natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
One participant of our interviews, aged 23, has this to say:
Projekcije pričakovane življenjske dobe kažejo, da lahko današnji mladi povsem resno računajo na doseženo starost med 80 in 90 let.
When are you an adult (A.N.)?
S tega vidika imajo odločitve v obdobju prehoda v odraslost vse daljnosežnejše posledice.
“When you can be independent and when you can take responsibility for your actions.”
8 Tudi nesprejemanje te odgovornosti je v resnici izbira, ki ima dolgoročne posledice za prihodnost posameznika.
How do you feel (A.
Kako se ti počutiš (A.
“Yes, in a way I'm an adult.
»Ja, na nek način sem odrasel.
I see myself as responsible, I could take care of myself, I have enough income to provide for my own child, I have an apartment and so on.”
Sebe vidim kot odgovornega, lahko bi skrbel za sebe, dohodka imam dovolj, da bi skrbel za svojega otroka, imel stanovanje in podobno.
These findings would at first glance appear to be countered by the findings of research to date regarding the extended period of transition from childhood to adulthood (Dwyer and Wyn, 2001; Furlong and Kelly, 2005).
Tem ugotovitvam se na prvi pogled zdijo nasprotujoče ugotovitve dosedanjih raziskavo podaljševanju obdobja prehodov iz otroštva v odraslost (Dwyer in Wyn, 2001; Furlong in Kelly, 2005).
Clearly the realisation that differing criteria can be applied for these transitions is key to our discussion.
Očitno je za našo razpravo ključno spoznanje, da se za te prehode lahko uporabijo različna merila.
Ule and Kuhar (2003) stress four key transitions: (1) stable full-time employment, (2) leaving the original family home, (3) stable partnership and (4) parenthood.
Ule in Kuhar (2003) poudarita štiri ključne prehode: (1) stabilna redna zaposlitev, (2) odselitev od izvorne družine, (3) stabilno partnerstvo in (4) starševstvo.
Graph 2: Milestones of reaching adulthood, Youth 2000 and Youth 2010
Grafikon 2: Mejniki odraščanja, Mladina 2000 in Mladina 2010
How old were you when you experienced the following situations, or how old do you think you will be when these happen?
Koliko si bil/a star/a, ko so se ti zgodile naštete situacije oz. koliko meniš, da boš star/a, ko se ti bodo zgodile?
Becoming a father/mother for the ﬁ rst time
Prvič postati oče / mati Poročiti se
Leaving the parental home
Odseliti se od staršev
Finishing education
Zaključiti šolanje
Ge ing ﬁ rst full-time job
Prvič se redno zaposliti
Total:
Skupaj:
Average 2010 Average 2000
Povprečje 2010 Povprečje 2000
In the perception of young people, the above graph clearly shows a trend of postponing transitions, since the average age at which young people fulfil the transitions or anticipate their fulfilment has risen for pretty much all indicators (the exceptions being first sexual relations and marriage).
Iz zgornjega grafikona je pri zaznavanju mladih jasno razviden trend odlaganja prehodov, saj se je povprečna starost, pri kateri mladi prehode uresničijo ali pričakujejo, da jih bodo uresničili, povišala pri domala vseh kazalnikih (izjemi sta prvi spolni odnos in poroka).
Over the past decade the average age for all those selected has risen by a little less than a year.
V zadnjem desetletju se je povprečna starost pri vseh izbranih povišala za nekaj manj kot leto dni.
Here it should be stressed that the most pronounced increases were in those indicators measuring the onset of material independence.
Pri tem je treba poudariti, da so se najizraziteje dvignile vrednosti kazalnikov, ki merijo nastop gmotne neodvisnosti.
The average estimated age at the start of earning money to support oneself has thus risen by a full two years, and there have also been above-average shifts in terms of finishing school and first full-time employment.
Povprečna ocenjena starost pri začetku služenja denarja za preživetje se je tako dvignila kar za dve leti, nadpovprečni pa so tudi premiki glede dokončanja šolanja in prve redne zaposlitve.
It should be added that the modest delay in starting one's own family can at least partly be ascribed to the perceived delay in material independence.
Treba je dodati, da lahko rahlo zakasnitev pri ustvarjanju lastne družine vsaj delno pripišemo zaznani zakasnitvi pri gmotnem osamosvajanju.
The reasons for this can be sought with considerable certainty in the flourishing of tertiary education, which keeps young people longer in education.
Razloge za to lahko s precejšnjo gotovostjo iščemo v razmahu terciarnega izobraževanja, ki mlade dlje zadržuje v izobraževanju.
It is interesting to note here that young people gain/plan earnings to support themselves approximately two years before their actual/anticipated full time employment, which points to the gradual nature of the transition from education to a regular job, specifically via various forms of temporary and occasional employment.
Zanimivo pri tem je, da mladi pridobivajo/načrtujejo zaslužek za lastno preživetje približno dve leti pred dejansko/pričakovano redno zaposlitvijo, kar kaže na postopnost prehajanja od šolanja k redni zaposlitvi, in sicer s pomočjo različnih oblik začasnih in priložnostnih zaposlitev.
A synthesis of what has been established regarding the transitions of young people offers this conclusion:
Sinteza ugotovljenega o prehodih mladih tako ponuja sklep:
Young people in Slovenia are identifying themselves with adulthood increasingly early, while at the same time they are increasingly late in fulﬁ lling their actual transitions such as leaving the parental home, establishing material independence and starting their own families.
Mladi v Sloveniji se vse bolj zgodaj enačijo z odraslostjo, hkrati pa vedno pozneje uresničujejo dejanske prehode, kot so odselitev od staršev, vzpostavitev gmotne neodvisnosti in oblikovanje lastne družine.
Although these would appear to be opposing trends, a convincing reason can be found for them coinciding.
Čeprav gre za dve na videz nasprotujoči si težnji, se ponuja prepričljiva razlaga njunega sovpadanja.
On the one hand young people are taking responsibility for their personal “life projects” at a relatively early stage, and in this sense they are acting and making decisions as responsible adults, while on the other hand structural conditions such as extending education and the (low) prospects for employment are shifting key milestones of attaining adulthood to later years.
Po eni strani namreč mladi sorazmerno zgodaj prevzemajo odgovornost za svoje osebne »življenjske projekte« in se v tem smislu vedejo in odločajo kot odgovorni odrasli, po drugi strani pa strukturni pogoji, kot so podaljševanje šolanja in (majhne) možnosti za zaposlitev, premikajo ključne mejnike odraščanja v poznejša leta.
For a more precise analysis of the factors that affect the time dimension of transitions to adulthood, it makes sense to limit the number of observed variables.
Za natančnejšo analizo dejavnikov, ki vplivajo na časovno razsežnost prehodov v odraslost, je smiselno omejiti število opazovanih spremenljivk.
A factor analysis shows us that in the framework of the given transition variables, two factors can be formed.
Faktorska analiza nam pokaže, da je v okviru danih spremenljivk prehoda mogoče oblikovati dva faktorja.
Table 10: Factor structure of indicators of transition to adulthood, Youth 2010
Preglednica 10: Faktorska struktura kazalnikov prehoda v odraslost, Mladina 2010
Living together with a partner
S partnerjem / partnerico skupaj živeti
Finishing education
Končati šolanje
First full-time employment
Prvič se redno zaposliti
Earning money to support oneself
Zaslužiti denar za lastno preživetje
Below we analyse various factors that might influence the assessed age of transitions.
V nadaljevanju smo analizirali različne dejavnike, ki bi lahko vplivali na ocenjene starosti prehodov.
It has been shown that women want to start a family noticeably earlier (M=26.0 years) than men (M=27.3 years).
Pokazalo se je, da si ženske občutno prej (M = 26,0 let) kot moški (M = 27,3) želijo ustvariti družino.
Men, meanwhile, want material independence somewhat earlier (M=23.0) than women (who average
Moški pa si želijo nekoliko prej (M = 23,0) postati gmotno neodvisni (za ženske povprečje znaša 23,6).
A relatively strong influence on material independence is exerted by the father's education (r = 0.228; p < 0.01) and mother's education (r = 0.228; p < 0.01).
Sorazmerno močan vpliv na ekonomsko neodvisnost imata izobrazba očeta (r = 0,228; p < 0,01) in izobrazbe matere (r = 0,228; p < 0,01).
It seems logical that the children of more educated parents plan to study longer/are studying longer, which pushes access to one's own earnings back to slightly later years.
Zdi se logično, da otroci bolj izobraženih staršev načrtujejo daljše izobraževanje/se dlje izobražujejo, kar postavlja dostop do lastnega zaslužka v nekoliko poznejša leta.
Tied to this is the association (r = 0.149, p < 0.01) between the size of residential settlement ad the anticipated age of material independence.
S tem je povezana tudi povezava (r = 0,149, p < 0,01) med velikostjo naselja bivanja in pričakovano starostjo glede ekonomske neodvisnosti.
Among young people in Ljubljana and Maribor, for instance, the average is 24.1 years, while among those living in the countryside it is just 22.9 years.
Med mladimi iz Ljubljane in Maribora povprečje na primer znaša 24,1 leta, med mladimi, ki živijo na podeželju, pa le 22,9 leta.
The age of interviewees has only a modest effect in yielding a slightly higher age with material independence (r = 0.078; p < 0.01) and starting a family (r = 0.077; p < 0.05).
Starost anketirancev le rahlo vpliva na nekoliko višje starosti ob ekonomski neodvisnosti (r = 0,078; p < 0,01) in ustvarjanju družine (r = 0,077; p < 0,05).
It is also interesting to note the influence of psychological factors on the time frame for transitions to adulthood.
Zanimivo je opazovati tudi vpliv psiholoških dejavnikov na časovne okvire prehodov k odraslosti.
For this purpose it makes sense to limit ourselves to the older group of young people (25-29 years), since they have already completed some transitions, and those that they have not, are closer, so they can give them a more realistic time assessment.
Za ta namen se je smiselno omejiti na starejšo skupino mladih (25-29 let), saj so ti nekatere prehode že opravili, tisti, ki jih še niso, pa so jim bližje, zato jih lahko časovno tudi realneje ocenijo.
On average, material independence is achieved sooner (or sought sooner) by individuals who are more authoritarian (r = -0.158; p < 0.01), socially intolerant (r = -0.202; p < 0.01) and fatalistically focused on the present (r= -0.133; p < 0.01).
Ekonomsko neodvisnost v povprečju prej dosegajo (ali jo želijo doseči) posamezniki, ki so bolj avtoritarni (r = -0,158; p < 0,01), socialno nestrpni (r = -0,202; p < 0,01) in fatalistično usmerjeni v sedanjost (r= -0,133; p < 0,01).
These are all qualities that are tied tendentially to lower levels of education, which is logically associated with more rapid entry into the labour market.
To so vse lastnosti, ki se tendenčno povezujejo z nižjimi stopnjami izobrazbe, kar je logično povezano s hitrejšim vstopom na trg dela.
Material independence is sought or attained somewhat later by young people with a grandiose level of narcissism, in other words a distinctly high opinion of themselves (r = 0.128; p < 0.01).
Nekoliko pozneje pa si ekonomske neodvisnosti želijo ali jo dosegajo mladi z narcistično grandioznostjo, to je z izrazito visokim mnenjem o sebi (r = 0,128; p < 0,01).
This can be linked at least in part to the fact that such grandiosity is associated with higher levels of education (r = 0.180; p < 0.01), which logically delays entry into the labour market to later years.
To lahko vsaj deloma povežemo z dejstvom, da je grandioznost povezana z višjo doseženo izobrazbo (r = 0,180; p < 0,01), kar logično odmika vstop na trg dela v poznejša leta.
In the transitions of young people an especially interesting issue is the (later) leaving of the parental home, which we discuss in more detail in the chapter on youth housing conditions.
Pri prehodih mladih je posebej zanimivo vprašanje (poznega) odseljevanja od staršev, ki ga natančneje obravnavamo v poglavju o stanovanjskih razmerah mladih.
2.2 Number and proportion of young people in Slovenia
2.2 Število in delež mladih v Sloveniji
Irrespective of the differing perceptions of what the term youth means, we will use primarily the definition from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, whereby all those aged between 15 and 29 years are classed as youth (Vertot, 2009).
Ne glede na različne zaznave pojma mladosti bomo v nadaljevanju upoštevali predvsem opredelitev Statističnega urada RS, po kateri spadajo v skupino mladih vsi, ki so stari med 15 in 29 let (Vertot, 2009).
One of the basic demographic trends that will undoubtedly frame youth policy in the coming decade is the marked decline in the numbers of young people.
Eno temeljnih demografskih gibanj, ki bo zaznamovalo okvire mladinske politike v naslednjem desetletju, je gotovo zelo občutno zmanjšanje števila mladih.
In the period from 2010 to 2020, the number of young people (15-29 years) in Slovenia will fall by over 20 percent.
V obdobju 2010-2020 se bo število mladih (15-29 let) v Sloveniji zmanjšalo za dobrih 20 odstotkov.
This reduction is an intensification of the long-term demographic trend that Slovenia has witnessed ever since 1980.
To zmanjšanje je zaostritev dolgoročnega demografskega gibanja, ki smo mu v Sloveniji priča vse od leta 1980.
So in 2020 Slovenia will have almost a third less young people than it had in 1990.
Tako bo v Sloveniji leta 2020 skoraj za tretjino manj mladih, kot jih je bilo leta 1990.
In this period the proportion of young people in the entire population will fall from 23 to 15 percent.
Delež mladih v celotnem prebivalstvu pa se bo v tem obdobju znižal s 23 odstotkov na 15 odstotkov.
Graph 3: Number of young people (15-29 years) in Slovenia, selected years
Grafikon 3: Število mladih (15-29 let) v Sloveniji, izbrana leta
NOTE: * Data are obtained from the SI-STAT database.
VIR: SURS* OPOMBA: * Podatki so pridobljeni iz podatkovne zbirke SI-STAT.
A decline in the numbers and proportion of young people is in fact the general trend in EU Member States.
Upadanje števila in deleža mladih je sicer splošen trend v državah članicah EU.
A feature peculiar to Slovenia is the pronounced (20.6-percent) anticipated decline in the period 2010-2020, which according to Eurostat projections significantly exceeds the anticipated 8.9-percent drop across the EU-27 and also the anticipated decline in neighbouring EU countries.
Posebnost Slovenije je predvsem izrazit (20,6-odstotni) pričakovan upad v obdobju 2010-2020, ki po Eurostatovih projekcijah bistveno presega pričakovani 8,9-odstotni upad na ravni EU-27in tudi pričakovani upad v sosednjih članicah EU.
Up to 2020, therefore, by share of young people Slovenia will shift away from the EU average, along with Italy, which had the lowest share of young people of all the Member States in 2008 (Vertot, 2009: 20).
Do leta 2020 se bo tako Slovenija po deležu mladih od sedanjega povprečja EU premaknila ob bok Italiji, ki je imela v letu 2008 najnižji delež mladih med vsemi članicami EU (Vertot, 2009: 20).
The decline in the proportion of young people is especially interesting in view of the increasing number of older inhabitants in modern industrialised societies.
Upad deleža mladih je posebej zanimiv z vidika povečevanja števila starejših prebivalcev v sodobnih industrializiranih družbah.
Graph 4: Proportions of young (15-29 years) and older (65+) inhabitants in Slovenia and EU-27, selected years
Grafikon 4: Deleži mladih (15-29 let) in starejših (65+) prebivalcev v Sloveniji in EU-27, izbrana leta
EU-27: Old people (65+)
EU-27: Starejši (65+) Slovenija: Starejši (65+)
Slovenia: Young people (15-29)
VIR: Eurostat*
Where Slovenia had a slightly higher proportion of young people and slightly lower proportion of older people in 2000 compared to the EU-27, in 2020 the picture will most probably be turned around: the proportion of young people will be below the EU average, and the proportion of older people above it.
Če smo imeli leta 2000 v primerjavi z EU-27 še nekoliko večji delež mladih in nekoliko manjši delež starejših, bo v letu 2020 slika najverjetneje obrnjena: delež mladih bo pod povprečjem EU, delež starejših pa nad njim.
The number of older (65+) inhabitants per young person should be almost trebled in Slovenia by 2050.
Število starejših (65+) prebivalcev na enega mladega se bo do leta 2050 v Sloveniji predvidoma skoraj potrojilo.
Where there were 87 older inhabitants to every 100 young people in Slovenia in 2010, in 2020 there will be 137 and in 2050 as many as 234.
Če je na 100 mladih v letu 2010 prišlo v Sloveniji 87 starejših prebivalcev, jih bo leta 2020 že 137, leta 2050 pa kar 234.
The effects of these trends on young people will be seen in various areas.
Učinki teh gibanj se bodo za mlade izrazili na različnih področjih.
Of especial interest in these areas will be the labour market, in which the growing share of older inhabitants on the one hand is forcing the state to extend the number of years worked before retirement, which in turn reduces the number of job vacancies for younger generations, while on the other hand the number of young people is falling, which reduces the number of candidates for existing jobs.
Med njimi je posebej zanimivo področje trga dela, na katerem naraščanje deleža starejših prebivalcev po eni strani sili državo v podaljševanje delovne dobe, ki je potrebna za upokojitev, kar zmanjšuje število prostih delovnih mest za mlajše generacije, po drugi strani pa število mladih upada, kar zmanjšuje število kandidatov za obstoječa delovna mesta.
A major challenge in the future for the governments of Slovenia and other European countries will be harmonising the two trends so as to improve the situation of young people in the labour market or (given the extended employment of older generations) at least not to make it significantly worse.
Pomemben izziv v prihodnosti za slovensko in druge evropske vlade bo uskladiti oba trenda tako, da se bo položaj mladih na trgu delovne sile izboljšal ali se (zaradi podaljševanja zaposlenosti starejših generacij) vsaj ne bo bistveno poslabšal.
In the labour market there is thus a clearly discernible sharpening of competition between the young and older generations in the distribution of (very) rare resources, such as in this case, employment.
Na trgu delovne sile se tako jasno kaže zaostrovanje tekme mlade in starejše generacije pri razdelitvi (pre)redkih virov, kakršna je v tem primeru zaposlitev.
We may expect a similar situation regarding public spending.
Podobno lahko pričakujemo pri javnofinančnih izdatkih.
In the future, any change in average pensions will have a significantly more powerful impact on the available funds (including) for young people.
V prihodnosti bo vsakršna sprememba povprečnih pokojnin bistveno bolj vplivala na razpoložljiva sredstva (tudi) za mlade.
To put it in slightly simplified terms: a reduction in the average pension of 10 euros would today free up 8.70 euros, and in 2050 as much as 23.40 euros in additional available state funds per young inhabitant of Slovenia.
Če malo karikiramo: zmanjšanje povprečne pokojnine za 10evrov bi danes omogočilo 8,7evra, leta 2050 pa že 23,4evra dodatnih razpoložljivih mesečnih sredstev države na enega mladega prebivalca Slovenije.
It is clear, therefore, that the issue of dialogue and social accord between generations is becoming increasingly important.
Očitno je torej, da postaja vprašanje dialoga in družbenega soglasja med generacijami vse pomembnejše.
From the perspective of our research, something of related importance is the issue of the willingness of young people to become involved in intergenerational dialogue and cooperation, and this was nicely indicated in the opinion of one of our interviewees:
Z vidika naše raziskave je v zvezi s tem pomembno predvsem vprašanje pripravljenosti mladih za vključevanje v medgeneracijski dialog in sodelovanje, kar lepo nakazuje mnenje ene od udeleženk intervjujev:
2.3 Openness of young people to intergenerational cooperation
(Mateja, 29 let, zaposlena v parlamentu)
Here we put several questions to young people from the concurrent survey of German youth (Hurrelmann, 2010).
Pri tem smo mladim zastavili nekaj vprašanj iz časovno sovpadajoče raziskave nemške mladine (Hurrelmann, 2010).
To ensure comparability of responses with the German survey, in both cases we limited ourselves to the age group of 15 to 25 years.
Zaradi primerljivosti odgovorov z nemško raziskavo smo se v obeh primerih omejili na starostno skupino od 15 do 25 let.
First of all we asked the young people, how big a problem did it seem to them that in the near future there would be increasing numbers of old people and fewer and fewer young people.
Najprej smo mlade vprašali, kako velik problem se jim zdi to, da bo v Sloveniji v bližnji prihodnosti vse več starejših in vse manj mladih.
The average value in the range from 1 (no problem at all) to 4 (very big problem) amounted in Slovenia to 3.0 (SD = 0.8), and in Germany to 2.82 (SD = 0.9).
Povprečna vrednost v razponu vrednosti od 1 (sploh ni problem) do 4 (zelo velik problem) je znašala v Sloveniji 3,0 (SD=0,8), v Nemčiji pa 2,82 (SD=0,9).
This was seen as a big or very big problem by 77 percent of youths in Slovenia and 70.4 percent of youths in Germany.
Da je to velik ali zelo velik problem, je menilo 77 odstotkov mladih v Sloveniji in 70,4 odstotka mladih v Nemčiji.
So Slovenian young people are slightly more worried about the ageing population, something also confirmed by the fact that as much as 67.1 percent of young people in Slovenia assess relations between young and old people as relatively tense, while this share was (just) 54.7 percent in Germany.
Slovenska mladina je torej zaradi staranja prebivalstva nekoliko bolj zaskrbljena, kar potrjuje tudi podatek, da kar 67,1 odstotka mladih v Sloveniji ocenjuje odnose med mladimi in starejšimi kot bolj napete, medtem ko je ta delež v Nemčiji (le) 54,7 odstotka.
As regards the future of these relations, young people in Slovenia are a little less pessimistic than their German peers, with (just) 22.9 percent taking the view that relations between young and old people will get even worse in the future, while the share among German respondents was as high as 41.8 percent.
Glede prihodnosti teh odnosov so sicer mladi v Sloveniji nekoliko manj pesimistični od nemških vrstnikov, saj jih (le) 22,9 odstotka meni, da se bodo odnosi med mladimi in starejšimi v prihodnje še poslabšali, medtem ko je ta delež med nemškimi anketiranci kar 41,8 odstotka.
On the other hand a little less than 12 percent in both samples believe in an improvement in relations.
Po drugi strani je takih, ki verjamejo v izboljšanje odnosov, v obeh vzorcih nekaj manj kot 12 odstotkov.
In general, therefore, the majority of young people in Slovenia assess relations with older people as being tense, and they do not expect them to improve in the future.
Na splošno torej večina mladih v Sloveniji odnose s starejšimi ocenjuje kot napete in ne pričakuje, da bi sev prihodnosti izboljšali.
The great majority of young people in Slovenia view the ageing of the population as a serious problem, and they assess relations between young and old people as tense, while also anticipating no change for the be er in this regard.
Velika večina mladih v Sloveniji vidi staranje prebivalstva kot resen problem, odnose med mladimi in starejšimi ocenjuje kot napete ter v zvezi s tem ne pričakuje sprememb na bolje.
We also asked young people how they assess the distribution of wealth among generations.
Mlade smo povprašali še, kako ocenjujejo porazdelitev blaginje med generacijami.
Graph 5: Views of the distribution of wealth among generations, Youth 2010 and Shell 2010
Grafikon 5: Stališča glede porazdelitve blaginje med generacijami, Mladina 2010 in Shell 2010
How is wealth divided among generations today?
Kako je danes s porazdelitvijo blaginje med generacijami
Old people should reduce their demands in favour of young people
Starejši ljudje bi morali zmanjšati svoje zahteve v korist mlajših
Wealth is fairly distributed between young and old people
Blaginja je med mladimi in starejšimi pravično razdeljena