natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As the decision was taken when the project was almost complete, it seemed to cover risks not related to the R & D content of the project.
Ker je bila odločitev sprejeta, ko je bil projekt skoraj končan, se je zdelo, da so bili kriti stroški tveganj, ki niso bila povezana z vsebino projekta R&R.
According to chapter 6 of the R & D&I Framework the Commission has first to look whether the request for the aid was submitted by the beneficiary before the start of the R & D project.
V skladu s poglavjem 6 Okvira R&R&I Komisija najprej pogleda, ali je upravičenec zahtevek za pomoč predložil pred začetkom projekta R&R.
As already indicated in the opening decision, the aid was requested by Volvo Aero before the start of the project, thus respecting the provision contained in the second paragraph of chapter 6 of the R & D&I Framework.
Kot je navedeno v odločbi o sprožitvi postopka, je Volvo Aero zahtevek za pomoč predložil pred začetkom projekta, kar je v skladu z določbami drugega odstavka poglavja 6 Okvira R&R&I.
The Commission notes that it normally questions the incentive effect of a measure whenever a formal decision to grant the aid is taken by the State at a point where the project is well advanced and de facto financed by the beneficiary.
Komisija navaja, da se o spodbujevalnem učinku ukrepa običajno sprašuje takrat, kadar država sprejme uradno odločitev o dodelitvi pomoči na točki, ko projekt dobro napreduje in ga dejansko financira upravičenec.
In the case of R & D, it is essential that the aid should have an impact on the behaviour of the Company, in inducing a larger or a speedier investment in a project.
V primeru R&R je bistveno, da mora imeti pomoč vpliv na poslovanje podjetja, tako da spodbuja večje ali hitrejše naložbe v projekt.
Without such an impact, the aid would have no incentive effect and would therefore not be necessary.
Brez takega vpliva pomoč ne bi imela spodbujevalnega učinka in zato ne bi bila potrebna.
In order to have such an impact, the aid has to be decided upon by the State, either formally, but with a suspensive clause in view of the necessary approval by the Commission of the compatibility of the aid on the basis of the Article 88(3) of the Treaty, or through a letter of intent, which would not give rise to any legitimate expectations but would be sufficiently strong to indicate a willingness by the State to support a project [17].
Da bi pomoč imela tak vpliv, mora o njej odločiti država, bodisi uradno, vendar s klavzulo o odložitvi zaradi potrebne odobritve Komisije v zvezi z združljivostjo pomoči na podlagi člena 88(3) Pogodbe, ali s pismom o nameri, ki ne bi vzbudilo nobenega upravičenega pričakovanja, vendar bi zadostovalo, da pokaže pripravljenost države za podporo projekta [17].
The Commission also notes that a necessary condition for the compatibility of aid to a R & D project is an early notification of the aid under Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
Komisija prav tako navaja, da je potreben pogoj za združljivost pomoči za projekt R&R zgodnja priglasitev pomoči v skladu s členom 88(3) Pogodbe.
A notification of aid to a project which is close to its end would mean that the State is not convinced about the aid it intends to grant or not able to give an assurance about such aid.
Priglasitev pomoči za projekt, ki je skoraj pri koncu, bi pomenila, da država ni prepričana o pomoči, ki jo namerava dodeliti, ali ne more dati zagotovila za tako pomoč.
If on the face of this uncertainty, the Company is able to carry out the project, and even to conclude it, it is likely then that the aid is largely not necessary for the Company itself.
Če se v tej negotovosti izkaže, da je podjetje sposobno izvajati projekt in ga celo dokončati, je verjetno, da pomoč v veliki meri za samo podjetje ni potrebna.
According to Chapter 6 of the R & D&I Framework, the Commission has to assess, for all individual measures, a number of criteria indicating the incentive effect of the aid, related to the increase in size, scope or speed of the project or the increase in total amount spent by the beneficiary on R & D. The Commission, in performing the detailed assessment of the incentive effect, has based itself on point 7.3.3 of the R & D&I Framework.
