natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Since the opening of proceedings, NGTransco has revised its forecast for capacity margin in the England and Wales market.
Podjetje NGTransco je od začetka postopka revidirala napoved za presežek zmogljivosti na trgu Anglije in Walesa.
A new forecast was sent to the Commission with NGTransco’s submission.
Nova napoved je bila poslana Komisiji skupaj z vlogo podjetja NGTransco.
An even newer version of the same forecast has been published by NGTransco in its 2004 Seven Year Statement [64].
Podjetja NGTransco je v Sedemletnih napovedih iz leta 2004 objavilo še novejšo različico te napovedi [64].
The Commission used this later newer version for the purpose of its analysis.
Komisija je za analizo uporabila to poznejšo novejšo različico.
Indeed, this newer version is based on the same fundamental hypothesis, in particular for input data, as that taken in the forecast that was considered as relevant by NGTransco in its submission to the Commission.
Res temelji ta novejša različica na isti temeljni hipotezi, še zlasti za vhodne podatke, kot tista, na kateri temelji napoved, da jo je podjetje NGTransco upoštevalo kot relevantno pri vlogi Komisiji.
It only incorporates more up to date input on market development.
Ta različica vključuje le sodobnejše vhodne podatke o razvoju trga.
This forecast envisages three scenarios.
Ta napoved predvideva tri scenarije.
The most optimistic scenario (SYS background) assumes that generation availability will correspond to signed transmission contracts.
Najbolj optimistični scenarij („na podlagi sistema prenosa energije“) predvideva razpoložljivost proizvodnih zmogljivosti, ki bo ustrezala sklenjenim pogodbam o prenosu.
The most pessimistic scenario (‘existing or under construction background’) assumes that no plants other than existing ones and plants currently under construction will be available.
Najbolj pesimistični scenarij („na podlagi obstoječih objektov ali objektov v gradnji“) predvideva, da bodo na voljo le obstoječe elektrarne in elektrarne, ki se sedaj gradijo.
The intermediate scenario (‘consents background’) assumes that available plants will be the existing ones, the ones already under construction and the ones for which necessary consents under the Electricity Act and the Energy Act have already been granted.
Vmesni scenarij („na podlagi dovoljenj“) predvideva, da bodo na voljo obstoječe elektrarne, elektrarne, ki se sedaj gradijo, in tiste elektrarne, za katere so že bila odobrena potrebna dovoljenja na podlagi Zakona o električni energiji in Energetskega zakona.
The following chart summarises the forecast in the three scenarios.
Naslednja tabela povzema napovedi vseh treh scenarijev.
2004 NGTransco capacity margin scenarios for England and Wales
Scenariji presežka zmogljivosti za Anglijo in Wales, ki jih je leta 2004 objavilo podjetje NGTransco
Note: Capacity margin is over ACS peak demand.
Opomba: Presežek zmogljivosti presega največje povpraševanje v povprečnem hladnem obdobju.
Interconnectors with France and Scotland are assumed to be fully used for import.
Za povezovalne vode s Francijo in Škotsko se predvideva, da se v celoti uporabljajo za uvoz.
SYS background
Na podlagi sistema prenosa energije
Consents background
Na podlagi dovoljenj
Existing and under construction background
Na podlagi obstoječih objektov ali objektov v gradnji
The three scenarios differ principally on the latest years, which is not surprising in view of the fact that their underlying hypotheses make differences mainly in the future.
Ti trije scenariji se razlikujejo predvsem v podatkih za zadnja leta, kar ni presenetljivo glede na to, da se hipoteze, na katerih temeljijo, v večji meri razlikujejo predvsem za prihodnost.
However, these years are not as relevant to assess the existence of structural overcapacity at present on the market.
Vseeno ta leta niso tako pomembna za oceno sedanjega obstoja strukturnega presežka na trgu.
In the next three years, the three scenarios foresee a capacity margin between 18,7 and 23,1 %, with an average of around 21,5 %.
