natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The existence of an advantage lies in the combination of these elements.
Obstoj prednosti se nahaja v kombinaciji omenjenih elementov.
As shown above, the long duration of the PPAs contributes to a great extent to the existence of an advantage.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, dolgo trajanje SNEE v veliki meri prispeva k obstoju prednosti.
The impact of the PPAs on the market in the period following Hungary's accession to the European Union
Vpliv SNEE na trg v obdobju, ki je sledilo pristopu Madžarske k Evropski uniji.
Interested parties argue in their comments that the prices applied under the PPAs are not higher than wholesale market prices.
Zainteresirane stranke v svojih pripombah trdijo, da so cene, ki so bile določene v okviru SNEE, višje od veleprodajnih tržnih cen.
The Mátra power plant especially stresses that is prices are competitive because it has its own coal mine, so it has low mining costs.
Elektrarna Mátra zlasti poudarja, da so njene cene konkurenčne, saj ima nizke stroške izkopa, ker ima lasten premogovnik.
Consequently, they conclude that they do not benefit from any advantage.
Zato zaključujejo, da nimajo nikakršne prednosti.
First, as discussed in detail above, the price actually paid under the PPAs is one consequence of the PPAs but it does not constitute the core of the advantage entailed in them.
Prvič, kot je podrobno navedeno zgoraj, je cena, ki je dejansko plačana v okviru SNEE, sicer posledica SNEE, vendar ne predstavlja bistva prednosti, ki jo prinašajo.
The comments by the banking institutions referred to above (see in particular recitals 175 and 176) also confirm that all the elements of the PPAs guaranteeing the generating units the return on the investment of the assets and shielding the generators from the commercial risks of their operation constitute together the core of the advantage of these agreements.
Pripombe bančnih institucij, ki so omenjene zgoraj (glej zlasti uvodni izjavi 175 in 176), tudi potrjujejo, da vsi elementi SNEE, ki proizvodni enoti zagotavljajo donosnost naložb sredstev in ščitijo proizvajalce pred poslovnimi tveganji pri njihovem delovanju, skupaj predstavljajo bistvo prednosti omenjenih sporazumov.
Second, the price difference compared to market prices depends on a great number of factors linked to market evolution which are independent of the PPAs and can only be assessed a posteriori.
Drugič, razlika v ceni v primerjavi s tržnimi cenami je odvisna od velikega števila dejavnikov, ki so povezani z razvojem trga in neodvisni od SNEE ter se jih lahko ocenjuje samo naknadno.
The PPA prices are unit prices at a certain point in time; they do not take into consideration the advantage flowing from all other elements of the PPAs, such as the capacities and quantities which the generators could have sold if their sales depended on market demand.
Cene SNEE so cene enot v določenem trenutku; ne upoštevajo prednosti, ki jo prinašajo drugi elementi SNEE, kot so zmogljivosti in količine, ki bi jih proizvajalci lahko prodali, če bi bila njihova prodaja odvisna od povpraševanja na trgu.
As discussed above, the Commission is of the view that there is an economic advantage for generators inherent to all PPAs under assessment, whether or not they actually lead, at a given period of time, to prices above market prices.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, je Komisija mnenja, da gre za ekonomsko prednost pri vseh proizvajalcih v SNEE, ki so predmet ocene, ne glede na to, ali je v zadevnem trenutku dejansko vodila do cen, ki so bile višje od tržnih cen.
For the sake of completeness of the Commission's answers to the comments received and to better understand the consequences of the PPAs in this regard, the Commission nevertheless compared the PPA prices actually applied with prices achieved on the part of the wholesale market not covered by PPAs.
Zaradi popolnosti odgovorov Komisije na prejete pripombe in za boljše razumevanje posledic SNEE v tem smislu je Komisija primerjala cene SNEE, ki so se dejansko uporabljale, s cenami, ki so bile dosežene na delu veleprodajnega trga, ki ga SNEE ne pokrivajo.
