natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Based on its review of the record evidence, the Commission does not believe that the net benefit to Hynix of the full debt-to-equity swap is diminished as a result of the issuance of new shares.
Na podlagi pregleda razpoložljivih dokazov Komisija meni, da se neto ugodnost Hynixa, dodeljena na podlagi celotne zamenjave v lastniške deleže, zaradi izdajanja novih delnic ni zmanjšala.
In this regard, the Commission believes it is essential to recognise the impact that the debt-to-equity swap had on Hynix's financial situation.
Glede na to Komisija meni, da je bistvenega pomena priznati učinek, ki ga je imela zamenjava terjatev v lastniške deleže na finančno stanje Hynixa.
The fundamental benefit to Hynix resulted from the massive amount of debt that was extinguished as a result of the swap, namely KRW 1861,5 billion.
Temeljna ugodnost, ki je bila dodeljena Hynixu, je izbris ogromnega zneska dolga, do katerega je prišlo na podlagi te zamenjave, namreč 1861,5 milijarde KRW.
This absolved Hynix from having to repay any of this principal amount and from having to pay interest.
S tem je bil Hynix oproščen vseh odplačil tega osnovnega zneska in plačil obresti.
Instead, this massive amount of debt was replaced with shares issued to the creditor banks.
Namesto tega so ogromen znesek dolga nadomestile lastniške delnice, izdane za banke upnice.
While the existing share value was diluted as a result of the issuance, this had absolutely no balance sheet impact for Hynix.
Zaradi izdajanja novih delnic je sicer prišlo do razvodenitve obstoječih delnic, vendar to ni imelo nikakršnega vpliva na bilanco družbe Hynix.
It did not result in any cash outlays (apart from the expense associated with the issuance of the new shares) and did not obligate Hynix to make any kind of cash payments in the future, as would have been the case with debt instruments.
Ni povzročilo nikakršnih gotovinskih odhodkov (razen stroškov, povezanih z izdajanjem novih delnic) in Hynixa ni obvezalo kakršnih koli gotovinskih plačil v prihodnosti, do česar bi sicer prišlo v primeru dolžniških instrumentov.
The company claimed that the market value of the shares has to be deducted from any finding of benefit and cited the Commission's Guidelines for the Calculation of Subsidy in Countervailing Duty Investigations, which provide, in paragraph E(f)(iii), that ‘if the government buys shares in a company and pays above the market price for these shares (taking into account of any other factors which may have influenced a private investor), the amount of subsidy is the difference between the two prices (emphasis added)’.
Družba je trdila, da je treba tržni delež delnic odšteti od ugotovljenih ugodnosti in citirala Smernice Komisije za izračun višine subvencij v preiskavah v zvezi z izravnalnimi dajatvami, kjer je v odstavku E(f)(iii) navedeno: „če vlada kupi delnice družbe in plača zanje višjo ceno od tržne cene (ob upoštevanju katerih koli dejavnikov, ki bi lahko vplivali na zasebnega vlagatelja), je znesek subvencije razlika med dvema cenama“ (poudarek dodan).
However, a private investor would not have purchased Hynix shares in the relevant period at all.
Vendar pa naj zasebni vlagatelj v zadevnem obdobju Hynixovih delnic sploh ne bi kupoval.
In fact, evidence on the record shows that Hynix's shares were trading at such a low level that they should have been suspended, but for an exception to the Korean Listing Regulations which appeared to have been carved out for Hynix alone.
Dejansko zabeleženi dokazi kažejo, da so se Hynixove delnice prodajale po tako nizki ceni, da bi moralo biti trgovanje prekinjeno, če ne bi bilo izjeme o ustreznih korejskih borznih predpisih (Korean Listing Regulations), ki so se zdeli kot izdelani le za Hynix.
Further, the fact that there was a market value attached to the shares does not impact on the company, which does not have to pay it.
Nadalje dejstvo, da je bila delnici pripisana tržna vrednost, ni vplivalo na družbo, zato ji je ni bilo treba plačati.
This would only be a relevant consideration if there was an element in the debt-to-equity swap which obliged Hynix to enter into a share buy-back.
