natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Moreover, Article 20 of Law 342/2000 provided detailed rules for the substitute capital gain tax to be paid and for the tax credit relative to such tax in favour of the shareholders receiving dividends resulting from the capital gains recognised.
Poleg tega so bila v členu 20 Zakona 342/2000 določena podrobna pravila za nadomestni davek na kapitalski dobiček, ki ga je treba plačati, in za davčno dobroimetje v zvezi s takim davkom v korist delničarjem, ki prejmejo dividende iz priznanih kapitalskih dobičkov.
Realignments pursuant to Law 448/2001
Prerazporeditve v skladu z Zakonom 448/2001
Law No 448 of 28 December 2001 (Law 448/2001) extended the time scope of the realignment schemes provided by Law 342/2000 with respect to assets resulting from the balance sheet of a company and whose value had not yet been realigned.
Z Zakonom št. 448 z dne 28. decembra 2001 (Zakon 448/2001) se je razširil časovni okvir shem prerazporeditve, določenih z Zakonom 342/2000, v zvezi s sredstvi, ki izhajajo iz bilance stanja gospodarske družbe in katerih vrednost še ni bila prerazporejena.
Article 3(11) of Law 448/2001 provided that the realignment scheme under Articles from 17 to 20 of Law 342/2000 would apply to unrecognised gains relative both to the assets and shares deriving from the banking reorganisations pursuant to Law 218/1990 and to the assets deriving from other reorganisations under Legislative Decree No 358/1997, still held at the date of 31 December 2001.
V členu 3(11) Zakona št. 448/2001 je določeno, da naj bi shema prerazporeditve v skladu s členi od 17 do 20 Zakona 342/2000 veljala za nepriznane dobičke, ki se nanašajo na sredstva in kapitalske deleže, ki izhajajo iz prestrukturiranj bančništva v skladu z Zakonom 218/1990, in sredstva, ki izhajajo iz drugih prestrukturiranj v skladu z zakonodajnim odlokom št. 358/1997, ki je še vedno veljal 31. decembra 2001.
Law 448/2001 provided that the substitute taxes due on the gains recognised were set at 12 % and 9 % respectively for dual realignments (realignment of both the assets held by the operating company and the stocks received by the participating company) and single realignment (only the assets held by the operating company are realigned) in lieu of the company tax of 41 % applicable at the time of the realignment (36 % company tax plus 5 % local business tax).
V Zakonu 448/2001 je bilo določeno, da so bili nadomestni davki na priznane dobičke določeni na 12 odstotkov za dvojne prerazporeditve (prerazporeditev sredstev v rokah operativne družbe in kapitalskih deležev, ki jih prejme sodelujoča družba) in devet odstotkov za enojne prerazporeditve (prerazporejena so le sredstva v rokah operativne družbe) namesto 41-odstotnega davka od dobička gospodarskih družb, ki je veljal ob prerazporeditvi (36-odstotnega davka od dobička gospodarskih družb plus 5-odstotnega lokalnega davka od poslovanja).
Realignments under Law 350/2003
Prerazporeditve v skladu z Zakonom 350/2003
Finally, Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 provided that the realignment scheme foreseen by Article 17 of Law 342/2000 could also apply to the realised but unrecognised gains relative to the assets concerned with the banking reorganisations pursuant to Law 218/1990, still resulting from the company’s accounting at the date of 31 December 2003.
Nazadnje, v členu 2(26) Zakona 350/2003 je določeno, da naj bi shema prerazporeditve, predvidena v členu 17 Zakona 342/2000, veljala tudi za ustvarjene, a nepriznane dobičke, ki se nanašajo na sredstva, povezana s prestrukturiranji bančništva v skladu z Zakonom 218/1990, ki še vedno izhajajo iz računovodskih evidenc družbe na dan 31. decembra 2003.
Law 350/2003 provided that the substitute capital gain taxes on the realignments of such gains were 12 % and 9 %, respectively for dual realignments (realignment of both the assets held by the banking company and the stocks received by the banking holding) and single realignment (only the assets held by the banking company are realigned).
V Zakonu 350/2003 je bila za nadomestne davke na kapitalske dobičke za prerazporeditve takih dobičkov določena 12-odstotna mera za dvojne prerazporeditve (prerazporeditev sredstev v rokah bančne družbe in kapitalskih deležev, ki jih prejme bančni holding), 9-odstotna mera pa za enojne prerazporeditve (prerazporejena so le sredstva v rokah bančne družbe).
In particular, pursuant to Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003, the historic gains realised under Law 218/1990 with respect to the contributions of banking assets to newly created or existing private banks in exchange for the stocks of such banks could be fiscally recognised by payment of a substitute capital gain tax under the preferential tax rates of 12 % or 9 % in lieu of the company tax of 37,25 % of the time (33 % company tax plus 4,25 % local business tax).
V skladu s členom 2(26) Zakona 350/2003 je bilo prejšnje dobičke, ustvarjene na podlagi Zakona 218/1990 v zvezi z vložki bančnih sredstev v novoustanovljene ali obstoječe zasebne banke v zameno za kapitalske deleže takih bank, mogoče davčno priznati s plačilom nadomestnega davka na kapitalski dobiček v skladu z 12- in 9-odstotnimi preferenčnimi davčnimi stopnjami namesto takratnega 37,25-odstotnega davka od dobička gospodarskih družb (33-odstotnega davka od dobička gospodarskih družb plus 4,25-odstotnega lokalnega davka od poslovanja).
Law 350/2003 also provided that the substitute tax was payable in three instalments (50 % in 2004, 25 % in 2005 and 25 % in 2006), without interest.
V Zakonu 350/2003 je bilo tudi določeno, da je bil nadomestni davek plačljiv v treh obrokih (50 % leta 2004, 25 % leta 2005 in 25 % leta 2006) brez obresti.
According to the information provided by the Italian authorities, nine banking groups realigned their assets pursuant to Article 26(26) of Law 350/2003, by payment of the substitute capital gain tax of 9 % (single realignment).
V skladu z informacijami, ki so jih predložili italijanski organi, je devet bančnih skupin prerazporedilo svoja sredstva v skladu s členom 26(26) Zakona 350/2003, tako da so plačale 9-odstotni nadomestni davek na kapitalski dobiček (enojna prerazporeditev).
The global capital gains thereto recognised totalled over EUR 2059 millions. The nine beneficiaries borne a substitute tax of EUR 180615534. To compute the effective equivalent of the tax for State aid purposes, the instalments payable in 2005 and 2006 shall be compounded by the applicable 3,7 % reference rate for the recovery of unlawful aid provided under the Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 [8].
Pri tem so celotni priznani kapitalski dobički znašali več kot 2059 milijonov EUR. Teh devet upravičencev je bilo obremenjenih z nadomestnim davkom v višini 180615534 EUR. Za izračun dejanskega ekvivalenta davka za namene državne pomoči je treba obroke, plačljive v letih 2005 in 2006, združiti z veljavno 3,7-odstotno referenčno mero za povračilo nezakonite pomoči v skladu z Uredbo Komisije št. 794/2004 [8].
The tax effectively incurred accordingly amounts to EUR 185505996 [9], which is the term of reference to compute the eventual aid grant equivalent.
Tako je dejansko nastali davek znašal 185505996 EUR [9], kar je referenčni znesek za izračun morebitnega ekvivalenta dotacije pomoči.
Revaluations under Law 350/2003
Prevrednotenja v skladu z Zakonom 350/2003
Article 2(25) of Law 350/2003 provided that all taxable companies may revalue the tax bases of their assets existing at the date of 31 December 2002 to mark them to their market value of the time, by payment of a substitute tax of 19 % in case of revaluation of depreciable assets and 15 % in case of non-depreciable assets, payable in three instalments (50 % in 2004, 25 % in 2005 and 25 % in 2006).
