natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, no comments were received.
Pripomb ni posredoval noben drugi udeleženec.
By letter dated 19 December 2003, Austria announced that, as part of the process of privatising Bank Burgenland AG, it intended to amend the aid measures notified.
Z dopisom z dne 19. decembra 2003 so avstrijske oblasti sporočile, da nameravajo v okviru privatizacijskega postopka BB objavljene ukrepe za pomoč prilagoditi.
By letter dated 21 January 2004, the Commission notified Austria of its decision to extend the procedure under Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty to the planned amendments to the aid measures for restructuring Bank Burgenland AG.
Z dopisom z dne 21. januarja 2004 je Komisija Avstriji posredovala svoj sklep za razširitev formalnega postopka v skladu s členom 88(2) Pogodbe ES na načrtovane spremembe ukrepov za pomoč pri prestrukturiranju Bank Burgenland AG.
On 27 February 2004 Austria submitted its comments.
februarja je Avstrija predložila svoje stališče.
The Commission decision to extend the procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union [4]. The Commission invited interested parties to submit their comments.
Z objavo sklepa Komisije o razširitvi postopka v Uradnem listu Evropske unije [4] je Komisija pozvala tudi ostale udeležence, da pošljejo svoja stališča.
BB is a regional mortgage bank with its registered office in Eisenstadt; its business is confined largely to the territory of the Federal Province of Burgenland.
BB je deželna hipotekarna banka (regionalna banka) s sedežem v Železnem in s poslovanjem, ki je v glavnem omejeno na območje Gradiščanske.
The latter is the main shareholder in BB and holds 97,897 % of the equity.
Glavni delničar BB je Gradiščanska s 97,897 % deležem osnovnega kapitala.
The remaining 2,103 % is portfolio investment.
Ostalih 2,103 % je v portfeljski naložbi.
BB had a balance sheet value of some EUR 2,7 billion in 2000 [5] and was ranked 33rd in the list of Austrian banks.
V letu 2000 je znašala bilančna vsota BB približno 2,7 milijarde EUR [5], kar je BB uvrstilo na 33. mesto med avstrijskimi bankami.
Before the two guarantee agreements of June and December 2000, the Province of Burgenland held 50,63 % of BB’s equity.
Pred obema garancijskima sporazumoma junija 2000 in tudi decembra 2000 je bilo v lasti Gradiščanske 50,63 % deleža osnovnega kapitala BB.
Other important shareholders were Bank Austria (40,34 %) and Bausparkasse Wüstenrot (7 %).
Ostala pomembna lastnika deleža sta bila Bank Austria s 40,34 % in Bausparkasse Wüstenrot s 7 %.
The remaining 2,03 % of the shares were portfolio investment.
Ostalih 2,03 % deleža je bilo v portfeljski naložbi.
Following the purchase of Bank Austria’s shares (guarantee agreement of 23 October 2000), the Province of Burgenland concluded an option contract with Bausparkasse Wüstenrot to purchase all its shares.
Gradiščanska je po pridobitvi delnic Bank Austria (garancijski sporazum z dne 23. oktobra 2000) z Bausparkasse Wüstenrot AG sklenila opcijsko pogodbo o pridobitvi vseh delnic Bausparkasse Wüstenrot AG.
This was to be the first step towards the privatisation of BB.
To naj bi bil prvi korak v smeri privatizacije BB.
As a regional mortgage bank, BB’s task is to promote monetary and credit transactions in Burgenland.
Naloga BB kot deželne hipotekarne banke je spodbujanje denarnih in kreditnih poslov v zadevni zvezni deželi.
Its main business is to grant mortgage loans and issue mortgage bonds and municipal bonds.
Glavno poslovanje BB predstavlja dajanje hipotekarnih posojil in izdaja hipotekarnih ter komunalnih obveznic.
It also provides virtually the whole range of other banking and financial services.
Obenem ponuja skoraj celotno paleto ostalih bančnih storitev.
In 2000 its share of the total bank deposits market in Burgenland was 30 % and of the lending market 39 %.
Leta 2000 je tržni delež BB vseh vlog na Gradiščanskem znašal 30 %, delež kreditov je bil 39 %.
Under Section 4 of the Burgenland Regional Mortgage Bank Law (LGBl. No 58.1991, in the version published in LBGl. No 63/1998), if BB defaults, the Province of Burgenland is liable as deficiency guarantor under Section 1356 of the General Civil Code (ABGB) for all the bank’s liabilities.
V skladu s členom 4 zakona Gradiščanske Landes-Hypothekenbank, (LGB1. št. 58/1991, v izdaji zakona LGB1. št. 63/1998) jamči Gradiščanska v skladu s členom 1356 splošnega civilnega zakonika (ABGB) v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti BB za vse obveznosti podjetja kot porok.
The Province of Burgenland has been deficiency guarantor for BB and its legal predecessors in virtually unchanged form since 1928.
Za BB in njene pravne predhodnice obstaja poroštvo Gradiščanske v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti v praktično nespremenjeni obliki že od leta 1928.
The statutory arrangements for the authority’s guarantor liability came into force on 29 June 1991 and, since then, the Province of Burgenland has received a liability fee for providing the statutory deficiency guarantee.
Zakonita ureditev za takrat veljavno odgovornost uradne osebe – poroka je začela veljati 29. junija 1991. Gradiščanska prejema od te novele zakona poroštveno provizijo za zagotovitev zakonskega poroštva.
BB’s financial difficulties
Finančne težave BB
In the course of the audit of BB’s annual accounts for 1999 a fraud involving the loss of some EUR 189 million was discovered in connection with the credit management of HOWE Bau AG when it became insolvent: the auditor’s certificates for the annual accounts submitted by HOWE had been forged.
Med preverjanjem letnega poročila BB za leto 1999 je bila v zvezi z upravljanjem kredita za družbo HOWE Bau AG, ki je postala plačilno nesposobna, odkrita prevara v višini približno 189 milijonov EUR, ker so bila potrdila o poročilu revizorja za HOWE Bau AG ponarejena.
It emerged that the actual value of the land charge certificates drawn up as collateral for the loans was far from sufficient to cover the liabilities.
V tej zvezi se je pokazalo tudi, da dejanska vrednost zastavljenih hipotekarnih zavarovanj še zdaleč ni zadoščala za kritje kreditnih obveznosti.
There was therefore a need for a valuation adjustment of EUR 171 million, which exceeded the Bank’s core capital of EUR 80 million and would, therefore, have led directly to BB’s insolvency.
Zato je bil potreben popravek vrednosti v višini 171 milijonov EUR, ki je presegel temeljni kapital banke v višini 80 milijonov EUR in posredno povzročil plačilno nesposobnost BB.
Furthermore, under Section 83 of the Banking Law (BWG), BB would have had to apply for the imposition of a court supervised management procedure, which is a special arrangement under insolvency law for credit institutions, and this would, in Austria’s opinion, have been tantamount to bankruptcy for BB.
Nadalje bi morala BB v skladu s členom 83 zakona o bančništvu (BWG) vložiti zahtevek za odreditev poslovne inšpekcije, ki predstavlja posebno pravno ureditev v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti kreditnih institucij, zaradi česar bi lahko po mnenju Avstrije to enačili s stečajem BB.
It would also have meant that the Province of Burgenland’s deficiency liability would have come into effect.
To bi obenem pomenilo začetek veljavnosti poroštva dežele Gradiščanske.
According to the report by KPMG Austria Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft m.b.H. of 17 June 2000, the amount to be covered by the Province of Burgenland in the event of BB’s insolvency would have been EUR 247 million.
Po izvedenskem mnenju KPMG Austria Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft m.b.H. z dne 17. junija 2000 bi v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti BB znesek, ki bi ga morala pokriti Gradiščanska, znašal 247 milijonov EUR.
In order to avoid these consequences, the Province of Burgenland concluded the guarantee agreement of 20 June 2000 for an amount of EUR 171 million to cover BB’s bad debts, which would have represented excessive balance sheet debt.
Da bi se izognila posledicam, je Gradiščanska 20. junija 2000 sklenila garancijsko pogodbo v vrednosti 171 milijonov EUR in s tem pokrila neizterljive terjatve zoper BB, ki bi pomenile čezmerno bilančno zadolžitev.
The HOWE fraud was used as an opportunity to commission a comprehensive audit of accounts receivable which should show whether the systemic shortcomings revealed by the fraud could also affect other credit exposures.
Primer goljufije v zvezi s krediti družbe HOWE je bil povod za naročilo obsežnega preverjanja dolžnikov, ki naj bi pokazalo, ali so sistemski primanjkljaji, odkriti v okviru goljufije HOWE, vplivali na nadaljnjo kreditno izpostavljenost.
The need for an additional valuation adjustment of some EUR 189 million identified by the audit which took place in autumn 2000, put the bank back in a situation where the necessary valuation adjustments would have exceeded the bank’s core capital and only the intervention of the Province prevented the initiation of the court supervised management procedure.
V jeseni 2000 se je kot posledica preverjanja dolžnikov izkazala potreba po popravku vrednosti v višini 189 milijonov EUR in banka se je ponovno znašla v situaciji, ko bi potreben znesek popravka presegel temeljni kapital banke. Vključitev poslovne inšpekcije je preprečilo le posredovanje dežele.
In order to avoid a further imminent loss in its capacity as shareholder and deficiency guarantor, the Province of Burgenland concluded with Bank Austria AG and BB a framework agreement whereby Bank Austria AG waived claims against BB.
Za preprečitev nadaljnje neposredne škode za deželo Gradiščansko kot delničarja in poroka, je Gradiščanska z BB in Bank Austrio AG sklenila okvirni sporazum, po katerem se je Bank Austria AG odpovedala terjatvam zoper BB.
The liabilities assumed in 2000 by the Province of Burgenland vis-à-vis BB were as follows:
V letu 2000 je Gradiščanska prevzela jamstva za BB v naslednjih primerih:
Guarantee agreement of 20 June 2000
Garancijski sporazum z dne 20. junija 2000
The Province of Burgenland assumed vis-à-vis BB a liability of EUR 171 million, plus annual interest at 5 %, on a current-account basis in respect of the guaranteed amount for the more detailed loan commitments in connection with the circumstances of the HOWE case.
Gradiščanska je prevzela poroštvo za Bank Burgenland v višini 171 milijonov EUR s 5 % letno obrestno mero, kontokorentno od konkretne garancijske vsote za natančneje določene kreditne obveznosti v skladu z dogodki, ki zadevajo kompleks HOWE.
Under the agreement, BB’s operating profits are used to cover the amount of the guarantee.
Garancijski sporazum predvideva, da se pozitivni poslovni rezultati BB uporabijo za kritje garancijske vsote.
Accordingly, the amount of the guarantee is reduced by BB’s annual profits where these are not needed to distribute preferred dividends, including possible back payments in respect of previous years.
Garancijska vsota se zato zmanjša za letni dobiček BB, v kolikor ta ne bo potreben za izplačilo prednostnih dividend, vključno z možnimi izplačili za prejšnja leta.
The guarantee can be called by BB at the earliest when the accounts for the financial year 2010 are closed.
BB lahko uveljavlja garancijo šele po zaključku letnega poročila za poslovno leto 2010.
Framework agreement of 23 October 2000
Okvirni sporazum z dne 23. oktobra 2000
In order to cover the necessary value adjustment of EUR 189 million discovered during a comprehensive audit of accounts receivable, the framework agreement of 23 October 2000 was concluded with BB’s main creditor, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG.
Za kritje zneska popravka v višini 189 milijonov EUR, odkritega po obsežnem preverjanju dolžnikov, je bil z glavnim upnikom BB, Bank Austrio Creditanstalt AG, 23. oktobra 2000 sklenjen okvirni sporazum.
Waiver of claims between Bank Austria AG and BB
Odpoved terjatvam med Bank Austrio AG in BB
Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG waived claims on BB totalling EUR 189 million.
Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG se je odpovedala svojim terjatvam v višini 189 milijonov EUR zoper BB.
Better-fortune clause between Bank Austria AG and BB
Sporazum o izboljšavi stanja med Bank Austrio AG in BB
The claims waiver was in exchange for an interest-bearing better-fortune clause on the part of BB and provides for repayment of the full amount of Bank Austria’s claims, plus interest in seven instalments, starting on 30 June 2004.
Odpoved terjatvam je bila sprejeta, ko se je BB obvezala izboljšati stanje s plačilom obresti, in predvideva vračilo celotnega zneska opuščenih terjatev Bank Austrie, vključujoč obresti, v sedmih obrokih s pričetkom 30. junija 2004.
From that date, BB has, therefore, to repay the amount of the claim waiver, plus interest accrued up to that date, in seven equal annual instalments, plus interest payable each year (Euribor plus 5 basis points) on 30 June each year until 30 June 2010.
Od tega datuma naprej do 30. junija 2010 mora BB v sedmih enakih letnih obrokih, vsako leto 30. junija, vrniti znesek opuščenih terjatev, vključno z do tedaj obračunanimi obrestmi ter letnimi natečenimi obrestmi (Euribor plus 5 baznih točk).
The future redemption of the better-fortune clause is based on BB’s annual profits, taking into account movements in reserves and any payments to preference shareholders in the previous financial year.
Nadaljnje odplačilo po obvezi k izboljšavi stanja bo sledilo iz letnega dobička BB z upoštevanjem gibanja rezervnih skladov in morebitni izpolnitvi obveznosti do prednostnih delničarjev iz preteklega poslovnega leta.
Guarantee agreement
Garancijski sporazum
In the event of BB being unable to meet its better-fortune obligation, the Province of Burgenland has, under an additional agreement of 1 December 2000, assumed an irrevocable deficiency guarantee towards Bank Austria AG which is effective for each year in the period 2004-10 and under which the Province of Burgenland must cover any shortfall (annual instalment less the amount paid by BB to Bank Austria AG) towards Bank Austria AG.
V primeru, da BB ne bo mogla izpolniti obveze o izboljšavi stanja, je Gradiščanska v okviru dodatnega sporazuma z dne 1. decembra 2000 prevzela nepreklicno poroštvo v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti v korist Bank Austrie AG. Poroštvo velja za vsako leto v obdobju 2004–2010 in v skladu s tem poroštvom bo Gradiščanska pokrila manjkajoči znesek Bank Austrii AG (letni obrok brez zneska, ki ga je BB že izplačala Bank Austrii AG).
Under this agreement, both BB and the Province of Burgenland are free to meet the better-fortune obligation towards Bank Austria AG ahead of the deadlines set.
BB, kot tudi Gradiščanska lahko, kot izhaja iz tega sporazuma, Bank Austria AG poravnata obvezo pred določenim rokom.
Sale of shares between Bank Austria AG and the Province of Burgenland
Prodaja delnic med Bank Austrio AG in deželo Gradiščansko
Bank Austria AG sold 34,13 % of its shares in BB at EUR 0,07 per share to the Province of Burgenland.
Bank Austria AG proda Gradiščanski svoje delnice BB v vrednosti 34,13 % po ceni 0,07 EUR.
Reasons for initiating the procedure
Razlogi za sprožitev postopka
In its decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, the Commission provisionally classified the measures to be assessed as State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty and Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement since the aid was granted through State resources and was such as to affect the economic position of competitors from other Member States by improving the bank’s financial situation [6] and, therefore, to distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between Member States.
V sklepu o sprožitvi formalnega preiskovalnega postopka v skladu s členom 88(2) Pogodbe ES je Komisija prehodno razvrstila potrebne ukrepe preiskave kot državno pomoč v skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe ES ter s členom 61(1) Pogodbe EGS, saj so bili dodeljeni z državnih sredstev in lahko ob izboljšanju finančnega položaja podjetja vplivajo na gospodarski položaj konkurentov iz drugih držav članic [6] ter s tem izkrivljajo konkurenčni boj in ovirajo trgovanje med državami članicami.
On the basis of its provisional assessment, the Commission came to the conclusion that the aid should be examined in the light of the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [7] (hereinafter the guidelines) and that no other compatibility provisions in the EC Treaty or Community guidelines were applicable.
Na osnovi predhodne presoje je prišla Komisija do spoznanja, da je potrebno pomoč presojati na osnovi smernic Družbe za presojo državne pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah [7] (v nadaljevanju „smernic“) ter da niso uporabni niti ostali kompatibilni predpisi Pogodbe ES niti ostale družbene smernice.
It agreed with Austria that BB was a firm in difficulty within the meaning of Section 2.1 of the guidelines.
Komisija je potrdila mnenje Avstrije, da je BB podjetje v težavah v skladu z odstavkom 2.1 smernic.
However, since some information was still missing and a number of matters were outstanding, there were doubts as to the compatibility of the aid measures with the common market.
Zaradi manjkajočih informacij in odprtih vprašanj je bila združljivost ukrepov za pomoč s skupnim trgom vprašljiva.
Restoration of the firm’s long-term viability
Ponovna vzpostavitev dolgoročne donosnosti podjetja:
In accordance with points 31 to 34 of the guidelines, the Commission must endorse a restructuring plan in the case of all individual aid measures by assessing whether the plan is capable of restoring the long-term viability of the firm within a reasonable timescale and on the basis of realistic assumptions.
V skladu z odstavki 31–34 smernic preverja Komisija načrte za prestrukturiranje vseh posameznih pomoči v smislu, ali so sposobni v ustreznem roku ter na osnovi realističnih predpostavk ponovno vzpostaviti dolgoročno donosnost podjetja.
As regards the restructuring plan initially submitted to it, the Commission doubted whether the market assumptions and the forecasts regarding the viability objective were precise enough to draw any conclusions as to prospects for the success of the proposed restructuring measures.
Komisija dvomi, da so bile v prvotno posredovanem načrtu za prestrukturiranje predpostavke glede trga ter napovedi glede želene donosnosti dovolj natančne, da bi bilo mogoče sklepati o uspehu predvidenih načrtov za prestrukturiranje.
It was difficult to ascertain on which market assumptions the restructuring measures were based.
Težko je bilo ugotoviti, na katerih predpostavljenih tržnih pogojih so ukrepi za prestrukturiranje temeljili.
As regards the long-term profitability forecast of 15 % by 2010 given in the notification, the Commission first criticised the fact that no basis whatsoever had been provided for that forecast and also doubted whether the target return of 15 % was realistic and hence whether it could actually be achieved by 2010.
Glede napovedi o dolgoročni rentabilnosti v višini 15 % do leta 2010, omenjene v priglasitvi, je Komisija prvič kritizirala, da ni nikakršne osnove za dolgoročno donosnost, ter podvomila tudi v verjetnost 15 % predvidenega donosa in doseganje tega donosa do leta 2010.
Austria was, therefore, requested to provide detailed forecasting data and the underlying assumptions.
Zato je bila Avstrija naprošena, da predloži natančne prognostične podatke in predpostavke, na katerih napoved temelji.
The Commission also called on Austria to provide detailed information (e.g. comparative figures for the banking sector) in support of its statement that, before the difficulties materialised, BB did not have too many staff and did not spend too much on materials, with the result that the opportunity and the need for the bank to reduce staff numbers were limited.
Glede na izjavo Avstrije, da pred nastopom težav BB ni imela niti previsokega števila zaposlenih niti previsokih stvarnih stroškov, zaradi česar naj bi bile možnosti za zmanjšanje števila zaposlenih omejene, je Komisija zaprosila Avstrijo za natančnejše informacije (npr. primerjalne vrednosti v bančnem sektorju).
The Commission further noted that the information provided by Austria regarding the reasons for the firm’s difficulties was, for the most part, a summary of the financial difficulties.
Komisija je ugotovila, da podatki, ki jih je posredovala Avstrija v zvezi z razlogi za težave podjetja, predstavljajo predvsem povzetek finančnih težav.
However, only one real reason for those difficulties was given, namely inadequate credit risk management.
Naveden pa je bil samo en resničen razlog za te težave, in sicer pomanjkljivo delovanje v menedžmentu kreditnega tveganja.
There was no detailed analysis of corporate and management structures or of specific management failings, but such an analysis was, in the Commission’s view, necessary to assess the prospects for BB’s restructuring.
Manjkala je temeljita analiza struktur podjetja in menedžmenta ter konkretnih napak menedžmenta. Takšna analiza pa je po mnenju Komisije pomembna za presojo možnosti prestrukturiranje BB.
The Commission thus doubted whether the causes of BB’s difficulties were sufficiently recognised and addressed in the restructuring plan.
Komisija je zaradi tega dvomila, da so bili razlogi za težave BB v načrtu za prestrukturiranje pravilno prepoznani in obravnavani.
Accordingly, Austria was asked to submit a detailed analysis of past failings and future prospects and problems with regard to corporate structures, management and supervisory methods, control and reporting concepts, and techniques for introducing commercially based decision-making procedures.
Zato so Avstrijo zaprosili za predložitev natančne analize preteklih izgub ter bodočih možnosti in težav v kontekstu podjetniških struktur, načinov menedžmenta in nadzora, konceptov kontrole in poročanja kot tudi tehnik za uvedbo komercialno utemeljenih odločitvenih postopkov.
As regards BB’s possible privatisation, Austria mentioned that this was its intention and referred to initial steps taken and to the planned date for completion of the privatisation process.
Glede na mogočo privatizacijo BB je Avstrija omenila namen in prve korake ter načrtovan zaključek privatizacijskega postopka.
However, no details at all were provided, for example, on the proposed procedure, conditions and other relevant factors.
Navedenih pa ni bilo nikakršnih podrobnosti, kot so recimo načrtovani postopek, pogoji ter ostali pomembni dejavniki.
The Commission therefore requested Austria to provide further information, in particular regarding the stage which a possible privatisation procedure had reached, whether the possible privatisation would be implemented on the basis of a transparent, non-discriminatory procedure and what the future timetable looked like.
Zaradi tega je Komisija Avstrijo zaprosila za nadaljnje informacije, še posebej o ravni, v kateri se trenutno nahaja potencialni privatizacijski postopek ter ali bi bila potencialna privatizacija izpeljana v okviru transparentnega, nediskriminacijskega postopka in kako bi potekal nadaljnji načrt.
The derogation in Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty is conditional on the aid not adversely affecting trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Posebna pravila člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES veljajo le pod pogojem, da pomoč ne spreminja trgovinskih pogojev tako, da bi ti škodovali skupnim interesom.
Points 35 to 39 of the guidelines state that measures must be taken to mitigate as far as possible any adverse effects of the aid on competition.
Smernice v odstavkih 35 do 39 določajo, da je potrebno sprejeti ukrepe, ki bi zmanjšali negativen vpliv pomoči na konkurenco.
This condition usually takes the form of a limitation on, or a reduction in, the company’s presence on the relevant product markets, a sale of production capacity or subsidiaries or a reduction in activities.
Običajno se ta pogoj konkretizira z omejitvijo ali zmanjšanjem navzočnosti podjetja na pomembnih proizvodnih trgih, z odsvojitvijo proizvodnih naprav ali hčerinskih podjetij ali z zmanjšanjem dejavnosti.
The limitation or reduction must be in proportion to the distortive effects of the aid and, in particular, to the relative importance of the firm on its market or markets.
Omejitev ali zmanjšanje mora biti v razmerju z deformacijskimi učinki, ki so posledica pomoči, in še posebej z relativno težo podjetja na svojem trgu ali trgih.