natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The terminology used in this Recommendation is based on terminology used in Directive 2002/21/EC and Directive 2002/22/EC; the Explanatory Note to this Recommendation describes the evolving technologies in relation to these markets.
Terminologija, uporabljena v tem priporočilu, temelji na terminologiji iz Direktive 2002/21/ES in Direktive 2002/22/ES; pojasnilo k temu priporočilu opisuje razvijajoče se tehnologije v zvezi s temi trgi.
In accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC, it is for national regulatory authorities to define relevant markets appropriate to national circumstances, in particular relevant geographic markets within their territory.
V skladu z Direktivo 2002/21/ES nacionalni regulativni organi opredelijo upoštevne trge glede na razmere v državi, zlasti upoštevne geografske trge na svojem ozemlju.
The starting point for the identification of markets in this Recommendation is the definition of retail markets from a forward-looking perspective, taking into account demand-side and supply-side substitutability.
Izhodišče za opredelitev trgov v tem priporočilu je opredelitev maloprodajnih trgov glede na pričakovani prihodnji razvoj, ob upoštevanju nadomestljivosti pri povpraševanju in ponudbi.
Having defined retail markets, it is then appropriate to identify relevant wholesale markets.
Po opredelitvi maloprodajnih trgov je ustrezno opredeliti upoštevne veleprodajne trge.
If the downstream market is supplied by a vertically-integrated undertaking or undertakings, there may be no (merchant) wholesale market in the absence of regulation.
Ob odsotnosti pravne ureditve morda ni nobenega (trgovskega) veleprodajnega trga, če trg na koncu prodajne verige oskrbuje vertikalno povezano podjetje ali podjetja.
Consequently, if the market warrants identification, it may be necessary to construct a notional upstream wholesale market.
Če trg utemeljuje opredelitev, je morda treba zgraditi hipotetični veleprodajni trg, ki je višje v prodajni verigi.
Markets in the electronic communications sector are often of a two-sided nature, in that they comprise services provided over networks or platforms that bring together users on either side of the market; for example end-users that exchange communications, or senders and receivers of information or content.
Trgi v sektorju elektronskih komunikacij so pogosto dvostranski, ker obsegajo opravljanje storitev preko omrežij ali platform, ki združujejo uporabnike na obeh straneh trga; na primer končne uporabnike, ki si izmenjujejo komunikacije, ali pošiljatelje in prejemnike informacij ali vsebine.
These aspects need to be taken into account when considering the identification and definition of markets, as they can affect both the way markets are defined and whether they have the characteristics which may justify the imposition of ex ante regulatory obligations.
Te vidike je treba upoštevati pri določanju in opredelitvi trgov, ker lahko vplivajo na način opredelitve trgov in na to, ali imajo značilnosti, ki bi lahko utemeljile uvedbo predhodnih regulativnih obveznosti.
In order to identify markets that are susceptible to ex ante regulation, it is appropriate to apply the following cumulative criteria.
Za opredelitev trgov, ki so lahko predmet predhodnega urejanja, je treba uporabiti naslednja kumulativna merila.
The first criterion is the presence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry.
Prvo merilo je prisotnost velikih in stalnih ovir za vstop na trg.
These may be of a structural, legal or regulatory nature.
Te so lahko strukturne, pravne ali regulativne.
However, given the dynamic character and functioning of electronic communications markets, possibilities to overcome barriers to entry within the relevant time horizon should also be taken into consideration when carrying out a prospective analysis to identify the relevant markets for possible ex ante regulation.
Vendar pa je treba glede na dinamičen značaj in delovanje trgov elektronskih komunikacij pri analizi prihodnjih razmer za opredelitev upoštevnih trgov, ki bi lahko bili predmet predhodnega urejanja, upoštevati tudi možnosti premagovanja ovir za vstop na trg v ustreznem časovnem okviru.
Therefore the second criterion admits only those markets whose structure does not tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon.
Drugo merilo torej dopušča le tiste trge, katerih struktura se ne nagiba k učinkoviti konkurenci v ustreznem časovnem okviru.
The application of this criterion involves examining the state of competition behind the barriers to entry.
Uporaba tega merila vključuje pregled stanja na področju konkurence za ovirami za vstop.
The third criterion is that application of competition law alone would not adequately address the market failure(s) concerned.
Tretje merilo je, da zgolj uporaba konkurenčnega prava ne bi zadostovala za ustrezen odziv na zadevne tržne nepopolnosti.
