natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In Government Decree 1074/1995 (VIII.4) on electricity price regulation, the government made a commitment that, as of 1 January 1997 (the beginning of the so-called first price regulation cycle), ‘in addition to covering the justified operating costs, wholesale and retail prices shall ensure 8 % return on equity’.
V Uredbi vlade 1074/1995. (VIII.4.) o uravnavanju cen električne energije se je vlada obvezala, da bo od 1. januarja 1997 (začetek t. i. prvega cikla uravnavanja cen) „poleg kritja upravičenih operativnih stroškov, z veleprodajnimi in maloprodajnimi cenami zagotavljala 8-odstotni dobiček na lastniški kapital“.
The government thereby guaranteed an 8 % rate of return on capital to the power plants under PPA.
Vlada je tako zagotovila 8-odstotno stopnjo dobička na kapital elektrarnam v okviru SNEE.
As of 1 January 2001 (the beginning of the second price regulation cycle), the official prices included 9,8 % profit on assets (eszközarányos megtérülés) for the power plants.
Od 1. januarja 2001 (začetek drugega cikla uravnavanja cen) so uradne cene vključevale 9,8-odstotni dobiček na kapitalska sredstva (eszközarányos megtérülés) za elektrarne.
The increase in percentage did not necessarily mean a change in actual amounts, as the bases of the two rates of return were different (the first one was calculated on equity while the second one was calculated on assets).
Povišanje v odstotkih ni nujno privedlo do spremembe dejanskih količin, saj sta bili osnovi obeh stopenj dobička različni (prva je bila izračunana na osnovi lastniškega kapitala, druga na osnovi sredstev).
The prices reflected changes in inflation.
Cene so odražale spremembe inflacije.
The regulated prices remained in place for the power plants until 31 December 2003.
Regulirane cene za elektrarne so ostale enake do 31. decembra 2003.
During this period of price regulation, the Hungarian Energy Office analysed the cost structure of each power plant and fixed the price for the purchase of electricity by MVM at a value that ensured guaranteed profitability.
V tem obdobju uravnavanja cen je madžarski urad za energetiko analiziral sestavo stroškov vsake elektrarne in določil ceno za nakup električne energije s strani MVM v višini, ki je zagotavljala dobičkonosnost.
The list of costs covered by this price-setting mechanism included the following main cost items [21]:
Seznam stroškov, ki so vključeni v omenjeni mehanizem za določanje cen, je vključeval naslednje glavne stroškovne postavke [21]:
fixed costs depreciation, insurance, certain fixed maintenance and operating costs, loan interest [‘hitelkamatok’], decommissioning [‘rekultivációs költségek’], fiscal costs (taxes), personnel expenditure [‘személyi jellegű költségek’], environmental protection costs, expenditures to the Central Nuclear Fund [‘Központi Nukleáris Alap befizetések’] for the nuclear power plant and extraordinary expenses [‘rendkívüli ráfordítások’];
fiksni stroški: amortizacija, zavarovanje, določeni fiksni stroški vzdrževanja in operativni stroški, obresti na posojilo [„hitelkamatok“], neobratovanje [„rekultivációs költségek“], davčni stroški (takse), izdatki za osebje [„személyi jellegű költségek“], okoljski stroški, izdatki za Centralni jedrski sklad [„Központi Nukleáris Alap befizetések“] za jedrsko elektrarno in izredni stroški [„rendkívüli ráfordítások“],
variable costs fuel costs.
variabilni stroški stroški goriva.
The Hungarian Energy Office had the task of ensuring that the costs covered were reasonable and necessary.
Madžarski energetski urad je imel nalogo zagotoviti, da so bili plačani stroški upravičeni in nujni.
The official price overwrote the price established by the PPAs.
Uradna cena je nadomestila ceno, ki je bila postavljena s SNEE.
As of 1 January 2004, the prices were determined on the basis of the PPAs’ price formulae.
Od 1. januarja 2004 so bile cene določene na podlagi cenovnih formul SNEE.
