natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Finally, on 27 November 2002 and 20 November 2003 the KBN awarded grants of PLN 1100000 and PLN 280000 (PLN 1380000) in total against total costs of PLN 4370000 (30.4 %) for industrial research and pre-competitive activity for a project designed to help analyse ways of modernising the technological process in foundries by amending the breakdown of components used to make steel with a view to increasing quality and efficiency.
Nazadnje, 27. novembra 2002 in 20. novembra 2003 je KBN odobril podpori 1100000 PLN in 280000 PLN (1380000 PLN) v celoti za skupne stroške 4370000 PLN (30,4 %) za industrijske raziskave in predkonkurenčne dejavnosti za projekt, ki bi pomagal analizirati načine za moderniziranje tehnološkega procesa v livarnah s spremembo razdrobitve sestavin, ki se uporabljajo za izdelovanje jekla z namenom povišanja kakovosti in učinkovitosti.
In its decision to initiate proceedings, the Commission expressed doubts that the measures implemented by Poland involved aid, essentially for three reasons:
Komisija je v svoji odločbi o začetku postopka izrazila dvome, da so ukrepi, ki jih je izvedla Poljska, vključevali pomoč, pomembno za tri razloge:
The Commission had reasons to believe that the restructuring of HCz did not pass the private creditor test.
Komisija ima razloge, da verjame, da prestrukturiranje HCz ni opravilo preizkusa zasebnih upnikov.
It appeared that some public creditors were writing off more debts in the course of restructuring than they would have if they had faced bankruptcy, given the possession of first-class sureties, at least in the case of public institutional creditors.
Pokazalo se je, da so nekateri javni upniki odpisovali več dolgov v okviru prestrukturiranja, kot bi jih, če bi se soočili s stečajem, glede na lastništvo prvorazrednih poroštev, vsaj v primeru javnih institucionalnih upnikov.
In these circumstances the Commission was reluctant to accept the Polish argument that overall the restructuring plan would produce a better return for the state than liquidation.
V teh okoliščinah je Komisija nerada sprejela argument Poljske, da bi v celoti načrt za prestrukturiranje ustvaril boljši donos za državo kot pa likvidacija.
Moreover, the Commission was not sure whether the public institutional creditors' consent was obtained purely on the basis of the Act of 30 October 2002 and whether the Operator really would receive valuable assets.
Poleg tega Komisija ni bila prepričana, ali je bilo soglasje javnih institucionalnih upnikov pridobljeno samo na podlagi zakona z dne 30. oktobra 2002 in ali bo operater res prejel vrednostna sredstva.
In addition, the Commission was not sure how HSCz had continued production without working capital and whether it had received other financial aid.
Komisija tudi ni bila prepričana, kako je HSCz nadaljeval s proizvodnjo brez gibljivih sredstev in ali je prejel kakšno drugo finančno pomoč.
Finally, the Commission had information in its file that HCz had received various financial aid measures between 1997 and 2002.
In nazadnje, Komisija je imela v svoji dokumentaciji podatke, da je HCz med leti 1997 in 2002 prejel različne ukrepe finančne pomoči.
The Commission also expressed concern as to whether, in the light of point 4a of Protocol No 8, LNM would be entitled to acquire shares in HCz, as LNM already owned MSP, a state aid recipient under that Protocol.
Komisija je prav tako izrazila zaskrbljenost, ali je, ob upoštevanju točke 4a Protokola št. 8, LNM upravičen do pridobitve delnic v HCz, saj je LNM že lastnik MSP, prejemnika državne pomoči po tem protokolu.
By letter dated 9 September 2004, UK Steel, acting on behalf of HCz's UK competitors, argues that debt write-offs and deferrals constitute state aid until such time as they are repaid in full.
V dopisu z dne 9. septembra 2004, UK Steel, ki deluje v imenu konkurentov HCz iz Združenega kraljestva, trdi, da odpisi dolgov in dolgovi predstavljajo državno pomoč do takrat, ko so v celoti izplačani.
It endorses the Commission's concerns that under normal market conditions HCz's steel assets would been liquidated and not leased to HSCz.
Odobrava zaskrbljenost Komisije, da bi bila pod normalnimi tržnimi pogoji jeklarska sredstva HCz likvidirana, ne pa da jih je najel HSCz.
UK Steel also urges the Commission to apply point 4b of Protocol No 8 which, in its view, would completely bar LNM from acquiring HCz's assets.
UK Steel prav tako poziva Komisijo, da uporabi točko 4b Protokola št. 8, ki bi po njegovem mnenju v celoti izločila LNM za pridobitev sredstev HCs.
By letter dated 10 September 2004, the Czech Republic, as the owner of another plate producing steel plant, Vítkovice Steel, declared its interest in the Commission proceedings.
V dopisu z dne 10. septembra 2004 je Češka republika kot lastnik druge tovarne, ki proizvaja jekleno pločevino, Vítkovice Steel, izrazila svoj interes pri postopkih Komisije.
By letter of 10 September 2004, LNM intervenes in the Commission proceedings as one of the potential bidders.
V dopisu z dne 10. septembra 2004 se LNM pridružuje postopkom Komisije kot eden potencialnih ponudnikov.
LNM states that its aim is to help demonstrate that the privatisation of the HCz steel companies and the relationship between other LNM group companies are fully compatible with the Accession Treaty and the state aid rules.
LNM navaja, da je njegov cilj pomagati prikazati, da sta privatizacija jeklarskih podjetij HCz in odnos med drugimi podjetji v skupini LNM popolnoma skladna s Pristopno pogodbo ter pravili državne pomoči.
It particular, it confirms that its subsidiary MSP is not acquiring the HCz companies.
Potrjuje zlasti, da njegovo hčerinsko podjetje MSP ne prevzema podjetij HCz.
It reiterates its unequivocal assurance that, should it be successful in acquiring the HCz companies, it would operate them as an independent entity, entirely separate from MSP, and that it would ensure that no state aid or capacity were transferred between them and MSP.
Ponavlja svoje nedvomno zagotovilo, da bo v primeru, če bo uspešen pri prevzemu podjetij HCz, ta podjetja vodil kot neodvisno podjetje, povsem ločeno od MSP, in da bo zagotovil, da med njimi in MSP ne bo prenesena nobena državna pomoč ali zmogljivost.
The only relationship the companies would have would be a commercial one whereby MSP would supply slabs to HCz; this relationship would be organised in a transparent fashion and at market prices which did not differ from the prices charged by the company's competitors.
Edini odnos med podjetji bi bil komercialni, pri čemer bi MSP podjetju HCz dobavljal bloke; ta odnos bi bil organiziran na transparenten način in po tržnih cenah, ki ne bi odstopale od cen, ki jih zaračunavajo konkurenti podjetja.
Donbass intervened in the Commission proceedings as one of the potential bidders by letter dated 13 September 2004.
Donbass je posegel v postopke Komisije kot eden potencialnih ponudnikov v dopisu z dne 13. septembra 2004.
In Donbass' view the restructuring is taking place under market conditions.
Donbass meni, da prestrukturiranje poteka v skladu s tržnimi pogoji.
Given the cumbersome nature and length of bankruptcy proceedings, it doubts that it would be interested in purchasing HCz's assets if such proceedings were launched.
Zaradi zapletene narave in trajanja stečajnih postopkov dvomi, da bi bil zainteresiran za nakup sredstev HCz, če bi bili takšni postopki sproženi.
V. COMMENTS FROM POLAND
V. PRIPOMBE POLJSKE
The Polish authorities provided additional information.
Poljske oblasti so zagotovile dodatne informacije.
They attempt to explain that neither the restructuring of HCz nor the operation of HSCz involved restructuring aid.
Nameravajo pojasniti, da niti prestrukturiranje HCz niti delovanje HSCz nista vključevala pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
They only admit that some aid was awarded to HCz prior to end-2002.
Priznavajo samo, da je bilo nekaj pomoči dodeljene HCz pred koncem leta 2002.
Finally, Poland explains why the Commission should agree to a change of the NRP.
Končno Poljska razlaga, zakaj naj bi Komisija privolila v spremembo NPP.
The Polish authorities first provide new arguments as to why the restructuring of HCz did not involve state aid.
Poljske oblasti najprej zagotavljajo nove razloge, zakaj prestrukturiranje HCz ne sme vključevati državne pomoči.
In that connection, they present the above-mentioned analysis of the bankruptcy scenario carried out by PWC.
V tej povezavi predstavljajo zgoraj omenjeno analizo stečajnega postopka, ki ga je izvedel PWC.
They wish to demonstrate that all public creditors' claims will be met to a greater extent in the event of restructuring than they would in the event of bankruptcy.
Želijo prikazati, da bodo v primeru prestrukturiranja izpolnjene vse terjatve javnih upnikov v večjem obsegu kot bi bile v primeru stečaja.
The analysis is based on a proper analysis of the value of the sureties, which had not been conducted before.
Analiza temelji na ustrezni analizi vrednosti poroštev, ki prej še ni bila izvedena.
In fact, the PWC analysis emphasises that public creditors' claims are predominantly secured on non-productive assets, with only a small part of the security on productive assets, while civil creditors' claims are primarily secured on (the most valuable) productive assets.
Analiza PWC dejansko poudarja, da so terjatve javnih upnikov pretežno zavarovane na neproizvodnih sredstvih s samo majhnim delom zavarovanja na proizvodnih sredstvih, medtem ko so terjatve civilnih upnikov zavarovane zlasti na (najbolj vrednih) proizvodnih sredstvih.
Moreover, even in cases where public creditors' claims are secured on HCz's productive assets, they were registered with later dates than the claims of private creditors.
Poleg tega so bile terjatve javnih upnikov celo v primerih, kjer so zavarovane s proizvodnimi sredstvi HCz, registrirane s kasnejšimi datumi od terjatev zasebnih upnikov.
Under the Polish Bankruptcy Act, such claims cannot be satisfied until claims registered previously have been settled (i.e. the private creditors' claims).
V skladu s poljskim Zakonom o stečaju takšne terjatve ne morejo biti izpolnjene, dokler niso urejene terjatve, ki so bile registrirane prej (tj. terjatve zasebnih upnikov).
On the basis of this analysis, Poland claims that restructuring would meet the private creditor test.
Poljska na podlagi te analize trdi, da prestrukturiranje izpolnjuje preizkus zasebnih upnikov.
Only a few public creditors receive less in restructuring than in bankruptcy (those which have a minus in the last column of tables 2 and 3) but, in any event, this would still be more than in a realistic bankruptcy scenario.
Le majhno število javnih upnikov prejema manj pri prestrukturiranju kot pri stečaju (tisti, ki imajo minus v zadnjem stolpcu tabele 2 in 3), vendar je v vsakem primeru to še vedno več kot v realističnem stečajnem poteku.
Poland argues that the PWC analysis for 2003 is a very optimistic scenario for public institutional creditors.
Poljska trdi, da je analiza PWC za leto 2003 zelo optimistična podlaga za javne institucionalne upnike.
In reality, a further reduction in proceeds from bankruptcy proceedings is primarily the result of the peculiar nature of court-supervised bankruptcy proceedings in Poland, which comprise the receiver's costs, usually amounting to 5 % of receipts from sales and, in HCz's case, probably as much as 10 %.
V resnici je nadaljnje zniževanje prihodkov iz stečajnih postopkov prvotno rezultat posebne narave stečajnih postopkov na Poljskem, ki jih nadzoruje sodišče, ki zajema stroške prejemnikov, ki ponavadi znašajo do 5 % prejemkov od prodaje in v primeru HCz verjetno največ 10 %.
In addition, bankruptcy proceedings take a long period of time, which can further diminish the value.
Stečajni postopki pa so lahko tudi dolgotrajni, kar še dodatno zniža vrednost.
The Polish authorities also argue that bankruptcy might have the effect that assets are not sold in a uniform process, as some creditors have ownership rights transferred onto individual assets and can thus sell them separately.
