natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Senate information report No 274, attached to the minutes of the sitting of 21.2.2002: ‘On 29 May 2000, France Télécom and the Vodafone group concluded an agreement whereby France Télécom was to acquire, from Mannesmann, all the shares comprising the capital of Orange plc, the British mobile telecommunications operator.
Poročilo o podatkih Senata št. 274, združeno v zapisniku seje z dne 21. februarja 2002„Dne 29. maja 2000 sta podjetje France Télécom in skupina Vodafone sklenila sporazum, s katerim mora podjetje France Télécom pridobiti, poleg podjetja Mannesmann, vse delnice, ki predstavljajo kapital podjetja Orange plc, britanskega operaterja za mobilne telekomunikacije.
The agreement was executed on 22 August 2000 by the purchase, by France Télécom, of 664743658 Orange shares for EUR 21,5 billion in cash and the transfer, from Vodafone to France Télécom, of 544559931 Orange shares, paid for by the issue of 129201742 France Télécom shares at the price of EUR 140,2 each, with Vodafone agreeing to abstain from exercising the voting rights attached to those shares.
Ta sporazum je bil izveden 22. avgusta 2000, ko je France Télécom kupil 664743658 delnic podjetja Orange za plačilo 21,5 milijard EUR v gotovini in s prinosom 544559931 delnic podjetja Orange, od podjetja Vodafone k podjetju France Télécom, plačanih z izdajo 129201742 delnic podjetja France Télécom po enotni ceni 140,2 EUR; ob tem je Vodafone prepovedal uporabo pravic glasovanja povezanih s temi delnicami.
Concomitantly, France Télécom granted Vodafone a series of sell options on the France Télécom shares which had been issued to it and Vodafone granted France Télécom a buy option on all or part of its France Télécom shares.
Sočasno je podjetje France Télécom podjetju Vodafone dodelilo vrsto možnosti prodaje za delnice podjetja France Télécom, ki so bile izdane v njegovo korist, Vodafone pa je dodelil podjetju France Télécom možnost nakupa za vse ali samo del svojih delnic podjetja France Télécom.
France Télécom immediately repurchased from Vodafone 15355531 France Télécom shares at their issue price, with the result that Vodafone held no more than 9,9 % of France Télécom's capital … Following the stock exchange listing of Orange SA on 13 February 2001, Vodafone and France Télécom reached an agreement on 28 February 2001 on the arrangements for the sale to France Télécom of the 113,85 million France Télécom shares still held by Vodafone.
Podjetje France Télécom je nemudoma odkupil od podjetja Vodafone 15355531 delnic podjetja France Télécom po njihovi ceni, tako da Vodafone nima več kot 9,9 % kapitala podjetja France Télécoma … Po vstopu podjetja Orange SA na borzo dne 13. februarja 2001, sta Vodafone in France Télécom dne 28. februarja 2001 dosegla sporazum o načinih prodaje podjetju France Télécom 113,85 milijona delnic podjetja France Télécom, ki jih je še imelo podjetje Vodafone.
This agreement laid down the overall arrangements for exercising the sell and buy options on the France Télécom shares held by Vodafone and fixed at approximately EUR 11,63 billion the total price of these shares … The third payment may be subject to a supplement … The supplement might come to approximately EUR 1,5 billion ... On the basis of this agreement, the total cost of acquiring Orange plc comes to EUR 35472 million’.
Ta sporazum na splošno določa načine izvajanja možnosti prodaje in nakupa delnic podjetja France Télécom, ki jih ima podjetje Vodafone, in določa skupno ceno teh delnic na približno 11,63 milijard EUR … Tretje plačilo je lahko del dodatka … Dodatek se lahko zviša do zneska približno 1,5 milijard EUR … Na podlagi tega sporazuma se je celotni strošek nakupa podjetja Orange plc dvignil na 35472 milijonov EUR“.
See also the report of the above-mentioned commission of enquiry: ‘The 43,2 billion purchase (reduced to EUR 35,4 billion in February 2001) was financed half in cash (EUR 21,5 billion) and half by the exchange of shares (EUR 18,1 billion).
