natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It points out that viability can be restored only through a restructuring drive enjoying the support of the public authorities.
V raziskavi je bilo navedeno, da je ponovna vzpostavitev rentabilnosti mogoča le s prestrukturiranjem s podporo javnih organov.
Break-even should be achieved in 1996, with a positive result of DEM 1,394 million.
Prag dobička naj bi bil dosežen leta 1996 s pozitivnim rezultatom v višini 1,394 milijona DEM.
In addition, the study points out that the public commitment towards Kahla II involves substantial risks, and any possibility of the company paying back any financial support before 1998 is ruled out.
Poleg tega je bilo v raziskavi omenjeno, da javna obveznost v korist Kahle II vključuje visoka tveganja in izključena je bila vsaka možnost, da bi lahko podjetje vrnilo finančno podporo pred letom 1998.
In the light of these reports, the Commission concludes that the public financial institutions – particularly TIB – did not act like market economy investors in offering financial support to Kahla II.
Na podlagi tega poročila Komisija sklene, da državne finančne institucije – zlasti TIB – ob dodelitvi finančne pomoči Kahli II niso ravnale kot tržno usmerjeni podjetnik.
The reports clearly state that the objective of the regional government and its financial institutions was to preserve jobs, which is not the main aim of a market economy investor.
Ti dve poročili jasno dokazujeta, da je bil cilj deželne vlade in njenih finančnih institucij ohraniti delovna mesta. To pa ni glavni cilj tržno usmerjenega podjetnika.
Moreover, the reports forecast losses for at least two years and do not analyse any potential quid pro quos for the authorities’ participation, something that would have been a must for any private investor.
Poročili predvidevata izgubo za najmanj dve leti in ne obravnavata morebitnih nadomestil za udeležbo javnih organov, kot je to obvezno pri vsakem tržno usmerjenem podjetniku.
As regards more specifically the TIB participation, the Commission cannot but adhere to its view that it is not in keeping with the private investor principle and that, consequently, it must be regarded as aid.
Zlasti glede udeležbe TIB-a lahko Komisija ohrani svoje stališče, da ta ni v skladu z načelom tržno usmerjenega podjetnika in jo je zato mogoče obravnavati kot pomoč.
The fact that five years later TIB sold its stake to the majority shareholders, Mr G. Raithel and his son, for more than it had itself paid in 1994 does not alter this conclusion.
Dejstvo, da je TIB svoj delež pet let kasneje prodal večinskima lastnikoma g. G. Raithelu in njegovemu sinu, in sicer za višjo ceno, kot je zanj plačal leta 1994, ne spremeni tega sklepa.
TIB’s behaviour must be assessed ex ante, taking the potential risks and expected revenues into account.
Ravnanje TIB-a je treba presojati predhodno z upoštevanjem morebitnih tveganj in pričakovanih prihodkov.
On the basis of the reports available at that time, those risks were high [24], no measures were taken to address them and no analysis of future revenues was undertaken.
Na podlagi takrat razpoložljivih poročil so bila ta tveganja visoka [24], vendar niso bili sprejeti nobeni ukrepi za njihovo preprečitev in ni bila opravljena analiza bodočih prihodkov.
What is more, the profit actually made by TIB was small.
Poleg tega je bil ustvarjeni dobiček TIB-a majhen.
Contrary to what Germany maintains, the terms of the TIB participation are not comparable to the terms offered by the private investor, Mr Raithel.
V nasprotju z izjavami Nemčije pogoji udeležbe TIB-a niso primerljivi s pogoji zasebnega investitorja, Raithela.
Raithel allegedly invested DEM 2,055 million in the company.
Raithel je v podjetje domnevno investiral 2,055 milijona DEM.
However, only DEM 0,055 million came out of his own pocket.
Vendar je iz njegovih sredstev izviralo le 0,055 milijona DEM.
The remaining DEM 2 million came from state resources in the form of two loans granted to Raithel (measures 16 and 17).
Preostala 2 milijona DEM sta izvirala iz državnih sredstev v obliki dveh posojil, ki sta bili dodeljeni g. Raithelu (ukrepa 16 in 17).
Moreover, one of the loans (measure 16) was included in a Federal Government guarantee to the granting Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, while the other (measure 17) was secured by a first mortgage on Kahla II’s land [25].
Poleg tega je bilo eno posojilo (ukrep 16) vključeno v jamstvo zvezne vlade za banko Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, ki je posojilo dodelila, drugo posojilo (ukrep 17) je bilo zavarovano s prvo hipoteko na zemljišče podjetja Kahla II [25].
TIB, on the other hand, made available to the company DEM 1,975 million of its own resources in the form of a holding.
TIB pa je podjetju dal na razpolago 1,975 milijona DEM iz lastnih sredstev v obliki udeležbe.
This amount constituted capital which in the event of insolvency would be treated as junior ranking.
Ta znesek je predstavljal lastni kapital, ki bi bil v primeru stečaja podrejen.
The risk assumed by TIB is therefore much higher than that assumed by the private investor.
Tveganje, ki ga je prevzel TIB, je tako precej večje od tveganja zasebnega investitorja.
As will be explained in paragraph 111, Mr Raithel was entitled, furthermore, to withdraw from the agreement if the TIB participation and/or other measures did not materialise, whereas TIB did not have that right.
Kot bo razloženo v odstavku 111, je imel g. G. Raithel zato pravico, da odstopi od pogodbe, če udeležba TIB-a ali/in drugi ukrepi ne bi bili uresničeni, medtem ko TIB ni imel takšne pravice.
The TIB participation is therefore not in keeping with the private investor principle.
Udeležba TIB-a tako ni v skladu z načelom zasebnega investitorja.
As regards the remaining measures taken by Germany, in view of the particular situation of the company and of the fact that it operated in a market suffering from structural overcapacity, a market economy investor would have granted financial support only under conditions which reflected those facts.
Glede ostalih ukrepov, ki jih je izvedla Nemčija, bi tržno usmerjeni podjetnik zaradi posebnega položaja podjetja in zaradi dejstva, da je le-to dejavno na trgu, na katerem obstajajo presežne kapacitete, finančno podporo dodelil le ob upoštevanju teh dejstev.
The Commission will first analyse the loans granted by TIB and state-owned banks.
Komisija bo najprej proučila kredite, ki so jih dodelili TIB in državne banke.
These loans are summarised in Table 10.
Ti krediti so prikazani v Tabeli 10.
Reference rate
Referenčna obrestna mera
Securities
Zavarovanja
6 million
6 mio
0,2 million
0,2 mio
Federal Government guarantee
jamstva zvezne vlade
1,8 million
1,8 mio
mortgage on real estate for DEM 1,8 million; secondary mortgage on real estate for DEM 20 million
prva hipoteka na zemljišče za 1,8 mio DEM; subsidiarna hipoteka na zemljišče za 20 mio DEM
2 million
2 mio
mortgage on real estate for DEM 1,8 million, 2nd and 3rd mortgages for DEM 20 million, cession of machinery and rights over third parties, cession of stock, cession of claims against customers, 90 % guarantee from Land of Thuringia
druga hipoteka na zemljišče za 1,8 mio DEM, druga in tretja hipoteka za več kot 20 mio DEM, izročitev strojev in pravic tretji osebi, izročitev zalog, izročitev terjatev proti kupcem, 90-odstotno jamstvo dežele Turingija
1 million
1 millón
As measure 18
kot ukrep 18
1,73 million
1,73 mio
3,45 million
3,45 mio
Table 10 proves that the public financial institutions did not behave like market economy investors.
Tabela 10 dokazuje, da državne finančne institucije niso delovale kot tržno usmerjeni podjetnik.
Specifically, as regards the shareholder loan from TIB (measure 12), it is noted that the agreed rate of interest was 12 % but that the amount of interest was capped at 50 % of annual profits.
Zlasti glede posojila delničarja TIB-a (ukrep 12) se ugotovi, da je dogovorjena obrestna mera znašala 12 %, da pa je bila višina obresti omejena na 50 % letnega presežka.
The reports had already pointed out that Kahla II would not generate any profits during at least the first two years, which is what in fact happened.
V poročilih je bilo poudarjeno, da Kahla II najmanj prvi dve leti ne bo ustvarjala dobička. To se je dejansko tudi zgodilo.
No increased interest rate was agreed to compensate for the years for which interest payments were improbable.
Določena ni bila nobena višja obrestna mera, s katero bi se nadomestila leta, v katerih ni bilo mogoče odplačevati obresti.
Consequently, TIB knowingly granted a shareholder loan which did not give it any additional voting rights, without demanding any security and at 0 % interest for at least two years.
Zato je TIB namerno dodelil posojilo delničarja, ki ni bilo povezano z dodatnimi glasovalnimi pravicami, ne da bi zahteval kakršno koli zavarovanje in z obrestno mero 0 % za obdobje najmanj dveh let.
No risk premium was agreed to offset the risks forecast in the report on the basis of which the shareholder loan (and the holding) was agreed.
Določena ni bila nobena premija tveganja za kompenzacijo, kot je bilo predvideno v poročilu, na podlagi katerega je bilo dodeljeno posojilo (in udeležba) delničarja.
As regards the remaining loans, the table shows they were all granted below the reference interest rate.
Preostala posojila so bila (kot kaže tabela) dodeljena za nižjo obrestno mero od referenčne obrestne mere.
Moreover, when security was provided, it either came from the public authorities or the same assets were used repeatedly to secure all loans.
Zavarovanja so dodelili nemški organi ali pa so bila vsa posojila zavarovana z istim premoženjem.
These assets were not independently valued, so their actual value is uncertain.
Premoženje ni bilo neodvisno ocenjeno, tako da je njegova dejanska vrednost dvomljiva.
It must also be remembered that they were financed with state support.
Poleg tega je treba opomniti, da je bilo to premoženje financirano z državno podporo.
The guarantee agreement provided that a subsidiary guarantee amounting to DEM 0,7 million should be given by Mr G. Raithel, unless it could be proved that he had given a personal guarantee for the equity loan (measure 16).
Garancijska pogodba je predvidevala, da g. G. Raithel zagotovi podrejeno jamstvo v višini 0,7 milijona DEM, razen če bi bilo mogoče dokazati, da je zagotovil osebno jamstvo za posojilo za lastniški kapital (ukrep 16).
The loan agreement for measure 16 does not mention any provision of a personal guarantee, but refers to a Federal Government guarantee.
Posojilna pogodba za ukrep 16 nikakor ne nakazuje zagotovitve osebnega jamstva, temveč garancijo vlade.
The Commission was never informed that such a DEM 0,7 million guarantee was ever given.
Toda Komisija nikoli ni bila seznanjena s tem, da je bilo to jamstvo v višini 0,7 milijona DEM zagotovljeno.
Rather, according to the Commission’s information, the loan was secured by a Federal Government guarantee and not by a personal guarantee.
Nasprotno, po informacijah Komisije je bilo posojilo zavarovano z garancijo vlade in ne z osebnim jamstvom.
Even if it had been given, it would rank lower than every other security and would cover only a very small part of the potentially high risk of non-payment.
Tudi če bi osebno jamstvo bilo zagotovljeno, bi bilo v primerjavi z ostalim zavarovanjem podrejeno in bi pokrilo dokaj majhen del morebitnega velikega tveganja neplačila.
In view of the above, the Commission can only conclude that the public banks and institutions did not act like market economy operators.
Zato lahko Komisija sklene le to, da državne banke in institucije niso delovale kot tržno usmerjeni podjetnik.
Moreover, as regards the loans under measures 16-22, Germany itself describes them as aid [28], albeit of the existing variety.
Poleg tega Nemčija sama označuje posojila iz ukrepov 16 do 22 kot pomoč [28], čeprav kot obstoječo pomoč.
The Commission shares Germany’s view that they constitute aid.
