natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
‘Gama'a al-Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ — ‘IG’)
„Gama'a al-Islamiyya“ (alias „Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya“), „Islamic Group“ (Islamistična skupina) – „IG“;
‘İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ — ‘IBDA-C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’)
„İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi“ – „IBDA-C“ („Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front“ (Fronta islamskih bojevnikov velikega vzhoda));
‘Hizbul Mujahideen’ — ‘HM’
„Hizbul Mudjahideen“ – „HM“;
‘International Sikh Youth Federation’ — ‘ISYF’
„International Sikh Youth Federation“ – „ISYF“ (Mednarodna federacija sikhovske mladine);
‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ — ‘KZF’
„Khalistan Zindabad Force“ – „KZF“;
‘Kurdistan Workers' Party’ — ‘PKK’, (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA-GEL’)
„Kurdistan Workers' Party“ (Delavska stranka Kurdistana) – „PKK“ (alias „KADEK“, alias „KONGRA-GEL“);
‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ — ‘LTTE’
„Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam“ (Osvobodilni tigri tamilskega Eelama) – LTTE;
‘Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation’ — ‘MEK’ or ‘MKO’, excluding the ‘National Council of Resistance of Iran’ — ‘NCRI’ (a.k.a. ‘The National Liberation Army of Iran’ — ‘NLA’ (the militant wing of the ‘MEK’), a.k.a. the ‘People's Mujahidin of Iran’ — ‘PMOI’, a.k.a. ‘Muslim Iranian Student's Society’)
„Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation“ – „MEK“ ali „MKO“, brez „National Council of Resistance of Iran“ – „NCRI“ (alias „The National Liberation Army of Iran“ – „NLA“ (militantno krilo „MEK“), alias „The People's Mujahidin of Iran“ – „PMOI“, alias „Muslim Iranian Student's Society“);
‘Palestine Liberation Front’ — ‘PLF’
„Palestine Liberation Front“ (Fronta za osvoboditev Palestine) – „PLF“;
‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ — ‘PIJ’
„Palestinian Islamic Jihad“ (Palestinski islamski džihad) – „PIJ“;
‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ — ‘PFLP’
„Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine“ (Ljudska fronta za osvoboditev Palestine) – „PFLP“;
‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP — General Command’)
„Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command“ (Ljudska fronta za osvoboditev Palestine – glavno poveljstvo), alias „PFLP-General Command“ (PFLP-glavno poveljstvo);
‘Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia’ — ‘FARC’ (‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’)
„Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia“ („Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia“ (Oborožene revolucionarne sile Kolumbije)) – „FARC“;
‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ — ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’ (‘Revolutionary Left’), a.k.a. ‘Dev Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party’)
„Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi“ („Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party“ (Revolucionarna ljudska osvobodilna vojska/fronta/stranka) – „DHKP/C“, alias „Devrimci Sol“ („Revolucionary Left“ (Revolucionarna levica)), alias „Dev Sol“;
‘Sendero Luminoso’ — ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’)
„Sendero Luminoso“ („Shining Path“ (Sijoča pot)) – „SL“;
‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ — ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’)
„Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan“ – „TAK“ (alias „Kurdistan Freedom Falcons“, alias „Kurdistan Freedon Hawks“ (Kurdistanski sokoli svobode));
‘Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia’ — ‘AUC’ (‘United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia’)
„Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia“ („United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia“ (Združene samoobrambne sile/skupine Kolumbije)) – „AUC“;
amending Decision 2006/493/EC laying down the amount of Community support for rural development for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013, its annual breakdown and the minimum amount to be concentrated in regions eligible under the Convergence Objective
o spremembi Sklepa 2006/493/ES o določitvi zneska podpore Skupnosti za razvoj podeželja za obdobje od 1. januarja 2007 do 31. decembra 2013, letne razdelitve in najmanjše zneske, ki se dodelijo regijam, ki so upravičene do pomoči v okviru cilja „konvergenca“
Council Decision 2006/493/EC [2] lays down the amount of Community support for rural development for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013, its annual breakdown and the minimum amount to be concentrated in regions eligible under the Convergence Objective.
Sklep 2006/493/ES [2] določa znesek podpore Skupnosti za razvoj podeželja za obdobje od 1. januarja 2007 do 31. decembra 2013, letno razdelitev in najmanjši znesek, ki se dodeli regijam, ki so upravičene do pomoči v okviru cilja „konvergenca“.
Since the Budgetary Authority has decided to transfer certain commitment appropriations for Community support for rural development under Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 which were not used in 2007, in accordance with paragraph 48 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management [3], Decision 2006/493/EC should be amended in order to reallocate those appropriations to the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2013.
Ker se je proračunski organ v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1698/2005 odločil za prerazporeditev nekaterih razpoložljivih odobrenih sredstev za prevzem obveznosti v okviru podpore Skupnosti za razvoj podeželja, ki niso bila porabljena v letu 2007, na podlagi določb točke 48 Medinstitucionalnega sporazuma med Evropskim parlamentom, Svetom in Komisijo o proračunski disciplini in dobrem finančnem poslovodenju [3], je treba Sklep 2006/493/ES spremeniti, da se ta sredstva prerazporedijo na obdobje od 1. januarja 2008 do 31. decembra 2013.
Decision 2006/493/EC should therefore be amended accordingly,
Sklep 2006/493/ES je zato treba ustrezno spremeniti –
The Annex to Decision 2006/493/EC is replaced by the text in the Annex to this Decision.
Priloga k Sklepu 2006/493/ES se nadomesti z besedilom Priloge k temu sklepu.
This Decision shall apply as from 1 January 2008.
Ta sklep se uporablja od 1. januarja 2008 dalje.
Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 146/2008 (OJ L 46, 21.2.2008, p. 1).
Uredba, kakor je bila nazadnje spremenjena z Uredbo (ES) št. 146/2008 (UL L 46, 21.2.2008, str. 1).
Agreement last amended by Decision 2008/371/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 128, 16.5.2008, p. 8).
Sporazum, kakor je bil nazadnje spremenjen s Sklepom 2008/371/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (UL L 128, 16.5.2008, str. 8).
Total amount of commitment appropriations for 2007-13, annual breakdown and minimum amount to be concentrated in regions eligible under the Convergence Objective [1]
Skupni znesek odobrenih sredstev za prevzem obveznosti za obdobje 2007–2013, letna razdelitev in najmanjši zneski, ki se dodelijo regijam, ki so upravičene do pomoči v okviru cilja ‚konvergenca‘ [1]
2004 prices in EUR [2]
Cene v letu 2004 v EUR [2]
Total amount for EU-25 plus Bulgaria and Romania
Skupni znesek za EU-25 ter Bolgarijo in Romunijo
Minimum amount for regions eligible under the Convergence Objective
Najmanjši zneski za regije, ki so upravičene do pomoči v okviru cilja ‚konvergenca‘
Total amount of commitment appropriations for 2007-13, annual breakdown and minimum amount to be concentrated in regions eligible under the Convergence Objective [3]current prices in EUR [4]
Skupni znesek odobrenih sredstev za prevzem obveznosti za obdobje 2007–2013, letna razdelitev in najmanjši zneski, ki se dodelijo regijam, ki so upravičene do pomoči v okviru cilja ‚konvergenca‘ [3]Tekoče cene v EUR [4]
Amounts are rounded to the nearest euro.
Zneski so zaokroženi na euro.
Amounts are rounded to the nearest euro.’
Zneski so zaokroženi na euro.“
of 7 July 2008
z dne 7. julija 2008
exempting the production of electricity in Austria from the application of Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors
o izvzetju proizvodnje električne energije v Avstriji od uporabe Direktive 2004/17/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil naročnikov v vodnem, energetskem in transportnem sektorju ter sektorju poštnih storitev
(notified under document number C(2008) 3382)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2008) 3382)
Having regard to Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [1], and in particular Article 30(4) and (6) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Direktive 2004/17/ES Evropskega Parlamenta in Sveta z dne 31. marca 2004 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil naročnikov v vodnem, energetskem in transportnem sektorju ter sektorju poštnih storitev [1] in zlasti člena 30(4) in (6) Direktive,
Having regard to the request submitted by the Republic of Austria by e-mail of 10 January 2008,
ob upoštevanju zahtevka, ki ga je Republika Avstrija poslala po elektronski pošti 10. januarja 2008,
On 10 January 2008, Austria transmitted a request pursuant to Article 30(4) of Directive 2004/17/EC to the Commission by e-mail.
Avstrija je 10. januarja 2008 Komisiji po elektronski pošti poslala zahtevek v skladu s členom 30(4) Direktive 2004/17/ES.
The Commission requested additional information by e-mail of 4 February 2008, which, following a prolongation of the initial deadline, was transmitted by the Austrian authorities by e-mail of 29 February 2008.
Komisija je v elektronski pošti z dne 4. februarja 2008 zahtevala dodatne informacije, ki so jih avstrijski organi po podaljšanju prvotnega roka posredovali po elektronski pošti 29. februarja 2008.
The request submitted by the Republic of Austria concerns production of electricity.
Zahtevek Republike Avstrije se nanaša na proizvodnjo električne energije.
The request is accompanied by a letter from the independent national authority, E-Control (Energie-Control GmbH, the regulator of the Austrian electricity and natural gas markets), which limits itself to a statement that ‘… no objection exists against an exemption from the application of Public Procurement Law in the field of electricity generation.’
Zahtevku je priložen dopis neodvisnega državnega organa E-Control (Energie-Control GmbH, ki ureja avstrijska trga električne energije in zemeljskega plina), ki se omejuje na izjavo, da „… ni pripomb proti izvzetju od uporabe zakona o javnih naročilih na področju proizvodnje električne energije.“
Article 30 of Directive 2004/17/EC provides that contracts intended to enable the performance of one of the activities to which the Directive applies shall not be subject to the Directive if, in the Member State in which it is carried out, the activity is directly exposed to competition on markets to which access is not restricted.
Člen 30 Direktive 2004/17/ES določa, da se Direktiva ne uporablja za naročila, katerih namen je omogočiti opravljanje ene od dejavnosti, na katere se Direktiva nanaša, če je v državi članici, v kateri se dejavnost opravlja, dejavnost neposredno izpostavljena konkurenci na trgih, na katere dostop ni omejen.
Austria has implemented and applied not only Directive 96/92/EC but also Directive 2003/54/EC, opting for legal and functional unbundling for transmission and distribution networks except for the smallest companies, which are exempted from the requirements of functional unbundling.
Avstrija ne izvaja in uporablja samo Direktive 96/92/ES, ampak tudi Direktivo 2003/54/ES, pri čemer je izbrala pravno in funkcionalno ločevanje za prenosno in distribucijsko omrežje, razen za najmanjša podjetja, ki so izvzeta iz zahteve funkcionalnega ločevanja.
In respect of the markets concerned by this decision, the market share of the main players on a given market constitutes one criterion which should be taken into account.
V zvezi s trgi, na katere se nanaša ta odločba, je eno od meril, ki jih je treba upoštevati, tržni delež glavnih akterjev.
Given the characteristics of the markets concerned, further criteria should also be taken into account such as the functioning of the balancing market, price competition and the degree of customer switching.
Glede na značilnosti zadevnih trgov bi bilo treba upoštevati tudi druga merila, kot so delovanje izravnalnega trga, cenovna konkurenca in stopnja menjav dobavitelja.
The request submitted by Austria concerns production of electricity in Austria.
Zahtevek Avstrije se nanaša na proizvodnjo električne energije v tej državi.
Austria is divided into three balancing zones and internal congestion points are experienced within one of these (the APG balancing zone in which congestion can arise between the Vienna and Graz areas, interconnected through the Steirmarkleitung).
Avstrija je razdeljena na tri izravnalna območja in v enem od teh se pojavljajo notranje točke prezasedenosti (izravnalno območje APG, v katerem se lahko pojavi prezasedenost med območji Dunaja in Gradca, ki sta medsebojno povezani prek t. i. „Steirmarkleitung“).
The question could therefore be raised whether the geographical market would be smaller than national [4].
Zato bi se lahko zastavilo vprašanje, ali obstaja geografski trg, ki je manjši od državnega [4].
However, according to the available information, in most cases the effects of these internal congestion points are coped with through the application of technical measures such as the appliance of phase shifters to control transmission capacity.
Vendar se glede na razpoložljive informacije v večini primerov posledice teh notranjih točk prezasedenosti odpravljajo z uporabo tehničnih ukrepov, kot je uporaba preklopnikov napetosti za nadzor prenosne zmogljivosti.
In a few cases it may be necessary to use additional power plants to stabilise the network.
V nekaterih primerih bi bilo morda treba uporabiti dodatne elektrarne, da se omrežje stabilizira.
When these internal congestion points require that producers in the north of Austria reduce their generation capacity, which according to the Austrian authorities takes place only exceptionally, they are paid damages by the network operator.
Če se zaradi teh notranjih točk prezasedenosti od proizvajalcev na severu Avstrije zahteva, da zmanjšajo svojo proizvodno zmogljivost, kar se po navedbi avstrijskih organov zgodi le redko, upravljavec omrežja zadevnim proizvajalcem plača odškodnino.
Furthermore, there are no congestion points between this balancing zone and the two other Austrian balancing zones, nor between the APG balancing zone and Germany.
Poleg tega med tem izravnalnim območjem in drugima dvema avstrijskima izravnalnima območjema ter med izravnalnim območjem APG in Nemčijo ni točk prezasedenosti.
The effect of the internal congestion points are therefore, according to the available information, not significant in terms of energy supply and competition.
Posledice notranjih točk prezasedenosti zato glede na razpoložljive informacije niso pomembne z vidika dobave električne energije in konkurence.
The absence of congestion in the connections with Germany has raised the question whether a geographical market covering these two countries might exist, which the Commission has concluded not to be the case [5].
Ker pri povezavah z Nemčijo ni prezasedenosti, se je pojavilo vprašanje, ali morda obstaja geografski trg, ki pokriva ti dve državi. Komisija je prišla do sklepa, da tak trg ne obstaja [5].
Consequently, the territory of the Republic of Austria should be considered to constitute the relevant market for the purposes of evaluating the conditions laid down in Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC, although it cannot be seen as being isolated from the surrounding countries.
Zato se za ozemlje Republike Avstrije šteje, da predstavlja ustrezen trg za namene ocenjevanja pogojev, določenih s členom 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES, čeprav se ga ne more šteti za ločenega od sosednjih držav.
The Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market [6], hereafter referred to as the ‘2005 Report’, states that ‘many national markets display a high degree of concentration of the industry, impeding the development of effective competition’ [7].
Komisija je v svojem sporočilu Svetu in Evropskemu parlamentu z naslovom „Poročilo o napredku pri oblikovanju notranjega trga s plinom in električno energijo“ [6] (v nadaljevanju: poročilo iz leta 2005) navedla, da „mnogo nacionalnih trgov kaže visoko stopnjo koncentracije industrije, ki ovira razvoj učinkovite konkurence“ [7].
Consequently, it considered that, in respect of electricity generation, ‘one indicator for the degree of competition on national markets is the total market share of the biggest three producers’ [8].
Zato je menila, da je v zvezi s proizvodnjo električne energije „eden od pokazateljev stopnje konkurence na nacionalnih trgih […] skupni tržni delež treh največjih proizvajalcev“ [8].
For 2006, the share of the three largest generators is indicated as 52,2 % in the Commission Staff Working Document of 15 April 2008, SEC(2008) 460 [9].
Za leto 2006 je v delovnem dokumentu služb Komisije z dne 15. aprila 2008 (SEC(2008) 460) [9] delež treh največjih proizvajalcev naveden kot 52,2 %. Vendar Avstrija električno energijo veliko izvaža in uvaža.
However, Austria has substantial exports and imports of electricity, in 2005 of the order of more than 17500 GWh exports and over 20000 GWh imports.
Leta 2005 jo je izvozila več kot 17500 GWh, uvozila pa več kot 20000 GWh.
It is thus a net importer and imported electricity accounted for approximately a quarter [10] of its total needs [11], in particular for base load power.
Zato velja za neto uvoznico, električna energija, ki jo je uvozila, pa znaša približno četrtino [10] njenih celotnih potreb [11], zlasti za električno energijo za osnovno obremenitev.
There is therefore a certain degree of constraint on the pricing behaviour of the leading Austrian producers through imports of electricity from outside the Austrian territory and as a result investment in the electricity sector inside the Austrian territory takes into account other producers in the surrounding countries, in particular in Germany.
Pri vodilnih avstrijskih proizvajalcih se zato opaža določeno zadržanost pri določanju cen zaradi uvoza električne energije iz tujine, pri naložbah v sektor električne energije znotraj avstrijskega ozemlja pa se upoštevajo drugi proizvajalci iz sosednjih držav, zlasti iz Nemčije.
These factors should therefore be taken as an indication of a certain degree of direct exposure to competition as regards production of electricity.
Te dejavnike je treba zato upoštevati kot pokazatelje določene stopnje neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci, kar zadeva proizvodnjo električne energije.
Furthermore, even though they represent a small part of the total amount of electricity produced and/or consumed in a Member State, the functioning of the balancing markets should also be considered as an additional indicator.
Poleg tega je treba delovanje izravnalnih trgov, kljub temu, da predstavljajo majhen del skupne količine električne energije, proizvedene in/ali potrošene v državi članici, prav tako šteti za dodatni pokazatelj.
In fact, ‘any market participant who cannot easily match its generation portfolio to the characteristics of its customers may find itself exposed to the difference between the price at which the transmission system operator (hereinafter TSO) will sell imbalance energy, and the price at which it will buy back excess production.
Dejansko „je lahko kateri koli udeleženec na trgu, ki le s težavo prilagodi svoj proizvodni portfelj lastnostim svojih strank, izpostavljen razliki med ceno, po kateri bo upravljavec prenosnih omrežij prodajal izravnalno električno energijo, in ceno, po kateri bo odkupil presežno proizvodnjo.
These prices may either be directly imposed by the regulator on the TSO; or alternatively a market based mechanism will be used in which the price is determined by bids from other producers to regulate their production upwards or downwards […].
Te cene lahko upravljavcem prenosnih omrežij neposredno predpiše regulatorni organ ali pa se kot druga rešitev uporabi tržni mehanizem, po katerem se cena določi na podlagi ponudb drugih proizvajalcev, ki lahko tako svojo proizvodnjo popravijo navzgor ali navzdol […].
A key difficulty for small market participants arises where there is the risk of a large spread between the buying price from the TSO and the selling price.
Glavna težava za male udeležence na trgu se pojavi, kadar obstaja nevarnost velike razlike med nakupno ceno upravljavca prenosnih omrežij in prodajno ceno.
A high spread may be indicative of an insufficient level of competition in the balancing market which may be dominated by only one or two main generators’ [12]. The Austrian balancing market and its main characteristics — in particular its market based pricing and a relatively low spread [13] between the buying price from the TSO and the selling price — are such that it should be taken as an additional indicator that electricity production is directly exposed to competition.
Velika razlika je lahko znak nezadostne stopnje konkurence na izravnalnem trgu, na katerem lahko prevladujeta samo eden ali dva glavna proizvajalca.“ [12] Glavne značilnosti avstrijskega izravnalnega trga – zlasti tržno določanje cen ter nizka cenovna razlika [13] med nakupno ceno upravljavca prenosnega omrežja in prodajno ceno – pa so takšne, da lahko veljajo kot dodatni pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti proizvodnje električne energije konkurenci.
Given the characteristics of the product concerned (electricity) and the scarcity or unavailability of suitable substitutable products or services, price competition and price formation assume greater importance when assessing the competitive state of the electricity markets.
Ob upoštevanju značilnosti zadevnega proizvoda (električne energije) in pomanjkanja primernih nadomestnih proizvodov ali storitev je treba cenovni konkurenci in oblikovanju cen pri ocenjevanju stanja konkurence na trgih električne energije pripisati večji pomen.
In respect of large industrial (end-)users, who are most liable to procure their electricity directly from suppliers which are at the same time generators, the number of customers switching supplier may serve as an indicator of price competition and, thus, indirectly, ‘a natural indicator of the effectiveness of competition.
Pri industrijskih (končnih) uporabnikih, ki električno energijo prejemajo najbolj neposredno od dobaviteljev, ki so hkrati tudi proizvajalci, je število odjemalcev, ki menjajo dobavitelje, lahko pokazatelj cenovne konkurence in zato posredno „naravni pokazatelj učinkovitosti konkurence.
Although the retaining of controls may be justified in a period of transition, these will increasingly cause distortions as the need for investment approaches’ [15].
Čeprav je v prehodnem obdobju ohranitev nadzora mogoče upravičiti, bo le-ta povzročal še večje izkrivljanje, ko se bo pojavila potreba po naložbah“ [15].
According to the latest available information, switching rates amount to 41,5 % for large and very large industrial customers in Austria [16].
Glede na zadnje razpoložljive podatke delež odjemalcev, ki zamenjajo ponudnika, znaša 41,5 % za velike in zelo velike industrijske odjemalce v Avstriji [16].
Furthermore, there is no end-user price control [17] in Austria, that is, prices are set by the economic operators themselves and do not have to be approved by any authority prior to their application.
Poleg tega v Avstriji ni nadzora nad cenami za končne uporabnike [17], kar pomeni, da cene določijo gospodarski subjekti sami in jih pred njihovo uporabo ni treba odobriti nobenemu drugemu organu.
The situation in Austria is therefore satisfactory as far as switching of large and very large industrial (end-)users and end-user price control are concerned and should be taken as an indicator of direct exposure to competition.
Stanje v Avstriji je zato zadovoljivo, kar zadeva menjave velikih in zelo velikih industrijskih (končnih) uporabnikov in nadzor nad cenami za končne uporabnike, in mora veljati kot pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci.