natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In 2006 DWAR acquired 51 % of the shares from Daewoo Motors Ltd. for a sales price of USD 50 million plus a settlement payment of USD 10 million for any outstanding liabilities to other Daewoo subsidiaries.
Leta 2006 je DWAR pridobil 51 % delnic od Daewoo Motors Ltd. za prodajno ceno 50 milijonov USD in poravnal plačilo 10 milijonov USD za vsakršne druge preostale obveznosti do drugih odvisnih družb Daewoo.
Based on an exchange rate of EUR 1 = USD 1,4.
Na osnovi menjalnega tečaja 1 EUR = 1,4 USD.
See Case T-471/93 Tiercé Ladbroke SA v Commission, at points 54 and 56-63.
Glej Zadevo T-471/93 Tiercé Ladbroke SA proti Komisiji, točka 54 in točke 56–63.
See, for example, Case T-296/97 Alitalia, Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99 WestLB v Commission, Case T-366/00 Scott SA, Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia v Commission and Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission.
Glej na primer Zadevo T-296/97 Alitalia, zadevi T-228/99 in T-233/99 WestLB proti Komisiji, Zadevo T-366/00 Scott SA, Zadevi C-328/99 in C-399/00 Italija in SIM 2 Multimedia proti Komisiji ter Zadevo T-358/94 Air France proti Komisiji.
XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy (1993), p. 255.
Poročilo o politiki konkurenčnosti (1993), str. 255.
Points 402 et seq. of the XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy (1993).
Točke 402 in naslednje XXIII. Poročila o politiki konkurence (1993).
See also point 248 of the XXIst Report on Competition Policy (1991): ‘[…] no aid is involved where the shareholdings are sold to the highest bidder as a result of an open and unconditional bidding procedure.
Glej tudi točko 248 XXI. Poročila o politiki konkurence (1991): „[…] pomoč ni vključena, kjer so deleži prodani najboljšemu ponudniku preko odprtega in brezpogojnega ponudbenega postopka.
If shareholdings are sold under other conditions, aid elements may be present.’
Če so deleži prodani pod drugimi pogoji, so lahko prisotni elementi pomoči.“
See, for example, the Commission Decision on TASQ of 3 May 2000, which states that ‘The French authorities also showed that the invitation to tender was transparent and unconditional […].
Glej, na primer, odločbo Komisije o TASQ z dne 3. maja 2000, po kateri „so francoski organi pokazali, da je bil razpis pregleden in brezpogojen […].
In particular, the documents submitted to the Commission showed that the sale of TASQ was not conditional on, for example, job maintenance, locations or continuation of activity.’ This fact enabled the Commission to conclude that no aid was involved in that privatisation.
Predvsem dokumenti, predloženi Komisiji, so pokazali, da prodaja TASQ ni bila pogojena na primer z ohranitvijo delovnih mest, lokacijo ali nadaljevanjem dejavnosti.“ To dejstvo je Komisiji pomagalo pri ugotovitvi, da v tej privatizaciji ni bila vključena pomoč.
See, for example, Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99 WestLB v Commission, Case T-366/00 Scott SA, Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia v Commission and Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission.
Glej, na primer, zadevi T-228/99 in T-233/99 WestLB proti Komisiji, Zadeva T-366/00 Scott SA, zadevi C-328/99 in C-399/00 Italija in SIM 2 Multimedia proti Komisiji ter Zadeva T-358/94 Air France proti Komisiji.
In Case T-296/97 Alitalia, the Court states that ‘It must be emphasised that the conduct of a private investor in a market economy is guided by prospects of profitability.
V Zadevi T-296/97 Alitalia proti Komisiji Sodišče meni, da „je treba poudariti, da se zasebni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu ravna po dobičku.
The measure was motivated by the desire to keep the jobs and therefore, above all, by considerations pertaining to the applicant’s viability and survival rather than by prospects of profitability.’
Ta ukrep je bil posledica želje po ohranitvi delovnih mest, torej predvsem z upoštevanjem sposobnosti vlagatelja za preživetje kot pa obetov dobičkonosnosti.“
See the XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy (1993), p. 255.
Glej XXIII. Poročilo o politiki konkurence (1993), str. 255.
In several of the Commission Decisions, the absence of conditions. i.e. the unconditional nature of the tender, was a decisive argument that allowed the Commission to conclude that privatisation procedures did not include State aid.
V več odločbah Komisije je bila odsotnost pogojev, tj. brezpogojna narava razpisa, odločilni argument, ki je Komisiji pomagal pri ugotovitvi, da v tej privatizaciji ni bila vključena pomoč.
See, for example, the Commission Decisions of 15 February 2000 on Dessauer Geräteindustrie (OJ L 1, 4.1.2001, p. 10), of 13 December 2000 on SKET Walwerkstechnik (OJ L 301, 17.11.2001, p. 37) and of 30 January 2002 on Gothaer Fahrzeugtechnik (OJ L 314, 18.11.2002, p. 62), in which the Commission explained: ‘To rule out any aid element in the transaction, the BvS would have had to demand a price corresponding to the company’s market value.
Glej na primer odločbo Komisije z dne 15. februarja 2000 o Dessauer Geräteindustrie (UL L 1, 4.1.2001, str. 10), odločbo Komisije z dne 13. decembra 2000 o SKET Walwerkstechnik (UL L 301, 17.11.2001, str. 37) in odločbo Komisije z dne 30. januarja 2002 o Gothaer Fahrzeugtechnik (UL L 314, 18.11.2002, str. 62), v kateri Komisija pojasnjuje: „Da bi izločil element pomoči v transakciji, bi BvS moral zahtevati ceno, ki ustreza tržni vrednosti družbe.
The Commission therefore verifies whether the sales procedure was an appropriate one for the purpose of establishing the market value.
Komisija zato preverja, ali je bil postopek prodaje ustrezen za določitev tržne vrednosti.
[…] the sales price is the market price if the sale is effected through an open and unconditional tender procedure and the assets go to the highest or only bidder.’
[…] Prodajna cena je tržna cena, če se prodaja izvrši z odprtim in brezpogojnim razpisom in če gredo sredstva največjemu ali edinemu ponudniku.“
See, for example, Commission Decision 97/81/EC of 30 July 1996 on Head Tyrolia Mares, where the Commission states that ‘It is not in the interest of a market economy investor to ensure, without clear economic reasons, a certain employment level when taking his divesting decisions.
Glej, na primer odločbo Komisije 97/81/ES z dne 30. julija 1996 o Head Tyrolia Mares, kjer Komisija navaja, da „Ni v interesu zasebni vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, da bi pri sprejemanju odločitev o naložbi brez jasnih ekonomskih razlogov zagotovil določen obseg delovnih mest.
Without the condition in question, a potential buyer would gain entrepreneurial independence and HTM’s value would increase, which could result in a higher sale price or reduced funding by AT.’ and Commission Decision 2000/628/EC of 11 April 2000 on the aid granted by Italy to Centrale del Latte di Roma, in which the Commission spells out the criteria whereby a privatisation of a publicly owned company does not involve State aid (see recital 32 et seq., and in particular recital 36): ‘The Commission believes that the market value of the company would have been the price a private investor would have paid had the sale been subject to no conditions, particularly those relating to the maintenance of a certain number of jobs and the supply of raw materials from local producers.’
Brez zadevnega pogoja bi potencialni kupec dosegel podjetniško neodvisnost in vrednost HTM bi se povečala, kar bi povzročilo višjo prodajno ceno, ali manjši obseg sredstev AT“ in odločbo Komisije 2000/628/ES z dne 11. aprila 2000 o pomoči, ki jo je Italija dodelila podjetju Centrale del Latte di Roma (C(2000) 1173) (UL L 265, 19.10.2000, str. 15), v kateri Komisija določa merila, po katerih privatizacija zasebnih podjetij ne vključuje državne pomoči (glej uvodne ugotovitve 32 et seq., in zlasti 36): „Komisija meni, da bi bila tržna vrednost družbe cena, ki bi jo zasebni vlagatelj plačal, če za prodajo ne bi veljali pogoji, zlasti tisti, ki se nanašajo na ohranitev določenega števila delovnih mest in dobave surovin od domačih proizvajalcev.“
Such an analysis was carried out, for example, in the Commission Decision of 20 June 2001 on GSG and enabled the Commission to conclude that no aid was involved even in the presence of some unusual conditions because it found that those conditions could not lead to a reduction in the sales price.
Takšna analiza je na primer narejena v odločbi Komisije z dne 20. junija 2001 o GSG, ki je Komisiji pomagalo pri ugotovitvi, da ni bila vključena pomoč niti v zvezi z nekaterimi nenavadnimi pogoji, ker je bilo ugotovljeno, da ti pogoji ne vodijo v zmanjšanje prodajne cene.
In the above calculations, the Commission assumed that the impact of the condition relating to the integration level can be ignored.
V zgoraj navedenih izračunih je Komisija menila, da se vpliv pogoja v zvezi s stopnjo integracije, lahko zanemari.
As rightfully pointed out by Ford and in line with the Commission’s practice, this requirement is in breach of the internal market rules regarding the free movement of goods.
Kot je pravilno poudaril Ford in v skladu s prakso Komisije, ta zahteva krši pravila notranjega trga na področju prostega gibanja blaga.
Accordingly, Ford undertook to achieve a 60 % integration level within four years of the privatisation ‘subject to consistency with EU law’.
V tem smislu se je Ford zavezal doseči 60 % stopnjo integracije v štirih letih po privatizaciji „odvisno od skladnosti s pravom EU“.
Since Ford highlighted this aspect in its correspondence with AVAS, which was also available to GM, it is assumed that GM too understood that this particular requirement could be accepted conditionally without having any practical consequences for its offer.
Ker je Ford v svojem dopisovanju z AVAS poudaril ta vidik, in je bil dostopen tudi GM, velja, da je tudi GM razumel, da bi bila ta posebna zahteva pogojno sprejeta brez kakršnih koli praktičnih posledic za njegovo ponudbo.
However, if the price would also have to compensate for the failure to meet this criterion, the price differential would be even wider than explained above.
Če pa naj bi cena nadomestila neizpolnjevanje tega merila, bi bila razlika v ceni še večja kot je razloženo zgoraj.
See, for example, Case C-119/05 Italy v Lucchini.
Glej na primer Zadevo C-119/05 Italija proti Lucchini.
State aid N 767/07: Large Investment Project — Romania — Ford Craiova. [21] OJ L 140, 30.4.2004, p. 1.
Državna pomoč št. 767/2007: Veliki naložbeni projekt – Romunija – Ford Craiova.
Information regarding the application of the Commission Decision in case C 46/07 (ex NN 59/07) on aid implemented by Romania for Automobile Craiova
Informacije o uporabi Odločbe Komisije v zadevi C 46/2007 (ex NN 59/07) o pomoči, ki jo Romunija namenja podjetju Automobile Craiova
Information about the amounts of aid received, to be recovered and already recovered
Informacije o zneskih pomoči, ki je bila prejeta, ki jo je treba vrniti in ki je že povrnjena
Total amount of aid received [1]
Skupni znesek prejete pomoči [1]
Total amount of aid to be recovered [1](Principal)
Skupni znesek pomoči, ki jo je treba vrniti [1](Glavnica)
Total amount already repaid [1]
Skupni znesek že povrnjene pomoči [1]
Recovery interest
Obresti na znesek za izterjavo
(°) In of national currency (million)
(°) V domači valuti (v milijonih)
Sixth, as regards the customs claim of EUR 800 million, Romania explained its origin.
Šestič, kar zadeva carinsko terjatev 800 milijonov EUR, je Romunija pojasnila njihov izvor.
According to Law 71/1994 on attracting foreign investors, Romanian companies were exempted from customs duties and profits tax if they fulfilled four conditions: the foreign subscribed capital is at least USD 50 million; at least 50 % of production is exported; a production integration level of at least 60 % is achieved; and the share capital does not decrease within 14 years of the date of the foreign subscription with the result that the foreign participation falls below USD 50 million.
