natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status follows an analysis of the company ' s liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state ' s potential involvement in the French telecommunications market ’ (p. 19); ‘France Télécom benefited from the market's increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit’ (p. 20); ‘we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided’ (page 54) ‘However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called “implicit government support”.
Po izračunih Deutsche Bank bi moralo biti razmerje dolg/EBITDA podjetja FT 4,9 v drugem polletju 2002 in 5,231. decembra 2002. (‘… on July 12, 2002, S & P … downgraded France Télécom’s ratings to BBB- … The agency no longer expects France Télécom to hit the 3.5x net debt/EBITDA target by 2003, but did assign a “stable” outlook to the low triple B ratings. It seems that the stable outlook is anchored by “the French state … [which] has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor’s that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Télécom were to face any difficulties.” … Interestingly, S & P had initially said it was not incorporating any extraordinary support from the French government into its rating when it downgraded France Télécom’s ratings to BBB in June. Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status “follows an analysis of the company’s liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state’s potential involvement in the French telecommunications market”’ (p. 19); ‘France Télécom benefited from the market’s increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit’ (p. 20); ‘we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided’ (page 54) ‘However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called “implicit government support”.
This could take the form of banks or the government providing the necessary loans at market prices ’ (p. 21).
This could take the form of banks or the government providing the necessary loans at market prices ’ (str. 21).
However ‘what is the market price for, say, 10 bn of new debt to a BBB- credit?
Zato ‘what is the market price for, say, 10 bn of new debt to a BBB- credit?
… we suspect there is no right answer to these questions, because if FT was operating in the real world, it would not be able to refinance without a debt for equity swap, in our view.’ (p.
… we suspect there is no right answer to these questions, because if FT was operating in the real world, it would not be able to refinance without a debt for equity swap, in our view.’(str.
33, along the same lines, see p. 54).
33, v enakem primeru glej str. 54).
’ (p. 28); ‘It is worth noting that S & P states on its recent conference call on its downgrade of FT's credit that, in general, a company generating free cash flow with debt to EBITDA of four times would qualify as a BBB- credit, the last investment grade rating.
These reports have resulted in a significant rally in both bonds and equity prices, with the equity rallying over 90 % and the bonds 137bp in two weeks, as nervous shorts covered position.
Ibid., ‘Bonds and convertibles suggest that the market is unsure of the weight of government support’ (p. 3).
Ibid., ‘Bonds and convertibles suggest that the market is unsure of the weight of government support’ (str. 3).
Which indicates that the agency did not expect any subsequent downgrading.
To nakazuje, da agencija ni pričakovala nadaljnjega znižanja.
France Télécom LT Rating cut to ‘BBB-’; Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST Today, Standard & Poor ' s Ratings direct, ( July 12, 2002).
France Télécom LT Rating cut to „BBB-“; Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST Today, Standard & Poor’s Ratings direct, ( 12. julij 2002).
S & P seems to be referring rather to information supplied by the French Government to the agency itself, but, according to the understanding which the Commission has of the file in view of the evidence in its possession, the content of this information relates substantially to the same commitments as those contained in the announcements made in public.
Agencija S & P se bolj sklicuje na ocene, ki jih vlada zagotavlja sami agenciji, vendar po razumevanju, da Komisija ima dokumentacijo ob upoštevanju lastnih elementov, vsebina teh ocen temelji predvsem na istih obvezah iz javnih objav.
Board meeting presentation, France Télécom stock-taking exercise, December 2002, p. 36.
Board meeting presentation, France Télécom mission «Etat des lieux, december 2002, str. 36».
In a covering letter accompanying the financial protocol signed by […] bank on 12 September 2002 concerning the bank's commitment in relation to the Company's planned capital increase, the bank's representative is unambiguous on this point: ‘We feel that the planned transaction would be difficult under present conditions and that a favourable reaction by the markets to the declarations and official statements to be published at the end of the week will be a key factor in creating the necessary conditions for carrying out the transaction’.
V posebni pošti na začetku finančnega protokola, ki ga je podpisala banka […] 12. septembra 2002, in v zvezi z obveznostjo omenjene banke v okviru zvišanja kapitala predvidenega s strani podjetja predstavnik banke o tem nedvomno meni: „Ocenjujemo, da bo predvideni postopek v trenutnih okoliščinah težak in da bo pozitiven odziv trgov na izjave in sporočila, ki bodo objavljena konec tedna, eden od ključnih elementov za ustvarjanje potrebnih okoliščin za izvedbo tega postopka“.
See FT form 20-F, March 2003, pp. 15-16: ‘a decrease of one notch in its long term debt rating by S & P's and Moody's would automatically increase its annual interest expense by approximately € 75 million.’
Glej podjetje FT, obrazec 20-F, marec 2003, P15-16 „znižanje ocene dolgoročnega dolga za eno stopnjo agencije S & P in samodejno zvišanje stroškov letnih obresti agencije Moddy's, okrog 75 milijonov EUR“ ( ‘a decrease of one notch in its long term debt rating by S & P’s and Moody’s would automatically increase its annual interest expense by approximately € 75 million.’)
A step-up clause determines an increase in a bond's coupon rate and in the interest rates on credit lines as the credit rating declines.
Klavzula „step up“ določa porast kupona obveznic in obrestne mere za kreditne linije, kadar se bonitetna ocena slabša.
Memoranda of understanding signed on 11 and 12 September 2002 between the State and the banks (condition h).
Protokoli podpisani 11. in 12. septembra 2002 med državo in bankami (pogoj h).
See in this connection the Seleco decision, referred to above, paragraph 84.
V zvezi s tem glej zgoraj omenjeno odločitev o podjetju Seleco, točka 84. Glej tudi odločitve generalnega pravobranilca g. L.A.
See also the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 27.9.2001 in Joined Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italy v Commission [2001] ECR I-4035, which states (unofficial translation): ‘Hence it is conceivable that these private investors were willing to contribute only after the authorities decided to grant new aid.
Geelhoeda z dne 27. septembra 2001 o združenih primerih C-328/99 in C-399/00, Italija proti Komisiji, Rec. 2003, str. I-4035, ki določa: „Lahko si predstavljamo, da zasebni vlagatelji niso bili pripravljeni poseči dokler se vlada ni odločila dodeliti novih pomoči.
The fact that these private investors were then willing to contribute at the same time is no longer relevant’.
Dejstvo, da so ti zasebni vlagatelji pripravljeni poseči istočasno, ni več umestno“.
See point 3.1.1.
Glej točko 3.1.1.
See France Télécom's comments contained in Mr Ehlermann's report of 21.1.2004: ‘… during the first half of 2002, the market gradually lost confidence in France Télécom's capacity to cope with its debt and in the management team's ability to solve the problem (point 7) … once the first half's figures were known and in view of the management team's inability to reassure the markets, the French State intervened in September 2002 (point 8).’
Glej pripombe podjetja France Télécom v poročilu g. Ehlermanna z dne 21. januarja 2004: „… v prvem polletju 2002 je trg postopno izgubil zaupanje v sposobnosti podjetja FT, da bi se soočilo s svojo zadolženostjo, in v zmožnosti vodstva, da najde rešitev za težavo (točka 7) … francoska vlada je, ko je že poznala številke prvega polletja in še pred nezmožnostjo vodstva, da bi zagotovilo trge, posredovala septembra 2002 (točka 8).“
The appointment of a new management team and the launching of a study to prepare the ground for a new industrial plan would appear to be the first steps to take in order to regain the market's confidence (see, for example, the above-mentioned HSBC report, p. 6: ‘… the normal attitude of a prudent investor when faced with such a situation is: (i) to re-establish confidence in the company's future by appointing a management with fresh credibility’.
Postavitev nove uprave in izvajanje študije za pripravo novega industrijskega načrta sta prva ukrepa, ki ju je treba sprejeti, če želimo ponovno pridobiti zaupanje trga (glej na primer prej omenjeno poročilo HSBC, str. 6 „… običajen odnos dobro poučenega vlagatelja v takšni situaciji je: (i) da ponovno vzpostavi zaupanje v prihodnost družbe s postavitvijo uprave, ki ima novo verodostojnost“.
In the same vein, see the Deutsche Bank study of 22.7.2002, referred to above: ‘If we assume a management change which would be necessary for any deal ()… With a new management the equity story could then perhaps be sold to the markets’, p. 33.
V enakem primeru glej že omenjeno študijo Deutsche Bank z dne 22. julija 2002, „če predpostavljamo zamenjavo uprave, kar je pri tem postopku potrebno (…) Ob novi upravi se lahko postopek zvišanja kapitala proda tudi na trgu“ ( „If we assume a management change which would be necessary for any deal ()… With a new management the equity story could then perhaps be sold to the markets“ str. 33).
During the meeting with the Commission on 22.1.2003, the French authorities explained that their conduct had been comparable to that of a prudent investor as, before acting, they had awaited: the change of management, verification of the Company's financial situation, preparation of the TOP plan, the announcement of the State's support and of its intention to participate in the operation to strengthen the Company's capital base, and, lastly, the recovery of the market's confidence.
Pravzaprav je ob srečanju s Komisijo 22. januarja 2003 francoska vlada razložila, da je bilo njeno ravnanje primerljivo z ravnanjem dobro poučenega vlagatelja, ker je pred ukrepanjem pričakovala: zamenjavo uprave, preverjanje finančne situacije podjetja, pripravo načrta TOP, objavo podpore države in njeno namero o sodelovanju pri postopku krepitve lastnih sredstev podjetja ter nazadnje vrnitev zaupanja trga.
The Commission agrees with the French authorities that these steps are those which any prudent private investor would have taken before entering into any commitment to support the Company.
Komisija se strinja s francosko vlado, da bi tak ukrep moral narediti vsak zaseben dobro poučen vlagatelj pred sprejemom kakršne koli obveznosti podpore podjetju.
However, as shown above, the Commission has concluded that the State had committed itself to supporting France Télécom well before any of these steps had been taken.
Zato, kot je bilo že omenjeno, je Komisija zaključila, da se je država obvezala za podporo podjetju FT še pred začetkom katerega koli ukrepa.
As mentioned above, the rating agencies downgraded France Télécom's rating during the months of June and July 2002 to just above that of junk bond, stating in their press release that the rating would have been lower still had it been based solely on France Télécom's fundamentals.
Kot je bilo že omenjeno, so agencije za ocenjevanje znižale oceno podjetja FT v juniju in juliju 2002 na raven rahlo višjo od „junk bond“, ob poudarku v sporočilu za javnost, da bi bila ocena še nižja, če bi bila znižana samo na osnovah podjetja FT.
See the above-mentioned Deutsche Bank study of 22.7.2002: ‘In our view the risk reward balance is not currently very attractive for investors to participate in a capital increase’.
Glej zgoraj omenjeno študijo Deutsche Bank z dne 22. julija 2002: „Po našem mnenju poročilo o tveganju/povračilu trenutno ne spodbuja posebno vlagateljev, da sodelujejo pri zvišanju kapitala“. ( ‘in our view the risk reward balance is not currently very attractive for investor to participate in a capital increase‘.)
Information which was considered partial by the above-mentioned commission of enquiry.
Podatki, ki jih je delno ocenila zgoraj omenjena komisija za preiskave.
See inter alia: ‘The State thus comes across as being both very present and too often ineffective ... The State has difficulty in giving public undertakings clear guidelines … Moreover, the State's means of control are considerably weakened by the forms taken by external growth, that is to say, the development of subsidiaries.
Glej predvsem: „Država se tako pogosto izkaže kot dostikrat prisotna in prevečkrat neučinkovita … Država preizkuša težave, da bi javnim podjetjem ponudila jasne direktive … Poleg tega država ocenjuje svoja sredstva nadzora kot precej oslabljena zaradi zunanje rasti, torej zaradi razvoja hčerinskih družb.
Decisions that are fundamental to public groups are being taken at the level of subsidiaries, something which, owing to their strong identity (Orange or Equant in the case of France Télécom) and the specific details of their governance (the number of “direct” representatives of the State on their boards is small or non-existent, notwithstanding the State ' s controlling majority), reduces still further the time available for and the quality of the information transmitted to the public shareholder ’.
Temeljne odločitve za javne skupine se sprejmejo na ravni hčerinskih družb, kar zaradi njihove močne identitete (Orange in Equant v primeru podjetja France Télécom) in zaradi posebnih načinov njihovega vodenja (število ‚neposrednih‘ predstavnikov države v upravnih svetih je majhno ali ga ni, brez zagotovila sodelovanja nadzora države) zmanjša roke in kakovost podatkov pri prenosu javnemu delničarju “.
It cannot but be concluded that, as Mr Elie Cohen said, “both Crédit Lyonnais and France Télécom were subject to control by the State, to the tutelage of the Treasury and to monitoring by the Court of Auditors, that is to say, to a whole series of external controls, which, in the last analysis, failed to work”’.
Pravzaprav na koncu ne bomo vedeli drugače kot ob ugotavljanju, kot je to naredil g. Elie Cohen, ‚tako banka Crédit Lyonnais kot podjetje France Télécom sta bila pod nadzorom države, pod zaščito blagajne, pod nadzorom Računskega sodišča, ki so bili vrsta zunanjih nadzorov in v tem primeru niso delovali‘. “
Which was, in fact, done only in October after the appointment of Mr Thierry Breton as CEO.
