natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Since the tax on disposition is generally paid up front but the tax benefits of the stepped-up basis in the assets being transferred arise over time through their periodic depreciation or at the time of disposition of the assets, ordinary taxation of such gains would generally lead to an increase in the net aggregate tax of the transferor-company and the transferee-company.
Ker se davek od prodaje običajno plača najprej, davčne ugodnosti povišane osnove v sredstvih, ki se prenašajo, pa se pokažejo sčasoma z njihovim periodičnim razvrednotenjem ali ob prodaji sredstev, bi običajna obdavčitev takih dobičkov na splošno pripeljala do povišanja čistega skupnega davka družbe prenosnice in družbe prejemnice.
Thus, a lower substitute tax on the gains realised from company reorganisations could be justified in principle as a technical measure to facilitate capital gain recognition.
Tako bi bil nižji nadomestni davek na dobiček, ustvarjen iz prestrukturiranj družbe, načeloma upravičen kot tehnični ukrep za pospešitev priznanja kapitalskega dobička.
Such a favourable tax realignment may however only be justified if it is objectively open to all similar recognitions of capital gains, such as those resulting from other reorganisations not covered by Law 218/1990 including those relating to other banks.
Vendar pa bi bila taka ugodna prerazporeditev davka lahko upravičena le, če je objektivno odprta za vsa podobna priznanja kapitalskih dobičkov, kot so tisti, ki izhajajo iz drugih prestrukturiranj, ki niso zajeta z Zakonom 218/1990, vključno s tistimi, ki se nanašajo na druge banke.
The Commission considers that the realignments provided for by Laws 342/2000 and 448/2001 allowed the undertakings concerned with the reorganisations governed by both Law 218/1990 and Legislative Decree 358/1997 to recognise the historical gains realised by payment of a substitute tax set at the same level for all the undertakings concerned.
Komisija meni, da so prerazporeditve, predvidene v zakonih 342/2000 in 448/2001, omogočile podjetjem, ki so jih zadevala prestrukturiranja, urejena z Zakonom 218/1990 in zakonodajnim odlokom 358/1997, da so priznala prejšnje ustvarjene dobičke s plačilom nadomestnega davka, ki je bil določen na isti ravni za vsa zadevna podjetja.
The Commission therefore concludes that the possibility to realign was a general tax measure and the reduced substitute tax as opposed to the ordinary company tax applicable at the time did not provide any competitive advantage to the companies in question because it was applied under identical conditions to all undertakings choosing to recognise the historical gains realised but temporarily non-recognised under the relevant provisions of Law 218/1990 or Legislative Decree 358/1997.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da je bila možnost prerazporeditve splošni davčni ukrep in da znižani nadomestni davek v nasprotju s takrat veljavnim običajnim davkom od dobička gospodarskih družb ni zagotovil nobene konkurenčne prednosti zadevnim družbam, ker se je uporabljal pod enakimi pogoji za vsa podjetja, ki so se odločila priznati prejšnje ustvarjene dobičke, ki pa začasno niso bili priznani v skladu z veljavnimi določbami Zakona 218/1990 ali zakonodajnega odloka 358/1997.
The Commission therefore concludes that such realignments are general measures justified by the logic of the tax system and do not constitute State aid.
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da so take prerazporeditve splošni ukrepi, utemeljeni z logiko davčnega sistema, in ne pomenijo državne pomoči.
By contrast the Commission considers that the tax realignment foreseen by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 was not a general measure because it was only applicable to the capital gains derived by certain banks from the reorganisations effected under Law 218/1990.
Nasprotno pa Komisija meni, da davčna prerazporeditev, predvidena s členom 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, ni bila splošni ukrep, ker je veljala samo za kapitalske dobičke, ki so jih imele nekatere banke zaradi prestrukturiranj, izvedenih v skladu z Zakonom 218/1990.
The Commission considers in particular that the tax scheme in review provided an advantage represented by the difference between the tax effectively paid to realign the value of the assets and the tax which would have been normally paid if the same realignment would have been made in the absence of the same Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003.
Komisija predvsem meni, da je bila s pregledovano davčno shemo zagotovljena ugodnost, izraženo v razliki med dejansko plačanim davkom za prerazporeditev vrednosti sredstev in davkom, ki bi ga bilo treba običajno plačati, če bi bila ta prerazporeditev izvedena ob odsotnosti istega člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003.
The effective tax rate applicable in 2004 on such gains would have been 37,25 % (including 33 % company tax and 4,25 % local business tax), while the substitute tax effectively paid was 9 % (excluding the allowance for deferred payments).
Dejanska davčna stopnja, veljavna za take dobičke v letu 2004, bi bila 37,25-odstotna (vključujoč 33-odstotni davek od dobička gospodarskih družb in 4,25-odstotni lokalni davek od poslovanja), medtem ko je bil dejansko plačani nadomestni davek 9-odstotni (brez popravka za odložena plačila).
The Commission further considers that, under Law 350/2003, the substitute tax was payable in three instalments (50 % in 2004, 25 % in 2005 and 25 % in 2006) without interests, while the tax which would ordinarily have been applied in the absence of Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 would have been payable in 2004.
Komisija nato ugotavlja, da je bil po Zakonu 350/2003 nadomestni davek plačljiv v treh obrokih (50 % leta 2004, 25 % leta 2005 in 25 % leta 2006) brez obresti, medtem ko naj bi bil davek, ki bi se običajno uporabljal ob odsotnosti člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, plačljiv leta 2004.
The Commission therefore notes that the grant equivalent value of the tax effectively paid by the nine beneficiaries of the scheme in review was EUR 185505996, while the tax ordinarily payable would have been EUR 771991022 (37,25 % of the realised gain totalling over EUR 2059 millions).
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je vrednost ekvivalenta dotacije pri davku, ki ga je dejansko plačalo devet upravičencev pregledovane sheme, znašala 185505996 EUR, medtem ko bi davek, ki bi ga bilo običajno treba plačati, znašal 771991022 EUR (37,25 % ustvarjenega dobička, ki je presegal 2059 milijonov EUR).
As a result, the difference between the tax ordinarily payable and the tax paid amounts to EUR 586485026.
Razlika med običajno plačljivim in plačanim davkom tako znaša 586485026 EUR.
The Italian authorities and the interested parties have observed that none of the nine beneficiaries of the scheme would have ever accepted to realign the value of their assets had they known that they would have been subject to the ordinary company tax on the gains so recognised.
Italijanski organi in zainteresirane stranke so navedli, da nobeden od devetih upravičencev sheme ne bi nikoli sprejel prerazporeditve svojih sredstev, če bi vedel, da bi zanj veljal običajni davek od dobička gospodarskih družb za tako priznane dobičke.
Furthermore, as explained by the Italian authorities, the other companies not concerned by the reorganisations effected under Law 218/1990 would have benefited from the implicit tax realignment scheme of Article 2(25) of Law 350/2003 at the substantively equivalent conditions generally set by Article 17 of Law 342/2000.
Poleg tega bi, kot so razložili italijanski organi, druge gospodarske družbe, ki jih ne zadevajo prestrukturiranja, izvedena v skladu z Zakonom 218/1990, imele koristi od implicitne sheme davčne prerazporeditve iz člena 2(25) Zakona 350/2003 po vsebinsko enakih pogojih, na splošno določenih v členu 17 Zakona 342/2000.
For the Italian authorities and the interested parties, to rightly compute the advantage in question, account should be taken of the taxes paid at the time of the initial contributions at a global tax rate of over 40 %.
Po mnenju italijanskih organov in zainteresiranih strank bi bilo za pravilen izračun zadevne ugodnosti treba upoštevati davke, plačane ob začetnih vložkih po splošni davčni stopnji, ki presega 40 %.
The combined effective taxation on the capital gains in question in 1990 and 2004 would have largely exceeded the general rate for realignments applied in 2000 and therefore there would be no advantage.
Skupna dejanska obdavčitev zadevnih kapitalskih dobičkov v letih 1990 in 2004 bi precej presegla splošno stopnjo za prerazporeditve, uporabljeno leta 2000, in zato ne bi bilo nobene ugodnosti.
The Commission maintains however that the scheme provided for by Article 2(25) of Law 350/2003 was not a tax realignment of values misaligned following tax neutral reorganisations but rather a tax revaluation scheme which permitted to realise the hidden gains deriving from the adjustment of the tax value of the assets held by the beneficiary companies to their current value.
Vendar pa Komisija trdi, da shema, predvidena v členu 2(25) Zakona 350/2003, ni pomenila davčne prerazporeditve vrednosti, ki so bile neusklajene po davčno nevtralnih prestrukturiranjih, temveč shemo davčne prerazporeditve, ki je omogočila ustvarjanje skritih dobičkov, ki so izhajali iz prilagoditve davčne vrednosti sredstev v lasti družb upravičenk njihovi tekoči vrednosti.
The Commission considers that the two schemes a not comparable, nor was the tax revaluation scheme of Article 2(25) of Law 350/2003 equivalent to the tax realignment provided for by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003, considering the difference between the statutory substitute tax rates foreseen by the two schemes.
Komisija meni, da shemi nista primerljivi, prav tako pa tudi shema davčnega prevrednotenja iz člena 2(25) Zakona 350/2003 ni bila enakovredna davčni prerazporeditvi, predvideni v členu 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, glede na razliko med zakonitimi stopnjami nadomestnega davka, predvidenimi v shemah.
The Commission therefore concludes that the companies having realigned the tax bases of their assets pursuant to Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 benefited from a specific tax advantage consisting in the difference between the ordinary tax rate on the gains recognised and the special substitute tax on the same gains.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da so imele družbe, ki so davčne osnove svojih sredstev prerazporedile v skladu s členom 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, koristi od posebne davčne ugodnosti zaradi razlike med običajno davčno stopnjo pri priznanih dobičkih in posebnim nadomestnim davkom pri teh istih dobičkih.
The interested parties have objected that the lower substitute tax rate used by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 was not selective because it was justified by the legal and factual specificities of the taxation of the capital gains resulting from the reorganisations effected under Law 218/1990.
Zainteresirane stranke so ugovarjale, da nižja stopnja nadomestnega davka, uporabljena v členu 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, ni bila selektivna, ker je bila utemeljena z zakonitimi in dejanskimi posebnostmi obdavčitve kapitalskih dobičkov, ki so rezultat prestrukturiranj, izvedenih v skladu z Zakonom 218/1990.
Furthermore, they argued that Italy would not have been entitled to recognise these gains as taxable after so many years under the same conditions applicable to the capital gains resulting from other company reorganisations.
Nato so trdile, da naj Italija po toliko letih ne bi bila upravičena do priznanja teh dobičkov kot obdavčljivih pod enakimi pogoji, kot so veljali za kapitalske dobičke, ki so posledica prestrukturiranj drugih družb.
The Commission takes note of the fact that the reorganisations effected under Law 218/1990 provided specific conditions and provision to defer the fiscal recognition of the gains realised following such reorganisations, as also indicated by the said Risoluzione.
Komisija se zaveda dejstva, da so prestrukturiranja, izvedena po Zakonu 218/1990, zagotovila posebne pogoje in omogočila odlog davčnega priznanja dobičkov, ustvarjenih po takih prestrukturiranjih, kot je tudi navedeno v omenjenem dokumentu Risoluzione.
Since the two situations were indeed comparable they should have been treated alike when the legislator in 2003 provided for the fiscal recognition of the suspended gains.
Ker sta bili situaciji dejansko primerljivi, bi ju bilo treba enako obravnavati, ko je zakonodajalec leta 2003 predvidel davčno priznanje odloženih dobičkov.
The Commission further considers that the lower tax rate applied did not merely offset the harsher tax treatment of distributions to shareholders of the gains deriving from the banking restructurings of Law 218/1990 vis-à-vis the distributions of the gains relating to other tax-neutral reorganisations in the case of the distribution of the capital gains to shareholders, as indicated by the said Risoluzione.
Komisija nato meni, da uporabljena nižja davčna stopnja ni zgolj izravnala strožje davčne obravnave delitev dobičkov delničarjem iz prestrukturiranj bank po Zakonu 218/1990 v primerjavi z delitvami dobičkov, ki se nanašajo na druga davčno nevtralna prestrukturiranja v primeru razdelitve kapitalskih dobičkov delničarjem, kot je navedeno v omenjenem dokumentu Risoluzione.
This view cannot be followed because the application of different substitute taxes to capital gains cannot always be imputed to a distribution of the capital gains suspended.
Temu mnenju ni mogoče slediti, saj uporabe različnih nadomestnih davkov za kapitalske dobičke ni mogoče vedno pripisati razdelitvi odloženih kapitalskih dobičkov.
The Commission considers that accepting this justification would effectively result into allowing the application of different effective company tax rates to some companies solely because these took part to certain types of reorganisations preferred by the State.
Komisija meni, da bi sprejetje te utemeljitve dejansko vodilo v dovoljevanje uporabe različnih veljavnih stopenj davka na dobiček gospodarskih družb za nekatere družbe zgolj zato, ker so te sodelovale v različnih vrstah prestrukturiranj, ki jim je bila država naklonjena.
The Commission considers that the tax advantage resulting from the application of the tax realignment scheme foreseen by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 was not de-minimis.
Komisija meni, da davčna ugodnost, ki izhaja iz uporabe sheme davčne prerazporeditve, predvidene s členom 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, ni bila pomoč de minimis.
In determining the presence of an aid, the Commission shall indeed compare the nominal taxation applied under the scheme in review and the tax which would have been applied had the scheme in review not been available, and had the beneficiary banks stepped-up the tax bases of their assets and distributed the capital gains resulting from such fiscal realignments to their shareholders.
Pri določanju navzočnosti pomoči mora Komisija dejansko primerjati nominalno obdavčitev, uporabljeno v skladu s pregledovano shemo, in davek, ki bi bil uporabljen, če pregledovana shema ne bi bila na voljo ter če bi banke upravičenke povečale davčno osnovo svojih sredstev in delničarjem razdelile kapitalske dobičke, ki so posledica takih davčnih prerazporeditev.
Furthermore the Commission considers that the alleged reduced amount of an advantage may not per se be sufficient to exclude its aid character.
Komisija nato meni, da domnevno znižani znesek ugodnosti sam po sebi ne more zadoščati za izločitev značaja pomoči.
The Commission also notes that the de minimis exclusion provided by the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid [21] cannot be invoked because the measure gives rise to non-transparent aid as postulated by the Regulation and because the Italian authorities have not complied with the conditions of this Regulation.
Komisija tudi navaja, da se ni mogoče sklicevati na izločilno merilo de minimis iz Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1998/2006 z dne 15. decembra 2006 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES pri pomoči [21]de minimis, ker navedeni ukrep povzroča nepregledno pomoč, kot se to domneva v Uredbi, in ker italijanski organi niso izpolnili pogojev te uredbe.
Justification by the Nature of the Scheme
Utemeljitev narave sheme
The Italian authorities and the interested parties have observed that the realignment scheme provided by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 would be justified by the peculiarities of the banking sector and for this reason it would not be State aid.
Italijanski organi in zainteresirane stranke so navedli, da naj bi bila shema prerazporeditve iz člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003 utemeljena s posebnostmi bančnega sektorja in da naj zato ne bi bila državna pomoč.
Under the case law of the Court, a tax measure is specific only if it unreasonably discriminates between situations being legally and factually comparable in the light of the objectives set by the tax system [22] and ‘the fact that undertakings are treated differently does not automatically imply the existence of an advantage for the purposes of Article 92(1) of the Treaty’ [23].
V skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča je davčni ukrep poseben le, če neupravičeno razlikuje med situacijami, ki so pravno in dejansko primerljive glede na cilje, določene v davčnem sistemu [22], in „dejstvo, da so podjetja obravnavana drugače, ne pomeni avtomatično obstoja ugodnosti za namene člena 92(1) Pogodbe“ [23].
The Commission considers, however, that the scheme under examination does not seem to represent an adaptation of the general system to the distinctive features of banking, but, rather, a specific advantage having the effect of improving the competitiveness of certain undertakings, i.e. the banks concerned with certain reorganisations.
Vendar pa Komisija meni, da za pregledovano shemo ni videti, da bi pomenila prilagoditev splošnega sistema posebnim značilnostim bančništva, temveč je prej posebna ugodnost, ki ima za posledico izboljšanje konkurenčnosti nekaterih podjetij, to je bank, ki jih zadevajo nekatera prestrukturiranja.
The Italian authorities also argue that the scheme would be a mere repetition of the scheme enacted under Law 342/2000 which did not involve State aid as it applied to realised gains deriving from all company restructurings.
Italijanski organi tudi trdijo, da naj bi bila shema zgolj ponovitev sheme, ki je bila uzakonjena v skladu z Zakonom 342/2000 in ni vključevala državne pomoči, saj je veljala za ustvarjene dobičke, ki izhajajo iz prestrukturiranj vseh družb.
The scheme under the Law 350/2003 should be compared to the one foreseen by the Law 342/2000 and would not provide any possible additional advantage.
Shemo po Zakonu 350/2003 naj bi bilo treba primerjati s shemo, predvideno po Zakonu 342/2000, in naj ne bi zagotavljala nobene morebitne dodatne ugodnosti.
As illustrated above, the Commission disagrees with this opinion, because the realignment under Law 350/2003 has a more limited scope than the general realignment under Law 342/2000.
Kot je ponazorjeno zgoraj, se Komisija ne strinja s tem mnenjem, ker ima prerazporeditev po Zakonu 350/2003 bolj omejen obseg kot splošna prerazporeditev po Zakonu 342/2000.
In the light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the advantage granted to certain banks, consisting in the special substitute tax for the gains realised from certain contributions of assets in lieu of the ordinary tax rate, under the Law 218/1990 is specific and not justified by the nature of the tax system.
Glede na navedeno Komisija ugotavlja, da gre pri ugodnosti, ki je bila dodeljena nekaterim bankam in ki vključuje poseben nadomestni davek za dobičke, ustvarjene iz nekaterih vložkov sredstev, namesto običajne davčne stopnje, po Zakonu 218/1990 za posebno ugodnost, ki ni utemeljena z naravo davčnega sistema.
The Commission considers that the considerable amount of the aid has strengthened the financial position of its beneficiaries belonging to the banking sector and competing on the liberalised market of financial services being open to competition with other undertakings being active in providing intra-Community services.
Komisija meni, da je precejšen del pomoči okrepil finančni položaj prejemnikov, ki spadajo v bančni sektor in tekmujejo na liberaliziranem trgu finančnih storitev, odprtem konkurenci z drugimi podjetji, dejavnimi pri ponudbi storitev znotraj Skupnosti.
The Commission further considers that the advantage granted in favour of the banks in question is also susceptible to distort competition in the current context characterised by consolidation opportunities in the Italian banking sector.
Komisija nato meni, da bi zadevna dodeljena ugodnost v korist bank lahko izkrivljala konkurenco tudi v sedanjih okoliščinah, za katere so značilne priložnosti za konsolidacijo v italijanskem bančnem sektorju.
The fact that certain Italian banks have eliminated their tax liabilities inherent to hidden gains in their assets at a nominal tax cost is susceptible to increase the attractiveness of such banks and their economic value both for investors and company acquirers.
Dejstvo, da so nekatere italijanske banke odpravile davčne obveznosti, vgrajene v skrite dobičke v svojih sredstvih, po nominalnih davčnih stroških, bi lahko povečalo privlačnost takih bank ter njihove ekonomske vrednosti za vlagatelje in prevzemne družbe.
The Commission considers that the advantage provided by the tax scheme in review is susceptible of unduly altering the market for company acquisitions in the banking sector in Italy.
Komisija meni, da bi prednost, ki jo omogoča pregledovana davčna shema, lahko neupravičeno spremenila trg na področju prevzemov družb v bančnem sektorju v Italiji.
Insofar as the scheme in review constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, its compatibility must be evaluated in the light of the exceptions provided for in Articles 87(2) and 87(3) EC.
Če pregledovana shema pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, je treba njeno združljivost oceniti ob upoštevanju izjem iz člena 87(2) in (87)(3) Pogodbe ES.
The Italian authorities or the interested parties have advanced no arguments to show that any of the above exceptions are applicable in this case.
Italijanski organi ali zainteresirane stranke niso predložili nobenih utemeljitev, s katerimi bi pokazali, da se v tem primeru uporablja katera od zgornjih izjem.
The exceptions provided for by Article 87(2) EC, concerning aid of a social character granted to individual consumers, aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences and aid granted to certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany, do not apply in this case.
Izjeme iz člena 87(2) Pogodbe ES, ki zadevajo pomoč socialnega značaja, dodeljeno posameznim potrošnikom, pomoč za povrnitev škode, ki so jo povzročile naravne nesreče ali izjemni dogodki, in pomoč, dodeljeno nekaterim območjem Zvezne republike Nemčije, v tem primeru ne veljajo.
The exception provided for in Article 87(3)(a) EC provides for the authorisation of aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, but does not apply in this case as the aid does not favour economic development in such regions in Italy.
Izjema iz člena 87(3)(a) Pogodbe ES predvideva odobritev pomoči za pospeševanje gospodarskega razvoja območij, na katerih je življenjski standard izjemno nizek ali kjer je podzaposlenost velika, vendar pa to v tem primeru ne velja, saj pomoč ne spodbuja gospodarskega razvoja v takih regijah v Italiji.
The scheme cannot be considered either as a project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State, as provided for by Article 87(3)(b) EC, nor does it have as its object the promotion of culture and heritage conservation as provided for by Article 87(3)(d) EC.
Sheme prav tako ni mogoče obravnavati kot projekt skupnega evropskega interesa ali ukrep za odpravljanje resne motnje v gospodarstvu države članice, kot je opredeljeno v členu 87(3)(b) Pogodbe ES, prav tako tudi nima za cilj spodbujanja ohranjanja kulture in dediščine, kot je predvideno v členu 87(3)(d) Pogodbe ES.