natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
right to reserve approval of restructuring operations.
pridržek do soglasja pri prestrukturiranjih.
The bank made its own significant contribution by selling assets or subsidiaries which were not essential for its long‐term viability.
Prodaja premoženja ali hčerinskih družb naj bi bil pomemben lastni prispevek banke, ki ni nujno potreben za njeno dolgoročno življenjsko sposobnost.
The holdings in question were both substantial and profitable and were sold by open and transparent procedures.
Gre za bistvene, tudi dobičkonosne udeležbe, ki so bile odsvojene v javnih in preglednih postopkih.
It was also planned to sell the real estate services business.
Sem sodi tudi predvidena odsvojitev področja nepremičninskih storitev.
BGB could make no further contribution of its own, having already done its utmost in 2001 to counter the extensive loss of own resources and to prop up its own‐funds ratio by reducing its risk‐bearing assets.
Nadaljnji lastni prispevek naj ne bi bil mogoč, saj je BGB že v letu 2001 ob krčenju tvegane aktive naredila vse v njenih močeh, da v največjem možnem obsegu prepreči izgubo lastnih sredstev in podpre stopnjo lastnih sredstev.
The core capital and own‐funds ratios targeted from 2003 under the restructuring plan and provisionally approved as rescue aid were also necessary.
Prav tako so potrebne stopnje temeljnih in lastnih sredstev, ki so bile začasno odobrene kot pomoči pri reševanju, in za katere si banka prizadeva od leta 2003 v skladu z načrtom prestrukturiranja.
If the undertaking was to survive and obtain a solid rating from rating agencies, it was vital that it achieved the provisionally approved core‐capital ratio of 5 % and the own‐funds ratio of 9,7 % and, from 2006, the target core‐capital ratio of around 7,5 % and the own‐funds ratio of around 12 %.
Doseganje začasno dovoljene stopnje temeljnega kapitala v višini 5 % in stopnje lastnih sredstev v višini 9,7 %, ter stopnje temeljnega kapitala v višini 7,5 % in stopnje lastnih sredstev v višini približno 12 %, za katero si prizadevajo po letu 2006, je za nadaljevanje obstoja podjetja in njegovega solidnega ratinga, ki ga ocenjujejo rating agencije, nujno potrebno.
Given [...]* and BGB’s [...]* liquidity situation, an above‐average capital base was essential if [...]*.
Še zlasti glede [...]* in [...]* likvidnostne situacije BGB je razpoložljivost lastnih sredstev nujno potrebna, okoli [...]*.
Between 1995 and 2000 the average core capital and own‐funds ratios of Land banks/saving banks ranged from 5,7 % to 6,8 % and from 8,9 % to 10,2 % respectively.
Povprečna stopnja temeljnega kapitala ali lastnih sredstev deželnih bank/hranilnic se je v letih 1995 do 2000 gibala v razponu med 5,7 % do 6,8 % oz. 8,9 % do 10,2 %.
BGB’s provisionally approved core‐capital ratio of 5 % was therefore below the long‐term average of comparable banks, while the provisionally approved own‐funds ratio was a mere 0,1 % above the mean value for the years 1995 to 2000.
5 % stopnja temeljnega kapitala, ki je bila BGB začasno odobrena, tako leži pod dolgoročnim povprečjem primerljivih bank, medtem ko je začasno odobrena stopnja lastnih sredstev z 0,1 % le nepomembno nad srednjo vrednostjo v letih 1995 do 2000.
These ratios appeared to be very conservative and failed to take account of BGB’s specific problems.
Te stopnje se zdijo zelo konservativne in ne upoštevajo specifičnega težavnega položaja BGB.
In the market as a whole, i.e. private and public banks in Germany, solvency ratios ranged between 6,3 % and 7,3 % (core‐capital ratio) and between 10,4 % and 11,3 % (own‐funds ratio), partly because of the absence of guarantor liability in private banking.
Stopnje solventnosti skupnega trga, t.j. zasebnih in javnih bank v Nemčiji, se giblje, med drugim zaradi manjkajočega jamstva garanta v zasebnih bančnih sektorjih, v razponu od 6,3 do 7,3 % (stopnja temeljnega kapitala) oz. 10,4 % do 11,3 % (stopnja lastnih sredstev).
