natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The yard has been producing steel structures, blocks and sections, thereby competing with many other companies acting as subcontractors for other shipyards building complete vessels.
Ladjedelnica je proizvajala jeklene konstrukcije, škripce in profile, s čimer je konkurirala številnim drugim družbam, ki so delovale kot podizvajalec za druge ladjedelnice, ki gradijo celotna plovila.
In the last two years the yard has started to produce off-shore vessels, which is a segment in which other European shipyards, for example the Norwegian ones, are active.
Ladjedelnica je v zadnjih dveh letih začela proizvajati plovila za plovbo po odprtem morju, ki predstavljajo segment, v katerem so dejavne druge evropske ladjedelnice, na primer norveške.
The continuous subsidising of Gdańsk Shipyard, for example via non-enforcement of public liabilities, production guarantees as well as numerous capital injections and loans, allowed the yard to conclude contracts without full recognition and remuneration of all the risks involved.
Stalno subvencioniranje ladjedelnice Gdańsk, na primer prek neizvrševanja javnopravnih obveznosti, jamstev za proizvodnjo ter več dokapitalizacij in posojil, je ladjedelnici omogočilo sklepanje pogodb brez popolnega priznavanja in plačila vseh vključenih tveganj.
Otherwise its competitors might have taken over at least part of its market share.
V nasprotnem primeru bi njeni konkurenti lahko prevzeli vsaj del njenega tržnega deleža.
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that the State aid granted to Gdańsk Shipyard affected trade between Member States.
Na podlagi navedenega Komisija ugotavlja, da je državna pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena ladjedelnici Gdańsk, vplivala na trgovino med državami članicami.
The Commission also needs to determine whether the measures granted to Gdańsk Shipyard conferred an undue advantage on it and thereby distorted or threatened to distort competition.
Komisija mora tudi ugotoviti, ali je imela ladjedelnica Gdańsk zaradi ukrepov, ki so ji bili dodeljeni, neupravičeno prednost ter ali so ti ukrepi izkrivljali ali bi lahko izkrivljali konkurenco.
The Commission takes the view that reliance on State aid enabled Gdańsk Shipyard to engage in anti-competitive practice such as pricing below production costs without suffering the consequences that such practices normally entail, namely elimination from the market.
Komisija meni, da je uporaba državne pomoči ladjedelnici Gdańsk omogočila izvajanje protikonkurenčnih praks, kot je oblikovanje cen pod proizvodnimi stroški, ne da bi nanjo vplivale posledice, ki jih takšne prakse običajno povzročijo, in sicer izločitev iz trga.
The Commission also notes that one of Gdańsk Shipyard’s main long-term problems was the conclusion of contracts which proved to be loss-making as the zloty appreciated against the dollar, the dominant currency in the shipbuilding business, and the price of steel plates increased worldwide.
Komisija ugotavlja tudi, da je bila ena od glavnih dolgoročnih težav ladjedelnice Gdańsk sklepanje pogodb, ki so ustvarjale izgube, saj je vrednost zlota glede na dolar, ki je prevladujoča valuta v ladjedelništvu, rasla, cene jeklenih plošč pa so se na svetovni ravni zvišale.
These external factors were already identified as the main threats to the yard’s continued operation in the Restructuring Plan for 2003-08, and then subsequently in the amended version of March 2004, in the new 2006 Restructuring Plan and, lastly, in the 2009 Restructuring Plan.
Ti zunanji dejavniki so bili kot glavne grožnje neprekinjenemu delovanju ladjedelnice opredeljeni že v načrtu prestrukturiranja za obdobje 2003–2008, nato v spremenjeni različici iz marca 2004, v novem načrtu prestrukturiranja iz leta 2006 in nazadnje v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009.
Despite the fact that the yard’s management was aware of these threats, the yard continued to conclude contracts without taking any measures to mitigate the risk.
