natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In addition, we support ongoing work that explores various ways of spreading the cost of bank resolutions among shareholders and unsecured creditors, for example through the use of contingent capital instruments or debt-for-equity swaps. 
In addition, we support ongoing work that explores various ways of spreading the cost of bank resolutions among shareholders and unsecured creditors, for example through the use of contingent capital instruments or debt-for-equity swaps.
Increasing the scope for private sector solutions should reduce the need for fiscal burden sharing among host and home authorities. 
Increasing the scope for private sector solutions should reduce the need for fiscal burden sharing among host and home authorities.
In our view, priority should be given to improving national crisis resolution and insolvency systems and requesting cross-border banks to develop recovery and resolution plans. 
In our view, priority should be given to improving national crisis resolution and insolvency systems and requesting cross-border banks to develop recovery and resolution plans.
The parent bank could be requested to provide “support statements” for the host banks (letter of comfort, contribution orders, etc.). 
The parent bank could be requested to provide “support statements” for the host banks (letter of comfort, contribution orders, etc.).
This should clearly be considered a last option. 
This should clearly be considered a last option.
INSOLVENCY 
INSOLVENCY
A harmonised EU insolvency regime for banks 
A harmonised EU insolvency regime for banks
Is a more integrated insolvency framework for banking groups needed? 
Is a more integrated insolvency framework for banking groups needed?
If so, how should it be designed? 
If so, how should it be designed?
Should there be a separate and self contained insolvency regime for cross-border banks? 
Should there be a separate and self contained insolvency regime for cross-border banks?
A fully harmonized insolvency regime in the EU may not be feasible in the short run. 
A fully harmonized insolvency regime in the EU may not be feasible in the short run.
A minimum harmonization of national insolvency and resolution regimes should be attempted, focusing on a few critical features that all national regimes should incorporate. 
A minimum harmonization of national insolvency and resolution regimes should be attempted, focusing on a few critical features that all national regimes should incorporate.
Additional minimum requirement for banks wishing to conduct cross-border business in Europe should then be enacted, on a national level and with supplementary powers to the new European Banking Authority. 
Additional minimum requirement for banks wishing to conduct cross-border business in Europe should then be enacted, on a national level and with supplementary powers to the new European Banking Authority.
As noted above, clarifying responsibilities for resolving complex corporate structures where form does not follow function should be a priority. 
As noted above, clarifying responsibilities for resolving complex corporate structures where form does not follow function should be a priority.
Thorvald Grung Moe 
Thorvald Grung Moe
US legislation enabling the FDIC to set up bridge banks and preserve derivative contracts without operational interruption. 
US legislation enabling the FDIC to set up bridge banks and preserve derivative contracts without operational interruption.
Introduction Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet support establishing mechanisms to ensure that banks build up countercyclical capital buffers. 
Introduction Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet support establishing mechanisms to ensure that banks build up countercyclical capital buffers.
In summary our position is that: 
In summary our position is that:
ii) The countercyclical buffer should consist of common equity only. 
ii) The countercyclical buffer should consist of common equity only.
iii) The countercyclical buffer framework should be implemented as soon as possible. 
iii) The countercyclical buffer framework should be implemented as soon as possible.
Question 1 Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet generally support a strengthening of host supervisory authority powers in EU regulation, and thus strongly prefer the approach to determining the bank-specific buffers proposed by the Basel Committee. 
Question 1 Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet generally support a strengthening of host supervisory authority powers in EU regulation, and thus strongly prefer the approach to determining the bank-specific buffers proposed by the Basel Committee.
The European Commission presents two possible alternative approaches. 
The European Commission presents two possible alternative approaches.
This opportunity risks blurring the distinction between individual pillar 2 issues and macroprudential issues. 
This opportunity risks blurring the distinction between individual pillar 2 issues and macroprudential issues.
Consequently, buffer decisions by national authorities may not have full effect on the macroprudential risks in the jurisdiction. 
Consequently, buffer decisions by national authorities may not have full effect on the macroprudential risks in the jurisdiction.
Question 2 Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet believe the Basel approach will lead to less regulatory arbitrage than alternative A and B of the Commission. 
Question 2 Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet believe the Basel approach will lead to less regulatory arbitrage than alternative A and B of the Commission.
Question 3 Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet support applying the countercyclical buffer requirement at solo, sub-consolidated and consolidated basis. 
