natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that, since this condition did not have an onerous character and this was obvious to all potential buyers from the way in which the tender documents were formulated, it did not lower the purchase price and did not have the potential to deter potential investors from submitting a bid, and therefore did not entail a loss of resources for the State.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da ta pogoj, ker ni pomenil obremenitve in so to na podlagi formulacije razpisne dokumentacije vedeli vsi morebitni kupci, ni znižal nakupne cene in mogočih vlagateljev ni mogel odvrniti od ponudbe ter da z njim zato država ni izgubila sredstev.
This conclusion is also supported by the fact that all bids submitted by the bidders were limited and carefully worded, giving bidders the flexibility to ensure that their commercial and profit-motivated ambitions could be achieved [39].
Ta sklepna ugotovitev je podprta tudi z dejstvom, da so bile vse ponudbe, ki so jih vložili ponudniki, izražene jasno in ozko ter skrbno, s (čimer so bili ponudniki tako prilagodljivi, da so si zagotovili možnost izpolnitve svojih poslovnih ambicij in ambicij, usmerjenih k dobičku [39].
Similarly, with regard to ‘establishing a committee to protect Austria’s interests’, the Commission notes that such a committee is purely advisory and has no decision-making powers.
Podobno Komisija glede „ustanovitve odbora za varstvo avstrijskih lokalnih interesov“ ugotavlja, da je to le svetovalni odbor in ni pooblaščen za odločanje.
Furthermore, none of the […] bidders were deterred by such a condition, as […].
Poleg tega tak pogoj ni odvrnil nobenega od […] ponudnikov, saj […].
The Commission can therefore conclude that, since this condition did not have an onerous character, it did not lower the purchase price and did not have the potential to deter potential investors from submitting a bid.
Komisija lahko zato ugotovi, da ta pogoj, ker ni pomenil obremenitve, ni znižal nakupne cene in morebitnih vlagateljev ni mogel odvrniti od ponudbe.
It did not therefore involve State aid.
Zato ne pomeni državne pomoči.
With regard to the goal of ‘keeping the Company’s headquarters in Austria’, the Commission notes that all […] bidders expressed their intention of doing so.
Komisija glede cilja „ohranitve centrale za odločanje v Avstriji“ ugotavlja, da so vsi […] ponudniki izrazili namen ohraniti centralo za odločanje v Avstriji.
As this condition is based on the logic of the ‘core shareholder’ requirement and is merely a refinement thereof, the Commission will deal with the two requirements together.
Ker ta pogoj temelji na logiki zahteve po strukturi glavnega delničarja in je le njena izboljšana različica, Komisija ti zahtevi obravnava skupaj.
Owing to the regulatory and other particularities of the air transport sector, the value of an airline is largely determined by intangible assets, such as slots and air traffic rights.
Vrednost letalske proge je zaradi regulativnih in drugih posebnosti letalskega sektorja precej odvisna od nematerialnega blaga, kot so na primer sloti in pravice do opravljanja zračnega prometa.
As such, both the seller and the buyer would see maintaining these rights as positive for potentially maintaining the value of the company.
Ohranitev teh pravic naj bi se tako prodajalcu kot tudi kupcu zdela pozitiven element za mogočo ohranitev vrednosti podjetja.
In view of the above considerations, the Commission can conclude that, rather than being onerous, this condition and the condition of keeping the headquarters in Austria were essentially commercial conditions actually designed to maintain bilateral traffic rights with certain third countries and thus rather to maintain the turnover of the company and the value of Austrian Airlines for the potential purchaser than, for example, to dictate the output or investment levels.
Komisija lahko na podlagi tega sklene, da ta pogoj in pogoj ohranitve centrale za odločanje v Avstriji nista bila obremenitvi, temveč v bistvu poslovna pogoja, dejansko oblikovana za ohranitev dvostranskih prometnih pravic z nekaterimi tretjimi državami in s tem prej kot zaščita prihodkov podjetja in vrednosti Austrian Airlines za morebitnega kupca, in ne da bi na primer predpisovala raven rezultatov ali naložb.
The Commission is also of the opinion that, while such conditions may give rise to compatibility problems with Community law, their relevance would have been obvious and important to all potential bidders, as maintaining traffic rights is essential.
Komisija še meni, da taki pogoji sicer lahko povzročijo težave glede združljivosti s pravom Skupnosti, vendar naj bi bil njihov pomen jasen in pomemben za vse morebitne ponudnike, saj je ohranitev prometnih pravic nujno potrebna.
In the context of the current state of development of the international air transport market and of bilateral agreements with third countries, the Commission considers that such conditions are not unusual in this sector.