Za naslednja tri leta je predvideni presežek zmogljivosti po treh scenarijih med 18,7 % in 23,1 %, s povprečjem približno 21,5 %.
This value is slightly above the 20 % benchmark.
Ta vrednost nekoliko presega merilo 20 %.
However, the difference between 21,5 and 20 % of the ACS peak demand is 1,5 % of 57000 MW [65], that is, 855 MW.
Vseeno je razlika med 21,5-odstotnim in 20-odstotnim največjim povpraševanjem v povprečnem hladnem obdobju 1,5 % od 57000 MW [65], to je 855 MW.
This value is smaller than any of British Energy’s nuclear plants’ capacity.
Ta vrednost je nižja od zmogljivosti katere koli jedrske elektrarne družbe British Energy.
As it is furthermore the result of a statistical average, the Commission considers that it cannot be deemed to be statistically significant enough to represent a structural overcapacity.
Ker je ob tem rezultat statističnega povprečja, Komisije upošteva, da se ne more šteti za statistično dovolj pomembno, da bi lahko predstavljala strukturni presežek.
In the following years, the difference between the three scenarios grows, which makes it even more difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from them.
V naslednjih letih razlika med tremi scenariji narašča, zato je še težje priti do pomembnejših zaključkov.
However, the Commission notes that during these years the average of the three scenarios fluctuates between 17,0 and 22,7 %, with two years at around 20,2 % This seems to indicate that there is an overall tendency for the capacity margin to stay very much around 20 %, including some margin of error.
Vseeno Komisija ugotavlja, da se povprečje treh scenarijev za ta leta giblje med 17 % in 22,7 %, z dvema letoma s približno 20,2 %. To kaže na splošno težnjo po tem, da se presežek zmogljivosti, vključno z določeno toleranco napake, ohrani tesno ob 20 %.
The Commission concludes from the above that there is no structural overcapacity on the England and Wales electricity market.
Komisija na podlagi zgoraj omenjenega ugotavlja, da na trgu električne energije v Angliji in Walesu ni strukturnega presežka.
Global Great Britain
Velika Britanija v celoti
In contrast with England and Wales, there are two network operators in Scotland: Scottish and Southern Electricity and Scottish Power.
V nasprotju z Anglijo in Walesom sta na Škotskem dva upravljavca omrežja: Scottish and Southern Electricity in Scottish Power.
These two operators publish forecasts for their own regional area.
Ta upravljavca omrežja objavljata napovedi za svoji regionalni območji.
These forecasts are however less detailed than NGTransco’s as to possible scenarios for the future.
Vseeno so te napovedi v zvezi z mogočimi scenariji za prihodnost manj podrobne kot napovedi podjetja NGTransco.
For these reasons, the Commission has concentrated its analysis for Scotland on the present situation, for which there is less need to envisage various scenarios.
Zato je analiza Komisije za Škotsko osredotočena na sedanje stanje, za katero predvidevanje različnih scenarijev ni tako nujno.
Since neither of the two Scottish operators has submitted comments to the Commission in the context of these proceedings, the analysis is based on documents available to the public.
Ker škotska upravljavca omrežja Komisiji nista predložila pripomb v zvezi s tem postopkom, temelji analiza na dokumentih, dostopnih javnosti.
For Scottish and Southern Electricity, the Commission used the figures provided in its 2003 Seven-year Statement [66].
Za Scottish and Southern Electricity je Komisija uporabila njihove podatke iz Sedemletnih napovedi iz leta 2003 [66].
For Scottish Power, the Commission used the figures provided in its April 2003 Transmission Seven-year Statement [67].
Za Scottish Power je Komisija uporabila njihove podatke iz Sedemletnih napovedi za prenos aprila 2003 [67].
The following chart summarises forecast peak demand and installed capacity in the various geographical regions for 2004/2005.
Naslednja tabela povzema napovedi največjega povpraševanja in inštalirane zmogljivosti v različnih geografskih območjih za leto 2004/2005.
Table 11
Tabela 11
Great Britain Capacity and demand forecasts for 2004/2005.
