natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This association put forward a number of allegations concerning the behaviour of the Community producers on the Community market to the detriment of independent distributors of agrochemicals.
Združenje je navedlo vrsto obtožb o ravnanju proizvajalcev Skupnosti na trgu Skupnosti na škodo neodvisnih distributerjev kemikalij za kmetijsko uporabo.
This association and an importer/formulator claimed that the Community market is heavily protected against imports through regulatory barriers, namely Council Directive 91/414/EC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market [8], therefore making it unnecessary for measures to remain in place.
To združenje in en uvoznik/formulator sta trdila, da je trg Skupnosti s pomočjo regulativnih ovir močno zaščiten proti uvozu, na primer z Direktivo Sveta 91/414/ES z dne 15. julija 1991 o dajanju fitofarmacevtskih sredstev v promet [8], zato ni potrebno, da ukrepi ostanejo v veljavi.
This claim was repeated by the association following disclosure of the findings.
To trditev je združenje ponovilo po obvestilu o ugotovitvah.
It has to be noted that this Directive does not relate to trade defence, but rather to environmental safety issues.
Treba je vedeti, da se ta direktiva ne nanaša na trgovinsko zaščito, temveč na varstvo okolja.
It was nevertheless argued that obtaining the necessary information for registration of glyphosate is both costly and time consuming and acts as a deterrent for importers/formulators to import glyphosate from third countries.
Kljub temu je združenje ugovarjalo, da je pridobivanje potrebnih informacij za registracijo glifosata drago in zamudno ter da odvrača uvoznike/formulatorje od uvoza glifosata iz tretjih držav.
However, in practice this does not appear to be a severe limitation since a number of importers/formulators have succeeded in obtaining registration under Directive 91/414/EC.
Vendar pa se v praksi to ne zdi takšna ovira, ker je več uvoznikom/formulatorjem uspelo pridobiti registracijo iz Direktive 91/414/ES.
Furthermore, the cooperating importer/formulator stated that they would import glyphosate originating in the PRC should measures be lifted.
Poleg tega je sodelujoči uvoznik/formulator dejal, da bi uvažal glifosat s poreklom iz LRK, če bi bili ukrepi odpravljeni.
Therefore, it is considered that Directive 91/414/EC does not close the Community market to imports of glyphosate from the PRC.
Zato se šteje, da Direktiva 91/414/ES ne zapira trga Skupnosti za uvoz glifosata iz LRK.
The association further claimed that low prices of ‘generic’ standard formulated products produced by formulators based on acid or salt manufactured by a certain Community producer are compensated by high prices of ‘branded’ equivalent products sold by the same producer.
Združenje je trdilo tudi, da se nizke cene „generičnih“ standardnih formuliranih izdelkov, ki jih proizvajajo formulatorji na osnovi kisline ali soli določenega proizvajalca Skupnosti, poravnavajo z visokimi cenami enakovrednih izdelkov z „znamkami“, ki jih prodaja isti proizvajalec.
It was claimed that these low priced ‘generic’ products would act as a deterrent toward the entry of other manufactures, including imports of glyphosate originating in the PRC, to the Community market.
Trdilo je, da bi te nizke cene „generičnih“ izdelkov ovirale prodor ostalih proizvajalcev, vključno z uvozom glifosata s poreklom iz LRK, na trg Skupnosti.
While it was confirmed that formulators purchase acid and/or salt from this Community producer at low prices, it could not be said that the Community producer was in a position to achieve high prices on its formulated products.
Čeprav se je potrdilo, da formulatorji kupujejo kislino in/ali sol od tega proizvajalca Skupnosti po nizkih cenah, ni mogoče trditi, da lahko proizvajalec Skupnosti dosega visoke cene za formulirane izdelke.
As stated in recital 75, Community producers, including the producer concerned, were selling their standard formulated products (which are branded products) at a loss during the analysis period, which makes the claim that they would be in a position to obtain high prices on their ‘brand’ products implausible.
