natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As regards the first approach (a comparison with the ‘market price’), the Commission does not consider that, at the present time, an appropriate benchmark can be identified to establish a true market price for services provided by airports [58].
Hĺbková analýza je preskúmanie potenciálneho cieľa fúzie, akvizície, privatizácie alebo podobnej obchodnej finančnej transakcie, zvyčajne vykonaná kupujúcim.
It therefore considers an ex ante incremental profitability analysis to be the most relevant approach for the assessment of arrangements concluded by airports with individual airlines.
Oznámenie Komisie o pojme štátna pomoc uvedenom v článku 107 ods. 1 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie, (Ú. v. EÚ C 262, 19.7.2016, s. 1), odôvodnenie 94.
It should be noted that, in general, the application of the MEO principle based on an average price on other, similar markets may prove helpful if such a price can be reasonably identified or deduced from other market indicators.
Vec T-415/05, Grécko/Komisia, ECLI:EU:T:2010:386, bod 146.
Moreover, the liberalisation of the air transport market complicates any purely comparative analysis.
Vec C-610/10, Komisia/Španielsko, Zb.
As can be seen in this case, commercial practices between airports and airlines are not always based exclusively on a published schedule of charges.
2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:781, bod 106.
Rather, these commercial relations vary to a great extent.
Insolvenčný poriadok („Insolvenzordnung“) z 5. októbra 1994 (BGBl.
They include sharing risks with regard to passenger traffic and any related commercial and financial liability, standard incentive schemes and changing the spread of risks over the term of the agreements.
I, s. 2866), naposledy zmenené článkom 16 zákona z 20. novembra 2015 (BGBl.
Consequently, one transaction cannot really be compared with another based on a turnaround price or price per passenger.
I, s. 2010).
In addition, benchmarking is not an appropriate method to establish market prices if the available benchmarks have not been defined with regard to market considerations or the existing prices are significantly distorted by public interventions.
Pozri rozhodnutie Komisie 2008/717/ES z 27. februára 2008 o štátnej pomoci C 46/07 (ex NN 59/07), ktorú Rumunsko poskytlo v prospech spoločnosti Automobile Craiova (bývalá Daewoo Romania), (Ú. v. EÚ L 239, 6.9.2008, s. 12).
Such distortions appear to be present in the aviation industry, for reasons explained in paragraphs 57 to 59 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines:
Vec C-342/96, Španielske kráľovstvo/Komisia, ECLI:EU:C:1999:210, bod 41; vec C-39/94, Syndicat français de l'Express international (SFEI) a ďalší/La Poste a ďalší, ECLI:EU:C:1996:285, bod 60.
‘Publicly owned airports have traditionally been considered by public authorities as infrastructures for facilitating local development and not as undertakings operating in accordance with market rules.
Pozri napríklad: vec T-296/97, Alitalia/Komisia, ECLI:EU:T:2000:289; veci T-228/99 a T-233/99, WestLB/Komisia, ECLI:EU:T:2003:57; vec T-366/00, Scott SA/Komisia, ECLI:EU:T:2007:99; veci C-328/99 a C-399/00, Taliansko a SIM 2 Multimedia/Komisia, ECLI:EU:C:2003:252; vec T-358/94, Air France/Komisia, ECLI:EU:T:1996:194.
Those airports' prices consequently tend not to be determined with regard to market considerations and in particular sound ex ante profitability prospects, but essentially having regard to social or regional considerations.
Správa č. XXIII o politike hospodárskej súťaže, 1993, s. 255.
In those circumstances, the Commission has strong doubts that at the present time, an appropriate benchmark can be identified to establish a true market price for services provided by airports.
Vec C-482/99, Francúzsko/Komisia („Stardust Marine“), ECLI:EU:T:2002:33, bod 71.
Moreover, as the Union courts have recalled, benchmarking by reference to the sector concerned is merely one analytical tool amongst others to determine if a beneficiary has received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained in normal market conditions [61].
Pozri 23. správu Európskej komisie o politike hospodárskej súťaže za rok 1993, bod 403; oznámenie Komisie o pojme štátna pomoc uvedenom v článku 107 ods. 1 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie, bod 4.2.3.1 (Ú. v. EÚ C 262, 19.7.2016, s. 1).
Ryanair essentially argued that the MEO test can be applied based on a comparison with the commercial arrangements of other European airports.
Pozri usmernenia v oblasti letectva z roku 2014, bod 59.
In particular, it compared charges paid by Ryanair at Bournemouth, Grenoble, Knock, Maastricht, Nîmes and Prestwick airports with the charges paid by Ryanair under the agreements at Lübeck airport.
Pozri rozhodnutie Komisie 2011/60/EÚ z 27. januára 2010 o štátnej pomoci C 12/2008 (ex NN 74/07) – Slovensko – Zmluva medzi Letiskom Bratislava a spoločnosťou Ryanair, odôvodnenia 88 a 89 (Ú. v.
The study did not assess whether the sample of benchmark airports fulfilled all the criteria spelled out in the 2014 Aviation guidelines, as it only assessed traffic volumes, type of airport traffic and prosperity of the surrounding area [62].
EÚ L 27, 1.2.2011, s. 24).
In its 2012 Opening decision, the Commission compared the charges laid down in the March and October 2010 Side letters with charges at Hamburg airport, which led to doubts as to the market conformity of the charges laid down in the Side letters.
Pozri usmernenia v oblasti letectva z roku 2014, body 57 až 59.
The Commission notes that traffic volume in Lübeck is much lower than in Hamburg airport.
Pokiaľ ide o referenčné porovnávanie na základe ziskovosti (na rozdiel od ocenenia) v sektore, pozri spojené veci T-319/12 a T-321/12, Španielsko a Ciudad de la Luz/Komisia, ECLI:EU:T:2014:604, bod 44.
In fact, Hamburg is the airport with the most traffic in Northern Germany.
Ďalšie kritériá na posúdenie pozri v usmerneniach v oblasti letectva z roku 2014, bod 60.
Hamburg is used for all segments of air transport, whereas Lübeck was specialised in low cost carriers which required fewer check-incounters and facilities for transfer passengers, no passenger busses, less luggage handling personnel and facilities, less cleaning personnel, and allowed for a shorter circulation time.
Pozri usmernenia v oblasti letectva z roku 2014, body 59 a 63.
In addition to those considerations, the airport infrastructure must be open to all airlines and not dedicated to a specific airline in order to exclude that the advantage resulting from compatible aid to the airport operator is passed on to a specific airline.
Vec T-196/04, Ryanair/Komisia („Charleroi“), ECLI:EU:T:2008:585, bod 59.
The Commission also notes in this context that price differentiation is a standard business practice.
Vec C-305/89, Talianska republika/Komisia Európskych spoločenstiev (ALFA Romeo), ECLI:EU:C:1991:142.
Such differentiated pricing policies should, however, be commercially justified.
Správa sa už spomínala v oddiele 7.3.1.1 o ziskovosti zmluvy medzi mestom Lübeck a spoločnosťou Infratil.
The Commission considers that arrangements concluded between airlines and an airport can be deemed to satisfy the MEO test when they incrementally contribute, from an ex ante point of view, to the profitability of the airport.
Porovnaj rozhodnutie (EÚ) 2015/1226.
The airport should demonstrate that, when setting up an arrangement with an airline (for example, an individual contract or an overall scheme of airport charges), it is capable of covering all costs stemming from the arrangement, over the duration of the arrangement, with a reasonable profit margin on the basis of sound medium-term prospects [64].
Rozhodnutie (EÚ) 2015/1584.
In order to assess whether an arrangement concluded by an airport with an airline satisfies the MEO test, expected non-aeronautical revenues stemming from the airline's activity must be taken into consideration together with airport charges, net of any rebates, marketing support or incentive schemes.
Správa spoločnosti Oxera, Hospodárske posúdenie zásady súkromného subjektu v trhovom hospodárstve: letisko Lübeck, 1. september 2014.
Similarly, all expected costs incrementally incurred by the airport in relation to the airline's activity at the airport have to be taken into account.
Vec T-210/02, RENV British Aggregates Association/Komisia, ECLI:EU:T:2012:110, body 82 a 83; spojené veci C-106/09 P a C-107/09 P, Komisia a Španielsko/Government of Gibraltar a Spojené kráľovstvo Veľkej Británie a Severného Írska, ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, body 74 a 75; vec C-518/13 Eventech/The Parking Adjudicator, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, body 54 a 55.
Such incremental costs may encompass all categories of expenses or investments, such as incremental personnel, equipment and investment costs induced by the presence of the airline at the airport [65].
Vec C-524/14 P, Komisia/Hansestadt Lübeck, ECLI:EU:C:2016:971, bod 62.
The Commission considers in its constant decision making practice that costs which the airport would have to incur anyway, independently from the arrangement with the airline, should not be taken into account in the MEO test [66].
V rokoch 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 a 2006 bolo Komisii doručených niekoľko sťažností leteckého dopravcu Air Berlin, environmentálnej MVO (Bund Umwelt und Naturschutz) a súkromných osôb, týkajúcich sa údajnej štátnej pomoci v prospech spoločností Flughafen Lübeck GmbH (ďalej len „FLG“), Infratil Limited (ďalej len „Infratil“) [3] a leteckého dopravcu Ryanair [4].
According to the Charleroi judgement [67] when assessing the measures in question the Commission has to take into account all the relevant features of the measures and their context.
Komisia požiadala 7. novembra 2005 Nemecko o informácie, ktoré Nemecko poskytlo 7. februára 2006.
In other words, the Commission has to analyse the expected impact of the agreement with Ryanair on FLG, taking into account all relevant features of the measure in question.
Ďalšie informácie boli vyžiadané listom z 22. marca 2006, na ktorý Nemecko odpovedalo 12. júna 2006.
The Court declared in the Stardust Marine judgment that, ‘[…] in order to examine whether or not the State has adopted the conduct of a prudent investor operating in a market economy, it is necessary to place oneself in the context of the period during which the financial support measures were taken in order to assess the economic rationality of the State's conduct, and thus to refrain from any assessment based on a later situation.’ [68].
Stretnutia medzi útvarmi Komisie, spoločnosťou Infratil, ktorá bola väčšinovým vlastníkom prevádzkovateľa letiska, a hanzovým mestom Lübeck (ďalej len „mesto Lübeck“) sa uskutočnili 14. októbra a 4. decembra 2006.
In order to apply the MEO test, the Commission has to place itself at the time when the agreement was concluded.
V liste z 10. júla 2007 Komisia informovala Nemecko o svojom rozhodnutí začať konanie podľa článku 108 ods. 2 ZFEÚ, pokiaľ ide o financovanie letiska Lübeck a finančné vzťahy medzi mestom Lübeck a spoločnosťou Infratil a finančné vzťahy medzi letiskom a spoločnosťou Ryanair (ďalej len „rozhodnutie o začatí konania z roku 2007“).
The Commission has also to base its assessment on the information and assumptions which were at the disposal of FLG when the agreement was concluded.
Formálne vyšetrovacie konanie bolo zaevidované pod číslom SA.21877 (C 24/2007).
Application of the MEO principle to the 2000 Agreement
Dňa 24. októbra 2007 bolo prijaté korigendum k rozhodnutiu o začatí konania z roku 2007.
Preliminary remarks
Rozhodnutie o začatí konania z roku 2007 bolo uverejnené v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie [5] 29. novembra 2007.
The Commission notes that Air Berlin argued that the agreements between Ryanair and Lübeck airport were not profitable as the losses of FLG increased continuously (see Table 8) after the arrival of Ryanair.
Korigendum k rozhodnutiu bolo uverejnené 7. decembra 2007 [6].
As Ryanair and Wizz Air were the only airlines flying regular lines from the airport, Air Berlin concluded that FLG's losses must be attributable to these airlines.
Komisia vyzvala zainteresované strany, aby predložili pripomienky k predmetným opatreniam do jedného mesiaca od dátumu uverejnenia.
The Commission notes that even if a significant correlation between the number of Ryanair passengers at Lübeck airport and the losses incurred by FLG could be established, such correlation would not necessarily imply that the losses result from the operation of Ryanair at Lübeck airport.
Komisii boli doručené pripomienky týchto zúčastnených strán: Ryanair, Air Berlin, Infratil, FLG, dvoch MVO [7], Priemyselnej a obchodnej komory v Lübecku (ďalej len „IHK v Lübecku“) [8], Nemeckej asociácie leteckých spoločností (Bundesverband der Deutschen Fluggesellschaften, ďalej len „BDF“) a jednotlivcov [9].
Germany stated that more than […] % of the losses between 2000 and 2005 resulted from investments necessary to adapt the airport to increased passenger numbers.
Nemecko odpovedalo na pripomienky 17. apríla 2008.
Such investments were necessary to increase the airport value in the event of the envisaged privatisation and to prepare the airport to attract any airline.
Nezávislá konzultačná spoločnosť pre Komisiu Ecorys požiadala 24. júla 2008 Nemecko o informácie, potrebné na vypracovanie správy o predmetnej záležitosti.
In addition, the Commission recalls that the MEO test is based on an ex ante assessment.
Nemecko sa obrátilo na Komisiu 1. augusta 2008 s námietkou proti právu spoločnosti Ecorys na získanie informácií a dokumentov.
According to the case law of the Court of Justice, the conduct of a private market operator, which is used to assess the conduct of a public operator, does not need to be aimed at short-term profitability but can be guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term [69].
Požadované informácie boli následne doručené 18. septembra 2008.
Even where an airport is loss-making over the period of Ryanair's operation, it is still possible that an airport airline agreement is incrementally profitable to an airport on an ex ante basis.
Dňa 16. apríla 2009 Komisia požiadala Nemecko o ďalšie informácie.
As a final remark, the Commission notes that in the context of the present investigation, Ecorys was asked to compile a report on the profitability of the 2000 Agreement between FLG and Ryanair [70].
Nemecko požiadalo o predĺženie lehoty 21. apríla 2009 a opäť 7. júla 2009.
However, the report was based on a total cost approach, rather than an incremental cost approach and will therefore not be taken into consideration.
Vyžiadané informácie boli predložené 30. októbra 2009.
Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
Komisia požiadala o ďalšie informácie 29. októbra 2009 a Nemecko ich poskytlo 16. decembra 2009.
As a time frame for assessing the agreement in question a MEO would have chosen as a starting point the date of the signature of the agreement, i.e. 29 May 2000.
Dňa 17. októbra 2010 Komisia dostala informácie od spoločnosti Air Berlin.
As an end date a MEO would have taken the end date as stipulated in the 2000 Agreement, i.e. 31 May 2010.
Dňa 20. apríla 2011 Komisia vyhovela žiadosti Nemecka o predĺženie lehoty.
For the purpose of assessing the agreement in question and given the findings in recitals 282 to 301, both the existence and the amount of possible aid in this agreement have to be assessed in the light of the situation prevailing at the time it was signed and, more specifically, in the light of the information available and developments foreseeable at that time.
Dňa 21. apríla 2011 Nemecko požiadalo o ďalšie predĺženie lehoty.
At the time of the negotiation of the agreement, FLG expected the business of Ryanair at Lübeck airport to lead to increased passenger numbers, thereby increasing non-aeronautic revenues, to the expansion of non-aeronautic services, as well as to the attraction of further airlines.
Komisia tejto žiadosti vyhovela 27. apríla 2011.
Even though FLG was making losses in the years preceding the agreement, Ryanair's business at the airport was expected to lead to moderate profits in the medium- to long-term.
Komisia si v reakcii z15. júna 2011 vyžiadala chýbajúce informácie.
Germany provided data on the ex ante expected growth of passenger numbers as well as the expected incremental costs and revenues, in a best-case and worst-case scenario.
Dňa 8. apríla 2011 Komisia zaslala spoločnosti Ryanair dotazník.
Incremental revenues that a private investor would reasonably expect from the agreement include:
Odpovede boli doručené Komisii do 4. júla 2011.
additional aeronautical revenues from passengers and landing charges paid by Ryanair and
Komisia postúpila tieto odpovede Nemecku 18. júla 2011 a vyzvala ho predložiť pripomienky do 18. augusta 2011.
additional non-aeronautical revenues from, for example, car parking, franchised shops, or directly operated shops.
Dňa 7. februára 2012 Komisia požiadala spoločnosť Ryanair o ďalšie informácie týkajúce sa štúdie spoločnosti Oxera, ktoré spoločnosť Ryanair poskytla 4. júla 2011.
Applying the ‘single-till’ principle, the Commission takes the view that both aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues should be taken into account [71].
Spoločnosť Oxera sa obrátila na Komisiu 16. februára 2012 so žiadosťou o objasnenie jednej z položených otázok.
Germany submitted that based on the charges stipulated in the 2000 Agreement, the airport expected to have average aeronautical revenues of EUR […] per passenger.
Komisia poskytla objasnenie 17. februára 2012.
FLG estimated revenues from non-aviation business as representing […] % of aviation business income.
Spoločnosť Ryanair zaslala svoje pripomienky 13. apríla 2012.
Incremental costs that a private investor would reasonably expect from the agreement would include:
Komisia tieto pripomienky zaslala Nemecku 27. júna 2012.
incremental operational costs directly caused by the Ryanair agreement,
Nemecko predložilo pripomienky k pripomienkam spoločnosti Ryanair v liste z 10. septembra 2012.
costs for marketing services,
Záverečná správa spoločnosti Ecorys z 29. marca 2011 bola 29. júna 2011 odoslaná Nemecku s výzvou na predloženie pripomienok.
investment costs directly linked to the Ryanair agreement.
Preklad správy bol poslaný Nemecku 24. augusta 2011 spolu s výzvou na predloženie pripomienok do 26. septembra 2011.
Germany stated that it was necessary to increase the number of staff of FLG to handle the expected passenger numbers.
Nemecko predložilo pripomienky 10. októbra 2011.
FLG expected incremental operational and personnel costs of EUR […] per passenger.
Nemecko zaslalo druhú časť informácií, ktoré žiadala Komisia, 30. júna 2011.
Based on the 2000 Agreement, FLG expected incremental marketing costs for the period 2000-2012 of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Dňa 29. júna 2011 Nemecko odpovedalo na list Komisie z 15. júna 2011.
Regarding investment costs, Germany stated that the airport infrastructure already existed prior to the agreement with Ryanair and that the initially planned operation of Ryanair at Lübeck airport did not require any additional infrastructure investments.
Komisia 5. júla 2011 požiadala Nemecko o poskytnutie chýbajúcich informácií.
Germany submitted the following revenues and operating costs for the best case (Table 11) and the worst case (Table 12):
Nemecko poslalo chýbajúce informácie 15. júla 2011.
Table 11
Dňa 4. júla 2011 spoločnosť Ryanair zaslala Komisii pripomienky, ktoré boli postúpené Nemecku 8. augusta 2011.
Best-case costs and revenues
Nemecko sa vyjadrilo k týmto pripomienkam 8. októbra 2011.
year
Nemecko si 19. marca 2012 vyžiadalo predĺženie lehoty na poskytnutie informácií do 17. apríla 2012.
passengers
Komisia žiadosti vyhovela 21. marca 2012.
aeronautic revenues
Dňa 18. apríla 2012 Komisia požiadala Nemecko o poskytnutie chýbajúcich informácií do 28. apríla 2012 bez možnosti predĺženia lehoty.
non-aeronautic revenues
Komisia ďalej uviedla, že v prípade nesplnenia povinnosti mu bude uložený príkaz na poskytnutie informácie podľa článku 10 ods. 3 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 659/1999 [10].
operating costs
Dňa 2. mája 2012 sa uskutočnilo stretnutie medzi Komisiou a Nemeckom.
Table 12
Dňa 3. mája 2012 Komisia súhlasila s predĺžením lehoty do 11. mája 2012.
Worst-case costs and revenues
Spoločnosť Ryanair zaslala Komisii správu o prístupe spoločnosti Oxera k zásade súkromného subjektu v trhovom hospodárstve v liste z 10. apríla 2013.
FLG estimated positive financial effects from the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair.
Správa bola Nemecku zaslaná 3. mája 2013.
In this regard, Table 13 summarises the revenues from aeronautic and non-aeronautic activities, as well as the costs directly attributable to the operation of Ryanair at the airport and marketing costs.
Spoločnosť Ryanair predložila Komisii ďalšie informácie 20. decembra 2013.
Table 13
Listom z 24. februára 2014 Komisia vyzvala spoločnosť Ryanair, aby sa vyjadrila k uplatňovaniu usmernení v oblasti letectva z roku 2014 [11].
Ex ante profitability assessment
Dňa 21. marca 2014 vyzvala Komisia spoločnosť Infratil, aby sa vyjadrila k usmerneniam v oblasti letectva z roku 2014.
profitability assessment
Formálna výzva pre zainteresované strany predložiť pripomienky k usmerneniam v oblasti letectva z roku 2014 bola uverejnená v úradnom vestníku 15. apríla 2014.
marketing costs
Nemecko zaslalo pripomienky 12. mája 2014.
In the best case, Germany rounded passenger numbers to […], leading to aeronautic revenues of EUR […].
Ďalšie pripomienky predložili spoločnosti Air Berlin, Infratil a združenie Schutzgemeinschaft gegen Fluglärm Lübeck und Umgebung eV (ďalej len „združenie SGF“) [13].
In the worst-case scenario, a total of […] passengers was expected, leading to aeronautic revenues of EUR […].
Nemecko požiadalo o predĺženie lehoty do 15. júla 2011.
Since non-aeronautic revenues were expected to amount to […] % of aeronautic revenues, non-aeronautic revenues were calculated to be EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Listom z 20. apríla 2011 Komisia vyzvala Nemecko, aby odpovedalo na otázky týkajúce sa sťažností do 28. apríla 2011.
It was calculated that operating costs would amount to a total of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Nemecko požiadalo o ďalšie predĺženie lehoty v liste z 21. apríla 2011.
Marketing costs were not calculated on a per passenger basis, but were estimated, in total, to be EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Listom z 27. apríla 2011 Komisia povolila predĺženie lehoty do 16. mája 2011.
(315) Table 13 shows that revenues stemming from the 2000 Agreement were expected to exceed costs, leading to an annual surplus of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Nemecko zaslalo informácie 16. mája 2011.
The Commission finds the approach taken by Germany sound.
Dňa 20. mája 2011 Komisia zaslala upomienku podľa článku 10 ods. 3 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 659/1999, pričom uviedla, že poslané informácie neboli úplné.
The estimated average aeronautical revenues were based on the terms of the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair.
Odpoveď mala byť poskytnutá v lehote do 7. júna 2011.
The non-aeronautical revenues were expected to be […] % of the aeronautical revenue, which seems to be in line with general expectations as regards non-aeronautical revenues at other airports (see Table 6).
Nemecko odpovedalo listom zo 7. júna 2011 a vyjadrilo nesúhlas s tým, že list z 20. mája 2011 mal byť upomienkou v zmysle nariadenia (ES) č. 659/1999, keďže dve z otázok sa zdali byť prepracované a jedna z otázok bola podľa jeho názoru nová.
The assumption that the staff number would need to be increased when passenger numbers increase also seems reasonable.
Dňa 15. júna 2011 Komisia zaslala Nemecku druhú upomienku podľa článku 10 ods. 3 nariadenia (ES) č. 659/1999 s možnosťou poskytnúť informácie do 29. júna 2011.
The Commission notes that investments related to the expansion of Lübeck airport were not specific to Ryanair but could potentially be exploited by other airlines.
Ak by Nemecko nesplnilo svoju povinnosť na základe upomienky, Komisia by zvážila uloženie príkazu na poskytnutie informácie.