natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Those meetings were followed by the dispatch of additional information, as requested by the Commission, on 22 May 2009 and 18 June 2009.
Avstrija je po sestankih z dopisoma z dne 22. maja 2009 in 18. junija 2009 predložila dodatna pojasnila, za katera je zaprosila Komisija.
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS
DEJSTVA
Background to the investigation
Ozadje preiskave
Austrian Airlines is a member of the Star Alliance.
Austrian Airlines je član Star Alliance.
The Austrian State holds 41,56 % of Austrian Airlines shares through a State holding company, Österreichische Industrieholding AG (hereinafter ÖIAG).
Avstrija ima prek državne holdinške družbe Österreichische Industrieholding AG (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ÖIAG) v lasti 41,56-odstotni delež Austrian Airlines.
ÖIAG is the largest shareholder.
ÖIAG je največji delničar.
Given the difficult — and deteriorating — financial situation in which the Austrian Airlines Group has found itself over the last few years (see Commission Decision of 19 January 2009 on State aid NN 72/08, Austrian Airlines — Rescue aid [3]), the Austrian Government issued a privatisation mandate on 12 August 2008, authorising ÖIAG to dispose of all of its shares in Austrian Airlines.
Avstrijska zvezna vlada je zaradi težavnega in vedno slabšega finančnega položaja, v katerem je poslovna skupina Austrian Airlines že nekaj let (glej Odločbo Komisije z dne 19. januarja 2009 o državni pomoči NN 72/08, Austrian Airlines – pomoč za reševanje [3], 12. avgusta 2008 izdala pooblastilo za privatizacijo, s katerim je ÖIAG pooblastila za odsvojitev vseh svojih deležev v Austrian Airlines.
On 29 October 2008, this mandate was extended until 31 December 2008.
Pooblastilo je bilo 29. oktobra 2008 podaljšano do 31. decembra 2008.
ÖIAG published announcements in the Austrian and international press [4] on 13 August 2008 inviting potential investors to express their interest in acquiring ÖIAG’s shareholding in Austrian Airlines.
ÖIAG je 13. avgusta 2008 v avstrijskem in mednarodnem tisku [4] objavil poziv morebitnim vlagateljem, naj izrazijo interes za pridobitev deležev ÖIAG v Austrian Airlines.
On 28 August 2008, the potential investors were notified that an acquisition concept should be submitted by 12 September 2008.
ÖIAG je 28. avgusta 2008 morebitnim vlagateljem sporočil, da morajo do 12. septembra 2008 predložiti koncept za prevzem.
The acquisition concept had to include information on the bidder, a strategic concept for the future of Austrian Airlines, a proposal for the transaction structure, information on the planned financing and certain additional information relating to the subject matter of the contract (warranties, guarantees).
Koncept mora vsebovati podatke o ponudniku, strateški koncept za prihodnost Austrian Airlines, predlog za strukturo transakcije, podatke o načrtovanem financiranju in nekatere dodatne informacije o vsebini pogodbe (zagotovila, garancije). Predloženi so bili samo trije koncepti za prevzem.
On 16 September 2008, the three remaining bidders were invited to submit their final offers without a purchase price by 21 October 2008 and their final offers with the purchase price by 24 October 2008.
ÖIAG je 16. septembra 2008 pozval preostale tri ponudnike, naj končno ponudbo brez navedbe nakupne cene predložijo do 21. oktobra 2008, z navedbo nakupne cene pa do 24. oktobra 2008.
On 21 October 2008, Deutsche Lufthansa AG (hereinafter Lufthansa) was the only bidder to submit an offer, including a contract and strategic concept, without a price as had been requested.
Letalska družba Deutsche Lufthansa AG (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Lufthansa) je 21. oktobra 2008 kot edini ponudnik v skladu z zahtevami predložila ponudbo, vključno s pogodbo in strateškim konceptom brez navedbe nakupne cene.
On 24 October 2008, Lufthansa submitted a binding offer indicating the price it was prepared to pay for ÖIAG’s shareholding in Austrian Airlines.
Lufthansa je 24. oktobra 2008 predložila zavezujočo ponudbo z navedbo nakupne cene, ki jo je bila pripravljena plačati za deleže ÖIAG v Austrian Airlines.
The transaction was approved by Lufthansa’s Supervisory Board on 3 December 2008 and by ÖIAG’s Supervisory Board on 5 December 2008.
Transakcijo sta odobrila nadzorni svet Deutsche Lufthansa AG in nadzorni svet ÖIAG 3. oziroma 5. decembra 2008.
Thus, at the end of the privatisation process, Lufthansa, as the selected bidder, made an offer for ÖIAG’s shareholding in Austrian Airlines which was accepted by ÖIAG’s Supervisory Board.
Tako je Lufthansa na koncu postopka privatizacije kot izbrani ponudnik Austrian Airlines oddala ponudbo za deleže ÖIAG, ki jo je nadzorni svet ÖIAG sprejel.
The transaction concluded between ÖIAG and Lufthansa stipulates that:
V transakciji, ki sta jo sklenila ÖIAG in Lufthansa, je predvideno:
Lufthansa is to pay ÖIAG a purchase price of EUR 366268,75,
Lufthansa plača ÖIAG nakupno ceno 366268,75 EUR,
ÖIAG is to receive a debtor warrant [8] which may lead to entitlement to an additional payment of up to EUR 162 million,through a special purpose vehicle, ÖIAG is to pay an amount of EUR 500 million, which Lufthansa is to use for a capital increase in Austrian Airlines.
ÖIAG prejme nalog za plačilo dolgov [8], na podlagi katerega lahko nastane pravica do dodatnega plačila v višini do 162 milijonov EUR,ÖIAG prek namenske družbe plača nepovratna sredstva v višini 500 milijonov EUR, ki jih Lufthansa uporabi za dokapitalizacijo letalske družbe Austrian Airlines.
When notifying the measure for reasons of legal certainty on 21 December 2008, the Republic of Austria expressed the opinion that the sales transaction does not involve State aid because the price to be paid for Austrian Airlines is the market price for the company.
Republika Avstrija je v obvestilu o ukrepu z dne 21. decembra 2008, ki ga je poslala iz razlogov pravne varnosti, zastopala stališče, da naj prodajna transakcija ne bi bila povezana z dodelitvijo državne pomoči, ker naj bi bila cena, ki jo je treba plačati za Austrian Airlines, tržna cena tega podjetja.
In any case, the price to be paid by Lufthansa for the State’s participation in Austrian Airlines does not constitute State aid because any alternative scenario would have resulted in higher costs for ÖIAG.
Cena, ki jo mora Lufthansa plačati za državni delež v Austrian Airlines, naj vsekakor ne bi pomenila državne pomoči, saj bi vsak drug mogoč scenarij povzročil višje stroške za ÖIAG.
Additionally, and without prejudice to the above arguments, the Austrian authorities stated that, in the event of the Commission not accepting that the measures in question did not amount to State aid, they would also submit a restructuring plan for Austrian Airlines, so that the aid would be compatible under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.
Avstrijski organi so poleg tega in ne glede na zgornje utemeljitve navedli, da bi, če naj Komisija prav tako ne bi ugotovila, da naj pri zadevnih ukrepih ne bi šlo za državno pomoč, predložili tudi načrt za prestrukturiranje za Austrian Airlines, da bi bila pomoč v skladu s členom 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES.
In accordance with the rescue aid decision, the rescue aid (in the form of a State guarantee for a framework credit agreement) will be brought to an end when the Commission reaches a definitive State aid position (final decision) on the sale process/restructuring plan submitted by the Austrian authorities [9].
V skladu z odločbo o pomoči za reševanje pomoč za reševanje (v obliki državnega poroštva za globalni kreditni dogovor) preneha, ko Komisija sprejme končno stališče o državni pomoči (končno odločitev) glede prodajnega postopka/načrta za prestrukturiranje, ki so ga predložili avstrijski organi [9].