Po uvodni izjavi (75) zgoraj, so proizvajalci Skupnosti, tudi omenjeni proizvajalec, svoje standardne formulirane izdelke (z znamko) v analiznem obdobju prodajali z izgubami. Zato se zdi neverjetna trditev, da bi lahko dosegali visoke cene za svoje izdelke z „znamkami“.
This association also claimed that two Community producers operate a cartel in the Community because one of them appears to limit its market share in the Community while they could supply a much larger share of the Community market.
Združenje je tudi trdilo, da dva proizvajalca Skupnosti delujeta v kartelu v Skupnosti, ker se zdi, da eden od njiju omejuje svoj tržni delež v Skupnosti, čeprav bi lahko dobavljala veliko večji delež na trg Skupnosti.
In this regard, it should be noted that evidence presented in support of the claim was not conclusive, since factors other than the existence of a cartel could explain the alleged limitation of the market share by the Community producer.
V tej zvezi je treba vnaprej opozoriti, da dokazi za to trditev niso bili zadostni, saj bi tudi drugi dejavniki razen obstoja kartela lahko razložili domnevno omejevanje tržnega deleža s strani proizvajalca Skupnosti.
First of all, it has to be pointed out that the market share of not only the producer in question but also of other producers did not vary substantially over the analysis period.
Najprej je treba povedati, da niti tržni delež omenjenega proizvajalca niti drugih proizvajalcev niso znatno nihali v analiznem obdobju.
Secondly, sales on export markets could be made at higher prices, and hence the fact that the company did not sell more in the Community as opposed to outside of it could possibly be explained by other factors such as, for example, the company's own efforts to maximise returns on export markets which were more profitable than the Community market.
Poleg tega je bilo mogoče po višjih cenah prodajati na izvoznih trgih, torej je dejstvo, da podjetje v Skupnosti ni prodajalo več kot zunaj nje, mogoče razložiti z drugimi dejavniki, kot na primer lastnimi prizadevanji podjetja za čimvečje zvečanje prihodkov na izvoznih trgih, ki so bili bolj donosni kot trg Skupnosti.
Furthermore, the production of the Community industry is significantly larger than consumption in the Community and, therefore, it is important economically for all Community manufacturers to export glyphosate to third countries in order to achieve high capacity utilisation in order to fully absorb their fixed costs.
Nadalje je proizvodnja industrije Skupnosti bistveno večja od porabe Skupnosti, in je zato gospodarsko pomembno za vse proizvajalce iz Skupnosti, da izvažajo glifosat v tretje države, da lahko dosežejo visoko izkoriščenost zmogljivosti in v celoti absorbirajo fiksne stroške.
In this context, there is at present insufficient evidence to conclude that a cartel exists, involving the deliberate limitation of quantities supplied to the Community market to the detriment of consumers.
S tega stališča trenutno ni dovolj dokazov o obstoju kartela, ki bi v škodo potrošnikov namenoma omejeval količino dobave na trg Skupnosti.
Finally, the question of the existence or not of any cartel is a matter which should rather be addressed in the context of an anti-trust investigation.
Končno je vprašanje obstoja ali neobstoja katerega koli kartela vprašanje, ki bi ga bilo potrebno obravnavati v protimonopolni preiskavi.
However, no anti-trust procedure has been initiated, to date, by the Commission on this matter.
Toda do sedaj Komisija še ni uvedla nobene protimonopolne preiskave o tej zadevi.
On the other hand, there was no indication concerning possible negative effects of the continuation of the anti-dumping measures as regards the glyphosate distributors.
Po drugi strani pa ni bilo nobenega znaka o možnih negativnih učinkih nadaljevanja protidampinških ukrepov na distributerje glifosata.
As regards the consumers of the product, these are essentially farmers.
Potrošniki izdelka pa so večinoma kmetje.
A reduction in the price of glyphosate would have a minimal effect on their profitability since this is only a relatively minor item in the overall cost of crop growing.