The exact meaning of the formulae was clarified in the context of the yearly price negotiations between MVM and the power generators.
Natančen pomen formul je bil pojasnjen v okviru pogajanj glede letne cene med MVM in proizvajalci električne energije.
(According to the submission, ‘the agreements copied in the formulae and definitions contained in the decree’.)
(V skladu s predloženimi stališči „sporazumi vsebujejo formule in opredelitve iz uredbe“).
Consequently, the price-fixing principles of the PPAs are based, similarly to the mechanism used for setting regulated prices, on the justified cost categories.
Zato so načela določanja cen SNEE temeljila na kategorijah upravičenih stroškov, podobno kot mehanizem, ki se uporablja za določanje reguliranih cen.
Each PPA contains two main types of fee components: the capacity fee (or fee for making capacity available) for the reserved capacities (MW) covering fixed costs + profit (cost of capital), and the electricity fee covering variable costs.
Vsak SNEE vključuje dve glavni vrsti pristojbin: pristojbino za zmogljivost (ali pristojbino za omogočanje uporabe zmogljivosti) za rezervirane zmogljivosti (MW), ki pokriva fiksne stroške + dobiček (stroški kapitala), in pristojbino za električno energijo, ki pokriva variabilne stroške.
The different PPAs provide for different additional charges.
Različni SNEE določajo različne dodatne pristojbine.
Depending on the PPAs, these additional fees can be bonus/malus fees applied as an incentive for the power generators to operate in accordance with the lowest cost principle, and supplementary fees for maintaining generating reserves, rescheduling maintenance at MVM's request, increasing load in peak periods and minimising load below that contracted during the minimum demand period, etc. The periodical (annual, quarterly, monthly) changes of capacity fees depend on a number of factors: activation of implemented retrofit projects, various interest categories, foreign exchange rates, inflation indices, etc. The capacity fee and the supplementary fees also cover the system services (covered by the PPA).
Glede na SNEE, so lahko omenjene dodatne pristojbine bonus/malus pristojbine, ki se uporabljajo kot spodbuda za proizvajalce električne energije, da delujejo v skladu z načelom najnižjih stroškov, in dopolnilne pristojbine za ohranjanje proizvodnih rezerv, ponovno časovno organiziranje vzdrževanja na zahtevo MVM, povečanje obremenitve v visoki sezoni in zmanjšanje obremenitve pod dogovorjeno mejo v obdobju najmanjšega povpraševanja itd. Periodične spremembe (letne, četrtletne, mesečne) pristojbin za zmogljivost so odvisne od številnih dejavnikov: aktivacije izvajanih projektov naknadnega opremljanja, različnih kategorij obresti, deviznega tečaja, kazalnikov inflacije itd. Pristojbina za zmogljivost in dodatne pristojbine pokrivajo tudi sistemske storitve (vključene v SNEE).
Essentially, electricity fees are related to fuel costs and specific fuel heat utilisations (fajlagos tüzelőhő felhasználása).
Pristojbine za električno energijo so povezane s stroški goriva in posebnimi rabami goriva za kurjavo (fajlagos tüzelőhő felhasználása).
They are calculated on the basis of the principle of pass-through of the variable costs.
Izračunane so na podlagi načela pass-through variabilnih stroškov.
It must be noted that the definition of the covered cost categories was not necessarily identical in the price regulation before 1 January 2004 and in the PPAs.
Treba je opomniti, da opredelitev, ki vključuje kategorije pokritih stroškov ni bila nujno enaka pri uravnavanju cen pred 1. januarjem 2004 in v SNEE.
Hungary's submissions [23] show that, for example, the capacity fee of […] and Dunament power plants were higher in their PPA than under price regulation.
Podatki, ki jih je predložila Madžarska [23], kažejo, da je bila pristojbina za zmogljivost elektrarn […] in Dunament višja v njihovih SNEE kot pa v okviru uravnavanja cen.
This was because these PPAs took retrofitting into account, thereby leading to higher fixed costs.