The decision to open the formal investigation (hereinafter the decision to initiate proceedings) raised the following questions:
Komisija je v odločbi o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba o sprožitvi postopka) odprla vprašanja,
whether the sales price achieved for the Austrian State’s shareholding in Austrian Airlines is the market price,
ali je prodajna cena, dosežena za delež Avstrije v Austrian Airlines, tržna cena,
whether ÖIAG acted as a market economy investor in accepting a negative price [10], as any alternative scenario would have resulted in higher costs, and
ali je ÖIAG pri sprejetju negativne cene [10] ravnal kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, saj bi vsak drug mogoč scenarij povzročil višje stroške, in
whether, if State aid is involved, this aid is restructuring aid compatible with the common market.
ali v primeru obstoja državne pomoči ta pomoč pomeni pomoč za prestrukturiranje, ki mora biti v skladu s skupnim trgom.
The market price of ÖIAG’s shareholding in Austrian Airlines
Tržna cena deležev ÖIAG v Austrian Airlines
The Commission expressed doubts as to whether the price to be paid by Lufthansa for the shares it is buying reflects the market price, given the conditions attached to the sale.
Komisija je izrazila dvom, ali je zaradi pogojev za prodajo cena, ki jo mora Lufthansa plačati za pridobljene delnice, tržna cena.
The privatisation mandate given to ÖIAG stated that:
V pooblastilu za privatizacijo, izdanemu ÖIAG, je bilo predvideno:
‘ÖIAG is authorised to privatise Austrian Airlines AG, ensuring an Austrian core shareholder structure of 25 % plus one share.
„ÖIAG se pooblasti za privatizacijo Austrian Airlines AG ob ohranitvi avstrijske strukture glavnega delničarja v višini 25 % in ene delnice.
The aim is to:
Namen teh pogojev je:
retain the trade mark “Austrian”;
ohranitev blagovne znamke ‚Austrian‘;
keep the headquarters in Austria;
ohranitev centrale za odločanje v Avstriji;
retain a transport network appropriate for the location and pay due regard to Austria as a centre for business and employment;
ohranitev linijske mreže, primerne za lokacijo, ter upoštevanje gospodarske in zaposlitvene lokacije Avstrije;
preserve as many secure jobs as possible at Austrian Airlines and Vienna airport; and
ohranitev čim večjega števila delovnih mest pri Austrian Airlines in na dunajskem letališču ter
establish a committee to protect Austria’s interests as a location’.
ustanovitev odbora za varstvo avstrijskih lokalnih interesov.“
The price to be paid to the Austrian State will be supplemented by an ‘earn out’ clause allowing the Austrian State to be paid from possible future profits.
Ceno, ki jo je treba plačati Avstriji, dopolnjuje klavzula o izboljšanju stanja, na podlagi katere Avstrija prejme plačila iz morebitnih dobičkov.
The Commission wanted to gain a better understanding of this mechanism and its value.
Komisija se je namenila razjasniti ta mehanizem in njegovo vrednost.
When opening the investigation, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the sale of Austrian Airlines took place under appropriate conditions.
Komisija je ob sprožitvi postopka dvomila, ali je prodaja Austrian Airlines potekala pod primernimi pogoji.
The Commission also indicated that it could not definitively determine whether the conditions attached to the sale were such as to have an influence on the price paid.
Komisija je navedla še, da ni mogla dokončno presoditi, ali so bili pogoji prodaje taki, da so vplivali na plačano ceno.
In relation to the price paid by Lufthansa, the Commission stated that it was unable to establish definitively whether the warrant for the sum of EUR 162 million could adequately compensate the Austrian State for the lower price per share it is willing to accept when concluding the sale or whether, by accepting a price per share that is considerably lower than the price to be paid to the other shareholders, the State is not in fact granting State aid to Lufthansa and thereby to Austrian Airlines.
