natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As the tax saving is essentially only available if VCCs invest in TEs, the measure also favours TEs indirectly.
Ker je davčni prihranek na splošno možen le, če družbe tveganega kapitala vlagajo v ciljne družbe, imajo ciljne družbe tudi posredne koristi.
Indeed, it constitutes an incentive for VCCs to invest in TEs rather than other companies that may be targeted by venture capital investors on the basis of purely economic considerations.
Ukrep spodbuja družbe tveganega kapitala, da vlagajo v ciljne družbe in ne v druga podjetja, ki bi bila za vlagatelje tveganega kapitala zanimiva zaradi popolnoma gospodarskih razlogov.
TEs are thereby in a position to receive risk capital in amounts and under conditions that would not have been the case without the measure.
Glede na to lahko ciljne družbe pridobijo rizični kapital v drugačnem obsegu in pod drugačnimi pogoji, kot bi ga lahko brez ukrepa.
The measure is thus capable of indirectly reinforcing the capital base of TEs.
Zato se lahko zaradi ukrepa posredno okrepi kapitalska osnova ciljnih družb.
It also seems appropriate to reject Germany’s argument according to which, even if it cannot be excluded that the definition of TEs covers firms in difficulty, this measure does not represents an advantage for such companies.
Poleg tega je treba zavrniti navedbe Nemčije, da ta ukrep ne daje prednosti podjetjem v težavah, čeprav ni mogoče izključiti možnosti, da opredelitev ciljne družbe vključuje takšna podjetja.
Indeed, Germany argues that if a TE is in difficulty, it will not make profits that would offset its losses and could be taxed.
Po navedbah Nemčije ciljna družba v težavah nima dobička, s katerim bi pobotala izgubo in ki bi lahko bil obdavčen.
So it is irrelevant whether or not such a firm can exploit the losses of earlier periods.
Zato je možnost uporabe izgube iz prejšnjih obdobij za ta podjetja nepomembna.
As a result, according to Germany, the MoRaKG does not offer any advantage to firms in difficulty as defined by Community law.
Poleg tega Zakon o kapitalskih naložbah ne daje prednosti podjetjem v težavah v skladu z opredelitvijo Skupnosti.
The Commission finds that this argument is not plausible, since an acquirer of a firm in difficulty or of a ‘shell company’ may in fact be particularly interested in the loss carry forward for tax purposes.
Komisija meni, da te navedbe niso prepričljive, ker je lahko zaradi davčnih razlogov za pridobitelja podjetja v težavah ali „navideznega podjetja“ dejansko zanimiv predvsem prenos izgube.
These advantages are capable of affecting trade and competition.
Takšne prednosti bi lahko prizadele trgovino in konkurenco.
For VCCs, the Commission examined this requirement with regard to the trade tax rule in recital 71.
Za družbe tveganega kapitala je Komisija to merilo preverila v zvezi z ureditvijo davka na dohodek iz poslovne dejavnosti v recitalu 71.
With regard to TEs, the Commission notes that these companies can operate in any economic sector, including those that involve or could involve intra-Community trade.
V zvezi s ciljnimi družbami Komisija meni, da lahko ta podjetja opravljajo svojo dejavnost v kateri koli panogi, kar vključuje tudi panoge, v katerih se izvaja ali se lahko izvaja trgovina v Skupnosti.
Therefore, the economic advantage granted to them is apt to affect competition and trade between Member States.
Zato bi lahko gospodarska prednost, ki jim je omogočena, prizadela konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami.
Secondly, the Commission notes that the measure is undisputedly selective.
Drugič, Komisija meni, da je selektivnost ukrepa nesporna.
Thirdly, the Commission finds that Germany has not succeeded in demonstrating that the measure is compatible with the nature and logic of the German tax system.
Tretjič, Komisija meni, da Nemčija ni dokazala združljivosti ukrepa z značilnostmi in logiko nemškega davčnega sistema.
