natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
the main parameters and rationale for any annual bonus scheme and any other non-cash benefits.
glavne parametre in utemeljitev za morebitno letno shemo bonusov in druge nedenarne ugodnosti.
When determining the level of the information which should be disclosed, Member States should take into account the nature, the size as well as the specific scope of activities of the financial undertakings concerned.
Pri določanju ravni informacij, ki jih je treba razkriti, bi morale države članice upoštevati naravo, velikost in posebno področje dejavnosti zadevnega finančnega podjetja.
Member States should ensure that competent authorities take into account the size of the financial undertaking and the nature and the complexity of its activities when monitoring whether the principles contained in sections II and III are followed.
Države članice morajo zagotoviti, da pristojni organi pri nadzoru spoštovanja načel iz oddelkov II in III upoštevajo velikost finančnega podjetja, naravo in zahtevnost njegovih dejavnosti.
Member States should ensure that financial undertakings are in a position to communicate the remuneration policy covered by this Recommendation to their competent authorities, including an indication of compliance with the principles set out in this Recommendation, in the form of a remuneration policy statement subject to appropriate updates.
Države članice morajo zagotoviti, da imajo finančna podjetja možnost svojim pristojnim organom predložiti plačno politiko, zajeto s tem priporočilom, vključno z navedbo skladnosti z načeli iz tega priporočila, v obliki izjave o plačni politiki, ki se ustrezno posodablja.
Member States should ensure that competent authorities may request and have access to all information they need to evaluate the extent to which the principles contained in sections II and III are followed.
Države članice morajo zagotoviti, da imajo pristojni organi dostop do informacij, ki jih potrebujejo za oceno, koliko se upoštevajo načela iz oddelkov II in III.
Member States are invited to take the necessary measures to promote the application of this Recommendation by 31 December 2009 and to notify the Commission of the measures taken in accordance with this Recommendation, in order to enable the Commission to monitor closely the situation and, on that basis, to assess the need for further measures.
Države članice so pozvane, da sprejmejo vse potrebne ukrepe za spodbujanje uporabe tega priporočila do 31. decembra 2009 in da uradno obvestijo Komisijo o ukrepih, sprejetih v skladu s tem priporočilom, da bi Komisiji omogočili natančno spremljanje stanja in na podlagi tega ocenitev potrebe za sprejetje dodatnih ukrepov.
complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies
o dopolnitvi priporočil 2004/913/ES in 2005/162/ES glede sistema prejemkov direktorjev javnih družb
On 14 December 2004, the Commission adopted Recommendation 2004/913/EC fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies [1] and on 15 February 2005 the Commission adopted Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board [2].
Komisija je 14. decembra 2004 sprejela Priporočilo 2004/913/ES o spodbujanju ustreznega sistema prejemkov direktorjev javnih družb [1], 15. februarja 2005 pa Priporočilo 2005/162/ES o vlogi neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta javnih družb in o komisijah upravnega odbora ali nadzornega sveta [2].
The main objectives of those Recommendations are to ensure transparency of remuneration practices, shareholder control on the remuneration policy and individual remuneration through disclosure and the introduction of a mandatory or advisory vote on the remuneration statement and shareholder approval for share-based remuneration schemes, effective and independent non-executive supervision and at least an advisory role of the remuneration committee with regard to remuneration practices.
Glavni cilji teh priporočil so zagotoviti transparentnost praks prejemkov, nadzor delničarjev nad politiko prejemkov in prejemki posameznikov z razkritjem in uvedbo obveznega ali posvetovalnega glasovanja o poročilu o prejemkih ter tako, da delničarji odobrijo sheme prejemkov v obliki delnic, učinkovit in neodvisen neizvršni nadzor ter vsaj posvetovalno vlogo komisije za prejemke glede praks prejemkov.
It follows from those Recommendations that the Commission should monitor the situation, including implementation and application of the principles included in those Recommendations, and assess the need for further measures.
Iz teh priporočil sledi, da mora Komisija spremljati stanje, vključno z uresničevanjem in uporabo načel, vključenih v ti priporočili, ter oceniti potrebo po nadaljnjih ukrepih.
Moreover, experience over the last years, and more recently in relation to the financial crisis, has shown that remuneration structures have become increasingly complex, too focused on short-term achievements and in some cases led to excessive remuneration, which was not justified by performance.
