natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It was not possible to set up a standardised institution under the Banking Law without forgoing, pursuant to Section 40 of that Law, the name ‘Berliner Sparkasse’ and BerlinHyp’s mortgage bond privilege.
Ustanove, poenotene v smislu zakona o kreditnem poslovanju ni bilo mogoče ustvariti ne da bi se zaradi 40. odstavka zakona o kreditnem poslovanju izgubilo ime „Berliner Sparkasse“, kot tudi privilegij hipotekarnih obveznic, ki je pripadal BerlinHyp.
The absence of a single management feasible under company law meant that group‐wide risk management could be introduced only in stages.
Neobstoj enotnega vodenja, ki bi ga bilo mogoče družbeno-pravno uveljaviti, je bil vzrok, da je potekalo izgrajevanje upravljanje tveganj po vsem koncernu le postopoma.
There were also technical IT constraints and delays in establishing adequate data quality.
Temu so se pridružile še tehnične omejitve na področju elektronske obdelave podatkov in časovni zamiki pri ustvarjanju zadostne kakovosti podatkov.
Risk management received little support and had to compile risk‐relevant data manually.
Stopnja podpore upravljanja tveganja je bila nizka in odvisna od ročnega zbiranja podatkov, pomembnih pri presoji tveganja.
It was therefore potentially always subject to error, was incomplete and was characterised by long lead times.
Potencialno je s tem vedno povezana možnost nepopolne označitve in dolgih časov predhodne obdelave.
Internal rating procedures were not validated using statistical methods.
Notranji rating postopki niso bili validirani s statističnimi metodami.
The introduction of efficient risk monitoring and a new data bank system by the end of 2002, however, constituted an operational guarantee that future problems could be identified and corrected in time.
Uvedba učinkovitega upravljanja tveganj in novega sistema bančnih podatkov do konca 2002 zagotavlja iz poslovno-ekonomskega vidika v prihodnje zgodnje razpoznavanje in odpravljanje zgrešenega razvoja.
All activities of the entire group relevant in credit risk terms were consolidated in a risk register data bank.
V banki evidenčnih podatkov se uskupinjeno stekajo vsi posli celotnega koncerna, pomembni za kreditno tveganje.
These data formed the basis for a limit management system for assessing credit risks for their risk potential and subjecting them to various limits.
Ti podatki so osnova za upravljalni sistem limita, s katerim so bili ovrednoteni potenciali tveganja kreditnih tveganj in ocenjeni iz vidika različnih omejitev.
An information platform was therefore available on a same‐day basis for all credit risk assessments.
Tako je na voljo dnevno posodobljena informacijska platforma za vse analize tveganj pri kreditnem poslovanju.
On this basis, a new credit risk report was developed for the executive and supervisory boards.
Na tej osnovi je bil razvit nov način poročanja o kreditnih tveganjih za upravo in nadzorni svet.
The rating procedures had been completely reworked in cooperation with the DSGV and the German Landesbanken.
Rating postopki so se v sodelovanju z DSGV (Zveza nemških hranilnic in žiro sistemov) in nemškimi deželnimi bankami na novo razvili.
The extensive exchange of managerial staff and the reduction in areas from 63 to 34 also helped to improve risk control.
K boljši kontroli tveganj je prispevala tudi obsežna zamenjava vodilnega osebja in skrčenje področij iz 63 na 34.
Simplifying the group and management structures and introducing efficient control systems involved, among other things, structural improvements in the areas of corporate governance, risk control, control/management of the real estate services subsidiaries and alignment of the IT infrastructure.
Poenostavitev strukture koncerna in upravljanja ter uvedba učinkovitih sistemov kontroling med drugim izvira iz strukturnih izboljšav na področjih obvladovanja podjetja, nadziranja tveganja, nadziranja/vodenja hčerinskih podjetij za nepremičninske storitve in homogenizacije infrastrukture informacijske tehnike.
Under the new structure, BGB itself would in future cover wholesale and real estate financing activities and centralise the staff.
Nova struktura pomeni, da bo BGB v prihodnje zajemala področja veleprodaje in financiranja nepremičnin in centralizirala vodilno osebje.
Landesbank Berlin would combine all marketing activities, including the entire corporate and private retail segment, but with the exception of the wholesale business and commercial real estate financing.
Landesbank Berlin bo, z izjemo dejavnosti veleprodaje in financiranja industrijskih nepremičnin, združila vse prodajne dejavnosti, vključno celotno poslovanje s podjetji in občani.
The objective of a single management for the group had largely been achieved.
Cilj enotnega vodenja koncerna naj bi bil v glavnem uresničen.
Measures to improve structural and operational processes consisted in the appointment of a Risk Review Committee to conduct a comprehensive analysis of all the group’s risks, the establishment of an independent risk register area to assess operational risks and the setting up of risk management units in the corporate banking and real estate financing business areas.
Ukrepe za izboljšanje zgradbe in potekov poslovanja udejanja sklic Komisije za revizijo tveganj, ki bi razširjeno analizirala vsa tveganja koncerna; vzpostavitev samostojnega področja centralne evidence tveganj za vrednotenje operativnih tveganj in uvedba enote za upravljanje s tveganji na poslovnih področjih poslovanja s podjetji in financiranje nepremičnin.
A project team was also set up to deal with problems identified in audit reports.
Nadaljnje je bila določena projektna ekipa za dosledno strukturiranje pritožb iz revizijskih poročil in njihove obdelave.
Existing loans at significant risk would in future be monitored centrally by the risk management area to improve risk assessment.
Bistveno ogrožene obstoječe kredite v portfelju bi v prihodnje nadzirani centralno v enoti upravljanje tveganj zaradi boljše ocenitve tveganj.
Target yields before tax of around 6 to 7 % (according to the original notification) or [...]** % (according to the revised medium‐term plan of 24 June 2003) for BGB in 2006 were sufficient.
Ciljni donos pred davki na področju 6-7 % (v skladu s prvotno priglasitvijo) oz. [...]* % (v skladu s preoblikovanim srednjeročnim načrtovanjem z dne 24. junija 2003) naj bi za BGB zadoščal za leto 2006.
Yield rates before tax in Germany in the period from 1995 to 2000 ranged from 12,6 % to 17,6 % for regional banks/savings bank and from 13 % to 16,5 % for all banks (top 100).
Stopnja donosa pred davki se je v Nemčiji v obdobju od 1995 do 2000 pri deželnih bankah/hranilnicah oz. pri vseh bankah (top 100), gibala med 12,6 % - 17,6 % oz. 13,0 % - 16,5 %.
Over time, however, a reduction in equity return could be observed.
Vendar pa je mogoče v toku časa opaziti krčenje dobička na lastniški kapital pred davki.
In the regional banks/savings bank sector in particular, it had fallen from 17,6 % in 1995 to 12,6 % in 2000.
Še zlasti v sektorju deželnih bank/hranilnic se je skrčila iz 17,6 % v letu 1995 na 12,6 % v letu 2000.
Given the worsening of the economic situation that followed and the faltering consolidation process in Germany, the figures in the following years remained lower, ranging from 7 % (2001) to 8,5 % (2006) for regional banks/savings banks and from 9,9 % (2001) to 12 % (2006) in the sector as a whole.
Zaradi sledečega poslabšanja konjunkturnega položaja in zatikajočega se postopka uskupinjevanja v Nemčiji so se številke v naslednjih letih trajno nižale, zato naj bi se v letih od 2001 do 2006 pri deželnih bankah/hranilnicah gibale med 7,0 % (2000) in 8,5 % (2006) in v skupnih sektorjih med 9,9 % (2001) in 12,0 % (2006).
For regional banks/savings banks, the potential for recovery was severely restricted both by the loss of institutional liability and guarantor liability (Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung) and by Basle II.
Pri deželnih bankah/hranilnicah bo potencial za izboljšanje močno omejen z odpadom obveznosti za ohranjanje javnega podjetja in jamstva garanta ter z Basel II.
