natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission found that the relevant product market for recorded music (including A&R and the promotion, sales and marketing of recorded music) might be subdivided into distinct product markets based on genre (such as international pop, local pop, classical music) or for compilations.
Komisija je ugotovila, da je mogoče upoštevni proizvodni trg glasbenih posnetkov (vključno z „A&R“ ter promocijo, prodajo in trženjem glasbenih posnetkov) razdeliti na ločene proizvodne trge na podlagi žanra (kot so mednarodni pop, domači pop, klasična glasba) ali za kompilacije.
For the purpose of the present case, however, it could be left open whether the abovementioned genres or categories constitute separate markets, as the concentration would not lead to a creation or strengthening of a dominant position under any market definition considered.
Vendar bi lahko za namen obravnavane zadeve vprašanje o tem, ali gre pri zgoraj navedenih žanrih ali kategorijah za ločene trge, ostalo odprto, saj naj koncentracija ne bi privedla do ustvarjanja ali krepitve prevladujočega položaja ne glede na to, katera določitev trga je pri tem upoštevana.
The market investigation confirmed a number of factors (e.g. A&R, pricing, sales and marketing mainly taking place nationally, strong demand for local repertoire, and limited international presence of independent record companies) for the relevant geographic markets for recorded music being considered as national.
Raziskava trga je potrdila številne dejavnike (npr. to, da dejavnosti A&R, oblikovanje cen, prodaja in trženje potekajo večinoma na nacionalni ravni, da je veliko povpraševanje po lokalnem repertoarju in omejena mednarodna prisotnost neodvisnih proizvajalcev fonogramov), zaradi katerih veljajo upoštevni geografski trgi glasbenih posnetkov za nacionalne.
Online music
Glasba na spletu
Supported by its findings in the market investigation, the Commission considers that online music is not part of the market for physical recorded music, in particular due to differences in the product and its distribution.
Komisija na podlagi svojih ugotovitev iz raziskave trga ocenjuje, da glasba na spletu ni del trga fizičnih glasbenih posnetkov, zlasti zaradi razlik v izdelkih in drugačne distribucije.
It identified two distinct product markets for online music: (i) the wholesale market for licences for online music and (ii) the retail market for distribution of online music.
Ugotovila je, da je treba ločevati med dvema različnima proizvodnima trgoma glasbe na spletu: (i) trg na debelo za dovoljenja za glasbo na spletu in (ii) trg na drobno za distribucijo glasbe na spletu.
For the purpose of the present case the Commission considers that both the wholesale market for licences for online music and the retail market for distribution of online music are national in scope.
Za namen obravnavane zadeve Komisija upošteva, da sta tako trg na debelo za dovoljenja za glasbo na spletu kakor trg na drobno za distribucijo glasbe na spletu nacionalna po obsegu.
This may change in the future, depending on further cross-border developments in online music licensing and music distribution.
To se lahko v prihodnosti spremeni, odvisno od nadaljnjega čezmejnega razvoja dogodkov na področju podeljevanja dovoljenj in distribucije glasbe na spletu.
Music publishing
Glasbeno založništvo
Based on both demand and supply-side considerations the Commission found indications for the existence of separate product markets for music publishing according to the exploitation of the different rights categories (i.e. mechanical, performance, synchronisation, print and other rights).
Komisija je ob upoštevanju vidikov povpraševanja in vidikov ponudbe ugotovila znake, ki kažejo na obstoj ločenih proizvodnih trgov glasbenega založništva glede na izkoriščanje različnih kategorij pravic (tj. mehanične pravice, izvajalske pravice, pravice do sinhronizacije, pravice do tiskanja in druge pravice).
However, the exact scope of the relevant product market could be left open as the competitive assessment is the same under any market definition considered.
Vendar bi lahko vprašanje natančnega obsega upoštevnega proizvodnega trga ostalo odprto, saj je ocena konkurenčnosti enaka ne glede na to, katera določitev trga se pri tem upošteva.
The market investigation has confirmed that the geographic scope of the market is essentially, and in spite of some cross-border elements, national, given that licence fees for mechanical and performance rights are generally collected on a national basis.
Raziskava trga je potrdila, da je trg po svojem geografskem obsegu kljub nekaterim čezmejnim prvinam v bistvu nacionalen, glede na to, da se licenčnine za mehanične in izvajalske pravice pobirajo večinoma na nacionalni podlagi.
For the purpose of the present case the exact scope of the relevant geographic market could be left open as the competitive assessment is the same under any market definition considered.
