natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The legislator intended to facilitate the privatisation of certain publicly-held banks by way of their restructuring and change of their business form into stock companies privately held, while avoiding to provide unnecessary advantages to such banks.
Zakonodajalec je nameraval pospešiti privatizacijo nekaterih bank v javni lasti z njihovim prestrukturiranjem in spremembo njihove poslovne oblike v zasebne delniške družbe, hkrati pa se je izogibal zagotavljanju nepotrebnih ugodnosti takim bankam.
To prevent competition distortions vis-à-vis other private banks, the Italian legislator provided for (a) partial tax neutrality for both the transferor and the transferee entities (15 % of the realised gain was fiscally recognised and taxed at the ordinary rate of 52,2 % at the time), (b) the provision of special tax-suspended reserves for unrecognised gains, and (c) the opening of the same partial tax-neutrality regime to the reorganisations of non-public banks to ensure an equal tax treatment of company reorganisations to which both the public and private banks were permitted to participate.
Da bi preprečil izkrivljanje konkurence v odnosu do drugih zasebnih bank, je italijanski zakonodajalec predvidel (a) delno davčno nevtralnost za prenosnika in prejemnika (15 % ustvarjenega dobička je bilo davčno priznanega in obdavčenega po takrat običajni stopnji 52,2 %), (b) zagotovitev posebnih davčno odloženih rezerv za nepriznane dobičke in (c) odprtje istega sistema delne davčne nevtralnosti za prestrukturiranja nejavnih bank, da bi zagotovili enako davčno obravnavo prestrukturiranj družb, v katerih je bilo dovoljeno sodelovati tako javnim kot zasebnim bankam.
Italy further considers that if such conclusions are correct, the tax realignment regime of Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 should also be considered as not being State aid as this was the necessary completion of the partial tax-neutrality regime provided by Article 7(2) of Law 218/1990 and in view of the special nature of such banking reorganisations.
Če so take ugotovitve pravilne, Italija nato meni, da bi tudi pri sistemu davčne prerazporeditve po členu 2(26) Zakona 350/2003 moralo veljati, da ne gre za državno pomoč, saj je šlo za potrebno dokončanje delnega davčno nevtralnega sistema, določenega v členu 7(2) Zakona 218/1990, pa tudi ob upoštevanju posebne narave takih bančnih prestrukturiranj.
Italy stresses that the sole gains that could be realigned were the remainder of the historical gains resulting from the original reorganisations carried out between 22 August 1990 and 31 December 1995, following the taxable recognition of 15 % of the gains.
Italijanski organi poudarjajo, da so edini dobički, ki bi jih lahko prerazporedili, bili ostanek prejšnjih dobičkov, ki so bili posledica prvotnih prestrukturiranj, opravljenih med 22. avgustom 1990 in 31. decembrom 1995, po priznanju obdavčljivosti 15 odstotkov dobičkov.
For such gains, which are not new but have been realised in such prior years, the application of a reduced substitute tax would be fully justified by the specific nature of the revenues in question, and more particularly by the special nature of the banking reorganisations under Law 218/2000 for which a tax of 52,2 % on 15 % of the realised gains was paid.
Za take dobičke, ki niso bili novi, ampak ustvarjeni v navedenih predhodnih letih, bi bila uporaba znižanega nadomestnega davka popolnoma utemeljena s posebno naravo zadevnih prihodkov, predvsem pa s posebno naravo bančnih prestrukturiranj v skladu z Zakonom 218/2000, za katera je bil plačan 52,2-odstotni davek na 15 % ustvarjenih dobičkov.
Furthermore, Italy considers that the realignment scheme of Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 was less flexible as it provided to opt for the realignment of all the remaining gains resulting from the historic reorganisation, while the implicit realignment scheme of Article 2(25) provided for the possibility to realign the single assets registering an inherent gain.
Poleg tega Italijanski organi menijo, da je bila shema prerazporeditve iz člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003 manj prožna, saj je predvidevala možnost prerazporeditve vseh preostalih dobičkov, ki so bili posledica prejšnjih prestrukturiranj, medtem ko je bila v implicitni shemi prerazporeditve iz člena 2(25) predvidevana možnost prerazporeditve posameznih sredstev z evidentiranjem vgrajenega dobička.
For Italy, this flexibility would be highly valuable for the beneficiary companies as these could have opted to realign the sole assets being depreciable and not those whose sale gave rise to non-exempt gains.
Po mnenju Italijanskih organov bi bila ta prožnost zelo dragocena za družbe upravičenke, saj bi se lahko odločile le za prerazporeditev sredstev, ki se amortizirajo, in ne sredstev, katerih prodaja je povzročila dobičke, ki niso bili oproščeni.
For example, the sale of qualified shareholdings under the participation exemption scheme is 95 % exempt as of 1 January 2004 and therefore it would not be convenient for a company to pay the tax to recognise gains relative to assets which would in any event be almost fully tax exempt.
Na primer, prodaja kvalificiranih poslovnih deležev v skladu s shemo oprostitve deležev je od 1. januarja 2004 95-odstotno izvzeta, in zato za družbo ne bi bilo prikladno plačati davka, da prizna dobičke v zvezi s sredstvi, ki bi bila vsekakor skoraj popolnoma oproščena davka.
This is not an anodyne difference, for Italy, as many of the assets historically contributed to the newly formed banking companies in the '90s consisted of company participations being exempt following the above-described 2003 tax reform.
To po mnenju italijanskih organov ni blažilna razlika, saj so številna sredstva, ki so bila v preteklosti pripisana novoustanovljenim bančnim družbam, v devetdesetih letih vključevala vložke družb, ki so bili oproščeni po zgoraj opisani davčni reformi iz leta 2003.
Finally, Italy considers that even if the Commission should conclude that the tax rate paid under Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 was more favourable than the one which would have been paid under the ‘general’ realignment scheme under Article 2(25) of the same Law, the concrete difference would be minimal and should be considered as de minimis aid.
Italijanski organi nazadnje kljub morebitni končni ugotovitvi Komisije, da je bila davčna stopnja, plačana v skladu s členom 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, ugodnejša od stopnje, ki bi bila plačana v skladu s „splošno“ shemo prerazporeditve po členu 2(25) istega zakona, menijo, da bi bila konkretna razlika minimalna in bi morala veljati za pomoč de minimis.
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED PARTIES
PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANK
In their submissions, the interested parties have presented several arguments to reject the State aid qualification of the tax realignment scheme in review.
V predloženih dokumentih so zainteresirane stranke predstavile več utemeljitev za zavrnitev opredelitve državne pomoči pri pregledovani shemi davčne prerazporeditve.
They argued that it would be a technical tax measure aimed at addressing a specific situation, namely that of the realignment of certain unrecognised tax values relative to assets exchanged upon certain company reorganisations in the banking sector, and that it would not even provide an advantage to the banking groups concerned because it would in fact result in the payment of extra charges, which are not normally due by other companies having taken part to comparable reorganisations under the applicable general tax-neutrality scheme provided for by D.Lgs.
Trdile so, da naj bi šlo za tehnični davčni ukrep, namenjen za obravnavanje posebnega položaja, in sicer prerazporeditve nekaterih nepriznanih davčnih vrednosti v zvezi s sredstvi, zamenjanimi ob prestrukturiranjih nekaterih družb v bančnem sektorju, in da to ne bi pomenilo ugodnosti niti za zadevne bančne skupine, saj bi pravzaprav imelo za posledico plačilo dodatnih stroškov, ki jih drugim družbam, sodelujočim v primerljivih prestrukturiranjih v okviru veljavne splošne sheme davčne nevtralnosti, določene v D.Lgs.
358/1997 and the Merger Directive.
358/1997 in Direktivi o združitvah, običajno ni treba plačati.
The interested parties in essence claim that the scheme in review is not selective because it is justified by the specificities of the banking sector and more particularly by the specificities of the banking restructurings in Italy.
Zainteresirane stranke v bistvu trdijo, da pregledovana shema ni selektivna, saj je utemeljena s posebnostmi bančnega sektorja, še natančneje pa s posebnostmi bančnega prestrukturiranja v Italiji.
The Commission would have already considered the partial tax-neutrality scheme foreseen by Law 218/1990 as compatible with the common market in its prior practice, such as, for example, its Decision 2002/581/EC of 11 December 2001 on the tax measures for banks and banking foundations implemented by Italy [14], which further refers to its Notice opening the formal investigation procedure on the aid granted by Italy to Banco di Napoli [15].
Komisija naj bi v pretekli praksi ob obravnavanju sheme delne davčne nevtralnosti, predvidene z Zakonom 218/1990, že ugotovila, da je združljiva s skupnim trgom, na primer v Odločbi 2002/581/ES z dne 11. decembra 2001 o davčnih ukrepih Italije za banke in bančne ustanove [14], ki se nato sklicuje na obvestilo Komisije o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave glede pomoči, ki jo je Italija odobrila družbi Banco di Napoli [15].
The interested parties also claim that there would be no specific advantage in favour of the restructured banks, should one compare the substitute tax paid to realign their gains and the tax payable by other companies having undergone similar tax-neutral reorganisations.
Zainteresirane stranke tudi trdijo, da naj ne bi bilo nobene posebne ugodnosti v podporo prestrukturiranih bank, če primerjamo nadomestni davek, plačan za prerazporeditev njihovih dobičkov, in davek, ki ga morajo plačati druge družbe, ki so šle skozi podobna davčno nevtralna prestrukturiranja.
358/1997 restructurings were ‘freely distributable gains’ in that such gains could be distributed to shareholders without further company taxation, the gains realised under Law 218/1990 were ‘suspended’ for both the transferee and the transferor companies until such gains would have been distributed to respective shareholders.
358/1997, „prosto razdeljivi dobički“, saj jih je bilo mogoče razdeliti delničarjem brez nadaljnje obdavčitve družbe, medtem ko so bili dobički, ustvarjeni po Zakonu 218/1990, „odloženi“ za družbe prejemnice in prenosnice, dokler jih ne bi razdelili zadevnim delničarjem.
The different tax regimes of the realised gains resulting from the two situations would have been interpretatively confirmed by the Risoluzione No 82/2000 of the Italian Ministry of Finance [16], whereby the tax administration would have recognised that the difference between the fair market value of a contributed branch and its tax basis did not give rise to a taxable gain, under the contribution in tax neutrality regime, provided that the tax bases of both the transferor and the transferee were not stepped up to the fair value.
Različna davčna sistema ustvarjenih dobičkov, ki sta posledica različnih situacij, naj bi bila razlagalno potrjena z dokumentom Risoluzione št. 82/2000 italijanskega ministrstva za finance [16], s katerim naj bi davčna uprava ugotovila, da razlika med pošteno tržno vrednostjo vložene veje in njeno davčno osnovo ni povzročila obdavčljivega dobička, v skladu z vložkom v sistemu davčne nevtralnosti, če davčni osnovi za prenosnika in prejemnika nista bili povečani na pošteno vrednost.
The Risoluzione would have further stated in fine that the difference realised from the transfer of the branch had a mere accounting relevance until the assets included in the branch are effectively sold and thus the ‘suspended gain’ was distributable to shareholders without any company tax.
V Risoluzione naj bi bilo na koncu navedeno, da je bila razlika, ustvarjena iz prenosa veje, pomembna zgolj z računovodskega vidika, dokler v vejo vključena sredstva niso bila dejansko prodana in je bilo tako „odloženi dobiček“ mogoče razdeliti delničarjem brez kakršnega koli davka od dobička gospodarskih družb.
On the other hand, the accounting difference resulting from a partial tax-neutral contribution following the bank restructurings in question is, pursuant to Article 7(2) of Law 218/1990, expressly taxed not only if the assets are sold but also if the gain is distributed.
Po drugi strani je knjigovodska razlika, ki izhaja iz zadevnega delno davčno nevtralnega vložka po bančnih prestrukturiranjih, v skladu s členom 7(2) Zakona 218/1990, izrecno obdavčena, ne le ob prodaji sredstev, temveč tudi ob razdelitvi dobička.
According to the comments received from interested parties, the fact that the tax rates set under Laws 342/2000 and 448/2001 for gain realignments in 2000 and 2001 were the same for banks and other company restructurings while in 2003 the tax rates were apparently more advantageous for the banks can be explained by the change introduced by the Italian company tax reform enacted in 2003 with the replacement of the tax imputation system with the 95 %-exemption system to avoid double economic taxation of dividends.
V skladu s pripombami, prijetimi od zainteresiranih strank, je mogoče dejstvo, da so bile davčne stopnje, določene v skladu z zakonoma 342/2000 in 448/2001 za prerazporeditve dobička v letih 2000 in 2001, enake za prestrukturiranja bank in drugih gospodarskih družb, medtem ko so bile leta 2003 davčne stopnje očitno ugodnejše za banke, razložiti s spremembo, ki jo bila uvedena z reformo italijanskega zakona o gospodarskih družbah, uzakonjeno leta 2003, s katero je bil sistem davčnega pripisovanja nadomeščen s sistemom 95-odstotne oprostitve, da bi se izognili dvojnemu ekonomskemu obdavčevanju dividend.
In case a substitute company tax was imposed to recognise such gains (like in the case of the tax realignment schemes of 2000 and 2001), the tax paid would have been credited against the tax payable by the shareholder upon receipt of the dividend.
V primeru nadomestnega davka od dobička gospodarskih družb zaradi priznanja takih dobičkov (kot pri shemah davčne prerazporeditve iz let 2000 in 2001) naj bi bilo plačanemu davku pripisano dobroimetje glede na davek, ki naj bi ga delničar plačal ob prejetju dividende.
The situation would have substantively changed after 31 December 2003 with the 95 %-dividend exemption system applicable to gains being further distributed as dividends.
Položaj naj bi se precej spremenil po 31. decembru 2003 s sistemom 95-odstotne oprostitve dividend, ki je veljal za dobičke, naprej razdeljene kot dividende.
As of 2004, the tax on the gains realised from company reorganisations and further distributed as dividends would have been only applicable on 5 % of the gain distributed as dividend, with the latter being the only tax applicable (in the absence of any substitute tax), while the ordinary company tax rate would have applied to the gains of the reorganised banks in case distributed (also in the absence of any substitute tax).
Od leta 2004 naj bi davek na dobičke, ustvarjene iz prestrukturiranj gospodarskih družb in naprej razdeljene kot dividende, veljal le za 5 % dobička, razdeljenega kot dividende, s tem da je bil ta davek edini veljavni davek (ob odsotnosti kakršnega koli nadomestnega davka), medtem ko naj bi stopnja običajnega davka od dobička gospodarskih družb veljala za dobičke prestrukturiranih bank, če bi bili ti razdeljeni (tudi ob odsotnosti kakršnega koli nadomestnega davka).
Such difference would total a fraction of the tax on the revaluation made and should even be reduced by the tax in excess paid to realign assets that do not give rise to taxable gains if sold (assets the transfer of which gives rise to exempt capital gains).
Ta razlika naj bi znašala del davka na opravljeno prevrednotenje in naj bi jo bilo treba celo zmanjšati za odvečno plačani davek za prerazporeditev sredstev, ki ob prodaji ne povzročijo obdavčljivih dobičkov (sredstva, katerih prenos ima za posledico oproščene kapitalske dobičke).
Under the settled case law of the Court [17], to be considered State aid, a measure must fulfil all the criteria set by Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty; that is the measure must be granted by the State or through State resources, provide an advantage selectively favouring certain undertakings or productions without there being a justification deriving from the logic of the tax scheme, distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade.
Po ustaljeni sodni praksi Sodišča [17] mora ukrep, da bi veljal za državno pomoč, izpolnjevati vsa merila, določena v členu 87(1) Pogodbe ES; to je dodeliti ga mora država ali mora biti dodeljen iz državnih sredstev, dajati mora selektivno prednost posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnjam brez utemeljitve, ki bi izhajala iz logike davčne sheme, izkrivljati mora konkurenco oziroma pomeniti grožnjo, da bi lahko izkrivljal konkurenco, in vplivati mora na trgovino.
The Commission considers that the scheme in review is clearly financed through State resources as the payment of a nominal substitute tax in lieu of the ordinary company tax on the gains recognised by effect of Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 amounts to a relief from the company tax that should have been paid, at the expense of the State treasury.
Komisija meni, da je pregledovana shema očitno financirana iz državnih virov, saj plačilo nominalnega nadomestnega davka namesto običajnega davka od dobička gospodarskih družb, priznanega z veljavo člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, pomeni oprostitev davka od dobička gospodarskih družb, ki bi moral biti plačan, na račun državne zakladnice.
Presence of a selective advantage
Navzočnost selektivne prednosti
The Italian authorities and the interested parties have observed that, in its prior Decisions 2000/600/EC [18] on the conditional approval of the aid granted by Italy to the public banks Banco di Sicilia and Sicilcassa, and 1999/288/EC [19] on the conditional approval of the aid granted by Italy to Banco di Napoli, the Commission would have examined and approved the partial tax-neutrality scheme of Law 218/1990 because it concluded that the measure did not constitute State aid.
Italijanski organi in zainteresirane stranke so navedli, da naj bi Komisija v prejšnjih odločbah 2000/600/ES [18] o pogojni odobritvi pomoči, ki jo je Italija dodelila javnima bankama Banco di Sicilia in Sicilcassa, ter 1999/288/ES [19] o pogojni odobritvi pomoč, ki jo je Italija dodelila banki Banco di Napoli, preučila in odobrila shemo delne davčne nevtralnosti Zakona 218/1990, ker je ugotovila, da ukrep ni pomenil državne pomoči.
For this reason, the scheme in review would also not constitute State aid as it would be the natural outcome of the tax suspension scheme set forth by Law 218/1990.
Zato naj tudi pregledovana shema ne bi pomenila državne pomoči, saj naj bi bila naravni rezultat sheme odloga davka, določene z Zakonom 218/1990.
The Commission considers that Article 7(2) of Law 218/1990 provided that the transfers of assets and stocks effected in the context of the banking reorganisations in question were treated as partially tax neutral.
Komisija meni, da je bilo v členu 7(2) Zakona 218/1990 določeno, da so bili prenosi sredstev in deležev, izvedeni na podlagi bančnih prestrukturiranj, obravnavani kot delno davčno nevtralni.
This implied the partial non-recognition of gains realised from the transfer of the banking branches both for the transferor and the transferee entities, provided that the assets composing the transferred branch take the same tax basis they had in the hands of the transferor (carried-over basis) and the stock received by the transferor takes the same basis of the assets transferred (substituted basis).
To je pomenilo delno nepriznanje dobičkov, ustvarjenih iz prenosa bančnih vej za prenosno in prejemno družbo, če imajo sredstva, ki sestavljajo preneseno vejo, enako davčno osnovo, kot so jo imela v rokah prenosnika (prenesena osnova), deleži, ki jih je prejel prenosnik, pa enako osnovo kot prenesena sredstva (nadomeščena osnova).
Under that regime, since there was no step-up in the tax bases of the assets and stocks exchanged, there was no tax advantage granted to the reorganising parties and the taxation of the gain realised from the transfer was only temporarily deferred for future recognition (such as the sale of the assets by the transferee or the stocks by the transferor).
Ker ni bilo nobenega povečanja v davčnih osnovah zamenjanih sredstev in deležev, v skladu s tem sistemom ni bila prestrukturirajočim se strankam odobrena nobena davčna ugodnost, obdavčitev dobička, ustvarjenega iz prenosa, pa je bila le začasno odložena zaradi prihodnjega priznanja (kot je prodaja sredstev, ki jo opravi prejemnik, ali deležev, ki jo pravi prenosnik).
As there was no basis step-up both for the transferor and of the transferee, there was no aid resulting from deferring the company-level gain recognition.
Ker ni bilo nobenega povečanja osnove za prenosnika oziroma prejemnika, ni bilo nobene pomoči, ki bi bila posledica odloga priznanja dobička na ravni družbe.
This tax deferral under the regime of Law 218/1990 was indeed consistent with the founding principles of company taxation according to which income taxation is applied to all revenues and gains realised by any company, and the realised gains were not recognised because there was no corresponding stepped-up tax basis for the assets concerned, so that taxation could still take place at a later stage.
Ta odlog davka po sistemu iz Zakona 218/1990 je bil dejansko skladen z ustanovnimi načeli obdavčevanja družbe, v skladu s katerimi se obdavčevanje dohodka uporablja za vse prihodke in dobičke, ki jih je ustvarila katera koli družba, ustvarjeni dobički pa niso bili priznani, ker ni bilo nikakršnega ustreznega povečanja davčne osnove za zadevna sredstva, tako da bi se obdavčenje še vedno lahko izvedlo pozneje.
As the realised gains were frozen, the relative earnings could not be distributed, nor could the correspondingly increased value of the assets be depreciated, amortised or otherwise deducted from the taxable income of the companies resulting from such transactions.
Ker so bili ustvarjeni dobički zamrznjeni, relativnih dobičkov ni bilo mogoče razdeliti, prav tako pa ustrezno povečane vrednosti sredstev tudi ni bilo mogoče amortizirati, odpisati ali kako drugače odbiti od obdavčljivega dohodka družb, ki je bil posledica takih transakcij.
The Commission therefore concludes that the tax neutrality was justified by the inherent logic of the tax system and does not constitute State aid.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je bila davčna nevtralnost utemeljena z vgrajeno logiko davčnega sistema in da ne pomeni državne pomoči.
By contrast, the tax realignment scheme foreseen by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 gave right to basis step-up, for which the ordinary company tax would have been paid, should a special substitute tax payable like the one in review not have been available.
Obratno pa je bilo s shemo davčne prerazporeditve, predvideno v členu 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, dopuščeno povišanje osnove, za katero bi bil plačan običajni davek od dobička gospodarskih družb, če ne bi bil na voljo poseben plačljiv nadomestni davek, kot je pregledovani davek.
The Commission understands that to facilitate the taxation of capital gains, the national legislator may apply a substitute tax at a more convenient rate than the ordinary tax.
Komisija razume, da lahko nacionalni zakonodajalec za pospešitev obdavčenja kapitalskih dobičkov uporabi nadomestni davek po ustreznejši stopnji od običajnega davka.