natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Taking as an example the ten-year, EUR 2,1 billion bonds auctioned by the Greek authorities on 7 June 2005 (the year of the VRS) at a weighted average yield of 3,41 %, and the five-year, EUR 1,68 billion bonds auctioned a month later at a weighted average yield of 2,71 %, CRA International takes the spot risk-free interest rate for all maturities to be about 3 % [25].
Če upoštevamo desetletne obveznice v višini 2,1 milijarde EUR, ki so jih grški organi prodali na dražbi 7. junija 2005 (leto SPU) po tehtanem povprečnem donosu 3,41 %, in petletne obveznice v višini 1,68 milijarde, ki so jih prodali na dražbi po tehtanem povprečnem donosu 2,71 % en mesec kasneje, je CRA International izračunala, da je promptna netvegana obrestna mera za vse zapadlosti 3 % [25].
Based on these assumptions, CRA International has estimated the NPV of the VRS at EUR 1086,2 million. Contrary to KPMG calculations (see recital 60 above), CRA International calculations do not take into consideration the EUR 154,4 million already provisioned by OTE in its 2004 accounts, since they are not bound by the accounting constraints of an auditor.
Na podlagi teh predpostavk je CRA International ocenila NPV SPU na 1086,2 milijona EUR. V nasprotju z izračuni KPMG (glej uvodno izjavo 60 zgoraj), izračuni CRA International ne upoštevajo 154,4 milijona EUR, ki jih je OTE že prikazala v finančnih izkazih družbe leta 2004, ker jih ne obvezujejo računovodske omejitve za revizorje.
Moreover, given that all the VRS payments by OTE are deductible for corporate tax purposes under Greek corporate law, CRA International has estimated that the real NPV of the VRS stands, post-tax, at EUR 784,3 million [26].
Nadalje je CRA International na podlagi dejstva, da je po grškem zakonu o gospodarskih družbah vsa plačila iz naslova SPU s strani OTE mogoče odbiti za namene davka od dohodka pravnih oseb, ocenila, da je dejanska čista sedanja vrednost SPU po plačilu davka 784,3 milijonov EUR [26].
On the basis of the above post-tax amount, CRA International calculated the costs that OTE would have incurred had it been a private company.
Na podlagi zgoraj omenjenega zneska po plačilu davka je CRA International izračunala stroške, ki bi jih utrpela družba OTE, če bi bila zasebno podjetje.
To this end, CRA International assumed that (a) according to the conclusions drawn by the Hay Group report, a private company would under normal circumstances offer a package amounting to 1,5 times the legal redundancy indemnity, and that (b) according to the data presented in the 2004 KPMG survey of compensations and benefits in the Greek high tech sector, this percentage would apply to salaries which are 33 % lower than those paid by OTE.
V ta namen je CRA International sklepala, (a) da bi v skladu z ugotovitvami iz poročila Hay Group zasebno podjetje v običajnih okoliščinah ponudilo paket, 1,5-krat višji, kot je odpravnina za zakonito upokojitev zaradi presežka delovne sile in (b) da bi se glede na podatke, predstavljene v raziskavi KPMG za leto 2004 o nadomestilih in ugodnostih v grškem sektorju visoke tehnologije, ta odstotek nanašal na plače, ki so 33 % nižje kot plače OTE.
Based on the assumption that OTE would provide a package equal to 150 % of the legal requirement but with private-sector salaries, i.e. 33 % lower than those of OTE, CRA International concluded that a private company other than OTE would have incurred costs, after tax, amounting to EUR 314,4 million for implementing the VRS.
Na podlagi predpostavke, da bi OTE zagotovila paket, ki je enak 150 % pravno predpisane zahteve, ampak s takimi plačami, kot jih imajo v zasebnem sektorju, tj. 33 % nižje kot pri OTE, je CRA International ugotovila, da bi v zasebnem podjetju, ki ni OTE, z uvedbo SPU po plačilu davka v znesku 314,4 milijona EUR nastali stroški.
