natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Decision 2006/769/EC should therefore be amended accordingly.
Odločbo 2006/769/ES je zato treba ustrezno spremeniti.
Decision 2006/769/EC is amended as follows:
Odločba 2006/769/ES se spremeni:
the following entries are inserted after the entry ‘BE353 Arr.
za vnosom „BE353 Arr.
Philippeville’:
Philippeville“ se vstavijo naslednji vnosi:
the following entries are inserted after the entry ‘PT184 Baixo Alentejo’:
za vnosom „PT184 Baixo Alentejo“ se vstavijo naslednji vnosi:
In Annex II, the list of areas under the heading ‘SOUTH EAST EUROPE’ is amended as follows:
V Prilogi II se seznam območij pod naslovom „JUGOVZHODNA EVROPA“ spremeni:
the following entries are inserted before the entry ‘GR11 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki’:
pred vnosom „GR11 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki“ se vstavijo naslednji vnosi:
the following entries are inserted after the entry ‘AT34 Vorarlberg’:
za vnosom „AT34 Vorarlberg“ se vstavijo naslednji vnosi:
OJ L 312, 11.11.2006, p. 47.
UL L 312, 11.11.2006, str. 47.
amending Decision 2006/594/EC fixing an indicative allocation by Member State of the commitment appropriations for the Convergence Objective for the period 2007 to 2013 as concerns Bulgaria and Romania
o spremembi Odločbe 2006/594/ES o določitvi okvirne dodelitve odobritev za prevzem obveznosti po državah članicah za konvergenčni cilj za obdobje 2007–2013 v zvezi z Bolgarijo in Romunijo
(notified under document number C(2007) 1290)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2007) 1290)
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions for the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [1], and in particular Article 18(2) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1083/2006 z dne 11. julija 2006 o splošnih določbah o Evropskem skladu za regionalni razvoj, Evropskem socialnem skladu in Kohezijskem skladu in razveljavitvi Uredbe (ES) št. 1260/1999 [1] in zlasti člena 18(2) Uredbe,
By Decision 2006/594/EC [2], the Commission fixed an indicative allocation by Member State of the commitment appropriations for the Convergence Objective for the period 2007 to 2013.
Z Odločbo 2006/594/ES [2] je Komisija določila okvirno dodelitev odobritev za prevzem obveznosti po državah članicah za konvergenčni cilj za obdobje 2007–2013.
Following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the indicative amounts of the commitment appropriations for the regions eligible to benefit from Structural Funds under the Convergence Objective, should be fixed for those Member States.
Po pristopu Bolgarije in Romunije je treba za ti dve državi določiti okvirne zneske odobritev za prevzem obveznosti za regije, upravičene do sredstev iz strukturnih skladov na podlagi konvergenčnega cilja.
Decision 2006/594/EC should therefore be amended accordingly.
Odločbo 2006/594/ES je zato treba ustrezno spremeniti.
For reasons of clarity and legal certainty, this Decision should apply from the date of accession of Bulgaria and Romania,
Zaradi jasnosti in pravne varnosti bi se morala ta odločba uporabljati od dne pristopa Bolgarije in Romunije –
Decision 2006/594/EC is amended as follows:
Odločba 2006/594/ES se spremeni:
OJ L 243, 6.9.2006, p. 37.
UL L 243, 6.9.2006, str. 37.
