natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
All questions at press conferences must be asked in plenary. 
På pressekonferansene må alle spørsmål stilles i plenum.
In the same year non-performing loans accounted for 9 per cent of loans outstanding for the entire banking industry1. 
In the same year non-performing loans accounted for 9 per cent of loans outstanding for the entire banking industry1.
The corresponding figure for Indonesia was as high as 70 per cent, 33 per cent in Thailand, and 18 per cent in Sweden2. 
The corresponding figure for Indonesia was as high as 70 per cent, 33 per cent in Thailand, and 18 per cent in Sweden2.
In this relatively short presentation, I will concentrate on the main issues of the crisis and its resolution. 
In this relatively short presentation, I will concentrate on the main issues of the crisis and its resolution.
Thus, not every stage in the development of the crisis will be recapitulated, or every step and detail in its resolution. 
Thus, not every stage in the development of the crisis will be recapitulated, or every step and detail in its resolution.
The views I put forward are my own and have been deliberately sharpened to promote discussion. 
The views I put forward are my own and have been deliberately sharpened to promote discussion.
The most important characteristics of the resolution of the Norwegian crisis can be summarized as follows: 
The most important characteristics of the resolution of the Norwegian crisis can be summarized as follows:
The banks' own collective guarantee funds handled the problems in the banking sector before the crisis became systemic. 
The banks' own collective guarantee funds handled the problems in the banking sector before the crisis became systemic.
No blanket guarantee for the banks' debts was provided by the government. 
No blanket guarantee for the banks' debts was provided by the government.
No regulatory forebearance. 
No regulatory forebearance.
No liquidity support to banks whose solvency was in doubt. 
No liquidity support to banks whose solvency was in doubt.
A clear and transparent division of responsibility between the political authorities, the supervisory authority and the central bank was established early on. 
A clear and transparent division of responsibility between the political authorities, the supervisory authority and the central bank was established early on.
Government support was contingent on strict requirements being met, e.g. existing shareholders accepting a write-down to cover losses to the extent possible. 
Government support was contingent on strict requirements being met, e.g. existing shareholders accepting a write-down to cover losses to the extent possible.
No micro-management of the banks. 
No micro-management of the banks.
Measures taken to prevent supported banks exploiting the situation vis-à-vis non-supported banks. 
Measures taken to prevent supported banks exploiting the situation vis-à-vis non-supported banks.
No asset management companies or "bad banks". 
No asset management companies or "bad banks".
I shall comment on each of these issues, but before doing this let me briefly mention the background for the crisis: 
I shall comment on each of these issues, but before doing this let me briefly mention the background for the crisis:
During 1984 and 1985, the Norwegian banking system was deregulated. 
During 1984 and 1985, the Norwegian banking system was deregulated.
In this new environment, banks started to compete for market shares. 
In this new environment, banks started to compete for market shares.
In short, deregulation, a lending boom, and an ensuing recession set the stage for increasing bank losses. 
In short, deregulation, a lending boom, and an ensuing recession set the stage for increasing bank losses.
The Norwegian banking crisis evolved in two stages: 
The Norwegian banking crisis evolved in two stages:
In the first stage from 1988 till 1990, several small and some medium banks failed. 
In the first stage from 1988 till 1990, several small and some medium banks failed.
From 1990 - 1991, the crisis became systemic. 
From 1990 - 1991, the crisis became systemic.
These funds had a wider mandate than just paying out depositors at the closure of a failed bank. 
These funds had a wider mandate than just paying out depositors at the closure of a failed bank.
To make sure that there would still be a safety net present, the government established the Government Bank Insurance Fund - or GBIF - in early 1991. 
To make sure that there would still be a safety net present, the government established the Government Bank Insurance Fund - or GBIF - in early 1991.
At the same time it was made clear that it was through this fund only that public money might be injected into failing banks. 
At the same time it was made clear that it was through this fund only that public money might be injected into failing banks.
The central bank might provide liquidity support only once solvency was assured. 
The central bank might provide liquidity support only once solvency was assured.
The GBIF was given a specific grant by the Storting (parliament). 
The GBIF was given a specific grant by the Storting (parliament).
The new fund could lend money to the banks' own guarantee funds to enable them to recapitalize failing banks. 
