natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Germany first arranged for the auction to take place in 2002, then in 2003.
Nemčija je javno dražbo najprej načrtovala v letu 2002, nato pa v letu 2003.
In order to ensure that Jahnke might acquire the assets at this auction, it was first to acquire the liens from HAMESTA’s creditors and then the assets.
Da bi podjetje Jahnke na tej dražbi zagotovo pridobilo premoženje, bi moralo najprej od upnikov podjetja HAMESTA pridobiti zastavne pravice in nato še premoženje.
Jahnke also took over HAMESTA’s stock for a purchase price of EUR 76694. Moreover, between 2000 and 2002 it invested some EUR 237000 in repairs to the assets.
Podjetje Jahnke je nato prevzelo zaloge podjetja HAMESTA za nakupno ceno v višini 76694 EUR in med letoma 2000 in 2002 investiralo okoli 237000 EUR za vzdrževanje premoženja.
HAMESTA’s receiver informed Mr Jahnke by letter dated 30 November 1999 of his intention to sell Jahnke HAMESTA’s assets for a purchase price of EUR 2,5 million, provided he secured the agreement of the creditors’ meeting.
Stečajni upravitelj podjetja HAMESTA je z dopisom z dne 30. novembra 1999 Jahnkeju sporočil svojo namero, da mu bo za ceno 2,5 milijonov EUR prodal premoženje podjetja HAMESTA pod pogojem, da Jahnke pridobi soglasje upniškega odbora.
The assets were at that time rented out to someone else (until 31 March 2000 at the latest).
Premoženje je imel v tistem času do najmanj 31. marca 2000 že v najemu nekdo drug.
The receiver also proposed to Mr Jahnke that he might, in agreement with the other tenant, utilise the assets for a fee of about EUR 13000, payable after 1 January 2000.
Poleg tega je gospodu Jahnkeju ponudil, da bi lahko v dogovoru z najemnikom uporabljal premoženje v zameno za znesek okoli 13000 EUR, plačljiv od 1. januarja 2000 dalje.
The sales contract concluded between the receiver and Jahnke in February 2000 never became effective as HAMESTA’s creditors’ meeting preferred to sell the assets by public auction.
Prodajna pogodba, sklenjena februarja 2000 med stečajnim upraviteljem in Jahnkejem, ni bila nikoli veljavna, saj se je upniški odbor podjetja HAMESTA odločil, da bo premoženje prodal na javni dražbi.
A new rental agreement between the receiver and Jahnke was concluded in May 2000. This agreement could be terminated at six months’ notice at year’s end.
Maja 2000 sta stečajni upravitelj in Jahnke sklenila novo najemno pogodbo, ki jo je bilo mogoče prekiniti s šestmesečnim odpovednim rokom ob koncu leta.
It would expire when HAMESTA came out of receivership.
Pogodba bi se iztekla ob zaključku stečajnega postopka HAMESTE.
The Commission considers that it does not follow clearly from the letter of 30 November 1999 that the receiver was committing himself to a final takeover of the assets by Jahnke.
Komisija je mnenja, da iz dopisa z dne 30. novembra 1999 ni jasno razvidno, da se je stečajni upravitelj odločil za dokončni prevzem premoženja s strani podjetja Jahnke.
The receiver was merely proposing to Mr Jahnke that he might, in agreement with the other tenant, utilise the assets for an indeterminate duration.
Gospodu Jahnkeju je zgolj ponudil, da bi v dogovoru s tedanjim najemnikom uporabljal premoženje za nedoločen čas.
Mr Jahnke could utilise the assets until such time as the receiver terminated the agreement within the legal deadline.
Gospod Jahnke bi premoženje lahko uporabljal tako dolgo, dokler ne bi stečajni upravitelj pogodbe prekinil v zakonsko določenem roku.
The receiver was manifestly unable in November 1999 to enter into a long-term commitment for a takeover of the assets as he did not have the agreement of the creditors’ meeting.
Stečajni upravitelj se novembra 1999 ni mogel dogovoriti za dolgoročni prevzem premoženja, saj ni imel soglasja upniškega odbora.
As became clear in February 2000, the creditors’ meeting was not in favour of a direct asset sale to Jahnke but preferred to sell the assets via a public auction.
Februarja 2000 je postalo jasno, da upniški odbor ne podpira neposredne prodaje premoženja Jahnkeju, temveč se je raje odločil za prodajo na javni dražbi.
The public auction of HAMESTA’s assets has not yet taken place.
Načrtovane dražbe premoženja podjetja HAMESTA doslej še ni bilo.
According to the German authorities, the value of the assets has to be re-established before the auction can take place (now scheduled for the end of 2003).
Po besedah nemških organov je treba premoženje ponovno oceniti, da bo lahko prišlo do dražbe, ki je zaenkrat predvidena ob koncu leta 2003.
The Commission cannot therefore assume that Jahnke will be able to acquire the assets or operate them on a permanent basis.
Zato Komisija ne more predvidevati, da bo Jahnke premoženje lahko kupil ali ga trajno uporabljal.
The present case is different from the Homatec and Ambau cases, both of which fell under the 1994 guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [11].
Pričujoči primer se razlikuje od primerov HOMATEC in AMBAU, za katera so veljale smernice iz leta 1994 za presojo državnih pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah [11].
Owing to the exceptional circumstances prevailing in the new Länder, the Commission authorised under the 1994 guidelines restructuring aid to firms newly created in the form of so-called ‘Auffanglösung’ [12].
Zaradi izrednih okoliščin v novih zveznih deželah je Komisija v skladu s smernicami iz leta 1994 odobrila pomoč za prestrukturiranje novoustanovljenim podjetjem v obliki t. i. „Auffanglösungen“ [12].
As Homatec and Ambau were both Auffanglösungen and as all the relevant criteria of the 1994 guidelines were satisfied, the Commission was able to approve the restructuring aid for these two companies at that time.
Ker je šlo pri HOMATECU in AMBAUU za „Auffanglösungen“ in ker so bili izpolnjena vsa merila smernic iz leta 1994, se je lahko Komisija strinjala s pomočjo za prestrukturiranje za obe podjetji.
The present case, however, concerns the application of the 1999 guidelines, under which the Auffanglösung concept was limited to cases dealt with before 31 December 1999.
Pričujoči primer se nanaša na uporabo smernic iz leta 1999, s katerimi so koncept „Auffanglösungen“ omejili na primere, ki so bili obravnavani pred 31. decembrom 1999.
Moreover, the circumstances of the present case are factually different inasmuch as the economic operation of HAMESTA was not taken over by Jahnke on a long-term basis but only on the basis of an offer from the receiver to utilise the assets and only until such time as the receivership was closed.
Pričujoči primer se dejansko razlikuje, saj podjetje Jahnke ni dolgoročno prevzelo poslovanja podjetja HAMESTA, temveč je lahko na podlagi ponudbe stečajnega upravitelja uporabljalo premoženje le do zaključka stečajnega postopka.
The present case is therefore different from the two aforementioned cases.
Tako se pričujoči primer razlikuje od obeh zgoraj omenjenih primerov.
As the case falls to be assessed under the new, stricter guidelines, the Commission must apply different criteria from those used in the Homatec and Ambau cases.
Ker je ta primer potrebno oceniti s pomočjo novih, strožjih smernic, mora Komisija določiti drugačna merila kot v primerih HOMATEC in AMBAU.
For the reasons set out above, the Commission cannot consider that Jahnke fulfils the criteria for exemption from the general prohibition on restructuring aid to a newly created firm.
Iz zgoraj pojasnjenih razlogov Komisija ne more upoštevati, da Jahnke izpolnjuje pogoje za izjemo od splošne prepovedi pomoči za prestrukturiranje za novoustanovljena podjetja.
The Commission believes that its considerations about the non-eligibility for restructuring aid are reason enough to find that the aid does not meet the conditions for a favourable exercise of its discretion under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija je mnenja, da pomisleki glede prepovedi pomoči za prestrukturiranje utemeljujejo ugotovitev, da pomoč ni izpolnjevala pogojev za uporabo člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES.
However, in order to assess whether the measures fulfil the other criteria of the approved aid schemes, the Commission has also examined the other relevant criteria of the guidelines.