Komisija je glede cene, ki jo je plačala Lufthansa, navedla, da ni mogla dokončno ugotoviti, ali je z nalogom za plačilo dolgov v vrednosti 162 milijonov EUR mogoče primerno odškodovati Avstrijo za nižjo ceno na delnico, ki jo je pripravljena sprejeti ob sklenitvi prodaje, ali Avstrija s tem, da sprejme ceno za delnico, ki je precej nižja od cene, ki se plača drugim delničarjem, Lufthansi in tako tudi Austrian Airlines v bistvu dodeli državno pomoč.
With respect to the negative price to be paid by Lufthansa, and as set out in the complaint made by Air France/KLM, it is not clear whether all bidders were afforded the same opportunity to make bids on the same terms.
Glede negativne cene, ki jo mora plačati Lufthansa, kot je navedeno tudi v pritožbi Air France/KLM, ni jasno, ali so vsi ponudniki dobili enako priložnost za oddajo ponudb na enaki podlagi.
Nor was it clear that all bidders were given enough time and information to be able to value the assets for sale.
Jasno ni bilo niti, ali so vsi ponudniki dobili dovolj časa in informacij za oceno premoženja, določenega za prodajo.
The Commission also noted that the price to be paid by Lufthansa for the shares it will buy from the State is different from (i.e. lower than) the price to be paid to the floating shareholders.
Komisija je še pripomnila, da je cena, ki jo mora plačati Lufthansa za delnice, ki jih bo pridobila od države, drugačna (in sicer nižja) od cene, ki se plača delničarjem na prostem trgu.
ÖIAG acted as a market economy investor, as any other scenario would have resulted in higher costs
ÖIAG je ravnal kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, saj bi vsak drug scenarij povzročil višje stroške
The Austrian authorities submitted that, if ÖIAG had not sold its shareholding, it would have been faced with one of three possible scenarios, all resulting in higher costs.
Avstrijski organi so navedli, da bi se ÖIAG spopadal z enim od treh mogočih scenarijev, ki bi povzročili višje stroške, če ne bi prodal svojega deleža:
Liquidation of Austrian Airlines: ÖIAG would bear the costs (estimated at up to EUR […]) arising from a controlled liquidation of Austrian Airlines.
Likvidacija Austrian Airlines: ÖIAG bi nosil stroške (ocenjene na do […] EUR), ki bi nastali pri nadzorovani likvidaciji Austrian Airlines.
Insolvency of Austrian Airlines: ÖIAG does not support Austrian Airlines, resulting in the insolvency of the company.
Prijava stečaja Austrian Airlines: ÖIAG ne podpre Austrian Airlines, kar bi povzročilo stečaj podjetja.
Direct and indirect costs in excess of the net-costs of the privatisation would then arise for ÖIAG.
Neposredne in posredne stroške, ki bi presegli neto stroške privatizacije, bi moral nato prevzeti ÖIAG.
Restructuring of Austrian Airlines on a stand-alone basis: ÖIAG finances the restructuring of Austrian Airlines to allow it to operate on a stand-alone basis.
Prestrukturiranje Austrian Airlines ob ohranitvi samostojnosti („rešitev ‚stand alone‘“): ÖIAG financira prestrukturiranje Austrian Airlines zato, da ta lahko ohrani samostojnost („rešitev ‚stand alone‘“).
In opening the investigation, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the option chosen by the State was the action of a market economy investor.
Komisija je ob sprožitvi postopka dvomila, ali možnost, ki jo je izbrala država, ustreza ravnanju vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
It did not have enough information at its disposal, either regarding the liquidation costs that would have had to be borne in the event of a winding-up of the company or regarding the costs and losses that ÖIAG would have incurred in the event of insolvency.
Komisija ni imela zadostnih informacij niti o stroških likvidacije, ki bi jih bilo treba nositi ob likvidaciji podjetja, niti o stroških in izgubah, ki bi ÖIAG nastali ob stečaju.
Nor did it have sufficient information to be able to evaluate the stand-alone option.
Prav tako ni imela zadostnih informacij za oceno možnosti ohranitve samostojnosti.
The Commission pointed out that, in general, it does not accept that a shareholder is automatically obliged to meet costs arising from the insolvency or liquidation of a company.