In this comparison, the Commission does not take into account 2007 prices as in that year (more precisely, from 9 December 2006 to 31 December 2007) the PPA prices were overwritten by official prices.
V tej primerjavi Komisija ne upošteva cen iz leta 2007, saj so bile v tem letu (natančneje od 9. decembra 2006 do 31. decembra 2007) cene SNEE nadomeščene z uradnimi cenami.
Accordingly, the applied prices do not necessarily reflect the exact prices to which the application of the PPA price formulae would have led.
V skladu s tem veljavne cene ne odražajo nujno natančnih cen, ki bi jih pridobili z uporabo cenovnih formul SNEE.
Consequently, the Commission compared the applied PPA prices with free market prices for 2004 to 2006.
Komisija je primerjala veljavne cene SNEE s cenami na prostem trgu za obdobje 2004–2006.
The average price of electricity sold to MVM under the PPAs [67] [67]HUF/kWh
Povprečna cena električne energije, prodane MVM v okviru SNEE [67] [67]HUF/kWh
The quantity and average price of electricity sold by domestic generators without PPA to the free market [68] [68]Power plant
Količina in povprečna cena električne energije, ki so jo prodali domači proizvajalci brez SNEE na prostem trgu [68] [68]Elektrarna
Mátra ([…] blocks)
Mátra (bloki […])
Dunamenti […] block
Blok […] elektrarne Dunamenti
The quantity and average price of electricity imports purchased by MVM [70] [70]
Količina in povprečna cena uvožene električne energije, ki jo je nabavilo MVM [70] [70]
Ukrainethrough Slovakia ([…] [71])
Ukrajinačez Slovaško ([…] [71])
Switzerland through Slovakia ([…] [71])
Švica prek Slovaške ([…] [71])
Switzerland ([…] [71])
Švica ([…] [71])
Since 2003, in line with Energy Act II [73], MVM has been releasing surplus power (i.e. power in excess of what it needed for the public utility segment) for supply to the competitive market through three release channels: (i) public generation capacity auctions, (ii) capacity tenders and (iii) its virtual on-line trading platform, the ‘Piactér’.
Od leta 2003 MVM v skladu z Energetskim zakonom II [73] sprošča presežne količine energije (tj. energijo, ki presega potrebe segmenta javne porabe) za dobavo na konkurenčnem trgu s pomočjo treh sprostitvenih kanalov: (i) avkcij zmogljivosti za proizvodnjo električne energije, (ii) javnih razpisov za zmogljivosti in (iii) prodaje na virtualni spletni trgovinski platformi, imenovani „Piactér“.
The table below presents the average prices achieved at these sales:
Spodnja tabela prikazuje dosežene povprečne cene pri teh prodajah:
Average price achieved by MVM capacity auctions, tenders and Marketplace [74] [74]Year of delivery of auctioned product [75]
Povprečne cene, dosežene na MVM-jevih avkcijah zmogljivosti, javnih razpisih za zmogljivosti in na trgu [74] [74]Leto dobave proizvoda na avkciji [75]
Weighted average price at capacity auctions
Ponderirana povprečna cena na avkcijah zmogljivosti
Year of Tenders and Marketplace sales
Leto prodaje preko javnih razpisov in trga
Average price at tenders and Marketplace
Povprečna cena pri ponudnikih in na trgu
Auction of 17 June 2004
Avkcija z dne 17.6.2004
Off peak: 3,48
Nizka obremenitev: 3,48
Base: 8,4
Osnovna: 8,4
Auction of 9 December 2004
Avkcija z dne 9.12.2004
Off peak: 4,54
Nizka obremenitev: 4,54
Base: 8,32
Osnovna: 8,32
Auction of 10 June 2005
Avkcija z dne 10.6.2005
Off peak: 4,6
Nizka obremenitev: 4,6
Base: 8,5
Osnovna: 8,5
Auction of 21 July 2005
Avkcija z dne 21.7.2005
Base: 9,3
Osnovna: 9,3
Peak: 10,42
Konična: 10,42
Auction of 9 November 2005
Avkcija z dne 9.11.2005
Off peak: 6,02
Nizka obremenitev: 6,02
Base: 9,74
Osnovna: 9,74
Peak: 11,76
Konična: 11,76
Auction of 31 May 2006
Avkcija z dne 31.5.2006
Base: 11,33
Osnovna: 11,33
The above figures show that the average prices at which electricity was sold in Hungary on the competitive sector in 2004 at the wholesale level varied between 4,7 and 12,76 HUF/kWh.
