natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
because SNIACE did not fully repay its loan from another public creditor (FOGASA) which, moreover, had agreed to an accumulation of debts; and
ker je podjetje SNIACE svoje kredite plačevalo nepopolno, in sicer drugemu upniku (skladu FOGASA), ki je sprejel celo združevanje dolgov, in
owing to uncertain prospects of profitability caused by the continued deterioration of the financial situation.
zaradi negotovih možnosti za ustvarjanje dobička, ker se je finančno stanje podjetja nenehno slabšalo;
CONCLUSION ON THE EXISTENCE OF AID
SKLEP O OBSTOJU POMOČI
In the Commission’s opinion, only the measure that led to the agreement of 5 November 1993 between FOGASA and SNIACE can be regarded as fulfilling the private creditor criterion.
Po mnenju Komisije se lahko le za ukrep, na podlagi katere je bil sklenjen sporazum z dne 5. novembra 1993 med skladom FOGASA in podjetjem SNIACE šteje, da izpolnjuje kriterije zasebnega upnika.
Therefore, that measure does not grant an advantage to SNIACE.
Zato ta pomoč ne daje prednosti podjetju SNIACE. Zato ta pomoč ne daje prednosti podjetju SNIACE.
On the other hand, the Commission considers that the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement, as amended on 18 March 1999, the FOGASA II agreement and the TGSS agreement grant advantages to SNIACE for the purposes of Article 87(1) of the Treaty for the reasons set out above.
Nasprotno Komisija meni, da izvršitev sporazuma FOGASA I, spremenjenega dne 18. marca 1999, sporazuma FOGASA II in sporazuma TGSS daje prednost podjetju SNIACE v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe zaradi prej navedenih razlogov.
In fact, those measures grant an advantage to SNIACE by enabling it to reschedule its legal obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions and the debts contracted with FOGASA, which SNIACE would normally have had to fulfil if those creditors had been private creditors.
Ti ukrepi dajejo prednost podjetju SNIACE, saj mu omogočajo reprogramiranje svojih zakonitih obveznosti v zvezi s plačilom prispevkov za socialno zavarovanje in dolgov, zajetih v sporazumih s skladom FOGASA, s katerimi bi se podjetje SNIACE moralo soočiti sicer, v kolikor bi bili ti upniki zasebni.
As regards the other criteria, the Commission considers, firstly, that the measures are financed by State funds, as both FOGASA and the TGSS are public bodies whose resources arise from the payment of compulsory contributions.
Glede drugih kriterijev Komisija meni, prvič, da se ukrepi financirajo iz državnih sredstev, saj sta tako sklad FOGASA kot TGSS javna organa, katerih finančni viri izhajajo iz obveznega plačila prispevkov.
Secondly, the contested measures are selective as they apply only to SNIACE.
Drugič, so uvedeni ukrepi selektivni, saj veljajo le za podjetje SNIACE
Thirdly, the markets in which SNIACE operates are characterised by a high level of trade between Member States.
Tretjič, trge, na katerih deluje podjetje SNIACE, zaznamuje visoka stopnja trgovinskih izmenjav med državami članicami EU.
SNIACE markets part of its production in Europe, where it competes with other undertakings.
Podjetje SNIACE prodaja del svojih izdelkov v Evropo, kjer se srečuje s konkurenco drugih podjetij.
Consequently, the aid granted to SNIACE may affect trade between Member States.
Zaradi tega lahko pomoči, ki jih prejema podjetje SNIACE vplivajo na trgovanje med državami članicami.
Accordingly, those measures threaten to distort competition between producers of textile products.
Na enak način te pomoči lahko povzročijo tudi potvarjanje konkurence med proizvajalci tekstilnih izdelkov.
Therefore, the Commission considers that the measures relating to the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement, the FOGASA II agreement and the TGSS agreement constitute State Aid for the purposes of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Zato Komisija meni, da so ukrepi v zvezi z izvršitvijo sporazuma FOGASA I, sporazuma FOGASA II in sporazuma TGSS vključeni med državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe.
