natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For two findings concerning the manual of operations and its AOC, the company indicated that it had submitted to the approval of the competent authorities of Ukraine changes to its manual of operations and had requested a flight level limitation in its AOC regarding aircraft AN-12 (UR-UCN) and AN-26 (UR-UDM).
V zvezi z dvema ugotovitvama, ki se nanašata na operativni priročnik in spričevalo letalskega prevoznika, je UCA navedel, da je pristojnim organom Ukrajine v odobritev predložil spremembe svojega operativnega priročnika in zaprosil za omejitev višine leta v svojem spričevalu letalskega prevoznika za zrakoplova vrste AN-12 (UR-UCN) in AN-26 (UR-UDM).
The Commission did not receive any information regarding the approval of the changes (limitations) requested by the company.
Komisija ni prejela nobenih informacij o odobritvi sprememb (omejitev), za katere je zaprosil letalski prevoznik.
Also, the carrier requested to be heard and made representations to the Commission and the Air Safety Committee on 1 July indicating that out of a total of 51 corrective actions 15 were still to be implemented by the end of August 2009 following which verification by the competent authorities of Ukraine would take place.
Prevoznik je tudi zaprosil za zaslišanje ter je pred Komisijo in Odborom za varnost v zračnem prometu 1. julija imel predstavitve, v katerih je navedel, da naj bi bilo do konca avgusta 2009 izvedenih še 15 od skupno 51 korekcijskih ukrepov, nato pa bo sledilo preverjanje pristojnih organov Ukrajine.
The Commission reserves the right to proceed to verification of the implementation of corrective measures by this carrier.
Komisija si pridržuje pravico, da začne preverjati izvajanje korekcijskih ukrepov tega prevoznika.
In the light of these findings the Commission considers that at this stage, on the basis of the common criteria, the company does not meet the relevant safety standards and should therefore be retained in Annex A.
Komisija glede na te ugotovitve in na podlagi splošnih meril meni, da podjetje za zdaj ne izpolnjuje ustreznih varnostnih standardov, zato mora ostati v Prilogi A.
Following the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 298/2009 the carrier was visited by the EC team of experts on 28 May 2009.
Skupina strokovnjakov ES je po sprejetju Uredbe (ES) št. 298/2009 28. maja 2009 obiskala tega letalskega prevoznika.
The report of the visit indicates that UMAir has made significant improvements in its documentation system which has been completely reviewed.
Iz poročila o obisku je razvidno, da je UMAir bistveno izboljšal svoj dokumentacijski sistem, ki je v celoti revidiran.
A safety department was established and a focal point for SAFA inspections nominated.
Ustanovljen je bil varnostni oddelek, imenovana pa je bila tudi informacijska točka za preglede SAFA.
The training procedures were also revised and improved.
Revidirani in izboljšani so bili tudi postopki usposabljanja.
Nevertheless, while UMAir contends having completed the implementation of its corrective action plan, as verified by the competent authorities of Ukraine, sampled corrective actions by the team show that some deficiencies remain: Corrective actions undertaken by UMAir in relation to the load-sheet/dry operating index do not appear to be effectively applied for all aircraft types on the AOC.
Medtem ko UMAir trdi, da je izvedel svoj načrt korekcijskih ukrepov, kar so preverili pristojni organi Ukrajine, pa korekcijski ukrepi, ki jih je skupina izbrala za vzorec, še vedno kažejo na nekatere pomanjkljivosti: zdi se, da UMAir korekcijskih ukrepov, ki jih je sprejel v zvezi s seznamom tovora/indeksom suhe operativne mase, ne uporablja učinkovito za vse vrste zrakoplovov, navedene na spričevalu letalskega prevoznika.
Some remedial actions for deficiencies noted during SAFA inspection are not being systematically corrected including determination of their root cause (oil leak on engine, missing screws, performance limitation in MEL, etc).
