natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Qualified producers can also choose to sell their electricity directly on the market, in which case they are entitled to receive from the State a premium payment equal to the difference between the revenues they would have received should they have chosen to sell their electricity to their network operator and the revenue they received from the market.
Kvalificirani proizvajalci se lahko tudi odločijo svojo električno energijo prodati neposredno na trgu, pri čemer so v tem primeru upravičeni do državne premije, ki je enaka razliki med prihodki, ki bi jih prejeli, če bi se odločili, da svojo električno energijo prodajo upravljavcu omrežja, in prihodki, ki so jih prejeli od trga.
Network operators recover the losses they incur from the purchase obligation through payments from a fund established by law.
Upravljavci omrežja izgube, ki nastanejo zaradi obveznega odkupa, pokrijejo s plačili iz sklada, ustanovljenega na podlagi zakona.
Monies from the fund are also used to pay the premiums to qualified producers which choose to sell their electricity on the market.
Z denarjem iz sklada se poplačajo tudi premije kvalificiranim proizvajalcem, ki se odločijo svojo električno energijo prodati na trgu.
The fund is fed by the proceeds of a parafiscal levy on the consumption of electricity which is imposed on all electricity consumers in Slovenia.
Sklad se napaja iz prilivov od davku podobne dajatve za porabo električne energije, ki jih morajo plačevati vsi porabniki električne energije v Sloveniji.
DOUBTS EXPRESSED IN THE DECISION TO OPEN PROCEEDINGS
DVOMI, IZRAŽENI V ODLOČITVI O SPROŽITVI POSTOPKA
After the analysis of information at its disposal, the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the support was State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty since it met the four cumulative criteria of the relevant definition.
Po analizi dostopnih podatkov je Komisija prišla do predhodne ugotovitve, da podpora pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, saj izpolnjuje vsa štiri kumulativna merila iz ustrezne opredelitve.
The Commission also doubted whether the scheme could be considered compatible with the common market.
Komisija je dvomila tudi, da bi bila lahko shema združljiva s skupnim trgom.
Firstly, the Commission analysed the aid in the light of the Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection [4] (hereinafter ‘the environmental guidelines’).
Komisija je najprej analizirala pomoč z vidika Smernic skupnosti o državni pomoči za varstvo okolja [4] (v nadaljnjem besedilu „okoljske smernice“).
This analysis led to doubts as to the compatibility of the aid with the environmental guidelines, in particular as regards the definition of producers using renewable energy and efficient combined heat and power generation, and as regards the level of the aid as compared to the real excess costs borne by the producers.
Ta analiza je vzbudila dvome glede združljivosti pomoči z okoljskimi smernicami, zlasti kar zadeva opredelitev proizvajalcev, ki uporabljajo obnovljive vire energije ter učinkovito sočasno proizvodnjo toplote in električne energije, in kar zadeva raven pomoči v primerjavi z dejanskimi presežnimi stroški proizvajalcev.
Secondly, it analysed the aid in the light of the Commission Communication relating to the methodology for analysing State aid linked to stranded costs [5] (hereinafter ‘the methodology’).
Potem je analizirala pomoč ob upoštevanju Sporočila Komisije o metodologiji za analiziranje državne pomoči, povezane z nasedlimi stroški [5] (v nadaljnjem besedilu „metodologija“).
This analysis led to doubts as to the compatibility of the scheme with the methodology.
Ta analiza je privedla do dvomov glede združljivosti sheme z metodologijo.
In particular, the Commission was not in a position to conclude that the aid had been calculated in a way that was sufficiently precise to enable the power plant by power plant calculation that is necessary under this methodology.
Komisija zlasti ni mogla ugotoviti, ali je bila pomoč izračunana dovolj natančno, da bi se zagotovil izračun po posameznih elektrarnah, ki je po tej metodologiji potreben.
Thirdly, it analysed the aid as compensation for charges linked to services of general economic interest.
Nato je analizirala pomoč kot nadomestilo za stroške, povezane s storitvami splošnega gospodarskega pomena.
This analysis led to doubts as to the compatibility of the aid since, for most of the beneficiaries, the Commission was not in a position to define a sufficiently precise service of general economic interest with which they would have been entrusted and, for the only beneficiary for which this service could have been precisely defined, it was not in a position to assess the proportionality of the compensation.
Ta analiza je vzbudila dvome glede združljivosti pomoči, saj Komisija za večino upravičencev ni mogla dovolj natančno opredeliti storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena, ki naj bi jim bila zaupana, za edinega upravičenca, za katerega bi bila lahko ta storitev natančno opredeljena, pa ni mogla presoditi sorazmernost nadomestila.
The Commission also had doubts whether the aid, which is financed via a parafiscal levy imposed on electricity consumers, is compatible with Articles 25 and 90 of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je prav tako dvomila, da je pomoč, ki se financira z davku podobno dajatvijo, ki jo morajo plačevati porabniki električne energije, združljiva s členoma 25 in 90 Pogodbe ES.
COMMENTS FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
PRIPOMBE DRUGIH ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANK
Following the decision to open proceedings the Commission did not receive any comments from other interested parties.
Komisija po objavi odločitve o sprožitvi postopka ni prejela nikakršnih pripomb drugih zainteresiranih strank.
INITIAL COMMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATE
ZAČETNE PRIPOMBE DRŽAVE ČLANICE
These comments referred only to the problem of the definition of State aid and the notion of a parafiscal levy.
Te pripombe so se nanašale le na problem opredelitve državne pomoči in pojem davku podobne dajatve.
Slovenia pointed out that the Slovenian distribution companies are not 100 % State-owned.
Slovenija je poudarila, da slovenske distribucijske družbe niso v 100 % državni lasti.
Slovenia states that, in fact, the ownership of the operators is divided between the State (approximately 80 %) and private investment funds and others (approximately 20 %).
Slovenija navaja, da je lastništvo upravljavcev dejansko razdeljeno med državo (približno 80 %) ter zasebne naložbene sklade in druge (približno 20 %).
Moreover, for the purposes of the purchase obligation scheme, Slovenian legislation draws no distinction between State-owned and privately owned operators.
Poleg tega slovenska zakonodaja v shemi obveznega odkupa ne razlikuje med upravljavci v državni lasti in upravljavci v zasebni lasti.
The Energy Act [6] imposes no condition that the operator must be State-owned and allows operators to be privately or State-owned.
Energetski zakon [6] ne uvaja pogoja, po katerem bi moral biti upravljavec subjekt v državni lasti, in omogoča, da je subjekt v zasebni ali državni lasti.
In Slovenia’s opinion, the fact that a particular entity involved in the purchase obligation scheme is State-owned does not mean that, on those grounds alone, this constitutes State aid.
Po mnenju Slovenije dejstvo, da je določen subjekt v shemi obveznega odkupa v lasti države, ne pomeni, da gre zgolj zaradi tega za državno pomoč.
Reference was made to the judgment by the European Court of Justice of 13 March 2001 in Case C-379/98.
Pri tem se sklicuje na sodbo Evropskega sodišča z dne 13. marca 2001 v zadevi C-379/98.
Furthermore, Slovenia argues that the system of purchasing electricity from qualified producers, as laid down by Slovenian regulations, is very similar to other schemes examined by the Commission, e.g. in cases NN 27/2000 and NN 68/2000 [7], where the Commission concluded that no State aid was involved.
Nadalje Slovenija navaja, da je sistem odkupa električne energije od kvalificiranih proizvajalcev, kot ga ureja slovenska zakonodaja, zelo podobna drugim shemam, ki jih je Komisija že obravnavala, npr. v zadevah NN 27/2000 in NN 68/2000 [7], pri katerih je Komisija ugotovila, da ne predstavljata državne pomoči.
According to Slovenia, in the decisions on those two cases, the Commission found that, since the obligation applied to both numerous private and some public network operators, the laws — or rather the cases in question — could not be deemed to involve state resources.
Slovenija navaja, da je Komisija v odločitvi o obeh primerih ugotovila, da se obveznost nanaša na številne zasebne in na nekatere javne upravljavce omrežij, zato se zadevna zakona oziroma primera ne moreta obravnavati, kot da vključujeta državna sredstva.
In view of the above considerations and taking into account the system as it stands, Slovenia considered that, in so far as the funds do not by their nature come from state resources, the question of the ownership of the entities involved cannot on its own alter that nature.
Glede na navedene pomisleke in ob upoštevanju veljavnega sistema Slovenija meni, da zgolj vprašanje lastništva vpletenih subjektov samo po sebi ne more spreminjati narave sredstev, če ta po svoji naravi ne prihajajo iz državnih virov.
Furthermore, according to Slovenia, mandatory contributions received by a public undertaking do not constitute State aid where the undertaking in question does not have the right to dispose freely of those funds.
Nadalje Slovenija navaja, da sredstva v obliki obveznih prispevkov, ki jih pridobi javno podjetje, ne predstavljajo državne pomoči, če podjetje nima pravice z njimi prosto razpolagati.
In the case of the purchase obligation, the source of financing of the scheme is the fee for network use paid by all electricity users, part of which is collected by the network operators in separate accounts for a pre-determined purpose.
Pri obveznem odkupu je vir financiranja sheme cena za uporabo omrežij, ki jo plačujejo vsi porabniki električne energije in katere del se zbira pri upravljavcih omrežij na ločenih računih za v naprej predviden namen.
Parafiscal levy
Davku podobna dajatev
Slovenia pointed out that the purchase obligation scheme is financed from part of the fee for network use paid by all electricity users under identical conditions that are known in advance.
Slovenija je poudarila, da se shema obveznega odkupa financira iz dela cene za uporabo omrežij, ki jo plačujejo vsi porabniki električne energije pod enakimi in v naprej znanimi pogoji.
The components of the fee for network use are determined by the Energy Agency (energy market regulator) and the Government.
Sestavne dele cene za uporabo omrežij določata Agencija za energijo (regulator energetskega trga) in vlada.
Differences in price are covered by a mechanism whereby the network operators buy electricity at a fixed price and sell it at the market price.
Pokrivanje razlike v ceni poteka tako, da upravljavci omrežij odkupijo električno energijo po fiksni ceni in jo prodajo po tržni ceni.
Any loss they incur as a result is covered from part of the fee for network use.
Če imajo ob tem izgubo, jo pokrijejo iz dela cene za uporabo omrežij.
So operators under the purchase obligation receive funds not from the State, but from part of the fee for network use.
Upravljavci, ki jim je naložen odkup, torej ne dobijo sredstev od države temveč iz dela cene za uporabo omrežij.
The operators have to allocate these funds to a special account.
Upravljavci morajo ta sredstva voditi na posebnem računu.
The funds also serve as a source for paying the additional premium where qualified producers sell part of their electricity independently or through an intermediary.
Sredstva so tudi vir plačila dodatne premije, če kvalificirani proizvajalci del svoje električne energije prodajo samostojno ali preko posrednika.
Slovenia claimed that the scheme incorporates neither a state fund nor any other sort of fund through which the resources are transited.
Slovenija je trdila tudi, da shema ne vključuje nikakršnega državnega ali kakršnega koli drugega sklada, preko katerega se prelivajo sredstva.
The resources to fund the scheme cannot be perceived as stemming from a parafiscal levy as they do not stem from the State budget and are not attributable to the State.
Sredstev za financiranje sheme se torej ne da obravnavati, kot da izhajajo iz davku podobne dajatve, saj ne izhajajo iz državnega proračuna in se ne morejo pripisati državi.
FURTHER INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY SLOVENIA
DODATNI PODATKI, KI JIH JE PREDLOŽILA SLOVENIJA
By further correspondence with the Commission, Slovenia submitted additional information and commitments on the scheme.
Slovenija je v nadaljnji korespondenci s Komisijo predložila dodatne podatke in zaveze glede sheme.
Renewables
Obnovljivi viri
Slovenia provided new information detailing the environmental protection objectives of the scheme.
Slovenija je zagotovila nove podatke s podrobnostmi o okoljevarstvenih ciljih sheme.
First of all, the scheme was designed to contribute to the general environmental policy objectives:
Prvič, shema je bila vzpostavljena kot prispevek k splošnima ciljema okoljske politike:
more efficient energy use;
učinkovitejši porabi energije;
increasing the proportion of renewable energy sources in the primary energy balance of the Community from 8,8 % in 2001 to 12 % by 2010.
povečanju deleža obnovljivih virov energije v primarni energetski bilanci Skupnosti z 8,8 % v letu 2001 na 12 % do leta 2010.
The stated objectives include targets for co-generation and for renewable sources, both of which fall under the electricity purchase scheme.
Navedena cilja vključujeta cilje za soproizvodnjo in obnovljive vire, ki oba spadata v shemo odkupa električne energije.
These objectives are consistent with the targets set for Slovenia inter alia by Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market [8].
Ta cilja se skladata s cilji, določenimi za Slovenijo med drugim z Direktivo 2001/77/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 27. septembra 2001 o spodbujanju proizvodnje električne energije iz obnovljivih virov energije na notranjem trgu z električno energijo [8].
Directive 2001/77/EC sets indicative targets for individual Member States.
Direktiva 2001/77/ES določa okvirne cilje za posamezne države članice.
For Slovenia, the objective is a share of electricity consumption coming from renewables of 32,6 % by 2010.
Ciljni delež porabe električne energije iz obnovljivih virov za Slovenijo znaša 32,6 % do leta 2010.
The total number of power plants from which electricity is purchased under the scheme is 434, of which 430 are connected to the distribution network and four to the transmission network.
Skupno število elektrarn, od katerih se električna energija odkupuje v skladu s shemo, je 434, od teh jih je 430 priključenih na distribucijsko omrežje, 4 pa so priključene na prenosno omrežje.
More than 90 % of the power plants connected to the distribution network are hydroelectric plants, the remainder being biomass power plants, solar plants and CHP plants.
Več kot 90 % elektrarn, priključenih na distribucijsko omrežje, je hidroelektrarn, preostale pa so elektrarne na biomaso, sončne elektrarne in elektrarne za sočasno proizvodnjo toplote in električne energije.
The scheme has been in force since the Decree on the rules for determining prices and purchasing of electricity from qualified electricity producers [9] entered into force on 4 April 2002.
Shema velja od Uredbe o pravilih za določitev cen in za odkup električne energije od kvalificiranih proizvajalcev električne energije [9] ki je začela veljati 4. aprila 2002.
The electricity purchase agreements currently in force between qualified power plants and network or system operators have been concluded for a period of 10 years.
Pogodbe o odkupu električne energije, ki trenutno veljajo za kvalificirane elektrarne in upravljavce omrežij ali sistemov, so bile sklenjene za obdobje desetih let.
Slovenia explained that, according to Article 4 of the 1999 Energy Act, renewable sources of energy are defined as provided for in Directive 2001/77/EC.
Slovenija je pojasnila, da so v skladu s členom 4 Energetskega zakona iz leta 1999 obnovljivi viri energije opredeljeni tako, kot jih določa Direktiva 2001/77/ES.
The main aim of the scheme is to ensure appropriate economic conditions for the development and implementation of new qualified power plant projects.
Glavni cilj sheme je zagotoviti primerne gospodarske razmere za razvoj in izvajanje novih projektov kvalificiranih elektrarn.
A cost analysis of individual qualified power plants (with regard to primary energy source and size) has been used to work out purchase prices for individual types of qualified power plants that would guarantee at least the minimum return required for making new investments.
Za določitev odkupnih cen po posameznih vrstah kvalificiranih elektrarn, ki bi zagotovile vsaj minimalni donos, potreben za nove naložbe, je bila uporabljena analiza stroškov posameznih kvalificiranih elektrarn (glede na primarni vir energije in velikost).
The amount of aid or premium is determined as the difference between the uniform annual purchase price and the average market price of electricity.
Višina pomoči ali premije se določi kot razlika med enotno letno odkupno ceno in povprečno tržno ceno električne energije.
If the market price increases, the premiums are reduced accordingly.
Če se tržna cena zviša, se premije ustrezno znižajo.
The table below compares production costs of the qualified producers per power plant technology and size categories with the premium offered by the scheme.
V spodnji razpredelnici so navedeni proizvodni stroški kvalificiranih proizvajalcev glede na kategorijo tehnologije in velikosti v primerjavi s premijo, ki jo nudi shema.
The table assumes an average market price of 8 SIT/kWh.
Razpredelnica je zasnovana na domnevni povprečni tržni ceni 8 SIT/kWh.
This value is for reference only since, if market prices increase, premiums are decreased accordingly.
Ta znesek lahko služi le kot vodilo, saj se premije ustrezno znižajo, če se tržne cene zvišajo.
In all cases, production costs are higher than both the average market price and the guaranteed uniform purchase price under the qualified producers’ scheme.
V vseh primerih so proizvodni stroški višji od povprečne tržne cene in od zagotovljene enotne odkupne cene v skladu s shemo kvalificiranih proizvajalcev.
Comparison of production costs of qualified power plants with the purchase price under the scheme
Primerjava proizvodnih stroškov kvalificiranih elektrarn z odkupno ceno v skladu s shemo
Assuming a market price of SIT 8/kWh.
Opomba: Ob predvideni tržni ceni 8 SIT/kWh.
Type of qualified power plant (QPP) by primary energy source
Vrsta kvalificirane elektrarne (KE) glede na primarni vir energije
Premium
Premija
Hydroelectric plants
Hidroelektrarne
Biomass plants
Elektrarne na biomaso
Wind plants
Vetrne elektrarne
Geothermal plants
Geotermalne elektrarne
Solar plants
Sončne elektrarne
Other QPPs (biogas)
Druge KE (bioplin)
QPPs or thermal plants using municipal waste
KE ali toplotne elektrarne, ki uporabljajo komunalne odpadke
CHP thermal plants for district heating
Toplotne elektrarne s sočasno proizvodnjo toplote in električne energije za daljinsko ogrevanje
CHP industrial thermal plants
Industrijske toplotne elektrarne s sočasno proizvodnjo toplote in električne energije
On the basis of a cost analysis and an economic calculation for categories of qualified power plant units, as shown in the table below, it emerges that the net present value (NPV) of the purchase prices applied under the scheme does not exceed the NPV of all investment costs at any of the qualified power plants.
Kot je prikazano v spodnji razpredelnici, iz analize stroškov in ekonomskega izračuna po kategorijah enot kvalificiranih elektrarn sledi, da neto sedanja vrednost (NSV) odkupnih cen, uporabljena v skladu s shemo, ne presega NSV vseh naložbenih stroškov v kateri koli kvalificirani elektrarni.
Comparison of NPV of purchase prices with investment costs of individual qualified power plants
Primerjava NSV odkupnih cen z naložbenimi stroški posameznih kvalificiranih elektrarn
Applying a discount rate of 8 %, a period of 15 years and a decrease in the purchase price or premium of 5 % after five years and 10 % after ten years, in accordance with the Decree on purchasing.
Opomba: Z uporabljeno diskontno stopnjo 8 %, obdobjem 15 let in znižanjem odkupne cene ali premije za 5 % po petih letih in 10 % po desetih letih, v skladu z Uredbo o odkupu.
Projected annual sales
Predvidena letna prodaja
Specific investment costs
Posebni naložbeni stroški
Annual premium
Letna premija
Premium — investment costs (NPV)
Premija – naložbeni stroški (NSV)
[SIT million]
[v milijonih SIT]
[SIT million/a]
[v milijonih SIT na leto]
The premiums for individual qualified power plants also include the return on capital prescribed by Slovenian legislation — this amounts to a minimum discount rate of 8 % on investments from public funds.
Premije za posamezne kvalificirane elektrarne vključujejo tudi donos kapitala, ki ga predpisuje slovenska zakonodaja – ta znaša najmanj diskontno stopnjo 8 % na naložbe javnih skladov.
Non-adjustment of purchase prices and premiums has meant that the current return for all qualified power plants using renewable energy sources is lower than 8 %, as shown in the table below.
Ker se odkupne cene in premije niso usklajevale, je trenutni donos za vse kvalificirane elektrarne, ki uporabljajo obnovljive energije, nižji od 8 %, kot je razvidno iz spodnje razpredelnice.
For solar plants the premium allows no return on capital (negative return), particularly in the case of small and medium-sized plants.
Sončnim elektrarnam premija ne dovoljuje nikakršnega donosa kapitala (negativni donos), zlasti v primeru majhnih in srednje velikih elektrarn.
Return on capital for individual qualified power plants
Donos kapitala za posamezne kvalificirane elektrarne
N.B.: Return on capital calculated on investments in QPPs (see Table 2) at the current value of premiums.
Opomba: Donos kapitala, izračunan na naložbe v KE (glej Razpredelnico 2), glede na trenutno vrednost premij.
Return on capital included in premium
Donos kapitala, vključen v premijo
Combined heat and power generation
Sočasna proizvodnja toplote in električne energije
Slovenia explains that new CHP units are equipped mainly with gas turbines, which, during operation, attain an electrical efficiency of between 37 % and 40 % and an overall efficiency of over 80 %.
Slovenija pojasnjuje, da so nove enote za sočasno proizvodnjo toplote in električne energije večinoma opremljene s plinskimi turbinami, ki med delovanjem dosegajo električno učinkovitost med 37 % in 40 % ter skupno učinkovitost nad 80 %.
New smaller turbines attain an electrical efficiency of over 30 % and again an overall efficiency of over 80 %.
Nove manjše turbine dosegajo električno učinkovitost nad 30 % in prav tako skupno učinkovitost nad 80 %.
Given that the average electrical efficiency of conventional thermal power plants in Slovenia is around 31 %, this shows the large primary energy savings (between 15 % and 25 %) made by generating electricity in co-generation units and making beneficial use of heat.
Ker je povprečna električna učinkovitost običajnih toplotnih elektrarn v Sloveniji približno 31 %, to kaže na velike prihranke primarne energije (med 15 % in 25 %), ustvarjene s proizvodnjo električne energije v enotah za soproizvodnjo in koristno porabo toplote.