natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This demonstrates that the PPAs were concluded by PSE not for commercial purposes but, as acknowledged by the Polish authorities themselves, in order to implement a number of important policy objectives.
Iz tega je razvidno, da PSE ni sklenil pogodb PNE s komercialnim namenom, ampak da bi uresničil več pomembnih ciljev politike, kot potrjujejo poljski organi sami.
The state's control over the award of PPAs is evidenced in the fact that the invitations to submit tenders were sent to participants by the Polish Ministry of Industry and Trade.
Nadzor države nad dodeljevanjem pogodb PNE dokazuje dejstvo, da je povabilo k oddaji ponudbe udeležencem poslalo poljsko Ministrstvo za industrijo in trgovino.
Moreover, under the Polish Commercial Code, the Minister of the Treasury has the full authority of the General Assembly of Shareholders.
Poleg tega ima v skladu s poljskim trgovinskim zakonikom minister za finance polno pooblastilo generalne skupščine delničarjev.
The core principle underpinning the prices provided for in the PPAs was that they should cover investment and operating costs and ensure a certain profit margin.
Bistveno načelo, na katerem temeljijo cene, predvidene v pogodbah PNE, je bilo to, da morajo pokriti stroške naložb in poslovanja ter zagotoviti določeno stopnjo dobička.
This framework is designed to ensure the necessary investments and also reflects a decision by the state authorities implemented via PSE.
Ta okvir je zasnovan za zagotavljanje potrebnih naložb, izraža pa tudi odločitev državnih organov, ki se uresničuje prek PSE.
In the light of the above assessment, the Commission considers that the above elements constitute a set of indicators which, according to the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in the Stardust judgment, lead to the conclusion that the use of PSE's funds in the PPAs is imputable to the state and that therefore, in view of the arguments set out, the PPAs should be considered, for the purposes of the assessment, as being financed from state resources.
Glede na zgornjo oceno Komisija meni, da navedeni elementi tvorijo niz kazalnikov, ki v skladu z merili, določenimi v sodbi Sodišča Stardust, vodijo do sklepa, da se uporaba sredstev PSE pri pogodbah PNE lahko pripiše državi, in da je treba torej glede na navedene argumente pogodbe PNE za namen ocenjevanja obravnavati, kot da se financirajo iz državnih sredstev.
It seems clear to the Commission that the state was involved in concluding the PPAs and in defining the basic rules governing these agreements.
Komisiji se zdi jasno, da je bila država vpletena v sklepanje pogodb PNE in opredelitev osnovnih pravil, ki urejajo te pogodbe.
The legal form of a PPA is a contract concluded between two parties: PSE and the power generators.
Pogodbe PNE so po pravni obliki pogodbe, sklenjene med dvema strankama: PSE in proizvajalci energije.
As explained in recital 172, PSE is a fully state-owned company.
Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 172, je PSE družba v popolni državni lasti.
To determine whether the PPAs provide an economic advantage to power generators, the Commission must assess whether, via the PPAs, generators obtain economic advantages that they would not obtain from the market.
Da bi Komisija ugotovila, ali pogodbe PNE proizvajalcem energije zagotavljajo gospodarsko prednost, mora oceniti, ali proizvajalci s pogodbami PNE pridobijo gospodarsko prednost, ki je ne bi mogli pridobiti na trgu.
PPAs provide eligible generators with an advantage if the parties to these agreements are placed in a better economic position than other companies.
Pogodbe PNE zagotavljajo upravičenim proizvajalcem prednost, če imajo stranke teh pogodb boljši gospodarski položaj kot druge družbe.
Even though the details of individual PPAs may vary, all PPAs are structured around a core invariable principle: the mandatory purchase by PSE of most (sometimes all) of the electricity generated by the companies concerned, at a price reviewed periodically in accordance with the principle that the total costs (fixed and variable) of generating electricity, plus a profit margin, are passed on to the consumer.