Based on a comparison of the post-tax present value (PV) of the VRS (EUR 784,3 million) with the costs that OTE would have incurred had it been an ordinary private company (EUR 314,4 million), CRA International has calculated that the extra costs borne by OTE for the implementation of its VRS amount to EUR 469,9 million [27].
Na podlagi primerjave sedanje vrednosti (PV – present value) SPU po plačilu davka (784,3 milijona EUR s stroški, ki bi jih družba OTE imela, če bi bila običajna zasebna družba (314,4 milijona EUR), je RCA International izračunala, da dodatni stroški družbe OTE za uvedbo SPU znašajo 469,9 milijona EUR [27].
For the sake of completeness, CRA International also calculated the extra costs borne by OTE on the basis of two alternative scenarios.
Zaradi celovitejšega pregleda je RCA International izračunala tudi dodatne stroške družbe OTE na podlagi dveh alternativnih scenarijev.
The first scenario is based on the higher OTE WACC discount rate (7,8 %).
Prvi scenarij temelji na višjem tehtanem povprečju stroškov kapitala družbe OTE (7,8 %).
Absence of labour-related or other advantages
Odsotnost z delom povezanih ugodnosti in drugih ugodnosti
On the basis of a study carried out by Prof. Levantis of the University of Athens, the Greek authorities stress that that OTE does not benefit from any labour-related advantage.
Na podlagi študije prof. Levantisa iz atenske univerze grški organi poudarjajo, da OTE nima nobenih koristi od z delom povezanih ugodnosti.
More particularly, the Greek authorities confirm that OTE is not exempted from payment of unemployment contributions [28].
Nadalje grški organi potrjujejo, da OTE ni oproščena plačila prispevkov za brezposelnost [28].
In any event, in connection with the Combus judgment, the Greek authorities argue that the existence of structural advantages was not part of the Court’s analysis, and neither were they part of the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of the aid granted by France to EDF.
V vsakem primeru grški organi, v povezavi s sodbo Combus, trdijo, da obstoj strukturnih ugodnosti ni bil del analize Sodišča in tudi ni bil del ocene Komisije glede skladnosti pomoči, ki jih je Francija odobrila družbi EDF.
With regard to advantages that OTE may derive from its former monopoly position, the Greek authorities recall that the fixed line market has been fully liberalised since 2001, and that OTE has been the subject of extensive ex ante regulation in accordance with the provisions of the applicable regulatory framework for electronic communications services and networks.
V zvezi z ugodnostmi, ki jih je družba OTE morda imela zaradi svojega nekdanjega monopolnega položaja, grški organi opominjajo, da je bil fiksni trg popolnoma liberaliziran leta 2001 in da je bila OTE predmet predhodne zakonske ureditve v skladu z določbami veljavnega regulativnega okvira za storitve in omrežja elektronskih komunikacij.
The remedies imposed on OTE by the national regulatory authority, the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT), in relation to the fixed markets have led to competitive entry from alternative operators and the subsequent loss of market share by OTE.
Pravna sredstva, ki so jih družbi OTE v zvezi s fiksnimi trgi naložili državni regulativni organi, Helenska komisija za telekomunikacije in pošto (EETT) so bila vzrok za konkurenčni vstop drugih operaterjev in posledično izgubo tržnega deleža družbe OTE.
The undertaking offered by the Greek authorities
Pravno zavezujoča obljuba grških organov
In their reply, the Greek authorities based their calculations on OTE’s share price at close of trading on 25 April 2006, namely EUR 17,98. Thus, on 25 April 2006, 4 % of the stock of OTE corresponded to a stock value of EUR 353 million. The value of the Greek State’s contribution to the VRS, as of 25 April 2006, was therefore 25 % lower than the amount of EUR 469,9 million that corresponds to the extra cost of the VRS.
