natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission notes that, on the basis of these two factors, […] should be taken into account in the baseline scenario, even if the company is in financial difficulties and given the importance of savings in restoring profitability in the industry.
Komisija ugotavlja, da bi bilo treba v osnovnem scenariju upoštevati […] iz teh dveh dejavnikov, čeprav je podjetje v finančnih težavah in zaradi pomena prihrankov pri obnovi sposobnosti preživetja v tej panogi.
The following table summarises the results of the equity value calculation.
Spodnja tabela je pregled rezultatov izračuna vrednosti lastnega kapitala.
This calculation is based on the business scenario submitted by Austria, which assumes, among other things, that the weighted average cost of capital (hereinafter WACC) is […] % in phases I and II and […] % [32] in phase III.
Izračun temelji na poslovnem scenariju, ki ga je predložila Avstrija, pri čemer se med drugim predpostavlja tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala (Weighted average cost of capital, v nadaljnjem besedilu: WACC) […] % v I. in II. fazi ter […] % [32] v III. fazi.
Calculation of the value of Austrian Airlines — baseline scenario
Izračun vrednosti podjetja Austrian Airlines – osnovni scenarij
Source: Deloitte valuation report dated 19 March 2009
Vir: Poročilo o oceni Deloitte z dne 19. marca 2009
(in EUR million [33])
v milijonih EUR [33]
Phase II
faza
Phase III
faza
Ist
Dejansko stanje
Budget [35]
Proračun [35]
Adjusted tax
Prilagojeni davki
Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Tax
Neto poslovni dobiček minus prilagojeni davki
+ Depreciation
+ amortizacija
+/– Change in capital expenses
+/– sprememba investicijskih izdatkov
+/– Change in working capital
+/– sprememba gibljivih sredstev
Free Cash Flow (FCF)
Prosti denarni tok (FCF)
NPV Phase I + II + III
NPV I. + II. + III. faza
Total NPV
NPV skupaj
NPV loss carried forward
NPV prenesene izgube
Non-operating assets
Neposlovna sredstva
Entity value
Tržna vrednost skupnega kapitala
Net debt
Čisti dolg
Equity value
Vrednost lastnega kapitala
The Commission notes that the WACC used as a discount rate for calculating the NPV of the free cash flows assumed a debt risk premium of […] basis points for Austrian Airlines’ debts.
Komisija opaža, da je bila pri stopnji WACC, ki se uporablja kot diskontna stopnja za izračun NPV prostega denarnega toka, za dolgove Austrian Airlines predpostavljena rizična premija za dolg v višini […] osnovnih točk.
This resulted from the risk premium applied by the banks for the rescue loan granted at the beginning of 2009.
Ta izhaja iz rizične premije, ki so jo banke uporabljale za posojilo za reševanje, odobreno v začetku leta 2009.
The Commission notes that, in December 2009, a credit default swap [37] by Lufthansa required a risk premium of […] basis points.
Komisija opozarja, da je bila decembra 2009 za zamenjavo neplačil (Credit Default Swap) [37] Lufthanse potrebna rizična premija v višini […] osnovnih točk.
Therefore, a risk premium of […] basis points appears to be rather low and does not fully reflect the risk situation of Austrian Airlines.
Zato se rizična premija v višini […] osnovnih točk zdi prav nizka in ne odseva v celoti stanja tveganja Austrian Airlines.
The Commission’s expert has therefore reviewed Deloitte’s calculation using a WACC of […] % and […] %.
Izvedenec Komisije je izračun Deloitte zato ponovil s stopnjama WACC […] % in […] %.
The Commission notes that the WACC used — in order to reflect the risk premium which might be required by Austrian Airlines’ shareholders and creditors — significantly increases the negative equity value of Austrian Airlines (see table below).
Komisija opozarja, da uporabljena stopnja WACC – za odsev rizične premije, ki bi jo lahko terjali delničarji in upniki Austrian Airlines – pomembno zvišuje negativno vrednost lastnega kapitala Austrian Airlines (glej spodnjo tabelo).
