natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Belgian Government added that, by implementing the restructuring plan, IFB had considerably reduced its transhipment capacity, as described in part 2 of the initiating letter (points 25 to 29).
Belgijska vlada dodaja, da je družba IFB z izvajanjem načrta za prestrukturiranje zelo zmanjšala zmogljivosti pretovarjanja, kot je opisano v delu 2 dopisa o sprožitvi postopka (točke od 25 do 29).
With regard to the circumstance that, with the exception of the DPD terminal, all of the assets sold are still in operation today, the Belgian authorities consider that the takeovers are to be considered as real and substantial compensatory measures.
Glede na to, da razen terminala DPD vse prodane naprave še vedno obratujejo, belgijski organi menijo, da je treba prenose upoštevati kot resnične in znatne izravnalne ukrepe.
According to the Belgian Government, the set of takeovers would represent a reduction in IFB’s capacity from 1,5 million TEU in 2002 to 1,1 million TEU at the end of 2005, i.e. a reduction of 27 %.
Po mnenju belgijske vlade naj bi vsi prenosi pomenili zmanjšanje zmogljivosti IFB z 1,5 milijona TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) leta 2002 na 1,1 milijona TEU konec leta 2005, to je za 27 %.
The Belgian authorities added that the implementation of the restructuring plan by IFB has not been accompanied by pricing measures which had the aim or effect of increasing IFB’s market share.
Belgijski organi dodajajo, da izvajanja načrta za prestrukturiranje s strani IFB niso spremljali cenovni ukrepi, ki bi imeli za cilj ali posledico povečanje tržnega deleža IFB.
They observe that IFB increased its prices by an average of 4,2 % [24], whereas the industrial annual rate of inflation was 1,9 %.
Ugotavljajo, da je družba IFB v povprečju zvišala svoje cene za 4,2 % [24], medtem ko je bila povprečna letna stopnja inflacije v industriji 1,9 %.
The mitigating measures on the logistics market.
Olajševalni ukrepi na logističnem trgu.
The initiating letter considers (paragraphs 258-260) that the measures ‘proposed’ did not concern the logistics market, and that IFB had been able to increase its volume in this market.
V dopisu o sprožitvi postopka se ugotavlja (odstavki 258–260), da „predlagani“ ukrepi niso zadevali logističnega trga in da bi družba IFB lahko povečala svoj obseg na tem trgu.
The Belgian authorities put forward five arguments to show that sufficient mitigating measures have been taken in the logistics market.
Belgijski organi navajajo pet argumentov, da bi dokazali, da so bili sprejeti zadostni olajševalni ukrepi na logističnem trgu.
First, IFB had taken measures which have led to a reduction in its capacity in the logistics market.
Prvič, družba IFB naj bi sprejela ukrepe, ki so zmanjšali njeno zmogljivost na logističnem trgu.
The reduction in IFB’s logistics capacity also resulted from the fact that IFB’s shareholding in the company CNC (now Naviland Cargo) weakened, from 10 % in 2002 to 2 % currently.
Zmanjšana logistična zmogljivost IFB naj bi bila tudi posledica dejstva, da se je delež IFB v družbi CNC (zdaj Naviland Cargo) zmanjšal z 10 % leta 2002 na sedanja 2 %.
Second, the Belgian authorities consider that IFB’s share of the logistics market is well below 5 %, if the geographical extent of this market is limited to Belgian territory.
Drugič, belgijski organi menijo, da je tržni delež IFB na logističnem trgu precej pod 5 %, če bi ta trg geografsko omejili na belgijsko ozemlje.
It is appropriate then, by virtue of point 36 of the guidelines, to ask whether the anti-competitive effects resulting from State aid in this case can be considered to be perceptible.
Zato je treba v skladu s točko 36 smernic postaviti vprašanje, ali protikonkurenčni učinki zadevnih državnih pomoči lahko veljajo za občutne.
According to the Belgian authorities, IFB cannot be considered to be capable of exercising a perceptible influence on the competitive element of the logistics market.
Po mnenju belgijskih organov IFB nikakor ni mogoče šteti za podjetje, ki je sposobno občutnega vpliva na konkurenčno igro na logističnem trgu.
