natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
When implementing this Recommendation, Member States should consider the specificities of collective investment undertakings of the corporate type and prevent the various types of collective investment undertaking from being subjected, unnecessarily, to unequal treatment.
Pri izvajanju tega priporočila bi morale države članice upoštevati posebnosti kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov v obliki družbe in preprečiti, da bi bile različne oblike kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov po nepotrebnem različno obravnavane.
As regards collective investment undertakings as defined in Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) [2], that Directive already provides for a set of specific governance mechanisms.
Glede kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov, kakor so opredeljeni v Direktivi Sveta 85/611/EGS z dne 20. decembra 1985 o usklajevanju zakonov in drugih predpisov o kolektivnih naložbenih podjemih za vlaganja v prenosljive vrednostne papirje (KNPVP) [2], slednja že določa niz posebnih mehanizmov upravljanja.
However, in order to prevent the unnecessarily unequal treatment of those collective investment undertakings of the corporate type not subject to harmonisation at Community level, Member States should take into account whether and to what extent these non-harmonised collective investment undertakings are subject to equivalent governance mechanisms.
Vendar pa, da bi se izognili nepotrebno neenakemu obravnavanju tistih kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov v obliki družbe, ki jih usklajevanje na ravni Skupnosti ne zadeva, bi morale države članice upoštevati, ali in do kolikšne mere enakovredni mehanizmi upravljanja zadevajo te neusklajene kolektivne naložbene podjeme.
In view of the complexity of many of the issues at stake, the adoption of detailed binding rules is not necessarily the most desirable and efficient way of achieving the objectives pursued.
Glede na zahtevnost številnih obravnavanih vprašanj, sprejemanje podrobnih obvezujočih pravil ni nujno najbolj zaželen in učinkovit način za dosego zastavljenih ciljev.
Many corporate governance codes adopted in Member States tend to rely on disclosure to encourage compliance, based on the ‘comply or explain’ approach: companies are invited to disclose whether they comply with the code and to explain any material departures from it.
Številni kodeksi o upravljanju družb, sprejeti v državah članicah, se z namenom spodbujanja skladnosti zanašajo na razkrivanje, ki temelji na pristopu „upoštevaj ali pojasni“: to pomeni, da morajo družbe razkriti, ali ravnajo v skladu s kodeksom, oziroma pojasniti vse bistvene odmike od kodeksa.
This approach enables companies to reflect sector- and enterprise-specific requirements, and the markets to assess the explanations and justifications provided.
Ta pristop družbam omogoča, da izrazijo sektorske zahteve in zahteve, ki so značilne za družbe, trgom pa ocenjevanje pojasnil in ponujenih utemeljitev.
With a view to fostering the role of non-executive or supervisory directors, it is therefore appropriate that all Member States be invited to take the steps necessary to introduce at national level a set of provisions based on the principles set out in this Recommendation, to be used by listed companies either on the basis of the ‘comply or explain’ approach or pursuant to legislation.
Zato je z namenom spodbujanja vloge neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta primerno, da se vse države članice povabi, da ukrenejo vse, kar je potrebno, da na državni ravni uvedejo niz določb, temelječih na načelih, predstavljenih v tem priporočilu, ki naj bi jih uporabljale javne družbe bodisi na podlagi pristopa „upoštevaj ali pojasni“ bodisi na podlagi zakonodaje.
If Member States decide to use the ‘comply or explain’ approach (whereby companies are required to explain their practices by reference to a set of designated best practice recommendations), they should be free to do so on the basis of relevant recommendations developed by market participants.
Če se države članice odločijo, da bodo uporabile pristop „upoštevaj ali pojasni“ (pri katerem morajo podjetja pojasniti svoje ravnanje glede na niz določenih priporočil o najboljši praksi), bi morale imeti možnost, da to storijo na podlagi ustreznih priporočil, ki so jih razvili udeleženci na trgu.
Any measures adopted by Member States in line with this Recommendation should aim fundamentally at improving the corporate governance of listed companies.
Osnovni cilj katerih koli ukrepov, ki jih bodo sprejele države članice v skladu s tem priporočilom, bi moral biti izboljšanje upravljanja javnih družb.
Since that objective is relevant to the protection of investors, actual or potential, in all companies listed in the Community, whether or not they are incorporated in one of the Member States, the measures should also cover companies incorporated in third countries but listed in the Community.
Ker je omenjeni cilj pomemben za zaščito dejanskih ali možnih vlagateljev v vse javne družbe v Skupnosti, ne glede na to, ali so registrirane v eni od držav članic ali ne, bi ti ukrepi morali veljati tudi za družbe iz tretjih držav, ki imajo vrednostne papirje uvrščene na organizirani trg v Skupnosti.
The presence of independent representatives on the board, capable of challenging the decisions of management, is widely considered as a means of protecting the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.
Prisotnost neodvisnih predstavnikov v upravnem odboru ali nadzornem svetu, sposobnih izpodbijati odločitve vodstva, na splošno velja kot sredstvo za zaščito interesov delničarjev in drugih zainteresiranih strani.
In companies with a dispersed ownership, the primary concern is how to make managers accountable to weak shareholders.
V družbah z razpršenim lastništvom je temeljni problem vprašanje, kako zagotoviti, da bi bilo vodstvo odgovorno majhnim delničarjem.
In companies with controlling shareholders, the focus is more on how to make sure that the company will be run in a way that sufficiently takes into account the interests of minority shareholders.
V družbah z večinskimi delničarji je pozornost bolj namenjena zagotavljanju takšnega vodenja družbe, ki v zadostni meri upošteva interese manjšinskih delničarjev.
Ensuring adequate protection for third parties is relevant in both cases.
Zagotavljanje zadostne zaščite za tretje stranke je pomembno v obeh primerih.
Whatever the formal board structure of a company, the management function should therefore be subject to an effective and sufficiently independent supervisory function.
Ne glede na formalno strukturo sveta katere koli družbe, bi morala biti v ta namen vodstvena funkcija podvržena učinkoviti in dovolj neodvisni nadzorni funkciji.
Independence should be understood as the absence of any material conflict of interest; in this context, proper attention should be paid namely to any threats which might arise from the fact that a representative on the board has close ties with a competitor of the company.
Neodvisnost je treba razumeti kot odsotnost kakršnega koli bistvenega navzkrižja interesov; v tej zvezi bi bilo treba pozornost posvetiti nevarnostim, ki se bi utegnile pojaviti zaradi dejstva, da ima predstavnik sveta tesne vezi s konkurenčno družbo.
In order to ensure that the management function will be submitted to an effective and sufficiently independent supervisory function, the (supervisory) board should comprise a sufficient number of committed non-executive or supervisory directors, who play no role in the management of the company or its group and who are independent in that they are free of any material conflict of interest.
Za zagotovitev, da bo vodstvena funkcija podvržena učinkoviti in dovolj neodvisni nadzorni funkciji, bi moral upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet vključevati zadostno število neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta, ki v družbi ali njeni skupini nimajo vodstvene funkcije in ki so neodvisni, tj. prosti vseh bistvenih navzkrižij interesov.
In view of the different legal systems existing in Member States, the proportion of (supervisory) board members to be made up of independent directors should not be defined precisely at Community level.
Glede na različne pravne sisteme v državah članicah, ne bi bilo primerno, da se delež neodvisnih direktorjev v upravnem odboru ali nadzornem svetu natančno določi na ravni Skupnosti.
The supervisory role of non-executive or supervisory directors is commonly perceived as crucial in three areas, where the potential for conflict of interest of management is particularly high, especially when such matters are not a direct responsibility for shareholders: nomination of directors, remuneration of directors, and audit.
Nadzorna vloga neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta se običajno šteje za ključnega pomena na treh področjih, na katerih je možnost navzkrižja interesov na ravni vodstva posebej visoka, še zlasti kadar te zadeve niso neposredna odgovornost delničarjev, to je pri imenovanju direktorjev, pri prejemkih direktorjev in pri reviziji.
It is therefore appropriate to foster the role of non-executive or supervisory directors in these areas and to encourage the creation within the (supervisory) board of committees responsible respectively for nomination, remuneration and audit.
Zato je na teh področjih primerno pospeševanje vloge neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta in spodbujanje ustanavljanja komisij, pristojnih bodisi za imenovanje, za prejemke ali za revizijo, v upravnem odboru ali nadzornem svetu.
In principle, and without prejudice to the powers of the general meeting, only the (supervisory) board as a whole has statutory decision-making authority and, as a collegiate body, is collectively accountable for the performance of its duties.
Načeloma, in brez poseganja v pooblastila skupščine delničarjev, ima samo upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet kot celota zakonsko predpisano pristojnost odločanja in je zato kot telo, sestavljeno iz več članov, kolektivno odgovorno za izvajanje svojih nalog.
The (supervisory) board has the power to determine the number and structure of the committees which it deems to be appropriate to facilitate its own work, but these committees are in principle not to be a substitute for the (supervisory) board itself.
Upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet je pooblaščen, da določi število in strukturo komisij, za katere meni, da so primerne za olajšanje lastnega dela, vendar pa te komisije načeloma ne smejo predstavljati nadomestek samega upravnega odbora ali nadzornega sveta.
As a general rule, therefore, the nomination, remuneration and audit committees should make recommendations aimed at preparing the decisions to be taken by the (supervisory) board.
Kot splošno pravilo bi torej komisije za imenovanje, za prejemke in za revizijo morale oblikovati le priporočila, namenjena pripravi odločitev, ki jih nato sprejme upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet.
However, the (supervisory) board should not be precluded from delegating part of its decision-making powers to committees when it considers it appropriate and when this is permissible under national law, even though the (supervisory) board remains fully responsible for the decisions taken in its field of competence.
Kljub temu bi moral imeti upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet možnost prenosa dela svojih pooblastil za odločanje na komisije, kadar meni, da je to primerno, in kadar je to dovoljeno v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo, pri čemer bo ostal upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet v celoti odgovoren za odločitve, ki so sprejete na njegovem področju pristojnosti.
Since the identification of candidates to fill unitary or dual board vacancies raises issues relevant to the selection of non-executive or supervisory directors who are to oversee management or relevant to the continuation in office of management, the nomination committee should be composed mainly of independent non-executive or supervisory directors.
Ker sproža določanje kandidatov, ki naj bi zapolnili prosta mesta v vodstvenih organih družbe (enotirni ali dvotirni organ upravljanja), vprašanja, ki so povezana z izbiro neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta, ki naj bi nadzirali vodstvo, ali ki so povezana z zagotavljanjem izpolnjevanja njegovih nalog, bi morala biti komisija za imenovanja sestavljena pretežno iz neodvisnih neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta.
That would leave room on the nomination committee for non-executive or supervisory directors who do not meet the independence criteria.
To pa ne bi izključevalo, da so v komisiji za imenovanja neizvršni direktorji ali člani nadzornega sveta, ki ne ustrezajo merilom neodvisnosti.
It would also leave room for executive/managing directors (in companies where the nomination committee is created within the unitary board and as long as executive/managing directors do not form a majority on that committee).
Prav tako ne bi izključevalo izvršnih direktorjev/članov uprave (če je komisija za imenovanja ustanovljena v primeru enotirnega organa upravljanja in dokler niso takšni direktorji v tej komisiji v večini).
Given the different approaches in the Member States with respect to the bodies responsible for appointing and removing directors, the role of a nomination committee created within the (supervisory) board should essentially be to make sure that, where the (supervisory) board plays a role in the appointment and removal process (either through a power to table proposals or to make decisions, as defined by national law), this role is performed in as objective and professional a way as possible.
Ker obstajajo v državah članicah različni pristopi k organom, pristojnim za imenovanja in odstavitve direktorjev, bi morala biti vloga komisije za imenovanje, ustanovljene znotraj upravnega odbora ali nadzornega sveta, predvsem zagotavljanje, da je, ko ima upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet funkcijo v procesu imenovanj in odstavitev (ne glede na to ali je v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo pristojen za predložitev predlogov ali za sprejemanje odločitev), ta vloga opravljena na čim bolj objektiven in strokoven način.
The nomination committee should therefore essentially make recommendations to the (supervisory) board with respect to the appointment and removal of directors by the body competent under national company law.
Komisija za imenovanja bi morala zato predvsem oblikovati priporočila upravnemu odboru ali nadzornemu svetu glede imenovanja in odstavitve direktorjev s strani pristojnega organa v skladu z nacionalnim pravom družb.
In the area of remuneration, corporate governance codes adopted in Member States tend to focus primarily on the remuneration of executive or managing directors, since the potential for abuse and conflicts of interest is essentially located there.
