natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, in competitive market conditions, the existence of standardised power exchanges and OTC trading necessarily influence such transactions, as a generator or importer would not agree to engage in a bespoke bilateral contract that would offer clearly worse conditions than a standardised spot or forward contract.
Kljub temu pa v pogojih konkurenčnih trgov obstoj standardiziranih borz električne energije in OTC trgovanja neizbežno vpliva na tovrstne transakcije, saj se proizvajalec ali uvoznik ne bi hotel obvezati z dvostransko pogodbo po meri, ki bi nudila slabše pogoje kot standardizirana promptna ali terminska pogodba.
Therefore, standardised spot and forward contracts on European wholesale markets constitute a relevant basis for comparison in assessing the existence of an advantage conferred on generators by PPAs.
Zato standardizirane in terminske pogodbe na evropskih veleprodajnih trgih predstavljajo pomembno podlago za primerjavo pri presoji obstoja prednosti, ki naj bi jo proizvajalcem omogočali SNEE.
On forward markets the longest delivery period is one year.
Na terminskih trgih je najdaljši rok za dobavo eno leto.
The longest duration between the conclusion of the contract and the beginning of the actual delivery period is four years in NordPool (Scandinavian countries), three years in Powernext (France), five years in UKPX (United Kingdom) and six years in EEX (Germany).
Najdaljše obdobje od sklenitve pogodbe do začetka dejanskega roka dobave je štiri leta na NordPoolu (skandinavske države), tri leta na Powernextu (Francija), pet let na UKPX-u (Velika Britanija) in šest let na EEX-u (Nemčija).
On some exchanges, like OMEL in Spain, no forward contracts are concluded.
Na nekaterih borzah, kot je OMEL v Španiji, se terminske pogodbe ne sklepajo.
A standardised forward contract places on the supplier the obligation to provide a certain amount of energy at a price agreed in advance, over a maximum period of one year starting within at maximum 6 years of the conclusion of the contract.
Standardizirana terminska pogodba nalaga dobavitelju obveznost zagotavljanja določene količine energije po ceni, ki je dogovorjena vnaprej, za obdobje največ enega leta, ki začne teči najkasneje šest let po sklenitvi pogodbe.
The order of magnitude of these timeframes is significantly below the usual depreciation and lifetime of any power generation station.
Ti časovni okviri so veliko krajši kot običajna amortizacija ali življenjska doba katere koli elektrarne.
Consequently, in normal market conditions and even if they trade most of their output in the form of forward contracts, generators have no visibility on prices and sales volumes over the depreciation and lifetime of power generation assets.
Zato v običajnih tržnih pogojih in tudi v primeru najvišjega donosa v obliki terminskih pogodb proizvajalci nimajo jasne predstave glede cen in obsega prodaje, amortizacije in življenjske dobe sredstev za proizvodnjo električne energije.
Furthermore, as prices are fixed in advance, generators run the risk that their costs will exceed the agreed prices.
Ker so cene določene vnaprej, proizvajalci tvegajo, da bodo njihovi stroški presegli dogovorjene cene.
This risk is not negligible, owing in particular to the volatility of fuel costs, which is for most generation technologies the main component of variable costs.
To tveganje ni zanemarljivo, še zlasti zaradi nihanja cen goriva, ki je za mnoge proizvodne tehnologije glavna komponenta variabilnih stroškov.
Furthermore, generators are faced with competitive pressure as they have to renew their forward contracts a significant number of times during the lifetime of their generation assets, and therefore adapt their offers to evolving competitive conditions.
Poleg tega se proizvajalci soočajo s konkurenčnim pritiskom, saj morajo v času življenjske dobe proizvodnih sredstev večkrat obnoviti svoje terminske pogodbe in tako prilagajati svoje ponudbe konkurenčnim pogojem, ki se stalno spreminjajo.
Contracts involving the reservation of generation capacities may also be encountered on wholesale markets in the form of ‘drawing rights’, which are therefore worth comparing with the PPAs.
