natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The three Member States concerned believed that the concentration threatened to create or reinforce a dominant position by creating a structural link between the two main European suppliers of uranium enrichment services and that, as the geographic markets were considered to be at least EEA-wide, there would be an effect on trade between Member States.
Tri zadevne države članice so menile, da koncentracija zaradi vzpostavitve strukturne vezi med dvema glavnima evropskima izvajalcema storitev obogatitve urana predstavlja nevarnost ustvarjanja ali krepitve prevladujočega položaja in da bi lahko prizadela trgovino med državami članicami, ker naj bi geografski trgi obsegali vsaj EGP.
The Commission found that that joint referral request meets the requirements laid down in Article 22(3) of the Merger Regulation and therefore accepted jurisdiction for the case.
Stališče Komisije je bilo, da zadevni skupni zahtevek za napotitev izpolnjuje zahteve iz člena 22(3) Uredbe o združitvah in je zaradi tega sprejela pristojnost za to zadevo.
V. RELEVANT MARKETS
V. UPOŠTEVNI TRGI
The stages concerned in the production of nuclear fuel are: conversion; enrichment; and fuel fabrication.
Proizvodnja jedrskega goriva obsega naslednje faze: pretvorba; obogatitev; in izdelava goriva.
The production of energy in nuclear reactors results from the fission or splitting of the U-235 atoms, a process which releases energy in the form of heat.
Proizvodnja energije v jedrskih reaktorjih je posledica fisije ali cepitve atomov U235, kar je postopek, ki sprošča energijo v obliki toplote.
U-235 is the main fissile isotope of uranium.
je glavni cepljivi uranov izotop.
Enrichment is the most expensive stage in the fabrication of nuclear fuel.
Obogatitev je najdražja faza proizvodnje jedrskega goriva.
Uranium enrichment consists of increasing the percentage of fissile U235 isotopes in the uranium compared to the U238 isotopes.
Obogatitev urana obsega povečanje deleža cepljivih izotopov U235 v uranu v primerjavi z izotopi U238.
For civil nuclear electricity generation, uranium is enriched to a 3-5 % level and is called Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).
Za proizvodnjo električne energije v jedrskih reaktorjih v civilne namene se uran obogati na raven 3–5 % in se imenuje nizko obogateni uran.
In most cases, the enrichment company provides enrichment services or supplies enriched uranium to utilities by transforming the uranium provided by the utility into LEU that meets internationally accepted standards.
V večini primerov podjetje, ki se ukvarja z obogatitvijo, zagotavlja storitve obogatitve ali dobavlja obogateni uran gospodarskim javnim službam s pretvorbo urana, ki ga dobavlja gospodarska javna služba, v nizko obogateni uran, ki izpolnjuje mednarodno sprejete standarde.
However, in some cases LEU is simply sold to utilities rather than enriched on their behalf (supply of LEU).
Vendar se v nekaterih primerih nizko obogateni uran gospodarskim javnim službam preprosto proda, namesto da bi se opravila obogatitev v njihovem imenu (dobava nizko obogatenega urana).
There are two ways to provide uranium enrichment services: the enrichment of uranium in centrifuges or gas diffusion plants; or the down blending of Highly Enriched Uranium [3] (‘HEU’), resulting from the decommissioning of Russian nuclear weapons, where the HEU is diluted to produce low enriched uranium (‘LEU’).
Obstajata dva načina zagotavljanja storitev obogatitve urana: obogatitev urana v centrifugah ali v obratih za plinsko difuzijo; ali mešanje visoko obogatenega urana [3] z uranom, kakor obstaja v naravi, ki izhaja iz razgradnje ruskega jedrskega orožja, pri kateri se visoko obogateni uran razredči za proizvodnjo nizko obogatenega urana.
The Commission’s market investigation clearly showed that from the demand side down blended HEU and enriched natural uranium are substitutes.