Even if it were true that the venture capital market were particularly affected by the restriction on exploitation of tax losses and thus justified special treatment, the Commission finds that the distinction drawn up by Germany between taxpayers is not justified by this reasoning since only part of the venture capital sector is exempted from the prohibition on loss carry forward.
Tudi če bi bila omejitev glede uporabe izgube za trg tveganega kapitala zelo obremenjujoča in bi bila zato posebna obravnava utemeljena, to po mnenju Komisije ne bi upravičevalo razlikovanja davčnih zavezancev, ki ga je uvedla Nemčija, ker iz prepovedi prenosa izgube ne bi bil izvzet celotni sektor tveganega kapitala.
If Germany’s claims were correct, there would be no objective reason for non-VCCs not to benefit from the measure when they invest in the same TEs.
Če bi bile domneve Nemčije utemeljene, ne bi bilo objektivnega razloga za izključitev podjetij, ki niso družbe tveganega kapitala in ki vlagajo v ciljne družbe, iz ukrepa.
However, non-VCCs only benefit from the measure in the rare case when they acquire a participation in a TE from a VCC.
Vendar lahko podjetja, ki niso družbe tveganega kapitala, uporabijo ukrep le zelo redko, tj. kadar pridobijo delež v ciljni družbi od družbe tveganega kapitala.
These views are also confirmed by BVK’s comments in point 5.2.
To potrjujejo tudi pripombe BVK v točki 0.
Moreover, the measure does not seem to comply with the nature and logic of the German tax system as Germany has not demonstrated why VCCs would be particularly affected by the restriction on the exploitation of tax losses when they invest in TEs and not when they carry out the same activity of providing capital to other companies such as partnerships which might also have difficulties in accessing risk capital (notably young innovative companies).
Poleg tega se zdi, da ukrep ni združljiv z značilnostmi in logiko nemškega sistema, ker ni dokazano, zakaj je za družbe tveganega kapitala omejitev glede uporabe izgube zelo obremenjujoča, če vlagajo v ciljne družbe, ni pa obremenjujoča, če opravljajo enake dejavnosti, pri čemer zagotavljajo kapital drugim družbam, kot so osebne družbe, ki lahko imajo prav tako težave pri zagotavljanju rizičnega kapitala (zlasti mlada, inovativna podjetja).
The Commission notes furthermore that when Germany tightened the anti-abuse measures on loss carry forward by means of the 2008 Company Taxation Reform Act, as stated in point 2.4.1, it set out the new general tax regulation in this area.
Poleg tega Komisija meni, da je Nemčija nov splošni davčni predpis na tem področju določila že, ko je z Zakonom o reformi davka na ustvarjeni dohodek iz leta 2008 poostrila ukrepe za preprečevanje zlorab pri prenosu izgube, kot je navedeno v točki 2.4.1.
By allowing more generous terms for loss carry forward for a selected group of companies, these anti-abuse measures would be partly reversed; this does not seem to be justified by the nature and logic of the tax system in force since 2008.
Ti ukrepi za preprečevanje zlorab so delno razveljavljeni z milejšimi določbami o prenosu izgube, ki veljajo za določeno skupino podjetij, kar pa značilnosti in logika davčnega sistema, ki velja od leta 2008, ne utemeljujejo.
The Commission therefore concludes that the notified measure on loss carry forward constitutes State aid to TEs and VCCs within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da priglašeni ukrep prenosa izgube pomeni državno pomoč v skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES za ciljne družbe in družbe tveganega kapitala.
As stated under point 4.3, Germany claims that since the beneficiaries are natural persons, the measure cannot constitute State aid.
Nemčija v skladu s točko 4.3 meni, da ta ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči, ker so upravičenci fizične osebe.
Germany also claims that the measure has no verifiable and quantifiable advantage for TEs and hence has no impact on the price of shares.
