natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Taking into account the nature of the infringement committed and the fact that it covered the whole of the common market and, following its creation, the EEA in its entirety, the Commission considers that Akzo Nobel, BASF and UCB have committed a very serious infringement of Article 81(1) of the Treaty and 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Ob upoštevanju narave povzročene kršitve in dejstva, da je obsegala celoten skupni trg, ter po uresničenju celotni EGP, Komisija meni, da so Akzo Nobel, BASF in UCB zagrešili resne kršitve člena 81(1) Pogodbe in člena 53(1) Sporazuma EGP.
In the Commission’s view these factors are such that the infringement must qualify as very serious, even if the actual impact of the infringement cannot be measured.
Po mnenju Komisije so ta dejstva takšna, da se kršitev obravnava kot zelo resna, čeprav se dejanskega vpliva kršitve ne more izmeriti.
Within the category of very serious infringements, the scale of likely fines makes it possible to apply differential treatment to undertakings in order to take account of the effective economic capacity of the offenders to cause significant damage to competition.
Stopnja možnih glob omogoča znotraj obsega zelo resnih kršitev uporabo različnega obravnavanja podjetij, da se lahko upošteva učinkovito gospodarsko zmogljivost kršiteljev, ki so povzročili precejšno škodo konkurenci.
Taking into account that the infringement started at the global level, with the participation of North American companies which agreed, inter alia, to withdraw from the European market, the Commission considers it appropriate in this case to use the global market shares of the undertakings participating in the infringement to determine their respective weight.
Ob upoštevanju, da se je kršitev začela na svetovni ravni, s sodelovanjem severnoameriških podjetij, ki so se med drugim strinjala z umikom z evropskega trga, Komisija meni, da je v tem primeru ustrezno uporabiti svetovne tržne deleže podjetij, ki so sodelovala pri kršitvi, za določitev njihove teže.
Chinook was the largest market operator in the world, with a market share of 19,3 %.
Chinook je bil največji akter na svetovnem trgu s tržnim deležem 19,3 %.
It is therefore placed in a first category.
Zato je postavljen v prvo kategorijo.
DuCoa, with a market share of 16,3 %, is placed in a second category.
DuCoa, s tržnim deležem 16,3 %, je postavljena v drugo kategorijo.
UCB, Bioproducts and Akzo Nobel, with market shares of 13,4 %, 12,2 % and 12 % respectively, are placed in a third category.
UCB, Bioproducts in Akzo Nobel, s tržnimi deleži 13,4 %, 12,2 % in 12 %, so postavljeni v tretjo kategorijo.
Finally, BASF, with a market share of 9,1 %, is placed in a fourth category.
Nazadnje je BASF, s tržnim deležem 9,1 %, postavljen v četrto kategorijo.
Sufficient deterrence
Zadostna svarila
Within the category of very serious infringements, the scale of likely fines also makes it possible to set the fines at a level which ensures that they have sufficient deterrent effect, taking into account the size of each undertaking.
Stopnja možnih glob omogoča znotraj obsega zelo resnih kršitev tudi določitev glob na ravni, ki zagotavlja zadosten svarilni učinek, ob upoštevanju velikosti vsakega podjetja.
In this respect, the Commission notes that in 2003, the most recent financial year preceding this Decision, the turnover of UCB was EUR 3 billion, that of Akzo Nobel EUR 13 billion and that of BASF EUR 33,4 billion. Accordingly, the Commission considers it appropriate to multiply the fine for Akzo Nobel with a factor of 1,5 and that of BASF with a factor of 2.
Pri tem Komisija opaža, da je imel leta 2003, zadnje finančno leto pred to odločbo, UCB promet 3 milijarde EUR, Akzo Nobel 13 milijard EUR in BASF 33,4 milijarde EUR. V skladu s tem Komisija meni, da se globo ustrezno pomnoži za Akzo Nobel s faktorjem 1,5 in za BASF s faktorjem 2.
