natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It argues that, in line with Article 11(4) of the Electricity Directive [46], State aid should be considered as compatible with the common market when, for reasons of security of supply, it finances the generation of electricity from indigenous coal.
Trdi, da je treba državno pomoč v skladu s členom 11(4) Direktive o električni energiji [46], šteti za skladno s skupnim trgom, če zaradi varnosti dobave financira proizvodnjo električne energije iz domačega premoga.
No advantage in long duration
Ni prednosti zaradi daljšega trajanja
Csepel, Mátra and Budapest power plants argue that the long duration of a contract should not be construed as an advantage per se.
Elektrarne Csepel, Mátra in Budapest trdijo, da se dolgo trajanje pogodbe ne sme šteti za prednost.
The Csepel power plant argues that in a long-term agreement both parties pay a price for the certainty the long term offers.
Elektrarna Csepel trdi, da pri dolgoročnem sporazumu oba podpisnika plačata ceno za gotovost, ki jo sporazum ponuja.
The power generators agree to offer a lower price than the spot market price and to be bound by the agreed price, whatever the spot prices are.
Proizvajalci električne energije se sporazumejo, da bodo nudili nižje cene od trenutnih tržnih cen in da bodo vezani na dogovorjeno ceno, ne glede na trenutne tržne cene.
They also agree to reserve their capacities for one company for the entire duration of the agreement.
Sporazumejo se tudi, da bodo rezervirali svoje zmogljivosti za eno podjetje za celotno trajanje sporazuma.
It is argued that long-term agreements therefore represent a balancing of economic risks and opportunities for both parties and cannot be seen as a pure advantage.
Dolgoročni sporazumi naj bi torej predstavljali izravnavanje gospodarskih tveganj in priložnosti za oba podpisnika in jih ni mogoče šteti za čisto prednost.
On the basis of the above arguments, all power generators conclude that the PPAs do not provide them with an economic advantage and that consequently they do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Na podlagi zgornjih argumentov vsi proizvajalci zaključijo, da jim SNEE ne zagotavljajo gospodarske prednosti in torej ne predstavljajo državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe o EU.
AES-Tisza argues that the PPAs do not provide a selective advantage.
AES-Tisza trdi, da SNEE ne zagotavljajo selektivne prednosti.
The interested party refers to the existence of long-term agreements in the entire electricity sector, not only between the generators and MVM but also between MVM and the distribution companies and between fuel suppliers and electricity generators, as well as for the import of electricity.
Zainteresirana stranka se sklicuje na obstoj dolgoročnih sporazumov v celotnem energetskem sektorju, ne samo med proizvajalci in MVM, temveč tudi med MVM in distribucijskimi podjetji ter dobavitelji goriva in proizvajalci električne energije, prav tako pa tudi na uvoz električne energije.
As far as the generators are concerned, the Energy Act I (from 1994) and Government Decree 34/1995 explicitly required generators to conclude a power purchase agreement with MVM in order to obtain a construction and operation licence.
Glede proizvajalcev Energetski zakon I (od leta 1994) in Uredba vlade 34/1995 izrecno zahtevata od proizvajalcev, da sklenejo sporazum o nakupu električne energije z MVM z namenom pridobitve gradbenega in delovnega dovoljenja.
Consequently, all generators had agreements with MVM and only renewable and cogeneration plants could have shorter term agreements, as these generators have different legal guarantees (e.g. mandatory off-take).
Posledično so vsi proizvajalci imeli sporazume z MVM, kratkoročnejše sporazume pa so lahko imele samo obnovljive elektrarne ter elektrarne za istočasno proizvodnjo električnega toka in toplote, saj imajo omenjeni proizvajalci drugačna pravna jamstva (npr. obvezen odjem).
Mátra power plant submits that only the price can be considered State aid in the PPAs.
Elektrarna Mátra trdi, da se lahko samo cena šteje za državno pomoč v SNEE.
