natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
An employee that enjoys a quasi-civil-servant status would decide to exit the company only if the employer offered the appropriate incentives to that effect.
Zaposleni, ki ima status kvazi državnega uradnika, se bo odločil zapustiti podjetje samo, če mu bo delodajalec ponudil ustrezno spodbudo.
OTE needed therefore to offer at least adequate compensation for the economic benefits that an employee would have continued to enjoy had he stayed under the protection of permanency.
OTE je zato morala ponuditi najmanj enakovredno nadomestilo za gospodarske ugodnosti, ki bi jih delavec imel, če bi imel še naprej status stalno zaposlenega.
The subsequent successful take-up of the VRS (around 91 % of all eligible employees) confirms that the further incentives offered by OTE to its employees in the form of recognised notional years of service is an appropriate instrument.
Posledično številčno sodelovanje v SPU (okoli 91 % vseh upravičenih zaposlenih) potrjuje, da so pobude, ki jih je družba OTE ponudila svojim zaposlenim v obliki priznanih hipotetičnih delovnih let, ustrezen instrument.
OTE could not have gone back to resorting to other less costly measures such as a redundancy plan, since OTE employees would have to consent to losing their life tenure employment status in exchange for a lower redundancy compensation.
Družba OTE ni mogla uporabiti manj dragih ukrepov, kot je načrt razreševanja presežnih delavcev, saj bi zaposleni pri OTE morali pristati na izgubo svojega zaposlitvenega statusa stalno zaposlenih v zameno za nižjo nadomestilo za upokojitev zaradi presežka delovne sile.
Nor could it have abolished retroactively the permanent status of its employees in order to be able to carry out a mandatory redundancy scheme since, as the Greek authorities explained, such an option would have raised very serious legal and constitutional issues that would have defeated the whole restructuring of OTE.
Prav tako ni mogla retroaktivno ukiniti statusa stalno zaposlenih, da bi lahko izvedla obvezno shemo razreševanja presežnih delavcev, saj bi taka možnost, kot so razložili grški organi, sprožila zelo resna pravna in ustavna vprašanja, s čimer bi se preprečil celoten proces prestrukturiranja družbe OTE.
Moreover, an analogy could be drawn between the present case and the Commission’s Communication on stranded costs in the energy sector [48].
Obstaja podobnost med zadevnim primerom in Sporočilom Komisije o nasedlih naložbah na področju energetike [48].
Stranded costs arise when the incumbent retains costs associated with being an incumbent supplier but is no longer able to recuperate them because new competitors are now servicing the market as a result of liberalisation.
Do nasedlih naložb pride, ko prvotni operater pridrži stroške, ki so povezani s tem, da je edini dobavitelj, ampak jih ne more povrniti, ker so na trgu zaradi liberalizacije novi tekmeci.
Thus, the Greek State’s contribution to the VRS could by analogy be treated in a similar manner as the compensation for stranded costs, for the following reasons.
Prispevek grške države v SPU bi bil lahko zato podobno upoštevan kot nadomestilo za nasedle naložbe zaradi naslednjih razlogov.
The special permanent status of OTE’s employees is linked to the previous monopoly situation where the market was not yet liberalised.
Posebni zaposlitveni status stalno zaposlenih pri OTE je povezan s prejšnjim monopolnim položajem, ko trg še ni bil liberaliziran.
This special regime did not give rise to any difficulty as long as OTE operated in a monopoly environment.
Pri tej posebni ureditvi ni bilo nobenih težav, dokler je družba OTE delovala v monopolnem okolju.
OTE incurred higher costs as compared to others, but it was shielded from any intra-industry competition.
OTE je imela višje stroške v primerjavi z drugimi, ampak je bila zaščitena pred kakršno koli konkurenco znotraj panoge.
Since the liberalisation of the Greek telecommunications market, this specific employee arrangement has gradually become a burden for OTE, affecting its competitiveness.
Po liberalizaciji grškega trga telekomunikacij je ta posebna zaposlitvena ureditev postopoma postala breme za družbo OTE in začela vplivati na njeno konkurenčnost.