Even before the guarantor liability for public banks was discontinued, it was likely that the solvency ratios of Land banks/saving banks would gradually be aligned on the higher ratios of private banks.
Že v pripravi na odpad jamstva garanta za javne banke bi stopnje solventnosti deželnih bank/hranilnic predvidoma počasi prilagajali višji ravni zasebnih bank.
As a result, the average own‐funds ratios of Land banks/saving banks would ceteris paribus increase from 9,6 % to around 10,9 % in 2006.
S tem naj bi se povišala povprečna stopnja lastnih sredstev deželnih bank/hranilnic v letu 2006, v kolikor vse ostalo ostane nespremenjeno, iz 9,6 % na približno 10,9 %.
The restructuring plan estimates BGB’s own‐funds ratio in 2006 at [...]* %; on this basis, BGB’s own resources cushion would be reduced to no more than around [...]* %.
Tako bi se varnostna zaloga lastnih sredstev BGB na osnovi stopnje lastnih sredstev BGB, napovedane v sanacijskem osnutku za leto 2006, zmanjšala iz [...]* % na zgolj približno [...]* %.
When it came to assessing the own‐funds ratio, what counted therefore was not the statutory minimum of 8 %, which BAFin had in fact increased to 8,4 % and which, allowing for volatility, actually lay around 8,6 %.
Za ocenitev stopnje lastnih sredstev tako ni pomemben predpisan minimum v višini 8 %, ki ga je BAFin dejansko že povečala na 8,4 % in je zaradi nihajnostjo praktično okoli 8,6 %.
Instead, the capital market and rating agencies tended to use appropriate benchmarks which entailed considerably higher own‐funds ratios and hence reduced the apparently large own resources cushion from just under [...]* % to around [...]* %.
Nasprotno, trga kapitala oz. rating agencije se običajno orientirajo po ustreznih primerjalnih podatkih, ki izkazujejo bistveno višje stopnje lastnih sredstev in s tem ustrezno krčijo navidezno visoke varnostne zaloge lastnih sredstev iz nekoliko manj kot [...]* % na približno [...]* %.
An above‐average own‐funds ratio in 2006 was vital [...]*.
Nadpovprečna stopnja lastnih sredstev v letu 2006 v višini [...]* je nujno potrebna.
Rating agencies attached considerable importance to capital structure and in the past have called for improvements in BGB’s core‐capital ratio.
Rating agencije pripisujejo strukturi kapitala pri ocenjevanju velik pomen in naj bi že v preteklosti opomnile BGB, da izboljša stopnjo temeljnega kapitala.
Given the close correlation between the financial strength rating and the long‐term rating, on the one hand, and the forthcoming end of guarantor liability, on the other, a significant improvement in the financial strength rating was required to avoid negative consequences for the scale and cost of refinancing.
Zaradi tesne korelacije med ratingom finančne moči in dolgoročnim ratingom ter prihodnjega neobstoja jamstva garanta je treba znatno izboljšanje ocene finančne moči, da bi se izognili negativnim učinkom na obseg in stroške refinanciranja.
Moreover, the reappraisal of risk‐bearing assets under Basel II would probably result in a higher own resources requirement from 2006 onwards because of the increasing volatility of risk‐bearing assets.
Poleg tega je posledica nove ocenitve tvegane aktive v skladu z Basel II predvidoma od leta 2006 povečana potreba po lastnih sredstvih zaradi naraščajoče nihajnosti tvegane aktive.
COMMENTS FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
STALIŠČA DRUGIH UDELEŽENCEV
In response to the publication of the decision to initiate proceedings in the Official Journal of the European Communities, the Commission received comments from two other interested parties, namely Berliner Volksbank and a third party which asked for its identity to be kept secret.
Po objavi Sklepa o uvedbi postopka v Uradnem listu Evropskih Skupnosti je Komisija prejela mnenja dveh drugih udeležencev, in sicer Berliner Volksbank in tretjega, ki je zaprosil za ohranitev tajnosti identitete.
Comments from Berliner Volksbank
Stališče Berliner Volksbank
Berliner Volksbank argued that there could be no question of authorising the notified restructuring aid under Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty.
Berliner Volksbank je navedla, da odobritev prijavljene pomoči za prestrukturiranje po tretjem odstavku člena 87 Pogodbe ES ne pride v poštev.
The aid was also not covered by the statutory arrangements of institutional liability (Anstaltslast) and guarantor liability (Gewährträgerhaftung) and hence was not existing aid.
Pomoči prav tako niso zajete v pravnih institucijah obveznosti za ohranjanje javnega podjetja in jamstva garanta, zato tudi niso obstoječe pomoči.
The aid measures for BGB were on a completely new scale.
Ukrepi pomoči v korist BGB so presegli doslej znane dimenzije.
The bank’s financial difficulties were due in the first place to its extremely exposed business in closed‐end real estate funds.
Finančne težave BGB so v prvi vrsti posledica izjemno slabih poslov z zaprtimi nepremičninskimi skladi, ki so podjetju prinesli izgubo.
The reason for BGB’s losses was that virtually no checks had been made when the property had been acquired.
Razlog za izgube pri BGB je, da pri kupovanju stavb tako rekoč ni bilo preverjanj.
Yet investors had been guaranteed an income.
Kljub temu so vlagateljem v sklade zagotavljali prihodke.
The undertaking had been regarded throughout the Federal Republic as the market leader — primarily, in all probability, on account of the favourable conditions for investors.
Podjetje je, verjetno v prvi vrsti zaradi ugodnih pogojev za vlagatelje, veljajo za vodilnega na celotnem zveznem trgu.
Restructuring aid could be justified in individual cases given the serious negative consequences of a bank failure for the banking system and public confidence.
Sicer bi bile lahko pomoči pri prestrukturiranju v posamičnih primerih zaradi izjemno negativnih posledic plačilne nesposobnosti banke za bančni sistem in za zaupanje javnosti upravičene.
Unlike in previous cases decided by the Commission, however, the aid recipient here operated on a limited regional scale so that the effect of the aid was concentrated on only a few competitors.
Vendar pa gre v nasprotju s primeri, o katerih je doslej odločala Komisija, za prejemnika pomoči z omejenim regionalnim krogom dejavnosti, zato je učinek pomoči strnjen na le kopico tekmecev.
These would be hit all the harder by the distortive effects, especially Berliner Volksbank, which competed with the BGB right across its business.
Te bi učinki izkrivljanja konkurence še toliko bolj prizadeli, še zlasti Berliner Volksbank, ki je z BGB tekmovala na vseh svojih področjih poslovanja.
The level and intensity of the aid should be limited to the minimum necessary for the restructuring.
Višino in intenzivnost pomoči bi bilo treba omejiti na najnižjo potrebno mero za prestrukturiranje.
But this was not apparent.
Vendar tega ni videti.
The Land guarantee for risks in the property sector was an unlimited additional funding commitment since the Land of Berlin’s associated liability could not currently be estimated and was therefore a ‘blank cheque’ for future losses.
Garancija dežele za tveganja na nepremičninskem področju ustreza neomejeni obvezi plačevanja, saj s tem povezane obveznosti plačevanja dežele Berlin zdaj ni mogoče oceniti, zato naj bi ustrezala „bianko čeku“ za prihodnje izgube.
No excess liquidity could be allocated to the undertaking, however.
Vendar pa podjetju ni dovoljeno zagotoviti prekomerne likvidnosti.
Given its amount (EUR 21,6 billion) and its duration (30 years), the guarantee was already disproportionate: it gave the bank virtually unlimited creditworthiness and distorted competition quite considerably.
Že zaradi svoje višine (21,6 milijarde EUR) in dobe (trideset let) je garancija nesorazmerna in banki zagotavljala praktično neomejeno boniteto, zato je njen vpliv na izkrivljanje konkurence občuten.
By being completely indemnified against the risks of property servicing in operational banking, BGB was receiving an ‘unconditional licence’ to submit offers on whatever terms it wanted, e.g. when selling or leasing property.
