natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Law empowering the Land Government to issue a guarantee provides that the shares in BGB held by the Land of Berlin are to be sold as rapidly as possible on terms fair to the Land and that, as part of a reorganisation of BGB’s ownership structure, Investitionsbank Berlin (IBB) is to have its ties with BGB cut, leaving it as a separate development bank established under public law (see below).
V zakonu o pooblastitvi senata za prevzem deželne garancije za tveganja pri poslih nepremičninskih storitev družbe Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG in nekaterih njenih hčerinskih družb je določeno tudi, da je treba deleže dežele Berlin v BGB čim prej odsvojiti po pogojih, dopustnih za deželo Berlin, in da treba je v zvezi z reorganizacijo lastniške strukture BGB banko Investitionsbank Berlin (IBB) izločiti iz BGB kot samostojno javnopravno razvojno banka (podrobnosti glej spodaj).
Agreement on the treatment of any claims to repayment brought by the Land of Berlin arising out of the investigation procedure initiated by the Commission in respect of Landesbank Berlin ‐ Girozentrale
Sporazum o obravnavanju morebitnih vračilnih zahtevkov dežele Berlin iz preiskovalnega postopka o dodelitvi pomoči Landesbank Berlin — žiro centrala Evropske Komisije
In its decision to initiate the procedure in the present case, the Commission also drew attention to an important fact that had not been taken into account in the initial restructuring plan.
V svojem Sklepu o uvedbi postopka je Komisija opozorila tudi na pomembno dejstvo, ki v prvotnem načrtu prestrukturiranja ni bilo upoštevano.
At the end of 1992 Wohnungsbau‐Kreditanstalt (WBK) was transferred to LBB with all its assets; at the same time, all WBK’s functions were transferred to the newly set‐up IBB.
Konec leta 1992 je bila WBK z vsem svojim premoženjem prenesena na LBB; sočasno so se vse naloge WBK prenesle na takrat novoustanovljeno IBB.
The transfer increased LBB’s own funds by about DEM 1,9 billion.
S tem prenosom se je zajamčen lastniški kapital LBB povečal za približno 1,9 milijarde nemških mark (DEM).
From 1995 onwards, LBB paid a remuneration of 0,25 % of the amount taken up.
LBB je od leta 1995 za vsakokrat uporabljen znesek plačevala nadomestilo v povprečni višini 0,25 %.
As the Commission doubted whether this remuneration was compatible with the principle of the investor operating in a market economy, it initiated the investigation procedure (C 48/2002) in July 2002.
Ker je Komisija dvomila o združljivosti nadomestila z načelom tržno-gospodarskega ravnanja vlagatelja, je junija 2002, uvedla postopek C 48/02.
If the Commission were to conclude that the remuneration paid was not compatible with the principle of the market‐economy investor and if none of the tests for compatibility laid down in the Treaty were met, the difference between the remuneration paid and the ordinary market return on such an investment would constitute state aid incompatible with the common market that would have to be repaid by LBB to the Land of Berlin.
Če bo Komisija ugotovila, da plačano nadomestilo ni združljivo z načelom tržno-gospodarskega ravnanja vlagatelja, bo razlika med plačanim nadomestilom in običajnim tržnim donosom takšne investicije ob neobstoju predpostavke standarda usklajenosti Pogodbe ES pomenila pomoč, ki je nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom in jo mora LBB vrniti deželi Berlin.
The possibility that repayment might be required constitutes a substantial threat to the prospects for a restoration of profitability under the restructuring plan.
Možnost zahtevka po vračilu je glede na rentabilnost, ki jo je treba ponovno vzpostaviti, znatno tveganje za uspeh načrta prestrukturiranja.
In the decision initiating the procedure, therefore, the Commission asked Germany to identify an appropriate solution and noted that Germany was working on such a solution.
Zatorej je Komisija Nemčijo v Sklepu o uvedbi postopka pozvala, da v tej zvezi najde ustrezno rešitev. Ob tem je izvedela, da Nemčija ustrezno rešitev že išče.
