natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, Gibraltar observes high standards of supervision and financial regulation, in both the public and private sectors.
Gibraltar pa upošteva visoke standarde za nadzor in finančne predpise, tako v javnem kot v privatnih sektorjih.
The Gibraltar Financial Services Commission is an independent and respected body.
Gibraltarska Komisija finančnih storitev je neodvisno in upoštevano telo.
This view has been corroborated by several international bodies, which have also commended Gibraltar's actions in combating money laundering.
To mnenje je bilo podprto s strani več mednarodnih teles, ki so tudi pohvalile dejavnosti Gibraltarja pri boju proti pranju denarja.
Gibraltar was one of the first jurisdictions within the EU to implement the EU's Money Laundering Directive on an all-crimes basis.
Gibraltar je bila ena prvih sodnih pristojnosti znotraj EU, ki je izvajala Direktivo EU o pranju denarja na podlagi vseh kaznivih dejanj.
A report of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), published in November 2002, states that ‘Gibraltar has in place a robust arsenal of legislation, regulations and administrative practices to counter money laundering’ and is ‘close to complete adherence with the FATF 40 Recommendations’ [18].
Poročilo Projektne skupine za finančno ukrepanje (FATF), objavljeno v novembru 2002, navaja, da „Gibraltar ima nameščen robusten arzenal zakonodaje, uredb in upravnih praks za boj proti pranju denarja“ in je „blizu popolni skladnosti s 40 priporočili FATF.“ [18].
An IMF report from October 2001 judged that Gibraltar was compliant with 66 out of 67 established international standards on financial regulation, and concluded that ‘supervision is generally effective and thorough … Gibraltar ranks as a well-developed supervisor’ [19].
Poročilo IMF iz oktobra 2001 ugotavlja, da je bil Gibraltar skladen s 66 od 67 vzpostavljenih mednarodnih standardov za finančne predpise, in zaključilo, da „nadzor je splošno učinkovit in natančen ... Gibraltar je uvrščen kot dobro razvit nadzornik.“ [19].
Under OECD rules, Gibraltar has been classified as a cooperative tax jurisdiction.
Gibraltar je bil v okviru pravil OECD uvrščen kot sodelujoča davčna sodna pristojnost.
In order to be considered to be State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, a measure must satisfy the four following criteria.
Da bi ukrep obravnavali kot državno pomoč v okviru pomena člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, mora izpolnjevati naslednje štiri kriterije.
First, the measure must afford the beneficiaries an advantage that reduces the costs they normally bear in the course of their business.
Prvič, ukrep mora upravičencem omogočati prednost, ki zmanjšuje stroške, ki bi jih normalno imeli v poteku poslovanja.
Second, the advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources.
Drugič, prednost mora odobriti država ali mora biti odobrena preko državnih sredstev.
Third, the measure must affect competition and trade between Member States.
Tretjič, ukrep mora vplivati na konkurenčnost in trgovino med državami članicami.
Finally, the measure must be specific or selective in that it favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.
Končno, ukrep mora biti specifičen ali selektiven v tem, da podpira določena podjetja ali proizvodnjo določenega blaga.
According to point 16 of the Notice, the main criterion in applying Article 87(1) EC to a tax measure is that it ‘provides in favour of certain undertakings in the Member State an exception to the application of the tax system.
V skladu s točko 16 Obvestila je glavni kriterij pri uporabi člena 87(1) ES za davčni ukrep, da „zagotavlja izjemo pri uporabi davčnega sistema v korist določenih podjetij v državi članici.
The question of material selectivity of the different components of the reform in the Gibraltar context is examined separately below in paragraphs 128 to 152.
Vprašanje materialne selektivnosti različnih komponent reforme v zvezi z Gibraltarjem je preučeno ločeno, v odstavkih 128 do 152 spodaj.
In its decision to open the formal State aid investigation procedure [20], the Commission identified the ways in which the reform as a whole provides for advantages to Gibraltar companies compared with companies in the United Kingdom.
V sklepu o uvedbi formalnega preiskovalnega postopka o državni pomoči [20] je Komisija navedla načine, kako reforma kot celota zagotavlja prednosti za družbe v Gibraltarju v nasprotju z družbami v Združenem kraljestvu.
Neither the United Kingdom nor the Government of Gibraltar has contested the factual basis of this comparison and it is therefore repeated and refined below.
Niti Združeno kraljestvo niti gibraltarska vlada nista nasprotovala dejanski podlagi za to primerjavo, zato je spodaj ponovljena in izboljšana.
Under the United Kingdom corporation tax regime the maximum rate of corporation tax is 30 % of companies' profits.
V okviru režima davka od dobička pravnih oseb v Združenem kraljestvu je najvišja stopnja davka od dobička pravnih oseb 30 % dobička družb.
In contrast, under the reform, the maximum rate of corporation tax for all Gibraltar companies except utility companies is 15 %.
V primerjavi s tem je v okviru reforme najvišja stopnja davka od dobička pravnih oseb za vse družbe v Gibraltarju, razen družb javnih gospodarskih služb, 15 %.
The differences between on the one hand, the United Kingdom corporation tax regime and the company taxation regime in Gibraltar as envisaged by the reform on the other hand, have the consequence that companies operating in the United Kingdom will be taxed at a maximum rate of 30 % of profits whereas companies (other than utility companies) operating in Gibraltar will be taxed at a maximum rate of 15 % of profits.
Razlika med režimom davka od dobička pravnih oseb v Združenem kraljestvu na eni strani, in režima davka od dobička pravnih oseb v Gibraltarju, kot je predviden v reformi, na drugi strani, pomeni, da bodo družbe, ki delujejo v Združenem kraljestvu, obdavčene po najvišji stopnji 30 % dobička, medtem ko bodo družbe (razen družb javnih gospodarskih služb), ki delujejo v Gibraltarju, obdavčene po najvišji stopnji 15 % dobička.
In addition, as described in paragraphs 128 to 152 below, certain types of company will either escape tax or will be taxed at a rate of 5 % of profits.
Dodatno pa se bodo, kot je opisano v odstavkih 128 do 152 spodaj, nekatere vrste družb ali v celoti izognile davku ali pa bodo obdavčene po stopnji 5 % dobička.
These differences in tax treatment represent an advantage to companies other than utility companies established in Gibraltar compared with companies established in the United Kingdom.
Te razlike v davčnem ravnanju predstavljajo prednost za družbe, razen za družbe javnih gospodarskih služb, ki so ustanovljene v Gibraltarju, v primerjavi z družbami, ustanovljenimi v Združenem kraljestvu.
Further advantages arise to companies in Gibraltar as compared with those in the United Kingdom through other differences in the tax regime.
Nadaljnje prednosti za družbe v Gibraltarju v primerjavi s tistimi v Združenem kraljestvu izvirajo iz drugih razlik v davčnem režimu.
The Commission notes that under the reform, capital gains are excluded from any calculation of profit.
Komisija ugotavlja, da so v okviru nove reforme kapitalni dobički izključeni iz vsakršnih izračunov dobička.
In contrast, capital gains are generally chargeable to corporation tax in the United Kingdom.
V nasprotju s tem se v Združenem kraljestvu kapitalni dobički v splošnem zaračunajo v davku na dobiček od pravnih oseb.
Similarly, the differences in capital allowance give rise to advantages.
Podobno, tudi razlike v minimalni amortizaciji omogočajo prednosti.
In contrast to the 33 1/3 % allowance for capital expenditure on plant and machinery, the United Kingdom tax regime provides for an allowance of 25 % of the declining balance and has no generally applicable first year allowances.
V primerjavi s 331/3 % amortizacijo za zneske investicij na obrate in stroje, davčni režim v Združenem kraljestvu zagotavlja dovoljenje 25 % padajoče bilance in nima splošno veljavnih dovoljenj za prvo leto.
As is evident from the previous paragraphs, the essence of the Commission's view on the regional selectivity of the Gibraltar tax reform proposals is that they provide, in general, for a lower level of taxation than that applicable in the United Kingdom and that this difference amounts to a selective advantage for companies active in Gibraltar.
Kot je razvidno iz prejšnjih odstavkov, je bistvo stališča Komisije o regionalni selektivnosti predlogov za davčno reformo Gibraltarja, da zagotavljajo, v splošnem, nižjo stopnjo obdavčitve od tiste, ki velja v Združenem kraljestvu, in da ta razlika pomeni selektivno prednost za družbe, dejavne v Gibraltarju.
This premise is consistent with point 16 of the Notice.
Ta predpostavka je skladna s točko 16 Obvestila.
Even if they were to apply automatically and equally to all economic operators liable for tax in Gibraltar, without introducing any difference in treatment in favour of one or more sectors of activity, which is not the case here, the abovementioned tax reductions ‘are intended exclusively for companies situated in a particular region of the Member State in question and constitute for them an advantage which companies intending to carry out similar economic operations in other areas in the same State cannot enjoy’ [22].
Tudi če bi veljali avtomatično in enako za vse gospodarske subjekte, ki so obvezani plačilu davka v Gibraltarju, ne da bi vpeljevali kakršne koli razlike pri obravnavanju v korist enega ali več sektorjev ali dejavnosti, kar v tem primeru ne drži, so zgoraj omenjena znižanja davkov „namenjena izključno družbam s sedežem v določeni regiji v zadevni državi članici in predstavljajo za njih prednost, ki je družbe, ki nameravajo izvajati podobne gospodarske operacije v drugih regijah iste države, ne morejo koristiti“ [22].
In this case the abovementioned tax reductions do in fact favour firms taxed in Gibraltar, in comparison with all firms active in the United Kingdom.
V tem primeru zgoraj omenjena znižanja davkov dejansko koristijo podjetjem, obdavčenim v Gibraltarju, v primerjavi z vsemi podjetji, dejavnimi v Združenem kraljestvu.
The United Kingdom, the Government of Gibraltar and the Åland Executive disagree with the view that the measure is selective, i.e. that it favours ‘certain firms or certain products’.
Združeno kraljestvo, gibraltarska vlada in Alandski izvršilni organ se ne strinjajo s stališčem, da je ukrep selektiven, tj. da podpira „določena podjetja ali določene proizvode“ .
They argue that a distinction should be drawn between cases in which the State grants tax benefits of limited scope to part of national territory and cases in which such benefits are granted by an infra-State regional authority for the part of the territory that falls within its jurisdiction: the former are selective because their scope is limited to some of the firms under State jurisdiction, while the latter are general measures since they apply to all firms under the jurisdiction of the regional authority.
Trdijo, da je treba ločiti med primeri, kjer država odobri davčne olajšave omejenega obsega delu državnega ozemlja, in primeri, kjer takšne olajšave odobri infradržavna regionalna oblast za del ozemlja, ki spada pod njeno sodno pristojnostjo. Prve so selektivne, ker je njihov obseg omejen na nekatera podjetja pod sodno pristojnostjo države, medtem ko so zadnje splošni ukrepi, ker veljajo za vsa podjetja pod sodno pristojnostjo regionalne oblasti.
The Commission considers first that the element of selectivity in the concept of aid is based on a comparison between the advantageous treatment granted to certain firms and the treatment that applies to other firms in the same reference framework.
Komisija najprej meni, da element selektivnosti v konceptu pomoči temelji na primerjavi med prednostno obravnavo, odobreno nekaterim podjetjem, in obravnavo, ki velja za druga podjetja v istem referenčnem ogrodju.
The definition of this framework takes on added importance in the case of tax measures since the very existence of an advantage can only be established in relation to taxation defined as normal.
Definicija tega ogrodja je še posebej pomembna v primeru davčnih ukrepov, saj je sam obstoj prednosti mogoče določiti le, če je obdavčenje opredeljeno kot normalno.
In theory it follows both from the general scheme of the Treaty, which concerns aid granted by the State or through State resources, and from the fundamental role the central authorities of the Member States play in defining the political and economic environment in which firms operate, thanks to the measures they adopt, the services they provide and possibly the financial transfers they make, that the framework in which such a comparison should be made is the economy of the Member State.
V teoriji tako iz splošne sheme Pogodbe, ki zadeva pomoč, ki jo odobri država ali izvira iz državnih sredstev, in iz temeljne vloge, ki jo imajo centralne oblasti držav članic v opredeljevanju političnega in gospodarskega okolja, v katerem delujejo podjetja, zaradi ukrepov, ki jih sprejemajo, storitev, ki jih zagotavljajo, in morda finančnih prenosov, ki jih izvajajo, sledi, da je ogrodje, v kateri bi bilo treba takšno primerjavo izvesti, gospodarstvo države članice.
In this respect the text of the Treaty itself, which classifies measures intended ‘to promote the economic development’ of a particular region (Article 87(3)(a) and (c)) as State aid that may be considered to be compatible, indicates that benefits whose scope is limited to part of the territory of the State subject to the rules on aid may constitute selective benefits.
V zvezi s tem samo besedilo Pogodbe, ki uvršča ukrepe, namenjene „spodbujanju gospodarskega razvoja“ določene regije (člen 87(3)(a) in (c)), v državno pomoč, ki jo je mogoče obravnavati kot združljivo, nakazuje, da koristi, katerih obseg je omejen na del ozemlja države, ki je predmet pravil o pomoči, lahko predstavljajo selektivne koristi.
It is clear that if the reference context for assessing the territorial selectivity of a measure is the territory in which it applies, measures that benefit all the firms in the territory would by definition become general measures.
Jasno je, če je referenčno ozadje za ocenjevanje teritorialne selektivnosti ukrepa ozemlje, v katerem ukrep velja, ukrepi, ki koristijo vsem podjetjem na ozemlju, po definiciji postanejo splošni ukrepi.
The settled practice of the Commission, confirmed by the Court of Justice, on the contrary consists of classifying as aid tax schemes applicable in particular regions or territories which are favourable in comparison to the general scheme of a Member State [23].
Ustaljena praksa Komisije, ki jo je potrdilo Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti, je, v nasprotju s tem, sestavljena iz uvrščanja davčnih shem, veljavnih v določenih regijah ali ozemljih, ki so bolj ugodne od splošne sheme države članice, kot pomoči [23].
Second, the United Kingdom's argument according to which benefits of limited territorial scope become general measures in the region concerned only because they are established by the regional rather than by the central authority, and that they apply throughout the territory under the region's jurisdiction, cannot be reconciled with the concept of aid.
Drugič, argumenta Združenega kraljestva, v skladu s katerim koristi omejenega ozemeljskega obsega postanejo splošni ukrepi v zadevni regiji, samo zato ker jih vzpostavi regionalna, ne pa centralna oblast, in ker veljajo po vsem ozemlju pod sodno pristojnostjo regije, ni mogoče uskladiti s konceptom pomoči.
This concept is objective, covering all aid that reduces the charges that are normally borne from the budget of one or more firms in various forms, regardless of its purpose, justification or objective or the status of the public authority that establishes it or whose budget bears the charge.
Ta koncept je objektiven, pokriva vso pomoč, ki zmanjšuje dajatve, ki jih normalno nosijo proračuni enega ali več podjetij v različnih oblikah, ne glede na namen, upravičenost, cilj ali status javne oblasti, ki ga vzpostavi ali ki nosi breme dajatev.
A distinction based solely on the body that decides the measure would remove all effectiveness from Article 87 of the Treaty, which seeks to cover the measures concerned exclusively according to their effects on competition and Community trade [24].
Razlikovanje, ki temelji samo na organu, ki odloča o ukrepu, bi odstranilo vso učinkovitost iz člena 87 Pogodbe, ki želi zadevne ukrepe zajeti izključno v skladu z njihovimi učinki na konkurenco in trgovino Skupnosti [24].
Such aid therefore cannot be treated differently from measures which have the same objectives, use the same resources and have the same effects on trade and competition, according only to the formal criterion of the degree of autonomy of the infra-State authority that establishes it.
Takšne pomoči zato ni mogoče obravnavati drugače kot ukrepe, ki imajo enake cilje, uporabljajo enaka sredstva in imajo enak učinek na trgovino in konkurenco, samo v skladu s formalnim kriterijem stopnje avtonomije infradržavne oblasti, ki jo vzpostavi.
According to the abovementioned conclusions of Mr Advocate General Saggio in Joined Cases C-400/97, C-401/97 and C-402/97, ‘the fact that the measures at issue were adopted by regional authorities with exclusive competence under national law is (...) merely a matter of form, which is not sufficient to justify the preferential treatment reserved to companies which fall under the provincial laws.
V skladu z zgoraj omenjenimi zaključki g. generalnega pravobranilca Saggia v združenih primerih C-400/97, C-401/97 in C-402/97, „dejstvo, da so zadevne ukrepe sprejele regionalne oblasti z izključno pristojnostjo v okviru državnega prava, je (…) samo stvar oblike, ki ni zadostna za upravičenje ugodnejšega obravnavanja, omejenega na družbe, ki spadajo v pokrajinsko pravo.
If this were not the case, the State could easily avoid the application, in part of its own territory, of provisions of Community law on State aid simply by making changes to the internal allocation of competence on certain matters, thus raising the general nature, for that territory, of the measure in question’.
Če to ne bi bilo tako, bi se država na delu svojega ozemlja z lahkoto lahko izognila uporabi določb zakonodaje Skupnosti o državni pomoči, preprosto tako, da bi uvedla spremembe v notranji dodelitvi pristojnosti za določene zadeve in tako dvignila splošno naravo zadevnega ukrepa za tisto območje“ .
The Commission points out that the use of a purely institutional criterion to differentiate ‘aid’ from ‘general measures’ would inevitably lead to differences in treatment in the application of the rules on aid to Member States, according to whether they had adopted a centralised or decentralised model of allocating tax competence (or other competence, such as in the area of social security).
Komisija poudarja, da bi uporaba čisto institucionalnega kriterija za razlikovanje med „pomočjo“ in „splošnimi ukrepi“ neizogibno vodila v razlike v obravnavanju pri uporabi pravil o pomoči za države članice, v skladu s tem, ali so sprejele centraliziran ali decentraliziran model dodelitve davčnih pristojnosti (ali drugih pristojnosti, npr. na področju socialne varnosti).
If the United Kingdom's argument were accepted, Member States whose internal administrative organisation allowed certain regional authorities below State level to make changes to the general tax system in the form of tax benefits applicable to firms that operated in the respective regions would escape the rules on regional aid in relation to those regions and measures.
Če bi sprejeli argument Združenega kraljestva, bi se države članice, katerih notranja upravna organizacija dovoljuje določenim regionalnim oblastem pod državnim nivojem, da uvajajo spremembe v splošni davčni sistem v obliki davčnih olajšav, ki veljajo za podjetja, ki delujejo v teh regijah, izognile pravilom o regionalni pomoči v zvezi s tistimi regijami in ukrepi.
The Commission considers that if measures completely identical in their objectives, technique and effects were not subject to the same rules it would be contrary to equal treatment and would create serious distortions in the functioning of the common market.
Komisija meni, če za ukrepe, ki imajo popolnoma enake cilje, tehniko in učinke, ne veljajo ista pravila, je to v nasprotju z enakopravno obravnavo in bi ustvarilo resne motnje v delovanju skupnega trga.
The existence of the rules on aid to regional tax benefits should be based on objective criteria and cannot depend on a purely institutional factor such as the application at a particular time of more or less extensive tax autonomy in favour of an infra-State authority of more or less broad territorial scope.
Obstoj pravil o pomoči regionalnim davčnim olajšavam bi moral temeljiti na objektivnih kriterijih in ne more biti odvisen izključno od institucionalnega dejavnika, kot je uporaba v določenem času s strani bolj ali manj obsežne davčne avtonomije v korist infradržavne oblasti bolj ali manj obsežnega teritorialnega obsega.
If this technique were generalised it would undermine equality in applying the rules on State aid and therefore render them ineffective.
Če bi to tehniko posplošili, bi ogrozila enakost pri uporabi pravil o državni pomoči in jih tako spremenila v neučinkovite.
In the Commission's approach the tax autonomy of the regional authority that grants the benefits has never been considered as a factor that would make it possible not to regard measures as aid.
V pristopu Komisije davčna avtonomija regionalne oblasti, ki odobri koristi, nikoli ni veljala kot dejavnik, ki bi omogočil obravnavanje ukrepa kot pomoč.
In Decision 93/337/EEC [25], recognition that ‘the competent institutions in each of the three Basque provinces may, under certain conditions, maintain, establish and regulate the tax system within their territory’ did not prevent the Commission from finding that the tax benefits in question created by the three provinces were covered by Article 87(1) and from declaring them incompatible because they did not comply with the rules on regional and sectoral aid [26].
Priznanje v Odločbi 93/337/EGS [25], da „pristojne institucije v vsaki od treh baskovskih provinc lahko, pod določenimi pogoji, vzdržujejo, vzpostavljajo in urejajo davčni sistem znotraj svojega ozemlja“ Komisiji ni preprečilo, da bi ugotovila, da so zadevne davčne olajšave, ki so jih ustvarile te tri province, pokrite s členom 87(1), in jih razglasila za nezdružljive, ker niso skladne s pravili o regionalni in sektorski pomoči [26].
Other cases concerning measures adopted by the authorities of the Basque provinces were decided on grounds of material selectivity [27].
Drugi primeri v zvezi z ukrepi, ki so jih sprejele baskovske province, so bili sprejeti na podlagi materialne selektivnosti [27].
The issue of regional selectivity was not addressed by the Community Courts when assessing the validity of such decisions [28] since the Commission had not relied upon this criterion in its decision: the comments of United Kingdom and the Government of Gibraltar on territorial competence are therefore not relevant.
Vprašanja regionalne selektivnosti sodišče Skupnosti, pri oceni veljavnosti takšnih odločb [28], ni obravnavalo, saj se Komisija pri svoji odločitvi ni zanašala na ta kriterij: pripombe Združenega kraljestva in gibraltarske vlade o teritorialni pristojnosti torej niso pomembne.
In subsequent decisions on tax concession schemes implemented by autonomous tax authorities the Commission, while taking the view that the measures examined constituted aid because of their material selectivity, expressly left open the possibility of examining their territorial selectivity [29].
V poznejših odločbah o shemah davčnih olajšav, ki jih izvajajo avtonomne davčne uprave, je Komisija, čeprav je bila mnenja, da so preučevani ukrepi, zaradi njihove materialne selektivnosti, predstavljali pomoč, izrecno pustila odprto možnost za preučitev njihove teritorialne selektivnosti [29].