The target yields before tax of around 6 to 7 % (according to the original notification) or [...]** % (according to the revised medium‐term plan of 24 June 2003) were not directly comparable with the yields of competitors since BGB’s core‐capital ratio during the restructuring phase contained a ‘safety buffer’ to ensure refinancing on the capital market, partly to offset the total absence of hidden reserves.
Ciljni donos pred davki na področju 6-7 % (v skladu z začetno priglasitvijo) oz. [...]* % (v skladu s preoblikovanim srednjeročnim načrtom z dne 24. junija 2003), ni neposredno primerljiv z donosi konkurenčnih institutov, ker je stopnja temeljnega kapitala BGB med fazo prestrukturiranja za zagotovitev refinanciranja na trgu kapitala vključevala „varnostne rezerve“, namenjene delni kompenzaciji tihih rezerv, ki so v celoti manjkale.
Consequently, the future core‐capital ratio of [...]** % had to be significantly higher than the average core‐capital ratio of 6,1 % for regional banks/savings banks in the period from 1995 to 2000.
Zaradi tega bi morala v prihodnje predvidena stopnja temeljnega kapitala [...]* ležati občutno nad povprečno stopnjo temeljnega kapitala 6,1 % deželnih bank/hranilnic v obdobju od 1995 do 2000.
As a result of the safety buffer of some [...]** %, the equity return — for the same pre‐tax earnings — also fell by about [...]** % compared with competitors since the pre‐tax earnings related to a larger amount of own funds.
Kot posledica varnostnih rezerv v višini približno [...]* % se bo pri enakem dobičku pred davkom donos na lastniški kapital v primerjavi s konkurenčnimi kreditnimi instituti zmanjšal za približno [...]* %, saj je prigospodarjen dobiček pred davkom postavljen v razmerje z večjim lastniškim kapitalom.
The mere fact of being publicly owned did not call into question the possibility and value of restructuring the group.
Že samo dejstvo o javni lasti ne vzbuja dvomov, da je koncern mogoče sanirati in da je tega vreden.
Giving black marks to public undertakings ran counter to Article 295 of the EC Treaty.
Malus v škodo javnih podjetij je v skladu s členom 295 Pogodbe ES nezakonit.
Possible unlawful use of influence in connection with public ownership would be investigated by a parliamentary committee and by the Berlin public prosecutor.
Morebitno nezakonito vplivanje v povezavi z javno lastnino je raziskala preiskovalna komisija poslanske zbornice in javno tožilstvo v Berlinu.
The Land of Berlin also intended to privatise BGB.
Sicer namerava dežela Berlin izvesti privatizacijo BGB.
Furthermore, LBB’s business activity would be critically influenced by two special factors.
Poleg tega naj bi na poslovno dejavnost LBB odločilno vplivali dve posebnosti.
First, under Section 3(6) of the LBB Law, it would in future have to continue to carry out development activities such as promoting saving and managing giro accounts also for private customers with limited creditworthiness (accounts for the man in the street).
Po eni strani bi morala LBB v skladu s šestim odstavkom člena 3 zakona LBB, tudi v prihodnje zagotavljati razvojne naloge, kot je npr. pospeševanje varčevanja in vodenje žiro računov tudi za občane z omejeno kreditno sposobnostjo („Račun za vsakogar“).
As a result, it had a disproportionately large number of customers in low‐income brackets, and this significantly affected its yield potential.
S tem je število njenih strank z nizkim dohodkom nadpovprečno, kar občutno vpliva na bankin potencial donosnosti.
Changes could be made only over a long period of time.
Spremembe bi bilo mogoče uresničiti le v daljšem časovnem obdobju.
The takeover of the former Ost‐Berliner Sparkasse gave LBB a far higher share in eastern Berlin, which was particularly weak structurally.
S prevzemom nekdanje Ost-Berliner Sparkasse je imela LBB očitno večji delež zlasti v strukturno šibkem vzhodnem Berlinu.
Of LBB’s customers, 55 % were from eastern Berlin, although they accounted for only 37,5 % of all Berlin residents.
55 % strank LBB je bilo iz vzhodnega Berlina, kar pa je znašalo samo 37,5 % vseh prebivalcev Berlina.
