natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
All the above aims shall be achieved in a way guaranteeing …the safety of the primary energy supply, enable those intending to invest in this area to feel their investments, the return on investments in safety, …, the fulfilment of the declared government intentions in safety.’
Vsi zgoraj navedeni cilji bodo doseženi na način, ki bo zagotavlja …varnost dobave primarne energije, omogočil tistim, ki nameravajo investirati na tem področju, da izkoristijo svoje naložbe, varno donosnost naložb, …, varno izpolnjevanje navedenih ciljev vlade.“
The Joint Guidelines then regulate the competition procedure relating to the establishment of power plant capacities.
Skupne smernice urejajo natečajni postopek, ki je povezan z vzpostavitvijo zmogljivosti elektrarn.
A Principal Evaluating Committee (Értékelő Főbizottság) made the final proposal to the winner of the tender.
Glavni ocenjevalni odbor („Értékelő Főbizottság“) je podal končni predlog zmagovalcu javnega razpisa.
The members of this Committee were the representatives of the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Environment, the Hungarian Energy Office, MVM and the ERSTE Bank.
Člani tega odbora so bili predstavniki Ministrstva za gospodarstvo, Ministrstva za okolje, Madžarskega urada za energetiko, MVM-ja in ERSTE Bank.
The final decision was taken by the Board of Directors of MVM.
Končno odločitev je sprejel nadzorni svet MVM.
Under the Joint Guidelines, the official result of the tender was to be published (exclusively) in the official bulletin of the Ministry.
V okviru skupnih smernic je bil uradni rezultat razpisa objavljen (ekskluzivno) v uradnem biltenu Ministrstva.
Energy Act II was constructed in a way as to presuppose the existence of the PPAs.
Energetski zakon II je bil sestavljen tako, da je predpostavljal obstoj SNEE.
This Parliamentary Act that is the main legal framework for the operation of the Hungarian energy market in the period under assessment refers numerous times to the long-term purchase obligations of MVM.
Ta parlamentarni akt, ki je glavni pravni okvir za delovanje madžarskega trga z električno energijo v ocenjevanem obdobju, se večkrat nanaša na dolgoročne obveznosti nakupa MVM.
Article 5(2) of Government Decree No 183/2002 (VIII.23) on stranded costs lays down an obligation for MVM to initiate the renegotiation of the PPAs in order to decrease the purchased capacities.
Člen 5(2) Uredbe vlade št. 183/2002 (VIII.23.) o nasedlih stroških določa obveznost MVM-ja glede začetka ponovnega pogajanja v okviru SNEE z namenom zmanjšanja kupljenih zmogljivosti.
The decree thus obliges MVM to propose the amendment of the PPAs.
Uredba MVM obvezuje, da predlaga spremembo SNEE.
AES-Tisza argued in its observations that the prices under the PPAs were not imputable to the State after the period of price regulation (i.e. after 1 January 2004, with the exception of new price regulation in 2007), but were the result of negotiations between the power plant and MVM.
AES-Tisza v svojih pripombah navaja, da cen v okviru SNEE ni določila država po obdobju uravnavanja cen (tj. po 1. januarju 2004, z izjemo novega uravnavanja cen leta 2007), temveč so bile posledica pogajanj med elektrarno in MVM.
The Commission acknowledges that the exact amount of resources transferred to the beneficiaries does not solely depend on the clauses contained in the PPAs, which are imputable to the State, but also to periodic bilateral negotiations conducted by MVM with the generators.
Komisija potrjuje, da natančen znesek prenesenih sredstev upravičencem ni odvisen samo od klavzul, ki jih vsebuje SNEE in je zanje odgovorna država, ampak tudi od periodičnih dvostranskih pogajanj, ki jih je vodil MVM s proizvajalci.
In fact, PPAs offer a certain latitude to the parties to negotiate the quantities of electricity actually purchased by MVM as well as certain components of the price, notably with respect to the calculation of the capacity fees, which as indicated in recital 356 depend on a number of factors and necessitate periodic adjustments.
