natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In preliminary discussions on the transfer of the LTS promotion-related assets to NordLB, the Land of Lower Saxony made it clear to the only other guarantor at that time, namely NSGV, that, in its view, both guarantors bore joint financial responsibility and that NSGV would have to make its own contribution in accordance with its 40 % share of capital.
Dežela Spodnja Saška je v predhodnih razpravah o prenosu sredstev LTS za pospeševanje na NordLB takrat edinemu drugemu garantu NSGV pojasnila, da finančno odgovornost nosita oba garanta in da mora NSGV zagotoviti svoj prispevek, ki je skladen s 40 % deležem njegovega kapitala.
If this were to pose problems, a change in ownership structure would have to be discussed.
Če bi to privedlo do težav, bi se bilo potrebno pogovoriti o spremembi lastniške strukture.
A draft agreement to be concluded between the two guarantors was annexed to the draft law of 15 October 1991.
Osnutku zakona z dne 15. oktobra 1991 se je priložil osnutek sporazuma, ki naj bi ga sklenila garanta.
According to Germany, the only obstacle to this ‘guarantor agreement’ being signed immediately was the fact that it had to be co-signed by the Land of Saxony-Anhalt and SBV, and the latter had not yet been set up at that time.
Po navedbah Nemčije je bila edina ovira pri takojšnjem podpisu tega „sporazuma garantov“ dejstvo, da je bil predviden tudi podpis dežele Spodnje Saške in združenja SBV, ki pa takrat še ni bilo ustanovljeno.
On concluding the transfer agreement on 20 December 1991, the assembled guarantors, consisting at that time of the Land of Lower Saxony and NSGV, decided to reach such a guarantor agreement which was then duly concluded on 5 March 1992 — after the entry into force of the State Treaty — with the participation of the Land of Saxony-Anhalt and SBV.
Ob sklenitvi sporazuma o prenosu z dne 20. decembra 1991 se je združenje garantov, ki sta ga takrat sestavljala Spodnja Saška in NSGV, odločilo za sklenitev takšnega sporazuma garantov. Sporazum je bil sklenjen 5 marca 1992, po začetku veljavnosti Državne pogodbe, med deželo Spodnjo Saško in SBV.
According to Germany, NSGV subsequently honoured its undertakings under the guarantor agreement of 5 March 1992 and in July and October 1994 increased NordLB's own funds recognised for supervisory purposes by a total of DEM 1000 million (in line with its 40 % share of NordLB’s capital at that time) by means of two measures described in more detail below.
NSGV je nato po navedbah Nemčije izpolnilo svoje obveznosti iz sporazuma garantov z dne 5. marca 1992 ter julija in oktobra 1994 povečalo lastna sredstva NordLB, priznana za nadzorne namene, za skupno 1 milijardo DEM (v skladu z njegovim takratnim 40 % deležem kapitala pri NordLB) z dvema ukrepoma, natančneje opisanima spodaj.
LBS special-purpose reserve of DEM 450 million
REZERVA LBS ZA POSEBNE NAMENE V VIŠINI 450 MILIJONOV DEM
Following negotiations between the Land, NSGV and NordLB at the end of 1993, the Landesbausparkasse (LBS), previously incorporated in NordLB, was hived off by an Act adopted on 6 June 1994 and turned into an independent public-law institution (Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) with legal capacity, with effect from 1 July 1994.
Landesbausparkasse (LBS), do takrat vključena v NordLB, je bila po pogajanjih med deželo Spodnjo Saško, NSGV in NordLB ob koncu leta 1993 z Zakonom z dne 6. junija 1994 s 1. julijem izločena iz NordLB in preoblikovana v neodvisno institucijo v javni lasti s pravno sposobnostjo.
Up to then, LBS had been 60 %-owned by the Land of Lower Saxony and 40 %-owned by NSGV.
Notranje razmerje lastništva garantov pri LBS je bilo do takrat 60 % Spodnja Saška in 40 % NSGV.
Their value was estimated at DEM 900 million.
Vrednost hranilnice LBS je bila ocenjena na 900 milijonov DEM.