These special factors would continue to play a role after any privatisation.
Te posebnosti so bile učinkovite tudi po privatizaciji.
On the basis of the revised medium‐term plan of 24 June 2003, Germany also provided a quantification of the effects of the proposals by the Commission's advisers (e.g. increase in risk provisioning), of the divestment of the real estate services business, to which it was already committed, and the hive‐off of IBB, finding that the medium‐ to long‐term effects of these three measures were insignificant.
Nemčija je prav tako na osnovi preoblikovanega srednjeročnega načrtovanja z dne 24. junija 2003 predložila kvantifikacijo učinkov predlogov svetovalcev Komisije (npr. povečanje rezervacij za tveganja) o že potrjeni izločitvi nepremičninske storitvene dejavnosti in odcepitvi IBB in povedala, da so sredstva oz. dolgoročni učinki vseh treh ukrepov majhni.
At the Commission’s subsequent request, Germany and the bank outlined further the consequences of a separate sale of Berliner Bank by 2005 for the survival of the rest of the group.
Na nadaljnjo poizvedbo Komisije je Nemčija oz. banka nadaljnje obrazložila posledice ločene odsvojitve Berliner Bank do konca 2005 na življenjsko sposobnost preostalega koncerna.
In Germany’s view, this sale would have a negative effect on the group’s medium‐term plan.
Po trditvah Nemčije ima ta odsvojitev negativne učinke na srednjeročno načrtovanje koncerna.
In total, there would be one‐off effects in the period 2003 to 2005 of around minus EUR [...]**, [...]** of which would be accounted for by the extraordinary costs of the sale and the remainder by reserves for staff, IT, buildings and additional restructuring costs.
Vsota naj bi izkazovala enkratne učinke v obdobju od 2003 do 2005 v znesku približno minus [...]* EUR, od tega [...]* za izredne stroške prodaje, ostanek pa so rezervacije za osebje, informacijsko tehnologijo, stavbe in dodatne stroške prestrukturiranja.
In the medium to long term, the planned result before tax in 2006 of EUR [...]** (according to the revised medium‐term plan and on the basis of the above three measures) would fall by about EUR [...]** to just under EUR [...]**, [...]** of this amount on account of the loss of Berliner Bank’s income to the group and the remainder on account of the delays in staff cutbacks, the loss of the planned increase in fee income and remaining (fixed) costs (especially in the context of back‐office diseconomies of scale).
Srednje oz. dolgoročno se bo načrtovan dobiček pred davki v letu 2006 zmanjšal v višini [...]* EUR (po preoblikovanem srednjeročnem načrtovanju na osnovi zgoraj omenjenih treh ukrepov) za približno [...]* EUR na skoraj [...]* EUR, od tega [...]* zaradi umika zneska izida Berliner Bank za koncern, ostanek pa zaradi časovnega zamika pri zmanjševanju števila zaposlenih, neuresničitve načrtovanega povišanja dobička iz provizij in preostalih (fiksnih) stroškov (zlasti zaradi neugodnega volumna zalednih pisarn).
The return on equity would decline by [...]** percentage points to [...]** % in 2006.
Donos lastniškega kapitala naj bi v letu 2006 padel za [...]* odstotnih točk na [...]* %.
This calculation was based on the assumption that Berliner Bank would be sold as an independent bank to maximise the number of bidders, something which would entail higher costs than the sale of assets or of an operating division.
Vendar ta izračun temelji na domnevi, da je bila Berliner Bank za maksimiranje kroga ponudnikov odsvojena kot samostojna banka, kar bi pomenilo večje stroške kot odsvojitev premoženja oz. operativnih enot.
Furthermore, the hive‐off of Berliner Bank would reduce the retail business’s share in the profits of BGB as a whole from a little over [...]** % to around [...]** %, while there would be a corresponding increase in the share of the capital market business from a little over [...]** % to around [...]** %.
