natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1396/2007 (OJ L 311, 29.11.2007, p. 3).
Uredba, kakor je bila nazadnje spremenjena z Uredbo (ES) št. 1396/2007 (UL L 311, 29.11.2007, str. 3).
Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2008
Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 320/2008
repealing the countervailing duty imposed on imports of certain electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (Dynamic Random Access Memories) originating in the Republic of Korea and terminating the proceeding
o razveljavitvi izravnalnih dajatev na uvoz nekaterih elektronskih mikrovezij, znanih kot DRAM (dinamični bralno-pisalni pomnilniki), s poreklom iz Republike Koreje in zaključku postopka
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community [1] (the basic Regulation) and in particular Article 19 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 2026/97 z dne 6. oktobra 1997 o zaščiti proti subvencioniranemu uvozu iz držav, ki niso članice Evropske skupnosti [1] („osnovna uredba“), in zlasti člena 19 Uredbe,
I. Existing measures
I. Obstoječi ukrepi
By Council Regulation (EC) No 1480/2003 [2] (the definitive duty Regulation), the Council imposed a definitive countervailing duty of 34,8 % on imports of certain electronic microcircuits known as Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAMs) originating in the Republic of Korea and manufactured by all companies other than Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd (Samsung), for which a 0 % duty rate was established.
Z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1480/2003 [2] („uredba o dokončni dajatvi“) je Svet uvedel dokončno izravnalno dajatev v višini 34,8 % („izravnalna dajatev“) na uvoz nekaterih elektronskih mikrovezij, znanih kot DRAM (dinamični bralno-pisalni pomnilnik), s poreklom iz Republike Koreje, ki jih proizvajajo vse družbe razen družbe Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd („Samsung“), za katero je bila določena stopnja dajatve 0 %.
The definitive duty Regulation was preceded by Commission Regulation (EC) No 708/2003 of 23 April 2003 imposing a provisional countervailing duty on imports of certain electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea [3] (the provisional duty Regulation).
Pred uredbo o dokončni dajatvi je bila izdana Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 708/2003 z dne 23. aprila 2003 o uvedbi začasne izravnalne dajatve na uvoz nekaterih elektronskih mikrovezij, znanih kot DRAM (dinamični bralno-pisalni pomnilniki), s poreklom iz Republike Koreje [3] („uredba o začasni dajatvi“).
Following a report adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organisation [4] (the EC-Korea DRAMs Panel Report), the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 584/2006 [5], implementing the recommendations made by the Panel Report and lowering the definitive countervailing duty to 32,9 % (the implementing Regulation).
Svet je na podlagi poročila, ki ga je sprejel Odbor STO za poravnavo sporov [4] („poročilo preiskovalnega odbora ES-Koreja o DRAM“), sprejel Uredbo (ES) št. 584/2006 [5] o izvajanju priporočil preiskovalnega odbora in zmanjšanju dokončne izravnalne dajatve na 32,9 % („izvedbena uredba“).
The Community producers Micron Europe Ltd and Qimonda AG (formerly, Infineon Technologies AG) provided prima facie evidence to the Commission indicating that Hynix Semiconductor Inc. (Hynix) was in receipt of additional subsidies in the period following the investigation period of the original investigation.
Proizvajalca Skupnosti Micron Europe Ltd in Qimonda AG (nekdanji Infineon Technologies AG) sta Komisiji predložila prima facie dokaze, ki so pokazali, da je Hynix Semiconductor Inc. („Hynix“) prejemal dodatne subvencije v obdobju preiskave po obdobju prvotne preiskave.
Additionally, Hynix submitted a request for a partial interim review alleging that the subsidies found to be countervailable in the original investigation had ceased to exist.
Poleg tega je Hynix predložil zahtevek za delni vmesni pregled, ker naj bi domnevno sporne subvencije, odkrite v prvotni preiskavi, ne zagotavljale več ugodnosti.
In view of the submissions above, the Commission decided to proceed ex officio.
Glede na zgornje navedbe se je Komisija odločila za postopek po uradni dolžnosti.
Having determined that sufficient evidence existed to justify the initiation of a partial interim review and having consulted the Advisory Committee, the Commission announced on 18 March 2006, by a Notice of Initiation published in the Official Journal of the European Union [6], the ex officio initiation of a partial interim review, in accordance with Article 19 of the basic Regulation.
Po posvetovanju s svetovalnim odborom je Komisija ugotovila, da obstaja dovolj dokazov, ki upravičujejo začetek delnega vmesnega pregleda, zato je 18. marca 2006 z obvestilom o začetku, objavljenim v Uradnem listu Evropske unije [6], napovedala začetek delnega vmesnega pregleda po uradni dolžnosti v skladu s členom 19 osnovne uredbe.
The review was limited in scope to the examination of subsidisation of one exporting producer, Hynix, in order to assess the need for the continuation, removal or amendment of the existing measures.
Pregled je bil omejen na proučitev subvencioniranja enega proizvajalca izvoznika, in sicer družbe Hynix, da bi se ocenila potreba po nadaljevanju, odpravi ali spremembi obstoječih ukrepov.
The investigation period ran from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2005 (IP).
Obdobje preiskave je trajalo od 1. januarja 2005 do 31. decembra 2005 („OP“).
The Commission officially advised the exporting producer concerned (Hynix), the Government of the Republic of Korea (the GOK) and the Community producers of the initiation of the partial interim review.
Komisija je o začetku delnega vmesnega pregleda uradno obvestila zadevnega proizvajalca izvoznika (Hynix), vlado Republike Koreje in proizvajalce Skupnosti.
Interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing within the time limits set out in the Notice of Initiation.
Zainteresirane stranke so imele možnost pisno izraziti svoja stališča in v rokih, določenih v obvestilu o začetku, zahtevati zaslišanje.
In order to obtain the information necessary for its investigation, the Commission sent questionnaires to all parties known to be concerned and received replies from the company, the GOK and a number of Korean banks, as well as Deutsche Bank AG.
Komisija je za pridobitev potrebnih informacij za preiskavo vsem zadevnim strankam poslala vprašalnike, odgovore pa je prejela od družbe, vlade Republike Koreje in številnih korejskih bank ter tudi od Deutsche Bank AG.
The Commission sought to verify the information received and carried out verification visits at the premises of the GOK (Ministry of Finance and Economy — MOFE and the Financial Supervisory Commission — FSC) and the following companies and institutions in Seoul:
Komisija je preverila prejete informacije in izvedla preveritvene obiske v prostorih vlade Republike Koreje (na Ministrstvu za finance in ekonomijo („MFE“) in v Finančni nadzorni komisiji („FSC“)) ter naslednjih družbah in institucijah v Seulu:
Korea Exchange Bank (KEB),
Korea Exchange Bank („KEB“),
Korea Development Bank (KDB),
Korea Development Bank („KDB“),
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF),
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation („NACF“),
The product under consideration and the like product are the same as that covered in the original investigation, i.e. certain electronic microcircuits known as Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAMs) of all types, densities and variations, whether assembled, in processed wafer or chips (dies), manufactured using variations of Metal Oxide-Semiconductors (MOS) process technology, including complementary MOS types (CMOS), of all densities (including future densities), irrespective of access speed, configuration, package or frame etc. originating in the Republic of Korea.
Zadevni izdelek v tej preiskavi je enak izdelku, obravnavanemu v prvotni preiskavi, in sicer gre za nekatera elektronska mikrovezja, znana kot DRAM (dinamični-bralno pisalni pomnilniki), vseh vrst, gostot in različic, sestavljena na predelanih ploščicah ali čipih (matricah), proizvedenih z uporabo različic procesne tehnologije kovinskooksidnih polprevodnikov („MOS“), vključno z dopolnilnimi vrstami MOS („CMOS“), vseh gostot (vključno s prihodnjimi gostotami), ne glede na hitrost dostopa, konfiguracijo, paket ali okvir itd., s poreklom iz Republike Koreje.
The product concerned also includes DRAMs presented in (non-customised) memory modules or (non-customised) memory boards or in some other kind of aggregate form provided the main purpose of which is to provide memory.
Zadevni izdelek vključuje tudi DRAM, v obliki (neprirejenih) pomnilniških modulov ali (neprirejenih) pomnilniških plošč ali v drugačni skupni obliki, če je njihov glavni namen pomnjenje.
The product concerned is currently classifiable within CN codes ex84733020, ex84735020, ex85423210, ex85423231, ex85423239 and ex85489020.
Zadevni izdelek se sedaj uvršča pod oznake KN ex84733020, ex84735020, ex85423210, ex85423231, ex85423239 in ex85489020.
On the basis of the information available to the Commission at initiation and the replies given to the Commission's questionnaires, the following measures were investigated:
Na podlagi informacij, ki so bile Komisiji na razpolago na začetku preiskave, ter izpolnjenih vprašalnikov Komisije so bili proučeni naslednji ukrepi:
a rescue package approved by the Hynix Creditors' and Financial Institutions Council (CFIC) on 30 December 2002 (the new restructuring), comprising a debt-to-equity swap, a debt rollover and changes in the interest payment conditions;
paket pomoči („novo prestrukturiranje“), ki ga je „Creditors' and Financial Institutions Council“ („CFIC“) 30. decembra 2002 odobril družbi Hynix, zajema pa zamenjavo terjatev v lastniške deleže, prenos dolga in spremembe pogojev za plačilo obresti;
alleged preferential financing provided by Korean banks to Beijing Orient Electronics (BOE) to facilitate the purchase of Hydis, a Hynix operation;
domnevno preferenčno financiranje, ki so ga družbi Beijing Orient Electronics („BOE“) zagotovile korejske banke za lažji nakup družbe Hydis, Hynixove poslovalnice;
alleged preferential financing provided by Korean banks to CVC to facilitate the purchase of System IC, a Hynix operation, including the transfer of Hynix debt to another entity at a discount;
domnevno preferenčno financiranje družbe CVC, ki so ga zagotovile korejske banke za lažji nakupa System IC, Hynixove poslovalnice, vključno s prenosom dolga družbe Hynix na drug subjekt po znižani ceni;
a discounted cash buyout of the Hynix debt;
gotovinski odkup dolga družbe Hynix po znižani ceni;
preferential tax treatment allegedly given to Hynix by GOK;
domnevna preferenčna davčna obravnava družbe Hynix s strani vlade Republike Koreje;
the July 2005 refinancing of Hynix debt.
refinanciranje dolga družbe Hynix julija 2005.
All the measures listed above were ad hoc measures.
Vsi zgoraj navedeni ukrepi so ad hoc ukrepi.
With the exception of (e) above, all investigated measures were taken by the creditor banks/institutions of Hynix, allegedly under direction by the GOK.
Razen točke (e) so vse proučene ukrepe sprejele banke upnice/finančne institucije družbe Hynix, domnevno po navodilih vlade Republike Koreje.
The issue of ‘financial contribution by a government’, within the meaning of Article 2 of the basic Regulation, is, as in the original investigation, central to this proceeding and recitals 9 to 15 of the definitive duty Regulation are hereby recalled.
Vprašanje „finančnega prispevka vlade“ v smislu člena 2 osnovne uredbe je kot v prvotni preiskavi ključno za ta postopek in zato se v zvezi s tem opozarja na uvodne izjave 9 do 15 uredbe o dokončni dajatvi.
The financial situation of Hynix after the original investigation
Finančni položaj družbe Hynix po prvotni preiskavi
Despite the large bail-out packages received by Hynix in 2001, its financial situation did not improve and in 2002 it was still rated Selective Default by Standard & Poor.
Kljub obsežnim paketom pomoči, ki jih je družba Hynix prejela leta 2001, se njen finančni položaj ni izboljšal in jo je agencija Standard & Poor leta 2002 ocenila kot družbo, ki plačuje le nekatere obveznosti (selective default).
It reported a loss of KRW 1,03 trillion for the first nine months of 2002; it was obvious that it was in no position to pay any maturing debt.
Družba je v prvih devetih mesecih leta 2002 utrpela izgubo v višini 1,03 biljarde KRW in bilo je očitno, da ni bila zmožna plačati nobenega zapadlega dolga.
Its ratios, based on its 2002 financial statement, show that it could not cover its current liabilities with current assets, could not cover its interest expense with its earning, was financed with significantly more debt than equity and had large net losses.
Finančna razmerja iz njenega finančnega izkaza za leto 2002 so pokazala, da svojih tekočih obveznosti ni mogla pokriti s tekočimi sredstvi, svojih prihodkov od obresti pa ne z zaslužkom, financirala pa se je bistveno bolj z zadolževanjem kot lastnimi sredstvi in je imela velike neto izgube.
Although the October 2001 bail out had helped matters to some degree, the company was still in considerable distress.
Čeprav je paket pomoči oktobra 2001 nekoliko izboljšal položaj, pa je bila družba še naprej v precejšnjih finančnih težavah.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, one of Hynix's external advisors, in a report produced in September 2002, stated that Hynix would be very unlikely to ‘accumulate enough cash in the next two years to meet maturing debt obligations’ or ‘expand capacity and fund the technological upgrades and R&D necessary for it to remain a competitive DRAM producer.’
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, eden od zunanjih svetovalcev družbe Hynix, je v poročilu, ki ga je pripravil septembra 2002, navedel, da Hynix „v naslednjih dveh letih zelo verjetno ne bo akumuliral dovolj denarja za poravnavo zapadlega dolga“ ali „razširil svojih zmogljivosti in investiral v tehnološko posodobitev ter raziskave in razvoj, potrebne za to, da ostane konkurenčen proizvajalec DRAM“.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter went on to say that ‘Hynix is technically bankrupt, kept alive only though debt restructuring programmes’ and that ‘The financial commitment required to bring the company back to a competitive level looks too great.
Poleg tega je Morgan Stanley Dean Witter navedel, da je „Hynix tehnično bankrotiral, da se je ohranjal pri življenju le s programi prestrukturiranja dolga“ in da „se zdijo finančna sredstva, potrebna za to, da družba postane konkurenčna, prevelika.
Creditors cannot afford to nurse the company back to health.
Upniki si ne morejo privoščiti, da bi družbi finančno pomagali na noge.
Whatever the outcome, the message is clear to investors: Hynix is not an investment grade company.’
Ne glede na rezultat je sporočilo vlagateljem jasno, in sicer da Hynix ni družba z investicijsko kategorijo.“
Merrill Lynch, again in September 2002, stated, ‘We are increasingly concerned about Hynix's dismal earnings prospects.
Prav tako je septembra 2002 Merrill Lynch navedel: „Vse bolj smo zaskrbljeni zaradi slabih možnosti družbe Hynix za zaslužek.
The company itself does not dispute the severity of its financial difficulties at the relevant time.
Družba sama ne zanika resnosti svojih finančnih težav v zadevnem obdobju.
The New Restructuring
Novo prestrukturiranje
In October 2001, a business normalisation plan was adopted by the CFIC to pursue the reconstruction of the company.
Oktobra 2001 je CFIC sprejel poslovni načrt za obnovo družbe.
The CFIC was made up of banks and other institutions which were Hynix's creditors.
CFIC so sestavljale banke in druge institucije, ki so bile upnice družbe Hynix.
The voting rights of each institution were determined in accordance with its exposure to Hynix.
Volilne pravice vsake institucije so bile določene v skladu z njihovim kreditnim tveganjem v zvezi z družbo Hynix.
Hynix was under the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act (the CRPA) and, as such, was effectively under the control of its creditors.
Za družbo Hynix je veljal Zakon o spodbujanju prestrukturiranja družb („CRPA“) in je bila kot takšna dejansko pod nadzorom svojih upnikov.
The CFIC decided to sell the business or part of the business to a third party.
CFIC je odločil, da se družba ali del družbe proda tretji stranki.
In December 2002, the Restructuring Committee, which is a sub-committee of the CFIC, initiated negotiations with Micron Technology Inc. These lasted for five months; a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the parties, but the terms of the sale were eventually rejected by the Hynix Board of Directors.
Decembra 2002 je Odbor za prestrukturiranje, ki je pododbor CFIC, začel pogajanja z družbo Micron Technology Inc., ki so trajala 5 mesecev, stranki pa sta podpisali memorandum o soglasju, vendar je Hynixov nadzorni svet prodajne pogoje nazadnje zavrnil.
In May 2002, as a follow-up measure given the continuing deterioration of Hynix's finances, the CFIC hired a number of external advisors, including Deutsche Bank (DB), Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Deloitte & Touche and A. D. Little, to analyse Hynix and come up with a plan to rescue the company.
Maja 2002 je CFIC kot spremljevalni ukrep zaradi nenehnega slabšanja finančnega položaja družbe Hynix najel številne zunanje svetovalce, in sicer družbo Deutsche Bank („DB“), svetovalca Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, družbo Deloitte & Touche in A. D. Little za analizo družbe Hynix in oblikovanje načrta za rešitev družbe.
Together with these external advisors, KEB, which was the head of the CFIC as lead creditor, performed due diligence on Hynix until November 2002.
Skupaj s temi zunanjimi svetovalci je KEB, ki je bil kot glavni upnik vodil CFIC, opravil ustrezno analizo družbe Hynix do novembra 2002.
The resulting report, prepared by Deutsche Bank and KEB (the DB Report), was submitted to the CFIC.
Poročilo, ki sta ga pripravila Deutsche Bank in KEB („poročilo DB“), je bilo predloženo CFIC.
On 30 December 2002, the CFIC decided to implement a corporate turnaround and sell-off of the business, as outlined in the DB Report.
CFIC je dne 30. decembra 2002 sklenil izvesti podjetniški preobrat in jo prodati, kot je navedeno v poročilu DB.
The corporate turnaround involved a restructuring, comprising:
Podjetniški preobrat je vključeval prestrukturiranje, ki zajema:
a debt-to-equity swap of KRW 1861,5 bn,
zamenjavo terjatev v lastniške deleže v višini 1861,5 milijarde KRW,
a capital write-down on a ratio of 21:1,
odpis kapitala 21:1,
a rollover of debt amounting to KRW 3293 bn, and
prenos dolga v višini 3293 milijard KRW in
changes to the interest payment conditions of the rolled-over debt.
spremembe pogojev plačila obresti od prenosa dolga.
Description of the Measures
Opis ukrepov
The CFIC decided to swap debt amounting to KRW 1861,5 bn for Hynix shares; this amounted to approximately 50 % of Hynix's unsecured loans.
CFIC je sklenil zamenjati dolg v vrednosti 1861,5 milijarde KRW za Hynixove delnice, kar je znašalo približno 50 % nezavarovanega posojila.
The swap share price was fixed to KRW 435 at the time the decision was taken in December 2002, by taking the one-month average market price.
Ko je bila sprejeta odločitev decembra 2002, je cena za delnico ob zamenjavi znašala 435 KRW, pri čemer je bila upoštevana enomesečna povprečna tržna cena.
Although there is an obligation under the CRPA on the CFIC to use a reasonable method in calculating the swap price, no specific method is provided.
Čeprav mora CFIC v okviru CRPA uporabiti razumno metodo za izračun cene zamenjave, ni zagotovljena nobena posebna metoda.
The restructuring plan involved a capital write-down prior to the swap taking place, which required shareholder approval; hence the swap could not take place immediately.
Načrt za prestrukturiranje je vključeval odpis kapitala pred zamenjavo, za katero je bila potrebna potrditev delničarja; sicer zamenjava ne bi bila takoj izvedljiva.
Once the capital write-down was implemented, at a ratio of 21:1, the share swap price became KRW 9135 (21 × KRW 435) and the swap went ahead.
Ko je bil odpis kapitala zaključen v razmerju 21:1, je cena za delnico ob zamenjavi znašala 9135 KRW (21 × 435 KRW) in zamenjava je bila izvedena.
As the shares pursuant to the swap were not to be issued until April 2003, this price was to serve as a floor, but no ceiling was set.
Ker naj delnice za zamenjavo ne bi bile izdane do aprila 2003, je bila ta cena izhodiščna, ni pa bila določena zgornja meja.
The actual share price at the time of the decision was in fact KRW 280; it fell to KRW 167 in April 2003.
V času odločitve je bila dejanska cena za delnico 280 KRW, aprila 2003 pa se je znižala na 167 KRW.
Debt rollover
Prenos dolga
The maturity of the Hynix debt which was not converted to equity was extended to December 2006.
Plačilo zapadlega dolga družbe Hynix, ki ni bilo spremenjeno v lastniški delež, se je podaljšalo do decembra 2006.
This rolled-over debt amounted, in total, to KRW 3293 bn.
Ta prenos je skupaj znašal 3293 milijard KRW.
Changes in the terms of interest payments
Spremembe pogojev plačila obresti
The interest rate on the rolled-over debt was reduced to 3,5 % from 6,5 %.
Obresti na prenesen dolg so bile s 6,5 % zmanjšane na 3,5 %.
The 3 % difference was treated as additional principal and was added on to the outstanding debt, with a maturity date of December 2006, as well.
3-odstotna razlika je bila obravnavana kot dodatna glavnica in je bila tudi dodana neporavnanemu dolgu z zapadlostjo decembra 2006.
Interest on this additional principal was set at 6 %, to be paid quarterly.
Obresti na to dodatno glavnico so znašale 6 %, odplačevati pa jih je bilo treba na vsako četrtletje.
V. The Policy of the GOK as regards Hynix
V. Politika vlade Republike Koreje glede družbe Hynix
As described in the provisional and the definitive duty Regulations, the GOK had a keen interest in the fact of Hynix.
Kot je opisano v uredbah o začasni in dokončni dajatvi, se je vlada Republike Koreje zelo zanimala za Hynixov primer.
The GOK admitted that, due to Hynix's situation, foreign investors were not willing to invest in Korea, because the Korean banks' exposure to Hynix was so high.
Vlada Republike Koreje je priznala, da tuji vlagatelji zaradi Hynixovega položaja niso bili pripravljeni investirati v Koreji, ker je bilo kreditno tveganje korejskih bank v zvezi s Hynixom tako veliko.
It need the Hynix problem to be solved, in order to remove the uncertainty; in fact, Hynix's ‘structural adjustment’ was cited as a main policy issue for the second half of 2002 in a report by the Ministry of Finance and Economy.
Težavo družbe Hynix je bilo treba rešiti, da se odpravi negotovost; v poročilu Ministrstva za finance in ekonomijo je bila strukturalna prilagoditev družbe Hynix navedena kot glavno politično vprašanje za drugo polovico leta 2002.
A report submitted to the National Assembly by Korea's Grand National Party (GNP), in opposition, criticised the GOK's insistence on rescuing the Hyundai Group, in which Hynix was a subsidiary, stating that the GOK, by saving Hynix, was ‘injecting money into bottomless pits’.
Poročilo, ki ga je Velika nacionalna stranka Koreje predložila nacionalni skupščini v opoziciji, kritizira vztrajno prizadevanje vlade Republike Koreje za rešitev skupine Hyundai, katere hčerinska družba je bil Hynix, z navedbo, da vlada Republike Koreje z reševanjem družbe Hynix „investira v sod brez dna“.
Hynix claims that, as the report was submitted in November 2002, it should not be considered as evidence of the GOK's involvement in the new restructuring.
Ker je bilo poročilo predloženo novembra 2002, Hynix meni, da se ne bi smelo šteti kot dokaz udeležbe vlade Republike Koreje pri novem prestrukturiranju.
However, the new restructuring was approved by the creditors only a month following the submission of the GNP report and deliberations on the best way to rescue Hynix had been ongoing for months before that.
Vendar pa so upniki novo prestrukturiranje potrdili le mesec po predložitvi poročila Velike nacionalne stranke, prizadevanja za rešitev Hynixa pa so potekala že mesece prej.