Do tega je prišlo, ker so SNEE upoštevali naknadno opremljanje, kar je vodilo do višjih fiksnih stroškov.
These higher fixed costs appeared gradually (following the gradual retrofitting) in higher capacity fees under the PPAs than under price regulation.
Omenjeni višji fiksni stroški so se pojavili postopoma (po postopnem naknadnem opremljanju) pri višjih pristojbinah za zmogljivost v okviru SNEE kot v okviru uravnavanja cen.
Other differences due to bilateral negotiations between MVM and the generators could also be observed between regulated prices and PPA prices.
Druge razlike, do katerih je prišlo zaradi dvostranskih pogajanj med MVM in proizvajalci, je moč opaziti med reguliranimi cenami in cenami iz SNEE.
Notwithstanding such differences, in Hungary's submissions of 20 October 2004 and 20 July 2005 each power plant under PPA confirmed that the price calculation method as well as the cost categories applied after the end of price regulation were largely similar to those applied by the Hungarian Energy Office before that date.
Navkljub tovrstnim razlikam je v predloženih podatkih, ki jih je poslala Madžarska dne 20. oktobra 2004 in 20. julija 2005, vsaka elektrarna v okviru SNEE potrdila, da so bile metoda izračuna cen in kategorije stroškov, ki so se uporabljale po zaključku uravnavanja cen, zelo podobne tistim, ki jih je uporabljal Madžarski urad za energetiko pred tem datumom.
The prices under the PPAs applied after 1 January 2004 thus remained based on the calculation of justified (fixed and variable) costs + profit.
Cene v okviru SNEE, ki se uporabljajo po 1. januarju 2004, torej še naprej temeljijo na izračunu upravičenih (fiksnih in variabilnih stroškov) stroškov in dobička.
It follows from the above that although price regulation ended on 31 December 2003, prices were not genuinely liberalised as the wholesale pricing of electricity remained driven by the principle of return on investments enshrined in the PPAs [24].
Iz zgoraj navedenega lahko sklepamo, da se, čeprav se je uravnavanje cen končalo 31. decembra 2003, cene niso dejansko liberalizirale, saj so veleprodajne cene električne energije ostale pod vplivom načela donosnosti naložb v okviru SNEE [24].
On 6 February 2006, the Hungarian Parliament adopted Act XXXV of 2006 [25] which reinstated governmental price regulation for the electricity sold to MVM under the PPAs.
februarja 2006 je madžarski parlament sprejel Zakon XXXV 2006 [25], ki je ponovno vzpostavil vladno uravnavanje cen za električno energijo, ki se prodaja MVM v okviru SNEE.
As of 1 January 2008, in the context of the liberalisation of the market, Energy Act III put an end to the regulated generation prices as well as to the existence of the dual public utility and free market segments.
Od 1. januarja 2008 je v okviru liberalizacije trga Zakon o električni energiji III ukinil regulirane proizvodne cene, prav tako pa tudi obstoj dvojnih gospodarskih javnih služb in segmentov prostega trga.
Consequently, as of 1 January 2008 the price of the electricity sold by the power generators to MVM under the PPAs is again defined by the price formulae of the PPAs.
Od 1. januarja 2008 je bila cena električne energije, ki so jo proizvajalci prodali MVM v okviru SNEE, znova določena s pomočjo cenovne formule SNEE.
The underlying principles of these formulae have not been altered since their last application: they thus follow the same principles as in the period between 1 January 2004 and 8 December 2006 (see recitals 54 to 59 above).
Temeljna načela omenjenih formul niso bila spremenjena od njihove zadnje uporabe: sledijo torej enakim načelom kot v obdobju med 1. januarjem 2004 in 8. decembrom 2006 (glej zgoraj omenjene uvodne izjave od 54 do 59).
Accordingly, pricing under PPA remains driven by the principle of return on investment.
V skladu s tem na oblikovanje cen v okviru SNEE vpliva načelo donosnosti naložbe.
