natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The same would apply accordingly to the guarantee agreement of 20 June 2000 between the Province of Burgenland and BB since, here too, neither BB nor the buyer of BB should be encumbered in any way.
Smiselno je, da velja enako tudi za Garancijski sporazum z dne 20. junija 2000 med deželo Gradiščansko in BB, ker tudi tukaj niti BB niti ponudnik ne bi smela naleteti na obremenitve.
In the view of Austria, if BB were still required to transfer its profits, it would be doubtful whether any buyer for the bank could be found since potential buyers would have little interest in a transaction from which they could not expect any profits for a number of years.
Po mnenju Avstrije bi bilo v primeru ohranjenega obveznega odvajanja dobička BB vprašljivo, ali se bo sploh lahko našel pakupec za banko, saj bi imeli potencialni ponudniki manj zanimanja za nakup, če več let ne bi mogli pričakovati dobička.
Abolition of the requirement for BB to transfer its profits would, therefore, be a necessary condition for its forthcoming privatisation if the notified restructuring plan, of which BB’s privatisation was an essential component, were to have any realistic chance of success.
Odprava obveznega odvajanja dobička BB je torej nujen pogoj za njeno bližajočo se privatizacijo, še posebej če naj ima priglašen koncept prestrukturiranja, katerega osnovna enota je privatizacija BB, realistične možnosti za uspeh.
This would provide a potential buyer of BB with the prospect of availing itself immediately of BB’s profits, which would in turn be a necessary condition for obtaining the best possible sales price.
S tem bi potencialni ponudnik BB imel možnost takoj uveljavljati donose, kar bi bila pomembna predpostavka za doseganje maksimalne prenosne cene.
ASSESSMENT OF THE AID MEASURE
PRESOJA UKREPOV POMOČI
State aid under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty
Državna pomoč v skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES
The two guarantee agreements between the Province of Burgenland and BB involve State resources.
Oba Garancijska sporazuma dežele Gradiščanske v prid BB sta vsebovala državna sredstva.
They were concluded on conditions that would not be acceptable to a market-economy private investor.
Ukrepi so bili sprejeti pod pogoji, ki niso bili sprejemljivi za financerja, ki ravna v skladu s pogoji tržnega gospodarstva.
Austria maintained that, through the guarantee agreements, the Province of Burgenland avoided greater financial loss since the agreements would have been restricted to providing the absolute minimum necessary to prevent the imposition of court-supervised management.
Avstrija vztraja pri stališču, da je dežela Gradiščanska s sklenitvijo Garancijskega sporazuma preprečila višjo finančno škodo, ker je bil sporazum omejen samo na najnujnejše ukrepe za preprečitev posredovanja poslovne inšpekcije v BB.
If, as a result of the statutory requirement, the Province had had to step in as deficiency guarantor, the unlimited deficiency liability would have meant that the financial obligations under the two guarantees would have been exceeded.
Če bi morala dežela Gradiščanska zaradi zakonsko določene obveze kot porok zaradi plačilne nesposobnosti jamčiti za BB, bi glede jamstva, ki ni bilo omejeno z zneskom, prekoračili finančne obveznosti obeh garancij.
Accordingly, Austria maintained the legal view that the Province of Burgenland had acted in accordance with the ‘market-economy private investor’ principle.
Pravno stališče Avstrije je, da je dežela Gradiščanska ravnala po principu financerja, ki ravna v skladu s pogoji tržnega gospodarstva.
In this connection, however, it must be objected that Austria has not submitted any calculations that could have supported this assertion.
Temu je mogoče oporekati, da avstrijski organi niso predložili izračunov, ki bi te trditve lahko podprli.
The KPMG report of 17 June 2000, referred to in paragraph 13, puts at EUR 247 million the amount that would have to be covered by the Province of Burgenland in the event of BB’s insolvency.
V 13. odstavku navedeno izvedensko mnenje KPMG z dne 17. junija 2000 navaja znesek 247 milijonov EUR, ki bi ga morala dežela Gradiščanska pokriti v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti BB.
This is lower than the aggregate value of the two guarantees, although it should be pointed out that this figure was calculated before the second comprehensive audit of accounts receivable conducted in the second half of 2000 and, viewed from today’s perspective, should therefore be higher.
To je manj kot skupni znesek obeh garancij, pri čemer je treba opozoriti, da se je vsota izračunala pred drugo celovito revizijo računovodskih izkazov, ki jo je bilo treba pripraviti v drugi polovici leta 2000 in bi morala biti z današnjega vidika zato višja.
