natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
strengthening national legislative and regulatory infrastructures for the implementation of relevant international instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol;
okrepitev nacionalne zakonodajne in ureditvene infrastrukture za izvajanje mednarodnih instrumentov na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja, vključno s celovitimi sporazumi o varnostnih ukrepih in Dodatnim protokolom;
assisting States in strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radio-active materials;
pomoč državam pri krepitvi varnosti jedrskih in drugih radioaktivnih snovi ter nadzora nad njimi;
strengthening States’ capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radio-active materials.
okrepitev zmogljivosti držav za odkrivanje nedovoljenega prometa z jedrskim in drugim radioaktivnim snovmi ter za odzivanje nanj;
These projects shall be carried out in countries needing assistance in these areas after an initial assessment undertaken by an expert team.
Ti projekti se po prvotni oceni, ki jo izvede skupina strokovnjakov, izvajajo v državah, ki potrebujejo pomoč na teh področjih.
The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (SG/HR), shall be responsible for the implementation of this Joint Action.
Za izvajanje tega skupnega ukrepa je odgovorno predsedstvo, ki mu pomaga generalni sekretar/visoki predstavnik za skupno zunanjo in varnostno politiko (GS/VP).
The projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the IAEA.
Projekte iz člena 1(2) izvaja MAAE.
It shall perform this task under the control of the SG/HR, assisting the Presidency.
Svojo nalogo izvaja pod nadzorom GS/VP, ki je v pomoč predsedstvu.
The Presidency, the SG/HR and the Commission shall keep each other regularly informed about the projects, in conformity with their respective competences.
Predsedstvo, GS/VP in Komisija v skladu s svojimi pristojnostmi drug drugega redno obveščajo o projektih.
The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 7703000.
Referenčni finančni znesek za izvajanje projektov iz člena 1(2) je 7703000 EUR.
The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the European Community procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.
Odhodki, ki se financirajo iz zneska, določenega v odstavku 1, se upravljajo v skladu s postopki in pravili Evropske skupnosti, ki se uporabljajo za splošni proračun Evropskih skupnosti.
The financing agreement shall stipulate that the IAEA is to ensure visibility of the EU contribution, appropriate to its size.
V sporazumu o financiranju se določi, da bo MAAE zagotovila razpoznavnost prispevka EU, ustrezno njegovemu obsegu.
These reports shall form the basis for the evaluation by the Council.
Na podlagi teh poročil bo Svet opravil oceno.
It shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of this Joint Action.
Komisija zagotovi podatke o finančnih vidikih izvajanja tega skupnega ukrepa.
It shall expire 15 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement between the Commission and the IAEA or on 14 April 2009 if no financing agreement has been concluded before that date.
Veljati preneha 15 mesecev po dnevu sklenitve sporazuma o financiranju med Komisijo in MAAE ali dne 14. aprila 2009.
OJ L 165, 17.6.2006, p. 20.
UL L 165, 17.6.2006, str. 20.
EU support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Podpora EU dejavnostim MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje
The number of terrorist incidents in EU Member States and elsewhere over recent years has shown no sign of diminishing.
Število terorističnih napadov se v državah članicah EU in drugod v preteklih letih nikakor ni zmanjšalo.
The international community has recognized in various fora that the risk of successful acts of nuclear terrorism involving nuclear or other radioactive material remains high.
Mednarodna skupnost je v različnih forumih ugotovila, da je nevarnost uspešnega jedrskega terorizma z jedrskimi in drugimi radioaktivnimi snovmi še vedno velika.
In addition, recent reports of illicit trafficking, also involving particularly sensitive nuclear material, have underscored the continuing risk that terrorists could acquire such materials.
Tudi v nedavnih poročilih o nedovoljeni trgovini, vključno z zelo občutljivim jedrskim materialom, je bila poudarjena stalna nevarnost, da bi teroristi lahko pridobili takšen material.
The international community has reacted strongly to these threats and has taken several initiatives aimed at preventing nuclear or other radioactive material from falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists.
Mednarodna skupnost se je odločno odzvala na to grožnjo in sprejela več pobud, s katerimi naj bi preprečili, da bi se jedrski ali drug radioaktiven material znašel v rokah storilcev kaznivih dejanj in teroristov.
Particular attention was drawn to the situation in Asia by the Seminar on Strengthening Nuclear Security in Asian Countries, which took place in Tokyo in November 2006 and which called on the IAEA to enhance its cooperation with States in the region to ensure that acceptable levels of security are applied to all nuclear and other radioactive material under national jurisdictions and according to effective national systems and functions.
Na seminarju za povečanje jedrske varnosti v azijskih državah novembra 2006 v Tokiu je bila posebna pozornost namenjena razmeram v Aziji; na tem seminarju je bila MAAE pozvana k okrepitvi sodelovanja z državami v regiji, da bi se za ves jedrski in drug radioaktivni material zagotovila sprejemljiva raven varnosti v skladu z zadevnimi državnimi jurisdikcijami ter učinkovitimi nacionalnimi sistemi in funkcijami.
Added impetus to international efforts was given through the launch in July 2006 of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
Dodaten zagon je bil mednarodnim prizadevanjem dan julija 2006 z začetkom svetovne pobude za boj proti terorizmu.
IAEA verification remains an indispensable tool for building confidence among States with regard to nuclear non-proliferation undertakings, and for advancing the peaceful use of nuclear material.
Preverjanje MAAE ostaja nepogrešljivo sredstvo za vzpostavljanje zaupanja med državami v kontekstu prizadevanj za neširjenje jedrskega orožja ter za razvoj miroljubne uporabe jedrskega materiala.
Recent international developments have resulted in a new and strengthened set of international legal instruments that are relevant to nuclear security and verification: in July 2005, States Parties adopted the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was opened for signature in September 2005; and in April 2004 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1540(2004) dealing with weapons of mass destruction and non-State actors.
Nedavni premiki na mednarodnem prizorišču so prinesli niz novih in okrepljenih mednarodnih instrumentov, ki so pomembni za jedrsko varnost in preverjanje: julija 2005 so države pogodbenice sprejele Spremembo Konvencije o fizičnem varovanju jedrskega materiala; od septembra 2005 je na voljo za podpis Mednarodna konvencija za preprečevanje jedrskega terorizma; aprila 2004 pa je Varnostni svet ZN sprejel Resolucijo 1540 (2004) o orožju za množično uničevanje in nedržavnih akterjih.
UN Security Council resolution 1373(2001) calls for all States to become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
Varnostni svet ZN je v Resoluciji 1373 (2001) države pozval, naj čim prej pristopijo k ustreznim konvencijam in protokolom, ki se nanašajo na terorizem.
To date, over 80 States have made a political commitment to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [1].
Do sedaj se je k izvajanju Pravil ravnanja za varnost in zaščito radioaktivnih virov politično zavezalo več kot 80 držav [1].
In addition, in 2005 the General Conference and the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a number of resolutions and decisions to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system [2].States’ implementation of these international instruments may be significantly facilitated, in part, by assistance provided through the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009, which was approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in September 2005 [3].
Poleg tega sta v letu 2005 Generalna konferenca in Svet guvernerjev MAAE sprejela več resolucij in sklepov o krepitvi sistema varnostnih ukrepov MAAE [2]. Državam bi uveljavljanje teh mednarodnih instrumentov utegnila vsaj v določenem delu znatno olajšati pomoč v okviru Načrta za jedrsko varnost MAAE za obdobje 2006–2009, ki ga je septembra 2005 potrdil Svet guvernerjev MAAE [3].
The Nuclear Security Plan includes three activity areas: (1) Needs assessment, analysis and coordination, (2) Prevention, and (3) Detection and response.
Načrt za jedrsko varnost obravnava dejavnosti na treh področjih: (1) ocena potreb, analiza in usklajevanje, (2) preprečevanje in (3) odkrivanje in odziv.
It is of utmost importance that the required national legislation for the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA and, if applicable, an additional protocol, is in place [5].
Nadvse pomembno je, da se uveljavi nacionalna zakonodaja, potrebna za izvajanje celovitega sporazuma o nadzornih ukrepih z MAAE in po potrebi Dodatnega protokola [5].
The Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 pursues similar objectives to some elements of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
V Načrtu za jedrsko varnost za obdobje 2006–2009 so zapisani cilji, podobni tistim iz nekaterih delov Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje.
The IAEA is about to complete implementation of Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP and is in the process of implementing Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP as well as Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP all of which concern support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
MAAE zaključuje izvajanje Skupnega ukrepa 2004/495/SZVP in je v postopku izvajanja Skupnega ukrepa 2005/574/SZVP ter Skupnega ukrepa 2006/418/SZVP, ki vsi zadevajo podporo dejavnostim MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje.
With the associated contributions of the EU, the IAEA has initiated major activities to support efforts of recipient States in Caucasus, Central Asia, South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the Mediterranean region in the Middle East, and Africa to strengthen nuclear security and the implementation of international safeguards in these countries.
S pomočjo, ki jo je prispevala EU, je MAAE sprožila obsežne dejavnosti v podporo prizadevanjem držav prejemnic na območju Kavkaza, Srednje Azije, Jugovzhodne Evrope in Balkana, na sredozemskem območju Bližnjega vzhoda in v Afriki, katerih namen je okrepiti jedrsko varnost in uveljaviti mednarodne nadzorne ukrepe v teh državah.
in South-Eastern Europe: Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope: Albanija, Bosna in Hercegovina, Črna gora, Hrvaška, Moldavija, Nekdanja jugoslovanska republika Makedonija, Srbija in Turčija;
in the Central Asia region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan;
na srednje-azijskem območju: Kazahstan, Kirgizistan, Tadžikistan, Turkmenistan in Uzbekistan;
in the Caucasus region: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia;
na območju Kavkaza: Armenija, Azerbajdžan in Gruzija;
in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syrian Arab Republic;
na območju Sredozemlja in Bližnjega vzhoda: Izrael, Jordanija, Libanon, Sirija;
in Africa [6]: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe;
v Afriki: [6] Alžirija, Angola, Benin, Bocvana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Centralnoafriška republika, Čad, Kamerun, Komori, Kongo, Demokratična republika Kongo, Džibuti, Egipt, Ekvatorialna Gvineja, Eritreja, Etiopija, Gabon, Gambija, Gana, Gvineja, Gvineja Bissau, Južna Afrika, Kenija, Lesoto, Liberija, Libija, Madagaskar, Malavi, Mali, Maroko, Mauritius, Mavretanija, Mozambik, Namibija, Niger, Nigerija, Ruanda, Sao Tome in Principe, Senegal, Sejšeli, Sierra Leone, Slonokoščena obala, Somalija, Sudan, Svazi, Tanzanija, Togo, Tunizija, Uganda, Zambija, Zimbabve in Zelenortski otoki;
in the South East Asia region: Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.
na območju Jugovzhodne Azije: Bangladeš, Brunej, Filipini, Indonezija, Kambodža, Laos, Malezija, Mjanmar, Singapur, Tajska, Vietnam.
Work will continue in South-Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East, and in Africa on the basis of the existing Joint Actions and an update of the needs evaluations carried out as part of those Joint Actions.
Dejavnosti se bodo nadaljevale na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope; v Srednji Aziji; na območju Kavkaza; na območju Sredozemlja in Bližnjega vzhoda in v Afriki, in sicer na podlagi obstoječih skupnih ukrepov in posodobitve ocenjevanja potreb, ki se izvaja kot del teh skupnih ukrepov.
The final selection of the additional countries in the South East Asia region to receive support will be made on the basis of the needs evaluation phase, which will comprise evaluation of existing information in headquarters supplemented by assessment missions where required.
Dokončni izbor drugih držav na območju jugovzhodne Azije, ki naj bi bile deležne podpore, bo opravljen glede na ugotovitve v fazi ocenjevanja potreb, ki bo zajemalo ustrezno pregledovanje obstoječih podatkov na sedežu, po potrebi dopolnjeno z ocenjevalnimi misijami.
The support activities for each project will be focused on those countries that are in most need of support in each project area.
Podporne dejavnosti za vsak projekt bodo osredotočene na tiste države, ki so na posameznem projektnem področju najbolj potrebne pomoči.
For the purpose of the needs evaluations, a team of recognised experts will assess the present status of nuclear security system already in place in these countries and give recommendations on improvements.
Za ocenjevanje potreb bo skupina priznanih strokovnjakov ocenila sedanje stanje sistema jedrske varnosti, ki so ga te države že vzpostavile, in predložila priporočila za izboljšave.
Priorities will be set in identifying the countries for each project covered by the budget made available through EU support.
Pri določanju držav za vsak projekt bodo postavljene prioritete, ki se bodo krile iz proračuna, razpoložljivega zahvaljujoč podpori EU.
This broad range of norms (many developed under IAEA auspices) provides a framework for using nuclear material, other radioactive substances and their related facilities safely and securely – both those with large nuclear programmes and those conducting only limited nuclear activities.
Ta široka paleta predpisov (veliko jih je bilo razvitih pod okriljem MAAE) zagotavlja okvir, v katerem se jedrski material, druge radioaktivne snovi in z njimi povezani objekti uporabljajo varno in varovano – tako za države z obsežnimi jedrskimi programi kot tudi za tiste z jedrskimi dejavnostmi manjšega obsega.
National implementing legislation should provide a framework of principles and general provisions that enables authorized governmental entities to exercise the necessary regulatory functions and that regulates the conduct of any person engaged in regulated activities.
V nacionalnih izvedbenih predpisih je treba poskrbeti za okvir z načeli in splošnimi določbami, ki bo pooblaščenim vladnim subjektom omogočal izvrševanje potrebnih upravnih funkcij in urejal ravnanje vseh oseb, ki se ukvarjajo z zadevnimi dejavnostmi.
In many States such legislation is inadequate and the regulatory infrastructure is not in place or is inadequate.
V mnogih državah je tovrstna zakonodaja neustrezna, nadzorne infrastrukture pa sploh ni ali je prav tako neustrezna.
Some of these sources are highly radioactive and belong to categories 1 to 3 as defined in the IAEA document ‘Categorisation of Radioactive Sources’.
Nekateri od teh virov so visoko radioaktivni in spadajo v kategorije od 1 do 3, kakor so opredeljene v dokumentu MAAE „Kategorizacija radioaktivnih virov sevanja“.
These sources, if not adequately under regulatory control and protected, may fall into the wrong hands and be used in malicious activities.
Brez ustreznega upravnega nadzora in varovanja lahko ti viri pridejo v napačne roke in se uporabijo pri zlonamernih dejavnostih.
The regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources must be effective and must function adequately in accordance with international standards, the guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the associated import/export guidance, and best practices.
Nadzorna infrastruktura za varstvo pred sevanji in za zaščito radioaktivnih virov mora biti dejansko učinkovita in delovati ustrezno v skladu z mednarodnimi standardi, smernicami iz Pravil ravnanja za varnost in zaščito radioaktivnih virov in najboljšo prakso.
The conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the IAEA is an effective measure that promotes stringent national and international control over nuclear material and related technologies.
Sklenitev sporazumov o nadzornih ukrepih in dodatnih protokolov z MAAE je učinkovit ukrep, ki spodbuja strog nacionalni in mednarodni nadzor nad jedrskim materialom ter z njim povezanih tehnologij.
In addition, States that have concluded an additional protocol need to ensure that their national implementing legislation has been enhanced to enable the State concerned to comply with the additional obligations under the additional protocol.
Poleg tega morajo države, ki so sklenile Dodatni protokol, poskrbeti za izboljšanje nacionalnih izvedbenih predpisov in tako omogočiti izpolnjevanje dodatnih obveznosti, izhajajočih iz Dodatnega protokola.
In particular, the State’s domestic legislation should be revised to expand the responsibilities and powers of the regulatory body designated for the purposes of implementing and applying the safeguards agreements concluded.
Zlasti je treba notranjo zakonodajo države revidirati tako, da se razširijo pristojnosti in pooblastila upravnega organa, ki je bil določen za namene izvajanja in uporabe sklenjenih sporazumov o nadzornih ukrepih.
States also accept obligations to meet international norms related to nuclear security when becoming parties to the CPPNM by ratifying the Amendment to the CPPNM, and when becoming a party to the Nuclear Terrorism Convention.
Države sprejmejo obveznost, da bodo izpolnjevale mednarodna merila v zvezi z jedrsko varnostjo, tudi, ko postanejo pogodbenice Konvencije o fizičnem varovanju jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov, CPPNM, z ratifikacijo Spremembe CPPNM in ko postanejo pogodbenice Konvencije o jedrskem terorizmu.
In addition, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540(2004) also obliges all States to establish domestic controls including appropriate controls over materials related to nuclear weapons.
Varnostna resolucija Varnostnega Sveta Združenih narodov 1540 (2004) pa vse države obvezuje tudi k vzpostavitvi notranjega nadzora, vključno z vzpostavitvijo ustreznega nadzora nad materiali, povezanimi z jedrskim orožjem.
States’ undertakings included in the aforementioned international instruments in the field of nuclear security have resulted in a juxtaposition of commitments related to the security of nuclear material and facilities and other radioactive sources.
Ukrepanje držav na področju jedrske varnosti, ki izhaja iz navedenih mednarodnih instrumentov, je privedlo do soočenja zavez v zvezi z varnostjo jedrskega materiala z objekti in drugimi radioaktivnimi viri.
These commitments include measures for the establishment of a regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources; accountancy and control measures; physical protection measures; import and export controls and the criminalization of unlawful acts.
Med drugim se te zaveze nanašajo na ukrepe za vzpostavitev nadzorne infrastrukture za varstvo pred sevanji in zaščito radioaktivnih virov; ukrepe za evidentiranje in nadzor; ukrepe za fizično varovanje; nadzor nad uvozom in izvozom in inkriminiranje nezakonitih dejanj.
It is also of vital importance that powerful and vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications are physically protected against malicious acts when used or stored, and when no longer required, that they be dismantled and stored, or disposed of as radioactive waste, in a safe and secure location.
Prav tako je bistvenega pomena, da se pred zlonamernimi dejanji med uporabo ali skladiščenjem fizično varujejo tudi močni in nevarovani radioaktivni viri iz nejedrskih uporab, ko pa niso več potrebni, jih je treba razgraditi in uskladiščiti ali odstraniti kot radioaktivne odpadke na varno in varovano mesto.
All States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to establish and maintain state systems of accounting for and control of all nuclear material (SSACs) subject to safeguards.
Vsaka država s celovitim sporazumom o nadzornih ukrepih mora vzpostaviti in skrbeti za državni sistem vodenja evidenc jedrskih materialov, za katere veljajo nadzorni ukrepi, in nadzora nad njimi (SSAC).
However, IAEA estimates that such systems are lacking or inadequate in many States that are party to such agreements.
Vendar pa MAAE ocenjuje, da takšnih sistemov v mnogih državah pogodbenicah teh sporazumov bodisi ni bodisi so neustrezni.
Strengthening of States’ Capabilities for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking
Krepitev zmogljivosti držav za odkrivanje nedovoljenega prometa in za odzivanje nanj
To combat illicit trafficking, States thus require the necessary regulatory systems to be in place, as well as technical systems (including user-friendly instruments) and available procedures and information at border posts for detecting attempts to smuggle radioactive materials (including fissile, radioactive materials) or unauthorised trade in sensitive equipment and technology.
Za boj proti nedovoljenemu prometu morajo zato države vzpostaviti ustrezne nadzorne pa tudi tehnične sisteme (vključno z uporabniku prijaznimi instrumenti) ter postopke in informacije, ki bodo na mejnih prehodih na voljo za odkrivanje poskusov tihotapljenja radioaktivnih snovi (vključno s cepljivimi radioaktivnimi snovmi) ali nedovoljene trgovine z občutljivo opremo in tehnologijo.
Different training should be offered to staff of different categories, both in using detection instruments and in understanding the reading of the instruments in order to be able to decide on follow-up activities.
Zaposlenim različnih kategorij bi bilo treba ponuditi različne oblike izobraževanja in usposabljanja, tako glede rabe instrumentov za odkrivanje kot tudi glede tolmačenja odčitavanja teh instrumentov, da bi lahko sprejemali odločitve glede nadaljnjega postopanja.