natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Such exemptions from the general legal provisions should be avoided to the fullest extent possible in order to avoid market distortions and underpinning the accountability of management.
Takšnim izjemam od splošnih pravnih predpisov se je potrebno izogibati v največji možni meri, da bi preprečili tržna izkrivljanja in ščitenje menedžmenta pred odgovornostjo.
SOEs as well as the state as a shareholder should not be protected from challenge via the courts or the regulatory authorities, in case they infringe the law.
V primeru kršenja zakonov se družb v državni lasti in države kot lastnice ne bi smelo ščititi pred sodnimi postopki ali ukrepi regulatornih organov.
Stakeholders should be able to challenge the state as an owner in the courts and be treated fairly and equitably in such case by the judicial system.
Deležniki bi morali imeti možnost izzvati državo kot lastnico na sodišču in bi jih moral pravni sistem v takih primerih obravnavati pošteno in enakopravno.
The rigidity of the capital structure sometimes makes it difficult for an SOE to develop or fulfil its objectives.
Rigidnost kapitalske strukture včasih družbam v državni lasti otežuje postavljanje in izvajanje ciljev.
The state as an owner should develop an overall policy and provide mechanisms that allow appropriate changes in SOEs&apos; capital structure.
Država kot lastnica bi morala razviti celovito politiko in zagotoviti mehanizme, ki bi dovoljevali ustrezne spremembe kapitalske strukture družb v državni lasti.
These mechanisms could include the capacity, for the ownership function, to adjust the SOEs&apos; capital structures in a flexible way but within clear limits.
Ti mehanizmi bi lahko omogočali lastniku, da kapitalsko strukturo družb v državni lasti fleksibilno prilagodi, vendar v okviru jasno začrtanih mej.
Within certain limits, this could, for example, facilitate the indirect transfer of capital from one SOE to another, such as through some reinvestment of dividends received, or the raising of capital on competitive market terms.
V določenih mejah bi to na primer lahko omogočalo posreden prenos kapitala iz ene družbe v državni lasti v drugo, kot je na primer delno reinvestiranje prejetih dividend ali povečanje kapitala po konkurenčnih tržnih pogojih.
These mechanisms should respect the Parliament decision making power regarding the budget or the appropriate level of state ownership as well as the overall transparency in the budgetary system.
Ti mehanizmi bi morali upoštevati moč odločanja parlamenta o državnem proračunu oziroma določeno stopnjo državnega lastništva, kot tudi splošno preglednost proračunskega sistema.
Any change in the capital structure of an SOE should be clearly consistent with the state ownership objective and the SOE&apos;s specific circumstances.
Vsaka sprememba kapitalske strukture družbe v državni lasti mora biti dosledno v skladu s cilji državnega lastništva in z njenim specifičnim položajem.
Decisions should be adequately documented to allow effective accountability through audits or scrutiny by the Parliament.
Odločitve morajo biti ustrezno dokumentirane zaradi jasnosti glede odgovornosti pri parlamentarnih revizijah in skrbnih pregledih.
Finally, such mechanisms should be limited and subject to careful oversight in order to avoid any form of cross-subsidisation via capital transfers.
Takšni mehanizmi bi morali biti tudi omejeni in skrbno nadzorovani, da bi se izognili vsakršni obliki počeznega subvencioniranja prek kapitalskih transferjev.
Creditors and the board often assume that there is an implicit state guarantee on SOEs&apos; debts.
Upniki in odbor so pogosto mnenja, da država brezpogojno jamči za dolgove družb v državni lasti.
This situation has in many instances led to excessive indebtedness, wasted resources and market distortion, to the detriment of both creditors and the taxpayers.
Takšna situacija je v mnogih primerih pripeljala do prekomerne zadolženosti, zapravljanja sredstev in izkrivljanja trga v škodo tako upnikom kot davkoplačevalcem.
Moreover, in some countries, state-owned banks and other financial institutions tend to be the most significant if not the main creditor of SOEs.
Razen tega so v posameznih državah banke v državnem lastništvu in druge finančne institucije največji, če ne glavni upniki družb v državni lasti.
This environment leaves great scope for conflicts of interest.
Takšne razmere so gojišče za navzkrižja interesov.
It may lead to bad loans by state-owned banks as the enterprise might feel itself under no obligation to repay the loan.
Ena od posledic so neugodna posojila državnih bank, saj družba ne čuti odgovornosti za odplačevanje posojil.
This may shelter SOEs from a crucial source of market monitoring and pressure, thereby distort their incentive structure.