Komisija je tako kot Nemčija mnenja, da ta posojila predstavljajo pomoči.
As regards their classification as existing aid, this issue will be analysed in the sections that follow.
Njihova opredelitev kot obstoječe pomoči bo preučena v naslednjih odstavkih.
Regarding the grants (measures 15, 24-29 and 31-32), the Commission considers that a market economy investor would not have granted non-reimbursable subsidies.
Glede podpore (ukrepi 15, 24–29, 31–32) je Komisija mnenja, da noben tržno usmerjeni podjetnik ne bi dodelil nepovratne podpore.
Germany has not contested this point.
Nemčija temu dejstvu ni oporekala.
Finally, as regards the 90 % state guarantees (measures 13, 14, 23 and 30), Germany itself accepts that they constitute aid.
Glede 90-odstotnih jamstev dežele (ukrepi 13, 14, 23 in 30) Nemčija sama priznava, da le-ta predstavljajo pomoči.
In view of the related high risk and the lack of an appropriate risk premium, the Commission fully shares this view.
Zaradi s tem povezanega visokega tveganja in odsotnosti ustrezne premije za tveganje se Komisija popolnoma strinja s tem mnenjem.
There is therefore no need to analyse this issue further.
Zato tega vprašanja ni potrebno še naprej obravnavati.
Germany asserts that these guarantees fall under the de minimis rules.
Po besedah Nemčije spadajo ta jamstva med pravila de minimis.
This will be examined in Section D.
To bo obravnavano v oddelku D presoje.
In view of the above, the Commission cannot conclude that the public financial institutions offered support to Kahla II under conditions comparable to those of a market economy investor.
Zato Komisija ne more ugotoviti, ali so finančne institucije dodelile podporo Kahli II pod pogoji, primerljivimi s pogoji tržno usmerjenega podjetnika.
Consequently, all Germany’s measures are still regarded as aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Zato bodo ukrepi Nemčije kot že poprej obravnavani kot pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
Company in difficulty
Podjetje v težavah
Kahla II is an Auffanglösung, this is, a new set-up which has taken over the assets of a bankrupt company.
Kahla II je Auffanglösung, torej novoustanovljeno podjetje, ki je prevzelo premoženje podjetja, ki je v stečaju.
Although they are newly created companies, Auffanglösungen, a peculiar eastern German creation, can be regarded as companies in difficulty.
Čeprav so Auffanglösungen novoustanovljena podjetja, lahko ta podjetja, ki so nastala predvsem v vzhodni Nemčiji, obravnavamo kot podjetja v težavah.
The reason for this is that these shell companies take over the assets of a company which has gone bankrupt and continue their business, usually without undergoing any acceptable restructuring.
Razlog za to je dejstvo, da ta navidezna podjetja prevzamejo premoženje podjetja, ki se nahaja v stečaju, hkrati nadaljujejo njegovo dejavnost in to praviloma tako, da pred tem ne izvedejo sprejemljivega prestrukturiranja.
Auffanglösungen therefore “inherit” a number of structural deficiencies and need substantial changes if they are to operate in a market economy.
Auffanglösungen torej „podedujejo“ vrsto strukturnih pomanjkljivosti in potrebujejo temeljite spremembe, da bi lahko delovale v tržnem gospodarstvu.
Among these changes are investments to replace and update old plant and machinery, changes in the company’s structure (traditionally large conglomerates operating under a planned economy), personnel reduction (eastern German conglomerates usually operated with an excessively large workforce), a new product orientation, marketing, etc. In addition, the confidence of customers, suppliers and credit institutions needs to be regained since the Auffanggesellschaft is the successor to a failed company.
K tem spremembam spadajo investicije za zamenjavo in modernizacijo starih strojev in opreme, spremembe v strukturi podjetja (tradicionalno veliki konglomerati, ki delujejo v okviru planskega gospodarstva), zmanjševanje števila zaposlenih (vzhodnonemški konglomerati so praviloma imeli preveč zaposlenih), novo usmeritev v izdelkih, trženje itd. Poleg tega je potrebno ponovno pridobiti zaupanje kupcev, dobaviteljev in kreditnih institucij, saj je Auffanglösung naslednica propadlega podjetja.
In this sense they are not comparable to other newly created companies.
V tem smislu niso primerljiva z drugimi novoustanovljenimi podjetji.
The adjustment usually takes place through a restructuring involving, in most cases, state aid.
Prilagoditev se praviloma doseže s prestrukturiranjem, ki v večini primerov vključuje državno pomoč.
Taking the specific situation of the former eastern Germany into account, the Commission has adopted a flexible, generous approach allowing Auffanglösungen to benefit from restructuring aid until the end of 1999.
Ob upoštevanju posebnega položaja novih dežel je Komisija sprejela prilagodljiv in velikodušen pristop, ki tem novim podjetjem do konca leta 1999 omogoča, da koristijo pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
This approach is codified in footnote 10 of the restructuring aid guidelines [29].
To ravnanje je kodificirano [29] v opombi 10 smernic za prestrukturiranje iz leta 1999.
In view of their specific situation, Auffanggesellschaften form an exception to the rule that newly created companies are ineligible for rescue and restructuring aid under the restructuring aid guidelines.
Na podlagi posebnega položaja so Auffanggesellschaften izjeme od pravila, da novoustanovljena podjetja v skladu s smernicami za prestrukturiranje niso upravičena do pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
In separate proceedings [30], Germany expressly stated in letters dated 5 March and 6 May 1999 that Kahla II was a company in difficulty.
V okviru drugega postopka [30] je Nemčija z dopisoma z dne 5. marca in 6. maja 1999 izrecno navedla, da Kahla II predstavlja podjetje v težavah.
However, two years later, in a letter dated 26 September 2001, Germany contradicted its earlier statements, asserting that Kahla II had never been in difficulty.
Dve leti kasneje je Nemčija z dopisom z dne 26. septembra 2001 ugovarjala svojim prejšnjim navedbam in trdila, da se Kahla II nikoli ni nahajala v težavah.
In the context of these proceedings, Germany considers that Kahla II cannot be regarded as a firm in difficulty as not all the conditions of the restructuring aid guidelines are met.
V zvezi s tem postopkom Nemčija zastopa stališče, da Kahla II ne more biti obravnavana kot podjetje v težavah, saj niso izpolnjeni vsi pogoji, navedeni v smernicah za prestrukturiranje.
The Commission would point out that the restructuring aid guidelines do not give a precise definition of a company in difficulty, but instead mention typical symptoms.
Komisija opozarja, da smernice za prestrukturiranje ne dajejo jasne opredelitve podjetja v težavah, temveč navajajo značilne simptome.
Ex post this is confirmed by the fact that, according to the information available, the company never obtained any external bank finance without state support [33].
Naknadno je to potrjeno z dejstvom, da podjetje po razpoložljivih informacijah od bank nikoli ni prejelo finančnih sredstev brez državne pomoči [33].
Effectively some of the indicators set out in the restructuring guidelines are not envisaged for Auffanglösungen since, as start-ups, the past cannot be looked into.
(110 Dejansko nekateri kazalci, predstavljeni v smernicah za prestrukturiranje, niso predvideni za Auffanglösungen, saj le-te predstavljajo novoustanovljena podjetja, pri katerih ni mogoče preveriti razvoja poslovanja v preteklosti.
Consequently, at the time of their creation they do not suffer from deteriorating profitability, increasing losses, diminishing turnover, growing inventories, declining cash flow, rising interest charges, etc. The Commission here recalls that Auffanglösungen are the exception to the rule that under the restructuring aid guidelines newly created companies cannot be considered firms in difficulty and therefore are not eligible for restructuring aid.
Zato takšna podjetja v času ustanovitve ne trpijo zaradi zmanjšanja rentabilnosti, vse večjih izgub, zmanjšanja prihodkov, povečanja zalog, zmanjšanega denarnega toka, naraščajočih stroškov obresti itd. Tukaj Komisija opominja, da Auffanglösungen predstavljajo izjeme od pravila, da novoustanovljena podjetja ne morejo biti opredeljena kot podjetja v težavah in zato ne morejo prejeti pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
On the other hand, other indicators do apply to Auffanglösungen, particularly low net asset value.
Po drugi strani pa so nekateri kazalci dejansko uporabni za Auffanglösungen, zlasti nizka čista vrednost sredstev.
In the case of Kahla II, the Commission would point out that it is the successor to a bankrupt company and is therefore likely to have lost the confidence of a number of customers, suppliers and financial institutions.
V primeru Kahle II Komisija opomni, da je Kahla II naslednica podjetja, ki je v stečaju, in je zato verjetno izgubila zaupanje številnih kupcev, dobaviteljev in finančnih institucij.
Even the acquisition of assets was thus dependent on state support.
Tako je bil celo nakup premoženja odvisen od državne podpore.
The contract for the sale of Kahla I’s assets stipulated that the new investor, Mr G. Raithel, was entitled to withdraw from the contract if the financing, including as it did various state measures (such as the TIB participation and state loans), was not assured [34].
Kupna pogodba o premoženju Kahle I je predvidevala, da ima g. G. Raithel, novi investitor, pravico do odstopa od pogodbe, če financiranje, ki je vključevalo različne državne ukrepe (kot npr. udeležba TIB-a in državna posojila), ni bilo zavarovano [34].
Moreover, Kahla II took over the assets of Kahla I, which never underwent a successful restructuring, a fact which led to its bankruptcy.
Poleg tega je Kahla II prevzela premoženje Kahle I, ki nikoli ni izvedla uspešnega prestrukturiranja in je zaradi tega morala prijaviti stečaj.
Ex post it is clear that structural difficulties were passed on as Kahla II received no private financing without state support.
Naknadno je jasno, da so se prenesle tudi strukturne težave, saj Kahla II ni prejela nobenega zasebnega financiranja brez državne pomoči.
Another indicator is the excessive size of the workforce.
Nadaljnji kazalec je preveliko število zaposlenih.
As the state support granted to Auffanglösungen is usually conditional on the safeguarding of jobs, this implies that during a certain period they endure the additional handicap of preserving a certain number of jobs.
Ker je državna podpora, dodeljena Auffanglösungen, praviloma povezana z ohranitvijo delovnih mest, prinaša s seboj za določeno obdobje dodatne težave, saj je treba ohraniti določeno število delovnih mest.
As evidenced by the reports referred to in paragraph 91, the main aim of the regional government was to preserve jobs.
Kot je dokazano v poročilih, omenjenih v odstavku 91, je glavni cilj deželne vlade ohraniti delovna mesta.
In the years that followed, Kahla II reduced the number of its employees, from which it can be deduced that it started off with too many.
V naslednjih letih je Kahla II zmanjšala število zaposlenih, iz česar je mogoče sklepati, da je imela na začetku preveč zaposlenih.
Moreover, since Auffanglösungen are forced to restructure in order to be able to operate in a market economy, losses are incurred and cash flow does not increase during the first few years and the necessary investment translates into substantial debts and high interest rates.
Ker so Auffanglösungen prisiljene izvesti prestrukturiranje, da bi lahko bile dejavne v tržnem gospodarstvu, prihaja v prvih letih do izgub, denarni tok v prvih letih ne narašča, potrebne investicije pa s seboj prinašajo velike dolgove in visoke obresti.
This, again, was the case with Kahla II.
Tako je bilo tudi pri Kahli II.
Although Germany has never characterised the process undergone by Kahla II as a restructuring of a firm in difficulty, the Commission notes that both reports, that of November 1993 and that of January 1994, proposed a restructuring as being necessary to restore the company’s viability.
Nemčija procesa, kateremu je bila podvržena Kahla II, nikoli ni označila kot prestrukturiranje podjetja v težavah, vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da je bilo prestrukturiranje predlagano v obeh poročilih novembra 1993 in januarja 1994, in sicer kot nujno za ponovno vzpostavitev rentabilnosti podjetja.