natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The KDB debenture programme, for example, exhibits some of the characteristics of a guarantee, insofar as the entire measure was set up, sponsored and effectively guaranteed by the GOK or a GOK public body.
Zadolžniški program KDB kaže nekatere značilnosti jamstva, glede na to, da je celotni ukrep uvedla, sponzorirala in zanj jamčila KV ali javna organizacija KV.
Thus, one reasonable method of enquiring into the amount of benefit of such a measure might be to compare the guarantee provided by the government with a comparable guarantee provided by the market.
Primerna metoda za ugotavljanje višine ugodnosti takega ukrepa bi lahko bila primerjava med jamstvom vlade s primerljivim jamstvom, ki ga ponuja trg.
The KDB debenture programme might also be considered in the light of Article 6(b) of the basic Regulation (which generally corresponds to Article 14(b) of the SCM Agreement), which refers to government loans, and Article 6(c) of the basic Regulation (which generally corresponds to Article 14(c) of the SCM Agreement), which refers to a loan guarantee by a government.
Zadolžniški program KDB bi lahko preučili tudi glede na člen 6(b) osnovne Uredbe (ki na splošno ustreza členu 14(b) Sporazuma SIU), ki se nanaša na vladna posojila; in člen 6(c) osnovne Uredbe (ki na splošno ustreza členu 14(c) Sporazuma SIU), ki se nanaša na vladna jamstva za posojila.
The Commission has re-examined the record to consider whether there is any relevant benchmark against which the amount of the benefit could be calculated.
Komisija je ponovno pregledala dokumente, da bi proučila, če obstaja kakšna ustrezna primerjava, na podlagi katere bi lahko izračunali višino ugodnosti.
It has looked for verified evidence about a comparable government guarantee or ‘a comparable commercial loan’ or ‘a comparable commercial loan absent the government guarantee’ that Hynix or another firm in a situation comparable to Hynix concluded at the relevant time.
Iskala je preverjene dokaze o primerljivem vladnem jamstvu ali „primerljivem komercialnem posojilu“ ali „primerljivem komercialnem posojilu brez vladnega jamstva“, ki ga je Hynix ali drugo podjetje v primerljivem položaju sklenilo v zadevnem obdobju.
A comparable commercial loan would ideally be one of approximately the same size, would relate to the same or a similar sector of economic activity, would involve a comparable type of activity, and would have been concluded at approximately the same time.
Primerljivo komercialno posojilo bi bilo v najboljšem primeru približno enakega obsega, nanašalo bi se na isti ali podoben sektor gospodarske dejavnosti, vključevalo bi primerljivo vrsto dejavnosti in bi bilo sklenjeno približno v istem obdobju.
Having conducted this re-examination, the Commission has determined that a commercial benchmark meeting these criteria was not available in this case.
S to ponovno preučitvijo je Komisija ugotovila, da primerljivega posojila, ki bi ustrezalo tem merilom, za ta primer ni na voljo.
Hynix itself did not sell any corporate bonds into the commercial market at the time it participated in the KDB debenture programme.
V času, ko je družba Hynix udeležena v zadolžniškem programu KDB, sama ni prodala nobenih podjetniških obveznic na komercialnem trgu.
In fact, one of the threshold criteria for participation in the KDB debenture programme was that the company in question could not obtain loans or sell bonds on the normal commercial market.
Pravzaprav je bilo eno od meril za udeležbo pri zadolžniškem programu KDB, da zadevna družba ni mogla prejemati nikakršnih posojil ali prodajati podjetniških obveznic na normalnem komercialnem trgu.
Moreover, as noted in recital 53 of the definitive Regulation, Hynix provided no evidence on the record that it tried to access foreign debt markets during this period.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 53 dokončne Uredbe, Hynix ni predložil nikakršnih dokazov, da je v tem obdobju poskušal pridobiti posojilo na tujih trgih.
In addition, the fact that the international ratings agency Standard and Poor's downgraded Hynix's debt to a speculative rating of ‘B-’ makes it unlikely that Hynix would have been able to access foreign bond or loan markets, even if it had tried to do so.