EXAMINATION OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID
PREVERJANJE ZDRUŽLJIVOSTI POMOČI
The compatibility of the measures considered as State Aid under Article 87(1) of the Treaty must be assessed on the basis of the exemptions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same article.
Združljivost pomoči, imenovanih državne pomoči skladno s členom 87(1) Pogodbe je potrebno oceniti na podlagi izjem, predvidenih v odstavkih 2 in 3 istega člena Pogodbe.
The exemptions provided for in Article 87(2) and in Article 87(3)(b), (d) and (e), are clearly not applicable as the measures are not intended to promote the execution of a major project of common Community interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State, or to promote culture and heritage conservation.
Izjeme, ki so predvidene v členu 87(2) in v točkah (b), (d) in (e) člena 87(3) se ne uporabljajo, če niso namenjene podpori pri realizaciji pomembnega projekta, ki je v skupnem interesu EU ali za lajšanje hujšega pretresa gospodarstva določene države članice, prav tako pa tudi ne za spodbujanje kulture in ohranjanja dediščine.
Nor do they come under another category of aid determined by decision of the Council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.
Prav tako ne gre za drugo obliko pomoči, ki bi jo z odlokom, ki bi ga potrdila večina, določil Svet na predlog Komisije.
Consequently, the exemptions relating to the development of certain regions or sectors provided for in Article 87(3)(a) and (c), should be assessed.
Posledično je potrebno oceniti izjeme v povezavi z razvojem določenih regij ali sektorjev, predvidenih v točkah (a) in (c) člena 87(3).
As regards aid intended to promote the development of certain sectors, and taking into account the nature of the measures in question, the only relevant criteria are those relating to aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.
Ker gre za pomoč, namenjeno za spodbujanje razvijanja določenih sektorjev in ob upoštevanju narave zadevnih ukrepov, so edini ustrezni kriteriji tisti, ki se nanašajo na pomoč za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah.
As regards aid intended to promote the development of certain regions, the Commission notes that the region in which SNIACE is situated may opt, from September 1995, for regional aid under Article 87(3)(a), and that, before that date, it could opt for regional aid under Article 87(3)(c).
Ker gre za pomoč, namenjeno za spodbujanje razvijanja določenih regij Komisija ugotavlja, da lahko regija, v kateri se nahaja podjetje SNIACE od meseca septembra 1995 zaprosi za pomoč za regionalni razvoj v smislu člena 87(3)(a), pred tem pa je lahko zaprosila za pomoč za regionalni razvoj v smislu člena 87(3)(c).
Consequently, the Commission has to analyse the measures in the light of the Community guidelines on aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty and the guidelines on regional aid.
Zato mora Komisija analizirati pomoči v okviru Smernic Evropske Unije o državnih pomočeh za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah in Smernic o državni regionalni pomoči.
Pursuant to the Commission notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid [19], the measures must be assessed in accordance with the guidelines in force at the time when the aid was granted.
Na podlagi obvestila Komisije o določitvi pravil, ki se uporabljajo pri ocenjevanju nezakonitih državnih pomoči [19], morajo biti pomoči ocenjene skladno s smernicami, ki veljajo v času odobritve pomoči.
Aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty
Pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah
As regards the rules relating to aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, it is clear that, since the publication of the Eighth Report on Competition Policy of 1979 and in all its successive guidelines, the Commission requires a restructuring plan enabling the viability of the firms in difficulty to be restored [20].
Pri pravilih, povezanih s pomočmi za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah ni dvoma, da Komisija od objave Osmega poročila o politiki konkurenčnosti iz leta 1979 in v vseh naslednjih smernicah zahteva načrt prestrukturiranja, ki omogoča ponovno oživitev podjetij v krizi [20].
In the present case, the Spanish authorities have never argued that the measures are rescuing and restructuring aid.