To je bilo pravzaprav narejeno oktobra, po imenovanju Thierryja Bretona.
See France Télécom's comments as set out in Mr Ehlermann's report of 21.1.2004, point 90.
Glej pripombe podjetja France Télécom v poročilu g. Ehlermanna z dne 21. januarja 2004, točka 90.
Point 5(a) of the Guidelines.
Točka 5 a) v smernicah.
Mention is made here only of criteria applicable to a company in the telecommunications sector.
Tukaj so omenjena samo merila uporabna za podjetje, ki deluje v sektorju telekomunikacij.
Mr Douste-Blazy, chairman of the commission of enquiry, said: ‘The downgrading of the company's credit rating denied it access to the bond market and hence compromised its ability to borrow’.
Douste-Blazy, predsednik komisije za preiskave „Točne navedbe o tem, da je znižanje finančne ocene podjetja le-temu zaprlo dostop do trga obveznic in zato škodilo njegovim zmožnostim za posojilo“.
The downgrading to which he is referring is that of May 2002.
Znižanje o katerem govori predsednik se je pojavilo v maju 2002.
Sara Husband, High Yield Report, 1.7.2002.
Sara Husband, High Yield Report, 1. julij 2002.
See the statements by the previous CEO of France Télécom, Michel Bon, reported in the press: article in La Tribune of 16.9.2002‘… the fall in credit rating is preventing the planned refinancing’; article in Le Monde of 16.9.2002‘the downgrading at the end of June of the rating for FT's debt by the Moody's rating agency … has denied us access to the market’; article in the Financial Times of 16.9.2002‘FT cannot continue to survive when no one wants to lend us money and, on the contrary, when everyone wants to be paid on the nail.
Glej prejšnje izjave predsednika podjetja FT, Michela Bona, ki so bile objavljene v medijih: članek iz časopisa Tribune z dne 16. septembra 2002„… znižanje ocene povzroča predvidena ponovna financiranja“; članek iz časopisa Monde z dne 16. septembra 2002„znižanje ocene dolga podjetja FT agencije za ocenjevanje Moody's […] nam je zaprlo dostop na trg“; članek iz časopisa Financial Times z dne 16. septembra 2002‘FT cannot continue to survive when no one wants to lend us money and, on the contrary, when everyone wants to be paid on the nail.
See also the statement by the French authorities: ‘achieving a net debt reduction and a reconstitution of the company capital [is] a sine qua non for the ultimate restoration of the company's reputation in credit markets …’, p. 26 of the French authorities ' letter of 3.12.2002.
Glej tudi zagotovila francoske vlade: „uresničiti povračilo čistega dolga ter ponovno vzpostaviti lastna sredstva [je] osnovni pogoj preoblikovanja na kredit podjetja v obliki kredita …“ str. 26 pisma francoske vlade z dne 3. decembra 2002.
Committee on Finance, the General Economy and the Plan, record No 26, sitting of 5.12.2002, hearing of Mr Thierry Breton, France Télécom's CEO.
Komisija za finance, Splošno gospodarstvo in Načrt, vključno s št. 26, seja z dne 5. decembra 2002, zaslišanje g. Thierryja Bretona, predsednika podjetja France Télécom.
See also hearing of Mr Thierry Breton, France Télécom's CEO, before the Economic Affairs Committee on 11.12.2002: ‘[Mr Thierry Breton] Dwelling on the refound confidence, as witnessed by the very good reception accorded to the EUR 1,5 billion bond issue launched the previous day for the first time since 2001’.
Glej tudi zaslišanje g. Thierryja Bretona, predsednika podjetja FT, pri Komisiji za gospodarske zadeve z dne 11. decembra 2002: „[G. Thierry Breton] Ob vztrajanju pri ponovno odkritem zaupanju o katerem priča izredno dober sprejem pripravljen za izdajanje obveznic v višini 1,5 milijard EUR prejšnji dan, prvič leta 2001“.
Barclays' proposal for an exchange offer: ‘We provide below preliminary thoughts on such a transaction’.
Barclays Proposal for an exchange offer: ‘We provide below preliminary thoughts on such a transaction’.
See the French authorities' letter of 16.2.2004.
Glej pismo francoske vlade z dne 16. februarja 2004.
See the French authorities' comments of 4.12.2003, 22.1.2004 and 16.2.2004.
Glej pripombe francoske vlade z dne 4. decembra 2003, z dne 22. januarja 2004 in z dne 16. februarja 2004.
