natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Unlike in the WestLB case, where the transferred Wfa assets made up almost 50 % of the bank's equity capital, the transferred housing-promotion loans accounted for only around 8 % of BayernLB's equity capital at the time of the transfer.
V nasprotju s primerom WestLB, kjer je preneseno premoženje „Wfa“ znašalo skoraj 50 % lastniškega kapitala banke, je ustrezen delež prenesenih posojil za pospeševanje gradnje stanovanj v času prenosa znašal samo okrog 8 % lastnega kapitala BayernLB. Poleg tega BayernLB, za razliko od WestLB, ni bila odvisna od temeljnega kapitala, ki je sestavljen iz sredstev za gradnjo stanovanj.
Moreover, unlike WestLB, BayernLB was not dependent on the core capital constituted by the housing assets.
Banka je bila vedno dobičkonosna in je že pred tem razpolagala z znatnimi lastnimi sredstvi.
The bank had always been profitable and already had significant equity capital before the transfer, by virtue not least of the silent partnership contributions invested by the Bavarian savings banks and by private companies from 1991 onwards.
Ta lastna sredstva so že vse od leta 1991 dalje temeljila na vložkih tihih družb bavarskih hranilnic in zasebnih podjetij.
Furthermore, the Land of Bavaria and BayernLB had agreed that the special-purpose assets would be used to cover risk assets only when all other capital items had been used.
Nadalje sta se Bavarska in BayernLB dogovorila, da se bodo posebna namenska sredstva uporabila za kritje tvegane aktive šele po uporabi vseh drugih postavk kapitala.
Another reason why the Land faced a lower risk in transferring the assets than an investor in share capital was that, pursuant to Section 2 of the agreement between the Land of Bavaria and the Bavarian Sparkassenverband of 15 December 1994, the latter was required, as second shareholder, to bear half of any loss suffered by BayernLB in the event of the special-purpose reserve being depleted or used by BayernLB's creditors to cover losses.
Še en razlog, zakaj je Bavarska s prenosom posebnih namenskih sredstev tvegala manj kot vlagatelj v osnovni kapital, gre pripisati dejstvu, da je bil Sparkassenverband Bayern kot drugi delničar v skladu s poglavjem 2 pogodbe med Svobodno državo Bavarsko in bavarskim združenjem hranilnic (Sparkassenverband Bayern) z dne 15. decembra 1994 dolžan financirati polovico izgub BayernLB, ki bi nastale v primeru, da bi se posebna namenska sredstva izčrpala ali da bi jih upniki BayernLB uporabili za kritje izgub.
APPROPRIATE REMUNERATION FOR THE SPECIAL PURPOSE ASSETS
PRIMERNO NADOMESTILO ZA POSEBNA NAMENSKA SREDSTVA
Based on the assumption that the capital made available was comparable — as a core capital instrument — to silent partnerships and not to a share capital investment, Germany came to the conclusion that appropriate remuneration was provided for the special-purpose assets and that, therefore, no advantage was conferred on BayernLB, thereby ruling out the presence of any state aid.
Nemčija je na podlagi tega, da je razpoložljiv kapital primerljiv z vložki tihih družb in ne z osnovnim kapitalom, zaključila, da so bila posebna namenska sredstva povrnjena s primernim nadomestilom, torej BayernLB ni bila deležna posebne ugodnosti in da potemtakem ne gre za državno pomoč.
According to Germany, the agreed remuneration took the form of the guarantee commission (Haftungsprovision) — dependent on capital used and paid out of income from banking business — equal to 0,6 % per annum of the value of the special-purpose reserve recognised for supervisory purposes as core capital.
Po navedbah Nemčije je bilo dogovorjeno nadomestilo v obliki provizije za jamstvo (Haftungsprovision), ki se plača na uporabljen kapital in znaša 0,6 % letno v breme dohodkov banke iz vrednosti rezerve za posebne namene, ki je bila za potrebe nadzora priznana kot temeljni kapital.