Indicative allocation by Member State of the commitment appropriations for the regions eligible for funding from the Structural Funds under the Convergence Objective for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013
Okvirna dodelitev odobritev za prevzem obveznosti po državah članicah za regije, upravičene do financiranja iz strukturnih skladov na podlagi konvergenčnega cilja za obdobje od 1. januarja 2007 do 31. decembra 2013
Regions eligible under the Convergence Objective
Regije, upravičene na podlagi konvergenčnega cilja
Indicative allocation by Member State of the commitment appropriations for the Member States eligible for funding from the Cohesion Fund under the Convergence Objective for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013
Okvirna dodelitev odobritev za prevzem obveznosti po državah članicah za države članice, upravičene do financiranja iz Kohezijskega sklada na podlagi konvergenčnega cilja za obdobje od 1. januarja 2007 do 31. decembra 2013
Additional funding referred to in Annex II of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 under paragraph 24
Dodatno financiranje iz Priloge II k Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 1083/2006 v skladu z odstavkom 24
(Case COMP/M.3916 — T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring)
(Zadeva št. COMP/M.3916 – T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring)
(notified under document number C(2006) 1695)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2006) 1695)
On 26 April 2006 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [1], and in particular Article 8(2) of that Regulation.
Komisija je 26. aprila 2006 na podlagi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 z dne 20. januarja 2004 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij [1] in zlasti člena 8(2) Uredbe sprejela odločbo glede združitve.
A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case and in the working languages of the Commission on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.htmlSUMMARY OF THE DECISION
Različica celotne določbe, ki ni zaupna, je na voljo v verodostojnem jeziku zadeve in v delovnih jezikih Komisije na spletni strani Generalnega direktorata za konkurenco, na naslednjem naslovu: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.htmlPOVZETEK ODLOČBE
This case concerns a proposed operation pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the Merger Regulation), whereby the undertaking T-Mobile Austria GmbH (T-Mobile, Austria), part of the German group Deutsche Telekom AG (Deutsche Telekom), acquires, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation, control of the whole of the undertaking tele.ring Unternehmensgruppe (tele.ring, Austria).
V tej zadevi gre za predlog transakcije v skladu s členom 4 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 („Uredbe o združitvah“), s katerim podjetje T-Mobile Austria GmbH („T-Mobile“, Avstrija), del nemške skupine Deutsche Telekom AG („Deutsche Telekom“), dobi v smislu člena 3(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta nadzor nad celotno skupino tele.ring Unternehmensgruppe („tele.ring“, Avstrija).
T-Mobile and tele.ring operate mobile networks in Austria and are also active on related end-customer and wholesale markets.
T-Mobile in tele.ring sta operaterja mobilnih omrežij v Avstriji, dejavna pa sta tudi na s tem povezanem trgu končnih uporabnikov in grosističnem trgu.
The proposed transaction involves T-Mobile acquiring all the shares in tele.ring.
Predlagana transakcija pomeni, da bi podjetje T-Mobile pridobilo vse delnice skupine tele.ring.
The market investigation has revealed that in the Austrian market for the provision of mobile telecommunication services to end customers the concentration would raise serious impediment to effective competition mainly through unilateral effects.
Raziskava trga je pokazala, da bi bila koncentracija na avstrijskem trgu za zagotavljanje storitev mobilne telefonije končnim uporabnikom velika ovira za učinkovitost konkurence, predvsem z enostranskimi učinki.
The undertakings proposed by the parties, however, are suitable to remove the competition concerns.
Vendar so predlogi strank ustrezni za odpravo pomislekov glede konkurence.
The relevant product markets
Upoštevni proizvodni trgi
The market investigation to define the relevant product markets confirmed that as to the market for the provision of mobile telecommunication services to end customers that there is a single market for the provision of such services to end customers and that no further distinction needs to be made, for instance by customer type, voice telephony and data services, 2G and 3G networks.
Tržna raziskava, ki naj bi opredelila upoštevne proizvodne trge, je v zvezi s trgom za zagotavljanje storitev mobilne telefonije končnim uporabnikom potrdila, da obstaja enotni trg za zagotavljanje takšnih storitev končnim uporabnikom in da ga ni treba dodatno razločevati, na primer glede na vrsto uporabnika, glasovno telefonijo in podatkovne storitve, omrežja 2G in 3G.
As to the wholesale of termination services, the network of each operator represents its own single market, as viewed by the Commission in previous decisions and reflected in the Commission’s Recommendation 2003/311/EC [2] on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector.
