natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The G20 meetings build support and commitment that otherwise would not exist for international development strategies. 
The G20 meetings build support and commitment that otherwise would not exist for international development strategies.
However, the multiplication of international ad hoc organizations also poses a variety of much less positive consequences. 
However, the multiplication of international ad hoc organizations also poses a variety of much less positive consequences.
First, the diffuse and piecemeal nature of today’s global governance has meant that too many of its main organizations and summits lack the clear mandates and transparent decision-making processes necessary to effectively address the issues they are designed to resolve. 
First, the diffuse and piecemeal nature of today’s global governance has meant that too many of its main organizations and summits lack the clear mandates and transparent decision-making processes necessary to effectively address the issues they are designed to resolve.
Take the G20 as an example. 
Take the G20 as an example.
It is arguably one of the most influential organizations dealing with international financial and economic coordination. 
It is arguably one of the most influential organizations dealing with international financial and economic coordination.
It has become a central stage for coordinating global policy decisions. 
It has become a central stage for coordinating global policy decisions.
However, it has no explicit mandate, nor any clear, collective decision-making and accountability mechanism. 
However, it has no explicit mandate, nor any clear, collective decision-making and accountability mechanism.
Instead, the leader of its host nation largely influences the agenda of its conferences. 
Instead, the leader of its host nation largely influences the agenda of its conferences.
Additionally, many of the products of summit-mania face real legitimacy issues. 
Additionally, many of the products of summit-mania face real legitimacy issues.
In a global political arena composed of sovereign states, the perceived legitimacy of a policy is often based on whether effected states have had the ability to voice their views through sufficient representation in the policy-making process. 
In a global political arena composed of sovereign states, the perceived legitimacy of a policy is often based on whether effected states have had the ability to voice their views through sufficient representation in the policy-making process.
From this perspective, the G20 again exemplifies the structural weakness of many summit-mania institutions. 
From this perspective, the G20 again exemplifies the structural weakness of many summit-mania institutions.
Even though it represents 80 percent of the world’s GDP, its members only represent 60 percent of the world population and less than 15 percent of sovereign states. 
Even though it represents 80 percent of the world’s GDP, its members only represent 60 percent of the world population and less than 15 percent of sovereign states.
This limited representation is problematic in principle as well as in practice, as it subverts the legitimacy of the G20 and thereby hampers its effectiveness. 
This limited representation is problematic in principle as well as in practice, as it subverts the legitimacy of the G20 and thereby hampers its effectiveness.
Take, for example, the G20’s proposed austerity measures in response to the recent economic crisis in Greece. 
Take, for example, the G20’s proposed austerity measures in response to the recent economic crisis in Greece.
These policies, despite their technical merits, faced widespread distrust within Greece, which did not play a substantive role in their design. 
These policies, despite their technical merits, faced widespread distrust within Greece, which did not play a substantive role in their design.
The lack of channels for participation in G20 decision-making gives Greece and most of the countries of the world little compelling reason to follow the institution’s initiatives if they are not in these states’ immediate short-term interests. 
The lack of channels for participation in G20 decision-making gives Greece and most of the countries of the world little compelling reason to follow the institution’s initiatives if they are not in these states’ immediate short-term interests.
In this sense, far from being luxuries to ignore in times of crisis, perceptions of legitimacy based on representativeness are key factors in determining whether global organizations are able to help steer the world economy toward calmer waters. 
In this sense, far from being luxuries to ignore in times of crisis, perceptions of legitimacy based on representativeness are key factors in determining whether global organizations are able to help steer the world economy toward calmer waters.
Lack of institutional legitimacy also points to a third concern: that the failure to solve pressing global problems of economic security and stability will push countries away from international cooperation and toward new forms of nationalism and protectionism. 
Lack of institutional legitimacy also points to a third concern: that the failure to solve pressing global problems of economic security and stability will push countries away from international cooperation and toward new forms of nationalism and protectionism.
This tendency arose in the years leading up to World War I, and it has experienced resurgence in parts of the world today. 
This tendency arose in the years leading up to World War I, and it has experienced resurgence in parts of the world today.
If the issues that summit-mania reflects are not solved collectively, countries will increasingly seek to solve them on their own, potentially strengthening economic protectionism and escalating international tensions. 
If the issues that summit-mania reflects are not solved collectively, countries will increasingly seek to solve them on their own, potentially strengthening economic protectionism and escalating international tensions.
This potential speaks to the final problem of summit-mania: its significant but hidden opportunity cost. 
