natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The compatibility of these measures with the schemes under which they were allegedly granted should though be examined.
Vendar je nasprotno treba preveriti združljivost teh ukrepov s programi pomoči, na podlagi katerih se jih je domnevno izvajalo.
Measures 1, 2 and 3: As the company had some 70 employees at the time of privatisation, Germany regards any aid granted within this context as being covered by THA scheme N 768/94 [17].
Ukrepi 1, 2 in 3: Ker je podjetje v času privatizacije zaposlovalo približno 70 delavcev, po mnenju Nemčije vsaka pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena v tej zvezi, spada v program pomoči THA N 768/94 [17].
The Commission acknowledges that the company had fewer than 250 employees at the time of privatisation.
Komisija potrjuje, da je imelo podjetje v času privatizacije manj kot 250 zaposlenih.
These measures do not, therefore, need to be notified to the Commission and are to be regarded as constituting existing aid.
O teh ukrepih Komisije zato ni bilo treba obvestiti in spadajo pod obstoječo pomoč.
Measure 1a: As the granting of the guarantee is covered by the THA scheme, the possibility of converting this guarantee into a loan or grant had been envisaged from the outset because the company was already in difficulties.
Ukrep 1a: Ker dajanje poroštva spada v program pomoči THA, se je že od začetka razmišljalo o možnosti pretvorbe poroštva v posojilo ali subvencijo, saj je bilo podjetje že takrat v težavah.
This is consistently acknowledged in the three THA schemes that constitute the legal basis for the granting of the guarantee.
Takšen pristop trije programi pomoči THA, ki so pravna podlaga za dajanje poroštva, soglasno priznavajo.
The decision on THA scheme E 15/92 explicitly states that loans and guarantees provided by the THA are increasingly likely to be converted into grants [18].
V odločbi o programu pomoči THA E 15/92 se izrecno glasi, da so posojila in poroštva, ki jih zagotovi THA, v vedno večji meri primerna za to, da se pretvorijo v subvencije [18].
Conversion of the guarantee into a loan and grant was already covered by the THA scheme and cannot therefore be classified as new aid.
Pretvorba poroštva v posojilo ali subvencijo je bila v programu pomoči THA že vključena in je zato ni mogoče obravnavati kot novo pomoč.
Measures 9 and 10: After the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, Germany stated for the first time that these guarantees had been granted under a scheme approved by the Commission for the rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty [19].
Ukrepa 9 in 10: Po uvedbi uradnega preiskovalnega postopka je Nemčija najprej sporočila, da so bila ta poroštva dana na osnovi programa za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah, ki ga je Komisija odobrila [19].
The Commission notes that all the conditions laid down for the granting of guarantees have been met in the present case.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so vsi pogoji, ki jih program predvideva za dajanje poroštva, v tem primeru izpolnjeni.
It has to be emphasised that the scheme was adopted before the entry into force of the Community guidelines and that these guidelines did not require the Member States to bring their existing schemes into line with the new rules (see point 2.5 of the Community guidelines).
Poudariti je treba, da je bil program pomoči sprejet, preden so v veljavo stopile Smernice Skupnosti (1994), in Smernice Skupnosti (1994) od držav članic niso zahtevale, da morajo svoje obstoječe programe pomoči uskladiti z novimi predpisi (glej odstavek 2.5 Smernic Skupnosti (1994)).
In addition, the Commission did not review the scheme at issue after the adoption of the Community guidelines.
Poleg tega Komisija zadevnega programa pomoči po objavi Smernic Skupnosti (1994) ni preverila.
This explains why Measures 9 and 10 comply with the rescue and restructuring scheme but are not in accordance with the Community guidelines.
To pojasnjuje, zakaj ukrepa 9 in 10 sicer ustrezata programu za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, vendar nista v skladu s Smernicami Skupnosti (1994).
The measures in question can thus be regarded as existing aid which need not be reassessed.
