natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the event of BB being liquidated, its assets would be evaluated and the revenues used to reimburse creditors.
Če bi prišlo do likvidacije banke BB, bi se ovrednotila njena sredstva, prihodki pa bi se uporabili za poplačilo upnikov.
If the revenues from the liquidation of the assets were insufficient to reimburse the creditors, BB’s own funds of about EUR 90 million would be depleted. Any remaining shortfall would be allocated equally among the outstanding liabilities and thus result in default for the creditors.
Če prihodki iz likvidacije sredstev ne bi bili zadostni za poplačilo upnikov, bi se porabili lastni viri sredstev banke BB v višini 90 milijonov EUR. Kakršen koli preostali primanjkljaj bi se enakovredno porazdelil med neporavnane obveznosti, zaradi česar bi ostale obveznosti do upnikov neporavnane.
Ausfallhaftung, as a direct claim by BB’s creditors against the Province of Burgenland, would create the obligation for the Province of Burgenland to step in and fully compensate the creditors for the default of the liabilities covered by Ausfallhaftung.
Garancija Ausfallhaftung kot neposredna terjatev upnikov banke BB do Gradiščanske bi pomenila obveznost za Gradiščansko, da ukrepa in upnikom v celoti nadomesti neporavnane obveznosti, ki jih krije garancija Ausfallhaftung.
The share of the liabilities covered by Ausfallhaftung will decrease from 100 % at the time the deal was closed (May 2006) to nearly 0 % in 2017.
Delež obveznosti, ki jih krije garancija Ausfallhaftung, se bo zmanjšal s 100 % ob sklenitvi posla (maj 2006) na skoraj 0 % leta 2017.
Such a possible liquidation of BB could be sparked by difficulties of the bank either to refinance itself in the capital markets or to comply with regulatory requirements, such as minimum capital ratios.
Tako mogočo likvidacijo banke BB bi lahko spodbudile težave banke, da se refinancira na kapitalskih trgih ali izpolni predpisane zahteve, kot so količniki minimalne kapitalske ustreznosti.
Austria argued that the liquidity problem would especially have emerged as soon as the sale to the Consortium was announced in the press.
Avstrija je trdila, da bi se težave z likvidnostjo pojavile predvsem takoj po napovedi prodaje konzorciju v tisku.
Therefore the sale of BB to the Consortium was not even an option.
Zato prodaja banke BB konzorciju sploh ni bila upoštevana kot mogoča.
The Commission recognises that the announcement of the sale of BB to the Consortium by the Province of Burgenland could have resulted in the withdrawal of deposits and inter-banking lines, but the calculations presented by Austria seem to be wrong for a number of reasons.
Komisija priznava, da bi napoved, da bo Gradiščanska prodala banko BB konzorciju, lahko povzročila dvig vlog in medbančnih kreditnih linij, vendar se zdijo izračuni, ki jih je predložila Avstrija, napačni zaradi več razlogov.
Based on comparable events, the assumption of withdrawals of 50 – 60 % of deposits is unrealistic [54].
Na podlagi primerljivih dogodkov je domneva o dvigu 50–60 % vlog nerealna [54].
The liquidity outflow for new business in such a crisis situation would be limited by BB to the minimum required [55].
Likvidnostni odliv za nov posel v takih kriznih razmerah bi banka BB omejila na obvezni minimalni znesek [55].
Furthermore, looking at the calculations submitted by Austria, tradable assets are not or only partly liquidated [56] and some liquidity outflow positions are incomprehensible [57].
Poleg tega pri izračunih, ki jih je predložila Avstrija, tržljiva sredstva niso likvidirana ali so samo delno likvidirana [56] in nekatere postavke likvidnostnega odliva niso razumljive [57].
The Commission is of the view that even in a crisis situation the expected liquidity outflow could be compensated by an efficient and preventive liquidity management of BB and the resulting net outflow kept under control.
Komisija meni, da bi bilo pričakovani likvidnostni odliv tudi v kriznih razmerah mogoče izravnati z učinkovitim in preventivnim upravljanjem likvidnosti banke BB ter ohraniti nadzor nad posledičnim neto odlivom.
