natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
whenever Community law requires the setting up of competent authorities, Gibraltar sets up its own competent authorities, distinct from those set up for the same purpose in the United Kingdom, and
kadar koli zakonodaja Skupnosti zahteva vzpostavitev pristojnih oblasti, Gibraltar vzpostavi svoje pristojne oblasti, ločene od oblasti, ki jih v enak namen vzpostavi Združeno kraljestvo in
until the European Court of Human Rights' judgment in the Matthews case, Gibraltar was excluded from participation in elections to the European Parliament even though that exclusion was operated by Annex II to the 1976 Act on Direct Elections which was termed as follows: ‘The United Kingdom will apply the provisions of this Act only in respect of the United Kingdom.’
do sodbe Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice v zadevi Matthews je bil Gibraltar izločen iz sodelovanja na volitvah v Evropski parlament, čeprav je to izločitev urejal dodatek II k Zakonu o neposrednih volitvah iz leta 1976, kjer je bilo navedeno sledeče: „Združeno kraljestvo bo uveljavljalo določbe tega zakona samo v okviru Združenega kraljestva.“
General comments
Splošne pripombe
The Commission appears to fear that Gibraltar's proposed new corporate tax system might perpetuate harmful tax competition.
Zdi se, da se Komisija boji, da bo predlagani novi sistem davkov od dobička pravnih oseb v Gibraltarju zakoličil škodljivo davčno konkurenco.
Both the United Kingdom and the Gibraltar Governments believe that the proposed tax reform is compatible with the Code of Conduct on business taxation and the OECD report on harmful tax competition.
Vladi Združenega kraljestva in Gibraltarja menita, da je predlagana davčna reforma združljiva z etičnim kodeksom za obdavčenje podjetij in poročilom OECD o škodljivi davčni konkurenci.
Harmful tax measures typically involve lack of transparency, lack of exchange of information, and a more favourable tax treatment of non-resident companies compared with resident ones.
Škodljivi davčni ukrepi po navadi vključujejo pomanjkanje preglednosti, pomanjkanje izmenjave informacij in bolj ugodno davčno obravnavanje nerezidenčnih družb v primerjavi z rezidenčnimi družbami.
With the proposed reform Gibraltar will eliminate all such harmful aspects of the current exempt and qualifying companies taxation.
Gibraltar bo s predlagano reformo izključil vse te škodljive vidike trenutne obdavčitve izvzetih in ustreznih družb.
Even if Gibraltar were to be considered a favourable tax territory, this concern cannot be addressed through the application of the State aid rules when no State aid is involved.
Tudi če bi Gibraltar obravnavali kot ugodno davčno območje, te zadeve ne bi bilo mogoče rešiti z uporabo pravil državne pomoči, če državna pomoč ni vključena.
V. COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
V. PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANK
Observations were received from the Government of Gibraltar, Spain, the Spanish Confederation of Business Organisations and the Åland Executive.
Pripombe so bile prejete od gibraltarske vlade, Španske konfederacije poslovnih organizacij, Alandskega izvršilnega organa in iz Španije.
The Government of Gibraltar
Vlada Gibraltarja
The Government of Gibraltar is aware of, and fully endorses, the arguments put forward by the United Kingdom [8].
Vlada Gibraltarja je seznanjena z argumenti, ki jih je predstavilo Združeno kraljestvo [8], in jih v celoti podpira.
The additional points made by the Government of Gibraltar in its separate observations can be summarised as follows.
Dodatne točke, ki jih je vlada Gibraltarja predstavila v ločenih komentarjih, je mogoče povzeti na sledeči način.
The Gibraltar Government has no power to tax United Kingdom companies.
Gibraltarska vlada nima pooblastil za obdavčitev družb iz Združenega kraljestva.
Similarly, the United Kingdom Government has no power to tax Gibraltar companies.
Podobno, vlada Združenega kraljestva nima pooblastil za obdavčitev družb iz Gibraltarja.
