natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
If a TSP has a particular interest in having an extensive distribution network in a Member State where the merged firm would have a broad TA network, Galileo/Worldspan could possibly leverage its downstream market share in that Member State in order to gain concessions from the TSP when negotiating a worldwide agreement.
Če je ponudnik turističnih storitev posebej zainteresiran, da ima široko distribucijsko mrežo v državi članici, v kateri bi združeno podjetje imelo široko mrežo potovalnih agencij, bi lahko združeno podjetje Galileo/Worldspan izkoristilo delež svojega prodajnega trga v tej državi članici, da pridobi koncesije od ponudnika turističnih storitev, ko se pogaja o svetovnem dogovoru.
In other words, the bargaining position of the merged firm vis à vis TSPs could result in greater market power than Galileo/Worldspan's upstream market share of (20 to 30 %) in the EEA would suggest.
Povedano drugače, posledica pogajalskega položaja združenega podjetja nasproti ponudnikom turističnih storitev bi lahko bila večja tržna moč, kot bi jo kazal tržni delež združenega podjetja Galielo/Worldspan na nabavnem trgu [20–30 %] EGS.
This bargaining power could possibly allow the combined entity to raise prices unilaterally post merger.
Pogajalska moč bi lahko omogočila združenemu subjektu enostranski dvig cene po združitvi.
As long as TAs use ‘single-homing’, GDS providers have exclusive access to TAs belonging to their respective TA networks.
Dokler potovalne agencije uporabljajo „enosistemsko usmerjanje“, imajo ponudniki GDS izključni dostop do potovalnih agencij, ki spadajo k njihovim zadevnim mrežam potovalnih agencij.
Each GDS provider therefore has a certain degree of monopoly power in relation to TSPs that need to reach the TAs exclusively connected to one GDS.
Zato ima vsak ponudnik GDS določeno stopnjo monopolne moči v odnosu do ponudnikov turističnih storitev, ki morajo doseči potovalne agencije, izključno povezane z enim GDS.
This monopoly power allows the GDS provider to charge higher prices to TSPs.
Ta monopolna moč omogoča ponudniku GDS, da ponudnikom turističnih storitev zaračunava višje cene.
These ‘monopoly rents’ extracted from TSPs are to a large extent used to cover the financial incentives granted to TAs.
Te „monopolne rente“, pridobljene od ponudnikov turističnih storitev, se pretežno uporabljajo za kritje finančnih spodbud, dodeljenih potovalnim agencijam.
The Commission has however found that the bargaining interaction between GDS providers and customers on both sides of the market has started to change.
Vendar pa je Komisija ugotovila, da se je medsebojni pogajalski vpliv med ponudniki GDS in uporabniki na obeh straneh trga začel spreminjati.
TSPs and TAs have recently increased their bargaining strength relative to GDS providers.
Ponudniki turističnih storitev in potovalne agencije so pred kratkim povečali svojo pogajalsko moč do ponudnikov GDS.
These changes in the relative bargaining power result from (i) a consolidation among TAs, (ii) the introduction of direct bookings via ‘supplier.com’ and (iii) surcharges imposed by TSPs.
Te spremembe v relativni pogajalski moči so posledica (i) združevanja potovalnih agencij, (ii) uvedbe neposrednih rezervacij prek kanala „supplier.com“ in (iii) dodatnih plačil, ki so jih uvedli ponudniki turističnih storitev.
Apart from the threat to withhold travel content via ‘supplier.com’, TSPs have developed an additional tool to put pressure on GDSs.
Poleg nevarnosti, da pridržijo vsebino potovanja in jo dajo na voljo samo prek kanala „supplier.com“, so ponudniki turističnih storitev razvili dodatno orodje, s katerim izvajajo pritisk na ponudnike GDS.
By applying, or threatening to apply surcharges to TAs, TSPs may influence the use of a specific GDS and make it lose volumes in favour of either ‘supplier.com’ or another GDS.
Ponudniki turističnih storitev lahko z uporabo dodatnih plačil za potovalne agencije ali grožnjo, da jih bodo uporabili, vplivajo na uporabo določenih GDS in povzročijo izgubo obsega rezervacij v korist kanalov „supplier.com“ ali drugega ponudnika GDS.
Impact of the merger
Učinek združitve
The reduction in the number of GDS providers is unlikely to lead to price increases as a result of ‘vertical cross-market effects’ of the market for the following reasons.
Zmanjšanje števila ponudnikov GDS verjetno ne bo povzročilo povišanja cen kot posledice „vertikalnih medtržnih učinkov“ trga zaradi naslednjih razlogov.
On the TSP side, the in-depth investigation confirms that TSPs are capable to force GDS providers to lower their prices in exchange for full content, or alternatively, in order to avoid surcharges being applied on their contracted TAs.
Glede ponudnikov turističnih storitev poglobljena raziskava potrjuje, da lahko ponudniki turističnih storitev prisilijo ponudnike GDS k znižanju cen v zamenjavo za polno vsebino oziroma za neuporabo dodatnih plačil za potovalne agencije, s katerimi imajo sklenjene pogodbe.
Airlines in particular have developed a number of bargaining tools (especially, but not only, ‘supplier.com’) allowing them to retain part of their surplus in the negotiation with GDS providers.
Zlasti letalski prevozniki so razvili številna pogajalska orodja (zlasti, vendar ne samo kanalov „supplier.com“), ki jim omogočajo, da obdržijo del svojega presežka v pogajanjih s ponudniki GDS.
Even in a situation with only three GDS providers, none of them will be able to increase prices because TSPs will maintain a strong enough bargaining power, based on (i) the capacity to channel bookings towards the ‘supplier.com’ websites, (ii) the surcharges imposed on TAs, (iii) the brand recognition in the home market(s) and (iv) the possibility to develop new bargaining tools in the future.
Tudi če so samo trije ponudniki GDS, ne bo mogel nobeden od njih povišati cen, ker bodo ponudniki turističnih storitev obdržali dovolj veliko pogajalsko moč, na podlagi (i) sposobnosti usmerjanja rezervacij k spletnim stranem „supplier.com“, (ii) dodatnih plačil, uvedenih za potovalne agencije, (iii) prepoznavanja blagovnih znamk na domačem(-ih) trgu(-ih) in (iv) možnosti razvoja novih pogajalskih orodij v prihodnosti.
Therefore, the Commission concludes in the Decision that a reduction in the number of GDS providers from four to three does not increase the likelihood of unilateral price increases as a result of ‘vertical cross-market effects’.
Komisija zato v odločbi ugotavlja, da zmanjšanje števila ponudnikov GDS s štiri na tri ne povečuje verjetnosti enostranskih povišanj cen kot posledice „vertikalnih medtržnih učinkov“.
This conclusion also applies to other TSPs, such as rental car companies and hotel chains.
Ta ugotovitev velja tudi za druge ponudnike turističnih storitev, kot so družbe za izposojo avtomobilov in hotelske verige.
On the TA side, a sufficient number of GDS platforms will remain available to TAs and switching costs are not an insurmountable obstacle to choosing another GDS provider.
Potovalnim agencijam bo ostalo na voljo zadostno število platform GDS, stroški prehoda pa niso nepremostljiva ovira za izbiro drugega ponudnika GDS.
The fact that GDS providers need to create and maintain a sufficiently broad network of TAs in order to generate demand on the TSP side, leaves TAs in a favourable bargaining position vis à vis GDS providers even after the elimination of one of them.
Zaradi dejstva, da morajo ponudniki GDS ustvariti in ohraniti dovolj široko mrežo potovalnih agencij, da lahko ustvarijo povpraševanje na strani ponudnikov turističnih storitev, so potovalne agencije v ugodnem pogajalskem položaju nasproti ponudnikom GDS, tudi po izločitvi enega od njih.
In the Decision, the Commission concludes that these elements (effective bargaining power of the TSPs and on-going or possible development of additional bargaining tools) suffice to counter the potentially detrimental effect of the merger in terms of the reduction from four to three GDS providers as well as the potential occurrence of vertical cross-market effects.
Komisija v odločbi ugotavlja, da ti elementi (dejanska pogajalska moč ponudnikov turističnih storitev in stalen ali možen razvoj dodatnih pogajalskih orodij) zadostujejo za preprečitev morebiti škodljivega učinka združitve v smislu zmanjšanja števila ponudnikov GDS s štiri na tri in morebitnega pojava vertikalnih medtržnih učinkov.
Loss of Worldspan as ‘pricing maverick’
Izguba podjetja Worldspan kot „odpadnika pri oblikovanju cen“
A second theory of harm investigated by the Commission relates to Worldspan acting as a ‘price maverick’ in the EEA, charging lower prices than its competitors (Galileo, Sabre and Amadeus).
Druga teorija škode, ki jo je raziskala Komisija, je v zvezi s podjetjem Worldspan, ki deluje kot „odpadnik pri oblikovanju cen“ v EGP in zaračunava nižje cene kot njegovi konkurenti (Galileo, Sabre in Amadeus).
During the market investigation, concerns had been expressed that, following the loss of competition between the merging firms, Worldspan's prices would be increased and aligned to those charged by Galileo.
Med raziskavo trga so bili izraženi pomisleki, da bi se po prenehanju konkurence med podjetjema, ki se združujeta, cene podjetja Worldspan povišale in prilagodile cenam, ki jih zaračunava podjetje Galileo.
The Commission's in-depth investigation shows however, that this theory of harm cannot be upheld.
Vendar pa poglobljena raziskava, ki jo je opravila Komisija, kaže, da te teorije škode ni mogoče potrditi.
In order to conclude that the merger would be likely to lead to significant post-merger price increases by Worldspan it would have to be shown that pre-merger Worldspan's prices are significantly lower than those of its competitors, in particular Galileo, and that the merging parties would have the incentives and ability to increase Worldspan's prices post-merger.
Da bi Komisija ugotovila, da bo zaradi združitve podjetje Worldspan verjetno precej povišalo cene po njej, bi bilo treba pokazati, da so cene podjetja Worldspan pred združitvijo precej nižje od cen konkurentov, zlasti podjetja Galileo, ter da bi stranki, ki se združujeta, imeli spodbude in zmožnost povišati cene podjetja Worldspan po združitvi.
Worldspan is not charging lower prices
Worldspan ne zaračunava nižjih cen
The notifying party submitted a comparison of the merging parties' most basic types of booking for 2006: Galileo’s ‘Active Net Segment’ with Worldspan’s ‘Full Service’.
Priglasitelj je predložil primerjavo najosnovnejših vrst rezervacij strank, ki se združujeta, za leto 2006: „aktivnega mrežnega segmenta“ podjetja Galileo in „celostnih storitev“ podjetja Worldspan.
This shows that Worldspan’s list price is actually […] than Galileo’s list price for […] types of ‘Full Service’ booking alternatives.
Ta kaže, da je cena po ceniku podjetja Worldspan dejansko […] od cene po ceniku podjetja Galileo za […] vrste nadomestnih rezervacij „celostnih storitev“.
Further, if Worldspan's fees for each booking category are weighted as an average across all bookings according to the relative weight of each of the four categories of Worldspan pricing under its ‘Full Service’ functionality level, the result is USD […], while Galileo’s Active Net Segment price for 2006 is USD […].
Poleg tega, če so pristojbine podjetja Worldspan za vsako skupino rezervacij tehtane kot povprečje vseh rezervacij glede na relativno utež vsake od štirih skupin oblikovanja cen podjetja Worldspan v okviru njegove funkcijske stopnje „celostnih storitev“, je rezultat […] USD, cena aktivnega mrežnega segmenta podjetja Galileo za leto 2006 pa je […] USD.
The Commission therefore concludes in the Decision that in most cases Worldspan is not the lowest priced GDS for TSPs.
Komisija zato v odločbi ugotavlja, da največkrat podjetje Worldspan ni najcenejši ponudnik GDS za ponudnike turističnih storitev.
Generally, there is always a cheaper alternative present on the market than Worldspan.
Na splošno na trgu vedno obstaja nadomestna možnost, ki je cenejša od podjetja Worldspan.
Worldspan has lost market share
Podjetje Worldspan je izgubilo tržni delež
Another reason why, according to the notifying party, Worldspan does not qualify as a price maverick, is because its alleged low pricing policy has not allowed Worldspan to aggressively expand its market presence.
Po besedah priglasitelja je drugi razlog, zakaj podjetja Worldspan ni mogoče označiti kot „odpadnika pri oblikovanju cen“, ta, da mu njegova domnevna politika nizkih cen ni omogočila, da bi agresivno razširil svojo prisotnost na trgu.
The notifying party argues that, on the contrary, as the smallest GDS in the EEA for more than five years, Worldspan's market share in the EEA has not showed any signs of growth.
Priglasitelj trdi, da ravno nasprotno podjetje Worldspan kot najmanjši ponudnik v EGS več kot pet let ni pokazalo nobenih znakov rasti.
The evolution of Worldspan's market share between 2003 and 2006 shows a decrease by (0 to 5 %) in the upstream market (EEA).
Razvoj tržnega deleža podjetja Worldspan med letoma 2003 in 2006 kaže zmanjšanje za [0–5 %] na nabavnem trgu (EGS).
In relation to the downstream market, Worldspan's market shares have remained relatively stable, with annual average increases/decreases of approximately (0 to 5 %) or less, with the exception of Hungary, where growth took place between 2004 and 2005.
Na prodajnem trgu so tržni deleži podjetja Worldspan ostali sorazmerno nespremenjeni, s povprečnim letnim povečanjem/zmanjšanjem za približno [0–5 %] ali manj, pri tem pa je izjema Madžarska, kjer se je tržni delež med letoma 2004 in 2005 povečal.
Contrary to what one would expect from a company which is alleged to be a maverick, Worldspan's markets shares do not show general signs of growth.
V nasprotju s tem, kar bi se pričakovalo od družbe, ki je po domnevah odpadnik, tržni deleži podjetja Worldspan ne kažejo splošnih znakov rasti.
Finally, according to the notifying party, Worldspan can not be considered as a price maverick in the EEA, since it acts rather as a price taker than as a price setter.
Nazadnje se podjetje Worldspan po besedah priglasitelja ne more obravnavati kot odpadnik pri oblikovanju cen v EGS, ker deluje kot podjetje, ki se prilagaja cenam, in ne kot podjetje, ki jih določa.
The notifying party refers inter alia to the fact that other GDSs were first in the EEA in concluding full content agreements with five of the major EEA airlines.
Priglasitelj se med drugim sklicuje na dejstvo, da so bili drugi ponudniki GDS prvi v EGS pri sklepanju pogodb o polni vsebini s petimi glavnimi letalskimi prevozniki v EGS.
This is confirmed by the in-depth investigation.
Poglobljena raziskava to potrjuje.
Galileo/Worldspan are not each others' closest competitors
Galileo in Worldspan nista najtesnejša medsebojna konkurenta
The notifying party considers that the scope for price increases by Worldspan's prices post merger is further decreased by the fact that Galileo and Worldspan are not each others' closest competitors on the EEA market.
Priglasitelj meni, da možnost povišanja cen s strani podjetja Worldspan po združitvi dodatno zmanjšuje dejstvo, da podjetji Galileo in Worldspan nista najtesnejša medsebojna konkurenta na trgu EGS.
The in-depth investigation confirms that Galileo is generally perceived by TSPs as stronger in corporate travel, while Worldspan is stronger in leisure travel and on-line TAs.
Poglobljena raziskava potrjuje, da ponudniki turističnih storitev na splošno menijo, da je podjetje Galileo močnejše na področju poslovnih potovanj, podjetje Worldspan pa pri počitniških potovanjih in spletnih potovalnih agencijah.
Downstream, the vast majority of the TAs considers Amadeus as the closest competitor of both Galileo and Worldspan.
Na prodajni strani trga velika večina potovalnih agencij meni, da je podjetje Amadeus najbližji konkurent podjetjema Galileo in Worldspan.
There are no incentives for Worldspan to increase its prices post-merger and align them to Galileo's prices
Podjetje Worldspan nima spodbud za povišanje cen po združitvi in za njihovo prilagoditev cenam podjetja Galileo
The fact that the merging parties are not each others' closest competitors reduces the incentives for the parties to increase Worldspan's prices post-merger.
Dejstvo, da stranki, ki se združujeta, nista medsebojna najtesnejša konkurenta zmanjšuje njune spodbude za povišanje cen podjetja Worldspan po združitvi.
Moreover, the decreasing pre-merger margins of the parties indicate that the scope for higher post-merger prices is limited.
Poleg tega marže strank, ki so se pred združitvijo zmanjševale, kažejo, da je možnost višjih cen po združitvi omejena.
The likelihood of higher post-merger prices upstream is further reduced by the fact that such a price increase would trigger a potential withdrawal of content from Worldspan's GDS by the TSPs or the imposition of surcharges by the TSPs on TAs which use Worldspan.
Verjetnost višjih cen po združitvi na nabavni strani trga dodatno zmanjšuje dejstvo, da bi ponudniki turističnih storitev zaradi takega povišanja cen morda umaknili vsebino iz GDS podjetja Worldspan ali pa bi uvedli dodatna plačila za potovalne agencije, ki uporabljajo Worldspan GDS.
In summary, the Commission's in-depth investigation shows that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Worldspan charges lower prices than its competitors and that it would act as a price maverick.
Na kratko, poglobljena raziskava, ki jo je opravila Komisija, kaže, da ni dovolj dokazov za ugotovitev, da podjetje Worldspan zaračunava nižje cene kot njegovi konkurenti in da bi delovalo kot odpadnik pri oblikovanju cen.
As a result, the Decision concludes that it is unlikely that the transaction would lead to an increase of Worldspan's prices.
Zato Komisija v odločbi ugotavlja, da transakcija verjetno ne bo povzročila povišanja cen podjetja Worldspan.
Very large market shares of the parties on the downstream side of the market
Zelo veliki tržni deleži strank na prodajni strani trga
As regards the downstream side of the market, the transaction would lead to high market shares (above 40 %) in six Member States, with significant increments.
Na prodajni strani trga bi se s transakcijo povečali tržni deleži (na več kot 40 %) v šestih državah članicah, in sicer močno.
In these six Member States the market shares in 2006 range from (40 to 50 %) to (70 to 80 %).
V teh šestih državah članicah so leta 2006 tržni deleži znašali od [40–50 %] do [70–80 %].
Combined market share
Skupni tržni delež
The size of the high combined market shares in these six Member States could potentially allow the parties to behave independently of their competitors and customers post-merger and exploit their commercial relationship with TAs.
Velikost velikih skupnih tržnih deležev v teh šestih državah članicah bi lahko omogočila strankama, da po združitvi ravnata neodvisno od svojih konkurentov in uporabnikov ter izkoriščata svoj poslovni odnos s potovalnimi agencijami.
However, the in-depth investigation shows that the merger will not allow the merged firms to exert market power on the TAs in those national markets where the transaction will lead to high joint market shares.
Vendar pa poglobljena raziskava kaže, da združitev ne bo omogočila združenima podjetjema, da uveljavljata tržno moč nad potovalnimi agencijami na nacionalnih trgih, kjer bodo zaradi transakcije skupni tržni deleži veliki.
Downward trend of Galileo's market share
Trend upadanja tržnega deleža podjetja Galileo
The notifying party argues that Galileo has lost significant market shares in each of the Member States where traditionally it had an important share, due to historical links with national carriers.
Priglasitelj trdi, da je podjetje Galileo izgubilo velike tržne deleže v vseh državah članicah, v katerih je po navadi imelo pomemben delež, zaradi zgodovinskih vezi z nacionalnimi prevozniki.
The decrease in Galileo's market shares would, according to the notifying party, demonstrate that Galileo's above average market share does not reflect market power.
Zmanjšanje tržnih deležev podjetja Galileo bi po besedah priglasitelja dokazalo, da njegov nadpovprečni tržni delež ne izraža tržne moči.
The transaction is unlikely to reverse the declining trend in Galileo's market share, especially given Worldspan’s marginal role at an EEA level and its documented inability to improve its market position on the EEA market over the years.
Transakcija verjetno ne bo obrnila trenda upadanja tržnega deleža podjetja Galileo, zlasti ob upoštevanju obrobne vloge podjetja Worldspan na ravni EGS in njegove dokazane nezmožnosti izboljšanja tržnega položaja na trgu EGS v zadnjih letih.
The trend in Galileo's market shares as well as the marginal role played by Worldspan at EEA level have been confirmed by the in-depth investigation.
Trend na področju tržnih deležev podjetja Galileo in obrobno vlogo, ki jo ima podjetje Worldspan na ravni EGS, je potrdila poglobljena raziskava.
TAs are in general net receivers as they receive more financial incentives from GDSs than they pay in subscription fees to the GDSs.
Potovalne agencije so navadno neto prejemnice, ker so finančne spodbude, ki jih prejemajo od ponudnikov GDS, višje od naročnin, ki jih plačujejo ponudnikom GDS.
Incentive payments have consistently increased over the last five years, including in those Member States where the parties have high market shares (above 40 %).
Spodbujevalna plačila so se v zadnjih petih letih stalno povečevala, vključno v tistih državah članicah, v katerih imata stranki velike tržne deleže (nad 40 %).
The in-depth investigation showed that during the period 2003/2006 TA revenues have in general increased whereas the evolution of their gross margins is positive.
Poglobljena raziskava je pokazala, da so se v obdobju 2003/2006 prihodki potovalnih agencij na splošno povečevali, razvoj njihovih bruto marž pa je pozitiven.
This development shows the importance of TAs to GDSs and reflects the general view among the respondents to the in-depth investigation that competition between GDSs on the downstream market is strong.
Ta razvoj kaže pomen potovalnih agencij za ponudnike GDS in izraža splošno stališče sodelujočih v poglobljeni raziskavi, da je konkurenca med ponudniki GDS na prodajnem trgu močna.
Switching costs
Stroški prehoda
An additional reason why the transaction is unlikely to result in price increases on the downstream market is related to the fact, as confirmed by the in-depth investigation, that switching costs are not insurmountable impediments to switching.
Dodaten razlog, zakaj se cene s transakcijo na prodajnem trgu verjetno ne bodo povišale, je povezan z dejstvom, kot ga je potrdila poglobljena raziskava, da stroški prehoda niso nepremostljive ovire za prehod.
Although the quantification of switching costs is difficult, both in terms of time and training needed, as well as in financial terms, some general conclusions may be drawn from the in-depth investigation.
Čeprav je stroške prehoda težko količinsko opredeliti v smislu potrebnega časa in usposabljanja ter v finančnem smislu, je iz poglobljene raziskave mogoče izpeljati nekaj ugotovitev.
Small TAs need one or several weeks to change from one GDS to another; the training needs are not significant and their productivity is not negatively affected by the change.
Majhne potovalne agencije potrebujejo en teden ali več, da zamenjajo enega ponudnika GDS z drugim; potrebe po usposabljanju niso velike, zamenjava pa na njihovo produktivnost ne vpliva negativno.
However, large TAs estimate the time needed to switch to approximately 12 months at a significant financial cost (more than EUR 1 million).
Velike potovalne agencije pa ocenjujejo, da potrebujejo za prehod približno 12 mesecev ob velikih finančnih stroških (več kot 1 milijon EUR).
Also the needs in terms of training are higher.
Večje so tudi potrebe v smislu usposabljanja.
In particular cases (e.g. because of technical aspects of the change), the financial cost as well as the timing needed may be even higher.
V nekaterih primerih (npr. zaradi tehničnih vidikov zamenjave) so lahko finančni stroški celo višji in potreben čas celo daljši.