Čeprav se lahko podrobnosti posameznih pogodb PNE razlikujejo, vse temeljijo na bistvenem nespremenljivem načelu: PSE mora obvezno odkupiti del električne energije (včasih vso), ki jo proizvedejo zadevne družbe, po ceni, ki se občasno preverja po načelu, da se celotni stroški (stalni in spremenljivi) proizvodnje energije plus stopnja dobička prenesejo na odjemalca.
The Polish electricity regulator, URE, indirectly retains the right to check whether the costs charged to PSE are justified and reasonable, but in practice URE uses this power only to check that the costs were actually linked to electricity generation.
Poljski regulativni organ za področje električne energije, URE, posredno ohrani pravico, da preveri, ali so stroški, ki se zaračunajo PSE, upravičeni in ustrezni, vendar v praksi URE to pravico uporablja samo za preverjanje, ali so bili stroški dejansko povezani s proizvodnjo električne energije.
Furthermore, URE's checks are only indirect since their purpose is to verify the cost structure of PSE with a view to defining PSE's income from captive customers.
Poleg tega je preverjanje, ki ga opravlja URE, samo posredno, ker je njegov namen preveriti stroškovno strukturo PSE, da bi se tako opredelil prihodek PSE od vezanih odjemalcev.
In the unlikely circumstance of some of the PPA-related costs charged to PSE being deemed unjustified by URE, it can only prohibit PSE from passing these costs on to its captive customers.
V malo verjetnih okoliščinah, v katerih bi URE menil, da je del stroškov v zvezi s pogodbami PNE, ki so bili zaračunani PSE, neupravičen, lahko le prepove PSE, da bi te stroške prenesel na vezane odjemalce.
This might make it more difficult for PSE to discharge its obligations under the PPAs, but it would not mean they had been legally annulled.
Zaradi tega bi PSE morda težje izpolnjeval svoje obveznosti v skladu s pogodbami PNE, vendar pa to ne bi pomenilo, da so bile pravno razveljavljene.
The core principle described above is applied for the whole duration of the PPA, which lasts from 7 years to 20 years from the beginning of operation of the plants, i.e. from 10 to 31 years following the conclusion of the PPAs and, in the majority of cases, more than 15 years.
Bistveno načelo, opisano zgoraj, se uporablja v celotnem obdobju veljavnosti pogodbe PNE, ki traja od 7 do 20 let od začetka delovanja elektrarn, torej od 10 do 31 let po sklenitvi pogodb PNE, in v večini primerov več kot 15 let.
This means that, during this period, the commercial risk associated with operating the power plants is borne by the buyer of the electricity, i.e. PSE.
To pomeni, da v tem obdobju poslovno tveganje, povezano z delovanjem elektrarn, prevzame kupec električne energije, torej PSE.
This includes the risk associated with fluctuations in electricity generation costs and, in particular, fuel costs, the risk associated with fluctuations in end-user electricity prices, and the risk associated with fluctuation in end-user electricity demand.
To vključuje tveganje, povezano z nihanjem stroškov proizvodnje električne energije in zlasti stroškov goriva, tveganje, povezano z nihanjem cen električne energije na ravni končnega odjemalca, in tveganje, povezano z nihanjem povpraševanja po električni energiji na ravni končnega odjemalca.
These are the typical risks that any power generator without a PPA would bear itself.
To so značilna tveganja, ki bi jih vsak proizvajalec energije brez pogodbe PNE prevzel sam.
This means that power plants which have concluded PPAs (provided that they are properly managed from a technical perspective) have guaranteed profits extending over a very significant period equivalent to the typical expected lifetime of the assets concerned or their depreciation.
To pomeni, da imajo elektrarne, ki so sklenile pogodbe PNE (če se ustrezno upravljajo s tehničnega vidika), zagotovljen dobiček v precej dolgem obdobju, enakovrednem značilni pričakovani življenjski dobi zadevnih naložb ali njihovi amortizaciji.