Poleg tega je navedla, da ciljne družbe zaradi ukrepa nimajo preverljive in količinsko opredeljive prednosti, zato ukrep ne vpliva na ceno deležev.
The tax amount saved by private investors is quite small and granted only in the event of a successful exit by the investor.
Davčni prihranek zasebnih vlagateljev je zelo omejen in nastane le v primeru uspešnega izstopa vlagatelja.
Therefore, as Germany argues, the measure is likely to have only a limited incentive effect for individuals to invest in TEs.
Zato Nemčija meni, da spodbuja ukrep zasebne vlagatelje k naložbam v ciljne družbe le neznatno.
Hence it would also have a limited distortive effect on competition between TEs and non-TEs.
Ob upoštevanju tega je izkrivljanje konkurence med ciljnimi družbami in drugimi podjetji zaradi ukrepa le neznatno.
As stated under point 2.1, this measure implies a loss of State resources estimated by Germany at EUR 30 million per year.
Kot je navedeno v točki 2.1, izgubi Nemčija zaradi ukrepa 30 milijonov EUR državnih sredstev na leto.
The measure is therefore granted through State resources.
Zato je ukrep financiran iz državnih sredstev.
The measure in question provides individuals with tax incentives to invest in a selected group of enterprises (i.e. TEs) rather than in other companies that may be targeted by venture capital investors on the basis of purely economic considerations.
Zaradi davčnih spodbud zadevnega ukrepa bodo fizične osebe pripravljene vlagati v določeno skupino podjetij (tj. ciljne družbe) in ne v druga podjetja, ki bi bila za vlagatelje tveganega kapitala zanimiva zaradi popolnoma gospodarskih razlogov.
TEs are thereby in a position to receive risk capital in amounts and under conditions that would not have been the case without the measure and under normal market conditions.
Glede na to lahko ciljne družbe pridobijo rizični kapital v drugačnem obsegu in pod drugačnimi pogoji, kot bi ga lahko brez ukrepa.
This analysis holds even if the fiscal advantage granted to investors is contingent on future profits and the amount is relatively limited, as underlined by Germany and third parties.
Ta ugotovitev velja tudi, če je davčna ugodnost vlagateljev odvisna od prihodnjega dobička in je znesek razmeroma majhen, kot so poudarile Nemčija in tretje osebe.
Indeed, because of the nature of the measure it is extremely difficult to precisely quantify the advantage that TEs will receive ex ante [17].
Glede na značilnosti ukrepa je ugodnost, ki jo bodo zaradi ukrepa imela ciljna podjetja, zelo težko vnaprej natančno količinsko opredeliti [17].
Consequently, it is impossible to conclude that the aid granted to TEs will always be de minimis.
Zato ni mogoče ugotoviti, da gre pri pomoči za ciljne družbe v vsakem primeru za zneske de minimis.
Moreover, the fact that a tax advantage to individuals investing in certain companies may involve aid to these companies, regardless of the magnitude of such advantages, has been confirmed by the Court [18].
Poleg tega je dejstvo, da lahko davčne olajšave za fizične osebe, ki vlagajo v nekatera podjetja, ne glede na obseg ugodnosti, ki jo ima fizična oseba, pomenijo državno pomoč za ta podjetja, potrdilo Sodišče [18].
Therefore, the Commission concludes that the income tax benefit measure is selective and favours a limited number of companies by giving them better access to risk capital than under normal market conditions.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da je ukrep glede olajšave pri davku od dohodka selektiven in daje prednost le nekaterim podjetjem, pri čemer jim v primerjavi z običajnimi tržnimi pogoji zagotavlja boljši dostop do rizičnega kapitala.
This advantage is granted through State resources because it is basically the loss of tax revenues that creates the market incentive for private individuals to provide capital to TEs rather than to other enterprises that would normally have been targeted on the basis of the prospects of return on the investment that they offer.
