natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The aircraft operator shall have an understanding of the main sources of uncertainty when calculating tonne-kilometre data.
Operator zrakoplova razume glavne vire negotovosti pri izračunu podatkov o tonskih kilometrih.
A detailed uncertainty analysis as set out in Section 7 of Annex I is not required for the methodology of tonne-kilometre data determination.
Podrobna analiza negotovosti iz oddelka 7 Priloge I se za metodologijo določanja podatkov o tonskih kilometrih ne zahteva.
Aircraft operators shall not be required to carry out a detailed uncertainty assessment as set out in Section 7.1 of Annex I, provided the aircraft operator identifies sources of uncertainties and their associated levels of uncertainty. This information shall be used when selecting the monitoring methodology under section 2.2.
Če operator zrakoplova opredeli vire negotovosti in z njimi povezane stopnje negotovosti, se od operatorjev zrakoplovov ne zahteva podrobna ocena negotovosti, kot je določena v oddelku 7.1 Priloge I. Te informacije se uporabijo pri izbiri metodologije spremljanja v skladu z oddelkom 2.2.
Corrigendum to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1205/2008 of 3 December 2008 implementing Directive 2007/2/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards metadata
Popravek Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1205/2008 z dne 3. decembra 2008 o izvajanju Direktive 2007/2/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta glede metapodatkov
(Official Journal of the European Union L 326 of 4 December 2008)
(Uradni list Evropske unije L 326 z dne 4. decembra 2008)
On page 12, delete the subtitle ‘(Text with EEA relevance)’;
Na strani 12 se črta podnaslov „(Besedilo velja za EGP)“.
on page 20, Annex, Part D, point 1.3:
Stran 20, Priloga, del D, oddelek 1.3:
‘Spatial data services (services)’,
„Storitve v zvezi s prostorskimi podatki (services)“,
‘Spatial data service (service)’.
„Storitev v zvezi s prostorskimi podatki (service)“.
appointing one Swedish member and one Swedish alternate member of the Committee of the Regions
o imenovanju švedske članice in švedske nadomestne članice Odbora regij
Having regard to the proposal of the Swedish Government,
ob upoštevanju predloga švedske vlade,
A member’s seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the resignation of Ms Ann BESKOW.
Zaradi odstopa Ann BESKOW se je sprostilo mesto člana Odbora regij.
An alternate member’s seat has become vacant following the appointment of Ms Yoomi RENSTRÖM as a member of the Committee of the Regions,
Mesto nadomestnega člana se je sprostilo zaradi imenovanja Yoomi RENSTRÖM za članico Odbora regij –
Ms Yoomi RENSTRÖM, Ovanåker kommun (change of mandate);
Yoomi RENSTRÖM, Ovanåker kommun (sprememba mandata),
as alternate member:
za nadomestno članico:
on State aid C 9/08 (ex NN 8/08, CP 244/07) implemented by Germany for Sachsen LB
o državni pomoči C 9/08 (prej NN 8/08, CP 244/07) Nemčije v korist banke Sachsen LB
(notified under document number C(2008) 2269)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2008) 2269)
By letter dated 27 February 2008, the Commission informed Germany that it had decided to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of the measures.
Z dopisom z dne 27. februarja 2008 je Komisija uradno obvestila Nemčijo o svoji odločitvi, da v zvezi z ukrepi sproži postopek na podlagi člena 88(2) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure (hereinafter called ‘the opening decision’) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union [2].
Odločitev Komisije, da sproži formalni postopek preiskave (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločitev o sprožitvi postopka), je bila objavljena v Uradnem listu Evropske unije [2].
Germany submitted its comments on this third-party observation by letter of 30 April 2008.
V zvezi s tem je Nemčija predložila svoje stališče z dopisom z dne 30. aprila 2008.
A number of meetings and regular telephone conferences took place with Germany, the beneficiary and Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (hereinafter called LBBW).
Za Nemčijo, upravičenko in deželno banko Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (v nadaljnjem besedilu: LBBW) je bila organizirana vrsta srečanj in rednih telefonskih konferenc.
The present case originated with the still ongoing US subprime crisis in which Landesbank Sachsen Girozentrale (hereinafter called Sachsen LB) and in particular one of its off-balance conduits, Ormond Quay, was caught.
Obravnavana zadeva se je začela s še trajajočo krizo na področju hipotekarnih posojil v ZDA, v vrtinec katere je padla deželna banka Landesbank Sachsen Girozentrale (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sachsen LB) in zlasti eden izmed njenih posebnih naložbenih skladov (Conduit) z zunajbilančnimi obveznostmi, Ormond Quay.
A conduit — also known as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or special investment vehicle (SIV) — is a corporate body (usually a limited company of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfil narrow, specific or temporary objectives, primarily to isolate financial risk (usually bankruptcy but sometimes a specific taxation or regulatory risk).
Conduit, imenovan tudi posebni naložbeni sklad (special purpose vehicle) ali posebni naložbeni nosilec (special investment vehicle – SIV), je družba (praviloma vrsta družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo ali v nekaterih primerih komanditna družba), ki je ustanovljena s posebnimi, ozko določenimi in časovno omejenimi cilji, da bi praviloma izključila finančno tveganje (običajno stečaj, včasih pa tudi posebno davčno tveganje ali tveganje v zvezi z nadzorom).
SIVs have been used because they can remain off balance sheet and not be consolidated by banks.
Na SIV se sklicujemo zato, ker gre za družbe, ki ne vplivajo na bilanco in pri katerih bankam ni treba izvesti konsolidacije.
This allows banks to fund lending at cheaper rates than those they would provide themselves (due notably to the obligations of regulatory liquidity ratios).
Tako lahko banke financirajo kredite po obrestnih merah, ki so nižje kot njihove lastne (saj so tudi same vezane na določen delež likvidnostnih rezerv zaradi bančnega nadzora).
The conduit refinances investments in asset-backed securities (ABSs) by borrowing in the short-term asset-backed commercial paper [3] (CP) market.
Posebni naložbeni sklad refinancira investicije v vrednostne papirje, zavarovane s premoženjem (asset-backed securities, v nadaljnjem besedilu: ABS), tako da najame posojilo na trgu komercialnih zapisov, zavarovanih s premoženjem [3] (Commercial Papers, v nadaljnjem besedilu: CP).
Potential liquidity needs of the conduits (where the commercial papers are not sold completely) are bridged by credit lines provided by commercial banks.
Posebni naložbeni skladi premostijo morebitne likvidnostne težave (če niso vsi CP prodani) s kreditnimi linijami pri poslovnih bankah.
Ormond Quay was used by Sachsen LB to fund investments in ABSs which included US mortgage-backed securities.
Banka Sachsen LB je prek posebnega naložbenega sklada Ormond Quay financirala investicije v ABS, h katerim so spadali tudi hipotekarno zavarovani vrednostni papirji iz ZDA.
In order to guarantee the liquidity needs of the conduit in case the commercial banks withdrew the credit lines, Sachsen LB had to guarantee the liquidity of Ormond Quay and assume special liquidity facilities.
Da bi še naprej lahko krila likvidnostni primanjkljaj Conduita, če bi poslovne banke odpovedale kreditne linije, je banka Sachsen LB morala jamčiti za likvidnost sklada Ormond Quay in zagotoviti posebna likvidnostna posojila.
In return for assuming the risk, Sachsen LB received the generated surplus of the conduit in the form of an annual fee.
V povračilo za prevzem tega tveganja je banka Sachsen LB v obliki provizije prejela presežke, ki jih je ustvaril posebni naložbeni sklad.
Ormond Quay generated a significant surplus by financing the long-term and high-yield ABS investments through short-term and low-yield commercial papers.
Pri financiranju dolgoročnih visoko donosnih ABS-investicij s kratkoročnimi CP z nizkimi obrestnimi merami je sklad Ormond Quay dosegel precejšnje presežke.
Market conditions deteriorated, however, as a result of the subprime crisis.
Zaradi krize na področju hipotekarnih posojil v ZDA pa so se tržni pogoji poslabšali.
In the light of these market conditions the hedge funds and institutional investors refused to reinvest in mortgage-backed commercial papers.
Zaradi takega tržnega okolja hedge skladi in institucionalni vlagatelji niso več želeli investirati v hipotekarno zavarovane CP.
SPVs were thus no longer able to borrow in the short-term asset-backed commercial paper market.
Posledično posebni naložbeni skladi niso več mogli najeti posojila na trgu kratkoročnih CP, zavarovanih s premoženjem.
Ormond Quay was seriously affected by this phenomenon.
Sklad Ormond Quay je v tej situaciji zašel v finančno zelo kritičen položaj.
The commercial banks providing credit lines to Ormond Quay also withdrew, making it necessary that it draw upon the liquidity facility provided by Sachsen LB.
Poleg tega so poslovne banke odpravile kreditne linije, odobrene posebnemu naložbenemu skladu, tako da je bil sklad Ormond Quay prisiljen uporabiti likvidnostno posojilo banke Sachsen LB.
THE BENEFICIARY
UPRAVIČENKA
The beneficiary is Sachsen LB.
Upravičenka je banka Sachsen LB.
The shareholders of Sachsen LB were the Free State of Saxony (around 37 %) and Sachsen-Finanzgruppe (hereinafter called SFG), a holding company linking eight Saxony savings banks with the cross-regional Sachsen LB (around 63 %), which is itself owned by local authorities (77,6 %) and the Free State of Saxony (22,4 %).
Delničarja banke Sachsen LB sta bila Freistaat Sachsen (zvezna dežela Saška, približno 37-odstotni delež) in finančna skupina Sachsen (v nadaljnjem besedilu: SFG, približno 63-odstotni delež), ki v skupnem holdingu povezuje osem hranilnic zvezne dežele Saške in Sachsen LB, ki posluje na medregionalni ravni. Delničarji SFG pa so občine zvezne dežele Saške s 77,6-odstotnim deležem in Freistaat Sachsen (zvezna dežela Saška) z 22,4-odstotnim deležem.
As a commercial bank, Sachsen LB executed banking transactions of all kinds.
Kot poslovna banka je Sachsen LB izvajala bančne transakcije vseh vrst.
Sachsen LB Europe plc (hereinafter called Sachsen LB Europe) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sachsen LB and was based in Dublin.
Sachsen LB Europe plc (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sachsen LB Europe) je bila odvisna družba v 100-odstotni lasti družbe Sachsen LB s sedežem v Dublinu.
It was a service provider for structured financial investments and was until mid-2007 the main source of profits for the Sachsen LB group.
Kot ponudnik storitev za strukturirane finančne investicije je bila do sredine leta 2007 glavni vir dobička za skupino Sachsen LB.
Until 18 July 2005 Sachsen LB still profited from the unlimited state guarantees ‘Anstaltslast’ and ‘Gewährträgerhaftung’, which had to be abolished following a number of understandings between Germany and the Commission.
Za Sachsen LB so bila v okviru jamstva za poslovanje javnih institucij in državnega jamstva za nemške javne banke (Gewährträgerhaftung) do 18. julija 2005 v veljavi še neomejena državna jamstva, ki so bila pozneje na podlagi vrste sporazumov med Nemčijo in Komisijo odpravljena.
According to the first of the understandings dated 17 July 2001, within a transitional period until 18 July 2005 new liabilities could still be covered by Gewährträgerhaftung (so-called grandfathering), provided their maturity did not go beyond 31 December 2015 [5].
Na podlagi Sporazuma I z dne 17. julija 2001 je bilo v skladu z ohranitvijo pridobljenih pravic (tako imenovani „grandfathering“) za prehodno obdobje do 18. julija 2005 še dovoljeno izdajati nove obveznice z zapadlostjo do 31. decembra 2015, za katere veljajo državna jamstva za nemške javne banke [5].
On 26 October 2007 the legal form of Sachsen LB was changed from a public-sector institution (Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) into a joint stock company.
Pravni status banke Sachsen LB se je 26. oktobra 2007 spremenil, in sicer iz institucije javnega prava v delniško družbo.
THE BUYER OF THE BENEFICIARY
KUPEC UPRAVIČENKE
LBBW is the Landesbank for the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg and acts as well as a universal and a commercial bank.
Deželna banka zvezne dežele Baden-Württemberg (LBBW) posluje kot univerzalna banka in kot poslovna banka.
For the savings banks in Rhineland-Palatinate it is the central banking institution together with Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz, which was taken over by LBBW on 1 January 2005.
LBBW deluje kot osrednja institucija hranilnic v zvezni deželi Za hranilnice v zvezni deželi Porenje-Pfalz opravlja to funkcijo skupaj z deželno banko Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz, ki jo je prevzela 1. januarja 2005.
The LBBW model, which has now been extended to Saxony, is based on locally rooted banks concentrating on SMEs and private banking (BW-Bank for Baden-Württemberg, RP-Bank for Rhineland-Palatinate, and now Sachsen Bank for Saxony) and centralised functions in Stuttgart, supported by one direct LBBW branch in each, Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate.
Model banke LBBW, ki je bil razširjen na zvezno deželo Saško, temelji na lokalnih bankah, ki so osredotočene na bančno poslovanje z majhnimi in srednje velikimi podjetji ter s prebivalstvom (BW-Bank za Baden-Württemberg, RP-Bank za Porenje-Pfalz in nazadnje Sachsen Bank za Saško), in na centraliziranih nalogah v Stuttgartu, v katere je vključena tudi po ena LBBW-podružnica v zveznih deželah Saška in Porenje-Pfalz.
As described in detail in the opening decision [6] Sachsen LB got caught in the maelstrom of the still ongoing US subprime crisis in particular because of one off-balance conduit, Ormond Quay, which was unable to refinance itself and was in need of liquidity of up to EUR 17,1 billion in order to avoid fire sales.
Kot je izčrpno opisano v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka [6], je banka Sachsen LB padla v vrtinec še trajajoče krize na področju hipotekarnih posojil v ZDA, zlasti zaradi sklada Ormond Quay, ki ne vpliva na bilanco, kajti sklad ni mogel več refinancirati svojih investicij, zaradi preprečevanja prisilnih razprodaj pa je imel likvidnostni primanjkljaj 17,1 milijarde EUR.
THE LIQUIDITY MEASURE
LIKVIDNOSTNO POSOJILO
On 19 August 2007, a group of 10 German Landesbanken and DekaBank (an agency under public law which is jointly held by the German Landesbanken and by DSGV) (hereinafter called ‘the banking pool’) entered into a pool contract, committing them to buying the CPs emitted by Ormond Quay up to an amount of EUR 17,1 billion if these could not be placed on the market.
Skupina bank, sestavljena iz desetih nemških deželnih bank in javne banke DekaBank, ki jo skupaj nadzirajo nemške deželne banke in DSGV, je 19. avgusta 2007 podpisala meddeželni sporazum o črpanju sredstev, s katerim so se banke iz omenjene skupine zavezale, da bodo vrednostne papirje CP, ki jih je izdal sklad Ormond Quay, odkupile do zneska v protivrednosti 17,1 milijarde EUR, če jih ne bo mogoče prodati na trgu (obveznost odkupa).
Each pool bank would acquire the CPs in its own name and for its own account.
Vsaka banka iz omenjene skupine bi ustrezne papirje CP pridobila v svojem imenu in za svoj račun.
The pool banks were not jointly liable.
Skupna odgovornost je bila izključena.
DekaBank had a share of around […] [7].
Banka DekaBank je prevzela približno […] [7] celotne vrednosti CP.
The remaining part was taken over by the other Landesbanken according to their respective size and performance.
Preostanek so prevzele druge banke, pri čemer je bila porazdelitev odvisna od velikosti in ključnih vrednosti posameznih deželnih bank.
According to the information received by Germany, the maximum amount of CPs actually bought until the beginning of January 2008 by the banking pool under the pool contract was EUR […] billion.
Na podlagi informacij, s katerimi razpolaga Nemčija, je omenjena skupina bank do začetka januarja 2008 v okviru meddeželnega sporazuma o črpanju sredstev prevzela CP v višini maksimalno […] milijard EUR.
The remuneration for the CPs was fixed at the reference rate (Euribor or Libor depending on the origin of the underlying assets) plus a margin of […] bps.
Za odkup CP so banke iz omenjene skupine kot odškodnino prejele določeno referenčno obrestno mero (EURIBOR oziroma LIBOR, glede na izvor upoštevnih sredstev) povečano za […] baznih točk.
The duration of the CPs could not exceed one month.
Zapadlost CP ni smela biti daljša kot en mesec.
The pool contract was limited to a period of six months.
Meddeželni sporazum o črpanju sredstev je bil omejen na obdobje šestih mesecev.
The pool banks only had to buy the CPs which could not be placed on the market.
Obveznost odkupa je bila veljavna le za CP, za katere ni bilo mogoče najti drugih investitorjev kot banke iz omenjene skupine.
Whereas in August 2007 the demand for mortgage-backed CPs had completely dried up and there was no efficient market for this type of investment, the situation gradually improved.
Medtem ko je avgusta 2007 povpraševanje po hipotekarno zavarovanih CP popolnoma zastalo in za take investicije trg ni več deloval, se je v nadaljevanju stanje izboljševalo.
Since October 2007 some investors (mainly […(banks belonging to the public sector)]) had started again to buy CPs on the market outside the context and the detrimental conditions of the pool contract, i.e. for a remuneration of less than […(50-100)] bps, so that the pool contract lost its initial purpose.
Od oktobra 2007 so papirje CP ponovno kupovali nekateri investitorji (predvsem [… (banke, ki spadajo v javni sektor)]) zunaj meddeželnega sporazuma o črpanju sredstev in po drugačnih pogojih, kot so določeni v sporazumu, torej za odškodnino pod [… (50–100)] baznih točk, tako da je meddeželni sporazum o črpanju sredstev izgubil svoj prvotni namen.
The pool contract came formally to an end on 23 February 2008.
Meddeželni sporazum o črpanju sredstev se je iztekel 23. februarja 2008.
THE SALE OF SACHSEN LB
PRODAJA BANKE SACHSEN LB
Sachsen LB had already in 2005 started to look for a strategic partner in particular among the other Landesbanken [8].
Banka Sachsen LB je že leta 2005 začela iskati strateškega partnerja, zlasti med drugimi deželnimi bankami [8].
Talks with interested buyers were therefore continued and intensive negotiations were held with several interested parties.
Zato so bili s strankami, zainteresiranimi za nakup Sachsen LB, opravljeni predhodni pogovori, katerim so sledila intenzivna pogajanja z več zainteresiranimi strankami.
This led to the sale to LBBW because it submitted, according to Germany, the economically best offer.
Končno je bila izbrana ponudba banke LBBW, ker je, kot pravi Nemčija, predložila gospodarsko najboljšo ponudbo.
LBBW had a particular interest in buying Sachsen LB in order to ensure its market expansion not only in Saxony but also in Eastern Europe.
Banka LBBW je imela poseben podjetniški interes, namreč da bi z nakupom banke Sachsen LB precej okrepila svoj položaj na trgu ne samo na Saškem, ampak tudi in zlasti v vzhodni Evropi.
The signed sales agreement included immediate prepayment of EUR 250 million by LBBW to the shareholders of Sachsen LB, who in turn injected this capital into the bank to cover losses.
Nadalje je bilo v podpisanem temeljnem sporazumu predvideno, da banka LBBW delničarjema banke Sachsen LB izplača predčasno poravnavo z denarjem v višini 250 milijonov EUR, kar delničarja vložita v Sachsen LB za kritje izgub.
According to Germany, this amount was sufficient to fulfil the regulatory capital requirements and to absorb potential additional losses.
Ta znesek je, kot navaja Nemčija, zadostoval za izpolnitev kapitalskih zahtev bančnega nadzora in za pokritje morebitnih dodatnih izgub v prihodnosti.
At the time of the sale, the parties expected that the crisis would soon be over.
Ob prodaji so pogodbene stranke predpostavljale, da bo kriza kmalu premoščena.
On the assumption that the markets would have normalised by the end of the year, LBBW did not make any special arrangements for the structured investment portfolio of Sachsen LB and would have acquired it.
Na podlagi domneve, da se bodo trgi do konca leta normalizirali, banka LBBW za strukturirani investicijski portfelj banke Sachsen LB ni sprejela nobenih posebnih ukrepov in je želela portfelj prevzeti.
In particular, it was considered that Ormond Quay’s problems would resolve themselves over time and it would again be able to re-finance itself on the market.
Zlasti se je domnevalo, da se bodo težave sklada Ormond Quay rešile same od sebe in da bo posebni naložbeni sklad nato ponovno lahko refinanciral svoje investicije na trgu.
At the end of 2007, further risks involved in Sachsen LB’s structured investment portfolio appeared.
Ob koncu leta 2007 so se v povezavi s strukturiranim portfeljem banke Sachsen LB pojavila dodatna tveganja.
Before closure of the sale, the situation in the financial markets further deteriorated and in particular Ormond Quay became problematic because the mark-to-market [10] evaluation of its assets amounted to losses of about EUR […(0,5-1,5)] billion.
Pred opravljeno prodajo se je položaj na finančnih trgih še poslabšal, tako da je težave povzročal zlasti sklad Ormond Quay, saj je ocena Mark-to-Market [10] za njegova sredstva izkazovala izgube okrog [… (0,5–1,5)] milijarde EUR.
This endangered the final sale of the bank, given that the core capital could potentially have fallen below the required minimum threshold.
To je ogrozilo dokončno prodajo banke, saj bi temeljni kapital lahko padel pod vrednost praga.
The mark-to-market devaluations had to be accounted as losses and as a consequence reduced the core capital in the balance sheet.
Nižje ocene Mark-to-Market so morale biti v bilanci izkazane kot izgube, zato so povzročile zmanjšanje temeljnega kapitala.
It appeared that Sachsen LB’s core capital ratios would fall below […] %, which gave LBBW the right to renegotiate the sale.
Obstajala je bojazen, da bi temeljni kapital Sachsen LB padel pod […] %, kar bi pomenilo, da bi banka LBBW lahko zahtevala nova pogajanja o nakupu.
Even if market conditions had improved from August [11] and selling the assets would have been a possibility, LBBW was neither capable nor willing to assume such high mark-to-market losses.
Tudi če bi se tržni pogoji avgusta [11] izboljšali in bi bila prodaja sredstev mogoča, banka LBBW ni bila niti sposobna niti pripravljena, da bi prevzela tako visoke izgube Mark-to-Market.
To be able to conclude the deal, a solution had to be found to prevent these losses from being reflected in the valuation of Sachsen LB.
Da bi prodajo lahko opravili, je bilo treba najti rešitev, ki bi preprečila, da bi te izgube vplivale na vrednotenje banke Sachsen LB.
Otherwise, LBBW would have to pay for these losses, in addition to the minimum purchase price of EUR 300 million that had been set in August.
Sicer bi morala banka LBBW k najnižji nakupni ceni v višini 300 milijonov EUR, ki so jo dosegli s pogajanji v avgustu, dodati še prevzem teh izgub.
After intensive negotiations, a final and non-reversible agreement concluding the sale of the bank (Eckpunktevereinbarung) was signed on 13 December 2007.
Po intenzivnih pogajanjih je bila prodaja opravljena z dokončnim in nepreklicnim sporazumom, podpisanim 13. decembra 2007 (sporazum o ključnih parametrih).
The solution found was to avoid consolidation of the mark-to-market losses coming from Sachsen LB’s conduits and to protect LBBW from potential losses that could be incurred from the conduits if the securities in the portfolio were held to maturity.
V bistvu je bila prodaja omogočena s tem, da je bila preprečena konsolidacija izgub Mark-to-Market v posebnih naložbenih skladih banke Sachsen LB in da je bila banka LBBW zaščitena pred morebitnimi izgubami posebnih naložbenih skladov, do katerih bi lahko prišlo, če bi bila sredstva v portfelju zadržana do zapadlosti.