Komisija je opozorila, da se na splošno ne strinja, da mora delničar samodejno nositi stroške, ki nastanejo ob stečaju ali likvidaciji podjetja.
The considerations concerning the social and economic consequences of a failure by ÖIAG to support Austrian Airlines appeared to result from the fact that ÖIAG is a State holding company.
Zdi se, da naj bi bil razlog za razmišljanje o socialnih in gospodarskih posledicah, ki bi nastale, če ÖIAG ne bi podprl Austrian Airlines, dejstvo, da je ÖIAG državna holdinška družba.
In addition, the Commission noted that the reasoning of the Austrian authorities is also dependent on the price paid by the selected bidder having been the highest possible price.
Komisija je še pripomnila, da avstrijski organi pri utemeljitvi še naprej izhajajo iz tega, da naj bi šlo pri ceni, ki jo je plačal izbrani ponudnik, za najvišjo mogočo ceno.
The restructuring plan submitted for Austrian Airlines
Predloženi načrt za prestrukturiranje Austrian Airlines
Having concluded that it could not exclude the existence of State aid, the Commission was obliged to examine the restructuring plan in the light of the applicable legislation, namely the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [11] (hereinafter the 2004 Guidelines) and the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State aids in the aviation sector [12] (hereinafter the 1994 Aviation Guidelines).
Ker je Komisija ugotovila, da ni bilo mogoče izključiti obstoja državne pomoči, je morala preveriti, ali je načrt za prestrukturiranje v skladu s pravom, ki se uporablja, in sicer v skladu s Smernicami Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah [11] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Smernice iz leta 2004) ter Obvestilom Komisije o uporabi členov 92 in 93 Pogodbe ES in člena 61 Sporazuma EGP o državnih pomočeh v letalskem sektorju [12] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Smernice za letalski sektor iz leta 1994).
These guidelines set out a number of conditions under which restructuring aid can be granted.
V teh smernicah so navedeni različni pogoji, pod katerimi se lahko odobrijo pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
In opening the proceedings, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the conditions relating to the eligibility of the firm, the restoration of long-term viability, the aid amount, the compensatory measures and the level of own contribution have been complied with.
Komisija je ob sprožitvi postopka dvomila, ali so izpolnjeni pogoji glede upravičenosti podjetja, obnove dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja, višine pomoči, izravnalnih ukrepov in višine lastnega prispevka.
The Austrian authorities began their observations by providing background information on and a description of the privatisation process.
Avstrijski organi so v uvodu pripomb navedli informacije o ozadju postopka privatizacije in ga opisali.
In accordance with Community law, the privatisation process was open and fully publicised, and all bidders were treated equally throughout all phases of the process.
V skladu s pravom Skupnosti naj bi bil postopek privatizacije odprt in v celoti objavljen, vsi ponudniki pa naj bi bili v vseh fazah postopka privatizacije obravnavani enako.
Although the privatisation process was conducted to a tight schedule, the Austrian authorities are of the opinion that all bidders had sufficient time to obtain all necessary information and were in a position to prepare a final offer based on that information.
Postopek privatizacije naj bi bil sicer izveden v kratkem času, vendar naj bi imeli po mnenju avstrijskih organov vsi ponudniki dovolj časa za pridobitev vseh potrebnih informacij in naj bi jim bilo omogočeno na podlagi teh informacij pripraviti dokončno ponudbo.
Conditions imposed on the privatisation
Pogoji, določeni za privatizacijo
In relation to the conditions imposed by the privatisation mandate, the Austrian authorities made a distinction between ‘best effort aims’, i.e.
Avstrijski organi so pri pogojih, določenih za privatizacijo, razlikovali med „ciljema, ki se upoštevata po najboljših močeh“:
retaining a transport network appropriate for Austria; and
ohranitev linijske mreže, primerne za Avstrijo, in
preserving as many jobs as possible;
ohranitev čim večjega števila delovnih mest
and ‘binding aims’, i.e.
ter „zavezujočimi cilji“:
retaining the trade mark ‘Austrian’;
ohranitev blagovne znamke Austrian;
keeping the headquarters in Austria;
ohranitev centrale za odločanje v Avstriji;
creating a committee to protect Austria’s interests; and
ustanovitev odbora za varstvo avstrijskih lokalnih interesov;
ensuring an Austrian core shareholder structure of 25 % plus one share.
ohranitev avstrijske strukture glavnega delničarja v višini 25 % in ene delnice.
