natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission also notes that most generators benefiting from the PPAs belong to major international groups that are present in several Member States.
Komisija ugotavlja, da večina proizvajalcev, ki imajo korist od SNEE, pripada večjim mednarodnim skupinam, ki so prisotne v več državah članicah.
Conferring a competitive advantage on those groups indubitably has an effect on trade and the potential to distort competition on the common market.
Dodeljevanje konkurenčne prednosti omenjenim skupinam nedvomno vpliva na trgovino in možnost izkrivljanja konkurence na skupnem trgu.
The majority of the interested parties’ assessments of the criteria for impact on trade and distortion of competition refer to market circumstances at the time of conclusion of the PPAs and, in any case, to market circumstances before Hungary's accession to the EU.
Večina ocen zainteresiranih strank za merila za vpliv na trgovanje in izkrivljanje konkurence se nanaša na tržne pogoje ob času sklenitve SNEE in v vsakem primeru na tržne okoliščine v času pred priključitvijo Madžarske k EU.
The Commission cannot accept this line of argument and refers in this regard to recitals 156 to 172 above.
Komisija tovrstnih argumentov ne more sprejeti in se v zvezi s tem sklicuje na zgornje uvodne izjave od 156 do 172.
Certain interested parties also argue that their PPA, viewed individually, does not affect trade as the generation capacity of their power plant is minor compared to the country's overall generation capacities.
Nekatere zainteresirane stranke tudi trdijo, da njihov SNEE, obravnavan individualno, ne vpliva na trgovino, saj je proizvodna zmogljivost njihove elektrarne v primerjavi s skupnimi proizvodnimi zmogljivostmi države majhna.
As the core principle of the PPAs is the same for all of them (obligation to purchase a certain minimum quantity of generated electricity, reservation of generation capacities, a price covering the justified fixed and variable costs over a duration of 15 to 27 years), each PPA has an impact on the market.
Ker je glavno načelo vseh SNEE za vse enako (obveznost nakupa določenih minimalnih količin proizvedene energije, rezervacija proizvodnih zmogljivosti, cena, ki pokriva upravičene fiksne in variabilne stroške elektrarne za obdobje od 15 do 27 let), ima vsak SNEE vpliv na trg.
However, by definition, the extent of the effect is multiplied by the co-existence of the ten PPAs on the Hungarian market.
Vendar pa je v skladu z opredelitvijo obseg učinka večji, če na madžarskem trgu istočasno obstaja deset SNEE.
The more capacities covered by PPA, the greater the above effects are.
Več zmogljivosti kot pokrivajo SNEE, večji so zgornji učinki.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that the terms and conditions of the PPAs described above have an effect on trade and the potential to distort competition.
V skladu z zgoraj navedenim Komisija sklepa, da zgoraj opisani pogoji SNEE vplivajo na trgovino in lahko izkrivljajo konkurenco.
In point 3.1 of its Opening Decision, the Commission expressed its doubts as to the State aid character of Paks power plant owing to differences that may exist between the PPA of this plant and the other PPAs with regard to its governing principles.
V točki 3.1 Sklepa o začetku postopka je Komisija izrazila svoje dvome glede državne pomoči in značaja elektrarne Paks zaradi razlik, ki lahko obstajajo med SNEE te elektrarne in SNEE ostalih elektrarn glede veljavnih načel.
However, as a result of its investigations the Commission concludes that the above assessment of the State aid criteria applies equally to Paks PPA, as the same core principles are present in it with the specific features set out under the relevant criteria.
Kot rezultat njene raziskave je Komisija sklenila, da se zgornja ocena meril za oceno državne pomoči uporablja enakovredno tudi za SNEE elektrarne Paks, saj so v njem vsebovana enaka osnovna načela s posebnostmi, ki so navedene v okviru zadevnih meril.
On the basis of the above assessment, the Commission takes the view that the main terms and conditions of the purchase obligation enshrined in the PPAs, i.e. the capacity reservations and guaranteed off-take by MVM under such conditions as to ensure the return on investment of the power plants by shielding them from the commercial risks of the operation of their plant, constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Na podlagi zgornje ocene je Komisija mnenja, da glavni pogoji obveznosti nakupa, ki so opredeljeni v SNEE, tj. rezervacija proizvodnih zmogljivosti, minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema s strani MVM v pogojih, ki zagotavljajo donosnost naložb elektrarn tako, da jih ščitijo pred poslovnim tveganjem glede obratovanja elektrarne, predstavljajo državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe EU.
This State aid is achieved by the combination of the capacity reservations, the minimum guaranteed off-take, the pricing mechanism based on a capacity fee and an energy fee to cover fixed, variable and capital costs, over a long duration beyond normal commercial practice.
Ta državna pomoč je dosežena s kombinacijo dolgoročne rezervacije zmogljivosti, minimalne zagotovljene količine odjema in mehanizmov za določanje cen, ki temeljijo na pristojbini za zmogljivost in pristojbini za energijo, ki pokrivata fiksne in variabilne stroške ter stroške kapitala, za daljše obdobje, ki presega običajne poslovne prakse.
Applicability of the PPAs after accession
Veljavnost SNEE po pristopu
The interested parties argue that in accordance with the general principle of non-retroactivity, measures that were established in accordance with the law prior to accession should not be reviewed by the Commission after accession.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da v skladu s splošnim načelom neveljavnosti za nazaj, Komisija ne sme revidirati ukrepov, ki so bili določeni v skladu z zakonodajo, ki se je uporabljala pred pristopom.
The Commission cannot agree with this argument.
Komisija se ne more strinjati s tem argumentom.
All measures, irrespective of their legality under national rules before accession, become subject to the rules of the acquis communautaire at the date of accession.
Vsi ukrepi, ne glede na njihovo zakonitost v okviru nacionalnih določb pred pristopom, so podvrženi pravilom pravnega reda Skupnosti na dan pristopa.
The specific rules for State aid measures set forth in Annex IV to the Accession Act do apply to aid measures, even if they were otherwise established in accordance with national legal rules prior to accession.
Posebna pravila za ukrepe glede državne pomoči, ki so določena v Prilogi IV Akta o pristopu, se uporabljajo za ukrepe glede državne pomoči, četudi so bila določena v skladu z nacionalnimi pravnimi predpisi pred pristopom.
Annex IV.3(1) to the Act of Accession defines as existing aid only three categories of measures: (i) those put into effect before 10 December 1994; (ii) those that – having been examined by the Commission – were included in the list in Annex IV to the Treaty of Accession; and (iii) those approved by the Commission under the so-called interim mechanism.
Priloga IV.3(1) Akta o pristopu določa kot veljavno pomoč samo tri kategorije ukrepov: (i) tiste, ki so začeli veljati pred 10. decembrom 1994; (ii) tiste, ki so bili potem, ko jih je preučila Komisija, vključeni na seznam v Prilogi IV pristopne pogodbe; in (iii) tiste, ki jih je Komisija potrdila s t. i. začasnim mehanizmom.
All the measures still applicable after the date of accession, which constitute State aid and do not fall within one of these three categories, are considered as new aid upon accession; the Commission therefore has full powers to prohibit these measures if they are incompatible with the common market.
Vsi ukrepi, ki se še vedno uporabljajo po pristopu in predstavljajo državno pomoč ter ne spadajo v nobeno izmed navedenih kategorij, se štejejo za novo pomoč po pristopu; Komisija ima torej vsa pooblastila, da prepove te ukrepe, če niso združljivi s skupnim trgom.
This application of State aid rules to the future effects of measures still applicable after accession does not entail any retroactive application of the EC State aid rules and is in any event mandated by the Act of Accession.