Nadaljnje se z izločitvijo Berliner Bank zmanjša tudi delež izida iz poslovanja s prebivalstvom pri celotnem poslovanju BGB iz nekaj več kot [...]* % na okoli [...]* %, delež poslovanja na trgu kapitala pa se bi ustrezno povečal iz nekaj več kot [...]* % na približno [...]* % [...]*.
The Commission asked Germany and the bank to quantify the consequences of a separate sale of BerlinHyp by the end of 2006 for the survival of the rest of the group.
Komisija je Nemčijo oz. banko nadaljnje zaprosila za kvantifikacijo posledic srednjeročne ločene odsvojitve BerlinerHyp do konca 2006 na življenjsko sposobnost preostalega koncerna.
According to Germany and the bank, this would have the following negative consequences for the rest of the group or would impose the following requirements, which the buyer could not necessarily meet: the buyer would have to take over as far as possible internal refinancing (currently some EUR [...]**) on comparable terms, i.e. have at least as good a rating as Landesbank Berlin, and BGB’s guarantee for BerlinHyp in order to avoid applying the methodology for large credits (current estimated volume: about EUR [...]**).
Ta bi po navedbah Nemčije oz. banke imela naslednje negativne učinke na preostali koncern ali pa bi pomenila naslednje zahteve, ki jih morebiti kupec ne bi mogel izpolniti: Kupec bi moral v največjem izvedljivem obsegu prevzeti interno refinanciranje koncerna (zdaj približno [...]* EUR) pod primerljivimi pogoji, t.j. imeti najmanj tako dober rating kot Landesbank Berlin in prevzeti bi moral izjave o nameri BGB za BerlinHyp, da bi preprečil prištetje velikih kreditov (zdaj ocenjen obseg: približno [...]* EUR).
The buyer would also have to offer at least the book value of BerlinHyp as the purchase price since otherwise book value write‐downs of [...]** might result, endangering the survival of the rest of the group.
Nadaljnje bi moral kupec kot kupoprodajno ceno ponuditi najmanj knjižno vrednost BerlinerHyp, saj bi sicer prišlo do [...]* odpisa knjižne vrednosti, ki bi morebiti ogrožala življenjsko sposobnost preostalega koncerna.
Even a negative outcome of the bidding procedure would involve a risk of further book value write‐downs.
Tudi pri negativnem izidu postopka ponudbe obstaja tveganje nadaljnjega odpisa knjižne vrednosti.
A sale without serious consequences for the restructuring plan would be possible only if the marketing cooperation between BerlinHyp and the group could be maintained.
Nadaljnje bi naj bila odsvojitev brez hudih posledic za načrt prestrukturiranja mogoča le ob ohranitvi prodajnega sodelovanja med BerlinHyp in koncernom.
This, together with the separate sale of Berliner Bank, would result in a further fall in the target equity return in 2006 for the rest of the group of some [...]** %, to just over [...]** % in all, and a core‐capital ratio of just under [...]** %.
Z ločeno prodajo Berliner Bank bi to pomenilo nadaljnje znižanje donosa lastniškega kapitala preostalega koncerna za leto 2006, za katerega si je prizadeval preostali koncern, za približno [...]* % na skupaj nekaj več kot [...]* %, ter stopenj temeljnega kapitala, ki bi le za nekoliko presegala [...]* %.
Germany submitted a ‘medium‐term plan’ for the development of individual balance‐sheet and profit‐and‐loss account items during the period from 2001 (actual situation) to 2006 (planned situation). It updated the plan several times in the course of the proceedings in line with the further sales, closures and reduction measures that were promised.
Nemčija je predložila tako imenovan srednjeročni načrt za razvoj posameznih postavk bilance stanja in bilance uspešnosti za leta od 2001 (dejanska situacija) do 2006 (načrt), ki ga je v teku postopka večkrat posodobila ustrezno z obljubljenimi dodatnimi ukrepi odsvojevanja, zapiranja in krčenja.
The revised medium‐term plan submitted in June 2003, which already takes into account the divestment of the real estate services business and of IBB as well as all the measures originally intended, suggests the following consequences in individual business areas over the restructuring period 2001 to 2006. The various items listed in the medium‐term plan are presented here by way of illustration mainly in terms of segment assets and number of employees only.
V skladu s srednjeročnim načrtom, predloženim junija 2003, ki že upošteva izločitev posla storitev z nepremičninami in IBB, ter vse prvotno nameravane ukrepe, nastanejo naslednji učinki za obdobje prestrukturiranja 2001 do 2006 na posameznih področjih dejavnosti, pri čemer je tukaj med različnimi postavkami, naštetimi v srednjeročnem načrtu, kot primer v bistvu naveden le segment sredstev in števila zaposlenih.
In the private customer segment, assets were to fall (by EUR [...]** or EUR [...]** %) from a little over EUR [...]** to just under EUR [...]** as a result of sales, closures and other reduction measures. Around 90 % of this fall was accounted for by sales of holdings (in particular in Allbank, Weberbank, BG Polska and Zivnostenska Banka).
Na področju poslovanja z občani se bo premoženje segmenta zaradi ukrepov odsvojitve, zapiranja in drugih ukrepov krčenja znižalo iz nekaj več kot [...]* EUR na malo manj kot (za [...]* EUR ali [...]* %), pri čemer odpade približno 90 % na odsvojitve udeležb (zlasti Allbank, Weberbank, BG Polska, Zivnostenka Banka).
The workforce was to be cut by a disproportionately high figure of [...]** %.
Število zaposlenih se bo nadsorazmerno zmanjšalo za približno [...]* %.
These figures take no account of the sale of Berliner Bank, promised for a later date.
Kasneje obljubljena odsvojitev Berliner Bank ni upoštevana.
Assets in the other retail banking segment, corporate customers, i.e. business with small and medium‐sized enterprises (rather than large customers), were expected to fall from almost EUR [...]* in 2001 to around EUR [...]* in 2006 (down by just under [...]* %).
Pri drugem področju poslovanja s prebivalstvom, poslovanje s podjetji, t.j. poslovanje z manjšimi in srednje velikimi podjetji (ne: velike stranke), s pričakuje zmanjšanje premoženja segmenta v višini skoraj [...]* EUR v letu 2001 na približno [...]* EUR v letu 2006 (za skoraj [...]* EUR ali [...]* %).
The compensatory measure in the real estate financing sector consisted mainly in a reduction in the risk portfolio and a refocusing on less risk‐prone business.
Kompenzacijski ukrepi na poslovnem področju financiranja nepremičnin temeljijo zlasti na krčenju portfelja tveganja in usmeritvi na posle z nizko stopnjo tveganja.
This was to reduce the segment assets by around [...]* %, from around EUR [...]* in 2001 to around EUR [...]* in 2006.
Tako se je premoženje posameznega segmenta zmanjšalo iz približno [...]* EUR v letu 2001 na približno [...]* EUR v letu 2006 (za približno [...]* %).
The workforce is to be cut by around [...]* %.
Število zaposlenih naj bi se skrčilo za približno [...]* %.
Scaling back the capital market business would lead to a reduction in the workforce of around [...]* %, while the segment assets would fall by approximately [...]* %, from around EUR [...]* in 2001 to around EUR [...]* in 2006.
Krčenje poslovanje na trgu kapitala bi povzročilo skrčenje števila zaposlenih za približno [...]* %; premoženje segmenta bi se zmanjšalo za približno [...]* %, iz približno [...]* EUR v letu 2001 na približno [...]* EUR v letu 2006.
Compared with the original plan, there was to be a stronger emphasis on less risk‐prone business.
V primerjavi s prvotnim načrtom bi se pozornost usmerila na poslovanje s strankami z nizko stopnjo tveganja.
Segment liabilities would be reduced disproportionately by over [...]* %.
Obveznosti segmentov bi se z več kot [...]* % nadsorazmerno skrčile.
With the gradual winding‐up of the large/foreign customer business the assets in that segment would fall by about [...]* and the number of employees would be cut by around [...]* %.
Postopna likvidacija poslovanja z velikimi strankami/tujino bi povzročila skrčenje premoženja segmenta za približno [...]* in zmanjšanje števila zaposlenih za približno [...]* %.