Poljske oblasti prav tako trdijo, da bi stečaj lahko imel učinek, da sredstva niso prodana v enotnem postopku, saj imajo nekateri upniki lastniške pravice prenesene na posamezna sredstva in jih lahko zato prodajo ločeno.
As such, investors cannot be sure that they will obtain the full production line, which may result in the price being reduced.
Tako investitorji ne morejo biti prepričani, da bodo pridobili celotno proizvodno linijo, kar lahko vodi v znižanje cene.
Poland has provided several examples of sales under bankruptcy procedure, including the case of Huta Andrzej in which the breakdown of ownership of production assets made the sale very difficult and caused the price to be reduced.
Poljska je zagotovila več primerov prodaj v stečajnem postopku, vključno s primerom Huta Andrzej, v katerem je razdelitev lastništva nad proizvodnimi sredstvi zelo otežila prodajo in povzročila znižanje cene.
Therefore a sale under bankruptcy procedure may result in a much lower price than a sale organised under the restructuring process.
Zaradi tega lahko prodaja pod stečajnim postopkom vodi v znatno nižjo ceno, kot pa prodaja, organizirana pod postopkom prestrukturiranja.
The Polish authorities also argue that ‘loss-making’ public creditors still get a better deal than private creditors who, in any event, opted for restructuring (for details see tables 2 and 3).
Poljske oblasti prav tako trdijo, da so „izgubarski“ javni upniki še vedno v boljšem položaju od zasebnih upnikov, ki so v vsakem primeru izbrali prestrukturiranje (za podrobnosti glej tabeli 2 in 3).
The Polish authorities explain that the main reason why creditors were reluctant to sign the Creditor Agreement was a lack of trust that the restructuring programme would produce positive results.
Poljske oblasti razlagajo, da je glavni razlog, zakaj so upniki neradi podpisali upniški sporazum, pomanjkanje zaupanja, da bo program prestrukturiranja obrodil pozitivne rezultate.
The Polish authorities also suggest that private creditors are generally reticent about new proposals, in particular because banks are unwilling to swap sureties and mortgages on assets for shares, as this results in their receivables being downgraded by the auditors or Banking Inspectorate and their being obliged to indicate a loss in their books.
Poljske oblasti prav tako predlagajo, da so zasebni upniki v glavnem zadržani glede novih ponudb, še posebej zaradi tega, ker banke niso pripravljene zamenjati poroštev in hipotek na sredstva za delnice, saj to vodi v dejstvo, da njihove terjatve znižajo revizorji ali Bančni inšpektorat in so tako zavezani, da v svojih knjigah prikažejo izgubo.
Keeping the status quo, on the other hand, allows them to keep a higher value in their books, even if this is not realistic.
Na drugi strani pa ohranitev sedanjega stanja omogoča, da ohranijo višjo vrednost v svojih knjigah, tudi če ta ni realna.
However, when restructuring seems to be a realistic scenario, the time needed to achieve results is not very long and there is a good chance of cashing in receivables, there is a tendency to agree to such deals.
Tudi če se prestrukturiranje zdi realno, časa, ki je potreben za dosego rezultatov, pa ni veliko in obstaja dobra možnost za izplačilo v terjatvah, potem se kaže težnja po zavzemanju za takšne rešitve.
In fact, Poland has provided letters from Kredyt Bank and ING BSK which show that even those banks which lose the most from restructuring now view restructuring programmes as a better solution than bankruptcy.
Poljska je dejansko zagotovila dopise Kredyt Bank in ING BSK, ki kažejo, da celo tiste banke, ki pri prestrukturiranju največ izgubijo, sedaj vidijo v prestrukturiranju boljšo možnost kot pa v stečaju.
In the meantime, the private commercial creditors have indicated that they are prepared for a further reduction in interest recovery in order to ensure that HCz retains sufficient funds to repay all its non-restructurable liabilities and associated costs.
Medtem so zasebni komercialni upniki navedli, da so pripravljeni na nadaljnje znižanje povrnitev obresti, da bi zagotovili, da HCz ohrani zadostna sredstva za izplačilo vseh svojih neprestrukturljivih obveznosti in s tem povezanih stroškov.