Tržna raziskava Komisije je jasno pokazala, da sta z vidika povpraševanja visoko obogateni uran, ki se meša z uranom, kakor obstaja v naravi, in obogateni naravni uran nadomestka.
Uranium for fuel can be divided into three types of LEU: enriched natural uranium (ENU), enriched reprocessed uranium (ERU) and mixed oxide (MOX).
Pri uranu za gorivo lahko razlikujemo med tremi vrstami nizko obogatenega urana: obogateni naravni uran, obogateni predelani uran in gorivo mešanica iz urana in plutonija (MOX).
The market investigation confirmed that these are not interchangeable products and thus constitute separate product markets.
Tržna raziskava je potrdila, da to niso medsebojno zamenljivi proizvodi in zato predstavljajo ločene proizvodne trge.
It can be concluded that the product market comprises enriched natural uranium, enriched depleted uranium and down blended HEU with a 3-6 % content of U-235.
Lahko se zaključi, da je proizvodni trg sestavljen iz obogatenega naravnega urana, obogatenega osiromašenega urana in visoko obogatenega urana, ki se meša z uranom, kakor obstaja v naravi, z 3–6 % vsebnostjo U235.
On the basis of their different characteristics enriched reprocessed uranium and mixed oxide fuel should not be included in the relevant product market.
Obogateni predelani uran in gorivo (MOX), mešanica iz urana in plutonija, zaradi svojih različnih značilnosti ne bi smela biti vključena v upoštevni proizvodni trg.
Relevant Geographic Markets
Upoštevni geografski trgi
There are some indications that the market may be European wide in particular the following: (i) stability of market shares — in the last 13 years the two European enrichment companies shared constantly approximately 80 % of the European market; (ii) the indigenous suppliers in the different regions of the world in which LEU is consumed have strong positions in their domestic markets (Russia, US, Asia) whereas in the EU the combined shares of Asian and U.S. enrichers have been far below 5 % throughout that period; (iii) there is limited constraint from non-EU suppliers, in particular due to the operation of the so-called ‘Corfu Declaration’ which has as its aim the security of supply by European enrichers and the restriction of imports from Russia to a maximum 20 % threshold.
Obstaja nekaj znakov, da bi trg lahko zajemal celotno Evropo, med katerimi je treba omeniti naslednje: (i) stabilnost tržnih deležev – v zadnjih trinajstih letih sta si evropski podjetji, ki se ukvarjata z obogatitvijo urana, stalno delili približno 80 % evropskega trga; (ii) domači dobavitelji v različnih regijah sveta, v katerih se uporablja nizko obogateni uran, imajo močne položaje na svojih notranjih trgih (Rusija, Združene države, Azija), medtem ko znaša skupni delež podjetij iz Azije in Združenih držav, ki se ukvarjajo z obogatitvijo, v EU veliko manj kot 5 % v celotnem navedenem obdobju; (iii) obstaja omejena konkurenca dobaviteljev, ki niso iz EU, zlasti zaradi t.i. „Deklaracije iz Krfa“, katerih namen je zaščita dobave, ki izvira od evropskih podjetij, ki se ukvarjajo z obogatitvijo, in omejitev uvoza iz Rusije na največjo možno mejno vrednost 20 %.
However, the Commission also found indications that the Russian supplier, Tenex may exercise a certain competitive constraint on the parties and that conditions of competition might change in the foreseeable future as USEC might re-direct some of its capacity to Europe.
Vendar je Komisija ugotovila tudi, da lahko ruski dobavitelj Tenex do določene mere na stranke izvaja konkurenčen pritisk in da se lahko pogoji konkurence v predvidljivi prihodnosti spremenijo, ker bi lahko USEC nekaj svojih zmogljivosti preusmeril na Evropo.
In any case, for the purposes of the this decision, the scope of the geographic market can be left open since the commitments submitted by the parties on 20 August 2004 remove the Commission’s serious doubts as to the compatibility of the proposed concentration with the common market, whether the market is EU-wide or wider in scope.
