natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
OJ C 47, 12.2.1998, p. 3.
UL C 47, 12.2.1998, str. 3.
The decision has been sent to Greece on 1 August 1997 (letter SG(97)D 6556).
Odločba je bila poslan Grčiji 1. avgusta 1997 (dopis SG(97)D 6556).
OJ C 202, 10.8.2004, p. 3.
UL C 202, 10.8.2004, str. 3.
Indeed, it is recalled that any submission of an interested party has to be sent to Greece for comments.
Opozoriti je treba, da je treba vse predložene pripombe zainteresirane stranke poslati Grčiji, da lahko nanje odgovori.
Greece has one month to reply.
Grčija ima en mesec časa, da predloži odgovor.
Some submissions having a large size, Greece could have requested to be given more time to reply.
V primeru obsežnih pripombe bi lahko Grčija zaprosila za več časa.
If some assertions are not underpinned in a solid manner, the Commission services may have to ask more documents to underpin these claims.
Če določene trditve niso trdno podprte, lahko službe Komisije zahtevajo več dokumentov v podporo teh trditev.
The Commission services may also have to ask precise questions to Greece on new issues raised in the submission of the interested party.
Službe Komisije lahko Grčiji zastavijo tudi natančna vprašanja v zvezi z novimi vprašanji, ki so predmet pripomb zainteresirane stranke.
This letter has 65 pages, plus 290 pages of annexes. The letter dated 24 April 2008 has 35 pages, plus 900 pages of annexes and the letter dated 2 June 2008 has 63 pages, plus 1750 pages of annexes.
Ta dopis obsega 65 strani in 290 strani prilog, dopis z dne 24. aprila 2008 ima 35 strani in 900 strani prilog, dopis z dne 2. junija 2008 pa ima 63 strani in 1750 strani prilog.
The information provided in this section comes to a large extent from the document: ‘Hellenic Shipyards S.A. — Confidential Information Memorandum — Alpha Finance/Commercial Bank of Greece/KPMG/Elias SP.
Informacije iz tega oddelka so večinoma povzete iz dokumenta: „Hellenic Shipyards S.A. – Memorandum o zaupnih informacijah – Alpha Finance/Komercialna banka Grčije/KPMG/Elias SP.
Paraskevas’ dated March 2001 and which was distributed to the interested bidders.
Paraskevas“, ki je bilo objavljeno marca 2001 in poslano zainteresiranim ponudnikom.
A copy of this report was provided by TKMS/GNSH in its letter of 21 June 2007.
Izvod tega poročila sta podjetji TKMS/GNSH predložili v svojem dopisu z dne 21. junija 2007.
OJ L 380, 31.12.1990, p. 27; special provisions referring to Greece are in Article 10.
UL L 380, 31.12.1990, str. 27. posebne določbe, ki se nanašajo na Grčijo, so vsebovane v členu 10.
OJ C 88, 30.3.1993, p. 6.
UL C 88, 30.3.1993, str. 6.
OJ C 138, 20.5.1994, p. 2.
UL C 138, 20.5.1994, str. 2.
OJ C 68, 6.3.1996, p. 4.
UL C 68, 6.3.1996, str. 4.
OJ C 80, 13.3.1997, p. 8.
UL C 80, 13.3.1997, str. 8.
OJ C 306, 8.10.1997, p. 5.
UL C 306, 8.10.1997, str. 5.
The merger was authorised by the Commission by Decision M.2772 of 25.4.2002 (OJ C 143, 15.6.2002, p. 7).
Združitev je odobrila Komisija z Odločbo M.2772 z dne 25.4.2002 (UL C 143, 15.6.2002, str. 7).
The merger was authorised by the Commission by Decision M.3596 of 10.12.2004 (OJ C 103, 29.4.2006, p. 30).
Združitev je odobrila Komisija z Odločbo M.3596 z dne 10.12.2004 (UL C 103, 29.4.2006, str. 30).
The merger was authorised by the Commission by Decision M.3932 of 10.11.2005 (OJ C 287, 18.11.2005, p. 5).
Združitev je odobrila Komisija z Odločbo M.3932 z dne 10.11.2005 (UL C 287, 18.11.2005, str. 5).
OJ L 75, 22.3.2005, p. 44.
UL L 75, 22.3.2005, str. 44.
The Greek authorities have confirmed this assessment in their letter of 20 October 2004.