However, those costs bear no relationship to the role of the Province of Burgenland as owner of the shares of BB.
Vendar ti stroški nimajo nobene povezave z vlogo dežele Gradiščanske kot lastnice delnic BB.
Instead, they are the result of a special statutory requirement, namely the State default liability, that can never concern a private investor.
Namesto tega so posledica posebne zakonske zahteve, namreč državnega kritja neporavnanih obveznosti, ki ne morejo nikoli zadevati zasebnega vlagatelja.
Both measures were taken for the benefit of an undertaking in serious financial difficulties.
Oba ukrepa sta bila sprejeta v prid podjetja, ki se je nahajalo v resnih finančnih težavah.
All things considered, the total involved (EUR 359,8 million) is a considerable amount.
V celoti gledano predstavlja 359,8 milijonov EUR občuten znesek.
When the guarantees were underwritten, the Province could clearly not have expected to make a return on them that would have been acceptable to a market-economy private investor.
V času prevzema garancije za zvezno deželo ni bilo predvidljivo, da bi lahko iz tega prevzema prigospodarili donos, ki bi bila za financerja, ki ravna v skladu s tržnim gospodarstvom, sprejemljiva.
The aid in question favours BB and gives it an artificial advantage over its competitors, thereby distorting competition.
Pomoči so ugodne za BB in jo umetno uvrščajo na boljše mesto kakor njene konkurente, zaradi česar prihaja do izkrivljanja konkurenčnosti.
In its main lines of business, BB operates at both regional and national levels.
BB je dejavna v svojih najpomembnejših panogah na regijski in tudi na državni ravni.
The financial services sector as a whole is characterised by growing integration, and the internal market has been achieved in important areas.
Finančne storitvene dejavnosti so skupno zaznamovane z rastočo integracijo, notranji trg je udejanjen v bistvenih delnih področjih.
There is strong competition between financial institutions of different Member States, and this is increasing as a result of the introduction of the single currency.
Med finančnimi institucijami držav članic vlada močna konkurenca, ki se z uvedbo enotne valute dalje zaostruje.
Competition is being, or threatens to be, distorted by these measures and their effects on current and potential competitors from other Member States.
Ukrepi in njihovi vplivi na sedanje in potencialne konkurente iz drugih držav članic privedejo do izkrivljanja konkurenčnosti – oz. grozijo, z izkrivljenostjo – in ovirajo trgovanje med državami članicami.
Consequently, the measures constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Zaradi tega urejajo državno pomoč ukrepi v skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
Austria has not challenged this view but notified the measures concerned, albeit later than required.
Avstrija ni podvomila v to mnenje, temveč je prijavila zadevne ukrepe, čeprav pozneje kot predpisano.
Compatibility of the aid measures with the common market
Združljivost ukrepov za pomoč s skupnim trgom
Since the aid measures were not granted under an approved aid scheme, the Commission must assess their compatibility with the common market in the light of Article 87 of the EC Treaty and the guidelines [9].
Ker ukrepi za pomoč niso bili odobreni na osnovi programa pomoči, mora Komisija preveriti združljivost ukrepov z načeli skupnega trga v skladu s členom 87 Pogodbe ES in Smernicami Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah [9] („Smernice“).
In accordance with Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, save as otherwise provided for in that Treaty, any State aid granted or any aid granted through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market.
V skladu s členom 87(1) člena Pogodbe ES so, v kolikor ta pogodba ne določa česar drugega, državne ali iz državnih sredstev zagotovljene pomoči vseh vrst, ki s posebnimi ugodnostmi za določena podjetja ali proizvodne panoge pripomorejo k izkrivljanju konkurenčnosti oz. grozijo z izkrivljanjem konkurenčnosti, nezdružljive s skupnim trgom, v kolikor ovirajo trgovanje med državami članicami.
However, Article 87 does provide for exceptions to the principle that State aid is incompatible with the common market.
Člen 87 Pogodbe ES vendarle dopušča izjeme od osnovnega načela o nezdružljivosti državnih pomoči s skupnim trgom.
The derogations under Article 87(2) could provide grounds for aid to be deemed compatible with the common market.
Izjemna določila po členu 87(2) Pogodbe ES lahko utemeljijo združljivost pomoči s skupnim trgom.
The aid measures to be assessed cannot, however, be regarded either as aid having a social character and granted to individual consumers (point (a)), as aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances (point (b)) or as aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany (point (c)).