Za namene te odločbe ni treba podati dokončnega zaključka glede področja uporabe geografskega trga, ker obveznosti, ki so jih stranke predložile 20. avgusta 2004, odpravljajo resne dvome Komisije v zvezi z združljivostjo predlagane koncentracije s skupnim trgom, če trg zajema vso EU ali je še širši.
The competition concerns resulting from the proposed transaction may be grouped into the following main elements:
Pomisleki glede konkurence, ki izhajajo iz predlagane transakcije se lahko razvrstijo v naslednje glavne točke:
The joint venture enables the parties to control each other’s decisions on adding enrichment capacity;
Mešana družba omogoča strankam, da nadzorujejo odločitve druga druge glede razširjanja zmogljivosti v zvezi z obogatitvijo urana;
The control on capacity levels is likely to lead to higher prices in the EU and, to a more limited extent, in the rest of the world (explicit coordination on capacity); and
verjetno je, da bo nadzor stopenj zmogljivosti vodil do višjih cen v EU in, v manjšem obsegu, drugod po svetu (izrecna koordinacija zmogljivosti); in
The joint venture facilitates tacit coordination on supply into the EU.
mešana družba pospešuje tiho koordinacijo dobave v EU.
Control over capacity decisions.
Nadzor nad odločitvami glede zmogljivosti.
According to the transaction notified neither Areva nor Urenco would be able to purchase centrifuges from ETC without the prior explicit approval of the other parent company.
V skladu s priglašeno transakcijo niti Areva niti Urenco ne bi moglo kupiti centrifug od ETC pred izrecno odobritvijo druge matične družbe.
In other words, both parties will be able to prevent capacity increases by the other.
Povedano drugače, obe stranki bosta lahko druga drugi preprečili povečanja zmogljivosti.
The joint venture provides thus each party with the ability to control the capacity of the other party.
Mešana družba zato vsaki stranki zagotavlja, da lahko nadzoruje zmogljivost druge stranke.
Coordination on capacity.
Koordinacija zmogljivosti.
In the field of centrifuge technology, there is a very strong link between capacity levels and total output.
Na področju tehnologije centrifugiranja obstaja zelo močna povezava med stopnjami zmogljivosti in celotno proizvodnjo.
From a technical viewpoint the technology mandates that the centrifuges, once they have started spinning, should not be turned off during their entire life time ([…]).
S tehničnega vidika je nujno, da se centrifuge po zagonu v celotnem obdobju njenega delovanja ne izključi([…]).
Turning the centrifuges off and restarting them significantly increases the risk of the centrifuges being damaged.
Izključitev centrifug in njihov ponovni zagon občutno povečuje tveganje, da se centrifuge poškodujejo.
In addition, the enrichment industry is highly capital intensive with very low marginal costs.
Poleg tega je gospodarska panoga, ki se ukvarja z obogatitvijo urana, zelo kapitalsko intenzivna z zelo nizkimi mejnimi stroški.
In view of these technological and commercial constraints, output of centrifuges is therefore regularly close to capacity level.
Glede na te tehnološke in gospodarske omejitve je proizvodnja centrifug praviloma blizu njihovih stopenj zmogljivosti.
Capacity (output) levels are among the main drivers of prices in the enrichment market.
Stopnje zmogljivosti (proizvodnje) so med glavnimi gibali cen na trgu za obogatitev urana.
As a result of the transaction, the two main competitors in the uranium enrichment market (Areva and Urenco are the two European enrichment companies with approximately 80 % of the European market for the last 13 years, and about 40 % at the world level) will be able to establish perfect coordination of capacity decisions.
Zaradi transakcije bosta lahko glavna konkurenta na trgu za obogatitev urana (Areva in Urenco sta evropski podjetji, ki se ukvarjata z obogatitvijo urana, ki imata v zadnjih trinajstih letih 80-odstotni delež evropskega trga in okoli 40-odstotni delež na svetovni ravni) vzpostavila popolno koordinacijo odločitev glede zmogljivosti.