To meet this need, an agreement was concluded between the Land of Berlin and BGB on 23 December 2002, entitled the ‘Agreement on the treatment of any claims to repayment brought by the Land of Berlin arising out of state aid case C 48/2002 Landesbank Berlin — Girozentrale, currently being examined by the European Commission’ (the repayment agreement).
Zato je bil med deželo Berlin in BGB 23. decembra 2002 sklenjen Sporazum o obravnavanju morebitnih vračilnih zahtevkov dežele Berlin iz preiskovalnega postopka Evropske Komisije o dodelitvi pomoči C48/2002 Landesbank Berlin — žiro centrala („Sporazum o vračilu“).
By this agreement the Land of Berlin undertakes that, in the event of a Commission decision requiring repayment, it will provide as a contribution to LBB’s capital a reorganisation grant to the value necessary to prevent the threatened repayment requirement from forcing LBB or the BGB group, or both, to fall below the minimum capital ratios specified in the agreement.
Če bi Komisija sklenila, da je treba vrniti znesek, sporazum ureja, da se mora dežela Berlin obvezati, da bo kot vlogo v LBB v obliki subvencije za sanacijo vplačala tolikšen znesek, ki bi bil potreben za preprečitev nedoseganja stopenj kapitala LBB in/ali koncerna BGB zaradi plačila zahtevanega vračila.
The minimum ratios specified in the repayment agreement are a total capital ratio of 9,7 % and a core‐capital ratio of 6 %.
Minimalne stopnje kapitala, navedene v sporazumu o vračilu, znašajo 9,7 % (stopnja skupnega kapitala) in 6 % (stopnja temeljnega kapitala).
The agreement is subject to the suspensory condition that the Commission must approve such aid.
Ta sporazum je pogojen s predhodnim sklepom Komisija o odobritvi pomoči.
Although this measure had not yet been taken at the time of the decision to initiate the procedure, the risks arising from a possible repayment decision by the Commission were mentioned in the decision as a factor to be taken into account.
Čeprav ta ukrep v času izdaje Sklepa o uvedbi postopka še ni bil sprejet in tako ni bil del načrta prestrukturiranja, so se obstoječa tveganja zaradi morebitne odločitve Komisije o vračilu v Sklepu o uvedbi postopka upoštevala kot dejavnik, ki vpliva na možnosti rentabilnosti banke.
The repayment agreement was finally concluded in order to take account of this misgiving.
Končno je bil sporazum o vračilu sklenjen ob upoštevanju tega pomisleka.
Given that this measure is essential to the success of the restructuring plan, the Commission considers it appropriate to assess this agreement together with the other aid measures, having been able to set the upper limit in this respect.
Ker so ti ukrepi za uspeh prestrukturiranja nujno potrebni, je Komisija ocenila, da je sporazum za vračilo, potem ko je bilo mogoče določiti najvišji znesek pomoči, ustrezno presojati skupaj z drugimi ukrepi pomoči.
Grounds for initiating the procedure
Vzroki za uvedbo postopka
In its decision initiating the formal investigation procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, the Commission provisionally classified the measures under examination as state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty and Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement because they were granted through state resources and because, by improving the recipient’s financial position, they were likely to affect the economic position of competitors from other Member States and consequently distorted or threatened to distort competition and affected trade between Member States.
V svojem Sklepu o uvedbi formalnega preiskovalnega postopka v skladu z drugim odstavkom člena 88 Pogodbe ES je Komisija ukrepe, ki jih je treba preveriti, začasno uvrstila med državne pomoči v smislu prvega odstavka člena 87 Pogodbe ES in prvega odstavka člena 61 Sporazuma EGP, ker so bili dodeljeni iz državnih sredstev in lahko z izboljšanjem finančnega položaja podjetja vplivajo na gospodarski položaj tekmecev drugih držav članic, in tako izkrivijo konkurenco, ali pa grozijo z izkrivljanjem in s tem ovirajo trgovanje med državami članicami.