The main indicators to be considered when assessing the first and second criteria are similar to those examined as part of a forward-looking market analysis, in particular, indicators of barriers to entry in the absence of regulation, (including the extent of sunk costs), market structure, market performance and market dynamics, including indicators such as market shares and trends, market prices and trends, and the extent and coverage of competing networks or infrastructures.
Glavni kazalniki, ki se upoštevajo pri ocenjevanju prvega in drugega merila, so podobni tistim, ki se preverijo kot del analize prihodnjih razmer na trgu, zlasti kazalniki ovir za vstop ob odsotnosti pravne ureditve (vključno z obsegom nepovratnih stroškov), tržna struktura, delovanje trga in tržna dinamika, vključno s kazalniki, kot so tržni deleži in gibanja, tržne cene in gibanja ter obseg in pokritost konkurenčnih omrežij ali infrastruktur.
Any market which satisfies the three criteria in the absence of ex ante regulation is susceptible to ex ante regulation.
Vsak trg, ki brez predhodne ureditve izpolnjuje ta tri merila, je lahko predmet predhodnega urejanja.
Newly emerging markets should not be subject to inappropriate obligations, even if there is a first mover advantage, in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC.
Na novo nastajajočih trgih se v skladu z Direktivo 2002/21/ES ne smejo uvesti neprimerne obveznosti, tudi če ima prvi na trgu prednost.
Newly emerging markets are considered to comprise products or services, where, due to their novelty, it is very difficult to predict demand conditions or market entry and supply conditions, and consequently difficult to apply the three criteria.
Za novo nastajajoče trge se šteje, da obsegajo proizvode ali storitve, pri katerih je zaradi njihovih novosti zelo težko predvideti pogoje povpraševanja ali vstop na trg in ponudbene pogoje, zato je tudi težko uporabiti ta tri merila.
The purpose of not subjecting newly emerging markets to inappropriate obligations is to promote innovation as required by Article 8 of the Directive 2002/21/EC; at the same time, foreclosure of such markets by the leading undertaking should be prevented, as also indicated in the Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications and services [3].
Namen tega, da se na novo nastajajočih trgih ne smejo uvesti neprimerne obveznosti, je spodbujati inovacije, kot zahteva člen 8 Direktive 2002/21/ES, hkrati pa je treba preprečiti, da bi vodilno podjetje zaseglo takšne trge, kot je določeno tudi v smernicah Komisije za tržno analizo in ocenjevanje pomembne tržne moči na podlagi regulativnega okvira Skupnosti za elektronske komunikacije in storitve [3].
Incremental upgrades to existing network infrastructure rarely lead to a new or emerging market.
Primarne nadgraditve obstoječe omrežne infrastrukture redko privedejo do novega ali nastajajočega trga.
The lack of substitutability of a product has to be established from both demand and supply-side perspectives before it can be concluded that it is not part of an already existing market.
Pomanjkanje zamenljivosti proizvoda se določi z vidika povpraševanja in ponudbe, preden je mogoče zaključiti, da ni del že obstoječega trga.
The emergence of new retail services may give rise to a new derived wholesale market to the extent that such retail services cannot be provided using existing wholesale products.
Pojav novih storitev na maloprodajni ravni lahko povzroči nastanek novega veleprodajnega trga v takšnem obsegu, da teh storitev na maloprodajni ravni ni mogoče zagotoviti z uporabo obstoječih proizvodov za ponudbo na veliko.
As far as barriers to entry are concerned, two types are relevant for the purpose of this Recommendation: structural barriers and legal or regulatory barriers.
Za to priporočilo sta pomembni zlasti dve vrsti ovir za vstop: strukturne in pravne ali regulativne ovire.
Structural barriers to entry result from original cost or demand conditions that create asymmetric conditions between incumbents and new entrants impeding or preventing market entry of the latter.
Strukturne ovire za vstop izvirajo iz prvotnih značilnosti na ravni stroškov ali povpraševanja, ki ustvarjajo nesorazmerne pogoje med prvotnimi ponudniki in novimi tekmeci ter ovirajo ali preprečujejo vstop slednjih na trg.
For instance, high structural barriers may be found to exist when the market is characterised by absolute cost advantages, substantial economies of scale and/or economies of scope, capacity constraints and high sunk costs.
Visoke strukturne ovire na primer obstajajo, kadar so za trg značilne absolutne stroškovne prednosti, znatna ekonomija obsega in/ali dosega, omejitve zmogljivosti in visoki nepovratni stroški.
