natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the Commission notes that this concept entails an aspect of urgency that is incompatible with the PPAs.
Nadalje Komisija navaja, da ta pojem vključuje vidik nujnosti, ki pa ni v skladu s SNEE.
Neither the Hungarian authorities nor the interested parties argued that the PPAs were compatible with Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty.
Niti madžarski organi niti zainteresirane stranke niso trdili, da so SNEE skladni s členom 87(3)(b) Pogodbe ES.
In view of the above, the Commission concludes that the aid does not qualify for the derogation enshrined in Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty.
V skladu z zgoraj navedenim Komisija sklepa, da pomoči ni mogoče šteti za odstopanje iz člena 87(3)(b) Pogodbe ES.
Article 87(3)(d) of the EC Treaty states that aid to promote culture and heritage conservation may be declared compatible with the EC Treaty if such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest.
Člen 87(3)(d) Pogodbe ES navaja, da je pomoč za pospeševanje ohranjanja kulturne dediščine v skladu s Pogodbo ES, če takšna pomoč ne vpliva na pogoje trgovanja in konkurenco v Skupnosti v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
This Article obviously does not apply to the PPAs.
Ta člen očitno ne velja za SNEE.
Article 87(3)(c) provides for the authorisation of aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or economic areas where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Člen 87(3)(c) določa odobritev pomoči za pospeševanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih dejavnosti ali gospodarskih območij, kjer takšna pomoč nima negativnega učinka na pogoje trgovanja v takem obsegu, da je v nasprotju s skupnim interesom.
The Commission has developed several guidelines and communications that explain how the derogation contained in this Article is to apply.
Komisija je razvila več smernic in obvestil, ki razlagajo, kako se uporablja odstopanje iz tega člena.
As far as both the old and the new Regional Aid Guidelines are concerned, the PPAs’ incompatibility with those Guidelines is shown in recitals 393 to 398 above.
V zvezi s starimi in novimi smernicami za regionalno pomoč je neskladnost SNEE s temi smernicami prikazana v uvodnih izjavah od 393 do 398 zgoraj.
The Commission notes that the Environmental Guidelines applicable at the time of Hungary's accession to the EU [109], like the Regional Aid Guidelines, primarily allow investment aid.
Komisija navaja, da Okoljske smernice, ki so se uporabljale v času pristopa Madžarske k EU [109], tako kot smernice za regionalno pomoč, načeloma dopuščajo investicijsko pomoč.
The first is aid for the management of waste and for energy saving (section E.3.1), which is limited to a maximum duration of 5 years.
Prvi je pomoč za upravljanje z odpadki in varčevanje z energijo (oddelek E.3.1), ki je omejena na najdaljše obdobje 5 let.
The second is aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions (section E.3.2).
Drugi je pomoč v obliki znižanja davkov ali izvzetij (oddelek E.3.2).
The third is aid for renewable energy sources (section E.3.3).
Tretji je pomoč za obnovljive energetske vire (oddelek E.3.3).
Clearly, none of these provisions apply in the present case.
Jasno je, da se nobena izmed teh določb ne uporablja v zadevnem primeru.
The fourth and last type of operating aid that can be authorised is aid for the combined production of power and heat, hereinafter referred to as ‘cogeneration’ (section E.3.4).
Četrta in zadnja vrsta pomoči za tekoče poslovanje, ki se jo lahko odobri, je pomoč za kombinirano proizvodnjo energije in toplote, v nadaljevanju „soproizvodnja“ (oddelek E.3.4.).
Some of the generators concerned produce heat and power.
Nekateri izmed zadevnih proizvajalcev proizvajajo toploto in energijo.
However, the conditions of point 66 and hence the conditions of the options under points 58 to 65 of the Environmental Guidelines were not met by the PPAs.
Vendar kljub temu SNEE niso izpolnjevali pogojev iz točke 66 in torej pogojev možnosti iz točk 58 do 65 Okoljskih smernic.
One of the conditions set out in point 66 is that the support measure is beneficial in terms of the protection of the environment because the conversion efficiency is particularly high, because the measure will allow energy consumption to be reduced or because the production process will be less damaging to the environment.
Eden izmed pogojev, določenih v točki 66, je, da je podporni ukrep koristen zaradi varstva okolja, saj je pretvorbena učinkovitost izjemno visoka, in bo omogočal, da se bo poraba energije zmanjšala ali da bo proizvodni postopek manj škodljiv za okolje.
Nothing in the information available to the Commission indicates that this condition is met.
Iz informacij, ki jih ima na voljo Komisija, ni razvidno, da je ta pogoj izpolnjen.
The three options that Member States may use to grant operating aid for cogeneration are the following:
Tri možnosti, ki jih države članice lahko uporabljajo pri dodelitvi pomoči za tekoče poslovanje za soproizvodnjo, so naslednje:
option 1: aid to compensate for the difference between the production costs of the cogeneration plant and the market price of the energy produced,
možnost 1: pomoč za nadomestilo razlike med proizvodnimi stroški elektrarne za soproizvodnjo in tržno ceno proizvedene energije;
option 2: introduction of market mechanisms such as green certificates or tenders,
možnost 2: uvedba tržnih mehanizmov, kot so zeleni certifikati ali javni razpisi;
option 3: aid to compensate for the external costs avoided, which are the environmental costs that society would have to bear if the same quantity of energy was not produced by cogeneration,
možnost 3: pomoč za nadomestilo za preprečevanje zunanjih stroškov, ki so okoljski stroški, ki bi jih morala plačati družba, če enaka količina energije ne bi bila proizvedena s soproizvodnjo;
option 4: aid limited to 5 years, either digressive or limited to 50 % of the eligible costs.
možnost 4: pomoč, ki je omejena na 5 let in je padajoča ali pa omejena na 50 % upravičenih stroškov.
It is obvious that the PPAs do not fulfil the conditions of option 2 and option 3.
Jasno je, SNEE ne izpolnjujejo pogojev možnosti 2 in možnosti 3.
The conditions of option 1 are not fulfilled either, as the market price of the energy produced is not used to calculate the amount of aid.
Ne izpolnjujejo niti pogojev možnosti 1, saj se tržna cena proizvedene energije ne uporablja pri izračunu višine pomoči.
The amounts of aid transferred under a given PPA depend not on the prices offered by any other power generator, but solely on the investment and operating costs incurred by the generator in question.
Zneski pomoči, preneseni v okviru zadevnega SNEE, niso odvisni od cen, ki jih nudi kateri koli drug proizvajalec, temveč samo od investicijskih stroškov in stroškov za tekoče poslovanje, ki jih je imel zadevni proizvajalec.
Furthermore, neither Hungary nor any of the producers concerned has actually argued compatibility on the basis of these articles or ever demonstrated that the plants meet the criteria of the Environmental Guidelines for operating aid to cogeneration.
Poleg tega se niti Madžarska niti nihče od zadevnih proizvajalcev ni skliceval na skladnost na podlagi teh členov ali kadar koli dokazal, da elektrarne izpolnjujejo merila Okoljskih smernic za pomoč za tekoče poslovanje za soproizvodnjo.
On 23 January 2008, the Commission adopted new guidelines on State aid for environmental protection [110].
Dne 23. januarja 2008 je Komisija sprejela nove smernice glede državne pomoči za varstvo okolja [110].
These new Guidelines also allow operating aid only in the cases of energy saving, cogeneration, the use of renewable energy sources and tax reductions and exemptions.
Te nove smernice dopuščajo pomoč za tekoče poslovanje samo v primerih varčevanja z energijo, soproizvodnje, uporabe obnovljivih virov in zmanjšanja davkov ter izjem.
As mentioned above, none of these apply to the PPAs.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, se nobeden izmed primerov ne nanaša na SNEE.
