natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hynix claims that the new restructuring was market-based, as it was devised by external advisors, such as DB and Deloittes, after months of due diligence and was based on the DB report which recommended the course of action which was eventually followed.
Hynix trdi, da je bilo novo prestrukturiranje tržno usmerjeno, kot so ga po mesecih skrbne proučitve oblikovali zunanji svetovalci, kot sta DB in Deloittes, in je temeljilo na poročilu DB, ki je priporočilo serijo ukrepov, ki so bili dejansko izvedeni.
However, the DB report was addressed to Hynix's creditors.
Vendar je bilo poročilo naslovljeno na Hynixove upnike.
Its aim was to maximise debt recovery for such creditors while keeping the company from failing.
Njegov cilj je bil v največji meri izterjati dolg za takšne upnike, obenem pa preprečiti propad družbe.
Hynix argued that the test to be applied to ascertain the benefit received by the company from the new restructuring should be the ‘private creditor’ test and not the ‘private investor’ test.
Hynix je trdil, da bi morala biti ocena o ugodnostih, ki jih je družba prejela v okviru novega prestrukturiranja, ocena „zasebnega upnika“ in ne „zasebnega vlagatelja“.
The position of the creditors is a factor which could be considered in an analysis; however, as explained in recital 36 and following, it cannot play a role in this case.
Položaj upnikov je dejavnik, ki bi ga lahko proučili v analizi, vendar, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 36 in pozneje v besedilu, v tem primeru ne more biti pomemben.
In general terms, the relevant standard is whether or not a market-oriented investor with or without an existing exposure to Hynix, would have assessed the proposed investment in Hynix as one worth making.
Na splošno je odločilno, ali bi tržno usmerjen vlagatelj z ali brez kreditnega tveganja glede Hynixa ocenil predlagano naložbo v Hynix kot donosno naložbo.
The DB report does not provide a reliable response to that question, because, being addressed to the existing creditors, it is premised on using what are in general terms the existing Hynix debt and equity structures as a vehicle for the proposed investment, thus reducing to vanishing point any possibility for hypothetical outside investment on the same terms.
Poročilo DB ne daje zanesljivega odgovora na navedeno vprašanje, ker je naslovljeno na obstoječe upnike, in na splošno izhaja iz obstoječih Hynixovih dolgov in lastniških struktur kot osnove predlagane naložbe, in tako zmanjšuje možnost za hipotetično naložbo od zunaj praktično na nič.
The DB report contains no evidence that outside private investors would have had any interest in putting money into Hynix.
Poročilo DB ne vsebuje nobenih dokazov, da bi se zunanji zasebni vlagatelji zanimali za naložbe v Hynix.
Indeed, DB's advice to private investors was, in fact, not to invest in Hynix, as shown by the fact that its research department did not follow Hynix equity.
DB je zasebnim vlagateljem dejansko svetoval, naj ne vlagajo v Hynix, kot kaže dejstvo, da njegov oddelek za raziskave ni spremljal razvoja Hynixovega lastniškega kapitala.
In any event, the financial situation of Hynix at the time of the new restructuring, as described in recital 14, was dire and it was evident that Hynix was not in a position to service its liabilities; hence, no funding was forthcoming from the market, as is evident from the statements of financial advisors cited in recitals 14 and 15.
V vsakem primeru je bil Hynixov finančni položaj v obdobju novega prestrukturiranja, kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 14, zastrašujoč in je bilo jasno, da Hynix ni bil zmožen poravnati svojih dolgov, zato trg ni vlagal vanj, kar izhaja iz izjave finančnih svetovalcev iz uvodnih izjav 14 in 15.
While the DB report points the way for Hynix's creditors to minimise their losses, it gives no indication as to why the market would have continued to lend or invest money in Hynix, a company in selective default.
Poročilo DB sicer izpostavlja način Hynixovih upnikov za zmanjšanje njihovih izgub, ne navaja pa, zakaj bi trg še naprej posojal denar ali vlagal v Hynix, torej v družbo, ki plačuje le nekatere obveznosti.
Therefore, such other data as are available concerning the position of Hynix and the market situation confirm that the DB report does not provide any reliable response to the question of whether or not a market-oriented investor would have assessed the proposed investment in Hynix as one worth making.
Zato takšni podatki, ki so na voljo glede Hynixovega položaja in tržnih razmer, potrjujejo, da poročilo DB ne daje zanesljivega odgovora na vprašanje, ali bi tržno usmerjen vlagatelj predlagano naložbo v Hynix ocenil kot donosno.
In addition, leaving aside the question of what course of action might or might not have been open to the parties in 2002 given the situation as it then existed, the fact remains that Hynix had been put in this situation by economically irrational investment and lending decisions taken by or on behalf of the GOK in 2001, the effects of which continued into 2002 and beyond.
Poleg tega ne glede na vprašanje, kakšne možnosti za delovanje so imele stranke glede na razmere leta 2002, ostaja dejstvo, da je bil Hynix v takšen položaj pahnjen zaradi ekonomsko nerazumnih odločitev o naložbah in posojilu, ki jih je sprejela vlada Republike Koreje ali so bile sprejete v njenem imenu leta 2001 in katerih vpliv je trajal tudi leta 2002 in pozneje.
The express purpose of the new restructuring was to re-finance Hynix and it cannot be divorced from the initial 2001 bail-out.
Izrecen cilj novega prestrukturiranja je bilo refinanciranje Hynixa, ki ga ni mogoče ločiti od paketa pomoči iz leta 2001.
The two are inextricably linked.
Ta dva elementa sta tesno povezana.
In other words, it is only because of the irrational nature and the subsequent failure of the earlier restructuring that it became necessary to rollover the exposure of the existing creditors in the 2002 measure.
Z drugimi besedami, ker je bilo prejšnje prestrukturiranje nerazumno in ni uspelo, je bilo potrebno obstoječo kreditno tveganje upnikov prenesti v ukrep iz leta 2002.
Therefore, the solution proposed in the DB report was only possible on the back of the 2001 measures.
Zato je bila predlagana rešitev iz poročila DB možna le zaradi ukrepov iz leta 2001.
It is not possible to treat a certain proposed course of action as a market benchmark if that course of action is itself a continuation of a previous unreasonable government investment decision.
Določenih predlaganih ukrepov ni mogoče obravnavati kot merilo tržne uspešnosti, ker so ukrepi sami nadaljevanje prejšnjih nerazumnih odločitev vlade glede naložb.
For this reason also, the DB report does not provide a reliable answer to the question of whether or not a market-oriented investor would have assessed the proposed investment in Hynix as one worth making.
Zato poročilo DB ne daje zanesljivega odgovora na vprašanje, ali bi tržno usmerjen vlagatelj predlagano naložbo v Hynix ocenil kot donosno.
It is therefore considered that the new restructuring conferred a benefit to the company, within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation.
Zato se šteje, da je novo prestrukturiranje družbi prineslo ugodnosti v smislu člena 2(2) osnovne uredbe.
Specificity
Posebnost
As the measures comprising the new restructuring were taken exclusively for Hynix, the debt rollover, the principalisation of interest and the debt-to-equity swap are considered to be specific within the meaning of Article 3 of the basic Regulation.
Ker so bili ukrepi za novo prestrukturiranje namenjeni izrecno Hynixu, se prenos terjatev, pretvorba obresti v glavnico in zamenjava terjatev v lastniške deleže obravnavajo kot specifični v smislu člena 3 osnovne uredbe.
Timing of the benefit
Čas ugodnosti
According to Article 5 of the basic Regulation, the amount of countervailable subsidies shall be calculated in terms of the benefit to the recipient which is found to exist during the investigation period of subsidisation.
V skladu s členom 5 osnovne uredbe se znesek subvencije, proti kateremu se lahko sprejmejo izravnalni ukrepi, izračuna glede na ugodnost prejemnika, katere obstoj se ugotovi med obdobjem preiskave subvencioniranja.
The amount of debt equivalent to the amount to be swapped into equity was moved away from loans and booked as a capital adjustment when the decision for the restructuring was taken on 30 December 2002 (Note 14 to Hynix's Financial Statements 2002).
Znesek terjatev ustreza znesku zamenjave v lastniške deleže in je bil izbrisan iz posojil in vknjižen kot prilagoditev kapitala, ko je bila sprejeta odločitev o prestrukturiranju dne 30. decembra 2002 (Opomba 14 k finančnemu izkazu Hynixa za leto 2002).
Similarly, Hynix was released from its interest payment obligations with regard to this debt on the same date.
Podobno je bilo Hynixu odpisano plačilo obresti na njegov dolg istega dne.
The Community industry argued that the benefit from the new restructuring did not accrue to Hynix until 13 April 2003, when shares were in fact issued to the creditors.
Industrija Skupnosti je trdila, da Hynix od novega prestrukturiranja ni imel ugodnosti od 13. aprila 2003, ko so bile delnice dejansko izdane upnikom.
On the other hand, the company argued that the effective date of the benefit is, in fact, December 2002, as that was the date when the decision to approve the restructuring was taken by the creditors and the date on which Hynix was released from its obligations as regards its debt.
Po drugi strani je družba trdila, da je bil dejanski datum ugodnosti december 2002, ker je bil to datum, ko so upniki sprejeli odločitev o odobritvi prestrukturiranja, in datum, na katerega so Hynixu odpisali njegove obveznosti v zvezi z njegovim dolgom.
As the DSB Panel on DRAMs stated that the benefit of a subsidy must be viewed form the point of view of the recipient and the company was no longer under any obligation vis-à-vis its debt exposure to its creditors from the date the decision to proceed with the new restructuring was taken, it is considered that the effective date for the accrual of the benefit to Hynix was 30 December 2002.
Ker je odbor DSB za DRAM navedel, da je treba na ugodnosti subvencije gledati z vidika prejemnika, in ker od dne, ko je bila sprejeta odločitev o novem prestrukturiranju, družba ni imela več nobenih dolgov do svojih upnikov, se šteje, da je Hynix 30. decembra 2002 dejansko začel uživati ugodnosti od subvencioniranja.
Debt rollover and changes to the interest rate and payment conditions
Prenos dolga in spremembe pogojev plačila obresti in plačila
In accordance with the methodology adopted in the original investigation, a debt rollover is taken to be a loan for the purposes of the benefit calculation.
V skladu z metodologijo, sprejeto v prvotni preiskavi, se za namene izračuna ugodnosti prenos dolga obravnava kot posojilo.
The principalised interest will also be treated as a loan for these purposes.
Tudi pretvorba obresti v glavnico bo za ta namen obravnavana kot posojilo.
In the original investigation, the subsidy was considered to be the face amount of the principal of the loan, allocated over the normal five-year depreciation period of assets.
V prvotni preiskavi je bila subvencija obravnavana kot znesek glavnice posojila, razporejenega na obdobje petih let, kar ustreza običajni amortizacijski dobi sredstev.
Each annual amount so allocated was increased by adding the standard commercial interest rate in Korea (7 %).
Vsak tako razporejeni letni znesek se je povečal s standardno komercialno obrestno mero v Koreji (7 %).
The EC-Korea DRAMs Panel criticised this as being a ‘grant methodology’ which did not reflect the fact that loans, unlike grants, are repayable and that ‘it is thus obviously less beneficial for a company to be given a loan than it is to be given a grant’ [8].
Preiskovalni odbor ES-Koreja o DRAM je to kritiziral, saj naj bi šlo za metodologijo v zvezi s subvencijami, ki ni odražala dejstva, da so posojila v nasprotju s subvencijami povračljiva in da je „zato očitno, da je za družbo ugodnejše, če dobi subvencijo kot pa posojilo“ [8].
The Panel considered that the EC should base its calculation on benchmarks reflecting normal investment practices.
Odbor je menil, da mora ES izračun oblikovati na podlagi meril, ki odražajo običajne naložbene prakse.
Following the WTO Panel's comments with regard to the grant methodology employed in the original investigation, it was considered appropriate in this review to find a loan-based benchmark against which the benefit could be calculated.
Po pripombah odbora STO v zvezi z metodologijo glede subvencij iz prvotne preiskave, se je zdelo ustrezno, da se v zvezi s tem za izračun ugodnosti uporabijo merila, ki temeljijo na posojilih.
The financial situation of Hynix at the time of the new restructuring, as described in recitals 14 and 15 above, was dire and it was evident that Hynix was not in a position to service its liabilities; hence, no funding was forthcoming from the market.
Finančni položaj Hynixa je bil v obdobju novega prestrukturiranja zastrašujoč, kot je opisano v uvodnih izjavah 14 in 15, in je bilo jasno, da Hynix ni bil zmožen poravnati svojih dolgov, zato trg ni vlagal vanj.
No commercially comparable lending had been provided to Hynix at the time of the new restructuring, nor was there any verified evidence on record regarding the cost and terms of a comparable commercial loan that Hynix or another firm in a situation comparable to Hynix had been provided at the relevant time.
Hynix ni prejel nobenega komercialno primerljivega posojila v obdobju novega prestrukturiranja, niti ni bilo preverjenih zabeleženih dokazov v zvezi s stroški in pogoji primerljivega komercialnega posojila, ki bi ga Hynix ali druga družba v podobnem položaju prejela v zadevnem obdobju.
The fact that private entities had also participated in the new restructuring does not provide a reliable benchmark; the entities involved were small and held insignificant amounts of debt in Hynix, compared to the GOK-directed entities.
Dejstvo, da so zasebni subjekti tudi sodelovali pri novem prestrukturiranju, ne zagotavlja zanesljivega merila, sodelujoči subjekti pa so bili majhni in so imeli zanemarljivo majhne deleže v Hynixu v primerjavi z družbami, ki so delovale po navodilih vlade Republike Koreje.
Further, in accordance with the findings of the WTO Panel in the Japan DRAMs case, which considered the same facts as the current investigation, the presence of contemporaneous government involvement in the decision-making process regarding the new restructuring acts to distort the market and thus private, non-directed entities cannot be taken as a reliable benchmark [9].
Nadalje je v skladu z izsledki odbora STO v primeru DRAM na Japonskem, ki so obravnavali ista dejstva kot sedanja preiskava, prisotnost hkratne vpletenosti vlade v proces odločanja glede novega prestrukturiranja škodljivo delovala na trg, zato zasebne družbe ne morejo biti zanesljivo merilo [9].
The Commission has therefore constructed a proxy benchmark, based on a commercial interest rate, with the addition of a risk premium reflecting the default rates of companies exhibiting comparable risk.
Komisija je zato na podlagi komercialne obrestne mere oblikovala alternativno primerjavo, skupaj s premijo za kritje tveganja, iz česar bi bile razvidne zamudne obresti družb s primerljivo stopnjo tveganja.
Such a benchmark takes into account the term of the loan, a benchmark interest rate that would be paid by a creditworthy company, the probability of default by an uncreditworthy company within a specified period of time and the probability of default by a creditworthy company within the same period of time.
Takšno merilo upošteva časovni rok posojila, primerljivo obrestno mero, ki bi jo kreditno sposobna družba lahko plačala, verjetnost neizpolnitve obveznosti s strani kreditno nesposobne družbe v določenem časovnem obdobju in verjetnost neizpolnitve obveznosti s strani kreditno sposobne družbe v istem časovnem obdobju.
The Commission has used the following formula to calculate an appropriate uncreditworthy benchmark interest rate:
Komisija je za izračun primerljive obrestne mere za kreditno nesposobnega posojilojemalca uporabila naslednjo formulo:
the benchmark interest rate for an uncreditworthy borrower
primerljiva obrestna mera za kreditno nesposobnega posojilojemalca,
the long-term interest rate that would be paid by a creditworthy company
dolgoročna obrestna mera, ki bi jo plačala kreditno sposobna družba,
the probability of default by an uncreditworthy company within n years
verjetnost za neizpolnitev obveznosti s strani kreditno nesposobne družbe v roku n let,
the probability of default by a creditworthy company within n years.
verjetnost za neizpolnitev obveznosti s strani kreditno sposobne družbe v roku n let.
For the purposes of this calculation, the Commission has used as the creditworthy rate for KRW loans the average Bank of Korea interest rate on investment grade corporate bonds in 2003, which was 10,43 %.
Za ta izračun je Komisija kot obrestno mero v KRW za posojila kreditno sposobnim družbam uporabila povprečno obrestno mero Bank of Korea za dolgoročne podjetniške obveznice v letu 2003, in sicer 10,43-odstotno obrestno mero.
The rate of default of an uncreditworthy company in 2003 within three years (the term of the rollover) was 54,86 %, whereas the rate of default of a creditworthy company within three years in 2003 was 0,33 %.
V letu 2003 je bila zamudna obrestna mera za kreditno nesposobno družbo za obdobje treh let (obdobje, potrebno za novo posojilo in obnavljanje dolga) 54,86-odstotna, zamudna obrestna mera za kreditno sposobno družbo za obdobje treh let pa je bila v istem letu 0,33-odstotna.
This led to a total interest rate of 43,8 %.
Tako je dobila skupno obrestno mero v višini 43,8 %.
In contrast, the interest rate payable by Hynix on the rolled-over debt was 3,5 %, i.e. an interest rate differential of 40,3 %, which leads to a countervailing duty rate of 23,7 %.
V nasprotju s tem je bila obrestna mera, ki jo je plačeval Hynix za zadevna posojila, 3,5-odstotna, tako da razlika v obrestnih merah znaša 40,3 %, iz česar izhaja 23,7-odstotna izravnalna dajatev.
As described in recital 21, the CFIC calculated a swap price for the debt-to-equity swap of KRW 435 on 30 December 2002, based on the one-month average market price.
Kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 21, je CFIC izračunal ceno za delnico ob zamenjavi, ki je 30. decembra 2002 znašala 435 KRW, pri čemer je bila vzeta enomesečna povprečna tržna cena.
The company claims that this was a commercially valid method to determine the share price and that it reflected market reality.
Družba trdi, da je bila to komercialno veljavna metoda za določanje cene delnice in je odražala tržne razmere.
In fact, this price reflected a ceiling; if the share price went up between 30 December 2002 and the day the shares were actually issued, the price would have changed accordingly.
Ta cena je dejansko odražala zgornjo mejo, če pa bi se cena za delnico med 30. decembrom 2002 in dnem dejanske izdaje delnic povečala, bi se cena delnic ustrezno spremenila.
The actual price on the day the decision to proceed with the new restructuring was taken was KRW 280.
Dejanska cena na dan odločitve o začetku novega prestrukturiranja je znašala 280 KRW.
When the debt was eventually converted into equity, following the capital reduction, at a price of KRW 9135 (KRW 435 × 21), the share price was, in fact, KRW 3500.
Ko je bil dolg po zmanjšanju kapitala za ceno 9135 KRW (435 KRW × 21) dejansko spremenjen v lastniški kapital, je bila cena delnice dejansko 3500 KRW.
If the effect of the capital writedown is ignored, the shares issued were trading well below par, at KRW 167.
Če se ne bi upoštevalo zmanjšanje kapitala, bi se izdane delnice prodajale precej pod ceno za 167 KRW.
It is not disputed that the CFIC had a discretion as to the method by which it could set the swap price.
Nesporno je, da je CFIC sam izbiral metodo določitve cene za delnico ob zamenjavi.
Notwithstanding such a discretion, however, as the swap price was not a fixed price, but a guarantee that the company would receive a minimum amount for its shares, it cannot be considered to be a price which corresponds to commercial reality, especially given the actual price at the time the swap price was set and the unsurprising downward trend between the time of the CFIC meetings until the swap date in April 2003.
Ne glede na takšno določitev se, ker cena delnice ob zamenjavi ni bila fiksna cena, temveč jamstvo, da bi družba prejela minimalno vsoto za svoje delnice, ne more šteti, da je to cena, ki ustreza trgovinskim razmeram, zlasti glede na določitev dejanske cene v obdobju cene za delnico ob zamenjavi in nepresenetljivem trendu zmanjševanja v obdobju med sestanki CFIC do datuma zamenjave aprila 2003.
In order to calculate the benefit received by Hynix from the debt-to-equity swap, the cost of issuing equity to Hynix must be considered.
Za izračun ugodnosti, ki jih je prejel Hynix od zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže, je treba upoštevati Hynixove stroške izdaje delnic.
The Commission noted that, in order the examine the cost, if any, of the swap from the point of view of the recipient, the obligations imposed on a company when issuing new equity would have to be considered.
Komisija je opozorila, da je treba pri proučitvi morebitnega stroška, ki bi za prejemnika nastal ob zamenjavi, upoštevati obveznosti, ki jih je družba dobila ob izdaji novih delnic.
The Commission noted in this respect, that injections of ordinary share capital do not generally impose particular obligations on a company, as there is nether a fixed rate of return which the company must achieve nor, in fact, do any payments need to be made.
S tem v zvezi Komisija opozarja, da vložek običajnega delniškega kapitala na splošno ne pomeni posebnih obveznosti za družbo, saj ne gre niti za fiksno stopnjo donosa, ki bi ga morala družba doseči, niti ni treba opraviti nikakršnih plačil.
However, the company has at least a theoretical obligation to distribute its profits, or part thereof, to its shareholders; the return on equity ratio (ROE) could provide some indication of the level of return the company is expected to provide to its shareholders and could be used in the calculation of the amount of the benefit to Hynix.
Vendar pa ima družba vsaj teoretično obveznost delitve dobička ali dela dobička do svojih delničarjev; stopnja donosnosti delniškega kapitala („ROE“) bi lahko bila podlaga za stopnjo donosnosti, ki jo delničarji pričakujejo od družbe, in bi se lahko uporabila za izračun višine ugodnosti, dodeljene Hynixu.
However, the ROE of Hynix in 2003 was a negative percentage, as calculated by reference to its financial statements for the year.
Vendar pa je bil ROE za Hynix za leto 2003 negativni odstotek, kakor je bil izračunan na podlagi njegovih računovodskih izkazov za to leto.
Therefore, on the basis of an objective evaluation of Hynix's financial standing at the time of the debt-to-equity swap, it is unreasonable to expect that Hynix would be in a position to distributed any sort of return to its shareholders for the relevant year.
Zato je na podlagi objektivnega vrednotenja finančnega stanja Hynixa v času zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže nerazumno pričakovati, da bi bil Hynix v zadevnem letu sposoben svojim delničarjem razdeliti kakršen koli dobiček.
Hence, using the ROE as a benchmark, it would still be concluded that the entire amount of the debt-to-equity swap is a countervailable subsidy.
Tudi če ROE uporabimo za primerjavo, ugotovimo, da je bil celoten znesek zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže znesek subvencije, proti kateri se lahko sprejmejo izravnalni ukrepi.
The Commission has also examined whether there are costs to Hynix associated with having to surrender ownership shares as a result of the swap or the cost to Hynix from a potential dilution of the share price resulting from the issuance of new shares.
Komisija je tudi preverila, če je imel Hynix kakšne stroške v zvezi z odstopom lastniških deležev zaradi zamenjave ali možne razvodenitve cene delnic zaradi izdajanja novih delnic.