Preverjane ukrepe za pomoč ne moremo obravnavati kot socialno pomoč posameznim uporabnikom (točka (a)), niti kot pomoč za odpravo škode, ki je nastala kot posledica naravne katastrofe ali drugih izrednih dogodkov (točka (b)) ter niti kot pomoč gospodarstvu določenih, zaradi delitve Nemčije prizadetih območij Zvezne Republike Nemčije (točka (c)).
These derogations are not, therefore, applicable in the present case.
Te izjeme v konkretnem primeru niso uporabne.
As regards the derogations in Article 87(3)(b) and (d), it should be pointed out that the aid does not serve to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and cannot be regarded either as aid to promote culture and heritage conservation.
S pogledom izjemnih določil v skladu s členom 87(3)(b) in (d) pogodbe ES lahko ugotovimo, da pomoč ne služi za spodbujanje pomembnih načrtov, ki so v skupnem evropskem interesu, ali za pokritje znatne motnje v gospodarstvu ene izmed držav članic, in ne predstavlja pomoči za spodbujanje kulture in ohranjanja kulturne dediščine.
Consequently, the Commission is assessing the aid measures on the basis of the derogation in Article 87(3)(c).
Zato Komisija ukrepe za pomoč preverja na osnovi izjemnih določil člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES.
It bases its assessment of aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest on the relevant Community guidelines.
Komisija se pri presoji pomoči za pospeševanje razvoja nekaterih gospodarskih panog, v kolikor jih trgovinski posli ne spreminjajo tako, da nasprotujejo skupnim interesom, opira na zadevne skupinske smernice.
In the Commission’s view, the only guidelines applicable in the present case are those referred to in recital 68.
Po razumevanju Komisije v predloženem primeru niso uporabne druge kot v uvodni izjavi 68 omenjene Smernice.
The Commission also takes the view that the aid measures described help to finance the restructuring of the undertaking and are, therefore, to be regarded as restructuring aid.
Komisija je mnenja, da opisani ukrepi za pomoč pripomorejo k financiranju prestrukturiranja podjetja in jih je potrebno obravnavati kot pomoč pri prestrukturiranju.
In accordance with the guidelines, restructuring aid is admissible only if it does not run counter to the common interest.
V skladu s smernicami je pomoč za prestrukturiranje dovoljena le, če ne nasprotuje skupnim interesom.
Under the guidelines, approval of aid by the Commission is subject to certain conditions:
V smernicah se odobritev pomoči s strani Komisije navezuje na določene predpostavke:
Eligibility of the undertaking for aid
Zmožnost pomoči podjetja
The Commission accepts Austria’s explanation for classifying BB as a firm in difficulty under point 30, read in conjunction with points 4 to 8, of the guidelines.
Komisija se popolnoma strinja z razlago Avstrije, zaradi česar uvrsti BB kot podjetje v težavah v skladu z odstavkom 30 v kombinaciji z odstavki smernic 4–8.
Without the intervention of the Province of Burgenland, BB would have been placed under court-supervised management and would have been condemned to go out of business within the meaning of the guidelines.
Brez posredovanja dežele Gradiščanske bi BB postavili pod drobnogled poslovne inšpekcije in bi jo s tem v smislu Smernic pripeljali do gospodarskega propada.
Basic principle
Temeljni princip
Under point 28 of the guidelines, restructuring aid can be allowed only if strict criteria are met and if it is certain that any distortions of competition will be offset by the benefits flowing from the firm’s survival, in particular where it is clear that the net effect of redundancies resulting from the firm going out of business would exacerbate local, regional or national employment problems or exceptionally, where the firm’s disappearance would result in a monopoly or a tight oligopolistic situation.
V skladu z odstavkom 28 Smernic je mogoče zagotoviti pomoč za prestrukturiranje le, ko so izpolnjeni strožji pogoji in obstaja gotovost, da ne bo prišlo do morebitne izkrivitve konkurence zaradi ugodnosti pri nadaljnjem vodenju podjetja, še posebej če bi neto učinek brezposelnosti, povzročene s stečajem, dokazano zaostril lokalne, regionalne ali državne zaposlitvene težave, ali v izjemnih primerih, ko bi izginotje podjetja privedlo do monopola oz. ozke oligopolne situacije.
The latter can be excluded, however, since BB’s position is not so strong that bankruptcy and the subsequent partial sale would create a monopoly or oligopolistic situation.
Zadnje lahko izključimo, saj položaj BB ni dovolj močan, da bi s stečajem oz. temu sledeči prodaji po delih ustvaril monopol ali oligopolno situacijo.
Although Austria argues that, apart from BB, virtually the only important bank doing business in Burgenland is the Raiffeisen group (rural credit cooperatives) and that BB’s disappearance would thus lead to a greater concentration of market structure and further strengthen that group, this argument is not, on the basis of the information currently available, convincing, given that other banks, savings banks and people’s banks are present in Burgenland.
Avstrija sicer navaja, da je poleg BB na Gradiščanskem kot pomembna banka skoraj izključno dejavna skupina Raiffeisen in tako bi izginotje BB privedlo do večje koncentracije tržne strukture in do nadaljnje okrepitve skupine Raiffeisen, vendar pa glede na dejstvo, da so na Gradiščanskem zastopane tudi ostale banke, hranilnice in ljudske banke, ta argument na osnovi trenutnih informacij ni prepričljiv.
It should be noted, however, that the effects of a hypothetical liquidation of BB are difficult to calculate.
Vendarle pa je bilo ugotovljeno, da so vplivi hipotetične plačilne nesposobnosti BB težko izračunljive.
If BB were to be liquidated or the number of its branches reduced, the likelihood of a foreign bank establishing itself in Burgenland and taking over BB’s business would be extremely small, given the Province’s economic situation and lack of attractiveness.
V primeru likvidacije ali zmanjšanja števila poslovalnic BB je verjetnost, da bi se v deželi Gradiščanski odprla tuja banka in bi prevzela dejavnosti BB, zaradi gospodarskega položaja in relativno nizke privlačnosti dežele Gradiščanske izjemno majhna.
Instead, it would appear conceivable that basic financial services would be in short supply in certain rural regions in Burgenland.
Veliko bolj verjetna je premajhna ponudba osnovnih finančnih storitev v nekaterih podeželskih regijah Gradiščanske.
Assessment of long-term viability
Presoja dolgoročne rentabilnosti
According to point 3.2.2(b) of the guidelines, the grant of the aid is conditional on implementation of the restructuring plan, which must be endorsed by the Commission in the case of all aid measures and must be assessed in respect of its ability to restore the long-term viability of the firm within a reasonable timescale.
V skladu s členom 3.2.2, točka (b) Smernic je dodelitev pomoči odvisna od izvedbe načrta za prestrukturiranje, ki ga mora v vseh posameznih primerih odobriti Komisija, in ki mora biti v določenem roku preverjen glede sposobnosti za ponovno vzpostavitev dolgoročne donosnosti podjetja.
The restructuring plan must be of limited duration and be based on realistic assumptions.
Načrt za prestrukturiranje mora imeti omejen rok trajanja in mora biti zasnovan na realističnih domnevah.
It must describe the circumstances that led to the firm’s difficulties, thereby providing a basis for assessing whether the proposed measures are appropriate.
Opisati mora okoliščine, ki so podjetje privedle v težave, da lahko presodijo ali so predlagani ukrepi ustrezni.
It should enable the firm to progress towards a new structure that affords prospects for its long-term viability and enables it to stand on its own feet, i.e. to cover all its costs including depreciation and financial charges and to generate enough return on capital to enable it to compete in the marketplace.
Podjetju omogoča prehod k novi strukturi, ki nudi dolgoročno donosnost in možnost delovanja z lastno močjo, podjetju torej omogoča kritje vseh stroškov vključno z odpisom in s stroški financiranja ter doseženo donosnost lastnega kapitala, ki zadošča za njegovo konkurenčnost.
The Commission has based its assessment on the information provided by Austria, including the planning for the individual restructuring measures, the predicted return on investment for the restructuring period 2000 to 2010 based on a cautious appraisal of future developments, on the one hand, and on the results of normal business activity as indicated in the annual accounts and the plan calculation, on the other, and the analysis of the inadequate credit risk management responsible for the problems and of the structural deficits.
Komisija je svojo oceno oprla na avstrijske podatke, med drugim na načrtovanje posameznih ukrepov za prestrukturiranje, napovedano donosnost za obdobje prestrukturiranja od leta 2000 do leta 2010 na osnovi previdne ocene bodočega razvoja na eni strani in rezultata običajnega poslovanja na osnovi letnih poročil in poslovnega načrta, kot tudi analize nezadostnega menedžmenta kreditnega tveganja, odgovornega za težave, in strukturnih deficitov.
The Commission has also based its assessment on the information provided by Austria concerning progress in implementing the restructuring plan, the amendments to the individual measures and the schedule for completing the planned privatisation of BB.
Pri presoji se je Komisija opirala na avstrijske podatke o trenutnem poteku načrta za prestrukturiranje, o prilagajanju posameznih ukrepov kot tudi o časovnem načrtu, ki zadeva zaključek načrtovane privatizacije BB.
For want of detailed forecasting data and the underlying assumptions, the Commission, in its decision to initiate the procedure, expressed doubts regarding the forecast long-term profitability of 15 % by 2010.
Zaradi pomanjkanja natančnih prognostičnih podatkov in na njih utemeljenih domnevah je Komisija v sklepu o uvedbi stečajnega postopka podvomila v prognozo dolgoročne rentabilnosti do leta 2010 v višini 15 %.
Austria subsequently provided a calculation which, based on the principle of cautious planning and in the light of the economic environment (thriving business location, growing resident population, increasing wealth, EU enlargement), indicates a continuing improvement in profitability of some 15 % over a seven-year period.
Avstrija je nato posredovala poslovni načrt, ki temelji na osnovnem načelu previdnega načrtovanja in pod politično-gospodarskimi okvirnimi pogoji (poslovna lokacija v vzponu, rast prebivalstva, rast premoženja, širitev Evropske unije) privede do stalnega 15 % izboljšanja donosnosti v časovnem obdobju 7 let.
This is also borne out by the figures for normal business activity given in the annual accounts.
To potrjujejo tudi rezultat običajnega poslovanja v letnih obračunih.
Accordingly, as regards future developments, the Commission regards the restructuring plan as altogether plausible and complete.
Komisija zaradi tega sprejme načrt za prestrukturiranje glede bodočega razvoja kot v celoti verjetnega in popolnega.
In addition, Austria provided further information on, and comparative figures for, materials and staff costs relative to other credit institutions with a comparable structure and/or of comparable size which show that BB is significantly below the average as regards both per capita staff costs and materials costs.
Avstrija je posredovala nadaljnje informacije in primerjalne vrednosti materialnih stroškov in stroškov za osebje z ostalimi kreditnimi institucijami s primerljivo strukturo oz. velikostjo podjetja, ki so pokazali, da leži BB pri izdatkih za osebje in materialnih izdatkih krepko pod povprečjem.
Austria provided additional information in support of the analysis of company and management structures and of management failings which the Commission, in its decision to initiate the procedure, had described as inadequate.
Analiza podjetniških in menedžment struktur ter zamujenega s strani menedžmenta, za katere je Komisija v sklepu o uvedbi stečajnega postopka odkrila, da manjkajo, je naknadno izročila Avstrija.
Causes of BB’s financial difficulties included fraud, poorly conceived risk policy, absence of risk management and internal control systems, inadequate reporting arrangements, no instruments for overall bank control and inefficient organisational procedures.
Kot vzroki za finančne težave BB so bili našteti goljufija, nerazumevanje politike tveganja, neobstoječe upravljanje tveganja, manjkajoči interni kontrolni sistemi, nezadostno poročanje, odsotnost instrumentarija za upravljanje banke in neučinkovit potek organizacije.
The summary specified the following restructuring measures: introduction of a new risk policy, implementation of independent risk management, new approach to asset allocation, creation of a new management and operational structure, introduction of a management information system, and streamlining of cost management.
Kot ukrepi za prestrukturiranje so bili omenjeni zasidranje nove politike tveganja, uvedba neodvisnega upravljanja tveganja, nova definicija strukturiranja portfelja, ustvarjena nova organizacija izgradnje in poteka, uvedba informacijskega menedžmentskega sistema in zaostritev upravljanja stroškov.
The Commission regards the operational, functional and financial measures taken to date or planned as being suitable for restoring the bank’s long-term viability.
Komisija meni, da so do sedaj izvršeni oz. predvideni operacionalni, funkcionalni in finančni ukrepi primerni za ponovno vzpostavitev dolgoročnega poslovanja banke.
Austria has also notified the Commission that the Provincial Government views privatisation of BB as an essential component of its restructuring plan.
Avstrija je v nadaljevanju sporočila, da si deželna vlada pri konceptu za prestrukturiranje BB v glavni meri prizadeva za privatizacijo BB.
Negotiations with the three remaining best bidders would begin in April 2004, after completion of the compulsory due diligence process.
Aprila 2004 – po izvedbi obveznega postopka pravnega pregleda (due diligence) – naj bi prišlo do pogajanj s tremi najboljšimi ponudniki, ki so še ostali.
The Commission assumes that there is a good chance of the bank’s privatisation being successful.
Komisija izhaja iz dejstva, da ima privatizacija banke dovolj možnosti za uspeh.