In Germany's view, the fee (Bürgschaftsgebühr) of 0,05 % per annum for the loan claims guaranteed by the Land can also be viewed as remuneration for the transfer of the special-purpose assets, as provision of the guarantee was directly linked to the aim of increasing the Landesbank's equity capital.
Poleg tega je treba upoštevati tudi provizijo za jamstvo 0,05 % letno za vsoto terjatev iz posojil, ki jo je Svobodna država Bavarska zagotovila v zameno za prenos posebnih namenskih sredstev. To za Nemčijo izhaja iz tega, da je bila dodelitev garancije v neposredni povezavi z namenom povečanja lastnega kapitala deželne banke.
According to the explanatory memorandum to the Act, the guarantee was necessary to ensure the desired strengthening of the Landesbank's equity capital by preventing the special-purpose assets from being reduced by defaults on loans .
V skladu z obrazložitvijo zakona je bilo jamstvo potrebno za zagotovitev okrepitve lastnega kapitala deželne banke, ki jo predvideva zakon, tako da se je preprečilo zmanjšanje posebnih namenskih sredstev zaradi izpada nadomestil.
With reference to the expert reports by […]dated 5 October 1994 and 30 April 1996, Germany argued that, without the default guarantee provided by the Land, the capitalisation interest rate of 7,5 % used to calculate the cash value of the claims would have had to have been increased by a risk premium.
Nemčija je prav tako, sklicujoč se na izvedensko mnenje [...] z dne 5. oktobra 1994 in z dne 30. aprila 1996, opozorila, da bi t.i. 7,5 % kapitalizacijsko obrestno mero za izračun denarne vrednosti terjatev brez dodelitve jamstva s strani Svobodne države Bavarske, bilo treba povečati za dodatno premijo tveganja.
A lower cash value would have resulted and so only a lower amount could have been recognised by BAKred.
Posledično bi zaradi tega dobili nižjo denarno vrednost in tako bi lahko BAKred bil priznal nižji znesek.
In the course of the proceedings, Germany expressly abandoned its earlier standpoint that the interest on intermediate investments and the interest payments by borrowers accruing to the Land could be viewed as elements of remuneration.
Med potekom postopkov je Nemčija izrecno opustila svoje prejšnjo stališče, da se tudi obresti iz začasnih naložb ter povračila obresti iz posojil, ki so se še naprej odvajala Bavarski, obravnavajo kot elementi nadomestil.
As for the normal market remuneration, Germany stated that, since the assets were comparable to BayernLB's silent partnerships, the initial rate should be that paid by BayernLB to its silent partners in the relevant period, i.e. some 7-8 % per annum of their nominal value.
Nemčija je glede običajne tržne narave izplačanega nadomestila izjavila, da bi se morala na podlagi primerljivosti sredstev z vložkom tihe družbe BayernLB kot izhodišče uporabiti stopnja nadomestila, ki ga je BayernLB v ustreznem obdobju plačala svojim tihim družbenikom, tj. v višini 7-8 % letno od njene posamezne nominalne vrednosti.
It argued that the lack of liquidity alone should lead to a considerable reduction in this initial rate.
Že samo pomanjkanje likvidnosti bi moralo pri tem privesti do znatnega odbitka te izhodiščne stopnje.
In this case, not only the net refinancing costs should be deducted, as in the WestLB case, but also the gross refinancing costs.
Pri tem je treba v zadevnem primeru odbiti ne samo neto stroške refinanciranja kot v primeru WestLB, temveč tudi bruto stroške refinanciranja.
Given that the capital injection into BayernLB made up only 8 % of equity capital and not 50 % as in the WestLB case, a private investor could not have deducted the net refinancing costs alone.
Glede na to, da je kapital vložen v BayernLB predstavljal samo 8 % lastnih sredstev, in ne 50 % kot v primeru WestLB, zasebni vlagatelj ne bi mogel sam doseči odbitka neto stroškov refinanciranja.
FAILURE TO CHANGE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND OWNER EFFECT
NESPREMENJENA LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA IN LASTNIŠKI VPLIV
In its comments on the Commission's decision to initiate proceedings, Germany also pointed out that, given that the special-purpose assets only involved capital that was comparable to silent partnerships, Germany felt that a change in the ownership of BayernLB in favour of the Land was not necessary.
Nadalje je Nemčija v svojih pripombah k odločitvi Komisije o začetku postopka poudarila, da glede na to, da gre tudi v primeru prenesenih namenskih sredstev zgolj za kapital, ki je primerljiv z vložki tihih družb, sprememba razmerja lastniških deležev BayernLB v korist Svobodne države Bavarske ni potrebna.
Even so, the Sparkassenverband would scarcely have agreed to a change in ownership to its detriment since there was no need for additional capital at the time of the transfer and since it had itself previously invested DEM 900 million in the bank in the form of silent partnership contributions , without the Land of Bavaria making a comparable contribution.
Ne glede na to, bi se združenje Sparkassenverband težko strinjalo s spremembo razmerja lastniških deležev sebi v škodo, saj v času prenosa ni bilo potrebe po dodatnem kapitalu in je samo združenje pred tem v banko vložilo okrog 900 milijonov DEM v obliki vložka tihe družbe, ne da bi Svobodna država Bavarska vložila kaj podobnega.
Germany also stated that, as a 50 % shareholder, the Land could assume that it would benefit from very favourable capital returns compared with other credit institutions.
Nemčija je še navedla, da bi Bavarska kot 50-odstotni delničar lahko izhajala iz tega, da bi imela koristi od zelo ugodnih donosov lastnega kapitala v primerjavi z drugimi kreditnimi institucijami.
The Land would therefore not have been content with a limited return or no return at all.
Bavarska se potemtakem ne bi zadovoljila z omejenim donosom ali celo izpadom donosa.
This should be taken into account by the Commission in its assessment of the investment.
To bi morala Komisija upoštevati pri svoji oceni naložbe.
V. COMMENTS FROM THE COMPLAINANT BDB
V. PRIPOMBE PRITOŽNIKA BDB
The BdB submitted that BayernLB did not pay an appropriate remuneration for the transferred core capital and was therefore in receipt of state aid.
BdB meni, da BayernLB ni izplačeval primernega nadomestila za prenesen temeljni kapital in je torej prejemal državno pomoč.
In its comments of 29 July 2003 on the proceedings initiated in respect of the Landesbanks on 13 November 2002, the BdB stated that the question of whether the remuneration was appropriate should be determined using the method employed by the Commission in its WestLB decision of 8 July 1999.
BdB v svojem mnenju z dne 29. julija 2003 glede postopkov, začetih dne 13. novembra 2002 v zvezi z deželnimi bankami, navaja, da se mora na vprašanje glede primernosti nadomestila odgovoriti s pomočjo metodologije, ki jo je Komisija uporabila za sprejetje Odločbe glede WestLB z dne 8 julija 1999.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER EQUITY INSTRUMENTS
PRIMERJAVA Z DRUGIMI INSTRUMENTI LASTNEGA KAPITALA
In its comments of 29 July 2003 the BdB came to the conclusion that the transfer of housing-construction and promotion assets in the BayernLB case and in the other above-mentioned Landesbank cases can be compared to an injection of share capital.
BdB je v omenjenem mnenju z dne 29. julija 2003 prišel do zaključka, da je prenos sredstev za pospeševanje in gradnjo stanovanj v primeru BayernLB ter v ostalih navedenih postopkih deželnih bank primerljiv z vlogo v osnovni kapital.
Nearly all the Landesbanks are said to have required fresh core capital from 1992 onwards in order to meet the stricter requirements arising from the new Solvency Directive.
Skoraj vse deželne banke so z letom 1992 potrebovale nov temeljni kapital, da bi izpolnile strožje zahteve nove Direktive o solventnosti.
Without these increases in capital, the Landesbanks would have had to scale down their business.
Deželne banke bi morale brez teh povečanj kapitala zmanjšati svoj obseg dejavnosti.
It can therefore be concluded, the BdB argues, that the capital injected can be compared only with equity instruments that were recognised as core capital (‘tier I capital’) and available in Germany in the year of the transfer.