V odgovoru so izračuni grških organov temeljili na ceni delnice OTE ob zaključku trgovanja 25. aprila 2006, to je 17,98 EUR. 25. aprila 2006 je 4-odstotni delež družbe OTE ustrezal vrednosti 353 milijonov EUR. Vrednost prispevka grške države k SPU z dne 25. aprila 2006 je bila zato 25 % nižja kot dodatni stroški SPU, kar znaša 469,9 milijona EUR.
However, given that the price of OTE shares is subject to fluctuation on the Athens Stock Exchange, if the total value of the 4 % of OTE’s stock exceeds the extra costs borne by OTE, Greece expressly undertakes to amend Article 74 of Law No 3371/2005, so as to limit the State’s financial contribution accordingly.
Glede na to, da je cena delnic družbe OTE predmet nihanja na atenski borzi, si Grčija izrecno prizadeva za spremembo člena 74 Zakona 3371/2005, na podlagi katerega se državni finančni prispevek ustrezno omeji, če celotna vrednost 4-odstotnega deleža delnic družbe OTE preseže vrednost dodatnih stroškov, ki jih krije družba OTE.
Reply to third-party comments
Odgovor na pripombe tretjih strank
The Greek authorities underline that in accordance with Article 34 of Greek Company Law No 2190/1920, the general meeting does not have the competence to adopt management decisions; such competence is vested in the board of directors (Article 9(d) of OTE’s statutes).
Grški organi poudarjajo, da v skladu s členom 24 grškega Zakona o podjetjih št. 2190/1920, generalna skupščina ni pristojna za sprejemanje vodstvenih odločitev, tako pristojnost ima nadzorni svet (člen 9(d) Statuta družbe OTE).
The VRS was thus discussed and decided by the company’s board of directors and later presented to institutional investors.
O SPU je zato razpravljal in se odločil nadzorni svet ter jo kasneje predstavil institucionalnim vlagateljem.
The Greek authorities argue that the comments made about the fact that every year the Greek State covers part of the deficit of TAP-OTE are based on an incorrect understanding of Greece’s social security system.
Grški organi trdijo, da pripombe glede dejstva, da grška država vsako leto krije del primanjkljaja TAP-OTE, temeljijo na neustreznem razumevanju grškega sistema socialne varnosti.
The Greek authorities reiterate that the main pension fund for OTE employees, TAP-OTE, is a separate legal entity, governed by public law, in the same way as all other pension funds in Greece.
Grški organi ponavljajo, da je glavni pokojninski sklad za zaposlene pri OTE, TAP-OTE, ločen pravni subjekt, ki ga ureja javno pravo, kot vse druge pokojninske sklade v Grčiji.
It has its own board of directors, administration, budget and finance departments.
Ima nadzorni svet, upravo, proračun in finančni oddelek.
Almost all existing pension funds are public law funds, and are independent from the companies in which the employees work, are self-governed and not profit-oriented.
Skoraj vse pokojninske sklade ureja javno pravo in so neodvisni od podjetij, kjer so delavci zaposleni, so samoupravljani in neprofitni.
Pension rights are vested rights under the Greek Constitution (Article 25).
Pokojninske pravice so dodeljene pravice po grški ustavi (člen 25).
The basic characteristics of the Greek social security system are its obligatory, public and universal character.
Za grški sistem socialne varnosti je značilno, da je obvezen, javen in splošen.
The Greek pension system is thus a ‘pay as you go’ system.
Za grški pokojninski sistem je zato značilno „sprotno prispevno kritje“.
Deficits of the various public law funds are not financed by the employers or the employees, but by the State, the latter being under the constitutional obligation to guarantee that all pensions are fully paid.
Primanjkljajev različnih skladov, ki jih ureja javno pravo, ne krijejo delodajalci ali zaposleni, ampak država, ki je po ustavi zavezana, da zagotovi celotno izplačilo pokojnin.
