natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In its comments, the Berliner Volksbank also argued that Berlin was the relevant geographic market for assessing the aid in retail banking and that this was in line with the Commission’s usual assessment criteria for defining the market in merger control.
Tudi Berliner Volksbank je v svojem stališču navedla, da je Berlin upošteven prostorski trg za ocenitev pomoči pri poslovanju z občani. To je tudi v skladu z običajnimi ocenitvenimi kriteriji Komisije za prostorsko omejitev trga pri nadzoru združevanja.
Merger decisions in the banking sector had cited such factors as the general preference of banking customers for local suppliers, the significance of a dense branch network and the need for the bank to be physically close to its customers.
Tako so bili pri odločitvah o nadzoru združevanja, ki velja za bančne sektorje, navedeni dejavniki kot so splošna preferenca strank banke za lokalne ponudnike, pomen goste mreže podružnic in potreba po fizični navzočnosti pooblaščene banke v prostorski bližini strank.
If the Commission had none the less tended so far to assume in merger decisions relating to financial services that markets were national in scope, this was because an absence of competition concerns (indications of a dominant market position) meant that no thorough analysis of retail banking was necessary.
Če je Komisija kljub temu na področju kontrole združevanja pri finančnih storitvah doslej načeloma izhajala zlasti iz nacionalnih trgov, je bil razlog za to ta, da zaradi pomanjkanja konkurenčnih pomislekov (dejavniki tržno prevladujočega položaja) ni bila potrebna temeljita analiza na področju bančnega poslovanja z občani.
However, it would be inappropriate to define the market as national when assessing the distortive effects of the aid in this case on competition on the Berlin retail banking market.
Vendar nacionalna omejitev ne bi bila ustrezna za revizijo učinkov izkrivljanja obravnavane pomoči na berlinsko konkurenco pri bančnem poslovanju z občani.
It was precisely in this area, given its pre‐eminent market position, that BGB would have to offer compensatory measures to reduce its market presence.
Zlasti na tem področju bi morala BGB zaradi svojega izstopajočega tržnega položaja ponuditi dolžnost zmanjševanja navzočnosti na trgu.
On account of its dual brand strategy, among other things, BGB’s market position was far greater than was usual for regionally strong savings banks in some German cities.
Tržni položaj BGB med drugim tudi zaradi strategije dveh imen znatno presega to, kar je glede na močne regionalne hranilnice deloma običajno v nemških mestih.
This concentration made market access more difficult for potential competitors and had meant that the market share of foreign banks in Berlin was negligible.
Koncentracija otežuje pristop na trg potencialnih tekmic in je povzročila tudi, da so tržni deleži tujih bank v Berlinu zanemarljivo majhni.
For the purposes of this decision, the Commission has no cause to depart from the position of Germany and Berliner Volksbank with respect to the geographical focus on Berlin in retail banking.
Komisija za namene te odločitve ne vidi povoda odstopati od predstavitve Nemčije in Berliner Volksbank v zvezi z zemljepisno upoštevnostjo poslovanja z občani na Berlin.
As stated in the decision initiating the procedure, it has to date in the area of merger control generally assumed that the markets in the financial sector are national in scope — with the exception of financial services - but has left room for a regional definition in private‐customer and corporate banking.
Kot je navedla v sklepu o uvedbi postopka, se je na področju nadzora združevanja doslej sicer na splošno izhajalo iz tega, da so trgi glede na razširjenost njihovega finančnega sektorja, z izjemo finančnih poslov in poslov z vrednostnimi papirji, nacionalni, vendar so pri tem vsekakor pustili prostor za regionalno opazovanje na področju poslovanja z zasebnimi strankami in podjetji.
The significance of the branch network and that of the bank’s local physical presence in retail banking suggest that the focus should be on the Berlin market.
Pomen omrežja podružnic in lokalne fizične navzočnosti banke pri poslovanju z občani govorijo v prid opazovanja berlinskega trga.
Customer behaviour also points to this approach since, when branches are closed or sold off in a large city such as Berlin and to the extent that customers change banks at all, they tend to switch to another locally represented credit institution, despite the increase in telebanking.
Na to kažejo tudi načini vedenja strank, ki pri zaprtju ali odsvojitvi podružnic v velikem mestu kot je Berlin, v kolikor banko sploh zamenjajo, kljub naraščajočem daljinskem bančništvu praviloma preidejo k drugi, lokalno zastopani kreditni instituciji.
The inclusion of Brandenburg, apart from the areas adjoining Berlin, therefore seemed to be casting the net too wide, as BGB’s withdrawal from Brandenburg and its concentration on the core region also suggest.
Do te mere se je zdela vključitev Brandenburga, razen obrobja Berlina, že preveč obširen, kot nakazujeta umik BGB iz dežele Brandenburg in osredotočanje na temeljne regije.
For the purposes of this decision, however, a precise definition of the geographic market is not important since it is not a question of proving that there is a dominant position but of assessing whether the proposed compensatory measures suffice to offset the distortive effects of the aid at issue by reducing market presence.
Za namene te odločbe pa ni bistvena natančna omejitev zemljepisnega trga, saj dokazovanje prevladujočega položaja v tem primeru ni pomembno, temveč ali ponujene dolžnosti zmanjševanja navzočnosti na trgu zadoščajo za kompenzacijo zadevne pomoči na izkrivljanje konkurence.
There can be no doubt and no disputing the fact that the aid has helped the bank to remain on the various markets and thus also to preserve its strong position on the Berlin retail market.
Nedvomno in nesporno je, da so pomoči banki pomagale k obstanku na različnih trgih in s tem k ohranjanju njenega močnega položaja.
The Commission has doubts about the reliability of the market share estimates that had been submitted by Germany and adjusted downwards, first because similar reporting problems in individual cases may also affect the other competitors but may not have been taken into account in the market volumes given, and second because third parties which submitted comments in the course of the proceedings and were asked for their own estimates more or less confirmed the original figures.
V zvezi z navzdol popravljenimi ocenami tržnega deleža, ki jih je predložila Nemčija, Komisija dvomi o zanesljivosti zmanjšanih številk, po eni strani zato, ker so se morda podobne posamične prijavne težave pojavile tudi pri drugih tekmicah, ki pa se v navedenem tržnem obsegu niso upoštevale. Po drugi strani pa so tretje stranke, ki so med postopkom predložile opombe in ki so bile povprašane po ocenitvah, potrdile približno višino prvotnih številk.
However, independent market share calculations with verifiable distinctions by region and product are not available.
Vendar je potrebno opozoriti, da neodvisni izračuni tržnih deležev, vključno s preverljivimi stvarnimi in regionalnimi omejitvami, niso na voljo.
Enquiries showed that no competition‐based analysis in the antitrust/merger control field has been carried out in this connection by the Bundesbank/Land central bank, the Federal Cartel Office or the Commission.
Kot se je izkazalo pri poizvedovanjih, zadevne konkurenčne analize doslej ni izvedla ne Bundesbank (Narodna banka)/Landeszentralbank, ne Zvezni kartelni urad ali Komisija na področju kartelnega prava/nadzora združevanja.
In the state aid field, the Commission does not have the necessary powers to conduct investigations among competitors.
Na področju same politike pomoči Komisija nima potrebnih pooblastil za preiskavo, ki bi jih lahko uveljavljala pri tekmicah.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this decision, a precise analysis of market share is not necessary since, as explained above, assessing state aid does not involve proving that a dominant position exists.
Nasprotno pa v namene te odločbe natančna analiza tržnih deležev ni potrebna, saj pri preverjanju pomoči dokazovanje prevladujočega položaja ni pomembno.
It is indisputable that the aid concerned here distorts or threatens to distort competition, especially on the markets on which BGB has a strong position; this also corresponds to BGB’s view of itself as the leading retail bank in Berlin.
Ni dvoma, da preverjanje pomoči izkrivljajo konkurenco oz. tako grozijo, in da je izkrivljanje pomembno zlasti na trgih, na katerih ima BGB močan tržni položaj. Tržna moč ustreza tudi zaznavanju BGB kot vodeče banke v Berlinu na področju poslovanja z občani.
The adjusted market shares of between a little over 20 % and more than 40 % in the individual segments do not contradict this even if they are correct, which is doubtful.
Četudi ustrezni, navzdol popravljeni tržni deleži v višini nekaj več kot 20 % do več kot 40 % v posameznih segmentih temu ne nasprotujejo, kar je dvomljivo.
In this connection, it should also be noted that, according to the information submitted by Germany, BGB’s share or market penetration in 2002 in terms of first giro accounts held by private customers was 48 % and that, according to comments by BGB’s chairman of the board, the bank’s market share, with the brands Berliner Sparkasse and Berliner Bank, was in some cases more than 50 %.
V tej zvezi je potrebno spomniti tudi, da je bil delež BGB oz. njen prodor na trg v letu 2002 po informacijah, ki jih je predložila Nemčija, merjeno glede na prvi žiro račun pri poslovanju z zasebnimi strankami 48 %, in da ima po navedbah predsednika uprave BGB z imeni Berliner Sparkasse in Berliner Bank tržni delež, ki deloma presega 50 %.
Consequently, there is no doubt that BGB enjoys a strong market position and is clearly the leading retail group in the greater Berlin area, which has a population of roughly 4 million.
Zato ni dvoma o močnem tržnem položaju BGB in o njenem položaju vodilne banke za poslovanje z občani na območju Berlina, ki zajema približno 4 milijone prebivalcev.
Its market position has not significantly changed since its foundation in 1994, when Berliner Bank and Berliner Sparkasse (then already combining the former Sparkasse in West Berlin and that in East Berlin, with the latter enjoying a quasi‐monopoly position) were brought under one roof or since the start of the crisis in 2001.
Tržni položaj BGB se po njeni ustanovitvi leta 1994, ko sta se združili „Berliner Bank“ in „Berliner Sparkasse“ (ki je tedaj združevala hranilnice zahodnega in vzhodnega dela mesta, pri čemer je imela zadnje imenovana tako rekoč monopolni položaj), ni bistveno spremenil, tudi ne od začetka krize v letu 2001.
This ‘stability’ serves as an indicator for its market power vis-à-vis actual and potential competitors.
Ta „stabilnost“ je lahko zato kazalnik relativne tržne moči BGB v primerjavi z njenimi aktualnimi in potencialnimi tekmicami.
Against this background, the Commission made it clear that approving restructuring aid on the basis of compensatory measures which leave BGB’s position on the Berlin market for retail banking basically intact would not be compatible with the EU's state aid rules.
Ob upoštevanju tega je Komisija ponazorila, da odobritev pomoči za prestrukturiranje zaradi naloženih dolžnosti, ki na skoraj noben način ne vplivajo na položaj BGB na berlinskem trgu pri bančnem poslovanju z občani, ni združljiva s pravico do pomoči Skupnosti.
Germany, however, remained preoccupied with the bank’s arguments about the threat to its viability.
Vendar pa je bila Nemčija soočena z argumenti, ki jih je predložila banka v zvezi z vplivom na njeno življenjsko sposobnost.
After intensive further negotiations on 18 December 2003 with representatives of the Federal Government and the Land of Berlin, Germany finally committed itself to the divestment of Berliner Bank as a further compensatory measure with a view to enabling the Commission to approve the aid without imposing further extensive compensation measures.
Po intenzivnih dodatnih pogajanjih dne 18. decembra 2003 s predstavniki Nemčije in dežele Berlin je na koncu Nemčija privolila v odsvojitev Berliner Bank kot dodatno dolžnostim za vzpostavitev sposobnosti za odobritev pomoči ali da bi se izognila dodatnim kompenzacijskim storitvam, ki bi jih sicer naložila Komisija.
It accordingly undertakes to ensure that the group sells the ‘Berliner Bank’ division as an economic entity, including at least its trade name, all customer relations associated with the trade name, as well as branch offices and staff in a legally effective, open, transparent and non‐discriminatory procedure by 1 October 2006 (closing by 1 February 2007).
V skladu s to privolitvijo se Nemčija obvezuje zagotoviti, da bo koncern bančne družbe v odprtem in preglednem, nediskriminativnem postopku do 1. oktobra 2006 pravnomočno odsvojil oddelek „Berliner Bank“ kot gospodarsko enoto z vključno najmanj enim imenom, vsemi razmerji s strankami, ki sodijo k imenu, podružnicami in zadevnimi zaposlenimi (sklenitev prodaje 1. februarja 2007).
The effective date for the determination of the number of customers, branches and front‐office staff is 31 December 2003, taking into account the planned implementation of the restructuring plan notified to the Commission and natural business fluctuations, i.e. increases and decreases in the number of customers, staff, assets and liabilities that are based on individual decisions (such as the relocation of customers or employees and dissatisfaction with the previous bank or employer) and not influenced by the bank.
Število strank, podružnic in zaposlenih, ki bodo odsvojeni, se določi z 31. decembrom 2003, z izjemo izvedbe načrta prestrukturiranja, priglašenega Komisiji, ter naravne fluktuacije posla, to pomeni odhajanje in prihajanje strank, zaposlenih, aktiva in pasiva, ki temelji na posamičnih odločitvah (kot je selitev strank ali zaposlenih ali nezadovoljstvo s prejšnjo banko ali delodajalcem) in na katerega banka nima vpliva.
This means in particular that BGB is not allowed to incite customers to transfer from Berliner Bank to other parts of the group, such as Berliner Sparkasse.
To še zlasti pomeni, da BGB ne sme sprejemati ukrepov, ki bi povzročili, da bi stranke Berliner Bank prešle k drugim podjetjem ali področjem BGB, kot na primer Berliner Sparkasse.
A trustee appointed by Germany (the Land of Berlin) and approved by the Commission will ensure that the bank continues to restructure Berliner Bank in accordance with business sense, investing in it and not taking any steps to reduce its value, in particular by the transfer of private or corporate customers or sales staff to Berliner Sparkasse or other parts of the Bankgesellschaft group.
Fiduciar, ki ga imenuje Nemčija (dežela Berlin) in potrdi Komisija bo zagotovil, da bo banka v trgovsko razumni meri naprej prestrukturirala Berliner Bank in vanjo vlagala in da ne bo naredila nič takega, kar bi zmanjšalo vrednost Berliner Bank, zlasti s prenosom strank občanov ali podjetij ali prodajnega osebja k Berliner Sparkasse ali drugim delom koncerna bančne družbe.
By 2006 the sale of Berliner Bank will reduce the assets in retail banking by a further EUR [...]* (and, together with the measures already planned and promised, by some EUR [...]* in all.
Z odsvojitvijo Berliner Bank se bo premoženje posameznega segmenta na področju bančnega poslovanja z občani do leta 2006 zmanjšalo za dodatnih [...]* EUR (to pomeni skupaj z doslej načrtovanimi in potrjenimi že opisanimi ukrepi za približno [...]* EUR).
BGB’s market share in the individual segments of the Berlin retail business will be reduced by one third to one sixth as a result of the sale.
Tržni delež BGB v posameznih segmentih berlinskega poslovanja z občani se bo z odsvojitvijo zmanjšal za približno 1/3 do 1/6.
The balance‐sheet total will be reduced from roughly EUR 189 billion to about EUR 124 billion.
Skupno se bo bilančni volumen zmanjšal iz približno 189 milijard EUR na približno 124 milijard EUR.
In the Commission’s view, therefore, the completed, planned and promised divestments, closures and reductions of other kinds suffice as a whole to mitigate the distortive effect of the aid measures at issue.
Po stališču Komisije tako za omilitev učinkov izkrivljanja konkurence zadevnih ukrepov pomoči zadoščajo do sedaj že izvedene, načrtovane in odobrene odsvojitve, zaprtja in zmanjšanja drugih oblik.
Lastly, it must be mentioned that, in its original notification, Germany stated that Berlin was a region within the meaning of Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty and qualified for regional aid and that points 53 and 54 of the guidelines would have to be taken into account in assessing compensatory measures, without giving further explanations or specific details.
Ob koncu je treba omeniti, da je Nemčija prvotno v prijavi omenila, da je Berlin regija v smislu črke (c) odstavka 3 člena 87 Pogodbe ES in da je zanjo možna regijska pomoč, ter ob tem napotila na številki 53 in 54 smernice in njeno upoštevanje ob ocenjevanju dolžnosti, ki pa jih ni speljala oz. uveljavila konkretne vidike.
Points 53 and 54 state that the assessment criteria in the guidelines also apply to assisted areas but that the capacity reduction required on markets with excess structural capacity may be less stringent.
Številki 53 in 54 pravita, da veljajo ocenjevalni kriteriji smernice tudi za regionalna razvojna področja, toda merila za opustitev kapacitet na trgih s strukturnimi presežnimi kapacitetami bi bila lahko manj stroga.
In its decision initiating the procedure, the Commission noted that it was not in a position, in the absence of further specific details, to assess the extent to which this criterion applied.
Komisija je v sklepu o uvedbi postopka ugotovila, da zaradi pomanjkanja dodatne konkretizacije ne more oceniti uporabnost tega kriterija.
Since Germany did not come back to this point in the course of the proceedings and since, as explained above, the banking sector does not involve markets with excess structural capacity, the Commission considers that points 53 and 54 are not applicable in this case.
Ker se Nemčija tudi v nadaljevanju postopka ni odzvala na to točko in je bilo zgoraj dodatno razloženo, da v bančnih sektorjih ne gre za trge s strukturno presežno kapaciteto, je treba številki 53 in 54 smernice v obravnavanem primeru oceniti kot neuporabni.
In the Commission’s view, Germany has demonstrated satisfactorily that the amounts of the three aid measures granted — the capital injection, the risk shield and the agreement on the treatment of any claims to repayment brought against the bank by the Land of Berlin — are limited to the strict minimum needed to enable restructuring to be undertaken in the light of the existing financial resources of the bank and its shareholders.
Nemčija je po mnenju Komisije v zadostni meri dokazala, da so zneski treh odobrenih pomoči, priliv kapitala, omejitev tveganja in pogodba o obravnavi morebitnih vračilnih zahtevkov dežele Berlin proti banki, omejeni na nujno potrebno najmanjšo mero v skladu z razpoložljivimi finančnimi sredstvi banke in njenih delničarjev.
The bank received no surplus cash or surplus own resources which it could have misused for the purposes of an unreasonable expansion of its business at the expense of its competitors.
Banka ne bo prejela presežne likvidnosti in presežnih lastna sredstva, ki bi jih lahko zlorabila za neprimerno širitev svojega posla v breme svojih tekmic.
The EUR 1.755 billion capital injection in August 2001, initially granted as rescue aid, was assessed on the basis that it could help the bank secure a core‐capital ratio of 5.0 % and an own‐funds ratio of 9,7 %.
Znesek priliva kapitala v višini 1,755 milijard EUR v avgustu 2001, ki je bil najprej odobren kot pomoč za reševanje, je bil odmerjen tako, da je bilo mogoče z njim zagotoviti stopnjo temeljnega kapitala banke v višini 5,0 % oziroma stopnjo lastnih sredstev v višini 9,7 %.
As stated above, the Commission regards this as vital for a bank’s short‐term survival.
Kot je obrazloženo zgoraj Komisija meni, da so nujno potrebni za kratkoročno preživetje banke.
By its own efforts, in particular by reducing its risk exposure, the bank subsequently managed to increase its core‐capital ratio to above 5 %.
Banki je v nadaljevanju uspelo z lastnim trudom, zlasti z zmanjšanjem tveganih postavk, povečati stopnjo temeljnega kapitala nad 5 %.
At the end of 2003 the ratio stood at around 6 %.
Ob koncu leta 2003 je znašala približno 6 %.
In view of current practice on financial markets and the corresponding expectations of ratings agencies and market participants, the Commission regards a core‐capital ratio of 6 % as absolutely vital in the longer term to ensure the bank’s attractiveness to capital markets.
Komisija glede na današnjo prakso na finančnih trgih in glede na ustrezna pričakovanja rating agencij in udeležencev na trgu meni, da je 6,0 % stopnja temeljnega kapitala nujno potrebna za zagotovitev dolgoročne sposobnosti banke na trgu kapitala.
The amount of the capital injection in 2001 was absolutely necessary to maintain the bank’s core‐capital ratio. In the assessment of restructuring aid as a whole, it can therefore be regarded as corresponding to the strict minimum and can thus be approved.
Priliv kapitala iz leta 2001 je nujno potreben za ohranitev stopnje temeljnega kapitala banke na tej višini in ga je v zvezi z ocenitvijo mogoče odobriti in v celoti upoštevati kot pomoč pri prestrukturiranju, omejena na nujno potreben minimum.
Furthermore, as explained above, in order to prepare for the end of the two forms of public liability, the introduction of the IAS and the Basel II accord, the bank sees itself constrained to increase its core‐capital ratio to at least 7 % by its own efforts and thus to secure the rating required for refinancing terms that are operationally defensible.
Banka se čuti veliko bolj odgovorno, kot je razloženo zgoraj in v zvezi z odpadom državnega jamstva, uvedbe IAS in sporazuma v okviru Basel II, da z lastnim trudom poveča stopnjo temeljnega kapitala na najmanj 7 % in si tako zagotovi rating, potreben za operativno sprejemljive pogoje refinanciranja.
The Commission welcomes these plans to stabilise the bank further.
Komisija pozdravlja načrtovane ukrepe za dodatno stabiliziranje banke.
As explained in paragraph 138, the risk shield, which has a nominal value of EUR 21,6 billion, is worth EUR 6,1 billion in economic terms for the purpose of assessing the state aid. On this point Berliner Volksbank argues that the Land’s risk shield actually constitutes an unlimited additional funding commitment since the Land of Berlin’s associated liability cannot be estimated at present and is therefore a ‘blank cheque’ for future losses.
Omejitev tveganja v nominalni višini 21,6 milijarde EUR ima, kot je razloženo v obrobni številki 138, za ocenitev kot državna pomoč gospodarsko vrednost v višini 6,1 milijarde EUR. Berliner Volksbank zastopa stališče, da omejitev tveganja dežele bolj ustreza neomejeni obvezi dodatnih prispevkov, saj s tem povezane obveze plačevanja dežele Berlin zdaj ni mogoče oceniti, zato ustreza „bianko čeku“ za prihodnje izgube.
In Berliner Volksbank’s view, it is disproportionate in both size and duration, affords the bank virtually unlimited creditworthiness and gives it an ‘unconditional licence’ to submit offers on whatever terms it wants and, as no precise figure can be put on the additional funding commitment, it is not eligible for approval.
Njena višina in trajanje sta nesorazmerna in banki omogočata skoraj neomejene bonitete, banki omogočata „privilegije“ pri oddaji ponudb pod poljubnimi pogoji, zaradi nezmožnosti številčnega ovrednotenja obveze plačevanja pa je ni mogoče odobriti.
The Commission believes this argument to be incorrect and endorses Germany’s views instead.
Komisija meni, da so argumenti neustrezni in se pridružuje navedbam Nemčije.
Contrary to Berliner Volksbank’s claims, the risk shield structure specifically does not allow the bank to expand its banking or other business.
Nasprotno, konstrukcija omejitve tveganj banki ne omogoča, kot trdi Berliner Volksbank, širjenja bančnih ali drugih poslov.