The longer the period is, the greater the value of the guarantee, since it protects against a risk whose occurrence is increasingly unpredictable.
Daljše je to obdobje, večja je vrednost jamstva, saj ščiti pred tveganjem, katerega pojav je vedno bolj nepredvidljiv.
The Commission considers that this guarantee, which is the core of the PPAs, places the beneficiaries in a better economic situation than other companies on the market and therefore provides an advantage to the relevant power plants.
Komisija meni, da so zaradi tega jamstva, ki je bistvo pogodb PNE, upravičenci v ugodnejšem gospodarskem položaju kot druge družbe na trgu, torej zadevnim elektrarnam zagotavlja prednost.
According to both the Polish authorities and the interested parties, the banks required the PPAs to be signed as a precondition for awarding loans to finance the assets.
Po trditvah poljskih organov in zainteresiranih strank so banke zahtevale podpis pogodb PNE kot predpogoj za dodelitev posojila za financiranje naložb.
The financial institutions' agreement to finance the investments was therefore contingent on the PPA.
Soglasje finančnih institucij, da bodo financirale naložbe, je bilo torej odvisno od pogodb PNE.
It follows from the above considerations that PPAs are not a traditional form of guarantee but simply provide for payment by the State-owned and State-controlled PSE of the investment costs and the most important (if not all) operating costs of the power plants which are parties to the agreements.
Iz navedenih preudarkov sledi, da pogodbe PNE niso tradicionalna oblika jamstva, ampak samo določajo, da PSE, ki je v lasti države in pod njenim nadzorom, plača stroške naložbe in najpomembnejše (če ne celotne) stroške poslovanja elektrarn, ki so stranke teh pogodb.
In practice, this ‘guarantee’ means that, over more or less the full depreciation period or planned lifetime of the plant, and irrespective of any changes in the conditions obtaining on the market, PSE buys a fixed quantity of electricity at a price that must ensure the power plant's viability.
V praksi to „jamstvo“ pomeni, da PSE v več ali manj celotni amortizacijski dobi ali načrtovani življenjski dobi elektrarne in ne glede na kakršne koli spremembe pogojev, ki prevladujejo na trgu, odkupi določeno količino električne energije po ceni, ki mora zagotoviti sposobnost preživetja elektrarn.
With a view to determining whether an advantage exists, the Commission analyses several other aspects in the following paragraphs.
Da bi ugotovila, ali prednost obstaja, Komisija v naslednjih odstavkih analizira več drugih vidikov.
First, the Commission notes that in Poland PPAs were concluded only with selected power generators.
Komisija najprej ugotavlja, da so bile pogodbe PNE na Poljskem sklenjene samo z izbranimi proizvajalci energije.
At the time they were concluded, there were other electricity generators that did not benefit from the PPA rules.
Ob njihovi sklenitvi so obstajali drugi proizvajalci električne energije, ki niso imeli koristi od pravil pogodb PNE.
More were set up in later years, and new investments are currently under way without PPA support.
V naslednjih letih je bilo ustanovljenih še več takih proizvajalcev in trenutno se izvajajo nove naložbe brez podpore pogodb PNE.
In the first years of the PPAs, power generators without a PPA could sell their electricity at prices controlled by the State via URE.
V prvih letih pogodb PNE so lahko proizvajalci energije brez pogodb PNE prodajali svojo električno energijo po cenah, ki jih je nadzorovala država prek URE.
On 28 June 2001 a start was made on eliminating this mechanism and these power generators started selling their electricity at free, market-based prices.
junija 2001 se je začelo odpravljanje tega mehanizma in ti proizvajalci energije so začeli prodajati svojo električno energijo po prostih, tržnih cenah.
As the interested parties have indicated, none of these mechanisms (price controlled by the state or free, market-based price) enabled generators without PPAs to cover all their costs.
