natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
See, along the same lines, the HSBC report of 12.6.2004, page 11: ‘all in all, FT was not a firm in difficulty inasmuch as its business was healthy, but it did suffer from an unsuitable financing structure with a lack of capital and excessively short debt-refinancing periods, coupled with a crisis of confidence on the part of the markets born of the uncertainties to which this state of affairs gave rise’.
V enakem primeru glej poročilo banke HSBC z dne 12. junija 2004, stran 11: „skratka, podjetje FT ni bilo v težavah, v pomenu, da so njegove dejavnosti zdrave, vendar je trpelo zaradi finančne strukture, neprilagojene primanjkljaju lastnih sredstev in prekratkih izmenjav ponovnega financiranja dolga ter zaradi krize sofinanciranja trgov, kljub negotovosti zaradi situacije“.
Case 223/85 RSV v Commission [1987] ECR 4617.
Sodba sodišča z dne 24. novembra 1987, zadeva 223/85, RSV proti Komisiji, PSES 4617.
Case C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437.
Sodba sodišča z dne 20. septembra 1990, zadeva C-5/89, Komisija proti Nemčiji, PSES 1990, str. I-3437.
Nevertheless, it also pointed up the heavy weight of the past, which wiped out the net result before exceptional provisions of EUR 1,9 billion, turning it into a EUR 8,3 billion loss. While the provisions correct the value of France Télécom's assets to a more realistic level, the colossal size of the debt, at EUR 63 billion, persists. This context, together with the inadequacy of the expected cash flow, helps explain the serious structural problems.
Kljub temu je objava računov dokazala velik vpliv iz preteklosti, ki je popolnoma izničil čisti izid pred izjemnimi provizijami 1,9 milijard EUR, hkrati pa jih je pretvorila v izgubo 8,3 milijard EUR. Če bodo provizije popravile vrednost aktive podjetja FT na bolj običajno raven, potem bo raven velikega dolga ostala pri 63 milijardah EUR. Takšno stanje in nezadosten denarni tok ponazarjata velike strukturne težave.
The plan contains measures not forming part of a rescue operation, such as recourse to the bond market or the envisaged recapitalisation.
Načrt vsebuje namreč ukrepe, ki ne spadajo na področje reševanja, na primer opiranje na trg obveznic ali predvidena dokapitalizacija.
Among other things, the amount of the recapitalisation is more than is needed to cover France Télécom's short-term operating needs alone, excluding reimbursement of the loans taken out at the time of its expansion.
Podjetje BT prav tako meni, da je znesek kapitalizacije verjetno previsok, da bi pokril kratkoročne potrebe obratovanja podjetja FT, razen povračila kreditov, ki so bili odobreni za razvoj.
It maintains that the Commission may justifiably consider that the French State granted aid to France Télécom even before an agreement for the granting of a EUR 9 billion credit line was signed as the announcement of support was sufficient to render this emergency financing unnecessary.
Podjetje Cégétel poudarja, da je upravičeno, da Komisija upošteva dejstvo, da je francoska država podjetju FT dodelila pomoč pred samim podpisom konvencije o pomoči v zvezi s kreditno linijo v višini 9 milijard EUR, saj je bilo obvestilo o pomoči dovolj, da bi financiranje v izrednih razmerah postalo neuporabno.
Lenders were thus certain that France Télécom could never default on its payments inasmuch as the State would always be ready to grant it the funds it needed to honour its commitments, and this enabled France Télécom to obtain financing directly on the market.
Tako so posojilodajalci imeli zagotovilo, da bo podjetje FT vedno izpolnjevalo svoje obveznosti, saj mu je država vedno pripravljena dodeliti potrebna sredstva, s katerimi bi podjetje lahko poravnalo svoje obveznosti, zaradi česar je podjetje FT lahko neposredno pridobilo financiranje na trgu.
If the declarations made by the State between July and October 2002 had really been legally equivalent to, or even simply perceived by the market and the rating agencies as being, a promise to provide France Télécom with an “unlimited guarantee”, then there would not have been any downgrading of France Télécom's rating in July and the company's spreads and rating during that period would have reflected the state risk (AAA rating and very low spread).
Če bi bile državne izjave med julijem in oktobrom 2002 resnično pravno enakovredne ali če bi jih trg in agencije za ocenjevanje dojemale kot obljubo o ‚neomejenem jamstvu‘ v korist podjetju FT, potem ne bi prišlo do znižanja ocene podjetja FT v juliju in bi razmiki in ocena podjetja FT v času tega obdobja odražala državno tveganje (ocena AAA in zelo šibki razmiki).
Lastly, any factoring in by the rating agencies of the State's presence as majority shareholder irrespective of any implicit or explicit guarantee or of any specific measure and irrespective of the company's specific financial situation at any given moment cannot in itself be considered state aid.
Možnost, da bi agencije za ocenjevanje upoštevale prisotnost države v vlogi večinskega delničarja neodvisno od vsakega implicitnega ali eksplicitnega jamstva ali določenih ukrepov in neodvisno od določenega finančnega položaja podjetja v danem trenutku, ne more veljati kot državna pomoč.
You are the majority shareholder in the company, do you have a message to convey?’. The Minister could not therefore have been unaware that he was sending a message to the Company and its employees as well as to the Company's other shareholders, banks, creditors and competitors.
Vi ste večinski delničar tega podjetja s 55 % kapitala, lahko kaj poveste o tem?“ Minister mora torej vedeti, da v tem trenutku sporoča podjetju in zaposlenim ter tudi drugim delničarjem, bankam, upnikom in konkurentom podjetja.
Source: Rapports Annuels France Telecom 2001, 2002.
Vír: Letni porocili podjetja France Tetecom 2001, 2002
See the report drawn up on behalf of the commission of enquiry into the management of public undertakings with a view to improving the decision-making system, registered at the office of the President of the National Assembly on 3.7.2003 (‘the commission of enquiry report’, or ‘commission of enquiry’ for short): ‘The commission wished to carry out a precise analysis of the strategy and procedure with regard to the international acquisitions engaged in by France Télécom and EDF in view of their serious consequences for both companies' accounts (in the case of France Télécom, the losses attributable to the exceptional provisions and amortisations relating to acquisitions during the period 1998-2002 amounted to EUR 28,5 billion for 2001 and 2002).
Glej poročilo, oblikovano v imenu komisije za preiskave, o upravljanju z javnimi družbami, za izboljšanje načina sprejemanja odločitev; potrjeno v predsedstvu Državnega zbora dne 3. julija 2003 (v nadaljevanju „poročilo komisije za preiskave“ ali krajše „komisija za preiskave“): „Komisija je želela natančno analizirati strategijo postopka mednarodnih nakupov, ki jih je vodilo podjetje France Télécom in EDF, vključno s težkimi posledicami na račun teh dveh podjetij (v primeru podjetja France Télécom, izgube zaradi provizij in izrednih odplačevanj, povezanih z nakupi v obdobju 1998–2002, tvorijo 28,5 milijard EUR v letu 2001 in 2002).
Pretty much the same factors are at play: haste in carrying out huge acquisitions (in one year, from 1999 to 2000, France Télécom devoted EUR 65 million to this), insufficient attention to the economic, political or geopolitical risks, particularly imprudent financing arrangements … In this climate of disquiet, urgency and doubt, the company embarked as from 1999 upon an ambitious and disorganised external growth programme, according priority to access to the UK and German markets’.
Več ali manj najdemo enako vsebino: prenagljenost pri nakupih velikih razsežnosti (v enem letu, od 1999 do 2000, je podjetje France Télécom temu namenilo 65 milijonov EUR), nezadostna pozornost za gospodarska, politična ali geopolitična tveganja, še posebej neprevidni načini financiranja … V takšnem izjemnem, nemirnem in zaskrbljenem okolju se je podjetje spustilo v ambiciozno in neurejeno zunanjo rast, s poudarkom vstopa na trg Združenega kraljestva in Nemčije“.
FT current BBB- rating appears to be based largely on the promise of government support providing liquidity, rather than on fundamentals’ (p. 30).
’ (str. 28); ‘It is worth noting that S & P states on its recent conference call on its downgrade of FT’s credit that, in general, a company generating free cash flow with debt to EBITDA of four times would qualify as a BBB- credit, the last investment grade rating.
According to Deutsche Bank ' s calculations, France Télécom ' s debt/EBITDA ratio was 4,9 during the second half of 2002 and 5,20 on 31.12.2002.
FT current BBB- rating appears to be based largely on the promise of government support providing liquidity, rather than on fundamentals’ (str. 30).)
See also p. 22.
Glej tudi str. 22.
Chapelle Darblay.
Rouen, 10. marec 1981, Jurisdata 1982-00382, Soc. Chapelle Darblay.
Even so, on p. 25 of their letter, the French authorities estimate at EUR 15 billion the amount of outstanding bonds coming due in 2003.
Na strani 25 tega pisma francoska vlada ocenjuje za 15 milijard EUR zapadlih neporavnanih obveznosti v letu 2003.
A similar difference is to be found in the estimate of the amount of bonds coming due by the end of 2004, which is put at EUR 18,8 billion in Annexe 2 and at EUR 23,9 billion on p. 20 of the letter.
Takšna razlika se pojavi pri oceni dolga v obveznicah, ki poteče do konca leta 2004, v višini 18,8 milijard EUR iz priloge 2 in v višini 23,9 milijard EUR s strani 20 tega pisma.
The syndicated loan to which the French authorities refer in their comments of 22 January 2004 dates from 14 February 2002, that is to say, from before the downgrading of France Télécom's credit rating by the rating agencies. On the other hand, the use for several months of this short-term credit instrument instead of a longer-term bond issue which would have made it possible to refinance part of the Company's debt seems rather to confirm that France Télécom's access to the capital market was not easy. This situation was confirmed, moreover, by the French authorities in their comments of 22 January 2004, when they stated that recourse to the syndicated loan was less costly for France Télécom than access to the bond market.
To situacijo je potrdila francoska vlada v svojih pripombah z dne 22. januarja 2004, kjer meni, da je bila izbira sindiciranega kredita bolj ugodna za podjetje FT kot dostop do trga obveznic.
This factor was still very important to S & P on 17 December 2002. Likewise, it was crucial as far as Moody's was concerned in February 2003.
Ta element je bil 17. decembra 2002 še vedno zelo pomemben za agencijo S & P. Bil je ključen za agencijo Moody's februarja 2003.
Cégétel refers to the Crédit Lyonnais II decision, in which the Commission finds that the aid measures could not be justified by the failings over many years of the State as shareholder. In Cégétel's opinion, opting to channel the aid through ERAP is not what a prudent investor would have done.
Podjetje Cégétel se sklicuje na odločbo o banki Crédit Lyonnais II, v katerem je Komisija določila, da ukrepi pomoči niso upravičeni zaradi dolgoletne nesposobnosti države v vlogi delničarja Poleg tega podjetje Cégétel meni, da se izbira o prenosu pomoči podjetja ERAP ne razume kot ravnanje dobro poučenega vlagatelja.
It recalls that, according to the Guidelines, where a State injects capital into a firm in difficulty, ‘it must be deemed likely that the financial transfers involve state aid’. It argues that the compensatory measures taken by France Télécom cannot be considered sufficient within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Podjetje Cégétel poudarja, da v skladu s smernicami, po katerih država prilije kapital v podjetje v težavah, „mora veljati kot verjetno, da finančni prenosi vsebujejo elemente državne pomoči“ Podjetje Cégétel opredeljuje, da nadomestila, ki jih je dobilo podjetje FT, v smislu smernic ne bi smela biti zadostna.
Thus, no prudent investor would, in September 2002 (when the State announced that it would be supporting France Télécom financially), have advanced EUR 9 billion under such economic circumstances without basing itself on a restructuring plan. LDCOM explains, moreover, that no private investor would have had the financial capacity to mobilise such amounts in such a short space of time.
Tako noben dobro poučen vlagatelj septembra 2002 (datum, ko je država razglasila, da podpira financiranje podjetja FT) v takšnih gospodarskih okoliščinah ne bi mogel preseči 9 milijard EUR, če se pri tem ne bi oprl na načrt o prestrukturiranju.f Podjetje LDCOM je poleg tega pojasnilo, da noben zasebni vlagatelj ni bil finančno sposoben, da bi priskrbel tolikšne zneske v tako omejenem času.
Moreover, operating results and cash flow were increasing (with cash flow up 15 % on the first half of 2001). France Télécom's very good performance prospects were further improved by the TOP plan.
Poleg tega pa so rezultat in operativni denarni tokovi neprestano naraščali (denarni tokovi so v primerjavi s prvim polletjem 2001 narasli za 15 %).Francoske oblasti poudarjajo, da so se odlične napovedi o učinkovitosti podjetja FT s pomočjo načrta TOP še izboljšale.
Table 11 France Télécom Consolidated balance sheet
Tabela 11
Containing three reports prepared by three experts appointed by France Télécom (Mr C.D. Ehlermann, Mr Y.
Vsebuje tri poročila, ki so jih pripravili trije strokovnjaki, imenovani s strani podjetja FT (g. C. D. Ehlermann, g. Y.
And again ‘There have been reports in the press that the French government will stand behind France Télécom, implying that it is willing to be the “lender of last resort” to the company. These reports have resulted in a significant rally in both bonds and equity prices, with the equity rallying over 90 % and the bonds 137bp in two weeks, as nervous shorts covered position.
In tudi ‘There have been reports in the press that the French government will stand behind France Télécom, implying that it is willing to be the “lender of last resort” to the company.
declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement
o združljivosti koncentracije s skupnim trgom in delovanju Sporazuma EGP
(Case COMP/M.3696 — E.ON/MOL)
(Zadeva COMP/M.3696 – E.ON/MOL)
(notified under document number C(2005) 5593)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2005) 5593)
On 21 December 2005 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [1], and in particular Article 8(2) of that Regulation.
Komisija je 21. decembra 2005 na podlagi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 z dne 20. januarja 2004 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij (Uredba ES o združitvah) [1] in zlasti člena 8(2) navedene uredbe sprejela odločbo glede združitve.
A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case and in the working languages of the Commission on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competiton/index_en.htmlI.
Različica celotne odločbe, ki ni zaupna, je na voljo v verodostojnem jeziku zadeve in v delovnih jezikih Komisije na spletni strani Generalnega direktorata za konkurenco na naslednjem naslovu: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.htmlI.
This case concerns the acquisition by E.ON (Germany) of two subsidiaries of MOL, an integrated Hungarian oil and gas company, which are active in the wholesale, marketing and trading of gas, and the storage of gas.
Ta zadeva se nanaša na nemško družbo E.ON in njeno pridobitev dveh odvisnih družb družbe MOL, madžarske podružnice za nafto in plin, ki se ukvarjata z veleprodajo, trženjem in trgovanjem s plinom ter njegovim skladiščenjem.
MOL also has a put option for two years to sell its gas transmission subsidiary to E.ON.
Družba MOL ima tudi prodajno opcijo, da v dveh letih proda svojo odvisno družbo za prenos plina družbi E.ON.
MOL already has, prior to the transaction, an almost exclusive control over the access to gas resources and gas infrastructures in Hungary.
Družba MOL ima že pred transakcijo skoraj izključni nadzor nad dostopom do plinskih virov in infrastrukture na Madžarskem.
MOL owns the gas transmission network, all Hungarian gas storage facilities and has a quasi-monopoly position on the gas wholesale markets.
Družba MOL je lastnik omrežja za transport plina, vseh madžarskih skladišč plina in zaseda kvazimonopolni položaj na veleprodajnih trgih s plinom.
MOL is already today the ‘gatekeeper’ for gas resources (both imports and domestic production) and gas infrastructure.
Družba MOL je že zdaj „nadzornik“ plinskih virov (uvoženih in iz domače proizvodnje) ter plinske infrastrukture.
This gatekeeper position will now be taken over by E.ON.
Vlogo nadzornika bo zdaj prevzela družba E.ON.
The essential change brought by the proposed transaction is that E.ON, unlike MOL, has strong market positions in the retail supply of gas and electricity in Hungary.
Bistvena sprememba, ki jo prinaša predlagana transakcija, je, da ima družba E.ON, v nasprotju z družbo MOL, močan tržni položaj v maloprodajni oskrbi s plinom in električno energijo na Madžarskem.
Therefore, except for the transmission and gas production businesses of MOL, the current transaction will create a vertically integrated entity along the gas and electricity supply chains in Hungary.
Torej bo posledica sedanje transakcije, z izjemo prenosa in proizvodnje plina družbe MOL, vertikalno integriran pravni subjekt vzporedno s plinskimi in električnimi dobavnimi verigami na Madžarskem.
The Commission’s market investigation has established that, owing to the new entity’s nearly exclusive control over gas resources (mostly of Russian origin) available in Hungary and its vertical integration in the gas and electricity markets, the transaction would lead to a serious risk of foreclosure of competitors on the downstream gas and electricity markets.
Tržna raziskava Komisije je pokazala, da bi zaradi skoraj izključnega nadzora novega pravnega subjekta nad plinskimi viri (večinoma ruskega izvora), ki so na voljo na Madžarskem, in njegove vertikalne integracije v trge s plinom in električno energijo, transakcija lahko povzročila resno tveganje za izključitev konkurentov s trgov s plinom in električno energijo na koncu prodajne verige.
As mentioned, contrary to MOL, E.ON is active downstream of the gas wholesale market, in the retail and distribution of gas and electricity (through its control of two out of six regional gas distribution companies and of three out of six regional electricity distribution companies) as well as in the generation of electricity.
Kakor je navedeno, je družba E.ON, v nasprotju z družbo MOL, dejavna na veleprodajnem trgu na koncu prodajne verige v trgovini na drobno ter v distribuciji plina in električne energije (z nadzorom dveh od šestih regionalnih družb za distribucijo plina in treh od šestih regionalnih družb za distribucijo električne energije) kot tudi v proizvodnji električne energije.
This would lead to a change of incentives of the new entity vis-à-vis its downstream competitors.
To bi povzročilo spremembo spodbud novega pravnega subjekta v razmerju do njegovih konkurentov na trgu na koncu prodajne verige.
The new entity would thus have both the ability and the incentive to discriminate against its competitors in the downstream markets both in the gas and in the electricity sectors.
Tako bi imel novi pravni subjekt možnost in interes povzročiti diskriminacijo svojim konkurentom na trgih na koncu prodajne verige v plinskem in električnem sektorju.
In order to remove the competition concerns identified during the procedure, E.ON submitted on 20 October 2005 a package of commitments.
Za odpravo pomislekov glede konkurence, ugotovljenih med postopkom, je družba E.ON 20. oktobra 2005 predložila paket obveznosti.
On 16 November 2005, E.ON submitted revised commitments.
novembra 2005 je družba E.ON predložila revidirane obveznosti.
The final commitments were submitted on 8 December 2005.
Končne obveznosti so bile predložene 8. decembra 2005.
The Commission believes that the undertakings, substantially improved following the market test compared to E.ON’s initial offer, meet the concerns expressed by third parties as regards the need to ensure sufficient liquidity of gas on the Hungarian wholesale gas market at price and conditions which will allow third parties to compete effectively with the new entity on the downstream gas and electricity markets in Hungary.
Komisija je prepričana, da so podjetja, ki so bistveno napredovala zaradi upoštevanja preskusa trga v primerjavi s prvotno ponudbo družbe E.ON, upoštevala izražene pomisleke tretjih strank glede potrebe po zagotovitvi zadostne likvidnosti plina na madžarskem veleprodajnem trgu s plinom po ceni in pod pogoji, ki bodo tretjim strankam omogočili, da bodo učinkovito konkurirale novemu pravnemu subjektu na trgih s plinom in električno energijo na koncu prodajne verige na Madžarskem.
A clearance decision with conditions and obligations pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation is therefore proposed for adoption.
Zato se v skladu s členom 8(2) Uredbe o združitvi predlaga sprejetje odločbe o potrditvi.
Ruhrgas International AG (‘E.ON’) belongs to the E.ON group of companies, a privately owned energy group with a focus on the supply of electricity and gas.
Družba E.ON Ruhrgas International AG („E.ON“) pripada skupini družb E.ON, skupini za energijo v zasebni lasti, katere glavna dejavnost je oskrba z električno energijo in plinom.
MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas (‘MOL’, Hungary) is an integrated oil and gas group which is primarily active in Hungary on the markets for natural gas, oils, fuels and chemicals.
Družba MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas („MOL“, Madžarska) je podružnica za nafto in plin, dejavna zlasti na madžarskih trgih z zemeljskim plinom, olji, gorivi in kemikalijami.
It is a public company listed on the Budapest stock exchange.
Je javno podjetje, ki kotira na borzi v Budimpešti.
The Hungarian State still owns 12 % of share capital, plus a golden share.
Madžarska država ima še vedno v lasti 12 % osnovnega kapitala ter tako imenovani zlato delnico.
The present case concerns a concentration by which E.ON acquires control of MOL Földgázellátó Rt. (‘MOL WMT’) and MOL Földgáztároló Rt. (‘MOL Storage’).
Zadevni primer obravnava koncentracijo, s katero družba E.ON pridobi nadzor nad družbama MOL Földgázellátó Rt., („MOL WMT“) in MOL Földgáztároló Rt. („MOL Storage“).
will also acquire MOL’s shareholdings in Panrusgáz Magyar-Orosz Gázipari Rt. (‘Panrusgáz’), a joint venture company between OAO Gazprom (Russia) and MOL.
Družba E.ON bo pridobila tudi kapitalski delež družbe MOL v družbi Panrusgáz Magyar-Orosz Gázipari Rt. („Panrusgáz“), ki je mešana družba OAO Gazprom (Rusija) in družbe MOL.
Mol Földgázszállító Rt. (‘MOL Transmission’), another solely-controlled subsidiary of MOL, is not acquired by E.ON through the present transaction.
Mol Földgázszállító Rt. („MOL Transmission“), je še ena odvisna družba pod izključnim nadzorom družbe MOL, ki pa je družba E.ON s sedanjo transakcijo ni pridobila.
MOL is instead granted a put option under which MOL can require E.ON to purchase a 25 % plus 1 share or a 75 % minus 1 share interest in MOL Transmission during the next two years.
Družbi MOL se namesto tega ponudi prodajna opcija, po kateri lahko družba MOL od družbe E.ON zahteva nakup 25 % in 1 delnice ali 75 % minus 1 delnice udeležbe v družbi MOL Transmission v naslednjih dveh letih.
Finally, MOL retains control over its gas exploration and production business (the MOL upstream gas Exploration and Production division (‘MOL E & P’)).
Družba MOL ohrani nadzor nad iskanjem in proizvodnjo plina (oddelek družbe MOL za iskanje in proizvodnjo plina na začetku proizvodne verige („MOL E & P“)).
However, as part of the transaction, MOL and MOL WMT have entered into a new long-term gas supply agreement for the gas produced by MOL E & P (the ‘Supply Agreement’).
Vendar sta, kot del transakcije, družbi MOL in MOL WMT sklenili nov dolgoročni sporazum za oskrbo s plinom, ki ga proizvaja družba MOL E & P („sporazum o oskrbi“).
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