natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Moreover, a report by Project Management Eschbach (PME) submitted by Germany in connection with another proceeding [35] described Kahla II as a company undergoing a restructuring process which would not be completed before the end of 1996 [36]].
Poleg tega je Kahla II v poročilu Project Management Eschbacha (PME), ki ga je Nemčija predložila v povezavi z drugim postopkom [35], opisana kot podjetje, ki je v procesu prestrukturiranja, ki se ne bo končal pred letom 1996 [36].
In the Commission’s view, such a process is not typical of a healthy firm.
Komisija je prišla do sklepa, da takšen proces ni značilen za zdravo podjetje.
Germany also considers that the losses which Kahla II incurred during the first few years were due only to the application of a special depreciation scheme (measure 33).
Nemčija je tudi mnenja, da je do izgub, ki so nastale v prvih letih obstoja Kahle II, prišlo zgolj zaradi programa amortizacije (ukrep 33).
The Commission takes the view, however, that, while it may be true that higher losses were incurred owing to the application of this depreciation scheme, without state support the company would certainly have incurred much higher losses and would probably have been driven out of the market.
Komisija meni, da je do večjih izgub lahko prišlo zaradi tega programa amortizacije, vendar pa bi podjetje brez državne podpore zagotovo utrpelo precej višje izgube in bi verjetno izginilo s trga.
It should be noted that the 1993 and 1994 reports supplied by Germany regarded state support as essential to the company’s survival and to the restoration of viability.
Ugotovi se, da je bila državna podpora, navedena v poročilih iz let 1993 in 1994, ki jih je predložila Nemčija, obravnavana kot odločilna za obstoj podjetja in ponovno vzpostavitev rentabilnosti.
Germany has provided a report drawn up by a consultant on 21 January 2002 in support of its argument that Kahla II was never in difficulty.
Nemčija je za podkrepitev utemeljitev, da Kahla II nikoli ni bila v težavah, predložila poročilo, ki ga je 21. januarja 2002 pripravil svetovalec.
Turnover (DEM million)
Prihodki ( v mio DEM)
Operating result before tax (DEM million)
Dobiček iz poslovanja pred obdavčitvijo (v mio DEM)
Cash flow (DEM million)
Denarni tok (v mio DEM)
% capacity utilisation
Izkoriščenost zmogljivosti v %
% own capital
Lastni kapital v %
% outside capital
Tuji kapital v %
The Commission notes that Table 11 is an ex post evaluation of the company’s history.
Komisija ugotavlja, da Tabela 11 predstavlja naknadno oceno zgodovine podjetja.
It is useful in that it confirms that the main forecasts of the reports available in 1994 were correct: losses were to be incurred during at least the first two years.
Koristno je navesti, da so bile najpomembnejše napovedi v letu 1994 razpoložljivega poročila pravilne: do izgub naj bi prihajalo najmanj prvi dve leti.
However, the Commission must make its assessment from an ex ante point of view, that is, it must establish whether from 1994 Germany fulfilled its obligations under the EC Treaty and notified the aid.
Vendar mora Komisija svojo presojo predhodno izvesti, tj. ugotoviti, ali je Nemčija od leta 1994 izpolnila svoje dolžnosti v skladu s Pogodbo ES in priglasila pomoč.
Had Germany fulfilled its obligations, the Commission would have based its assessment on the reports available at that time.
Če bi Nemčija izpolnila svoje dolžnosti, bi Komisija svojo presojo sestavila na podlagi poročil, razpoložljivih v tistem času.
As already stated in paragraphs 95, 96 and 113, those reports are based on the premiss that the company had to restore its viability and concluded that state support was absolutely essential to achieve that aim.
Kot je navedeno v odstavkih 95, 96 in 113, ti poročili temeljita na premisi, da mora podjetje ponovno vzpostaviti rentabilnost, in navajata, da je bila za uresničitev teh ciljev državna pomoč odločilna.
In the light of those reports, the Commission would have followed its established practice and regarded Kahla II (an Auffanglösung) as a firm in difficulty.