Glej tudi poročilo zgoraj omenjene komisije za preiskave: „Nakup v vrednosti 43,2 milijard EUR (znižan na 35,4 milijard EUR v februarju 2001) je bil financiran polovico z denarnimi sredstvi (21,5 milijard EUR) in polovico z izmenjavo delnic (18,1 milijard EUR).
On this last point, however, France Télécom undertook to repurchase the shares issued at a minimum price of EUR 104. There was scarcely any doubt that the seller would insist on these repurchase options being exercised … And, owing to the autumn 2000 stock market collapse, the risk that the French group might be forced to pay for Orange wholly in cash materialised, with two payments to Vodafone of EUR 6,631 billion and EUR 4,973 billion in March 2001 and 2002’.
Vendar se je na zadnji stopnji podjetje France Télécom odločilo odkupiti delnice po najnižjem tečaju 104 EUR. Ni bilo nobenega dvoma, da je prodajalec potreboval izvajanje teh možnosti odkupa … Zaradi padca borze jeseni 2000, se je tveganje, da je francoska skupina primorana plačati 100 % podjetja Orange v denarnih sredstvih, z dvema plačiloma podjetju Vodafone v znesku 6,631 milijard EUR in 4,973 milijard EUR v marcu 2001 in 2002, uresničilo“.
Commission of enquiry: ‘It was in these difficult circumstances that the idea of buying into Mobilcom's capital got off the ground … Evidently, the acquisition of a very large stake was not the subject of really in-depth thought despite its being fraught with considerable risk.
Komisija za preiskave: „V teh težkih okoliščinah se je pojavil projekt nakupa delnic podjetja Mobilcom … .
… In March 2000, France Télécom thus invested EUR 3,7 billion in a 28,5 % shareholding, valuing the operator at 80 times its EBITDA (compared with a stock-exchange valuation before rumours of the deal emerged of the order of 65 times EBITDA), or a premium of EUR 570 million. This contribution, which initially took the form of an irrevocable guaranteed loan, was payable by France Télécom even in the event of failure to obtain the UMTS licence.In addition, as part of a cooperation agreement of which your Rapporteur has become aware, France Télécom undertook to give Mobilcom, without restriction, the financial support necessitated by participation in the bidding mechanism and the development of UMTS activity in Germany ... In return for these commitments, the risks brought by Mobilcom were considerable.
Očitno delež sodelovanja zelo visokega zneska ni bil predmet poglobljenega razmišljanja, čeprav je skrival precejšna tveganja … Marca 2000 je podjetje France Télécom vložil 3,7 milijard EUR za prevzem 28,5 % kapitala, ob oceni operaterja na 80-kratno vrednost EBITDA (v nasprotju z borzno vrednostjo 65 -kratne vrednosti EBITDA pred govoricami o operaterju), v vrednosti premije 570 milijonov EUR. Za ta prinos, ki je imel najprej obliko posojila z nepovratnim jamstvom, je bilo podjetje France Télécom odgovorno tudi v primeru, če ne bi pridobilo licence za UMTS.Poleg tega se je podjetje France Télécom v okviru sporazuma o sodelovanju, s katerim je bil seznanjen vaš poročevalec, zavzel, da bo podjetju Mobilcom, brez vsake omejitve, zagotovilo finančno podporo, ki je nujna zaradi sodelovanja na dražbi in pri razvoju dejavnosti UMTS v Nemčiji … V nasprotju s temi nalogami so bila tveganja podjetja Mobilcoma precejšna.
The business plan drawn up in support of the operation seems to have been highly imperfect.
Finančni načrt, ki je bil izveden s pomočjo zelo nedovršenega postopka.
As regards first of all the development of UMTS, the price of licences was estimated at EUR 2-3 billion, whereas the British auction sales in March and April 2000 highlighted the ongoing licence inflation.