V skladu s poglavjem 6 Okvira R&R&I Komisija za vse posamezne ukrepe oceni več meril glede spodbujevalnega učinka pomoči, povezanega s povečanjem velikosti, obsega ali hitrosti projekta ali povečanjem skupnega zneska, ki ga je upravičenec porabil za R&R. Pri podrobnem ocenjevanju spodbujevalnega učinka se je Komisija oprla na točko 7.3.3 Okvira R&R&I.
In determining the incentive effect of the aid in changing the behaviour of the Company, the Commission questioned the value of the oral assurances by the Government given to Volvo Aero in December 2004.
Pri določanju spodbujevalnega učinka pomoči pri spremembi poslovanja podjetja se je Komisija spraševala o vrednosti ustnih zagotovil, ki jih je vlada dala podjetju Volvo Aero decembra 2004.
The Swedish authorities and third parties reiterated in their observations that the assurances by the Government to provide the aid were a decisive factor in the decision by Volvo Aero to engage in the project.
Švedski organi in tretje osebe so v svojih pripombah ponovno poudarili, da so bila zagotovila vlade za zagotovitev pomoči odločilni dejavnik pri odločitvi podjetja Volvo Aero za sodelovanje pri projektu.
Volvo Aero’s contacts with the Ministry of Industry during the autumn of 2004 further strengthened Volvo Aero in its confidence that the resources set aside by the Parliament would be used to support the GEnx R & D project [18].
Stiki podjetja Volvo Aero z ministrstvom za industrijo jeseni 2004 so še dodatno okrepili prepričanje podjetja Volvo Aero, da bodo sredstva, ki jih je prihranil parlament, uporabljena za podporo projekta GEnx R&R [18].
The Swedish authorities also provided internal documents demonstrating that the Company counted on the assurances concerning the aid before engaging in the project [19].
Švedski organi so predložili tudi notranje dokumente, ki kažejo, da je podjetje na zagotovila v zvezi s pomočjo računalo že pred vključitvijo v projekt [19].
As indicated by the former CEO of the Company, had Volvo Aero not received such assurances from the Government, the GE agreement would not have been concluded, as the project would represent an unacceptable level of risk and scale of investment for the Company and the Group.
Kot je navedel bivši generalni direktor podjetja, Volvo Aero sporazuma z GE ne bi sklenil, če ne bi dobil takih zagotovil vlade, saj bi projekt predstavljal nesprejemljivo raven tveganja in nesprejemljiv obseg naložbe za podjetje ter skupino.
According to Sweden, the fact that there is no counterfactual project (i.e. a project that the Company would carry out in the absence of aid) could also show that Volvo Aero had expectations of receiving the aid, as with the TRENT 900 project [20].
Po navedbah Švedske bi tudi dejstvo, da ni hipotetičnega projekta (tj. projekta, ki bi ga podjetje izvedlo, če pomoči ne bi bilo), lahko kazalo na to, da je Volvo Aero pričakoval, da bo dobil pomoč, tako kot pri projektu TRENT 900 [20].
GE has also confirmed in its observations that the prospect of receiving aid was important to Volvo Aero’s decision to become a risk-sharing partner.
Tudi GE je v svojih pripombah potrdil, da je bilo pričakovanje prejetja pomoči pomemben dejavnik pri odločitvi podjetja Volvo Aero, da postane partner pri delitvi tveganja.
The GE agreement with Volvo Aero dated 15 December 2004 also contains a reference to the support from the Swedish State.
Sporazum GE s podjetjem Volvo Aero z dne 15. decembra 2004 vsebuje tudi sklicevanje na podporo Švedske države.
The Commission took into account the economic arguments provided by the Swedish authorities justifying why the GEnx project would not have taken place without Government support.
Komisija je upoštevala gospodarske argumente, ki so jih predložili švedski organi in ki utemeljujejo, zakaj se projekt GEnx brez vladne podpore ne bi izvedel.