Komisija v kontekstu sedanjega stanja razvoja mednarodnega trga letalskega prometa in dvostranskih sporazumov s tretjimi državami meni, da so taki pogoji v tem sektorju običajni.
The Commission further notes that these conditions were not challenged by any potential purchaser but rather that all bidders sought in a variety of similar ways to satisfy them […].
Komisija ugotavlja še, da noben morebitni kupec ni dvomil o teh pogojih, temveč so jih vsi ponudniki na podoben, a še vedno različen način poskušali izpolniti […].
On this basis, the Commission can conclude that neither the requirement to maintain the headquarters in Austria nor the requirement to retain an Austrian core shareholder structure was liable to lower the purchase price or to deter potential investors from submitting a bid, so no loss of State resources was involved.
Komisija lahko zato sklene, da niti zahteva po ohranitvi centrale za odločanje v Avstriji niti zahteva po ohranitvi avstrijske strukture glavnega delničarja nista bili taki, da bi lahko znižali nakupno ceno in morebitne vlagatelje odvrnili od oddaje ponudbe, tako da država ni izgubila sredstev.
Although, in the context of a tendering procedure, such conditions are generally regarded as conditions that could result in a potential loss of State resources, the above qualitative assessment confirms that, in this particular case, the conditions had no effect on the price paid, given the very specific nature of the aviation industry, but rather contributed to maintaining the full value of Austrian Airlines.
Medtem ko naj bi take pogoje v razpisnem postopku na splošno obravnavali kot pogoje, ki bi lahko povzročili izgubo državnih sredstev, zgornja ocena kakovosti v tem posebnem primeru potrjuje, da pogoji zaradi zelo posebne narave letalskega sektorja niso vplivali na plačano ceno, temveč so, nasprotno, prispevali k ohranitvi popolne vrednosti Austrian Airlines.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that no aid to Lufthansa is contained in the price it paid for ÖIAG’s shareholding in Austrian Airlines.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da cena, ki jo je Lufthansa plačala ÖIAG za deleže v Austrian Airlines, ne pomeni pomoči za Lufthanso.
As the Commission has established that the sale took place at the market price, it is not required to further examine the fairness and transparency of the privatisation process as part of this aid assessment.
Komisiji v okviru te preiskave državne pomoči ni treba naprej preiskovati pravičnosti in preglednosti postopka privatizacije, saj je ugotovila, da so bili deleži prodani po tržni ceni.
Application of the ‘market economy investor’ test
Uporaba preskusa ravnanja kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu
The conclusion that the price paid by Lufthansa for ÖIAG’s shares in Austrian Airlines corresponds to the market price does not exclude the possibility that aid has been granted to Austrian Airlines itself.
Sklepna ugotovitev, da je cena, ki jo je Lufthansa plačala za deleže ÖIAG v Austrian Airlines, tržna cena, ne izključuje možnosti, da je bila pomoč odobrena samemu Austrian Airlines.
The fact that a market price has been paid for a company might ensure that no new aid is granted to the buyer, but the buyer should not be confused with the company sold at a negative price.
Dejstvo, da je bila za tako podjetje plačana tržna cena, lahko morda zagotovi, da se kupcu ne odobri nove pomoči, vendar se kupca ne sme zamenjati s podjetjem, ki se proda po negativni ceni.
The Court has in fact consistently held that, where an undertaking that has benefited from unlawful State aid is bought at the market price, that is to say at the highest price which a private investor acting under normal competitive conditions was ready to pay for that company in the situation it was in, in particular after having enjoyed State aid, the aid element was assessed at the market price and included in the purchase price [40].
V skladu s stalno sodno prakso Sodišča je bil v primeru, da je podjetje, ki je prejelo nezakonito pomoč, pridobljeno po tržni ceni, torej po najvišji ceni, ki jo je bil za to družbo v položaju, v katerem se je znašla zlasti po tem, ko je bila deležna državnih pomoči, v običajnih konkurenčnih pogojih pripravljen plačati zasebni vlagatelj, element pomoči ocenjen na podlagi tržne in nakupne cene [40].
Thus, where a company is sold by the State at a negative price, the sale at the market price is not a sufficient criterion for establishing that the State acted as a market economy investor and that no State aid was granted.
Če torej država proda podjetje po negativni ceni, prodaja po tržni ceni ni zadostno merilo za ugotovitev, da je država ravnala kot vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu in ni bila dodeljena državna pomoč.
Such a market economy investor would also compare the negative market price with the cost to him of alternative options, such as, in the present case, insolvency of the company (insolvency scenario).