Prednost je zagotovljena iz državnih sredstev, ker gre načeloma za davčne izgube, ki fizičnim osebam zagotavljajo tržne spodbude za zagotovitev kapitala ciljnim družbam in ne drugim podjetjem, ki bi bila zaradi pričakovanih donosov običajno zanimiva za vlagatelje.
The extent to which this aid could affect competition and trade between Member States is set out in recital 77 above.
V kakšnem obsegu lahko takšna pomoč prizadene konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami, je pojasnjeno v recitalu 77.
The Commission therefore concludes that the modified income tax benefit measure constitutes State aid to TEs within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da spremenjeni ukrep glede olajšave pri davku od dohodka pomeni državno pomoč v skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES za ciljne družbe.
Compatibility with the State aid rules
Združljivost s pravili o državni pomoči
Notification of the measure
Priglasitev ukrepa
By notifying the MoRaKG before implementing it, the German authorities fulfilled their obligations under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.
Nemčija je s priglasitvijo Zakona o kapitalskih naložbah pred njegovim izvajanjem izpolnila obveznosti iz člena 88(3) Pogodbe ES.
Given that all the measures in the MoRaKG pursue a common objective of supporting the provision of private venture capital to companies, the Commission analysed their compatibility with the common market on the basis of the rules established in the RC Guidelines.
Ker je cilj vseh ukrepov iz Zakona o kapitalskih naložbah enak, tj. omogočiti lažje zagotavljanje zasebnega tveganega kapitala za podjetja, je Komisija na podlagi Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu preverila njihovo združljivost s skupnim trgom.
The Commission also assessed the applicability of other State aid frameworks and regulations to the measures at hand, namely the Community framework for State aid for research and development and innovation [19], Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation) [20] (hereinafter GBER) and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid [21].
Poleg tega je Komisija preverila, ali se lahko za zadevne ukrepe uporabljajo drugi okviri ali uredbe o državni pomoči, kot je Okvir Skupnosti za državno pomoč za raziskave in razvoj ter inovacije [19], Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 800/2008 z dne 6. avgusta 2008 o razglasitvi nekaterih vrst pomoči za združljive s skupnim trgom z uporabo členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe (Uredba o splošnih skupinskih izjemah) [20] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Uredba o splošnih skupinskih izjemah) ali Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1998/2006 z dne 15. decembra 2006 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe pri pomoči de minimis [21].
Unlike the measures under examination, these frameworks and regulations exclude from the scope of the aid firms in difficulty and firms in the shipbuilding, coal and steel industry and/or limit the aid to SMEs.
V nasprotju z ukrepi, ki jih je Komisija preverila, so podjetja v težavah ter podjetja v ladjedelništvu, premogovništvu in jeklarstvu izključena s področja uporabe teh okvirov ali uredb Skupnosti in/ali je upravičenost do državne pomoči omejena le na mala in srednja podjetja.
In the light of the above the Commission is of the opinion that due to the scope of these frameworks and regulations, they are not applicable to the notified measures.
Zato Komisija meni, da teh okvirov in uredb Skupnosti zaradi njihovega področja uporabe ni mogoče uporabiti za priglašene ukrepe.
As stated in point 7.1.1, the trade tax measure constitutes State aid to VCCs.
Kot je navedeno v točki 7.1.1, pomeni ukrep glede davka na dohodek iz poslovne dejavnosti državno pomoč za družbe tveganega kapitala.
However, this measure does not explicitly provide incentives to VCCs to undertake risk capital investments, it merely enables them to have greater financial resources at their disposal, that they may use for any purpose (i.e. increased benefits distribution to their partners).
Ta ukrep družb tveganega kapitala ne spodbuja izrecno k naložbam rizičnega kapitala, ampak jim omogoča le razpolaganje z večjimi finančnimi sredstvi, o uporabi katerih se lahko prosto odločajo (tj. izplačilo višjih dividend partnerjem).
Unlike the present measure, under the RC Guidelines, State aid in the form of risk capital cannot be granted to large enterprises, firms in difficulty or firms in the shipbuilding, coal and steel industry.