Tudi glede na dejstvo, da je mednarodna bonitetna agencija Standard and Poor’s znižala oceno kreditne sposobnosti Hynixa na špekulativno oceno „B“, je malo verjetno, da bi bil Hynix sposoben dostopati do tujih obvezniških ali delniških trgov, čeprav bi to poskušal.
Even the Korean government itself noted in January 2001 that Hynix was ‘in a state of technical insolvency.’ [57].
Celo sama KV je januarja 2001 ugotovila, da je Hynix v „stanju tehnične plačilne nesposobnosti“ [57].
Moreover, other lending to Hynix during the period that the KDB rolled over Hynix’s maturing bonds cannot serve as a basis for measuring whether a benefit to Hynix exists.
Druga posojila Hynixu v času, ko je KDB obnavljala Hynixove zapadle obveznice, tudi ne morejo biti podlaga za ugotavljanje obstoja ugodnosti za Hynix.
For the reasons noted in recitals 17 to 22 above, the loans provided as part of the syndicated loan cannot serve as an appropriate basis of comparison.
Iz razlogov, navedenih v uvodnih izjavah 17 do 22, posojila, ki so bila del posojil bančnega konzorcija, ne morejo biti ustrezna osnova za primerjavo.
The lending made pursuant to the syndicated loan was so distorted by the government’s intervention in that loan that it cannot serve as a reasonable commercial benchmark by which to measure whether a benefit has occurred or the amount of that benefit.
Posojilo bančnega konzorcija je bilo zaradi vladne intervencije tako izkrivljeno, da tega posojila ne moremo uporabiti kot komercialno primerjavo, s katero bi ugotovili obstoj oziroma višino ugodnosti.
In this regard, the Commission recalls that the syndicated loan itself was made possible by the GOK waiving the lending limits for three key participants in that loan.
S tem v zvezi Komisija opozarja, da je že samo posojilo bančnega konzorcija omogočila korejska vlada, ko je opustila omejitev višine posojil za tri glavne upnike.
Without the participation of these three banks in the syndicate, it is unclear whether the loan would have been able to go forward at all, given that it would have been significantly undersubscribed [58].
Ni jasno, ali bi do tega posojila brez udeležbe teh treh bank sploh prišlo, glede na to, da potrebni znesek še zdaleč ni bi bil dosežen [58].
Further, the convertible bonds purchased by private bodies as part of the May 2001 restructuring programme cannot serve as a benchmark because, although the evidence on record did not rise to the level sufficient for a finding of entrustment or direction, it indicates a level of government involvement that makes the participation by private creditors an inappropriate measure of the commercial reasonableness of the CB purchases: the creditor banks themselves acknowledged in the 7 May 2001 creditor financial institution resolution that Hynix was unable to service its debts in May 2001 [59] and the GOK was clearly heavily involved in overseeing the completion of the May 2001 CB offering, going as far as having a high level FSS official attend the March 2001 meeting of the creditor council [60].
Tudi zamenljive obveznice, ki so jih v okviru programa prestrukturiranja iz maja 2001 kupili zasebni subjekti, ne morejo služiti za primerjavo, kajti čeprav obstoječi dokazi ne zadostujejo za sklepanje o pooblastilih ali navodilih, je dovolj dokazov o tem, da je bila vlada do neke mere vpletena, tako da je bila udeležba zasebnih upnikov pri nakupih zamenljivih obveznic gospodarsko nesprejemljiva: banke upnice so v resoluciji Sveta finančnih ustanov z dne 7. maja 2001 same priznale, da Hynix maja 2001 [59] ni bil sposoben servisirati dolgov, poleg tega je bila KV očitno močno vpletena pri nadzoru zaključka ponudbe zamenljivih obveznic iz maja 2001 in pri tem šla celo tako daleč, da se je sestanka Sveta upnikov [60] marca 2001 udeležil tudi visoki uradnik FSS.
Further, a comparable commercial loan which could serve as a benchmark is one which is concluded at approximately the same period of time; the CB offering took place five months after the KDB debenture programme, when both Hynix's financial situation and the state of the DRAMs market were markedly different.