S tem, da se banki popolnoma oprostijo tveganja pri poslovanju z nepremičninskimi storitvami v operativnem bančnem poslu, je BGB prejela proste roke pri oblikovanju ponudb s poljubnimi pogoji, npr. pri odsvojitvi ali oddajanju nepremičnin.
Even if the bank were to make losses in the process, these would be fully compensated by the Land of Berlin.
Četudi bi banka s tem pridelala izgube, bi jih dežela Berlin v celoti nadomestila.
Consequently, the guarantee was an additional funding commitment of unlimited amount which, by its very nature, could not be authorised and which was also not defined in the underlying legislation.
Ob koncu torej garancija ustreza neomejeni obveznosti plačevanja, ki že v svojem bistvu ne potrebuje pridobitve dovoljenja, in ki v zakonu, s katerim je utemeljena, ni ustrezno konkretno opredeljena.
In addition, the capital injection combined with the risk‐hedging guarantee provided double cover.
Poleg tega vodi kumulativno dovoljevanje priliva kapitala in garancija za omejitev tveganja do dvojnega kritja.
When determining the grant equivalent of the guarantee, the fact that much of it would definitely be used should be taken into account.
Pri določanju subvencijskega ekvivalenta garancije je treba upoštevati, da bo slednja prav gotovo v veliki meri izrabljena.
In the least favourable scenario, the Land was assuming EUR 6,1 billion. Since it was realistic to expect that the guarantee would be invoked (though, plainly, a precise figure could not be given), its aid intensity would correspond to the nominal amount.
V najslabšem primeru dežela izhaja iz 6,1 milijarde EUR. V kolikor je nastanek primera poroštva realistično pričakovati (česar očitno ni mogoče izraziti s številkami), ustreza višina pomoči garancije njenemu nominalnemu znesku.
The market for financial services was characterised by strong competition on terms, with considerable pressure on margins.
Trg finančnih storitev obeležuje znaten pritisk na marže, pogojen z močno tekmovalnostjo.
It was therefore to be expected that BGB would pass on the full advantage conferred by the aid to the market and thus considerably distort competition to the detriment of its competitors.
Zato je pričakovati, da se bo prednost, v obliki pomoči, ki jo je BGB prejela, v polnem obsegu odrazila na trgu, kar bo povzročilo znatno izkrivljenje konkurence v breme njenih tekmecev.
This was a particular cause for concern because the aid was being granted to the market leader in the Berlin/Brandenburg region, whose market share in that region relative to the lending business as a whole was, on BGB’s own estimation, just under 50 % and which owned just over 50 % of all branches of credit institutions in Berlin.
To je še zlasti zaskrbljujoče, ker bodo pomoči odobrene vodilnemu na trgu v pokrajini Berlin/Brandenburg, katerega tržni delež v pokrajini je glede na celotno aktivno poslovanje po lastni oceni skoraj 50 %, in ki razpolaga z več kot 50 % vseh podružničnih kreditnih ustanov v Berlinu.
BGB was a direct competitor of Berliner Volksbank in the latter’s main fields of business, i.e. personal banking and banking for medium‐sized corporate clients, and already had a market share many times larger than Berliner Volksbank’s.
BGB je neposredna tekmica Berliner Volksbank na njenih glavnih poslovnih področjih, ki je poslovanje z zasebnimi strankami in poslovanje s srednje velikimi podjetji. Že danes ima tržni delež, ki kar nekajkrat presega tržni delež Berliner Volksbank.
The aid thus contributed to a further economic ‘consolidation of power’ in the Berlin banking market.
Pomoč bi tako prispevala k dodatni gospodarski koncentraciji berlinskega bančnega trga.
The bank’s comparatively strong market presence was also a consequence of the multibrand strategy of BGB, which was operating with several institutions under different brands or business names.
Sorazmerno močna navzočnost BGB na trgu je tudi posledica strategije več znamk, saj BGB na trgu nastopa z več ustanovami pod različnimi imeni oz. firmami.
