natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
New strategy (not provided for in Protocol No 8)
Nova strategija (ni predvidena v Protokolu št. 8)
After the new rolling mill is fully operational in 2008, the old rolling mill will be closed.
Po tem, ko bo nova valjarna leta 2008 začela v celoti delovati, se bo stara valjarna zaprla.
At no point before 2007 did the company’s total production exceed the maximum capacity of […] tonnes.
Pred letom 2007 ni skupna proizvodnja družbe nikoli presegla največje zmogljivosti v višini […] ton.
Thus the modification of the investment program will result in an additional reduction of the company’s capacity by […] tonnes.
Sprememba programa naložb bo tako povzročila dodatno zmanjšanje zmogljivosti družbe za […] ton.
In its letter of 6 December 2006, the Commission indicated that AHW’s restructuring plan had not been implemented and stated that it intended to investigate whether this constituted a misuse of the restructuring aid granted.
V dopisu z dne 6. decembra 2006 je Komisija navedla, da načrt prestrukturiranja družbe AHW ni bil izveden, in sporočila, da namerava preiskati, ali je to zloraba odobrene pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
In particular the Commission indicated that a large amount of the aid had not been properly used.
Komisija je zlasti navedla, da velik del zneska pomoči ni bil ustrezno uporabljen.
Further, the Commission doubted whether it could accept the updated business plan under point 10 of Protocol No 8, as it concerns a new investment which might be useful but not necessary for the restructuring of the company.
Poleg tega je Komisija dvomila, ali lahko sprejme posodobljeni poslovni načrt na podlagi točke 10 Protokola št. 8, saj zadeva novo naložbo, ki je lahko koristna, ni pa potrebna za prestrukturiranje družbe.
The Polish authorities insist that AHW used the State guarantee in accordance with the terms and conditions under which it was granted and explains that:
Poljski organi vztrajajo, da je družba AHW uporabljala državno jamstvo v skladu s pogoji, pod katerimi je bilo odobreno, in pojasnjujejo, da:
Firstly, the repayment of the sale and leaseback transaction related to the investments, which were described only as a very general measure, without any investments being specified in detail.
prvič, je odplačilo transakcije prodaje in povratnega najema zadevalo naložbe, ki so bile opisane samo kot zelo splošen ukrep, pri čemer ni bila nobena naložba podrobno opisana;
Secondly, it was part of the financial restructuring as the amount of restructuring costs was PLN 857 million, since they also consider losses and liabilities to be restructuring costs.
drugič, je bilo del finančnega prestrukturiranja, saj je znesek stroškov prestrukturiranja znašal 857 milijonov PLN, saj med stroške prestrukturiranja uvrščajo tudi izgube in obveznosti.
Poland indicates that these consist of losses of PLN 150 million for the years 2002 and 2003, indicated in the forecasted balance sheet (p. 79, 2003 IBP).
Poljska navaja, da so stroški prestrukturiranja sestavljeni iz izgub v višini 150 milijonov PLN za leti 2002 in 2003, kot je bilo navedeno v predvideni bilanci stanja (str. 79, načrt IPN iz leta 2003).
Moreover the company also had long-term and short-term debt of PLN 513,4 million.
Poleg tega je imela družba tudi dolgoročni in kratkoročni dolg v višini 513,4 milijona PLN.
The additional costs come from the restructuring of employment and investments (PLN 190,5 million).
Dodatni stroški izhajajo iz prestrukturiranja zaposlovanja in naložb (190,5 milijona PLN);
Thirdly, the transaction was part of the asset restructuring which was provided for in the restructuring plan.
tretjič, je bila transakcija del prestrukturiranja sredstev, ki je bilo predvideno v načrtu prestrukturiranja.
The company therefore decided ‘to replace the leaseback agreement with a less costly financial loan’ in order to reduce its ‘negative cash flow effects from existing financial debt’.
Družba se je zato odločila „nadomestiti pogodbo o povratnem najemu z manj dragim finančnim posojilom“ za zmanjšanje njegovih „negativnih učinkov na denarni tok iz sedanjega finančnega dolga“.