Akzo Nobel N.V, together with Akzo Nobel Nederland B.V., Akzo Nobel Chemicals International B.V., Akzo Nobel Chemicals B.V. and Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals B.V., BASF A.G and UCB S.A participated in the infringement at least from 13 October 1992 until 30 September 1998, a period of five years and eleven months.
Akzo Nobel N.V., skupaj z Akzo Nobel Nederland B.V., Akzo Nobel Chemicals International B.V., Akzo Nobel Chemicals B.V. in Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals B.V., BASF A.G. ter UCB S.A. so sodelovali pri kršitvah najpozneje od 13. oktobra 1992 do 30. septembra 1998, v obdobju petih let in enajstih mesecev.
Recidivism
Ponavljanje kaznivih dejanj
At the time the infringement took place, BASF had already been subject to previous Commission prohibition decisions for cartel activities in Decisions 69/243/EEC [3] and 94/599/EC [4].
V času kršitve je Komisija že izdala odločbe o prepovedi BASF-u za dejavnosti kartela v Odločbah 69/243/EGS [3] in 94/599/ES [4].
The fact that BASF repeated the same type of conduct, albeit in a sector other than those in which it had previously incurred penalties, shows that the first penalties did not prompt BASF to change its conduct throughout the undertaking.
Dejstvo, da je BASF ponovil enako vrsto postopka, čeprav v različnem sektorju od prejšnjih kazni, kaže, da prve kazni BASF niso spodbudile k spremembi ravnanja v celotnem podjetju.
This constitutes for the Commission an aggravating circumstance.
To Komisiji pomeni oteževalne okoliščine.
This aggravating circumstance justifies an increase of 50 % in the basic amount of the fine to be imposed on BASF.
Oteževalna okoliščina utemeljuje povečanje za 50 % osnovnega zneska globe, naložene BASF.
A 50 % rate is the normal rate employed by the Commission in cases involving recidivism.
Povečanje 50 % je običajna stopnja, ki jo uporablja Komisija v primerih, ki vključujejo ponavljanje kaznivih dejanj.
Early termination of the infringement
Predčasno prenehanje kršitve
BASF and UCB claim a reduction for early termination.
BASF in UCB zahtevata znižanje zaradi predčasnega prenehanja.
Cartel infringements are by their very nature hard-core anti-trust violations.
Kršitve kartela so že po naravi najresnejše protikonkurenčne kršitve.
Participants in these infringements normally realise very well that they are engaged in illegal activities.
Sodelujoči pri teh kršitvah se običajno zelo dobro zavedajo, da so vpleteni v nezakonite dejavnosti.
In the Commission’s view, in such cases of deliberate illegal behaviour, the fact that a company terminates this behaviour before any intervention of the Commission does not merit any particular reward other than that the period of infringement of the company concerned will be shorter than it would otherwise have been.
Po mnenju Komisije v takšnih primerih namernega nezakonitega ravnanja dejstvo, da je podjetje zaključilo ravnanje pred posredovanjem Komisije, ne zasluži posebne nagrade, razen tega, da je obdobje kršitve zadevnega podjetja krajše, kot bi bilo sicer.
Non-implementation
Neizvrševanje
Akzo Nobel, BASF and UCB claim that the infringement or elements thereof were not, not fully or not effectively implemented.
Akzo Nobel, BASF in UCB trdijo, da kršitev ali njeni elementi niso bili ali v celoti ali učinkovito izvršeni.
In the Commission’s view, the arrangements, in so far as they pertained to the EEA market, were implemented, at least by the European producers.
Po mnenju Komisije so bili dogovori, če so veljali za trg EGP, izvršeni, najmanj s strani evropskih proizvajalcev.
They were implemented in particular in respect of the key elements of prices and allocation of clients in Europe and the control of converters, even if such implementation may have been less than fully successful in achieving an actual impact on the market because of remaining competition on that market.
Še zlasti so bili izvršeni v zvezi s ključnimi elementi cen in razdelitve strank v Evropi ter nadzora pretvornikov, tudi če so bile takšne izvršitve manj kot v celoti uspešne pri doseganju dejanskega vpliva na trg zaradi preostale konkurence na tem trgu.
