natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
States' implementation of these international instruments may be significantly facilitated, in part, by assistance provided through the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009, which was approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in September 2005 [3].
Državam bi uveljavljanje teh mednarodnih instrumentov utegnila vsaj v določenem delu znatno olajšati pomoč v okviru Načrta za jedrsko varnost MAAE za obdobje 2006–2009, ki ga je septembra 2005 potrdil Svet guvernerjev MAAE [3].
The Nuclear Security Plan includes three activity areas: (1) Needs assessment, analysis and coordination; (2) Prevention; and (3) Detection and response.
Načrt za jedrsko varnost obravnava dejavnosti na treh področjih: (1) ocena potreb, analiza in usklajevanje, (2) preprečevanje in (3) odkrivanje in odziv.
It also includes a part referred to as ‘Activities Supporting Nuclear Security’, which comprises activities originally identified for their safety and safeguards objectives but which are also recognised for their important contributions to nuclear security.
Prav tako vsebuje del o „Dejavnostih v podporo jedrski varnosti“, ki zajema dejavnosti, prvotno navedene zaradi njihovih varnostnih in nadzornih ciljev, vendar se zanje šteje, da pomembno prispevajo tudi k jedrski varnosti.
It is of utmost importance that the required national legislation for the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and, if applicable, an additional protocol, is in place [5].
Nadvse pomembno je, da se uveljavi nacionalna zakonodaja, potrebna za izvajanje celovitega sporazuma o nadzornih ukrepih z MAAE in po potrebi Dodatnega protokola [5].
The IAEA is about to complete implementation of Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
MAAE zaključuje izvajanje Skupnega ukrepa Sveta 2004/495/SZVP z dne 17. maja 2004 o podpori dejavnostim MAAE po Načrtu za jedrsko varnost in v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje.
In addition, the IAEA is in the process of implementing Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on support of IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP of 12 June 2006, on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Poleg tega je MAAE v postopku izvajanja Skupnega ukrepa Sveta 2005/574/SZVP z dne 18. julija 2005 o podpori dejavnostim MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje in Skupnega ukrepa Sveta 2006/418/SZVP z dne 12. junija 2006 o podpori dejavnostim MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje.
With the associated contributions of the EU, the IAEA has initiated major activities to support the efforts of recipient States in the Caucasus, Central Asia, south-eastern Europe and the Balkans, the Mediterranean region in the Middle East, and Africa to strengthen nuclear security and the implementation of international safeguards in these countries.
S pomočjo, ki jo je prispevala EU, je MAAE sprožila obsežne dejavnosti v podporo prizadevanjem držav prejemnic na Kavkazu, v Srednji Aziji, Jugovzhodni Evropi in na Balkanu, na sredozemskem območju Bližnjega vzhoda in v Afriki, katerih namen je okrepiti jedrsko varnost in uveljaviti mednarodne nadzorne ukrepe v teh državah.
in south-eastern Europe: Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope: Albanija, Bosna in Hercegovina, Črna gora, Hrvaška, Moldavija, Nekdanja jugoslovanska republika Makedonija, Srbija in Turčija;
in the Central Asia region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan;
na srednjeazijskem območju: Kazahstan, Kirgizistan, Tadžikistan, Turkmenistan in Uzbekistan;
in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syrian Arab Republic; and
na območju Sredozemlja in Bližnjega vzhoda: Izrael, Jordanija, Libanon, Sirija; ter
in Africa [6]: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe;
v Afriki [6]: Alžirija, Angola, Benin, Bocvana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Centralnoafriška republika, Čad, Kamerun, Komori, Kongo, Demokratična republika Kongo, Džibuti, Egipt, Ekvatorialna Gvineja, Eritreja, Etiopija, Gabon, Gambija, Gana, Gvineja, Gvineja Bissau, Južna Afrika, Kenija, Lesoto, Liberija, Libija, Madagaskar, Malavi, Mali, Maroko, Mauritius, Mavretanija, Mozambik, Namibija, Niger, Nigerija, Ruanda, Sao Tome in Principe, Senegal, Sejšeli, Sierra Leone, Slonokoščena obala, Somalija, Sudan, Svazi, Tanzanija, Togo, Tunizija, Uganda, Zambija, Zimbabve in Zelenortski otoki;
in the South-East Asia region: Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.
na območju Jugovzhodne Azije: Bangladeš, Brunej, Filipini, Indonezija, Kambodža, Laos, Malezija, Mjanmar, Singapur, Tajska, Vietnam.
Work will continue in south-eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East, and in Africa on the basis of the existing Joint Actions and an update of the needs evaluations carried out as part of those Joint Actions.
Dejavnosti se bodo nadaljevale na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope; v Srednji Aziji; na območju Kavkaza; na območju Sredozemlja in Bližnjega vzhoda in v Afriki, in sicer na podlagi obstoječih skupnih ukrepov in posodobitve ocenjevanja potreb, ki se izvaja kot del teh skupnih ukrepov.
This Joint Action will focus on South-East Asia.
Ta skupni ukrep se bo osredotočal na Jugovzhodno Azijo.
The final selection of the additional countries in the South-East Asia region to receive support will be made on the basis of the needs evaluation phase, which will comprise evaluation of existing information in headquarters supplemented by assessment missions where required.
Dokončni izbor drugih držav na območju Jugovzhodne Azije, ki naj bi bile deležne podpore, bo opravljen glede na ugotovitve v fazi ocenjevanja potreb, ki bo zajemalo ustrezno pregledovanje obstoječih podatkov na sedežu, po potrebi dopolnjeno z ocenjevalnimi misijami.
Priorities will be set in identifying the countries for each project that would be covered by the budget made available through EU support.
Pri določanju držav za vsak projekt bodo postavljene prioritete, ki se bodo krile iz proračuna, razpoložljivega zahvaljujoč podpori EU.
The legal foundation for nuclear security comprises, in large part, international instruments and recognised principles (treaties, conventions, agreements, norms, IAEA standards, codes of conduct and guidance documents, and recommendations) that are implemented by national authorities to control nuclear material and other radioactive sources.
Pravno podlago za jedrsko varnost pretežno sestavljajo mednarodni instrumenti in priznana načela (pogodbe, konvencije, sporazumi, merila, standardi MAAE, pravila ravnanja in usmeritveni dokumenti ter priporočila), ki jih uveljavljajo nacionalni organi za nadzor nad jedrskim materialom in drugimi radioaktivnimi viri.
Such gaps, combined with inefficient regulatory control infrastructures result in a weakness of the global security regime.
Te vrzeli v povezavi z neučinkovitimi upravnimi nadzornimi infrastrukturami botrujejo šibkosti svetovne varnostne ureditve.
The regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources must be effective and must function adequately in accordance with international standards, the guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the associated import/export guidance, and with best practices.
Nadzorna infrastruktura za varstvo pred sevanji in za zaščito radioaktivnih virov mora biti dejansko učinkovita in delovati ustrezno v skladu z mednarodnimi standardi, smernicami iz Pravil ravnanja za varnost in zaščito radioaktivnih virov in najboljšo prakso.
It is important that national implementing legislation clearly identify the nuclear activities, installations, facilities and material to which safeguards will be applied.
Pomembno je, da se v nacionalnih izvedbenih predpisih jasno opredelijo jedrske dejavnosti, obrati, objekti in material, za katere bodo veljali nadzorni ukrepi.
In particular, the State's domestic legislation should be revised to expand the responsibilities and powers of the regulatory body designated for the purposes of implementing and applying the safeguards agreements concluded.
Zlasti je treba notranjo zakonodajo države revidirati tako, da se razširijo pristojnosti in pooblastila upravnega organa, ki je bil določen za namene izvajanja in uporabe sklenjenih sporazumov o nadzornih ukrepih.
States also accept obligations to meet international norms related to nuclear security when becoming parties to the CPPNM by ratifying the Amendment to the CPPNM, and when becoming a party to the Nuclear Terrorism Convention.
Države sprejmejo obveznost, da bodo izpolnjevale mednarodna merila v zvezi z jedrsko varnostjo, tudi ko postanejo pogodbenice Konvencije o fizičnem varovanju jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov, CPPNM, z ratifikacijo Spremembe CPPNM in ko postanejo pogodbenice Konvencije o jedrskem terorizmu.
In addition, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540(2004) also obliges all States to establish domestic controls including the establishment of appropriate controls over materials related to nuclear weapons.
Resolucija Varnostnega sveta Združenih narodov 1540(2004) pa vse države obvezuje tudi k vzpostavitvi notranjega nadzora, vključno z vzpostavitvijo ustreznega nadzora nad materiali, povezanimi z jedrskim orožjem.
To combat illicit trafficking, States thus require the necessary regulatory systems to be in place, as well as technical systems (including user-friendly instruments) and available procedures and information at border stations for detecting attempts to smuggle radioactive materials (including fissile, radioactive materials) or unauthorised trade in sensitive equipment and technology.
Za boj proti nedovoljenemu prometu morajo zato države vzpostaviti ustrezne nadzorne pa tudi tehnične sisteme (vključno z uporabniku prijaznimi instrumenti) ter postopke in informacije, ki bodo na mejnih prehodih na voljo za odkrivanje poskusov tihotapljenja radioaktivnih snovi (vključno s cepljivimi radioaktivnimi snovmi) ali nedovoljene trgovine z občutljivo opremo in tehnologijo.
Evaluation will be carried out by the IAEA to identify needs to strengthen nuclear security in each of those countries mentioned in point 1, in which such evaluation has not been completed.
MAAE bo izvedla ocenjevanje z namenom opredelitve potreb po krepitvi jedrske varnosti v vsaki od držav iz točke 1, v katerih takšno ocenjevanje ni bilo dokončano.
Identify a subset of facilities and locations containing these materials to be selected for subsequent upgrading and support,
Določena bo skupina objektov in lokacij s temi materiali, ki naj bi bile kasneje deležne nadgradnje in podpore,
The specific equipment needed to provide protection would also be determined as a result of the evaluation,
V okviru ocene bo na podlagi ocenjevanja določena tudi posebna oprema, potrebna za zaščito,
evaluate, in each country, the current status of the capability to combat illicit trafficking and identify needs for the required improvements,
za vsako državo bodo ocenjene trenutne zmogljivosti za boj proti nedovoljenemu prometu, opredeljene bodo tudi potrebe v zvezi s potrebnimi izboljšavami,
evaluate, in each country, the status of the SSAC and identify needs for the required improvements.
v vsaki državi bo ocenjen položaj SSAC, opredeljene pa bodo tudi potrebe v zvezi s potrebnimi izboljšavami.
to strengthen national legislative and regulatory infrastructures related to nuclear and other radioactive material taking into account relevant international instruments and recognised principles in the nuclear security field and existing synergies with national systems of radiation safety,
okrepiti nacionalno zakonodajno in nadzorno infrastrukturo, ki ima opraviti z jedrskimi in drugimi radioaktivnimi snovmi, ob upoštevanju ustreznih mednarodnih instrumentov in priznanih načel na področju jedrske varnosti ter obstoječih sinergij z nacionalnimi sistemi varstva pred sevanji,
to strengthen national legislative frameworks for the implementation of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols concluded between States and the Agency,
okrepiti nacionalne zakonodajne okvire za izvajanje sporazumov o nadzornih ukrepih in dodatnih protokolov, sklenjenih med državami in Agencijo,
development and adoption of comprehensive, coherent and effective legislation at the national level, thereby contributing to a harmonised, strengthened and more universal system of nuclear security,
razvoj in sprejetje celovite, usklajene in učinkovite zakonodaje na nacionalni ravni ter s tem prispevek k usklajenemu, okrepljenemu in splošneje razširjenemu sistemu jedrske varnosti,
development and adoption (in national languages) of national legislation necessary to enable States to comply with their obligations under Agency Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,
razvoj in sprejetje potrebne nacionalne zakonodaje (v jezikih držav), potrebne, da bi države lahko izpolnjevale obveznosti iz sporazumov o nadzornih ukrepih in dodatnih protokolov, sklenjenih z Agencijo,
to strengthen physical protection of nuclear facilities and of nuclear and other radioactive materials in nuclear applications in the selected countries,
v izbranih državah okrepiti fizično varovanje jedrskih objektov ter jedrskih in drugih radioaktivnih snovi pri jedrskih uporabah,
to strengthen the control and physical protection of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications in the selected countries,
v izbranih državah okrepiti nadzor in fizično varovanje radioaktivnih materialov pri nejedrskih uporabah,
physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials at selected nuclear facilities and locations upgraded,
nadgrajeno fizično varovanje jedrskih materialov in drugih radioaktivnih snovi na izbranih jedrskih objektih in napravah ter lokacijah,
vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications protected or, as appropriate, dismantled and transferred to safe and secure storage in the selected countries,
zavarovanje ali po potrebi razgradnja in odstranitev ali preselitev nevarovanih virov pri nejedrskih uporabah v izbranih državah v varna in varovana skladišča,
national regulatory infrastructure for physical protection improved through expert assistance,
nacionalna nadzorna infrastruktura za fizično varovanje izboljšana s pomočjo izvedencev,
establishment and maintenance of effective SSACs capable of implementing safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including in States with ‘small quantities protocols’,
vzpostavitev in skrb za učinkovite SSAC, ki bodo sposobni izvajati sporazume o nadzornih ukrepih in dodatne protokole, tudi v državah, ki imajo sklenjen „protokol o manjših količinah“,
This information will also facilitate the prioritisation of the various activities undertaken to combat illicit trafficking,
Te informacije bodo olajšale določanje prednostnih nalog v sklopu boja proti nedovoljenemu prometu,
national frameworks established through expert assistance, to combat illicit trafficking and to improve the national coordination of control cross-border movements of radioactive materials, sensitive nuclear equipment and technology in the selected countries,
v izbranih državah z izvedensko pomočjo vzpostavljeni nacionalni okviri za boj proti nedovoljenemu prometu in za izboljšanje nacionalnega usklajevanja nadzora nad čezmejnim pretokom radioaktivnih materialov, občutljive jedrske opreme in tehnologije,
border-monitoring equipment upgraded at selected border crossings,
nadgrajena oprema za nadzor meje na izbranih mejnih prehodih,
The evaluation will be performed within a period of three months after the entry into force of the contribution agreement between the Commission and the IAEA.
Ocenjevanje bo izvedeno v treh mesecih po začetku veljavnosti sporazuma o prispevanju med Komisijo in MAAE.
The three projects will be performed in parallel during the 21 subsequent months.
Ti trije projekti bodo potekali vzporedno v 21 mesecih po tem.
The total estimated duration for the implementation of this Joint Action is 24 months.
Skupno naj bi se ta skupni ukrep izvajal 24 mesecev.
The implementation of the three projects will be done directly by the IAEA staff and/or by selected experts or contractors from IAEA Member States.
Zadevne tri projekte bo neposredno izvedlo osebje MAAE in/ali izbrani strokovnjaki ali pogodbeniki držav članic MAAE.
In the case of contractors, the procurement of any goods, works or services by the IAEA in the context of this Joint Action shall be carried out in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures of the IAEA.
V primeru pogodbenikov bo MAAE naročila za blago, dela ali storitve v okviru tega skupnega ukrepa oddala v skladu z veljavnimi pravili in postopki MAAE.
Experts from IAEA Member States may be considered as third party participants.
Strokovnjaki držav članic MAAE se lahko štejejo kot udeležene tretje osebe.
In September 2005, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided that in order to strengthen the safeguards system, the so-called ‘small quantities protocol’ (SQP) to NPT safeguards agreements should remain part of the Agency ' s safeguards system, subject to modifications in the standard text and the change in the SQP criteria; the 2005 IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution in which it noted, inter alia, that, in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.
Septembra 2005 je Svet guvernerjev Mednarodne agencije za atomsko energijo (MAAE) sklenil, da naj v korist krepitve sistema nadzornih ukrepov t. i. „protokol o manjših količinah“ ( „small quantities protocol“ – SQP) ostane del sistema nadzornih ukrepov Agencije, s pridržkom sprememb standardnega besedila in drugačnih meril za SQP; Generalna konferenca MAAE je leta 2005 sprejela resolucijo, v kateri je med drugim ugotovila, da takrat, ko ima država celovit sporazum o nadzornih ukrepih, ki ga dopolnjuje veljavni Dodatni protokol, to dvoje za to državo predstavlja višji standard preverjanja.
Up to 20 to 25 countries in Africa are foreseen to receive support for nuclear security upgrades under different projects.
Skupaj naj bi bilo v okviru različnih projektov v Afriki podpore za jedrsko varnost deležnih kakih 20–25 držav.
Council Common Position 2008/346/CFSP
Skupno stališče Sveta 2008/346/SZVP
amending Common Position 2007/871/CFSP updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism
o spremembi Skupnega stališča 2007/871/SZVP o posodobitvi Skupnega stališča 2001/931/SZVP o uporabi posebnih ukrepov za boj proti terorizmu
On 20 December 2007, the Council adopted Common Position 2007/871/CFSP updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP [2].
Svet je 20. decembra 2007 sprejel Skupno stališče 2007/871/SZVP o posodobitvi Skupnega stališča 2001/931/SZVP [2].
The Council has determined that there are no longer grounds for keeping certain persons on the list of persons, groups and entities to which Common Position 2001/931/CFSP applies,
Svet je ugotovil, da ni več razlogov, da bi bile nekatere osebe s seznama oseb, skupin in organizacij, za katere se uporablja Skupno stališče 2001/931/SZVP, še naprej vključene na ta seznam –
The persons listed in the Annex to this Common Position shall be removed from the list annexed to Common Position 2007/871/CFSP.
Osebe iz Priloge k temu skupnemu stališču se črtajo s seznama v Prilogi k Skupnemu stališču 2007/871/SZVP.
OJ L 340, 22.12.2007, p. 109.
UL L 340, 22.12.2007, str. 109.
List of persons referred to in Article 1 of this Common Position
Seznam oseb iz člena 1 tega skupnega stališča
Council Common Position 2008/347/CFSP
Skupno stališče Sveta 2008/347/SZVP
On 20 December 2007, the Council adopted Common Position 2007/871/CFSP updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP [2] and the list of persons, groups and entities to which that Common Position applies.
Svet je 20. decembra 2007 sprejel Skupno stališče 2007/871/SZVP o posodobitvi Skupnega stališča 2001/931/SZVP [2] in seznam oseb, skupin in organizacij, za katere se to skupno stališče uporablja.
Following a review, the Council has determined that Mr SISON should continue to be subject to the specific measures provided for in Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.
Po pregledu je Svet sklenil, da bi za g. Joseja Mario SISONA še vedno morali veljati posebni ukrepi, določeni v Skupnem stališču 2001/931/SZVP.
The Council has also concluded that the entries for Mr SISON and for the Communist Party of the Philippines on the list of persons, groups and entities to which Common Position 2001/931/CFSP applies should be amended,
Svet je tudi sklenil, da bi bilo treba spremeniti vnosa o g. Joseju Marii SISONU in Komunistični partiji Filipinov, navedena na seznamu oseb, skupin in organizacij, za katere se uporablja Skupno stališče 2001/931/SZVP –
In the Annex to Common Position 2007/871/CFSP the entry for Mr SISON, Jose Maria (a.k.a. Armando Liwanag, a.k.a. Joma), shall be replaced by the following:
V Prilogi k Skupnemu stališču 2007/871/SZVP se vnos za SISONA, Joseja Mario (alias Armanda Liwanaga, alias Jomo), nadomesti z naslednjim:
‘SISON, Jose Maria (a.k.a Armando Liwanag, a.k.a Joma), born 8.2.1939 in Cabugao (Philippines) — person playing a leading role in the “Communist Party of the Philippines”, including the “NPA” ’.
„SISON, Jose Maria (alias Armando Liwanag, alias Joma), rojen 8.2.1939 v Cabugau, Filipini – ima vodilno vlogo v ‚Komunistični partiji Filipinov‘, vključno z ‚NPA‘“.
In the Annex to Common Position 2007/871/CFSP, the entry for the Communist Party of the Philippines shall be replaced by the following:
V Prilogi k Skupnemu stališču 2007/871/SZVP se vnos za Komunistično partijo Filipinov nadomesti z naslednjim:
‘ “Communist Party of the Philippines”, including the “New People’s Army” — “NPA”, Philippines, linked to SISON, Jose Maria (a.k.a Armando Liwanag, a.k.a Joma, who plays a leading role in the “Communist Party of the Philippines”, including the “NPA”)’.
„‚Komunistična partija Filipinov‘ (Communist Party of the Philippines), vključno z ‚Novo ljudsko vojsko‘ (New People's Army – NPA), Filipini, povezana s SISONOM, Josejem Mario (alias Armandom Liwanagom, alias Jomom, ki ima vodilno vlogo v ‚Komunistični partiji Filipinov‘, vključno z ‚NPA‘)“.
Council Common Position 2008/348/CFSP
Skupno stališče Sveta 2008/348/SZVP
On 13 November 2007, the Council adopted Common Position 2007/734/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Uzbekistan [1].
Svet je 13. novembra 2007 sprejel Skupno stališče 2007/734/SZVP o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Uzbekistanu [1].