natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
EDP.4 Lease of TER production capacity equivalent to one unit subject to a review clause
EDP.4 Zakup proizvodne zmogljivosti TER-a, enakovredne eni enoti, ki je predmet klavzule o pregledu.
EDP.5 Suspension of some of EDP’s voting rights in Turbogás and appointment of independent board members in Turbogás
EDP.5 Začasen odvzem nekaterih glasovalnih pravic družbe EDP v Turbogásu in imenovanje članov neodvisnega odbora v Turbogásu.
ENI.II Sale of the Sines LNG terminal to REN
ENI.II Prodaja terminala za utekočinjen zemeljski plin v Sinèsu družbi REN.
ENI.III Sale of the Carriço underground storage to REN
ENI.III Prodaja podzemnega skladišča v Carriçu družbi REN.
ENI.IV Anticipated sale of the gas high-pressure network to REN
ENI.IV Pričakovana prodaja visokotlačnega plinskega omrežja družbi REN.
ENI.V Guarantees for access to the network pending sale of the network to REN
ENI.V Jamstva za dostop do omrežja v pričakovanju prodaje omrežja družbi REN.
ENI.VI Release to REN of the capacity at the Campo Maior entry point currently booked and unused by Transgás
ENI.VI Predaja zmogljivosti na vstopni točki Campo Maior družbi REN, ki trenutno pripada Transgásu, vendar je ta ne uporablja.
ENI.VII Commitment not to book further capacity at the Campo Maior entry point
ENI.VII Nenačrtovanje novih zmogljivosti na vstopni točki Campo Maior.
ENI.VIII Commitment not to book further capacity on the Extremadura pipeline
ENI.VIII Nenačrtovanje novih zmogljivosti na plinovodu Extremadura.
ENI.IX Commitment to make capacity available on the Extremadura pipeline and/or at the Campo Maior entry point under certain conditions
ENI.IX Zagotovitev zmogljivosti na plinovodu Extremadura in/ali na vstopni točki Campo Maior pod določenimi pogoji.
ENI.X Elimination of GDP’s right of first refusal, based on ‘matching the best offer mechanism’.
ENI.X Odvzem pravice družbe GDP do prve zavrnitve na podlagi „izenačevanja najugodnejše ponudbe“.
ENI.XI measures aimed at eliminating concerns related to possible privileged access to price information
ENI.XI Ukrepi za odpravljanje zaskrbljenosti v zvezi z morebitnim privilegiranim dostopom do podatkov o cenah.
ENI.XII Measures aimed at ensuring scope for the effective liberalisation of the demand represented by LICs
ENI.XII Ukrepi za zagotavljanje učinkovite liberalizacije povpraševanja velikih industrijskih odjemalcev.
ENI.XIII Commitment not to engage in dual offers of natural gas and electricity to LICs and retail customers in Portugal until the natural gas supply to such customer groups is liberalized
ENI.XIII Ne dajati ponudb za zemeljski plin in električno energijo velikim industrijskim in maloprodajnim odjemalcem na Portugalskem, dokler se dobava zemeljskega plina tem skupinam odjemalcev ne liberalizira.
ENI.XIV Sale of the LDC Setgás.
ENI.XIV Prodaja lokalnega distributerja Setgás.
ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITMENTS PROPOSED
OCENA PREDLAGANIH OBVEZNOSTI
COMMITMENTS ON ELECTRICITY
OBVEZNOSTI GLEDE ELEKTRIČNE ENERGIJE
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET
GROSISTIČNI TRG ELEKTRIČNE ENERGIJE
Horizontal effects of the operation (removal of GDP as the most likely entrant)
Horizontalni učinki transakcije (umik družbe GDP kot najverjetnejšega novega konkurenta)
The parties’ proposal consists in a combination of measures aimed at ensuring the entry of competitors while, at the same time, avoiding to divest generation assets.
Predlog strank zajema več ukrepov za zagotavljanje vstopa konkurentov in obenem za preprečevanje odprodaje proizvodnih sredstev.
It relies mainly on a moratorium concerning the construction of new CCGTs by EDP and the lease of some production capacity of EDP’s power plant TER for a limited period of time.
Temelji pretežno na začasni opustitvi izgradnje novih plinskih elektrarn družbe EDP in zakupu nekaterih proizvodnih zmogljivosti njene elektrarne TER za določen čas.
Respondents to the Commission’s market test considered these proposals as clearly insufficient in terms of scale, scope and duration to compensate for the significant loss of GDP as a potential competitor and to effectively ensure the timely entry of potential competitors.
Zaslišanci, ki so sodelovali pri preskušanju trga, ki ga je opravila Komisija, so te predloge označili za očitno neustrezne, saj so z vidika obsega, področja in trajanja ukrepi za odpravo posledic pomembnega umika družbe GDP kot morebitnega konkurenta in za pravočasno zagotavljanje vstopa morebitnih konkurentov na trg nezadovoljivi.
The Commission shares these concerns expressed by third parties.
Komisija se s temi vprašanji, ki so jih izpostavile tretje stranke, v celoti strinja.
The lease of production capacity from TER is equivalent to only one third of the plant and would account for 4 % of the total generation capacity in Portugal.
Zakup proizvodnih zmogljivosti TER-a zajema le eno tretjino zmogljivosti elektrarne, kar predstavlja 4 % skupnih proizvodnih zmogljivosti na Portugalskem.
The lease can be automatically terminated based on criteria which do not ensure the presence of new competitors nor the actual existence of an Iberian market.
Zakup se lahko samodejno prekine na podlagi meril, s katerimi ni zagotovljena niti prisotnost novih konkurentov niti dejanski obstoj trga, ki bi zajemal celoten Iberski polotok.
The lease can be as short as three years.
Zakup lahko traja tudi le 3 leta.
EDP will know in real-time the costs and volumes of electricity that the lessee can market.
Družba EDP bo imela ažurne podatke o tem, kakšni so stroški in količine električne energije, ki jih lahko zakupnik na trgu ponuja.
All this makes it unlikely that such a lessee might have a significant influence on the market and exercise a competitive constraint on EDP.
Z ozirom na vse zgoraj navedeno se zdi malo verjetno, da bi lahko takšen zakupnik močneje vplival na trg in tako predstavljal konkurenco družbi EDP.
Given the review clause attached to the proposed moratorium, the moratorium is likely to end shortly with no insurance that new competitors will actually enter the market.
Glede na klavzulo o pregledu, ki je del predlagane začasne opustitve, bo ta začasna opustitev verjetno kmalu odpravljena, pri čemer pa ne bo zagotovila, da bodo novi konkurenti dejansko vstopili na trg.
Besides, it does not prevent EDP from starting new CCGT projects (all steps but the actual building).
Poleg tega lahko družba EDP kljub začasni opustitvi sproži izvajanje novih projektov v zvezi s plinskimi elektrarnami (vse korake razen dejanske izgradnje).
The moratorium and the lease proposed thus fall short of having a pro-competitive effect similar to a structural remedy.
Predlagana začasna opustitev in predlagani zakup zato nimata učinka, ki bi spodbujal konkurenco, kakor to denimo zagotavlja ukrep za izboljšanje strukture.
In addition, the parties propose to divest EDP’s 10 % share in Tejo Energia, one of EDP’s competitor.
Poleg tega stranki predlagata odprodajo 10 % deleža družbe EDP v družbi Tejo Energia, ki je ena izmed njenih konkurentk.
If this is a positive proposal, it does not at all guarantee that Tejo Energia will actually build a CCGT in the future.
Če je ta predlog pozitiven, potem sploh ne zagotavlja, da bo Tejo Energia v prihodnosti dejansko zgradila plinsko elektrarno.
The parties have also proposed to suspend EDP’s voting rights in Turbogás.
Stranki sta predlagali tudi, da se glasovalne pravice v Turbogásu družbi EDP začasno odvzamejo.
This suspension is limited to a three year period and to only two specific areas of decision.
Ta začasen odvzem lahko traja največ tri leta, zajema pa lahko le dve področji odločanja.
EDP has also recently acquired an option to buy 20 % more share in Turbogás and manage all of Turbogás’ production.
EDP je nedavno dobil možnost kupiti še 20 % delnic Turbogása, s čimer bi popolnoma obvladoval njegovo proizvodnjo.
It is therefore quite doubtful that the parties’ commitments will prevent EDP from exercising influence on Turbogás’ gas supply policy and future projects.
Zato obstaja upravičen dvom, da bodo obveznosti strank družbi EDP preprečile, da bi ta vplivala na Turbogásovo politiko dobave plina in njegove bodoče projekte.
Non-horizontal effects (raising rival costs)
Vertikalni učinki (višji stroški za konkurente)
EDP’s privileged and preferential access to the Portuguese gas infrastructure
Privilegirani in prednostni dostop družbe EDP do portugalske plinske infrastrukture
The sale of the Sines LNG terminal and the Carriço underground storage to the gas high-pressure network operator, i.e. an ownership unbundling, is a positive proposal welcomed by the Commission.
Prodaja terminala za utekočinjen zemeljski plin v Sinèsu in podzemnega skladišča v Carriçu upravljavcu visokotlačnega plinskega omrežja, tj. prenos lastništva, je pozitiven predlog, ki ga Komisija pozdravlja.
However, the terms and conditions attached to these transfers do not ensure that a sufficient capacity will be available for third parties.
Vendar pa pogoji, pod katerimi je prenos izveden, tretjim strankam ne zagotavljajo dostopa do ustreznih zmogljivosti.
In particular, the remedies explicitly allows subsidiaries of the parties active in gas in Spain, Union Fenosa Gas and Naturcorp, to book further capacity even before the transfer, as well as the parties after the transfer.
Ukrepi za odpravo in preprečevanje kršitev podružnicama strank, ki se ukvarjata s plinskimi dejavnostmi v Španiji, to sta Union Fenosa Gas in Naturcorp, izrecno dovoljujejo načrtovanje dodatnih zmogljivosti že pred prenosom, medtem ko je strankama dovoljeno načrtovanje šele po prenosu.
The parties also proposed to make capacity available in the Spain-Portugal pipeline at Portuguese entry point (Campo Maior).
Stranki sta predlagali tudi, da se omogoči dostop do zmogljivosti plinovoda Španija–Portugalska pri vstopni točki na Portugalsko (Campo Maior).
According to the market test, this capacity is far too small (less than 10 % of this pipeline’s capacity, not enough to supply a single 400 MW CCGT unit) and is not ensured in the upstream pipeline (Extremadura pipeline) to bring gas up to the Portuguese border.
Kakor je pokazal preskus trga, so te zmogljivosti izrazito premajhne (manj kot 10 % zmogljivosti tega plinovoda, kar ni dovolj za oskrbo ene same plinske elektrarne z zmogljivostjo 400 MW) in zato niso namenjene prenosu plina po prenosnem plinovodu (plinovod Extremadura) do meje s Portugalsko.
A mechanism has been included to provide additional capacity but under conditions which make the access to this extra-capacity neither timely, economically feasible nor long-lasting enough for third parties to rely thereon.
Sicer se je oblikoval mehanizem za zagotovitev dodatnih zmogljivosti, vendar so pogoji za uporabo z vidika časovne primernosti, ekonomske izvedljivosti in same dolgoročnosti neugodni, zaradi česar mehanizem ni primeren, da bi se tretje stranke lahko nanj zanašale.
The commitments on natural gas infrastructures are therefore likely to have very limited positive effects on the electricity and gas markets in Portugal.
Obveznosti, ki se nanašajo na infrastrukturo zemeljskega plina, bodo tako najverjetneje imele manjše pozitivne učinke na portugalske trge električne energije in plina.
Other vertical impacts of the merger
Drugi vertikalni učinki združitve
As regards the other vertical competition concerns [14] raised by the operation, the commitments provide mainly for Chinese Walls to limit flows of information between GDP and EDP.
Kar zadeva druga vertikalna vprašanja o konkurenci [14], izpostavljena v okviru transakcije, obveznosti predpisujejo nepremostljive ovire, s katerimi bi preprečili pretok informacij med družbama GDP in EDP.
The market test clearly indicated that, in the present case, such measures are not sufficient to address these issues.
Preskus trga je jasno pokazal, da v obravnavanem primeru ti ukrepi niso primerni za razrešitev zastavljenih vprašanj.
MARKET FOR ANCILLARY SERVICES
TRG POMOŽNIH DEJAVNOSTI
The lease of production capacity, as provided for by commitments, do not allow the lessee to be active in the balancing power market, which requires adapting the output of the plant in real-time.
Zakup proizvodnih zmogljivosti, kakor ga predvidevajo obveznosti, zakupniku ne omogoča, da bi na trgu aktivno opravljal dejavnosti uravnavanja energije, kjer je potrebno v realnem času prilagajati proizvodnjo.
As explained above, the commitments do not ensure with a sufficient level of certainty that competitors will build new power generation capacities in Portugal in the foreseeable future.
Kakor je pojasnjeno zgoraj, obveznosti ne pomenijo, da bodo konkurenti na Portugalskem v predvidljivi prihodnosti zagotovo zgradili nove proizvodne zmogljivosti za pridobivanje energije.
As a result, the proposed remedies do not remedy the strengthening of EDP’s dominant position in this market.
Posledica tega je, da predlagani ukrepi ne preprečujejo krepitve prevladujočega položaja družbe EDP na tem trgu.
RETAIL SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY
MALOPRODAJNA OSKRBA Z ELEKTRIČNO ENERGIJO
The only remedy which relates directly to the retail supply of electricity is the commitment not to engage in dual offers of natural gas and electricity to retail customers until the natural gas supply to such customer groups is liberalised.
Edini ukrep, ki se neposredno nanaša na maloprodajno oskrbo z električno energijo, je „ne dajati ponudb za zemeljski plin in električno energijo velikim industrijskim in maloprodajnim odjemalcem na Portugalskem, dokler se dobava zemeljskega plina tem skupinam odjemalcev ne liberalizira“.
This commitment would only apply for a limited period and in any case, this remedy does not ensure the appearance of competitors to compensate for the loss of GDP.
Ta obveznost naj bi veljala le za določen čas, ukrep pa tako ali tako ne zagotavlja pojava novih konkurentov, ki bi zapolnili vrzel, nastalo zaradi umika družbe GDP.
Other remedies may indirectly positively affect the retail electricity market but do not ensure that new competitors will effectively enter the retail supply of electricity in Portugal in a timely and sufficiently large way so as to compensate for the loss of GDP’s future competition.
Drugi ukrepi lahko posredno ugodno vplivajo na maloprodajni trg električne energije, vendar ne zagotavljajo, da bodo novi konkurenti uspešno vstopili na portugalski maloprodajni trg električne energije in nudili pravočasno ter dovolj široko oskrbo, da bi s tem zapolnili vrzel, ki bi nastala zaradi umika bodoče konkurenčne družbe GDP.
NATURAL GAS MARKETS
TRGI ZEMELJSKEGA PLINA
GAS SUPPLY TO POWER PRODUCERS (CUSTOMER FORECLOSURE)
DOBAVA PLINA PROIZVAJALCEM ENERGIJE (IZLOČITEV ODJEMALCEV)
Three commitments directly relate to this concern: (i) the elimination of GDP’s right of first refusal for the gas supply of TER, (ii) the suspension of some of EDP’s voting rights in Turbogás for three years and (iii) the partial lease of TER.
To vprašanje neposredno urejajo tri obveznosti: (i) odvzem pravice družbe GDP do prve zavrnitve dobave plina TER-u, (ii) začasen odvzem nekaterih glasovalnih pravic družbe EDP v Turbogásu za obdobje treh let, in (iii) delni zakup TER-a.
Market participants have underlined that the elimination of GDP’s right of first refusal to supply TER does not eliminate EDP’s incentives to source gas supply from GDP; (ii) the mere suspension of some voting rights for a limited period of time does not prevent EDP’s influence on Turbogás’ gas supply policy; (iii) the lease accounts only for one third of TER and the lessee will have to buy most of its gas from GDP.
Udeleženci na trgu so poudarili, da odvzem pravice družbe GDP do prve zavrnitve dobave plina TER-u ne odpravlja interesa družbe EDP, da plin dobavlja iz GDP-ja; (ii) navaden odvzem nekaterih glasovalnih pravic za določen čas ne pomeni, da družba EDP ne bo več mogla vplivati na Turbogásovo politiko dobave plina; (iii) zakup zajema le eno tretjino TER-a, zato bo moral zakupnik kupovati večino plina od družbe GDP.
The Commission therefore considers that these commitments fall short from addressing the strengthening of GDP’s dominant position in the market for gas supply to power producers.
Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da te obveznosti sploh ne zadevajo krepitve prevladujočega položaja družbe GDP na trgu dobave pline proizvajalcem energije.
GAS SUPPLY TO LDCS (CUSTOMER FORECLOSURE)
DOBAVA PLINA LOKALNIM DISTRIBUTERJEM (IZLOČITEV ODJEMALCEV)
The operation forecloses the gas demand of Portgás, the only LDC not controlled by GDP.
Transakcija bo izločila Portgás, edinega lokalnega distributerja, ki ni pod nadzorom družbe GDP.
The gas consumption of the LDC proposed to be divested, Setgás, is four times as small as Portgás’.
Poraba plina lokalnega distributerja Setgása, za katerega je bila predlagana odprodaja, je štirikrat manjša od porabe Portgása.
The commitment therefore does not remove the strengthening of GDP’s dominant position in the market for the gas supply of LDCs.
Obveznost tako ne preprečuje krepitve prevladujočega položaja družbe GDP na trgu dobave plina lokalnim distributerjem.
GAS SUPPLY TO LARGE INDUSTRIAL CUSTOMERS (LICS)
DOBAVA PLINA VELIKIM INDUSTRIJSKIM ODJEMALCEM
The only remedies which directly address the concerns raised in this market are the commitments not to engage in dual offers (gas/electricity) before the gas liberalisation of LICs and to offer LICs the possibility to renew their gas contract on a yearly basis.
Edina ukrepa, ki se neposredno nanašata na problematiko na tem trgu, sta ne dajati ponudb za zemeljski plin in električno energijo, dokler se dobava zemeljskega plina velikim industrijskim odjemalcem ne liberalizira, in velikim industrijskim odjemalcem ponuditi možnost, da lahko pogodbo za dobavo plina vsako leto podaljšajo.
Both remedies fall short from ensuring that a new competitor will enter the gas market for LICs.
Noben izmed teh dveh ukrepov pa ne zagotavlja vstopa novega konkurenta na trg dobave plina velikim industrijskim odjemalcem.
Nevertheless, remedies which may have an indirect impact on this concern have also been analysed: as regards gas import infrastructures, high uncertainties remain as to whether sufficient capacities will be available.
Kljub temu je bila opravljena tudi analiza ukrepov, ki morda posredno vplivajo na to problematiko: na področju infrastrukture za uvoz plina je zagotovitev ustreznih zmogljivosti precej dvomljiva.
Besides, Setgás, which would be divested, accounts for less than 10 % of the gas customers in Portugal and would be a much more limited starting base to enter the LIC market as compared with EDP’s electricity and Portgás’ gas customer bases.
Poleg tega Setgás, ki naj bi bil odprodan, predstavlja manj kot 10 % odjemalcev plina na Portugalskem in ima za uspešen vstop na trg velikih industrijskih odjemalcev premajhen krog uporabnikov v primerjavi z odjemalci električne energije, ki jih pokriva EDP, in odjemalci plina, ki jih pokriva Portgás.
GAS SUPPLY TO SMALL CUSTOMERS
DOBAVA PLINA MALIM ODJEMALCEM
The divestiture of Setgás is a structural remedy but does not compensate for the loss of EDP/Portgás future competition in the gas retail market: Setgás’ sales account for 8 % of the overall gas retail sales in Portugal while Portgás holds a 30 % market share.
Odprodaja Setgása je ukrep za izboljšanje strukture, ni pa ustrezno sredstvo za zapolnitev vrzeli, ki bi na maloprodajnem trgu plina nastala zaradi umika bodoče konkurenčne družbe EDP/Portgás: prodaja Setgása predstavlja 8 % skupne maloprodaje plina na Portugalskem, medtem ko ima Portgás 30-odstotni tržni delež.
The commitment not to offer dual-fuel supplies to retail gas customers who are not yet eligible in both gas and electricity is very limited in time and effect.
Obveznost, ki določa, da se ne sme izvajati dobava električne energije tistim maloprodajnim odjemalcem, ki še niso upravičeni do obeh, električne energije in plina, je časovno in po učinku zelo omejena.
No other remedy has been proposed to directly address the loss of potential competition stemming from EDP’s ability to rely on its nationwide electricity customer base, its strong brand and its incentive to provide dual offers (electricity/gas) to customers.
Predlagan ni bil noben drug ukrep, ki bi neposredno obravnaval izgubo konkurence zaradi tega, ker se lahko EDP zanaša na obstoječe odjemalce električne energije po celotni državi, svojo močno blagovno znamko in interes odjemalcem ponujati električno energijo in plin.
LATE REMEDIES
PREPOZNA PREDLOŽITEV UKREPOV
After the expiration of the deadline set for the submission of remedies [15], on 26 November 2004, the parties submitted documents proposing to amend the remedies already presented, with a view to addressing the concerns raised by the Commission.
Po izteku roka za predložitev ukrepov [15] sta stranki 26. novembra 2004 predložili dokumente, s katerimi sta želeli spremeniti že predstavljene ukrepe in se lotiti problematike, ki jo je izpostavila Komisija.
However, these remedies did not fully and unambiguously remove the competition concerns identified by the Commission.
Ti ukrepi pa niso ponudili celovitih in nedvoumnih rešitev na vprašanja o konkurenci, ki jih je zastavila Komisija.
On Friday evening 3 December 2004, the parties submitted new set of ‘gas commitments’ aiming to implement the intentions stated by them in the document sent to the Commission on 26 November 2004.
V petek zvečer, dne 3. decembra 2004, sta stranki predložili novo zbirko „obveznosti s področja plinske problematike“, katerih cilj je uresničitev ciljev, predvidenih v dokumentu, ki sta ga stranki poslali Komisiji dne 26. novembra 2004.
Considering the very late stage of the procedure at which these new commitments have been presented (only three working days before the Commission meeting of 9 December 2004 scheduled for the adoption of the final decision, leaving insufficient time for the Commission to assess them in accordance with procedural obligations) and given that this proposal merely aims to implement the intentions expressed in the document sent on 26 November 2004, this latest set of commitments cannot form the basis of an authorisation decision.
Glede na to, da so bile te nove obveznosti predložene šele proti koncu postopka (le tri delovne dni pred sejo Komisije 9. decembra 2004, na kateri naj bi ta sprejela končno odločbo, tako da ni imela dovolj časa, da bi obveznosti ocenila v skladu s predpisanim postopkom) in da je cilj tega predloga zgolj uresničitev ciljev, predvidenih v dokumentu, ki je bil poslan 26. novembra 2004, ta najnovejša zbirka obveznosti ne more biti podlaga za sprejetje odločbe o odobritvi.
CONCLUSION
SKLEPNA UGOTOVITEV
For the reasons outlined above, considered individually or together, the Commission issued a decision on 9 December 2004, which declared the proposed concentration incompatible with the common market pursuant to Article 8(3) of the ECMR in that it strengthens dominant positions in several gas and electricity markets in Portugal as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in a substantial part of the common market.
Komisija je v skladu z razlogi, opisanimi v tem povzetku odločbe, ki jih je upoštevala posamično ali kot celoto, 9. decembra 2004 izdala odločbo, s katero razglaša, da je predlagana koncentracija v skladu s členom 8(3) Uredbe o združitvi nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom, ker krepi prevladujoče položaje na več trgih plina in električne energije na Portugalskem, kar bi bistveno oviralo učinkovito konkurenco na širšem območju skupnega trga.
Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC (OJ L 176, 15.7.2003, p. 57).
Direktiva Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 2003/55/ES z dne 26. junija 2003 o skupnih pravilih notranjega trga z zemeljskim plinom in o razveljavitvi Direktive 98/30/ES (UL L 176, 15.7.2003, str. 57).
See Case COMP/M.3268-Sydkraft/Graninge.
Glej primer COMP/M.3268-Sydkraft/Graninge.
The price formula essentially guarantees the payment for capacity (which implies a predetermined return on invested capital for the plant) and for energy (based on a reflection of costs).
Formula za izračun cene v bistvu zagotavlja plačilo za kapacitete (kar za elektrarno pomeni vnaprej določen donos vloženega kapitala) in energijo (z upoštevanjem stroškov).