natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission considers that the planned investment of PLN […] million for the relocation of some production assets in order to free up land is a replacement investment rather than a genuine modernisation of assets.
Komisija meni, da je načrtovana naložba v višini […] milijonov PLN za premestitev nekaterih proizvodnih sredstev, da se izprazni zemljišče, bolj nadomestna naložba kot pa prava posodobitev sredstev.
Therefore the costs of the planned modernisation amount to only PLN 104 million and the modernisation investment would be made in SSN Mostostal, SSN Ulstein and SSN Wspólna.
Zato znašajo stroški načrtovane posodobitve samo 104 milijone PLN, naložbo za posodobitev pa bi izvedli v SSN Mostostal, SSN Ulstein in SSN Wspólna.
SSN Odra, which is supposed to generate almost 50 % of the revenues of all the successor companies of SSN in the future, would not make any investments and would not have any fixed assets.
SSN Odra, ki naj bi v prihodnosti ustvarila skoraj 50 % prihodkov vseh naslednic SSN, ne bi izvedla naložb in ne bi imela osnovnih sredstev.
The Commission notes that the plan submitted by Mostostal in June 2008 envisaged investments of PLN 264 million.
Komisija upošteva, da je Mostostalov načrt iz junija 2008 predvideval naložbe v višini 264 milijonov PLN.
As no justification is presented for such a cut in the investment programme (by 40 % as compared to the June plan) and there is no analysis of the companies’ investment needs, the Commission considers that it has not been demonstrated that the planned investment programme is sufficient to restore the long-term viability of operations.
Ker za to zmanjšanje investicijskega programa ni utemeljitve (za 40 % v primerjavi z junijskim načrtom) in ker ni analize potreb podjetij po naložbah, Komisija meni, da ni bilo dokazano, da je načrtovani investicijski program zadosten za obnovo dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja dejavnosti.
The expected results of the restructuring measures are not described and the plan does not explain when the implementation of these measures would produce results and have an impact on the companies’ financial performance.
Pričakovani rezultati ukrepov za prestrukturiranje niso opisani in načrt ne pojasnjuje, kdaj bo izvedba teh ukrepov prinesla rezultate ter vplivala na finančne dosežke podjetij.
Furthermore, the plan does not describe the assumptions of the financial projections with regard to the revenues and costs envisaged.
Poleg tega načrt ne opisuje predpostavk finančnih napovedi v zvezi s predvidenimi prihodki in stroški.
These factors raise doubts as to the credibility of the projections.
Ti dejavniki vzbujajo dvom v verodostojnost napovedi.
In addition the sensitivity analysis shows that SSN Mostostal, and in particular SSN Odra, would remain very vulnerable to changing market conditions.
Poleg tega analiza občutljivosti kaže, da bosta SSN Mostostal in še zlasti SSN Odra ostala zelo ranljiva za spreminjajoče se tržne pogoje.
Depreciation of the US dollar by 10 % would cause a decrease in accumulated profit of 40 % for SSN Mostostal and 83 % for SSN Odra in the years 2009-2012 (the analysis for SSN Odra admittedly does not take account of the hedging policy).
Znižanje vrednosti ameriškega dolarja za 10 % bi v letih 2009 do 2012 povzročilo zmanjšanje akumuliranega dobička za 40 % za SSN Mostostal in 83 % za SSN Odra (analiza za SSN Odra seveda ne upošteva politike zavarovanja).
Furthermore, the plan assumes that a 10 % increase in steel prices will cause falls in accumulated profit of 40 % for SSN Mostostal and 50 % for SSN Odra.
Načrt tudi predvideva, da bi 10-odstotno zvišanje cen jekla pomenilo 40 % nižji akumulirani dobiček za SSN Mostostal in 50 % za SSN Odra.
The Commission thus concludes that the plan has not demonstrated that after implementation of a sound hedging policy the sensitivity of the companies to fluctuations in exchange rates or steel prices would be at an acceptable level.
Komisija zato sklepa, da načrt ni pokazal, da bi po uvedbi trdne politike zavarovanja občutljivost podjetij na nihanja menjalnih tečajev ali cen jekla ostala na sprejemljivi ravni.
As regards the planned return on sales, as the plan does not describe on what basis the envisaged results on sales were estimated (in terms of operational costs, vessel prices, the profitability of the steel construction business, etc.), the Commission must conclude that it has not been demonstrated that the projected results are based on realistic assumptions.
V zvezi z načrtovano donosnostjo prodaje mora Komisija skleniti, da ni bilo dokazano, da načrtovani rezultati temeljijo na realnih predpostavkah, saj načrt ne opisuje, na kakšni osnovi so bili ocenjeni načrtovani rezultati (glede stroškov poslovanja, cen plovil, dobičkonosnosti jeklenih konstrukcij itd.).
Furthermore, the projected return on sales for SSN Wspólna and SSN Biuro Projektowe is marginal, as is recognised in the restructuring plan.
Poleg tega je načrtovana donosnost prodaje za SSN Wspólna in SSN Biuro Projektowe mejna, kot je to ugotovljeno v načrtu za prestrukturiranje.
The Commission does not consider that such a low level of return would be sufficient to allow these companies to compete on the market without State support.
Komisija meni, da tako nizka raven donosnosti tema podjetjema ne bi omogočila konkuriranja na trgu brez državne pomoči.
Even though the plan claims that SSN Wspólna and SSN Biuro Projektowe are supposed to provide services for the other companies, which allegedly justifies the low projected return on sales, the Commission notes that they are supposed to be independent companies and their weak projected results raise doubts as to the long-term viability of the whole project.
Čeprav je v načrtu navedeno, da naj bi SSN Wspólna in SSN Biuro Projektowe nudila storitve drugim podjetjem, kar naj bi opravičevalo nizko načrtovano donosnost prodaje, pa Komisija opaža, da naj bi bili ti podjetji neodvisni in da njuni slabi načrtovani rezultati vzbujajo dvom glede dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja celotnega projekta.
The Commission therefore concludes that the credibility of the financial projections is doubtful and the projected results remain highly sensitive to changing market conditions.
Zato Komisija sklepa, da je verodostojnost finančnih napovedi dvomljiva in da načrtovani rezultati ostajajo zelo občutljivi na spreminjajoče se tržne pogoje.
Consequently the Commission considers that the robustness of the plan has not been demonstrated.
Posledično Komisija meni, da trdnost načrta ni bila dokazana.
In any case the above assessment shows that even if Ulstein was involved in the project or if Mostostal intended to implement the restructuring plan of 12 September alone (as announced in its letter of 22 September 2008), this plan could not be considered sufficient.
V vsakem primeru zgornja ocena kaže, da četudi bi Ulstein sodeloval pri projektu ali če bi Mostostal načrt za prestrukturiranje z 12. septembra nameraval izvesti sam (kot je navedel v dopisu z dne 22. septembra 2008), tega načrta ni mogoče označiti kot zadostnega.
The failure of the privatisation attempts means that the yard is not able to obtain on market terms sufficient capital to implement the 2006 restructuring plan, let alone to implement the necessary far-reaching restructuring strategy that would ensure the yard’s long-term viability without the need for continuing State support.
Neuspešni poskusi privatizacije pomenijo, da ladjedelnica pod tržnimi pogoji ni sposobna pridobiti dovolj kapitala za izvedbo načrta za prestrukturiranje 2006, kaj šele izvesti nujno daljnosežno strategijo prestrukturiranja, ki bi zagotovila dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja ladjedelnice brez potrebe po nenehni državni podpori.
It also means that SSN is not able to obtain the managerial and market know-how necessary for its restructuring.
Pomeni pa tudi, da SSN ne more pridobiti upravljavskega in tržnega strokovnega znanja, potrebnega za prestrukturiranje.
