natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In their initial notification of case HU 1/04 (withdrawn on 13 April 2005), the Hungarian authorities considered that this compensation constituted State aid to MVM.
V njihovem začetnem obvestilu glede primera HU 1/2004 (preklicanem 13. aprila 2005) so madžarski organi menili, da to nadomestilo predstavlja državno pomoč MVM.
In its Opening Decision, however, the Commission concluded that the compensation payments did not constitute State aid to MVM, but that the amount received under Government Decree 183/2002 (VIII.23) formed part of the purchase price paid by MVM to the power stations under PPA and thus constituted part of the advantage the generators received from the PPAs.
V Sklepu o začetku postopka je Komisija sklenila, da plačila nadomestil niso predstavljala državne pomoči MVM, vendar je znesek, ki je bil prejet v okviru Uredbe vlade 183/2002 (VIII.23) predstavljal del nakupne cene energetskih postaj, ki jih je kupil MVM, v okviru SNEE in je torej predstavljal prednost, ki so jo proizvajalci prejeli v okviru SNEE.
Consequently, the Opening Decision opens the formal investigation procedure on the PPAs only and not on Government Decree 183/2002 (VIII.23).
Zato Sklep o začetku postopka sproža postopek uradne preiskave samo glede SNEE in ne glede Uredbe vlade 183/2002 (VIII.23).
COMMENTS BY HUNGARY ON THE OPENING DECISION
PRIPOMBE MADŽARSKE GLEDE SKLEPA O ZAČETKU POSTOPKA
Hungary expresses its view that individual assessment of the PPAs would seem to be justified given the differences in their exact terms and conditions.
Madžarska je menila, da se zdi individualna ocena SNEE glede na razlike v njihovih natančnih pogojih upravičena.
With regard to the opening of the Hungarian electricity market, Hungary takes the view that it was successful (i.e. in line with the European average) in terms of the number of consumers switching to the free market.
Glede odprtja madžarskega trga z električno energijo Madžarska meni, da je bilo uspešno (tj. v skladu z evropskim povprečjem) glede na število potrošnikov, ki so se preusmerili na prosti trg.
Hungary concludes that the PPAs did not create a barrier for consumers to switch to the free market.
Madžarska zaključuje, da SNEE niso ustvarili ovire za potrošnike pri njihovi preusmeritvi na prosti trg.
Such a barrier would be much more likely to be constituted by Hungary's limited cross-border capacities and the consequently high prices.
Takšna ovira bi veliko verjetneje vključevala madžarske omejene čezmejne zmogljivosti in posledično visoke cene.
Hungary furthermore considers that the long-term nature of the PPAs cannot in itself constitute a competitive advantage to generators as such long-term contracts are widespread in the electricity sector both in Europe and on other continents.
Madžarska nadalje meni, da dolgoročna narava SNEE sama po sebi ne more predstavljati konkurenčne prednosti proizvajalcev, saj so tovrstne dolgoročne pogodbe zelo razširjene v energetskem sektorju tako v Evropi kot tudi na drugih celinah.
With regard to the reference price referred to in the Opening Decision, the Hungarian authorities suggest that the Commission should take into account the regional specificities of Hungary and the recent increase in fuel prices when establishing a reference price.
Glede referenčne cene iz Sklepa o začetku postopka madžarski organi predlagajo, naj Komisija pri določanju referenčne cene upošteva regionalne posebnosti Madžarske in nedavno povišanje cen goriva.
With regard to new entrants on the electricity market, Hungary informs the Commission that there have been none since 1 May 2004 (the date Hungary joined the EU and the date the energy market was liberalised).
Glede novih akterjev na trgu z električno energijo Madžarska obvešča Komisijo, da jih od 1. maja 2004 ni bilo (datum, ko je Madžarska pristopila k EU, in datum, ko je bil energetski trg liberaliziran).
The Hungarian authorities point to the time-consuming nature of any such investment and, as a result, to the unlikelihood of any investment being operational before 2011.