None of the three producers concerned have provided any indication that they had any desire, and undertook any action, to deliberately abstain from implementing the agreements they concluded in respect of the EEA during the period in which they adhered to them.
Nobeden od treh zadevnih proizvajalcev ni zagotovil nobenih navedb, da so želeli in storili kar koli, da bi se namerno vzdržali izvajanja sporazumov, ki so jih sklenili v zvezi z EGP v obdobju, v katerem so se jim pridružili.
Length of the investigation
Dolžina preiskave
BASF argues that a reduction should be granted because of the long duration of the investigation.
BASF trdi, da je upravičen do znižanja zaradi dolgega poteka preiskave.
The Commission observes that in general there is no requirement on the Commission to reduce the fine because of the length of an investigation.
Komisija meni, da na splošno Komisiji ni treba znižati denarne kazni zaradi dolžine preiskave.
The normal limitation periods spelled out in Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 apply.
Veljajo običajni roki zastaranja, opredeljeni v členu 25 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003.
In particular, paragraph 5 of that Article states that the limitation period shall expire at the latest on the day on which a period equal to twice the limitation period has elapsed without the Commission having imposed a fine or a periodic penalty payment.
Še zlasti odstavek 5 tega člena navaja, da zastaralni rok poteče najpozneje na dan, ko obdobje, enako dvakratnemu zastaralnemu roku, poteče, ne da bi Komisija naložila globo ali periodično denarno kazen.
This period is far from having expired in this proceeding.
To obdobje v tem postopku še zdaleč ni poteklo.
Crisis situation
Krizne razmere
BASF argues that a reduction should be granted for the alleged fact that the choline chloride industry was in a crisis situation.
BASF trdi, da je upravičen do znižanja zaradi domnevnega dejstva, ker je bila industrija holin klorida v kriznih razmerah.
The Commission observes that the fact that an undertaking may not happen to make profits on a certain commercial activity is no licence for it to enter into secret collusion with competitors to cheat customers and other competitors.
Komisija ugotavlja, da dejstvo, da podjetje ne bi imelo dobička zaradi neke tržne dejavnosti, še ni dovoljenje za skrivno dogovarjanje s konkurenti za goljufanje strank in drugih konkurentov.
As a general rule, cartels risk coming into play not when undertakings make large profits but precisely when a sector encounters problems.
V splošnem karteli ne tvegajo takrat, ko imajo podjetja velike dobičke, ampak natančno takrat, ko imajo sektorji težave.
Disciplinary measures and compliance programme
Disciplinski ukrepi in program skladnosti
BASF argues that it should receive a reduction for having taken disciplinary measures against employees involved in the infringement and for having introduced a compliance programme.
BASF trdi, da je upravičen do znižanja, ker je izvedel disciplinske ukrepe proti zaposlenim, vpletenim v kršitve, in ker je uvedel program skladnosti.
While the Commission welcomes measures taken by undertakings to avoid cartel infringements in the future, such measures cannot change the reality of the infringement and the need to sanction it appropriately in this Decision.
Medtem ko Komisija pozdravlja ukrepe podjetij, da bi se izognili kršitvam kartelov v prihodnje, takšni ukrepi ne morejo spremeniti resničnosti kršitev in potrebe po ustreznih sankcijah v tem sklepu.
Effective cooperation outside of the 1996 Leniency Notice
Učinkovito sodelovanje zunaj obvestila o ugodni obravnavi iz leta 1996
UCB was the first undertaking to voluntarily inform the Commission of the fact that in addition to meetings at the global level, the European producers had held a number of meetings among themselves at the European level.
UCB je bilo prvo podjetje, ki je prostovoljno obvestilo Komisijo, da so evropski proizvajalci imeli poleg srečanj na svetovni ravni številna medsebojna srečanja na evropski ravni.
The evidence voluntarily provided by UCB on these meetings allowed the Commission to determine the duration of the infringement as five years and eleven months.