Poleg tega so izkušnje iz zadnjih let in nedavne izkušnje v zvezi s finančno krizo pokazale, da postajajo strukture prejemkov vse bolj zapletene, da so preveč osredotočene na kratkoročne dosežke in da so v nekaterih primerih pripeljale do čezmernih prejemkov, ki jih rezultati niso upravičevali.
Whilst the form, structure and level of directors’ remuneration continue to be matters primarily falling within the competence of companies, their shareholders and, where applicable, employee representatives, the Commission considers that there is a need for additional principles regarding the structure of directors’ remuneration, as set out in a company’s remuneration policy and the process of determining remuneration and control on that process.
Medtem ko oblika, struktura in raven prejemkov direktorjev ostajajo zadeve, za katere so pristojni predvsem družbe, njihovi delničarji, in kadar je primerno, predstavniki zaposlenih, Komisija meni, da so potrebna dodatna načela glede strukture prejemkov direktorjev, kot je določena v politiki prejemkov družbe, ter glede postopka določanja prejemkov in nadzora nad tem postopkom.
This Recommendation is without prejudice to the rights, where applicable, of social partners in collective bargaining.
To priporočilo ne posega v morebitne pravice socialnih partnerjev pri kolektivnih pogajanjih.
The existing regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies should be strengthened by principles which are complementary to those contained in Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC.
Obstoječi sistem prejemkov direktorjev javnih družb je treba okrepiti z načeli, ki dopolnjujejo načela iz priporočil 2004/913/ES in 2005/162/ES.
The structure of directors’ remuneration should promote the long-term sustainability of the company and ensure that remuneration is based on performance.
Struktura prejemkov direktorjev mora spodbujati dolgoročno vzdržnost družbe in zagotoviti, da prejemki temeljijo na rezultatih.
Variable components of remuneration should therefore be linked to predetermined and measurable performance criteria, including criteria of a non-financial nature.
Zato je treba variabilni del prejemkov povezati z vnaprej določenimi in merljivimi merili uspešnosti, vključno z merili nefinančne narave.
Limits should be set on the variable components of remuneration.
Za variabilni del prejemkov je treba določiti omejitve.
Significant variable components of remuneration should be deferred for a certain period, for example, three to five years, subject to performance conditions.
Precej variabilnega dela prejemkov je treba odložiti za neko obdobje, na primer za od tri do pet let, glede na pogoje uspešnosti.
Further, companies should be able to reclaim variable components of remuneration that were paid on the basis of data, which proved to be manifestly misstated.
Nadalje morajo biti družbe zmožne zahtevati povračilo variabilnega dela prejemkov, ki je bil plačan na podlagi podatkov, za katere se je izkazalo, da so nedvomno napačno prikazani.
It is necessary to ensure that termination payments, so-called ‘golden parachutes’, are not a reward for failure and that the primary purpose of termination payments as a safety net in case of early termination of the contract is respected.
Zagotoviti je treba, da odpravnine, tako imenovana „zlata padala“, niso nagrade za neuspeh in da se spoštuje osnovni namen odpravnin kot varnostne mreže v primeru predčasne prekinitve pogodbe.
To that purpose, termination payments should be limited to a certain amount or duration beforehand, which, in general, should not be more than two years’ annual remuneration (on the basis of only the non-variable component of the annual remuneration) and not be paid if the termination is due to inadequate performance or if a director leaves on his own account.
V ta namen je treba odpravnine vnaprej omejiti na neki znesek ali trajanje, ki na splošno ne bi smel presegati dveh let letnih prejemkov (zgolj na podlagi fiksnega dela letnih prejemkov) in ne bi smel biti izplačan, če je prenehanje posledica neustreznih rezultatov ali če direktor odide po svoji volji.
This does not preclude termination payments in situations of early termination of the contract, due to changes in the strategy of the company or in merger and/or takeover situations.
To ne preprečuje odpravnin v primerih predčasnega prenehanja pogodbe zaradi sprememb strategije družbe oziroma v primerih združitve in/ali prevzema.
Schemes under which directors are remunerated in shares, share options or any other right to acquire shares or be remunerated on the basis of share price movements should be better linked to performance and long-term value creation of the company.
Sheme, v skladu s katerimi direktorji prejmejo plačilo v obliki delnic, delniških opcij ali v obliki katere druge pravice do pridobitve delnic oziroma na podlagi katerih se prejemki preračunajo glede na gibanje cen delnic, morajo biti bolje povezane z rezultati in ustvarjanjem dolgoročne vrednosti družbe.
Therefore, an appropriate vesting period should apply to shares, whereby vesting is made subject to performance conditions.
Zato bi morala za delnice veljati ustrezna odmerna doba, pri čemer je odmera pogojena z rezultati.
Share options and rights to acquire shares or be remunerated on the basis of share price movements should be not be exercisable during an appropriate period and the right to exercise them should be made subject to performance conditions.
V ustreznem obdobju ne sme biti mogoče izvrševanje delniških opcij in pravic do pridobitve delnic ali pravic do prejemkov, preračunanih glede na gibanje cen delnic, pravica do njihove izvršitve pa mora biti odvisna od rezultatov.
In order to further prevent conflicts of interest of directors who hold shares in the company, these directors should be obliged to retain a part of their shares until the end of their mandate.
Da bi poleg tega preprečili konflikte med interesi direktorjev, ki so lastniki delnic v družbi, morajo biti ti direktorji zavezani, da del svojih delnic obdržijo do konca mandata.
In order to facilitate the shareholders’ assessment of the company’s approach to remuneration and strengthen the company’s accountability towards its shareholders, the remuneration statement should be clear and easily understandable.
Da bi delničarjem olajšali ocenjevanje pristopa družbe k prejemkom in okrepili odgovornost družbe do delničarjev, mora biti poročilo o prejemkih jasno in lahko razumljivo.
Moreover, further disclosure of information relating to the structure of remuneration is necessary.
Poleg tega je potrebno nadaljnje razkritje informacij v zvezi s strukturo prejemkov.
In order to increase accountability, shareholders should be encouraged to attend general meetings and make considered use of their voting rights.
Da bi povečali odgovornost, je treba delničarje spodbujati, naj se udeležujejo skupščin in premišljeno uporabljajo glasovalne pravice.
In particular, institutional shareholders should take a leading role in the context of ensuring increased accountability of boards with regard to remuneration issues.
Predvsem institucionalni delničarji bi morali prevzeti vodilno vlogo za zagotavljanje večje odgovornosti upravnih odborov glede vprašanj prejemkov.
Remuneration committees, as referred to in Recommendation 2005/162/EC, fulfil an important role in designing a company’s remuneration policy, preventing conflicts of interests and supervising the (managing) board’s behaviour in the context of remuneration.
Komisije za prejemke iz Priporočila 2005/162/ES imajo pomembno vlogo pri oblikovanju politike prejemkov družbe, preprečevanju navzkrižij interesov in nadzorovanju ravnanja upravnega odbora ali nadzornega sveta glede prejemkov.
To strengthen the role of those committees, at least one member thereof should have expertise in the field of remuneration.
Za okrepitev vloge teh komisij mora imeti vsaj eden njihovih članov strokovno znanje in izkušnje na področju prejemkov.
Remuneration consultants may have conflicting interests, for instance when they advise the remuneration committee on remuneration practices and arrangements, and at the same time advise the company or the executive or managing director(s).
Svetovalci na področju prejemkov imajo lahko navzkrižne interese, na primer ko svetujejo komisiji za prejemke glede praks in ureditev prejemkov, hkrati pa svetujejo družbi ali izvršnim direktorjem ali članom uprave.
It is appropriate for remuneration committees to exercise caution when hiring remuneration consultants in order to ensure that the same consultants do not advise the human resources department of the company or executive or managing directors at the same time.
Za komisijo za prejemke je primerno, da je previdna pri najemanju svetovalcev na področju prejemkov in da zagotovi, da isti svetovalci hkrati ne svetujejo še kadrovskemu oddelku družbe ali izvršnim direktorjem oziroma članom uprave.
In view of the importance of the question of remuneration of directors and in order to enhance the effective application of the Community framework on directors’ remuneration, the Commission intends to make extended use of different monitoring mechanisms, such as annual scoreboards and mutual evaluation by Member States.
Komisija namerava ob upoštevanju pomembnosti vprašanja prejemkov direktorjev in zaradi povečanja učinkovite uporabe okvira Skupnosti za prejemke direktorjev obsežneje uporabiti različne mehanizme spremljanja, kot so letni kazalniki napredka in vzajemno ocenjevanje med državami članicami.
Moreover, the Commission intends to explore the possibilities of standardising disclosure of directors’ remuneration policy.
Poleg tega namerava Komisija raziskati možnosti za standardizacijo razkritja politike prejemkov direktorjev.
The notification of measures by Member States in accordance with this Recommendation should include a clear time-frame for companies to adopt remuneration policies consistent with the principles set out in this Recommendation,
Obvestilo o ukrepih držav članic v skladu s tem priporočilom mora vključevati jasen časovni okvir, v katerem bodo družbe sprejele politike prejemkov, skladne z načeli tega priporočila –
The scope of section II of this Recommendation corresponds to that of Recommendation 2004/913/EC.
Področje uporabe oddelka II tega priporočila ustreza področju uporabe Priporočila 2004/913/ES.
The scope of section III of this Recommendation corresponds to that of Recommendation 2005/162/EC.
Področje uporabe oddelka III tega priporočila ustreza področju uporabe Priporočila 2005/162/ES.
Member States should take all appropriate measures to ensure that listed companies, to which Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC are applicable, have regard to this Recommendation.
Države članice morajo sprejeti vse ustrezne ukrepe za zagotovitev, da javne družbe, za katere veljata priporočili 2004/913/ES in 2005/162/ES, upoštevajo to priporočilo.
Definitions in addition to those laid down in Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC
Opredelitve pojmov, poleg opredelitev iz priporočil 2004/913/ES in 2005/162/ES:
‘Variable components of remuneration’ means components of directors’ remuneration entitlement which are awarded on the basis of performance criteria, including bonuses.
„Variabilni del prejemkov“ pomeni del upravičenosti direktorjev do prejemkov, ki je dodeljen na podlagi meril uspešnosti, vključno z bonusi.
‘Termination payments’ means any payment linked to early termination of contracts for executive or managing directors, including payments related to the duration of a notice period or a non-competition clause included in the contract.
„Odpravnine“ pomenijo katero koli plačilo, povezano s predčasno prekinitvijo pogodb za izvršne direktorje ali člane uprav, vključno s plačili, povezanimi s trajanjem odpovednega roka ali konkurenčno klavzulo, vključeno v pogodbo.
(section II of Recommendation 2004/913/EC)
(oddelek II Priporočila 2004/913/ES)
Structure of the policy on directors’ remuneration
Struktura politike prejemkov direktorjev
Where the remuneration policy includes variable components of remuneration, companies should set limits on the variable component(s).
Kadar politika prejemkov vključuje variabilni del prejemkov, morajo družbe določiti omejitve variabilnega dela.
The non-variable component of remuneration should be sufficient to allow the company to withhold variable components of remuneration when performance criteria are not met.
Fiksni del prejemkov mora biti zadosten, da družbi omogoči zadržanje variabilnega dela prejemkov, kadar merila uspešnosti niso izpolnjena.
Award of variable components of remuneration should be subject to predetermined and measurable performance criteria.
Dodelitev variabilnega dela prejemkov mora biti odvisna od vnaprej določenih in merljivih meril uspešnosti.
Performance criteria should promote the long-term sustainability of the company and include non-financial criteria that are relevant to the company’s long-term value creation, such as compliance with applicable rules and procedures.
Merila uspešnosti morajo spodbujati dolgoročno vzdržnost družbe in vključevati nefinančna merila, ki so pomembna za ustvarjanje dolgoročne vrednosti družbe, kot je spoštovanje veljavnih pravil in postopkov.
Where a variable component of remuneration is awarded, a major part of the variable component should be deferred for a minimum period of time.
Kadar se dodeli variabilni del prejemkov, je treba večji del variabilnega dela odložiti za neko minimalno obdobje.
The part of the variable component subject to deferment should be determined in relation to the relative weight of the variable component compared to the non-variable component of remuneration.
Odloženi del variabilnega dela je treba določiti glede na relativno višino variabilnega dela v primerjavi s fiksnim delom prejemkov.
Contractual arrangements with executive or managing directors should include provisions that permit the company to reclaim variable components of remuneration that were awarded on the basis of data which subsequently proved to be manifestly misstated.
Pogodbene ureditve z izvršnimi direktorji ali člani uprav morajo vključevati določbe, ki družbi omogočajo, da zahteva povračilo variabilnega dela prejemkov, ki je bil izplačan na podlagi podatkov, za katere se je pozneje izkazalo, da so bili nedvomno napačno prikazani.
Termination payments should not exceed a fixed amount or fixed number of years of annual remuneration, which should, in general, not be higher than two years of the non-variable component of remuneration or the equivalent thereof.
Odpravnine ne smejo presegati fiksnega zneska ali fiksnega števila let letnih prejemkov, ki na splošno ne sme presegati dveh let fiksnega dela prejemkov ali njihove ustreznice.
Termination payments should not be paid if the termination is due to inadequate performance.
Odpravnine se ne izplačajo, če je prenehanje posledica neustreznih rezultatov.
Shares should not vest for at least three years after their award.
Delnice ne smejo biti odmerjene še vsaj tri leta po njihovi dodelitvi.
Share options or any other right to acquire shares or to be remunerated on the basis of share price movements should not be exercisable for at least three years after their award.
Izvrševanje delniških opcij ali katerih koli drugih pravic do pridobitve delnic ali pravic do prejemkov, preračunanih glede na gibanje cen delnic, ne sme biti mogoče vsaj tri leta po njihovi dodelitvi.
Vesting of shares and the right to exercise share options or any other right to acquire shares or to be remunerated on the basis of share price movements, should be subject to predetermined and measurable performance criteria.
Odmera delnic in pravica do izvršitve delniških opcij ali katera koli druga pravica do pridobitve delnic ali do prejemkov, preračunanih glede na gibanje cen delnic, morajo biti odvisne od vnaprej določenih in merljivih meril uspešnosti.
After vesting, directors should retain a number of shares, until the end of their mandate, subject to the need to finance any costs related to acquisition of the shares.
Direktorji morajo po odmeri obdržati določeno število delnic do konca svojega mandata, odvisno od potrebe po financiranju morebitnih stroškov, povezanih s pridobitvijo delnic.
The number of shares to be retained should be fixed, for example, twice the value of total annual remuneration (the non-variable plus the variable components).
Število delnic, ki jih je treba obdržati, mora biti fiksno, na primer v dvakratni vrednosti skupnih letnih prejemkov (fiksni plus variabilni del).
Remuneration of non-executive or supervisory directors should not include share options.
Prejemki neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta ne vključujejo delniških opcij.
Disclosure of the policy on directors’ remuneration
Razkritje politike prejemkov direktorjev
The remuneration statement, mentioned in point 3.1 of Recommendation 2004/913/EC, should be clear and easily understandable.
Poročilo o prejemkih, navedeno v točki 3.1 Priporočila 2004/913/ES, mora biti jasno in lahko razumljivo.
In addition to the information set out in point 3.3 of Recommendation 2004/913/EC, the remuneration statement should include the following:
Poleg informacij iz točke 3.3 Priporočila 2004/913/ES mora poročilo o prejemkih vsebovati:
an explanation how the choice of performance criteria contributes to the long-term interests of the company, in accordance with point 3.2 of this Recommendation;
razlago, kako izbira meril uspešnosti prispeva k dolgoročnim interesom družbe, v skladu s točko 3.2 tega priporočila;
an explanation of the methods, applied in order to determine whether performance criteria have been fulfilled;
razlago metod, uporabljenih za odločitev, ali so bila merila uspešnosti izpolnjena;
sufficient information on deferment periods with regard to variable components of remuneration, as referred to in point 3.3 of this Recommendation;
zadostne informacije o obdobjih odloga glede variabilnega dela prejemkov, kot je navedeno v točki 3.3 tega priporočila;
sufficient information on the policy regarding termination payments, as referred to in point 3.4 of this Recommendation;
zadostne informacije o politiki glede odpravnin, kot je navedeno v točki 3.4 tega priporočila;
sufficient information with regard to vesting periods for share-based remuneration, as referred to in point 4.1 of this Recommendation;
zadostne informacije v zvezi z odmernimi dobami, kot je navedeno v točki 4.1 tega priporočila;
sufficient information on the policy regarding retention of shares after vesting, as referred to in point 4.3 of this Recommendation;
zadostne informacije o politiki glede zadržanja delnic po odmeri, kot je navedeno v točki 4.3 tega priporočila;
sufficient information on the composition of peer groups of companies the remuneration policy of which has been examined in relation to the establishment of the remuneration policy of the company concerned.
zadostne informacije o sestavi strokovnih skupin družb, katerih politika prejemkov je bila proučena glede na vzpostavitev politike prejemkov zadevne družbe.
Shareholders’ vote
Glasovanje delničarjev