Tak vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu bi tudi negativno tržno ceno primerjal s stroški, ki bi mu nastali pri drugih možnostih, kot v obravnavanem primeru pri stečaju podjetja („scenarij stečaja“).
The Austrian authorities have argued that the decision to sell their stake in Austrian Airlines to Lufthansa at a negative price was the least expensive of the various options open to them.
Avstrijski organi so trdili, da je bila odločitev za prodajo njihove udeležbe v Austrian Airlines Lufthansi po negativni ceni stroškovno najugodnejša možnost med različnimi možnostmi, ki so jih imeli.
The other options were structured liquidation, the stand-alone scenario and the insolvency scenario.
Te druge možnosti so bile strukturirana likvidacija, scenarij samostojnosti in scenarij stečaja.
In this respect, the Commission notes that alternative scenarios do not have to be assessed in detail in this Decision, as all of them would lead to higher costs than insolvency.
Komisija glede tega opozarja, da drugih mogočih scenarijev v tej odločbi ni treba podrobno oceniti, ker bi vsi povzročili višje stroške kot stečaj.
Insolvency scenario
Scenarij stečaja
In the event of insolvency, outstanding debts to secured and unsecured creditors would have to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of unencumbered assets.
V primeru stečaja bi bilo treba neplačane obveznosti do zavarovanih in nezavarovanih upnikov poravnati iz izkupička prodaje premoženja, za katerega ne velja lastninski pridržek.
Under Austrian law, there are no preferential creditors, but the costs of the insolvency practitioner are settled in priority to any unsecured creditors.
V skladu z avstrijskim pravom noben upnik nima prednostne pravice, vendar je treba stroške stečajnega upravitelja poravnati prednostno, preden se poplačajo vsi nezavarovani upniki.
Furthermore, the claims of employees are not treated as preferential claims and will therefore be settled according to the quota that applies for all creditors.
Tudi zahtevki zaposlenih se ne obravnavajo prednostno, tako da se izpolnjujejo po deležu, ki velja za vse upnike.
In the insolvency scenario, shareholders would be unlikely to benefit from any return.
Delničarji v primeru stečaja verjetno ne bi mogli pričakovati plačila.
As a corollary, shareholders would have no liability other than the loss of their shareholdings.
Po drugi strani pa delničarji jamčijo samo za izgubo svojih deležev.
Assumption of all unsatisfied debts by ÖIAG in order to avoid a negative impact on its other shareholdings
Prevzem vseh neporavnanih obveznosti s strani ÖIAG, da se prepreči negativen vpliv na njegove druge udeležbe
In this regard, the Austrian authorities argue that the insolvency of Austrian Airlines would result in the downgrading of the rating of ÖIAG’s other shareholdings (OMV AG, Österreichische Post, Telekom Austria, etc.) and of the Austrian State’s other shareholdings ([…]).
Avstrijski organi v zvezi s tem navajajo, da bi stečaj Austrian Airlines povzročil znižanje stopnje bonitete drugih udeležb ÖIAG (kot so OMV AG, Österreichische Post, Telekom Austria itd.) in znižanje stopnje bonitete drugih deležev Avstrije ([…]).
Furthermore, they argue that such a downgrading would also negatively affect the share price of these companies and would result in a massive loss in the shareholdings of ÖIAG and of the Republic of Austria.
Poleg tega trdijo, da bi tako znižanje stopnje bonitete tudi negativno vplivalo na delniške tečaje teh podjetij in povzročilo masivno izgubo udeležb ÖIAG in Republike Avstrije.
In their opinion, the rating downgrade would result from the loss of the support of the parent company.
Avstrijski organi menijo, da naj bi bilo znižanje stopnje bonitete rezultat prenehanja podpore matičnega podjetja.
Moreover, they are of the opinion that the support of the parent company is one of the key rating factors.
Poleg tega menijo, da naj bi bila podpora matičnega podjetja eden glavnih dejavnikov za boniteto.
They have provided examples of private undertakings, stating, for example, that the ratings of Bank Austria and Hypovereinsbank have benefitted from the support of their parent company UniCredit.
Navajajo primere zasebnih podjetij, na primer boniteto Bank Austria in Hypovereinsbank, ki naj bi imeli korist od podpore matičnega podjetja Unicredit.
The Commission first notes that, irrespective of whether a company is wholly privately owned or whether it is publicly owned, its rating depends not only on the support of the parent company but also on other factors.