V tem primeru španske oblasti nikoli niso razlagale, da bi bili zadevni ukrepi tudi pomoč za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
Nor have they tried to show that they form part of a restructuring programme for the purposes of the rules applicable on the date when the contested aid was granted.
Prav tako niso skušale dokazati, da gre za načrt prestrukturiranja v okviru pravil, ki se uporabljajo na dan podelitve zadevne pomoči.
As regards the viability plan that the applicant submitted to the Commission before the procedure was initiated, the Spanish authorities confined themselves to stating, in particular, in their letter of 30 June 1997 in reply to the Commission’s letter of 16 May 1997, that the expert’s conclusion that ‘SNIACE’s viability can only be guaranteed by granting subsidies enabling investment projects to be implemented and debt to be renegotiated’ was a purely personal opinion expressed in a private study, and did not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Spanish authorities [22].
Glede načrta oživljanja, ki ga je predložil tožnik Komisiji pred začetkom postopka, so španske oblasti v dopisu z dne 30. junija 1997, ki je bil odgovor na dopis Komisije z dne 16. maja 1997, navedle, da je zaključek strokovnjaka, po katerem „se oživitev podjetja SNIACE lahko zagotovi le z dodeljevanjem subvencij, ki mu bodo omogočile zaključevanje investicijskih projektov in ponovna pogajanja o dolgovih.“ čisto osebno mnenje, izraženo v zasebni pisarni, in ne odraža nujno mnenja španskih oblasti [22].
Consequently, as there was no restructuring programme, the measures adopted within the framework of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements and the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement are not justified on the basis of the Eighth Report of the European Commission on Competition Policy of 1979 or the Community guidelines on State Aid for rescuing and restructuring of 1994, 1999 or 2004.
Posledično, ker načrta o prestrukturiranju ni, so ukrepi iz sporazumov FOGASA II in TGSS kot tudi izvršitev sporazuma FOGASA I na podlagi Osmega poročila Evropske komisije o politiki konkurenčnosti iz leta 1979 ali Smernic Skupnosti o državnih pomočeh za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah iz leta 1994, 1999 ali 2004, neupravičeni.
Regional aid
Pomoči za regionalni razvoj
As for the exemptions laid down in Article 87(3)(a) and (c) relating to aid intended to promote or facilitate the development of certain areas, the Commission points out that the area in which SNIACE is established may opt, from September 1995, for regional aid under Article 87(3)(a), and that, before that date, it could opt for regional aid under Article 87(3)(c).
Glede izjem, ki jih predvidevata točki (a) in (c) člena 87(3) v zvezi s pomočjo za spodbujanje ali omogočanje razvoja določenih regij, Komisija ugotavlja, da lahko regija, v kateri se nahaja podjetje SNIACE od meseca septembra 1995 zaprosi za pomoč za regionalni razvoj v smislu točke (a) člena 87(3), pred tem pa je lahko zaprosila za pomoč za regionalni razvoj v smislu točke (c) člena 87(3).
However, the aid granted to SNIACE lacks the necessary characteristics to facilitate the development of certain economic regions for the purposes of the said article, as it was granted in the form of operating aid, that is without being subject to any condition relating to investment or job creation.
Kljub temu pa pomoči, dodeljene podjetju SNIACE, nimajo značilnosti, ki so potrebne za omogočanje regionalnega razvoja določenih gospodarskih regij v smislu omenjenega člena, saj so bile dodeljene v obliki pomoči za poslovanje, torej ne da bi bile povržene kateremu koli pogoju glede investiranja ali ustvarjanja delovnih mest.
Since 1979 [23] the Commission only authorises aid that is not subject to an initial investment or job creation in regions that may opt for regional aid where the Member State succeeds in proving the existence of handicaps and gauges their importance, which has not occurred in this case.
Od leta 1979 [23] Komisija odobri le pomoči, ki niso podvržene začetni investiciji ali ustvarjanju delovnih mest v regijah, ki lahko zaprosijo za pomoč za regionalni razvoj, če država članica dokaže, da obstajajo pomanjkljivosti in meri njihov vpliv, kar se v tem primeru ni zgodilo.
Consequently, the measures adopted within the framework of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements and the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement cannot be justified on the basis of the Commission communication of 1979 or the Guidelines on regional aid of 1998.
Zaradi tega so ukrepi, sprejeti v okviru sporazumov FOGASA II in TGSS, kot tudi izvršitev sporazuma FOGASA I, na podlagi Obvestila Komisije iz leta 1979 in Smernic Skupnosti o nacionalni regionalni pomoči iz leta 1988, neupravičeni.
Aid for the synthetic fibres sector
Pomoč sektorju za sintetična vlakna
As regards the rules on the textile fibres sector applicable at the time when the agreements were concluded [24], the Commission considers that the only possible aid option was investment aid.
Glede pravil, povezanih s sektorjem za tekstilna vlakna, ki so veljala v trenutku podpisa sporazumov [24], Komisija meni, da je bila investicijska pomoč edina, za katero je bilo možno zaprositi.
However, the contested measures do not have any of the features of investment aid.
Vendar pa uvedeni ukrepi ne vsebujejo nobene od značilnosti investicijskih pomoči.
The measures adopted within the framework of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements and the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement are not justified on the basis of the guidelines of 1992 or 1996.
Ukrepi, sprejeti v okviru sporazumov FOGASA II in TGSS, kot tudi izvršitev sporazuma FOGASA I na podlagi Smernic od leta 1992 do 1996, niso upravičeni.
Conclusion on the compatibility of the aid
Sklep glede združljivosti pomoči
The Commission considers that the implementing provisions of the FOGASA I agreement, as amended on 18 March 1999, and the conclusion of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements cannot be declared compatible.
Komisija meni, da veljavna določila sporazuma FOGASA I, spremenjenega dne 18. marca 1999, ter podpis sporazumov FOGASA II in TGSS ne morejo biti združljivi
PROCEDURE FOR RECOVERY OF THE UNLAWFUL AID
POSTOPEK VRAČILA NEZAKONITIH POMOČI
Since the Commission considers that the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement, as amended on 18 March 1999, and of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements are incompatible with the Treaty, the beneficiary must return the amounts received.
Glede na to, da Komisija meni, da izvršitev sporazuma FOGASA I, spremenjenega dne 18. marca 1999, kot tudi sporazuma FOGASA II in TGSS niso združljivi s Pogodbo, mora prejemnik pomoči vrniti vse prejete zneske.
The procedures for recovering unlawful aid declared incompatible were laid down in the Notice from the Communication ‘Towards an effective implementation of Commission decisions ordering Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State Aid’ (hereinafter the Notice of 2007) [25].
Načini za vračilo nezakonitih pomoči, ki so nezdružljive, so opredeljene v Obvestilu Komisije „Za učinkovito izvajanje odločb Komisije, ki od držav članic zahtevajo dosego vračila nezakonite in nezdružljive državne pomoči“ (v nadaljevanju: Obvestilo iz leta 2007) [25].
The case-law of the Court, firstly, and paragraph 37 of the Notice of 2007 state that the Commission is not required to fix the exact amount to be recovered.
Najprej sodna praksa sodišča, nato pa še odstavek 37 Obvestila iz leta 2007 določa, da Komisija ni pristojna za določitev točnega zneska, ki ga je potrebno vrniti.
However, the decision must include information enabling Spain to determine that amount.
Kljub temu mora odločba vključevati navodila, ki Španiji omogočajo, da določi to vrednost.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 [26] implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 [27] provides that the aid to be recovered pursuant to a recovery decision is to include interest at an appropriate rate fixed by the Commission.
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 794/2004 [26] o določitvi podrobnih pravil o uporabi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 [27] določa, da se znesek pomoči za vračilo skladno z odločbo o vračilu poviša za obresti, preračunane na ustrezno obrestno mero, ki jo določi Komisija.