Pogodbe, ki vključujejo rezervacijo proizvodnih zmogljivosti, obstajajo tudi na veleprodajnih trgih v obliki „posebnih pravic črpanja“, ki se jih lahko primerja s SNEE.
Acquiring drawing rights consists in reserving part of the generation capacities of a given power plant, usually for the expected lifetime of the power station, and paying a ‘capacity fee’ to the plant operator, corresponding to the capital and fixed costs linked to the reserved capacities.
Pridobivanje posebnih pravic črpanja je sestavljeno iz rezervacije dela proizvodnih zmogljivosti določene elektrarne, običajno za pričakovano življenjsko dobo elektrarne, in plačila „pristojbine za zmogljivost“ upravljavcu elektrarne, v skladu s stroški investicijskega vzdrževanja in fiksnimi stroški, ki so povezani z rezerviranimi zmogljivostmi.
The technical risks are borne by the operator of the plant.
Za tehnična tveganja je odgovoren upravljavec elektrarne.
The holder of the drawing rights can decide on the level of use of the reserved capacities and pays to the power plant operator a price corresponding to the variable costs incurred for the energy generated from the reserved capacities.
Imetnik posebnih pravic črpanja lahko določi stopnjo uporabe rezerviranih zmogljivosti in plača upravljavcu elektrarne ceno, ki ustreza variabilnim stroškom, nastalim pri proizvodnji energije, ki so jo proizvedle rezervirane zmogljivosti.
In order to further assess the existence or otherwise of an advantage within the PPAs, it is also useful to consider the situation of large business or industrial end-consumers, even though they act not on wholesale markets but on retail (downstream) markets.
Da bi nadalje ocenili obstoj prednosti v okviru SNEE, je treba preučiti stanje pri večjih podjetjih ali končnih industrijskih odjemnikih, četudi ne delujejo na veleprodajnem trgu, temveč na maloprodajnem trgu (nadaljnjih odjemnikov).
As generators sometimes directly supply power to large business or industrial consumers, the comparison with the PPAs is relevant.
Ker proizvajalci včasih neposredno dobavljajo energijo večjim podjetjem ali industrijskim odjemnikom, je primerjava s SNEE pomembna.
The Energy Sector Inquiry has shown that it was common practice for electricity suppliers to sign fixed-price contracts with large business or industrial consumers.
Raziskava energetskega sektorja je pokazala, da je bila običajna praksa za dobavitelje električne energije podpis pogodb z že določeno ceno z večjimi podjetji ali industrijskimi odjemniki.
The duration of such contracts is usually limited to one to two years.
Trajanje takih pogodb je običajno omejeno na eno ali dve leti.
They usually provide for a delivery schedule based on historical consumption.
Običajno določajo razpored dobave, ki temelji na pretekli porabi.
The price is derived from wholesale prices on forward markets and contains other cost components such as expected costs of balancing or the supplier's margin.
Cena izhaja iz veleprodajnih cen na terminskih trgih in vključuje druge stroškovne komponente, kot so pričakovani stroški izravnave ali marža dobavitelja.
Deviation from the delivery schedule entails the application of a ‘take or pay’ clause, which compels the buyer to pay for energy which it does not need, or to pay an excess charge.
Odmik od razporeda dobave vključuje uporabo klavzule „vzemi ali plačaj“, ki prisili kupca, da plača za energijo, ki je ne potrebuje, ali da plača presežek.
In this respect, such contracts may be regarded as based on a minimum guaranteed off-take combined with the reservation of capacity [57].
V tem pogledu tovrstne pogodbe temeljijo na minimalni zagotovljeni količini odjema, kombinirani z rezervacijo zmogljivosti [57].
Another type of agreement has to be considered for the purpose of assessing the advantage within the PPAs, namely contracts concluded for the provision of balancing services to the Transmission System Operators (TSOs).
