natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The report provides, in our view, a balanced review of the challenges involved in resolving cross-border banking problems. 
The report provides, in our view, a balanced review of the challenges involved in resolving cross-border banking problems.
This involves a search for pragmatic bank resolution systems that hold shareholders, managers and, where appropriate, other creditors accountable while protecting depositors and if necessary preserving continued access to critical banking services. 
This involves a search for pragmatic bank resolution systems that hold shareholders, managers and, where appropriate, other creditors accountable while protecting depositors and if necessary preserving continued access to critical banking services.
This would greatly enhance market discipline and limit moral hazard. 
This would greatly enhance market discipline and limit moral hazard.
As to the 10 recommendations we have the following specific comments. 
As to the 10 recommendations we have the following specific comments.
Recommendation 1: Effective national resolution powers. 
Recommendation 1: Effective national resolution powers.
The report correctly observes that the crisis resolution options for the authorities are severely limited if the existing tool kit has not been adequately updated. 
The report correctly observes that the crisis resolution options for the authorities are severely limited if the existing tool kit has not been adequately updated.
If private sector participants know that the tool kit is not suited for time critical interventions; they might expect to be bailed out and gamble for resurrection when facing difficulties. 
If private sector participants know that the tool kit is not suited for time critical interventions; they might expect to be bailed out and gamble for resurrection when facing difficulties.
There is also a need for greater clarity about the intervention points for early intervention. 
There is also a need for greater clarity about the intervention points for early intervention.
This is particularly important in cross border banks given the uncertainties regarding the crisis management framework for these banks. 
This is particularly important in cross border banks given the uncertainties regarding the crisis management framework for these banks.
Currently, many supervisors would intervene if regulatory capital falls below 8 %, while others will not have the legal capacity to intervene before the bank is balance sheet insolvent. 
Currently, many supervisors would intervene if regulatory capital falls below 8 %, while others will not have the legal capacity to intervene before the bank is balance sheet insolvent.
This regulatory limbo is detrimental to any coordinated crisis resolution and should be addressed as a matter of priority. 
This regulatory limbo is detrimental to any coordinated crisis resolution and should be addressed as a matter of priority.
A first step could be to clarify national differences; then to look for common approaches to intervention within existing legal mandates. 
A first step could be to clarify national differences; then to look for common approaches to intervention within existing legal mandates.
Finally, new legal tools should be explored for those authorities with weak tool kits. 
Finally, new legal tools should be explored for those authorities with weak tool kits.
Recommendation 2: Framework for coordinated resolution of financial groups. 
Recommendation 2: Framework for coordinated resolution of financial groups.
Each jurisdiction should establish a national framework to coordinate the resolution of the legal entities of financial groups and financial conglomerates within its jurisdiction. 
Each jurisdiction should establish a national framework to coordinate the resolution of the legal entities of financial groups and financial conglomerates within its jurisdiction.
Crisis resolution in Norway is facilitated by having an integrated supervisory agency. 
Crisis resolution in Norway is facilitated by having an integrated supervisory agency.
In addition, the Domestic Standing Committee between representatives from the central bank, supervisory authority and the Ministry of Finance has the potential for being a vehicle for crisis coordination. 
In addition, the Domestic Standing Committee between representatives from the central bank, supervisory authority and the Ministry of Finance has the potential for being a vehicle for crisis coordination.
Recommendation 3: Convergence of national resolution measures. 
Recommendation 3: Convergence of national resolution measures.
National authorities should seek convergence of national resolution tools and measures toward those identified in Recommendations 1 and 2 in order to facilitate the coordinated resolution of financial institutions active in multiple jurisdictions. 
National authorities should seek convergence of national resolution tools and measures toward those identified in Recommendations 1 and 2 in order to facilitate the coordinated resolution of financial institutions active in multiple jurisdictions.
There are inherent conflicting interests of the home and host countries in cross border banking crisis. 
There are inherent conflicting interests of the home and host countries in cross border banking crisis.
These could be increased by differences in national banking crisis resolution regimes. 
These could be increased by differences in national banking crisis resolution regimes.
Even within the EU there are important differences in these regimes. 
Even within the EU there are important differences in these regimes.
As part of the territorial approach to banking crisis resolution, quite often the resolution regime is changed during a crisis. 
As part of the territorial approach to banking crisis resolution, quite often the resolution regime is changed during a crisis.
The experience from the EU is broadly that MoUs on crisis management were of limited use during the crisis. 
The experience from the EU is broadly that MoUs on crisis management were of limited use during the crisis.
Increased convergence is hence a challenging but important task. 
Increased convergence is hence a challenging but important task.
Close coordination of regulatory and supervisory standards between countries sharing a banking group will obviously reduce potential conflicts of interest. 
Close coordination of regulatory and supervisory standards between countries sharing a banking group will obviously reduce potential conflicts of interest.
One problem area exposed by the current crisis is the widely divergent parameters used by certain IRB banks for similar credit categories. 
One problem area exposed by the current crisis is the widely divergent parameters used by certain IRB banks for similar credit categories.
Comparison of financial strength across firms is thereby distorted, and trigger point information for supervisors weakened. 
Comparison of financial strength across firms is thereby distorted, and trigger point information for supervisors weakened.
The current impact assessment of Tier 1 capital has further strengthened the impression of widely divergent quality of core capital among large cross-border banks. 
The current impact assessment of Tier 1 capital has further strengthened the impression of widely divergent quality of core capital among large cross-border banks.
Increased convergence among national supervisors of key principles for capital estimation should be greatly encouraged, as it is a necessary requirement for consistent intervention polices in different jurisdictions. 
Increased convergence among national supervisors of key principles for capital estimation should be greatly encouraged, as it is a necessary requirement for consistent intervention polices in different jurisdictions.
Thus, we strongly support the report’s recommendation to require all countries to have a certain minimum tool kit in place. 
Thus, we strongly support the report’s recommendation to require all countries to have a certain minimum tool kit in place.
This is particularly the case for large subsidiary based financial groups, where resolution must be based on separate legal entities. 
This is particularly the case for large subsidiary based financial groups, where resolution must be based on separate legal entities.
Closer cooperation in supervisory colleges and more frequent interactions of key policy makers is needed to provide a more solid ground for crisis resolution among such firms. 
Closer cooperation in supervisory colleges and more frequent interactions of key policy makers is needed to provide a more solid ground for crisis resolution among such firms.
However, as the Icelandic case showed, if the parent banks have outgrown the local supervisory and deposit insurance systems, there is a legitimate basis for host county intervention to protect national interests. 
However, as the Icelandic case showed, if the parent banks have outgrown the local supervisory and deposit insurance systems, there is a legitimate basis for host county intervention to protect national interests.
We support greater scrutiny of home country regimes in the future, and a due process allowing host supervisors to raise their concerns. 
We support greater scrutiny of home country regimes in the future, and a due process allowing host supervisors to raise their concerns.
Parent banks must not be allowed to outgrow their home base, i.e. the national capacity to supervise and support overseas commitments. 
Parent banks must not be allowed to outgrow their home base, i.e. the national capacity to supervise and support overseas commitments.
Large cross-border banking croups with business line organization, but with legal subsidiary structure, pose a special challenge for crisis resolution. 
Large cross-border banking croups with business line organization, but with legal subsidiary structure, pose a special challenge for crisis resolution.
Host authorities may have reservations about supporting such “quasi subsidiaries”, and may not even be able to ring fence them since their liquidity, funding and IT functions have been centralized to profit centers in another country. 
Host authorities may have reservations about supporting such “quasi subsidiaries”, and may not even be able to ring fence them since their liquidity, funding and IT functions have been centralized to profit centers in another country.
This can easily create a stand-off situation between the home and the host authorities. 
This can easily create a stand-off situation between the home and the host authorities.