Interest is to be payable from the date on which the unlawful aid was at the disposal of the beneficiary until the date of its recovery.
Obresti se plačajo od datuma, ko je bila nezakonita pomoč na razpolago upravičencu, do datuma vračila.
The interest rate is to be applied on a compound basis until the date of recovery of the aid.
Uporabljena bo sestavljena obrestna mera do datuma vračila pomoči.
However, regarding the method for calculating the interest, the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 11 December 2008 in Case C-295/07, Commission v Département du Loiret and Scott SA [28], stated that the method for calculating the present-day value of unlawful aid is a substantive and not a procedural matter [29].
Vseeno pa je Sodišče v zvezi z metodo izračuna obrestne mere v sodbi z dne 11. decembra 2008 v zadevi C-295/07, Comisión/Département du Loiret y Scout, SA [28] potrdilo, da je metoda posodobitve nezakonite pomoči materialno in ne postopkovno vprašanje [29].
The Decision of 2000 and the Decision on the second initiation of the procedure were adopted long before Regulation (EC) No 794/2004.
Odločba iz leta 2000 in Odločba v zvezi z drugo sprožitvijo postopka sta bili sprejeti veliko prej kot Uredba (ES) št. 794/2004.
Consequently, the Commission considers that the method for calculating the recovery of the unlawful aid must be that used at the time of the annulled decision and that, therefore, the Member State will use the ‘simple interest’ method to calculate the amount to be repaid.
Na podlagi tega Komisija meni, da je potrebno metodo za izračun vračila nezakonite pomoči določiti v obdobju razveljavitve odločbe in da mora zato država članica uporabiti metodo, imenovano „enostavne obresti“ za izračun zneska, ki ga je potrebno vrniti.
For the purposes of the present case, the Commission distinguishes between, on the one hand, the partial implementation of the FOGASA I agreement and, on the other, the incompatible measures of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements.
Za namen tega primera Komisija razlikuje med delno izvršitvijo sporazuma FOGASA I na eni strani, in nezdružljivih ukrepov iz sporazumov FOGASA II in TGSS na drugi strani.
FOGASA I agreement
Sporazum FOGASA I
As has been stated in recital (77), the Commission considers that the agreement concluded between FOGASA and SNIACE on 5 November 1993 fulfils the private creditor criterion and, therefore, does not constitute State Aid.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 77, Komisija meni, da sporazum, ki sta ga sklad FOGASA in podjetje SNIACE podpisala dne 5. novembra 1993, izpolnjuje kriterij zasebnega upnika in zato ne predstavlja državne pomoči.
However, as the said agreement was only partly honoured, the Commission considers that the FOGASA I agreement, as revised on 18 March 1999, constitutes incompatible and unlawful aid that must be recovered.
Kljub temu, glede na to, da je bil omenjeni sporazum izvršen le delno, Komisija meni, da sporazum FOGASA I, spremenjen 18. marca 1999, predstavlja državno pomoč, ki je nezakonita in nezdružljiva in jo je potrebno vrniti.
The incompatibility affects, firstly, the sums not paid under the agreement by 18 March 1999 and, secondly, the remainder of the aid from that date.
Nezdružljivost po eni strani zadeva nepovrnjene zneske skladno s sporazumom do 18. marca 1999 in po drugi strani na ostanek pomoči od tega datuma dalje.
The aid to be recovered must include accrued interest calculated in accordance with the simple interest method (see recital (101)).
Pomoč, ki jo je potrebno vrniti mora vključevati obresti, izračunane skladno s metodo „enostavnih obresti“ (glej uvodno izjavo 105).
The sums that were repaid pursuant to the FOGASA I agreement before it was revised, even though the interest rate was lower than the Commission’s reference interest rate, do not constitute State Aid and it is therefore not necessary to recover them.
