natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Therefore, the measure is considered to grant an aid through State resources (via the Thüringer Aufbaubank).
Zato gre pri ukrepu za pomoč, dodeljeno iz državnih sredstev (preko banke Thüringer Aufbaubank).
As the guarantees were given to a company that was in financial difficulties, the Commission considers the aid element to be equal to 100 % of the guaranteed amount, namely DEM 880000 for the first and DEM 2000000 for the second guarantee, in total DEM 2,88 million.
Ker so bila jamstva za podjetje v finančnih težavah prevzeta, Komisija izhaja iz dejstva, da element pomoči ustreza 100 % zajamčenega zneska v višini 880000 DEM za prvo jamstvo in 2 mio DEM za drugo jamstvo, skupaj torej 2,88 mio DEM.
The aid is selective in that it favours a single company, Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH.
Do pomoči so upravičena določena podjetja, v zadevnem primeru le podjetje Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH.
According to the case law of the Court of Justice, improvement in the competitive position of a company resulting from a State aid generally points to a distortion of competition compared with other competing companies not receiving such assistance [9].
Po sodni praksi Evropskega sodišča izboljšanje konkurenčnega položaja podjetja na osnovi državne pomoči na splošno nakazuje izkrivljanje konkurence nasproti konkurenčnim podjetjem, ki niso prejela takšne podpore [9].
Neither the relatively low level of aid nor the relatively modest size of the beneficiary company rules out the possibility of trade between Member States being distorted [10].
Niti sorazmerno majhen obseg pomoči niti sorazmerno majhna velikost upravičenega podjetja vnaprej ne izključujeta možnosti oviranja trgovine med državami članicami [10].
A measure affects trade between Member States if it hampers imports from other Member States or facilitates exports to other Member States; the deciding factor is whether there is a risk that intra-Community trade will develop differently or is liable to develop differently as a result of the measure in question.
Ukrep ovira trgovino med državami članicami takrat, ko otežuje uvoz iz drugih držav članic ali olajša izvoz v druge države članice. Odločilno pri tem je, da se promet znotraj Skupnosti na podlagi vprašljivega ukrepa različno razvija ali bi se lahko različno razvijal.
The products to which the aid in question relates are involved in trade between Member States [11] and are thus exposed to competition.
Izdelki, ki so podprti s programom pomoči, so predmet trgovine med državami članicami [11] in so torej izpostavljeni konkurenci.
Therefore, there is a risk that intra-Community trade has developed differently as a result of the measure.
Zato obstaja bojazen, da se je zaradi ukrepa promet znotraj Skupnosti razvil drugače.
The measure in question thus constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Zadevni ukrep zato predstavlja pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
Article 87(2) of the EC Treaty: exceptions
Člen 87(2) Pogodbe ES: dejansko stanje izjem
Exceptions to the prohibition laid down in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty are set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article.
Prepovedi državnih pomoči v členu 87(1) Pogodbe ES v odstavkih 2 in 3 sledi dejansko stanje izjem.
The exceptions listed in Article 87(2) are not applicable, given the nature of the aid measure and its objectives.
Pogoji za izjeme od pravil v skladu s členom 87(2) Pogodbe ES na podlagi vrste ukrepa pomoči in njegove ciljne naravnanosti niso podani.
Nor has Germany claimed that Article 87(2) is applicable.
Sicer pa Nemčija ni uveljavila uporabe člena 87(2).
Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty: exceptions at the Commission’s discretion
Člen 87(3) Pogodbe ES: dejansko stanje izjem v presoji Komisije
Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty lists aids which may be considered to be compatible with the common market.
V členu 87(3) Pogodbe ES so navedene pomoči, ki jih je mogoče obravnavati kot združljive s skupnim trgom.
Their compatibility with the Treaty has to be studied from the point of view of the Community, not solely that of a given Member State.
Njihovo združljivost s Pogodbo je potrebno preveriti tako z nacionalnega stališča kot tudi z vidika Skupnosti.
