natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Any aid would then be in breach of Point 18(c) of Protocol No 8 prohibiting any granting of additional State Aid to the steel industry and to the benefiting companies indicated in the Protocol in particular.
Vsaka pomoč bi tako pomenila kršitev točke 18(c) Protokola št. 8, ki prepoveduje vsakršno dodelitev dodatne državne pomoči jeklarski industriji, zlasti pa upravičenim podjetjem, navedenim v Protokolu.
Notwithstanding this, the Polish authorities continued to give or prolong outstanding loans to TB after 2003 which has to be considered as State Aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) TEC.
Ne glede na to so poljski organi TB po letu 2003 še naprej dajali posojila ali podaljševali neodplačana posojila, kar je treba obravnavati kot državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) PES.
The Commission points out that Article 87(1) TEC covers interventions in various forms which reduce a company’s normal costs and which, without therefore being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect.
Komisija opozarja, da člen 87(1) PES zajema posege v različnih oblikah, ki znižujejo običajne stroške podjetja in ki sicer niso subvencije v ožjem pomenu besede, vendar pa so podobnega značaja in imajo enak učinek.
This has been confirmed on numerous occasions in cases where a public body responsible for collecting social security contributions tolerates non-payment or late payment of such contributions, as its conduct undoubtedly gives the recipient a significant competitive advantage by reducing, for that company, the burden associated with the normal operation of the social security system [36].
To je bilo potrjeno ob številnih priložnostih pri primerih, ko javni organ, odgovoren za zbiranje prispevkov za socialno varnost, dopušča neplačila ali zapoznela plačila takih prispevkov, saj njegovo ravnanje prejemniku nedvomno daje znatno konkurenčno prednost, saj se takemu podjetju zmanjša breme, povezano z običajnim delovanjem sistema socialne varnosti [36].
Instead of a deferral of payments the public creditor could have demanded immediate repayment of the total amount owed, if necessary by relying on the mortgage in its favour [37].
Namesto odloga plačil bi javni upnik lahko zahteval takojšnje odplačilo dolgovanega zneska, po potrebi s hipoteko v svojo korist [37].
In order to establish that there is an advantage which can be classified as State Aid for the purposes of Article 87(1) TEC, the Commission needs to demonstrate that the public authorities acted differently from a hypothetical private creditor, who would, in so far as possible, be in the same situation vis-à-vis his debtor [38].
Za ugotovitev, da obstaja prednost, ki jo je mogoče opredeliti kot državno pomoč za namene člena 87(1) PES, mora Komisija dokazati, da so javni organi ravnali drugače kot bi hipotetični zasebni upnik, ki bi bil glede dolžnika v kar najbolj podobnem položaju [38].
As a preliminary remark, the Commission notes that the very existence of previous aid to a company prevents it on the basis of established European case-law from viewing the case from the perspective of a hypothetical private creditor, since a creditor of that type would obviously not have tolerated the original waiver, as it would otherwise not have been aid [39].
Kot predhodno pripombo Komisija navaja, da ji sam obstoj predhodne pomoči za podjetje onemogoča, da bi na podlagi uveljavljene evropske sodne prakse primer obravnavala z vidika hipotetičnega zasebnega upnika, saj upnik take vrste očitno ne bi dopustil prvotne oprostitve, saj sicer ne bi šlo za pomoč [39].
This is particularly true in a restructuring scenario, where both measures fall within the restructuring period.
To še zlasti velja za scenarij prestrukturiranja, v katerem oba ukrepa spadata v obdobje prestrukturiranja.
The non-existence of an updated restructuring plan also prevents an assessment of a hypothetical private creditor.
Neobstoj posodobljenega načrta prestrukturiranja tudi onemogoča oceno hipotetičnega zasebnega upnika.
In this case too, according to established case-law, when considering a rescheduling agreement from a market economy investor perspective, such an investor would have required a comprehensive update of the original restructuring plan.
Tudi v tem primeru bi v skladu z dejansko sodno prakso pri obravnavanju sporazuma o reprogramiranju z vidika vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu tak vlagatelj zahteval izčrpno posodobitev prvotnega načrta prestrukturiranja.
No private creditor or investor would accept restructuring without such a plan [40], as was the case here.
Noben zasebni upnik ali vlagatelj ne bi sprejel prestrukturiranja brez takega načrta, [40] kakor se je zgodilo v danem primeru.
Furthermore, even on the basis of a hypothetical restructuring plan, no hypothetical private creditor would have entered into an additional restructuring agreement.
Poleg tega celo na podlagi hipotetičnega načrta prestrukturiranja noben hipotetični zasebni upnik ne bi sklenil dodatnega sporazuma o prestrukturiranju.
The Commission does not dispute that non-enforcement of the public debts which were eligible for waivers under the IBP/NRP was justified for a certain period of time under the mechanism envisaged in the Act of 30 August 2002.
Komisija ne oporeka, da je bila neizterjava javnih dolgov, ki so bili upravičeni do oprostitev po IPN/NPP, določeno obdobje upravičena v skladu z mehanizmom, predvidenim v Zakonu z dne 30. avgusta 2002.
Indeed, enforcement of the liabilities subject to restructuring on the basis of the Act of 30 August 2002 was prohibited pending the completion of restructuring proceedings or discontinuance of proceedings on the grounds enumerated in the Act.
Dejansko je bila izterjava obveznosti, ki so predmet prestrukturiranja na podlagi Zakona z dne 30. avgusta 2002, prepovedana do končanja postopka prestrukturiranja ali prekinitve postopka zaradi razlogov, naštetih v Zakonu.
Moreover, the Commission notes that as regards additional debts which were not subject to rescheduling, creditors could have counted on an improvement in TB's financial situation following the planned waiver, and therefore might have had reason to suspend debt enforcement until aid was awarded pursuant to the Act of 30 August 2002.
Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da bi glede dodatnih dolgov, ki niso bili predmet reprogramiranja, upniki lahko računali na izboljšanje finančnega položaja TB po načrtovani oprostitvi in bi potemtakem imeli razlog za zadržanje izterjave dolga do odobritve pomoči v skladu z Zakonom z dne 30. avgusta 2002.
However, it is evident that restructuring on the basis of the Act of 30 August 2002 failed, at least partly because of non-compliance with Protocol No 8 as manifested in the negative opinion of the OCCP (the first, dated 6 February 2004), and partly because of the company’s financial problems which prevented TB from complying with national law.
Vendar pa je očitno, da prestrukturiranje na podlagi Zakona z dne 30. avgusta 2002 ni uspelo, vsaj deloma zaradi nespoštovanja Protokola št. 8, kot je razvidno iz negativnega mnenja UKVP (prvega z dne 6. februarja 2004), in deloma zaradi finančnih težav družbe, ki so TB preprečile, da bi spoštoval nacionalno zakonodajo.
The Commission considers that such failure must have come to the knowledge of the main public creditors such as ZUS, the local authority and the Tax Office, as they all were involved in the original debt restructuring.
Komisija meni, da so glavni javni upniki, kot so ZUS, lokalni organ in davčni organ, gotovo izvedeli za ta neuspeh, saj so bili vsi vpleteni v prvotno prestrukturiranje dolga.
Similarly, PFRON should have been alerted by the OCCP’s opinion on TB's debt to PFRON.
Podobno bi moral biti tudi PFRON pozoren zaradi mnenja UKVP glede dolga TB do PFRON.
Following the failure of the previous restructuring agreement, particular alertness can be expected from private creditors, who would scrutinise the economic situation of their debtor [41].
Po neuspehu prejšnjega sporazuma o prestrukturiranju je mogoče pričakovati posebno budnost zasebnih upnikov, ki bi temeljito proučili gospodarski položaj svojega dolžnika [41].
Accordingly, careful consideration of the advantage derived from rescheduling the debt would have shown that the potential recovery would not have exceeded the safe return inherent in the firm’s liquidation [42].
Skladno s tem bi podrobna proučitev prednosti, pridobljene iz reprogramiranja dolga, pokazala, da potencialna povrnitev ne bi presegla varnega povračila, ki bi izhajal iz likvidacije družbe [42].
In fact, a new rescheduling agreement would require restructuring to restore viability to the company in all cases and to prevent increases in arrears, so that the creditor could anticipate recovery of the loans within a reasonable time.
Pravzaprav bi nov sporazum o reprogramiranju zahteval prestrukturiranje, da bi družba v vseh primerih znova postala rentabilna in da bi preprečili povišanja zaostalih plačil, tako da bi upnik lahko pričakoval povrnitev posojil v doglednem času.
In the case of TB, a return to viability by end-2004 was highly doubtful, as the company had had a negative operating margin throughout 2003 and 2004 as indicated in recitals (49) to (51).
V primeru TB je bila ponovna vzpostavitev rentabilnosti do konca leta 2004 zelo vprašljiva, saj je imelo podjetje v letih 2003 in 2004 negativni dobiček iz poslovanja, kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah od 49 do 51.
Its turnover was not sufficient to cover its costs.
Njegov promet ni zadoščal za pokritje stroškov.
TB did not even benefit from the upturn in the steel sector in 2004.
TB ni imel koristi niti od pozitivnega preobrata na trgu jekla v letu 2004.
As such, all indications regarding the prospects for TB's future viability were negative.
Tako so bili vsi kazalniki glede pričakovanj prihodnje rentabilnosti TB negativni.
In addition, given that TB was no longer creditworthy, its debts were steadily rising.
Poleg tega pa TB ni bil več kreditno sposoben in njegovi dolgovi so se stalno povečevali.
As of November 2004, TB was no longer able to pay its current debts, despite being in restructuring.
Od novembra 2004 TB ni več mogel odplačevati svojih tekočih dolgov, čeprav je bil v prestrukturiranju.
As such, there was no reasonable possibility of recovering the past debt as a result of any hypothetical new restructuring of the debt.
Tako ni bilo nobene razumne možnosti, da bi bila povrnitev prejšnjih dolgov rezultat kakršnega koli hipotetičnega novega prestrukturiranja dolga.
Given that the public creditors, i.e. the local authority, ZUS, PFRON and the Tax Office all had good securities, they had a good chance of transforming them into cash in collective insolvency proceedings under Polish insolvency law.
Glede na to, da so vsi javni upniki, tj. lokalni organ, ZUS, PFRON in davčni urad, imeli dobra jamstva, so imeli dobre možnosti, da jih preoblikujejo v gotovino v skupnem stečajnem postopku po poljskem zakonu o stečajnem postopku.
The Commission cannot accept ZUS's argument that it did not have good securities, since the Polish authorities have indicated that first-rank pledges accounted for a significant part, if not all, of the securities (see recital (40) above).
Komisija ne more sprejeti utemeljitve ZUS, da ni imel dobrih jamstev, saj so poljski organi navedli, da so zastavne pravice prvega razreda zajele precejšen del jamstev, če ne vseh (glej uvodno izjavo 40 zgoraj).
In view of the deterioration of the company and its assets, making use of these securities appeared to make more economic sense than restructuring [43].
Glede na slabšanje položaja družbe in njenih sredstev bi se zdela uporaba teh jamstev gospodarsko bolj smiselna od prestrukturiranja [43].
Furthermore, even if a hypothetical restructuring plan proposed some hypothetical asset restructuring, this proposal should not have reduced private creditors' resistance to restructuring.
Četudi bi načrt hipotetičnega prestrukturiranja predlagal hipotetično prestrukturiranje nekaterih sredstev, ta predlog ne bi smel zmanjšati odpora zasebnih upnikov do prestrukturiranja. To pa zato, ker so vsa sredstva tako zadolženega podjetja, kot je TB, običajno pod zastavno pravico in tako v primeru odprodaje obljubljajo komaj kakšno povračilo.
This is because all the assets of a firm as indebted as TB are normally pledged and thus promise hardly any return if sold off. Indeed, although the company announced asset restructuring on several occasions in 2005, it was not able to obtain more than PLN 5 million in cash from the sale of assets.
Četudi je družba leta 2005 večkrat napovedala prestrukturiranje sredstev, iz prodaje sredstev ni mogla dobiti več kot 5 milijonov PLN gotovine.
The Commission understands that in 2004 and subsequently TB made attempts to repay some of the debt but notes that these repayments barely covered the amounts of interest accrued (see the table in recital (34) for the effect of the PLN 5 million repaid in 2004).
Komisija razume, da si je leta 2004 in pozneje TB prizadeval odplačati nekaj dolga, vendar ugotavlja, da so ta odplačila komaj pokrila zneske, ki so se nabrali od obresti (glede učinka 5 milijonov PLN, odplačanih leta 2004, glej razpredelnico v uvodni izjavi 34).
Lastly, with a view to providing a complete picture, it should be noted that the September 2005 plan was by no means a proper basis for further rescheduling.
Na koncu je treba zaradi predstavitve celotne slike povedati, da načrt iz septembra 2005 nikakor ni bil primerna osnova za nadaljnje reprogramiranje.
Given that the company was to be wound up, it is clear that its business activities would not generate any more profits and that liquidation would be the only solution.
Glede na to, da naj bi družba prenehala poslovati, je jasno, da njene poslovne dejavnosti ne bi ustvarile nobenega dobička več in da bi bila likvidacija edina rešitev.
Indeed, the plan indicated that ZUS could count on only partial repayment.
Načrt je dejansko pokazal, da je lahko ZUS računal samo na delno odplačilo.
This was to be generated by the restructuring of assets worth about PLN 20 million up to end-2005, which proved unrealistic for the reasons stated in the previous paragraph.
To naj bi ustvarili s prestrukturiranjem sredstev, vrednih približno 20 milijonov PLN, do konca leta 2005, kar se je izkazalo za nerealno zaradi razlogov, navedenih v prejšnjem odstavku.
The proposed monthly payments after 2005 of PLN 100000, subject to TB’s ability to pay, were not feasible either as TB was no longer operating.
Predlagana mesečna odplačila po letu 2005 v znesku 100000 PLN, v skladu s plačilno zmožnostjo TB, ravno tako niso bila izvedljiva, saj TB ni več deloval.
Instead, as TB admitted in its 2005 IBP, it saw spinning off its assets into BA as its only hope of restoring the business's viability.
Namesto tega je TB, kot je navedel v svojem IPN 2005, videl edino upanje za vzpostavitev rentabilnosti v oddelitvi svojih sredstev BA.
That did not just entail the spinning-off of its only profitable business (BA) but also determined TB’s fate, i.e. its liquidation.
To je vključevalo oddelitev njegovega edinega dobičkonosnega podjetja (BA), pa tudi določilo usodo TB, tj. njegovo likvidacijo.
In short, the Commission finds that any hypothetical private creditor would have opted for enforcement of his claims as early as end-2004.
Na kratko, Komisija ugotavlja, da bi se vsak hipotetični zasebni upnik odločil za izterjavo svojih zahtevkov že ob koncu leta 2004.
Thus Poland failed to enforce PLN 20,761 million (PLN 20,267 million was indicated in the fourth Polish restructuring report, but that amount was later rectified by the Polish authorities).
Tako Poljski ni uspelo izterjati 20,761 milijona PLN (v 4. poljskem poročilu o prestrukturiranju je bilo navedenih 20,267 milijona PLN, vendar pa so poljski organi znesek pozneje popravili).
This constitutes operating support for the firm to continue its inefficient business and is therefore an advantage granted through state resources which threatens to distort competition in so far as it affects trade between Member States, and is thereby incompatible with the common market in the sense of Article 87 of the EC Treaty.
To pomeni operativno podporo podjetju, da nadaljuje svoje neuspešno poslovanje, in je zato prednost, odobrena iz državnih sredstev, za katero obstaja nevarnost, da bo izkrivila konkurenco, če vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami, ter je potemtakem nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom v smislu člena 87 PES.
In order to quantify the aid amount, the hypothetical effect of non-enforcement of debt must be simulated.
Da bi količinsko opredelili znesek pomoči, je treba simulirati hipotetični učinek neizterjave dolga.
Given that a private creditor would have preferred to enforce its claims, the advantage that the firm derives from non-enforcement is the full amount of the claims which it does not have to reimburse.
Glede na to, da bi zasebni upnik raje izterjal svoje zahtevke, je prednost, ki jo podjetje dobi zaradi neizterjave, enaka celotnemu znesku zahtevkov, ki mu jih ni treba povrniti.
In other words, the firm has at its disposal an amount which, due to its financial situation, it would not be able to obtain on the market.
Z drugimi besedami, podjetje ima na voljo znesek, ki ga zaradi svojega finančnega položaja na trgu ne bi moglo dobiti.
In particular, if the State had enforced its claims the firm would not have been able to pay the amount due and would most probably have gone bankrupt.
Predvsem pa velja, da če bi država uveljavila svoje zahtevke, podjetje ne bi bilo zmožno plačati dolgovanega zneska in bi šlo najverjetneje v stečaj.
Failure to enforce the claims therefore had the same effect as granting the recipient the entire non-enforced amount [44].
Neuspešna izterjava zahtevkov je tako imela enak učinek, kot če bi prejemniku odobrili celotni neizterjani znesek [44].
Hence the advantage obtained concerns an amount of PLN 20,761 million obtained as of 1 January 2005.
Zato se dobljena prednost nanaša na znesek 20,761 milijona PLN, pridobljenih od 1. januarja 2005.
However, given that a market economy operator would have enforced the original debt, this debt should hypothetically no longer exist and should not therefore be counted twice.
Ker pa bi udeleženec v tržnem gospodarstvu izterjal prvotni dolg, ta dolg hipotetično ne bi več obstajal in ga zato ne bi smeli šteti dvakrat.
As regards the budgetary funds indicated as employment restructuring and awarded after 2004, the Commission's doubts have been allayed.
Pomisleki Komisije o proračunskih sredstvih, navedenih kot prestrukturiranje zaposlovanja in dodeljenih po letu 2004, so bili pomirjeni.
Indeed they cannot be considered State Aid as the Polish authorities have explained that they are provided for the sole benefit of redundant workers, who cannot be considered as an undertaking; equally, such payments cannot be related to the employer as they are provided after the workers are laid off and do not diminish any other charges which the company would have to bear if no such aid were provided.
Zares jih ni mogoče obravnavati kot državno pomoč, saj so poljski organi razložili, da so bila sredstva zagotovljena izključno v korist odvečnih delavcev, ki jih ni mogoče obravnavati kot podjetje; takšnih plačil ni mogoče povezovati z delodajalcem, saj so dodeljena po odpustitvi delavcev in ne znižujejo nobenih drugih stroškov, ki bi jih morala nositi družba, če taka pomoč ne bi bila zagotovljena.
Misuse of aid
Zloraba pomoči
Point 18(a) of Protocol No 8 gives the Commission the power to take ‘appropriate steps requiring any company concerned to reimburse any aid awarded in breach of the conditions laid down in this Protocol […] if monitoring of the restructuring shows that the commitments for the transitional arrangements contained in this Protocol have not been fulfilled.’
S točko 18(a) Protokola št. 8 je Komisiji dana pristojnost, da „naredi vse potrebno, da se od zadevnih podjetij zahteva povrnitev vseh pomoči, katerih dodelitev pomeni kršitev pogojev iz tega protokola […], če spremljanje prestrukturiranja pokaže, da pogoji za prehodno ureditev iz tega protokola niso bili izpolnjeni“.
The Commission finds that TB did not fully implement its restructuring plan as explicitly stipulated in point 9 of Protocol No 8 and contributed to its bankruptcy with the various measures indicated in recital (56) above.
Komisija ugotavlja, da TB ni v celoti uresničil svojega načrta prestrukturiranja, kot je izrecno določeno v točki 9 Protokola št. 8, in je prispeval k svojemu stečaju z različnimi ukrepi, navedenimi v uvodni izjavi 56 zgoraj.
Poland has not disputed this finding.
Poljska tej ugotovitvi ni oporekala.
TB also failed to comply with several benchmarks set out in point 9 of Protocol No 8:
Poleg tega TB ni izpolnil vseh meril uspešnosti, določenih v točki 9 Protokola št. 8:
TB was not able to obtain financial support from creditors and local financial institutions as stipulated in point 9(c) of Protocol No 8;
TB ni mogel pridobiti finančne pomoči posojilodajalcev in lokalnih finančnih institucij, kot je določeno v točki 9(c) Protokola št. 8;
TB only partially reduced its costs as stipulated in point 9(c) of Protocol No 8.
TB je le deloma znižal svoje stroške, kot je določeno v točki 9(c) Protokola št. 8.
The consultant confirmed that this obligation was met only in part [45];
Svetovalec je potrdil, da je bila ta obveznost izpolnjena le delno [45];
TB managed only partially to implement employment restructuring as parts of its cost savings programme.
TB je uspelo le delno izvesti prestrukturiranje zaposlovanja, ki je bil del njegovega programa za zmanjševanje stroškov.
The number of workers was cut from 550 to 294 only thanks to the spinning-off of the rolls department into HB, not because of reductions in the core business [46];
Število delavcev se je zmanjšalo s 550 na 294 le zaradi oddelitve oddelka za proizvodnjo rol v HB, ne pa zaradi zmanjšanj v osnovnem podjetju [46];
TB was not able to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its business management as stipulated in the second recital of point 9(a) of Protocol No 8.
TB ni zmogel izboljšati učinkovitosti in uspešnosti svojega poslovnega upravljanja, kot je določeno v drugi alinei točke 9(a) Protokola št. 8.
In fact, TB’s management board has been replaced several times since 2002.
Dejansko je bil upravni odbor TB od leta 2002 večkrat zamenjan.
Since TB failed to meet the conditions set out in Protocol No 8 and did not properly implement its IBP, the restructuring aid has been misused and must be repaid.
Ker TB ni uspelo izpolniti pogojev iz Protokola št. 8 in ker ni ustrezno izvedel svojega IPN, je bila pomoč za prestrukturiranje zlorabljena in jo je treba povrniti.
Compatibility of aid
Združljivost pomoči
On the basis of the NRP between 1997 and 2003
Na podlagi NPP med letoma 1997 in 2003
The Commission indicated in the decision to initiate the procedure that other reasons of compatibility might take precedence over the fact that restructuring aid was not used in line with the restructuring plan.
Komisija je v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka navedla, da bi lahko imeli drugi razlogi združljivosti prednost pred dejstvom, da pomoč za prestrukturiranje ni bila porabljena v skladu z načrtom prestrukturiranja.
To that end the Commission observed that under the NRP not only restructuring aid but also other types of State Aid had been awarded.
Zato je Komisija pripomnila, da je bila v skladu z NPP dodeljena ne le pomoč za prestrukturiranje, temveč tudi druge vrste državne pomoči.
As such, the failure of the restructuring does not necessarily imply that all this aid was misused [47], if it can be proven to be compatible with the single market under other State Aid rules [48].
Neuspešno prestrukturiranje samo po sebi ne pomeni nujno, da je bila vsa pomoč zlorabljena, [47] če je mogoče dokazati, da je združljiva z enotnim trgom v skladu z drugimi pravili o državni pomoči [48].