V nasprotju z navedenimi ukrepi se v skladu s Smernicami o rizičnem kapitalu državna pomoč v obliki rizičnega kapitala ne sme dodeliti velikim podjetjem, podjetjem v težavah ali podjetjem v ladjedelništvu, premogovništvu in jeklarstvu.
The trade tax measure, on the other hand, could benefit such undertakings, especially large enterprises.
Vendar se ukrep glede davka na dohodek iz poslovne dejavnosti lahko uporablja za takšna podjetja, zlasti velika podjetja.
Therefore, the scope of this measure is not compatible with the Guidelines.
Zato področje uporabe ukrepa ni združljivo s Smernicami o rizičnem kapitalu.
The measure cannot be considered to be compatible with Chapter 4 of the RC Guidelines because the specific conditions for the application of this Chapter are not fulfilled.
Ukrep ni združljiv z oddelkom 4 Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu, ker niso izpolnjeni posebni pogoji za uporabo tega oddelka.
For instance, Chapter 4 requires that the maximum level of investment tranches may not exceed EUR 1,5 million per beneficiary over a period of 12 months.
V skladu z oddelkom 4 najvišja stopnja tranš razpoložljivega kapitala ne sme presegati 1,5 milijona EUR za upravičenca v vsakem dvanajstmesečnem obdobju.
The measure under examination does not contain such a ceiling.
Ukrep, ki ga je Komisija preverila, takšne zgornje meje ne določa.
Moreover, the RC Guidelines also require that the measure be restricted to providing financing up to the expansion stage for small enterprises or up to the early stage for medium-sized enterprises.
Poleg tega mora biti v skladu s Smernicami o rizičnem kapitalu financiranje v zvezi z ukrepi državne pomoči pri malih podjetjih omejeno na stopnjo širitve, pri srednje velikih podjetjih pa na začetno stopnjo.
These provisions are not met because TEs can be large undertakings.
Ti pogoji niso izpolnjeni, ker so lahko ciljna podjetja tudi velika podjetja.
The measure does not comply with the cumulation and reporting requirements set out in Chapter 6 and point 7.1 of the RC Guidelines.
Ukrep ni v skladu s pravili o kumulaciji in poročanju iz oddelkov 6 in 7.1 Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu.
Finally, the Commission is not in a position to assess the measure’s compatibility under Chapter 5 of the RC Guidelines.
Poleg tega Komisija meni, da ukrepa ne more preveriti glede njegove združljivosti z določbami iz oddelka 5 Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu.
Indeed, according to the RC Guidelines, State aid must target a specific market failure for the existence of which there is sufficient evidence.
V skladu s Smernicami o rizičnem kapitalu mora biti državna pomoč usmerjena na določeno tržno nepopolnost, za katero mora biti dovolj dokazov o obstoju.
Germany has not submitted any evidence that TEs are affected by a particular market failure.
Nemčija ni predložila dokazov, da na ciljne družbe vpliva posamezna tržna nepopolnost.
The Commission therefore concludes that the trade tax measure is not compatible with the common market.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da ukrep glede davka na dohodek iz poslovne dejavnosti ni združljiv s skupnim trgom.
As set out in point 7.1.2, the measure on loss carry forward constitutes State aid at VCC and TE level.
Kot je navedeno v točki 7.1.2, pomeni ukrep prenosa izgube državno pomoč na ravni družb tveganega kapitala in ciljnih družb.
The form of the aid measure is a fiscal incentive within the meaning of point 4.2(d) of the RC Guidelines.
Pomoč je v obliki davčne spodbude iz oddelka 4.2(d) Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu.