Sensitivity analysis of the WACC on the equity value of Austrian Airlines
Analiza občutljivosti stopnje WACC za vrednost lastnega kapitala Austrian Airlines
Equity Value
Vrednost lastnega kapitala
Difference in the equity value
Razlika pri vrednosti lastnega kapitala
[…] % in Phase I and II and […] % in Phase III
[…] % v I. in II. fazi ter […] % v III. fazi
In addition, the Commission’s expert evaluated a combination of worst- and best-case combinations of events and their impact on the equity value of Austrian Airlines.
Izvedenec Komisije je dodatno ocenil kombinacijo pesimistične in optimistične kombinacije dogodkov in njen vpliv na vrednost lastnega kapitala Austrian Airlines.
The expert carried out an evaluation based on Austrian Airlines’ business plan and Deloitte’s evaluation model and has identified best- and worst-case scenarios by applying a debt risk premium he believes the market would apply.
Izvedenec je izvedel oceno na podlagi poslovnega načrta Austrian Airlines in modela za ovrednotenje Deloitte ter je določil najboljši mogoči in najslabši mogoči scenarij ob uporabi rizične premije za dolg, ki bi jo trg uporabil po njegovi oceni.
The results of these sensitivity analyses are summarised in the table below.
Rezultati teh analiz občutljivosti so prikazani v spodnji preglednici.
Sensitivity analysis of the equity value of Austrian Airlines
Analiza občutljivosti za vrednost lastnega kapitala Austrian Airlines
Difference in the equity value (%)
Razlika pri vrednosti lastnega kapitala v %
‘Best-case’ (‘optimistic’) Scenario
Najboljši mogoči („optimistični“) scenarij
Baseline scenario (Deloitte)
Osnovni scenarij (Deloitte)
‘Worst-case’ scenario
Najslabši mogoči scenarij
These assumptions lead to an equity value of EUR […] million, which is EUR […] million or […] % more positive than in the baseline scenario calculated by Deloitte.
Rezultat teh domnev je vrednost lastnega kapitala […] milijonov EUR, kar je za […] milijonov EUR ali […] % bolj pozitivno od osnovnega scenarija, ki ga je izračunal Deloitte.
In the worst-case scenario, the Commission’s expert assumes lower sales growth, which is in line with GDP estimates for Austrian Airlines’ target markets (i.e. a growth rate of […] % instead of […] % in 2011 and […] % instead of […] % in 2012), and assumes that the management will only be able to maintain material and personnel costs at a constant percentage of revenues from 2011 to 2012 rather than introducing cost cutting measures.
Izvedenec Komisije pri najslabšem mogočem scenariju izhaja iz manjše rasti prometa, ki je v skladu z ocenami BDP ciljnih trgov Austrian Airlines (to je […]-odstotna rast leta 2011 namesto […]-odstotna in […]-odstotna leta 2012 namesto […]-odstotna), in predpostavlja, da bo uprava lahko materialne stroške in stroške zaposlenih v obdobju 2011–2012 samo ohranila pri stalnem odstotku, namesto da bi uvedla ukrepe za znižanje stroškov.
This leads to an equity value of EUR […] million, which is EUR […] million or […] % more negative than in the baseline scenario.
Rezultat teh predpostavk je vrednost lastnega kapitala […] milijonov EUR, kar je za […] milijonov EUR ali […] % bolj negativno od osnovnega scenarija.
On this basis, the Commission can conclude that, at the time of the sale, Austrian Airlines’ equity value, calculated on a going-concern assumption (going-concern value), was between EUR […] million and EUR […] million, with a mid-range value of EUR […] million.
Komisija lahko na podlagi tega sklene, da se je vrednost lastnega kapitala Austrian Airlines ob predpostavki delujočega podjetja („vrednost delujočega podjetja“) v času prodaje gibala med […] milijoni EUR in […] milijoni EUR, torej je bila povprečno […] milijonov EUR.
Share of the equity value that the buyer should pay
Delež vrednosti lastnega kapitala, ki bi ga kupec moral plačati
The Commission notes that this equity value corresponds to 100 % of the shares in Austrian Airlines.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je ta vrednost lastnega kapitala 100-odstotni delež v Austrian Airlines.
ÖIAG holds only 41,56 % of those shares.
ÖIAG ima v lasti samo 41,56 % tega deleža.