This potential speaks to the final problem of summit-mania: its significant but hidden opportunity cost.
Over-investment in diffuse networks of intergovernmental organizations and ad hoc meetings diverts energy from more established venues, dilutes global focus, and fragments the debate and decisions-making processes around global issues. 
Over-investment in diffuse networks of intergovernmental organizations and ad hoc meetings diverts energy from more established venues, dilutes global focus, and fragments the debate and decisions-making processes around global issues.
Instead of investing resources and political will into reforming existing universal institutions and building new, robust ones, we have created a poorly coordinated network unequipped to address many of today’s major problems. 
Instead of investing resources and political will into reforming existing universal institutions and building new, robust ones, we have created a poorly coordinated network unequipped to address many of today’s major problems.
Taming Summit-Mania Summit-mania, in sum, is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. 
Taming Summit-Mania Summit-mania, in sum, is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon.
The diversification of forums of global dialogue is necessary in allowing us to deal with an increasingly complex web of interests and challenges. 
The diversification of forums of global dialogue is necessary in allowing us to deal with an increasingly complex web of interests and challenges.
Yet, at the same time, it prevents us from finding common and systematic solutions to many of the global issues of our time. 
Yet, at the same time, it prevents us from finding common and systematic solutions to many of the global issues of our time.
How, then, should we respond? 
How, then, should we respond?
One thing we certainly should not do is wait for another systemic crisis so great that, as in the past, it has the capacity to push the global community to unite and explicitly restructure international governance. 
One thing we certainly should not do is wait for another systemic crisis so great that, as in the past, it has the capacity to push the global community to unite and explicitly restructure international governance.
In our era, this mode of institution building is counterproductive. 
In our era, this mode of institution building is counterproductive.
Yet, we should also reject the idea that we must simply accept today’s diffuse and undirected governing system. 
Yet, we should also reject the idea that we must simply accept today’s diffuse and undirected governing system.
As the old saying goes, we must strive to rebuild the ship at sea, plank by plank. 
As the old saying goes, we must strive to rebuild the ship at sea, plank by plank.
We need to refine and restructure the existing global architecture so that our various groups, gatherings, initiatives, and mechanisms amplify, rather than hinder, collective efficiency. 
We need to refine and restructure the existing global architecture so that our various groups, gatherings, initiatives, and mechanisms amplify, rather than hinder, collective efficiency.
The crucial question to ask is how might we harness the considerable, but manic, energy of summit-mania and channel it into real global governance? 
The crucial question to ask is how might we harness the considerable, but manic, energy of summit-mania and channel it into real global governance?
Allow me to suggest a few concrete steps. 
Allow me to suggest a few concrete steps.
First, we must strengthen the foundational institutions of today’s multilateral order. 
First, we must strengthen the foundational institutions of today’s multilateral order.
For better or for worse, the core institutions of the Bretton Woods system and the various UN bodies symbolize the norms and practices of international order. 
For better or for worse, the core institutions of the Bretton Woods system and the various UN bodies symbolize the norms and practices of international order.
Our global system of trade and mobility—and the economic prosperity and relative peace that accompany it—would not be possible without these institutions. 
Our global system of trade and mobility—and the economic prosperity and relative peace that accompany it—would not be possible without these institutions.
The G8, G20, or any other minimalist gathering of states cannot and should not replace the existing universal institutions of post-World War II global governance. 
The G8, G20, or any other minimalist gathering of states cannot and should not replace the existing universal institutions of post-World War II global governance.
However, the established institutions are in need of significant renovation and updating if they are to continue to play this key role. 
However, the established institutions are in need of significant renovation and updating if they are to continue to play this key role.
In particular, if the UN Security Council is to significantly influence our multi-polar future, it must become more legitimate in the eyes of its general membership and the greater world population. 
In particular, if the UN Security Council is to significantly influence our multi-polar future, it must become more legitimate in the eyes of its general membership and the greater world population.
This cannot happen without increasing the number of permanent and rotating members over time to make them more broadly representative and reflective of emerging distributions of power. 
This cannot happen without increasing the number of permanent and rotating members over time to make them more broadly representative and reflective of emerging distributions of power.
Security Council members have already stated they support this solution. 
Security Council members have already stated they support this solution.
Concerted US-Chinese leadership on this issue, however, is required to move from theoretical declarations of support to the next stage of identifying and testing different concrete models to see which is most functional. 
Concerted US-Chinese leadership on this issue, however, is required to move from theoretical declarations of support to the next stage of identifying and testing different concrete models to see which is most functional.
