natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to the Danish government, the Office of the Auditor General was not therefore criticising the fact that the Ministry recommended the capital injection of DKK 300 million, but rather the fact that it did not emphasise to the Finance Committee that the bill was based on budgets and estimates drawn up by Combus’ board.
Danska vlada trdi, da Urad generalnega državnega revizorja torej ni kritiziral dejstva, da je ministrstvo priporočilo kapitalski vložek v višini 300 milijonov DKK, temveč dejstvo, da pri finančnem odboru ni izpostavilo, da predlog zakona temelji na finančnih načrtih in ocenah, ki jih je pripravila uprava podjetja.
As an injection of capital was urgently required, the Ministry of Transport had no choice but to recommend the capital injection which was considered necessary to avoid bankruptcy and therefore also necessary if Combus was to be sold.
Ker je bil kapitalski vložek nujen, Ministrstvo za promet ni imelo druge izbire, kot da predlaga kapitalski vložek, ki se je štel za potrebnega, da se podjetje Combus izogne stečaju, in torej tudi za prodajo podjetja.
Secondly, the Danish government points out that the comments by Danske Busvognmaend focus exclusively on the question of the extent to which a private investor would have made a similar capital injection in 1999 based on the expectation that a future profit from Combus in itself would give a suitable return on the investment.
Drugič, danska vlada izpostavlja, da so pripombe podjetja Danske Busvognmaend osredotočene le na to, ali bi zasebni vlagatelj izvedel podoben kapitalski vložek leta 1999 na podlagi pričakovanja, da bo prihodnji dobiček iz podjetja Combus sam po sebi zagotovil zadosten donos na naložbo.
However, the Danish government’s view on the market economy investor principle is not merely based on the direct return which could reasonably be expected on the State’s investment.
Toda pogled danske vlade na načelo vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji ne temelji samo na neposrednem donosu, ki bi ga lahko razumno pričakovali od naložbe države.
On the contrary, account must be taken of the latent indirect losses and damaging effects on, amongst other things, future privatisations, which bankruptcy would entail.
Nasprotno, upoštevati je treba skrite neposredne izgube in škodljive učinke, ki bi jih imel stečaj, med drugim na prihodnje privatizacije.
Thirdly, the Danish government refutes the assertion that there were buyers interested in acquiring the loss-making contracts.
Tretjič, danska vlada zavrača trditev, da so obstajali zainteresirani kupci za pogodbe, ki so prinašale izgubo.
Even if there had been any such buyers, a transfer would merely have meant immediate confirmation of the losses on the contracts and thereby immediate, incalculable financial consequences for Combus.
Tudi če bi takšni kupci obstajali, bi prenos pomenil samo takojšno potrditev izgub iz naslova pogodb in s tem takojšnje finančne posledice za podjetje Combus, ki jih ni mogoče izračunati.
The Danish government also disagrees that any bus operator would have taken on the loss-making contracts at anything above the contracts’ negative value.
Danska vlada se prav tako ne strinja s tem, da bi kateri koli avtobusni prevoznik prevzel pogodbe, ki prinašajo izgubo, po kateri koli vrednosti, višji od negativne vrednosti pogodb.
A sale of the contracts would therefore only have been possible for a negative purchase price.
Pogodbe bi bilo torej mogoče prodati le po negativni nakupni ceni.
In any case, the sale of individual contracts and/or individual fixed assets or operating assets would not be a more profitable solution than an overall sale.
V vsakem primeru prodaja posameznih pogodb in/ali posameznih osnovnih sredstev ali obratnih sredstev ne bi bila donosnejša rešitev od celotne prodaje.
This view is supported by the Office of the Auditor General of Denmark [39].
To stališče podpira Urad generalnega državnega revizorja Danske [39].
With reference to paragraph 94 in the Combus judgment, Danske Busvognmaend states that other operators could have taken over Combus’ transport contracts at short notice in the event of the company going bankrupt.
Podjetje Danske Busvognmaend v zvezi s točko 94 sodbe Combus navaja, da bi lahko drugi prevozniki v kratkem roku prevzeli pogodbe podjetja Combus za prevoz, če bi šlo podjetje v stečaj.
The Danish government considers that this may be correct, but that this has no bearing on the legal assessment of whether the State acted in accordance with the market economy investor principle.
Po mnenju danske vlade je to morda točno, vendar ne vpliva na pravno oceno o tem, ali je država ravnala v skladu z načelom vlagatelja pod tržnimi pogoji.
The information may, however, be useful with regard to the question of the extent to which Combus going bankrupt would affect the management of public transport and any disruptions to transport services.
Toda informacije so lahko uporabne za vprašanje, v kolikšni meri bi stečaj podjetja Combus vplival na upravljanje javnega prevoza in povzročil morebitne motnje na področju prevoznih storitev.
With respect to the arguments presented by Danske Busvognmaend, the Danish government states that any reservation regarding the payment of aid on subsequent occasions does not affect whether more than one amount of aid can be regarded as a single aid measure paid out in more than one instalment.
Kar zadeva argumente, ki jih je predstavilo podjetje Danske Busvognmaend, danska vlada pravi, da noben zadržek glede naknadnega plačila pomoči ne vpliva na to, ali se lahko kot en sam ukrep pomoči upošteva več kot en znesek pomoči, izplačan v več kot enem obroku.
On the contrary, the decisive factor in this connection is an overall assessment of whether the individual amounts of aid are connected in time and purpose in such a way that they can be regarded as a single aid measure.
Nasprotno, odločilni dejavnik v povezavi s tem je skupna ocena, ali so posamezni zneski pomoči časovno in namensko povezani tako, da se jih lahko šteje za en sam ukrep pomoči.
The Danish government concedes that no restructuring plan had been submitted to the Commission when the capital injection of DKK 300 million was made, or when agreement was reached with Arriva in November 2000 on the principles of the sale.
Danska vlada se strinja, da Komisiji ob kapitalskem vložku 300 milijonov DKK ali ob sklenitvi dogovora s podjetjem Arriva novembra 2000 o načelih prodaje ni bil predložen noben načrt prestrukturiranja.
However, the Danish government does not share the interpretation Danske Busvognmaend makes of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-17/99, France v Commission, namely that a restructuring plan cannot be submitted to the Commission any longer, once the Member State has granted the aid.
Toda danska vlada se ne strinja s tem, kako podjetje Danske Busvognmaend razlaga sodbo Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti v zadevi C-17/99, Francija/Komisija, in sicer da načrta prestrukturiranja ni več mogoče predložiti Komisiji, ko država članica že dodeli pomoč.
The Danish government first points out that the 1999 restructuring guidelines contain no rules or instructions on the question of when a restructuring plan has to be submitted to the Commission.
Danska vlada najprej poudarja, da smernice o prestrukturiranju iz leta 1999 ne vsebujejo nobenih pravil ali navodil glede tega, kdaj je treba Komisiji predložiti načrt prestrukturiranja.
The only clear condition is that the Commission cannot approve restructuring aid unless it has previously received a restructuring plan.
Edini jasen pogoj je, da Komisija ne more odobriti pomoči za prestrukturiranje, če ni predhodno prejela načrta prestrukturiranja.
The Danish government considers that even in cases where an aid measure is implemented without first notifying the Commission, the Commission must check that the aid satisfies the conditions for approval.
Danska vlada meni, da mora Komisija tudi v primeru, ko se ukrep pomoči izvede, ne da bi bila o tem obveščena, preveriti, ali pomoč izpolnjuje pogoje za odobritev.
This is provided for, inter alia, in Article 13(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Procedural Regulation’).
Med drugim je to opredeljeno v členu 13(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: postopkovna uredba).
It considers that it is therefore perfectly satisfactory for the Commission to receive a restructuring plan which is approved before the Commission decides whether the State aid is compatible with the common market.
Zato meni, da je povsem zadovoljivo, če Komisija prejme načrt prestrukturiranja, ki je odobren, preden se Komisija odloči, ali je državna pomoč združljiva s skupnim trgom.
With respect to paragraph 43 in Case C-17/99, France v Commission [40], the Danish government points out that according to paragraph 41, the Commission stated, in the decision which was the subject of the case, that ‘the French Government did not submit a credible restructuring plan to the Commission’ and ‘[n]or has any such plan been submitted to the Commission by the French authorities since the proceedings were initiated.’
Kar zadeva točko 43 v zadevi C-17/99, Francija/Komisija [40], danska vlada izpostavlja, da je v skladu z odstavkom 41 Komisija v odločitvi, ki je bila predmet te zadeve, navedla, da „francoska vlada Komisiji ni predložila verodostojnega načrta prestrukturiranja“ in da „tudi po začetku postopka francoski organi niso predložili Komisiji takega načrta.“
For the Danish government, it is clear from the wording used by the Commission that it would have been sufficient to satisfy the conditions in the 1999 restructuring guidelines for a restructuring plan to submit a restructuring plan after the initiation of formal proceedings.
Za dansko vlado je iz besedila, ki ga je uporabila Komisija, jasno, da bi bili pogoji iz smernic o prestrukturiranju iz leta 1999 glede načrta prestrukturiranja izpolnjeni že, če bi bil načrt prestrukturiranja predložen po začetku formalnega postopka.
The decisive factor was therefore not the point in time when the restructuring plan is submitted, but the fact that it is submitted before the Commission reaches its final decision.
Odločilni dejavnik torej ni bil čas predložitve načrta prestrukturiranja, temveč dejstvo, da se predloži, preden Komisija sprejme končno odločitev.
The Danish government therefore considers that the restructuring plans of 8 and 23 January 2001 were submitted in time, and that they satisfied the conditions in the 1999 restructuring guidelines.
Danska vlada zato meni, da sta bila načrta prestrukturiranja z dne 8. in 23. januarja 2001 predložena pravočasno in da sta izpolnjevala pogoje iz smernic o prestrukturiranju iz leta 1999.
In its submissions of February and April 2007, the Danish government points out that a financial and an operational restructuring plan have been available when the Danish parliaments’ finance committee approved the 1999 capital injection.
V dokumentih, predloženih februarja in aprila 2007, danska vlada poudarja, da sta bila finančni in operativni načrt prestrukturiranja na voljo, ko je finančni odbor danskega parlamenta odobril kapitalski vložek leta 1999.
Mitigating the adverse effects of the aid
Blažitev škodljivih vplivov pomoči
The Danish government considers that Arriva’s sale to Connex did not result in a profit which exceeded the expectations and calculations of the Danish government and Arriva at the moment of the sale of Combus to Arriva.
Po mnenju danske vlade prodaja podjetja Arriva podjetju Connex ni prinesla dobička, ki bi presegal pričakovanja in izračune danske vlade in podjetja Arriva v času prodaje podjetja Combus podjetju Arriva.
Limiting the aid to a minimum
Omejitev pomoči na minimum
In response to the claim of Danske Busvognmaend, according to which the sale was not subject to a public tender, the Danish government argues that the sales process was particularly protracted, competitive, non-discriminatory and transparent, and the final price did not differ significantly from the original bid.
V odgovor na trditev podjetja Danske Busvognmaend, da prodaja ni bila izpeljana prek javnega razpisa, danska vlada zatrjuje, da je bil prodajni postopek zelo dolg, konkurenčen, nediskriminatoren in pregleden ter da se končna cena ni bistveno razlikovala od prvotne ponudbe.
In response to the claim that there were no independent checks of the market price, the Danish government points out that the sale had to be approved by the Parliamentary Finance Committee on the basis of financial analyses carried out by the financial adviser to the State, Alfred Berg.
V odgovor na trditev, da ni bilo neodvisnega preverjanja tržne cene, danska vlada izpostavlja, da je moral prodajo odobriti finančni odbor parlamenta na podlagi finančnih analiz, ki jih je izvedel finančni svetovalec vlade Alfred Berg.
The Danish government considers that this constitutes a sufficient check.
Po mnenju danske vlade pomeni to zadostno preverjanje.
In the view of the Danish government, the passages from the Annex to the CFI case, cited by Danske Busvognmaend, contain no acknowledgement of any failure to check that the aid was kept to a minimum.
Danska vlada je mnenja, da odlomki iz Priloge k zadevi SPS, ki jih je citiralo podjetje Danske Busvognmaend, ne potrjujejo, da ni bilo preverjeno, ali je pomoč omejena na najnujnejše.
The Danish government furthermore explains that after the sale, three independent investigations have been carried out on the sales price, namely the ‘Report on the investigation of Combus A/S’, the ‘Solicitor's investigation on the State’s management of the ownership of Combus A/S’ and the ‘Report from the Auditor General’.
Danska vlada tudi pojasnjuje, da so bile po prodaji opravljene tri neodvisne preiskave o prodajni ceni, in sicer „Poročilo o preiskavi podjetja Combus A/S“, „Preiskava odvetnika o državnem upravljanju lastniškega deleža v podjetju Combus A/S“ in „Poročilo generalnega revizorja“.
Against this background the Danish government disagrees that no checks were carried out as to whether the aid was limited to a minimum.
Na tej podlagi se danska vlada ne strinja, da ni bilo preverjanj, ali je pomoč omejena na najnujnejše.
The reference to Annexes K and I to the case by Danske Busvognmaend has no bearing whatsoever on the matter of whether the aid was limited to a minimum.
Sklicevanje na Prilogi K in I zadeve podjetja Danske Busvognmaend nima nobenega vpliva na to, ali je bila pomoč omejena na najnujnejše.
However, the quotes clearly show that the sale to Arriva was prepared on the basis of a business case, and that the sales price reflected the market price.
Toda ponudbe jasno kažejo, da je bila prodaja podjetju Arriva pripravljena na podlagi poslovnega primera in da je prodajna cena odražala tržno ceno.
Finally, the Danish government does not consider that using independent auditors would have resulted in a different assessment or in a different sale price for the Combus shares.
Končno pa danska vlada meni, da uporaba neodvisnih revizorjev ne bi privedla do drugačne presoje ali drugačne ocene ali prodajne cene delnic podjetja Combus.
For the Danish government, the decisive test was the market test.
Za dansko vlado je bil odločilen preizkus tržna analiza.
LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMISSION
PRAVNA OCENA KOMISIJE
ASSESSMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF AID WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 87(1) EC TREATY
OCENA OBSTOJA POMOČI V SMISLU ČLENA 87(1) POGODBE ES
Article 87(1) EC foresees that, ‘save as otherwise provided in the EC Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market’.
Člen 87(1) Pogodbe ES določa, da „razen če ta pogodba ne določa drugače, je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom, kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami“.
PRELIMINARY QUESTION: DO THE 1999 AND THE 2001 MEASURES CONSTITUTE ONE SINGLE OR TWO SEPARATE MEASURES TO BE ASSESSED UNDER ARTICLE 87(1) EC TREATY?
PREDHODNO VPRAŠANJE: ALI UKREPA IZ LET 1999 IN 2001 POMENITA EN SAM ALI DVA LOČENA UKREPA, KAR SE PRESODI PO ČLENU 87(1) POGODBE ES?
As described above, Combus received financial support from the Danish government in the form of capital injections (in 1999 and in 2001), of a subordinated loan (in 1999), of the subsequent conversion of the subordinated loan into share capital and of guarantees given to the buyer (in 2001).
Kot je opisano zgoraj, je podjetje Combus prejelo finančno podporo od danske vlade v obliki kapitalskih vložkov (leta 1999 in 2001), podrejenega dolga (leta 1999), posledične pretvorbe podrejenega dolga v osnovni kapital in jamstev, danih kupcu (leta 2001).
It is therefore important for the application of Article 87(1) EC treaty to establish whether the financial support granted during the privatisation process in 1999 and 2001 respectively constitutes two tranches of a single measure or two separate measures.
Zato je za uporabo člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES pomembno ugotoviti, ali finančna podpora, odobrena med privatizacijskim postopkom leta 1999 in 2001, pomeni dve tranši enega ukrepa ali dva ločena ukrepa.
The CFI has in BP Chemicals considered the following considerations to be relevant in making such a determination:
V zadevi BP Chemicals je SPS kot pomembne dejavnike za takšno ugotovitev upoštevalo naslednje:
The chronology of the capital injections in question;
časovno zaporedje zadevnih kapitalskih vložkov,
Their purpose;
njihov namen,
The situation of the company at the time when the decision to make an injection was made [41].
položaj podjetja v času, ko je bila sprejeta odločitev o vložku [41].
The Commission, in the light of the observations of the Danish government and third parties, will hereinafter assess whether the criteria established by the CFI in BP Chemicals are fulfilled in the present case.
Ob upoštevanju pripomb danske vlade in tretjih strank bo Komisija v nadaljevanju ocenila, ali so merila, ki jih je določilo SPS v zadevi BP Chemicals, v tem primeru izpolnjena.
Chronology of the measures
Časovno zaporedje ukrepov
The measures were taken respectively on 27 May 1999 and 15 January 2001.
Ukrepa sta bila izvedena 27. maja 1999 in 15. januarja 2001.
Therefore, approximately 18 months elapsed between the two decisions.
Torej je med obema odločitvama preteklo približno 18 mesecev.
The Danish government argues that in the light of the complexity of the privatisation process, 18 months constitute a reasonably short period of time.
Danska vlada trdi, da je glede na zapletenost privatizacijskega postopka 18 mesecev razmeroma kratko obdobje.
It also refers in this context to BP Chemicals, where the time between the first and the last tranche of the aid was 22 months.
V zvezi s tem se sklicuje tudi na zadevo BP Chemicals, kjer je med prvo in zadnjo tranšo pomoči preteklo 22 mesecev.
The Commission is not convinced by the arguments put forward by the Danish government.
Komisije niso prepričale trditve danske vlade.
First of all, there is an important factual difference between the BP Chemicals file and the present case.
Prvič, obstaja pomembna stvarna razlika med spisom BP Chemicals in pričujočim primerom.
In BP Chemicals, the public undertaking ENI made three capital injections into ENIChem, which took place in 1992, 1993 and 1994.
Pri BP Chemicals je javno podjetje ENI izvedlo tri kapitalske vložke v podjetje ENIChem, in sicer leta 1992, 1993 in 1994.
The CFI had to verify whether the Commission had rightly qualified the third capital injection as fulfilling the private investor test, whereas the first two had been qualified as State aid.
SPS je moralo preveriti, ali je Komisija upravičeno ugotovila, da tretji kapitalski vložek ustreza načelu zasebnega vlagatelja, medtem ko sta bila prva dva opredeljena kot državna pomoč.
The CFI found with respect to the chronology of the measures that the third capital injection was already foreseen by a restructuring plan, which had been adopted by the board of ENI the same day as the second capital injection, in December 1993.
V zvezi s časovnim zaporedjem ukrepov je SPS ugotovilo, da je bil tretji kapitalski vložek že predviden v načrtu prestrukturiranja, ki ga je uprava podjetja ENI odobrila istega dne kot drugi kapitalski vložek, namreč decembra 1993.
The actual decision to authorise the third capital injection had been taken less than a month later, in January 1994.
Dejanska odločitev o odobritvi tretjega kapitalskega vložka je bila sprejeta manj kot mesec dni pozneje, januarja 1994.
In the present case, on the contrary, nothing indicates that the Danish authorities planned in 1999, when they decided the first capital injection, to proceed with a second capital injection at a later stage of the restructuring.
Nasprotno pa v tem primeru nič ne kaže, da so danski organi leta 1999, ko so se odločili za prvi kapitalski vložek, načrtovali drugi kapitalski vložek v poznejši fazi prestrukturiranja.
On the contrary: the first capital injection had been calculated in a way that it should be sufficient to restore in itself the economic viability of Combus.
Nasprotno: prvi kapitalski vložek je bil izračunan tako, da bi moral zadostovati za povrnitev sposobnosti ekonomskega preživetja podjetja Combus.
The second capital injection has been decided more than one year and six months after the first capital injection in December 2000, when it became clear that the first capital injection had not been sufficient.
Odločitev o drugem kapitalskem vložku je bila sprejeta več kot leto in pol po prvem kapitalskem vložku, namreč decembra 2000, ko je postalo jasno, da prvi kapitalski vložek ni zadostoval.
There are, in conclusion, two important arguments from a chronological point of view for considering that the two capital injections constitute two separate measures:
S časovnega stališča obstajata torej dva pomembna argumenta, da kapitalska vložka pomenita dva ločena ukrepa:
The second capital injection has not been foreseen by the Danish authorities at the point in time when they decided to make the first capital injection, whereas this had been the case in BP Chemicals;
danski organi drugega kapitalskega vložka niso predvideli v času, ko so se odločili za prvi kapitalski vložek, medtem ko je bilo v zadevi BP Chemicals nasprotno;
The second capital injection was decided one year and six months after the first capital injection, whereas in BP Chemicals, there was only one month between the two measures.
odločitev o drugem kapitalskem vložku je bila sprejeta leto in pol po prvem kapitalskem vložku, medtem ko je v zadevi BP Chemicals med obema ukrepoma pretekel le en mesec.
Purpose of the measures
Namen ukrepov
The Danish government is of the opinion that the 1999 and the 2001 measures had the same purpose, namely to restructure and to recapitalise Combus in view of its successful privatisation.
Danska vlada meni, da sta imela ukrepa leta 1999 in 2001 enak namen, in sicer prestrukturiranje in dokapitalizacijo podjetja Combus zaradi uspešne privatizacije.
The Commission does not share this point of view.
Komisija se s tem ne strinja.
The detailed description of the facts above shows that the capital injection in 1999 was decided in order to avoid the imminent bankruptcy of Combus.
Podroben opis zgornjih dejstev kaže, da je bila odločitev o kapitalskem vložku leta 1999 sprejeta, da bi se izognili neizbežnemu stečaju podjetja Combus.
It did not have as a purpose the privatisation of Combus, but rather had become necessary because the first attempt to privatising Combus had failed.
Namen ukrepa ni bil privatizacija podjetja Combus, temveč je bil potreben, ker prvi poskus privatizacije podjetja Combus ni uspel.
The second capital injection served the purpose of increasing the capital of Combus to a level where the purchaser, Arriva, was willing to pay a symbolic price for the undertaking.
Namen drugega kapitalskega vložka je bil povečati kapital podjetja Combus do stopnje, ko bi kupec, podjetje Arriva, bil pripravljen plačati simbolično ceno za podjetje.