natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The fact that the share price of OTE has increased since the announcement of the VRS does not necessarily mean that the State’s financial contribution should be considered, for this reason alone, compatible with the private investor principle.
Dejstvo, da se je cena delnice družbe OTE po najavi SPU zvišala, ne pomeni nujno, da je treba samo zaradi tega razloga prispevek družbe upoštevati kot združljiv z načelom zasebnega vlagatelja.
In principle, any financial contribution by the State towards improving the financial position of a quoted company is likely also to improve the latter’s share price, and this regardless of whether such a contribution qualifies as aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Načeloma lahko vsak finančni prispevek države k boljšemu finančnemu položaju zadevne družbe izboljša tudi ceno delnice družbe ne glede na to, če tak prispevek pomeni pomoč v okviru člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
For all the above reasons, the argument of the Greek authorities that the State’s contribution to the costs of the VRS complies with the private investor principle should be rejected.
Zaradi vseh navedenih razlogov je treba utemeljitev grških organov, da je prispevek k stroškom SPU v skladu z načelom zasebnega vlagatelja, zavrniti.
Absence of an economic advantage
Odsotnost gospodarske ugodnosti
According to settled case-law, the concept of aid encompasses advantages granted by public authorities which, in various ways, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking [34].
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso koncept pomoči obsega ugodnosti s strani organov z javnimi pooblastili, ki na različne načine zmanjšujejo stroške, ki so običajno del proračuna podjetja [34].
The Court of Justice has held in this respect that a partial reduction of social charges devolving upon an undertaking constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty if that measure is intended partially to exempt that undertaking from the financial charges arising from the normal application of the general social security system, without there being any justification for this exemption on the basis of the nature or general scheme of this system [35].
Glede na to je Sodišče odločilo, da delno zmanjšanje prispevkov za socialno varnost podjetja pomeni pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, če je ta ukrep namenjen delni oprostitvi plačila finančnih stroškov tega podjetja, ki izhajajo iz običajne uporabe splošnega sistema socialne varnosti brez kakršne koli upravičenosti za to izvzetje na podlagi narave ali splošne sheme tega sistema [35].
The Greek authorities contest that the partial reduction of OTE’s costs of the VRS confers an advantage on the company, and has an impact on competition, on the grounds that it frees OTE from a structural disadvantage and ensures that the company will be subject to the same, less burdensome, labour law arrangements as any other company in the Greek electronic communications market.
Grški organi nasprotujejo trditvi, da delno zmanjšanje stroškov družbe OTE za SPU pomeni ugodnost za družbo in vpliva na konkurenco s trditvijo, da se odpravijo strukturne težave družbe OTE, s čimer se omogoči, da bo podjetje predmet enake, manj obremenjujoče ureditve delovnega prava kot vsa ostala podjetja na grškem trgu elektronskih komunikacij.
In this regard, the Greek authorities have relied on the Combus judgment delivered by the Court of First Instance.
V tej zvezi so se grški organi oprli na Sodbo sodišča prve stopnje Combus.
In that case, the Court stated that a (State) measure which was ‘introduced to replace the privileged and costly status of the officials employed by Combus with the status of employees on a contract basis comparable to that of employees of other bus transport undertakings competing with Combus’ did not constitute aid, for ‘the intention [of the Danish government] was thus to free Combus from a structural disadvantage it had in relation to its private-sector competitors’ [36].
V tej zadevi je Sodišče navedlo, da (državni) ukrep, ki je bil „uveden, da bi zamenjal privilegiran in drag status zaposlenih uradnikov pri Combusu z zaposlitvenim statusom na podlagi pogodbe, ki je primerljiv s statusom zaposlenih pri drugih avtobusnih podjetjih, ki konkurirajo Combusu“ ne pomeni pomoči, ker je bil „namen [Danske vlade] odpraviti strukturne težave družbe Combus v primerjavi z zasebnimi tekmeci“ [36].
In this regard, it should be noted that the finding in Combus has not been confirmed by the Court of Justice.
V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da ugotovitve v Sodbi Combus ni potrdilo Sodišče.
Certain judgments of the Court of Justice tell against the assumption that the provision of compensation for a structural disadvantage means that a measure cannot be categorised as aid.
Nekatere sodbe Sodišča nasprotujejo predpostavki, da zagotavljanje nadomestila za strukturne težave pomeni, da ukrepa ni mogoče označiti kot pomoč.