Dejansko SNEE omogočajo določeno svobodo podpisnikom, da lahko izpogajajo količine električne energije, ki jih bo MVM dejansko kupil, prav tako pa tudi določene komponente cene, ob upoštevanju izračuna pristojbin za zmogljivosti, ki so, kot je to navedeno v uvodni izjavi 356, odvisne od številnih dejavnikov in zahtevajo periodične prilagoditve.
However, the negotiations on purchased quantities can never lead to quantities below the minimum guaranteed off-take level established in the PPAs.
Kljub temu pa pogajanja glede kupljenih količin nikoli ne morejo voditi do količin, ki bi bile manjše od minimalne zagotovljene količine odjema, določene v SNEE.
Similarly, negotiations on prices can only be conducted in the framework of the price-setting mechanisms enshrined in the PPAs, which are imputable to the State.
Podobno se pogajanja glede cen lahko izvajajo samo v okviru mehanizmov za določanje cen, ki izhajajo iz SNEE in je zanje odgovorna država.
The price negotiations thus did not call into question the principle of purchase obligation covering justified costs and a level of profit necessary for the operation of the power plant.
Pogajanja glede cen torej ne postavljajo pod vprašaj načela obveznosti nakupa, s katerim se pokrijejo upravičeni stroški in stopnja dobička, ki je potrebna za delovanje elektrarne.
Furthermore, the fact that the PPAs provide for the reservation of the bulk of the capacities of the power plants under PPAs and a payment for these capacities entails in itself a transfer of State resources to the beneficiaries, independently of periodic negotiations between MVM and the generators.
Poleg tega pa dejstvo, da SNEE določajo rezervacijo večje količine zmogljivosti elektrarn v okviru SNEE in plačilo za te zmogljivosti, že samo po sebi vključuje prenos državnih sredstev upravičencem, neodvisno od periodičnih pogajanj med MVM in proizvajalci.
In their comments [89], the interested parties all agreed that the main formulae and definitions applied on the basis of the PPAs after 1 January 2004 followed the main rules of price regulation.
Vse zainteresirane stranke so se v svojih pripombah [89] strinjale, da so glavne formule in opredelitve, ki so se uporabljale na podlagi SNEE po 1. januarju 2004, sledile glavnim pravilom za uravnavanje cen.
[…] [90] itself explains both in its abovementioned comments and in its comments on the Opening Decision that the price negotiations ‘clarified’ the application of the pricing formulae and ‘interpreted’ its content [91].
[…] [90], pojasnjuje, tako v zgoraj omenjenih pripombah kot v pripombah glede Sklepa o začetku postopka, da so pogajanja glede cen „razjasnila“ uporabo cenovnih formul in „razložile“ njihovo vsebino [91].
It recognises that the PPA prices have always been cost based, covering justified costs, and that from the beginning they largely took into account the price calculation method applied by the price decrees.
Priznava, da so cene SNEE vedno temeljile na stroških in pokrivale upravičene stroške ter da so od začetka v veliki meri upoštevale metodo izračuna cen, ki se uporablja pri uredbah o cenah.
[…] furthermore explains that the price formulae of the […] amendment to its PPA are also based on government decrees: ‘The formula in the […] Amendment (Schedule […] Annex […]) for the calculation of the availability fee is the same as that included in the applicable Decrees (footnote reference to Decree 55/1996 of the Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism (IKIM) and Decree 46/2000 of the Minister of Economic Affairs (GM), and the last applicable one (re generators) before 1 January 2004 was Decree 60/2002 of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Transportation (GKM)) setting out the maximum availability (= capacity) and energy fees for generators listed therein’.
