natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On 19 April 2001 Siderúrgica Añón’s share capital was increased to EUR 10217220. The publicly controlled company SODIGA Galicia SCR, SA (hereinafter SODIGA), provided EUR 1803060 (the actual contribution amounted however only to a share value of EUR 1202040 as the price of EUR 60 per share to be paid was increased by a premium of EUR 30), Hierros Añón EUR 4006860 and Rodonita EUR 2003520. The private partners paid EUR 60 per share, half of which was paid immediately, with the other half to be paid before the end of September 2001.
Dne 19. aprila 2001 se je delniški kapital podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón povečal na 10217220 EUR. Javno nadzorovano podjetje SODIGA Galicia SCR, SA (v nadaljevanju besedila „SODIGA“) je prispevalo 1803060 EUR (vendar je bil dejanski prispevek le v vrednosti delnic 1202040 EUR, ker se je cena za plačilo 60 EUR na delnico zvišala za premijo 30 EUR), podjetje Hierros Ańón je prispevalo 4006860 EUR in podjetje Rodonita 2003520 EUR. Zasebni partnerji so plačali 60 EUR za vsako svojo delnico, od tega je bila polovica izplačana takoj, drugo polovico pa je bilo treba plačati pred koncem septembra 2001.
After this increase in capital, Siderúrgica Añón’s capital was held as follows: Hierros Añón 58,82 %; Rodonita 29,41 %; SODIGA 11,76 %.
Po tej dokapitalizaciji, je bila razdelitev kapitala podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón naslednja: Hierros Ańón SA – 58,82 %; Rodonita SL – 29,41 %; in SODIGA – 11,76 %.
The parties also signed an agreement whereby Hierros Añón and Rodonita (or Siderúrgica Añón itself) promised SODIGA to buy SODIGA’s stake by no later than 19 April 2007 for the higher of the following two amounts: (a) the theoretical accounting value of the firm, as determined, if necessary, by independent expertise; or (b) 141,85 % of the initial contribution, i.e. EUR 2557640,61. SODIGA will receive from Siderúrgica Añón as from 30 December 2002 five annual instalments of EUR 150916 as an advance payment against the final amount.
Stranke so tudi podpisale sporazum, s katerim sta se podjetji Hierros Ańón in Rodonita (ali samo podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón) zavezali, da bosta kupili delež podjetja SODIGA najpozneje do 19. aprila 2007 za najvišjega od naslednjih dveh zneskov: (a) teoretični računovodski vrednosti podjetja, določeni, če je potrebno, s strani neodvisnega strokovnjaka; ali (b) 141,85 % začetnega prispevka, tj. 2557640,61 EUR. Podjetje SODIGA bo od podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón prejelo od 30. decembra 2002 dalje pet letnih obrokov po 150916 EUR kot predhodno plačilo končnega zneska.
SODIGA is a risk capital company controlled by the Galician regional government and dedicated to acquiring temporary stakes in undertakings related to the development of Galicia’s economy and industry.
Podjetje SODIGA je podjetje s tveganim kapitalom, ki ga nadzoruje galicijska regionalna vlada, namenjeno pridobivanju začasnih deležev v podjetjih, povezanih z razvojem gospodarstva in industrije Galicije.
SODIGA’s shareholders are: the Galician regional government (20,6 % directly and 46,6 % through IGAPE) and financial institutions (32,8 %).
Delničarji podjetja SODIGA so: galicijska regionalna vlada (20,6 % neposrednega lastništva in 46,6 % prek IGAPE) in finančne institucije (32,8 %).
SODIGA receives grants from IGAPE which up to 2000 amounted to EUR 6861574,89. These grants must be used in the financing of special investments, i.e. investments riskier than those normally financed by the company or with longer maturities or amortisation periods or investments in certain geographical areas.