To bi bilo pomembno le, če bi zamenjava terjatev v lastniške deleže vsebovala element, po katerem bi Hynix moral ponovno odkupiti lastne delnice.
Consequently, in light of the above considerations and since Hynix did not report any costs associated with the issuance of equity, it is considered that the appropriate approach to measuring the benefit from the debt-to-equity swap is to take the full amount of the swap.
Ob upoštevanju vseh zgoraj navedenih dejstev ter glede na to, da Hynix ni poročal o kakršnih koli stroških v zvezi z izdajanjem lastniških deležev, je upoštevanje celotnega zneska zamenjave pri določanju višine ugodnosti v okviru zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže pravilen pristop.
Final calculation of benefit
Končni izračun ugodnosti
As explained in recital 61, the full amount of the debt-to-equity swap has been taken as the benefit accruing to Hynix from that measure.
Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 61, se je celoten znesek zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže obravnaval kot ugodnost, ki jo je Hynix imel od navedenega ukrepa.
This subsidy confers a large, non-recurring benefit as, as described above, the allocation method over a period of five years was considered appropriate.
S to subvencijo je dodeljena neponavljajoča se ugodnost, zato se metodologija razporeditve na obdobje petih let, kot je opisano zgoraj, šteje za ustrezno.
The amount of subsidy so allocated was expressed as a percentage of the total sales of Hynix in 2005.
Tako razdeljen znesek subvencije je bil izražen kot odstotek Hynixove celotne prodaje leta 2005.
With interest, using the average commercial interest rates applicable in Korea for the review investigation period, the countervailable subsidy is 6,8 %.
Subvencija, proti kateri se lahko sprejmejo izravnalni ukrepi, je skupaj z obrestmi, ob uporabi komercialne obrestne mere, veljavne v Koreji, v obdobju preiskave v zvezi s pregledom, znašala 6,8 %.
However, as the debt-to-equity swap is a one-off, non-recurring subsidy, allocated over a set period of time and as such allocation period is deemed to begin at the time the benefit was actually received, it is considered it expired on 31 December 2007.
Ker pa je zamenjava terjatev v lastniške deleže enkratna, neponavljajoča se subvencija, razdeljena po določenem obdobju in ker se izhaja iz tega, da se je to obdobje začelo z dnem, ko je bila ugodnost dejansko odobrena, se šteje, da so ukrepi, ki so bili uvedeni z dokončno uredbo 31. decembra 2007, prenehali veljati.
As mentioned in recital 50, the debt-rollover and the principalised interest were treated as loans and are considered to be a recurring subsidy.
Kot je omenjeno v uvodni izjavi 50, sta se prenos dolga in pretvorba obresti v glavnico štela kot posojili in se štejeta kot ponavljajoča se subvencija.
The company argued that it has repaid the subsidy received in the December 2002 restructuring when it refinanced its debt in July 2005 to a consortium of Korean and non-Korean banks (see recitals 75 and 76).
Družba je trdila, da je povrnila subvencije, ki jih je prejela decembra 2002 v okviru prestrukturiranja, ko je julija 2005 refinancirala svoj dolg konzorciju korejskih in nekorejskih bank (glej uvodni izjavi 75 in 76).
Hynix claims that the refinancing, by which it assumed new debt in order to pay the debt under the new restructuring and graduate from the CRPA, extinguished the subsidy.
Hynix je trdil, da je refinanciranje, v okviru katerega je predviden nov dolg za plačilo dolga v okviru novega prestrukturiranja in ne več v okviru CRPA, izbrisalo subvencije.
When the refinancing took place in 2005, Hynix had returned to profit and had a credit rating of BBB+ according to the Korea Investors Service Inc. The refinancing of its debt on commercial terms by Hynix effectively stopped the subsidy from recurring, thus the benefit ceased to exist.
Ko je leta 2005 potekalo refinanciranje, se je Hynix vrnil v cono dobička, njegova bonitetna ocena je bila BBB+ v skladu s Korea Investors Service Inc. Refinanciranje Hynixovega dolga v skladu s komercialnimi pogoji je učinkovito prekinilo ponavljajoče se subvencije, zato je ugodnost prenehala.