For the same reason, it was difficult, according to the Belgian Government, to consider the distortions of competition resulting from the aid from which IFB benefited as perceptible, and so only very limited measures appear necessary in order to limit unfavourable consequences for IFB’s competitors.
Prav zato bi po mnenju belgijske vlade izkrivljanje konkurence zaradi pomoči za IFB težko označili kot občutno, tako da se zdi, da so potrebni samo zelo omejeni ukrepi za ublažitev negativnih posledic pomoči na konkurente IFB.
Third, the Belgian authorities propose to put into perspective the development of IFB’s logistics activity in order to respond radically to the Commission's assertion that IFB had been ‘able to increase its volume in this market in a significant way’ during the period in question.
Tretjič, belgijski organi predlagajo, da se osvetlijo vsi vidiki razvoja logistične dejavnosti IFB, da bi zelo spremenili trditev Komisije, da naj bi družba IFB „občutno povečala svoj tržni delež na tem trgu“ v zadevnem obdobju.
According to the Belgian authorities, the following facts had to be taken into account:
Po mnenju belgijskih organov je namreč treba upoštevati naslednja dejstva:
For the combined (intermodal) transport sector, the volumes transported by IFB experienced annual growth in the order of 9,9 % during the period 2002–05, which is less than the average annual growth of 12 % observed in the ARA region for the same period,
v segmentu kombiniranega (intermodalnega) prevoza se je obseg prevozov IFB v obdobju 2002-2005 povečeval za 9,9 % na leto, kar je manj kot povprečna 12-odstotna letna rast v regiji ARA v istem obdobju;
In the conventional transport sector, IFB is a totally marginal player, even assuming that the market is restricted to Belgium.
v segmentu konvencionalnega prevoza je IFB obroben udeleženec, tudi ob domnevi, da je trg omejen na Belgijo.
IFB’s share, both in volume and value, is less than 1 %.
Dejansko je delež IFB po obsegu in po vrednosti nižji od 1 %.
In addition, the origin of IFB’s turnover in growth in its logistics activity, according to the Belgian Government, is to be found to some extent in the growth of the ‘bulk’ sub-sector (bulk transport).
Poleg tega naj bi rast prometa IFB v logistični dejavnosti po mnenju belgijske vlade delno izvirala iz rasti podsegmenta „bulk“ (prevoz razsutega tovora).
In 2003, IFB’s turnover on bulk was only EUR 3,3 million. In 2004, IFB obtained two bulk transport contracts of significant volume.
Leta 2003 je promet, ki ga je ustvarila družba IFB s prevozom razsutega tovora, znašal samo 3,3 milijona EUR. Vendar je družba IFB leta 2004 sklenila dve pogodbi o prevozu velike količine razsutega tovora.
Fourth, the Belgian Government considers that IFB’s opening-up of its terminals to competitors in the logistics market is also to be considered as an important mitigating measure.
Četrtič, belgijska vlada meni, da je treba tudi to, da je družba IFB odprla svoje terminale konkurentom na logističnem trgu, upoštevati kot pomemben olajševalni ukrep.
Fifth, the Belgian Government considers that the limited distortions of competition which could be considered to result from the restructuring aid to IFB are further reduced by the following factors:
Petič, belgijska vlada meni, da omejeno izkrivljanje konkurence, ki bi lahko bilo posledica pomoči za prestrukturiranje IFB, še nadalje zmanjšujejo naslednji dejavniki:
The liberalisation of rail freight transport in Belgium.
liberalizacija železniškega prevoza blaga v Belgiji.
The Belgian authorities, in compliance with the applicable European rules, opened this market to competition (from March 2003 for international transport, followed by total liberalisation on 1 January 2007) [27].
Belgijski organi so namreč v skladu z veljavnimi evropskimi pravili odprli ta trg konkurenci (od marca 2003 za mednarodni prevoz, čemur je sledila popolna liberalizacija od 1. januarja 2007).
This opening-up did not fail to have an effect, as shown by the activities of the companies DLC and, more recently, Fret SNCF.
To odprtje je povzročilo posledice, kot so pokazale dejavnosti družbe DLC in pred kratkim družbe Fret SNCF.
In its decision N 386/04, Fret SNCF, the Commission considered such liberalisation to be a compensatory measure for competitors,Several other competitors of SNCB/IFB (among which are Rail4Chem, Railion Nederland, TrainSport, DFG, EWS, Connex and ACTS) have already received or in all probability will receive their operating licences shortly,
Komisija naj bi v odločbi N 386/2004, Fret SNCF, tako liberalizacijo upoštevala kot kompenzacijski ukrep za konkurente;več drugih konkurentov SNCB/IFB (med njimi so Rail4Chem, Railion Nederland, TrainSport, DFG, EWS, Connex in ACTS) je že dobilo ali bo zelo verjetno v kratkem dobilo obratovalne licence;
The SNCB (B-Cargo) already currently provides traction services to IFB’s competitors, whether suppliers of combined (intermodal) transport such as companies as HUPAC, CNC (Naviland Cargo), Conliner, Danzas/DHL Express Cargo and ICF, or suppliers of ‘forwarding’ services such as Transfesa, K+N, Nauta, NTR, Panalpina, Rail&Sea, Railog, Chemfreight, Rhenania, TMF, Gondrand, RME Chem, RME fret and East Rail Expedition,
družba SNCB (B-Cargo) že zdaj opravlja vlečne storitve za konkurente IFB, naj gre za izvajalce kombiniranega (intermodalnega) prevoza, kot so HUPAC, CNC (Naviland Cargo), Conliner, Danzas / DHL Express Cargo in ICF, ali za izvajalce storitev „forwarding“, kot so Transfesa, K+N, Nauta, NTR, Panalpina, Rail&Sea, Railog, Chemfreight, Rhenania, TMF, Gondrand, RME Chem, RME fret in East Rail Expedition;
As the Commission noted in its decision in case N 386/04, Fret SNCF, the conditions between rail and road are not identical, to the detriment of rail.
Kot je poudarila Komisija v odločbi v zadevi N 386/2004, Fret SNCF, pogoji za železnice in ceste niso enaki, v škodo železnice.
According to the Belgian Government, the liberalisation measures have led to substantial capacity increases in the logistics market, as shown by the activities of IFB’s competitors during the period 2003-2005.
Po mnenju belgijske vlade so ukrepi liberalizacije znatno povečali zmogljivosti na logističnem trgu, kot kaže dejavnost konkurentov IFB v obdobju 2003-2005.
According to the Belgian Government, competition concentrated on the intermodal sector, where five of IFB’s competitors launched a total of 12 new links in this period.
Po mnenju belgijske vlade naj bi se konkurenca usmerjala v intermodalni segment, kjer je pet konkurentov IFB v tem obdobju uvedlo 12 novih prog.
Limitation of the increase in capital to the minimum
Čim manjše povečanje kapitala
In relation to the information communicated before the decision initiating the procedure (see points 265 to 269), SNCB and IFB have compiled additional information about the average level of solvency of, on the one hand, IFB’s competitors operating terminals and, on the other hand, of transport companies in competition with IFB.
V primerjavi s podatki, predloženimi pred odločbo o sprožitvi postopka (glej točke od 265 do 269), sta SNCB in IFB zbrali dodatne podatke o povprečni stopnji solventnosti za konkurente IFB, ki upravljajo terminale, in za prevozna podjetja, ki konkurirajo IFB.
The levels of solvency (which must be understood as the relationship between capital base and total balance sheet) of the companies in question are set out in Diagram 16.
Stopnja solventnosti (ki jo je treba razumeti kot razmerje med lastnim kapitalom in bilančno vsoto) zadevnih družb je predstavljena v shemi 16.
Diagram 16
Shema 16
Level of solvency — sample of comparable companies, 2004 (*)
Stopnja solventnosti – Vzorec primerljivih družb, 2004 (*)
Diagram 16 shows that the median level of solvency of the terminal operators is 56,6 %, whereas the median level of solvency of the transport companies is 20,4 %.
Shema 16 naj bi pokazala, da je povprečna stopnja solventnosti upravljavcev terminalov 56,6 %, prevoznih družb pa 20,4 %.
Since IFB is active in both sectors, IFB’s level of solvency, as a function of the ‘benchmarks’ referred to, should be less than 35,6 %.
Ker IFB deluje v obeh sektorjih, bi morala biti v skladu z zgornjimi merili njena stopnja solventnosti najmanj 35,6 %.
