natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Or to put it this way: If we want to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, we need to make sure that the Alliance’s conventional capacities are structured in such a way that they maintain the collective defence purpose in a credible manner. 
Or to put it this way: If we want to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, we need to make sure that the Alliance’s conventional capacities are structured in such a way that they maintain the collective defence purpose in a credible manner.
We should not forget that for several allies, the US nuclear umbrella is still perceived as their primary security guarantee. 
We should not forget that for several allies, the US nuclear umbrella is still perceived as their primary security guarantee.
Norway’s core area initiative in NATO should, therefore, also be viewed in light of this fact, as it suggests practical steps to improve NATO’s planning, situational awareness, command structure and conventional capacities in and around the Euro-Atlantic area. 
Norway’s core area initiative in NATO should, therefore, also be viewed in light of this fact, as it suggests practical steps to improve NATO’s planning, situational awareness, command structure and conventional capacities in and around the Euro-Atlantic area.
The security doctrines – not only of NATO but also those of states outside NATO – must be considered in this perspective, whether the frame of reference is regional or global. 
The security doctrines – not only of NATO but also those of states outside NATO – must be considered in this perspective, whether the frame of reference is regional or global.
For NATO, it is vital to strengthen the overall dialogue and cooperation with Russia. 
For NATO, it is vital to strengthen the overall dialogue and cooperation with Russia.
The NATO–Russia Council resumed its work last year. 
The NATO–Russia Council resumed its work last year.
An important NRC workshop on nuclear doctrines was held in Oslo last November, and we should take this agenda forward together. 
An important NRC workshop on nuclear doctrines was held in Oslo last November, and we should take this agenda forward together.
Russia is Norway’s big neighbour; we share a 192-kilometre border. 
Russia is Norway’s big neighbour; we share a 192-kilometre border.
For Norway it is vital that Russia is an integral part of global nuclear disarmament talks. 
For Norway it is vital that Russia is an integral part of global nuclear disarmament talks.
Close to our border we still find one of the world’s largest concentrations of nuclear capabilities. 
Close to our border we still find one of the world’s largest concentrations of nuclear capabilities.
The nuclear arsenal on the Kola Peninsula is enormous. 
The nuclear arsenal on the Kola Peninsula is enormous.
This is also NATO’s neighbourhood. 
This is also NATO’s neighbourhood.
And that is why the Norwegian Government actively pursues a dialogue about the High North in NATO circles; we do this not to raise an alarm, but as a continued reminder of a strategic reality. 
And that is why the Norwegian Government actively pursues a dialogue about the High North in NATO circles; we do this not to raise an alarm, but as a continued reminder of a strategic reality.
The broader security issues in Europe, including the general security architecture, the development of missile defence, and the various issues concerning conventional forces, should all be the subject of dialogue and cooperation. 
The broader security issues in Europe, including the general security architecture, the development of missile defence, and the various issues concerning conventional forces, should all be the subject of dialogue and cooperation.
And we need to create a basis for implementing the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. 
And we need to create a basis for implementing the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
There are today important windows of opportunity for progress in global disarmament diplomacy. 
There are today important windows of opportunity for progress in global disarmament diplomacy.
We encourage continued nuclear arms reduction talks between the US and Russia. 
We encourage continued nuclear arms reduction talks between the US and Russia.
We urge other nuclear weapons states to join these efforts. 
We urge other nuclear weapons states to join these efforts.
But this cannot be left to the few nuclear states alone; it is a matter for all of humanity. 
But this cannot be left to the few nuclear states alone; it is a matter for all of humanity.
All states – nuclear and non-nuclear alike - have a responsibility to create the conditions for eliminating nuclear weapons, as we all have a stake in securing our planet for future generations. 
All states – nuclear and non-nuclear alike - have a responsibility to create the conditions for eliminating nuclear weapons, as we all have a stake in securing our planet for future generations.
Norway will seek to exert its influence in different arenas. 
Norway will seek to exert its influence in different arenas.
With our allies we will promote changes in NATO. 
With our allies we will promote changes in NATO.
We will reach out to non-aligned states. 
We will reach out to non-aligned states.
We will engage civil society. 
We will engage civil society.
Our aim is to forge a new and more lasting international understanding of how to set a lasting course towards ridding ourselves of the nuclear menace. 
Our aim is to forge a new and more lasting international understanding of how to set a lasting course towards ridding ourselves of the nuclear menace.
Let us then further broaden our perspectives. 
Let us then further broaden our perspectives.
Still we have much work to do if we are to make substantial progress on the issues of nuclear weapons – be it in the NPT framework or in other arenas. 
