natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Three different risk profiles would be established.
Vzpostavili bi se trije različni profili tveganja.
For a 12-year loan, the one-off premium to be paid by the beneficiaries would amount to 2,065 % for the lowest risk category, to 2,603 % for the medium risk category, and to 3,142 % for the highest risk category.
Za 12-letno posojilo bi enkratna premija, plačana s strani upravičencev, znašala 2,065 % za kategorijo najmanjšega tveganja, 2,603 % za kategorijo srednjega tveganja in 3,142 % za kategorijo največjega tveganja.
This would correspond to a premium ranging between 0,4563 % p.a. of the guaranteed amount for the least risky projects to 0,6562 % p.a. for the most risky ones.
To bi ustrezalo letni premiji med 0,4563 % zajamčene vsote za projekte z najmanjšim tveganjem in 0,6562 % za najbolj tvegane projekte.
The authorities would establish different ranges of values according to six financial parameters which the authorities would have to assess when a potential beneficiary applied for the scheme.
Organi bi vzpostavili različne lestvice vrednosti, glede na šest finančnih parametrov, ki bi jih organi morali oceniti, ko potencialni upravičenec zaprosi za shemo.
The applicant’s overall performance in these parameters would result in it being placed into one of the three different risk categories.
Celotna storilnost prosilca v teh parametrih bi imela za posledico umestitev v eno izmed treh različnih kategorij tveganja.
However, this system has never been further elaborated, and no other concrete details on its possible operation have been submitted by the Italian authorities.
Vendar takšen sistem ni bil nikoli natančneje opredeljen in italijanski organi niso nikoli predložili nobenih drugih konkretnih podrobnosti o njegovi možni izvedbi.
V. ASSESSMENT
V. Ocena
Existence of State aid within a meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty
Obstoj državne pomoči
Article 87(1) of the Treaty states that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings is incompatible with the common market in so far as it affects trade between Member States.
Člen 87(1) Pogodbe ES navaja, da je s skupnim trgom nezdružljiva vsaka državna pomoč, odobrena z državnimi sredstvi določenim podjetjem, če takšna pomoč izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco v takšni meri, da bi vplivala na trgovino med državami članicami.
The measure to be assessed here consists of a guarantee fund providing cover for the financing of loans granted by banks to shipowners for shipbuilding or conversion work carried out in Italian shipyards.
Ukrep, ki ga je treba oceniti, je jamstveni sklad, ki zagotavlja jamstva za financiranje posojil, ki jih odobrijo banke lastnikom ladij za izdelavo ali predelavo ladij v italijanskih ladjedelnicah.
The Commission outlined its approach to such securities in the Guarantees Notice [3].
Komisija je svoj pristop k takšnim jamstvom opisala v obvestilu o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč v obliki jamstev („Obvestilo o jamstvih“) [3].
The Guarantees Notice explains why — under certain conditions — a State guarantee can constitute State aid: ‘The State guarantee enables the borrower to obtain better financial terms for a loan than those normally available on the financial markets.
Obvestilo o jamstvih pojasnjuje, zakaj – pod določenimi pogoji – državno jamstvo lahko pomeni državno pomoč: „državno jamstvo omogoča posojilojemalcu pridobitev boljših finančnih pogojev za posojilo, kot so običajno dostopni na finančnih trgih.
Typically, with the benefit of the State guarantee, the borrower can obtain lower rates and/or offer less security.
Značilno je, da lahko posojilojemalec z ugodnostjo državnega jamstva pridobi nižje stopnje in/ali ponudi manjše jamstvo.
In some cases, the borrower would not, without a State guarantee, find a financial institution prepared to lend on any terms (…).
V nekaterih primerih posojilojemalec brez državnega jamstva ne bo našel finančne ustanove, ki bi mu bila pripravljena posoditi, pod vsemi pogoji (…).
The benefit of a State guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the State.
Ugodnost državnega jamstva je, da tveganje, povezano z jamstvom, nosi država.
This carrying of a risk by the State should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium.
To tveganje, ki ga nosi država, je ponavadi povrnjeno z ustrezno premijo.
Where the State forgoes such a premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the State.
Če se država takšni premiji odreče, pomeni to korist za podjetje in izdatek za državna sredstva.
Thus, even if no payments are ever made by the State under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be a State aid under Article 87(1)’ [4].
Zato lahko po členu 87(1) vseeno obstaja državna pomoč, čeprav na podlagi jamstva niso izvršena plačila s strani države“ [4].
The main question in the present case is whether the premiums charged for the guarantee reflect an adequate market price.
Glavno vprašanje v tej zadevi je, ali zaračunane premije odražajo ustrezno tržno ceno.
In light of the general principles of State aid review, and on the basis of the provisions outlined above, it is evident that the underlying principle of the Guarantees Notice is that the benchmark for assessing whether a guarantee is free of State aid is the market.
Glede na splošna načela presoje državne pomoči in na osnovi zgoraj navedenih določb je očitno, da je trg osnovni princip za merilo uspešnosti ocene, določeno v Obvestilu o jamstvih, če je jamstvo brez državne pomoči.
If the State obtains a remuneration for the guarantee that is equivalent to what a private market operator would charge to equivalent beneficiaries, the beneficiaries are not being granted any advantage, and the State is acting like any private investor or creditor operating on the financial market.
Vsekakor, če država prejema plačilo za jamstvo, ki je enakovredno tistemu, ki bi ga zasebni akter na trgu zaračunal enakovrednim upravičencem, bi to pomenilo, da se slednjemu ne odobri nobena ugodnost in da država ravna kot vsak zasebni investitor ali upnik, ki deluje na finančnem trgu.
If, however, the price paid by the beneficiaries and the conditions applied to the guarantees are more favourable than those available in the market, then there is a clear economic advantage to the beneficiaries, and therefore (assuming the other conditions are met) State aid within the meaning of the Treaty.
Če so, nasprotno, cena, ki so jo plačali upravičenci, in pogoji, ki se uporabljajo za jamstva, bolj ugodni kot tisti, ki so razpoložljivi na trgu, potem obstaja nedvomna prednost za upravičence in zato (če so izpolnjeni drugi pogoji) državna pomoč v smislu Pogodbe.
Point 4.3 of the Guarantees Notice lays down six conditions on the basis of which the Commission will assess whether a State guarantee scheme constitutes State aid.
Obvestilo o jamstvih v točki 4.3 določa šest pogojev, ki Komisiji omogočajo, da oceni, ali državna garancijska shema pomeni državno pomoč.
In the first place, therefore, the Commission must consider whether the notified scheme fulfils these conditions; if it does, the Commission can conclude immediately that there is no aid element involved.
Tako mora Komisija najprej preučiti, ali sporočena shema izpolnjuje te pogoje, kar bi omogočilo takojšnjo izključitev prisotnosti katerega koli elementa pomoči v takšni shemi.
Point 4.3 states that a State guarantee scheme that fulfils all the following conditions does not constitute State aid under Article 87(1):
V skladu s točko 4.3 s strani države zagotovljena garancijska shema, ki izpolnjuje vse naslednje pogoje, ne pomeni državne pomoči po členu 87(1):
the scheme does not allow guarantees to be granted to borrowers who are in financial difficulty;
shema ne dovoljuje odobritev jamstev posojilojemalcem, ki so v finančnih težavah;
the borrowers would in principle be able to obtain a loan on market conditions from the financial markets without any intervention by the State;
posojilojemalci bi načeloma lahko pridobili posojilo, pod tržnimi pogoji finančnih trgov, brez kakršnega koli posredovanja države;
the guarantees are linked to a specific financial transaction, are for a fixed maximum amount, do not cover more than 80 % of each outstanding loan or other financial obligation (except for bonds and similar instruments) and are not open-ended;
jamstva so povezana s posebno finančno transakcijo za določen znesek, ne pokrivajo več kot 80 % vsakega neplačanega posojila ali druge finančne obveznosti (razen za obveznice in podobne instrumente) in niso odprta;
the terms of the scheme are based on a realistic assessment of the risk so that the premiums paid by the beneficiary enterprises make it, in all probability, self-financing;
pogoji sheme temeljijo na realni oceni tveganja, tako da so premije, ki jih plačajo upravičena podjetja, po vsej verjetnosti samofinancirane;
the scheme provides for the terms on which future guarantees are granted and the overall financing of the scheme to be reviewed at least once a year;
shema zagotavlja pogoje, na podlagi katerih se odobrijo bodoča jamstva in se vsaj enkrat letno pregleda celotno financiranje sheme;
the premiums cover both the normal risks associated with granting the guarantee and the administrative costs of the scheme, including, where the State provides the initial capital for the start-up of the scheme, a normal return on that capital.
premije pokrivajo običajna tveganja, povezana z odobritvijo jamstva, in administrativne stroške sheme, vključno z običajnim donosom kapitala, če država zagotovi osnovni kapital za zagon.
In the present case conditions (a), (b), (c) and (e) are fulfilled, but conditions (d) and (f) are not, as the risk carried by the State is not remunerated by an appropriate premium.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so v zadevnem primeru izpolnjeni pogoji (a), (b), (c) in (e), nista pa izpolnjena pogoja (d) in (f), ker breme tveganja države ni poplačano z ustrezno premijo.
Point 4.3(d) and (f) of the Notice require that the terms of the scheme be based on a realistic assessment of the risk, so as to make the system in all probability self-financing, and that the premiums collected be sufficient to cover the normal risks associated with granting the guarantees and the administrative costs of the scheme, including, where the State provides the initial capital for the start-up of the scheme, a normal return on that capital.
Točka 4.3 (d) in (f) Obvestila zahteva, da pogoji sheme temeljijo na realni oceni tveganja, da po vsej verjetnosti ustvarijo sistem, ki se financira sam, in da zbrane premije zadoščajo za kritje običajnih tveganj, povezanih z odobritvijo jamstev in administrativnih stroškov sheme (vključno z običajnim donosom kapitala, če država zagotovi osnovni kapital za zagon).
Italy has not been able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that the premiums provided for in the scheme can make it self-financing and cover all administrative costs.
Na zadovoljstvo Komisije Italija ni uspela dokazati, da v shemi predvidena premija lahko zagotovi samofinanciranje in krije vse administrativne stroške.
Inadequacy of the proposed premium
Neprimernost predlagane premije
Credit institutions operating on the financial market would charge their clients higher premiums for similar guarantees, given that a one-off premium of 2,3 % does not appear sufficient to ensure that in all likelihood all costs due to possible defaults and to administrative expenses will be covered.
Kreditne ustanove, ki delujejo na finančnem trgu, bi svojim strankam zaračunale višje premije za podobna jamstva, glede na to, da enkratna premija v višini 2,3 % (ali lestvica premij od 2,065 % do 2,603 %) verjetno ne zadošča za kritje vseh stroškov zaradi morebitnih neplačil obveznosti in administrativnih stroškov.
This is also true for the range of premiums between 2,065 % and 2,603 % mentioned in the Italian authorities’ letter of 3 June 2004.
To velja tudi za lestvico premij od 2,065 % do 2,603 %, kot je navedeno v pismu z dne 3. junija 2004 italijanskim organom.
The Italian authorities have not had any similar guarantee schemes in operation in the past, and consequently do not possess any reliable historical or empirical data (on e.g. industry defaults, the revenues of the scheme, or the actual administrative costs of running the scheme) which might have enabled them to demonstrate that the scheme would be self-financing.
Italijanski organi niso imeli nobene takšne podobne garancijske sheme, ki bi delovala v preteklosti. Zato nimajo doslednih podatkov ali drugih zanesljivih empiričnih podatkov (o npr. industrijskih neplačanih obveznostih, prihodkih sheme, dejanskih administrativnih stroških delujoče sheme), s katerimi bi lahko dokazali samofinanciranje sheme.
The Italian authorities argue that the premium proposed is derived from a comparable market benchmark, and should therefore be considered adequate.
Zato italijanski organi trdijo, da predlagana premija izhaja iz primerljivega tržnega merila uspešnosti in bi jo zato bilo treba šteti za primerno.
This is not borne out by the Commission’s information.
Vendar pa to ne ustreza podatkom, ki jih je pridobila Komisija.
First, the Italian authorities themselves in their letter of 7 October 1998 state that the average market price of a bank guarantee amounts, in their view, to 0,915 % p.a.
Prvič, italijanski organi sami v svojem pismu z dne 7. oktobra 1998 navajajo, da je povprečna tržna cena bančne garancije, po njihovem mnenju, do 0,915 % letno.
This is much higher than the annual premium that would correspond to the one-off premiums proposed by the Italian authorities initially or in the premiums proposed in their letter of 3 June 2004.
To je veliko več kot letna premija, ki ustreza enkratnim premijam, kot so jih predlagali italijanski organi (prvotno ali v svojem pismu z dne 3. junija 2004).
Second, the inadequacy of the proposed premium is confirmed by more recent data likewise provided to the Commission by the Italian authorities themselves.
Drugič, neprimernost predlagane premije potrjujejo nedavni podatki, ki so jih Komisiji posredovali sami italijanski organi.
In 2003 the Italian authorities conducted a market survey with the aim of investigating how much credit institutions would charge their clients for similar guarantees.
Italijanski organi so v letu 2003 izvedli analizo trga z namenom, da raziščejo, koliko bi kreditne ustanove zaračunale svojim strankam za podobna jamstva.
According to the letters received from the Italian banks and submitted to the Commission, all banks questioned would charge premiums higher than 0,5 % p.a., or a range of premiums higher than that proposed by Italy in its letter of 3 June 2004.
Prejeta pisma italijanskih bank, predložena Komisiji, dokazujejo, da bi vse banke, vključene v analizo, zaračunale premije, višje od 0,5 % letno, ali lestvico premij, višjo od tiste, ki jo je predlagala Italija v svojem pismu z dne 3. junija 2004.
The premiums suggested by the banks are as follows:
Premije, ki so jih predlagale banke, kot sledi:
between 0,50 % and 0,75 % p.a.
med 0,50 % in 0,75 % letno
ca 0,60 % p.a.
okrog 0,60 % letno
0,60 % p.a.
0,60 % letno
between 0,70 % and 0,80 % p.a.
med 0,70 % in 0,80 % letno
between 0,70 % and 0,75 % p.a.
med 0,70 % in 0,75 % letno
ca 0,75 % p.a.
okrog 0,75 % letno
between 0,75 % and 1,25 % p.a.
med 0,75 % in 1,25 % letno
Third, the inadequacy of the proposed premium is confirmed by the experience the Commission has gained in assessing ship financing schemes in Germany, which, unlike the Italian Fund, have been running for several years.
Tretjič, neprimernost predlagane premije potrjujejo izkušnje Komisije, pridobljene pri ocenjevanju nemških shem za financiranje ladij, ki so v nasprotju z ukrepi, preučevanimi v zadevnem primeru, delovale več let.
In December 2003 the Commission approved the guarantee schemes operated by the German Länder (State aid measure No N 512/03 [5]) on the grounds that the notified measures did not constitute State aid within the meaning of the Treaty.
Komisija je decembra 2003 odobrila te garancijske sheme za nemške dežele (Državna pomoč št. N 512/03 [5]), ker sporočeni ukrepi niso pomeni državne pomoči v smislu Pogodbe.
The German case showed that, to ensure that the default risks (and the administrative costs) were in all probability covered, higher premiums were needed: the German schemes carried premiums which varied between 0,8 % and 1,5 % p.a., depending on the creditworthiness of the beneficiary.
Nemški primer je pokazal, da so potrebne višje premije, da se zagotovi kritje tveganj zaradi neplačila obveznosti (in administrativnih stroškov): pri nemških shemah so premije znašale med 0,8 % in 1,5 % letno, glede na kreditno sposobnost upravičenca.
As the German scheme and the Italian scheme are substantially analogous and raise similar issues, the Commission suggested that the Italian authorities give careful consideration to the Decision in the case of the German Länder guarantee schemes, especially because, as already mentioned, the Länder had already had various guarantee schemes for shipbuilding in place in the past.
Glede na to, da sta bili nemška in italijanska shema zelo podobni in da sta izpostavili podobna vprašanja, je Komisija italijanskim organom predlagala, da podrobno preučijo odločbo, ki je bila sprejeta v primeru garancijske sheme za nemške dežele, zlasti, kot je že bilo navedeno, ker so nemške dežele v preteklih letih že imele vzpostavljene garancijske sheme za ladjedelništvo.
While the Italian authorities had not been able to produce any evidence to show that the scheme would be ‘in all probability self-financing’, the German authorities had extensive and reliable historical data on which to base their estimates [6].
Medtem ko italijanski organi niso imeli nobenih elementov, da bi lahko določili, kakšna višina premije bi lahko zagotovila „po vsej verjetnosti samofinanciranje“ garancijske sheme, so imeli nemški organi obsežne in zanesljive zgodovinske podatke za podkrepitev svojih ocen [6].
The Commission accordingly provided Italy with a non-confidential copy of the Commission Decision on the guarantee schemes operated by the German Länder.
V ta namen je Komisija Italiji zagotovila nezaupni izvod odločbe Komisije o garancijskih shemah za nemške dežele.
In addition, when the Italian authorities expressed their desire to have more complete and detailed information on the German case, if possible from the German authorities themselves, the Commission provided the Italian authorities and their consultant with contact details for the German authorities and their consultant.
Poleg tega, ko so italijanski organi izrazili željo po popolnejših in podrobnejših informacijah o nemškem primeru, ki naj bi jih prejeli od – po možnosti – samih nemških organov, je Komisija italijanskim organom in njihovim svetovalcem priskrbela podatke, potrebne za navezavo stikov, o ustreznih uradnikih in zadevnih svetovalcih.
Lack of risk differentiation
Pomanjkanje diferenciacije tveganja
In addition, the Commission considers that the Fund is not based on a realistic assessment of the risks and would therefore not in all probability be self-financing.
Poleg tega Komisija meni, da Sklad ne temelji na realni oceni tveganja in se zato po vsej verjetnosti ne bi samofinanciral.
The information available to the Commission indicates that ship financing is a sector in which it is possible to assess and price individual risks, and that a functioning market for the granting of end-financing guarantees for shipbuilding does exist.
Podatki, s katerimi razpolaga Komisija, kažejo, da je financiranje ladij sektor, v katerem je mogoče oceniti in določiti ceno posameznih tveganj, in zdi se, da obstaja delujoči trg za odobritev jamstev končnega financiranja za ladjedelništvo.
It appears, therefore, that a ship financing guarantee scheme that charges the same premium to all users, if it functions under the same conditions and restrictions as market operators, will not in all probability be self-financing.
Zato se zdi, da se garancijska shema za financiranje ladij, ki vsem uporabnikom zaračunava isto premijo, če deluje pod enakimi pogoji in omejitvami akterjev na trgu, po vsej verjetnosti ne bi samofinancirala.
This is so because it would always be possible for beneficiaries with lower than average risk to find a guarantor willing to cover their risk at premiums cheaper than the average premium.
To pa zato, ker bi bilo vselej mogoče, da solventni upravičenci (rectius, upravičenci z manjšim tveganjem od povprečnega) najdejo državnega poroka, ki bi bil pripravljen kriti njihovo tveganje po premijah, ki so nižje od povprečnih.
Unless the system was compulsory, this would leave the guarantee scheme offered by the public authorities with the higher than average risks, so that the system would not be adequately financed.
Če sistem ne bi bil obvezen, bi garancijska shema, ki jo ponujajo organi, pomenila večje tveganje od povprečnega, ki ne bi mogel ustrezno financirati sistema.
The information supplied indicates that the guarantee scheme for ship financing provided by Italy carries a fixed premium, and that the use of the scheme is not compulsory.
Posredovani podatki kažejo, da ima garancijska shema za financiranje ladij, ki jo je zagotovila Italija, določeno premijo in da je uporaba sheme obvezna.
At the same time, Italy confirms that it is possible to assess individual risks and that a market to provide such guarantees does exist.
Italija istočasno potrjuje, da je mogoče oceniti individualna tveganja in da obstaja trg za zagotavljanje takšnih jamstev.
On this basis, the premium guarantee system at issue cannot be held to be ‘in all probability self-financing’.
Na tej podlagi sistema premijske garancije ni mogoče šteti za „po vsej verjetnosti samofinanciranega“.
As mentioned above, however, in their submission of 4 June 2004 the Italian authorities manifested a willingness to adopt a system whereby different projects carrying different risks would be charged different premiums.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, so italijanski organi v svojem pismu z dne 4. junija 2004 izkazali pripravljenost za sprejetje sistema, s katerim bi se različnim projektom z različnim tveganjem zaračunale različne premije.
But that willingness has never been transformed into a concrete proposal.
Vendar ta pripravljenost nikoli ni bila pretvorjena v konkretni predlog.
The new system was briefly outlined in that letter, but no other details or information on its operation have been provided since, although the authorities were aware that this was an issue of crucial importance for the Commission’s Decision.
Nov sistem je bil v tem pismu na kratko opisan, vendar od takrat niso bile zagotovljene nobene druge podrobnosti in informacije o njegovem delovanju, čeprav so bili organi obveščeni, da je to vprašanje odločilnega pomena za odločbo Komisije.
In any event, even if it were to be held that such a system could ensure a realistic assessment of the risks, the low level of the premiums proposed (see above) would still indicate that the measure was capable of conferring an economic advantage on shipowners using the scheme.
V vsakem primeru, četudi bi se ta, samo na kratko ponazorjen sistem, štel za primernega za zagotovitev realne ocene tveganj, bi nizka stopnja predlaganih premij (glej zgoraj) še vedno kazala, da je ukrep zmožen zagotoviti gospodarske koristi lastnikom ladij, ki uporabljajo to shemo.
Coverage of administrative costs
Kritje administrativnih stroškov
Finally, the Italian authorities have not provided the Commission with reliable and detailed estimates of all the administrative costs related to the planning, the setting-up and the running of the scheme, despite the fact that the Commission raised the issue in the decision initiating the procedure.
Italijanski organi Komisiji niso posredovali zanesljivih in natančnih ocen vseh administrativnih stroškov, povezanih z načrtovanjem, vzpostavitvijo in delovanjem sheme. Italijanski organi tega pomanjkanja informacij niso nikoli odpravili, čeprav je Komisija to vprašanje izpostavila v svoji odločitvi o začetku postopka z dne 30. aprila 2003.