Grški organi so to oceno potrdili v svojem dopisu z dne 20. oktobra 2004.
Section 2.1 of the letter of 20 October 2004.
Oddelek 2.1 dopisa z dne 20. oktobra 2004.
In order to assess the own resources of the firm, the net equity is much more relevant than the share capital.
Za oceno lastnih sredstev podjetja je neto lastniški kapital veliko ustreznejši od osnovnega kapitala.
Indeed, the net equity takes into account the retained profits and the losses of the previous years, which respectively increase and decrease the own resources of the firm.
Neto lastniški kapital upošteva preneseni čisti dobiček in izgubo prejšnjih let, ki povečuje oziroma znižuje lastna sredstva podjetja.
Financial year 2003 ran from 1.1.2003 till 30.9.2003.
Finančno leto 2003 obsega obdobje od 1.1.2003 do 30.9.2003.
The Commission observes that HSY tried to borrow from the market at a lower rate, but without success.
Komisija opaža, da je podjetje HSY poskusilo pridobiti posojilo na trgu po nižji obrestni meri, vendar je bilo pri tem neuspešno.
This fact appears from the HSY’s Board of Directors minutes dated 1 December 1998 and 27 January 1999, copies of which were provided by TKMS/GNSH in its letter of 21 June 2007.
To je razvidno iz zapisnikov upravnega odbora podjetja HSY z dne 1. decembra 1998 in 27. januarja 1999, katerih izvode sta podjetji TKMS/GNSH predložili v svojem dopisu z dne 21. junija 2007.
The attempt to borrow from the market was also reported in the press (‘Hellenic Shipyards set first euromarket loan’, Reuters News, 19 March 1999).
O poskusu najema posojila na trgu je poročal tudi tisk („Podjetje Hellenic Shipyards uredilo prvo posojilo na evropskem trgu“, Reuters News, 19. marec 1999).
Thanks to the debt write-off implemented by the State, HSY was nearly debt-free, such that the interest expenses (i.e. interest rate paid to the lending banks) were extremely low in 1997 and 1998 (they dramatically increased the following years).
Zahvaljujoč odpisu dolga s strani države je bilo podjetje HSY skoraj brez dolga, tako da so bili stroški obresti (tj. obrestne mere, plačane bankam upnicam) v letih 1997 in 1998 skrajno nizki (močno so se povečali v naslednjih letih).
If in 1997 and 1998 the interest expenses had been at a more normal level, the financial results would have been less favourable and most probably no profit would have been recorded in 1998.
Če bi bili v letih 1997 in 1998 stroški obresti na bolj običajni ravni, bi bili finančni rezultati manj ugodni in v letu 1998 zelo verjetno ne bi bil zabeležen noben dobiček.
This was in fact the first shipbuilding contract concluded with a private firm in nearly two decades.
To je bila dejansko prva pogodba o gradnji ladij, sklenjena z zasebnim podjetjem v skoraj dveh desetletjih.
From the first year, the accounts of HSY contained a provision for the anticipated losses resulting from the execution of this contract.
Od prvega leta so računi podjetja HSY vsebovali postavko za predvidene izgube, ki bi bile posledica izvajanja te pogodbe.
This provision has increased each of the following years.
Ta postavka se je v vsakem naslednjem letu povečala.
In addition, it seems that these provisions were insufficient since TKMS/GNSH has initiated proceeding against the seller of HSY on that issue.
Poleg tega se zdi, da te postavke niso bile dovolj, saj sta podjetji TKMS/GNSH proti prodajalcu podjetja HSY v tej zadevi sprožile postopek na sodišču.
Regarding the reasons for concluding a contract which, when taken separately, is not profitable, the Commission notes that, by concluding this contract, the management probably expected to cover a part of the fixed costs of the yard (the shipbuilding orderbook was empty at that time) and therefore to reduce the expected loss of the yard.
V zvezi z razlogi za sklenitev pogodbe, ki v primeru, da se jo upošteva ločeno, ne prinaša dobička, Komisija ugotavlja, da je s sklenitvijo te pogodbe vodstvo verjetno pričakovalo, da bo pokrilo del fiksnih stroškov ladjedelnice (knjiga naročil ladjedelnice je bila v tistem času prazna) in tako zmanjšalo pričakovano izgubo ladjedelnice.
This contract was reported by the press.
O tem naročilu je poročal tudi tisk.
See for instance ‘Hellenic lands crucial submarine contract’, Lloyd’s List International, 30 July 1999.
