natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The expression ‘exporter’ is generally employed in respect of processors who have threshing equipment, which allows to produce the finished processed product (strips) sought by the cigarette manufacturers.
Izraz „izvoznik“ se splošno uporablja za predelovalce, ki imajo opremo za mlatenje, s katero je omogočena proizvodnja končnega predelanega izdelka (trakovi iz tobačnih listov), potrebnega za proizvajalce cigaret.
Processors which are only able to produce loose leaves are called ‘third packers’ or simply ‘packers’.
Predelovalci, ki lahko proizvedejo le nepakirane liste, se imenujejo „podjetja za tretje pakiranje“ ali preprosto „podjetja za pakiranje“.
After their initial treatment (e.g. removal of impurities and sorting) packers forward the tobacco to exporters for further treatment so that tobacco can be offered to manufacturers.
Tisti, ki pakirajo, po svoji začetni obdelavi (tj. odstranitev nečistoč in sortiranje) pošljejo tobak izvoznikom za nadaljnjo obdelavo, tako da se lahko tobak ponudi proizvajalcem.
The processors which are addresses of the Decision qualify as ‘exporters’.
Proizvajalce, ki so naslovniki Odločbe, označujemo kot „izvoznike“.
The Regulatory Framework
Ureditveni okvir
Both the production of raw tobacco and its sale to processors are subject to regulation under Community and national law.
Za proizvodnjo surovega tobaka ter njegovo prodajo proizvajalcem veljajo pravni predpisi v skladu s pravom Skupnosti in nacionalno zakonodajo.
The CMO for raw tobacco
Skupna ureditev trga za surovi tobak
The CMO in the raw tobacco sector provides for (i) a production quota system and (ii) support of producers’ income through a premium system for the production of raw tobacco.Premium is only granted in respect of tobacco produced within the quota (with certain adjustments).
Skupna ureditev trga v sektorju surovega tobaka predvideva (i) sistem proizvodnih kvot in (ii) podporo za prihodke proizvajalcev s pomočjo sistema premij za proizvodnjo surovega tobaka.Premija je dodeljena le glede na tobak, proizveden v okviru kvote (z nekaterimi prilagoditvami).
Since 1998, the payment of part of the Community premium (so-called variable part) has been linked to the quality of the tobacco produced which is reflected in the price.
Plačilo dela premije Skupnosti (t.i. variabilni del) je od leta 1998 v povezavi s kakovostjo proizvedenega tobaka, kar se kaže v ceni.
At this stage, prices are often expressed as minimum prices or a price range.
Na tej stopnji so cene pogosto izražene kot najnižje cene ali cenovni razpon.
To note, however, that the final price (or ‘delivery price’) can only be determined when the harvest takes place (i.e. between October and January) and can vary significantly from the ‘cultivation contract price’, depending on quality, quantities and further bargaining.
Toda opozoriti je treba, da se končna cena (ali „dobavna cena“) lahko določi le, ko pride čas žetve (tj. med oktobrom in januarjem), ter se lahko močno razlikuje od „pridelovalne pogodbene cene“ glede na kakovost, količino in nadaljnje pogajanje.
Community law favours the creation of inter-branch organisations within which producers and processors should co-operate for the efficient operation of the market.
Pravo Skupnosti podpira ustanavljanje medpanožnih organizacij, v okviru katerih proizvajalci in predelovalci sodelujejo za učinkovito delovanje trga.
Prices and quota fixing are however expressly forbidden.
Vendar je določanje cen in kvot izrecno prepovedano.
None of the associations involved in this case is an inter-branch organisation within the meaning of Community law.
Nobeno združenje, vpleteno v to zadevo, ni medpanožna organizacija v smislu pomena prava Skupnosti.
National legislation
Nacionalna zakonodaja
In Italy, Law 88/88 regulating interprofessional (meaning sector-wide) agreements, cultivation contracts and sales of agricultural products.
Italijanski zakon št. 88/88 ureja panožne (kar pomeni sektorske) sporazume, pogodbe o pridelavi in prodajo kmetijskih proizvodov.
More specifically, Article 5(1)(b) of law 88/88 provides that interprofessional agreements must determine the product concerned by the agreement, the modalities and the timing for its delivery and the minimum price.
Natančneje člen 5(1)(b) zakona št. 88/88 določa, da morajo panožni sporazumi o zadevnem proizvodu odločati s pogodbo, načini in časovnim razporedom za njegovo dobavo ter najnižjo ceno.
Incentives (especially in terms of preferential aid) are offered to producers and processors complying with the terms of interprofessional agreements.
Spodbude (še posebej v smislu preferencialne pomoči) so ponujene proizvajalcem in predelovalcem, ki ravnajo v skladu s pogoji panožnih sporazumov.
Law 88/88 has found application in a number of agricultural sectors, including tobacco, where APTI and UNITAB concluded a number of interprofessional agreements (providing for cultivation contract prices expressed in the form of minimum prices or price ranges) between 1999 and 2001.
Zakon št. 88/88 se uporablja v številnih kmetijskih sektorjih, vključno s tobačnim, v katerem sta združenji APTI in UNITAB sklenili več panožnih sporazumov (predpisovanje pridelovalnih pogodbenih cen, izraženih v obliki najnižjih cen ali cenovnega razpona) med leti 1999 in 2001.
Practises addressed in the decision
Dejavnosti, naslovljene v Odločbi
The processors infringement
Kršitev predelovalcev
From 1995 until the beginning of 2002 Deltafina, Dimon, Transcatab and Romana Tabacchi entered into agreements and or participated into concerted practices aimed at fixing their trading conditions for the purchase of raw tobacco in Italy (to include both direct purchases from producers and purchases from third packers), including: (a) The setting of common purchase prices which processors would pay at the delivery of tobacco and other trading conditions; (b) the allocation of suppliers and quantities; (c) the exchange of information to co-ordinate their competitive purchasing behaviour; (d) the determination of quantities and prices in respect of surplus production; and (e) the co-ordination of bids for public auctions in 1995 and 1998.
Družbe Deltafina, Dimon, Transcatab in Romana Tabacchi so od leta 1995 do začetka leta 2002 sklepale sporazume in/ali sodelovale v usklajenih ravnanjih, katerih namen je bil določiti pogoje trgovanja za nakup surovega tobaka v Italiji (z vključevanjem obeh neposrednih nabav od predelovalcev in od tretjih podjetij za pakiranje), vključno z: (a) določanjem skupnih odkupnih cen, ki so jih plačali predelovalci pri dostavi tobaka, in drugih pogojev trgovanja; (b) porazdelitvijo dobaviteljev in količin; (c) izmenjavo informacij za usklajevanje njihovega konkurenčnega nabavnega vedenja; (d) odločanjem o količinah in cenah za presežek proizvodnje; ter (e) usklajevanjem ponudb za javne dražbe leta 1995 in leta 1998.
APTI’s infringement
Kršitev združenja APTI
From 1999 and until the end of 2001 APTI determined its negotiating position in respect of prices for each quality grade of each tobacco variety to be agreed with UNITAB in the context of the conclusion of the Interprofessional Agreements.
Združenje APTI je od leta 1999 do konca leta 2001 določalo svoje pogajalsko izhodišče glede na cene za vsak kakovostni razred vsake posamezne sorte, o katerih se je potrebno sporazumeti s konfederacijo UNITAB v okviru sklepanja panožnih sporazumov.
UNITAB’s infringement
Kršitev konfederacije UNITAB
From 1999 and until the end of 2001 UNITAB determined its negotiating position in respect of prices for each quality grade of each tobacco variety to be agreed with APTI in the context of the conclusion of the Interprofessional Agreements.
Konfederacija UNITAB je od leta 1999 do konca leta 2001 določala svoje pogajalsko izhodišče glede na cene za vsak kakovostni razred vsake posamezne sorte, o katerih se je potrebno sporazumeti z združenjem APTI v okviru sklepanja panožnih sporazumov.
In the Decision, the Commission finds that the practices described above constitute three separate (single and continuous) infringements of Article 81 of the Treaty.
Komisija v Odločbi ugotavlja, da zgoraj opisana ravnanja pomenijo tri ločene (posamične in nepretrgane) kršitve člena 81 Pogodbe.
All the participants in the infringements to which the Decision is addressed are or form part of undertakings, associations of undertakings or associations of associations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty.
Vsi udeleženci kršitev, na katere je Odločba naslovljena, so ali tvorijo del družb, združenj teh družb ali zveze združenj družb in podjetij v smislu člena 81 Pogodbe.
Agreements and/or concerted practices which directly or indirectly fix transaction prices or share quantities are by their very object restrictive of competition.
Sam namen sporazumov in/ali usklajenih ravnanj, ki neposredno ali posredno določajo cene transakcij ali razdelijo količine, je omejevanje konkurence.
More specifically, co-ordination by the processors of their purchasing conduct in this case affected fundamental aspects of their competitive conduct and was also by definition capable of affecting the behaviour of the same companies in any other market in which they compete, including downstream markets.
Natančneje je v tej zadevi nabavno vedenje, ki so ga predelovalci usklajevali, vplivalo na temeljne vidike njihovega konkurenčnega vedenja in je lahko po definiciji tudi vplivalo na vedenje istih podjetij na vsakem drugem trgu, na katerem tekmujejo, vključno s prodajnim trgom.
These conducts are specifically envisaged under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty.
Taka vedenja so posebej predvidena na podlagi člena 81(1) Pogodbe ES.
Such conducts are capable, at least potentially, to have an impact on the trade of raw tobacco between Italy and other Member States, as they cover a significant amount of the purchases of Italian raw tobacco and relate to a product (raw tobacco) which is an intermediate product of processed tobacco, a product which is largely exported.
Taka vedenja lahko vsaj morebitno vplivajo na trgovino s surovim tobakom med Italijo in drugimi državami članicami, saj pokrivajo precejšnje število nakupov italijanskega surovega tobaka in s proizvodom (surovim tobakom), ki je vmesni proizvod predelanega tobaka, povezujejo proizvod, ki se ga večinoma izvaža.
The Decision addresses the issue of the application of Council Regulation No 26 of 4 April 1962 (applying certain rules on competition to production of and trade in agricultural products — ‘Regulation No 26’) to the practices which are being considered.
V Odločbi se ukvarjajo z vprašanjem uporabe Uredbe Sveta št. 26 z dne 4. aprila 1962 (o uporabi nekaterih pravil konkurence v proizvodnji in trgovini s kmetijskimi proizvodi – „Uredba št. 26“) za ravnanja, ki se jih obravnava.
It concludes that the restrictive practices at issue cannot be regarded as being ‘necessary’ for the attainment of the objectives of the Common agricultural policy and are therefore fully subject to the application of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.
Zaključeno je, da se zadevna omejevalna ravnanja ne morejo šteti za „potrebna“ pri doseganju ciljev skupne kmetijske politike in so zato v celoti predmet uporabe člena 81(1) Pogodbe.
Finally, the Decision concludes that neither national law nor the administrative practice obliged the processors to agree on the average or maximum purchase price for raw tobacco or to share out quantities of tobacco to be bought by each processor.
V Odločbi je nazadnje ugotovljeno, da nista niti nacionalno pravo niti upravna praksa zahtevala od predelovalcev, da se sporazumejo o povprečni ali največji nabavni ceni za surovi tobak ali da si razdelijo količine tobaka, ki naj bi jih kupil vsak predelovalec.
Moreover, such regulatory framework did not require processors and producers to agree collectively on the ‘contract prices’ nor did it remove all possibility of competitive behaviour on their part.
Nadalje tak ureditveni okvir ni zahteval, da se predelovalci in proizvajalci skupno sporazumejo o „pogodbenih cenah“, niti ni odpravil vseh možnosti konkurenčnega vedenja z njihove strani.
Consequently, the agreements and/or concerted practices of the producer representatives, on the one hand, and the processors, on the other, are fully caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty.
Zato sporazume in/ali usklajena ravnanja predstavnikov proizvajalcev na eni strani in predelovalcev na drugi popolnoma zajema člen 81(1) Pogodbe.
Liability of the mother companies of deltafina, Transcatab and dimon
Odgovornost matičnih družb deltafina, Transcatab in dimon
The Decision also finds that Universal (for Deltafina), Dimon Inc. (for Dimon) and SCC (for Transcatab) exercised decisive influence on their subsidiaries during the period considered and should therefore found to be jointly and severally liable for their subsidiary’s conduct.
V Odločbi je tudi ugotovljeno, da so družbe Universal (za Deltafino), Dimon Inc. (za Dimon) in SCC (za Transcatab) med obravnavanim obdobjem odločilno vplivale na svoje podružnice ter so zato skupno in solidarno odgovorne za vedenje svojih podružnic.
Fines
Globe
Fines imposed in respect of UNITAB’s and APTI’s infringements
Globe, naložene za kršitve združenj UNITAB in APTI
Concerning the producers and processors representatives’ behaviour, the Decision considers that a fine of only EUR 1000 is appropriate.
Odločba glede vedenja predstavnika proizvajalcev in predelovalcev meni, da je primerna le globa v višini 1000 EUR.
Although the conclusion of Interprofessional Agreements under the terms of Law 88/88 was not mandatory and in fact no Interprofessional Agreement was entered for several years, Law 88/88 (as further applied in the administrative practice of the Ministry), created incentives for the conclusion of Interprofessional Agreements containing minimum prices.
Čeprav sklepanje panožnih sporazumov pod pogoji Zakona št. 88/88 ni bilo obvezno in dejansko več let ni bil sklenjen noben panožni sporazum, je Zakon št. 88/88 (kakor se je nadalje uporabljal v upravni praksi ministrstva) ustvaril spodbude za sklepanje panožnih sporazumov, ki vsebujejo najnižje cene.
It should also be considered that Law 88/88 had found application in several instances in the agricultural sector before the conclusion of the Interprofessional Agreements discussed in this Decision, including in the tobacco sector, and the behaviour of the parties negotiating them had never been challenged under either national or Community law, notwithstanding these agreements were in the public domain and communicated to the Ministry.
Prav tako je treba upoštevati, da se je Zakon št. 88/88 uporabljal v različnih primerih kmetijskega sektorja pred sklenitvijo panožnih sporazumov, ki jih obravnava ta odločba, vključno s sektorjem tobaka, in da vedenja strank, ki so se o njih pogajale, nista nikoli izpodbijala niti nacionalna zakonodaja niti pravo Skupnosti, kljub temu, da so bili ti sporazumi v javni domeni in so bili sporočeni ministrstvu.
Fines imposed in respect of the processors’ infringement
Globe, naložene za kršitve predelovalcev
Gravity of the processors’ infringement
Teža kršitve predelovalcev
The nature of the processors’ infringement is considered to be very serious, since it concerns the fixing of the prices of the varieties of Italian raw tobacco and the sharing of quantities.
Narava kršitve predelovalcev je zelo resna, ker zadeva določanje cen za sorte italijanskega surovega tobaka in razdelitev količin.
Buying cartels can in fact distort producers’ willingness to generate output as well as limit competition amongst processors in downstream markets.
Nakupni karteli lahko dejansko izkrivljajo pripravljenost proizvajalcev, da ustvarjajo proizvodnjo, ter omejujejo konkurenco med predelovalci na prodajnem trgu in drugih trgih.
This is particularly so in cases like the present one, where the product affected by the buying cartel (raw tobacco) constitutes a substantial input of the activities carried out by participants downstream (the first processing and sale of processed tobacco in this case).
To zlasti drži v primerih, kot je obravnavana zadeva, v kateri proizvod, na katerega vpliva nakupni kartel (surovi tobak), pomeni znatni vnos dejavnosti, ki jih izvajajo udeleženci na prodajnem trgu (prva predelava in prodaja predelanega tobaka v tej zadevi).
The production of raw tobacco in Italy accounts for some 38 % of the Community in-quota production.
Proizvodnja surovega tobaka v Italiji dosega približno 38 % proizvodnje Skupnosti v okviru kvote.
The overall value of this production was Eur 67,338 million in 2001 (the last full year of infringement).
Skupna vrednost te proizvodnje je bila 67338 milijonov EUR v letu 2001 (zadnje polno leto kršitve).
Individual weight and deterrence
Posamezna teža in odvračanje
The Commission considers that fines to the four processors involved should be set in consideration their market position.
Komisija meni, da je treba globe za štiri vpletene predelovalce določiti ob upoštevanju njihovega tržnega položaja.
A higher starting amount should apply in respect of Deltafina as it appears to be the bigger purchaser with a market share of around 25 % in 2001 (full last year of the infringement).
Višji začeti znesek je treba določiti za družbo Deltafina, saj je razvidno, da je največji kupec s tržnim deležem okrog 25 % v letu 2001 (zadnje polno leto kršitve).
In consideration of their smaller shares in the market of raw tobacco in Italy (between, 8,86 and 11,28) Transcatab, Dimon and Romana Tabacchi should be grouped together and receive lower starting amounts.
Ob upoštevanju manjših deležev na trgu surovega tobaka v Italiji (med 8,86 in 11,28) je treba družbe Transcatab, Dimon in Romana Tabacchi združiti in jim določiti nižje začetne zneske.
As Deltafina, Transcatab and Dimon (now Mindo) are (or, in the case of Mindo, used to be) part of large groups that are also addressees of the Decision, a multiplying factor will be applied to their fines to ensure sufficient deterrence.
Ker so (oziroma v primeru družbe Mindo – je bila) družbe Deltafina, Transcatab in Dimon (sedaj Mindo) del velikih združenj, ki so prav tako naslovniki Odločbe, se za njihove globe uporablja multiplikativni dejavnik za zagotovitev učinkovitega odvračanja.
For these reasons, the starting amount of the fines in this case is set as follows:
Zaradi teh razlogov je začetni znesek v tej zadevi določen tako:
Deltafina’s, Dimon’s, Transcatab’s infringement lasted for approximately 6 years and 5 months.
Kršitev družb Deltafina, Dimon, Transcatab je trajala približno 6 let in 5 mesecev.
Romana Tabacchi’s participation in the infringement is taken to have lasted for more than 2 years and 9 months.
Sodelovanje družbe Romana Tabacchi pri kršitvi naj bi trajalo več kot 2 leti in 9 mesecev.
For these reasons, the basic amount of the fines to be imposed in this case should be set as follows:
Zaradi teh razlogov je treba osnovni znesek naloženih glob v tej zadevi določiti tako:
An attenuating circumstance is recognised in favour of Romana Tabacchi for not taking part in certain aspects of the cartel and for acting against the purpose of the cartel to the point of causing the other participants’ joint reaction against it.
Olajševalna okoliščina je priznana v korist družbe Romana Tabacchi, ker ni sodelovala v določenih vidikih kartela in je delovala proti namenu kartela do te mere, da je povzročila skupen odziv ostalih udeležencev proti njej.
Mitigating effect is also recognised to Deltafina’s effective co-operation during the proceedings.
Olajševalno dejstvo je priznano tudi družbi Deltafina za dejavno sodelovanje med postopkom.
As explained below, Deltafina has forfeited its entitlement to immunity from fines under the terms of the Leniency Notice.
Deltafina je, kakor je pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, izgubila svojo imuniteto pred globami pod pogoji Obvestila o ugodni obravnavi.
However, in consideration of the exceptional circumstances of this case (being this the first case where an application under the Leniency Notice was made and the first where a decision applies it), Deltafina’s co-operation should be favourably taken into consideration.
Vendar je treba ob upoštevanju izjemnih okoliščin te zadeve (gre za prvo zadevo, v kateri je bil predložen zahtevek za ugodno obravnavo, in prvo zadevo, v kateri se uporablja v odločbi) sodelovanje Deltafine ugodno obravnavati.
Deltafina’s cooperation was indeed substantial and continued throughout the procedure (with the exception of the facts discussed below) and should therefore attract the application of a mitigating factor.
Sodelovanje Deltafine je bilo resnično precejšnje in je trajalo celoten postopek (z izjemo dejstev, ki se jih obravnava v nadaljevanju), zato je treba uporabiti olajševalni dejavnik.
Upper limit to the fine
Zgornja meja globe
The 10 % turnover limit set out under Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 does not appear to be exceeded in this case in respect of fines to be imposed on Universal/Deltafina and Alliance/Transcatab-Mindo.
Zdi se, da v tej zadevi ni presežena 10-odstotna meja celotnega prometa, določena na podlagi člena 23(2) Uredbe ES št. 1/2003, za globe, naložene družbam Universal/Deltafina in Alliance/Transcatab-Mindo.
However, as Mindo does no longer maintain any link with the former Dimon group, its joint and several liability should be apportioned within the 10 % of its turnover in its most recent business year (i.e. Eur 2,59 million).
Vendar je treba skupno in resno odgovornost družbe Mindo, ker ta družba ne vzdržuje več nobene povezave s prejšnjo skupino Dimon, porazdeliti v 10 % njegovega celotnega prometa v najbolj nedavnih poslovnih letih (tj. 2,59 milijona EUR).
Reduction within the 10 % is necessary in respect of Romana Tabacchi.
Za družbo Romana Tabacchi je potrebno zmanjšanje v okviru 10 %.
The resulting amounts are therefore as follows:
Nastali zneski so zato naslednji:
Deltafina, Dimon and Transcatab applied for leniency under the terms of the 2002 Leniency Notice (see above under section)
Družbe Deltafina, Dimon in Transcatab so zahtevale ugodno obravnavo pod pogoji Obvestila o ugodni obravnavi iz leta 2002 (glej zgoraj pod oddelek 2).
Deltafina’s application for immunity
Vloga za imuniteto družbe Deltafina
The Leniency Notice makes the granting of final immunity conditional upon the fulfilment of the cumulative conditions set out in point 11 of the Notice.
Zaradi Obvestila o ugodni obravnavi postane odobritev končne imunitete pogojna za izpolnjevanje kumulativnih pogojev, določenih v točki 11 obvestila.
In particular point 11(a) requires undertakings (having been granted conditional immunity) to cooperate ‘fully, on a continuous basis […]’.
Še zlasti točka 11(a) določa, da morajo podjetja (ki se jim odobri pogojna imuniteta) sodelovati „v celoti, na trajni podlagi […]“.
At the oral hearing of 22 June 2004 it became apparent that Deltafina had divulged its Immunity application on the occasion of a meeting of APTI’s managing committee which was also attended by representatives of Dimon, Transcatab and Trestina.
Na ustnem zaslišanju z dne 22. junija 2004 je postalo očitno, da je Deltafina razkrila svojo vlogo za imuniteto na srečanju z upravnim odborom združenja APTI, na tem srečanju so bili tudi predstavniki družb Dimon, Transcatab in Trestina.
Such disclosure occurred before the Commission had an opportunity to carry out the investigations and was well capable of jeopardising them.
Tako razkritje se je zgodilo preden je imela Komisija priložnost opraviti preiskave in bi jih lahko ogrozilo.
The Decision concludes that by so acting Deltafina breached the co-operation obligation to which it was bound by virtue of point 11(a) of the Leniency Notice.
V Odločbi je tako ugotovljeno, da je Deltafina s takim dejanjem kršila obveznost sodelovanja, ki bi jo morala spoštovati na podlagi točke 11(a) Obvestila o ugodni obravnavi.
Accordingly, immunity cannot be granted to Deltafina.
Zato se družbi Deltafina imuniteta ne more odobriti.