natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The intention behind this was to allow the company to maintain the value of its capital, in order to ensure that its losses did not make its share capital and reserves fall below the legal limit, thereby preventing insolvency proceedings (procedura concorsuale), and to ensure that the possibility of privatisation remained open and credible.
Namen te možnosti je družbi omogočiti ohranitev vrednosti njenega kapitala, da izgube ne bi povzročile zmanjšanja osnovnega kapitala in rezerv pod zakonsko določeno mejo, s čimer bi se sprožil postopek zaradi insolventnosti („procedura concorsuale“); s tem bi se omogočilo tudi, da ostane možnost privatizacije odprta in verjetna.
The loan repayment terms laid down in Decree-Law No 80 remain applicable in the context of Decree-Law No 93, except for the fact that the interest rate to which the loan is subject has been increased by 1 % (see Article 4(1) and (2) of Decree-Law No 93) and that, in the event of the company being liquidated, the amount in question will be repaid only after all the other creditors have been paid off, jointly and in proportion to the share capital (see Article 4(4) of Decree-Law No 93).
Način vračila posojila, določen v zakonskem odloku št. 80, velja tudi na podlagi zakonskega odloka št. 93, razen za obrestno mero za posojilo, povečano za 1 odstotno točko (glej člen 4(1) in (2) zakonskega odloka št. 93), in ker bo v primeru likvidacije družbe zadevni znesek šele po solidarnem poplačilu vseh drugih upnikov vrnjen sorazmerno z lastniškim kapitalom (glej člen 4(4) zakonskega odloka št. 93).
In its Decision of 11 June 2008, the Commission found that the measure in question (hereinafter referred to as the measure) was a loan granted by the Italian State, the value of which could be counted as part of Alitalia’s capital [7].
Komisija v odločitvi z dne 11. junija 2008 opozarja, da je zadevni ukrep posojilo, ki ga je odobrila Italija in katerega znesek je mogoče vključiti v lastniški kapital družbe Alitalia [7] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: ukrep).
On the subject of whether the measure in question could be regarded as aid, the Commission expressed its doubts as to whether the Italian State, in granting Alitalia the measure, acted as a prudent shareholder pursuing a structural policy — whether general or sectoral — guided by longer-term prospects of profitability on the capital invested than those of an ordinary investor.
Ker zadevni ukrep velja za pomoč, je Komisija imela dvome, ali se je Italija z dodelitvijo pomoči Alitalii vedla kot osveščeni delničar, ki vodi strukturno, globalno ali sektorsko politiko ter ga usmerjajo možnosti dolgoročnejše rentabilnosti vloženega kapitala, kot to velja za navadne vlagatelje.
In this context, the Commission took the view, on the basis of the information at its disposal, that, irrespective of how the relevant funds were used, the measure in question provided Alitalia with an economic advantage it would not have had under normal market conditions.
V tem okviru je Komisija na podlagi informacij, ki jih je imela na voljo, zlasti menila, da navedeni ukrep ne glede na način uporabe zadevnih sredstev pomeni gospodarsko prednost za Alitalio, ki je ob običajnih tržnih pogojih ne bi imela.
This assessment was based on the company’s financial situation and on the conditions and circumstances under which the measure was granted.
Ta ocena je temeljila na finančnem položaju družbe ter na pogojih in okoliščinah dodelitve obravnavane pomoči.
The Commission also expressed doubts as to whether the measure was compatible with the common market.
Komisija je imela tudi dvome glede skladnosti ukrepa s skupnim trgom.
On the basis of the information at its disposal at that stage of the procedure, it took the view that the measure could not be declared compatible with the common market in accordance with the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (hereinafter referred to as the 2004 guidelines) [8].
V zvezi s tem je na podlagi informacij, ki jih je imela takrat na voljo, zlasti menila, da ukrep zadevne pomoči ne bi mogel veljati za skladnega s skupnim trgom na podlagi Smernic Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah (v nadaljnjem besedilu: smernice iz leta 2004) [8].
It pointed out that Alitalia had already received rescue and restructuring aid.
Opozorila je tudi, da je Alitalia že prejela pomoči za prestrukturiranje in reševanje.
Accordingly, the Commission decided to initiate the formal investigation procedure in order to allay its doubts both as to whether the scheme in question constituted State aid and as to its compatibility with the common market.
Komisija se je zato odločila sprožiti formalni postopek preiskave, da bi odpravila dvome glede opredelitve zadevne sheme kot državne pomoči in njene združljivosti s skupnim trgom.
COMMENTS BY THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES
PRIPOMBE ITALIJANSKIH ORGANOV
In their comments, the Italian authorities asserted that the measure in question did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Italijanski organi v pripombah trdijo, da zadevni ukrep ni državna pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe.
They considered that the Italian State had acted as a shareholder whose objective was to ensure that a company in which it held a stake had the financial resources necessary to meet its liquidity needs in the short term.
V zvezi s tem menijo, da je Italija ravnala kot delničar, katerega namen je podjetju, v katerem ima delež, zagotoviti potrebna finančna sredstva, da bo kratkoročno lahko pokrilo likvidnostne potrebe.
The ordinary shareholder loan granted by Italy thus constituted a simple bridging loan intended to protect the value of the State’s holding and would have been granted by any prudent shareholder pursuing a structural policy — whether general or sectoral — guided by longer-term prospects of profitability on the capital invested than those of an ordinary investor.
Posojilo navadnega delničarja, ki ga je odobrila Italija, naj bi bilo torej samo premostitveno financiranje za povečanje vrednosti državnega deleža, ki naj bi ga odobril osveščeni delničar, ki vodi strukturno, globalno ali sektorsko politiko ter ga usmerjajo možnosti dolgoročnejše rentabilnosti vloženega kapitala, kot to velja za navadne vlagatelje.
In this context, the interest rates applied in the case in point were consistent with the nature and objectives of a shareholder loan.
V tem okviru naj bi bile uporabljene obrestne mere skladne z naravo in ciljem financiranja družbe.
Although such financing is often not onerous, in the case in point it was considered to be onerous, taking into account the nature of the lender and the setting of the interest rate at a level allowing a direct and appropriate return on the capital.
Čeprav je za tako financiranje najpogosteje značilna neodplačnost, naj bi se v obravnavanem primeru štelo za odplačno ob upoštevanju statusa posojilodajalca in z določitvijo obrestne mere na taki ravni, da omogoča neposreden in ustrezen ekonomski donos kapitala.
With regard to the Commission’s claim that the doubts concerning the aid nature of the measure in question were substantiated by the fact that it was adopted at the same time as withdrawal of a takeover bid submitted to Alitalia on 14 March 2008 and by the fact that the existence of ‘certain and immediate prospects of Alitalia being purchased by another investor’ was not proven, Italy pointed out that the reasons preventing the privatisation process being finalised with the Air France-KLM group had already been made clear.
Glede trditve Komisije, da pomisleke o tem, ali ima zadevni ukrep značaj pomoči, kar podpirata dejstvo, da je bil ukrep sprejet hkrati z umikom ponudbe za prevzem, ki je bila družbi Alitalia predložena 14. marca 2008, in neobstoj dokazov o obstoju „zanesljivih in takojšnjih možnosti, da bi družbo Alitalia kupil drug vlagatelj“, Italija opozarja, da so bili razlogi, zakaj ni mogla končati postopka privatizacije s skupino Air France-KLM, že pojasnjeni.
According to the Italian authorities, however, the non-completion of this process did not undermine the prospect of privatisation in a context making best use of the company’s assets, while safeguarding its residual value for shareholders.
Po mnenju italijanskih organov nedokončanje tega postopka vseeno ni nasprotovalo načrtu za privatizacijo v okoliščinah, ki povečujejo vrednost premoženja družbe in hkrati ohranjajo njeno preostalo vrednost za delničarje.
Moreover, developments after 30 May 2008 suggested that this course could still reasonably be followed.
Poleg tega je dogajanje po 30. maju 2008 nakazovalo, da je še vedno mogoče iti v to smer.
In this context, the Italian authorities referred to the contract concluded on 9 and 10 June 2008 with which Alitalia charged Intesa Sanpaolo SpA (hereinafter referred to as Intesa Sanpaolo) with seeking out a bid to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, as shareholder in Alitalia, and to Alitalia, with the aim that one or more industrial or financial investors interested in participating in the recovery, development and relaunching of Alitalia, particularly through its capitalisation, would take lasting control of the company.
Italijanski organi se v tem smislu sklicujejo na pogodbo, sklenjeno 9. in 10. junija 2008, s katero je družba Alitalia družbi Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba Intesa Sanpaolo) zaupala nalogo, spodbujati in najti ponudbo, namenjeno ministrstvu za gospodarstvo in finance kot delničarju družbe Alitalia in družbi Alitalia, da bi eden ali več industrijskih ali finančnih vlagateljev, zainteresiranih za sodelovanje pri sanaciji, razvoju in oživitvi družbe Alitalia, predvsem s kapitalizacijo trajno prevzelo nadzor nad družbo.
This mandate had a duration of 60 days and could be extended by 30 days at the company’s request.
To pooblastilo, ki se izvaja, naj bi veljalo 60 dni in bi se lahko na zahtevo družbe podaljšalo za 30 dni.
In the alternative, the Italian authorities asserted that, in any event, the measure was compatible with the common market in accordance with the 2004 guidelines.
Italijanski organi trdijo, da je ukrep vsekakor združljiv s skupnim trgom na podlagi smernic iz leta 2004.
Firstly, Alitalia was a firm in difficulty within the meaning of those guidelines.
Prvič: družba Alitalia naj bi bila podjetje v težavah v smislu navedenih smernic.
Secondly, the measure in question was reversible and thus complied with the requirement of the 2004 guidelines according to which rescue aid must involve purely temporary forms of support and must not constitute structural measures.
Drugič: obravnavani ukrep naj bi bil povratna transakcija, s čimer se upošteva zahteva iz smernic iz leta 2004, da morajo biti pomoči za reševanje samo začasna pomoč in ne smejo biti strukturni ukrepi.
Fifthly, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 25(d) of the 2004 guidelines, granting of the loan in question was necessary by virtue of the company’s immediate liquidity need caused by objective economic difficulties, which were recognised by the Commission in its Decision of 11 June 2008 (see recitals 18 to 20 of the Decision).
Petič: v skladu z zahtevami iz točke 25(d) smernic iz leta 2004 naj bi bila odobritev zadevnega posojila potrebna zaradi takojšnje potrebe družbe po likvidnih sredstvih zaradi objektivnih gospodarskih težav, ki jih je Komisija sicer priznala v odločitvi z dne 11. junija 2008 (glej uvodne izjave od 18 do 20 te odločbe).
In this connection, the Italian authorities pointed out that the loan simply aimed to safeguard, in the short term, the survival and assets of Alitalia, in order to allow the privatisation process to succeed.
V zvezi s tem italijanski organi opozarjajo, da je namen posojila kratkoročno zagotoviti nadaljnji obstoj in ohranitev premoženja družbe Alitalia, da bi se lahko postopek privatizacije uspešno zaključil.
The total amount of EUR 300 million was strictly necessary and proportional to achieving these objectives, as demonstrated by Italy’s presentation of the company’s economic and financial situation in its letter of 30 May 2008 to the Commission (see pages 6 to 9).
Skupni znesek pomoči, to je 300 milijonov EUR, naj bi bil nujno potreben in sorazmeren z uresničevanjem teh ciljev, kot med drugim dokazuje predstavitev ekonomskega in finančnega položaja družbe, ki jo je Italija poslala Komisiji v dopisu z dne 30. maja 2008 (glej str. od 6 do 9).
Sixthly, and lastly, application of the ‘one time, last time’ principle referred to in paragraph 25(e) of the 2004 guidelines was not contrary to the specific circumstances of the case in point.
Šestič: uporaba načela o enkratni pomoči iz točke 25(e) smernic iz leta 2004 v posebnih okoliščinah obravnavanega primera ni protislovna.
Although Alitalia had already received restructuring aid linked to the recovery plan over the 1996-2000 period, and rescue aid in 2004, it could be exempted from the ‘one time, last time’ principle.
Čeprav je družba Alitalia že prejela pomoč za prestrukturiranje za načrt sanacije za obdobje 1996–2000 in pomoč za reševanje leta 2004, je namreč mogoče odstopati od načela o enkratni pomoči.
The Italian authorities referred, in this context, to the Commission Decision of 1 December 2004 concerning the State aid which France was planning to implement for Bull [10] (hereinafter the Bull Decision).
Italijanski organi se v zvezi s tem sklicujejo na Odločbo Komisije z dne 1. decembra 2004 o državni pomoči Francije za Bull [10] (v nadaljnjem besedilu: odločba o družbi Bull).
They pointed out that application of the ‘one time, last time’ principle was aimed at avoiding a situation whereby repeated public intervention in favour of certain firms simply ‘maintain[ed] the status quo, postpone[d] the inevitable and in the meantime shift[ed] economic and social problems on to other, more efficient producers or other Member States’ (paragraph 72 of the 2004 guidelines).
Opozarjajo, da je namen uporabe načela o enkratni pomoči preprečiti, da bi ponavljajoča se državna podpora za nekatera podjetja „zgolj ohranjala obstoječe stanje, odložila to, kar je neizbežno, na kasnejši čas, ter med tem preložila gospodarske in socialne probleme na druge, učinkovitejše proizvajalce ali druge države članice“ (točka 72 smernic iz leta 2004).
The possibility of waiving this principle was dependent on recognition of the existence of cases where these factors were not verifiable and the cumulation of aid granted over a given period to a single beneficiary was not sufficient to consider that the firm ‘[could] only survive thanks to repeated state support’ (paragraph 72 of the guidelines).
Vendar naj bi bila možnost odstopanja od uporabe tega načela povezana s priznavanjem obstoja primerov, ko ti dejavniki niso preverljivi, ker iz skupnega zneska pomoči, dodeljenih istemu upravičencu v danem obdobju, ni mogoče sklepati, da podjetje „preživi zgolj zaradi ponavljajoče se državne podpore“ (točka 72 smernic).
In this connection, privatisation of the company, which remained a possible and credible outcome, could lead, when achieved, to a real change as compared to the existing situation concerning the management of Alitalia, which would be subject to new supervisory bodies, and allow the company to return to profitability through the economic contributions of the shareholders of the new company.
V zvezi s tem lahko privatizacija družbe, ki ostaja mogoča in verjetna rešitev, ob njenem dokončanju povzroči dejanski konec sedanjega stanja, kar zadeva industrijsko upravljanje družbe Alitalia, ki bi jo tako vodili novi nadzorni organi, ter omogoči učinkovito obnovo rentabilnosti družbe zaradi finančnih prispevkov članov nove družbe.
The Italian authorities also pointed out that all the external and unforeseen factors which, taken together, had prolonged the privatisation process of Alitalia could undoubtedly be considered exceptional and unforeseen circumstances for which it was not responsible, in accordance with paragraph 73 of the 2004 guidelines.
Italijanski organi nadalje trdijo, da k vsem zunanjim in nepredvidenim dejavnikom, ki so podaljšali postopek privatizacije družbe Alitalia, nedvomno spadajo tudi nepredvidljive in izjemne okoliščine, za katere družba v skladu s točko 73 smernic iz leta 2004 ni odgovorna.
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES
PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH TRETJIH STRANI
Five interested parties submitted their comments to the Commission under Article 88(2) of the Treaty.
Pet zainteresiranih strani je Komisiji poslalo pripombe na podlagi člena 88(2) Pogodbe.
With regard to whether the measure in question constituted aid, four interested parties supported the Commission’s position, believing that this measure constituted aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Prvič: v zvezi z vprašanjem opredelitve obravnavanega ukrepa kot pomoči štiri zainteresirane strani podpirajo stališče Komisije glede tega, ker menijo, da je navedeni ukrep pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe.
British Airways (BA) and Sterling Airlines asserted that, without the measure in question, Alitalia would go bankrupt under Italian law.
Družbi British Airways (BA) in Sterling Airlines opozarjata, da bi družba Alitalia brez zadevnega ukrepa v skladu z italijanskim zakonom šla v stečaj.
Alitalia would thus lose its air operator’s certificate in accordance with the civil aviation regulations and, in consequence, would have to cease operations.
Družba Alitalia bi tako v skladu s predpisi o civilnem letalstvu izgubila spričevalo letalskega prevoznika in bi zato morala prenehati delovati.
Neos pointed out, as regards the interest rate applicable to the measure in question for the purposes of repayment, that the 100 basis points added to the reference rate by no means reflected the risks incurred by the Italian authorities in granting the measure.
Družba Neos v zvezi s tem trdi, da za obrestno mero, ki se uporablja za vračilo zadevne pomoči, povišanje referenčne obrestne mere za 100 bazičnih točk nikakor ne pomeni, da se upoštevajo tveganja, v katera so privolili italijanski organi, ko so odobrili zadevni ukrep.
Neos also supported the Commission’s assessment in its Decision of 11 June 2008 concerning the lack of prospects for the privatisation of Alitalia when the measure in question was granted.
Družba Neos podpira tudi oceno Komisije v odločitvi z dne 11. junija 2008, da ob odobritvi zadevnega ukrepa ni bilo možnosti privatizacije družbe Alitalia.
Indeed, this circumstance would later be confirmed by the serious tensions during August between the Italian Ministry of Finance and the company’s management board concerning the ‘continuity of the company’ and the approval of its half-yearly accounts.
To dejstvo namreč potrjujejo hude napetosti, ki so avgusta obstajale med italijanskim ministrstvom za finance in upravnim odborom družbe glede „nadaljnjega obstoja podjetja“ in potrditve polletnih računovodskih izkazov te družbe.
BA and Sterling Airlines recalled that Alitalia had benefited from similar measures in the past.
Družbi BA in Sterling Airlines opozarjata, da je družba Alitalia v preteklosti prejela podobne pomoči.
Meanwhile, Ryanair expressed regret that the Commission had limited the scope of the formal investigation procedure initiated on 11 June 2008 to the measure in question, since, in its view, Alitalia had benefited from other illegal State aid measures since November 2005.
Družba Ryanair obžaluje, da je Komisija predmet formalnega postopka preiskave, ki ga je začela 11. junija 2008, omejila na zadevni ukrep, saj je družba Alitalia po mnenju družbe Ryanair od novembra 2005 prejela tudi druge nezakonite državne pomoči.
Analysing these other measures would have reinforced the view that, in the circumstances in question, a private investor would not have agreed to grant the relevant measure.
Z analizo teh drugih ukrepov bi lahko potrdili analizo, da zasebni vlagatelj v okoliščinah obravnavanega primera ne bi privolil v dodelitev zadevne pomoči.
Both Neos and Ryanair denounced the distortion of competition which resulted from the support which Alitalia had received from Italy for many years.
Družba Neos in tudi družba Ryanair navajata izkrivljanje konkurence zaradi pomoči, ki jo je Italija dolga leta zagotavljala družbi Alitalia.
In this connection, BA pointed out that this measure could not be granted without infringing the ‘one time, last time’ principle in the guidelines (paragraph 25(e) of the 2004 guidelines), since Alitalia had already received restructuring aid approved by the Commission.
Družba BA v zvezi s tem trdi, da se ta pomoč ni mogla dodeliti brez kršenja zlasti načela o enkratni pomoči iz smernic (točka 25(e) smernic iz leta 2004), ker je družba Alitalia že prejela pomoč za prestrukturiranje, ki jo je odobrila Komisija.
BA added that the exemption from the ‘one time, last time’ principle under paragraph 73 of the guidelines was not applicable in the case in point, since Alitalia had not had to deal with unforeseen circumstances for which it was not responsible.
Družba BA dodaja, da izjema od načela o enkratni pomoči iz točke 73 smernic v obravnavanem primeru ne velja, ker se družbi Alitalia ni bilo treba spopasti z nepredvidljivimi okoliščinami, za katere ni bila odgovorna.
In this context, BA and Sterling Airlines made clear that the very difficult situation facing the air sector and linked, in particular, to the increased oil price, affected all the participants in the sector.
V tem smislu družbi BA in Sterling Airlines pojasnjujeta, da sedanje zelo težke gospodarske razmere v letalskem sektorju, povezane predvsem z rastjo cen nafte, zadevajo vse akterje v sektorju.
Moreover, according to BA, the measure in question was not liquidity support in the form of loan guarantees or loans, but had the characteristics of an injection of capital guaranteeing the Italian Government effective control of the company (paragraph 25(a) of the 2004 guidelines).
Poleg tega po mnenju družbe BA obravnavani ukrep ni likvidnostna pomoč v obliki poroštev za posojilo ali v obliki posojil, ampak ima značilnosti dokapitalizacije, ki italijanski vladi zagotavlja dejanski nadzor nad družbo (točka 25(a) smernic).
With regard to the condition in the 2004 guidelines linked to the existence of serious social difficulties, BA stressed that the insolvency of Alitalia would not cause serious disruption to passengers, owing to the existence of competitors on both national and international routes.
Družba BA glede pogoja iz smernic iz leta 2004 v zvezi z obstojem resnih socialnih težav poudarja, da plačilna nesposobnost družbe Alitalia ne more povzročiti resnih motenj za potnike zaradi prisotnosti konkurentov na notranjih in mednarodnih letih.
As for adverse spillover effects on its competitors, these resulted from the preservation of Alitalia on the market despite its financial difficulties, the increase in its number of routes, particularly from Rome and Milan to Los Angeles, and the reduction in its fares.
Škodljivi učinki prelivanja na položaj njenih konkurentov naj bi bili posledica ohranitve družbe Alitalia na trgu kljub njenim finančnim težavam, povečanja števila prog, zlasti iz Rima in Milana v Los Angeles, in znižanja cen.
These commercial decisions were not rational given the company’s financial situation and demonstrated its wish to increase its market share as compared to those of its competitors not in receipt of State aid (paragraph 25(b) of the 2004 guidelines).
Te poslovne odločitve niso bile razumne, zlasti glede na finančni položaj družbe, in naj bi dokazovale njeno željo po povečanju tržnega deleža v primerjavi s konkurenti, ki niso prejeli državne pomoči (točka 25(b) smernic iz leta 2004).
Moreover, the measure in question was not granted to Alitalia for a period limited to six months, as required by the 2004 guidelines (paragraph 25(c)).
Poleg tega zadevna pomoč družbi Alitalia ni bila odobrena za omejeno obdobje šestih mesecev, kot se zahteva v smernicah iz leta 2004 (točka 25(c) smernic).