Secondly, we must encourage the most influential organizations of summit-mania to play a more complementary role in events with established bodies such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. 
Secondly, we must encourage the most influential organizations of summit-mania to play a more complementary role in events with established bodies such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund.
The most promising candidate for helping achieve this goal is the G20. 
The most promising candidate for helping achieve this goal is the G20.
Since its establishment as a response to the crisis in Asia in 1999, it has displayed its potential and influence in building political consensus during the recent, global financial crisis. 
Since its establishment as a response to the crisis in Asia in 1999, it has displayed its potential and influence in building political consensus during the recent, global financial crisis.
Though it has no clear mandate as such, there nonetheless seems to be broad agreement that the G20’s prime business should be to address global economic and financial issues, and it should continue to help steer the world economy through the current crisis with the same efficiency it displayed in the hectic months of 2008. 
Though it has no clear mandate as such, there nonetheless seems to be broad agreement that the G20’s prime business should be to address global economic and financial issues, and it should continue to help steer the world economy through the current crisis with the same efficiency it displayed in the hectic months of 2008.
It is a self-appointed group, and we should not seek for it to become an organization that replaces or reproduces the decision-making and functions of existing universal institutions. 
It is a self-appointed group, and we should not seek for it to become an organization that replaces or reproduces the decision-making and functions of existing universal institutions.
Rather, the G20 should function more like a brokering house – a space where influential and interested actors brainstorm, debate, and reach consensus on broad road map plans to be implemented by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations. 
Rather, the G20 should function more like a brokering house – a space where influential and interested actors brainstorm, debate, and reach consensus on broad road map plans to be implemented by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations.
In this sense, its role would be comparable to the ‘green room’ at the World Trade Organization where influential actors explore possible solutions and find common ground. 
In this sense, its role would be comparable to the ‘green room’ at the World Trade Organization where influential actors explore possible solutions and find common ground.
These informal deliberations would help stimulate progress on other key institutional agendas. 
These informal deliberations would help stimulate progress on other key institutional agendas.
Three important global negotiation processes the G20 could focus on in this capacity are: 1) forging agreement on the ongoing Doha negotiations; 2) encouraging a range of stepwise agreements on climate change within the UN framework, such as the one the United States proposed last winter with regard to “short lived polluters”; and 3) testing whether there is extensive support for new disarmament agreements. 
Three important global negotiation processes the G20 could focus on in this capacity are: 1) forging agreement on the ongoing Doha negotiations; 2) encouraging a range of stepwise agreements on climate change within the UN framework, such as the one the United States proposed last winter with regard to “short lived polluters”; and 3) testing whether there is extensive support for new disarmament agreements.
More informal meetings, such as the gathering of foreign ministers in Los Cabos before the G20 summit in Mexico, could cultivate these types of limited agreements. 
More informal meetings, such as the gathering of foreign ministers in Los Cabos before the G20 summit in Mexico, could cultivate these types of limited agreements.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, if the G20 is to become more efficient and effective, it needs to reform its basic structure to improve its representativeness and legitimacy. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, if the G20 is to become more efficient and effective, it needs to reform its basic structure to improve its representativeness and legitimacy.
The G20 cannot take the necessary steps to increase its efficacy—for example, inheriting ultimate authority over the International Monetary Fund, as some have suggested—in a context in which its legitimacy is questioned. 
The G20 cannot take the necessary steps to increase its efficacy—for example, inheriting ultimate authority over the International Monetary Fund, as some have suggested—in a context in which its legitimacy is questioned.
The G20 itself has explicitly recognized this challenge and has increasingly sought to respond in an ad hoc way by selectively inviting additional countries to participate in certain meetings. 
The G20 itself has explicitly recognized this challenge and has increasingly sought to respond in an ad hoc way by selectively inviting additional countries to participate in certain meetings.
Though this inclusion is a positive move, and the G20 is now rather “Almost G30,” is not enough. 
Though this inclusion is a positive move, and the G20 is now rather “Almost G30,” is not enough.
The G20 should additional explore applying in a systematic way some of the representative mechanisms used by the International Monetary Fun in order to build a legitimacy rooted in robust representation. 
The G20 should additional explore applying in a systematic way some of the representative mechanisms used by the International Monetary Fun in order to build a legitimacy rooted in robust representation.
Achieving these reforms will not be easy. 
Achieving these reforms will not be easy.
The urgent concern of addressing a weakening global economy has continually sidelined internal G20 reform, even when host countries explicitly prioritize the issue. 
The urgent concern of addressing a weakening global economy has continually sidelined internal G20 reform, even when host countries explicitly prioritize the issue.
While this choice is understandable, it is crucial to recognize that we cannot afford to allow improving our global infrastructure to slip off our radar. 
While this choice is understandable, it is crucial to recognize that we cannot afford to allow improving our global infrastructure to slip off our radar.
Real organizational reform of the G20 would be a sign of much needed vitality in the world of summit-mania, and it is the single most important investment the international community can make for a stable economic global order. 
Real organizational reform of the G20 would be a sign of much needed vitality in the world of summit-mania, and it is the single most important investment the international community can make for a stable economic global order.
Additionally, a more representative UN Security Council is the best instrument available to prevent global power-games and to minimize future threats such as cyber-warfare and nuclear proliferation. 
Additionally, a more representative UN Security Council is the best instrument available to prevent global power-games and to minimize future threats such as cyber-warfare and nuclear proliferation.
There is great potential for the United States, Europe, and the BRICS countries to collaborate in reforming summit-mania. 
There is great potential for the United States, Europe, and the BRICS countries to collaborate in reforming summit-mania.
In fact, substantive change is likely to be impossible without these actors finding common ground and championing restructuring efforts. 
In fact, substantive change is likely to be impossible without these actors finding common ground and championing restructuring efforts.
It is in these superpowers’ mutual, long-term economic interests to address the current challenges of global governance and take steps to create a more effective and unified international order. 
It is in these superpowers’ mutual, long-term economic interests to address the current challenges of global governance and take steps to create a more effective and unified international order.
Their joint signal of support for real G20 and UN Security Council reform could decisively place the issue on the international agenda. 
Their joint signal of support for real G20 and UN Security Council reform could decisively place the issue on the international agenda.
These measures alone, of course, will not tame summit-mania completely. 
These measures alone, of course, will not tame summit-mania completely.
However, in a world where we must rebuild the ship of international order plank by plan, they are important first steps that will help begin to channel the energy of summit-mania toward more productive and constructive policy-making. 
However, in a world where we must rebuild the ship of international order plank by plan, they are important first steps that will help begin to channel the energy of summit-mania toward more productive and constructive policy-making.
Taming Summit-Mania 
Taming Summit-Mania
The system of sovereign states itself was inaugurated by one of the first modern diplomatic congresses, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, whose impetus was the end of the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War. 
The system of sovereign states itself was inaugurated by one of the first modern diplomatic congresses, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, whose impetus was the end of the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War.
Manuel Castells received the Holberg Prize 2012 
Manuel Castells mottok Holbergprisen for 2012
I congratulate Professor Castells with the prize, says Minister for Education and Research Kristin Halvorsen. 
Jeg gratulerer Professor Castells med prisen, sier kunnskapsminister Kristin Halvorsen.
This year’s Holberg Prize Laureate, Manuel Castells is professor of sociology and communications studies at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, University of California, Berkeley and at the Open University of Catalonia. 
Årets Holbergprisvinner, Manuel Castells, er professor i sosiologi og kommunikasjonsstudier ved University of Southern California, Los Angeles, University of California, Berkeley, og ved Open University of Catalonia.
Among his most important works is the trilogy The Information Age, in which he analyzes how new information technology affects all parts of society. 
Blant hans viktigste arbeider er triologien The Information Age, som analyserer hvordan ny informasjonsteknologi påvirker alle deler av samfunnet.
The Nils Klim award is worth 250.000 NOK and is awarded annually to young Nordic researchers in the fields of humanities, social sciences, law and theology. 
Nils Klim-prisen er på 250.000 kroner og deles ut årlig til yngre nordiske forskere innen humaniora, samfunnsvitenskap, jus og teologi.
Sara Hobolt has already achieved impressing academic results in comparative politics, and I hope that this award will inspire her in her future research career. 
- Sara Hobolt har allerede oppnådd imponerende akademiske resultater innen sammenliknende politikk, og jeg håper denne prisen vil inspirere henne i hennes videre forskerkarriere.
I also hope that this can serve as inspiration for other young researchers, says Minister for Education and Research Kristin Halvorsen. 
Jeg håper også at dette kan være til inspirasjon for andre unge forskere, sier Halvorsen.
Marine research funding tripled in ten years 
Marin forskingsinnsats tredobla på ti år
The report for 2009 is now available. 
No ligg rapporten for 2009 føre.