natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In particular it cites the ruling of the Regional Administrative Tribunal of Lazio dated 17 March 2005, which held that it was ‘perfectly legitimate that the Decree (of 2004) could define a scenario in which, for all routes subject to PSOs, there are several individual carriers in competition with each other.
Navaja zlasti sodbo TAR Lazia z dne 17. marca 2005, v kateri je navedeno, da je „povsem upravičeno, da lahko odredba (iz leta 2004) določi scenarij, po katerem je za vse proge, za katere veljajo OJS, na voljo več letalskih prevoznikov, ki niso razvrščeni in tekmujejo med seboj.
However such a possibility must be clearly stated and a minimum objective criterion must be provided for the prior allocation of time slots depending upon the number (one, two or more than two) of carriers accepting the PSOs in order to avoid detrimental overcapacity of supply and, above all, that the allocation of time slots does not result in the arbitrary introduction of and de facto exclusivity of operations, which the provisions of the Decree expressly rejected’ [14].
Vendar pa je treba tovrstno možnost jasno opredeliti, obenem pa zagotoviti minimalno objektivno merilo za a priori razporeditev časovnih intervalov (slotov) glede na število (eden, dva ali več kot dva) letalskih prevoznikov, ki so morda sprejeli OJS, da bi se izognili škodljivemu presežku ponudbe in predvsem zato, da dodelitev slotov ne bi pripeljala do samovoljne uvedbe in pravzaprav ekskluzivnosti storitve, ki so jih standardi v odloku izrecno zavrnili“ [14].
The PSOs imposed under Article 4(1)(a) must take account of all carriers operating or intending to operate the route concerned.
OJS, uvedene v skladu s členom 4(1)(a), morajo upoštevati vse letalske prevoznike, ki opravljajo ali nameravajo opravljati prevoze na zadevni progi.
This is confirmed in Article 4(1)(b) which states that ‘the adequacy of scheduled air services shall be assessed by the Member States having regard to the combined effect of all air carriers operating or intending to operate on the route’.
To potrjuje člen 4(1)(b), ki predpisuje, da „primernost rednih zračnih prevozov presodijo države članice glede na skupni učinek vseh letalskih prevoznikov, ki opravljajo ali nameravajo opravljati prevoze na progi“.
The Commission considers that this principle must be checked not only at the time of imposing the PSO but also throughout the whole duration of the regime.
Komisija meni, da bi bilo treba upoštevati to načelo ne le v času uvedbe, temveč tudi ves čas trajanja OJS.
Thus, each time a new operator commences, or is about to commence, operating a route, the level of capacity and frequency imposed by the PSO on each operator must be adjusted, so that the total frequency and capacity offered on each route does not exceed that which is strictly necessary to provide an adequate service.
Tako bi morala biti vsakič, ko nov letalski prevoznik začne ali bo v kratkem začel opravljati prevoze na tej progi, raven zmogljivosti in pogostosti letov, ki so jih naložile OJS, vsakemu letalskemu prevozniku prilagojena tako, da celotne zmogljivosti in pogostosti letov, ki so zagotovljene na vsaki letalski progi, ne presegajo tega, kar je nujno potrebno za zagotavljanje ustrezne storitve.
With regard to the PSOs imposed under Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation, carriers are not obliged to undertake to individually ensuring the level of frequency or capacity but all operators together may ensure that a minimum service is provided.
Ker gre pravzaprav za OJS, ki so bile uvedene v skladu s členom 4(1)(a) Uredbe, se letalski prevozniki niso dolžni obvezati, da bodo zagotovili posamezno število pogostosti letov ali število sedežev, vendar pa vsi letalski prevozniki skupaj lahko zagotovijo to minimalno storitev.
The Commission recognises that it may be necessary for the authority responsible for the PSOs to ensure that the level of frequency and capacity enables the PSOs to be met.
Komisija priznava, da se utegne izkazati za potrebno, da organ, ki je zadolžen za OJS, zagotovi, da lahko povezava med pogostostjo letov in zmogljivostmi omogoča izpolnjevanje OJS.