[…] nadalje razlaga, da so cenovne formule […] spremembe SNEE temeljile na vladnih uredbah: „formula v Amadmaju […] (razpored […] Prilogi […]) za izračun pristojbine za razpoložljivost je enaka formuli, ki je vključena v veljavne uredbe (sklicevanje na opombo iz Uredbe 55/1996 ministra za industrijo, trgovino in turizem (IKIM) in Uredbe 46/2000 ministra za gospodarske zadeve (GM),in pred 1. januarjem 2004 zadnja veljavna (vnovični proizvajalci) Uredba 60/2002 ministra za gospodarske zadeve in transport (GKM)), ki določa največjo razpoložljivost (= zmogljivost) in pristojbine za energijo za proizvajalce, ki so navedeni v njej.“
The above shows that neither the price negotiations nor the amendments to the PPAs affected the core principle of the PPAs as established in the circumstances described, when the PPAs were signed.
Zgoraj navedeno kaže, da niti pogajanja glede cen niti spremembe SNEE niso vplivali na osnovno načelo SNEE, kot je bilo določeno v opisanih okoliščinah, ko so bili SNEE podpisani.
The same principle of a purchase obligation in order to ensure return on investment governs the PPAs today.
Enako načelo glede obveznosti nakupa z namenom zagotavljanja donosnosti naložb velja za SNEE tudi danes.
It is apparent from the above circumstances that the existence of MVM's purchase obligation vis-à-vis the power generators, with the principle of covering justified fixed and variable costs, is imputable to the Hungarian State.
Iz zgoraj omenjenih okoliščin je razvidno, da je za obstoj MVM-jeve obveznosti nakupa od proizvajalcev električne energije, z načelom kritja upravičenih fiksnih in variabilnih stroškov, odgovorna država.
Furthermore, it is settled case law that a measure does not constitute State aid only when an advantage is conferred on undertakings by way of a direct and clear mobilisation of State resources, but also when the granting of the advantage may, if certain conditions are fulfilled in the future, entail an additional financial burden for the public authorities which they would not have had to bear if the advantage had not been granted [92].
Ustaljena sodna praksa je, da ukrep ne predstavlja državne pomoči samo takrat, kadar podjetjem dodeljuje prednost s pomočjo neposredne in jasne mobilizacije državnih sredstev, temveč tudi takrat, ko dodeljevanje prednosti lahko, če so v prihodnosti, izpolnjeni določeni pogoji, vključuje dodatno finančno breme za javne organe, ki jim ga ne bi bilo treba prenašati v primeru, da omenjena prednost ne bi bila dodeljena [92].
In 2004, it was clear that MVM would bear such an additional burden in the likely event that power generators and importers not engaged in PPAs offered lower prices than the PPA prices, because the development of such offers would create incentives for MVM to modify its supply portfolio and consequently reduce the quantities purchased from the power generators actually under PPAs and obtain price reductions from them.
Leta 2004 je bilo jasno, da bo MVM nosil takšno dodatno breme v primeru, da bi proizvajalci in uvozniki, ki niso podpisniki SNEE, ponudili nižje cene od cen SNEE, saj bi razvoj takih ponudb ustvaril pobude za MVM, da spremeni svoj portfelj dobave in posledično zmanjša količine, ki jih je kupil od proizvajalcev električne energije v okviru SNEE in od katerih je pridobil znižanje cen.
However, owing to its obligations stemming from the PPAs, MVM cannot make such decisions because, as shown above, MVM cannot reduce the quantities purchased from generators operating under PPAs below a minimum level (the guaranteed off-take quantity) and cannot negotiate prices on the basis of alternative offers provided by competing generators, but only within the cost-based price formation mechanism enshrined in the PPAs.
Kljub temu pa zaradi obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz SNEE, MVM ne more sprejeti takih sklepov, saj, kot je prikazano zgoraj, MVM ne more zmanjšati količin, ki jih kupuje od proizvajalcev, ki delujejo v okviru SNEE, na količino, ki je nižja od minimalne ravni (zagotovljena količina odjema), in se ne more pogajati za cene na podlagi alternativnih ponudb, ki jih nudijo konkurenčni proizvajalci, temveč samo v okviru mehanizma za oblikovanje cen na podlagi stroškov, ki izhaja iz SNEE.