To date, such barriers can still be identified with respect to the widespread deployment and/or provision of local access networks to fixed locations.
Danes je mogoče takšne ovire še vedno odkriti v zvezi s široko razširjeno uporabo in/ali zagotavljanjem omrežij za krajevni dostop na fiksnih lokacijah.
A related structural barrier can also exist where the provision of service requires a network component that cannot be technically duplicated or only duplicated at a cost that makes it uneconomic for competitors.
Sorodna strukturna ovira lahko obstaja tudi, kadar je za zagotavljanje storitve potrebna komponenta omrežja, ki je tehnično ni mogoče podvojiti ali pa jo je mogoče podvojiti le po takšni ceni, da postane nedonosna za tekmece.
Legal or regulatory barriers are not based on economic conditions, but result from legislative, administrative or other state measures that have a direct effect on the conditions of entry and/or the positioning of operators on the relevant market.
Pravne ali regulativne ovire ne temeljijo na gospodarskih razmerah, temveč izvirajo iz zakonodajnih, upravnih ali drugih državnih ukrepov, ki neposredno vplivajo na pogoje vstopa in/ali umestitve ponudnikov na upoštevnem trgu.
An example of a legal or regulatory barrier preventing entry into a market is a limit on the number of undertakings that have access to spectrum for the provision of underlying services.
Kot primer pravne ali regulativne ovire, ki preprečuje vstop na trg, lahko služi omejitev števila podjetij z dostopom do spektra za zagotavljanje osnovnih storitev.
Other examples of legal or regulatory barriers are price controls or other price-related measures imposed on undertakings, which affect not only entry but also the positioning of undertakings on the market.
Drugi primeri pravnih ali regulativnih ovir so cenovni nadzori ali drugi ukrepi v zvezi s cenami, uvedeni za podjetja, ki vplivajo tako na vstop kot tudi na umestitev podjetij na trgu.
Legal or regulatory barriers, which can be removed within the relevant time horizon, should not normally be deemed to constitute an economic barrier to entry, such as to fulfil the first criterion.
Pravne ali regulativne ovire, ki jih je mogoče odpraviti v ustreznem časovnem okviru, običajno ne predstavljajo gospodarske ovire za vstop na trg v smislu prvega merila.
Barriers to entry may also become less relevant with regard to innovation-driven markets characterised by ongoing technological progress.
Ovire za vstop lahko postanejo manj pomembne na trgih, vezanih na inovacije, za katere je značilen stalen tehnološki napredek.
In such markets, competitive constraints often come from innovative threats from potential competitors that are not currently in the market.
Konkurenčne omejitve na takšnih trgih pogosto izhajajo iz groženj, povezanih z inovacijami potencialnih tekmecev, ki jih trenutno ni na trgu.
In innovation-driven markets, dynamic or longer-term competition can take place among firms that are not necessarily competitors in an existing ‘static’ market.
Na takšnih trgih, vezanih na inovacije, lahko pride do dinamične ali dolgoročne konkurence med podjetji, ki niso nujno tekmeci na obstoječem „statičnem“ trgu.
This Recommendation does not identify markets where barriers to entry are not expected to persist over a foreseeable period.
To priporočilo ne opredeljuje trgov, pri katerih se pričakuje, da ovire za vstop ne bodo trajale dlje kot predvideno obdobje.
In assessing whether barriers to entry are likely to persist in the absence of regulation, it is necessary to examine whether the industry has experienced frequent and successful entry and whether entry has been or is likely in the future to be sufficiently immediate and persistent to limit market power.
Pri ocenjevanju, ali bodo ovire za vstop v odsotnosti pravne ureditve še naprej obstajale, je treba preveriti, ali je industrija izkusila pogoste in uspešne vstope na trg in ali so vstopi bili ali bodo verjetno v prihodnosti dovolj hitri in trajni, da bodo omejili tržno moč.
The relevance of barriers to entry will depend inter alia on the minimum efficient scale of output and the costs which are sunk.
Pomen ovir za vstop bo med drugim odvisen od najmanjšega učinkovitega obsega proizvodnje in nepovratnih stroškov.
Even when a market is characterised by high barriers to entry, other structural factors in that market may mean that the market tends towards an effectively competitive outcome within the relevant time horizon.
Tudi kadar so za trg značilne visoke ovire za vstop, lahko drugi strukturni dejavniki na tem trgu pomenijo, da se trg nagiba proti učinkoviti konkurence v ustreznem časovnem okviru.
