natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, the Commission cannot share this view: the contract between CWP and its supplier was dated July 1998, whereas the project was conceived in 1996.
Vendar se Komisija s tem ne more strinjati: podjetje CWP je z dobaviteljem pogodbo sklenilo julija 1998, projekt pa je bil zasnovan leta 1996.
Hence, already in 1996 it should have been clear that a post-treatment phase was necessary, particularly in order to obtain high-purity products for the food industry, as CWP intended.
Zato bi moralo biti že leta 1996 jasno, da je za izdelavo izdelkov z visoko stopnjo čistosti za živilsko industrijo, ki jo je podjetje CWP načrtovalo, potrebna zaključna obdelava.
Pre- and post-treatment of the products also require larger installations, as CWP realised in 1999.
Poleg tega so za predhodno in zaključno obdelavo izdelkov potrebne večje naprave in objekti, kar je podjetje CWP ugotovilo leta 1999.
This again should have been anticipated from the outset.
Tudi to bi podjetje CWP moralo predvideti že na samem začetku.
Moreover, the 1996 documents constituting the restructuring plan did not contain an adequate solution for the highly toxic raffinate. They do not mention it at all.
Razen tega dokumenti iz leta 1996, ki so koncept za prestrukturiranje, ne vsebujejo ustrezne rešitve za skrajno toksičen rafinat.
Nor does the 1997 notification.
Slednji sploh ni omenjen, niti v prijavi iz leta 1997.
The 1997 DLM study states that phosphates derived from raffinate (which contains phosphoric acid) have too high a metallic content and that it should be established what an acceptable proportion would be.
V študiji DLM o izvedljivosti ekstrakcijskega objekta iz novembra 1997 piše, da fosfati, izdelani iz rafinata, ki vsebuje fosforno kislino, vsebujejo prevelik delež kovin, in je treba določiti, kakšen delež bi bil sprejemljiv.
In other words, it identifies a problem and a possible approach to resolving it but does not provide a solution.
Z drugimi besedami študija nakazuje problem in morebiten pristop k reševanju, vendar ne navaja rešitve.
Subsequently, CWP probably hoped to be able to sell the raffinate but discovered that there was no demand for it, and this contributed to the acute financial crisis in 2000.
Kasneje je podjetje CWP najbrž upalo, da bo rafinat lahko prodalo, vendar je ugotovilo, da zanj ni povpraševanja, kar je pripomoglo k akutni finančni krizi leta 2000.
It should have been clear already at the conception phase of the plan in 1996 that a solution had to be found for the toxic raffinate.
Že ko se je leta 1996 snoval koncept, bi moralo biti jasno, da je treba najti rešitev za toksičen rafinat.
If the solution were to sell it, then an appropriate market study should have been conducted in order to establish whether this was feasible.
Ali bi bila rešitev lahko prodaja, bi bilo treba ugotoviti z ustrezno študijo trga.
However, the 1996 and 1997 documents did not even mention the problem.
Vendar v dokumentih iz let 1996 in 1997 ta problem ni niti enkrat omenjen.
As a consequence of the inadequate planning of the necessary steps to achieve the objective, the costs of the entire investment programme and, in particular, of the extraction installation were clearly understated.
Ker ni v zadostni meri načrtovalo potrebnih korakov za dosego cilja, je podjetje CWP nedvomno ocenilo prenizke stroške celotnega investicijskega programa in zlasti ekstrakcijskega objekta.
Germany, however, does not share this view and presented a study by DLM on the costs of the extraction installation.
Vendar se Nemčija s tem ne strinja in je predložila študijo DLM o stroških za ekstrakcijski objekt.
The four-page study, which is based on theoretical calculations that need be checked by conducting practical tests, is simply a list of the costs of producing phosphoric acid by means of the wet process.
Študija, ki obsega štiri strani in temelji na teoretičnih izračunih, ki bi jih bilo treba preveriti s praktičnimi preskusi, samo našteva stroške za izdelavo fosforne kisline v mokrem postopku.
No estimate is given of the costs of building the installation itself.