Reserved capacities
Rezervirane zmogljivosti
The PPAs reserve for MVM all or a substantial part of the capacities of the generating units under PPA.
SNEE rezervirajo za MVM vse ali večji del zmogljivosti proizvodnih enot v okviru SNEE.
Hungary's domestic generation capacity [26] [26](MW)
Zmogljivost proizvodnje na Madžarskem [26] [26](MW)
Installed total generation capacity [27]
Skupno število proizvodnih zmogljivosti [27]
Gross available capacity [28]
Bruto razpoložljive zmogljivosti [28]
Net available capacity [29]
Neto razpoložljive zmogljivosti [29]
Peak load of the Hungarian electricity system
Največja obremenitev madžarskega električnega sistema
Generation capacity of the power plants under PPA [30] [30](MW)
Proizvodna zmogljivost elektrarn v okviru SNEE [30] [30](MW)
Power plant
Elektrarna
Net available capacity
neto razpoložljive zmogljivosti
Contracted capacity [31]
pogodbene zmogljivosti [31]
Contracted capacity
pogodbene zmogljivosti
Total net available capacity of the power plants under PPA
Skupno neto število razpoložljivih zmogljivosti elektrarn v okviru SNEE.
Total contracted capacity
Skupne pogodbene zmogljivosti
The above figures show that in the period under assessment, around 60 % of Hungarian net available generation capacity is contracted by MVM under PPAs.
Zgornje številke kažejo, da je bilo v obdobju ocenjevanja za okoli 60 % razpoložljivih proizvodnih zmogljivosti v madžarski mreži sklenjena pogodba z MVM v okviru SNEE.
If the actually available capacities of the power plants (Ténylegesen igénybevehető teljesítőképesség) minus their own consumption (Önfogyasztás) are taken into account, the ratio is higher than the above.
Če se upoštevajo dejanske zmogljivosti elektrarn („Ténylegesen igénybevehető teljesítőképesség“) minus njihova lastna potrošnja („Önfogyasztás“), je razmerje višje od zgoraj omenjenega.
The above tables also show that the capacity reserved under the PPAs for MVM cover all or the bulk of the respective plants’ available capacities.
Zgornje tabele tudi kažejo, da zmogljivosti, rezervirane za MVM v okviru SNEE, vključujejo vse ali večino zadevnih razpoložljivih zmogljivosti.
MVM pays a capacity fee for these capacity reservations (recital 56 above), irrespective of the actual use of the plant.
MVM plačuje pristojbino za omenjene rezervacije zmogljivosti (uvodna izjava 56 zgoraj), ne glede na dejansko uporabo elektrarne.
Import capacity in Hungary is around 1000-1300 MW.
Uvozna zmogljivost na Madžarskem znaša približno 1000–1300 MW.
Around 600 MW of this import capacity is reserved for MVM under other long-term agreements.
Približno 600 MW omenjene uvozne zmogljivosti je rezerviranih za MVM v okviru dolgoročnih sporazumov.
Sold quantities
Prodane količine
When MVM actually makes use of its reserved capacity and buys electricity from the power plant, it then pays the energy fee for the off-taken electricity (see recital 56 above).
Če MVM dejansko uporablja rezervirane zmogljivosti in kupuje električno energijo od elektrarne, plača energetsko pristojbino za odvzeto energijo (glej uvodno izjavo 56 zgoraj).
There is a certain minimum off-take guaranteed by the PPAs for each power plant.
V okviru SNEE obstaja določena minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema za vsako elektrarno.
The overall domestic electricity production in Hungary is between 32 and 36 TWh (= 32 – 36000000 GWh) a year.
Skupna domača proizvodnja električne energije na Madžarskem znaša med 32 in 36 TWh (= 32–36000000 GWh) na leto.
