natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Germany justifies the decision to require remuneration only for the part of the IBB special-purpose reserve actually taken up inter alia on the grounds that the reserve was available primarily to IBB and that, if it were insufficient, it was first LBB which was obliged to reduce its risk assets or raise subordinated capital on the market.
Svojo odločitev, da je plačala nadomestilo samo za del rezerve IBB za posebne namene, ki se ga je koristilo, Nemčija med drugim utemeljuje s tem, da je bila rezerva za posebne namene v prvi vrsti na razpolago IBB in da bi bila, če ta ne bi zadostovala, v prvi vrsti LBB tista, ki bi morala zmanjšati svoje tvegane aktive oz. na trgu najeti podrejena sredstva.
As owner of IBB, the Land of Berlin was entitled to withdraw parts of the special-purpose reserve at any time.
Dežela Berlin je imela kot lastnica IBB ves čas pravico, da odvzame dele rezerve za posebne namene.
Germany also commented in this connection that the liquidity of the special-purpose reserve was tied up in IBB's existing business and was not available to LBB for financing purposes.
V zvezi s tem je Nemčija nadalje navedla, da je likvidnost rezerve IBB za posebne namene vezana na obstoječe posle IBB in je LBB nima na razpolago za financiranje.
IBB had to underpin its lending itself with own funds and, in so doing, to have recourse to the special-purpose reserve.
IBB mora kredite, ki jih je dala, sama financirati z lastnimi sredstvi in pri tem poseči po rezervi za posebne namene.
Germany stated that, in the light of these specific factors, WBK's assets could not be equated with freely available financial assets and that, therefore, only the guarantee function and thus the business expansion function were at issue.
Nemčija je razložila, da premoženja WBK zaradi teh posebnosti ni mogoče primerjati s prosto razpoložljivo denarno naložbo in da gre le za jamstvo in s tem širitev poslovanja.
Whether the remuneration was paid to the Land or to IBB was immaterial here since the Land as guarantor would, in any event, profit from both IBB and LBB, either through LBB's increase in value and distribution of profits or through inflows into IBB's special-purpose reserve, on which the Land had a claim.
Ali se nadomestilo plača deželi ali IBB, tu ni pomembno, saj ima dežela kot nosilka zavoda IBB in LBB od tega v vsakem primeru korist, pa naj bo zaradi povečanja vrednosti in izplačil dobička LBB ali zaradi pritoka v rezervo IBB za posebne namene, ki pripada deželi.
Besides these comments on the direct remuneration, Germany also argued that it was not a factor, or not the only factor, in an investment decision and that ‘in accordance with the case law, … an investor who does not hold or seek to hold a significant share in the relevant company but who is interested in a rapid return on his investment must be distinguished from investors geared to the long term, such as holding companies’.
Ne glede na te oblike neposrednega nadomestila je bila Nemčija načelno mnenja, da odločitev za naložbo ni odvisna od tega oz. samo od tega in da je „v skladu s sodno prakso ... vlagatelja, ki v zadevnem podjetju nima imenovanja vredne udeležbe in to tudi ni njegov cilj, ampak je njegov cilj, da za svojo naložbo hitro dobi obresti, treba razlikovati od dolgoročno usmerjenih vlagateljev, npr. holdingov“.
The latter were interested in long-term return expectations and would also take account of strategic considerations.
Ti pričakujejo dolgoročno donosnost in razmišljajo tudi strateško.
As sole owner of LBB, the Land assumed at the time of the investment that it would benefit fully and directly from the increase in LBB's value brought about by WBK's transfer.
Dežela kot edini lastnik LBB je v času naložbe pričakovala, da bo s povečanjem vrednosti LBB kot posledico vključitve WBK v celoti in neposredno imela korist.
Germany initially indicated that LBB's return-on-equity ratio was 13,5 % in 1992 and 30,83 % in 1993.
Kot je sprva pojasnila Nemčija, je LBB leta 1992 iz lastnega kapitala ustvarila 13,5-odstotni donos in leta 1993 30,83-odstotni donos.
These figures, submitted back in 1999, related to the ratio ‘earnings before (income) tax/equity capital shown in the balance sheet at the start of the same year’.
Te številke, ki so bile posredovane že leta 1999, pomenijo „rezultat pred davki na dobiček/bilančni lastni kapital na začetku istega leta“.
However, in supplying these figures, Germany had not included IBB's special-purpose reserve in LBB's equity capital from 1993 onwards.
Vendar pa Nemčija pri posredovanju teh številk rezerve IBB za posebne namene od leta 1993 ni več upoštevala kot lasten kapital LBB.
At the Commission's request, this was corrected with the sending of data series covering a longer period.
Na prošnjo Komisije je Nemčija pri posredovanju številk za daljše obdobje to storila.
For the period 1985-1992 these figures gave an average return on equity of about 13 %.
V skladu s temi številkami je v obdobju od leta 1985 do 1992 povprečni donos iz lastnega kapitala znašal približno 13 %.
Germany stated that these figures would fall within the range of values obtained by private German banks in the same period, but it did not initially provide data produced by a similar method for other banks.
Nemčija je pojasnila, da ti kazalniki nihajo v razponu vrednosti donosa, ki bi ga v enakem časovnem obdobju ustvarile zasebne nemške banke. Vendar pa so podatki drugih bank, ki bi bili primerljivi z vidika metodike, sprva manjkali.
It subsequently submitted its own calculations based on the published profit and loss statements of 35 German banks.
Kasneje je Nemčija naknadno predložila lastne izračune na osnovi javno dostopnih računov o dobičku in izgubi 35 nemških bank.
Taking ‘earnings before tax as a percentage of equity capital shown in the balance sheet at the start of the same year’, this gave an average return-on-equity ratio for these banks of around 11 % in 1992 and just under 13 % for the period from 1988 to 1992.
V skladu s temi izračuni je bil na osnovi „rezultat pred davki/bilančni lastni kapital na začetku istega leta“ za te banke v letu 1992 ugotovljen povprečni donos iz lastnega kapitala v vrednosti približno 11 % in v obdobju od leta 1988 do leta 1992 v vrednosti slabih 13 %.
Germany also stated that, from a business point of view, earning capacity was a decisive factor in an investment decision and that, in the case of banks, it could best be derived from profit from ordinary business or from operating result as a percentage of equity capital shown in the balance sheet since extraordinary earnings and expenditure would then be excluded.
Nadalje je Nemčija pojasnila, da je za odločitev o naložbi iz poslovno ekonomskega vidika merodajna moč donosa in da jo pri banki najlažje ugotovimo na osnovi rezultata običajnega poslovanja oz. poslovnega rezultata v razmerju do bilance stanja, saj tako izredni donosi in stroški niso upoštevani.
In the years 1990-92 LBB faced extraordinary circumstances, in particular the integration of the East Berlin Savings Bank and the related setting up of its own pension scheme, at the same time as it had to pay a compensation fee for withdrawing from the Federal and Länder Pension Institution and to make provision for the general banking risks of the former East Berlin Savings Bank.
Tako so za LBB v letih 1990-1992 vladale izredne razmere, predvsem zaradi vključitve „Sparkasse Ost“ in s tem povezano vzpostavitvijo lastnega pokojninskega zavarovanja ob sočasnem plačilu odškodnine za izstop iz oskrbovalnega zavoda Zveze in dežel ter zavarovanja tveganja za splošna bančna tveganja nekdanje „Sparkasse Ost“.
As regards obtaining methodologically comparable return-on-equity ratios for other banks in the same period, Germany stated that banks were required only as of 1993 to enter extraordinary result and profit from ordinary business separately in the profit and loss account, and that this cannot be compared with the pre-1993 method, when extraordinary income and expenditure were included, together with other items, under ‘other income and expenditure’ and therefore could not be identified precisely.
V zvezi z donosi iz lastnega kapitala, ki so jih v istem časovnem obdobju ustvarile druge banke in so z vidika metodike primerljivi, je Nemčija pojasnila, da se šele od leta 1993 zahteva, da se izredni rezultat in rezultat normalnega poslovanja v računih o dobičku in izgubi prikaže ločeno, kar z metodiko, ki je veljala pred letom 1993, ni primerljivo, saj so bili izredni donosi in stroški poleg drugih postavk do takrat vključeni v postavko „drugi donosi/stroški“ in jih tako ni bilo mogoče natančno prepoznati.
For the period pre-1993, Germany submitted its own calculations.
Za obdobje pred tem je Nemčija predložila lastne izračune.
In the course of the proceedings Germany also made corrections and additions to the method for calculating LBB's return on equity, in order to render the figures for LBB comparable with the Bundesbank's official survey of German banks.
Nemčija je kasneje med postopkom popravila oz. dopolnila metodo za izračun donosov iz lastnega kapitala LBB, da bi bile številke LBB skupno tako primerljive z dvigi Zvezne banke za nemške banke.
According to Germany, this did not change the basic assessment that LBB's return on equity was in line with the average for the sector.
Kot pravi Nemčija, to ni vplivalo na splošno oceno, da so donosi LBB iz lastnega kapitala glede na druge v isti panogi povprečni.
In Germany's view, all the data showed that, at the time of the capital injection, LBB had a high earning capacity.
Po mnenju Nemčije vse številke dokazujejo, da je bila LBB v času, ko je dobila sredstva, podjetje, ki je bilo sposobno dosegati donose.
The Land of Berlin was the sole owner and would alone benefit from the bank's commercial success, whether in the form of dividends or an increase in value.
Dežela Berlin je edini lastnik kapitala, ki mu pripada poslovni uspeh banke, pa naj bo to v obliki izplačil dobička ali povečanja vrednosti.
In this respect, the Land would not have to share the expected increase in return with other shareholders and the almost ‘intra-group’ investment was sound conduct from the point of view of an investor operating in a market economy.
Zato deželi pričakovanega povečanega donosa ni bilo treba deliti z drugimi lastniki deležev in je prenos tako rekoč „znotraj skupine“ iz vidika vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu razumna poteza.
The question of whether and how large a remuneration was paid by LBB for the capital injection was therefore irrelevant to an assessment of the transfer's market-economy status.
Vprašanje, če in v kakšni višini je LBB plačala nadomestilo za dovedena sredstva, je za vprašanje tržno gospodarske narave prenosa nepomembno.
According to Germany, the Commission expressly laid down this assessment criterion in Decision 2000/392/EC: ‘Therefore, one way of ensuring an adequate return on the capital provided would have been to increase the Land’s participation in WestLB accordingly, provided that the bank's overall profitability corresponds to the normal rate of return that a market-economy investor would expect from his investment.
Komisija je to merilo za oceno izrecno uporabila v svoji Odločbi 2000/392/ES: „En način za zagotovitev primernega donosa iz zagotovljenega kapitala bi torej bil, ustrezno povečanje udeležbe dežele v WestLB, v kolikor splošna donosnost banke ustreza običajnemu donosu, ki ga vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu pričakuje za svojo naložbo.
This would have avoided the discussion of whether the 0,6 % rate of remuneration is appropriate. However, this course was not adopted by the Land.’
S tem bi se izognili razpravi o vprašanju, ali je nadomestilo 0,6 % primerno, vendar se dežela ni odločila za takšno ravnanje.“
In this connection, Germany also stated that LBB's increase in value as a result of WBK's assets benefited the Land after LBB's incorporation into BGB.
V zvezi s tem je Nemčija nadalje pojasnila, da je šla povečana vrednost LBB zaradi premoženja WBK po vključitvi LBB v BGB v korist dežele.
The transfer, undertaken in three stages in 1994 and 1998, of 100 % of the beneficial ownership in LBB to BGB was carried out on the basis of expert reports by various chartered accountants and one investment bank on the value of the Land’s silent partnership in LBB and on whether the quid pro quo — the BGB shares transferred, including in relation to other shareholders — equated to an acceptable market price.
Prenos 100-odstotnega lastniškega deleža v LBB na BGB, ki je v treh delih potekal leta 1994 in 1998, je bil uresničen na podlagi izvedenskih mnenj različnih revizorjev in investicijske banke o vrednosti vložene tihe udeležbe dežele v LBB in tržni primernosti nasprotnih dajatev – prenesene delnice BGB, tudi v razmerju do drugih delničarjev.
Germany provided relevant extracts from these reports and the related correspondence with the accountants.
Nemčija je posredovala ustrezne odlomke izvedenskih mnenj in dopise, ki si jih je izmenjala z revizorji.
According to these documents, the value of LBB was set at some DEM 3,5 billion in 1993 (excluding IBB itself, but taking account of LBB's higher core capital ratio as a result of the special-purpose reserve) and, by a further expert, at just under DEM 6 billion at 31 December 1997.
V izvedenskih mnenjih je bila vrednost LBB leta 1993 ocenjena na približno 3,5 milijarde DEM (brez IBB, ampak s temeljnim kapitalom LBB, ki se je povečal zaradi rezerve za posebne namene), 31. decembra 1997 pa jo je nek drug izvedenec ocenil na slabih 6 milijard DEM.
Germany also suggested, in the alternative, that the method used by the Commission in Decision 2000/392/EC was faulty in that it assumed comparability with liquid ordinary capital investment.
Sicer pa je bila Nemčija mnenja, da je metodika, ki je bila uporabljena pri Odločbi 2000/392/ES napačna, ker izhaja iz primerljivosti z likvidnimi običajnimi naložbami delniškega kapitala.
This approach failed to take account of the particularities of the transaction at issue in these proceedings.
Tak pristop ne ustreza posebnostim transakcije, o kateri je govora.
It was proper to use comparable equity instruments as a basis for calculating even the starting amount.
Že pri izhodiščni vrednosti je treba poseči po primerljivih instrumentih lastnega kapitala.
While this might be difficult, as the Commission had explained in the WestLB case, the difficulties would not be overcome by using a completely unsuitable equity capital instrument, almost as a ‘way around’ the problem.
To je sicer, kot je Komisija ugotovila že v primeru WestLB, lahko težko, vendar pa teh težav ni mogoče odpraviti s tem, da se uporabi popolnoma neprimeren instrument lastnega kapitala, tako rekoč kot „ovinek“.
It was also mistaken to use average return as a benchmark.
Nadalje je uporaba povprečnega donosa kot merila napačna.
Only a return below the range available to investors for assessment purposes was no longer acceptable to a private investor.
Šele donos, ki je nižji od najnižjega donosa v razponu donosov, ki jih imajo vlagatelji na voljo, tudi za zasebnega vlagatelja ni več sprejemljiv.
Lastly, it was erroneous to deduct only net refinancing costs instead of total refinancing costs.
Končno je odbitek samo neto stroškov refinanciranja namesto celotnih stroškov refinanciranja napačen.
Any tax savings by the company were immaterial from the investor's point of view.
Morebitni prihranki pri davkih so z vidika vlagatelja nepomembni.
A further consideration showed that this approach was unacceptable since with non-liquid provision of capital the earnings function of the capital was still available to the investor and could be re-invested by him to obtain at least the risk-free rate of interest, and he would thus achieve ‘double’ earnings.
Tudi že drug nadzorni premislek kaže, da je ta pristop nesprejemljiv, saj ima vlagatelj pri nelikvidni prepustitvi kapitala še naprej na razpolago funkcijo donosa kapitala, tako da ga lahko ponovno vloži in dobi vsaj netvegane obresti, torej „dvojni“ donos.
Germany also argued that the limitation period had expired (pursuant to Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999) and that the Commission therefore had no power to order recovery of any aid.
Poleg tega je Nemčija tudi mnenja, da Komisija zaradi poteka roka (člen 15(1) Uredbe 659/1999/ES) ni imela pooblastil, zahtevati vračila morebitnih pomoči.
The basic resolution on WBK's transfer had been adopted on 16 June 1992, i.e. more than ten years before the decision initiating the investigation procedure was served on 4 July 2002.
Osnovni sklep o prenosu WBK je bil sprejet že 16. junija 1992, več kot deset let pred začetkom postopka, ki je bil vročen 4. julija 2002.
The resolution expressed the basic intention to merge the Land’s bank holdings and WBK into one holding company (later BGB), provided that WBK's promotional activities could continue and that the assumption of sovereign tasks and the tax exemption were guaranteed.
Pri tem je bil načeloma namen tak, da se udeležbe dežele in WBK v bankah združi v holding (kasnejša BGB), kolikor bi bili zagotovljeni nadaljevanje pospeševalnega poslovanja WBK, opravljanje upravnih nalog in neobdavčenost.
The resolution had been in the public domain since then, and the Commission had been informed of its date in 1999.
Sklep je bil javnosti od takrat znan, Komisija je bila o datumu sprejetja sklepa obveščena leta 1999.
In a number of decisions, the Commission had already taken the declaration of intent by the relevant body, even subject to conditions, as marking the point at which the aid was implemented.
Komisija je že v več odločbah razlago namena pristojnega organa – celo pod pogoji – ocenila kot čas izvajanja pomoči.
This was also the position adopted by the Commission in the decision on rescue aid for BGB, even though the resolution concerned, adopted on 22 May 2002, had still required the approval of Parliament and of the Commission.
Tako je to Komisija na primer ocenila tudi pri odločbi o reševalni pomoči za BGB, čeprav zadevni sklep z dne 22. maja 2002 še ni bil potrjen s strani Parlamenta in Komisije.
Moreover, in Germany's view, the limitation period had not been interrupted pursuant to the second sentence of Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which states that only action taken by the Commission can interrupt the period.
Nadalje po mnenju Nemčije rok v skladu s členom 15(2)(2) Uredbe 659/1999/ES ni bil prekinjen. V skladu s tem členom lahko rok z ukrepi prekine samo Komisija.
The first such Commission action was the letter regarding the initiation of the procedure dated 4 July 2002, and not the requests for information, which were not measures taken by the Commission or the relevant Commission Member.
To se je zgodilo šele 4. julija 2002 z dopisom o začetku postopka in ne samo s prošnjami za informacije, ki niso ukrep Komisije ali pristojnega člana Komisije.
Account should moreover be taken of the fact that the limitation period existed in the interests of legal certainty, not only in relations between the Commission and the Member States but also for the recipients of state aid.
Nadalje je treba upoštevati, da rok zastaranja služi pravni varnosti ne le v razmerju Komisija – države članice, ampak tudi pravni varnosti prejemnika pomoči.
As Germany was asked for the first time in the decision initiating the procedure to forward a copy of the letter to the aid recipient, which it did on 9 July 2002, the limitation period was interrupted only as of that date.
Ker je bila Nemčija prvič v začetku postopka pozvana, da kopijo dopisa posreduje prejemniku pomoči, kar je storila dne 9. julija 2002, je učinek prekinitve zastaranja lahko nastopil šele tega dne.
Since the measure subject to state aid monitoring was the resolution of 16 June 1992, it constituted, if it were aid at all, existing aid pursuant to Article 15(3) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Ker je zadevni ukrep, ki ga je treba preiskati, sklep z dne 16. junija 1992, gre pri njem, če sploh gre za pomoč, za obstoječo pomoč v skladu s členom 15(3) Uredbe 659/1999/ES.
V. COMMENTS FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
V. PRIPOMBE OSTALIH ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANK
After the decision initiating the procedure had been published in the Official Journal, the Commission received comments from the Berliner Volksbank (‘BV’) and the Bundesverband deutscher Banken (‘BdB’) in October and November respectively.
Po objavi začetka postopka v Uradnem listu je Komisija oktobra oz. novembra prejela pripombe Berliner Volksbank („BV“) in Zveznega združenja nemških bank Bundesverband deutscher Banken („BdB“).
The BV took the view that the transfer of WBK was aid because the capital had been made available on terms which a market-economy investor would not have accepted.
BV je bila mnenja, da je prenos WBK pomoč, ker so bila kapitalska sredstva dana na razpolago pod pogoji, ki jih vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu ne bi sprejel.
Payments were made by LBB to IBB, which was itself managed as a division of LBB; moreover, the agreed interest rate of 0,25 % lay well below the normal market rates, as illustrated by Decisions 2000/392/EC (WestLB), 95/547/EC and 98/490/EC (Crédit Lyonnais), where a likely return on capital of at least 12 % was taken as a basis.
LBB je plačevala IBB, ki je sama oddelek LBB; poleg tega je dogovorjena obrestna mera 0,25 % dosti nižja od tržno običajnih obrestnih mer, kot bi na primer pokazale Odločbe 2000/392/ES (WestLB), 95/547/ES in 98/490/ES (Crédit Lyonnais), v katerih je bil za izračun uporabljen najmanj pričakovan donos iz lastnega kapitala v vrednosti 12 %.
This aid led to a serious distortion of Community-wide competition, but with particularly serious consequences in Berlin, where BGB, including LBB (and Berliner Bank and Berliner Sparkasse), led the market in personal and corporate retail banking.
Ta pomoč je hudo izkrivila konkurenco v Skupnosti in zlasti izredno močno vplivala na konkurenco v Berlinu, kjer je BGB skupaj z LBB pri poslovanju z občani in podjetji (skupaj z Berliner Bank in Berliner Sparkasse) vodilna na tržišču.
By comparison, BV was a small competitor with market shares of 5-7 % and was thus particularly affected by the negative impact of the aid.
Nasprotno je BV majhen tekmec s temu ustreznimi tržnimi deleži 5-7 % in zato je pomoč nanjo vplivala še posebej negativno.
It closed its statement by calling on the Commission to order recovery of the aid.
V zaključku pripomb BV prosi Komisijo naj odredi vračilo pomoči.
The BdB began by stating that the proceedings at issue formed part of a series of investigations by the Commission involving the transfer of Land housing promotion institutions to the Landesbanks, which carried on competitive business.
BdB je najprej pojasnilo, da je zadevni postopek del kompleksnih preiskav Komisije, tj. prenosa zavoda za spodbujanje gradnje stanovanj dežel na deželne banke, ki se ukvarjajo s konkurenčnimi posli.
In LBB's case too, contrary to the statements by Germany, the higher own funds requirements under the Solvency Directive were decisive.
Tudi v primeru LBB so bile v nasprotju s trditvijo Nemčije odločilne zaostrene zahteve po lastnem kapitalu v skladu z Direktivo o solventnosti.
Evidence that this was the case were the timing of the transfer and the comments by the relevant Member of the Land Government at the time, who referred to the European own funds requirements, which were expected to become stricter.
Ta motivacija je razvidna že iz časa prenosa in izjav takrat pristojnega senatorja, ki je tudi omenil strožje evropske predpise glede lastnega kapitala, ki se jih je takrat pričakovalo.
In this respect, there was no relevant difference in state aid terms between the transfer of WBK to LBB at issue here and the transfer of WfA to WestLB, which meant that the method used by the Commission in Decision 2000/392/EC could be applied here.
Zato pravno gledano z vidika pomoči ni pomembne razlike med prenosom WBK na LBB, ki ga je treba oceniti tu, in prenosom WfA na WestLB, tako da se lahko uporabi metodika, ki jo je Komisija uporabila v Odločbi 2000/392/ES.