The duration of the PPAs and the guaranteed sales volumes cannot be viewed as State aid because even if they confer an advantage, they do not lead to the transfer of State resources.
Trajanje SNEE in zagotovljen obseg prodaje ne moreta predstavljati državne pomoči, kajti, četudi prinašata prednost, ne vodita do prenosa državnih sredstev.
The third party concludes that given Mátra power plant's very competitive prices (see (i) above), there is no State aid element whatsoever in its PPA.
Tretja stranka ugotavlja, da zaradi zelo konkurenčnih cen elektrarne Mátra (glej (i) zgoraj) njen SNEE ne vsebuje elementa državne pomoči.
Imputability to the State
Odgovornost do države
The company AES-Tisza argues that the PPA prices are imputable not to the State but to the parties to the PPAs.
Podjetje AES-Tisza trdi, da so za cene v okviru SNEE odgovorne podpisnice in ne država.
AES-Tisza criticises the imputability assessment of the Opening Decision in that it concentrates only on the imputability to the State of the actual conclusion of the PPAs and not on the imputability of the price setting, whereas at the same time the Commission argues that the unfair advantage is secured by the advantageous prices.
AES-Tisza kritizira presojo odgovornosti v Sklepu o začetku postopka, saj naj bi se osredotočala samo na odgovornost države glede dejanskega podpisa SNEE in ne na odgovornost določanja cen, medtem ko Komisija istočasno trdi, da prednostne cene zagotavljajo nepošteno prednost.
After the period of central price setting (i.e. after January 2004, and with the exception of 2007), the prices were negotiated between MVM and the power generators and cannot be attributed to the State.
Po obdobju določanja glavnih cen (tj. po januarju 2004 in z izjemo leta 2007) so pogajanja glede cen potekala med MVM in proizvajalci električne energije, zato jih ni mogoče pripisati državi.
AES-Tisza, Budapest and Csepel power plants contest the distorting effects of the PPAs and their potential to impact trade between Member States.
Elektrarne AES-Tisza, Budapest in Csepel spodbijajo učinke izkrivljanja SNEE in njihovih potencialnih vplivov na trgovino med državami članicami.
Firstly, the power plants in question submit that this criterion should also be assessed in the light of the time the PPAs were concluded.
Prvič, zadevne elektrarne trdijo, da je treba omenjeno merilo oceniti glede na čas, v katerem so bili SNEE sklenjeni.
At that time Hungary was not part of the EU and its electricity market was not liberalised.
V tem času Madžarska ni bila del EU in njen trg z električno energijo ni bil liberaliziran.
Consequently, it is argued that the PPAs could not by definition distort competition in the common market.
Zato trdijo, da SNEE po definiciji ne bi mogli izkrivljati konkurence na skupnem trgu.
Secondly, they argue that competition and trade between Member States are influenced by factors other than the PPAs.
Drugič, trdijo, da na konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami vplivajo drugi dejavniki in ne SNEE.
Specifically, they contend that Hungary's cross-border capacities are the main factor influencing trade between Hungary and other countries.
Trdijo, da so madžarske čezmejne zmogljivosti glavni dejavnik, ki vpliva na trgovino med Madžarsko in drugimi državami.
These cross-border capacities are used at their maximum.
Te čezmejne zmogljivosti se uporabljajo v največji možni meri.
Clearly, then, trade in electricity is limited because of Hungary's restricted cross-border capacities and not because of the PPAs.
Jasno je torej, da je trgovanje z električno energijo omejeno zaradi omejenih madžarskih čezmejnih zmogljivosti in ne zaradi SNEE.
Legislation is argued to be the other factor influencing trade between Member States.
Drug dejavnik, ki vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami, naj bi bila zakonodaja.
Under Hungarian legislation, the power generators were in any event not authorised to sell electricity abroad directly.
V okviru madžarske zakonodaje proizvajalci električne energije v nobenem primeru niso bili pooblaščeni za neposredno prodajo električne energije v tujino.
