natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
If a Member State does not comply with the rules set out in paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce the contribution of the Community to that Member State having regard to the nature and gravity of the infringment, and to the financial loss suffered by the Community.
Če država članica ne upošteva predpisov iz odstavka 1, bo Komisija znižala prispevek Skupnosti zadevni državi članici ob upoštevanju narave in teže prekrška ter finančne izgube Skupnosti.
This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2005.
Ta odločba se uporablja od 1. januarja 2005.
Done at Brussels, 30 November 2004.
V Bruslju, 30. novembra 2004
OJ L 347, 12.12.1990, p. 27.
UL L 347, 12.12.1990, str. 27.
Decision as amended by Directive 92/65/EEC (OJ L 268, 14.9.1992, p. 54).
Odločba, kakor je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 92/65/EGS (UL L 268, 14.9.1992, str. 54).
OJ L 316, 15.10.2004, p. 87.
UL L 316, 15.10.2004, str. 87.
Directive as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 806/2003.
Direktiva, kakor je bila nazadnje spremenjena z Uredbo (ES) št. 806/2003.
of 7 April 2004
z dne 7. aprila 2004
relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty concerning case COMP/A.38284/D2
o postopkih v skladu s členom 81 Pogodbe ES o zadevi COMP/A.38284/D2
Société Air France/Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane SpA [1](notified under document number C(2004) 1307)
Société Air France/Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane SpA [1](notificirana pod dokumentarno številko K(2004) 1307)
(Only the English text is authentic)
(Besedilo v angleškem jeziku je edino verodostojno)
On 7 April 2004, the Commission adopted a decision which grants an individual exemption under Article 81 (3) of the Treaty to a cooperation agreement between Air France and Alitalia.
Komisija je 7. aprila 2004 sprejela sklep, ki zagotavlja posamične izjeme v skladu s členom 81(3) Pogodbe k sporazumu o sodelovanju med družbama Air France in Alitalia.
A public version of this decision is available in English, French and German (only the English text is authentic) on DG COMP's website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html
Javna različica sklepa je na voljo v angleškem, francoskem in nemškem jeziku (besedilo v angleškem jeziku je edino verodostojno) na spletni strani DG COMP na spletni strani: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
POVZETEK POSTOPKA
On 12 November 2001, Air France (AF) and Alitalia (AZ) notified to the Commission a number of cooperation agreements and applied for negative clearance under Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 and/or exemption under Article 5 of the same Regulation [2].
Družbi Air France (AF) in Alitalia (AZ) sta 12. novembra 2001 Komisiji priglasili številne sporazume o sodelovanju in zaprosili za pridobitev negativnega izida v skladu s členom 3(2) Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 3975/87 in/ali izjemo v skladu s členom 5 iste uredbe [2].
On 8 May 2002, a summary of the notified agreements was published in the Official Journal of the European Union inviting interested third parties to send their comments within 30 days in accordance with Article 5(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 [3].
maja 2002 je bil v Uradnem listu Evropske unije objavljen povzetek priglašenih sporazumov, ki je pozval vse zainteresirane stranke, da v roku 30 dni posredujejo svoje komentarje skladno s členom 5(2) Uredbe (EGS) št. 3975/87 [3].
In response to this publication, several airlines expressed their interest in starting operations for the routes at issue, provided that barriers to entry are removed through adequate remedies.
V odgovor tej objavi so številni ponudniki letalskih prevozov izrazili svoj interes, da začnejo poslovati na zadevnih zračnih poteh pod pogojem, da se ovire za njihov vstop odstranijo z ustreznimi ukrepi.
A letter of serious doubts was notified by the Commission to the Parties on 1 July 2002, informing them that their cooperation agreements could not be approved in their current form.
Komisija je strankam 1. julija 2002 poslala pismo, v katerem je izrazila resne dvome in jih obvestila, da pogodb o sodelovanju v njihovi sedanji obliki ni mogoče odobriti.
On the basis of the reservations expressed by the Commission and after intensive discussions, the Parties proposed commitments which were published for comment in the Official Journal on 9 December 2003 in a notice pursuant to Article 16(3) of Regulation (EC) No 3975/87 [4].
Na osnovi zadržkov, ki jih je Komisija izrazila, ter po intenzivnih dogovarjanjih, sta stranki predlagali obveznosti, ki so bile objavljene za pridobitev komentarjev v Uradnem listu 9. decembra 2003 v obvestilu v skladu s členom 16(3) Uredbe (EGS) št. 3975/87 [4].
In the light of the comments received, the Parties accepted to improve further their commitments.
Glede na prejete komentarje sta se stranki strinjali, da izboljšata svoje bodoče obveznosti.
The improved commitments, combined with the fact that there are several entrants on the markets concerned, are satisfactory from a competition policy point of view.
Izboljšane obveznosti v kombinaciji z dejstvom, da obstaja več novih prevoznikov na zadevnem trgu, so iz vidika politike konkurenčnosti zadovoljive.
Provided the Parties comply with these commitments, the Commission decided to exempt their cooperation agreements for a six-year period.
Če se bosta stranki s temi obveznostmi strinjali, se je Komisija odločila, da bo sporazum o sodelovanju izvzela za šestletno obdobje.
THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT
SPORAZUM O SODELOVANJU
Through their cooperation, the Parties seek to establish a far-reaching, long-term strategic bilateral alliance, the main objectives of which are as follows:
Z medsebojnim sodelovanjem skušata stranki doseči dolgoročno strateško dvostransko zavezništvo z naslednjimi glavnimi cilji:
creation of a European multi-hub system based on the Parties' hubs at Paris Charles de Gaulle, Rome Fiumicino and Milan Malpensa airports, in order to interconnect their worldwide networks,
ustanovitev evropskega večvozliščnega sistema dostopa s stičišči na pariškem letališču Charles de Gaulle, rimskem letališču Fiumicino in milanskem letališču Malpensa z namenom povezati svetovno omrežje,
coordination of the Parties' passenger service operations, including extensive use of code-sharing, coordination of their scheduled passenger network, sales, revenue management, mutual recognition of the respective frequent flyer programmes, marketing coordination and share of lounge usage,
koordinacijo potniškega prometa, vključno z uporabo enake kode (tako imenovani code-sharing), koordinacijo linijskega omrežja potniškega prometa, prodaje, upravljanje dohodkov, medsebojno priznavanje programov nagrajevanja (frequent flyer), koordinacijo trženja in skupno uporabo čakalnih prostorov,
cooperation in other areas, such as cargo operations, passenger handling, maintenance, purchasing, catering, information technology, fleet development and purchase, crew training and revenue accounting.
sodelovanje na drugih področjih, kot so prevozi blaga, odprava potnikov, vzdrževanje, nakup, gostinske storitve, informacijska tehnologija, razvoj in nakup flote, usposabljanje ekip in skupno vodenje bilance uspešnosti.
As the aim of the alliance between Air France and Alitalia is to create a multi-hub system in order to interconnect their worldwide networks, the cooperation will be closer on the France-Italy ‘bundle’ which includes all the routes between France and Italy operated by Air France and/or Alitalia, excluding beyond and behind flights, whether domestic or international.
Ker je namen zavezništva med družbama Air France in Alitalia ustvariti večvozliščni sistem z namenom povezati svoji svetovni omrežji, bo sodelovanje tesnejše na svežnju Francija–Italija, ki vključuje vse zračne poti med Francijo in Italijo, na katerih letita Air France in/ali Alitalia, razen domačih ali mednarodnih povezovalnih letov.
On the France-Italy bundle, in addition to the overall coordination of their passenger service operations as described above, the Parties also agree on frequencies and share their capacities and their earnings.
Pri svežnju Francija-Italija se stranki poleg splošne koordinacije potniškega prometa, opisane zgoraj, strinjata tudi glede števila letov in deljenja kapacitet in donosov.
ASSESSMENT
PRESOJA
The activities affected by the agreement are scheduled air transport of passengers, air transport of goods and ground-handling services.
Sporazum obsega dejavnosti, kot so linijski zračni prevoz potnikov, zračni prevoz blaga in storitve na tleh.
The draft exemption decision only addresses the first area of cooperation, i.e. scheduled air transport of passengers.
Osnutek sklepa o izjemi se nanaša samo na prvo področje sodelovanja, to je na linijski zračni prevoz potnikov.
Air transport of cargo is excluded from the scope of the draft decision as the Parties are still negotiating the scope of their cooperation in that field.
Zračni prevoz tovora je izvzet iz obsega osnutka sklepa, saj se stranki še vedno pogajata o obsegu sodelovanja na tem področju.
The draft decision does not address ground handling services either, which do not fall within the scope of Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 [5].
Osnutek sklepa se prav tako ne nanaša na storitve na tleh, ki niso zajete v okviru Uredbe (EGS) št. 3975/87 [5].
The Commission accepts that, overall, the alliance contributes to improving the production and distribution of transport services and to promoting technical and economic progress.
Komisija sprejema, da zavezništvo na splošno prispeva k izboljšanju načrtovanja in porazdelitve prevoznih storitev ter k pospeševanju tehničnega in gospodarskega napredka.
The cooperation agreement is likely to generate benefits in terms of creating a more extensive worldwide network which would offer customers better services in terms of an increased number of direct and indirect flights.
Sporazum o sodelovanju bo po vsej verjetnosti prinesel ugodnosti v smislu ustanovitve bolj obsežnega svetovnega omrežja, ki bo za potrošnike pomenilo izboljšanje storitev v smislu povišanega števila direktnih in indirektnih letov.
While an increase in the airlines' size does not necessarily lead to a cost reduction because of constant economies of scale, savings may be realised due to an increase in traffic throughout the network, better planning of frequencies, a higher load factor, etc.
Povečanje velikosti letalske družbe ne pomeni nujno znižanja stroškov zaradi nenehnih ekonomij obsega, prihranke pa je mogoče doseči z zvišanjem prometa po vsem omrežju, boljšim načrtovanjem števila letov, bolj polnimi leti itd.
However, the consumer will only have a fair share from the expected cost reductions in the form of reduced prices if the Parties remain subject to a sufficient competitive constraint on the markets where competition is restricted by the alliance.
Kljub temu bo potrošnik užival pravičen delež znižanja stroškov v obliki znižanja cen, če bosta stranki še naprej del zadostnih konkurenčnih omejitev, ko konkurenčnost omejuje zavezništvo.
It results from the Commission's assessment under Article 81 that there is a risk that the alliance eliminates competition in respect of a substantial part of air passenger services on seven ‘origin and destination’ [6] pairs i.e. Paris–Milan, Paris–Rome, Paris–Venice, Paris–Florence, Paris–Bologna, Paris–Naples and Milan–Lyon.
Po presoji Komisije skladno s členom 81 obstaja tveganje, da bo zavezništvo izključilo konkurenčnost v smislu bistvenega dela storitev potniškega prometa na sedmih parih zračnih poti „Začetek & Konec“ [6], to je Pariz–Milano, Pariz–Rim, Pariz–Benetke, Pariz–Firence, Pariz–Bologna, Pariz–Neapelj in Milano–Lyon.
Prior to the alliance, Air France and Alitalia were the two main operators on these affected overlap markets, competing head-to-head.
Pred zavezništvom sta bila Air France in Alitalia dve glavni letalski družbi na zadevnih, prekrivajočih se trgih, ki sta si med seboj tesno konkurirali.
At the time of the notification, they had very high market shares on these seven O & D pairs.
V času priglasitve sta imeli na teh sedmih parih Z & K zelo visok tržni delež.
This goes for time-sensitive and flexibility-focused passengers as well as for price-sensitive passengers [7].
To velja za potnike z omejitvami glede časa in prilagodljivosti, kot tudi za potnike, ki so vezani na ceno [7].
Moreover, the Parties' overall strong market position is protected against potential entry by significant entry barriers, due for instance to the scarcity of slots at the airports concerned, to the number of frequencies operated by the Parties, to their high share of time-sensitive customers and to the pooling of their frequent flyer programs.
Poleg tega je močan tržni položaj strank zaščiten pred morebitnim vstopom novih ponudnikov z znatnimi ovirami, ki so na primer posledica pomanjkanja slotov na zadevnih letališčih, števila letov strank, visokega deleža potrošnikov, ki so vezani na čas in na združevanje njunih programov nagrajevanja (frequent flyer).
The cooperation agreement can therefore only be accepted on the basis of adequate remedies, the main purpose of which is to remove existing entry barriers for competitors and to ensure that affected consumers obtain a fair share of the benefits resulting from the cooperation.
Sporazum o sodelovanju je torej mogoče sprejeti samo na osnovi ustreznih ukrepov. Glavni namen ukrepov je odstraniti obstoječe ovire za konkurenčne ponudnike in zagotoviti, da bodo zadevni potrošniki prejeli pravični delež ugodnosti, ki bodo posledica sodelovanja.
COMMITMENTS
OBVEZNOSTI
On the basis of the reservations expressed by the Commission in its letter of serious doubts, the Parties proposed commitments which were published for comment on 9 December 2003.
Na osnovi zadržkov o resnih dvomih, ki jih je Komisija izrazila v svojem pismu, sta stranki predlagali obveznosti, ki so bile 9. decembra 2003 objavljene z namenom zbrati zadevne pripombe.
Several airlines and the United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading commented on them.
Pripombe je priglasilo več letalskih prevoznikov in Urad za pošteno poslovanje Združenega kraljestva.
In the light of these comments, the Parties accepted to improve further their commitments.
V smislu teh komentarjev so stranke pristale, da bodo nadalje izboljšale svoje obveznosti.
In particular, the conditions on the spread of slots at Paris CDG airport were substantially amended and the limitation on the number of slots to be released at Orly airport was removed.
Še posebej sta bistveno popravili pogoje o širjenju slotov na pariškem letališču CDG, odpravljena pa je bila tudi omejitev števila slotov na letališču Orly.
The main principles of these commitments are summarised below.
Bistvena načela sprejetih obveznosti so strnjena v nadaljevanju.
Number of slots to be surrendered
Število odstopljenih slotov
In order to remedy the slot shortage at congested airports, the Parties are required to make available to competitors a number of slots aimed at supporting new services on the seven routes where the Commission has identified competition concerns.
Da bi odpravili pomanjkanje slotov na prenapolnjenih letališčih, se od strank zahteva, da konkurentom omogočita število slotov, da bo mogoče urediti nov letalski promet na sedmih zračnih progah, na katerih je Komisija izrazila pomisleke glede konkurenčnosti.
The maximum number of slots to be released by the Parties is specified per route in the Annex to the decision.
Največje število slotov, ki jih bosta stranki sprostili, je določeno za vsako zračno pot posebej v Prilogi k sklepu.
On the basis of the Commission's extensive investigation on the France-Italy market and after having assessed the comments made by third parties in response to the publication of the Commission Notice pursuant to Article 16(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87, the number of slots that the Parties have accepted to release on each of the affected routes is considered sufficient to allow point-to-point carriers to compete effectively against the Parties on these routes.
Na osnovi obširnih preiskav, ki jih je Komisija izvedla na trgu Francija-Italija, in po presoji komentarjev, ki so jih priglasile tretje stranke kot odgovor na objavo obvestila Komisije skladno s členom 16(3) Uredbe (EGS) št. 3975/87, je mnenje Komisije, da je število slotov, ki jih nameravata stranki sprostiti za vsako od zadevnih zračnih poti zadostno, da omogoča letalskih družbam, ki ponujajo storitve od točke do točke, učinkovito konkuriranje s strankami na teh zračnih poteh.
The remedies are targeted to allow competitors to transport point-to-point traffic and in particular, to compete with the Parties for the transport of O & D time-sensitive and flexibility-focused passengers.
Cilj ukrepov je zračni promet od točke do točke in še posebej konkurirati s strankami za prevoz potnikov Z & K, ki so omejeni glede na čas in prilagajanje.
Considering that it is more effective to add frequencies to an existing service than to start a new service from scratch and that time-sensitive and flexibility-focused passengers need a sufficient number of daily frequencies, the slots will be made available on a preferential basis to the competitor which will operate, in total, the highest number of frequencies on the route (including its existing services).
Ob upoštevanju dejstva, da je bolj učinkovito dodati lete obstoječim storitvam, kot pa dodati novo storitev in začeti iz nič, in glede na to, da potniki, ki so omejeni s časom in prilagodljivostjo, potrebujejo zadostno število dnevnih poletov, bodo imeli pri dodelitvi slotov prednost konkurenti, ki bodo lahko na teh zračnih poteh ponudili najvišje število letov (vključno z obstoječimi storitvami).
Slot releases at Paris and Milan airports
Sprostitev slotov na pariških in milanskih letališčih
It results from the Commission's investigation on the France-Italy market that Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) and Orly (ORY) airports are substitutable from the point of view of the demand for transport services by O & D passengers on the routes in question.
Preiskava tržišča Francija-Italija, ki jo je izvedla Komisija, je pokazala, da sta letališči Charles de Gaulle (CDG) in Orly (ORY) medsebojno zamenljivi iz vidika potrebe po prevoznih storitvah potnikov Z & K na zadevnih zračnih poteh.
The same applies with respect to the Milan Linate and Malpensa airports.
Enako velja tudi za milanski letališči Linate in Malpensa.
The application of the principle of proportionality would normally imply that the Parties are allowed to choose at which airport to surrender slots, provided that this is sufficient to solve the competition concerns.
Uporaba načela sorazmernosti bi običajno narekovala, da je strankam na voljo izbrati, na katerem letališču bosta sprostili slote pod pogojem, da to zadošča za rešitev težav s konkurenčnostjo.
However, in the present case, the Commission has considered that, with respect to the Paris airports, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the remedies proposed, slots should also, under certain conditions, be surrendered at Orly to competitors who already offer services on the affected routes out of this airport, in order to allow them to increase their number of services.
Vendar pa Komisija v zadevnem primeru meni, da je potrebno, ob upoštevanju značaja pariških letališč in z namenom zagotoviti učinkovitost predlaganih ukrepov, pod določenimi pogoji predati tudi slote na letališču Orly tistim konkurentom, ki že ponujajo storitve na tem letališču, z namenom, da povišajo število svojih poletov.
This explains why the commitments provide that a competitor is entitled to obtain slots at Orly if it already operates flights on an affected route out of Orly and if it has all its scheduled flights serving Paris operated out of this airport.
S tem je pojasnjeno, zakaj obveznosti določajo, da ima konkurent pravico pridobiti slote na letališču Orly samo, če že ponuja prevoze na zadevnih zračnih poteh z letališča Orly, in če se odvijajo vsi konkurentovi linijski poleti za Pariz s tega letališča.
For the same reasons, the commitments provide that the Parties shall be required to release slots at Milan Linate airport only to a competitor which already operates services on an affected route out of Linate and wishes to add additional frequencies on this route.
Zaradi istih razlogov določajo obveznosti tudi, da se od strank zahteva sprostitev slotov na milanskem letališču Linate samo konkurentom, ki že ponujajo storitve na zadevni zračni poti z letališča Linate, in ki želijo dodati število poletov na zadevni zračni poti.
Other remedies
Drugi ukrepi
In addition to slots, other remedies are aimed at removing the additional entry barriers identified in the draft decision.
Poleg sprostitve slotov se bodo izvajali tudi drugi ukrepi z namenom odpraviti dodatne ovire za druge letalske prevoznike, ki so navedeni v osnutku sklepa.
Some of them will enhance the inter-changeability from the customer point of view between the flights operated by the Parties and the flights operated by competitors on the affected routes and will help new entrants to obtain a minimum number of passengers necessary to start operations on these routes.
Nekateri izmed ukrepov bodo iz vidika potnika povečali medsebojno zamenljivost poletov, ki jih ponujata stranki, in poletov, ki jih ponujajo konkurenti na zadevnih zračnih poteh, in bodo pripomogli novim ponudnikom pridobiti najnižje število potnikov, ki jih potrebujejo da začnejo delovati na teh zračnih poteh.
They provide notably that the Parties will have to allow new entrants to participate in their frequent flyer programmes, if they so wish.
Še posebej morata stranki novim ponudnikom dovoliti udeležbo v njunem programu nagrajevanja (frequent flyer), če bodo tako želeli.
Another commitment relates to interlining and special prorate agreements and will allow passengers to fly with the Parties and return with a competitor or conversely on a given journey, based on a single ticket.
Naslednja obveznost se nanaša na interlining in posebne dogovore o sorazmernosti, po katerih bo potnikom omogočeno, da letijo s stranko in se vrnejo s konkurentom ali obratno na zadevni zračni progi z eno samo letalsko karto.
The Parties also committed to facilitate intermodal passenger agreements, whereby they provide air transport services as part of an itinerary that includes surface or sea transportation, in order to ensure greater choice and better multimodal transport services for consumers.
Stranki sta se prav tako obvezali, da bosta spodbujali sporazume o kombiniranih potniških storitvah, pri čemer bosta ponujali storitev zračnega prevoza kot del povezave, ki vključuje prevoz po kopnem ali morju, z namenom izboljšati ponudbo in ponuditi potnikom različne vrste prevozov.
This, for instance, could allow time-sensitive customers to combine a one way railway trip with a return flight at attractive conditions.
S tem bi na primer potniki, ki so omejeni s časom, lahko kombinirali svoje potovanje tako, da bi odpotovali z železnico in se vrnili z letalom pod ugodnimi pogoji.
Finally, the commitments impose on the Parties an obligation to maintain a frequency freeze (regulation of frequency increases) during a start-up period to ensure that new entrants are not squeezed out of the market shortly after entry.
Končno nalagajo obveznosti, ki so jih stranke prevzele, da ne spreminjajo števila (uredba o povišanju števila letov) v začetnem obdobju, s čimer se prepreči, da bi se nove ponudnike letalskih storitev izrinilo s trga kmalu po tem, ko začnejo ponujati svoje storitve.
On the basis of the above, the commitments submitted by the Parties are sufficient to solve the competition concerns in the markets identified during the investigation by allowing and facilitating third parties' entry.
Na osnovi zgoraj navedenega so obveznosti, ki so jih stranke posredovale, zadostne za rešitev težav s konkurenčnostjo na trgu, opredeljenem v preiskavi s tem, da bo omogočen in olajšan vstop novim ponudnikom letalskih storitev.