Nekateri korekcijski ukrepi za pomanjkljivosti, ugotovljene med pregledom SAFA, se ne odpravljajo sistematično, vključno z ugotavljanjem njihovega temeljnega vzroka (iztekanje olja iz motorja, manjkajoči vijaki, omejitev delovanja v MEL itd.).
Furthermore, significant safety findings were raised in the area of operations and continuing airworthiness, maintenance and engineering: a clear procedure to be applied by UMAir flight crew in case of an en route engine failure (drift-down) is not available and in the operations manual, the procedure to declare an emergency when during the flight the expected/calculated fuel at landing is expected to be below the minimum, is missing.
Poleg tega so bile ugotovljene resne varnostne pomanjkljivosti na področjih dejavnosti in stalne plovnosti, vzdrževanja in inženiringa: na voljo ni jasnega postopka, v skladu s katerim naj ravna letalsko osebje UMAir v primeru odpovedi motorja med letom (spust med letom), v operativnem priročniku pa ni opisan postopek za razglasitev nevarnosti, če se med letom pričakuje/izračuna, da bo ob pristanku količina goriva manjša od najmanjše zahtevane količine.
Also, no evidence of compliance with airworthiness directives for an aircraft (UR-CFF) and its engine could be presented, various deficiencies for the aircraft of type DC-9 and MD 83 were found and the program rules of the corrosion prevention and control program (CPCP, Corrosion Level identification and reporting rules) are not followed.
Letalski prevoznik tudi ni predložil dokazil o skladnosti z direktivami o plovnosti za zrakoplov (UR-CFF) in njegov motor, odkrite so bile različne pomanjkljivosti pri zrakoplovih vrste DC-9 in MD 83, ugotovljeno pa je bilo tudi, da se ne upoštevajo programska pravila za program preprečevanja in nadzorovanja korozije (CPCP, Pravila za ugotavljanje ravni korozije in poročanje).
With regard to the quality system of the carrier, the EC team found in its report that the organization could not demonstrate that all aspects of the maintenance and flight operational processes are audited on a regular basis; actions implemented do not always take the root cause into account and there is no overall system to control the open findings (internal and external audits including Ukraine SAA findings).
V zvezi s sistemom kakovosti letalskega prevoznika je skupina ES v poročilu ugotovila, da prevoznik ni dokazal, da se vsi vidiki postopkov vzdrževanja in letalskih dejavnosti redno revidirajo; letalski prevoznik pri izvajanju ukrepov ne upošteva vedno temeljnega vzroka in nima celovitega sistema za nadzor nad neodpravljenimi pomanjkljivostmi (notranje in zunanje revizije, vključno z ugotovitvami državne letalske uprave Ukrajine).
UMAir presented a corrective action plan approved by the competent authorities of Ukraine at the meeting of the Air Safety Committee on 1 July 2009.
UMAir je na srečanju Odbora za varnost v zračnem prometu 1. julija 2009 predstavil načrt korekcijskih ukrepov, ki so ga odobrili pristojni organi Ukrajine.
The corrective action plan has been drawn-up to address the safety deficiencies identified during the visit.
Načrt korekcijskih ukrepov je bil pripravljen za odpravo varnostnih pomanjkljivosti, ugotovljenih med obiskom.
However, the presentation by the carrier did not allow resolution of the findings raised during the visit in particular in the area of continuing airworthiness.
Vendar pa predstavitev, ki jo je imel prevoznik, ni omogočila odprave ugotovitev z obiska, zlasti s področja stalne plovnosti.
In the light of these findings, the Commission considers that at this stage, on the basis of the common criteria, the company does not meet the relevant safety standards and should therefore be retained in Annex A.
Komisija glede na te ugotovitve na podlagi splošnih meril meni, da podjetje za zdaj ne izpolnjuje ustreznih varnostnih standardov, zato mora ostati v Prilogi A.
There is verified evidence of lack of ability of the authority responsible for the safety oversight of air carriers certified in Kazakhstan to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards, as demonstrated by the results of the audit carried out by the ICAO under the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP).
Obstajajo preverjeni dokazi o pomanjkanju sposobnosti organa, odgovornega za nadzor nad varnostjo letalskih prevoznikov, certificiranih v Kazahstanu, za izvajanje in uveljavljanje ustreznih varnostnih standardov, kar dokazujejo izsledki revizije, ki jo je opravil ICAO v okviru USOAP.
Following the USOAP audit of Kazakhstan carried out in April 2009, ICAO has notified to all states party to the Chicago convention the existence of significant safety concerns affecting the safety oversight of carriers and aircraft registered in Kazakhstan, one related to operations [7] and one related to airworthiness [8], according which the certification process used in Kazakhstan for the issuance of an Air Operator Certificate (AOC) does not address all the applicable provisions of ICAO Annex 6.
ICAO je po reviziji USOAP, opravljeni v Kazahstanu aprila 2009, vsem državam pogodbenicam Čikaške konvencije sporočil, da obstajata resna pomisleka glede varnosti, ki vplivata na nadzor nad varnostjo letalskih prevoznikov in zrakoplovov, registriranih v Kazahstanu, od katerih se eden nanaša na dejavnosti [7] in drugi na plovnost [8], na podlagi katerih se v postopku certificiranja, ki se v Kazahstanu uporablja za izdajo spričevala letalskega prevoznika, ne upoštevajo vse veljavne določbe Priloge 6 ICAO.
Most of the existing AOCs have been issued without the involvement of a qualified airworthiness inspector.
Večina veljavnih spričeval letalskih prevoznikov je bilo izdanih brez sodelovanja usposobljenega inšpektorja za plovnost.
In particular, the following items are not addressed as part of the certification process: submission of maintenance programmes, review of minimum equipment lists (MEL), continuing airworthiness requirements for the issue of specific operations approvals such as ETOPS and CAT III.
Zlasti postopek certificiranja ne vključuje naslednjih točk: predložitve programov za vzdrževanje, pregleda seznamov obvezne opreme, zahtev glede stalne plovnosti za izdajo posebnih dovoljenj za dejavnosti, kot sta ETOPS in CAT III.
Further, the majority of the certificates of airworthiness have been issued without technical inspection of the aircraft and periodic aircraft inspections have not been conducted by the competent authorities of Kazakhstan.
Poleg tega je bila večina spričeval o plovnosti izdanih brez tehničnega pregleda zrakoplova, pristojni organi Kazahstana pa niso izvajali niti rednih pregledov zrakoplova.
Corrective actions plans proposed by these authorities were not considered acceptable by ICAO as they do not include firm implementation dates for the immediate correctives actions to resolve these significant safety concerns.
Načrti korekcijskih ukrepov, ki so jih predlagali ti organi, se ICAO niso zdeli sprejemljivi, saj ne vsebujejo fiksnih datumov za izvajanje takojšnjih korekcijskih ukrepov za odpravo teh resnih pomislekov glede varnosti.
The Commission, having regard to the two significant safety concerns published shortly after the visit by ICAO and the SAFA reports, has entered into consultation with the competent authorities of Kazakhstan, expressing serious concerns about the safety of the operations of air carriers licensed in the State, asking for clarifications regarding the actions undertaken by the competent authorities to respond to ICAO findings and to SAFA findings.
Komisija je ob upoštevanju dveh resnih pomislekov glede varnosti, kmalu po obisku objavljenih v poročilu ICAO in poročilu SAFA, začela posvetovanja s pristojnimi organi Kazahstana, na katerih je izrazila resne pomisleke glede varnosti dejavnosti letalskih prevoznikov, ki jim je bila licenca izdana v tej državi, ter zahtevala pojasnila v zvezi z ukrepi, ki so jih pristojni organi sprejeli v odgovor na ugotovitve ICAO in ugotovitve SAFA.
The competent authorities of Kazakhstan submitted documentation between 5 and 29 June and made a presentation to the Air Safety Committee on 30 June 2009.
Pristojni organi Kazahstana so dokumentacijo predložili med 5. in 29. junijem, predstavitev Odboru za varnost v zračnem prometu pa imeli 30. junija 2009.
The competent authorities of Kazakhstan informed the Commission and the Air Safety Committee during their presentation on 30 June 2009 that a corrective action plan was established to address the deficiencies reported by ICAO and that they have initiated the first steps of its implementation, allowing for compliance with all ICAO safety requirements possibly in June 2010.
Med predstavitvijo 30. junija 2009 so Komisijo in Odbor za varnost v zračnem prometu obvestili, da je pripravljen načrt korekcijskih ukrepov za odpravo pomanjkljivosti, o katerih je poročal ICAO, in da so storili prve korake za njegovo izvedbo, zaradi česar bo skladnost z vsemi varnostnimi zahtevami ICAO mogoča junija 2010.
The competent authorities of Kazakhstan failed to present any information regarding the certificates held by the carriers BEK Air previously named Berkut Air, and the implementation of any corrective actions affecting the safety deficiencies which led to the inclusion of this carrier into Annex A in April 2009 and failed to submit the evidence demonstrating that this air carrier is subject to any enforcement actions.
Pristojni organi Kazahstana niso predstavili nobenih informacij v zvezi s spričevali prevoznika BEK Air, ki se je prej imenoval Berkut Air, in izvajanjem kakršnih koli korekcijskih ukrepov, ki vplivajo na varnostne pomanjkljivosti, zaradi katerih je bil ta prevoznik aprila 2009 vključen v Prilogo A, prav tako pa niso predložili dokazov o tem, da za tega letalskega prevoznika veljajo kakršni koli izvršilni ukrepi.
The competent authorities of Kazakhstan informed the Air Safety Committee of the existence of a third carrier called Berkut KZ but failed to present any information regarding the certificates held by this carrier.
Pristojni organi Kazahstana so Odbor za varnost v zračnem prometu obvestili o obstoju tretjega prevoznika z nazivom Berkut KZ, vendar niso predstavili nobenih informacij v zvezi s spričevali tega prevoznika.
In addition, the carrier and the competent authorities of Kazakhstan failed to provide evidence that the continuing airworthiness and maintenance of the aircraft of type Boeing B-737-522 and B-757-204 registered in Lithuania (registration marks: LY-AWE, LY-AWD, LY-FLB and LY-FLG) is done in accordance with applicable European regulations.
Poleg tega prevoznik in pristojni organi Kazahstana niso zagotovili dokazov, da sta stalna plovnost in vzdrževanje zrakoplovov vrst Boeing B-737-522 in B-757-204, registriranih v Litvi (registrske oznake: LY-AWE, LY-AWD, LY-FLB in LY-FLG), opravljena v skladu z veljavnimi evropskimi predpisi.
The Commission acknowledges the efforts made to reform the civil aviation system in Kazakhstan and the first steps undertaken to address the safety deficiencies reported by ICAO.
Komisija pozdravlja prizadevanja za reformiranje sistema civilnega letalstva v Kazahstanu in prve korake, sprejete za odpravo varnostnih pomanjkljivosti, o katerih je poročal ICAO.
However, on the basis of the common criteria, pending the effective implementation of adequate corrective actions to remedy the ICAO significant safety concerns, it is assessed that the competent authorities of Kazakhstan are, at this stage, not able to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards on all air carriers under their regulatory control.
Na podlagi splošnih meril pa se do dejanske izvedbe primernih korekcijskih ukrepov za odpravo resnih pomislekov glede varnosti, ki jih je izrazil ICAO, ocenjuje, da pristojni organi Kazahstana za zdaj niso sposobni izvajati in uveljavljati ustreznih varnostnih standardov na vseh letalskih prevoznikih, ki so pod njihovim regulativnim nadzorom.
Therefore, all air carriers certified in Kazakhstan should be subject to an operating ban and therefore included in Annex A, with the exception of the air carrier Air Astana.
Zato bi za vse letalske prevoznike, certificirane v Kazahstanu, morala veljati prepoved opravljanja letov in bi jih bilo zato treba vključiti v Prilogo A, razen letalskega prevoznika Air Astana.