Market dynamics may for instance be caused by technological developments, or by the convergence of products and markets which may give rise to competitive constraints being exercised between operators active in distinct product markets.
Tržno dinamiko lahko na primer povzroči tehnološki razvoj ali zbliževanje proizvodov in trgov, ki lahko povzroči konkurenčne omejitve med izvajalci, ki delujejo na ločenih proizvodnih trgih.
This may also be the case in markets with a limited — but sufficient — number of undertakings having diverging cost structures and facing price-elastic market demand.
Do tega lahko pride tudi na trgih z omejenim, vendar zadostnim številom podjetij z različnimi strukturami stroškov, ki se soočajo s tržnim povpraševanjem po elastičnih cenah.
There may also be excess capacity in a market that would normally allow rival firms to expand output very rapidly in response to any price increase.
Na trgu lahko obstaja tudi presežna zmogljivost, ki konkurenčnim podjetjem običajno omogoči zelo hitro povečanje proizvodnje kot odgovor na kakršen koli dvig cen.
In such markets, market shares may change over time and/or falling prices may be observed.
Na takšnih trgih lahko sčasoma pride do spremembe tržnih deležev in/ali do padca cen.
Where market dynamics are changing rapidly, care should be taken in choosing the relevant time horizon so as to reflect the pertinent market developments.
Če se tržne dinamike hitro spreminjajo, je potrebna posebna previdnost pri izbiri ustreznega časovnega okvira, da bi odražal ustrezen tržni razvoj.
The decision to identify a market as susceptible to ex ante regulation should also depend on an assessment of the sufficiency of competition law to address the market failures that result from the first two criteria being met.
Odločitev, da se trg opredeli kot trg, ki je lahko predmet predhodnega urejanja, mora biti odvisna tudi od ocene ustreznosti konkurenčnega prava za odpravo tržnih pomanjkljivosti, ki so posledica tega, da sta izpolnjeni prvi dve merili.
Competition law interventions are unlikely to be sufficient where the compliance requirements of an intervention to redress a market failure are extensive or where frequent and/or timely intervention is indispensable.
Ukrepi konkurenčnega prava verjetno ne zadostujejo, če so zahteve po skladnosti ukrepanja za odpravo tržne pomanjkljivosti obsežne ali če je nujno pogosto in/ali pravočasno ukrepanje.
The application of the three criteria should limit the number of markets within the electronic communications sector where ex ante regulatory obligations are imposed and thereby contribute to the aim of the regulatory framework to reduce ex ante sector-specific rules progressively as competition in the markets develops.
Uporaba navedenih treh meril bi morala omejiti število trgov v sektorju elektronskih komunikacij, na katerih se uvedejo predhodne regulativne obveznosti, kar bi prispevalo k cilju regulativnega okvira, da se z razvojem konkurence na trgih postopno omejijo predhodne posebne določbe, ki veljajo za sektor.
These criteria should be applied cumulatively, so that failure to meet any one of them would indicate that a market should not be identified as susceptible to ex ante regulation.
Ta merila je treba uporabljati kumulativno, tako da neizpolnjevanje katerega koli od njih pomeni, da trg ne more biti predmet predhodnega urejanja.
Regulatory controls on retail services should only be imposed where national regulatory authorities consider that relevant wholesale measures or measures regarding carrier selection or pre-selection would fail to achieve the objective of ensuring effective competition and the fulfilment of public interest objectives.
Regulativni nadzor maloprodajnih storitev se uvede samo, kadar nacionalni regulativni organi menijo, da z ustreznimi ukrepi v veleprodaji ali ukrepi glede izbire ali predizbire obratovalca ne bi dosegli cilja, da se zagotovi učinkovita konkurenca in ciljev javnega interesa.
By intervening at the wholesale level, including with remedies which may affect retail markets, Member States can ensure that as much of the value chain is open to normal competition processes as possible, thereby delivering the best outcomes for end-users.
S posredovanjem na veleprodajni ravni, vključno s sredstvi, ki lahko vplivajo na maloprodajne trge, lahko države članice zagotovijo, da je vrednostna veriga čim bolj odprta za običajne konkurenčne postopke, s čimer se dosežejo najboljši rezultati za končne uporabnike.
This Recommendation therefore mainly identifies wholesale markets, the appropriate regulation of which is intended to address a lack of effective competition that is manifest on end-user markets.
To priporočilo zato opredeljuje predvsem veleprodajne trge, katerih ustrezna pravna ureditev je namenjena odpravi pomanjkanja učinkovite konkurence, ki se odraža na trgih končnih uporabnikov.