On the basis of its provisional assessment, the Commission concluded that the aid had to be assessed in the light of the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (‘the guidelines’) and that there were no other provisions of the Treaty or other Community guidelines that might render the aid compatible.
Na osnovi predhodne presoje je Komisija prišla do ugotovitve, da so bile pomoči ocenjene na osnovi smernice Skupnosti za presojanje državne pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah (v nadaljevanju „smernice“), ter da ni bilo mogoče uporabiti niti drugih predpisov o skladnosti Pogodbe ES, niti drugih smernice Skupnosti.
It agreed with Germany that BGB was a firm in difficulty within the meaning of paragraph 2.1 of the guidelines, but it seriously doubted whether the aid measures were compatible with the common market.
Komisija se je strinjala s pojmovanjem Nemčije, da gre pri BGB za podjetje v težavah v smislu oddelka 2.1 smernice. Vendar pa so obstajali znatni dvomi glede združljivosti ukrepov pomoči s skupnim trgom.
Restoration of long‐term viability
Ponovna vzpostavitev dolgoročne rentabilnosti podjetja:
Paragraphs 31 to 34 of the guidelines state that, in the case of all individual aid measures, the Commission will examine the restructuring plan to establish whether it is capable of restoring the long‐term viability of the firm within a reasonable timescale and on the basis of reasonable assumptions.
V skladu s številkami smernic 31 - 34 preverja Komisija za vsako posamezno pomoè naèrt prestrukturiranja, da ugotovi, ali omogoèa vzpostavitev dolgoroène rentabilnosti podjetja v ustreznem èasovnem obdobju na osnovi realistiènih predvidevanj.
The Commission took the view that in the restructuring plan initially submitted there was no explanation of future strategies on the market in investment banking.
Komisija je pri prvotno predloženem naèrtu prestrukturiranja grajala, da prihodnje strategije na trgu investicijskega banèništva niso bile razložene.
As regards future strategy in the real estate business, it wanted to see more detailed specification of the difference in costs between liquidation and continued operation of the real estate services subsidiary IBAG.
Komisija je tudi glede na prihodnje strategije nepremièninske dejavnosti zahtevala podrobnejšo specifikacijo razlike v stroških med likvidacijo in nadaljevanjem hèerinske družbe za nepremièninske storitve IBAG.
The Commission doubted whether the market assumptions in the initial restructuring plan and the forecasts of supply and demand were sufficiently precise to allow conclusions to be drawn regarding the prospects of success of the restructuring measures proposed.
Komisija je dvomila, da so bila predvidevanja v prvotnem naèrtu prestrukturiranja glede na trga in napovedi glede razvoja ponudbe in povpraševanja dovolj natanène, da bi dovoljevale sklepati o možnostih uspeha predlaganih ukrepov prestrukturiranja.
It was difficult to see on what market assumptions the restructuring measures were based.
Težko je bilo razpoznati, na katerih tržnih predvidevanjih temeljijo ukrepi prestrukturiranja.
The Commission also found that the information supplied by Germany with regard to the causes of the firm’s difficulties in the past was relatively superficial.
Komisija je ugotovila tudi, da so bile informacije, ki jih je Nemèija predložila v zvezi z razlogi za pretekle težave podjetja, sorazmerno površne.
The following three causes were cited: (a) bad loans; (b) the issue of extensive guarantees for real estate funds; and (c) the late introduction (1999) and slow implementation of systematic risk control.
Navedeni so bili naslednji trije razlogi: (a) slabi krediti, (b) odobritev obsežnih garancij na podroèju nepremièninskih skladov in (c) prepozna uvedba (1999) in poèasno uresnièevanje sistematiènega kontrolinga tveganj.
The information supplied was essentially a summary of the financial difficulties.
Podane informacije so dejansko le povzetek finanènih težav.