Glej na primer, „Hellenic dobil ključno naročilo za podmornice“, Lloyd’s List International, 30. julij 1999.
According to page 5-12 of the report of Deloitte Financial Advisory Services (hereafter ‘the first Deloitte report’) submitted by HSY in support of its comments on the extension decision, the construction of the submarines would start only in 2003.
V skladu z zapisanim na straneh 5–12 poročila revizijske hiše Deloitte (v nadaljnjem besedilu: prvo poročilo revizijske hiše Deloitte), ki ga je podjetje HSY predložilo v podporo svojim pripombam o odločbi o podaljšanju postopka, bi se gradnja podmornic začela šele leta 2003.
According to press articles, the management of HSY warned the shareholders already in October 1998 regarding the expected difficulties (see the press article quoted in footnote 38).
V skladu s časopisnimi članki je vodstvo podjetja HSY že oktobra 1998 opozorilo delničarje na pričakovane težave (glej časopisni članek, citiran v opombi 38).
The possibility of such a large loss for 1999 was already reported by the press in November 1999 (‘Brown & Root team ousted from Hellenic’, Lloyd’s List, 19 November 1999).
O možnosti tako velike izgube v letu 1999 je novembra 1999 poročal že tisk („Skupina Brown & Root izrinjena iz podjetja Hellenic“, Lloyd’s List, 19. november 1999).
Except if the State would provide additional (incompatible) aid to support the civil activities of the yard and would provide large support to the military activities.
Razen če bi država zagotovila dodatno (nezdružljivo) pomoč za podporo civilnih dejavnosti ladjedelnice in obsežno podporo za njene vojaške dejavnosti.
Therefore, the yard ran the risks of not receiving the investment aid promised by the Greek authorities, which set the date of 31 December 1999 to complete the programme.
Za ladjedelnico je torej obstajalo tveganje, da ne bo prejela pomoči v naložbah, ki so ji jo obljubili grški organi, ki je za izvedbo načrta določala datum 31. december 1999.
According to the Greek law, in order to obtain a prolongation of this period, at least 50 % of the expenses had to be incurred.
V skladu z grško zakonodajo, je bilo treba ustvariti vsaj 50 % stroškov, da bi se lahko pridobilo podaljšanje tega roka.
In the document ‘Hellenic Shipyards S.A. — Confidential Information Memorandum — Alpha Finance/Commercial Bank of Greece/KPMG/Elias SP.
V dokumentu „Hellenic Shipyards S.A. – Memorandum o zaupnih informacijah – Alpha Finance/Komercialna banka Grčije/KPMG/Elias SP.
Paraskevas’ dated March 2001 and which was provided to interested bidders (a copy of this document was provided by TKMS/GNSH in its letter of 21 June 2007), the following description appears: ‘In 1999 though, the financial results of the Company became negative again. Brown & Root insisted to proceed with structural personnel changes.
Paraskevas“, ki je bil izdan marca 2001 in posredovan zainteresiranim ponudnikom (izvod tega dokumenta sta podjetji TKMS/GNSH predložili v svojem dopisu z dne 21. junija 2007), je navedeno naslednje: „Vendar so bili leta 1999 finančni rezultati podjetja spet negativni.
Such changes were not accepted by the Shareholders (ETBAbank and Employees), and Brown & Root’s contract was revoked.’
Skupina Brown & Root je vztrajala pri nadaljevanju strukturnih sprememb med zaposlenimi.
(page 15).
Delničarji (banka ETVA in zaposleni) niso sprejeli takšnih sprememb, zato je bila pogodba skupine Brown & Root razveljavljena.“ (stran 15).
Press articles are more explicit: ‘It is thought management informed Hellenic’s owners as early as last October that the current year would be a bad one unless steps were taken to rationalise the workforce, which co-owns the yard with a State bank.
Časopisni članki se bolj jasno izražajo: „Obstajajo mnenja, da je vodstvo že prejšnji oktober obvestilo lastnike podjetja Hellenic, da bo tekoče leto slabo, če ne bodo sprejeti ukrepi za racionalizacijo na področju zaposlenih, ki so skupaj z državno banko lastniki ladjedelnice.
With money being spent on modernising Hellenic for the first time in years, new equipment has made the reported overmanning problem starker, but shareholders have so far dismissed proposals for shedding a minimum of 250 mainly white-collar jobs.