V zvezi z razvojem storitve UMTS so bile cene licenc ocenjene na 2 ali 3 milijarde EUR, medtem ko je potek britanske dražbe marca in aprila 2000 dokazoval inflacijo licenc.
In August 2000, the German licences reached EUR 8,4 billion, and still France Télécom did not think of withdrawing despite having invested two months earlier EUR 43 billion in the acquisition of Orange (emphasis added) ... It was not until the summer of 2002 that two auditing exercises were launched to look into the German operator's prospects. These revealed the company's extreme fragility, the weakness of its customer base and the manifest impossibility of obtaining a return on the investment’.
Avgusta 2000 so nemške licence dosegle 8,4 milijarde EUR, ne da bi podjetje France Télécom pomislil da bi se odrekel obveznosti kljub temu, da je vložil dva meseca prezgodaj 43 milijard EUR v nakup podjetja Orange [podčrtano je dodano] … Pravzaprav je bilo treba čakati na poletje 2002, da bi se izpeljali dve zgoraj omenjeni nalogi o perspektivah nemškega operaterja, ki sta pokazali izredno šibkost podjetja, slabo kakovost strukture strank in nezmožnost, ki se kaže v rentabilnosti vlaganja“.
Commission of enquiry: ‘It should be pointed out, moreover, that, concurrently with this major acquisitions drive [NTL, Mobilcom, Orange], France Télécom was also forging ahead with opportunistic acquisitions which were merely peripheral to its international strategy.
Komisija za preiskave: „Poleg tega želimo spomniti, da je sočasno z iskanjem glavnega lastniškega kapitala [NTL, Mobilcom, Orange] podjetje France Télécom ostalo stanovitno v svojih oportunističnih nakupih, ki so spadali samo na področje dobička iz mednarodnih strategij.
Even if their industrial value was often real, they needlessly increased the operator's exposure to industrial risks and added to its financial commitments ... Once again, even if the investment may have seemed attractive, questions may be asked about its scale (EUR 7,69 billion, to which must be added EUR 1,5 billion for the repurchase option granted to the other party and an investment programme worth EUR 6,7 billion over 7 years, which was, however, supposed to be largely self-financed), at a time when, owing mainly to the acquisition of Orange, the group's financing capacity was very largely saturated (with an indebtedness more than 2,7 times own funds) and when clear signs were appearing of a stock market crisis ... What is one to think, therefore, of Mr Michel Bon's statement before your commission on this transaction: “It would have been preferable to call it off, but it was too late ...”’.
Kljub temu, da je bil njihov industrijski interes pogosto realen, so nepotrebno povečevali izpostavljenost operaterja industrijskim tveganjem in oteževali njegove finančne obveznosti … In kljub temu, da se vlaganje lahko zdi vabljivo, se je treba o njegovi razsežnosti vprašati (7,69 milijard EUR, katerim je treba dodati še 1,5 milijard EUR možnosti odkupa določenega partnerju in program vlaganja za 6,7 milijard EUR v sedmih letih, ki jih mora v veliki večini financirati sam) takrat, kadar so bile zmožnosti financiranja skupine v večinoma zapolnjene, predvsem zaradi nakupa podjetja Orange, (z dolgom 2,7 krat večjim od lastnih sredstev) in kadar so se pojavili jasni znaki borzne krize … O čem razmišljati torej glede na izjave g. Michela Bona pred vašo komisijo o tem poslu: ‚Bilo bi bolje, da se prekine, vendar je bilo že prepozno …‘“.
The TPSA example is enlightening.
Primer TPSA je jasen.
The French operator bid for the historic Polish operator at the time of its privatisation in September 1999.
Francoski operater je kandidiral za nakup prejšnjega poljskega operaterja, ob njegovi privatizaciji septembra 1999.
Commission of enquiry: ‘In July [1999], France Télécom wished to seize the opportunity of penetrating the British market by becoming NTL's reference shareholder.
Komisija za preiskave: „julija [1999] je podjetje France Télécom želelo izkoristiti priložnost za vstop na britanski trg, ko je postal referenčni delničar podjetja NTL.