Csepel power plant argues that in any event it sells electricity in Hungary only, so its PPA cannot have any de facto effect on trade between Member States.
Elektrarna Csepel trdi, da v vsakem primeru prodaja električno energijo samo na Madžarskem, zato njeni SNEE dejansko nimajo učinka na trgovino med državami članicami.
It is also argued that the Hungarian electricity market has been gradually opened up to competition in line with EU obligations.
Trdi tudi, da se je madžarski trg z električno energijo začel postopoma odpirati konkurenci v skladu z obveznostmi EU.
A significant percentage of consumers had switched to the free market segment within a short time.
Velik odstotek potrošnikov se je v zelo kratkem času preusmeril na segment prostega trga.
New players would be deterred from entering the Hungarian electricity market or extending their presence in that market by the unpredictability of returns, not the existence of the PPAs.
Novi akterji ne bi mogli vstopiti na madžarski trg z električno energijo ali pa ne bi mogli povečati prisotnosti na omenjenem trgu zaradi nepredvidljivosti dobičkov in ne zaradi obstoja SNEE.
Csepel power plant argues that in recent years power stations have been built in Hungary only when the State has offered some form of stability and predictability of project returns through long-term agreements or in the form of compulsory off-take, or where the use of new capacities was guaranteed by demand for the vertically integrated distribution activity.
Elektrarna Csepel trdi, da so v zadnjih letih na Madžarskem gradili elektrarne samo, če je država nudila določeno obliko stabilnosti in predvidljivosti dobička pri projektih s pomočjo dolgoročnih sporazumov ali obveznega odjema oziroma kadar je bila uporaba novih zmogljivosti zagotovljena s povpraševanjem zaradi vertikalno integrirane distribucijske dejavnosti.
In any event, the existing PPAs were not a factor deterring new entry.
V vsakem primeru pa obstoječi SNEE niso predstavljali ovire za nov vstop.
It is furthermore argued that there is no market demand in Hungary for additional capacities.
Poleg tega se trdi, da na Madžarskem ni tržnega povpraševanja po dodatnih zmogljivostih.
This is evidenced by the fact that at electricity auctions by MVM a huge majority of the capacities offered for sale remained unsold.
To dokazuje dejstvo, da na MVM-jevih avkcijah električne energije velika večina ponujenih zmogljivosti ni bila prodana.
This observation was submitted by Budapest power plant.
To pripombo je predložila elektrarna Budapest.
Budapest power plant argues that the PPAs cannot be regarded as ‘still applicable after accession’ within the meaning of Annex IV, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1(c) to the Accession Act.
Elektrarna Budapest trdi, da SNEE ni mogoče šteti za „še vedno veljavne po pristopu“ v smislu pododstavka 1(c) odstavka 3 Priloge IV Akta o pristopu.
The interested party argues that in line with the general principle of non-retroactivity, measures that were established in accordance with the law prior to accession should not be reviewed by the Commission after accession.
Zainteresirana stranka trdi, da v skladu s splošnim načelom neveljavnosti za nazaj Komisija ne sme preučiti ukrepov, ki so bili določeni v skladu z zakonodajo, ki se je uporabljala pred pristopom.
As Community State aid rules apply only from the date of accession, only aid measures that provide an additional benefit after accession can be defined as applicable after accession.
Ker se predpisi Skupnosti o državni pomoči uporabljajo samo od datuma pristopa naprej, se lahko po pristopu uporabljajo samo ukrepi pomoči, ki zagotavljajo dodatno korist po pristopu.
They argue that the PPAs do not provide any additional benefit after accession as their price formulae were defined before accession, and consequently the State's financial exposure was entirely known prior to accession.
Trdijo, da SNEE niso prinašali dodatne koristi po pristopu, saj so bile njihove cenovne formule določene pred pristopom in je bila zato finančna izpostavljenost države popolnoma znana že pred pristopom.
This argument was submitted by Budapest, Csepel, AES-Tisza and Mátra power plants and by […] Bank.