For the same reasons as highlighted above in recitals 92, 93, 94 and 95, the Commission cannot consider the present measure to be compatible with the common market as it meets neither the exclusion criteria of point 2.1 of the RC Guidelines, nor the cumulation and reporting requirements referred to in Chapter 6 and point 7.1 of the Guidelines, nor the conditions set out in Chapter 4 of the Guidelines; neither is there any evidence of a particular market failure affecting TEs and VCCs that would allow the Commission to launch a detailed assessment of the compatibility of these measures under Chapter 5 of the RC Guidelines.
V skladu z razlogi iz recitalov 92, 93, 94 in 95 Komisija zadevnega ukrepa ne more šteti za združljivega s skupnim trgom, saj ni v skladu z merili o izključitvi iz oddelka 2.1, pravili o kumulaciji in poročanju iz oddelkov 6 in 7.1 Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu ter merili iz oddelka 4 Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu; poleg tega ni dokazov o tržnih nepopolnostih, ki bi vplivale na ciljne družbe in družbe tveganega kapitala, zato Komisija meni, da ni razlogov za podrobnejšo presojo združljivosti zadevnih ukrepov v skladu z oddelkom 5 Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu.
This measure does not exclude the purchase of existing shares (replacement capital) in TEs.
Pridobitev obstoječih deležev (zamenjava sredstev) v ciljni družbi pri tem ukrepu ni izključena.
Replacement finance is, however, excluded by the definition of venture capital in the RC Guidelines.
Zamenjava sredstev je v skladu z opredelitvijo „tveganega kapitala“ iz Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu nedopustna.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that restricting the tax advantage to VCCs investing in incorporated enterprises appears to contradict the declared objective of the measure, namely to promote risk capital.
Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da je omejitev davčne ugodnosti na družbe tveganega kapitala, ki vlagajo v kapitalske družbe, v nasprotju z opredeljenim ciljem ukrepa, tj. spodbujanjem naložb rizičnega kapitala.
The Commission therefore concludes that measure on loss carry forward is not compatible with the common market.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da ukrep prenosa izgube ni združljiv s skupnim trgom.
As set out in point 7.1.3, the income tax benefit measure constitutes indirect State aid at TE level.
Kot je navedeno v točki 7.1.3, pomeni ukrep glede olajšave pri davku od dohodka posredno državno pomoč na ravni ciljnih družb.
Since the measure creates incentives for private investors to invest in TEs, it may favour risk capital investments pursuant to point 4.2(d) of the RC Guidelines.
Ker ukrep spodbuja fizične osebe k naložbam v ciljne družbe, je lahko v skladu z oddelkom 4.2(d) Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu ugoden za naložbe rizičnega kapitala.
For the same reasons as highlighted above in recitals 92, 93, 94 and 95, the Commission cannot consider the present measure to be compatible with the common market as it meets neither the exclusion criteria of point 2.1 of the RC Guidelines, nor the cumulation and reporting requirements referred to in Chapter 6 and point 7.1 of the Guidelines, nor the conditions set out in Chapter 4 of the Guidelines; neither is there any evidence of a particular market failure affecting TEs and VCC that would allow the Commission to launch a detailed assessment of the compatibility of these measures under Chapter 5 of the RC Guidelines.
V skladu z razlogi iz recitalov 92, 93, 94 in 95 Komisija zadevnega ukrepa ne more šteti za združljivega s skupnim trgom, saj ni v skladu z merili o izključitvi iz oddelka 2.1, pravili o kumulaciji in poročanju iz oddelkov 6 in 7.1 Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu ter merili iz oddelka 4 Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu; poleg tega ni dokazov o tržnih nepopolnostih, ki bi vplivale na ciljne družbe in družbe tveganega kapitala, zato Komisija meni, da ni razlogov za podrobnejšo presojo združljivosti zadevnih ukrepov v skladu z oddelkom 5 Smernic o rizičnem kapitalu.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that the income tax benefit measure as it stands cannot be considered compatible with the common market on the basis of the RC Guidelines.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da v skladu s Smernicami o rizičnem kapitalu ukrep glede olajšave pri davku od dohodka v sedanji obliki ni združljiv s skupnim trgom.