It was agreed that NordLB would withdraw DEM 450 million from LBS before it was hived off and that NSGV would inject the same amount into LBS.
Dogovorili so se, da NordLB še pred izločitvijo LBS dvigne 450 milijonov DEM, NSGV pa v LBS vloži enak znesek.
This last measure was effected by deducting DEM 450 million from NGSV’s commitment under the guarantor agreement to inject DEM 1000 million into NordLB, on condition that NSGV would make a further capital contribution of DEM 550 million.
Ta ukrep se je izvedel tako, da se je odštel znesek 450 milijonov DEM od obveznosti NSGV po sporazumu garantov, da v NordLB vloži 1 milijardo DEM, pod pogojem, da NSGV vloži še 550 milijonov DEM sredstev.
NordLB booked the sum of DEM 450 million it had withdrawn to a revenue reserve in the form of a special reserve as additional liable equity capital within the meaning of the banking supervisory rules.
NordLB je znesek 450 milijonov DEM, ki ga je dvignila, vknjižila v prosto rezervo v obliki rezerve za posebne namene kot dodaten rizični lastni kapital v smislu predpisov za bančni nadzor.
The special reserve yielded cumulative interest before tax of 7,5 % per annum and was owned jointly by the guarantors in accordance with their internal relationship, i.e. 60 % by the Land and 40 % by NGSV.
Rezerva za posebne namene se obrestuje s skupno letno obrestno mero 7,5 % pred obdavčitvijo in je skupna last garantov v skladu z njunim notranjem razmerjem, 60 % Spodnja Saška in 40 % NSGV.
Silent partnership contribution of DEM 550 million
VLOGA TIHEGA PARTNERSTVA V VIŠINI 550 MILIJONOV DEM
Germany states that on 10 October 1994 NSGV and NordLB concluded an agreement concerning a capital contribution under Section 10(4) KWG.
NSGV in NordLB sta po navedbah Nemčije 10. oktobra 1994 sklenila sporazum o vloženih sredstvih v skladu s KWG poglavje 10(4).
Under that agreement, NSGV undertook to make a capital contribution to NordLB in the form of a silent partnership amounting to DEM 550 million, with effect from 10 October 1994, in return for payment of a profit-linked remuneration the amount of which would be derived from the interest rate (specified in more detail) on 10-year bearer bonds amounting to 7,91 % plus a margin of 1,2 % per annum.
V skladu s tem sporazumom se je združenje NSGV zavezalo, da bo z 10. oktobrom 1994 začelo vlagati sredstva v NordLB v obliki tihega partnerstva v višini 550 milijonov DEM proti plačilu nadomestila, odvisnega od dobička, katerega višina se določi na podlagi podrobneje opredeljene obrestne mere za 10-letne imetniške obveznice v višini 7,91 % in 1,2 % marže letno.
This produces a total interest rate of 9,11 %, which, according to the German authorities, corresponds to the normal market remuneration for silent partnerships and at the same time to the remuneration payable to the Land of Lower Saxony for contributing the promotion-related assets as liable equity capital.
Po navedbah nemških organov je tako skupna obrestna mera 9,11 %, ki je v skladu z običajnim tržnim nadomestilom za tiha partnerstva in hkrati z nadomestilom, ki se mora izplačati deželi Spodnji Saški za njeno vlogo sredstev za pospeševanje kot rizičnega lastnega kapitala.
The German authorities state that the contribution was made in accordance with the agreement and was recognised for supervisory purposes as liable equity capital of NordLB.
Po navedbah nemških organov je vloga skladna s sporazumom in je bila za nadzorne namene priznana kot rizični lastni kapital NordLB.
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
STALIŠČE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANK
COMPLAINT AND OBSERVATIONS BY THE COMPLAINANT (THE BDB)
PRITOŽBA IN PRIPOMBE PRITOŽNIKA
In BdB's view, the transfer of the LTS promotion-related assets and the associated increase in NordLB's capital distorted competition in favour of NordLB since the latter did not pay remuneration consistent with the market-economy investor principle.
