoretična, ker je bila Češka vsako leto, vsaj od leta 2003, neto izvoznik in bo v srednjeročnem obdobju to tudi ostala.
This level of concentration therefore cannot be taken as an indicator of direct exposure to competition of the generation market.
Ta stopnja koncentracije se torej ne more upoštevati kot pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti trga proizvodnje električne energije konkurenci.
The Czech authorities’ answer of 9 October 2008 also points towards CEZ planning the majority of future large-scale generation projects on the transmission network level, through in particular envisaged nuclear new-build, the planned life-time extension of the existing Dukovany nuclear plant as well as coal- and gas-fired power plant projects.
Odgovor čeških organov z dne 9. oktobra 2008 prav tako kaže, da CEZ načrtuje večino prihodnjih večjih proizvodnih projektov na ravni prenosnih omrežij, zlasti s predvidenimi gradnjami novih jedrskih elektrarn, načrtovanim podaljšanjem življenjske dobe obstoječe jedrske elektrarne Dukovany ter projekti gradnje termoelektrarn in plinskih elektrarn.
Besides CEZ’s plans, there are also projects, especially in the field of renewable energy sources, which are planned by others in part at the transmission level and in particular at the distribution level.
Poleg načrtov CEZ obstajajo tudi projekti, zlasti na področju obnovljivih virov energije, ki jih načrtujejo drugi, delno na ravni prenosa, vendar zlasti na ravni distribucije.
Furthermore, even though they represent a small part of the total amount of electricity produced and/or consumed in a Member State, the functioning of the balancing mechanisms should also be considered as an additional indicator.
Poleg tega je treba delovanje izravnalnih mehanizmov, čeprav predstavljajo majhen del skupne količine električne energije, proizvedene in/ali potrošene v državi članici, prav tako šteti za dodaten pokazatelj.
According to the available information, the workings of the balancing mechanism – in particular the markets based pricing and the well-developed intra-day market with one-and-a-half hourly gate closures, that is the possibility for network users to adjust their position every one-and-a-half hours – are such that it does not constitute an obstacle to electricity production being subject to direct exposure to competition.
V skladu z razpoložljivimi informacijami je delovanje izravnalnih mehanizmov – zlasti tržno določanje cen in dobro razvit enodnevni trg z zapiranjem na uro in pol, to je možnost, da uporabniki omrežja vsako uro in pol prilagodijo svoj položaj – takšno, da ne predstavlja ovire neposrednemu izpostavljanju proizvodnje električne energije konkurenci.
Given the characteristics of the product concerned (electricity) and the scarcity or unavailability of suitable substitutable products or services, price competition and price formation assume greater importance when assessing the competitive state of the electricity markets.
Ob upoštevanju značilnosti zadevnega proizvoda (električne energije) in pomanjkanja primernih nadomestnih proizvodov ali storitev morata biti cenovna konkurenca in oblikovanje cen pri ocenjevanju stanja konkurence na trgih električne energije pomembnejša.
In respect of large industrial (end)users, the number of customers switching supplier may serve as an indicator of price competition and, thus, indirectly, ‘a natural indicator’ of the effectiveness of competition.
Število odjemalcev, ki menjajo dobavitelje, je lahko v zvezi z velikimi industrijskimi (končnimi) odjemalci pokazatelj cenovne konkurence in zato posredno „naravni pokazatelj“ učinkovitosti konkurence.
If few customers are switching, there is likely to be a problem with the functioning of the market, even if the benefits from the possibility of renegotiating with the historical supplier should not be ignored [21].
Če prestopa malo odjemalcev, verjetno obstaja problem pri delovanju trga, čeprav ne smemo pozabiti na koristi, ki jih prinaša možnost ponovnega pogajanja s prejšnjim dobaviteljem [21].
Although the retaining of controls may be justified in a period of transition, these will increasingly cause distortions as the need for investment approaches’ [22].
Čeprav je v prehodnem obdobju ohranitev nadzora mogoče upravičiti, bo le-ta povzročal še večje izkrivljanje, ko se bo pojavila potreba po naložbah“ [22].
According to the latest available information, switching rates in the Czech Republic have been qualified as being at a ‘high level’ [23] and, according to the latest information given by the Czech authorities in their answer of 9 October, ‘since the electricity market opening almost every second customer in the large customer segment has changed its electricity supplier’.
Glede na najnovejše razpoložljive informacije so bili deleži odjemalcev, ki so na Češkem zamenjali ponudnika, določeni kot zelo visoki [23], poleg tega najnovejše informacije, ki so jih češki organi navedli v svojem odgovoru z dne 9. oktobra, navajajo, da je „od odprtja trga električne energije […] skoraj vsak drugi odjemalcev v segmentu večjih odjemalcev zamenjal svojega dobavitelja električne energije“.
This must be seen against the background of the situation as set out in the previous Decisions concerning the electricity sector in which switching rates for large and very large industrial users ranged from more than 75 % (Decision 2006/422/EC concerning Finland) to 41,5 % (Decision 2008/585/EC concerning Austria).
Pri tem je treba upoštevati ozadje stanja, kot je bilo navedeno v prejšnjih odločbah o elektroenergetskem sektorju, v katerih je bil delež odjemalcev, ki zamenjajo ponudnika, pri velikih in zelo velikih industrijskih uporabnikih v razponu od več kot 75 % (Odločba 2006/422/ES za Finsko) do 41,5 % (Odločba 2008/585/ES za Avstrijo).
Furthermore, supply markets (for household, industrial customers, etc.) have in the Commission’s prior decision practice been defined as separate product markets, and may, due to the influence of strong and well-established supply companies, have a different competitive landscape the wholesale or generation market.