Take situacije lahko tudi ščitijo družbo v državni lasti pred ključno pomembnim nadzorom in tržno konkurenco, s čimer razdirajo njene spodbujevalne mehanizme.
A clear distinction is necessary between the state and SOEs&apos; respective responsibilities in relation to creditors.
Nujno potrebno je jasno razločevati med odgovornostmi države od odgovornosti družb v državni lasti v odnosu do upnikov.
The state often grants guarantees to SOEs to compensate for its inability to provide them with equity capital, but this facility is often widely abused.
Država pogosto daje garancije družbam v državni lasti za kompenziranje svoje nezmožnosti, da bi jim zagotovila lastniški kapital, vendar se te olajšave pogosto na široko zlorablja.
As a general principle, the state should not give an automatic guarantee in respect of SOE liabilities.
Veljati bi moralo splošno načelo, da država ne daje avtomatičnih garancij za obveznosti družb v državni lasti.
Fair practices with regard to the disclosure and remuneration of state guarantees should also be developed and SOEs should be encouraged to seek financing from capital markets.
Razviti je potrebno tudi primerne postopke za objavljanje podatkov in plačilo državnih garancij ter spodbujati družbe v državni lasti, da si iščejo finančne vire na kapitalskih trgih.
Mechanisms should be developed to manage conflicts of interests and ensure that SOEs develop relations with state-owned banks, other financial institutions as well as other SOEs based on purely commercial grounds.
Razviti je potrebno mehanizme za obvladovanje navskrižij interesov in zagotoviti, da družbe v državni lasti vzpostavijo odnose z državnimi bankami, drugimi finančnimi institucijami ter drugimi družbami v državni lasti na izključno komercialnih osnovah.
State-owned banks should grant credit to SOEs on the same terms and conditions as for private companies.
Banke v državi lasti morajo dajati kredite družbam v državni lasti po enakih pogojih kot privatnim družbam.
These mechanisms could also include limits and careful scrutiny on SOEs&apos; board members sitting on the board of state-owned banks.
Ti mehanizmi lahko obsegajo tudi omejitve in skrbno preverjanje članov odborov družb v državni lasti, ki so tudi člani odborov bank v državni lasti.
Annotations to Chapter II
Opombe k poglavju II
In order to carry out its ownership functions, the government should refer to private and public sector governance standards, notably the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which are also applicable to SOEs.
Za izvajanje lastniške funkcije se je dolžna vlada opirati na standarde upravljanja za privatni in javni sektor, izrecno še na Načela korporativnega upravljanja OECD, ki veljajo tudi za družbe v državni lasti.
It is often the multiple and contradictory objectives of state ownership that lead to either a very passive conduct of ownership functions, or conversely results in the state&apos;s excessive intervention in matters or decisions which should be left to the company and its governance organs.
Ponavljajoči se in nasprotujoči si cilji državnega lastništva pogosto vodijo bodisi v zelo pasivno opravljanje lastniških funkcij ali v nasprotne rezultate zaradi pretiranega vpletanja države v zadeve oziroma odločitve, ki bi jih ta morala prepustiti družbi in njenim organom upravljanja.
In order for the state to clearly position itself as an owner, it should clarify and prioritise its objectives.
Da bi se država lahko jasno pozicionirala kot lastnica, mora jasno formulirati svoje cilje in jih razvrstiti po prioriteti.
The objectives may include avoiding market distortion and the pursuit of profitability, expressed in the form of specific targets, such as rate-of-return and dividend policy.
Med njene cilje sodijo izogibanje tržnim izkrivljanjem in donosnost, izražena v obliki specifičnih ciljnih vrednosti, kot na primer v stopnji donosnosti in politiki dividend.
Setting objectives may include trade-offs, for example between shareholder value, public service and even job security.
Med cilje bi sodile tudi kompenzacije, na primer med vrednostjo za delničarje, javnimi storitvami in celo varnostjo delovnih mest.
The state should therefore go further than defining its main objectives as an owner; it should also indicate its priorities and clarify how inherent trade-offs shall be handled.
Država mora zato narediti še korak dlje od samega definiranja svojih glavnih lastniških ciljev. Postaviti mora tudi prioritete in pojasniti, kako je potrebno obravnavati inherentne kompenzacije.
In doing so, the state should avoid interfering in operational matters, and thereby respect the independence of the board.
Pri tem se država ne sme vmešavati v operativne zadeve in je dolžna spoštovati neodvisnost odbora.