However, under Section 22(2) of the Austrian Takeover Act, a direct controlling interest is a direct interest held in a company which gives the holder more than 30 % of the shares with permanent voting rights.
V skladu s členom 22(2) avstrijskega zakona o prevzemih pa je neposredna nadzorna udeležba neposredna udeležba v družbi, ki lastniku daje več kot 30 % glasovalnih pravic, ki odpadejo na delnice s stalno glasovalno pravico.
Thus, in the present case, ÖIAG can be regarded as the controlling shareholder.
Zato je ÖIAG v obravnavanem primeru mogoče obravnavati kot delničarja, ki izvaja nadzor.
There is no other shareholder who could also be considered a controlling shareholder or even a blocking minority shareholder (25 % plus one share).
Ni nobenega drugega delničarja, ki bi ga prav tako lahko obravnavali kot delničarja, ki izvaja nadzor, ali vsaj kot manjšinjskega delničarja, ki lahko prepreči sprejemanje odločitev (25 % in ena delnica).
The Commission notes that a control premium is usually imposed to reflect the increase in value as a result of the benefit of control where the initial indication of value does not reflect this capacity.
Komisija ugotavlja, da se praviloma določi nadzorna premija, ki odseva povečanje vrednosti, ki je pogojeno s prednostjo možnosti nadzora, če prvotna navedba vrednosti ne odseva te sposobnosti.
This is confirmed in the present case by the fact that, by obtaining a controlling interest in Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa assumes full responsibility for restructuring the undertaking, and the benefit of control does not constitute a benefit for the purchaser but rather a burden.
To v obravnavanem primeru potrjuje dejstvo, da Lufthansa s pridobitvijo nadzorne udeležbe v Austrian Airlines v celoti prevzema odgovornost za prestrukturiranje podjetja in prednost izvajanja nadzora nima prednosti za kupca, temveč mu je prej v breme.
The Commission also agrees with the Austrian authorities that a percentage of 58,44 % is a negative control premium which has to be assumed by ÖIAG as the controlling shareholder when selling its shareholding.
Komisija se tudi strinja z avstrijskimi organi, da pomeni 58,44 % negativno nadzorno premijo, ki jo mora prevzeti ÖIAG kot delničar, ki izvaja nadzor, če odsvoji svoj delež.
This explains why Lufthansa will pay a more negative price than 41,56 % of the going-concern price.
To pojasnjuje, zakaj je Lufthansa plačala ceno, ki je bolj negativna od 41,56 % cene delujočega podjetja.
In addition, a ‘blockage discount’ must also be assumed for ÖIAG’s shareholding.
Poleg tega je treba predpostavljati tudi „paketno znižanje cene“ deležev ÖIAG.
This discount may be imposed to reflect the negative effect on share price when a large block of shares is offered for sale all at once and the market is flooded with sell orders and demand is insufficient to take up supply.
To se lahko stori za ponazoritev negativnih učinkov na delniški tečaj, če se hkrati v prodajo ponudi velik paket deležev in je trg preplavljen s prodajnimi naročili, nezadostno povpraševanje pa ne izravna ponudbe.
In the present case, ÖIAG’s stake in Austrian Airlines corresponds to 36626875 shares out of a total of 88134724.
Udeležba ÖIAG v Austrian Airlines je v obravnavanem primeru 36626875 od skupno 88134724 delnic.
It must also be taken into account that only 47,94 % of Austrian Airlines’ share capital is traded on the stock exchange.
Upoštevati je treba tudi dejstvo, da se na borzi trguje samo s 47,94 % delniškega kapitala Austrian Airlines.
It is therefore logical that ÖIAG would accept a lower price in order to be able to sell its shares en bloc.
Zato je logično, da bi ÖIAG sprejel nižjo ceno, da bi svoje deleže lahko prodal „en bloc“ (v enem kosu).
On this basis, the Commission can conclude that the price for ÖIAG’s 41,56 % shareholding corresponds to 100 % of the equity value.
Komisija lahko na podlagi tega sklene, da je cena za 41,56-odstotno udeležbo ÖIAG 100 % vrednosti lastnega kapitala.