In the absence of a realistic and far-reaching restructuring plan, the Commission concludes that the aid granted to SSN and described in part 2.7 above is purely operating aid, and not restructuring aid that is compatible with the common market.
Ob odsotnosti realnega in daljnosežnega načrta za prestrukturiranje Komisija sklene, da je pomoč za SSN, opisana v delu 2.7 zgoraj, izključno pomoč za tekoče poslovanje in ne pomoč za prestrukturiranje, ki je združljiva s skupnim trgom.
AID LIMITED TO MINIMUM
POMOČ, OMEJENA NA NAJNIŽJO VSOTO
Under point 43 of the Guidelines, the amount of the aid must be limited to the strict minimum of the restructuring costs necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken.
Po točki 43 Smernic mora biti pomoč omejena na najnižjo vsoto stroškov za prestrukturiranje, ki je potrebna za izvedbo prestrukturiranja.
The beneficiary is expected to make a significant contribution to financing the restructuring from its own resources or from external financing on market terms.
Od upravičenca se pričakuje, da bo znatno prispeval k financiranju prestrukturiranja, in sicer s pomočjo lastnih sredstev ali zunanjega financiranja po tržnih pogojih.
Such a contribution is, on the one hand, a sign that the market believes in the feasibility of the return to viability and, on the other hand, a way of ensuring that the State aid is limited to the minimum.
Takšen prispevek je na eni strani znak, da trg verjame v izvedljivost obnove sposobnosti preživetja, na drugi strani pa je to način zagotavljanja, da je državna pomoč omejena na najnižjo vsoto.
In the case of large enterprises, such as SSN, this contribution should be at least 50 % of the restructuring costs.
V primeru velikih podjetij, kakršna je SSN, bi moral biti ta prispevek najmanj 50 % stroškov za prestrukturiranje.
Firstly, it follows from the above description of SSN’s situation that the yard has hardly been able to attract any external financing for its restructuring.
Iz zgornjega opisa stanja SSN izhaja, da ladjedelnica praktično ni bila uspešna pri pridobivanju zunanjega financiranja za prestrukturiranje.
Restructuring plan of June 2006
Načrt za prestrukturiranje iz junija 2006
As regards the own contribution, under the 2006 restructuring plan restructuring costs, including operating costs would be PLN 11500 million, while the proposed own contribution would be PLN 3600 million, i.e. 30 %.
V zvezi z lastnim prispevkom je v načrtu za prestrukturiranje 2006 navedeno, da znašajo stroški za prestrukturiranje, vključno s stroški poslovanja, 11500 milijonov PLN, predlagani lastni prispevek pa znaša 3600 milijonov PLN, tj. 30 %.
If the operating costs were excluded from the costs and financing, the restructuring costs would amount to PLN 374,7 million and the own contribution would be PLN 190 million.
Če bi stroške za poslovanje izključili iz stroškov in financiranja, bi stroški za prestrukturiranje znašali 374,7 milijona PLN, lastni prispevek pa bi znašal 190 milijonov PLN.
The Commission had doubts as to whether the expectation of obtaining PLN 190 million on the market was realistic.
Komisija je dvomila, da so pričakovanja v zvezi s pridobitvijo 190 milijonov PLN na trgu realna.
There was no indication at the time that SSN could raise this capital on the market.
Ni bilo dokazov, da bi SSN na trgu uspela zbrati tolikšen kapital.
The proposed contribution could not therefore be considered actual and real as the Guidelines require.
Predlaganega prispevka torej ni mogoče obravnavati kot dejanskega in resničnega, kot to zahtevajo Smernice.
Indeed, the several unsuccessful attempts by KPS and ARP, first to attract minority shareholders and then to sell 100 % of the yard’s shares, have demonstrated that the market is not interested in investing in SSN.
Neuspešna poskusa KPS in ARP, tj. najprej pridobiti manjšinske delničarje in nato prodati 100 % delnic ladjedelnice, sta dejansko pokazala, da se trg ne zanima za naložbe v ladjedelnico SSN.
As regards the financing of operations, the 2006 restructuring plan assumed that production would be financed through commercial loans and ship-owners’ advance payments not guaranteed by KUKE, the total value of which throughout the restructuring period 2002-2009 was to be PLN 3200 million, as compared to PLN 4200 million financed thanks to KUKE guarantees.
V zvezi s financiranjem dejavnosti je načrt za prestrukturiranje 2006 predvideval, da se bo proizvodnja financirala iz komercialnih posojil in avansov lastnikov ladij, za katere KUKE ne jamči, skupna vrednost tega financiranja v obdobju prestrukturiranja 2002–2009 pa naj bi bila 3200 milijonov PLN, v primerjavi s 4200 milijoni PLN, financiranimi z garancijami KUKE.
Again, there was no indication at that time that SSN would be able to obtain such financing on the market.
Tudi v tem primeru ni bilo dokazov, da bo SSN na trgu uspela pridobiti tolikšna finančna sredstva.
The proposed contribution in the form of commercial loans and guarantees could not therefore be considered actual and real, as the Guidelines require.
Predlaganega prispevka v obliki komercialnih posojil in garancij zato ni mogoče obravnavati kot dejanskega in resničnega, kot to zahtevajo Smernice.
The Commission indeed notes that to this date the yard has been unable to obtain financing of its operations on the market without State support.
Komisija ugotavlja, da ladjedelnici na trgu do sedaj ni uspelo pridobiti financiranja dejavnosti brez državne podpore.
Moreover the 2006 restructuring plan submitted that additional payments of PLN 628,7 million from shipowners following the renegotiation of contracts should be considered an own contribution.
Še več, v načrtu za prestrukturiranje 2006 je navedeno, da je treba dodatna plačila lastnikov ladij v višini 628,7 milijona PLN po ponovnem izpogajanju pogodb obravnavati kot lastni prispevek.
Some contracts have in fact been renegotiated.
Nekatere pogodbe so dejansko bile ponovno izpogajane.
The Commission points out that, according to the Guidelines, the own contribution should be a sign that markets believe in the feasibility of the return to viability.
Komisija poudarja, da bi moral biti, v skladu s Smernicami, lastni prispevek znak, da trg verjame v izvedljivost obnove sposobnosti preživetja.
The fact that shipowners, when facing the risk of non-delivery of contracted vessels and in view of external factors (such as the increase in steel prices), are willing to increase the price of contracted vessels does not demonstrate that they believe in the yard’s ability to become viable and able to compete in the long term.
Dejstvo, da so lastniki, kadar se soočajo s tveganjem nedobave pogodbeno dogovorjenih plovil in zaradi zunanjih dejavnikov (na primer dviga cen jekla), pripravljeni zvišati ceno pogodbeno dogovorjenih plovil, ne dokazuje, da zaupajo v zmožnost ladjedelnice, da obnovi sposobnost preživetja in dolgoročno konkurira na trgu.
Moreover, the shipowners have not agreed to make additional payments to cover the costs of restructuring but only (and only to a certain extent) to cover the production costs of the contracted vessels.
Poleg tega se lastniki ladij niso strinjali z dodatnimi plačili za kritje stroškov za prestrukturiranje, temveč so pristali samo na (in samo v določenem obsegu) kritje proizvodnih stroškov pogodbeno dogovorjenih plovil.
Therefore, the Commission cannot accept additional payments by shipowners as an own contribution within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Zato Komisija ne more sprejeti dodatnih plačil lastnikov ladij kot lastnega prispevka v smislu Smernic.
The June 2008 restructuring plan did not make any substantial improvement in this respect.
Načrt za prestrukturiranje iz junija 2008 ni prinesel večjih izboljšav.
While the investor undertook to inject PLN 149,5 million to be used to partially finance the investment programme, it also requested an additional capital injection from the State of PLN 588 million in total and a loan of PLN 68 million from ARP.
Vlagatelj se je zavezal, da bo vložil 149,5 milijona PLN za delno financiranje investicijskega programa, vendar je od države zahteval tudi dodatno dokapitalizacijo v višini 588 milijonov PLN, od ARP pa posojilo v višini 68 milijonov PLN.
The investor also requested additional guarantees from KUKE to finance the working capital.
Vlagatelj je od KUKE zahteval tudi dodatne garancije za financiranje obratnih sredstev.
The restructuring costs that could be identified on the basis of the limited information contained in the restructuring plan of June 2008 corresponded to at least the forecast amount needed to cover expected losses on existing shipbuilding contracts for 2008-2009 (PLN 588 million) and to the investment needs envisaged for the period 2008-2012 (PLN 264 million).
Stroški za prestrukturiranje, ki jih je mogoče opredeliti na podlagi omejenih informacij, vsebovanih v načrtu za prestrukturiranje iz junija 2008, so ustrezali najmanj predvidenemu znesku, potrebnemu za kritje pričakovanih izgub iz obstoječih ladjedelniških pogodb za leti 2008 in 2009 (588 milijonov PLN), in potrebam po naložbah, predvidenih za obdobje 2008–2012 (264 milijonov PLN).
Most of these costs were to be covered by State aid.
Večino teh stroškov naj bi krila državna pomoč.
Effectively, the only envisaged own contribution from the investor was a capital injection of PLN 149,5 million, which corresponded to 17 % of the restructuring costs shown above.
Edini predvideni lastni prispevek vlagatelja je bila dokapitalizacija v višini 149,5 milijona PLN, kar ustreza 17 % stroškov za prestrukturiranje.
In line with established practice [35], the Commission considers that future cash flow cannot be considered an own contribution within the meaning of the Guidelines, because it does not represent an actual and real contribution of the company or its shareholders to the coverage of restructuring costs.
V skladu z ustaljeno prakso [35] Komisija meni, da prihodnjega denarnega toka ni mogoče obravnavati kot lastnega prispevka v smislu Smernic, saj ta ne predstavlja dejanskega in resničnega prispevka podjetja ali njegovih delničarjev h kritju stroškov za prestrukturiranje.
It is therefore obvious that the own contribution did not remotely approach the threshold of 50 % of restructuring costs required by the Guidelines.
Zato je jasno, da lastni prispevek niti približno ne dosega praga 50 % stroškov za prestrukturiranje, ki ga zahtevajo Smernice.
The restructuring plan of 12 September 2008 also fails to improve on the planned level of the own contribution to restructuring costs.
Načrt za prestrukturiranje z 12. septembra 2008 prav tako ne izboljšuje načrtovane ravni lastnega prispevka k stroškom za prestrukturiranje.
The restructuring plan of 12 September provides more detailed information concerning the planned restructuring costs and sources of financing.
Načrt za prestrukturiranje z 12. septembra 2008 daje podrobnejše informacije v zvezi z načrtovanimi stroški za prestrukturiranje in viri financiranja.
The planned restructuring costs consist of investment costs (PLN 104 million), the costs of relocating production assets to another area of the yard (PLN 50 million), employment restructuring (PLN 53,4 million), coverage of future losses on existing contracts (PLN 840 million) and coverage of the yard’s accumulated liabilities to ARP and KPS (PLN 197,5 million) [36].
Načrtovani stroški za prestrukturiranje so sestavljeni iz investicijskih stroškov (104 milijone PLN), stroškov za preselitev proizvodnih sredstev na drugo lokacijo ladjedelnice (50 milijonov PLN), prestrukturiranja zaposlovanja (53,4 milijona PLN), kritja prihodnjih izgub iz obstoječih pogodb (840 milijonov PLN) in kritja akumuliranih obveznosti ladjedelnice do ARP in KPS (197,5 milijona PLN) [36].
In total the restructuring costs amount to PLN 1,354 billion.
Stroški za prestrukturiranje skupaj znašajo 1,354 milijarde PLN.
Furthermore, the plan treats the working capital requirements of PLN 227,6 million as part of the restructuring costs.
Načrt obravnava zahteve po obratnih sredstvih v višini 227,6 milijona PLN kot del stroškov za prestrukturiranje.
The Commission considers working capital requirements to be part of the normal operation of a company, and not a restructuring cost, and therefore their financing should be assessed separately.
Komisija meni, da so zahteve po obratnih sredstvih del običajnega delovanja podjetja in ne stroški za prestrukturiranje, zato je treba njihovo financiranje oceniti ločeno.
As regards the own contribution, the plan envisages the following categories: additional payments by shipowners after renegotiation of contracts (PLN 376 million), capital injections by investors (PLN 242 million), revenue from the sale of assets (PLN 118 million) and financing of working capital (a loan and a trade credit from Mostostal in the amount of PLN 170 million).
V zvezi z lastnim prispevkom načrt predvideva naslednje kategorije: dodatna plačila lastnikov ladij po ponovnem izpogajanju pogodb (376 milijonov PLN), dokapitalizacije vlagateljev (242 milijonov PLN), prihodki od prodaje sredstev (118 milijonov PLN) in financiranje obratnih sredstev (posojilo in komercialni kredit Mostostala v znesku 170 milijonov PLN).
As to the financing of working capital requirements, the Commission considers that because of the long production cycles and the high value of the end products in the shipbuilding sector, the financing of working capital is a specific problem.
V zvezi s financiranjem zahtev po obratnih sredstvih Komisija meni, da je zaradi dolgih proizvodnih ciklusov in visoke vrednosti končnih proizvodov v ladjedelniškem sektorju financiranje obratnih sredstev poseben problem.
In shipbuilding, working capital is to a large extent obtained from external sources.
V ladjedelništvu se obratna sredstva pridobivajo večinoma iz zunanjih virov.
Part of working capital is obtained from advance payments from shipowners, typically against a guarantee, which in Poland is most often provided by KUKE.
Del obratnih sredstev se pridobi iz avansov lastnikov ladij, običajno proti garanciji, ki jo na Poljskem najpogosteje zagotovi KUKE.
Because the advance payments do not usually exceed 80 % of the purchase price, shipyards have recourse to bridging loans or trade credit from their suppliers.
Ker avansi običajno ne presežejo 80 % nakupne cene, si ladjedelnice pomagajo s premostitvenimi posojili ali komercialnimi krediti svojih dobaviteljev.
The Commission therefore considers that, owing to the specific situation in the shipbuilding sector, working capital requirements call for a structural solution and are not part of one-off restructuring costs.
Zato Komisija meni, da zaradi posebnih razmer v ladjedelniškem sektorju zahteve po obratnih sredstvih zahtevajo strukturno rešitev in niso del enkratnih stroškov za prestrukturiranje.
Thus, the Commission considers that in shipbuilding sector loans for working capital cannot be considered an own contribution because they serve to finance ongoing operations, not restructuring costs.
Zato Komisija meni, da v ladjedelniškem sektorju posojil za obratna sredstva ni mogoče obravnavati kot lastni prispevek, saj so namenjena financiranju tekočih dejavnosti in ne stroškov za prestrukturiranje.
As explained above, the Commission considers that the additional payments by shipowners after renegotiation of contracts to increase the purchase price cannot be considered an own contribution within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj, Komisija meni, da dodatnih plačil lastnikov ladij po ponovnem izpogajanju pogodb za dvig nakupne cene ni mogoče obravnavati kot lastni prispevek v smislu Smernic.
Sale of assets
Prodaja sredstev
As regards the planned revenue from the sale of redundant assets of an estimated value of PLN 118 million, the Commission considers that it has not been demonstrated that this source of financing can be considered actual and real.
V zvezi z načrtovanim prihodkom od prodaje odvečnih sredstev v ocenjenem znesku 118 milijonov PLN Komisija meni, da ni bilo dokazano, da je ta finančna sredstva mogoče obravnavati kor dejanska in resnična.