Ta uporaba pravil glede državne pomoči za prihodnje učinke ukrepov, ki se izvajajo tudi po pristopu, ne vključuje veljavnosti za nazaj pravil ES glede državne pomoči in je v vsakem primeru določena z Aktom o pristopu.
Annex IV.3(2) to the Act of Accession defines the ‘interim mechanism’.
Priloga IV.3(2) Akta o pristopu določa „začasni mehanizem“.
It provides a legal framework for the assessment of aid schemes and individual aid measures put into effect in a new Member State before the date of accession and still applicable after accession.
Določa pravni okvir za oceno programov pomoči in individualne ukrepe pomoči, ki so začeli veljati v novi državi članici pred dnevom pristopa in se uporabljajo tudi po pristopu.
The interested parties argue that, as Community State aid rules apply only from the date of accession, only aid measures that provide an additional benefit after accession could be defined as applicable after accession.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da ker se pravila Skupnosti glede državne pomoči uporabljajo samo od datuma pristopa, se lahko po pristopu za veljavne opredeli samo tiste ukrepe pomoči, ki po pristopu zagotavljajo dodatno korist.
They argue that the PPAs do not produce any additional benefit after accession, as their price formulae were defined before accession and, consequently, the State's financial exposure was entirely known prior to accession.
Trdijo, da SNEE po pristopu niso ustvarili dodatnih koristi, saj so bile njihove cenovne formule določene pred pristopom, zato je bila finančna izpostavljenost države v celoti znana pred pristopom.
The Commission makes the following observations.
Komisija je podala naslednje pripombe.
The PPAs expire between 2010 and 2024, i.e. after accession.
SNEE potečejo med letoma 2010 in 2024, tj. po pristopu.
Only in very exceptional circumstances has the Commission considered that an aid measure still in force after accession does not constitute aid applicable after accession within the meaning of the Accession Act.
Samo v izjemnih okoliščinah je Komisija menila, da ukrep pomoči, ki se je po pristopu še vedno uporabljal, ne predstavlja pomoči, ki se uporablja tudi po pristopu v smislu Akta o pristopu.
Such exceptional practice should nevertheless, as all exceptions in law, be interpreted stricto sensu to avoid removing from the Commission's State aid control measures that the signatories of the Accession Act intended to be under such control.
Vendar pa se take izjemne prakse ne sme, tako kot vseh izjem v okviru zakonodaje, ne sme razlagati dobesedno, da se prepreči ukinitev nadzora državne pomoči s strani Komisije za ukrepe, za katere so podpisniki Akta o pristopu določili, da bodo podvrženi tovrstnemu nadzoru.
In this context, the Commission has indeed considered in its practice [101] that aid measures for which the State ' s exact economic exposure was precisely known before accession were not applicable after accession within the meaning of Annex IV to the Accession Act.
V zvezi s tem je Komisija v svoji praksi [101] upoštevala, da se ukrepi pomoči, za katere je bila natančna ekonomska izpostavljenost države znana že pred pristopom, ne uporabljajo po pristopu v smislu Priloge IV Akta o pristopu.
The ‘exact economic exposure of the State’
„Natančna ekonomska izpostavljenost države“
The PPAs do not cap at a maximum amount the State's financial exposure, nor could it be precisely calculated before accession for the entire duration of the PPAs.
SNEE ne omejujejo finančne izpostavljenosti države do najvišje možne vrednosti, hkrati pa je pred pristopom tudi ni bilo mogoče natančno izračunati za celotno obdobje trajanja SNEE.
On the contrary, the State's economic exposure under the PPAs depends on parameters whose future evolution was unknown at the time of accession.
Nasprotno pa je ekonomska izpostavljenost države v okviru SNEE odvisna od parametrov, katerih prihodnji razvoj je bil v času pristopa neznan.
Moreover, the PPAs guaranteed generators protection from fluctuations in costs which were unrelated to pre-accession transactions or events but concerned future developments and were therefore unknown on the date of accession.
