natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In addition to these horizontal effects, the Decision concludes that the transaction will lead to customer foreclosure, and as a result, to a significant impediment to effective competition, due to a vertical integration of DONG with E2 and Elsam, which account for about [20-30 %] * of total Danish consumption.
Poleg teh horizontalnih učinkov se v Odločbi ugotavlja, da bo transakcija na podlagi vertikalnega vključevanja DONG z E2 in Elsam, katerima pripada okoli [20–30 %] * celotne porabe na Danskem, vodila do izključitve odjemalcev in do bistvenega oviranja učinkovite konkurence.
It will thus be more difficult for DONG’s competitors to enter Danish gas markets, both as wholesale suppliers and as suppliers of final customers, thereby raising barriers to entry to these markets.
Zato bo za konkurente podjetja DONG vstop na danski trg zemeljskega plina težji tako za grosiste kot tudi za dobavitelje končnim odjemalcem, kar pomeni postavitev vstopnih ovir za te trge.
The parties submitted that so far Elsam has sourced from third parties only to a limited extent, since it has only engaged in some swapping and short-term purchasing agreements.
Stranke menijo, da je Elsam do sedaj pridobival zemeljski plin od tretjih strank le v omejenem obsegu, ker je sklenil le nekaj menjav in kratkoročnih nakupnih sporazumov.
The Commission, however, considers that supplies to Elsam by DONG’s rivals would at least have constituted a potential constraint on DONG’s behaviour.
Vendar Komisija meni, da bi dobave podjetju Elsam s strani konkurentov podjetja DONG pomenile vsaj morebitni pritisk na obnašanje podjetja DONG.
The Decision concludes that even if the foreclosure effect was limited to the foreclosure of demand from E2, such foreclosure would significantly strengthen DONG’s dominant position on the Danish wholesale market through creating further disincentives to third parties entering this market on a significant scale.
V Odločbi se ugotavlja, da, četudi je bil učinek izključitve omejen na izključitev potreb E2, bi takšna izključitev znatno okrepila prevladujoči položaj podjetja DONG na danskem grosističnem trgu, kar bi tretje stranke nadalje oviralo pri vstopu na ta trg v pomembnem obsegu.
This is because nearly all independent (non-captive) third party demand for Denmark has so far arisen through E2.
To je zato, ker potreba skoraj vseh neodvisnih (ki niso vezane na monopol) tretjih strank na Danskem pade na E2.
The proposed merger will as a result raise entry barriers to the Danish wholesale market because it eliminates a company that has purchased important quantities of natural gas on the wholesale market with a view both of using it internally and of supplying natural gas to other users.
Posledično bo predlagana združitev povečala vstopne ovire na danski grosistični trg, ker izloča podjetje, ki je kupilo pomembne količine zemeljskega plina na grosističnem trgu na podlagi domače porabe in dobave zemeljskega plina za druge uporabnike.
The Decision concludes the proposed concentration removes significant competitive constraints to DONG, on the Danish gas wholesale market.
V Odločbi se ugotavlja, da bo predlagana koncentracija na danskem grosističnem trgu zemeljskega plina odpravila znatne konkurenčne pritiske na DONG.
Given DONG’s entrenched dominant position on such a market, the proposed transaction is likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition, in particular through the strengthening of DONG’s dominant position.
Zaradi uveljavljenega prevladujočega položaja podjetja DONG na takšnem trgu bo predlagana transakcija verjetno vodila do bistvenega oviranja učinkovite konkurence, zlasti s krepitvijo prevladujočega položaja podjetja DONG.
As regards gas wholesale supplies in Sweden, DONG has a very strong position also on that market [5].
Glede grosistične dobave zemeljskega plina na Švedskem ima DONG zelo močan položaj tudi na tem trgu [5].
The Decision leaves open the question as to whether DONG is in a position of single or joint dominance in a Swedish or Danish-Swedish wholesale supplies market, since any harmful effects on any of these markets would be derived from a harmful effect the operation would have on the wholesale market for Denmark.