Prvič, Komisija ugotavlja, da bonitetna stopnja podjetja, ne glede na to, ali je v celoti v zasebni ali državni lasti, ni odvisna samo od podpore matičnega podjetja, temveč tudi od drugih dejavnikov.
Key rating factors are the production characteristics of the company, the re-investment risk, the operating and capital efficiency and downstream rating factors such as the dependence of its customers, diversification, its financial situation and its liquidity profile in general.
Dejavniki, odločilni za boniteto, so značilnosti proizvodnje podjetja, tveganje ponovne naložbe, učinkovitost poslovanja in kapitala ter drugorazredni bonitetni dejavniki, kot so odvisnost od kupcev, povečevanje raznovrstnosti, finančni položaj in likvidnostni profil na splošno.
In addition, the examples summarised in Table 1 relate to a downgrading of the rating of a parent company resulting in the downgrading of the rating of its subsidiary.
Poleg tega se primeri, prikazani v preglednici 1, nanašajo na znižanje stopnje bonitete matičnega podjetja, ki je povzročilo znižanje stopnje bonitete njegove hčerinske družbe.
Based on the rating methodology, the rating of a subsidiary cannot be better than that of the parent company.
Na podlagi metodologije za ocenjevanje bonitete boniteta hčerinskega podjetja ne more biti boljša od bonitete matičnega podjetja.
In the present case, ÖIAG does not have a rating.
ÖIAG v obravnavanem primeru nima bonitetne ocene.
Furthermore, the ÖIAG Act of 26 April 2000 expressly forbids the consolidation of ÖIAG with its shareholdings and, moreover, its liabilities are covered by a State guarantee.
Poleg tega je v zakonu o ÖIAG z dne 26. aprila 2000 izrecno prepovedana konsolidacija ÖIAG z njegovimi udeležbami in so njegove obveznosti krite z državnim poroštvom.
ÖIAG’s role appears, by its nature, to be that of an asset management fund rather than that of a diversified group holding.
Zdi se, da ima ÖIAG bolj vlogo sklada za upravljanje premoženja kot vlogo holdinga razpršenega koncerna.
The Commission also notes that a significant number of its shareholdings (OMV AG, Österreichische Post, Telekom Austria) are themselves listed separately on the Vienna stock exchange rather than being unified within a single group structure and that the majority of each of these companies is owned by shareholders other than ÖIAG.
Komisija še ugotavlja, da precej njegovih udeležb (OMV AG, Österreichische Post, Telekom Austria) ločeno kotira na dunajski borzi, namesto da bi bile združene v en sam koncern, in da je večina teh podjetij v lasti drugih delničarjev, in ne ÖIAG.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that, when the fundamental business data of undertakings such as OMV AG, Österreichische Post or Telekom Austria are examined by analysts, the performance of other undertakings in which ÖIAG has a stake is not taken into consideration [41].
Komisija še meni, da analitiki pri preverjanju temeljnih poslovnih podatkov takih podjetij, kot so OMV AG, Österreichische Post ali Telekom Austria, ne upoštevajo razvoja drugih podjetij, v katerih ima ÖIAG delež [41].
In view of the above, the Commission cannot agree with the argument that the insolvency of Austrian Airlines would have an effect on the rating of the other shareholdings and would result in ÖIAG’s shares losing value.
Zato se Komisija ne more strinjati z utemeljitvijo, da bi stečaj Austrian Airlines vplival na bonitetno oceno drugih udeležb in povzročil izgubo vrednosti deležev ÖIAG.
Similarly, the Commission cannot accept that the insolvency of Austrian Airlines would also affect the rating and value of any other undertaking owned by the Republic of Austria.
Komisija se tudi ne more strinjati s tem, da bi stečaj Austrian Airlines škodoval tudi bonitetni oceni in vrednosti drugih podjetij v lasti Republike Avstrije.
Assumption of social costs by ÖIAG
Prevzem socialnih stroškov s strani ÖIAG
The Austrian authorities and Austrian Airlines have provided the Commission with information on cases in which privately owned companies have voluntarily assumed the cost of social plans when they have closed business divisions or production units in Austria.
Avstrijski organi in Austrian Airlines so Komisiji predložili informacije o primerih, v katerih so podjetja v zasebni lasti prostovoljno prevzela stroške socialnih načrtov, ko so zaprla poslovna področja ali obrate v Avstriji.
On the basis of this information, it would appear that it is common practice in Austria for a parent company or group to assume social costs when it closes down a subsidiary or reduces its production capacity in order to relocate production to another country.
Na podlagi teh informacij se zdi, da je v Avstriji na splošno običajno, da matično podjetje ali koncern ob zaprtju hčerinske družbe ali zmanjšanju proizvodne zmogljivosti za preselitev proizvodnje v tujino prevzame socialne stroške.
The Austrian authorities have argued that the same would hold true if the parent company or group were to allow the subsidiary to become insolvent.
Avstrijski organi so trdili, da naj bi enako veljalo, če matično podjetje ali koncern pusti, da gre hčerinsko podjetje v stečaj.
In this regard, the Commission notes that, in the cases presented as examples, the parent company still continues to offer products under the brand name of the liquidated subsidiary in Austria even though its production or parts of its production have been relocated to another country.
Komisija v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da matično podjetje v navedenih primerih v Avstriji še naprej ponuja izdelke pod blagovno znamko likvidirane hčerinske družbe, čeprav so bili proizvodnja ali deli proizvodnje preseljeni v tujino.
Against this background, the Commission observes that it would be only reasonable from an economic point of view for the parent company to assume the obligations of a subsidiary towards its employees under the applicable labour law in the event of structured liquidation of the subsidiary if the parent company retains a presence in the market in question.
Zato Komisija opozarja, da je to, da matično podjetje pri strukturirani likvidaciji hčerinskega podjetja v skladu z veljavnim delovnim pravom prevzame obveznosti hčerinskega podjetja do njegovih zaposlenih, gospodarsko smiselno samo, če matično podjetje ostane dejavno na zadevnem trgu.
In the present case, however, ÖIAG would, in the hypothetical insolvency scenario, fully disinvest from the aviation market in Austria.
ÖIAG pa bi se v obravnavanem primeru v domnevnem scenariju stečaja v celoti umaknil z avstrijskega trga letalskega prometa.
Therefore, it does not seem convincing that, in a similar situation to ÖIAG, a private investor (such as a purely financial holding) would assume the social costs for reasons relating to the ‘Austrian Airlines’ brand image (a brand it would no longer have any interest in).
Zato se ne zdi prepričljivo, da bi zasebni vlagatelj (kot je čisti finančni holding) v podobnem položaju, kot je ÖIAG, iz razlogov, povezanih z ugledom znamke „Austrian Airlines“ (znamke, za katero naj ne bi imel več nobenih interesov), prevzel socialne stroške.
The Commission also notes that, for the same reasons, the amount of social costs for Austrian Airlines (see Table 2) hypothetically to be assumed by ÖIAG in the event of insolvency cannot be compared with the examples of voluntary assumption of social costs.
Komisija še ugotavlja, da višine socialnih stroškov Austrian Airlines (glej preglednico 2), ki bi jih ÖIAG domnevno prevzel v primeru stečaja, iz enakih razlogov ni mogoče primerjati s primeri prostovoljnega prevzema socialnih stroškov.
The Commission further observes that Austrian Airlines’ social costs are very high, both in terms of average individual payment and in terms of overall payment amount, when compared with the social costs voluntarily assumed by other companies (see Table 4).
Komisija še opaža, da so socialni stroški Austrian Airlines v primerjavi s socialnimi stroški, ki so jih prostovoljno prevzela druga podjetja (glej preglednico 4) tako glede povprečnega posameznega plačila kot tudi glede skupnega zneska, zelo visoki.
The Austrian authorities argue that there are clearly a number of factors which would influence the costs of such a social plan.
Avstrijski organi trdijo, da naj bi očitno obstajali številni dejavniki, ki naj bi vplivali na stroške takega socialnega načrta.
The most important factors would be the length of service of the employees and their salary levels.
Najpomembnejša dejavnika naj bi bila trajanje zaposlenosti delavcev v podjetju in višina njihove plače.
In the present case, the Commission notes that the costs of a social plan in the event of a company’s insolvency and in the event of closure of a production unit may be different from the social plan costs in the event of a reduction in production capacity, where the undertaking is still active on the market.
Komisija v obravnavanem primeru ugotavlja, da so lahko stroški socialnega načrta pri stečaju podjetja in zaprtju proizvodne enote drugačni kot pri zmanjšanju proizvodne zmogljivosti, v primeru katerega je podjetje še vedno dejavno na trgu.
In this regard, the Commission considers that the Austrian authorities have not demonstrated that insolvency would have had a sufficiently negative impact on the brand image of the ÖIAG holding company to oblige it voluntarily to assume social costs of such a magnitude.
Komisija v zvezi s tem meni, da avstrijski organi niso dokazali, da bi imel stečaj zadostno negativen vpliv na ugled znamke holdinga ÖIAG, da bi se ta čutil dolžnega prostovoljno prevzeti socialne stroške v tej višini.