Poland indicated that this was urgent as HLW was at the ‘point of exhaustion of its financial resources’.
Poljska je navedla, da je bilo to nujno, saj je bila družba HLW „tik pred izčrpanjem svojih finančnih virov“.
The Polish authorities further claim that the sale and leaseback transaction also contributed to the viability of the company but do not substantiate this.
Poljski organi nato trdijo, da je transakcija prodaje in povratnega najema prispevala tudi k rentabilnosti družbe, vendar tega ne utemeljujejo.
The Polish authorities confirm that the timing of the aid was crucial.
Poljski organi potrjujejo, da je bil čas pomoči ključen.
In fact they state that ‘there was a need for State aid only in 2003/04’ when there was essentially a financing gap [17].
Dejansko navajajo, da „je potreba po državni pomoči obstajala samo v letih 2003/2004“, ko je v bistvu obstajala vrzel v financiranju [17].
The Polish authorities reiterate that AHW has paid back the aid.
Poljski organi ponovno poudarjajo, da je družba AHW odplačala pomoč.
The State guarantee was supposed to be only supplementary to the other collaterals for the loan.
Predvideno je bilo, da bo državno jamstvo le dopolnjevalo druga zavarovanja za posojilo.
In fact a collateral in the form of a pledge on land and on all fixed assets was given to the bank, as well as seven bills of exchange.
Banki so bila dejansko dana poroštvo na zemljišče in vsa osnovna sredstva ter sedem menic.
Moreover, Poland submitted details on various other financing instruments that HLW was also using at the time and consequently argues that HLW could have obtained financing on the market without the guarantee.
Poleg tega je Poljska predložila podrobne podatke o različnih drugih finančnih instrumentih, ki jih je takrat prav tako uporabljala družba HLW, in na tej podlagi trdi, da bi lahko družba HLW pridobila financiranje na trgu brez jamstva.
The Polish authorities recall that Arcelor would not have bought the company unless it was certain that HLW was ‘entitled to the State aid it had received for the restructuring process’.
Poljski organi opozarjajo, da družba Arcelor ne bi kupila družbe HLW, če ne bi bila prepričana, da je bila ta „upravičena do državne pomoči, ki jo je prejela za postopek prestrukturiranja“.
The Polish authorities underline that the modification of the plan will result in a broader investment programme than the one envisaged in the original plan and that all the investment was irrecoverably committed by the end of 2006 (i.e. by the end of restructuring period).
Poljski organi poudarjajo, da bo zaradi spremembe načrta program naložb širši, kot je bilo predvideno v prvotnem načrtu, in da so bile vse naložbe dokončno izvedene do konca leta 2006 (tj. do konca obdobja prestrukturiranja).
The Polish authorities are thus of the opinion that the aid should not be considered misused and the proposed modification of the plan should be considered compatible with Community rules.
Poljski organi zato menijo, da se pomoč ne sme šteti za zlorabljeno in da je treba predlagano spremembo načrta šteti za združljivo s pravili Skupnosti.
The Polish authorities indicate that the investment envisaged in the 2005 IBP, i.e. the replacement of the medium mill, was discussed as early as 1997.
Poljski organi navajajo, da se je o naložbi, predvideni v načrtu IPN iz leta 2005, tj. zamenjavi valjarne za srednje težko profilirano jeklo, razpravljalo že leta 1997.
However from 1997 to 2003 the company had insufficient cash flow to finance this investment.
Vendar pa družba med letoma 1997 in 2003 ni imela na voljo dovolj finančnih sredstev za financiranje te naložbe.
Only when Arcelor took over the company were sufficient funds available for the financing [18].
Šele ko je družba Arcelor prevzela družbo HLW, so bila na voljo zadostna sredstva za financiranje [18].
Furthermore Poland argues that the product range was only broadly defined in the 2003 IBP and what was defined was not optimal to meet the changed demand structure in the Polish market, which required adaptation of the product range.
Poleg tega Poljska trdi, da je bil proizvodni asortiment v načrtu IPN iz leta 2003 le splošno opredeljen, in kar je bilo opredeljeno, ni bilo optimalno za zadostitev spremenjene strukture povpraševanja na poljskem trgu, kar je zahtevalo prilagoditev proizvodnega asortimenta.
The Polish authorities argue that the amendments in the 2005 IBP have no negative impact on Protocol No 8.
Poljski organi trdijo, da spremembe načrta IPN iz leta 2005 nimajo negativnega vpliva na Protokol št. 8.
The new plan is necessary to achieve ‘lasting viability’.
Nov načrt je potreben za dosego „trajne rentabilnosti“.
The current viability at the end of the restructuring period was only due to the positive market and price/revenue/cost situation.
Sedanja rentabilnost na koncu obdobja prestrukturiranja je samo posledica pozitivnega stanja na trgu in stanja cen/prihodkov/stroškov.
In this sense it is claimed that the blooming technology would not guarantee the company being competitive in the long term, and needed to be replaced by a state-of-the-art continuous casting process.
V tem smislu se trdi, da tehnologija bluming ne bo zagotovila dolgoročne konkurenčnosti družbe in da jo je treba nadomestiti z najsodobnejšim postopkom kontinuiranega litja.
The Polish authorities suggest that even if the aid obtained was considered to be additional operating aid, it should be deemed to be balanced by the compensatory measures, i.e. the company’s additional capacity reduction after the strategy was modified.
Poljski organi navajajo, da tudi če se pridobljena pomoč obravnava kot dodatna pomoč za poslovanje, jo je treba šteti za uravnoteženo z izravnalnimi ukrepi, tj. dodatnim zmanjšanjem zmogljivosti družbe po spremembi strategije.
The Polish authorities also confirm that HLW did not carry out all its investments because its asset restructuring was delayed.
Poljski organi prav tako potrjujejo, da družba HLW ni izvedla vseh svojih naložb, saj je bilo njeno prestrukturiranje sredstev odloženo.
Poland also informed the Commission of the interest rate charged for the loan as indicated above in point (41) and the other costs charged in relation to the loan and guaranty as indicated in point (42).
Poljska je Komisijo obvestila tudi o obrestni meri, zaračunani za posojilo, kot je navedeno v točki (41) zgoraj, in drugih stroških, zaračunanih v zvezi s posojilom in jamstvom, kot je navedeno v točki 42.
The beneficiary submitted comments on the initiation of the procedure and has subsequently been kept informed about the information exchange between the Commission and the Polish authorities.
Prejemnik pomoči je predložil pripombe o sprožitvi postopka, po tem je bil obveščen o izmenjavi informacij med Komisijo in poljskimi organi.
AHW argues that a large part of the aid was used to buy back some leased assets in order to reduce financial costs.
Družba AHW trdi, da je bil velik del pomoči porabljen za odkup nekaterih sredstev, danih v zakup, za znižanje finančnih stroškov.
Moreover, as the investments concerned the leased property, its buy-back could be seen as part of the restructuring.
Ker so naložbe zadevale premoženje, dano v zakup, bi bilo mogoče odkup tega premoženja šteti za del prestrukturiranja.
The beneficiary also argues that the guarantee was granted before Poland’s accession to the European Union (the resolution of the Council of Ministers was adopted in December 2003), and it was therefore up to the Polish government to determine the purpose of the aid.
Prejemnik pomoči prav tako trdi, da je bilo jamstvo odobreno pred pristopom Poljske k Evropski uniji (resolucija Sveta ministrov je bila sprejeta decembra 2003), zato je bila poljska vlada tista, ki je določila namen pomoči.
Moreover, the company indicates that it has used the aid in exact accordance with the decision granting the guarantee.
Poleg tega družba navaja, da je uporabila pomoč popolnoma v skladu z odločbo o odobritvi jamstva.
AHW reiterates that the new plan is to serve the objective of the old plan and the change of strategy is necessary for the long-term viability of the company.
Družba AHW ponovno poudarja, da bo novi načrt ustrezal cilju starega načrta in da je sprememba strategije potrebna za dolgoročno rentabilnost družbe.
Applicable law
Zakonodaja, ki se uporablja
Point 1 of Protocol No 8 provides that ‘notwithstanding Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty, State aid granted by Poland for restructuring purposes to specified parts of the Polish steel industry shall be deemed to be compatible with the common market’ if, inter alia, the conditions set out in the Protocol are met.
Točka 1 Protokola št. 8 določa, da se „ne glede na člena 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES državna pomoč, ki jo je odobrila Poljska za namene prestrukturiranja določenih delov poljske jeklarske industrije, šteje za združljivo s skupnim trgom“, če so med drugim izpolnjeni pogoji, ki so določeni v Protokolu.
The grace period for granting restructuring aid to the Polish steel industry under the Europe Agreement was extended by the Council until the accession of Poland to the European Union.
Obdobje odloga za odobritev pomoči za prestrukturiranje poljski jeklarski industriji v skladu z Evropskim sporazumom je Svet podaljšal do pristopa Poljske k Evropski uniji.
This arrangement was recognised in Protocol No 8 as part of Poland’s accession to the European Union.
Ta dogovor je bil priznan v Protokolu št. 8 kot del poljskega pristopa k Evropski uniji.
In order to achieve this objective, the Protocol covers a time frame extending before and after accession.
Za dosego tega cilja Protokol pokriva časovno obdobje pred pristopom in po njem.
More precisely, it authorises a limited amount of restructuring aid for the years from 1997 to 2003 and forbids any further State aid to the Polish steel industry for restructuring purposes between 1997 and 2006.
Natančneje, v Protokolu je odobren omejen znesek pomoči za prestrukturiranje za leta od 1997 do 2003 in prepovedana kakršna koli dodatna državna pomoč za namene prestrukturiranja poljski jeklarski industriji med letoma 1997 in 2006.
In this respect it clearly differs from other provisions of the Accession Treaty such as the interim mechanism set out in Annex IV (the existing aid procedure), which only concerns State aid granted before accession insofar as it is ‘still applicable after’ the date of accession.
S tega vidika se Protokol jasno razlikuje od drugih določb Pogodbe o pristopu, kot je začasni mehanizem, določen v Prilogi IV („postopek obstoječe pomoči“), ki zadeva samo državno pomoč, dodeljeno pred pristopom, če je ta „še vedno veljavna po“ datumu pristopa.
Protocol No 8 can therefore be regarded as lex specialis which, for the matters that it covers, supersedes any other provision of the Act of Accession [19].
Protokol št. 8 se tako lahko obravnava kot lex specialis, ki v zadevah, ki jih ureja, izpodrinja vse druge določbe Pogodbe o pristopu [19].
Consequently, while Articles 87 and 88 ECT would normally not apply to aid granted before accession and not applicable after accession, the provisions of Protocol No 8 extend State aid monitoring under the EC Treaty to any aid granted for the restructuring of the Polish steel industry between 1997 and 2006.
In čeprav se člena 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES običajno ne bi uporabljala za pomoč, dodeljeno pred pristopom, ki ni veljavna po pristopu, določbe Protokola št. 8 razširjajo spremljanje državne pomoči v skladu s Pogodbo ES na vso pomoč, dodeljeno za prestrukturiranje poljske jeklarske industrije v obdobju med letoma 1997 in 2006.
The decision may be taken under Article 88(2) EC after Poland’s accession because, in the absence of specific provisions in Protocol No 8, the normal rules and principles should apply.
Ta odločba se lahko sprejme po pristopu Poljske v skladu s členom 88(2) Pogodbe ES, ker se v odsotnosti posebnih določb v Protokolu št. 8 uporabljajo običajna pravila in načela.
Consequently Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 (hereinafter the Procedural Regulation) [20] will also apply.
Posledično se bo uporabljala tudi Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 (v nadaljevanju „postopkovna uredba“) [20].
Point 18(a) of Protocol No 8 gives the Commission the power to take ‘appropriate steps requiring any company concerned to reimburse any aid granted in breach of the conditions laid down in this Protocol […] if monitoring of the restructuring shows that the commitments for the transitional arrangements contained in this Protocol have not been fulfilled’.
Točka 18(a) Protokola št. 8 Komisiji daje pooblastilo, da „naredi vse potrebno, da se od zadevnih družb zahteva povrnitev vseh pomoči, ki so bile dodeljene s kršenjem pogojev iz tega Protokola […], če spremljanje prestrukturiranja pokaže, da niso bile izpolnjene zaveze v zvezi s prehodno ureditvijo iz tega protokola“.
Following the formal investigation, the Commission has concluded that Poland has not been able to allay its doubts concerning misuse of the restructuring aid.
Po formalnem postopku preiskave je Komisija sklenila, da Poljska ni odpravila njenih dvomov glede zlorabe pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
The Commission concludes that the company has not properly implemented its restructuring plan as explicitly stipulated in points 9(a) and (h) of Protocol No 8.
Komisija ugotavlja, da družba ni ustrezno izvedla svojega načrta prestrukturiranja, kot je izrecno določeno v točki 9(a) in (h) Protokola št. 8.
The Commission observes that, of the financial resources made available (around EUR 34 million), only an insignificant part was used for financing investments in line with 2003 IBP, while the rest, i.e. EUR 31,2 million, was used for purposes not indicated in the plan.
Komisija opozarja, da se je od finančnih sredstev, ki so bila dana na voljo (približno 34 milijonov EUR), le zanemarljiv del uporabil za financiranje naložb v skladu z načrtom IPN iz leta 2003, medtem ko se je preostali del, tj. 31,2 milijona EUR, uporabil za namene, ki niso bili navedeni v načrtu.
To arrive at its conclusion, the Commission first assessed what kind of measures were planned in the original IBP, then whether the measures which were pursued by the company were in any way incompatible with the common market, and then the effect of the incompatibility of the misused aid in view of the overall plan, before considering the aid amount.
Za oblikovanje svojega sklepa je Komisija pred upoštevanjem zneska pomoči najprej ocenila, katere vrste ukrepi so bili načrtovani v prvotnem načrtu IPN, zatem, ali so bili ukrepi, ki jih je izvajala družba, kakor koli nezdružljivi s skupnim trgom, in nato učinek nezdružljivosti zlorabljene pomoči glede na splošni načrt.
The question of whether the new plan may change this conclusion is discussed in the following chapter (3).
O vprašanju, ali novi načrt lahko spremeni ta sklep, se razpravlja v naslednjem poglavju (3).
Scope of restructuring established in the original investment plan
Obseg prestrukturiranja, opredeljen v prvotnem naložbenem načrtu
The Commission first clarifies the scope of the 2003 IBP and whether the pay-off of the productive assets sale and leaseback agreement, for which the restructuring aid was mainly used, was covered by the 2003 IBP.
Komisija najprej pojasnjuje obseg načrta IPN iz leta 2003 in ali je bilo odplačilo pogodbe o prodaji in povratnem najemu proizvodnih sredstev, za katero se je v glavnem uporabila pomoč za prestrukturiranje, zajeto v načrt IPN iz leta 2003.
As stated above in point (34), the main task of the restructuring plan was to guarantee the execution of certain measures necessary for HLW to restore viability in a timely fashion.
Kot je navedeno v točki (34) zgoraj, je bila glavna naloga načrta prestrukturiranja zagotoviti izvedbo nekaterih ukrepov, ki jih je družba HLW potrebovala za pravočasno ponovno vzpostavitev rentabilnosti.
This mainly concerned investments and financial restructuring.
To se je nanašalo predvsem na naložbe in finančno prestrukturiranje.
The emphasis of the plan was on enabling the company to restructure in 2002 and 2003.
Poudarek načrta je bil na tem, da se družbi omogoči prestrukturiranje v letih 2002 in 2003.
Firstly, under the 2003 IBP HLW was to invest PLN [150-220] million.
Prvič, v skladu z načrtom IPN iz leta 2003 bi morala družba HLW vložiti [150–220] milijonov PLN.
However, both the beneficiary and the Polish authorities seem to infer that acquisition of the productive assets could be seen as part of the investment programme.
Vendar se zdi, da prejemnik pomoči in poljski organi sklepajo, da je mogoče nakup proizvodnih sredstev šteti za del naložbenega programa.
Poland argues that the investments were described as a very general measure, without specifying any of the investments in detail.
Poljska trdi, da so bile naložbe opisane kot zelo splošen ukrep, pri čemer niso bile nobene naložbe podrobno opisane.
Moreover the beneficiary argues that the purchase was necessary to the restructuring process ‘since the plant could not have been operated during the restructuring without these facilities’.
Poleg tega prejemnik pomoči trdi, da je bil nakup potreben za postopek prestrukturiranja, „saj jeklarna med prestrukturiranjem ne bi mogla obratovati brez teh zmogljivosti“.
The Commission cannot accept these arguments.
Komisija ne more sprejeti teh utemeljitev.
It is evident that the 2003 IBP earmarked the investments under point 4.4 in terms of costs (Table 21 of 2003 IBP, shown as Table 1 in point (18) above), object (Table 22 of 2003 IBP) and time (Table 23 of 2003 IBP).
Očitno je, da so bile v načrtu IPN iz leta 2003 naložbe predvidene na podlagi točke 4.4 z vidika stroškov (tabela 21 načrta IPN iz leta 2003, prikazana kot tabela 1 v točki 18 zgoraj), namena (tabela 22 načrta IPN iz leta 2003) in časa (tabela 23 načrta IPN iz leta 2003).
There was no room for any paying off of the productive assets sale and lease agreement.
Odplačilo pogodbe o prodaji in povratnem najemu proizvodnih sredstev ni bilo mogoče.
In fact, this attempt rather illustrates that neither the Polish authorities nor the beneficiary saw any plausible justification for paying off the sale and lease agreement.
Ta poskus dejansko kaže, da niti poljski organi niti prejemnik pomoči niso našli nobene verodostojne utemeljitve za odplačilo pogodbe o prodaji in povratnem najemu.
Otherwise this would have been included in the plan.
V nasprotnem primeru bi bilo to vključeno v načrt.
Secondly, the 2003 IBP envisages limited financial restructuring.
Drugič, v načrtu IPN iz leta 2003 je bilo predvideno omejeno finančno prestrukturiranje.
In their later submissions the Polish authorities claimed that the amount of the repurchase of the productive assets should be included in the financial restructuring [21].
V poznejših predložitvah so poljski organi trdili, da je treba znesek ponovnega odkupa proizvodnih sredstev vključiti v finančno prestrukturiranje [21].
They argue that the financial restructuring also covered existing losses of PLN 150 million and debt rescheduling of PLN 513 million and thus arrive at total restructuring costs of around PLN 858 million.
Trdijo, da je finančno prestrukturiranje pokrivalo tudi sedanje izgube v višini 150 milijonov PLN in reprogramiranje dolga v višini 513 milijonov PLN, zato skupni stroški prestrukturiranja znašajo približno 858 milijonov PLN.
However, the Commission cannot accept that the existing losses of PLN 150 million and the debt rescheduling of PLN 513 million are restructuring costs.
Vendar Komisija ne more sprejeti trditve, da so sedanje izgube v višini 150 milijonov PLN in reprogramiranje dolga v višini 513 milijonov PLN stroški prestrukturiranja.
As indicated in point (22), the Commission does not dispute that point 4.7 of the 2003 IBP mentions that ‘the company intends to restructure the liability of PLN 513 million’.
Kot je navedeno v točki 22, Komisija ne zanika, da je v točki 4.7 načrta IPN iz leta 2003 navedeno, da „družba namerava prestrukturirati obveznost v višini 513 milijonov PLN“.
However, it is not indicated that this is necessarily part of the restructuring tasks.
Vendar pa ni navedeno, da je to nujno del nalog prestrukturiranja.