natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Regarding wholly-owned SOEs, the co-ordinating or ownership entity should maintain a continuous dialogue with external auditors, as well as with the specific state controllers when these latter exist.
Pri družbah v 100- odstotni državni lasti je koordinacijski oz. lastniški organ dolžan vzdrževati stalen dialog z zunanjimi revizorji ter z ustreznimi državnimi kontrolorji, če ti obstajajo.
This continuous dialogue could take the form of regular exchange of information, meetings or ad hoc discussions when specific problems occur.
Stalen dialog lahko poteka v obliki redne izmenjave informacij, sestankov ali ad hoc pogovorov, ko se pojavi kak specifičen problem.
External auditors will provide the co-ordinating or ownership entity with an external, independent and qualified view on the SOE performance and financial situation.
Zunanji revizorji bodo zagotavljali koordinacijskemu oz. lastniškemu odboru zunanji, neodvisen in strokoven pogled na poslovanje in finančni položaj družbe v državni lasti.
However, continuous dialogue of the ownership entity with external auditors and state controllers should not be at the expense of the board&apos;s responsibility.
Seveda pa stalen dialog med lastniškim organom in zunanjimi revizorji in državnimi kontrolorji ne sme prekoračiti odgovornosti odbora.
When SOEs are publicly traded or partially-owned, the co-ordinating or ownership entity must respect the rights and fair treatment of minority shareholders.
Če so družbe v državni lasti delniške družbe oziroma v delnem lastništvu države, je koordinacijski oz. lastniški organ dolžan pošteno obravnavati in spoštovati pravice manjšinskih delničarjev.
The dialogue with external auditors should not give the co-ordinating or ownership entity any privileged information and should respect regulation regarding privileged and confidential information.
Koordinacijski oz. lastniški organ ne sme v dialogu z zunanjimi revizorji dobivati nobenih privilegiranih informacij, skladno s predpisi v zvezi s privilegiranimi in zaupnimi informacijami.
Ensuring that remuneration schemes for SOE board members foster the long term interest of the company and can attract and motivate qualified professionals
zagotavljati da bodo sistemi nadomestil za člane odborov družb v državni lasti zadovoljevali dolgoročne interese družbe ter pritegovali in motivirali kvalificirane strokovnjake.
There is a strong trend to bring the remuneration of board members of SOEs closer to private sector practices.
Obstaja močan trend, da bi nagrajevanje članov odborov družb v državni lasti približali praksi v privatnem sektorju.
However, in a majority of OECD countries, this remuneration is still far below market levels for the competencies and experience required, as well as for responsibilities involved.
Je pa višina tega nagrajevanja v večini držav članic OECD še vedno močno pod ravnijo tržne ponudbe in povpraševanja za tovrstne kompetence in izkušnje, kot tudi za s tem povezane odgovornosti.
It is in the state&apos;s interest to ensure that, in all enterprises where it has a stake, minority shareholders are treated equitably, since its reputation in this respect will influence its capacity of attracting outside funding and the valuation of the company.
V interesu države je zagotoviti, da so v vseh družbah, ker je država soudeležena kot lastnica, manjšinski delničarji obravnavani nepristransko, ker bo zaradi svojega ugleda, ki ga bo deležna zaradi tega, uspešneje pritegovala zunanje vlagatelje in bo to prispevalo tudi k višji vrednosti družbe.
It should therefore ensure that other shareholders do not perceive the state as an opaque, unpredictable and unfair owner.
Zato mora zagotoviti, da drugi delničarji ne bodo dojemali države kot nejasne, nepredvidljive in nepoštene lastnice.
The state should on the contrary establish itself as exemplary and follow best practices regarding the treatment of minority shareholders.
Država mora biti v nasprotju s tem zgled najboljšega obravnavanja manjšinskih delničarjev.
Whenever a part of an SOEs&apos; capital is held by private shareholders, institutional or individual, the state should recognise their rights.
Ko je del kapitala družb v državni lasti v rokah zasebnih, institucionalnih ali posameznih delničarjev, je država dolžna priznavati njihove pravice.
It is in the interest of the co-ordinating or ownership entity and SOEs themselves to refer to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance with regard to minority shareholders&apos; rights.
V interesu koordinacijskega oz. lastniškega organa in družb v državni lasti je, da upoštevajo Načela korporativnega upravljanja OECD, ki se nanašajo na pravice manjšinskih delničarjev.
The Principles state that “Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive action, by, or in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and should have effective means of redress”.
Načela navajajo, da »morajo biti manjšinski delničarji zaščiteni pred neposrednimi ali posrednimi zlorabami v interesu obvladujočih delničarjev in morajo imeti na voljo ustrezne mehanizme za uveljavljanje odškodnin v primeru zlorabe njihovih pravic«.
The Principles also prohibit insider trading and abusive self-dealing.
Načela tudi prepovedujejo trgovanje na osnovi notranjih informacij in zlorabljanje poslov v lastno korist.
Finally, the annotations to the OECD Principles suggest pre-emptive rights and qualified majorities for certain shareholder decisions as an ex-ante means of minority shareholders protection.
Končno predlagajo opombe k Načelom OECD predkupne pravice in kvalificirano večino za določene delničarske odločitve kot ex-ante način za zaščito manjšinskih delničarjev.
As a dominant shareholder, the state is in many cases able to make decisions in general shareholders meetings without the agreement of any other shareholders.
Država kot prevladujoča lastnica je v mnogih primerih sposobna sprejemati odločitve na skupščinah delničarjev brez soglasja drugih delničarjev.
It is usually in a position to decide on the composition of the board of directors.
Običajno je tudi v položaju, da lahko odloča o sestavi uprave.
While such decision making power is a legitimate right that follows with ownership, it is important that the state doesn&apos;t abuse its role as a dominant shareholder, for example by pursuing objectives that are not in the interest of the company and thereby to the detriment of other shareholders.
Čeprav je ta moč odločanja legitimna pravica, pogojena z lastništvom, je pomembno, da država ne izrablja svoje vloge prevladujočega delničarja, na primer z zasledovanjem ciljev, ki niso v interesu družbe in s tem tudi ne v interesu drugih delničarjev.
Abuse can occur through inappropriate related party transactions, biased business decisions or changes in the capital structure favouring controlling shareholders.
Zlorabe se lahko zgodijo tudi z neprimernimi transakcijami s povezanimi družbami, pristranskimi poslovnimi odločitvami ali spremembami kapitalske strukture v korist obvladujočih delničarjev.
The measures which can be taken include better disclosure, a duty of loyalty of board members, as well as qualified majorities for certain shareholder&apos;s decisions.
Vpeljati bi bilo potrebno ukrepe za boljšo objavo podatkov, za obveznosti v zvezi z lojalnostjo članov odborov ter za uporabo kvalificirane večine pri določenih delničarskih odločitvah.
The co-ordinating or ownership entity should develop guidelines regarding equitable treatment of minority shareholders.
Koordinacijski oz. lastniški organ mora razviti navodila za nepristransko obravnavo manjšinskih delničarjev.
It should ensure that individual SOEs, and more particularly their boards, are fully aware of the importance of the relationship with minority shareholders and are active in enhancing it.
Zagotoviti mora, da se bodo družbe, in še posebej njihovi odbori, v celoti zavedali pomena odnosov z manjšinskimi delničarji in da bodo te odnose aktivno vzdrževali.
As stated in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, “the potential for abuse is marked when the legal system allows, and the market accepts, controlling shareholders to exercise a level of control which does not correspond to the level of risk that they assume as owners through exploiting legal devices to separate ownership from control”.
Načela korporativnega upravljanja OECD navajajo, da »se možnost zlorab opaža v pravnih sistemih, ki dovoljujejo prakso in jo trg tudi sprejema, da prevladujoči lastniki izvajajo stopnjo nadzora v nesorazmerju s tveganji, ki jih prevzamejo z lastništvom, s tem da izrabijo pravna sredstva za ločevanje lastništva od nadzora«.
Therefore governments should, as far as possible, limit the use of Golden Shares and disclose shareholders&apos; agreements and capital structures that allow a shareholder to exercise a degree of control over the corporation disproportionate to the shareholders&apos; equity ownership in the company.
Zato morajo vlade v največji možni meri omejiti uporabo zlatih delnic in objavljati delničarske pogodbe ter kapitalske strukture, ki omogočajo delničarjem izvajati stopnjo nadzora nad družbo, ki ni v sorazmerju z njihovim lastniškim deležem.
A crucial condition for protecting minority and other shareholders is to ensure a high degree of transparency.
Ključen pogoj za zaščito manjšinskih in drugih delničarjev je zagotavljanje visoke stopnje preglednosti.
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance “support simultaneous reporting of information to all shareholders in order to ensure their equitable treatment.&quot;
Načela korporativnega upravljanja OECD »podpirajo istočasno poročanje podatkov vsem delničarjem za zagotavljanje nepristranske obravnave.
In maintaining close relations with investors and market participants, companies must be careful not to violate this fundamental principle of equitable treatment.”
Za vzdrževanje tesnih odnosov z vlagatelji in udeleženci na trgu morajo družbe paziti, da ne kršijo tega temeljnega načela nepristranske obravnave«.
Minority and other shareholders should have access to all the necessary information to be able to make informed investment decisions.
Manjšinski in drugi delničarji morajo imeti dostop do vseh potrebnih informacij, da bi se lahko argumentirano odločali.
Meanwhile, significant shareholders, including the co-ordinating or ownership entity, should not make any abusive use of the information they might obtain as controlling shareholders or board members.
Pomembni delničarji, in tudi koordinacijski oz. lastniški organ, pa po drugi strani ne smejo zlorabljati informacij, ki jih utegnejo dobiti kot obvladujoči delničarji ali člani odborov.
For non-listed SOEs, other shareholders are usually well identified and often have privileged access to information, through board seats for example.
Drugi delničarji družb v državni lasti, ki ne kotirajo na borzi, so običajno dobro identificirani in imajo običajno privilegiran dostop do informacij, na primer s članstvom v odborih.
However, whatever the quality and completeness of the legal and regulatory framework concerning disclosure of information, the co-ordinating or ownership entity should ensure that all enterprises where the state has shares put mechanisms and procedures in place to guarantee easy and equitable access to information by all shareholders.
Seveda pa, ne glede na kakovost in celovitost pravnega in regulatornega okvira za objavo podatkov, mora koordinacijski oz. lastniški organ zagotoviti, da vse družbe z državnim lastniškim deležem uvedejo mehanizme in postopke za omogočanje lahkega in nepristranskega dostopa do informacij vsem delničarjem.
Any shareholder agreements, including information agreements covering board members, should be disclosed.
Vsi delniški sporazumi, vključno sporazumi s člani odborov o obveščanju, morajo biti objavljeni.
SOEs, including any enterprise in which the state is a minority shareholder, should identify their shareholders and keep them duly informed in a timely and systematic fashion about material events and forthcoming shareholder meetings.
Družbe v državni lasti, tudi tiste z manjšinskim lastništvom, morajo identificirati svoje delničarje, da jih lahko pravočasno in sistematično obveščajo o bistvenih zadevah in načrtovanih delničarskih skupščinah.
They should also provide them with sufficient background information on issues that will be subject to decision.
Oskrbovati jih morajo tudi z zadostnim ozadjem informacij o zadevah, ki bodo predmet odločanja.
It is the responsibility of SOEs&apos; boards to make sure that the company fulfils its obligations in terms of information to the shareholders.
Odgovornost odborov družb v državni lasti je zagotoviti, da bo družba izpolnjevala svoje obveznosti v zvezi obveščanjem delničarjev.
In doing so, SOEs should not only apply the existing legal and regulatory framework, but are encouraged to go beyond it when relevant in order to build credibility and confidence.
Pri tem morajo ne samo upoštevati veljavni pravni in regulatorni okvir, ampak je priporočljivo, da ga presegajo, ko je to pomembno za večjo kredibilnosti in zaupanje.
Where possible, active consultation with minority shareholders will help in improving the decision making process and the acceptance of key decisions.
Kjer je to možno, bo aktivno posvetovanje z manjšinskimi delničarji pomagalo izboljšati proces odločanja in sprejemanja ključnih odločitev.
D. The participation of minority shareholders&apos; in shareholder meetings should be facilitated in order to allow them to take part in fundamental corporate decisions such as board election.
D. Udeležbo manjšinskih delničarjev na skupščinah delničarjev je potrebno podpirati zato, da ti lahko sodelujejo pri temeljnih korporativnih odločitvah, kot so na primer volitve odbora.
Minority shareholders may be concerned about actual decisions being made outside the company&apos;s shareholder meetings or board meetings.
Manjšinske delničarje utegnejo skrbeti aktualne odločitve, ki niso bile sprejete na skupščinah delničarjev ali na sestankih odbora družbe.
This is a legitimate concern for listed companies with a significant or controlling shareholder, but it can also be an issue in companies where the state is the dominant shareholder.
To je legitimna skrb v primeru družb s pomembnim ali obvladujočim delničarjem, ki kotirajo na borzi, je pa lahko tudi problem v družbah s prevladujočim državnim lastništvom.
It might be appropriate for the state as an owner to reassure minority shareholders that their interests are taken into consideration.
Za državo kot lastnico bi bilo primerno, da manjšinskim delničarjem ponovno zagotovi, da se njihovi interesi upoštevajo.
As underlined in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the right to participate in general shareholder meetings is a fundamental shareholder right.
Kot je poudarjeno v Načelih korporativnega upravljanja OECD, je pravica sodelovanja na skupščinah delničarjev temelja delničarska pravica.
To encourage minority shareholders to actively participate in SOEs general shareholder meetings and to facilitate the exercise of their rights, specific mechanisms could be adopted by SOEs, in the same vein as those recommended for listed companies in the OECD Principles.
Za zagotovitev aktivnega sodelovanja manjšinskih delničarjev na skupščinah delničarjev družb v državni lasti in izvajanja njihovih pravic, lahko družbe v državni lasti uvedejo posebne mehanizme z istim namenom kot tiste, ki jih Načela OECD priporočajo družbam, ki kotirajo na borzi.
These could include qualified majorities for certain shareholder decisions and, when deemed useful by the circumstances, the possibility to use special election rules, such as cumulative voting.
Med take mehanizme sodijo kvalificirana večina za določene delničarske odločitve in možnost uporabe posebnih volilnih pravil, kot je kumulativno glasovanje, ko bi se v določenih razmerah to izkazalo za koristno.
Additional measures should include facilitating voting in absentia or developing the use of electronic means as a way to reduce participation costs.
Dodatni ukrepi bi morali vsebovati možnost glasovanja v odsotnosti ali razvoj uporabe elektronskih komunikacijskih poti za zmanjšanje stroškov sodelovanja.
Moreover, employee-shareholder participation in general shareholders meetings could be facilitated by, for example, the collection of proxy votes from employee-shareholders.
Razen tega bi se zastopanje zaposlenih-delničarjev na skupščinah delničarjev lahko omogočalo, na primer, z zbiranjem glasov pooblaščenca od zaposlenih-delničarjev.
It is important that any special mechanism for minority protection is carefully balanced.
Pomembno je, da je vsak poseben mehanizem za zaščito manjšinskih delničarjev skrbno uravnotežen.
It should favour all minority shareholders and in no respect contradict the concept of equitable treatment.
Upoštevati mora vse manjšinske delničarje in v nobenem pogledu ne sme biti v nasprotju z načelom nepristranske obravnave.
It should neither prevent the state as a majority shareholder from exercising its legitimate influence on the decisions nor should it allow minority shareholders to holdup the decision-making process.
Razen tega ne sme preprečevati državi kot manjšinski delničarki, da bi izvajala svoj legitimen vpliv na odločitve, niti ne sme dovoljevati manjšinskim delničarjem, da bi lahko zavirali proces odločanja.
In some OECD countries, legal status, regulations or mutual agreements/ contracts grant certain stakeholders specific rights in SOEs.
V nekaterih državah OECD so določene posebne pravice deležnikov v družbah v državni lasti zajamčene s pravnim statusom, predpisi ali medsebojnimi dogovori / pogodbami.
Some SOEs might even be characterised by distinct governance structures as regard the rights granted to stakeholders, principally employee board level representation, or other consultation/decision making rights to employees&apos; representatives and consumer organisations, for example through advisory councils.
Nekatere družbe v državni lasti imajo celo drugačno strukturo upravljanja za uveljavljanje pravic deležnikov. V prvi vrsti je to zastopanje zaposlenih v odboru ali druge pravice do svetovanja/odločanja predstavnikov zaposlenih ter organiziranje potrošnikov, na primer prek svetovalnih odborov.
SOEs should acknowledge the importance of stakeholder relations for building sustainable and financially sound enterprises.
Družbe v državni lasti so dolžne priznavati pomen odnosom z deležniki za oblikovanje trdnih in finančno zdravih družb.
Stakeholder relations are particularly important for SOEs as they may be critical for the fulfilment of general service obligations whenever these exist and as SOEs may have, in some infrastructure sectors, a vital impact on the economic development potential and on the communities in which they are active.
Odnosi z deležniki so posebej pomembni za družbe v državni lasti, ker so lahko ključni pri obveznih splošnih storitvah, ki jih te družbe izvajajo v posameznih infrastrukturnih dejavnostih in vitalno vplivajo na potenciale gospodarskega razvoja in na lokalne skupnosti, kjer poslujejo.
Moreover, some investors increasingly consider stakeholder related issues in their investment decisions and appreciate potential litigation risks linked to stakeholder issues.
Razen tega se posamezni vlagatelji pri odločitvah o vlaganju vse bolj zanimajo tudi za zadeve v zvezi z deležniki in ocenjujejo tveganja glede potencialnih pravdanj z deležniki.
It is therefore important that the co-ordinating or ownership entity and SOEs recognise the impact that an active stakeholder policy may have on the company&apos;s long term strategic goal and reputation.
Zato je pomembno, da se koordinacijski oz. lastniški organ in družbe v državni lasti zavedajo vpliva, ki ga ima lahko aktivna politika do deležnikov na dolgoročne strateške cilje in ugled družbe.
They should thus develop and adequately disclose clear stakeholder policies.
S tega vidika bi bilo potrebno razviti in objaviti jasno politiko do deležnikov.
However, the government should not use SOEs to further goals which differ from those which apply to the private sector, unless compensated in some form.
Pri tem pa vlada ne bi smela uporabljati družb v državni lasti za izvajanje širših ciljev, kot jih ima privatni sektor, razen če jih v neki obliki ne kompenzira.
Any specific rights granted to stakeholders or influence on the decision making process should be explicit.
Vse posebne pravice, ki so dodeljene deležnikom ali ki vplivajo na proces odločanja, morajo biti jasno definirane.
Whatever rights granted to stakeholders by the law or special obligations that have to be fulfilled by the SOE in this regard, the company organs, principally the general shareholders meeting and the board, should retain their decision making powers.
Ne glede na pravice, podeljene deležnikom z zakonom ali s posebnimi obveznostmi in jih morajo družbe upoštevati, pa morajo svojo moč odločanja organi družbe, posebej še skupščina delničarjev in odbor, zadržati.
As a dominant shareholder, the state may control corporate decision making and be in a position to take decisions to the detriment of stakeholders.
Država kot prevladujoči delničar lahko nadzoruje korporativno odločanje in je v položaju, da lahko sprejema odločitve v škodo deležnikov.
It is therefore important to establish mechanisms and procedures to protect stakeholder rights.
Zato je pomembno vzpostaviti mehanizme in postopke, ki bodo ščitili pravice deležnikov.
The co-ordinating or ownership entity should have a clear policy in this regard.
Koordinacijski oz. lastniški organ bi moral imeti v tem pogledu izdelano jasno politiko.
SOEs should fully respect the rights of stakeholders, as established by law, regulations and mutual agreements.
Družbe v državni lasti bi morale v celoti spoštovati pravice deležnikov, opredeljene z zakonom, predpisi in medsebojnimi dogovori.
They should act in the same way as private sector listed companies and refer to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance regarding relations with stakeholders.
Ravnati morajo na isti način kot privatne družbe, ki kotirajo na borzi, in upoštevati Načela korporativnega upravljanja OECD v delu, ki govori o odnosih z deležniki.
Implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance implies full recognition of the contribution of various stakeholders and encourages active and wealth-creating co-operation with them.
Uvedba Načel korporativnega upravljanja OECD implicira popolno priznavanje prispevka različnih deležnikov in spodbujanje aktivnega in plodnega sodelovanja z njimi.
To this end, SOEs should ensure that stakeholders have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis to be able to exercise their rights.
V ta namen morajo družbe v državni lasti zagotoviti, da bodo imeli deležniki pravočasen in reden dostop do relevantnih, zadostnih in zanesljivih informacij za izvajanje svojih pravic.
Stakeholders should have access to legal redress in the event their rights are violated.
Deležniki morajo imeti zakonito možnost izterjave odškodnin za primere kršenja njihovih pravic.
Employees should also be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board and their rights should not be compromised for doing that.
Zaposlenim mora biti omogočeno svobodno obveščanje odbora o opažanjih nezakonitega in neetičnega ravnanja, zaradi česar njihove pravice ne smejo biti ogrožene.
Performance enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop when considered relevant with regard to the importance of stakeholder relations for some SOEs.
Dovoliti je potrebno razvoj mehanizmov za spodbujanje zaposlenih k sodelovanju, ko se odnosi z deležniki izkažejo pomembni za družbo.
However, when deciding on the relevance and desired development of such mechanisms, the state should give careful consideration to the inherent difficulties in transforming entitlement legacies into effective performance enhancing mechanisms.
Pri odločanju glede pomembnosti in želenega razvoja takšnih mehanizmov mora država skrbno pretehtati inherentne težave pri pretvarjanju podedovanih pravic v učinkovite mehanizme za takšno spodbujanje.