natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In view of this factor, the Commission considered in its decision initiating the procedure (points 232 and 233) that the criterion of point 23(b) was not fulfilled, and the cash aid could not be authorised as rescue aid.
Glede na ta podatek je Komisija v odločbi o sprožitvi postopka (točki 232 in 233) menila, da merilo iz točke 23(b) ni izpolnjeno in da likvidnostne pomoči ni mogoče odobriti kot pomoči za reševanje.
Belgium contests this legal assessment with three arguments.
Belgija s tremi argumenti spodbija to pravno presojo.
It considers firstly that SNCB maintained the rescue measures with the sole intention of allowing the Commission to conclude its scrutiny of case NN 9/04.
Najprej meni, da je SNCB ohranila ukrepe reševanja samo zato, da bi Komisija lahko zaključila pregled zadeve NN 9/2004.
It takes advantage of point 24 of the guidelines, which provides that the authorisation of rescue measures remains valid until the Commission rules on the restructuring plan.
Sklicuje se na točko 24 smernic, ki določa, da odobritev ukrepov za reševanje velja, dokler Komisija ne odloči o načrtu za prestrukturiranje.
Consequently, the Belgian authorities asked the Commission not to refer to the duration of its own procedure for approval of the rescue measures to contest the duration of the maintenance of these measures, and to approve the rescue measures on the basis of point 24 of the 1999 guidelines, until the Commission rules upon the restructuring plan.
Zato belgijski organi prosijo Komisijo, naj se pri spodbijanju trajanja teh ukrepov ne sklicuje na trajanje postopka za odobritev ukrepov reševanja in naj na podlagi točke 24 smernic iz leta 1999 odobri ukrepe reševanja za toliko časa, dokler Komisija ne odloči o načrtu za prestrukturiranje.
The Commission does not consider this argument to be relevant.
Komisija meni, da ta argument ni umesten.
Point 24 of the 1999 guidelines states that ‘the rescue aid will initially be authorised for not more than six months or, where the Member State concerned has submitted a restructuring plan within that period, until the Commission reaches its decision on the plan.
Točka 24 smernic iz leta 1999 namreč določa, da se „pomoč za reševanje […] v začetku odobri za največ šest mesecev ali, če zadevna država članica predloži plan prestrukturiranja v tem obdobju, dokler Komisija ne odloči o planu.
In duly substantiated exceptional circumstances and at the request of the Member State concerned, the Commission may extend the initial six-month period’.
V primerno obrazloženih izjemnih okoliščinah in na zahtevo zadevne države članice lahko Komisija podaljša začetno šestmesečno obdobje.“
The Belgian authorities’ second argument that they had supplied the Commission with all the necessary information for a decision on the rescue measures in their communication of 12 August 2003 is also not relevant.
Tudi drugi argument belgijskih organov, da so Komisiji predložili vse potrebne elemente za odločanje o pomoči za reševanje v dopisu z dne 12. avgusta 2003, ne drži.
The fact that the Commission requested additional information on several subsequent occasions shows that the information supplied by Belgium was not complete.
Že dejstvo, da je Komisija večkrat zahtevala dodatne informacije, namreč kaže, da informacije, ki jih je dala Belgija, niso bile popolne.
As regards the Belgian authorities’ argument that the Commission had never expressed reservations regarding the provisional continuation of the rescue measures, it suffices to recall that the Commission, in its letters of 13 October 2003 and 26 January 2005, included the following warning: the Commission draws ‘the attention of the Belgian authorities to the suspensive clause on implementation Article 88, paragraph 3, of the EC Treaty, laid down in Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/99, which prohibits the implementation of any new aid before the Commission has taken, or is deemed to have taken, a decision authorising it.
V zvezi z argumentom belgijskih organov, da Komisija ni nikdar izrazila pomislekov o začasnem nadaljevanju ukrepov reševanja, je dovolj, če se spomnimo, da je Komisija v dopisih z dne 13. oktobra 2003 in 26. januarja 2005 vključila naslednje opozorilo: Komisija opozarja „[…] belgijske organe na določbo o mirovanju izvajanja člena 88(3) Pogodbe ES iz člena 3 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/99, ki prepoveduje izvajanje vsake nove pomoči, preden Komisija sprejme ali se šteje, da je sprejela, odločbo o odobritvi takšne pomoči. Poleg tega opozarjam belgijske organe, da se v skladu s členom 14 omenjene uredbe od upravičenca lahko zahteva vračilo pomoči, ki se izvaja v nasprotju z določbo o mirovanju.“[…] belgijske organe na določbo o mirovanju izvajanja člena 88(3) Pogodbe ES iz člena 3 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/99, ki prepoveduje izvajanje vsake nove pomoči, preden Komisija sprejme ali se šteje, da je sprejela, odločbo o odobritvi takšne pomoči.
Furthermore, I would like to remind the Belgian authorities that the recovery of all aid implemented in contravention of this clause, would have to be charged to its beneficiary under the terms of Article 14 of said regulation’.
Poleg tega opozarjam belgijske organe, da se v skladu s členom 14 omenjene uredbe od upravičenca lahko zahteva vračilo pomoči, ki se izvaja v nasprotju z določbo o mirovanju.
The Commission therefore concludes that the cash aids awarded by SNCB to IFB exceeded the period of 12 months laid down in point 23(b) of the 1999 guidelines, and that the Belgian authorities did not submit the restructuring plan to the Commission within a period of six months, as laid down in point 24 of the 1999 guidelines.
Komisija torej sklepa, da je likvidnostna pomoč, ki jo je družba SNCB odobrila IFB, prekoračila dvanajstmesečni rok iz točke 23(b) smernic iz leta 1999 in da belgijski organi Komisiji niso predložili načrta za prestrukturiranje v roku šestih mesecev iz točke 24 smernic iz leta 1999.
The aid awarded by SNCB may not therefore be authorised as rescue aid.
Pomoči, ki jo je dodelila družba SNCB, ni mogoče odobriti kot pomoči za reševanje.
It could nevertheless be compatible with the common market as restructuring aid.
Vendar pa bi lahko bila združljiva s skupnim trgom kot pomoč za prestrukturiranje.
The question arises again as to which version of the guidelines is applicable.
Ponovno se postavlja vprašanje, katera različica smernic se uporabi.
In its decision initiating the procedure (point 240), the Commission considers that if SNCB decides not to award any new benefit to IFB, and if proof is provided that SNCB was committed to converting debts into capital before the publication of the 2004 guidelines, in its final decision the Commission must assess the aid awarded to IFB by SNCB on the basis of the 1999 guidelines.
V odločbi o sprožitvi postopka (točka 240) je Komisija menila, da bi morala, če se bo družba SNCB odločila, da IFB ne bo dodelila nove ugodnosti in če se dokaže, da se je SNCB zavezala, da bo pretvorila svoje terjatve v kapital, preden so bile objavljene smernice iz leta 2004, Komisija v končni odločitvi preučiti pomoč, ki jo je družba SNCB dodelila IFB, na podlagi smernic iz leta 1999.
As demonstrated by the Belgian authorities, if this condition precedent is fulfilled, it has a retroactive effect.
Kajti, kot so pokazali že belgijski organi, če je odložilni pogoj izpolnjen, ima to retroaktivni učinek.
SNCB’s commitment to convert its debts into capital is therefore firm as from 7 April 2003.
Zaveza družbe SNCB, da bo pretvorila terjatve v kapital, je torej zavezujoča od 7. aprila 2003.
‘[…] if SNCB decides not to award the new benefit to IFB, and if proof is provided that SNCB was committed to converting debts into capital before the publication of the 2004 guidelines, in its final decision the Commission must assess the aid awarded to IFB by SNCB on the basis of the 1999 guidelines’ [49].