To ensure the proper operation of the common market, the exceptions provided for in Article 87(3) must be interpreted in a strict manner.
Da bi se zagotovilo nemoteno delovanje skupnega trga, je potrebno natančno upoštevati dejansko stanje izjem, ki je oblikovano v členu 87(3).
As regards Article 87(3)(a) of the EC Treaty, it is pointed out that the beneficiary of the aid is located in a region where the economic situation can be described as extremely unfavourable in relation to the Community as a whole according to the Guidelines on national regional aid [12] (having a per capita gross domestic product, measured in purchasing power standards, of less than 75 % of the Community average).
V zvezi s členom 87(3)(a) Pogodbe ES je potrebno opozoriti na dejstvo, da ima upravičeno podjetje sedež v regiji, katere gospodarsko stanje je mogoče v skladu s Smernicami za državne pomoči z regionalno naravnanostjo [12], merjeno na ravni Skupnosti, v celoti gledano obravnavati kot skrajno neugodno (BDP na prebivalca – merjeno na kupni moči – je pod 75 % evropskega povprečja).
However, the abovementioned regional aid guidelines (and a previous version of these guidelines [13]) state that the specific provisions concerning the granting of State aid in Article 87(3)(a) regions are not applicable in the agriculture sector.
Po navedenih Smernicah za državne pomoči z regionalno naravnanostjo (in po prejšnji različici teh smernic [13] predpisi glede dodelitve državnih pomoči v regijah v skladu s členom 87(3)(a) Pogodbe ES za kmetijski sektor ne veljajo.
Therefore, Article 87(3)(a) of the EC Treaty cannot justify an aid for the production, processing or marketing of Annex I products.
Zato člena 87(3)(a) Pogodbe ES ni mogoče uporabiti za utemeljitev pomoči za proizvodnjo, predelavo in trženje izdelkov Priloge I.
As regards Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, it is noted that the measure concerned is not intended to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy in Germany.
V zvezi s členom 87(3)(b) Pogodbe ES je mogoče ugotoviti, da zadevni ukrep ne služi niti pospeševanju pomembnega načrta skupnega evropskega interesa niti ne odpravlja znatne motnje gospodarskega življenja v Nemčiji.
Nor is the aid designed or intended or appropriate to the objectives referred to in Article 87(3)(d) of the EC Treaty.
Poleg tega ukrep ni niti določen niti primeren za uresničevanje ciljev v skladu s členom 87(3)(d) Pogodbe ES.
Article 87(3)(c)of the EC Treaty
Člen 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES
Aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas may be deemed by the Commission to be compatible with the common market under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty if the aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Pomoči, ki pospešujejo razvoj določene gospodarske panoge ali gospodarskega območja, lahko Komisija v skladu s členom 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES obravnava za združljive s skupnim trgom, dokler olajšujejo razvoj določene gospodarske panoge ali gospodarskega območja in pogojev trgovanja ne spreminjajo na način, ki je v nasprotju s skupnim interesom.
Normally, the Commission would assess compatibility with Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty of aid granted to companies in financial difficulty on the basis of the 2004 Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [14] (2004 guidelines).
Običajno bi Komisija združljivost pomoči za podjetja, ki so v finančnih težavah, presojala v skladu s členom 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES na podlagi Smernic Skupnosti za državne pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah [14] iz leta 2004 (smernice iz leta 2004).
However, in accordance with points 103 and 104 of these guidelines, the Commission assesses aid notified prior to 10 October 2004 as well as non-notified rescue and restructuring aid granted in full before the publication of the 2004 guidelines on the basis of the guidelines in force at the time of notification or at the time the aid was granted, as the case may be.
Komisija pa v skladu s točkama 103 in 104 Smernic presoja tako pomoči, priglašene pred 10. oktobrom 2004, kot tudi pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, ki so bile dodeljene v celoti pred objavo smernic iz leta 2004 in niso priglašene, na podlagi smernic, veljavnih v času priglasitve oz. v času dodelitve pomoči.
Aid 1 was granted in 1996 and Aid 2 was notified in November 1997.
Pomoč 1 je bila dodeljena leta 1996, pomoč 2 je bila priglašena novembra 1997.
At the time, the 1994 Community guidelines on State aid were in force.
V tem času so veljale smernice iz leta 1994.
According to point 2.2 of the 1994 guidelines, special rules for rescue and restructuring aid could be applied to individual beneficiaries in the agriculture sector at the discretion of the Member State concerned.
Po točki 2.2 smernic iz leta 1994 je v presoji držav članic za kmetijski sektor zapisano, naj se v tem sektorju še naprej uporabljajo posebni predpisi Komisije glede pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje za posamezne prejemnike pomoči, ki veljajo pred začetkom veljavnosti istih smernic.
Germany has not asked for the application of special rules.
Nemčija ni zaprosila za uveljavljanje te možnosti.
Therefore, the measure is assessed under the conditions and provisions of the 1994 guidelines.
Zato se bo ukrep presojal na podlagi določb smernic iz leta 1994.
Aid 1
Pomoč 1
Aid 1 concerns an 80 % State guarantee on loans worth DEM 1,1 million.
Pomoč 1 zadeva 80 % državnega jamstva za posojilo v vrednosti 1,1 mio DEM.
The Commission initiated the procedure provided for under Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty on the following grounds:
Komisija je sprožila postopek iz člena 88(2) Pogodbe ES iz naslednjih razlogov:
it was not certain whether the guarantee complied with the specific conditions required for a State guarantee,
ni bilo gotovo, ali je jamstvo v skladu s posebnimi pogoji za državna jamstva;
there was no restructuring plan which would show the aid was compatible with the rescue and restructuring guidelines.
ni obstojal načrt za prestrukturiranje (zasnova sanacije), iz katerega bi izhajalo, da je pomoč v skladu s Smernicami za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah.
Germany has sent a copy of the guarantee contract.
Nemčija je posredovala kopijo jamstvene pogodbe.
This copy shows that the guarantee can only be invoked when the benefiting company is in financial difficulties (bankruptcy- or a similar procedure) and when the sale of other assets owned by the company cannot lead to redemption of the guaranteed loan.
Po slednji pride jamstvo v poštev le v primeru, če je upravičeno podjetje v finančnih težavah (stečajni postopek ali podobno) in če zajamčenega posojila ni mogoče vrniti s prodajo drugega premoženja podjetja.
Therefore, the specific condition mentioned in the Commission letter to Member States SG(89) D/4328 of 5 April 1989 [15] has been met and the guarantee thus complied with the specific conditions required for a State guarantee.
Tako je bil pogoj, naveden v Dopisu Komisije državam članicam SG (89) D/4328 z dne 5. aprila 1989 [15], izpolnjen. To pomeni, da je bilo jamstvo v skladu s posebnimi pogoji za državna jamstva.
However, as the beneficiary of the guarantee, Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH, had to be regarded as a firm in difficulty at the time of the granting of the guarantee, the aid has to be assessed under the rules for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulties applicable at that time (cf. recital 49).
Ker je bilo upravičeno podjetje, Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH, v času dodelitve jamstva označeno kot podjetje v težavah, pa je treba pomoč preveriti v okviru določb Skupnosti za oceno državnih pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah, ki so veljale v času dodelitve jamstva (glej uvodno izjavo 49).
The guarantee was granted in the context of a restructuring of the beneficiary company.
Jamstvo je bilo dodeljeno v okviru sanacije upravičenega podjetja.
Germany has sent a copy of a report drafted by Dr. Zimmermann & Partner dated 9 September 1996.
Nemčija je posredovala poročilo podjetja Dr. Zimmermann & Partner z dne 9. septembra 1996.
According to Germany, this report was the restructuring plan that was adopted at the time of the first State aid.
Po podatkih Nemčije gre pri tem poročilu za zasnovo sanacije, ki je bila predložena v času dodelitve prve državne pomoči.
The report has two major shortcomings as a restructuring plan: the status of the report is not clear and the report does not seem to concern any restructuring.
Poročilo pa kot zasnova sanacije v dveh pogledih ni primerno: status poročila ni jasen in v poročilu ni omenjeno prestrukturiranje.
The report seems to be a description of the company, dated 9 September 1996.
Nasprotno, zdi se, da je poročilo opis podjetja z datumom 9. septembra 1996.
According to the report, difficulties are caused by the BSE-crisis and by the loss of export markets in Eastern Europe.
Po tem datumu je imelo podjetje težave zaradi krize BSE in zaradi izgube izvoznih trgov v Vzhodni Evropi.
However, figures have been changed by hand, presumably at a later date.
Toda poročilo je vsebovalo – domnevno pozneje – ročno spremenjene številke.
The status of those amendments is not clear.
Status teh popravkov ni jasen.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the plan was adopted by the owners of the company.
Nadalje ni jasno, ali je bil načrt sprejet s strani lastnikov podjetja.
The report depicts the cost structure and the need for capital in September 1996.
V poročilu so podatki o strukturi stroškov in potrebi po kapitalu podjetja v septembru 1996.
Apart from a description of a reinforcement of the existing management it is not clear how the company is to be restructured.
Če odmislimo opis okrepitev obstoječega vodstva, ni jasno, kako naj bi se podjetje prestrukturiralo.
If the report was meant as a restructuring plan at the time, which is not clear, it seemed to suggest that the company could outgrow its difficulties without any restructuring.
Če je bilo poročilo v času svojega nastanka mišljeno kot načrt za prestrukturiranje, kar pa ni gotovo, ga je mogoče razumeti tako, da bi lahko podjetje težave premagalo s širitvijo in brez kakršnega koli prestrukturiranja.
To be compatible with the 1994 guidelines, the following conditions would have to be met:
Po smernicah iz leta 1994 je pomoč združljiva s skupnim trgom, če so izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji:
the aid would lead to a restoration of viability;
s pomočjo je treba ponovno vzpostaviti rentabilnost podjetja;
the aid would avoid undue distortion of competition;
nesprejemljivemu izkrivljanju konkurence zaradi pomoči se je treba izogibati;
the aid amount would be in proportion to the restructuring costs and benefits;
znesek pomoči mora biti v primernem razmerju s stroški in koristjo prestrukturiranja; in
the restructuring would be monitored and would be reported on.
izvedba načrta za prestrukturiranje se nadzoruje s pomočjo letno predloženih poročil.
The report drafted by Dr. Zimmermann & Partner showed a yearly decrease in turnover from 1994 onward.
Po poročilu podjetja Dr. Zimmermann & Partner se je prihodek upravičenega podjetja od leta 1994 nenehno zmanjševal.
Still, according to the report, turnover would increase again in the following year.
Vendar naj bi se prihodek, tako poročilo, v naslednjem letu povečal.
The report did not give an explanation of this expected development. However, the return to viability depended on this change of trend.
Razlaga za pričakovan razvoj ni podana, čeprav je ponovna vzpostavitev rentabilnosti odvisna od obrata tega trenda.
According to point 3.2.2(i) of the 1994 guidelines ‘the improvement in viability must mainly result from internal measures contained in the restructuring plan and may only be based on external factors such as … price and demand increases …, if the market assumptions made are generally acknowledged’.
Po točki 3.2.2 (i) smernic iz leta 1994 mora „izboljšanje gospodarnosti podjetja (…) biti doseženo predvsem z ustreznimi ukrepi v podjetju, ki so navedeni v načrtu za prestrukturiranje.
As this condition is not met, the Commission does not consider the aid in form of a guarantee to lead to a restoration of viability.
Zunanji dejavniki, kot so višje cene (…), se smejo upoštevati le, ko so zadevne napovedi za trg splošno priznane.“ Ker ta pogoj ni izpolnjen, Komisija ni mnenja, da pomoč v obliki jamstva vodi k ponovni vzpostavitvi rentabilnosti.
The restoration of viability would have been the result of an increase of turnover.
Rentabilnost naj bi se ponovno vzpostavila s povečanjem prihodka.
Although, this increased turnover apparently could be realised with the existing capacity, the restoration would depend on the loss of market share of competitors (if the market would be stable, however, according to the ‘restructuring’ report, the demand was decreasing).
Čeprav bi bilo mogoče povečanje prihodka doseči z obstoječo proizvodno kapaciteto, bi se lahko rentabilnost ponovno vzpostavila le tako, da bi konkurenčna podjetja izgubila svoje tržne deleže (če bi bil trg stabilen, kot je ugotovljeno v poročilu o prestrukturiranju, bi se povpraševanje zmanjšalo).
Therefore, the Commission also concludes that the aid does not avoid an undue distortion of competition since a return to viability would have led to a disadvantage of competitors.
Zato Komisija tudi ugotavlja, da pomoč ni namenjena izogibanju nesprejemljivemu izkrivljanju konkurence, saj bi se zaradi ponovne vzpostavitve rentabilnosti konkurenčna podjetja znašla v neugodnem položaju.
The condition concerning the balance between costs and benefits of the restructuring plan is difficult to assess.
Težko je presoditi, ali je zahteva po sorazmernosti stroškov in koristi prestrukturiranja izpolnjena.
Normally, beneficiaries are expected to make a significant contribution from their own resources or from external commercial financing.
Od podjetij, upravičenih do pomoči, se praviloma pričakuje, da k prestrukturiranju prispevajo znaten prispevek iz lastnih sredstev ali iz zunanjih poslovnih virov financiranja.
According to the report drafted by Dr. Zimmermann & Partners the owner of the benefiting company would inject new capital but it was unclear whether this was done.
Po poročilu podjetja Dr. Zimmermann & Partner naj bi lastnik podjetju dovajal nov kapital, vendar ni bilo jasno, ali se je to res zgodilo.
Therefore, the Commission cannot conclude that the aid complies with the 1994 guidelines on this point.
Zato Komisija ne more zaključiti, ali je pomoč v tej točki usklajena z navedenimi smernicami iz leta 1994.
Finally, it is unclear how the ‘restructuring’ would be monitored or reported on.
Končno ni jasno, kako naj bi se prestrukturiranje nadzorovalo.
Consequently, this condition of the guidelines is not met either.
Zato tudi ta, v Smernicah naveden pogoj, ni izpolnjen.
Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH met the criteria to fall under the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH izpolnjuje pogoje za uvrstitev med mala in srednje velika podjetja (MSP).
Point 3.2.4 of the 1994 guidelines provides that the Commission is justified in taking a less restrictive attitude towards restructuring aids granted to SMEs as those tend to affect trading conditions less than that to large firms.
V skladu s točko 3.2.4 Smernic iz leta 1994 Komisija za pomoči za prestrukturiranje za MSP ne bo postavila enako strogih zahtev kot za pomoči za prestrukturiranje za velika podjetja, saj takšne pomoči pogoje trgovanja praviloma spreminjajo v manjšem obsegu.
However, this more lenient approach towards SMEs in assessing restructuring aid particularly concerns the obligation of capacity reduction in markets of structural overcapacity and the reporting obligation.
Ta blag pristop k oceni pomoči za prestrukturiranje za MSP še posebej zadeva obvezo zmanjšanja kapacitet v gospodarskih panogah s strukturnim presežkom kapacitet in obveznost poročanja.
In spite of the more lenient approach applicable to SMEs, the aid was already found not to lead to a restoration of viability (cf. recital 57) and to distort competition unduly.
Ne glede na blag pristop, veljaven za MSP, je bilo ugotovljeno, da pomoč ne vodi k ponovni vzpostavitvi rentabilnosti upravičenega podjetja (glej uvodno izjavo 57) in da na neupravičen način izkrivlja konkurenco.
For the abovementioned reasons, the Commission considers Aid 1, granted in the form of State guarantees to Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH for an amount of maximally DEM 880000, to be incompatible with Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty.
Iz navedenih razlogov je Komisija prvo pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH v obliki državnih jamstev za znesek do višine 880000 DEM, označila za nezdružljivo s členoma 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES.
Since the aid has been granted illegally and is incompatible, it has to be recovered.
Ker je bila pomoč dodeljena neupravičeno in ni združljiva s Pogodbo, jo je potrebno vrniti.
Aid 2
Pomoč 2
The second aid concerns the partial mobilisation and payment of DEM 370000 to Sparkasse Erfurt under the first guarantee in the context of the debt rescheduling/restructuring undergone in 1997 as well as an 80 % State guarantee on a DEM 2,5 million loan taken out in 1997 at Dresdner Bank.
Druga pomoč zadeva delno uveljavljanje in izplačilo 370000 DEM banki Sparkasse Erfurt v okviru prvega jamstva pri reprogramiranju/prestrukturiranju iz leta 1997 ter 80 % državno jamstvo za posojilo v višini 2,5 mio DEM, ki ga je leta 1997 zagotovila banka Dresdner Bank.
As it is stated in point 62 that the first State guarantee was found to be illegal and incompatible aid to Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH under Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty, the part-mobilisation of the first guarantee under the second restructuring plan is covered by these findings.
Ker prvo državno jamstvo, kot je navedeno v odstavku 62, predstavlja pomoč za Greußener Salamifabrik GmbH, ki je bila dodeljena neupravičeno in ni združljiva s členoma 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES, veljajo te ugotovitve tudi za delno uveljavljanje prvega jamstva v okviru drugega načrta za prestrukturiranje.
The 80 % State guarantee on a DEM 2,5 million loan has to be assessed under the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees (cf. recital 34).
80 % državno jamstvo za posojilo v višini 2,5 mio DEM mora biti ocenjeno po določbah Obvestila Komisije o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč v obliki poroštev (glej uvodno izjavo 34).
The general conditions for guarantees applied by Thüringer Aufbaubank, provided to the Commission, show that guarantees can only be invoked when the benefiting company is in financial difficulties (bankruptcy- or a similar procedure) and when the sale of other assets owned by the company cannot lead to redemption of the guaranteed loan (cf. also recital 51).
Po splošnih pogojih za jamstva, ki so bili predloženi Komisiji in jih uporablja banka Thüringer Aufbaubank, je razvidno, da je mogoče za jamstvo zaprositi le v primeru, če je upravičeno podjetje v finančnih težavah (stečajni postopek in podobno) ter če zajamčenega posojila ni mogoče vrniti s prodajo drugega premoženja podjetja (glej tudi uvodno izjavo 51).
Therefore, the specific conditions for guarantees under point 5.3 of the abovementioned Commission Notice are met.
Posebni pogoji, navedeni v točki 5.3 navedenega obvestila Komisije, so tako izpolnjeni.
Pursuant to point 2.1 of the 1994 guidelines, typical symptoms for a firm in difficulties are deteriorating profitability, increasing size of losses, diminishing turnover, growing inventories, excess capacity, declining cash flow, increasing debt, rising interest charges and low net asset value.
V skladu s točko 2.1 Smernic iz leta 1994 spadajo k značilnim simptomom, ki kažejo, da je podjetje v težavah, zmanjšana rentabilnost, povečanje izgub, zmanjšani prihodki, povečane zaloge, prevelike kapacitete, zmanjšan denarni tok, povečana zadolženost in obremenitev z obrestmi ter nižja neto knjižna vrednost.