V skladu z Zakonom 71/1994 o pridobivanju tujih vlagateljev so bile romunske družbe izvzete plačila carinskih dajatev in davka na dobiček, če so izpolnjevala štiri pogoje: tuji vpisani kapital mora znašati najmanj 50 milijonov USD; najmanj 50 % proizvodnje mora biti namenjena izvozu; doseči je treba najmanj 60 % integracijske ravni in delniški kapital se v obdobju 14 let od datuma tujega vpisa ne sme zmanjšati tako, da bi tuja udeležba padla pod 50 milijonov USD.
This set of rules, specifically for the aviation sector, can be found in ‘Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State aids in the aviation sector’ ( OJ C 350, 10.12.1994, p. 5), which states that ‘Aid is excluded […] if, upon privatisation, the following conditions are fulfilled: the disposals made by way of an unconditional public invitation to tender […].
Ta sklop pravil, posebej za letalski sektor, najdemo v Izvajanju členov 92 in 93 Pogodbe o ES in člena 61 Sporazuma EGP o državni pomoči za letalski sektor (UL C 350, 10.12.1994, str. 5), ki določa, da „je pomoč izključena […] če so ob privatizaciji izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji: da se da na voljo prek brezpogojnega ponudbenega postopka […].
On the other hand, the following sales are subject to the pre-notification requirements of Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty because there is a presumption that they contain aid: […] all sales that are realised in conditions that would not be acceptable for a transaction between market economy investors.’
Po drugi strani so naslednje prodaje predmet zahtev o predhodni priglasitvi po členu 93(3) Pogodbe o ES zaradi predpostavke, da vključujejo pomoč: […] vsakršna prodaja, ki se opravi pod pogoji, ki ne bi bili sprejemljivi za posel med vlagatelji v tržni ekonomiji.“
Therefore, the total value of all the shares at that time was EUR 78 million.
Torej je bila tedaj skupna vrednost vseh delnic 78 milijonov EUR. Ford je ponudil 57 milijonov EUR za 72,4 % delnic v podjetju Automobile Craiova, kar pomeni, da so skupno vredne 78 milijonov EUR. Če upoštevamo vrednost posamezne delnice, ki kotira na borzi, je bila vrednost vseh delnic v podjetju Automobile Craiova 16. marca 2007 okoli 59 milijonov EUR. Zato je nakupna cena 57 milijonov EUR, ki jo je Ford poravnal za 72 % delnic, višja od tržne cene.
The present decision applies only to this sale of the 72,4 % stake by AVAS to Ford.
Sedanja odločba se nanaša le na prodajo 72,4 % deleža, ki ga je AVAS prodal podjetju Ford.
It does not prejudge any future assessment of a potential sale of the remaining 27,6 % of shares.
Odločba ne vpliva na prihodnje ocene morebitne prodaje preostalega 27,6 % deleža.
DWAR generated losses of around EUR 350 million in 2006 and of around EUR 3,4 million until 30 April 2007.
Podjetje DWAR je ustvarilo izgubo v vrednosti približno 350 milijonov EUR v letu 2006 in približno 3,4 milijona do 30. aprila 2007.
In 2006 it had total debts of around EUR 88 million, of which EUR 56 million to the public budget and EUR 25 million to suppliers.
V letu 2006 je podjetje imelo približno 88 milijonov EUR skupnega dolga, od tega 56 milijonov do javnega proračuna in 25 milijonov do dobaviteljev.
The lower sales price for the 72,4 % stake is thus paid from the revenue forgone by the State. Therefore, the measures involve state resources.
Nižja prodajna cena za delež 72,4 % je tako plačana s prihodki, ki se jim država odpove, zato ukrepi vključujejo državna sredstva.
Second, the comparison between the sales price and the stock exchange value of the shares in Automobile Craiova, which was about EUR 50 million, cannot be accepted. It does not take into consideration the fact that, for the acquisition of a majority holding, the value of the shares is significantly higher than the sum of the price for individual shares.
Drugič, ni mogoče sprejeti primerjave med prodajno ceno in vrednostjo deležev v podjetju Automobile Craiova na borzi, ki je bila približno 50 milijonov EUR. Ne upošteva dejstva, da je za nakup večine delnic vrednost deležev bistveno višja, kot je vsota cen posameznih delnic.
Ford offered EUR 57 million for 72,4 % of the shares in Automobile Craiova, corresponding to EUR 78 million for all of them. Also, taking the value per share traded on the stock exchange, the value of all the shares in Automobile Craiova on 16 March 2007 was about EUR 59 million. Therefore, the purchase price of EUR 57 million paid by Ford for 72 % of the shares is above the market price. In addition, under the restructuring process, AVAS will also remain owner of the non-core assets.
Poleg tega bo AVAS med procesom prestrukturiranja ostal lastnik stranskega (pomožnega) kapitala.
on the measure C 29/07 (ex N 310/06) which Hungary is planning to implement in the form of a short-term export-credit guarantee for SMEs with limited export turnover
o ukrepu C 29/07 (ex N 310/06), ki ga Madžarska namerava izvajati v obliki kratkoročnega jamstva za izvozne kredite za MSP z omejenim izvoznim prometom
(notified under document number C(2008) 1332)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2008) 1332)
(Only the Hungarian version is authentic)
(Besedilo v madžarskem jeziku je edino verodostojno)
Having called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to the provisions cited above [1] and having regard to their comments,
po pozivu vsem zainteresiranim strankam, naj predložijo pripombe v skladu z navedenimi členi [1], in ob upoštevanju teh pripomb,
By electronic notification dated 17 May 2006, the Hungarian authorities notified the above-mentioned measure (hereinafter referred to as the measure) pursuant to Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.
Z elektronskim obvestilom z dne 17. maja 2006 so madžarski organi priglasili zgoraj navedeni ukrep (v nadaljnjem besedilu „ukrep“) na podlagi člena 88(3) Pogodbe ES.
The notification was supplemented by letter dated 21 June 2006, registered at the Commission on 22 June 2006.
Obvestilu je bil priložen dopis z dne 21. junija 2006, evidentiran pri Komisiji 22. junija 2006.
By letters dated 1 August 2006, 30 October 2006 and 30 April 2007, the Commission requested additional information, which was provided by Hungary by letters dated 12 September 2006, 21 March 2007 and 30 May 2007, registered at the Commission on the same days.
Z dopisi z dne 1. avgusta 2006, 30. oktobra 2006 in 30. aprila 2007 je Komisija zahtevala dodatne informacije, in Madžarska jih je predložila z dopisi z dne 12. septembra 2006, 21. marca 2007 in 30. maja 2007, evidentiranimi pri Komisiji na iste dneve.
By letter dated 18 July 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the decision initiating proceedings), the Commission informed Hungary that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of the measure.
Z dopisom z dne 18. julija 2007 (v nadaljnjem besedilu „odločitev o sprožitvi postopka“) je Komisija obvestila Madžarsko, da se je odločila za sprožitev postopka, kot je v zvezi z ukrepom določen v členu 88(2) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission decision to initiate the procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union [2].
Odločitev Komisije, da bo sprožila postopek, je bila objavljena v Uradnem listu Evropske unije [2].
The Commission invited interested parties to submit their comments on the aid.
Komisija je zainteresirane strani povabila, naj predložijo pripombe glede pomoči.
The Commission received no comments from interested third parties.
Komisija ni prejela pripomb zainteresiranih tretjih strani.
The comments of the Hungarian authorities were received by letter dated 21 September 2007.
Pripombe madžarskih organov je prejela z dopisom z dne 21. septembra 2007.
The objective of the measure is to provide short-term export-credit guarantees to finance export transactions by SMEs [3] with an annual export turnover not exceeding EUR 2 million (hereinafter referred to as SMEs with limited export turnover).
Cilj ukrepa je zagotoviti kratkoročna jamstva za izvozne kredite za financiranje izvoznih transakcij, ki jih izvajajo MSP [3], katerih izvozni promet ne presega 2 milijonov EUR (v nadaljnjem besedilu „MSP z omejenim izvoznim prometom“).
Hungary wishes to implement the measure under point 2.5 of the Communication of the Commission to the Member States pursuant to Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty applying Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty to short-term export-credit insurance [4] (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Communication on short-term export-credit insurance’ or ‘Communication’).
Madžarska želi ukrep izvajati na podlagi točke 2.5 Sporočila Komisije državam članicam po členu 93(1) Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti o uporabi členov 92 in 93 Pogodbe za kratkoročno zavarovanje izvoznih kreditov [4] (v nadaljnjem besedilu „Sporočilo o kratkoročnem zavarovanju izvoznih kreditov“ ali „Sporočilo“).
Terms and conditions of the guarantee
Pogoji za jamstvo
The guarantee in relation to the repayment of a loan to finance export transactions can be given:
Jamstvo za vračilo posojila za financiranje izvoznih transakcij se lahko odobri:
to an exporting domestic SME with limited export turnover in order to enhance its ability to take out a loan from a commercial bank.
domačemu izvoznemu MSP z omejenim izvoznim prometom, da se poveča njegova sposobnost za pridobitev posojila od poslovne banke.
In such a case, the risks may be associated directly with the seller (i.e. the exporting SME), and indirectly with the buyer;
V takem primeru tveganje nosi prodajalec neposredno (tj. izvozno MSP), kupec pa posredno;
to a foreign buyer purchasing goods and services from a domestic SME with limited export turnover, in order to enhance the ability of the buyer to take out a loan from a commercial bank.
tujemu kupcu, ki kupuje blago in storitve domačega MSP z omejenim izvoznim prometom, da se poveča sposobnost kupca za pridobitev posojila od poslovne banke.
In such a case, the risks are associated directly with the buyer.
V takem primeru tveganje nosi neposredno kupec.
There is no restriction as to the country of the buyer, i.e. the buyer can be located either in one of the countries listed in the Annex to the Communication or in another country.
Glede države kupca ni nobene omejitve, torej je sedež kupca lahko v eni od držav, navedenih v Prilogi k Sporočilu, ali v kateri drugi državi.
Nor is there any restriction as regards the size of the foreign buyer (i.e. it can be a large enterprise).
Prav tako ni omejitev glede velikosti tujega kupca (torej je lahko veliko podjetje).
The Hungarian authorities state that in both the above cases the guarantee must finance an export transaction.
Madžarski organi trdijo, da mora v obeh zgoraj navedenih primerih jamstvo financirati izvozno transakcijo.
The maximum maturity of the guarantee is two years.
Doba zapadlosti jamstva je največ dve leti.
The amount of the guarantee may not exceed 70 % of the value of the export contract (reduced by an advance payment of at least 15 %) or 70 % of the underlying loan.
Znesek jamstva ne sme presegati 70 % vrednosti izvozne pogodbe (zmanjšane za znesek predplačila v višini najmanj 15 %) ali 70 % vrednosti posojila, ki mu je jamstvo namenjeno.
Exporting SMEs with limited export turnover are not eligible for the guarantee if they are involved in bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings or are in receivership.
Izvozna MSP z omejenim izvoznim prometom niso upravičena do jamstva, če so v stečaju, likvidaciji ali stečajnem postopku.
No information has been submitted as to the existence of any such restrictions regarding guarantees given to foreign buyers.
Glede obstoja takih omejitev za jamstva tujim kupcem ni bilo predloženih nobenih informacij.
In case of guarantees covering domestic risks (i.e. guarantee for the exporting SME), the fee depends on the credit-worthiness of the exporting SME and is set on the basis of a five-grade rating system based on objective criteria as well as subjective evaluation, carried out in line with commercial bank practice.
V primeru jamstev, ki pokrivajo domača tveganja (npr. jamstvo za izvozna MSP), je provizija za jamstvo odvisna od kreditne sposobnosti izvoznega MSP in se določi na podlagi petstopenjskega ocenjevalnega sistema, ki temelji na objektivnih merilih, in subjektivne ocene, ki je opravljena v skladu s prakso poslovne banke.