Pri grosističnih storitvah zaključevanja klicev pa omrežje posameznega operaterja pomeni lastni enotni trg, kar je v skladu z mnenjem Komisije v prejšnjih določbah in priporočilom Komisije 2003/311/ES o upoštevnih proizvodnih trgih in trgih storitev v sektorju elektronskih komunikacij [2].
With respect to wholesale international roaming services, both companies offer their customers international roaming services and hence they have concluded international roaming agreements with foreign mobile telephony operators.
V zvezi z grosističnimi storitvami mednarodnega gostovanja obe podjetji svojim uporabnikom ponujata storitve mednarodnega gostovanja in sta zato sklenili pogodbe o mednarodnem gostovanju s tujimi operaterji mobilne telefonije.
The different Austrian mobile telephony networks are in competition with each other for both inbound and outbound traffic.
Različna avstrijska mobilna omrežja med seboj tekmujejo za promet z dohodnimi in odhodnimi klici.
The relevant geographic markets
Upoštevni geografski trgi
The market investigation to define the relevant geographic markets confirmed that the geographic scope with respect to the provision of mobile telecommunication services to end customers, likewise the wholesale of termination services and the wholesale of international roaming services is national, i.e. limited to Austria.
Tržna raziskava, ki naj bi opredelila upoštevne geografske trge, je v zvezi z zagotavljanjem storitev mobilne telefonije končnim uporabnikom ter grosističnimi storitvami zaključevanja klicev in grosističnimi storitvami mednarodnega gostovanja potrdila, da je geografski obseg nacionalen, tj. omejen na Avstrijo.
Affected markets and competition analysis
Prizadeti trgi in analiza konkurence
The notified concentration affects the market for the provision of mobile telecommunication services to end customers, on which four companies currently operate mobile telephony networks based on 2G/GSM and 3G/UMTS technology and one company, Hutchison (H3G), only on 3G/UMTS technology.
Priglašena koncentracija zadeva trg za zagotavljanje storitev mobilne telefonije končnim uporabnikom, na katerem trenutno delujejo štirje operaterji mobilnih omrežij, ki uporabljajo tehnologijo 2G/GSM in 3G/UMTS, ter en operater, Hutchison („H3G“), ki uporablja le tehnologijo 3G/UMTS.
The five network operators offer their customers a wide range of services.
Teh pet omrežnih operaterjev svojim uporabnikom ponuja veliko izbiro storitev.
Post-transaction, the new entity T-Mobile/tele.ring would increase their market share to a level (about [30–40] [3] % [4] depending on turnover or customers) similar to the incumbent Mobilkom, leaving the other two companies number three and four (with a market share of around [10–20] * % for ONE and [0–10] * % for H3G respectively).
Po transakciji bi se tržni delež novega subjekta T-Mobile/tele.ring povečal na raven (okoli [30–40] [3] %, odvisno od prometa ali uporabnikov), podobno sedanji Mobilkomovi [4], kar bi pomenilo, da preostalima dvema podjetjema ostaneta tretje in četrto mesto (s tržnim deležem okoli [10–20] * % za ONE in [0–10] * % za H3G).
Independent service providers play a negligible role in the Austrian market.
Vloga neodvisnih ponudnikov storitev je na avstrijskem trgu zanemarljiva.
Also YESSS!, the discount brand of ONE, has only a very limited market share and cannot be considered as competing on the same level as the other operators since it offers only a limited range of services.
Tudi YESSS!, cenena blagovna znamka ONE, ima zelo majhen tržni delež in se ne more šteti za konkurenčno na enaki ravni kakor drugi operaterji, saj ponuja zelo omejeno izbiro storitev.
The proposed transaction would give rise to non-coordinated effects, even though T-Mobile would not become the largest player after the merger.
Predlagana transakcija bi imela neusklajene učinke, čeprav T-Mobile po združitvi ne bi postal največji operater.
From the analysis of the market shares it can be concluded that, for the last three years, tele.ring has played by far the most active role on the market in practising successfully a price aggressive strategy.
Iz analize tržnega deleža sledi, da je bil tele.ring zadnja tri leta na trgu daleč najbolj dejaven pri uspešnem izvajanju udarne cenovne strategije.
It has thereby increased its market share substantially while the market shares of the other operators have been largely flat or even slightly decreasing.
Svoj tržni delež je zato občutno povečal, tržni deleži preostalih operaterjev pa so v glavnem ostali enaki ali so se celo rahlo zmanjševali.
Calculation of the HHI revealed that the level of concentration is already high and it would significantly increase post-transaction.
Izračun indeksa HHI je pokazal, da je raven koncentracije že visoka in bi se po transakciji zelo povečala.
While T-Mobile argues for cost efficiencies, the Parties were unable to demonstrate that these would be for the benefit of consumers.
Čeprav T-Mobile zagovarja stroškovno učinkovitost, pa stranki nista mogli dokazati, da bi bila ta v korist uporabnikov.
Analysing the switching rates, it was found that half of all switching customers switched to tele.ring and furthermore much more than half of the customers who left T-Mobile and Mobilkom switched to tele.ring.
Analiza sprememb operaterja je pokazala, da je od vseh uporabnikov, ki so zamenjali operaterja, polovica prešla k tele.ringu, pri čemer je precej več kakor polovica tistih uporabnikov, ki so zapustili T-Mobile in Mobilkom, prešla k tele.ringu.
This analysis confirms that tele.ring has exerted significant competitive pressure on both large operators.
Ta analiza potrjuje, da je tele.ring izvajal velik konkurenčni pritisk na oba velika operaterja.
An analysis of the average per-minute price on the basis of all the tariffs applied by the various network operators, using data from the Austrian regulator and the consumer association AK Wien, has shown that tele.ring has been the most active player in the market.
Analiza povprečne cene na minuto na podlagi cen različnih omrežnih operaterjev, pri kateri so bili uporabljeni podatki avstrijskega regulatorja in zveze potrošnikov AK Wien, je pokazala, da je bil na trgu najbolj dejaven tele.ring.
Its prices were among the lowest thereby exercising competitive pressure on T-Mobile and Mobilkom in particular […] *.
Njegove cene so bile med najnižjimi, kar je pomenilo konkurenčni pritisk zlasti na T-Mobile in Mobilkom […] *.
closely followed the pricing of tele.ring, whereas ONE as third player in the market was rather matching with the larger players T-Mobile and Mobilkom.
je s cenami tesno sledil tele.ringu, medtem ko je ONE kot tretji pomembni subjekt na trgu imel precej podobne cene kakor največja tržna subjekta T-Mobile in Mobilkom.
In general terms, the incentive for an operator to attract new customers to an existing network by making aggressive price offers is determined by the size of its customer base.
Na splošno je velikost mreže uporabnikov pomembna za odločitev operaterja, da z udarnimi cenovnimi ponudbami pritegne nove uporabnike k sedanjemu omrežju.
In its decision whether or not to price aggressively any operator has to balance the expected gains by additional revenues from new customers attracted by lower tariffs against the risk of a decreasing profitability of its existing customers to whom the price reduction cannot be refused, at least in the medium and long term.
Pri svoji odločitvi za udarne cene ali proti njim mora vsak operater uravnotežiti pričakovane prejemke, dosežene z dodatnimi prihodki od novih uporabnikov, ki so jih pritegnile nižje cene, s tveganjem zniževanja donosnosti pri njihovih trenutnih uporabnikih, katerim se ne morejo odreči nižje cene, vsaj srednje- in dolgoročno ne.
Generally speaking, that risk of a loss of profitability is all the higher the larger the existing customer base of an operator is.
Na splošno je tveganje zaradi manjše donosnosti tem večje, čim večja je mreža trenutnih uporabnikov, ki jih ima operater.
Consequently, tele.ring has started with a small customer base that it had to increase through an aggressive pricing policy to gain the necessary numbers.
Posledično je tele.ring začel z majhno mrežo uporabnikov, ki jo je bilo treba povečati z udarno cenovno politiko, s katero bi pridobil potrebno število.
By contrast, neither Mobilkom nor T-Mobile has made any such move in the past by making particularly aggressive offers.
Nasprotno pa nista niti Mobilkom niti T-Mobile v preteklosti imela posebno udarne ponudbe.
A further factor affecting prices is network structure and network capacity.
Nadaljnji dejavnik, ki vpliva na cene, je struktura in zmogljivost omrežja.
While no major differences in the nationwide network coverage exist for Mobilkom, T-Mobile, ONE and tele.ring, however, difference emerges in relation to H3G, whose network currently only covers around 50 % of the Austrian population.
Medtem ko pri nacionalnem dosegu omrežja operaterjev Mobilkom, T-Mobile, ONE in tele.ring ni večjih razlik, se razlike pojavljajo v zvezi z operaterjem H3G, katerega omrežje trenutno zajema okoli 50 % prebivalcev Avstrije.
To cover the remainder, H3G depends on a national roaming agreement with Mobilkom.
Ali bo H3G lahko zajel še preostanek, je odvisno od pogodbe o nacionalnem gostovanju z Mobilkomom.
Hence, H3G cannot achieve economies of scale outside its own network, and this has consequently implications on its current pricing.
Zato H3G ne more doseči ekonomije obsega zunaj svojega omrežja, to pa posledično vpliva na njegove sedanje cene.
Post-transaction, T-Mobile intends to make […] * of tele.ring’s sites and […] *.
Po transakciji namerava T-Mobile vzpostaviti […] * mest tele.ringa in […] *.
The transaction therefore would not only […] *, but a benchmark analysis has shown that […] *.
Zato transakcija ne bi le […] *, vendar je primerjalna analiza pokazala, da […] *.
Nevertheless, […] * in available capacity might have a negative impact on competition.
Vseeno pa lahko […] * razpoložljive zmogljivosti negativno vpliva na konkurenco.
However, none of the remaining competitors appeared to be in a position to take over tele.ring’s role after the merger.
Vendar nihče od preostalih konkurentov ni bil zmožen, da bi po združitvi prevzel vlogo tele.ringa.
could until now not be regarded as a fully-fledged network operator since it has only limited network coverage and it depends on the national roaming agreement with Mobilkom.
Doslej se omrežnega operaterja H3G ni moglo šteti za popolnoma razvitega, saj ima njegovo omrežje le manjši doseg in je odvisen od pogodbe o nacionalnem gostovanju z Mobilkomom.
Furthermore, the company is restricted by the limited 3G/UMTS frequency spectrum currently available to it.
Nadalje podjetje ovira omejen razpon frekvenc 3G/UMTS, ki so trenutno na voljo.
ONE has with its main brand so far no track record for aggressive pricing.
Doslej ONE s svojo glavno blagovno znamko še ni imel udarne cenovne politike.
Recently it has launched its discount brand YESSS! which offers lower tariffs but only a limited range of mobile telephony services and can therefore not be considered as competing on the same level as the other operators.
Pred kratkim je uvedel svojo ceneno blagovno znamko YESSS!, ki sicer ponuja nižje cene, vendar ima le omejeno izbiro storitev mobilne telefonije, in se zato ne more šteti za konkurenčno na enaki ravni kakor drugi operaterji.
While the parties claim that tele.ring’s strategy of aggressive pricing would come to an end soon, relevant internal documents from tele.ring indicate […] *.
Čeprav stranki trdita, da bo tele.ringove strategije udarnih cen kmalu konec, pa ustrezni notranji dokumenti iz tele.ringa pokažejo […] *.
In their replies to the SO the parties further argue that […] *.