Question 3 Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet support applying the countercyclical buffer requirement at solo, sub-consolidated and consolidated basis.
The very existence of a higher buffer option might also have a dampening effect. 
The very existence of a higher buffer option might also have a dampening effect.
We believe the European Systemic Risk Board could promote these aims. 
We believe the European Systemic Risk Board could promote these aims.
Question 6 Under the Basel approach host countries must rely on home country authorities to enforce the buffer decisions of host countries for foreign branches. 
Question 6 Under the Basel approach host countries must rely on home country authorities to enforce the buffer decisions of host countries for foreign branches.
Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet suggest that the supervisory colleges and the European Banking Authority are given roles in securing this cooperation. 
Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet suggest that the supervisory colleges and the European Banking Authority are given roles in securing this cooperation.
A capital buffer should have full loss absorbency. 
A capital buffer should have full loss absorbency.
We believe contingent convertible debt instruments should not be included in the countercyclical buffer before more experience with such instruments has been gained. 
We believe contingent convertible debt instruments should not be included in the countercyclical buffer before more experience with such instruments has been gained.
Emil Steffensen 
Emil Steffensen
Deputy Director General Finanstilsynet 
Deputy Director General Finanstilsynet
Executive Director Norges Bank 
Executive Director Norges Bank
Copy: The Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
Copy: The Norwegian Ministry of Finance
(1) Response to the Basel Committee's consultative document on countercyclical capital buffer. 
(1) Response to the Basel Committee's consultative document on countercyclical capital buffer.
Letter of 10 September 2010 
Letter of 10 September 2010
Sponsored by the Norges Bank Bicentenary Project 1816-2016. 
Sponsored by the Norges Bank Bicentenary Project 1816-2016.
How will the sub-prime crisis impact on policy institutions and international cooperation? 
How will the sub-prime crisis impact on policy institutions and international cooperation?
Day 1: Thursday, February 3, 2011, Villa Barton, Graduate Institute, Geneva 
Day 1: Thursday, February 3, 2011, Villa Barton, Graduate Institute, Geneva
Opening Address and Welcome: Philippe Burrin, Director, Graduate Institute. 
Opening Address and Welcome: Philippe Burrin, Director, Graduate Institute.
Marc Flandreau, Graduate Institute: The Future of PPP 
Marc Flandreau, Graduate Institute: The Future of PPP
Chair: Edi Hochreiter, Joint Vienna Institute 
Chair: Edi Hochreiter, Joint Vienna Institute
Session 1: Core Problems. 
Session 1: Core Problems.
Chair: Jaime Reis, Instituto de Cienciais Sociais, Lisboa 
Chair: Jaime Reis, Instituto de Cienciais Sociais, Lisboa
Paper (pdf, 699 kB) Presentation (pdf, 587 kB) 
Paper (pdf, 699 kB) Presentation (pdf, 587 kB)
Discussants: 
Discussants:
Charles Wyplosz (Graduate Institute) 
Charles Wyplosz (Graduate Institute)
Charlie Calomiris (Columbia University). 
Charlie Calomiris (Columbia University).
Discussion (pdf, 2 Mb) 
Discussion (pdf, 2 Mb)
Vincent Bignon, (Graduate Institute, Geneva) “Financial crises, Business cycles, and Bankruptcies in the Very Long Run: France during the 19th Century”. 
Vincent Bignon, (Graduate Institute, Geneva) “Financial crises, Business cycles, and Bankruptcies in the Very Long Run: France during the 19th Century”.
Paper (pdf, 679 kB). 
Paper (pdf, 679 kB).
Presentation (pdf, 166 kB) 
Presentation (pdf, 166 kB)
Øyvind Eitrheim (Norges Bank). 
Øyvind Eitrheim (Norges Bank).
Discussion (pdf, 396 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 396 kB)
Albrecht Ritschl (London School of Economics). 
Albrecht Ritschl (London School of Economics).
Discussion (pdf, 455kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 455kB)
Session 2: Legacy of the Interwar Crisis. 
Session 2: Legacy of the Interwar Crisis.
Chair: Mike Bordo, Rutgers University 
Chair: Mike Bordo, Rutgers University
Marc Flandreau (Graduate Institute, Geneva) “Autopsy of a Regime Change: International Effects of New Deal Financial Acts". 