One might also argue that the Province of Burgenland could have solved the liquidity issue, if considered significant, by issuing additional bonds in the amount of the missing liquidity, as they did in the event for GRAWE by issuing the additional EUR 380 million.
Mogoče je tudi trditi, da bi Gradiščanska lahko rešila likvidnostne težave, če bi se ji zdele velike, tako da bi izdala dodatne obveznice v vrednosti manjkajoče likvidnosti, kakor je storila v primeru družbe GRAWE z izdajo dodatnih 380 milijonov EUR.
In view of the above, the Commission assumes that insolvency or liquidation of BB would originate more in regulatory reasons than in a liquidity shortage following the announcement of the deal.
Glede na zgornje navedbe Komisija domneva, da bi nesolventnost ali likvidacijo banke BB povzročili bolj regulativni razlogi in ne pomanjkanje likvidnosti po objavi posla.
Austria argues that the insolvency risk in the event of a sale of BB to the Consortium would be substantially higher than with GRAWE as new owner.
Avstrija trdi, da bi bilo tveganje za nesolventnost pri prodaji banke BB konzorciju bistveno večje, kot če bi bila novi lastnik družba GRAWE.
GRAWE would continue BB’s regional business focused on retail and wholesale and not change the current business model.
Družba GRAWE bi nadaljevala regionalno poslovanje banke BB, usmerjeno na majhne in velike bančne posle, in ne bi spreminjala sedanjega poslovnega modela.
According to the business plan submitted by the Consortium, BB’s business model would have taken a more risky direction including such activities as international trade finance.
V skladu s poslovnim načrtom, ki ga je predložil konzorcij, bi bil poslovni model banke BB bolj tvegan, ker bi vključeval take dejavnosti, kot je financiranje mednarodne trgovine.
The possible integration of Active Bank into BB would have exposed BB to exchange rate fluctuations of the euro against the Ukrainian Hrywnja, which are very expensive to hedge.
Morebitna pridružitev banke Active Bank banki BB bi banko BB izpostavila nihanjem deviznih tečajev eura in ukrajinske grivne, katerih varovanje je drago.
Austria also argued that other factors such as lack of experience in the banking sector and the lower rating of the Consortium would have significantly increased the risk of insolvency of BB.
Avstrija je tudi trdila, da bi drugi dejavniki, kot sta pomanjkanje izkušenj v bančnem sektorju in nižja bonitetna ocena konzorcija, bistveno povečali tveganje za nesolventnost banke BB.
The Commission recognises that it is highly hypothetical to predict the long-term development of BB in the two sales scenarios.
Komisija priznava, da je napovedovanje dolgoročnega razvoja banke BB v obeh scenarijih prodaje zelo hipotetično.
The Province of Burgenland has to accept that once it sells BB to a new owner, regardless of whether this is GRAWE or the Consortium, it has only a very limited influence on the new strategic orientation of the bank.
Gradiščanska mora sprejeti dejstvo, da ima po prodaji banke BB novemu lastniku ne glede na to, ali je to družba GRAWE ali konzorcij, zelo omejen vpliv na novo strateško usmeritev banke.
In this context it is important to note that the future business model of BB cannot be defined in the sales contract in a binding way, but it is the new owner’s responsibility to decide the new strategic orientation of the bank, including the required capital increases and future integrations of other companies.
Glede na to je pomembno opozoriti, da prihodnji poslovni model banke BB ne sme biti zavezujoče opredeljen v prodajni pogodbi, ampak je za odločitev o novi strateški usmeritvi banke odgovoren novi lastnik, vključno s potrebnimi povečanji kapitala in prihodnjo pridružitvijo drugih družb.
Even so, the new owners are limited in their business management by existing banking regulations.
Novi lastniki so pri poslovnem upravljanju kljub temu omejeni z veljavnimi predpisi o bančništvu.