Electricity produced under PPAs [38] [38]
Električna energija, proizvedena v okviru SNEE [38] [38]
Produced electricity
Proizvedena električna energija
(including Kelenföld, Újpest and Kispest)
(vključno z Kelenföld, Újpest in Kispest)
Total generated electricity
celotna proizvedena električna energija
Own consumption
lastna poraba
Minimum guaranteed off-take
minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema
Actual off-take
dejanska poraba
Own consumption of the plant
lastna poraba elektrarne
The minimum guaranteed off-take is the quantity MVM is required to purchase irrespective of market demand.
Minimalna zagotovljena količina odjema je količina, ki jo mora MVM kupiti ne glede na povpraševanje na trgu.
Should MVM not purchase the fixed minimum quantities, it still has to pay for the fuel costs incurred (Dunament, Kelenfold, Pécs and […]), all costs or compensation incurred by the generator on the basis of its Fuel Supply Agreement (Csepel), and all justified costs (Kispest and Ujpest).
V primeru, da MVM ne kupi določenih minimalnih količin, mora še vedno plačati nastale stroške goriva (Dunament, Kelenfold, Pécs in […]), vse stroške nadomestil, ki jih je imel proizvajalec na podlagi Sporazuma o dobavi goriva (Csepel) in vse upravičene stroške (Kispest in Ujpest).
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE PROCEDURE
VZROKI ZA ZAČETEK POSTOPKA
In its Opening Decision, the Commission reached the preliminary conclusion that the PPAs constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty to the power generators parties to a PPA with MVM.
V Sklepu o začetku postopka je Komisija predhodno sklenila, da so SNEE predstavljali državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES za proizvajalce električne energije, podpisnike SNEE z MVM.
It expressed the view that PPAs were applicable after accession within the meaning of Annex IV, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1(c) to the Accession Act [40] and that they did not constitute existing aid, since they do not come under the aid categories that were regarded, as of accession, as existing aid within the meaning of Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty.
Izrazila je stališče, da so se SNEE po pristopu izvajali v smislu pododstavka 1(c) odstavka 3 Priloge IV k Aktu o pristopu [40] in da niso predstavljali obstoječe pomoči, saj se ne uvrščajo v kategorije pomoči, ki se štejejo za pristopno ali obstoječo pomoč v okviru člena 88(1) Pogodbe ES.
Thirdly, the Commission had not been given notice of the PPAs under the so-called ‘interim procedure’.
Tretjič, Komisija ni prejela obvestila o SNEE v t.i. „začasnem postopku“.
The Commission expressed the view that the guaranteed return on investment and the high purchase price secured by the PPAs put power generators operating under a PPA in a more advantageous economic situation than other power generators not parties to a PPA, including possible new entrants on the market and companies in other, comparable sectors in which such long-term agreements have not even been offered to market players.
Komisija je izrazila mnenje, da sta zagotovljena donosnost naložb in visoka nakupna cena, ki jo zagotavlja SNEE, proizvajalcem električne energije, ki so delovali v okviru SNEE, omogočili prednostni ekonomski položaj v primerjavi z drugimi proizvajalci električne energije, ki niso bili podpisniki SNEE, vključno z možnimi novimi akterji na trgu in podjetji v drugih primerljivih sektorjih, kjer takšni dolgoročni sporazumi sploh niso bili ponujeni tržnim akterjem.
The measure was therefore found, on a preliminary basis, to confer a selective advantage on those power generators.
Na predhodni osnovi se je torej izkazalo, da ukrep dodeljuje selektivno prednost omenjenim proizvajalcem električne energije.
The Commission also noted that the electricity markets had been opened to competition and that electricity had been traded between Member States at least since the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [41].
Komisija je tudi opozorila, da so bili trgi z električno energijo odprti za konkurenco in da so države članice trgovale z električno energijo vsaj od začetka veljavnosti Direktive 96/92/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. decembra 1996 o skupnih pravilih notranjega trga z električno energijo [41].
Measures favouring particular companies in the energy sector in one Member State were therefore regarded as potentially impeding the scope for companies from other Member States to export electricity to that Member State, or favouring exports of electricity from that Member State to other Member States.