Poleg tega bi moralo biti primerljivo komercialno posojilo, ki bi ga lahko uporabili kot primerjavo, sklenjeno v približno istem obdobju; do ponudbe zamenljivih obveznic pa je prišlo pet mesecev po zadolžniškem programu KDB, ko so se finančno stanje Hynixa in razmere na trgu DRAM že znatno spremenile.
As already indicated above [61], no other comparable commercial benchmark was actually available in the market.
Kot že zgoraj navedeno [61], na trgu dejansko ni bilo na voljo druge primerjave.
On the contrary, the available information indicates Hynix would not have obtained the relevant funds in the market.
Nasprotno pa razpoložljivi podatki kažejo, da Hynix zadevnih sredstev na trgu ne bi mogel dobiti.
Accordingly, under these circumstances, the Commission finds that the amount of the benefit to Hynix could not exceed the full amount of the funds obtained by Hynix as a result of the operation of the KDB debenture programme, plus compound interest and the costs of recovery or attempted recovery in the event of default.
Glede na to Komisija ugotavlja, da višina ugodnosti, dodeljena Hynixu, ni mogla preseči skupnega zneska sredstev, ki jih je Hynix prejel v okviru zadolžniškega programa KDB, poleg obrestnih obresti in stroškov izterjave ali poskusa izterjave v primeru neizpolnitve obveznosti.
Because there is also no reliable information on the record regarding these latter additional costs, the Commission has confined itself to the full amount of the funds.
Ker o dokazih glede slednjih dodatnih stroškov ni zanesljivih podatkov, se je Komisija omejila na skupni znesek teh sredstev.
However, mindful of the WTO Panel's reasoning, the Commission has also considered whether or not, even without the availability of any appropriate commercial benchmarks, there is anything that might serve as the basis for a proxy benchmark, adjusted where necessary to take account of the particular circumstances of this case.
Glede na argumente preiskovalnega odbora STO je Komisija preučila možnosti, ali kljub odsotnosti primerne komercialne primerjave, vseeno obstaja kakšna ustrezna podlaga, ki bi jo lahko uporabili kot približek, ki bi ga po potrebi prilagodili, da bi upoštevali specifične okoliščine tega primera.
Such a proxy could, for example, be calculated along the lines already indicated above in recitals 45 and 46 with respect to the KEIC Guarantee.
Tak približek bi lahko na primer izračunali na način, naveden v uvodnih izjavah 45 in 46, ki se nanaša na jamstvo KEIC.
For the purposes of this calculation, and as suggested by GOK, the Commission has used as the creditworthy rate for KRW loans the IMF International Financial Statistics rate on short-term KRW denominated-lending, which was 7,7 %.
Za ta izračun je Komisija po predlogu kot obrestno mero za posojila kreditno sposobnim podjetjem v KRW uporabila obrestno mero za kratkoročna posojila mednarodnega finančnega statističnega urada IMF v KRW, ki znaša 7,7 %.
The default rates for both creditworthy and uncreditworthy companies for the term of the measure in question were taken from Moody's Investor Services (0,13 % and 34,37 % respectively).
Za zamudne obresti za kreditno sposobna in kreditno nesposobna podjetja v obdobju trajanja zadevnega ukrepa je uporabila obrestne mere Moody’s Investor Services (0,13 % oziroma 34,37 %).
This led to a total interest rate of 63,89 %.
Tako je dobila skupno obrestno mero v višini 63,89 %.
In contrast, the average interest rate payable by Hynix on the KDB debentures in question was 12,7 %, i.e., a total interest rate differential of 51,19 %.
V nasprotju s tem je bila povprečna obrestna mera, ki jo je plačeval Hynix na zadevne zadolžnice pri KDB, 12,7 %, tako da razlika znaša 51,19 %.
Viewing the financial contribution as a recurring subsidy, rather than as a non-recurring subsidy to be allocated over time, and applying this model to the calculation of the amount of the benefit in the financial contribution under consideration, would lead to an amount of benefit of KRW 626,9 billion, resulting in a countervailable subsidy allocated on turnover of 11,8 %, instead of the 4,9 % originally calculated by the Commission.
