natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
When compared to the Finnish territory, the aggregate market shares of the three largest generators are, of course, higher [11].
Kar zadeva finsko ozemlje pa je vsota tržnega deleža treh največjih proizvajalcev seveda višja [11].
However, the periods in which the Finnish market is isolated are limited [12].
Vendar so obdobja, v katerih je finski trg izoliran, omejena [12].
There is, therefore, during significant parts of the year, a competitive pressure deriving from the potential to obtain electricity from outside Finnish territory, the more so as no transmission fee is charged between the Nordic countries.
Zato znatni del leta obstaja pritisk konkurence, ki izhaja iz možnosti, da se električno energijo pridobi zunaj finskega ozemlja, zlasti zato, ker med nordijskimi državami ni pristojbine za prenos.
The temporary nature of congestion prevents investment inside the Finnish territory without having regard to other producers in the Nordic market.
Začasni zastoji preprečujejo naložbe znotraj finskega ozemlja, ne da bi upoštevali druge proizvajalce na nordijskem trgu.
These factors should therefore be taken as an indication of direct exposure to competition for the production market whether taken as the national Finnish market or the emerging regional one.
Te dejavnike je zato treba šteti kot pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci za trg proizvodnje ne glede na to, ali je osnova nacionalni finski trg ali nastajajoči regionalni trg.
The degrees of concentration and of liquidity are also good indicators of competition on the electricity wholesale market.
Stopnji koncentracije in likvidnosti sta tudi dober pokazatelj konkurence na veleprodajnem trgu električne energije.
The market share of Nord Pool Spot AS, the voluntary Nordic power exchange described in recital 3, in 2004 was 42 % of the physical delivery in the Nordic countries [13].
Tržni delež Nord Pool Spot AS – prostovoljne nordijske energetske borze, opisane v uvodni izjavi 3 – je bil leta 200442 % fizične dobave v nordijskih državah [13].
In comparison to a regional market, this is at a satisfactory level.
Kar zadeva regionalni trg, je to zadovoljiva stopnja.
Furthermore, the conditions of competition in the electricity wholesale trade are also greatly influenced by financial trade in electricity in the market area, which, in terms of volume via NordPool, represented 1,5 times the amount consumed in the Nordic countries [14] (and, if other identified transactions such as OTC, over the counter or direct sale, are included, more than four times the amount [15].
Poleg tega na pogoje konkurence v veleprodajni trgovini z električno energijo močno vpliva finančno trgovanje z električno energijo na področju trga, ki je glede na obseg trgovanja prek NordPool pomenilo 1,5 količine, porabljene v nordijskih državah [14] (če vključimo še ostale transakcije, kot sta OTC in neposredna prodaja, pa je vrednost več kot štirikrat večja [15].
As concluded in the Technical Annex [16], this degree of liquidity should be considered as being satisfactory, i.e. it is such as to constitute an indicator of a well-functioning and competitive regional market.
Kakor je bilo ugotovljeno v Tehnični prilogi [16], je treba to stopnjo likvidnosti šteti za zadovoljivo, tj. stopnja je pokazatelj, da regionalni trg deluje dobro in konkurenčno.
As previously indicated, the competitive situation should also be examined as it relates solely to Finnish territory.
Kot je bilo predhodno navedeno, je treba konkurenčne razmere proučiti tudi samo glede finskega ozemlja.
First of all it should once again be stressed that the aforementioned bottleneck problems are not constant, only temporary.
Najprej je treba ponovno poudariti, da prej omenjeni problemi ozkih grl niso stalni, ampak le začasni.
There is therefore the constant competitive pressure deriving from the potential to obtain electricity from outside Finnish territory, the more so as no transmission fee is charged between the Nordic countries.
Zato znatni del leta obstaja pritisk konkurence, ki izhaja iz možnosti, da se električno energijo pridobi zunaj finskega ozemlja, zlasti zato, ker med nordijskimi državami ni pristojbine za prenos.
Furthermore, prices for wholesale electricity in Finland are set by Nordpool.
Poleg tega veleprodajne cene električne energije določi Nordpool.
These factors should therefore be taken as an indication of direct exposure to competition for the wholesale market, whether taken as the national Finnish market or the emerging regional one.
Ti dejavniki morajo zato veljati kot pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci za veleprodajni trg ne glede na to, ali je osnova nacionalni finski trg ali nastajajoči regionalni trg.
Taking the size of the country into account, the number of economic operators on the retail market is fairly large (more than 60, a considerable number of which offer their services on a nationwide basis) as is the number of companies with a market share above 5 %.
