natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
FOGASA’s position compared with that of private creditors, including Banesto
Položaj FOGASE v primerjavi z zasebnimi upniki, med njimi z Banestom
The Commission notes that the first debt rescheduling agreement with FOGASA dates from 5 November 1993, that is almost 8 months after the suspension of payments declaration issued by the court of first instance on 25 March 1993 requiring that FOGASA pay SNIACE’s employees.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je bil prvi sporazum o reprogramiranju dolgov s skladom FOGASA sklenjen 5. novembra 1993, torej 8 mesecev po obvestilu o zaustavitvi izplačil, ki ga je prvostopenjski sodnik objavil dne 25. marca 1993, kar je povzročilo, da je bil sklad FOGASA tisti, ki je moral plačati zaposlenim podjetja SNIACE.
At that time, FOGASA linked the agreement to the mortgaging of SNIACE’s assets in order to guarantee at least a part of its loan.
Takrat je sklad FOGASA sporazum navezal na hipoteko delnic SNIACE, da si zagotovi najmanj del kredita.
The rate applied by FOGASA was 10 %, as laid down by the legislation in force when the agreement was concluded.
Obrestna mera sklada FOGASA je bila 10 %, kot je določala veljavna zakonodaja v trenutku podpisa sporazuma.
For its part, Banesto had granted lines of mortgage credit to SNIACE in 1987 and 1991, that is to say some time before the FOGASA I agreement was concluded, at rates of 16 % and 18 % respectively (the market conditions at that time).
Banka Banesto je dva hipotekarna kredita s podjetjem SNIACE sklenila že leta 1987 in 1991, torej precej prej, kot je bil sklenjen sporazum FOGASA I, in sicer prvega po 16-odstotni obrestni meri in drugega po 18-odstotni obrestni meri (po takratnih tržnih pogojih).
Thus, it should be noted that, when the suspension of payments occurred in 1992, SNIACE had at least two creditors: FOGASA, to which it owed the wages that SNIACE had been unable to pay to its employees, and BANESTO, because of the loans that it had granted to SNIACE and which SNIACE had still not entirely repaid.
Tako je torej potrebno upoštevati, da je imelo podjetje SNIACE ob zaustavitvi izplačil leta 1992 najmanj dva upnika: sklad FOGASA, kateremu je dolgovalo plače, ki jih podjetje SNIACE ni moglo izplačati svojim zaposlenim, in BANESTO, za kredite, ki jih je le ta sklenil s podjetjem SNIACE, ki še vedno niso v celoti poplačani.
From the time when the suspension of payments was announced, BANESTO could have asserted its rights as a preferential mortgage creditor of SNIACE.
Od objave obvestila o zaustavitvi izplačil bi lahko BANESTO izvrševal svoje pravice privilegiranega hipotekarnega upnika podjetja SNIACE.
However, only under the agreement of 26 de September 1996, in other words, three years after the FOGASA I agreement was concluded, did SNIACE transfer to Banesto, as payment of part of its debts, the shares that it owned in the undertaking Inquitex and some plots of land that were covered by the mortgage.
Kljub temu je v okviru sporazuma z dne 26. septembra 1996, tri leta po sklenitvi sporazuma FOGASA I, podjetje SNIACE kot del plačila svojih dolgov BANESTO prodalo delnice podjetja Inquitex in nekaterih ozemelj, ki so bila v lasti podjetja in so bila navedena v hipoteki.
For its part, FOGASA was legally obliged to pay the wages in the event of suspension of payments.
Sklad FOGASA je bil po drugi strani zakonsko zavezan, da krije plače v primeru, ko pride do zaustavitve izplačil.
From the time when FOGASA had to pay the wages of the SNIACE workers, it began to negotiate a rescheduling agreement with SNAICE in order to recover its loan.
Od trenutka, ko je sklad FOGASA moral plačati plače zaposlenim v podjetju SNIACE, se je s podjetjem začel pogajati o sporazumu o reprogramiranju dolgov s ciljem, da se vrne dolg.
The fact that BANESTO did not enforce its mortgage loans against SNIACE rather demonstrates that FOGASA acted prudently and wisely when it concluded the rescheduling agreement and obtained guarantees as soon as the suspension of payments was notified, unlike the private creditor BANESTO.