Ukrepi, ki so delovali v prid določenim podjetjem v energetskem sektorju, so zato potencialno ovirali obseg delovanja ostalih podjetij iz drugih držav članic pri izvozu električne energije v zadevno državo članico, ali pa so dajali prednost izvozu električne energije iz zadevne države članice v drugo državo članico.
The Commission also expressed the view that this advantage stemmed from the use of state resources, because the decision to sign the PPAs was a consequence of state policy implemented via the State-owned public utility wholesaler MVM.
Komisija je hkrati izrazila mnenje, da je ta prednost izhajala iz uporabe državnih sredstev, saj je bila odločitev o podpisu SNEE posledica državne politike, ki se je izvajala preko MVM, trgovca na debelo za javno uporabo, ki je v državni lasti.
Under the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Court of Justice), when a State-owned company uses its funds in a way that is imputable to the State, these funds should be regarded as State resources within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty [42].
Če podjetje v državni lasti uporablja svoje sklade tako, da se jih dodeli državi, je treba te sklade v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti („Sodišče“) šteti za državna sredstva v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES [42].
The Commission therefore came to the preliminary conclusion that the PPAs constituted State aid to the power generators within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, such aid being ‘still applicable after’ within the meaning of Annex IV, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1(c) to the Accession Act.
Zato je Komisija predhodno sklenila, da SNEE predstavljajo državno pomoč za proizvajalce električne energije v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, tovrstna pomoč pa se „še vedno izvaja“ v smislu pododstavka 1(c) odstavka 3 Priloge IV k Aktu o pristopu.
Compatibility of the PPAs with the EC Treaty
Skladnost SNEE s Pogodbo ES
The Commission went on to state that the Stranded Costs Methodology should be used to analyse the State aid received by the power generators.
Komisija je nadalje navedla, da bi bilo treba Metodologijo za nasedle stroške uporabljati za analizo državne pomoči, ki so jo prejeli proizvajalci električne energije.
On the basis of the documents in its possession at the time of the Opening Decision, the Commission had doubts as to the PPAs’ compatibility with the criteria set out in the Methodology.
Na podlagi dokumentov, ki jih je posedovala v času Sklepa o začetku postopka, je Komisija podvomila glede skladnosti SNEE z merili iz te metodologije.
Firstly, the Commission had doubts that the very principles governing a PPA which create a barrier to free competition on the market could be deemed compatible with the fundamental objective of the Methodology, i.e. to assist by means of State aid the liberalisation of the sector by granting adequate compensation to incumbents facing new conditions of competition.
Prvič, Komisija je imela pomisleke, da bi bila načela, ki veljajo za SNEE in predstavljajo oviro svobodni konkurenci na trgu, skladna z osnovnim ciljem te metodologije, tj. prispevanjem k liberalizaciji sektorja s pomočjo državne pomoči in dodelitvijo ustreznega nadomestila tradicionalnim izvajalcem, ki se soočajo z novimi konkurenčnimi pogoji.
Secondly, the Commission doubted that the State aid element included in the PPAs was compatible with the detailed criteria of the Methodology as regards the calculation of eligible stranded costs and the determination of adequate compensation.
Drugič, Komisija je imela pomisleke glede skladnosti elementa državne pomoči, ki je bil vključen v SNEE, s podrobnimi merili te metodologije, ki se nanašajo na izračun upravičenih nasedlih stroškov in določitev ustreznega nadomestila.
Government Decree No 183/2002 (VIII.23) on stranded costs
Uredba vlade št. 183/2002 (VIII.23) o nasedlih stroških
In order to enable MVM to honour its PPAs and, at the same time, keep the resale prices on the public utility segment approximately at the level of the free market price, Government Decree 183/2002 (VIII.23) provided for the payment of State compensation to MVM in certain circumstances.
Da bi omogočili MVM, da spoštuje svoje SNEE in hkrati obdrži maloprodajne cene v segmentu javne porabe približno na ravni cene na prostem trgu, je z Uredbo vlade 183/2002 (VIII.23) določeno plačilo državnega nadomestila MVM v določenih okoliščinah.