Zgornje številke kažejo, da so se povprečne cene, po katerih se je na ravni veleprodaje prodajala električna energija na Madžarskem v konkurenčnem sektorju leta 2004, gibale med 4,7 in 12,76 HUF/kWh.
Of the generators with PPAs, the Paks nuclear power plant and Mátra sold to MVM at prices in that range.
Izmed proizvajalcev s SNEE sta jedrski elektrarni Paks in Mátra prodajali MVM-ju po cenah, ki so se gibale v tem razponu.
Dunament […] sold its electricity under PPA at […], the highest price ([…]) achieved without PPA.
Dunament […] je prodajal svojo električno energijo v okviru SNEE po […], najvišji ceni ([…]), ki jo je dosegel brez SNEE.
All other generators charged MVM an average price between 13,86 and 25,46 HUF/kWh.
Vsi ostali proizvajalci so MVM-ju v povprečju zaračunali od 13,86 do 25,46 HUF/kWh.
This pricing is 10 % to 100 % higher than the highest free market price.
Te cene so od 10 % do 100 % višje od najvišje cene na prostem trgu.
In 2005, the prices of sales outside the PPAs under assessment varied between 5,4 and 12,91 HUF/kWh.
Leta 2005 so se prodajne cene izven okvira SNEE, ki so predmet ocene, gibale med 5,4 in 12,91 HUF/kWh.
Of the generators with PPA, only the Paks and Mátra power plants sold electricity under their PPAs within this price range.
Izmed proizvajalcev s SNEE sta samo elektrarni Paks in Mátra prodajali električno energijo v okviru svojih SNEE v tem cenovnem razponu.
All other generators charged their electricity under PPA at an average price between 13,99 and 25,64 HUF/kWh.
Vsi ostali proizvajalci so MVM-ju v okviru SNEE v povprečju zaračunali od 13,86 do 25,64 HUF/kWh.
This pricing is between 10 and 100 % higher than the highest free market price.
Te cene so od 10 % do 100 % višje od najvišje cene na prostem trgu.
In 2006, sales prices outside the PPAs in question varied between 9,1 and 14,27 HUF/kWh.
Leta 2006 so se prodajne cene izven okvira zadevnih SNEE gibale med 9,1 in 14,27 HUF/kWh.
Of the generators with PPA, only the Paks and Mátra power plants sold electricity under their PPAs within this price range (in the case of Paks, actually below the lowest free market price).
Izmed proizvajalcev s SNEE sta samo elektrarni Paks in Mátra prodajali električno energijo v okviru svojih SNEE v tem cenovnem razponu (elektrarna Paks pravzaprav pod najnižjo ceno na prostem trgu).
All other generators charged their electricity under PPA at an average price between 16,67 and 33,49 HUF/kWh.
Vsi ostali proizvajalci so za električno energijo v okviru SNEE v povprečju zaračunali od 16,67 do 33,49 HUF/kWh.
This is between 15 % and 135 % higher than the highest free market price.
Te cene so od 15 % do 135 % višje od najvišje cene na prostem trgu.
The above calculations are based on average price figures, i.e. they do not calculate separately with off peak, base or peak prices.
Zgornji izračuni temeljijo na povprečni ceni, tj. ni posebnega izračuna za cene ob nizki običajni in visoki obremenitvi.
Generators that would mainly sell peak load products in the absence of PPAs [76] argue that their prices should not be compared to base load prices.
Proizvajalci, ki večinoma prodajajo proizvode ob konični obremenitvi brez SNEE [76], trdijo, da se njihovih cen ne bi smelo primerjati s cenami ob običajni obremenitvi.