This is likely to lead to upward pressure on prices in the EU and the rest of the world.
To bo najverjetneje vodilo do pritiska za višje cene v EU in drugod po svetu.
Rather than tacitly coordinating directly on price, which appears to be difficult in this market, coordination on supply in the form of maintaining a broad market share division in the EU market is feasible.
V nasprotju s tiho koordinacijo, ki bi se neposredno nanašala na cene, kar se zdi na tem trgu težko doseči, je koordinacija dobave v obliki ohranjanja delitve obsežnega tržnega deleža na trgu EU izvedljiva.
Ultimately, such coordination on supply will have the effect of raising the price level in the market (or prevent it from falling, in the context of Areva’s costs decreasing).
Takšna koordinacija dobave bi imela učinek zviševanja ravni cen na trgu (ali preprečitve njihovega padanja v okviru zmanjševanja stroškov podjetja Areva).
The factors that make coordination on supply more likely after the transaction than it was in the past are (i) the centralisation of capacity decisions in ETC, (ii) the structural link of ETC, and (iii) increased scope for information exchange.
Dejavniki, zaradi katerih je koordinacija dobave po transakciji bolj verjetna, kot je bila v preteklosti so (i) centralizacija odločitev glede zmogljivosti pri ETC, (ii) strukturna vez ETC in (iii) povečan obseg izmenjave informacij.
Reaching a common understanding
Sklenitev skupnega dogovora
Under the hypothesis of an EU market, it should be noted that a common understanding has to be reached between only two market players, Areva and Urenco.
Pri hipotezi o trgu EU je treba povedati, da morata skupni dogovor doseči samo dva akterja na trgu, podjetji Areva in Urenco.
USEC is unlikely to be a competitive threat for the foreseeable future, and Tenex faces regulatory constraints to supply into the EU.
Ni verjetno, da bi USEC v predvidljivi prihodnosti predstavljal konkurenčno nevarnost, za Tenex pa veljajo regulativne omejitve za dobavo v EU.
Coordination on supply is by itself not too complicated.
Koordinacija dobave sama po sebi ni preveč zapletena.
The number of customers in the EU market is limited.
Število kupcev na trgu EU je omejeno.
Not bidding for a specific contract, or bidding for it at non-attractive terms, is a way to leave a customer (or sales opportunity) to the other party so as to maintain a broad market share division in the EU market.
Če na določen razpis ne prispe nobena ponudba ali če je ta nezanimiva, je kupec (ali priložnost za prodajo) prepuščen drugi stranki, da bi se na trgu EU ohranjala delitev obsežnega tržnega deleža.
There are only 13 European utilities (in the EU 15) that operate nuclear power plants.
Obstaja samo 13 evropskih gospodarskih javnih služb (v EU–15), ki upravljajo jedrske elektrarne.
The number of supply opportunities, such as tenders for the supply of (part of) the requirements of European utilities, or the opportunity to conclude contract extensions, is equally somewhat limited, in the range of 10-20 per year.
Število priložnosti za dobavo, kot so javni razpisi za dobavo (dela) potreb evropskih gospodarskih javnih služb ali priložnosti sklenitve podaljšanja pogodb, je prav tako nekoliko omejeno v razponu 10–20 na leto.
The degree of transparency in this market appears to be sufficient to maintain coordination on supply in the European market.
Stopnja preglednosti na tem trgu se zdi zadostna za ohranjanje koordinacije glede dobave na evropskem trgu.
As indicated above, there are only few European customers and a few supply opportunities each year.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, je samo nekaj evropskih kupcev in malo priložnosti za dobavo vsako leto.
More importantly, it requires only the coordination by two players, Areva and Urenco.
Še več, to zahteva koordinacijo samo med dvema akterjema, podjetjema Areva in Urenco.
The joint control of ETC by Areva and Urenco will increase transparency between the parties with respect to each other’s capacity plans and other competitive parameters.
