natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In order to obtain the lowest prices possible, buyers often use tendering procedures.
Za pridobitev najnižjih možnih cen kupci pogosto uporabljajo razpisne postopke.
Balancing services contracts
Pogodbe o storitvah izravnave
Balancing services contracts are relevant to the assessment of the existence of an advantage between the PPAs because a minor part of the capacities reserved under PPAs is assigned by MVM for the provision of balancing services to the TSO [58].
Pogodbe o storitvah izravnave so pomembne pri oceni obstoja prednosti med SNEE, saj je manjši del rezerviranih zmogljivosti, ki so rezervirane v okviru SNEE, dodeljen MVM-ju za zagotavljanje storitev izravnave UPO [58].
In practice, MVM sells capacities to the TSO on an annual basis as a package and uses part of the capacities reserved under the PPAs for that purpose.
V praksi MVM prodaja zmogljivosti UPO na letni ravni v obliki svežnja in uporablja del zmogljivosti, ki so rezervirane v okviru SNEE za te namene.
In practice, it means that the generators do not bear the risk attached to the annual tenders [59] and to the uncertainty concerning the amount of energy that they will provide.
V praksi to pomeni, da proizvajalci niso izpostavljeni tveganju glede letnih ponudnikov [59] in negotovosti glede količine energije, ki jo morajo zagotoviti.
From their point of view, the contractual conditions governing the provision of balancing services are those of the PPAs.
Z njihovega stališča so pogodbeni pogoji, ki so navedeni pri zagotavljanju storitev izravnave enaki kot pri SNEE.
However, as shown in recital 204, the specifications of the PPAs, especially their long duration and the existence of minimum guaranteed off-take, cannot be justified on commercial grounds even for the provision of balancing services.
Vendar kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 204, specifikacij SNEE, še zlasti njihovega dolgega trajanja in obstoja minimalne zagotovljene porabe, ni mogoče upravičiti s poslovnimi razlogi, pa četudi gre za zagotavljanje storitev izravnave.
The Commission recognises that in Hungary, few generation units may be able to provide the necessary balancing services to the TSO, as claimed by interested parties, but has come to the conclusion that even in such circumstances the conditions offered by the PPAs go further than what a TSO may consider acceptable on commercial grounds.
Komisija priznava, da lahko na Madžarskem potrebne storitve izravnave UPO zagotavlja samo nekaj proizvodnih enot, kot to trdijo zainteresirane stranke, vendar je prišla do zaključka, da pogoji, ki jih nudijo SNEE, tudi v takšnih okoliščinah presegajo tisto, kar UPO še šteje za sprejemljivo iz poslovnih razlogov.
Conclusion on the comparison between PPAs and standard commercial practices
Sklep o primerjavi med SNEE in standardnimi poslovnimi praksami
This comparison shows that PPAs structurally provide more guarantees to generators than standard commercial contracts.
Ta primerjava kaže, da SNEE strukturno zagotavljajo več jamstev proizvajalcem kot običajne poslovne pogodbe.
The generators are thus in a more advantageous situation that the one they would face on the free market without their PPA.
Proizvajalci so torej v boljšem položaju, kot bi ga imeli na prostem trgu brez SNEE.
In order to complete the assessment of the existence of an advantage, it is necessary to assess the positive and negative effects that the public authorities could expect from the PPAs when Hungary joined the European Union and to verify whether they could have expected a better balance between the positive and negative effects from other approaches based on standard commercial practices.
Da bi zaključili oceno glede obstoja prednosti, je treba oceniti pozitivne in negativne učinke, ki bi jih javni organi lahko pričakovali od SNEE, ko se je Madžarska pridružila Evropski uniji, in preveriti, ali bi lahko pričakovali večje ravnovesje med negativnimi in pozitivnimi posledicami v okviru drugih pristopov, ki temeljijo na standardnih poslovnih praksah.
Foreseeable consequences of the PPAs for the public authorities in the light of the comparison with buyers’ standard commercial practices on European electricity markets
Predvidene posledice SNEE za javne organe v primerjavi s standardnimi poslovnimi praksami kupcev na evropskem trgu z električno energijo
The public authorities could expect from the PPAs that MVM would be able to find enough energy to fulfil the needs of the public utility market over a long period of time.
Javni organi bi lahko od SNEE pričakovali, da bo MVM sposoben dobaviti dovolj energije, da bi zadostil potrebam trga javne porabe za daljše časovno obdobje.
However, they had no assurance concerning the level of price that would have to be paid by MVM over that same period because the PPAs do not provide hedging against risks of price fluctuations, which are due in particular to fluctuation in fuel costs.
Vendar kljub temu niso imeli nobenega zagotovila glede stopnje cen, ki bi jih moral plačati MVM v enakem obdobju, saj SNEE ne zagotavljajo zavarovanja pred tveganjem nihanja cen, do katerega prihaja zlasti zaradi nihanj cen goriva.
Furthermore, the combination of long-term capacity reservation and the associated minimum guaranteed off-take deprives the public authorities of the possibility of benefiting from more attractive prices offered by other generators and importers.
Poleg tega kombinacija dolgoročne rezervacije zmogljivosti in s tem povezana minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema javnim organom odvzemata možnost pridobitve koristi zaradi ugodnejših cen, ki jih nudijo drugi proizvajalci in uvozniki.
The capacities and minimum guaranteed off-take of the PPAs, the long-term import contracts concluded by MVM and the quantities purchased by it under the mandatory off-take system [60] were sufficient to cover its needs.
Zmogljivosti in minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema SNEE, dolgoročne pogodbe o uvozu, ki jih je sklenil MVM, in kupljene količine v okviru sistema obveznega odjema [60] so zadostovale za kritje potreb.
MVM could thus not diversify its supply portfolio, although alternative generation capacities were available.
MVM torej ni mogel diverzificirati svojega portfelja dobave, čeprav so bile na voljo alternativne proizvodne zmogljivosti.
In 2004, several power generators were not engaged in long-term power purchase agreements.
Leta 2004 nekaj proizvajalcev energije ni bilo vključenih v dolgoročne sporazume o nakupu energije.
The PPAs of two power plants accounting for 470 MW of installed capacity expired at the end of 2003, which significantly increased the supply capacity outside PPAs.
SNEE dveh elektrarn, ki predstavljata 470 MW nameščenih zmogljivosti, sta potekla ob koncu leta 2003, kar je občutno povečalo zmogljivost dobave izven okvira SNEE.
Around 700 MW of import capacities are not covered by long-term import contracts and could have been used by MVM to import electricity if it had not been bound by the system of reserved capacities and minimum guaranteed off-take.
Okoli 700 MW uvoznih zmogljivosti ni vključenih v dolgoročne pogodbe o uvozu in bi jih MVM lahko uporabljal za uvoz električne energije, če ne bi bil obvezan s sistemom rezerviranih zmogljivosti in minimalne zagotovljene količine odjema.
As shown in the following recitals, it was clear when Hungary joined the European Union in 2003 and 2004 that the system of reserved capacities and minimum guaranteed off-take, which was designed under a Single Buyer Model whereby all electricity consumed in Hungary transited through MVM, entailed significant risks that the PPAs would require MVM to purchase energy beyond its needs.
Kot je razvidno iz naslednjih uvodnih izjav, je bilo jasno, da ko se je Madžarska pridružila Evropski uniji leta 2003 in 2004, sistem rezerviranih zmogljivosti in minimalne zagotovljene količine odjema, ki je bil oblikovan v okviru modela pooblaščenega kupca, pri katerem vsa električna energija, ki je porabljena na Madžarskem, potuje preko MVM, prinaša določena tveganja, da bodo SNEE zahtevali, da MVM izvede nakupe električne energije, ki presegajo njegove potrebe.
This legislative measure, which came into force on 1 January 2003, led to the creation, alongside the pre-existing public utility segment, of a free market where prices resulted from the confrontation of supply and demand.
Zakonodajni ukrep, ki je začel veljati 1. januarja 2003, je ob prej obstoječem segmentu javne porabe vodil do vzpostavitve prostega trga, kjer so cene izhajale iz primerjave ponudbe in povpraševanja.
The foreseeable effect of that measure was to reduce the quantities needed by MVM for supply to the regional distribution companies for the fulfilment of demand on the public utility segment.
Predvidena posledica omenjenega ukrepa je bila zmanjšanje količin, ki jih je MVM potreboval za dobavo regionalnim distribucijskim podjetjem za zadostitev povpraševanja v segmentu javne porabe.
The following table shows the continuous increase in quantities actually sold on the free market between 2003 and 2006 and the corresponding decrease in quantities actually sold on the public utility segment through regional distribution companies.
Sledeča tabela prikazuje stalno rast količin, ki so bile dejansko prodane na prostem trgu med letoma 2003 in 2006, in ustrezen upad količin, ki so bile dejansko prodane v segmentu javne porabe s pomočjo regionalnih distribucijskih podjetij.
Sales on the retail market (regulated segment and free segment)
Prodaja na maloprodajnem trgu (reguliran segment in prosti segment)
Source: Statistical data of the Hungarian power system, 2006 [61].
Vir: Statistični podatki o madžarskem energetskem sistemu 2006 [61].
Total consumption
Skupna poraba v
Sales on the free segment
Prodaja v prostem segmentu
Sales on the regulated segment
Prodaja v reguliranem segmentu
Between 2003 and 2006 the quantities sold on the public utility segment, which correspond to MVM's actual purchase needs, decreased by 25 %.
Med letoma 2003 in 2006 so se količine, ki so bile prodane v segmentu javne porabe in so ustrezale MVM-jevim dejanskim potrebam po nakupu, zmanjšale za 25 %.
The decrease of MVM's needs was largely foreseeable at the time when Hungary joined the European Union, particularly in the light of the significant difference between the official prices on the public utility segment (prices paid by consumers to regional distribution companies) and the prices observed on the free segment in 2003 and 2004.
Zmanjšanje MVM-jevih potreb je bilo v veliki meri predvidljivo v času, ko se je Madžarska pridružila Evropski uniji, še zlasti zaradi občutne razlike med uradnimi cenami v segmentu javne porabe (cene, ki so jih plačali odjemalci podjetjem za regionalno distribucijo) in cenami, ki so se pojavile v prostem segmentu v letih 2003 in 2004.
Price differences between the regulated segment and the free segment on the retail market in 2003 and 2004
Razlike v cenah med reguliranim segmentom in prostim segmentom v letih 2003 in 2004
Source: Statistical data on the Hungarian power system, 2006
Vir: Statistični podatki o madžarskem energetskem sistemu 2006.
Average price on the free market
Povprečna cena na prostem trgu
Average prices on the public utility sector [62]
Povprečna cena v sektorju javne porabe [62]
Prices on the free market indeed constituted clear incentives for eligible consumers to make use of their eligibility rights.
Cene na prostem trgu so predstavljale jasne spodbude za upravičene odjemalce glede uporabe njihovih pravic.
It was also well known in 2003 and 2004 that the forthcoming accession of Hungary to the European Union would entail the entry into force of the Second Electricity Directive [63], and consequently the rights of all consumers to become eligible as from 1 July 2007, which would lead to a further reduction of MVM's needs over a much shorter period of time than the remaining validity of the PPAs.
V letih 2003 in 2004 je bilo splošno znano, da bližajoči se pristop Madžarske k Evropski uniji prinaša tudi začetek veljavnosti Druge direktive o električni energiji [63], in posledično upravičenost vseh odjemalcev od 1. julija 2007 naprej, kar je povzročilo še dodatno zmanjšanje potreb MVM v veliko krajšem obdobju, kot je bilo obdobje veljavnosti SNEE.
Consequently, it was clear in 2003 and 2004 that the PPAs, which had been designed in the context of a Single Buyer Model whereby all electricity needed by the Hungarian market transited through MVM, would not only prevent MVM from diversifying its supply portfolio and obtaining more favourable prices by fostering competition between its suppliers, but was also likely to result in the obligation on MVM to purchase more energy than it actually needed.
V letih 2003 in 2004 je bilo očitno, da bodo SNEE, ki so bili oblikovani v okviru modela pooblaščenega kupca, pri čemer je bil MVM posrednik za vso električno energijo, ki jo je potreboval madžarski trg, preprečili MVM-ju zagotavljanje raznovrstnosti v njegovem portfelju in pridobitev ugodnejše cene s pomočjo spodbujanja konkurence med njegovimi dobavitelji, obstajala pa je tudi verjetnost, da bi bila MVM-ju naložena obveznost za nakup več energije, kot jo je dejansko potreboval.
This risk had actually been identified by the public authorities.
Javni organi so prepoznali to tveganje.
In 2002, the Hungarian Government issued a Decree [64] which required MVM to initiate a renegotiation of the PPAs with all generators with a view to adjusting the amount of reserved capacity.
Leta 2002 je madžarska vlada izdala uredbo [64], ki je od MVM-ja zahtevala, da začne z vsemi proizvajalci ponovno pogajanje glede SNEE z namenom prilagoditve količine rezervirane zmogljivosti.
Although that Decree did not require the termination of the PPAs, it is in itself a clear indication that the amounts of capacity reserved under the PPAs (and subsequently, the minimum guaranteed off-take) were too high in the light of the gradual liberalisation of the retail market.
Čeprav uredba ni nalagala prekinitve SNEE, je bilo jasno, da so količine zmogljivosti, ki so bile rezervirane v okviru SNEE (in posledično minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema), previsoke z vidika postopne liberalizacije maloprodajnega trga.
That Decree also introduced the possibility for MVM, in the event of failure to complete negotiations with generators, to sell capacities and energy which prove to be in excess of the amounts actually needed to supply the regulated segment, through three ‘release mechanisms’: capacity auctions, capacity tenders and sales on a virtual Internet-based trading platform called ‘the Marketplace’ (Piactér).
Ta uredba je uvedla tudi možnost, da MVM v primeru neuspešnega izida pogajanj s proizvajalci proda zmogljivosti in energijo, za katero se izkaže, da predstavlja presežek količine, dejansko potrebne za oskrbovanje reguliranega segmenta, s pomočjo treh „sprostitvenih mehanizmov“: avkcij zmogljivosti, razpisov za podizvajalce in prodajo na virtualni internetni trgovinski platformi, imenovani „trg“ („Piactér“).
Although the form of these three mechanisms vary, all three of them in essence consist in MVM offering for sale on the free market, in the form of a variety of forward delivery products, the surplus energy that it does not need to supply the public utility sector but that it has to purchase in accordance with the terms of the PPAs.
Čeprav je oblika teh treh mehanizmov različna, vsi trije MVM-ju ponujajo prodajo na prostem trgu, v obliki različnih terminskih proizvodov, presežka energije, ki ga ne potrebuje za oskrbo sektorja javne porabe, vendar ga mora kupiti v skladu s pogoji SNEE.
The following table displays data concerning the first three auctions carried out by MVM.
Spodnja tabela prikazuje podatke, ki se nanašajo na prve tri avkcije, ki jih je izvedel MVM.
It shows that the prices received by MVM for the energy sold through the release mechanisms were significantly below the prices paid for that same energy under the PPAs.
Videti je, da so bile cene, po katerih je MVM prodajal energijo s pomočjo sprostitvenih mehanizmov, občutno nižje od cen, ki jih je plačal za enako energijo v okviru SNEE,
MVM's three first auctions
Prve tri avkcije MVM-ja
First auction June 2003
Prva avkcija junij 2003
Second auction December 2003
Druga avkcija december 2003
Third auction June 2004
Tretja avkcija junij 2004
Baseload products
Proizvodi pasovne energije:
Quantities of electricity sold (GWh)
Prodane količine električne energije (GWh)
Sale prices on auctions (HUF/kWh)
Prodajna cena na avkcijah (HUF/kWh)
Off-peak load products
Proizvodi pri običajnem obratovanju:
Sale price on auctions
Prodajna cena na avkcijah
Average annual PPA prices
Povprečne letne cene SNEE
The Hungarian legislation had actually anticipated that effect and provided for a compensation to be paid by the Hungarian State to MVM for the losses incurred owing to the difference between the price paid for the quantities released through capacity auctions and the sales prices obtained on the market.
Madžarska zakonodaja je pravzaprav predvidela to posledico in zagotovila nadomestilo, ki ga madžarska država izplača MVM-ju za izgube, nastale zaradi razlik med plačano ceno za količine, ki so bile prodane na avkciji zmogljivosti, in prodajnimi cenami na trgu.
The compensation paid to MVM amounted to 3,8 billion HUF in 2003 [65].
Leta 2003 je nadomestilo, ki je bilo izplačano MVM-ju, znašalo 3,8 milijarde forintov [65].
According to MVM's annual report for 2004, the compensation increased by HUF 2,4 billion in 2004.
Po podatkih iz letnega poročila MVM iz leta 2004 se je nadomestilo leta 2004 povečalo za 2,4 milijarde madžarskih forintov.
From the point of view of the public authorities, it is clear that such a system cannot be justified on commercial grounds as it amounts to subsidising the sales of generators for supply to the free market segment.
Z vidika javnih organov je jasno, da takšnega sistema ni mogoče upravičiti s poslovnimi razlogi, saj prispeva k subvencioniranju prodaje proizvajalcev za dobavo na segment prostega trga.
The following table shows the total quantities of energy sold by MVM through the release channels between 2003 and 2004 on the basis of the information provided by Hungary on 24 September 2007 and 21 April 2008.
Spodnja tabela prikazuje skupne količine električne energije, ki jih je MVM prodal s pomočjo sprostitvenih kanalov med letoma 2003 in 2004, na podlagi podatkov, ki jih je posredovala Madžarska 24. septembra 2007 in 21. aprila 2008.
Quantities sold by MVM through the release mechanisms
Količine, ki jih je MVM prodal s pomočjo sprostitvenih mehanizmov
Total sales by MVM through the release mechanisms [66]
Celotna prodaja MVM-ja s pomočjo sprostitvenih mehanizmov [66]
It is clear that under normal market circumstances buyers do not engage in contracts which entail a significant risk of being compelled to buy more electricity than needed and incurring substantial losses when reselling that energy.
Jasno je, da v običajnih tržnih pogojih kupci ne sklepajo pogodb, ki prinašajo določena tveganja glede prisilnega nakupa več električne energije, kot jo potrebujejo, in večjih izgub pri ponovni prodaji te energije.
This risk is theoretically present in forward contracts and long-term contracts concluded by large end-consumers, but to a much lower degree.
To tveganje je teoretično prisotno v terminskih pogodbah in dolgoročnih pogodbah, ki jih sklepajo večji končni odjemalci, vendar v precej manjši meri.
The duration of forward contracts is significantly less than that of the PPAs.
Terminske pogodbe trajajo veliko manj časa kot SNEE.
The buyer has a much better overview of its needs for such timeframes than for a period ranging from 15 to 27 years.
Kupec ima veliko boljši pregled nad svojimi potrebami v takšnih časovnih okvirih kot pa v obdobju, ki traja od 15 do 27 let.
Furthermore, buyers tend to cover only part of their expected needs with forward contracts, buying any additional quantities needed on spot markets.
Kupci težijo k temu, da bi s terminskimi pogodbami pokrivali samo del svojih pričakovanih potreb in kupovali dodatne količine, ki jih potrebujejo, na promptnih trgih.
Long-term contracts concluded by large end-consumers also entail only a limited risk of excess purchase because of their limited duration, and also because the consumption of large industrial and business end-consumers entering into such contracts is as a rule stable and predictable, which is not the case for MVM for the reasons outlined above.
Dolgoročne pogodbe, ki jih sklepajo večji končni odjemalci, vključujejo samo omejeno tveganje prevelikega nakupa, saj je njihovo trajanje omejeno, poraba večjih industrijskih in končnih poslovnih odjemalcev, ki podpisujejo take pogodbe, pa je praviloma stabilna in predvidljiva, kar pa iz zgoraj navedenih razlogov ne moremo trditi za MVM.
Furthermore, it is useful to recall that under forward contracts or long-term purchase contracts concluded by end-consumers, buyers commit to buying a certain amount of energy several months or years before actual delivery takes place because their purchase contract provides hedging against price fluctuations.
Nadalje je treba omeniti, da se v okviru terminskih pogodb ali pogodb o dolgoročnih nakupih, ki jih sklepajo končni odjemalci, kupci obvežejo k nakupu določene količine električne energije več mesecev ali let pred dejansko dobavo, saj njihova pogodba o nakupu vključuje zavarovanje v primeru nihanja cen.
This benefit is not present in the PPAs because prices cover variable costs, which owing to variation in fuel costs may increase in unpredictable proportions.
Takšna ugodnost ni vključena v SNEE, saj cene pokrivajo variabilne stroške, ki se lahko zaradi sprememb cen goriva povečajo v nepredvidljivem obsegu.
Conclusion on the existence of an advantage
Sklep o obstoju prednosti
The Commission concludes that the benefits obtained by the public authorities from the PPAs do not provide the hedging on energy prices that the average market operator would expect from a long-term contract and entail significant risks of being compelled to purchase energy in excess of actual needs and incurring losses when reselling the surplus quantities.
Komisija sklepa, da koristi, ki so jih javni organi pridobili od SNEE, ne zagotavljajo zavarovanja glede cen energije, ki bi ga običajni tržni akter pričakoval v okviru dolgoročne pogodbe, in predstavljajo pomembna tveganja glede prisile k nakupu energije, ki presega dejanske potrebe in povzroča izgube pri ponovni prodaji odvečnih količin energije.
These risks were well known by the Hungarian authorities when Hungary joined the European Union.
Ta tveganja so bila madžarskim organom dobro znana, ko se je Madžarska pridružila Evropski uniji.
The comparison between PPAs and standard commercial practices on European electricity markets shows that a buyer acting on purely commercial grounds would not have accepted such detrimental effects and would have adopted other purchase strategies and entered into different types of agreements in line with standard commercial practice.
Primerjava med SNEE in običajnimi poslovnimi praksami na trgih kaže, da kupec, ki bi deloval iz povsem poslovnih vzgibov, ne bi sprejel tako škodljivih učinkov in bi sprejel druge strategije glede nakupa ter podpisal druge vrste sporazumov v skladu s standardno poslovno prakso.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that the core principles of the PPAs entail an advantage to the power generators beyond normal commercial advantage.
Na podlagi zgoraj navedenega Komisija sklepa, da osnovna načela SNEE za proizvajalce energije predstavljajo prednost, ki presega običajno poslovno prednost.
In this respect, it is essential to stress that the main principles of the PPAs, i.e. the long-time capacity reservation, minimum guaranteed off-take and pricing mechanisms based on a capacity fee and an energy fee to cover fixed, variable and capital costs, cannot be isolated and assessed separately.
Treba je poudariti, da glavnih načel SNEE, tj. dolgoročne rezervacije zmogljivosti, minimalnih zagotovljenih količin odjema in mehanizmov za določanje cen, ki temeljijo na pristojbini za zmogljivost in pristojbini za energijo, ki pokrivata fiksne in variabilne stroške ter stroške kapitala, ni mogoče osamiti in oceniti ločeno.