Poland also argues that the public commercial creditors who, on the basis of the PWC analysis, would get less from a restructuring scenario than from bankruptcy would not, in any event, have enough power to prevent a conciliatory agreement being concluded under Polish law.
Poljska tudi trdi, da javni komercialni upniki, ki bodo na osnovi analize PWC dobili manj pri postopku prestrukturiranja kot pri stečaju, v nobenem primeru ne bodo imeli dovolj moči, da bi preprečili spravni sporazum, sklenjen v skladu s poljsko zakonodajo.
Therefore in practice a minority of unsatisfied creditors would not have the power to force liquidation.
Zato bo v praksi le manjšina nezadovoljnih upnikov imela moč, da izsili likvidacijo.
As regards public institutional creditors, the Polish authorities have indicated that the release of collateral held by public creditors and the transfer of claims to a new entity, the Operator, does not take place automatically.
Kar zadeva javne institucionalne upnike, so poljske oblasti navedle, da do sprostitve zavarovanj, ki jih imajo javni upniki, in prenosa terjatev na novo podjetje, operaterja, ne pride avtomatično.
Instead such action shall require the sole, individual consent of each of the public institutional creditors which — according to the Polish authorities — is discretionary.
Namesto tega bi moralo takšno ravnanje zahtevati izključno, posamezno soglasje vsakega izmed javnih institucionalnih upnikov, ki je – po mnenju poljskih oblasti – diskrecijsko.
This is best exemplified by three public institutional creditors (Częstochowa Tax office, the FGSP and Poraj municipal authorities), which rejected the special restructuring scheme on the grounds that bankruptcy would bring them a better result.
To je najboljše ponazorjeno s tremi javnimi institucionalnimi upniki (davčni urad Częstochowa, FGSP in občinske oblasti Poraja), ki so zavrnile posebno shemo za prestrukturiranje zaradi tega, ker menijo, da bi jim stečaj prinesel boljše rezultate.
The operation of Huta Stali Częstochowa
Dejavnost Huta Stali Częstochowa
Poland has also provided additional information on the operation of HSCz.
Poljska je prav tako zagotovila dodatne informacije o dejavnosti HSCz.
It argues that the lease of steel production assets by HCz to HSCz is an act any private creditor would normally agree to.
Trdi, da so jeklarska proizvodna sredstva, ki jih je HCz dal v zakup HSCz, dejanje, na katerega bi navadno pristal vsak zasebni upnik.
While the standard practice of the court receivers would have caused cessation of production activities, the solution consisting in leasing such assets prior to bankruptcy to an independent company beyond the receivers' control is a way of preserving the value of the assets as a going concern.
Medtem ko bi ustaljena praksa sodnih prejemnikov povzročila ustavitev proizvodnih dejavnosti, je rešitev, ki sestoji iz dajanja takšnih sredstev pred stečajem v zakup neodvisnemu podjetju izven nadzora prejemnikov, način ohranjanja vrednosti sredstev kot delujočega podjetja.
To that end a private creditor would also have accepted a deferral of payments under the lease agreement.
Zato bi zasebni upnik tudi sprejel odlog plačil v skladu z najemno pogodbo.
In addition, the Polish authorities do not accept that their activities constitute state aid as financing was provided from loans granted on a commercial basis by suppliers and prepayments from the steelwork's customers, who did not want to lose HCz/HSCz as a customer.
Poljske oblasti tudi ne priznavajo, da so bile njihove dejavnosti, ki predstavljajo državno pomoč v obliki financiranja, zagotovljene iz posojil, ki so jih na komercialnem temelju odobrili dobavitelji in predplačila jeklarskih strank, ki niso hotele izgubiti HCz/HSCz kot stranke.
As regards payment of energy bills to PSE, Poland argues that the guarantees did not constitute state aid as HSCz paid TFS the market rate for the sureties, amounting to 2 % of their real value.
Glede plačila računov za energijo PSE Poljska trdi, da poroštva niso predstavljala državne pomoči, ko je HSCz plačal TFS tržno stopnjo za poroštva, ki je znašala 2 % njihove realne vrednosti.