Da bi lahko ugotovila, ali ukrepi izpolnjujejo druga merila odobrenega programa pomoči, je Komisija proučila ostale zadevna merila smernic.
Restoration of viability
Vzpostavitev rentabilnosti
According to the guidelines, the restructuring plan must restore the long-term viability and health of the firm within a reasonable timescale and on the basis of realistic assumptions as to its future operating conditions.
V skladu s smernicami mora načrt za prestrukturiranje voditi k vzpostavitvi dolgoročne rentabilnosti in zdravja podjetja v ustreznem roku na podlagi realističnih predpostavk glede prihodnjih operativnih pogojev.
To fulfil the viability criterion, the restructuring plan must be considered capable of putting the firm into a position of covering all its costs including depreciation and financial charges and generating a minimum return on capital such that, after completing its restructuring, the firm will not require further injections of State aid and will be able to compete in the market place on its own merits.
Da bi bilo merilo rentabilnosti izpolnjeno, mora biti načrt za prestrukturiranje takšen, da podjetje pripelje v položaj, ko lahko pokriva vse svoje stroške, vključno z amortizacijo in finančnimi dajatvami, ter da doseže minimalni donos kapitala, tako da po prestrukturiranju ne potrebuje več dodatne pomoči in da se lahko s konkurenco na trgu spopade z lastnimi močmi.
In its decision to open the formal investigation procedure the Commission noted that the cooperation with Jahnke Lenzen was a main element of the restructuring plan.
V svojem sklepu o sprožitvi uradnega postopka preiskave je Komisija ugotovila, da je sodelovanje s podjetjem Jahnke Lenzen glavni sestavni del načrta za prestrukturiranje.
The Commission pointed out in this connection that it could not endorse a restructuring plan under which the definitive beneficiary of the aid would not necessarily be in a position to carry out the restructuring measures.
Komisija je pripomnila, da se ne bi mogla strinjati z načrtom za prestrukturiranje, če prejemnik pomoči ne bi bil v položaju, da sam izpelje ukrepe za prestrukturiranje.
Furthermore, the Commission raised doubts whether the investor would have the necessary financial resources to acquire the assets.
Poleg tega je Komisija izrazila dvom, da bi investitor imel potrebna denarna sredstva za nakup premoženja.
In the light of the fact that the restructuring period was to end in November 2002 but the public auction was only to take place between March and September 2002, the Commission also raised doubts whether the restructuring plan could restore the long-term viability of Jahnke in accordance with the guidelines.
Spričo dejstva, da naj bi se prestrukturiranje zaključilo novembra 2002, javna dražba pa naj bi potekala med marcem in septembrom 2002, je Komisija izrazila pomisleke, ali bi načrt za prestrukturiranje lahko v skladu s smernicami vzpostavil dolgoročno rentabilnost podjetja Jahnke.
From the information set out above it appears that so far Jahnke has been unable to permanently acquire HAMESTA’s assets, which in itself shows that the undertaking is not viable.
Iz navedenih podatkov izhaja, da podjetje Jahnke doslej ni moglo dokončno pridobiti premoženja podjetja HAMESTA, kar že samo po sebi kaže na to, da podjetje ni sposobno preživeti.
For the following reasons it seems hardly possible that Jahnke will be able to acquire the assets in the near future:
Iz spodnjih razlogov se zdi malo verjetno, da bi podjetje Jahnke v bližnji prihodnosti lahko pridobilo to premoženje:
the bank loan of EUR 2,5 million, necessary for financing the sales price of the assets, has not been granted;
bančno posojilo v višini 2,5 milijona EUR, ki je potrebno za financiranje nakupne cene premoženja, ni bilo dodeljeno;
the investor himself has only limited financial resources; and
investitor razpolaga le z omejenimi denarnimi sredstvi; in
Jahnke applied for insolvency in 2002.
podjetje Jahnke je leta 2002 napovedalo stečaj.
The weakness of the restructuring plan lies in the fact that at no time was the precondition for its implementation, i.e. the takeover of the assets, financially secured.
