natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In any event, Citibank did not cooperate in the investigation.
Poleg tega Citibank tudi ni sodelovala v preiskavi.
Given Hynix's financial condition, there are no Hynix-specific benchmarks that can be used and there is no data on the record regarding loans to companies in a similar financial condition to Hynix.
Glede finančnega stanja Hynixa ni nobene ustrezne primerjave, ki bi jo lahko uporabili, ne zabeleženih podatkov v zvezi s posojili družbam v podobnem finančnem stanju, kot je Hynix.
Moreover, the available information indicates that Hynix did not obtain, and would not have been able to obtain, the relevant funds in the market [40].
Poleg tega je iz razpoložljivih podatkov razvidno, da Hynix ni pridobil in ne bi mogel pridobiti ustreznih sredstev na trgu [40].
The KEIC export credit guarantee programme and the KDB debenture programme were in effect throughout 2001. During this period, Hynix was, by all measures, uncreditworthy.
Program KEIC za jamstvo izvoznih posojil in zadolžniški program KDB sta se izvajala v letu 2001.
Hynix's already dismal financial condition worsened markedly in 2000, when the company suffered a net loss of over KRW 2 trillion.
V tem obdobju je bil Hynix vsekakor kreditno nesposoben, že tako izjemno težko finančno stanje družbe pa se je še znatno poslabšalo leta 2000, ko je utrpela neto izgubo v višini več kot 2 trilijona KRW.
At year-end 2000, Hynix's total indebtedness was KRW 8 trillion, and Hynix's current ratio, which measures the degree to which a firm's current assets cover current liabilities, was 0,33 [41].
Konec leta 2000 je celoten dolg Hynixa znašal 8 trilijonov KRW, tekoče razmerje Hynixa, ki meri stopnjo, do katere tekoča sredstva družbe krijejo tekoče obveznosti, pa je bilo 0,33 [41].
Hynix ' s net profit margin fell from 2,08 % in 1999 to minus 24,03 % in 2000 (when the DRAM industry as a whole performed well) and minus 93,83 % in 2001 [42].
Profitna marža Hynixa se je spustila z 2,08 % leta 1999 na minus 24,03 % leta 2000 (ko je industrija DRAM v celoti poslovala dobro) in minus 93,83 % leta 2001 [42].
Clearly, during 2000 and 2001, Hynix was unable to generate adequate cash flow to cover its existing debt, much less new debt.
Očitno je, da Hynix ni bil sposoben ustvarjati zadostnega prihodka, da bi kril svoj obstoječi dolg ali nove dolgove.
Market analysts agreed that Hynix was not creditworthy during this period.
Tržni analitiki so se strinjali, da Hynix v tistem obdobju ni bil kreditno sposoben.
Hynix's Standard & Poor's rating was B- in March 2001, CCC+ in August 2001 and ‘selective default’ in October 2001.
Ocena Hynixa s strani Standard and Poor’s je bila marca 2001 B–, avgusta 2001 CCC+ in oktobra 2001 „selective default“ (podjetje, ki plačuje le nekatere obveznosti).
Similarly, in February 2001, Deutsche Bank posited the cash flow problem bluntly: ‘We believe the most critical concern for (Hynix) is its ongoing cash flow concerns.
Februarja 2001 je tudi Deutsche Bank izpostavila problem denarnega toka, in sicer zelo neposredno: „menimo, da je najresnejši problem Hynixa njegov denarni tok.
In our view, it is unlikely that the Korean Government would be willing to give up on the company yet ….We believe (Hynix's) financial crisis will continue to carry a heavy burden on its ability to recover, as the DRAM sector is perhaps the most capital-intensive sector within semiconductors, with a constant requirement to upgrade technology processes’ [45].
Po našem mnenju je malo verjetno, da bi korejska vlada prenehala podpirati družbo (…) Menimo, da bo finančna kriza Hynixa še naprej težko breme za družbo pri njenih poskusih, da si opomore, saj je sektor DRAM verjetno finančno najintenzivnejši sektor v okviru polprevodnikov, ki zahteva neprestano nadgrajevanje procesne tehnologije.“ [45].
