natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The foreign nationals among them must leave the country, and negotiations must be initiated with legitimate representatives of the people in eastern Ukraine,’ said Mr Brende. 
Utenlandske borgere blant dem må forlate landet, og forhandlinger med legitime representanter for befolkningen i øst må finne sted, sier utenriksministeren.
‘I can’t see that Russia is helping to stabilise the situation as we had hoped and expected. 
- Jeg kan ikke se at Russland bidrar til å stabilisere situasjonen slik vi hadde håpet og forventet.
The international community must provide assistance for the people of Donbass, but it is only the Ukrainian authorities in Kiev who have the right and duty to restore law and order in the area. 
Det internasjonale samfunn må bistå befolkningen i Donbass, men det er bare ukrainske myndigheter i Kiev som har rett og plikt til å gjenopprette lov og orden i området.
We expect both parties to do their utmost to prevent further loss of life and damage to property,’ said Mr Brende. 
Vi forventer at begge parter gjør sitt ytterste for å unngå ytterligere tap av liv og ødeleggelser av eiendom, understreker utenriksministeren.
Norway to implement new restrictive measures against Russia 
Norge vil innføre nye restriktive tiltak mot Russland
Foreign Minister Brende: ‘Norway likely to align itself with EU’s new restrictive measures against Russia’ 
Brende: Norge tar sikte på å slutte seg til nye EU-tiltak
Norway regrets claims by a UN report linking Norwegian development efforts to commercial interests in Somalia 
Norway regrets claims by a UN report linking Norwegian development efforts to commercial interests in Somalia
It is therefore with serious concern that we understand the Monitoring Group in its Report to the Security Council is conveying some conspiratory allegations, found on the internet, implying that Norwegian assistance to Somalia is a cover to promote the commercial interests of some Norwegian oil companies. 
It is therefore with serious concern that we understand the Monitoring Group in its Report to the Security Council is conveying some conspiratory allegations, found on the internet, implying that Norwegian assistance to Somalia is a cover to promote the commercial interests of some Norwegian oil companies.
This is both unfounded and untrue. 
This is both unfounded and untrue.
We have previously noted that such allegations in particular have been furthered by some groups against the legal assistance that Norway has provided to Somalia in order to help the country comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
We have previously noted that such allegations in particular have been furthered by some groups against the legal assistance that Norway has provided to Somalia in order to help the country comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
However, this is an assistance that was requested both by the then UN Special Representative for Somalia, as well as by several subsequent Somali Governments, in order for Somalia to gain proper and legal rights over its own coastal and continental shelf resources. 
However, this is an assistance that was requested both by the then UN Special Representative for Somalia, as well as by several subsequent Somali Governments, in order for Somalia to gain proper and legal rights over its own coastal and continental shelf resources.
Norway also has assisted a number of other African coastal states in the same field, without ever having experienced any similar kind of allegations. 
Norway also has assisted a number of other African coastal states in the same field, without ever having experienced any similar kind of allegations.
The notion that Norway in this connection somehow should have been collaborating with Kenya to gain access to an area of the continental shelf that rightly belongs to Somalia is also totally unfounded. 
The notion that Norway in this connection somehow should have been collaborating with Kenya to gain access to an area of the continental shelf that rightly belongs to Somalia is also totally unfounded.
When submitting the necessary documentation to the “International Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” in 2009, both Somalia and Kenya jointly confirmed an understanding which guaranteed that the submission would not, and could not, in any way, prejudice the future drawing of the maritime boundaries between the two countries. 
When submitting the necessary documentation to the “International Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” in 2009, both Somalia and Kenya jointly confirmed an understanding which guaranteed that the submission would not, and could not, in any way, prejudice the future drawing of the maritime boundaries between the two countries.
Not issuing such an understanding would in fact have prevented the Commission from considering any Somali data relating its continental shelf. 
Not issuing such an understanding would in fact have prevented the Commission from considering any Somali data relating its continental shelf.
We are aware that the Norwegian oil company Statoil has showed some interest in possible future oil concessions in Kenya, but the Norwegian Government has always advised the company not to apply for such concessions in any areas where there may be a potential legal dispute, and when realizing that this was the case with the mentioned L26 block, Statoil decided not to get involved. 
We are aware that the Norwegian oil company Statoil has showed some interest in possible future oil concessions in Kenya, but the Norwegian Government has always advised the company not to apply for such concessions in any areas where there may be a potential legal dispute, and when realizing that this was the case with the mentioned L26 block, Statoil decided not to get involved.
The case with the company DNO International ASA is slightly different. 
The case with the company DNO International ASA is slightly different.
Although the company has its HQ in Norway, it is an international company with mostly foreign owners, mainly from the Middle East, and the Norwegian Government has no ownership in the company. 
Although the company has its HQ in Norway, it is an international company with mostly foreign owners, mainly from the Middle East, and the Norwegian Government has no ownership in the company.
When the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs became aware of the company’s intention to get into the mentioned and disputed area of Somaliland, the Ministry even warned about the risks that this might entail. 
When the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs became aware of the company’s intention to get into the mentioned and disputed area of Somaliland, the Ministry even warned about the risks that this might entail.
To imply that the Norwegian Government’s assistance to Somalia may be “a cover for commercial interests” is therefore totally unfounded. 
To imply that the Norwegian Government’s assistance to Somalia may be “a cover for commercial interests” is therefore totally unfounded.
This do of course also apply to the cooperation that Norway presently is involved in with the Somali Federal Government, and with other international partners to set up a Special Financing Facility, in order to help speed up the government’s reconstruction efforts. 
This do of course also apply to the cooperation that Norway presently is involved in with the Somali Federal Government, and with other international partners to set up a Special Financing Facility, in order to help speed up the government’s reconstruction efforts.
This SFF is seen as a temporary funding mechanism until the World Bank and other multilateral donors may take over this responsibility, and it is based on the so called “New Deal” principles, in which the Somalia government will have full responsibility for the use of the funds, while the donors may be monitoring that the funds are used properly and not disappear through corruption etc. 
This SFF is seen as a temporary funding mechanism until the World Bank and other multilateral donors may take over this responsibility, and it is based on the so called “New Deal” principles, in which the Somalia government will have full responsibility for the use of the funds, while the donors may be monitoring that the funds are used properly and not disappear through corruption etc.
Norway concerned about violence in Xinjiang 
Norge bekymret over voldsbruk i Xinjiang
The text of the EU declaration is available on the EU website. 
Les EU-erklæringen på EUs nettsider (PDF).
Norway calls on all parties to refrain from further violence. 
Norge henstiller alle parter til å avstå fra ytterligere bruk av vold.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is following the situation closely. 
Utenriksdepartementet følger situasjonen nøye.
The Government also proposes continued operations at the Technology Centre Mongstad (TCM) after the current agreement expires in August 2017. 
Regjeringen foreslår også å fortsette driften av teknologisenteret for CO2-fangst på Mongstad (TCM) etter at inneværende avtaleperiode utløper i august 2017.
In addition, the Government proposes to grant 200 million Norwegian kroner for the research program CLIMIT. 
Videre foreslår regjeringen å bevilge 200 millioner kroner til forskningsprogrammet CLIMIT.
- CCS is one of the Government's five prioritized areas for enhanced national climate action. 
- CO2-håndtering er ett av regjeringens fem prioriterte innsatsområder i klimapolitikken.
The concept studies we initiate now is a necessary step on the path to realizing full-scale CCS in Norway, says Minister of Petroleum and Energy Tord Lien. 
Konseptstudiene vi nå setter i gang er et nødvendig steg på veien mot realisering av fullskala CO2-håndtering i Norge, sier olje- og energiminister Tord Lien.
Gassnova will shortly announce concept studies with an option for FEED (Front End Engineering and Design). 
Gassnova vil om kort tid lyse ut konseptstudier med opsjon på forprosjektering.
The studies will be the basis for the concept decision regarding, inter alia, capture technology, development concepts and infrastructure. 
Studiene vil danne grunnlag for å fatte konseptvalg om blant annet fangstteknologi, utbyggingsløsning og infrastruktur.
The announcement will be based on the feasibility studies that were presented 4 July this year. 
Utlysningen vil bygge på mulighetsstudiene som ble lagt frem 4. juli i år.
The authorities will enter contracts for the financing of concept studies with up to three capture projects. 
Staten legger opp til å inngå konseptstudieavtaler med inntil tre fangstprosjekter.
Other projects on the same maturity level, and which fulfil the criteria in the announcement may also apply. 
Andre prosjekter som er på samme modenhetsnivå og oppfyller kriteriene i utlysningen vil også kunne søke.
For CO2 –storage, the announcement will be based on the development of a storage site east of the Troll-field connected with an on-shore facility for off-loading of CO2. 
For CO2-lagring vil grunnlaget for utlysing være å utvikle et lager øst for Trollfeltet med tilhørende landanlegg.
The concept studies will go on until the autumn 2017. 
Konseptstudiene vil pågå frem til høsten 2017.
Continuation of the project to a FEED phase will be considered in the budget for 2018. 
Videreføring av prosjektet inn i en forprosjektfase vil bli behandlet i budsjettet for 2018.
This facilitates a potential investment decision within the summer 2019. 
Dette legger til rette for at en eventuell investeringsbeslutning kan fattes våren 2019.
The feasibility studies have demonstrated that it is possible to implement all three projects. 