Poleg tega so SNEE zagotavljali proizvajalcem zaščito pred nihanji stroškov, ki niso bili povezani s transakcijami ali dogodki v obdobju pred pristopom, vendar so se nanašali na prihodnji razvoj in so bili torej na dan pristopa neznani.
In particular, the fact that the State's exposure under the PPAs was not known on the date of accession and that the PPAs imposed obligations on the State after accession is demonstrated by the following circumstances.
Dejstvo, da izpostavljenost države v okviru SNEE ni bila znana na datum pristopa in da so SNEE nalagali državi obveznosti po pristopu, je prikazano zlasti z naslednjimi okoliščinami.
First, the exact energy prices at which the power generators sell electricity to MVM are not laid down in the individual PPAs.
Prvič, natančne cene energije, po katerih proizvajalci energije prodajajo električno energijo MVM-ju, niso določene v posameznih SNEEh.
The prices are the result of calculations made using a formula comprising a series of parameters that fluctuate in an unforeseeable way.
Cene so posledica izračunov, narejenih z uporabo formule, ki vključuje vrsto parametrov, ki nihajo na nepredvidljiv način.
The price formulae of the PPAs include a capacity fee and an electricity fee, with other different supplementary fees depending on the generators.
Cenovne formule SNEE vključujejo pristojbino za zmogljivosti in pristojbino za električno energijo, skupaj z drugimi dodatnimi pristojbinami, ki so odvisne od proizvajalcev.
The formulae define only the admissible costs and charges under each category of fees and the importance of that category of fees in the price.
Formule določajo samo dopustne stroške in dajatve v okviru vsake kategorije pristojbin ter stopnjo pomembnosti zadevne kategorije pristojbin v okviru cene.
The generators themselves as well as MVM recognised in their observations that the exact meaning of certain categories of fees must have been further clarified in negotiations with MVM.
Proizvajalci sami kot tudi MVM so v svojih pripombah priznali, da je treba natančen pomen določenih kategorij pristojbin dodatno pojasniti v pogajanjih z MVM.
A great number of cost categories recognised by the PPAs are variable and cannot have been precisely known prior to accession.
Veliko kategorij stroškov, ki jih priznavajo SNEE, je spremenljivih in niso bile znane pred pristopom.
Capacity fee
Pristojbina za zmogljivosti
This cost category takes into account both the guaranteed capacities and the capacities actually used for MVM.
Ta kategorija stroškov upošteva tako zagotovljene zmogljivosti kot tudi zmogljivosti, ki so dejansko porabljene za MVM.
This cost category depends, amongst others, on yearly, monthly and weekly planning.
Ta kategorija stroškov je med drugim odvisna od letnega, mesečnega in tedenskega načrtovanja.
Each of the PPAs refers to the rules of the periodical planning, and the exact final price depends in each PPA of the yearly, monthly and weekly plans.
Vsak izmed SNEE se sklicuje na pravila periodičnega načrtovanja, natančna končna cena pa je odvisna od vsakega SNEE ter njegovih letnih, mesečnih in tedenskih načrtov.
By definition, these cost categories cannot be precisely defined in advance.
Po definiciji se teh kategorij stroškov ne da natančno vnaprej določiti.
The parties can for instance foresee ‘overcapacities’ for a given period in their plans.
Podpisnice lahko na primer predvidijo presežek zmogljivosti za določeno obdobje v njihovem načrtu.
The overall price to be paid by MVM will necessarily depend on other parameters, e.g. the weather, influencing electricity demand.
Skupna cena, ki jo plača MVM, bo nujno odvisna od drugih parametrov, npr. vremena, povpraševanja po električni energiji.
This cost category also depends on the exchange rates of HUF.
Ta kategorija stroškov je odvisna od menjalnega tečaja forinta.