Dejstvo, da BANESTO ni izvršil hipotekarnih kreditov zoper podjetje SNIACE, dokazuje, da je sklad FOGASA postopal preudarno in pametno, ko je sklenil sporazum o reprogramiranju dolgov in pridobil garancijo od objave zaustavitve plačil, kar je nasprotno od tistega, kar je storil zasebni upnik BANESTO.
FOGASA and SNIACE therefore rapidly concluded negotiations that showed the parties’ willingness to arrive at an amicable solution.
Zato sta sklad FOGASA in podjetje SNIACE hitro začela s pogajanji, kjer je dobra volja obeh strani omogočila pogoje za doseganje prijateljske rešitve.
Possibility of recovering in full the sums owed to FOGASA without suffering any financial loss
Možnost vračila vseh dolgov skladu FOGASA brez finančne izgube
After accepting the SNIACE workers’ demand that they should be paid the wages and compensation owed to them pursuant to the judicial proceedings that had declared the suspension of payments, FOGASA concluded a debt rescheduling agreement whereby SNIACE would repay to it the sums involved.
Po odobritvi zahteve zaposlenih v podjetju SNIACE, ki so zahtevali izplačilo plač in odškodnin, ki jim jih je bilo dolžno podjetje zaradi sodnega postopka, v katerem je bila določena zaustavitev izplačil, je sklad FOGASA sklenil sporazum o reprogramiranju dolgov s ciljem, da mu podjetje SNIACE povrne te zneske.
FOGASA applied the legal rate of interest laid down by Spanish law, namely 10 % at the time when the parties concluded the agreement.
Sklad FOGASA je pri tem uporabil zakonito obrestno mero, določeno v španski zakonodaji, to je 10 % v trenutku, ko sta obe strani podpisali sporazum.
The Commission considers that, by granting to SNIACE a rescheduling of its debts, FOGASA applied the principle of the Tubacex judgment, whereby ‘a creditor does not seek to make any special profit on the money which is due to him, but merely wishes to recover in full the sums he has advanced without suffering any financial loss.
Komisija meni, da je pri odobritvi reprogramiranja dolgov sklad FOGASA uporabil načelo sodbe „Tubacex“, v kateri „upnik ne namerava pridobiti izjemnega dobička od posojila, temveč želi le vračilo celotnega zneska, ki ga je posodil, ne da bi pri tem utrpel finančno škodo. V tem smislu zahteva dodatno plačilo obresti takrat, ko odobri odlog plačila posojila, s ciljem, da se mu denar povrne, to dodatno plačilo pa je namenjeno kompenzaciji zaradi devalvacije, ki ga denar utrpi kot posledica odloga plačila.
To that end, where he agrees to the rescheduling of his debt for the purpose of ensuring that it is repaid, he requires the further payment of interest, the purpose of which is to compensate him for depreciation of the money as a result of the rescheduling’ [13].
V tem smislu zahteva dodatno plačilo obresti takrat, ko odobri odlog plačila posojila, s ciljem, da se mu denar povrne, to dodatno plačilo pa je namenjeno kompenzaciji zaradi devalvacije, ki ga denar utrpi kot posledica odloga plačila [13].“.
Prospects of future financial profitability
Možnost finančne sposobnosti v prihodnosti
At the time when the agreement was concluded, FOGASA was aware of the crisis that SNIACE was undergoing, which is why it had intervened on behalf of the workers so that they could be paid the wages and compensation that SNIACE could not pay them because its payments had been suspended.
V obdobju podpisa sporazuma je bil sklad FOGASA seznanjen s krizo podjetja SNIACE, zaradi česar je posredoval v dobro zaposlenih, da bi ti lahko prejeli plačo in odškodnino, ki jih podjetje SNIACE ni moglo plačati, ker se je znašlo v položaju zaustavitve izplačil.
Admittedly, at the material time the only genuine viability plan for SNIACE proposed to FOGASA was to reschedule the debts.
Res je, da je bilo v danem trenutku reprogramiranje dolgov edini možen načrt za podjetje SNIACE, ki ga je prejel sklad FOGASA.