In February 2001, in an article in the Korea Herald [46], another market expert stated that: ‘Given the fact that credit risk is still pronounced and haunting investors, I don't think fluent capital will flow into corporate bonds rated below BBB+’.
Februarja 2001 je v Korea Herald [46] nek drugi tržni poznavalec izjavil: „Glede na to, da je kreditno tveganje še vedno zelo veliko in preganja vlagatelje, mislim, da se kapital ne bo vlagal v podjetniške obveznice, ki so ocenjene pod BBB+“.
This coincides with the early period of the KEIC Guarantee and KDB Debenture Programme.
To sovpada z zgodnjim obdobjem jamstva KEIC in zadolžniškega programa KDB.
The article goes on to point out the yield difference between investment grade bonds and junk bonds, concluding that ‘this indicates that investors continue to shun low-grade corporate bonds, expanding the spread between high-credited bonds and the so-called junk bonds to their widest margin’.
Članek v nadaljevanju poudari razliko med dolgoročnimi obveznicami in „junk bonds“ in zaključi, da „to kaže na to, da se vlagatelji še naprej izogibajo podjetniškim obveznicam z nizko oceno in s tem večajo razliko med obveznicami z visoko oceno in t. i. junk bonds do največje možne mere“.
A press report in June 2001 stated that ‘Investors have started gazing down the Asian credit curve, but they still lack the nerve to eye corporates with ratings below the bottom rung of investment grade at BBB-minus. Only companies with strong cash flows, ability to service debt and growth prospects are likely to make them look.’
Junija 2001 je bilo v nekem članku objavljeno: „Vlagatelji so se začeli ozirati proti nižjemu koncu azijske kreditne krivulje, a še vedno nimajo poguma, da bi se soočili s podjetji z ocenami, ki so pod najnižjo investicijsko kategorijo, tj. pod BBB– (BBB minus).
Thus, the Commission confirms its original finding that Hynix fell short of the investment grade required by investors for the junk bond market; and that, during the IP, the type of capital markets referred to by the Panel were inaccessible to companies with prospects as weak as those of Hynix.
Zato Komisija potrjuje svojo prvotno ugotovitev, da Hynix ni dosegal dolgoročne bonitetne ocene, ki so jo zahtevali vlagatelji na trgu „junk bond“; in da so bile med OP vrste kapitalskega trga, na katere se sklicuje preiskovalni odbor, nedosegljive družbam s tako šibkimi razvojnimi možnostmi, kot jih je imel Hynix.
Accordingly, such information as is on the record does not permit the establishment of a reliable benchmark with respect to such markets.
Iz tega sledi, da se na podlagi podatkov, ki so predloženi v dokumentaciji, ne da določiti zanesljive primerjave v zvezi s takšnimi trgi.
The Commission would therefore be in a position to reasonably and objectively conclude that no alternative commercial benchmark would actually be available in this case.
Zato je sklepna ugotovitev Komisije, da za ta primer alternativne primerjave ni na voljo, utemeljena in objektivna.
Accordingly, in these circumstances, the Commission finds that the amount of the benefit to Hynix could not exceed the full amount of the loan, plus compound interest and the costs of recovery or attempted recovery in the event of default.
Glede na to Komisija ugotavlja, da višina ugodnosti, ki je bila dodeljena Hynixu, ni mogla preseči skupnega zneska posojila, ki se mu prištejejo še obrestne obresti in stroški izterjave ali poskusa izterjave v primeru neizpolnitve obveznosti.
Because there is also no reliable information on the record regarding these latter additional costs, the Commission has confined itself to the full amount of the loan.
Ker o dokazih glede teh dodatnih stroškov ni zanesljivih podatkov, se je Komisija omejila na skupni znesek posojila.
The Commission believes that this conclusion is fully supported by its (unchanged) determinations regarding the financial situation and worth of Hynix, and the situation in the DRAMs market and the financial markets, and that it is consistent with the basic Regulation and the Guidelines.
Komisija je prepričana, da njene (nespremenjene) ugotovitve o finančnem stanju in vrednosti družbe Hynix kot tudi stanju na trgu DRAM in na finančnih trgih popolnoma podpirajo to sklepno ugotovitev, ki je v skladu z osnovno uredbo in Smernicami.
However, mindful of the WTO Panel’s reasoning, the Commission has, exceptionally and for this reason only, also considered whether or not, even absent any relevant benchmarks, there is anything that might serve as the basis for a proxy benchmark, adjusted where necessary to take account of the particular circumstances of this case.
Glede na argumente preiskovalnega odbora STO je Komisija tudi preučila, izjemoma in samo zaradi teh argumentov, možnosti, ali kljub odsotnosti primerne primerjave vendarle ne obstaja kakšna ustrezna podlaga, ki bi jo lahko uporabili kot približek primerjave, ki bi jo po potrebi prilagodili, da bi upoštevali specifične okoliščine tega primera.
Such a proxy could, for example, be based on a commercial interest rate, with the addition of a risk premium, reflecting the default rates of companies exhibiting comparable risk.
Takšen približek bi na primer temeljil na komercialni obrestni meri, skupaj s premijo za kritje tveganja, iz česar bi bile razvidne zamudne obresti družb s primerljivo stopnjo tveganja.
Such a calculation would take into account the term of the loan, a benchmark interest rate that would be paid by a creditworthy company, the probability of default by an uncreditwothy company within a specified period of time and the probability of default by a creditworthy company within the same specified period of time.
Takšen izračun bi upošteval časovni rok posojila, primerljivo obrestno mero, ki bi jo kreditno sposobna družba lahko plačala, verjetnost neizpolnitve obveznosti s strani kreditno nesposobne družbe v določenem časovnem obdobju in verjetnost neizpolnitve obveznosti s strani kreditno sposobne družbe v istem časovnem obdobju.
This approach is premised on the commonly understood notion that when a lender makes a loan to a company that is considered to be uncreditworthy, the lender faces higher probability that the borrower will default on repayment of the loan.
Ta pristop temelji na splošno priznanem načelu, ki pravi, da se verjetnost, da posojilojemalec ne bo odplačal posojila, poveča, če posojilodajalec odobri posojilo družbi, ki je ocenjena za kreditno nesposobno.
As a consequence of this higher default probability, the lender will charge a higher rate of interest, and one that is in proportion to the increased probability of default.
Zaradi te povečane verjetnosti za neizpolnitev obveznosti bo posojilodajalec uporabil višjo obrestno mero, ki bo v skladu z verjetnostjo tveganja.
Essentially, this would entail taking an interest rate available in the market to creditworthy borrowers and adding a ‘risk premium’ to it in order to account for the increased risk associated with lending to a company that is not creditworthy.
To v bistvu pomeni, da se izbere obrestna mera, ki je kreditno sposobnim posojilojemalcem dosegljiva na trgu, in se ji doda „premija za kritje tveganja“, da se upošteva povečano tveganje v zvezi s posojili družbam, ki so kreditno nesposobne.
For purposes of implementing the Panel's report in this case, the Commission has used the following formula to calculate an appropriate uncreditworthy benchmark interest rate:
Za namene izvajanja poročila preiskovalnega odbora v tem primeru je Komisija uporabila naslednjo formulo za izračun primerne primerljive obrestne mere za kreditno nesposobnega posojilojemalca:
n the term of the loan
n časovni rok posojila,
ib the benchmark interest rate for an uncreditworthy borrower
ib primerljiva obrestna mera za kreditno nesposobnega posojilojemalca,
if the long-term interest rate that would be paid by a creditworthy company
if dolgoročna obrestna mera, ki bi jo plačala kreditno sposobna družba,
pn the probability of default by an uncreditworthy company within n years
pn verjetnost za neizpolnitev obveznosti s strani kreditno nesposobne družbe v roku n let,
qn the probability of default by a creditworthy company within n years.
qn verjetnost za neizpolnitev obveznosti s strani kreditno sposobne družbe v roku n let,
For the purposes of this implementation, the Commission has used as the creditworthy (or commercial) rate for USD loans the average USD lending interest rate for 2001, which, according to the IMF International Financial Statistics Service, was 6,922 %.
Za ta izračun je Komisija kot obrestno mero za posojila kreditno sposobnim podjetjem (ali „komercialno“ obrestno mero) v USD uporabila povprečno obrestno mero za posojila v USD za leto 2001, ki je bila po mednarodnem finančnem statičnem uradu IMF 6,922-odstotna.
Although the credit received by Hynix by virtue of the guarantee was short term, the measure under consideration, i.e., the guarantee itself, was in fact a form of rolling credit.
Čeprav je bilo posojilo na podlagi jamstva, ki ga je prejel Hynix, kratkoročno, je bil obravnavani ukrep, tj. jamstvo samo, dejansko oblika stalnega posojila.
The Commission used data from Moody's Investor Service to obtain default rates for creditworthy and uncreditworthy companies.
Komisija je za pridobitev zamudnih obresti za kreditno sposobne in nesposobne družbe uporabila podatke Moody’s Investor Service.
For the uncreditworthy rate, the Commission used the likelihood of default for companies with a credit rating of Caa to C during the term of the relevant measure (i.e., one year for the KEIC guarantee).
Za obrestno mero za kreditno nesposobne je Komisija upoštevala verjetnost za neizpolnitev obveznosti pri družbah z bonitetnimi ocenami Caa do C v obdobju zadevnega ukrepa (tj. eno leto za jamstvo KEIC).
Similarly, the Commission used the default rate for a creditworthy company during the term of the measure in question, calculated based on a cumulation of data for investment grade companies.
Podobno je Komisija uporabila zamudne obresti za kreditno sposobne družbe v obdobju obravnavanega ukrepa, izračunane na podlagi kumulacije podatkov za družbe z investicijsko kategorijo.
The rate of default of an uncreditworthy company in 2001 within one year was, according to Moody's, 34,34 %.
Po oceni Moody’s so bile leta 2001 zamudne obresti za eno leto za kreditno nesposobno družbo 34,34-odstotne.
The rate of default of a creditworthy company in 2001 within one year was 0,13 %.
Zamudne obresti za eno leto za kreditno sposobno družbo so bile leta 20010, 13-odstotne.
This led to total interest rate of 62,70 %.
Tako je bila skupna obrestna mera 62,70-odstotna.
In contrast, the interest rate payable by Hynix on the USD loans in question was 8,33 %, i.e., a total interest differential of 54,37 %.
V nasprotju s tem je bila obrestna mera, ki jo je plačeval Hynix za zadevna posojila v USD 8,33-odstotna, tako da razlika znaša 54,37 %.
In this case, the allocation period was five years and no additional costs were added to the full amount of the loan as explained in recital 44 above, which means that 20 % of the financial contribution was allocated to each year.
V tem primeru je bilo obdobje dodelitve pet let in skupnemu znesku posojila niso bili prišteti nobeni dodatni stroški, kakor je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 44, kar pomeni, da je bilo je bilo vsakemu letu pripisanih 20 % finančnega prispevka.
Had the Commission used an interest rate comparison as described in recitals 45 to 47 above, the benefit (i.e., the difference between the benchmark and the actual interest rate) would have been considered as a recurring subsidy.
Če bi Komisija uporabila primerjavo obrestnih mer, kakor je opisana v uvodnih izjavah 45 do 47, bi se ugodnost (tj. razlika med primerljivo in dejansko obrestno mero) obravnavala kot ponavljajoča se subvencija.
The amount of subsidy allocated to each year would have been the interest rate differential multiplied by the fact amount of the loan.
Višina subvencije, dodeljena za vsako leto, bi bila razlika v obrestnih merah, pomnožena z dejansko višino posojila.
Therefore, depending on the size of the interest rate differential, the terms and conditions of the loan, and the length of the depreciation period, the annual benefit obtained by making an interest rate comparison may be bigger or smaller than that which results from the application of the Commission’s original approach.
Zato je lahko letna ugodnost, glede na velikost razlike v obrestnih merah, pogoje posojila ter dolžino amortizacijske dobe, izračunana s primerjavo obrestnih mer, večja ali manjša od tiste, ki je izračunana z uporabo prvotnega pristopa Komisije.
In this case, the Commission's original approach would result in an allocated annual benefit of 20 % of the financial contribution.
V tem primeru bi po uporabi prvotnega pristopa Komisije dodeljena letna ugodnost znašala 20 % finančnega prispevka.
Depending on the exact terms of the loan, i.e., whether the beneficiary repays interest and capital or interest only each year, this amount would be reached with an interest rate differential of no less than 20 % and no more than about 35 % per year.
Glede na natančne pogoje posojila, tj. ali prejemnik odloča obresti in kapital ali samo obresti vsako leto, bi se dalo ta znesek doseči z razliko v obrestnih merah, ki bi znašala najmanj 20 % in največ 35 % na leto.
The actual interest differential in this case is 54,37 %.
Dejanska razlika v obrestnih merah je v tem primeru 54,37 %.
This means that a strict application of this method would result in a much higher rate of countervailable subsidy allocated on turnover, in fact 12,8 % instead of the 5,1 % originally calculated by the Commission.
To pomeni, da bi dosledna uporaba te metode imela za posledico precej višjo obrestno mero za subvencijo, proti kateri se lahko uvede izravnalni ukrep, razdeljeno na skupni promet, in sicer 12,8-odstotno in ne 5,1-odstotno, kolikor je znašala po prvotnem izračunu Komisije.
Consequently, the Commission considers that its original approach was and is reasonable in this case.
Zato Komisija meni, da v tem primeru njen pristop je in je bil ustrezen.
Indeed, it is only in extreme cases that the Commission will determine the amount of the benefit to be equivalent to the full amount of a loan (i.e., when there is no realistic possibility of repayment) and in such circumstances it is usual that the benchmark interest rate will be extremely high.
Dejansko Komisija samo v izjemnih primerih ugotovi, da je višina ugodnosti enaka skupnemu znesku posojila (tj. ko ne obstaja nobena realna možnost za odplačilo), in v takšnih okoliščinah je primerljiva obrestna mera običajno zelo visoka.
Therefore, the interest rate differential will often give a higher amount of benefit than a simple allocation of the face amount of the loan over time.
Zato bo na podlagi razlike v obrestnih merah pogosto ugotovljen višji znesek ugodnosti kot z enostavno razporeditvijo zneska posojila v določenem obdobju.
In these circumstances, the Commission has used the more conservative of the two options in order to be sure that it has not exaggerated the amount of the subsidy, and will treat the face amount of the loan as the basis for a cap on the maximum amount of the benefit.
V teh okoliščinah je Komisija uporabila konzervativnejšo možnost, s katero je hotela zagotoviti, da pri znesku subvencije ne bo pretiravala in bo kot osnovo za določanje najvišjega zneska ugodnosti vzela nominalni znesek posojila.
On the above basis, the amount of benefit conferred by the KEIC guarantee ad valorem of export turnover was 5,1 %.
Na podlagi zgoraj navedenega je bila višina ugodnosti, ki jo je dodelilo jamstvo KEIC, glede na skupni izvozni promet ad valorem 5,1 %.
KDB debenture programme
Zadolžniški program KDB
The Panel summarised the facts concerning the KDB debenture programme in the following terms:
Preiskovalni odbor je takole povzel dejstva glede zadolžniškega programa KDB:
A third programme found to constitute a subsidy by Korea was the KDB debenture programme to which Hynix was admitted on 4 January 2001.
Tretji program, pri katerem je bilo ugotovljeno, da gre za subvencijo Koreje, je bil zadolžniški program KDB, do katerega je Hynix pridobil pristop 4. januarja 2001.
This was a programme which essentially lasted for one year (2001) and was set up by the government in response to financial instability in Korea caused by the fact that a large amount of bonds issued by a few companies (including Hynix) were due to mature simultaneously.
To je bil program, ki je v bistvu trajal eno leto (2001) in ga je ustanovila vlada zaradi finančne nestabilnosti v Koreji, ki je bila posledica dejstva, da bi veliko število obveznic, ki so jih izdale nekatere družbe (vključno s Hynixom), zapadlo istočasno.
Under this programme, maturing debt was rolled-over and re-packaged for investors.
V okviru tega programa je bil zapadli dolg obnovljen in na novo predstavljen vlagateljem.
A participating company repaid on its own 20 % of its corporate bonds falling due and the KDB assumed the remaining 80 %.
Sodelujoča družba je odplačala 20 % svojih podjetniških obveznic, ki bi kmalu zapadle, KDB pa je prevzel ostalih 80 %.
This constituted the first phase of the programme.
To je bila prva faza programa.
Of the 80 % originally assumed by the KDB, 20 % of the bonds was then sold to the company's creditor banks in proportion to their debt exposure to the company; 70 % was re-packaged for sale to investors as collateralised bond obligations (CBOs) and/or collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), guaranteed by the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF); and the KDB retained the remaining 10 %.
Od 80 %, ki jih je sprva prevzel KDB, je bilo potem 20 % obveznic prodanih bankam upnicam družbe glede na njihov delež posojila, ki so ga odobrile družbi. 70 % je bilo na novo predstavljenih za prodajo vlagateljem, in sicer kot „krite obveznice“ (collateralised bond obligations – „CBO“) in/ali „krito posojilo“ („collateralised loan obligations“ – „CLO“), za katere jamči Korea Credit Guarantee Fund („KCFG“); KDB je obdržal ostalih 10 %.
The participating company had to repurchase at least 3 % of any CBOs and 5 % of any CLOs.
Sodelujoča družba je morala ponovno kupiti vsaj 3 % CBO in 5 % CLO.
Preliminary Determination, paragraphs 49 to 52.
Id., odstavki 49–52.
The EC states that the budget for the programme was KRW 6,2 trillion, of which KRW 2,9 trillion was earmarked for Hynix, eventual expenditure being KRW 2,9 trillion, of which KRW 1,2 trillion (41 %) was for Hynix and 38 % was used for the other three Hyundai companies [53].’
ES navaja, da je bil proračun za program 6,2 trilijona KRW, od česar je bilo 2,9 trilijona KRW rezerviranih za Hynix; končna poraba je znašala 2,9 trilijona KRW, od tega 1,2 trilijona KRW (41 %) za Hynix in 38 % za druge tri družbe iz skupine Hyundai. [53]“
The EC found that the bond purchase by the KDB as part of this programme constituted a financial contribution by the government which conferred a benefit on Hynix.
ES je ugotovila, da je nakup obveznic s strani KDB v okviru tega programa predstavljal finančni prispevek vlade, ki je dodelila ugodnost Hynixu.
The Panel found that the EC reached a reasonable and reasoned conclusion on the basis of the record before it that the KDB debenture programme conferred a benefit on Hynix.
Po mnenju odbora je bila ugotovitev ES na podlagi prejšnjega poročila o tem, da je zadolžniški program KDB družbi Hynix omogočal ugodnosti, primerna in utemeljena.
In doing so, it recalled that the KDB debenture programme was itself set up and effectively guaranteed by the GOK [54].
Ob tem je opozoril, da je zadolžniški program KDB uvedla korejska vlada [54] sama, ki je zanj tudi jamčila.
However, as regards the amount of the benefit, the Panel report indicates that the Commission should, as a matter of WTO law, re-examine the question of the availability of alternative benchmarks.
Kar zadeva višino ugodnosti, pa je v poročilu preiskovalnega odbora navedeno, da mora Komisija v skladu z zakonodajo STO ponovno preveriti razpoložljivost alternativnih primerjav.
As the Panel observed, the question of benefit, at least in the case of a government guarantee, can be examined from more than one angle [55], and in applying the guidelines contained in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement, an investigating authority is entitled to considerable leeway [56].
Po mnenju preiskovalnega odbora se lahko vprašanje ugodnosti, vsaj kadar gre za vladne garancije, preveri z več plati [55], in pri uporabi Smernic iz člena 14 Sporazuma SIU, ima preiskovalni organ veliko možnosti [56].