On the one hand, as an Austria-based bank operating with an Austrian banking licence, BB continues to be supervised by the Austrian banking regulator and has therefore to fulfil the same regulatory requirements (e.g. minimum capital ratios) as other European banks.
Na eni strani banko BB kot banko s sedežem v Avstriji, ki opravlja dejavnost z avstrijskim dovoljenjem za opravljanje bančnih storitev, še naprej nadzoruje avstrijski regulativni organ za bančništvo, zato mora izpolnjevati iste predpisane zahteve (npr. količnike minimalne kapitalske ustreznosti) kot druge evropske banke.
On the other hand, as an integral part of the global financial network, BB needs at least an investment grade rating in order to obtain inter-bank refinancing.
Na drugi strani banka BB kot sestavni del svetovne finančne mreže potrebuje vsaj bonitetno oceno naložbenega razreda, da bi pridobila medbančno refinanciranje.
Thus BB is also exposed to the own funds requirements of the rating agencies.
Tako za banko BB veljajo tudi zahteve bonitetnih agencij glede lastnih sredstev.
Higher risk taking must therefore be accompanied by adequate new own capital, which must be injected by the owners.
Večje tveganje mora torej spremljati ustrezen nov lastni kapital, ki ga morajo vložiti lastniki.
The Commission likewise cannot concur with Austria’s argument that it is indispensable that BB’s future owner should have extensive banking experience.
Komisija se prav tako ne more strinjati z argumentom Avstrije, da bi moral prihodnji lastnik banke BB nujno imeti obsežne izkušnje z bančništvom.
It is not the owners’ role to manage BB, it is for BB’s management to do so.
Upravljanje banke BB ni naloga lastnikov, ampak uprave banke BB.
Furthermore the Commission does not understand why BB’s rating after the sale should be identical to that of GRAWE or the Ukrainian State, as put forward by Austria.
Komisija poleg tega ne razume, zakaj naj bi bila bonitetna ocena banke BB po prodaji enaka bonitetni oceni družbe GRAWE ali ukrajinske države, kot je trdila Avstrija.
On the one hand, GRAWE did not claim to give a general guarantee (Patronatserklärung) for BB and the bank will therefore be primarily rated on the basis of its own performance.
Po eni strani družba GRAWE ni trdila, da je dala splošno garancijo za banko BB, zato bo banka ocenjena predvsem na podlagi svoje uspešnosti.
On the other hand, BB remains an Austrian bank located in Austria and hence the alleged B-rating of the Ukrainian State — which might play a role in the case of a bank located in that State — is prima facie irrelevant.
Po drugi strani banka BB ostaja avstrijska banka s sedežem v Avstriji, zato je tudi domnevna bonitetna ocena B ukrajinske države – ki bi lahko bila pomembna, če bi imela banka sedež v tej državi – na prvi pogled nepomembna.
In this context it is also important to note that BB will continue to be covered by the Ausfallhaftung guarantee.
V zvezi s tem je pomembno tudi opozoriti, da bo banka BB še naprej krita z garancijo Ausfallhaftung.
Notwithstanding this, it cannot be entirely ruled out that BB, whoever the new owner may be, might face serious difficulties in the future and insolvency/liquidation might become unavoidable.
Kljub temu pa ni mogoče povsem izključiti, da bi lahko banka BB ne glede na to, kdo je novi lastnik, v prihodnosti zašla v hude težave, zaradi katerih se ne bi mogla izogniti nesolventnosti/likvidaciji.
In such a scenario it is important to understand that BB is a very small bank (significantly less than 1 % of the size of major European banks by balance sheet) and that the liquidation of BB would have a minor or even negligible impact on the Austrian or European banking system.
Pri takem scenariju je pomembno razumeti, da je banka BB zelo majhna (bistveno manjša od 1 % velikosti večjih evropskih bank glede na bilanco stanja), zato bi imela njena likvidacija majhen ali celo zanemarljiv vpliv na avstrijski ali evropski bančni sistem.
