natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Contrary to what the French authorities maintain, France Télécom did not have access to the financial markets in 2002 on suitable terms prior to the series of declarations of support by the State from July until December of that year.
V nasprotju s tem, kar trdi francoska vlada, podjetje FT ni imelo dostopa na finančne trge v letu 2002 v ustreznih pogojih, pred vrsto izjav o podpori države od julija do decembra 2002.
The difficulties which France Télécom would have had in refinancing itself on suitable terms without the State's support are illustrated by the financial analysts' reports.
Težave podjetja FT pri ponovnem financiranju v ustreznih pogojih brez podpore države so prikazane s poročilih finančnih analitikov.
For example, one analyst has stated that, in July 2002, with a Baa3 rating the Company would have had difficulty solving its debt problem through the acquisition of new capital: ‘FT's Baa3 rating meant that it was hard to say who would buy a potential bond issue.
Julija 2002 je na primer nek analitik trdil, da bo z oceno Baa3 podjetje težko rešilo težave dolga s pridobivanjem novega kapitala: „Ocena Baaa3 pomeni, da je težko reči, kdo naj bi kupil možno izdajo obveznic. Negativen pogled povečuje možnost, da podjetje postane ‚fallen angel‘ če ne reši svojih težav z dolgom“.
A report by JP Morgan dated 2 December 2002 also seems to confirm that, without the State's support, France Télécom would not have been capable of obtaining fresh capital on the market in order to refinance its debt.
Poročilo JP MORGAN z dne 2. decembra 2002 tudi potrjuje, da brez podpore države podjetje FT ne bi moglo pridobiti novega kapitala na trgu za ponovno financiranje svojega dolga. Poročilo navaja: „Še vedno se nam profil podjetja FT v okviru tveganja/povračila ne zdi zanimiv ob čakanju rezultata strateškega pregleda.
The report states: ‘We continue to view FT's risk/reward profile as unattractive pending the outcome of a strategy review.
[…] Kljub temu, da je pomembno za podjetje FT, da zniža stroške in pride do zelo pomembnega donosa, in kljub temu, da ima predsednik velik ugled, je osrednja vloga vlade, da podjetju FT omogoči potrebno prilagodljivost. Medtem je tveganje izgubljene likvidnosti in rast kapitala po našem mnenju samo vprašanje časa.
… Although we see significant scope for FT to cut costs and deliver a compelling yield and even though the CEO has strong track record execution, the government role in giving FT the flexibility it requires is pivotal.
[…] Vloga vlade bo pri ponovnem financiranju in zniževanju dolga še vedno osrednja. Medtem so se kljub neuspešnem ponovnem financiranju v letu 2003 podjetje FT in agencije za ocenjevanje kratkoročno osredotočile na tveganje likvidnosti in ponovnega financiranja podjetja.
In the meantime, liquidity risk remains and in our view, a right issue is a matter of when not if.
To bi bilo nemogoče brez posredovanja vlade – kljub temu, da ga je podjetje France Téĺécom prejelo ob telefonski konferenci v tretjem trimestru“. („We continue to view FT’s risk/reward profile as unattractive pending the outcome of a strategy review.
However it is liquidity or refinancing risk that is the near-term focus of FT and rating agencies alike, with a daunting refinancing schedule ahead in 2003.
In the meantime, liquidity risk remains and in our view, a right issue is a matter of when not if. […] The government’s role will again be pivotal in refinancing and reducing this debt.
[…] This would be impossible without government intervention — even FT acknowledged this in its Q3 conference call’ (emphasis added).
However it is liquidity or refinancing risk that is the near-term focus of FT and rating agencies alike, with a daunting refinancing schedule ahead in 2003. […] This would be impossible without government intervention – even FT acknowledged this in its Q3 conference call“) (podčrtano je dodano).
Two reports by Goldman Sachs and SG Equity Research confirm that it was only after the series of declarations by the State that the capital market allowed France Télécom to refinance itself on suitable terms.
Dve poročili podjetij Goldman Sachs in SG Equity Research potrjujeta, da je šele po vrsti izjav države trg kapitala dovolil podjetju FT ponovno financiranje v ustreznih pogojih.
Global Equity Research stated on 20 February 2003 that: ‘[the] immediate liquidity issues are solved: since the government's upfront prepayment of its €15bn equity offering in the form of a €9bn standby facility, FT has been able to re-access the debt capital markets to solve its immediate liquidity challenges’.