From 1994 until 2001, although a private law company under state control and totally independent from the public law pension fund TAP-OTE, OTE was mandated through ad hoc legislation and through collective labour agreements to cover the deficit of TAP-OTE, and thus to operate a kind of a social insurance arrangement on behalf of the State.
Od leta 1994 do leta 2001 je bila družba OTE, kljub temu, da je zasebno podjetje pod nadzorom države in da je popolnoma neodvisno od javnega pokojninskega sklada TAP-OTE, z ad hoc zakonodajo in s kolektivnimi sporazumi o delu pooblaščena, da pokrije primanjkljaj TAP-OTE in upravlja neke vrste sporazum o socialnem zavarovanju v imenu države.
OTE’s liability to cover such ad hoc deficits of TAP-OTE increased yet further its non-wage costs compared to its competitors and new entrants in the market and constituted a clear disadvantage for the company.
Obveznost družbe OTE, da pokrije take ad hoc primanjkljaje TAP-OTE, je še nadalje povečala neplačane stroške družbe v primerjavi s tekmeci in novimi člani na trgu in jo postavilo v prikrajšan položaj.
With regard to the alleged advantages that OTE derived from its former monopoly position, the Greek authorities emphasise that since 2001, the Greek telecommunications market has been fully liberalised and subject to the ex ante regulatory supervision of EETT, the national regulatory authority.
V zvezi z domnevnimi ugodnostmi, ki bi jih družba OTE naj imela zaradi nekdanjega monopolnega položaja, grški organi poudarjajo, da je od leta 2001 grški trg telekomunikacij popolnoma liberaliziran in predmet nadzora prejšnje ureditve s strani državnega regulativnega organa EETT.
The alleged abusive behaviour of OTE would have to be dealt with under the respective sector-specific rules of the new regulatory framework and the relevant directives thereof.
Domnevne zlorabe družbe OTE bi morale biti preučene v skladu z ustreznimi sektorskimi pravili in direktivami novega regulativnega okvira.
For the Greek authorities, compensatory measures that pertain to a fully liberalised market cannot be requested through a completely different avenue, i.e. the State aid assessment of state measures which are solely labour-related.
V skladu z grškimi organi kompenzacijskih ukrepov, ki se nanašajo na popolnoma liberaliziran trg, ni mogoče zahtevati po popolnoma drugi poti, tj. z oceno državnih ukrepov za državno pomoč, ki so povezani izključno z delom.
Finally, the Greek authorities reject as incorrect the third party’s allegation that OTE is exempt from the advertisement tax, whereas other companies in Greece are liable to pay it.
Končno, grški organi zavračajo obtožbe tretjih strank, da je OTE oproščena plačila davka na oglaševanje, medtem ko ga morajo druga podjetja v Grčiji plačati, kot netočne.
Although, according to Article 19(2) of Law No 1264/1982, public undertakings or utilities (like OTE) are exempt from the payment of the advertisement tax, a recent judgment by the Administrative Court of First Instance (Decision No 9564/2005) has interpreted the notions of ‘public service’ and ‘utilities’ in Law No 1264/1982 as meaning that not only OTE but every telecommunications operator is exempt from the advertising tax [29], irrespective of its status as a public or private company [30].
Kljub temu, da so v skladu s členom 19(2) Zakona št. 1264/1982 javna podjetja ali javne gospodarske družbe (kot OTE) oproščene plačila davka na oglaševanje, je nedavna sodba Upravnega sodišča prve stopnje (Odločba št. 9564/2005) pojasnila pojme, kot so „javne storitve“ in „javne gospodarske službe“ iz Zakona št. 1264/1982, na način, da so vsa telekomunikacijska podjetja, ne samo OTE, oproščena plačila davka na oglaševanje [29] ne glede na njihov status kot javno ali zasebno podjetje [30].
Existence of the aid
Obstoj pomoči
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty provides that any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, is incompatible with the common market.
Člen 87(1) Pogodbe ES določa, da je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica ali se dodeli s strani državnih sredstev v kakršni koli obliki, ki izkrivlja ali ogroža konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti nekaterim podjetjem, in če vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami, nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom.
The classification of a national measure as State aid presupposes that the following cumulative conditions are met: (a) the measure is granted by a Member State from state resources in whatever form; (b) the advantage is selective; and (c) the measure distorts or threatens to distort competition and is capable of affecting trade between Member States.
Opis nacionalnega ukrepa kot državne pomoči predpostavlja, da so izpolnjeni naslednji kumulativni pogoji: (a) država članica ukrep odobri iz državnih sredstev v kakršni koli obliki; (b) ugodnost je izbirna; in (c) ukrep izkrivlja ali obstaja možnost izkrivljanja konkurence in lahko vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami.
In the present case it is not disputed that to the extent that the State proposes to transfer to TAP-OTE 4 % of its shareholding in OTE as a contribution towards the overall costs of the company’s VRS, state resources are involved in the measure.
V zadevnem primeru, ko država predlaga prenos 4-odstotnega deleža svojih delnic v OTE na TAP-OTE kot prispevek k celotnim stroškom SPU družbe, ni sporno, da so v ukrep vključena državna sredstva.
The holding by the State of 4 % of OTE’s shares constitutes an asset with financial value.
4 % delnic v družbi OTE, ki so v lasti države, pomeni sredstva s finančno vrednostjo.
This asset is transferred without any compensation at the market price.
Ta sredstva se prenesejo brez nadomestila po tržni ceni.
As a result, the measure is a transfer of state resources.
Posledično zato ukrep pomeni prenos državnih sredstev.
Moreover, although the direct recipient of the aid is TAP-OTE — a public law pension fund which is part of the wider social security system of Greece — the real beneficiary of the measure is OTE, in that the company is relieved of part of its social security obligations resulting from the VRS in question.
Nadalje, kljub temu, da je neposredni dobitnik pomoči TAP-OTE – javni pokojninski sklad, ki je del širšega sistema socialne varnosti Grčije – je dejanski prejemnik ukrepa OTE, ker je družba oproščena dela svojih obveznosti za socialno varnost, ki izhajajo iz zadevne SPU.
No other company enjoys that particular advantage.
Nobeno drugo podjetje ni deležno take ugodnosti.
As a result, the measure is selective in nature.
Posledično je ukrep po naravi izbiren.
Neither is it contested that, OTE being a nationwide network operator engaged in the provision of electronic communications networks and services including the provision of international electronic communications services, any aid granted is capable of affecting trade between Member States.
Tudi dejstvo, da lahko vsaka dodeljena pomoč vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami, je neizpodbitno, glede na to, da ima družba OTE mrežo, ki po vsej državi zagotavlja storitve elektronskih komunikacijskih omrežij in storitve, ki vključujejo zagotavljanje mednarodnih elektronskih komunikacijskih omrežij.
However, as to the question whether this state contribution confers an advantage on OTE which distorts or threatens to distort competition, the Greek authorities have argued (a) that they have acted as a private investor, and (b) that the measure does not grant an advantage to OTE since it merely provides compensation for the structural disadvantages of the latter due to the de facto permanent employment status of its employees and the higher salary costs imposed on it by law during the pre-liberalisation period.
Glede vprašanja, če ta državni prispevek družbi OTE dodeljuje ugodnost, ki izkrivlja ali nakazuje možnost izkrivljanja konkurence, so grški organi trdili, da (a) so delovali kot zasebni vlagatelj in (b) da ukrep družbi OTE ne dodeljuje ugodnosti, ker samo zagotavlja nadomestilo za strukturne težave družbe, zaradi dejansko zaposlitvenega statusa stalno zaposlenih pri družbi in zaradi višjih stroškov plač po zakonu iz obdobja pred liberalizacijo.
