natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP
Skupni ukrep Sveta 2006/418/SZVP
on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
o podpori dejavnostim MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje
On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation and which need to be taken both within the EU and in third countries.
Evropski svet je 12. decembra 2003 sprejel Strategijo EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje, ki v Poglavju III opredeljuje ukrepe zoper njegovo širjenje, te pa je treba sprejeti tako v EU kot tudi v tretjih državah.
The EU is actively implementing this Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
EU to strategijo dejavno izvaja in uveljavlja ukrepe iz Poglavja III, in sicer zlasti s sproščanjem finančnih sredstev, namenjenih podpori za posebne projekte, ki jih izvajajo večstranske institucije, kakršna je tudi Mednarodna agencija za atomsko energijo (MAAE).
On 17 November 2003 the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP [1] on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery.
Svet je 17. novembra 2003 sprejel Skupno stališče 2003/805/SZVP [1] o vsesplošni uporabi in krepitvi multilateralnih sporazumov na področju neširjenja orožja za množično uničevanje in njegovih nosilcev.
That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the European Union to work towards making the Additional Protocol and comprehensive safeguards agreements the standard for the IAEA verification system.
V omenjenem skupnem stališču se med drugim poziva k pospeševanju sklenitve celovitih sporazumov o nadzornih ukrepih in dodatnih protokolov z MAAE, Evropsko unijo pa se obvezuje, da deluje tako, da bodo dodatni protokoli in celoviti sporazumi o nadzornih ukrepih postali merilo sistema preverjanja MAAE.
On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP [2] on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Svet je 17. maja 2004 sprejel Skupni ukrep 2004/495/SZVP [2] o podpori dejavnostim MAAE po Načrtu za jedrsko varnost in v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje.
On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP [3] on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Svet je 18. julija 2005 sprejel Skupni ukrep 2004/574/SZVP [3] o podpori dejavnostim MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje.
As far as the EU is concerned, the Council adopted on 22 December 2003 Directive 2003/122/Euratom [4] on the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources, the strengthening of the control of high activity radioactive sources in all third countries, in accordance with the G-8 statement and Action Plan on securing radioactive sources, remains an important objective to be pursued.
Kar zadeva EU, je Svet 22. decembra 2003 sprejel Direktivo 2003/122/Euratom [4] o nadzoru visoko-aktivnih zaprtih radioaktivnih virov in virov neznanega izvora; pomemben cilj ostaja krepitev nadzora nad visoko-aktivnimi radioaktivnimi viri sevanja v vseh tretjih državah v skladu z izjavo in Akcijskim načrtom G-8 o varovanju radioaktivnih virov.
In July 2005, States Parties and the European Atomic Energy Community agreed by consensus to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) with a view to expanding the scope to encompass nuclear material and facilities in peaceful domestic use and storage, as well as in transport, and will oblige States Parties to put violations under criminal sanctions.
Julija 2005 so se države pogodbenice in Evropska skupnost za atomsko energijo soglasno dogovorile o spremembi Konvencije o fizičnem varovanju jedrskega materiala CPPNM, tako da bo področje njene uporabe zajemalo tudi jedrski material in objekte pri miroljubni domači uporabi in skladiščenju ter pri transportu, države pogodbenice pa bodo za kršitve morale predvideti kazenske sankcije.
In September 2005, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) was opened for signature.
Od septembra 2005 je na voljo za podpis Mednarodna konvencija za preprečevanje jedrskega terorizma (Konvencija o jedrskem terorizmu).
Once entered into force, it will require States Parties to enact legislation to criminalise these offences.
Ko bo začela veljati, bo države podpisnice obvezovala, da uveljavijo zakonodajo, s katero bodo te kršitve inkriminirane.
The IAEA pursues the same objectives as set out in Recitals (3) to (8).
MAAE sledi enakim ciljem, kakor so navedeni v uvodnih izjavah od (3) do (8).
This is done through the implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan which is financed through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund,
Zanje si prizadeva z izvajanjem svojega Načrta za jedrsko varnost, ki se financira iz prostovoljnih prispevkov v Sklad za jedrsko varnost MAAE –
For the purposes of giving immediate and practical implementation to some elements of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU shall support the IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification in order to further the following objectives:
Zaradi takojšnjega in praktičnega izvajanja nekaterih elementov Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje, EU podpre dejavnosti MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja, in sicer v podporo naslednjim ciljem:
to work towards the universalisation of international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol,
čim bolj vsesplošni uporabi mednarodnih instrumentov na področju neširjenja in jedrske varnosti, vključno s celovitimi sporazumi o nadzornih ukrepih in Dodatnim protokolom;
to enhance the protection of proliferation-sensitive materials and equipment and the relevant technology, provide legislative and regulatory assistance in the area of nuclear security and safeguards,
izboljšanju zaščite materiala in opreme ter ustrezne tehnologije, ki bi lahko postali predmet širjenja, zagotavljanju zakonodajne in upravne pomoči na področju jedrske varnosti in nadzornih ukrepov;
to strengthen the detection of and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radio-active materials.
izboljšanju odkrivanja nedovoljenega prometa z jedrskimi in drugimi radioaktivnimi snovmi ter odzivanja nanj.
The projects of the IAEA, corresponding to measures of the EU Strategy, are the projects which aim at:
Projekti MAAE, ki ustrezajo ukrepom iz Strategije EU, imajo naslednje cilje:
strengthening national legislative and regulatory infrastructures for the implementation of relevant international instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol,
okrepitev nacionalne zakonodajne in ureditvene infrastrukture za izvajanje mednarodnih instrumentov na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja, vključno s celovitimi sporazumi o varnostnih ukrepih in Dodatnim protokolom;
assisting States in strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radio-active materials,
pomoč državam pri krepitvi varnosti jedrskih in drugih radioaktivnih snovi ter nadzora nad njimi;
strengthening States' capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radio-active materials.
okrepitev zmogljivosti držav za odkrivanje nedovoljenega prometa z jedrskim in drugim radioaktivnim snovmi ter za odzivanje nanj.
These projects will be carried out in countries needing assistance in these areas after an initial assessment carried out by an expert team.
Ti projekti se bodo po prvotni oceni, ki jo bo izvedla skupina strokovnjakov, izvajali v državah, ki potrebujejo pomoč na teh področjih.
The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR), shall be responsible for the implementation of this Joint Action.
Za izvajanje tega skupnega ukrepa je odgovorno predsedstvo, ki mu pomaga generalni sekretar/visoki predstavnik za SZVP (GS/VP).
The Commission shall be fully associated to this task.
Komisija je v celoti vključena v to nalogo.
The Commission shall supervise the proper implementation of the financial contribution referred to in Article 3.
Komisija nadzira pravilnost uporabe finančnega prispevka iz člena 3.
The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be entrusted to the IAEA, which shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the Presidency and under the control of the SG/HR.
Tehnično izvajanje projekta iz člena 1(2) se zaupa MAAE, ki svoje naloge opravlja pod pristojnostjo predsedstva in pod nadzorom GS/VP.
For this purpose, the SG/HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the IAEA.
V ta namen se GS/VP po potrebi dogovarja z MAAE.
The choice of the beneficiaries and actions shall be made, on the basis of the initial assessment referred to in Article 1(2), by the implementing entity.
Upravičenke in ukrepe izbere izvajalec na podlagi prvotne ocene iz člena 1(2).
Member States and the Commission will be consulted in the framework of the competent Council working group.
Posvetovanja z državami članicami in Komisijo bodo potekala v okviru pristojne delovne skupine Sveta.
The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 6995000.
Referenčni finančni znesek za izvajanje projektov iz člena 1(2) znaša 6995000 EUR.
The management of the expenditure financed by the general budget of the European Union specified in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the procedures and rules of the Community applying to budget matters with the proviso that any pre financing shall not remain the property of the Community.
Pri upravljanju odhodkov, financiranih iz splošnega proračuna Evropske unije, kakor je opredeljeno v odstavku 1, veljajo postopki in pravila Skupnosti, ki se uporabljajo za proračunske zadeve, s tem da kakršno koli pred-financiranje ne ostane v lasti Skupnosti.
For the purpose of implementing the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall conclude a specific financing agreement with the IAEA in accordance with the Regulations and Rules of the IAEA.
Za namene izvrševanja odhodkov iz odstavka 1 Komisija sklene poseben dogovor o financiranju z MAAE v skladu s predpisi in pravili MAAE.
It shall stipulate that the IAEA shall ensure visibility of the EU contribution, appropriate to its size.
S tem dogovorom se določi, da MAAE poskrbi za vidnost prispevka EU, ustrezno njegovemu obsegu.
The Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the basis of regular reports prepared by the IAEA.
Predsedstvo, ki mu pomaga GS/VP, poroča Svetu o izvajanju tega skupnega ukrepa na podlagi rednih poročil MAAE.
The Commission shall be fully associated and shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).
Pri tem popolnoma sodeluje tudi Komisija, ki zagotavlja podatke o finančnih vidikih izvajanja projekta iz člena 1(2).
It shall expire on 12 September 2007.
Veljati preneha 12. septembra 2007.
OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 44.
UL L 193, 23.7.2005, str. 44.
EU support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Podpora EU dejavnostim MAAE na področju jedrske varnosti in preverjanja ter v okviru izvajanja Strategije EU proti širjenju in orožju za množično uničevanje
Meanwhile, IAEA verification remains an indispensable tool for building confidence among States with regard to nuclear non-proliferation undertakings, and for advancing the peaceful use of nuclear material.
Mednarodna skupnost se je odzvala silovito in dala več pobud, da bi preprečili, da bi se jedrske ali druge radioaktivne snovi znašle v rokah zločincev in teroristov.
Recent international developments have resulted in a new and strengthened set of international legal instruments that are relevant for nuclear security and verification.
Preverjanje MAAE vsekakor ostaja nepogrešljivo sredstvo za vzpostavljanje zaupanja med državami v kontekstu prizadevanj za neširjenje jedrskega orožja ter za razvoj miroljubne uporabe jedrskega materiala.
In July 2005, States Parties adopted the Amendment to the CPPNM; the Nuclear Terrorism Convention was opened for signature in September 2005; and in April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction and non-State actors.
Nedavni premiki na mednarodnem prizorišču so prinesli niz novih in okrepljenih mednarodnih instrumentov, ki so pomembni za jedrsko varnost in preverjanje: julija 2005 so države pogodbenice sprejele Spremembo CPPNM; od septembra 2005 je na voljo za podpis Konvencija o jedrskem terorizmu; aprila 2004 pa je Varnostni svet ZN sprejel Resolucijo 1540 o orožju za množično uničevanje in nedržavnih akterjih.
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 calls for all States to become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
Varnostni svet ZN je leta 2001 v Resoluciji 1373 države pozval, naj čimprej pristopijo k ustreznim konvencijam in protokolom, ki se nanašajo na terorizem.
As of to date, over 80 States have made a political commitment to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [1].
Do sedaj se je k izvajanju Pravil ravnanja za varnost in zaščito radioaktivnih virov politično zavezalo 80 držav [1].
In addition, in 2005 the General Conference and Board of Governors of the IAEA have adopted several resolutions and decisions to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system [2].States' implementation of these international instruments may be significantly facilitated, in part, by assistance provided through the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009, which was approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in September 2005 [3].
Poleg tega sta v letu 2005 Generalna konferenca in Svet guvernerjev MAAE sprejela več resolucij in sklepov o krepitvi sistema varnostnih ukrepov MAAE [2]. Državam bi uveljavljanje teh mednarodnih instrumentov utegnila vsaj v določenem delu znatno olajšati pomoč v okviru Načrta za jedrsko varnost MAAE za obdobje 2006–2009, ki ga je septembra 2005 potrdil Svet guvernerjev MAAE [3].
This is a continuation to the 2003-2005 Plan of Activities to protect against nuclear terrorism [4].
Gre za nadaljevanje Načrta dejavnosti za zaščito pred jedrskim terorizmom za obdobje 2003–2005 [4].
The new Nuclear Security Plan includes three activity areas: (1) Needs assessment, analysis and coordination, (2) Prevention, and (3) Detection and response.
Novi Načrt za jedrsko varnost obravnava dejavnosti na treh področjih: (1) ocena potreb, analiza in usklajevanje, (2) preprečevanje in (3) odkrivanje in odziv.
It also includes a part referred to as ‘Activities Supporting Nuclear Security’, which comprises activities originally identified for their safety and safeguards objectives but which are also recognized for their important contributions to nuclear security.
Prav tako vsebuje del o „Dejavnostih v podporo jedrski varnosti“, ki zajema dejavnosti, prvotno navedene zaradi njihovih varnostnih in nadzornih ciljev, vendar se zanje šteje, da pomembno prispevajo tudi k jedrski varnosti.
International Safeguards, as implemented by the IAEA, represent key means of verifying the compliance by States with their specific non-proliferation commitments and obligations.
Mednarodni varnostni ukrepi, ki jih uveljavlja MAAE, predstavljajo ključno sredstvo pri preverjanju, ali države ravnajo skladno s svojimi posebnimi zavezami in obveznosti glede neširjenja.
It is of utmost importance that the required national legislation for the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and, if applicable, an Additional Protocol, is in place [5].
Nadvse pomembno je, da se uveljavi nacionalna zakonodaja, potrebna za izvajanje celovitega sporazuma o nadzornih ukrepih z MAAE in po potrebi Dodatnega protokola [5].
The implementation requires that each State party to such agreements maintain an effective State System for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC).
Za izvajanje takšnega sporazuma mora vsaka država pogodbenica imeti učinkovit državni sistem vodenja evidenc jedrskih materialov in nadzora nad njimi (SSAC).
In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors requested that the IAEA Secretariat assist States for which comprehensive safeguards agreements had small quantities protocols attached, including non-members of the Agency, through available resources, in the establishment and maintenance of such SSACs.
Svet guvernerjev MAAE je septembra 2005 sekretariat MAAE zaprosil, naj državam, ki so sklenile celovit sporazum o nadzornih ukrepih, temu pa je bil dodan še protokol o manjših količinah, tudi nečlanicam, z razpoložljivimi sredstvi pomaga pri vzpostavitvi in skrbi za takšne SSAC.
The Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 pursues the similar objectives to some elements of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
V Načrtu za jedrsko varnost za obdobje 2006–2009 so zapisani cilji, podobni tistim iz nekaterih delov Strategije EU proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje.
These provide a comprehensive approach to nuclear security including the regulatory controls, accountability and protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials in use, storage and transport, ‘from cradle to grave’, in the short term as well as in the long term.
Ti predvidevajo celovit pristop k jedrski varnosti, ki bo v vseh fazah („od zibeli do groba“) zagotavljal upravni nadzor, evidentiranost in varovanje jedrskih in drugih radioaktivnih snovi med uporabo, skladiščenjem in transportom, tako kratkoročno kot dolgoročno.
However, should the protection fail, backup measures must be established to detect theft or attempts to smuggle the material across international borders and to respond to malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive materials, should they occur.
Za primer, da varovanje odpove, pa je treba določiti varnostne ukrepe, s pomočjo katerih bo mogoče odkriti krajo ali poskuse tihotapljenja tega materiala preko mednarodnih meja in se odzvati na storjena zlonamerna dejanja z jedrskimi in drugimi radioaktivnimi snovmi.
The IAEA is in the process of completing the implementation of Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP, and is implementing Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP.
MAAE zaključuje izvajanje Skupnega ukrepa Sveta 2004/495/SZVP in izvaja Skupni ukrep Sveta 2005/574/SZVP.
With the associated contributions of the EU, the IAEA has initiated major activities to support efforts of the recipient States in Caucasus, Central Asia, South-eastern Europe and Balkan regions, and Northern Africa and the Mediterranean region in Middle East, to strengthen the nuclear security and the implementation of international safeguards in these countries.
S pomočjo, ki jo je prispevala EU, je MAAE sprožila obsežne dejavnosti v podporo prizadevanjem držav prejemnic na območju Kavkaza, Srednje Azije, Jugovzhodne Evrope in Balkana, na severnoafriškem in sredozemskem območju Bližnjega vzhoda, katerih namen je okrepiti jedrsko varnost in uveljaviti mednarodne nadzorne ukrepe v teh državah.
Support for these efforts continues to be in high demand in IAEA Member States as well as in States that are not members of the IAEA.
Povpraševanje po podpori za ta prizadevanja je v državah članicah MAAE in tudi v državah, ki niso njene članice, še naprej veliko.
Countries eligible to receive support are:
Do podpore upravičene države so:
in South-eastern Europe: Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
v Jugo-vzhodni Evropi: Turčija, Albanija, Bosna in Hercegovina, Hrvaška, Srbija in Črna gora, Republika Moldavija in Nekdanja jugoslovanska republika Makedonija;
in the Central Asia region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan,
na srednje-azijskem območju: Kazahstan, Kirgizistan, Uzbekistan, Tadžikistan in Turkmenistan;
in the Caucasus region: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
na območju Kavkaza: Armenija, Azerbajdžan in Gruzija;
in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syrian Arab Republic, and
na območju Sredozemlja in Bližnjega vzhoda: Izrael, Jordanija, Libanon, Sirska arabska republika in
in Africa [6]: Altogether up to 20-25 countries in Africa are foreseen to receive support for nuclear security upgrades under different projects.
v Afriki [6]: vsega skupaj naj bi bilo v okviru različnih projektov v Afriki podpore za jedrsko varnost deležnih kakih 20–25 držav.
Additional countries may be involved in regional training events.
Še več držav pa bi utegnilo biti vključenih v usposabljanja na ravni regij.
The final selection of those African countries to receive support will be made on the basis of the needs evaluation phase, which will comprise assessment missions and evaluation of already existing information in headquarters.
Dokončni izbor afriških držav, ki naj bi bile deležne podpore, bo opravljen glede na ugotovitve v fazi ocene potreb, pri kateri bo šlo za ocenjevalne misije in ustrezno pregledovanje že obstoječih podatkov na sedežu.
The support activities for each project will be focused on those countries in the region that have major activities in each project area:
Podporne dejavnosti za vsak projekt bodo osredotočene na tiste države v tej regiji, ki so na vsakokratnem projektnem področju najbolj dejavne:
physical protection upgrades are foreseen in four to six of the eight countries in the region that have nuclear reactors; strengthening the security of radioactive sources is foreseen in five to seven of the 10 countries that have most vulnerable sources in use and in storage;
nadgradnja fizičnega varovanja je predvidena v šestih od tistih osmih držav v tej regiji, ki imajo jedrske reaktorje. Krepitev zaščite radioaktivnih virov je predvidena v petih do sedmih državah izmed tistih desetih, v katerih se uporabljajo in skladiščijo najmanj varovani viri;
provision of support to upgrade the capability to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive materials is foreseen in five to six countries which, on the basis of the information available to the IAEA, pose the highest risk of illicit trafficking, taking into account the existence nuclear material and of radioactive sources in the country and its neighbouring countries;
zagotovitev podpore za nadgradnjo zmogljivosti za odkrivanje nedovoljenega prometa z jedrskimi in drugimi radioaktivnimi snovmi je predvidena za pet do šest držav, ki glede na podatke, s katerimi razpolaga MAAE, in upoštevajoč prisotnost jedrskega materiala in radioaktivnih virov v zadevnih in sosednjih državah, predstavljajo največje tveganje nedovoljenega prometa;