natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
But now we see China taking active part in the G20, and we see China as a component of the G2 when we talk about US–China relations. 
But now we see China taking active part in the G20, and we see China as a component of the G2 when we talk about US–China relations.
We have an economic power with the ability to project its influence. 
We have an economic power with the ability to project its influence.
And I think history has taught us that countries with such economic power will project an influence – but in what way? 
And I think history has taught us that countries with such economic power will project an influence – but in what way?
China will probably do so differently from other major global players. 
China will probably do so differently from other major global players.
But how will it do it? 
But how will it do it?
How will China decide to promote its power regionally? 
How will China decide to promote its power regionally?
You can feel its influence as you travel through the regional capitals in Asia. 
You can feel its influence as you travel through the regional capitals in Asia.
What effect will this have globally? 
What effect will this have globally?
I was told by a researcher on China that China has not lost a soldier in foreign operations since 1979, i.e. since the Vietnam War. 
I was told by a researcher on China that China has not lost a soldier in foreign operations since 1979, i.e. since the Vietnam War.
I think this observation shows a country that is projecting its influence through other means. 
I think this observation shows a country that is projecting its influence through other means.
At the same time, we know there are other major powers that are losing soldiers in this way. 
At the same time, we know there are other major powers that are losing soldiers in this way.
So, we see a conquest – I would say – by involvement and investment in Africa, in Latin America and in Asia in connection with natural resources and through other means. 
So, we see a conquest – I would say – by involvement and investment in Africa, in Latin America and in Asia in connection with natural resources and through other means.
I wonder what exactly does this huge economic performance really mean – in terms of political influence? 
I wonder what exactly does this huge economic performance really mean – in terms of political influence?
We see it in Afghanistan, where China is responsible for an extraordinary investment – 3.5 billion dollars in a copper plant, with a dedicated railway to transport this resource to China. 
We see it in Afghanistan, where China is responsible for an extraordinary investment – 3.5 billion dollars in a copper plant, with a dedicated railway to transport this resource to China.
But its political involvement is a big question. 
But its political involvement is a big question.
Afghanistan’s instability is in this region, it is not directly our instability – but it could be China’s instability. 
Afghanistan’s instability is in this region, it is not directly our instability – but it could be China’s instability.
So how will China respond to this? 
So how will China respond to this?
We know that China knows very well that it may be have a secondary role as a future focus for trans-national terrorist attention. 
We know that China knows very well that it may be have a secondary role as a future focus for trans-national terrorist attention.
Now China does not have a primary role, but it could take on a primary role through its international performance. 
Now China does not have a primary role, but it could take on a primary role through its international performance.
How will China guard its interests and how many of these interests are at stake? 
How will China guard its interests and how many of these interests are at stake?
For a country that is no longer just a passenger, but now has to take responsibility, in the driver seat, what course will it take? 
For a country that is no longer just a passenger, but now has to take responsibility, in the driver seat, what course will it take?
What will map will it follow? 
What will map will it follow?
And what will its intentions be? 
And what will its intentions be?
On climate change, of course, China will be the key. 
On climate change, of course, China will be the key.
No country is worse hit by climate change than China. 
No country is worse hit by climate change than China.
So if China takes a long perspective of things, it will have to look beyond its immediate interests and do something about it. 
So if China takes a long perspective of things, it will have to look beyond its immediate interests and do something about it.
On trade, I think we saw this, as I said, in the WTO and the Doha round. 
On trade, I think we saw this, as I said, in the WTO and the Doha round.
Another thing we saw, was a group of developing countries that feared not so much US pressure when they opened up their markets, but protection against the Chinese export machine. 
Another thing we saw, was a group of developing countries that feared not so much US pressure when they opened up their markets, but protection against the Chinese export machine.
And we received, as Ministers, letters from the car industry in India, fearing competition from the Chinese car industry, i.e. letters not from Europe, but from India. 
And we received, as Ministers, letters from the car industry in India, fearing competition from the Chinese car industry, i.e. letters not from Europe, but from India.
So, we see new kinds of complex alliances. 
So, we see new kinds of complex alliances.
