natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The EC Treaty provides for several exceptions to the principle of the general incompatibility of state aid with the common market.
V Pogodbi ES so predvidene nekatere izjeme od osnovnega načela splošne nezdružljivosti državnih pomoči s skupnim trgom.
The exemptions in Article 87(2) of the EC Treaty do not apply in the present case because the aid measures neither have a social character and are granted to individual consumers, nor do they make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, nor are they granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by its division.
Izjeme od določb, navedene v členu 87(2) Pogodbe ES, v zadevnem primeru niso uporabne, saj ukrepi pomoči ne predstavljajo niti pomoči socialnega značaja za posameznega potrošnika niti pomoči za povrnitev škode, nastale zaradi naravnih nesreč ali drugih izjemnih dogodkov, niti pomoči za gospodarstvo določenih območij Zvezne republike Nemčije, prizadetih zaradi delitve Nemčije.
Further exemptions are laid down in Article 87(3)(a) and (c) of the EC Treaty.
Morebitne izjeme od temeljne nezdružljivosti s skupnim trgom so določene v členu 87(3)(a) in 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES.
Article 87(3)(a) allows the Commission to authorise aid for the economic development of certain areas.
Člen 87(3)(a) Komisiji dovoljuje odobritev pomoči za gospodarski razvoj določenega območja.
Article 87(3)(c) provides for the authorisation of state aid that is granted to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Člen 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES predvideva odobritev državnih pomoči za spodbujanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih panog ali gospodarskih območij, dokler se pogoji trgovanja ne spremenijo tako, da so v nasprotju s skupnim interesom.
The Commission has issued various guidelines to spell out the conditions under which aid can be authorised on the basis of this provision.
Komisija je objavila različne smernice, v katerih so natančno razloženi pogoji, pod katerimi so lahko pomoči odobrene na podlagi te določbe.
Aid granted until the end of 1996
Pomoči, dodeljene do konca leta 1996
Germany does not contest the fact that, despite the company concerned being located in an area where regional aid may be granted in accordance with Article 87(3)(a) of the EC Treaty, the aid to Kahla I falls to be assessed under the 1994 restructuring aid guidelines as the primary objective of the aid was not regional but concerned the restoration of the long-term viability of an undertaking in difficulty.
Nemčija ne oporeka temu, da je treba pomoči za Kahlo I oceniti v okviru smernic za prestrukturiranje (1994), čeprav se zadevno podjetje nahaja na območju, kjer se regionalna pomoč lahko dodeli v skladu s členom 87(3)(a) Pogodbe ES. Prednostni namen pomoči namreč ni bil regionalne narave, temveč ponovna vzpostavitev dolgoročne rentabilnosti podjetja v težavah.
The Commission would make clear here that only the aid granted under measure 8 falls to be assessed.
Komisija na tem mestu opozarja, da je treba oceniti le pomoč, dodeljeno v okviru ukrepa 8.
With regard to Kahla II, Germany claims that the objective of the measures found to constitute aid not covered by approved aid schemes or falling outside the de minimis rules was regional.
Glede Kahle II Nemčija trdi, da je bil cilj ukrepov, ki so bili označeni kot pomoči, ki niso zajete v odobrene programe pomoči ali ki ne spadajo pod pravila de minimis, regionalne narave.
The Commission would make clear here that the ad hoc aid to be assessed is constituted by measures 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 30 and 32.
Komisija na tem mestu opozarja, da začasne pomoči, ki jih je treba oceniti, zajemajo ukrepe 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 30 in 32.
The Commission considers that the guidelines on national regional aid [59] (regional aid guidelines) are not the appropriate provision for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid awarded from 1994 to 1996.
Komisija je mnenja, da smernice za nacionalno regionalno pomoč [59] (smernice za regionalno pomoč) niso uporabne za oceno združljivosti pomoči, dodeljenih med letoma 1994 in 1996, s skupnim trgom.
