natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Among the several ‘energy-related services’ in which both parties are active, the operation raises competition concerns for one of them: the nationally defined market for the public service delegation of managing district heating systems in France.
Kar zadeva razne „energetske storitve“, ki jih ponujata stranki, koncentracija zbuja pomisleke glede konkurence pri eni od njih: gre za trg, opredeljen na nacionalni ravni, za prenos pooblastil za upravljanje javne storitve daljinskega ogrevanja v Franciji („ogrevalno omrežje“).
Long-term contracts (12 to 24 years) to manage district heating systems are currently granted by the municipalities concerned on the basis of an official tendering process, in which in practice only a handful of France-based specialised companies participate.
Za upravljanje ogrevalnih omrežij sklenejo občine dolgoročne pogodbe (12 do 24 let) na podlagi javnih razpisov, na katerih v praksi sodeluje samo nekaj specializiranih francoskih družb.
These suppliers are: Dalkia (Veolia Group), SES-Elyo (Suez Group), Soccram (Thion Group) and Cogac (Cofathec-Coriance, GDF Group).
In sicer so to naslednji ponudniki: družba Dalkia (skupina Veolia), družba SES-Elyo (skupina Suez), družba Soccram (skupina Thion) in družba Cogac (Cofathec-Coriance, skupina GDF).
Cogac (GDF Group) has a substantial shareholding in and arguably joint control of Soccram (Thion Group).
Družba Cogac (skupina GDF) ima znaten delež v družbi Soccram (skupina Thion) in si verjetno deli skupni nadzor nad to družbo.
After the merger, the parties will be the largest player in the market.
Po opravljeni koncentraciji bi stranki postali glavni udeleženec na zadevnem trgu.
The merger removes Cogac (GDF Group), which has been a ‘maverick’ in the market, thus leading to non-coordinated effects.
Koncentracija bi odpravila družbo Cogac (skupina GDF), ki ima vlogo „odpadnika“ na trgu, kar pojasni pomanjkanje usklajenega delovanja na tem trgu.
The position of GDF as the dominant supplier of gas to anyone participating in a tender to manage a district heating system in France is a further factor reducing competitive pressures in this market.
Poleg tega je položaj skupine GDF kot vodilnega dobavitelja plina za kogar koli, ki se prijavi na javni razpis za upravljanje ogrevalnega omrežja v Franciji, dodatni dejavnik, ki zmanjšuje konkurenčni pritisk na tem trgu.
Commitments offered by the parties
Zaveze, ki sta jih ponudili stranki
In order to remedy the competition concerns identified by the Commission, on 20 September 2006 the parties submitted a package of commitments.
Da bi odpravili pomisleke glede konkurence, ki jih je predstavila Komisija, sta stranki 20. septembra 2006 ponudili svoje zaveze.
Most answers to the market test showed that the vast majority of the commitments offered by the parties were not sufficient to remove the competition concerns raised by the notified operation.
Odgovori udeležencev na trgu, s katerimi se je Komisija posvetovala, so v zelo veliki večini pokazali, da te zaveze niso zadostne za odpravo pomislekov glede konkurence zaradi priglašene koncentracije.
After being informed by the Commission on the results of the market test, the parties modified their initial commitments on 13 October 2006.
Ko je bila Komisija obveščena o rezultatih posvetovanja z udeleženci na trgu, sta stranki 13. oktobra 2006 spremenili prvotne zaveze.
The commitments proposed on 13 October 2006
Vsebina zavez z dne 13. oktobra 2006
The commitments offered by the parties consist of five main elements:
Zaveze, ki sta jih ponudili stranki, so sestavljene iz petih glavnih elementov:
the divestiture of Suez Group’s shareholding in Distrigaz.
odprodaje deleža skupine Suez v družbi Distrigaz.
In this context, the merged entity may request Distrigaz to supply it with gas for the needs of its electricity generating plants and of ECS's customers.