Still we have much work to do if we are to make substantial progress on the issues of nuclear weapons – be it in the NPT framework or in other arenas.
I believe we need to identify the links between different spheres of disarmament, to let lessons from one field inspire the efforts in another. 
I believe we need to identify the links between different spheres of disarmament, to let lessons from one field inspire the efforts in another.
Let us take into account the fact that as progress on the nuclear agenda stalled, progress in disarmament was made elsewhere. 
Let us take into account the fact that as progress on the nuclear agenda stalled, progress in disarmament was made elsewhere.
Remember that the nuclear standstill did not shut other windows of opportunity. 
Remember that the nuclear standstill did not shut other windows of opportunity.
Let me explain, and let me recall the basic fact: that disarmament is a tool to enhance international, national and human security, for states and for people. 
Let me explain, and let me recall the basic fact: that disarmament is a tool to enhance international, national and human security, for states and for people.
In order to employ this tool in a productive manner adapted to present-day realities, we have been engaged in expanding the state-to-state framework of balances, deterrence and reassurance. 
In order to employ this tool in a productive manner adapted to present-day realities, we have been engaged in expanding the state-to-state framework of balances, deterrence and reassurance.
We have come to the understanding that only by approaching disarmament in the broadest sense – including the humanitarian and development aspects – can we achieve real progress. 
We have come to the understanding that only by approaching disarmament in the broadest sense – including the humanitarian and development aspects – can we achieve real progress.
In short, there was a need to reframe the challenge of disarmament, and this is the main message to you this morning. 
In short, there was a need to reframe the challenge of disarmament, and this is the main message to you this morning.
In an otherwise – I would say - non-productive disarmament landscape during the last decades, we do find two real success stories: 
In an otherwise – I would say - non-productive disarmament landscape during the last decades, we do find two real success stories:
the Mine Ban Convention of 1997 and 
the Mine Ban Convention of 1997 and
the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 2008. 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 2008.
These two treaties stand out by setting new international legal norms in a comprehensive package of weapon-specific measures. 
These two treaties stand out by setting new international legal norms in a comprehensive package of weapon-specific measures.
They were the result of innovative processes and conceptual approaches. 
They were the result of innovative processes and conceptual approaches.
But they also sprang from a strong undercurrent in international affairs in recent years concerning the norms governing the conduct of war. 
But they also sprang from a strong undercurrent in international affairs in recent years concerning the norms governing the conduct of war.
When we compare the situation today with the world twenty years ago, two factors stand out: 
When we compare the situation today with the world twenty years ago, two factors stand out:
First, we have seen a significant strengthening of international humanitarian law. 
First, we have seen a significant strengthening of international humanitarian law.
Increased focus on the protection of civilians sets limits for what weapons may be used - and how. 
Increased focus on the protection of civilians sets limits for what weapons may be used - and how.
And the norm governing what is acceptable in the conduct of war has become considerably more restrictive. 
And the norm governing what is acceptable in the conduct of war has become considerably more restrictive.
Second, there is now far greater understanding of the relationship between military means and political goals. 
Second, there is now far greater understanding of the relationship between military means and political goals.
The use of military force may be necessary to achieve legitimate political objectives. 
The use of military force may be necessary to achieve legitimate political objectives.
However, certain weapons, and the use of weapons in certain ways, may also be counterproductive to these objectives. 
However, certain weapons, and the use of weapons in certain ways, may also be counterproductive to these objectives.
This way of thinking is not completely new. 
This way of thinking is not completely new.
In 1925, the international community agreed on the Geneva Protocol banning the use of poisonous gases in warfare, such as chemical and biological weapons. 
In 1925, the international community agreed on the Geneva Protocol banning the use of poisonous gases in warfare, such as chemical and biological weapons.
So, although the concept of “humanitarian disarmament” has emerged over the last few years, the idea of making inhuman weapons illegal is far from new. 
So, although the concept of “humanitarian disarmament” has emerged over the last few years, the idea of making inhuman weapons illegal is far from new.
Now, what does “humanitarian disarmament” mean in practice, on the ground? 
Now, what does “humanitarian disarmament” mean in practice, on the ground?
What have we learned from these new approaches to disarmament? 
What have we learned from these new approaches to disarmament?
Let me use the cluster munitions process as an example. 
Let me use the cluster munitions process as an example.
We learned new, valuable lessons of how powerful alliances can be created when governments and NGOs work well together. 
We learned new, valuable lessons of how powerful alliances can be created when governments and NGOs work well together.
No veto to the least willing – those who want to make progress can and must do so! 