As a result, it is considered that from 13 July 2005 the debt-rollover and the principalised interest ceased to confer a benefit to Hynix.
Zato se šteje, da je Hynixova ugodnost od prenosa dolga in pretvorbe obresti v glavnico od 13. julija 2005 dalje prenehala.
Other alleged subsidy schemes
Druge domnevne sheme subvencioniranja
The BOE-Hydis sale
Prodaja Beijing Orient Electronics („BOE“)-Hydis
In January 2003, Hynix sold its liquid crystal display business (Hydis) to Beijing Orient Electronics Technology Group Co. Limited (BOE), a Chinese company, for approximately USD 380 million.
Januarja 2003 je Hynix prodal svoje posle v zvezi z zaslonom na tekoče kristale kitajski družbi Beijing Orient Electronics Technology Group Co. Limited („BOE“), za približno 380 milijonov USD.
The purchase price was funded to a large degree by loans provided by Hynix creditor banks, namely, KEB, KDB, Woori Bank and Hyundai Marine and Fire Insurance (HMFI), which collectively lent USD 188 million to the new company formed to buy the assets, BOE-Hydis.
Nakupna cena se je v veliki meri financirala s posojili Hynixovih bank upnic, in sicer KEB, KDB, Woori Bank in Hyundai Marine and Fire Insurance („HMFI“), ki so novi družbi, ustanovljeni za nakup sredstev BOE-Hydis, zagotovili posojila v višini 188 milijonov.
The Community industry alleged that the GOK entrusted and directed the Korean banks to provide funding on preferential terms in order to enable BOE to purchase the assets, thus providing a much-needed cash injection to Hynix.
Industrija Skupnosti je domnevala, da je vlada Republike Koreje pooblastila ali naročila korejskim bankam, naj zagotovijo finančna sredstva po ugodnejših pogojih, da se BOE omogoči nakup sredstev ter tako Hynixu omogoči tako zelo potrebno gotovinsko injekcijo.
Although there was some evidence that pressure was exerted on to some of the other lenders by KEB and Hynix and that BOE was not able to attract financing from independent creditors, there was no evidence that the funding provided was, in fact, a countervailable subsidy.
Čeprav je bilo nekaj dokazov, da se je na nekatere druge posojilodajalce izvajal pritisk s strani KEB in Hynixa ter da BOE za financiranje ni mogel pridobiti neodvisnih upnikov, ni bilo dokazov, da je zagotovljeno financiranje dejansko pomenilo subvencijo, proti kateri se lahko uvedejo izravnalni ukrepi.
A finding of entrustment and/or direction of the Korean banks by the GOK is not enough; in order to find a countervailable subsidy in the circumstances described by the Community industry, it must be shown that BOE was itself entrusted and directed by the GOK to purchase Hydis.
Ugotovitev o pooblastilu ali navodilih vlade Republike Koreje korejskim bankam ni dovolj, da se v okoliščinah, ki jih je opisala industrija Skupnosti, ugotovi subvencija, proti kateri se lahko uvedejo izravnalni ukrepi, dokazati je treba, da je vlada Republike Koreje dala pooblastila ali navodila za nakup Hydisa.
Even though the terms of the funding provided by the Korean banks were generous, BOE still assumed a debt of USD 188 million and paid the remainder of the purchase price in cash; there is no evidence of entrustment/direction by the GOK of BOE.
Čeprav so bili pogoji financiranja, ki so ga zagotovile korejske banke, velikodušni, je BOE še vedno dolgoval 188 milijonov USD in je plačal ostanek nakupne cene v gotovini, ni pa dokazov za to, da bi vlada Republike Koreje dala BOE navodila/pooblastila.
In any event, the funding was given to BOE-Hydis, and no evidence has been presented that a benefit passed though to Hynix.
Vsekakor je BOE-Hydis prejel finančna sredstva, dokazi, da je Hynix prejel ugodnosti, pa niso bili predloženi.
Therefore, the loans of USD 188 million given to BOE-Hydis by Korean banks are not considered to constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article 2 of the basic Regulation.
