natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Norges Bank's results consist primarily of interest and any net exchange gains or losses on foreign exchange reserves. 
Norges Banks resultat består i hovedsak av renter og eventuelle netto kursgevinster/tap fra valutareserven.
Exchange and capital gains are derived from exchange rate fluctuations, changes in equity prices and interest rate changes that affect bond prices. 
Kursgevinstene har sitt opphav i valutakursendringer, aksjekursendringer og renteendringer som påvirker obligasjonskursene.
Norges Bank's results will depend on developments in these variables, which may cause wide annual fluctuations in the Bank's results. 
Norges Banks resultat vil avhenge av utviklingen i disse størrelsene, og det kan gi store årlige svingninger i resultatet.
The rise in prices in international securities markets in 2003 resulted in a gain of NOK 4.2 billion, compared with a loss of NOK 2.6 billion in 2002. 
Kursoppgangen i de internasjonale verdipapirmarkedene i 2003 har medført en gevinst på 4,2 milliarder kroner mot et kurstap året før på 2,6 milliarder kroner.
Due to the depreciation of the Norwegian krone, foreign exchange reserves translated into NOK showed exchange gains totalling NOK 12.3 billion in 2003, compared with exchange losses of NOK 24.3 billion in 2002. 
Svekkelsen av den norske kronen har medført at valutabeholdningen omregnet til norske kroner viser kursgevinst på i alt 12,3 milliarder kroner i 2003, mot kurstap på 24,3 milliarder kroner i 2002.
The exchange gains due to the depreciation of the krone have no effect on the international purchasing power of the foreign exchange reserves. 
Kursgevinst som skyldes svekket kronekurs har ikke betydning for valutareservenes internasjonale kjøpekraft.
At the end of 2003, Norges Bank's international reserves amounted to NOK 202.0 billion at market value and taking into account repurchasing agreements and deposits. 
Ved utgangen av 2003 utgjorde de internasjonale reserver, hensyntatt gjenkjøpsavtaler og innlån, 202,0 milliarder kroner målt etter markedsverdi.
This is NOK 31.5 billion more than at end-2002. 
Dette er 31,5 milliarder kroner mer enn ved utgangen av 2002.
International reserves comprise foreign exchange reserves, gold and claims on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
De internasjonale reserver består av valutareserver, gull og fordringer på Det internasjonale valutafondet (IMF).
From end-2002 to end-2003, foreign exchange reserves increased by NOK 31.3 billion to NOK 189.1 billion. 
Valutareservene økte med 31,3 milliarder kroner fra utgangen av 2002 til utgangen av 2003 og utgjorde ved årets utgang 189,1 milliarder kroner.
The increase was mainly due to a positive return of NOK 22.8 billion in 2003. 
Økningen skyldes i hovedsak positiv avkastning på 22,8 milliarder kroner i 2003.
In addition, total foreign exchange transfers from the SDFI, the State's Direct Financial Interest in petroleum activities, and purchases of foreign exchange in the market to build up the Government Petroleum Fund were larger than the total amount transferred to the Petroleum Fund for 2003. 
Videre var de samlede overføringer i valuta fra SDØE og løpende kjøp av valuta i markedet til oppbygging av Petroleumsfondet større enn det totale beløp som ble overført til Petroleumsfondet for 2003.
As a result of the year's allocations, the Adjustment Fund amounts to NOK 41.9 billion. 
Etter resultatdisponering utgjør kursreguleringsfondet 41,9 milliarder kroner.
As there are no funds in the Transfer Fund, no transfer will be made to the Treasury. 
Det er ikke midler i overføringsfondet, og det blir derfor ikke gjort overføring til statskassen.
The financial crisis has illustrated the shortcomings of the current crisis management frameworks in Europe. 
The financial crisis has illustrated the shortcomings of the current crisis management frameworks in Europe.
Since all EU banking legislation is implemented in full in Norway as an EEA member state, Norges Bank has the following comments on the Communication. 
Since all EU banking legislation is implemented in full in Norway as an EEA member state, Norges Bank has the following comments on the Communication.
General observations 
General observations
We welcome the broad approach adopted by the Commission to crisis management policy. 
We welcome the broad approach adopted by the Commission to crisis management policy.
We realised during the recent crisis the importance of vital banking services for the public and this has implications for our future systemic risk assessments. 
We realised during the recent crisis the importance of vital banking services for the public and this has implications for our future systemic risk assessments.
We strongly support crisis management policies that hold shareholders, managers and, where appropriate, other creditors accountable while protecting depositors. 
We strongly support crisis management policies that hold shareholders, managers and, where appropriate, other creditors accountable while protecting depositors.
We support a stronger role for innovative capital and crisis intervention tools without public financial support; this will at the same time minimize the need for burden sharing among national fiscal authorities in Europe. 
We support a stronger role for innovative capital and crisis intervention tools without public financial support; this will at the same time minimize the need for burden sharing among national fiscal authorities in Europe.
Specific comments 
Specific comments
EARLY INTERVENTION 
EARLY INTERVENTION
Early intervention tools 
Early intervention tools
Which additional tools should supervisors have in order to address developing problems? 
Which additional tools should supervisors have in order to address developing problems?
How should their use be triggered? 
How should their use be triggered?
How important are wind-down plans ("living wills") as a tool for crisis management? 
How important are wind-down plans ("living wills") as a tool for crisis management?
The current crisis has highlighted the importance of early intervention: Prevention is better than resolution. 
The current crisis has highlighted the importance of early intervention: Prevention is better than resolution.
However, intervention powers and tools differ significantly among EU countries, as documented by CEBS. 
However, intervention powers and tools differ significantly among EU countries, as documented by CEBS.
In addition, widely different national practices on regulatory adjustments to capital complicate convergence on trigger points for intervention. 
In addition, widely different national practices on regulatory adjustments to capital complicate convergence on trigger points for intervention.
Despite this difficulty, it is important to work towards a common minimum set of early intervention tools among all EU countries. 
Despite this difficulty, it is important to work towards a common minimum set of early intervention tools among all EU countries.
A common set of intervention tools should be available to all EEA supervisors at certain predefined stages of early stress, and these tools should if required be applicable without shareholder consent. 
A common set of intervention tools should be available to all EEA supervisors at certain predefined stages of early stress, and these tools should if required be applicable without shareholder consent.
The new Basel proposal for a “capital conservation rule” could be a starting point for developing such early intervention triggers in the EU. [1] 
The new Basel proposal for a “capital conservation rule” could be a starting point for developing such early intervention triggers in the EU. [1]
If implemented, this will introduce some elements of “prompt corrective action” in the European crisis management system, while preserving supervisory discretionary powers. 
If implemented, this will introduce some elements of “prompt corrective action” in the European crisis management system, while preserving supervisory discretionary powers.
“Living wills” are, in our view, also an essential element of the new EU crisis management framework. 
“Living wills” are, in our view, also an essential element of the new EU crisis management framework.
All cross-border banks should be required to have one in place, not only the largest ones. 
All cross-border banks should be required to have one in place, not only the largest ones.
That way, one would also avoid having to decide which cross-border banks are large (systemic) and which are not. 
That way, one would also avoid having to decide which cross-border banks are large (systemic) and which are not.
For small banks with uncomplicated structures setting up a living will involve minor costs. 
For small banks with uncomplicated structures setting up a living will involve minor costs.
Living wills would be an important part of a “cross-border license” for banks, covering issues such as legal structures, IT infrastructure, and capital and liquidity buffers. 
Living wills would be an important part of a “cross-border license” for banks, covering issues such as legal structures, IT infrastructure, and capital and liquidity buffers.
The Financial Stability Board has recently pointed out that such contingency plans for banks actually need two distinct components. 
The Financial Stability Board has recently pointed out that such contingency plans for banks actually need two distinct components.
These two should be developed and discussed proactively with senior management of all cross-border banks. 
These two should be developed and discussed proactively with senior management of all cross-border banks.
In Norway, we have for long favored a holding company approach to financial institutions and as a result most of our financial groups have fairly transparent organisational structures. 
In Norway, we have for long favored a holding company approach to financial institutions and as a result most of our financial groups have fairly transparent organisational structures.
Intra-group asset transfers 
Intra-group asset transfers
Is the development of a framework for asset transfer feasible? 
Is the development of a framework for asset transfer feasible?
If so, what challenges would need to be addressed? 
If so, what challenges would need to be addressed?
What safeguards for shareholders and creditors are needed? 
What safeguards for shareholders and creditors are needed?
This is a particularly contentious issue for cross-border banking groups with business like organisations. 
This is a particularly contentious issue for cross-border banking groups with business like organisations.
Sorting out the responsibilities for such cross-border EU groups is therefore a precondition for any new framework for asset transfers. 
Sorting out the responsibilities for such cross-border EU groups is therefore a precondition for any new framework for asset transfers.
The Communication (and the staff paper) suggest that asset transfers could be acceptable prior to insolvency and outside of resolution under certain circumstances. 
The Communication (and the staff paper) suggest that asset transfers could be acceptable prior to insolvency and outside of resolution under certain circumstances.
It notes that asset transfers on commercial terms takes place within all banking groups as part of their regular liquidity management. 
It notes that asset transfers on commercial terms takes place within all banking groups as part of their regular liquidity management.
This could prevent intra-group asset transfers that might be in the best interest of the banking group. 
This could prevent intra-group asset transfers that might be in the best interest of the banking group.