The plan had a sound industrial justification … In all, the French operator committed EUR 8,122 billion to an investment which, as soon as the Orange repurchase became a real possibility, lost almost all strategic interest and over which, moreover, it had only minority control.
Seveda so bila industrijska dokazila projekta trdna … Francoski operater je podelil naloge za 8,122 milijard EUR za investicijo, ki je od predvidenega odkupa podjetja Orange kmalu izgubila strateško zanimanje in zaradi katere je poleg tega operater izvajal samo manjši nadzor.
The lack of seriousness with which the management seems to have analysed the situation does not cease to astound’.
Površnost, s katero je uprava podjetja analizirala te okoliščine, resnično preseneča“.
‘The Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry denies that Mr Thierry Breton has accepted the chairmanship of France Télécom in place of Mr Michel Bon’.
„Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo, finance in industrijo zanika podatke, po katerih naj bi g. Thierry BRETON sprejel položaj predsednika podjetja FRANCE TELECOM kot zamenjavo za g. Michela BONA“.
Press release of the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance of 12.9.2002, Joint Ministerial Technical Committee.
Sporočilo za javnost ministra za gospodarstvo in finance, z dne 12. septembra 2002, skupni ministrski tehnični odbor.
Press release of the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance of 13.9.2002, Financial situation of France Télécom.
Sporočilo za javnost ministra za gospodarstvo in finance, z dne 13. septembra 2002, Finančna situacija France Télécoma.
‘Moody's changes France Télécom and Orange's outlook to stable from negative and affirms the Baa3 long-term debt ratings and prime-3 short-term rating’, Moody's investors services,13.9.2002.
„Agencija Moody's spremeni perspektivo dolga podjetju France Télécom in podjetju Orange z negativne na stabilno in potrdi oceno Baa3 za dolgoročni dolg ter premijo 3 za kratkoročni dolg“. (Moody’s changes France Télécom and Orange’s outlook to stable from negative and affirms the Baa3 long-term debt ratings and prime-3 short-term rating), Moody’S investors services, September 13, 2002.
The relevant part of the press release states: ‘Moody's have taken increased comfort from the government's statement, which once again confirmed their strong support for FT.
Ustrezni del sporočila za javnost predvideva: „Agencija Moody's je povečala zaupanje zaradi izjave vlade, ki je že enkrat prej potrdila svojo močno podporo podjetju France Télécom.
Whilst Moody's concerns regarding the overall level of financial risk and particularly FT's weak liquidity position remain, Moody's has grown more comfortable with expectation that the French government will act in a supportive manner, if FT started to encounter difficulties with its debt repayment schedule’ (emphasis added).
Kljub zaskrbljenosti agencije Moody's glede splošne ravni finančnega tveganja in zlasti zaradi stanja šibkih okoliščin likvidnosti podjetja FT, je agencija Moody's okrepila zaupanje zaradi pričakovanja podpore francoske vlade podjetju France Télécom, če bi podjetje imelo težave pri povračilu dolga“. ( ‘Moody's have taken increased comfort from the governments statement, which once again confirmed their strong support for FT. Whilst Moody's concerns regarding the overall level of financial risk and particularly FT's weak liquidity position remain, Moody's has grown more comfortable with expectation that the French government will act in a supportive manner, if FT started to encounter difficulties with its debt repayment schedule’.) (podčrtano je dodano)
Press release of the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance of 2.10.2002, France Télécom.
Sporočilo za javnost ministra za gospodarstvo in finance, sreda, 2. oktober 2002, France Télécom.
France Télécom press release of 5.12.2002, p. 1.
Sporočilo javnosti podjetja FT z dne 5. decembra 2002, str. 1.
27 of the French authorities' letter of 3.12.2002.
Pismo francoske vlade z dne 3. decembra 2002, str. 27.
Press release of the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance of 4.12.2002, State support for the action plan approved by France Télécom's board of directors.
Sporočilo ministra za gospodarstvo in finance dne 4. decembra 2002, Podpora države poslovnega načrta, ki ga je odobril upravni odbor podjetja France Télécom.
See also France Télécom's annual report for 2002: ‘On July 29, 2002, France Télécom issued a bond that is only redeemable in STMicroelectronics shares at a rate of 6,75 % and for a total amount of €442 million and maturing on August 6, 2005.
Glej tudi letno poročilo podjetja France Télécom za leto 2002: „Poleg tega je podjetje France Télécom 29. julija 2002 izdal posojilo v obveznicah, obvezno odplačljivo z delnicami ST Microelectronics s stopnjo 6,75 %, v višini 442 milijonov EUR, medtem ko je datum roka plačila 6. avgust 2005.
The rates obtained are indexed on those of the money market, increased by a margin’.
Privzete stopnje so označene s tistimi na denarnem trgu, povišane z maržo“.
AFP, 13.12.2003: ‘France Télécom has launched a new stage in its refinancing plan via the bond market with a EUR 3 billion debenture issue ….
Tiskovna agencija AFP dne 13. januarja 2003: „Podjetje France Télécom bo izdalo nov del svojega načrta za refinanciranje prek trga obveznic s posojilom 3 milijarde EUR […].
The terms will be known before the end of the week’.
Pogoji postopka bodo znani pred koncem tedna“.
According to an article in the Financial Times of 15.1.2003: ‘FT will today settle investor doubt about its cash flow situation in 2003 by raising €5,5 billion in the bond market … It would now have all the cash it needs to honour €15 billion of debts that falls due for repayment this year … FT also faces €35 billion of debt repayments in 2004 and 2005’.
Povzeto po članku iz britanskega dnevnika Financial Times, dne 15. januarja 2003: „Podjetje FT bo danes razpršilo dvome vlagateljev o stanju blagajne z dvigom 5,5 milijard EUR na trgu z obveznicami. […] V prihodnosti bo imel tako vsa potrebna denarna sredstva za poravnavo dolga 15 milijard EUR, ki poteče to leto […] Podjetje FT se mora prav tako soočiti z dolgom 35 milijard EUR v letu 2004 in 2005“. ( ‘FT will today settle investor doubt about its cash flow situation in 2003 by raising €5,5 billion in the bond market. […] It would now have all the cash it needs to honor €15 billion of debts that falls due for repayment this year […] FT also faces €35 billion of debt repayments in 2004 and 2005’.)
Research France Télécom, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS DIRECT, 17.12.2002: ‘Since July 2002, support from the French state has been a key rating factor, underpinning the group's investment-grade status’.
Research France Télécom, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGSDIRECT, 17 december 2002: „Od julija 2002 je bila podpora francoske vlade ključni dejavnik ocene družbe in jo ohranjala na ravni vlaganja“. ( ‘Since July 2002, support from the French state has been a key rating factor, underpinning the group’s investment-grade status’.) (podčrtano je dodano).
(emphasis added).
To potrdilo sledi tistemu z dne 5. decembra „Službe za ocenjevanje agencije Standard&Poor so danes izjavile, da potrjujejo dolgoročno oceno BBB- podjetja FT in kratkoročno oceno A-3. Od julija 2002 je agencija Standard & Poor označila, da je pričakovana podpora od delničarja s 56 % podjetja FT, francoske vlade, dejavnik, ki verjetno pospešuje kakovost vlaganja družbe.
This statement follows that of 5 December: ‘Standard & Poor's rating services said today that it has affirmed its BBB- long term and A-3 short term corporate credit ratings [on FT] … Since July 2002 Standard & Poor's has indicated that expected support from FT's 56 % shareholder, the French State, is a likely factor underpinning the group's investment–grade status.
Današnje obvestilo države, ki je takoj podelilo delničarsko posojilo 9 milijard EUR kot pomoč podjetju FT, da se sooči z roki v letu 2003, agencija Standard & Poor obravnava kot trden dokaz o njeni podpori“. ( ‘Standard & Poor’s rating services said today that it has affirmed its BBB- long term and A-3 short term corporate credit ratings [on FT] … Since July 2002 Standard & Poor’s has indicated that expected support from FT’s 56 % shareholder, the French State, is a likely factor underpinning the group investments–grade status.
The French State's announcement today that it will immediately grant a €9 billion shareholder loan to help FT face its 2003 debt obligations is viewed by Standard & Poor's as strong evidence of this support’ (Standard & Poor ' s, 5.12.2002) (emphasis added).
The French State’s announcement today that it will immediately grant a 9€ billion shareholder loan to help FT face its 2003 debt obligations is viewed by Standard & Poor’s as strong evidence of this support’.) (Standard & Poor’s, 5. december 2002) (podčrtano je dodano)
Research France Télécom, Standard & poor's ratings direct,17.12.2002: ‘The state's December 2002 announcement that it will grant a €9 billion shareholder loan, coupled with its commitment to subscribe to a €15 billion capital increase, underscores this support and provides significant credit protection for FT's debtholders.
Research France Télécom, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGSDIRECT, 17. december 2002: ‘The state's December 2002 announcement that it will grant a €9 billion shareholder loan, coupled with its commitment to subscribe to a €15 billion capital increase, underscores this support and provides significant credit protection for FT's debtholders.
While market conditions may challenge the operation, the state's commitment to subscribe to the equity injection — so as to at least maintain its stake — strongly mitigates execution risks’.
While market conditions may challenge the operation, the state's commitment to subscribe to the equity injection–so as to at least maintain its stake–strongly mitigates execution risks’.
In its analysis of the Company's fundamentals, the latter agency took into account (i) the fact that France Télécom was the largest French fixed and mobile telephony operator; (ii) the possible privatisation of the Company (‘FT's path from Government Entity to Private Corporation’; (iii) in the section entitled ‘Government seen As Supportive’, the fact that ‘the French government has consistently stated its support for FT and its willingness to provide financial support if required, thereby addressing potential liquidity concerns.
V analizi osnov podjetja ta agencija obravnava (i) podjetje FT kot največjega francoskega operaterja fiksne in mobilne telefonije in (ii) možnost privatizacije podjetja ‘FT’s path from Governement Entity to Private Corporation’; (iii) – v oddelku „Governement seen As Supportive‘ – dejstvo: ’Francoska vlada je v nadaljevanju potrdila svojo podporo podjetju France Télécom in namero, da zagotovi finančno podporo, če je potrebno, za ublažitev možnih težav z likvidnostjo. Ta podpora je bila predstavljena z določitvijo, s strani ERAP-a, kreditne linije 9 milijard EUR za podjetje France Télécom, za obdobje 18 mesecev, vključno z obrestmi, vendar odplačljivo samo z delnicami podjetja France Télécom. Moody's vključuje tudi podporo države v oceno Baa3“.
(emphasis added) This support has been evidenced by ERAP's providing a €9 billion loan facility to FT, which pays cash interest, but is only repayable in FT's equity, upon maturity in 18 months time … Moody's factors government support into the Baaa3 rating’.
‘The French government has consistently stated its support for FT and its willingness to provide financial support if required, thereby addressing potential liquidity concerns. (podčrtano je dodano) This support has been evidenced by ERAP’s providing a €9 billion loan facility to FT, which pays cash interest, but is only repayable in FT’s equity, upon maturity in 18 months time […]. Moody’s factors governement support into the Baaa3 rating’.)
(emphasis added); and (iv) in the section entitled ‘Risks/weaknesses’, the fact that ‘the financial risk of the highly leveraged FT is not commensurate with investment grade (compensated by strong operational performance/implicit support of French government)’.
(podčrtano je dodano); (iv) – v oddelku ‘risks/weaknesses section’ – dejstvo: „finančno tveganje precejšne zadolženosti podjetja France Télécom ne ustreza kakovosti vlaganja (ki je nadomeščena z dobro operativno učinkovitostjo in obsežno podporo francoske vlade“.