Madžarski organi so izpostavili dolgotrajno naravo vseh takšnih naložb in kot posledico tega nezmožnost delovanja kakršne koli naložbe pred letom 2011.
Finally, in response to the Commission's doubts as to the compatibility of the PPAs with point 4.6 of the Methodology, Hungary confirms that it will grant no State aid for the rescue and restructuring of the companies benefitting from the PPAs under assessment.
V odgovor na dvome Komisije glede skladnosti SNEE s točko 4.6 Metodologije Madžarska potrjuje, da ne bo dodelila nobene državne pomoči za rešitev in rekonstrukcijo podjetij, ki imajo koristi od SNEE, ki se preverjajo.
Following the publication of the decision to initiate the procedure (21 December 2005), and within the relevant deadline (in most cases following a deadline extension requested by the interested parties and accepted by the Commission), the Commission received comments from:
Po objavi odločitve o sprožitvi postopka (21. decembra 2005) in v ustreznem časovnem roku (v večini primerov po podaljšanju časovnega roka, za katerega so zaprosile zainteresirane stranke in ga je Komisija sprejela) je Komisija prejela pripombe:
the following electricity generating companies: AES-Tisza Erőmű Rt., Budapesti Erőmű Zrt., Csepeli Áramtermelő Rt., Dunamenti Erőmű Zrt. and its main shareholder, Electrabel S.A., and Mátrai Erőmű Rt.,
naslednjih podjetij, ki proizvajajo električno energijo: AES-Tisza Erőmű Rt., Budapesti Erőmű Zrt., Csepeli Áramtermelő Rt., Dunamenti Erőmű Zrt. in njegov večinski delničar Electrabel S.A. ter Mátrai Erőmű Rt.;
the following banks that provided financing to the electricity generators: […] Bank, acting as Facilities Agent on behalf of twelve banks, lenders to Csepeli Áramtermelő Kft. and […] Bank acting as Facilities Agent on behalf of nine banking institutions, lenders to AES-Tisza Erőmű Kft. and
naslednjih bank, ki so zagotovile financiranje proizvajalcem električne energije: banka […], ki deluje kot vodilna banka v imenu dvanajstih bank, posojilodajalcev podjetja Csepeli Áramtermelő Kft., in banka […], ki deluje kot vodilna banka v imenu devetih bank, posojilodajalcev podjetja AES-Tisza Erőmű Kft.; ter
MVM and,
MVM; in
a third party that requested its identity to be withheld.
tretja stranka, ki je zahtevala, da se njena identiteta ne razkrije.
Most of the comments submitted to the Commission by the parties follow very similar lines of argument.
Večina pripomb, ki so jih Komisiji poslale stranke, sledi zelo podobnemu toku argumentov.
For that reason, instead of describing the comments of each interested party separately, the Commission has grouped them into general categories (see points 5.1 to 5.7 below).
Iz tega razloga je Komisija pripombe razdelila v splošne kategorije (glej točke od 5.1 do 5.7 spodaj), namesto da bi jih opisovala ločeno za vsako zainteresirano stranko.
Comments on the individual assessment of the PPAs
Komentarji glede individualne presoje SNEE
The Mátra power plant and another interested party that requested its identity to be withheld expressed the view that the PPAs should be assessed individually by the Commission given the differences that exist between their exact content.
Elektrarna Mátra in druga zainteresirana stranka, ki je zahtevala, da se njena identiteta ne razkrije, sta izrazili mnenje, da mora Komisija SNEE presojati individualno zaradi razlik, ki obstajajo med njihovimi natančnimi vsebinami.
Other power generators implicitly requested individual assessment of their PPA by giving the Commission details of the specific terms and conditions of their own PPA.
Drugi proizvajalci električne energije so zahtevali individualno presojo njihovega SNEE tako, da so Komisiji predložili natančne podatke glede določenih pogojev njihovega SNEE.
Comments on the existence of State aid
Komentarji glede obstoja državne pomoči
The relevant time of assessment
Zadevni čas presoje
AES-Tisza Erőmű, Budapesti Erőmű, Csepeli Áramtermelő and Dunamenti Erőmű argue that the criteria for the existence of State aid at the time of the conclusion of the PPAs should be assessed in the context of the market conditions that prevailed at that time.