The new fund could lend money to the banks' own guarantee funds to enable them to recapitalize failing banks.
Later, as the crisis escalated, the GBIF was permitted to recapitalize the banks directly. 
Later, as the crisis escalated, the GBIF was permitted to recapitalize the banks directly.
In both cases, strict conditions were attached. 
In both cases, strict conditions were attached.
Most often these included: 
Most often these included:
the management and board of directors of the bank were replaced 
the management and board of directors of the bank were replaced
the existing share capital was written down to cover losses to the fullest extent possible 
the existing share capital was written down to cover losses to the fullest extent possible
the bank's operating costs were reduced and some of its activities downsized 
the bank's operating costs were reduced and some of its activities downsized
measures were taken to restrain growth in the bank's total assets. 
measures were taken to restrain growth in the bank's total assets.
An example of the conditions that were imposed can be found in chart 8. 
An example of the conditions that were imposed can be found in chart 8.
These conditions were of course rather unattractive to bank managers, board members and shareholders. 
These conditions were of course rather unattractive to bank managers, board members and shareholders.
Such decisions would normally have to be made by the banks' General Meetings. 
Such decisions would normally have to be made by the banks' General Meetings.
This authority was used in two instances where shareholders refused to write down a bank's shares as required by GBIF. 
This authority was used in two instances where shareholders refused to write down a bank's shares as required by GBIF.
Shareholders in one bank brought the case to the courts, but lost. 
Shareholders in one bank brought the case to the courts, but lost.
This agreement was made public. 
This agreement was made public.
However, the GBIF kept in close contact with the financial supervisors and the central bank. 
However, the GBIF kept in close contact with the financial supervisors and the central bank.
General assurances were given that the central bank would provide liquidity support to sound financial institutions (including non-banks). 
General assurances were given that the central bank would provide liquidity support to sound financial institutions (including non-banks).
Before GBIF injected capital into crisis-stricken banks, efforts were made to attract private investors. 
Before GBIF injected capital into crisis-stricken banks, efforts were made to attract private investors.
However, these efforts did not succeed. 
However, these efforts did not succeed.
Under these circumstances, the government was the only source available to support the financial system. 
Under these circumstances, the government was the only source available to support the financial system.
Hence, it might have been a profitable investment for private investors, although with a huge risk ex ante. 
Hence, it might have been a profitable investment for private investors, although with a huge risk ex ante.
The Fund was intended to take part in equity emissions at (non-problem) banks on commercial terms. 
The Fund was intended to take part in equity emissions at (non-problem) banks on commercial terms.
Certain other forms of general support to the banking industry were also provided. 
Certain other forms of general support to the banking industry were also provided.
At its peak, the share of state ownership in the banking sector was close to 60 percent. 
At its peak, the share of state ownership in the banking sector was close to 60 percent.
Unlike many other countries dealing with a banking crisis, Norway did not set up a separate asset management company - or "bad bank" - to handle problem loans. 
Unlike many other countries dealing with a banking crisis, Norway did not set up a separate asset management company - or "bad bank" - to handle problem loans.
There were several reasons why we chose not to do this: 
There were several reasons why we chose not to do this:
The banks themselves knew their borrowers best and had experience in working out defaulted loans. 
The banks themselves knew their borrowers best and had experience in working out defaulted loans.
Setting up an asset management company and transferring bad loans from the banks would have required complicated accounting and legal work. 
Setting up an asset management company and transferring bad loans from the banks would have required complicated accounting and legal work.
Thus, more taxpayers' money would have been put at risk. 
Thus, more taxpayers' money would have been put at risk.
None chose to do so. 
None chose to do so.
Nor did the Norwegian authorities issue a blanket guarantee for the banks' liabilities. 
Nor did the Norwegian authorities issue a blanket guarantee for the banks' liabilities.
Such a guarantee can create moral hazard problems and actually lead to more bank problems in the future4. 
Such a guarantee can create moral hazard problems and actually lead to more bank problems in the future4.
No assurances were given that individual banks would be rescued. 
No assurances were given that individual banks would be rescued.
The discounted value of the gross fiscal costs of the resolution of the Norwegian crisis resolution is estimated at 2.9 per cent of GDP as of year end 1993. 
The discounted value of the gross fiscal costs of the resolution of the Norwegian crisis resolution is estimated at 2.9 per cent of GDP as of year end 1993.
Looking at simple non-discounted sums, gross fiscal costs for Sweden were 3.6 per cent of GDP in 1997. 
Looking at simple non-discounted sums, gross fiscal costs for Sweden were 3.6 per cent of GDP in 1997.
For Norway, the comparable figure was only 2 per cent6. 
For Norway, the comparable figure was only 2 per cent6.
Part of this difference can probably be traced back to Sweden's use of government-financed asset management companies as part of their crisis resolution. 
Part of this difference can probably be traced back to Sweden's use of government-financed asset management companies as part of their crisis resolution.
The two others are now subsidiaries of a Danish and a Nordic banking group respectively. 
The two others are now subsidiaries of a Danish and a Nordic banking group respectively.
In one respect, we were rather lucky compared to others. 
In one respect, we were rather lucky compared to others.
The focus must be on saving the financial system, not the individual bank. 
The focus must be on saving the financial system, not the individual bank.
As then, owners should be the first in line to shoulder losses. 
As then, owners should be the first in line to shoulder losses.
Hopefully we have all, bankers and authorities alike, learnt from the crisis. 
Hopefully we have all, bankers and authorities alike, learnt from the crisis.
At the central bank, we have strengthened our surveillance of the soundness of our financial system (macro-prudential supervision). 
At the central bank, we have strengthened our surveillance of the soundness of our financial system (macro-prudential supervision).
There is also an extensive exchange of information with the supervisors in the Banking Insurance and Securities Commission. 
There is also an extensive exchange of information with the supervisors in the Banking Insurance and Securities Commission.
However, the financial system is evolving rapidly. 
However, the financial system is evolving rapidly.
Tomorrow's problems could easily be different from the past. 
Tomorrow's problems could easily be different from the past.
Today, a large part of our banking industry is part of Nordic banking groups. 
Today, a large part of our banking industry is part of Nordic banking groups.
This raises the question of whether a model for crisis resolution only based on national considerations would work. 
This raises the question of whether a model for crisis resolution only based on national considerations would work.
In terms of crisis resolution, this is most probably a further complication. 
In terms of crisis resolution, this is most probably a further complication.
Banking crises have occurred at irregular intervals as long as banks have existed. 
Banking crises have occurred at irregular intervals as long as banks have existed.
And it could happen again. 
And it could happen again.
We need to be vigilant and alert in our macro prudential supervision, and willing to consider new approaches in crisis resolution to lessen the impact of any new financial crisis. 
We need to be vigilant and alert in our macro prudential supervision, and willing to consider new approaches in crisis resolution to lessen the impact of any new financial crisis.
References 
References
Drees, Burkhard and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu (1998). 
Drees, Burkhard and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu (1998).
The Nordic Banking Crisis: Pitfalls in Financial Liberalisation. 
The Nordic Banking Crisis: Pitfalls in Financial Liberalisation.
IMF Occasional Paper. 
IMF Occasional Paper.
Hoggarth, Glenn, Ricardo Reis and Victoria Saporta (2002). 
Hoggarth, Glenn, Ricardo Reis and Victoria Saporta (2002).
Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence. 
Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence.
IMF (2001). 
IMF (2001).
Thailand: Selected Issues. 
Thailand: Selected Issues.
IMF Country Report 01/147, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 
IMF Country Report 01/147, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
Jennergren, Peter and Bertil Näslund (1998). 
Jennergren, Peter and Bertil Näslund (1998).
Efter Bankkrisen: Vad blev notan för skattebetalarna? 
Efter Bankkrisen: Vad blev notan för skattebetalarna?
Kane, Edward J. and Daniela Klingebiel (2002) Alternatives to blanket guarantees for containing a systemic crisis. 
Kane, Edward J. and Daniela Klingebiel (2002) Alternatives to blanket guarantees for containing a systemic crisis.
At: www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/ Kane_Klingebiel--alterns_to_blnkt_guars-doc.pdf, 
At: www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/ Kane_Klingebiel--alterns_to_blnkt_guars-doc.pdf,
The Norwegian Banking Crisis, Norges Bank Occasional Paper No. 3X. 
The Norwegian Banking Crisis, Norges Bank Occasional Paper No.
Nåverdien av statens investeringer i og støtte til norske banker. 