First, high upfront costs would put an unacceptable strain on the Company’s financial position.
Prvič, visoki predhodni stroški bi pomenili nesprejemljivo obremenitev za finančno stanje podjetja.
As evidenced by financial documents, Volvo Aero was able to finance only up to 60 % of the project costs from its operating cash flow while the remaining 40 % of the project costs were temporarily covered from the intra-group cash pool in anticipation of the expected public funding.
Kot je razvidno iz finančnih dokumentov, je bilo podjetje Volvo Aero iz svojega denarnega toka poslovanja sposobno financirati samo 60 % stroškov projekta, medtem ko je bilo preostalih 40 % stroškov projekta začasno kritih iz združenih denarnih sredstev znotraj skupine, ob upoštevanju pričakovanih javnih sredstev.
The Commission notes that while the aid seems to have had a limited effect on liquidity (the project has after all been financed by Volvo Aero from its internal cash flow and intra-group funding) and a limited effect on profitability in terms of its impact on the internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value (NPV), the aid reduced the financial exposure of Volvo Aero, thus reducing the project risks in the event of its technological or commercial failure.
Komisija navaja, da se zdi, da je imela pomoč omejen učinek na likvidnost (navsezadnje je podjetje Volvo Aero projekt financiralo iz svojega notranjega denarnega toka in sredstev znotraj skupine) in omejen učinek na donosnost z vidika njenega vpliva na notranjo stopnjo donosa (internal rate of return – IRR) ter neto sedanjo vrednost (net present value – NPV), vendar pa je pomoč zmanjšala finančno izpostavljenost podjetja Volvo Aero, tako da je zmanjšala projektna tveganja v primeru tehnološkega ali poslovnega neuspeha.
The R & D work related to GEnx presented additional risks which were not present in the CF6-80 programme, which was pure production work without any R & D component.
Delo na projektu R&R, povezano z GEnx, je predstavljalo dodatna tveganja, ki jih pri programu CF6-80, ki je vključeval samo proizvodno delo brez kakršnih koli komponent R&R, ni bilo.
The Commission questioned in its opening decision the incentive effect of the aid that would come when the project was very nearly complete and the nature of technical and commercial risks changed.
V odločbi o sprožitvi postopka se je Komisija spraševala o spodbujevalnem učinku pomoči, ki bi bila dodeljena, ko bi bil projekt skoraj končan, narava tehničnih in poslovnih tveganj pa spremenjena.
In their observations, the Swedish authorities demonstrated adequately that technical and commercial risks were still very significant even when the R & D project was at a fairly advanced stage due to the novelty of the technology and Volvo Aero’s limited experience of this type of project.
Švedski organi so v svojih pripombah ustrezno dokazali, da so bila kljub temu, da je bil projekt R&R že v precej napredni fazi, tehnična in poslovna tveganja zaradi novosti v tehnologiji in omejenih izkušenj podjetja Volvo Aero pri tej vrsti projekta še vedno precejšnja.
In light of the above, the Commission is able to conclude that internal decision-making documents and GE observations indicate the critical importance of the aid for Volvo Aero in taking the decision to engage in the project because it reduces risk levels to a level that is acceptable for the Company to undertake the project.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno lahko Komisija sklene, da notranji dokumenti v zvezi z odločanjem in pripombe GE kažejo na to, da je bila pomoč za Volvo Aero odločilnega pomena pri sprejemanju odločitve za vključitev v projekt, saj je zmanjšala ravni tveganja na raven, ki je za podjetje sprejemljiva za izvedbo projekta.
On the basis of these elements, the Commission is able to accept that the aid had an incentive effect as it was considered necessary in order for Volvo Aero to engage in the GEnx project.
Na podlagi teh elementov Komisija lahko potrdi, da je imela pomoč spodbujevalni učinek, saj se je štela za potrebno, da se je podjetje Volvo Aero lahko vključilo v projekt GEnx.
In its opening decision, the Commission stated it was not entirely convinced about the proportionality of the aid as concerns the repayment terms of the repayable advance.