And then, of course, as I said, when you look at the regional dimension in and around China, in Asia, all those tensions, for how long can China afford not to take a more active role? 
And then, of course, as I said, when you look at the regional dimension in and around China, in Asia, all those tensions, for how long can China afford not to take a more active role?
From Sri Lanka to Afghanistan, including the instability of Pakistan, a country with which China has enjoyed a very privileged and substantial relationship for a long time, how long can China not be in the driver’s seat in relation to all these things? 
From Sri Lanka to Afghanistan, including the instability of Pakistan, a country with which China has enjoyed a very privileged and substantial relationship for a long time, how long can China not be in the driver’s seat in relation to all these things?
And then, its relations with the United States, will they be stable and how will they evolve? 
And then, its relations with the United States, will they be stable and how will they evolve?
How are these countries linked together – in this China–US relationship – where the one’s vulnerability is part of the other’s strength, and visa versa. 
How are these countries linked together – in this China–US relationship – where the one’s vulnerability is part of the other’s strength, and visa versa.
And then, of course, on to Chinas vulnerability, and my last point. 
And then, of course, on to Chinas vulnerability, and my last point.
We should ask ourselves: Have we become star-struck by China? 
We should ask ourselves: Have we become star-struck by China?
We tend to overlook the tremendous vulnerabilities of this country, which is so much more than a country. 
We tend to overlook the tremendous vulnerabilities of this country, which is so much more than a country.
In social, environmental, political and economic terms. 
In social, environmental, political and economic terms.
Yes, there can be no democracy without a market economy. 
Yes, there can be no democracy without a market economy.
But it is still an open question whether you can have a market economy without a democracy. 
But it is still an open question whether you can have a market economy without a democracy.
In the short term – yes, you can. 
In the short term – yes, you can.
Franco could, Pinochet could. 
Franco could, Pinochet could.
But what about the long term? 
But what about the long term?
What will this do to citizens living in a country with such huge disparities between the poor and the affluent? 
What will this do to citizens living in a country with such huge disparities between the poor and the affluent?
How will they view this? 
How will they view this?
How will the party and the leadership deal with diversity? 
How will the party and the leadership deal with diversity?
And how will the affluent people with education deal with their own individual rights? 
And how will the affluent people with education deal with their own individual rights?
Their global, universal rights? 
Their global, universal rights?
And what effect will this have on the understanding of universal human rights and the role that China is taking on in the global arena, in terms of defining what universal global rights are? 
And what effect will this have on the understanding of universal human rights and the role that China is taking on in the global arena, in terms of defining what universal global rights are?
We are saying that freedom of expression and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are “Western values”. 
We are saying that freedom of expression and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are “Western values”.
They are global values. 
They are global values.
They are universal. 
They are universal.
But we know that the interpretation of universal rights depends on who out there is defining, interpreting, speaking out for them. 
But we know that the interpretation of universal rights depends on who out there is defining, interpreting, speaking out for them.
So what will it mean to have China on board this debate too? 
So what will it mean to have China on board this debate too?
So here are a few questions, and I think the questions are as stimulating as the answers. 
So here are a few questions, and I think the questions are as stimulating as the answers.
But we will have some indications of the answers today from our speakers, and then we will have an interesting debate in the panel. 
But we will have some indications of the answers today from our speakers, and then we will have an interesting debate in the panel.
So, thank you and welcome to this seminar. 
So, thank you and welcome to this seminar.
China Forum 
Møte i Kinaforum
Have an enjoyable afternoon. 
Have an enjoyable afternoon.
The Beijing Olympics have put a spotlight on China. 
OL i Beijing har satt et flomlys på Kina.
The Chinese leaders must have known that this would happen when they applied to host the Games. 
At det ville skje, må kinesiske ledere ha visst da de søkte lekene.
China has invited the world to Beijing in connection with the Games. 
Gjennom OL har Kina invitert verden til Beijing.
And the world will watch, listen and speak out about what it sees. 
Og verden vil se, lytte og si fra om det de ser.
That’s how it is in our open world. 
Slik er vår åpne verden.
It is revealing amazing progress – not only in economic and industrial terms, but also social. 
Det belyser utrolige fremskritt, økonomisk og industrielt, men også sosialt.