V svojih odgovorih na obvestilo o nasprotovanju stranki nadalje trdita, da […] *.
However, […] * have had no effect on tele.ring’s price aggressive offers.
Vendar […] * ni imelo nobenega vpliva na tele.ringove udarne ponudbe glede cen.
In the wholesale market for call termination, the proposed transaction would not lead to competition concerns, neither at horizontal nor at vertical level.
Na grosističnem trgu zaključevanja klicev predlagana transakcija ne bi vzbujala pomislekov glede konkurence, niti na horizontalni niti na vertikalni ravni.
There is no overlap since each network constitutes a separate market and there is no risk of input foreclosure, in particular as the pricing of these services is regulated by the Austrian regulator and their price glides on a downward path reaching a bottom line in 2009 applicable to all operators.
Prekrivanja ni, saj je vsako omrežje ločen trg in ni tveganja za vnaprejšnjo izključitev dostopa, zlasti ker cene teh storitev uravnava avstrijski regulator, njihove cene pa drsijo navzdol in bodo leta 2009 dosegle spodnjo mejo, ki bo veljala za vse operaterje.
With respect to the wholesale of international roaming, no competition concern would arise from the proposed transaction since the parties but also their competitors have concluded multiple international roaming agreements that serve their customers in the provision of outbound and inbound traffic.
V zvezi z grosističnimi storitvami mednarodnega gostovanja ni pomislekov glede konkurence zaradi predlagane transakcije, saj so stranki in njuni konkurenti sklenili večstranske pogodbe o mednarodnem gostovanju, ki se uporabljajo pri zagotavljanju dohodnih in odhodnih klicev njihovim uporabnikom.
Although pre-selection of roaming partners appears to happen, none of the Austrian network operators have reached a substantial position in international roaming in Austria.
Čeprav se pri gostovanju zdi, da obstaja predizbira partnerjev, nihče od avstrijskih omrežnih operaterjev ni dosegel večjega deleža pri mednarodnem gostovanju v Avstriji.
It therefore can be concluded that the proposed concentration in its notified form is likely to lead to a significant impediment of effective competition in the Austrian market for the provision of mobile telecommunication services to end customers.
Da se sklepati, da bi bila verjetno predlagana koncentracija, kakor je bila priglašena, velika ovira za učinkovitost konkurence na avstrijskem trgu za zagotavljanje storitev mobilne telefonije končnim uporabnikom.
Commitments offered by the Parties
Zaveze, ki so jih dale stranke
In order to address the aforementioned competition concerns in the market for the provision of mobile telecommunication services to end customers, the Parties have submitted the undertakings described below.
Za odpravo zgoraj navedenih pomislekov glede konkurence na trgu za zagotavljanje storitev mobilne telefonije končnim uporabnikom sta se stranki zavezali, da bosta ukrepali, kakor je navedeno spodaj.
In summary, the commitments provide that T-Mobile sells two 5 MHz 3G/UMTS frequency blocks, which are currently licensed to tele.ring, to competitors with smaller market shares, subject to approval by the Austrian Regulator and the Commission.
Na kratko, zavezujeta se, da bo T-Mobile prodal dva frekvenčna bloka 5 MHz 3G/UMTS, za katera ima trenutno licenco tele.ring, konkurenci z manjšim tržnim deležem, kar morata potrditi avstrijski regulator in Komisija.
At least one frequency package will go to H3G [5].
Vsaj en sveženj frekvenc bo šel H3G [5].
Furthermore, T-Mobile will dispose of a large number of tele.ring’s mobile communication sites, while only approximately [10–20] * % of tele.ring’s sites will remain within T-Mobile for the integration of the tele.ring customers.
Poleg tega bo T-Mobile dal na razpolago večje število tele.ringovih mest mobilne telefonije, pri tem pa bo le približno [10–20] * % tele.ringovih mest ostalo znotraj T-Mobila za vključitev uporabnikov tele.ringa.