„[…] če se bo družba SNCB odločila, da IFB ne bo dodelila nove ugodnosti in če je dokazano, da se je SNCB zavezala, da bo pretvorila svoje terjatve v kapital, preden so bile objavljene smernice iz leta 2004, bi morala Komisija v končni odločitvi preučiti pomoč, ki jo je družba SNCB dodelila IFB, na podlagi smernic iz leta 1999“ [49].
In order to be able to benefit from restructuring aid, a firm must firstly be eligible for the application of the guidelines.
Da bi podjetje lahko koristilo pomoč za prestrukturiranje, mora biti upravičeno za uporabo smernic.
To be eligible a firm must be a firm in difficulty.
Upravičeno je lahko samo podjetje, ki je v težavah.
On this subject, the 1999 guidelines state (points 4 and 5):
Smernice iz leta 1999 s tem v zvezi določajo (točki 4 in 5):
[…] the Commission regards a firm as being in difficulty where it is unable, whether through its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its owner/shareholders or creditors, to stem losses which, without outside intervention by the public authorities, will almost certainly condemn it to go out of business in the short or medium term.
Za namen teh smernic […] Komisija šteje, da je podjetje v težavah, ko ni zmožno z lastnimi sredstvi ali sredstvi, ki jih lahko pridobi od svojih lastnikov/delničarjev ali upnikov, ustaviti negativna gibanja poslovanja, ki bi brez posredovanja države ogrozili obstoj podjetja.
In particular, a firm is, in any event and irrespective of its size, regarded as being in difficulty for the purpose of these guidelines:
Za namen teh smernic je podjetje v težavah v vsakem primeru in ne glede na velikost zlasti:
in the case of a limited company, where more than half of its registered capital has disappeared and more than one quarter of that capital has been lost over the preceding 12 months’.
v primeru kapitalskih družb, če je več kakor polovica registriranega osnovnega kapitala izgubljena in je bila več kakor četrtina takšnega kapitala izgubljena v zadnjih dvanajstih mesecih.“
More than half of the subscribed capital having disappeared at this time, more than a quarter which in the previous 12 months, IFB is a firm in difficulty in the sense of points 4 and 5 of the guidelines.
Ker je bila takrat izgubljena več kot polovica vpisanega kapitala, od tega več kot četrtina v zadnjih dvanajstih mesecih, je IFB podjetje v težavah v smislu točk 4 in 5 smernic.
Furthermore, the firm does not have to be a newly created firm.
Poleg tega podjetje ne sme biti na novo ustanovljeno.
On this subject, the 1999 guidelines state (point 7).
Smernice iz leta 1999 s tem v zvezi določajo (točka 7):
For the purposes of these Guidelines, a newly created firm is not eligible for rescue or restructuring aid, even if its initial financial position is insecure.
V okviru teh smernic novo nastala podjetja niso upravičena do pomoči za reševanje ali prestrukturiranje, čeprav je njihov začetni finančni položaj negotov.
This is the case, for instance, where a new firm emerges from the liquidation of a previous firm or merely takes over such firm’s assets.’
Primer takšnega podjetja je, ko po likvidaciji podjetja nastane novo podjetje, ki le prevzame premoženje starega podjetj.“
As described in section 2 of this decision, IFB was created on 1 April 1998 by the merger of the company FerryBoats SA with the company InterFerry SA, and the addition of the ‘rail’ division of the company Edmond Depaire SA to the merged entity.
Kot je opisano v delu 2 te odločbe, je bila družba IFB ustanovljena 1. aprila 1998 z združitvijo družbe FerryBoats SA, družbe InterFerry SA in „železniškega“ oddelka družbe Edmond Depaire SA v združeni subjekt.
In the letter initiating the procedure (points 218 to 223), the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the new IFB business continued with the legal identity of one of the three companies, or if it had been newly created in 1998.
V dopisu o sprožitvi postopka (točke od 218 do 223) je Komisija izrazila dvome o tem, ali je novo podjetje IFB nadaljevanje pravne osebe ene od treh družb ali pa je bilo leta 1998 ustanovljeno novo podjetje.