Čeprav se je uprava ladjedelnice teh groženj zavedala, je ladjedelnica še naprej sklepala pogodbe, ne da bi sprejela ukrepe za zmanjšanje tveganja.
This business practice continued during the unprecedented boom in the shipbuilding market between 2004 and 2008, when shipbuilding prices rose to record levels.
Ta poslovna praksa se je nadaljevala med izrednimi dogodki na ladjedelniškem trgu med letoma 2004 in 2008, ko so se cene v ladjedelništvu dvignile na rekordne ravni.
As a result of this practice, the yard managed to maintain activity and employment, but at the cost of large losses on regular shipbuilding production.
Zaradi te prakse je ladjedelnica uspela ohraniti dejavnost in število zaposlenih, vendar na račun velikih izgub v redni ladjedelniški proizvodnji.
On that basis, the Commission concludes that all the aid granted to Gdańsk Shipyard described in recitals 105-170 was such as to distort or threaten to distort competition on the shipbuilding market.
Na podlagi tega Komisija ugotavlja, da je bila pomoč, dodeljena ladjedelnici Gdańsk in opisana v uvodnih izjavah 105–170, takšna, da izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco na ladjedelniškem trgu.
The Commission notes that the Polish authorities did not dispute the classification of the measures covered by the present decision as State aid, with two exceptions.
Komisija ugotavlja, da poljski organi razen dveh izjem niso nasprotovali klasifikaciji ukrepov, ki so zajeti v tej odločbi.
Firstly, they claimed that the loans granted to Gdańsk Shipyard by KPS did not constitute aid.
Prvič, trdili so, da posojila, ki jih je ladjedelnici Gdańsk odobrila KPS, niso pomenila pomoči.
Second, they questioned the aid character of the guarantees provided by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation which were alleged to comply with the market economy operator principle.
Drugič, izrazili so dvom o tem, ali pomenijo jamstva, ki jih je zagotovila družba Export Credit Insurance Corporation in ki naj bi bila v skladu z načelom udeleženca v tržnem gospodarstvu, pomoč.
In addition, the Polish authorities did not give notification of the continuous non-enforcement of public-law liabilities as a separate State aid measure.
Poleg tega poljski organi niso priglasili stalnega neizvrševanja javnopravnih obveznosti kot ločen ukrep državne pomoči.
The Commission will explain below why it regards these three measures as constituting a competition-distorting advantage.
Komisija bo spodaj pojasnila, zakaj po njenem mnenju ti trije ukrepi pomenijo prednost, ki izkrivlja konkurenco.
Continuous non-enforcement of public-law liabilities
Stalno neizvrševanje javnopravnih obveznosti
According to established case-law [34], continuous non-enforcement of public-law debt can in itself constitute State aid.
V skladu z uveljavljeno sodno prakso [34] lahko stalno neizvrševanje javnopravnih obveznosti samo po sebi pomeni državno pomoč.
As explained by the Polish authorities [36], due to its precarious financial situation, after 1 May 2004 the yard was unable to pay its public-law liabilities on time and its outstanding debt was been continuously deferred without any formal decision on the part of the relevant public creditors.
Kot so pojasnili poljski organi [36], ladjedelnica zaradi svojega negotovega finančnega položaja po 1. maju 2004 ni bila zmožna pravočasno odplačati svojih javnopravnih obveznosti, pri čemer se je odplačilo neporavnanega dolga brez kakršne koli formalne odločitve zadevnih javnih upnikov nenehno odlagalo.
The 2009 Restructuring Plan assumes that the accumulated public-law liabilities will be repaid in September 2009 after the yard receives new State aid.
V načrtu prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009 je predvideno, da bodo nakopičene javnopravne obveznosti odplačane septembra 2009, ko bo ladjedelnica prejela novo državno pomoč.
This shows that in practice the public-law liabilities accrued since 2004 were deferred for an unlimited or unspecified period of time, have been repaid only occasionally as permitted by the yard’s cash flow and can now be fully repaid only thanks to additional State aid.