Napovedi zmogljivosti in povpraševanja v Veliki Britaniji za leto 2004/2005.
All figures are in MW
Vsi podatki so v MW
Capacity connected to Scottish Power’s network
Zmogljivost, povezana z omrežjem Scottish Power
Capacity connected to Scottish and Southern Electricity’s network
Zmogljivost, povezana z omrežjem Scottish and Southern Electricity
Capacity connected to NGTransco’s network, excluding interconnectors
Zmogljivost, povezana z omrežjem podjetja NGTransco brez povezovalnih vodov
Ireland/Scotland interconnector capacity
Zmogljivost povezovalnega voda med Irsko in Škotsko
France/England interconnector capacity
Zmogljivost povezovalnega voda med Francijo in Anglijo
Available capacity in Great Britain
Razpoložljiva zmogljivost v Veliki Britaniji
Maximum demand in Scottish Power’s zone
Največje povpraševanje na območju Scottish Power
Maximum demand in Scottish and Southern Electricity’s zone
Največje povpraševanje na območju Scottish and Southern Electricity
ACS peak demand in NGTransco’s zone
Največje povpraševanje v povprečnem hladnem obdobju na območju podjetja NGTransco
Aggregate peak demand [68]
Skupno največje povpraševanje [68]
Capacity margin for Great Britain is therefore about 23,6 % [69].
Presežek zmogljivosti za Veliko Britanijo je zato približno 23,6 % [69].
This figure is higher than the 20 % benchmark referred to in recital (400), but as was noted, the 20 % benchmark that applies to a flexible network such as the one in England and Wales has to be increased to accommodate constraints in networks with bottlenecks.
Ta številka presega merilo 20 % iz uvodne izjave (399), vendar, kot je bilo ugotovljeno, se mora merilo 20 %, v veljavi za prilagodljivo omrežje, kot je omrežje Anglije in Walesa, zvišati za zmanjšanje omejitev v omrežjih z ozkimi grli.
Furthermore, these figures are computed on the hypothesis that both interconnectors with Northern Ireland and France are available at full capacity for imports, which is not always granted.
Ob tem so ti podatki izračunani na podlagi predvidevanja, da sta povezovalna voda s Severno Irsko in Francijo na voljo v polni zmogljivosti za uvoz, kar ni vedno zagotovljeno.
Should these interconnectors be used for export at the time of ACS peak demand, their capacity should be netted of the available capacity, and at the same time added to the power demand, which would decrease the capacity margin to 15,5 %.
Če sta povezovalna voda uporabljena za izvoz v času največjega povpraševanja v povprečnem hladnem obdobju, mora biti njuna zmogljivost odšteta od razpoložljive zmogljivosti in hkrati prišteta povpraševanju po energiji, kar bi presežek zmogljivosti zmanjšalo na 15,5 %.
In view of the above, the Commission considers that there is no statistically significant structural overcapacity on the Great Britain market.
Na tej podlagi Komisija upošteva, da na trgu Velike Britanije ni statistično dovolj pomembnega strukturnega presežka.
In view of the above, the Commission judges that there is no structural overcapacity on the relevant market.
Na tej podlagi Komisija sklepa, da na upoštevanem trgu ni strukturnega presežka.
Compensatory measures in the form of irreversible reduction of production capacity are therefore not mandatory.
Izravnalni ukrepi v obliki trajnega zmanjšanja proizvodne zmogljivosti zato niso obvezni.
Impact of the aid on competition on the relevant market
Vpliv pomoči na konkurenco na upoštevanem trgu
Since there is no structural overcapacity on the relevant market, the Commission must assess the necessity of compensatory measures and the form they should take on the case’s merit.
Ker na upoštevanem trgu ni strukturnega presežka, mora Komisija na podlagi primera oceniti nujnost izravnalnih ukrepov in njihovo obliko.
Possible compensatory measures must take account of the potentially distortive effects of the aid on competition.
Mogoči izravnalni ukrepi morajo upoštevati možne izkrivljajoče učinke pomoči na konkurenco.