AES-Tisza Erőmű, Budapesti Erőmű, Csepeli Áramtermelő in Dunamenti Erőmű trdijo, da bi morala biti merila za obstoj državne pomoči v času sklenitve SNEE ocenjena v okviru tržnih pogojev, ki so prevladovali v tistem času.
Some of the comments state this requirement explicitly, while others imply it by referring to the circumstances of the conclusion of the PPAs in their assessment of the existence of State aid.
V nekaterih komentarjih je ta zahteva izrecno navedena, medtem ko jo drugi navajajo pri sklicevanju na okoliščine sklenitve SNEE pri njihovi presoji državne pomoči.
Reference is made to the Court's case law in this regard [43].
Gre za sklicevanje na sodno prakso Sodišča [43].
No economic advantage
Ni ekonomske prednosti
Wrong reference price/No advantageous prices
Napačna referenčna cena/Ni prednostnih cen
All the power generators argue that the PPAs do not confer any economic advantage.
Vsi proizvajalci električne energije trdijo, da SNEE ne prinašajo nikakršne ekonomske prednosti.
They criticise the Commission's preliminary finding that the prices established under the PPAs are higher than generators’ market prices.
Kritizirajo predhodno ugotovitev Komisije, da so cene, ki so bile določene v okviru SNEE, višje od tržnih cen proizvajalcev.
They argue that the reference price of EUR 36/MWh used in other decisions and referred to in the Opening Decision is inappropriate in this procedure as it originates from a completely different geographical and temporal context.
Trdijo, da referenčna cena 36 EUR/MWh, ki se uporablja v drugih sklepih in je omenjena v Sklepu o začetku postopka, ni primerna za ta postopek, saj izhaja iz popolnoma drugačnega geografskega in časovnega okvira.
They argue that the price assessment should take into account the circumstances that prevailed at the time of conclusion of the PPAs.
Trdijo, da je treba pri presoji cene upoštevati okoliščine, ki so prevladovale v času sklepanja SNEE.
They also stress that prices under any long-term agreement will always be lower than spot market prices.
Hkrati tudi poudarjajo, da bodo cene v okviru dolgoročnih sporazumov vedno nižje od trenutnih cen na trgu.
Moreover, generators that provide MVM with mainly peak load electricity also argue that their prices cannot be compared to base load prices.
Nadalje proizvajalci, ki oskrbujejo MVM večinoma z električno energijo ob najvišjih obremenitvah, trdijo, da se njihove cene ne morejo primerjati s cenami ob najnižji obremenitvi.
Most of them suggest that the Commission should take into account the substantial increase in fuel prices in recent years.
Večina izmed njih meni, da bi morala Komisija upoštevati znatno povišanje cen goriva v zadnjih letih.
Many of the generators argue that their actual rate of return was below the rates mentioned in the Opening Decision.
Mnogi izmed proizvajalcev trdijo, da je njihova trenutna stopnja dobička pod stopnjami, ki so omenjene v Sklepu o začetku postopka.
The generators also emphasize that they do bear important risks (contrary to what is suggested in the Opening Decision), in particular construction, regulatory, environmental, maintenance and fiscal/financial risks.
Proizvajalci poudarjajo, da so izpostavljeni tveganju (nasprotno od tega, kar je navedeno v Sklepu o začetku postopka), še zlasti gradbenemu, regulativnemu, okoljskemu, vzdrževalnemu, davčnemu in finančnemu tveganju.
Price regulation was mentioned as one of the principal categories of regulatory risks.
Uravnavanje cen je bila omenjeno kot ena izmed glavnih kategorij regulativnih tveganj.
Generators also consider that the reservation of a significant share of their generation capacities by MVM constitutes a disadvantage, as it prevents them from using these capacities to produce energy for other potential customers.
Proizvajalci menijo, da rezervacija večinskega deleža njihovih proizvodnih zmogljivosti s strani MVM predstavlja pomanjkljivost, saj jim onemogoča uporabo omenjenih zmogljivosti za proizvodnjo energije za druge potencialne kupce.
