natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In addition, Austria argued that the bidders had priced in the conditions of the tender procedure and therefore both offers had been higher than the actual market value.
Poleg tega je Avstrija trdila, da sta ponudnika v ceno vračunala pogoje razpisnega postopka, zato sta bili obe ponudbi višji od dejanske tržne vrednosti.
Austria offered to commission a further study by an independent expert in order to establish that a price in line with market conditions had been paid.
Avstrija je ponudila, da lahko naroči nadaljnjo študijo pri neodvisnem strokovnjaku, da bi potrdili, da je bila plačana cena skladna s tržnimi pogoji.
The role of Ausfallhaftung in the sale of BB
Vloga garancije Ausfallhaftung pri prodaji banke BB
Throughout the investigation Austria repeatedly stressed the importance of Ausfallhaftung and the ensuing financial interest of the Province of Burgenland in the sale of BB, and in this was supported by GRAWE.
Med preiskavo je Avstrija večkrat poudarila pomen garancije Ausfallhaftung in posledični finančni interes Gradiščanske, da bi prodala banko BB, kar je potrdila tudi družba GRAWE.
The criterion of ‘continued operation of Bank Burgenland and, at the same time, avoidance of the use of Ausfallhaftung’ was one of the conditions Austria had made public in the tender procedure and hence was known to all concerned.
Merilo „neprekinjeno delovanje banke BB in hkrati izogibanje uporabi garancije Ausfallhaftung“ je bilo med pogoji, ki jih je Avstrija objavila v zvezi z razpisnim postopkom, tako da je bilo znano vsem udeležencem.
In this connection, Austria and GRAWE presented the following arguments in particular.
V zvezi s tem sta Avstrija in družba GRAWE predstavili predvsem naslednje argumente.
The basis for Ausfallhaftung could be found in statute.
Podlago za garancijo Ausfallhaftung je mogoče najti v statutu.
In not accepting this argument, the Commission was ignoring the separation of powers in Austria between the legislature (the source of Ausfallhaftung), on the one hand, and the executive (the Province of Burgenland, which had taken the decision to sell BB), on the other.
S tem ko tega argumenta ni sprejela, Komisija ni upoštevala avstrijske delitve oblasti med zakonodajnim telesom (virom garancije Ausfallhaftung) na eni strani in izvršilno oblastjo (Gradiščanska, ki se je odločila prodati banko BB) na drugi strani.
The relationship between the Province of Burgenland and BB could be likened to the situation of a parent company giving a guarantee for its subsidiary in the form of a comfort letter (Patronatserklärung).
Odnos med Gradiščansko in banko BB se lahko primerja s položajem matične družbe, ki daje garancijo svoji podružnici v obliki upravnega pisma (Patronatserklärung).
Such a guarantee would be taken into account when selling a subsidiary, as would any other off-balance sheet risk.
Taka garancija bi se upoštevala pri prodaji podružnice tako kot vsako drugo zunajbilančno tveganje.
Austria further supported this view by referring to a judgment of the Austrian Supreme Court of 4 April 2006 [25].
Avstrija je to stališče podprla še s sklicevanjem na sodbo avstrijskega Vrhovnega sodišča z dne 4. aprila 2006 [25].
Furthermore, the Commission and Austria had agreed on the abolition of the guarantee as existing aid after a transitional period.
Poleg tega sta se Komisija in Avstrija dogovorili o odpravi garancije kot obstoječe pomoči po prehodnem obdobju.
Until its abolition, Ausfallhaftung would be ‘legalised’, which should also allow the Province of Burgenland to take it into consideration when selling BB.
Do odprave bi bila garancija Ausfallhaftung„legalizirana“, kar bi Gradiščanski omogočilo tudi, da jo upošteva pri prodaji banke BB.
The guarantee had not been granted by the Province of Burgenland with a view to the privatisation process and Austria had had no legal means of discharging itself from its guarantee prior to the sale of BB.
Garancije Gradiščanska ni odobrila zaradi postopka privatizacije in Avstrija ni imela nobenih pravnih sredstev, da bi se pred prodajo banke BB rešila te garancije.
If the risk associated with Ausfallhaftung could not be taken into account under these circumstances, the Commission would effectively be preventing the Province of Burgenland from privatising BB.
Če se tveganje, povezano z garancijo Ausfallhaftung, v teh okoliščinah ne bi moglo upoštevati, bi Komisija Gradiščanski dejansko preprečila privatizacijo banke BB.
This would contradict the privatisation requirement in the Commission’s earlier decision on BB and would unlawfully restrict Member States' freedom to privatise their assets.
To bi bilo v nasprotju z zahtevo po privatizaciji v predhodni odločbi Komisije o banki BB in bi državam članicam nezakonito omejevalo svobodno privatizacijo njihovega premoženja.
Austria’s view was confirmed by the Commission’s own practice and by the European Courts.
Stališče Avstrije naj bi potrjevala praksa same Komisije in evropskih sodišč.
In particular, the Commission had recognised that liabilities and off-balance sheet risks could be taken into account in a privatisation procedure [26].
Komisija se je predvsem strinjala, da se obveznosti in zunajbilančna tveganja lahko upoštevajo pri postopku privatizacije [26].
In Gröditzer Stahlwerke, the Court of Justice of the European Communities also implicitly recognised that a guarantee given by the State, which was relevant to the liquidation of the undertaking, should be taken into account [27].
V zadevi Gröditzer Stahlwerke je Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti tudi implicitno priznalo, da je treba garancijo države, povezano z likvidacijo družbe, upoštevati [27].
The recognition of Ausfallhaftung as existing aid was therefore relevant.
Zato je bilo pomembno, da se garancija Ausfallhaftung prizna kot obstoječa pomoč.
The risk that Ausfallhaftung might be called upon depended on the future risk profile of the bank and, therefore, on the risk profile of its new owner.
Tveganje, da bi lahko prišlo do sklicevanja na garancijo Ausfallhaftung, je bilo odvisno od prihodnjega profila tveganja banke in torej profila tveganja njenega novega lastnika.
The Province of Burgenland had considered the risk associated with the Consortium as owner to be unacceptable.
Gradiščanska je menila, da je tveganje, povezano s konzorcijem kot lastnikom, nesprejemljivo.
The fact that BB remained under the supervision of the FMA did not change this prognosis, as the FMA intervened only ex post.
To, da je banka BB ostala pod nadzorom organa za finančni trg, te napovedi ni spremenilo, saj je organ za finančni trg posredoval šele naknadno.
The liquidation scenario presented by Austria
Scenarij likvidacije, ki ga je predstavila Avstrija
GRAWE submitted that it was wrong to use a liquidation scenario in this context as the Province of Burgenland had to decide, not on a liquidation of BB, but on which buyer it should choose.
Družba GRAWE je navedla, da je bila uporaba scenarija likvidacije v tem okviru napačna, saj se Gradiščanska ni odločala glede likvidacije banke BB, ampak glede tega, katerega kupca naj izbere.
The liquidation scenario had been intended for a different situation (decision on restructuring aid).
Scenarij likvidacije je bil namenjen za drugačne okoliščine (odločba o pomoči za prestrukturiranje).
In addition, in a situation of Ausfallhaftung, the Province of Burgenland would not be able to demand the liquidation of all assets, as all creditors could address the Province directly with their claims.
Poleg tega pri garanciji Ausfallhaftung Gradiščanska ne bi mogla zahtevati likvidacije vseh sredstev, ker bi se lahko upniki s svojimi zahtevki obrnili neposredno nanjo.
The refinancing of BB after its sale
Refinanciranje banke BB po prodaji
Austria linked this element to the criterion of ‘continued operation of BB and, at the same time, avoidance of the use of the guarantee’, maintaining that the announcement of the sale of BB to the Consortium might have led to an increase in BB’s refinancing needs and a significant liquidity outflow, and eventually might have triggered Ausfallhaftung.
Avstrija je povezala ta element z merilom „neprekinjeno delovanje banke BB in hkrati izogibanje uporabi garancije“, pri čemer je trdila, da bi napoved prodaje banke BB konzorciju lahko povzročila povečanje potreb banke BB po refinanciranju in precejšen likvidnostni odliv, kar bi sčasoma lahko sprožilo garancijo Ausfallhaftung.
BB’s liquidity in the wake of the sale had been a crucial factor in the decision-making.
Likvidnost banke BB po prodaji je bila ključni dejavnik odločanja.
The Consortium had also not excluded the possibility of deposit withdrawal by clients or the cancellation of inter-bank credit lines, albeit to a significantly lesser extent than estimated by Austria.
Konzorcij tudi ni izključil možnosti, da bodo stranke dvignile svoje vloge ali da bodo odpravljene medbančne kreditne linije, čeprav so bila njegova pričakovanja precej nižja od predvidevanj Avstrije.
Austria further underlined that it would have been less concerned on this score had the Consortium presented a financially strong business partner, as it had announced during the negotiations.
Avstrija je poudarila tudi, da ne bi bila tako zaskrbljena zaradi tega, če bi konzorcij pomenil finančno močnega poslovnega partnerja, kakor je napovedal med pogajanji.
Issues regarding the authorisation of the sale by the FMA
Vprašanja glede prodaje, ki jo odobri organ za finančni trg
Austria explained that, according to Section 20 of the Banking Act, the FMA could only carry out the so-called ‘fit & proper test’ of the buyer of a bank when the parties had already entered into a binding agreement.
Avstrija je razložila, da bi lahko organ za finančni trg v skladu z oddelkom 20 Zakona o bančništvu tako imenovani „preizkus sposobnosti in primernosti“ kupca banke opravil šele, ko bi stranki že sklenili zavezujočo pogodbo.
A hypothetical evaluation of more than one potential buyer would exceed the FMA’s powers.
Hipotetično ocenjevanje več kot enega mogočega kupca bi presegalo pooblastila organa za finančni trg.
For the same reason, it was not possible to provide the Commission ex post with such an evaluation, as requested in the opening decision.
Zaradi istega razloga Komisiji ni bilo mogoče naknadno zagotoviti take ocene, kot je bilo zahtevano v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka.
Consequently, the FMA had refused to examine the documents both of the Consortium and of GRAWE, as both potential buyers had provided the FMA with documents in order to obtain permission prior to the sale [28].
Organ za finančni trg je zato zavrnil preučitev dokumentov konzorcija in družbe GRAWE, ker sta mu oba mogoča kupca predložila dokumente, da bi dobila dovoljenje pred prodajo [28].
The FMA was required to evaluate any deal in an unbiased manner.
Organ za finančni trg je bil zavezan, da kakršen koli posel oceni nepristransko.
Austria stated that it had nevertheless tried to obtain a statement concerning the two remaining bidders.
Avstrija je izjavila, da je kljub temu poskusila dobiti oceno v zvezi z dvema preostalima ponudnikoma.
Informally, the FMA had indicated that an evaluation of GRAWE, which was well known to the authority, would probably only take a few weeks.
Neformalno je organ za finančni trg navedel, da bi za oceno družbe GRAWE, ki je bila temu organu dobro znana, najbrž potreboval samo nekaj tednov.
In contrast, the evaluation of the Consortium also involved other authorities outside the European Union and would therefore presumably take more than three months.
V nasprotju s tem bi ocena konzorcija vključevala druge organe zunaj Evropske unije in bi zato predvidoma trajala več kot tri mesece.
However, the FMA was bound by law to react within three months; otherwise the sale would be deemed authorised.
Vendar pa je bil organ za finančni trg zavezan z zakonom, da se odzove v treh mesecih; drugače bi prodaja štela za odobreno.
Therefore, a sale to the Consortium would inevitably lead to the FMA provisionally prohibiting the sale as a first step.
Zato bi prodaja konzorciju neizogibno povzročila, da bi organ za finančni trg najprej začasno prepovedal prodajo.
The FMA could, however, continue with the examination and, if necessary, revoke its earlier refusal.
Vendar bi organ za finančni trg lahko nadaljeval preiskavo in umaknil predhodno prepoved, če bi bilo potrebno.
The whole process could take up to a year.
Ta celotni postopek bi lahko trajal tudi leto dni.
According to the FMA, the outcome would have been ‘entirely open’.
Po mnenju organa za finančni trg bi bil rezultat „popolnoma odprt“.
Against this background, Austria stressed that the Province of Burgenland had needed to sell BB on the basis of its own prognosis of the FMA’s final decision.
Na podlagi tega je Avstrija poudarila, da je morala Gradiščanska banko BB prodati glede na lastno napoved končne odločitve organa za finančni trg.
However, Austria had considered that the FMA would never have allowed a sale to the Consortium.
Vendar pa je Avstrija menila, da organ za finančni trg nikoli ne bi odobril prodaje banke BB konzorciju.
The main considerations underlying the prognosis by the Province of Burgenland had been as follows:
Glavni premisleki, na katerih je temeljila napoved Gradiščanske, so bili naslednji:
One of the grounds for rejection had been that the Ukrainian fund which was the owner at the time did not apply International Accounting Standards (IAS).
Eden od razlogov za zavrnitev je bil, da ukrajinski sklad, ki je bil takrat lastnik te banke, ni uporabljal mednarodnih računovodskih standardov (IAS).
Apart from a small member of the Consortium, Active Bank Ltd with activities in Ukraine only, no banking activities had been carried on within the group thus far.
Razen manjšega člana konzorcija, banke Active Bank Ltd, ki je bila dejavna samo v Ukrajini, v skupini do tedaj še niso opravljali bančnih dejavnosti.
None of the Consortium’s members was rated by an internationally recognised rating agency.
Nobenega člana konzorcija ni ocenila katera od mednarodno priznanih bonitetnih agencij.
In contrast, in GRAWE Bank Burgenland would be gaining an experienced partner in the banking and capital market sector that had an ‘A’ rating and was well known to the FMA.
V nasprotju s tem bi banka Bank Burgenland z družbo GRAWE pridobila partnerja, izkušenega v sektorju bančništva in kapitalskega trga, ki je imel bonitetno oceno „A“ in je bil organu za finančni trg dobro znan.
Similarly, Austria referred to its experience during the two earlier unsuccessful attempts at privatising BB.
Prav tako se je Avstrija sklicevala na svoje izkušnje z dvema predhodnima neuspešnima poskusoma privatizacije banke BB.
Especially during the second attempt, which ended in failure in August 2005, a Lithuania-based bank with a Russian owner had taken part and Austria had reason to believe that the FMA would have forbidden such a deal.
Predvsem se je sklicevala na izkušnje v drugem poskusu, ki se je neuspešno končal avgusta 2005 in v katerem je sodelovala litvanska banka z ruskim lastnikom, tako da je imela Avstrija razloge za mnenje, da bi organ za finančni trg tak posel prepovedal.
Austria also noted that the decision would be more time-consuming owing to the non-existence of a memorandum of understanding as a basis for mutual cooperation and information exchange between the FMA and the Ukrainian National Bank.
Avstrija je ugotovila tudi, da bi odločitev o tem trajala dlje, ker ni memoranduma o soglasju, ki bi zagotavljal medsebojno sodelovanje in izmenjavo informacij med organom za finančni trg in Narodno banko Ukrajine.
Furthermore, in order to preserve its good reputation, it was in GRAWE’s interests to intervene in the event of BB experiencing difficulties.
Poleg tega je bilo zaradi ohranjanja dobrega ugleda v interesu družbe GRAWE, da bi posredovala, če bi banka BB zašla v težave.
The same could not be said of the Consortium.
Za konzorcij tega ni bilo mogoče trditi.
In addition, Austria stressed that, with a Ukraine-based owner, BB would never obtain a rating similar to GRAWE’s ‘A’ rating, but rather a rating between ‘BB’ and ‘B’, in accordance with the principle that an undertaking cannot secure a better rating than the country in which it is established.
Poleg tega je Avstrija poudarila, da z ukrajinskim lastnikom banka BB nikoli ne bi dobila bonitetne ocene, podobne oceni „A“ družbe GRAWE, ampak bonitetno oceno „BB“ in „B“, v skladu z načelom, da podjetje ne more dobiti boljše ocene kot država, v kateri ima sedež.
Further elements of the prognosis of the Province of Burgenland
Nadaljnji elementi napovedi Gradiščanske
Austria also presented a note by HSBC confirming all considerations by the Province of Burgenland as to the probability that the FMA would authorize the deal and that Ausfallhaftung might be availed of in the event of a decision in favour of GRAWE.
Avstrija je predložila sporočilo družbe HSBC, v katerem so bili potrjeni vsi premisleki Gradiščanske v zvezi z možnostjo, da bi organ za finančni trg odobril posel in da bi se pri odločitvi v korist družbe GRAWE izkoristila garancija Ausfallhaftung.
The price difference was far outweighed by the much smaller risk in the event of a sale to GRAWE.
Razliko v ceni je več kot odtehtalo veliko manjše tveganje pri prodaji družbi GRAWE.
The Consortium’s business plan was also a matter for concern.
Zaskrbljujoč je bil tudi poslovni načrt konzorcija.
It had not been submitted until late in the process on 27 February 2006 and provided for the integration of Ukraine-based Active Bank Ltd. Indeed, the Consortium made this a condition precedent to acquiring BB.
Predložen je bil šele pozno v postopku, 27. februarja 2006, predvideval pa je združitev z banko Active Bank Ltd. s sedežem v Ukrajini. Konzorcij je to postavil kot prvi pogoj za pridobitev banke BB.
However, there were a number of elements in this business plan which the Province of Burgenland considered highly dangerous to BB’s very existence.
Vendar pa so bili v tem poslovnem načrtu številni elementi, zaradi katerih je Gradiščanska menila, da je obstoj banke BB zelo ogrožen.
In particular, only a very small part of the new capital pledged by the Consortium had been earmarked for strengthening the regional activities of BB (EUR 17 million out of a total of EUR 85 million), the rest being intended for Ukraine-based Active Bank.
Predvsem je bil samo zelo majhen del novega kapitala, za katerega je jamčil konzorcij, namenjen krepitvi regionalnih dejavnosti banke BB (17 milijonov EUR od skupaj 85 milijonov EUR), preostalo je bilo namenjeno banki Active Bank s sedežem v Ukrajini.
According to the business plan, the future main centre of gravity of the business was to be in Ukraine instead of in the Province of Burgenland — a situation which involved exchange risks.
V skladu s poslovnim načrtom bi bilo glavno težišče poslovanja v prihodnje v Ukrajini, ne na Gradiščanskem – kar bi bile okoliščine, v katerih bi prihajalo do tečajnih tveganj.
Also, the Province of Burgenland had never been able to find out how the Consortium intended to integrate Active Bank, the value of which was over-estimated.
Poleg tega Gradiščanska nikoli ni izvedela, kako je konzorcij nameraval združiti banki BB in Active Bank, katere vrednost je bila precenjena.
For prudential reasons, the Province of Burgenland assumed a worst-case scenario for BB in which a failure of Active Bank would seriously jeopardise BB and, ultimately, even result in BB’s insolvency.
Iz previdnosti je Gradiščanska za banko BB predvidela najslabši mogoči scenarij, v katerem bi neuspeh banke Active Bank resno ogrozil banko BB in na koncu celo povzročil plačilno nesposobnost banke BB.
Based on that business plan, the Province of Burgenland would not have sold BB even if the Consortium had been the only bidder [29].
Glede na ta poslovni načrt Gradiščanska banke BB ne bi prodala, tudi če bi bil konzorcij edini ponudnik [29].
Furthermore, Austria had been concerned about the fact that the FMA would have needed considerably more time to evaluate a sale to the Consortium.
Poleg tega je Avstrijo skrbelo, da bi organ za finančni trg potreboval veliko več časa za ocenjevanje prodaje Konzorciju.
A timely privatisation of BB was required by the decision concerning the restructuring of BB.
Pravočasna privatizacija BB je bila zahtevana v Odločbi o prestrukturiranju banke BB.
In addition, GRAWE had limited the validity of its offer to 31 March 2006.
Poleg tega je družba GRAWE veljavnost svoje ponudbe omejila na 31. marec 2006.
The Province of Burgenland therefore risked being left without a buyer if the FMA prohibited the sale.
Tako je Gradiščanska tvegala, da bo ostala brez kupca, če bi organ za finančni trg prepovedal prodajo.
On 5 March 2008 Austria referred to a German court judgment confirming a BaFin decision prohibiting the sale of shares in a German bank to a Ukrainian group.
Avstrija se je 5. marca 2008 sklicevala na sodbo nemškega sodišča, ki je potrdila odločbo urada BaFin o prepovedi prodaje delnic v nemški banki neimenovani ukrajinski skupini.
Austria did not maintain that the Ukrainian group concerned by this case was the Consortium, but it nevertheless found its own prognosis to be supported by the decision, which it had taken BaFin 13 months to reach.
Avstrija ni trdila, da je bila zadevna ukrajinska skupina v tem primeru konzorcij, vendar je kljub temu menila, da ta odločitev, za katero je urad BaFin potreboval 13 mesecev, podpira njeno napoved.
In Austria’s view, the question of a timely sale was closely linked to the required transaction security.
Po mnenju Avstrije je bilo vprašanje pravočasne prodaje tesno povezano z zahtevano varnostjo transakcije.
A failure of the third privatisation round would have endangered the bank and might in the aftermath even have led to BB’S insolvency, triggering Ausfallhaftung.
Neuspešen tretji poskus privatizacije bi ogrozil banko in posledično morda celo povzročil plačilno nesposobnost banke BB ter sprožil garancijo Ausfallhaftung.
Other risk evaluation methods presented by Austria and GRAWE
Druge metode za ocenjevanje tveganja, ki sta jih predstavili Avstrija in družba GRAWE
Austria submitted further explanations of the recommendation by HSBC, which follows an approach based on total guaranteed liabilities.
Avstrija je predložila dodatne obrazložitve priporočila družbe HSBC, ki temelji na pristopu na podlagi skupnih jamčenih obveznosti.
A moderate increase in the probability that Ausfallhaftung might be triggered if BB were sold to the Consortium was sufficient to outweigh the difference between the two offers and hence pointed to a decision in favour of GRAWE.
Zmerno povečanje možnosti, da bi se sprožila garancija Ausfallhaftung, če bi banko BB prodali konzorciju, je zadostovalo, da je odtehtalo razliko med ponudbama, in tako podprlo odločitev v korist družbe GRAWE.
GRAWE, supported by Austria, submitted an expert opinion based on an option pricing model to explain and justify the sale to GRAWE.
Družba GRAWE, je predložila strokovno mnenje, ki ga je podpirala Avstrija in je temeljilo na modelu za določanje vrednosti opcij, da bi razložila in upravičila prodajo družbi GRAWE.
Very late in the procedure, on 22 February 2008, Austria submitted an analysis of how the capital markets valued a guarantee such as Ausfallhaftung.
Zelo pozno v postopku, 22. februarja 2008, je Avstrija predložila analizo, kako kapitalski trgi vrednotijo garancije, kakršna je Ausfallhaftung.
A more detailed exposition of the approach taken in the analysis, produced by Morgan Stanley, was provided on 9 April 2008.
Podrobnejša obrazložitev pristopa, s katerim je bila opravljena analiza, ki jo je pripravila družba Morgan Stanley, je bila predložena 9. aprila 2008.
The analysis started from the assumption that the Province of Burgenland could re-insure itself on the capital markets against the risk of Ausfallhaftung by means of a credit default swap.
Analiza temeljila na domnevi, da bi se Gradiščanska proti tveganju garancije Ausfallhaftung lahko pozavarovala na kapitalskih trgih z zamenjavo neplačil.
Austria argued that the results of the analysis showed that the decision by the Province of Burgenland was justified.
Avstrija je trdila, da so rezultati analize pokazali, da je bila odločitev Gradiščanske utemeljena.