Če bi izhajali iz dejstva, da ta finančni prispevek pomeni ponavljajočo se subvencijo, in ne enkratne subvencije, ki se jo razporedi v določenem obdobju, ter uporabimo model izračuna višine ugodnosti v okviru obravnavanega finančnega prispevka, dobimo znesek ugodnosti v višini 626,9 milijard KRW, na podlagi česar bi subvencija, proti kateri se lahko uvede izravnalni ukrep, razporejena na skupni promet, znašala 11,8 % in ne 4,9 %, kot je prvotno izračunala Komisija.
Consequently, the Commission considers that its original approach was and is reasonable in this case, as the interest rate differential would give a much higher amount of benefit than a simple allocation of the face amount of the loan over time.
Zato Komisija meni, da v tem primeru njen prvotni pristop je in je bil ustrezen, saj bi na podlagi razlike v obrestnih merah dobili znatno višji znesek ugodnosti kot z enostavno razporeditvijo zneska posojila v določenem obdobju.
In these circumstances, the Commission has used the more conservative of the two options in order to be sure that it has not exaggerated the amount of the subsidy and will treat the face amount of the loan as the basis for a cap on the maximum amount of the benefit.
V teh okoliščinah je Komisija uporabila konzervativnejšo možnost, s katero je hotela zagotoviti, da pri znesku subvencije ne bi pretiravala, in bo kot osnovo za določanje najvišjega zneska ugodnosti vzela nominalni znesek posojila.
Taking the amount of the funds obtained by Hynix as a result of the operation of the KDB debenture programme as a cap on the maximum amount of the benefit, the Commission finds that the amount of benefit to Hynix in the financial contribution at issue ad valorem of turnover was 4,9 %.
Če se kot najvišji znesek ugodnosti šteje višino sredstev, ki so bila družbi Hynix dodeljena v okviru zadolžniškega programa KDB, Komisija meni, da ugodnost, dodeljena Hynixu kot zadevni finančni prispevek, znaša glede na skupni promet ad valorem 4,9 %.
October 2001 rescue package, consisting of debt-to-equity swap, second roll-over of debt and provision of new loan of KRW 658 billion
Reševalni paket iz oktobra 2001, sestavljen iz zamenjave terjatev v lastniške deleže, drugo obnavljanje dolga in zagotovitev novega posojila v znesku 658 milijard KRW
The Panel summarised the facts concerning the October 2001 restructuring programme in the following terms:
Preiskovalni odbor je takole povzel dejstva glede programa prestrukturiranja iz oktobra 2001:
The fifth and final programme considered to constitute a subsidy was the October 2001 restructuring programme.
Peti in zadnji program, ki se šteje za subvencijo, je bil program prestrukturiranja iz oktobra 2001.
On 4 October 2001, a second Hynix CFIC was set up in accordance with the provisions of the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act (CRPA).
oktobra 2001 je bil ustanovljen drugi CFIC za Hynix v skladu z določbami Zakona o spodbujanju prestrukturiranja podjetij (Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act – CRPA).
The CRPA was enacted in August 2001 and its purpose was to facilitate corporate restructuring, which before was based on agreements between creditor banks and the companies concerned.
CRPA je začel veljati avgusta 2001, njegov namen pa je bil spodbujanje prestrukturiranja podjetij, ki je pred tem temeljilo na sporazumih med bankami upnicami in zadevnimi družbami.
The CFIC consisted of 110 financial institutions including 17 banks and 15 investment trust companies.
CFIC je sestavljalo sto deset finančnih institucij vključno s sedemnajstimi bankami in petnajstimi investicijskimi družbami.
The decisions of the CFIC were taken by a 75 % majority.
Odločitve CFIC so se sprejemale s 75-odstotno večino.
The votes were allocated in proportion of each institution’s exposure to the total loans to Hynix.
Glasovi so bili razdeljeni sorazmerno glede na višino posojila, ki je bilo dodeljeno družbi Hynix.
