natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As the Court has ruled on several occasions, the concept of &quot;private life&quot; is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition.
Kot je Sodišče že večkrat presodilo, je &quot;zasebno življenje&quot; širok pojem, ki se ne more v celoti opredeliti.
It covers, among many other things, the personal identity and physical, psychological and moral integrity of a person.
Med številnimi drugimi vidiki se nanaša na osebno identiteto ter telesno, psihološko in moralno celovitost osebe.
It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the person&apos;s physical, social and moral identity and dignity.
Zato lahko zajema tudi mnogovrstne vidike telesne, družbene in moralne celovitosti osebe.
The right to private life cannot be restricted to the so-called &quot;inner circle&quot; of human existence, in which an individual may live his or her own personal life as he or she chooses, thus excluding entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle.
Pravica do zasebnega življenja se ne more omejiti na tako imenovani &quot;notranji krog&quot; človekovega bivanja, v katerem lahko posameznik živi svoje osebno življenje po lastni izbiri, s čimer popolnoma izključi zunanji svet, ki ga ta krog ne zajema.
Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings (see Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, § 29, Series A 251-B).
Spoštovanje zasebnega življenja mora vsebovati tudi neko stopnjo pravice vzpostavljanja in razvoja odnosov z drugimi človeškimi bitji (glej Niemietz proti Nemčiji, 16. 12. 1992, 29. odstavek, serija A 251-B).
It follows necessitate nature that Article 8 protects in addition the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings as well as the outside world, even in the public context, which may also fall within the scope of &quot;private life&quot; (see S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 66, ECHR 2008, and P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, ECHR 2001-IX).
Iz te necessitate nature izhaja, da 8. člen varuje tudi pravico do osebnega razvoja ter pravico do vzpostavljanja in razvoja odnosov z drugimi človeškimi bitji, pa tudi z zunanjim svetom, celo v povezavi z javnim, kar prav tako lahko spada v &quot;zasebno življenje&quot; (glej S. in Marper proti Združenemu kraljestvu [VS], št. 30562/04 in 30566/04, 66. odstavek, ESČP 2008, ter P. G. in J. H. proti Združenemu kraljestvu, št. 44787/98, ESČP 2001-IX).
On the one hand, it is absolutely clear that the right to legal personality is a basic precondition and essential necessity both for the realisation and enjoyment of the aforementioned different aspects of private life, including the so-called &quot;inner circle&quot;, and also - in the public context - for the &quot;external development&quot; of personality.
Po eni strani je popolnoma jasno, da je pravica do pravne osebnosti temeljni pogoj in bistvena nujnost za uresničevanje in uživanje že omenjenih različnih vidikov zasebnega življenja, vključno s tako imenovanim &quot;notranjim krogom&quot;, pa tudi - v povezavi z javnim - za &quot;zunanji razvoj&quot; osebnosti.
On the other hand, the right to legal personality is a normal, natural and logical consequence of human personality and inherent human dignity; it is a natural and inherent part of every human being and his or her human personality.
Po drugi strani pa je pravica do pravne osebnosti normalna, naravna in logična posledica človekove osebnosti in neločljivega človekovega dostojanstva; je naravni in neločljivi del vsakega človeškega bitja ter njegove ali njene človekove osebnosti.
The broad, non-exhaustive and flexible nature of Article 8 of the Convention obviously means that this right is included within its comprehensive ambit.
Široka, nepopolna in prilagodljiva narava 8. člena konvencije očitno pomeni, da je ta pravica vključena v njegovo obširno področje.
This right is tacitly, but very clearly, included and deeply rooted in the concept of individual personality and inherent human dignity embraced by Article 8 of the Convention.
Ta pravica je sicer tiho, vendar zelo jasno vključena in globoko zakoreninjena v pojmu posameznikove osebnosti in neločljivega človekovega dostojanstva, ki ga zajema 8. konvencije.
The right to be a person before the law is acquired by birth, but unfortunately it can be restricted or totally denied by the illegal and arbitrary action of a government.
Pravica biti oseba pred zakonom je pridobljena z rojstvom, vendar pa se žal z nezakonitim in samovoljnim dejanjem vlade lahko omeji ali popolnoma zanika.
