natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Nor had the BdB provided any further explanation or justification on this point.
BdB tega tudi ne pojasnjuje ali utemeljuje podrobneje.
In the market comparison, lastly, contrary to the view put forward by the BdB, the trade tax effect had to be taken into account.
Nazadnje pa se mora pri tržni primerjavi v nasprotju s trditvijo BdB upoštevati učinek obratovalnega davka.
Silent partnership contributions to credit institutions were usually provided by institutional investors which had themselves to pay the trade tax on the remuneration received.
Vložki tihe družbe v kreditne institucije ponavadi ponujajo institucionalni vlagatelji, ki morajo sami plačevati obratovalni davek od prejetega nadomestila.
The Land, by contrast, was not liable to trade tax and would therefore be satisfied with a correspondingly lower remuneration.
Dežela Hessen pa je oproščena obratovalnega davka in bo torej zadovoljna z ustreznim manjšim nadomestilom.
The counter effect of the non-liability of the Land was the liability of the bank, which accordingly had to pay the trade tax.
Nasprotni učinek oprostitve dežele Hessen je zavezanost banke, ki mora torej plačevati obratovalni davek.
Whether it was paid to the Land or the municipality was irrelevant, as was the fact that the trade tax was assessed on the taxable income (usually the taxable income of the recipient of the remuneration, but here the taxable income of the bank), so long as the bank did in fact achieve income.
Ali se plačuje deželi Hessen ali občini, ni pomembno, prav tako pa ni pomembno dejstvo, da se obratovalni davek odmerja na podlagi obdavčljivega prihodka (ponavadi obdavčljivega prihodka prejemnika nadomestila, v tem primeru pa banke), dokler banka dejansko beleži prihodek.
If, by contrast, it suffered losses, not only was there no payment of trade tax, but also no payment of the remuneration on the contribution.
Če pa slednja utrpi izgube, preneha plačevati tako obratovalni davek kot nadomestilo za vložek.
Contrary to what the BdB argued, Helaba did not pay the remuneration to itself either.
V nasprotju s trditvijo BdB Helaba tudi ne izplačuje nadomestila sama sebi.
In accordance with the decision of the Land of Hessen, the yield remaining after tax from the investment of the special fund did not accrue to the general budget, but was similarly tied to the earmarked purposes of the fund and was to be used to strengthen the promotion-related business.
V skladu z odločitvijo dežele Hessen se donos na vlogo posebnega sklada, ki ostaja po obdavčitvi, ne izteka v splošni proračun, temveč je prav tako na voljo za posebne namene in se mora uporabljati za krepitev dejavnosti za pospeševanje.
This was a question of the use of the resources paid by Helaba to the Land.
To je vprašanje uporabe sredstev, ki jih Helaba izplačuje Hessnu.
With the transfer of silent partnership assets, the Land of Hessen opted for a form of contribution of resources based on the concept of transferring public aid resources to Helaba in order to strengthen its equity-capital base, but also of achieving additional income for the Land of Hessen.
Z vložkom tihe družbe se je dežela Hessen odločila za metodo vloge sredstev, ki temelji na konceptu prenosa javnih sredstev za pospeševanje na Helabo, da bi se okrepil obseg lastnega kapitala banke in dosegel dodaten prihodek dežele Hessen.
In spite of the fact that the returns from these claims were still available for promotion-related assets and hence served a public-benefit purpose, the assets were recognised by the supervisory authority and could therefore be used to provide cover for the liabilities of Helaba, which was in competition with other credit institutions.
Ne glede na dejstvo, da so bila povračila iz teh terjatev še vedno na razpolago za sredstva za pospeševanje in so torej služila za splošnokoristne namene, so bila sredstva priznana s strani nadzorstva in so se torej lahko uporabljala za namene jamstva Helabe, ki je tekmovala z drugimi kreditnimi institucijami.
State resources therefore were transferred to Helaba.
Na Helabo so se torej prenesla državna sredstva.
This principle was accepted and developed by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in a number of cases, in particular by the WestLB judgment, in a context which is relevant to the present case.
To načelo sta Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti in Sodišče prve stopnje sprejeli in razvijali v številnih primerih, zlasti v sodbi v primeru WestLB, ki je pomembna za zadevni primer.
According to this principle, no state aid is involved where funds are made available on ‘terms which a private investor would find acceptable in providing funds to a comparable private undertaking when the private investor is operating under normal market-economy conditions’.
Glede na to načelo ne gre za pomoč podjetju, kadar so sredstva na razpolago pod „pogoji, pod katerimi bi bil zasebni vlagatelj, ki deluje v običajnih pogojih v tržnem gospodarstvu, pripravljen zagotoviti sredstva zasebnemu podjetju“.