Any financial institution exercising its dissenter’s rights by disagreeing with a CFIC resolution would be excluded from the CFIC permanently.
Vsako finančno institucijo, ki bi uveljavljala pravico do nestrinjanja (dissenter’s rights) in ne bi soglašala s sklepom CFIC, bi za vedno izključili iz CFIC.
In its second meeting held on 31 October 2001, the CFIC decided on a ‘second restructuring package’ for Hynix.
Na drugem sestanku, ki je potekal 31. oktobra 2001, je CFIC odločal o „drugem paketu prestrukturiranja“ za Hynix.
The following measures were proposed:
Predlagani so bile naslednji ukrepi:
provision of a new loan of KRW 1 trillion to Hynix with an interest rate of 7 %;
zagotovitev novega posojila Hynixu v višini 1000 milijard KRW po sedem odstotni obrestni meri;
debt-to-equity swap by provision of bonds convertible into shares;
zamenjava terjatev v lastniške deleže z zagotovitvijo obveznic, zamenljivih v delnice;
extending the maturities of existing loans until 31 December 2004, converting the maturing corporate bonds into corporate bonds with a three-year maturity and an interest rate of 6,5 % and adjusting the interest rate of the remaining loans in Korean currency to 6 %.
odlog zapadlosti obstoječih posojil do 31. decembra 2004, z zamenjavo zapadlih podjetniških obveznic v podjetniške obveznice z zapadlostjo 3 let in obrestno mero 6,5 odstotka ter prilagoditev obrestne mere preostalih posojil v korejski valuti na 6 odstotkov.
Secondly, the banks which did not want to participate in the new loan were obliged to swap 28,5 % of their loans into equity and waive the rest of the Hynix debt (Option 2).
Prva možnost je bila, da se strinjajo s predlogi in odobrijo novo posojilo ter sodelujejo pri zamenjavi terjatev v lastniške deleže („možnost 1“).
Thirdly, the CFIC also decided that those banks which objected to the measures and used their dissenter’s rights would have their loans purchased back at the liquidation value as established by Arthur Andersen, the firm that was commissioned to conduct a study on the financial situation of Hynix at the time (Option 3).
Drugič, banke, ki niso hotele sodelovati pri novem posojilu, so morale zamenjati 28,5 odstotkov svojih posojil v lastniške deleže in se odpovedati ostali terjatvi do Hynixa. („možnost 2“). In tretjič je CFIC odločil, da bodo tistim bankam, ki bodo nasprotovale ukrepom in uveljavile svojo pravico do nestrinjanja, posojila odkupljena po likvidacijski vrednosti, ki jo je določilo podjetje Arthur Andersen, podjetje, ki je v tem času dobilo naročilo za izvedbo študije o finančnem stanju Hynixa („možnost 3“).
Nevertheless, only six banks agreed to extend new credit, which amounted to KRW 658 billion instead of the planned KRW 1 trillion.
Kljub temu se je le šest bank odločilo za odobritev novega posojila, ki nato znašalo 658 milijard KRW namesto načrtovanih 1000 milijard KRW. Te banke so znaten delež svojih posojil zamenjale v lastniški kapital. Banke, ki so izkoristile možnost 1, so bile KEB, Woori Bank, Chohung Bank, KDB, NACF in Citibank.
These banks swapped a considerable amount of their loans into equity.
Osem bank je zavrnilo odobritev novih posojil, in so približno tretjino svojih posojil spremenile v lastniške deleže, ostalo pa odpisale kot izgubo. Ostale banke, ki so prestrukturiranju nasprotovale, so prejele likvidacijsko vrednost svojih posojil, preostalo terjatev pa so morale odpisati kot izgubo.
The EC considered that the participation by the six Option 1 banks in the October 2001 restructuring programme constituted a financial contribution by the government which conferred a benefit on Hynix.
ES je menila, da je udeležba teh šestih bank, ki so pri programu prestrukturiranja izbrale možnost 1, pomenila finančni prispevek vlade, ki je družbi Hynix omogočal ugodnosti.
The rate of subsidisation for this October 2001 restructuring programme was calculated to be 19,4 %.