V Odločbi ostaja nedoločeno, ali ima DONG lahko prevladujoči položaj enega območja ali skupni prevladujoči položaj na švedskem ali na švedsko-danskem trgu za grosistično dobavo, ker bi kateri koli škodljivi učinki na katerega koli od teh trgov izhajali iz škodljivega učinka povezovanja na grosističnem trgu za Dansko.
The market for the supply of natural gas to central CHPs
Trg za dobavo zemeljskega plina centralnim SPTE
The Decision considers that no customer foreclosure or input foreclosure can arise on the markets for supply of natural gas to central CHPs in Denmark and Sweden, since a) at least until 2009 no central CHP customers would suffer harm on either the Danish or the Swedish markets for supply to central CHPs, and, b) CHPs would post 2009 be protected if the functioning of the wholesale market is reinforced through the gas release program proposed by the parties.
V Odločbi se meni, da na trgih za dobavo zemeljskega plina centralnim SPTE na Danskem in Švedskem ne more priti do izključitve odjemalca ali preprečevanja vstopa, ker (a) ne bi nobena centralna SPTE na danskih ali švedskih trgih za dobavo centralnim SPTE vsaj do leta 2009 utrpela škode, in (b) SPTE bi bile po letu 2009 zaščitene, če bi se delovanje grosističnega trga okrepilo s pomočjo programa sprostitve plina, ki so ga predlagale stranke.
As regards potential competition, the Decision concludes that it is not likely that E2 and/or Elsam could be considered potential entrants on the market for supply to central CHPs since it would seem unlikely that other central CHPs would be willing to satisfy its gas needs by supplies from its direct competitors.
Glede morebitne konkurence se v Odločbi ugotavlja, da ni verjetno, da bi se lahko E2 in/ali Elsam obravnavala kot morebitna udeleženca na trgu za dobavo centralnim SPTE, ker bi bilo malo verjetno, da bi bile druge centralne SPTE pripravljene zadovoljiti svoje potrebe po zemeljskem plinu tako, da bi ga dobavljale pri svojih neposrednih konkurentih.
The Decision therefore considers that the concentration does not lead to a significant impediment of effective competition on the markets for supplies to central CHPs in neither Denmark nor Sweden.
V Odločbi se zato meni, da koncentracija ne vodi do bistvenega oviranja učinkovite konkurence na trgih za dobavo centralnim SPTE tako na Danskem kot tudi na Švedskem.
Market(s) for supplies to industrial customers and decentral CHPs
Trg(-i) za dobavo zemeljskega plina industrijskim odjemalcem in decentraliziranim SPTE
The Decision finds that DONG is dominant and will remain dominant in the foreseeable future with a market share of [60-70 %] * in 2004, which is the latest year with reliable market share data.
V Odločbi se ugotavlja, da DONG prevladuje in bo v predvidljivi prihodnosti prevladoval s tržnim deležem v višini [60–70 %] * leta 2004, ki je zadnje leto, ki beleži zanesljive podatke glede tržnega deleža.
There is no reason to believe that DONG’s market share would fall below 50 % in the foreseeable future.
Ni razloga, da bi verjeli, da bi tržni delež podjetja DONG v predvidljivi prihodnosti padel pod 50 %.
DONG’s dominance upstream in wholesale, storage, offshore gas and import pipes further supports DONG’s position in this market/these markets of supply to large business customers and decentralised CHPs, since storage facilities and access to gas are important competitive parameters in the context of supplies to these customer groups.
Začetni prevladujoči položaj podjetja DONG pri grosistični prodaji, skladiščenju, podvodnem zemeljskem plinu in uvozu cevi nadalje podpira položaj podjetja DONG na tem trgu/teh trgih za dobavo velikim industrijskim odjemalcem in decentraliziranim SPTE, ker so skladišča in dostop do zemeljskega plina pomembni konkurenčni dejavniki v smislu dobave tem skupinam odjemalcev.