Zato se posojila korejskih bank BOE v višini 188 milijonov USD ne štejejo kot subvencija v smislu člena 2 osnovne uredbe.
The System IC Sale
Prodaja System IC
As envisaged by the terms of the new restructuring, in October 2004 Hynix sold its System IC assets to a consortium led by CVC Partners, a private equity fund managed by Citigroup Venture Capital for KRW 954,3 billion.
Kot je bilo predvideno v pogojih novega prestrukturiranja, je Hynix oktobra 2004 svoja sredstva System IC prodal za 954,3 milijarde KRW konzorciju, ki ga je vodil CVC Partners, zasebni delniški sklad, ki ga je upravljal Citigroup Venture Capital.
Acquisition financing made up KRW 481,3 billion of the purchase price and it mostly took the form of a debt transfer from Hynix to MagnaChip, the company formed to buy the System IC assets.
Financiranje nakupa je znašalo 481,3 milijarde KRW nakupne cene in je bilo v glavnem v obliki prenosa dolga iz Hynixa v MagnaChip, družbe, ki je bila ustanovljena zaradi nakupa sredstev System IC.
Hynix creditors transferred their unsecured Hynix debts to MagnaChip at a 21 % discount rate, but secured debts were assumed by the new company without any concession.
Hynixovi upniki so Hynixov nezavarovan dolg prenesli na MagnaChip z 21-odstotnim popustom, medtem ko je nova družba zavarovane dolgove prevzela brez popusta.
The Community industry alleged that the discounted debt transfer amounted to a countervailable subsidy.
Industrija Skupnosti je domnevala, da je prenos znižanega dolga predstavljal subvencijo, proti kateri se lahko uvede izravnalna dajatev.
However, given that MagnaChip assumed debt of KRW 481,3 billion and paid KRW 481,3 billion in cash, in order to find that the transaction involved a financial contribution there should first be evidence of entrustment or direction of MagnaChip/CVC Partners and none was provided or found.
Vendar pa bi glede na to, da je MagnaChip sprejel dolg v višini 481,3 milijarde KRW in plačal 481,3 milijarde v gotovini, morali za ugotovitev, da je ta posel vključeval finančno pomoč, najprej predložiti dokaz o navodilu ali pooblastilu MagnaChip/CVC Partners, vendar tak dokaz ni bil niti predložen niti odkrit.
Participation in the discounted debt transfer by the creditors was voluntary.
Udeležba upnikov pri prenosu znižanega dolga je bila prostovoljna.
Similarly to the BOE-Hydis sale, the funding was given to a third party and not Hynix, thus there is no evidence of a benefit having passed through to Hynix.
Podobno kot pri prodaji BOE-Hydis je bila financirana tretja stranka in ne Hynix. Zato ni dokazov, da so bile preko tega Hynixu zagotovljene ugodnosti.
Therefore, the discounted debt transfer to MagnaChip is not considered to constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article 2 of the basic Regulation.
Zato se prenos znižanega dolga družbi MagnaChip ne šteje kot subvencija v smislu člena 2 osnovne uredbe.
Cash Buyout
Gotovinski odkup
In October 2004, Hynix used the proceeds from the sale of the System IC assets to implement a Cash Buyout plan, approved by the CFIC, according to which Hynix ‘bought back’ the debt it owed to its creditors at a discount.
Oktobra 2004 je Hynix uporabil prihodke od prodaje System IC za izvedbo načrta gotovinskega odkupa, ki ga je odobril CFIC, ki je predvideval, da bo Hynix svoje dolgove pri svojih upnikih „ponovno odkupil“.
In effect, Hynix offered to repay its debt early, albeit at a reduced rate.
Hynix je ponudil, da svoje dolgove odplača predčasno, vendar s popustom.
A second cash buyout (CBO) took place in December 2004.
Drugi gotovinski odkup se je zgodil decembra 2004.
The Community industry alleged that these discounted cash CBOs were a countervailable subsidy.
Industrija Skupnosti je domnevala, da je bil ta gotovinski odkup po znižani ceni sporna subvencija.
The creditors who wished to participate in the October CBO agreed that Hynix would repay 70 % of the unsecured debt owed to them and 96 % of any secured debt.
Upniki, ki so želeli sodelovati pri oktobrskem gotovinskem odkupu, so se dogovorili, da Hynix poplača 70 % svojega nezavarovanega dolga, ki jim ga dolguje, in 96 % zavarovanega dolga.
The discount rate for unsecured debt was reduced to 21,84 % in for the December CBO.
Popust na nezavarovani dolg za decembrski gotovinski odkup se je znižal na 21,84 %.
Evidence on the record shows that participation in the CBOs was voluntary.
Predloženi dokazi kažejo, da je bila udeležba pri tem gotovinskem odkupu prostovoljna.
Further, there is no evidence suggesting that the participating creditors' behaviour was commercially unreasonable as the discount on the unsecured debt was compensated by the fact of early repayment and, hence, the time value of money.
Poleg tega ni bilo dokazov, ki bi nakazovali, da je bilo vedenje sodelujočih upnikov trgovinsko nerazumno, ker se je popust na nezavarovan dolg izravnal s predčasnim poplačilom in zmanjšanjem obresti.
Therefore, the CBOs are not considered to constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article 2 of the basic Regulation.
Zato se gotovinski odkupi ne štejejo kot subvencija v smislu člena 2 osnovne uredbe.
Preferential tax treatment
Preferenčna davčna obravnava
The Community industry alleged that the GOK gave preferential tax treatment to Hynix by not requiring it to recognise the gains from the debt-to-equity swap in the new restructuring as income.
Industrija Skupnosti je domnevala, da je vlada republike Koreje Hynixu zagotovila ugodnejšo davčno obravnavo s tem, da od družbe ni zahtevala, da dobiček od zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže v okviru novega prestrukturiranja prikaže kot prihodek.
Although Hynix's losses were such in 2003 that it would not have been required to pay corporation tax even if it had recognised the gain from the swap as income, the Community industry claimed that Hynix received a benefit because, by not recognising the gain, it did not reduce its loss carryforwards, which it was then able to set off against taxable gains in 2005, when it became profitable.
Čeprav so bile Hynixove izgube leta 2003 tako velike, da od njega ne bi mogli zahtevati plačila davka od dobička pravnih oseb, četudi bi dobiček od zamenjave knjižil kot prihodek, je industrija Skupnosti trdila, da je Hynix prejel ugodnosti, saj se s tem, da ni knjižil dobička, ni zmanjšal preneseni dolg, ki bi se lahko leta 2005, ko je bila družba ponovno dobičkonosna, izravnal z obdavčljivim dobičkom.
The alleged preferential tax treatment stems from a postponement of a change in the law which would require companies under voluntary restructurings, such as Hynix, to recognise gains from debt-to-equity swaps as taxable income.
Domnevno ugodnejša davčna obravnava izhaja iz odloga spremembe zakona, s katerim bi bile družbe v okviru prostovoljnega prestrukturiranja kot v Hynixovem primeru dolžne knjižiti dobiček iz zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže.
The Community industry has alleged that the GOK originally intended the change in legislation to come into force in March 2003, thus making the gains from Hynix's debt-to-equity swap pursuant to the new restructuring taxable.
Industrija Skupnosti je domnevala, da je vlada Republike Koreje prvotno nameravala spremeniti zakonodajo z začetkom veljavnosti marca 2003, s čimer bi postal dobiček od zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže v okviru novega prestrukturiranja obdavčljiv.
The Community industry claimed that following complaints from at least one of three companies directly affected by this change in the law, of which Hynix was one, the GOK postponed the coming into force of this new provision to 1 January 2004.
Industrija Skupnosti je trdila, da je na podlagi pritožb vsaj ene od treh družb, ki so bile neposredno prizadete zaradi te spremembe zakona, od katerih je bila ena Hynix, vlada Republike Koreje odložila začetek veljavnosti tega novega predpisa na 1. januar 2004.
Hynix claimed that the postponement of the effective date of the new provision was made when the GOK realised that the ruling's immediate effect would have been contrary to the principles of non-retroactivity and to the established practice of tax provisions coming into force at the beginning of the tax year.