Ker je bilo prvič po mnogih letih veliko denarja porabljenega za modernizacijo podjetja Hellenic, je pridobitev nove opreme še okrepila problem preštevilčne delovne sile, vendar so delničarji do zdaj zavračali predloge za ukinitev najmanj 250 v glavnem pisarniških delovnih mest.
At the same time, management has sought to introduce greater flexibility in the yard’s working practices.
Obenem je vodstvo iskalo način za uvedbo večje prožnosti pri delovnih praksah ladjedelnice.
But the main result appears to have been to alienate union leaders who have sought the removal of the eight-man management team, headed by Mr Groves, which is on secondment from the UK’s Brown & Root’.
Vendar se zdi, da je glavni rezultat tega odtujevanje vodij sindikatov, ki so zahtevali odstranitev osemčlanske vodstvene skupine, ki ji je predsedoval g. Groves, ki ga je na to delovno mesto napotila skupina Brown & Root iz Združenega kraljestva“.
Recital 68 of Commission Decision of 16 June 2004 on the measures implemented by Spain for Siderùrgica Anón SA (OJ L 311, 26.11.2005, p. 22); Recital 42 of Commission Decision of 11 December 2002 on the State aid implemented by Spain for Sniace SA (OJ L 108, 30.4.2003, p. 35).
Uvodna izjava 68 Odločbe Komisije z dne 16. junija 2004 o ukrepih, ki jih izvaja Španija za podjetje Siderùrgica Anón SA (UL L 311, 26.11.2005, str. 22); uvodna izjava 42 Odločbe Komisije z dne 11. decembra 2002 o državni pomoči Španije za Sniace SA (UL L 108, 30.4.2003, str. 35).
Page 5-19 of the report.
Stran 5-19 poročila.
See footnote 28.
Glej opombo 28.
The Commission describes here some of the errors that appear in Chapter 5.0, ‘Credit Worthiness of Hellenic Shipyards S.A.’, of the first Deloitte report.
Komisija na tem mestu opisuje nekaj napak, ki se pojavljajo v poglavju 5.0, „Kreditna sposobnost podjetja Hellenic Shipyards S.A.“, prvega poročila revizijske hiše Deloitte.
Firstly, regarding the ‘Implementation of the Investment Plan (Status and Evolution)’ the first Deloitte report claims on page 5-4 that on 30 June 1999‘The amount certified exceeded the 50 % of the total investment’.
Prvič, kar zadeva „Izvajanje naložbenega načrta (stanje in razvoj)“, prvo poročilo revizijske hiše Deloitte na strani 5-4 navaja, da je 30. junija 1999„[p]otrjeni znesek […] presegel 50 % skupnih naložb“.
However in reality the amount certified on 30 June 1999 accounted for 18 % of the total investment programme.
Vendar je v resnici znesek, potrjen 30. junija 1999, znašal 18 % celotnega naložbenega načrta.
This shows that the implementation of the investment plan was slow.
To kaže na to, da je izvajanje naložbenega načrta potekalo počasi.
The ‘Status and Evolution’ of the plan was therefore rather a ‘negative’ factor in the table at page 5-2 of the report.
„Stanje in razvoj“ načrta sta bila torej precej „negativen“ dejavnik na preglednici na strani 5-2 poročila.
Secondly, regarding the criteria ‘Availability of property that could be encumbered’ (page 5-5 and 5-6), the Commission considers that this element is irrelevant to assess whether a private bank would have granted the loans and guarantees granted by ETVA and the State.
Drugič, kar zadeva „Obstoj premoženja, ki bi ga bilo mogoče obremeniti“ (strani 5-5 in 5-6), Komisija meni, da je ta element nepomemben za oceno, ali bi zasebna banka odobrila posojila in poroštva, ki sta jih odobrili banka ETVA in država.
Indeed, the latter loans and guarantees were not secured by any lien on property.
Ta posojila in poroštva dejansko niso bila zavarovana z nobenimi zastavnimi pravicami na premoženju.
When assessing whether a loan or guarantee granted by the State constitutes aid, one must assess whether this precise transaction would have been acceptable for a private investor.
Pri oceni, ali posojilo oziroma poroštvo, ki ju odobri država, pomenita pomoč, je treba ugotoviti, ali bi bila enaka transakcija sprejemljiva tudi za zasebnega vlagatelja.
The Commission does not have to assess whether HSY, by concluding another type of contract granting more right to the lender, would have been able to obtain the loans and the guarantees.
Komisija ni obvezna ocenjevati, ali bi podjetje HSY s sklenitvijo drugačne pogodbe, na podlagi katere bi bilo posojilodajalcu podeljenih več pravic, lahko pridobilo posojila in poroštva.
Even if the existence of property that could be encumbered would be relevant, the Commission observes that the existing property were already encumbered for an amount of EUR 199 million until 1998 and for an amount of EUR 51 million until 2003. Therefore, a potential lender would have been able to get a first lien only on a limited part of the property.
Tudi če bi bil obstoj premoženja, ki bi ga bilo mogoče obremeniti, relevanten, Komisija meni, da je bilo obstoječe premoženje do leta 1998 že obremenjeno v znesku 199 milijonov EUR, do leta 2003 pa v znesku 51 milijonov EUR. Zato bi potencialni posojilodajalec lahko dobil prvo zastavno pravico samo na omejenem delu premoženja.
Moreover, the tangible assets of HSY had a low liquidation value.
Poleg tega so imela opredmetena sredstva podjetja HSY nizko likvidacijsko vrednost.
Thirdly, the ‘Availability of construction relating to work in progress that could be encumbered’ (page 5-7) is not offering a solid protection to a creditor if HSY defaults and ceases activity.
Tretjič, „Obstoj gradnje, povezane z nedokončano proizvodnjo, ki jo je mogoče obremeniti“ (stran 5-7) upniku ne nudi zadostne zaščite, če podjetje HSY ne bi izpolnjevalo svojih obveznosti ali če bi ustavilo dejavnosti.
Indeed, the market value of a work-in-progress in usually low compared to the funds borrowed to build it and compared to the contract value.
Tržna vrednost nedokončane proizvodnje je dejansko nizka v primerjavi z izposojenimi sredstvi za gradnjo in v primerjavi s pogodbeno vrednostjo.
This was illustrated by the two hulls of the ferries ordered by Strintzis lines, which were sold at a low price and only (i.e. not earlier than) two years after the revocation of the shipbuilding contract.
To se je pokazalo pri dveh trupih trajektov, ki ju je naročil prevoznik Strintzis, ki sta bila prodana po nizki ceni in šele (tj. ne prej kot) dve leti po preklicu pogodbe o gradnji ladij.
Regarding the conveyance of HSY’s receivables to a lending bank, it is not a solid protection either since if the yard ceases its activities, the purchaser would not receive the ordered product and would therefore not have to pay the purchase price.
Prenos terjatev podjetja HSY na banko upnico prav tako ne pomeni zadostne zaščite, saj če bi ladjedelnica ustavila svoje dejavnosti, kupec ne bi prejel naročenega proizvoda in mu zato ne bi bilo treba plačati nakupne cene.
Fourthly, as regards ‘Total bank loans to shareholder’s Equity ratio & debt obligations outstanding at the time’, ‘Signed Client Contracts (HS’s orderbook)’, ‘Evolution of revenue generation’ and ‘Evolution of profitability’, the Commission refers to its comments developed earlier in the present decision.
Četrtič, kar zadeva „Skupna bančna posojila za neporavnane obveznosti delničarja iz razmerja med dolgovi in lastnim kapitalom“, „Podpisane pogodbe s strankami (knjiga naročil podjetja HSY))“, „Razvoj generacije prihodkov“ in „Razvoj generacije dobičkonosnosti“, se Komisija sklicuje na svoje pripombe, ki so bile pojasnjene v tej odločbi.
In summary, the Commission considers that the first Deloitte report does not take into account that the negative financial results of the years 1999 and 2000 were already foreseeable before the start of the respective year.
Komisija skratka meni, da prvo poročilo revizijske hiše Deloitte ne upošteva dejstva, da je bilo negativne finančne rezultate za leti 1999 in 2000 mogoče predvideti že pred začetkom teh let.
Fifthly and lastly, as already explained, any potential lender would have seen the circumstances and reasons why HSY’s existing management was ousted as a negative factor.
Petič in zadnjič, kot je bilo že pojasnjeno, vsak potencialni posojilodajalec bi te okoliščine in razloge za odstranitev obstoječega vodstva podjetja HSY lahko štel za negativni dejavnik.
Therefore, the classification as ‘Indefinable’ in page 5-2 can not be accepted by the Commission.
Zato Komisija klasifikacije „Neopredeljivo“ na strani 5-2 ne more sprejeti.
