natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In reply to Deltafina’s defence on this point, the Decision confirms that point 11(a) of the Leniency Notice includes a duty to keep the immunity application confidential, which is justified by the need to ensure that the result of the subsequent investigations which the Commission needs to carry out be not compromised.
Odločba, kot odgovor na obrambo Deltafine o tej točki, potrjuje, da točka 11(a) Obvestila o ugodni obravnavi vključuje dolžnost, da je treba vlogo za imuniteto obravnavati kot zaupno, kar je utemeljeno s potrebo po zagotovitvi neogroženega rezultata naknadnih preiskav, ki jih mora opraviti Komisija.
Deltafina was aware of the Commission’s intention to carry out surprise investigations.
Deltafina se je zavedala, da namerava Komisija opraviti nenapovedane preiskave.
Inspection were actually organised and occurred as announced to Deltafina at a meeting between Deltafina and the Commission services.
Inšpekcijski pregledi so bili dejansko organizirani in opravljeni, kakor so družbi Deltafina povedali na srečanju med Deltafino in službami Komisije.
A certain degree of difficulty in keeping an immunity application confidential is inherent in all cases where a cartel participant decides to apply for immunity.
Določena stopnja težavnosti je prisotna pri ohranjanju zaupnosti vloge za imuniteto v vseh zadevah, v katerih se udeleženec v kartelu odloči predložiti vlogo za imuniteto.
However, any such difficulty (or the fact of having informed the Commission of it) does not licence the immunity applicant to voluntarily disclose its immunity application at meetings with competitors.
Vendar vsaka taka težava (ali dejstvo, da je bila o tem obveščena Komisija) vlagatelju za imuniteto ne dovoljuje, da bi prostovoljno razkril svojo vlogo za imuniteto na srečanjih s konkurenti.
Deltafina’s alternative application for reduction of the fine
Nadomestni zahtevek za zmanjšanje glob družbe Deltafina
Deltafina’s application for immunity also included an application for a reduction of the fine which would have been otherwise applicable to it in this case, strictly subject to ‘rejection by DG Comp of its application for full immunity’.
Vloga za imuniteto družbe Deltafina je vključevala tudi zahtevek za zmanjšanje globe, ki bi ji bila v tej zadevi sicer odrejena, dosledno v skladu z „GD Comp, ki je zavrnil njeno vlogo za polno imuniteto“.
The Decision (based on the tenor of the Leniency Notice, as well as on its teleological and systematic interpretation), finds that subsidiary applications for reduction can only be accepted in cases where conditional immunity cannot be granted at the time an application is made and loses any legal value once conditional immunity is granted.
Odločba (ki temelji na veljavnosti Obvestila o ugodni obravnavi ter na njegovi teleološki in sistematični razlagi) ugotavlja, da se dodatni zahtevki za zmanjšanje lahko sprejmejo le v primerih, v katerih se pogojna imuniteta ne more odobriti takrat, ko je predložen zahtevek, in izgubi vsako pravno veljavo, ko se pogojna imuniteta enkrat odobri.
Given that Deltafina was initially granted conditional immunity and lost it for breaching the cooperation obligations to which it was subject, it cannot benefit from a reduction of the fine.
Ker je bila družbi Deltafina prvotno odobrena pogojna imuniteta in ker jo je izgubila zaradi kršitve obveznosti, katerih bi se morala držati, ni upravičena do zmanjšanja globe.
Application of the Leniency Notice to Dimon and Transcatab
Uporaba Obvestila o ugodni obravnavi družb Dimon in Transcatab
Both Dimon and Transcatab are found to have complied with the conditions imposed on them by virtue of their application for reduction.
Ugotovilo se je, da sta obe družbi Dimon in Transcatab ravnali v skladu s pogoji, postavljenimi na podlagi njunega zahtevka za zmanjšanje.
Upon assessment of the evidence supplied to the Commission and their co-operation with the Commission during the procedure, the Decision awards Dimon and Transcatab with the highest level of reduction which is envisaged within the brackets which were indicated to them following their applications for reduction (i.e. 50 % and 30 % respectively).
Na podlagi ocene dokazov, predloženih Komisiji in njunega sodelovanja s Komisijo med postopkom, dodeljuje Odločba družbama Dimon in Transcatab najvišjo raven zmanjšanja, predvideno znotraj razredov, ki so jima bili navedeni po njunih zahtevkih za zmanjšanje (tj. 50 % oziroma 30 %).
In view of the above, the final amount of the fines in this case is set as follows:
Glede na zgoraj navedeno je končni znesek glob v tej zadevi določen tako:
Deltafina and Universal, jointly and severally,
Deltafina in Universal, skupno in solidarno
Dimon (Mindo) and Alliance One International,
Dimon (Mindo) in Alliance One International
Alliance One International being responsible for the whole, Mindo only being jointly and severally liable for EUR 3,99 million
Alliance One International je odgovorna za celoto, Mindo je skupno in solidarno odgovoren le za 3,99 milijonov EUR
Transcatab and Alliance One International, jointly and severally
Transcatab in Alliance One International, skupno in solidarno
Council Regulation (EEC) No 727/70 of 21 April 1970 on the common organisation of the market in raw tobacco, hereinafter ‘Regulation 727/70’ ( OJ L 94, 28.4.1970, p. 1) as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2075/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the market in raw tobacco, hereinafter ‘Regulation 2075/92’ ( OJ L 215, 30.7.1992, p. 70) (last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2004 of 29 April 2004 (OJ L 161, 30.4.2004, p. 48)).
Uredba Sveta (EGS) št. 727/70 z dne 21. aprila 1970 o skupni ureditvi trga za surovi tobak, v nadaljnjem besedilu „Uredba 727/70“ ( UL L 94, 28.4.1970, str. 1), kakor je bila spremenjena z Uredbo Sveta (EGS) št. 2075/92 z dne 30. junija 1992 o skupni ureditvi trga za surovi tobak, v nadaljnjem besedilu „Uredba 2075/92“ ( UL L 215, 30.7.1992, str. 70) (nazadnje spremenjena z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 864/2004 z dne 29. aprila 2004 (UL L 161, 30.4.2004, str. 48)).
See also Council Regulation (EC) No 1636/98, of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation 2075/92, hereinafter ‘Regulation 1636/98’ ( OJ L 210, 28.7.1998, p. 23) and Commission Regulation (EC) No 2848/98 of 22 December 1998 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation 2075/92 as regards the premium scheme, production quotas and the specific aid to be granted to producer groups in the raw tobacco sector, hereinafter ‘Regulation 2848/98’ ( OJ L 358, 31.12.1998, p. 17), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1983/2002 of 7 November 2002 (OJ L 306, 8.11.2002, p. 8).
Glej tudi Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1636/98, z dne 20. julija 1998 o spremembi Uredbe št. 2075/92, v nadaljnjem besedilu „Uredba 1636/98“ ( UL L 210, 28.7.1998, str. 23), in Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 2848/98 z dne 22. decembra 1998 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 2075/92 glede sheme premij, proizvodnih kvot in posebne pomoči za skupine proizvajalcev v sektorju surovega tobaka, v nadaljnjem besedilu „Uredba 1636/98“ ( UL L 358, 31.12.1998, str. 17), kakor je bila nazadnje spremenjena z Uredbo Komisije št. 1983/2002 z dne 7. novembra 2002 (UL L 306, 8.11.2002, str. 8).
On 19 February 2002, the Commission received an application for leniency from Deltafina S.p.A.
Komisija je 19. februarja 2002 prejela zahtevek za ugodno obravnavo od družbe Deltafina S.p.A.
(‘Deltafina’, the leading Italian processor) under the terms of the then newly adopted Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (the ‘Leniency Notice’).
(„Deltafina“, vodilni italijanski predelovalec) pod pogoji tedaj na novo sprejetega Obvestila Komisije o imuniteti pred globami in zmanjševanju glob v primerih kartelov („Obvestilo o ugodni obravnavi“).
Since September 2004, Dimon has changed its name into Mindo S.r.l (‘Mindo’) and is no longer part of the Dimon Inc. group.
Od septembra 2004 je Dimon spremenil ime v Mindo S.r.l („Mindo“) in ni več del Dimon Inc. group.
Dimon Inc. and SCC have merged on 13 April 2005 to form Alliance One International Inc. (‘Alliance’).
Dimon Inc. in SCC sta se 13. aprila 2005 združila, da je nastal Alliance One International Inc. („Alliance“).
The payment of the variable part of the premium is entrusted to the producers’ groups.
Za plačilo variabilnega dela premije so pooblaščene skupine proizvajalcev.
The CMO requires each producer or producers’ group and each first processor to enter into so-called ‘cultivation contracts’ at the start of each year's campaign (around March-May, when tobacco seedlings are transplanted) where they agree on ‘contract prices’ for each quality grade for each individual variety.
Skupna ureditev trga zahteva, da vsak proizvajalec ali skupina proizvajalcev in vsako podjetje za prvo predelavo sklenejo tako imenovano „pogodbo o pridelavi“ na začetku vsakoletnega obdobja (od marca do maja, ko se presadijo sadike tobaka), tedaj se sporazumejo o „pogodbenih cenah“ za vsak kakovostni razred vsake posamezne sorte.
Romana Tabacchi
Romana Tabacchi
APTI
APTI
UNITAB
UNITAB
Deltafina
Deltafina
Transcatab
Transcatab
Dimon (Mindo)
Dimon (Mindo)
On 18-19 April 2002, the Commission carried investigations at the premises of Dimon, Transcatab Trestina Azienda Tabacchi S.p.A. (‘Trestina’) and Romana Tabacchi s.r.l.
Komisija je 18. in 19. aprila 2002 opravila preiskave v prostorih družb Dimon, Transcatab, Trestina Azienda Tabacchi S.p.A („Trestina“) in Romana Tabacchi s.r.l.
The Decision concludes that the non application of final immunity to Deltafina does not have any direct bearing on the way the Leniency Notice should apply to Dimon and Transcatab. In particular, the Leniency Notice does not warrant any up-grading of their positions following withholding of final immunity to Deltafina.
Odločba ugotavlja, da neuporaba končne imunitete za družbo Deltafina nima nobenega neposrednega vpliva na način uporabe Obvestila o ugodni obravnavi za podjetji Dimon in Transcatab Obvestilo o ugodni obravnavi še zlasti ne zagotavlja izboljšave njihovih položajev po zavrnitvi končne imunitete družbi Deltafina.
of 21 December 2005
z dne 12. decembra 2005
relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement against Flexsys NV, Bayer AG, Crompton Manufacturing Company Inc. (former Uniroyal Chemical Company Inc.), Crompton Europe Ltd, Chemtura Corporation (former Crompton Corporation), General Química SA, Repsol Química SA and Repsol YPF SA.
v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP proti podjetjem Flexsys NV, Bayer AG, Crompton Manufacturing Company Inc. (nekdanji Uniroyal Chemical Company Inc.), Crompton Europe Ltd, Chemtura Corporation (nekdanji Crompton Corporation), General Química SA, Repsol Química SA in Repsol YPF SA
(Case No COMP/F/C.38.443 — Rubber chemicals)
(Zadeva COMP/F/C.38.443 – Kemikalije v industriji gume)
(notified under document number (2005) 5592)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2004) 5592)
(only the English, German and Spanish texts are authentic)
(Besedila v angleškem, nemškem in španskem jeziku so edina verodostojna)
Crompton Manufacturing Company, Inc. (former Uniroyal Chemical Company Inc.);
Crompton Manufacturing Company, Inc. (nekdanji Uniroyal Chemical Company Inc.);
Chemtura Corporation (former Crompton Corporation);
Chemtura Corporation (nekdanji Crompton Corporation);
The addressees of the Decision participated in a single, complex and continuous infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, involving the fixing of prices and the exchange of confidential information concerning certain rubber chemicals (antioxidants, antiozonants and primary accelerators) in the EEA and worldwide markets.
Naslovniki Odločbe so sodelovali v eni sami, sestavljeni in nepretrgani kršitvi člena 81 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti in člena 53 Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru, ki vključuje določanje cen in izmenjavo zaupnih podatkov o določenih kemikalijah v industriji gume (antioksidanti, antiozonanti, primarni pospeševalci) na trgih v EGP in drugje po svetu.
The rubber chemicals sector
Sektor kemikalij v industriji gume
Rubber chemicals are synthetic or organic chemicals that act as productivity and quality enhancers in the manufacture of rubber, mainly used in vehicle tires.
Kemikalije v industriji gume so sintetične ali organske kemikalije, s katerimi se izboljšujeta produktivnost in kakovost pri proizvodnji gume, ki se večinoma uporablja za avtomobilske pnevmatike.
In 2001, the EEA market value was estimated at EUR 200 million, covering the categories antiozonants, antioxidants and primary accelerators that were affected by the cartel.
Leta 2001 je bila vrednost na trgu EGP ocenjena na 200 milijonov EUR, kar zajema kategorije antiozonantov, antioksidantov in primarnih pospeševalcev, ki jih je prizadel kartel.
The major global producers of rubber chemicals are Flexsys, Bayer and Chemtura (former Crompton), accounting together for approximately a half of the world-wide rubber chemical market.
Veliki svetovni proizvajalci kemikalij v industriji gume so podjetja Flexsys, Bayer in Chemtura (nekdanji Crompton), ki skupaj preskrbujejo približno polovico svetovnega trga kemikalij v industriji gume.
There are a number of significant smaller competitors, such as General Química (Spain), Duslo (Slovakia), Istrochem (Slovakia), Noveon (USA) and Great Lakes (USA), as well as many minor competitors particularly in Asia.
Obstaja še nekaj pomembnih manjših konkurentov, kot na primer General Quimica (Španija), Duslo (Slovaška), Istrochem (Slovaška), Noveon (ZDA) in Great Lakes (ZDA) ter veliko manj pomembnih konkurentov, predvsem v Aziji.
The major customers for rubber chemicals are the globally operating big tire companies Michelin (France), Goodyear (USA), Bridgestone/Firestone (Japan), Continental (Germany) and Pirelli (Italy), accounting together for about 35-40 % of world-wide consumption.
Največji kupci kemikalij v industriji gume so veliki proizvajalci pnevmatik, ki delujejo po vsem svetu – Michelin (Francija), Goodyear (ZDA), Bridgestone/Firestone (Japonska), Continental (Nemčija) in Pirelli (Italija), ki skupaj pomenijo 35–40 % svetovne potrošnje.
The geographic scope of rubber chemicals business changed gradually from regional to global in the mid-1990s.
Sredi devetdesetih let 20. stoletja se je geografski obseg poslovanja s kemikalijami v industriji gume postopoma spremenil iz regionalnega v globalnega.
This affected the scope of the cartel as well, so that after 1995 the parties reached understandings mostly about world-wide price increases.
To je vplivalo tudi na obseg kartela in zato so se po letu 1995 stranke večinoma dogovorile o zvišanju svetovnih cen.
Whilst there are a number of indications that collusive activities within the rubber chemicals industry were already taking place at least occasionally in the 1970s, the Commission only has sufficiently firm evidence of the existence of the cartel for the period covering the years 1996-2001 for Flexsys, Bayer and Crompton (now Chemtura) (including Crompton Europe and Uniroyal Chemical Company).
Čeprav obstaja več znakov, da so se vsaj občasni skrivni dogovori na področju kemikalij v industriji gume dogajali že od sedemdesetih let 20. stoletja, ima Komisija dovolj trdne dokaze za obstoj kartela šele za obdobje med letoma 1996–2001 za podjetja Flexsys, Bayer in Crompton (zdaj Chemtura) (vključno s podjetjema Crompton Europe in Uniroyal Chemical Company).
These undertakings agreed to raise prices of certain rubber chemicals (antioxidants, antiozonants and primary accelerators) in the EEA and world-wide markets at least in 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001.
Ta podjetja so se dogovarjala o zvišanju cen za nekatere kemikalije v industriji gume (antioksidante, antiozonante in primarne pospeševalce) v EGP in na svetovnih trgih vsaj v letih 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000 in 2001.
General Química, which must be considered a fringe player, participated to these agreements in 1999 and 2000.
Podjetje General Química, ki je igralo le stransko vlogo, je bilo vpleteno v te dogovore v letih 1999 in 2000.
Coordination of price increases normally followed a general pattern, involving contacts among the competitors during a preparatory phase preceding the announcement to customers, thereafter during the negotiations with customers, and lastly after the contracts had been made to monitor compliance and success on the market.
Dogovarjanje o zviševanju cen je ponavadi sledilo splošnemu vzorcu, ki je vključeval stike med konkurenti med pripravljalno fazo, preden so kupci obveščeni o cenah, nato med pogajanji s kupci in nazadnje še po podpisu pogodb, s čimer sta se spremljala spoštovanje dogovorov in uspešnost na trgu.
During the contacts preceding the coordinated action, the parties sought support for a suggested price increase and agreed upon its amount, the products and territory covered, as well as the leader and the timing of the announcements.
Med stiki pred usklajenim delovanjem so stranke iskale podporo za predlagano zvišanje cen ter se dogovorile o zneskih ter izdelkih in območju, ki jih bo zvišanje pokrivalo, prav tako pa tudi o vodji in časovnem usklajevanju objav.
During the implementation phase, the focus was on the customers’ reactions to the announced price increases and exchanges on the positions regarding price negotiations with the customers.
Faza izvajanja kršitve je bila osredotočena na spremljanje odzivov kupcev na objavljena zvišanja cen in na vzajemno obveščanje o stanju pogajanj s kupci glede cen.
The follow-up contacts included typically the exchange of detailed information on contracted volumes and prices with specific customers.
Stiki, ki so temu sledili, so ponavadi vključevali izmenjavo podrobnih podatkov o pogodbenih količinah in cenah s posameznimi kupci.
The investigation into the rubber chemicals sector was initiated as a result of an application for conditional immunity from fines by Flexsys in April 2002, which was granted in June 2002.
Preiskava sektorja kemikalij v industriji gume se je začela kot posledica vložitve prošnje podjetja Flexys za pogojno imuniteto pred globami aprila 2002, ki je bila odobrena junija 2002.
Subsequently, the Commission carried out inspections at the premises of Bayer, Crompton Europe and General Química in September 2002.
Posledično je Komisija septembra 2002 izvedla preglede v prostorih podjetij Bayer, Crompton Europe in General Química.
Crompton (now Chemtura), Bayer and General Química applied for leniency, on 8 October 2002, 24 October 2002 and 7 June 2004, respectively.
Podjetja Crompton (zdaj Chemtura), Bayer in General Química so 8. oktobra 2002, 24. oktobra 2002 in 7. junija 2004, v tem zaporedju, vložila prošnje za prizanesljivost.
The Commission informed, in due course, all the applicants of its intention to apply reductions of fines.
Komisija je pravočasno obvestila vse vlagatelje prošenj, da namerava znižati globe.
On 12 April 2005, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections against Bayer, Crompton, Crompton Europe, Uniroyal Chemical Company, Flexsys, Akzo Nobel, Pharmacia (former Monsanto), General Química, Repsol Química, Repsol YPF, Duslo, Prezam, Vagus and Istrochem.
Dne 12. aprila 2005 je Komisija sprejela obvestilo o nasprotovanju proti podjetjem Bayer, Crompton, Crompton Europe, Uniroyal Chemical Company, Flexsys, Akzo Nobel, Pharmacia (nekdanji Monsanto), General Química, Repsol Química, Repsol YPF, Duslo, Prezam, Vagus in Istrochem.
An Oral Hearing on the case was held on 18 July 2005.
Ustno zaslišanje je bilo 18. julija 2005.
The proceedings were subsequently closed against Akzo Nobel NV, Pharmacia Corporation, Duslo a.s., Prezam a.s., Vagus a.s., and Istrochem a.s.
Posledično so se zaključili postopki proti podjetjem Akzo Nobel NV, Pharmacia Corporation, Duslo a.s., Prezam a.s., Vagus a.s. in Istrochem a.s.
Liabilities
Odgovornosti
Repsol YPF SA and Repsol Química SA, although they did not participate themselves in the arrangements in question, are nevertheless held responsible for the conduct of their wholly owned subsidiary General Química.
Čeprav podjetji Repsol YPF SA in Repsol Química SA sami nista sodelovali v zadevnih dogovorih, sta vseeno odgovorni za vedenje podjetja General Química, ki je v celoti v njuni lasti.
The basic amount of the fine is determined according to the gravity and duration of the infringement.
Osnovni znesek globe se določi glede na stopnjo in trajanje kršitve.
In assessing the gravity of the infringement, the Commission takes account of its nature, its actual impact on the market, where this can be measured, and the size of the relevant geographic market.
Pri oceni teže kršitve Komisija upošteva njeno naravo, njen dejanski učinek na trg, kadar je ta izmerljiv, in velikost upoštevnega geografskega trga.
Considering the nature of the infringement and its geographic scope (the infringement in this case consisted primarily of secret collusion between cartel members to fix prices in the EEA and elsewhere, supported by the exchange of confidential information), the infringement must be qualified as very serious.
Upoštevajoč naravo kršitve in njen geografski obseg (kršitev je v tem primeru sestavljena predvsem iz skrivnih dogovorov med člani kartela o določanju cen v EGP in drugod, podprtih z izmenjavami skrivnih podatkov) je treba kršitev opredeliti kot zelo resno.
Within the category of very serious infringements, the scale of likely fines makes it possible to apply differential treatment to undertakings in order to take account of the effective economic capacity of the offenders to cause significant damage to competition, as well as to set the fine at a level which ensures that it has sufficient deterrent effect.
V kategoriji zelo resnih kršitev dovoljuje lestvica možnih glob preferenčno obravnavo podjetij, da se s tem upoštevajo dejanske ekonomske zmožnosti kršiteljev za povzročanje resne škode konkurenci ter da se višina globe postavi tako, da ima zadosten odvračalni učinek.
Based on the fact that both the geographic scope of the cartel and the rubber chemicals business in general is essentially world-wide, the global market shares in 2001, the last full year of the infringement, are used as reference values in the calculation of the fines.
Na osnovi dejstva, da sta tako geografski obseg kartela kot trg s kemikalijami v industriji gume razširjena po vsem svetu, se deleži globalnega trga iz leta 2001, zadnjega polnega leta kršitve, uporabijo kot referenčne vrednosti pri izračunu glob.
Flexsys was the largest market operator in the world, with a market share of approximately [20-30] %.
Podjetje Flexys je bilo največji svetovni upravljalec trga, s tržnim deležem približno [20–30] %.
It is therefore placed in a first category.
Zato spada v prvo kategorijo.
Bayer, with a market share of approximately [10-20] %, is placed in a second category.
Podjetje Bayer s tržnim deležem približno [10–20] % spada v drugo kategorijo.
Crompton, with a market share of approximately [10-20] %, is placed in a third category.
Podjetje Crompton s tržnim deležem približno [10–20] % spada v tretjo kategorijo.
Finally, General Química, with a market share of approximately [0-10] %, is placed in a fourth category.
In nazadnje, podjetje General Química s tržnim deležem približno [0–10] % spada v četrto kategorijo.
The starting amounts will be fixed proportionally, albeit not arithmetically, having regard to the market shares.
Začetni zneski bodo določeni sorazmerno, čeprav ne aritmetično, z ozirom na tržne deleže.
Within the category of very serious infringements, the scale of likely fines also makes it possible to set the fines at a level which ensures that they have sufficient deterrent effect, taking into account the size of each undertaking.
V kategoriji zelo resnih kršitev lestvica možnih glob omogoča tudi določitev takšne višine glob, ki zagotavlja zadosten odvračalni učinek, s tem, da se upošteva velikost vsakega podjetja.