Zato ta ukrepa lahko obravnavamo kot obstoječi pomoči, ki ju ni treba ponovno presojati.
Measure 11: Investment grants amounting to EUR 1,94 million (DEM 3,8 million) were granted on the basis of an aid scheme approved by the Commission as regional investment aid [20].
Ukrep 11: Subvencije za naložbe v višini 1,94 milijona EUR (3,8 milijona DEM) so bili dodeljene na osnovi programa pomoči, ki ga je Komisija odobrila kot regionalno pomoč za naložbe [20].
In its response to the information injunction, Germany stated that it would ensure that the rules on cumulation were complied with in respect of regional aid granted to CWP and that the maximum regional aid ceiling for SMEs was respected.
V svojem odgovoru na odredbo o predložitvi podatkov je Nemčija razložila, da bo zagotovila, da bo podjetje CWP regionalne pomoči dobilo v skladu z določbami za kumulacijo in da bo upoštevala najvišjo regionalno pomoč za mala in srednja podjetja.
The Commission thus regards the measure as existing aid.
Komisija ukrep zato obravnava kot obstoječo pomoč.
In addition, the aid measure was not taken into consideration when the formal investigation procedure was initiated.
Poleg tega ukrep pomoči ni bil del uradnega preiskovalnega postopka.
Measure 12: Investment allowances amounting to EUR 0,36 million (DEM 0,7 million) were granted on the basis of aid schemes approved by the Commission as regional investment aid.
Ukrep 12: Dodatki za naložbe v vrednosti 0,36 milijona EUR (0,7 milijona DEM), ki so bili dodeljeni na osnovi programov pomoči, ki jih je Komisija odobrila kot regionalno podporo za naložbe.
Accordingly, the Commission considers that on the basis of the information provided, Measures 1 (including 1a), 2 and 3 as well as Measures 9, 10, 11 and 12 constitute existing aid which need not be reassessed by the Commission.
Komisija je zato mnenja, da gre glede na razpoložljive informacije pri ukrepih 1 (vključno z 1a), 2 in 3 ter ukrepih 9, 10, 11 in 12 za obstoječo pomoč, ki je Komisiji ni treba ponovno presojati.
Their amount will nevertheless be taken into account in assessing the proportionality of the overall aid.
Vendar se bo ta znesek upošteval pri oceni sorazmernosti celotne pomoči.
Other State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty
Druga državna pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES
According to Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, any aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings is incompatible with the common market in so far as it affects trade between Member States.
V skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES so pomoči vseh vrst, ki koristijo določenim podjetjem in s tem izkrivljajo konkurenco ali predstavljajo grožnjo, nezdružljive s skupnim trgom, če ovirajo trgovino med državami članicami.
The financial measures in favour of CWP have conferred advantages on CWP that a company in difficulty would not have obtained on the market.
Finančni ukrepi v korist podjetja CWP so podjetju prinesli prednosti, ki jih podjetje v težavah na trgu ne bi dobilo.
It should be recalled here that CWP was on the verge of insolvency in 1997 and that no private investor was willing at that time to provide CWP with the financial means it needed.
Naj spomnimo na to, da je bilo podjetje CWP leta 1997 tik pred insolvenco in mu takrat noben zasebni vlagatelj ni bil pripravljen zagotoviti potrebnih finančnih sredstev.
As CWP’s products are also traded and as its competitors are present in other Member States, the measures threaten to distort competition and affect trade between Member States.
Ker se z izdelki, ki jih izdeluje podjetje CWP, tudi trguje, in so tekmeci podjetja CWP prisotni v drugih državah članicah, grozi nevarnost, da ukrepi izkrivijo konkurenco in ovirajo trgovino med državami članicami.
The measures are financed through State resources and granted by the THA/BvS and the Land of Saxony-Anhalt.
Ukrepi se financirajo iz državnih sredstev in jih zagotavljajo THA/BvS in dežela Saška-Anhalt.