Mulighetsstudiene har vist at det er mulig å gjennomføre alle tre prosjektene.
We now have the opportunity to mature all three capture projects to concept selection, says Tord Lien. 
Vi gir nå rom for at alle tre fangstprosjektene kan modnes frem til konseptvalg, sier Tord Lien.
The agreement between the State, Statoil, Shell and Sasol, which regulates ownership and operations of the Technology Centre Mongstad expires in August 2017. 
Avtalen mellom staten, Statoil, Shell og Sasol som regulerer eierskap og drift av teknologisenteret på Mongstad (TCM) utløper i august i 2017.
The Government proposes to continue the operations at TCM after the expiry of this agreement, and have agreed with Statoil and Shell to continue negotiations about the continuation of the technology centre, initially for another three years. 
Regjeringen foreslår å videreføre driften av TCM etter at avtalen utløper, og er enige med Statoil og Shell om å fortsette forhandlinger om videreføring av teknologisenteret, i første omgang for tre nye år.
The parties aim to reach an agreement within the end of 2016. 
Målet er å bli enige om en avtale innen utgangen av 2016.
Development of a full-scale CCS project 
Viderefører satsingen på CO2-håndtering
The Government proposes to grant 360 million Norwegian kroner for the continued planning of a full-scale CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) demonstration facility in Norway. 
Regjeringen foreslår å bevilge 360 millioner kroner til å videreføre planleggingsarbeidet av et fullskala demonstrasjonsanlegg for CO2-håndtering (CCS) i Norge.
“Developments in eastern Ukraine over the last 24 hours give cause for concern. 
- Utviklingen i Øst-Ukraina det siste døgnet er urovekkende.
It is deeply regrettable that once again people have been killed as a result of the political conflict in the country,” said Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende. 
Det er dypt beklagelig at det igjen er dødsofre som følge av den politiske konflikten i landet, sier utenriksminister Børge Brende.
I urge all parties to refrain from aggressive and confrontational actions that could aggravate the situation,” said Mr Brende. 
Jeg oppfordrer alle parter til å avstå fra aggressive og konfronterende handlinger som kan bidra til å forverre situasjonen, sier Brende.
In Mr Brende’s view, the need for dialogue is now greater than ever in order to prevent a further escalation of the situation. 
Utenriksministeren mener at behovet for dialog nå er større enn noensinne for å forhindre en ytterligere opptrapping av situasjonen.
“The concentration of Russian military forces along the eastern border with Ukraine is further destabilising the situation. 
-Russisk militær styrkekonsentrasjon langs Ukrainas østgrense destabiliserer situasjonen ytterligere.
I reiterate Norway’s strong support for Ukraine’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Jeg gjentar Norges sterke støtte for Ukrainas enhet, suverenitet og territorielle integritet.
Russia must pull its troops back from Ukraine’s borders and desist from all other actions aimed at destabilising Ukraine,” said Mr Brende. 
Russland må trekke tilbake sine styrker fra Ukrainas grenser og oppgi alle andre handlinger som søker å destabilisere Ukraina, sier utenriksministeren.
A meeting between Ukraine, the US, the EU and Russia is scheduled for this week, focusing on the situation in Ukraine. 
Det er planlagt et møte mellom Ukraina, USA, EU og Russland til uken, hvor situasjonen i Ukraina står på dagsordenen.
Deeply worrying developments in eastern Ukraine 
Svært bekymringsfull utvikling i Øst-Ukraina
Army Summit 2010, Akershus Fortress, Oslo, 30 September 2010 
Army Summit 2010, Akershus Slott, Oslo 30. september 2010
"The relationship between poverty and war has three main dimensions. 
- The relationship between poverty and war has three main dimensions.
They have to do with legitimacy, with recruitment and with the weakness of the state. 
They have to do with legitimacy, with recruitment and with the weakness of the state.
Today there are no longer any wars between developed states", Minister of the Environment and International Development Erik Solheim said in his speech on 30 September 2010. 
Today there are no longer any wars between developed states , sa Erik Solheim bl.a. i sin tale 30. september.
Allow me to start with a quote: 
Allow me to start with a quote:
“The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies. 
“The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies.
For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves”. 
For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves”.
This quote is not taken from the programme of some naive, left-wing European fringe party. 
This quote is not taken from the programme of some naive, left-wing European fringe party.
It is a direct quote from the current US National Defence Strategy, launched by the Bush Administration. 
It is a direct quote from the current US National Defence Strategy, launched by the Bush Administration.
It is very much an expression of the thinking of Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, and it also happens to be a perfect reflection of our thinking on the relationship between development policy, on the one hand, and our foreign and security policy, on the other. 
It is very much an expression of the thinking of Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, and it also happens to be a perfect reflection of our thinking on the relationship between development policy, on the one hand, and our foreign and security policy, on the other.
Development policy has for too many decades been dominated by “do-good’ers”. 
Development policy has for too many decades been dominated by “do-good’ers”.
Doing good is good, but I believe it is dangerous to think that development policy can or should be seen as something detached from general foreign and security policy interests. 
Doing good is good, but I believe it is dangerous to think that development policy can or should be seen as something detached from general foreign and security policy interests.
This is an idea that at best should be considered naive. 
This is an idea that at best should be considered naive.
Development policy is not some kind of large-scale state-sponsored philanthropic endeavour. 
Development policy is not some kind of large-scale state-sponsored philanthropic endeavour.
Ever since we came into office, we’ve been very clear on development policy being an integral part of our general foreign policy. 
Ever since we came into office, we’ve been very clear on development policy being an integral part of our general foreign policy.
The last person I spoke with before coming here was Tendai Biti, the Minister of Finance of Zimbabwe. 
The last person I spoke with before coming here was Tendai Biti, the Minister of Finance of Zimbabwe.
In Zimbabwe they have found their solution in the form of a coalition. 
In Zimbabwe they have found their solution in the form of a coalition.
Biti was the mortal enemy of Mugabe. 
Biti was the mortal enemy of Mugabe.
He spent time in prison and was treated badly when imprisoned. 
He spent time in prison and was treated badly when imprisoned.
He came out of prison with the conviction that there was no way to save Zimbabwe except by joining hands with the arch enemy in a government of national unity. 
He came out of prison with the conviction that there was no way to save Zimbabwe except by joining hands with the arch enemy in a government of national unity.
It is a very fragile construction, and no one knows whether the country might again relapse into violence. 
It is a very fragile construction, and no one knows whether the country might again relapse into violence.
But it is their decision, and we cannot tell them to do otherwise. 
But it is their decision, and we cannot tell them to do otherwise.
Fragile states are at the centre of the world’s military concerns. 
Fragile states are at the centre of the world’s military concerns.
They are the most likely scenes of violence, whether on a small or large scale. 
They are the most likely scenes of violence, whether on a small or large scale.
If at the end of the Cold War, somebody would have suggested that twenty years later, Afghanistan would be the main centre of Norway’s military engagement abroad, people would have laughed. 
If at the end of the Cold War, somebody would have suggested that twenty years later, Afghanistan would be the main centre of Norway’s military engagement abroad, people would have laughed.
Nobody saw Afghanistan, or Chad for that matter, as natural security concerns for Norway. 
Nobody saw Afghanistan, or Chad for that matter, as natural security concerns for Norway.
It is a completely new situation, where our focus has been directed towards vulnerable states. 
It is a completely new situation, where our focus has been directed towards vulnerable states.
During the Cold War, these states did not play a very important role on the world scene. 
During the Cold War, these states did not play a very important role on the world scene.
The reason is rather brutal: there was no dictator in Africa or any other place that was considered too cruel to be supported by one or other of the two superpowers. 
The reason is rather brutal: there was no dictator in Africa or any other place that was considered too cruel to be supported by one or other of the two superpowers.
Many of these dictators had no political programme beyond keeping themselves in power. 
Many of these dictators had no political programme beyond keeping themselves in power.
Some of them switched easily from market liberalism to communism, when this seemed to be advantageous. 
Some of them switched easily from market liberalism to communism, when this seemed to be advantageous.
Western concepts of ideology bore very little meaning to most of them. 
Western concepts of ideology bore very little meaning to most of them.
During the Cold War, there was no real fragile states, because they were all propped up by one of the two superpowers. 
During the Cold War, there was no real fragile states, because they were all propped up by one of the two superpowers.
When the Cold War was over, these states lost their strategic importance and were left to their own devices, hence the large number of fragile states the world community has to deal with today. 
When the Cold War was over, these states lost their strategic importance and were left to their own devices, hence the large number of fragile states the world community has to deal with today.
Fragile states come in many versions. 
Fragile states come in many versions.
Somalia is hardly a functioning state at all – we could label it as a failed state – and then there are states like Zimbabwe, which is a very weak state. 
Somalia is hardly a functioning state at all – we could label it as a failed state – and then there are states like Zimbabwe, which is a very weak state.
My interest lies very much in the relationship between poverty and war. 
My interest lies very much in the relationship between poverty and war.
In my view there it is a threefold relationship. 
In my view there it is a threefold relationship.
The first one is the issue of legitimacy. 
The first one is the issue of legitimacy.
If a society is very unjust, if there are a lot of grievances and suffering, it is much easier to justify a rebellion, whatever the real motives of the rebels might be. 
If a society is very unjust, if there are a lot of grievances and suffering, it is much easier to justify a rebellion, whatever the real motives of the rebels might be.