To kaže, da so bile javnopravne obveznosti, ki so nastale od leta 2004, v praksi odložene za neomejen ali nedoločen čas, da so bile odplačane le občasno glede na denarni tok ladjedelnice in da se zdaj lahko v celoti odplačajo le s pomočjo dodatne državne pomoči.
The Commission considers that no market economy creditor would accept such an unlimited deferral of its liabilities.
Komisija meni, da noben upnik v tržnem gospodarstvu ne bi sprejel takšnega neomejenega odloga svojih obveznosti.
Furthermore, even after the yard’s privatisation and the capital injection by ISD Polska of PLN 305 million, the Polish authorities have not undertaken measures to enforce repayment of liabilities.
Poleg tega poljski organi tudi po privatizaciji ladjedelnice in dokapitalizaciji v višini 305 milijonov PLN, ki jo je zagotovila družba ISD Polska, niso sprejeli ukrepov za izvrševanje odplačila obveznosti.
The information submitted by the Polish authorities contains no indication that public creditors have undertaken any action to enforce their public-law receivables from Gdańsk Shipyard, in particular by way of forced recovery or bankruptcy law.
Informacije, ki so jih predložili poljski organi, ne vsebujejo navedb o morebitnih ukrepih javnih upnikov za izvrševanje svojih javnopravnih terjatev do ladjedelnice Gdańsk, zlasti prek prisilne izterjave ali zakona o stečaju.
The Commission therefore concludes that continuous non-enforcement of public-law liabilities represents an advantage that the recipient would have not obtained from a market economy creditor and therefore constitutes State aid similar to an (interest-free) loan.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da predstavlja stalno neizvrševanje javnopravnih obveznosti prednost, ki je prejemnik ne bi imel pri upniku v tržnem gospodarstvu, in pomeni državno pomoč, ki je podobna (brezobrestnemu) posojilu.
According to the 2009 Restructuring Plan the total amount of non-enforced public liabilities is PLN 63013631.
V skladu z načrtom prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009 celotni znesek neizvršenih javnopravnih obveznosti znaša 63013631 PLN.
However, according to the information submitted by the Polish authorities in their letter of 9 January 2008, the accumulated public liabilities of Gdańsk Shipyard at that time accounted to PLN 90245096,76 (including accrued interest).
Vendar so v skladu z informacijami, ki so jih predložili poljski organi z dopisom z dne 9. januarja 2008, nakopičene javnopravne obveznosti ladjedelnice Gdańsk takrat znašale 90245096,76 PLN (vključno z nastalimi obrestmi).
Furthermore, when quantifying the restructuring costs, the 2009 Restructuring Plan indicates that the yard will need to repay an amount of PLN 95354830,90 in accumulated public liabilities.
Poleg tega je v zvezi s količinsko opredelitvijo stroškov prestrukturiranja v načrtu prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009 navedeno, da bo morala ladjedelnica odplačati nakopičene javnopravne obveznosti v višini 95354830,90 PLN.
On that basis the Commission considers that the total value of non-enforced public liabilities, with interest, amounts to PLN 95354830,90; that amount was indicated in Table 4 above.
Na podlagi tega Komisija meni, da celotna vrednost neizvršenih javnopravnih obveznosti, vključno z obrestmi, znaša 95354830,90 PLN, navedeni znesek pa je bil naveden v tabeli 4.
The Commission cannot accept Poland’s argument that aid in the form of working capital loans from KPS was free of State aid.
Komisija se ne strinja z argumentom Poljske, da pomoč v obliki posojil KPS za gibljiva sredstva ni vsebovala državne pomoči.
The Commission observes that the interest rate charged by KPS was about 400 basis points above the reference rate.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je bila obrestna mera, ki jo je zaračunala KPS, približno 400 bazičnih točk nad referenčno mero.
The Commission also notes that Gdańsk Shipyard has been in a very precarious financial situation for several years, making significant losses and accumulating debts.
Komisija ugotavlja tudi, da je finančni položaj ladjedelnice Gdańsk že več let zelo negotov, pri čemer ladjedelnica ustvarja znatne izgube in kopiči dolgove.
Gdańsk Shipyard has not been able to obtain funding for its production from any other external source.
Ladjedelnica Gdańsk ni uspela pridobiti finančnih sredstev za proizvodnjo od nobenega drugega zunanjega vira.
Its working capital was financed by advance payments fully covered by guarantees from the Export Credit Insurance Corporation, by loans fully covered by Treasury guarantees and by KPS loans.
Njena gibljiva sredstva so bila financirana s predplačili, ki so jih v celoti krila jamstva družbe Export Credit Insurance Corporation, posojili, ki so jih v celoti krila jamstva finančnega ministrstva, in posojili KPS.
The interest rate charged by KPS therefore does not appear to correctly reflect the risk incurred.
Zato se zdi, da obrestna mera, ki jo je zaračunala KPS, ne izraža ustrezno nastalega tveganja.
Although KPS did require collateral, its value remains questionable.
Čeprav je KPS zahtevala zavarovanje, je vrednost tega zavarovanja vprašljiva.
It seems likely that KPS was not able to obtain first-rank collateral on the yard’s assets.
KPS verjetno ni uspela pridobiti prvovrstnega zavarovanja za sredstva ladjedelnice.
In any event, Poland has not provided detailed information enabling the Commission to determine the real value of the required collateral.
V vsakem primeru Poljska ni predložila podrobnih informacij, ki bi Komisiji omogočile, da določi dejansko vrednost zahtevanega zavarovanja.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that KPS was established as a government-controlled fund with public policy objectives, the funding of which was fully provided, or guaranteed, by the State via the IDA.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da je bila KPS ustanovljena kot sklad pod nadzorom vlade s cilji javne politike, financiranje zanjo pa je bilo v celoti zagotovljeno ali zajamčeno s strani države prek ARP.
According to the document ‘A strategy for the shipbuilding sector (maritime construction shipyards) in Poland 2006-10’, KPS was ‘founded to organise the financing of shipyard production until such time as private investors took control’.
V skladu z dokumentom z naslovom „Strategija za ladjedelniški sektor (ladjedelnice za pomorske gradnje) na Poljskem med letoma 2006 in 2010“ je bila KPS „ustanovljena za ureditev financiranja ladjedelniške proizvodnje, dokler nadzora ne bi prevzeli zasebni vlagatelji“.
The strategy, which is designed to achieve not only economic but also social and macroeconomic aims [37], mandates KPS with various powers, along with the IDA, the Treasury and other competent public bodies.
Strategija, ki je namenjena doseganju ne le gospodarskih, ampak tudi socialnih in makroekonomskih ciljev [37], daje KPS različna pooblastila, skupaj z ARP, finančnim ministrstvom in drugimi pristojnimi javnimi organi.
The financial links of KPS to the IDA and the Treasury are clear and KPS acts rather like a vehicle for the transfer of assets earmarked by the State budget for shipyards in Poland, including Gdańsk Shipyard.
Finančne povezave KPS z ARP in finančnim ministrstvom so jasne, pri čemer KPS deluje kot nekakšen mehanizem za prenos sredstev, ki se ladjedelnicam na Poljskem, vključno z ladjedelnico Gdańsk, namenijo iz državnega proračuna.
Finally, the Commission notes that in the letter giving notification of the 2009 Restructuring Plan the Polish authorities acknowledged that the KPS loans constituted State aid.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so poljski organi v dopisu o priglasitvi načrta prestrukturiranja iz leta 2009 priznali, da so posojila KPS pomenila državno pomoč.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that KPS did not act as a market economy investor when it granted working capital loans to Gdańsk Shipyard.
Na podlagi navedenega Komisija ugotavlja, da KPS ni delovala kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, ko je ladjedelnici Gdańsk odobrila posojila za gibljiva sredstva.
These loans, listed in Table 4, therefore constitute State aid.
Zato ta posojila iz tabele 4 pomenijo državno pomoč.
Export Credit Insurance Corporation guarantees
Jamstva družbe Export Credit Insurance Corporation
First, the Commission observes that the Export Credit Insurance Corporation production guarantees were formally granted to Gdynia Shipyard Group.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so bila jamstva za proizvodnjo družbe Export Credit Insurance Corporation uradno dodeljena skupini Gdynia.
Nevertheless, a certain number of these guarantees were used exclusively to finance shipbuilding at Gdańsk Shipyard, then a subsidiary of Gdynia Shipyard Group.
Vendar so bila nekatera od teh jamstev uporabljena izključno za financiranje ladjedelništva v ladjedelnici Gdańsk, ki je bila takrat hčerinska družba skupine Gdynia.
It was thanks to these guarantees that Gdańsk Shipyard was able to attract new contracts and continue its shipbuilding activity.
S pomočjo teh jamstev je lahko ladjedelnica Gdańsk pridobila nova naročila in nadaljevala s svojo ladjedelniško dejavnostjo.
In its comments following the adoption of the decision to open the formal investigation, Poland argued that the guarantees granted by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation to Gdynia Shipyard Group did not constitute State aid.
Poljska je v svojih pripombah po sprejetju odločitve o začetku formalne preiskave trdila, da jamstva, ki jih je družba Export Credit Insurance Corporation dodelila skupini Gdynia, niso pomenila državne pomoči.
The Commission cannot accept this assertion.
Komisija se s to trditvijo ne strinja.
First, the Commission would point out that Export Credit Insurance Corporation advance payment guarantees are underwritten by the Treasury and that the related transactions are entered to a separate bank account in the name of ‘Interes Narodowy’.
Prvič, Komisija poudarja, da jamstva za predplačila družbe Export Credit Insurance Corporation zagotavlja finančno ministrstvo in da so zadevne transakcije vnesene na ločen bančni račun pod nazivom „Interes Narodowy“.
If insufficient funds are available on that account, the Export Credit Insurance Corporation can either draw down loans from the Treasury or benefit from Treasury loan guarantees.
Če na tem računu ni dovolj sredstev, lahko družba Export Credit Insurance Corporation črpa sredstva iz posojil finančnega ministrstva ali uporabi jamstva za posojilo finančnega ministrstva.
This is a security that a market economy operator is unable to rely on.
Na takšno zavarovanje se udeleženec v tržnem gospodarstvu ne more zanesti.
Second, the Commission recalls its decision of 18 July 2007 in Case N 105/07 [38] in which it approved as free of State aid the scheme under which the Export Credit Insurance Corporation operated its programme of export insurance guaranteed by the Treasury.
Drugič, Komisija se sklicuje na svojo odločbo z dne 18. julija 2007 v zadevi N 105/2007 [38], v kateri je kot shemo brez državne pomoči odobrila shemo, s katero je družba Export Credit Insurance Corporation izvajala svoj program izvoznega zavarovanja, za katerega jamči finančno ministrstvo.
Among other measures, this scheme also covers the type of production guarantees that Gdańsk Shipyard has been receiving for the last few years.
Ta shema poleg drugih ukrepov zajema tudi vrsto jamstev za proizvodnjo, ki jih je v zadnjih nekaj letih prejemala ladjedelnica Gdańsk.
The Commission notes that the scheme explicitly excludes [39] companies in financial difficulties within the meaning of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [40].
Komisija ugotavlja, da shema izrecno izključuje [39] družbe v finančnih težavah v smislu smernic Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah [40].
The main feature of the scheme is that the guarantee premia are determined on the basis of a risk assessment.
Glavna značilnost sheme je, da se premije jamstva določijo na podlagi ocene tveganja.
For example, the guarantee premium for a company belonging to the highest risk category corresponds to […] % p.a. for guarantees under two years and […] % p.a. for guarantees above two years.
Na primer, premija jamstva za družbo, ki spada v kategorijo največjega tveganja, ustreza […] % na leto za jamstva za manj kot dve leti in […] % na leto za jamstva za več kot dve leti.
The base premium equals 2,8 % p.a.
Osnovna premija je enaka 2,8 % na leto.
By way of comparison, the guarantees to Gdańsk Shipyard were awarded by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation against a premium of 2 % p.a. if the guarantee did not exceed PLN 35 million and against a premium of 1 % p.a. if the guarantee exceeded that amount.
Družba Export Credit Insurance Corporation je za jamstva, dodeljena ladjedelnici Gdańsk, zaračunala premijo v višini 2 % na leto, če jamstvo ni presegalo 35 milijonov PLN, in premijo v višini 1 % na leto, če je jamstvo presegalo navedeni znesek.
It is therefore clear that Gdańsk Shipyard, being a company in difficulties, is not eligible for guarantees covered by the scheme described above and approved by the Commission as free of aid.
Zato je jasno, da ladjedelnica Gdańsk kot družba v težavah ni upravičena do jamstev, ki jih zajema navedena shema in ki jih je Komisija odobrila kot jamstva brez pomoči.
Accordingly, the guarantees granted to Gdańsk Shipyard are not free of aid.
Zato jamstva, dodeljena ladjedelnici Gdańsk, niso jamstva brez pomoči.
Furthermore, it is obvious that the guarantee premium charged to the yard is well below the base premium used for guarantees to healthy companies and several times lower than the premium charged to high-risk companies which are eligible under the scheme described above.
Poleg tega je jasno, da je premija jamstva, zaračunana ladjedelnici, precej nižja od osnovne premije, ki se uporablja za jamstva za zdrave družbe, in nekajkrat nižja od premije, zaračunane družbam z velikim tveganjem, ki so upravičene v skladu z navedeno shemo.
The Commission concludes that the guarantee premium applied to Gdańsk Shipyard does not correspond to a market premium and that therefore these guarantees constitute State aid.
Komisija ugotavlja, da premija jamstva, zaračunana ladjedelnici Gdańsk, ne ustreza tržni premiji in zato ta jamstva pomenijo državno pomoč.
Third, pursuant to the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees [41], in the case of an individual State guarantee which does not constitute State aid, the borrower must not be in financial difficulty.
Tretjič, da posamezno državno jamstvo v skladu z obvestilom Komisije o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč v obliki poroštev [41] ne bi pomenilo državne pomoči, prejemnik sredstev ne sme biti v finančnih težavah.
This is clearly not the case here.
Jasno je, da v tem primeru to ne velja.
Pursuant to the same Notice, when the borrower is in financial difficulty the aid element of the guarantee may be as high as the amount covered by that guarantee.
V skladu z istim obvestilom je lahko element pomoči jamstva enako visok kot znesek, ki ga to jamstvo krije, kadar je prejemnik sredstev v finančnih težavah.
Lastly, the Commission notes that Gdańsk Shipyard relied exclusively on guarantees provided by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation and the Treasury and did not manage to obtain any guarantees on the market.
Nazadnje Komisija ugotavlja, da se je ladjedelnica Gdańsk znašala izključno na jamstva, ki sta jih zagotovila družba Export Credit Insurance Corporation in finančno ministrstvo, medtem ko na trgu jamstev ni uspela pridobiti.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Export Credit Insurance Corporation did not act as a market economy investor when it gave guarantees to Gdańsk Shipyard.
Na podlagi navedenega Komisija ugotavlja, da družba Export Credit Insurance Corporation ni delovala kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, ko je ladjedelnici Gdańsk dodelila jamstva.
The Commission notes that production guarantees of this type are a typical characteristic of the shipbuilding sector.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so takšne vrste jamstev za proizvodnjo značilne za ladjedelniški sektor.