Gibraltar's tax laws are enforced exclusively by the Gibraltar authorities.
Davčne zakone Gibraltarja uveljavljajo izključno gibraltarske oblasti.
The objective of the reform is to implement a corporate tax regime which complies both with the State aid rules and with the Code of Conduct.
Cilj reforme je uvesti režim davka od dobička pravnih oseb, ki je združljiv tako s pravili o državni pomoči kot tudi z etičnim kodeksom.
The reform is also part of the wider aim to secure compliance with international standards for financial regulation and supervision and to obtain good standing in the international financial community.
Reforma je tudi del širšega cilja za zagotovitev združljivosti z mednarodnimi standardi za finančno urejanje in nadzor ter pridobitev dobrega imena v mednarodni finančni skupnosti.
Gibraltar had previously been found to be a ‘tax haven’ by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the OECD.
Mednarodni denarni sklad (IMF), Projektna skupina za finančno ukrepanje (FATF) in OECD so Gibraltar prej obravnavali kot „davčna nebesa“ .
The IMF and FATF Reports on Gibraltar [9] confirm Gibraltar's compliance with the main international standards on financial regulation and supervision.
Poročila IMF in FATF o Gibraltarju [9] potrjujejo združljivost Gibraltarja z glavnimi mednarodnimi standardi o finančnem urejanju in nadzoru.
The Gibraltar Government's commitment to the OECD [10] delivers compliance with the requirements for exchange of information and transparency.
Zavezanost gibraltarske vlade OECD [10] zagotavlja združljivost z zahtevami za izmenjavo informacij in preglednost.
Gibraltar's tax reform, as amended, delivers de facto compliance with the EU Code of Conduct.
Davčna reforma Gibraltarja, kot je spremenjena, zagotavlja dejansko združljivost z EU etičnim kodeksom.
The reform also delivers compliance with the State aid rules.
Reforma zagotavlja tudi združljivost s pravili o državni pomoči.
Clearance under State aid rules remains the last obstacle in the way of ensuring that Gibraltar, as required by the international community including the European Union, has now addressed all the perceived evils of a tax haven.
Združljivost s pravili o državni pomoči predstavlja zadnjo oviro na poti k zagotavljanju, da je Gibraltar, tako kot zahteva mednarodna skupnosti, vključno z Evropsko unijo, zdaj obravnaval vsa opažena zla davčnih nebes.
Two Gibraltar measures, the exempt and qualifying company regimes, were among eleven measures into which the Commission opened formal State aid investigations on 11 July 2001.
Dva ukrepa Gibraltarja, režima izvzetih in ustreznih družb, sta bila med enajstimi ukrepi, za katere je Komisija 11. julija 2001 uvedla formalno preiskavo o državni pomoči.
All 11 were among the large number of fiscal measures identified as harmful by the Code of Conduct Group [11].
Vseh enajst ukrepov je bilo iz velikega števila davčnih ukrepov, ki jih je Skupina za etični kodeks [11]označila kot škodljive.
They were singled out under the Commission's powers to enforce State aid rules, sometimes by applying new interpretations of the selectivity criterion, essential to the notion of State aid.
V okviru pristojnosti Komisije so bili ukrepi določeni, da izvajajo pravila državne pomoči, včasih tako, da uveljavljajo nove interpretacije kriterija selektivnosti, ki je ključnega pomena za državno pomoč.
The mere fact that a tax regime is listed as harmful under the Code of Conduct does not, however, necessarily mean that it involves State aid (point 30 of the Notice).
Samo dejstvo, da je davčni režim naveden kot škodljiv v okviru etičnega kodeksa, pa ne pomeni nujno, da vključuje državno pomoč (točka 30 Obvestila).
By proceeding in this way, the Commission has embarked on a strategy which could easily lead to the unwanted consequence for competition policy that tax measures which constitute a significant distortion of competition to the detriment of the effective functioning of the single market are left intact for political reasons — the Commission refrains from using appropriate tax harmonisation measures — while less harmful tax systems are being persistently challenged by the Commission in a way that does not respect equality of treatment.
Z nadaljevanjem v tej smeri se je Komisija odpravila po poti strategije, ki bi lahko vodila do neželenih posledic za politiko konkurence, da davčni ukrepi, ki predstavljajo resno motnjo konkurenci do izgube učinkovitega delovanja na enotnem trgu, ostanejo takšni, kot so, iz političnih razlogov — Komisija ne želi uporabiti primernih ukrepov za davčno usklajevanje — medtem ko Komisija manj škodljive davčne sisteme neprestano izpodbija na način, ki ne spoštuje enakosti obravnave.
In order to achieve a common level of business taxation across the European Union, if that is the objective, the Commission must resort to tax harmonisation measures.
Da bi dosegli enoten nivo obdavčenja podjetij po vsej Evropski uniji, če je to cilj, mora Komisija uporabiti ukrepe za davčno usklajevanje.
Otherwise an abuse of powers may be involved.
Drugače je lahko prisotna zloraba pristojnosti.
Point 15 of the Notice confirms that differences between tax systems as such are not regulated by the State aid rules, but should rather be addressed under Articles 95 to 97 EC.
Točka 15 Obvestila potrjuje, da razlik med davčnimi sistemi kot takimi ne urejajo pravila o državni pomoči, ampak jih je treba obravnavati v okviru členov 95 do 97 ES.
The new system will address the concerns regarding possible harmful tax competition.
Novi sistem bo obravnaval zadeve v zvezi z možno škodljivo davčno konkurenco.
First, the reform abolishes any distinction between resident and non-resident companies (so-called ring-fencing) which has been at the heart of the Code of Conduct exercise, the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, and the selectivity aspect of the exempt and qualifying companies legislation.
Prvič, reforma ukinja vso razlikovanje med rezidenčnimi in nerezidenčnimi družbami (tako imenovano „ograjevanje“), ki je bilo v središču izvajanja etičnega kodeksa, poročila OECD o škodljivi davčni konkurenci in vidika selektivnosti zakonodaje izvzetih in ustreznih družb.
The reform applies in a uniform way to all companies registered in Gibraltar.
Reforma velja na enoten način za vse družbe, registrirane v Gibraltarju.
Second, it delivers transparency of the system because all companies will be required to file tax accounts.
Drugič, zagotavlja preglednost sistema, ker bodo vse družbe morale predložiti davčne račune.
Finally, financial services companies in Gibraltar will not be exempted from taxation, but will be subject to an extra top-up tax on profits attributable to such activities.
Končno, družbe finančnih storitev v Gibraltarju ne bodo izvzete iz obdavčenja, ampak bodo predmet dodatnega dopolnilnega davka na dobičke, ki jih je mogoče pripisati takim dejavnostim.
The 15 % profits-based cap and non-taxation of companies making no profit are of general application and do not constitute material selectivity.
15 % omejitev, ki temelji na dobičku, in neobdavčitev družb, ki nimajo dobička, sta splošno veljavni in ne predstavljata materialne selektivnosti.
The simple fact that one company may benefit from a general rule in a given year as compared to another company in the same tax jurisdiction cannot be sufficient to constitute a State aid under the rules of the EC Treaty.
Preprosto dejstvo, da ima lahko ena družba v danem letu glede na drugo družbo korist od splošnega pravila v isti davčni sodni pristojnosti, ne more biti zadosten razlog, da bi to predstavljalo državno pomoč v okviru pravil Pogodbe ES.
This result is clearly not contemplated by the points 13 and 14 of the Notice.
Takega rezultata točki 13 — 14 Obvestila gotovo ne predvidevata.
Regional selectivity could arise if there was a tax, applicable throughout the whole State, but regional parliaments or authorities had power to reduce the rate of that tax (or to give exemptions from it) in their regions.
Do regionalne selektivnosti bi lahko prišlo, če bi obstajal davek, ki bi veljal v celotni državi, a bi regionalni parlamenti ali oblasti imeli pooblastila, da zmanjšajo stopnjo tega davka (ali podajo njegove izjeme) v svojih regijah.
Selectivity issues therefore can arise if the taxing powers of the region said to be giving aid are in some sense secondary or supplementary powers to modify a standard or residual regime.
Vprašanja o selektivnosti se zato lahko pojavijo le, če so davčna pooblastila v regiji, ki naj bi dajala pomoč, v neki meri sekundarna ali dopolnilna pooblastila za spreminjanje standardnega ali preostalega režima.
This may perhaps be the position in some other Member States, but it is not the position in Gibraltar.
Takšen je morda položaj v nekaterih drugih državah članicah, a ne v Gibraltarju.
The situation is entirely different if the tax jurisdiction said to be giving aid is, and has been at all relevant times, a genuinely autonomous tax jurisdiction which determines its tax system independently under its own budgetary responsibility, and in which taxes imposed by the other tax jurisdictions in the State are not payable.
Položaj je popolnoma drugačen, če davčna sodna pristojnost, ki naj bi dajala pomoč, je in je v vseh pomembnih trenutkih bila pristno avtonomna davčna sodna pristojnost, ki svoj davčni sistem določa neodvisno v okviru lastne proračunske odgovornosti in v kateri davki, ki jih nalagajo druge davčne sodne pristojnosti v državi, niso plačljivi.
Without prejudice to whether generally applicable deviations from a national norm adopted by a fully autonomous region (in contrast to a region acting by ad hoc delegation of powers) without any link to the central budget would constitute State aid or not, the Gibraltar tax reform is also in that respect fundamentally different.
Brez poseganja v to, ali splošno veljavna odstopanja od državne norme, ki jo je sprejela popolnoma avtonomna regija (v nasprotju z regijo, ki deluje z ad hoc prenosom pooblastil), brez kakršne koli povezave s centralnim proračunom, predstavljajo državno pomoč ali ne, je davčna reforma Gibraltarja tudi s tega vidika bistveno drugačna.
Not only is there a genuine, sui generis, autonomy in the territory, but this autonomy is used to devise independently a wholly different and separate system which is not based, in any way, on the United Kingdom scheme or norms.
Ne le, da obstaja za pristno, sui generis, avtonomijo na ozemlju, ampak se ta avtonomija uporablja tudi za neodvisno izdelavo popolnoma drugačnega in ločenega sistema, ki na noben način ne temelji na shemi ali normah Združenega kraljestva.
It is thus completely inappropriate and irrelevant to compare the Gibraltar tax rules to the rules which would apply had the same tax subject been based in the United Kingdom.
Zato je popolnoma neprimerno in nepotrebno primerjati davčna pravila Gibraltarja s pravili, ki bi veljala, če bi enak predmet davka temeljil v Združenem kraljestvu.
The Court of First Instance (CFI) has recently reviewed the Commission's decisions to open formal procedures in cases concerning fiscal measures adopted pursuant to some degree of regional autonomy granted to the Basque Provinces under the Spanish constitution.
Sodišče prve stopnje (CFI) je pred kratkim pregledalo sklepe Komisije o uvedbi formalnih postopkov v primerih, ki se navezujejo na davčne ukrepe, sprejete v skladu z določeno stopnjo regionalne avtonomije, ki je bila baskovskim provincam odobrena v okviru španske ustave.
However the Basque Provinces applied their fiscal powers to deviate from the national tax system by granting tax relief from otherwise applicable rules.
Baskovske province pa so svoja davčna pooblastila uporabile za odstopanje od državnega davčnega sistema, tako da so odobrile davčne olajšave od drugače veljavnih pravil.
In its preliminary conclusions that the tax measures in question were selective and could constitute illegal State aid, the Commission did not rely on the fact that they applied only to part of the Spanish territory.
Komisija se v svojih prvotnih zaključkih, da so bili zadevni davčni ukrepi selektivni in bi lahko predstavljali nezakonito državno pomoč, ni zanašala na dejstvo, da so veljali samo za del španskega ozemlja.
The CFI specifically noted in one case [12] that the Commission's decision to open procedures ‘has no effect on the competence of the Territorio Histórico de Álava to adopt general tax measures applicable to the whole of the region concerned’.
CFI je v enem primeru [12] izrecno izpostavila, da sklep Komisije, da začne s postopki, „nima nobenega vpliva na pristojnosti Territorio Histórico de Álava-e za sprejetje splošnih davčnih ukrepov, veljavnih v vsej zadevni regiji“ .
The reform is not regional in scope for the purposes of the State aid rules because the fiscal measures in question, which constitute the entire and exclusive corporate tax system, would apply in the same way throughout the relevant tax jurisdiction.
Reforma za pravila državne pomoči ni regionalnega obsega, ker bi zadevni davčni ukrepi, ki predstavljajo celotni in izključni sistem davka od dobička pravnih oseb, veljali na enak način po vsej zadevni davčni sodni pristojnosti.
The Åland Executive
Alandski izvršilni organ
The comments of the Åland Executive can be summarised as follows.
Pripombe Alandskega izvršilnega organa je možno povzeti na sledeči način.
In deciding that the reform is likely to constitute State aid, the Commission states that the possible existence of regional selectivity is taken into account in order to reach its conclusions.
Pri sklepu, da reforma lahko predstavlja državno pomoč, Komisija navaja, da je upoštevala možen obstoj regionalne selektivnosti, da je prišla do svojih zaključkov.
The Commission cites previous decisions, including the decision to open the formal State aid investigation procedure on captive insurance companies in the Åland Islands.
Komisija navaja prejšnje sklepe, vključno s sklepom o uvedbi formalnega preiskovalnega postopka o državni pomoči o zavarovalnicah za zavarovanje lastnih tveganj v Alandskih otokih.
This invitation to submit comments refers to the possible existence of regional specificity.
Ta razpis za oddajanje pripomb se nanaša na možen obstoj regionalne specifičnosti.
But the reference was dropped from the Commission's final decision.
A referenco na to je Komisija iz končnega sklepa izpustila.
Therefore the Åland case cannot serve as an example of regional specificity or selectivity.
Zato primer Aland ne more služiti kot primer regionalne specifičnosti ali selektivnosti.
The account of previous Commission practice should refer only to the Commission's final decision.
Prejšnja praksa Komisije bi se morala nanašati samo na končni sklep Komisije.
If a self-governing region has sole power to legislate in matters relating to direct corporate taxation, and that region introduces a tax measure, the measure has to be assessed and authorised in accordance with the same principles that would apply if it were taken by a Member State.
Če ima regija s samostojno upravo izključno pristojnost za izdajanje predpisov v zadevah, ki se nanašajo na neposredne davke od dobička pravnih oseb, in ta regija uvede davčni ukrep, mora biti ukrep ocenjen in potrjen v skladu z enakimi načeli, ki bi veljala, kot če bi ga sprejela država članica.
The self-governing region is to be regarded as a separate jurisdiction in those areas where legislative power lies with its legislature exclusively.
Regijo s samostojno upravo je treba obravnavati kot ločeno sodno pristojnost na tistih področjih, kjer se zakonodajna pooblastila nahajajo izključno v njeni zakonodaji.
This means that the compatibility of a tax measure with the rules on State aid is to be judged in the same way whether it is taken by a Member State or by a self-governing region.
To pomeni, da je treba združljivost davčnega ukrepa s pravili državne pomoči presojati na enak način, če ga sprejme država članica ali regija s samostojno upravo.
Any other conclusion would make it impossible for a region under self-government to exercise its legislative power in a way that differed from the rest of the Member State.
Vsak drugačen sklep bi regiji s samostojno upravo onemogočal izvajanje njenih zakonodajnih pooblastil na način, ki se razlikuje od ostale države članice.
Accordingly, a tax measure that is plainly a general one within a self-governing region is not to be regarded as selective, and does not constitute State aid for purposes of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, in so far as the region has exclusive power in tax matters, irrespective of whether the tax charged in the area is different from that in the Member State to which the region belongs.
Torej se davčnega ukrepa, ki je v okviru regije s samostojno upravo jasno splošne narave, ne sme obravnavati kot selektivnega in ne predstavlja državne pomoči za člen 87(1) Pogodbe ES, v kolikor ima regija izključna pooblastila v davčnih zadevah, ne glede na to, ali se davek, predpisan na območju, razlikuje od davka v državi članici, kateri regija pripada.
Any other interpretation would jeopardise the region's authority in tax matters.
Vsaka druga interpretacija bi ogrozila pristojnost regije v davčnih zadevah.
Spain essentially endorses the Commission's preliminary analysis of the reform set out in the invitation to comment [13].
Španija v glavnem podpira predhodne analize reforme Komisije, navedene v razpisu za oddajo pripomb [13].
The additional comments made by Spain can be summarised as follows.
Dodatne pripombe Španije je možno povzeti na sledeči način.
Gibraltar's tax system is an extremely important issue for Spain, given the geographical contiguity of the two territories and the serious detriment it is causing to Spanish public finances.
Davčni sistem Gibraltarja je izjemno pomembno vprašanje za Španijo, glede na geografski stik teh dveh ozemelj in resno motnjo, ki jo povzroča španskim javnim financam.
The unfair competition from Gibraltar can be described as harmful since both under the present system and under the proposed new arrangements the tax burden on businesses and investments is much lower there than in Spain.
Nelojalno konkurenco iz Gibraltarja je mogoče opisati kot škodljivo, saj je davčna obremenitev podjetij in naložb tako v okviru zdajšnjega sistema kot v okviru predlagane nove ureditve mnogo manjša tam kot v Španiji.
The reform would continue to be harmful to the Spanish tax system since it would maintain a level of taxation substantially lower in Gibraltar than in Spain, where the standard rate of corporation tax is 35 %, and would differ greatly from the tax system in the United Kingdom, creating a risk that businesses would relocate to Gibraltar in order to benefit from more favourable tax arrangements.
Reforma bi še naprej bila škodljiva za španski davčni sistem, saj bi ohranila nivo obdavčitve, ki je mnogo nižji v Gibraltarju kot v Španiji, kjer je standardna stopnja davka od dobička pravnih oseb 35 %, in bi se zelo razlikovala od davčnega sistema v Združenem kraljestvu, kar bi ustvarilo tveganje, da bi se podjetja preselila v Gibraltar, zato da bi imela korist od bolj ugodne davčne ureditve.
It is likely that most firms in Gibraltar would pay less than the maximum liability of 15 %, at least 15 to 20 percentage points lower than in either Spain or the United Kingdom.
Verjetno je, da bo večina podjetij v Gibraltarju plačala manj kot največjo obveznost, ki znaša 15 %, kar je vsaj 15 do 20 odstotnih točk manj kot v Španiji ali Združenem kraljestvu.
For the 28800 companies not liable to the top-up taxes on utilities and financial services activities, the proposed tax system is not in fact an overall corporation tax on business profits but a combination of various individual taxes subject to ceilings which render the tax liability either extremely small or non-existent (the reform is referred to as ‘zero rate tax’ in Gibraltar).
Za 28800 družb, ki niso obvezane za plačevanje dopolnilnih davkov na javne gospodarske službe in dejavnosti finančnih storitev, predlagani davčni sistem dejansko ni celoten davek na dobiček od pravnih oseb, ampak kombinacija različnih posameznih davkov, ki so predmet omejitev, ki davčno obveznost spremenijo tako, da je ali zelo majhna ali pa je sploh ni (reforma se v Gibraltarju omenja kot „davek nične stopnje“).