natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The AIBN basis for this assertion is the gap between the tunnel’s safety equipment and emergency preparedness solution seen against traffic volume development and composition. 
SHT begrunner dette med gapet mellom tunnelens sikkerhetsutrustning og beredskapsløsning sett opp mot trafikkutviklingen og – sammensetningen.
The AIBN is of the opinion that this is connected to the Norwegian Public Roads Administration's riskbased approach to safety and deficient emergency preparedness in the tunnel. 
SHT mener at dette har sammenheng med at Statens vegvesens risikobaserte tilnærming til sikkerheten og beredskapen i tunnelen var mangelfull.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration develop its safety management system further as regards risk-based and pro-active principles to secure a satisfactory safety level for the Oslofjord tunnel and similar road tunnels. 
Statens havarikommisjon for transport tilrår at Statens vegvesen videreutvikler sitt sikkerhetsstyringssystem med hensyn på risikobaserte og proaktive prinsipper for å sikre et tilfredsstillende sikkerhetsnivå for Oslofjordtunnelen og tilsvarende veitunneler.
The investigation has shown that the maximum fire effect for lorry truck fires ranges from 50 to 150 MW, and that rescue efforts in long and steep single-lane tunnels pose great demands on firefighters and the safety equipment of the tunnel. 
Undersøkelsen har vist at maksimal branneffekt for vogntogbranner ligger i størrelsesorden 50 – 150 MW, samt at redningsinnsatsen i lange og bratte ettløpstunneler stiller store krav til brannmannskap og tunnelens sikkerhetsutrustning.
This, and not the dimensioning requirements for the tunnel class alone, should in the AIBN's opinion form the basis for required equipment and emergency preparedness in tunnels. 
Dette, og ikke dimensjoneringskravene for tunnelklassen alene, bør etter SHTs oppfatning være utgangspunktet for hva som kreves av utrustning og beredskap i tunneler.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, along with the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and the fire department, follows up and dimensions the rescue and firefighting effort to realistic fire effects and the specific design of the tunnel in question. 
Statens havarikommisjon for transport tilrår at Statens vegvesen, sammen med Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap og brannvesenet, følger opp og dimensjonerer rednings- og brannslukkingsinnsatsen etter reelle branneffekter og den særskilte tunnelens utforming.
Rv 23, The Oslofjord tunnel, Akershus 
Rv 23 Oslofjordtunnelen, Akershus
23.06.2011 
23.06.2011
The rear of the semi-trailer moved into the opposite lane, colliding with an oncoming passenger car. 
Bakre del av semitraileren kom over i motgående kjørefelt hvor den kolliderte med en møtende personbil.
The driver and the passenger in the passenger car were seriously injured. 
Føreren og passasjeren i personbilen ble alvorlig skadet.
AIBN's investigation of the accident found several faults with the breaking system. 
SHTs undersøkelse av ulykken påviste flere feil tilknyttet bremsesystemet på vogntoget.
Theese faults were, in the AIBN's assessment, contributing factors to the semi-trailer sliding into the opposing lane. 
Disse feilene bidro etter SHTs vurdering til at semitraileren skrenset over i motgående kjørefelt.
AIBN has made a safety recommendation as a result of the investigation. 
SHT fremmer en sikkerhetstilråding som følge av undersøkelsen.
This resulted in both the ABS and ALB system being disabled and contributed to the semi-trailer losing traction. 
Dette medførte at både ABS- og ALB-systemet ble satt ut av funksjon og bidro til at semitraileren fikk skrens.
There were no warnings on the driver's display panel which informed the driver of the real faults in the braking system, only information that the trailer did not have ABS brakes. 
Det var ingen varsler i førerdisplayet som informerte føreren om feilene med bremsesystemet, men kun informasjon om at tilhengeren ikke hadde ABS-bremser.
Based on this and previous investigations, the AIBN believes that such faults on trailers are safety-critical. 
Med bakgrunn i denne og tidligere undersøkelser mener SHT at slike feil på tilhengere er kritiske for sikkerheten.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration follow up the issues of lack of warning and loss of ABS and ALB capability in connection with loss of power/contact faults on trailers. 
Statens havarikommisjon for transport tilrår at Statens vegvesen følger opp problemstillingene med manglende varsling og bortfall av ABS- og ALB-funksjon ved strømbrudd/kontaktfeil på tilhengere.
Fv 115 Hjellebøl, Akershus 
Fv 115 Hjellebøl, Akershus
Romerike 
Romerike
Accident Investigation Board Norway has decided to conduct a safety investigation of the accident in the Raunekleiv tunnel on July 11, 2017 where a cyclist died when he was ran into /hit from behind by a passenger car inside the tunnel. 
Statens havarikommisjon for transport iverksetter undersøkelse av ulykke i Raunekleivtunnelen den 11. juli 2017 hvor en syklist omkom da han ble påkjørt bakfra av en personbil inne i tunnelen.
The accident occurred when an entourage of 12 Belgian cyclists were heading east towards Samnanger. 
Ulykken skjedde da et følge på 12 belgiske sykkelturister var på vei østover i retning Samnanger.
A passenger car was heading in the same direction and ran into one of the cyclists from behind, inside the Raunekleiv tunnel. 
En personbil som kjørte i samme retning kjørte inn i en av syklistene bakfra, inne i Raunekleivtunnelen.
He died of injuries he suffered in the collision. 
Han omkom av skadene han ble påført i sammenstøtet.
The investigation will focus on clarifying the sequence of events, as well as uncover why the accident happened. 
Undersøkelsen vil ha fokus på å avklare hendelsesforløpet, samt avdekke hvorfor dette skjedde.
Photo: the Norwegian Public Roads Administration 
Foto: Statens vegvesen
Latest update: 23.08.2017 
Sist oppdatert: 23.08.2017
Fv 7, Raunekleivtunnelen, Samnanger, Hordaland 
Fv 7, Raunekleivtunnelen, Samnanger, Hordaland
11.07.2017 
11.07.2017
Passenger car, Bicycle 
Personbil, Sykkel
Aviation - reports 
Luftfart - rapporter
Railway - reports 
Jernbane - rapporter
Road traffic - reports 
Veitrafikk - rapporter
Marine - reports 
Sjøfart - rapporter
ALL 
ALLE
Vennligst oppgi e-post 
Vennligst oppgi e-post
Ikke gyldig e-postadresse 
Ikke gyldig e-postadresse
My e-mail 
Min e-post
I no longer want to receive newsletter updates. 
Jeg ønsker ikke å motta flere nyhetsbrev.
Please remove me from all e-mail lists. 
Vennligst fjern meg fra alle e-postlister.
I wish to subscribe to e-mail notifications about the following pages: 
Jeg ønsker å abonnere på e-post om nytt på følgende sider:
At approximately 1410 hours, the car, first in a line of four, started veering over into the lane with oncoming traffic. 
Bussfører mistet muligheten til å styre bussen, og den kolliderte deretter med en mindre buss (minibuss).
A Volvo coach with a driver and 42 passengers on board were driving in the opposite direction. 
Det var i alt 57 personer involvert i ulykken, hvor 5 personer omkom og 5 ble alvorlig skadd.
The coach driver saw the car veering slowly into his lane and tried an evasive manoeuvre to the right, but the crash barrier on the right prevented this. 
SHT har gjennomført en undersøkelse av møteulykken som var representativ som ulykkestype og i tillegg til et stort skadeomfang også hadde ytterligere skadepotensial.
The car and the coach collided on the front left side, with an overlap of approx. 25 cm. 
Ulykken involverte både privat og yrkesrettet transport.
The coach’s steering was damaged in the collision, and it therefore veered over into the oncoming lane where it collided front to front with an oncoming minibus carrying a driver and six passengers. 
Det har ikke vært mulig å påvise eksakt årsak til at ulykken ble utløst, men undersøkelsen har satt fokus på viktige sikkerhetskritiske forhold knyttet til både vei, trafikant og kjøretøy.
None of the passengers noticed this. 
2012/05T
Lavangsdalen, Troms 
E8 Lavangsdalen, Troms fylke
07.01.2011 
07.01.2011
Passenger transport, Private transport 
Persontransport, Privat transport
The helicopter was about to land on a construction site and was approximately 2 m above the ground at low speed when the tail rotor hit a stack of concrete blocks. 
2 m over bakken og hadde lav hastighet, kom halerotoren i berøring med en stabel betongelementer.
Flatoy, Hordaland, Norway 
Flatøy, Meland i Hordaland
14.12.2014 
14.12.2014
Airbus Helicopter AS 350 B3 Ecureuil 
Airbus Helicopter AS 350 B3 Ecureuil
LN-OWE 
LN-OWE
ENOB (Bodø FIC/OFIR) 
ENOB (Bodø FIC/OFIR)
The shipping company Torghatten Nord AS had just deployed MF Røst in the Svolvær-Skutvik-Skrova ferry service. 
The shipping company Torghatten Nord AS had just deployed MF Røst in the Svolvær-Skutvik-Skrova ferry service.
The crew had been given a verbal message from the shipping company not to sail through Fyrsundet sound until further notice, as the aft mast was assumed to be too high for MF Røst to pass under the overhead high-voltage cables. 
The crew had been given a verbal message from the shipping company not to sail through Fyrsundet sound until further notice, as the aft mast was assumed to be too high for MF Røst to pass under the overhead high-voltage cables.
However, the captain and chief mate on duty at the time of the accident believed that it would be possible for MF Røst to pass under the cables. 
However, the captain and chief mate on duty at the time of the accident believed that it would be possible for MF Røst to pass under the cables.
On 18 May 2013, they therefore intended to verify the distance between the vessel's aft mast and the overhead cables. 
On 18 May 2013, they therefore intended to verify the distance between the vessel's aft mast and the overhead cables.
The nautical charts showed a safe vertical clearance of 20 metres, while the signs ashore showed 22 metres. 
The nautical charts showed a safe vertical clearance of 20 metres, while the signs ashore showed 22 metres.
The shipboard management had measured the vessel's air draught to be 20.7 metres from the waterline to the top of the aft mast. 
The shipboard management had measured the vessel's air draught to be 20.7 metres from the waterline to the top of the aft mast.
On reaching Fyrsundet, the chief mate climbed into the fore mast, that was slightly lower than the aft mast, to observe the passage and to check the margin between the mast and the cables using a fishing rod that he had taken with him. 
On reaching Fyrsundet, the chief mate climbed into the fore mast, that was slightly lower than the aft mast, to observe the passage and to check the margin between the mast and the cables using a fishing rod that he had taken with him.
However, as the vessel passed under the last of the three high-voltage cables, the fishing rod came in contact with high-voltage, the chief mate received an electric shock and died as a consequence of falling down from the fore mast. 
However, as the vessel passed under the last of the three high-voltage cables, the fishing rod came in contact with high-voltage, the chief mate received an electric shock and died as a consequence of falling down from the fore mast.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway proposes four safety recommendations as a result of the investigation. 
The Accident Investigation Board Norway proposes four safety recommendations as a result of the investigation.
Safety recommendation MARINE No 2014/08T 
2014/08T
One consequence of this may be that seafarers challenge the shown safe vertical clearance and by this comes into the danger zone from high voltage. 
En konsekvens av dette kan være at sjøfarende utfordrer angitt friseilingshøyde og kommer inn i faresonen rundt høyspentledninger.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the International Chamber of Shipping incorporate into its Bridge Procedures Guide practical and relevant advice on height limitations in general, about the safety margin and the safe vertical clearance under power cables that carry high voltage. 
Statens havarikommisjon for transport tilrår at International Chamber of Shipping i sin publikasjon Bridge Procedures Guide tar inn praktiske og relevante råd om høydebegrensinger generelt, om sikkerhetsmargin og friseilinghøyde under luftspenn som fører høyspenning.
Safety recommendation MARINE No 2014/07T 
2014/07T
The investigation of the accident on board MF Røst on 18 May 2013 has shown that national nautical guidelines urge seafarers to exercise caution when navigating near power lines, but contain no information about the safety margin that is taken into consideration for the safe vertical clearances shown in the charts and on signs ashore when high voltage is involved. 
Undersøkelsen av ulykken om bord i MF Røst 18. mai 2013 har vist at nasjonal nautisk veiledning henstiller sjøfarende til forsiktighet ved navigering nær kraftledninger, men opplyser ikke om sikkerhetsmarginen som er tatt hensyn til ved høyspent i friseilingshøyden angitt i kart og på skilt.
One consequence of this may be that seafarers challenge the shown safe vertical clearance and by this comes into the danger zone from high voltage. 
En konsekvens av dette kan være at sjøfarende utfordrer angitt friseilingshøyde og på grunn av dette kommer inn i faresonen rundt høyspentledninger.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends the Norwegian Hydrographic Service to clarify in relevant publications about the national requirements that applies for the safety margin that is taken into consideration when stating the safe vertical clearance under power cables that carry high voltage. 
Statens havarikommisjon for transport tilrår Statens kartverk Sjø å tydeliggjøre i egnede publikasjoner hva som gjelder av nasjonale krav til sikkerhetsmargin for angivelsen av friseilinghøyden under luftspenn som fører høyspenning.
Safety recommendation MARINE No 2014/06T 
2014/06T
The investigation of the accident on board MF Røst on 18 May 2013 has shown that there was justified uncertainty about the safe vertical clearance in the sound. 
Undersøkelsen av ulykken om bord i MF Røst 18. mai 2013 har vist at det var en usikkerhet om hva som var friseilingshøyden i sundet.
Differences have been found between the safe vertical clearance shown in the charts and the figure shown on the signs ashore. 
Det er funnet forskjeller i høydeangivelse av luftspennet i kartet sammenlignet med skiltene i land.
In addition the actual signs were unclear about safety margins in relation to high voltage. 
De aktuelle skiltene var dessuten uklare om sikkerhetsmarginer ved høyspenning.
Further, the investigation has shown that the power cables in 2013 were lower than the last recorded modification. 
Videre har undersøkelsen avdekket at kraftlinjen i 2013 var lavere enn ved siste oppgitte modifisering.
The consequence of this is that seafarers cannot with certainty know what the correct safe vertical clearance is. 
Konsekvensene av dette er at sjøfarende ikke med sikkerhet kan vite hva som er riktig friseilingshøyde.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Coastal Administration take steps to ensure that the correct safe vertical clearances are unambiguously communicated so that they are clear to seafarers. 
Statens havarikommisjon for transport tilrår at Kystverket gjennomfører tiltak slik at riktige friseilingshøyder blir kommunisert entydig og fremstår tydelig for sjøfarende.
Safety recommendation MARINE No 2014/05T 
2014/05T
The investigation of the accident on board MF Røst on 18 May 2013 has shown that no risk assessment was available for MF Røst in the new service at the time of the accident and that the communication of safety-critical information, concerning the limitations in the service, was inadequate. 
Undersøkelsen av ulykken om bord i MF Røst 18. mai 2013 har vist at det ikke var gjennomført en risikovurdering for MF Røst i nytt samband på ulykkestidspunktet og at formidlingen av sikkerhetskritisk informasjon om begrensinger i sambandet var mangelfull.
The consequence of this was that the crew on board MF Røst ignored the instructions given by the shipping company. 
Konsekvensen av dette var at besetningen om bord i MF Røst ignorerte de instruksene som ble gitt av rederiet.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that Torghatten Nord AS review and improve its internal procedures for communication between the shipping company and vessels, as well as the procedures for carrying out risk assessments before starting to operate a new service or a new vessel. 
Statens havarikommisjon for transport tilrår at Torghatten Nord AS gjennomgår og forbedrer sine interne rutiner for kommunikasjon mellom rederi og fartøy, samt rutiner for gjennomføring av risikovurderinger før oppstart av et nytt rutesamband eller nytt fartøy.
Skrova, Vågan, Nordland 
Skrova, Vågan, Nordland
18.05.2013 
18.05.2013
Personal injury 
Personskade
Norwegian Territorial Waters 
Norsk territorialfarvann
9035709 
9035709
MF Røst 
MF Røst
Accident type 
Type hendelse
Fatal Accident, Fall on board 
Dødsulykke, Fall om bord
Vessel type 
Type fartøy
Passenger Ship - Ferry 
5 - Passasjerskip-ferjer
The Norwegian Ship Register 
NOR
LN-BEM started on 17 June 2017 from Sola seaplane harbour with the commander and two passengers onboard. 
LN-BEM startet 17. juni 2017 fra Sola sjø med fartøysjefen og to passasjerer om bord.
The seaplane had just become airborne after a stop at Lake Frøylandsvatnet when engine power was lost. 
Sjøflyet hadde nettopp tatt av etter en mellomlanding på Frøylandsvatnet da motorkraften forsvant.
The commander performed an emergency landing at the south end of the lake. 
Fartøysjefen gjennomførte en nødlanding i sør-enden av vannet.
The aeroplane continued ashore and tipped over on its back. 
Flyet fortsatte inn på land og tippet over på ryggen.
None of the three occupants received any injuries, while the aeroplane was significantly damaged. 
Ingen av de tre ombordværende ble skadet, mens flyet ble betydelig skadd.
Preliminary examination of the aeroplane has revealed that a hole has appeared in the crankcase. 
Foreløpige undersøkelser av flyet viser at det er slått hull i veivkassen.
The engine will be disassemblied for further examinations. 
Motoren vil bli demontert og undersøkt nærmere.
Latest update: 27.07.2017 
Sist oppdatert: 27.07.2017
Lake Frøylandsvannet in Bryne municipality in Rogaland county / Norway 
Ved Frøylandsvannet i Bryne i Rogaland
17.06.2017 
17.06.2017
Cessna 206 Stationair 
Cessna 206 Stationair
LN-BEM 
LN-BEM
The object resembled a radio controlled aircraft and was seen by the commander and several of the parachutists on board. 
Objektet lignet et fjernstyrt fly og ble sett av fartøysjefen og flere av fallskjermhopperne om bord.
The incident happened at about 4,800 feet altitude in controlled airspace (Farris TMA). 
Hendelsen skjedde i ca 4 800 fot høyde i kontrollert luftrom (Farris TMA).
The commander elected to continue the climb after he had lost visual contact with the object. 
Fartøysjefen valgte å fortsette utklatringen etter at han hadde mistet visuell kontakt med objektet.
Farris TMA, 5 NM south of Skien airport Geiteryggen (ENSN) 
Farris TMA, 5NM syd av Skien lufthavn Geiteryggen (ENSN)
28.05.2014 
28.05.2014
Cessna øvrige/ RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aircraft System) 
Cessna øvrige/ Drone
LN-PER 
LN-PER
Air traffic incident 
Lufttrafikkhendelse
Private (club)/ Private 
Privat (klubb)/ Privat
Light, aeroplane (< 5 700kg)/ Light, aeroplane (< 5 700kg) 
Lett, fly (< 5 700kg)/ Lett, fly (< 5 700kg)
Landplane, Single-engine, Turboprop/turboshaft 
Landfly, Single-engine, Turboprop/turboshaft
Hard landing with right main gear collaps. 
Hard landing med påfølgende kollaps av høyre hovedunderstell.
Landing in difficult wind conditions caused a hard landing and right main gear collaps as a consequence of overload on the "Fuse Pin". 
Landing under krevende vindforhold medførte hard landing og kollaps i høyre hovedunderstell som følge av overbelastning i "Fuse Pin".
Major damage in the wheel well area, right propeller and underneath the aircraft fuselage. 
Betydelige skader i hjulbrønnområde, høyre propell og flyets buk.
Sandnessjøen airport Stokka, Norway (ENST) 
Sandessjøen lufthavn Stokka (ENST)
15.09.2010 
15.09.2010
ENST 
ENST
DeHavilland DHC-8 
DeHavilland DHC-8
LN-WIF 
LN-WIF
None of the three on board were injured, but the main landing gear, its attachment and the propeller was substantially damaged. 
Ingen av de tre om bord ble skadet, men hovedunderstellet med innfesting og propellen ble betydelig skadet.
Elverum airfield Starmoen, Norway (ENSM) 
Elverum flyplass Starmoen (ENSM)
20.06.2015 
20.06.2015
ENSM 
ENSM
LN-WNM 
LN-WNM
Shortly after airborne from the airfield 10 July 2015, the airplane pitched down and the pilot in command was unable to prevent the airplane from hitting the runway. 
Like etter avgang fra grusbanen 10. juli 2015 løftet venstre vinge og hale seg brått.
The landing was firm and the aircraft immediately skidded to the right and came to rest approximately 9 meters from the runway edge. 
Fartøysjefen klarte ikke å hindre at flyet ble presset ned mot grusbanen.
The pilot in command was not injured while the aircraft received damage to the propeller and nose landing gear. 
Landingen ble hard og flyet skar umiddelbart ut til høyre og kom til ro ca.
This report is in Norwegian only. 
9 meter fra rullebanekanten.
Private airfield, Villmobakken, Vannøya at Troms county, Norway 
Privat flystripe, Villmobakken, Vannøya i Troms
Cessna 172 Skyhawk 
Cessna 172 Skyhawk
SE-FBT 
SE-FBT
On 21 September 2015 the helicopter should conduct a flight with an underslung sensor probe on behalf of NGU (Geological Survey of Norway). 
21. september 2015 skulle det gjennomføres en flyging med underhengende sonde på oppdrag fra NGU (Norges Geologiske Undersøkelse).
The probe was hanging approximately 30 meters below the helicopter. 
Denne sonden hang ca 30 meter under helikopteret.
The helicopter was not exposed to any damages. 
Det oppstod ingen skade på helikopteret.
AIBN has in its investigation found that the commander had a very high workload during the flight due to large differences in terrain elevation. 
Havarikommisjonen har i sin undersøkelse funnet at fartøysjefen hadde meget høy arbeidsbelastning under flygingen på grunn av terreng med store høydeforskjeller.
The flight was challenging due to the fact that the height above the terrain should be within certain criterias, and that the helicopter should follow a predefined track with high precision. 
Flygingen var utfordrende ved at høyde over terreng skulle være innenfor gitte kriteria, og helikopteret skulle følge en forhåndsdefinert trase med en stor grad av nøyaktighet.
AIBN is of the opinion that these elements have been contributing factors causing the helicopter to come too close to the power line. 
Dette mener havarikommisjonen har vært bidragsytende faktorer til at helikopteret kom for nærme kraftlinjen.
Lagovaggi, Nordland county, Norway 
Lagovaggi, Nordland fylke
21.09.2015 
21.09.2015
LN-OGL 
LN-OGL
During landing the Cessna bounced and hit the runway hard, causing the nose landing gear leg to collapse. 
Under landing gjorde flyet et hopp og traff deretter rullebanen så hardt med nesehjulet at leggen knakk.
Subsequently, the propeller contacted the runway. 
Propellen kom så i kontakt med rullebanen.
The commander, the only person on board, was not injured. 
Fartøysjefen, som var alene om bord, ble ikke skadet.
The aircraft became extensively structurally damaged. 
Flyet fikk omfattende strukturskader.
Rakkestad Airfield, Norway (ENRK) 
Rakkestad flyplass Åstorp (ENRK)
ENRK 
ENRK
Cessna 177 Cardinal 
Cessna 177 Cardinal
LN-TST 
LN-TST
The commander was about to start the engine when he realized that the battery voltage was too low. 
Fartøysjefen skulle starte motoren da han oppdaget at det var for lite spenning på batteriet.
He therefore decided to hand start the engine by turning the propeller. 
Han valgte derfor å håndstarte motoren alene ved hjelp av propellsving.