This value is calculated on the basis that the guaranteed sum was never to exceed PLN 6 million and thus the premium of PLN 120000 should actually be equivalent to 2 %.
Ta vrednost je izračunana na osnovi, da zagotovljena vsota ni nikoli presegla 6 milijonov PLN in na ta način bi morala biti premija 120000 PLN dejansko enaka 2 %.
By way of comparison, the Polish authorities quote the National Fund for Credit Guarantees, which offers ‘loan guarantees’ to the clients of more than 25 commercial banks at rates that currently amount to 1 % for 1 year, 1,2 % for 2 years and 1,4 % for 3 years.
Za primerjavo poljske oblasti navajajo Nacionalni sklad za kreditna poroštva, ki strankam iz več kot 25 komercialnih bank nudi „poroštva za posojila“ po stopnjah, ki trenutno znašajo 1 % za 1 leto, 1,2 % za 2 leti in 1,4 % za tri leta.
Therefore, in the Polish authorities' view, the cost of the guarantees and the amounts thereof reflect the market terms prevailing at the time.
Zato po mnenju poljskih oblasti cena poroštev in zneski iz tega odsevajo tržne pogoje, ki so prevladujoči v tem času.
Grants and other measures
Subvencije in drugi ukrepi
First, Poland accepts that the aid to HCz of PLN 19699452 (EUR 4147332) granted between 1997 and May 2002 constituted restructuring aid.
Prvič, Poljska priznava, da je pomoč HCz v znesku 19699452 PLN (4147332 EUR), odobrena med letom 1997 in majem 2002, predstavljala pomoč za prestrukturiranje.
Second, however, as regards the aid to KBN, the Polish authorities take the view that the grants in question meet the criteria set out in the Community framework for state aid for research and development (hereinafter ‘R&D framework’) and should be treated as aid of that type.
Drugič, poljske oblasti glede pomoči KBN menijo, da zadevne pomoči izpolnjujejo merila, določena v okviru Skupnosti za državno pomoč za raziskave in razvoj (v nadaljevanju „okvir R&R“) in se morajo obravnavati kot pomoč te vrste.
The Polish authorities indicate that this aid is partly covered by the Programme of 30 November 2001 issued by the Chairman of KBN on the criteria for and method of granting state financial support for science, which was included on the list of existing aid in the Accession Treaty.
Poljske oblasti navajajo, da jih delno pokriva program, ki ga je 30. novembra 2001 sprejel predsednik KBN, o merilih in metodah za dodelitev državne finančne podpore za znanost, ki je bila vključena na seznam obstoječe pomoči v Pristopni pogodbi.
This is the case at least for the aid of PLN 1380000 to HSCz, which was granted after the Programme was adopted.
To velja vsaj za pomoč podjetju HSCz v znesku 1380000 PLN, ki je bila odobrena po sprejemu programa.
Poland also takes the view that KBN's grants of PLN 5461620 to HCz, although not awarded under the Programme, should be regarded as compatible as they meet the similar conditions set out in the R&D aid framework.
Poljska prav tako meni, da bi odobritve KBN podjetju HCz v znesku 5461620 PLN, čeprav niso podeljene v skladu s programom, morale biti obravnavane kot združljive, saj izpolnjujejo podobne pogoje, določene v okviru pomoči R&R.
Although they were awarded before the programme came into effect, the aid was nevertheless assessed under the same criteria of the programme and is thus in line with the R&D aid framework.
Čeprav so bile podeljene, preden je program stopil v veljavo, je bila pomoč vseeno ocenjena pod enakimi merili programa in je tako združljiva z okvirom pomoči R&R.
Poland indicates that more detailed information on this aid, which was described in part II above, is not available as the KBN has in the meantime been dissolved.
Poljska navaja, da bolj podrobne informacije o pomoči, ki je opisana v delu II, niso na voljo, saj je bil KBN med tem časom razpuščen.
Third, Poland argues that various financial measures in favour of HSCz have been repaid in the meantime.
Tretjič, Poljska trdi, da so bili med tem časom povrnjeni različni finančni ukrepi v korist HSCz.