Indeed, the Commission recognises that peak electricity prices are normally higher than those of base load electricity.
Komisija priznava, da so cene električne energije ob konični obremenitvi običajno višje od cen ob nizki obremenitvi.
When comparing those prices with free market sales (for instance, at the electricity auctions by MVM), peak products show an average price level around 10-30 % above base load prices.
Pri primerjavi omenjenih cen s prodajnimi cenami na prostem trgu (na primer MVM-jeve avkcije električne energije) so povprečne cene proizvodov ob konični obremenitvi za približno 10–30 % višje od cen proizvodov ob običajni obremenitvi.
However, when comparing the prices of Csepel, Dunament F and […] with peak prices achieved at the capacity auctions, it can be seen that their prices were higher than the price of any peak product obtained at the auctions during these years.
Vendar je ob primerjavi cen Csepela, Dunamenta F in […] s koničnimi cenami, ki so bile dosežene na avkcijah zmogljivosti, razvidno, da so bile njihove cene višje od koničnih cen katerega koli proizvoda na avkcijah v teh letih.
Moreover, amongst the generators selling electricity without PPA to the free market and listed in Table 11 above, there are some (for instance the EMA plant) which also sold mainly peak products.
Med proizvajalci, ki prodajajo električno energijo na prosti trg brez SNEE in so navedeni v zgornji tabeli 11, so nekateri (npr. elektrarna EMA), ki so prodajali tudi večinoma konične proizvode.
The above comparison shows that the PPA prices of the generators under PPA in years 2004 to 2006, with the exception of the Paks and Mátra power plants, were actually higher than the highest free market prices.
Zgornja primerjava kaže, da so bile cene SNEE proizvajalcev v okviru SNEE v letih od 2004 do 2006, z izjemo elektrarn Paks in Mátras, dejansko višje od najvišjih cen na prostem trgu.
Accordingly, the Commission disagrees with the arguments of interested parties that their PPA prices were not higher than free market prices.
V skladu s tem se Komisija ne strinja z argumenti zainteresiranih strank, da njihove cene SNEE niso bile višje od cen na prostem trgu.
(252 ) As far as the Paks and Mátra power plants are concerned, the above tables show that their prices were below the highest price achieved on the free market.
Glede elektrarn Paks in Mátra zgornje tabele kažejo, da so bile njune cene nižje od najvišje cene, dosežene na prostem trgu.
Mátra plant's prices were in the higher range of free market prices.
Cene elektrarne Mátra so bile med višjimi cenami na prostem trgu.
Although its prices are indeed likely to be more competitive than most PPA prices, the Commission cannot exclude that it could not have achieved at least the same prices without its PPA.
Čeprav so njene cene bolj konkurenčne od večine cen SNEE, Komisija ne more izločiti možnosti, da bi lahko dosegla vsaj enake cene brez SNEE-ja.
The Commission notes that the prices Mátra achieved from sales of its blocks without PPA were significantly below its PPA prices.
Komisija poudarja, da so bile cene, ki jih je dosegla Mátra od prodaje svojih blokov brez SNEE-ja, veliko nižje kot njene cene v okviru SNEE-ja.
The Commission is aware that the prices achieved in the free market sector (without PPAs) cannot be considered as corresponding to the exact market price the generators would have achieved without PPAs if the PPAs had not existed in the period in question.
Komisija se zaveda, da cen, ki so bile dosežene v sektorju prostega trga (brez SNEE), ni mogoče šteti za enake natančnim tržnim cenam, ki bi jih proizvajalci dosegli brez SNEE, če SNEE v zadevnem obdobju ne bi obstajali.
PPAs covering approximately 60 % of the generation market undoubtedly impact prices on the rest of the market.
SNEE, ki pokrivajo približno 60 % proizvodnega trga nedvomno vplivajo na cene na ostalem delu trga.
However, this comparison gives an indication of the order of magnitude of the difference between the PPA and the actually observed ‘non-PPA’ prices.