However, after the serious social conflict that the undertaking experienced in 1992, its activity gradually revived, offering a glimpse of the prospect of future profitability, although the situation of the undertaking was still fragile.
Kljub temu pa je po velikem sporu v podjetju, do katerega je prišlo leta 1992, dejavnost podjetja počasi napredovala, zaradi česar je bilo mogoče videti nekaj možnosti za ustvarjanje dobička v prihodnosti, čeprav je bil položaj podjetja še vedno nestabilen.
The absence of an agreement with the private creditors and the fact that they had not enforced payment of the debts since 1993 shows that there was some basis for thinking that the undertaking was on the right track and that, therefore, it was not advisable to increase the risk that the undertaking would cease activities.
Dejstvo, da ni bilo sklenjenih sporazumov z zasebnimi upniki, kot tudi to, da ti niso bili prisiljeni terjati dolgov od leta 1993, dokazuje, da so bile napovedi o tem, da se bo podjetje ustalilo, upravičene, in da posledično ne bi bilo ustrezno povečevati možnosti, da podjetje preneha delovati.
Conclusion on the FOGASA I agreement
Sklep glede podpisa sporazuma FOGASA I
The Commission considers that, at the time when it was concluded, the FOGASA I agreement did not constitute State Aid.
Komisija meni, da v trenutku podpisa sporazum FOGASA I ni vključeval državne pomoči.
Analysis of the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement
Analiza izvršitve sporazuma FOGASA I
Between 5 November 1993 and 18 March 1999, the date on which FOGASA concluded a new rescheduling agreement extending the debt payment period for a further two years, SNIACE had only repaid about 50 % of its debt.
Med 5. novembrom 1993 in 18. marcem 1999, datumom, ko je sklad FOGASA sklenil nov sporazum o reprogramiranju, s katerim se je za dve leti podaljšal rok plačila dolgov, je podjetje SNIACE vrnilo le približno 50 % celotnega dolga.
Position of the public creditors compared with that of the private creditors
Položaj javnih upnikov v primerjavi z zasebnimi upniki;
Rather than enforce the guarantees and mortgages established in its favour at the time of the 1993 agreement, FOGASA preferred to amend the rescheduling agreement in order to maximise the prospects of recovering its loans.
Pred izvršitvijo garancij in hipotek, ki so bile predložene v okviru sporazuma iz leta 1993, je sklad FOGASA želel spremeniti sporazum o reprogramiranju s ciljem, da kar najbolj poveča možnosti vračila dolga.
On the other hand, the Commission notes that on 26 September 1996, Banesto accepted, as part-payment of SNIACE’s debt, some plots of land owned by that undertaking, as well as shares that SNIACE owned in the undertaking Inquitex.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je 26. septembra 1996 Banesto kot del dolga podjetja SNIACE prejel ozemlje, ki je bilo last tega podjetja, kot tudi delnice, ki jih je imelo podjetje SNIACE od podjetja Inquitex.
The Commission considers that FOGASA’s behaviour is not comparable to that of BANESTO, which tried to protect a part of its loan by concluding the 1996 agreement, unlike FOGASA, which in no way tried to recover its loan under the agreement concluded with SNIACE.
Komisija je menila, da ravnanje sklada FOGASA ni primerljivo z ravnanjem banke BANESTO, ki je skušal zaščititi del kredita s sporazumom iz leta 1996 v nasprotju s skladom FOGASA, ki je skušal zavarovati svoj kredit na kakršen koli način v okviru sklenjenega sporazuma s podjetjem SNIACE.
The Commission points out that, at the time when the agreement was renegotiated, FOGASA did not require additional payment of interest as the total amount payable was the same, although the final date was delayed by two years [14].
Komisija navaja, da v trenutku ponovnega sklepanja sporazuma sklad FOGASA ni zahteval dodatnega plačila obresti, saj je bila celotna vrednost za plačilo enaka prejšnji, čeprav se je rok plačila prestavil za dve leti [14].
Consequently, the Commission considers that Spain’s argument [15] that it wanted to protect its investment from monetary depreciation must be rejected.