No veto to the least willing – those who want to make progress can and must do so!
Some would ask: Can the approach exemplified by the Oslo Process and the Ottawa process that produced the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 be relevant to other areas of disarmament? 
Some would ask: Can the approach exemplified by the Oslo Process and the Ottawa process that produced the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 be relevant to other areas of disarmament?
In certain respects I would think so. 
In certain respects I would think so.
First of all, (as I mentioned) these processes have forced us to rethink the concept of disarmament. 
First of all, (as I mentioned) these processes have forced us to rethink the concept of disarmament.
We have moved beyond the traditional understanding of disarmament solely as a means of reducing armed forces and eliminating weapons. 
We have moved beyond the traditional understanding of disarmament solely as a means of reducing armed forces and eliminating weapons.
Although this remains crucial, we have now increased focus on the rights of victims and the prevention of humanitarian tragedy, in short, the rights of civilians, the human factor. 
Although this remains crucial, we have now increased focus on the rights of victims and the prevention of humanitarian tragedy, in short, the rights of civilians, the human factor.
Disarmament seen from this perspective has an important norm-setting function, and it is clear that it concerns us all. 
Disarmament seen from this perspective has an important norm-setting function, and it is clear that it concerns us all.
This is easily seen in relation to small arms, landmines and cluster munitions, where nearly all the victims are civilians. 
This is easily seen in relation to small arms, landmines and cluster munitions, where nearly all the victims are civilians.
The uncontrolled use of small arms and light weapons is an immense threat to development and basic human rights. 
The uncontrolled use of small arms and light weapons is an immense threat to development and basic human rights.
Small arms are in fact the real mass destructive device, killing up to 2000 people every day. 
Small arms are in fact the real mass destructive device, killing up to 2000 people every day.
Disarmament at this level is essential. 
Disarmament at this level is essential.
Not only to avoid the threat to international peace and security, but also to realise individual rights to life and health – the right to development. 
Not only to avoid the threat to international peace and security, but also to realise individual rights to life and health – the right to development.
We recognise, of course, the right of states to acquire weapons for self-defence. 
We recognise, of course, the right of states to acquire weapons for self-defence.
Norway does so and will continue to do so. 
Norway does so and will continue to do so.
But at the same time, states also have the right – and the obligation - to defend themselves against the loss of civilian lives due to 
But at the same time, states also have the right – and the obligation - to defend themselves against the loss of civilian lives due to
unexploded ordnances, 
unexploded ordnances,
uncontrolled proliferation of arms, and 
uncontrolled proliferation of arms, and
the use of explosives in populated areas. 
the use of explosives in populated areas.
In shaping a modern foreign and security policy we need to ask: How can we – Norway – make a difference? 
In shaping a modern foreign and security policy we need to ask: How can we – Norway – make a difference?
Let draw some other lessons from the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
Let draw some other lessons from the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Cluster munitions were developed in the Cold War era. 
Cluster munitions were developed in the Cold War era.
They were intended as area weapons to prevent large troop concentrations from moving forward. 
They were intended as area weapons to prevent large troop concentrations from moving forward.
Many believed them to be crucial to military operations. 
Many believed them to be crucial to military operations.
It was also maintained that modern munitions were reliable in use and would self-destruct. 
It was also maintained that modern munitions were reliable in use and would self-destruct.
However, research and tests undertaken by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment – as well as documentation from the 2006 war in Lebanon – proved that cluster munitions were inaccurate and unreliable. 
However, research and tests undertaken by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment – as well as documentation from the 2006 war in Lebanon – proved that cluster munitions were inaccurate and unreliable.
It turned out that on the battlefield, cluster munitions had a failure rate at least ten times higher than what was claimed by their producers, whose tests apparently had been set up to provide the best possible – but highly unrealistic – conditions. 
It turned out that on the battlefield, cluster munitions had a failure rate at least ten times higher than what was claimed by their producers, whose tests apparently had been set up to provide the best possible – but highly unrealistic – conditions.
In the course of the process, we also found that there were many further reasons to get rid of these weapons, including their highly indiscriminate area effect, and the enduring humanitarian problem created by unexploded remnants. 
In the course of the process, we also found that there were many further reasons to get rid of these weapons, including their highly indiscriminate area effect, and the enduring humanitarian problem created by unexploded remnants.
In short, through the Oslo Process, cluster munitions were found to be inappropriate for modern warfare. 
In short, through the Oslo Process, cluster munitions were found to be inappropriate for modern warfare.
The Convention on Cluster Munitions therefore prohibits the use, production and trade of these weapons. 
