natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The definition contained in point 17 of the Guidelines indicates that restructuring aid is based on a feasible, coherent and far-reaching plan to restore the firm’s long-term viability within a reasonable time-frame.
Opredelitev iz točke 17 Smernic navaja, da pomoč za prestrukturiranje temelji na izvedljivem, skladnem in daljnosežnem načrtu za obnovo dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja podjetja v razumnem časovnem okviru.
Restructuring usually involves the following elements: restructuring of all aspects of the company’s activities, reorganisation and rationalisation of its business, including withdrawal from loss-making activities and financial restructuring.
Prestrukturiranje običajno vključuje naslednje elemente: prestrukturiranje vseh vidikov dejavnosti podjetja, reorganizacijo in racionalizacijo poslovanja, vključno z umikom iz dejavnosti, ki prinašajo izgube, in finančno prestrukturiranje.
Restructuring operations, if benefiting from State aid, cannot however be limited to financial aid designed to make good past losses without tackling the reasons for those losses, i.e. without undertaking genuine restructuring.
Vendar pa postopki prestrukturiranja, če izhajajo iz državne pomoči, ne smejo biti omejeni na finančno pomoč, namenjeno pokritju preteklih izgub, ne da bi se ugotavljali razlogi za te izgube, tj. brez izvedbe pravega prestrukturiranja.
Furthermore, restructuring must be financed at least in part from the company’s own resources or from external sources free of State aid, and State aid must be limited to the minimum necessary to restore viability.
Poleg tega se mora prestrukturiranje vsaj delno financirati iz lastnih sredstev podjetja ali iz zunanjih virov, ki ne vsebujejo državne pomoči, državna pomoč pa mora biti omejena na najmanjši znesek, potreben za obnovo sposobnosti preživetja.
Lastly, countervailing measures must be adopted to mitigate the distortive effect of the aid.
Sprejeti morajo biti izravnalni ukrepi za zmanjšanje učinka izkrivljanja državne pomoči.
In view of the very distortive nature of restructuring aid, the Commission considers that aid to firms in difficulty can contribute to the development of economic activities without adversely affecting trade to an extent contrary to the Community interest only if all the conditions set out in the Guidelines are met.
Zaradi zelo izkrivljajoče narave pomoči za prestrukturiranje Komisija meni, da lahko pomoč podjetjem v težavah prispeva k razvoju gospodarskih dejavnosti brez škodljivega vpliva na trgovino v obsegu, ki je v nasprotju z interesom Skupnosti, samo, če so izpolnjeni vsi pogoji iz Smernic.
The Commission analyses below whether these conditions have been met.
Komisija v nadaljevanju analizira, ali so bili ti pogoji izpolnjeni.
To be eligible for rescue or restructuring aid, the firm must qualify as a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Da bi bilo podjetje upravičeno do pomoči za reševanje ali prestrukturiranje, mora biti podjetje v težavah v smislu Smernic.
The Commission believes that the financial situation of Gdynia Shipyard, at least since 2002, has been characterised by continuous illiquidity and insolvency, increasing losses and negative asset value.
Komisija meni, da je bilo finančno stanje ladjedelnice Gdynia, vsaj leta 2002, močno zaznamovano s stalno nelikvidnostjo in nesolventnostjo, kar je povečevalo izgube in negativno vrednost sredstev.
Gdynia Shipyard is therefore a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Ladjedelnica Gdynia je zato v smislu Smernic podjetje v težavah.
Pursuant to point 34 of the Guidelines, the granting of aid must be conditional on implementation of a restructuring plan, which must enable the company to restore viability within a reasonable time-frame.
V skladu s točko 34 Smernic mora biti dodelitev pomoči pogojena z izvajanjem načrta za prestrukturiranje, ki mora podjetju omogočiti obnovo sposobnosti preživetja v razumnem časovnem okviru.
Restoration of viability means that the company, after completing restructuring, is able to cover all its costs and generate a sufficient return on capital to compete on its own merits.
