natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Figures include bond and commercial paper interest and principal (interest on commercial paper was computed from 25 July 2002 to 31 December 2003 due to data unavailability for previous dates)”
Figures include bond and commercial paper interest and principal (interest on commercial paper was computed from 25 July 2002 to 31 December 2003 due to data unavailability for previous dates)“)
‘Credit ratings are used by investors as indications of the likelihood of repayment in accordance with the terms on which they invested.
credit ratings používajú investori ako ukazovateľa pravdepodobnosti splácania v súlade s podmienkami, ktorými sa riadi ich investícia. Zaradenie úverového ratingu definuje jeho funkciu: „investičným stupňom“ (sem patria kategórie, ktoré sú v medzinárodnom meradle dlhodobé zaradené do ratingu „AAA“ až „BBB“ a krátkodobo do ratingu „F1“ – „F3“) poukazuje na relatívne malú pravdepodobnosť platobnej neschopnosti, kým ratingy z kategórie „špekulatívnych“ alebo z „neinvestičného stupňa“ (dlhodobé do „BB“ až „D“ a krátkodobé do „B – D“) môžu poukazovať na vysokú pravdepodobnosť platobnej neschopnosti alebo na to, že platobná neschopnosť už nastala“ (webová stránka Fitchs Rating: http://www.fitchratings.com/)).
Thus, the use of credit ratings defines their function: “investment grade” ratings (international long-term “AAA” — “BBB” categories; short-term “F1” — “F3”) indicate a relatively low probability of default, while those in the “speculative” or “non-investment grade” categories (international long-term “BB” — “D”; short-term “B” — “D”) may signal a higher probability of default or that a default has already occurred ’ (Fitch Rating ' s Internet site: http://www.fitchratings.com/).
„Credit ratings are used by investors as indications of the likelihood of repayment in accordance with the terms on which they invested. Thus, the use of credit ratings defines their function: ‚investment grade‘ ratings (international long-term ‚AAA‘ – ‚BBB‘ categories; short-term ‚F1‘ – ‚F3‘) indicate a relatively low probability of default, while those in the ‚speculative‘ or ‚non-investment grade‘ categories (international long-term ‚BB‘ – ‚D‘; short-term ‚B‘ – ‚D‘) may signal a higher probability of default or that a default has already occurred “ (site internet de Fitchs Rating: http://www.fitchratings.com/).)
Moody's: ‘Moody's places France Telecom and Orange's long-term debt ratings on review for downgrade — Approximately EUR 60 billion of Debt Securities Affected… The France Telecom ratings under review for possible downgrade relate to the following: Convertible global bonds, Euro MTNs, Eurobonds, Floating Rate Euro MTNs, Floating Rate French Franc Bonds, French Bonds, Swiss Franc Bonds, its issuer rating and bank loan rating…. any resulting rating action should not exceed more than one notch’.
Moody’s: „Moody's places France Telecom and Orange's long-term debt ratings on review for downgrade – Approximately EUR60 billion of Debt Securities Affected… The France Telecom ratings under review for possible downgrade relate to the following: Convertible global bonds, Euro MTNs, Eurobonds, Floating Rate Euro MTNs, Floating Rate French Franc Bonds, French Bonds, Swiss Franc Bonds, its issuer rating and bank loan rating…. any resulting rating action should not exceed more than one notch“.
‘France Telecom's Long-Term“BBB+” Rating Placed on CreditWatch Negative; A-2 Rating Affirmed… The action follows news that the German stock-exchange regulatory authority will investigate a possible agreement between France Telecom, the main shareholder — Gerhard Schmid — of France Telecom ' s 28,5 % -owned German associate Mobilcom AG, and a consortium of European banks regarding the conditions for a change in control of Mobilcom’.
„Perspektíva dlhodobého dlhu BBB+ France Télécom sa stala negatívnou; rating A-2 bol potvrdený … Toto rozhodnutie nasleduje po správe, že nemecký burzový orgán preskúma možnosť uzavretia dohody medzi France Télécom, väčšinovým akcionárom – Gerhardom Schmidom – z Mobilcom AG, v ktorom France Télécom vlastní 28,5 % a konzorciom európskych bánk, ktorá by sa týkala podmienok zmeny kontroly Mobilcom“. ( „France Telecom's Long-Term‚BBB+‘ Rating Placed on CreditWatch Negative; A-2 Rating Affirmed… The action follows news that the German stock-exchange regulatory authority will investigate a possible agreement between France Telecom, the main shareholder–Gerhard Schmid–of France Telecom ' s 28,5 % -owned German associate Mobilcom AG, and a consortium of European banks regarding the conditions for a change in control of Mobilcom“.)
‘Moody's Investors Service has today placed the Prime-2 short-term rating of France Telecom (FT) on review for possible downgrade as a result of the rating agency's decision to expand the scope of the ongoing review of FT.
„Moody's Investors Service has today placed the Prime-2 short-term rating of France Telecom (FT) on review for possible downgrade as a result of the rating agency's decision to expand the scope of the ongoing review of FT.
The rating agency noted that FT's slow progress in finalising asset sales, coupled with continuing deterioration in capital market conditions in this sector, could further limit FT's ability to improve its financial flexibility and meet its debt reduction targets’.
The rating agency noted that FT's slow progress in finalising asset sales, coupled with continuing deterioration in capital market conditions in this sector, could further limit FT's ability to improve its financial flexibility and meet its debt reduction targets“.
‘Standard & Poor's said today that the ratings on France Telecom (BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2) remain unchanged, including the group's short-term corporate credit rating.
„Standard & Poor's said today that the ratings on France Telecom (BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2) remain unchanged, including the group's short-term corporate credit rating.
‘… Despite expectations that FT's EBITDA will grow to around €14 billion in 2002, FT's substantial interest and capex requirements means the company is not expected to generate material free cashflow for deleveraging in the near term.
„[…] Despite expectations that FT’s EBITDA will grow to around €14 billion in 2002, FT’s substantial interest and capex requirements means the company is not expected to generate material free cashflow for deleveraging in the near term.
Although Moody's does not have any immediate liquidity concerns, the rating agency notes that FT faces around €15 billion of total long-term debt maturities in 2003’.
Although Moody's does not have any immediate liquidity concerns, the rating agency notes that FT faces around €15 billion of total long-term debt maturities in 2003;“
‘Standard & Poor's said today that it has lowered its long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on France Telecom (FT) to triple-“B”/ “A-3” from triple- “B”-plus/ “A-2”.
„Standard & Poor's said today that it has lowered its long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on France Telecom (FT) to triple-‚B‘/ ‚A-3‘ from triple- ‚B‘-plus/ ‚A-2‘.
Standard & Poor's also lowered to triple-“B” from triple- “B”-plus its long-term corporate credit rating on Orange S.A., FT ' s majority-owned wireless subsidiary.
Standard & Poor's also lowered to triple-‚B‘ from triple- ‚B‘-plus its long-term corporate credit rating on Orange S.A., FT ' s majority-owned wireless subsidiary.
The long-term ratings on both companies remain on CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on March 28, 2002, reflecting FT's challenging refinancing needs, including €15 billion of financial obligations in 2003’.
The long-term ratings on both companies main on CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on March 28, 2002, reflecting FT's challenging refinancing needs, including €15 billion of financial obligations in 2003“.
Fitch reduced France Télécom's rating on 5 July 2002 and S & P reduced it on 12 July.
Fitch znížil rating FT 5. júla 2002 a S & P ho znížil 12. júla 2002.
In its 12 July press release, S & P stated that: ‘FT could face certain difficulties refinancing its debt obligations coming due in 2003’.
V tlačovej správe z 12. júla S & P tvrdil, že: „FT môže mať isté problémy so splácaním dlhu so splatnosťou v roku 2003“. ( „FT could face certain difficulties refinancing its debt obligations coming due in 2003“.)
Hearing of Mr V. de la Bachelerie, France Télécom's auditor, before the above-mentioned commission of enquiry: ‘By law, we have to put into effect the alert procedure as soon as a number of criteria and indicators appear.
Vypočutie V. de la Bachelerie, audítora z FT pred uvedenou vyšetrovacou komisiou: „V mene zákona musíme vždy, keď sa vyskytne určité množstvo kritérií a ukazovateľov, uplatniť krízový postup.
The procedure was not applicable before mid-2002, at which time a signal given out by the market came to our attention, namely the downgrading of France Télécom's rating.
Tento postup sa nepoužíval až do polovice roku 2002, kedy trh vyvolal zníženie ratingu France Télécom.
As part of our auditor's duties, we thus had to deal with the question within the audit committee and the board of directors, demanding that board members be provided with a short-term liquidity plan in order to cope with the “liquidity wall” problem.
V rámci nášho audítorského poslania sme boli nútení zaoberať sa otázkou zníženia ratingu v audítorskom výbore a predstavenstve, pričom sme požadovali predloženie členom predstavenstva krátkodobého plánu likvidity, aby sme mohli odstrániť prekážku likvidity.
It must be said that this constraint appeared at a late stage, in so far as the company had, up to that time, the means with which to refinance itself and had, moreover, introduced substantial financing measures, including jumbos.
Treba povedať, že táto prekážka sa objavila až neskôr, pretože dovtedy mala spoločnosť prostriedky na refinancovanie a teda pristúpila k financovaniu v značnom rozsahu, najmä ‚jumbos‘.
Consequently, when the liquidity wall appeared with the downgrading of the rate, we ask for an update of the cash flow forecasts.
Keď sa vyskytla prekážka likvidity a v tej súvislosti došlo k zníženiu ratingu, požiadali sme o aktualizovanie stavu hotovosti.
At the time of the half-yearly accounts, which were adopted at the beginning of September 2002 and finalised at the board meeting on 12 September 2002, a review was carried out of the liquidity situation in the short term — liquidity visibility being assessed over the short term, that is to say, less than a year.
V súvislosti s polročným účtovným výkazom zostaveným na začiatku septembra 2002 a dokončeným na zasadnutí rady dňa 12. septembra 2002 sa uskutočnila previerka krátkodobého stavu likvidných prostriedkov – existencia likvidity sa totiž posudzuje z krátkodobého hľadiska, t.j. za obdobie kratšie ako jeden rok.
The situation, which was by then critical, was made official in the notes annexed to the financial statements on 30 June 2002’.
Stav, ktorý je kritický, bol uvedený v poznámkach pripojených k finančným výkazom zostaveným k 30. júnu 2002“
The wording of the French Government's declarations is reproduced in paragraph 204 below.
Znenie vyhlásení francúzskej vlády je uvedené v ustanovení 204.
Goldman Sachs: ‘FT was on the brink of “junk” status with both Moody ' s and S & P ' s ’.
Goldman Sachs: „Moody’s a S & P môžu každú chvíľu znížiť rating FT na úroveň špekulatívneho radu“. ( „FT was on the brink of ‚junk‘ status with both Moody’s and S & P’s “.)
Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST Today, Standard & Poor's Ratings Direct (12.7.2002)
Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST Today, Standard & Poor’s Ratings direct, (12. júla 2002).
Hearing of Mr Thierry Breton, France Télécom's CEO, before the National Assembly's Economic Affairs Committee on 11.12.2002: ‘He pointed out that the financing plan that had been implemented had not been adhered to and matters had grown worse at the beginning of 2001 with the result that a liquidity crisis was foreseeable by the summer of 2003 … Mr Breton stated that, threatened with a suspension of payments, the company was in a state of shock … owing to the scale of its debt, as it had to find enough liquidity to reimburse EUR 15 billion in 2003 and again in 2004, and EUR 20 billion in 2005’.
Vypočutie Thierry Bretona, predsedu predstavenstva a generálneho riaditeľa FT pred komisiou pre hospodárske veci Národného zhromaždenia 11. decembra 2002: „Zistil, že zavedený plán financovania nebol dodržaný a že jeho realizácia sa skomplikovala začiatkom roka 2001, takže sa dal predpokladať vznik krízy likvidity v lete 2003… Thierry Breton vyhlásil, že keď podniku hrozilo zastavenie platieb, ocitol sa v stave šoku … vzhľadom na výšku svojho zadĺženia, pretože potreboval získať likvidné prostriedky na platenie 15 miliárd eur v roku 2003 a neskôr v roku 2004, a 20 miliárd eur v roku 2005“.
Senate, 21.11.2002, opinion presented on behalf of the Committee on Economic Affairs and the Plan (1) on the draft Finance Act, 2003, adopted by the National Assembly.
Senát predložil 21. novembra 2002 stanovisko v mene komisie pre hospodárske veci a plánovanie (1) k návrhu finančného zákona na rok 2003, schválené Národným zhromaždením.
These figures have been taken from the annex to the French authorities’ letter of 3.12.2002.
Tieto čísla pochádzajú z prílohy k listu francúzskych úradov z 3. decembra 2002.
Even so, on p. 25 of their letter, the French authorities estimate at EUR 15 billion the amount of outstanding bonds coming due in 2003. A similar difference is to be found in the estimate of the amount of bonds coming due by the end of 2004, which is put at EUR 18,8 billion in Annexe 2 and at EUR 23,9 billion on p. 20 of the letter.
Na strane 25 tohto listu francúzske úrady odhadujú sumu ešte nesplatených dlhopisov so splatnosťou v roku 2003 na 15 milárd eur. V uvedenom liste sa v prílohe 2 odhaduje dlh na základe dlhopisov, ktorého splatnosť uplynie koncom roka 2004, na 18,8 miliárd eur a na strane 20 listu sa uvádza dlh 23,9 miliárd eur.
See also the press release of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance of 5.12.2002: ‘… the company is faced today with an unbalanced financial structure and a need for own funds and refinancing in the medium term.
Pozri aj tlačovú správu ministra hospodárstva a financií z 5. decembra 2002: „… podnik musí v súčasnosti riešiť problém nevyváženej finančnej štruktúry, nedostatku vlastného kapitálu a nedostatku zdrojov strednodobého financovania.
This situation is due to the failure of past investments, which were carried out badly at the peak of the financial bubble, and, more generally, to the reversal of the markets.
Takáto situácia je výsledkom neúspešných a zle spravovaných investícií realizovaných v minulých obdobiach, spľasnutia telekomunikačnej ‚bubliny‘ a vo všeobecnosti je výsledkom obratu na trhoch.
France Télécom's inability to finance its growth other than through debt has made matters worse’.
Situáciu ešte zhoršila skutočnosť, že France Télécom nemala inú možnosť financovať svoj rozvoj než zadĺžením “.
‘According to the information communicated by the French authorities, this level of indebtedness is due to the fact that, since 1999, France Télécom has undergone very considerable external growth, which it has financed entirely by borrowing, without resorting, like its competitors, to mechanisms for increasing capital or exchanging shares owing to the legal obligation aimed at ensuring that France Télécom's capital is majority-held by the State.
„Podľa informácií poskytnutých francúzskymi orgánmi, túto mieru zadĺženia možno vysvetliť skutočnosťou, že FT zaznamenala od roku 1999 veľmi výraznú expanziu, ktorú financovala výlučne z pôžičiek, pričom nepoužila tak, ako to urobili jej konkurenti, mechanizmy zvýšenia imania alebo výmeny akcií z dôvodu právnej povinnosti zabezpečiť, aby väčšinovým vlastníkom imania FT bol štát.
The French authorities have also referred to the reversal of the markets, which has led to successive debt plans not being implemented … In the course of 2000, the company thus financed its acquisitions massively on the bond and banking markets: France Télécom's total long-term loan issues reached €59 billion in 2000-01, and the “€15 G” credit line is itself no more than the partial refinancing of acquisition financing via bank loans set up in mid-2000 to the tune of €30 billion ... ’ (paragraphs 20 and 21 of the opening decision, unofficial translation).
Francúzske úrady zároveň spomenuli obrat na trhoch, ktorý viedol k tomu, že nebolo možné realizovať sústavu plánov na splatenie dlhu … V priebehu roka 2000 podnik masívne financoval svoje akvizície obligáciami a na bankových trhoch: v rokoch 2000 – 2001 dosiahla celková suma emisie dlhodobých dlhopisov FT 59 miliárd EUR a samotná úverová linka 15 mld. EUR je prostriedkom iba čiastočného refinancovania bankového financovania akvizície realizovaného v polovici roku 2000 vo výške 30 miliárd EUR ...“ (body 20 a 21 rozhodnutia o začatí konania).
France Télécom press release of 5.12.2002, p. 2.
Tlačová správa FT z 5. decembra 2002, s. 2.
See also hearing of Mr Thierry Breton, France Télécom's CEO, before the Economic Affairs Committee on 11.12.2002: ‘during the course of 2000, carried out acquisitions worth a total of EUR 106 billion (purchase of Orange plc, NTL, Equant, TPSA)’.
Pozri aj vyjadrenia Thierry Bretona, predsedu predstavenstva a generálneho riaditeľa FT pred komisiou pre hospodárske veci dňa 11. decembra 2002: „v priebehu roka 2000 sa uskutočnili akvizície v celkovej sume 106 miliárd eur (akvizícia Orange PLC, NTL, Equant, TPSA)“.
Hearing of Mr Thierry Breton, France Télécom's CEO, before the above-mentioned Economic Affairs Committee meeting: ‘In total, he observed, out of approximately EUR 100 billion worth of purchases, 75 was used to develop the strategy in the mobiles sector, 10 billion being invested in TPSA, 11,2 billion in Mobilcom and 9 billion in NTL’.
Vyjadrenia p. Thierry Bretona, predsedu predstavenstva a generálneho riaditeľa FT, pred uvedenou komisiou pre hospodárske veci: „Celkove sa zrealizovali obchody za zhruba 100 miliárd eur, z čoho 75 miliárd eur bolo použitých na rozvoj stratégie sektora mobilných telefónov, 10 miliárd eur bolo investovaných do TPSA, 11,2 miliárd do Mobilcom a 9 miliárd eur do NTL“.
See also the report by Goldman Sachs of 26.9.2002, which explained that the debt had been ‘amassed through a series of transactions in 2000, mainly the acquisition of Orange and the Mobilcom joint venture’.
Pozri aj správu Goldmana Sachsa z 26. septembra 2002, v ktorej je vysvetlené, že dlh bol „akumulovaný radom transakcií v roku 2000, hlavne nadobudnutím Orange a spoločného podniku Mobilcom“ ( „amassed through a series of transactions in 2000, mainly the acquisition of Orange and the Mobilcom joint venture“).
Above-mentioned commission of enquiry: ‘In the case of Orange, which contributed decisively to the explosion of the group's debt’.
Uvedená vyšetrovacia komisia: „V prípade Orange, ktorý výrazne prispel k obrovskému zadĺženiu skupiny“.
Senate information report No 274, attached to the minutes of the sitting of 21.2.2002: ‘On 29 May 2000, France Télécom and the Vodafone group concluded an agreement whereby France Télécom was to acquire, from Mannesmann, all the shares comprising the capital of Orange plc, the British mobile telecommunications operator.
Informatívna správa senátu č. 274 pripojená k zápisnici zo zasadnutia z 21. februára 2002„Dňa 29. mája 2000 došlo k uzavretiu zmluvy medzi France Télécom a skupinou Vodafone, na základe ktorej mala France Télécom odkúpiť od Mannesmann všetky akcie tvoriace imanie Orange plc, britského operátora mobilných telekomunikácií.
The agreement was executed on 22 August 2000 by the purchase, by France Télécom, of 664743658 Orange shares for EUR 21,5 billion in cash and the transfer, from Vodafone to France Télécom, of 544559931 Orange shares, paid for by the issue of 129201742 France Télécom shares at the price of EUR 140,2 each, with Vodafone agreeing to abstain from exercising the voting rights attached to those shares.
Zmluva bola vykonaná 22. augusta 2000, keď France Télécom kúpila 664743658 akcií Orange za hotové peniaze v sume 21,5 miliárd eur a prínos Vodafone do France Télécom v akciách Orange v hodnote 544559931 splatenom formou emisie 129201742 akcií France Télécom za jednotkovú cenu 140,2 eur, pričom Vodafone nechcel využiť hlasovacie práva spojené s týmito akciami.
Concomitantly, France Télécom granted Vodafone a series of sell options on the France Télécom shares which had been issued to it and Vodafone granted France Télécom a buy option on all or part of its France Télécom shares.
France Télécom súčasne poskytla Vodafone rad predajných opcií na akcie France Télécom, ktoré boli vydané v jej prospech a Vodafone poskytlo France Télécom nákupnú opciu na všetky svoje akcie France Télécom alebo ich časť.
France Télécom immediately repurchased from Vodafone 15355531 France Télécom shares at their issue price, with the result that Vodafone held no more than 9,9 % of France Télécom's capital … Following the stock exchange listing of Orange SA on 13 February 2001, Vodafone and France Télécom reached an agreement on 28 February 2001 on the arrangements for the sale to France Télécom of the 113,85 million France Télécom shares still held by Vodafone.
France Télécom ihneď odkúpila od Vodafone 15355531 akcií France Télécom za ich emisnú cenu tak, aby Vodafone nevlastnil viac ako 9,9 % imania France Télécom …Po zapísaní Orange SA na burzu 13. februára 2001 sa Vodafone a France Télécom dohodli dňa 28. februára 2001 na podmienkach predaja France Télécom 113,85 miliónov akcií France Télécom, ktoré ešte vlastnil Vodafone.
This agreement laid down the overall arrangements for exercising the sell and buy options on the France Télécom shares held by Vodafone and fixed at approximately EUR 11,63 billion the total price of these shares … The third payment may be subject to a supplement … The supplement might come to approximately EUR 1,5 billion ... On the basis of this agreement, the total cost of acquiring Orange plc comes to EUR 35472 million’.
V uvedenej zmluve sú vymedzené podmienky využitia predajných opcií a nákupu opcií France Télécom vo vlastníctve Vodafone a celková cena týchto akcií je stanovená na zhruba 11,63 miliárd eur… Tretia platba môže byť predmetom doplatku … Doplatok bude môcť dosiahnuť sumu cca 1,5 miliárd eur... Na základe tejto zmluvy sú celkové obstarávacie náklady Orange plc 35472 miliónov eur“.
See also the report of the above-mentioned commission of enquiry: ‘The 43,2 billion purchase (reduced to EUR 35,4 billion in February 2001) was financed half in cash (EUR 21,5 billion) and half by the exchange of shares (EUR 18,1 billion).
Pozri aj správu uvedenej vyšetrovacej komisie: „Nákup za 43,2 miliárd eur (ktorého hodnota bola vo februári 2001 znížená na 35,4 miliárd eur) bol spolovice zaplatený v hotovosti (21,5 miliárd eur) a spolovice výmenou akcií (18,1 miliárd eur).
On this last point, however, France Télécom undertook to repurchase the shares issued at a minimum price of EUR 104. There was scarcely any doubt that the seller would insist on these repurchase options being exercised … And, owing to the autumn 2000 stock market collapse, the risk that the French group might be forced to pay for Orange wholly in cash materialised, with two payments to Vodafone of EUR 6,631 billion and EUR 4,973 billion in March 2001 and 2002’.
V tomto ohľade sa však France Télécom zaviazal, že odkúpi dané akcie za minimálny kurz 104 eur. Neexistovali žiadne pochybnosti o tom, že predávajúci bude požadovať uplatnenie týchto kúpnych opcií … Následkom prudkého poklesu na burze od jesene 2000 sa riziko, že francúzska skupina bude nútená zaplatiť v hotovosti 100 % akcií Orange, stalo reálnym a skupina zaplatila Vodafone 6,631 miliárd eur a 4,973 miliárd eur v roku v marci 2001 a 2002“.
Commission of enquiry: ‘It was in these difficult circumstances that the idea of buying into Mobilcom's capital got off the ground … Evidently, the acquisition of a very large stake was not the subject of really in-depth thought despite its being fraught with considerable risk.
Vyšetrovacia komisia: „Projekt vstupu do kapitálu Mobilcom sa uskutočnil práve za takýchto zložitých okolností ….