Podjetje SODIGA prejema dotacije od IGAPE, ki so do leta 2000 nanesle 6861574,89 EUR. Te dotacije je treba uporabiti pri financiranju posebnih naložb, tj. naložb, ki nosijo večje tveganje od naložb, ki jih podjetje običajno financira ali ki imajo daljša obdobja dospetja ali amortizacije, in od naložb na nekaterih geografskih območjih.
On 1 March 2002 Siderúrgica Añón’s share capital was increased by a further EUR 4207140. The three shareholders subscribed according to their stakes (SODIGA contributed EUR 495180) and on the same terms for all three shareholders as to price per share and payment.
Dne 1. marca 2002 se je delniški kapital podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón povečal na 4207140 EUR. Obstoječi trije delničarji so ga vpisali glede na svoje deleže (podjetje SODIGA je prispevalo 495180 EUR) in po enakih pogojih za vse tri delničarje glede cene za delnico in plačila.
The parties also signed an agreement whereby Hierros Añón and Rodonita (or Siderúrgica Añón itself) promised SODIGA to buy SODIGA’s stake by no later than 19 April 2007 for the higher of the following two amounts: (a) the theoretical accounting value of the firm, as determined, if necessary, by an independent expertise; or (b) 133,82 % of the initial contribution, i.e. EUR 662650. SODIGA will receive from Siderúrgica Añón as from 30 December 2003 four annual instalments of EUR 41867 as an advance payment against the final amount.
Stranke so tudi podpisale sporazum, s katerim sta se podjetji Hierros Ańón in Rodonita (ali samo podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón) zavezali, da bosta kupili delež podjetja SODIGA najpozneje do 19. aprila 2007 za najvišjega od naslednjih dveh zneskov: (a) teoretični računovodski vrednosti podjetja, določeni, če je potrebno, s strani neodvisnega strokovnjaka; ali (b) 133,82 % začetnega prispevka, tj. 662650 EUR. Podjetje SODIGA bo od podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón prejelo od 30. decembra 2003 dalje štiri letne obroke po 41867 EUR kot predhodno plačilo končnega zneska.
Grounds for initiating the procedure
Razlogi za sprožitev postopka
In its decisions initiating proceedings, the Commission expressed its doubts whether the stake acquired by SODIGA in the share capital of Siderúrgica Añón could be regarded as a genuine provision of risk capital according to usual investment practice in a market economy and whether the price paid for the guarantee was a market price.
V svojih odločitvah za uvedbo postopka je Komisija izrazila dvome, da bi se delež, ki ga je podjetje SODIGA pridobilo v delniškem kapitalu podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón, lahko obravnavalo kot resnično tvegani kapital v skladu z običajno investicijsko prakso v tržnem gospodarstvu in da je bila cena, plačana za poroštvo, tržna cena.
Moreover, the Commission expressed its doubts as to the compatibility with the common market of those measures as well as the other measures adopted by the Spanish authorities for financing the investment, listed in the previous section.
Poleg tega je Komisija izrazila dvome o združljivosti teh ukrepov s skupnim trgom in o združljivosti s skupnim trgom drugih ukrepov, ki so jih sprejeli španski organi za financiranje naložbe, naštetih v prejšnjem oddelku.
In their letter of 22 February 2002, the European Independent Steelworks Association (EISA) considered that the aid was incompatible with the common market mainly because (a) the market for steel bars was suffering from overcapacity, (b) the investment would never be profitable and would lead only to distortions of competition and (c) no private investor would risk capital in current market conditions for the production of these products.
V dopisu z dne 22. februarja 2002 je evropsko neodvisno jeklarsko združenje (EISA) menilo, da je pomoč nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom predvsem, ker je (a) trg z jeklenimi palicami prizadet zaradi presežne zmogljivosti, (b) naložba ne bo nikoli dobičkonosna in bo pripeljala le do izkrivljanja konkurence in (c) noben zasebni vlagatelj ne bo tvegal kapitala ob trenutnih tržnih pogojih za proizvodnjo teh izdelkov.