The restriction or denial of this right can take place through two principal means of &quot;vulgar positivism&quot;:
Ta pravica se lahko omeji ali zanika z dvema glavnima sredstvoma &quot;vulgarnega pozitivizma&quot;:
the passing of &quot;illegal and illegitimate laws&quot;, that is, laws with illegal and illegitimate aims or with an &quot;anti-human content&quot;; and the improper and arbitrary implementation of formally &quot;legal and legitimate laws&quot;, as happened in the present case.
s sprejemanjem &quot;nezakonitih in nelegitimnih zakonov&quot;, namreč zakonov z nezakonitimi in nelegitimnimi cilji ali s &quot;protičloveško vsebino&quot;, ter z nepravilnim in samovoljnim izvajanjem formalno &quot;zakonitih in legitimnih zakonov&quot;, kot se je zgodilo v tej zadevi.
The Court had an excellent opportunity to rule that this right was an inherent part of Article 8 of the Convention.
Sodišče je imelo sijajno priložnost razsoditi, da je bila ta pravica neločljivi del 8. člena konvencije.
The majority unfortunately failed to say so and to confirm expressly and explicitly something that already falls implicitly and tacitly within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention.
Žal večina temu ni pritrdila ali izrecno in jasno potrdila nečesa, kar že implicitno in tiho spada na področje 8. člena konvencije.
This aim could have been achieved by adding one short and simple sentence to this effect at the end of paragraph 356.
Ta cilj bi se lahko dosegel z ustreznim dodatkom, ki bi vseboval en sam kratek in enostaven stavek na koncu 356. odstavka.
Divesting the applicants of their legal personality by virtue of the large-scale &quot;erasure&quot; deprived them not only of their legal status, which had previously given them access to a wide range of rights.
Z odvzemom pravne osebnosti pritožnikom na podlagi velikopoteznega izbrisa ti niso bili le prikrajšani za pravni status, ki jim je prej omogočal dostop do cele vrste pravic.
It also essentially and substantially decreased their legal capacity and procedural ability to use the allegedly accessible domestic remedies to regulate their legal status.
To dejanje je tudi bistveno in stvarno zmanjšalo njihovo pravno in postopkovno sposobnost za uporabo domnevno dostopnih domačih pravnih sredstev za zakonsko ureditev njihovega pravnega statusa.
For this reason, all the remedies mentioned by the Government may be considered to have been essentially inaccessible and insufficient for the applicants, as stated in the joint dissenting opinion of judges.
Zato se lahko za vsa pravna sredstva, ki jih omenja vlada, reče, da so bila za pritožnike v bistvu nedostopna in nezadostna, kot so v svojem skupnem odklonilnem ločenem mnenju navedli sodniki.
Not only the legal vacuum in the independence legislation (see paragraphs 344-356 of the judgment), but also the deliberate implementation of this legislation through secret and subordinate regulations with clearly illegitimate aims, placed additional, insurmountable administrative obstacles in the applicants&apos; way and thwarted the subsequent success of their legitimate claims for regularisation of their legal status.
Ne le pravna praznina v osamosvojitveni zakonodaji (glej 344.-356. odstavek sodbe), ampak tudi premišljeno izvajanje te zakonodaje na podlagi tajnih in podrejenih predpisov z nedvomno nezakonitimi cilji sta na pot pritožnikov postavila dodatne, nepremostljive administrativne ovire in preprečila poznejši uspeh njihovih zakonitih zahtev za zakonsko ureditev njihovega pravnega statusa.
In such circumstances Mr and Mrs should have been considered to have been dispensed from the obligation to apply formally for a residence permit in the first place.
V teh okoliščinah bi se moralo za že od vsega začetka šteti, da sta razbremenjena obveznosti formalno zaprositi za dovoljenje za prebivanje.
In a situation where they had previously been &quot;erased&quot; from the legal system of Slovenia, de facto deprived of their legal capacity and confronted with an organised and carefully planned governmental policy with the aim of decreasing the number of &quot;ethnically unsuitable&quot; citizens, such an application, no doubt, would have been totally pointless and futile, as was clearly the case for the other applicants.
Potem ko sta bila predhodno izbrisana iz slovenskega pravnega sistema, dejansko prikrajšana za svojo pravno sposobnost ter postavljena pred organizirano in skrbno načrtovano vladno politiko, katere cilj je bil zmanjšati število &quot;etnično neprimernih&quot; državljanov, bi bila taka prošnja nedvomno popolnoma nesmiselna in jalova, kakor se je jasno pokazalo pri drugih pritožnikih.
The applicants, including Mr and Mrs, could not have lost their victim status, because they are still suffering.
Pritožniki, vključno z niso mogli izgubiti statusa žrtve, ker še vedno trpijo.
They have to endure the consequences of the &quot;erasure&quot; and the deprivation of their legal personality.
Prenašati morajo posledice izbrisa in odvzema pravne osebnosti.
Nor have they yet been given any appropriate redress and compensation!
Prav tako niso bili deležni nobene poprave krivic in odškodnine!
Furthermore, for years the Government blatantly disregarded the judgments of the Constitutional Court of Slovenia.
Poleg tega se vlada dolga leta sploh ni zmenila za odločbe slovenskega ustavnega sodišča.
These judgments of the Constitutional Court clearly confirmed the violations of the applicants&apos; rights.
V njih je ustavno sodišče nedvoumno potrdilo kršitve pravic pritožnikov.
In this case, we have what is a classic example of a &quot;continuing violation&quot; of the Convention.
Pri tej zadevi imamo opravka s prvovrstnim primerom &quot;trajajoče kršitve&quot; konvencije.
Last but not least, in my opinion, the Court did not sufficiently take into consideration the particularly aggravating circumstances in this case, namely the fact that this was a large-scale, gross and systematic violation of basic human rights as a consequence of a deliberately organised and planned governmental policy, as more than 25,000 persons were &quot;erased&quot; from the Slovenian legal system and thus deprived of their right to be recognised as a person before the law.
Ne nazadnje menim, da Sodišče pri tej zadevi ni dovolj upoštevalo posebej obremenilnih okoliščin, namreč da je bila to velikopotezna, velikanska in sistematična kršitev temeljnih človekovih pravic kot posledica premišljeno organizirane in načrtovane vladne politike, saj je bilo več kot 25.000 oseb izbrisanih iz slovenskega pravnega sistema, s čimer jim je bila odvzeta pravica, da se priznavajo kot osebe pred zakonom.
Needless to say, this amounted to a legalistic means of ethnic cleansing.
Odveč je reči, da je bilo to legalistično sredstvo etničnega čiščenja.
We are unable to follow the majority in upholding the Government&apos;s preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of Mr and Mrs (point 4 of the operative provisions of the judgment).
Ne moremo se pridružiti večini, ki je v primeru ugodila predhodnemu ugovoru vlade glede neizčrpanja notranjepravnih sredstev (4. točka izreka sodbe).
In the present case the Court found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.
V obravnavani zadevi je Sodišče ugotovilo kršitev 13. člena v povezavi z 8. členom konvencije.
In paragraph 371 of the judgment it referred to its finding that the Government had failed to establish that the remedies available to the applicants were &quot;adequate&quot; and &quot;effective&quot; in order to redress, at the material time, the alleged violation of Article 8. The Court linked its finding of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention to its decision to dismiss the objection of non-exhaustion in respect of the six applicants who eventually received residence permits (see paragraphs 295-313 of the judgment).
V 371. odstavku sodbe se sklicuje na svojo ugotovitev, da vladi ni uspelo dokazati &quot;ustreznosti&quot; in &quot;učinkovitosti&quot; razpoložljivih pravnih sredstev za popravo zatrjevane kršitve 8. člena v spornem času. Sodišče je ugotovitev kršitve 13. a konvencije navezalo na svoj sklep, da zavrne ugovor neizčrpanja pri šestih pritožnikih, ki so na koncu prejeli dovoljenje za prebivanje (glej 295.-313. odstavek sodbe).
In accordance with the traditional approach taken in its case-law, it thereby applied the principle of the &quot;close affinity&quot; characterising the subtle links between Articles 35 and 13 of the Convention.
V skladu z običajnim načinom v svoji sodni praksi je tako uporabilo načelo &quot;tesne sorodnosti&quot;, ki je značilno za subtilne vezi med 35. in 13. členom konvencije.
The non-exhaustion rule is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 of the Convention - with which it has close affinity - that there is an effective remedy available in the domestic system in respect of the alleged breach (see, as most recent authorities, Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], no. 34869/05, § 32, 29 June 2011, and McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 107, 10 September 2010).
Pravilo neizčrpanja temelji na domnevi, izraženi v 13. členu konvencije (z njim je to pravilo tesno povezano), da v domačem sistemu obstaja učinkovito pravno sredstvo, ki je na voljo v zvezi z zatrjevano kršitvijo (glej najnovejše zadeve Sabeh El Leil proti Franciji [VS], št. odstavek, 29. 6. 2011, in McFarlane proti Irski [VS], št. odstavek, 10. 9. 2010).
The Court conducted a detailed examination of the various options referred to by the Government in support of their objection, namely individual constitutional appeals, a petition for an abstract review of the constitutionality of legislation, the amended Legal Status Act and citizenship proceedings.
Sodišče je podrobno proučilo različne možnosti, ki jih je vlada navedla v podporo svojemu ugovoru, namreč posamezne ustavne pritožbe, pobudo za presojo ustavnosti zakonodaje, spremenjeni in dopolnjeni ZUSDDD ter postopke za pridobitev državljanstva.
The Court was not persuaded by any of these remedies put forward by the Government, holding that the objection should be dismissed and quite logically concluding, on exactly the same grounds, that there had been a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8.
Nobeno pravno sredstvo, ki ga je navedla, ni prepričalo Sodišča, ki je presodilo, da je treba ugovor zavrniti, in iz popolnoma istih razlogov čisto logično ugotovilo, da je bil kršen 13. člen v povezavi z 8. členom.
There are only two alternatives here:
Tu obstajata le dve možnosti:
either there are remedies satisfying the criteria of adequacy and effectiveness, or there are not.
ali pravna sredstva, ki izpolnjujejo merila ustreznosti in učinkovitosti, so ali pa jih ni.
In opting for the second alternative, the Court should in our view have also dismissed the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of Mr and Mrs.
Ko se je odločilo za drugo možnost, bi moralo Sodišče po našem mnenju zavrniti ugovor o neizčrpanju notranjepravnih sredstev tudi v primeru.
The fact that these two applicants did not attempt to obtain a residence permit or take any other steps to regularise their residence status (see paragraphs 289-294 of the judgment) is of no relevance to a finding that domestic remedies were not exhausted.
Dejstvo, da pritožnika nista poskušala pridobiti dovoljenja za prebivanje ali sprejeti katerih drugih ukrepov za zakonsko ureditev svojega prebivališča (glej 289.-294. odstavek sodbe), za ugotovitev, da notranjepravna sredstva niso bila izčrpana, ni pomembno.
I readily subscribe to the excellent arguments put forward by Judge and several other colleagues in their joint opinion:
Brez omahovanja se pridružujem izvrstnim argumentom, ki so jih predstavili sodnik Spielmann in mnogi drugi kolegi v skupnem mnenju:
the application, in so far as it was lodged by Mr and Mrs should not, in my opinion, have been rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
pritožba, ki sta jo vložila, po mojem mnenju ne bi smela biti zavrnjena zaradi neizčrpanja notranjepravnih sredstev.
Since the Court found that the domestic remedies were not sufficiently effective, it should not have been necessary to exhaust them, and the reasoning in the judgment is contradictory in this respect; I shall not labour the point.
Ker je Sodišče ugotovilo, da notranjepravna sredstva niso bila dovolj učinkovita, je bila zahteva po njihovem izčrpanju nepotrebna, zaradi česar je obrazložitev, navedena v sodbi, v tem pogledu protislovna. O tej točki ne nameravam več razpravljati.
I would, however, add an observation covering two aspects.
Kljub temu bi rad dodal pripombo, ki se nanaša na dva vidika.
In my view, it would have been preferable to examine in the first place whether these two people qualified as victims or whether, as the Slovenian Government also maintained, the fact that they did not seek to avail themselves of the laws whereby their claims could (possibly) have been satisfied demonstrated their lack, or loss, of victim status.
Menim, da bi bilo že od vsega začetka bolje preveriti, ali sta bili ti osebi upravičeni do statusa žrtve oziroma ali je dejstvo, da nista poskušali uporabiti zakonov, na podlagi katerih bi bilo njunim zahtevkom (morebiti) ugodeno, dokazovalo, da nista žrtvi ali da sta izgubili status žrtve, kot je še zatrjevala slovenska vlada.
Firstly, although the Court&apos;s case-law does not lay down a rigid hierarchy regarding objections to admissibility, it would seem more natural to determine whether applicants have victim status before deciding whether they have exhausted domestic remedies.
Prvič, čeprav sodna praksa Sodišča ne določa stroge hierarhije pri ugovorih glede sprejemljivosti, bi se še pred odločanjem o tem, ali sta pritožnika izčrpala notranjepravna sredstva, vendarle zdelo primerneje ugotoviti, ali imata status žrtve.
The former issue, moreover, is referred to in Article 34 of the Convention and the latter in Article 35, although I accept that this textual argument is not compelling.
Poleg tega je prvo vprašanje, omenjeno v 34. členu konvencije, in drugo iz 35. člena, pri čemer dopuščam, da ta tekstualna trditev ni prepričljiva.
Secondly, I consider that the Government were mistaken in confusing the apparent lack of interest shown by these applicants with the loss of their status as victims.
Drugič, menim, da se je vlada motila, ko je domnevno pomanjkanje interesa, ki sta ga pokazala ta pritožnika, zamenjala z izgubo njunega statusa žrtve.
Mr and Mrs were in very difficult circumstances for reasons relating to ill health and geographical distance, and the complexity of the various legal changes affecting their situation did not make it any easier for them to become acquainted with the instruments that might have formed the basis for their requests.
sta bila zaradi slabega zdravja in geografske oddaljenosti v zelo težkem položaju, prav tako pa jima zapletenost različnih pravnih sprememb, ki so vplivale na njun položaj, ni prav nič olajšala seznanitve s sredstvi, ki bi bila lahko podlaga za njune zahtevke.
It is therefore harsh to maintain that their subjective - and, I repeat, apparent - lack of interest can be taken to equate to loss of victim status, which is an objective factor.
Zato je zelo strogo trditi, da se lahko njuno subjektivno - ponavljam domnevno - pomanjkanje interesa razume tako, kot da bi bilo enako izgubi statusa žrtve, kar je objektivni dejavnik.
A shift from subjective to objective considerations is not impossible in certain special circumstances, but it can certainly not be presumed.
V nekaterih posebnih okoliščinah premik od subjektivnih do objektivnih preudarkov ni nemogoč, vsekakor pa se ne more predvideti.
Admittedly, by upholding the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the judgment was not required to examine the objection of lack of victim status, rightly noting that it was not necessary to do so.
Res je, da zaradi ugoditve ugovoru neizčrpanja notranjepravnih sredstev v sodbi ni bilo treba proučiti ugovora izgube statusa žrtve, pri čemer je bilo pravilno ugotovljeno, da to ni potrebno.
However, I wished to point out that in my view, the complaints which Mr and Mrs brought before the European Court of Human Rights were admissible on two counts, and probably well-founded.
Kljub temu pa sem želel poudariti, da sta bili po mojem mnenju pritožbi, ki sta ju vložila pri Evropskem sodišču za človekove pravice, sprejemljivi v dveh točkah in verjetno utemeljeni.
I thus find it all the more regrettable that these complaints were rejected.
Zato se mi zdi še toliko bolj obžalovanja vredno, da sta bili pritožbi zavrnjeni.
Together with Judges we have expressed our disagreement with the conclusions of the majority as concerns the admissibility of the complaints by the applicants Mr and Mrs.
Skupaj s sodniki sva izrazila nestrinjanje z ugotovitvami večine glede sprejemljivosti pritožb pritožnikov.
In our view similar concerns were applicable to the conclusions reached by the Chamber of the Third Section in its judgme nt of 31 May 2007 in respect of the victim status of the applicants Mr and Mr.
Meniva, da so se podobni pomisleki lahko uporabili za ugotovitve senata tretjega oddelka v sodbi z dne 31. 5. 2007 glede statusa žrtve pritožnikov Ljubomirja.
In this regard the Chamber on the one hand found that “the issuing of the retroactive residence permits, in line with the Constitutional Court's decision, constitutes an adequate and sufficient remedy for their complaints” (see paragraph 311 of the Chamber judgment), while on the other hand finding a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, holding that “the respondent Government have failed to establish that the [same] remedies at the applicants' disposal can be regarded as effective remedies” (see paragraph 385 of the Chamber judgment).
V tej zvezi je senat po eni strani ugotovil, da &quot;je izdaja dovoljenj za prebivanje za nazaj v skladu z odločbo ustavnega sodišča primerno in zadostno pravno sredstvo za njuni pritožbi&quot; (glej 311. odstavek sodbe senata). Pri tem pa je po drugi strani ugotovil kršitev 13. člena konvencije, ker je menil, da &quot;tožena vlada ni dokazala, da se lahko [ista] pravna sredstva, ki so bila na voljo pritožnikoma, štejejo za učinkovita&quot; (glej 285. odstavek sodbe senata).