China’s leaders have chosen to involve China in international economic and political cooperation. 
Og det er et valg Kinas ledere har tatt, å bringe Kina inn i internasjonalt samkvem, økonomisk og politisk.
The question of whether there should be a boycott of the entire Olympic Games or parts of them should, in my view, be considered in such a perspective. 
Spørsmålet om en boikott av hele eller deler av OL må etter min mening sees i et slikt perspektiv.
Is it the best means of positioning ourselves for our long-term relations with China, which we will want to continue developing after the Olympic flame has been extinguished? 
Er det slik vi best stiller oss for et langsiktig forhold til Kina, et forhold som skal utvikles også etter at den olympiske ild slukker?
I don’t think so. 
Jeg tror ikke det.
But today I cannot see that a boycott would be a justified or effective tool. 
Men jeg kan ikke i dag se at boikott er et berettiget eller effektivt virkemiddel.
It would not make our message more forceful. 
Det styrker ikke budskapet.
The boycott debate is deflecting attention from China to the finer points of the various countries’ positions on the opening ceremony on 8 August. 
Boikottdiskusjonen tar fokus bort fra Kina og over på nyanser i ulike lands mulige posisjoner omkring åpningsseremonien 8. august.
We must put the focus back on China. 
Vi må få fokus tilbake på Kina.
Today’s China covers the span from the ox carts used in the villages to the astronaut Yang Liwei’s space mission. 
Dagens Kina presenterer seg med en spennvidde fra oksekjerra på landsbygda til astronauten Yang Liweis romferd.
Just take climate change. 
Tenk bare på klima.
China is important for Norway, and there has been broad political agreement on Norway’s China policy for many years. 
Kina er viktig for Norge, og vi har i mange år hatt en bred politisk enighet om Norges Kina-politikk.
The Government’s China Strategy provides a framework for broad cooperation based on increased contact between the authorities and a more strategic focus on the many interfaces that have developed in the areas of trade, education and research. 
Regjeringens Kina-strategi legger rammen for et bredt samarbeid preget av økt myndighetskontakt og mer strategisk fokus på de mange kontaktflater som har oppstått innenfor handel, kultur, utdanning og forskning.
China is making tremendous progress. 
Kina gjør formidable fremskritt.
Hardly a day goes by without our using a whole array of products made in China. 
Det går knapt en dag uten at vi bruker tallrike produkter fra Kina.
But China is also facing tremendous challenges. 
Men Kina møter også formidable utfordringer.
Millions are being lifted out of poverty, but millions of others are subject to economic marginalisation and environmental degradation. 
Millioner løftes ut av fattigdom, men andre millioner er rammet av økonomisk marginalisering og miljøødeleggelser.
China is a patchwork of minorities and ethnic groups. 
Kina har et lappeteppe av minoriteter og folkegrupper.
To the outside world, China appears as the self-possessed mastodon. 
Utad er Kina den stramme mastodonten.
Under the surface, the stability is not quite so unshakeable. 
Under overflaten er stabiliteten langt mindre solid.
The economy has skyrocketed, and many people are better off. 
Økonomien har skutt fart, mange har fått bedre råd.
But China still lacks one of the basic prerequisites for a sustainable market economy: the rule of law, which guarantees predictable rights that can be tested by an independent judiciary. 
Men Kina mangler fortsatt en nøkkelforutsetning for at markedsøkonomien skal fungere over tid; en rettsstat med forutsigbare og etterprøvbare rettigheter i uavhengige domstoler.
Increasingly often we see Chinese leaders who recognise these challenges. 
I økende grad møter vi kinesiske ledere som erkjenner disse utfordringene.
This is something new. 
Det er nytt.
Our dialogue with China is robust enough now for us to take up all aspects of our relations, even those issues where we take a critical view. 
Vår dialog med Kina er nå robust nok til å ta opp alle sider av våre forbindelser, også de sakene der vi er kritiske.
But many ask whether the dialogue is producing results. 
Men blir det resultater av dialogen, spør mange.
We have no exact tool for measuring this. 
Vi får neppe et eksakt måleinstrument for det.
