natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Joint Stock Company Chelyabinsk Tube Rolling Plant and Joint Stock Company Pervouralsky Novotrubny Works
Joint Stock Company Chelyabinsk Tube Rolling Plant in Joint Stock Company Pervouralsky Novotrubny Works
Conclusion on dumping regarding Russia
Sklepna ugotovitev o dampingu glede Rusije
Since the companies mentioned in recital (79) represent all export sales from Russia to the Community, the residual dumping margin was set at the same level as the one established for the non-cooperating group of exporting producers, namely 35,8 %.
Ker zajema izvoz družb, navedenih v uvodni izjavi (79), celoten izvoz iz Rusije v Skupnost, je bila preostala stopnja dampinga določena na isti ravni kot stopnja, ugotovljena za nesodelujočo skupino proizvajalcev izvoznikov, namreč 35,8 %.
At the time of initiation of this investigation, Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation was applicable to Ukraine.
Na začetku te preiskave se je za Ukrajino uporabil člen 2(7)(b) osnovne uredbe.
This Article stated that the procedure in anti-dumping investigations, concerning imports originating in Ukraine, was that normal value shall be determined in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 6 of the said Article for those producers which were found to meet the criteria laid down in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation.
V tem členu je navedeno, da je v protidampinških preiskavah o uvozu s poreklom iz Ukrajine normalna vrednost določena v skladu z odstavki od 1 do 6 navedenega člena za tiste proizvajalce, ki izpolnjujejo merila iz člena 2(7)(c) osnovne uredbe.
Briefly, and for ease of reference only, these criteria, fulfilment of which the applicant companies have to demonstrate, are set out in summarised form below:
Na kratko in samo zaradi lažjega sklica so ta merila, katerih izpolnitev morajo vložniki dokazati, povzeta v nadaljevanju:
Business decisions are made in response to market signals, without significant State interference, and cost reflect market values,
poslovne odločitve se sprejemajo v skladu s tržnimi razmerami, brez občutnega vmešavanja države, stroški pa odražajo tržne vrednosti;
Firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited, in line with international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes,
družbe imajo jasen seznam osnovnih računovodskih evidenc, ki se neodvisno pregledujejo v skladu z mednarodnimi računovodskimi standardi in se uporabljajo za vse namene;
There are no significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system,
ni znatnih izkrivljanj, prenesenih iz nekdanjega sistema netržnega gospodarstva;
Legal certainty and stability is guaranteed by bankruptcy and property laws,
pravno varnost in stabilnost zagotavljata stečajno in premoženjsko pravo;
Exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate.
pretvorbe valut se izvajajo po tržnem tečaju.
Three groups of Ukrainian exporting producers requested MET pursuant to Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation and replied to the MET claim form for exporting producers.
Tri skupine ukrajinskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov so zahtevale TGO v skladu s členom 2(7)(b) osnovne uredbe in so izpolnile zahtevek za TGO za proizvajalce izvoznike.
The Commission sought and verified at the premises of these companies all necessary information submitted in their MET applications.
Komisija je poiskala in v prostorih teh družb preverila vse informacije, navedene v obrazcu TGO.
The investigation showed that the three groups of Ukrainian exporting producers mentioned above fulfilled all the criteria required and they were therefore granted MET.
Preiskava je pokazala, da tri zgoraj navedene skupine ukrajinskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov izpolnjujejo vsa zahtevana merila, zato jim je bil TGO odobren.
The Community industry was given the opportunity to comment and objected that several of the five criteria set out in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation were not met by all exporting producers.
Industrija Skupnosti je imela možnost predložitve pripomb in je trdila, da vsi proizvajalci izvozniki nekaterih od petih meril iz člena 2(7)(c) osnovne uredbe, niso izpolnili.
More specifically, the Community industry argued that (i) the State might take back control of certain of the privatised exporting producers; (ii) the State intervened in their day-to-day decisions; (iii) the regulations and laws in force in Ukraine during the IP as regards labour, bankruptcy and property did not guarantee proper market economy conditions; and (iv) State intervention took place with regard to export sales price and costs of inputs.
Natančneje, industrija Skupnosti je trdila, da (i) bi lahko država ponovno začela nadzorovati nekatere privatizirane proizvajalce izvoznike; (ii) se država vmešava v njihove vsakodnevne poslovne odločitve; (iii) delovna zakonodaja ter stečajno in premoženjsko pravo nista zagotovila ustreznih pogojev tržnega gospodarstva; in (iv) da se je država vmešavala pri določanju izvoznih cen in stroškov vložkov.
The comments of the Community industry were duly taken into account.
Pripombe industrije Skupnosti so bile upoštevane.
However, these comments did not provide sufficient evidence that any of the five criteria against which the Ukrainian exporting producers' claims for MET was analysed pursuant to Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation as described above was not fulfilled.
Vendar ni bilo predloženih zadostnih dokazov, da katero koli od meril, na podlagi katerih ukrajinski proizvajalci izvozniki zahtevajo TGO in ki so bila proučena v skladu s členom 2(7)(c) osnovne uredbe, kot je opisano zgoraj, ne bi bilo izpolnjeno.
Indeed, the investigation showed that no significant interference of the State was taking place in the companies' business decisions.
Preiskava je dejansko pokazala, da se država ni občutno vmešavala v poslovne odločitve družb.
In this respect, it can be recalled that partial State ownership is not as such, according to the Commission's practice, sufficient grounds to consider that criterion 1 of Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation is not fulfilled.
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da delna državna lastnina kot taka v skladu s prakso Komisije ni zadosten razlog za domnevo, da merilo 1 člena 2(7)(c) osnovne uredbe ni izpolnjeno.
It was also found that the costs of the main inputs reflected market values.
Ugotovljeno je bilo tudi, da so stroški glavnih vložkov odražali tržne vrednosti.
As regards gas and electricity prices, they were found to be in line with average prices in Ukraine, although lower than the prices in Europe and other markets.
Za cene plina in električne energije je bilo ugotovljeno, da so v skladu s povprečnimi cenami v Ukrajini, čeprav so nižje od cen na evropskih in drugih trgih.
This was not deemed to be sufficient grounds, however, to consider that criterion 1 was not fulfilled, since gas and electricity only represent a relatively minor part of the cost of production of SPT and since these prices, in so far as they were found to be distorted, have been adjusted to market prices for the purpose of the dumping calculation (see recitals (119) to (127)).
To se ni štelo za zadosten razlog, da se merilo 1 šteje kot neizpolnjeno, saj pomenijo stroški za plin in električno energijo relativno majhen del stroškov proizvodnje BC in so bile te cene v primeru izkrivljanj za izračun dampinga prilagojene na tržne cene (glej uvodne izjave (119) do (127)).
Furthermore, the investigation showed that the laws in force in Ukraine with regard to employment and labour conditions were in line with market economy principles.
Preiskava je tudi pokazala, da je bila zakonodaja o zaposlovanju in delovnih pogojih, veljavna v Ukrajini, v skladu z načeli tržnega gospodarstva.
In particular, it was found that the three groups of exporting producers were free to hire or dismiss their staff.
Ugotovljeno je bilo zlasti, da so tri skupine proizvajalcev izvoznikov prosto zaposlovale ali odpuščale svoje osebje.
Similarly, no argument brought forward by the Community industry was able to rebut the conclusion of the Commission that bankruptcy and property laws guaranteed proper market economy conditions for the three groups of exporters.
Industrija Skupnosti z nobeno utemeljitvijo ni mogla izpodbiti sklepa Komisije, da sta stečajno in premoženjsko pravo za te tri skupine izvoznikov zagotovila ustrezne pogoje tržnega gospodarstva.
There was therefore no reason not to grant MET to the three groups of Ukrainian exporting producers.
Zato ni bilo razloga, da trem skupinam ukrajinskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov TGO ne bi bil odobren.
The Advisory Committee was consulted and did not object to the conclusions of the Commission.
Opravljena so bila posvetovanja s svetovalnim odborom in ta ugotovitvam Komisije ni nasprotoval.
Dumping calculation
Izračun dampinga
Questionnaire replies were received from three groups of exporting producers.
Tri skupine proizvajalcev izvoznikov so izpolnile vprašalnike.
One group consists of two producers and two related traders, whereas another group consists of one producer and two related traders, whilst the latter exporting producer has no related company involved in the production or sale of the product concerned.
Eno skupino sestavljajo dva proizvajalca in dva povezana trgovca, drugo skupino pa en proizvajalec in dva povezana trgovca, pri čemer slednji proizvajalec izvoznik nima povezane družbe, vključene v proizvodnjo ali prodajo zadevnega izdelka.
For all three groups of exporting producers, the total volume of domestic sales of the like product was representative as defined in recital (41).
Za vse tri skupine proizvajalcev izvoznikov je bil celoten obseg domače prodaje podobnega izdelka reprezentativen, kot je opredeljeno v uvodni izjavi (41) zgoraj.
For part of the product types normal value was based on prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in Ukraine, and for the product types for which the domestic sales were insufficient to be considered representative or they were not made in the ordinary course of trade, normal value was constructed as described in recital (45).
Za del vrste izdelkov je normalna vrednost temeljila na cenah, plačanih ali plačljivih v običajnem poteku trgovine s strani neodvisnih strank v Ukrajini, za vrste izdelka, katerih domača prodaja ni bila zadostna, da bi se lahko štela za reprezentativno ali ni bila izvedena v okviru običajnega poteka trgovine, pa je bila normalna vrednost konstruirana tako, kot je opisana v uvodni izjavi (45).
With regard to the manufacturing costs, and in particular energy costs, it was found during the investigation that energy prices paid by the three groups of companies were regulated by the State and significantly lower than international prices.
Glede na proizvodne stroške in zlasti stroške energije je bilo v preiskavi ugotovljeno, da je cene energije, ki so jih plačale tri skupine družb, določala država in so bile znatno nižje od mednarodnih cen.
The prices charged by the Ukrainian State-owned and/or State-regulated suppliers of electricity to the three groups of exporting producers were compared to prices in Romania as well as to prices in the Community for the same general category of electricity users.
Cene, ki so jih ukrajinski dobavitelji električne energije, ki so bili v lasti države in/ali jih je ta upravljala, zaračunavali trem skupinam proizvajalcev izvoznikov, so se primerjale s cenami v Romuniji in Skupnosti za enako splošno kategorijo potrošnikov električne energije.
In all cases, these prices were found to be considerably lower than the prices in Romania and in the Community, and it was concluded that the electricity prices paid by the Ukrainian exporters did not reasonably reflect the actual production and sale costs of the electricity purchased.
V vseh primerih je bilo ugotovljeno, da so cene znatno nižje od cen v Romuniji in Skupnosti, zato je bilo sklenjeno, da cene električne energije, ki so jih plačali ukrajinski izvozniki niso realno odražale dejanskih stroškov proizvodnje in prodaje nabavljene električne energije.
The three cooperating Ukrainian exporters opposed to these conclusions and submitted that the costs reported in their accounting records reflected the price actually paid to their suppliers of electricity.
Trije sodelujoči ukrajinski izvozniki so sklepom nasprotovali in trdili, da so stroški, zabeleženi v njihovih računovodskih evidencah, odražali ceno, dejansko plačano njihovim dobaviteljem električne energije.
However, none of the arguments put forward could explain the differences found with prices in Romania and average prices in the Community, and the conclusions above were confirmed.
Nobena utemeljitev ni pojasnila razlik, ki so nastale v primerjavi s cenami v Romuniji in povprečnimi cenami v Skupnosti, zato so bili zgornji sklepi potrjeni.
The same approach was followed as regards gas prices.
Enak pristop je veljal za cene plina.
A comparison showed that gas prices charged to Ukrainian exporters by their State-owned and/or State-regulated suppliers were around half the prices in Romania and also considerably lower than average prices charged in the Community for gas to the same general category of customers.
Primerjava je pokazala, da so cene plina, ki so jih ukrajinski dobavitelji električne energije, ki so bili v lasti države in/ali jih je ta upravljala, zaračunavali ukrajinskim izvoznikom, za enako skupino potrošnikov za polovico nižje od cen v Romuniji ter znatno nižje od povprečnih cen plina v Skupnosti.
During the IP, Ukraine got a major part of its supplies of gas from Russia.
V OP so Ukrajini plin dobavljali večinoma ruski dobavitelji.
OAO Gazprom's stated in its annual report 2004 that: ‘As it supplied gas to CIS states, OAO “Gazprom” pursued its main strategic objective of providing environment for unimpeded transit of Russian gas to Europe through and their territory’ and further that: ‘In the reporting year 84,9 % of the total amount of gas supplied to Ukraine […] was treated as payment for transit services’.
OAO Gazprom je v svojem letnem poročilu 2004 navedel: „Z dobavljanjem plina državam CIS je OAO ‚Gazprom‘ zasledoval svoj glavni strateški cilj zagotoviti pogoje za neoviran prenos ruskega plina v Evropo preko svojega ozemlja“. Nadalje je navedel: „V letu poročanja je bilo 84,9 % celotne količine plina, dostavljenega Ukrajini […], obravnavanih kot plačilo za tranzitne storitve“.
The export price of gas from Russia to Ukraine could therefore not serve as a proper basis for comparison to determine whether the gas prices paid by the Ukrainian exporters reflected the cost associated with the production and sale of the gas purchased, since this export price may well have been influenced by the barter trade agreement.
Izvozne cene plina iz Rusije v Ukrajino zato ni bilo mogoče uporabiti kot pravo podlago za primerjavo pri ugotavljanju, ali so cene plina, ki so jih plačali ukrajinski izvozniki, odražale stroške, povezane s proizvodnjo in prodajo nabavljenega plina, saj bi na to izvozno ceno lahko vplival sporazum o menjalni trgovini.
Moreover, the prices paid by Ukrainian exporting producers were compared to the average export price from Russia to Western and Eastern Europe, as determined above, as well as to average gas prices in North America, which were determined using Nymex Henry Hub index for gas.
Cene, ki so jih plačali ukrajinski proizvajalci izvozniki, so se primerjale s povprečno izvozno ceno iz Rusije v zahodno in vzhodno Evropo, kot je navedeno zgoraj, ter s povprečnimi cenami plina v Severni Ameriki, ki so bile določene na podlagi indeksa Nymex Henry Hub za plin.
In both cases they were found considerably lower.
V obeh primerih so bile cene znatno nižje.
Given the above, it was concluded that the gas prices paid by the Ukrainian exporting producers, which were in direct relation with the export price declared by OAO Gazprom for exports to Ukraine and which was found to be very likely influenced by an existing barter trade agreement, did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with production and sale of the gas purchased.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno je bilo sklenjeno, da cene plina, ki so jih plačali ukrajinski proizvajalci izvozniki in ki so bile neposredno povezane z izvozno ceno, ki jo je OAO Gazprom navedel za izvoz v Ukrajino in na katero naj bi po vsej verjetnosti vplival obstoječi sporazum o menjalni trgovini, niso dejansko odražale stroškov, povezanih s proizvodnjo in prodajo nabavljenega plina.
Again the three cooperating Ukrainian exporters opposed to these conclusions and submitted that the costs reported in their accounting records reflected the price actually paid to their suppliers of gas.
Trije sodelujoči ukrajinski izvozniki so sklepom nasprotovali in trdili, da so stroški, zabeleženi v njihovih računovodskih evidencah, odražali ceno, dejansko plačano njihovim dobaviteljem plina.
However, the arguments put forward were not able to rebut the conclusions above, insofar as the price of the gas supplied by Russia to Ukraine was significantly affected by an agreement in place during the IP concerning the transit of gas through Ukraine, as confirmed by the annual report for 2004 of ‘OAO Gazprom’.
Navedene utemeljitve niso mogle izpodbiti zgornjih sklepov, saj je na ceno plina, ki ga je Rusija dobavila Ukrajini, znatno vplival sporazum glede prenosa plina preko Ukrajine, ki je veljal v OP, kar je potrdilo letno poročilo za leto 2004 „OAO Gazproma“.
Therefore, as provided for in Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation, the electricity and gas costs of the Ukrainian exporting producers were adjusted to reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of electricity and gas during the IP.
Kot določa člen 2(5) osnovne uredbe, so bili stroški električne energije in plina ukrajinskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov prilagojeni tako, da realno odražajo stroške, povezane s proizvodnjo in prodajo električne energije in plina v OP.
The adjustment was based on an average of the prices observed during the IP in Romania, a market-economy country which also imports gas from Russia, and is roughly the same distance from the Russian gas fields.
Prilagoditev je temeljila na povprečju cen v OP v Romuniji, državi s tržnim gospodarstvom, ki prav tako uvaža plin iz Rusije in je približno enako oddaljena od ruskih plinskih polj.
The average price for Romania was based on the verified data collected at Romanian exporting producers of the product concerned.
Povprečna cena za Romunijo je temeljila na preverjenih podatkih, ki so jih navedli romunski proizvajalci izvozniki zadevnega izdelka.
It has to be noted that this average price is not significantly different from the average gas export price determined above for Russia.
Treba je opomniti, da ta povprečna cena ni znatno drugačna od povprečne izvozne cene plina, določene zgoraj za Rusijo.
One exporter claimed that the profit margin used for the construction of the normal value was different from the average profit made by this exporter on sales on the domestic market, and too high.
En izvoznik je trdil, da se stopnja dobička, uporabljena pri konstruiranju normalne vrednosti, razlikuje od povprečnega dobička, ki ga je ustvaril ta izvoznik pri prodaji na notranjem trgu, in da je previsoka.
This claim had to be rejected as the profit used in constructing normal value was the one calculated in accordance with the applicable provision, i.e. the first sentence of Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation.
To trditev je bilo treba zavrniti, ker je bil pri konstruiranju normalne vrednosti uporabljen dobiček, izračunan v skladu z veljavno določbo, tj. prvim stavkom člena 2(6) osnovne uredbe.
In other words, the profit margin used equalled the profit margin pertaining to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the like product on the Ukrainian domestic market.
Povedano drugače, stopnja dobička je ustrezala stopnji dobička, ki se nanaša na proizvodnjo in prodajo podobnega izdelka na ukrajinskem notranjem trgu v običajnem poteku trgovine.
It was calculated based on the information which was submitted by the company in its questionnaire response and could be verified.
Izračun je temeljil na informacijah, ki jih je predložila družba v svojem vprašalniku in ki jih je bilo mogoče preveriti.
Two groups of exporting producers made the vast majority of their export sales via a related trading company located in a third country.
Dve skupini proizvajalcev izvoznikov sta izvozili večino izdelkov prek prevezane trgovinske družbe v tretji državi.
The export price for those two groups of exporting producers was established on the basis of the related trading companies' resale prices to the first independent customers in the Community, except for the few transactions which corresponded to direct sales of those exporting producers to independent customers in the Community.
Izvozna cena za ti dve skupini proizvajalcev izvoznikov je bila določena na podlagi cen pri nadaljnji prodaji povezanih trgovinskih družb prvi neodvisni stranki v Skupnosti, razen nekaj transakcij, ki so ustrezale neposredni prodaji navedenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov neodvisnim strankam v Skupnosti.
In the latter case, the export price was determined as the price actually paid or payable for the product when sold for export from Ukraine to the Community.
V slednjem primeru je bila izvozna cena določena kot cena, dejansko plačana ali plačljiva za izdelek pri izvozu iz Ukrajine v Skupnost.
Another exporting producer made all its sales to independent customers in the Community, and the export price was therefore established, as described in recital (46), on the price actually paid or payable for the product when sold for export from Ukraine to the Community.
Drugi proizvajalec izvoznik je vse izdelke izvozil neodvisnim strankam v Skupnosti, zato je bila izvozna cena določena na podlagi dejansko plačane ali plačljive cene za izdelek pri izvozu iz Ukrajine v Skupnost, kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi (46).
Adjustments were made, where appropriate, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation, in respect of discounts for transport, insurance, handling, loading, and ancillary costs, credit, and commissions.
Prilagoditve so bile po potrebi izvedene v skladu s členom 2(10) osnovne uredbe pri popustih za prevozne, zavarovalniške, manipulativne stroške, stroške nakladanja in druge tozadevne stroške ter stroške posojila in provizij.
For the two groups of exporting producers which channelled most of their sales through related traders, an adjustment to the export price for a commission was made in accordance with Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, in the cases where sales were made through these related traders, as these related traders had functions similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis.
Za dve skupini proizvajalcev izvoznikov, ki so večino svojih izdelkov prodali preko povezanih trgovcev, je bila prilagoditev izvozne cene za provizijo izvedena v skladu s členom 2(10)(i) osnovne uredbe v primeru, kjer je prodaja potekala preko teh povezanih trgovcev, saj so imeli ti podobne funkcije kot zastopnik, ki dela za provizijo.
In this context, in the calculation of the commission, the SGA expenses incurred by the related traders to sell the product concerned produced by Ukrainian producers were taken into account, as well as a reasonable profit margin.
Pri izračunu provizije so se upoštevali PSA-stroški, ki so jih povezani trgovci imeli pri prodaji zadevnega izdelka, ki so ga proizvedli ukrajinski proizvajalci, ter ustrezna stopnja dobička.
This latter was based on a weighted average of the profit margins for sales of like products to unrelated customers found for the three unrelated importers in the Community which cooperated with the investigation and submitted information which was verified.
Slednja je temeljila na tehtanem povprečju stopenj dobička za prodajo podobnega izdelka nepovezanim strankam za tri nepovezane uvoznike v Skupnosti, ki so sodelovali pri preiskavi in so predložili informacije, ki so bile preverjene.
The two groups of exporters contested the calculation made by the Commission and argued that the profit margin used in this adjustment was excessive.
Ti dve skupini izvoznikov sta nasprotovali izračunu Komisije in trdili, da je bila uporabljena stopnja dobička prevelika.