V okviru tega bo združeni gospodarski subjekt družbo Distrigaz lahko zaprosil za dobavo plina za potrebe svojih elektrarn in odjemalcev družbe ECS.
However, since the duration of the related contracts is […] * years (from the date of the divestiture of Distrigaz) for most of the volumes concerned, those supply volumes will be limited and decreasing in time,
Vendar bodo dobavljene količine omejene in se bodo polagoma zmanjševale, saj so s tem povezane pogodbe za večino zadevnih količin sklenjene za največ […] * let (od datuma odprodaje družbe Distrigaz),
the divestiture of Gaz de France’s 25,5 % shareholding in SPE,
odprodaje 25,5-odstotnega deleža skupine GDF v družbi SPE,
the relinquishment of any control — de facto or de jure — over Fluxys SA, which will be the transmission operator of all regulated gas infrastructures in Belgium (transport/transit, storage, Zeebrugge LNG terminal) after the reorganisation of its activities.
odpovedi strank vsakršnemu nadzoru – pravnemu in dejanskemu – nad družbo Fluxys s. a., ki bo po reorganizaciji svojega poslovanja edina upravljavka celotne urejene plinske infrastrukture v Belgiji (prenosno/tranzitno omrežje, skladiščenje, terminal utekočinjenega zemeljskega plina v Zeebruggeu).
In this scheme, the management committee of Fluxys SA, which will not be controlled by the parties, will be the exclusive decision maker as regards the global investment programmes concerning the regulated gas infrastructures,
V okviru tega bo usmerjevalni odbor družbe Fluxys s. a., ki ne bo smel biti pod nadzorom strank, edini odločal o splošnem načrtu naložb v zvezi z urejeno plinsko infrastrukturo,
a package of complementary measures concerning gas infrastructures in Belgium and in France,
vrste dopolnilnih ukrepov v zvezi s plinsko infrastrukturo v Belgiji in Franciji,
the divestiture of Cofathec Coriance plus Cofathec Service’s heating networks, excluding Cofathec Coriance’s holding in Climespace and SESAS.
odprodaje družbe Cofathec Coriance skupaj z ogrevalnimi omrežji družbe Cofathec Service, razen deleža družbe Cofathec Coriance v družbah Climespace in SESAS.
Assessment of these commitments by the Commission
Ocena Komisije glede zavez
On the basis of its assessment of the information provided by the investigation and, in particular, of the results of the previous consultation of the market operators, the Commission considers that the modified commitments proposed by the parties on 13 October 2006 are clear-cut and sufficient to remove the competition concerns raised by the notified operation, in Belgium and in France, without the need to run a further market test, for the following reasons:
Komisija na podlagi svoje ocene podatkov, ki jih je že pridobila v okviru preiskave, zlasti rezultatov prejšnjega posvetovanja z udeleženci na trgu, jasno in ne da bi bilo potrebno novo posvetovanje z udeleženci na trgu, ugotavlja, da spremenjene zaveze, ki sta jih stranki ponudili 13. oktobra 2006, zadostujejo za odpravo pomislekov glede konkurence zaradi priglašene koncentracije, in sicer tako v Belgiji kot v Franciji, zlasti iz naslednjih razlogov:
the divestitures of Distrigaz, of GDF’s shareholding in SPE, of Cofathec Coriance and of Cofathec Service’s heating networks remove the overlaps between the parties in all markets previously affected by competition concerns.
Odprodaje družbe Distrigaz, deleža skupine GDF v družbi SPE ter družbe Cofathec Coriance in ogrevalnih omrežij družbe Cofathec Service preprečujejo prekrivanje med strankama na vseh trgih, na katerih bi lahko nastali pomisleki glede konkurence.
These divestitures also remove vertical foreclosure problems between gas and electricity markets,
Te odprodaje odpravljajo tudi pomisleke glede vertikalnega zapiranja med trgi s plinom in trgi z električno energijo.
the loss of control by the parties over Fluxys SA and the remedies related to the gas infrastructures in Belgium and in France are sufficient to lower the barriers to entry to a degree that would allow effective competition to develop.
Izguba nadzora strank nad družbo Fluxys s. a. ter korektivni ukrepi v zvezi s plinsko infrastrukturo v Belgiji in Franciji zadostujejo za zmanjšanje ovir pri vstopu na mero, ki omogoča razvoj učinkovite konkurence.
The merger as notified would significantly impede competition in a number of markets.
Koncentracija, kot je bila priglašena, bi bistveno ovirala konkurenco na več trgih.
The modified commitments offered by the parties on 13 October 2006 are sufficient to remove the competition concerns identified.
Spremenjene zaveze, ki sta jih stranki ponudili 13. oktobra 2006, pa zadostujejo za odpravo navedenih pomislekov glede konkurence.
Therefore, and subject to the parties’ full compliance with the commitments made on 13 October 2006 and repeated on 6 November 2006, the Decision concludes that the merger is compatible with the common market.
Zato je v odločbi ugotovljeno, da je ob spoštovanju zavez, ki sta jih stranki ponudili 13. oktobra 2006 in ponovili 6. novembra 2006, koncentracija združljiva s skupnim trgom.
The present Commission Decision therefore declares the notified operation compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation.
S to odločbo Komisija torej razglaša, da je priglašena združitev združljiva s skupnim trgom in delovanjem Sporazuma EGP v skladu s členom 8(2) Uredbe o združitvah.
GDF and Centrica each own 50 % of a holding company that acquired 51 % of SPE in 2005.
Skupini GDF in Centrica imata vsaka v lasti 50 % holdinške družbe, ki je leta 2005 pridobila 51-odstotni delež v družbi SPE.
Together, they exercise joint control over SPE.
Nad družbo SPE imata skupni nadzor.
The former owners of SPE, ALG and Publilum own 49 % of SPE via another holding company, but do not exercise control.
Nekdanji lastnici družbe SPE, družbi ALG in Publilum, imata preko druge holdinške družbe v družbi SPE 49-odstotni delež, vendar nad njo nimata nadzora.
Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
Nekateri deli tega dokumenta so izbrisani, da bi preprečili razkritje zaupnih podatkov; namesto izbrisanih delov so vstavljeni oglati oklepaji, ki so označeni z zvezdico.
The Suez Group has built up a considerable position among large industrial gas-supply customers (via Distrigaz) and already has contacts with several million household customers as a water distributor in France (via Lyonnaise des Eaux), which makes it one of the best-placed operators to compete against GDF once the household customer market opens up on 1 July 2007.
Skupina Suez je dosegla zelo vpliven položaj med velikimi industrijskimi odjemalci plina (preko družbe Distrigaz) in že ima stik z več milijoni gospodinjstev kot distributer vode v Franciji (preko družbe Lyonnaise des eaux), zaradi česar bi bila ta skupina eden najmočnejših konkurentov skupine GDF ob odprtju trga za gospodinjstva 1. julija 2007.
At the date of this Decision, GDF operated the only gas-fired electricity generating plant in France and supplied the gas for it.
Na dan te odločbe je skupina GDF upravljala edino obstoječo plinsko elektrarno v Franciji in ji dobavljala potrebni plin.
In a competitive market, electricity prices are set by the power plant with the highest marginal costs producing electricity at any given moment, i.e. the producer at the top of the supply curve (often called the ‘merit curve’ in the electricity sector).
Na konkurenčnem trgu določa cene električne energije elektrarna z najvišjimi mejnimi stroški pri proizvodnji električne energije v danem trenutku, torej proizvajalec, ki se nahaja na vrhu krivulje ponudbe (v sektorju električne energije pogosto imenovane „krivulja uspešnosti“).
to dealers (i.e. the ‘intercommunales’, ‘default suppliers’ such as ECS (Electrabel Customer Solutions) and newcomers on the gas supply market in Belgium such as Essent and Nuon),
lokalnim distributerjem (tj. medobčinskim družbam „intercommunales“, „osnovnim“ dobaviteljem, kot je družba ECS (Electrabel Customer Solutions), ter novim udeležencem na trgu za dobavo plina v Belgiji, kot sta družbi Essent in Nuon),
to large industrial customers,
velikim industrijskim odjemalcem,
In all these markets, GDF enjoys a dominant position. In all cases, the disappearance of Suez (Distrigaz) from the market strengthens the dominant player by removing one of the best-placed and strongest competitors.
V vseh zgoraj navedenih primerih bi prenehanje obstoja skupine Suez (družbe Distrigaz) na trgu okrepilo položaj vodilnega udeleženca, saj bi bil odstranjen eden njegovih najresnejših in najmočnejših konkurentov.
Concerning gas in France, the geographic markets taken into account are based on the division of the country into five balancing zones, North, West, East, South and South-West. While the latter’s main transport network is managed by Total Infrastructure Gaz France (TIGF), a wholly owned subsidiary of Total, the first four are managed by GDF Réseau Transport (GRTgaz), a wholly owned subsidiary of GDF.
Kar zadeva sektor plina v Franciji, temelji delitev upoštevnih geografskih trgov na delitvi države na pet „izravnalnih območij“ (zones d'équilibrage), in sicer na severno, zahodno, vzhodno, južno in jugovzhodno; osnovno prenosno omrežje za jugovzhodno območje upravlja Total Infrastructure Gaz France (TIGF), odvisna družba v 100-odstotni lasti skupine Total, za druga štiri pa GDF Réseau transport (GRT gaz), odvisna družba v 100-odstotni lasti skupine GDF.
of 27 March 2007
z dne 27. marca 2007
determining a mechanism for the allocation of quotas to producers and importers of hydrochlorofluorocarbons for the years 2003 to 2009 under Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council
o določitvi mehanizma za dodelitev kvot proizvajalcem in uvoznikom delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov za leta od 2003 do 2009 na podlagi Uredbe (ES) št. 2037/2000 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta
(notified under document number C(2007) 819_2)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2007) 819_2)
(Only the Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, Hungarian, German, Greek, Italian, Lithuanian, Polish, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish texts are authentic)
(Besedila v angleškem, estonskem, finskem, francoskem, grškem, italijanskem, litovskem, madžarskem, nemškem, nizozemskem, poljskem, slovenskem, španskem in švedskem jeziku so edina verodostojna)
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on substances that deplete the ozone layer [1], and in particular Article 4(3)(ii) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe (ES) št. 2037/2000 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 29. junija 2000 o snoveh, ki tanjšajo ozonski plašč [1], in zlasti člena 4(3)(ii) Uredbe,
Community measures, as in particular contained in Council Regulation (EC) No 3093/94 of 15 December 1994 on substances that deplete the ozone layer [2] which was replaced by Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000, have led over several years to a reduction of overall consumption of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs).
Zaradi ukrepov Skupnosti, zlasti tistih iz Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 3093/94 z dne 15. decembra 1994 o snoveh, ki tanjšajo ozonski plašč [2], ki jo je nadomestila Uredba (ES) št. 2037/2000, se je v obdobju nekaj let skupna poraba delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov (HCFC) zmanjšala.
In the context of that reduction, quotas for individual producers and importers were fixed based on historical market shares and calculated by reference to the ozone depleting potential of those substances.
V povezavi s tem zmanjšanjem so bile za posamezne proizvajalce in uvoznike določene kvote, ki temeljijo na preteklih tržnih deležih in so bile izračunane glede na dejavnik škodljivosti teh snovi za ozon.
Since 1997 the market for those substances in respect of different uses has been stable.
Od leta 1997 je trg za te snovi v zvezi z različnimi uporabami stabilen.
Almost two-thirds of the HCFCs were used for the production of foam until this use of HCFCs was banned on 1 January 2003.
Skoraj dve tretjini HCFC se je porabilo pri proizvodnji pene, dokler ni bila taka uporaba 1. januarja 2003 prepovedana.
In order to not disadvantage users of HCFCs making non-foam products from 1 January 2003 which would occur if the allocation system were to be based on historical market share of the use of HCFCs for foam products, it is appropriate to provide for a new allocation mechanism for the use of HCFCs after that date for the manufacture of non-foam products.
Da uporabniki HCFC, ki proizvajajo izdelke, ki niso pena, po 1. januarju 2003 ne bi bili v slabšem položaju, do česar bi prišlo, če bi sistem dodeljevanja temeljil na preteklem tržnem deležu uporabe HCFC za proizvodnjo pene, je primerno, da se po navedenem datumu zagotovi nov mehanizem za dodelitev za uporabo HCFC pri proizvodnji izdelkov, ki niso pena.
For 2004 to 2009, the allocation system considered most appropriate was that based solely on the average, historical market share of HCFCs used for non-foam production.
Za obdobje od 2004 do 2009 je za najbolj primernega veljal sistem dodeljevanja, ki temelji samo na povprečnem preteklem tržnem deležu HCFC pri proizvodnji izdelkov, ki niso pena.
While it is appropriate to limit the quotas available to each importer to their respective percentage market share in 1999 and for each importer in the Member States that acceded on the 1 May 2004 to the average of its percentage market share in 2002 and 2003, provision should also be made to reallocate to registered HCFCs importers any import quota which has not been claimed and allocated in a given year.
Primerno je, da se kvote, ki so na voljo vsakemu uvozniku, omejijo na ustrezen odstotek tržnega deleža, ki ga je imel uvoznik leta 1999, kvote vsakega uvoznika iz držav članic, ki so k EU pristopile 1. maja 2004, pa na povprečni tržni delež uvoznika iz let 2002 in 2003, vendar je treba zagotoviti tudi, da se uvozne kvote, za katere v določenem letu ni bilo zaprošeno in niso bile dodeljene, na novo dodelijo registriranim uvoznikom HCFC.
Commission Decision 2005/103/EC [3] which determined a mechanism for the allocation of quotas to producers and importers for hydrochlorofluorocarbons for the years 2003 to 2009 under Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 should be amended in order to take account of a revised base date for producers and importers in the Member States that acceded on the 1 May 2004 and the increased quota for hydrochlorofluorocarbons (Group VIII) in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000, as amended by the 2005 Act of Accession and the historical market share of undertakings in the Member States that acceded on the 1 January 2007.
Odločbo Komisije 2005/103/ES [3], ki je določila mehanizem za dodelitev kvot proizvajalcem in uvoznikom za delno halogenirane klorofluoroogljikovodike za leta 2003 do 2009 na podlagi Uredbe (ES) št. 2037/2000, je treba spremeniti, da se bodo upoštevali spremenjeni referenčni datum za proizvajalce in uvoznike v državah članicah, ki so k EU pristopile 1. maja 2004, povečana kvota za halogenirane klorofluoroogljikovodike (skupina VIII) iz Priloge III k Uredbi (ES) št. 2037/2000, kakor je bila spremenjena z Aktom o pristopu iz leta 2005, ter pretekli tržni delež podjetij v državah članicah, ki sta k EU pristopili 1. januarja 2007.
In the interests of legal clarity and transparency Decision 2005/103/EC should therefore be replaced.
Zaradi pravne jasnosti in preglednosti je treba Odločbo 2005/103/ES nadomestiti.
‘Market share for refrigeration’ means the average market share of sales of hydrochlorofluorocarbons for refrigeration applications of a producer in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 as a percentage of the total market for refrigeration applications;
„tržni delež za hladilna sredstva“ pomeni povprečni tržni delež prodaje delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov za hladilne naprave, ki ga je imel proizvajalec v letih 1997, 1998 in 1999, izražen kot odstotek celotnega trga za hladilne naprave;
‘Market share for foam production’ means the average market share of sales of hydrochlorofluorocarbons for foam production of a producer in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 as a percentage of the total market for foam production; and
„tržni delež za proizvodnjo pene“ pomeni povprečni tržni delež prodaje delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov za proizvodnjo pene, ki ga je imel proizvajalec v letih 1997, 1998 in 1999, izražen kot odstotek celotnega trga za proizvodnjo pene; in
‘Market share for solvent uses’ means the average market share of sales of hydrochlorofluorocarbons for solvent uses of a producer in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 as a percentage of the total market for solvent uses.
„tržni delež za topila“ pomeni povprečni tržni delež prodaje delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov za topila, ki ga je imel proizvajalec v letih 1997, 1998 in 1999, izražen kot odstotek celotnega trga topil.
The indicative quantities assigned for the consumption of hydrochlorofluorocarbons for refrigeration, foam production and solvents from the producers share of the calculated levels set out in Article 4(3)(i)(e) and (f) of Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000, shall be as set out in Annex I to this Decision.
Okvirne količine, dodeljene za porabo delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov za hladilna sredstva, proizvodnjo pene in topila na podlagi deleža proizvajalcev pri obračunskih ravneh, določenih v členu 4(3)(i)(e) in (f) Uredbe (ES) št. 2037/2000, so navedene v Prilogi I k tej odločbi.
For 2007, for each producer the quota of the calculated level of hydrochlorofluorocarbons set out in Article 4(3)(i)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 which it places on the market or uses for its own account shall not exceed the sum of the following:
Kvota obračunske ravni delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov iz člena 4(3)(i)(e) Uredbe (ES) št. 2037/2000, ki jih proizvajalec da na trg ali uporablja zase, za vsakega proizvajalca za leto 2007 ne presega vsote naslednjih elementov:
the producer’s market share for refrigeration of the total indicative quantity assigned for refrigeration in 2004;
tržnega deleža proizvajalca za hladilna sredstva glede na skupno okvirno količino, dodeljeno za hladilna sredstva v letu 2004;
For the years 2008 and 2009, for each producer the quota of the calculated level of hydrochlorofluorocarbons set out in Article 4(3)(i)(f) of Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 which it places on the market or uses for its own account shall not on a pro rata basis exceed the sum of the following:
Kvota obračunske ravni delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov iz člena 4(3)(i)(f) Uredbe (ES) št. 2037/2000, ki jih proizvajalec da na trg ali uporablja zase, za vsakega proizvajalca za obdobje od 2008 do 2009 v sorazmerju ne presega vsote naslednjih elementov:
The calculated level of hydrochlorofluorocarbons that each importer may place on the market or use for its own account shall not exceed, as a percentage of the calculated levels set out in Article 4(3)(i)(d), (e) and (f) of Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000, the percentage share assigned to it in 1999.
Obračunska raven delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov, ki jih posamezen uvoznik sme dati na trg ali uporabljati zase, kot odstotek obračunskih ravni iz člena 4(3)(i)(d), (e) in (f) Uredbe (ES) št. 2037/2000 ne presega odstotnega deleža, ki mu je bil dodeljen v letu 1999.
By way of derogation the calculated level of hydrochlorofluorocarbons that each importer in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia may place on the market or use for its own account shall not exceed, as a percentage of the calculated levels set out in Article 4(3)(i)(d), (e) and (f) of Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000, the average of its percentage market share in 2002 and 2003.
Z odstopanjem obračunska raven delno halogeniranih klorofluoroogljikovodikov, ki jih posamezen uvoznik iz Češke, Estonije, Cipra, Latvije, Litve, Madžarske, Malte, Poljske, Slovenije in Slovaške sme dati na trg ali uporabljati zase, kot odstotek obračunskih ravni iz člena 4(3)(i)(d), (e) in (f) Uredbe (ES) št. 2037/2000 ne presega povprečnega odstotnega tržnega deleža, ki mu je bil dodeljen v letih 2002 in 2003.