Zneski, ki so bili povrnjeni skladno s sporazumom FOGASA I pred revizijo, ne predstavljajo državne pomoči, četudi je bila obrestna mera nižja od obrestne mere, ki jo predpisuje Komisija, in zato tega zneska ni potrebno vračati.
Payments made other than the amounts paid under the agreements may be deducted from the sums to be recovered as unlawful and incompatible aid.
Izvedena plačila, ki se razlikujejo od podeljenih zneskov skladno s sporazumom je možno izračunati iz zneskov, ki jih je potrebno vrniti zaradi nezakonite in nezdružljive pomoči.
FOGASA II and TGSS agreements
Sporazuma FOGASA in TGSS
As has also been stated above, the Commission considers that Spain granted unlawful aid in the form of a repayment agreement concluded with FOGASA on 30 October 1995 and a debt rescheduling agreement concluded with the TGSS on 8 March 1996 contrary to Article 88(3) of the Treaty, and that such aid is incompatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
Kot že prej navedeno, Komisija meni, da je Španija dodelila nezakonito pomoč v obliki sporazuma o vračilu, podpisanim s skladom FOGASA dne 30. oktobra 1995, in sporazuma o reprogramiranju dolgov, podpisanim s TGSS dne 8. marca 1996, ki je v nasprotju s členom 88(3) Pogodbe, pomoč pa ni skladna s skupnim trgom in izvajanjem Sporazuma o EGP.
As the aid is unlawful and incompatible, it must be repaid in full and its economic effects must be annulled.
Glede na to, da so pomoči nezakonite in neskladne, jih je potrebno v celoti vrniti in razveljaviti njihove finančne posledice.
The amounts to be recovered equate to the total debt covered by the second agreement with FOGASA and the agreement with the TGSS.
Zneski, ki jih je potrebno vrniti, so enaki skupnemu znesku dolga, ki je predmet drugega sporazuma s skladom FOGASA in sporazuma s TGSS.
To these must be added the simple interest calculated in accordance with the Commission’s reference interest rate.
K temu je potrebno prišteti še enostavne obresti skladno z obrestno mero, ki jo določi Komisija.
The payments made may be deducted from the amounts to be recovered.
Izvedena plačila se lahko izračunajo iz zneskov, ki jih je potrebno vrniti.
In the light of the above considerations, Decision 1999/395/EC should therefore be amended.
Glede na predhodne ugotovitve je potrebno spremeniti Odločbo 1999/395/ES.
The first repayment agreement concluded between FOGASA and SNIACE does not constitute State Aid.
Prvi sporazum o vračilu, podpisan med skladom FOGASA in podjetjem SNIACE ne predstavlja državne pomoči.
However, the reassessment of the implementation of the repayment agreement concluded with FOGASA on 3 November 1993, the repayment agreement concluded with FOGASA on 30 October 1995 and the rescheduling agreements concluded with the TGSS leads to the conclusion that Spain granted unlawful aid contrary to Article 88(3) of the Treaty and that such aid is incompatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
Nasprotno, nova ocena izvršitve sporazuma o vračilu s skladom FOGASA z dne 3. novembra 1993, sporazuma o vračilu s skladom FOGASA z dne 30. oktobra 1995 in sporazumom o reprogramiranju s TGSS kaže, da je Španija podeljevala nezakonito pomoč, ki je v nasprotju s členom 88(3) Pogodbe, in da pomoč ni skladna s skupnim trgom in izvajanjem Sporazuma o EGP.
As the aid granted is unlawful and incompatible with the common market, its repayment must be secured under Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 and its economic effects annulled,
Glede na to, da je podeljena pomoč nezakonita in neskladna s skupnim trgom, je potrebno zagotoviti vračilo skladno z Uredbo (ES) št. 659/1999 in razveljaviti njene finančne posledice –
Decision 1999/395/EC shall be amended as follows:
Odločba 1999/395/ES se spremeni kot sledi:
the first paragraph shall be replaced by the following text:
prvi odstavek se nadomesti z naslednjim odstavkom: