natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The EPPO is expected to start operating from late 2020 or early 2021 onwards in 22 Member States and will be competent to investigate crimes against the EU budget including serious cross-border VAT fraud over €10 million. o The proposal to amend the OLAF's Regulation 883/2013 (COM(2018) 338) concerning investigations conducted by the OLAF as regards cooperation with the EPPO and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations adopted in May 2018. o The new Financial Regulation entered into force in July 2018. 59 
Se preconizează că EPPO va începe să funcționeze de la sfârșitul anului 2020 sau de la începutul anului 2021 în 22 de state membre și va avea competența de a investiga infracțiuni împotriva bugetului UE, inclusiv fraudele transfrontaliere grave legate de TVA de peste 10 milioane de euro. o Propunerea de modificare a Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 referitor la OLAF [COM(2018) 338] privind investigațiile efectuate de OLAF în ceea ce privește cooperarea cu EPPO și eficacitatea investigațiilor OLAF, adoptată în mai 2018. o Noul Regulament financiar a intrat in vigoare în iulie 2018.
Annex IV — Events triggering Member States to report cases of fraud under criminal investigation to the Commission 60 Event BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK After indictment √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ After initial sentence √ √ √ √ √ √ √ After definitive sentence-final court decision √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Other √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Anexa IV – Evenimente care determină statele membre să raporteze Comisiei cazurile de fraudă care fac obiectul unor anchete penale 65 Evenimentul BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK După punerea în mișcare a acțiunii penale √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ După pronunțarea sentin ț√ √ √ √ √ √ √ După pronunțarea sentinței definitive – hotărâre judecătorească definitivă √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Altele √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
They may be required to take action as a result of the outcome; • Not involved. * Consultation of OLAF on all other actions in the Planning and Implementation Phases is facultative, except where such actions are based on a recommendation by OLAF. ** Following its Charter and International standards, does not have any management responsibility at any stage of the anti-fraud cycle *** TheClearingHouseGroupcanbeinformedonacasebasedapproachnotonageneralsystemicapproach. ****TheAPCisinformedofissuesarisingintheseareasindirectly,i.e onthebasisofinternaland/orexternalauditfindings. TheAPCisinformedaboutkeypointsoftheAARsandofthedraftAMPR. 
Poate fi necesar ca aceasta (acesta) să ia măsuri pe baza rezultatului; • Neimplicat. * Consultarea OLAF cu privire la toate celelalte acțiuni în etapele de planificare și de punere în aplicare este facultativă, cu excepția cazului în care astfel de acțiuni se bazează pe o recomandare din partea OLAF. ** Potrivit cartei sale și standardelor internaționale, Serviciul de Audit Intern nu are nicio responsabilitate de gestiune în nicio etapă a ciclului antifraudă. *** Grupul „Clearing House” poate fi informat de la caz la caz, dar nu în mod general și sistemic. **** Comitetul de monitorizare a auditurilor este informat în mod indirect cu privire la chestiunile care apar în aceste domenii, și anume prin intermediul constatărilor de audit intern și/sau extern.
Annex VI — List of references Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2013), The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Controlling corruption in the European Union, Berlin. 
Anexa VI – Lista de referințe Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Controlling corruption in the European Union, Berlin, 2013.
Fabio Giuffrida, ‘The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: King without kingdom?’(2017), CEPS Research Report No 3/2017, p. 
Giuffrida, Fabio, The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: King without kingdom?, Raportul de cercetare al CEPS nr. 3/2017, p.
Golden, Miriam and Picci, Lucio (2005), Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, and Tests using Italian Data, Economics and Politics. 
Golden, Miriam și Picci, Lucio, „Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, and Tests using Italian Data”, în Economics and Politics, vol.
17, 2005, pp. 37-75. 
17, 2005, p. 37-75.
Mark Button and Jim Gee (2015), The financial cost of fraud 2015 - What the latest data from around the world shows, PKF Littlejohn LLP and PKF; See also Brooks, G., Button, M. and Gee, J. (2012), The scale of healthcare fraud: a global evaluation, Security Journal, Vol. 
Button, Mark și Gee, Jim, „The financial cost of fraud 2015 – What the latest data from around the world shows”, în PKF Littlejohn LLP and PKF, 2015; a se vedea și Brooks, G., Button, M. și Gee, J., „The scale of healthcare fraud: a global evaluation”, în Security Journal, vol.
25 No. 2, pp. 76-87. 
2, 2012, p. 76-87.
Mark Button, Chris Lewis, David Shepherd, Graham Brooks and Alison Wakefield (2012), Fraud and Punishment: Enhancing Deterrence Through More Effective Sanctions, Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, University of Portsmouth. 
Button, Mark; Lewis, Chris; Shepherd, David; Brooks, Graham și Wakefield, Alison, Fraud and Punishment: Enhancing Deterrence Through More Effective Sanctions, Centrul pentru Studii privind Combaterea Fraudei, Universitatea din Portsmouth, 2012.
Mihaly Fazekas and Peter Lawrence King (2018), Perils of development funding? 
Fazekas, Mihaly și King, Peter Lawrence, „Perils of development funding?
Regulation & Governance 2018, pp. 14-15. Mihaly Fazekas and Gábor Kocsis (2017), Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Public Procurement Data. 
14-15. Fazekas, Mihaly și Kocsis, Gábor, „Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Public Procurement Data”, în British Journal of Political Science, 2017, disponibil online.
British Journal of Political Science, av. online. Mihaly Fazekas, István János Tóth and Peter Lawrence King (2016), An Objective Corruption Risk Index Using Public Procurement Data. 
Fazekas, Mihaly; Tóth, István János și King, Peter Lawrence, „An Objective Corruption Risk Index Using Public Procurement Data”, în European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 2016, 22(3), p.
Mihaly Fazekas and István János Tóth (2017), Corruption in EU Funds? 
Fazekas, Mihaly și Tóth, István János, „Corruption in EU Funds?
In J. Bachtler et al (Eds.), EU Cohesion Policy. Reassessing performance and direction. Ch. 
Europe-wide evidence on the corruption effect of EU-funded public contracting”, în J. Bachtler și alții (editori), EU Cohesion Policy.
Paulo Mauro (1996), The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure, International Monetary Fund, WP/96/98. 
Mauro, Paulo, The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure, International Monetary Fund, WP/96/98, 1996.
62 Paulo Mauro (1998), Corruption and the composition of government expenditure, International Monetary Fund, Journal of Public Economics 69. 
68 Mauro, Paulo, „Corruption and the composition of government expenditure”, Fondul Monetar Internațional, în Journal of Public Economics, vol.
Jajkowicz, O. and Drobiszova, A. 
Jajkowicz, O. și Drobiszova, A., „The Effect of Corruption on Government Expenditure Allocation in OECD Countries”, în Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, vol.
63 Acronyms and abbreviations AAR: Annual activity report AFCOS: Anti-fraud coordination services AFS: Anti-fraud strategy AMPR: Annual management and performance report AOD: Authorising officer by delegation CAFS: Commission anti-fraud strategy DG: Directorate-General ECJ: European Court of Justice EDES: Early detection and exclusion system EPPO: European Public Prosecutor’s Office IBOAs: EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies IMS: Irregularity management system MFF: Multi-annual financial framework OLAF: European Anti-fraud Office PACA: Primary administrative or judicial finding PIF: Protection of the European Union’s financial interests 64 
Termeni și acronime AFCOS: Servicii de coordonare antifraudă (Anti-fraud coordination services) AMPR: Raport anual privind gestionarea și performanța bugetului UE (Annual management and performance report) CFM: Cadru financiar multianual CJUE: Curtea de Justiție a Uniunii Europene DG: Direcție generală EDES: Sistem de detectare timpurie și de excludere (Early detection and exclusion system) EPPO: Parchetul European IBOA: Instituțiile, organismele, oficiile și agențiile UE IMS: Sistemul de gestionare a neregulilor (Irregularity management system) OLAF: Oficiul European de Luptă Antifraudă PACA: Constatare primară administrativă sau judiciară (Primary administrative or judicial finding) PIF: Protecția intereselor financiare ale Uniunii Europene RAA: Raport anual de activitate SAFC: Strategia antifraudă a Comisiei
Conviction: A court’s judgement by which the defendant is found to be guilty of having committed a crime. 
Condamnare: o hotărâre a unei instanțe judecătorești prin care pârâtul este găsit vinovat de săvârșirea unei infracțiuni.
A person can be considered convicted only when the judgement is final. 
O persoană poate fi considerată condamnată numai atunci când hotărârea este definitivă.
Corruption: Corruption is the abuse of power for private gain. 
Corupție: corupția este definită ca fiind abuzul de putere pentru a obține câștiguri private.
It comprises of any act or omission that misuses official authority, or seeks to influence the misuse of official authority, in order to obtain an undue benefit. 
Aceasta cuprinde orice act sau omisiune care utilizează abuziv sau încearcă să influențeze utilizarea abuzivă a autorității publice, în scopul de a obține un beneficiu necuvenit.
Error: An irregularity arising from non-compliance with legal and contractual requirements. 
Eroare: o neregulă care rezultă din nerespectarea cerințelor legale sau a celor contractuale.
Impact assessment: Impact assessments contribute to EU decision-making processes by systematically collecting and analysing information on planned interventions and estimating their likely impact. 
Evaluarea impactului: evaluările de impact contribuie la procesul decizional al UE prin colectarea și analizarea sistematică de informații cu privire la intervențiile planificate și prin estimarea impactului probabil al acestor intervenții.
Impact assessments must be carried out for all major policy initiatives (i.e. those presented in the annual policy strategy (APS) or, later, as part of the Commission’s legislative work programme (CLWP)), with some clearly defined exceptions. 
Evaluările de impact trebuie efectuate pentru toate inițiativele de politică majore [de exemplu, cele prezentate în Strategia politică anuală (SPA) sau, ulterior, ca parte a Programului legislativ și de lucru al Comisiei (PLLC)], cu anumite excepții clar specificate.
In addition, other significant initiatives can be covered on a case-by-case basis. 
De asemenea, și alte inițiative semnificative pot face obiectul unei evaluări de impact, în funcție de situația particulară a acestora.
Indictment: An official notification given to a natural or legal person by the prosecutor of an allegation that he or she or it has committed a criminal offence and by which the prosecutor brings the prosecution to court. 
Punere în mișcare a acțiunii penale/punere sub acuzare: o notificare oficială transmisă unei persoane fizice sau juridice de către procuror cu privire la acuzația că aceasta a săvârșit o infracțiune și prin care procurorul dispune trimiterea în judecată.
Irregularity Management System (IMS): The Irregularity Management System is a secure electronic tool for reporting, management and analysis of irregularities. 
Sistemul de gestionare a neregulilor (IMS): Sistemul de gestionare a neregulilor este un instrument electronic securizat pentru raportarea, gestionarea și analizarea neregulilor.
IMS is part of the Anti-fraud Information System (AFIS), developed and maintained by OLAF, which facilitates the exchange of information between OLAF and relevant administrations. 
IMS este parte a Sistemului de Informații Antifraudă (AFIS), dezvoltat și administrat de OLAF, care facilitează schimbul de informații între OLAF și administrațiile competente.
Suspected fraud: An irregularity that gives rise to the initiation of administrative or judicial proceedings being brought at national level to establish whether behaviour was intentional is categorised by the Commission and Member States as ‘suspected fraud’. 
Suspiciune de fraudă: o neregulă care determină inițierea unei proceduri administrative sau judiciare la nivel național pentru a se stabili dacă un comportament a fost intenționat este clasificată de Comisie și de statele membre drept „suspiciune de fraudă”.
The Commission is currently considering the resource implications of the recommendations of the ECA in the context of the ongoing revision of the CAFS. V. The specific issues raised by the ECA regarding the Commission's anti-fraud policy cannot be seen in isolation from the important developments listed below:  Revision of the Staff Regulations for officials and other servants of the European Union in 2013;  Updated integrated control framework and peer review of fraud risk in 2017;Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive);  Regulation 2017/1939 setting up the EPPO;  Proposal of 2018 to amend the OLAF Regulation 883/2013;  New Financial Regulation 2018/1046;  Initiative for a revision of the Financial Framework Regulation on decentralised agencies;  Proposals for post-2020 spending programmes; 1 
V. The specific issues raised by the ECA regarding the Commission's anti-fraud policy cannot be seen in isolation from the important developments listed below:  Revision of the Staff Regulations for officials and other servants of the European Union in 2013;  Updated integrated control framework and peer review of fraud risk in 2017;Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive);  Regulation 2017/1939 setting up the EPPO;  Proposal of 2018 to amend the OLAF Regulation 883/2013;  New Financial Regulation 2018/1046;  Initiative for a revision of the Financial Framework Regulation on decentralised agencies;  Proposals for post-2020 spending programmes; 1
See also Commission's reply to paragraphs 50-54. Recommendation 3: First indent: The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
See also Commission's reply to paragraphs 50-54. Recommendation 3: First indent: The Commission accepts the recommendation.
1 See Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 on the creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) of 12 October 2017. 3 
1 See Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 on the creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) of 12 October 2017. 3
Translated in terms on the fraud detection rate in 2017, this would imply a figure 0.22% instead of 0.21%. 7 
Translated in terms on the fraud detection rate in 2017, this would imply a figure 0.22% instead of 0.21%. 7
That said, the Commission intends to reinforce OLAF’s analytical capabilities, which will, in due course, contribute to a refinement of fraud risk assessments (see the Commission’s replies to recommendations 1, 3.1 and 4). Some Commission services, in particular DG REGIO, use external sources as appropriate (e.g. Transparency International and DIGIWHIST). 
That said, the Commission intends to reinforce OLAF’s analytical capabilities, which will, in due course, contribute to a refinement of fraud risk assessments (see the Commission’s replies to recommendations 1, 3.1 and 4). Some Commission services, in particular DG REGIO, use external sources as appropriate (e.g. Transparency International and DIGIWHIST).
The 2018 Financial Regulation further 3 4 https://www.moorestephens.co.uk/news-views/november-2017/misspending-public-money-is-top-risk-area-for-frau See OLAF Report 2016, pp. 15-18, for the importance of procurement fraud. 10 
The 2018 Financial Regulation further 3 4 https://www.moorestephens.co.uk/news-views/november-2017/misspending-public-money-is-top-risk-area-for-frau See OLAF Report 2016, pp. 15-18, for the importance of procurement fraud. 10
In line with Article 11(1) of the OLAF Regulation, OLAF's recommendations indicate the action to be taken by the IBOA and the competent authorities of the Member States. Pursuant to Article 11(2), OLAF's final reports constitute admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings in Member States in the same way and under the same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors. 
In line with Article 11(1) of the OLAF Regulation, OLAF's recommendations indicate the action to be taken by the IBOA and the competent authorities of the Member States. Pursuant to Article 11(2), OLAF's final reports constitute admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings in Member States in the same way and under the same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors.
Article 325 TFEU. For the latest version, see Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 'Protection of the European Union's financial interests – Fight against fraud 2017 Annual Report', Brussels, 03.09.2018, COM(2018) 553 final. 
For the latest version, see Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 'Protection of the European Union's financial interests – Fight against fraud 2017 Annual Report', Brussels, 03.09.2018, COM(2018) 553 final.
In addition, the PIF Directive includes for the first time specific rules on limitation periods for PIF offences (Article 12). The Commission's proposal 18 
In addition, the PIF Directive includes for the first time specific rules on limitation periods for PIF offences (Article 12). The Commission's proposal 18
Common reply to paragraphs 106-108: 10 See 2017 OLAF Report. 20 
Common reply to paragraphs 106-108: 10 See 2017 OLAF Report. 20
The default approach of DG DEVCO is to follow OLAF's recommendations. However, when there are important reasons not to follow OLAF's recommendations, DG DEVCO reports back to OLAF on the decision and measures taken. 23 
The default approach of DG DEVCO is to follow OLAF's recommendations. However, when there are important reasons not to follow OLAF's recommendations, DG DEVCO reports back to OLAF on the decision and measures taken. 23
24 The EPPO Regulation contains also very specific obligations on Member States to provide European Delegated Prosecutors with the resources and equipment necessary to exercise their functions (Article 96(6)). 
24 The EPPO Regulation contains also very specific obligations on Member States to provide European Delegated Prosecutors with the resources and equipment necessary to exercise their functions (Article 96(6)).
8, paragraph 'Fraud prevention'. 28 
8, paragraph 'Fraud prevention'. 28
Audit team The ECA’s special reports set out the results of its audits of EU policies and programmes, or of management-related topics from specific budgetary areas. 
Echipa de audit Rapoartele speciale ale Curții de Conturi Europene prezintă rezultatele auditurilor sale cu privire la politicile și programele UE sau la diverse aspecte legate de gestiune aferente unor domenii specifice ale bugetului UE.
The audit was led by ECA Member Juhan Parts, supported by Ken-Marti Vaher, Head of Private Office and Margus Kurm, Private Office Attaché; Judit Oroszki, Principal Manager and Head of Task; Tomasz Plebanowicz, Deputy Head of Task; Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Daria Bochnar, Jana Janeckova and Anzela Poliulianaite, Auditors. 
Auditul a fost condus de domnul Juhan Parts, membru al Curții de Conturi Europene, beneficiind de sprijinul unei echipe formate din: Ken-Marti Vaher, șef de cabinet, și Margus Kurm, atașat în cadrul cabinetului; Judit Oroszki, manager principal și coordonatoare; Tomasz Plebanowicz, coordonator adjunct; Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Daria Bochnar, Jana Janeckova și Anzela Poliulianaite, auditori.
Michael Pyper provided linguistic support and Valérie Tempez-Erasmi provided secretarial assistance. 
Michael Pyper a furnizat sprijin lingvistic, iar Valérie Tempez-Erasmi a furnizat asistență în materie de secretariat.
From left to right: Ken-Marti Vaher, Judit Oroszki, Tomasz Plebanowicz, Juhan Parts, Michael Pyper, Daria Bochnar, Anzela Poliulianaite, Jana Janeckova, Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Valérie Tempez-Erasmi, Margus Kurm. 
De la stânga la dreapta: Ken-Marti Vaher, Judit Oroszki, Tomasz Plebanowicz, Juhan Parts, Michael Pyper, Daria Bochnar, Anzela Poliulianaite, Jana Janeckova, Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Valérie Tempez-Erasmi, Margus Kurm.
Event Date Adoption of Audit Planning Memorandum (APM) / Start of audit 4.4.2017 Official sending of draft report to Commission (or other auditee) 26.6.2018 Adoption of the final report after the adversarial procedure 14.11.2018 Commission’s (or other auditee’s) official replies received in all languages EN: 8.1.2019 PDF ISBN 978-92-847-1460-5 doi:10.2865/951680 QJ-AB-18-030-EN-N HTML ISBN 978-92-847-1466-7 doi:10.2865/057159 QJ-AB-18-030-EN-Q 
Etapă Data Adoptarea planului de audit / Demararea auditului 4.4.2017 Trimiterea oficială către Comisie (sau către o altă entitate auditată) a proiectului de raport 26.6.2018 Adoptarea raportului final după procedura contradictorie 14.11.2018 Primirea răspunsurilor Comisiei (sau ale altei entități auditate) în toate versiunile lingvistice EN: 8.1.2019 PDF ISBN 978-92-847-1444-5 doi:10.2865/087549 QJ-AB-18-030-RO-N HTML ISBN 978-92-847-1446-9 doi:10.2865/175100 QJ-AB-18-030-RO-Q
Protecting the EU’s financial interests against fraud is a key responsibility of the European Commission. 
Protejarea intereselor financiare ale UE împotriva fraudei este o responsabilitate esențială a Comisiei Europene.
The Commission ‘s own Directorates-General, Executive agencies and Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) work with a large number of other organisations, including authorities in the Member States and the future European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). 
Direcțiile generale ale Comisiei, agențiile executive și Oficiul de Luptă Antifraudă (OLAF) colaborează cu un număr mare de alte organizații, inclusiv autorități din statele membre și viitorul Parchet European (EPPO).
In this audit we assessed whether the Commission is properly managing the risk of fraudulent activities to the detriment of the EU budget. 
În cadrul acestui audit, Curtea a evaluat dacă Comisia gestionează în mod adecvat riscul de activități frauduloase care sunt în detrimentul bugetului UE.
We found that the Commission lacks comprehensive and comparable data on the detected fraud level in EU spending. 
Curtea a constatat că Comisia nu dispune de date cuprinzătoare și comparabile cu privire la nivelul fraudei detectate în legătură cu cheltuielile UE.
Moreover, it has so far not carried out any assessment of undetected fraud, nor detailed analysis of what causes economic actors to engage in fraudulent activities. 
Mai mult decât atât, până în prezent aceasta nu a efectuat nicio evaluare a fraudei nedetectate și nicio analiză detaliată a motivelor care îi determină pe operatorii economici să se angajeze în activități frauduloase.
This reduces the practical value and effectiveness of the Commission’s strategic plans for protecting the EU’s financial interests against fraud. 
Acest lucru reduce valoarea practică și eficacitatea planurilor strategice ale Comisiei privind protejarea intereselor financiare ale UE împotriva fraudei.
The current system, whereby OLAF’s administrative investigation of suspected fraud is followed by a criminal investigation at national level, takes up much time in a considerable number of cases and thus it decreases the chances to achieve prosecution. 
Sistemul actual, în care investigația administrativă a OLAF cu privire la o suspiciune de fraudă este urmată de o anchetă penală la nivel național, necesită mult timp într-un număr considerabil de cazuri și reduce astfel șansele începerii urmăririi penale.