Furthermore, and without prejudice to the arguments set out and the conclusions reached above, the Commission notes that, without taking into account the control premium and blockage discount, the value for 41,56 % would be between EUR […] and EUR […], with a mid-range value of EUR […].
Komisija poleg tega ne glede na predstavljene utemeljitve in zgornje sklepne ugotovitve ugotavlja, da bi se vrednost za 41,56 % brez upoštevanja nadzorne premije in paketnega znižanja cene gibala med […] EUR in […] EUR ter bi bila tako povprečno […] EUR.
Price paid by Lufthansa for ÖIAG’s shareholding in Austrian Airlines
Cena, ki jo je plačala Lufthansa za deleže ÖIAG v Austrian Airlines
As previously explained, the price paid by Lufthansa is made up of three elements: (a) EUR 366268,75 (EUR 0,01 per share), (b) a debtor warrant and (c) ÖIAG’s contribution of EUR 500 million.
Kot je bilo že navedeno, je cena, ki jo je plačala Lufthansa, sestavljena iz treh delov: a) 366268,75 EUR (0,01 EUR na delnico), b) naloga za plačilo dolgov in c) zneska ÖIAG v višini 500 milijonov EUR.
The Commission’s expert carried out a review of the potential payout under the warrant.
Izvedenec Komisije je preiskal mogoče izplačilo iz naloga za plačilo dolgov.
He noted that the warrant becomes payable following the signing of Austrian Airlines’ financial statements for the year ending 2011.
Ugotovil je, da nalog za plačilo dolgov zapade po podpisu finančnega poročila Austrian Airlines za poslovno leto, ki se konča leta 2011.
Under the terms of the warrant, the maximum possible additional consideration cannot exceed the amount per share paid to minority shareholders under the Austrian Takeover Act unless Lufthansa increases its offer to the minority shareholders.
V skladu s pogoji naloga za plačilo dolgov najvišje mogoče dodatno plačilo ne more preseči zneska na delnico, ki se plača manjšinskim delničarjem v skladu z avstrijskim zakonom o prevzemih, če Lufthansa ne zviša ponudbe za manjšinjske delničarje.
Thus the maximum ÖIAG can receive is EUR 164,1 million.
Zato je najvišji znesek, ki ga lahko prejme ÖIAG, 164,1 milijona EUR.
The warrant is made up of two components: […] [38].
Nalog za plačilo dolgov sestavljata dva elementa: […] [38].
The Commission’s expert looked into the report prepared by ÖIAG’s advisors, Merrill Lynch, which analysed the potential payout under the debtor warrant.
Izvedenec Komisije je preveril poročilo, ki ga je pripravil svetovalec ÖIAG Merrill Lynch, v katerem je analizirano mogoče izplačilo iz naloga za plačilo dolgov.
Moore Stephens concluded that Merrill Lynch’s approach to estimating the payout under the debtor warrant was based on reasonable assumptions and used recognised and established capital market valuation techniques.
Moore Stephens je ugotovil, da pristop Merrill Lynch za oceno izplačila iz naloga za plačilo dolgov temelji na razumnih domnevah ter da so bile uporabljene priznane in uveljavljene tehnike za oceno kapitalskega trga.
Nevertheless, the Commission’s expert carried out a sensitivity analysis in order to determine the payout depending on various […].
Izvedenec Komisije je kljub temu izvedel analizo občutljivosti, da bi določil izplačilo v odvisnosti od različnih […].
The results are summarised in the table below.
Rezultati so prikazani v spodnji preglednici.
Sensitivity analysis of […]
Analiza občutljivosti […]
Sensitivity […]
Občutljivost […]
Cumulative […]
Kumulativni […]
Cumulative adjusted consolidated […]
Kumulativni čisti konsolidirani […]
Payout
Izplačilo
As regards the […], which is calculated on the basis of […], the Commission notes that, due to the deterioration in the European air passenger and cargo market, there is a risk that the […]
Komisija glede […], ki se izračuna na podlagi […], ugotavlja, da zaradi poslabšanja položaja na evropskem trgu letalskega prevoza potnikov in tovora obstaja tveganje, da […].
Based on the foregoing, it would appear that the […].
Na podlagi zgornjih navedb je videti, da […].
