natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It also stresses that in its ship-repair activities ATSM is currently working in synergy with Fincantieri.
Poudarja tudi, da ATSM pri dejavnostih popravila ladij trenutno deluje v sinergiji z Fincantierijem.
However, the Commission is still not convinced by Italy's arguments that ATSM could be transformed from a dry-docking facility for ship repairs into a fully functioning shipyard in a short period of time.
Vendar Komisije argumenti Italije, da bi bilo mogoče ATSM preoblikovati iz obrata s suhim dokom za popravilo ladij v popolnoma funkcionalno ladjedelnico v tako kratkem času, še vedno niso prepričali.
The conclusion is thus that Fincantieri itself doubted Ancona's ability to outfit the ship; neither has it provided any proof that ATSM was able to do so.
Zato sledi, da je Fincantieri sam dvomil v sposobnost ladjedelnice v Anconi, da opremi ladjo; niti ni predložil nobenega dokaza, da bi lahko to storil ATSM.
Based on the above observations, the Commission considers that the December 2000 plan was unrealistic and unspecific both as regards the construction of a ship at Ancona/ATSM and as regards the situation at Palermo, confirming its doubts on these points.
Na podlagi zgornjih ugotovitev Komisija meni, da je bil načrt iz decembra 2000 nerealen in nespecifičen tako glede gradnje ladje v ladjedelnici v Anconi/ATSM in glede položaja v Palermu, kar potrjuje njene dvome.
Outfitting by the Fincantieri group
Opremljanje s strani skupine Fincantieri
In the decision initiating the formal procedure, the Commission estimated that delivery of all five ships plus all the other ships planned would have involved twice as much outfitting work as Fincantieri had ever done before, and that for the Marghera shipyard the outfitting planned for 2003 would have amounted to around 40 % more than the yard had ever done before.
V odločitvi o sprožitvi formalnega postopka je Komisija ocenila, da bi dobava vseh petih ladij skupaj z drugimi načrtovanimi ladjami predstavljala dvakrat več opremljanja, kot ga je Fincantieri opravil kdaj koli pred tem in da bi za ladjedelnico v Margheri opremljanje, načrtovano za leto 2003, predstavljalo okoli 40 % več dela, kot ga je ladjedelnica opravila kdaj koli pred tem.
Italy replied, for one thing, that the hull erection capacity was sufficient.
Italija je odgovorila, da je zmogljivost gradnje ladijskega trupa zadostna.
This argument is however not relevant, since the Commission did not question the ability to construct the hulls.
Vendar ta argument ni relevanten, saj Komisija ni podvomila o sposobnosti gradnje ladijskega trupa.
Fincantieri and Italy also question the Commission's estimates of the amount of outfitting in relation to previous years and argue for example that the increase was not more than 20 %.
Fincantieri in Italija postavljata pod vprašaj tudi oceno Komisije o količini opremljanja v primerjavi s prejšnjimi leti in na primer trdita, da povečanje ni bilo večje od 20 %.
They also claim that it would have been possible to accomplish the necessary outfitting within the deadline with the help of the network of subcontractors.
Trdita tudi, da bi bilo mogoče potrebno opremljanje dokončati v roku s pomočjo mreže podizvajalcev.
The Commission maintains, however, and is supported in this by its technical expert, that the outfitting issue is as pertinent as stated in the decision initiating the formal procedure.
Vendar Komisija vztraja, pri čemer jo podpira njen tehnični strokovnjak, da je vprašanje opremljanja tako pomembno kot je navedeno v odločitvi o sprožitvi formalnega postopka.
Although Italy has indicated that individual yards could have increased their production up to their peak level by operating two shifts, to do so simultaneously in all or most of its shipyards would, in the Commission's opinion, involve a very high risk and cost and would place a heavy strain on management capacities, particularly since Italy underlines the central management structure of Fincantieri's production process.
Čeprav je Italija pojasnila, da bi lahko posamezne ladjedelnice z dvema izmenama povečale svojo proizvodnjo do najvišje stopnje, bi to po mnenju Komisije, če bi se izvajalo hkrati v vseh ali skoraj vseh ladjedelnicah, vključevalo visoko tveganje in stroške ter bi zelo močno obremenilo upravljavske sposobnosti, predvsem zato, ker Italija poudarja osrednjo upravljavsko strukturo Fincantierijevega proizvodnega postopka.
The outfitting work is particularly critical for hulls 6078 and 6079, which were both planned to be built at the Marghera shipyard and delivered before the end of December 2003, with an interval of only two months between them.
Najbolj kritično je opremljanje ladijskih trupov 6078 in 6079, ki naj bi bila zgrajena v ladjedelnici Marghera in dobavljena pred koncem decembra 2003, med katerima naj bi bil zgolj dvomesečno obdobje.
The Commission's view, supported by the expert's assessment, is that Italy, although providing some figures on how it had planned to accomplish all the outfitting, has not given a proper reply to this important point.
Mnenje Komisije, ki ga podpira ocena strokovnjaka, je, da Italija, četudi je predložila nekatere podatke o tem, kako načrtuje izvršitev vseh del opremljanja, na to pomembno vprašanje ni ustrezno dogovorila.
In its letter dated 12 October 2005, Italy comments on this point made by the expert, stating that delivery of two ships within a period of two months was feasible, and that for example nine months had been set aside for ship 6078, compared with seven months for 6079, so as to be able to work on 6079 if necessary.
V svojem dopisu z dne 12. oktobra 2005 Italija komentira mnenje strokovnjaka in navaja, da je bila dobava dveh ladij v roku dveh mesecev izvedljiva in da je bilo, na primer, ladji 6078 namenjenih devet mesecev, v primerjavi s sedmimi meseci za ladjo 6079, da bi lahko, če bi bilo to potrebno, delali na ladji 6079.
The Commission takes note of Italy's statement that the outfitting time for some previous ships was reduced to seven or even six months.
Komisija je upoštevala izjavo Italije, da je bil čas, namenjen za opremljanje nekaterih prejšnjih ladij zmanjšan na sedem ali celo šest mesecev.
However, this took place in shipyards that were able to work in the normal way, outfitting one ship at a time.
Vendar se je to zgodilo v ladjedelnicah, kjer je delo potekalo v normalnih pogojih in se je opremljala zgolj ena ladja.
The fact that Marghera managed in the past to deliver four ships in 15 months does not dispel the Commission's doubts, since they mainly concern the two planned deliveries within two months.
Dejstvo, da je Marghera v preteklosti uspešno dobavila štiri ladje v 15 mesecih ne odpravi dvomov Komisije, saj le-ti v glavnem zadevajo dve načrtovani dobavi v roku dveh mesecev.
The Commission also notes that real production at Marghera in 2003, which was still considered a busy year for Fincantieri, was around 130000 cgt, far less than the planned production of 160000 cgt for 2003 in the December 2000 plan.
Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da je bila realna proizvodnja v ladjedelnici Marghera v letu 2003, ki je še vedno veljalo za zelo delovno leto za Fincantierija, okoli 130000 brt, kar je veliko nižje od načrtovane proizvodnje 160000 brt za leto 2003 iz načrta iz decembra 2000.
The delivery of four ships in a short timeframe would furthermore, in the view of the expert consulted by the Commission, have caused difficulties for the shipowner, who would probably have had to overcome serious organisational problems in order to be in a position to take delivery of four vessels within two months.
Poleg tega bi dobava štirih ladij v kratkem časovnem okviru, po mnenju strokovnjaka s katerim se je posvetovala Komisija, povzročila težave lastniku ladje, ki bi verjetno moral premagati resne organizacijske težave, da bi lahko sprejel dobavo štirih plovil v dveh mesecih.
As for ships 6078 and 6079, which were planned to be delivered from the Marghera shipyard, the planned production times of 18 and 19 months were according to the Commission's expert extremely short.
V zvezi z ladjama 6078 in 6079, ki naj bi bili dobavljeni iz ladjedelnice Marghera, je bilo po mnenju strokovnjaka Komisije načrtovano obdobje proizvodnje, tj.18 mesecev in 19 mesecev, zelo kratko.
In this respect the expert questions the claims made by Italy in its letter dated 25 May 2005 that there would be a learning curve which would reduce the time needed for the later ships in a series.
S tem v zvezi strokovnjak postavlja pod vprašaj trditve Italije iz njenega dopisa z dne 25. maja 2005, da bi se s krivuljo učenja zmanjšal čas, potreben za kasnejše ladje v seriji.
While this assumption is correct when ships are built in the same yard and with the same methods, it is, according to the expert, not correct when the same type of ship is built in different locations, with different teams, as would have been the case under the December 2000 plan.
Po mnenju strokovnjaka je ta predpostavka pravilna pri gradnji ladij v isti ladjedelnici in z istimi metodami, ni pa pravilna pri gradnji iste vrste ladje na različnih lokacijah in z različnimi skupinami ljudi, kot bi bilo v primeru načrta iz decembra 2000.
The Commission notes that the three sister ships 6077, 6078 and 6079 would not have been built at the same yards and with the same production methods under the December 2000 plan.
Komisija ugotavlja, da po načrtu iz decembra 2000 tri sestrske ladje 6077, 6078 in 6079 ne bi bile zgrajene v isti ladjedelnici in z enakimi proizvodnimi metodami.
It also notes that according to Italy ship 6079 is in fact not the third in a series but the fifth, and that labour savings of 16 % and 8 % for the first and second sister ships had already been achieved.
Ugotavlja tudi, da po podatkih Italije ladja 6079 dejansko ni tretja v seriji, temveč peta in da so bili prihranki delovne sile v višini 16 % in 8 % za prvo in drugo sestrsko ladjo že doseženi.
To expect additional efficiency gains and time savings for each further ship is even less plausible for the last two ships in a series of five than in a series of three ships.
Pričakovati dodatna povečanja učinkovitosti in prihranke časa za vsako nadaljnjo ladjo je manj verjetno za zadnji dve ladji v seriji petih kot v seriji treh ladij.
The Commission therefore considers that the estimated reductions in production times for ships 6078 and 6079 in the plan dating from 2000 were unrealistic.
Zato Komisija meni, da so bila predvidena znižanja obdobij proizvodnje za ladji 6078 in 6079 v načrtu iz decembra 2000 nerealna.
Missing evidence
Manjkajoči dokazi
The technical expert consulted by the Commission following the initiation of the formal procedure provided the Commission with some examples of what kind of information Italy/Fincantieri could have provided to show that Fincantieri really had the intention and the capability to deliver all five ships by the end of 2003.
Tehnični strokovnjak, s katerim se je Komisija posvetovala po sprožitvi formalnega postopka, je Komisiji predstavil nekaj primerov vrste informacij, ki bi jih Italija/Fincantieri lahko predložila, da bi dokazala, da je Fincantieri resnično nameraval in bil sposoben dobaviti vseh pet ladij do konca leta 2003.
Another such example would be contracts with subcontractors, which should have been concluded before the end of July 2001 according to the process description presented by Italy, and in any event before September 2001.
Še en primer bi bile pogodbe s podizvajalci, ki bi bile sklenjene pred koncem leta 2001 v skladu z opisom postopka, ki ga je predstavila Italija in vsekakor pred septembrom 2001.
However, Italy has only presented a list of subcontractors that potentially work for Fincantieri.
Vendar je Italija predložila zgolj seznam podizvajalcev, ki potencialno sodelujejo s Ficantierijem.
A third example of proof that could have been provided would be actual dates of downpayments on contracts or performance bonds/bank guarantees arranged for the orders and normally produced against payment of the first instalment for a new ship.
Tretji primer dokaza, ki bi ga lahko predložili so dejanski datumi odplačil na pogodbah ali garancijah za dobro izvedbo/bančnih garancijah, predvideni za naročila in ponavadi izdelani ob plačilu prvega obroka za novo ladjo.
Italy and Fincantieri did not provide any such evidence of Fincantieri's intention and ability to deliver all the ships by the end of 2003, including ship 6079, even though by letter dated 26 August 2005 the Commission informed Italy that precisely this type of information would have been useful.
Italija in Fincantieri takšnih dokazov o Fincantierijevi nameri in sposobnosti za dobavo vseh ladij do konca leta 2003, vključno z ladjo 6079, nista predložila, čeprav je Komisija v dopisu z dne 26. avgusta 2005 Italijo obvestila, da bi bila prav ta vrsta informacij uporabna.
The lack of such information further supports the Commission's view that the December 2000 production plan was unrealistic and that ship 6079 could not have been delivered by the end of 2003.
Pomanjkanje takšnih informacij nadalje podpira mnenje Komisije, da je bil načrt iz decembra 2000 nerealen in da ladja 6079 ne bi mogla biti dobavljena do konca leta 2003.
Expected delivery of the ship
Pričakovani rok dobave ladje
The Commission finally notes that according to a press release issued on 20 June 2005 by the ship operator (Holland America Line), the vessel in question (ship 6079), to be named MS Noordam, is to be delivered in January 2006.
Komisija na koncu ugotavlja, da naj bi bilo po podatkih sporočila za javnost, ki ga je 20. junija 2005 izdal upravljavec ladje (Holland America Line), zadevno plovilo (ladja 6079), ki se bo imenovalo „MS Noordam“, dobavljeno januarja 2006.
The Commission notes that if this information on the delivery date is correct, the aid could not have been granted by Italy even if the Commission had allowed an extension of the delivery limit until the end of October 2005, as requested by Italy.
Komisija ugotavlja, da če je ta dobavni rok pravilen, Italija pomoči ne bi mogla dodeliti, četudi bi Komisija dovolila podaljšanje roka dobave do konca oktobra 2005, kot je to zahtevala Italija.
The Commission has analysed the information provided by Italy following the Commission decision to open a formal investigation into the technical ability to deliver all the ships that were scheduled for delivery in 2003 according to Fincantieri's December 2000 plan, and in particular hull 6079.
Komisija je pregledala informacije, ki jih je predložila Italija po odločitvi Komisije o sprožitvi formalne preiskave o tehnični sposobnosti za dobavo vseh ladij, ki naj bi bile dobavljene leta 2003 v skladu s Fincantierijevim načrtom iz decembra 2000 in zlasti ladijskega trupa ladje 6079.
In the Commission's view the information that Italy has provided has not dispelled the doubts it raised concerning the feasibility of the December 2000 plan submitted by Italy.
Po mnenju Komisije informacije, ki jih je predložila Italija, niso pregnale dvomov Komisije o izvedljivosti načrta iz decembra 2000, ki ga je predložila Italija.
The original doubts were shared by an independent expert.
Neodvisni strokovnjak se je s prvotnimi dvomi strinjal.
The new information was assessed by another independent expert, who also came to the same conclusion as the Commission.
Drug neodvisni strokovnjak je ocenil nove informacije in prišel do enakega zaključka kot Komisija.
Italy had the opportunity to comment on the conclusions set out in the reports by both experts.
Italija je imela možnost, da poda pripombe o zaključkih iz poročil obeh strokovnjakov.
Based on its assessment of all the available facts the Commission comes to the conclusion that the original production plan, with delivery of all five notified cruise ships before the end of 2003, was unrealistic.
Na podlagi svoje ocene vseh razpoložljivih dejstev je Komisija sklenila, da je bil prvotni proizvodni načrt z dobavo vseh petih priglašenih ladij za križarjenje pred koncem leta 2003 nerealen.
The doubts concerning the ability to deliver ship 6079 by the end of 2003 have therefore been confirmed.
Torej so bili dvomi glede sposobnosti za dobavo ladje 6079 do konca leta 2003 potrjeni.
The Commission notes that it has already authorised an extension of the delivery limit for four ships produced by Fincantieri, in accordance with Article 3(2) of the Shipbuilding Regulation.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je v skladu s členom 3(2) Uredbe o ladjedelništvu že dovolila podaljšanje roka dobave za štiri ladje, ki jih je proizvedel Fincantieri.
That provision applies only to unexpected disruptions of a substantial and defensible nature due to exceptional circumstances, unforeseeable and external to the company, and the Court has already stated that it should be given a restrictive interpretation.
Ta določba se uporablja zgolj za nepričakovane obsežne in opravičljive motnje zaradi izjemnih okoliščin, ki jih družba ni mogla predvideti in so bile zunaj njenega nadzora, Sodišče pa je že poudarilo, da se mora zanjo uporabljati restriktivna razlaga.
On the basis of the conclusion set out in paragraph 70, an extension of the delivery limit is not defensible, and for this reason the Commission cannot authorise an extension of the delivery limit for hull 6079,
Na podlagi zaključka iz odstavka 70 podaljšanje roka dobave ni opravičljivo in zato Komisija ne more dovoliti podaljšanja roka dobave za ladijski trup 6079 –
The three-year delivery limit laid down in Article 3(2) of Council Regulation No 1540/98 cannot be extended for ship 6079 built by Fincantieri.
Triletnega roka dobave iz člena 3(2) Uredbe Sveta št. 1540/98 ni mogoče podaljšati za ladjo 6079, ki jo je zgradil Fincantieri.
The contract-related operating aid for the ship may accordingly not be implemented.
V skladu s tem se s pogodbo povezana pomoč za tekoče poslovanje ne sme izvajati.
Italy shall inform the Commission, within two months of notification of this Decision, of the measures taken to comply with it.
Italija bo v dveh mesecih od uradnega obvestila o tej odločbi Komisijo obvestila o ukrepih, sprejetih za uskladitev s to odločbo.
Done at Brussels, 23 November 2005.
V Bruslju, 23. november 2005.
OJ C 30, 5.2.2005, p. 12.
UL C 30, 5.2.2005, str. 12.
OJ C 238, 3.10.2002, p. 14 (state aid case N 843/01).
UL C 238, 3.10.2002, str. 14 (zadeva državne pomoči N 843/01).
Case T-72/98 Astilleros Zamacona SA v Commission [2000] ECR II-1683.
Zadeva T-72/98 Astilleros Zamacona SA proti Komisiji [2000] Recueil II-1683.
For administrative reasons, a different one from the expert consulted before the formal procedure was initiated.
Zaradi upravnih razlogov drug strokovnjak kot tisti, s katerim se je Komisija posvetovala pred sprožitvijo postopka.
According to Fincantieri's annual report for 2003, ‘2003 was a particularly busy year for the Cruise Ship Business Unit, which was engaged in delivering three ships in a brief period of time’.
Po podatkih Fincantierijevega letnega poročila za leto 2003 je bilo „leto 2003 še posebej delovno leto za poslovno enoto ladij za križarjenja, ki je dobavilo tri ladje v zelo kratkem času“. (Prevod iz angleškega izvirnika).
Italy stated that the shipowner requested a postponement, in the autumn of 2001, of the delivery dates to various dates in 2004 and 2005. This request was motivated by the severe impact on the cruise industry of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Italija je izjavila, da je lastnik ladje jeseni 2001 zaprosil za odložitev dobavnih rokov na različne datume v letih 2004 in 2005 ter prošnjo utemeljil z močnim vplivom terorističnih napadov 11. septembra 2001 na segment križarjenj.
There were chiefly two reasons for initiating the formal procedure.
Za sprožitev formalnega postopka sta bila predvsem dva razloga.
One was doubts concerning the feasibility of the plan, whereby one of the five ships (ship 6077) was to be built at the Ancona shipyard, involving a complex production process in which hull sections had to be moved for assembly to a second yard (ATSM Trieste) and back to Ancona, since the length of Ancona's dock is shorter than the ship.
Prvi razlog je bil dvom glede izvedljivosti načrta, da bi eno izmed petih ladij (ladjo 6077) zgradili v ladjedelnici v Anconi, kar bi vključevalo kompleksni proizvodni postopek, pri katerem bi za sestavo delov ladijskega trupa le-te morali prestaviti v drugo ladjedelnico (ATSM Trieste) in nato nazaj v Ancono, saj je dok v Anconi krajši od ladje.
The Commission points out here that the planned outfitting times for sister ships 6075, 6076 and 6077 were nine, eight and ten months respectively.
Komisija tu opozarja na načrtovano dolžino časa za opremljanje sestrskih ladij 6075, 6076 in 6077, ki je bila devet, osem in deset mesecev, v tem zaporedju.
Nine months for 6078 therefore appeared to be not particularly long, and seven months for 6079 extremely short, given that the outfitting work on that vessel was planned to be carried out simultaneously with ship 6078.
Obdobje devetih mesecev, namenjenih za ladjo 6078 se ni zdelo preveč dolgo, obdobje sedmih mesecev za ladjo 6079 pa zelo kratko glede na to, da naj bi se opremljanje za to plovilo izvedlo skupaj z opremljanjem ladje 6078.
The Commission can agree that a certain learning curve exists even when production takes place at different yards, e.g. as regards aspects linked to the central management structure and the supply of major equipment.
Komisija se strinja, da obstaja določena krivulja učenja tudi ob proizvodnji v različnih ladjedelnicah, npr. glede vidikov, povezanih s strukturo osrednjega upravljanja in dobavo glavne opreme.
Nevertheless, when ships are built in different locations, and even with different production methods, it is clear that this learning curve is much less significant than when there is repeated production in the same yard.
Vseeno je jasno, da je pri gradnji ladij na različnih lokacijah in celo z drugačnimi proizvodnimi metodami krivulja učenja veliko manj izrazita, kot če se proizvodnja ponovi v isti ladjedelnici.
In its letter dated 12 October 2005, Italy comments on this point.
Italija je o tem izrazila svoje pripombe v dopisu z dne 12. oktobra 2005.
It considers that there is a learning curve even when ships are built in different locations.
Meni, da obstaja krivulja učenja tudi pri gradnji ladij na različnih lokacijah.
One such example is orders to suppliers for main items such as propulsion systems or main power generators.
Eden od primerov so naročila dobaviteljem za glavne sestavne dele, kot so pogonski sistemi ali glavni električni generatorji.
These have to be ordered at an early stage so as to be sure to receive them in time.
Te je treba naročiti zelo zgodaj, da jih ladjedelnica prejme pravočasno.
This would have involved, in the Commission's estimation, twice as much outfitting work in 2003 as Fincantieri had ever done in any other year. Furthermore, for the shipyard at Marghera, the outfitting planned for 2003 would have amounted to around 40 % more than the yard had ever done before.
Poleg tega bi za ladjedelnico v Margheri opremljanje, načrtovano za leto 2003, prineslo okoli 40 % več dela, kot ga je ladjedelnica kdaj koli prej opravila.