Skupni nadzor družbe ETC s strani podjetij Areva in Urenco bo povečal preglednost med strankami glede načrtov zmogljivosti, ki jih ima vsaka stranka, in drugih konkurenčnih dejavnikov.
This is mainly due to the information flows from ETC to its shareholders and more particularly to the decisive role of ETC’s Board of Directors which is appointed by the Areva and Urenco.
Do tega prihaja predvsem zaradi pretoka informacij od ETC do njenih delničarjev in bolj natančno zaradi odločilne vloge nadzornega sveta ETC, ki ga imenujeta podjetji Areva in Urenco.
Disciplining mechanisms
Disciplinski mehanizmi
The scope for deviating and increasing sales into the EU may be limited.
Možnost, da bi stranki odstopali od skupnega dogovora in povečali prodajo v EU, je omejena.
In the event that either party were to deviate from the common understanding, retaliation could be brought about by temporarily reverting to intense competition.
Če bi katera koli stranka odstopila od skupnega dogovora, bi možen povračilni ukrep lahko pomenil začasno vrnitev k ostri konkurenci.
Furthermore, the fact that each party is dependent on the other party for such vital strategic decisions as capacity decisions increases the likelihood that the companies will adhere to a common understanding.
Poleg tega je zaradi dejstva, da je vsaka stranka odvisna od druge zaradi tako pomembnih strateških odločitev, kot so odločitve glede zmogljivosti, bolj verjetno, da bosta podjetji spoštovali skupen dogovor.
Reactions from competitors or customers
Odzivi konkurentov ali kupcev
On a hypothetical EU market, third parties, such as competitors or customers, may not be able to counter coordination on supply by the two main enrichment companies in the EU.
Na hipotetičnem trgu EU je možno, da tretje stranke, kot so konkurenti ali kupci, ne bodo zadosti močni, da bi nasprotovali koordinaciji dobave dveh glavnih podjetij, ki se ukvarjata z obogatitvijo urana v EU.
The only two other significant competitors in sight, Tenex and USEC, may not be in a position to destabilise any common understanding between two parties.
Preostala možna pomembna konkurenta, Tenex in USEC, verjetno ne bosta zmogla ogroziti kakršnega koli skupnega dogovora med strankama.
Customers, likewise, cannot be considered to be a position to prevent coordination on supply by the two parties.
Prav tako se ne da zagovarjati stališča, da lahko kupci preprečijo koordinacijo dobave dveh strank.
The only exception, if there is one, is EDF.
Edina izjema, če sploh katera obstaja, je EDF.
In view of its size, it must be considered capable of maintaining at least a certain degree of competition between two parties.
Glede na njegovo velikost je verjetno, da je zmožen ohranjanja najmanj določene stopnje konkurence med dvema strankama.
However, when the overall level of capacity is tight for both parties, the leverage of EDF is likely to be comparatively smaller.
Kadar pa bo splošna stopnja zmogljivosti pri obeh strankah tolikšna, da bo povpraševanje tesno sledilo ponudbi, je verjetno, da bo vpliv EDF temu primerno manjši.
Conclusion.
Sklepna ugotovitev.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission had serious doubts and considered that the proposed transaction would be likely to lead to the creation of a joint dominant position for Areva and Urenco on a possible EU enrichment market within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation.
Komisija je imela glede na navedeno resne dvome in je menila, da je verjetno, da bo predlagana transakcija vodila k oblikovanju skupnega prevladujočega položaja podjetij Areva in Urenco na možnem trgu EU za obogatitev urana v smislu člena 2(3) Uredbe o združitvah.
In view of the enhanced possibilities that the joint venture ETC offers the parties to coordinate downstream on enrichment capacity and output in the European market, any such coordination would be causally linked to the creation of the joint venture.
Kar zadeva večje možnosti, ki jih za koordinacijo prodaje in distribucije zmogljivosti v zvezi z obogatitvijo in proizvodnje na evropskem trgu mešana družba ETC ponuja strankama, bi bila vsaka takšna koordinacija vzročno povezana z ustanovitvijo mešane družbe.