The sale of BB’s assets in the amount of approximately EUR 3,5 billion (credits, bonds, shares, derivatives, real estate) on the global financial markets would not lead to a dysfunctioning of the market and therefore the markets and especially the prices of assets would remain stable.
Prodaja sredstev banke BB v znesku približno 3,5 milijarde EUR (krediti, obveznice, delnice, izvedeni finančni instrumenti, nepremičnine) na svetovnih finančnih trgih ne bi povzročila motenj v delovanju trga, zato bi trgi in predvsem cene sredstev ostali stabilni.
Austria submitted a liquidation scenario.
Avstrija je predložila scenarij likvidacije.
The liquidation scenario assumes that the liquidation of the assets will occur in 2006 and that the achievable price of the assets depends on their weighted risk.
V scenariju likvidacije je predvideno, da bo likvidacija sredstev opravljena leta 2006 in da je dosegljiva cena sredstev odvisna od njihovega tehtanega tveganja.
The adjustments made are in the range of 2 % for 0 % risk-weighted assets (RWA) up to 20 % for 100 % RWA.
Opravljene prilagoditve so gibljejo od 2 % za 0 % sredstev, tehtanih glede na tveganje, do 20 % za 100 % sredstev, tehtanih glede na tveganje.
The liquidation scenario includes adjustments of EUR 90 million for the liquidation of off-balance-sheet items.
Scenarij likvidacije vključuje prilagoditve v višini 90 milijonov EUR za likvidacijo zunajbilančnih postavk.
After deduction of the own funds, the scenario arrives at the conclusion that Ausfallhaftung and therefore the Province of Burgenland would have to step in with around EUR 270 million in a liquidation scenario.
Ugotovitev scenarija po odbitku lastnih sredstev je, da bi bilo treba uporabiti garancijo Ausfallhaftung, torej bi morala v scenarij likvidacije poseči Gradiščanska s približno 270 milijoni EUR.
The Commission agrees with the general methodology of the liquidation scenario provided by Austria in order to obtain a first estimate of the potential losses involved in an insolvency of BB.
Komisija se strinja s splošno metodologijo scenarija likvidacije, ki ga je predložila Avstrija, da bi pridobila prve ocene mogočih izgub zaradi nesolventnosti banke BB.
The Commission is, however, of the opinion that the adjustments made on the assets are too high (e.g. 10–20 % adjustments on mortgage-backed credits which can be securitised and sold in packages) and cannot understand the off-balance-sheet adjustments.
Vendar pa Komisija meni, da so prilagoditve v zvezi s sredstvi previsoke (npr. od 10 do 20 odstotne prilagoditve za hipotekarno zavarovane kredite, ki se lahko listinijo in prodajo v paketih) in ne razume zunajbilančnih prilagoditev.
Furthermore, Austria assumed a 100 % probability that liquidation will take place in 2006 and therefore took into account the nominal values of the assets.
Avstrija je poleg tega predvidela 100-odstotno verjetnost, da bo likvidacija opravljena v letu 2006, zato je upoštevala nominalne vrednosti sredstev.
Such a scenario does not appear to be realistic.
Tak scenarij se ne zdi realen.
Reflecting these comments in the liquidation scenario, the Commission would conclude that each per cent of probability that Ausfallhaftung will be triggered in the future could be taken into account with a maximum of EUR 1 million by the Province of Burgenland. This means that, in order to compensate for the price difference of the Consortium’s bid, the probability of an insolvency of BB with the Consortium as new owner has to be assumed to be more than 50 % higher than in the case of GRAWE.
Komisija po obravnavi teh pripomb v scenariju likvidacije ugotavlja, da bi Gradiščanska lahko upoštevala vsak odstotek verjetnosti za sprožitev garancije Ausfallhaftung v prihodnosti do največ 1 milijona EUR. To pomeni, da je treba za izravnavo razlike v ceni ponudbe konzorcija domnevati, da je verjetnost nesolventnosti banke BB s konzorcijem kot novim lastnikom več kot 50 % višja kot v primeru družbe GRAWE.
The Commission does not see any grounds for such an assumption and therefore concludes that, even if the Province of Burgenland could have taken Ausfallhaftung into account as an evaluation factor, GRAWE’s bid was not the best offer.
Komisija ne vidi nobene podlage za tako domnevo, zato ugotavlja, da ponudba družbe GRAWE ni bila najboljša ponudba, tudi če bi Gradiščanska kot dejavnik ocenjevanja upoštevala garancijo Ausfallhaftung.
Other methodologies presented by Austria and GRAWE
Druge metodologije, ki sta jih predstavili Avstrija in družba GRAWE
Austria and GRAWE also submitted other methods [58] of evaluating the different risks involved with the two bidders.
Avstrija in družba GRAWE sta predložili tudi druge metode [58] ocenjevanja različnih tveganj v zvezi s ponudnikoma.
The Commission considers that the general methodology applied in the liquidation scenario best reflects the specific conditions of an insolvency case and it is therefore not only the most appropriate, but also the most transparent and comprehensible method of estimating the risks stemming from Ausfallhaftung.
Komisija meni, da splošna metodologija, uporabljena v scenariju likvidacije, najbolje izraža posebne pogoje v primeru nesolventnosti, zato je najustreznejša, najpreglednejša in najrazumljivejša metoda za ocenjevanje tveganj, ki izhajajo iz garancije Ausfallhaftung.
Those further methods presented by Austria are not relevant and, moreover, either not comprehensible, based on improper assumptions or not applicable to the specific conditions of the case.
Dodatne metode, ki jih je predstavila Avstrija, niso pomembne, razen tega pa niso razumljive zaradi neustreznih domnev ali se ne uporabljajo za posebne pogoje tega primera.
The sales contract between the Province of Burgenland and GRAWE furthermore contains a warranty clause which stipulates — among other things — that the Province of Burgenland is obliged to reimburse GRAWE such amount as the Commission might fix in a recovery decision (and all related procedural costs for the buyer).
Prodajna pogodba med Gradiščansko in družbo GRAWE poleg tega vsebuje garancijsko klavzulo, ki določa – med drugim – da mora Gradiščanska povrniti družbi GRAWE tolikšen znesek, kot ga določi Komisija v odločbi o vračilu.
Although the buyer retains a right to rescind the contract if an adjustment of the purchase price is illegal, this element of the purchase contract needs to be highlighted in a decision.
Čeprav kupec ohrani pravico, da odstopi od pogodbe, če je prilagoditev nakupne cene nezakonita, je treba ta element prodajne pogodbe pri odločitvi poudariti.
First, such a warranty clause, negotiated after the tender procedure, changes the conditions of the sale for the particular buyer and might have induced GRAWE to come forward with a higher bid; second and even more importantly, such a warranty clause amounts to a circumvention of any recovery decision the Commission might take.
Prvič, taka garancijska klavzula, dogovorjena po razpisnem postopku, spremeni pogoje prodaje za posameznega kupca in bi lahko družbo GRAWE spodbudila k predložitvi višje ponudbe; drugič, še pomembneje pa je, da lahko taka garancijska klavzula pomeni izogibanje morebitni odločbi Komisije o vračilu.
This strongly contrasts with the obligation of Member States to implement Commission Decisions and to cooperate with the Commission.
To je v hudem nasprotju z obveznostjo držav članic, da izvajajo odločbe Komisije in sodelujejo z njo.
Therefore, this clause should not be applied, as otherwise it would amount to new state aid to GRAWE.
Ta klavzula se torej ne sme uporabljati, ker bi drugače pomenila novo državno pomoč družbi GRAWE.
Final conclusion on the existence of State aid
Končna ugotovitev o obstoju državne pomoči
In conclusion, the sale of BB to GRAWE constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Prodaja banke BB družbi GRAWE torej pomeni državno pomoč po členu 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
In the opening decision, the Commission indicated that, on the basis of the information available, none of the reasons for declaring the aid compatible according to Article 87(2) or (3) seemed to apply.