Energy fee
Pristojbina za energijo
This cost category depends primarily on fuel costs.
Ta kategorija stroškov je odvisna predvsem od stroškov goriva.
These costs fluctuate according to market rules outside the control of the parties.
Ti stroški nihajo v skladu s pravili trga, ki jih stranke ne morejo nadzorovati.
The costs linked to the future price evolution of fuel are not subject to any concrete cap in the PPAs.
Stroški, ki so povezani s prihodnjim razvojem cen goriva, niso predmet kakršnih koli omejitev v okviru SNEE.
The exact amount of the energy fees payable over a certain period of time furthermore naturally depends on the exact quantity of sales to MVM, which can only be calculated a posteriori.
Natančna višina pristojbine za energijo, ki se plačuje za določeno obdobje, je nadalje odvisna od natančnega obsega prodaje MVM –ju, ki se lahko izračuna samo naknadno.
Supplementary fees (where applicable)
Dodatne pristojbine (če se uporabljajo)
Certain PPAs provide for a supplementary fee for capacities that were reserved but in the end not used.
Nekateri SNEE določajo dodatne pristojbine za zmogljivosti, ki so bile rezervirane, vendar na koncu niso bile porabljene.
Its exact amount cannot, by definition, be specified in advance.
Njihovega natančnega zneska ni mogoče določiti vnaprej.
In most PPAs there is a system of bonus/malus whereby generators are entitled to a bonus if they operate more capacities in peak periods than provided for in the PPA, or generate more electricity.
Pri večini SNEE obstaja sistem olajšav/kazni, kjer so proizvajalci električne energije upravičeni do olajšav, če v koničnih obdobjih obratujejo z več zmogljivostmi, kot to določa SNEE, ali proizvedejo več energije.
A malus is provided for if a generator provides less capacity than forecast by the PPA and the yearly/monthly plans.
Kazni se določijo, če proizvajalec električne energije zagotavlja manj zmogljivosti, kot je predvideno v SNEE in letnih/mesečnih načrtih.
These calculations, like the others listed above, are based on periodic operating plans and depend also on the generator's own behaviour.
Ti izračuni, tako kot ostali zgoraj navedeni, temeljijo na periodičnih delovnih načrtih in so odvisni tudi od samega delovanja proizvajalca.
They can under no circumstances be defined in advance.
Pod nobenimi pogoji jih ni mogoče določiti vnaprej.
All the above shows that fixing the exact final price for the purchase of electricity for contracts of a duration of 15 to 27 years is technically impossible.
Zgoraj navedena dejstva kažejo, da je določanje natančne cene za nakup električne energije pri pogodbah z obdobjem trajanja od 15 do 27 let, praktično nemogoče.
The exact price takes into account periodic production plans and depends on electricity demand, the behaviour of the parties to the contract, fuel prices, etc.
Natančna cena upošteva periodične proizvodne načrte in je odvisna od povpraševanja po električni energiji, vedenja pogodbenih strank, cen goriva ipd.
Even if not all of these arguments apply to all PPAs (as the admissible cost categories vary to a certain extent depending on the PPAs), all PPAs contain price elements which it is impossible to define with exactitude in advance.
Četudi vsi izmed teh argumentov ne veljajo za vse SNEE (saj se kategorije dopustnih stroškov do določene mere spreminjajo glede na SNEE), vsi SNEE vključujejo elemente cene, ki jih ni mogoče natančno določiti vnaprej.
Against this background, the Commission takes the view that the existence of the price-setting formula does not constitute a sufficient cap on the State's economic exposure.
Na podlagi tega Komisija meni, da obstoj formule za določanje cen ne predstavlja zadostne omejitve pri ekonomski izpostavljenosti države.
The very existence of a number of changing parameters in the formula makes it impossible to determine the future level of the State's exposure with sufficient precision.
Že sam obstoj velikega števila spreminjajočih se parametrov pri formuli onemogoča natančno določitev prihodnje stopnje izpostavljenosti države.