The market-economy investor principle is applicable in the same way to all public enterprises, whether profitable or loss-making.
Načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu se na enak način uporablja za vsa javna podjetja in sicer ne glede na to, ali so donosna ali poslujejo z izgubo.
The Commission's view here was upheld by the Court of First Instance in WestLB.
To stališče Komisije je potrdilo Sodišče prve stopnje v sodbi v primeru WestLB.
It follows that the key question in examining this case is whether a market-economy investor would have transferred to Helaba capital that had the same characteristics as the Land of Hessen's promotion-related assets and under the same conditions, especially in view of the probable return on the investment.
Temeljno vprašanje v zadevni preiskavi je torej, ali bi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu kapital, ki ima enake značilnosti kot sredstva dežele Hessen za pospeševanje, vložil pri Helabi pod enakimi pogoji, zlasti glede na predviden donos na naložbo.
Legal and economic classification of the capital contributed
Pravna in gospodarska klasifikacija vloženega kapitala
The Land of Hessen contributed to Helaba up to 31 December 1998 as silent partnership reserves promotion-related assets with a nominal loan portfolio for the Land share of DEM 6,026 billion (EUR 3,081 billion) and a cash value assessed on the basis of an expert evaluation of DEM 2,473 billion (EUR 1,264 billion).
Dežela Hessen je do 31. decembra 1998 pri Helabi v obliki vložka tihe družbe vložila sredstva za pospeševanje z nominalnim portfeljem posojil za delež Hessna v višini 6,026 milijarde DEM (3,081 milijarde EUR) in strokovno ocenjeno denarno vrednostjo 2,473 milijarde DEM (1,264 milijarde EUR).
BAKred recognised these, as stated above, in full as basic own funds for supervisory purposes.
BAKred jih je, kot je navedeno zgoraj, v okviru nadzorstva v celoti priznal kot temeljni kapital.
They were to only a small extent required, on the basis of an amount which varied from year to year, to underpin promotion operations.
Le v majhnem obsegu so bila sredstva z letno spreminjajočim se zneskom potrebna za kritje dejavnosti za pospeševanje.
This part of the silent partnership reserves shown in the balance sheet served only a guarantee function for Helaba.
Ta del vložka tihe družbe, vknjižen v bilanci stanja, je Helaba uporabljala le za funkcijo jamstva.
Most of the remainder was available to Helaba to underpin and expand its competitive business.
Večino preostanka je imela Helaba na razpolago za kritje in širjenje konkurenčnih dejavnosti.
As in the WestLB case the Commission has determined the appropriate remuneration for the transferred promotion-related assets in the light of their commercial usefulness for Helaba.
Kot v primeru WestLB Komisija določa primerno nadomestilo za prenesena sredstva za pospeševanje glede na njihovo poslovno uporabnost za Helabo.
As explained above, the starting point for determining the normal market remuneration is primarily the remuneration that would be demanded by a market-economy investor providing a bank with equity capital.
Kot je navedeno zgoraj, je izhodišče za določitev običajnega tržnega nadomestila v prvi vrsti nadomestilo, ki bi ga zahteval vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu, ki banki zagotavlja lastni kapital v tej obliki.
The complainant argues that the capital made available to Helaba is, as in the case of the transfer of the WfA assets to WestLB, an investment similar to share capital.
Pritožnik pri tem navaja, da gre pri kapitalu, ki ga ima na razpolago Helaba, tako kot v primeru prenosa sredstev WfA na WestLB, za naložbo, ki je podobna osnovnemu kapitalu.
Germany disputes its similarity with share capital.
Nemčija izpodbija njegovo podobnost z osnovnim kapitalom.
It argues, rather, that the capital is a silent partnership, which affects the level of the remuneration.
Kapital je prej vložek tihe družbe, kar vpliva na višino nadomestila.
Germany, Helaba and the complainant agree that the promotion-related assets comprised in the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen constitute core capital.
Nemčija, Helaba in pritožnik se strinjajo, da sredstva za pospeševanje v okviru vložka tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen predstavljajo temeljni kapital.
The special-purpose reserve was recognised by BAKred as core capital (‘tier 1 capital’) and could therefore only be compared with equity instruments that were recognised as core capital in Germany in the year of the transfer and that were available to Helaba at the time of contribution specifically for an investment of this order of magnitude, which made up significantly more than 15 % of the core capital.
Rezervo za posebne namene je BAKred priznal kot temeljni kapital (kapital „razred 1“) in se torej lahko primerja le s takimi instrumenti lastnega kapitala, ki so bili v Nemčiji priznani kot temeljni kapital v letu prenosa in jih je imela Helaba na razpolago v času vloge konkretno za naložbo tega reda velikosti, ki je predstavljala znatno več kot 15 % temeljnega kapitala.
The Commission agrees with the parties on this point.
Komisija se v tej točki strinja z udeleženci v postopku.
It already made clear in its WestLB decision of 1999 that a comparison between the Wfa assets, which were also recognised as core capital, and equity instruments that were recognised only as additional capital, such as profit participation certificates and non-voting preference shares, cannot serve as a basis for determining the appropriate remuneration for the transferred capital (Decision 2000/392/EC, paragraph 199).
Že v Odločbi glede primera WestLB iz leta 1999 je pojasnila, da primerjava sredstev Wfa, ki so prav tako priznana kot temeljni kapital, in instrumentov lastnega kapitala, ki se lahko uporabljajo le kot dodatni kapital, kot so potrdila o udeležbi pri dobičku in neglasovalne prednostne delnice, ne more služiti kot podlaga za določitev primernega nadomestila za prenesen kapital (Odločba 2000/392/ES, odstavek 199).
For the capital provided to be recognised as basic own funds, there must be greater exposure to risk, which as a general rule is also reflected in a higher market remuneration for such instruments.
Da se razpoložljiv kapital prizna kot temeljni kapital, je potrebna večja izpostavljenost tveganju, ki se načeloma izraža tudi v večjem tržnem nadomestilu za take instrumente.
In the view of the BdB, however, the only legal form properly available to Helaba for this specific investment was that of share capital.
Po mnenju BdB pa je bila edina primerna pravna oblika, ki jo je imela Helaba na razpolago za konkretno naložbo, osnovni kapital.
In the view of Germany, another legal form available was that of a silent partnership contribution of unlimited duration (perpetual), which met the requirements of Section 10(4) of the German Banking Act (KWG) and at the same time the criteria of the ‘Sydney Declaration’ of the Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, which in turn guided the decisions taken by the German banking supervisory authority BAKred.
Nemčija meni, da je bila na razpolago še ena pravna oblika in sicer vložek tihe družbe za neomejeno obdobje (perpetual), ki izpolnjuje zahteve iz člena 10(4) KWG in hkrati merila iz „Sydneyske izjave“ Odbora za bančni nadzor Banke za mednarodne poravnave v Baslu, ki so podlaga za odločitve nemškega organa za bančni nadzor BAKred.
The subject of the agreement between the Land of Hessen and Helaba was, therefore, the legal form of a silent partnership contribution of unlimited duration, which was recognised as such both by the competent banking supervisory authority BAKred and also by the competent tax authority.
Predmet dogovora med deželo Hessen in Helabo je bila zato pravna oblika vloge tihe družbe za neomejeno obdobje, ki je bila kot taka priznana tako s strani pristojnega organa za bančni nadzor BAKred kot tudi pristojnega davčnega organa.
In the Commission's view, Germany has demonstrated sufficiently that the BdB's argument will not stand up.
Po mnenju Komisije je Nemčija uspešno dokazala, da trditev BdB ni prepričljiva.
The BdB argues that the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen represented a formal abuse of a ‘normal’ silent partnership.
BdB trdi, da vložek tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen predstavlja formalno zlorabo „običajnega“ vložka tihe družbe.
In economic terms, the silent partnership contribution had so many points in common with share capital that an investor would have insisted on the payment of interest corresponding to the remuneration of share capital.
V gospodarskem smislu ima vložek tihe družbe toliko skupnega z osnovnim kapitalom, da bi vlagatelj zahteval plačilo obresti, ki ustreza nadomestilu za osnovni kapital.
The Commission notes firstly that the silent partnership contribution was expressly agreed as such between the Land of Hessen and Helaba and accepted as such by the competent German authorities.
Komisija najprej navaja, da je bil vložek tihe družbe izrecno dogovorjen kot tak med deželo Hessen in Helabo ter priznan kot tak s strani pristojnih nemških organov.
In order to be able to assume that there was an abuse of form, it would have to be beyond question that the competent German authority wrongly recognised the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen as such.
Da bi se lahko domnevala zloraba oblike, bi moralo nedvomno držati, da so pristojni nemški organi napačno priznali vložek tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen kot takega.
However, there is no evidence of this.
Vendar dokaza za to ni.
The Commission agrees here with Germany's view that the limited duration or withdrawability of a silent partnership contribution is, neither from the company law nor banking supervision points of view, a necessary characteristic feature for the recognition of a silent partnership as core capital pursuant to Section 10(4) of the German Banking Act.
Komisija se v tej točki strinja z mnenjem Nemčije, da omejeno trajanje ali odpovedljivost v smislu tako podjetniškega prava kot bančnega nadzorstva ni obvezna značilnost za priznanje vložka tihe družbe kot temeljni kapital skladno s členom 10(4) KWG.
Furthermore, the Commission interprets the ‘Sydney Declaration’ of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of October 1998 as imposing a 15 % limit only for the recognition of certain innovative capital instruments, particularly those limited in time, as core capital.
Poleg tega Komisija razlaga „Sydneysko izjavo“ Baselskega odbora za bančni nadzor iz oktobra 1998 kot tako, ki nalaga zgolj mejo 15 % za priznavanje določenih, zlasti časovno omejenih inovativnih instrumentov kot temeljni kapital.
However, the converse conclusion may not be drawn that permanent innovative capital instruments may not at all be recognised as core capital or are also covered by this limit.
Vendar po drugi strani ne gre sklepati, da se trajni inovativni instrumenti pod nobenim pogojem ne morejo priznati kot temeljni kapital ali pasti pod navedeno mejo.
Moreover, the usefulness of permanent innovative capital instruments as core capital above the 15 % limit is testified to by the practice of private banks as well in recent years, as was amply demonstrated by Germany.
Poleg tega o uporabnosti trajnih inovativnih instrumentov kapitala kot temeljni kapital nad mejo 15 % govori tudi praksa zasebnih bank v preteklih letih, kakor je uspešno dokazala Nemčija.
Nor does the Commission regard the selective criteria adduced by the BdB as sufficiently convincing.
Tudi selektivno uporabljena merila s strani BdB se Komisiji ne zdijo dovolj prepričljiva.
From the risk analysis point of view, the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen is more similar in type to a ‘normal’ silent partnership than to share capital.
Z vidika analize tveganja je vložek tihe družbe tipološko bolj podoben „običajnemu“ vložku tihe družbe kot osnovnemu kapitalu.
The Commission agrees with Germany's comments here too.
Komisija se tudi tu strinja z ugotovitvami Nemčije.
For the Commission, it is crucial in this context that both the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen and other ‘normal’, i.e. time-limited silent partnerships taken up on the capital market must in insolvency proceedings be paid back before share capital and that the investor thus gets the recovery percentage, whereas in the case of a share capital investment he gets nothing.
Za Komisijo je v tej zvezi bistveno, da se morata tako vložek tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen kot drugi „običajni“, t.j. omejeni vložki tihe družbe, prejeti na trgu kapitala, v primeru insolventnosti vrniti pred osnovnim kapitalom in da torej vlagatelj prejme delež povračila, medtem ko v primeru osnovnega kapitala ne dobi ničesar.
Germany submitted a legal opinion demonstrating that, under the contractual provisions, the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen will, in the event of solvency or liquidation, in so far as it has not been reduced or used up by losses, be met on a prior-ranking basis before share capital from any remaining assets.
Nemčija je s predložitvijo pravnega mnenja pojasnila, da se bo v skladu s pogodbenimi določbami vložek tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen v času njenega obstoja v primeru insolventnosti ali likvidacije, če se ni zmanjšala ali porabila zaradi izgub, kril prednostno pred osnovnim kapitalom iz morebitnih preostalih sredstev.
Furthermore, so long as the undertaking is not making a loss, both the Land of Hessen and the investor of a time-limited silent partnership get the entire agreed remuneration, whereas the investor in share capital can claim only payment of a dividend that is in proportion to profits.
Poleg tega dobita tako dežela Hessen kot vlagatelj omejenega vložka tihe družbe, če podjetje ne posluje z izgubo, celotno dogovorjeno nadomestilo, medtem ko lahko vlagatelj v osnovni kapital terja le izplačilo dividende, sorazmerne z dobičkom.
In this respect too, the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen is a typical silent partnership contribution within the meaning of Section 10(4) of the German Banking Act.
Tudi v tej zvezi je vložek tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen običajni vložek tihe družbe v smislu člena 10(4) KWG.
Nor is the BdB's objection convincing that the silent partnership was equivalent to share capital because in the long term it had resulted in an increase of almost 50 % in Helaba's core capital.
Prepričljiv ni niti ugovor BdB, da je vložek tihe družbe enak osnovnemu kapitalu že zato, ker je dolgoročno gledano temeljni kapital Helabe povečal za skoraj 50 %.
Account should be taken here firstly of the phased arrangement which the Land of Hessen and Helaba had agreed and under which, in the period from 1999 to 2002, in line with its actual capital requirement, Helaba could use only an annual increasing partial amount of the usable core capital to actually cover core business.
Tu je treba najprej opozoriti na postopno ureditev, za katero sta se dogovorili dežela Hessen in Helaba in po kateri je Helaba v obdobju med 1999 in 2002 skladno s svojo dejansko potrebo po kapitalu lahko uporabljala za temeljne dejavnosti le letno naraščajoči delni znesek razpoložljivega temeljnega kapitala.
Furthermore, the Commission would in this context draw explicit attention to the fact that, in the WestLB case too, the large volume of the capital injection is merely an indicator, but not on its own decisive in assuming similarity to share capital.
Poleg tega Komisija v tej zvezi izrecno opozarja na dejstvo, da je tudi v primeru WestLB velik obseg vloženega kapitala pokazatelj, ni pa sam po sebi odločilen pri domnevi o podobnosti osnovnemu kapitalu.
In the WestLB decision, the Commission concluded, on the basis of an overall assessment, that the similarity of the transaction being examined to a share capital investment was predominant.
Komisija je v Odločbi glede WestLB 2000/392/ES in ponovni Odločbi z dne 20. oktobra 2004 na podlagi celovite ocene ugotovila, da je podobnost obravnavane transakcije z naložbo v osnovni kapital prevladujoča.
An essential consideration in this respect was, for example, the fact that the WfA assets had, like share capital, been exposed to the full risk of loss in the event of solvency or liquidation.
Tam je bil bistven dejavnik, na primer, dejstvo, da so bila sredstva WfA tako kot osnovni kapital povsem izpostavljena tveganju izgube v primeru insolventnosti ali likvidacije.
Furthermore, in the WestLB case, the Commission also took account of the fact that, at the time of the transfer of the WfA assets in 1991 — in contrast to the time of the transfer of the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen to Helaba in 1998 — there was not yet a developed market for hybrid core capital instruments in Germany and a credit institution such as WestLB could have taken up a comparable core capital volume on the market only in the form of share capital.
Poleg tega je Komisija v primeru WestLB upoštevala tudi dejstvo, da v času prenosa sredstev Wfa leta 1991 – drugače kot v času prenosa vložka tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen na Helabo leta 1998 – v Nemčiji še ni bil razvit trg za hibridne instrumente temeljnega kapitala in bi kreditna institucija, kot je WestLB, lahko sprejela primerljiv obseg temeljnega kapitala na trgu le v obliki osnovnega kapitala.
In the current case, Helaba could also easily have covered its estimated capital requirement in the period from 1998 to 2002 on the market by taking up, at intervals, several smaller silent partnership contributions from a number of different institutional investors.
V zadevnem primeru bi lahko Helaba zlahka zadovoljila svojo predvideno potrebo po kapitalu na trgu v obdobju med 1998 in 2002 tudi s prejemom več časovno porazdeljenih manjših vložkov tihe družbe s strani različnih institucionalnih vlagateljev.
The BdB also points out that, with the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen, Helaba's share capital buffer was only 50 %, whereas, in the case of private credit institutions, the share of hybrid instruments in core capital is below 20 % and hence the share capital buffer amounts to more than 80 %.
BdB tudi poudarja, da je z vložkom tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen rezerva osnovnega kapitala Helabe znašala le še 50 %, medtem ko je v primeru zasebnih kreditnih institucij delež hibridnih instrumentov pri temeljnem kapitalu pod 20 % in tako znaša rezerva osnovnega kapitala več kot 80 %.
An institutional investor would, according to the BdB, against the background of this high share in Helaba's overall core capital, not have agreed to a comparable contribution.
Institucionalni vlagatelj se po navedbah BdB ob upoštevanju velikega deleža pri celotnem temeljnem kapitalu Helabe ne bi strinjal s primerljivo vlogo.
Germany confirmed that the proportion of core capital accounted for by the silent partnership contribution in 2003, i.e. after the last stage of the phased arrangement had been reached, was [...] % and that the proportion accounted for by all the silent partnership contributions (i.e. not only the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen) in 2003 amounted to [...] %.
Nemčija je potrdila, da je delež vložka tihe družbe pri temeljnem kapitalu leta 2003, torej po zadnji stopnji stopenjskega modela, znašal […] %, delež vseh vložkov tihe družbe (t.j. ne samo vložka tihe družbe s strani Hessna) pa leta 2003 […] %.