natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
See also Decision 94/662/EC, referred to above.
Pozri aj rozhodnutie 94/662/ES.
The State's direct approaching of the rating agencies shows clearly that the declarations were the expression of a clearly defined, well thought-out will.
Priama intervencia štátu u ratingových agentúr totiž jasne poukazuje na to, že tieto vyhlásenia boli vyjadrením jednoznačne definovanej a premyslenej vôle.
The Standard & Poor's agency states that: ‘The French State – which owns 55 % of France Telecom — has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor's that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Telecom were to face any difficulties’.)
Agentúra Standard & Poor’s tvrdí, že: „Francúzsky štát, ktorý vlastní vo France Télécom 55 %, sa pre Standard & Poor jasne vyjadril, že sa bude správať ako uvedomelý investor a ak bude mať FT nejaké ťažkosti, prijme adekvátne opatrenia“. ( „the French State – which owns 55 % of France Telecom – has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor’s that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Telecom were to face any difficulties“.)
France Télécom LT Rating cut to ‘BBB-’; Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST Today, Standard & Poor ' s Ratings Direct, ( 12.7.2002).
France Télécom LT Rating cut to „BBB-“; „Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST“ Today, Standard & Poor’s Ratingsdirect, ( 12. júla 2002).
See statements by France Télécom's previous CEO, Michel Bon, appearing in the press: article in La Tribune dated 16.9.2002‘… the downgrading is preventing the planned refinancing’; article in Le Monde dated 16.9.2002‘the downgrading at the end of June of the rating attributed to FT's debt by the Moody's rating agency … has denied us access to the market’; article in the Financial Times dated 16.9.2002‘FT cannot continue to survive when no one wants to lend us money and, on the contrary, when everyone wants to be paid on the nail.
Pozri vyhlásenia predchádzajúceho predsedu predstavenstva a generálneho riaditeľa FT Michela Bona, ktoré sa objavili v tlači: článok v la Tribune zo 16. septembra 2002„… pokles ratingu zabraňuje plánovanému refinancovaniu“; článok v le Monde zo 16. septembra 2002„zníženie bonitného zaradenia dlhu FT ratingovou agentúrou Moody’s [….] nám uzavrela prístup na trh“; článok vo Financial Times zo 16. septembra 2002„FT cannot continue to survive when no one wants to lend us money and, on the contrary, when everyone wants to be paid on the nail.
Some even take the view that the Company would not have been able to find the necessary liquidity on the market in the event of a downgrading of its credit rating.
Niektorí sa nazdávajú, že v prípade zníženia svojho ratingu by podnik nezohnal potrebné likvidné protriedky na trhu.
See, for example, p. 9 of the above-mentioned report by Goldman Sachs of 22.7.2002: ‘If these bonds moved from the investment grade segment of the fixed income market, to “junk”, i.e. high yield, they would swamp the current European high yield market … we believe it would be difficult for the existing European investor base alone to absorb all France Telecom bonds ’.
Porovnaj napr. na s. 9 správy Goldmana Sachsa z 22. júla 2002: „Keby sa tieto dlhopisy postúpili z investičnej úrovne burzy obligácií s pevným úrokom do špekulatívnej úrovne t.j. úrovne s vysokým výnosom, zaplavili by súčasný európsky trh obligácií s vysokou výnosnosťou (…) [a] nazdávame sa, že pre európskych investorov by bolo obtiažne absorbovať všetky dlhopisy France Télécom“. ( „If these bonds moved from the investment grade segment of the fixed income market, to ‚junk‘, i.e. high yield, they would swamp the current European high yield market(…) we believe it would be difficult for the existing European investor base alone to absorb all France Telecom bonds “.)
According to a French writer on the subject, ‘There are a multiplicity of public mechanisms which make it possible to confer on borrowings a level of guarantee equivalent to that of a formal loan guarantee: the feature they have in common is that they increase the risks of uncertainty as to the amount of the State's commitments to a point where they become indefinite, without Parliament having performed in their regard its role of fixing public expenditure in advance’ ( A delion, Les Garanties D'emprunt des Collectivités Locales et de L'État, Petites Affiches, 17.6.1998 No 72, p. 19).
Podľa francúzskeho autora totiž: „Existuje veľa verejných mechanizmov, ktoré umožňujú zabezpečiť pôžičkám rovnakú mieru záruky ako v prípade formálnej záruky pôžičky: ich spoločnou črtou je to, že zvyšujú riziká neistoty, čo sa týka výšky štátnych záväzkov, ktoré sa dokonca môžu stať bližšie neurčenými, pričom parlament nemôže takto plniť voči nim svoju úlohu odhadného stanovenia verejného výdavku“ (A DELION, Les Garanties D ' emprunt des Collectivites Locales et de L ' Etat, Petites Affiches, 17. júna 1998 č. 72, s. 19).
See Com, 28.3.2000, D. 2000, cah.dr. aff., p. 210.
Pozri Com, 28. marec 2000, D. 2000, cah.dr. aff., s. 210
Through the concept of opposability erga omnes, derived from a 1985 Act.
Cez pojem namietateľnosti erga omnes, ktorý vychádza zo zákona z roku 1985.
But the question is, firstly, different from that of the binding nature of the commitment and, secondly, scarcely exceptional since any opposability depends ultimately on a legislative provision.
Otázka sa však v prvom rade líši od otázky záväznosti záväzku a v druhom rade nie je nijako výnimočná, pretože každá namietateľnosť závisí v konečnom dôsledku od zákonného ustanovenia.
A bond may be defined as a fixed-interest security by which the issuer undertakes to pay the lender a fixed capital sum at a specific time in the future and a series of interest payments; in other words, it is a promise to pay the capital plus interest on predetermined dates.
Dlhopis možno definovať ako investičný cenný papier s pevným úrokom, ktorým sa emitent zaväzuje, že požičiavajúcemu subjektu zaplatí k neskoršiemu stanovenému dátumu fixný kapitál spolu s úrokmi; inými slovami, ide o sľub zaplatenia kapitálu spolu s úrokmi vo vopred stanovených termínoch.
As indicated by NERA: ‘economists and game theorists have studied extensively the importance and value of reputation.
Ako uviedol NERA: „Ekonómovia a teoretici dôkladne preskúmali význam a dôležitosť dobrej povesti. Prakticky vo všetkých hospodárskych vzťahoch existuje určitý stupeň neistoty, čo sa týka povahy druhej strany. Vo väčšine prípadov však nie je strana počas daného obdobia zaangažovaná iba v jednej transakcii, ale v celom rade podobných transakcií. Je bežné, že jedna alebo druhá strana sa usiluje vybudovať si dobrú povesť, pretože to ju môže posunúť ďalej.
In almost any economic relationship there is some degree of uncertainty regarding the nature of the counter party.
[…] V posledných 25 rokoch ekonómovia dôkladne preskúmali fenomén získavania reputácie a počet článkov na túto tému v odborných časopisoch je veľký. Tento pojem sa veľmi hojne používa v rôznych oblastiach, ale tu uvedieme iba 3 príklady: činnosti centrálnych bánk, priemyselná organizácia a obchody na základe dlhu zaručeného štátom.
However, very often a party is involved in not a single but a whole series of similar transactions over a period of time.
(…) Vybudovanie dobrej povesti je dôležité aj v oblasti pôžičky a úveru (v medzinárodnom meradle). Nezávislý subjekt, akým je súkromný dlžník, ktorý si neplní povinnosť splácať pôžičku, bude mať v budúcnosti problémy so získaním nových úverových zdrojov.
It is a common observation that one or both parties may seek to establish a reputation for themselves, as this may be beneficial later on’.
Práve preto štáty niekedy uprednostňujú hospodársky pokles so všetkými previerkami, ktoré so sebou prináša situácia platobnej neschopnosti. Preto má francúzska vláda povesť, že si plní svoje záväzky prijaté pri riadení mnohých obchodných firiem a obchodov, ktoré sa dotýkajú jej daňového postavenia. Porušenie slova v týchto oblastiach by bolo veľmi nákladné“. („economists and game theorists have studied extensively the importance and value of reputation. In almost any economic relationship there is some degree of uncertainty regarding the nature of the counter party. However, very often a party is involved in not a single but a whole series of similar transactions over a period of time. It is a common observation that one or both parties may seek to establish a reputation for themselves, as this may be beneficial later on“.
(David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 Journal of EConomic theory 253-279 (1982)).‘Economists have studied the phenomenon of reputation acquisition rigorously over the past 25 years, and the list of publications in leading journals is sizeable.
(David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 253-279 (1982).„Economists have studied the phenomenon of reputation acquisition rigorously over the past 25 years, and the list of publications in leading journals is sizeable.
That is why countries sometimes seem to prefer an economic downturn, with all its hardships, to a situation of default’.
That is why countries sometimes seem to prefer an economic downturn, with all its hardships, to a situation of default“.
(Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, S overeign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?, 79 American EConomic review 43-50 (1989)).‘In the same vein, the French government benefits from a reputation for honouring the commitment it makes regarding its management of many commercial enterprises, and matters affecting the fiscal position of the government.
(Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?, 79 American economic review 43-50 (1989).„In the same vein, the French government benefits from a reputation for honouring the commitment it makes regarding its management of many commercial enterprises, and matters affecting the fiscal position of the government.
It would be very costly if its word could not be believed in these matters’.
It would be very costly if its word could not be believed in these matters“.)
See the report by the Minister for Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry entitled L'État actionnaire 2003: ‘On 31 December 2002, according to the latest available statistics, the State controlled, directly or indirectly, 1616 undertakings, including 97 blue chip companies.
Pozri správu ministra hospodárstva, financií a priemyslu Štát akcionár 2003: „K 31. decembru 2002, ku ktorému boli disponibilné posledné štatistiky štát kontroloval, či už priamo, alebo nepriamo, 1616 firiem, z toho 97 z prvého finančného radu.
These are undertakings with a registered office in France’ http://www.paris-europlace.net/links/doc062197.htm.
Ide o firmy so sídlom vo Francúzsku“ http://www.paris-europlace.net/links/doc062197.htm .
For more information on this point see La gestion de la dette publique en France: les objectifs, les instruments et la gestion des risques by Christian Esters, École Nationale d'Administration 2000: ‘The French bond market grew during the 1990s.
Viac informácií na túto tému nájdete v publikácii od Christiana Estersa Riadenie štátneho dlhu vo Francúzsku: ciele, nástroje a riadenie rizík, Ecole Nationale d’Administration 2000: „V priebehu 90 rokoch sme zaznamenali zvýšenie emisií na francúzskom trhu s dlhopismi.
The share of the bond market accounted for by treasury bills increased considerably between 1989 and 1993, remaining thereafter at a level of about 50 %, except in 1995, when the other bond issues on the French market suffered their second consecutive fall with the result that, despite their numbers remaining stable in absolute terms, the share accounted for by treasury bills increased sharply that year … The long-term increase in the State's share of the bond markets is a consequence of the reform of public debt management in France starting in 1986.
Podiel emisií štátnej pokladnice na trhu s dlhopismi sa výrazne zvýšil v rokoch 1989 – 1993 a odvtedy zostáva na úrovni okolo 50 %, s výnimkou roku 1995, keď ďalšie emisie dlhopisov na francúzskom trhu zaznamenali druhý náhly pokles, takže v priebehu tohto roka sa časť emisií štátnej pokladnice i napriek stabilite absolútnych čísiel výrazne zvýšila… Dlhodobé zvyšovanie emisií štátom na trhoch s dlhopismi je dôsledkom reformy manažmentu štátneho dlhu vo Francúzsku od roku 1986.
One of the reforms consisted in changing the debt's structure: negotiable state securities replaced non-negotiable debt, leading to the strong increase in the State's share of the bond market’. http://www.ena.fr/tele/mcil99/master99esters.pdf
Jedna z reforiem totiž spočívala v zmene štruktúry dlhu: obchodovateľné štátne cenné papiere nahradili neobchodovateľný dlh, čo sa prejavilo vo výraznom zvýšení štátneho podielu na trhu s dlhopism“. http://www.ena.fr/tele/mcil99/master99esters.pdf
Moreover the effect is strongly statistically significant: it is not the result of random fluctuations in prices … The market believed that, as a result of the statement, the French Authorities would offer more support to France Télécom than they would do in the absence of any costs of non-performance’.
Moreover the effect is strongly statistically significant: it is not the result of random fluctuations in prices … The market believed that, as a result of the statement, the French Authorities would offer more support to France Télécom than they would do in the absence of any costs of non-performance“.
Deutsche Bank France Télécom/Deutsche Telekom Debt Liquidity and possible solution22 July 2002, pp. 1, 3, 8.
Deutsche Bank France Télécom/Deutsche Telekom Debt Liquidity and possible solution 22 July 2002, p. 1, 3, 8.
Deutsche Bank report dated 22.7.2002 entitled France Télécom/Deutsche Telekom Debt Liquidity and possible solution: ‘… on July 12, 2002, S & P … downgraded France Télécom's ratings to BBB- ... The agency no longer expects France Télécom to hit the 3,5× net debt/EBITDA target by 2003, but did assign a “stable” outlook to the low triple B ratings.
Správa Deutsche Bank z 22 júla 2002 s názvom ‘France Télécom/Deutsche Telekom Debt Liquidity and possible solution’: Dňa 12. júla 2002 S & P znížil rating France Télécom na BBB- …Táto agentúra už neočakáva, že France Télécom dosiahne v roku 2003 svoj cieľ 3,5 × čistý dlh/zisk pred započítaním úrokov, daní, odpisov a amortizácie (EBITDA), ale oznámil perspektívu stability nízkeho ratingu BBB. Perspektívu stability podporilo aj vyhlásenie ‚Francúzsky štát – ktorý vlastní vo France Télécom 55 % – sa jasne vyjadril pre Standard & Poor’s, že sa bude správať ako uvedomelý investor, a ak bude mať FT ťažkosti, prijme adekvátne riešenia‘. Treba uviesť, že S & P na začiatku povedal, že mimoriadnu podporu od francúzskej vlády nezohľadní v ratingu France Télécom po tom, čo ho znížil v júni na BBB. Odvtedy agentúra zmenila názor vyhlasujúc, že závery creditwatch status „sledujú analýzu likvidných prostriedkov spoločnosti na konci roka 2003 a revíziu potenciálnej účasti francúzskeho štátu na francúzskom telekomunikačnom trhu“(s. 19). „France Télécom vyťažil z rastúcej dôvery trhu v to, že vláda podporí tým či oným spôsobom úver“ (s. 20). „Nemôžeme ignorovať skutočnosť, že majoritným vlastníkom FT je francúzsky štát a nedávne komentáre francúzskeho ministerstva financií uistili investorov o zabezpečení likvidity.“ (s. 54). Ako sme spomenuli už viackrát, nazdávame sa, že spoločnosť nakoniec zoženie voľné finančné prostriedky, ktoré potrebuje, cez tzv. ‚implicitnú štátnu podporu‘. Mohla by ich zohnať vo forme pôžičiek, podmienok na trhu, ktoré by poskytli banky alebo vláda (s. 21).
It seems that the stable outlook is anchored by “the French state … [which] has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor's that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Télécom were to face any difficulties.”
Aká „je však trhová cena povedzme nového dlhu 10 miliárd na základe cenných papierov s bonitným hodnotením BBB- ?“ Aká je reálna cena dlhu 10 miliárd eur spoločnosti, ktorá nie je naozaj hodnotená známkou BBB- a ktorá je daným spôsobom posudzovaná iba kvôli podpore od vlády? … Domievame sa, že na tieto otázky neexistuje správna odpoveď, pretože keby FT pôsobila v reálnom svete, podľa nás by nebola v situácii refinancovania sa bez konverzie dlhu na kapitál (s. 33, v tom istom zmysle pozri s. 54).
… Interestingly, S & P had initially said it was not incorporating any extraordinary support from the French government into its rating when it downgraded France Télécom ' s ratings to BBB in June.
«Nakoniec ešte spomeňme, že v tlači sa objavilo vyjadrenie, že francúzska vláda podporí France Télécom, ktorá súhlasí s tým, že bude pre spoločnosť “požičiavajúcim subjektom v poslednej inštancii”. Toto vyjadrenie výrazne zvýšilo cenu dlhopisov a akcií, pričom akcie sa zvýšili o 90 % a dlhopisy 137pb v priebehu 2 týždňov, najmä preto, lebo špekulanti uzavreli svoje pozície ». (s. 28). Zdôraznime, že S & P sa počas nedávnej telefonickej konferencie vyjadril k zníženiu kreditu FT, že ako podnik tvoriaci cash flow a s koeficientom dlh/EBITDA sa rovná štyrom mala byť hodnotená známkou BBB-, a teda by mala byť zaradená do posledného investičného stupňa.
Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status follows an analysis of the company ' s liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state ' s potential involvement in the French telecommunications market ’ (p. 19); ‘France Télécom benefited from the market's increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit’ (p. 20); ‘we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided’ (page 54) ‘However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called “implicit government support”.
Aktuálny rating France Télécom BBB-, je ako sa zdá, viac založený na prísľube podpory vlády vo veci zabezpečenia likvidity, než na jej vlastných základných prostriedkoch. Podľa prepočtov Deutsche Bank bol pomer dlh/EBITDA France Télécom 4,9 v druhom polroku 2002 a 5,20 k 31. decembru 2002. („… on July 12, 2002, S & P … downgraded France Télécom’s ratings to BBB- ... The agency no longer expects France Télécom to hit the 3.5x net debt/EBITDA target by 2003, but did assign a ‚stable‘ outlook to the low triple B ratings. It seems that the stable outlook is anchored by ‚the French state … [which] has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor’s that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Télécom were to face any difficulties.‘ … Interestingly, S & P had initially said it was not incorporating any extraordinary support from the French government into its rating when it downgraded France Télécom’s ratings to BBB in June. Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status ‚follows an analysis of the company’s liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state’s potential involvement in the French telecommunications market‘ (p. 19); ‚France Télécom benefited from the market’s increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit‘ (p. 20); ‚we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided‘ (page 54) ‚However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called „implicit government support“.
This could take the form of banks or the government providing the necessary loans at market prices ’ (p. 21).
This could take the form of banks or the government providing the necessary loans at market prices ‘ (p.. 21).
However ‘what is the market price for, say, 10 bn of new debt to a BBB- credit?
Cependant ‚what is the market price for, say, 10 bn of new debt to a BBB- credit?
… we suspect there is no right answer to these questions, because if FT was operating in the real world, it would not be able to refinance without a debt for equity swap, in our view.’ (p.
… we suspect there is no right answer to these questions, because if FT was operating in the real world, it would not be able to refinance without a debt for equity swap, in our view.‘(p.
33, along the same lines, see p. 54).
33, dans le même sens, voir P. 54).
And again ‘There have been reports in the press that the French government will stand behind France Télécom, implying that it is willing to be the “lender of last resort” to the company.
Et encore ‚There have been reports in the press that the French government will stand behind France Télécom, implying that it is willing to be the „lender of last resort“ to the company.
’ (p. 28); ‘It is worth noting that S & P states on its recent conference call on its downgrade of FT's credit that, in general, a company generating free cash flow with debt to EBITDA of four times would qualify as a BBB- credit, the last investment grade rating.
‘ (p. 28); It is worth noting that S & P states on its recent conference call on its downgrade of FT’s credit that, in general, a company generating free cash flow with debt to EBITDA of four times would qualify as a BBB- credit, the last investment grade rating.
FT current BBB- rating appears to be based largely on the promise of government support providing liquidity, rather than on fundamentals’ (p. 30). According to Deutsche Bank ' s calculations, France Télécom ' s debt/EBITDA ratio was 4,9 during the second half of 2002 and 5,20 on 31.12.2002.
FT current BBB- rating appears to be based largely on the promise of government support providing liquidity, rather than on fundamentals “ (p. 30).)
Ibid., ‘Bonds and convertibles suggest that the market is unsure of the weight of government support’ (p. 3).
To isté, „Bonds and convertibles suggest that the market is unsure of the weight of government support“ (s. 3).
Which indicates that the agency did not expect any subsequent downgrading.
Čo znamená, že agentúra neočakávala neskoršie zníženie.
France Télécom LT Rating cut to ‘BBB-’; Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST Today, Standard & Poor ' s Ratings direct, ( July 12, 2002).
France Télécom LT Rating cut to „BBB-“; Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST Today, Standard & Poor’s Ratings direct, (July 12, 2002).
S & P seems to be referring rather to information supplied by the French Government to the agency itself, but, according to the understanding which the Commission has of the file in view of the evidence in its possession, the content of this information relates substantially to the same commitments as those contained in the announcements made in public.
S & P sa odvoláva skôr na vyjadrenia, ktoré vláda poskytla samotnej agentúre, ale keďže vyrozumel, že Komisia má spis zostavený z informácií, ktorými disponuje, obsah týchto vyjadrení sa týka hlavne rovnakých záväzkov ako sú tie, ktoré sú obsiahnuté vo verejne prednesených vyhláseniach.
Board meeting presentation, France Télécom stock-taking exercise, December 2002, p. 36.
Board meeting presentation, misia France Télécom „Stav podniku“ december 2002, s. 36.