The specific permanency of the employees, i.e. the quasi-civil-servant status, represents an additional wage cost for OTE that its competitors do not have to bear [49].
Posebni zaposlitveni status stalno zaposlenih, tj. status kvazi državnih uradnikov, predstavlja dodatni strošek plače za družbo OTE, ki ga njenim tekmecem ni treba kriti [49].
Accordingly, the decision of the Greek authorities to finance the costs of the VRS that result from the permanency costs and the high salaries of OTE is in line with the necessity requirement, for it enables OTE to restructure its operations in a manner similar to that of a private company without having to incur the extra costs that derive from the pre-liberalisation period.
Skladno s tem je odločitev grških organov, da financira stroške SPU, ki izhajajo iz stroškov zaradi statusa stalno zaposlenih in visokih plač družbe OTE, v skladu z zahtevo nujnosti, ker omogoča družbi OTE, da svoje poslovanje prestrukturira na podoben način kot zasebna podjetja, ne da bi morala kriti dodatne stroške, ki izhajajo iz obdobja pred liberalizacijo.
The State’s contribution compensates OTE only for the permanency and high salaries costs that arise from the extra notional years that are given to employees who would have reached the mandatory retirement age from 2005 to 2012.
Prispevek države nadomesti samo stroške statusa stalno zaposlenih in visokih plač družbe OTE, ki nastanejo zaradi dodatnih hipotetičnih let za zaposlene, ki bi obvezno starost za upokojitev dosegli med letoma 2005 in 2012.
In particular, the Greek State does not intervene to finance the existing pension liabilities of OTE or to cover any sort of pension deficit that should have been assumed by the company.
Grška država še zlasti ne posega v financiranje obstoječih pokojninskih obveznosti družbe OTE ali pokojninskega primanjkljaja, ki bi ga morala prevzeti družba.
OTE has paid all its past employer contributions to TAP-OTE in full, and is also paying all the costs of the VRS, up to the effective date of the implementation of the VRS, with the exception of the costs that a private company would not have to bear had it had to take similar measures to reduce its workforce.
Družba OTE je v celoti poravnala vse pretekle prispevke delodajalca v TAP-OTE in plačuje tudi vse stroške SPU do dneva uvedbe SPU, z izjemo stroškov, ki jih zasebni družbi ne bi bilo treba kriti, če bi morala povzeti podobne ukrepe za zmanjšanje delovne sile.
Thus, the Greek State is transferring 4 % of its stake in OTE into the pension fund in order to finance the costs of the VRS that result from the fact that the pensions of those eligible for the VRS are not calculated on the basis of the year of their actual departure, but on the basis of the year they would have retired had they chosen to take full benefit of their permanent status.
Grška država zato nakazuje 4 % svojega deleža v družbi OTE v pokojninski sklad, da bi financirala stroške SPU, ki izhajajo iz dejstva, da pokojnine upravičencev do SPU niso izračunane na podlagi leta njihovega dejanskega odhoda, ampak na podlagi leta, ko bi se upokojili, če bi izkoristili vse ugodnosti svojega statusa stalno zaposlenih.
In other words, the State is essentially financing the future employer and employee pensions that correspond to the notional years being awarded to those taking advantage of the VRS offer.
To pomeni, da država v glavnem financira prihodnjega delodajalca in pokojnine zaposlenih, ki ustrezajo dodeljenim hipotetičnim letom zaposlenih, ki izkoristijo ugodnosti SPU.
The State’s contribution should also be assessed within the wider agreement reached by the management of OTE and its employees whereby in exchange for the generous incentives given for early retirement, OTE employees have consented to the abolition of the permanent employment status for future recruits.
Prispevek države je treba oceniti tudi v okviru širšega sporazuma med upravo družbe OTE in njenimi zaposlenimi, ki so v zameno za ugodno spodbudo za predčasno upokojevanje pristali na ukinitev statusa stalno zaposlenih za nadaljnje zaposlovanje.