In their letter of 5 March 2002, the Unión de Empresas Siderúrgicas (UNESID) considered it illogical that public funds should be used to build new capacities in a sector where substantial amounts of public funds had been devoted to reducing the workforce and capacities.
V dopisu z dne 5. marca 2002 je združenje Unión de Empresas Siderúrgicas (UNESID) menilo, da je nelogično, da je treba javna sredstva uporabljati za gradnjo novih zmogljivosti v sektorju, v katerem je bilo veliko javnih sredstev namenjenih zmanjšanju delovne sile in zmogljivosti.
In their letter of 8 March 2002, Federacciai, the federation of Italian steel companies, argued that the market for steel bars was suffering from overcapacity and that investments in the sector therefore involved high risk and could hardly be expected to be profitable.
V dopisu z dne 8. marca 2002 je združenje italijanskih jeklarskih podjetij Federacciai trdilo, da trg z jeklenimi palicami trpi zaradi presežne zmogljivosti in da zato naložba v sektor nosi visoko tveganje ob malo verjetni donosnosti.
Moreover, it considered that the involvement of SODIGA and INESGA was prompted by political considerations.
Poleg tega je menilo, da je sodelovanje podjetja SODIGA in razvojnega sklada INESGA spodbudilo politični vidik.
Finally, the interest rate of the loan granted through INESGA and the premium paid for the guarantee did not correspond to market conditions.
Na koncu obrestna mera posojila, ki ga je dodelil sklad INESGA, in premija, plačana za poroštvo, nista bili v skladu s tržnimi pogoji.
In their letter of 17 October 2002, UK Steel Enterprise Ltd. (hereinafter UK Steel) submitted that overcapacity, excessive third-country competition and low prices were the features of this sector and all indicated that a normal private investor would not have contributed capital towards the creation of new capacity.
V dopisu z dne 17. oktobra 2002 je združenje UK Steel Enterprise Ltd. (v nadaljnjem besedilu „UK Steel“) predložilo, da so značilnosti tega sektorja presežna zmogljivost, prevelika konkurenca iz tretjih držav in nizke cene ter da vse to kaže, da običajen zasebni vlagatelj ne bi prispeval kapitala k ustanovitvi novih zmogljivosti.
It should be questioned whether Hierros Añón and Rodonita themselves would have invested in this project had it not been for the availability of illegal state aid.
Vprašanje je, ali bi podjetji Hierros Ańón in Rodonita sami vložili sredstva v ta projekt, če ne bi bilo na voljo nelegalne državne pomoči.
Furthermore, the fact that Hierros Añón and Rodonita were to use 70 % of the output for their own internal purposes had to put a question mark over the likely profitability of Siderúrgica Añón.
Poleg tega dejstvo, da bosta podjetji Hierros Ańón in Rodonita porabili 70 % proizvodnje za lastne notranje potrebe, postavlja verjetno donosnost podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón pod vprašaj.
Transfer pricing of the product would be untransparent and would presumably be geared more towards maximising the downstream profitability of Hierros Añón and Rodonita than that of Siderúrgica Añón.
Cene prenosa proizvodov bodo nepregledne in bodo verjetno bolj usmerjene k čim večji donosnosti podjetij Hierros Ańón in Rodonita kot k donosnosti podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón.
By letter dated 31 July 2002, Siderúrgica Añón made the following submissions:
V dopisu z dne 31. julija 2002 je podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón predložilo naslednje:
According to the company, as from 23 July 2002, Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to state aid to small and medium sized enterprises [6] (hereinafter the SME Regulation), applied to the steel sector.
Podjetje je trdilo, da se od 23. julija 2002 za jeklarski sektor uporablja Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 70/2001 z dne 12. januarja 2001 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe Evropske skupnosti pri pomoči za majhna in srednje velika podjetja [6] (v nadaljnjem besedilu „uredba o MSP“).
The fact that the aid was granted before the expiry of the ECSC Treaty was of no consequence since according to settled case-law, Commission decisions on compatibility of aid had to be based on the elements of fact and law existing at the moment when the decision was adopted and not at the moment when the aid was granted.