Nåverdien av statens investeringer i og støtte til norske banker.
Working Paper ANO 2003/6, Norges Bank, Oslo 
Working Paper ANO 2003/6, Norges Bank, Oslo
Norwegian Official Reports (1992). 
Norwegian Official Reports (1992).
Report by the Commision on the Banking Crisis. 
Report by the Commision on the Banking Crisis.
NOU 1992: 30E, Royal Ministry of Finance and Customs, Oslo. 
NOU 1992: 30E, Royal Ministry of Finance and Customs, Oslo.
OECD (2001). 
OECD (2001).
OECD Bank Profitability 2000. 
OECD Bank Profitability 2000.
Firms and their distressed banks: lessons from the Norwegian banking crisis. 
Firms and their distressed banks: lessons from the Norwegian banking crisis.
Collateral damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United States. 
Collateral damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United States.
Sandal, Knut (2004). 
Sandal, Knut (2004).
The Nordic banking crises in the early 1990s - resolution methods and fiscal costs. 
The Nordic banking crises in the early 1990s - resolution methods and fiscal costs.
Economic costs of the Nordic banking crises. 
Economic costs of the Nordic banking crises.
Working Paper. 
Working Paper.
ANO 2003/X forthcoming, Norges Bank, Oslo. 
ANO 2003/X forthcoming, Norges Bank, Oslo.
Steigum, Erling (2004). 
Steigum, Erling (2004).
Financial Deregulation with a Fixed Exchange Rate: Lessons from Norway's Boom-Bust Cycle and Banking Crisis. 
Financial Deregulation with a Fixed Exchange Rate: Lessons from Norway's Boom-Bust Cycle and Banking Crisis.
Dokument nr. 17 (1997-98), Oslo. 
17 (1997-98), Oslo.
Vale, Bent. 
Vale, Bent.
(2002). 
(2002).
Firms' inventory investments, financial conditions and banking crisis. 
Firms' inventory investments, financial conditions and banking crisis.
Management of the banking crisis and state ownership of commercial banks. 
Management of the banking crisis and state ownership of commercial banks.
1Source: Sandal (2004) 
1Source: Sandal (2004)
2Source: Kane and Klingebiel (2002) and Norges Bank 
2Source: Kane and Klingebiel (2002) and Norges Bank
3Interested readers are referred to Moe, Solheim and Vale (2004), Norwegian Official Reports (1992), Wilse (1995), and Stortinget (1998). 
3Interested readers are referred to Moe, Solheim and Vale (2004), Norwegian Official Reports (1992), Wilse (1995), and Stortinget (1998).
Steigum (2004) sets out the macroeconomic background and implications of the banking crisis. 
Steigum (2004) sets out the macroeconomic background and implications of the banking crisis.
4 Cf. 
4 Cf.
Kane and Klingebiel (2002) 
Kane and Klingebiel (2002)
5 Source: St.meld. 
5 Source: St.meld.
39 (1993-94) 
39 (1993-94)
6 Source: For Sweden: Jennergren and Näslund (1998). 
6 Source: For Sweden: Jennergren and Näslund (1998).
For Norway: Norges Bank, Moen (2003) 
For Norway: Norges Bank, Moen (2003)
7 See Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2002). 
7 See Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2002).
8 Peek and Rosengren (2000) look at the loan supply shock facing U.S. firms borrowing from Japanese banks during the banking crisis in Japan. 
8 Peek and Rosengren (2000) look at the loan supply shock facing U.S. firms borrowing from Japanese banks during the banking crisis in Japan.
They identify a substantial impact on U.S. real estate activity from this supply shock. 
They identify a substantial impact on U.S. real estate activity from this supply shock.
9See Ongena, Smith and Michalsen (2003) and Vale (2002) 
9See Ongena, Smith and Michalsen (2003) and Vale (2002)
According to Norges Bank's assessment, with a sight deposit rate of 1.75 per cent at present, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be lower than 2½ per cent is greater than the probability that it will be higher. 
Det er Norges Banks vurdering at med en foliorente nå på 1,75 prosent er det mer sannsynlig at inflasjonen på to års sikt blir lavere enn 2½ prosent enn at den blir høyere.
Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that variability in both output and employment and inflation is given weight. 