Had the employment status of OTE future employees remained unchanged, the State’s contribution would not have had any effect on the company’s long-term viability since any future recruits would have neutralised any short-term cost savings that OTE would have realised through the VRS.
Če bi zaposlitveni status zaposlenih pri družbi OTE ostal enak, prispevek države ne bi imel nobenega učinka na dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja družbe, ker bi se z nadaljnjim zaposlovanjem nevtralizirali kakršni koli kratkoročni prihranki stroškov, ki bi jih OTE realizirala z SPU.
The proportional character of the aid in question also depends on ascertaining first that (a) the Greek authorities have adequately quantified the extra costs that the OTE will have to bear because of the permanency and high fixed salaries of the personnel taking advantage of the VRS offer, and (b) that the State’s contribution does not overcompensate OTE.
Sorazmerna narava zadevne pomoči je odvisna tudi od potrditve, da (a) so grški organi ustrezno ocenili dodatne stroške, ki jih bo morala kriti družba OTE zaradi statusa stalno zaposlenih in visokih fiksnih plač zaposlenih, ki bodo izkoristili ponudbo SPU in (b) da države ne prispeva čezmernega nadomestila stroškov družbe OTE.
i. The extra costs of OTE
Dodatni stroški družbe OTE
On the basis of the detailed information submitted by the Greek authorities, the nominal costs of the VRS, as certified by KPMG in accordance with the certified IFRS Financial Statements of OTE for 2005, is EUR 1161,8 million.
Na podlagi podrobnih podatkov, ki so jih posredovali grški organi, znašajo nominalni stroški SPU, kot jih je potrdila KPMG v skladu s potrjenimi Finančnimi izkazi MSRP družbe OTE za leto 2005, 1161,8 milijona EUR.
According to the study carried out by CRA International (see recital 65), the NPV of the VRS is EUR 1086,2 million. Taking into account the tax benefits to OTE arising from the deductions to be made for corporate tax purposes, CRA International has estimated the post-tax NPV of the VRS at EUR 784,3 million.
V skladu s študijo družbe CRA International (glej uvodno izjavo 65) NPV SPU znaša 1086,2 milijona EUR. Ob upoštevanju davčnih ugodnosti družbe OTE zaradi odbitkov davka od dohodka pravnih oseb, je CRA International nominalno sedanjo vrednost po plačilu davka SPU ocenila na 784,3 milijona EUR.
CRA International has based the calculation of the NPV on a discount rate of 3 %, which corresponds to the return of risk-free securities.
CRA International je izračun NPV naredila na podlagi 3-odstotne diskontne stopnje, kar ustreza donosu varnih vrednostnih papirjev.
This approach contrasts with the November 2005 submissions of the Greek authorities which were based on the WACC of OTE, estimated at 7,8 %.
Ta pristop je v nasprotju z uradnimi obvestili grških organov novembra 2005, ki so temeljili na tehtanem povprečju stroškov kapitala družbe OTE, ocenjenem na 7,8 %.
CRA International does not deny that the WACC can be used as a discount rate.
CRA International ne zanika, da je lahko tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala uporabljeno kot diskontna stopnja.
It considers, however, that while the use of the WACC reflects the usual risk to which a company is exposed in the course of its business, in the present case the payment of salaries and pensions to OTE employees is devoid of any uncertainty, for salaries follow a strict salary scale and their yearly ‘upward’ revision is not correlated to OTE’s own economic performance.
Upošteva pa, da medtem, ko uporaba tehtanega povprečja stroškov kapitala odraža običajno tveganje, ki mu je izpostavljeno podjetje med poslovanjem, v tem primeru pri plačilu plač in pokojnin zaposlenih pri OTE ni negotovosti, saj so plače v skladu s strogo plačno lestvico, njihova letna revizija „navzgor“ pa ni povezana z ekonomsko uspešnostjo družbe OTE.
However, for the sake of completeness, CRA International also calculates the NVP of the VRS by reference to the WACC of OTE and concludes that the NPV of the VRS is EUR 704,8 million.