Primerjava prikazuje delitev glede na stopnjo razlik med SNEE in dejansko opazovanimi cenami, ki niso v okviru SNEE.
Service of general economic interest (SGEI)
Storitev v splošnem gospodarskem interesu (SGEI)
The Budapest and Csepel power plants have argued that the PPAs should be regarded as implementing SGEIs for the purpose of securing electricity supplies.
Elektrarni Budapest in Csepel sta trdili, da je treba SNEE upoštevati kot izvajanje SGEI za zagotavljanje dobave električne energije.
They considered that they fulfil the criteria laid down in the Altmark judgment, which means that their PPAs do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Menita, da izpolnjujeta pogoje iz razsodbe Altmark, kar pomeni, da njuni SNEE ne predstavljajo državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission has analysed these arguments and cannot agree with them for the following reasons.
Komisija je analizirala omenjene argumente in se ne more strinjati z njimi iz naslednjih razlogov.
Under Community legislation, Member States have a certain margin of discretion to define services they consider to be SGEIs.
V okviru zakonodaje Skupnosti imajo države članice določen manevrski prostor za določitev storitev, ki jih štejejo za SGEI.
Defining the scope of SGEIs in a Member State is, within the limits defined by Community legislation, a prerogative of the State itself and it is not for the beneficiaries of aid measures to qualify their own service as a public service.
Določanje področja SGEI v državi članici je v okviru meja, ki jih določa zakonodaja Skupnosti, posebne pravice same države in upravičenci do ukrepov pomoči svoje lastne storitve ne morejo opredeliti kot javno storitev.
In the course of the present procedure, however, the Hungarian authorities never submitted the argument that any of the generators provided an SGEI, nor did they support the generators’ arguments to that effect.
Med zadevnim postopkom niso madžarski organi nikoli predložili argumenta, da bi kateri koli proizvajalec zagotavljal SGEI niti niso v tem smislu podprle argumenta proizvajalcev.
The Commission also considers that the PPAs do not fulfil all the criteria laid down in the Altmark judgment.
Komisija meni, da SNEE ne izpolnjujejo meril iz razsodbe Altmark.
First, under the Altmark judgment, the recipient undertaking is actually required to discharge a public service and the obligations connected with that service are to have been clearly defined by the Member State.
Prvič, v okviru razsodbe Altmark je podjetje prejemnik dejansko razrešeno opravljanja javne storitve, obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz te storitve, pa bi morala jasno določiti država članica.
MVM did have an obligation of security of supply under Hungarian legislation in the time period under assessment, but this obligation was a general obligation whereby the Single Buyer at the time had to ensure the necessary supply of energy to cover total demand; however, it does not entrust any specific generator with a defined SGEI.
MVM je imel obveznost zagotavljanja dobave v okviru madžarske zakonodaje v zadevnem obdobju, vendar je bila ta obveznost splošna obveznost, pri kateri je moral v tem času pooblaščeni kupec zagotavljati potrebno dobavo energije za pokrivanje celotnega povpraševanja; vendar pa ne pooblašča nobenega določenega proizvajalca za opravljanje SGEI.
The objective of security of supply is of a very general nature.
Cilj zagotavljanja dobave je zelo splošne narave.
To some extent, the view could be taken that any generator in the electricity sector contributes towards achieving this objective.
Do neke mere je navedeno mogoče razlagati tako, da mora vsak proizvajalec v sektorju električne energije prispevati k doseganju tega cilja.
The interested parties failed to submit any official document of the Hungarian State clearly defining an SGEI and entrusting a specific generator (or generators) with providing that specific service.
Zainteresirane stranke niso poslale nobenega uradnega dokumenta, v katerem bi madžarska država jasno opredelila SGEI in pooblastila določenega proizvajalca za zagotavljanje te posebne storitve.
The PPAs themselves are similar in this respect: they fix the obligations of the parties but do not define a specific public service obligation.
SNEE so v tem pogledu podobni: določajo obveznosti podpisnic, vendar ne opredeljujejo posebne obveznosti glede javnih storitev.
The fact that all of the ten power plants under PPAs have to reserve their capacities to MVM does not in itself mean that they are specifically entrusted with a public service obligation.
Dejstvo, da mora vseh deset elektrarn v okviru SNEE rezervirati svoje zmogljivosti za MVM, samo po sebi še ne pomeni, da jim je izrecno naložena obveznost izvajanja javnih storitev.
Again, such an approach could lead to the conclusion that the whole power generation sector fulfils an SGEI – which would clearly be in breach of the spirit Community legislation and practice means to give to the concept.
Tak pristop bi lahko vodil do zaključka, da celotni sektor proizvodnje električne energije izvaja SGEI, kar bi nedvomno pomenilo kršitev smisla, ki naj bi ga zakonodaja in praksa Skupnosti dajali konceptu.
In the present case, the alleged public service obligations have not been clearly defined and there is no specific generator required to discharge any such concretely defined public service obligation.
V tem primeru domnevne obveznosti javnih storitev niso bile jasno določene in noben proizvajalec ni bil potreben za opravljanje takšne konkretno določene obveznosti javnih storitev.
The interested parties argue that PPAs are documents that entrust generators with SGEIs.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da so SNEE dokumenti, ki pooblaščajo proizvajalce za opravljanje SGEI.
But PPAs do not contain any specific definition of SGEIs and do not refer to these obligations or to legal provisions that would be a basis for the State to entrust SGEIs to other entities.
SNEE ne vsebujejo posebne opredelitve SGEI in se ne nanašajo na omenjene obveznosti ali na pravne določbe, ki bi služile državi kot podlaga za poveritev SGEI drugim.
In its decisions to date [77], the Commission has taken the view that security of supply could be an SGEI subject to the restrictions provided for in Article 8(4) of Directive 96/92/EC (which corresponds to Article 11(4) of Directive 2003/54/EC), i.e. provided that the generators concerned use indigenous primary energy fuel sources to produce energy and that the total volume of energy does not exceed in any calendar year 15 % of the total primary energy necessary to produce the electricity consumed in the Member State concerned.
Komisija v svojih dosedanjih sklepih [77] meni, da je varnost dobave lahko SGEI v okviru omejitev, ki jih določa člen 8(4) Direktive 96/92/ES (ki ustreza členu 11(4) Direktive 2003/54/ES), tj pod pogojem, da zadevni proizvajalci za proizvodnjo energije uporabljajo domače primarne energetske vire in da celotna količina energije v nobenem koledarskem letu ne presega 15 % skupne primarne energije, ki je potrebna za proizvodnjo električne energije, porabljene v zadevni državi članici.
The only generator that submitted that it used indigenous primary energy fuel was Mátra power plant.
Edini proizvajalec, ki je sporočil, da je uporabljal domačo primarno energetsko gorivo, je elektrarna Mátra.
However, Mátra power plant did not produce any official documents showing that the Hungarian State had specifically entrusted it with a clearly defined SGEI.
Kljub temu pa elektrarna Mátra ni predložila nobenega uradnega dokumenta, s katerim bi lahko dokazala, da jo je madžarska država izrecno pooblastila za jasno določene SGEI.
In the light of the above, the Commission must reject the claim that the PPAs discharge a public service obligation in the field of security of supply.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno mora Komisija zavrniti trditev, da SNEE predstavljajo obveznost v okviru javnih storitev na področju varnosti dobave.
Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated should have been established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner, and the compensation should not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant revenue and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations [78].
Drugič, parametri na podlagi katerih se izračuna nadomestilo, bi morali biti vnaprej določeni na objektiven in pregleden način, nadomestilo pa ne bi smelo presegati zneska, ki je potrebna za kritje vseh ali dela stroškov, ki so nastali pri opravljanju obveznosti javnih storitev, ob upoštevanju ustreznega prihodka in primernega dobička za izvajanje omenjenih obveznosti [78].