‘The UK authorities argue that the aid package has no impact on competition.
Organi Združenega kraljestva dokazujejo, da paket pomoči ne vpliva na konkurenco.
According to them, within NETA, power plants’ economical ability to generate is determined by their short run marginal costs (SRMC).
Menijo, da je gospodarska sposobnost elektrarn za proizvodnjo znotraj nove ureditve trgovanja z električno energijo odvisna od njihovih kratkoročnih mejnih stroškov („KMS“).
At a given time, the market operates as if power plants were called by their SRMC ranking, from the lowest to the largest, until their cumulated capacity reaches demand.
V nekem obdobju deluje trg, kot da bi se elektrarne priključevale na podlagi razvrstitve po KMS, od najnižjih do najvišjih, dokler njihova skupna zmogljivost ne doseže povpraševanja.
Electricity price at that time is set by the SRMC of the last power plant called, which is known as the marginal power plant.
Cena električne energije v tem času ustreza KMS zadnje priključene elektrarne, ki je znana kot mejna elektrarna.
According to the UK authorities, the aid is aimed solely at the nuclear plants.
Organi Združenega kraljestva menijo, da je pomoč usmerjena le na jedrske elektrarne.
It would not change their SRMC to such an extent as to modify their rank in the SRMC order.
To njihovih KMS ne bi spremenilo v tolikšni meri, da bi se spremenila njihova stopnja v razvrstitvi po KMS.
Furthermore, BE’s nuclear plants’ SRMC would be such that they are at all times below the marginal plant’s SRMC.
Ob tem KMS jedrskih elektrarn družbe BE ne bi nikoli presegali KMS mejne elektrarne.
The aid would never have an impact on BE’s competitors’ ability to generate, nor the price at which they can sell the electricity generated.
Pomoč ne bi nikoli vplivala na sposobnost tekmecev družbe BE za proizvodnjo ali na ceno, po kateri lahko prodajajo proizvedeno električno energijo.
There would therefore be no impact on BE’s competitors.
Zato ne bi bilo nobenega vpliva na tekmece družbe BE.
The Commission considers that the UK authorities’ reasoning might hold in a perfect market based on a single totally transparent auctioning process.
Komisija upošteva, da velja stališče organov Združenega kraljestva za popoln trg, ki temelji na enem, popolnoma preglednem avkcijskem postopku.
However, as was explained in recitals (389) and (390), NETA is not such a market.
Vseeno nova ureditev trgovanja z električno energijo, kot je bilo pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah (388) in (389), ni takšen trg.
The Commission considers that the aid may have an impact on BE’s competitors in many ways.
Komisija upošteva, da lahko vpliva pomoč na tekmece družbe BE na več načinov.
Two of them might have a major impact on competition.
Dva od njih lahko močno vplivata na konkurenco.
Firstly, BE does not only own nuclear power plants.
Prvič, družba BE ni le lastnica jedrskih elektrarn.
It also owns the Eggborough coal fired plant, which is by itself as big as some of BE’s competitors’ total capacity.
Je tudi lastnica elektrarne na premog Eggborough, ki sama po sebi presega skupno zmogljivost nekaterih tekmecev družbe BE.
BE could use the aid it receives for its nuclear plants for the benefit of the Eggborough power plant.
Družba BE bi lahko prejeto pomoč za jedrske elektrarne uporabila v korist elektrarne Eggborough.
For instance, it could use this money in order to fit Eggborough with flue gas desulphurisation devices that would allow it to comply with new environment regulations, which would in turn extend significantly the plant’s lifetime.
Z denarjem bi lahko na primer opremila elektrarno Eggborough z napravami za razžvepljanje dimnih plinov, s čimer bi bila v skladu z novimi okoljskimi pravili, kar bi znatno podaljšalo življenjsko dobo elektrarne.
Alternatively, BE could also use the funds made available by the aid in order to purchase more non-nuclear generation assets.
Ali pa bi se lahko dodeljena sredstva pomoči v večji meri porabila za nakup nejedrske opreme.
Admittedly, BE needs some flexible source of electricity generation to compensate for its nuclear stations’ inflexibility.
Družba BE potrebuje zaradi neprilagodljivosti svojih jedrskih elektrarn prilagodljiv vir proizvodnje električne energije.
Whenever the aid allows BE to extend its non nuclear portfolio, it allows it to have more internal access to flexible generation, and therefore increases its possibility to offer better deals to its customers, while at the same time decreasing its need to purchase flexible generation from its competitors.
Kadar pomoč dopušča širitev jedrskega portfelja družbe BE, dovoljuje bolj notranji dostop do prilagodljive proizvodnje, s čimer povečuje možnost za boljšo ponudbo odjemalcem in hkrati zmanjšuje potrebo po nakupu opreme, prilagodljive proizvodnji njenih tekmecev.
Secondly, NETA is not a single market.
Drugič, trg na podlagi nove ureditve trgovanja z električno energijo ni enoten trg.
NETA comprises in particular a wholesale market segment, in which generators sell electricity to suppliers and a direct sales to business (DSB) segment, in which generators sell electricity directly to large end users.
Nova ureditev trgovanja z električno energijo vključuje še zlasti veleprodajni tržni segment, v katerem proizvajalci prodajajo električno energijo dobaviteljem, in tržni segment neposredne prodaje podjetjem, v katerem proizvajalci prodajajo električno energijo neposredno velikim končnim uporabnikom.
Generators generally sell electricity on the DSB market with a premium over the wholesale market [70].
Proizvajalci na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem navadno prodajajo električno energijo po ceni, višji od cene na trgu na debelo [70].
It is thus preferable for a generator to sell electricity on the DSB market segment.
Zato je za proizvajalca ugodnejša prodaja električne energije v tržnem segmentu neposredne prodaje podjetjem.
While analysing the impact of the aid, one should therefore consider not only the global amount of electricity sold by each generator, but also the spread of its sales on the wholesale and DSB market segments.
Pri analizi vpliva pomoči je treba zato upoštevati skupno količino električne energije, ki jo proda vsak proizvajalec, ter obseg prodaje na veleprodajnem tržnem segmentu in segmentu neposredne prodaje podjetjem.
One element of the BE restructuring plan aims to increase the company’s share in the DSB segment.
Cilj enega od elementov načrta družbe BE za prestrukturiranje je povečanje deleža družbe na tržnem segmentu neposredne prodaje podjetjem.
In order to do so, the company will have to try to offer DSB customers a competitively low premium over wholesale electricity prices.
Za doseganje tega bo morala skušati družba odjemalcem na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem ponuditi konkurenčno majhno razliko v primerjavi z veleprodajnimi cenami električne energije.
BE will be able to finance part or whole of this competitive offer via the decrease in its nuclear plants’ SRMC.
Družba BE bo lahko prek znižanja KMS jedrskih elektrarn financirala delno ali celotno konkurenčno ponudbo.
Therefore, even though BE’s plants’ SRMC ranking might remain the same and hence not have any impact on its competitors’ load, the variation of their level will allow BE to shift part of its sales from the wholesale market to the DSB market.
Zato bo, čeprav ostane razvrstitev elektrarne družbe BE po KMS nespremenjena in zato ne vpliva na obremenitev tekmecev, sprememba njihove stopnje družbi BE omogočila prenos dela prodaje s trga na debelo na trg neposredne prodaje podjetjem.
This in turn will shift part of the competitors’ output from the DSB to the wholesale market.
Zaradi tega se bo del donosa tekmecev premaknil s trga neposredne prodaje podjetjem na trg na debelo.
In this way, the aid might increase BE’s profits and decrease those of its competitors.
Tako lahko pomoč poveča dobiček družbe BE in zmanjša dobiček njenih tekmecev.
In view of the above, the Commission considers that the aid has a significant impact on BE’s competitors, and that compensatory measures are necessary to mitigate this impact.
Na tej podlagi Komisija upošteva, da pomoč pomembno vpliva na tekmece družbe BE in da so za ublažitev tega vpliva potrebni izravnalni ukrepi.
Compensatory measures to be implemented
Izravnalni ukrepi, ki jih je treba izvesti
Compensatory measures must strike a balance between the need to mitigate the impact of the aid on competitors and the need to preserve the beneficiary company’s prospects of viability.
Izravnalni ukrepi morajo vzpostaviti ravnovesje med potrebo po ublažitvi vpliva pomoči na tekmece in potrebo po ohranitvi možnosti ponovne pridobitve sposobnosti preživetja družbe upravičenke.
For this purpose, the Commission considers that compensatory measures should target precisely the mechanisms by which the aid could be detrimental to BE’s competitors.
Komisija zato upošteva, da morajo biti izravnalni ukrepi usmerjeni prav na mehanizme, s katerimi bi lahko pomoč škodovala tekmecem družbe BE.
This means that compensatory measures in this case should aim at ensuring that BE will not use the aid granted by the Government for the purpose of unduly increasing its flexible generation portfolio or gaining DSB market shares.
To pomeni, da mora biti cilj izravnalnih ukrepov v tem primeru zagotovitev, da družba BE pomoči vlade ne bo porabila za neupravičeno povečanje svojega portfelja prilagodljive proizvodnje ali pridobitev tržnega deleža na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem.
This goal has lead the Commission to ask for three compensatory measures.
Ta cilj je bil razlog za zahtevo Komisije po treh izravnalnih ukrepih.
These compensatory measures were proposed by the UK authorities on the basis of the measures suggested by BE’s competitors in their submission.
Te izravnalne ukrepe so organi Združenega kraljestva predlagali na podlagi ukrepov, ki so jih v svoji vlogi predlagali tekmeci družbe BE.
Compensatory measure No 1.
Izravnalni ukrep št. 1.
As was explained in recital (437), one way the aid could potentially have a greater impact on BE’s competitors would be if, instead of paying for charges incurred by BE’s nuclear fleet as intended, it was used for the purpose of improving BE’s non nuclear generation capacity.
Kot je bilo pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi (436), je eden od načinov, s katerim bi pomoč družbi BE lahko bolj vplivala na tekmece, uporaba pomoči za izboljšanje nejedrskih zmogljivosti namesto predvidenega plačila stroškov jedrskega potenciala družbe BE.
This would allow BE to compete with its competitors’ plants more easily [71], and would give it more access to flexible generation than it presently has, which would in turn decrease BE’s need to purchase this flexibility from outside.
To bi družbi BE omogočilo lažje konkuriranje elektrarnam njenih tekmecev [71] in večji dostop do prilagodljive proizvodnje, kar bi zmanjšalo potrebo družbe BE po prilagodljivi opremi, kupljeni zunaj.
In order to avoid this possibility, BE’s different businesses should be separated into different legal entities with separate accounts.
Za izognitev tej možnosti se morajo različna podjetja družbe BE ločiti na različne pravne osebe z ločenimi računi.
For this purpose, BE’s structure should be modified in such a way that nuclear generation, non-nuclear generation, sales to the wholesale market and DSB sales are established in separate subsidiaries.
Za ta namen se mora struktura družbe BE spremeniti z ustanovitvijo posameznih hčerinskih družb za jedrsko proizvodnjo, nejedrsko proizvodnjo, prodajo na trgu na debelo in prodajo na trgu neposredne prodaje podjetjem.
The aid should be attributed solely to the nuclear generation business.
Pomoč se mora dodeliti le za jedrsko proizvodnjo.
Cross subsidisation between the various subsidiaries should be forbidden.
Navzkrižno subvencioniranje med različnimi hčerinskimi družbami mora biti prepovedano.
This prohibition should be implemented as much as possible through the companies’ licensing regime and as such monitored by the Great Britain electricity system regulator: OFGEM.
Ta prepoved se mora v največji mogoči meri izvajati prek režima podeljevanja dovoljenj družbam, spremljati jo mora regulator sistema električne energije v Veliki Britaniji: OFGEM.