V študiji stroški za samo gradnjo objekta sploh niso ocenjeni.
This study does not then alter the view that the costs of the investment programme and, in particular, of the extraction installation were not carefully planned when the restructuring strategy was decided on.
Zato je ocena, da podjetje CWP pri določanju strategije za prestrukturiranje ni pazljivo načrtovalo stroškov investicijskega programa in zlasti ekstrakcijskega objekta, pravilna.
This view has been confirmed subsequently as the costs were seriously understated.
To se je kasneje potrdilo, saj je podjetje CWP ocenilo precej prenizke stroške.
The extraction installation was supposed to cost EUR 3,07 million (DEM 6 million) in 1996 but the cost had risen to EUR 7,72 million (DEM 15,1 million) by 2000/2001, when the work was interrupted owing to a lack of liquidity.
Stroški za ekstrakcijski objekt, leta 1996 načrtovani v vrednosti 3,07 milijona EUR (6 milijonov DEM), so v letu 2000/2001, ko se je z deli zaradi pomanjkanja likvidnosti prekinilo, znašali 7,72 milijona EUR (15,1 milijona DEM).
The overall investment, which had been put at for EUR 7,67 million in 1996, had risen to EUR 17,93 million by 2000/2001.
Leta 1996 načrtovana vrednost skupnih naložb 7,67 milijona EUR se je do leta 2000/2001 zvišala na vrednost 17,93 milijona EUR.
The inevitable consequence of the lack of any real planning for the restructuring measures and the investment costs was that the extraction installation was not completed by 1998 and CWP had not restored its long-term viability by 2000 as initially envisaged.
Neizogibna posledica tega, da podjetje CWP ni v zadostni meri načrtovalo dejanskih ukrepov za prestrukturiranje in investicijskih stroškov, je, da ekstrakcijski objekt do leta 1998 še ni bil končan in podjetje CWP do leta 2000 ni ponovno vzpostavilo dolgoročne donosnosti, kot je bilo prvotno predvideno.
By 2000 CWP had not managed to repay any of the loans granted to it, was far from having completed the extraction installation, continued to be dependent on elemental phosphorus and was on the verge of insolvency.
Leta 2000 podjetje CWP ni vrnilo še nobenega posojila, ekstrakcijski objekt še zdaleč ni bil končan, podjetje je bilo še vedno odvisno od elementarnega fosforja in mu je grozila insolvenca.
It can thus be assumed that the 1996 restructuring strategy failed in 2000.
Zato se lahko ugotovi, da je strategija za prestrukturiranje iz leta 1996 leta 2000 spodletela.
Germany, however, takes a different view, namely that, when CWP avoided insolvency by selling its phosphate division to TI, it successfully accomplished the restructuring of that division.
Vendar Nemčija ni tega mnenja. Po njenem mnenju je podjetje CWP, s tem ko je s prodajo trgovine s fosfati podjetju TI preprečilo insolvenco, uspešno zaključilo prestrukturiranje tega poslovnega področja podjetja.
In addition, it considers that the restructuring of the phosphoric acid division will have been successful once TI pays the outstanding amount of the price because then CWP will complete the innovative extraction installation and become viable once again.
Prestrukturiranje poslovnega področja „fosforna kislina“ bo po mnenju Nemčije uspešno zaključeno takoj, ko bo podjetje TI plačalo preostalo nakupno ceno, saj bo podjetje CWP potem lahko končalo inovativni ekstrakcijski objekt in spet postalo donosno.
In support of this assertion, Germany has submitted a report from Dr Scheibitz dated 25 July 2000.
Da bi podprla svojo izjavo, je Nemčija predložila izvedensko mnenje dr. Scheibitza z dne 25. julija 2000.
Its conclusion is that the initial strategy was successful and, even if the Commission does not share this view, the changes to the initial strategy have ensured that CWP will be viable.
Nemčija ugotavlja, da je bila prvotna strategija uspešna in da so spremembe prvotnega koncepta, tudi če Komisija ni tega mnenja, zagotovile preživetje podjetja CWP.
The Commission does not agree.
Vendar se Komisija s tem ne more strinjati.
Moreover, the restructuring of the two divisions is linked: CWP could produce phosphates efficiently only if it could count on producing phosphoric acid economically.
Poleg tega je prestrukturiranje obeh področij medsebojno povezano: učinkovita proizvodnja fosfatov bi bila mogoča samo, če bi se podjetje CWP lahko oprlo na ekonomično izdelavo fosforne kisline.
Although CWP increased its product range and potentially even the quality of its phosphates, it never produced them efficiently because it remained dependent on elemental phosphorus.
Čeprav je podjetje CWP razširilo svojo paleto izdelkov in po možnosti tudi izboljšalo kakovost svojih fosfatov, učinkovita izdelava ni bila mogoča, ker je bilo podjetje še naprej odvisno od elementarnega fosforja.
The fact that CWP withdrew from its traditional market by selling its phosphates division in a bid to avoid insolvency cannot be regarded as a successful restructuring but is proof of the failure of the original plan.
Dejstva, da se je podjetje CWP, da bi s prodajo trgovine s fosfati preprečilo insolvenco, ki mu je grozila, umaknilo s svojega tradicionalnega trga, ne moremo obravnavati kot uspešno prestrukturiranje, temveč je dokaz za to, da je prvoten koncept spodletel.
It should also be noted that the restructuring has not yet ended.
Poleg tega lahko ugotovimo, da prestrukturiranje še ni končano.
The extraction installation, which should have been completed by 1998, i.e. before the ‘sale’ of the phosphates division to TI, is still not operational and the installations for the production of thermal phosphoric acid have been closed down.
Ekstrakcijski objekt, ki bi moral biti po načrtih končan do leta 1998, tj. pred „prodajo“ trgovine s fosfati podjetju TI, še vedno ni obratovalno sposoben in obratovanje naprav za izdelavo fosforne kisline s termičnim postopkom je ustavljeno. Komisija tega ne more obravnavati kot spremembo prvotnega koncepta za prestrukturiranje.
The Commission cannot regard these as changes to the initial restructuring strategy: what is clear is that the initial strategy failed completely in 2000 and that CWP is now in a quite different position.
Jasno je, da je prvotna strategija leta 2000 v celoti spodletela in je podjetje CWP od takrat v popolnoma drugačni situaciji.
The Commission cannot agree with Germany either that the modified strategy would increase CWP’s chances of survival.
Komisija se tudi ne more strinjati z mnenjem Nemčije, da je spremenjena strategija izboljšala možnosti za preživetje podjetja CWP.
It notes that the report from Dr Scheibitz, which Germany presented in order to demonstrate the technical feasibility of the extraction installation, points to two main problems.
Komisija ugotavlja, da izvedensko mnenje dr. Scheibitza, ki ga je Nemčija predložila kot dokazilo o tehnični izvedljivosti ekstrakcijskega objekta, opozarja na dva glavna problema.
First, if the problem with the raffinate is not solved, the installation cannot become operational.
Prvič objekt, če se ne reši problem rafinata, ne more obratovati.
Second, CWP obviously did not incorporate in its planning a pilot phase that could show clearly whether there were any problems with the installation.
Drugič pa podjetje CWP očitno ni načrtovalo preskusne faze, ki bi lahko jasno pokazala morebitne probleme v zvezi z obratovanjem objekta.
As could have been envisaged, shortly after this report CWP was once again on the verge of insolvency.
Kot je bilo pričakovati, se je podjetje CWP kmalu po izvedenskem mnenju spet znašlo na robu insolvence.
On the basis of the information available, the problem with the raffinate has not been solved.
Glede na razpoložljive informacije se problema z rafinatom ni rešilo.
Even if CWP were to complete the installation, further problems could arise in the absence of a pilot phase.
Tudi če bi podjetje CWP dokončalo ekstrakcijski objekt, bi se lahko brez preskusne faze pojavili dodatni problemi.
Finally, the Commission notes that CWP is not a major player on what is a difficult and highly concentrated market dominated by large firms such as Rhodia, Astaris, Prayon and TI.
Nazadnje Komisija ugotavlja, da je podjetje CWP majhen igralec na težkem, zelo koncentriranem trgu, ki ga obvladujejo velika podjetja, kot so Rhodia, Astaris, Prayon in TI.
CWP clearly does not have easy access to financing and suffers from a chronic lack of equity.
Očitno podjetje CWP težko dostopa do sredstev za financiranje in je kronično premalo likvidno.
Even completion of the extraction installation would not by itself ensure the company’s survival.
Tudi če bi dokončalo ekstrakcijski objekt, si s tem ne bi kar avtomatično zagotovilo preživetja.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the 1996 strategy was not carefully planned and presented shortcomings and that costs were understated.
Nazadnje je Komisija mnenja, da strategija iz leta 1996 ni bila skrbno načrtovana, v njej so določeni koraki manjkali in stroški so bili ocenjeni prenizko.
Such a strategy could not lead to the restoration of long-term viability.
Takšna strategija ni mogla ponovno vzpostaviti dolgoročne donosnosti.
The numerous changes to the plan support this view.
Številne spremembe koncepta to potrjujejo.
It is not surprising, therefore, that CWP found itself on the verge of insolvency at the time when the restructuring should have been successfully completed.
Zato ne preseneča dejstvo, da je bilo podjetje CWP v času, ko bi moralo biti prestrukturiranje uspešno zaključeno, tik pred insolvenco.
In addition, the Commission considers that the 1996 strategy, for which the aid was granted, failed completely in 2000 and that there is no guarantee of CWP’s continued survival.
Poleg tega je Komisija mnenja, da je strategija iz leta 1996, za katero je bila dodeljena pomoč, leta 2000 v celoti spodletela in da ni jamstva za nadaljnji obstoj podjetja CWP.
Consequently, the conditions laid down in point 3.2.2(i) of the Community guidelines are clearly not met.
Torej pogoji, ki so določeni v odstavku 3.2.2.(i) Smernic Skupnosti (1994), očitno niso izpolnjeni.
Aid in proportion to the restructuring costs and benefits
Pomoč v razmerju s stroški in koristmi prestrukturiranja
The amount and intensity of the aid must be limited to the strict minimum needed to enable restructuring to be undertaken and must be related to the benefits anticipated from the Community’s point of view.
Obseg in intenzivnost pomoči se morata omejiti na minimum, ki je potreben za prestrukturiranje, in morata biti v razmerju s koristmi, pričakovanimi z vidika Skupnosti.
Therefore, aid beneficiaries will normally be expected to make a significant contribution to the restructuring plan from their own resources or from external commercial financing.
Zato se od prejemnikov pomoči običajno pričakuje, da k načrtu za prestrukturiranje občutno prispevajo iz lastnih ali tujih sredstev.
Moreover, the form in which the aid is granted must be such as to avoid providing the company with surplus cash which would be used for aggressive, market-distorting activities not linked to the restructuring process.
Poleg tega je pomoč treba dodeliti v takšni obliki, da podjetju ne prinaša dodatnega denarja, ki bi ga lahko uporabilo za agresivno in izkrivljajoče vedenje na trgu na poslovnih področjih, ki niso vključena v proces prestrukturiranja.
As regards the contribution of the beneficiary to the restructuring, the 1997 notification identified two items: financing of investments of EUR 5,11 million (DEM 10 million) and contribution from the shareholders of originally EUR 0,15 million (DEM 0,3 million).
Kot prispevek prejemnika pomoči k prestrukturiranju Nemčija v prijavi iz leta 1997 navaja dve postavki: financiranje naložb v višini 5,11 milijona EUR (10 milijonov DEM) in prispevek družbenikov v višini prvotno 0,15 milijona EUR (0,3 milijona DEM).
As noted in the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, the investment obligation was a requirement of the privatisation in 1994, which had been agreed two years before the restructuring started, and not a contribution to the 1996 restructuring.
Kot je Komisija ugotovila v odločitvi za uvedbo uradnega preiskovalnega postopka, je bila obveznost investiranja pogoj za privatizacijo leta 1994, dogovorjeno dve leti pred začetkom prestrukturiranja, in ne prispevek k prestrukturiranju iz leta 1996.
Moreover, under this investment obligation only investments amounting to EUR 5,11 million had to be carried out. And so this obligation cannot be considered as a private investor contribution to the 1996 restructuring.
Poleg tega je ta obveznost investiranja obvezovala samo k temu, da je treba opraviti naložbe v višini 5,11 milijona EUR. Zato te obveznosti ne moremo obravnavati kot zasebni prispevek vlagatelja k prestrukturiranju iz leta 1996.
The State-guaranteed loans cannot be considered as a private investor contribution as claimed by CWP.
Posojil, ki so zavarovana z državnimi poroštvi, ni mogoče obravnavati kot zasebni prispevek vlagatelja, kot trdi podjetje CWP.
In its response to the information injunction, Germany lists a supplier credit from Vopelius as a private investor contribution.
V svojem odgovoru na odredbo o predložitvi podatkov Nemčija kot investicijski prispevek navaja kredit dobavitelja, podjetja Vopelius.
It should be noted that this item does not constitute a credit as such but consists in deferral for several weeks of the payment by CWP for raw material supplies from Vopelius.
Ugotovimo lahko, da ne gre za kredit kot tak, ampak za večtedenski odlog plačila za surovine, ki jih je dobavljalo podjetje Vopelius.
The amount of EUR 2,75 million indicated by Germany as a private investor contribution is an outstanding claim of Vopelius dated January 1998.
Pri znesku v višini 2,75 milijona EUR, ki ga Nemčija navaja kot investicijski prispevek, gre za neporavnano terjatev podjetja Vopelius iz januarja 1998.
The outstanding claim fluctuates constantly.
Višina terjatve ves čas niha.
It amounted to EUR 0,73 million in January 1997 and then fell to EUR 0,4 million in April 1997 before increasing again until January 1998.
Januarja 1997 je terjatev znašala 0,73 milijona EUR, aprila 1997 je padla na 0,4 milijona EUR, do januarja 1998 pa je spet zrasla.
This short-term deferral of the payment of liabilities, which is not related to the financing of the restructuring costs, cannot be considered as a private contribution to the restructuring.
Tega kratkotrajnega odloga plačila za obveznosti, ki nikakor ni povezan s financiranjem stroškov prestrukturiranja, ni mogoče obravnavati kot lasten prispevek k prestrukturiranju.
The other measures listed by Germany as private investor contribution in its response to the information injunction date from the period after 1998 and so are not related to the granting of the aid in late 1996/early 1997 or to the original restructuring plan.
Drugi ukrepi, ki jih je Nemčija v svojem odgovoru na odredbo o predložitvi podatkov imenovala kot lastni prispevek, so iz obdobja po letu 1998 in torej niso povezani z dodelitvijo pomoči konec leta 1996/začetek leta 1997 ali s prvotnim konceptom za prestrukturiranje.
Therefore, even if the Commission were to take into account the planned restructuring costs as originally notified by Germany (EUR 12,88 million) and to regard as private contributions the company’s subscribed capital of EUR 0,29 million and the shareholders’ contribution of EUR 0,15 million mentioned in the 1997 notification, the ratio of private contributions to the restructuring costs would amount to 3,4 %, which is manifestly insufficient, even when taking into account the previous practice regarding aid to companies in the Länder of eastern Germany.
Tudi če bi Komisija upoštevala načrtovane stroške prestrukturiranja (12,88 milijona EUR), kot jih je prvotno prijavila Nemčija, in kot lastni prispevek priznala zabeleženi kapital podjetja v višini 0,29 milijona EUR in prispevek družbenikov v višini 0,15 milijona EUR, naveden v prijavi iz leta 1997, bi prišla na lastni prispevek v višini 3,4 % v razmerju do stroškov prestrukturiranja, kar je očitno premalo, tudi če upoštevamo dosedanjo prakso pri dodeljevanju pomoči podjetjem, ki imajo sedež v vzhodnonemških zveznih deželah.
Consequently, the condition of the aid being proportionate to the restructuring costs and benefits is not fulfilled.
Zato pogoj, da mora biti pomoč sorazmerna s stroški in koristmi prestrukturiranja, ni izpolnjen.
The criteria laid down in point 3.2.2(iii) of the Community guidelines are clearly not met.
Merila iz odstavka 3.2.2(iii) Smernic Skupnosti (1994) očitno niso izpolnjena.
Full implementation of the restructuring plan
Popolna izvedba načrta za prestrukturiranje
As already mentioned, the 1996 restructuring plan has not been implemented.
Kot je bilo že navedeno, „koncept za prestrukturiranje“ iz leta 1996 ni bil izveden.
Consequently, the conditions laid down in point 3.2.2(iv) of the Community guidelines are not met.
Zato tudi pogoji, navedeni v odstavku 3.2.2(iv) Smernic Skupnosti (1994), niso izpolnjeni.
An ex ante assessment indicates that the aid, as initially planned and granted, does not fulfil the criteria of the Community guidelines and so cannot be regarded as being compatible with the common market.
Predhodna presoja kaže, da pomoč, kot je bila sprva načrtovana in dodeljena, ne izpolnjuje pogojev Smernic Skupnosti (1994) in je zato ne moremo obravnavati kot združljivo s skupnim trgom.
Moreover, it is to be noted that subsequent events both during the period when further measures were granted and after the granting of the last measures confirm this conclusion: it is clear that the initial strategy for which the aid was granted failed and that the future of the company is highly uncertain.
Poleg tega je potrebno navesti, da kasnejši dogodki med obdobjem odobritve dodatnih ukrepov in po odobritvi zadnjih ukrepov, ta zaključek potrjujejo: jasno je, da je prvotna strategija, za katero je bila dodeljena pomoč, spodletela in je prihodnost podjetja skrajno negotova.
For this reason, the Commission considers that the aid granted to CWP is incompatible with the common market.
Zato je pomoč, ki je bila dodeljena podjetju CWP, po mnenju Komisije nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom.
In accordance with Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 [24], where negative decisions are taken in cases of unlawful aid, the Commission has to decide that the Member State concerned must take all necessary measures unless this would be contrary to a general principle of Community law.
V skladu s členom 14 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/99 [24] Komisija pri negativnih odločitvah glede nezakonite pomoči odloči, da mora zadevna država članica sprejeti vse potrebne ukrepe, razen če bi bilo to zoper splošno načelo prava Skupnosti.
In the present case, all the aid measures, including those that were notified initially, have been granted and not authorised by a valid Commission decision.
V tem primeru so bili vsi ukrepi pomoči, vključno z ukrepi, ki so bili prvotno prijavljeni, dodeljeni in niso bili odobreni z veljavno odločbo Komisije.
They must, therefore, be considered as unlawful aid.
Zato jih je treba obravnavati kot nezakonite pomoči.
Given that the previous decision was challenged within the prescribed time-limits and annulled by the Court of First Instance, the general principles of Community law, and in particular the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, do not preclude recovery.
Spričo dejstva, da se je prejšnjo odločbo pravočasno izpodbijalo in jo je Sodišče prve stopnje izreklo za nično, splošna načela prava Skupnosti in zlasti načela pravne varnosti in upravičenega zaupanja ne izključujejo terjatve vračila.
This is consistent with the relevant case law of the Community Courts [25].
To je v skladu z ustrezno sodno prakso sodišč Skupnosti [25].
To conclude otherwise would render ineffective the review conducted by the Community legislator in accordance with Article 220, the first paragraph of Article 230 and Article 233 of the EC Treaty, of the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions [26].
Pregled zakonitosti pravnih aktov, izdanih s strani organov Skupnosti, ki ga sodnik Skupnosti izvaja v skladu s členi 220, 230(1) in 233 Pogodbe ES, bi bil v nasprotnem primeru nesmiseln [26].