As far as cogeneration is concerned, there are three options Member States can choose from when granting such aid:
V zvezi s soproizvodnjo lahko države članice izbirajo med tremi možnimi načini dodeljevanja takšne pomoči:
option 2: introduction of market mechanisms like green certificates or tenders,
možnost 2: uvedba tržnih mehanizmov, kot so zeleni certifikati ali javni razpisi;
option 3: aid limited to 5 years, either digressive or limited to 50 % of the eligible costs,
možnost 3: pomoč, ki je omejena na 5 let in je padajoča ali pa omejena na 50 % upravičenih stroškov.
None of the conditions of these options are fulfilled by the PPAs.
SNEE ne izpolnjujejo nobenega izmed pogojev v okviru teh možnosti.
Neither the Hungarian authorities nor the power generators provided evidence of any kind on the fulfilment of these criteria of the new Environmental Guidelines.
Niti madžarski organi niti proizvajalci energije niso predložili nikakršnih dokazov glede izpolnjevanja teh meril novih okoljskih smernic.
Of the guidelines and communications the Commission developed to explain how exactly it will apply the derogation contained in Article 87(3)(c), the only one which could apply in the present case is the Stranded Costs Methodology (see recital 26 above).
Izmed smernic in obvestil, ki jih je Komisija razvila za pojasnitev, kako se bo natančno izvajalo odstopanje iz člena 87(3)(c), je edina, ki bi se v zadevnem primeru lahko uporabljala, Metodologija za nasedle stroške (glej zgornjo uvodno izjavo 26).
The Stranded Costs Methodology concerns aid granted to incumbent companies that invested in power plants prior to liberalisation of the electricity sector and that may have difficulties in recouping their investment costs in a liberalised market.
Metodologija za nasedle stroške se nanaša na pomoč, dodeljeno prvotnim podjetjem, ki so pred liberalizacijo sektorja električne energije investirala v elektrarne in ki so morda imela težave pri povračilu investicijskih stroškov na liberaliziranem trgu.
Since one of the essential features of the PPAs is to allow certain companies which invested in power generation assets before the liberalisation of the electricity sector to continue to benefit from a guarantee of revenues which secures a return on investment, the Methodology is to be regarded as a relevant basis for the assessment of the compatibility of the PPAs.
Ker je ena izmed poglavitnih lastnosti SNEE ta, da določenim podjetjem, ki so investirala v sredstva za proizvodnjo energije pred liberalizacijo sektorja električne energije, omogoča, da imajo še naprej koristi od zajamčenih prihodkov, ki zagotavljajo donosnost naložb, je treba to metodologijo šteti za pomembno osnovo pri oceni skladnosti SNEE.
The Commission notes that neither the Hungarian authorities nor any of the power generators concerned argued in their comments that the PPAs were themselves compatible with the criteria of the Methodology.
Komisija poudarja, da niti madžarski organi niti nihče izmed zadevnih proizvajalcev energije ni v svojih pripombah navedel, da so bili SNEE skladni z merili te metodologije.
Most generators actually conclude that the PPAs are commercial agreements established well before the existence of the Methodology, and the criteria of a compensation mechanism are simply inadequate to assess the PPAs.
Večina proizvajalcev pravzaprav meni, da so SNEE trgovinski sporazumi, ki so bili vzpostavljeni veliko pred obstojem te metodologije, in da so merila mehanizma nadomestil enostavno neprimerna za oceno SNEE.
The main purpose of the Stranded Costs Methodology is to help the transition of the energy sector to a liberalised market by allowing the incumbent electricity undertakings to adapt to the introduction of competition [111].
Glavni namen Metodologije za nasedle stroške je pomoč pri prehodu energetskega sektorja na liberaliziran trg z omogočanjem prvotnim podjetjem z električno energijo, da se prilagodijo na uvedbo konkurence [111].
The Methodology outlines the principles applied by the Commission in assessing aid measures designed to compensate for the costs of commitments or guarantees that it might no longer be possible to honour on account of the liberalisation of the electricity market.
Ta metodologija določa načela, ki jih uporablja Komisija pri ocenjevanju ukrepov pomoči, ki so bili zasnovani za nadomestilo stroškov obveznosti ali jamstev, ki morda ne bo več dolgo možno zaradi liberalizacije trga z električno energijo.
Such commitments or guarantees are referred to as ‘stranded costs’ and can take a variety of forms, notably investments undertaken with an implicit or explicit guarantee of sale.
Take obveznosti ali jamstva se imenujejo „nasedli stroški“ in se lahko pojavljajo v različnih oblikah, predvsem kot naložbe, ki se izvajajo v okviru brezpogojnega ali izrecnega jamstva prodaje.
Since the PPAs themselves constitute an explicit guarantee of sale pre-dating liberalisation, the power plants under PPAs may be regarded as falling within the scope of the Methodology.
Ker sami SNEE predstavljajo izrecno jamstvo prodaje pred liberalizacijo, se lahko šteje, da elektrarne v okviru SNEE sodijo v področje uporabe te metodologije.
However, the Commission notes that several elements of the main principles constituting the PPAs do not meet the conditions laid down in section 4 of the Methodology.
Vendar pa Komisija ugotavlja, da nekateri elementi glavnih načel, vsebovanih v SNEEh, ne izpolnjujejo pogojev, določenih v poglavju 4 Metodologije.
First, they do not meet the condition set out in paragraph 4.2 of the Methodology, which requires that the arrangements for paying the aid must take account of future development in competition.
Prvič, ne izpolnjujejo pogoja, določenega v odstavku 4.2 Metodologije, ki zahteva, da morajo ureditve za plačilo pomoči upoštevati prihodnji razvoj v konkurenci.
The price-setting mechanisms of the PPAs are designed in such a way as to take into consideration only specific parameters of the power plant concerned to establish the price.
Mehanizmi določanja cen iz SNEE so oblikovani tako, da za določitev cene upoštevajo samo določene parametre zadevne elektrarne.
Prices offered by competing generators and their generation capacities do not have to be taken into account.
Cen, ki jih ponujajo konkurenčni proizvajalci in njihove proizvodne zmogljivosti, ni treba upoštevati.
According to point 4.9 of the Methodology, the Commission has the most serious misgivings when the amount of aid is not likely to be adjusted to take due account of the differences between the economic and market assumptions initially made when estimating stranded costs and real changes in them over time.
V skladu s točko 4.9 Metodologije ima Komisija najbolj resne pomisleke, kadar znesek pomoči verjetno ne bo prilagojen, da se ustrezno upošteva razlike med ekonomskimi in tržnimi predpostavkami, ki so bile prvotno oblikovane pri ocenjevanju nasedlih stroškov in kasnejših resničnih sprememb v teh naložbah.
The PPAs fall within this category, as no market assumption has been used to design the aid measure.
SNEE spadajo v omenjeno kategorijo, saj za oblikovanje ukrepa pomoči ni bila uporabljena nobena tržna predpostavka.
Furthermore, the fact that the core principles of the PPAs have remained unchanged in spite of the gradual opening of the electricity market and therefore entail the obligation on MVM to purchase energy in excess of its needs and to release it on the free market, clearly shows that the PPAs take no account of actual market developments.
Poleg tega dejstvo, da so temeljna načela SNEE ostala nespremenjena kljub postopnemu odpiranju trga z električno energijo in zato MVM-ju nalagajo obveznost nakupa energije v obsegu, ki presega njegove potrebe, in njene sprostitve na prostem trgu, jasno kaže, da SNEE ne upoštevajo trenutnega razvoja trga.
Furthermore, as shown under Chapter 3 above, one of the main advantages of the PPAs for the power generators is the purchase obligation by MVM of fixed capacities and guaranteed quantities at a price covering fixed, variable and capital costs, over a duration corresponding approximately to the lifetime or depreciation time of the assets.
Poleg tega je za proizvajalce energije, kot je prikazano v zgornjem poglavju 3, ena izmed glavnih prednosti SNEE obveznost nakupa s strani MVM določenih zmogljivosti in zagotovljenih količin po ceni, ki pokriva fiksne, variabilne stroške in stroške kapitala za čas trajanja, ki vključuje večji del življenjske dobe ali amortizacijsko dobo premoženja.
As a consequence, PPAs have the effect of obliging one of the parties to purchase its electricity from the other party, irrespective of the actual development of offers by competitors.
Zato SNEE obvežejo eno izmed strank, da kupi električno energijo od druge stranke, ne glede na dejanski razvoj ponudb konkurentov.
Several Member States have put in place compensation mechanisms whereby a maximum aid amount is set in advance on the basis of an analysis of the future competitive market and in particular of future market prices resulting from the confrontation of supply and demand.
Več držav članic je uvedlo mehanizme nadomestil, pri katerih se vnaprej določi najvišji znesek pomoči na podlagi analize bodočega konkurenčnega trga in zlasti bodočih tržnih cen, ki izhajajo iz primerjave ponudbe in povpraševanja.
If actual revenues obtained by the generators concerned turn out higher than forecast, the actual grants are recalculated and set at a lower level than the maximum amount.
Če bi se izkazalo, da so dejanski prihodki zadevnih proizvajalcev višji od predvidenih, je treba dejanske dodelitve znova izračunati in določiti zneske, ki so nižji od najvišjega zneska.
The impact of the compensation on the market is therefore limited to the minimum, notably because it does not secure a minimum level of production and sale to the beneficiaries.
Vpliv nadomestil na trg se torej omeji na najnižjo možno raven, saj upravičencem ne zagotavlja minimalne ravni proizvodnje in prodaje.
In this respect, instead of helping transition to a competitive market, the PPAs in fact create an obstacle to the development of real competition on a substantial part of the power generation market.
V tem smislu SNEE, namesto da bi pripomogli k prehodu na konkurenčni trg, dejansko ustvarjajo oviro pri razvoju resnične konkurence na velikem delu trga za proizvodnjo energije.
Therefore, the arrangements for paying the aid do not allow account to be taken of future development in competition and the amount of aid is not conditional on the development of genuine competition.
To pomeni, da ureditve za plačilo pomoči ne upoštevajo prihodnjega razvoja konkurence in da znesek pomoči ni pogojen z razvojem prave konkurence.
As a consequence, they also contradict the principles laid down in Section 5 of the Methodology whereby the financing arrangements must not conflict with the Community interest, notably competition.
Zato so tudi v nasprotju z načeli, določenimi v oddelku 5 Metodologije, po katerih finančne ureditve ne smejo biti v nasprotju z interesom Skupnosti, še zlasti s konkurenco.
Under Section 5, the financing arrangements must not have the effect of deterring outside undertakings or new players from entering certain national or regional markets.
V skladu s poglavjem 5 finančne ureditve ne smejo ovirati zunanjih podjetij ali novih akterjev pri vstopu na določene nacionalne ali regionalne trge.
However, as highlighted, inter alia, in recital 220, the system of capacity reservation and capacity fee tends to deter MVM – which is by far the largest buyer on the wholesale market – from shifting to producers other than those under PPAs.
Vendar kljub temu, kot je to med drugim navedeno v uvodni izjavi 220, sistem rezervacij zmogljivosti in pristojbina za zmogljivost običajno ovirata MVM – ki je daleč največji kupec na veleprodajnem trgu – pri preusmeritvi na proizvajalce, ki ne delujejo v okviru SNEE.
Furthermore, the opening of the market and the conditions set out in the PPAs compel MVM to purchase more electricity than it needs and lead it to resell that electricity on the free market through release mechanisms.
