natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Limiting the maximum amount of liability to the economically realistic risk would, on the contrary, mean in supervisory terms that the credits would have to count as risk assets to the tune of EUR [...]*, the large‐scale lending ceiling would be exceeded and the falling own‐funds ratios would make a further significant capital injection necessary.
Omejitev najvišjega jamstvenega zneska na gospodarsko realistično tveganje bi v nasprotju iz nadzorno-pravnega vidika povzročilo prištetje kreditov v višini do [...]* EUR k tvegani aktivi, kar bi prekoračilo mejo velikega kredita, padajoč kazalnik lastniških sredstev pa bi povzročil potrebo po dodatnem znatnem prilivu kapitala.
The need, from a supervisory standpoint, to start with all the theoretically occurring risks, despite a lower economic value, was confirmed by the BAF in its letter of 7 March 2003.
BAFin je s pismom z dne 7. marca 2003 potrdila nadzorno-pravno nujnost za primer vseh teoretično možnih tveganj kljub majhni gospodarski vrednosti.
The Commission recognises the need, from a supervisory standpoint, to start with all the theoretically occurring risks and an amount of EUR 21,6 billion. Further, for the state aid assessment of the measure, it assumes, on the basis of the justification presented by Germany, that the aid contained in the risk shield has an economic value of EUR 6,1 billion.
Komisija priznava to nadzorno-pravno nujnost za primer vseh teoretično možnih tveganj v višini 21,6 milijarde EUR. Pri presoji ukrepov pravne pomoči Komisija izhaja tudi iz utemeljitve Nemčije o gospodarske vrednosti pomoči, zajeti v omejitvi tveganja, v višini 6,1 milijarde EUR. Ta znesek ustreza realističnemu „worst-case“ ali najslabšemu scenariju, ki ga je Nemčija še podkrepila s predvidevanji, zato je za presojo primeren že zaradi previdnosti.
This amount corresponds to the realistic worst‐case scenario supported by Germany with assumptions and is thus necessary for the assessment if only for prudential reasons. In addition, a value of roughly this amount would also result if, in the alternative, the liability from risks is discharged by capital injection.
Tudi pri alternativni razrešitvi odgovornosti za tveganja zaradi priliva kapitala bi bil rezultat približno enaka vrednost.
With regard to the contribution promised by the Land of Berlin in the refund agreement, it should be noted first of all that this will apply only if the Commission concludes the LBB/IBB proceeding with a recovery decision and if, in this case too, only the necessary amount of the reorganisation grant is paid, in order to avoid undershooting the capital ratios mentioned in the agreement in the case of LBB and/or the BGB group.
Glede vloge, ki jo je dežela Berlin obljubila s sporazumom o vračilu je treba uvodoma pripomniti, da je ta uporabna le, če Komisija postopek C 48/2002 („LBB/IBB“) sklene s sklepom o vračilnem zahtevku, in če je tudi v tem primeru subvencija za sanacijo plačana le višini, potrebni za preprečitev nedoseganja stopnje kapitala pri LBB in/ali koncernu BGB, ki je imenovana v sporazumu.
Since the examination in the LBB proceeding has not yet been completed, it is not possible at the moment to determine the exact economic value of this aid.
Ker preverjanje postopka „LBB/IBB“ še ni zaključeno, zdaj ni mogoče natančno določiti gospodarske vrednosti te pomoči.
For the purposes of the competition assessment, though, the theoretical upper limit can be given as EUR 1,8 billion.
Za namen konkurenčne presoje je mogoče navesti teoretično zgornjo mejo, ki znaša 1,8 milijarde EUR.
The measures make it possible to improve BGB’s financial position considerably.
Ukrepi so primerni za bistveno izboljšanje finančnega položaja BGB.
They have so far prevented supervisory intervention, e.g. temporary closure, and the probable insolvency of substantial subsidiaries in the group and are thus likely to distort competition.
Vse do danes so preprečevali nadzorno-pravne posege, kot je začasno zaprtje in verjetna plačilna nesposobnost bistvenega delnega področja koncerna, zato so primerni za izkrivljanje konkurence.
With its subsidiaries, the undertaking is one of the largest German banks.
Podjetje je skupaj s svojimi hčerinskimi družbami ena največjih nemških bank.
In 2002 it had a group balance sheet of approximately EUR 175 billion and was ranked twelfth.
Leta 2002 je z bilančno vsoto koncerna v višini 175 milijard EUR zasedalo dvanajsto mesto.
In its largest segments, BGB is active at regional, national and international level.
BGB je v svojih najpomembnejših poslovnih področjih dejavna na regionalni, nacionalni in mednarodni ravni.
The financial services sector as a whole is characterised by increasing integration, and in substantial subsectors the internal market is a reality.
Celotni sektor finančnih storitev je obeležen z vedno večjo integracijo in v večini delnih področjih je notranje tržišče uresničeno.
Competition between financial institutions in different Member States is strong and has been getting stronger since the introduction of the single currency.
Med finančnimi institucijami različnih držav članic vlada močna tekmovalnost, ki se je po uvedbi enotne valute še okrepila. Z ukrepi in njihovimi učinki na aktualne in potencialne tekmece prihaja do izkrivljanja konkurence oz. do grožnje, da bo to tega prišlo.
The measures and their effects on actual and potential competitors distort — or threaten to distort — competition.
Med finančnimi institucijami različnih držav članic vlada močna tekmovalnost, ki se je po uvedbi enotne valute še okrepila.
The distortions of competition thus also affect trade between Member States.
Izkrivljanje konkurence tako vpliva tudi na trgovanje med državami članicami.
The measures therefore constitute state aid under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Kot posledica tega so ukrepi državna pomoč v skladu s prvim odstavkom člena 87 Pogodbe ES.
Germany has not questioned this view.
Nemčija nikoli ni podvomila v ta nazor.
In the decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission noted that not only the Land of Berlin but also NordLB contributed capital, although the amount was proportionately less than its shareholding prior to the capital injection (EUR 166 million, or 8,3 % of the capital increase, compared with a 20 % shareholding prior to the capital injection).
V Sklepu o uvedbi postopka je Komisija opozorila na to, da pri prilivu kapitala ni bila udeležena le dežela Berlin, ampak tudi NordLB, vendar z zneskom, ki je bil sorazmerno manjši kot delnice, ki jih je imela pred prilivom (166 milijonov EUR ustrezno z 8,3 % povišanjem kapitala, pri lastništvu 20 % delnic pred prilivom kapitala).
The Commission could not evaluate this measure at the time because it lacked sufficient information and could not therefore conclude that the capital contributed by NordLB was also state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija tega ukrepa svoj čas zaradi manjkajočih dodatnih informacij ni mogla presoditi in zato tudi ne izključiti, da gre pri kapitalu, ki ga je prispevala NordLB, prav tako za državno pomoč v smislu člena prvega odstavka člena 87 Pogodbe ES.
It requested Germany to send the necessary information.
Nemčijo je prosila za predložitev potrebnih informacij.
Germany explained that NordLB’s capital increase contained no aid since it had been made in accordance with the market‐economy investor principle.
Nemčija je nato navedla, da povišanje kapitala NordLB ni vsebovalo pomoči, ker je bilo izvedeno po načelu vlagatelja, ki se ravna po tržnem gospodarstvu.
Like the private shareholder Parion and the miscellaneous small shareholders, NordLB had participated in the capital increase to a less than proportionate degree, although the Land of Berlin and BGB had expected each to take part in accordance with their respective shareholdings.
NordLB je bila, tako kot zasebni delničar Parion in delničarji, združeni v razpršenem lastništvu, podsorazmerno udeležena pri povišanju kapitala, čeprav sta dežela Berlin in BGB pričakovali udeležbo, ki bi ustrezala njenemu delniškemu lastništvu.
NordLB’s 20 % stake prior to the capital injection would have corresponded to a capital contribution of just over DEM 400 million.
Lastništvo NordLB pred prilivom kapitala 20 % bi ustrezalo prilivu kapitala v višini nekoliko več kot 400 milijonov DEM.
Such an exposure, however, did not seem good business to NordLB.
NordLB pa se tovrstni angažma iz podjetniškega vidika ni zdel smiseln.
On the other hand, to have refused to participate in the capital increase at all would have reduced NordLB’s stake to 4 %.
Po drugi strani pa bi se lastništvo NordLB zmanjšalo na 4 %, če bi se odpovedala udeležbe na povišanju kapitala.
NordLB would thus have lost the participatory rights associated with a holding of at least 10 %, such as asking a court to appoint special auditors or asserting the company’s claims against members of the management and supervisory boards.
Tako bi NordLB izgubila pravico sodelovanja, ki je povezano z najmanj 10-odstotnim lastništvom delnic, kot je npr. sodno imenovanje posebnih revizorjev ali uveljavitev pravic družbe proti članom upravnega odbora in nadzornega sveta.
Further, in August 2001 NordLB had submitted an offer that ‘promoted its interests’ with regard to unfinished discussions on deepening cooperation and a possible merger.
NordLB v avgustu 2001 ob upoštevanju še ne sklenjenih premislekov o poglobitvi sodelovanja in morebitni združitvi oddala tudi „Ponudbo za varovanje interesov“.
Without any participation in the capital increase, this would have hardly been credible.
Brez kakršne koli udeležbe pri povišanju kapitala bi bila slednja neverodostojna.
Altogether, this was a decision that carefully weighed up NordLB’s business interests.
V celoti je šlo pri NordLB za odločitev, skrbno pretehtano iz vidika podjetniških interesov.
Given that the relative weight of this measure in the restructuring plan is marginal and that the classification of the measure as state aid or normal market behaviour would not alter the Commission’s assessment in this case, it is not necessary for the Commission to take a definite view on this issue.
Ker je teža teh ukrepov v primerjavi s vsemi upoštevnimi pomočmi obrobna in ker uvrstitev priliva kapitala NordLB kot pomoč ali kot običajno tržno ravnanje v tem primeru ne bi vplivalo na presojo Komisije, dokončna ocena Komisije tozadevno ni potrebna.
In the decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission pointed out that the capital injection and the risk shield together should be treated as non‐notified aid, with the legal consequences of Article 13(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, since, in the detailed agreement, despite notification and the suspensory condition of aid authorisation, neither of the two measures can be suspended without attracting supervisory measures by the BAFin, such as a temporary closure of BGB.
V Sklepu o uvedbi postopka je Komisija opozorila, da se priliva kapitala v povezavi z omejitvijo tveganja ne sme obravnavati kot nepriglašene pomoči s pravnimi posledicami iz drugega odstavka člena 13 Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999, ker kljub priglasitvi in odložilnim pogojem odobritve pravne pomoči v podrobnem sporazumu ni mogoče izpostaviti nobenega od ukrepov, ne da bi to imelo za posledico nadzorno-pravne ukrepe BAFin-a, kot je začasno zaprtje BGB.
As Germany too has explained, both measures — the risk shield and the capital injection, which itself has been provisionally authorised as rescue aid — are part of a single restructuring plan.
Kot je razložila tudi Nemčija, sta oba ukrepa, tako omejitev tveganj kot tudi priliv kapitala, začasno odobren kot pomoč pri reševanju, del enega samega načrta prestrukturiranja.
The Commission must, however, assess this as a whole and, consequently, the two measures cannot be given different legal classifications.
Tega pa mora Komisija presojati kot celoto. Pravna uvrstitev obeh ukrepov zato ne more biti različna.
In this respect, Germany explained in its comments that the suspensory condition leaves the legal effectiveness of the adopted schemes open, but it conceded that the capital injection and the risk shield have together produced effects because only through these measures could BGB continue in business.
V svojem stališču je k temu Nemčija navedla, da odložilni pogoj ohranja možnost pravne veljavnosti ureditve, vendar pod pogojem, da priliv kapitala in omejitev tveganja dejansko razvijeta učinke, saj lahko BGB nadaljuje s poslovanjem le s tem ukrepom.
It also attached importance to the observation that the ban on implementing aid for firms in difficulty before the adoption of a final decision by the Commission constitutes a procedural problem in view of the duration of the authorisation procedure.
V tej zvezi je Nemčija prav tako upoštevala ugotovitev, da predstavlja prepoved izvrševanja pomoči za podjetja v težavah pred dokončno odločitvijo Komisije glede trajanja postopka za pridobitev dovoljenja procesno-pravno težavo.
As also acknowledged by Germany, the aid in its totality has produced actual effects before a final decision since only through these measures has BGB been able to continue in business.
Kot je Nemčija prav tako prepoznala, so pomoči kot celota razvile dejanske učinke še pred dokončno odločitvijo Komisije, ker lahko le s temi ukrepi BGB nadaljuje svojo poslovno dejavnost.
This applies not only to the capital injection and the risk shield, but also to the Land’s obligation to contribute under the refund agreement.
To ne velja le za priliv kapitala in omejitev tveganja, ampak prav tako za obveznost vlaganja dežele, urejene s sporazumom o vračilu.
Admittedly, this obligation applies only in the event of a recovery decision by the Commission in the LBB/IBB case, and only then if the amount to be recovered leads to the capital ratios mentioned in the agreement not being met.
Sicer pride ta v poštev samo v primeru, da se bo Komisija v postopku LBB/IBB odločila za vračilni zahtevek in v primeru, če znesek vračilnega zahtevka ne bi povzročil nedoseganje stopnje kapitala, določene s sporazumom.
However, the success of the restructuring, including the other two measures, would be jeopardised without such a precaution, so that this measure too, despite a suspensory condition relating to authorisation by the Commission, has produced economic effects on its conclusion and hence before the authorisation.
Kljub temu bi bil uspeh prestrukturiranja vključno z obema drugima ukrepoma brez tega previdnostnega ukrepa ogrožen, zato je tudi ta ukrep kljub odložilnemu pogoju v zvezi z odobritvijo Komisije s sklenitvijo in zato še pred potrditvijo razvil gospodarske učinke.
The Commission notes, however, that through the suspensory conditions making the validity of the repayment agreement dependent on state aid approval by the Commission and the prompt transmission of comprehensive information Germany has expressed its readiness to cooperate.
Vendar se Komisija zaveda, da je Nemčija z odložilnim pogojem o odobritvi pravne pomoči Komisije iz dogovora o vračilu in s takojšnjo predložitvijo obsežnih informacij izkazala izrecno pripravljenost za sodelovanje
The financial burden imposed by the BGB restructuring plan on the Land of Berlin is — as will be shown below — lower than in the scenario involving use of only the existing state guarantees (institutional liability and guarantor liability) for Land banks.
Finančne obremenitve, ki so jih za deželo Berlin povzročile pomoči za prestrukturiranje BGB, so, kot je predstavljeno v nadaljevanju, manjše kot tiste, ki bi nastale z uporabo državnih garancij za deželne banke, obveznosti za ohranjanje javnega podjetja in jamstvo garanta, ki veljajo še do leta 2005.
This fact, however, does not imply that the measures taken in favour of BGB are in line with the market‐economy investor principle and would consequently not constitute state aid.
Vendar to ne pomeni, da so ukrepi v korist BGB v soglasju z načelom tržno nastopajočega vlagatelja ter zatorej niso državna pomoč.
Firstly, the existing state guarantees themselves, even if only until 2005, constitute state aid compatible with the common market.
Prvič so same obstoječe državne garancije, četudi le do leta 2005, s celotnim trgom združljive pomoči.
Secondly, the Commission notes that the aid measures in question keep BGB in operation for restructuring purposes and thus benefit the entire group, including the various private‐law companies.
Drugič pa Komisija ugotavlja, da upoštevna pomoč BGB dopušča nadaljevanje poslovne dejavnosti za namen prestrukturiranja in tako koristi celotnemu koncernu, vključno z različnimi civilnopravnimi podjetji koncerna.
They are thus radically different in nature and scope from the pure implementation of the state guarantees, which exist only for the Land bank LBB, part of the group.
Tako se v svoji pravni naravi in posameznem dosegu razlikujejo od čiste uresničitve državnih garancij za obveznost ohranitve javnega podjetja in jamstva garanta, ki obstajata samo za deželno banko LBB, torej za le en del koncerna.
For these reasons, all the measures under examination here constitute new state aid.
Zaradi teh razlogov so vse pomoči, ki jih je tukaj treba preveriti, novi ukrepi pomoči.
Compatibility of the aid measures with the common market
Združljivost ukrepov pomoči s skupnim trgom
Since the aid measures were not granted under an approved aid scheme, the Commission must assess their compatibility with the common market in the light of Article 87 of the EC Treaty.
Ker ukrepi pomoči niso bili odobreni na osnovi dovoljenega predpisa o pomoči, mora Komisija preveriti njihovo združljivost s skupnim trgom v skladu s členom 87 Pogodbe ES.
In accordance with Article 87(1), save as otherwise provided for in the EC Treaty, state aid or aid granted through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market.
V skladu s prvim odstavkom člena 87 Pogodbe ES so, v kolikor v tej pogodbi ni določeno drugače, državne ali iz državnih sredstev dodeljene pomoči kakršne koli vrste, ki zaradi posebnih ugodnosti za določena podjetja ali proizvodne veje izkrivljajo konkurenco ali pa tako grozijo, nezdružljive s skupnim trgom, če vplivajo na trgovanje med državami članicami.
However, Article 87 does allow exemptions from the principle of the incompatibility of state aid with the common market.
Vendar pa člen 87 Pogodbe ES dopušča izjeme od načela nezdružljivosti državne pomoči s skupnim trgom.
Provided that the conditions governing exemption under Article 87(2) were met, aid could be deemed compatible with the common market.
Izjeme, določene z drugim odstavkom člena 87 Pogodbe ES bi lahko utemeljevale združljivost pomoči s skupnim trgom.
However, the aid measures under examination cannot be regarded as aid having a social character that is granted to individual consumers (subparagraph (a)), as aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences (subparagraph (b)) or as aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany (subparagraph (c)).
Ukrepov pomoči, ki jih je treba preveriti, ni mogoče upoštevati kot socialno pomoč za posameznega porabnika [črka (a)], niti kot pomoč za odpravljanje škode, nastale zaradi naravnih nesreč ali drugih nenavadnih dogodkov [(b)], in tudi ne kot pomoč za gospodarstvo na področjih Zvezne republike Nemčije, prizadetih zaradi razdeljenosti Nemčije [(c)].
These exemptions are not, therefore, applicable in the present case.
Tako te izjeme v obravnavanem primeru niso uporabne.
As regards the exemptions under Article 87(3)(b) and (d), it is to be noted that the aid does not serve to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of the Member State and cannot be regarded as aid to promote culture and heritage conservation.
Glede na izjemno določbo v skladu s črkama (b) in (d) tretjega odstavka člena 87 Pogodbe ES je mogoče ugotoviti, da pomoči ne služijo za pospeševanje pomembnih načrtov skupnega evropskega interesa ali za odpravljanje znatnih motenj v gospodarskem življenju katere od držav članic, in da nanje tudi ni mogoče gledati kot na pomoč za pospeševanje kulture in ohranjanje kulturne dediščine.
Accordingly, the Commission is vetting the aid measures in the light of the exemption in Article 87(3)(c).
Komisija posledično preverja ukrepe pomoči na osnovi izjemnih določb črke (c) tretjega odstavka člena 87 Pogodbe ES.
It is basing its assessment of aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, on the relevant Community guidelines.
Komisija opira svojo oceno o pomočeh za pospeševanje razvoja določenih gospodarskih panog, v kolikor tržnih pogojev ne spreminjajo na način, ki je v nasprotju s skupnimi interesi, na upoštevne smernice Skupnosti.
In the Commission's view, the only guidelines applicable are those on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (hereinafter the guidelines).
Po dojemanju Komisije v zadevnem primeru ni mogoče uporabiti nobene druge že imenovane smernice za državno pomoč za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah („smernice“).
The Commission also takes the view that the measures described make a contribution to financing the restructuring of the firm and are, therefore, to be regarded as restructuring aid.
Poleg tega je Komisija mnenja, da opisani ukrepi pomoči prispevajo k financiranju prestrukturiranja podjetja, zaradi česar veljajo kot pomoč za prestrukturiranje.
According to the guidelines, restructuring aid is permissible only if it does not run counter to the Community interest.
V skladu s smernicami so pomoči za prestrukturiranje dopustne le, kadar niso v nasprotju s skupnim interesom.
Under the guidelines, aid may be approved by the Commission only if certain conditions that are examined below are met.
V smernicah se odobritev pomoči Komisije navezuje na določene predpostavke:
Eligibility of the firm receiving the aid
Sposobnost podjetja za prejem pomoči
Although the measures in question, which benefited BGB before its business activities were terminated, were taken by the Land of Berlin, i.e. by BGB's majority shareholder, it had already been noted that a market‐economy investor would not have provided those resources on the same terms.
Dežela Berlin, večinska delničarka BGB, je sicer sprejela ukrepe, o katerih je govora in ki jih so BGB obvarovali pred ustavitvijo poslovne dejavnosti. Vendar je bilo že ugotovljeno, da vlagatelj, ki ravna po načelih tržnega gospodarstva, teh sredstev pod danimi pogoji ne bi zagotovil.
Without the Land aid measures, the capital ratios would have fallen below the thresholds prescribed by the Banking Law, with the result that BAFin (known at the time as BAKred) would have had to take the necessary measures under Sections 45 to 46a of the Banking Law, including, for example, temporary closure.
Brez ukrepov pomoči dežele bi stopnje kapitala padle pod minimalno vrednost, ki jo predpisuje Zakon o kreditnih sistemih, tako da bi moral BAFin (takrat BAFred) ukrepati v skladu s členi 45 — 46a Zakona o kreditnih sistemih, kot na primer z začasnim zaprtjem.
Moreover, at the time the aid was granted, BGB satisfied other criteria governing the definition of a firm in difficulty under point 6 of the guidelines; these include increasing losses, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling net asset value.
Poleg tega je BGB v času dodelitve pomoči izpolnjevala tudi druge kriterije, ki opredeljujejo podjetje v težavah v skladu s številko 6 smernic; k temu spadajo vedno večje izgube, vedno večje zadolževanje in obrestne obremenitve ter nižanje vrednosti čistega premoženja.
Basic principle
Temeljno načelo