natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The deferred lease payments to HCz as well as the interest owed to ZUS and FGSP were paid at the statutory rate of 16 % between July 2002 and 21 January 2003, 13 % until 24 September 2003 and 12,25 % until 25 November 2004.
Odložena plačila najemnine HCz kot tudi obresti, dolgovane ZUS in FGSP, so bile plačane po zakonski stopnji 16 % med julijem 2002 in 21. januarjem 2003, 13 % do 24. septembra 2003 in 12,25 % do 25. novembra 2004.
Finally, the aid in the form of fiscal benefits from PFRON and the Tax Office of PLN 62116 (about EUR 13077) has not been repaid because the tax authorities did not accept repayment without a recovery decision.
Nazadnje, pomoč v obliki davčnih olajšav od PFRON in davčnega urada v znesku 62116 PLN (približno 13077 EUR) ni bila povrnjena, ker davčne oblasti niso sprejele izplačila brez odločbe o vračilu.
However, Poland claims that this is de minimis aid.
Vendar Poljska trdi, da je to pomoč de minimis.
Approval of changes in the NRP
Odobritev sprememb v NPP
Poland asks for the Commission's agreement under point 10 of Protocol No 8 to changes in the NRP.
Poljska prosi za sporazum Komisije v skladu s točko 10 Protokola št. 8 za spremembe v NPP.
The Polish authorities have provided assurances that HCz will continue to operate without aid and not be liquidated.
Poljske oblasti so zagotovile, da bo HCz še naprej deloval brez pomoči in ne bo likvidiran.
In exchange, Poland undertakes that HCz will not receive any additional state aid between 1997 and 2006 and not increase the capacity described above before end-2006, the end of the restructuring period laid down in Protocol No 8.
V zameno se Poljska obvezuje, da HCz ne bo prejel nobene dodatne državne pomoči med leti 1997 in 2006 in ne bo povečal opisane zmogljivosti pred koncem leta 2006, ko se zaključi obdobje prestrukturiranja, določeno v Protokolu št. 8.
The Polish authorities have explained that restructuring HCz without state aid was not considered possible when the NRP was drafted in autumn 2002.
Poljske oblasti so pojasnile, da se prestrukturiranje HCz brez državne pomoči ni štelo za mogoče, ko je bil jeseni 2002 osnovan NPP.
As long as there seemed to be a possibility of full repayment of debts with the help of state aid, no creditor was willing to forego its part of the debt.
Dokler je obstajala možnost celotnega povračila dolgov s pomočjo državne pomoči, se noben upnik ni želel odreči svojemu delu dolga.
Only when the NRP refused to provide aid to HCz did the company's creditors agree to reduce their receivables.
Šele ko je NPP odklonil zagotavljanje pomoči HCz, so se upniki podjetja sporazumeli o znižanju svojih terjatev.
Furthermore, only the entry-into-force of the Act of 30 October 2002 provided an effective instrument under Polish law enabling public claims to be written off and creditors to be paid in proceedings under their control.
Razen tega je šele začetek veljavnosti zakona z dne 30. oktobra 2002 zagotovil učinkovit instrument v skladu s poljsko zakonodajo, ki je omogočil, da so bile javne terjatve odpisane in upniki plačani v postopkih pod njihovim nadzorom.
Assurance concerning separation of the respective operations of LNM, MSP and HCz
Zagotovila glede ločevanja zadevnih dejavnosti LNM, MSP in HCz
Poland has assured the Commission that the contract for the sale of MH, HSCz and other companies to a strategic investor will exclude the possibility of state aid being passed on from any of the recipients under Protocol No 8 to HCz.
Poljska je Komisiji zagotovila, da bo pogodba za prodajo MH, HSCz in druga podjetja strateškemu investitorju izključila možnost, da bi bila državna pomoč prenesena od katerega koli prejemnika v skladu s Protokolom št. 8 na HCz.