In view of the above, the Commission can conclude that the price paid by Lufthansa is in the range between EUR […] million and EUR […] million, depending on the payout under the debtor warrant (see Table 11 below).
Zato lahko Komisija sklene, da je cena, ki jo je plačala Lufthansa, odvisno od izplačila iz naloga za plačilo dolgov (glej preglednico 11), od […] milijonov EUR do […] milijonov EUR.
Summary of the price paid by Lufthansa
Pregled cene, ki jo je plačala Lufthansa
Price paid by Lufthansa for ÖIAG’s shareholding
Cena, ki jo je plačala Lufthansa za deleže ÖIAG
Maximum price
Najvišja cena
Price for ÖIAG’s shareholding
Cena za deleže ÖIAG
Debtor warrant ([…])
Nalog za plačilo dolgov([…])
ÖIAG grant
Prispevek ÖIAG
Total amount (1) + (2) + (3)
Vsota (1) + (2) + (3)
Price paid to minority shareholders
Cena, plačana manjšinskim delničarjem
In relation to the fact that Lufthansa will pay a price for the free-float shares that differs from that paid for ÖIAG’s stake, the Commission notes that public takeovers of companies quoted on the Austrian stock exchange are governed by the Takeover Act, which is implemented by the Takeover Commission.
Komisija glede dejstva, da bo Lufthansa za delnice v prostem obtoku plačala drugačno ceno kot za deleže ÖIAG, ugotavlja, da se za javne prevzeme podjetij, ki kotirajo na avstrijski borzi, uporablja zakon o prevzemih, ki ga uporablja komisija za prevzeme.
The Takeover Commission ensures that minority shareholders are protected and that the takeover procedure is carried out in the interests of the target company and the securities markets.
Komisija za prevzeme zagotavlja, da so manjšinjski delničarji zaščiteni ter se prevzemni postopki izvajajo v interesu ciljne družbe in trgov vrednostnih papirjev.
The Takeover Act obliges an acquirer of more than 30 % of the target company’s shares to announce a mandatory offer for all of the target company’s equities within 20 days of crossing the threshold (Section 22 of the Takeover Act).
V skladu z zakonom o prevzemih je pridobitelj več kot 30-odstotnega deleža v ciljni družbi v 20 dneh po prekoračitvi praga zavezan naznaniti obvezno ponudbo za vse udeležbene vrednostne papirje ciljne družbe (člen 22 zakona o prevzemih).
Section 26 of the Takeover Act states that the price of a mandatory or voluntary bid to acquire a controlling interest must not be lower than the highest money consideration paid or agreed by the bidder for these equities over the 12 months preceding the announcement of the bid and that this price must be at least the average stock-market price for the equities concerned, weighted according to the respective trading volumes, over the six months preceding the day on which the bid was announced.
V skladu s členom 26 zakona o prevzemih cena obvezne ponudbe ali prostovoljne ponudbe za pridobitev nadzora ne sme biti nižja od najvišje nasprotne dajatve za ta udeležbeni vrednostni papir ciljne družbe, ki jo je ponudnik plačal v denarju ali dogovoril v zadnjih dvanajstih mesecih pred naznanitvijo ponudbe; ta cena mora biti poleg tega enaka vsaj povprečnemu borznemu tečaju konkretnega udeležbenega vrednostnega papirja v zadnjih šestih mesecih pred dnem naznanitve ponudbe, ponderiranemu v skladu s konkretnim obsegom trgovanja.
Lufthansa, as the acquirer of ÖIAG’s controlling stake, is therefore obliged to make an offer to all shareholders at the weighted average price.
Zato mora Lufthansa kot pridobiteljica nadzornega deleža ÖIAG vsem delničarjem predložiti ponudbo po povprečnem ponderiranem tečaju.
The Commission notes that the bidder has no discretion with regard to the level of this price.
Komisija opozarja, da ponudnik glede višine te cene nima manevrskega prostora.
In addition, because of the public tendering procedure for ÖIAG’s shares, the transaction attracted media interest, which is why the share price has been influenced by market activity and speculation.
Transakcija je zaradi javnega razpisnega postopka za deleže ÖIAG poleg tega zbudila zanimanje medijev, zaradi česar so na tečaj delnice vplivale dejavnost trga in špekulacije.
