natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Under Article 174 of the EC Treaty, the Community policy on the environment shall be based in particular on the principle that the polluter should pay.
V skladu s členom 174 Pogodbe ES okoljska politika Skupnosti temelji zlasti na načelu „onesnaževalec plača“.
Under Article 6 of the EC Treaty, environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies.
Po členu 6 Pogodbe ES morajo biti okoljevarstvene zahteve vključene v opredelitev in izvajanje politike Skupnosti.
In practical terms, it is Commission practice to consider that the implementation in State aid policy of the polluter-pays principle requires that the costs of pollution be internalised by polluters.
V praksi Komisija običajno meni, da vključevanje načela „onesnaževalec plača“ v politiko državne pomoči pomeni, da morajo stroške onesnaževanja vračunati onesnaževalci.
This means that such costs should be considered precisely as costs normally to be borne by the polluter, which, in turn, means that their payment by the State should be considered as an advantage granted by the State.
To pomeni, da je take stroške treba obravnavati kot stroške, ki jih običajno nosi onesnaževalec, kar pa pomeni, da je plačilo teh stroškov s strani države treba obravnavati kot dajanje prednosti s strani države.
In the present case, the State will undertake to cover any shortfall in the NDA's ability to cover the costs linked to the nuclear liabilities of the assets that will be transferred to the NDA.
V tem primeru se bo država zavezala, da bo pokrila kakršen koli primanjkljaj, če NDA ne bo mogel pokriti stroškov, povezanih z jedrskimi obveznostmi za sredstva, ki bodo prenesena na NDA.
Since these liabilities relate to the clean-up of sites contaminated by radioactivity, the Commission considers that they are pollution costs which, as explained above, should normally be borne by the polluters, namely, the operators of the sites.
Ker so te obveznosti povezane s čiščenjem lokacij, kontaminiranih z radioaktivnostjo, Komisija meni, da gre za stroške onesnaževanja, ki jih morajo, kot je opisano zgoraj, običajno nositi onesnaževalci oziroma upravljavci lokacij.
Since the State will pay for part of these costs, these payments should be considered as granting an advantage to the polluters.
Ker bo država plačala del teh stroškov, se mora tako plačilo obravnavati kot dajanje prednosti onesnaževalcem.
In this respect, the Commission disagrees with the United Kingdom's claim that the Measure fulfils the polluter-pays principle because, according to the United Kingdom's figures, over 88 % of these costs will be paid for by the operators.
V zvezi s tem se Komisija ne strinja s trditvijo Združenega kraljestva, da je ukrep skladen z načelom „onesnaževalec plača“, saj bodo po podatkih za Združeno kraljestvo upravljavci plačali dobrih 88 % teh stroškov.
The Commission considers that these estimates show that about 12 % of the pollution costs will not be covered by the polluters, which demonstrates that the Measure does not fully implement the polluter-pays principle.
Komisija meni, da te ocene kažejo, da približno 12 % stroškov onesnaževanja ne bodo nosili onesnaževalci, kar kaže, da ukrep ni v celoti skladen z načelom „onesnaževalec plača“.
Whilst, as explained above, it is relatively easy to determine in this case that the Measure results globally in polluters being granted an advantage because they do not pay the full costs arising from their pollution, it is more difficult to determine the precise extent to which each of the operators is a polluter, and therefore the precise extent to which each of them is relieved of bearing its pollution costs.
Čeprav je, kot je prikazano zgoraj, v tem primeru relativno lahko ugotoviti, da je splošna posledica ukrepa dajanje prednosti onesnaževalcem, ker ne plačajo vseh stroškov, ki izhajajo iz onesnaževanja, pa je težje natančno opredeliti, v kakšnem obsegu je vsak upravljavec onesnaževalec, in zato tudi, v kakšnem obsegu je oproščen od plačila stroškov onesnaževanja.
Indeed, the majority of the pollution costs at stake in this case are costs linked to the decommissioning of nuclear power plants that were operated by several operators during their total lifetime.
V tem primeru je večina stroškov onesnaževanja povezanih z razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn, ki jih je v vsej njihovi življenjski dobi upravljalo več upravljavcev.
Implementing the polluter-pays principle in this case requires the ability to decide which of the successive operators is responsible for what part of these costs.
Za izvajanje načela „onesnaževalec plača“ je v tem primeru treba določiti, kateri zaporedni upravljavec je odgovoren za kakšen del teh stroškov.
Decommissioning costs are generated in one go in the very first moments of the operation of the plants.
Stroški razgradnje se ustvarijo naenkrat že v prvih trenutkih, ko elektrarna začne delovati.
Later increments in these costs are marginal as compared with those created at the outset.
Kasnejše povečevanje teh stroškov je zanemarljivo v primerjavi s stroški, ki nastanejo na začetku obratovanja.
A completely direct implementation of the internalisation of costs principle, which is the translation of the polluter-pays principle, would therefore require that all the plant's decommissioning costs be factored in the price of the first units of energy sold by the plant.
Popolnoma neposredno izvajanje načela internalizacije stroškov, kar je v bistvu prevod načela „onesnaževalec plača“, bi zato pomenilo, da se morajo vsi stroški razgradnje vračunati v ceno prvih enot energije, ki jih elektrarna proda.
It is obvious that such an interpretation of the polluter-pays principle would be in complete contradiction with the economics of electricity generation and would be so impracticable that it would not even achieve its own goal.
Jasno je, da bi bila taka razlaga načela „onesnaževalec plača“ popolnoma v nasprotju z ekonomijo proizvodnje energije in tako neizvedljiva, da ne bi dosegla niti svojega cilja.
It is therefore generally accepted that, in order to apply the polluter-pays principle to these costs in a way that would be practical, a means should be found of spreading the pollution costs (or, to be more exact, the legal duty to cover them) over at least the expected lifetime of the plant.
Zato se na splošno priznava, da je treba, da bi se lahko načelo „onesnaževalec plača“ uporabilo za te stroške na izvedljiv način, določiti način za razporeditev teh stroškov onesnaževanja (ali, natančneje, pravne obveznosti njihovega plačila) vsaj na pričakovano življenjsko dobo elektrarne.
The way these pollution costs are spread has a particular relevance for the application of State aid rules where the State intervenes to pay the decommissioning costs of plants that have been owned by several owners.
Način razporeditve teh stroškov onesnaževanja je posebej pomemben za uporabo predpisov o državni pomoči, kadar država posreduje tako, da plača stroške razgradnje elektrarn, ki so bile v lasti več lastnikov.
Indeed, in such a case, the spread of the pollution costs between the successive owners also drives the spread of the potential advantage granted by the State to each of them.
V takem primeru razporeditev stroškov onesnaževanja med zaporedne lastnike pomeni tudi razporeditev morebitne prednosti, ki jo država daje vsakemu od njih.
There is no harmonised Community-wide system for allocating decommissioning costs to the successive owners of a nuclear plant.
Ne obstaja usklajen sistem po vsej Skupnosti za dodeljevanje stroškov razgradnje zaporednim lastnikom jedrske elektrarne.
Member States have different systems for implementing a legal duty to meet nuclear liabilities, these systems resulting in different possible attributions of costs between successive plant owners.
Države članice imajo različne sisteme za izvajanje zakonske dolžnosti izpolnjevanja jedrskih obveznosti, iz katerih izhajajo različne možne razporeditve stroškov med zaporednimi lastniki elektrarn.
Despite the lack of a harmonised system, the Commission considers that it is still possible to identify two broad categories.
Kljub temu, da ne obstaja usklajen sistem, pa Komisija meni, da je mogoče opredeliti dve večji skupini.
The first type of system consists in treating decommissioning liabilities as investment costs.
Prva skupina sistemov obravnava obveznosti razgradnje kot investicijske stroške.
In this case, the liability to cover these costs is created at the time the plant is turned on, and the cost becomes unavoidable from then on.
V tem primeru se obveznost plačila teh stroškov ustvari v trenutku, ko elektrarna začne delovati, in od takrat naprej so ti stroški neizogibni.
In accounting terms, liabilities are similar to a debt to a hypothetical decommissioning operator.
Z računovodskega vidika so obveznosti podobne dolgu hipotetičnemu upravljavcu razgradnje.
Like all debt, this one may be repaid in instalments, as well as purchased or sold by various parties.
Kot vsi dolgovi se tudi ta dolg lahko odplačuje v obrokih, različne stranke pa ga lahko tudi kupijo ali prodajo.
But it is in any event completely triggered as from the beginning of operations.
V vsakem primeru pa se dolg v celoti sproži z začetkom obratovanja.
The second type of system consists in treating decommissioning liabilities as operating costs.
Druga skupina sistemov obravnava obveznosti razgradnje kot stroške obratovanja.
In such cases, the legal liability to cover these costs is created periodically, normally on a yearly basis, as a counterpart for the operation of the plant.
V takem primeru se pravna obveznost plačila teh stroškov ustvari v rednih časovnih presledkih, običajno enkrat letno, kot protipostavka za poslovanje elektrarne.
Future instalments therefore remain avoidable.
Prihodnji obroki zato ostanejo izogibljivi.
In accounting terms, liabilities are similar to an annual tax paid to a hypothetical decommissioning operator.
Z računovodskega vidika so obveznosti podobne letnim davkom, ki se plačujejo hipotetičnemu upravljavcu razgradnje.
The legal charge for this equivalent of a tax is not completely triggered as from the beginning of the operations, but on a continuous basis during the operation of the plant.
Zakonska dajatev za to ustreznico davkov se ne sproži v celoti z začetkom obratovanja, temveč nastaja nepretrgoma med celotnim trajanjem obratovanja.
The two systems above may in practice lead to the same behaviour in many cases, in particular for economically efficient power plants.
Zgoraj navedena sistema lahko v praksi povzročita enako vedenje v številnih primerih, zlasti pri gospodarsko uspešnih elektrarnah.
In this case, operators covered by the first system would tend to put money aside to meet their originally triggered liability in the same regular way as they would if they had to meet an annual payment.
Tako bi upravljavci, vključeni v prvi sistem, običajno dajali na stran denarna sredstva, da bi izpolnili na začetku ustvarjeno obveznost, na enak način, kot če bi morali plačevati anuiteto.
However, they lead to two very different interpretations in State aid analysis in cases where an economically inefficient power plant is transferred from one owner to another under the promise by the State to pay for a shortfall in decommissioning costs.
Vendar pa ta dva sistema oblikujeta dve zelo različni razlagi, kar zadeva analizo državne pomoči, kadar se gospodarsko neuspešna elektrarna prenese iz enega lastnika na drugega z obljubo države, da bo plačala primanjkljaj v zvezi s stroški razgradnje.
Under the first system, liability for funding the whole decommissioning cannot be avoided by the first owner.
V skladu s prvim sistemom se prvi lastnik ne more izogniti obveznosti plačila celotne razgradnje.
If he cannot sell a part of this liability under market conditions to the new owner he remains liable for this part, and the new owner cannot be held liable for it, irrespective of the size of this part as compared to the actual time during which the first owner operated the plant.
Če ne more prodati dela svojih obveznosti po tržnih pogojih novemu lastniku, ostane zavezan za plačilo tega dela obveznosti in ta odgovornost se ne more prenesti na novega lastnika ne glede na to, kako velik je ta del v primerjavi z dejanskim obdobjem, ko je elektrarno upravljal prvi lastnik.
This can lead to a situation where the first owner has to face a burden which is disproportionately high in relation to the time during which it operated the plant and, conversely, the new owner is faced with a burden which is disproportionately low.
Tako se lahko zgodi, da mora prvi lastnik nositi breme, ki je nesorazmerno veliko glede na obdobje, v katerem je upravljal elektrarno, novi lastnik pa nosi breme, ki je nesorazmerno majhno.
The economic situation of the power plant is the factor that determines the spread of liabilities.
Dejavnik, ki določa razporeditev obveznosti, je gospodarski položaj elektrarne.
In the extreme case where the power plant is so inefficient that it covers no more than its operating costs, the first owner would be liable for all decommissioning costs and the new one for none.
V skrajnih primerih, ko je elektrarna tako neuspešna, da pokriva zgolj stroške obratovanja, bi bil tako prvi lastnik odgovoren za vse stroške razgradnje, novi lastnik pa ne bi nosil nobenih stroškov.
State intervention would then have to be interpreted as an advantage to the first owner only.
Državno posredovanje je v tem primeru treba razlagati kot dajanje prednosti samo prvemu lastniku.
Under the second system, the new operator would in any event have to pay for amounts that would be charged to it under the periodical liability mechanism in the future.
V skladu z drugim sistemom bi novi upravljavec v vsakem primeru moral plačati zneske, ki bi se mu zaračunali v prihodnosti v skladu z mehanizmom plačevanja obveznosti v rednih časovnih presledkih.
These liabilities, on the other hand, are avoidable for the first operator, since the legal duty to pay them is only triggered upon actual operation of the plant.
Vendar pa se prvi upravljavec lahko izogne tem obveznostim, ker se pravna obveznost njihovega plačila ustvari šele na osnovi dejanskega poslovanja elektrarne.
Therefore, the first operator cannot be charged for future liabilities by the new operator under a market transaction unless it receives proper compensation.
Zato novi upravljavec na podlagi tržne transakcije ne more prvemu upravljavcu zaračunati prihodnjih obveznosti, razen če prvi upravljavec prejme ustrezno nadomestilo.
Under this system, operators therefore always remain liable for their share of the decommissioning costs, whatever the economic situation of the power plant.
V okviru tega sistema torej upravljavci vedno ostanejo odgovorni za svoj delež stroškov razgradnje, ne glede na gospodarski položaj elektrarne.
The United Kingdom's method for treating nuclear liabilities is neither of the two reference systems to implement the polluter-pays principle described in recitals (101) and (102) above, since, as has already been mentioned, it does not implement fully the polluter-pays principle.
Metoda, ki jo uporablja Združeno kraljestvo za obravnavanje jedrskih obveznosti, ne sodi v nobenega od navedenih dveh sistemov izvajanja načela „onesnaževalec plača“, opisanih v uvodnih izjavah (101) in (102) ker, kakor je bilo že navedeno, njegov ukrep ni v celoti skladen z načelom „onesnaževalec plača“.
It is nevertheless necessary to refer to one proper benchmark in order to assess the Measure, otherwise it would not be possible to assess the extent to which the polluter-pays principle has not been implemented.
Kljub temu pa je treba za oceno ukrepa uporabiti ustrezno merilo, sicer ni mogoče oceniti, v kakšnem obsegu se načelo „onesnaževalec plača“ ni izvajalo.
At the present stage of its legal analysis, the Commission is not in a position to decide whether Community law allows it to impose one of the two methods above in the context of analysing the implications of the polluter-pays principle under the State aid rules.
Komisija v tej fazi zakonske analize ne more sprejeti odločitve o tem, ali ji zakonodaja Skupnosti dopušča, da uporabi eno od dveh navedenih metod za analizo posledic načela „onesnaževalec plača“ v skladu s predpisi o državni pomoči.
The Commission finds that, in any event, it is not necessary to decide on this question for the present case, since, as will be demonstrated below, the two methods come to the same conclusion as regards BNFL and the NDA, that is, that the Measure does not include State aid to BNFL and includes a State aid to the NDA that can be found compatible with the common market.
Vendar pa Komisija ugotavlja, da se v tem primeru ni treba odločiti o tem vprašanju. Kot bo predstavljeno v nadaljevanju, obe metodi namreč vodita do istega sklepa, kar zadeva družbo BNFL in NDA, in sicer, da ukrep ne zajema državne pomoči za družbo BNFL, zajema pa državno pomoč za NDA, za katero pa se lahko ugotovi, da je združljiva s skupnim trgom.
Aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty — Absence of aid to BNFL.
Pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES – Odsotnost pomoči za družbo BNFL.
The Commission has analysed whether the Measure includes an advantage to BNFL under each of the two reference systems described in recitals (101) and (102) above.
Komisija je analizirala, ali ukrep vključuje prednost za družbo BNFL v skladu z vsakim od obeh referenčnih sistemov, opisanih v uvodnih izjavah (101) in (102) zgoraj.
As is explained above, both analyses aim at making sure that, consistently with the polluter pays principle, BNFL has covered the part of the nuclear liabilities that is attributable to it by its own means only –and in particular not by State support.
Kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj, je namen obeh analiz preveriti, ali je družba BNFL skladno z načelom „onesnaževalec plača“ pokrila del jedrskih obveznosti, ki jih ji je mogoče pripisati le z njenimi lastnimi sredstvi – in predvsem ne z državno podporo.
In conducting these two analyses, the Commission took account of the history of the ownership of the assets under consideration, as well as the history of State intervention in their favour, which is summarised below.
Komisija je pri izvedbi teh dveh analiz upoštevala zgodovino lastništva obravnavanih sredstev in zgodovino državnih intervencij v njihovo korist, kar je povzeto spodaj.
The Magnox power plants were originally owned and operated by two publicly owned companies that also owned other, non-Magnox, power plants in the United Kingdom.
Prvotno sta bili lastnici in upravljavki elektrarn Magnox dve družbi v javni lasti, ki sta bili tudi lastnici drugih elektrarn v Združenem kraljestvu, ki ne spadajo v skupino Magnox.
The British nuclear sector was then restructured in several steps.
Britanski jedrski sektor je bilo nato v več fazah prestrukturiran.
In a first step, Magnox plants were separated from non-Magnox plants.
Najprej so se elektrarne Magnox ločile od elektrarn, ki ne spadajo v skupino Magnox.
The former were grouped together in a single publicly-owned company known as Magnox Electric.
Prve so bile združene v enotno družbo v javni lasti, imenovano Magnox Electric.
A debt corresponding to the book value of the transferred plants was created.
Nastal je dolg, ki je ustrezal knjigovodski vrednosti prenesenih elektrarn.
This debt was owed to Magnox Electric by the companies now owning only the non-Magnox plants (hereunder referred to as ‘the Non-Magnox Operators’).
Ta dolg do Magnox Electric so imele družbe, ki so imele sedaj v lasti samo elektrarne, ki ne spadajo v skupino Magnox (v nadaljnjem besedilu „upravljavci elektrarn, ki ne spadajo v skupino Magnox“).
The debt later on was earmarked for covering the Magnox plants' complete nuclear liabilities.
Dolg je bil kasneje namenjen za pokritje celotnih jedrskih obveznosti elektrarn Magnox.
In a second step, the UK Government purchased the debt from Magnox Electric and replaced it with an undertaking to pay for the shortfall of nuclear liabilities, capped with the same value as the debt, and indexed with the same rates.
V drugi fazi je vlada Združenega kraljestva odkupila dolg od družbe Magnox Electric in ga nadomestila z zavezo, da bo plačala primanjkljaj jedrskih obveznosti, ki je bil omejen z enako vrednostjo kot dolg in indeksiran z enakimi stopnjami.
It should be noted that this step did not change Magnox Electric's position as it was entitled to receive this money as a result of the first step.
Opozoriti je treba, da ta faza ni spremenila položaja družbe Magnox Electric, saj je bila upravičena do prejemanja tega denarja kot posledica prve faze.
On the other hand, by this step the State alleviated the debt burden to the Non-Magnox Operators.
Na drugi strani je država s to fazo ublažila breme dolga za upravljavce elektrarn, ki ne spadajo v skupino Magnox.
In a third step, BNFL purchased Magnox Electric from the Government for a symbolic price of one pound.
V tretji fazi je družba BNFL od vlade kupila Magnox Electric za simbolično ceno en funt.
At that time, the Government undertaking mentioned above was replaced by a new one, fixed at the newly estimated negative net book value of the power plants: GBP 3,7 billion.
Takrat se je zgoraj navedena zaveza vlade nadomestila z novo zavezo, ki je bila določena z novo ocenjeno negativno neto knjigovodsko vrednostjo elektrarn: 3,7 milijarde GBP.
It must be noted that, in contrast to what the Commission believed at the time of the Opening of Procedure, this undertaking bears no relationship with the letter of comfort which was approved by the Commission under State aid Case N 34/90.
Treba je poudariti, da v nasprotju s tistim, kar je Komisija menila ob sprožitvi postopka, ta zaveza nima nobene zveze s priporočilnim pismom, ki ga je Komisija odobrila v zvezi z državno pomočjo v zadevi N 34/90.
The Measure represents the fourth and last step of the restructuring.
Ukrep je četrta in zadnja faza prestrukturiranja.
BNFL transfers the power plants to the NDA, together with all financial assets attached to them, including the aforementioned undertaking (hereinafter the Magnox Undertaking).
Družba BNFL prenese elektrarne na NDA skupaj z vsemi pripadajočimi finančnimi sredstvi, vključno z zgoraj navedeno zavezo (v nadaljnjem besedilu „zaveza Magnox“).
The Calder Hall and Chapelcross Magnox plants represent an exception to the process described above.
Elektrarne Calder Hall in Chapelcross Magnox so izvzete iz zgoraj opisanega postopka.
They have been the responsibility of BNFL since 1971, when BNFL was set up and these stations were transferred to it.
Zanje je bila od leta 1971 odgovorna družba BNFL, ko je bila ta družba ustanovljena in so se te elektrarne prenesle nanjo.
BNFL assumed ownership and responsibility for the Springfields site at the same time.
Družba BNFL je hkrati prevzela lastništvo in odgovornost za lokacijo Springfields.
The other assets concerned by the transfer to the NDA, and in particular THORP and SMP, were owned by BNFL from the beginning of their operations until their transfer to the NDA.
Druga sredstva, na katere se je nanašal prenos na NDA, zlasti obrata THORP in SMP, so bila že od vsega začetka njihovega delovanja v lasti družbe BNFL, dokler se niso prenesla na NDA.
Analysis under the first reference system (decommissioning costs as investment costs).
Analiza v skladu s prvim referenčnim sistemom (stroški razgradnje kot investicijski stroški)
Under this analysis, as explained in recital (105), if an installation changes ownership the buyer cannot be held responsible for nuclear liabilities in excess of those he would be ready to acquire from the seller.
V skladu s to analizo, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (105), v primeru spremembe lastništva obrata kupec ne more biti odgovoren za jedrske obveznosti, ki presegajo tiste obveznosti, ki bi jih bil pripravljen kupiti od prodajalca.