Za namene ocenjevanja prednosti v okviru SNEE je treba preučiti še eno vrsto sporazuma, in sicer pogodbe, ki so sklenjene za zagotavljanje storitev izravnave upravljavcem prenosnih omrežij (UPO).
As electricity cannot be stored, demand and supply must be matched at each point in time.
Ker električne energije ni mogoče shranjevati, morata biti povpraševanje in dobava v vsakem trenutku usklajena.
If demand or supply deviate from forecasts and result in a need for additional generation, it is the responsibility of the Transmission System Operator to call on certain generators to increase production at short notice.
Če povpraševanje ali dobava odstopata od napovedi in je potrebna dodatna proizvodnja, mora upravljavec prenosnih omrežij v okviru svoje odgovornosti pozvati določene proizvajalce, da v zelo kratkem času povečajo proizvodnjo.
In order to ensure the availability of generation capacities to face such situations, TSOs reserve capacities in generation units which are capable of modifying their production level at short notice.
Da bi zagotovili razpoložljivost proizvodnih zmogljivosti v takšnih primerih, UPO rezervirajo zmogljivosti v proizvodnih enotah, ki so sposobne v zelo kratkem času spremeniti svojo raven proizvodnje.
In Hungary, as there is no pump storage plant, natural gas fired plants have the most appropriate technical characteristics to provide these services.
Ker na Madžarskem ni zmogljivosti za shranjevanje električne energije, imajo elektrarne na zemeljski plin ustrezne tehnične značilnosti za zagotavljanje omenjenih storitev.
The Energy Sector Inquiry has provided an overview of European TSOs’ practice with respect to capacity reservation contracts for the provision of balancing services.
Raziskava energetskega sektorja je zagotovila pregled evropske prakse UPO glede pogodb o rezervacijah zmogljivosti za zagotavljanje storitev izravnave.
This overview shows that capacities are reserved by means of tenders.
Iz tega pregleda je razvidno, da so zmogljivosti rezervirane s sredstvi ponudnikov.
One year may be regarded as a standard duration, which grants flexibility to TSOs to adjust the amounts of reserved capacities to their actual needs.
Eno leto se lahko šteje za običajni rok, ki UPO zagotavlja prožnost za prilagoditev količine rezerviranih zmogljivosti njihovim trenutnim potrebam.
The contracts generally specify the technical characteristics of the required service, the reserved capacity and a price either for the energy provided or for both energy and capacity.
Pogodbe običajno določajo tehnične značilnosti zahtevane storitve, rezervirano zmogljivost in ceno za dobavljeno energijo ali za energijo in zmogljivost.
Comparison of the PPAs with standard commercial practices
Primerjava SNEE s standardnimi poslovnimi praksami
The Commission has compared the purchase obligation enshrined in the PPAs with the main features of standard forward and spot contracts, ‘drawing rights’ contracts, long-term contracts concluded by large end-consumers, and contracts concluded between generators and TSOs for the provision of balancing services.
Komisija je primerjala obveznost nakupa, ki je vključena v SNEE, z glavnimi značilnostmi standardnih terminskih in promptnih pogodb, pogodb o „posebnih pravicah črpanja“, dolgoročnih pogodb, ki so jih sklenili večji končni odjemalci, in pogodb, ki so bile sklenjene med proizvajalci in UPO za zagotovitev storitev izravnave.
Standard spot and forward contracts
Standardne promptne in terminske pogodbe
It follows from the description presented in recitals 195 to 200 that the combination of long-term capacity reservation, a minimum guaranteed off-take and price-setting mechanisms covering variable, fixed and capital costs do not correspond to usual contracts on European wholesale markets and that they shield generators from more risks than standard forward and spot contracts.
Iz opisa iz uvodnih izjav od (195) do (200) je razvidno, da kombinacija dolgoročne rezervacije zmogljivosti, minimalne zagotovljene količine odjema in mehanizmov za določanje cen, ki vključujejo fiksne stroške in stroške kapitala, ne sodi med običajne pogodbe na evropskih veleprodajnih trgih in da ščiti proizvajalce pred več tveganji kot standardne terminske in promptne pogodbe.