Dokaz o teh srečanjih, ki ga je prostovoljno zagotovil UCB, je Komisiji omogočil, da določi trajanje kršitev na pet let in enajst mesecev.
Had the Commission remained aware only of the arrangements at the global level, the duration of the infringement would have been one year and six months.
Če bi Komisija upoštevala le dogovore na svetovni ravni, bi bilo trajanje kršitev le eno leto in šest mesecev.
In order to reward UCB for this increase in the duration, the Commission considers it appropriate to grant UCB a reduction for attenuating circumstances equal to 25,8 % of the basic amount.
Zaradi podaljšanega trajanja Komisija meni, da je za nagrado UCB primerno podeliti znižanje kot olajševalno okoliščino za 25,8 % od osnovnega zneska.
This reduction corresponds to the 40 % increase in the basic amount resulting from a duration of the infringement of five years and eleven months instead of one year and six months.
To znižanje ustreza 40 % povečanja osnovnega zneska, ki izhaja iz trajanja kršitve petih let in enajstih mesecev, namesto enega leta in šestih mesecev.
Application of the 1996 Leniency Notice
Uporaba obvestila o ugodni obravnavi iz leta 1996
Significant reduction of a fine (‘Section D’: reduction from 10 % to 50 %)
Znatno znižanje globe („oddelek D“: znižanje od 10 % do 50 %)
Akzo Nobel, BASF and UCB all co-operated with the Commission at different stages of the investigation with a view to receiving the favourable treatment set out in the 1996 Leniency Notice, which applies in this proceeding [5].
Akzo Nobel, BASF in UCB so sodelovali s Komisijo na različnih stopnjah preiskave zaradi bolj ugodne obravnave, določene v obvestilu o ugodni obravnavi iz leta 1996, ki velja v tem postopku [5].
BASF was the third company to voluntarily submit evidence on the global arrangements.
BASF je bilo tretje podjetje, ki je prostovoljno predložilo dokaz o svetovnih dogovorih.
When BASF submitted its evidence, the Commission already had at its disposal evidence regarding these arrangements submitted by Chinook and by Bioproducts.
Ko je BASF predložil svoj dokaz, je Komisija že imela na voljo dokaz v zvezi s temi dogovori, ki sta ga predložila Chinook in Bioproducts.
Irrespective of the value of the evidence submitted by Chinook, Bioproducts’ evidence in itself was clearly sufficient to constitute decisive evidence of the cartel’s existence within the meaning of section B of the 1996 Leniency Notice.
Ne glede na vrednost dokaza, ki ga je predložil Chinook, je bil sam dokaz Bioproducts očitno dovolj za določitev odločilnega dokaza o obstoju kartela, v smislu oddelka B obvestila o ugodni obravnavi iz leta 1996.
Therefore, when BASF made its submissions, it was not the first undertaking to provide decisive evidence of the cartel’s existence to the Commission.
Zato BASF, ko je predložil Komisiji svoje dokaze, ni bilo prvo podjetje, ki je zagotovilo odločilni dokaz o obstoju kartela.
As a result, sections B and C of the 1996 Leniency Notice do not apply to BASF, nor to the other two European producers.
Zato oddelka B in C obvestila o ugodni obravnavi iz leta 1996 ne veljata za BASF niti za druga dva evropska proizvajalca.
As to its substance, the evidence submitted by BASF, which was limited to the global arrangements, may be said to have materially contributed to establishing the existence of the infringement within the meaning of section D of the 1996 Leniency Notice, which provides for possible reductions of between 10 % and 50 %.
Glede na vsebino dokaza, ki ga je predložil BASF in je omejeno na svetovne dogovore, se lahko ugotovi, da je materialno prispeval k ustanavljanju obstoja kršitev v smislu oddelka D obvestila o ugodni obravnavi iz leta 1996, ki zagotavlja možna znižanja med 10 % in 50 %.
But the value of these submissions remained quite limited taking into account the extensive evidence on the global arrangements already in the Commission’s possession.