Point 3.2.2 of the 1999 guidelines sets out the conditions for the authorisation of restructuring aid.
V točki 3.2.2 smernic iz leta 1999 so navedeni pogoji za odobritev pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
The conditions are as follows:
Ti pogoji so:
The restructuring plan must make it possible to restore the long-term viability of the firm within a reasonable period,
načrt za prestrukturiranje mora omogočiti obnovitev dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja podjetja v smiselnem časovnem okviru;
Measures must be taken to mitigate, as far as possible, any adverse effects of the aid on competitors,
treba je sprejeti ukrepe, da se, kolikor je mogoče, omili neugodne posledice pomoči za konkurente;
The aid must be limited to the strict minimum needed to enable restructuring to be carried out, and the firm must make a contribution to its restructuring,
pomoč mora biti omejena na najnižjo možno vsoto za prestrukturiranje;
The Commission must be able to satisfy itself, on the basis of regular detailed reports, that the restructuring plan is being implemented properly,
Komisiji je treba redno pošiljati podrobna poročila, da lahko ta zagotovi ustrezno izvajanje načrta za prestrukturiranje;
The restructuring aid should be granted once only.
pomoč za prestrukturiranje se dodeli le enkrat.
Restructuring plan restoring the economic viability of the firm
Načrt za prestrukturiranje za obnovitev sposobnosti preživetja podjetja
As regards the restructuring plan restoring the economic viability of the firm, the 1999 guidelines state:
Smernice iz leta 1999 v zvezi z načrtom za prestrukturiranje za obnovitev sposobnosti preživetja podjetja navajajo:
The grant of the aid is conditional on implementation of the restructuring plan which must be endorsed by the Commission in the case of all individual aid measures.
Dodelitev pomoči je pogojena z izvajanjem plana prestrukturiranja, ki ga je potrdila Komisija za vse individualne pomoči.
The restructuring plan, the duration of which must be as short as possible, must restore the long-term viability of the firm within a reasonable timescale and on the basis of realistic assumptions as to future operating conditions.
Plan prestrukturiranja, katerega rok za izvajanje mora biti čim krajši, mora obnoviti dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja podjetja v razumnem času in na podlagi realističnih predpostavk glede prihodnjih pogojev poslovanja.
Restructuring aid must therefore be linked to a viable restructuring plan to which the Member State concerned commits itself.
Pomoč za prestrukturiranje mora biti povezana z upravičenim planom prestrukturiranja, za katerega se zaveže zadevna država članica.
The plan must be submitted in all relevant detail to the Commission and include, in particular, a market survey.
Primerno podroben načrt je treba poslati Komisiji, priložiti pa je treba zlasti tržno poročilo.
The improvement in viability must derive mainly from internal measures contained in the restructuring plan and may be based on external factors such as variations in prices and demand over which the company has no great influence if the market assumptions made are generally acknowledged.
Izboljšanje sposobnosti preživetja je treba doseči zlasti z notranjimi ukrepi, ki jih vsebuje plan prestrukturiranja, in lahko temelji na zunanjih dejavnikih, kot so spremembe cen in povpraševanja, na katere podjetje nima večjega vpliva, če so tržne predpostavke na splošno priznane.
Restructuring must involve the abandonment of activities which would remain structurally loss making even after restructuring.
Prestrukturiranje mora vključevati opustitev dejavnosti, ki bi povzročale izgubo tudi po prestrukturiranju.
The restructuring plan should describe the circumstances that led to the company’s difficulties, thereby providing a basis for assessing whether the proposed measures are appropriate.
Plan prestrukturiranja mora opisati okoliščine, ki so podjetje privedle v težave, ker predpostavljajo osnovo za ocenjevanje, in, ali so predlagani ukrepi primerni.
It should take account, inter alia, of the present State of and future prospects for supply and demand on the relevant product market, with scenarios reflecting best-case, worst-case and intermediate assumptions and the firm’s specific strengths and weaknesses.
Upoštevati mora med drugim tudi sedanje in prihodnje stanje ponudbe in povpraševanja na zadevnem trgu s proizvodi, predvidevati pa mora najboljši, najslabši in srednji potek nadaljnjega poslovanja ter prednosti in slabosti podjetja.
It should enable the firm to progress towards a new structure that offers it prospects for long-term viability and enables it to stand on its own feet.
Podjetju mora omogočati napredek k novi strukturi, ki mu bo nudila dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja in mu bo omogočila, da se postavi na lastne noge.
The plan should provide for a turnaround that will enable the company, after completing its restructuring, to cover all its costs including depreciation and financial charges.
Plan mora potekati tako, da bo podjetje po prestrukturiranju lahko samo pokrilo vse stroške, vključno z amortizacijo in finančnimi bremeni.
The expected return on capital should be enough to enable the restructured firm to compete in the marketplace on its own merits’.
Pričakovana donosnost kapitala mora biti dovolj velika, da bo prestrukturiranemu podjetju omogočila samostojno konkuriranje na trgu.“
The Commission concluded in its decision initiating the procedure (points 242 to 247) that Belgium had provided a restructuring plan which fulfilled the criteria set out in the guidelines, and therefore did not express any doubts as to this criterion.
Komisija je v odločbi o sprožitvi postopka (točke 242 do 247) ugotovila, da je Belgija predložila načrt za prestrukturiranje, ki izpolnjuje pogoje iz smernic, in torej ni izrazila dvomov o tem merilu.
Following the initiation of the procedure, the Commission did not receive any comments from interested parties contesting this conclusion.
Komisija po sprožitvi postopka ni prejela pripomb zainteresiranih strank, ki bi izpodbijale ta sklep.
The Commission observes that the firm IFB had been able to demonstrate its economic viability both in its restructuring plan, presented in 2003, and in its results achieved since then.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je podjetje IFB znalo dokazati svojo sposobnost preživetja v svojem načrtu za prestrukturiranje, predstavljenem leta 2003, in z rezultati, ki jih je doseglo od takrat.
Consequently, the Commission concludes, as in its decision initiating the procedure (point 271), that the criterion ‘restructuring plan restoring the economic viability of the firm’ is fulfilled.
Zato Komisija enako kot v odločbi o sprožitvi postopka (točka 271) sklepa, da je merilo „načrta za prestrukturiranje za obnovitev sposobnosti preživetja podjetja“ izpolnjeno.
Nevertheless, as indicated in point 290 of this decision, the restructuring plan establishing the economic viability of the firm is not a sufficient condition; it is also necessary to establish that aid does not lead to undue distortions of competition.
Vendar, kot izhaja iz točke 290 te odločbe, načrt za prestrukturiranje, ki vzpostavlja sposobnost preživetja podjetja, ni zadosten pogoj; treba je tudi ugotoviti, da pomoč ne povzroča nedovoljenega izkrivljanja konkurence.
Prevention of undue distortions in competition
Preprečevanje nedovoljenega izkrivljanja konkurence
As regards the prevention of undue distortions of competition, the 1999 guidelines state (points 35 to 39):
Smernice iz leta 1999 glede preprečevanja nedovoljenega izkrivljanja konkurence določajo (točke 35 do 39):
Measures must be taken to mitigate as far as possible any adverse effects of the aid on competitors.
Treba je sprejeti ukrepe, ki bodo čim bolj omilili škodljive učinke pomoči na konkurente.
Otherwise, the aid should be regarded as “contrary to the common interest” and therefore incompatible with the common market.
Drugače bo pomoč veljala za ‚nezdružljivo s skupnimi interesi‘ in torej nezdružljivo s skupnim trgom.
This condition usually takes the form of a limitation on the presence which the company can enjoy on its market or markets after the end of the restructuring period.
Ta pogoj je običajno postavljen kot omejitev prisotnosti, ki jo lahko ima podjetje na trgu ali na trgih po koncu obdobja prestrukturiranja.
Where the size of the relevant market(s) is negligible at Community and at EEA level or the firm’s share of the relevant market(s) is negligible it should be considered that there is no undue distortion of competition.
Če je velikost zadevnih trgov zanemarljiva na ravni Skupnosti in EGP ali če je delež trga, ki ga ima podjetje, zanemarljiv, se šteje, da ni nedovoljenega izkrivljanja konkurence.
This condition should accordingly be regarded as not normally applying to small or medium-sized enterprises, except where otherwise provided by rules on State aid in a particular sector.
Običajno se ta pogoj uporablja za mala in srednje velika podjetja, razen če ni drugače določeno s pravili o državni pomoči v določenem sektorju.
The compulsory limitation or reduction of the company’s presence on the relevant market(s) represents a compensatory factor in favour of its competitors.
Obvezna omejitev ali zmanjšanje prisotnosti podjetja na zadevnih trgih predstavlja kompenzacijski faktor v korist konkurentom.
It should be in proportion to the distortive effects of the aid and, in particular, to the relative importance of the firm on its market or markets.
Omejitev mora biti sorazmerna s škodljivim učinkom pomoči in zlasti ustrezna pomenu podjetja na svojem trgu ali na svojih trgih.
The Commission will determine the extent of the limitation or reduction on the basis of the market survey attached to the structuring plan and, where the procedure has been initiated, on the basis of information supplied by interested parties.
Komisija bo določila višino omejitve ali zmanjšanja na podlagi tržne raziskave, ki je priložena k planu prestrukturiranja in, če se je postopek že začel, na podlagi podatkov, ki jih pošljejo zainteresirane stranke.
The reduction in the firm’s presence is to be put into effect through the restructuring plan and any conditions attached thereto.
Zmanjšanje prisotnosti podjetja na trgu je treba izvajati v skladu s planom prestrukturiranja in s pogoji, ki so v njem določeni.
A relaxation of the need for compensatory measures may be contemplated if such a reduction or limitation is likely to cause a manifest deterioration in the structure of the market, for example by having the indirect effect of creating a monopoly or a tight oligopolistic situation.
Potrebo po izravnalnih ukrepih je mogoče ublažiti, če bi takšno zmanjšanje ali omejitev lahko povzročilo izrazito poslabšanje strukture trga, na primer s posrednimi učinki ustvarjanja monopola ali resnih oligopolnih razmer.
Prior to the decision initiating the procedure, the Belgian authorities had explained that, in order to mitigate, as far as possible, any adverse effects of the aid on competitors, IFB had taken two measures:
Belgijski organi so pred odločbo o sprožitvi postopka pojasnili, da je družba IFB, da bi čim bolj omilila škodljive učinke pomoči na konkurente, sprejela dva ukrepa:
Withdrawal from its transhipment activities in France,
umik svojih dejavnosti pretovarjanja iz Francije,
The closure of the terminal in Bressoux in Belgium and the sale of shareholdings in the terminals in Brussels and Zeebrugge in Belgium.
zaprtje terminala v Bressouxu v Belgiji in prodajo deležev v terminalih v Bruslju in Zeebruggu v Belgiji.
In its decision initiating the procedure (points 252 to 265), the Commission expressed doubts as to whether these measures were sufficient to mitigate, as far as possible, any unfavourable consequences of the aid on competitors.
Komisija je v odločbi o sprožitvi postopka (točke 252 do 265) izrazila dvome o tem, ali ti ukrepi zadostujejo za čim večjo omilitev škodljivih učinkov pomoči na konkurente.
These doubts concern the two sectors in which IFB is continuing its activities, that is to say the Belgian freight transhipment market and the Belgian logistics market.
Ti dvomi so zadevali dva sektorja, v katerih je družba IFB nadaljevala svojo dejavnost, in sicer belgijski trg pretovarjanja in belgijski trg logistike.
The Belgian freight transhipment market
Belgijski trg pretovarjanja