natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement in considering all factors relevant to the overall condition of the domestic industry, except for the factor ‘wages’;
upoštevanje vseh dejavnikov v zvezi s splošnim stanjem domače industrije, razen dejavnika „mezde“, je v skladu s členom 15.4 Sporazuma SIU;
Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement in demonstrating the requisite causal link between the subsidised imports and injury; and
prikaz vzročne zveze med subvencioniranim uvozom in škodo je v skladu s členom 15.5 Sporazuma SIU; ter
Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement in applying ‘facts available’ with respect to the subsidy investigation.
uporaba „razpoložljivih dejstev“ za preiskavo v zvezi s subvencijami je v skladu s členom 12.7 Sporazuma SIU.
Reassessment to implement the DSB's recommendations
Ponovna ocena zaradi izvajanja priporočil DSB
In the light of the recommendations set out in the Panel report, the Commission conducted a thorough and objective reassessment of the relevant findings in the definitive Regulation on the basis of information on the record.
Na podlagi priporočil iz poročila preiskovalnega odbora je Komisija izvedla temeljito in nepristransko ponovno oceno zadevnih ugotovitev v dokončni uredbi ob upoštevanju razpoložljivih podatkov.
The scope of the reassessment is appropriately limited to an examination of the five specific aspects of the existing measure, as described above, that were found to be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.
Ponovna ocena je ustrezno omejena na pregled petih posameznih vidikov obstoječega ukrepa, kakor so opisani zgoraj in za katere je bilo ugotovljeno, da so v neskladju s Sporazumom SIU.
This examination is based on the re-evaluation of the existing evidence on the record of the original investigation in light of the relevant findings in the Panel report.
Ta pregled temelji na ponovni oceni obstoječih dokazil iz prvotne preiskave ob upoštevanju zadevnih ugotovitev iz poročila preiskovalnega odbora.
The reassessment set out below shows that injurious subsidisation still exists, although at a slightly lower level.
Ponovna ocena, kakor je opisana v nadaljevanju, je pokazala, da škodljivo subvencioniranje še vedno obstaja, čeprav v manjši meri.
PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION AND LIKE PRODUCT
OBRAVNAVANI IZDELEK IN PODOBNI IZDELEK
The product under consideration and the like product are the same as that covered by the original investigation, i.e. certain electronic microcircuits known as dynamic random access memories (DRAMs), of all types, densities and variations, whether assembled, in processed wafer or chips (dies), manufactured using variations of metal oxide-semiconductors (MOS) process technology, including complementary MOS types (CMOS), of all densities (including future densities), irrespective of access speed, configuration, package or frame etc., originating in the Republic of Korea.
Obravnavani izdelek in podobni izdelek sta enaka izdelkom iz prvotne preiskave, tj. nekaterim elektronskim mikrovezjem, znanim kot DRAM (dinamični bralno-pisalni pomnilnik), vseh vrst, gostot in različic, sestavljenih na predelanih ploščicah ali čipih (matricah), proizvedenih z uporabo različic procesne tehnologije kovinskooksidnih polprevodnikov („MOS“), vključno z dopolnilnimi vrstami MOS (CMOS), vseh gostot (vključno s prihodnjimi gostotami), ne glede na hitrost dostopa, konfiguracijo, paket ali okvir itd., s poreklom iz Republike Koreje.
The product concerned also includes DRAMs presented in (non-customised) memory modules or (non-customised) memory boards, or in some other kind of aggregate form, provided the main purpose of which is to provide memory [7].
Zadevni izdelek vključuje tudi DRAM, predstavljen v (neprirejenih) pomnilniških modulih ali (neprirejenih) pomnilniških ploščah ali v drugačni skupni obliki, če je njegov glavni namen pomnjenje [7].
The product concerned is currently classifiable within CN codes 85422111, 85422113, 85422115, 85422117, ex85422101, ex85422105, ex85489010, ex84733010 and ex84735010.