Znižanje cen glifosata bi minimalno vplivalo na njihovo donosnost, ker je to le majhen del celotnih stroškov pri gojenju pridelkov.
It was established that the expiry of the measures would lead to an improvement in the profit margin of farmers which would be of the order of 0,1 %.
Ugotovljeno je bilo, da bi iztek ukrepov izboljšal stopnjo dobička kmetov za približno 0,1 %.
For the abovementioned reasons, it is considered that any benefits afforded to the Community industry resulting from maintaining the measures would outweigh any marginal negative impact that may result for the distributors and consumers concerned.
Zaradi zgoraj omenjenega se šteje, da bi koristi, ki bi jih imela industrija Skupnosti zaradi nadaljevanja ukrepov, odtehtale te nepomembne negativne posledice za vpletene distributerje in potrošnike.
Conclusion on Community interest
Zaključek o interesu Skupnosti
Should the existing measures expire, it is expected that the Community industry would suffer significant losses due to price depression on the Community market, which would either lead to a loss of market share against increased imports originating in the PRC or a further deterioration of their sales prices should they attempt to maintain their market share.
Če bi obstoječi ukrepi prenehali veljati, bi bilo pričakovati, da bi industrija Skupnosti utrpela precejšnje izgube zaradi padca cen na trgu Skupnosti. To bi povzročilo izgubo tržnega deleža zaradi povečanega uvoza s poreklom iz LRK ali pa nadaljnje zniževanje prodajnih cen, v primeru, da bi industrija Skupnosti skušala obdržati svoj tržni delež.
Importers/formulators could benefit from an increasing market share due to cheaper supply of glyphosate originating in the PRC, but, compared to the losses incurred by the Community industry, the economic effect of this for importers/formulators would be minor in view of the need to pass on price reductions to their clients.
Uvozniki/formulatorji bi lahko imeli koristi od povečanega tržnega deleža zaradi cenejše dobave glifosata s poreklom iz LRK, vendar bi bil v primerjavi z izgubami, ki bi jih imela industrija Skupnosti, gospodarski učinek za uvoznike/formulatorje majhen, ker bi od nižjih cen imeli koristi predvsem njihovi kupci.
There was no indication concerning possible negative effects of the continuation of the anti-dumping measures as regards the glyphosate distributors.
Nobenega znaka ni bilo o možnih negativnih učinkih nadaljevanja protidampinških ukrepov na distributerje glifosata.
For users, although these might benefit somewhat from lower prices if measures were removed, this would not have a significant effect on their profit margin or, consequently, on their activity.
Čeprav bi uporabniki lahko imeli nekaj koristi od nižjih cen, če bi se ukrepe ukinilo, pa to ne bi občutno vplivalo na njihovo stopnjo dobička in posledično na njihovo dejavnost.
After weighing the interests of the various parties involved, the Commission concludes that there are no compelling reasons of Community interest against the continuation of measures.
Potem ko je pretehtala interese različnih vpletenih strank, Komisija zaključuje, da ni v interesu Skupnosti nobenih tehtnih razlogov proti nadaljevanju ukrepov.
PROPOSED DUTIES
PREDLAGANE DAJATVE
The product type used as a reference to determine the duty rate was glyphosate acid because it is the common base of all forms of glyphosate exported from the PRC and produced in the Community.
Referenčna vrsta izdelka za ugotavljanje stopnje dajatve je bila glifosatna kislina, ker je to skupna osnova za vse oblike glifosata, ki ga LRK izvaža in ki ga proizvaja Skupnost.
It was found that acid accounts for 55 % of the manufacturing costs of the equivalent quantity of standard 360 formulated product.
Ugotovljeno je bilo, da kislina predstavlja 55 % proizvodnih stroškov enakovredne količine standardnega formuliranega pripravka 360.
Moreover, the acid form represented more than 90 % of the volume imported from the PRC during the investigation period.