Marc Flandreau (Graduate Institute, Geneva) “Autopsy of a Regime Change: International Effects of New Deal Financial Acts".
Paper (pdf, 1 Mb). 
Paper (pdf, 1 Mb).
Presentation (pdf, 1 Mb) 
Presentation (pdf, 1 Mb)
Isabel Schnabel (University of Mainz). 
Isabel Schnabel (University of Mainz).
Discussion (pdf, 114 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 114 kB)
Day 2: Friday, February 4, 2011, Villa Barton, Graduate Institute, Geneva 
Day 2: Friday, February 4, 2011, Villa Barton, Graduate Institute, Geneva
Session 3: Scandinavian Perspectives. 
Session 3: Scandinavian Perspectives.
Chair: Lars Jonung, Lund University and the Fiscal Policy Council of Sweden 
Chair: Lars Jonung, Lund University and the Fiscal Policy Council of Sweden
Lars Fredrik Øksendal (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) “The margins for discretion: Crisis management under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Lars Fredrik Øksendal (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) “The margins for discretion: Crisis management under a fixed exchange rate regime.
The case of Norway in the late 1870s”. 
The case of Norway in the late 1870s”.
Paper (pdf, 536 kB). 
Paper (pdf, 536 kB).
Mike Bordo (Rutgers University). 
Mike Bordo (Rutgers University).
Discussion (pdf, 34 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 34 kB)
Stefano Ugolini (Graduate Institute/Scuola Normale di Pisa). 
Stefano Ugolini (Graduate Institute/Scuola Normale di Pisa).
Discussion (pdf, 433 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 433 kB)
Sverre Knutsen, (Norwegian School of Management), “A comparative analysis of three Norwegian bank crises”. 
Sverre Knutsen, (Norwegian School of Management), “A comparative analysis of three Norwegian bank crises”.
Paper (pdf, 652 kB). 
Paper (pdf, 652 kB).
Presentation (pdf, 445 kB) 
Presentation (pdf, 445 kB)
Nathan Sussman (Hebrew University). 
Nathan Sussman (Hebrew University).
Discussion (pdf, 215 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 215 kB)
Lars Fredrik Øksendal (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration). 
Lars Fredrik Øksendal (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration).
Discussion (pdf, 43 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 43 kB)
Anders Øgren (Stockholm School of Economics and Université Paris Nanterre) “The Causes and Consequences of Banking Regulation: Sweden as a Natural Experiment”. 
Anders Øgren (Stockholm School of Economics and Université Paris Nanterre) “The Causes and Consequences of Banking Regulation: Sweden as a Natural Experiment”.
Paper (pdf, 667 kB). 
Paper (pdf, 667 kB).
Presentation (pdf, 339 kB) 
Presentation (pdf, 339 kB)
Tobias Strauman (University of Zürich). 
Tobias Strauman (University of Zürich).
Discussion (pdf, 52 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 52 kB)
Juan Flores (University of Geneva). 
Juan Flores (University of Geneva).
Discussion (pdf, 138 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 138 kB)
Lunch speaker: Lars Jonung (Lund University), Lessons from the Nordic financial crisis (pdf, 658 kB) 
Lunch speaker: Lars Jonung (Lund University), Lessons from the Nordic financial crisis (pdf, 658 kB)
Session 4: The Costs of Regulation. 
Session 4: The Costs of Regulation.
Chair: Jorge Braga de Macedo 
Chair: Jorge Braga de Macedo
Christophe Farquet (Université de Lausanne), “The political economy of tax evasion: France and Switzerland in the interwar”. 
Christophe Farquet (Université de Lausanne), “The political economy of tax evasion: France and Switzerland in the interwar”.
Paper (pdf, 2 Mb). 
Paper (pdf, 2 Mb).
Presentation (pdf, 778 kB) 
Presentation (pdf, 778 kB)
Pierre Sicsic (Banque de France) 
Pierre Sicsic (Banque de France)
Gianni Toniolo (Duke University and LUISS, Roma). 
Gianni Toniolo (Duke University and LUISS, Roma).
Discussion (pdf, 216 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 216 kB)
Helen Paul (University of Southampton) “Limiting the Witch-Hunt: recovering from the South Sea Bubble”. 
Helen Paul (University of Southampton) “Limiting the Witch-Hunt: recovering from the South Sea Bubble”.
Paper (pdf, 315 kB). 