My definite impression is that the dialogue is producing results, and that the extensive exchanges between Norwegian and Chinese institutions that have been going on for a number of years have had an effect. 
Mitt bestemte inntrykk er at dialog gir resultater og at omfattende utveksling mellom norske og kinesiske institusjoner over flere år har betydning.
China is still feeling its way, in spite of the self-assurance it shows on occasion. 
Kina søker fortsatt etter sin vei, mye mer enn den tidvise selvsikkerheten skulle tilsi.
It is therefore in our interests that they keep the door open to such exchanges. 
Vi er tjent med at de holder døren oppe for slik utveksling.
Human rights and the principles of the rule of law are one of the priorities set out in the Norwegian Government’s China Strategy. 
Regjeringens Kina-strategi har menneskerettigheter og rettstatsprinsipper som ett av fem satsingsområder.
In its latest report on the Olympic Games and human rights, Amnesty calls attention to trends in China that give cause for concern. 
Amnestys siste rapport om OL og menneskerettigheter peker på utviklingstrekk i Kina som er bekymringsfulle.
We are voicing these concerns. 
Det gir vi uttrykk for.
But we must not lose sight of the change that has taken place. 
Men la oss ikke bli historieløse.
It can hardly be denied that China has made progress in this area. 
Det er vanskelig å bestride at Kina over tid har opplevd fremskritt på dette feltet.
China lived with Mao for almost 30 years. 
Kina levde nesten 30 år med Mao.
Now they’ve been living without him for more than 30. 
Nå har de levd vel 30 år uten.
A lawyer I met during my visit to China in January put it this way: “Thirty years ago, China was governed by human’s will. 
En jurist jeg traff under mitt besøk i januar sa: «For tretti år siden ble Kina styrt av menneskelig vilje.
Now we are on the way to becoming a society governed by law.” 
Nå er vi på vei mot et samfunn styrt av lov».
A number of China’s judges still have no legal training, and human rights do not have a prominent place in university law programmes in China. 
Fortsatt mangler flere av Kinas dommere en juridisk utdannelse, og menneskerettigheter har ikke noe sentral plass i jussopplæringen i Kina.
The first Chinese-language textbook on international human rights was published in 2002. 
Den første kinesisk-språklige læreboken om internasjonale menneskerettigheter kom i 2002.
It was produced by the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights and its Chinese partners. 
Den ble utarbeidet av Det norske senter for menneskerettigheter og kinesiske partnere.
These contacts were established through the Norwegian-Chinese human rights dialogue, which has been going on since 1997. 
Disse kontaktene ble etablert under den kinesisk-norske menneskerettighetsdialog som har pågått siden 1997.
The Centre has trained more than 200 Chinese teachers in human rights, and courses in human rights are offered at around 20 Chinese universities. 
Senteret har trent over 200 lærere i menneskerettigheter, og det tilbys kurs i menneskerettigheter ved ca 20 universiteter.
Small steps, you might say. 
Små skritt?
Yes, but they are giving the Chinese people new tools in their struggle to promote respect for human rights 
Ja, men på denne måten får kinesiske borgere nye verktøy i sin kamp for økt respekt for menneskerettighetene.
Earlier this year, a new law on employment contracts entered into force in China. 
Tidligere i år trådte en ny lov om arbeidsavtaler i kraft i Kina.
There was no such legislation in China 30 years ago. 
For 30 år siden fantes ikke slikt lovverk.
The law is important for Chinese workers, for example because it provides better protection against dismissal. 
Loven er viktig for kinesiske arbeidstakere, blant annet i form av bedret oppsigelsesvern.
Today we know that the experience gained by Chinese experts from their project cooperation with the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) on workers’ rights was an important source of inspiration in this process. 
Vi vet i dag at erfaringer kinesiske eksperter har hentet fra prosjektsamarbeid om trepartssamarbeid og arbeidstakeres rettigheter med LO og NHO har tjent som viktig inspirasjon i dette arbeidet.
Such cooperation rarely makes the headlines. 
Slik kontakt når sjelden avisoverskriftene.
China’s legislation will not be patterned on Norwegian legislation. 
Kinas lovverk blir ikke en kopi av det norske.
But the Chinese are seeking experience they can draw on. 