Na področju prejemkov se kodeksi o upravljanju družb, ki so jih sprejele države članice, osredotočajo predvsem na prejemke izvršnih direktorjev ali članov uprave, ker je na tem področju največja možnost zlorab in obstoja navzkrižij interesov.
Many codes also recognise that some consideration should be given at board level to the remuneration policy for senior management.
Številni kodeksi tudi priznavajo, da bi tudi politika prejemkov višjih kadrov morala biti obravnavana na nivoju odbora oz. sveta.
Finally, the issue of stock options is granted special attention.
Posebna pozornost je namenjena možnosti delniških opcij.
Given the different approaches in the Member States with respect to the bodies responsible for setting the remuneration of directors, the role of a remuneration committee created within the (supervisory) board should essentially be to make sure that, where the (supervisory) board plays a role in the remuneration setting process (either through a power to table proposals or to make decisions, as defined by national law), this role is performed in as objective and professional a way as possible.
Ker v državah članicah obstajajo različni pristopi v zvezi z organi, odgovornimi za določanje prejemkov direktorjev, bi morala biti vloga komisije za prejemke, ustanovljene znotraj upravnega odbora ali nadzornega sveta, predvsem zagotavljanje, da je, ko ima upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet določeno vlogo v procesu določanja prejemkov (ne glede na to ali je v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo pristojen za predložitev predlogov ali za sprejemanje odločitev), ta vloga opravljena na čim bolj objektiven in strokoven način.
The remuneration committee should therefore essentially make recommendations to the (supervisory) board with respect to those remuneration issues for decision by the body competent under national company law.
Komisija za prejemke bi zato morala upravnemu odboru ali nadzornemu svetu predvsem oblikovati priporočila glede tistih vprašanj o prejemkih, o katerih odloča pristojen organ v skladu z nacionalnim pravom družb.
Two key responsibilities of the (supervisory) board seem to ensure that the financial reports and other related information disseminated by the company present an accurate and complete picture of the company’s position and to monitor the procedures established for the evaluation and management of risks.
Zdi se, da sta dve temeljni nalogi upravnega odbora ali nadzornega sveta zagotavljanje, da finančna poročila in druge s tem povezane informacije, ki jih razširja družba, predstavljajo točno in popolno sliko njenega položaja, in nadziranje postopkov za ocenjevanje in upravljanje s tveganji.
In this context, most corporate governance codes assign to the audit committee an essential role in assisting the (supervisory) board to fulfil these duties.
V tem pogledu daje večina kodeksov o upravljanju družb bistveno vlogo revizijski komisiji v smislu pomoči upravnemu odboru ali nadzornemu svetu pri izpolnjevanju te dolžnosti.
In some Member States, such responsibilities are attributed, wholly or partly, to corporate bodies external to the (supervisory) board.
V nekaterih državah članicah so te odgovornosti, v celoti ali delno, dodeljene organom družbe zunaj upravnega odbora ali nadzornega sveta.
It is therefore appropriate to provide that an audit committee created within the (supervisory) board should, as a general rule, make recommendations to the (supervisory) board with respect to those audit issues, and that such functions may be performed by other structures — external to the (supervisory) board — which would be equally effective.
Zato bi bilo primerno določiti, da bi praviloma morala revizijska komisija, ustanovljena znotraj upravnega odbora ali nadzornega sveta, za slednjega oblikovati priporočila o omenjenih revizijskih vprašanjih, hkrati pa, da bi te funkcije lahko opravljali tudi drugi organi, – zunaj upravnega odbora ali nadzornega sveta – ki bi bili enako učinkoviti.
In order for non-executive or supervisory directors to play an effective role, they should have the right background and sufficient time for the job.
Da bi neizvršni direktorji ali člani nadzornega sveta lahko dejansko opravljali svojo funkcijo, bi morali imeti ustrezno strokovno znanje in izkušnje ter dovolj časa za svoje delo.
In addition, a sufficient number of them should meet appropriate independence criteria.
Poleg tega bi jih moralo med njimi zadostno število dosegati ustrezna merila neodvisnosti.
Before the appointment of non-executive or supervisory directors, adequate information should be provided on these issues and that information should be updated with sufficient frequency.
Pred imenovanjem neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta bi morale biti zagotovljene zadostne informacije o teh vprašanjih, te informacije pa bi morale biti dovolj pogosto osvežene.