Slabost načrta za prestrukturiranje je, da predpogoj za izvedbo, tj. za prevzem premoženja, nikoli ni bil finančno zavarovan.
The information submitted after the opening of the procedure does not allow the conclusion to be drawn that at any point has a clear commitment been given by the financing bank.
Iz podatkov, predloženih po sklepu o sprožitvi postopka, ni mogoče sklepati, da se je banka kdaj koli zavezala k sodelovanju.
Nor does this information show that the investor could have obtained the lacking financial support from out of his own resources, as they had already been allocated to financing the start-up measures, or from the planned profits of the business itself, as these would have been insufficient.
Iz opisov prav tako ni razvidno, da bi investitor manjkajoča denarna sredstva lahko financiral iz svojih virov, ki so bili uporabljeni za financiranje začetnih ukrepov, ali pa iz načrtovanega dobička podjetja, saj bi bil le-ta nezadosten.
The Commission’s initial doubts have been confirmed by the fact that the actual performance of Jahnke has been below expectations.
Nadalje je mogoče ugotoviti, da so bili dvomi Komisije potrjeni, saj so bili dejanski rezultati poslovanja podjetja Jahnke pod pričakovanji.
Whereas the restructuring plan foresaw an annual result of EUR 250000 in 2000 and EUR 600000 in 2001, the actual result has been about EUR 100000 in 2000 and EUR 15000 in 2001.
Načrt za prestrukturiranje je predvideval letni rezultat v višini 250000 EUR leta 2000 in v višini 600000 EUR leta 2001, dejanska rezultata pa sta znašala 100000 EUR leta 2000 in 15000 EUR leta 2001.
The Commission cannot consider the restructuring plan as being based on realistic assumptions or that Jahnke will be restored to long-term viability within a reasonable timescale.
Komisija ne more upoštevati, da načrt za prestrukturiranje sloni na realističnih predpostavkah in da bo dolgoročna rentabilnost podjetja Jahnke vzpostavljena v ustreznem roku.
The restructuring plan must contain measures to offset as far as possible adverse effects on competitors, otherwise the aid involved is contrary to the common interest and not eligible for exemption pursuant to Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.
Načrt za prestrukturiranje mora vsebovati ukrepe za izravnavo morebitnih negativnih vplivov na konkurenco, saj je v nasprotnem primeru dodeljena pomoč v nasprotju s skupnim interesom in ne pride v poštev za izjemo po členu 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES.
This implies that, if the undertaking concerned is active in a market in the EU where an objective assessment of supply and demand shows that there is a structural excess of production capacity, the restructuring plan must make a significant contribution, proportionate to the amount of aid received, to the restructuring of the industry serving the relevant market by irreversibly reducing or closing capacity.
To pomeni, da mora v primeru, če zadevno podjetje deluje na trgu Skupnosti, kjer objektivna ocena ponudbe in povpraševanja kaže, da obstaja strukturni presežek proizvodnih kapacitet, načrt za prestrukturiranje predvideti znatni prispevek, ki mora biti v ustreznem razmerju z vsoto prejete pomoči, za namen prestrukturiranja gospodarske panoge na upoštevanem trgu v Skupnosti z dokončnim zmanjšanjem ali zaprtjem kapacitet.
In cases where there is no structural excess of production capacity, the Commission will not normally require a reduction of capacity in return for the aid.
Če ni strukturnega presežka proizvodnih kapacitet, Komisija ne zahteva zmanjšanja kapacitet v zameno za pomoč.
Since Jahnke is an SME and the restructuring plan does not provide for any increase in production capacity, the Commission considers the corresponding criterion of the guidelines to be fulfilled.
Ker je Jahnke MSP in ker načrt za prestrukturiranje ne predvideva širjenja proizvodnih kapacitet, Komisija meni, da so ustrezna merila smernic izpolnjena.
Proportionality to the restructuring costs and benefits
Sorazmernost stroškov prestrukturiranja in koristi
The amount and intensity of the aid must be limited to the strict minimum needed to enable the restructuring to be undertaken and in the Commission’s opinion must be proportionate to the expected benefits.