Zadevni izdelek se trenutno uvršča pod oznake KN 85422111, 85422113, 85422115, 85422117, ex85422101, ex85422105, ex85489010, ex84733010 in ex84735010.
The Panel report did not cover any claims affecting the findings set out in the definitive Regulation concerning the product under consideration and the like product.
Poročilo preiskovalnega odbora ni zajelo nobenega zahtevka, ki je zadeval ugotovitve o obravnavanem izdelku in podobnem izdelku iz dokončne uredbe.
REVISED FINDINGS BASED ON THE PANEL REPORT
PONOVNO PROUČENE UGOTOVITVE NA PODLAGI POROČILA PREISKOVALNEGA ODBORA
This part sets out the reassessed findings based on the conclusions and recommendations of the Panel report concerning:
Ta del opisuje ugotovitve, ki so bile ponovno ocenjene na podlagi sklepov in priporočil iz poročila preiskovalnega odbora v zvezi z:
whether the May 2001 restructuring programme constituted a financial contribution by the GOK within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation;
vprašanjem, ali je program prestrukturiranja iz maja 2001 predstavljal finančni prispevek KV v smislu člena 2(1) osnovne uredbe;
whether there was a benefit in the case of the syndicated loan within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation;
vprašanjem, ali je bila dodeljena ugodnost v primeru posojila bančnega konzorcija v smislu člena 2(2) osnovne uredbe;
the calculation of the amount of the benefit with regard to all subsidy programmes within the meaning of Articles 2(2) and 6 of the basic Regulation.
izračunom višine ugodnosti pri vseh subvencijskih programih v smislu člena 2(2) in člena 6 osnovne uredbe.
All other findings concerning subsidies remain as established in the original investigation and set out in the provisional Regulation and the definitive Regulation.
Vse druge ugotovitve v zvezi s subvencijami ostajajo takšne, kot so bile dokazane v prvotni preiskavi ter določene v začasni uredbi in dokončni uredbi.
May 2001 bond purchase by creditor banks in the amount of KRW 1 trillion and first roll-over of debt (restructuring programme)
Nakup obveznic maja 2001 s strani bank upnic v višini 1 trilijona KRW in prvo obnavljanje dolgov (program prestrukturiranja)
The Panel found that the determination that the creditor banks were directed to participate in the May 2001 restructuring programme and that their purchase of KRW 1 trillion of convertible bonds (CBs) as part of the programme therefore constituted a financial contribution by the GOK was not consistent with Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement [8].
Po mnenju preiskovalnega odbora je bila ugotovitev, da je bilo bankam upnicam svetovano, naj sodelujejo v programu prestrukturiranja za maj 2001, in da njihov nakup zamenljivih obveznic („ZO“) v višini 1 trilijona KRW v okviru tega programa predstavlja finančni prispevek KV, v neskladju s členom 1.1(a) Sporazuma SIU [8].
More specifically, the Panel found that ‘while the May 2001 restructuring programme is a close case, we consider that the evidence before the investigating authority was insufficient to reasonably conclude that the government entrusted or directed the private banks to purchase the Hynix CBs.’ [9].
Natančneje, preiskovalni odbor je ugotovil, da: „čeprav je program prestrukturiranja za maj 2001 zaključen primer, menimo, da so bila dokazila, predložena preiskovalnemu organu, nezadostna za utemeljen sklep, da je vlada pooblastila ali svetovala zasebnim bankam, naj kupijo ZO Hynixa“ [9].
In accordance with the Panel's assessment, the funds provided to Hynix in the context of the May 2001 restructuring programme shall not be countervailed [10].
V skladu z oceno preiskovalnega odbora za sredstva, ki so bila zagotovljena Hynixu v okviru programa prestrukturiranja iz maja 2001, ne bodo uvedeni izravnalni ukrepi [10].
Syndicated loan of KRW 800 billion
Posojilo bančnega konzorcija v višini 800 milijard KRW
With respect to the syndicated loan of KRW 800 billion, the Panel found that the EC had properly established that the GOK directed the Korea Exchange Bank (KEB) to participate in the loan and that this constituted a financial contribution via entrustment or direction of KEB in accordance with Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
V zvezi s posojilom bančnega konzorcija v višini 800 milijard KRW je preiskovalni odbor ugotovil, da je ES pravilno sklepala, da je KV svetovala Korea Exchange Bank („KEB“), naj sodeluje pri posojilu, in da to predstavlja finančni prispevek preko pooblastila ali navodila KEB v skladu s členom 1.1(a) Sporazuma SIU.
The Panel also found that the Korea Development Bank (KDB) provided a direct financial contribution through its participation in the syndicated loan, and, because the KDB was a public body, the EC was not required to make a finding of entrustment or direction [11].
Preiskovalni odbor je tudi ugotovil, da je Korea Development Bank („KDB“) zagotovila neposreden finančni prispevek s svojim sodelovanjem pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija, in ker je bila KDB javna organizacija, ES ni bilo treba predložiti dokazila o pooblastitvi ali navodilu [11].
However, the Panel found that the EC failed to establish the existence of a benefit from the financial contribution provided by the KDB and the KEB within the meaning of Article 1(b) of the SCM Agreement [12].
Vendar pa je preiskovalni odbor ugotovil, da ES ni uspela prikazati obstoja ugodnosti v zvezi s finančnim prispevkom, ki sta ga zagotovili KDB in KEB, v smislu člena 1(b) Sporazuma SIU [12].
Specifically, the Panel stated that the EC had not examined whether there were comparable commercial loans that could actually have been obtained by Hynix on the market and stated that the EC had ignored the other participants in the syndicated loans as possible benchmarks [13].
Natančneje, preiskovalni odbor je izjavil, da ES ni preverila, ali so obstajala primerljiva komercialna posojila, ki bi jih na trgu lahko bil pridobil Hynix, in da je ES prezrla druge udeležence pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija, ki bi jih lahko uporabila za primerjavo [13].
In the view of the Commission, the participation by the other banks in the syndicated loan cannot serve as a proper benchmark for determining the existence of a benefit.
Komisija meni, da sodelovanje drugih bank pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija ne more veljati za ustrezno primerjavo pri ugotavljanju obstoja ugodnosti.
As the Panel itself noted, in determining the existence of a commercial benchmark, authorities must examine whether such loans were so influenced by the alleged government intervention that they do not represent loans that could actually be obtained on the market [14].
Kot je opozoril že preiskovalni odbor, morajo pri ugotavljanju obstoja komercialne primerjave pristojni organi preučiti, ali je domnevna vpletenost vlade vplivala na posojila na tak način, da ne predstavljajo več posojil, ki bi dejansko obstajala na trgu [14].
The Commission has conducted a thorough re-examination of the extensive record in this case and has employed the type of analysis discussed by the Panel.
Komisija je v tem primeru izvedla temeljit ponoven pregled obsežne dokumentacije in pri tem uporabila vrsto analize, o kateri je razpravljal preiskovalni odbor.
On this basis, the Commission has determined that the loans from the other banks participating in the syndicated loan could not serve as a proper benchmark.
Na podlagi tega je Komisija ugotovila, da posojila drugih bank, ki so sodelovale pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija ne morejo biti uporabljena kot ustrezna primerjava.
First, bearing in mind the financial condition of Hynix at the time that the syndicated loan was arranged, as noted in recital 19 of the definitive Regulation, at the time the loan was agreed to, at the end of 2000, Hynix was in severe financial distress.
Prvič je treba upoštevati finančno stanje Hynixa v času, ko je bilo dogovorjeno posojilo bančnega konzorcija. Kakor je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 19 dokončne uredbe, je bil Hynix konec leta 2000, ko je bilo posojilo dogovorjeno, v resnih finančnih težavah.
It had over USD 9,46 billion in liabilities at the end of 2000, which was over twice its net worth and over four times the market capitalisation of the company.
Imel je več kot 9,46 milijard USD obveznosti, kar je več kot dvakrat toliko kakor njegova neto vrednost in več kot štirikrat toliko, kolikor znaša tržna kapitalizacija družbe.
It suffered a loss in 2000, a year in which other large DRAM producers registered profits and which was generally considered to have been a very good year in the DRAM industry.
Leta 2000, ko so drugi večji proizvajalci DRAM-a zabeležili dobiček in ki je bilo tudi sicer ocenjeno za zelo uspešno leto, je utrpel izgubo.
The majority of Hynix liabilities were coming due in 2001 and the company was facing intense liquidity problems.
Večina Hynixovih obveznosti naj bi zapadla v letu 2001 in družba se je soočala z resnimi likvidacijskimi težavami.
Many independent analysts and brokerage houses were saying at that time that the company would not be able to generate sufficient cash flow or asset disposals to pay off its maturing liabilities.
Več neodvisnih analitikov in borznoposredniških družb je v tistem času trdilo, da družba ne bo mogla ustvarjati zadostnega prihodka ali prodaje sredstev, da bi poplačala zapadle obveznosti.
Under such circumstances, profit maximising banks operating under normal commercial conditions would not voluntarily participate in loans with such enormous risk of default [15].
V takšnih okoliščinah banke, ki želijo kar najbolj povečati dobiček in ki poslujejo v normalnih tržnih pogojih, ne bi prostovoljno sodelovale pri posojilih s tako visokimi možnostmi za neuspeh [15].
Second, there is ample evidence on the record that other participants in the syndicated loan were pressured to participate in the overall restructuring of Hynix's debt.
Drugič, obstaja ogromno zabeleženih dokazov, da so bili drugi udeleženci pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija prisiljeni k sodelovanju pri splošnem restrukturiranju dolga Hynixa.
For example, the record contains evidence that one of the participants, Kookmin Bank, was required to lend directly to ‘troubled corporate borrowers’.
Dokumentacija na primer vsebuje dokazila, da je eden od udeležencev, Kookmin Bank, moral neposredno odobriti posojila „podjetjem-posojilojemalcem v težavah“.
Specifically, in a statement to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States, Kookmin stated:
Natančneje, v izjavi za Komisijo Združenih držav Amerike za vrednostne papirje in borzo je Kookmin izjavil:
‘The Korean government has promoted, and, as a matter of policy, may continue to promote lending to certain types of borrowers.
„Korejska vlada je spodbujala posojila določenim vrstam posojilojemalcev in lahko to v skladu s svojo politiko počne tudi v prihodnje.
It generally has done this by requesting banks to participate in remedial programs for troubled borrowers (such as Hynix) and by identifying sectors of the economy it wishes to promote and making low interest loans available to banks and financial institutions who lend to borrowers in these sectors. The government has in this manner promoted low-income mortgage lending and lending to technology companies.
V glavnem je to počela tako, da je pozvala banke, naj sodelujejo pri sanacijskih programih za posojilojemalce v težavah/zadolžene posojilojemalce (kot npr. Hynix), in določila gospodarska področja, ki jih je želela spodbujati, nato pa je bankam in finančnim institucijam, ki so odobrila posojila posojilojemalcem s teh področij, omogočila posojila z nizkimi obrestnimi merami.
We expect that all loans made pursuant to government policies will be reviewed in accordance with our credit review policies.
Vlada je na ta način spodbujala hipotekarna posojila posojilojemalcem z nizkimi dohodki in posojila tehnološkim družbam.
However, government policies may influence us to lend to certain sectors or in a manner in which we otherwise would not in the absence of government policy.’
Pričakujemo, da bodo vsa posojila, ki so bila odobrena v okviru političnih prioritet vlade, pregledana v skladu z našimi postopki preverjanja posojil.
[16].It is clear that Kookmin refers to Hynix in mentioning ‘troubled borrowers’, because the bank's 2001 annual report lists Hynix as the single largest financially troubled borrower [17].
Vendar pa vladna politika lahko vpliva na nas, tako da bi odobrili posojila nekaterim sektorjem in pod pogoji, ki v odsotnosti takšne politike ne bi prišli v poštev.“ [16].Očitno je, da se „posojilojemalci v finančnih težavah“, o katerih govori Kookmin, nanašajo na Hynix, saj letno poročilo te banke za leto 2001 navaja Hynix kot edinega večjega posojilojemalca v finančnih težavah [17].
Further, Kookmin, as a GOK-invested enterprise, was subject to audit and inspection by the GOK Board of Audit and Inspection and as such was under pressure to comply with GOK policy.
Poleg tega je bil Kookmin kot podjetje, v katerega vlaga KV, v postopku revizije in pregleda, ki ga je izvajal Svet za revizijo in pregled KV, in je bil zato prisiljen ravnati v skladu s politiko KV.
Other participants in the syndicated loan were also under pressure from the GOK to assist Hynix.
Tudi drugi udeleženci pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija so bili s strani KV prisiljeni pomagati Hynixu.
In this respect, recital 55 of the definitive Regulation provides extensive information regarding the extent to which the GOK put pressure on Korea First Bank (KFB) to provide ongoing financing to Hynix.
V zvezi s tem so v uvodni izjavi 55 dokončne uredbe navedeni obsežni podatki o tem, kako velik je bil pritisk, ki ga je izvajala KV nad Korea First Bank („KFB“), da bi slednja še naprej financirala Hynix.
In a high-level economic ministerial meeting in November 2000 the GOK took steps to ‘alleviate Hynix's cash crunch’ and waived statutory credit limits for KFB, KEB and KDB.
Novembra 2000 si je KV na srečanju gospodarskih ministrov na visoki ravni prizadevala „olajšati denarne težave Hynixa“ in omejila omejitve posojil KFB, KEB in KDB.
The Panel did not examine the evidence in relation to KFB, because the Commission concluded its involvement to be negligible.
Preiskovalni odbor ni pregledal dokazil v zvezi s KFB, ker je Komisija ugotovila, da je njegovo sodelovanje pri tem zanemarljivo.
However, given that the Panel found that the same GOK tactics employed in relation to KEB amounted to direction and that the GOK owns 49 % of KFB, it is reasonable to conclude that the GOK was in a position to and did exert influence over KFB in relation to its decision to participate in the syndicated loan.
Vendar pa je preiskovalni odbor ugotovil, da je KV pri KFB uporabila isto taktiko kot pri KEB in da ima KV v lasti 49 % KFB, zaradi česar se da logično sklepati, da je KV lahko in tudi je vplivala na KFB glede njegove odločitve o sodelovanju pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija.
KDB is a public body and KEB was found by the Panel to have been directed by the GOK.
KDB je javna organizacija in preiskovalni odbor je ugotovil, da je KV vplivala na KEB.
The participation of these banks in the syndicated loan is thus not a reliable commercial benchmark.
Zato sodelovanje teh dveh bank pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija ni zanesljiva komercialna primerjava.
Other banks that were part of the syndicated loan were also subject to similar pressure from the GOK.
Tudi druge banke, ki so sodelovale pri osojilu bančnega konzorcija, so bile podvržene podobnemu pritisku s strani KV.
The GOK put very direct pressure on both Shinhan and KorAm banks regarding the extension of the export credit arrangements, which was made at the same time as the syndicated loan.
KV je neposredno vplivala na banki Shinhan in KorAm v zvezi s podaljšanjem dogovorov o posojilu za izvoz, ki je časovno sovpadel s posojilom bančnega konzorcija.
These banks had concluded that they were already over-exposed to Hynix and reversed their earlier decision to increase the export credit ceiling available to Hynix.
Ti banki sta ugotovili, da sta v zvezi s Hynixom že preveč tvegali in sta preklicali svojo odločitev o povišanju zgornje meje posojila za izvoz Hynixu.
In response, an FSS official criticised their move as ‘unthinkable’ [18].
V odgovor je uradnik FSS to odločitev označil za „nezaslišano“ [18].
The GOK held 18,3 % of Shinhan and was its largest shareholder, thus able to exert considerable influence over the bank.
KV je imela v lasti 18,3 % Shinhana in je bila večinski delničar, zaradi česar je lahko v veliki meri vplivala na banko.
It is clear that Shinhan was not acting commercially given that it increased its loan loss reserves for Hynix even as it continued to assist the company and that it offered no legitimate credit risk analysis for assisting it.
Jasno je, da Shinhan ni ravnal v skladu s tržnimi kriteriji, saj je povečal svoje rezerve za izgube posojil za Hynix, čeprav je še naprej pomagal družbi, in pri tem ni izvedel nobene legitimne analize kreditnega tveganja.
KorAM Bank again faced GOK threats when the bank refused to purchase Hynix CBs, because it decided that doing so was not financially sound.
KorAm Bank se je ponovno soočila z grožnjami, ko je zavrnila nakup ZO Hynixa, ker je menila, da to ne bi bila pametna finančna odločitev.
In response to the bank's decision not to purchase the bonds, an FSS official rebuked KorAm, using language uncharacteristic of a government apparently uninvolved in credit decisions.
V odgovor na odločitev banke, da ne bo kupila obveznic, je uradnik FSS okaral KorAm, pri čemer je uporabil dikcijo, ki ni v skladu z dikcijo vlade, ki naj se ne bi vpletala v odločitve o posojilih.
As a result of these threats, KorAm Bank capitulated and reversed its decision [21], while at the same time increasing its loan loss reserves for Hynix and offering no legitimate credit analysis for providing such financial assistance.
Pod pritiskom teh groženj se je KorAm vdal in spremenil svojo odločitev [21], hkrati pa je povečal svoje rezerve za izgube posojil za Hynix ter pri tem ni izvedel nobene legitimne analize za nudenje takšne finančne pomoči.
Of the remaining banks which participated in the syndicated loan, Chohung Bank, Woori Bank, the NACF, Seoul Bank, Kwangju Bank, Peace Bank, Kyongnam Bank and the Industrial Bank of Korea are all GOK-owned and thus their credit decisions are tainted by GOK policy.
Ostale banke, ki so sodelovale pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija, so Chohung Bank, Woori Bank, NACF, Seoul Bank, Kwangju Bank, Peace Bank, Kyongnam Bank in Industrial Bank of Korea v lasti KV, zaradi česar na njihove odločitve o posojilih vpliva politika KV.
The Housing and Commercial Bank, of which the GOK has a 20 % share, admitted government direction in its credit decisions in a sworn statement to the US SEC [22].
Housing and Commercial Bank, ki je v 20-odstotni lasti KV, je v zapriseženi izjavi za Komisijo Združenih držav Amerike za vrednostne papirje in borzo [22] priznala, da je dobila navodila vlade, kako ravnati pri odločitvah o posojilih.
Finally, although Pusan Bank had no GOK ownership, it was nevertheless ordered by the FSS in 1999 to fire or replace its executives and to increase its paid-in capital by USD 86,2 million before the end of March 2000 [23], to ‘slash their manpower, the number of branches and organisations, while disposing of ailing subsidiaries’ [24] and, in 2000, the FSS sanctioned its former and current officials for mismanagement [25].
Nenazadnje je bilo tudi Pusan Bank, čeprav KV nima v njej nobenega deleža, leta 1999 s strani FSS ukazano, naj odpusti ali zamenja svoje vodstvene delavce ter pred koncem marca 2000 poveča svoj vplačani kapital za 86,2 milijona USD [23], „drastično zmanjša delovno silo, število poslovalnic in organizacij ter ukine opešane podružnice“ [24], poleg tega pa je leta 2000 FSS kaznovala bivše in takratne uradnike za zgrešeno upravljanje [25].
Given this degree of GOK control over Pusan Bank, the bank's decision to participate in the syndicated loan cannot be considered to be a safe commercial benchmark.
Glede na takšno stopnjo nadzora KV nad Pusan Bank se odločitev banke za sodelovanje pri posojilu bančnega konzorcija ne more šteti za zanesljivo komercialno primerjavo.