In its settled case-law, the Court of Justice has decided that the extent to which a measure constitutes aid must be determined according to the effects of the measure and not by reference to its causes or aims [37].
Sodišče je v skladu s svojo sodno prakso določilo, da je treba obseg ukrepa, ki pomeni pomoč, določiti glede na učinke ukrepa in ne glede na njegove vzroke in cilje [37].
The Court has also decided that any measure exempting an undertaking from the charges which are normally included in its budget constitutes State aid [38].
Sodišče je tudi odločilo, da vsak ukrep, zaradi katerega je podjetje izvzeto od plačil, ki so običajno del proračuna, pomeni državno pomoč [38].
The Court has made clear that this includes, for example, the costs linked to employee pay [39].
Sodišče je pojasnilo, da to vključuje tudi na primer stroške, povezane s plačami zaposlenih [39].
In the light of these considerations, the Court has rejected the notion that a measure does not give an advantage to the undertaking solely because it compensates some disadvantage which the undertaking has suffered in the past [40].
Z vidika teh pomislekov je Sodišče zavrnilo stališče, da ukrep podjetju ne daje ugodnosti, zato ker nadomesti slabši položaj, ki ga je imelo podjetje v preteklosti [40].
It is true that the labour law applicable to OTE is different from that applied to any other private company in Greece, in that the permanent tenure of OTE employees and their higher salaries cannot be modified unless new legislation is passed giving effect to the consent required of OTE’s employees.
Delovno pravo, ki velja za OTE, se res razlikuje od prava, ki velja za druga zasebna podjetja v Grčiji, in sicer v tem, da statusa stalno zaposlenih pri OTE in njihove višje plače ni mogoče spremeniti, razen v primeru sprejetja nove zakonodaje, ki bi uveljavila privolitev zaposlenih pri OTE.
Overall, the labour rules applicable to OTE increase its labour and social security costs and deprive the company from the freedom enjoyed by other competing companies when it comes to restructuring their labour costs in line with the prevailing market conditions.
Delovna pravila, ki veljajo za OTE, na splošno zvišujejo delovne stroške in stroške za socialno varnost družbe, hkrati pa družbi omejujejo svobodo, ki jo imajo druga konkurenčna podjetja, ko gre za prestrukturiranje njihovih delovnih stroškov v skladu s prevladujočimi tržnimi pogoji.
In this regard, the present case bears a number of similarities with Combus.
V tem pogledu je obravnavan primer zelo podoben zadevi Combus.
In Combus, the Danish State did not compensate the company concerned but the officials employed by it.
V zadevi Combus danska država ni nadomestila stroškov zadevne družbe, ampak stroške uradnikov, zaposlenih v družbi.
Likewise, the Greek State is not compensating OTE but the employees’ pension fund for the loss of revenue due to early retirement.
Podobno tudi grška država ne kompenzira družbe OTE, ampak pokojninski sklad za zaposlene, ki izgubijo prihodek zaradi predčasnega upokojevanja.
Like in Combus, the permanent status of OTE’s employees constitutes a ‘privileged and costly status’ vis-à-vis the status of private-sector employees.
Tako kot v Combusu, tudi v družbi OTE status stalno zaposlenih pomeni „privilegiran in drag status“ v primerjavi s statusom zaposlenih v zasebnem sektorju.
Like in Combus the intention of the Greek Government is to free OTE ‘from a structural disadvantage it ha[s] in relation to its private-sector competitors’.
Tako kot v Combusu, je tudi pri družbi OTE namen grške vlade odpraviti „strukturne težave družbe v primerjavi s tekmeci iz zasebnega sektorja.“
Furthermore, as was the case in Combus, the State’s intervention does not aim to make up for, or alleviate OTE from, its past pensions obligations resulting from the period of time when the company became subject to a sui generis labour law framework (past liabilities), but is strictly limited to putting OTE in line with the private sector for its future pension rights.
Nadalje, tako kot v zadevi Combus, tudi v primeru OTE država ne želi nadomestiti ali zmanjšati preteklih pokojninskih obveznosti iz obdobja, ko je družba postala predmet sui generis okvira za delovno pravo (pretekle obveznosti), ampak je izrecno usmerjena v uskladitev družbe OTE z zasebnim sektorjem za njene prihodnje pokojninske pravice.
That being said, the Commission also notes that the factual and legal context of the case at hand exhibits a number of particularities compared with Combus.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da dejanski in pravni kontekst primera kažeta na številne posebnosti v primerjavi z zadevo Combus.
First, in Combus the Danish authorities’ compensation aimed to facilitate the planned change of status of the company from public to private, hence the financial compensation (bonus) offered by the Danish Government to Combus employees whose status changed from public servants to private-law contract employees.
Prvič, v zadevi Combus je bilo nadomestilo danskih organov namenjeno pospeševanju načrtovane spremembe statusa družbe iz javne v zasebno družbo, finančno nadomestilo (dodatek) danske države zaposlenim pri Combusu, katerih status se je spremenil iz statusa državnih uradnikov v status zasebnih pogodbenih delavcev.
OTE, however, became a public limited company in 1994, without the State taking any appropriate measures at the time to ensure that the company’s labour rules would be aligned on those of a normal public limited company.
OTE je postala delniška družba leta 1994, ne da bi država tedaj sprejela kakršne koli ustrezne ukrepe, s katerimi bi zagotovila, da bi bila delovna pravila družbe v skladu s pravili običajne delniške družbe.
Nor did the State intervene in 2001, when OTE lost its exclusive right to provide fixed voice telecommunications services and the Greek electronic communications market was fully liberalised.
Država ni intervenirala niti leta 2001, ko je družba OTE izgubila svojo ekskluzivno pravico za zagotavljanje storitev fiksnih glasovnih telekomunikacij in se je grški trg elektronskih komunikacij popolnoma liberaliziral.
In this respect, it is not impossible that the high number of employees enabled OTE, especially during the critical years before and immediately after full liberalisation, to secure and maintain its current dominant position and continue to be present in virtually all segments of the electronic communications market.
V zvezi s tem ni nemogoče, da je ravno visoko število zaposlenih omogočilo družbi OTE, še posebno med kritičnimi leti pred in takoj po popolni liberalizaciji, da zagotovi in vzdržuje svoj trenutni dominantni položaj ter je še naprej prisotna v vseh segmentih trga elektronskih komunikacij.
Moreover, as stated in recital 93, the concept of aid in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty covers only measures which lighten the burdens normally assumed in an undertaking’s budget and which are to be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions [41].
Nadalje, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 93, koncept pomoči iz člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES zajema samo ukrepe, ki zmanjšujejo obremenitve, običajno vključene v proračun podjetja, in ki jih je treba upoštevati kot ekonomsko ugodnost, ki je podjetje ne bi pridobilo v običajnih tržnih pogojih [41].
In this respect, it should be recalled that according to the case-law, the costs for undertakings that arise from collective agreements concluded between employers and trade unions, which undertakings are bound to observe, either because they have acceded to those agreements or because those agreements have been extended by regulation, are costs that are included, by their nature, in the budgets of undertakings [42].
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da so v skladu s sodno prakso stroški podjetja, ki izhajajo iz kolektivnih sporazumov med delodajalci in sindikati ter ki jih morajo podjetja upoštevati, ker so pristopila k tem sporazumom ali ker so bili ti sporazumi razširjeni z zakonodajo, stroški, ki so po svoji naravi vključeni v proračun podjetij [42].
Although, as pointed out in recital 93, the labour rules imposed on OTE are indeed an exception to the ordinary labour law applied to date to any other private company in Greece, and the permanent status and the high salaries guaranteed to OTE employees were not in reality the result of a freely negotiated collective agreement, but rather imposed on the company by the State itself, the Commission notes that at no time since OTE became a listed company did the Greek authorities indicate that OTE’s labour law liabilities did not have to be assumed by the company’s normal budget or that the State would have to compensate OTE for the extra costs of permanency and high salaries imposed by law on it.
Kljub temu da so, kot je poudarjeno v uvodni izjavi 93, predpisi s področja delovnega prava za družbo OTE vsekakor izjemni glede na običajno delovno pravo, ki velja za katero koli drugo zasebno podjetje v Grčiji, status stalno zaposlenih in zagotovljene visoke plače zaposlenih pri OTE pa dejansko niso bile rezultat prostih pogajanj o kolektivnem sporazumu, ampak jih je družbi določila država sama, Komisija ugotavlja, da grški organi, odkar je OTE postala javna družba, niso navedli, da obveznosti družbe OTE na področju delovnega prava ni treba vključiti v proračun podjetja ali da bi morala država družbi OTE nadomestiti dodatne stroške za status stalno zaposlenih in visoke plače, določene po zakonu.
Likewise, OTE’s stock valuation was also based on the assumption that the permanency and high salary costs of OTE are normally for OTE’s budget to bear.
Vrednost delnice družbe OTE je bila tudi določena na podlagi predpostavke, da mora podjetje OTE stroške stalnega statusa in visokih plač poravnati iz svojega proračuna.
These considerations, examined in conjunction with the findings in the Combus case, indicate that the measure at issue can be regarded as aid.
Ti pomisleki, preučeni v povezavi z ugotovitvami iz zadeve Combus, kažejo, da se zadevni ukrep lahko upošteva kot pomoč.
However, the matter does not need to be pursued further since, for the reasons set out in detail below, it is in any event compatible with the common market under Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty.
Zadeve ni treba nadalje raziskovati, ker je zaradi razlogov, podrobno opisanih spodaj, v vsakem primeru združljiva s skupnim trgom po členu 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES.
COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID WITH THE COMMON MARKET
SKLADNOST POMOČI S SKUPNIM TRGOM
The Commission notes that the planned contribution of the State to the costs of the VRS of OTE is part of wider plan of the Greek authorities to restructure the employment regime applicable to OTE so as to guarantee its long term viability and to improve the functioning of the electronic communications market.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je načrtovan prispevek države k stroškom SPU družbe OTE del širšega načrta grških organov, da bi prestrukturirali zaposlitveno ureditev, ki velja za družbo OTE, in zagotovili dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja podjetja ter izboljšali delovanje trga za elektronske komunikacije.
The VRS is thus a necessary step towards the further privatisation of OTE.
SPU je zato potreben korak k nadaljnji privatizaciji družbe OTE.
The Commission therefore considers that the assessment of the compatibility of the measure with the common market needs to be based directly on Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty which states that: ‘aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’ may be considered to be compatible with the common market.
Komisija zato meni, da mora ocena združljivosti ukrepa s skupnim trgom temeljiti neposredno na členu 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES, ki navaja, da lahko „pomoč za pospeševanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih dejavnosti ali določenih gospodarskih območij, kadar takšna pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi,“ štejemo kot združljivo s skupnim trgom.
For an aid measure to be considered compatible with the common market on the grounds that it facilitates the development of economic activities or certain economic areas, it must improve the way the economic activity is carried out.
Da lahko ukrep pomoči štejemo kot združljiv s skupnim trgom na podlagi dejstva, da pospešuje razvoj gospodarskih dejavnosti ali določenih gospodarskih območij, mora ukrep izboljšati način izvajanja gospodarske dejavnosti.
Aid is compatible under Article 87(3)(c) only where it does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Pomoč je združljiva s členom 87(3)(c), samo če ne škodi trgovinskim pogojem v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
In carrying out its assessment, the Commission pays particular attention to the criteria of necessity and proportionality [43].
Pri izvajanju svoje ocene je Komisija posebej pozorna na merila nujnosti in sorazmernosti [43].
The measure is in line with the common interest
Ukrep je skladen s skupnimi interesi
By relieving OTE from the extra costs it bears as a former public undertaking due to the permanent employment status and the high salaries of its staff, the notified measure will enable the company to operate freely in the fully liberalised electronic communications market and to make the necessary adjustments to respond to market and other technological developments that affect the company’s viability in the long term.
Z izvzetjem družbe OTE od plačila stroškov, ki jih ima kot nekdanje javno podjetje zaradi zaposlitvenega statusa stalno zaposlenih in visokih plač delavcev, bo priglašen ukrep podjetju omogočil prosto delovanje na popolnoma liberaliziranem trgu elektronskih komunikacij ter prilagoditev trgu in drugemu tehnološkemu razvoju, ki dolgoročno vpliva na sposobnost preživetja podjetja.
In particular, the reduction of around one third of OTE’s staff through the VRS, together with the consent of OTE employees to abolish permanency for future recruits in exchange for the early retirement package offered by OTE, are key components of the overall restructuring operations of OTE that should guarantee the company’s profitability, efficient operations and further privatisation.
Zmanjševanje števila zaposlenih pri OTE za približno tretjino s pomočjo SPU ter privolitev zaposlenih pri OTE, da se ukine status stalno zaposlenih za nadaljnje zaposlovanje v zameno za paket predčasnega upokojevanja, ki ga je ponudila družba OTE, so glavni elementi celotnega prestrukturiranja družbe OTE, ki bi moralo zagotoviti donosnost družbe, učinkovito delovanje in nadaljnjo privatizacijo.
To date, the permanent employment status of OTE employees, their excessive number and the fixed salary regime applied to them constitute major obstacles to the further privatisation of the company and to the exit of the Greek State from OTE.
Zaposlitveni status stalno zaposlenih pri OTE, presežek delovne sile in fiksna plačna ureditev, ki se uporablja, so dozdaj pomenili glavno oviro za nadaljnjo privatizacijo družbe ter za umik grške države iz družbe OTE.
The ongoing transformation of OTE from an ex-monopolist to a company that is subject to the same legal framework as any other private operator in Greece, with the subsequently envisaged relinquishment by the Greek State of its control over the company, improves the operation of the Greek electronic communications market, lowers the barriers to entry and exit in the market [44] and is beneficial in the longer term to end-users.
Sedanje preoblikovanje družbe OTE iz nekdanje monopolne družbe v družbo, za katero velja enak pravni okvir kot za vsa druga zasebna podjetja v Grčiji, s posledično predvidenim odstopom nadzora grške države nad podjetjem, izboljšuje delovanje grškega trga elektronskih komunikacij, zmanjšuje ovire za vstop in umikom s trga [44] ter dolgoročno koristi končnim uporabnikom.
Therefore the planned financial contribution of the Greek State to the costs of the VRS is in line with the common interest.
Načrtovani finančni prispevek grške države k stroškom SPU je zato v skladu s skupnim interesom.
The aid is the appropriate instrument
Pomoč je ustrezni instrument
At the opening of the formal investigation, the Commission expressed reservations as regards the need for the present VRS by reference to other previous VRSs that were financed entirely by OTE.
Ob sprožitvi uradne preiskave je Komisija izrazila pomisleke v zvezi s potrebo po sedanji SPU s sklicevanjem na prejšnje SPU, ki jih je v celoti financirala družba OTE.
In particular, the investigation showed that since 1996 and up to 2004, OTE allowed 8173 employees to retire early.
Preiskava je pokazala, da je OTE od leta 1996 do leta 20048173 zaposlenim omogočila predčasno upokojitev.
However, these smaller annual VRSs (900 employees on average each year) were offered only to employees who were already entitled to a pension but could still continue to work until the conditions for mandatory retirement were met [45].
Vendar so se te manjše letne SPU (v povprečju 900 zaposlenih na leto) ponudile samo zaposlenim, ki so že bili upravičeni do pokojnine, ampak so lahko nadaljevali z delom, dokler niso izpolnili pogojev za obvezno upokojitev [45].
Accordingly, these past VRSs did not involve the recognition of any notional years to the employees concerned, and therefore cannot be compared to the present VRS as far their structure and scope are concerned.
S temi preteklimi SPU se zaposlenim tudi niso priznavala nobena hipotetična leta ter jih zato ni mogoče primerjati s sedanjo SPU v smislu strukture in obsega.
In that sense, the previous VRSs implemented by OTE were no different from equivalent VRSs implemented by any other private company or OTE’s current ‘regular’ VRS [46].
V tem pogledu se prejšnje SPU družbe OTE niso razlikovale od enakovrednih SPU, ki so jih izvajala druga zasebna podjetja, ali od trenutne „redne“ SPU družbe OTE [46].
In the present case, a VRS which would have merely offered early retirement only to employees who were entitled to a pension but had not yet reached the mandatory retirement age would not have led to the highest possible take-up since a number of eligible employees would still have preferred to remain in employment in order to receive the maximum possible pension [47].
V tem primeru SPU, ki bi ponudila predčasno upokojevanje samo zaposlenim, ki so upravičeni do pokojnine, ampak še niso dosegli starosti za obvezno upokojitev, ne bi vzpodbudila čim številčnejše sodelovanje v shemi, saj bi veliko zaposlenih raje ostalo v podjetju, da bi dobili najvišjo možno pokojnino [47].
In these circumstances, the decision of OTE to recognise up to seven notional years of service to all employees who would have been subject to mandatory retirement between 2005 and 2012, and thus offer them an early retirement option with a full pension, appears to have been the only means likely to lead to the timely release of a significant number of employees.
V teh okoliščinah se zdi, da je bila odločitev družbe OTE, da prizna do sedem hipotetičnih delovnih let vsem zaposlenim, ki bi se obvezno upokojili med letoma 2005 in 2012, in jim ponudi možnost predčasnega upokojevanja s polno pokojnino, edino sredstvo, ki lahko omogoči pravočasen odpust večjega števila delavcev.