Glede na velikost države je število gospodarskih subjektov na maloprodajnem trgu razmeroma veliko (več kot 60, od katerih jih znatno število ponuja storitve na državni ravni) kot tudi število podjetij s tržnim deležem več kot 5 %.
According to the latest information available, the aggregate market share of the three largest companies in terms of supply to small- and medium-sized businesses, as well as to very small commercial customers and households, is at a satisfactorily low level at 35-40 % [17].
Po zadnjih razpoložljivih podatkih je vsota tržnih deležev treh največjih družb v smislu oskrbe malih in srednjih podjetij ter zelo majhnih poslovnih odjemalcev in gospodinjstev na zadovoljivo nizki stopnji 35–40 % [17].
These factors should therefore be taken as an indication of direct exposure to competition.
Te dejavnike je zato treba upoštevati kot znak neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci.
The workings of the balancing markets should also be considered as indicators, not only in respect of production but also for the wholesale and retail markets.
Delovanje izravnalnih trgov je ravno tako treba šteti za pokazatelje, ne samo v zvezi s proizvodnjo, ampak tudi za veleprodajni in maloprodajni trg.
In fact, ‘any market participant who cannot easily match its generation portfolio to the characteristics of its customers may find itself exposed to the difference between the price at which the TSO (transmission system operator) will sell imbalance energy, and the price at which it will buy back excess production.
Dejansko „je lahko kateri koli udeleženec na trgu, ki le s težavo prilagodi svoj proizvodni portfelj lastnostim svojih strank, izpostavljen razliki med ceno, po kateri bo upravljavec prenosnih omrežij prodajal izravnalno električno energijo, in ceno, po kateri bo odkupil presežno proizvodnjo.
A high spread may be indicative of an insufficient level of competition in the balancing market which may be dominated by only one or two main generators.
To se pojavlja v mnogih državah članicah in lahko škodi razvoju konkurence.
Such difficulties are made worse where network users are unable to adjust their positions close to real time.’
Velika razlika je lahko znak nezadostne stopnje konkurence na izravnalnem trgu, na katerem lahko prevladujeta samo eden ali dva glavna proizvajalca.
There is an integrated balancing market in the Nordic area for supplying balancing energy and its main characteristics (market-based pricing, hourly gate closures and a low spread) are such that it should be taken as an indicator of direct exposure to competition.
Na nordijskem območju obstaja integriran izravnalni trg za oskrbo izravnalne energije, njegove glavne značilnosti (tržno določanje cen, možnost prilagajanja vsako uro in nizke cenovne razlike) pa so takšne, da lahko veljajo kot pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci.
Given the characteristics of the product concerned here (electricity) and the scarcity or unavailability of suitable substitutable products or services, price competition and price formation assume greater importance when assessing the competitive state of the electricity markets. The number of customers switching supplier is an indicator of genuine price competition and, thus, indirectly, ‘a natural indicator of the effectiveness of competition.
Ob upoštevanju značilnosti zadevnega proizvoda (električna energija) in pomanjkanja primernih nadomestnih proizvodov ali storitev je treba cenovni konkurenci in oblikovanju cen pri ocenjevanju stanja konkurence na trgih električne energije pripisati večji pomen.
If few customers are switching, there is likely to be a problem with the functioning of the market, even if the benefits from the possibility of renegotiating with the historical supplier should not be ignored.’
Število odjemalcev, ki menjajo dobavitelje, je pokazatelj resnične cenovne konkurence in zato posredno „naravni pokazatelj učinkovitosti konkurence.
Furthermore, ‘the existence of regulated end-user prices is clearly a key determinant of customer behaviour (…) Although the retaining of controls may be justified in a period of transition, these will increasingly cause distortions as the need for investment approaches.’
Če menja malo odjemalcev, verjetno obstaja problem pri delovanju trga, čeprav ne smemo pozabiti koristi, ki jih prinaša možnost ponovnega pogajanja s prejšnjim dobaviteljem“ [19].
In Finland, the degree of switching for the three categories of users — large and very large industrial users, small and medium-sized industrial and business, and very small business and household users — is above 75 % for the first two groups and 30 % for the last category [21] and there is no end-user price control [22]: that is, prices are set by the economic operators themselves and do not have to be approved by any authority prior to their application.
Na Finskem je stopnja menjav za tri skupine uporabnikov – velike in zelo velike industrijske uporabnike, male in srednje industrijske in poslovne uporabnike ter zelo majhne poslovne in gospodinjske uporabnike – nad 75 % za prvi dve skupini in 30 % za zadnjo skupino [21], medtem ko nadzora nad cenami za končne uporabnike ni [22], kar pomeni, da cene določijo gospodarski subjekti sami in jih pred njihovo uporabo ni treba odobriti nobenemu drugemu organu.
The situation in Finland is therefore satisfactory as far as switching and end-user price control are concerned and should be taken as an indicator of direct exposure to competition.
Stanje na Finskem je zato zadovoljivo, kar zadeva menjave in nadzor nad cenami za končne uporabnike, in mora veljati kot pokazatelj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci.
In view of the abovementioned indicators and given the overall picture of this sector in Finland, in particular the extent to which networks have been unbundled from generation/supply and the effective regulation of network access, that emerges from the information submitted by the Republic of Finland, the 2005 Report and the Technical Annex thereto, the condition of direct exposure to competition laid down in Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC should be considered to be met in respect of production and sale of electricity in Finland, excluding the Åland islands.
Ob upoštevanju zgoraj omenjenih pokazateljev in splošnega stanja v tem sektorju na Finskem – zlasti glede na obseg, v katerem so bila omrežja ločena od proizvodnje/oskrbe, in učinkovito ureditev dostopa do omrežja –, ki je razvidno iz informacij Republike Finske, Poročila za leto 2005 in Tehnične priloge k Poročilu, se šteje, da je pogoj neposredne izpostavljenosti konkurenci, določen v členu 30(1) Direktive 2004/17/ES, glede proizvodnje in prodaje električne energije na Finskem, pri čemer Ålandski otoki niso vključeni, izpolnjen.
As noted in recital 5, the further condition of free access to the activity must be deemed to be met.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj v uvodni izjavi 5, je treba šteti, da je nadaljnji pogoj za prost dostop do dejavnosti izpolnjen.
Consequently, Directive 2004/17/EC should not apply when contracting entities award contracts intended to enable electricity generation or the sale of electricity to be carried out in these geographical areas nor when they organise design contests for the pursuit of such an activity there.
Zato se Direktiva 2004/17/ES ne sme uporabljati niti v primerih, kadar naročniki oddajo naročila za omogočanje proizvodnje ali prodaje električne energije na teh zemljepisnih območjih, niti kadar organizirajo natečaje za tamkajšnje izvajanje takšne dejavnosti.
This Decision is based on the legal and factual situation as of February 2006 as it appears from the information submitted by the Republic of Finland, the 2005 Report and the Technical Annex thereto.
Ta odločba temelji na pravnem in dejanskem stanju iz februarja 2006, kot je razvidno iz informacij Republike Finske, Poročila za leto 2005 in Tehnične priloge k Poročilu.
Directive 2004/17/EC shall not apply to contracts awarded by contracting entities and intended to enable them to carry out electricity generation or the sale of electricity in Finland, excluding the Åland islands.
Direktiva 2004/17/ES se ne uporablja za naročila, ki naročnikom omogočajo proizvodnjo ali prodajo električne energije na Finskem, pri čemer Ålandski otoki niso vključeni.
Done at Brussels, 19 June 2006.
V Bruslju, 19. junija 2006
This is consistent with the findings of the Preliminary Report of the Sector Inquiry into Competition in Gas and Electricity Markets (in the following referred to as Preliminary Report), Annex B, p. 197, which found that the congestion frequency of the Sweden-Finland link was of the order of 8 % in the first eight months of 2005.
To je v skladu z ugotovitvami predhodnega poročila preiskave sektorja v zvezi s konkurenco na trgu s plinom in električno energijo (v nadaljevanju „Predhodno poročilo“), Priloga B, str. 197, v katerem je bilo ugotovljeno, da je bila v prvih osmih mesecih leta 2005 pogostost zastojev povezave med Švedsko in Finsko 8 %.
Of the order of approximately 28 % of peak demand.
Približno 28 % največjega povpraševanja.
COM(2005) 568 final of 15.11.2005.
COM(2005) 568 konč.
2005 Report, p. 2.
Poročilo iz leta 2005, str. 2.
2005 Report, p. 7.
Poročilo iz leta 2005, str. 7.
Commission Staff Working Document, Technical Annex to the 2005 Report, SEC(2005) 1448.
Delovni dokument osebja Komisije, Tehnična priloga k Poročilu iz leta 2005, SEC(2005) 1448.
Technical Annex, p. 44, table 4.1.
Tehnična priloga, str. 44, tabela 4.1.
According to the Preliminary Report, Annex C, p. 201, the aggregate share was 73,6 % in 2004.
Glede na Predhodno poročilo, Priloga C, str. 201 je bila leta 2004 vsota deležev 73,6 %.
To 9,3 % of the time in 2005, see recital 3.
9,3 % časa v letu 2005, glej uvodno izjavo 3.
Technical Annex, p. 124.
Tehnična priloga, str. 124.
Preliminary Report, p. 112.
Predhodno poročilo, str. 112.
See the information given by the Finnish authorities and the Technical Annex, p. 44, table 4.1.
Glej podatke, ki so jih dali finski organi, in Tehnično prilogo, str. 44, tabela 4.1.
Technical Annex, p. 44.
Tehnična priloga, str. 44–45.
The Finnish application and Technical Annex, p. 45.
Finski zahtevek in Tehnična priloga, str. 45.
Technical Annex, p. 67.
Tehnična priloga, str. 67–68.
2005 Report, p. 9.
Poročilo za leto 2005, str. 9.
Technical Annex, p. 17.
Tehnična priloga, str. 17.
2005 Report, p. 10.
Poročilo za leto 2005, str. 10.
These prices may either be directly imposed by the regulator on the TSO; or alternatively a market based mechanism will be used in which the price is determined by bids from other producers to regulate their production upwards or downwards (…) a key difficulty for small market participants arises where there is the risk of a large spread between the buying price from the TSO and the selling price.
Te cene lahko upravljalcem prenosnih omrežij neposredno predpiše regulatorni organ ali pa se kot druga rešitev uporabi tržni mehanizem, po katerem se cena določi na podlagi ponudb drugih proizvajalcev, ki lahko tako svojo proizvodnjo popravijo navzgor ali navzdol.
This occurs in a number of Member States and is likely to be detrimental to the development of competition.
Glavna težava za male udeležence na trgu se pojavi, kadar obstaja nevarnost velike razlike med nakupno ceno upravljavca prenosnih omrežij in prodajno ceno.
of 20 June 2006
z dne 20. junija 2006
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in Romania
o ustavitvi protidampinškega postopka glede uvoza silicijevega karbida s poreklom iz Romunije
On 17 May 2005, the Commission received a complaint concerning the alleged injurious dumping of imports of silicon carbide originating in Romania.
Komisija je 17. maja 2005 prejela pritožbo o domnevnem škodljivem dampinškem uvozu silicijevega karbida s poreklom iz Romunije.
The complaint was lodged by the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) on behalf of Community producers representing 100 % of the total Community production of silicon carbide pursuant to Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the basic Regulation.
Pritožbo je v skladu s členom 4(1) in členom 5(4) osnovne uredbe vložil Evropski svet za kemično industrijo („CEFIC“) v imenu proizvajalcev Skupnosti, ki predstavljajo 100 % celotne proizvodnje silicijevega karbida v Skupnosti.
The complaint contained prima facie evidence of the existence of dumping and of material injury resulting therefrom, which was considered sufficient to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding.
Pritožba je vsebovala prima facie dokaze o dampingu in o posledični znatni škodi, kar je zadostovalo za upravičenost začetka protidampinškega postopka.
The Commission, by a notice (notice of initiation) published in the Official Journal of the European Union [2], accordingly initiated an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into the Community of silicon carbide, currently classifiable within CN code 28492000 and originating in Romania.
Komisija je z obvestilom („obvestilo o začetku“), objavljenim v Uradnem listu Evropske Unije [2] začela s protidampinškim postopkom v zvezi z uvozom silicijevega karbida v Skupnost, trenutno uvrščenega pod oznako KN 28492000, s poreklom iz Romunije.
The Commission officially advised the exporting producers, importers and associations of importers or exporters known to be concerned, the representatives of the exporting country, users, consumer organisations and the complainant Community producers of the initiation of the investigation.
Komisija je o začetku preiskave uradno obvestila proizvajalce izvoznike, uvoznike, združenja uvoznikov ali izvoznikov, za katere je znano, da jih to zadeva, predstavnike države izvoznice, uporabnike, organizacije potrošnikov in proizvajalce pritožnike Skupnosti.
Interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing within the time limit set out in the notice of initiation and questionnaires were sent to all parties concerned.
Zainteresiranim strankam je bila dana možnost, da pisno izrazijo svoja stališča in zaprosijo Komisijo za zaslišanje v roku, ki je naveden v obvestilu o začetku postopka, vsem zadevnim strankam pa so bili poslani tudi vprašalniki.
On 1 March 2006 CEFIC formally withdrew its complaint.
CEFIC je 1. marca 2006 uradno umaknil svojo pritožbo.
In accordance with Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation, the proceeding may be terminated where the complaint is withdrawn, unless such termination would not be in the Community interest.
V skladu s členom 9(1) osnovne uredbe, se lahko postopek ustavi, če je pritožba umaknjena, razen če takšna ustavitev ne bi bila v interesu Skupnosti.
Interested parties were informed accordingly and were given the opportunity to comment.
Zainteresirane stranke so bile o tem obveščene in dobile so možnost, da dajo pripombe.
No comments were received indicating that such termination would not be in the Community interest.
Prejeta ni bila nobena pripomba, da ta ustavitev ni v interesu Skupnosti.
The Commission therefore concludes that the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into the Community of silicon carbide originating in Romania should be terminated without the imposition of anti-dumping measures,
Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je treba protidampinški postopek v zvezi z uvozom silicijevega karbida s poreklom iz Romunije v Skupnost ustaviti brez uvedbe protidampinških ukrepov –
The anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide, currently classifiable within CN code 28492000 and originating in Romania, is hereby terminated.
Protidampinški postopek v zvezi z uvozom silicijevega karbida, trenutno uvrščenega pod oznako KN 28492000, s poreklom iz Romunije, se ustavi.
Done at Brussels, 20 June 2006.
V Bruslju, 20. junija 2006
OJ C 159, 30.6.2005, p. 4.
UL C 159, 30.6.2005, str. 4.
laying down performance monitoring methods and methods for assessing cattle's genetic value for pure-bred breeding animals of the bovine species
o določitvi metod za spremljanje proizvodnih lastnosti in metod za napovedovanje genetske vrednosti čistopasemskega plemenskega goveda
(notified under document number C(2006) 2376)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2006) 2376)
Having regard to Council Directive 77/504/EEC of 25 July 1977 on pure-bred breeding animals of the bovine species [1], and in particular the first indent of Article 6(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Direktive Sveta 77/504/EGS z dne 25. julija 1977 o čistopasemskem plemenskem govedu [1], in zlasti prve alinee člena 6(1) Direktive,
Commission Decision 86/130/EEC of 11 March 1986 laying down performance monitoring methods and methods for assessing cattle’s genetic value for pure-bred breeding animals of the bovine species [2] has been substantially amended [3].
Odločba Komisije 86/130/EGS z dne 11. marca 1986 o določitvi metod za merjenje in ocenjevanje proizvodnih lastnosti in metod za napovedovanje genetske vrednosti čistopasemskega plemenskega goveda [2] je bila bistveno spremenjena [3].
The Commission is to determine the methods for performance recording and genetic evaluation of bovine animals.
Komisija določa metode za kontrolo proizvodnih lastnosti in vrednotenje genetske vrednosti govedi.
The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Zootechnics,
Ukrepi, predvideni s to direktivo, so v skladu z mnenjem Stalnega odbora za zootehniko –
The performance monitoring methods and methods for assessing cattle's genetic value for pure-bred breeding animals of the bovine species shall be those laid down in Annex I.
Za čistopasemsko plemensko govedo se za spremljanje proizvodnih lastnosti in za napovedovanje genetske vrednosti govedi uporabljajo metode, določene v Prilogi I.
Decision 86/130/EEC is repealed.
Odločba 86/130/EGS se razveljavi.
References to the repealed Decision shall be construed as references to this Decision and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex III.
Sklici na razveljavljeno odločbo se upoštevajo kot sklici na to odločbo in se berejo v skladu s primerjalno tabelo v Prilogi III.
Decision as amended by Decision 94/515/EC (OJ L 207, 10.8.1994, p. 30).
Odločba, kakor je bila spremenjena z Odločbo 94/515/ES (UL L 207, 10.8.1994, str. 30).
I. The competent authorities of the Member States are to approve the bodies responsible for setting the rules for performance recording and assessing the genetic value and for publication of the evaluation results of pure-bred breeding animals of the bovine species.
I. Pristojni organi držav članic morajo odobriti organizacije, odgovorne za določitev pravil za proizvodnih lastnosti in napoved genetske vrednosti ter za objavljanje rezultatov vrednotenja čistopasemskega plemenskega goveda.
The names of the approved bodies must be notified to the Commission and the other Member States.
Imena odobrenih organizacij je treba sporočiti Komisiji in drugim državam članicam.
In particular, those bodies shall give an account of the recording methods, the model of performance description, the statistical method of analysis and the genetic parameters used for each evaluated trait.
Navedene organizacije morajo predvsem poročati o metodah, o obrazcu za opis proizvodnih lastnosti, o statistični metodi analize in o genetskih parametrih za vsako ocenjeno lastnost.
Performance recording
Spremljanje proizvodnih lastnosti