This last percentage has been calculated by weighting IFB’s operational fixed assets in the following way:
Zadnji odstotek je izračunan s ponderiranjem operativnih osnovnih sredstev IFB, kot sledi:
42 % of IFB’s operational fixed assets (measured by their net accounting value, that is to say after amortisations and depreciation) are allocated to the terminals activities,
42 % operativnih osnovnih sredstev IFB (glede na neto računovodsko vrednost po amortizaciji in zmanjšanju vrednosti) je dodeljenih dejavnosti terminalov;
58 % of IFB’s operational fixed assets are allocated to the transport (logistics) activity.
58 % operativnih osnovnih sredstev IFB je dodeljenih prevozni dejavnosti („logistika“).
The Belgian authorities made the observation that IFB’s target level of solvency is also in line with the actual level of solvency of companies such as Gosselin (38,9 %) and Hupac (34,9 %), which, like IFB, combine the operation of terminals with logistics activities.
Belgijski organi pripominjajo, da je ciljna stopnja solventnosti IFB v skladu z realno stopnjo solventnosti družb, kot sta Gosselin (38,9 %) in Hupac (34,9 %), ki tako kot IFB združujeta upravljanje terminalov in dejavnosti logistike.
Based on IFB’s target level of solvency IFB of 35,6 % and a total debt of EUR 128,1 million (estimate as at 30 June 2006), the increase in capital of IFB, according to the Belgian authorities’ calculations, should therefore imply a conversion of debt into capital of at least EUR 95,3 million.
Na podlagi ciljne stopnje solventnosti IFB 35,6 % in skupnega dolga v višini 128,1 milijona EUR (ocena na dan 30. junija 2006), bi moralo povečanje kapitala IFB po izračunih belgijskih organov vključevati pretvorbo dolga v kapital v višini najmanj 95,3 milijona EUR.
IFB’s own contribution
Lastni prispevek IFB
According to the Belgian authorities, SNCB’s total contribution to the restructuring of IFB is EUR 95,3 million, i.e. the forecast amount of additional capital.
Po mnenju belgijskih organov skupni prispevek SNCB pri prestrukturiranju IFB znaša 95,3 milijona EUR, to je znesek predvidenega povečanja kapitala.
The sums committed to the French part of the group should be subtracted from this amount, i.e. EUR 39,1 million. The balance, i.e. EUR 56,2 million, therefore represents SNCB’s contribution to the restructuring of the group’s non-French activities.
Od tega zneska bi morali odšteti vsote, namenjene francoskemu delu skupine, to je 39,1 milijona EUR. Preostalih 56,2 milijona EUR bi torej predstavljalo prispevek SNCB k prestrukturiranju dejavnosti skupine izven Francije.
Later, the Belgian authorities specify that the borrowing requirements for IFB’s non-French activities for the restructuring period (from 1 January 2003 to 30 June 2006), were EUR 106,3 million. Of these requirements, EUR 56,2 million will be covered by SNCB and EUR 50,1 million by means of IFB’s own resources.
Nato belgijski organi razložijo, da so finančne potrebe za dejavnosti IFB izven Francije v obdobju prestrukturiranja (od 1. januarja 2003 do 30. junija 2006) znašale 106,3 milijona EUR. Od tega bi 56,2 milijona EUR potreb krila družba SNCB, 50,1 milijona pa IFB iz lastnih virov.
IFB’s contribution to the total cost of restructuring its activities in Belgium will be 47,1 %.
Prispevek IFB k skupnim stroškom prestrukturiranja dejavnosti v Belgiji bi znašal 47,1 %.
The following table shows the financing details:
Naslednja razpredelnica kaže podrobno razdelitev financiranja:
Finance requirements and sources
Finančne potrebe in finančni viri
(Assuming the conversion of receivables of EUR 63 million constitutes a ‘cost’ of restructuring.)
(predpostavka, po kateri terjatev v višini 63 milijonov EUR predstavlja „stroške“ prestrukturiranja)
Restructured division
Prestrukturirani del
French divestitures
Dezinvesticije v Franciji
Period: 1.1.2003-30.6.2006
Obdobje: 1.1.2003–30.6.2006
FINANCE REQUIREMENTS
FINANČNE POTREBE
Gross operating loss (‘cash drain’) excluding the effect of productivity gains
Bruto izguba iz poslovanja („cash drain “) brez vpliva povečane produktivnosti
(equivalent to the gross operating loss in 2002; pro rata for 6 months in 2006
(enaka bruto izgubi iz poslovanja za leto 2002; sorazmerni delež za 6 mesecev leta 2006)
Exceptional charges
Izredni izdatki
Capital requirements during restructuring
Potrebe po kapitalu med prestrukturiranjem
Variation in working capital (additional)
Spreminjanje potreb po gibljivih sredstvih (povečanje)
Investments in renewal in non-financial fixed assets
Nadomestne naložbe v nefinančna osnovna sredstva
Investments in financial fixed assets (shareholdings)
Nadomestne naložbe v finančna osnovna sredstva (kapitalske udeležbe)
Repayment of debts and interest
Povračilo dolgov in obresti
In favour of creditors (financiers) other than the SNCB
(Finančnim) upnikom razen SNCB
Interest payments
Plačilo obresti
Repayment of financial debts
Povračilo finančnega dolga
In favour of the SNCB
Družbi SNCB
Repayment of debt prior to 2003
Povračilo dolga iz obdobja pred 2003
Payment of interest accumulated from 31.6.2005 on debt prior to 2003
Plačilo natečenih obresti na dan 30.6.2005 za dolg iz obdobja pred 2003
Payment of interest accumulated from 31.6.2005 on credit facility
Plačilo natečenih obresti na dan 30.6.2005 za posojilo
Payment of interest from second half of 2005 and first half of 2006
Plačilo obresti drugo polletje 2005 in prvo polletje 2006
Taxes (accrual from 1999 tax year)
Davki (poravnava za davčno leto 1999)
Total of requirements A.1 + A.2+ A.3 + A.4
Skupaj potrebe (A.1 + A.2 + A.3 + A.4)
FINANCE SOURCES
FINANČNI VIRI
Financed by the SNCB
Financiranje s strani SNCB
Credit facility (to be subsequently converted into capital)
Posojilo (ki ga je treba kasneje pretvoriti v kapital)
Additional capital (over and above the conversion of the credit facility
Povečanja kapitala (poleg pretvorbe posojila)
Total SNCB contribution (subtotal B.1)
Skupni znesek prispevka SNCB (Vmesna vsota B.1)
Financed by IFB’ s own resources
Financiranje z lastnimi sredstvi IFB:
Productivity gains:
Povečanje produktivnosti:
Partial or total disappearance of gross operating loss in column A.1.1
Delna ali popolna odprava bruto izgube iz poslovanja v rubriki A.1.1
Gross operating surplus in 2004, 2005 and 2006
Bruto dobiček iz rednega poslovanja v letih 2004, 2005 in 2006
Financial receipts
Finančni prihodki
Variation in requirement and working capital (reduction)
Spreminjanje potreb po gibljivih sredstvih (zmanjšanje)
Sale of non-financial fixed assets (essentially the OCHZ terminal in 2004)
Spreminjanje potreb po gibljivih sredstvih (zmanjšanje)
Sale of financial fixed assets (shareholdings)
Prodaja finančnih osnovnih sredstev (kapitalske udeležbe)
Financial debts entered into with credit institutions
Finančni dolg pri kreditnih institucijah
Exceptional receipts
Izredni prihodki
Total IFB contribution (subtotal B.2)
Skupaj prispevek IFB (Vmesna vsota B.2)
Total of sources (B.1 + B.2)
Skupaj viri (B.1 + B.2)
Financed by the SNCB as a % of the total
Financiranje s strani SNCB v % skupnega zneska
Financed by IFB as a % of the total
Financiranje s strani IFB v % skupnega zneska
OWN CONTRIBUTION
LASTNI PRISPEVEK
PRIVATE INVESTOR
ZASEBNI VLAGATELJ
Belgium provides the following details on this table.
Belgija k razpredelnici dodaja naslednja pojasnila.
The financing requirements cover the following categories:
Finančne potrebe so povzete v naslednjih kategorijah:
Direct costs of restructuring (section A.1): these costs comprise principally the cumulative gross operating loss (‘cash drain’), without taking account of the productivity gains.
neposredni stroški prestrukturiranja (odsek A.1): ti stroški zajemajo zlasti skupno bruto izgubo iz poslovanja („cash drain“) brez povečanja produktivnosti.
If the productivity gains which IFB achieved during the implementation of its restructuring plan are not taken into account, the gross operating loss in 2003, 2004 and 2005 would be the same as in 2002, that is to say an annual sum of EUR 8 million to be financed, as shown in the table below.
Če ne upoštevamo povečanja produktivnosti IFB med uresničevanjem načrta za prestrukturiranje, bi bruto izguba iz poslovanja v letih 2003, 2004 in 2005 ostala enaka kot leta 2002, to je 8 milijonov EUR, ki bi jih bilo treba financirati vsako leto, kot kaže spodnja razpredelnica.
Forecast
Napoved
Period 2003 to 30.6.2006
Obdobje od leta 2003 do 30.6.2006
cumulative
Skupaj
Operating profit
Izid iz rednega poslovanja
+ Amortisations and reductions in value of fixed assets
+ Amortizacije in zmanjšanje vrednosti osnovnih sredstev
+ Reductions in value of current assets
+ Zmanjšanje vrednosti gibljivih sredstev
0+ Provisions
0+ Rezervacije
Gross operating profit
Bruto izid iz rednega poslovanja
Gross operating loss (‘cash drain’) excluding the effect of gains in productivity
Bruto izguba iz poslovanja („cash drain“) brez vpliva povečane produktivnosti
Capital requirements during restructuring (variations in working capital requirements and investments during restructuring, section A.2): these costs consist of necessary investments during the restructuring period.
potrebe po kapitalu med prestrukturiranjem (različice potrebe po gibljivih sredstvih in naložbe med prestrukturiranjem, odsek A.2): to so stroški nujnih naložb v obdobju prestrukturiranja.
An increase in working capital was necessary in order to finance the works in progress, to absorb the difference between receivables and commercial debts and to maintain sufficient liquidity.
Povečanje gibljivih sredstev je bilo nujno za financiranje del, ki so že tekla, pokrivanje razlik med terjatvami in poslovnimi obveznostmi in zagotavljanje zadostnih denarnih sredstev.
Investments in renewals of tangible fixed assets were necessary for the continuation of IFB’s activities during the implementation of the restructuring plan.
Med uresničevanjem načrta za prestrukturiranje so bile za nadaljevanje dejavnosti IFB potrebne nadomestne naložbe v opredmetena osnovna sredstva.
They were not aimed at expanding IFB’s capacity but were rather investments in renewal of assets which had come to the end of their life cycle and were entirely amortised, together with various investments such as vehicles, computers, minor building renovations etc. The investment of EUR 0,6 million in financial fixed assets in 2004 was linked to the restructuring of the subsidiary IFB Maritime Germany: IFB Maritime Germany was taken over by Haeger & Schmidt International and the shareholding in RKE owned by Haeger & Schmidt International was transferred to IFB,
Njihov namen ni bil širitev zmogljivosti IFB, ampak nadomestne naložbe za popolnoma amortizirana sredstva na koncu življenjskega cikla in različne naložbe, kot so avtomobili, računalniki, majhne prenove zgradb itd. Naložba v višini 0,6 milijona EUR v finančne naložbe leta 2004 je bila povezana s prestrukturiranjem hčerinske družbe IFB Maritime Germany: Haeger & Schmidt International je prevzela družbo IFB Maritime Germany in delež Haeger & Schmidt International v družbi RKE je bil prenesen na IFB.
Repayment of debts and interest (section A.3): apart from interest and repayment of financial debts to credit institutions, this category accounts for interest and repayment of debts to SNCB.
povračilo dolgov in obresti (odsek A.3): poleg obresti in povračil finančnih dolgov kreditnim institucijam ta kategorija vsebuje tudi obresti in povračilo dolgov družbi SNCB.
The debt of EUR 33,2 million is the portion of the debt of EUR 63 million which does not relate to the French subsidiaries.
Dolg v višini 33,2 milijona EUR je del dolga v znesku 63 milijonov EUR, ki ni povezan s francoskimi hčerinskimi družbami.
The interest of EUR 1,4 million payables in 2006 is the interest which does not form part of the increase in capital (in order to minimise the increase in capital).
Obresti v višini 1,4 milijona EUR, plačljive leta 2006, so obresti, ki ne bodo vključene v povečanje kapitala (da bi čim bolj omejili povečanje kapitala).