Only one real reason for these difficulties was put forward, namely ineffective group and management structures, including the lack of an effective system of risk control.
Za te težave je bil podan samo en resnièni razlog, in sicer neuèinkovite strukture koncerna in upravljanja, ter posledièno nedelujoè kontroling tveganj.
There was no in‐depth analysis of these structures or of specific management shortcomings, such as the implications of state ownership.
Manjkala je temeljita analiza teh struktur in konkretnih neopravljenih obveznosti poslovodenja, med drugim vplivov državne lastnine.
However, the Commission took the view that an analysis of this kind was necessary if there was to be a proper assessment of the prospects for the restructured BGB.
Komisija je bila mnenja, da je takšna analiza za presojo možnosti prestrukturiranja BGB nujno potrebna.
It doubted therefore whether the causes of BGB’s difficulties were properly identified and addressed in the restructuring plan.
Zato je Komisija dvomila, da so bili v naèrtu prestrukturiranja vzroki za težave BGB identificirani in obravnavani na zadovoljiv naèin.
It thus asked Germany to provide an in‐depth analysis of past shortcomings and of future prospects and problems, in the context of group structures, management and supervisory methods, control and reporting patterns and techniques for the introduction of commercially based decision‐making processes.
Nemèijo so zato prosili, da predloži temeljito analizo preteklih neizvršenih dejanj ter prihodnjih možnosti in težav v zvezi s strukturo koncerna, naèini upravljanja in nadziranja, osnutkov preverjanja in poroèanja ter naèinov za uvedbo komercialno utemeljenih postopkov odloèanja.
Germany spoke of negotiations with potential buyers with a view to a possible privatisation but gave no details of the procedures envisaged, the terms of sale or other relevant factors.
Glede možnosti privatizacije je Nemèija omenila pogajanja s potencialnimi kupci, vendar pa ni razkrila podrobnosti o npr. nameravanem postopku, pogojih ali drugih pomembnih dejavnikih.
The Commission therefore wondered whether privatisation, in whole or in part, was being seriously considered and whether, if privatisation did take place, it would be conducted by means of an open, transparent and non‐discriminatory procedure.
Komisija si je tako zastavila vprašanje, ali se o privatizaciji, v celoti ali deloma, resno razmišlja in ali je, èe bo treba, zagotovljena njena izvedba v odprtem, preglednem, nediskriminativnem postopku.
The initial notification referred to target profitability of just 7 %. The Commission doubted whether this could really be reached, especially given the problematic institutional and management structure of the group, the unclear market assumptions on which the restructuring measures were based, and the continuation of the problematic real estate business.
Glede ciljnega donosa v višini malo manj kot 7 %, ki je prvotno omenjen v obvestilu, Komisija resnièno dvomi, da bi ga bilo mogoèe dejansko doseèi, še zlasti glede na težavno ustanovno in upravljalno strukturo koncerna, nejasnih tržnih predvidevanj, na katerih temeljijo ukrepi prestrukturiranja, ter glede na nadaljevanje problematiènega nepremièninskega posla.
Even if 7 % profitability were to be achieved, the Commission doubted whether such a return on the capital invested was enough to be compatible with the principle of the market‐economy investor.
Èetudi bi bil želen donos v višini nekaj manj kot 7 % dosežen, je Komisija še naprej dvomila, da bi obrestovanje uporabljenega kapitala zadošèalo za združitev z naèelom tržno-gospodarsko ravnanja vlagatelja.
The Commission also drew attention to the fact that the possibility of a claim for repayment resulting from the LBB case represented a substantial risk to the prospects of success of the restructuring plan and so, in the decision initiating the procedure, it called on Germany to come up with a solution.
Nadaljnje je Komisija pozornost preusmerila tudi na to, da pomeni možnost vraèilnega zahtevka iz postopka LBB veliko tveganje za uspešnost naèrta prestrukturiranja, zato je Nemèijo v Sklepu o uvedbi postopka pozvala, da naj izdela predloge za rešitev.
Avoidance of undue distortions of competition
Preprečevanje nesprejemljivega izkrivljanja konkurence
The exception laid down in Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty is subject to the condition that the aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Pravila črke (c) tretjega odstavka člena 87 Pogodbe ES, ki urejajo izjeme, vsebuje pogoj, da pomoči ne smejo vplivati na trgovske pogoje na način, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi.
Paragraphs 35 to 39 of the guidelines state that measures must be taken to mitigate as far as possible any adverse effects of the aid on competitors.
Številke smernice od 35 do 39 določajo, da je treba sprejeti ukrepe, ki blažijo negativne vplive pomoči na tekmece, če je mogoče.
This condition usually involves limiting or reducing the company's presence on the relevant product markets by selling production capacity or subsidiaries or reducing activities.
Običajno je ta pogoj udejanjen z omejitvijo ali skrčenjem navzočnosti podjetij na ustreznem trgu produktov, z odsvojitvijo proizvodne opreme ali hčerinskih družb ali pa s skrčenjem dejavnosti.
The limitation or reduction should be in proportion to the distortive effects of the aid and, in particular, to the relative importance of the firm on its market or markets.
Omejitev ali skrčenje mora biti v razmerju z učinkom izkrivljanja, ki ga povzročajo pomoči in še zlasti s sorazmerno težo podjetja na svojem trgu ali trgih.
The compensatory measures originally proposed, such as the divestment of major shareholdings, reductions in the financial services, debt finance and real estate businesses, in the number of subsidiaries and staff and in lending to public authorities, and the giving‐up of branches and business with large and with foreign customers, were imposed in order to reduce BGB's balance‐sheet total by 26 % (from EUR 190 billion to EUR 140 billion).
Skupno bi naj prvotno predlagane dolžnosti oz. kompenzacijski ukrepi, kot so odsvojitev bistvenih udeležb, skrčenje denarnih poslov in poslovanja z vrednostnimi papirji, dejavnost financiranja z izposojenim kapitalom, poslovanja z nepremičninami, števila sedežev podjetja, osebja in območja javnega organa, ter nalog lokacij in poslovanja s tujino in velikimi strankami povzročili zmanjšanje bilančne vsote BGB za 26 % (iz 190 na 140 milijard EUR).
Given the description of the compensatory measures, which was vague in parts, and their individual contribution to the desired effects on BGB's assets and employment situation, the Commission was not in a position to assess whether this entire effect could realistically be achieved or how the measures would affect BGB's future position in the markets or segments defined by Germany.
Zaradi deloma nejasnega opisa kompenzacijskih ukrepov in vsakokratnega konkretnega prispevka k želenim vplivom na premoženje in zaposlitveno situacijo BGB Komisija nikakor ni mogla presoditi, ali je realistično pričakovati, da bo tak učinek dosežen in kako bi ukrepi vplivali na prihodnje položaje BGB na trgih ali segmentih, ki jih je razmejila Nemčija.
It therefore needed detailed information as to the effect of each measure on BGB's assets, employment situation and future market/segment positions.
Komisija je zatorej potrebovala natančnejše informacije glede učinka posameznih ukrepov na premoženje, zaposlitveno situacijo in prihodnji položaj BGB na trgu ali segmentih.
Even if the above reduction (26 % or EUR 50 billion of the balance‐sheet total) were achieved in full, the Commission questioned whether it would be sufficient in view of the large amounts of aid and its practice in previous decisions on restructuring aid for banks.
Četudi bi bil dosežen celoten zgoraj prikazani učinek skrčenja (26 % ali 50 milijard EUR bilančne vsote), je Komisija ocenila za vprašljivo, ali bi skrčenje ob upoštevanju znatne vsote pomoči in prakse Komisije glede pomoči pri prestrukturiranju bankam zadoščala.
In this connection, the Commission suggested that the legal minimum capital requirements could serve as a guide for assessing the appropriateness of the compensatory measures since a bank that was undercapitalised would have to reduce its activities accordingly (undercapitalisation of EUR 1 billion with a legal minimum capital ratio of 4 % would require a theoretical reduction of risk‐adjusted assets of up to EUR 25 billion).
Z zvezi s tem je Komisija imenovala zakonsko minimalno stopnjo kapitala kot možno orientacijsko točko za presojanje ustreznosti dolžnosti, ker mora v primeru podkapitalizacije banka svoj obseg poslovanja ustrezno zmanjšati (pri podkapitalizaciji v višini 1 milijarde EUR in zakonski minimalno osnovi stopnje kapitala v višini 4 % bi bilo treba teoretično zmanjšanje aktive z uteženimi tveganji do 25 milijard EUR).
Such ‘opportunity reductions’ could serve as a rough guide for the degree of market distortion and the corresponding compensatory measures required.
Te „možnostne redukcije“ lahko služijo kot približna oporna točka za stopnjo izkrivljanja tržnih razmer in posledično potrebnih kompenzacijskih ukrepov.
According to this approach, the EUR 1,755 billion capital injection from the Land of Berlin in the summer of 2001 would alone correspond to a theoretical asset reduction of up to EUR 44 billion. However, the Commission pointed out that this guide should not be applied ‘mechanically’ but should be subject to discretion in order to take account of specific circumstances and factors important for the survival and viability of the bank.
Že sam priliv kapitala dežele Berlin v višini 1,755 milijarde EUR poleti 2001 bi v skladu s temi preudarki ustrezal teoretičnemu zmanjšanju premoženja do 44 milijard EUR. Vendar je Komisija opozorila, da teh opornih točk ni mogoče uporabljati „mehansko“, ampak so pogojene s presojo upoštevanja posebnih okoliščin, kot na primer dejavnikov, pomembnih za preživetje in rentabilnost banke.
When new risks were discovered following the capital injection, the solvency ratios again threatened to become insufficient.
Ko so bila po prilivu kapitala odkrita nova tveganja, je kazalo, da bo koeficient solventnosti ponovno postal nezadosten.
In order to avoid a new capital injection, the Land of Berlin opted for the solution of general guarantees by means of a risk shield.
Da bi preprečili ponovni priliv kapitala, se je dežela Berlin odločila za rešitev s splošnimi garancijami ob omejitvi tveganja.
As a result, the guarantees have an effect similar to that of a capital injection.
Posledično imajo garancije podoben učinek kot priliv kapitala.
The problem with the risk shield, however, was that the amount of aid which would ultimately be granted was not clear.
Težava z omejevanjem tveganj je bila, da vsota pomoči, ki naj bi bila končno odobrena, ni bila nedvoumno določena.
The nominal theoretical maximum specified in Article 45 of the detailed agreement is EUR 35,34 billion; when multiple coverage is taken out, the maximum is EUR 21,6 billion. This, however, is still a nominal value, i.e. it assumes full materialisation of all risks, something which is unlikely (see above).
Nominalni, teoretični najvišji znesek, naveden v členu 45 podrobnega sporazuma, znaša 35,34 milijarde EUR. Ob odštetem večkratnem kritju tveganj znaša najvišji znesek 21,6 milijarde EUR. Vendar je to še vedno nominalna vrednost, kar pomeni, da izhaja iz popolne materializacije vseh tveganj, ki pa ni verjetna (glej zgoraj).
Consequently, for reasons of prudence, the Commission had to work with the only limit available, i.e. EUR 35,34 billion. Since this amount would though probably not be called in, it would be out of proportion to take it as a basis for establishing the necessary compensatory measures.
Tako je morala Komisija zaradi skrbnosti uporabljati edino razpoložljivo najvišjo mejo, to je 35,34 milijarde EUR. Ker tega zneska predvidoma ne bi bilo mogoče uresničiti, bi ga bilo nesorazmerno uporabiti kot osnovo za ugotavljanje potrebnih kompenzacijskih ukrepov.