Razen tega so bili dobavni trgi (za gospodinjstva, industrijske odjemalce itd.) v praksi Komisije pred odločbo opredeljeni kot ločeni proizvodni trgi ter lahko imajo zaradi vpliva močnih in dobro vzpostavljenih dobavnih podjetij različno konkurenčno okolje, in sicer veleprodajni ali proizvodni trg.
The high level of switching can therefore not be taken as an unequivocal indicator of direct exposure to competition.
Pogoste menjave se lahko zato obravnavajo kot nedvomen pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci.
In respect of production of electricity in the Czech Republic, the situation can thus be summarised as follows: the aggregate market shares of the three biggest generators are high, but more importantly, the biggest generator on its own represents a market share of almost 70 %, without this having been counterbalanced by imported electricity, as the Czech Republic has on the contrary been a constant net exporter of substantial quantities of electricity over at least the past 5 years.
V zvezi s proizvodnjo električne energije na Češkem se lahko položaj povzame tako: skupni tržni deleži treh največjih proizvajalcev so visoki, vendar je še pomembneje, da največji proizvajalec sam predstavlja skoraj 70-odstotni tržni delež, pri čemer ta ni uravnotežen z uvoženo električno energijo, ker je bila Češka v zadnjih petih letih stalen neto izvoznik velikih količin električne energije.
As set out in recital 17, the functioning of the balancing mechanism does not constitute an obstacle to direct exposure to competition of the electricity generation market and there is a high degree of switching.
Kot je določeno v uvodni izjavi 17, delovanje izravnalnega mehanizma ne ovira neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci na trgu proizvodnje električne energije, na katerem se pojavljajo pogoste menjave ponudnikov.
The well-functioning balancing mechanism and the high level of switching can not, however, outweigh the quite high degree of concentration, and in particular the high share of the greatest producer, taking into account also the jurisprudence mentioned under recital 14 above.
Vendar dobro delujoč izravnalni mehanizem in pogosto menjavanje ponudnikov ne moreta odtehtati dokaj visoke stopnje koncentracije ter zlasti visokega deleža največjega proizvajalca, pri čemer se upošteva tudi sodna praksa, omenjena v uvodni izjavi 14.
In view of the factors examined in recitals 9 to 20, it should be concluded that production of electricity is currently not directly exposed to competition in the Czech Republic.
Glede na preučene dejavnike iz uvodnih izjav 9 do 20 je mogoče sklepati, da proizvodnja električne energije na Češkem trenutno ni neposredno izpostavljena konkurenci.
Therefore Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC is not applicable to contracts intended to enable the pursuit of those activities in the Czech Republic.
Člen 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES se torej ne uporablja pri naročilih, ki naj bi omogočala opravljanje navedenih dejavnosti na Češkem.
Consequently, Directive 2004/17/EC continues to apply when contracting entities award contracts intended to enable generation of electricity to be carried out in the Czech Republic or when they organise design contests for the pursuit of such activities in the Czech Republic.
Zato se Direktiva 2004/17/ES še naprej uporablja, kadar naročniki oddajajo naročila za omogočanje proizvodnje električne energije na Češkem ali kadar organizirajo natečaje za izvajanje takšne dejavnosti v tej državi.
This Decision is based on the legal and factual situation as of July to October 2008 as it appears from the information submitted by the Czech Republic, the 2007 Communication and the 2007 Staff Document, the Final Report as well as the 2007 Progress Report and the Annex thereto.
Ta odločba temelji na pravnem in dejanskem stanju v obdobju od julija do oktobra 2008, kot je razvidno iz informacij, ki jih je poslala Češka, iz sporočila iz leta 2007 in dokumenta služb iz leta 2007 ter iz končnega poročila in tudi iz poročila o napredku iz leta 2007 ter priloge k temu poročilu.
It may be revised, should significant changes in the legal or factual situation mean that the conditions for the applicability of Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC are met,
Spremeni se lahko, če bi pomembne spremembe pravnih ali dejanskih razmer pomenile, da so pogoji za uporabo člena 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES izpolnjeni –
Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC is not applicable to production of electricity in the Czech Republic.
Člen 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES se ne uporablja pri proizvodnji električne energije v Češki republiki.
Consequently, Directive 2004/17/EC shall continue to apply to contracts awarded by contracting entities and intended to enable them to carry out such activities in the Czech Republic.
Zato se Direktiva 2004/17/ES še naprej uporablja za naročila, ki naročnikom omogočajo izvajanje tovrstnih dejavnosti v Češki republiki.
The total (gross) exports amounted to 31,45 % of the total, net generation, whereas the total imports amounted to 11,67 % of the total, net generation.
Skupni (bruto) izvoz je znašal 31,45 % celotne neto proizvodnje, medtem ko je celoten uvoz znašal 11,67 % skupne neto proizvodnje.
If seen in relation to the domestic net electricity consumption for 2007 (approximately 59,7 TWh according to the Czech authorities), the total exports amounted to 42,88 % and net exports to 26,97 %, whereas total imports amounted to 15,91 % of the domestic net electricity consumption.
Če se obravnava glede na domačo neto porabo električne energije leta 2007 (približno 59,7 TWh po navedbah čeških organov), je skupni izvoz znašal 42,88 %, neto izvoz pa 26,97 %, medtem ko je skupni uvoz znašal 15,91 % neto domače porabe električne energije.
See COM(2006) 851 final of 10.1.2007: Commission Communication: Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors, hereinafter referred to as ‘Final Report’, Annex B, point A.2.7, p. 339.
Glej COM(2006) 851 konč. z dne 10. januarja 2007: Sporočilo Komisije: Preiskava na podlagi člena 17 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 v panogi plina in elektroenergetski panogi (končno poročilo), Priloga B, točka A.2.7, str. 339.