Paper (pdf, 315 kB).
Presentation (pdf, 15 kB) 
Presentation (pdf, 15 kB)
Clemens Jobst (Austrian National Bank). 
Clemens Jobst (Austrian National Bank).
Discussion (pdf, 358 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 358 kB)
Michel Girardin (Union Bancaire Privée, Geneva) 
Michel Girardin (Union Bancaire Privée, Geneva)
Paper (pdf, 849 kB). 
Paper (pdf, 849 kB).
Mary O’Sullivan (Université de Genève). 
Mary O’Sullivan (Université de Genève).
Discussion (pdf, 75 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 75 kB)
Eugene White (Rutgers University). 
Eugene White (Rutgers University).
Discussion (pdf, 130 kB) 
Discussion (pdf, 130 kB)
Joint comments from Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet 
Joint comments from Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet
We strongly support the work by the Commission to develop a more harmonised framework for early intervention and prevention of banking crises and new policy tools for bank recovery and resolution. 
We strongly support the work by the Commission to develop a more harmonised framework for early intervention and prevention of banking crises and new policy tools for bank recovery and resolution.
However, we would stress the importance of allowing national authorities to keep or add supplementary intervention and resolution tools in their national legislation. 
However, we would stress the importance of allowing national authorities to keep or add supplementary intervention and resolution tools in their national legislation.
Since EU banking legislation is implemented in Norway as a European Economic Area (EEA) member state, Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank have the following comments on the proposed framework. 
Since EU banking legislation is implemented in Norway as a European Economic Area (EEA) member state, Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank have the following comments on the proposed framework.
(Q1a) 
(Q1a)
The new framework should also be implemented for bank holding companies. 
The new framework should also be implemented for bank holding companies.
(Q2a) 
(Q2a)
(Q3a) 
(Q3a)
We support the suggested option under which firms perform their stress testing based on a common framework with a subsequent supervisory review process. 
We support the suggested option under which firms perform their stress testing based on a common framework with a subsequent supervisory review process.
(Q4a) 
(Q4a)
Recovery Planning The content of the suggested preparatory recovery plans seem adequate for timely recovery in stressed situations. 
Recovery Planning The content of the suggested preparatory recovery plans seem adequate for timely recovery in stressed situations.
(Q6) 
(Q6)
We also support the suggested framework for group preparatory recovery plans in the case of a banking group. 
We also support the suggested framework for group preparatory recovery plans in the case of a banking group.
EBA could play a mediation role if required. 
EBA could play a mediation role if required.
(Q7) 
(Q7)
Intra-group Financial Support Intra-group financial support agreements may run counter to the group concept itself and dilute the legal form of the group and the legitimate interests of host countries. 
Intra-group Financial Support Intra-group financial support agreements may run counter to the group concept itself and dilute the legal form of the group and the legitimate interests of host countries.
(Q9) 
(Q9)
(Q16a) 
(Q16a)
Resolution Plans Resolution plans should be required for all credit institutions. 
Resolution Plans Resolution plans should be required for all credit institutions.
Obviously they would be much simpler for smaller banks. 
Obviously they would be much simpler for smaller banks.
(Q21a) 
(Q21a)
We find the suggested requirements for resolution plans adequate and consider them to be essential for successful resolution, especially of larger institutions. 
We find the suggested requirements for resolution plans adequate and consider them to be essential for successful resolution, especially of larger institutions.
All resolution plans should identify critical banking services to be preserved in a crisis. 
All resolution plans should identify critical banking services to be preserved in a crisis.
(Q22a) 
(Q22a)
Early Intervention We strongly support the new early intervention powers proposed in the working document. 
Early Intervention We strongly support the new early intervention powers proposed in the working document.
The Norwegian legislation on early intervention already includes most of the powers that are proposed. 
The Norwegian legislation on early intervention already includes most of the powers that are proposed.
Additional powers could in principle be needed in the future; thus the list should not exclude the possibility of introducing additional powers. 
Additional powers could in principle be needed in the future; thus the list should not exclude the possibility of introducing additional powers.
(Q24b) 
(Q24b)
The extended early intervention powers under Article 136 should be available to supervisors long before a credit institution is likely to breach the CRD requirement. 
The extended early intervention powers under Article 136 should be available to supervisors long before a credit institution is likely to breach the CRD requirement.