With that aim, specific provision will be made in the sales contract with the investor for all necessary monitoring arrangements.
S tem ciljem bo v prodajni pogodbi za vse potrebne nadzorne ureditve narejena posebna določba z investitorjem.
AID ASSESSMENT
PRESOJA POMOČI
Point 1 of Protocol No 8 provides that ‘notwithstanding Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty, state aid granted by Poland for restructuring purposes to specified parts of the Polish steel industry shall be deemed to be compatible with the common market’ if, inter alia, the conditions set out in the Protocol are met.
Točka 1 Protokola št. 8 določa, da se „ne glede na člena 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES državna pomoč, ki jo je odobrila Poljska za namene prestrukturiranja določenih delov poljske jeklarske industrije, šteje za združljivo s skupnim trgom“, če so med drugim izpolnjeni pogoji, ki so določeni v Protokolu.
According to point 3 of Protocol No 8, restructuring aid may be granted only to the companies listed in Annex 1.
Po točki 3 Protokola št. 8 se lahko pomoč za prestrukturiranje podeli samo podjetjem, ki so navedena v Prilogi 1.
Poland has selected 8 companies to be included on that list.
Poljska je izbrala 8 podjetij, ki naj se jih vključi na ta seznam.
Neither HCz, HSCz nor any subsidiaries of HCz are listed.
Vključena niso niti HCz, HSCz niti druga hčerinska podjetja HCz.
Point 6, third subparagraph of Protocol No 8 prohibits granting any additional aid for the purpose of restructuring the Polish steel industry.
Točka 6 tretjega pododstavka Protokola št. 8 prepoveduje podelitev kakršnekoli dodatne pomoči za namene prestrukturiranja poljske jeklarske industrije.
To that end, point 18 of Protocol No 8 gives the Commission the power to take ‘appropriate steps requiring any company concerned to reimburse any aid granted’ if monitoring of the restructuring shows non-compliance as a result of the award of ‘additional incompatible state aid to the steel industry.’
Točka 18 Protokola št. 8 daje glede tega Komisiji pristojnost, da izvede „dodatne korake, s katerimi od vsakega zadevnega podjetja zahteva povračilo vsake odobrene pomoči“, če spremljanje prestrukturiranja pokaže nezdružljivost kot posledico podelitve „dodatne nezdružljive državne pomoči jeklarski industriji.“
The grace period for granting restructuring aid to the Polish steel industry under the Europe Agreement was extended by the Council until 31 December 2006.
Plačilni rok za odobritev pomoči za prestrukturiranje poljski jeklarski industriji v skladu z Evropskim sporazumom je Svet podaljšal do 31. decembra 2006.
This arrangement was recognised in Protocol No 8 as part of Poland's accession to the European Union.
Ta dogovor je Protokol št. 8 razglasil kot del poljskega pristopa k Evropski uniji.
In order to achieve this objective, it covers a time-frame extending before and after accession.
Da bi ta cilj dosegel, pokriva časovno obdobje pred in po pristopu.
More precisely, it authorises a limited amount of restructuring aid for the years from 1997 to 2003 and forbids any further state aid for restructuring purposes to the Polish steel industry between 1997 and 2006.
Bolj podrobno, odobrava omejen znesek pomoči za prestrukturiranje za leta od 1997 do 2003 in prepoveduje vsako dodatno državno pomoč za namene prestrukturiranja poljski jeklarski industriji med leti 1997 in 2006.
In that respect, it clearly differs from other provisions of the Accession Treaty such as the interim mechanism set out in Annex IV (the ‘existing aid procedure’), which only concerns state aid granted before accession in so far as it is ‘still applicable after’ the date of accession.
V tem smislu se jasno razlikuje od drugih določb Pristopne pogodbe, kot je začasni mehanizem, določen v Prilogi IV („obstoječi postopek pomoči“), ki zadeva samo državno pomoč, odobreno pred pristopom, v kolikor je „še vedno veljavna po“ datumu pristopa.
Protocol No 8 can therefore be regarded as lex specialis which, for the matters that it covers, supersedes any other provision of the Act of Accession.
Protokol št. 8 se lahko zato šteje kot lex specialis, ki za zadeve, ki jih pokriva, nadomešča vsako drugo določbo Akta o pristopu.
Consequently, while Articles 87 and 88 EC would normally not apply to aid granted before accession and which is not applicable after accession, the provisions of Protocol No 8 extend state aid monitoring under the EC Treaty to any aid granted for the restructuring of the Polish steel industry between 1997 and 2006.
Posledično, medtem ko se člena 87 in 88 ES navadno ne bi nanašala na pomoč, ki je odobrena pred pristopom in ki ni veljavna po pristopu, določbe Protokola št. 8 razširjajo spremljanje državne pomoči v skladu s Pogodbo ES na vsako pomoč, dodeljeno za prestrukturiranje poljske jeklarske industrije med leti 1997 in 2006.
The decision may be taken after Poland's accession under Article 88(2) EC because, in the absence of specific provisions in Protocol No 8, the normal rules and principles should apply.
Ta odločba se lahko sprejme po pristopu Poljske v skladu s členom 88(2) Pogodbe ES, ker se brez navzočnosti nekaterih določb v Protokolu št. 8 uporabljajo normalna pravila in načela.
Consequently Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 (hereinafter ‘the Procedural Regulation’) will also apply.
Posledično se bo uporabljala tudi Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 (v nadaljevanju „postopkovna uredba“).
According to Article 87(1) EC, state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts, or threatens to distort, competition by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, and is thereby incompatible with the common market.
V skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES je državna pomoč vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem, nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom, v kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami.
Article 86(1) EC specifies that Article 87 EC also applies to public undertakings, i.e. to companies controlled by the state.
Člen 86(1) Pogodbe ES določa, da se člen 87 Pogodbe ES nanaša tudi na javna podjetja, tj. podjetja, ki jih nadzira država.
Aid for the restructuring of Huta Częstochowa and application of the private creditor test
Pomoč za prestrukturiranje Huta Częstochowa in uporaba preizkusa zasebnih upnikov
The writing-off of debts by the authorities confers an economic advantage as it constitutes an agreement to forgo revenue and is therefore aid from state resources.
Odpis dolga, ki ga izvedejo oblasti, dodeli gospodarsko ugodnost, saj predstavlja sporazum za opuščanje prihodkov in je zato pomoč iz državnih virov.
However, in case-law, a state measure constitutes aid for the purposes of Article 87 EC only if the recipient acquires a competitive edge which it would not have acquired under normal market conditions.
Vendar po precedenčnem pravu državni ukrep predstavlja pomoč za namene člena 87 Pogodbe ES samo, če prejemnik pridobi konkurenčno prednost, ki je pod normalnimi tržnimi pogoji ne bi pridobil.
In fact, it has been established that a market economy investor may pursue a structural policy whereby he is guided by the longer-term prospect of the capital invested yielding a profit.
Dejansko se je izkazalo, da lahko investitor pod tržnimi pogoji uveljavlja strukturno politiko, pri čemer ga vodi dolgoročna možnost donosnosti vloženega kapitala.
However, according to case-law, a market economy creditor would tend to seek to obtain payment of sums owed to him by a debtor in financial difficulties within a reasonable period of time.
Vendar bi si v skladu s precedenčnim pravom upnik pod tržnimi pogoji in v razumnem časovnem obdobju moral prizadevati za plačilo zneskov, ki mu jih dolguje dolžnik v finančnih težavah.
Therefore, the Court of First Instance takes the view that, where a debtor in financial difficulties proposes rescheduling debt in order to avoid liquidation, each creditor must, as a minimum, carefully balance the advantage inherent in obtaining the offered sum under the restructuring plan and the sum they would be able to recover via the firm's liquidation (this evaluation is hereinafter referred to as ‘the private creditor test’).
Zato sodišče prve stopnje meni, da mora vsak upnik v primeru, ko dolžnik v finančnih težavah predlaga prerazporeditev dolga, da bi se izognil likvidaciji, vsaj pazljivo uskladiti ugodnosti, vsebovane pri pridobitvi ponujene vsote v skladu z načrtom za prestrukturiranje ter vsoto, ki bi jo lahko povrnili z likvidacijo podjetja (ta presoja je v nadaljevanju „preizkus zasebnih upnikov“).
The Court of First Instance has established that the private creditor test is influenced by a number of factors, including the creditor ' s status as the holder of a secured, preferential or ordinary claim, the nature and extent of any security it may hold, its assessment of the chances of the firm being restored to viability, as well as the amount it would receive in the event of liquidation.
Sodišče prve stopnje je ugotovilo, da na preizkus zasebnih upnikov vplivajo številni dejavniki, vključno s statusom upnika kot lastnika zavarovanih, preferencianih in običajnih terjatev, naravo in obsegom vsake terjatve, ki jo ima, njegove presoje možnosti, da bo podjetje ponovno vzpostavilo sposobnost preživetja, kot tudi zneska, ki bi ga prejel v primeru likvidacije.
Existence of aid as regards debt write-offs in favour of Huta Częstochowa
Obstoj pomoči v zvezi z odpisi dolgov za Huta Częstochowa
As regards the restructuring of HCz, the Commission has assessed the documentation and information provided by Poland and concluded that the doubts it expressed when proceedings were opened have subsequently been allayed.
Glede prestrukturiranja HCz je Komisija ocenila dokumentacijo in informacije, ki jih je zagotovila Poljska, in zaključila, da so bili dvomi, ki jih je izrazila, ko so se postopki začeli, posledično pomirjeni.
The Commission considers that the restructuring meets the private creditor test.
Komisija meni, da prestrukturiranje izpolnjuje preizkus zasebnih upnikov.
On the basis of the PWC analysis, the Commission no longer takes the view that, in view of the guarantees held by public institutional creditors, liquidation would yield better proceeds than restructuring.
Na osnovi analize PWC Komisija ni več mnenja, da bi v primeru poroštev, ki jih imajo javni institucionalni upniki, likvidacija prinesla boljše prihodke kot prestrukturiranje.
It understands from the explanations provided in the PWC analysis that public creditors had similar guarantees to private creditors on the same production assets; however, their guarantees were registered later than those of private creditors.
Iz razlag, ki jih ponuja analiza PWC, razume, da so imeli javni upniki podobna poroštva do zasebnih upnikov na istih proizvodnih sredstvih; vendar so bila njihova poroštva registrirana kasneje kot tista od zasebnih upnikov.
Therefore priority will be given to satisfying private creditors, thus reducing the extent to which public institutional creditors are satisfied.
Zato bo prednost dana zadovoljitvi zasebnih upnikov, s čimer bo zmanjšan obseg, v katerem so zadovoljeni javni institucionalni upniki.
In addition, the Commission can now conclude that the present restructuring proposal will allow each public creditor to benefit from the restructuring of HCz.
Komisija lahko sedaj poleg tega zaključi, da bo sedanji predlog prestrukturiranja dopuščal vsakemu javnemu upniku, da ima koristi od prestrukturiranja HCz.
To this end, the Commission notes that the assessment concerning commercial creditors should be made with reference to the situation prevailing in December 2003.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da se mora ocena glede komercialnih upnikov izvesti z upoštevanjem stanja, prevladujočega decembra 2003.
Although the Creditor Agreement has subsequently been amended, the basic elements of the agreement have remained valid and binding since that time.
Čeprav je bil upniški sporazum posledično spremenjen, so osnovni elementi sporazuma od takrat ostali veljavni in zavezujoči.
However, the relevant date for institutional public creditors is June 2005 because these creditors still have to agree unconditionally to the terms of the restructuring decision.
Vendar je ustrezen datum za institucionalne javne upnike junij 2005, ker se morajo ti upniki še vedno brezpogojno strinjati s pogoji odločbe o prestrukturiranju.
The analysis that restructuring will be more profitable for creditors than bankruptcy applies even in the best-case scenario of bankruptcy for public creditors.
Analiza, da bo prestrukturiranje bolj dobičkonosno za upnike kot stečaj, se uporablja tudi v najboljšem primeru stečaja za javne upnike.
In the best-case bankruptcy scenario for public creditors, only three public institutional creditors in 2005 and one public commercial creditor in 2003 could have received a smaller return in the event of restructuring than in the event of bankruptcy.
V najboljšem primeru stečaja za javne upnike bi samo trije javni institucionalni upniki v letu 2005 in eden javni komercialni upnik v letu 2003 lahko prejeli manjše povračilo v primeru prestrukturiranja kot v primeru stečaja.
However, all three public institutional creditors have voted against the restructuring and the Polish authorities have guaranteed that their claims will be repaid in full from RFG's assets.
Vendar so vsi trije javni institucionalni upniki glasovali proti prestrukturiranju in poljske oblasti so zagotovile, da bodo njihove terjatve v celoti izplačane iz sredstev RFG.
Therefore these public creditors have not provided any advantage to the debtor nor have they committed public resources, i.e. their conduct cannot entail any state aid.
Zato ti javni upniki niso zagotovili nobenih ugodnosti dolžniku, niti niso prevzeli javnih virov, tj. njihovo ravnanje ne more imeti za posledico nobene državne pomoči.
As to the public commercial creditor, Zakład Energetyczny, which is the energy provider in the Częstochowa region, it should first be noted that the difference in the level of satisfaction of its claims between the restructuring scenario and the bankruptcy scenario is minimal.
Glede javnega komercialnega upnika, Zakład Energetyczny, ki je ponudnik energije v regiji Częstochowa, je treba najprej opomniti, da je razlika v stopnji zadovoljitve njegovih terjatev med primerom prestrukturiranja in primerom stečaja minimalna.
Second, the Commission understands that a private creditor providing services to HCz would, in most cases, be against its bankruptcy because it would lose an important customer if HCz's production were interrupted for a long time or simply abandoned.
Drugič, Komisija razume, da bi bil zasebni upnik, ki nudi storitve HCz, v večini primerov proti stečaju, saj bi izgubil pomembno stranko, če bi bila proizvodnja HCz prekinjena za daljše časovno obdobje ali preprosto opuščena.
This is particularly true of Zakład Energetyczny, which would have lost its main client.
To velja zlasti za Zakład Energetyczny, ki bi izgubil svojo glavno stranko.
Therefore this creditor acted in accordance with its business interests and did not provide HCz with an undue advantage.
Zato je ta upnik ravnal v skladu s svojimi poslovnimi interesi in HCz ni zagotovil nepotrebnih ugodnosti.
In addition, the Commission understands that the private creditor test requires a realistic assessment of bankruptcy vis-à-vis restructuring, when considering the above-mentioned case-law according to which ‘the amount it would receive in the event of liquidation’ must be compared with ‘the assessment of the chances of the firm being restored to viability.’
Komisija tudi razume, da preizkus zasebnih upnikov zahteva realistično presojo stečaja vis-á-vis prestrukturiranju pri upoštevanju že omenjenega precedenčnega prava, po katerem mora biti „znesek, ki bi ga prejel v primeru likvidacije“ primerljiv s „presojo možnosti, da bo podjetje ponovno vzpostavilo sposobnost preživetja.“
In the present case there is clearly a good likelihood of the firm being restored to viability.
V najboljšem primeru je zagotovo zelo verjetno, da bo podjetje ponovno vzpostavilo sposobnost preživetja.
The commercial liabilities will be sold to a strategic investor, and there was evidence (in 2003) and still is today (in 2005) that serious offers have been made.
Komercialne obveznosti bodo prodane strateškemu investitorju in dokaz (leta 2003), ki še vedno obstaja (v letu 2005), kaže, da so bile podane resne ponudbe.
In addition, the transfer of claims to the Operator also appears to have a sound economic basis.
Poleg tega ima tudi prenos terjatev na operaterja trdno gospodarsko osnovo.
The value of the assets has been confirmed by a credible evaluation company.
Vrednost sredstev je potrdilo verodostojno podjetje za ocenjevanje.
The Commission also understands that the amount receivable in the event of bankruptcy as suggested by way of an example in the PWC analysis is by no means guaranteed.
Komisija prav tako razume, da znesek, prejet v primeru stečaja, kot je predlagano v primeru v analizi PWC, nikakor ni zagotovljen.
Rather, the analysis was made on the basis of a best-case scenario for public creditors, and is based on similar expectations of the sale of assets as those indicated for restructuring.
Analiza je temeljila zlasti na najboljšem primeru za javne upnike in ima podlago na podobnih pričakovanjih prodaje sredstev kot tistih, navedenih za prestrukturiranje.
However, it is by no means guaranteed that assets would be sold together by the receiver in a uniform process.
Vendar v nobenem primeru ni zagotovljeno, da bo prejemnik prodal sredstva skupaj v enotnem postopku.
Instead, some creditors may take away assets on which they have pledges, and as such the sale will probably yield a lower price than the restructuring process.
Namesto tega lahko nekateri upniki odvzamejo sredstva, na katerih imajo poroštva, in kot taka bi prodaja verjetno prinesla nižjo ceno kot pa postopek prestrukturiranja.
Poland has provided empirical evidence to confirm this hypothesis.
Poljska je zagotovila empirične dokaze za potrditev te hipoteze.
The behaviour of the private creditors clearly suggests that they would adopt a market-based approach.
Obnašanje zasebnih upnikov jasno nakazuje, da bodo sprejeli pristop, ki temelji na trgu.
In fact, the private creditors also voted for restructuring despite the fact that, according to tables 2 and 3, bankruptcy was in their favour.
Dejansko so tudi zasebni upniki glasovali za prestrukturiranje kljub dejstvu, glede na tabeli 2 in 3, da so bili naklonjeni stečaju.
For example, in 2003 the private bank BPH faced losses of its receivables of PLN 75 million equivalent to 19 % (PLN 14 million) in the event of bankruptcy while, in the event of restructuring, it was expected to lose about 49 % (PLN 37 million).
Na primer, v letu 2003 se je zasebna banka BPH soočila z izgubami svojih terjatev v vrednosti 75 milijonov PLN, enakovrednih 19 % (14 milijonov PLN) v primeru stečaja, medtem ko je v primeru prestrukturiranja pričakovala izgube približno 49 % (37 milijonov PLN).
As such, compared at the time with the best-case bankruptcy scenario, restructuring offered a return of only 62 %.
Zaradi tega je v primerjavi s časom v najboljšem primeru stečaja prestrukturiranje ponujalo povračilo samo 62 %.
Nevertheless, BPH voted in favour of the Creditor Agreement.
Nenazadnje je BPH glasovala za upniški sporazum.
If the same yardstick were to be applied to the public creditors, almost everyone should have favoured restructuring. i.e. all public commercial creditors and most public institutional creditors.
Če bi enaka merila veljala za javne upnike, bi skoraj vsakdo moral podpreti prestrukturiranje, tj. vsi javni komercialni upniki in večina javnih institucionalnih upnikov.
Existence of aid as regards Huta Stali Częstochowa's activities
Obstoj pomoči v zvezi z dejavnostjo Huta Stali Częstochowa
The Commission has also overcome its doubts that the outsourcing of HCz's production to HSCz involved aid.
Komisija je tudi premagala dvome, da je zunanje izvajanje proizvodnje HCz za HSCz vključevalo pomoč.