As the Communication suggests, a possible solution could be stronger “group assurances” from the parent bank (and home authorities) as a pre-condition for such asset transfers. 
As the Communication suggests, a possible solution could be stronger “group assurances” from the parent bank (and home authorities) as a pre-condition for such asset transfers.
The alternative would be a transformation of the group to either a branch-based or a real subsidiary-based structure (see section on burden sharing below for further comments on the concept of “group support”). 
The alternative would be a transformation of the group to either a branch-based or a real subsidiary-based structure (see section on burden sharing below for further comments on the concept of “group support”).
BANK RESOLUTION 
BANK RESOLUTION
Why is EU action on bank resolution needed? 
Why is EU action on bank resolution needed?
What should be the key objectives and priorities for an EU bank resolution framework? 
What should be the key objectives and priorities for an EU bank resolution framework?
The recent crisis exposed the EU’s lack of an effective resolution framework, despite the recently agreed Memorandum of Understanding on crisis management. 
The recent crisis exposed the EU’s lack of an effective resolution framework, despite the recently agreed Memorandum of Understanding on crisis management.
To achieve a common banking market the EU needs a common framework for cross-border crisis management. 
To achieve a common banking market the EU needs a common framework for cross-border crisis management.
If private sector participants know that the tool kit is not suited for time critical interventions; they will expect to be bailed out and gamble for resurrection when facing difficulties. 
If private sector participants know that the tool kit is not suited for time critical interventions; they will expect to be bailed out and gamble for resurrection when facing difficulties.
Action is therefore needed on three fronts: 
Action is therefore needed on three fronts:
Improve insolvency regimes in all EU states to enable quick closure of small failing banks (not necessarily full harmonization) 
Improve insolvency regimes in all EU states to enable quick closure of small failing banks (not necessarily full harmonization)
Establish more robust resolution regimes for larger (predominantly national) banks and cross-border banks with branch structures. 
Establish more robust resolution regimes for larger (predominantly national) banks and cross-border banks with branch structures.
Add a new crisis management framework specifically for cross border banking groups with subsidiary structures. 
Add a new crisis management framework specifically for cross border banking groups with subsidiary structures.
What resolution tools are needed? 
What resolution tools are needed?
What are the key tools for an EU resolution regime? 
What are the key tools for an EU resolution regime?
All EEA authorities should as a minimum have a resolution toolkit available to 
All EEA authorities should as a minimum have a resolution toolkit available to
split and transfer assets, 
split and transfer assets,
establish a bridge bank to secure essential banking services, 
establish a bridge bank to secure essential banking services,
seize and run a bank (temporary public ownership). 
seize and run a bank (temporary public ownership).
Specifically, authorities need to be able to impose these resolution measures without shareholder approval. 
Specifically, authorities need to be able to impose these resolution measures without shareholder approval.
It is in this regard important to determine which legal changes are required to enable resolved banks to continue vital operations. [3] 
It is in this regard important to determine which legal changes are required to enable resolved banks to continue vital operations. [3]
Threshold conditions and timing for use of tools 
Threshold conditions and timing for use of tools
What are the appropriate thresholds for the use of resolution tools? 
What are the appropriate thresholds for the use of resolution tools?
Resolution tools can be activated either based on a discretionary judgment (UK FSA threshold conditions) or based on hard (solvency) triggers (US FDIC). 
Resolution tools can be activated either based on a discretionary judgment (UK FSA threshold conditions) or based on hard (solvency) triggers (US FDIC).
A resolution system based exclusively on solvency levels as triggers may not be sufficiently robust to valuation issues in a crisis. 
A resolution system based exclusively on solvency levels as triggers may not be sufficiently robust to valuation issues in a crisis.
However, the system should also include some clear minimum thresholds leading to prompt resolution well before the bank is balance sheet insolvent. [4] 
However, the system should also include some clear minimum thresholds leading to prompt resolution well before the bank is balance sheet insolvent. [4]
In Norway, authorities were given strong intervention powers after the banking crisis in the early 90s, including the power to write down share capital and subordinated loans on a going concern basis. 
In Norway, authorities were given strong intervention powers after the banking crisis in the early 90s, including the power to write down share capital and subordinated loans on a going concern basis.
An additional problem area exposed by the current crisis is the widely divergent parameters used by certain IRB banks for similar credit categories. 
An additional problem area exposed by the current crisis is the widely divergent parameters used by certain IRB banks for similar credit categories.
A first step could be to clarify national differences in the EU, and then to look for common approaches to intervention within existing legal mandates. 
A first step could be to clarify national differences in the EU, and then to look for common approaches to intervention within existing legal mandates.
Thereafter, new legal tools could be implemented by those authorities with weak tool kits. 
Thereafter, new legal tools could be implemented by those authorities with weak tool kits.
The proposed BCBS measures on international standards for capital levels and quality should in any case facilitate a more consistent approach to resolution measures. [5] 
The proposed BCBS measures on international standards for capital levels and quality should in any case facilitate a more consistent approach to resolution measures. [5]
Similar intervention threshold may also facilitate coordinated crisis intervention in cross-border banking groups. 
Similar intervention threshold may also facilitate coordinated crisis intervention in cross-border banking groups.
Given the uncertainties regarding the crisis management framework for cross border banks, intervention thresholds should ideally kick in earlier for these banks than for pure domestic banks. 
Given the uncertainties regarding the crisis management framework for cross border banks, intervention thresholds should ideally kick in earlier for these banks than for pure domestic banks.
They should also be required to hold ample buffers commensurate with the increased risk related to such groups. 
They should also be required to hold ample buffers commensurate with the increased risk related to such groups.
Scope of the bank resolution framework 
Scope of the bank resolution framework
What should be the scope of an EU resolution framework? 
What should be the scope of an EU resolution framework?
Should it only focus on deposit-taking banks (as opposed to any other regulated financial institution)? 
Should it only focus on deposit-taking banks (as opposed to any other regulated financial institution)?
If so, should it apply only to cross-border banking groups or should it also encompass single entities which only operate cross-border through branches? 
If so, should it apply only to cross-border banking groups or should it also encompass single entities which only operate cross-border through branches?
Full harmonization of national resolution and insolvency laws will probably not be feasible in the short run, even though all national insolvency laws should be required to incorporate certain key minimum features. 
Full harmonization of national resolution and insolvency laws will probably not be feasible in the short run, even though all national insolvency laws should be required to incorporate certain key minimum features.
We do not favour a special crisis management framework for (only) systemic banks. 
We do not favour a special crisis management framework for (only) systemic banks.
Stakeholders' rights in bank resolution procedures 
Stakeholders' rights in bank resolution procedures
What appropriate safeguards, review or compensation mechanisms for shareholders, creditors and counterparties would be appropriate? 
What appropriate safeguards, review or compensation mechanisms for shareholders, creditors and counterparties would be appropriate?
Adjustments need to be made to relevant EU legislation to enable authorities to implement the new resolution regime, while at the same time preserving shareholders rights (according the ECHR). 
Adjustments need to be made to relevant EU legislation to enable authorities to implement the new resolution regime, while at the same time preserving shareholders rights (according the ECHR).
Application of resolution measures to a banking group 
Application of resolution measures to a banking group
How can cooperation and communication between authorities and administrators responsible for the resolution and insolvency of a cross border banking group be improved? 
How can cooperation and communication between authorities and administrators responsible for the resolution and insolvency of a cross border banking group be improved?
Is integrated resolution through a European Resolution Authority for banking groups desirable and feasible? 
Is integrated resolution through a European Resolution Authority for banking groups desirable and feasible?
If this option is not considered feasible, what minimum national resolution measures for a cross-border banking group are necessary? 
If this option is not considered feasible, what minimum national resolution measures for a cross-border banking group are necessary?
Crisis coordination between national authorities will be greatly facilitated if all EU countries have a common minimum tool kit in place. 
Crisis coordination between national authorities will be greatly facilitated if all EU countries have a common minimum tool kit in place.
Large cross-border banking groups with business line organization, but with legal subsidiary structure, pose a special challenge for crisis resolution, as noted in the Communication. 
Large cross-border banking groups with business line organization, but with legal subsidiary structure, pose a special challenge for crisis resolution, as noted in the Communication.
Clarifying the responsibilities for cross-border banking groups with business line organization is in our view key to further progress on cross-border crisis resolution in the EU. 
Clarifying the responsibilities for cross-border banking groups with business line organization is in our view key to further progress on cross-border crisis resolution in the EU.
Financing a cross-border resolution 
Financing a cross-border resolution
What is the most appropriate way to secure cross-border funding for bank resolution measures? 
What is the most appropriate way to secure cross-border funding for bank resolution measures?
What role is there for specific private sector funding? 
What role is there for specific private sector funding?
Is establishing ex-ante crisis funding arrangements practical? 
Is establishing ex-ante crisis funding arrangements practical?
If not, how could private sector solutions best address the issue? 
If not, how could private sector solutions best address the issue?
Is there scope to achieve greater clarity on burden sharing? 
Is there scope to achieve greater clarity on burden sharing?
If so, would the first priority be to define principles for burden sharing? 
If so, would the first priority be to define principles for burden sharing?
This goes beyond simply writing down shareholder capital and removing management of failing institutions. 
This goes beyond simply writing down shareholder capital and removing management of failing institutions.
Deposit insurance schemes should also be allowed to contribute to such private based crisis resolutions. 
Deposit insurance schemes should also be allowed to contribute to such private based crisis resolutions.