Za namen obravnavane zadeve bi lahko vprašanje natančnega obsega upoštevnega geografskega trga ostalo odprto, saj je ocena konkurenčnosti enaka ne glede na to, katera določitev trga se pri tem upošteva.
ASSESSMENT
OCENA
Possible strengthening of collective dominance in the recorded music markets
Možnost krepitve kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja na trgih glasbenih posnetkov
The Commission’s investigation has not provided sufficiently conclusive evidence for the existence of a collective dominant position of the five ‘majors’ (Sony, BMG, Universal, EMI and Warner) in the markets for music recording.
Preiskava Komisije ni prinesla dovolj trdnih dokazov o obstoju kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja petih glavnih proizvajalcev fonogramov (Sony, BMG, Universal, EMI in Warner) na trgih glasbenih posnetkov.
Based on the case law of the European courts, in particular the Airtours judgment, a prerequisite for the existence of a collective dominant position among market players is: (i) a common understanding about the terms of coordination; (ii) the ability to monitor whether such terms are adhered to; (iii) the existence of a deterrent mechanism in case of deviations; and (iv) third parties (actual and potential competitors, customers) not being able to effectively jeopardise the benefits expected from coordination.
Na podlagi sodne prakse evropskih sodišč, zlasti razsodbe v zadevi Airtours, so predpogoji za obstoj kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja med udeleženci na trgu naslednji: (i) skupni dogovor o pogojih usklajevanja; (ii) sposobnost nadzorovanja, ali se takšni pogoji upoštevajo; (iii) obstoj mehanizma zastraševanja v primeru odklonov; in (iv) tretje osebe (dejanski in potencialni konkurenti, stranke) ne morejo učinkovito ogroziti pričakovanih rezultatov usklajevanja.
In assessing whether there exists a collective dominant position in the markets for recorded music among the five music majors, the Commission analysed whether during the last three to four years a coordinated price policy of the majors could be established in the EEA Member States.
Pri ocenjevanju, ali na trgih glasbenih posnetkov obstaja kolektivni prevladujoči položaj med petimi glavnimi proizvajalci fonogramov, je Komisija analizirala, ali bi v zadnjih treh do štirih letih v državah članicah EGP lahko prišlo do oblikovanja usklajene cenovne politike glavnih proizvajalcev fonogramov.
For this purpose the Commission investigated the development of the five majors’ wholesale prices to wholesalers and retailers in each Member State in the period 1998 to 2003.
V ta namen je Komisija raziskala gibanje veleprodajnih cen petih glavnih proizvajalcev fonogramov za trgovce na veliko in drobno v vsaki državi članici v obdobju 1998–2003.
In particular, the Commission’s analysis focused on the development of average net wholesale prices, PPDs (Published Prices to Dealers), gross and net price ratios as well as invoice discounts and retrospective discounts.
Zlasti se je analiza Komisije osredotočila na gibanje povprečnih neto veleprodajnih cen, objavljenih cen za trgovce (PPD), razmerij med bruto in neto cenami ter popustov na ravni računov in naknadnih popustov.
To assess a possible coordination of the majors’ wholesale prices, the Commission analysed the parallelism of the development of (inflation-corrected) average net prices for the top 100 single albums of each major in the five largest Member States (this is considered a representative sample as the top 100 single albums account for approximately 70 to 80 % of the majors’ respective total music sales).
Da bi ocenila možno uskladitev veleprodajnih cen glavnih proizvajalcev fonogramov, je Komisija analizirala podobnost gibanja povprečnih neto cen (usklajenih z inflacijo) za prvih 100 najbolje prodajanih enojnih albumov vsakega glavnega proizvajalca fonogramov v petih največjih državah članicah (to velja za reprezentativni vzorec, saj 100 najbolje prodajanih enojnih albumov predstavlja približno 70–80 % skupne prodaje fonogramov glavnih proizvajalcev).
Secondly, the Commission examined whether any price coordination could have been reached in using list prices (PPDs) as focal points.
Drugič, Komisija je preučila, ali je bila morda kakšna uskladitev cen dosežena tako, da so se kot podlaga zanjo uporabile cene po ceniku (PPD).
Thirdly, the Commission analysed whether the different majors’ discounts were aligned and sufficiently transparent in order to allow effective monitoring of competitive behaviour.