With regard to the safety situation of its fleet, all aircraft on the AOC of the carrier are registered outside Kazakhstan (Aruba).
Kar zadeva stanje glede varnosti flote tega prevoznika, so vsi zrakoplovi, ki so navedeni na spričevalu tega prevoznika, registrirani zunaj Kazahstana (na Arubi).
The competent authority of Aruba is responsible for the oversight of the aircraft on the fleet of Air Astana in accordance with the provisions of Annexes 1, and 8 to the Chicago Convention as well as Annex 6 for continuing airworthiness aspects.
Pristojni organ Arube je odgovoren za nadzor nad zrakoplovom v floti prevoznika Air Astana v skladu z določbami prilog 1 in 8 k Čikaški konvenciji ter Priloge 6 za vidike stalne plovnosti.
In view of the above does not consider it necessary to include the carrier Air Astana into Annex A. However, taking into account the results of recent ramp inspections [13] performed at Community airports under the SAFA programme, as well as the commitment of Member States to further increase the number of ramp checks on aircraft operated by Air Astana to the Community, the Commission considers that it is appropriate to institute specific surveillance of the operations of Air Astana into the Community under strict conditions and therefore that its operations should be strictly limited to their present level and with the aircraft currently used.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno se Komisiji ne zdi nujno, da bi bilo treba prevoznika Air Astana vključiti v Prilogo A. Ob upoštevanju rezultatov nedavnih preverjanj na ploščadi [13] na letališčih Skupnosti, izvedenih v skladu s programom SAFA, ter obveze držav članic, da še povečajo število preverjanj na ploščadi pri zrakoplovih, s katerimi Air Astana leti v Skupnost, pa Komisija meni, da je primerno vpeljati poseben nadzor nad leti prevoznika Air Astana v Skupnost pod strožjimi pogoji, in da morajo biti zato njegovi leti strogo omejeni na sedanjo raven in zrakoplov, ki se zdaj uporablja.
Consequently, on the basis of the common criteria, and under these conditions, this carrier should be included in Annex B.
Na podlagi splošnih meril in pod temi pogoji je zato treba tega prevoznika vključiti v Prilogo B.
Air carriers from Zambia
Letalski prevozniki iz Zambije
Following the suspension of operations of the Zambian flag carrier Zambian Airways in January 2009 and the publication by ICAO of a significant safety concern in February 2009 after the USOAP Audit visit regarding aircraft operations, certification and supervision exercised by the Civil Aviation Authority of Zambia, the Commission requested information from these authorities in April 2009 to verify the implementation of corrective actions to redress this concern.
Po začasnem prenehanju dejavnosti zambijskega domačega prevoznika Zambian Airways januarja 2009 in resnem pomisleku glede varnosti, ki ga je ICAO objavil februarja 2009 po reviziji USOAP, opravljeni z namenom pregleda dejavnosti zrakoplovov, certificiranja in nadzora, ki jih izvaja uprava za civilno letalstvo Zambije, je Komisija aprila 2009 od uprave zahtevala informacije, da bi preverila napredek pri izvajanju korekcijskih ukrepov za odpravo tega pomisleka.
The significant safety concern relates to the fact that the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) of Zambia has issued 21 Air Service Permits to commercial air operators, with some including the permission to conduct international operations.
Resen pomislek glede varnosti se nanaša na dejstvo, da je oddelek za civilno letalstvo Zambije komercialnim letalskim prevoznikom izdal enaindvajset dovoljenj za opravljanje letov, pri čemer nekatera vključujejo dovoljenje za izvajanje mednarodnih letov.
These Air Service Permits address economic rather than safety-related issues.
V teh dovoljenjih za opravljanje letov so obravnavana bolj ekonomska kot varnostna vprašanja.
The holders of these Air Service Permits operate international flights, even though the operations and airworthiness inspections required prior to the issuance of an AOC have not been conducted.
