natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In its Altmark judgment, the Court held that ‘[w]here a Member State grants a public subsidy to an undertaking, the supply of transport services by that undertaking may for that reason be maintained or increased with the result that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of providing their transport services in the market in that Member State (see, to that effect, Case 102/87 France v Commission [1988] ECR I-4067, paragraph 19; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 26; and Spain v Commission, paragraph 40)’ [50].
V sodbi Altmark je bilo sodišče mnenja, da „če država članica dodeli javno subvencijo podjetju, lahko to podjetje še naprej zagotavlja prevozne storitve v enakem ali večjem obsegu, kar povzroči, da imajo podjetja, ustanovljena v drugih državah članicah, manjše možnosti zagotavljanja prevoznih storitev na trgu v tej državi članici (o tem glej zadevo 102/87, Francija proti Komisiji, Recueil 1988, str. 4067, točka 19; zadevo C-305/89, Italija proti Komisiji, Recueil 1991, str. I-1603, točka 26; in Španija proti Komisiji, točka 40“ [50].
Indeed, several Member States have since 1995 started unilaterally to open certain transport markets to competition from undertakings established in other Member States, so that a number of undertakings are already offering their urban, suburban or regional transport services in Member States other than their State of origin [51].
Dejansko je z letom 1995 več držav začelo enostransko odpirati določene trge prevoznih storitev za konkurenco, ki jo predstavljajo podjetja, ustanovljena v drugih državah članicah, tako da številna podjetja že zagotavljajo storitve mestnega, primestnega ali regionalnega prevoza v državah članicah zunaj svoje države izvora [51].
In Denmark, the deregulation of the bus market since 1990 has changed the nature of the provision of bus services from a reserved market to one in which competition between undertakings is possible.
Na Danskem je deregulacija avtobusnega trga od leta 1990 spremenila značaj zagotavljanja storitev avtobusnih prevozov, in sicer se je rezerviran trg spremenil v trg, na katerem je mogoča konkurenca med podjetji.
Both Danish and other EU companies can compete to provide services tendered by regional and local government authorities.
Tako Danska kot druge države EU se lahko potegujejo za zagotavljanje storitev, ki jih razpišejo regionalni in lokalni vladni organi.
Similar conditions apply in other Member States; Arriva operates for example also in Sweden and the Netherlands.
Podobni pogoji veljajo v drugih državah članicah; podjetje Arriva, na primer, deluje tudi na Švedskem in Nizozemskem.
The liberalisation of the bus market in Denmark and other Member States has been accompanied at the Community level by Directive 92/50/EEC, which obliges Member States to tender out public service bus contracts.
Liberalizacijo trga avtobusnih prevozov na Danskem in v drugih državah članicah je na ravni Skupnosti spremljala Direktiva 92/50/EGS, ki države članice obvezuje, da za javna naročila storitev avtobusnega prevoza razpišejo razpis.
In the light of Directive 92/50/EEC, the ECJ, in the Concordia case, has held that the purpose of coordinating at Community level the procedures for the award of public contracts is to eliminate barriers to the free movement of services and goods [52].
Glede na Direktivo 92/50/EGS je Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti v zadevi Concordia ugotovilo, da je namen usklajevanja postopkov za oddaje javnih naročil na ravni Skupnosti odprava ovir za prost pretok storitev in blaga [52].
As the bus market is partially liberalised within the Community due to the unilateral decision of several Member States to open up their bus markets, which has been accompanied by the entry into force of Directive 92/50/EEC, competition between the bus market suppliers exists.
Ker je trg avtobusnih prevozov v Skupnosti deloma liberaliziran zaradi enostranske odločitve več držav članic, da odprejo svoje avtobusne trge, ki jo je spremljal začetek veljavnosti Direktive 92/50/EGS, je med ponudniki storitev avtobusnih prevozov konkurenca.
Consequently, the restructuring measure may improve the position of Combus and its buyer in relation to its competitors in the EU, thereby affecting both competition between undertakings and trade between Member States.
Posledično lahko ukrep prestrukturiranja izboljša položaj podjetja Combus in njegovega kupca glede na konkurente v EU, kar vpliva tako na konkurenco med podjetji in na trgovanje med državami članicami.
CONCLUSION: PRESENCE OF STATE AID
SKLEP: OBSTOJ DRŽAVNE POMOČI
The Commission concludes that the restructuring measure constitutes State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) EC treaty.
Komisija ugotavlja, da ukrep prestrukturiranja pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID WITH THE COMMON MARKET
OCENA ZDRUŽLJIVOSTI POMOČI S SKUPNIM TRGOM
According to Article 87(1) EC State aid is in principle incompatible with the common market.
V skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES je državna pomoč načeloma nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom.
The State aid in the present case could nevertheless be compatible with the common market by virtue of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 or Article 87(3)(c) EC, as specified by the 1999 Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.
Toda v pričujočem primeru bi lahko bila državna pomoč kljub temu združljiva s skupnim trgom na podlagi Uredbe (EGS) št. 1191/69 ali člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES, kot je določeno v smernicah Skupnosti iz leta 1999 o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah.
No other compatibility provision is applicable in the present case.
V tem primeru se ne uporablja nobena druga določba o združljivosti.
COMPATIBILITY OF THE 1999 AND/OR THE 2001 MEASURE BY VIRTUE OF REGULATION (EEC) No 1191/69
ZDRUŽLJIVOST UKREPA IZ LETA 1999 IN/ALI 2001 NA PODLAGI UREDBE (EGS) ŠT. 1191/69
The decision to initiate the procedure offers (recitals 90 to 96) a brief description why the restructuring measure granted by the Danish State to Combus cannot be considered compatible with the common market by virtue of Article 73 EC and Regulation (EEC) No 1169/91.
Odločitev o sprožitvi postopka vsebuje (uvodne izjave 90 do 96) kratek opis, zakaj ukrepa prestrukturiranja, ki ga je danska država odobrila podjetju Combus, ni mogoče šteti za združljivega s skupnim trgom na podlagi člena 73 Pogodbe ES in Uredbe (EGS) št. 1169/91.
Neither the Danish government nor third parties have contested the reasoning of the Commission on this point.
Danska vlada in tretje stranke niso izpodbijale utemeljitve Komisije v tej točki.
The Commission therefore concludes, for the reasons set out in the decision to initiate the procedure, that the restructuring measure cannot be considered compatible with the common market by virtue of Article 73 EC and Regulation (EEC) No 1169/91.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da ukrepa prestrukturiranja zaradi razlogov, navedenih v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka, ni mogoče šteti za združljivega s skupnim trgom na podlagi člena 73 Pogodbe ES in Uredbe (EGS) št. 1169/91.
COMPATIBILITY OF THE 1999 MEASURE BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 87(3)(C) EC
ZDRUŽLJIVOST UKREPA IZ LETA 1999 NA PODLAGI ČLENA 87(3)(C) POGODBE ES
Article 87(3)(c) EC foresees that, ‘aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, may be considered to be compatible with the common market, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’.
Člen 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES določa, da „se lahko pomoč za pospeševanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih dejavnosti ali določenih gospodarskih območij, kadar takšna pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi, šteje za združljivo s skupnim trgom“.
On the basis of this article, the Commission has adopted guidelines for State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.
Na podlagi tega člena je Komisija sprejela smernice o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah.
The Commission adopted its original guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty in 1994 [53].
Komisija je prvotne smernice o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah sprejela leta 1994 [53].
A new version of the guidelines was adopted in 1999 [4] OJ C 288, 9.10.1999, p. 2.
Nova različica smernic je bila sprejeta leta 1999 [4] UL C 288, 9.10.1999, str. 2.
followed by the latest version of the guidelines dating from 2004 [54].
, leta 2004 [54] pa je sledila njihova najnovejša različica.
As regards the ratione temporis application of these guidelines, points 103 and 104 of the 2004 guidelines state, as regards non-notified aid:
Kar zadeva časovno uporabo teh smernic, točki 103 in 104 smernic iz leta 2004 navajata, v zvezi z nepriglašeno pomočjo:
‘The Commission will examine the compatibility with the common market of any rescue or restructuring aid granted without its authorisation and therefore in breach of Article 88(3) of the Treaty on the basis of these Guidelines if some or all of the aid is granted after their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.’
„Komisija bo preverila združljivost s skupnim trgom kakršne koli pomoči za reševanje ali prestrukturiranje, dodeljene brez njene odobritve in zato v nasprotju s členom 88(3) Pogodbe na podlagi teh smernic, če je del pomoči ali vsa pomoč dodeljena po njihovi objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.“
Points 100 and 101 of the guidelines of 1999 have the same content as the guidelines of 2004.
Točki 100 in 101 smernic iz leta 1999 imata enako vsebino kot smernice iz leta 2004.
The 1999 measure granted to Combus constitutes non-notified aid.
Ukrep iz leta 1999, odobren podjetju Combus, pomeni nepriglašeno pomoč.
It was granted prior to the coming into force of the 1999 guidelines.
Odobren je bil, preden so smernice iz leta 1999 začele veljati.
Consequently, the 1994 restructuring guidelines apply to the 1999 measure.
Posledično se smernice o prestrukturiranju iz leta 1994 uporabljajo za ukrep iz leta 1999.
Section 3.2.2 of the 1994 restructuring guidelines sets out the following conditions for authorising restructuring aid:
Razdelek 3.2.2 smernic o prestrukturiranju iz leta 1994 določa naslednje pogoje za odobritev pomoči za prestrukturiranje:
Economic viability.
Sposobnost ekonomskega preživetja.
The viability of the company must be restored.
Sposobnost preživetja podjetja je treba obnoviti.
Mitigation of adverse effects on competitors.
Blažitev škodljivih vplivov na konkurente.
Proportionality.
Sorazmernost.
The aid must be in proportion to the restructuring costs and benefits.
Pomoč mora biti sorazmerna s stroški in koristmi prestrukturiranja.
Annual report and monitoring.
Letno poročilo in spremljanje.
The Member State must provide an annual report on the aid to allow the Commission to monitor that the restructuring plan is being implemented properly.
Država članica mora predložiti letno poročilo o pomoči, da lahko Komisija spremlja, ali se načrt prestrukturiranja izvaja pravilno.
One time, last time.
Načelo enkratnosti pomoči.
Restructuring aid should be granted once only.
Pomoč za prestrukturiranje se lahko odobri samo enkrat.
Restructuring plan and economic viability
Načrt prestrukturiranja in sposobnost ekonomskega preživetja
With respect to the restructuring plan, point 3.2.2.A of the 1994 restructuring guidelines set out the following requirements:
V zvezi z načrtom prestrukturiranja točka 3.2.2.A smernic o prestrukturiranju iz leta 1994 določa naslednje zahteve:
‘The sine qua non of all restructuring plans is that they must restore the long-term viability and health of the firm within a reasonable time scale and on the basis of realistic assumptions as to its future operating conditions.
„Nujen pogoj vseh načrtov prestrukturiranja je, da morajo obnoviti dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja in zdravje podjetja v razumnem času in na podlagi realističnih predpostavk glede prihodnjih pogojev poslovanja.
Consequently, restructuring aid must be linked to a viable restructuring/recovery programme submitted in all relevant detail to the Commission.
Zato mora biti pomoč za prestrukturiranje povezana z izvedljivim programom prestrukturiranja/sanacije, ki se vključno z vsemi potrebnimi podrobnostmi predloži Komisiji.
The plan must restore the firm to competitiveness within a reasonable period.
Načrt mora ponovno vzpostaviti konkurenčnost podjetja v razumnem obdobju.
The improvement in viability must mainly result from internal measures contained in the restructuring plan and may only be based on external factors such as price and demand increases over which the company has no great influence, if the market assumptions made are generally acknowledged.
Izboljšanje sposobnosti preživetja mora biti večinoma rezultat notranjih ukrepov, ki jih vsebuje načrt prestrukturiranja, in lahko temelji samo na zunanjih dejavnikih, kot so spremembe cene in povpraševanja, na katere podjetje nima večjega vpliva, če so tržne predpostavke na splošno priznane.
Successful restructuring should involve the abandonment of structurally loss-making activities.
Uspešno prestrukturiranje mora vključevati opustitev strukturno deficitnih dejavnosti.
To fulfil the viability criterion, the restructuring plan must be considered capable of putting the company into a position of covering all its costs including depreciation and financial charges and generating a minimum return on capital such that, after completing its restructuring, the firm will not require further injections of State aid and will be able to compete in the market place on its own merits.’
Za izpolnitev merila sposobnosti preživetja mora biti načrt prestrukturiranja takšen, da bo lahko podjetje po prestrukturiranju samo pokrilo vse stroške, vključno z amortizacijo in finančnimi stroški, ter ustvarilo minimalen donos kapitala, tako da po zaključku prestrukturiranja podjetje ne bo potrebovalo dodatne državne pomoči in bo lahko samostojno konkurira na trgu.“
In 1999, prior to the capital injection, Kromann and Münter had presented to the Danish government a plan for achieving the financial turn-around of Combus, and the management of Combus had prepared an operational restructuring plan, formalised in a memo from KPMG.
Leta 1999, pred kapitalskim vložkom, je podjetje Kromann and Münter danski vladi predložilo načrt za finančni preobrat podjetja Combus, uprava podjetja Combus pa je pripravila operativni načrt prestrukturiranja, dokončno oblikovan v sporočilu KPMG.
As Denmark considered at the time that the decision respected the private investor principle, it did not submit these documents to the Commission.
Ker je Danska takrat menila, da odločitev ustreza načelu zasebnega vlagatelja, teh dokumentov ni predložila Komisiji.
With respect to the restructuring plan and the economic viability of Combus, two questions have arisen in the course of the procedure:
V zvezi z načrtom prestrukturiranja in sposobnostjo ekonomskega preživetja podjetja Combus sta se med postopkom pojavili dve vprašanji:
Danske Busvognmaend considers that no restructuring plan was available when the capital injection of 1999 was made.
Podjetje Danske Busvognmaend meni, da načrta prestrukturiranja ni bilo, ko je bil izveden kapitalski vložek leta 1999.
Further to this, Danske Busvognmaend claims that a restructuring plan cannot be drawn up in arrears,
Poleg tega podjetje Danske Busvognmaend trdi, da načrta prestrukturiranja ni mogoče sestaviti za nazaj.
Are the conditions set out for a restructuring plan in the 1994 guidelines fulfilled?
Ali so bili pogoji, ki so v smernicah iz leta 1994 opredeljeni za načrt prestrukturiranja, izpolnjeni?
Time of availability of the restructuring plan
Čas razpoložljivosti načrta prestrukturiranja
The Commission considers that with respect to the time of the availability of the restructuring plan, it is necessary to distinguish between the material existence of the plan and its submission to the Commission.
Komisija meni, da je treba v zvezi s časom razpoložljivosti načrta prestrukturiranja razlikovati med stvarnim obstojem načrta in njegovo predložitvijo Komisiji.
Material existence of the restructuring plan.
Stvaren obstoj načrta prestrukturiranja.
The ECJ has decided in France v Commission that the authorities of the Member State granting the restructuring aid have to possess, ‘when the disputed aid was granted, a restructuring plan meeting the requirements [of the Rescue and Restructuring guidelines]’ [55].
SES je v zadevi Francija/Komisija razsodilo, da morajo organi držav članic, ki odobrijo pomoč za prestrukturiranje, imeti „načrt prestrukturiranja, ki izpolnjuje zahteve [smernic o reševanju in prestrukturiranju], ko se sporna pomoč odobri“ [55].
For the present case, this means that Denmark needed to have in its possession a restructuring plan meeting the requirements of the 1994 restructuring guidelines the latest when the first capital injection in 1999 was made.
V tem primeru to pomeni, da bi Danska morala imeti v posesti načrt prestrukturiranja, ki izpolnjuje zahteve iz smernic o prestrukturiranju iz leta 1994, najpozneje ob prvem kapitalskem vložku leta 1999.
As described above, the capital injection in 1999 was based on a calculation of the capital needs of Combus and a restructuring plan, which had been drawn up by the law firm Kromann and Münter and the management of Combus.
Kot je opisano zgoraj, je kapitalski vložek leta 1999 temeljil na izračunu kapitalskih potreb podjetja Combus in načrtu prestrukturiranja, ki sta ga sestavili odvetniška pisarna Kromann and Münter in uprava podjetja Combus.
The restructuring plan foresaw that Combus would return to economic viability in 2001, if a capital injection of DKK 300 million took place and the management of the company would implement the foreseen restructuring measures.
Načrt prestrukturiranja je predvideval, da bo podjetje Combus ponovno doseglo sposobnost ekonomskega preživetja leta 2001, če bi prejelo kapitalski vložek v višini 300 milijonov DKK in če bi uprava podjetja izvedla predvidene ukrepe prestrukturiranja.
The restructuring plan formed the basis on which the Danish ministry for transport prepared the confidential bill of 27 may 1999, which approved the capital injection.
Načrt prestrukturiranja je bil podlaga, na kateri je dansko Ministrstvo za promet pripravilo zaupni predlog zakona z dne 27. maja 1999, s katerim je odobrilo kapitalski vložek.
The Commission concludes that the restructuring aid to Combus was granted only after a restructuring plan was available to the Danish government.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je bila pomoč za prestrukturiranje podjetju Combus odobrena šele, ko je bil načrt prestrukturiranja na voljo danski vladi.
This leaves the question open as to whether this restructuring plan meets the requirements of the 1994 restructuring guidelines.
Tako ostaja odprto vprašanje, ali načrt prestrukturiranja izpolnjuje zahteve iz smernic o prestrukturiranju iz leta 1994.
Submission of the restructuring plan to the Commission.
Predložitev načrta prestrukturiranja Komisiji.
The Commission has, as rightly pointed out by the Danish government, in its submission to the ECJ in France v Commission, stated that ‘the French Government did not submit a credible restructuring plan to the Commission’ and ‘[n]or has any such plan been submitted to the Commission by the French authorities since the proceedings were initiated’ [56].
Kot je pravilno poudarila danska vlada, je Komisija ob predložitvi Sodišču Evropskih skupnosti v zadevi Francija/Komisija navedla, da „francoska vlada Komisiji ni predložila verodostojnega načrta prestrukturiranja“ in da „tudi po začetku postopka francoski organi niso predložili Komisiji takega načrta“ [56].
It results from this statement, which has not been contradicted by the Court, that the restructuring plan needs to be available to the Commission at the latest at the date the Commission takes its decision.
Iz te izjave izhaja, da mora biti načrt prestrukturiranja na voljo Komisiji najpozneje do datuma, ko Komisija sprejme odločitev, čemur Sodišče ne oporeka.
In the present case, the Danish authorities have submitted to the Commission in April 2007 a total of four notes dated 26 April 1999, 15 May 1999, and twice 18 May 1999.
V pričujočem primeru so danski organi Komisiji aprila 2007 predložili skupno štiri obvestila, po eno z dne 26. aprila 1999, 15. maja 1999 in dve z dne 18. maja 1999.
Three of the notes have been written by Kromann and Münter, one by KPMG.
Tri obvestila je napisalo podjetje Kromann and Münter, eno pa KPMG.
The Danish authorities consider that the three notes of Kromann and Münter constitute the financial restructuring plan, and the note of KPMG the operational restructuring plan.
Danske oblasti menijo, da tri obvestila, ki jih je napisalo podjetje Kromann and Münter, predstavljajo načrt finančnega prestrukturiranja, obvestilo KPMG pa operativni načrt prestrukturiranja.
Restructuring plan meeting the requirements of the 1994 guidelines
Načrt prestrukturiranja izpolnjuje zahteve iz smernic iz leta 1994
The Danish government has submitted to the Commission that the four memos of Kromann and Münter and KPMG constitute a restructuring plan meeting the requirements of the 1994 guidelines.
Danska vlada je Komisiji pojasnila, da štiri obvestila, ki sta jih napisala podjetje Kromann and Münter in KPMG, predstavljajo načrt prestrukturiranja, ki izpolnjuje zahteve iz smernic iz leta 1994.
The Commission notes that the memo of KPMG merely restates the intentions of the board and the management of Combus, as they had been decided in November 1998 and April 1999.
Komisija opominja, da sporočilo KPMG le ponovno navaja namene vodstva in uprave podjetja Combus iz novembra 1998 in aprila 1999.
KPMG points out that they did not perform a budget examination, but worked on the assumptions made by Combus.
KPMG poudarja, da niso pregledali proračuna, temveč so delali na podlagi predpostavk podjetja Combus.
In other words, KPMG had not verified whether the assumptions on which its work was based were realistic.
Z drugimi besedami, podjetje KPMG ni preverilo, ali so predpostavke, na katerih temelji njegovo delo, realne.
Therefore, the Commission considers that the restructuring plan does not fulfil the criterion ‘based on realistic assumptions’, because the Danish government never verified whether the assumptions were realistic.
Zato Komisija meni, da načrt prestrukturiranja ne izpolnjuje merila „na podlagi realnih predpostavk“, ker danska vlada ni nikoli preverila, ali so predpostavke realne.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that the KPMG memo only analyses some of Combus’ areas of activity, and does so not based on the individual bus contracts, but based on summary assumptions about bus areas.
Poleg tega Komisija opozarja, da sporočilo KPMG le analizira nekatera področja dejavnosti podjetja Combus in še to ne na podlagi posameznih pogodb o avtobusnem prevozu, temveč na podlagi povzetka predpostavk o območjih avtobusnih prevozov.
The restructuring plan is hence incomplete, because it covers only part of Combus’ activities, and not detailed enough, as it is not based on the individual contracts, which form the basis of Combus’ business.
Načrt prestrukturiranja je torej nepopoln, ker pokriva le del dejavnosti podjetja Combus in ni dovolj podroben, saj ne temelji na posameznih pogodbah, ki so osnova poslovanja podjetja Combus.
Finally, the Commission notes that the proposed restructuring measures are neither broken down by bus area, nor are individual saving targets allocated to the individual restructuring measure.
Končno Komisija opozarja, da predlagani ukrepi prestrukturiranja niso razčlenjeni po območjih avtobusnih prevozov niti niso določeni posamezni cilji varčevanja za posamezne ukrepe prestrukturiranja.
In addition, the accountants did not verify whether the cost savings expected by the management were realistic.
Poleg tega računovodje niso preverili, ali so prihranki stroškov, ki jih pričakuje uprava, realni.
The three documents concerning the financial restructuring do not address the operational restructuring at all.
Trije dokumenti, ki se nanašajo na finančno prestrukturiranje, sploh ne zadevajo operativnega prestrukturiranja.