(1) Clarifying responsibility for cross-border banking croups with business line organization is, in our view, quite important and should be explored further as an important premise for further progress on cross-border crisis resolution. 
(1) Clarifying responsibility for cross-border banking croups with business line organization is, in our view, quite important and should be explored further as an important premise for further progress on cross-border crisis resolution.
Recommendation 4: Cross-border effects of national resolution measures. 
Recommendation 4: Cross-border effects of national resolution measures.
See recommendation 3. 
See recommendation 3.
Recommendation 5: Reduction of complexity and interconnectedness of group structures and operations. 
Recommendation 5: Reduction of complexity and interconnectedness of group structures and operations.
Supervisors should work closely with relevant home and host resolution authorities in order to understand how group structures and their individual components would be resolved in a crisis. 
Supervisors should work closely with relevant home and host resolution authorities in order to understand how group structures and their individual components would be resolved in a crisis.
As a preventive measure, we believe cross-border banks should be required to hold ample capital and liquidity buffers. 
As a preventive measure, we believe cross-border banks should be required to hold ample capital and liquidity buffers.
The large negative real economy effects of a potential disorderly resolution process for a large cross-border bank represent a negative externality that should be appropriately captured in the incentives facing such banks. 
The large negative real economy effects of a potential disorderly resolution process for a large cross-border bank represent a negative externality that should be appropriately captured in the incentives facing such banks.
This is indeed the direction of current regulatory initiatives, which we strongly support. 
This is indeed the direction of current regulatory initiatives, which we strongly support.
This could take the form of a systemic surcharge to the national deposit insurance fund, or as an extra capital charge, probably under Pillar 2. 
This could take the form of a systemic surcharge to the national deposit insurance fund, or as an extra capital charge, probably under Pillar 2.
This surcharge could be lowered if the complexity of the group is reduced, for example following a review of a resolution and recovery plan. 
This surcharge could be lowered if the complexity of the group is reduced, for example following a review of a resolution and recovery plan.
Recommendation 6: Planning in advance for orderly resolution. 
Recommendation 6: Planning in advance for orderly resolution.
This report is one of several international reports on improving the crisis resolution systems both domestically and globally. 
This report is one of several international reports on improving the crisis resolution systems both domestically and globally.
We believe that the concept of living wills could be particularly relevant for cross border banks. 
We believe that the concept of living wills could be particularly relevant for cross border banks.
The Financial Stability Board has recently pointed out that contingency plans for banks actually need two distinct components. 
The Financial Stability Board has recently pointed out that contingency plans for banks actually need two distinct components.
A recovery plan for maintaining a going concern and a resolution plan for institutions that needs to be closed. 
A recovery plan for maintaining a going concern and a resolution plan for institutions that needs to be closed.
These two should be developed and evaluated separately. 
These two should be developed and evaluated separately.
In Norway, we have for long favored a holding company approach to financial institutions, and as a result most of our financial groups have fairly transparent organizational structures. 
In Norway, we have for long favored a holding company approach to financial institutions, and as a result most of our financial groups have fairly transparent organizational structures.
Recommendation 7: Cross-border cooperation and information sharing. 
Recommendation 7: Cross-border cooperation and information sharing.
Otherwise, the concern for a level playing field and regulatory arbitrage will make it difficult to impose the proper measures. 
Otherwise, the concern for a level playing field and regulatory arbitrage will make it difficult to impose the proper measures.
This would modify the home country responsibilities in the EU regulations, but based on an agreement that we believe is within the broader EU principles for cross border financial stability. 
This would modify the home country responsibilities in the EU regulations, but based on an agreement that we believe is within the broader EU principles for cross border financial stability.
Recommendation 8: Strengthening risk mitigation mechanisms. 
Recommendation 8: Strengthening risk mitigation mechanisms.
These risk mitigation techniques include enforceable netting agreements, collateralisation, and segregation of client positions. 
These risk mitigation techniques include enforceable netting agreements, collateralisation, and segregation of client positions.
We support this recommendation. 
We support this recommendation.