Odprtje trga in pogoji, ki jih določajo SNEE, obvezujejo MVM, da kupuje več električne energije, kot jo potrebuje, in jo ponovno proda na prostem trgu s pomočjo mehanizmov za sprostitev.
This in itself hampers new entries on the wholesale market.
To samo po sebi ovira nove vstope na veleprodajni trg.
Finally, the Commission considers that the PPAs entail distortions of competition on the Hungarian wholesale electricity market over a period largely exceeding the time necessary for a reasonable transition to a competitive market.
Komisija meni, da SNEE vodijo do izkrivljanja konkurence na madžarskem veleprodajnem trgu z električno energijo v časovnem obdobju, ki je veliko daljše od časa, ki je potreben za običajen prehod na konkurenčni trg.
The rules constituting the PPAs do not meet the criteria set out in paragraph 4.5 of the Methodology, since the maximum amount of aid to be paid to generators between 1 May 2004 and the expiry of the PPAs is not specified in advance.
Pravila, ki jih vključujejo SNEE, ne izpolnjujejo meril, določenih v odstavku 4.5 Metodologije, saj največji znesek pomoči, ki ga je treba plačati proizvajalcem med 1. majem 2004 in datumom poteka veljavnosti SNEE, ni vnaprej določen.
Furthermore, point 4.8 of the Methodology indicates that the Commission has the most serious misgivings regarding aid that is intended to safeguard all or some of the income pre-dating the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC [112], without taking strictly into account the eligible stranded costs that might result from the opening of the market.
Točka 4.8 Metodologije navaja, da ima Komisija zelo resne pomisleke glede pomoči, ki je namenjena zaščiti celotnega ali delnega prihodka pred začetkom veljavnosti Direktive 96/26/ES [112], brez strogega upoštevanja upravičenih nasedlih stroškov, ki bi bili lahko posledica odpiranja trga.
The fact that the PPAs were maintained when Hungary joined the European Union was designed precisely to safeguard most of the income obtained by the power generators concerned before the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC.
Dejstvo, da so se SNEE ohranili, ko se je Madžarska pridružila Evropski uniji, je bilo oblikovano ravno za zaščito večine prihodkov, ki so jih zadevni proizvajalci prejeli pred začetkom veljavnosti Direktive 96/92/ES.
Furthermore, the plants under PPA cover a very important share of the market and for a very long duration, considerably exceeding the time necessary for a reasonable transition to the market.
Poleg tega elektrarne v okviru SNEE pokrivajo zelo pomemben delež trga, in sicer za obdobje, ki močno presega čas, ki je potreben za običajen prehod na konkurenčni trg.
Moreover, within the main provisions constituting the PPAs, the Commission cannot isolate a set of elements that it might consider compatible with the common market under the Methodology.
Poleg tega Komisija v okviru glavnih določb, ki so del SNEE, ne more osamiti niza elementov, za katerega meni, da je po Metodologiji skladen s skupnim trgom.
In particular, a reduction of the duration of the PPAs would not suffice to make the PPAs compatible, since the financing method, which is based on reserved capacities and guaranteed off-take quantities, would still hamper the development of genuine competition.
Še zlasti skrajšanje trajanja SNEE ne bi pripomoglo k skladnosti SNEE, saj bi finančna metoda, ki temelji na rezerviranih zmogljivostih in zagotovljenih količinah odjema, še vedno ovirala razvoj prave konkurence.
The price formation mechanisms would also continue to contradict the objective of fostering the emergence of a truly competitive market where prices result from the interplay of supply and demand.
Mehanizmi za določanje cen bi bili še vedno v nasprotju s ciljem spodbujanja resnično konkurenčnega trga, kjer cene izhajajo iz razmerja med ponudbo in povpraševanjem.
In the light of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the PPAs are incompatible with the criteria laid down in the Methodology.
V skladu z zgornjimi trditvami Komisija sklepa, da so SNEE nezdružljivi z merili, določenimi v Metodologiji.