Ta argument so posredovale elektrarne Budapest, Csepel, AES-Tisza in Mátra ter banka […].
The interested parties argue that even if one were to accept that the PPAs constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, such State aid should be regarded as existing aid within the meaning of Annex IV, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1(c) to the Accession Act.
Zainteresirane stranke trdijo, da četudi bi se kdo strinjal, da SNEE predstavljajo državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, se bi tovrstna državna pomoč štela za veljavno pomoč v smislu pododstavka 1(c) odstavka 3 Priloge IV Akta o pristopu.
They are of the view that the Commission did not object to the measure within the period of 3 months required by the Accession Act.
Menijo, da Komisija ni nasprotovala ukrepu v roku 3 mesecev, določenem v Aktu o pristopu.
Budapest power plant also takes the view that a decision determining whether aid awarded prior to accession and continued after accession should be regarded as ‘new aid’ or ‘existing aid’ should not be based solely on Annex IV to the Accession Act.
Elektrarna Budapest meni, da sklep, ki določa, ali se pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena pred pristopom in se nadaljuje po pristopu, šteje za „novo pomoč“ ali „veljavno pomoč“, ne sme temeljiti samo na Prilogi IV Akta o pristopu.
According to Budapest power plant, if such aid does not qualify as existing aid under Annex IV to the Accession Act, it should still be examined in the light of Article 1(b)(ii)-(v) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Elektrarna Budapest meni, da če se taka pomoč ne šteje za veljavno pomoč v okviru Priloge IV Akta o pristopu, jo je še vedno treba preučiti v smislu člena 1(b)(ii)-(v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999.
Budapest power plant further argues that Article 1(b)(v) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 applies to the PPAs and that the PPAs therefore constitute ‘existing aid’.
Elektrarna Budapest nadalje trdi, da se člen 1(b)(v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 nanaša na SNEE in da SNEE torej predstavljajo „veljavno pomoč“.
In its view, the last sentence of Article 1(b)(v) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 referring to new aid does not apply to the PPAs for three reasons.
Po njenem mnenju se zadnji stavek člena 1(b)(v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 nanaša na novo pomoč in se ne uporablja za SNEE iz treh razlogov.
First, in the Alzetta Mauro judgment [47], the Court ruled that aid that existed in a certain market which was initially closed to competition before its liberalisation is to be regarded as existing aid from the time of liberalisation.
Prvič, v razsodbi Alzetta Mauro [47] je Sodišče razsodilo, da se pomoč, ki je obstajala na določenem trgu, ki je bil v začetku pred liberalizacijo zaprt za konkurenco, šteje za veljavno pomoč iz obdobja liberalizacije.
According to the interested party, this judgment is based directly on an interpretation of Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty, and therefore takes precedence over Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Zainteresirana stranka trdi, da ta razsodba temelji na razlagi člena 88(1) Pogodbe ES in ima zato prednost pred Uredbo (ES) št. 659/1999.
Second, in any event, given that Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 had not yet entered into force when the electricity market was liberalised under Directive 96/92/EC or when the PPAs were signed, the rules as set out in the Alzetta Mauro judgment applied, not Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Drugič, ker Uredba (ES) št. 659/1999 še ni začela veljati, ko je bil trg z električno energijo liberaliziran v okviru Direktive 96/92/ES ali ko so bili SNEE podpisani, so se uporabljale določbe, ki so navedene v razsodbi Alzetta Mauro, in ne Uredba (ES) št. 659/1999.
Third, a comparison of the wording of the different categories in Article 1(b) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 leads to the conclusion that Article 1(b)(v) applies only to State aid schemes, since individual aid is not explicitly mentioned.
Tretjič, primerjava besedila različnih kategorij v členu 1(b) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 vodi do zaključka, da se člen 1(b)(v) uporablja samo za programe državne pomoči, saj posamezna pomoč ni izrecno omenjena.