Recommendation 9: Transfer of contractual relationships. 
Recommendation 9: Transfer of contractual relationships.
Recommendation 10: Exit strategies and market discipline. 
Recommendation 10: Exit strategies and market discipline.
Footnotes 
Footnotes
There is a continued need for an expansionary monetary policy. 
Det er fortsatt behov for en ekspansiv pengepolitikk.
Interest rates abroad are low. 
Rentene ute er lave.
Capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy is below a normal level, and the outlook suggests that inflation will remain below 2.5 percent in the coming years. 
Kapasitetsutnyttingen i norsk økonomi er under et normalt nivå, og det er utsikter til at prisveksten holder seg under 2,5 prosent de neste årene.
Capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy is on the rise and appears to be somewhat higher than previously assumed. 
Kapasitetsutnyttingen i norsk økonomi er på vei opp, og den synes noe høyere enn tidligere lagt til grunn.
Inflation has declined as expected. 
Prisveksten har som ventet avtatt.
Wage growth will likely remain moderate, and the outlook for inflation for the next few years is little changed. 
Lønnsveksten vil trolig holde seg moderat, og utsiktene for prisveksten de nærmeste årene er lite endret.
Inflation expectations appear to be firmly anchored, and the increase in capacity utilisation suggests that inflation will pick up further out. 
Inflasjonsforventningene synes godt forankret, og økningen i kapasitetsutnyttingen tilsier at prisveksten etter hvert vil ta seg opp.
The changes in the outlook and the balance of risks imply a somewhat earlier increase in the key policy rate than projected in the June Report. 
Endringene i utsiktene og risikobildet tilsier en noe tidligere renteøkning enn i forrige rapport.
Uncertainty surrounding the effects of monetary policy suggests a cautious approach to interest rate setting, also when it becomes appropriate to increase the key policy rate. 
Usikkerheten om virkningene av pengepolitikken taler for å gå varsomt frem, også når det blir aktuelt å heve styringsrenten.
"The Executive Board's current assessment of the outlook and balance of risks suggests that the key policy rate will remain at today's level in the period ahead," says Governor Øystein Olsen. 
– Slik vi nå vurderer utsiktene og risikobildet, vil styringsrenten bli liggende på dagens nivå den nærmeste tiden, sier sentralbanksjef Øystein Olsen.
In Monetary Policy Report 3/17, the key policy rate is forecast to be 0.5 percent over the coming year, rising gradually thereafter. 
Prognosen for styringsrenten i Pengepolitisk rapport 3/17 ligger på 0,5 prosent det neste året før den øker gradvis.
The forecast is little changed on the June Report, but is a little higher towards the end of the forecast period. 
Prognosen er lite endret fra forrige rapport, men er litt høyere mot slutten av prognoseperioden.
Norges Bank has advised the Ministry of Finance to keep the countercyclical capital buffer for banks unchanged at 2 percent, effective from the end of 2017. 
Norges Bank har gitt råd til Finansdepartementet om å holde kravet til motsyklisk kapitalbuffer i bankene uendret på 2 prosent fra utgangen av året.
A persistent rise in household debt ratios and high property price inflation over a long period suggest that financial imbalances have built up. 
Vedvarende oppgang i husholdningenes gjeldsbelastning og sterk vekst i eiendomspriser over lengre tid tyder på at finansielle ubalanser har bygd seg opp.
House prices have long risen considerably more than household disposable income, but house price inflation has slowed considerably since the turn of the year. 
Boligprisene har lenge økt vesentlig mer enn husholdningenes disponible inntekter, men siden årsskiftet har veksten i boligprisene avtatt betydelig.
"Household debt growth remains high, and it will take time for household sector vulnerabilities to recede. 
– Husholdningenes gjeldsvekst er fortsatt høy, og det vil ta tid før sårbarheten i husholdningssektoren reduseres.
The correction in the housing market may lower the risk of an abrupt and more pronounced decline further out", says Governor Øystein Olsen. 
Omslaget i boligmarkedet kan bidra til lavere risiko for en brå og mer markert nedgang lenger frem i tid, sier sentralbanksjef Øystein Olsen.
In line with Norges Bank's advice, the Ministry of Finance decided today to keep the buffer rate unchanged at 2 percent from the end of 2017. 
Finansdepartementet har i dag besluttet å holde bufferkravet uendret på 2 prosent fra utgangen av 2017 i tråd med rådet fra Norges Bank.
Norges Bank's advice is issued in the letter: Advice on the countercyclical capital buffer 2017 Q3 
Norges Banks råd er gitt i brevet: Råd om motsyklisk kapitalbuffer 3. kvartal 2017
The decision basis for Norges Bank's advice is presented in Section 5 of the September Monetary Policy Report (3/17) 
Beslutningsgrunnlaget for rådet er gjengitt i kapittel 5 i Pengepolitisk rapport 3/17
Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor, Norges Bank Modum Sparebank Modum, 2 December 2002 
Visesentralbanksjef Jarle Bergo, Modum Sparebank, 2. desember 2002
The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank's press conference following the Executive Board's monetary policy meeting on 30 October and on previous speeches. 
Foredraget bygger på vurderingene gitt i Norges Banks presskonferanse etter rentemøtet i Hovedstyret 30. oktober og tidligere foredrag.
Norway has a petroleum-based economy. 
Norge er en oljeøkonomi.
Our petroleum revenues provide us with an economic starting point that many other countries do not have. 
Oljeinntektene gir oss et økonomisk utgangspunkt som mange andre land ikke har.
How are we to live (well) with this petroleum? 
Hvordan skal vi leve (godt) med oljen?
This question presents a number of challenges with respect to our economic policy. 
Dette spørsmålet stiller den økonomiske politikken ovenfor flere utfordringer.
Our petroleum wealth must be distributed across generations in an appropriate way. 
Rikdommen må fordeles mellom generasjoner på en god måte.
This means that the authorities must be disciplined and apply long-term considerations in their spending. 
Det innebærer at myndighetsutøverne må ha disiplin i pengebruken, og vurdere denne i lys av langsiktige hensyn.
The flow of revenues from petroleum activities will vary. 
Størrelsen på inntektsstrømmen fra oljevirksomheten varierer.
This may cause substantial variation in the demand directed at the Norwegian economy, and may amplify cyclical fluctuations. 
Det kan gi store utslag i etterspørselsimpulsene rettet mot norsk økonomi og kan bidra til å forsterke konjunktursvingninger.
The use of petroleum revenues influences the competitiveness of Norwegian manufacturing. 
Bruk av oljeinntekter påvirker konkurranseevnen for norsk industri.
Large fluctuations in the use of revenues may have major consequences for the operating environment of internationally exposed industries. 
Store svingninger i inntektsbruken kan få store konsekvenser for rammebetingelsene i konkurranseutsatte næringer.
Therefore it is important that we succeed in maintaining an industry structure that promotes learning, innovation and development. 
Det er derfor viktig at vi klarer å beholde en næringsstruktur som fremmer læring, nyskapning og utvikling.
Petroleum activities constitute an important part of the Norwegian economy. 
Petroleumsvirksomheten utgjør en betydelig del av norsk økonomi.
In recent years petroleum revenues have amounted to 25-30 per cent of government income. 
De siste årene har oljeinntektene utgjort 25-30 prosent av statens inntekter.
A sound economic policy and high oil prices have contributed to the highest budget surpluses recorded in any OECD country. 
Fornuftig økonomisk politikk og høy oljepris har samlet bidratt til de høyeste overskuddene på budsjettbalansen som er registrert i noe OECD-land.
Even in 1998, when the oil price was down to USD 10 per barrel, we had a surplus of 4 per cent of GDP measured by government net lending. 
Selv i 1998, da oljeprisen var nede i 10 dollar fatet, hadde vi et overskudd på 4 prosent av BNP målt ved statens nettofinansinvesteringer.