As a subsidiary argument, MVM's financial exposure under the PPAs is very much contingent on demand.
Kot dodatni argument se navaja, da je MVM-jeva finančna izpostavljenost v okviru SNEE zelo odvisna od povpraševanja.
It is equivalent to the difference between the purchase price under the PPAs and the revenue MVM can generate by selling the electricity.
Enaka je razliki med nabavno ceno v okviru SNEE in prihodkom, ki ga MVM lahko ustvari s pomočjo prodaje električne energije.
However, the price at which MVM sells its electricity cannot be predicted.
Kljub temu pa cene, po kateri MVM prodaja svojo električno energijo, ni mogoče predvideti.
It depends on the exact revenues generated by MVM's sales under its agreements with the regional distributors, the outcome of its auctions, tenders and its sales at the ‘Marketplace’ (Piactér).
Odvisna je od natančnih prihodkov, ki jih ustvari MVM s prodajo v okviru svojih sporazumov z regionalnimi distributerji, izkupička od avkcij, ponudnikov in njihove prodaje na trgu („Piactér“).
These prices are also influenced by periodic official price regulation and fluctuation of market demand.
Na te cene vplivata tudi periodično uravnavanje cen in nihanje povpraševanja na trgu.
This increases the unpredictability of the State's exposure under PPAs.
To povečuje nepredvidljivost izpostavljenosti države v okviru SNEE.
Therefore MVM's payments to the power generators after accession are not the mere disbursement of tranches within an overall fixed cap established before accession.
Zato plačila MVM proizvajalcem električne energije po pristopu niso zgolj izplačilo obrokov v okviru splošne fiksne omejitve, ki je bila določena pred pristopom.
Consequently, the PPAs under assessment in this Decision are applicable after Accession within the meaning of point 3 of Annex IV to the Accession Act.
Zato so SNEE, ki so predmet ocene iz te odločbe, veljavni po pristopu v smislu člena točke 3 Priloge IV Akta o pristopu.
PPAs as ‘new aid’ as opposed to ‘existing aid’
SNEE kot „nova pomoč“ v nasprotju z „obstoječo pomočjo“
According to point 3 of Annex IV to the Accession Act, ‘if the Commission does not object to the existing aid measure on the ground of serious doubts as to the compatibility of the measure with the common market, within 3 months of receipt of complete information on that measure or of receipt of the statement of the new Member State in which it informs the Commission that it considers the information provided to be complete because the additional information requested is not available or has been already provided, the Commission shall be deemed not to have raised an objection.’
V skladu s točko 3 Priloge IV Akta o pristopu, „če Komisija v 3 mesecih od prejema popolnih informacij o ukrepu nima pripomb zaradi resnih dvomov glede združljivosti ukrepa s skupnim trgom glede obstoječega ukrepa pomoči ali od prejema izjave nove države članice, v kateri ta obvešča Komisijo, da šteje predložene informacije za popolne, ker dodatne zahtevane informacije niso dostopne ali so že bile predložene, se šteje, da mu Komisija ni ugovarjala.“
Based on this article, certain interested parties argue that the Commission missed the three months’ deadline after Hungary's notification of 31 March 2004 and thereby implicitly approved the measure under the interim procedure.
Na podlagi tega člena nekatere zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da je Komisija po obvestilu Madžarske z dne 31. marca 2004 zamudila rok 3 mesecev, kar implicitno vključuje njeno potrditev ukrepa v okviru začasnega postopka.
In this regard, the Commission points out that the subject of the notification of 31 March 2004 under the interim procedure was a decree on compensations granted to MVM, and not the PPAs.
V zvezi s tem Komisija trdi, da je predmet obvestila z dne 31. marca 2004 v okviru začasnega postopka uredba o nadomestilih, ki so bila dodeljena MVM-ju, in ne SNEE.