Vendar je vrednost teh predložitev ostala precej omejena, ob upoštevanju obsežnega dokaza o svetovnih dogovorih, ki ga je Komisija že imela.
After receiving the Statement of Objections, BASF informed the Commission that it did not substantially contest the facts on which the Commission based its allegations, except for certain factual corrections which the Commission has accepted.
Po prejetju obvestila o nasprotovanju je BASF obvestil Komisijo, da ni bistveno spodbijal dejstev, na katerih temeljijo trditve Komisije, razen nekaterih dejanskih popravkov, ki jih je Komisija sprejela.
Taking into account the different elements of cooperation mentioned, the Commission considers that BASF is entitled to a 20 % reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed.
Ob upoštevanju različnih elementov omenjenega sodelovanja Komisija meni, da je BASF upravičen do 20 % znižanja globe, ki bi bila naložena.
UCB voluntarily informed the Commission of nine cartel meetings held at the European level, from March 1994 until October 1998.
UCB je prostovoljno obvestil Komisijo o devetih srečanjih kartela na evropski ravni, od marca 1994 do oktobra 1998.
It mentioned the participants and provided a brief general description of the contents of these meetings.
Omenil je sodelujoče in zagotovil kratek splošni opis vsebine teh srečanj.
It also added contemporaneous reports of the first two of these cartel meetings, which took place in 1994.
Dodal je tudi istočasna poročila o prvih dveh srečanjih kartela iz leta 1994.
At the time when UCB made this submission, the Commission was not aware of any meetings at the European level.
Ko je UCB predložil dokaz, Komisija ni vedela za srečanja na evropski ravni.
Together, this evidence constituted a significant material contribution to the establishment of the infringement, even if no written contemporaneous evidence was provided for the period from 1995 to 1998.
Skupaj je ta dokaz predstavljal pomemben materialni prispevek pri ugotavljanju kršitve, tudi če ne bi bil zagotovljen noben pisni istočasni dokaz za obdobje med letoma 1995 in 1998.
After receiving the Statement of Objections, UCB informed the Commission that it did not substantially contest the facts on which the Commission based its allegations, except for certain factual corrections which the Commission has accepted.
Po prejetju obvestila o nasprotovanju je UCB obvestil Komisijo, da ni bistveno spodbijal dejstev, na katerih temeljijo trditve Komisije, razen nekaterih dejanskih popravkov, ki jih je Komisija sprejela.
However, in the same submission UCB claimed that, although it participated in a number of meetings at the global level, it was never a party to any agreement at the global level.
Vendar je UCB v istih predloženih dokazih trdil, da čeprav je sodeloval pri številnih srečanjih na svetovni ravni, ni bil nikoli udeležen pri nobenem sporazumu na svetovni ravni.
In the Decision, the Commission has rejected this claim as unfounded.
V sklepu je Komisija to trditev zavrnila kot neutemeljeno.
Therefore, as UCB did in fact, after receiving the Statement of Objections, contest an essential element of the facts on which the Commission based its allegations, it does not receive any reduction for not contesting the facts on which the Commission bases its allegations.
Ker je UCB po prejetju obvestila o nasprotovanju dejansko spodbijal bistveni element dejstev, na katerih temeljijo trditve Komisije, ne prejme nobenega znižanja, ker ni spodbijal dejstev, na katerih temeljijo trditve Komisije.
Taking into account the different elements of cooperation mentioned, the Commission considers that UCB is entitled to a 30 % reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed.
Ob upoštevanju različnih elementov omenjenega sodelovanja Komisija meni, da je UCB upravičen do 30 % znižanja globe, ki bi bila naložena.
In January 2002, Akzo Nobel submitted a voluntary report on the European arrangements.
Januarja 2002 je Akzo Nobel predložil prostovoljno poročilo o evropskih dogovorih.
This report gave a detailed description of the contents of the arrangements at the European level, including considerable information that UCB had not provided.
Poročilo je vsebovalo podroben opis vsebine dogovorov na evropski ravni, vključno s pomembnimi podatki, ki jih UCB ni predložil.
However, the fact that Akzo Nobel filed this report two and a half years after UCB had made its submission on these arrangements should be taken into account in the leniency reduction granted.
Vendar je treba pri zagotavljanju znižanja zaradi ugodne obravnave upoštevati dejstvo, da je Akzo Nobel predložil poročilo o teh dogovorih dve leti in pol po predložitvi UCB.
After receiving the Statement of Objections, Akzo Nobel informed the Commission that it did not substantially contest the facts on which the Commission based its allegations, except for certain factual corrections which the Commission has accepted.
Po prejetju obvestila o nasprotovanju je Akzo Nobel obvestil Komisijo, da ni bistveno spodbijal dejstev, na katerih temeljijo trditve Komisije, razen nekaterih dejanskih popravkov, ki jih je Komisija sprejela.
Taking into account the different elements of cooperation mentioned, the Commission considers that Akzo Nobel is entitled to a 30 % reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed.
Ob upoštevanju različnih elementov omenjenega sodelovanja Komisija meni, da je Akzo Nobel upravičen do 30 % znižanja globe, ki bi bila naložena.
This assessment takes into account, on the one hand, that Akzo Nobel’s report on the European arrangements was about as valuable to the Commission as the information and evidence on those arrangements supplied earlier by UCB, but arrived two and a half years later and, on the other hand, that Akzo Nobel, as opposed to UCB, did not contest the facts on which the Commission based its allegations.
Ta ocena upošteva, da je bilo poročilo Akzo Nobel o evropskih dogovorih prav tako koristno za Komisijo kot podatki in dokazi o teh dogovorih, ki jih je prej predložil UCB, čeprav so prispeli šele dve leti in pol pozneje, in da Akzo Nobel, v primerjavi z UCB, ni spodbijal dejstev, na katerih so temeljile trditve Komisije.
As a result, both undertakings merit the same percentage reduction.
Zato obe podjetji zaslužita enak odstotek znižanja.
The following undertakings infringed Article 81(1) of the Treaty and, from 1 January 1994, Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement by participating, for the periods indicated, in a complex of agreements and concerted practices consisting of price fixing, market sharing and agreed actions against competitors in the choline chloride sector in the EEA:
Naslednja podjetja so kršila člen 81(1) Pogodbe in od 1. januarja 1994, člen 53(1) Sporazuma EGP s sodelovanjem v navedenih obdobjih pri številnih dogovorih in usklajenih ravnanjih v zvezi z določanjem cene, tržnega deleža in dogovorjenih dejavnosti proti konkurentom v sektorju holin klorida v EGP:
Akzo Nobel N.V, together with Akzo Nobel Nederland B.V., Akzo Nobel Chemicals International B.V., Akzo Nobel Chemicals B.V. and Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals B.V., from 13 October 1992 until 30 September 1998;
Akzo Nobel N.V., skupaj z Akzo Nobel Nederland B.V., Akzo Nobel Chemicals International B.V., Akzo Nobel Chemicals B.V. in Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals B.V., od 13. oktobra 1992 do 30. septembra 1998;
BASF A.G., from 13 October 1992 until 30 September 1998;
BASF A.G., od 13. oktobra 1992 do 30. septembra 1998;
Bioproducts Incorporated, from 13 October 1992 until 14 April 1994;
Bioproducts Incorporated, od 13. oktobra 1992 do 14. aprila 1994;
Chinook Group Limited Partnership, together with Chinook Group Limited, from 13 October 1992 until 14 April 1994;
Chinook Group Limited Partnership, skupaj z Chinook Group Limited, od 13. oktobra 1992 do 14. aprila 1994;
DuCoa, L.P., from 13 October 1992 until 14 April 1994;
DuCoa, L.P., od 13. oktobra 1992 do 14. aprila 1994;
UCB S.A., from 13 October 1992 until 30 September 1998.
UCB S.A., od 13. oktobra 1992 do 30. septembra 1998.
For these infringements, the following fines are imposed:
Za te kršitve so naložene naslednje globe: