natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In deciding whether elements of state aid are involved in a financial measure taken by a public owner of an enterprise, the Commission applies the market-economy investor principle.
Da bi preverila, ali sprejeti kapitalski ukrep s strani javnega delničarja nekega podjetja zajema elemente državne pomoči, Komisija uporablja „načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu“.
This principle has been applied by the Commission in many cases and has been accepted and developed by the Court in several decisions.
To načelo je Komisija uporabila v številnih primerih, Sodišče pa ga je sprejelo in razvijalo naprej v več odločbah.
It allows the Commission to bear in mind the specific circumstances of each case, e.g. to take into account certain strategies of a holding company or group of companies or to distinguish between the short- and long-term interests of an investor.
Komisiji omogoča, da upošteva posebne okoliščine posameznega primera, na primer določene strategije holdinga ali skupine podjetij, ali da razlikuje med kratkoročnimi in dolgoročnimi interesi vlagatelja.
The market-economy investor principle will also be applied in the case at hand.
To načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu se uporabi tudi v pričujočem primeru.
According to the principle, no state aid is involved if funds are made available on ‘terms which a private investor would find acceptable in providing funds to a comparable private undertaking when the private investor is operating under normal market economy conditions’.
Po tem načelu ne gre za državno pomoč, kadar so sredstva na razpolago pod „pogoji, pod katerimi bi bil zasebni vlagatelj, ki deluje v običajnih pogojih v tržnem gospodarstvu, pripravljen zagotoviti sredstva zasebnemu podjetju“.
In particular, a financial measure must be considered unacceptable to a market-economy investor if the financial position of the company is such that a normal return (in the form of dividends and capital gains) cannot be expected within a reasonable period of time.
Zlasti pa finančni ukrep za vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu velja za nesprejemljivega, ko je finančno stanje podjetja tako, da običajnega donosa (v obliki dividend ali povečanja vrednosti) ne gre pričakovati v razumnem roku.
The Commission has, of course, to base its appraisal of a case on the data available to the investor at the time he took his decision on the financial measure in question.
Seveda mora Komisija svojo presojo primera podpreti s podatki, ki so bili na razpolago vlagatelju v času njegove odločitve o vprašljivem finančnem ukrepu.
The transfer of Wfa was decided in 1991 by the relevant public bodies.
Prenos Wfa so leta 1991 sklenili pristojni javni organi.
The Commission has, therefore, to assess the transaction on the basis of the data available and economic and market circumstances obtaining at that time.
Tako mora Komisija prenos oceniti na podlagi podatkov, ki so bili takrat na razpolago, in takratnih gospodarskih in tržnih razmer.
The data in this decision that relate to later years are used only to show the effects of the transfer on WestLB's situation and in no way to justify or question the transaction with the benefit of hindsight.
Podatki navedeni v tej odločbi, ki se nanašajo na kasnejša leta, se uporabljajo samo za prikaz posledic prenosa na položaj WestLB in prenosa ne upravičujejo naknadno ali postavljajo pod vprašaj.
Germany reminded the Commission to examine the case purely on the basis of the situation at the time of the transfer decision, i.e. the end of 1991, and not to take later developments into account.
Nemčija je Komisijo spomnila, naj primer preverja samo glede na razmere v trenutku odločitve o prenosu, t.j. konec leta 1991, in da naj ne upošteva kasnejšega razvoja dogodkov.
Such a view might imply that the Commission could not take into account either the fact that only DEM 4000 million (EUR 2050 million) of original own funds instead of the requested DEM 5900 million (EUR 3020 million) were accepted by BAKred or the fact that a remuneration of 0,6 % was agreed in 1993.
To bi pomenilo, da Komisija ne bi smela upoštevati niti dejstva, da je BAKred kot temeljni lastni vir sredstev priznal samo 4 milijarde DEM (2,05 milijarde EUR) namesto zahtevanih 5,9 milijard DEM (3,02 milijarde EUR), niti dejstva, da je bilo leta 1993 dogovorjeno nadomestilo 0,6 %.
However, at the time of the transfer, although the value of Wfa agreed on by the Land and WestLB was DEM 5900 million (EUR 3020 million), no level of remuneration was fixed.
Vendar pa v času prenosa ni bila določena višina nadomestila, čeprav sta se dežela in WestLB dogovorili o vrednosti Wfa v višini 5,9 milijard DEM (3,02 milijarde EUR).
The Commission therefore considers it appropriate, when assessing the operation, also to take into account the situation prevailing when the parties finally fixed the remuneration.
Komisiji se zato zdi primerno, da pri presoji transakcije upošteva tudi razmere v času, v katerem je bilo končno določeno nadomestilo.
The Commission does not agree with Germany and WestLB that the market-economy investor principle is not applicable to sound and profitable undertakings and that this is supported by the case law.
Komisija se ne strinja z Nemčijo in WestLB, da se načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu ne uporablja za zdrava in dobičkonosna podjetja in da to ni razvidno iz sodne prakse Sodišča.
The fact that the principle has, in the past, been applied mainly to firms in difficulties in no way restricts its application to this category of firm.
Dejstvo, da je bilo načelo doslej uporabljeno predvsem za podjetja v težavah, ne omejuje njegove uporabe na to kategorijo podjetij.
Restructuring aid for firms may be granted only in cases where a restructuring plan restores the firm's viability, i.e. leads to a ‘normal’ rate of return that allows the aided firm to continue by its own efforts, because this ‘normal’ market rate of return is acceptable to a market-economy investor.
Podpore za prestrukturiranje podjetij se lahko odobrijo samo v primerih, ko načrt prestrukturiranja ponovno vzpostavi sposobnost preživetja podjetja, t.j. vodi do „običajnega“ donosa, s katerim si lahko subvencionirano podjetje zagotovi obstoj z lastnimi močmi, ker je ta „običajen“ donos sprejemljiv za vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
In cases where such matters have been brought before the Court, it has never called into question the fact that the Commission required not only a break-even situation or a token return but also a full ‘normal’ market rate.
V primerih, v katerih so bile takšne odločitve predložene Sodišče, slednje ni nikoli postavljalo pod vprašaj dejstva, da Komisija ne zahteva zgolj kritja stroškov ali simboličnega donosa, temveč popoln „običajen“ donos.
There is no provision to the effect that, if a company makes a profit, this rules out a priori the possibility that the provision of capital contains elements of state aid.
Ni nobenega pravila, po katerem okoliščina, da podjetje ustvarja dobiček, vnaprej izključuje možnost, da kapitalski vložek vsebuje elemente državne pomoči.
Even if a company is profitable, a market-economy investor might refrain from injecting (further) capital if he could not expect an appropriate return on his capital contribution (in the form of dividends and an increase in the value of the investment).
Tudi če podjetje posluje z dobičkom, bi se vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu lahko vzdržal (nadaljnjega) kapitalskega vložka, če ne more pričakovati primernega donosa (v obliki dividend ali povečanju vrednosti) na vložen kapital.
Should the company not show the appropriate expected return at the time of the investment, a market-economy investor would call for measures to increase the return.
V kolikor podjetje v času naložbe ne prinaša pričakovanega donosa, bi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu zahteval uvedbo ukrepov za povečanje donosa.
Therefore, the market-economy investor principle is applicable in the same way to all public enterprises, whether profitable or loss-making.
Zato se načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu na enak način uporablja za vsa javna podjetja in sicer ne glede na to, ali so dobičkonosna ali pa poslujejo z izgubo.
The adequacy of the likely return on capital depends in turn on what a market-economy investor can expect from similar investments with a similar exposure to risk.
Primernost verjetnega donosa vloženega kapitala pa je spet odvisna od tega, kaj lahko vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu pričakuje od primerljivih naložb s primerljivim tveganjem.
It is evident that a constantly underperforming enterprise showing no signs of recovery is not viable in the long term.
Tako je očitno, da podjetje z neprestano slabimi rezultati in brez znakov izboljšanja, na dolgi rok ni sposobno preživeti.
New investors would decline to meet the company's demand for further capital and existing investors would eventually disinvest, even accepting a loss, if necessary, in order to reallocate their capital to more profitable investments.
Novi vlagatelji bi zavrnili zahtevo podjetja po nadaljnjem kapitalu, obstoječi vlagatelji pa bi se konec koncev umaknili – po potrebi utrpeli celo izgubo – da bi lahko preusmerili svoj kapital v bolj donosne naložbe.
Thus, in a communication to the Member States on the application of the state aid rules to public undertakings, the Commission stated that, when comparing the actions of the State with those of a market-economy investor, ‘in particular when a company is not making a loss’, it would evaluate the financial situation of the company at the time an additional capital injection is proposed.
Zato je Komisija v sporočilu državam članicam o uporabi pravil glede državnih pomoči za javna podjetja napovedala, da bo preverjala finančno stanje podjetja v času, ko je predviden prenos dodatnega kapitala, če primerja ravnanje države z ravnanjem vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu, „zlasti v primerih, ko podjetje ne ustvarja izgub“.
It should also be borne in mind that ‘sound and profitable firms’ cannot be equated with firms which do not make a loss.
Sicer pa je treba tudi pripomniti, da izraza „zdrava in dobičkonosna podjetja“ ne gre enačiti s podjetji, ki ne ustvarjajo izgub.
A firm which generates only small profits or generates neither profits nor losses cannot in fact be regarded as sound and profitable.
Podjetje, ki izkazuje majhne dobičke ali pa niti dobičke niti izgube, se dejansko ne more šteti za zdravo in dobičkonosno podjetje.
It is certainly difficult to determine ‘average profitability’ as this is dependent on a number of factors, i.e. the level of risk in the industry in which the firm operates.
Gotovo je težko določiti „povprečno donosnost“, ker je to odvisno od vrste dejavnikov, npr. od tveganja v gospodarski panogi, v kateri je podjetje dejavno.
However, firms which, over a certain period, generated a profit lower than that generated by firms with a similar risk structure would, as mentioned, be eliminated from the market in the long run.
Vendar bi bila podjetja, ki v določenem časovnem obdobju ustvarjajo dobiček, a je ta pod ravnijo podjetij s primerljivo strukturo tveganja, kot že rečeno, na dolgi rok izrinjena s trga.
The position taken by Germany and WestLB would lead to a situation where the State could invest in firms operating with an annual profit of EUR 1, regardless of the state aid rules in the EC Treaty.
Stališče, ki ga zastopata Nemčija in WestLB, bi privedlo do situacije, v kateri bi država lahko brez upoštevanja pravil glede državnih pomoči, ki so predvidene v Pogodbi ES, investirala v podjetja, ki ustvarjajo letni dobiček 1 EUR.
It is clearly not the Commission's task to initiate procedures systematically and immediately if a public enterprise shows below-average profitability.
Zagotovo ni naloga Komisije, da sistematično začne s postopkom takoj, ko neko javno podjetje izkaže podpovprečno donosnost.
Even private firms may, from time to time, have lower-than-average profitability. (The existence of an average logically implies deviations in both directions.)
Tudi zasebna podjetja občasno izkazujejo podpovprečno donosnost (logično je, da od sredinske vrednosti obstajajo odkloni v obe smeri).
However, in such circumstances a normal firm operating on the market would try to increase its profitability and carry out restructuring and other measures in order to prevent this situation from becoming chronic.
Vendar pa bi običajno podjetje na trgu v takšnem primeru skušalo povečati svojo donosnost in pričelo s prestrukturiranjem ali uvedlo druge ukrepe, da bi preprečilo trajanje takšne situacije.
Market investors would expect appropriate measures to be taken in this respect.
In vlagatelji na trgu pričakujejo, da se v zvezi s tem sprejmejo ustrezni ukrepi.
Furthermore, as already indicated above, a distinction must be drawn between existing and new investments because the starting points for the investment decision in question are different, but not the basic principles.
Prav tako je treba, kot je že bilo omenjeno, razlikovati med obstoječimi in novimi vlagatelji, ker so njihova izhodišča – ne pa osnovna načela – za odločitev o naložbi različna.
In the case of an existing investment, the investor might be more willing to accept a lower (or even negative) return in the short run if he expects the situation to improve.
Pri obstoječi naložbi bi lahko bil vlagatelj prej pripravljen kratkoročno sprejeti nižji (ali celo negativen) donos, če računa z izboljšanjem stanja.
Certainly, an investor might also increase his investment in a firm with low profitability. However, he would not do so unless he expected an improvement in the situation and a reasonable return in the long term.
Vsekakor bi lahko vlagatelj svojo naložbo v podjetju z manjšo donosnostjo povečal, vendar pa tega ne bi storil, če dolgoročno ne bi pričakoval izboljšanja stanja in primernega donosa.
If, on the other hand, he expects the combination of risk and return to be poorer than in comparable firms, he will consider terminating his investment.
V kolikor pa po drugi strani pričakuje, da se bo kombinacija tveganja in donosa izšla slabše kot v primerljivem podjetju, bo razmislil o dezinvesticiji.
In the case of a new investment, the investor may be less willing to accept lower profitability from the very outset.
V primeru nove naložbe bo vlagatelj morda od vsega začetka pripravljen sprejeti nižjo donosnost.
However, as already stated, the principles are the same in all decision-making situations: the return expected in the long run from the investment (taking into account the risk and other factors) must at least be equal to that from comparable investments.
Vendar pa so, kot je že bilo rečeno, načela pri vseh odločitvah enaka: Dolgoročni pričakovani donos iz naložbe (ob upoštevanju tveganja in drugih dejavnikov) mora biti vsaj tako visok kot donos primerljivih naložb.
Otherwise, the company will not be able to find the necessary funds and will therefore not be viable in the long run.
Če temu ni tako, podjetje ne bo moglo priskrbeti potrebnih sredstev in na dolgi rok ne bo sposobno preživeti.
According to WestLB, the question of whether the bank generated average profits in the years before the transfer can, in principle, remain unanswered if a fixed and appropriate remuneration is agreed and if profitability is sufficient to maintain this remuneration in the long run.
Po mnenju WestLB lahko vprašanje, ali je banka v letih pred prenosom ustvarjala povprečne donose, načeloma ostane neodgovorjeno, če je bilo dogovorjeno primerno fiksno nadomestilo in če se zdi donosnost zadostna za vzdrževanje tega nadomestila na dolgi rok.
This view can be accepted in principle.
S tem stališčem se Komisija načelno strinja.
However it should also be borne in mind that viability in the long run depends on the company achieving an average rate of return on its equity capital.
Vendar je treba misliti tudi na to, da je sposobnost preživetja na dolgi rok odvisna od tega, ali lahko podjetje iz lastnega kapitala doseže povprečni donos.
With respect to the probable behaviour of a market-economy investor, it is of no relevance that other banks also had to raise additional capital as a consequence of the stricter rules of the Solvency Ratio Directive.
Kar zadeva verjetno ravnanje vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu je nepomembno, da so morale zaradi strožjih predpisov iz Direktive o solventnosti, tudi druge banke najeti dodaten kapital.
The Directive does not impose any obligation on banks to raise additional capital.
Direktiva od bank ne zahteva sprejema dodatnega kapitala.
It merely stipulates a minimum ratio of capital to risk-adjusted assets, i.e. it establishes a legal presumption of what is necessary for a bank's viability.
Določa le minimalno raven kapitala za tveganju prilagojeno tehtano aktivo, torej postavlja pravno domnevo o tem, kaj je potrebno za sposobnost preživetja banke.
In other words, a market-economy investor might have urged his bank to restructure its risks in order to comply with the new solvency rules instead of increasing the bank's capital.
To pomeni, da bi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu morebiti pooblastil svojo banko, naj prestrukturira svoja tveganja in tako upošteva nove predpise o solventnosti, namesto povečanja kapitala banke.
Such step would directly reduce the bank's volume of business and hence its market presence.
S tem bi se obseg dejavnosti banke neposredno zmanjšal, njena prisotnost na trgih pa upadla.
If a public shareholder decides that a capital injection is an appropriate way for the bank to meet the capital requirements, the question is whether the particular circumstances under which the capital is provided would be acceptable for a market-economy investor.
Če javni delničar sklene, da je kapitalski vložek primeren način, da banka zadosti zahtevam lastnega kapitala, se postavlja vprašanje, ali bi bile te posebne okoliščine, v katerih se je zagotovil kapital, sprejemljive za vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
If a capital measure is needed to meet the solvency requirements, a market-economy investor might be willing to carry out this measure in order to preserve the value of investments already made.
Če je za izpolnitev zahtev po solventnosti potreben finančni ukrep, bi lahko vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu bil pripravljen izvesti ta ukrep, da bi ohranil vrednost že opravljene naložbe.
But he would insist on receiving an appropriate return on the newly injected capital.
Ampak bi vztrajal na primernem donosu iz novega kapitalskega vložka.
It is likely that a market-economy investor would expect a higher return on a capital investment in a bank whose capital resources are depleted and which is in urgent need of new capital because this circumstance exposes him to higher risk.
Verjetno bi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu pričakoval višji donos iz kapitalske naložbe v banko, katere kapitalske rezerve so izčrpane in ki nujno potrebuje novi kapital, ker ga te okoliščine izpostavljajo večjemu tveganju.
In the light of the market-economy investor principle, the key question is whether such an investor would have supplied WestLB with capital that had the specific characteristics of Wfa's assets and under the same conditions, especially in view of the probable return on the investment.
Ob upoštevanju „načela vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu“ se torej temeljno vprašanje glasi, ali bi takšen vlagatelj kapital, ki ima enake značilnosti kot sredstva Wfa, dal WestLB na razpolago pod enakimi pogoji, zlasti glede na predviden donos na naložbo.
This question will be examined below.
To vprašanje bo obravnavano v nadaljevanju.
ARTICLE 295 OF THE EC TREATY
ČLEN 295 POGODBE ES
Germany argues that the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia was not obliged to consider privatising WestLB in order to increase the latter's equity, that the Land was, in principle, free to transfer Wfa to WestLB in order to achieve synergies and that the Land was not obliged under Community law to consider the transfer of Wfa to a private credit institution.
Nemčija trdi, da dežela Severno Porenje-Vestfalija ni bila dolžna izvesti privatizacije WestLB za povečanje njenega obsega lastnega kapitala, da lahko dežela načeloma prenese Wfa na WestLB za doseganje sinergijskih učinkov in da dežela po zakonodaji Skupnosti ni dolžna razmisliti o prenosu Wfa na zasebno kreditno institucijo.
This argument can be accepted.
S tem stališčem se Komisija lahko strinja.
Germany also claims that Wfa's public remit constitutes a task of general economic interest and that Wfa is, therefore, not subject to supervision by the Commission under Article 295.
Nemčija nadalje navaja, da javna namenskost Wfa predstavlja nalogo splošnega ekonomskega interesa in da Wfa torej na podlagi člena 295 ni podvržena nadzoru Komisije.
As long as public entities carry out only public tasks and do not compete with commercial enterprises, the competition rules do not apply to them.
Dokler javne ustanove opravljajo izključno naloge javnega značaja in ne konkurirajo komercialnim podjetjem, se pravila o konkurenci za njih ne uporabljajo.
The situation changes when there are implications for competition.
Položaj se spremeni, kadar pride do vplivanja na konkurenco.
Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty deals with situations where it might be necessary to deviate from the competition rules in order to ensure the provision of services of general economic interest.
Člen 86(2) Pogodbe ES služi za obravnavo situacij, v katerih so morda odstopanja od pravil o konkurenci potrebna, da bi se s tem zagotovile storitve splošnega ekonomskega interesa.
It is discussed at point V.6.
Člen 86(2) Pogodbe ES se obravnava v oddelku V, številka 6.
On the other hand, Article 295 of the EC Treaty protects the national systems of property ownership but this cannot justify any infringement of the Treaty's competition rules.
Po drugi strani člen 295 Pogodbe ES ščiti ureditev lastninskopravnih razmerij v posameznih državah članicah, kar pa ne upravičuje nobene kršitve pravil o konkurenci iz Pogodbe.
The German authorities and WestLB claim that, because of the constraints imposed by the special purpose assigned to Wfa's assets, as laid down by the Housing Promotion Law, the only possible profitable use of these resources was to transfer them to a similar public-law entity.
Nemčija in WestLB trdita, da zaradi namenske vezanosti sredstev Wfa, ki je predvidena v zakonu o pospeševanju gradnje stanovanj, da prenesena sredstva ne bi mogla biti uporabljena na kakršen koli drug dobičkonosen način kot s prenosom na podobno javnopravno ustanovo.
Thus, the transfer represented the most commercially sensible use of the assets in question.
Zato je prenos predstavljal poslovno najbolj smiselno uporabo teh sredstev.
It is therefore argued that any remuneration for the transfer, i.e. any additional return on Wfa's capital, is sufficient to justify the transfer in view of the market-economy investor principle.
Tako bi bilo vsako povračilo za prenos, t.j. vsak dodaten donos iz kapitala Wfa, zadostno za utemeljitev prenosa ob upoštevanju „načela vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu“.
This argument cannot be accepted.
Te argumentacije ni mogoče uporabiti.
It may be true that Wfa's transfer to WestLB, which subsequently allowed WestLB to use part of Wfa's capital for solvency purposes, was the most commercially sensible use.
Morda je res tako, da je bil prenos Wfa na WestLB in posledična možnost banke, da del kapitala Wfa uporabi za namene solventnosti, gospodarsko najbolj smiselna uporaba.
Member States are free to use public funds for public sovereign purposes, demanding no or low profits in return.
Državam članicam je prepuščeno, da uporabljajo javna sredstva za javne, suverene namene in v zvezi s tem zahtevajo manjše dobičke ali pa ne.
The Commission does not question the right of the Member States to create special-purpose funds in order to fulfil tasks of general economic interest.
Komisija ne postavlja pod vprašaj pravice držav članic, da ustanovijo posebne sklade za izpolnjevanje nalog, ki v splošnem ekonomskem interesu.
However, as soon as such public funds and assets are used for commercial competitive activities, normal market-economy rules have to be applied.
Vendar pa je treba, takoj ko gre za uporabo javnih sredstev ali drugih aktiv za komercialne in tržno usmerjene dejavnosti, uporabiti običajna pravila tržnega gospodarstva.