Poleg tega je oblika kisline v OP predstavljala več kot 90 % obsega uvoza iz LRK.
It is therefore considered that a duty established on the basis of data concerning glyphosate acid would be representative of all different forms of glyphosate imported from the PRC.
Zato se šteje, da bi bila dajatev, osnovana na podatkih o glifosatni kislini, reprezentančna za vse različne oblike glifosata, ki se uvozi iz LRK.
For the purposes of calculating the price increase necessary in order to remove the injurious effects of dumping, it was considered appropriate to compare the prices of the dumped imports with the production costs of glyphosate acid of the Community industry increased by an amount sufficient to achieve a reasonable level of profit.
Da bi se lahko izračunalo zvišanje cene, ki je potrebno za odstranitev škodljivih učinkov dampinga, se je štelo za primerno primerjati cene dampinškega uvoza s proizvodnimi stroški glifosatne kisline, ki jo proizvaja industrija Skupnosti, katerim pa se doda zadostna vsota za doseganje razumne stopnje dobička.
The Commission took the view that a profit margin of 5 % represented a reasonable profit since glyphosate acid is a commodity, theoretically sold in bulk to intermediate customers who bear the extra cost of formulation before selling it in the market to end users, as already considered in the original investigation.
Komisija je zavzela stališče, da 5-odstotna stopnja dobička predstavlja razumen dobiček, ker je glifosatna kislina tržni izdelek, ki se teoretično na veliko prodaja vmesnim kupcem, ki nosijo dodatne stroške formulacije izdelkov pred prodajo končnim uporabnikom na trgu, kot je že bilo upoštevano v prvotni preiskavi.
On this basis, the weighted average of the export prices for this product type for the IP, on a cif Community frontier level, was compared with the weighted average total cost of production of the Community producers, increased to give by a profit margin of 5 %.
Na tej podlagi se je ponderirano povprečno izvozno ceno za to vrsto izdelka v OP na stopnji CIF meja Skupnosti primerjalo s ponderiranimi povprečnimi skupnimi stroški proizvodnje proizvajalcev Skupnosti, katerim se je dodalo 5-odstotno stopnjo dobička.
This comparison showed an underselling margin of 80 %.
Ta primerjava je pokazala, da obstaja 80-odstotna stopnja prodaje po nižjih cenah.
Since the injury margin is higher than the dumping margin found, the anti-dumping duties should be based on the dumping margin in accordance with the provisions of Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation.
Ker je stopnja škode višja od ugotovljene stopnje dampinga, bi protidampinške dajatve morale temeljiti na stopnji dampinga v skladu z določbami člena 7(2) osnovne uredbe.
In view of the findings above, it is considered appropriate that the anti-dumping duties imposed by the original measures should be set at the level mentioned below:
Glede na zgoraj ugotovljeno se upošteva, da je primerno, da se postavi proti-dampinške dajatve iz prvotnih ukrepov na spodaj navedeno stopnjo:
Rate of AD duty
Stopnja protidampinške dajatve
All exporting producers
vsi proizvajalci – izvozniki
The anti-dumping duty in force in respect of glyphosate was extended by Regulation (EC) No 163/2002 to cover, in addition, imports of glyphosate consigned from Malaysia and Taiwan, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or Taiwan or not.
Uredba (ES) št. 163/2002 je veljavno protidampinško dajatev za glifosat razširila še na uvoz glifosata, poslanega iz Malezije in Tajvana, ne glede na to, ali je njegovo poreklo deklarirano v Maleziji ali Tajvanu ali ne.
As a consequence of the fact that the anti-dumping duty, as calculated in this review, replaces the duty in force, the anti-dumping duty to be applied to imports of the product concerned, as set out in recital 122, should be extended to imports of glyphosate consigned from Malaysia and Taiwan, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or Taiwan or not.