Compliance with the private investor principle
Skladnost z načelom zasebnega vlagatelja
In line with the requirements arising from the case-law, in order to determine whether the Greek State’s financial contribution towards the costs of OTE’s VRS can be regarded as being in line with the behaviour of a private investor acting under normal market conditions, it is necessary to consider whether in similar circumstances a private investor of a size comparable to that of the State might have provided a similar financial contribution, namely the equivalent of 4 % of OTE’s shares [31].
Da bi se ugotovilo, ali je mogoče finančni prispevek grške države k stroškom SPU družbe OTE obravnavati kot usklajen z vedenjem zasebnega vlagatelja, ki deluje v običajnih tržnih pogojih, je treba v skladu z zahtevami iz sodne prakse preučiti, ali bi lahko zasebni vlagatelj, ki je podobne velikosti kot država, v podobnih okoliščinah zagotovil podoben finančni prispevek, tj. prispevek, enak 4-odstotnemu deležu OTE [31].
In that respect, a distinction must be drawn between the obligations which the State must assume as the owner of the share capital of a company and its obligations as a public authority [32].
V tem pogledu je treba ločiti med obveznostmi države kot lastnice osnovnega kapitala podjetja in obveznostmi, ki jih ima kot organ z javnimi pooblastili [32].
OTE being a public limited company, the Greek State as the majority owner of the share capital of the company would have been liable for the debts of the company only up to the liquidation value of its assets.
Glede na to, da je OTE delniška družba, bi bila grška država kot večinski lastnik osnovnega kapitala družbe odgovorna za dolgove družbe do likvidacijske vrednosti njenih sredstev.
Social security and other labour-law-related liabilities are normally for the company concerned to bear, not for its shareholders.
Obveznosti iz socialne varnosti in druge z delom povezane obveznosti mora kriti zadevno podjetje, ne njeni delničarji.
Furthermore, it should be stressed that OTE is not a company which is currently in a difficult financial situation or unable to meet on its own the financial liabilities of the VRS.
Nadalje je treba poudariti, da družba OTE trenutno ni v težki finančni situaciji in je sposobna sama izpolniti svoje finančne obveznosti do SPU.
Therefore, the obligations arising from the cost of the early retirement redundancies and the payments of any other associated employment benefits cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of applying the private investor principle [33].
Obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz stroškov, nastalih pri odpuščanju zaposlenih zaradi predčasnega upokojevanja, in plačil kakršnih koli drugih povezanih ugodnosti v zvezi z zaposlitvijo, se ne more upoštevati za namen uporabe načela zasebnega vlagatelja [33].
Moreover, no shareholder other than the Greek State has contributed to the extra costs of the restructuring plan of OTE, although the expected improved profitability of OTE should benefit all investors without distinction.
Nadalje, razen grške države k dodatnim stroškom načrta prestrukturiranja družbe OTE ni prispeval noben delničar, čeprav bi pričakovana izboljšana donosnost morala koristiti vsem vlagateljem brez razlikovanja.
In these circumstances, the behaviour of the Greek State was different from that of the other private investors in OTE.
V teh okoliščinah se je delovanje grške države razlikovalo od ravnanja drugih zasebnih vlagateljev v družbi OTE.
Even if the special position of the State as the largest shareholder might justify different behaviour, one would normally expect that where one of the shareholders of a company provides financial assistance without the other shareholders doing so in the same manner, such a shareholder would receive some sort of compensation by way of an increased stake in the company or suchlike.
Tudi če bi lahko poseben položaj države kot največjega delničarja opravičil drugačno ravnanje, bi bilo normalno pričakovati, da, kadar eden izmed delničarjev družbe zagotovi finančno pomoč in drugi delničarji tega ne storijo, bi ta delničar prejel neke vrste nadomestilo, na primer v obliki povečanega deleža v družbi ali podobno.
However, in the present case, the State receives no compensation in excess of that of all the other investors in the company.
Vendar v zadevnem primeru država ne prejme nobenega nadomestila, ki bi preseglo nadomestila drugih vlagateljev.