natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As the German authorities communicated that the company was permanently threatened by insolvency, Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH was found to be a firm in difficulty at the time of the granting of the guarantee (cf. recitals 9 and 34).
Ker je Nemčija jasno izrazila, da podjetju nenehno grozi nevarnost stečaja, je bilo ugotovljeno, da je bilo Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH v času dodelitve jamstva podjetje v težavah (glej uvodni izjavi 9 in 34).
Therefore the aid has to be assessed under the applicable rules for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulties.
Zato je pomoč treba preveriti po veljavnih določbah Skupnosti za oceno državnih pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah.
As set out in recital 49, these are the 1994 guidelines.
Kot je bilo navedeno v uvodni izjavi 49, v tem primeru veljajo smernice iz leta 1994.
The Commission initiated the procedure provided for under Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty against this aid because it was doubted whether the following conditions from the 1994 guidelines were met:
Komisija je zaradi te pomoči sprožila postopek iz člena 88(2) Pogodbe ES, ker je dvomila, da so izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji smernic iz leta 1994:
restructuring aid should be granted once only;
pomoči za prestrukturiranje se dodelijo le enkrat;
the aid should lead to a restoration of viability;
pomoč mora voditi k ponovni vzpostavitvi rentabilnosti podjetja;
the aid should not unduly distort competition;
pomoč ne sme voditi k nesprejemljivem izkrivljanju konkurence;
the implementation of the restructuring plan should be monitored and reported on.
izvajanje načrta za prestrukturiranje je treba nadzorovati s pomočjo letno predloženih poročil.
According to point 3.2.2(i) of the 1994 guidelines, aid for restructuring shall basically only be granted once.
Po točki 3.2.2 (i) Smernic iz leta 1994 se pomoči za prestrukturiranje običajno dodelijo le enkrat.
Germany has not commented upon this point.
Nemčija se glede te točke ni izrazila.
The fact that another guarantee was granted in the course of a second restructuring violates the basic principle of the one-off character of restructuring aid.
Dejstvo, da je bila v okviru drugega prestrukturiranja dodeljena nadaljnja pomoč, je v nasprotju z osnovnim načelom, po katerem se lahko pomoči za prestrukturiranje dodelijo samo enkrat.
The Commission doubted whether the restructuring plan, presented to justify the second restructuring aid (i.e. the second guarantee), would lead to a restoration of viability.
Komisija je podvomila, da bo načrt za prestrukturiranje, ki je bil predložen zaradi utemeljitve druge pomoči za prestrukturiranje (v obliki drugega jamstva), privedel k ponovni vzpostavitvi rentabilnosti podjetja.
The restoration of viability seemed to be based on a higher turnover.
Za to bi bilo potrebno znatno zvišanje prihodkov.
This increased turnover seemed unlikely, especially since the first projected turnover figures were already proven to be too optimistic at the time of the initiation of the procedure.
Toda zdelo se je malo verjetno, da se bo to dejansko zgodilo, predvsem zato, ker so se prve napovedi že v času sprožitve postopka izkazale za preveč optimistične.
Germany has not provided any justification or explanation for the projected increases in turnover.
Nemčija ni posredovala nikakršne utemeljitve ali pojasnila za posredovane napovedi prihodka.
Therefore, the Commission maintains its doubts on the fulfilment of the condition that the restructuring plan should lead to restoration of viability.
Zato je Komisija še naprej dvomila, da je pogoj, da se z načrtom za prestrukturiranje lahko ponovno vzpostavi dolgoročna rentabilnost podjetja, izpolnjen.
As far as the condition on the avoidance of an undue distortion of competition is concerned, Germany presented two arguments.
K merilu izogibanja nesprejemljivemu izkrivljanju konkurence je Nemčija predložila dva argumenta.
First of all, Germany stated that the company concerned was too small to distort competition or influence Community trade.
Prvič, zadevno podjetje je premajhno, da bi izkrivljalo konkurenco ali da bi vplivalo na promet znotraj Skupnosti.
Secondly, Germany stated that the company would not expand its capacity but would make better use of existing capacity.
Drugič, podjetje ne bo razširilo svojih proizvodnih kapacitet, temveč jih bo zgolj bolje izrabilo.
The first argument is rebutted by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (cf. recital 38).
Prvi argument izpodbija sodna praksa Evropskega sodišča (glej uvodno izjavo 38).
As to the second argument, according to point 3.2.2(ii) of the 1994 guidelines, the Commission only asks for a reduction of capacity if there is a structural excess of production capacity in the European Community.
Glede drugega argumenta je mogoče reči, da Komisija v skladu s točko 3.2.2 (ii) Smernic iz leta 1994 zahteva zmanjšanje kapacitet le v primeru, če obstaja strukturni presežek kapacitet znotraj Skupnosti.
At the initiation of the procedure the Commission found that there was no overcapacity in the sector concerned.
V času sprožitve postopka je Komisija ugotovila, da v zadevnem sektorju ni presežnih kapacitet.
However, the Commission wondered how the measure could be considered in the common interest if it was based on increased production. Increased production would automatically lead to a decrease in market share for competitors.
Kljub temu si je Komisija zastavila vprašanje, kako je mogoče ukrep označiti kot ukrep skupnega interesa, če je bil njegov cilj povečanje proizvodnje, povečanja proizvodnje pa samodejno vodijo k zmanjšanju tržnih deležev konkurenčnih podjetij.
Germany has in no way explained how the increased production could be absorbed by the market without negative consequences for competitors.
Nemčija ni razložila, na kakšen način večja proizvodnja ne bi imela negativnih posledic na konkurenčna podjetja.
Moreover, Germany has not given any data on the balance between the benefit for the company concerned and the costs for the sector as a whole.
Poleg tega Nemčija ni navedla podatkov o razmerju med koristjo za zadevno podjetje in stroški za sektor na splošno.
Therefore, the Commission cannot assess whether the measure avoids an undue distortion of competition.
Zato Komisija ne more presoditi, ali se pomoč izogiba nesprejemljivemu izkrivljanju konkurence.
Germany did not provide any information on the monitoring of the restructuring plan.
Nemčija ni posredovala informacij o nadzoru izvajanja načrta za prestrukturiranje.
It is not clear whether Ergewa falls under the SME definition under the 1994 guidelines and thus changes the status of Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH, being a more than 25 % shareholder.
Ni jasno, ali se lahko Ergewa uvrsti med MSP v smislu Smernic iz leta 1994 in ali je zaradi tega prišlo do kakšnih sprememb v statusu podjetja Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH, v katerem ima Ergewa GmbH več kot 25 % delež.
However, even taking into account the more lenient approach for SMEs provided for in point 3.2.4 of the 1994 guidelines, it was made clear in recital 72 that no overcapacity existed in the sector concerned and furthermore no assessment could be made on the monitoring requirement due to a lack of information.
Tudi če se kot osnova upošteva blag pristop k ocenjevanju pomoči za prestrukturiranje za MSP (točka 3.2.4 Smernic iz leta 1994), se ugotovi, da v sektorju, kot je navedeno v odstavku 72, ni presežnih kapacitet in da zaradi nezadostnih podatkov ni bilo mogoče izvesti kontrolnih zahtev.
Therefore, the fact that the beneficiary company could probably still fall under the SME definition in 1997, does not change the evaluation of the present aid.
Dejstvo, da bi se lahko upravičeno podjetje verjetno tudi leta 1997 še uvrstilo med MSP, pri oceni obravnavane pomoči ničesar ne spremeni.
For the abovementioned reasons, the Commission considers Aid 2, granted in the form of a State guarantee for an amount of up to DEM 2 million to Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH to be incompatible with Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty.
Iz navedenih razlogov je Komisija mnenja, da druga pomoč, ki je bila podjetju Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH dodeljena v obliki državnega jamstva za znesek v višini do 2 mio DEM, ni združljiva s členoma 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES.
The German authorities stated in their letter of 4 February 1999, and reiterated in their letter of 18 May 2005, that the guarantee had been given subject to the Commission authorisation.
Nemčija je v svojem dopisu z dne 4. februarja 1999 in ponovno v dopisu z dne 18. maja 2005 sporočila, da je bilo jamstvo dodeljeno le pod pogojem odobritve s strani Komisije.
Therefore, as no payments have been made under the guarantee, the incompatible aid does not have to be recovered.
Ker v okviru tega jamstva ni prišlo do izplačil, vračilo te pomoči, ki ni združljiva s Pogodbo, ni potrebno.
The Commission finds that the State aid measures in the form of State guarantees worth DEM 880000 (Aid 1) and DEM 2000000 (Aid 2), totalling DEM 2,88 million on loans worth DEM 1100000 and DEM 2500000 respectively, totalling DEM 3,6 million are incompatible with the common market.
Komisija ugotavlja, da državna pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena v obliki državnih jamstev v višini 880000 DEM (pomoč 1) oz. 2 mio DEM (pomoč 2), skupaj torej 2,88 mio DEM, za posojilo v vrednosti 1,1 mio DEM oz. 2,5 mio DEM, skupaj torej 3,6 mio DEM, ni združljiva s skupnim trgom.
Incompatible aid granted illegally has to be recovered.
Pomoči, ki so bile dodeljene neupravičeno in so nezdružljive s Pogodbo, je treba vrniti.
The Commission notes that the insolvency procedure was initiated for Greußener Salamifabrik on 1 October 1999.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je bil 1. oktobra 1999 sprožen stečajni postopek o premoženju podjetja Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH.
As it is not known to the Commission whether the company has ceased its existence as a result of the insolvency proceedings, the recovery may still have to take place.
Ker Komisiji ni znano, ali po stečajnem postopku podjetje še obstaja, je vračilo morda primerno tudi v prihodnje.
The Commission draws the attention of the German authorities to the fact that according to point 6.4 and 6.5 of the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees the question whether the illegality of the aid affects the legal relationship between the State and third parties is a matter which has to be examined under national law.
Komisija opozarja Nemčijo, da je potrebno v skladu z odstavkoma 6.4 in 6.5 Obvestila Komisije o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč v obliki poroštev z nacionalno zakonodajo preveriti, če protipravnost pomoči zadeva pravno razmerje med državo in tretjo osebo.
National courts may have to examine whether national law prevents the guarantee contracts from being honoured and in that assessment the Commission considers that they should take account of the breach of Community law,
Nacionalna sodišča morajo v določenih okoliščinah preveriti, če je nacionalna zakonodaja v nasprotju z upoštevanjem garancijskih pogodb; pri preverjanju tega vprašanja je treba upoštevati kršitve prava Skupnosti –
The State aid which Germany has granted in the form of a guarantee in 1996 to Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH amounting to DEM 880000 is incompatible with the common market.
Pomoč, ki jo je Nemčija leta 1996 v obliki jamstva v višini 880000 DEM dodelila podjetju Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH, ni združljiva s skupnim trgom.
Germany shall take all appropriate measures to recover from the recipient the payments made under the guarantee referred to in Article 1.
Nemčija sprejme vse potrebne ukrepe, da bo od prejemnika izterjala zneske, izplačane v okviru jamstva, navedenega v členu 1.
Recovery of the aid shall be effected without delay and in accordance with the procedures of national law in so far as they allow the immediate and effective execution of the decision.
Izterjava pomoči se izvede v skladu s postopki nacionalnega prava, v kolikor le-to omogoča takojšnjo in učinkovito izvršitev odločbe.
The amounts to be recovered shall include interest from the date on which it was at the disposal of the recipient until the date of its actual recovery.
Zneski, ki jih je treba vrniti, vključujejo obresti od datuma, ko je prejemnik pomoč prejel, do datuma, ko jo je dejansko vrnil.
Interest shall be calculated on the basis of the reference rate used for calculating the grant-equivalent of regional aid.
Obresti se izračunajo na podlagi referenčne obrestne mere, ki se uporablja za izračun ekvivalenta dotacij.
The State aid which Germany planned to grant to the Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH in the form of a guarantee amounting to DEM 2 million is incompatible with the common market.
Pomoč v obliki jamstva v višini 2 mio DEM za Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH, ki jo je Nemčija nameravala dodeliti, ni združljiva s skupnim trgom.
This aid may not therefore be granted.
Iz tega razloga se ta pomoč ne sme dodeliti.
Germany shall inform the Commission, within two months of notification of this Decision, of the measures taken to comply with it.
Nemčija obvesti Komisijo v dveh mesecih po uradnem obvestilu o tej odločbi o ukrepih, sprejetih za izvajanje te odločbe.
Done at Brussels, 20 July 2005.
V Bruslju, dne 20. julija 2005
OJ C 238, 21.8.1999, p. 15.
UL C 238, 21.8.1999, str. 15.
OJ C 368, 23.12.1994, p. 12 and OJ C 283, 19.9.1997, p. 2.
UL C 368, 23.12.1994, str. 12 in UL C 283, 19.9.1997, str. 2.
Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1899/2004 (OJ L 328, 30.10.2004, p. 67).
Uredba, kakor je bila nazadnje spremenjena z Uredbo Komisije (ES) št. 1899/2004. (UL L 328, 30.10.2004, str. 67).
Judgment of the Court of 17 September 1980 Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission of the European Communities [1980] ECR 2671, paragraphs 11 and 12.
Sodba Sodišča z dne 17. septembra 1980, zadeva 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV proti Komisiji Evropskih skupnosti [1980] PSES, str. 2671, odst. 11 in 12.
Judgment of the Court of 21 March 1990 Case C-142/87 Kingdom of Belgium v Commission of the European Communities [1990] ECR I-959, paragraph 43, and Judgment of the Court of 14 September 1994 Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities [1994] ECR I-4103, paragraphs 40 to 42.
Sodba Sodišča z dne 21. marca 1990, zadeva C-142/87 Kraljevina Belgija proti Komisiji Evropskih skupnosti [1990] PSES, I-959, odst. 43, in Sodba Sodišča z dne 14. septembra 1994 povezane zadeve C-278/92, C-279/92 in C-280/92 Kraljevina Španija proti Komisiji Evropskih skupnosti [1994] PSES, I-4103, odst. 40 do 42.
The meat sector in general is subject to significant intra-EU trade.
V sektorju mesnih izdelkov obstaja znaten promet znotraj Skupnosti.
In 1996, some 8 million tonnes of meat (carcass weight) were traded within the EU.
Leta 1996 se je trgovalo z okoli 8 mio tonami mesa (zaklano meso) znotraj EU.
This represented some 23 % of total 1996 meat production. (Source: Eurostat).
To je znašalo okoli 23 % celotne proizvodnje mesa leta 1996 (Vir: Eurostat).
OJ C 31, 3.2.1979, p. 9.
UL C 31, 3.2.1979, str. 9.
OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p. 2.
UL C 244, 1.10.2004, str. 2.
This letter has been superseded by the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees (OJ C 71, 11.3.2000, p. 14).
Ta dopis je bil nadomeščen z Obvestilom Komisije o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč v obliki poroštev (UL C 71, 11.3.2000, str. 14).
The Commission received comments from Kemper Fleischwarenfabrik (Nortrup), from the Bundesverband der Deutschen Fleischwarenindustrie e.V.
Komisija je prejela pripombe podjetja Kemper Fleischwarenfabrik (Nortrup), Zveznega združenja nemške mesne industrije (Bundesverband der Deutschen Fleischwarenindustrie e.V.)
(Bonn) and from an interested party that prefers to remain anonymous.
(Bonn) in še tretje zainteresirane stranke, ki je želela ostati neimenovana.
Political and Security Committee Decision EUPOL Kinshasa/2/2005
Sklep Političnega in varnostnega odbora EUPOL Kinshasa/2/2005
extending the mandate of the Head of Mission of the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC), EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’
o podaljšanju mandata vodje Policijske misije EU v Kinšasi (DRK) EUPOL „Kinshasa“
(2005/921/CFSP)
(2005/921/SZVP)
Having regard to Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 on the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’) [1], and in particular Article 5 and 8 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Skupnega ukrepa Sveta 2004/847/SZVP z dne 9. decembra 2004 o Policijski misiji Evropske unije v Kinšasi (DRK) v zvezi z združeno policijsko enoto (EUPOL „Kinshasa“) [1], in zlasti členov 5 in 8 Skupnega ukrepa,
On 9 December 2004, the Political and Security Committee adopted Decision EUPOL Kinshasa/1/2004 [2] appointing Mr Adílio Custódio as Head of Mission of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’.
Politični in varnostni odbor je 9. decembra 2004 sprejel Sklep EUPOL Kinshasa/1/2004 [2] o imenovanju g. Adília Custódia za vodjo misije EUPOL „Kinshasa“.
The abovementioned Decision expires on 31 December 2005.
Navedeni sklep preneha veljati 31. decembra 2005.
On 7 November 2005 the Council agreed to extend EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ for a further period of 12 months.
Svet se je 7. novembra 2005 strinjal s podaljšanjem misije EUPOL „Kinshasa“ za nadaljnjih 12 mesecev.
The Secretary—General/High Representative has proposed the extension of the mandate of Mr Adílio Custódio as Head of Mission of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ until the end of the Mission.
Generalni sekretar/visoki predstavnik je predlagal, da se mandat g. Adília Custódia, vodje misije EUPOL „Kinshasa“, podaljša do konca misije.
The mandate of the Head of Mission of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ should therefore be extended until the end of the Mission,
Mandat vodje misije EUPOL „Kinshasa“ je zato treba podaljšati do konca misije –
The mandate of Mr Adílio Custódio as Head of Mission of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ is hereby extended until the end of the Mission.
Mandat g. Adília Custódia, vodje misije EUPOL „Kinshasa“, se podaljša do konca misije.
It shall apply until the end of the Mission EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’.
Uporablja se do konca misije EUPOL „Kinshasa“.
OJ L 396, 31.12.2004, p. 61.
UL L 396, 31.12.2004, str. 61.
concerning the appointment of the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
o imenovanju vodje misije/policijskega komisarja Policijske misije Evropske unije (EUPM) v Bosni in Hercegovini (BiH)
(2005/922/CFSP)
(2005/922/SZVP)
Having regard to Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [1], and, in particular, Article 9(1) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Skupnega ukrepa Sveta 2005/824/SZVP z dne 24. novembra 2005 [1] o Policijski misiji Evropske unije (EUPM) v Bosni in Hercegovini (BiH), in zlasti člena 9(1) Skupnega ukrepa,
Article 9(1) of Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP provides that the Council authorises the Political and Security Committee to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty, including the decision to appoint, upon a proposal by the Secretary-General/High Representative, a Head of Mission/Police Commissioner.
Člen 9(1) Skupnega ukrepa 2005/824/SZVP določa, da Svet pooblasti Politični in varnostni odbor za sprejemanje ustreznih odločitev v skladu s členom 25 Pogodbe, vključno z odločitvijo, da na predlog generalnega sekretarja/visokega predstavnika imenuje vodjo misije/policijskega komisarja.
The Secretary-General/High Representative has proposed the appointment of Mr Vincenzo Coppola,
Generalni sekretar/visoki predstavnik je predlagal, da se imenuje g. Vicenza Coppolo –
Mr Vincenzo Coppola is hereby appointed Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), from the day the mission is launched.
Vizenzo Coppola se z učinkom od dneva začetka delovanja misije imenuje za vodjo misije/policijskega komisarja Policijske misije Evropske unije (EUPM) v Bosni in Hercegovini (BiH).
Until that date, he shall act as Head of the planning team.
Do tega datuma deluje kot vodja enote za načrtovanje.
OJ L 307, 25.11.2005, p. 55.
UL L 307, 25.11.2005, str. 55.
on the list of the beneficiary countries which qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, provided for by Article 26(e) of Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences
o seznamu držav upravičenk, ki so upravičene do posebnega spodbujevalnega režima za trajnostni razvoj in dobro upravljanje, kakor je predvideno v členu 26(e) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 980/2005 o uporabi sheme splošnih tarifnih preferencialov
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences [1], and in particular Articles 11 and 26 thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 980/2005 z dne 27. junija 2005 o uporabi sheme splošnih tarifnih preferencialov [1], in zlasti členov 11 in 26 Uredbe,
Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 provides for the granting of a special incentive arrangement to developing countries which satisfy certain requirements for sustainable development and good governance.
Uredba (ES) št. 980/2005 predvideva dodelitev posebnega spodbujevalnega režima državam v razvoju, ki izpolnjujejo določene zahteve za trajnostni razvoj in dobro upravljanje.
Each developing country wishing to avail itself of the special incentive arrangement has submitted its request in writing by 31 October 2005, accompanied by the comprehensive information concerning ratification of the relevant conventions, the legislation and measures to implement effectively the provisions of the conventions and its commitment to accept and comply fully with the monitoring and review mechanism envisaged in the relevant conventions and related instruments.
Vse države v razvoju, ki želijo koristiti posebni spodbujevalni režim, so do 31. oktobra 2005 predložile prošnjo v pisni obliki z izčrpnimi informacijami o ratifikaciji zadevnih konvencij, zakonodaji in ukrepih za dejansko izvajanje določb konvencij ter svojo zavezo, da bodo dopustile in spoštovale spremljanje in preglede izvajanja, ki so predvideni v zadevnih konvencijah in v z njimi povezanih instrumentih.
The Commission has examined these requests, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 980/2005, and has established the final list of beneficiary countries which fulfil the relevant criteria.
Komisija je te prošnje preučila v skladu z določbami člena 11 Uredbe (ES) št. 980/2005 in oblikovala končni seznam držav upravičenk, ki izpolnjujejo ustrezna merila.
Accordingly, the special incentive arrangement should be granted to those countries from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2008.
V skladu s tem je treba tem državam od 1. januarja 2006 do 31. decembra 2008 dodeliti posebni spodbujevalni režim.
The following developing countries shall benefit from the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for in Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2008:
Do ugodnosti posebnega spodbujevalnega režima za trajnostni razvoj in dobro upravljanje, kakor je določeno v Uredbi (ES) št. 980/2005, so od 1. januarja 2006 do 31. decembra 2008 upravičene naslednje države v razvoju:
(BO) Bolivia
(BO) Bolivija
(CO) Colombia
(CO) Kolumbija
(EC) Ecuador
(EC) Ekvador
(GE) Georgia
(GE) Gruzija
(LK) Sri Lanka
(LK) Šrilanka
(MD) Republic of Moldova
(MD) Republika Moldavija
(MN) Mongolia
(MN) Mongolija
(NI) Nicaragua
(NI) Nikaragva
Done at Brussels, 21 December 2005.
V Bruslju, 21. decembra 2005
OJ L 169, 30.6.2005, p. 1.
UL L 169, 30.6.2005, str. 1.
(GT) Guatemala
(GT) Gvatemala
on introducing supplementary measures to control infections with low pathogenic avian influenza in Italy and repealing Decision 2004/666/EC
o uvedbi dopolnilnih ukrepov za obvladovanje okužb z nizko patogeno aviarno influenco v Italiji in o razveljavitvi Odločbe 2004/666/ES
(notified under document number C(2005) 5566)
(notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2005) 5566)