It is critical that supervisors be given the powers to intervene early in a graduated and predictable manner. 
It is critical that supervisors be given the powers to intervene early in a graduated and predictable manner.
This should enable converging supervisory practice across national authorities. 
This should enable converging supervisory practice across national authorities.
In addition, early intervention powers should also be related to other metrics than capital. 
In addition, early intervention powers should also be related to other metrics than capital.
The proposed new liquidity requirements, or something similar, could be considered as a supplementary trigger for early intervention. 
The proposed new liquidity requirements, or something similar, could be considered as a supplementary trigger for early intervention.
(Q24a) 
(Q24a)
The new and improved triggers for early intervention will be a valuable addition to the ongoing supervisory dialogue under Pillar 2. 
The new and improved triggers for early intervention will be a valuable addition to the ongoing supervisory dialogue under Pillar 2.
Special management The authority to appoint a special manager to the company or to assist the management is a sensible tool. 
Special management The authority to appoint a special manager to the company or to assist the management is a sensible tool.
(Q25) 
(Q25)
Recovery plans We support the wide use of recovery plans among credit institutions. 
Recovery plans We support the wide use of recovery plans among credit institutions.
For banking groups with subsidiaries, the recovery plan should be a joint product, coordinated by the parent bank and in close liaison with the consolidated supervisor. 
For banking groups with subsidiaries, the recovery plan should be a joint product, coordinated by the parent bank and in close liaison with the consolidated supervisor.
In case of disagreements, EBA could mediate ref. above. 
In case of disagreements, EBA could mediate ref. above.
(Q26) 
(Q26)
Conditions for resolution The three proposed triggers (Options 1-3) contain relevant elements, but none of them are sufficient. 
Conditions for resolution The three proposed triggers (Options 1-3) contain relevant elements, but none of them are sufficient.
Options 2 and 3 (both based on capital triggers) will ensure earlier resolution, but will not enable intervention if the bank is only illiquid. 
Options 2 and 3 (both based on capital triggers) will ensure earlier resolution, but will not enable intervention if the bank is only illiquid.
If a capital trigger should be chosen, we would prefer to focus on the Tier 1 capital levels, or even better the new Common Equity Tier 1 ratio. 
If a capital trigger should be chosen, we would prefer to focus on the Tier 1 capital levels, or even better the new Common Equity Tier 1 ratio.
In addition, we agree with the two suggested supplementary conditions on page 47. 
In addition, we agree with the two suggested supplementary conditions on page 47.
(Q 28) 
(Q 28)
Resolution objectives and principles The resolution objectives suggested in section F3 are quite adequate and would be appropriate to justify resolution. 
Resolution objectives and principles The resolution objectives suggested in section F3 are quite adequate and would be appropriate to justify resolution.
We also agree with the general principles governing resolution in section F4. 
We also agree with the general principles governing resolution in section F4.
(Q29 & Q30a,b) 
(Q29 & Q30a,b)
As for the independent valuation, this is an obvious task for the resolution authority once resolution has commenced. 
As for the independent valuation, this is an obvious task for the resolution authority once resolution has commenced.
(Q30c) 
(Q30c)
Resolution tools, powers and mechanisms and ancillary provisions We share the general views of the DG Internal Market and Services and support its proposals on resolution tools. 
Resolution tools, powers and mechanisms and ancillary provisions We share the general views of the DG Internal Market and Services and support its proposals on resolution tools.
We find the suggested tools sufficiently comprehensive for now, but would like to emphasize that we find it important that member States are allowed to supplement the proposed EU resolution tool kit with national tools and powers. 
We find the suggested tools sufficiently comprehensive for now, but would like to emphasize that we find it important that member States are allowed to supplement the proposed EU resolution tool kit with national tools and powers.
(Q31a) 
(Q31a)
We agree with the conditions for the sale of business tool suggested in section G2. 
We agree with the conditions for the sale of business tool suggested in section G2.
(Q32) 
(Q32)
As for the winding up of the residual bank when a bridge bank is established, there should be an explicit requirement that the residual bank must be wound up. 
As for the winding up of the residual bank when a bridge bank is established, there should be an explicit requirement that the residual bank must be wound up.
There should be an explicit time limit for the operation of such banks, e.g. 1-2 years. 
There should be an explicit time limit for the operation of such banks, e.g.
(Q33) 
(Q33)