The Convention on Cluster Munitions therefore prohibits the use, production and trade of these weapons.
Contrary to what some pessimists and cynics expected, we achieved a ban on all cluster munitions that have ever been produced, and we set very strong criteria for future substitute weapons. 
Contrary to what some pessimists and cynics expected, we achieved a ban on all cluster munitions that have ever been produced, and we set very strong criteria for future substitute weapons.
The Convention strengthens international humanitarian law and it provides a framework for implementation. 
The Convention strengthens international humanitarian law and it provides a framework for implementation.
The entire stockpile of Norwegian cluster munitions will be destroyed before the end of this year – long before the timeframe set out in the Convention. 
The entire stockpile of Norwegian cluster munitions will be destroyed before the end of this year – long before the timeframe set out in the Convention.
The vast majority of our NATO allies – 20 out of 28 so far – have made similar commitments. 
The vast majority of our NATO allies – 20 out of 28 so far – have made similar commitments.
It should also be noted that although NATO used cluster munitions against Serbia in 1999, such weapons have not been used by ISAF forces in Afghanistan for several years. 
It should also be noted that although NATO used cluster munitions against Serbia in 1999, such weapons have not been used by ISAF forces in Afghanistan for several years.
Their detrimental effect in a complex stability operation like the one in Afghanistan was actually recognised even before the Convention was in place. 
Their detrimental effect in a complex stability operation like the one in Afghanistan was actually recognised even before the Convention was in place.
On 3 December 2008, a majority of UN member states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions here in Oslo (some of you, Ambassadors, were there). 
On 3 December 2008, a majority of UN member states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions here in Oslo (some of you, Ambassadors, were there).
Today 104 states have signed, and the Convention will enter into force later this year. 
Today 104 states have signed, and the Convention will enter into force later this year.
While looking ahead to this milestone, we already see that the Convention on Cluster Munitions – like the Mine Ban Convention before it – has set a new standard for the conduct of warfare. 
While looking ahead to this milestone, we already see that the Convention on Cluster Munitions – like the Mine Ban Convention before it – has set a new standard for the conduct of warfare.
Although large producers and potential users of cluster munitions have neither signed nor ratified the Convention, the use of cluster munitions is highly stigmatised and would entail major political risk for all states, whether they are party to the Convention or not. 
Although large producers and potential users of cluster munitions have neither signed nor ratified the Convention, the use of cluster munitions is highly stigmatised and would entail major political risk for all states, whether they are party to the Convention or not.
The key here is that the Convention reinforces the international norm of the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. 
The key here is that the Convention reinforces the international norm of the protection of civilians in armed conflicts.
It clearly extends beyond the states that have ratified the relevant treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions. 
It clearly extends beyond the states that have ratified the relevant treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions.
And, maybe most interestingly, according to industry representatives, it appears that the international market for cluster munitions has basically collapsed. 
And, maybe most interestingly, according to industry representatives, it appears that the international market for cluster munitions has basically collapsed.
When hardly anyone seeks to purchase these munitions, the weapon producers will follow the money – the law of the market – as they always do, and adapt their research and development accordingly. 
When hardly anyone seeks to purchase these munitions, the weapon producers will follow the money – the law of the market – as they always do, and adapt their research and development accordingly.
My point is that international efforts to ban or regulate a particular weapon must also address the effects of the weapon, and not just its intended use. 
My point is that international efforts to ban or regulate a particular weapon must also address the effects of the weapon, and not just its intended use.
In this way, the focus has turned to the humanitarian consequences. 
In this way, the focus has turned to the humanitarian consequences.
This, in turn, reflects a new understanding of security, as an issue that directly affects human beings and their communities. 
This, in turn, reflects a new understanding of security, as an issue that directly affects human beings and their communities.
In other words, we have to address today’s threats against human security from armed violence at all levels – locally, nationally and globally – with both remedial and preventive measures. 
In other words, we have to address today’s threats against human security from armed violence at all levels – locally, nationally and globally – with both remedial and preventive measures.
In order to do this, we must involve all states and not only weapon possessors and producers in cross-regional partnerships. 
In order to do this, we must involve all states and not only weapon possessors and producers in cross-regional partnerships.
It is crucial to involve civil society, both as advocates, and as field experts on the effects of the weapons on the ground. 
It is crucial to involve civil society, both as advocates, and as field experts on the effects of the weapons on the ground.
In general, civil society will continue to have a key role to play in our efforts to achieve conventional arms control and disarmament. 
In general, civil society will continue to have a key role to play in our efforts to achieve conventional arms control and disarmament.