Hynix je trdil, da je bil odlog dejanskega datuma veljavnosti novega predpisa opravljen, ko je vlada Republike Koreje spoznala, da bi bila takojšnja veljavnost zakona v nasprotju z načeli neretroaktivnosti in obstoječo prakso davčnih predpisov, ki bi začeli veljati v začetku novega fiskalnega leta.
The Community industry reiterated its claims in its comments submitted following the disclosure of the essential facts and findings of the investigation.
Industrija Skupnosti je ponovila svoje trditve v svojih stališčih po razkritju pomembnih dejstev in ugotovitev preiskave.
However, there is insufficient evidence on the record of the GOK's intention to ensure that Hynix's gain from its debt-to-equity swap was not taxed or that the alleged preferential treatment was, in fact, specific, within the meaning of Article 3 of the basic Regulation.
Vendar ni zadovoljivih zabeleženih dokazov o nameri vlade Republike Koreje za zagotovitev, da se Hynixov dobiček pri zamenjavi terjatev v lastniške deleže ne obdavči ali da je bila ugodnejša davčna obravnava specifična v smislu člena 3 osnovne uredbe.
Further, it is doubtful whether Hynix received any benefit from this tax exemption given the size of its net operating losses and the fact that these could be carried forward only for five years.
Poleg tega ni gotovo, ali je Hynix prejel ugodnosti od davčne oprostitve, glede na velikost neto izgub in dejstvo, da bi se jih lahko razporedilo le na pet let.
Hynix eventually made a profit in 2005, but its losses were such that, even if the gain from the debt-to-equity swap was recognised as taxable income, its remaining loss carry-forward was still more than enough to absorb the profit made in 2005, thus, no benefit would have accrued to Hynix during (or before) the IP.
Leta 2005 je Hynix dejansko ustvaril dobiček, vendar so bile njegove izgube tako velike, da četudi bi dobiček iz zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže knjižil kot obdavčljiv dohodek, bi bil prenos dolga še vedno več kot dovolj za absorpcijo dobička iz leta 2005, vendar Hynix med (ali pred) OP ni imel ugodnosti.
Moreover, as the benefit from the debt-to-equity swap was countervailed ‘gross’, i.e. without taking any potential taxation impact into account, any benefit from such preferential tax treatment, has already been taken into account and to countervail it again would be double counting.
Ker je bila ugodnost iz zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže izravnana „bruto“, kar pomeni brez upoštevanja morebitnega obdavčenja, so bile ugodnosti iz takšne ugodnejše davčne obravnave že upoštevane in če bi nanje ponovno uvedli izravnalne ukrepe, bi bilo to podobno dvojnemu štetju.
Therefore, the tax treatment of Hynix's debt-to-equity by the GOK is not considered to be a subsidy within the meaning of Article 2 of the basic Regulation.
Zato se davčna obravnava Hynixove zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže s strani vlade Republike Koreje ne šteje kot subvencija iz člena 2 osnovne uredbe.
July 2005 refinancing
Refinanciranje julija 2005
In July 2005, Hynix refinanced KRW 1,2 trillion of its debt and graduated early from the CRPA.
Julija 2005 je Hynix refinanciral 1,2 bilijona KRW svojega dolga in je bil predčasno odpuščen iz področja CRPA.
The refinancing involved a term loan of USD 500 million, raised by a bond issue on the New York Stock Exchange, and KRW 250 billion and a USD 550 million revolving credit agreement with the participation of both Korean and foreign banks (the July 2005 refinancing).
Refinanciranje je vključevalo srednjeročno posojilo v višini 500 milijonov USD, pridobljeno z izdajo obveznic z Newyorške borze in 250 milijardami KRW in 550 milijoni USD revolving kredita z udeležbo korejskih in tujih bank (refinanciranje julija 2005).
The Community industry claimed that the July 2005 refinancing involves a further subsidy, as Hynix was still a heavily indebted company to which no funding was available on the market.
Industrija Skupnosti je trdila, da je refinanciranje julija 2005 vključevalo nadaljnje subvencioniranje, ker je bil Hynix še vedno zelo zadolžena družba, ki je trg ni hotel financirati.