A clear ownership policy will help in avoiding the situation where SOEs are given excessive autonomy in setting their own objectives or in defining the nature and extent of their public service obligations.
Z jasno lastniško politiko se je možno izogniti situacijam, da bi družbe v državni lasti dobile preveč avtonomije in bi si same postavljale svoje lastne cilje ali si same določale naravo in obseg nalog za opravljanje javnih storitev.
Moreover, the state should strive to be consistent in its ownership policy and avoid modifying the overall objectives too often.
Država si mora razen tega prizadevati za doslednost svoje lastniške politike in se izogibati prepogostemu spreminjanju splošnih ciljev.
A clear, consistent and explicit ownership policy will provide SOEs, the market and the general public with predictability and a clear understanding of the state&apos;s objectives as an owner as well as of its long term commitments.
Z jasno, dosledno in nedvoumno lastniško politiko bo sporočala družbam v državni lasti, trgu in splošni javnosti predvidljive in jasne cilje države kot lastnice ter svoje dolgoročne zaveze.
In developing and updating the state&apos;s ownership policy, governments should make appropriate use of public consultation.
Pri razvoju in posodabljanju lastniške politike države morajo vlade organizirati javne posvete za zbiranje predlogov in pripomb.
The ownership policy and associated company objectives should be public documents accessible to the general public and widely circulated amongst the relevant ministries, agencies, SOE boards, management, and the legislature.
Lastniška politika države in z njo povezani cilji družbe morata biti javna dokumenta, dostopna splošni javnosti in morata biti na široko skomunicirana med ustrezna ministrstva, agencije, odbore družb v državni lasti, menedžment in zakonodajna telesa.
It is also important that relevant civil servants endorse the ownership policy and that the SOE General shareholders meeting, the board and senior management endorse the corporate objectives statements.
Pomembno je tudi, da lastniško politiko indosirajo ustrezni javni uslužbenci in da izjavo korporativnih ciljev indosira generalna skupščina delničarjev družbe v državni lasti, odbor in najvišji menedžment.
The prime means for an active and informed ownership by the state is a clear and consistent ownership strategy, a structured board nomination process and an effective exercise of established ownership rights.
Osnovno orodje za aktivno in obveščeno lastništvo države so jasna in dosledna lastniška strategija, strukturiran postopek kandidiranja odbora in učinkovito izvajanje lastniških pravic.
Any involvement in the day-to-day management of SOEs should be avoided.
Izogibati se je potrebno vsakemu vmešavanju v dnevno vodenje družbe v državni lasti.
The ownership or co-ordinating entity&apos;s ability to give direction to the SOE or its board should be limited to strategic issues and policies.
Pravica lastniškega oziroma koordinacijskega odbora, da daje usmeritve družbam v državni lasti, mora biti omejena na strateške zadeve in politike.
It should be publicly disclosed and specified in which areas and types of decisions the ownership or co-ordinating entity is competent to give instructions.
Javno je potrebno objaviti in navesti, za katera področja in vrste odločitev je lastniški oziroma koordinacijski odbor pooblaščen dajati usmeritve.
Along the same lines, strict limits should also be put on the ability of any other government bodies to intervene in day-to-day management of SOEs.
V istem smislu morajo biti postavljene tudi stroge omejitve drugim vladnim organom, da se ne bi vmešavali v tekoče vodenje družb v državni lasti.
In the nomination and election of board members, the ownership entity should focus on the need for SOE boards to exercise their responsibilities in a professional and independent manner.
Pri kandidiranju in volitvah članov odbora se mora lastniški organ osredotočati na potrebo po profesionalnem in neodvisnem izvajanju nalog članov odbora družbe v državni lasti.
As stated in the OECD Principles, it is important that individual board members when they carry out their duties do not act as representatives for different constituencies.
V skladu z Načeli OECD je za člane odborov pomembno, da se pri izvajanju nalog ne obnašajo kot da bi bili predstavniki posameznih volilnih skupin.
Independence requires that all board members carry out their duties in an even-handed manner with respect to all shareholders.
Člani odbora morajo biti neodvisni in izvrševati svoje naloge enakopravno v imenu vseh delničarjev.
Except when this is compatible with the company charter or the explicit objectives of the company, this means that board members should not be guided by any political concerns when carrying out their board duties.
To pomeni, da članov odbora pri izvajanju nalog ne smejo voditi kakršni koli politični interesi, razen če je to v skladu z ustanovno listino ali eksplicitnimi cilji družbe.
When the state is a controlling owner, it is in a unique position to nominate and elect the board without the consent of other shareholders.
Ko je država obvladujoč lastnik, je v položaju, da lahko kandidira in voli odbor brez privoljenja drugih delničarjev.
This legitimate right comes with a high degree of responsibility for identifying, nominating and electing board members.
Ta legitimna pravica je povezana z visoko stopnjo odgovornosti za izbiro, kandidiranje in volitve članov odbora.
In this process, and in order to minimize possible conflicts of interest, the ownership entity should avoid electing an excessive number of board members from the state administration.
V tem postopku in zato da bi se zmanjšalo potencialna navzkrižja interesov na minimum, se mora lastniški organ izogibati pretiranemu številu članov odbora iz vrst državne uprave.
This is particularly relevant for partly owned SOEs and for SOEs in competitive industries.
To je posebej pomembno za družbe v delni državni lasti in za družbe v državni lasti, ki opravljajo konkurenčno dejavnost.
Some countries have decided to avoid nominating or electing anyone from the ownership entity or other state officials on SOE boards.
Nekatere države so se odločile, da v odbore družb v državni lasti ne bodo kandidirale niti volile nikogar iz lastniškega odbora in tudi ne drugih državnih uradnikov.
This aims at clearly depriving the government from the possibility to directly intervene in the SOE&apos;s business or management and at limiting the state responsibility for decisions taken by SOE boards.
Cilj tega je dosledno distanciranje vlade od morebitnega neposrednega vmešavanja v poslovanje ali vodenja družb v državni lasti ter omejevanje odgovornosti države za poslovne odločitve odborov družb v državni lasti.
Employees of the ownership entity, professionals from other parts of the administration or from the political constituencies should only be elected on SOE boards if they meet the required competence level for all board members and if they do not act as a conduit for undue political influence.
Uslužbenci lastniškega odbora, strokovnjaki iz drugih delov državne uprave ali iz političnih volilnih skupin so lahko izvoljeni v odbor družbe v državni lasti, če ustrezajo zahtevani stopnji kompetenc za člane odborov in če ne služijo le kot podaljšana roka za nedovoljena politična vplivanja.
They should have the same duties and responsibilities as the other board members and act in the interest of the SOE and all its shareholders.
Imeti morajo enake naloge in odgovornosti kot drugi člani odbora in ravnati v interesu družbe in vseh njenih delničarjev.
Disqualification conditions and situations of conflict of interest should be carefully evaluated and guidance provided about how to handle and resolve them.
Diskvalifikacijske pogoje in situacije potencialnih navzkrižij interesov je potrebno skrbno oceniti ter pripraviti navodila za obravnavanje in reševanje navzkrižij interesov.
The professionals concerned should have neither excessive inherent nor perceived conflicts of interest.
Ti strokovnjaki ne smejo biti niti v izrazito inherentnem niti v domnevnem navzkrižju interesov.
In particular this implies that they should neither take part in regulatory decisions concerning the same SOE nor have any specific obligations or restrictions that would prevent them from acting in the company&apos;s interest.
Še posebej velja, da ne smejo sodelovati pri regulativnih ukrepih, povezanih s temi družbami, niti ne smejo imeti specifičnih nalog ali omejitev, ki bi jim prepovedovale delati v interesu te družbe v državni lasti.
More generally, all potential conflicts of interests concerning any member of the board should be reported to the board which should then disclose these together with information on how they are being managed.
Skratka, vsako potencialno navzkrižje interesov, povezano s katerim koli članom odbora, je potrebno sporočiti odboru, ki ga je nato dolžan objaviti skupaj s tem, kako ga bo razrešil.
It is particularly necessary to clarify the respective personal and state liability when state officials are on SOE boards.
Ko so državni uradniki člani odborov družb v državni lasti, je še posebej pomembno jasno opredeliti osebno odgovornost in odgovornost države.
The state officials concerned might have to disclose any personal ownership they have in the SOE and follow the relevant insider trading regulation.
Ti državni uslužbenci so dolžni objaviti tudi vsako morebitno lastništvo, ki ga imajo v družbi in upoštevati ustrezne predpise v zvezi s trgovanjem na osnovi notranjih informacij.
Guidelines or codes of ethics for members of the ownership entity and other state officials serving as SOE board members could be developed by the co-ordinating or ownership entity.
Smernice ali etični kodeks za člane lastniškega organa in druge državne uslužbence, ki so člani odborov družb v državni lasti, lahko pripravi koordinacijski oziroma lastniški organ.
These Guidelines or codes of ethics should also indicate how confidential information passed on to the state from these board members should be handled.
Vsebovati morajo tudi navodila za obravnavanje zaupnih informacij, ki jih posredujejo ti člani odbora državi.
Direction in terms of broader political objectives should be channelled through the co-ordinating or ownership entity and enunciated as enterprise objectives rather than imposed directly through board participation.
Usmeritve, povezane s širšimi političnimi cilji, je potrebno usmerjati prek koordinacijskega ali lastniškega organa in jih predstavljati kot cilje družbe in ne, kot da jih sprejel neposredno odbor.
SOE boards should not respond to policy signals until they are authorised by the Parliament or approved by specific procedures.
Odbori družb v državni lasti se ne smejo odzivati na politične signale preden niso ti sprejeti v parlamentu ali potrjeni v posebnih postopkih.
It is critical for the ownership function within the state administration to be clearly identified, whether it is located at a central ministry such as the finance or economics ministries, in a separate administrative entity, or within a specific sector ministry.
Za lastniško funkcijo v državni upravi je zelo pomembno, da se jasno opredeli njena lociranost, bodisi v centralnem ministrstvu kot sta finančno ali gospodarsko, v ločeni upravni enoti ali v določenem sektorskem ministrstvu.
To achieve a clear identification of the ownership function, it can be centralised in a single entity, which is independent or under the authority of one ministry.
Za jasno opredeljenost lastniške funkcije mora biti ta centralizirana v enem organu, ki je neodvisen ali pod nadzorom določenega ministrstva.
This approach would help in clarifying the ownership policy and its orientation, and would also ensure its more consistent implementation.
Tak pristop bo prispeval tudi k razjasnitvi lastniške politike in njene usmerjenosti in bo tudi zagotavljal bolj dosledno uvedbo te politike.
Centralisation of the ownership function could also allow for reinforcing and bringing together relevant competencies by organising “pools” of experts on key matters, such as financial reporting or board nomination.
Centralizacija lastniške funkcije bo tudi omogočala okrepitev in združevanje ustreznih kompetenc z organiziranjem &quot;bazenov&quot; strokovnjakov za obravnavo ključnih zadev, kot je finančno poročanje ali kandidiranje članov odbora.
In this way, centralisation can be a major force in the development of aggregate reporting on state ownership.
Na ta način bo centralizirana lastniška funkcija lahko postala gonilna sila pri razvoju zbirnega poročanja o državnem lastništvu.
Finally, centralisation is also an effective way to clearly separate the exercise of ownership functions from other activities performed by the state, particularly market regulation and industrial policy as mentioned in guideline I.A above.
In kot je že omenjeno v smernici I. A. tega dokumenta, je centralizacija tudi učinkovit način za jasno ločevanje izvajanja lastniških funkcij od drugih aktivnosti države, posebej od regulacije trga in industrijske politike.
If the ownership function is not centralised, a minimum requirement is to establish a strong co-ordinating entity among the different administrative departments involved.
Če se lastniške funkcije ne centralizira, je potrebno ustanoviti vsaj močan koordinacijski organ, v katerem bodo sodelovali različni oddelki državne uprave.
This will help to ensure that each SOE has a clear mandate and receives a coherent message in terms of strategic guidance or reporting requirements.
To bi pomagalo zagotoviti, da bi imela vsaka družba v državni lasti jasna pooblastila in bi dobivala koherentna sporočila z vidika strateških usmeritev ali zahtev po poročanju.
The co-ordinating entity would harmonise and co-ordinate the actions and policies undertaken by different ownership departments in various ministries.
Koordinacijski organ bi usklajeval in koordiniral aktivnosti in politike, ki bi jih sprejeli lastniški oddelki v posameznih ministrstvih.
The co-ordinating entity should also be in charge of establishing an overall ownership policy, developing specific guidelines and unifying practices among the various ministries.
Koordinacijski organ bi moral biti tudi zadolžen za uvedbo celovite lastniške politike, za razvoj posebnih usmeritev in za poenotenje delovnih postopkov v posameznih ministrstvih.
Centralisation of the ownership function in a single entity is probably most relevant for SOEs in competitive sectors and is not necessarily applicable to SOEs that are mainly pursuing public policy objectives.
Centralizacija lastniške funkcije v enem samem organu je verjetno najprimernejša oblika za družbe v državni lasti, ki poslujejo v konkurenčnih sektorjih in ni nujno uporabna tudi za družbe v državni lasti, ki v glavnem uresničujejo cilje javne politike.