Komisija je v odločitvi o sprožitvi postopka navedla, da se na podlagi razpoložljivih informacij zdi, da se ne uporablja noben razlog za razglasitev pomoči za združljivo v skladu s členom 87(2) ali (3).
Austria concentrated on demonstrating that the measure did not constitute State aid.
Avstrija se je osredotočila na dokazovanje, da ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči.
The only arguments as to a potential compatibility of the aid with the common market have been put forward by the beneficiary.
Edine argumente za mogočo združljivost pomoči s skupnim trgom je predložil upravičenec.
In GRAWE’s opinion, the earlier decision on restructuring aid to BB implied that even a privatised BB — privatisation having been a precondition for declaring the aid compatible with the common market — should keep its regional orientation.
Po mnenju družbe GRAWE je predhodna odločba o pomoči banki BB za prestrukturiranje pomenila, da bi morala tudi privatizirana banka BB – privatizacija je bila prvi pogoj za razglasitev pomoči za združljivo s skupnim trgom – obdržati svojo regionalno usmeritev.
Only GRAWE’s business plan fulfilled this requirement.
Samo poslovni načrt družbe GRAWE je izpolnjeval to zahtevo.
The Commission considers that the restructuring decision by no means supports this argument.
Komisija meni, da odločba o prestrukturiranju nikakor ne podpira tega argumenta.
Apart from the operational, functional and financial measures offered by Austria and agreed by the Commission, privatisation is a further element to secure the bank’s long-term viability.
Poleg operativnih, funkcionalnih in finančnih ukrepov, ki jih je Avstrija omogočila, Komisija pa se je z njimi strinjala, je privatizacija dodaten element za zagotavljanje dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja banke.
The earlier decision examines the effects of a hypothetical liquidation of BB, and in this context the Commission concedes that ‘it would appear conceivable that basic financial services would be in short supply in certain rural regions in Burgenland’ [59].
V predhodni odločbi so preučeni učinki hipotetične likvidacije banke BB in v zvezi s tem Komisija priznava, da „je verjetna premajhna ponudba osnovnih finančnih storitev v nekaterih podeželskih regijah Gradiščanske“ [59].
However, this statement does not imply a condition of such kind in the privatisation process, which is not mentioned elsewhere.
Vendar pa se ta trditev ne nanaša na tak pogoj pri privatizacijskem postopku, ki drugod ni naveden.
On the basis of the above, the Commission’s initial finding is confirmed.
Na podlagi zgornjih navedb je prvotna ugotovitev Komisije potrjena.
The aid cannot be declared compatible with the common market.
Pomoč ne more biti razglašena za združljivo s skupnim trgom.
Full effectiveness of Commission Decision 2005/691/EC on the restructuring of Bank Burgenland
Polna učinkovitost Odločbe Komisije 2005/691/ES o prestrukturiranju banke Bank Burgenland
In the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, the Commission doubted whether the early discharge of the guarantee agreement of 20 June 2000, as approved in the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004, was permissible, as this might be in conflict with the decision on the restructuring of BB.
Komisija je v odločitvi o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave izrazila dvom o tem, ali je bila predčasna izpolnitev garancijskega sporazuma z dne 20. junija 2000, odobrenega v Odločbi Komisije z dne 7. maja 2004, dopustna, ker bi lahko bila v nasprotju z Odločbo o prestrukturiranju banke BB.
However, having examined this issue further, the Commission finds that the arrangement is indeed consistent with that decision.
Vendar po dodatni preučitvi tega vprašanja Komisija ugotavlja, da je ta dogovor dejansko skladen z navedeno odločbo.
Since the measure was implemented without prior notification to the Commission and is incompatible with the state aid rules, Austria should be required to recover the aid from the beneficiary.
Ker je bil ukrep uresničen brez predhodne priglasitve Komisiji in ni združljiv s pravili o državni pomoči, je treba od Avstrije zahtevati, naj od upravičenca povrne pomoč.
The amount to be recovered should be such as to eliminate the aid.
Znesek, ki ga je treba povrniti, mora biti tolikšen, da odpravi pomoč.