Furthermore, DONG’s competitors cannot challenge DONG’s dominance, since HNG/MN and Statoil Gazelle are small companies, since HNG/MN is a financially weak competitor and since there exist strong ties between DONG and HNG/MN.
Poleg tega konkurenti podjetja DONG ne morejo ogroziti prevladujočega položaja podjetja DONG, ker sta HNG/MN in Statoil Gazelle majhni podjetji, ker je HNG/MN finančno šibak konkurent in ker DONG in HNG/MN med seboj tesno sodelujeta.
and Shell both have a very modest market share in the Danish market(s) for sales to large business customers and decentralised CHPs and E.ON is likely to focus its Nordic efforts on the Swedish market.
in Shell imata zelo skromen tržni delež na danskem(-ih) trgu(-ih) za prodajo velikim industrijskim odjemalcem in decentraliziranim SPTE, E.ON pa se bo verjetno osredotočil na svoje nordijske napore na švedskem trgu.
The Decision finds that the proposed operation strengthens DONG’s dominance due to the raising of entry barriers and due to the elimination of potential competition.
V Odločbi se ugotavlja, da predlagano povezovanje zaradi postavitve vstopnih ovir in odprave morebitne konkurence krepi prevladujoči položaj podjetja DONG.
The proposed operation raises entry barriers because it will be more difficult for other players to attain critical size in gas supply if some 20 % of total Danish gas consumption is removed from the market.
Predlagano povezovanje postavlja vstopne ovire, ker bo za druge udeležence veliko težje doseči kritično velikost pri dobavi zemeljskega plina, če se s trga odpravi približno 20 % celotne danske porabe zemeljskega plina.
Moreover, DONG’s already privileged access to decentral CHPs will be further strengthened as a consequence of the merger.
Poleg tega se bo, kot posledica združitve, že privilegiran dostop podjetja DONG do decentraliziranih SPTE še nadalje okrepil.
The merger also raises the risk of gas storage input foreclosure or raising of rivals’ costs in connection with storage, which will further increase entry barriers.
Združitev povečuje tveganje za preprečevanje vstopa pri skladiščenju zemeljskega plina ali zvišuje stroške za konkurente glede skladiščenja, kar bo nadalje postavilo vstopne ovire.
Furthermore, the concentration is likely to raise entry barriers on wholesale markets thereby making it more difficult for DONG’s competitors to source supplies competitively.
Nadalje bo koncentracija verjetno postavila vstopne ovire na grosističnih trgih in tako bo konkurentom podjetja DONG težje, da bi zemeljski plin pridobivali pod konkurenčnimi pogoji.
DONG will post merger also be in a privileged position to offer dual fuel products, whereas other competitors will find it more difficult to match DONG’s offer.
DONG bo imel tudi po združitvi privilegiran položaj s ponudbo dvojnih goriv, medtem ko se bodo drugi konkurenti težje približali ponudbi podjetja DONG.
The proposed operation furthermore strengthens DONG’s dominance due to elimination of the potential competitors Elsam, E2, Nesa and KE.
Predlagano povezovanje poleg tega zaradi odprave morebitnih konkurentov Elsam, E2, Nesa in KE krepi prevladujoči položaj podjetja DONG.
and Elsam both have access to large quantities of natural gas at competitive prices.
in Elsam imata dostop do velikih količin zemeljskega plina po konkurenčnih cenah.
They also have access to storage and means of flexibility.
Imata tudi dostop do skladiščenja in sredstev prilagodljivosti.
Moreover, they have the necessary ‘energy’ brand.
Poleg tega imata potrebno „energetsko“ blagovno znamko.
A clear majority of respondents to the Commission’s market investigation has stated that Elsam and E2 could sell on extra quantities of gas to them.
Velika večina vprašanih v okviru raziskave trga, ki jo je izvedla Komisija, je navedla, da bi Elsam in E2 njim lahko prodala dodatno količino zemeljskega plina.
Finally, the Commission has found strong evidence for such entry opportunities and intentions by E2, who has already submitted offers to wholesale regional supply companies in Sweden and Denmark in 2003 and 2004.
Komisija je našla tudi trdni dokaz za tovrstne možnosti vstopa na trg in namene podjetja E2, ki je že v letih 2003 in 2004 predložilo ponudbe regionalnim podjetjem za grosistično dobavo na Švedskem in Danskem.
NESA and KE have strong energy brands and can achieve cost synergies and increased customer loyalty by sales of duel fuel.
NESA in KE imata trdno energetsko blagovno znamko in lahko jima uspe doseči stroškovno sinergijo ter s prodajo dvojnih goriv povečano zaupanje odjemalcev.
They have access to a large customer base of industrial customers.
Podjetji imata dostop do širše mreže industrijskih odjemalcev.
Also DONG and Statoil Gazelle considered KE, Elsam and Energi E2 potential competitors on Danish gas markets.
Tudi DONG in Statoil Gazelle sta KE, Elsam in Energi E2 obravnavala kot morebitne konkurente na danskih trgih zemeljskega plina.
For these reasons, the Decision concludes that the proposed operation will lead to a significant impediment of effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of dominant positions on the market or markets of the supply of natural gas to large business customers and decentralised CHPs.
Zato se v Odločbi ugotavlja, da bo predlagano povezovanje vodilo do bistvenega oviranja učinkovite konkurence, zlasti zaradi oblikovanja ali krepitve prevladujočega položaja na trgu ali trgih za dobavo zemeljskega plina velikim industrijskim odjemalcem in decentraliziranim SPTE.
The Decision finds that DONG is dominant in two regional areas with a market share above [90-100 %] * and that this dominance is reinforced by high entry barriers, DONG’s control over storages and access to offshore gas as well as its dominant position on the wholesale market.
V Odločbi se ugotavlja, da DONG prevladuje na dveh regionalnih območjih s tržnim deležem nad [90–100 %] * in da je ta prevladujoči položaj okrepljen z velikimi vstopnimi ovirami, nadzorom podjetja DONG nad skladiščenjem in dostopom do podvodnega zemeljskega plina ter njegovim prevladujočim položajem na grosističnem trgu.
On the alternative assumption of a national market, DONG and HNG/MN are considered joint dominant with market shares of [25-35 %] * and [55-65 %] * respectively.
Na podlagi možne predpostavke nacionalnega trga se DONG in HNG/MN obravnavata, da imata skupni prevladujoči položaj s tržnim deležem v višini [25–35 %] * oziroma [55–65 %] *.
There exist strong ties between these companies.
Ti dve podjetji tesno sodelujeta med seboj.
The market is very transparent and any deviation from oligopolistic behaviour could therefore be detected easily.
Trg je zelo pregleden in kakršno koli odstopanje od oligopolnega obnašanja bi bilo zato lahko preprosto odkriti.
The product is very homogenous and facilitates tacit coordination.
Proizvod je zelo homogen in omogoča tiho usklajevanje.
There are very high customer loyalty rates which result in high entry barriers.
Stopnje zvestobe strank so zelo visoke, katerih posledica so velike vstopne ovire.
Moreover, there are effective retaliation mechanisms against a deviating oligopolist and a high joint interest in maintaining the status quo.
Poleg tega so na voljo učinkoviti povračilni ukrepi proti odstopanju oligopolista in visok skupni interes za ohranitev sedanjega stanja.
The Decision finds that DONG’s dominance will be strengthened by raising entry barriers and, to a certain extent, by elimination of potential competition.
V Odločbi se ugotavlja, da se bo s postavitvijo vstopnih ovir in, do določene mere, z odpravo morebitne konkurence prevladujoči položaj podjetja DONG okrepil.
The concentration will raise entry barriers due to higher storage cost and to higher difficulties of achieving critical size and reaching the economies of scale and scope necessary for entry to be financially viable.
Koncentracija bo postavila vstopne ovire, ker se stroški skladiščenja višajo in je težje doseči kritično velikost in ekonomijo obsega ter okvira, ki je potreben za finančno podprt vstop.
Furthermore, the operation removes larger customers on different markets whose flexibility could be balanced against the flexibility requirements of household and small business customers.
Poleg tega bodo zaradi povezovanja odstranjeni večji odjemalci na drugih trgih, katerih prilagodljivost bi se lahko porabila za izravnavo potreb prilagodljivosti gospodinjstva in majhnih poslovnih odjemalcev.
Finally, the likely reduction of liquidity on the Danish wholesale gas market increases the ability of DONG to foreclose access to wholesale gas to its competitors.
Verjetno zmanjšanje likvidnosti na danskem grosističnem trgu zemeljskega plina tudi povečuje sposobnost podjetja DONG, da svojim konkurentom prepreči dostop do grosističnega trga.
The concentration will eliminate some potential competition from KE and to NESA, who are electricity retailers, both with a base in the greater Copenhagen area.
Koncentracija bo nekatere morebitne konkurente, namreč KE in NESA, trgovca za električno energijo z mrežo na večjem območju Copenhagena, izključila.
They have already sales offices, large sales forces, IT equipment and billing systems in place.
Podjetji sta že vzpostavili urad za prodajo, veliko prodajno skupino, računalniško opremo in sisteme za zaračunavanje.
They have large customer portfolios, which could be built upon with the aim to enter gas retail markets.
Obe podjetji imata velik portfelj odjemalcev, ki bi lahko bil podlaga za vstop na maloprodajne trge zemeljskega plina.
Both companies also have considerable brand strength both at a national and especially at a regional level.
Poleg tega imata precej dobro blagovno znamko tako na nacionalni in še posebno na regionalni ravni.
Thus, NESA and KE do not face the high barriers to entry that most other entrants would meet.
NESA in KE se tako ne spopadata z velikimi vstopnimi ovirami, s katerimi bi se morala spopadati večina drugih udeležencev.
On the other hand, many of KE’s customers already will have its energy requirements for cooking covered by city gas and their heating requirements covered by district heating.
Po drugi strani, bo imelo že veliko odjemalcev podjetja KE pokrite svoje energetske potrebe za kuhanje, ki jih pokriva mestni plinovod, ter ogrevanje, ki ga pokriva daljinsko ogrevanje.
It also has to be taken into account that the bulk of NESA’s and KE’s electricity customer base could only have been used to compete with HNG/MN whose gas distribution areas geographically overlap with NESA and KE, and not with DONG.
Upoštevati je treba tudi, da bi se lahko večina mreže odjemalcev električne energije podjetij NESA in KE uporabila za konkuriranje s podjetjem HNG/MN, katerega območja distribucije zemeljskega plina se geografsko prekrivajo z območji podjetij NESA in KE, ne pa z območjem podjetja DONG.
The Decision also acknowledges that other electricity supply companies could enter the market for supply of gas to small business and household customers, but concludes that KE and NESA have a special position when it comes to access to gas, that would be difficult for other electricity companies to duplicate.
V Odločbi se tudi priznava, da bi lahko na trg za dobavo zemeljskega plina majhnim poslovnim odjemalcem in gospodinjstvom vstopila druga podjetja za dobavo električne energije, vendar se ugotavlja, da imata KE in NESA poseben položaj, ko gre za dostop do zemeljskega plina, katerega bi druga podjetja težje dosegla.
For these reasons, the Decision concludes that the proposed merger will significantly impede competition on the market or markets for the supply of gas to households and small business customers, irrespective of whether these markets are/this market is defined as regional or as national, in particular through the strengthening of a dominant position.
Zato se v Odločbi ugotavlja, da bo predlagana združitev bistveno ovirala konkurenco na trgu ali na trgih za dobavo zemeljskega plina gospodinjstvom in majhnim poslovnim odjemalcem, zlasti s krepitvijo prevladujočega položaja in ne glede na to, ali je ta trg/so ti trgi opredeljen(-i) kot regionalni ali nacionalni.
Conclusion on the assessment of the natural gas markets prior to consideration of modifications to the notified concentration
Sklepne ugotovitve ocene trgov zemeljskega plina pred upoštevanjem sprememb k priglašeni koncentraciji
The Decision concludes that the transaction leads to a significant impediment of effective competition, in particular through the strengthening of dominant positions on the following product markets:
V Odločbi se ugotavlja, da transakcija vodi do bistvenega oviranja učinkovite konkurence, zlasti s krepitvijo prevladujočega položaja na naslednjih proizvodnih trgih:
supply of gas to large business customers and decentral CHPs, as one or two markets, in Denmark,
dobava zemeljskega plina velikim industrijskim odjemalcem in decentraliziranim SPTE na Danskem, obravnavano kot eden ali dva ločena trga,
supply of gas to small business customers and/or households, as one or two markets, in Denmark.
dobava zemeljskega plina majhnim poslovnim odjemalcem in/ali gospodinjstvom na Danskem, obravnavano kot eden ali dva ločena trga.
The Decision finds that the concentration does not give rise to competition concerns on the electricity market.
V Odločbi se ugotavlja, da koncentracija ne bo sprožila pomislekov glede konkurence na nobenem trgu električne energije.
Electricity wholesale
Grosistična prodaja električne energije
The Decision finds, that prima facie Elsam and E2 hold a dominant position in their respective Nord Pool areas in electricity wholesale whenever these areas are isolated from other Nord Pool areas, since the effective constraint exerted by intra-area windmills and decentral CHP’s are low.
V Odločbi se ugotavlja, da imata Elsam in E2 na prvi pogled prevladujoči položaj na svojih zadevnih območjih Nord Poola pri grosistični prodaji električne energije, kadar so ta območja oddaljena od drugih območij Nord Poola, ker je učinkovit pritisk, ki ga izvajajo vetrni mlini na notranjem območju in decentralizirane SPTE, nizek.
However, the horizontal effects of the proposed transaction will most likely be substantially surpassed by the loss of market share due to the Vattenfall conditionally linked divestitures of power plants to Vattenfall in both East and West Denmark, which create a viable competitor to the area incumbents, reducing their market shares substantially.
Vendar pa bodo izgube tržnih deležev najverjetneje znatno presegle horizontalne učinke predlagane transakcije zaradi pogojne odprodaje elektrarn v Vattenfallu na vzhodnem in zahodnem območju Danske, kar bo povzročilo pojav konkurenta, ki bo sposoben preživeti v primerjavi z nekdanjimi monopolisti na teh območjih, in znatno zmanjšalo tržne deleže.
The Decision also concludes that intentions by Elsam and E2 to enter into each other’s territories have not been established and that DONG had rejected to enter into electricity generation via a gas-fired power plant.
V Odločbi se tudi ugotavlja, da se namere podjetij Elsam in E2, da bi vstopila na ozemlje drug drugega, niso uresničile in da je DONG zavrnil vstop na področje proizvodnje električne energije prek plinsko-parne elektrarne.
Therefore the Decision concludes that any potential horizontal effects are by far outweighed by the more certain and immediate positive effect of Vattenfall’s entry.
Zato se v Odločbi ugotavlja, da bo bolj zanesljivi in takojšnji pozitivni učinek vstopa Vattenfalla presegel vse morebitne horizontalne učinke.
As to vertical effects, the Decision finds that DONG is unlikely to raise rivals’ costs (gas as input) post merger.
Glede vertikalnih učinkov se v Odločbi ugotavlja, da je za DONG malo verjetno, da bo po združitvi dvignil stroške za konkurente (zemeljski plin pri vstopu).
A model simulation confirmed that in order for the reduction in output to be of any importance very significant increases in gas prices would be required.
Simulacija modela je potrdila, da bi se morale cene zemeljskega plina znatno povečati, da bi se proizvodnja vidno zmanjšala.