Therefore, the Commission considered that the participation of Areva in the joint venture is also likely to appreciably restrict competition in the sense of Article 81(1) of the Treaty in combination of Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation on either a European or worldwide market.
Zato je Komisija menila, da je verjetno, da bo udeležba podjetja Areva v mešani družbi znatno omejila konkurenco v smislu člena 81(1) Pogodbe v kombinaciji s členom 2(4) Uredbe o združitvah na evropskem ali svetovnem trgu.
It cannot be concluded with sufficient certainty that the conditions for an exemption pursuant to Article 81(3) of the Treaty are fulfilled.
Ne moremo sklepati dovolj zanesljivo, ali so izpolnjeni pogoji za izjemo v skladu s členom 81(3) Pogodbe.
In particular, there are no indications that any coordination between Areva and Urenco would be likely to benefit the consumer nor that the restrictions imposed by the agreements bringing about the proposed operation are indispensable.
Zlasti ni nobenih znakov, da obstaja verjetnost, da bi kakršna koli koordinacija med podjetjema Areva in Urenco koristila kupcem, ali da so omejitve, ki jih določajo dogovori in zaradi katerih se izvaja predlagana transakcija, nujne.
COMMITMENTS PROPOSED BY THE PARTIES
OBVEZNOSTI, KI JIH PREDLAGATA STRANKI
On 20 August 2004, the parties submitted a package of commitments in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation.
Stranki sta 20. avgusta 2004 predložili paket obveznosti v skladu s členom 8(2) Uredbe o združitvah.
These were modified by the parties on 3 September 2004.
Te obveznosti sta stranki 3. septembra 2004 spremenili.
The Commission is of the view that that the commitments address and resolve in a satisfactory manner the competition concerns raised by the concentration.
Stališče Komisije je, da obveznosti v zadovoljivi meri obravnavajo in rešujejo pomisleke glede konkurence, ki jih je sprožila koncentracija.
Summary of the Commitments offered by the parties
Povzetek obveznosti, ki sta jih ponudili stranki
The proposed commitments consist of the following key elements: (i) removal of the parties’ veto rights over capacity increases; (ii) reinforcement of firewalls to prevent information flows between the parties and between the joint venture and the parties; and (iii) provision of information to Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) to enable it to monitor prices of enrichment and allowing ESA, if necessary, to take corrective actions, e.g. by increasing third party imports.
Predlagane obveznosti obsegajo naslednje ključne točke: (i) odprava pravic veta strank zaradi povečanja zmogljivosti; (ii) okrepitev zapore informacij, da bi se preprečil pretok informacij med strankama in med mešano družbo in strankama; ter (iii) zagotavljanje informacij Agenciji za preskrbo (ESA), da bo ta lahko spremljala cene obogatitve urana in ji bo omogočeno, da po potrebi sprejeme popravne ukrepe, npr. na podlagi povečanja uvoza tretjih strank.
Removal of veto rights on capacity expansion
Odprava pravic veta glede širjenja zmogljivosti
The initial shareholders’ agreement for the JV foresees that the supply of centrifuges to Areva or Urenco, be it as part of the JV’s business plan/budget or beyond that, will require the unanimous approval of the ETC board. As an equal number of board members will be nominated by Areva and Urenco, either of Areva and Urenco would be in a position to prevent capacity increases by the other beyond what is foreseen in the current business plan.
Začetni dogovor delničarjev glede mešane družbe predvideva, da je za dobavo centrifug podjetjema Areva in Urenco, pa če gre za del poslovnega načrta/proračuna mešane družbe ali ne, potrebna soglasna odobritev nadzornega sveta ETC. Ker bosta podjetji Areva in Urenco v nadzorni svet imenovali enako število članov, nobeno izmed omenjenih podjetij ne bo imelo možnosti drug drugemu preprečiti povečanja zmogljivosti, razen tistega, kar je predvideno v tekočem poslovnem načrtu.