The French authorities refer to five bond issues made between 26.7.2002 and 23.12.2002, worth in the case of the bonds issued before the announcement of the Ambition 2005 plan (5.12.2002) a total of EUR 220 million, to which must be added an amount of EUR 442,2 million corresponding to the issuance of ORA.
Francoska vlada se sklicuje na 5 obveznih posojil izdanih med 26. julijem 2002 in 23. decembrom 2002, katerega skupen znesek je 220 milijonov EUR za obvezna posojila izdana pred objavo načrta Ambition 2005 (5. december 2002), kateremu se doda znesek 442,2 milijonov EUR, kar ustreza izdaji „ORA“.
Over the period prior to the announcement of the Ambition 2005 plan on 5.12.2002.
V obdobju pred objavo načrta Ambition 2005 5. decembra 2002.
The average is EUR 1,5 billion.
Povprečje je 1,5 milijard EUR.
EUR 442,2 million.
442,2 milijonov EUR.
Such issues were made in December 2002 and January 2003.
Te izdaje so bile izvedene decembra 2002 in januarja 2003.
It is worth recalling in this connection certain passages from the hearing before the commission of enquiry of France Télécom's auditors:‘Mr Edouard Salustro: Mr Deputy, allow me to draw attention to something you know better than anyone else.
Zato je zanimivo spomniti na nekatere odlomke zaslišanja pred komisijo za preiskave odbora revizorjev podjetja FT:„G. Edouard Salustro: G. poslanec, treba je omeniti eno stvar, ki jo vi poznate najbolje od vseh.
Before expressing his opinion on a set of financial data, the auditor asks himself whether the company is capable of the economically justified pursuit of its business.
Pred izražanjem svojega mnenja o vseh finančnih podatkih si revizor postavi vprašanje ali je družba v stanju za preiskavo zaradi gospodarskega delovanja.
It is the first question, a basic principle which he goes on to state in the accounts.
To je prvo vprašanje, to je osnovno načelo, ki ga v potem v svojih stroških razlikuje.
Afterwards, the question no longer arises ... as it has already been answered.Mr Xavier de Roux: You considered, therefore, that the continuation of the business went without saying.Mr Edouard Salustro: No!
Potem si vprašanja ne zastavlja več, ker je nanj odgovoril že prej.G. Xavier de Roux: Upoštevali ste torej, da je bila preiskava o delovanju očitna.G. Edouard Salustro: Ne! Torej, seveda!
I mean, of course!… I wasn't there!…Mr Vincent de La Bachelerie: It did not necessarily go without saying, and we are in fact monitoring …’.
… Sploh nisem bil prisoten!G. Vincent de La Bachelerie: Ni nujno da je bila očitna, pravzaprav učinkovito nadzorujemo točko …“.
Even clearer on this score is the explanation given by Mr Bon, France Télécom's former CEO, before the same commission of enquiry:‘There is one fundamental point that the black scenario never included: the fact that access to the capital market was closed off to us.
Še bolj jasno se je o tem izrazil g. Bon, nekdanji predsednik podjetja FT, pred isto komisijo za preiskave:„Torej je podatek, da črni scenarij ni bil nikoli vključen: dejstvo, da je bil dostop na trg kapitala za nas zaprt.
We had never entertained that possibility because we thought that the State's presence as majority shareholder would prevent the market for contemplating France Télécom's bankruptcy without its even being necessary for the State to voice its support.
Nikoli nismo predvideli te možnosti, ker menimo, da je jasno, da bi prisotnost države kot večinskega delničarja ovirala trg pri pričakovanju stečaja podjetja France Télécom, brez da bi morala država pokazati svojo podporo.
This view was shared by almost all market operators up until the time when one of the three rating agencies — and one only — decided that France Télécom was on the verge of insolvency and reviewed its rating, denying it any market access overnight ... When, in June, that one rating agency delivered its opinion and we were denied market access, I knew that, unable to borrow again, France Télécom would be in payment difficulties a year later, towards the end of the first half of 2003’.
To mnenje si je delila kvazi-večina akterjev na trgu dokler se ni ena izmed treh agencij za ocenjevanje – samo ena – odločila, da je bilo podjetje France Télécom na robu nezmožnost, in je ponovno pregledala svojo oceno ter mu od naslednjega dne zaprla dostop do trga … Ker je od junija naprej ta agencija za ocenjevanje izdala svoje mnenje in nam je bil dostop do trga zaprt, sem vedel, da se je kljub ponovnem posojilu podjetju France Télécom znašel v težavah pri plačilu, eno leto kasneje, proti koncu prvega polletja leta 2003“.