This fact, together with the conclusion reached in recitals 315 and 316, leads the Commission to conclude that the condition of transfer of State resources has been present in the PPAs since 1 May 2004 and will be present as long as they are valid, independently of actual market conditions, because they prevent MVM from carrying out the arbitrages that might prove appropriate to minimise the amounts of resources spent for the purchase of the electricity necessary to fulfil its needs.
To dejstvo skupaj s sklepom, ki je bil sprejet v uvodnih izjavah 315–316, navaja Komisijo k sklepu, da je pogoj za prenos državnih sredstev prisoten v SNEE od 1. maja 2004 in bo prisoten še toliko časa, dokler bodo veljavni, ne glede na trenutne tržne pogoje, saj MVM-ju onemogočajo izvajanje arbitraž, ki bi se lahko izkazale za ustrezne pri zmanjševanju sredstev, porabljenih za nakup količine električne energije, ki bi zadostila potrebam.
It follows from the above considerations that the PPAs lead to the transfer of State resources.
Iz zgornjih ugotovitev sledi, da SNEE vodijo do prenosa državnih sredstev.
The electricity markets have been opened to competition and electricity has been traded between Member States in particular since the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricit [93].
Trgi z električno energijo so se odprli za konkurenco in države članice so trgovale z električno energijo zlasti od začetka veljavnosti Direktive 96/92/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. decembra 1996 o skupnih pravilih za notranji trg z električno energijo [93].
Measures that favour undertakings in the energy sector in one Member State may therefore impede the ability of undertakings from other Member States to export electricity to that State, or favour the export of electricity from that State to the other Member State.
Ukrepi, ki dajejo prednost podjetjem v energetskem sektorju v eni državi članici, lahko torej ovirajo možnost podjetij v drugih državah članicah, da izvažajo električno energijo v to državo, ali pa dajejo prednost izvozu električne energije iz te države v drugo državo članico.
This is particularly true for Hungary, which owing to its central location in Europe is connected or can easily connect to the networks of numerous present or future Member States.
To zlasti velja za Madžarsko, ki je zaradi osrednje lege v Evropi povezana ali pa se lahko zlahka poveže z mrežami številnih sedanjih ali prihodnjih držav članic.
This is particularly true for Hungary, which is a centrally located country in Europe surrounded by seven countries, four of which belong to the EU.
To še zlasti velja za Madžarsko, ki se nahaja v srednji Evropi in je obdana s sedmimi državami, od katerih štiri pripadajo EU.
Of the EU Member States, it has interconnectors with Slovakia, Austria and Romania.
Izmed držav članic EU je povezana s Slovaško, Avstrijo in Romunijo.
In 2004 it imported nearly 14000 GWh and exported 6300 GWh.
Leta 2004 je uvozila skoraj 14000 GWh in izvozila 6300 GWh.
From 2005, imports increased to above 15000 GWh and exports to between 8000 and 10000 GWh.
Od leta 2005 je uvoz narasel na več kot 15000 GWh, izvoz pa na 8000 do 10000 GWh.
In the years following Hungary's accession to the EU, approximately 60 % of Hungarian generation capacity was contracted by MVM under PPAs.
V letih, ki so sledila pristopu Madžarske k EU, je bilo skoraj 60 % madžarskih proizvodnih zmogljivosti predmet pogodbe z MVM v okviru SNEE.
The first step of the opening up of the market in Hungary took place on 1 July 2004, when all non-household consumers became eligible to switch to the free market.
Prvi korak k odprtju trga na Madžarskem je bil storjen 1. julija 2004, ko so odjemalci, ki niso bili gospodinjstva, postali upravičeni do preusmeritve na prosti trg.
On 1 January 2008 the public utility segment ceased to exist and accordingly all customers became ‘eligible’.
januarja 2008 je segment javne porabe prenehal obstajati in v skladu s tem so vsi odjemalci postali „upravičeni“.