V odločbi o sprožitvi postopka je Komisija navedla, da ni popolnoma prepričana o sorazmernosti pomoči glede na pogoje odplačevanja vračljivega predujma.
Given that the reimbursement of the advance is structured on the basis of SEK sales figures, while revenues from sales to GE are USD-based, the Commission suspected that the foreign exchange risks might be borne by the Government and not by the Company.
Ker je povračilo predujma sestavljeno na podlagi prodajnega tečaja SEK, medtem ko so prihodki od prodaje družbi GE v USD, je Komisija domnevala, da bi valutno tveganje nosila vlada in ne podjetje.
The Commission notes the arguments presented by the Swedish authorities that it is Volvo Aero and not the Government that bears the foreign exchange risk, given that Volvo Aero receives payments from GE in USD, while the aid has to be repaid in SEK.
Komisija navaja argumente, ki so jih predložili švedski organi, da valutno tveganje nosi Volvo Aero in ne vlada, saj podjetje Volvo Aero prejema plačila od GE v USD, medtem ko mora biti pomoč povrnjena v SEK.
Besides, since the repayment of the advance is based on revenues from sales (regardless of currency) and not units sold, the instrument is more proportionate, as it also includes the sale of spare parts.
Ker vračilo predujma temelji na prihodkih od prodaje (ne glede na valuto) in ne na prodanih enotah, je tudi instrument bolj sorazmeren, saj vključuje tudi prodajo rezervnih delov.
The repayment terms of the repayable advance would seem to confirm the proportionality of the aid: returns are set at 7,32 %, surplus repayments are not capped in time and the repayment is on a quarterly basis based on revenues from GE.
Videti je, da bi pogoji odplačevanja vračljivega predujma potrdili sorazmernost pomoči: donosi so določeni na 7,32 %, vračila presežnih sredstev niso časovno omejena in vračilo na četrtletni osnovi temelji na prihodkih GE.
While the Commission notes that the foreign exchange risk should be borne by the Company, the fact that the reimbursement is made on all revenues and not just on sales of engines balances the potential advantage to the Company from foreign exchange gains.
Medtem ko Komisija navaja, da bi moralo valutno tveganje nositi podjetje, je, glede na to, da se povračilo izvede od vseh prihodkov in ne samo od prodaje motorjev, morebitna prednost podjetja zaradi valutnih zaslužkov izničena.
Furthermore, the repayment advance is in line with the R & D&I Framework and it is a less distorting aid instrument.
Poleg tega je vračljivi predujem skladen z Okvirom R&R&I in je manj izkrivljajoč instrument pomoči.
Taking into account also the relatively high return demanded by Sweden, the aid can be considered to be proportionate, as concerns the foreign exchange risk.
Tudi ob upoštevanju razmeroma visokih povračil, ki jih zahteva Švedska, se pomoč, kar zadeva valutno tveganje, lahko šteje za sorazmerno.
The Commission further points out that a repayable advance is a risk-sharing instrument that, where the project is successful, allows for a more than proportionate reimbursement from the beneficiary: If sales forecasts are reached, the aid is fully reimbursed, including interest.
Nadalje Komisija poudarja, da je vračljivi predujem instrument z deljenim tveganjem, ki dopušča večje povračilo od sorazmernega s strani upravičenca, kadar je projekt uspešen: če se napovedi prodaje uresničijo, se pomoč povrne v celoti, vključno z obrestmi.
If sales fall below the forecast, the reimbursement is reduced proportionally [21].
Če je prodaja manjša od napovedi, se povračilo sorazmerno zmanjša [21].
If sales are above the forecast, the reimbursement exceeds the amount of the advance received.
Če je prodaja večja od napovedi, povračilo preseže znesek prejetega predujma.
In assessing whether the aid is proportionate to the nature and magnitude of the market failure, the Commission must ensure that the aid is limited to the necessary minimum.
Komisija oceni, ali je pomoč sorazmerna z naravo in obsegom tržne pomanjkljivosti, pri tem pa mora zagotoviti, da je pomoč omejena na najnižji potrebni znesek.
In its letter of 12 November 2008 the Commission therefore questioned whether the whole amount of the aid was actually necessary, considering that the aid was formally agreed when the project was fairly advanced and Volvo Aero had been able to finance the costs through the cash-pool described above.
Komisija se je zato v svojem dopisu z dne 12. novembra 2008 spraševala, ali je bil celoten znesek pomoči dejansko potreben, saj je bila pomoč uradno dogovorjena, ko je bil projekt že v precej napredni fazi in je bilo podjetje Volvo Aero sposobno kriti stroške iz zgoraj opisanih združenih denarnih sredstev.
In response to the Commission’s concerns that the aid may not have been kept to the minimum, the Swedish authorities acknowledged that the aid granting process and the financial situation of the Group were an indication that the amount of aid could be reduced compared to their initial intention.
Kot odgovor na pomisleke Komisije, da pomoč ni bila omejena na najnižji znesek, so švedski organi potrdili, da sta postopek dodelitve pomoči in finančno stanje skupine kazala na to, da bi se znesek pomoči v primerjavi z njihovo prvotno namero lahko zmanjšal.
They proposed to reduce the amount of the aid based on the de facto situation of Volvo Aero at the moment of the agreement to grant the aid on 14 June 2007.
Predlagali so zmanjšanje zneska pomoči na podlagi dejanskega stanja podjetja Volvo Aero v času soglasja za dodelitev pomoči dne 14. junija 2007.
As of that date, Volvo Aero covered approx. 66,5 % of the eligible costs, of which 60 % had been covered from Volvo Aero internal cash.
Od navedenega datuma je Volvo Aero kril pribl. 66,5 % upravičenih stroškov, pri čemer se je 60 % krilo z notranjim denarjem podjetja Volvo Aero.
The remaining 6,5 %, equivalent to approx. SEK 58 million (approx. EUR 6 million), was financed from the intra-group cash pool.
Ostalih 6,5 %, kar znaša pribl. 58 milijonov SEK(pribl. 6 milijonov EUR), se je krilo iz združenih denarnih sredstev skupine.
In summary, Sweden proposes to reduce the total aid amount from the initially requested SEK 362 million (approx. EUR 39 million) to approx. SEK 304 million (approx. EUR 33 million).
Švedska zato predlaga zmanjšanje skupnega zneska pomoči s prvotno zahtevanih 362 milijonov SEK(pribl. 39 milijonov EUR) na pribl. 304 milijone SEK(pribl. 33 milijonov EUR).
The Commission finds that limiting the aid to the proposed SEK 304 million (approx. EUR 33 million), which represents 33,5 % of the eligible project costs, compared to the initially proposed 39 % of the eligible costs, ensures the aid is kept to the necessary minimum.
Komisija meni, da omejitev pomoči na predlaganih 304 milijone SEK(pribl. 33 milijonov EUR), kar je 33,5 % upravičenih stroškov projekta, v primerjavi s prvotno predlaganimi 39 % upravičenih stroškov, zagotavlja, da je pomoč omejena na najnižji potrebni znesek.
This is because the proposed aid amount addresses the actual funding needs by Volvo Aero at the moment when the aid was formalised and in this way it better reflects the magnitude of the market failure.
To pa zato, ker predlagani znesek pomoči ustreza dejansko potrebnim sredstvom podjetja Volvo Aero v času formalizacije pomoči in tako bolje odraža obseg nedelovanje trga.
The Commission therefore is able to conclude that the reduced aid amount ensures that the aid remains proportionate and kept to the absolute minimum.
Komisija zato lahko sklene, da zmanjšani znesek pomoči zagotavlja, da pomoč ostaja sorazmerna in omejena na absolutno najnižji znesek.
The Commission therefore is able to conclude that the aid repayment terms and the reduction in the aid amount to 33,5 % of the eligible costs are proportionate to the degree and magnitude of the market failure.
Komisija zato lahko sklene, da so pogoji odplačevanja pomoči in zmanjšanje zneska pomoči na 33,5 % upravičenih stroškov sorazmerni s stopnjo in obsegom nedelovanja trga.
Impact on competition
Vpliv na konkurenco
In its opening decision, the Commission considered the relevant market to be the market for engines for large civil aircraft.
V odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka je Komisija menila, da je trg motorjev za velika civilna letala upoštevni trg.
The Commission reached the preliminary conclusion that the impact on competition of the aid was limited, in view of the limited market share and of the investment size.
Komisija je predhodno ugotovila, da je vpliv pomoči na konkurenco glede na omejen tržni delež in velikost naložbe omejen.
Competitors were none the less invited to comment and substantiate a possible significant impact on competition.
Kljub temu so bili konkurenti pozvani, da pošljejo pripombe in utemeljijo morebiten znaten vpliv na konkurenco.
The Swedish authorities indicated that on the worldwide market of components for aero-engines, Volvo Aero is a small player compared to its competitors in Europe, such as Rolls Royce, Snecma, Avio, and MTU.
Švedski organi so navedli, da je Volvo Aero na svetovnem trgu komponent za letalske motorje majhen akter v primerjavi s konkurenti v Evropi, kot so Rolls Royce, Snecma, Avio in MTU.
Given that Volvo Aero has only 2 % market share in the large civil aircraft engine market, the aid would have a very limited impact.
Glede na to, da ima Volvo Aero samo 2-odstotni tržni delež na trgu motorjev za velika civilna letala, bi imela pomoč zelo omejen vpliv.
The components developed and manufactured by Volvo cannot be easily considered as a separate sub-market, not least because they can be developed either by the large original equipment manufacturers or by other suppliers.
Komponente, ki jih razvija in proizvaja Volvo, ni mogoče zlahka šteti za ločen podtrg, tudi zato, ker jih lahko razvijajo veliki proizvajalci originalne opreme ali drugi ponudniki.
The Commission notes that no competitors intervened after the Commission initiated formal investigation procedures.
Komisija navaja, da po sprožitvi uradnih postopkov preiskave s strani Komisije ni posredoval noben konkurent.
Taking into account the publicity given to the decision to open proceedings, the very limited market share of Volvo Aero in the large civil aircraft engine market, and the likely lack of European partners for the same components, the Commission infers from this absence of comments that no competitor had concerns that this aid may distort dynamic incentives, create market power or maintain inefficient market structures.
Glede na publiciteto, ki jo je bila deležna odločba o sprožitvi postopkov, in zelo omejen tržni delež podjetja Volvo Aero na trgu motorjev za velika civilna letala ter verjetno pomanjkanje evropskih partnerjev za enake komponente, Komisija sklepa, ker ni bilo pripomb, da nobenega konkurenta ni skrbelo, da bi ta pomoč lahko izkrivljala dinamične spodbude, ustvarjala tržno moč ali ohranjala neučinkovite tržne strukture.
The Commission also took into account supportive comments received from GE Aviation, as well as from the former president and CEO of Volvo Aero, and from Volvo trade unions.
Komisija je upoštevala tudi pripombe v podporo, ki so jih poslali GE Aviation, bivši predsednik in generalni direktor podjetja Volvo Aero ter sindikati podjetja.
To all appearances, the proposed aid does not seem to distort the dynamic incentives of competitors (engine component producers) to invest and compete.
Vse kaže, da predlagana pomoč ne izkrivlja dinamičnih spodbud konkurentov (proizvajalcev komponent za motorje) za naložbe in konkuriranje.
This may be mainly because many second and third tier suppliers tend to have long term relationships with a single Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) as their preferred partner.
V veliki meri je vzrok tega lahko dejstvo, da veliko ponudnikov na drugi in tretji stopnji raje dolgoročno sodeluje z enim proizvajalcem originalne opreme, ki je njihov prednostni partner.