Obnova sposobnosti pomeni, da lahko podjetje po zaključenem prestrukturiranju krije vse svoje stroške in ustvari zadosten donos, da lahko samo konkurira.
Restructuring must be carried out as quickly as possible.
Prestrukturiranje mora biti izvedeno, kakor hitro je mogoče.
The Commission notes that, in the course of this investigation, it reviewed two restructuring plans (2004 and 2006) prepared by the yard’s management and approved by its majority owner, the State.
Komisija navaja, da je v teku te preiskave pregledala dva načrta za prestrukturiranje (2004 in 2006), ki ju je pripravila uprava ladjedelnice in odobril večinski lastnik, država.
The Commission concluded that its serious concerns as to whether the two plans would restore the yard’s viability had not been assuaged.
Komisija je sklenila, da je njena zaskrbljenost v zvezi s tem, ali bosta načrta obnovila sposobnost preživetja ladjedelnice, še vedno prisotna.
Since the 2006 restructuring plan has replaced the 2004 restructuring plan, the Commission explains below the grounds for its serious doubts concerning the 2006 restructuring plan.
Ker je načrt za prestrukturiranje 2006 nadomestil načrt za prestrukturiranje 2004, Komisija spodaj pojasnjuje razloge za resne dvome v zvezi z načrtom za prestrukturiranje 2006.
The Commission, however, notes that this plan resembles in many aspects the 2004 restructuring plan and the doubts expressed by the Commission in its decision to open a formal investigation with regard to the 2004 restructuring plan also apply in full to the 2006 restructuring plan.
Komisija opaža, da je ta načrt v marsičem podoben načrtu za prestrukturiranje 2004, dvomi, ki jih je Komisija izrazila v odločitvi o sprožitvi formalne preiskave v zvezi z načrtom za prestrukturiranje 2004, pa v celoti veljajo tudi za načrt za prestrukturiranje 2006.
The Commission recalls Poland’s claim, after the decision to open the formal investigation had been taken, that the 2004 restructuring plan constituted a sound economic basis for the yard’s restructuring.
Komisija se sklicuje na trditev Poljske po sprejetju odločitve o sprožitvi formalne preiskave, da načrt za prestrukturiranje 2004 predstavlja trdno gospodarsko podlago za prestrukturiranje ladjedelnice.
Reality showed that the 2004 plan was not sufficient to restore the yard’s viability and needed to be amended as early as 2006.
V resnici se je izkazalo, da načrt iz leta 2004 ni zadostoval za obnovo sposobnosti preživetja ladjedelnice in da ga je bilo treba spremeniti že leta 2006.
The Commission notes that the 2006 restructuring plan focused mainly on financial restructuring and that industrial aspects were not addressed in a convincing manner.
Komisija upošteva, da se je načrt za prestrukturiranje 2006 usmeril predvsem v finančno prestrukturiranje in da industrijski vidiki niso bili prepričljivo obravnavani.
No convincing far-reaching industrial strategy emerged from the plan.
Iz načrta ni izhajala nobena prepričljiva daljnosežna industrijska strategija.
This is illustrated in particular by the proposed investment strategy, which could be characterised as a collection of small upgrading projects without the global vision which would appear necessary to modernise facilities many of which date from the 1970s.
To prikazuje zlasti predlagana naložbena strategija, ki jo je mogoče označiti kot zbirko manjših projektov za posodobitev brez globalne vizije, ki se zdi nujna za posodobitev zmogljivosti, ki so bile večinoma zgrajene v 70. letih prejšnjega stoletja.
The plan does not analyse in detail the current state of production facilities or their shortcomings and does not identify the yard’s bottlenecks.
Načrt ne analizira podrobno sedanjega stanja proizvodnih zmogljivosti ali njihovih pomanjkljivosti in ne opredeljuje ozkih grl ladjedelnice.
According to the Commission’s external consultant, the amounts earmarked for investments (PLN 240 million; EUR 69 million) are too low to ensure genuine modernisation.
