natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the case of hard core restrictions, such as horizontal price fixing which occur when the conference tariff is set and charges and surcharges are jointly fixed, the negative effects are very serious.
V primeru resnega omejevanja, kot je horizontalno določanje cen, do katerega pride, če je cena konference določena in so doplačila in dodatni stroški določeni skupaj, so negativni učinki zelo resni.
However no clearly positive effects have been identified.
Vsekakor so se prepoznali nejasni pozitivni učinki.
Transport users consider that conferences operate for the benefit of the least efficient members and call for their abolishment.
Uporabniki prevoza ugotavljajo, da konference delujejo v korist najmanj učinkovitih članov in zahtevajo njihovo ukinitev.
Conferences no longer fulfil the second condition of Article 81(3).
Konference ne izpolnjujejo več drugega pogoja člena 81(3) Pogodbe.
The third condition for exemption under Article 81(3) is that the conduct must not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of its objectives.
Tretji pogoj za izjemo po členu 81(3) Pogodbe je, da dogovori o omejitvah ne smejo naložiti zadevnim podjetjem omejitev, ki niso nujno potrebne pri doseganju njegovih ciljev.
Consortia are cooperative agreements between liner shipping lines that do not involve price fixing and are therefore less restrictive than conferences.
Konzorciji so usklajeni sporazumi med linijami linijskega pomorskega prometa, ki ne vključujejo določanja cen, in so zato manj omejeni od konferenc.
Transport users consider them to provide adequate, reliable and efficient scheduled maritime services.
Uporabniki prevoza zahtevajo, da se jim zagotovijo primerne, zanesljive in učinkovite redne storitve pomorskega prometa.
In addition the use of individual service agreements has increased significantly in recent years.
Poleg tega se je uporaba sporazumov za posamezne storitve v zadnjih letih znatno povečala.
By definition, such individual service agreements do not restrict competition and provide benefits to exporters as they make it possible to tailor special services.
Takšni sporazumi za posamezne storitve praviloma ne omejujejo konkurence in izvoznikom nudijo koristi, ker omogočajo prilagoditev posebnih storitev.
Furthermore, because the price is established in advance and does not fluctuate for a predetermined period (usually up to one year), service contracts can contribute to price stability.
Ker je cena določena vnaprej in v predvidenem obdobju (običajno do enega leta) ne niha, lahko pogodbe za storitve prispevajo k stabilnosti cen.
It has therefore not been established that the restrictions of competition permitted under Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 (price fixing and capacity regulation) are indispensable for the provision of reliable shipping services to transport users as these can be achieved by less restrictive means.
Ni bilo torej ugotovljeno, da je omejevanje konkurence, ki ga dovoljuje Uredba (EGS) št. 4056/86 (določanje cen in urejanje zmogljivosti), nujno potrebno, da se uporabnikom prevoza zagotovijo zanesljive storitve v pomorskem prometu, saj se to lahko doseže z manj omejenimi sredstvi.
The third condition under Article 81(3) is therefore not satisfied.
Tretji pogoj člena 81(3) Pogodbe zato ni izpolnjen.
Finally, the fourth condition under Article 81(3) requires that the conference should remain subject to effective competitive constraints.
Končno, četrti pogoj po členu 81(3) Pogodbe zahteva, da bi morala konferenca ostati predmet učinkovitih omejitev konkurence.
In current market circumstances conferences are present in nearly all major trade lanes and they compete with carriers grouped in consortia and with independent lines.
Konference so v trenutnih tržnih okoliščinah prisotne na skoraj vseh največjih plovnih poteh in tekmujejo s prevozniki, ki so združeni v konzorcijih, ter z neodvisnimi linijami.
Whilst there may be price competition on the ocean freight rate due to the weakening of the conference system there is hardly any price competition with respect to the surcharges and ancillary charges.
Medtem ko je cenovna konkurenca tovornin preko oceana posledica slabitve sistema konferenc, skoraj ni mogoča kakršna koli cenovna konkurenca v zvezi z dodatnimi stroški in doplačili.
These are set by the conference and the same level of charges is often applied by non-conference carriers.
Dodatne stroške in doplačila določi konferenca, pogosto pa jih v enaki višini povišajo tudi prevozniki, ki niso del konference.
In addition, carriers participate in conferences and consortia on the same trade, exchanging commercially sensitive information and cumulating the benefits of the conference (price fixing and capacity regulation) and of the consortia (operational cooperation for the provision of a joint service) block exemptions.
Poleg tega prevozniki sodelujejo v konferencah in konzorcijih na istem trgu, si izmenjujejo poslovno občutljive informacije in kopičijo ugodnosti konference (določanje cen in urejanje zmogljivosti) in skupinskih izjem konzorcijev (operativno sodelovanje za zmogljivost skupnih storitev).
Given the increasing number of links between carriers in the same trade, determining the extent to which conferences are subject to effective internal and external competition is a very complex exercise and one that can only be done on a case by case basis.
Ker se je število povezav med prevozniki na istem trgu povečalo, je določanje, v kolikšni meri so konference predmet učinkovite notranje in zunanje konkurence zelo zapleteno in se lahko izvede le za vsak posamezni primer.
Liner shipping conferences therefore no longer fulfil the four cumulative conditions for exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty and the block exemption in respect of such conferences should therefore be abolished.
Ker linijske konference v pomorskem prometu ne izpolnjujejo več štirih kumulativnih pogojev za izjemo iz člena 81(3) Pogodbe, se mora odpraviti skupinska izjema v zvezi s takšnimi konferencami.
The exclusion from the prohibition of Article 81(1) of the Treaty of purely technical agreements and the procedure for dealing with conflicts of law which may arise are also redundant.
Odvečna sta tudi izključitev iz prepovedi člena 81(1) Pogodbe zgolj tehničnih sporazumov in postopek za obravnavanje kolizije zakonov, do katere bi lahko prišlo.
Those provisions should therefore also be deleted.
Te določbe bi se morale zato izbrisati.
In the light of the above, Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 should be repealed in its entirety.
Ob upoštevanju zgoraj navedenega bi bilo treba Uredbo (EGS) št. 4056/86 v celoti razveljaviti.
Liner conferences are tolerated in several jurisdictions.
Linijske konference dopuščajo pristojni organi večih držav.
In this, as in other sectors, competition law is not applied in the same way worldwide.
Zakonodaja o konkurenci se kot tudi v drugih sektorjih tudi v tem ne uporablja enako po vsem svetu.
In light of the global nature of the liner shipping industry, the Commission should take the appropriate steps to advance the removal of the price fixing exemption for liner conferences that exist elsewhere whilst maintaining the exemption for operational cooperation between shipping lines grouped in consortia and alliances, in line with the recommendations of the OECD Secretariat in 2002.
Ob upoštevanju globalne narave industrije linijskega pomorskega prometa bi morala Komisija sprejeti vse ustrezne pobude za pospešitev odstranitve izjeme določanja cen za linijske konference, ki obstajajo drugje, medtem ko bo ohranila izjeme za operativno sodelovanje med linijami pomorskega prometa, združenimi v konzorcijih in združenjih, v skladu s priporočili Sekretariata OECD leta 2002.
Cabotage and international tramp vessel services have been excluded from the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty originally laid down in Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 and subsequently in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
Kabotaža in mednarodne prevozne storitve v prosti plovbi so bile izključene iz pravil o izvajanju členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe, prvotno določenih v Uredbi (EGS) št. 4056/86 in naknadno v Uredbi (ES) št. 1/2003.
They are currently the only remaining sectors to be excluded from the Community competition implementing rules.
Trenutno so edini preostali sektorji, ki se morajo izključiti iz izvajanja pravil o konkurenci Skupnosti.
The lack of effective enforcement powers for these sectors is an anomaly from a regulatory point of view.
Pomanjkanje učinkovitih izvršilnih pooblastil za te sektorje je anomalija z ureditvenega vidika.
The exclusion of tramp vessel services from Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 was based on the fact that rates for these services are freely negotiated on a case by case basis in accordance with supply and demand conditions.
Izključitev prevoznih storitev v prosti plovbi iz Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 je temeljila na dejstvu, da so cene teh storitev predmet prostega dogovarjanja za vsak posamezni primer skladno s pogoji ponudbe in povpraševanja.
However, such market conditions are present in other sectors and the substantive provisions of Articles 81 and 82 already apply to these services.
Takšni tržni pogoji so vsekakor prisotni v drugih sektorjih in te storitve vsebinske določbe členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe že uporabljajo.
No convincing reason has been brought forward to maintain the current exclusion of these services from the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
Da bi se ohranila trenutna izključitev teh storitev iz pravil o izvajanju členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe, se predlaga razlog, ki ni prepričljiv.
Similarly, although cabotage services often have no effect on intra Community trade, this does not mean that they should be excluded from the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 from the outset.
Podobno, čeprav storitve kabotaže pogosto ne vplivajo na notranjo trgovino Skupnosti, to ne pomeni, da morajo biti že od začetka izključene iz okvira Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003.
As the mechanisms enshrined in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 are appropriate for applying the competition rules to all sectors, the scope of that Regulation should be amended so as to include cabotage and tramp vessel services.
Ker so mehanizmi, vsebovani v Uredbi (ES) št. 1/2003, primerni za uporabo pravil konkurence v vseh sektorjih, bi se moral okvir te uredbe spremeniti, tako da vključuje kabotažo in prevozne storitve v prosti plovbi.
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 should therefore be amended accordingly.
Uredbo (ES) št. 1/2003 je treba zato ustrezno spremeniti.
Since Member States may need to adjust their international commitments in the light of the abolition of the conference system, the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 relating to the liner conference block exemption should continue to apply to conferences satisfying the requirements of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 on the date of entry into force of this Regulation for a transitional period,
Ker lahko države članice potrebujejo prilagoditev svojih mednarodnih dogovorov ob upoštevanju ukinitve sistema konferenc, bi se morale določbe Uredbe (EGS) št. 4056/86 v zvezi s skupinsko izjemo za linijske konference v prehodnem obdobju še nadalje uporabljati za konference, ki izpolnjujejo zahteve Uredbe (EGS) št. 4056/86 na datum začetka veljavnosti te uredbe –
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 shall be repealed.
Uredba (EGS) št. 4056/86 je razveljavljena.
However, Article 1(3)(b) and (c), Articles 3 to 7, Article 8(2) and Article 26 of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 shall continue to apply in respect of liner shipping conferences satisfying the requirements of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 on 18 October 2006, for a transitional period of two years from that date.
Vendar se člen 1(3)(b) in (c), členi 3 do 7, člen 8(2) in člen 26 Uredbe (EGS) št. 4056/86 še naprej uporabljajo glede na linijske konference v pomorskem prometu, ki zadovoljujejo zahteve Uredbe (EGS) št. 4056/86 na dan 18. oktobra 2006, za prehodno obdobje dveh let od navedenega datuma.
Article 32 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 shall be deleted.
Člen 32 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 se črta.
Opinion of 4 July 2006 (not yet published in the Official Journal).
Mnenje z dne 4. julija 2006 (še ni objavljeno v Uradnem listu).
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1420/2006
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1420/2006
This Regulation shall enter into force on 28 September 2006.
Ta uredba začne veljati 28. septembra 2006.
to Commission Regulation of 27 September 2006 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables
k Uredbi Komisije z dne 27. septembra 2006 o določitvi pavšalnih uvoznih vrednosti za določanje vhodne cene nekaterega sadja in zelenjave
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1421/2006
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1421/2006
Pursuant to the Community’s international obligations in the context of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations [2], it is necessary to create the conditions to import a certain quantity of maize into Spain.
V skladu z mednarodnimi obveznosmi Skupnosti, sklenjenimi v okviru urugvajskega kroga večstranskih trgovinskih pogajanj [2], je potrebno oblikovati pogoje za uvoz določene količine koruze v Španijo.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1839/95 of 26 July 1995 laying down detailed rules for the application of tariff quotas for imports of maize and sorghum into Spain and imports of maize into Portugal [3] lays down the special additional detailed rules necessary for implementing the invitation to tender.
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1839/95 z dne 26. julija 1995 o določitvi podrobnih pravil uporabe tarifnih kvot pri uvozu koruze in sirka v Španijo ter koruze na Portugalsko [3] uvaja posebna dodatna pravila, potrebna za izvedbo natečaja
In view of the current market demand in Spain, an invitation to tender for the reduction in the duty on maize is appropriate.
Zlasti z ozirom na trenutne tržne potrebe v Španiji bi bilo potrebno razpisati natečaj za znižanje uvozne dajatve za koruzo v okviru posebne ureditve za uvoz.
The invitation to tender shall be open until 26 October 2006.
Natečaj je razpisan do 26. oktobra 2006.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1422/2006
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1422/2006
on the issue of rice import licences for applications lodged in the first 10 working days of September 2006 under Regulation (EC) No 327/98
o izdaji uvoznih dovoljenj za riž na podlagi zahtevkov, vloženih v prvih desetih delovnih dneh meseca septembra 2006 v okviru Uredbe (ES) št. 327/98
Examination of the quantities for which rice import licence applications have been lodged for the September 2006 tranche shows that licences should be issued for the quantities applied for, multiplied, where appropriate, by a percentage reduction and that the quantities available for carry-over to the following tranche and the total quantities available for the various quotas should be fixed,
Po preučitvi količin, za katere so bili zahtevki za uvozna dovoljenja za riž vloženi za serijo za september 2006, se je pokazalo, da je treba predvideti izdajo dovoljenj za količine iz zahtevkov, po potrebi zmanjšane za odstotek znižanja in določiti razpoložljive količine za prenos v naslednjo serijo ter določiti skupne količine, ki so na voljo za različne kontingente –
Import licence applications for the tariff quotas for rice opened by Regulation (EC) No 327/98, submitted in the first 10 working days of September 2006 and notified to the Commission, shall be subject to percentage reduction coefficients as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.
Zahtevki za uvozna dovoljenja za tarifne kvote riža, odprte z Uredbo (ES) št. 327/98, vloženi v prvih desetih delovnih dneh meseca septembra 2006 in o katerih je Komisija obveščena, so zmanjšani za koeficient znižanja v skladu z odstotki iz Priloge k tej uredbi.
The quantities available under the September 2006 tranche, to be carried over to the following tranche, and the total quantities available for the October 2006 tranche shall be as set out in the Annex hereto.
Razpoložljive količine v okviru serije za mesec september 2006, ki se jih prenese v naslednjo serijo, in skupne razpoložljive količine za serijo za mesec oktober 2006 so določene v Prilogi.
This Regulation shall enter into force on 28 September 2006.
Ta uredba začne veljati 28. septembra 2006
Reduction percentages to be applied to quantities applied for under the September 2006 tranche and quantities carried over to the following tranche
Odstotki znižanja, ki se uporabijo za zahtevane količine za serijo za mesec september 2006, in količine, ki se prenesejo v naslednjo serijo:
Reduction percentage for the September 2006 tranche
Odstotek znižanja za serijo za september 2006
Quota of broken rice falling within CN code 10064000 provided for in Article 1(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98
Kvota za lomljen riž z oznako KN 10064000, določena v členu 1(1)(e) Uredbe (ES) št. 327/98
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1423/2006
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1423/2006
establishing a mechanism for appropriate measures in the field of agricultural spending in respect of Bulgaria and Romania
o vzpostavitvi mehanizma za primerne ukrepe na področju kmetijskih izdatkov v zvezi z Bolgarijo in Romunijo
Having regard to the Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, and in particular Article 37 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Akta o pristopu Bolgarije in Romunije in zlasti člena 37 Akta,
According to Article 2 of the Act of Accession, the provisions of the acts adopted by the institutions before accession shall be binding on Bulgaria and Romania and shall apply in those States under the conditions laid down in the Treaties and the aforesaid Act.
V skladu s členom 2 Akta o pristopu so določbe aktov, ki so jih institucije sprejele pred pristopom, zavezujoče za Bolgarijo in Romunijo in se uporabljajo v navedenih državah pod pogoji, ki jih določajo pogodbe in navedeni akt.
Article 37 of the Act of Accession enables the Commission to take appropriate measures in case Bulgaria or Romania has failed to implement commitments undertaken in the context of the accession negotiations, causing a serious breach of the functioning of the internal market or an imminent risk of such a breach.
Člen 37 Akta o pristopu Komisiji omogoča, da ustrezno ukrepa, če Bolgarija ali Romunija ne izpolnjuje obveznosti, ki jih je prevzela v okviru pristopnih pogajanj, in s tem povzroča hujšo nepravilnost v delovanju notranjega trga ali neposredno nevarnost za tako nepravilnost.
Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999, (EC) No 1673/2000, (EEC) No 2358/71 and (EC) No 2529/2001 [1] requires Member States to set up an integrated administration and control system, hereinafter referred to as the ‘IACS’.
Člen 17 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1782/2003 z dne 29. septembra 2003 o skupnih pravilih za sheme neposrednih podpor v okviru skupne kmetijske politike in o uvedbi nekaterih shem podpor za kmete ter o spremembi uredb (EGS) št. 2019/93, (ES) št. 1452/2001, (ES) št. 1453/2001, (ES) št. 1454/2001, (ES) št. 1868/94, (ES) št. 1251/1999, (ES) št. 1254/1999, (ES) št. 1673/2000, (EGS) št. 2358/71 in (ES) št. 2529/2001 [1] zahteva, da države članice vzpostavijo integriran administrativni in kontrolni sistem, v nadaljnjem besedilu „IACS“.
As of their accession, Bulgaria and Romania are required to have an IACS in place in order to control a large part of the Community’s agricultural support in these States.
Od priključitve Bolgarije in Romunije se bo od obeh držav zahtevalo, da imata vzpostavljen IACS za nadzor večjega dela kmetijske podpore Skupnosti v teh državah.
The Commission has concluded on the basis of information provided by Bulgaria and Romania until the date of adoption of this Regulation and on the basis of its own inspections that there is a real risk as to the existence and operability of the IACS in these States.
Komisija je na podlagi informacij, ki sta jih do datuma sprejetja te uredbe priskrbeli Bolgarija in Romunija, in na podlagi svojih inšpekcijskih pregledov ugotovila, da obstaja resno tveganje glede obstoja in operabilnosti IACS v teh državah.
Serious deficiencies in the IACS of Bulgaria or Romania would lead to a situation where the payments of agricultural support which should be controlled under this system would not or not properly be controlled.
Resne pomanjkljivosti IACS v Bolgariji ali Romuniji bi povzročile, da plačila kmetijske podpore, ki jih mora ta sistem nadzorovati, ne bi bila nadzorovana oz. ne bi bila ustrezno nadzorovana.
There would exist, therefore, a serious risk that producers who are not, either in total or in part, entitled to the agricultural support would receive this support, thereby being put in a more favourable position than foreseen in Community legislation.
Tako bi obstajala resna nevarnost, da bi podporo prejeli proizvajalci, ki deloma ali v celoti niso upravičeni do kmetijske podpore in bi bili tako v ugodnejšem položaju, kot ga predvideva zakonodaja Skupnosti.
For each of these States expenditure for direct payments and rural development controlled under the IACS will amount to around 80 % of total agricultural expenditure and involve substantial amounts of several hundreds of millions of euro, which demonstrates the importance of a properly functioning IACS for the introduction of the common agricultural policy in the two countries and the good functioning of the Community’s internal market.
Za obe navedeni državi bodo odhodki za neposredna plačila in razvoj podeželja, ki jih nadzoruje IACS, znašali do okoli 80 % skupnih kmetijskih odhodkov in bodo vključevali znatne zneske več sto milijonov EUR, kar dokazuje, kako pomembno je pravilno delovanje IACS pri uvajanju skupne kmetijske politike v obeh državah in za dobro delovanje notranjega trga Skupnosti.
As the more favourable position in combination with the sums involved is likely to have an effect on trade of agricultural products in the internal market, it would cause an imminent risk of a serious breach of the functioning of this market.
Ker obstaja verjetnost, da bi te prednosti skupaj z vključenimi zneski vplivale na trgovino s kmetijskimi proizvodi na notranjem trgu, bi povzročile neposredno nevarnost za hujšo nepravilnost v delovanju notranjega trga.
This risk cannot be properly addressed solely by the application of Articles 17 and 27 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy [2], given the nature of the systems and procedures foreseen in these provisions.
Tega tveganja se ne more obravnavati izključno z uporabo členov 17 in 27 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1290/2005 z dne 21. junija 2005 o financiranju skupne kmetijske politike [2], glede na značilnosti sistemov in postopkov, predvidenih v teh določbah.
It is therefore necessary to have recourse to Article 37 of the Act of Accession allowing the Commission to take the appropriate measures aimed at eliminating the risk.
Zato je treba imeti možnost uporabe člena 37 Akta o pristopu, ki omogoča Komisiji, da ustrezno ukrepa za odpravo tveganja.
After the accession, both Bulgaria and Romania should, on the basis of a report from an independent body, make a declaration to the Commission stating whether their IACS exists and is operational.
Po priključitvi morata Bolgarija in Romunija na podlagi poročila neodvisnega organa predložiti Komisiji izjavo, v kateri navedeta, ali IACS v teh državah obstaja in deluje.
In case of deficiencies, these States should remedy the deficiencies immediately.
Če obstajajo pomanjkljivosti, jih morata državi takoj odpraviti.