Izračunana stopnja subvencioniranja pri programu prestrukturiranja iz oktobra 2001 znaša 19,4 odstotke.
The Panel found that the EC reached a reasonable and reasoned conclusion on the basis of the record before it that the October 2001 restructuring programme conferred a benefit on Hynix [64].
Po mnenju preiskovalnega odbora je bila ugotovitev, ki jo je ES sprejela na podlagi prejšnjega poročila, da je program prestrukturiranja iz oktobra 2001 družbi Hynix [64] omogočal ugodnosti, primerna in utemeljena.
However, as regards the amount of the benefit, the Panel report indicates that the EC should, as a matter of WTO law, re-examine the question of the availability of alternative benchmarks.
Kar zadeva višino ugodnosti, pa je v poročilu Odbora navedeno, da mora ES v skladu z zakonodajo STO ponovno preveriti razpoložljivost alternativnih primerjav.
Debt-to-equity swap
Zamenjava terjatev v lastniške deleže
As the Panel indicated, in approaching the question of benefit in the case of the government provision of equity capital and in applying the guidelines contained in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement, an investigating authority is entitled to considerable leeway [65].
Po navedbah preiskovalnega odbora ima preiskovalni organ pri ugotavljanju ugodnosti v primeru zagotavljanja lastniškega kapitala s strani vlade in pri uporabi Smernic iz člena 14 Sporazuma SIU na voljo veliko možnosti [65].
The Commission considers that the debt-to-equity swap in the October 2001 restructuring programme may be considered in the light of Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation (which generally corresponds to Article 14(a) of the SCM Agreement), which refers to government provision of equity capital inconsistent with the usual investment practice, including for the provision of risk capital, or private investors in the territory of the relevant Member.
Komisija meni, da je zamenjavo terjatev v lastniške deleže v okviru programa prestrukturiranja iz oktobra 2001 možno obravnavati glede na člen 6(1) osnovne uredbe (ki na splošno ustreza členu 14(a) Sporazuma SIU), ki se nanaša na zagotavljanje lastniškega kapitala s strani vlade, ki odstopa od običajne vlagateljske prakse, vključno z zagotavljanjem tveganega kapitala, zasebnih vlagateljev na ozemlju zadevne članice.
The Commission notes that, unlike subparagraphs (b) and (c), subparagraph (a) contains no final sentence providing further guidance on how the amount of the benefit is to be calculated.
Komisija opozarja, da pododstavek (a) v nasprotju s pododstavkoma (b) in (c) ne vsebuje zadnjega stavka, ki bi vseboval informacijo o načinu izračuna ugodnosti.
It has looked for verified evidence about a comparable private provision of equity capital that Hynix or another firm in a situation comparable to Hynix concluded at the relevant time.
Iskala je preverjene dokaze o primerljivem zagotavljanju lastniškega kapitala s strani zasebnih vlagateljev, ki bi ga Hynix ali drugo podjetje v primerljivem položaju sklenilo v zadevnem obdobju.
A comparable provision of equity ideally would be one of approximately the same size, would relate to the same or a similar sector of economic activity, would involve a comparable type of activity and would have been concluded at approximately the same time.
Primerljivo zagotavljanje lastniškega kapitala bi bilo v najboljšem primeru približno enakega obsega, nanašalo bi se na isti ali podoben sektor gospodarske dejavnosti, vključevalo bi primerljivo vrsto dejavnosti in bi bilo sklenjeno približno v istem času.
Having conducted this re-examination, the Commission has determined that there is no verified information on the record regarding these matters.
S to ponovno preučitvijo je Komisija ugotovila, da glede dokazov v zvezi s to zadevo ni preverjenih podatkov.
The equity provided to Hynix was generally either provided by the GOK or by banks that were entrusted or directed by the GOK.
Lastniški kapital so Hynixu zagotavljale bodisi KV bodisi banke, ki so dobile pooblastila ali navodila KV.
Moreover, no other comparable commercial benchmark was actually available in the market.
Poleg tega druge primerjave na trgu dejansko ni bilo na voljo.