natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Article 12, point (8)
Člen 12, točka 8
Article 8(2)(g)
Člen 8(2)(g)
Article 12, point (9)
Člen 12, točka 9
Article 9(4) —
Člen 9(4)
Article 8(1) Article 6, second subparagraph
Člen 8(2) do (9)
Article 8(1) — Article 8(2), introductory sentence
Člen 8(2), uvodni stavek
amending Decision 2003/17/EC on the equivalence of field inspections carried out in third countries on seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of seed produced in third countries
o spremembi Odločbe 2003/17/ES o enakovrednosti poljskih pregledov semenskih posevkov v tretjih državah in o enakovrednosti semena, pridelanega v tretjih državah
Having regard to Council Directive 66/401/EEC of 14 June 1966 on the marketing of fodder plant seed [1], and in particular Article 16(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Direktive Sveta 66/401/EGS z dne 14. junija 1966 o trženju semen krmnih rastlin [1] in zlasti člena 16(1) Direktive,
Having regard to Council Directive 66/402/EEC of 14 June 1966 on the marketing of cereal seed [2], and in particular Article 16(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Direktive Sveta 66/402/EGS z dne 14. junija 1966 o trženju semena žit [2] in zlasti člena 16(1) Direktive,
Having regard to Council Directive 2002/54/EC of 13 June 2002 on the marketing of beet seed [3], and in particular Article 23(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Direktive Sveta 2002/54/ES z dne 13. junija 2002 o trženju semena pese [3] in zlasti člena 23(1) Direktive,
Having regard to Council Directive 2002/57/EC of 13 June 2002 on the marketing of seed of oil and fibre plants [4], and in particular Article 20(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Direktive Sveta 2002/57/ES z dne 13. junija 2002 o trženju semena oljnic in predivnic [4] in zlasti člena 20(1) Direktive,
Council Decision 2003/17/EC [5] provides that for a limited period field inspections carried out in third countries on seed-producing crops of certain species are considered as equivalent to field inspections carried out in accordance with Community legislation and that seed of certain species produced in third countries is considered as equivalent to seed produced in accordance with Community legislation.
Odločba 2003/17/ES [5], določa, da se za omejeno časovno obdobje poljski pregledi, opravljeni za semenske posevke določenih vrst v nekaterih tretjih državah, štejejo za enakovredne poljskim pregledom, opravljenim v skladu z zakonodajo Skupnosti, in da se seme določenih vrst, pridelano v navedenih državah, šteje za enakovredno semenu, pridelanemu v skladu z zakonodajo Skupnosti.
It appears that those field inspections continue to afford the same guarantees as those carried out by the Member States.
Zdi se, da navedeni poljski pregledi še naprej dajejo enaka zagotovila kot poljski pregledi, ki jih opravljajo države članice.
Those field inspections should therefore continue to be considered as equivalent.
Navedene poljske nadzore bi bilo zato treba še naprej šteti za enakovredne.
As Decision 2003/17/EC will expire on 31 December 2007, the period for which equivalence is recognised under that Decision should be extended.
Ker bo Odločba 2003/17/ES 31. decembra 2007 prenehala veljati, bi bilo treba obdobje, za katero se priznava enakovrednost v skladu z navedeno odločbo, podaljšati.
It appears desirable to limit that period to five years.
Zaželeno je, da se navedeno obdobje omeji na pet let.
Decision 2003/17/EC should therefore be amended accordingly,
Odločbo 2003/17/ES bi bilo zato treba ustrezno spremeniti –
In Article 6 of Decision 2003/17/EC, ‘31 December 2007’ shall be replaced by ‘31 December 2012’.
V členu 6 Odločbe 2003/17/ES se „31. decembra 2007“ nadomesti z „31. decembra 2012“.
OJ 125, 11.7.1966, p. 2298.
UL 125, 11.7.1966, str. 2298.
Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 2006/55/EC (OJ L 159, 13.6.2006, p. 13).
Direktiva, kakor je bila nazadnje spremenjena z Direktivo Komisije 2006/55/ES (UL L 159, 13.6.2006, str. 13).
(Case COMP/M.4523 — Travelport/Worldspan)
(Zadeva COMP/M.4523 – Travelport/Worldspan)
(notified under document number C(2007) 3938)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2007) 3938)
On 21 August 2007 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [1], and in particular Article 8(1) of that Regulation.
Komisija je 21. avgusta 2007 na podlagi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 z dne 20. januarja 2004 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij [1] in zlasti člena 8(1) navedene uredbe sprejela odločbo glede združitve.
A non-confidential version of the full decision can be found in the authentic language of the case and in the working languages of the Commission on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.htmlI.
Različica celotne odločbe, ki ni zaupna, je na voljo v verodostojnem jeziku zadeve in v delovnih jezikih Komisije na spletni strani Generalnega direktorata za konkurenco na naslednjem naslovu: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.htmlI.
Travelport LLC, a subsidiary of the Blackstone Group (Blackstone, USA), operates Galileo — a global distribution system (GDS) and Gulliver's Travel Associates.
Travelport LLC, podružnica družbe Blackstone Group („Blackstone“, ZDA), upravlja Galileo, globalni distribucijski sistem („GDS“), in podjetje Gulliver’s Travel Associates.
In addition, Travelport operates a number of online travel agencies and websites, including ebookers, Orbitz, Cheaptickets, Octopus Travel, HotelClub and RatesToGo.
Poleg tega upravlja številne spletne potovalne agencije in spletne strani, vključno z ebookers, Orbitz, Cheaptickets, Octopus Travel, HotelClub in RatesToGo.
Worldspan Technologies Inc. (Worldspan) provides travel distribution services through the Worldspan GDS.
Worldspan Technologies Inc. („Worldspan“) zagotavlja storitve distribucije potovanj prek sistema Worldspan GDS.
The company focuses on providing GDS services to on-line and, more recently also traditional travel agencies, primarily in the leisure sector.
Družba se osredotoča na nudenje storitev GDS spletnim in od nedavnega tudi tradicionalnim potovalnim agencijam, predvsem v sektorju dejavnosti za prosti čas.
Furthermore, Worldspan provides IT services to airlines (e.g. internal reservation systems and flight operations technology services).
Poleg tega podjetje Worldspan ponuja storitve informacijske tehnologije za letalske prevoznike (npr. notranji rezervacijski sistem in storitve na področju tehnologije letalskih operacij).
Pursuant to the operation, based on a referral pursuant to Article 4(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the Merger Regulation) Travelport acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of Worldspan by way of purchase of shares.
Skladno z dejanjem, na podlagi napotitve v skladu s členom 4(5) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 („Uredba o združitvah“), pridobi podjetje Travelport z nakupom delnic nadzor nad celotnim podjetjem Worldspan v smislu člena 3(1)(b) Uredbe o združitvah.
The Commission’s market investigation has revealed that the proposed concentration will not give raise to any competition concerns as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it.
Raziskava trga, ki jo je opravila Komisija, je pokazala, da predlagana koncentracija ne bo povzročila nobenih pomislekov glede konkurence, zaradi katerih bi bila učinkovita konkurenca na skupnem trgu ali na njegovem večjem delu močno ovirana.
Relevant Product Market and Possible Alternative Market Definitions
Upoštevni proizvodni trg in možne alternativne opredelitve trga
In previous cases, the Commission has defined a GDS as a tool provided to travel agencies (TAs) in order to allow them to obtain information and make reservations related to travel service providers (TSPs), i.e. airlines, hotels and rental car firms, who in turn supply the GDS with data on the products they provide.
V prejšnjih zadevah je Komisija opredelila GDS kot orodje za potovalne agencije, da lahko pridobivajo informacije in delajo rezervacije pri ponudnikih turističnih storitev, to so letalski prevozniki, hoteli in podjetja za izposojo avtomobilov, ki v GDS pošiljajo podatke o proizvodih, ki jih ponujajo.
The product market affected by this transaction is defined in the Decision as the market for electronic travel distribution services through a GDS.
Proizvodni trg, na katerega vpliva ta transakcija, je v odločbi opredeljen kot trg storitev elektronske distribucije potovanj prek GDS.
This market is of a two-sided nature, with two separate customer categories.
Ta trg je dvostranske narave z dvema ločenima skupinama uporabnikov.
GDS providers act as intermediaries, allowing on the one hand TSPs, (upstream of the GDS provider) to distribute their travel content to TAs and ultimately to end-consumers and on the other hand TAs (downstream of the GDS provider) to access and book travel content for the end-consumers.
Ponudniki GDS delujejo kot posredniki in na eni strani omogočajo ponudnikom turističnih storitev (ki so v distribucijski verigi pred ponudnikom GDS), da distribuirajo vsebino svojih potovanj potovalnim agencijam in nazadnje končnim uporabnikom, na drugi strani pa omogočajo potovalnim agencijam (ki so v distribucijski verigi za ponudnikom GDS) dostop do vsebine potovanj in delanje rezervacij vsebine potovanja za končne uporabnike.
The in-depth investigation has confirmed these characteristics of the product market.
Poglobljena raziskava je potrdila te značilnosti proizvodnega trga.
The Commission has assessed whether — as the notifying party has stated — the relevant product market consists not only of the GDS providers themselves but also of alternative technologies by which GDS providers can be by-passed and their use avoided.
Komisija je presodila, ali, kot je navedel priglasitelj, upoštevni proizvodni trg ne sestavljajo samo ponudniki GDS, ampak tudi nadomestne tehnologije, s katerimi je mogoče obiti ponudnike GDS in se izogniti uporabi njihovih storitev.
These alternatives are (i) meta search engines, (ii) direct links, (iii) so-called ‘GDS New Entrants’ (GNEs) and the (iv) ‘supplier.com’.
Te nadomestne možnosti so (i) meta iskalniki, (ii) neposredne povezave, (iii) tako imenovani „novi konkurenti GDS“ in (iv) kanali „supplier.com“.
The inclusion of the first three in the relevant product market is dismissed in the Decision, since the in-depth investigation has clearly shown that they are either not real GDS substitutes, or that their presence and/or impact in the EEA is very limited.
Vključitev prvih treh možnosti na upoštevni proizvodni trg je Komisija v odločbi zavrnila, ker je poglobljena raziskava pokazala, da niso pravi nadomestki za GDS ali pa je njihova prisotnost in/ali vpliv v EGP zelo omejen.
In order to determine whether the services provided via ‘supplier.com’ are substitutable to GDS services and would be part of the same product market, a complex assessment covering both sides of the market has been carried out.
Da bi Komisija ugotovila, ali so storitve, ki se izvajajo prek kanalov „supplier.com“, nadomestki za storitve GDS in bi bile del istega proizvodnega trga, je bila opravljena kompleksna presoja, ki je pokrivala obe strani trga.
On the upstream side of the market, ‘supplier.com’ allow TSPs to significantly reduce their average and marginal distribution costs, since they ultimately save the booking fee charged by the GDS as well as the possible booking commission paid to the TA doing the GDS booking.
Na nabavni strani trga kanali „supplier.com“ omogočajo ponudnikom turističnih storitev, da močno zmanjšajo svoje povprečne in mejne stroške distribucije, ker na koncu prihranijo pristojbino za rezervacijo, ki jo zaračunajo ponudniki GDS, in morebitno provizijo od rezervacije, ki jo plačajo potovalni agenciji, ki je opravila rezervacijo prek GDS.
Conventional airlines are thus able to compete better with Low Cost Carriers (LCCs), whose main channel is ‘supplier.com’.
Konvencionalni letalski prevozniki lahko tako bolje konkurirajo z nizkocenovnimi prevozniki, katerih glavni kanal je „supplier.com“.
An additional incentive for TSPs to promote ‘supplier.com’ is the fact that comparison-shopping between TSPs by the end user becomes more difficult as individual web-sites have to be consulted.
Dodatna spodbuda za ponudnike turističnih storitev, da uveljavljajo kanale „supplier.com“, je dejstvo, da postaja primerjalno nakupovanje med ponudniki turističnih storitev za končnega uporabnika vse težje, ker je treba obiskati posamezne spletne strani.
This partially explains the growth of supplier.com in recent years.
To deloma pojasnjuje rast kanalov „supplier.com“ v zadnjih letih.
According to IATA data, on average, 25 % of all bookings of the 20 largest airlines in the EEA were direct bookings in 2005 (compared to 20 % in 2004 and 16 % in 2003).
Po podatkih Mednarodnega združenja letalskih prevoznikov (IATA) je bilo leta 2005 v povprečju 25 % vseh rezervacij 20 največjih letalskih prevoznikov v EGP neposrednih (v primerjavi z 20 % leta 2004 in 16 % leta 2003).
The in-depth investigation has shown that the extent to which TSPs are able to shift bookings away from GDS providers to their ‘supplier.com’ varies considerably, according to the business model chosen by the TSP.
Poglobljena raziskava je pokazala, da se zmožnost posameznih ponudnikov turističnih storitev, da pri rezervacijah preidejo od ponudnikov GDS k njihovim kanalom „supplier.com“, zelo razlikuje in je odvisna od poslovnega modela, ki ga je izbral ponudnik turističnih storitev.
It is also dependent on the size and behavioural profile of its end-consumer base, which is to some extent ‘captive’ to travel content distribution through a GDS.
Odvisna je tudi od velikosti in vedenjskega profila njihove baze končnih uporabnikov, ki je nekoliko odvisna od distribucije vsebine potovanj prek GDS.
On the downstream side of the market, when booking through a GDS, TAs receive substantial incentive payments by the GDS providers but also possible booking commissions paid by the TSPs.
Na prodajni strani trga prejemajo potovalne agencije, ko delajo rezervacijo prek GDS, večja spodbujevalna plačila od ponudnikov GDS in tudi morebitne provizije od rezervacij, ki jih plačajo ponudniki turističnih storitev.
This revenue will be lost if TAs book though a ‘supplier.com’.
Tega prihodka ne bo več, če bodo potovalne agencije delale rezervacije prek kanala „supplier.com“.
In order to compensate this loss of revenue, TAs would need to charge the end-user a service fee (which in its turn gives the end-user the incentive to book his tickets himself via ‘supplier.com’ instead of the TA, further decreasing the revenues of the TA).
Da bi potovalne agencije nadomestile izgubo tega prihodka, bi morale zaračunati končnemu uporabniku pristojbino za storitev (kar spodbuja končnega uporabnika, da sam rezervira svojo vozovnico prek kanala „supplier.com“, namesto potovalne agencije, to pa dodatno zmanjšuje prihodke potovalne agencije).
Therefore, the Commission concludes in the Decision that TAs have strong incentives to keep using a GDS and not to substitute bookings via GDS with bookings via ‘supplier.com’.
Komisija zato v odločbi ugotavlja, da ti prihodki močno spodbujajo potovalne agencije, da še naprej uporabljajo GDS in da opravljanja rezervacij prek GDS ne nadomestijo z opravljanjem rezervacij prek kanalov „supplier.com“.
The Commission in-depth investigation has also confirmed that TAs consider that using ‘supplier.com’ is cumbersome and lacks the versatility of inventory and price comparability offered by GDSs.
Poglobljena raziskava, ki jo je opravila Komisija, je potrdila tudi, da potovalne agencije menijo, da je uporaba kanalov „supplier.com“ nepraktična ter da kanali nimajo raznolike evidence zalog in primerljivosti cen, ki ju ponujajo globalni distribucijski sistemi.
Considering that substitution upstream is only partial, leaving substantial volumes of TSP's bookings ‘captive’ for the GDS providers and the fact that downstream substitution is very limited, the Decision concludes that ‘supplier.com’ should not be included in the relevant product market in which GDS-providers are active.
Ker je substitucija na nabavnem trgu le delna, zaradi česar so večji obsegi rezervacij ponudnikov turističnih storitev „odvisni“ od ponudnikov GDS, substitucija na prodajnem trgu pa zelo omejena, Komisija v odločbi ugotavlja, da se kanali „supplier.com“ ne smejo vključiti na upoštevni proizvodni trg, na katerem delujejo ponudniki GDS.
The Decision recognises however that the rapid uptake of ‘supplier.com’ has an impact on the competitive conditions in the market for GDS services and constrains the market behaviour of the merged firms.
Vendar pa v odločbi priznava, da hitro sprejemanje kanalov „supplier.com“ vpliva na konkurenčne pogoje na trgih storitev GDS in ovira delovanje združenih podjetij na trgu.
The Decision defines the geographic market delineation of the upstream side of the market as EEA-wide.
Nabavna stran trga z vidika geografskih trgov je v odločbi opisana kot trg celotnega EGP.
The global agreements between TSPs and GDSs normally include separate regional pricing schemes for the EEA, the US and other parts of the world.
Globalni dogovori med ponudniki turističnih storitev in ponudniki GDS navadno vključujejo ločene regionalne sheme oblikovanja cen za EGS, Združene države in druge dele sveta.
Booking fees paid by TSPs for a booking made in a GDS are substantially higher in the EEA than in the U.S.
Pristojbine za rezervacije, ki jih plačajo ponudniki turističnih storitev za rezervacijo prek GDS, so precej višje v EGP kot v Združenih državah Amerike.
Moreover, the EEA market is regulated by the EU Code of Conduct, whereas the US market was deregulated in 2006.
Poleg tega trg EGS ureja kodeks ravnanja EU, medtem ko je bil trg Združenih držav dereguliran leta 2006.
Finally, the market shares of the GDS providers vary substantially depending on the region and the country concerned.
Tržni deleži ponudnikov GDS se torej zelo razlikujejo glede na regijo in zadevno državo.
Therefore, the Commission concludes in the Decision that the competitive conditions in the EEA and the US differ significantly.
Komisija zato v odločbi ugotavlja, da se konkurenčni pogoji v EGS in v Združenih državah zelo razlikujejo.
The Decision defines the downstream side of the market as national in scope, since market shares of the GDS providers vary significantly between Member States.
Komisija v odločbi opredeljuje prodajno stran trga kot nacionalno po obsegu, ker se tržni deleži ponudnikov GDS močno razlikujejo med državami članicami.
This is in line with previous Commission Decisions and is confirmed by the market investigation.
To je potrdila raziskava trga in je v skladu s prejšnjimi odločbami Komisije.
Almost all TAs — often including online TAs — are still active in only one country, with the exception of a few TAs which have pan-European (or worldwide) activities.
Skoraj vse potovalne agencije, pogosto vključno s spletnimi potovalnimi agencijami, še vedno delujejo le v eni državi, razen nekaj potovalnih agencij z vseevropskimi (ali svetovnimi) dejavnostmi.
The subscription fees that TAs pay for the use of a GDS and the incentive payments they receive also vary between countries within the EEA.
Naročnine, ki jih potovalne agencije plačujejo za uporabo GDS, in spodbujevalna plačila, ki jih prejemajo, se prav tako razlikujejo med državami znotraj EGP.
In addition, Amadeus and Galileo have established national sales and service points in almost all EEA Member States, in order to better serve the specific national markets.
Poleg tega sta podjetji Amadeus in Galileo ustanovili nacionalna prodajna in storitvena mesta v skoraj vseh državah članicah EGS, da bi bolje zadovoljila potrebe posebnih nacionalnih trgov.
Competitive Assessment of theories of harm
Konkurenčna presoja teorij škode
The theories of harm
Teorije škode
In its Decision of 3 May 2007, the Commission found that the notified concentration raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market and the functioning of the EEA agreement.
Komisija je v svoji odločbi z dne 3. maja 2007 ugotovila, da priglašena koncentracija vzbuja resne pomisleke glede združljivosti s skupnim trgom in delovanjem Sporazuma EGS.
The Commission accordingly initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation.
Skladno s tem je začela postopek na podlagi člena 6(1)(c) Uredbe o združitvah.
In the Article 6(1)(c) Decision it was argued that the merger could theoretically lead to non-coordinated as well as coordinated effects.
V odločbi po členu 6(1)(c) je navedeno, da bi lahko združitev teoretično povzročila neusklajene in usklajene učinke.
As regards non-coordinated effects, the Commission identified three theories of harm which it considered prima facie plausible.
V zvezi z neusklajenimi učinki je Komisija opredelila tri teorije škode, za katere je menila, da so na prvi pogled verjetne.
In addition to assessing the risk for coordinated effects, the Commission focused its in-depth investigation of non-coordinated effects on assessing whether:
Poleg presoje tveganja usklajenih učinkov je Komisija svojo poglobljeno raziskavo neusklajenih učinkov usmerila v presojo, ali bi:
the merger would allow the parties to use their strong market position downstream vis à vis TAs in order to increase prices vis à vis TSPs upstream (vertical cross market effects);
združitev omogočila strankama, da uporabita svoj močan tržni položaj nasproti potovalnim agencijam na prodajni strani trga zato, da bi povišali cene nasproti ponudnikom turističnih storitev na nabavni strani trga („vertikalni medtržni učinki“);
the merger would eliminate Worldspan as the alleged ‘pricing Maverick’ and therefore lead to post-merger price increases;
združitev izločila podjetje Worldspan kot domnevnega „odpadnika pri oblikovanju cen“ in zato povzročila povišanje cen po združitvi;
the merger would allow the parties to exploit their post-merger market power vis à vis TAs in Member States in which Galileo/Worldspan would have high market shares.
združitev omogočila strankama, da izkoriščata svojo tržno moč po združitvi nasproti potovalnim agencijam v državah članicah, v katerih bi združeno podjetje Galileo/Worldspan imelo velike tržne deleže.
Vertical cross-market effects (multi-homing vs. single-homing)
Vertikalni medtržni učinki („večsistemsko usmerjanje“ v primerjavi z „enosistemskim usmerjanjem“)
During the initial stage of the investigation, concerns were raised that Galileo/Worldspan would be able to leverage its post-merger market power vis à vis TAs in a number of national downstream markets, in order to strengthen its bargaining power in relation to TSPs operating on the upstream EEA market.
Na začetni stopnji raziskave so bili izraženi pomisleki, da bi lahko združeno podjetje Galileo/Worldspan izkoristilo svojo tržno moč po združitvi v odnosu do potovalnih agencij na številnih nacionalnih prodajnih trgih, da bi okrepilo svojo pogajalsko pomoč do ponudnikov turističnih storitev, ki delujejo na nabavnem trgu EGS.
This possibility to leverage market power may be labelled as a ‘vertical cross-market effect’.
To možnost izkoriščenja tržne moči je mogoče označiti kot „vertikalni medtržni učinek“.
Such an effect could be described as follows.
Opiše se lahko tako.
After the merger, Galileo/Worldspan would obtain large market shares with significant increments on the downstream side of the market in Ireland, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary and Belgium (see section on the downstream side of the market below).
Po združitvi bi združeno podjetje Galileo/Worldspan doseglo velike tržne deleže z večjimi povečanji na prodajni strani trga na Irskem v Združenem kraljestvu, Italiji, na Nizozemskem, Madžarskem in v Belgiji (glej razdelek o prodajni strani trga spodaj).