The difference in the prices may also be explained by the control discount applicable to minority shareholdings.
Razliko v ceni je mogoče pojasniti tudi z nadzornim znižanjem cene, ki velja za manjšinjske udeležbe.
In contrast to the control premium, the value of minority shareholdings does not reflect the value attached to the controlling interest.
Vrednost manjšinjskih deležev v nasprotju z nadzorno premijo ne odseva vrednosti, povezane z nadzorno udeležbo.
Although the total price paid to ÖIAG is negative and, as explained above, can be derived from a negotiated procedure, the price paid for the free-float shares is set by law, is in fact known to all parties in advance and would amount to approximately EUR 220 million in the present case.
Skupna cena, plačana ÖIAG, je negativna in jo je, kot je bilo že pojasnjeno, mogoče izpeljati iz pogajalskega postopka, cena, ki se plača za delnice v prostem obtoku, pa je zakonsko določena, dejansko vnaprej znana vsem strankam in bi bila v obravnavanem primeru približno 220 milijonov EUR.
Accordingly, the Commission can conclude that the minority share price is based solely on legal obligations which Lufthansa must meet and that, in the present case, no conclusions regarding the price paid to ÖIAG can therefore be inferred from the price paid to the minority shareholders.
Komisija v skladu s tem lahko sklepa, da cena za manjšinske delnice temelji samo na zakonskih obveznostih, ki jih mora izpolniti Lufthansa, in da zato v obravnavanem primeru na podlagi cene, plačane manjšinskim delničarjem, ni mogoče sklepati o ceni, plačani ÖIAG.
It follows from the above that the price paid by Lufthansa for ÖIAG’s stake is between EUR […] and EUR […]. This must be compared with a going-concern value for Austrian Airlines of between EUR […] and EUR […], with a mid-range value of EUR […]. The price paid is therefore not lower than the going-concern value.
Iz zgornjih navedb je razvidno, da se cena, ki jo je Lufthansa plačala za deleže ÖIAG, giblje od […] do […] EUR. To je treba primerjati z vrednostjo delujočega Austrian Airlines, ki se giblje od […] do […] EUR in je torej povprečno […] EUR. Zato plačana cena ni nižja od vrednosti delujočega podjetja.
The Commission notes that, even though the price paid is only 41,56 % of the value of the company, that price is very close to the range identified by the expert.
Komisija opozarja, da je ta cena zelo blizu razponu, ki so ga ugotovili strokovnjaki, tudi če je plačana cena enaka samo 41,56 % vrednosti podjetja.
The Commission therefore concludes that the price paid by Lufthansa is within the range of market prices for the shareholding in Austrian Airlines being sold by ÖIAG.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da je bila cena, ki jo je plačala Lufthansa, v okviru razpona tržnih cen za deleže v Austrian Airlines, ki jih je prodal ÖIAG.
Hence, the conditions did not have an impact on the sales price.
Torej pogoji niso vplivali na prodajno ceno.
This conclusion is confirmed by a qualitative assessment of the above-mentioned conditions.
To sklepno ugotovitev potrjuje ocena kakovosti zgoraj navedenih pogojev.
As set out above, the Austrian authorities argued that the conditions imposed on ÖIAG by the privatisation mandate were not such as to have a negative impact or indeed any impact on the price that the purchasers were willing to pay.
Kot je bilo že navedeno, so avstrijski organi trdili, da pogoji, določeni ÖIAG v pooblastilu za privatizacijo, niso bili taki, da bi negativno vplivali ali sploh vplivali na ceno, ki bi jo bili pripravljeni plačati kupci.
With regard to the goal of ‘preserving as many secure jobs as possible’, the Commission is of the opinion that this requirement is merely a ‘best efforts’ aim.
Komisija glede cilja „čim večje ohranitve varnih delovnih mest“ meni, da ta zahteva pomeni samo cilj, za katerega si je treba prizadevati po najboljših močeh.
The Commission notes that this condition was formulated in such a manner that it did not impose any onerous or binding obligations on potential buyers.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je bil ta pogoj izražen tako, da za morebitne kupce s tem ni bila določena obremenjujoča ali zavezujoča obveznost.