Tretjič, Komisija je analizirala, ali so bili popusti različnih glavnih proizvajalcev fonogramov usklajeni in dovolj pregledni, da bi se omogočilo učinkovito spremljanje konkurenčnega obnašanja.
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK
Francija, Nemčija, Italija, Španija, Združeno kraljestvo
On the basis of the net average prices, the Commission found some parallelism and a relatively similar development of the majors’ prices in the five larger markets, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK.
Na podlagi povprečnih neto cen je Komisija odkrila neko vzporednico in relativno podobno gibanje cen glavnih proizvajalcev fonogramov na petih največjih trgih, v Franciji, Nemčiji, Italiji, Španiji in Združenem kraljestvu.
However, these observations as such are not sufficient to conclude that coordinated pricing behaviour existed in the past.
Vendar ta opažanja kot takšna niso zadostna, da bi bilo mogoče sklepati, da je v preteklosti obstajalo usklajeno gibanje cen.
Therefore, the Commission further investigated whether additional elements, namely list prices and discounts, were aligned and sufficiently transparent to provide sufficient evidence for coordination.
Zato je Komisija nadalje raziskala, ali so bili dodatni elementi, namreč cene po ceniku in popusti, usklajeni in dovolj pregledni, da bi bilo mogoče pridobiti zadostne dokaze o usklajevanju.
The Commission found some indications that PPDs could have been used as focal points for an alignment of the majors’ list prices in all five Member States.
Komisija je našla nekatere znake o tem, da bi bile lahko PPD uporabljene kot podlaga, na kateri so glavni proizvajalci fonogramov v vseh petih državah članicah usklajevali svoje cene po ceniku.
Regarding discounts, the investigation indicated that the level of discounts varied to some extent among the different majors and that certain types of discounts were not sufficiently transparent to establish existing collusion.
Kar zadeva popuste, je iz raziskave razvidno, da se je raven popustov pri različnih velikih proizvajalcih fonogramov nekoliko razlikovala in da nekatere vrste popustov niso bile dovolj pregledne, da bi bilo mogoče dokazati obstoj tajnega dogovora.
Furthermore, the Commission analysed whether the markets for recorded music were characterised by features facilitating collective dominance, in particular by considering product homogeneity, transparency and retaliation mechanisms.
Poleg tega je Komisija analizirala, ali so na trgih glasbenih posnetkov prevladovale določene značilnosti, ki so spodbujale kolektivni prevladujoči položaj, zlasti ob upoštevanju homogenosti izdelkov, preglednosti in mehanizmov povračilnih ukrepov.
As to product homogeneity, the Commission found that the content of individual albums is differentiated but also that pricing and marketing are standardised to some extent.
V zvezi s homogenostjo izdelkov je Komisija ugotovila, da je vsebina posameznih albumov raznovrstna, toda tudi to, da sta oblikovanje cen in trženje do neke mere standardizirana.
However, the heterogeneity of content has some implications for pricing and reduces transparency in the market and makes tacit collusion more difficult as it requires monitoring at the individual album level.
Vendar ima heterogenost vsebine določene posledice za oblikovanje cen, zmanjšuje preglednosti na trgu in otežuje tajne dogovore, saj zahteva spremljanje na ravni posameznega albuma.
With respect to transparency, the Commission found that the publication of weekly charts, the stability of the common customer base and the majors’ monitoring of the retail market by means of weekly reports increase the market transparency and facilitate the monitoring of a coordinated policy.
Glede preglednosti je Komisija ugotovila, da objava tedenskih lestvic, stabilnost skupne baze kupcev in spremljanje maloprodajnega trga na podlagi tedenskih poročil povečujejo preglednost trga in olajšujejo spremljanje usklajene politike.
However, the investigation also indicated that the monitoring of campaign discounts requires monitoring on an album level, which reduces the transparency in the market and makes tacit collusion more difficult.
Vendar je raziskava prav tako pokazala, da je za spremljanje akcijskih popustov potrebno spremljanje na ravni posameznih albumov, kar zmanjšuje preglednost trga in otežuje tajne dogovore.
On balance, the Commission has not found sufficient evidence that the majors have overcome this transparency deficit in the past.
Komisija navsezadnje ni našla zadostnih dokazov o tem, da so glavni proizvajalci fonogramov v preteklosti odpravili to pomanjkanje preglednosti.
As to retaliation, the Commission explored whether majors could retaliate against any ‘cheating’ major, in particular by a (temporary) return to competitive behaviour or by exclusion of the deviator from compilation joint ventures and agreements.
Kar zadeva povračilne ukrepe, je Komisija raziskala, ali so se morda glavni proizvajalci fonogramov maščevali morebitnemu „goljufivemu“ glavnemu proizvajalcu fonogramov, zlasti tako, da so se znova začeli (začasno) obnašati konkurenčno ali da so „goljufa“ izključili iz skupnih projektov in sporazumov v zvezi s kompilacijami.
However, the Commission has not found sufficient evidence that such retaliation mechanisms have been applied or used as a threat in the past.
Vendar Komisija ni našla zadostnih dokazov o tem, da bi se v preteklosti takšni povračilni ukrepi izvajali ali da bi se uporabljali za zastraševalne namene.
The Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Greece
Nizozemska, Švedska, Irska, Avstrija, Belgija, Danska, Finska, Norveška, Portugalska, Grčija
In the smaller Member States the Commission equally found a considerable degree of parallelism between the PPDs of the majors which, in principle, could be have been used as focal points by the majors to align prices.
V manjših državah članicah je Komisija prav tako odkrila znatno stopnjo podobnosti med PPD, ki bi jih lahko proizvajalci fonogramov načeloma uporabili kot podlago za usklajevanje cen.
However, the investigation revealed, also in the smaller Member States, some differences in the level of discounts and deficits of transparency with respect to certain discounts.
Vendar je preiskava tudi v manjših državah članicah razkrila določene razlike v stopnji popustov in pomanjkanje preglednosti v zvezi z nekaterimi popusti.
The Commission’s considerations as to homogeneity of the product, transparency of the market and the possibility to retaliate, as specified above for the larger Member States, are also valid for the smaller Member States.
Ugotovitve Komisije glede homogenosti izdelkov, preglednosti trga in možnosti povračilnih ukrepov, kakor so navedene zgoraj za večje države članice, veljajo tudi za manjše države članice.
The Commission considers that it has not found sufficient evidence for an existing collective dominant position of the five music majors in the markets for recorded music in any EEA Member State.
Komisija meni, da ni našla zadostnih dokazov o obstoju kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja petih največjih proizvajalcev fonogramov na trgih glasbenih posnetkov v kateri koli državi članici EGP.
Possible creation of collective dominance in the recorded music markets
Možnost ustvarjanja kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja na trgih glasbenih posnetkov
The Commission has also considered whether the merger would lead to the creation of collective dominance of the music majors in any EEA Member State.
Komisija je prav tako preučila, ali bi združitev privedla do ustvarjanja kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja velikih proizvajalcev fonogramov v kateri koli državi članici EGP.
However, in the light of the above remarks, in particular regarding market transparency, product content heterogeneity and retaliation, the Commission considers that the effect of a reduction from five to four majors following the merger would not be substantial enough to lead to the creation of a collective dominant position of the majors in the recorded music markets.
Vendar pa glede na zgornje pripombe, zlasti v zvezi s preglednostjo trga, heterogenostjo vsebine izdelkov in povračilnimi ukrepi, Komisija meni, da učinek zmanjšanja števila velikih proizvajalcev fonogramov s pet na štiri po združitvi ne bo tako velik, da bi to lahko privedlo do oblikovanja kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja velikih proizvajalcev fonogramov na trgih glasbenih posnetkov.
Possible creation of single dominance in the recorded music markets
Možnost ustvarjanja posamičnega prevladujočega položaja na trgih glasbenih posnetkov
Third parties raised concerns that the joint venture would achieve a position of single dominance in the markets for recorded music due to the joint venture’s vertical relationship to Bertelsmann’s media interests.
Tretje osebe so izrazile zaskrbljenost, da bi skupno podjetje doseglo posamični prevladujoči položaj na trgih glasbenih posnetkov zaradi svojih vertikalnih povezav z Bertelsmannovimi medijskimi interesi.
It is argued that Bertelsmann could use its position in television and radio stations to foreclose competitors and favour Sony BMG, in particular by granting preferential rates or treatment or by foreclosure of competitors from promoting their artists via these channels.
Trdijo namreč, da bi lahko Bertelsmann svoj položaj v televizijskih in radijskih postajah izrabil za preprečevanje konkurence in dajanje prednosti družbi SonyBMG, zlasti z zagotavljanjem posebno ugodnih cen ali preferencialne obravnave ali tako, da bi konkurentom preprečeval oglaševanje in promocijo njihovih izvajalcev na teh kanalih.
The Commission concludes that it is not likely that the proposed joint venture would achieve single dominance on the markets for recorded music in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France, where Bertelsmann is active via RTL TV and radio stations.
Komisija ugotavlja, da ni verjetno, da bi predlagano skupno podjetje doseglo posamični prevladujoči položaj na trgih glasbenih posnetkov v Nemčiji, na Nizozemskem, v Belgiji, Luksemburgu in Franciji, kjer je Bertelsmann dejaven prek televizijskih in radijskih postaj skupine RTL.
The advantages derived from the vertical integration in Bertelsmann’s media group (e.g. through the Pop Idol format which, according to industry experts has already passed its peak) are already incorporated in BMG’s market shares for 2003.
Prednosti, ki izhajajo iz vertikalne integracije v Bertelsmannovi medijski skupini (npr. prek formata oddaje Pop Idol, ki pa po mnenju strokovnjakov za to industrijo ni več na vrhuncu svoje priljubljenosti), so že vključene v tržne deleže družbe BMG za leto 2003.
On the basis of these market shares the proposed joint venture does not reach the threshold of single dominance.
Na podlagi teh tržnih deležev predlagano skupno podjetje ne dosega praga posamičnega prevladujočega položaja.
Furthermore, the Commission has not found any evidence that it could be a profitable strategy for Bertelsmann to foreclose competitors from access to its TV channels and radio stations.
Poleg tega Komisija ni našla nobenih dokazov o tem, da bi strategija, s katero bi Bertelsmann konkurentom preprečeval dostop do svojih televizijskih kanalov in radijskih postaj, lahko prinašala dobiček.
Possible collective dominance in the wholesale market for licenses for online music
Možnost kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja na trgu na debelo dovoljenj za glasbo na spletu
The Commission notes that the market for legal online music is currently in a state of infancy as most of the sites for online music have only recently started operations in the EEA.
Komisija opaža, da je trg legalne glasbe na spletu trenutno še v povojih, saj je večina spletnih mest, ki ponujajo glasbo na spletu, v EGP začela delovati šele nedavno.
It is therefore difficult to definitively conclude on the market positions of the major record companies, particularly in relation to national markets.
Zato je težko z gotovostjo sklepati o tržnih položajih glavnih proizvajalcev fonogramov, zlasti v zvezi z nacionalnimi trgi.
In addition, the information on actually downloaded or streamed songs does not appear to give a clear picture of the different players’ market positions and no public industry data is available.
Poleg tega se zdi, da podatki o glasbenih datotekah, ki so bile dejansko prenesene ali neposredno predvajane z interneta, ne dajejo jasne slike o tržnih položajih različnih udeležencev, prav tako ni na voljo javnih podatkov o tej industriji.
However, on the basis of the information received by the Commission, it can be concluded that the market position of the major record companies on the wholesale market for licences for online music appears to be by and large similar to their position on the markets for recorded music.
Vendar je na podlagi informacij, ki jih je prejela Komisija, mogoče sklepati, da je tržni položaj glavnih proizvajalcev fonogramov na trgu na debelo dovoljenj za glasbo na spletu bolj ali manj podoben njihovemu položaju na trgih glasbenih posnetkov.
Given the emerging state of the markets and the differences in pricing and conditions in the current agreements, the Commission has concluded that no sufficient evidence could be found for an existing collective dominant position of the majors on the national markets for licences for online music and that the concentration would not result in the creation of a collective dominant position on these markets.
Glede na to, da so ti trgi še v začetni fazi razvoja in da obstajajo razlike v oblikovanju cen in pogojih uporabe v trenutnih sporazumih, je Komisija sklenila, da ni bilo mogoče najti zadostnih dokazov o obstoju kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja velikih proizvajalcev fonogramov na nacionalnih trgih dovoljenj za glasbo na spletu niti o tem, da bi koncentracija privedla do oblikovanja kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja na teh trgih.
Possible single dominance in the online music distribution markets
Možnost posamičnega prevladujočega položaja na trgih distribucije glasbe na spletu
Third parties have raised concerns that, as a result of the transaction, Sony could obtain a position of single dominance on the national markets for distribution of online music via its Sony Connect music downloading service.
Tretje osebe so izrazile zaskrbljenost, da bi zaradi obravnavane transakcije Sony lahko pridobil posamični prevladujoči položaj na nacionalnih trgih distribucije glasbe na spletu preko svoje storitve za prenašanje glasbe z interneta, imenovane „Sony Connect“.