natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Another factor was that the Land made its contribution available to Helaba without any possibility of withdrawal on its part, i.e. for unlimited duration.
Še en dejavnik je dejstvo, da dežela Hessen vložek daje na razpolago Helabi brez možnosti za odpoved s svoje strani, torej za neomejeno obdobje.
Although a shareholder could not ‘withdraw’ his share capital, he was nevertheless free to decide to sell his shares and invest elsewhere.
Delničar sicer ne more svojega delniškega kapitala „odpovedati“, lahko pa se svobodno odloči, da delnice proda in jih naloži drugam.
Regardless of the details of the legal form, there was no such transferability in this instance if only because at all events there was virtually no market for a capital investment of this size and of unlimited duration.
Ne glede na podrobnosti pravne oblike tu ne gre za tako prenosljivost že zaradi tega, ker v vsakem primeru trg za vlogo kapitala v takem obsegu in za neomejeno obdobje praktično ne obstaja.
Private investors, by contrast, usually kept open the possibility of withdrawing their capital again in the event of persistently bad results and of investing again more profitability.
Po drugi strani pa zasebni vlagatelji ponavadi pustijo odprto možnost za ponoven dvig svojega kapitala v primeru trajno slabih rezultatov in za donosnejšo naložbo.
A private investor would — if at all — accept the permanent tying of risk capital only in return for a correspondingly high yield.
Zasebni vlagatelj bi trajno vezavo rizičnega kapitala sprejel morda le v zameno za primerno velik donos.
The form of capital transfer opted for here was therefore a normal share capital investment, for which a market-economy investor would expect a corresponding yield.
Oblika vloge kapitala, izbrana v tem primeru, je torej običajna naložba v osnovni kapital, za katero bi vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu pričakoval primeren donos.
In particular, it was not sufficient to take account of the unlimited term merely through a premium on the basic yield, determined for comparison purposes, on a silent partnership contribution of limited duration.
Zlasti ni dovolj, da se neomejeno trajanje upošteva le s pribitkom na osnovno stopnjo donosa, določeno za namene primerjave za (omejen) vložek tihe družbe.
The following two tables showed the essential differences between Helaba's ‘silent partnership contribution’ and other forms of equity capital available at the time of the investment:
Naslednji preglednici prikazujeta bistvene razlike med „vložkom tihe družbe“ v primeru Helaba in drugimi oblikami osnovnega kapitala, ki so bile na razpolago v času naložbe:
Helaba's ‘silent partner-ship contribution’
„Vložek tihe družbe“ Helaba
Silent partner-ship
Tiha udeležba
Preference shares
Neglasovalne prednostne delnice
Profit participation rights
Pravice za udeležbo pri dobičku
Availability on the German market in 1998
Razpoložljivost na nemškem trgu leta 1998
Status for banking supervisory purposes
Kakovost glede na bančno nadzorstvo
Core capital only under certain conditions and 15 % limit
Temeljni kapital le pod določenimi pogoji in mejo 15 %
Additional capital
Dodatni kapital
Additional capital subject to special conditions
Dodatni kapital pod posebnimi pogoji
Additional capital or core capital with 15 % limit
Dodatni kapital ali temeljni kapital z mejo 15 %
Helaba's ‘silent partnership contribution’
„Vložek tihe družbe“ Helaba
Silent partnership
Tiha udeležba
Usability for large volumes
Uporabnost za velike obsege
Unlimited duration
Neomejeno trajanje
Investor has no right of withdrawal
Vlagatelj nima pravice odpovedi
Participation in current losses
Udeležba pri tekočih izgubah
Repayment in insolvency proceedings, by creditor
Vračilo v postopku insolventnosti na zahtevo upnika
No internal ‘junior-ranking nature’ compared with share capital
Ni notranje „podrejenosti“ v primerjavi z osnovnim kapitalom
Repayment before share capital
Vračilo pred osnovnim kapitalom
Profit-share remuneration
Nadomestilo, sorazmerno z dobičkom
No subsequent payment in the event of absence of remuneration
Ni doplačila v primeru izpada nadomestila
Cumulative subsequent payment possible
Ne Kumulativno doplačilo možno
TAX DEDUCTIBILITY
ODBITNA POSTAVKA
The BdB doubts that the profit share of the Land of Hessen is tax deductible as operating expenditure.
BdB dvomi, da je delež dežele Hessen pri dobičku odbitna postavka kot strošek poslovanja.
In its view, it was to be assumed that the Land of Hessen was incurring a substantial business risk with the silent partnership contribution.
Domneva, da se Hessen z vložkom tihe družbe izpostavlja znatnemu poslovnemu tveganju.
This was evident not only from the size of the capital investment, but also from the fact that the participation was not withdrawable.
To potrjuje ne samo obseg kapitalske vloge temveč tudi neodpovedljivost udeležbe.
This business risk justified the existence of a partnership (so-called atypical silent partnership), the ranking of the silent partnership contribution for tax purposes as partnership equity capital and the non-deductibility of the silent partner's profit share as operating expenditure on the part of Helaba.
To poslovno tveganje upravičuje obstoj partnerstva (t.i. neznačilne tihe družbe), davčno opredelitev vložka tihe družbe kot lastni kapital partnerstva in dejstvo, da delež tihega družbenika pri dobičku ni odbitna postavka kot strošek poslovanja Helabe.
MINIMUM REMUNERATION FOR A SHARE-CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN A LANDESBANK
NAJMANJŠE NADOMESTILO ZA NALOŽBO V OSNOVNI KAPITAL DEŽELNE BANKE
The BdB argues that all methods of determining an appropriate remuneration (return) for the provision of equity capital start from a risk-free return and add a risk premium.
BdB trdi, da vse metode za določitev ustreznega nadomestila (donosa) za razpoložljiv lastni kapital izhajajo iz netveganega donosa in vključujejo premijo tveganja.
They can be traced back to the following basic principle:
Te metode se lahko pojasnijo po naslednjem temeljnem načelu:
= risk-free return + risk premium for the high-risk investment
= netvegan donos + premija tveganja za tvegano naložbo
To derive the risk premium, the BdB first works out the ‘market risk premium’, i.e. the difference between the long-term average return on shares and that on government bonds.
BdB za izpeljavo premije tveganja najprej določi tako imenovano premijo tržnega tveganja, torej razliko med povprečnim dolgoročnim donosom na delnice in na državne obveznice.
For the German share market, the BdB assumes, on the basis of a study by Stehle-Hartmond (1991), a uniform long-term market risk premium of 4,6 %.
Za nemški delniški trg BdB na podlagi študije Stehle-Hartmond (1991) izhaja iz enotne dolgoročne premije tržnega tveganja v višini 4,6 %.
The BdB then determines the beta value for the Landesbanks, i.e. the individual risk premium for the banks, on the basis of which the general market risk premium was to be adjusted.
BdB v drugem koraku določi beta vrednost za deželne banke, t.j. posamezno premijo tveganja bank, kateri se mora prilagoditi splošna premija tržnega tveganja.
The BdB stated that it had determined the beta values statistically, which means that it had estimated them on the basis of a historical data sample.
Po navedbah BdB so se beta vrednosti določile statistično, kar pomeni, da so se ocenile na podlagi vzorca preteklih podatkov.
The BdB concludes that all the beta values for all the Landesbanks and periods considered are greater than one.
BdB ugotavlja, da so vse beta vrednosti za vse deželne banke in obravnavana obdobja večja kot ena.
The BdB therefore calculates the expected minimum remuneration for an investment in the share capital of Helaba to be 11,66 % a year at the time when the promotion-related assets were transferred on 31 December 1998.
Po izračunih BdB pričakovano najmanjše nadomestilo za naložbo v osnovni kapital Helabe v času prenosa sredstev za pospeševanje dne 31. decembra 1998 znaša 11,66 % letno.
The BdB notes that the Commission's deduction in its decision on WestLB of 4,2 % from the minimum remuneration of 12 % to take account of the lack of liquidity of the Wfa assets was upheld by the Court of First Instance.
BdB ugotavlja, da je Sodišče prve stopnje potrdilo odbitek 4,2 % od najmanjšega nadomestila 12 % zaradi manjkajoče likvidnosti sredstev Wfa, ki ga je Komisija določila v Odločbi glede WestLB.
It therefore sees no reason to depart from this method in the present case, with the result that a deduction for liquidity should also be made here.
Zato ne vidi nobenega razloga za odstopanje od te metode v zadevnih primerih; tudi tu se opravi odbitek zaradi manjkajoče likvidnosti.
The liquidity deduction would be calculated for Helaba on the basis of a gross refinancing rate of 6,57 % a year (corresponding to the long-term risk-free base rate at the time of the transfer in 1998), to which the overall tax rate should be applied to obtain the net refinancing rate.
Odbitek zaradi manjkajoče likvidnosti se za Helabo izračuna na podlagi bruto obrestne mere refinanciranja 6,57 % letno (ki ustreza dolgoročni netvegani temeljni obrestni meri v času prenosa leta 1998), na kateri se uporabi takrat veljavna skupna davčna stopnja za izračun neto obrestne mere refinanciranja.
In the BdB's view, three aspects of the transfer increase its risk compared with a ‘normal share capital investment’: the in part exceptionally high volume of assets transferred, the failure to issue new shares in the company and the related forgoing of additional voting rights, and the lack of fungibility of the investment, i.e. the impossibility of withdrawing the invested capital from the company again at any time.
BdB meni, da so trije vidiki prenosa razlog za povečanje njegovega tveganja glede na „običajno naložbo v osnovni kapital“: v določeni meri izredno visok obseg prenesenih sredstev, neizdaja novih delnic v družbi in s tem povezana odpoved dodatnim glasovalnim pravicam ter nezadostna tržnost vloge, t.j. nemožnost, da bi se vložen kapital kadar koli dvignil iz podjetja.
The BdB considers a premium of at least 1,5 % a year justified here in line with the WestLB methodology.
BdB spoznava pribitek v višini najmanj 1,5 % letno za upravičenega glede na metodologijo WestLB.
CAPITAL BASE AND ELEMENTS OF REMUNERATION
KAPITALSKA OSNOVA IN DELI NADOMESTILA
The BdB stresses firstly that, in calculating the appropriate remuneration in the case of Helaba, the total amount which was recognised as core capital for underpinning competitive business should be taken as the basis and not solely the actually used or usable part.
BdB najprej poudarja, da mora biti pri izračunu primernega nadomestila v primeru Helaba osnova skupni znesek, priznan kot temeljni kapital za kritje konkurenčnih dejavnosti, in ne zgolj dejansko uporabljen ali uporaben del.
The calculation of the remuneration in the period 1998 to 2002 on the basis of tranches rising in annual steps had been justified not as a discount because of the fact that the transferred capital had not been ‘split up’ or by the fact that transfer ‘en bloc’ to Helaba would have had the effect of imposing a burden on it.
Izračun nadomestila v obdobju med 1998 in 2002 na podlagi letno naraščajočih tranš ni bil upravičen kot odbitek zaradi dejstva, da vložen kapital ni bil „razdeljen“, ali dejstva, da bi enkratna vloga za Helabo pomenila breme.
Even if the capital transfer was perhaps not necessary to meet solvability criteria, it had nevertheless considerably increased Helaba's equity capital base and had allowed a strong expansion in its competitive activity.
Tudi če vloga kapitala morda ni bi bila potrebna za izpolnitev zahtev glede solventnosti, je vseeno znatno povečala obseg lastnega kapitala Helabe in omogočila veliko razširitev njenih konkurenčnih dejavnosti.
A market-economy investor would therefore require a full remuneration on the entire amount on the basis of its recognition as liable equity capital.
Vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu bi torej zahteval neomejeno nadomestilo za celoten znesek na podlagi njegovega priznanja kot rizični lastni kapital.
The 0,3 % a year guarantee commission (Haftungsprovision) applied by the Commission in its WestLB decision, which it calculated by comparing the amount of capital with a guarantee, had to be charged for the part of the transferred core capital that could not be used to underpin competitive business.
Provizija za jamstvo v višini 0,3 % letno, ki jo je Komisija uporabila v Odločbi glede WestLB, izračunala pa jo je s primerjavo zneska kapitala z jamstvom, se mora naložiti za tisti del vloženega temeljnega kapitala, ki se ne more uporabljati za kritje konkurenčnih dejavnosti.
Only the guarantee commission (Haftungsprovision) and the perpetuity premium (Permanenzzuschlag) could be taken into account as components of the remuneration.
Kot dela nadomestila se lahko upoštevata le provizija za jamstvo (Haftungsprovision) in pribitek za trajnost (Permanenzzuschlag).
Trade tax, most of which went not to the Land at all, but to the municipality, was not a part of the remuneration.
Obratovalni davek, ki se večinoma sploh ne odvaja deželi Hessen, temveč občini, ni del nadomestila.
It was a charge imposed by law, stemming from tax-related circumstances that were independent of the intentions of the parties.
Gre za zakonsko naloženo obremenitev, ki neodvisno od namena strank izhaja iz davčnega položaja.
Lastly, the return was paid not to the Land of Hessen, but — after deduction of capital yield tax — ‘allocated as a net amount to the special fund’.
Nazadnje pa se donos ne izplačuje deželi Hessen, temveč se – po odbitku davka od kapitalskega donosa – „kot neto znesek odvaja v posebni sklad“.
Since Helaba was the (sole) owner of the special fund, it was in reality paying itself.
Ker je Helaba (edina) lastnica posebnega sklada, v resnici izplačuje sama sebi.
A private investor would not have accepted this as a return for his investment.
Vlagatelj v tržnem gospodarstvu tega ne bi sprejel kot izravnavo za svojo naložbo.
COMMENTS FROM THE LAND OF NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA AND WESTLB
PRIPOMBE DEŽELE SEVERNO PORENJE-VESTFALIJA IN WESTLB
On 30 October 2003, Germany forwarded a response from the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia and WestLB to the Commission's decision of 13 November 2002 to initiate proceedings in which they disputed the statement that the assets transferred to the Landesbanks could be compared to share capital.
Nemčija je 30. oktobra 2003 posredovala odgovor na sklep Komisije o začetku preiskovalnega postopka z dne 13. novembra 2002, v katerem Severno Porenje-Vestfalija in NordLB izpodbijata trditev, da so sredstva, prenesena na deželne banke, primerljiva z osnovnim kapitalom.
They added that remuneration for an investment depended not on how it was classified by the banking supervisory authorities, but on its risk profile.
Nadomestilo zato ne temelji na tem, kako organi za bančni nadzor razvrščajo naložbo, temveč na njenem profilu tveganja.
Since the assets were junior-ranking, the risk pattern had more in common with silent partnership contributions or ‘perpetuals’ than with share-capital investments.
Ker so sredstva v podrejenem položaju, je struktura tveganja bolj primerljiva z vložki tihe družbe ali tako imenovanimi perpetuali kot z naložbami v osnovni kapital.
WestLB had no objections to the CAPM method for calculating the minimum remuneration for a share-capital investment, but it felt that the beta values determined by the BdB — at well over one — were inappropriate.
Kar zadeva izračun najmanjšega nadomestila za naložbo v osnovni kapital, se WestLB strinja z metodo CAPM. Vendar pa beta vrednosti, določene s strani BdB, ki so znatno večje od 1, niso primerne.
A beta factor of more than one meant that a company's shares represented a higher risk than the market as a whole.
Beta faktor, ki je večji od 1, namreč pomeni, da delnice podjetja predstavljajo večje tveganje kot celotni trg.
Moreover, in the specific case of the Landesbanks, it was a mistake to use as a benchmark the return expected at the time that the assets were transferred to the banks.
Poleg tega je v posebnem primeru deželnih bank napačno kot merilo uporabiti donos, pričakovan ob prenosu sredstev na deželne banke. Ta pristop je sicer načeloma v zvezi z merili za zasebne naložbe smiseln.
As regards the discount for the lack of liquidity of the transferred assets, WestLB and the Land of North Rhine -Westphalia considered that the rate for risk-free government bonds should be deducted in full from the basic return.
Kar zadeva odbitek zaradi manjkajoče likvidnosti prenesenih sredstev, sta WestLB in dežela Severno Porenje-Vestfalija mnenja, da se mora stopnja za netvegane državne obveznice v celoti odbiti od osnovne stopnje donosa.
Lastly, the fact that the assets' lack of liquidity did not pose a risk to the liquidity position should be seen as reducing the risk — and hence the remuneration.
Nazadnje pa se mora dejstvo, da manjkajoča likvidnost sredstev ne ogroža stanja likvidnosti, obravnavati kot znižanje tveganja – in s tem nadomestila.
This should be taken into account by applying a corresponding deduction.
To se mora upoštevati z ustreznim odbitkom.
Likewise, a discount should be granted on account of the ‘owner effect’ since an investor who already owned shares in a company took a different view of an additional investment from that of a new investor.
Prav tako se mora opraviti odbitek zaradi tako imenovanega lastniškega učinka, saj vlagatelj, ki že ima svoj delež v podjetju, dodatne naložbe vrednoti drugače kot nov vlagatelj.
V. GERMANY'S RESPONSE TO THE BDB'S COMMENTS
V. ODZIV NEMČIJE NA PRIPOMBE BDB
In Germany's view, the BdB was not successful in its attempt to reinterpret the silent partnership contribution as a share capital investment, nor was it able to raise doubts as to the appropriateness of the remuneration which was agreed and paid to the Land of Hessen.
Po mnenju Nemčije združenju BdB ni uspelo pretvoriti vložka tihe družbe v naložbo v osnovni kapital, prav tako pa ni vzbudilo dvoma glede primernosti dogovorjenega in deželi Hessen izplačanega nadomestila.
In Germany's view, therefore, there was no aid.
Torej tu ne gre za pomoč.
In Germany's view, there was no justification, in calculating the remuneration, for taking the roundabout approach of calculating the remuneration on a fictitious share capital investment.
Nemčija pri izračunu nadomestila ne upravičuje posrednega izračuna nadomestila za dozdevno naložbo v osnovni kapital.
The Land of Hessen had from the outset transferred its housing-promotion assets as a silent partnership contribution to the bank.
Dežela Hessen že od vsega začetka prenaša na banko sredstva za pospeševanje gradnje stanovanj kot vložek tihe družbe.
What was involved was therefore a financing instrument which was defined in company, tax and banking supervision law and which differed fundamentally from a share capital investment, in which the Land was not interested and which the owners of the bank did not want.
Pri tem gre za finančni instrument, opredeljen v smislu prava družb, davčnega prava in prava bančnega nadzorstva, ki se bistveno razlikuje od naložbe v osnovni kapital, ki dežele Hessen ni zanimala in je lastniki banke niti niso hoteli.
The BdB ignored important differences between share capital and silent partnership contributions and tried to identify non-existent differences between ‘normal’ silent partnership contributions and the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen.
Združenje BdB zanemarja pomembno razliko med osnovnim kapitalom in vložki tihe družbe, sklicuje pa se na neobstoječe razlike med „običajnimi“ vložki tihe družbe in vložkom tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen.
The BdB essentially argued that silent partnerships were of only limited duration or could be withdrawn and consequently, in accordance with the principles of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, were recognised as core capital only up to 15 % of the entire core capital of a credit institution.
BdB predvsem trdi, da so tihe udeležbe časovno omejene in se lahko odpovedo in so torej v skladu z Baselskim odborom za bančni nadzor priznane kot temeljni kapital le do 15 % celotnega temeljnega kapitala kreditne institucije.
Since the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen had been made available to Helaba without any time limit and was not covered by the 15 % limit and therefore did not represent a ‘normal’ silent partnership contribution, but functionally represented share capital, the criterion in assessing the remuneration should not be other silent partnership contributions or other innovative capital instruments, but share capital investments.
Ker je vložek tihe družbe s strani dežele Hessen Helabi na razpolago brez časovne omejitve in ni pod mejo 15 % in torej ne predstavlja „običajnega“ vložka tihe družbe temveč funkcionalni osnovni kapital, merilo za izračun nadomestila ne smejo biti drugi vložki tihe družbe ali drugi inovativni instrumenti kapitala temveč naložbe v osnovni kapital.
This core argument on which the BdB was relying was, for a number of reasons, erroneous.
Ta glavna trditev BdB je iz več razlogov napačna.
For example, limited duration or withdrawability were not a necessary and indispensable feature of silent partnerships either under company law or under banking supervision law.
Omejeno trajanje ali odpovedljivost v smislu prava družb ali bančnega nadzorstva ni obvezna in neizbežna značilnost tihih udeležb.
Conversely, share capital was not necessarily of unlimited duration and unwithdrawable.
Po drugi strani pa osnovni kapital ni nujno časovno neomejen ali neodpovedljiv.
Under German company law, rather, all companies irrespective of their legal form could be set up for a limited period or it could be agreed that a contribution could be withdrawn subject to notice, which did not stand in the way of its recognition as core capital under German banking supervision law.
Po nemškem pravu družb se lahko namreč vse družbe ne glede na svojo pravno obliko ustanovijo za omejeno obdobje ali dogovorijo za odpovedljivost vloge, kar ni v nasprotju s priznanjem vložka kot temeljni kapital v skladu z nemškim pravom bančnega nadzorstva.
The BdB was also wrong in arguing that the 15 % limit for recognition as core capital under international banking supervision law did not, under the ‘Sydney declaration’ of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the practice of the Germany supervisory authority based on it, apply to permanent capital instruments, which could be withdrawn only on the initiative of the issuer (but not of the investor).
BdB napačno trdi tudi, da se meja 15 % za priznavanje kot temeljni kapital po mednarodnem pravu bančnega nadzorstva v skladu s „Sydneyjsko izjavo“ Baselskega odbora za bančni nadzor in na njej temelječo prakso nemškega nadzornega organa ne uporablja za trajne instrumente kapitala, ki se lahko odpovedo le na pobudo izdajatelja (in ne vlagatelja).
Furthermore, the practice of the German supervisory authority was now based on the assumption that a contribution with a term of at least 30 years and the explicit exclusion of withdrawal was made available to the investor on a ‘permanent’ basis and consequently did not come under the 15 % limit.
Poleg tega praksa nemškega nadzornega organa zdaj temelji na domnevi, da je tudi vložek z obdobjem trajanja najmanj 30 let in izrecno neodpovedljivostjo vlagatelju na razpolago „trajno“ in zato ne pade pod mejo 15 %.
This too showed that the difference between contributions of limited and unlimited duration was by no means as great as the BdB was arguing.
Tudi to dokazuje, da razlika med vložki omejenega in neomejenega trajanja nikakor ni tako velika, kot trdi BdB.
As far as the appropriate remuneration was concerned, there was no cause or justification on this account for reinterpreting silent partnership contributions as share capital.
Zaradi tega, kar zadeva primerno nadomestilo, ni razloga ali opravičila za pretvorbo vložkov tihe družbe v osnovni kapital.
Only a few months after Helaba, the Deutsche Bank had taken up a ‘permanent’ contribution in the form of ‘perpetuals’, and had done so on the capital market.
Le nekaj mesecev po primeru Helaba je Deutsche Bank sprejela „trajni“ vložek v obliki „perpetualov“ in sicer na trgu kapitala.