natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
344/2003, the tax-neutrality regime for all company reorganisations such as company mergers and divisions was transposed in the amended general tax code Articles 170 to 174 of DPR 917/1986.
344/2003 je bil sistem davčne nevtralnosti za vsa prestrukturiranja gospodarskih družb, kot so združitve ali delitve družb, prenesen v člene od 170 do 174 DPR 917/1986 spremenjenega splošnega davčnega zakonika.
With the tax reform of D.Lgs.
Z davčno reformo, ki jo je uvedel D.Lgs.
344/2003, all reorganisations between companies of different Member States keep on being governed by the tax-neutrality regime of the Merger Directive based on the option that allowed a contribution in tax neutrality.
344/2003, se vsa prestrukturiranja med gospodarskimi družbami različnih držav članic še naprej urejajo s shemo davčne nevtralnosti iz Direktive o združitvah na podlagi možnosti dopustitve vložka v davčni nevtralnosti.
The option to apply the substitute tax of 19 % pursuant to Article 3 of D.Lgs.
Možnost uporabe nadomestnega 19-odstotnega davka v skladu s členom 3 D.Lgs.
358/1997 was repealed as of 1 January 2004, while the system of determination of capital gains deriving from the contribution of business branches in accounting neutrality was maintained.
358/1997 je bila ukinjena 1. januarja 2004, ohranjen pa je bil sistem ugotavljanja kapitalskih dobičkov, ki izhajajo iz vložkov poslovnih vej v knjigovodski nevtralnosti.
The optional system of taxation provided by Article 4 of D.Lgs.
Prav tako je bil ukinjen izbirni sistem obdavčitve, ki je bil določen v členu 4 D.Lgs.
The Commission considered it necessary to describe the framework set by the above described Merger Directive and D.Lgs.
Komisija je menila, da je treba opisati okvir, ki je bil določen z zgoraj opisano Direktivo o združitvah in D.Lgs.
358/1997 with a view to examining the various schemes for companies to revaluate or realign the value of their capital assets.
358/1997, da bi preučila različne sheme, ki jih imajo gospodarske družbe na voljo za prevrednotenje ali prerazporeditev vrednosti svojih kapitalskih sredstev.
In parallel to the realignment of the assets and shares exchanged in the described banking reorganisations, Article 19 of Law 342/2000 provided that the same substitute capital gain tax could be paid by the companies willing to realign the tax bases of the assets and shares held following any other company reorganisations which benefited from the tax neutrality regime pursuant to the said D.Lgs.
Vzporedno s prerazporeditvami sredstev in kapitalskih deležev, zamenjanih med opisanimi bančnimi prestrukturiranji, je bilo v členu 19 Zakona 342/2000 določeno, da lahko isti nadomestni davek na kapitalski dobiček plačajo gospodarske družbe, ki so pripravljene prerazporediti davčne osnove svojih sredstev in kapitalskih deležev po katerih koli drugih prestrukturiranjih gospodarskih družb, ki so imele korist od sistema davčne nevtralnosti v skladu z navedenim D.Lgs.
Article 26 of Law 350/2003, however, did not foresee any other asset realignments relative to general company reorganisations under D.Lgs.
Vendar pa v členu 26 Zakona 350/2003 niso bile predvidene nobene prerazporeditve drugih sredstev, povezanih s splošnimi prestrukturiranji družb v skladu z D.Lgs.
This general realignment scheme was made available by an implicit reference of Article 2(25) to Article 14 of Law 342/2000, providing the recognition of gains suspended following tax neutral reorganisations and therefore covered all misalignments resulting from the company reorganisations carried out under D.Lgs.
Ta splošna shema prerazporeditve je bila na voljo z implicitnim sklicevanjem členov od 2(25) do 14 Zakona 342/2000, v katerih je določeno priznanje odloženih dobičkov po davčno nevtralnih prestrukturiranjih, in je zato zajemala vse neusklajenosti, ki izhajajo iz prestrukturiranj družb, izvedenih v skladu z D.Lgs.
This difference would have to be further discounted by the fact that the beneficiary banks had paid a relatively higher tax on 15 % of their initial gains realised as opposed to all other companies which could have opted for the full tax neutrality under D.Lgs.
To razliko bi bilo treba nato zmanjšati zaradi dejstva, da so banke upravičenke plačale relativno višji davek na 15 % svojih ustvarjenih začetnih dobičkov, v nasprotju z vsemi drugimi družbami, ki bi se odločile za popolno davčno nevtralnost v skladu z D.Lgs.
The Italian authorities consider that the Commission’s conclusions that the tax neutrality regimes, provided by both Law 218/1990 and D.Lgs.
Po mnenju italijanskih organov oblasti so pravilne ugotovitve Komisije, da sistemi davčne nevtralnosti, ki so določeni v Zakonu 218/1990 in D.Lgs.
358/1999 were not State aid because they are justified by the logic of the tax system are correct (point (30) of the Decision opening the formal investigation procedure).
358/1999, niso bili državna pomoč, saj so utemeljeni z logiko davčnega sistema (točka (30) odločbe o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave).
The different tax rates applied in 2003 to the restructured banks as opposed to other companies can be explained by the different tax regimes for the two sets of restructurings.
Različne davčne stopnje, ki so leta 2003 veljale za prestrukturirane banke v primerjavi z drugimi družbami, je mogoče razložiti z drugačnimi davčnimi ureditvami za ta dva sklopa prestrukturiranj.
The parties observed that while the unrecognised gains resulting from the D.Lgs.
Stranke so navedle, da so bili nepriznani dobički, ki so izhajali iz prestrukturiranj po D.Lgs.
Thus, under the old imputation system, the shareholder-level tax would have in any event absorbed the company tax possibly paid and therefore would have equalised the tax treatment of any realignment schemes.
Tako bi v starem sistemu pripisovanja davek na ravni delničarja v vsakem primeru vsrkal davek od dobička gospodarskih družb, ki bi bil mogoče plačan, in bi tako izenačil davčno obravnavo kakršnih koli shem prerazporeditve.
This would have justified the same substitute tax rate applicable to both restructured banks and other reorganised companies at that time.
To naj bi upravičevalo enako stopnjo nadomestnega davka, ki je takrat veljala za prestrukturirane banke in druge prestrukturirane gospodarske družbe.
To correct this difference of treatment, the legislator would have provided the nominal substitute tax rate set forth by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 to recognise the gains suspended with sole respect of the reorganised banks in question, while excluding the gains suspended under D.Lgs.
Da bi popravil to razliko v obravnavanju, naj bi zakonodajalec predvidel nominalno stopnjo nadomestnega davka, določeno s členom 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, da bi priznal odložene dobičke zgolj ob upoštevanju zadevnih prestrukturiranih bank, medtem ko bi izključil odložene davke po D.Lgs.
358/1997 because they were less severely taxed upon distribution (95 % excluded from taxation at the level of the recipient).
358/1997, saj so bili ti ob razdelitvi manj strogo obdavčeni (95-odstotna izločitev iz obdavčitve na ravni prejemnika).
In sum, according to interested parties, the 2003 tax realignment scheme did not provide an advantage to the restructured banks but it was a measure to readjust the disparity between the considerably harsher tax realignment regime of restructured banks under Law 218/1990 and the more generous regime of gains distributed by reorganised companies under the general regime of D.Lgs.
Če povzamemo, po mnenju zainteresiranih strank s shemo davčne prerazporeditve iz leta 2003 niso bile zagotovljene ugodnosti prestrukturiranim bankam, temveč je bila shema ukrep za vnovično uskladitev razlik med precej strožjim sistemom davčne prerazporeditve prestrukturiranih bank v skladu z Zakonom 218/1990 in bolj velikodušnim sistemom dobičkov, ki so jih prestrukturirane gospodarske družbe razdelile v skladu s splošnim sistemom po D.Lgs.
In the light of the foregoing, the Commission confirms the initial assessment made in its Decision opening the formal investigation procedure that both (a) the non-recognition of 85 % of the capital gains realised in the transactions governed by Law 218/1990, and (b) the non-recognition of the gains realised in the transactions governed by D.Lgs.
Glede na navedeno Komisija potrjuje začetno oceno iz odločbe o sprožitvi formalnega postopka preiskave, da (a) nepriznanje 85 % kapitalskih dobičkov, ustvarjenih v transakcijah, ki jih ureja Zakon 218/1990, in (b) nepriznanje dobičkov, ustvarjenih v transakcijah, ki jih ureja D.Lgs.
358/1997 are not State aid because the fiscal values of the assets exchanged remained unaltered [20], so that the fiscal gains did not materialise and no tax advantage was in conclusion granted.
358/1997, nista državna pomoč, ker so davčne vrednosti zamenjanih sredstev ostale nespremenjene [20], tako da se davčni dobički niso materializirali in nazadnje ni bila dodeljena nobena davčna ugodnost.
The Commission considers that the above advantage was effectively limited to the sole banks concerned with the transactions governed by Law 218/1990, while other banks and other companies concerned with equivalent transactions governed by D.Lgs.
Komisija meni, da je bila zgornja ugodnost dejansko omejena zgolj na banke, ki so jih zadevale transakcije po Zakonu 218/1990, medtem ko druge banke in druge gospodarske družbe, ki so jih zadevale enakovredne transakcije po Zakonu D.Lgs.
358/1997 could not benefit from the same tax realignment scheme and its favourable conditions.
358/1997, niso mogle imeti koristi od iste sheme davčne prerazporeditve in njenih ugodnih pogojev.
It nonetheless considers that the partial tax neutrality regime provided by Law 218/1990 was in essence equivalent to the full tax neutrality regime provided by D.Lgs.
Vendar pa meni, da je bil sistem delne davčne nevtralnosti, določen z Zakonom 218/1990, v bistvu enakovreden sistemu popolne davčne nevtralnosti, določenem v D.Lgs.
358/1997, as to the capital gains realised but not fiscally recognised.
358/1997, glede ustvarjenih kapitalskih dobičkov, ki niso bili davčno priznani.
Under the settled case law of the Court [24], for a State measure to distort competition it is sufficient that the recipient of the aid competes with other undertakings on markets open to competition.
V skladu z uveljavljeno sodno prakso Sodišča [24] gre pri državnem ukrepu za izkrivljanje konkurence že, če prejemnik pomoči tekmuje z drugimi podjetji na trgih, odprtih za konkurenco.
Furthermore, a measure affects intra-Community trade when the financial aid received from the State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade [25].
Poleg tega ukrep vpliva na trgovino znotraj Skupnosti, če od države prejeta finančna pomoč krepi položaj podjetja v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji, ki tekmujejo v trgovini znotraj Skupnosti [25].
Italy shares with most modern taxing jurisdictions certain fundamental principles of taxation of business entities.
Italijanska pravna ureditev za področje davkov pozna nekatera temeljna načela obdavčitve poslovnih subjektov, ki jih priznava večina sodobnih ureditev s tega področja.
There is an entity-level income taxation that is applied to most business entities having legal personality (mainly companies) although with some possibility for mandatory or optional fiscal transparency as for partnerships and certain entities or associations without legal personality.
Obdavčevanje dohodka na ravni subjekta se uporablja za večino poslovnih subjektov s pravno osebnostjo (v glavnem gospodarske družbe), ob tem pa je mogoče uveljavljati načelo obvezne ali neobvezne davčne preglednosti tudi za nekatere subjekte ali združenja, ki nimajo pravne osebnosti.
The latter parallel scheme of Article 19 (providing substitute capital gain taxes of 19 % and 15 % on assets and shares realignments) effectively equalised the recognition of gains resulting from tax realignments relative to the company reorganisations carried out under D.Lgs.
Navedena vzporedna shema iz člena 19 (ki določa 19-odstotni nadomestni davek na kapitalski dobiček ter 15-odstotni davek na prerazporeditve sredstev in kapitalskih deležev) je dejansko izenačila priznanje dobičkov, ki izhajajo iz davčnih prerazporeditev v zvezi s prestrukturiranji gospodarskih družb, opravljenimi v skladu z D.Lgs.
358/1997 with those made by banks under the Law 218/1990.
358/1997, z dobički bank po Zakonu 218/1990.
If one averages the 52,2 % tax rate applied with the 9 % and 12 % substitute taxes foreseen by Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 on the remaining 85 % of the gain the comprehensive rate applied would have ranged between 15,48 % and 17,85 %.
Če bi izračunali povprečno vrednost uporabljene 52,2-odstotne davčne stopnje z 9-odstotnimi in 12-odstotnimi nadomestnimi davki, predvidenimi v členu 2(26) Zakona 350/2003, na preostalih 85 % dobička, bi bila uporabljena skupna stopnja v razponu od 15,48 % do 17,85 %.
For Italy, such rates would be effectively comparable to the rates of 15 % and 19 % applicable under the implicit realignment scheme provided by Law 350/2003, respectively for depreciable and non-depreciable assets of all companies.
Po mnenju Italijanskih organov bi bile take stopnje dejansko primerljive s 15- in 19-odstotnimi stopnjami, ki veljajo v skladu z implicitno shemo prerazporeditve, določeno z Zakonom 350/2003, za sredstva vseh družb, ki se in ki se ne amortizirajo.
In particular, the Paribas banking group including Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, and the Unicredit banking group including Capitalia, Banca di Roma and Banco di Sicilia have provided comments.
Pripombe sta predložili predvsem bančna skupina Paribas, ki vključuje banko Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, in bančna skupina Unicredit, ki vključuje banke Capitalia, Banca di Roma in Banco di Sicilia.
As there should be no step-up in the basis of company assets without company-level tax recognition, the revaluation surplus is a capital gain.
Ker povišanja osnove sredstev družbe ne sme biti brez priznanja davka na ravni družbe, je presežek iz prevrednotenja kapitalski dobiček.
The surplus is depreciable over time together with the relevant assets.
Presežek se sčasoma amortizira skupaj z zadevnimi sredstvi.
According to the comments received from interested parties, the restructured companies (unlike the restructured banks) could have distributed their historical gains without payment of any company tax.
V skladu s pripombami, prejetimi od zainteresiranih strank, so prestrukturirane družbe (drugače kot prestrukturirane banke) lahko razdelile svoje prejšnje dobičke brez plačila kakršnega koli davka od dobička gospodarskih družb.
Under the imputation system applicable until 31 December 2003, however, the relative dividends would have been taxable at the level of the beneficiary-shareholder.
Po sistemu pripisovanja, ki je veljal do 31. decembra 2003, pa naj bi bile zadevne dividende obdavčljive na ravni upravičenec-delničar.
Finally, the interested parties have subordinately suggested that even if the Commission were to conclude that the tax realignment scheme of Article 2(26) of Law 350/2003 provided a specific advantage only of the banks having taken part to the restructurings under Law 218/1990, the advantage would not amount to that preliminarily identified by the Commission.
Nazadnje, zainteresirane stranke so dodale še svoje mnenje, po katerem naj v primeru ugotovitve Komisije, da je bila s shemo davčne prerazporeditve iz člena 2(26) Zakona 350/2003 omogočena posebna ugodnost izključno bankam, ki so sodelovale v prestrukturiranjih po Zakonu 218/1990, ta prednost ne bi znašala toliko, kot je prej ugotovila Komisija.
The advantage would in fact only consist in the difference between the realignment tax paid and the distinct tax payable to revaluate single depreciable or non-depreciable assets pursuant to Article 2(25) of Law 350/2003.
Ugodnost naj bi dejansko vključevala le razliko med plačanim davkom za prerazporeditev in ločenim davkom, ki ga je treba plačati za prevrednotenje posameznih sredstev, ki se oziroma se ne amortizirajo, v skladu s členom 2(25) Zakona 350/2003.
Political and Security Committee Decision BiH/13/2008
Sklep Političnega in varnostnega odbora BiH/13/2008
(2008/712/CFSP)
(2008/712/SZVP)
Following the invitation of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic to participate in operation ALTHEA, the President of the Superior Council for the Central American Armed Forces Conference in his letter of 2 April 2008 forwarded an offer of contribution on behalf of these four States.
Potem ko so bili Honduras, Gvatemala, Salvador in Dominikanska republika povabljeni k sodelovanju v operaciji ALTHEA, je predsednik Vrhovnega sveta Konference oboroženih sil Srednje Amerike (CFAC – Conferência das Forças Armadas da América Central) v pismu z dne 2. aprila 2008 ponudil prispevek v imenu teh štirih držav.
Following recommendations on their contributions by the EU Operation Commander and the European Union Military Committee, the contributions from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic should be accepted.
Na podlagi priporočil poveljnika operacije EU in Vojaškega odbora Evropske unije glede njihovega prispevka bi bilo treba prispevek Hondurasa, Gvatemale, Salvadorja in Dominikanske republike sprejeti.
Following the withdrawal of the contributions from Canada, Morocco, New Zealand and Norway and following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, the annexes to Decisions BiH/1/2004 and BiH/3/2004 need to be further revised.
Zaradi umika prispevka Kanade, Maroka, Nove Zelandije in Norveške ter pristopa Bolgarije in Romunije k Evropski uniji je treba priloge Sklepov BiH/1/2004 in BiH/3/2004 še dodatno revidirati.
Therefore, Denmark does not participate in the financing of the operation.
Zato Danska ne sodeluje pri financiranju te operacije.
The Copenhagen European Council adopted on 12 and 13 December 2002 a Declaration stating that the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the ‘Partnership for Peace’, and which have consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO,
Evropski svet je na zasedanju 12 in 13. decembra 2002 v Kopenhagnu sprejel izjavo, ki poudarja, da se bo ureditev „Berlin plus“ in njeno izvajanje uporabljalo le za tiste države članice EU, ki so hkrati tudi članice NATA, ali pogodbenice „Partnerstva za mir“ in so torej z NATOM sklenile dvostranske varnostne sporazume –
The Annex to Decision BiH/3/2004 shall be replaced by the following:
Priloga Sklepa BiH/3/2004 se nadomesti z naslednjim besedilom:
OJ L 325, 28.10.2004, p. 64.
UL L 325, 28.10.2004, str. 64. --------- „PRILOGA
STATES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3(1)
SEZNAM TRETJIH DRŽAV IZ ČLENA 3(1)
Albania,
Albanija
El Salvador,
Salvador
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Nekdanja jugoslovanska republika Makedonija
Guatemala,
Gvatemala
Switzerland,
Švica
Dominican Republic,
Dominikanska republika
of 8 July 2008
z dne 24. julija 2008
Article 104 of the Treaty lays down an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) to ensure that Member States avoid excessive government deficits or that they correct such deficits when they occur.
S členom 104 Pogodbe je določen postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem za zagotovitev, da se države članice izogibajo čezmernemu javnofinančnemu primanjkljaju ali da ga zmanjšajo, kadar do njega pride.
Pursuant to point 5 of the Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the obligation under Article 104(1) of the Treaty to avoid excessive general government deficits does not apply to the United Kingdom unless it moves to the third stage of economic and monetary union.
V skladu s točko 5 Protokola o določbah v zvezi z Združenim kraljestvom Velika Britanija in Severna Irska se obveznost iz člena 104(1) Pogodbe o izogibanju čezmernemu javnofinančnemu primanjkljaju ne uporablja za Združeno kraljestvo, razen če preide v tretjo fazo ekonomske in monetarne unije.
While in the second stage of economic and monetary union, the United Kingdom shall endeavour to avoid excessive deficits, pursuant to Article 116(4) of the Treaty.
V drugi fazi si mora Združeno kraljestvo v skladu s členom 116(4) Pogodbe prizadevati za izogibanje čezmernemu javnofinančnemu primanjkljaju.
The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation.
Pakt stabilnosti in rasti temelji na cilju zdravih javnih financ kot sredstvu za izboljšanje pogojev za stabilnost cen in močno trajnostno rast, ki pospešuje ustvarjanje delovnih mest.
The excessive deficit procedure under Article 104 of the Treaty, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [1], which is part of the Stability and Growth Pact, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit.
V postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem iz člena 104 Pogodbe, kakor je bil pojasnjen z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1467/97 z dne 7. julija 1997 o pospešitvi in razjasnitvi izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem [1], ki je del Pakta stabilnosti in rasti, je predvidena odločba o obstoju čezmernega primanjkljaja.
The Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.
V protokolu o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, priloženemu Pogodbi, so določene nadaljnje določbe, ki se nanašajo na izvajanje postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 [2] lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provision of the said Protocol.
V Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 3605/93 [2] so določena podrobna pravila in opredeljeni pojmi za uporabo določb omenjenega protokola.
Article 104(5) of the Treaty requires the Commission to address an opinion to the Council if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State or may occur.
V skladu s členom 104(5) Pogodbe Komisija predloži mnenje Svetu, če meni, da v neki državi članici obstaja čezmerni primanjkljaj ali bi do njega lahko prišlo.
Having taken into account its report in accordance with Article 104(3) of the Treaty and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee in accordance with Article 104(4), the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in the United Kingdom.
Ob upoštevanju poročila Komisije v skladu s členom 104(3) Pogodbe in mnenja Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora v skladu s členom 104(4) Pogodbe je Komisija sklenila, da v Združenem kraljestvu obstaja čezmerni primanjkljaj.
The Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to the Council in respect of the United Kingdom on 2 July 2008.
Zato je Komisija 2. julija 2008 naslovila na Svet mnenje v zvezi z Združenim kraljestvom.
In the case of the United Kingdom, this overall assessment leads to the following conclusions.
V primeru Združenega kraljestva iz te celovite ocene izhajajo naslednji sklepi.
The United Kingdom undertook strong fiscal consolidation efforts during the late 1990s.
Združeno kraljestvo si je v poznih 90. letih 20. stoletja močno prizadevalo za fiskalno konsolidacijo.
Thereafter, the government adopted a looser fiscal stance, mainly as a result of an explicit policy objective to raise expenditure on public services.
Nato je vlada sprejela ohlapnejšo fiskalno naravnanost, predvsem zaradi izrecnega političnega cilja zvišati odhodke za javne storitve.
percentage points of GDP [3] between 1999/00 and 2004/05.
S proizvodno vrzeljo, ki je ostala v tem obdobju pozitivna, je to ustrezalo poslabšanju strukturnega salda za 4,75 odstotne točke BDP [3] v obdobju med letoma 1999/2000 in 2004/2005.