Znesek in intenzivnost pomoči morata biti omejena na najnižjo vsoto, da se omogoči prestrukturiranje, in morata biti po mnenju Komisije v ustreznem razmerju s pričakovano koristjo.
The investor must therefore make a significant contribution towards the restructuring costs from out of his own resources.
Zato mora investitor iz lastnih sredstev prispevati znaten delež k stroškom za prestrukturiranje.
On the basis of the information provided by Germany, the proposed own contribution of the investor is about 21 % of the total costs.
Po podatkih, ki jih je predložila Nemčija, znaša predvideni lastni prispevek investitorja okoli 21 % vseh stroškov.
Because Jahnke is a firm in the small to medium-sized category, the Commission is justified in taking a less restrictive attitude towards the aid.
Ker spada Jahnke med srednje velika podjetja, lahko Komisija pomoč ocenjuje manj strogo.
It is, therefore, of the opinion that the investor contribution is reasonable.
Zato je Komisija mnenja, da je lastni prispevek investitorja ustrezen.
In the light of the above considerations, the Commission finds that, even though its initial doubts concerning the undue distortion of competition and the proportionality of the aid have been allayed, neither the conditions set out in the guidelines concerning the eligibility of the company nor those concerning the viability of the restructuring plan have been met.
Glede na zgoraj omenjene premisleke Komisija ugotavlja, da kljub temu, da dvomov glede nesprejemljivega izkrivljanja konkurence in glede primernosti pomoči ni več, niso izpolnjena niti merila za izpolnjevanje pogojev za pridobitev pomoči niti merilo rentabilnosti smernic za prestrukturiranje.
Consequently, the aid has to be considered incompatible with the common market.
Zato pomoč ni združljiva s skupnim trgom.
The Commission finds that the Federal Republic of Germany has unlawfully granted aid of about EUR 820000 in breach of Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.
Komisija ugotavlja, da je Zvezna republika Nemčija nezakonito dodelila pomoč v višini okoli 820000 EUR in s tem kršila člen 88(3) Pogodbe ES.
The unlawfully granted aid, consisting of two loans from the BvS totalling EUR 560000 and a loan from the Land of Saxony-Anhalt amounting to EUR 260000, must, in so far as it has not been repaid, be recovered from the recipient,
Nezakonito dodeljeno pomoč, sestavljeno iz dveh posojil BvS v višini 560000 EUR in enega posojila dežele Saška-Anhalt v višini 260000 EUR, mora prejemnik vrniti, v kolikor tega že ni storil –
The aid which Germany has granted to Jahnke Stahlbau GmbH in the form of two loans from the BvS totalling EUR 560000 and a loan from the Land of Saxony-Anhalt amounting to EUR 260000 is incompatible with the common market.
Pomoč Nemčije za Jahnke Stahlbau GmbH v višini 560000 EUR v obliki dveh posojil BvS in 260000 EUR v obliki posojila dežele Saška-Anhalt ni združljiva s skupnim trgom.
The aid which Germany has granted in the form of a EUR 2000000 guarantee from the Land of Saxony-Anhalt in favour of Jahnke Stahlbau GmbH is incompatible with the common market.
Pomoč Nemčije v obliki jamstva dežele Saška-Anhalt za Jahnke Stahlbau GmbH v višini 2000000 EUR ni združljiva s skupnim trgom.
Germany shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid referred to in Article 1 and unlawfully made available to the recipient.
Nemčija bo sprejela vse potrebne ukrepe, da bo v členu 1 omenjeno in protipravno dodeljeno pomoč izterjala od prejemnika.
Recovery shall be effected without delay and in accordance with the procedures of national law provided that they allow the immediate and effective execution of the decision.
Izterjava pomoči bo izvedena v skladu s postopki nacionalnega prava, v kolikor le-to omogoča takojšnjo in učinkovito izvršitev odločbe.
The aid to be recovered shall include interest from the date on which it was at the disposal of the recipient until the date of its recovery.
Pomoč, ki jo je treba vrniti, vključuje obresti od datuma, ko je prejemnik pomoč prejel, do datuma, ko jo je dejansko vrnil.
Germany shall inform the Commission, within two months of notification of this Decision, of the measures taken to comply with it.
Nemčija bo Komisiji najpozneje v 2 mesecih od objave te odločbe sporočila, s katerimi ukrepi bo izvršila to odločbo.
Done at Brussels, 1 October 2003.
V Bruslju, dne 1. oktobra 2003
OJ C 160, 2.6.2001, p. 2.
UL C 160, 2.6.2001, str. 2.
Guarantee guidelines of the Land of Saxony-Anhalt, circular of 4 April 2000 (Bürgschaftsrichtlinie des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt RdErl vom 4.4.2000), N 413/91; E 5/94; E 8/01.
Direktiva o jamstvu dežele Saška-Anhalt, okrožnica z dne 4. aprila 2000 (Bürgschaftsrichtlinie des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt RdErl vom 4.4.2000), N 413/91; E 5/94; E 8/01.
Granted under the guidelines for granting consolidation loans to small and medium-sized businesses in the Land of Saxony-Anhalt (Richtlinie über die Gewährung von Konsolidierungsdarlehen an mittelständische Unternehmen im Land Sachsen-Anhalt), an aid scheme approved by the Commission under number N 452/97.
Dodeljeno v skladu z direktivo o dodelitvi konsolidacijskega posojila majhnim in srednje velikim podjetjem v deželi Saška-Anhalt (Richtlinie über die Gewährung von Konsolidierungsdarlehen an mittelständische Unternehmen im Land Sachsen-Anhalt), programom pomoči, ki ga je odobrila Komisija pod številko 452/97.
Homatec: decision of 12.7.2002 (OJ C 310, 13.12.2002, p. 22); Ambau: Commission Decision 2003/261/EC (OJ L 103, 24.4.2003, p. 51).
HOMATEC: sklep z dne 12. julija 2002 (UL C 310, 13.12.2002, str. 22); AMBAU: Odločba Komisije 2003/261/ES (UL L 103, 24.4.2003, str. 51).
OJ L 107, 30.4.1996, p. 4. See also Annex, Article 11 paragraphs 1 and 6.
UL L 107, 30.4.1996, str. 4; glej tudi Prilogo, odstavka 1 in 6 člena 1.
As adapted by circulars of the Ministry of Finance dated 4 April 2000 and 3 March 2001.
Tem smernicam prilagojeno z okrožnicami Ministrstva za finance dne 4. aprila 2000 in 3. marca 2001.
These guidelines are applicable inasmuch as part of the aid was granted after they were published (see point 101 of the guidelines).
Te smernice se uporabljajo, če je bil del pomoči dodeljen po njihovi objavi (glej točko 101 smernic).
OJ C 386, 23.12.1994, p. 12.
UL C 386, 23.12.1994, str. 12.
New firms evolving out of the bankruptcy proceedings and taking over the economic operation of the bankrupt business.
Nova podjetja, ki so nastala iz stečajnih postopkov in ki so prevzela posel predhodnega podjetja, ki je šlo v stečaj.
On 17 January 2003, Germany informed the Commission that Jahnke had applied for insolvency. On 31 July 2003, Germany informed the Commission that Jahnke’s insolvency proceedings had been opened in February 2003.
januarja 2003 je Nemčija Komisiji sporočila, da je Jahnke zaprosil za stečajni postopek; julija 2003 je nadalje sporočila, da se je stečajni postopek začel februarja 2003.
Germany has provided the Commission with detailed information concerning the situation in the steel construction market.
Nemčija je Komisiji predložila podrobne podatke o stanju na trgu jeklenih konstrukcij in s tem dokazala, da na nemškem trgu ni strukturnih presežkov proizvodnih kapacitet.
The Commission is satisfied that there is no structural excess of production capacity in the market in which Jahnke Halle is predominantly active, namely the German market, in which its market share is less than 1 %, and in the European market, where its market share is less than 0,001 %.
Podjetje Jahnke Halle je dejavno predvsem na nemškem trgu, kjer njegov tržni delež znaša manj kot 1 %. Prav tako ni strukturnih presežkov proizvodnih kapacitet na evropskem trgu, kjer ima Jahnke tržni delež pod 0,001 %.
on the State aid which France is planning to implement for Bull
o državni pomoči Francije za Bull