V členu 2(25) Zakona 350/2003 je bilo določeno, da lahko vse davčno zavezane družbe prevrednotijo davčne osnove svojih sredstev, ki so obstajale na dan 31. decembra 2002, tako da jim določijo njihovo takratno tržno vrednost, s plačilom 19-odstotnega nadomestnega davka v primeru prevrednotenja sredstev, ki se amortizirajo, in 15-odstotnega nadomestnega davka v primeru sredstev, ki se ne amortizirajo, plačljivega v treh obrokih (50 % leta 2004, 25 % leta 2005 in 25 % leta 2006).
As indicated above, revaluations are extraordinary operations which are occasionally allowed by special tax regulations to reconcile the historic value of assets with their current value.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, so prevrednotenja izjemne operacije, ki so občasno dovoljene s posebnimi davčnimi predpisi, da se uskladita prejšnja vrednost sredstev in njihova tekoča vrednost.
A tax revaluation is distinct from a realignment, because in the revaluation the tax base of the assets held by a company may be stepped up to the current market value at the time of the revaluation, while in a realignment the fiscal gain recognised is capped at the value realised at the time of a prior realisation event as for example a reorganisation.
Davčno prevrednotenje se razlikuje od prerazporeditve, saj je pri prevrednotenju davčno osnovo sredstev, ki jih ima družba, mogoče povišati na tekočo vrednost ob prevrednotenju, medtem ko je prerazporeditev priznanega davčnega dobička omejena na vrednost, ustvarjeno ob predhodnem dogodku realizacije, kot je na primer prestrukturiranje.
By its decision of 30 May 2007 [10], the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty on the tax realignment scheme provided for by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 because it appeared to fulfil all the conditions to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC and there were doubts about its compatibility with the common market as none of the exceptions provided for in Articles 87(2) and (3) seemed applicable.
Komisija je z odločbo z dne 30. maja 2007 [10] sprožila formalni postopek preiskave, določen v členu 88(2) Pogodbe ES, glede sheme davčne prerazporeditve, ki je bila predvidena v členu 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, ker je bilo videti, da izpolnjuje vse pogoje, da obvelja za davčno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) ES, in ker so obstajali dvomi o njeni združljivosti s skupnim trgom, saj se je zdelo, da ni mogoče uporabiti nobene od izjem, predvidenih v členu 87(2) in (3).
In particular, the Commission considered that Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 provided a financial advantage represented by the difference between the tax effectively paid in 2004 to realign the value of the assets and the tax which would have been normally borne if the same realignment would have been made in the absence of the same Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003.
Komisija je predvsem menila, da je bila v členu 2(26) Zakona 350/2003 določena finančna ugodnost, ki jo je izražala razlika med dejansko plačanim davkom leta 2004 za prerazporeditev vrednosti sredstev in davkom, ki bi ga bilo treba običajno plačati, če bi bila ta prerazporeditev izvedena ob odsotnosti istega člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003.
The effective tax rate applicable in 2004 on such gains would have been 37,25 % (including 33 % company tax and 4,25 % local business tax), while the substitute tax effectively paid was 9 %.
Dejanska davčna stopnja, veljavna za take dobičke v letu 2004, bi bila 37,25-odstotna (vključujoč 33-odstotni davek od dobička gospodarskih družb in 4,25-odstotni lokalni davek od poslovanja), medtem ko je bil dejansko plačani nadomestni davek 9-odstotni.
The Commission further considered that, under Law 350/2003, the substitute tax was payable in three instalments (50 % in 2004, 25 % in 2005 and 25 % in 2006) without interests, while the tax which would have ordinarily be applied in the absence of Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 would have been payable in 2004.
Komisija je nato upoštevala, da je bil po Zakonu 350/2003 nadomestni davek plačljiv v treh obrokih (50 % leta 2004, 25 % leta 2005 in 25 % leta 2006) brez obresti, medtem ko bi bil davek, ki bi se običajno uporabljal ob odsotnosti člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, plačljiv leta 2004.
The Commission has computed that the grant equivalent value of the tax effectively paid by the nine beneficiaries of the scheme in review was EUR 185505996, while the tax ordinarily due would have been EUR 771991022 (37,25 % of the realised gain totalling over EUR 2059 millions).
Komisija je izračunala, da je vrednost ekvivalenta dotacije pri davku, ki ga je dejansko plačalo devet upravičencev pregledovane sheme, znašala 185505996 EUR, medtem ko bi davek, ki bi ga bilo treba običajno plačati, znašal 771991022 EUR (37,25 % ustvarjenega dobička, ki je presegal 2059 milijonov EUR).
The difference between the tax ordinarily payable and the tax paid thus amounted to EUR 586485026.
Razlika med običajno plačljivim in plačanim davkom je tako znašala 586485026 EUR.
The Commission also considered that while the beneficial tax realignments obtained under the abovementioned Laws 342/2000 and 448/2001 constituted general measures to ensure equitable taxation of the gains realised, the realignment provided for by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 was only limited to the banks concerned with the reorganisations governed by Law 218/1990, and therefore could not be considered a general measure, nor did it ensure neutrality of treatment between the capital gains concerned and those realised from comparable company reorganisations.
Komisija je tudi menila, da so ugodne davčne prerazporeditve, ki so izhajale iz zgoraj navedenih zakonov 342/2000 in 448/2001, pomenile splošne ukrepe za zagotovitev enake obdavčitve ustvarjenih dobičkov, medtem ko je bila prerazporeditev iz člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003 omejena le na banke, ki so jih zadevala prestrukturiranja, urejena z Zakonom 218/1990, in tako ni mogla veljati za splošni ukrep, prav tako pa ta prerazporeditev ni zagotovila nevtralnosti obravnavanja med zadevnimi kapitalskimi dobički in dobički, ustvarjenimi iz primerljivih prestrukturiranj družb.
The Commission also held that the fact that certain Italian banks had cleared their suspended tax liabilities relative to unrecognised capital gains in their balance-sheets at a nominal tax cost was susceptible to increase their attractiveness as potential company targets and could have distorted the market of banking acquisitions.
Komisija je tudi menila, da bi zaradi dejstva, da so nekatere italijanske banke po nominalnih davčnih stroških poravnale svoje odložene davčne obveznosti, povezane z nepriznanimi kapitalskimi dobički v njihovih bilancah uspeha, te družbe lahko bile privlačnejše kot mogoče ciljne družbe in bi lahko izkrivljale trg bančnih prevzemov.
The Commission concluded that the scheme in review could represent incompatible State aid and accordingly opened the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je ugotovila, da bi preučevana shema lahko pomenila nezdružljivo državno pomoč, in je v skladu s tem sprožila postopek, določen v členu 88(2) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission warned that should it conclude at the closing of the abovementioned procedure that the scheme in review is incompatible State aid, recovery would have to take place in accordance with Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [11].
Komisija je opozorila, da bi bilo treba ob koncu zgoraj navedenega postopka v primeru ugotovitve, da preučevana shema pomeni nezdružljivo državno pomoč, vrniti sredstva v skladu s členom 14 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999, v katerem so določena podrobna pravila za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES [11].
The Commission considered, however, that in the light of its past practice regarding certain fiscal aid schemes [12], recovery should only concern the taxes paid in defect of what a beneficiary of the scheme would have paid had the beneficiary applied other tax schemes available at that time, provided this did not lead to reconstruct merely hypothetical choices which could have been made by the beneficiary concerned [13].
Vendar pa je Komisija menila, da bi v skladu s preteklo prakso v zvezi z nekaterimi shemami davčne pomoči [12] vračilo moralo zadevati le premalo plačane davke glede na davke, ki bi jih upravičenec sheme plačal, če bi uporabljal druge takrat veljavne davčne sheme, če to ne bi vodilo v rekonstrukcijo zgolj hipotetičnih izbir, za katere bi se lahko odločil zadevni upravičenec [13].