Po besedah zunanjega svetovalca Komisije so zneski, določeni za naložbe (240 milijonov PLN, 69 milijonov EUR), prenizki za zagotovitev prave posodobitve.
To put the planned investments in perspective, it is also worthwhile considering the forecasts for annual depreciation of the yard’s assets and trends in the value of fixed assets, as estimated by the 2006 restructuring plan.
Za boljšo sliko načrtovanih naložb je treba obravnavati napovedi za letno zmanjšanje vrednosti sredstev ladjedelnice in gibanja vrednosti osnovnih sredstev, kot jih ocenjuje načrt za prestrukturiranje 2006.
Depreciation over 2007-09, i.e. the investment period, is estimated at PLN 100 million.
Zmanjšanje vrednosti v letih 2007 do 2009, tj. v naložbenem obdobju, se ocenjuje na 100 milijonov PLN.
It follows that at least 40 % of the planned investments of PLN 240 million is needed simply to maintain the assets at their current technical level and the remaining 60 % would be the maximum available for real modernisation.
Iz tega sledi, da je najmanj 40 % načrtovanih naložb v višini 240 milijonov PLN potrebnih samo za ohranjanje sredstev na njihovi sedanji tehnični ravni, preostalih 60 % pa bi bil najvišji znesek za dejansko posodobitev.
The balance sheet forecast shows a steady increase in fixed assets from PLN 246 million in 2006 to PLN 361 million in 2010; however, that trend should be reversed in 2010, with the value of fixed assets decreasing again to a level of PLN 284 million in 2012 (the last year included in the forecast).
Napoved bilance stanja kaže enakomerno povečanje osnovnih sredstev s 246 milijonov PLN leta 2006 na 361 milijonov PLN leta 2010; vendar pa naj bi se ta trend leta 2010 obrnil in vrednost osnovnih sredstev naj bi se leta 2012 zmanjšala na raven 284 milijonov PLN (to je zadnje leto, vključeno v napoved).
In the light of the above, the Commission does not consider that the investment strategy is sufficiently far-reaching to ensure genuine modernisation and viability in the long term.
V luči zgoraj navedenega Komisija meni, da naložbena strategija ni dovolj daljnosežna za zagotovitev prave posodobitve in dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja.
The Commission also notes that the productivity target for 2012 of 37 man-hours/CGT, while an improvement compared with today’s situation, is still modest in comparison with efficient European shipyards attaining productivity of about 20 man-hours/CGT.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da čeprav načrtovana produktivnost za leto 2010 v višini 37 delovnih ur/KBT v primerjavi s sedanjim stanjem pomeni izboljšanje, je še vedno skromna v primerjavi z učinkovitimi evropskimi ladjedelnicami, ki dosegajo produktivnost okoli 20 delovnih ur/KBT.
The plan states that one of the yard’s main problems is high absenteeism and a shortage of qualified workers, who are leaving for better pay at other European yards.
Načrt navaja, da sta dve izmed glavnih težav ladjedelnice visoka stopnja bolniške odsotnosti in pomanjkanje usposobljenih delavcev, ki se zaradi boljšega plačila raje zaposlijo v drugih evropskih ladjedelnicah.
The Commission considers that the planned wage increase of 10 % in 2006 and 4 % annually from 2008 onwards will not be sufficient to address this problem.
Komisija meni, da načrtovano povišanje plač v višini 10 % leta 2006 in 4 % letno od leta 2008 ne bo zadovoljivo rešilo tega problema.
On the basis of the above the Commission does not consider that the planned industrial and organisational restructuring will be sufficient to restore the long-term viability of the yards.
Na podlagi zgoraj navedenega Komisija meni, da načrtovano industrijsko in organizacijsko prestrukturiranje ne bo zadostovalo za obnovo dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja ladjedelnice.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that the financial results forecast by the yard did not tally with its sensitivity analysis, based on a scenario involving depreciation of the US dollar, falling prices for vessels and rising prices for materials and wages.
Poleg tega Komisija upošteva, da se napoved finančnih rezultatov ladjedelnice ni ujemala z analizo občutljivosti na podlagi scenarija, ki vključuje zmanjšanje vrednosti ameriškega dolarja, padajoče cene plovil ter naraščajoče cene materialov in plač.
The sensitivity analysis shows that depreciation of the US dollar by PLN 0,10 p.a. would mean that viability would not be restored on the basis of the 2006 restructuring plan.
Analiza občutljivosti kaže, da bi znižanje vrednosti USD za 0,10 PLN na leto pomenilo, da sposobnosti preživetja na podlagi načrta za prestrukturiranje 2006 ni mogoče obnoviti.
The Commission therefore concludes that the 2006 restructuring plan is not sufficiently robust [66].
Zato Komisija sklepa, da načrt za prestrukturiranje 2006 ni dovolj trden [66].
Lastly, the Commission noted that the restructuring measures envisaged in the plan could not be implemented in the absence of an investor and that the new capital required in order to implement what appeared to be a rather modest restructuring was significant, mainly as a result of the need to undertake costly financial restructuring (PLN 1,015 billion) [67].
Komisija je nazadnje navedla, da ukrepov za prestrukturiranje, predvidenih v načrtu, ne bi bilo mogoče izvesti brez vlagatelja, in da je nov kapital, potreben za izvajanje na videz precej skromnega prestrukturiranja, znaten, predvsem zaradi potrebe po izvedbi dragega finančnega prestrukturiranja (1,015 milijarde PLN) [67].
The Commission doubted whether the plan was based on realistic assumptions as to the yard’s capacity to attract new capital.
Komisija je dvomila, da je načrt temeljil na realnih predpostavkah v zvezi s sposobnostjo ladjedelnice, da privabi nov kapital.
These doubts were confirmed by actual developments in the privatisation process of Gdynia Shipyard.
Te dvome so potrdili dejanski dogodki v postopku privatizacije ladjedelnice Gdynia.
As indicated above, the State as the owner of Gdynia Shipyard has attempted twice to find a private investor ready to take over the yard.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, je država kot lastnica ladjedelnice Gdynia dvakrat poskušala najti zasebnega vlagatelja, ki bi prevzel ladjedelnico.
None of the privatisation attempts (whether the partial privatisation in 2006 or the sale of all publicly owned shares in 2007) succeeded.
Uspel ni noben poskus privatizacije (niti delna privatizacija leta 2006 niti prodaja vseh delnic države leta 2007).
The Commission notes that the privatisation attempts took place at a time when the shipbuilding market was characterised by an unprecedented boom and therefore provided optimal conditions for the sale of the yard.
Komisija upošteva, da so se poskusi privatizacije dogajali v času, ko je ladjedelniški trg doživljal dotlej največji razcvet, zaradi česar so bili pogoji za prodajo ladjedelnice optimalni.
The negative outcome of the privatisation process can only be interpreted as reflecting a lack of confidence of market players in the yard’s ability to restore long-term viability.
Negativni izid postopka privatizacije je mogoče pojasniti le kot odraz pomanjkanja zaupanja akterjev na trgu v zmožnost ladjedelnice, da obnovi sposobnost preživetja.
The withdrawal of Amber from the privatisation process after an in-depth due diligence examination only confirms this [68].
Umik Amberja iz postopka privatizacije po poglobljenem skrbnem pregledu to le še potrjuje [68].
The Commission took note of the renewed efforts of the Polish authorities to find a private investor for Gdynia Shipyard following the withdrawal of Amber.
Komisija je upoštevala obnovljena prizadevanja poljskih organov, da po umiku Amberja poiščejo zasebnega vlagatelja za ladjedelnico Gdynia.
Until the decision was issued, however, no evidence convinced the Commission that the re-launched privatisation effort could be concluded positively in a short period of time and in line with the Guidelines.
Vse do izdaje odločbe pa Komisije ni prepričal noben dokaz, da bi se lahko ponovno prizadevanje za privatizacijo končalo pozitivno v kratkem času in v skladu s Smernicami.
As explained below, the joint restructuring plan of ISD Polska and the restructuring plan of PSC are both based on the expectation that significant amounts of additional State aid will be granted to the yard and that it will be possible to return the yard to viability if it is freed from outstanding liabilities and anticipated losses on existing contracts.
Kot je pojasnjeno spodaj, skupni načrt za prestrukturiranje ISD Polska in načrt za prestrukturiranje PSC temeljita na pričakovanju, da bo dodeljena znatna dodatna državna pomoč in da bo mogoče obnoviti sposobnost preživetja ladjedelnice, če ta ne bo imela zapadlih obveznosti in pričakovanih izgub iz obstoječih pogodb.
Joint restructuring plan prepared by ISD
Skupni načrt za prestrukturiranje, ki ga je pripravil ISD
The Commission concludes that the joint restructuring plan has not demonstrated that the viability of Gdynia Shipyard will be restored after the merger with Gdańsk Shipyard.
Komisija ugotavlja, da skupni načrt za prestrukturiranje ni dokazal, da bo sposobnost preživetja ladjedelnice Gdynia obnovljena po združitvi z ladjedelnico Gdańsk.
In particular, the Commission is not convinced by the financial projections or the robustness of the plan.
Zlasti Komisije niso prepričale finančne napovedi ali trdnost načrta.
It takes the view that the restructuring measures envisaged in the plan are not sufficiently far-reaching.
Komisija meni, da ukrepi za prestrukturiranje, predvideni v načrtu, niso dovolj daljnosežni.
Although the revised joint restructuring plan has brought about some improvements, the Commission concludes that it will not restore the viability of the merged shipyards.
Čeprav je spremenjeni skupni načrt za prestrukturiranje prinesel nekaj izboljšav, Komisija ugotavlja, da ne bo obnovil sposobnosti preživetja združenih ladjedelnic.
Below the Commission assesses the September restructuring plan which replaced the June draft plan and highlights differences only where they are relevant to its assessment.
Komisija v nadaljevanju ocenjuje septembrski načrt za prestrukturiranje, ki je nadomestil junijski osnutek načrta, in poudarja samo tiste razlike, ki so pomembne za njeno oceno.
The assumptions in the June plan that the return on equity would be achieved only in 2020 and the return on investment only in 2016 tend to lead the Commission to the conclusion that the project is not viable.
Predpostavke iz junijskega načrta, v skladu s katerimi bo donos lastniškega kapitala dosežen šele leta 2020, donos naložb pa šele leta 2016, Komisijo napeljujejo k sklepu, da ta projekt ni sposoben za preživetje.
What is more, these results are based on non-discounted amounts; if the amounts were discounted the return on equity and investment would be achieved even later.
Še več, ti rezultati temeljijo na nediskontiranih zneskih; če bi bili zneski diskontirani, bi bil donos lastniškega kapitala in naložb dosežen še pozneje.
The September plan brings an improvement in that respect because it indicates discounted forecasts.
Septembrski načrt prinaša izboljšavo, saj navaja diskontirane napovedi.
Nevertheless, the plan assumed that the discounted return on equity would be achieved in 2018, i.e. 10 years after the entry of the new investor in 2009, which is still too long and demonstrates the riskiness of the project.
Kljub temu pa načrt predvideva, da bo diskontiran donos lastniškega kapitala dosežen leta 2018, tj. 10 let po vstopu novega vlagatelja leta 2009, kar pa je še vedno predolga doba in nakazuje tveganost projekta.
The Commission therefore maintains that the plan does not demonstrate that the project is viable.
Komisija zato vztraja, da načrt ne kaže sposobnosti projekta za preživetje.
In addition, the Commission notes that the improvement in financial projections is not based on the adoption of more far-reaching restructuring measures (such as productivity improvements or cost reduction) but on amendments to the main underlying financial assumptions that have not been sufficiently justified, as will be explained below.
Poleg tega Komisija vztraja, da izboljšanje finančnih napovedi ne temelji na sprejetju daljnosežnejših ukrepov za prestrukturiranje (na primer povečanje storilnosti ali zmanjšanje stroškov), temveč na spremembah glavnih osnovnih finančnih predpostavk, ki pa, kot bo pojasnjeno spodaj, niso bile dovolj utemeljene.
The financial projections assume that a large part of restructuring costs can be covered from the company’s future cash flows.
Finančne projekcije predvidevajo, da bo mogoče velik del stroškov za prestrukturiranje kriti iz prihodnjega denarnega toka podjetja.
The Commission regards this as unrealistic for a company which has generated enormous losses in the past and requires substantial restructuring.
Komisija meni, da to ni izvedljivo za podjetje, ki je v preteklosti ustvarjalo ogromne izgube in potrebuje obsežno prestrukturiranje.
According to the September plan, cash flow will be affected by past liabilities, which have increased from PLN 592 million to PLN 712 million.
V skladu s septembrskim načrtom bodo na denarni tok vplivale pretekle obveznosti, ki so se s 592 milijonov PLN povečale na 712 milijonov PLN.
Moreover, a large part of the public-law liabilities (more than PLN 400 million) is to be repaid between 2012 and 2018, i.e. long after the envisaged restructuring period [69].
Poleg tega naj bi bil velik del obveznosti po javnem pravu (več kot 400 milijonov PLN) poplačan med letoma 2012 in 2018, tj. dolgo po predvidenem obdobju prestrukturiranja [69].
The Commission notes that the investor has admitted that the level of expected results is borderline profitable, but he also claims that there is an additional reason why ISD Polska is interested in this project.
Komisija upošteva, da je vlagatelj priznal, da je raven pričakovanih rezultatov na meji dobičkonosnosti, vendar hkrati trdi, da obstaja še dodaten razlog, zakaj se ISD Polska zanima za ta projekt.
The investor claims that the yard will create significant demand for another group company, the steel mill Huta Częstochowa, and therefore investment in Gdynia Shipyard makes sense for the whole ISD Polska group.
Vlagatelj navaja, da bo ladjedelnica ustvarila veliko povpraševanje za drugo podjetje iz skupine, jeklarno Huta Częstochowa, zato je naložba v ladjedelnico Gdynia smiselna za celotno Skupino ISD Polska.
The Commission notes that the joint restructuring plan is based on an assumption that the State aid was awarded in the context of the privatisation to settle the yard’s balance sheet and cover expected losses.
Komisija upošteva, da skupni načrt za prestrukturiranje temelji na domnevi, da je bila državna pomoč dodeljena v okviru privatizacije za poravnavo bilance stanja in kritje pričakovanih izgub.
The plan is also based on an assumption that the shipyard’s activities will continue to be funded by guarantees from the Export Credit Insurance Corporation on advantageous terms compared with its normal practice for healthy companies.
Načrt temelji tudi na domnevi, da se bodo dejavnosti ladjedelnice še naprej financirale iz jamstev izvozno-kreditne agencije pod ugodnimi pogoji v primerjavi z običajno prakso za zdrava podjetja.
The financial projections take account of this expected State aid.
Finančne projekcije upoštevajo to pričakovano državno pomoč.
The September joint restructuring plan did not reduce this exposure to additional State aid.
Septembrski skupni načrt ni zmanjšal te izpostavljenosti dodatni državni pomoči.
On the contrary, the investor identified an additional potential liability of PLN 308 million linked to a tax dispute between Gdańsk Shipyard and the State.
Nasprotno, vlagatelj je opredelil dodatno možno obveznost v višini 308 milijonov PLN, povezano z davčnim sporom med ladjedelnico Gdańsk in državo.
The investor expects the Treasury to guarantee payment of this liability if it materialises.
Vlagatelj pričakuje, da bo finančno ministrstvo zagotovilo jamstvo za plačilo te obveznosti, če se ta uresniči.