natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, the Commission recognises that operators’ licences cannot be modified freely by OFGEM, which has a duty to consult third parties on such modifications and take account of comments received.
Vseeno Komisija priznava, da OFGEM dovoljenj proizvajalcev ne more poljubno spreminjati, ampak se mora o takšnih spremembah posvetovati s tretjimi osebami in upoštevati prejete pripombe.
Should it not be possible for OFGEM to modify one of BE’s licences in such a way as to forbid cross subsidisation, the UK Government should provide the Commission with a not limited in time undertaking with the same effect.
Če OFGEM ne bi mogel spremeniti enega od dovoljenj družbe BE tako, da bi s tem preprečil navzkrižno subvencioniranje, mora vlada Združenega kraljestva Komisiji predložiti časovno neomejeno obvezo z enakim učinkom.
In such a case, in order to further ensure that trade between the subsidiaries does not involve elements of cross-subsidy, the UK authorities should provide the Commission with an annual report displaying evidence that no such cross subsidy has occurred.
V takšnem primeru morajo organi Združenega kraljestva Komisiji za zagotovitev nadaljnje trgovine med hčerinskimi družbami brez navzkrižnih subvencij predložiti letno poročilo z dokazom, da se takšne navzkrižne subvencije niso izvajale.
The report should be based on an analysis by independent accounting experts.
To poročilo mora temeljiti na analizi neodvisnih računovodskih izvedencev.
The UK authorities have undertaken to implement this compensatory measure.
Organi Združenega kraljestva so se obvezali za izvedbo tega izravnalnega ukrepa.
Compensatory measure No 2.
Izravnalni ukrep št. 2.
Compensatory measure No 1 should in principle be sufficient to ensure that BE does not use the aid it receives for its nuclear reactors to improve or enlarge its existing non-nuclear fleet.
Izravnalni ukrep št. 1 bi moral zadostovati za zagotovitev, da družba BE pomoči, dodeljene za jedrske reaktorje, ne bo porabila za izboljšanje ali povečanje svojega sedanjega nejedrskega potenciala.
However, in view of the complexity of the electricity sector and in particular of the very large range of possible relationships between the different actors that NETA allows, the Commission considers that it is necessary to enforce other, more specific, measures, to further ensure that BE does not use the aid it receives for its nuclear reactors in other fields of its business.
Vseeno Komisija glede na kompleksnost sektorja za električno energijo in še zlasti velik razpon mogočih odnosov med različnimi udeleženci, ki jih omogoča nova ureditev trgovanja z električno energijo, upošteva, da je nujno izvajanje drugih, podrobnejših ukrepov za nadaljnjo zagotovitev, da družba BE pomoči, dodeljene za jedrske reaktorje, ne bo porabila na drugih področjih svojega delovanja.
Furthermore, although the capacity situation in the market does not make it economically sound to impose capacity reductions upon BE, the Commission judges that BE should nevertheless be required not to increase the scope of its activities.
Ob tem Komisija meni, da se mora od družbe BE kljub temu, da na podlagi sedanje zmogljivosti na trgu zmanjševanje zmogljivosti družbe BE z gospodarskega stališča ne bi bilo pametno, zahtevati, da ne povečuje obsega svojih dejavnosti.
In order to cope with those concerns, a series of prohibitions should be imposed on BE as regards its possible expansion in the generation fields where its competitors are active.
Da se sooči s temi težavami bi moral za družbo BE veljati niz prepovedi v zvezi z mogočo širitvijo na področja proizvodnje, na katerih delujejo njeni tekmeci.
For that purpose, a specific type of capacity should be identified (‘Restricted Capacity’).
Za ta namen bi morala biti določena posebna vrsta zmogljivosti („omejena zmogljivost“).
That capacity is composed of:
Ta zmogljivost vključuje:
registered operational fossil-fuelled capacity located in the European Economic Area,
registrirano proizvodno zmogljivost elektrarn na fosilna goriva v Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru,
registered operational large scale hydro [72] capacity located in the United Kingdom.
registrirano proizvodno zmogljivost večjih hidroelektrarn [72] v Združenem kraljestvu.
BE should be prohibited, for a period of six year from the date of this Decision, from owning or having the right of control over Restricted Capacity in excess of 2020MW, which is the capacity of its existing Eggborough (1970 MW) and District Energy (50 MW) stations.
Družbi BE bi se moralo, za šest let od datuma te odločbe, prepovedati lastništvo ali pravica do upravljanja z omejeno zmogljivostjo, ki presega 2020 MW, kar je zmogljivost njenih obstoječih elektrarn Eggborough (1970 MW) in District Energy (50 MW).
The reason for the need to prohibit any increase in BE’s fossil fuel capacity was explained in recital (437).
Razlog za prepoved povečanja zmogljivosti elektrarn družbe BE na fosilna goriva je pojasnjen v uvodni izjavi (436).
The Commission considers that there is a need to extend the prohibition to large scale hydroelectric stations to avoid any risk that BE might acquire existing large scale hydro stations especially in Scotland.
Komisija upošteva, da je treba za izognitev tveganju nakupa obstoječih velikih hidroelektrarn s strani družbe BE razširiti prepoved tudi na večje hidroelektrarne posebno na Škotskem.
The prohibition should last for six years, which is roughly twice the time necessary for the construction of a combined cycle gas turbine power plant.
Prepoved mora biti šestletna, kar je približno dvakrat toliko, kot je potrebno za gradnjo elektrarne s kombiniranimi plinsko-parnimi turbinami.
The objective of the prohibition is to prevent BE from acquiring more flexibility than it presently has with its Eggborough power plant, which should be sufficient to ensure its viability.
Cilj prepovedi je preprečiti družbi BE nakup bolj prilagodljive opreme, kot jo ima sedaj njena elektrarna Eggborough in kar zadostuje za zagotovitev sposobnosti preživetja.
However, the Commission is aware that, under the restructuring plan, the bank syndicate that provided finance for the Eggborough project will retain the option to purchase Eggborough from BE.
Vseeno se Komisija zaveda, da bo bančni konzorcij, ki je financiral projekt Eggborough, na podlagi načrta za prestrukturiranje, ohranil možnost odkupa elektrarne Eggborough od družbe BE.
Should the banks decide to exercise this option, BE would be deprived of its only source of flexibility, which the Commission recognises is necessary for the success restructuring plan.
Če se banke odločijo za to možnost, bi bila družba BE prikrajšana za svoj edini vir prilagodljivosti, ki je po mnenju Komisije nujen za uspešnost načrta za prestrukturiranje.
In this case, BE should be allowed to prepare for the replacement of Eggborough as soon as it receives notice from the banks of their intention to exercise their option.
V tem primeru bi moralo biti družbi BE dovoljeno, da se na zamenjavo elektrarne Eggborough pripravi takoj, ko jo banke obvestijo o svojem namenu za izvedbo te možnosti.
For this reason, the Commission considers that there should be some exception to the prohibition in the event that the banks exercise their option, in order to allow BE to acquire a source of flexibility to replace Eggborough, or in the event that Eggborough becomes definitively unavailable for a reason outside BE’s control.
Komisija zato upošteva, da bi morala v primeru, če se banke odločijo za izvedbo te možnosti, veljati pri prepovedi izjema, da se družbi BE omogočil nakup prilagodljivega vira za zamenjavo elektrarne Eggborough, ali v primeru, če elektrarna Eggborough ni več na voljo iz razloga, na katerega družba BE ni mogla vplivati.
This should not however have the ultimate effect of allowing BE to acquire more flexibility capacity than it presently has, nor to use this replacement capacity to make profit during the possible overlap period between the end of its construction and the disposal of Eggborough.
Vseeno to družbi BE ne bi smelo dopustiti nakupa bolj prilagodljive zmogljivosti, kot jo ima sedaj, ali ustvarjanja dobička z nadomestno zmogljivostjo v času med koncem gradnje in odstranitvijo elektrarne Eggborough.
In view of the above, BE should be allowed to own or have rights of control over more than 2020 MW of Restricted Capacity, for the period between the date on which it receives the notice from the banks and the date on which Eggborough’s capacity is no longer available to BE, or the end of the six year period referred to in recital (452) if earlier than the date on which where Eggborough’s capacity is no longer available to BE, under the condition that it does not operate the Restricted Capacity in excess of 2020 MW or that it divests itself of all operational control and interest in that excess Restricted Capacity.
Na tej podlagi bi moralo biti družbi BE dovoljeno imeti v lasti ali imeti pravico do upravljanja z več kot 2020 MW omejene zmogljivosti za obdobje med datumom prejetja obvestila bank in datumom, ko zmogljivost elektrarne Eggborough preneha biti na voljo družbi BE, ali pred koncem šestletnega obdobja iz uvodne izjave (b), če se to konča pred datumom, ko zmogljivost elektrarne Eggborough preneha biti na voljo družbi BE, pod pogojem, da ne obratuje z omejeno zmogljivostjo nad 2020 MW ali se odpove nadzoru obratovanja in deležu pri presežnem delu omejene zmogljivosti.
From the time Eggborough becomes unavailable to BE, either as referred to in recital (458) or after an event of force majeure or an irreparable failure, BE should be allowed to own or have right of control of up to 2222 MW of Restricted Capacity, under the condition that, until the end of the 6 year period referred to in recital (452), it declares its Restricted Capacity to the network operator as 2020 MW and does not operate more than 2020 MW of this capacity.
Ko elektrarna Eggborough preneha biti na voljo družbi BE, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi (457) ali v primeru višje sile ali nepopravljive napake, mora biti družbi BE dovoljeno imeti v lasti ali imeti pravico do upravljanja z do 2222 MW omejene zmogljivosti, pod pogojem, da je njena prijavljena omejena zmogljivost pri upravljavcu omrežja do konca šestletnega obdobja iz uvodne izjave (b) 2020 MW in da ne obratuje z več kot 2020 MW te zmogljivosti.
This provision aims at allowing BE to have more flexibility for the replacement of Eggborough, without relaxing the prohibition in practice.
Cilj te določbe je omogočiti družbi BE večjo prilagodljivost pri nadomestitvi elektrarne Eggborough, brez dejanskih olajšav prepovedi.
Finally, on top of the restrictions on Restricted Capacity as defined in recital (451), and in order to respect the philosophy of the guidelines on the necessity not to allow beneficiaries to use the State aid for the purpose of extending their market share, BE should also be forbidden to own nuclear generation assets other than those it presently owns, in the European Economic Area, without prior authorisation by the Commission, for six years following the date of adoption of this Decision.
Končno mora biti razen omejitev pri omejeni zmogljivosti iz uvodne izjave (450) družbi BE za spoštovanje filozofije Smernic o nujnosti preprečitve, da bi upravičenci porabili državno pomoč za povečanje tržnega deleža, tudi prepovedano imeti v lasti jedrsko premoženje, razen sedanjega, v Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru, brez predhodne odobritve Komisije, za obdobje šestih let po sprejetju te odločbe.
Compensatory measure No 3.
Izravnalni ukrep št. 3.
As was explained in recital (437), the aid would also be misused if, instead of aiming at covering BE’s nuclear reactors charges, it was used by BE to unduly acquire shares in the more profitable DSB market.
Kot je bilo pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (436), se pomoč zlorablja tudi, če je, namesto za pokritje stroškov jedrskih reaktorjev družbe BE, uporabljena za neupravičeno pridobitev deleža na bolj donosnem trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem.
The sensitivity of this potential misuse is particularly demonstrated by the content of the comments sent to the Commission by a third party that wished to remain anonymous [73].
Občutljivost možne zlorabe pomoči je dobro razvidna predvsem iz vsebine pripomb, ki jih je Komisiji poslala tretja stranka, ki je želela ostati anonimna [73].
Even if BE does not actually offer prices abnormally below market standards, the very suggestion that it might be able to do so thanks to the aid could also be harmful for BE’s competitors, since they would have to face customers with commercially incorrect expectations.
Čeprav družba BE v resnici ne ponuja cen, nenormalno pod tržnimi standardi, bi lahko imela že sama ideja, da bi to lahko storila s pomočjo pomoči, škodljiv vpliv na tekmece družbe BE, ker bi se morali soočiti z odjemalci z nepravilnimi tržnimi pričakovanji.
The Commission therefore considers that it is necessary to reinforce the guarantees already offered by Compensatory measure No 1 by a more specific compensatory measure aimed at BE’s behaviour on the DSB market.
Komisija zato upošteva, da je treba zagotovila iz izravnalnega ukrepa št. 1 okrepiti s posebnim izravnalnim ukrepom, osredotočenim na obnašanje družbe BE na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem.
BE should be required not to act on this market in ways that are not similar to its competitors’ standard.
Od družbe BE bi se moralo zahtevati, da na tem trgu ne deluje na način, ki ni podoben standardu tekmecev.
To ensure this, BE should be forbidden to offer prices below the prevailing wholesale market prices on the DSB market.
Za zagotovitev tega bi moralo biti družbi BE na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem prepovedano postavljati cene pod prevladujočimi veleprodajnimi cenami.
The duration of this measure should be six years from the date of this decision, as for Compensatory measure No 2.
Ta ukrep mora biti, tako kot izravnalni ukrep št. 2, veljaven šest let od datuma te odločbe.
The compliance of BE with the prohibition should be monitored by an independent body to be selected via a transparent tendering process organised by the UK authorities.
Spoštovanje prepovedi družbe BE mora spremljati neodvisni organ, izbran prek preglednega razpisa, ki ga pripravijo organi Združenega kraljestva.
The independent body should report annually to the Commission.
Neodvisni organ mora vsako leto poročati Komisiji.
In the past, DSB market prices have always followed the evolution of wholesale market prices with a premium.
V preteklosti so cene na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem vedno sledile spreminjanju veleprodajnih cen z dodatkom.
This prohibition will therefore ensure that BE does not behave commercially in a different way from that of its competitors.
Ta prepoved bo zato zagotovila, da se družba BE tržno ne bo obnašala drugače kot njeni tekmeci.
However, NETA is only three years old.
Vseeno je nova ureditev trgovanja z električno energijo stara šele tri leta.
It is not impossible that, in the upcoming 6 years, the relationship between the DSB and the wholesale market could during some times differ from what has been experienced until today.
Ni nemogoče, da se ne bi lahko, v prihodnjih šestih letih, odnos med trgom neposredne prodaje podjetjem in trgom na debelo v nekaterih obdobjih razlikoval od dosedanjih izkušenj.
One could imagine for instance that the wholesale market could become illiquid for some period, which could lead to abnormally high prices on this market.
Lahko bi si na primer predstavljali, da postane trg na debelo za določeno obdobje nelikviden, kar bi povzročilo nenormalno visoke cene na tem trgu.
In this case, the Commission considers that in order not to lose their customers, generators would certainly offer prices on the DSB market that would be somewhat below the wholesale market price.
V tem primeru Komisija upošteva, da bi proizvajalci za to, da ne bi izgubili svojih odjemalcev, na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem ponudili cene, nekoliko nižje od veleprodajnih cen.
If such a thing happened and BE did not have the capacity to react accordingly, it would be likely to lose its customer base on the DSB market, which would put its restructuring goal in peril.
Če bi prišlo do tega in družba BE ne bi bila sposobna ustrezno reagirati, bi verjetno izgubila svojo mrežo kupcev na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem, kar bi ogrozilo njen cilj prestrukturiranja.
It is therefore necessary that BE be left some flexibility to accommodate such exceptional events.
Zato je treba družbi BE pustiti nekaj prilagodljivosti za premostitev takšnih izjemnih okoliščin.
Its margin of manoeuvre should however be very limited, described in objective terms, and monitored carefully to avoid any abuse.
Njena meja delovanja za izognitev zlorabam mora vseeno biti zelo omejena, določena objektivno in dobro spremljana.
Criteria to allow BE to use its flexibility margin should be testable ex ante in order to avoid any abuse.
Merila za uporabo presežka prilagodljivosti družbe BE morajo biti za izognitev zlorabam predhodno preizkušena.
Since there is much less reliable reporting for DSB market prices than for wholesale market prices, it is very difficult to know during a DSB contract round whether DSB market prices will be offered below the wholesale market price.
Ker so poročila o cenah na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem precej manj zanesljiva kot poročila o veleprodajnih cenah, je v pogodbenem obdobju na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem težko napovedati, ali bodo ponujene cene na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem nižje od veleprodajnih cen.
This means that the objective criteria referred to in recital (469) cannot be directly based on checking whether BE’s competitors offer DSB prices under wholesale market prices.
To pomeni, da objektivno merilo iz uvodne izjave (468) ne more biti neposredno odvisno od preverjanja, ali so cene tekmecev družbe BE na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem nižje od veleprodajnih cen.
Instead, tests must rely on indirect indications that are accessible in the short term to BE, and that could signal that the wholesale market has become illiquid and that pricing at or above the wholesale market price on the DSB market is no longer commercially viable.
Namesto tega morajo preskusi temeljiti na posrednih znakih, ki so družbi BE na voljo kratkoročno in bi lahko kazali na to, da je postal trg na debelo nelikviden in da oblikovanje cene na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem, ki je enaka ali višja od veleprodajne cene, ni več tržno donosno.
The tests should be the following:
Opraviti se morajo naslednji preskusi:
in any period of […], (ending not more than […] before the date BE invokes exceptional market circumstances) […] of those existing BE non-domestic end-users to whom BE has made offers of supply on terms where the margin on the supply of energy element of the contract over the prevailing wholesale price is […] have rejected BE’s offer;
v vsakem obdobju […] (ki se konča najkasneje […] pred datumom, ko družba BE uveljavlja izjemne tržne okoliščine) je […] obstoječih tujih končnih uporabnikov, katerim je družba BE ponudila dobavo pod pogojem, da je element marže na dobavo energije v pogodbi nad prevladujočo veleprodajno ceno […], zavrnilo ponudbo družbe BE;
volumes traded in the wholesale electricity market over a […] period have dropped to less than […] of the average of those traded in the same period in the last […] for which data is available;
obseg trgovanja na trgu električne energije na debelo v obdobju […] se je zmanjšal na manj kot […] povprečnega obsega trgovanja v enakem obdobju v zadnjih […], za katera so na voljo podatki.
BE offers to supply a minimum of […] of electricity in the wholesale market […] and that volume is not sold within a period of […] hours.
družba BE ponuja dobavo najmanj […] električne energije na trgu na debelo […] in ta obseg se ne proda v […] urah.
The same independent body that monitors the compliance of BE with the prohibition should be responsible for checking whether BE is aware that the tests have been fulfilled.
Neodvisni organ, ki spremlja tudi spoštovanje prepovedi družbe BE, mora biti zadolžen za preverjanje, ali se družba BE zaveda, da so bili preskusi izvršeni.
The independent body will verify that test (a) together with either test (b) or (c) is fulfilled.
Neodvisni organ bo potrdil, da so bili preskus (a) ter preizkusa (b) in (c) izvršeni.
If it is indeed the case, BE should be entitled to price on the DSB market below wholesale market price for […] from the independent body’s decision That time limit may be extended by a decision of the independent body if exceptional market conditions continue to prevail.
Če je res tako, mora biti BE upravičena do cene na trgu neposredne prodaje, ki je pod veleprodajno tržno ceno za […] na podlagi odločitve neodvisnega telesa. Rok se lahko podaljša z odločitvijo neodvisnega organa, če se izjemne tržne razmere ne spremenijo.
During the […], BE should be obliged to behave in good faith and offer discounts that are comparable to what it can reasonably consider its competitors offer.
V času […], se mora družba BE vesti v dobri veri in ponujati popuste, ki so realno primerljivi s ponudbo tekmecev.
The independent body should assess the compliance of BE with this criterion ex post, where the […] is over.
Neodvisni organ mora oceniti združljivost družbe BE s tem merilom naknadno, ko je […] končano.
For the sake of transparency, the independent body should publish a statement at the end of the contract rounds confirming that the exceptional market circumstances actually occurred, and specifying the duration of the period of the exceptional circumstances.
Zaradi preglednosti mora neodvisni organ ob koncu pogodbenega obdobja objaviti izjavo, s katero potrjuje, da so izjemne tržne razmere res obstajale, in navesti trajanje obdobja izjemnih razmer.
Details of the assessment should be forwarded to the Commission.
Podrobnosti o oceni se morajo posredovati Komisiji.
The UK authorities have agreed to implement this compensatory measure.
Organi Združenega kraljestva so se dogovorili za izvedbo tega izravnalnega ukrepa.
Compensatory measures that were considered by the Commission but rejected
Izravnalni ukrepi, ki jih je Komisija po preučitvi zavrnila
The Commission judges that the three compensatory measures described in section 0 are sufficient in scope to mitigate the potentially distortive effect of the aid on competition, and thus meet the requirements of point 39(ii) of the guidelines.
Komisija ocenjuje, da so trije izravnalni ukrepi, opisani v razdelku 0, dovolj obsežni, da ublažijo morebiten izkrivljajoč učinek pomoči na konkurenco, in tako izpolnjujejo zahteve točke (39)(ii) v Smernicah.
They are also to be considered as specific conditions attached to the authorisation of aid within the meaning of point (42)(ii) of those guidelines.
Lahko se tudi upoštevajo kot posebni pogoji, ki veljajo za odobritev pomoči v smislu točke (42)(ii) v teh smernicah.
Other possible compensatory measures had been suggested by third parties.
Tretje osebe so predlagale še druge mogoče izravnalne ukrepe.
Greenpeace suggested that BE’s nuclear plants be closed in a phased process.
Organizacija Greenpeace je predlagala, da se jedrske elektrarne družbe BE zaprejo postopoma.
The Commission considers that in view of the absence of overcapacity on the relevant market, requesting the closure of BE’s generating assets would be disproportionate to the distortion of competition that the aid generates.
Komisija upošteva, da bi bila glede na odsotnost presežkov na zadevnem trgu zahteva po zaprtju proizvodnih sredstev družbe BE v nesorazmerju z izkrivljanjem konkurence, ki jo ustvarja pomoč.
Powergen suggested that the Dungeness B reactor could be closed, since it is the least profitable BE asset.
Družba Powergen je predlagala, da bi jedrski reaktor Dungeness B lahko zaprli, ker družbi BE prinaša najmanj dobička.
The viability of Dungeness B was already discussed in section VI(3)(a) above.
O sposobnosti preživetja elektrarne Dungeness B se je razpravljalo v razdelku VI(3)(a) zgoraj.