Notwithstanding the market opening since 2004, a sizable proportion of eligible customers did not choose the free market segment.
Kljub odprtju trga leta 2004 pa velik odstotek upravičenih odjemalcev ni izbral segmenta prostega trga.
The Report of the Office of Economic Competition on the sectoral investigation on the Hungarian energy market [94] explicitly concluded that the lack of available capacities on the free market due to the substantial volumes of capacities reserved under the PPAs creates a serious obstacle to choosing the free market.
V poročilu Urada za ekonomsko konkurenco o sektorski preiskavi na madžarskem trgu z električno energijo [94] je bilo ugotovljeno, da pomanjkanje razpoložljivih zmogljivosti na prostem trgu zaradi večjih količin zmogljivosti, ki so bile rezervirane v obliki SNEE, predstavlja resno oviro pri izbiri prostega trga.
Through the PPAs, around 60 % of Hungarian generation capacities were tied to the public utility sector, to MVM only, and only the remaining capacities could in reality compete for new customers.
S pomočjo SNEE je bilo okoli 60 % madžarskih proizvodnih zmogljivosti vezanih na sektor javne porabe, samo na MVM, in samo preostale zmogljivosti so zares lahko konkurirale za nove odjemalce.
The reserved capacities, i.e. the guaranteed quantities over a long duration also create a barrier to the entry of new generators on the wholesale market, as 60 % of all capacities is linked to one (State-owned) company with a purchase guarantee.
Rezervirane zmogljivosti, tj. zagotovljene količine za daljše časovno obdobje, ustvarjajo oviro za vstop novih proizvajalcev na veleprodajni trg, saj je 60 % vseh zmogljivosti povezanih z enim (državnim) podjetjem z jamstvom nakupa.
In this regard, the Commission also took into account the results of the sectoral investigation by the Hungarian Office of Economic Competition, which explicitly concluded that the PPAs lead to foreclosure of the competitive market by limiting the de facto possibility of eligible consumers to switch to that free market and deterring potential wholesalers from entering the market [95].
V tem smislu je Komisija upoštevala rezultate sektorske preiskave, ki jo je izvedel madžarski urad za ekonomsko konkurenco, ki je izrecno sklenil, da SNEE vodijo do omejevanja možnosti vstopa na konkurenčni trg s tem, da dejansko omejujejo možnost preusmeritve upravičenih odjemalcev na takšen prosti trg in preprečujejo potencialnim trgovcem na debelo, da bi vstopili na trg [95].
The scarcity of capacities available outside the PPAs furthermore lead to an increase of prices on the competitive market.
Pomanjkanje zmogljivosti, ki so na voljo izven okvira SNEE, nadalje vodi do povečanja cen na konkurenčnem trgu.
The substantial volume of capacities and quantities of energy reserved by the PPAs affect prices also on the free market.
Velik del zmogljivosti in količin energije, rezerviranih s SNEE, vpliva tudi na cene na prostem trgu.
According to a quantitative study by the Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research on the impact of the PPAs on wholesale electricity prices in Hungary [96], the PPAs lead to higher prices on the wholesale market than could be achieved without PPAs.
Po kvantitativni raziskavi glede vpliva SNEE na veleprodajne cene električne energije na Madžarskem, ki jo je izvedel Regionalni center za raziskovanje energetske politike [96], vodijo SNEE do višjih cen na veleprodajnem trgu, kot bi jih bilo mogoče doseči brez SNEE.
More generally, this study also argues that the PPAs constitute one of the major factors which lead to a market structure that is ‘incompatible with the principles of a free competitive market’ [97].
Na splošno ta raziskava trdi, da SNEE predstavljajo enega izmed poglavitnih dejavnikov, ki vodijo do tržne strukture, ki ni „združljiva z načeli prostega konkurenčnega trga“ [97].
This study actually proposes the termination of the PPAs as a solution to achieve free competition on the Hungarian electricity wholesale market.