Global Equity Research 20. februarja 2003 trdi, da „so neposredne težave likvidnosti rešene: od predplačila sodelovanja pri rasti kapitala 15 milijard EUR v obliki kreditne linije 9 milijard EUR je podjetje FT spet lahko stopilo na trg obveznic, da bi znižalo neposredne pritiske likvidnosti“. („[the] immediate liquidity issues are solved: since the government’s upfront prepayment of its €15bn equity offering in the form of a €9bn standby facility, FT has been able to re-access the debt capital markets to solve its immediate liquidity challenges“.)
The financial analysts' views are borne out by statements by the Company's then CEO, Mr Bon, as reported in several press articles, and by the French authorities themselves at the time of their December 2002 notification .
Mnenje finančnih analitikov so potrdile izjave predsednika podjetja v tem obdobju, g. Bona, v več člankih v medijih, in tudi francoska vlada ob obvestilu decembra 2002 .
Although the French authorities maintain that the opinion of France Télécom's former CEO is irrelevant in view of the circumstances in which it was formulated, it nevertheless remains that that opinion was borne out by the new CEO appointed in October 2002 when, at his hearing on 5 December 2002 before the Senate finance committee, he also stated that the group was in a worrying situation: ‘Despite being faced with huge debts, the company did not seem to have woken up to the fact that its credit rating was being downgraded, that it no longer had access to the capital markets ...’.
Kljub poudarjanju francoske vlade, da mnenje nekdanjega predsednika podjetja FT ni pomembno ob upoštevanju okoliščin v katerih so bila oblikovana, je to mnenje potrdil tudi novi predsednik podjetja FT, imenovan oktobra 2002, ki je od zaslišanja 5. decembra 2002 pred komisijo za finance v Senatu prav tako poudaril, da se je družba znašla v zaskrbljujoči situaciji: „Kljub ogromnemu dolgu, podjetje očitno ni prejelo ukrepa situacije družbe, ki je opazovalo znižanje svojega položaja in ki nima več dostopa do trga kapitala …“.
Similarly, the documents furnished by the French authorities to illustrate France Télécom's access to the markets are unconvincing.
Tudi dokumenti, ki jih je zagotovila francoska vlada, za prikaz dostopa podjetja FT do trga niso prepričljivi.
The exchange offers proposed by […] and […] to replace the short-term bonds by longer-term ones do not bear out the French authorities' argument as to France Télécom's access to the capital market.
Pravzaprav ponudbe izmenjave bank […] in […], ki naj bi nadomestile izplačane obveznice za kratek rok z obveznicami za daljši rok, ne podpirajo trditve francoske vlade o dostopu podjetja FT na trg kapitala.
The exchange offer by […], which was dated July 2002 and which is said to have been made to France Télécom on the 17th of that month, thus contains only preliminary remarks on a possible exchange transaction and mentions only an indicative price of Euribor + 380 base points and a coupon of 8,50 %.
Ponudba za izmenjavo iz banke […], iz julija 2002 in predložena 17. julija podjetju FT, vsebuje samo predhodne pripombe o možnem postopku izmenjave in označuje samo ciljno ceno za EURIBOR + 380 pb s kuponom 8,5 %.
The September 2002 offer by […] was not signed by the parties and contains no refinancing rate.
Ponudba banke […] septembra 2002 ni bila podpisana in ne vsebuje nobene stopnje ponovnega financiranja.
In the Commission's opinion, inasmuch as the offers were not formalised and only one of the two offers mentions an indicative rate, which was higher than the average of France Télécom's issue rates in 2002, these two offers are irrelevant.
Komisija poudarja, če ponudbe niso bile uradne in samo ena od obeh ponudb omenja ciljno ceno, višjo od povprečja stopenj izdaj podjetja FT v letu 2002, potem ti dve ponudbi nista ustrezni.
At all events, the offers seem to postdate the State's explicit declarations of support of July 2002 and hence cannot serve as evidence that France Télécom had normal access to the capital market.
V vsakem primeru so te ponudbe poznejše kot izjave o izključni podpori države julija 2002 in ne morejo pokazati, da je imelo podjetje FT običajen dostop do trga kapitala.
As to the various operations mentioned by the French authorities, and in particular the issuance by France Télécom of ordinary bonds and mandatory convertible bonds (‘ORA’) in the course of 2002, the Commission would point out that they likewise do not prove that France Télécom had access to the market on suitable terms.
Glede različnih omenjenih postopkov francoske vlade in zlasti izdaj izplačanih obveznic v delnicah podjetja FT („ORA“) v letu 2002, Komisija pravi, da kažejo samo to, da je podjetje FT imelo dostop do trga v ustreznih pogojih.
The total amount of the issues is far below the average for France Télécom over the period 1997-2003.
Tako Komisija poudarja, da je skupni znesek izdaj globoko pod povprečjem podjetja FT v obdobju 1997–2003.
Only the ORA issue is of any significant size, but this is precisely an instrument that is used where the risk is high and the cost of an ordinary bond issue would be too great.
Samo izdaja ORA je zelo pomembna, vendar gre za instrument, ki se uporablja ko se poveča tveganje in ko je strošek izdaje običajnih obveznic preveč pomemben.
As to the French authorities' assertion that they preferred to resort to a syndicated loan than to the bond market for the purpose of refinancing France Télécom, this is not indicative of the Company's capacity to refinance itself on suitable terms.
Glede potrdila francoske vlade, ki pravi, da so se raje zatekli k sindiciranemu kreditu kot k trgu obveznic za ponovno financiranje, slednje ni znak zmogljivosti podjetja FT, da se ponovno financira v ustreznih pogojih. Pravzaprav je sindiciran kredit, ki ga omenja francoska vlada v svojih pripombah z dne 22. januarja 2004 iz 14. februarja 2002, pred znižanjem ratinga agencije za ocenjevanje podjetju FT. Nasprotno se zdi, da večmesečna uporaba tega instrumenta kredita za kratki rok namesto izdaje obveznic za daljši rok, ki bi omogočila ponovno financiranje dela dolga podjetja, potrjuje, da dostop podjetja FT do trga kapitala ni bil enostaven.
In the light of all the above considerations, the Commission is of the opinion that France Télécom must be considered, during the first half of 2002, to have been a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Zaradi vsega omenjenega je Komisija mnenja, da se mora podjetje FT v prvem polletju leta 2002 obravnavati kot podjetje v težavah v okviru smernic.
However, the measures at issue cannot be characterised as aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty as they do not fulfil the conditions for authorisation laid down in the Guidelines.
Zato se zadevni ukrepi ne morejo obravnavati kot pomoč pri reševanju in za prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah, ker ne izpolnjujejo pogojev pooblastil, ki jih predvidevajo smernice.
The Commission would point out first of all here that the French authorities have not advanced any argument along these lines and have never asserted that the measures at issue had as their purpose the rescuing and restructuring of France Télécom.
Komisija o tem v uvodu poudarja, da francoska vlada ni ocenila nobenega takšnega argumenta in ni nikoli potrdila, da so zadevni ukrepi imeli namen reševati in prestrukturirati podjetje FT.
On the contrary, the French authorities have always denied that France Télécom should be characterised as a firm in difficulty and have stressed the Company's good operational health.
Nasprotno, francoska vlada je vedno izpodbijala, da je podjetje FT obravnavano kot podjetje v težavah v okviru smernic in je poudarila dobro operativno stanje podjetja.
The measures at issue cannot constitute rescue aid.
Zadevni ukrepi ne morejo sestavljati pomoči pri reševanju.
The Guidelines provide that the loan must be remunerated, which is not the case here.
Pravzaprav smernice predvidevajo, da se mora kredit poplačati, vendar v tem primeru ni tako.
Similarly, the aid must be justified by serious social reasons, but the Commission has no evidence in its possession to suggest that, in the absence of such aid, a situation of social distress would have been brought about.
Prav tako morajo za pomoč obstajati trdni socialni razlogi, kljub temu da Komisija nima nobenega elementa, ki kaže na to, da se ob odsotnosti te pomoči pojavi nevarna situacija na socialnem načrtu.
In so far as its assets were healthy from an operational standpoint, had France Télécom been obliged to dispose of assets to meet its financing requirements there would in all probability have been no serious social difficulties.
Pravzaprav če je bilo premoženje podjetja FT v operativnem okviru zdravo, v primeru ko je podjetje FT moralo nadaljevati s prenosom premoženja, da bi se soočilo s potrebami po financiranju, zelo verjetno ni bilo nikakršne trdne socialne težave.
The Guidelines also provide that rescue aid must be restricted to the amount needed to keep the firm in business for the period during which the aid is authorised.
Prav tako je v okviru smernic predvideno, da se mora višina pomoči pri reševanju omejiti na to, kar je potrebno za delovanje podjetja med obdobjem, za katerega je pomoč odobrena.
In the present case, however, the Commission has seen no evidence to the effect that the State's commitment to support France Télécom was limited to keeping the Company in business.
Zato v tem primeru Komisija nima nikakršnega elementa, ki ji omogočal zagotovitev, da je bila obveznost države pri podpori podjetja omejena na delovanje podjetja FT.
Moreover, the French authorities have not formally notified the measures in question as rescue aid, or affirmed that the measures are aimed at rescuing France Télécom.
Francoska vlada ni uradno objavila zadevnih ukrepov kot pomoči pri reševanju niti ni potrdila, da so ti ukrepi namenjeni reševanju podjetja FT.
Rescue aid must be repaid within 12 months of the date of the last payment; however, repayment in France Télécom shares cannot constitute repayment within the meaning of the Guidelines, being instead a mere capital injection as there is no guarantee that the shares' nominal value will correspond to the aid amount.
Pomoč pri reševanju se mora poplačati v 12 mesecih od datuma zadnjega plačila, kajti povračilo z nadomestilom v delnicah podjetja FT ne more sestavljati povračila v okviru smernic, ampak sestavlja enostaven priliv kapitala, ker nič ne zagotavlja, da bo osnovna vrednost delnic ustrezala višini pomoči.
The Guidelines provide, furthermore, that rescue aid may be granted for a maximum period of six months.
Prav tako se predvideva v okviru smernic, da se pomoč pri reševanju dodeli le za obdobje največ 6 mesecev.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the credit line was opened for a period of 18 months, the period authorised has been exceeded.
Ker je kreditna linija odprta za obdobje 18 mesecev, je torej ta rok daljši od odobrenega roka.
Nor can the measures at issue constitute restructuring aid.
Zadevni ukrepi ne morejo sestavljati pomoči pri prestrukturiranju.
In response to a request made by the Commission at the time of the opening decision, the French authorities submitted the Ambition 2005 plan.
Na zahtevo Komisije ob odločitvi o začetku je francoska vlada predstavila načrt Ambition 2005.
A perusal of the plan has confirmed that France Télécom was entering upon a phase of in-depth restructuring, both industrially and financially.
Pregled načrta je potrdil, da je podjetje FT vstopilo v obdobje temeljitega prestrukturiranja, tako na gospodarski kot na finančni ravni.
The Commission accordingly considers that the financial measures granted by the French authorities in support of France Télécom were capable of constituting restructuring aid within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Zato Komisija meni, da so dodeljeni finančni ukrepi francoske vlade pri podpori podjetja FT lahko sestavljali pomoč pri prestrukturiranju v okviru smernic.
That being so, the Commission cannot consider the measures compatible with the common market under Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and under the Guidelines.
Ob tem Komisija ne more obravnavati teh ukrepov kot usklajenih s skupnim trgom iz člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe in s smernicami.
According to the Guidelines, ‘aid for restructuring raises particular competition concerns’.
Treba je omeniti, da glede na smernice „pomoč pri prestrukturiranju predstavlja težave zlasti pri konkurenci“.
Consequently, such aid may be granted ‘only if strict criteria are met, and if it is certain that any distortions of competition will be offset by the benefits flowing from the firm's survival … and, where appropriate, there are adequate compensatory measures in favour of competitors’.
Zato se ta pomoč lahko dodeli „samo v okviru strogih meril in na zagotovilo, da se mogoče izkrivljanje konkurence povrne s predplačili, ki izhajajo iz ohranjanja podjetja … in, če je potrebno, z zadostnimi nadomestili za konkurenco“.
In the present case, however, the information furnished by the French authorities is silent on this point, and the authorities have not transmitted to the Commission certain information referred to in Annex I to the Guidelines, such as a detailed description of the aid (proposing compensatory measures) and market studies, which is essential if the Commission is to be able to rule on the scale of the distortions of competition involved and hence of the compensatory measures needed in order to verify the compatibility of the aid.
Ker v tem primeru podatki, ki jih je zagotovila francoska vlada, ne vsebujejo ničesar o tem, in zlasti ker francoska vlada ni sporočila Komisiji določenih podatkov iz priloge I o smernicah, še posebej natančnega opisa pomoči (ki predlaga nadomestila) in študije trga, kar so za Komisijo nenadomestljivi podatki, da bi lahko jasno izrazila obseg izkrivljanja konkurence in torej potrebna nadomestila za zagotovitev usklajenosti pomoči.
The Commission concludes that the financial measures granted by the French authorities in support of France Télécom are incompatible with the common market within the meaning of the Treaty's Article 87(3)(c) and of the Guidelines.
Komisija sklepa, da so finančni ukrepi, ki jih je dodelila francoska vlada pri podpori podjetja FT, neusklajeni s skupnim trgom v okviru člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe in v okviru smernic.
In the light of the above, the shareholder loan of December 2002 constitutes state aid incompatible with the common market.
Glede na zgoraj omenjeno, je delničarsko posojilo decembra 2002 državna pomoč, ki ni usklajena s skupnim trgom.
Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 requires, therefore, in principle that the Commission should demand its recovery.
Člen 14 Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 načeloma zahteva, da Komisija zahteva povračilo.
A precondition for carrying out that obligation is either that the amount of the aid should be fairly precisely quantified in the Decision or — if that is not possible — that the parameters should be included whereby the Member State, in cooperation with the Commission, might subsequently carry out such a calculation.
Seveda je predhoden pogoj za nadaljevanje izvajanja te obveznosti ali oceniti na razmeroma natančen način višino pomoči v odločitvi ali – če to ne bo mogoče, vključiti parametre, ki omogočajo državi članici v sodelovanju s Komisijo nadaljevati s takšnim izračunom naknadno.
In this respect, the Commission is not able at this stage to precisely quantify the aid in question.
Tako Komisija v tem stanju ne more nadaljevati z natančnim ocenjevanjem zadevne pomoči.
While it is true that the analysis based on the market situation before the July 2002 declarations suggests the existence of a considerable advantage conferred on France Télécom, the Commission does not consider it appropriate to rely on this factor alone in quantifying the aid.
Analiza od situacije trga pred izjavami julija 2002 nakazuje obstoj znatne prednosti, dodeljene podjetju FT. Vendar Komisija ocenjuje kot neustrezno, da se opira samo na te elemente za ocenjevanje pomoči.
Although reference to the market situation before the July 2002 declarations makes it possible to factor in the effect on the markets of the prior declarations of the French authorities, it does not make it possible to isolate that effect from any other effects of events such as the change of France Télécom's management or the Ambition 2005 plan.
Pravzaprav uporaba situacije trga pred izjavami julija 2002, če omogoča upoštevanje učinka predhodnih izjav francoskih organov na trge, ne omogoča ločevanja teh učinkov od drugih možnih učinkov dogodkov, kot je sprememba vodstva podjetja FT ali načrt Ambition 2005.
Such an assessment offers, therefore, only a ‘gross’ view which is probably not strictly equivalent to the advantage enjoyed by France Télécom.
Ta ocena torej ponuja samo „grob“ pogled, ki pa verjetno ne ustreza strogo prednosti, ki jo je doseglo podjetje FT.
Despite all its efforts, the Commission has been unable to arrive at a reasonable assessment of the notified measures' ‘net’ financial impact, which ought to be established on the basis of a theoretical calculation isolating the effects of the declarations and actions attributable to the State from any other event which may have exerted an influence on France Télécom's situation or on the perception of that situation by the markets.
Kljub vsem naporom Komisija ni sposobna pridobiti razumne ocene „čistega“ finančnega vpliva objavljenih ukrepov, ki bi moral biti oblikovan na osnovi teoretičnega izračuna, ki ločuje učinke izjav in spletk v breme države od vseh drugih dogodkov, ki bi lahko vplivali na situacijo podjetja FT ali na zaznavanje trgov te situacije.
Nor does it seem possible to incorporate in the Decision calculation parameters which are sufficiently precise to be able to carry out the final calculation during the Decision's implementing phase.
Prav tako se ne zdi mogoče vključiti v odločitev dovolj natančnih parametrov izračuna za izvedbo končnega izračuna v obdobju izvajanja odločitve.
In these particular circumstances, respect for the Member State's rights of defence might constitute an obstacle to recovery pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, according to which ‘the Commission shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of Community law’.
V teh posebnih okoliščinah lahko spoštovanje pravic do obrambe države članice predstavlja oviro pri povračilu, v skladu s členom 14(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/199, v kateri „Komisija ne zahteva povračila pomoči, če se je s tem uprla splošnemu načelu prava Skupnosti“.
This conclusion also seems to follow from the principle of legitimate expectation.
Ta sklep očitno izhaja iz načela zakonitega zaupanja. Seveda Francija ni predstavila Komisiji nobenega argumenta o obstoju zakonitega zaupanja glede upravičencev pomoči.
Although France has not presented to the Commission any argument based on the existence of a legitimate expectation on the part of the aid recipient, it follows from the case law of the Court of Justice that the Commission is required to take automatically into consideration any exceptional circumstances which justify, in accordance with Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, its refraining from ordering the recovery of unlawfully granted aid where such recovery is contrary to a general principle of Community law, such as respect for the legitimate expectations of the recipients.
Iz sodne prakse Sodišča izhaja, da mora Komisija uradno upoštevati izredne okoliščine, ki upravičujejo, v skladu s členom 14(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999, odpoved zahtevku za povračilo nezakonito dodeljenih pomoči, če je povračilo v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava Skupnosti, tako kot je spoštovanje zakonitega zaupanja upravičencev.