natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The GNP report, therefore, is not irrelevant to the question of whether the GOK had a policy to save Hynix.
Poročilo Velike nacionalne stranke zato ni nepomembno za vprašanje, ali je vlada Republike Koreje imela strategijo za rešitev Hynixa.
During the first half of the year, the Vice Minister for Finance stated that ‘creditors will have to find a solution to Hynix as soon as possible to minimise the adverse impact on the economy’.
V prvi polovici leta je namestnik finančnega ministra navedel, da „bodo morali upniki čim prej najti rešitev za Hynix, da se čim bolj zmanjšajo škodljivi učinki na gospodarstvo“.
To that end, a meeting between the GOK and Hynix's creditors had taken place to express the GOK's views with regard to the then ongoing negotiations with Micron.
S tem namenom je bilo organizirano srečanje med vlado Republike Koreje in Hynixovimi upniki, da bi vlada Republike Koreje izrazila svoje stališče glede tekočih pogajanj z družbo Micron.
The MOFE could neither confirm nor deny whether other meetings had taken place and claimed that records of meetings were not always kept.
Ministrstvo za finance in ekonomijo ni moglo ne potrditi ne zavrniti, ali so bila organizirana še druga srečanja, in je trdilo, da zapisniki srečanj niso bili vedno shranjeni.
The FSC, on the other hand, said that no other meetings had taken place, although it was kept abreast of what was happening by informal telephone calls.
Finančna nadzorna komisija pa je povedala, da ni bilo nobenih nadaljnjih srečanj, čeprav je bila o dogajanju obveščena preko neuradnih telefonskih pogovorov.
However, evidence on the record suggests that the GOK, mindful of the previous investigations in its involvement in Hynix by the European Communities and the United States, directed that any communication relating to Hynix should be made orally to avoid being traceable [7].
Vendar zabeleženi dokazi nakazujejo, da je vlada Republike Koreje, ki je vedela za predhodne preiskave Evropskih skupnosti in ZDA o njeni udeležbi pri družbi Hynix, ukazala, da mora biti vsa komunikacija v zvezi z družbo Hynix ustna, zato da je ne bi bilo mogoče dokazati [7].
The FSC stated that it had no power to intervene in the restructuring efforts of each company, but that it did conduct partial monitoring of the process, for example, where they thought there could be a potential shock to the markets.
Finančna nadzorna komisija je navedla, da ni imela pristojnosti za poseganje v prizadevanja za prestrukturiranje vsake družbe, vendar pa, da je izvedla delno spremljanje postopka, na primer, kadar je menila, da bi lahko obstajal šok za trge.
The FSC conducts such monitoring by contacts with ‘work-level’ persons, but not records are kept of such contacts.
Finančna nadzorna komisija izvaja takšno spremljanje s stiki z osebami na „delovni ravni“, vendar takšni stiki niso zabeleženi.
Although the FSC admitted that Hynix was restructured because it was so big, it insisted that the manner and mode of such restructuring was determined solely by the creditors.
Čeprav je finančna nadzorna komisija navedla, da je bil Hynix prestrukturiran, ker je bil tako velik, je vztrajala pri tem, da so način takšnega prestrukturiranja določili izključno upniki.
The Hynix creditor banks confirmed that the FSC kept a close eye on the restructuring by telephone calls and requests for information.
Hynixove banke upnice so potrdile, da je finančna nadzorna komisija budno spremljala prestrukturiranje, in sicer preko telefonskih klicev in zahtev po informacijah.
The GOK, in the meetings of April 2002, communicated its official position to Hynix's creditors, which was either to sell Hynix or to rescue it to buffer the shock.
Vlada Republike Koreje je na srečanjih aprila 2002 sporočila svoje uradno stališče Hynixovim upnikom, in sicer, da je treba Hynix prodati ali pa ga rešiti, da se omili šok.
Although the GOK insisted that the decision of whether liquidation was on the table or not was left to the creditors, its statements regarding the importance of rescuing Hynix (by a restructuring or a sale) in order to restore confidence in the Korean markets belies such insistence.
Čeprav je vlada Republike Koreje vztrajala, da je bila odločitev za likvidacijo prepuščena upnikom, njene izjave glede pomembnosti reševanja Hynixa (s prestrukturiranjema ali prodajo), da se ponovno vzpostavi zaupanje v korejske trge, ne podpirajo takšnega vztrajanja.
The GOK's belief that Hynix was too big to fail is corroborated by a statement by one of the creditor banks that Hynix was such a big company, employing such a large number of people and contracts you can imagine what would happen if it went bankrupt or insolvent.
Mnenje vlade Republike Koreje, da je bil Hynix prevelik, da bi propadel, je potrdila izjava ene od bank upnic, da je bil Hynix tako velika družba, ki je zaposlovala tako veliko število ljudi, da „so jasne posledice, če bi družba bankrotirala ali postala nelikvidna“.
Further, one of Hynix's external advisors, in its engagement letter wrote that it would assist … in (the) effort to find a realistic and viable restructuring solution for Hynix that would minimise social damage … (emphasis added).
Poleg tega je eden od zunanjih svetovalcev Hynixa v svojem pismu navedel, da bi pomagal „najti realno in učinkovito možnost za prestrukturiranje Hynixa, ki bi v največji možni meri zmanjšalo socialno škodo …“ (poudarek dodan).
It was plain that the liquidation of Hynix was not an option.
Jasno je bilo, da likvidacija Hynixa sploh ni bila sprejemljiva.
GOK involvement in Hynix creditor banks
Povezava vlade Republike Koreje s Hynixovimi bankami upnicami
The GOK is a major shareholder in a large number of Hynix creditor banks.
Vlada Republike Koreje je glavni delničar v številnih Hynixovih bankah upnicah.
The information on the record provided by the banks, Hynix and the GOK shows that the GOK has at least a significant shareholding (> 20 %) in creditor banks/financial institutions holding at least 75 % of the voting rights in the CFIC.
Zabeleženi podatki, ki so jih predložili banke, Hynix in vlada Republike Koreje, kažejo, da je imela vlada Republike Koreje bistven delež (> 20 %) v bankah upnicah/finančnih institucijah, kjer je imela v CFIC vsaj 75-odstotno volilno pravico.
It is recalled that the required majority in the CFIC was 75 %; therefore, the GOK's involvement in the decisions taken by the Creditors' Council cannot be doubted.
Opozoriti je treba, da je bila zahtevana večina v CFIC 75-odstotna, zato ni dvoma, da je vlada Republike Koreje sodelovala pri odločitvah v svetu upnic.
As in the original investigation, KDB and NACF are wholly-owned government entities and are thus considered public bodies within the meaning of Article 1(3) of the basic Regulation.
Kot v prvotni preiskavi sta KDB in NACF v celoti v lasti vlade in sta kot takšni v smislu člena 1(3) osnovne uredbe javna organa.
There is no evidence on the record to suggest that the situation as regards Woori Bank changed from the one described in recitals 80 to 82 of the provisional duty Regulation.
Ni pa zabeleženih dokazov, ki bi nakazovali, da se je situacija v zvezi z Woori Bank spremenila glede na opisano situacijo v uvodnih izjavah 80 do 82 uredbe o začasni dajatvi.
Further, as stated in the provisional duty Regulation, Chohung Bank, now called Shinhan Bank since its merged with Shinhan Bank on 1 April 2006, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) in January 2002, giving KDIC, a public body, a decisive influence over Chohung Bank's decision-making.
Poleg tega je Chohung Bank, ki se po združitvi s Shinhan Bank 1. aprila 2006 imenuje Shinhan Bank, januarja 2002, kot je navedeno v uredbi o začasni dajatvi, sklenila Memorandum o soglasju s Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation („KDIC“), kar je KDIC-u, ki je javni organ, omogočilo odločilen vpliv na odločanje v Chohung Bank.
Prime Minister's Decree 408 is further evidence that there is legal scope for GOK intervention in the financial sector for policy reasons.
Odlok 408 korejskega predsednika vlade je dodatni dokaz, da obstaja pravni obseg za poseganje vlade Republike Koreje v finančni sektor iz političnih razlogov.
The GOK cites the Decree as evidence that the Korean government officially stated that it would not intervene in banks and financial institutions.
Vlada Republike Koreje navaja, da je odlok dokaz, da je korejska vlada uradno navedla, da ne bo posegala v banke in finančne institucije.
However, Article 5(1) of Prime Minister's Decree 408 stipulates that ‘In case a financial supervisory organisation makes a request for a financial institution's cooperation or support in necessity for the stabilisation of the financial market … it shall be done in a document or by meeting.’
Vendar člen 5(1) odloka 408 korejskega predsednika vlade določa, da „če finančna nadzorna organizacija zaprosi za sodelovanje finančne institucije ali podporo zaradi stabilizacije finančnega trga,… se ta opredeli v dokumentu ali na srečanju“.
Therefore, not only does the Decree not preclude government intervention in financial institutions, it expressly sets out the ways in which such intervention may be carried out.
Zato ne le da uredba izključuje vladno poseganje v finančne institucije, temveč tudi jasno določa načine izvedbe takšnega poseganja.
Hynix claimed that KEB was not controlled by the GOK and presented Commerzbank's shareholding as evidence of its independence from GOK intervention.
Hynix je trdil, da vlada Republike Koreje ni nadzorovala KEB in da delež Commerzbank dokazuje njegovo neodvisnost od poseganja vlade Republike Koreje.
It also submitted documents which refer to Commerzbank's veto right over some issues, including risk management.
Predložil je tudi dokumente, ki se nanašajo na pravico Commerzbank do veta pri nekaterih vprašanjih, vključno z obvladovanjem tveganja.
However, KEB could not confirm that Commerzbank, although it had sent a person to become a member of the credit team, actually exercised any control over credit decisions and, in fact, stated that they were unaware of the existence of such veto rights.
Vendar KEB ni mogel potrditi, da je Commerzbank, čeprav je poslal osebo, ki je postala članica skupine upnikov, izvajal kakršen koli nadzor nad odločitvami o dajanju posojil in dejansko navedel, da niso vedeli za obstoj takšnih pravic do veta.
Further, the recent investigation into the GOK's involvement in Lone Star's purchase of shares in KEB in 2003 demonstrates further that KEB is controlled by the GOK.
Nadalje je nedavna preiskava vključenosti vlade Republike Koreje pri nakupu deležev KEB preko Lone Star leta 2003 pokazala, da vlada Republike Koreje nadzoruje KEB.
Therefore, it is considered that there is no reason to depart from the conclusions of the original investigation regarding the GOK's influence on the decisions of KEB.
Zato se šteje, da ni razloga za opustitev sklepnih ugotovitev iz prvotne preiskave glede vpliva vlade Republike Koreje o odločitvah o KEB.
Another example of GOK involvement in the Hynix creditor banks was the appointment of a former Minister of Industry and Commerce as Chairman of the Restructuring Committee of Hynix's CFIC, by the Steering Committee of that body, only for him to be re-appointed Minister a few months later.
Nadaljnji primer poseganja vlade Republike Koreje v Hynixovih bankah upnicah je bilo imenovanje nekdanjega ministra za industrijo in trgovino za predsednika odbora Hynixovega CFIC za prestrukturiranje, ki ga je imenoval usmerjevalni odbor navedenega organa, nekaj mesecev pozneje pa je bil ta ponovno imenovan za ministra.
Kookmin and Woori Bank have also indicated that GOK interference might lead them to make policy-based decisions in their prospectuses to the Securities Exchange Commission in 2002.
Kookmin in Woori Bank sta v svojih prospektih za Komisijo vrednostnih papirjev in borze za leto 2002 tudi navedla, da je vlada Republike Koreje lahko zaradi svojega vmešavanja vplivala na njihove politične odločitve.
Hynix has submitted evidence that the wording in question did not refer specifically to Hynix and should not be taken as intending to imply that the GOK exercised control over the Korean banking sector.
Hynix je predložil dokaze, da se zadevno besedilo ni specifično nanašalo nanj in ga ne gre jemati kot navedbo, da je vlada Republike Koreje izvajala nadzor nad korejskim bančnim sektorjem.
However, the evidence submitted by Hynix does not dispute other parts of the prospectus warning, for example, that GOK shareholding ‘could cause us to take actions or pursue policy objectives that may be against (creditors') interests’.
Vendar pa dokaz, ki ga je predložil Hynix, ne spodbija drugih opozoril iz prospekta, na primer, da bi vlada Republike Koreje kot imetnik deležev „lahko vplivala na sprejetje naših ukrepov ali izvajanje ciljev, ki niso v skladu z interesi [upnikov]“.
The Commission asked to see the internal documentation relating to creditors institutions' decision to approve the restructuring plan.
Komisija je zaprosila za vpogled v interno dokumentacijo v zvezi z odločitvijo bank upnic za odobritev načrta za prestrukturiranje.
For example, at the time the restructuring was approved, one bank's credit rating for Hynix indicated that the company was highly vulnerable and that the possibility of the business being restored was very unlikely.
Ko je bilo na primer odobreno prestrukturiranje, je bilo v bonitetni oceni Hynixa ene banke navedeno, da je družba izjemno ranljiva in da je zelo malo verjetno, da si bo opomogla.
The rating given to Hynix by another of the banks involved indicated that the possibility of default was very high and that there was no possibility of future recovery.
V oceni, ki so jo Hynixu dale druge banke, je bilo navedeno, da je možnost za propad zelo verjetna in da ni možnosti za ponovno obnovo družbe.
Instead, these banks went ahead and approved the restructuring proposal, even though the evidence suggests that this was not consistent with a market-oriented approach and the DB report does not indicate otherwise.
Banke so kljub temu odobrile predlog za prestrukturiranje, čeprav so dokazi kazali, da to ni usklajeno s tržno usmerjenim pristopom in da poročilo DB ne navaja drugačnih podatkov.
This was demonstrated by the creditors' treatment of both the debt they rolled over and the equity they received under the debt-to-equity swap: around 80-90 % of the Hynix debt had been written off as a loss — in one case, even 100 % — and the equity was booked at around 20 % of the price the creditors paid.
To so upniki dokazali z obravnavo dolga, ki so ga prenesli, in z lastniškim deležem, ki so ga prejeli v okviru zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže, in sicer je bilo okoli 80–90 % Hynixovega dolga odpisanega kot izguba, v drugem primeru celo 100 %, delnice pa so bile prodane za približno 20 % cene, ki so jo plačali upniki.
The company claims that subsequent events demonstrate that the creditors' decision was the correct one; Hynix has been profitable since 2005 and the creditors sold their shares in the company for a considerable profit.
Družba trdi, da poznejši dogodki kažejo, da je bila odločitev upnikov pravilna; Hynix je od leta 2005 dobičkonosen, upniki pa so svoje delnice v družbi prodali za precejšen dobiček.
However, first of all this is an ex post facto analysis, which does not at all justify the conclusion that at the time the creditors approved the restructuring plan, this was consistent with a market oriented approach.
Vendar gre v prvi vrsti za analizo za nazaj, ki nikakor ne utemelji sklepa, da je bil načrt za prestrukturiranje, ki so ga v zadevnem obdobju odobrili upniki, v skladu s tržno usmerjenim pristopom.
Moreover, the fact that Hynix survived was due to the enormous subsidies it received.
Poleg tega je dejstvo, da je Hynix preživel zaradi obsežnih subvencij.
One cannot argue that, because Hynix survived, subsidies were not subsidies, if that survival was only possible because of those subsidies.
Ker je Hynix preživel, ni mogoče trditi, da subvencije niso subvencije, če je bilo preživetje možno le zaradi teh subvencij.
Finally, the creditors were in the position they were in at the end of 2002 because they had participated in the 2001 restructuring, which constituted a subsidy.
Nenazadnje so bili upniki v položaju, v kakršnem so bili konec leta 2002, ker so leta 2001 sodelovali v prestrukturiranju, ki pomeni subvencioniranje.
Therefore, they cannot argue that they should be compared to private creditors who have taken all the steps leading to their position at a certain point in time entirely of their own volition.
Zato ne morejo trditi, da bi jih morali primerjati z zasebnimi upniki, ker so vse sprejete ukrepe, ki so v določenem obdobju vodili do njihovega položaja, sprejeli zgolj po lastni volji.
Thus, Hynix's argument does not affect the conclusion that the creditors were not acting conformity with a market-oriented approach.
Zato Hynixova utemeljitev ne vpliva na sklepno ugotovitev, da upniki niso delovali v skladu s tržno usmerjenim pristopom.
Conclusion on financial contribution
Sklepne ugotovitve o finančnem prispevku
In view of the evidence on the record regarding the GOK's policy as regards Hynix and its involvement in the decision-making process of Hynix's creditors, as well as the evidence relating to the dire state of Hynix and the market's unwillingness to advance capital, as well as the lack of evidence that the existing creditors acted in accordance with a market benchmark, itself undistorted by subsidies, it is concluded that the GOK entrusted and directed Hynix's creditors to rescue Hynix by approving the restructuring described in recital 19 above.
Glede na zabeležene dokaze v zvezi s politiko vlade Republike Koreje glede Hynixa in njene vključenosti v postopek odločanja Hynixovih upnikov ter tudi dokaze v zvezi s Hynixovim katastrofalnim položajem ter nepripravljenostjo trga za financiranje kapitala in pomanjkanje dokazov, da so obstoječi upniki delovali v skladu z merili tržne uspešnosti, se sklene, da je korejska vlada Hynixovim upnikom dajala navodila in pooblastila za rešitev Hynixa z odobritvijo prestrukturiranja, kot je opisano v zgornji uvodni izjavi 19.
This constituted a financial contribution within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation.
To je predstavljalo finančni prispevek v smislu člena 2(1) osnovne uredbe.
Hynix claimed that the GOK had nothing to do with the new restructuring, which was devised by the creditors with the help of the external advisors.
Hynix je trdil, da korejska vlada ni imela nič z novim prestrukturiranjem, ki so ga načrtovali njegovi upniki s pomočjo zunanjih svetovalcev.
Further, it claimed that the evidence on record only showed that the GOK was concerned about Hynix's future, but that it fell short of the requirement for a demonstrable link between the GOK and the banks' actions.
Poleg tega je trdil, da so zabeleženi dokazi pokazali le, da je bila vlada Republike Koreje zaskrbljena zaradi Hynixove prihodnosti, ni pa bilo dokazov za povezavo med vlado Republike Koreje in delovanjem bank.
Although GOK shareholding is not conclusive proof of direction or entrustment, it is strong evidence of the extent to which the GOK can influence the banks' decision-making process.
Čeprav delež vlade Republike Koreje ni dokončen dokaz o dajanju navodil in pooblastil, je močen dokaz za to, do kolikšne mere je vlada Republike Koreje lahko vplivala na postopek odločanja bank.
As was the case in the original investigation, evidence on the record shows that, as major shareholder, the GOK can appoint directors and is thus able to influence the outcome of voting at board meetings.
Kot kažejo dokazi zabeleženi v prvotni preiskavi, glavni delničar, torej vlada Republike Koreje, lahko imenuje direktorje in tako lahko vpliva na izid glasovanja na sestankih uprave.
Further, the various press articles and reports on record demonstrate clearly that the GOK would not allow Hynix to fail; this is also demonstrated by the fact that one of the wholly-owned GOK banks purchased Hynix debt from the other creditors to ease the financial burden on the banks that had been entrusted to save Hynix.
Poleg tega različni zabeleženi časopisni članki in poročila jasno kažejo, da vlada Republike Koreje ne bi dopustila Hynixovega propada; to potrjuje tudi dejstvo, da je ena od bank, ki je v celoti v lasti vlade Republike Koreje, kupila Hynixov dolg od drugih upnikov, da bi zmanjšala breme bank, ki jim je bilo naročeno, naj rešijo Hynix.
It is not disputed that the new restructuring plan was devised by Hynix's external advisors in conjunction with its creditors; however, the evidence on the record suggests that the GOK had entrusted and directed Hynix's creditors to restructure Hynix and not let it fail.
Nesporno je, da so nov načrt za prestrukturiranje pripravili Hynixovi zunanji svetovalci v sodelovanju z njegovimi upniki, vendar pa zabeleženi dokazi nakazujejo, da je vlada Republike Koreje naročila in pooblastila Hynixove upnike za njegovo prestrukturiranje in jim naročila, naj ne dopustijo Hynixovega propada.
The behaviour of the banks also clearly demonstrates that they were not acting in accordance with normal commercial considerations.
Vedenje bank prav tako jasno kaže, da niso delovale v skladu z običajnimi poslovnimi interesi.
None of the banks rated Hynix as an investment grade company; in fact, all the rating ascribed to Hynix by its creditors show that they considered it a substantial risk and doubted that it would be able to survive.
Nobena od bank ni ocenila Hynixa kot družbo z investicijsko kategorijo, vse ocene, ki so jih Hynixu dodelili njegovi upniki, kažejo, da so menili, da je bistveno ogrožen in so dvomili v morebitno preživetje družbe.
The company claimed that the creditors' behaviour should be examined from the point of view of an ‘existing creditor’.
Družba je trdila, da bi bilo treba proučiti vedenje upnikov z vidika „obstoječega upnika“.
However, as is discussed in more detail in recital 36 and recitals 41 to 44, certainly in this case, which is affected by very large and similar subsidies having been granted only around a year earlier, the correct test to be applied with regard to the commercial reasonableness of the creditors is the private investor test.
Vendar pa, kot je podrobneje obravnavano v uvodnih izjavah 36 in 41 do 44, zlasti v tem primeru, v katerem so bile zagotovljene podobne in zelo visoke subvencije, ki so bile odobrene komaj leto prej, bi bila pravilna ocena gospodarske sprejemljivosti upnikov ocena zasebnih vlagateljev.
Therefore, the question of whether an existing creditor would have behaved in a manner similar to that of the Hynix creditors need not be addressed.
Zato je treba obravnavati vprašanje, ali bi se obstoječi upnik vedel podobno kot Hynixovi upniki.
With regard to any benefit conferred to Hynix, KEB, Woori Bank, Shinhan Bank, KDB and NACF all argued that they had participated in the new restructuring because they wanted to maximise the recovery rate for the loans already granted to Hynix.
Ob upoštevanju katerih koli ugodnosti, ki jih je prejel Hynix, so KEB, Woori Bank, Shinhan Bank, KDB in NACF trdili, da so sodelovali v novem prestrukturiranju zaradi povečanja stopnje vračila posojil, ki so jih že odobrili Hynixu.
They considered that the value of Hynix as a going concern was higher than its immediate liquidation value.
Menili so, da je vrednost Hynixa kot delujoče družbe večja kakor trenutna likvidacijska vrednost.
Nevertheless, this comparison, whatever its merits are as a standard for analysis of the existence of a benefit, would in any case not be applicable in the present case for the reasons explained in recital 36 and 41 to 44 below.
Kljub temu pa se ta primerjava, ne glede na to, koliko je koristna kot standardna analiza obstoja ugodnosti, v tem primeru zaradi razlogov iz uvodne izjave 36 in uvodnih izjav 41 do 44 ne more uporabiti.
Furthermore, the existence of a potential benefit to the heavily exposed creditors does not demonstrate that there was no benefit to Hynix.
Poleg tega obstoj morebitnih ugodnosti s strani upnikov, ki so zelo veliko tvegali s svojimi vlaganji, ne dokazuje, da Hynixu niso bile zagotovljene ugodnosti.