Ta raziskava predlaga ukinitev SNEE. Kot rešitev za doseganje svobodne konkurence na madžarskem trgu z električno energijo
The various studies referred to above thus all conclude that the PPAs distort competition and may affect trade between Member States.
Razne raziskave, ki se nanašajo na zgoraj navedeno, vse zaključujejo, da SNEE izkrivljajo konkurenco in lahko vplivajo na trgovanje med državami članicami.
Interested parties argue further that it is untrue that the scarcity of available free capacities leads to the distortion of competition, as the capacity auctions of MVM show that it could not even sell all of its proposed electricity products.
Zainteresirane stranke nadalje trdijo, da ni res, da pomanjkanje razpoložljivih prostih zmogljivosti povzroča izkrivljanje konkurence, saj MVM-jeve avkcije zmogljivosti kažejo, da vseh svojih predlaganih proizvodov električne energije sploh ne bi mogel prodati.
The interested parties also submitted comments to emphasize that many other factors affected trade and influenced the success of the development of free competition on the wholesale energy market in Hungary.
Zainteresirane stranke so posredovale tudi pripombe, v katerih so poudarile, da so na trgovino in s tem na uspeh razvoja svobodne konkurence na veleprodajnem trgu z električno energijo na Madžarskem vplivali številni drugi dejavniki.
The Commission obviously agrees that the PPAs are not the sole factor influencing competition and trade.
Komisija se zelo očitno strinja, da SNEE niso edini dejavnik, ki vpliva na konkurenco in trgovino.
All the above-mentioned studies also recognize that a great number of other elements (legislation, limited access to cross-border capacities, significant influence of price evolution on international energy markets, etc.) equally affect the overall success of market opening and the actual price levels.
Vse zgoraj omenjene raziskave tudi navajajo, da številni drugi elementi (zakonodaja, omejen dostop do čezmejnih zmogljivosti, pomemben vpliv razvoja cen na mednarodne energetske trge ipd.) enako vplivajo na celoten uspeh odpiranja trga in dejansko raven cen.
However, all the studies submitted to the Commission in the course of the present procedure and otherwise available to it, except the one submitted by AES-Tisza and commissioned by it [100], clearly recognise that the PPAs do have a significant effect on competition and trade.
Kljub temu pa vse raziskave, ki so bile posredovane Komisiji med zadevnim postopkom in ki so ji sicer dostopne, razen tiste, ki jo je posredovala in naročila AES-Tizsa [100], jasno ugotavljajo, da imajo SNEE pomemben vpliv na konkurenco in trgovino.
The reserved capacities, the guaranteed off-take and the pricing mechanism provided for by the PPAs shield the power generators under PPA, for the entire duration of the PPA, from the commercial risk associated with operating the power plants.
Rezervirane zmogljivosti, zagotovljena poraba in mehanizem za določanje cen, ki ga zagotavljajo SNEE, ščitijo proizvajalce električne energije ves čas trajanja SNEE pred poslovnim tveganjem, ki je povezano z elektrarnami.
As indicated under recital 211 above, this includes the risk associated with fluctuations in electricity generation costs and, in particular, fuel costs, the risk associated with fluctuations in end-user electricity prices, and the risk associated with fluctuation in end-user electricity demand.
Kot je navedeno v zgornji uvodni izjavi 211, to vključuje tveganje, ki je povezano z nihanji stroškov proizvodnje elektrike in zlasti stroškov goriva, tveganje, ki je povezano z nihanjem cen električne energije za končnega odjemalca, in tveganje, ki je povezano z nihanjem povpraševanja končnega odjemalca glede električne energije.
As these risks are the typical risks that power generators without a PPA would have to bear, the PPAs create an obstacle for a level playing field in the power generation sector and distort competition based on merit.
Ker so vsa ta tveganja značilna tveganja, katerim so izpostavljeni proizvajalci električne energije brez SNEE, SNEE predstavljajo oviro za enake konkurenčne pogoje v energetskem sektorju in izkrivljajo konkurenco, ki temelji na uspešnosti.