natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Further, there are many other factors determining and limiting the choice of the terminals for each customer, such as the participation in part cargo services [5], additional services and storage capacity of terminals, risk of congestions, the number and location of the customer’s plants, accessibility to and suitability of barge or train connection, the security of supply (e.g. in the periods of low water in the river Rhine) or the existence of long-term contracts with the providers of the inland transport.
Poleg tega je še veliko drugih dejavnikov, ki za vsakega odjemalca določajo in omejujejo izbiro terminala, kot so udeležba v storitvah za zbirne prevoze tovora [5], dodatne zmogljivosti terminalov glede storitev in skladiščenja, možnost zastojev, število in lokacija odjemalčevih obratov, dostopnost do in primernost/ugodnost povezav s tovornimi čolni in vlaki, varnost dobave (npr. v obdobjih nizkega vodostaja reke Ren) ali obstoj dolgoročnih pogodb s ponudniki prevoza po celini.
This analysis confirmed that the scope for substitution between the ABT terminal and the EMO-EKOM terminal is very limited.
Ta analiza je potrdila, da je možnost prehajanja med terminalom ABT in podjetjem EMO-EKOM zelo omejena.
Based on the market investigation, the decision quantifies the actual possibilities of substitution: the volumes for which ABT can substitute EMO-EKOM are marginal in relation to EMO-EKOM’s total volume (less than 5 %).
Na podlagi tržne raziskave so v odločbi količinsko opredeljene dejanske možnosti zamenjave: količine, za katere lahko terminal ABT zamenja podjetje EMO-EKOM, so stranskega pomena v primerjavi s celotnim obsegom podjetja EMO-EKOM (manj kot 5 %).
These volumes do not put competitive pressure on EMO-EKOM, in particular as the most important customers do not intend to switch.
Te količine ne pomenijo konkurenčnega pritiska na podjetje EMO-EKOM, zlasti ker najpomembnejši odjemalci ne nameravajo zamenjati terminala.
The volumes for which EMO-EKOM can substitute ABT are also small in relation to ABT’s volume (less than 10 %).
Količine, za katere lahko podjetje EMO-EKOM zamenja terminal ABT, so tudi majhne v primerjavi z obsegom terminala ABT (manj kot 10 %).
These volumes only put very limited competitive pressure on ABT, in particular because ABT’s most important customers do not intend to switch.
Te količine pomenijo le majhen konkurenčni pritisk na terminal ABT, zlasti ker najpomembnejši odjemalci terminala ABT tega ne nameravajo zamenjati z drugim.
All this supports the conclusion that Rotterdam/Amsterdam/Zeeland is a separate geographic market from Antwerp/Ghent/Dunkirk [6].
Vse to potrjuje ugotovitev, da je Rotterdam/Amsterdam/Zeeland drug geografski trg kot Antwerpen/Gent/Dunkerque [6].
Conditions of competition are not the same in these two areas.
Pogoji konkurence na teh dveh območjih niso enaki.
However, there is some limited fringe competition between these geographic markets.
Vendar pa je med tema geografskima trgoma določena omejena konkurenca s prevladujočim ponudnikom.
This fringe competition mainly targets volumes of traders.
Cilj te konkurence s prevladujočim ponudnikom so v glavnem količine tovora trgovcev.
On the other hand, as regards the transhipment traffic for coal and iron ore, the relevant geographic would be broader, covering all main deep-sea ports in the Gothenburg — Le Havre range including UK and Irish deep-sea ports.
Kar po drugi strani zadeva promet s pretovarjanjem za premog in železovo rudo, bi bil upoštevni geografski trg širši, saj bi zajemal vsa glavna pristanišča za ladje za oceansko plovbo na področju Göteborg – Le Havre, vključno z britanskimi in irskimi.
Terminals services for hinterland traffic for coal and iron ore
Terminalske storitve za promet v notranjosti države za premog in železovo rudo
Unilateral effects
Enostranski učinki
Strengthening of ABT’s dominance in Antwerp
Krepitev prevladujočega položaja terminala ABT v Antwerpnu
ABT is dominant on the Antwerp market (market share 100 %) for terminal services for hinterland traffic for coal and iron ore [7] where it is only facing fringe competition.
Terminal ABT ima prevladujoči položaj na antwerpenskem trgu (100-odstotni tržni delež) za terminalske storitve za promet v notranjosti države za premog in železovo rudo [7], saj gre tam zgolj za konkurenco s prevladujočim ponudnikom.
The decision analyses whether Sea-Invest may have the possibilities and incentives to use its joint control in EMO-EKOM to restrict or eliminate this fringe competition.
Odločba analizira, ali bi podjetje Sea-Invest lahko imelo možnost in povod za to, da izkoristi svoj skupni nadzor v podjetju EMO-EKOM ter tako omeji ali odpravi to konkurenco s prevladujočim ponudnikom.
This joint control in EMO-EKOM will provide Sea-Invest it with a possibility to veto (but not actively determine) strategic decisions, in particular concerning the business plan and budget, appointment of management or major investments.
Ta skupni nadzor v podjetju EMO-EKOM bo podjetju Sea-Invest omogočil možnost veta na strateške odločitve (ne bo pa jih aktivno določal), zlasti glede poslovnega načrta in proračuna, imenovanja uprave in glavnih naložb.
Its participation in the board also provides it with some general information about EMO-EKOM’s business policy and strategic planning.
Njegova udeležba v upravi mu omogoča tudi splošne informacije o poslovni politiki in strateškem načrtovanju podjetja EMO-EKOM.
However, these powers cannot strengthen Sea-Invest’s position because the fringe customers can switch to alternative terminals.
Vendar se zaradi te moči položaj podjetja Sea-Invest ne more okrepiti, saj prevladujoči odjemalci lahko zamenjajo terminal.
The in-depth investigation confirmed that none of the fringe customers of ABT would solely depend on EMO-EKOM.
Temeljita raziskava je potrdila, da ni nobeden prevladujoči odjemalec terminala ABT odvisen samo od podjetja EMO-EKOM.
On the contrary, most of these customers identified other terminals, e.g. OBA and Rietlanden in Amsterdam and RBT in Rotterdam, as the best possible alternatives to ABT.
Ravno nasprotno, večina teh odjemalcev je kot najboljše možne alternative terminala ABT navedla druge terminale, npr. OBA in Rietlanden v Amsterdamu ter RBT v Rotterdamu.
Similarly, the fringe customers which are able to switch volumes from EMO-EKOM to ABT confirmed to have more and better alternatives, in particular other terminals in Rotterdam and Amsterdam.
Podobno so prevladujoči odjemalci, ki lahko zamenjajo količine v podjetju EMO-EKOM za terminal ABT, potrdili, da imajo več alternativ in da so te boljše – zlasti druge terminale v Rotterdamu in Amsterdamu.
Given the limited volumes of the fringe customers, these terminals would also have necessary available capacities to absorb their tonnages.
Zaradi omejenih količin prevladujočih odjemalcev bi ti terminali morali imeti tudi razpoložljive zmogljivosti za prevzem njihovih tonaž.
Further, the investigation showed that Sea-Invest would not have any incentive to use its veto powers to block important decisions in order to try to further decrease the limited competitive pressure from EMO-EKOM.
Raziskava je tudi pokazala, da podjetje Sea-Invest ne bi imelo nobenega povoda za to, da z uveljavljanjem pravice do veta ovira sprejetje pomembnih odločitev, da bi tako še bolj zmanjšalo omejeni konkurenčni pritisk podjetja EMO-EKOM.
Considering the limited volumes of fringe customers and focus of EMO-EKOM on the increasing coal imports to Germany, the costs of such veto for Sea-Invest would not be outweighed by its benefits.
Glede na omejene količine prevladujočih odjemalcev in osredotočenje podjetja EMO-EKOM na vse večji uvoz premoga iz Nemčije, koristi takega veta za podjetje Sea-Invest ne bi odtehtale njegovih stroškov.
Unilateral price increase of EMO-EKOM
Enostransko zvišanje cen podjetja EMO-EKOM
Another possible theory of harm concerns the unilateral effect of the transaction which might provide EMO-EKOM with the ability and incentive to increase prices.
Druga možna teorija škode zadeva enostranski učinek transakcije, ki bi podjetju EMO-EKOM lahko dala možnost in povod za zvišanje cen.
Such unilateral effect would be possible if pre-merger (i) Sea-Invest represented competitive constraints for EMO-EKOM preventing it from increasing its prices and (ii) the concentration eliminated or substantially weakened these competitive constraints on EMO-EKOM.
Tak enostranski učinek bi bil mogoč, če bi pred združitvijo (i) podjetje Sea-Invest pomenilo konkurenčni pritisk za podjetje EMO-EKOM in mu tako preprečevalo dvig cen ter (ii) bi koncentracija odpravila ali znatno zmanjšala ta konkurenčni pritisk na podjetje EMO-EKOM.
The in-depth market investigation demonstrated that none of these two conditions is fulfilled.
Temeljita tržna raziskava je pokazala, da nobeden od teh pogojev ni izpolnjen.
First, EMO-EKOM and Sea-Invest are in different geographic markets and any possible constraints exercised by Sea-Invest terminals on EMO-EKOM are limited only to the less than 5 % of the total volumes handled by EMO-EKOM.
Prvič, podjetji EMO-EKOM in Sea-Invest sta na različnih geografskih trgih in kakršni koli pritiski s strani terminalov podjetja Sea-Invest na podjetje EMO-EKOM so omejeni zgolj na manj kot 5 % vseh količin, ki jih tovori podjetje EMO-EKOM.
Further, customers of EMO-EKOM identified most often as possible substitutes other terminals in Rotterdam or Amsterdam, in particular OBA or Rietlanden.
Odjemalci podjetja EMO-EKOM so kot možne zamenjave najpogosteje navedli druge terminale v Rotterdamu ali Amsterdamu, zlasti terminala OBA in Rietlanden.
Second, even if there were any competitive constraints by Sea-Invest terminals on EMO-EKOM, it is highly unlikely that the acquisition of a co-controlling stake would substantially weaken these constraints.
Drugič, tudi če bi terminali podjetja Sea-Invest pomenili konkurenčni pritisk na podjetje EMO-EKOM, je zelo malo možnosti, da bi pridobitev kontrolnega deleža ta pritisk znatno zmanjšala.
Sea-Invest would have no incentive to relax ABT’s competition vis-à-vis EMO-EKOM as it will need to attract tonnages to Antwerp as it will not, contrary to Rotterdam, profit in any significant way from the increased imports of coal to Germany.
Podjetje Sea-Invest ne bi imelo povoda za sprostitev konkurence terminala ABT do podjetja EMO-EKOM, saj bo moralo pritegniti tonažo v Antwerpen, ker nasprotno kot Rotterdam ne bo imelo bistvene koristi od povečanega uvoza premoga v Nemčijo.
The transaction thus does not lead to any competition concerns due to unilateral effects strengthening the dominance of Sea-Invest or enabling a price increase by EMO-EKOM.
Transakcija zato ne povzroča pomislekov glede konkurence z vidika enostranskih učinkov, ki bi krepili prevladujoči položaj podjetja Sea-Invest ali podjetju EMO-EKOM omogočili zvišanje cen.
The Art 6(1)(c) decision identified as a possible competition concern also the coordination of behaviour between Sea-Invest and EMO-EKOM as well as other terminals (OBA, EBS, RBT, OVET) controlled by the shareholders of EMO-EKOM due to the structural links created between Sea-Invest and EMO-EKOM, HES and Manufrance.
V členu 6(1)(c) odločbe je kot možni pomislek glede konkurence navedeno tudi usklajevanje vedenja med podjetji Sea-Invest in EMO-EKOM ter drugimi terminali (OBA, EBS, RBT, OVET), ki jih zaradi strukturnih povezav, nastalih med podjetji Sea-Invest in EMO-EKOM ter HES in Manufrance, nadzorujejo delničarji podjetja EMO-EKOM.
However, taking into account the geographic markets defined above, terminals controlled by Sea-Invest on the one hand, and EMO-EKOM and other terminals controlled by HES and Manufrance on the other hand are active on separate markets.
Vendar z upoštevanjem geografskih trgov, opredeljenih zgoraj, terminali, ki jih nadzorujejo podjetje Sea-Invest na eni ter podjetje EMO-EKOM in drugi terminali, ki jih nadzorujeta podjetji HES in Manufrance, na drugi strani, poslujejo na različnih trgih.
Therefore, anti-competitive coordination of their behaviour due to the transaction is unlikely considering the limited competitive constraints between them.
Zato je glede na omejen konkurenčni pritisk med njimi protikonkurenčno usklajevanje njihovega vedenja zaradi transakcije malo verjetno.
To the extent that there is some fringe competition between ABT and other terminals in the ARA range, the in-depth investigation brought no evidence that the transaction might lead to coordinated effects.
Kolikor med terminalom ABT in drugimi terminali na območju ARA obstaja določena omejena konkurenca s prevladujočim ponudnikom, temeljita raziskava ni dala dokazov, da bi imela transakcija usklajene učinke.
The investigation showed that the management of the terminals is rather independent in the operational running of terminals, including pricing policy for individual customers or expansion plans.
Raziskava je pokazala, da je upravljanje terminalov neodvisno pri operativnem vodenju terminalov, vključno s politiko določanja cen za posamezne odjemalce ali širitvenimi načrti.
Any coordination is also less likely due to the fact that the shareholders of EMO-EKOM would still be rather heterogeneous as regards their scope of activities and vertical integration.
Kakršno koli usklajevanje je tudi manj verjetno zaradi dejstva, da bi bili delničarji podjetja EMO-EKOM kljub temu heterogeni, kar zadeva njihov obseg dejavnosti in vertikalno integracijo.
The transparency of the market as regard price conditions agreed upon in negotiations with individual customers is limited.
Kar zadeva cenovne pogoje, ki se sprejmejo med pogajanji s posameznimi odjemalci, je preglednost trga omejena.
Due to particularities of each customer in particular as regards its geographic location, the terminal services cannot be regarded as homogenous.
Zaradi posebnosti vsakega odjemalca, zlasti glede njegove geografske lokacije, se terminalske storitve ne morejo šteti za homogene.
Further, the in-depth investigation did not provide any evidence of a credible deterrent mechanism.
Poleg tega temeljita raziskava ni našla dokazov o prepričljivem odvračilnem mehanizmu.
Finally, both other competitors (in particular Rietlanden) as well as large customers represent important constraints able to jeopardise the outcome expected form the coordination.
Oba konkurenta (zlasti terminal Rietlanden) in veliki odjemalci pomenijo pomemben pritisk, ki bi lahko ogrozil izid, ki se pričakuje od usklajevanja.
Taking into account the above, the transaction does not lead to competition concerns due to coordinated effects between Sea-Invest, EMO-EKOM, HES and Manufrance.
Ob upoštevanju zgoraj navedenega transakcija zaradi usklajenih učinkov med podjetji Sea-Invest, EMO-EKOM, HES in Manufrance ne povzroča pomislekov glede konkurence.
The market investigation also confirmed that the transaction will not lead to any coordination between Sea-Invest, HES and Manufrance in the market for terminal services for other dry bulk.
Tržna raziskava je tudi potrdila, da transakcija na trgu za terminalske storitve za drugi suhi razsuti tovor ne bo povzročila kakršnega koli usklajevanja med podjetji Sea-Invest, HES in Manufrance.
There are no indications that the entry of Sea-Invest as a shareholder in the coal and iron ore terminal EMO-EKOM could lead to coordination with HES and Manufrance in other dry bulk.
Ni videti, da bi lahko nastop podjetja Sea-Invest kot delničarja terminala podjetja EMO-EKOM za premog in železovo rudo povzročil usklajevanje s podjetjema HES in Manufrance na področju drugega suhega razsutega tovora.
Further, there are a number of independent terminals handling other dry bulk in the ARA range.
Poleg tega obstajajo številni neodvisni terminali za tovorjenje drugega suhega razsutega tovora na območju ARA.
Terminals services for transhipment traffic for coal and iron ore
Terminalske storitve za promet s pretovarjanjem za premog in železovo rudo
The decision concludes that the transaction does not lead to any competition concerns in the market for terminal services for transhipment traffic for coal and iron ore considering the limited transhipment volumes of Sea-Invest and EMO-EKOM and the presence of multiple alternatives terminals.
V odločbi je ugotovljeno, da transakcija ob upoštevanju omejenih količin pretovarjanja blaga s strani podjetij Sea-Invest in EMO-EKOM ter obstoja številnih alternativnih terminalov ne povzroča pomislekov glede konkurence na trgu terminalskih storitev za promet s pretovarjanjem premoga in železove rude.
The Decision concludes that the proposed concentration will not give rise to any competition concerns as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it.
V odločbi je ugotovljeno, da predlagana koncentracija ne bo povzročila pomislekov glede konkurence, ki bi bistveno ovirali učinkovito konkurenco na skupnem trgu ali njegovem znatnem delu.
Consequently, the Commission declares the notified transaction compatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da je v skladu s členom 8(1) Uredbe o združitvah in členom 57 Sporazuma EGP priglašena koncentracija združljiva s skupnim trgom in Sporazumom EGP.
A wide range of various commodities such as zinc concentrates and other non-ferrous concentrates, cement clinkers, pig iron, kaolin, phosphates and other minerals, cokes, pet-cokes, anthracites, etc.
Najrazličnejši proizvodi, kot so cinkovi in drugi neželezovi koncentrati, cementni klinkerji, surovo železo, kaolin, fosfati in drugi minerali, koks, naftni koks, antraciti itd.
I.e. from deep-sea ship directly to inland barge, train or truck.
Tj. z ladje za oceansko plovbo neposredno na tovorni čoln za prevoz po celini, vlak ali tovornjak.
I.e. from deep-sea ship to relay/feeder vessel.
Tj. z ladje za oceansko plovbo na vmesno plovilo/plovilo feeder.
Also called ‘parcel services’.
Imenovane tudi „storitve kosovnih pošiljk“.
A part cargo service carries cargo of several customers who do not import sufficient quantities to make it economical to charter a vessel independently.
Storitve za zbirne prevoze tovora so storitve prevoza tovora več odjemalcev, ki ne uvažajo zadostnih količin blaga, da bi bilo zanje gospodarno samostojno najeti plovilo.
It can be left open whether the ports of Ghent and Dunkirk are in the same geographic market as Antwerp or form a separate market (which is in any case different to the Dutch ports).
Ugotovitev, ali sta pristanišči Gent in Dunkerque v istem geografskem trgu kot Antwerpen ali tvorita drug trg (ki se v vsakem primeru razlikuje od nizozemskih pristanišč), lahko ostane odprta.
Under both alternatives, the transaction does not lead to competition concerns.
Transakcija v nobenem primeru ne povzroči pomislekov glede konkurence.
Sea-Invest is also dominant if the ports of Ghent and Dunkirk were included in the geographic market as the terminals handling coal and iron ore for non-captive customers are controlled by Sea-Invest.
Podjetje Sea-Invest ima prevladujoč položaj tudi, če sta pristanišči Gent in Dunkerque vključeni v geografski trg, saj terminale za tovorjenje premoga in železove rude za odjemalce, ki niso vezani na monopol, nadzira podjetje Sea-Invest.
The following analysis would be the same if Ghent and Dunkirk were in the same market as Antwerp.
Analiza bi bila enaka, če bi pristanišči Gent in Dunkerque spadali v isti trg kot Antwerpen.
The cost difference between Antwerp and Rotterdam for these regions ranges between 20 % and 50 % of the average terminal fee.
Razlika v cenah za ta območja med Antwerpnom in Rotterdamom znaša od 20–50 % povprečne terminalske pristojbine.
This limits the economic incentive of customers to switch between Antwerp and Rotterdam in reaction to a 10 % increase in the terminal fee.
To omejuje ekonomsko spodbudo uporabnikom, da zaradi 10-odstotnega povišanja terminalskih pristojbin izbirajo med Antwerpnom in Rotterdamom.
of 19 October 2007
z dne 19. oktobra 2007
(notified under document number C(2007) 5054)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2007) 5054)
Following the notification of outbreaks of bluetongue serotype 1 in July 2007 in the south of Spain, Spain has established a restriction zone on account of this outbreak.
Španija je po uradnem obvestilu o izbruhih bolezni modrikastega jezika serotipa 1 na jugu Španije julija 2007 vzpostavila območje z omejitvami.
Following a substantiated request by Spain, it is appropriate to amend the demarcation of the restricted zone E in Annex I to Decision 2005/393/EC and to create a new zone where serotypes 1 and 4 are coexisting.
Glede na utemeljeno zahtevo, ki jo je predložila Španija, je primerno spremeniti razmejitev območja z omejitvami E v Prilogi I k Odločbi 2005/393/EGS in vzpostaviti novo območje, kjer sta hkrati prisotna serotipa 1 in 4.
Following a substantiated request submitted by France and Germany, it is appropriate to amend the demarcation of the restricted zone in France and Germany.
Glede na utemeljeni zahtevi, ki sta ju predložila Francija in Nemčija, je primerno spremeniti razmejitev območja z omejitvami v Franciji in Nemčiji.
Following the enlargement of the restricted zone in Germany due to the recent outbreaks in Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein, it is appropriate to demarcate restricted zones in the Czech Republic and in Denmark.
Po razširitvi območja z omejitvami v Nemčiji zaradi nedavnih izbruhov na Bavarskem in v Schleswig-Holsteinu je primerno razmejiti območja z omejitvami na Češkem in Danskem.
Done at Brussels, 19 October 2007.
V Bruslju, 19. oktobra 2007
Autonomous Region of Extremadura: provinces of Cáceres, Badajoz,
avtonomna pokrajina Ekstremadura: province Cáceres, Badajoz
Autonomous Region of Andalucia: provinces of Cádiz, Córdoba, Huelva, Jaén (comarcas of Alcalá la Real, Andújar, Huelma, Jaén, Linares, Santiesteban del Puerto, Ubeda), Málaga, Sevilla,
avtonomna pokrajina Andaluzija: province Cádiz, Córdoba, Huelva, Jaén (okraji Alcalá la Real, Andújar, Huelma, Jaén, Linares, Santiesteban del Puerto, Úbeda), Málaga, Sevilla
Autonomous Region of Castilla-La Mancha: provinces of Albacete (comarca of Alcaraz), Ciudad Real, Toledo,
avtonomna pokrajina Castilla-La Mancha: province Albacete (okraj Alcaraz), Ciudad Real, Toledo
Autonomous Region of Castilla y León: provinces of Avila (comarcas of Arenas de San Pedro, Candeleda, Cebreros, El Barco De Ávila, Las Navas del Marqués, Navaluenga, Sotillo de la Adrada), Salamanca (comarcas of Béjar, Ciudad Rodrigo and Sequeros),
avtonomna pokrajina Castilla y León: province Ávila (okraji Arenas de San Pedro, Candeleda, Cebreros, El Barco De Ávila, Las Navas del Marqués, Navaluenga, Sotillo de la Adrada), Salamanca (okraji Béjar, Ciudad Rodrigo in Sequeros)
Autonomous Region of Madrid: province of Madrid (comarcas of Alcalá de Henares, Aranjuez, Arganda del Rey, Colmenar Viejo, El Escorial, Grinon, Municipio de Madrid, Navalcarnero, San Martín de Valdeiglesias, Torrelaguna, Villarejo de Salvanés).’
avtonomna pokrajina Madrid: provinca Madrid (okraji Alcalá de Henares, Aranjuez, Arganda del Rey, Colmenar Viejo, El Escorial, Griñón, občina Madrid, Navalcarnero, San Martín de Valdeiglesias, Torrelaguna, Villarejo de Salvanés).“
Département de l’Aisne,
departma Aisne
Département des Ardennes,
departma Ardennes
Département de l’Aube,
departma Aube
Département du Cher: cantons d’Aix-d’Angillon, de Baugy, de La Guerche-sur-l’Aubois, de Henrichemont, de Léré, de Nérondes, de Sancergues, de Sancerre, de Sancoins, de Vailly-sur-Sauldre,
departma Cher: kantoni d’Aix-d’Angillon, Baugy, La Guerche-sur-l’Aubois, Henrichemont, Léré, Nérondes, Sancergues, Sancerre, Sancoins, Vailly-sur-Sauldre
Département de la Côte-d’Or,
departma Côte-d’Or
Département de l’Eure: arrondissement des Andelys,
departma Eure: okrožje Andelys
Département du Loiret: arrondissement de Montargis,
departma Loiret: okrožje Montargis
Département de la Marne,
departma Marne
Département de la Haute-Marne,
departma Haute-Marne
Département de Meurthe-et-Moselle,
departma Meurthe-et-Moselle
Département de la Meuse,
departma Meuse
Département de la Moselle,
departma Moselle
Département de la Nièvre,
departma Nièvre
Département du Nord,
departma Nord
Département de l’Oise,
departma Oise
Département du Pas-de-Calais,
departma Pas-de-Calais