Zato Komisija meni, da je potrebno zavrniti utemeljitev Španije [15], da je želel zaščititi svojo kapital pred denarno devalvacijo.
Prospects of future profitability
Možnost ustvarjanja dobička v prihodnosti
The Commission has established, in the light of Table 3 below, that at the time when the agreement of 18 March 1999 amending the agreement of 5 November 1993 was concluded, the undertaking was faced with increasing debts, recurring losses and negative equity capital, which raised doubts concerning the prospects of recovering the loan:
Komisija skladno s sliko 3, ki je predstavljena v nadaljevanju, potrjuje, da se je podjetje v trenutku podpisa sporazuma z dne 18. marca 1999, s katerim se je spremenil sporazum z dne 5. novembra 1993, soočalo z naraščanjem dolgov, ponovnimi izgubami in negativnim stanjem, kar je povzročilo dvome o možnosti vračila dolgov:
Total debts
Skupni dolg
Although it is true that the undertaking had modestly positive results in 1995, it must be recognised that its financial situation indicated that its prospects of profitability were uncertain.
Četudi je res, da je imelo podjetje rahlo pozitivne rezultate v letu 1995, je potrebno priznati, da je finančno stanje podjetja nakazovalo, da so možnosti za ustvarjanje dobička negotove.
Conclusion on the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement
Sklep o izvršitvi sporazuma FOGASA I
The Commission has arrived at the conclusion that FOGASA did not behave as a private creditor would have done:
Komisija je prišla do sklepa, da sklad FOGASA ni ravnal kot zasebni upnik:
by not trying to obtain as partial payment of the debt certain assets over which it had acquired rights upon the conclusion of the 1993 agreement;
ker ni skušal kot delnega vračila dolgov pridobiti določenih delnic, nad katerimi je pridobil pravico v sporazumu iz leta 1993;
owing to the uncertain prospects of profitability caused by the continued deterioration of the financial situation;
zaradi negotovih možnosti za ustvarjanje dobička, ker se je finančno stanje podjetja nenehno slabšalo;
by not requiring the additional payment of interest when the 1999 rescheduling agreement was negotiated or not applying default interest to the unpaid sums in accordance with the agreement.
ker ni zahteval dodatnega plačila obresti pri pogajanjih o sporazumu o reprogramiranju iz leta 1999 ali ker podeljenemu znesku skladno s sporazumom ni prištel zamudnih obresti.
FOGASA II agreement
Sporazum FOGASA II
SNIACE and FOGASA concluded a second debt rescheduling agreement on 31 October 1995 for the amount of ESP 339459878 (including interest).
Podjetje SNIACE in sklad FOGASA sta sklenila drugi sporazum o reprogramiranju dolgov dne 31. oktobra 1995 v znesku 339459878 pezet (skupaj z obrestmi).
That agreement was concluded after FOGASA had again paid the wages and compensation that SNIACE owed to its staff.
Sporazum je bil podpisan potem, ko je sklad FOGASA ponovno kril stroške plač in odškodnin, ki jih je podjetje SNIACE dolgovalo svojim zaposlenim.
Situation of the public creditors compared with that of the private creditors
Položaj javnih upnikov v primerjavi z zasebnimi upniki
As with the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement, the Commission considers that FOGASA’s behaviour is not comparable to that of BANESTO, which sought to protect a part of its loan by concluding the 1996 agreement, whereas FOGASA, which had only recovered a part of the debts that were covered by the 1993 agreement, concluded a new agreement in 1995 relating to new debts.
Enako kot pri izvršitvi sporazuma FOGASA I Komisija meni, da ravnanje sklada FOGASA ni primerljivo z ravnanjem BANESTO, organizacije, ki je s podpisom sporazuma leta 1996 skušala zaščititi del svojega kredita, medtem ko je sklad FOGASA, kateremu je bil povrnjen le del dolga na podlagi sporazuma iz leta 1993, sklenil nov sporazum leta 1995, katerega predmet so bili novi dolgovi.
That new agreement was concluded despite the fact that:
Novi sporazum je bil podpisan kljub temu, da:
the agreement of 5 November 1993 had not been complied with in full;
sporazum z dne 5. novembra 1993 ni bil v celoti spoštovan;
it related to new debts contracted with FOGASA, which, once again, had satisfied the demands of SNIACE workers concerning the payment of their wages; and
so bili predmet sporazuma novi dolgovi, preneseni na sklad FOGASA, ki je še enkrat ugodil zahtevam zaposlenih v podjetju SNIACE v zvezi s plačilom njihovih plač, in
the financial fragility of SNIACE, which was an undertaking in crisis as a result of repeated losses incurred over many years, negative equity capital and its substantial debt as shown in the table contained in recital (59), was well-known.
je bila poznana finančna nestabilnost podjetja SNIACE, ki je bilo podjetje v težavah zaradi nenehnih izgub, ki jih je podjetje utrpelo v nekaj letih, zaradi lastnega negativnega stanja in njihovih dolgov, kot je prikazano v tabeli v uvodni izjavi 59.
Moreover, it is clear that FOGASA did not contemplate the possibility of enforcing repayment of the debt by enforcing the mortgage established in its favour.
Poleg tega je očitno, da sklad FOGASA ni razmišljal o možnosti prisilne izterjave dolga z realizacijo hipoteke, ki je bila podlaga za sporazum.
Admittedly, enforced repayment could have resulted in the closure of the undertaking, but there is no doubt that, if SNIACE had been liquidated, FOGASA could have recovered all or part of the debt after the undertaking’s assets were transferred.
Res je, da bi prisilna izterjava dolga lahko povzročila zaprtje podjetja, vendar ni dvoma, da bi sklad FOGASA lahko v okviru likvidacije podjetja SNIACE v celoti izterjal dolg ali del dolga z zasego delnic podjetja.
On this point, the Commission notes that the Spanish authorities have repeatedly maintained that it was impossible to estimate the value of the undertaking, which would have made it possible to calculate the amount that could be recovered, and that, in any case, in the event of liquidation, the value of the undertaking’s assets could have depreciated significantly [16].
Glede na to posebnost, Komisija ugotavlja, da so španske oblasti večkrat odgovorile, da ni mogoče oceniti vrednosti podjetja, na podlagi katere bi bilo možno izračunati višino sredstev, ki jih je potrebno investirati za obnovo, in da bi v primeru likvidacije vrednost delnic podjetja lahko utrpela veliko devalvacijo [16].
Clearly, for that reason, FOGASA discarded the possibility of liquidating SNIACE in favour of the rescheduling solution.
Jasno je, da je sklad FOGASA zaradi tega izključil možnost likvidacije podjetja SNIACE in podprla rešitev z reprogramiranjem.
The Spanish authorities added in their reply of 29 September 2005 that ‘if, at any time, [FOGASA] had refused to enter into a recovery agreement without justifying that refusal, it would have been infringing the legislation binding on the organisation and would have been acting arbitrarily.’ The Commission infers from the Spanish authorities’ statement that FOGASA did not try to justify possible rejection of debt rescheduling.
Španske oblasti so v odgovoru dne 29. septembra 2005 dodale, da „če sklad FOGASA v danem položaju ne bi pristal na podpis sporazuma o obnovi, ne da bi utemeljil zavrnitev, bi s tem kršil veljavno zakonodajo, ki se nanaša na ta organ in bi deloval samovoljno.“ Komisija iz izjave španskih oblasti sklepa, da sklad FOGASA ni skušal upravičiti možne zavrnitve reprogramiranja dolgov.
For the Spanish authorities, the mere fact of trying to recover the debt in full, including through the closure of SNIACE, is insufficient [17].
Za španske oblasti tudi samo dejstvo, da upnik skuša pridobiti celoten dolg, celo z zaprtjem podjetja SNIACE, ni zadostno [17].
Conclusion on the FOGASA II agreement
Sklep o sporazumu FOGASA II
by not requiring payment of the debts that were covered by the 1993 agreement in accordance with the schedule laid down in that agreement;
ker ni zahteval plačila dolga, ki je bil predmet sporazuma iz leta 1993 skladno z načrtom, določenim v sporazumu;
by accepting the conclusion of an agreement relating to new debts.
ker je privolil v podpis drugega sporazuma, katerega predmet so bili novi dolgovi.
THE TGSS AGREEMENT
SPORAZUM TGSS
The Commission therefore considers that these agreements amounted to a single agreement that was amended a number of times.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da gre za en sporazum z več spremembami.
At the time when the first agreement was concluded between the TGSS and SNIACE, on 8 March 1996, and the time when it was first amended, on 7 May 1996, the private creditors had still not reached an agreement.
Z dnem, ko je prišlo do podpisa prvega sporazuma, 8. marca 1996, kot tudi z dnem, ko je prišlo do prve spremembe tega sporazuma 7. maja 1996, zasebni upniki še vedno niso prišli do dogovora.
Only when the agreement was amended for the second time, that is on 30 September 1997, could the TGSS’s position be compared with that of the private creditors.
Šele, ko je prišlo do druge spremembe sporazuma, torej 30. septembra 1997, je možno položaj TGSS primerjati s položajem zasebnih upnikov.
It may be conceded, at that stage, that the TGSS went further than the private creditors by concluding an agreement to maximise the prospects of recovering their loans.
V tej fazi lahko priznamo, da je šel TGSS dlje od zasebnih upnikov s tem, ko je podpisal sporazum s ciljem, da si kar najbolj poveča možnosti za vračilo kredita.
Possibility of recovering in full the sums owed to the TGSS without suffering any financial loss
Možnost vračila vseh dolgov TGSS brez finančne izgube
Under Spanish legislation, the TGSS may conclude debt rescheduling agreements provided that it applies the legal interest rate in force when the agreement is concluded.
Skladno s špansko zakonodajo lahko TGSS podpiše sporazum o reprogramiranju dolgov vedno, ko uporablja zakonito obrestno mero, ki je veljavna na dan podpisa sporazuma.
In this way, the TGSS tried to protect its loans without suffering financial losses, following the Tubacex judgment.
Na ta način je skušal TGSS zaščititi svoje kredite, ne da bi utrpel finančno škodo in sledil sodbi „Tubacex“.
Prospects of profitability of the undertaking
Možnosti ustvarjanja dobička v podjetju
At the time when that agreement was concluded, as has already been stated in recital (63(iii)), SNIACE was an undertaking in crisis as a result of repeated losses incurred over several years, negative equity capital and its substantial debt.
Z dnem podpisa tega sporazuma, kot je že bilo omenjeno v uvodni izjavi 63(iii), je bilo podjetje SNIACE v težavah zaradi nenehnih izgub, ki jih je podjetje utrpelo v nekaj letih, zaradi lastnega negativnega stanja in visokega zneska dolgov.
Instead, the Spanish authorities stated in their reply of 10 September 2008 that they did not have those documents.
Nasprotno so španske oblasti v dopisu z dne 10. septembra 2008 zatrdile, da s temi dokumenti ne razpolagajo.
It is clear, then, that the TGSS knew SNIACE’s financial situation, in particular, its failure to fulfil its commitments towards FOGASA.
Iz tega je torej razvidno, da je bila TGSS seznanjena s finančnim stanjem podjetja SNIACE, zlasti v zvezi z neizpolnjevanjem obveznosti in sporazuma s skladom FOGASA.
As the agreement was concluded in 1996, the TGSS could have verified from the undertaking’s accounting documents that SNIACE had only partially honoured the agreement of 1993 and that, moreover, it had concluded a new agreement with FOGASA in 1995 (that is to say, approximately 6 months before the agreement with the TGSS), which related to new debts.
Glede na to, da je bil sporazum podpisan leta 1996, bi lahko TGSS na podlagi računovodskih listin podjetja preverila, da je podjetje SNIACE le delno spoštovalo sporazum iz leta 1993 in da je poleg tega podpisalo s skladom FOGASA novi sporazum leta 1995 (torej približno 6 mesecev pred sporazumom s TGSS), katerega predmet so bili novi dolgovi.
Conclusion on the agreement with the TGSS
Sklep o sporazumu s TGSS
The Commission has arrived at the conclusion that the TGSS did not act as a private creditor would have done:
Komisija je prišla do sklepa, da TGSS ni ravnal kot bi ravnal zasebni upnik: