natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
After having examined the renegotiation from a microeconomic point of view, the Commission has checked whether BNFL was treated on an equal footing with that of private creditors of BE.
Potem ko je Komisija preverila ponovno pogajanje z mikroekonomskega vidika, je preverila, ali je bila družba BNFL obravnavana enako kot zasebni upniki družbe BE.
In this second step of analysis, the Commission has examined whether the concessions made by BNFL are similar to those of the private creditors.
Na drugi stopnji analize je Komisija preverila, ali so koncesije s strani družbe BNFL podobne koncesijam zasebnih upnikov.
The information submitted by the United Kingdom and BNFL show that:
Podatki, ki sta jih predložila Združeno kraljestvo in družba BNFL, kažejo, da:
even if BNFL established terms with BE prior to the negotiation by BE of individual terms with each of its major creditors, it required the inclusion of a clause allowing the withdrawal of the suggested concessions in the event that any other material creditor was offered more favourable terms than BNFL;
čeprav je družba BNFL določila pogoje z družbo BE pred pogajanjem družbe BE o posameznih pogojih z vsakim od njenih večjih upnikov, je zahtevala vključitev klavzule, ki dovoljuje umik predlaganih koncesij, če so kateremu koli drugemu materialnemu upniku bili ponujeni boljši pogoji kot družbi BNFL;
in the whole negotiation process, BNFL always checked that other private BE creditors would be asked to contribute in a comparable way to that of BNFL;
je družba BNFL skozi celoten pogajalski postopek vedno preverjala, ali so bili drugi zasebni upniki družbe BE naprošeni, da prispevajo podobno kot družba BNFL;
detailed quantified comparison of the creditors’ claims and the amounts compromised under the finally agreed restructuring package shows that relative to other creditors, BNFL has forgone a smaller proportion of outstanding liabilities.
natančna kvanticifirana primerjava zahtevkov upnikov in zneskov, dogovorjenih v končno sprejetem paketu za prestrukturiranje, kaže, da se je družba BNFL v primerjavi z drugimi upniki odpovedala manjšemu deležu neporavnanih obveznosti.
It must be also noted in this respect that BNFL had no security of its debt over any of BE’s assets.
V zvezi s tem je treba tudi ugotoviti, da družba BNFL ni imela zavarovanega dolga pri nobenem premoženju družbe BE.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that BNFL was treated on an equal footing vis-à-vis the private creditors.
Zato Komisija zaključi, da je bila družba BNFL obravnavana enako kot zasebni upniki.
This further indicates that BNFL did not behave differently in the restructuring plan negotiation than private creditors.
To nadalje kaže, da se družba BNFL pri pogajanju o načrtu za prestrukturiranje ni obnašala drugače od zasebnih upnikov.
Did BNFL act independently of the UK Government?
Je družba BNFL delovala neodvisno od vlade Združenega kraljestva?
The Commission considers that the conclusion above gives sufficient proof that BNFL acted in conformity with the market creditor principle, and that therefore Measure B does not involve State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija meni, da daje zgornji zaključek zadosten dokaz, da je družba BNFL ravnala v skladu z načelom tržnega upnika in da zato ukrep B ne vključuje državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
Moreover, the Commission considers that in the present case there is no indication whatsoever of the imputability of BNFL's behaviour to the State.
Razen tega Komisija meni, da v tem primeru ni ničesar, kar bi kazalo na kakršno koli odgovornost obnašanja družbe BNFL državi.
The imputability condition was recalled by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in its judgment in Stardust [45].
Na pogoj odgovornosti je opozorilo Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti v sodbi v zvezi z družbo Stardust [45].
As the Court held, it cannot be automatically presumed that a measure is a State aid because it was taken by a public undertaking.
Po mnenju Sodišča ni mogoče samodejno sklepati, da je ukrep državna pomoč, ker ga je sprejela javna družba.
It is not sufficient that the body granting the aid is a public undertaking within Article 2(1)(b) of Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings [46].
Ne zadostuje, da je organ, ki dodeljuje pomoč, javna družba v smislu Direktive Komisije 80/723/EGS z dne 25. junija 1980 o preglednosti finančnih odnosov med državami članicami in javnimi podjetji [46].
The fact that the public authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence does not prove that they actually exercised that influence in a given case.
Dejstvo, da lahko imajo javne organi neposreden ali posreden prevladujoč vpliv, ne dokazuje, da so dejansko uporabili ta vpliv v omenjenem primeru.
As explained by Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion on the Stardust case [47], the imputability to the State of an aid measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred by a set of indicators from the circumstances of the case and the context in which the measures were taken.
Kot je pojasnil generalni pravobranilec Jacobs v mnenju o primeru Stardust [47], se lahko o odgovornosti do države v zvezi z ukrepom, sprejetim s strani javne družbe, sklepa s pomočjo različnih kazalcev iz okoliščin primera in okoliščin, v katerem so bili ukrepi sprejeti.
The Advocate General gives a list of facts and circumstances which could be taken into account in his view such as the evidence that the measure was taken at the instigation of the State, the scale and the nature of the measure, the degree of control which the State enjoys over the public undertaking in question and a general practice of using the undertaking in question for ends other than commercial ones or of influencing its decisions.
Generalni pravobranilec navaja vrsto dejstev in okoliščin, ki bi se lahko po njegovem mnenju upoštevale, kot so dokaz, da je bil ukrep sprejet na pobudo države, obseg in narava ukrepa, raven nadzora, ki ga ima država nad zadevno družbo, ter splošna praksa uporabe zadevne družbe v druge namene, kot so poslovni, ali vplivanja na njene odločitve.
On the basis of the submissions of the UK Government and of third parties, the Commission has examined whether Measure B (and Measure C) could be attributable to the conduct of the State.
Na podlagi vlog vlade Združenega kraljestva in tretjih strank je Komisija preverila, ali bi se ukrep B (in ukrep C) lahko pripisal ravnanju države.
It took into account the fact that BNFL decided well before BE’s financial distress was publicly announced and well before the UK Government announced its role in a potential solvent restructuring that it was in its best interests to make concessions to ensure the ongoing solvency of BE.
Upoštevala je dejstvo, da se je družba BNFL odločila veliko prej, kot so bile objavljene finančne težave družbe BE in kot je vlada Združenega kraljestva objavila svojo vlogo možnega plačnika, da je v njenem najboljšem interesu, da popusti in s koncesijami zavaruje stalno plačilno sposobnost družbe BE.
From a chronological point of view, there is no evidence that the renegotiation took place at the instigation of the State.
S kronološkega vidika ni nobenega dokaza, da je ponovno pogajanje potekalo na pobudo države.
On the contrary, the fact that BNFL did not finally accept to participate in the restructuring plan before the UK Government announced its involvement can be viewed as proof that BNFL was not ready to save BE at any cost, and would preferred to wait for the intervention of the State, like all other creditors did.
Nasprotno, dejstvo, da se družba BNFL ni dokončno odločila sodelovati pri načrtu za prestrukturiranje, preden je vlada Združenega kraljestva objavila svojo udeležbo, se lahko šteje kot dokaz, da družba BNFL ni bila pripravljena rešiti družbe BE za vsako ceno in je, kot vsi drugi upniki, raje počakala na posredovanje države.
The Commission also took into account that according to UK law it is the fiduciary obligation of BNFL’s directors to act in the best commercial interests of BNFL in order to maximise value and minimise financial exposure on the basis of the information available to them at the relevant time.
Komisija je tudi upoštevala, da je po pravu Združenega kraljestva fiduciarna obveznost direktorjev družbe BNFL, da ravnajo v najboljših poslovnih interesih družbe BNFL, zato da čim bolj povečajo vrednost in zmanjšajo finančno izpostavljenost na podlagi podatkov, ki so jim bili takrat dosegljivi.
This is substantiated by the relevant extracts of Board meetings minutes available to the Commission.
To utemeljujejo ustrezni povzetki zapisnikov sej odbora, ki so na razpolago Komisiji.
On the basis of all the above elements, the Commission concludes that Measure B does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Na osnovi vseh zgoraj navedenih elementov Komisija ugotavlja, da ukrep B ne sestavlja državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
Measure C consists in standstill agreements concerning payments due by BNFL and a number of significant financial creditors of BE for a period starting on 14 February 2003 and ending at the earliest on 30 September 2004.
Ukrep C sestavljajo dogovori o odlogu plačil v zvezi z zapadlimi plačili družbe BNFL in številni pomembni finančni upniki družbe BE za obdobje, ki se začne 14. februarja 2003 in konča ne prej kot 30. septembra 2004.
Unlike other participating creditors, BNFL will not receive interest during the standstill period.
V nasprotju z drugimi udeleženimi upniki družba BNFL v obdobju odloga ne bo prejela obresti.
Assessment by the Commission
Ocena Komisije
On the basis of the information available, the Commission notes that BNFL’s financial advisers’ reports, which were drawn up at the time BNFL was negotiating with BE, conclude that in its share of the restructuring package, BNFL has not conceded more overall than other creditors, as is shown by a comparison of each significant creditor’s contribution.
Na podlagi razpoložljivih podatkov Komisija ugotavlja, da poročila finančnih svetovalcev družbe BNFL, ki so bila sestavljena v času pogajanj med družbama BNFL in BE, zaključujejo, da pri svojem deležu v paketu prestrukturiranja družbe BNFL ni na splošno prispevala več kot drugi upniki, kot prikazuje primerjava prispevkov vseh pomembnih upnikov.
As mentioned in recital (290), BNFL had no security over any of BE’s assets.
Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi (289), družba BNFL ni bila zavarovana pri nobenem premoženju družbe BE.
Furthermore, the Commission concludes that agreeing not to demand the payment of interest in order to preserve the agreed solvent restructuring option is conform to the behaviour of a private creditor aiming to ensure that the best possible commercial option available is preserved.
Ob tem Komisija zaključi, da je soglasje o nezahtevanju plačila obresti, zato da bi se tako ohranila dogovorjena možnost prestrukturiranja plačilne sposobnosti, v skladu z ravnanjem zasebnega upnika, ki hoče zagotoviti ohranitev najboljše poslovne možnosti.
The analysis of BNFL’s financial and legal advisers shows that demanding the renegotiation of the standstill conditions would have put at risk the whole of the agreements with BE and, above all, the solvency of BE as such.
Analiza finančnih in pravnih svetovalcev družbe BNFL kaže, da bi zahteva po ponovnem pogajanju o pogojih v zvezi z odlogom plačil v celoti ogrozila dogovore z družbo BE in, predvsem, plačilno sposobnost družbe BE kot tako.
The risk would have been significant in that demanding the payment of interest would have led to BE’s insolvency, which BNFL thought would not be favourable to its interests.
Tveganje bi bilo veliko, ker bi zahteva po plačilu obresti povzročila plačilno nesposobnost družbe BE, za kar pa družba BNFL meni, da ne bi bilo v njenem najboljšem interesu.
In renouncing to these interests, BNFL has acted in in a manner consistent with the conduct of a private creditor wishing to ensure the best revenue possible.
Ko se je družba BNFL odrekla tem obrestim, je ravnala, kot bi ravnal zasebni upnik, ki si želi zagotoviti najboljši mogoči prihodek.
To conclude, the Commission could not establish that the part of Measure C involving BNFL was imputable to the State, for the reasons set out in the assessment of Measure B in recitals (256) to (296).
Končno Komisija ni mogla ugotoviti, da se del ukrepa C, ki vključuje družbo BNFL, pripiše državi iz razlogov, določenih v oceni ukrepa B v uvodnih izjavah 0 do (295).
The Commission has therefore come to the conclusion that Measure C does not contain State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je zato zaključila, da ukrep C ne sestavlja državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
Compatibility assessment under the EC Treaty
Ocena združljivosti na podlagi Pogodbe ES
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty provides for the general principle of prohibition of State aid within the Community.
Člen 87(1) Pogodbe ES zagotavlja splošno načelo prepovedi državne pomoči znotraj Skupnosti.
Article 87(2) and 87(3) of the EC Treaty provide for exemptions to the general incompatibility set out in Article 87(1).
Člen 87(2) in (3) Pogodbe ES zagotavlja izjeme v zvezi s splošno nezdružljivostjo, določeno v členu 87(1).
The exemptions in Article 87(2) of the EC Treaty do not apply in this case because the aid measures do not have a social character and are not granted to individual consumers, they do not make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences and they are not granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by its division.
Izjeme v členu 87(2) Pogodbe ES v tem primeru ne veljajo, ker ukrepi pomoči nimajo socialnega značaja in se ne dodeljujejo posameznim uporabnikom, ne odpravljajo škode, ki jo povzročijo naravne nesreče ali izredne razmere, ter se ne dodeljujejo gospodarstvom nekaterih območij Zvezne republike Nemčije, na katere je vplivala njena delitev.
Further exemptions are set out in Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty.
Nadaljnje izjeme so določene v členu 87(3) Pogodbe ES.
Exemptions in Articles 87(3)(a), 87(3)(b) and 87(3)(d) do not apply in this case because the aid does not promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, it does not promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State, and it does not promote culture and heritage conservation.
Izjeme v členu 87(3)(a), (b) in (d) v tem primeru ne veljajo, ker pomoč ne spodbuja gospodarskega razvoja na območjih, kjer je življenjski standard nenormalno nizek ali kjer je velika brezposelnost, ne spodbuja izvajanja pomembnega projekta v skupnem evropskem interesu ali ne pomaga pomiriti resnih motenj na področju gospodarstva države članice ter ne pospešuje kulture in ohranjanja kulturne dediščine.
Only the exemption in Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty may therefore apply.
Zato lahko veljajo samo izjeme iz člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES.
Article 87(3)(c) provides for the authorisation of State aid that is granted to promote the development of certain economic sectors, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Člen 87(3)(c) zagotavlja odobritev državne pomoči za pospeševanje razvoja nekaterih gospodarskih sektorjev, v katerih takšna pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
In the guidelines, the Commission spelled out the preconditions for a favourable exercise of its powers of appreciation according to Article 87(3)(c) in cases such as this one.
V Smernicah je Komisija natančno določila pogoje za dobro izvajanje pooblastil v zvezi z oceno iz člena 87(3)(c) v primerih, kot je ta.
In its decision to initiate proceedings, the Commission expressed a number of doubts on the compatibility of the restructuring plan with the guidelines.
V sklepu o sprožitvi postopka je Komisija izrazila številne dvome o združljivosti načrta za prestrukturiranje s Smernicami.
These doubts were recalled in section 3) above.
Na te dvome je bilo opozorjeno v oddelku 3 zgoraj.
The following sections present the assessment and the final conclusions of the Commission on each of those doubts.
Naslednji oddelki predstavljajo oceno in končne zaključke Komisije o vsakem od teh dvomov.
On the restoration of BE’s viability
O ponovni vzpostavitvi sposobnosti preživetja družbe BE
The award of restructuring aid requires a feasible, coherent and far reaching restructuring plan capable of restoring the long-term viability of the firm within a reasonable time span and on the basis of realistic assumptions.
Dodelitev pomoči za prestrukturiranje zahteva izvedljiv, usklajen in daljnosežen načrt za prestrukturiranje, zmožen vzpostaviti dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja družbe v razumnem roku in na podlagi realističnih predpostavk.
According to point 32 of the guidelines, the improvement in viability must derive mainly from internal measures contained in the restructuring plan and may be based on external factors such as variations in prices and demand over which the company has no influence if the market assumptions made are generally acknowledged.
Po točki (32) Smernic mora izboljšanje sposobnosti preživetja izhajati predvsem iz notranjih ukrepov, ki jih vsebuje načrt za prestrukturiranje, in lahko temelji na zunanjih dejavnikih, kot so razlike v cenah in povpraševanje, na kar pa družba nima nobenega vpliva, če so tržne predpostavke splošno priznane.
Point 33 of the guidelines require the Member State to submit a restructuring plan describing the circumstances that led to the company’s difficulties and considering scenarios reflecting best-case, worst-case and intermediate assumptions.
Točka (33) Smernic zahteva, da država članica predloži načrt za prestrukturiranje z opisom okoliščin, ki so družbo pripeljale v težave, in obravnavo scenarijev s predpostavkami o najboljšem, najslabšem in srednjem izidu.
Point 34 of the guidelines adds that the plan should provide for a turnaround that will enable the company after completing its restructuring to cover all its costs including depreciation and financial charges.
Točka (34) Smernic dodaja, da bi načrt moral zagotoviti preobrat, ki bo družbi omogočil, da po končanem prestrukturiranju pokrije vse svoje stroške, vključno z amortizacijo in finančnimi stroški.
The expected return on capital should be enough to enable the restructured firm to compete in the market place on its own merits.
Pričakovan donos kapitala bi moral družbi zadostovati, da na trgu konkurira na podlagi lastnih zaslug.
In its decision to initiate proceedings, the Commission raised several issues in relation to the restoration of viability of BE.
V sklepu o sprožitvi postopkov je Komisija postavila več vprašanj v zvezi s ponovno vzpostavitvijo sposobnosti preživetja družbe BE.
These doubts were based on two observations.
Ti dvomi so temeljili na dveh ugotovitvah.
Firstly, the time span of certain items of Measure A and of Measure B seemed unlimited, which raised doubts as to whether the restructuring plan would allow BE to become able to face competition again on its own feet within a reasonable time frame.
Prvič, trajanje nekaterih zadev v ukrepu A in ukrepu B se je zdelo neomejeno, zaradi česar so nastali dvomi, ali bo načrt za prestrukturiranje družbi BE omogočil, da se bo spet zmožna samostojno spopasti s konkurenco v razumnem časovnem okviru.
Secondly, it seemed that the restructuring plan did not include enough measures internal to BE.
Drugič, zdelo se je, da načrt za prestrukturiranje ni vključil dovolj notranjih ukrepov za družbo BE.
The doubts of the Commission related in particular to Measures A and B. In view of the long duration of Measure A and the open ended nature of Measure B, the Commission wondered whether the restructuring aid in favour of BE was not awarded in the form of an on-going subsidy which would be contrary to the requirements of the guidelines.
Dvomi Komisije so veljali še zlasti za ukrepa A in B. Glede na dolgotrajnost ukrepa A in odprto naravo ukrepa B se je Komisija spraševala, ali pomoč za prestrukturiranje družbi BE ni bila dodeljena v obliki stalne subvencije, kar bi bilo v nasprotju z zahtevami Smernic.
This concern was shared by third parties such as Drax.
To se sprašujejo tudi tretje stranke, kot je družba Drax.
As far as Measure B is concerned, the Commission came to the conclusion that it does not contain state aid in the sense of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
V zvezi z ukrepom B je Komisija zaključila, da ne sestavlja državne pomoči v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES.
Consequently, the issue related to the open ended nature of Measure B is no longer relevant.
Zato vprašanje, povezano z odprto naravo ukrepa B, ni več pomembno.
As regards Measure A, the Commission was concerned that the costs related to the decommissioning of the nuclear plants could arise until 2086 and that the financing of the costs associated with the management of PWR spent fuel loaded into the Sizewell B reactor of BE was also open-ended.
V zvezi z ukrepom A je Komisija izrazila skrb, da bi lahko stroški, povezani z razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn, nastajali do leta 2086 in da je bilo tudi financiranje stroškov, povezanih z ravnanjem z izrabljenim gorivom za tlačnovodni reaktor, vstavljeno v reaktor elektrarne Sizewell B, odprte narave.
Concerning the decommissioning costs, the Commission notes that these costs will occur in the future but relate to the construction of nuclear plants which took place in the past.
V zvezi s stroški razgradnje ugotavlja Komisija, da bodo ti stroški v prihodnosti nastajali, vendar pa so povezani z gradnjo jedrskih elektrarn, ki je potekala v preteklosti.
The Commission accepts the UK argument that it is not possible to quantify precisely the amount relating to decommissioning in view of the absence of precedent for AGR plants and the fact that it will be done in the distant future with possible technological evolution.
Komisija sprejema argument Združenega kraljestva, da ni mogoče navesti natančnega zneska, povezanega z razgradnjo, glede na to, da ni precendenčnega primera v zvezi z elektrarnami s plinsko hlajenimi reaktorji, in dejstvo, da bo v daljni prihodnosti to potekalo v skladu z morebitnim tehnološkim razvojem.
In addition, the UK Government submits that decommissioning costs are already largely fixed and that any material increase in liabilities arising from a discretionary change in operating procedures for BE’s economic benefit or resulting from a breach of minimum performance standard will have to be paid by BE.
Razen tega vlada Združenega kraljestva trdi, da so stroški razgradnje v glavnem že fiksni in da bo družba BE morala kriti kakršno koli materialno zvišanje stroškov obveznosti, ki bi nastalo zaradi samovoljnih sprememb operativnih postopkov v gospodarsko korist družbe BE ali zaradi kršitve standarda najmanjše učinkovitosti.
In addition it is important to recall that the intervention of the State is foreseen in case of shortfall of the funding through the NLF.
Razen tega je pomembno opozoriti, da je posredovanje države predvideno v primeru nezadostnega financiranja iz sklada za jedrske obveznosti.
Taking into account the particular nature of the nuclear industry that does not allow the handling of radioactive material before its radiation rate has reached safer levels and the inevitable time-scale of financing the decommissioning liabilities, the Commission concludes that part of Measure A relating to those liabilities cannot be qualified as on-going subsidy to BE since they are defined and relate to costs already incurred.
Ob upoštevanju posebne narave jedrske industrije, ki ne dopušča obdelave radioaktivnega materiala, dokler se stopnja sevanja ne zmanjša, in neizogibnega časovnega obsega financiranja obveznosti razgradnje Komisija zaključi, da se del ukrepa A, povezanega s temi obveznostmi, ne more šteti kot stalna subvencija družbi BE, ker so te opredeljene in povezane z že nastalimi stroški.
A provision for these costs has already been made in BE’s balance sheet.
Ti stroški so že bili predvideni v bilanci stanja družbe BE.