Po navedbah zainteresiranih strank proizvajalcem brez pogodb PNE nobeden od teh mehanizmov (cene, ki jih nadzoruje država, ali proste tržne cene) ni omogočil kritja vseh njihovih stroškov.
They sell their electricity at a price corresponding to marginal costs, i.e. a price which only ensures that their variable costs are covered.
Ti svojo električno energijo prodajajo po ceni, ki ustreza mejnim stroškom, torej po ceni, ki zagotavlja samo kritje njihovih spremenljivih stroškov.
The interested parties have suggested that electricity produced by power generators without PPAs is not as environmentally friendly as electricity generated by beneficiaries of PPAs, and that this would justify the former receiving a lower price for their electricity.
Zainteresirane stranke so navedle, da električna energija, ki jo proizvedejo proizvajalci brez pogodb PNE, ni tako okolju prijazna kot tista, ki jo proizvedejo upravičenci do pogodb PNE, in da naj bi zaradi tega proizvajalci brez pogodb PNE utemeljeno prejemali nižje cene za svojo električno energijo.
First, it is not certain that all power plants without PPAs generate ‘dirty’ electricity.
Prvič, ni zagotovo res, da vse elektrarne brez pogodb PNE proizvajajo „umazano“ električno energijo.
The newest plants in Poland (without PPAs) produce electricity using state-of-the-art technology.
Najnovejše elektrarne na Poljskem (brez pogodb PNE) proizvajajo električno energijo z uporabo najsodobnejše tehnologije.
In addition, there is no economic reason why less environmentally friendly electricity would have a lower market value than more environmentally friendly electricity.
Poleg tega ni nobenega ekonomskega razloga, zaradi katerega bi imela okolju manj prijazna električna energija nižjo tržno vrednost od okolju prijaznejše električne energije.
The electricity produced is completely substitutable (it is not even possible to distinguish physically between the two types), and its value for the customer is exactly the same.
Proizvedena električna energija je v celoti zamenljiva (med obema vrstama sploh ni mogoče ugotoviti fizične razlike) in njena vrednost za odjemalca je čisto enaka.
In 2004, the average price on the market fluctuated around 115 PLN/MWh; in 2005 around 115-120 PLN/MWh; in 2006 it was rather stable at around 125 and in 2007 (to 31 July 2007) it fluctuated between 110 and 122 PLN/MWh.
Leta 2004 se je povprečna cena na trgu gibala okrog 115 PLN/MWh; leta 2005 okrog 115–120 PLN/MWh; leta 2006 je bila precej stabilna okrog 125, v letu 2007 (do 31. julija 2007) pa je nihala med 110 in 122 PLN/MWh.
By way of comparison, the information provided by Poland allowed the Commission to estimate the full costs incurred in 2005 by the power plants entitled to compensation under the Act as follows:
Komisija je lahko s primerjavo informacij, ki jih je predložila Poljska, izračunala celotne stroške, ki so jih leta 2005 imele elektrarne, upravičene do nadomestila v skladu z Zakonom:
Estimated total costs of generating electricity in power plants which concluded PPAs in 2005
Ocenjeni celotni stroški proizvodnje električne energije v elektrarnah, ki so sklenila pogodbe PNE, v letu 2005
Commission estimates based on data provided by Poland.
Izračuni Komisije na podlagi podatkov, ki jih je predložila Poljska.
For Pątnów II, the value is for 2008, the first year in which the plant should be operational.
Vrednost za Pątnów II je za leto 2008, ki naj bi bilo prvo leto delovanja te elektrarne.
Average generation costs in 2005 (PLN/MWh)
Povprečni proizvodni stroški v letu 2005 (PLN/MWh)
Average price on the Polish Power Exchange
Povprečna cena na poljski borzi električne energije
The figures in Table 5 above show how unlikely it is that market prices — i.e. the price that generators without PPAs are paid for their electricity on the market — would suffice to provide the same type of profit guarantee as the one PPAs offer.