Kot posledica dejstva, da protidampinška dajatev, izračunana v tem pregledu, nadomešča obstoječo dajatev, bi se moralo protidampinško dajatev na uvoz zadevnega izdelka po uvodni izjavi (122) zgoraj razširiti na uvoz glifosata, poslanega iz Malezije in Tajvana, ne glede na to, ali je njegovo poreklo deklarirano v Maleziji ali Tajvanu ali ne.
The two exporting producers who were exempted from the measures as extended by Regulation (EC) No 163/2002 should also be exempted from the measures as imposed by this Regulation.
Oba proizvajalca - izvoznika, ki sta bila izvzeta iz ukrepov po Uredbi (ES) št. 163/2002, bi morala biti izvzeta tudi iz ukrepov iz te uredbe.
In accordance with Article 20 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, all parties concerned were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to propose to reduce the level the existing measures.
V skladu s členom 20 osnovne protidampinške uredbe so bile vse zadevne stranke obveščene o bistvenih dejstvih in razmislekih, na podlagi katerih se je nameravalo predlagati znižanje stopnje obstoječih ukrepov.
They were also granted a period within which to make representations subsequent to that disclosure.
Po obvestilu jim je bil dan tudi rok za podajo stališč.
The comments received have been taken into consideration.
Prejete pripombe so bile upoštevane.
It follows from the above that, based on the findings of the review investigations, the anti-dumping duties imposed by Regulation (EC) No 368/98, should be lowered to 29,9 % expressed as a percentage of the net free-at-Community frontier price before duty,
Iz zgoraj navedenega sledi, da bi se na podlagi zaključkov ugotovitev o pregledih protidampinške dajatve iz Uredbe (ES) št. 368/98, moralo spustiti na 29,9 %, izraženo v odstotkih na neto ceno franko meja Skupnosti, neocarinjeno –
A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of glyphosate falling within CN codes ex29310095 (TARIC code 2931009582) and ex38083027 (TARIC code 3808302719) originating in the People's Republic of China.
Uvede se dokončna protidampinška dajatev na uvoz glifosata, ki spada pod oznaki KN ex29310095 (oznaka TARIC 2931009582) in ex38083027 (oznaka TARIC 3808302719), s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske.
The definitive anti-dumping duty mentioned in paragraph 1 is hereby extended to imports of glyphosate consigned from Malaysia (whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not) (TARIC codes 2931009581 and 3808302711) with the exception of those produced by Crop Protection (M) Sdn.
Dokončna protidampinška dajatev, omenjena v odstavku 1, se razširi na uvoz glifosata, poslanega iz Malezije (ne glede na to, ali je njegovo poreklo deklarirano v Maleziji ali ne) (oznaki TARIC 2931009581 in 3808302711), z izjemo glifosata, ki ga proizvaja Crop Protection (M) Sdn.
Bhd., Lot 746, Jalan Haji Sirat 4 1/2 Miles, off Jalan Kapar, 42100 Klang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia
Bhd., Lot 746, Jalan Haji Sirat 4 1/2 Miles, off Jalan Kapar, 42100 Klang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malezija
(TARIC additional code A309).
(dodatna oznaka TARIC A309).
The definitive anti-dumping duty mentioned in paragraph 1 is hereby extended to imports of glyphosate consigned from Taiwan (whether declared as originating in Taiwan or not) (TARIC codes 2931009581 and 3808302711) with the exception of those produced by Sinon Corporation, No 23, Sec.
Dokončna protidampinška dajatev, omenjena v odstavku 1, se razširi na uvoz glifosata, poslanega iz Tajvana (ne glede na to, ali je njegovo poreklo deklarirano v Tajvanu ali ne) (oznaki TARIC 2931009581 in 3808302711), z izjemo glifosata, ki ga proizvaja Sinon Corporation, No. 23, Sec.
(TARIC additional code A310).
(dodatna oznaka TARIC A310).
The rate of duty applicable to the net free-at-Community-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraphs 1 to 3, shall be 29,9 %.
Stopnja dajatev na neto ceno franko meja Skupnosti, neocarinjeno, izdelkov iz odstavkov od 1 do 3, je 29,9 %.
The anti-dumping duties shall be imposed for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Regulation.
Protidampinške dajatve se uvedejo za obdobje petih let od začetka veljavnosti te uredbe.
OJ L 47, 18.2.1998, p. 1.
UL L 47, 18.2.1998, str. 1.
OJ L 124, 25.5.2000, p. 1.
UL L 124, 25.5.2000, str. 1.
OJ L 30, 31.1.2002, p. 1.
UL L 30, 31.1.2002, str. 1.
OJ C 120, 23.5.2002, p. 3.
UL C 120, 23.5.2002, str. 3.
OJ C 36, 15.2.2003, p. 18.
UL C 36, 15.2.2003, str. 18.
Salt of glyphosate acid and Isopropylamine.
Sol glifosatne kisline in izopropilamina.
Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 2004/71/EC (OJ L 127, 29.4.2004, p. 104).
Direktiva, kakor je bila nazadnje spremenjena z Direktivo Komisije št. 2004/71/ES (UL L 127, 29.4.2004, str. 104).
(Index)
(indeks)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1684/2004
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1684/2004
This Regulation shall enter into force on 30 September 2004.
Ta uredba začne veljati 30. septembra 2004.
to Commission Regulation of 29 September 2004 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables
k Uredbi Komisije z dne 29. septembra 2004 o določitvi pavšalnih uvoznih vrednosti za določanje vhodne cene nekaterega sadja in zelenjave
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1685/2004
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1685/2004
amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 1327/2004 on a standing invitation to tender to determine levies and/or refunds on exports of white sugar for the 2004/2005 marketing year
Sprememba Uredbe (ES) št. 1327/2004 o stalnem javnem razpisu za določitev prelevmanov in/ali povračil pri izvozu belega sladkorja za tržno leto 2004/2005
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector [1], and in particular Articles 22(2), 27(5) and (15) and 33(3) thereof,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1260/2001 z dne 19. junija 2001 o skupni ureditvi trga za sladkor [1], in zlasti člena 22(2), člena 27(5) in (15) ter člena 33(3) Uredbe,
Article 4(2)(b) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1327/2004 [2] lays down the time limits for partial invitations to tender.
Člen 4(2)(b) Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1327/2004 [2] določa roke za oddajo ponudb posamičnih javnih razpisov.
The fourth indent of Article 4(2)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1327/2004 is hereby replaced by the following:
Četrta alinea člena 4(2)(b) Uredbe (ES) št. 1327/2004 se nadomesti z naslednjim:
11 and 25 November 2004,’.
11 in 25. november 2004“
Member States shall amend their notices of invitation to tender to bring them into line with the amendment in Article 1.
Države članice pripravijo obvestilo o oddaji javnega razpisa v skladu s spremembo člena 1.
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Ta uredba začne veljati na dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske Unije.
Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 39/2004 (OJ L 6, 10.1.2004, p. 16).
Uredba, kakor je bila nazadnje spremenjena z uredbo Komisije (ES) št. 39/2004 (UL L 6, 10.1.2004, str. 16).
Since 1 and 2 November 2004 are public holidays in the majority of Member States, the invitation to tender scheduled for Thursday 4 November 2004 will not take place for reasons relating to administration and sound management. Article 4(2) should be amended accordingly.
Z obzirom na dejstvo, da je 1. in 2. november 2004 nacionalni praznik v večini držav članic, se urnik oddaje javnega razpisa pomakne na četrtek 4. novembra 2004, kateri bo zaradi administrativnih in poslovnih razlogov iz člena (4)(2) spremenjen.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1686/2004
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1686/2004
authorising transfers between the quantitative limits of textiles and clothing products originating in Macao
o odobritvi prenosa med količinskimi omejitvami tekstila in oblačil s poreklom iz Macaa