The Austrian authorities further state that at no time did any of the bidders contest whether these aims could be implemented or argue that they would constitute ‘conditions’ that would affect the purchase price.
Avstrijski organi so še navedli, da naj nihče od ponudnikov nikoli ne bi oporekal temu, da je mogoče doseči te cilje, ali trdil, da naj bi ti pomenili „pogoje“, ki vplivajo na nakupno ceno.
In its decision to open the formal investigation, the Commission, in line with past decisions [13], stated that, with regard to (i) ‘retaining a transport network appropriate for Austria’ and (iii) ‘retaining the trade mark “Austrian” ’, it could be concluded that these conditions did not have any negative impact on the purchase price.
Komisija je v odločitvi o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave v skladu s svojo prakso odločanja [13] navedla, da je glede ciljev (i) „ohranitev linijske mreže, primerne za Avstrijo“ in (iii) „ohranitev blagovne znamke Austrian“ mogoče ugotoviti, da ta pogoja ne vplivata negativno na nakupno ceno.
Preservation of as many jobs as possible
Ohranitev čim večjega števila delovnih mest
The Austrian authorities submit that this condition should not raise any concerns.
Avstrijski organi so navedli, da naj ta pogoj ne bi bil povod za pomisleke. Pogodbena dokumentacija, ki jo je ÖIAG predložil ponudnikom, ni vsebovala nobenih tozadevnih obveznosti.
The contractual documentation submitted by ÖIAG to the bidders did not contain any obligations in this respect.
Opozorili so, da naj bi Komisija v svoji praksi odločanja navedla, da so nediskriminatorski pogoji, s katerimi se kupci pozovejo k ohranitvi delovnih mest, dopustni.
They pointed out that, in previous decisions, the Commission has stated that non-discriminatory conditions requesting buyers to preserve jobs are admissible [14].
Kakršen koli vpliv na nakupno ceno naj bi bil izključen, ker naj bi šlo pri tem samo za nediskriminatorsko pravno nezavezujočo določbo „best efforts“ (določbo, ki se upošteva po najboljših močeh).
Keeping the headquarters in Austria
Ohranitev centrale za odločanje v Avstriji
One aim stipulated in the privatisation mandate was to keep the headquarters of Austrian Airlines in Austria.
Cilj privatizacije naj bi bil ohranitev centrale za odločanje Austrian Airlines v Avstriji.
The Austrian authorities argue that, in order to obtain an operating licence, the registered office must be located in the Member State in which the licence was issued [16].
Avstrijski organi navajajo, da naj bi bil pogoj za pridobitev operativne licence, da je registrirani sedež v državi članici, v kateri je bila izdana operativna licenca.
If the headquarters or the registered office of Austrian Airlines is relocated outside Austria, this would result in the loss of the operating licence.
Če bi bila centrala ali registrirani sedež Austrian Airlines prenesena zunaj Avstrije, bi Austrian Airlines izgubil operativno licenco.
Consequently, under Community law (Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008) and Austrian law (the Aviation Act), Austrian Airlines would no longer be able to continue its aviation operation [17].
V skladu z določbami prava Skupnosti (Uredba (ES) št. 1008/2008) in avstrijskim pravom (Luftfahrtgesetz – Zakon o zračnem prometu) Austrian Airlines zato ne bi več mogel opravljati zračnih prevozov. [17]
Bilateral aviation agreements also require the headquarters to remain in Austria: the validity of the agreements is linked to a valid operating licence.
Ohranitev centrale za odločanje v Avstriji naj bi bila potrebna tudi v okviru dvostranskih sporazumov o letalskih prevozih: pogoj za veljavnost sporazumov naj bi bila veljavna operativna licenca.