Številke v preglednici 5 kažejo, kako malo verjetno je, da bi tržne cene – torej cene, ki jih proizvajalci električne energije brez pogodb PNE zaračunajo za svojo električno energijo na trgu – zadoščale za zagotavljanje enake vrste jamstva za dobiček, kot ga zagotavljajo pogodbe PNE.
The example of the Polish Power Exchange is not an isolated one.
Primer poljske borze električne energije ni edini.
Other Member States have also liberalised their electricity markets and established power exchanges in which buyers and sellers trade electricity under market conditions.
Druge države članice so prav tako liberalizirale svoje trge električne energije in vzpostavile borze električne energije, na katerih prodajalci in kupci trgujejo z električno energijo pod tržnimi pogoji.
In its Sector Enquiry on electricity markets in Europe, the Commission examined in detail the conditions governing trade in electricity in European wholesale markets.
Komisija je v svoji preiskavi sektorja trgov električne energije v Evropi podrobno proučila pogoje, ki urejajo trgovino z električno energijo na evropskih trgih na debelo.
The data gathered as part of this enquiry shows that no liberalised market provides a guarantee to generators that they will cover all their costs in the long-term.
Podatki, zbrani v tej preiskavi, kažejo, da noben liberaliziran trg proizvajalcem energije ne zagotavlja jamstva za dolgoročno pokritje vseh njihovih stroškov.
As a matter of fact, most transactions take place within a horizon of three years.
Pravzaprav večina poslov poteka v okviru treh let.
Trade in electricity on power exchanges is always based on marginal pricing, which guarantees only that short-run marginal costs are covered.
Trgovina z električno energijo na borzah električne energije vedno temelji na oblikovanju cene po mejnih stroških, ki zagotavlja samo kritje kratkoročnih mejnih stroškov.
Furthermore, the time horizon for contracts on these markets is shorter than for PPAs.
Poleg tega je trajanje pogodb na teh trgih krajše kot pri pogodbah PNE.
For instance, at present the longest contracts have been concluded for: four years in NordPool (Scandinavian countries), three years in Powernext (France), five years in UKPX (United Kingdom) and six years in EEX (Germany).
Na primer, pogodbe, ki so trenutno najdaljše, so bile sklenjene za: štiri leta na borzi NordPool (skandinavske države), tri leta na borzi Powernext (Francija), pet let na borzi UKPX (Združeno kraljestvo) in šest let na borzi EEX (Nemčija).
On some exchanges, like OMEL in Spain, no forward contracts are concluded.
Na nekaterih borzah, kot je OMEL v Španiji, ni sklenjenih terminskih pogodb.
Since 1 April 2006 no forward contracts have been concluded on the Polish Power Exchange either.
Od 1. aprila 2006 tudi na poljski borzi električne energije ni bila sklenjena nobena terminska pogodba.
In liberalised markets, electricity can also be traded via bilateral contracts (over the counter’ or OTC market).
Na liberaliziranih trgih lahko trgovina z električno energijo poteka tudi po dvostranskih pogodbah („prek okenc“ ali na prostem trgu).
An energy enquiry showed that, because of the possibility of arbitrage between power exchanges and bilateral contracts, trading conditions (in particular price and duration of contracts) on the OTC market are similar to those prevailing on power exchanges.
Preiskava sektorja energije je pokazala, da so zaradi možnosti arbitraže med borzami električne energije in dvostranskimi pogodbami trgovinski pogoji (zlasti cena in trajanje pogodb) na prostem trgu podobni tistim, ki prevladujejo na borzah električne energije.
In the PPAs, PSE undertook to purchase a fixed minimum volume of electricity from power generators at a price covering their full costs until 2007 for the shortest PPAs and until 2027 for the longest ones.
V pogodbah PNE se je PSE zavezal, da bo od proizvajalcev energije odkupil določeno najmanjšo količino električne energije po ceni, ki pokriva njihove celotne stroške, in sicer do leta 2007 v najkrajših pogodbah PNE in do leta 2027 v najdaljših pogodbah PNE.