BdB meni, da je prenos sredstev LTS za pospeševanje in s tem povezano povečanje lastnih sredstev NordLB izkrivilo konkurenco v prid NordLB, saj le-ta ni izplačevala nadomestila, skladnega z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
The BdB submits that the application of the market-economy investor principle is not limited to enterprises which are loss-making or in need of financial restructuring.
Po mnenju BdB uporaba načela vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu ni omejena na podjetja, ki imajo izgubo ali so potrebna sanacije.
An investor is not guided by the question of whether the enterprise in question is profitable at all but rather by whether the profitability corresponds to the market rate.
Vlagatelj se pri vlaganju ne odloča na podlagi vprašanja, ali je zadevno podjetje sploh donosno, temveč preveri, ali je donos skladen z običajno tržno stopnjo.
If capital injections by the public authorities were examined only in the case of loss-making enterprises, this would discriminate against private enterprises and thus infringe Article 86(1) of the EC Treaty.
Če bi se vložena sredstva javnih organov preverjala le v primeru podjetij, ki imajo izgubo, bi prišlo do diskriminacije zasebnih podjetij in s tem kršitve člena 86(1) Pogodbe ES.
It also submits that Article 295 of the EC Treaty cannot be used to exempt the transfer of the LTS from the competition rules, arguing that the Article in question may well protect the freedom of the State to create such a special asset but, as soon as it is transferred to a commercial enterprise, the competition rules must be applied.
Člen 295 Pogodbe ES se ne sme uporabljati za izvzetje prenosa LTS iz veljavnih predpisov o konkurenci. Člen namreč ščiti svobodo države pri oblikovanju takšnih posebnih sredstev; toda takoj ko se sredstva prenesejo na trgovsko podjetje, se morajo uporabiti predpisi o konkurenci.
The BdB states that the question of what remuneration was appropriate for the transfer of the promotion-related assets, particularly in the case of NordLB, should be determined using the method employed by the Commission in its WestLB decision of 8 July 1999.
BdB v svoji pritožbi ugotavlja, da se mora na vprašanje, kakšno nadomestilo je primerno za prenos sredstev za pospeševanje, med drugim v primeru NordLB, odgovoriti s pomočjo metode, ki jo je Komisija uporabila za sprejetje Odločbe glede WestLB z dne 8. julija 1999.
The first step is therefore to compare the capital provided with other equity instruments.
Prvi korak je torej primerjava razpoložljivega kapitala z drugimi instrumenti lastnega kapitala.
The second step is to determine the minimum remuneration which an investor would expect for a real equity-capital investment in the Landesbank.
Drugi korak je določitev najmanjšega nadomestila, ki bi ga vlagatelj pričakoval za dejansko naložbo v lastni kapital deželne banke.
Finally, a calculation must be made of any premiums and discounts applied by virtue of the particularities of the transfer.
Nazadnje se morajo izračunati morebitni pribitki in odbitki zaradi posebnosti prenosa.
The BdB comes to the conclusion that the transfer of the LTS promotion-related assets to NordLB — and the transfer of capital in all the other Landesbank cases — can be compared to an injection of share capital.
Združenje BdB je ugotovilo, da se lahko prenos sredstev LTS za pospeševanje na NordLB – ter vsi drugi postopki prenosa kapitala na deželne banke – primerja z vlogo osnovnega kapitala.
It argues that the promotion-related assets transferred cannot be compared with capital in the form of profit participation certificates, as profit participation rights constitute only additional capital.
Prenesena sredstva za pospeševanje se ne morejo primerjati s kapitalom v obliki potrdil o udeležbi pri dobičku, saj pravice za udeležbo pri dobičku predstavljajo le dodatni kapital.
At the time of the respective transfers, in particular at the end of 1991, only share capital (and reserves within the meaning of Section 10(2) KWG) and silent partnership contributions were recognised as core capital in Germany.
V Nemčiji so v času zadevnih prenosov, zlasti ob koncu leta 1991, temeljni kapital predstavljali le osnovni kapital (in rezerve v smislu poglavja 10(2) KWG) in vloge tihega partnerstva.
Any comparison with silent partnership contributions could be ruled out across the board.
Primerjava s tiho udeležbo ne pride v poštev v nobenem primeru.
First, such contributions were made available by an investor for a limited period only.
Kot prvo vlagatelj vloge tihega partnerstva nudi le v omejenem obdobju.
An investor could not therefore expect to receive the same return on a silent partnership contribution as for equity instruments recognised for supervisory purposes for an unlimited period, in particular a injection of share capital.
Zato za vlogo tihega partnerstva ne more pričakovati enakega donosa kot za instrumente lastnega kapitala, priznane za nadzorne namene za neomejeno obdobje, zlasti vlogo osnovnega kapitala.
Second, although it was asserted that the transferred capital was subordinate in liability to share capital pursuant to agreements between the Landesbanks' owners, this did not necessarily mean a lower risk for the investor.
Kot drugo potrditev, da je preneseni kapital v skladu s sporazumi med lastniki deželnih bank podrejen osnovnemu kapitalu, še ne pomeni manjšega tveganja za vlagatelja.
The injected capital made up a significant proportion of the total core capital, making it extremely likely that it would be drawn on — at least in part — in the event of losses.
Vloženi kapital predstavlja znaten delež celotnega temeljnega kapitala. Obstaja torej velika verjetnost, da se bo vloženi kapital v primeru izgub uporabil vsaj delno.
Third, the BdB submits that the difference in quality between silent partnership contributions and the capital transferred to the Landesbanks as promotion-related assets is confirmed by the definition of core capital for supervisory purposes adopted by the Basle Committee for Banking Supervision.
Kot tretje pa razliko med kakovostjo vlog tihega partnerstva in kapitala, ki se v obliki sredstev za pospeševanje prenese na deželne banke, potrjuje tudi Bazelski odbor za bančni nadzor s svojo opredelitvijo temeljnega kapitala za nadzorne namene. V skladu s to opredelitvijo se morajo vloge tihega partnerstva priznati za nadzorne namene kot tako imenovani Lower Tier 1 kapital.
According to this definition, silent partnership contributions must be recognised for supervisory purposes as no more than lower tier I capital, which may account for no more than 15 % of the requisite core-capital ratio. In other words, where the core-capital ratio is 4 %, 3,4 % must be made up of nominal capital and open reserves (e.g. the special-purpose reserves transferred to the Landesbanks).
Ta kapital lahko predstavlja le še 15 % potrebnega deleža temeljnega kapitala, torej kadar je delež temeljnega kapitala 4 %, morajo 3,4 % predstavljati osnovni kapital in javne rezerve (na primer rezerve za posebne namene, prenesene na deželne banke).
Furthermore, banks only ever took up subordinate equity instruments such as preference shares or profit participation rights in small volumes.
Poleg tega pa banke vedno opravljajo z drugotnimi instrumenti lastnega kapitala, kot so prednostne delnice ali pravice za udeležbo pri dobičku, le v majhnem obsegu.
Under pressure from the rating agencies, such instruments hardly ever accounted for more than 10 % of a bank's total core capital — a very different situation from that in the cases under examination.
Zaradi pritiska agencij za oceno kreditnih tveganj tovrstni instrumenti skoraj nikoli ne dosežejo več kot 10 % celotnega temeljnega kapitala banke, kar je povsem drugače kot v primerih, ki se ocenjujejo tu.
Against this background, silent partnership contributions could not be used for large volumes invested by a single investor.
Ob upoštevanju navedenega se vloge tihega partnerstva ne morejo uporabljati za velik obseg, ki ga vloži vlagatelj sam.
Minimum remuneration for a share-capital investment in a Landesbank
Najmanjše nadomestilo za naložbo v osnovni kapital deželne banke
The BdB argues that all methods of determining an appropriate remuneration (return) for the provision of share capital start from a risk-free return and add a risk premium.
BdB trdi, da vse metode za določitev ustreznega nadomestila (donosa) za razpoložljiv osnovni kapital izhajajo iz netveganega donosa in vključujejo premijo tveganja.
These methods can be traced back to the following basic principle:
Te metode se lahko pojasnijo na naslednjem temeljnem načelu:
Expected return on a risky investment
pričakovan donos na tvegano naložbo
risk-free return + risk premium for the risky investment
netvegan donos + premija tveganja za tvegano naložbo
To determine the risk-free return, the BdB uses the returns on long-term government bonds, fixed-rate securities issued by state bodies being the form of investment with the least or no risk.
BdB za določitev netveganega donosa uporablja donose na dolgoročne državne obveznice, saj gre pri vrednostnih papirjih s fiksnimi obrestmi, ki jih izdajajo državni organi, za obliko vloge z najmanjšim tveganjem ali brez tveganja.
To offset the effects of inflation, the rate of return on a long-term government bond should be determined for each transfer period, initially disregarding the inflation expectations.
Za izravnavo posledic inflacije se mora za vsako obdobje prenosa določiti stopnja donosa na dolgoročne državne obveznice, sprva brez upoštevanja predvidene inflacije.
Then, to estimate the long-term risk-free basic rate, the estimated figure for average long-term inflation expectations (3,6 %) is added to the ‘real basic rate’ at the time in question.
Za oceno dolgoročne netvegane osnovne stopnje se nato „dejanski osnovni stopnji“ v času obravnave doda ocena pričakovane povprečne dolgoročne inflacije v višini 3,6 %.
According to the BdB, the first step in working out the market-risk premium is to determine the difference between the long-term average return on shares and that on government bonds.
Po mnenju BdB je prvi korak za določitev premije tržnega tveganja primerjava povprečnega dolgoročnega donosa na delnice in donosa na državne obveznice.
As a second step, the BdB determines the beta value for the Landesbanks, i.e. the individual risk premium for the banks by which the general market-risk premium was to be adjusted.
V drugem koraku določa BdB beta vrednost za deželne banke, t.j. posamezno premijo tveganja bank, kateri se mora prilagoditi splošna premija tržnega tveganja.
Premiums and discounts on account of the particularities of the transactions
Pribitki in odbitki zaradi posebnosti transakcij
The BdB notes that the Commission's deduction, in Decision 2002/392/EC, from the minimum remuneration to allow for the lack of liquidity of Wfa’s assets was upheld by the Court of First Instance.
BdB ugotavlja, da je odbitek od najmanjšega nadomestila zaradi nelikvidnosti sredstev Wfa, ki ga je Komisija določila v Odločbi 2000392/ES, potrdilo Sodišče prve stopnje.
It therefore sees no reason to depart from this method in the present case, with the result that a deduction for liquidity should also be made here.
Zato ne vidi nobenega razloga za odstopanje od te metode v zadevnih primerih in tudi tu se opravi odbitek za likvidnost.
The amount of this discount would be calculated using the WestLB method, on the basis of net refinancing costs (gross refinancing costs minus the applicable corporation taxes).
Višina odbitka zaradi nelikvidnosti se izračuna s pomočjo metode WestLB na podlagi neto stroškov refinanciranja (bruto stroški refinanciranja minus ustrezni davki od dobička).
The Court of First Instance also upheld the premium applied by the Commission in Decision 2000/392/EC.
Sodišče prve stopnje je potrdilo tudi pribitek, ki ga je Komisija določila v Odločbi 2000/392/ES.
If the circumstances leading to an increase in risk compared with a ‘normal share-capital investment’ are also present in the other Landesbank cases (the in part exceptionally high volume of assets transferred, the failure to issue new shares in the company and the related forgoing of additional voting rights, and the lack of fungibility of the investment, i.e. the impossibility of withdrawing the invested capital from the company again at any time), the BdB considers that a premium is also justified here.
Če gre tudi v drugih primerih deželnih bank za okoliščine, ki vodijo v povečanje tveganja glede na „običajno naložbo v osnovni kapital“, kot je v določeni meri izredno velik obseg prenesenih sredstev, neizdaja novih delnic v podjetju in s tem povezana odpoved dodatnim glasovalnim pravicam ter nezadostna tržnost vloge, t.j. nemožnost, da bi se vložen kapital kadar koli dvignil iz podjetja, je po mnenju BdB tudi tu upravičen pribitek.
COMMENTS BY THE LAND OF NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA AND WESTLB
PRIPOMBE DEŽELE SEVERNO PORENJE-VESTFALIJA IN WESTLB
On 30 October 2003 Germany forwarded a response from the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia and WestLB to the Commission's decision to initiate the investigation procedure in which they disputed the statement that the assets transferred to the Landesbanks, including NordLB, could be compared to share-capital.
Nemčija je 30. oktobra 2003 posredovala odgovor na sklep Komisije o začetku preiskovalnega postopka, v katerem dežela Severno Porenje-Vestfalija in NordLB izpodbijata trditev, da so sredstva, prenesena na deželne banke, tudi v primeru NordLB, primerljiva z osnovnim kapitalom.
They argued that silent partnership contributions and ‘perpetuals’ had in fact been recognised as core capital in Germany since 1991, adding that remuneration for an investment depended not on how it was classified by the banking supervisory authorities, but on its risk profile.
Vloge tihega partnerstva in tako imenovani perpetuali se namreč v Nemčiji priznavajo kot temeljni kapital že od leta 1991. Nadomestilo zato ne temelji na tem, kako organi za bančni nadzor klasificirajo naložbo, temveč na njenem profilu tveganja.
Since the assets were junior-ranking, the risk pattern had more in common with silent partnership contributions or ‘perpetuals’ than with share-capital investments.
Ker so sredstva v podrejenem položaju, je struktura tveganja primerljivejša z vlogami tihega partnerstva ali tako imenovanimi perpetuali kot z naložbami v osnovni kapital.
WestLB had no objections to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) method for calculating the minimum remuneration for a share-capital investment but felt that the beta values determined by the BdB — at well over 1 — were inappropriate.
Kar zadeva izračun najmanjšega nadomestila za naložbo v osnovni kapital, se WestLb strinja z metodami modela vrednotenja dolgoročnih naložb (CAPM). Vendar pa beta vrednosti, določene s strani BdB, ki so znatno večje od 1, niso primerne.
A beta factor of more than 1 meant that a company's shares represented a higher risk than the market as a whole.
Beta faktor, ki je večji od 1, namreč pomeni, da delnice podjetja predstavljajo večje tveganje kot celotni trg.
Yet the risk of investing in a Landesbank was well below the overall market risk because of the institutional liability (Anstaltslast) and guarantor liability (Gewährträgerhaftung) which it enjoyed and which were not challenged at the time.
Vendar pa je tveganje pri naložbi v deželno banko zaradi takratnega nespornega obstoja pomoči Anstaltslast in Gewährträgerhaft znatno manjše od tveganja na celotnem trgu.
Moreover, they argued that, in the specific case of the Landesbanks, it was a mistake to use as a benchmark the return expected at the time that the assets were transferred to the banks.
Poleg tega je v posebnem primeru deželnih bank napačno kot merilo uporabiti donos, pričakovan ob prenosu sredstev na deželne banke. Ta pristop je sicer načeloma v zvezi z merili za zasebne naložbe smiseln.
Although this was generally a sensible approach to adopt in relation to the private-investor test, it here meant using as a basis the returns expected in 1991.
V tem primeru pa to pomeni, da je podlaga donos, pričakovan leta 1991.
As regards the discount for the lack of liquidity of the transferred assets, WestLB and the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia considered that the rate for risk-free government bonds should be deducted in full from the basic return.
Kar zadeva odbitek zaradi nelikvidnosti prenesenih sredstev, sta WestLB in dežela Severno Porenje-Vestfalija mnenja, da se mora stopnja za netvegane državne obveznice v celoti odbiti od osnovne stopnje donosa.
They argued that the Landesbanks had received no liquidity as a result of the asset transfers.
Deželne banke s prenosi sredstev niso pridobile likvidnosti.