natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Germany argues that a private investor would compare the direct cost of an insolvency of IKB, which would have been EUR 1,5 billion, stemming from maintaining IKB’s book value of about EUR 620 million (based on German accounting rules) [22] and the cost of writing off about EUR 850 million in loans which IKB had distributed to third parties in the context of KfW’s development business [23].
Nemčija trdi, da bi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu za osnovo vzel neposredne stroške plačilne nesposobnosti IKB, tj. v tem primeru 1,5 milijarde EUR, ki izhajajo iz ohranjanja knjigovodske vrednosti IKB v višini okoli 620 milijonov EUR [22] (po nemških računovodskih standardih) in odpisa kreditov v višini okoli 850 milijonov EUR, ki jih je banka IKB v okviru dejavnosti KfW za pospeševanje dodelila tretjim stranem [23].
In addition, Germany claims the insolvency of IKB would produce second-round effects resulting in the write-off of additional loans granted as part of credits from the development activities of at least EUR 1,1 billion and an increased cost of refinancing.
Poleg tega bi plačilna nesposobnost banke IKB privedla do tega, da bi bilo treba odpisati dodatne kredite iz dejavnosti za pospeševanje v višini najmanj 1,1 milijarde EUR, tako da bi stroški refinanciranja narasli.
Finally, KfW’s reputation would have suffered too.
Končno pa bi škodo utrpelo tudi dobro ime KfW.
Moreover, Germany argues that even if the support measures were considered to be aid, the amount of aid should be reduced by the losses that KfW would have suffered in case of insolvency.
Nemčija še navaja, da bi bilo treba pomoč, tudi če bi ukrepe pomoči šteli za državno pomoč, zmanjšati za izgube, ki bi jih utrpel KfW v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti.
As regards the second measure, Germany points out that it was only an ancillary to the first and was largely financed by the banking associations.
Nemčija v zvezi z drugim ukrepom opozarja na to, da gre samo za dopolnitev prvega ukrepa in da so ga večinoma financirala kreditna združenja.
Therefore, in the light of the Alitalia case law, it should be ‘regarded as satisfying the private investor test and not constituting State aid [given that] it was made at the same time as a significant capital contribution on the part of a private investor made in comparable circumstances’ [24].
Glede na sodbo v zadevi Alitalia naj bi izhajali iz tega, „da dokapitalizacija iz javnih sredstev ustreza načelu zasebnega vlagatelja in ne pomeni državne pomoči, če je izvedena skupaj z večjo dokapitalizacijo zasebnega vlagatelja, ki je bila izvedena pod primerljivimi pogoji“ [24].
Germany does not, however, dispute the aid character of the third measure.
Nemčija ne zanika, da ima tretji ukrep značilnosti pomoči.
Nor, in Germany’s view, did the sale of IKB result in State aid, because KfW behaved like a market-economy vendor.
Tudi pri prodaji IKB po mnenju Nemčije ne gre za državno pomoč, ker je KfW deloval kot odsvojitelj v tržnem gospodarstvu.
The purchase price was the result of negotiations conducted with several potential buyers and was therefore on market terms.
Nakupna cena naj bi bila rezultat pogajanj z različnimi potencialnimi kupci in torej posledično v skladu s tržnimi pogoji.
The several additional measures were necessary to sell the bank and were likewise on market terms.
Dodatni ukrepi naj bi bili nujni za prodajo banke in so bili prav tako v skladu s tržnimi pogoji.
This applies in the first place to the sale of SIP 1 to KfW, at a price [< 10] % below the IFRS book value.
To se prvič nanaša na portfelj SIP 1, ki je bil KfW prodan za [< 10] % nižjo ceno od knjigovodske vrednosti.
It is true that this price is better than the price that Lone Star negotiated for SIP 2 ([discount > 10,0] %) but it must be borne in mind that SIP 2 contained mainly […] and SIP 1 did not.
Ta cena je dejansko boljša od cene, ki jo je s pogajanji dosegla družba Lone Star za portfelj SIP 2 ([odbitek > 10] %), pri čemer je seveda treba upoštevati, da je bil portfelj SIP 2 v nasprotju s portfeljem SIP 1 sestavljen predvsem iz […].
Germany therefore claims that KfW will be able to sell the portfolio or hold it until maturity without losses.
Zaradi tega Nemčija trdi, da bi KfW lahko portfelj prodal ali ga obdržal do zapadlosti brez izgub.
Moreover, KfW needed support from its owner, the State, for the purchase of SIP 1 because it […]; the purchase was facilitated by the guarantee in order to avoid KfW having to commit equity of about EUR […] million ([…]).
Poleg tega je KfW za prodajo portfelja SIP 1 potreboval podporo svoje lastnice, Zvezne republike Nemčije, ker […]; to je bilo premoščeno z državnim jamstvom, da bi se preprečilo, da bi moral KfW vezati lastni kapital v višini približno […] milijonov EUR ([…]).
Second, KfW’s involvement in SIP 2 was also market-based since it involved only low risk, owing to the seniority of the loan, while the remuneration was high, at Euribor plus [> 80] bps, for which Germany provided market benchmarks.
Drugič je bila udeležba KfW v portfelju SIP 2 ravno tako ekonomsko utemeljena, saj je kljub prednosti kredita vsebovala manj tveganja in donos (euribor plus [> 80] osnovnih točk), za katerega je Nemčija posredovala tržne primerjave, je bil visok.
Finally, the fact that KfW had to provide an indemnity of EUR […] billion for […] is typical in cases where the risk of liability is low but the sum involved is large, and this condition was sought by all interested parties in the last round.
Dejstvo, da je moral KfW prevzeti tveganje zaradi jamstva (rezerve) v višini […] EUR za […], ni nenavadno v primerih z majhno verjetnostjo uresničitve in visoko vrednostjo spornega predmeta in so ga v zadnjem krogu pogajanj vsi sodelujoči postavili za pogoj.
Furthermore, Germany argues that, if the Commission were to consider the measures as involving […] aid elements, they would in any event qualify as compatible restructuring aid.
Če bi Komisija menila, da ukrepi vsebujejo značilnosti pomoči, Nemčija trdi, da bi bilo treba te ukrepe v vsakem primeru šteti za pomoč pri prestrukturiranju, ki je združljiva s skupnim trgom.
Germany argues that the business segment of the bank which gave rise to the difficulties has been abandoned and that the bank will now focus on its core business.
Poslovna dejavnost banke, ki jo je privedla v težave, je bila opuščena in banka se bo od zdaj osredotočala na svojo osnovno dejavnost.
Moreover, Germany has committed itself to take all the measures indicated above in recital 46.
Poleg tega se je Nemčija zavezala, da bo sprejela vse ukrepe, navedene v uvodni izjavi 46.
Finally, Germany argues that the restructuring is based on a significant own contribution of at least EUR [> 10] billion.
Nemčija še zatrjuje, da je banka k prestrukturiranju prispevala znatna lastna sredstva (najmanj [> 10] milijard EUR).
It has changed the information supplied in this respect at various times, and has recently included all contributions to the restructuring that were not covered by aid, the reduction of new business, and proceeds from the divestitures minus the losses.
Nemčija je svoje podatke v zvezi s to točko večkrat spremenila in je nazadnje navedla lastni prispevek kot vsoto vseh prispevkov za prestrukturiranje, za katere ni bila priznana pomoč, prihodkov zaradi zmanjšanja poslovnih dejavnosti in donosov zaradi odsvojitev, zmanjšano za izgube.
The net proceeds from divestitures were estimated at EUR [> 5] billion, calculated by looking at the assets to be sold within the restructuring period […] minus the remaining business in Luxembourg and minus some portfolio investments in Luxembourg.
Neto prihodki zaradi odsvojitev so bili ocenjeni na [> 5] milijard EUR; osnova za to so bile aktivne postavke, namenjene prodaji v obdobju prestrukturiranja, zmanjšane za […], preostalo dejavnost v Luxembourgu in nekatere portfeljske naložbe v Luxembourgu.
In detail, Germany estimated EUR […] billion from the real-estate business, EUR […] billion from the Luxembourg and EUR […] billion from the New York subsidiary, as well as EUR […] billion from Amsterdam, EUR […] billion from Movesta and EUR […] billion from other non-strategic assets.
Podrobno je Nemčija ocenila […] milijard EUR za dejavnost nepremičnin, […] milijard EUR za odvisno družbo iz Luxembourga, […] milijard EUR za odvisno družbo iz New Yorka, […] milijonov EUR za Amsterdam, […] milijard EUR za družbo Movesta in […] milijard EUR za drugo nestrateško premoženje.
The Commission will first assess whether the measures constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC.
Komisija bo najprej preverila, ali ukrepi pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
According to this provision, State aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.
V skladu s tem odstavkom je državna pomoč vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem, v kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami.
The risk shield and capital contribution measures (first three measures)
Zaščita pred tveganjem in povečanje kapitala (ukrepi od 1 do 3)
The Commission maintains the opinion put forward in the opening decision that none of the three financial interventions would have been provided by a market-economy investor, and thus all measures constitute State aid.
Komisija vztraja pri svojem stališču, ki ga je zagovarjala v uvodni odločbi, da vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu ne bi uporabil nobenega od treh finančnih ukrepov in da zaradi tega vsi pomenijo državno pomoč.
Given IKB’s cross-border and international activities, it is not disputed that any advantage from State resources would affect competition in the banking sector and would have an impact on intra-community trade [25].
Ker je delovanje IKB mednarodno in presega meje, je jasno, da bi dajanje prednosti z zagotovitvijo državnih sredstev oviralo konkurenco v bančnem sektorju in vplivalo na trgovino v Skupnosti [25].
The Commission notes first that the German authorities argue that the measures do not provide an advantage to IKB because KfW acted solely in its position as owner and thereby like a private investor, but do not dispute that KfW is a publicly owned credit institution with a public function and that its behaviour is imputable to the State.
Komisija je upoštevala argument Nemčije, da zadevni ukrepi niso dali nobene prednosti IKB, ker je KfW deloval izključno v svoji vlogi lastnika in s tem zasebnega vlagatelja. Nemčija kljub temu ne zanika, da je KfW državna kreditna ustanova, ki opravlja javne storitve, in je treba ravnanje KfW pripisati državi.
Germany implicitly confirms that the decisions of KfW are imputable to the State when it admits that the Federal Ministry of Finance was not only present at the meetings of its administrative board, which was involved in all decisions of the weekend between 27 and 29 July 2007, but at the moment of the decision was actually chairing it [26].
S tem ko Nemčija priznava, da zvezno ministrstvo za finance na sestankih upravnega odbora, ki je sodeloval pri vseh odločitvah med 27. in 29. julijem 2007, ni samo sodelovalo, temveč je med odločitvijo celo predsedovalo, Nemčija v bistvu potrjuje, da je treba odločitve KfW pripisati državi [26].
The Commission therefore concentrated on the question whether KfW’s intervention constituted an advantage to IKB that would also have been provided by a market-economy investor operating under similar market conditions.
Zaradi tega se je Komisija pri svoji preiskavi osredotočila na vprašanje, ali je imela banka IKB zaradi posredovanja KfW prednost, ki bi ji jo pod enakimi pogoji zagotovil tudi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu.
Moreover, it is important to stress that KfW did not rule out the possibility that is liability might potentially increase up to EUR 8,1 billion.
Poleg tega je treba poudariti, da KfW ni izključil, da bi jamstvo lahko naraslo tudi do 8,1 milijarde EUR.
It is not true that the intervention would be less costly for KfW and Germany than liquidation [28], even when evaluated ex ante at the time when the investment decision was made [29].
Trditev, da naj bi bil ukrep za KfW in Nemčijo cenejši od likvidacije IKB, ne drži [28], niti takrat ne, ko za podlago vzamemo vnaprejšnjo oceno položaja v času, ko je bila odločitev sprejeta [29].
First, the Commission cannot accept all the liquidation costs put forward by Germany.
Komisija ne more sprejeti vseh stroškov likvidacije, ki jih navaja Nemčija.
Although the Commission recognises that the book value of IKB was indeed EUR 620 million, in the opening decision it pointed out that IKB’s share price dropped significantly before KfW’s intervention, so that KfW’s holding in IKB at the time of the intervention was probably not equal to this book value.
Tudi če je bila knjigovodska vrednost IKB dejansko 620 milijonov EUR, je Komisija že v uvodni odločbi opozorila na to, da je cena delnice IKB znatno padla že pred posredovanjem KfW, tako da vrednost deleža KfW v IKB ob času posredovanja najverjetneje ni ustrezala tej knjigovodski vrednosti.
Furthermore, in the opening decision the Commission questioned whether the underlying default risk of around [> 15] % from the loans distributed in the development business was realistic.
Poleg tega je Komisija v uvodni odločbi dvomila, ali je bilo upoštevano tveganje zaradi neplačil v višini približno [> 15] % pri kreditih, dodeljenih v okviru dejavnosti za pospeševanje, realno.
Germany has not provided sufficient evidence to support the plausibility of KfW’s estimate.
Nemčija ni predložila zadostnih trdnih dokazov, ki bi podprli verjetnost ocene, ki jo je izvedel KfW.
The same lack of reasoning applies to the claimed threat of indirect losses as a consequence of a general banking crisis, which as indicated in the opening decision is purely hypothetical.
Po mnenju Komisije niso dovolj utemeljene niti trditve o nevarnosti posrednih izgub zaradi splošne bančne krize, ki se, kot je že bilo navedeno v uvodni odločbi, zdijo popolnoma hipotetične.
The Commission also remains of the view that structured development financing is part of KfW’s public remit and not part of its function as a normal commercial credit institution.
Komisija še vztraja, da strukturirano financiranje v okviru dejavnosti za pospeševanje spada med javne storitve KfW in ni del dejavnosti KfW kot običajne kreditne ustanove.
The losses from this business cannot therefore be considered as a cost which a market-economy investor would also have considered [30].
Zaradi tega izgub iz te dejavnosti ni mogoče šteti za stroške, ki bi jih upošteval tudi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu [30].
A crucial argument for the Commission remains that the estimated losses under the risk shield were in fact not limited to EUR 2,5 billion, but unlimited.
Odločilni argument za Komisijo je, da ocenjene izgube v okviru zaščite pred tveganjem dejansko niso bile omejene na 2,5 milijarde EUR, temveč so bile odprte navzgor.
Although it might be argued that the unlimited nature of the liability was required by BaFin as a conditio sine qua non for avoiding the moratorium, it is clear that a market-economy investor would also have considered this in the balancing test.
Tudi če bi bilo mogoče trditi, da je urad BaFin to neomejeno jamstvo zahteval kot nujen pogoj za opustitev moratorija, še vedno ni mogoče dvomiti, da bi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu to okoliščino prav tako upošteval pri tehtanju.
This is evident when looking at the private participation in the risk shield.
To je očitno, če opazujemo zasebno udeležbo pri zaščiti pred tveganjem.
In order to compare KfW’s behaviour with that of the banking associations, the Commission recalls that a public shareholder must not only act in parallel with other private investors, but the provision of capital needs to be proportionate, and must be provided under the same conditions [31] and industrial rationale [32].
V zvezi z ravnanjem KfW in kreditnih združenj Komisija opozarja, da mora biti v primeru javnega delničarja, ki deluje vzporedno z zasebnimi vlagatelji, dodelitev kapitala sorazmerna ter izvedena pod enakimi pogoji [31] in zaradi enakih poslovnih pričakovanj [32].
These considerations also guided the Court of First Instance’s judgment in Alitalia judgement, referred to by Germany, in which the Court likewise required comparable circumstances.
Ta pričakovanja so bila tudi podlaga za sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje v zadevi Alitalia, na katero se je sklicevala Nemčija in v kateri je bilo zahtevano priznanje podobnih okoliščin.
In this context the Commission notes that the banking associations capped their loss participation in the first measure at EUR 1 billion (approximately 30 %), whereas KfW did not do so and is thus far more exposed than the banking associations are.
V zvezi s tem Komisija meni, da so kreditna združenja svojo udeležbo pri pokritju izgub v okviru prvega ukrepa omejila na 1 milijardo EUR (približno 30 %), medtem ko KfW ni določil zgornje meje in je tako prevzel veliko večje tveganje kot kreditna združenja.
In any event, KfW’s participation in the risk shield was still as high as that of the banking pool as a whole, even if the potential direct losses resulting from its ownership and the loans, with a claimed value of EUR […] billion (see recital 56), were deducted and the worst-case estimate were used.
Tudi če bi odšteli morebitne neposredne izgube na podlagi lastništva KfW in kreditov (glej uvodno izjavo 56), kar naj bi skupaj obsegalo […] milijard EUR, in bi za osnovo vzeli najmanj ugodne ocene, bi bila udeležba KfW pri zaščiti pred tveganjem še vedno enako visoka kot udeležba vseh kreditnih združenj skupaj.
It is clear that that KfW did not intervene in a way comparable with the banking pool.
Zaradi tega je treba ugotoviti, da KfW ni deloval podobno kot bančni pool.
Moreover, there is no validity to the argument that a general crisis in the German banking sector would have been triggered and would have had a drastic impact on KfW.
Poleg tega tudi argument o splošni krizi v nemškem bančnem sektorju, ki je imela katastrofalne posledice za KfW, ni trden.
All other banks would have been similarly affected by a crisis.
Kriza je podobno vplivala tudi na vse druge banke.
But the share of the banking associations in the risk shield, capped at EUR 1 billion (approximately 30 %), bears no relation to the market share of their member banks in Germany, which is over 95 % [33].
Vendar pa na 1 milijardo EUR (približno 30 %) omejena udeležba kreditnih združenj pri zaščiti pred tveganjem ni v nobenem razmerju z več kot 95-odstotnim tržnim deležem njihovih bank članic v Nemčiji [33].
The Commission therefore sees no commercial reason for the disproportionate involvement of KfW.
Komisija tako ne more ugotoviti nobenega ekonomskega razloga za nesorazmerno visok vložek KfW.
Thus while KfW might indeed have intervened to some extent in the interest of its subsidiaries, it clearly acted in a way that went beyond what a private investor would have done.
KfW je mogoče do določene mere deloval v interesu svojih odvisnih družb, vendar je kljub vsemu nedvomno šel dlje, kot bi šel zasebni vlagatelj.
A private owner would have limited his involvement much more and relied on additional support from the banking associations or the State.
Zasebni lastnik bi se zavzel veliko manj in bi zahteval dodatno podporo kreditnih združenj ali države.
Thus KfW, at least to some extent, did not act like a market investor.
Zaradi tega se KfW vsaj v določeni meri ni obnašal kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu.
The same applies to the second measure, which, according to information supplied by Germany, was a mere ancillary to the first risk shield.
Enako velja za drugi ukrep, pri katerem je po navedbah Nemčije šlo le za ukrep za podporo prvi zaščiti pred tveganjem.
Thus, even if the participations of KfW and the banking associations seem more balanced in absolute terms (in relative terms the participation of the banking associations should still be much higher) this measure must be seen together with the first measure in the overall restructuring context, and settled case-law bars KfW from reverting to the market-economy investor argument after it has not acted as a market investor [34].
Tudi če bi se udeležba KfW in kreditnih združenj v absolutnih številkah zdela bolj uravnotežena (vendar bi morala biti udeležba kreditnih združenj relativno gledano znatno višja), bi bilo treba ta ukrep ovrednotiti skupaj s prvim ukrepom glede na celotno prestrukturiranje, tako da KfW, potem ko ni ravnal kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, po ustaljeni sodni praksi ne more več uveljavljati argumenta vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu [34].
In other cases, the Commission has expressed the view that it is difficult to determine the aid amount if the aid is granted by way of a risk shield [35].
V drugih primerih je Komisija zagovarjala trditev, da je znesek pomoči težko izračunati, če je pomoč zavarovana z zavarovanjem pred tveganjem [35].
In line with the guidelines and the case law, the aid element involved in a guarantee to a company in difficulty can be as high as the amount potentially covered by the guarantee, but can, on a case-by-case analysis, also be lower [36].
V skladu s smernicami in sodno prakso je element pomoči pri jamstvu za podjetje v težavah lahko natanko tako visok kot znesek, ki je potencialno pokrit z jamstvom, od primera do primera pa tudi nižji [36].
However, even if the aid element might have been evaluated ex ante at below EUR 8,1 billion (Rhineland, Havenrock and EUR 1 billion on-balance-sheet assets), the realistic estimate for the loss coverage is now far in excess of the worst-case estimate and has increased to EUR 6,8 billion (see Table 3, excluding the third measure).
Vendar pa tudi, če bi bil element pomoči vnaprej ocenjen na manj kot 8,1 milijarde EUR (Rhineland, Havenrock in 1 milijarda EUR bilančnih aktivnih postavk), ostaja realistična ocena izgub s 6,8 milijarde EUR medtem nad ocenami za najmanj ugoden primer (glej preglednico 3, brez tretjega ukrepa).
Hence the Commission considers that the amount of aid provided under the risk shield and the capital contributions is EUR 8,8 billion (see Table 1 Nos 1 and 3).
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena v okviru zaščite pred tveganjem in s kapitalskimi vložki, znaša 8,8 milijarde EUR (glej preglednico 3 št. 1 do 3).
The liquidity facility
Likvidnostno posojilo
In addition to the capital contribution and loss-coverage measures, KfW also ensured the status of IKB as a going concern by two framework liquidity facilities of EUR [> 1] billion each. These measures were taken in the context of the restructuring and cannot be isolated from the first and second measures.
KfW poslovanja IKB ni podprl samo s kapitalskimi vložki in ukrepi za izravnavo izgub, ampak tudi z dvema okvirnima viroma v višini po [> 1] milijard EUR. Ta ukrepa sta bila izvedena med prestrukturiranjem in ju ni mogoče ločiti od prvega in drugega ukrepa, tako da se KfW tudi v tem primeru ne more več sklicevati na argument vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu [37].
If KfW nevertheless acted by reference to some market benchmarks, however, this should be reflected in the quantification of the aid element involved.
Če bi se družba KfW kljub temu morala opirati na določene tržne primerjave, bi se to moralo pokazati v količinski opredelitvi elementa pomoči.
The Commission notes that the interest rate for the facilities was fixed for the first line, which was already drawn at Euribor plus [< 50] bps up to [> 50] bps, and for the second at Euribor plus [> 100] bps, and that each facility was collateralised […] above 100 % ([…] %).
Komisija vztraja, da je bila za prvi okvirni vir, ki je že bil črpan, določena fiksna obrestna mera euribor plus [< 50] do [> 50] osnovnih točk, za drugo likvidnostno posojilo je bila določena obrestna mera euribor plus [> 100] osnovnih točk in vsak vir je bil zavarovan za […] nad 100 % ([…] %).