According to footnote 10 of the guidelines, “ad hoc aid for firms in difficulty is governed by specific rules and is not conceived as regional aid as such”. These specific rules are the restructuring aid guidelines.
V opombi 10 teh smernic je določeno: „Začasne pomoči za podjetja v težavah urejajo posebna pravila in se ne obravnavajo kot regionalna pomoč.“ Ta posebna pravila so smernice za prestrukturiranje.
The Commission would point out that the current regional aid guidelines were not applicable at the time the aid was granted.
Komisija ugotavlja, da sedanje smernice za regionalno pomoč v času dodelitve pomoči niso bile veljavne.
However, the rules in force at the time of the award, i.e., those referred to in footnote 2 of the current guidelines, also clearly state that such aid must not be granted in violation of the specific rules on aid granted to companies in difficulty.
Pravila, ki so veljala v času dodelitve in ki so navedena v opombi 2 teh smernic, jasno določajo, da se takšne pomoči ne sme dodeliti, če se s tem kršijo posebne določbe za pomoči za podjetja v težavah.
As explained in Section B of the Assessment (paragraphs 106-118), the Commission has come to the conclusion that, until 1996, Kahla II was a company in difficulty.
Kot je pojasnjeno v zgoraj omenjenem oddelku B presoje (odstavki 106–118), je Komisija ugotovila, da je bila Kahla II do leta 1996 podjetje v težavah.
Consequently, the ad hoc aid cannot be assessed under these provisions.
Zato začasne pomoči ne morejo biti ocenjene po teh določbah.
This is also clear in the light of the kind of costs which were covered by the aid.
To je tudi jasno na podlagi vrste stroškov, ki so bili vključeni v pomoči.
In view of the above, the Commission cannot conclude that all the ad hoc aid to Kahla II until 1996 can be regarded as regional aid compatible with the common market.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno Komisija ne more ugotoviti, ali je mogoče začasne pomoči, dodeljene za Kahlo II do leta 1996, označiti kot s skupnim trgom združljive regionalne pomoči.
Germany recently argued that the aid under measure 26 should be regarded as employment aid.
Nemčija je nedavno trdila, da je treba pomoči v okviru ukrepa 26 označiti kot pomoči za zaposlovanje.
The employment aid guidelines [60] provide for aid for the creation of new jobs.
Smernice za zaposlovanje [60] predvidevajo pomoči za ustvarjanje novih delovnih mest.
According to Germany, the grants were used for the clearance of part of Kahla II’s installations.
Po navedbah Nemčije je bila podpora uporabljena za odstranitev dela opreme Kahle II.
This work was carried out by unemployed people and consequently led to the provisional employment of unemployed people.
Ta dela so opravljali brezposelni, kar je omogočilo začasno zaposlenost brezposelnih.
However, it did not lead to any lasting employment.
Vendar pa ta dela niso vodila k trajni zaposlitvi.
Nor can the aid be regarded as aid to preserve jobs as the size of the company’s workforce was reduced considerably (from 380 in 1994 to 327 in 1996).
Te pomoči tudi ni mogoče označiti kot pomoč za ohranjanje delovnih mest, saj se je število zaposlenih v podjetju znatno zmanjšalo (s 380 leta 1994 na 327 leta 1996).
Moreover, Germany’s explanations concerning the utilisation of the aid, namely, the temporary employment of unemployed people, clearly reinforce the view that no jobs at Kahla II were safeguarded.
Poleg tega pojasnila Nemčije glede uporabe pomoči, namreč začasna zaposlitev brezposelnih, jasno dokazujejo, da Kahla II ni obdržala delovnih mest.
The Commission therefore considers that measure 26 cannot be authorised as employment aid on the basis of the employment aid guidelines.
Zato je Komisija mnenja, da ukrepa 26 na podlagi smernic za zaposlovanje ni mogoče odobriti kot pomoči za zaposlovanje.
This view of the Commission’s also holds true with respect to the aid granted prior to the entry into force of the guidelines inasmuch as the guidelines simply confirmed existing practice, and in any event employment aid cannot be approved where jobs are neither created nor preserved.
To mnenje Komisije velja tudi glede pomoči, dodeljenih pred začetkom veljavnosti smernic, saj so le-te zgolj potrdile obstoječo prakso. Pomoč za zaposlovanje ne more biti odobrena, če se delovna mesta niti ne ustvarijo niti ohranijo.
Since the company was in difficulty at the time the ad hoc aid was granted, it must now be examined whether the aid to Kahla II until 1996 and the aid to Kahla I can be regarded as compatible with the common market under the restructuring aid guidelines.
Ker je bilo podjetje v času dodelitve začasne pomoči v težavah, je zdaj treba proučiti, ali je po smernicah za prestrukturiranje pomoč za Kahlo II do leta 1996 in pomoč za Kahlo I mogoče označiti za združljivi s skupnim trgom.
The Commission considers that none of the other Community guidelines, such as those on aid for research and development, environmental protection, small and medium-sized enterprises, or training, can apply.
Komisija je mnenja, da nobene od smernic Skupnosti, kot so npr. smernice za raziskave in razvoj, za varstvo okolja, za mala in srednje velika podjetja ali za usposabljanje, niso uporabne.
Since all the aid measures were granted before the revised version of the restructuring aid guidelines entered into force, the guidelines of 23 December 1994 are applicable [61].
Ker so bili vsi ukrepi pomoči dodeljeni pred začetkom veljavnosti revidirane različice smernic za prestrukturiranje, so uporabne smernice z dne 23. decembra 1994 [61].
The fulfilment of the main conditions set out in these guidelines will be assessed in turn.
Izpolnjevanje najpomembnejših pogojev, navedenih v teh smernicah, bo ocenjeno po vrsti.
Restructuring aid is usually a combination of operating aid to cover losses, social costs, working capital, etc., and material investments.
Pomoči za prestrukturiranje so praviloma kombinacija pomoči za tekoče poslovanje za kritje izgub, socialnih stroškov, gibljivih sredstev itd. in materialnih investicij.
This can be clearly verified by looking at the purpose of the aid measures in favour of Kahla I and of those in favour of Kahla II until 1996 [62].
To je mogoče jasno dokazati s pomočjo namena ukrepov pomoči za Kahlo I in s pomočjo ukrepov, ki so bili do leta 1996 dodeljeni Kahli II [62].
As regards the aid to Kahla I, as pointed out in the decisions to initiate and to extend the formal investigation procedure, no restructuring plan has ever been submitted to the Commission.
Glede pomoči za Kahlo I, kot je poudarjeno v sprožitvi in razširitvi formalnega postopka preiskave, Komisija nikoli ni prejela načrta za prestrukturiranje.
In the absence of a restructuring plan, the conditions which must be met if the restructuring is to be approved in accordance with the restructuring aid guidelines, in particular the existence of a sound restructuring plan when the aid was granted, are not fulfilled [63].
Ob odsotnosti načrta za prestrukturiranje pogoji, ki so nujni za odobritev prestrukturiranja v skladu s smernicami za prestrukturiranje, zlasti obstoj načrta za prestrukturiranje ob dodelitvi pomoči, niso izpolnjeni [63].
Consequently, the aid granted under measure 8 must be considered incompatible with the common market.
Zato je treba pomoč, dodeljeno v skladu z ukrepom 8, označiti kot nezdružljivo s skupnim trgom.
As regards the aid granted from 1994 until 1996 to Kahla II, in its decisions to initiate and to extend the formal investigation procedure the Commission noted that there were indications that the company had undergone restructuring.
Glede pomoči, ki so bile med letoma 1994 in 1996 dodeljene za Kahlo II, je Komisija v sklepu o sprožitvi in razširitvi formalnega postopka preiskave navedla, da so obstajali znaki, ki so kazali na to, da je podjetje izvedlo prestrukturiranje.
The reports submitted by Germany describe the following measures aimed at restoring viability: new product orientation, personnel reduction, the replacement of old plant and machinery, the closure of production facilities, investments aimed at meeting technical and environmental standards, and the setting-up of a distribution network.
Poročili, ki ju je posredovala Nemčija, opisujeta ukrepe za ponovno vzpostavitev sposobnosti preživetja: nova usmeritev izdelkov, zmanjševanje števila zaposlenih, zamenjava starih strojev in opreme, zaprtje proizvodnih obratov, investicije za ohranitev tehničnih in okoljskih standardov in vzpostavitev distribucijskega omrežja.
During the formal investigation procedure, Germany stated that these measures formed part of the original business plan, which was subsequently further developed, and it refused to describe them as a restructuring plan.
Med formalnim postopkom preiskave je Nemčija navedla, da so bili ti ukrepi del prvega poslovnega načrta, ki pa so ga pozneje še nadalje razvili, in odklonila opis teh ukrepov kot načrt za prestrukturiranje.
In its letter of 1 October 2002, Germany finally declared that, if the Commission were to consider Kahla II to be a company in difficulty, these measures should be regarded as a restructuring plan.
V dopisu z dne 1. oktobra 2002 je Nemčija pojasnila, da je te ukrepe treba označiti kot načrt za prestrukturiranje, če Komisija Kahlo II označi kot podjetje v težavah.
It is not clear, however, which of the documents transmitted is to be considered the relevant restructuring plan.
Vendar pa ni razvidno, katerega izmed posredovanih dokumentov je mogoče označiti kot ustrezen načrt za prestrukturiranje.
The Commission notes that the first report was drawn up before the assets sale took place, and what is more it was intended only for TIB to help it decide whether to acquire a stake in the company.
Komisija upošteva, da je bilo prvo poročilo pripravljeno pred prodajo premoženja in da je bilo namenjeno izključno TIB-u za odločitev o smotrnosti prevzema deleža v podjetju.
Although both suggested a number of measures that were necessary for the company’s viability, these measures were, according to Germany, developed further by the investor.
Čeprav sta obe poročili predlagali vrsto ukrepov, ki so bili potrebni za sposobnost preživetja podjetja, je te ukrepe po besedah Nemčije nadalje razvil investitor.
If the reports were to be considered a restructuring plan, clearly the proposed measures do not represent the final version of the plan, especially as far as the analysis of the cost of the proposed measures is concerned.
Če bi ta poročila obravnavali kot načrt za prestrukturiranje, potem je jasno, da predlagani ukrepi ne predstavljajo dokončne različice načrta, zlasti pri pregledu stroškov predlaganih ukrepov.
The first report provided for total costs of DEM 30,945 million, consisting of investments, acquisition of the assets, loss coverage and interest payments on loans.
Prvo poročilo je predvidevalo skupne stroške v višini 30,945 milijona DEM, ki so vključevali investicije, nakup premoženja, pokritje izgub in plačilo obresti za posojila.
The second report proposed restructuring measures costing a total of DEM 27,727 million, consisting of investments (including the taking-over of the assets), loss coverage and working capital.
Drugo poročilo je predlagalo ukrepe za prestrukturiranje v višini 27,727 milijona DEM, ki so vključevali investicije (vključno s prevzemom premoženja), pokritje izgub in gibljiva sredstva.
Neither the costs provided for in the first report nor those provided for in the second report correspond to those described by Germany in the ‘investment plan’ and set out in detail in Table 5, on the basis of which the aid was allegedly granted.
Niti v prvem niti v drugem poročilu se predvideni stroški ne ujemajo s stroški, ki jih je Nemčija opisala v „investicijskem načrtu“ in podrobno predstavila v Tabeli 5, na podlagi katere je bila pomoč domnevno dodeljena. V obeh poročilih seznam ukrepov, predvidenih za financiranje teh stroškov, zanemarja številne ukrepe pomoči, ki so bili podjetju dejansko dodeljeni (prim.
In both reports, the list of measures intended for financing these costs omits numerous aid measures that were actually granted to the company (see Table 4), something which also holds true for the ‘investment plan’ (Table 5).
Tabelo 4), kar velja tudi za „investicijski načrt“ (Tabela 5).
If one of these documents were to be considered the restructuring plan, the Commission can only conclude that either the plan was not the final plan or the company received excessive aid.
Če bi enega izmed teh dokumentov označili kot načrt za prestrukturiranje, lahko Komisija ugotovi, da načrt ni bil dokončna različica ali pa da je podjetje prejelo preveč pomoči.
Even if it were possible to regard these documents as a restructuring plan, they cannot be considered the final version of such a plan.
Tudi če bi te dokumente lahko označili kot načrt za prestrukturiranje, jih torej ne moremo označiti kot dokončno različico takšnega načrta.
It is not clear, moreover, to what extent the proposed measures were actually implemented.
Poleg tega ni razvidno, v kolikšni meri so bili predlagani ukrepi dejansko izpeljani.
In order to establish whether the criteria set out in the restructuring aid guidelines have been fulfilled, the Commission needs to know first of all precisely what restructuring measures were taken to restore the company’s long-term viability.
Da bi ugotovila, ali so bila merila, navedena v smernicah za prestrukturiranje, izpolnjena, potrebuje Komisija podatke o tem, kateri ukrepi prestrukturiranja so bili izvedeni za ponovno vzpostavitev dolgoročne rentabilnosti podjetja [64].
Despite repeated requests from the Commission, Germany has never submitted the final version of a restructuring plan for Kahla II or indicated which restructuring measures were effectively implemented.
Ne glede na večkratne zahteve Komisije Nemčija nikoli ni posredovala dokončne različice načrta za prestrukturiranje za Kahlo II ali predložila podatkov o tem, kateri ukrepi za prestrukturiranje so bili izvedeni.
In the absence of such a plan, the criteria of these guidelines cannot be verified.
Ker ta načrt ni bil predložen, ni mogoče preučiti meril teh smernic.
The Commission notes, moreover, that the private contribution to the overall costs cannot be regarded as substantial.
Po drugi strani Komisija ugotavlja, da zasebni prispevek k skupnim stroškom ni bil znaten.
It will be recalled that the Commission formally ordered Germany to furnish information about any contribution made or to be made by a private investor.
Treba je opomniti, da je Komisija od Nemčije formalno zahtevala, naj posreduje informacije o vsakem prispevku (danem ali načrtovanem) zasebnega investitorja.
In its letter of 1 October 2002, Germany describes the supposed private financing in accordance with the report of 29 November 1993.
V dopisu z dne 1. oktobra 2002 Nemčija opisuje domnevno zasebno financiranje v skladu s poročilom z dne 29. novembra 1993.
It consists of a contribution by Mr G. Raithel worth DEM 2,055 million, DEM 0,986 million of interest on the loans granted to Mr Raithel, cash flow of DEM 2,217 million and the DEM 7,975 million capital injection by TIB.
Financiranje vključuje udeležbo g. G. Raithela v višini 2,055 milijona DEM, 0,986 milijona DEM obresti za posojila g. G. Raithela, denarni tok v višini 2,217 milijona DEM in kapitalski vložek TIB-a v višini 7,975 milijona DEM.
The alleged investor contribution consisted of two soft loans granted by the State (measures 16 and 17) worth a total of DEM 2 million, and DEM 0,055 million which the investor brought into the company from his own resources by way of own capital.
Domnevni prispevek investitorja je vključeval dve posojili z ugodnimi obrestmi iz državnih sredstev (ukrepa 16 in 17) v skupni višini 2 milijonov DEM in znesek v višini 0,055 milijona DEM, ki ga je investitor vložil v podjetje iz lastnih sredstev kot lastniški kapital.
Only the latter contribution was fully private.
Le zadnji prispevek je bil v celoti zasebne narave.
The DEM 0,2 million loan under measure 16 was secured by a Federal Government guarantee.
Posojilo v višini 0,2 milijona DEM v okviru ukrepa 16 je bilo zavarovano z jamstvom zvezne vlade.
The DEM 1,8 million loan under measure 17 was secured by a mortgage on Kahla II’s land.
Posojilo v višini 1,8 milijona DEM v okviru ukrepa 17 je bilo zavarovano s hipoteko na nepremičnine podjetja Kahla II.
The purchase of these assets was financed by state aid.
Nakup tega premoženja je bil financiran z državnimi pomočmi.
In view of the fact that these loans were granted out of state resources and bearing in mind the security provided, the loans under measures 16 and 17 clearly cannot be considered a contribution by a private investor.
Spričo dejstva, da so bila ta posojila dodeljena iz državnih sredstev in ob upoštevanju zagotovljenih zavarovanj, posojil v okviru ukrepov 16 in 17 ni mogoče označiti kot prispevka zasebnega investitorja.
As for the alleged new interest payments amounting to DEM 0,986 million, the Commission has never received the slightest piece of information about this.
Komisija nikoli ni prejela nobenih informacij glede novih domnevnih plačil obresti v višini 0,986 milijona DEM.
Presumably they relate to the interest paid by Mr Raithel on the two loans under measures 16 and 17.
Verjetno se nanašajo na plačilo obresti g. G. Raithela za obe posojili v okviru ukrepov 16 in 17.
However, these interest payments do not finance any restructuring costs.
Toda ta plačila ne financirajo stroškov prestrukturiranja.
As regards cash flow, the Commission would point out that the forecast profit the company was to earn cannot be considered a substantial contribution within the meaning of the restructuring aid guidelines.
Glede denarnega toka Komisija ugotavlja, da načrtovanega dobička, ki naj bi ga podjetje ustvarilo, ni mogoče označiti kot znaten prispevek v smislu smernic za prestrukturiranje.
What is more, the Commission has not been informed whether this cash flow was actually achieved or whether it was used to cover restructuring costs.
Poleg tega Komisija ni seznanjena, ali je bil ta denarni tok dejansko ustvarjen in ali je bil porabljen za kritje stroškov prestrukturiranja.
As the company started generating some profits, on 30 March 1998 the investor converted part of the public loans into private loans.
Ker je podjetje pričelo ustvarjati dobiček, je investitor 30. marca 1998 del državnih posojil pretvoril v zasebna posojila.
However, this contribution was uncertain at the time of the granting of the aid and was not made until after the restructuring.
Ta prispevek je bil v času dodelitve pomoči negotov in je bil vložen šele po prestrukturiranju.
It can therefore be assumed that the subsequent contribution was possible thanks only to the improvement in the company’s financial situation due to the state aid.
Zato je mogoče domnevati, da je bil poznejši prispevek mogoč le zaradi izboljšanja finančnega položaja podjetja, ki je bil posledica državnih pomoči.
The Commission would go further and say that the contribution was possible thanks only to a 90 % guarantee provided to cover these loans [65].
Komisija dodaja, da je bil prispevek mogoč le zaradi 90-odstotnega jamstva, zagotovljenega za kritje tega posojila [65].
What is more, this happened after the restructuring was completed, and it was unclear at the time of the granting of the aid and it is still unclear what resources were used for the purpose.
Poleg tega se je to zgodilo, ko je bilo prestrukturiranje končano, in je še vedno nejasno, kateri viri so bili porabljeni v ta namen.
Lastly, in the absence of a precise breakdown of the restructuring costs, it cannot be concluded that the private contribution was substantial.
Zaradi odsotnosti analize stroškov prestrukturiranja ni mogoče sklepati, ali je bil zasebni prispevek znaten.