This point is developed in the next section (section 3.2) where the Commission analyses the imputability of ETVA’s behaviour to the State.
Ta točka je pojasnjena v naslednjem oddelku (oddelek 3.2), v katerem Komisija analizira možnost pripisovanja ravnanja banke ETVA državi.
Being a development bank was the only mandate of ETVA at that moment.
V tistem trenutku je imela banka ETVA zgolj pristojnosti razvojne banke.
The Greek authorities indicate in footnote 63 of their reaction to the extension decision: ‘ETVA was the only development bank in Greece, and thus there is no way of comparing its development activity against that of other credit institutions’.
Grški organi v opombi 63 k svojemu odgovoru na odločbo o podaljšanju postopka navajajo: „Banka ETVA je bila edina razvojna banka v Grčiji in zato njene razvojne dejavnosti nikakor ni mogoče primerjati z razvojnimi dejavnostmi drugih kreditnih institucij“.
See footnote 52.
Glej opombo 52.
As regards the period after 30 June 1999, the Commission also fails to see what ‘value’ the share of HSY had and therefore what ‘value’ ETVA was trying to preserve.
Komisija tudi v zvezi z obdobjem po 30. juniju 1999 ne more ugotoviti, kakšna je bila „vrednost“ delnice podjetja HSY in kakšno „vrednost“ je na podlagi tega poskušala ohraniti banka ETVA.
Indeed, the financial situation was so bad that one fails to see how the shares could have had any significant value.
Finančni položaj je bil dejansko tako slab, da ni mogoče ugotoviti, kako bi lahko delnice sploh imele kakšno večjo vrednost.
ECJ, case C-482/99, France v Commission (‘Stardust’) ECR [2002] I-4397, paragraph 52.
SES, zadeva C-482/99, Francija proti Komisiji („Stardust“), Recueil [2002], str. I-4397, odstavek 52.
Letter of 5 October 2006, paragraph 156.
Dopis z dne 5. oktobra 2006, odstavek 156.
The Share Purchase Agreement was signed on 18 December 2001 and amended on 20 March 2002, at which date the closing of the sale took place.
Sporazum o nakupu delnic je bil podpisan 18. decembra 2001 in spremenjen 20. marca 2002, ki je tudi datum zaključka prodaje.
There are many press articles showing the government involvement in that decision.
Številni časopisni članki opisujejo vpletenost vlade v to odločitev.
See for instance ‘Deadline for Greek shipyard — Government to decide on purchase of Hellenic Shipyards’, Financial Times, 19 April 1985, ‘According to the Greek minister of national economy and shipping, Mr G. Arsenis, the government is under pressure to buy the Hellenic Shipyards because of the structure of Greek industry’, Lloyd’s List International, 29 June 1985, ‘Government to buy ailing Greek shipyard’, Financial Times, 17 July 1985; ‘Mr A. Drossoyannnis, the Greek Minister for National Defence, has announced that all future naval newbuilding orders will be placed with Hellenic Shipyards’, Lloyd’s List International, 26 July 1985; ‘Jobless shipyard workers march in Athens’, The Wall Street Journal, 12 July 1985.
Na primer: „Rok za grško ladjedelnico/Vlada se odloča o nakupu podjetja Hellenic Shipyards“, Financial Times, 19. april 1985, „Po besedah grškega ministra za gospodarstvo in ladijski promet, G. Arsenisa, je vlada zaradi strukture grške industrije pod pritiskom, da kupi podjetje Hellenic Shipyards“, Lloyd’s List International, 29. junij 1985, „Vlada kupuje pešajočo grško ladjedelnico“, Financial Times, 17. julij 1985, „A. Drossoyannnis, grški minister za obrambo, je napovedal, da bo vsa prihodnja naročila za nove gradnje na področju pomorstva pridobilo podjetje Hellenic Shipyards“, Lloyd’s List International, 26. julij 1985, „Protesti odpuščenih delavcev ladjedelnice v Atenah“, The Wall Street Journal, 12. julij 1985.
By letter of 25 November 1986, Greece notified to the Commission a capital injection of USD 58,3 millions by ETVA into HSY.
Z dopisom z dne 25. novembra 1986 je Grčija Komisiji priglasila dokapitalizacijo v višini 58,3 milijona USD, ki jo je banka ETVA izvršila v podjetju HSY.
The case was registered under number N 230/86.
Zadeva je bila evidentirana pod številko N 230/86.