Trade in power on spot-market exchanges is always based on marginal pricing, which guarantees only that short-run marginal costs, and not all fixed and capital costs are covered.
Trgovanje z energijo na promptnih borzah vedno temelji na določanju mejnih cen, ki zagotavlja, da bodo kriti samo kratkoročni mejni stroški in ne vsi fiksni stroški in stroški kapitala.
Furthermore, on spot markets, a power generating company has no assurance as regards the level of utilisation of its generating capacities.
Na promptnih trgih podjetje, ki proizvaja energijo, nima zagotovila glede stopnje uporabe njegovih proizvodnih zmogljivosti.
This risk is much higher than for most manufacturing sectors and is due to the fact that it is impossible to store electricity economically, a very specific feature of that industry.
To tveganje je veliko večje kot pri večini proizvodnih sektorjev, in sicer zaradi dejstva, da električne energije ni mogoče varčno shranjevati, kar je posebnost te industrije.
If at a given point in time enough power to meet demand is offered at lower prices than those offered by a given generator for one of its power generation units, that unit will not be despatched, which means that its generation capacities will be lost for the concerned period of time.
Če je v določenem trenutku na voljo dovolj energije za zadostitev povpraševanja, in sicer po nižji ceni, kot je tista, ki jo ponuja zadevni proizvajalec za eno izmed svojih proizvodnih enot, ta enota ne bo odpremljena, kar pomeni, da bodo njene proizvodne zmogljivosti za zadevno časovno obdobje izgubljene.
Therefore, sales on spot markets entail a significant degree of uncertainty concerning the remuneration of fixed and capital costs and the level of utilisation of generation capacities.
Zato zaradi prodaje na promptnih trgih nastaja določena stopnja negotovosti glede nadomestila fiksnih stroškov in stroškov kapitala ter stopnje uporabe proizvodnih zmogljivosti.
Nor do forward markets, whose prices are derived from spot prices, provide assurance to generators that all their fixed and capital costs are covered by their sales, because prices are fixed in advance.
Tudi terminski trgi, na katerih cena izhaja iz promptnih cen, proizvajalcem ne zagotavljajo, da bodo njihovi fiksni stroški in stroški kapitala pokriti z njihovo prodajo, saj so cene določene vnaprej.
If fuel costs increase unexpectedly over the period of delivery, the costs of producing electricity may exceed the price set in advance.
Če se cene goriva med rokom dobave nepričakovano povečajo, lahko stroški proizvodnje električne energije presežejo ceno, ki je bila določena vnaprej.
On forward markets, the risk concerning the use of the production capacities is lower than in the case of spot products owing to the longer time horizon of forward contracts.
Na terminskih trgih je zaradi daljšega trajanja terminskih pogodb tveganje glede uporabe proizvodnih zmogljivosti manjše kot v primeru promptnih proizvodov.
However, even if a generator is able to sell most of its output through forward contracts, it enjoys visibility over the utilisation rate of its power generation units over a limited period of time compared to their lifetime.
Čeprav proizvajalcu uspe prodati večino svojih proizvodov s pomočjo terminskih pogodb, lahko predvidi stopnjo uporabe svojih enot za proizvodnjo energije v določenem obdobju v primerjavi z njihovo življenjsko dobo.
Interested parties emphasize that the generators do bear important risks under their PPAs, in particular constructional, regulatory, environmental, maintenance and fiscal/financial risks.
Zainteresirane stranke poudarjajo, da so proizvajalci izpostavljeni tveganju v okviru SNEE, zlasti gradbenemu, regulativnemu, okoljskemu, vzdrževalnemu, davčnemu in finančnemu tveganju.
The Commission recognises that the PPAs do not eliminate all risks linked to the operation of a power plant.
Komisija priznava, da SNEE ne odpravijo vseh tveganj, ki so povezana z delovanjem elektrarne.
Indeed, these risk elements listed by the generators in their comments are certainly borne by the generators themselves.
Dejansko so proizvajalci sami izpostavljeni elementom tveganja, ki jih navajajo v svojih pripombah.
However, this corresponds to normal risks any market player on the electricity generation market would need to bear, including in the case of sales in the form of standard spot or forward markets.
Kljub temu pa to spada med običajna tveganja, ki jih mora sprejeti vsak tržni akter na trgu proizvodnje električne energije, vključno s prodajo v obliki standardnih terminskih ali promptnih trgov.
However, the commercial risks associated with fluctuations in electricity generation costs and, in particular, fuel costs, the risk associated with fluctuations in end-user electricity prices, and the risk associated with fluctuation in end-user electricity demand are born by MVM on a substantial part (or entirety) of the lifetime of the assets under PPA.
Poslovna tveganja, ki so povezana z nihanjem stroškov proizvodnje električne energije in zlasti s stroški goriva, tveganje, ki je povezano s nihanjem cen električne energije za končnega odjemalca, in tveganje, ki je povezano z nihanjem povpraševanja končnega odjemalca glede električne energije, delno (ali v celoti) prevzame MVM za obdobje življenjske dobe sredstev v okviru SNEE.
Interested parties also argued in their comments that the reservation of capacities for MVM entailed a disadvantage for them, because they could not use these capacities for other purposes than for sales to MVM.
Zainteresirane stranke so v svojih pripombah tudi trdile, da rezervacija zmogljivosti za MVM zanje predstavlja pomanjkljivost, saj ne morejo uporabljati omenjenih zmogljivosti za druge namen kot za prodajo MVM.
However, the system of guaranteed minimum off-take mitigates that constraint to a large extent.
Sistem minimalne zagotovljene količine odjema v veliki meri zmanjšuje omenjeno omejitev.
The system of minimum guaranteed off-take should be regarded as a guarantee for generators that they will not be prevented from using their capacities for energy production and sale should MVM not make use of its reserved capacities.
Vendar pa je treba sistem zagotovljene najmanjše količine odjema upoštevati kot jamstvo proizvajalcem, da bodo lahko uporabljali svoje zmogljivosti za proizvodnjo električne energije in prodajo v primeru, da MVM ne bo uporabil svojih rezerviranih zmogljivosti.
As a matter of fact, as shown by the following table, the minimum guaranteed off-take corresponded to a utilisation rate of the reserved capacities exceeding the average utilisation rate of the total available capacities in Hungary.
Kot prikazuje spodnja tabela, minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema ustreza stopnji porabe rezerviranih zmogljivosti, ki presega običajno stopnjo porabe skupnih razpoložljivih zmogljivosti na Madžarskem.
Minimum guaranteed off-take and reserved capacities
Minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema in rezervirane zmogljivosti
Guaranteed off-take (GWh)
Minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema
Reserved capacities (MW)
Rezervirane zmogljivosti (MW)
Ratio between minimum guaranteed off-take and reserved capacities (number of hours per year)
Razmerje med minimalno zagotovljeno količino odjema in rezerviranimi zmogljivostmi (število ur na leto)
Ratio between net electricity generation and net available generation capacities for all Hungarian power generation units (number of hours per year)
Razmerje med proizvodnjo električne energije in neto razpoložljivimi proizvodnimi zmogljivostmi za vse madžarske proizvodne enote (število ur na leto)
Therefore, spot and forward contracts entail a much higher level of risk for generators than the PPAs, which provide certainty both as regards the remuneration of fixed and capital costs and the level of use of the generation capacities.
Zato prodaja na promptnih in terminskih trgih predstavlja veliko višjo stopnjo tveganja za proizvajalce kot SNEE, ki zagotavljajo gotovost glede nadomestila fiksnih stroškov in stroškov kapitala ter stopnje uporabe proizvodnih zmogljivosti.
Drawing rights
Posebne pravice črpanja
As regards drawing rights, the main difference between this form of agreement and the PPAs is that drawing rights are normally not associated with minimum guaranteed off-take.
Glede posebnih pravic črpanja je glavna razlika med to obliko sporazuma in SNEE ta, da posebne pravice črpanja običajno niso povezane z minimalno zagotovljeno količino odjema.
The holder of the drawing rights bears commercial risks linked to the sale of the energy produced out of the reserved capacities.
Imetnik posebnih pravic črpanja je izpostavljen poslovnemu tveganju, ki je povezano s prodajo energije, ki jo proizvajajo rezervirane zmogljivosti.
However, it has the assurance that it will be able to sell all that energy at prices covering at least variable costs, because it can decide not to generate energy if prices fall below variable costs.
Kljub temu pa ima zagotovilo, da bo lahko prodal energijo po cenah, ki krijejo vsaj variabilne stroške, saj se lahko odloči, da ne bo več proizvajal energije, če cene padejo pod variabilne stroške.
That assurance is not provided by the PPAs to MVM, owing to the existence of the minimum off-take obligations on MVM for the benefit of the generators.
SNEE MVM-ju ne nudijo takšnega zagotovila zaradi obstoja obveznosti v okviru minimalne zagotovljene porabe s strani MVM in v korist proizvajalcev.
Long-term purchase contracts concluded by large consumers
Dolgoročni sporazumi o nakupu, ki jih sklenejo večji odjemalci
As regards standard long-term purchase contracts concluded by large consumers, it is clear that they are much more advantageous for the buyer than the PPAs are to MVM because the price, which is usually fixed for the whole duration of the contract, is normally not indexed on parameters such as fuel costs whose development over the duration of the contract is unpredictable, and is not designed in such a way as to cover fixed and capital costs, as it depends on price quotations on wholesale markets.
Glede standardnih dolgoročnih pogodb o nakupu, ki jih sklenejo večji odjemalci, je jasno, da prinašajo kupcu veliko več prednosti kot SNEE MVM-ju, saj cena, ki je običajno določena za celotno obdobje trajanja pogodbe, običajno ni indeksirana na parametrih, kot so stroški goriva, katerih razvoj v času trajanja pogodbe je nepredvidljiv, in ni oblikovana tako, da bi krila fiksne stroške in stroške kapitala, saj je odvisna od cenovnih ponudb na veleprodajnih trgih.
Indeed, buyers have an interest in concluding long-term contracts only if these contracts provide them with some hedging against fluctuations in the electricity market, and in particular against changes linked to fluctuations in fuel costs.
Kupci se zanimajo za sklepanje dolgoročnih pogodb samo, če jim pogodbe zagotavljajo zavarovanje za primer nihanja na trgu z električno energijo, še zlasti za primer sprememb, ki so povezane z nihanji cen goriva.
For this reason a buyer would have an economic interest in a long-term contract of this type only if the seller offered to take part of the risk associated with fluctuations in fuel costs or if the generating technology ensured stable fuel costs, as is the case with hydropower plants and, in certain conditions, nuclear plants.
Iz tega razloga bi imel kupec ekonomski interes za dolgoročno pogodbo te vrste samo, če bi mu prodajalec ponudil, da prevzame del tveganja, ki je povezano z nihanji cen goriva, ali če bi proizvodna tehnologija zagotavljala stabilne cene goriva, kot je to običajno pri hidroelektrarnah in v določenih primerih tudi pri jedrskih elektrarnah.
Furthermore, these contracts are usually concluded for much shorter periods than the PPAs and therefore give buyers the option to change suppliers if better prices are offered by competitors.
Poleg tega se take pogodbe običajno sklepajo za veliko krajša obdobja kot SNEE in zato imajo kupci možnost, da zamenjajo dobavitelja, če konkurenca ponuja boljše cene.