natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The commercial debt to bodies other than SNCB, totalling EUR 22,9 million.
poslovne obveznosti do družb, ki niso SNCB, v skupni višini 22,9 milijona EUR.
On the basis of the above calculations, the IFB’s net asset value for SNCB, excluding debts to SNCB, would have been EUR – 39,4 million, i.e. the value of the assets recovered (EUR 37,5 million) from which the total sum of the commitments to be honoured due to liabilities (EUR 76,9 million) is subtracted, excluding debts to SNCB.
Iz zgornjih izračunov naj bi sledilo, da bi neto vrednost sredstev IFB za SNCB – brez dolgov do SNCB – znašala -39,4 milijona EUR, to je vrednost povrnjenih sredstev (37,5 milijona EUR), od katere se odšteje skupni znesek obveznosti iz virov, ki jih je treba plačati (76,9 milijona EUR), brez dolgov do SNCB.
The Belgian authorities consider that, in the event of liquidation, in order to avoid significant damage to its commercial reputation, SNCB would have absorbed the cost of IFB’s negative net asset value.
Belgijski organi menijo, da bi družba SNCB v primeru likvidacije prevzela stroške negativne neto vrednosti sredstev IFB, zato da bi preprečila veliko škodo za svoj poslovni ugled.
In this respect, they emphasise that most of IFB’s creditors are also clients, suppliers, creditors, debtors or partners of SNCB.
V tem pogledu belgijski organi poudarjajo, da so upniki IFB pretežno tudi stranke, dobavitelji, upniki, dolžniki ali partnerji SNCB.
Moreover, the cessation of the IFB’s activities, again according to the Belgian Government, would have give rise to a major social liability for SNCB, which can be estimated at 530 FTE (full time equivalents) [19].
Poleg tega bi ukinitev dejavnosti IFB po mnenju belgijske vlade povzročila velike socialne obveznosti za SNCB, ki bi jih lahko ocenili na 530 EPDČ (ekvivalent polnega delovnega časa) [19].
These 530 FTE are made up as follows:
Teh 530 EPDČ sestavljajo:
On the one hand, some 50 of SNCB’s personnel seconded to IFB who would have had to return SNCB in the event of bankruptcy,
približno 50 zaposlenih SNCB, napotenih v IFB, ki bi se morali v primeru stečaja ponovno vključiti v SNCB;
IFB’s share of the total turnover of SNCB’s Freight division is 8,1 %.
Delež IFB v skupnem prometu divizije Blago v SNCB je 8,1 %.
This ratio, when applied to the total number of SNCB personnel employed directly or indirectly by the Freight division on 31.12.2002, indicates that around 609 FTE depend upon IFB being in business.
To razmerje, preneseno na vse zaposlene SNCB, ki so bili posredno ali neposredno zaposleni v diviziji Blago 31. decembra 2002, kaže, da je bilo približno 609 EPDČ odvisnih od dejavnosti IFB.
Of these 609 FTE, it has been assumed that 129, or 21 %, would be able to retain a job despite IFB’s bankruptcy, as a result of SNCB’s specific initiatives to regain a share of the traffic previously generated by IFB.
Od teh 609 EPDČ bi jih kljub stečaju IFB 129, to je 21 %, lahko obdržalo delo zaradi posebnih pobud SNCB, da bi ponovno prevzela del prometa, ki ga je pred tem ustvarila IFB.
This ratio of 21 % corresponds to the number of Sabena jobs which could be saved by launching SN Brussels Airlines in the aftermath of Sabena’s bankruptcy.
Teh 21 % ustreza deležu zaposlitev v Sabeni, ki so jih uspeli ohraniti z zagonom SN Brussels Airlines po stečaju Sabene.
The Belgian Government considers that, since SNCB was at the time finalising its business plan ‘MOVE 2007’, which foresaw the shedding of 10000 jobs, almost a quarter of its personnel, between 2003 and 2007, the opportunity to reassign personnel rendered redundant as a result of the cessation of IFB’s activities was practically zero as regards both seconded personnel returning to SNCB or personnel linked to the Freight activity remaining with SNCB.
Glede na to, da je družba SNCB tedaj skoraj končala pripravo poslovnega načrta „MOVE 2007“, v katerem je bila predvidena ukinitev 10000 delovnih mest v obdobju od 2003 do 2007, to je skoraj četrtine njenega osebja, belgijska vlada meni, da praktično ni bilo možnosti za prezaposlitev osebja, ki je zaradi prenehanja dejavnosti IFB postalo presežno, tj. napotenega osebja, ki bi se vrnilo v SNCB, in osebja, povezanega z dejavnostjo Blago, ki je ostalo v SNCB.
In order to justify this calculation, Belgium first of all explained that the SNCB personnel made redundant due to the cessation of IFB’s activities could not be laid off, given that these personnel have the status of ‘statutory employee’ [20].
Da bi Belgija utemeljila ta izračun, najprej razloži, da zaposlenih v SNCB, ki bi postali presežni zaradi prenehanja dejavnosti IFB, ne morejo odpustiti, ker imajo status „javnih uslužbencev“ [20].
Following the meeting of 1 June 2006, the Belgian authorities sent the Commission a less pessimistic scenario for the calculation of the net value and social liability which would have been borne by SNCB in the event of the liquidation of IFB.
Belgijski organi so po delovnem srečanju 1. junija 2006 Komisiji poslali manj pesimističen scenarij za izračun neto vrednosti sredstev in socialnih obveznosti družbe, ki bi jih prevzela družba SNCB v primeru likvidacije IFB.
This scenario proposes the following two changes:
Ta scenarij predlaga naslednji spremembi:
SNCB would not have paid the total bundle of debts, but only those of creditors which were […], suppliers […] or partners […] of SNCB; on this assumption, the sum of IFB’s liability which would have been paid by SNCB would have been EUR 13 million […],
družba SNCB ne bi plačala vseh dolgov, ampak samo dolgove tistih upnikov, ki so obenem stranke […], dobavitelji […] ali partnerji […] SNCB; ob tej predpostavki bi bil znesek obveznosti IFB, ki bi jih plačala družba SNCB, 13 milijonov EUR […];
The IFB buyer would have largely continued to use SNCB’s services; on this assumption 79 % of the 609 FTE employed by SNCB and assigned as indirect support for IFB would have been able to keep their job; on this assumption, the additional social cost to be borne by SNCB would have been limited to EUR 41,1 million (this last sum corresponds to the salary costs of the 50 FTE seconded by SNCB to IFB along with 21 % of the 609 FTE referred to above).
prevzemnik dejavnosti IFB bi še naprej uporabljal velik del storitev SNCB; ob tej predpostavki bi 79 % od 609 EPDČ, zaposlenih v SNCB in kot posredna podpora dejavnostim IFB, lahko ostalo zaposlenih; ob tej predpostavki bi dodatni stroški za SNCB znašali 41,1 milijona EUR (ta znesek ustreza stroškom dela za 50 EPDČ, ki jih je družba SNCB napotila v IFB ter 21 % zgoraj navedenih 609 EPDČ).
The total cost which would have been borne by SNCB in the event of the liquidation of IFB in these two scenarios, as estimated by the Belgian authorities, is represented in the following table:
Skupni stroški, ki bi jih nosila družba SNCB v primeru likvidacije IFB v obeh scenarijih belgijskih organov so povzeti v spodnji razpredelnici: Neto stroški – zneski, navedeni v odgovoru
Net cost — sums retained in the response
Razlika v „optimističnih predpostavkah“
Difference in the ‘optimistic’ hypotheses
Neto stroški – prilagojeni zneski
Non-recovered assets
Neizterjana sredstva
Social costs
Socialni stroški
Taxes, salaries and social security
Davki, plače in socialna varnost
Provisions and deferred taxes
Rezervacije in odloženi davki:
Priority loans and other financial debt
Prednostne terjatve in drugi finančni dolgovi
Non-SNCB commercial debt
Poslovne obveznosti, brez obveznosti do SNCB
Recovery value
Vrednost izterjanih sredstev
Social liability to the SNCB
Socialne obveznosti do SNCB
Net cost for SNCB of filing for bankruptcy by IFB
Neto stroški za SNCB, če IFB razglasi stečaj
Valuation of IFB in a business-as-usual scenario
Valorizacija IFB po scenariju nadaljevanja dejavnosti
Belgium proposed to calculate IFB’s value in a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario according to the ‘discounted cash flows’ or ‘DCF’ method.
Belgija predlaga, da se vrednost IFB ob predpostavki „nadaljevanja dejavnosti“izračuna po metodi diskontiranih denarnih tokov („discounted cash flows“ ali „DCF“).
The parameters used for this analysis are as follows.
Za to analizo so bili izbrani naslednji parametri:
From 2006, the working assumption is an annual growth of 3 % of turnover which, at a constant margin, leads to a pre-tax rate of profit growth of 3 %.
Po letu 2006 delovna predpostavka predvideva 3-odstotno letno rast prometa, kar ob nespremenjeni marži pomeni 3-odstotno stopnjo rasti dobička pred davki.
The resulting discounted cash flows are compounded to a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 8 %.
Prosti denarni tokovi, ki izhajajo iz tega, se diskontirajo z 8-odstotnim tehtanim povprečjem stroškov kapitala (WACC).
The value of the terminals has been calculated on the assumption of a continuing annual growth of 3 %.
Vrednost terminalov je bila izračunana ob predpostavki stalne 3-odstotne rasti.
These calculations lead to valuation of the business at around EUR 29,1 million (excluding shareholdings and provisions), as shown in diagram 4.
Ti izračuni pripeljejo do valorizacije podjeta v višini približno 29,1 milijona EUR (brez kapitalske udeležbe in rezervacij), kot kaže shema 4.
Diagram 4
Shema 4
Value of ifb based on discounted cash flows — Assumptions and results
Vrednost ifb na podlagi diskontiranih denarnih tokov – predpostavka in rezultati
According to the Belgian Government, an analysis based on multiples (dependent on the results obtained in 2005) confirms the valuation obtained on the basis of the DCF method.
Po mnenju belgijske vlade analiza, ki temelji na večkratnikih (glede na rezultate v letu 2005), potrjuje valorizacijo na podlagi metode DCF.
The ‘multiples’ valuation (with more cautious multiples than the sector averages) indicates a value for the business of around EUR 28,7 million, as shown in diagram 5.
Dejansko valorizacija z „večkratniki“ (s previdnejšimi večkratniki, kot so sektorska povprečja) kaže vrednosti podjetja v višini približno 28,7 milijona EUR, kot kaže shema 5.
Diagram 5
Shema 5
Value of the ifb business
Vrednost podjetja IFB
The Belgian Government considers that the actual results obtained by IFB in the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 also confirm that the DCF valuation, and the assumptions upon which it is based, were realistic.
Belgijska vlada meni, da dejanski rezultati IFB v letih 2003, 2004 in 2005 potrjujejo tudi, da so bile valorizacija DCF in predpostavke, iz katerih je izhajala, realistične.
The Belgian Government considers that IFB’s shareholdings, namely the EUR 1,9 million entered as assets in IFB’s balance sheet of 31 December 2002, should be added to IFB’s value as calculated excluding provisions and shareholdings.
Belgijska vlada meni, da je treba vrednosti IFB brez kapitalske udeležbe in rezervacij prišteti še kapitalske udeležbe IFB, to je 1,9 milijona EUR, kakršna je bila knjigovodska bilančna vrednost sredstev IFB na dan 31. decembra 2002.
IFB’s total value, including the shareholdings, was therefore EUR 31 million on 31 December 2002.
Skupna vrednost podjetja IFB, vključno s kapitalsko udeležbo, je 31. decembra 2002 torej znašala 31 milijonov EUR.
Still according to the Belgian Government, the value of provisions, estimated at EUR 34,2 million [21], along with the financial debt amounting to EUR 15 million, should be deducted from this value of the business.
Od te vrednosti podjetja je treba po mnenju belgijske vlade odšteti vrednost rezervacij, ocenjeno na 34,2 milijona EUR [21], ter finančni dolg v višini 15 milijonov EUR.
As in the preceding estimate of the cost borne by SNCB in the event of the liquidation of IFB, the above calculations do not take account of the debts of EUR 63 million resulting from the unpaid invoices during the period between 2000 and 2002.
Kot v prejšnji oceni stroškov, ki bi jih nosila družba SNCB v primeru likvidacije IFB, zgornji izračuni ne upoštevajo dolgov v višini 63 milijonov EUR zaradi neplačanih računov v letih od 2000 do 2002.
Diagram 6
Shema 6
Evaluation of the investment option, January 2003
Ocena možnosti investicije, Jan 2003
Comparison of the two scenarios and conclusion
Primerjava obeh scenarijev in sklep
Based on the Belgian Government’s analysis, the two scenarios would give the following results:
V skladu z analizo belgijske vlade bi scenarija dala naslednje rezultate:
The net cost to SNCB of the bankruptcy and liquidation of IFB would be a net loss of EUR 161,8 million (reduced to EUR 70,6 million in the revised estimate),
neto stroški stečaja in likvidacije IFB za SNCB bi pomenili čisto izgubo v višini 161,8 milijona EUR (spremenjena na znesek 70,6 milijona EUR v popravljeni oceni);
The decision to invest EUR 15 million to allow IFB to remain in business would lead to a considerable reduction in the loss of value for SNCB, which would therefore be no more than EUR 18,2 million, a gain of EUR 143,6 million compared with the scenario of bankruptcy and liquidation (EUR 52,4 million compared with the revised estimate).
odločitev za naložbo v višini 15 milijonov EUR, da bi družba IFB lahko še naprej opravljala dejavnost, je občutno zmanjšala izgubo vrednosti za SNCB, ki je potem znašala samo še 18,2 milijona EUR, kar predstavlja pridobitev v višini 143,6 milijona EUR v primerjavi s scenarijem stečaja in likvidacije (52,4 milijona EUR v primerjavi s popravljeno oceno).
Consequently, the Belgian Government considers that SNCB, in agreeing the measures in question, had behaved as a private investor in a market economy would have done.
Zato belgijska vlada meni, da je družba SNCB z odobritvijo zadevnih ukrepov ravnala, kot bi ravnal zasebni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu.
Absence of distortion of competition
Odsotnost izkrivljanja konkurence
Finally, Belgium considers, as regards the part of the measures serving to finance the divestment of the French subsidiaries, that an amount of aid which is strictly limited to the actual costs incurred following the cessation of business cannot be considered to distort competition.
Nazadnje Belgija v zvezi z delom ukrepov za financiranje umika iz francoskih hčerinskih družb meni, da pomoči, katere znesek je natančno omejen na dejanske stroške, ki so nastali zaradi ukinitve dejavnosti, ni mogoče obravnavati kot pomoč, ki izkrivlja konkurenco.
That part of the financing would therefore not be covered by the scope of Article 87(1) for this reason.
Tudi zato naj ta del financiranja ne bi sodil na področje uporabe člena 87(1).
Compatibility of the rescue measures with the guidelines
Združljivost ukrepov reševanja s smernicami
IFB is not a newly created business
IFB ni novoustanovljeno podjetje
Belgium considers that since IFB was founded in 1923 and has, by means of a merger by takeover, acquired a company, along with a branch of activity in 1998 (see description in part 2 of this decision), there can be no doubt that IFB has had legal personality for more than 80 years and cannot therefore be considered a ‘newly created business’.
Ker je bila družba IFB ustanovljena leta 1923 in je leta 1998 ob združitvi s pripojitvijo pridobila družbo in dejavnost (prim. opis v delu 2 te odločbe), Belgija meni, da je nesporno, da je IFB pravna oseba že več kot 80 let in je torej ni mogoče obravnavati kot „novoustanovljeno podjetje“.
The rescue measures are compatible with the 1999 guidelines
Ukrepi reševanja so združljivi s smernicami iz leta 1999
Since point 24 of the 1999 guidelines provides that authorisation of the rescue measures remains valid until the Commission rules on the restructuring plan, the Belgian authorities request the Commission not to invoke the duration of its own approval procedure for the rescue measures in order to contest the duration of the continuation of these measures, and to approve the rescue measures, on the basis of point 24 of the 1999 guidelines.
Ker točka 24 smernic iz leta 1999 določa, da odobritev ukrepov reševanja velja, dokler Komisija ne sprejme odločitve o planu prestrukturiranja, belgijski organi prosijo Komisijo, naj se pri spodbijanju trajanja teh ukrepov ne sklicuje na trajanje postopka za odobritev teh ukrepov in naj na podlagi točke 24 smernic iz leta 1999 odobri ukrepe reševanja.
The Belgian authorities consider that the suspension of the capital increase pending examination by the Commission necessarily means the continuation, as a provisional and precautionary measure, of the payment period which IFB is allowed within the framework of the rescue measures, as the sole alternative would have been voluntary liquidation.
Belgijski organi menijo, da je odlog povečanja kapitala med poizvedbo Komisije nujno predpostavljal – začasno in do preklica – ohranitev odloga plačila, odobrenega IFB v okviru ukrepov reševanja, ker bi bil stečaj edina alternativna možnost.
Finally, according to the Belgian authorities, during the course of its examination, the Commission had never have expressed any reservation regarding the provisional continuation of the rescue measures.
Nazadnje, po mnenju belgijskih organov Komisija med poizvedbo ni nikdar izrazila pomislekov glede začasnega ohranjanja ukrepov reševanja.
The restructuring measures are compatible with the 1999 guidelines
Ukrepi prestrukturiranja so združljivi s smernicami iz leta 1999
Applicability of the 1999 guidelines
Uporabnost smernic iz leta 1999
Belgium considers that SNCB’s commitment to underwrite the increase in capital of IFB should be analysed within the context of the 1999 guidelines and not those of 2004.
Belgija meni, da je treba zavezo družbe SNCB, da bo prevzela financiranje povečanja kapitala IFB, analizirati v okviru smernic iz leta 1999 in ne iz leta 2004.
In order to justify this point of view, Belgium maintains that the two conditions established by the Commission in point 240 of the decision initiating the procedure for the applicability of the 1999 guidelines are met.
Da bi Belgija upravičila to stališče, trdi, da sta izpolnjena oba pogoja Komisije iz točke 240 odločbe o sprožitvi postopka za uporabo smernic iz leta 1999.
As a reminder, in point 240 of the decision initiating the procedure, the Commission concluded, as regards the interpretation of points 102 to 104 of the 2004 guidelines for this case, that ‘if SNCB decides not to award the new asset to IFB, and if the evidence is forthcoming that SNCB was engaged in converting its receivables into capital before the publication of the 2004 guidelines, the Commission would have to examine in its final decision the aid granted to IFB by the SNCB on the basis of the 1999 guidelines’.
Naj spomnimo, da je Komisija v točki 240 odločbe o sprožitvi postopka v zvezi z razlago točk od 102 do 104 smernic iz leta 2004 za ta spis ugotovila, da „če se bo družba SNCB odločila, da IFB ne bo dodelila nove ugodnosti in če je dokazano, da se je družba SNCB zavezala, da bo pretvorila svoje terjatve v kapital, preden so bile objavljene smernice iz leta 2004, bi morala Komisija v končni odločitvi preučiti pomoči, ki jih je družba SNCB dodelila IFB, na podlagi smernic iz leta 1999“.
As regards the first condition, Belgium observes that, in its reply to the letter initiating the procedure, it had retracted the increase in capital notified on 28 January 2005, and that consequently, the first condition was fulfilled.
V zvezi s prvim pogojem Belgija pripominja, da je v odgovoru na dopis o sprožitvi postopka umaknila dodatno povečanja kapitala, priglašeno 28. januarja 2005, zato je prvi pogoj izpolnjen.
As regards the second condition, Belgium considers that there can be no doubt that the increase in capital of IFB currently proposed would be put into effect as agreed by the parties, under the condition precedent of the Commission’s agreement, in the framework agreement of 7 April 2003.
V zvezi z drugim pogojem Belgija meni, da je nesporno, da se sedaj predlagano povečanje kapitala IFB izvede v skladu z dogovorom podpisnic okvirne pogodbe z dne 7. aprila 2003, vendar ob odložilnem pogoju odobritve Komisije.
In order to underline this point, the Belgian authorities draw the Commission’s attention to:
Da bi belgijski organi poudarili to točko, opozarjajo Komisijo na:
Point 4 of the preamble to the framework agreement of 7 April 2003, which confirms that the Management Board of SNCB has already approved the underwriting of an increase in capital of IFB,
točko 4 preambule okvirne pogodbe z dne 7. aprila 2003, ki potrjuje, da je upravni odbor SNCB že odobril prevzem financiranja povečanja kapitala IFB;
Article 4 of the same contract, which confirms the reciprocal intention of both parties to proceed with an increase in capital of IFB.
člen 4 iste pogodbe, ki potrjuje vzajemni namen podpisnic, da bosta povečali kapital IFB;
As regards the second point, the Belgian authorities draw attention to the fact that, under Belgian law (the law applicable to the framework agreement), a contract arises from the sole consensus of the contracting parties, and that in this case, Article 4 of the framework agreement expressly confirms without any ambiguity the consensus of SNCB and IFB to proceed with an increase in capital of IFB by converting SNCB’s receivables from IFB into capital retroactively to 7 April 2003.
V zvezi z drugo točko belgijski organi opozarjajo, da po belgijski zakonodaji (veljavni za okvirno pogodbo) pogodba nastane samo po volji podpisnic in da naj bi v tem primeru člen 4 okvirne pogodbe izrecno in nedvoumno potrjeval soglasje SNCB in IFB, da se poveča kapital IFB s pretvorbo terjatev SNCB do IFB v kapital retroaktivno do 7. aprila 2003.
The Belgian authorities point out that, under Belgian law, obligations which are subject to a condition precedent remain fully binding, and the implementation of the condition precedent has a retroactive effect on the contract which takes effect from the date of signature.
Belgijski organi opozarjajo, da v belgijski zakonodaji obveznosti, za katere velja odložilni pogoj, ostanejo polno zavezujoče, odložilni pogoj pa retroaktivno vpliva na pogodbo, ki začne veljati z datumom podpisa.
Measures to limit the adverse effects on competition as much as possible
Ukrepi, s katerimi se, kolikor je mogoče, omili izkrivljanje konkurence
The Belgian authorities emphasise that the IFB’s market shares are well below 10 % of the markets involved in this case.
Belgijski organi na splošno trdijo, da tržni deleži IFB na zadevnih trgih nikakor ne dosegajo 10 %.
Consequently, they consider that the anti-competitive effects resulting from the State aid involved cannot be considered to be significant.
Zato menijo, da protikonkurenčnih učinkov zadevnih državnih pomoči ni mogoče šteti za pomembne.
They point out notably that, by virtue of point 36 of the 1999 guidelines, ‘if the firm’s [beneficiary of the aid’s] share of the relevant market is negligible, it should be considered that there is no undue distortion of competition’ [22], and that, for the application of Article 81(1) EC, the Commission considers the anti-competitive effects of agreements concluded by businesses having market shares smaller than 10 % to be insignificant [23].
Zlasti v skladu s členom 36 smernic iz leta 1999 opozarjajo, da „če je delež [zadevnega] trga, ki ga ima podjetje [ki prejme pomoč], zanemarljiv, se šteje, da ni nedovoljenega izkrivljanja konkurence“ [22] in da za uporabo člena 81(1) Pogodbe Komisija meni, da so protikonkurenčni učinki dogovorov med podjetji, ki imajo manj kot 10-odstotni tržni delež, nepomembni [23].
As regards the activities of IFB Logistics and IFB Terminal more particularly, the Belgian authorities make the following comments.
Zlasti v zvezi z dejavnostmi IFB Logistics in IFB Terminal belgijski organi pripominjajo naslednje:
The mitigating measures on the freight transhipment market.
Olajševalni ukrepi na trgu pretovarjanja.
The Belgian Government observes that IFB’s share of the terminals market in the Antwerp region is less than 7 %, and that during the period 2002-2005 the terminals market in this region experienced a rate of growth of 10,7 % per annum on average, whereas the volumes transported by IFB increased by only 4,1 % per annum on average.
Belgijska vlada ugotavlja, da tržni delež IFB na trgu terminalov v regiji Antwerpen znaša manj kot 7 % in da je imel trg terminalov v tej regiji v obdobju 2002-2005 povprečno letno 10,7-odstotno stopnjo rasti, medtem ko se je obseg prevozov, ki jih je opravila družba IFB v povprečju povečeval samo za 4,1 % na leto.