The THA was set up as a public-law entity with the task of privatising State-owned firms in the former German Democratic Republic and was under the direct supervision of the German Ministry of Finance.
THA je bil ustanovljen kot javni zavod za privatizacijo državnih podjetij nekdanje Nemške demokratične republike in je bil podrejen neposredno finančnemu ministrstvu.
The BvS is the successor to the THA and likewise a public-law entity.
Tudi BvS je kot organ naslednik THA javni zavod.
The measures are thus imputable to the State.
Torej gre za državne ukrepe.
They constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty and have to be assessed accordingly.
Predstavljajo državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES in jih je treba temu ustrezno presoditi.
Measures 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8: These Measures, i.e. the waiver of the purchase price and the accumulated interest, the investment grant as well as the two 20 % BvS guarantees, were granted outside the scope of any aid scheme and thus constitute ad hoc aid and have to be assessed accordingly.
Ukrepi 4, 5, 6, 7 in 8: Ti ukrepi, tj. oprostitev nakupne cene in nabranih obresti, subvencija za naložbe in obe 20 %-ni poroštvi BvS-a, niso bili dodeljeni v okviru programov pomoči, zato gre pri njih za ad hoc pomoč in jih je treba temu ustrezno presoditi.
This is not contested by Germany.
Temu Nemčija ne oporeka.
Measures 7a/8a: In Germany’s view, the prolongation of the guarantees and their subsequent conversion into loans and grants do not rank as new aid.
Ukrepa 7a/8a: Po mnenju Nemčije se podaljšanje poroštev in kasnejša pretvorba v posojila in subvencije ne smeta obravnavati kot nova pomoč.
However, this would be relevant only if Measures 7 and 8 constituted existing aid, which is not the case.
Vendar bi bilo to vprašanje pomembno samo, če bi pri ukrepih 7 in 8 šlo za obstoječo pomoč, čemur pa ni tako.
Since Measures 7 and 8 are to be regarded as ad hoc measures, Measures 7a and 8a are, as part of Measures 7 and 8, included in the assessment of compatibility.
Ker je ukrepa 7 in 8 treba obravnavati kot ad hoc pomoč, sta ukrepa 7a in 8a kot del ukrepov 7 in 8 vključena v presojo združljivosti.
The guarantees under Measure 7 (including Measure 7a) and under Measure 8 (including Measure 8a) enabled CWP to obtain loans on better financial terms than those normally available on the financial markets.
Poroštvi v okviru ukrepa 7 (vključno s 7a) in ukrepa 8 (vključno z 8a) sta podjetju CWP omogočili, da je posojila dobilo pod ugodnejšimi pogoji, kot se jih sicer običajno ponuja na finančnih trgih.
The Commission considers that the aid element of the guarantees under Measures 7 and 8 is the difference between the interest rate that CWP would have had to pay for a loan on market terms, i.e. without a guarantee, and the interest rate at which the guaranteed loan was actually provided.
Kot element pomoči poroštev v okviru ukrepov 7 in 8 Komisija upošteva razliko med obrestno mero, ki bi jo podjetje CWP moralo plačati za posojilo pod tržnimi pogoji (tj. brez poroštva), in obrestno mero, po kateri je dejansko dobilo s poroštvom zavarovano posojilo.
As CWP was in severe financial difficulties at the time the guarantees were granted and the loans made available, the aid element could be as high as 100 % of the guarantees as nobody would have granted the loans without any guarantee.
Ker je bilo podjetje CWP v času zagotovitve poroštev in dodelitve posojil v hudih finančnih težavah, bi element pomoči lahko znašal do 100 % poroštev, saj posojil nihče ne bi dodelil brez poroštev.
According to the Commission notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates [21], the Commission establishes reference rates which are supposed to reflect the average level of interest rates charged on medium- and long-term loans backed by normal security.
Glede na sporočilo Komisije o metodi za določitev referenčnih in eskontnih obrestnih mer [21] bi morale referenčne obrestne mere odsevati povprečno višino obrestnih mer, ki na trgu veljajo za srednjeročna in dolgoročna posojila z običajnimi varščinami.
The notice also points out that this reference rate is a floor rate which may be increased in situations involving a particular risk, e.g. an undertaking in difficulty.
V nadaljevanju sporočila Komisija pravi, da je na tak način ugotovljena referenčna obrestna mera najnižja obrestna mera, ki se jo v posebej tveganih primerih (npr. podjetja v težavah) lahko zviša.
In such cases, the premium may amount to 400 basis points or more.
V tem primeru se lahko doda 400 odstotnih točk ali celo več.
And so, in the present case, the Commission considers that, without the guarantees, CWP would have had to pay an interest rate at least equal to the reference interest rate plus 400 basis points.
Zato je Komisija v zadevnem primeru mnenja, da bi podjetje CWP brez poroštev moralo plačati vsaj obrestno mero, ki bi bila enaka referenčni obrestni meri z dodatkom 400 odstotnih točk.
The aid element of each guarantee thus consists in the difference between the reference interest rate plus 400 basis points and the interest rate at which the guaranteed loan was provided.
Element pomoči vsakega poroštva je torej razlika med referenčno obrestno mero z dodatkom 400 odstotnih točk in obrestno mero, po kateri je podjetje dobilo s poroštvom zavarovano posojilo.
A similar reasoning applies to the conversion of the guarantees into loans by the BvS.
Podobno velja za pretvorbo poroštev v posojila s strani zavoda BvS.
The Commission considers that the loans were granted at an interest rate below the interest rate that CWP would have been able to obtain on the market.
Po mnenju Komisije je podjetje CWP posojila dobilo po obrestni meri, ki je nižja od tiste, ki bi jo dobilo na trgu.
The aid element of the BvS loans under Measures 7 (including Measure 7a) and Measure 8 (including Measure 8a) thus consists in the difference between the interest rate that CWP would have been able to obtain for such a loan on the market and the interest rate at which the loans were provided by the BvS.
Element pomoči posojila zavoda BvS v okviru ukrepa 7 (vključno z ukrepom 7a) in posojila zavoda BvS v okviru ukrepa 8 (vključno z ukrepom 8a) je torej razlika med obrestno mero, ki bi jo podjetje CWP za takšno posojilo dobilo na trgu, in obrestno mero, po kateri je podjetje CWP posojila dobilo od zavoda BvS.
The Commission takes the view that CWP would have had to pay an interest rate at least equal to the reference interest rate plus 400 basis points.
Po mnenju Komisije bi moralo podjetje CWP plačati vsaj obrestno mero, ki bi bila enaka referenčni obrestni meri z dodatkom 400 odstotnih točk.
The aid element of each loan is thus the difference between the reference rate plus 400 basis points and the interest rate at which the loan was actually granted.
Element pomoči vsakega posojila je tako razlika med referenčno obrestno mero z dodatkom 400 odstotnih točk in obrestno mero, po kateri je podjetje dejansko dobilo posojilo.
Measures 4, 5, 6, 7 (including 7a) and 8 (including 8a) are to be assessed by the Commission as ad hoc aid.
Ukrepe 4, 5, 6, 7 (vključno s 7a) in 8 (vključno z 8a) mora Komisija presoditi kot ad hoc pomoč.
Article 87(2) and (3) of the EC Treaty provides for derogations from the general prohibition on aid in Article 87(1).
Člen 87(2) in (3) Pogodbe ES predvideva odstopanja od splošne prepovedi pomoči iz člena 87(1).
The derogations in Article 87(2) of the EC Treaty do not apply in the present case because the aid measures neither have a social character and are granted to individual consumers, nor do they make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, nor is the aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany.
Posebne določbe iz člena 87(2) Pogodbe ES v tem primeru ne veljajo, saj ne gre niti za socialne pomoči posameznim potrošnikom niti za pomoči za odpravo škode, nastale zaradi naravnih nesreč ali drugih izjemnih dogodkov in niti za pomoči za gospodarstvo določenih območij, prizadetih zaradi delitve Nemčije.
Germany has not invoked any of these derogations.
Nemčija teh posebnih določb ni uveljavljala.
Further derogations are laid down in Article 87(3)(a) and (c) of the EC Treaty.
Nadaljnje posebne določbe so določene v členu 87(3)(a) in (c) Pogodbe ES.
As the primary objective of the aid is not regional development but the restoration of the long-term viability of an undertaking in difficulty, only restructuring aid could be authorized in the present case.
Ker glavni cilj pomoči ni regionalni razvoj temveč ponovna vzpostavitev dolgoročne donosnosti podjetja v težavah, se v tem primeru lahko odobri samo pomoči za prestrukturiranje.
Restructuring aid is covered above all by the derogation in Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty.
Pri pomoči za prestrukturiranje se uporablja predvsem posebna določba člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES.
The Commission considers that no other grounds for compatibility, and in particular none of the other Community guidelines or frameworks such as those for research and development, environmental protection, small and medium-sized enterprises, employment, training or risk capital, could apply.
Po mnenju Komisije za ugotavljanje združljivosti ni mogoče uporabiti nobenih drugih podlag in zlasti nobenih drugih okvirov Skupnosti, npr. za raziskovanje in razvoj, varstvo okolja, majhna in srednja podjetja, zaposlovanje in izobraževanje ter tvegani kapital.
Eligibility of the company
Upravičenost podjetja
According to point 2.1 of the Community guidelines, the financial weakness of firms that receive help for restructuring is due to poor past performance and dim future prospects.
V skladu z odstavkom 2.1 Smernic Skupnosti (1994) sta vzroka za finančno šibkost podjetij, ki prejmejo pomoč za prestrukturiranje, nezadostna storilnost v preteklosti in neugodni izgledi za prihodnost.
The typical symptoms are deteriorating profitability or increasing size of losses, diminishing turnover, growing inventories, excess capacity, declining cash flow, increasing debt, rising interest charges and low net asset value.
Tipični znaki so nazadujoča donosnost ali vedno večje izgube, padanje prometa, vedno večje zaloge, presežek zmogljivosti, manjši denarni tok, vedno večja zadolženost in obresti ter nizka neto knjigovodska vrednost.
At the time the aid was granted, CWP registered increasing losses and was faced with severe liquidity problems as described in detail above.
V času odobritve pomoči je podjetje CWP beležilo vedno večje izgube in se je spopadalo s hudimi likvidnostnimi težavami, kot je podrobno pojasnjeno že zgoraj.
The Commission thus considers that CWP ranked as a company in difficulty at the time.
Zato je Komisija mnenja, da je podjetje CWP v času odobritve pomoči veljalo za podjetje v težavah.
Restoration of viability
Ponovna vzpostavitev donosnosti
The sine qua non of all restructuring plans is that they must restore the long-term viability of the company within a reasonable time scale and on the basis of realistic assumptions as to its future operating conditions.
Vsak načrt za prestrukturiranje mora v primernem obdobju na osnovi realnih domnev glede obratovalnih pogojev v prihodnosti nujno ponovno vzpostaviti dolgoročno donosnost podjetja.
Consequently, restructuring aid must be linked to a viable restructuring plan.
Zato mora biti osnova pomoči za prestrukturiranje učinkovit koncept za prestrukturiranje.
The restructuring plan usually involves the reorganisation and rationalisation of the business activities on a more efficient basis.
Načrt za prestrukturiranje praviloma vsebuje reorganizacijo in racionalizacijo poslovnih področij na učinkovitejši podlagi.
Among other things, it takes into account the circumstances giving rise to the difficulties.
Med drugim mora upoštevati okoliščine, zaradi katerih je prišlo do težav.
It is to be noted that, in the case of CWP, a first restructuring had been undertaken following privatisation but it failed.