Na podlagi teh poročil bi Komisija Kahlo II (Auffanglösung) v skladu s svojo stalno prakso označila kot podjetje v težavah.
This conclusion cannot be altered, ex post, by the fact that, thanks to substantial aid awards, these difficulties were surmounted within a short space of time.
Ta sklep ne more biti naknadno spremenjen, saj so bile te težave v kratkem času odpravljene z dodelitvijo znatne pomoči.
To sum up, on the basis of the reports available at the relevant point in time, the Commission concludes that Kahla II was unable to recover through its own resources or by raising financing on the market.
Komisija na podlagi v zadevnem času razpoložljivih poročil sklene, da si Kahla II ni bila sposobna opomoči z lastnimi močmi ali s finančnimi sredstvi pod tržnimi pogoji.
The Commission notes in particular that Germany expressly admitted this back in 1999.
Komisija zlasti ugotavlja, da je Nemčija to dejstvo leta 1999 izrecno priznala.
Moreover, without state support the company would probably have been driven out of the market.
Poleg tega bi podjetje brez državne pomoči verjetno izginilo s trga.
The fact that not every indicator in the restructuring aid guidelines applies to Kahla II is irrelevant: the guidelines contain a non-exhaustive list of typical symptoms and not an exhaustive, cumulative list of criteria.
Dejstvo, da noben kazalec, naveden v smernicah za prestrukturiranje, ni uporaben za Kahlo, ni pomembno: te smernice vsebujejo neizčrpen seznam značilnih simptomov, ne pa izčrpnega in zbirnega seznama meril.
Consequently, the Commission adheres to its view that Kahla II was a company in difficulty during the period from 1994 to the end of 1996, when, most likely thanks to the aid injected, a slightly positive result was first achieved and the share of own capital began to increase.
Posledično ostaja Komisija pri svojem mnenju, da je Kahla II v času od 1994 do konca 1996 predstavljala podjetje v težavah, dokler ni bil dosežen, najverjetneje zaradi dodeljene pomoči, rahlo pozitiven rezultat in je delež lastnega kapitala začel naraščati.
The Commission considers that the lack of private financing without state support and the available data bear this out.
Komisija je mnenja, da pomanjkljivo zasebno financiranje brez državne podpore in razpoložljivi podatki to potrjujejo.
Aid purportedly covered by approved aid schemes
Pomoči, ki so domnevno vključene v odobreni program pomoči
Part of the aid to Kahla I and Kahla II was allegedly granted under approved aid schemes.
Del ukrepov pomoči za Kahlo I in Kahlo II je bil domnevno vključen v odobreni program pomoči.
Since the Commission had serious doubts about the compliance of these aid measures with the terms of the schemes under which they had allegedly been awarded, it issued an information order under Article 10(3) of Council Regulation No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [38], requiring Germany to supply all documentation, information and data necessary for their assessment.
Ker Komisija resno dvomi, da so ti ukrepi pomoči v skladu z odobrenimi programi pomoči, v okviru katerih naj bi bili dodeljeni, je od Nemčije s pomočjo uredbe o predložitvi podatkov v skladu s členom 10(3) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES [38] zahtevala, naj predloži vse za presojo potrebne dokumente, podatke in dejstva.
In so far as the information transmitted by Germany is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that these measures are covered by the relevant schemes, the Commission is accordingly empowered to take a decision on the basis of the information available.
Zaenkrat so informacije, ki jih je posredovala Nemčija, nezadostne za presojo o tem, ali so ti ukrepi zajeti v ustreznem programu. Komisija ima pravico, da odloči na podlagi razpoložljivih informacij.
In its decision to extend the formal investigation procedure, the Commission concluded that measures 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 in favour of Kahla I constituted existing aid which did not need to be reassessed.
V razširitvi formalnega postopka preiskave je Komisija sklenila, da ukrepi 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 in 10 predstavljajo za Kahlo II obstoječo pomoč, ki je ni potrebno še enkrat oceniti.
It still considers that measure 8 was not granted under any approved aid scheme and falls to be assessed as ad hoc aid.
Komisija je potrdila svoje mnenje, da ukrep 8 ni bil dodeljen v okviru odobrenega programa pomoči in ga je zato mogoče označiti kot začasno pomoč.
As regards Kahla II, in its decision to extend the formal investigation procedure the Commission concluded that measures 28 and 29 in favour of Kahla II constituted existing aid which did not need to be reassessed.
Glede Kahle II je Komisija v razširitvi formalnega postopka preiskave sklenila, da ukrepa 28 in 29 predstavljata za Kahlo II obstoječo pomoč, ki je Komisija ne bo ponovno ocenila.
It still considers that measures 11, 12 and 20 were not granted under any scheme approved by it.
Komisija je potrdila svoje mnenje, da ukrepi 11, 12 in 20 niso bili dodeljeni v okviru programa pomoči, ki ga je odobrila Komisija.
As regards the remaining measures allegedly granted under approved aid schemes, the Commission will partially review the provisional assessments made in the decisions to initiate and extend the formal investigation procedure.
Glede ostalih ukrepov, domnevno dodeljenih po odobrenih programih pomoči, bo Komisija delno preučila začasne presoje, opravljene v sklepu o sprožitvi in razširitvi formalnega postopka preiskave.
Measures 13, 14, 23 and 30: These 90 % state guarantees were based on a scheme which was never notified to the Commission.
Ukrepi 13, 14, 23 in 30: Ta 90-odstotna državna jamstva so temeljila na programu, ki Komisiji nikoli ni bil priglašen.
The scheme was registered under number NN 46/97 and was never approved by the Commission.
Program je bil evidentiran pod št. NN 46/97, vendar ga Komisija nikoli ni odobrila.
Consequently, as stated in the decision to extend the formal investigation procedure, these guarantees fall to be assessed as ad hoc aid.
Kot je navedeno v razširitvi formalnega postopka preiskave, je ta jamstva mogoče označiti kot začasne pomoči.
Moreover, in its decision on the guarantee guidelines of the Land of Thuringia [39], the Commission noted Thuringia’s commitment no longer to apply this non-notified scheme.
Komisija je v svoji odločbi o smernicah za jamstva dežele Turingije [39] tudi navedla, da Turingija ne sme več uporabljati tega nepriglašenega programa.
In respect of the aid element in these guarantees, Germany claims that, according to an agreement between Germany and the Commission, the aid element in the guarantee should be 0,5 % of the amount covered by the guarantee.
Glede elementa pomoči teh jamstev Nemčija trdi, da bi moral zaradi dogovora med Nemčijo in Komisijo element pomoči jamstva znašati 0,5 % zneska, ki ga zajema to jamstvo.
The Commission would point out, however, that this agreement concerned 80 % state guarantees complying with approved aid schemes.
Komisija navaja, da se ta dogovor nanaša na 80-odstotna državna jamstva, ki so v skladu z odobrenim programom pomoči.
The guarantees here exceed this limit by 10 % and were based, not on approved aid schemes, but on a non-notified scheme never approved by the Commission.
Zadevna jamstva to mejo prekoračujejo za 10 % in niso bila dodeljena v okviru odobrenega programa pomoči, temveč v okviru nepriglašenega programa, ki ga Komisija nikoli ni odobrila.
Moreover, the agreement excluded companies in difficulty from its scope.
Poleg tega je dogovor iz svojega področja uporabe izključil podjetja v težavah.
Consequently, despite Germany’s claims, the rate of 0,5 % cannot be applied to these guarantees.
Zato 0,5 odstotka v nasprotju z navedbami Nemčije ni mogoče uporabiti pri teh jamstvih.
In respect of the guarantees under measures 13, 14 and 23, according to the Commission notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to state aid in the form of guarantees, the following applies: “Where, at the time the loan is granted, there is a strong probability that the borrower will default, e.g. because he is in financial difficulty, the value of the guarantee may be as high as the amount effectively covered by that guarantee” [40].
Ob upoštevanju jamstev v okviru ukrepov 13, 14 in 23 na podlagi sporočila Komisije o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državne pomoči v obliki jamstev [40] velja naslednje: „Če je pri prevzemu jamstva zelo verjetno, da kreditojemalec svojih obveznosti ne bo mogel izpolniti, npr. ker je v finančnih težavah, je lahko vrednost jamstva tako visoka kot sam znesek, ki ga jamstvo učinkovito zajema“.
As stated in Section B of the Assessment (paragraphs 106 to 118), Kahla II was a company in difficulty at the time of the granting of these measures.
Kot je navedeno v oddelku B presoje (odstavki 106–118), je bila Kahla II v času dodelitve teh ukrepov podjetje v težavah.
This means that for guarantees provided until 1996, the aid element in these guarantees is potentially 90 % of the credits to which they relate.
To pomeni, da pri jamstvih, dodeljenih do leta 1996, element pomoči teh jamstev lahko znaša 90 % ustreznih kreditov.
As regards measure 30, which was granted when the company was no longer in difficulty, Germany again considers that, on the basis of the agreement with the Commission referred to in paragraph 123, the aid equivalent should be set at 0,5 %.
Glede ukrepa 30, ki je bil dodeljen v času, ko podjetje ni bilo več v težavah, je Nemčija ponovno mnenja, da bi moral biti ekvivalent pomoči na podlagi dogovora med Nemčijo in Komisijo, omenjenega v odstavku 123, določen pri 0,5 %.
The Commission would point out once more, however, that the agreement concerned 80 % guarantees provided under approved aid schemes.
Komisija ponovno opozarja, da se ta dogovor nanaša na 80-odstotna državna jamstva, ki so bila dodeljena v okviru odobrenega programa pomoči.
The guarantee here exceeded the 80 % limit by 10 % and was not provided under an approved aid scheme.
V omenjenem primeru je jamstvo prekoračilo 80-odstotno mejo za 10 % in ni bilo dodeljeno v okviru odobrenega programa pomoči.
Consequently, the 0,5 % aid equivalent cannot be applied here.
Zato tukaj ni mogoče uporabiti ekvivalenta pomoči 0,5 %.
At the time of the provision of this guarantee, the Land of Thuringia had agreed to make guarantees subject to the Commission decision on the guarantee guidelines of the Land of Thuringia [41], according to which, for 80 % guarantees provided under approved aid schemes, the aid element in these guarantees would be set at between 0,5 % and 2 %.
V času dodelitve tega jamstva je dežela Turingija soglašala s tem, da bodo jamstva odvisna od odločbe Komisije o smernicah za jamstva dežele Turingije [41], po kateri mora pri 80-odstotnih jamstvih, dodeljenih v okviru odobrenega programa pomoči, element pomoči znašati med 0,5 % in 2 %.
Although that decision again concerns 80 % guarantees provided under approved aid schemes, the Commission considers it appropriate to apply this rule here by analogy.
Čeprav tudi ta odločba zadeva 80-odstotna jamstva, ki so bila dodeljena v okviru odobrenega programa pomoči, je po mnenju Komisije primerno, da se ta program tukaj uporabi podobno.
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the guarantee covered a large part of the risks inherent in the loan, which is reflected by the low interest rate fixed by the private bank, the Commission will apply the maximum percentage allowed for guarantees in the scheme, i.e., 2 %.
Ob upoštevanju dejstva, da je jamstvo zajemalo velik del s posojilom povezanih tveganj, kar se je odražalo z nizko obrestno mero, ki so jo določile zasebne banke, bo za jamstva Komisija uporabila v tem programu najvišjo dovoljeno obrestno mero v višini 2 %.
Similarly, the Commission considers it appropriate to apply a 2 % aid element to the 90 % guarantee under measure 13, and this from 30 March 1998, when the loans under measures 18-21 were converted into a market loan.
Na podoben način se Komisiji zdi primerno, da za 90-odstotno jamstvo po ukrepu 13 uporabi element pomoči v višini 2 %, in sicer od 30. marca 1998, ko so bila posojila po ukrepih 18-21 spremenjena v posojila pod tržnimi pogoji.
The interest rate of the market loan came to 5,90 %.
Obrestna mera posojila pod tržnimi pogoji je znašala 5,9 %.
Before the loans under measures 18-21 were converted, their interest rate came to between 6,5 % and 6,75 %.
Preden so bila posojila v okviru ukrepov 18–21 spremenjena, je obrestna mera znašala med 6,5 % in 6,75 %.
The loans, which were obtained from state resources, were thus converted into a private loan at the precise time when it was possible for the company to secure a lower interest rate for a private loan on the market than was payable on loans obtained from state resources.
Posojila, dodeljena iz državnih sredstev, so bila spremenjena v zasebna posojila ravno v času, ko je podjetje za zasebno posojilo lahko dobilo nižjo obrestno mero kot za posojila iz državnih sredstev.
It should be pointed out in this connection that the conversion was possible only because a 90 % state guarantee had been provided in respect of this new loan.
S tem v zvezi je treba poudariti, da je bila ta sprememba mogoča le zato, ker je bilo za to novo posojilo zagotovljeno 90-odstotno jamstvo.
Germany states that these guarantees fall under the de minimis rules.
Nemčija trdi, da ta jamstva spadajo pod pravila de minimis.
The application of the de minimis rules will be verified in Section D of the Assessment.
Uporaba pravil de minimis je obravnavana v oddelku D presoje.
Measure 15: A grant of DEM 2,5 million was allegedly granted under an approved aid scheme [42].
Ukrep 15: Podpora v višini 2,5 milijona DEM je bila domnevno dodeljena v okviru odobrenega programa pomoči [42].
In its decision to extend the formal investigation procedure, the Commission erroneously stated that this scheme was intended only for SMEs.
V razširitvi formalnega postopka preiskave je Komisija pomotoma navedla, da je ta program predviden le za MSP.
Germany correctly pointed out that large companies were also eligible for aid under this scheme under certain circumstances.
Nemčija je pravilno opozorila, da so pod posebnimi pogoji do pomoči v okviru tega programa upravičena tudi velika podjetja.
However, the scheme expressly excludes companies in difficulty from its scope.
Vendar pa ta program iz svojega področja uporabe izrecno izključuje podjetja v težavah.
The Commission recently reached a negative decision in respect of this scheme on grounds of misuse, since it had been used for, amongst others, companies in difficulty [43].
Komisija je zaradi zlorabe nedavno sprejela negativno odločbo glede tega programa, ker je bil med drugim uporabljen za podjetja v težavah [43].
In its decision the Commission specifically noted that Germany had included Kahla II amongst the companies in difficulty which had benefited from this scheme, contrary to the specific provisions approved by the Commission.
V svoji odločbi je Komisija izrecno navedla, da je Nemčija Kahlo II uvrstila med podjetja v težavah, ki so v nasprotju s posebnimi določbami, ki jih je odobrila Komisija, uporabila ta program.
In its decision concerning this scheme, the Commission stated that its decision on the scheme was without prejudice to its decision in the present case, in the context of which this individual application was being examined.
Komisija je glede omenjenega programa v svoji odločbi navedla, da je njena odločba glede programa neodvisna od njene odločbe v zadevnem primeru, v okviru katerega je bila proučena posamezna uporaba.
In the present decision, the Commission considers that Kahla II was in difficulty at the time of the granting of this aid measure.
V zadevni odločbi Komisija zastopa stališče, da je bila Kahla II v času dodelitve tega ukrepa pomoči podjetje v težavah.
Consequently, the view that the aid here must be regarded as new aid is maintained.
Zato se ohranja stališče, da je to pomoč mogoče označiti kot novo pomoč.
Measure 16: A loan of DEM 0,2 million was allegedly granted under an approved equity loan scheme [44].
Ukrep 16: Posojilo v višini 0,2 milijona DEM je bilo domnevno odobreno v okviru programa za posojila za lastniški kapital [44].
This scheme was intended only for SMEs.
Ta program je bil namenjen le za MSP.
However, since Kahla II had more than 250 employees and therefore did not qualify as an SME at the time of the granting of this measure, the aid manifestly does not comply with the scheme.
Ker pa je imela Kahla II več kot 250 zaposlenih in v času dodelitve tega ukrepa ni bila MSP, pomoč očitno ni v skladu s tem programom.
Germany recently argued that the loan was granted to Mr G. Raithel and not to the company.
Nemčija je nedavno opozorila, da posojilo ni bilo dodeljeno podjetju, temveč g. G. Raithelu.
However, according to the Commission’s approval of the scheme on the basis of which the loan was awarded, investors may receive such support only on condition that they bring it into the company as capital.
Komisija je v odobritvi programa, v okviru katerega je bilo posojilo dodeljeno, navedla, da investitorji takšno podporo dobijo le pod pogojem, da jo kot kapital vložijo v podjetje.
This is what Mr Raithel did.
To pa je g. G. Raithel tudi storil.
Consequently, although directly granted to a private person, the purpose of the loan was to support an undertaking.
Posledično je bil namen tega posojila podpora podjetju, čeprav je bilo posojilo dodeljeno posamezniku.
Hence the loan is regarded as new aid to Kahla II.
Zato je posojilo mogoče oceniti kot novo pomoč za Kahlo II.
Measures 17, 18, 19 and 22: In the course of its examination the Commission came to the conclusion that the conditions set out in the scheme under which these loans were granted [45] were fulfilled in the present case.
Ukrepi 17, 18, 19 in 22: Komisija je ob preučitvi prišla so sklepa, da so pogoji programa, po katerem so bila posojila dodeljena [45], v zadevnem primeru izpolnjeni.
Consequently, these credits constitute existing aid which does not need to be reassessed by the Commission.
Zato predstavljajo ti krediti obstoječo pomoč, ki je Komisiji ni več potrebno oceniti.
Measure 21: This loan was allegedly granted under an approved aid scheme [46].
Ukrep 21: To posojilo je bilo domnevno dodeljeno v okviru odobrenega programa pomoči [46].
However, the scheme provided for loans of a maximum of DEM 2 million for companies in the new Länder.
Program je predvideval posojila v višini največ 2 milijonov DEM za podjetja v novih deželah.
The loan here exceeds this limit.
Zadevno posojilo to mejo presega.
Consequently, the Commission cannot conclude that the conditions of the relevant scheme were complied with.
Zato Komisija ne more ugotoviti, ali so bili pogoji, navedeni v zadevnem programu, izpolnjeni.
Taking into account the subsidised rate of interest, the reduced value of the collateral provided and the presence of a 90 % guarantee covering almost the whole risk of default, the Commission considers that at the time they were granted these loans constituted aid potentially to their full amount.
Ob upoštevanju subvencioniranih obresti, zmanjšane vrednosti danih zavarovanj in dodelitve 90-odstotnega jamstva, ki zajema skoraj celotno izredno tveganje, je Komisija mnenja, da je to posojilo v času dodelitve morda predstavljalo pomoč v celotni višini zneska.
Measures 24 and 25 were granted under approved aid schemes for the purpose of covering the investments detailed in Table 5.
Ukrepa 24 in 25 sta bila dodeljena v okviru odobrenih programov pomoči, in sicer za pokritje investicij, ki so podrobno prikazane v Tabeli 5.
In addition, the information provided by Germany indicates that part of the investment aid granted under the special depreciation scheme (measure 33) also contributed to the coverage of these investments.
Poleg tega iz informacij, ki jih je posredovala Nemčija, izhaja, da je del investicijske pomoči, dodeljene v okviru programa posebne amortizacije (ukrep 33), prav tako služil za pokritje investicij.