Dejstvo, da je bila pomoč dodeljena pred iztekom Pogodbe ESPJ, ni imelo nobenega vpliva, ker so morale glede na stalno sodno prakso odločbe Komisije o združljivosti pomoči temeljiti na dejstvih in zakonih, obstoječih v trenutku, ko je odločba sprejeta, in ne v trenutku, ko je pomoč dodeljena.
Moreover, the Commission notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful state aid [7], to which the communication from the Commission concerning certain aspects of the treatment of competition cases resulting from the expiry of the ECSC Treaty [8] referred, mentioned only frameworks, guidelines, communications and notices but not regulations.
Poleg tega je obvestilo Komisije o določitvi pravil, ki veljajo za oceno nelegalnih državnih pomoči [7], s katerim je bilo povezano Sporočilo Komisije o nekaterih vidikih obravnavanja konkurenčnih primerov, ki so nastali zaradi izteka veljavnosti Pogodbe ESPJ [8], omenjalo le okvire, smernice, sporočila in obvestila, ne pa tudi uredb.
In these circumstances, since Siderúrgica Añón was an SME and the intensity of the aid granted [9] was lower than the intensity mentioned in Article 4 of the SME Regulation, the aid was compatible with the common market (and exempted from the notification obligation).
V teh okoliščinah, ker je podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón spadalo med majhna in srednje velika podjetja in ker je bila intenzivnost dodeljene pomoči [9] manjša od intenzivnosti pomoči, navedene v členu 4 uredbe o MSP, je bila pomoč združljiva s skupnim trgom (in opravičena obveznosti obveščanja).
Moreover, as to the grant awarded by IGAPE and the interest-free loan granted by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the company argued that they were granted under schemes approved by the Commission on 5 July 1995 (state aid N 21/95) and 18 May 2001 (state aid N 182/01) respectively and were therefore compatible with the common market.
Poleg tega je glede subvencije, dodeljene s strani IGAPE, in brezobrestnega posojila ministrstva za znanost in tehnologijo podjetje trdilo, da sta bila dodeljena v okviru shem, ki jih je odobrila Komisija 5. julija 1995 (državna pomoč št. 21/95) in 18. maja 2001 (državna pomoč št. 182/01), in sta zato združljiva s skupnim trgom.
As to the stake acquired by SODIGA in the capital of Siderúrgica Añón, the company claimed that the fact that the interests of the private and public shareholders might be different was of no relevance since the essential factor was that the private and public investors participated on the same terms and conditions.
Glede deleža, ki ga je podjetje SODIGA pridobilo v kapitalu podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón, je podjetje trdilo, da dejstvo, da se interesi zasebnih in javnih delničarjev lahko razlikujejo, ni pomembno, ker je bistveno to, da imajo zasebni in javni vlagatelji svoje deleže pod enakimi pogoji.
To support this position the company contended that the Commission had considered that there was no state aid involved in the stake acquired by Bavaria in the capital of NMH along with three other steel producers (Decision of 26 July 1988, mentioned in the Commission Decision of 31 October 1995) and that when it initiated proceedings against the stake acquired by the Walloon Region in Carsid, the Commission did not take into account the different interests of the private and public shareholders.
Podjetje je to stališče podprlo s tem, da je Komisija menila, da pri deležu Bavarske v kapitalu NMH ob solastništvu treh drugih proizvajalcev jekla ni šlo za državno pomoč (Odločba z dne 26. julija 1988, omenjena v Odločbi Komisije z dne 31. oktobra 1995), in s tem, ko je sprožila postopek proti deležu, ki ga je pridobila valonska regija v podjetju Carsid, Komisija ni upoštevala različnih interesov zasebnih in javnih delničarjev.
In its letter of 30 September 2002, the company argued that, since the three-month period established in Article 6(5) of the Steel Aid Code for adopting a decision had elapsed, the Commission was no longer entitled to adopt a decision on the measures referred to in its letter of 20 December 2001.
V dopisu z dne 30. septembra 2002 je podjetje trdilo, da – glede na to, da je minilo trimesečno obdobje za sprejetje odločbe, določeno v členu 6(5) zakonika o pomoči jeklarski industriji – Komisija ni bila več upravičena do sprejemanja odločb o ukrepih iz prvega pisma z dne 20. decembra 2001.
By letter dated 23 June 2003, Siderúrgica Añón submitted further comments.
V dopisu z dne 23. junija 2003 je podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón predložilo dodatne pripombe.
Firstly, it claimed that the aid could not be analysed in the light of the ECSC Treaty or the Steel Aid Code.
Najprej je trdilo, da se pomoči ne da preučiti glede na Pogodbo ESPJ ali zakonik o pomoči jeklarski industriji.
Secondly, it maintained that the aid fell within the scope of the SME Regulation.
Drugič je vztrajalo, da je pomoč zajeta v Uredbi o majhnih in srednje velikih podjetjih.
Thirdly, it argued that the aid was existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [10] (hereinafter the Procedural Regulation) because it was granted before the entry into force for the steel sector of the state aid rules of the EC Treaty.
Tretjič je trdilo, da je bila pomoč obstoječa pomoč v smislu člena 1(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES [10] (v nadaljnjem besedilu „postopkovna uredba“), ker je bila pomoč dodeljena, preden so začela veljati pravila o državni pomoči za jeklarski sektor iz Pogodbe ES.
As regards the acquisition by SODIGA of a stake in the share capital of Siderúrgica Añón, the Spanish authorities argued that this was done following normal practice in a market economy.
Glede pridobitve deleža podjetja SODIGA v delniškem kapitalu podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón so španski organi menili, da je bil delež v skladu z ustaljeno prakso v tržnem gospodarstvu.
Investment decisions were taken considering only the viability of the projects and the expected profitability.
Odločitve o naložbah so se sprejemale le ob upoštevanju izvedljivosti projektov in pričakovane donosnosti.
In the present case, SODIGA’s stake in Siderúrgica Añón was acquired at the time of the increase in capital and simultaneously with the existing shareholders which, together, subscribed to 83,4 % of the new shares.
V tem primeru je podjetje SODIGA pridobilo delež v podjetju Siderúrgica Ańón ob dokapitalizaciji in hkrati z obstoječimi delničarji, ki so imeli skupaj v lasti 83,4 % novih delnic.
In these circumstances, the Spanish authorities maintained that, according to the case-law, it fulfilled the private investor criteria.
V teh okoliščinah so španski organi trdili, da so bili glede na sodno prakso izpolnjeni pogoji za zasebnega vlagatelja.
Moreover, the Spanish authorities claimed that, through the repurchase agreement, SODIGA ensured a minimum return on the investment of 7,2 % per year, which was higher than the interest on 10-year Treasury bonds at the time the contract was signed (5,3 %).
Poleg tega so menili, da je podjetje SODIGA prek sporazuma o odkupu zagotavljalo minimalno donosnost naložbe v višini 7,2 % na leto, kar je več od obresti desetletnih zakladnih obveznic v času podpisa pogodbe (5,3 %).
In any case, if state aid was involved it would be compatible with the common market according to point VIII.3 (ii) of the information from the Commission on state aid and risk capital [11] because it involved a medium-sized enterprise in its start-up stage in an assisted area.
Tudi v primeru, da bi šlo za državno pomoč, bi bila ta združljiva s skupnim trgom v skladu s točko VIII.3(ii) obvestila Komisije o državni pomoči in tveganem kapitalu [11], ker je šlo za zagon MSP na območju, ki je prejemalo pomoč.
As to the fact that SODIGA paid a higher price per share and disbursed it immediately, the Spanish authorities maintained that this compensated for the minimum return on investment granted to SODIGA, from which the other shareholders did not benefit.
Glede dejstva, da je podjetje SODIGA plačalo višjo ceno na delnico in znesek izplačalo takoj, so španski organi trdili, da je bil s tem poplačan minimalni donos na naložbo, ki je bil določen za podjetje SODIGA, ne pa tudi za ostale delničarje.
In any case, they maintained that it was only normal practice that a new shareholder should pay a higher price for the newly issued shares, reflecting the substantial impetus imparted to the project by the original shareholders (for example in contracts with suppliers of equipment and in the acquisition of land).
Kakor koli že, španski organi so menili, da je povsem običajna praksa, da mora novi delničar plačati višjo ceno za novo izdane delnice, kar odraža veliko spodbudo, ki so jo v projekt vložili prvotni delničarji, na primer pri pogodbah z dobavitelji opreme in pri pridobitvi zemljišča.
As for SODIGA’s participation in the second increase in the capital of Siderúrgica Añón, the Spanish authorities argued that SODIGA participated in proportion to its holding and on the same terms and conditions as the other shareholders.
Glede deleža podjetja SODIGA pri drugi dokapitalizaciji podjetja Siderúrgica Ańón so španski organi trdili, da je bil delež podjetja SODIGA pridobljen v sorazmerju z njegovim prejšnjim deležem in pod enakimi pogoji kot za ostale delničarje.
In these circumstances there was no state aid.
V teh okoliščinah ni bilo državne pomoči.
Concerning the imputability of the actions of SODIGA to the public authorities, the Spanish authorities contended that, according to the case-law, the Commission had to provide evidence that they intervened in the decision to invest in Siderúrgica Añón.
Glede odgovornosti javnih organov za dejanja podjetja SODIGA so španski organi trdili, da mora Komisija v skladu s sodno prakso dokazati, da so posredovali pri odločitvi za naložbo v podjetje Siderúrgica Ańón.
With regard to the loan granted through INESGA, the Spanish authorities maintained that the funds came exclusively from private sources (the participating banks), that those banks were free to participate in the financing of any operation and that INESGA’s involvement was limited to the follow-up.
V zvezi s posojilom, ki ga je odobril sklad INESGA, so španski organi trdili, da so sredstva prihajala zgolj iz zasebnih virov (udeleženih bank) in da so lahko te banke prosto sodelovale pri financiranju katere koli operacije, sodelovanje sklada INESGA pa je bilo omejeno na sledenje rezultatom.
In this sense, they concluded that no public funds were involved.
V tem pogledu so španski organi ugotovili, da javna sredstva niso bila vpletena.
Moreover, they maintained that the comparison with the reference rate used by the Commission was not appropriate since that reference rate corresponded to the average of the five-year interbank swap rates for the months of September, October and November 2000 increased by 75 percentage points.
Poleg tega so trdili, da primerjava z referenčno stopnjo, ki jo je uporabila Komisija, ni bila primerna, ker je ta referenčna stopnja ustrezala povprečju petletnih medbančnih menjalnih obrestnih mer za mesec september, oktober in november 2000, zvišanemu za 75 odstotnih točk.
Since the five-year interbank swap rate at the date of granting the loan was 4,769 %, the corrected reference rate should be 5,519 %.
Ker je bila petletna medbančna obrestna mera na dan odobritve posojila 4,769 %, bi morala biti popravljena referenčna stopnja 5,519 %.
Finally, they contended that the interest rate was similar to, or even higher than, other loans granted to companies belonging to the Añón group.
Na koncu so španski organi trdili, da je bila obrestna mera podobna ali celo višja kot pri drugih posojilih, odobrenih za podjetja v skupini Ańón.
On the guarantee given by IGAPE, the Spanish authorities claimed that it was in line with market conditions.
Glede poroštva IGAPE pa so menili, da je bilo v skladu s tržnimi pogoji.
They contended that the commission applied by private banks to these types of projects amounted to 0,15 % per quarter.
Zagovarjali so, da je provizija zasebnih bank za to vrsto projektov znašala do 0,15 % na četrtletje.