Nonetheless this authority must in no cases limit the possibility for carriers who wish to provide a higher level of service in terms of the capacity and frequency required under the PSOs, which should only be minimum obligations.
Vendar ta organ nikakor ne sme omejevati možnosti, da zadevni letalski prevozniki, če to želijo, opravljajo prevoze zunaj zmogljivosti ali pogostosti letov, ki jih zahtevajo OJS, ki so lahko zgolj minimalne obveznosti.
As a result, in so far as the rules adopted by ENAC aim to prevent carriers from providing additional services, they are unduly restrictive and contrary to the Regulation.
Zato so takrat, kadar je cilj pravil, ki jih je sprejel ENAC, preprečiti letalskemu prevozniku opravljanje dodatnih prevozov, ta pravila neupravičeno omejevalna in v nasprotju z Uredbo.
In this connection, the Commission welcomes the fact that the Italian Republic confirmed in its letter of 15 November 2006 that its administration would regularly assess the situation on an annual basis and would analyse any requests made by carriers willing to operate routes under the PSO regime [15].
V tem pogledu si Komisija čestita, da je Republika Italija v svojem pismu z dne 15. novembra 2006 potrdila, da bo njena vlada občasno izvajala ponovno ovrednotenje stanja na letni osnovi in analizirala morebitne vloge letalskih prevoznikov, ki bi bili pripravljeni opravljati prevoze na letalskih progah v okviru OJS [15].
It notes that the Italian Republic confirmed that ‘nothing stops a Member State from verifying (including during the validity period for PSOs) the adequacy and the need for the PSOs and as a result to amend and/or annul the PSOs, unless their usefulness or legitimacy is re-established’ [16].
Seznanjena je s tem, da je Republika Italija potrdila, da „nič ne prepoveduje državi članici, da bi preverila (vključno z obdobjem uporabe OJS) ustreznost in potrebo po OJS in se lotila njihove spremembe in/preklica, razen če se pozneje prizna njihova korist ali njihova dopustna narava“ [16].
Grouping of the routes Alghero–Rome and Alghero–Milan on the one hand and Olbia–Rome and Olbia–Milan on the other hand
Skupina letalskih prog Alghero–Rim in Alghero–Milano na eni strani ter Olbia–Rim in Olbia–Milano na drugi
The Italian Republic justifies grouping the routes Alghero–Rome and Alghero–Milan on the one hand and Olbia–Rome and Olbia–Milan on the other hand on the grounds that their operations are complementary and interdependent.
Republika Italija opravičuje razvrščaje prog Alghero–Rim in Alghero–Milano na eni strani ter Olbia–Rim in Olbia–Milano na drugi z njihovim dopolnjevanjem in neodvisnostjo, kar zadeva prevoze.
According to the Italian authorities, the volume of traffic on these routes is objectively low for two-thirds of the year due to the highly seasonal nature of traffic flows.
Pravzaprav je po mnenju italijanskih organov za te proge 2/3 leta značilen objektivno zmanjšan promet zaradi zelo velikih sezonskih nihanj v prometu.
Considering that there is no provision for financial compensation for these routes, it is up to the administration to ensure that carriers’ operations are sustainable despite not being economically attractive.
Ker na teh progah ni predvideno nobeno finančno nadomestilo, bi morala biti vlada odgovorna za zagotovitev, da prevozniki stalno opravljajo storitev glede na to, da ta z ekonomskega vidika ni zanimiva.
Thus it is a question of putting into place ‘a virtuous circle of operational interdependence’ to enable ‘aircraft to be rotated during the winter, given the scarcity of demand’ whilst ‘planning coupled routes helps to attract carriers willing to operate these routes’.
Na ta način bi lahko ustvarila „pozitivne učinke medsebojne odvisnosti prevozov“, ki „pozimi omogočajo menjavanje prog zrakoplovov zaradi nezadostnega povpraševanja“, medtem ko „napoved skupnih prog pripomore k temu, da pritegne letalske prevoznike, ki so pripravljeni opravljati prevoze na teh progah“.
Moreover, according to the Italian Republic, the supply required in the summer could be better met by jointly operating a group of routes.
Sicer pa bi se po mnenju Republike Italije ponudba, ki se zahteva za poletno obdobje, lahko bolj dosledno upoštevala pri skupnem izvajanju prevozov na skupini letalskih prog.
The Italian Republic lastly argues that the Regulation itself provides scope for combining fluctuations of demand, for example, within the same week.
Republika Italija nazadnje navaja, da sama Uredba predvideva možnost izravnave nihanj v povpraševanju z združevanjem v ustrezno skupino prog, na primer v enem tednu.
The Commission believes that grouping routes is incompatible with Article 4(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Regulation.
Komisija ocenjuje, da skupina prog ni v skladu s členom 4(1)(a), (b) in (c) Uredbe.
The eligibility and adequacy criteria for the PSOs provided for therein explicitly mention, each time, ‘the route’, with no provision anywhere for groups of routes.
Pravzaprav merila za upravičenost in ustreznost OJS, predvidena v teh določbah, vsakič izrecno omenjajo „progo“, ne da bi kadar koli predvidela kakršno koli skupino prog.
Therefore each of these criteria must be assessed separately with regard to each individual route.
Zato je treba sklepati, da je potrebno vsako od teh meril oceniti posebej glede na vsako posamezno progo.
In addition, this interpretation is in line with the principle of proportionality.
Poleg tega je ta razlaga v skladu z zahtevami načela sorazmernosti.
Grouping routes in this way would enable Member States to impose PSOs on routes where they are not necessary to ensure an adequate provision of service.
Taka skupina letalskih prog bi pravzaprav omogočila državam članicam uvedbo OJS na letalskih progah, kjer te niso potrebne za to, da bi zagotovile izvajanje ustrezne storitve.
Thus Article 4(1)(d) does not provide scope for grouping routes, but states that the right to operate such services shall be offered by public tender ‘either singly or for a group of such routes’.
Tako se možnost združevanja letalskih prog pojavi le v členu 4(1)(d), kjer je navedeno, da se pravica do opravljanja teh storitev podeli po objavi javnega razpisa „bodisi za eno samo progo bodisi za skupino prog“.
On the contrary, this clear mention in Article 4(1)(d) excludes the application of such a grouping to Article 4(1)(a), (b) and (c).
Ta navedba, ki je jasno izražena v členu 4(1)(d), nasprotno izključuje, da bi se taka skupina lahko uporabljala v okviru uporabe člena 4(1)(a), (b) in (c).
If the market fails to produce a single air carrier that has commenced or is about to commence operating scheduled air services on a route, in accordance with the PSOs imposed on that route, the Member State may limit access to one carrier for a maximum period of three years and may publish a call for tender to cover a group of routes.
To pa zato, ker tržišče ni dopuščalo, da bi letalski prevoznik začel ali bi v kratkem začel opravljati redne zračne prevoze na letalski progi skladno z OJS, ki so bile uvedene na tej progi, kjer lahko država članica omeji dostop na enega samega prevoznika za obdobje največ treh let in predvidi javni razpis, ki se lahko razširi na skupino letalskih prog.
To sum up, grouping several routes may be considered to be a response to a clear disruption of the market and a form of indirect compensation which, like direct compensation, is only eligible under Article 4(1)(d).
Skratka, skupino več letalskih prog je mogoče imeti kot odgovor na jasno prekinitev na tržišču ter obliko neposrednega nadomestila, ki je, tako kot posredna nadomestila, sprejemljiva le v okviru člena 4(1)(d).
In no cases under a PSO regime under Article 4(1)(a) may the purpose of grouping be to make two separate routes profitable so as to favour the operations of one or more carriers.
V nobenem primeru pa cilj skupine v režimu OJS, skladno s členom 4(1)(a), ne more biti donosnost dveh ločenih letalskih prog, da bi pospeševali prevoze enega ali več letalskih prevoznikov.
What is more, the explanations put forward by the Italian authorities are not based on any technical or economic figures to support their analysis.
Razen tega se razlage, ki so jih dali italijanski organi, ne opirajo na nobene tehnične ali ekonomske številčne podatke, ki bi podkrepili njihove analize.
The following counter-arguments can be put forward:
Pravzaprav jim je mogoče oporekati naslednje elemente:
the capacity and frequency required must reflect the need, route by route, and not be organised in such a way that their efficiency can only be improved if the routes are grouped,
Zahtevane zmogljivosti in pogostosti letov morajo upoštevati potrebe na vsaki letalski progi in ne le tako, da bi jih bilo mogoče učinkoviteje doseči zgolj s združevanjem teh prog.
the obligations in terms of frequency linked to the pairing of routes are so heavy that they dissuade many potential operators from accepting the PSOs and providing services to and from Sardinia but which, since their operations are not based in one of the two cities, are de facto denied the possibility to provide this service.
Obveznosti, kar zadeva pogostost letov v zvezi s tem združevanjem, se izkažejo za tako pomembne, da dejansko odvrnejo veliko število morebitnih letalskih prevoznikov, ki bi želeli izpolnjevati OJS in vzdrževati prometne povezave s Sardinijo, ki pa so zaradi odsotnosti operativne infrastrukture v enem od obeh mest v resnici brez kakršne koli možnosti, da bi zagotovili to storitev.
Thus the effect of grouping is to block the market,
Posledica tega je, da je učinek tega združevanja prej zaprtje trga.
it is clear that the PSOs grouped in this way would enable only a few existing operators to meet the requirements.
Glede na to je jasno, da so OJS, ki so bile tako združene, omogočile le majhnemu številu že delujočih letalskih prevoznikov, da so se ustrezno odzvali.
Therefore applying PSOs has sidelined companies operating or intending to operate routes from Rome and Milan to each of the two airports concerned, Olbia and Alghero.
Na ta način je uvedba OJS odvrnila letalske družbe, ki so opravljale prevoze ali so jih nameravale opravljati na progah od Rima in Milana, natanko v smeri vsakega od obeh zadevnih letališč, to je Olbie in Alghera.
Consequently, even if they had wanted to, these carriers were unable to apply to provide a service that would be too costly for their operations.
Tako ti letalski prevozniki, četudi so to želeli, niso mogli vložiti svoje kandidature za predrago izvajanje svojih prevozov.
Therefore these groupings are such that they sideline other potential operators.
Taka združevanja so torej že po svoji naravi odvrnila druge morebitne letalske prevoznike.
These restrictive effects are magnified when account is taken of the size of the markets concerned (total number of passengers in 2005 — figures provided by the Italian Republic):
Ti omejevalni učinki so še pomembnejši ob upoštevanju velikosti zadevnih trgov (skupno število potnikov leta 2005 – številke Republike Italije):
Olbia–Rome and Olbia–Milan: 731349 (390186 in summer and 341163 in winter).
Olbia–Rim in Olbia–Milano: 731349 (390186 poleti in 341163 pozimi);
Alghero–Rome and Alghero–Milan: 502820 (184273 in summer and 318547 in winter).
Alghero–Rim in Alghero–Milano: 502820 potnikov (184273 poleti in 318547 pozimi).
Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that these routes between Italy’s two main cities and the Sardinian airports in Olbia and Alghero are so unattractive that they need to be grouped in order to attract operators.
V teh razmerah ni verjetno, da bi bile proge med obema največjima mestoma Italije in letališči v Olbii in Algheru na Sardiniji tako malo privlačne, da bi jih bilo treba združiti, da bi to postale.
Therefore the Commission considers that grouping certain routes is incompatible with the Regulation and unduly restrictive.
Zato Komisija meni, da združevanje nekaterih letalskih prog ni v skladu z Uredbo in je neupravičeno omejevalno.
Preferential fares for persons born in Sardinia but not resident there
Znižane prevoznine za osebe rojene na Sardiniji, ki ne prebivajo tam
Decrees Nos 35 and 36 require carriers to apply preferential fares for persons born in Sardinia but not resident there.
Odloka št. 35 in 36 zahtevata, da letalski prevozniki uporabljajo znižane prevoznine za osebe rojene na Sardiniji, ki ne prebivajo tam.
According to the estimates made by the Italian Republic, applying these provisions would affect a maximum of 220000 persons, which in reality would be closer to 110000 if 50 % of these people are estimated to travel once a year.
Po ocenah Republike Italije bi uporaba teh določb vplivala na največ 220000 oseb, v resnici pa na število, ki je bližje 110000, če računamo, da bi 50 % od njih potovalo enkrat letno.
In practice, such a measure favours European citizens of Italian nationality over citizens of other nationalities.
V praksi pa tak ukrep daje prednost predvsem evropskim državljanom italijanske narodnosti pred državljani drugih narodnosti.
Consequently it can be considered discriminatory at first sight on the grounds of nationality and therefore contrary to the Treaty.
Zato ga je mogoče na prvi pogled imeti za diskriminatornega zaradi narodne pripadnosti in s tem v nasprotju s Pogodbo.
Such a measure may only be eligible as part of a PSO regime where differential treatment is based on objective considerations irrespective of the nationality of the persons concerned and proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued by national law.
Tak ukrep v okviru režima OJS bi lahko bil sprejemljiv le v taki meri, da bi razlika v obravnavi temeljila na objektivnih razlogih, ki niso odvisni od narodne pripadnosti zadevnih oseb in so v skladu s ciljem, ki ga zakonito uveljavlja nacionalna zakonodaja.
However the Italian Republic explains that the measure is necessary essentially to enable Sardinian emigrants to retain ties with their original cultural community [17].
Vendar Republika Italija pojasnjuje, da je ukrep potreben predvsem zato, da bi izseljencem iz Sardinije omogočil, da ostanejo povezani s svojo prvotno kulturno skupnostjo [17].
However, even if such a goal may be a legitimate objective of public interest under Article 4(1)(b)(i) of the Regulation, the measure is clearly disproportionate.
Vendar pa, četudi bi tak cilj utegnil veljati za upravičenega glede na javni interes v skladu s členom 4(1)(b)(i) Uredbe, je ukrep očitno nesorazmeren.
Firstly, the measure is applicable to all persons born in Sardinia, but not resident there, without it being necessary to show any remaining link, such as family ties, between the person concerned and their region of origin.
Prvič, ta ukrep velja za vse osebe, rojene na Sardiniji, ki ne prebivajo tam, ne da bi bilo potrebno dokazati povezavo, ki bi še utegnila obstajati, na primer v obliki družinskih vezi, med zadevno osebo in njenim domačim okoljem.
Secondly, the measure is applicable irrespective of the financial means of each emigrant.
Drugič se ta ukrep uporablja neodvisno od finančnih sredstev vsakega izseljenca.
Thirdly, unlike residents of Sardinia, who have to travel to the mainland regularly in order to receive certain basic services (education, health) or to carry out economic activities necessary for the development of Sardinia, emigrants only travel to Sardinia occasionally (a maximum of 50 % of persons potentially travel once a year, according to the Italian authorities).
Tretjič, v nasprotju s prebivalci Sardinije, ki morajo potovati proti celini sorazmerno pogosto, da bi bili deležni nekaterih osnovnih storitev (izobraževanje, zdravstvo) in opravljali gospodarske dejavnosti, ki so potrebne za razvoj Sardinije, pa izseljenci le občasno potujejo na Sardinijo (po navedbah italijanskih organov največ 50 % oseb, ki so morda zainteresirane za eno potovanje na leto).
Therefore the total costs of occasional travel are relatively low compared to the costs incurred by residents of Sardinia and may be easily covered, in most cases, by the emigrants, without the need for the reduction provided for in Decrees Nos 35 and 36.
Posledica tega je, da je celoten strošek teh občasnih potovanj sorazmerno nižji v primerjavi s stroški, ki jih imajo prebivalci Sardinije in bi ga v veliki večini primerov izseljenci zlahka pokrili, ne da bi bilo treba predvideti zniževanje cene, določeno v odlokih št. 35 in 36.
Lastly, where certain emigrants lack the necessary means to pay the price of an annual trip to Sardinia, a more adequate and less restrictive measure would be to offer aid to the emigrants concerned.
Nazadnje pa, če nekateri izseljenci ne bi imeli dovolj sredstev, da bi plačali en polet na Sardinijo letno, bi bilo primernejše in manj omejevalno ponuditi pomoč tem izseljencem.
Under these circumstances, the Commission considers this measure to be disproportionate and incompatible with the Regulation.
V teh okoliščinah Komisija meni, da je ta določba nesorazmerna in da ni v skladu z Uredbo.
Application to all airports
Uporaba za celoten sistem letališč
Decrees Nos 35 and 36 provide for the application of the PSOs to all the airports in the Rome and Milan systems, as listed in Annex II to the Regulation, i.e.:
Odloka št. 35 in 36 predpisujeta, da uvedba OJS proti Rimu in Milanu vključuje vse ustrezne letališke sisteme, naštete v Prilogi II k Uredbi, in sicer:
Fiumicino and Ciampino airports for Rome,
letališči Fiumicino in Ciampino za Rim
Linate, Malpensa and Bergamo for Milan.
letališča Linate, Malpensa in Bergamo za Milano.
It should be noted that the PSOs for the year 2000 covered the airports of ‘Rome (Fiumicino) and Milan’.
Opozoriti je treba, da so OJS iz leta 2000 zajele letališči „Rim (Fiumicino) in Milano“.
By setting up the Milan airport system in accordance with Article 8 of and Annex II to the Regulation, Italy automatically extended the scope of the PSOs to the whole airport system concerned.
V okviru uvedbe letališkega sistema v Milanu v skladu s členom 8 in Prilogo II k Uredbi, je Italija uradno razširila uporabo OJS na celoten zadevni letališki sistem.
The Italian Republic justified its choice solely on technical grounds, which automatically means that all the airport systems are covered.
Republika Italija je utemeljila svojo izbiro s tehničnimi razlogi, ki so jo pripeljali do tega, da je samodejno prevzela vsak letališki sistem v celoti.
However it confirmed that the main interest of the PSOs covered the airports of Rome-Fiumicino and Milan-Linate, favoured by the beneficiaries of the PSOs due to their proximity with the city centre concerned, which justified the provision in the PSOs that ‘subject to slot availability, at least 50 % of the connections scheduled from the Sardinian airports and Rome and Milan must be operated from and to Fiumicino and from and to Linate’ [18].
Vendar pa je potrdila, da je bil glavni interes OJS usmerjen na letališči Rim–Fiumicino in Milano–Linate, katerima dajejo uporabniki OJS prednost zaradi njune bližine s središčem mesta zadevnega območja (aglomeracije), kar je opravičilo dejstvo, da je v OJS predvideno, da „bi ob upoštevanju razpoložljivosti časovnih intervalov (slotov) najmanj 50 % predvidenih prog med letališči na Sardiniji ter Rimom in Milanom moralo biti zagotovljenih z odhodom iz in prihodom na Fiumicino in Linate“ [18].
The Italian Republic acknowledged that it was ‘objectively proven that Fiumicino airport for Rome and Linate airport for Milan were the destinations representing the highest level of convenience, service and attraction to users, being the closest airports with the best links to the respective city centres’. It also explained that ‘in order to ensure a better service and better meet the demands of users, it was deemed important to prevent the carriers taking on the PSOs from having the freedom to totally abandon these airports in favour of other airports (less convenient and attractive to users) in the same system.’
Republika Italija je soglašala, da je bilo „objektivno dokazano, da letališči Fiumicino za Rim in Linate za Milano pomenita najprimernejšo destinacijo, ki je najbolje oskrbovana in najprivlačnejša za uporabnike, ker sta ti dve letališči najbližji in najbolje povezani s središči obeh mest“.