Men kineserne søker etter erfaringer de kan trekke veksler på.
It is in our interests that our experience is put to use. 
Vi er tjent med at våre erfaringer blir lyttet til.
In other areas there are no laws, or those that do exist provide inadequate protection for the rights of individuals. 
På andre felt finnes ikke lover eller de som finnes gir svakt vern om individets rettigheter.
Civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression, religion and organisation, in particular must be considerably strengthened. 
Særlig de sivile og politiske rettigheter, som ytrings-, religions- og organisasjonsfrihet, må styrkes betraktelig.
The re-education camps have yet to be closed. 
Det gjenstår å få avviklet bruken av omskoleringsleire.
Minorities have yet to be afforded genuine protection of their culture and religion. 
Det gjenstår å gi minoriteter reell beskyttelse av sin kultur og sin religion.
Freedom of expression in China is under pressure. 
Ytringsfriheten i Kina er under press.
The extensive use of the death penalty is also a cause of concern. 
Utstrakt bruk av dødsstraff bekymrer også.
And I repeat, China must develop independent courts. 
Og igjen; Kina må utvikle uavhengige domstoler.
The reality in the 21st century is that China will be an influential key player in the international community. 
Dette er realiteten i det 21. århundre: Kina vil være en tung og sentral aktør i det internasjonale samfunnet.
We must position ourselves so that we can respond optimally to future developments in China. 
Vi må stille oss slik at vi kommer best mulig i inngrep med Kinas utvikling.
Not in the naive belief that Norway’s voice can determine the course. 
Ikke i naiv tro på at Norges stemme kan snu kursen.
But to help to integrate China into the international community in such a way that the country finds that it can achieve stability and development by acting in a responsible manner. 
Men for å bidra til å veve Kina inn i et internasjonalt samfunn der landet kan oppleve stabilitet og utvikling ved å opptre ansvarlig.
We must take advantage of the spotlight the Olympic Games are putting on the positive and negative aspects of Chinese society. 
Vi må benytte det flomlyset OL kaster på sol- og skyggesidene.
But we must also make sure that we can continue our dialogue once the 17 days of sporting events are over. 
Men vi må også stille oss slik at vi kan fortsette dialogen etter 17 dager med idrett.
Question to be answered in writing regarding the Olympic Games in China and human rights 
Støre om Kina, OL og menneskerettighetene
Norwegian–Chinese relations – much more than the Olympics 
Derfor er boikott feil
Norway provides assistance to China following earthquake 
Norge hjelper Kina etter jordskjelvet
Norway is providing NOK 2 million to China following the earthquake on 14 April. 
Norge gir to millioner kroner til Kina etter jordskjelvet 14. april.
The money is to go to the Chinese Red Cross. 
Pengene skal gå til Kinas Røde Kors.
The earthquake struck Qinghai province in northwestern China. 
Jordskjelvet rammet Qingahi-provinsen, nordvest i Kina.
”I am deeply saddened that China has once again been hit by an earthquake. 
- Det er trist at Kina nok en gang er rammet av et jordskjelv.
It is now crucial that the emergency relief reaches those affected. 
Nå er det viktig at nødhjelpen kommer frem.
Press contact: Duty Press Officer, international development, mobile phone: +47 913 95 000 (no text messages). 
Pressekontakt: Pressevakten for utviklingssaker, mobil 913 95 000 (ikke sms).
Norwegian Government launches new China strategy 
Regjeringen lanserer ny Kina-strategi
“This is a broad strategy with emphasis on increased market access, climate change, equitable distribution and international cooperation with China. 
- Det er en bred strategi med vekt på økt markedsadgang, klimautfordringer, fordelingspørsmål og internasjonalt samarbeid med Kina.
At the same time, we want to continue the open dialogue we have with China on strengthening democracy and human rights,” said Mr Støre. 
Samtidig vil vi videreføre den åpne dialog vi har med Kina om styrking av demokrati og menneskerettigheter, sier utenriksminister Støre.
“China’s economic growth is the most significant development the world has seen in the last 30 years,” commented Mr Solheim. 
- Kinas framvekst er den viktigste utviklingen verden har sett de siste 30 årene.