Should a national regulatory authority demonstrate that wholesale interventions have been unsuccessful, the relevant retail market may be susceptible to ex ante regulation provided that the three criteria set out above are met.
Če nacionalni regulativni organ dokaže, da so bili veleprodajni ukrepi neuspešni, je lahko zadevni maloprodajni trg predmet predhodnega urejanja, če so izpolnjena zgornja tri merila.
The process of identifying markets in this Recommendation is without prejudice to markets that may be defined in specific cases under competition law.
Postopek opredeljevanja trgov v tem priporočilu ne posega v trge, ki jih je mogoče v posebnih primerih opredeliti po konkurenčnem pravu.
Moreover, the scope of ex ante regulation is without prejudice to the scope of activities that may be analysed under competition law.
Poleg tega obseg predhodnega urejanja ne posega v obseg dejavnosti, ki se lahko analizirajo po konkurenčnem pravu.
The markets listed in the Annex have been identified on the basis of these three cumulative criteria.
Trgi, navedeni v Prilogi, so opredeljeni na podlagi teh treh kumulativnih meril.
For markets not listed in this Recommendation national regulatory authorities should apply the three-criteria test to the market concerned.
Za trge, ki niso navedeni v tem priporočilu, uporabijo nacionalni regulativni organi test treh meril.
For the markets in the Annex to Recommendation 2003/311/EC of 11 February 2003, which are not listed in the Annex to this Recommendation, national regulatory authorities should have the power to apply the three-criteria test in order to assess whether, on the basis of national circumstances, a market is still susceptible to ex ante regulation.
Za trge v prilogi k Priporočilu 2003/311/ES z dne 11. februarja 2003, ki niso navedeni v prilogi k temu priporočilu, morajo biti nacionalni regulativni organi pooblaščeni za uporabo testa treh meril, da ugotovijo, ali je glede na razmere v državi trg še lahko predmet predhodnega urejanja.
For markets listed in this Recommendation a national regulatory authority may choose not to carry out a market analysis procedure if it determines that the three criteria are not satisfied for the particular market.
Nacionalni regulativni organ se lahko pri trgih, navedenih v tem priporočilu, odloči, da jih ne bo analiziral, če ugotovi, da navedena tri merila za zadevni trg niso izpolnjena.
National regulatory authorities may identify markets that differ from those listed in this Recommendation, provided that they act in accordance with Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC.
Nacionalni regulativni organi lahko opredelijo trge, ki se razlikujejo od tistih, ki so navedeni v tem priporočilu, pod pogojem, da ravnajo v skladu s členom 7 Direktive 2002/21/ES.
Failure to notify a draft measure which affects trade between Member States as described in Recital 38 of Directive 2002/21/EC may result in infringement proceedings being taken.
Če osnutek ukrepa, ki vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami, kakor je opisano v uvodni izjavi 38 Direktive 2002/21/ES, ni sporočen, se lahko sproži postopek za ugotavljanje kršitev.
Markets other than those listed in this Recommendation should be defined on the basis of competition principles laid down in the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [4] and be consistent with the Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power [5] whilst satisfying the three criteria set out above.
Trgi, ki niso navedeni v tem priporočilu, morajo biti opredeljeni na podlagi konkurenčnih načel, določenih v Obvestilu Komisije o opredelitvi upoštevnega trga za namene konkurenčnega prava Skupnosti [4], in morajo biti skladni s smernicami Komisije za tržno analizo in oceno pomembne tržne moči [5], pri čemer morajo biti izpolnjena navedena tri merila.
The fact that this Recommendation identifies those product and service markets in which ex ante regulation may be warranted does not mean that regulation is always warranted or that these markets will be subject to the imposition of regulatory obligations set out in the specific Directives.
Dejstvo, da to priporočilo opredeljuje tiste trge proizvodov in storitev, na katerih je mogoče utemeljiti predhodno urejanje, ne pomeni, da je urejanje vedno upravičeno ali da bodo na teh trgih uvedene regulativne obveznosti iz določenih Direktiv.
In particular, regulation cannot be imposed or must be withdrawn if there is effective competition on these markets in the absence of regulation, that is to say, if no operator has significant market power within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2002/21/EC.
Urejanja zlasti ni mogoče uvesti ali pa ga je treba odpraviti, če na teh trgih obstaja učinkovita konkurenca brez pravne ureditve, kar pomeni, da noben izvajalec nima pomembne tržne moči v smislu člena 14 Direktive 2002/21/ES.