V primeru podjetja CWP lahko ugotovimo, da je prvo prestrukturiranje po privatizaciji spodletelo.
A second restructuring based on the two documents referred to in recitals 40 and 41 was undertaken in 1997.
Drugo prestrukturiranje na podlagi obeh dokumentov, ki sta navedena v uvodnih izjavah 40 in 41, je potekalo leta 1997.
Although there are differences between them, clearly the strategy was to introduce the wet process and for this the extraction installation was essential so that MGA could be used as the raw material and the dependence on high-cost elemental phosphorus reduced.
Tudi če se oba dokumenta med seboj razlikujeta, je bila strategija očitno takšna, da se uvede mokri postopek, za kar je potreben ekstrakcijski objekt, in se posledično kot surovino lahko uporablja MGA in podjetje ni več v tolikšni meri odvisno od visokih cen elementarnega fosforja.
In addition, the quality of the main end product, i.e. phosphates, was to be enhanced.
Poleg tega naj bi podjetje izboljšalo kakovost najpomembnejšega končnega proizvoda, tj. fosfatov.
The two aims are linked: CWP could produce phosphates economically with a more readily available and cheaper raw material only by using the wet process.
Oba cilja sta medsebojno povezana. Fosfate bi podjetje CWP iz surovine, ki jo je lažje dobiti in je ugodnejša, lahko ekonomično izdelovalo samo s pomočjo mokrega postopka.
In order to determine whether the 1996 strategy was viable, the measures for introducing the wet process need to be assessed.
Da bi ugotovili, ali je bila strategija iz leta 1996 uresničljiva, moramo oceniti ukrepe, ki so bili predvideni za uvedbo mokrega postopka.
As the expert report submitted by Prayon-Rupel demonstrates, the new production process cannot be introduced by way of minor adjustments to the existing installations. The wet process requires installations altogether different from those used for the thermal process and necessitates, among other things, pre- and post-treatment of the product including defluorination, concentration and decolourisation.
Kot sledi iz izvedenskega mnenja podjetja Prayon-Rupel, novega proizvodnega postopka ni mogoče uvesti z majhnimi spremembami obstoječih naprav in objektov.
However, the 1996 strategy did not provide for any of these steps.
Za mokri postopek so potrebne popolnoma druge naprave kot za termični postopek in med drugim tudi predproizvodna in poproizvodna obdelava izdelka vključno z defluoriranjem, koncentracijo, razbarvanjem itd. Vendar strategija iz leta 1996 ni vključevala nobene od teh procesnih faz.
Pre-treatment was introduced in December 1997, when the project was already operational, after tests in the laboratory had shown it to be necessary.
Fazo predhodne obdelave je podjetje uvedlo šele decembra 1997, ko je projekt že tekel in so potrebo po njej pokazali laboratorijski preskusi.
Such tests should have been conducted before the project started and should have served as a basis for calculating the overall costs.
Takšne preskuse bi bilo treba narediti pred začetkom projekta in jih uporabiti kot osnovo za izračun skupnih stroškov.
The DLM study on the feasibility of the installation dated November 1997 also mentions the necessary pre-treatment of wet phosphoric acid during the wet process.
Tudi študija DLM o izvedljivosti objekta iz novembra 1997 omenja, da je pri mokrem postopku potrebna predhodna obdelava fosforne kisline.
It should, however, have been drawn up before the restructuring plan was established and should have been used as a basis for determining the costs and financing of the restructuring.
To študijo bi bilo treba izdelati pred načrtom za prestrukturiranje in jo uporabiti kot osnovo za določitev stroškov in financiranja prestrukturiranja.
Post-treatment was introduced only in early 1999, although CWP claims that it turned out to be necessary only because its supplier could no longer provide the appropriate quality of acid.
Zaključno obdelavo so uvedli šele v začetku leta 1999, čeprav je bila ta, kot navaja podjetje CWP, potrebna samo zato, ker njegov dobavitelj ni mogel več dobavljati kisline primerne kakovosti.