Zaradi popolnosti CRA International izračuna tudi NPV SPU v skladu s tehtanim povprečjem stroškov kapitala družbe OTE in ugotovi, da je NPV SPU 704,8 milijona.
The Commission considers that an assessment based on the WACC of OTE (7,8 %) is in line with general practices in this area (as also acknowledged by CRA International itself) and with the Greek authorities’ earlier submissions.
Komisija meni, da je ocena na podlagi tehtanega povprečja stroškov kapitala družbe OTE (7,8 %) v skladu s splošno prakso na tem področju (to je potrdila tudi CRA International) in v skladu s prejšnjimi uradnimi obvestili grških organov.
Accordingly, the NPV of the VRS should be EUR 704,8 million.
NPV SPU bi morala znašati 704,8 milijona EUR.
Based on the assumption that OTE could provide an early retirement package equal to 150 % of the legal requirement for a redundancy, but with private salaries (in other words 33 % lower than those of OTE), CRA International concludes that the NPV of such a scheme would be EUR 314,4 million. It follows that the extra burden on OTE is EUR 390,4 million (EUR 704,8 – EUR 314,4 = EUR 390,4).
RCA International glede na predpostavko, da bi družba OTE lahko ponudila paket zgodnjega upokojevanja, ki je enak 150 % pravno predpisane zahteve za presežek delovne sile, ampak z zasebnimi plačami (to pomeni 33 % nižje plače kot v OTE), ugotavlja, da bi NPV take sheme znašal 314,4 milijona EUR. Iz tega sledi, da je dodatna obremenitev družbe OTE 390,4 milijona (704,8 – 314,4 = 390,4 EUR).
At the opening of the formal investigation, the Commission asked the Greek authorities to provide evidence for the proposition that private companies would have offered redundancy packages equal to 150 % of the minimum legal requirements.
Ob sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave je Komisija prosila grške organe, naj predložijo dokaze o tem, da nameravajo zasebna podjetja ponuditi pakete za presežek delovne sile, katerih vrednost bi bila enaka 150 % minimalnih pravno predpisanih zahtev.
The Greek authorities submitted a report by the Hay Group (see recital 61), which came to the conclusion that, although there had not been any kind of VRS in the EU comparable to that of OTE, based on interviews and information gathered by 40 companies operating in Greece, on average the redundancy package offered by private companies to employees aged 51 to 62 (the majority of OTE employees taking part in the VRS) was equal to 150 % the legal minimum requirement.
Grški organi so predložili poročilo podjetja Hay Group (glej uvodno izjavo 61), ki je na podlagi pogovorov in podatkov, zbranih od 40 podjetij, ki poslujejo v Grčiji, ugotovilo, da je bil, kljub temu, da nobena SPU v EU ni primerljiva s SPU družbe OTE, paket za presežek delovne sile, ki so ga zasebna podjetja ponudila svojim zaposlenim, starim od 51 do 62 (večina zaposlenih pri OTE, ki so sodelovali v SPU), v povprečju enak 150 % minimalnih pravno predpisanih zahtev.
Having examined the relevant information submitted by the Greek authorities, the Commission has no grounds to call into question the validity of the findings of the Hay report.
Po preučitvi ustreznih podatkov, ki so jih posredovali grški organi, Komisija nima podlage, da bi dvomila o veljavnosti ugotovitev iz poročila podjetja Hay Group.
Therefore, the calculation by CRA International of the extra burden of OTE (EUR 390,4 million) based on the 1,5 multiplier suggested by the Hay report should be accepted as well-founded.
Izračun dodatnih stroškov družbe OTE (390,4 milijona EUR), ki ga je opravila CRA International na podlagi množitelja 1,5, ki ga je v svojem poročilu predlagalo podjetje Hay, je treba sprejeti kot utemeljen.
The next question that needs to be answered is whether the Greek State’s contribution exceeds the extra burden for OTE, estimated at EUR 390,4 million.
Nadaljnje vprašanje, ki zahteva odgovor, je, ali prispevek grške države presega dodatne stroške družbe OTE, ki so ocenjeni na 390,4 milijona EUR.
The value of the Greek State’s contribution
Vrednost prispevka grške države
Pursuant to Article 74(4)(a) of Law No 3371/2005, the Greek authorities contribute 4 % of the share capital of OTE to TAP-OTE.
V skladu s členom 74(4)(a) Zakona št. 3371/2005 grški organi prispevajo 4 % osnovnega kapitala družbe OTE k TAP-OTE.
The value of the Greek State’s contribution to the VRS is calculated by multiplying the total number of shares of OTE (490582879) by 4 % and by the share closing price of OTE, as quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange [50].
Vrednost prispevka grške države k SPU se izračuna z množitvijo celotnega števila delnic družbe OTE (490582879) s 4 % in s končnim borznim tečajem družbe OTE na atenski borzi [50].
On the date of the publication of Law No 3371/2005 (14 July 2005), the closing price of the OTE share was EUR 16,35. At that date, the State’s contribution corresponded to around EUR 315 million. Since then, the share price of OTE has gradually increased, fluctuating from EUR 23 in mid-January 2007 to EUR 21 on 27 February 2007.
Na dan objave Zakona št. 3371/2005 (14. julija 2005) je bila končna cena delnice družbe OTE 16,35 EUR. Na ta datum je prispevek države znašal okoli 315 milijonov EUR. Od takrat se je cena delnice družbe OTE postopoma zvišala; cena je nihala od 23 EUR v sredini januarja 2007 do 21 EUR na dan 27. februarja 2007.
Thus on 27 February 2007, the value of the 4 % shareholding of the Greek State in OTE stood at around EUR 410089618.
februarja 2007 je zato vrednost 4 % deleža grške države v družbi OTE znašala okoli 410089618 EUR.
The value of the Greek State’s contribution at that date was higher than the amount corresponding to the extra burden of OTE (EUR 390,4 million).
Vrednost prispevka grške države na ta datum je bila višja kot znesek dodatne obremenitve družbe OTE (390,4 milijona EUR).
In its reply at the opening of the formal investigation, given the impossibility of predicting the future closing price of the OTE share, the Greek authorities formally undertook to repeal Law No 3371/2005 should the value of the 4 % stake exceed the amount of EUR 390,4 million on the day of its transfer to the pension fund and to take any other necessary measure to ensure that the value of the shares to be transferred to TAP-OTE would not exceed EUR 390,4 million.
Grški organi so se v svojem odgovoru ob sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave, ker ni mogoče predvideti prihodnje končne cene delnice družbe OTE, uradno zavezali, da bodo razveljavili Zakon št. 3371/2005, če bo vrednost 4-odstotnega deleža presegla znesek 390,4 milijona EUR na dan prenosa na pokojninski sklad in da bodo sprejeli vse druge potrebne ukrepe, s čimer zagotovi, da vrednost delnic, ki bodo prenesene v TAP-OTE, ne bo presegla 390,4 milijona EUR.
Accordingly, the Commission’s assessment in the present case is based on the undertaking given by Greece that its envisaged contribution to TAP-OTE will not exceed the amount of EUR 390,4 million that corresponds to the extra costs of the VRS for OTE, and that, if necessary, it will also repeal Law No 3371/2005.
V skladu z zgoraj navedenim temelji ocena Komisije glede zadevnega primera na jamstvu Grčije, da njen predviden prispevek v TAP-OTE ne bo presegel zneska 390,4 milijona EUR, kar ustreza dodatnim stroškom SPU družbe OTE, in da bo, če bo to potrebno, tudi razveljavila Zakon št. 3371/2005.
Other advantages
Druge ugodnosti
At the opening of the formal investigation the Commission observed that the additional costs borne by OTE owing to the special employment status of its employees would not necessarily justify the State’s contribution, given that OTE might have benefited, and may continue to benefit, from other advantages which neutralise the cost of the VRS (see recital 47).
Ob sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave je Komisija upoštevala, da dodatni stroški, ki jih ima družba OTE zaradi posebnega zaposlitvenega statusa svojih zaposlenih, ne bi nujno upravičili prispevka države, ker bi družba OTE lahko imela koristi zaradi drugih ugodnosti, ki nevtralizirajo stroške SPU (glej uvodno izjavo 47).
Such advantages could arise from the specific employment status of OTE employees, in general, or specific interventions, reducing OTE’s labour costs below the labour costs of companies subject to the generally applicable labour laws, such as exemption from unemployment charges or relief from pension obligations.
Take ugodnosti bi lahko izhajale iz posebnega zaposlitvenega statusa zaposlenih pri OTE, na splošno, ali iz posebnih intervencij, zaradi katerih bi bili delovni stroški družbe OTE manjši od delovnih stroškov podjetij, za katere velja splošna delovna zakonodaja, kot je izvzetje stroškov za brezposelnost ali oprostitev plačila pokojninskih obveznosti.
OTE might also derive benefits from its former monopoly position, compensating for the disadvantages resulting from the extra costs of the VRS (in particular as regards its fixed telecom network).
Tudi nekdanji monopolni položaj lahko koristi družbi OTE in nadomesti slabši položaj, ki izhaja iz dodatnih stroškov SPU (še posebno v zvezi s fiksnim telekomunikacijskim omrežjem).
Labour-law-related advantages
Ugodnosti v zvezi z delovnim pravom
The Commission now considers that the compatibility assessment under Article 87(3)(c) of measures that aim to compensate an ex-monopolist for the extra costs arising from a period when the company concerned operated as a monopoly should be limited to examining whether the company has benefited, or continues to benefit, from other advantages of a similar nature (such as, in the case at hand, other labour-law-related advantages enjoyed by OTE) which may neutralise the costs in question.
Komisija zdaj meni, da bi morala biti ocena skladnosti ukrepov s členom 87(3)(c), katerih namen je nadomestiti dodatne stroške podjetja z nekdanjim monopolnim položajem, ki izhajajo iz obdobja, ko je zadevna družba delovala kot monopolist, omejena na preiskavo o tem, če je družba imela koristi ali še ima koristi od drugih podobnih ugodnosti (kot v tem primeru, druge ugodnosti v zvezi z delovnim pravom, ki jih ima družba OTE), ki lahko nevtralizirajo zadevne stroške.
In this regard, the report by Prof. Levantis commissioned by the Greek State concludes that OTE does not benefit from any kind of labour advantages, and that for the rest, OTE is subject to the general labour law framework like any other public limited company.
V zvezi s tem prof. Levantis v poročilu, ki ga je naročila grška država, sklepa, da OTE nima koristi od kakršnih koli delovnih ugodnosti in da za družbo OTE velja splošni okvir za delovno pravo kot za vsako drugo delniško družbo.
Moreover, the Greek authorities have confirmed, as requested by the Commission at the opening of the formal investigation, that OTE, like any other employer in Greece, is subject to the payment of unemployment insurance contributions in accordance with the applicable social security legislation.
Nadalje so grški organi potrdili, kot je zahtevala Komisija ob sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave, da mora OTE, kot vsak drug delodajalec v Grčiji, plačati prispevke za socialno zavarovanje za nezaposlenost v skladu z veljavno zakonodajo za socialno varnost.
At the opening of the formal investigation, the Commission also queried whether OTE had in the past benefited from a relief from its pension liabilities.
Ob sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave je Komisija tudi raziskovala, če je imela družba OTE v preteklosti koristi zaradi oprostitev plačila pokojninskih obveznosti.
According to the information submitted by the Greek authorities, OTE has never been exempted or relieved from its pension obligations as an employer [51].
Glede na podatke, ki so jih predložili grški organi, družba OTE ni bila nikoli izvzeta ali oproščena plačila pokojninskih obveznosti kot delodajalec [51].
Competition-related advantages
Ugodnosti v zvezi s konkurenco