The Commission invited the Italian authorities and interested parties to comment on the question whether recovery should take place with sole respect to the difference between the tax which would have been paid under the revaluation scheme foresee by Article 2(25) of Law 350/2003 and the substitute tax effectively paid by the beneficiary banks pursuant to the realignment scheme of Article 2(26) of the said Law 350/2003.
Komisija je italijanske organe in zainteresirane stranke povabila, naj predložijo pripombe k vprašanju, ali naj bi povračilo zadevalo zgolj razliko med davkom, ki bi bil plačan v skladu s shemo prevrednotenja, predvideno v členu 2(25) Zakona 350/2003, in nadomestnim davkom, ki so ga banke upravičenke dejansko plačale v skladu s shemo prerazporeditve iz člena 2(26) navedenega zakona 350/2003.
COMMENTS BY ITALY
PRIPOMBE ITALIJANSKIH ORGANOV
By their submissions, the Italian authorities have essentially (a) rejected the State aid qualification of the scheme in review, and (b) observed in suborder that the possible advantage effectively granted was much less than the one provisionally calculated by the Commission and was de minimis.
Italijanski organi so v predloženih dokumentih predvsem (a) zavrnili, da bi preučevano shemo opredelili kot državno pomoč, in (b) podredno navedli, da je bila morebitna dejansko odobrena ugodnost precej nižja od tiste, ki jo je začasno izračunala Komisija, in da je bila pomoč de minimis.
In particular, Italy argues that Article 2(25) of Law 350/2003 would have implicitly allowed all companies having taken part to company reorganisations to benefit from the possibility to realign the value of their assets.
Italijanski organi so predvsem menili, da naj bi bilo s členom 2(25) Zakona 350/2003 vsem družbam, ki so sodelovale v prestrukturiranjih družb, implicitno dovoljeno, da imajo koristi od možnosti prerazporeditve vrednosti svojih sredstev.
For Italy, this general realignment could be effectuated by payment of a substitute tax of 19 % in case of revaluation of depreciable assets and 15 % in case of non-depreciable assets in three instalments (50 % in 2004, 25 % in 2005 and 25 % in 2006) pursuant to Article 12 of Law 342/2000.
Za Italijanske organe bi se ta splošna uskladitev lahko izvedla s plačilom 19-odstotnega nadomestnega davka za prevrednotenje amortiziranih sredstev in 15-odstotnega nadomestnega davka za sredstva, ki se ne amortizirajo, plačljivega v treh obrokih (50 % leta 2004, 25 % leta 2005 in 25 % leta 2006) v skladu s členom 12 Zakona 342/2000.
Thus, for Italy the regime provided by Article 2(26) would have to be appraised against this implicit realignment scheme set forth by Article 14 of Law 342/2000 rather than the general company tax revaluation system offered by Article 2(25) of Law 359/2003 as alleged by the Commission.
Tako bi bilo treba po mnenju Italijanskih organov sistem iz člena 2(26) oceniti glede na to implicitno shemo prerazporeditve, določeno v členu 14 Zakona 342/2000, in ne glede na splošni sistem prevrednotenja davka od dobička gospodarskih družb, ki je ponujen v členu 2(25) Zakona 359/2003, kot navaja Komisija.
Both the implicit realignment and the explicit revaluation schemes would have provided for the same substitute taxes of 19 % and 15 % as described.
Implicitna shema prerazporeditve in eksplicitna shema prevrednotenja naj bi obe predvidevali enaka 19- in 15-odstotna nadomestna davka, kot je opisano.
Unlike what the Commission alleged in its opening of the formal investigation procedure however, the possible advantage resulting from by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 would, according to Italy, only amount to the difference between the substitute tax of 9 % paid by the beneficiary banks on their unrecognised gains and the tax of 15 % payable on the same possible gains of all the other companies eligible to realign their asset values.
Vendar pa bi po mnenju Italije, v nasprotju s trditvami, ki jih je Komisija navedla pri sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave, morebitna ugodnost, ki izhaja iz člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, pomenila le razliko med 9-odstotnim nadomestnim davkom, ki so ga banke upravičenke plačale na svoje nepriznane dobičke, in 15-odstotnim davkom, plačljivim na enake morebitne dobičke vseh drugih družb, upravičenih do prerazporeditve vrednosti njihovih sredstev.
Italy further considers that the realignments provided for the gains resulting from the banking reorganisations made under Law 218/1990 are not comparable to all other measures for recognition of gains: first because the banking reorganisations in question were ontologically unique and not comparable to other reorganisations; second, because the tax measure devised to defer the recognition of the realised gains was specific to such reorganisations in that it provided a partial tax neutrality regime for both the transferor and the transferee entities.
Italijanski organi nato menijo, da prerazporeditve, predvidene za dobičke, ki so rezultat bančnih prestrukturiranj po Zakonu 218/1990, niso primerljive z vsemi drugimi ukrepi za priznanje dobičkov: prvič, ker so bila bančna prestrukturiranja ontološko edinstvena in neprimerljiva z drugimi prestrukturiranji; drugič, ker je bil davčni ukrep, namenjen za odložitev priznanja ustvarjen dobičkov, poseben za taka prestrukturiranja, saj je določal sistem delne davčne nevtralnosti za prenosnika in prejemnika.
As to the uniqueness of the banking reorganisations, Italy maintains that the measure only concerned certain banking reorganisations carried out between 22 August 1990 and 31 December 1995, mainly aimed at privatising the public banking sector in Italy.
V zvezi z edinstvenostjo bančnih prestrukturiranj Italijanski organi menijo, da je ukrep zadeval le nekatera bančna prestrukturiranja, opravljena med 22. avgustom 1990 in 31. decembrom 1995, ki so bila namenjena predvsem privatizaciji javnega bančnega sektorja v Italiji.
The joint stock company form was considered the most optimal business form for Italian public banks to ensure the formation of private banking groups in Italy and promoting a level playing field with other banks in the common market.
Oblika delniške družbe je veljala za najoptimalnejšo poslovno obliko za italijanske javne banke, da bi zagotovili oblikovanje zasebnih bančnih skupin v Italiji in spodbudili enake konkurenčne pogoje za druge banke na skupnem trgu.
Under Law 218/1990, the stocks of the former-public banks following their reorganisations were either attributed directly to State holding companies where the public ownership was predominant or to newly created banking or pre-existing private (banking) foundations where public ownership was spread among different local governments.
V skladu z Zakonom 218/1990 so bile delnice nekdanjih javnih bank po njihovih prestrukturiranjih pripisane državnim holdinškim družbam, v katerih je prevladovalo javno lastništvo, oziroma novooblikovanim bančnim ustanovam ali prej obstoječim zasebnim (bančnim) ustanovam, v katerih je bilo javno lastništvo razpršeno med različnimi lokalnimi upravami.
Both the State and the foundation holdings were entrusted to temporarily manage and progressively sell the stocks of the newly created companies on the market to allow the consolidation of the banking sector and formation of banking groups in Italy.
Državi in ustanovnim holdingom je bilo zaupano, da začasno upravljajo in progresivno prodajajo delnice novoustanovljenih družb na trgu, da bi omogočili konsolidacijo bančnega sektorja in oblikovanje bančnih skupin v Italiji.
As to the special nature of the tax neutral regime for such banking reorganisations, this was justified by the fact that at that time there was no general scheme to ensure neutrality of company reorganisations and contributions of business branches.
Glede na posebno naravo davčno nevtralnega sistema za takšna bančna prestrukturiranja je bilo to utemeljeno z dejstvom, da takrat ni bilo nobene splošne sheme za zagotovitev nevtralnosti prestrukturiranj družb in vložkov poslovnih vej.