BGB was pursuing a business strategy which had detached itself from profitability strategies and, through its subsidised conditions, had become predatory.
BGB sledi poslovni strategiji, ki se je odcepila od strategije donosnosti in zaradi subvencioniranih pogojev izrinila tekmece.
Because it lacked a cogent plan for a sustained recovery, the proposed restructuring programme would not restore the long‐term profitability of the undertaking.
Predložen načrt prestrukturiranja zaradi pomanjkanja sklepčnega osnutka za dolgotrajno ozdravitev ni primeren za ponovno vzpostavitev dolgoročne rentabilnosti podjetja.
It was based on overly optimistic assumptions, was not sufficiently specific and overemphasised positive aspects.
Namreč, temelji na optimističnih predvidevanjih, ni dovolj konkreten in preveč poudarja pozitivne vidike.
Moreover, it was not suited to ensuring the long‐term profitability and hence the viability of the undertaking since it set out to achieve a target profitability of only some 6 to 7 %, which was only half as much as the usual average for the sector.
Poleg tega načrt ni primeren za zagotovitev dolgoročne donosnosti in s tem življenjske sposobnosti podjetja, saj izhaja le iz ciljne donosnosti v višini okoli 6-7 %, kar je le polovica običajnega povprečja panoge.
Lastly, the restructuring programme did not mention future aid reimbursement obligations associated with the pending investigation of the transfer of WBK to the Land bank in 1993.
In končno osnutek za prestrukturiranje ne omenja pravnih dolžnosti za vračanje pomoči glede še nerešenega revizijskega postopka za prenos WBK na Landesbank v letu 1993.
Insufficient attention was paid to the need, identified in the Commission’s guidelines, to reduce the adverse effects on competitors by limiting the presence of the aid recipient on the relevant markets after restructuring since business activities in the relevant markets would actually expand.
Nujnost omilitve negativnih učinkov na tekmece z omejitvijo navzočnosti prejemnikov pomoči na upoštevnih trgih po zaključenem prestrukturiranju v skladu s smernicami Komisije ni upoštevana v zadostni meri, saj bi se naj poslovne aktivnosti na upoštevnih trgih celo razširile.
The restructuring programme would make it possible to increase profits in the private and corporate customer segments and to compensate for the closure of various sites outside Berlin, in particular by focusing and expanding those activities in Berlin.
Osnutek prestrukturiranja predvideva povišanje donosa iz poslovanja z zasebnimi strankami in podjetji ter nadomestilo za zaprtje različnih lokacij zunaj Berlina zlasti z usmeritvijo in razširitvijo teh poslovnih dejavnosti na Berlin.
BGB was planning to retreat only from those geographic markets in which it had not so far acquired considerable importance.
BGB načrtuje le umik iz tistih prostorskih trgov, kjer doslej ni razvila pomembne navzočnosti.
The announced closure of branches might not lead to a reduction of BGB’s market presence but it corresponded more to a general trend in the markets for financial services in Germany, which was regarded as ‘over‐banked’.
Napovedano zaprtje podružnic ne more povzročiti skrčenja navzočnosti BGB na trgu, ampak veliko bolj ustreza splošnemu trendu na trgih finančnih storitev v Nemčiji, ki velja za „prenatrpanega z bankami“.
The extent of the remedies to be provided by BGB would have to be calculated using its current dominant position in the Berlin banking market, since this was where the distortive effects were strongest.
Obseg dolžnosti, ki jih zagotavlja BGB, je izmerjen na osnovi trenutnega obvladujočega položaja BGB na berlinskem bančnem trgu, saj so tukaj posledice izkrivljanja konkurence najbolj vidne.
As a condition for offsetting the distortions caused by the aid, the Commission should consider the sale of part of the BGB group.
Kot pogoj Komisije za izravnavo izkrivljanja konkurence, ki ga povzroča zagotovljena pomoč, pride v poštev odsvojitev delnega področja koncerna BGB.
One possibility would be to sell Berliner Bank, which in the relevant market segments had market shares similar to those of Berliner Volksbank.
V ta namen se ponuja npr. odsvojitev poslovnega področja „Berliner Bank“, ki ima v upoštevnih segmentih trga tržne deleže, ki ustrezajo deležem Berliner Volksbank.
The advantage of selling Berliner Bank was that, organisationally, the institution was largely independent and had its own entrance to the market; it could therefore be taken over by a competitor with relative ease.
Prednost odsvojitve Berliner Bank je v tem, da gre za organizacijsko pretežno samostojno ustanovo z lastnim nastopom na trgu, zaradi česar jo lahko brez večjih težav v postopku prevzame katera od tekmic.
Given the amount of aid, the size of the business sold off would be appropriate compensation for the aid’s considerable distortive effects.
Obseg oddanega posla bi pomenil na osnovi višine pomoči ustrezno protiutež za znatne učinke izkrivljanje konkurence, ki ga pomoč povzroča.
Along with the public liability guarantees (Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung) and the transfer of Wohnbau‐Kreditanstalt to the Berlin Land bank, the present aid measure was only one of the many financial public support measures for BGB.
Obravnavana pomoč je poleg jamstva, ki ga garantira država (obveznost za ohranjanje javnega podjetja in jamstvo garanta) in prenosa stanovanjsko-kreditne ustanove na Landesbank Berlin, le eden številnih finančnih podpornih ukrepov javnega organa v korist BGB.
This resulted in a combination of aid which would also have to be taken into account in determining the remedies for the granting of the restructuring aid.
To vodi do kopičenja, ki ga je treba upoštevati tudi pri določanju dolžnosti za pomoč prestrukturiranja.
Raising the own‐funds ratio to 9,7 % was not essential.
Povišanje stopnje lastnih sredstev na 9,7 % ni potrebno.
Only the 8 % minimum laid down in the German Banking Law (Kreditwesengesetz) was legally binding and, in the words of the guidelines, the ‘strict minimum needed’.
Pravno obvezujoče je treba zagotoviti le 8 % minimum, ki ga predpisuje Zakon o kreditnem sistemu, ter „nujno potrebni minimum“ v skladu s smernicami Komisije.
The combination of risk hedging and capital injection was not essential since the former by itself would cover the risk of losses in the property sector.
Kopičenje omejitve tveganj in priliv kapitala nista potrebna, saj bi že prvi pokrili tveganja zaradi izgub iz nepremičninskega področja.
The capital injection led to the Land of Berlin compensating for losses twice over.
S prilivom kapitala dežela Berlin „dvakrat izravnava izgubo“ .
BGB might use the additional funds obtained for other business segments.
BGB bi lahko dodatno pridobljena sredstva uporabila za druga poslovna področja.
Furthermore, there were indications of other aid.
Povrhu vsega obstajajo namigi za dodatne pomoči.
The Land government was negotiating with selected investors over the takeover of the bank.
Senat se z izbranimi vlagatelji pogaja o prevzemu banke.
The sale was not at the market price since the tendering procedure was not open to all, was not transparent and was not being conducted without discrimination.
Prodaja naj se ne bi izvedla po tržni ceni, ker postopek za oddajo ponudb ni odprt vsem, ne poteka pregledno in ni diskriminativen.
Comments from a third party that asked for its identity to be kept secret
Stališče tretjega, ki je prosil za tajnost njegove identitete
The bank’s future strategy seemed in particular to be to reduce its activities, capacities and infrastructure and to concentrate on regional personal and corporate banking.
Kaže, kot je prihodnja strategija banke zlasti skrčenje njene dejavnosti, zmogljivosti in infrastrukture ter usmeritev na regionalno poslovanje z zasebnimi strankami in podjetji.
This plan could be based only on the assumption that these regional markets and the bank’s share of them would grow.
Ta osnutek bi moral temeljiti na predvidevanju, da bodo regionalni trgi in delež banke na njih rasli.
There were some doubts and contradictions, however, about the bank’s shares of these markets.
Vendar obstaja nekaj dvomov in protislovij v zvezi s tržnimi deleži banke na teh trgih.
It was also unclear whether the bank could build on a sound customer basis at all.
Prav tako ni jasno, ali banka sploh lahko gradi na solidni bazi strank.