Norges Bank har lagt til grunn at inflasjonsstyringen skal være fleksibel slik at variasjon i både produksjon og inflasjon tillegges vekt.
Previous assessments On 28 January 2004, Norges Bank's Executive Board decided to reduce the sight deposit rate by 0.25 percentage point to 2.00 per cent. 
Tidligere vurderinger Norges Banks hovedstyre besluttet 28. januar 2004 å sette ned bankenes innskuddsrente i Norges Bank, foliorenten, med 0,25 prosentenhet til 2,00 prosent.
It was also stated that "with a sight deposit rate of 2.00 per cent at present, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be lower than 2½ per cent is greater than the probability that it will be higher." 
Samtidig ble det uttrykt at "med en foliorente nå på 2,00 prosent er det mer sannsynlig at inflasjonen på to års sikt blir lavere enn 2½ prosent enn at den blir høyere".
In reaching its decision, the Executive Board weighed the objective of bringing inflation back to target and stabilising inflation expectations against the risk that output growth might eventually be too high. 
Hovedstyret avveide på den ene siden hensynet til å bringe inflasjonen tilbake til målet og stabilisere inflasjonsforventningene og på den andre siden risikoen for at veksten i produksjonen etter hvert kan bli for sterk.
Economic developments Particular emphasis has been placed on the following: 
Den økonomiske utviklingen Det er her særlig lagt vekt på følgende:
Underlying inflation is very low. 
Den underliggende prisveksten er svært lav.
The rise in consumer prices adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) has edged down since last summer. 
Konsumprisveksten justert for avgiftsendringer og uten energivarer (KPI-JAE) har avtatt gradvis siden i fjor sommer.
Annual CPI-ATE inflation was -0.1 per cent in February. 
Tolvmånedersveksten i KPI-JAE var -0,1 prosent i februar.
After showing a tendency to appreciate in autumn 2003, the krone has weakened markedly since early December. 
Etter å ha vist en tendens til å styrke seg utover høsten 2003 har kronekursen svekket seg markert siden tidlig i desember.
The krone, as measured by a broad index, is now at the level prevailing at the beginning of 2002 and in line with the level in the mid-1990s. 
Kronen, målt ved en bred indeks, er nå på det nivået den hadde ved inngangen til 2002 og på linje med nivået på midten av 1990-tallet.
In recent months, market participants have lowered their interest rate expectations for most of the other countries, and interest rates have fallen somewhat in other countries. 
Markedsaktørene har de siste månedene nedjustert sine renteforventninger for de fleste andre landene, og rentene ute har falt noe.
Market participants now expect that interest rates will be raised in the US well into the latter half of this year and in the euro area in the beginning of 2005. 
Markedsaktørene venter nå at rentene i USA først blir hevet godt inn i andre halvår i år og i euroområdet først ved begynnelsen av 2005.
In Sweden, the official interest rate was reduced by 0.25 percentage point in February. 
I Sverige ble renten satt ned med 0,25 prosentenhet i februar.
In Canada, the interest rate was cut by 0.25 percentage point in March. 
I Canada ble renten redusert med 0,25 prosentenhet i mars.
The recovery in the US and Asia has gained a firmer footing, while growth is sill very moderate in the euro area. 
Konjunkturoppgangen i USA og Asia har fått sterkere feste, mens veksten fortsatt er svært moderat i euroområdet.
Growth is high in the UK. 
I Storbritannia er det høy vekst.
The Swedish economy is rebounding, but unemployment has nevertheless increased. 
Svensk økonomi er i oppgang, men arbeidsledigheten har likevel økt.
The Danish economy stagnated last year, and unemployment rose. 
Dansk økonomi stagnerte i fjor, og arbeidsledigheten økte.
Oil prices are high. 
Oljeprisen er høy.
In the beginning of March, oil prices rose to more than USD34 per barrel, which is the highest level recorded since the war in Iraq. 
I begynnelsen av mars steg oljeprisen til over 34 USD per fat, som er det høyeste nivået siden krigen i Irak.
Measured in euros, however, oil prices are lower than one year earlier. 
Målt i euro er imidlertid oljeprisen lavere enn for et år siden.
Low inflation in December, January and February contributed to a fall in interest rate expectations in Norway. 
Den lave inflasjonen i desember, januar og februar bidro til at renteforventningene i Norge falt.