Moreover, the PPAs provide for clear obligations on the generators which, if the generators do not meet them, lead to lower payments or to damage claims.
SNEE določajo jasne obveznosti za proizvajalce; če proizvajalci teh obveznosti ne izpolnjujejo, vodi to do manjših plačil ali zahtevkov po odškodnini.
[…] maintained that one of the advantages gained by Hungary as a result of the PPAs were the reliable balancing services which could only be offered by itself and Dunamenti Erőmű.
[…] je trdil, da so ena izmed prednosti, ki jo je pridobila Madžarska kot posledico SNEE, zanesljive storitve izravnave, ki jih lahko nudita samo omenjeno podjetje in Dunamenti Erőmű.
This generator argued that it would not have entered the market and offered these services without a PPA.
Ta proizvajalec je trdil, da brez SNEE ne bi vstopil na trg in nudil teh storitev.
The Mátra power plant argues that it has cheap mining costs because it has its own coal mine, enabling it to offer very competitive prices.
Elektrarna Mátra trdi, da ima nizke stroške izkopa, ker ima lasten premogovnik, kar ji omogoča zelo konkurenčne cene.
It argues that its prices are even below MVM's resale prices, contrary to other PPA prices.
Trdi, da so njene cene celo nižje od maloprodajnih cen MVM, v nasprotju z drugimi cenami SNEE.
Privatisation price
Cena privatizacije
The Dunament power plant argues that it obtained no advantage from the PPA as it paid the market value for the privatisation of the power plants and the purchase price took into account its rights and obligations under the PPA.
Elektrarna Dunament trdi, da ni imela nobene prednosti zaradi SNEE, saj je plačala tržno vrednost za privatizacijo elektrarn, pri nabavni ceni pa so bile upoštevane njene pravice in dolžnosti v okviru SNEE.
Consequently, it paid for the PPA (and for any advantage it might confer on it) in the privatisation price.
Zato je za SNEE (in za kakršno koli prednost, ki bi iz tega lahko izhajala) plačala v ceni privatizacije.
Market investor principle
Načelo vlagatelja na trgu
The Budapest, AES-Tisza, Mátra and Csepel power plants argue that the PPAs reflect market conditions at the time of their conclusion, both for MVM and for the generators.
Elektrarne Budapest, AES-Tisza, Mátra in Csepel trdijo, da SNEE v času njihove sklepne ugotovitve odražajo stanje na trgu, tako za MVM kot tudi za proizvajalce.
With regard to MVM, they argue that any private operator in MVM's position (legal obligation of security of supply as single buyer, etc.) would have chosen to enter into the PPAs.
Glede MVM trdijo, da bi se vsak zasebni subjekt na mestu MVM (pravna zavezanost k varnosti dobave kot pooblaščeni kupec ipd.) odločil, da vstopi v SNEE.
With regard to the generators themselves, they argue that their ‘advantage’ from the PPAs does not go beyond what should be considered as normal commercial advantage for any party in any commercial agreement.
Glede samih proizvajalcev trdijo, da „prednost“ zaradi SNEE ne presega tistega, kar se šteje za običajno trgovsko prednost za vsako podpisnico kakršnega koli trgovskega sporazuma.
At the time of their conclusion, in the sector concerned, the PPAs reflected normal market conditions.
V času njihove sklenitve so SNEE v zadevnem sektorju odražali običajne tržne pogoje.
Furthermore, PPAs represent normal commercial business methods and a standard form of risk allocation and management.
Nadalje SNEE predstavljajo običajne trgovsko-poslovne metode ter standardno obliko razdelitve tveganj in upravljanja.
The PPAs were the only way to secure investments which met the requirements of the electricity sector in Hungary (in particular, modernisation of the whole system, environmental protection and security of supply).
SNEE so bili edini način za zavarovanje naložb, ki so izpolnjevale pogoje energetskega sektorja na Madžarskem (še zlasti modernizacije celotnega sistema, varstva okolja in varnosti dobave).
Applying the private investor principle should lead to take account of those requirements, and the only way of meeting the requirements was PPAs.
Izvajanje načela zasebnega investitorja naj bi upoštevalo omenjene zahteve in edini način za izpolnjevanje teh zahtev so bili SNEE.
The interested parties note that PPAs impose investment and availability obligations on power generators.
Zainteresirane stranke opozarjajo, da SNEE proizvajalcem električne energije nalagajo investicijske obveznosti in obveznosti glede razpoložljivosti.
Service of general economic interest
Storitve v splošnem gospodarskem interesu
The Budapest and Csepel power plants argue that generators party to PPAs provide services of general economic interest (SGEI).
Elektrarni Budapest in Csepel trdita, da proizvajalci podpisniki SNEE zagotavljajo storitve, ki so v splošnem gospodarskem interesu („SGI“).
In their view, the PPAs serve as a tool for MVM to meet its obligation of security of supply and therefore fulfil a public service obligation.
Po njihovem mnenju SNEE služijo kot orodje MVM za izpolnitev njihove obveznosti glede varnosti dobave in s tem tudi obveznosti v okviru javnih storitev.
Budapest power plant argues that it can also be considered that it is actually the Budapest power plant itself that has to discharge a public service obligation imposed on it by its PPAs.
Elektrarna Budapest trdi, da je dejansko ona sama tista, ki mora opravljati obveznost v okviru javnih storitev, ki ji jo nalagajo SNEE.
Both interested parties refer to the Commission's decision of 16 December 2003 in State aid case N 475/03 (Ireland) [44] whereby the Commission accepted that the construction of new generation capacity to ensure security of supply could be considered a service of general economic interest.
Obe zainteresirani stranki se sklicujeta na odločitev Komisije z dne 16. decembra 2003 v primeru državne pomoči N475/03 (Irska) [44], s katero je Komisija sprejela, da bi se gradnja novih proizvodnih zmogljivosti za zagotovitev varnosti dobave lahko štela za storitev, ki je v splošnem gospodarskem interesu.
The interested parties are of the opinion that, as in to the Irish case, State aid under the PPAs – if it exists – meets the four cumulative criteria laid down by the Court in its judgment in case C-280/00 (the Altmark judgment) [45].
Zainteresirani stranki menita, da mora, tako kot v primeru Irske, državna pomoč v okviru SNEE – če obstaja – izpolnjevati štiri kumulativna merila, ki jih določa Sodišče v svoji razsodbi v primeru C-280/00 („razsodba Altmark“) [45].
They argue as follows.
Trdita naslednje:
Firstly, it followed from the Hungarian Energy Acts that MVM had several public service obligations, such as security of supply at the lowest possible cost, environmental protection and efficiency.
Prvič, iz madžarskih energetskih zakonov je razvidno, da je imel MVM več obveznosti v okviru javnih storitev, kot so varnost dobave po najnižjih možnih cenah, okoljska zaščita in učinkovitost.
MVM's public service obligations are thus clearly defined by law and the power generators parties to the PPAs are entrusted with providing the SGEI.
Obveznosti MVM v okviru javnih storitev so torej jasno zakonsko opredeljene in proizvajalci električne energije, ki so podpisniki SNEE, so zadolženi za zagotavljanje SGEI.
Secondly, the compensations were set in advance by the government price decrees and by the price formulae of the PPAs.
Drugič, nadomestila so bila vnaprej določena z vladnimi odloki o cenah in s cenovnimi formulami SNEE.
The compensations could thus be calculated on the basis of objective and transparent parameters.
Nadomestila je bilo torej mogoče izračunati na podlagi objektivnih in preglednih parametrov.
Thirdly, the compensation paid on the basis of PPAs does not exceed the costs of the SGEI provided.
Tretjič, nadomestilo, ki je bilo izplačano na podlagi SNEE, ne presega stroškov opravljenih SGI.
PPAs are strictly cost-based and the profit margins do not exceed usual profit margins on the market.
SNEE dosledno temeljijo na stroških in stopnje dobička ne presegajo običajnih stopenj dobička na trgu.
This is ensured by the fact that, as Budapest power plant argues, its PPAs were openly and transparently tendered (see below).
To je zagotovljeno z dejstvom, da, kot trdi elektrarna Budapest, je za njene SNEE obstajal odprt in pregleden javni razpis (glej spodaj).
The power plants were sold to the tenderer with the highest bid and the best business plan.
Elektrarne so bile prodane ponudniku z najvišjo ponudbo in najboljšim poslovnim načrtom.
It follows from the tendering procedure that the compensation under the PPAs cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligation and a reasonable profit margin.
Iz razpisnega postopka je razvidno, da nadomestilo v okviru SNEE ne sme presegati zneska, ki je potreben za kritje vseh nastalih stroškov pri izpolnjevanju obveznosti v okviru javnih storitev in razumne stopnje dobička.
Fourthly, Budapest power plant argues that its PPAs were all openly and transparently tendered, either as an essential part of the privatisation package or separately.
Četrtič, elektrarna Budapest trdi, da je za njene SNEE obstajal odprt in pregleden javni razpis, bodisi kot bistveni del privatizacijskega paketa ali posamično.
Csepel power plant argues that although the plant was not chosen on the basis of a public tender, it still receives a compensation that is limited to cover costs and a reasonable profit margin.
Elektrarna Csepel trdi, da čeprav elektrarna ni bila izbrana na podlagi javnega razpisa, še vedno prejema nadomestilo, ki je omejeno na kritje stroškov in razumno stopnjo dobička.
The pricing mechanisms ensure that overcompensation is avoided.
Mehanizmi za določanje cen preprečujejo prekomerna nadomestila.
In the light of the above, the interested parties conclude that the PPAs fulfil the four cumulative criteria referred to in the Altmark judgment and do not therefore constitute aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Na podlagi zgoraj navedenega zainteresirane stranke sklenejo, da SNEE izpolnjujejo štiri kumulativna merila iz razsodbe Altmark in zato ne predstavljajo državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
The Budapest power plant also argues that even if PPAs were deemed not to fulfil the four cumulative criteria of the Altmark judgment, they could still be declared compatible with the common market under Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty.
Elektrarna Budapest tudi trdi, da četudi SNEE ne bi izpolnjevali štirih kumulativnih meril iz razsodbe Altmark, bi jih še vedno lahko razglasili za skladne s skupnim trgom v okviru člena 86(2) Pogodbe o EU.
The interested party expresses its view that the impact of its PPAs on the alleged foreclosure of the Hungarian electricity market is negligible, since they cover only 3 % of Hungarian electricity consumption.
Zainteresirana stranka je izrazila svoje mnenje glede vpliva njenih SNEE na domnevno omejevanje možnosti dostopa na madžarskem trgu z električno energijo, ki naj bi bil zanemarljiv, saj pokrivajo samo 3 % madžarske porabe električne energije.
Moreover, for technical reasons, an increase in electricity imports was impossible at the time the PPAs were concluded.
Poleg tega je bilo zaradi tehničnih vzrokov povečanje uvoza električne energije neizvedljivo v obdobju sklepanja SNEE.
Consequently, its PPAs would not have any adverse effect on trade.
Zato njeni SNEE niso imeli škodljivega učinka na trgovanje.
The interested party also stresses in its comments the importance of its cogeneration technology for district heating, which meets the objectives of EU energy and environmental policy.
Zainteresirana stranka v svojih opombah tudi poudarja pomembnost svoje tehnologije istočasne proizvodnje toplote in električne energije za daljinsko ogrevanje, ki izpolnjuje cilje energetske in okoljske politike EU.
The Mátra power plant argues that it was required to reserve a certain minimum capacity for MVM in order to secure the energy supply in the Hungarian market using indigenous coal resources.
Elektrarna Mátra trdi, da je morala rezervirati določeno najmanjšo zmogljivost za MVM, da bi zagotovila dobavo električne energije na madžarskem trgu s pomočjo domačih virov premoga.