With respect to the qualifications of directors, most corporate governance codes insist on the need to have qualified individuals on the board, but at the same time recognise that the definition of what constitutes proper qualifications should be left to the company itself, because such qualifications will depend, inter alia, on its activities, size and environment and because they should be met by the board as a whole.
Večina kodeksov o upravljanju družb glede usposobljenosti direktorjev zahteva, da so v svetu oz. v odboru prisotni ustrezno usposobljeni posamezniki, hkrati pa priznavajo, da bi morala biti opredelitev ustrezne usposobljenosti prepuščena sami družbi, saj je usposobljenost med drugim odvisna tudi od dejavnosti, velikosti in okolja, v katerem deluje družba, in zato, ker bi moral tej usposobljenosti zadostiti svet oz. odbor kot celota.
There is nevertheless one issue which usually raises particular concern, namely the need for particular competence in the audit committee where some specific knowledge is deemed to be indispensable.
Kljub temu pa neko vprašanje ponavadi sproža posebno skrb, in sicer potreba po posebni usposobljenosti posameznikov v revizijski komisiji, v kateri je določeno posebno znanje nujno potrebno.
The (supervisory) board should therefore determine the desired composition of the audit committee and evaluate it periodically, devoting specific attention to the experience necessary in that committee.
Upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet bi zato moral sam določiti zaželeno sestavo revizijske komisije in jo redno ocenjevati, pri čemer bi moral posebno pozornost nameniti izkušnjam, ki se zahtevajo za to komisijo.
With respect to the commitment of directors, most corporate governance codes seek to make sure that directors devote sufficient time to their duties.
Večina kodeksov o upravljanju družb poskuša zagotoviti, da bi direktorji namenili dovolj časa svojim dolžnostim.
Some of these codes limit the number of directorships that may be held in other companies: the positions of chairman or of executive or managing director are usually recognised as more demanding than those of non-executive or supervisory director, but the precise numbers of other directorships acceptable vary widely.
Nekateri omejujejo število mandatov, ki jih imajo lahko v drugih družbah: položaji predsednika, izvršnega direktorja ter člana uprave se ponavadi štejejo za bolj zahtevne od položaja neizvršnega direktorja ali člana nadzornega sveta, vendar pa je točno število drugih dovoljenih drugih mandatov zelo različno.
However, the involvement required from a director may vary widely depending on the company and its environment; in such a situation, each director should undertake to strike a proper balance between his various engagements.
Stopnja vključitve, ki se zahteva od direktorja, je v precejšnjem obsegu odvisna od družbe in od njenega okolja; vsak direktor bi se moral zavezati, da bo primerno uravnotežil svoje raznovrstne obveznosti.
Generally, corporate governance codes adopted in the Member States recognise the need for a significant proportion of non-executive or supervisory directors to be independent, that is to say, free of any material conflict of interest.
Na splošno kodeksi o upravljanju družb, sprejeti v državah članicah, priznavajo, da mora biti visok odstotek neizvršnih direktorjev ali članov nadzornega sveta neodvisnih, to pomeni prostih bistvenih navzkrižji interesov.
Independence is most often understood as the absence of close ties with management, controlling shareholders or the company itself.
Neodvisnost najpogosteje razumemo kot odsotnost tesnih vezi z vodstvom, z večinskimi delničarji ali z družbo samo.
In the absence of any common understanding of what independence precisely entails, it is appropriate to provide a general statement describing what the general objective is.
Ker ni skupnega dogovora o tem, kaj neodvisnost natančno pomeni, bi bilo primerno oblikovati splošno izjavo, ki bi opisala, kaj je glavni cilj.
Provision should also be made to cover a (non-exhaustive) number of situations, involving the relationships or circumstances usually recognised as likely to generate a material conflict of interest, which Member States must duly consider when introducing at national level the criteria to be used by the (supervisory) board.
Določiti bi bilo treba tudi (neizčrpen) seznam situacij, ki vključujejo odnose ali okoliščine, ki se običajno štejejo za takšne, da lahko sprožijo bistveno navzkrižje interesov, in ki jih morajo države članice upoštevati, ko na nacionalnem nivoju določajo ustrezna merila, ki naj bi jih uporabljal upravni odbor ali nadzorni svet.