Na podlagi tega se po besedah BdB lahko zaključi, da se vložen kapital lahko primerja le s takimi instrumenti lastnega kapitala, ki so bili v Nemčiji v letu prenosa priznani in na razpolago kot temeljni kapital (kapital „razred 1“).
This immediately excluded from any comparison non-voting preference shares, profit participation rights and perpetual preferred shares.
Pri primerjavi se torej takoj izključijo neglasovalne prednostne delnice, pravice za udeležbo pri dobičku in trajne prednostne delnice.
In Germany these three equity instruments are recognised not as core capital but as additional capital (‘tier II capital’).
Ti trije instrumenti lastnega kapitala v Nemčiji niso priznani kot temeljni kapital temveč kot dodatni kapital (kapital „razred 2“).
Moreover, perpetual preferred shares did not exist in Germany at the beginning of the 1990s.
Poleg tega trajne prednostne delnice v začetku devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja v Nemčiji sploh še niso obstajale.
At the time of the respective transfers, only share capital and silent partnership contributions were recognised as core capital in Germany.
V času zadevnih prenosov so bili v Nemčiji kot temeljni kapital priznani le osnovni kapital in vložek tihe družbe.
Any comparison with silent partnership contributions could be ruled out across the board.
Primerjava z vložki tihe družbe je v vseh primerih izključena.
First, unlike share capital, silent partnerships were valid for a limited period only or could be terminated and had to be paid back to the investor on maturity.
Prvič, za razliko od razpoložljivega osnovnega kapitala so vložki tihe družbe časovno omejeni oz. se lahko odpovedo in se morajo po preteku roka povrniti vlagatelju.
An investor could not therefore expect to receive the same remuneration for a silent partnership contribution as for equity instruments recognised for supervisory purposes for an unlimited period.
Vlagatelj zato ne more pričakovati enakega nadomestila za vložek tihe družbe kot za instrumente lastnega kapitala, ki so s strani bančnega nadzorstva priznani kot neomejeni.
Second, although in some cases it was asserted that the transferred capital was subordinate in liability to share capital pursuant to agreements between the Landesbanks' owners, this did not necessarily mean a lower risk for the investor.
Drugič, čeprav je bilo v nekaterih primerih uveljavljeno, da je prenesen kapital na podlagi dogovorov med lastniki deželnih bank v obveznosti do virov sredstev podrejen osnovnemu kapitalu, iz tega ne sme biti izpeljano zmanjšano tveganje za vlagatelja.
In all the cases the transferred capital made up a significant proportion of the total core capital, sometimes even more than 50 %.
V vseh primerih prenosa predstavlja prenesen kapital pomemben del celotnega temeljnega kapitala, deloma celo več kot 50 %.
This made it extremely likely that the injected capital could be drawn on — at least in part — in the event of losses.
Zaradi tega je obstajala zelo velika verjetnost, da bi se vložen kapital uporabljal vsaj deloma v primeru izgub.
Third, the BdB submits that the difference in quality between silent partnership contributions and share capital is confirmed by the definition of core capital for supervisory purposes adopted by the Basle Committee for Banking Supervision.
Tretjič, različno kakovost vložkov tihe družbe v primerjavi z osnovnim kapitalom je potrdil tudi Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor glede opredelitve temeljnega kapitala za potrebe nadzorstva. Po tej opredelitvi so vložki tihe družbe s strani bančnega nadzorstva priznane zgolj kot tako imenovani nižji kapital razreda 1.
According to this definition, silent partnership contributions must be recognised for supervisory purposes as no more than lower tier I capital, which may account for no more than 15 % of the requisite core-capital ratio. In other words, where the core-capital ratio is 4 %, 3,4 % must be made up of nominal capital and open reserves (e.g. the special-purpose reserve transferred to the Landesbanks).
Ta kapital lahko predstavlja samo še 15 % potrebnega deleža temeljnega kapitala, t.j. pri 4 % deležu temeljnega kapitala bi morali 3,4 % predstavljati osnovni kapital in odprte rezerve (npr. v deželne banke prenesene rezerve za posebne namene).
Furthermore, banks only ever took up subordinate equity instruments such as preference shares or profit participation rights in small volumes.
Poleg tega so banke podrejene instrumente lastnega kapitala vedno prevzemale zgolj v majhnem obsegu, npr. prednostne delnice ali pravice za udeležbo pri dobičku.
Under pressure from the rating agencies, such instruments hardly ever accounted for more than 10 % of a bank's total core capital — a very different situation from that in the cases under examination.
Pod pritiskom rating agencij ti instrumenti skoraj nikoli niso dosegli več kot 10 % celotnega temeljnega kapitala – čisto drugače kot v tukaj obravnavanih primerih.
Against this background, silent partnership contributions could not be used for large volumes invested by a single investor.
Na podlagi tega vložkov tihe družbe ni mogoče uporabiti za velike količine kapitala, ki ga vloži en sam vlagatelj.
MINIMUM REMUNERATION FOR A SHARE-CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN BAYERNLB
NAJMANJŠE NADOMESTILO ZA NALOŽBO V OSNOVNI KAPITAL BAYERNLB
The BdB argues that all methods of determining an appropriate remuneration (return) for the provision of share capital start from a risk-free return and add a risk premium.
BdB trdi, da vse metode za določitev ustreznega nadomestila (donosa) za razpoložljiv lastni kapital izhajajo iz netveganega donosa in vključujejo premijo tveganja.
They can be traced back to the following basic principle:
Te metode se lahko pojasnijo na naslednjem temeljnem načelu:
= risk-free return + risk premium for the risky investment
= netvegan donos + premija tveganja za tvegano naložbo
To determine the risk-free return, the BdB used the returns on long-term government bonds, fixed-rate securities issued by state bodies being the form of investment with the least or no risk.
BdB za določitev netveganega donosa uporablja donose na dolgoročne državne obveznice, saj gre pri vrednostnih papirjih s fiksnimi obrestmi, ki jih izdajajo državni organi, za obliko vloge z najmanjšim tveganjem ali brez tveganja.
To derive the risk premium, the BdB first worked out the ‘market risk premium’, i.e. the difference between the long-term average return on shares and that on government bonds.
BdB za izpeljavo premije tveganja najprej določi tako imenovano premijo tržnega tveganja, torej razliko med povprečnim dolgoročnim donosom na delnice in na državne obveznice.
In its comments of 29 July 2003, it assumed in the first place a long-term market risk premium of a uniform 4,6 %, with reference to a 1991 study by Stehle-Hartmond.
V svojem mnenju z dne 29. julija 2003 se je sprva s sklicevanjem na študijo Stehle/Hartmond iz leta 1991 opiral na enotno dolgoročno premijo tržnega tveganja v višini 4,6 %.
The BdB then determined the beta value for the Landesbanks, i.e. the individual risk premium for the banks by which the general market risk premium was to be adjusted.
BdB je v drugem koraku določil beta vrednost za deželne banke, t.j. posamezno premijo tveganja bank, kateri se mora prilagoditi splošna premija tržnega tveganja.
The BdB stated in its comments that it had determined the beta values statistically, which means that it estimated them on the basis of a historical data sample.
Po navedbah BdB iz navedenega mnenja so se beta vrednosti določile statistično, kar pomeni, da so se ocenile na podlagi vzorca preteklih podatkov.
The BdB came to the initial conclusion that all the beta values for all the Landesbanks and periods considered were greater than one.
BdB je pri tem sprva ugotovil, da so vse beta vrednosti za vse deželne banke in obravnavana obdobja bile večje kot ena.
Assuming a risk-free basic interest rate of 8,37 % (for the first instalment) and 6,57 % (for the second instalment) and a beta factor for BayernLB of 1,0803 (when the first instalment was made) and 1,0739 (when the second instalment was made), the BdB calculated the expected minimum remuneration for a hypothetical investment in the capital of BayernLB at the time when the building-loan claims were transferred to be 13,34 % per annum on 31 December 1994 and 12,87 % per annum on 31 December 1995.
Na podlagi netvegane temeljne obrestne mere 8,37 % (za prvo tranšo) in 6,57 % (za drugo tranšo) ter beta faktorja za BayernLB 1,0803 (čas prenosa prve tranše) in 1,0739 (čas prenosa druge tranše) je BdB izračunal pričakovano najmanjše nadomestilo za naložbo v osnovni kapital BayernLB v času prenosa terjatev iz stanovanjskih posojil dne 31. decembra 199413,34 % letno in za 31. december 199512,87 % letno.
PREMIUMS AND DISCOUNTS ON ACCOUNT OF THE PARTICULARITIES OF THE TRANSACTIONS
PRIBITKI IN ODBITKI ZARADI POSEBNOSTI TRANSAKCIJ
The BdB also noted that the Commission's deduction, in its WestLB decision, from the minimum remuneration to allow for the lack of liquidity of the Wfa's assets was upheld by the Court of First Instance.
BdB nadalje ugotavlja, da je Sodišče prve stopnje potrdilo odbitek od najmanjšega nadomestila zaradi manjkajoče likvidnosti sredstev Wfa, ki ga je Komisija določila v Odločbi glede WestLB.
It therefore saw no reason to depart from this method in the present case, with the result that a deduction for liquidity should also be made here.
Zato BdB ne vidi nobenega razloga za odstopanje od te metode v zadevnih primerih in je treba tudi tu opraviti odbitek zaradi manjkajoče likvidnosti.
The amount of the discount for lack of liquidity would be calculated, using the WestLB method, on the basis of net refinancing costs (gross refinancing costs minus the applicable corporation tax).
Višina odbitka zaradi manjkajoče likvidnosti se izračuna s pomočjo metodologije WestLB na podlagi neto stroškov refinanciranja (bruto stroški refinanciranja minus ustrezen davek od dobička).
In the BdB's view, the premium added by the Commission in the WestLB case (1,5 %) and upheld as such by the Court of First Instance should also be applied in the BayernLB case.
BdB meni, da je treba pribitek, ki ga je Komisija uporabila v primeru WestLB (tam 1,5 %) in ga je Sodišče prve stopnje potrdilo kot takega, uporabiti tudi v primeru BayernLB.
The three factors cited in the WestLB decision as increasing risk as compared with a ‘normal share capital investment’ also came into play here: the in part exceptionally high volume of assets transferred, the failure to issue new company shares and the associated absence of additional voting rights, and the lack of marketability of the investment, i.e. the impossibility of withdrawing the invested capital from the company again at any time
Tudi tukaj so trije vidiki razlogov, ki so navedeni v Odločbi glede WestLB, vplivali na povečanje tveganja glede na „običajno naložbo v osnovni kapital“: v določeni meri izredno visok obseg prenesenih sredstev, neizdaja novih delnic v družbi in s tem povezana odpoved dodatnim glasovalnim pravicam ter nezadostna tržnost vloge, t.j. nemožnost, da bi se vložen kapital kadar koli dvignil iz podjetja.
CAPITAL BASIS AND ELEMENTS OF REMUNERATION
KAPITALSKA OSNOVA IN ELEMENTI NADOMESTILA
Lastly, the BdB argued that, in calculating the appropriate remuneration in BayernLB's case, the entire amount recognised as core capital should be taken into account, and not just the part which was actually used.
Nazadnje BdB poudarja, da mora biti pri izračunu primernega nadomestila v primeru BayernLB osnova skupni znesek, priznan kot temeljni kapital, in ne zgolj dejansko uporabljen del.
It backed up this argument by stating that a market-economy investor would never agree to limit his remuneration to the portion of funds actually used.
To je utemeljil z dejstvom, da se vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu zagotovo ne bi strinjal z omejitvijo svojega nadomestila le na dejansko uporabljen del.
For a private investor bearing the risk of losing his investment, it is irrelevant whether the credit institution actually uses the injected capital to expand its business.
Za zasebnega vlagatelja, ki tvega izgubo svoje vloge, ni pomembno, ali kreditna institucija dejansko uporablja vložen kapital za širjenje svojih dejavnosti.