natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The difference with the commission applied in the present transaction stemmed from the following factors: (a) the conditions for calling on the guarantee were much stricter than those of the bank guarantees, since these were enforceable at first request and IGAPE’s guarantee was enforceable only in a subsidiary capacity (once the beneficiary was declared insolvent); (b) the risk assumed by IGAPE was very low since it covered only 30 % of the loan and the loan financed only 40 % of the investment; and (c) the project was promoted by groups known for their solvency.
Razlika od provizije v tej transakciji je izhajala iz naslednjih dejavnikov: (a) pogoji za unovčenje poroštva so bili precej strožji od pogojev za uporabo bančnih poroštev, ker so bančna poroštva unovčljiva na prvo zahtevo, poroštvo IGAPE pa je unovčljivo le subsidiarno (ko se upravičenca razglasi za nelikvidnega); (b) tveganje IGAPE je bilo zelo nizko, ker je zajemalo le 30 % posojila in s posojilom je bilo financiranih le 40 % naložbe; in (c) projekt so spodbujale skupine, znane po svoji likvidnosti.
The Spanish authorities provided statements from two banks (Caixa Galicia and Banco Pastor) to the effect that, in view of the conditions of the loan and the identity of the shareholders, they would have applied a commission of 0,20 % per year for such guarantee.
Španski organi so priskrbeli izjave dveh bank (Caixa Galicia in Banco Pastor), da bi sami glede na pogoje posojila in identiteto delničarjev za takšno poroštvo določili provizijo 0,20 % na leto.
As regards the IGAPE subsidy of 0,25 % and the formalisation fee, the Spanish authorities maintained that this aid was granted under schemes approved by the Commission, and that, except for EUR 14299,44, it fell within the scope of Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid [12], which applied also to the ECSC sector.
V zvezi s subvencijo IGAPE v višini 0,25 % in formalizacijsko provizijo so španski organi trdili, da je bila ta pomoč dodeljena v skladu s shemami, ki jih je odobrila Komisija, in da je z izjemo 14299,44 EUR ta pomoč spadala na področje uporabe Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 69/2001 z dne 12. januarja 2001 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES pri de minimis pomoči [12], ki se uporablja tudi za sektor ESPJ.
They also contended that the market for those products would not be affected since the majority of the products would be used within the group and almost all the rest would be exported outside the EEA.
Trdili so tudi, da trg za te izdelke ne bo prizadet, ker se bo večina izdelkov porabila znotraj skupine, skoraj ves preostanek pa bo izvožen zunaj območja EGP.
As to the grant provided by IGAPE, the Spanish authorities argued that it was awarded under a scheme approved by the Commission and was therefore compatible with the common market.
Glede dotacije IGAPE so španski organi menili, da je bila dodeljena po shemi, ki jo je odobrila Komisija, in je zato bila združljiva s skupnim trgom.
In any event, the Spanish authorities maintained that the aid was compatible with the common market because it fell within the scope of the SME Regulation, which applied also to the ECSC steel sector.
V vsakem primeru so španski organi trdili, da je bila pomoč združljiva s skupnim trgom, ker je spadala na področje uporabe uredbe o majhnih in srednje velikih podjetjih, ki se uporablja tudi za jeklarski sektor ESPJ.
They also affirmed that the aid was in line with the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection [13].
Poleg tega so potrdili, da je bila pomoč v skladu s Smernicami Skupnosti o državni pomoči za varstvo okolja [13].
They contended that the system chosen for water treatment would improve on environmental protection as compared with the traditional system and that it represented an additional cost of EUR 661113. Similarly, the use of natural gas in the reheating furnace would drastically reduce emissions as compared with fuel oil and represented an additional cost of EUR 1502530. Thirdly, the fact that all the civil works for the hydraulic installations, the lubricating installations, the cabling and the pipelining had been carried out on the surface instead of being made underground would improve working conditions and prevent underground leaks and represented an additional cost of EUR 6911639.
Trdili so, da bo sistem, izbran za čiščenje vode, izboljšal varstvo okolja v primerjavi s tradicionalnim sistemom, in da je predstavljal dodaten strošek v znesku 661113 EUR. Podobno bo uporaba naravnega plina v peči za pogrevanje drastično zmanjšala emisije v primerjavi z uporabo gorilnega olja in je predstavljala dodaten strošek v znesku 1502530 EUR. Tretjič, dejstvo, da so bila vsa komunalna dela za hidravlične instalacije in lubrikativne instalacije, polaganje kablov in cevovodov izvedena na površini namesto pod zemljo, bo izboljšalo delovne pogoje in preprečilo podzemne izpuste ter je predstavljalo dodatni strošek v znesku 6911639 EUR.
As for the comments made by third parties (see recitals 31 to 34), the Spanish authorities stated that they were not supported by any factual evidence, and that the associations were only trying to prevent the entry into the market of a new company.
V zvezi s pripombami tretjih strank (glej uvodne izjave (31) do (34)) so španski organi izjavili, da te pripombe niso bile podprte z dejstvi in da so ta združenja le poskušala preprečiti prisotnost novega podjetja na trgu.
In this context, the Spanish authorities recalled that it was the difficulties of obtaining supplies of these products from the traditional producers (mainly undue delay in honouring deliveries) that had prompted the promoters of the new company to carry out the investment.
V tem pogledu so španski organi opozorili, da je bil razlog za naložbo v novo podjetje v težavah pri zagotavljanju dobave teh izdelkov od tradicionalnih proizvajalcev (predvsem zaradi neupravičene zamude pri dobavi).
They also drew the Commission’s attention to Commission Decision 89/515/EEC of 2 August 1989 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty [14] and the related judgments of the Community lawcourts whereby it was found that some of the members of EISA had taken part in anti-competitive practices.
Prav tako so usmerili pozornost Komisije na Odločbo Komisije 89/515/EGS z dne 2. avgusta 1989 o postopku v skladu s členom 85 Pogodbe EGS [14] in k povezanim sodbam sodišč Skupnosti, ki so ugotovile, da so nekateri člani združenja EISA sodelovali pri nekonkurenčnih praksah.
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES
V. OCENA UKREPOV
Siderúrgica Añón manufactures steel bars and rods, which are products included in Annex I to the ECSC Treaty.
Podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón SA proizvaja jeklene gredi in drogove, ki so izdelki, vključeni v Prilogo I k Pogodbi ESPJ.
It is therefore an undertaking within the meaning of Article 80 of that Treaty.
Zato gre za podjetje v skladu s členom 80 te pogodbe.
In the present case, it is evident that Spain unlawfully implemented the measures since it did not follow the procedures laid down in Article 6 of the Steel Aid Code.
V tem primeru je očitno, da je Španija nelegalno izvedla ukrepe, ker ni sledila postopkom iz člena 6 zakonika o pomoči jeklarski industriji.
The Commission therefore cannot accept the argument put forward by the company (see recital 41) that the aid was existing aid.
Zato Komisija ne more sprejeti argumenta podjetja (glej uvodno izjavo (41)), da je bila pomoč obstoječa pomoč.
Even though the procedure was initiated under the ECSC Treaty, the Commission could not adopt a final decision before 23 July 2002 since the decision extending the procedure was adopted on 2 July 2002 and sent to the Spanish authorities on 4 July 2002.
Čeprav je bil postopek sprožen po Pogodbi ESPJ, Komisija ni mogla sprejeti končne odločbe pred 23. julijem 2002, ker je bila odločba o podaljšanju postopka sprejeta 2. julija 2002 in poslana španskim organom 4. julija 2002.
The notice of invitation to submit comments was published on 9 September 2002.
Obvestilo o povabilu k predložitvi pripomb je bilo objavljeno 9. septembra 2002.
In point 43 of its communication concerning certain aspects of the treatment of competition cases resulting from the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, the Commission stated that, in such cases, it would continue the investigation under the provisions of the Procedural Regulation and adopt a final decision under Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty.
V točki 43 sporočila Komisije o nekaterih vidikih obravnavanja konkurenčnih primerov zaradi izteka veljavnosti Pogodbe ESPJ je Komisija določila, da bo v takih primerih nadaljevala preiskavo po določbah postopkovne uredbe in sprejela končno odločbo po členu 88(2) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission cannot accept the company’s argument that the expiry of the three-month period since the initial decision initiating the procedure prevented it from adopting a decision (see recital 40).
Komisija ne more sprejeti argumenta podjetja, da zaradi izteka trimesečnega obdobja od prvotne odločbe o sprožitvi postopka ne bi mogla sprejeti odločbe (glej uvodno izjavo (40)).
As the Court of Justice ruled in its judgment of 12 December 2002 in Case C-5/01 Kingdom of Belgium v Commission of the European Communities [15], ‘the three-month period set out in Article 6(5) of the sixth steel aid code cannot be regarded as a prescription period linked to loss of competence’.
Kot je razsodilo Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti v zadevi C-5/01 Kraljevina Belgija proti Komisiji Evropskih skupnosti z dne 12. decembra 2002 [15], „se trimesečno obdobje, določeno v členu 6(5) šestega zakonika o pomoči jeklarski industriji ne more obravnavati kot zastaralni rok, povezan z izgubo pristojnosti“.
At present, the Procedural Regulation is fully applicable and Article 7(6) thereof has been complied with.
Zdaj se postopkovna uredba v celoti uporablja in člen 7(6) omenjene uredbe se spoštuje.
Existence of state aid
Obstoj državne pomoči
According to Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.
V skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom, če prizadene trgovino med državami članicami.
The acquisition by SODIGA of a stake in the share capital of Siderúrgica Añón
Pridobitev deleža s strani podjetja SODIGA v delniškem kapitalu podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón
As to the acquisition by SODIGA of a stake in the share capital of Siderúrgica Añón (see recitals 27 and 29) the Commission notes, in the first place, that SODIGA is controlled by the Galician regional government.
Glede pridobitve deleža s strani podjetja SODIGA v delniškem kapitalu Siderúrgica Ańón (glej uvodni izjavi (27) in (29)) Komisija najprej ugotovi, da podjetje SODIGA nadzoruje galicijska regionalna vlada.
The Commission also notes that the Galician regional government considers that it forms part of IGAPE’s programmes for the support of undertakings [16].
Komisija tudi ugotovi, da galicijska regionalna vlada obravnava omenjeno podjetje kot del programov IGAPE za podporo podjetjem [16].
In these circumstances the Commission considers that SODIGA’s actions are imputable to the State.
V teh okoliščinah Komisija meni, da gre odgovornost za dejanja podjetja SODIGA pripisati državi.
In order to decide whether an advantage is conferred on the beneficiary of the measure, the Commission applies the market economy investor principle.
Da bi Komisija odločila, ali ima upravičenec ukrepa prednost, uporablja načelo vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu.
This principle has been applied by the Commission in many cases and has been accepted and developed by the Court in several judgments [17].
Komisija je to načelo uporabila v mnogih primerih, sprejelo in razvijalo pa ga je Sodišče pri več sodbah [17].
The essence of this principle is that when a public authority invests in a company on terms and in conditions which would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions, the investment is not state aid.
Bistvo tega načela je, da v primerih, ko javni organi vlagajo v podjetje po pogojih, ki bi bili sprejemljivi zasebnemu vlagatelju, delujočemu v običajnih pogojih tržnega gospodarstva, naložba ni državna pomoč.
In principle, where in a given transaction a private investor and a public investor take part, there is no state aid if the private and the public investor participate on the same terms and conditions.
Načeloma velja, da kjer sta v dani transakciji udeležena zasebni in javni vlagatelj, ne gre za državno pomoč, če zasebni in javni vlagatelj sodelujeta pod enakimi pogoji.
This is not the case, however, of the acquisition by SODIGA of a stake in the capital of Siderúrgica Añón, for the following reasons:
Vendar to ne velja za pridobitev deleža s strani podjetja SODIGA v kapitalu podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón zaradi naslednjih razlogov:
Firstly, in the first increase in capital, SODIGA paid for its stake immediately, while the private partners paid for theirs later and SODIGA paid EUR 90 for each of the shares it acquired, while the private partners paid only EUR 60 for theirs.
Prvič, pri prvi dokapitalizaciji je podjetje SODIGA plačalo svoj delež takoj, medtem ko so zasebni vlagatelji plačali svoje deleže pozneje; podjetje SODIGA je plačalo 90 EUR za vsako delnico, medtem ko so zasebni partnerji plačali le 60 EUR za vsako svojo delnico.
Secondly, the main beneficiaries of Siderúrgica Añón’s production will be the private partners, who can make profits out of these inputs while SODIGA can only count on the profitability of Siderúrgica Añón in order to obtain a return on its investment.
Drugič, glavni upravičenci do proizvodnje podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón bodo zasebni partnerji, ki lahko imajo dobiček od svojih naložb, medtem ko lahko podjetje SODIGA računa le na donosnost podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón, da bi se mu povrnila naložba.
The Commission cannot accept the argument that the premium paid by SODIGA is normal practice (see recital 43) since the company had not yet started production and was not therefore capable of showing a particularly good performance record which could justify a premium.
Komisija ne more sprejeti argumenta, da je premija, ki jo je plačalo podjetje SODIGA, običajna praksa (glej uvodno izjavo (43)), ker podjetje še ni začelo proizvodnje in zato ni moglo prikazati dobrih rezultatov v preteklosti, ki bi upravičili premijo.
Furthermore, if the argument was accepted, it would have to be applied to the capital injections made by all the investors at that time.
Poleg tega, če bi se sprejel ta argument, bi se moral uporabljati za dokapitalizacijo vseh delničarjev v danem obdobju.
The Commission notes, however, that by virtue of the agreement for the buy-back of the shares, SODIGA ensured a return on investment of 7,2 % which the private shareholders did not have [18].
Vendar Komisija ugotovi, da je s sporazumom za odkup delnic podjetje SODIGA zagotovilo donos na naložbo v višini 7,2 %, česar zasebni delničarji nimajo [18].
The Commission considers that, taking into account the fact that annual instalments are going to be paid, SODIGA’s stake is a minority one which does not allow it any influence over the management of the company and that Siderúrgica Añón will produce mainly for its own shareholders, from an economic point of view this stake can be treated as a subordinated participating loan.
Po mnenju Komisije se ob upoštevanju, da bodo letni obroki plačani, da je delež podjetja SODIGA manjšinski in mu ne omogoča vpliva na upravljanje podjetja ter da bo podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón proizvajalo predvsem za svoje lastne delničarje, ta delež z ekonomskega stališča lahko obravnava kot podrejeno posojilo v obliki deleža.
From the standpoint of the risk involved, however, this investment has to be treated as normal share capital since although subordinated participating loans are ranked below other debt instruments they take priority over share capital.
Ne glede na to pa je treba s stališča tveganja to naložbo obravnavati kot normalni delniški kapital, kajti podrejena posojila v obliki deleža imajo kljub temu, da so podrejena drugim dolžniškim instrumentom, prednost pred delniškim kapitalom.
The question is therefore whether the abovementioned return on investment of 7,2 % would cover the risk involved and be acceptable for a private investor granting a subordinated participating loan.
Vprašanje je, ali bi zgoraj omenjeni donos na naložbo v višini 7,2 % pokril tveganje in bil sprejemljiv za zasebnega vlagatelja, ki bi odobril podrejeno posojilo v obliki deleža.
The Commission, following the approach adopted in Decision 2003/284/EC of 11 December 2002 on the state aid implemented by Spain for Sniace SA [19], considers that the normal interest rate to cover the risk involved would have been 12,33 % for the first increase in capital and 11,06 % for the second.
Komisija ob upoštevanju pristopa, sprejetega v Odločbi Komisije 2003/284/ES z dne 11. decembra 2002 o državni pomoči Španije za Sniace SA [19], meni, da bi bila običajna obrestna mera za kritje tveganja 12,33 % pri prvi dokapitalizaciji in 11,06 % pri drugi.
This corresponds to the interbank rate used by the Commission for the calculation of its market reference rate, plus the normal 75 basis points it adds for loans in Spain (6,33 % on 19 April 2001 and 5,06 % on 1 March 2002), plus 600 basis points.
To ustreza medbančni obrestni meri, ki jo Komisija uporablja za izračunavanje tržne referenčne stopnje ob prištetih običajnih 75 baznih točkah, ki jih dodaja pri posojilih v Španiji (6,33 % 19. aprila 2001 in 5,06 % 1. marca 2002), ob prištetih 600 baznih točkah.
These 600 basis points are justified by the absence of any security, the risk involved in the entry of a new company in the steel sector, which suffers from structural overcapacity, and the fact that, as explained earlier, it involves a much higher risk than a normal loan (in case of insolvency, all creditors would have priority) [20].
Teh 600 baznih točk je upravičenih zaradi pomanjkanja vsakega poroštva, zaradi tveganja pri novem podjetju v sektorju jeklarstva, za katerega je značilen presežek zmogljivosti, in zaradi dejstva, da, kot je bilo obrazloženo zgoraj, obstaja večje tveganje kot pri običajnem posojilu (v primeru nelikvidnosti bi imeli vsi upniki prednost) [20].
This is in line with the indications contained in the Commission notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates [21], which states that the reference rate may be increased by 400 basis points or more in situations involving particular risk (for example, where the security normally required by banks is not provided).
To je v skladu z navedbami v Obvestilu Komisije o načinu določanja referenčnih obrestnih mer in diskontnih stopenj [21], ki navaja, da se lahko referenčna stopnja zviša za 400 baznih točk ali več pri situacijah posebnega tveganja (na primer, kadar poroštva, ki jih zahtevajo banke niso pridobljena).
The Commission considers therefore that the acquisition of the stake at issue confers an advantage on Siderúrgica Añón which is financed through state resources.
Komisija zato meni, da pridobitev deleža dejansko daje prednost podjetju Siderúrgica Ańón, ki se financira iz državnih sredstev.
The aid element in the two stakes is equivalent to the difference in interest rates between 12,33 % and 7,2 %, i.e. 5,13 %, in the case of the first stake and between 11,06 % and 7,2 %, i.e. 3,86 %, in the case of the second stake.
Element pomoči pri obeh deležih je enak razliki v obrestnih stopnjah med 12,33 % in 7,2 % – oziroma 5,13 % – pri prvem deležu ter razliki v obrestnih stopnjah med 11,06 % in 7,2 % – oziroma 3,86 % – pri drugem deležu.
Taking into account the instalments being paid by Siderúrgica Añón to SODIGA, this aid then corresponds to the difference between the reimbursements actually being paid and the annual interest payments and reimbursement of the principal that would be due when applying the abovementioned normal interest rates of 12,33 % and 11,06 % respectively.
Ob upoštevanju obrokov, ki jih podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón plačuje podjetju SODIGA, ta pomoč torej ustreza razliki med odplačili, ki se dejansko izplačajo, in letnimi plačili obresti ter odplačilom glavnice, ki bi ga bilo treba izplačati ob uporabi zgoraj navedenih običajnih obrestnih mer 12,33 % in 11,06 %.
The latter results in yearly interest payments of EUR 222317,3 due for the first stake and EUR 54766,9 due for the second.
To vodi v letna plačila obresti 222317,3 EUR za prvi delež in 54766,9 EUR za drugi.
The difference between the appropriate interest payments and the actual reimbursement schedule for the two stakes can be set out as follows [22]:
Razlika med primernimi plačili obresti in dejanskimi roki odplačevanja za oba deleža se lahko prikaže kot spodaj [22]:
First stake of EUR 1803060 (2001)
Prvi delež v višini 1803060 EUR (2001)
Aid-free reimbursement schedule
Roki odplačevanja brez pomoči
Current reimbursement schedule
Trenutni roki odplačevanja
Aid per year
Pomoč na leto
Second stake of EUR 495180 (2002)
Drugi delež v višini 495180 EUR (2002)
The loan granted through INESGA
Posojilo, ki ga je odobril sklad INESGA
As regards the loan granted through INESGA (see recital 26), the Commission considers that state aid elements could be involved since the interest rate appears to be rather low.
V zvezi s posojilom prek sklada INESGA (glej uvodno izjavo (26)) Komisija meni, da bi lahko bili prisotni elementi državne pomoči, ker se obrestna mera zdi precej nizka.
The Commission notes, however, that the funds are provided by private banks which are free to decide whether or not to participate in the loan.
Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da sredstva prispevajo zasebne banke, ki se lahko svobodno odločajo, ali bodo sodelovale v posojilu ali ne.
In these circumstances, the Commission concludes that the better financial terms are due to IGAPE’s intervention (guarantee, interest subsidy paid directly to the banks) and to the fact that it is a syndicated loan.
V teh okoliščinah Komisija ugotavlja, da obstajajo boljši finančni pogoji zaradi posredovanja IGAPE (poroštvo, subvencioniranje obresti za neposredno plačilo bankam) in zaradi dejstva, da gre za sindicirano posojilo.
Therefore, no state aid is involved in the loan itself.
Zato v samem posojilu ni državne pomoči.
The guarantee granted by IGAPE
Poroštvo IGAPE
With regard to the guarantee granted by IGAPE (see recital 26), the Commission’s practice [23] for assessing individual guarantees includes several conditions for a guarantee not to constitute state aid.
V zvezi s poroštvom IGAPE (glej uvodno izjavo (26)), praksa Komisije [23] za ocenjevanje posameznih poroštev vključuje več pogojev, da poroštvo ni državna pomoč.
In the present case, the Commission notes that Siderúrgica Añón was not in financial difficulty within the meaning of the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [24] and has obtained loans on the financial markets without any intervention from the State.
V tem primeru je Komisija ugotovila, da podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón ni imelo finančnih težav v smislu Smernic Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah [24] in je pridobilo posojila na finančnih trgih brez posredovanja države.
It also notes that the guarantee is linked to a specific loan, is for a fixed maximum amount, covers 30 % of the outstanding loan and is not open-ended.
Ugotovila je tudi, da je poroštvo vezano na točno določeno posojilo, velja za fiksni maksimalni znesek, pokriva 30 % dolgovanega posojila in ni odprtega tipa.