Conversely, AES-Tisza argues that if the PPAs were to be classified as new aid, then such classification should be based on Article 1(b)(v) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Nasprotno pa AES-Tisza trdi, da če bi bili SNEE uvrščeni med novo pomoč, bi taka uvrstitev temeljila na členu 1(b)(v) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999.
Validly concluded private agreements cannot be ended by the Commission (pacta sunt servanda) — Legal uncertainty
Veljavno sklenjenih zasebnih sporazumov Komisija ne more razdreti („pacta sunt servanda“) – pravna negotovost
These arguments were submitted by Budapest and AES-Tisza power plants and […] Bank.
Te argumente sta posredovali elektrarni Budapest in AES-Tisza ter banka […].
The parties stress that they entered into the PPAs in good faith in the market circumstances that prevailed at the time.
Podpisnice poudarjajo, da so podpisale SNEE v dobri veri in v okoliščinah, ki so takrat prevladovale na trgu.
They accepted major investment obligations borne by credit institutions through financing agreements.
Sprejele so velike investicijske obveznosti, ki so jih krile kreditne ustanove s pomočjo finančnih sporazumov.
In their view, the Commission's investigations lead to significant legal uncertainty which should be avoided.
Po njihovem mnenju raziskave Komisije vodijo do velike pravne negotovosti, čemur bi se morali izogibati.
AES-Tisza questions the Commission's right to terminate, on the basis of the State aid rules and, more generally, the EC Treaty's competition rules, validly concluded commercial agreements [48].
AES-Tisza se sprašuje, ali ima Komisija pravico na podlagi določb o državni pomoči in, v širšem smislu, pravil konkurence Pogodbe ES razveljaviti veljavno sprejete trgovinske sporazume [48].
The AES-Tisza power plant expresses its concerns regarding the proportionality of the Commission's request to terminate the PPAs and refers to the possibility of renegotiation of the agreements by the parties.
Elektrarna AES-Tisza je izrazila svojo zaskrbljenost glede sorazmernosti zahteve Komisije po prekinitvi SNEE in se sklicuje na možnost vnovičnega pogajanja podpisnic glede sporazumov.
Comments on the compatibility of PPAs with the common market
Pripombe glede skladnosti SNEE s skupnim trgom
The companies Csepel and AES-Tisza submit that the PPAs were not designed to be a compensation scheme and it is therefore inappropriate to compare them to the Stranded Costs Methodology.
Podjetji Csepel in AES-Tisza trdita, da SNEE niso bili zasnovani kot kompenzacijska shema in jih zato ni primerno primerjati z Metodologijo za nasedle stroške.
At the time of their conclusion, the PPAs could not be construed as a stranded cost compensation as the Methodology did not even exist at that time.
V času njihovega sklepanja SNEE niso mogli predstavljati nadomestila za nasedle stroške, saj ta metodologija takrat sploh še ni obstajala.
In their view, the use of the Methodology is only appropriate in a situation where the PPAs were ended previously.
Po njihovem mnenju je ta metodologija uporabna samo v primeru, če bi se SNEE končali predčasno.
Conversely, […] Bank argues with regard to the Csepel PPA that the consideration paid under the PPA is limited to covering costs that are actually eligible under the Methodology (i.e. fixed costs, variable costs and a reasonable profit margin).
Nasprotno pa banka […] glede SNEE podjetja Csepel trdi, da je protivrednost, ki je bila izplačana v okviru SNEE, omejena na kritje stroškov, ki so dejansko upravičeni v okviru te metodologije (tj. fiksni stroški, variabilni stroški in razumna stopnja dobička).
It maintains that the Csepel PPA does not provide for compensation exceeding eligible stranded costs.
Trdi, da SNEE podjetja ne zagotavlja nadomestila, ki bi presegalo upravičene nasedle stroške.
Csepel furthermore argues that the PPAs fulfil the criteria of Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty in that they significantly contribute to the security of electricity supply in Hungary and, more generally, to the overall development of the Hungarian economy.
Nadalje Csepel trdi, da SNEE izpolnjujejo merila iz člena 87(3) Pogodbe ES, ker močno prispevajo k varnosti zagotavljanja električne energije na Madžarskem in s tem k splošnemu razvoju madžarskega gospodarstva.
The company AES-Tisza suggests (without giving detailed reasons) that the PPAs should be regarded as securing investment in an Article 87(3)(a) region.
Podjetje AES-Tisza predlaga (brez navedbe natančnih razlogov), da bi morali biti SNEE obravnavani kot varnostna naložba v členu 87(3)(a).
Moreover, AES-Tisza notes the Opening Decision's lack of clarity with regard to the ‘benchmark’ market price to be used, the meaning of ‘inefficient investment’ and the economic scenarios and time periods applied for the Commission's assessment of compatibility with the common market.
AES-Tisza opozarja na nejasnost Sklepa o začetku postopka glede „primerljive“ tržne cene, ki jo je treba uporabljati, pomena „neučinkovite naložbe“ in ekonomskih scenarijev ter časovnih obdobij, ki so zajeta v presojo Komisije glede skladnosti s skupnim trgom.
REPLY FROM HUNGARY ON COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
ODGOVOR MADŽARSKE NA PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANK
In reaction to the comments of Csepel power plant, Hungary submits that, contrary to what might be inferred from Csepel's comments, its PPA also contains guaranteed minimum off-take quantities.
V odgovoru na pripombe elektrarne Csepel Madžarska trdi, da v nasprotju s tistim, kar bi bilo moč razbrati iz pripomb Csepela, SNEE vključuje tudi minimalne zagotovljene količine odjema.
As regards Dunament's argument that it cannot refuse generation under conditions dictated by MVM even to the detriment of Dunament's free market sales, the Hungarian authorities point out that in 2006, MVM initiated the termination of the PPAs with regard to 4 F blocks which, as a result, could have competed directly on the free market for system services.
Glede argumenta Dunamenta, da ne more zavrniti proizvodnje v okviru pogojev, ki jih nalaga MVM, pa čeprav na račun Dunamentove prodaje na prostem trgu, madžarski organi poudarjajo, da je leta 2006 MVM začel z ukinjanjem SNEE v zvezi z bloki 4F, ki bi lahko neposredno predstavljali konkurenco na prostem trgu za sistemske storitve.
However, Dunament refused to take this opportunity.
Dunament te priložnosti ni izkoristil.
On the comments of AES-Tisza whereby generators without PPA mainly invested if they fell under the guarantee of mandatory off-take, the Hungarian authorities submit that important power plants and power plant blocks sell electricity on the free market without both PPAs and mandatory off-take (for instance the Dunament G1 block, the Vértes power plant and the Mátra I-II blocks).
Glede pripomb AES-Tisze, po katerih so proizvajalci brez SNEE večinoma investirali, če so imeli jamstvo obveznega odjema, madžarski organi trdijo, da pomembne elektrarne in njihovi bloki prodajajo električno energijo na prostem trgu brez SNEE in obveznega odjema (na primer blok G1 elektrarne Dunament, elektrarna Vértes in bloka I–II elektrarne Mátra).
Hungary also stresses that, contrary to AES-Tisza's comments, MVM's negotiating position is also limited by the PPAs themselves (price formulae and guaranteed off-take quantities).
Madžarska tudi poudarja, da je MVM-jev pogajalski položaj, v nasprotju s pripombami AES-Tisze, omejen s samimi SNEE (cenovne formule in zagotovljene količine odjema).
Unlawful aid
Nezakonita pomoč:
The aid contained in the PPAs was not notified to the Commission in accordance with the State aid procedural rules.
Pomoč iz SNEE ni bila priglašena Komisiji v skladu s postopkovnimi pravili o državni pomoči.
The aid thus constitutes unlawful aid.
Zato predstavlja nezakonito pomoč.
General comment on the individual assessment of the PPAs
Splošne pripombe glede individualne presoje SNEE