Njihovi imetniki opravljajo mednarodne lete, čeprav pregleda dejavnosti in plovnosti, ki se zahtevata pred izdajo spričevala letalskega prevoznika, nista bila izvedena.
In addition, reports of DCA periodic inspections identify safety deficiencies, with no record of their resolution.
Poleg tega so iz poročil o rednih pregledih oddelka za civilno letalstvo razvidne varnostne pomanjkljivosti, pri čemer ni navedeno, da bi bile odpravljene.
The information provided by the Zambian authorities in May 2009 does not contain any evidence of the urgent corrective actions needed to resolve the significant safety concerns raised by ICAO.
Informacije, ki so jih zambijski organi predložili maja 2009, ne vsebujejo dokazov o nujnih korekcijskih ukrepih, potrebnih za odpravo resnih pomislekov glede varnosti, ki jih je izrazil ICAO.
In particular, there is no certification plan and procedures presented, no rules and regulations substantiating the ICAO requirements in Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention for the certification.
Zambijski organi zlasti niso predložili načrta za certificiranje in postopkov ter pravil in predpisov, ki dokazujejo izpolnjevanje zahtev za certificiranje ICAO iz Priloge 6 k Čikaški konvenciji.
Also, there is no evidence of limitations to Zambian ‘Air Service Permits’, and no documentation to support the certification process required by ICAO Annex 6.
Predložene informacije tudi ne vsebujejo dokazov o omejitvah zambijskih „dovoljenj za opravljanje letov“ in dokumentacije, ki bi podprla postopek za certificiranje, ki se zahteva s Prilogo 6 ICAO.
Supplementary documentation sent by the competent authorities of Zambia on 1 June 2009 did not demonstrate that the AOC (Z/AOC/001/2009) issued on 29 May 2009 to Zambezi Airlines certified in Zambia is compliant with ICAO requirements and that the safety concern has been addressed.
Dodatna dokumentacija, ki so jo pristojni organi Zambije poslali 1. junija 2009, ne dokazuje, da spričevalo letalskega prevoznika (Z/AOC/001/2009), 29. maja 2009 izdano letalskemu prevozniku Zambezi Airlines, certificiranemu v Zambiji, izpolnjuje zahteve ICAO in da je bil pomislek glede varnosti odpravljen.
To date the ICAO safety concern is maintained.
Za zdaj pomislek glede varnosti ICAO ostaja.
In the light of these findings and in view of the potential risk that this situation may present for the safety of operations of air carriers certified in Zambia which are authorised to perform international flights, the Commission considers that on the basis of the common criteria, all carriers certified in Zambia should be included in Annex A.
Na podlagi teh ugotovitev in zaradi mogočega tveganja, ki ga ta položaj lahko pomeni za varnost dejavnosti letalskih prevoznikov, certificiranih v Zambiji, ki imajo dovoljenje za opravljanje mednarodnih letov, Komisija meni, da je na podlagi splošnih meril vse letalske prevoznike, certificirane v Zambiji, treba vključiti v Prilogo A.
The Indonesian Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGCA) has provided the Commission with evidence that the air carriers Garuda Indonesia, Airfast Indonesia, Mandala Airlines, and Ekspres Transportasi Antarbenua (trading as Premiair) have been granted on 10 June 2009 a new AOC under the new Indonesian Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASRs).
Indonezijski generalni direktorat za civilno letalstvo (DGCA) je Komisiji predložil dokazila, da so bila letalskim prevoznikom Garuda Indonesia, Airfast Indonesia, Mandala Airlines in Ekspres Transportasi Antarbenua (s tržnim imenom Premiair) 10. junija 2009 izdana nova spričevala letalskega prevoznika na podlagi novih indonezijskih varnostnih predpisov za civilno letalstvo.
In particular, the air carriers Garuda and Airfast have been granted new AOCs valid for two years, following a complete audit and recertification procedure.
Zlasti letalskima prevoznikoma Garuda in Airfast je bilo po popolni reviziji in ponovnem certificiranju odobreno novo spričevalo letalskega prevoznika, veljavno dve leti.