This decision was imposed on PSE by the Polish Government.
To odločitev je PSE naložila poljska vlada.
As ELCHO indicates in its comments, ‘the Polish Minister for Trade and Industry implemented the policy objectives of ensuring security of supply and improving environmental standards of power generation through PSE.’
ELCHO v svojih pripombah navaja: „Poljski minister za trgovino in industrijo je uresničeval cilje politike zagotavljanja zanesljivosti oskrbe in izboljševanja okoljskih standardov pri proizvodnji energije prek PSE“.
The very fact that the Polish Government had to decide in PSE's place that new investments would take place and would benefit from PPAs clearly shows that this decision was mainly based on criteria other than market investor considerations.
Samo dejstvo, da se je morala poljska vlada namesto PSE odločiti, da bodo opravljene nove naložbe, ki jim bodo koristile pogodbe PNE, jasno kaže, da je ta odločitev temeljila na merilih, ki niso razlogi tržnega vlagatelja.
There are two main reasons why PSE would not have had an economic interest in taking this decision without government intervention.
Razloga, da PSE ne bi imela ekonomskega interesa za sprejetje te odločitve brez vladne intervencije, sta dva.
First, PSE purchased a quantity of energy that it already knew might be surplus to its requirements.
Prvič, PSE je kupil količino energije, za katero je že vedel, da bi lahko presegla njegove potrebe.
By awarding the PPAs, PSE undertook to purchase a fixed and significant quantity of electricity (around 50 % of Polish electricity production in 2005, and up to 70 % in the period in question).
Z dodelitvijo pogodb PNE se je PSE zavezal, da odkupil določeno in precejšnjo količino električne energije (približno 50 % poljske proizvodnje električne energije v letu 2005 in do 70 % v zadevnem obdobju).
At the very beginning (the first few years of the PPAs) PSE was the only supplier in the Polish electricity system, so it could sell all this electricity to its end users.
Najprej (prvih nekaj let trajanja pogodb PNE) je bil PSE edini dobavitelj v poljskem elektroenergetskem sistemu, zato je lahko prodal vso to električno energijo svojim končnim odjemalcem.
However, from the very outset, it was clear that PSE would soon cease to be the sole electricity supplier in Poland.
Vendar pa je bilo že od začetka jasno, da PSE kmalu ne bo več edini dobavitelj električne energije na Poljskem.
In particular, during the pre-accession process, in December 1991, the Polish government had signed the Europe Agreement which constituted an association partnership between the EC and the Republic of Poland.
Poljska vlada je v predpristopnem procesu decembra 1991 podpisala Evropski sporazum, ki je vzpostavil pridruženo partnerstvo med ES in Republiko Poljsko.
Later, in 1994, Poland lodged its official application for EU membership.
Pozneje, leta 1994, je Poljska vložila uradno prošnjo za članstvo v EU.
Accession negotiations started in 1998 and ended in 2002 when the Copenhagen European Council found that Poland fulfilled the accession criteria.
Pristopna pogajanja so se začela leta 1998 in končala leta 2002, ko je Evropski Svet v Kopenhagnu, ugotovil, da Poljska izpolnjuje pristopna merila.
As a matter of fact, the interested parties even indicated that one of the aims of the PPAs was to ensure that Polish power generators complied with certain EU directives on air pollution and, in particular, with the directives on emissions of large combustion plants, which is further evidence that these parties were aware that Poland would soon accede to the European Union.
Pravzaprav so zainteresirane stranke celo navedle, da je bil eden od ciljev pogodb PNE zagotoviti, da bi poljski proizvajalci električne energije upoštevali nekatere direktive EU o onesnaževanju zraka in zlasti direktive o emisijah iz velikih kurilnih naprav, kar je dodaten dokaz, da so se te stranke zavedale, da bo Poljska kmalu pristopila k Evropski uniji.