natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
And most importantly the nuclear weapons states committed themselves “unequivocally” to eliminating their nuclear arsenals. 
And most importantly the nuclear weapons states committed themselves “unequivocally” to eliminating their nuclear arsenals.
However, as it turned out, the 2000 NPT Review Conference marked the end of the immediate post-Cold War era of optimism on arms control. 
However, as it turned out, the 2000 NPT Review Conference marked the end of the immediate post-Cold War era of optimism on arms control.
There had been many achievements in a short period of time: o In addition to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, o the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had been opened up for signature in 1998. o The IAEA Model Additional Protocol, which provided enhanced IAEA verification of civilian nuclear activities, had been adopted in 1997. o The Chemical Weapons Convention had entered into force in 1997. o The same year, the Mine Ban Convention had been negotiated in Oslo. 
There had been many achievements in a short period of time: o In addition to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, o the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had been opened up for signature in 1998. o The IAEA Model Additional Protocol, which provided enhanced IAEA verification of civilian nuclear activities, had been adopted in 1997. o The Chemical Weapons Convention had entered into force in 1997. o The same year, the Mine Ban Convention had been negotiated in Oslo.
But: the tide turned. 
But: the tide turned.
Already in 2001, there were clear signs that the nuclear weapons states were distancing themselves from their commitments. 
Already in 2001, there were clear signs that the nuclear weapons states were distancing themselves from their commitments.
This became even more apparent in the aftermath of 9/11. 
This became even more apparent in the aftermath of 9/11.
The Bush administration made it plain that it did not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
The Bush administration made it plain that it did not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The US withdrew from the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty with Russia. 
The US withdrew from the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty with Russia.
And, the new security doctrines of the nuclear weapons states put more - rather than less - emphasis on nuclear deterrence (contrary to the 13 practical steps I mentioned earlier). 
And, the new security doctrines of the nuclear weapons states put more - rather than less - emphasis on nuclear deterrence (contrary to the 13 practical steps I mentioned earlier).
The set-back in nuclear disarmament was matched by a definite lack of progress in strengthening the non-proliferation regime: 
The set-back in nuclear disarmament was matched by a definite lack of progress in strengthening the non-proliferation regime:
In addition to the unresolved cases of Iran and North Korea, it was not possible to achieve a common understanding that the IAEA Additional Protocol should be universally applied, and that the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies should be prevented. 
In addition to the unresolved cases of Iran and North Korea, it was not possible to achieve a common understanding that the IAEA Additional Protocol should be universally applied, and that the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies should be prevented.
The lack of a common vision on how to move the NPT process led to increased polarisation. 
The lack of a common vision on how to move the NPT process led to increased polarisation.
The low point was 2005, when the NPT Review Conference failed miserably, followed by an inability to reach consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the UN World Summit. 
The low point was 2005, when the NPT Review Conference failed miserably, followed by an inability to reach consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the UN World Summit.
So, when I became Foreign Minister in the autumn of 2005, I was struck by the sad state of affairs in nuclear arms control. 
So, when I became Foreign Minister in the autumn of 2005, I was struck by the sad state of affairs in nuclear arms control.
It was imperative to move out of this impasse. 
It was imperative to move out of this impasse.
The alternative would have been a continued weakening of the NPT regime’s credibility, and the danger that more countries could chose the nuclear option. 
The alternative would have been a continued weakening of the NPT regime’s credibility, and the danger that more countries could chose the nuclear option.
So, the German Foreign Minister and I published articles in our national newspapers, advocating renewed efforts to address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and calling for concrete steps to reduce their role in security policies. 
So, the German Foreign Minister and I published articles in our national newspapers, advocating renewed efforts to address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and calling for concrete steps to reduce their role in security policies.
In parallel, there was growing awareness of the threat of nuclear war, and the need to aim - not for constraints on the nuclear arms race – but for a world free of nuclear weapons. 
In parallel, there was growing awareness of the threat of nuclear war, and the need to aim - not for constraints on the nuclear arms race – but for a world free of nuclear weapons.
A focus on this vision. 
A focus on this vision.
The election of Barack Obama as President and his Prague speech last year were important events that gave this zero option more political clout. 
The election of Barack Obama as President and his Prague speech last year were important events that gave this zero option more political clout.
It was indeed a great change to see a world free from nuclear weapons enter the general political vocabulary. 
It was indeed a great change to see a world free from nuclear weapons enter the general political vocabulary.
Over the last year, I have seen that many countries are moving towards firmer commitments, and that the general view is that we need to engage actively in setting up a roadmap to eliminate nuclear weapons. 
Over the last year, I have seen that many countries are moving towards firmer commitments, and that the general view is that we need to engage actively in setting up a roadmap to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Here again (and my point, again, is) the credibility issue: Once it is made clear for all that we would actually be safer without nuclear weapons, it is very hard to find good arguments for keeping them. 
Here again (and my point, again, is) the credibility issue: Once it is made clear for all that we would actually be safer without nuclear weapons, it is very hard to find good arguments for keeping them.
The successful outcome (in my view) of the NPT 2010 Review Conference a few weeks ago has provided us with additional tools for this work. 
The successful outcome (in my view) of the NPT 2010 Review Conference a few weeks ago has provided us with additional tools for this work.
I know that some NGOs, observers and others are disappointed that the outcome document did not set up timelines for the elimination of existing nuclear weapons, or initiate a process to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention. 
I know that some NGOs, observers and others are disappointed that the outcome document did not set up timelines for the elimination of existing nuclear weapons, or initiate a process to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention.
I too, would certainly have welcomed a more ambitious outcome. 
I too, would certainly have welcomed a more ambitious outcome.
But, the fact that the outcome succeeded in salvaging the credibility and relevance of the treaty is in itself of great importance. 
But, the fact that the outcome succeeded in salvaging the credibility and relevance of the treaty is in itself of great importance.
The alternative would have left us with little to build on and greater challenges to overcome. 
The alternative would have left us with little to build on and greater challenges to overcome.
As for the outcome itself, it went very far in restoring the underlying compact from 1995 and 2000. 
As for the outcome itself, it went very far in restoring the underlying compact from 1995 and 2000.
Looking at what was actually adopted I see the glass as “half full” rather than “half empty”. 
Looking at what was actually adopted I see the glass as “half full” rather than “half empty”.
Let me explain: o The Review Conference agreed on 64 concrete actions along the three pillars of the NPT, o as well as steps to be taken with respect to the Middle East. o In this sense, it was more comprehensive than the 2000 outcome. o The Conference strongly emphasised the overall objective to eliminate nuclear weapons. o It explicitly brought the concept of international humanitarian law into the discussion of nuclear weapons. o It made clear that a convention (or other legally binding arrangement) was the ultimate objective of the disarmament obligations under the NPT. o It addressed all categories of nuclear weapons, and not least the question of their location. 
Let me explain: o The Review Conference agreed on 64 concrete actions along the three pillars of the NPT, o as well as steps to be taken with respect to the Middle East. o In this sense, it was more comprehensive than the 2000 outcome. o The Conference strongly emphasised the overall objective to eliminate nuclear weapons. o It explicitly brought the concept of international humanitarian law into the discussion of nuclear weapons. o It made clear that a convention (or other legally binding arrangement) was the ultimate objective of the disarmament obligations under the NPT. o It addressed all categories of nuclear weapons, and not least the question of their location.
This may be of particular interest for a country like Germany. o The Conference brought forward the question of negative security assurances. o And although no deadlines have been set for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Conference agreed that nuclear weapons states should report back by 2014 on their progress in implementing their commitments. o The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of the disarmament commitments. o The final document also contains clear non-proliferation obligations. 
This may be of particular interest for a country like Germany. o The Conference brought forward the question of negative security assurances. o And although no deadlines have been set for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Conference agreed that nuclear weapons states should report back by 2014 on their progress in implementing their commitments. o The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of the disarmament commitments. o The final document also contains clear non-proliferation obligations.
All states parties are encouraged to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol. o Furthermore, the Conference paved the way for more discussion on cooperative arrangements on production of nuclear fuel for civilian reactors and handling nuclear waste. 
All states parties are encouraged to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol. o Furthermore, the Conference paved the way for more discussion on cooperative arrangements on production of nuclear fuel for civilian reactors and handling nuclear waste.
Germany and Norway strongly urged that we should find ways to ensure that countries producing nuclear energy have access to fuel - without having to develop their own capacity. o And finally, the Conference clearly called for continued efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear research reactors, and to convert these reactors to run on low-enriched uranium. 
Germany and Norway strongly urged that we should find ways to ensure that countries producing nuclear energy have access to fuel - without having to develop their own capacity. o And finally, the Conference clearly called for continued efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear research reactors, and to convert these reactors to run on low-enriched uranium.
So, the way I see it, the nuclear weapons states have been given a short “delay” by the vast majority of NPT states parties before moving to zero. 
So, the way I see it, the nuclear weapons states have been given a short “delay” by the vast majority of NPT states parties before moving to zero.
There is no doubt that the division between the small number of nuclear weapons states and the much larger number of non-nuclear weapons states is not sustainable in the long run. 
There is no doubt that the division between the small number of nuclear weapons states and the much larger number of non-nuclear weapons states is not sustainable in the long run.
My view, if the nuclear weapons states do not live up to expectations, it is likely that the political pressure to move faster towards a legally binding instrument will be significant. 
My view, if the nuclear weapons states do not live up to expectations, it is likely that the political pressure to move faster towards a legally binding instrument will be significant.
As non-nuclear weapons states, we have a responsibility to do our part so that the outcome of the NPT Review Conference is implemented. 
As non-nuclear weapons states, we have a responsibility to do our part so that the outcome of the NPT Review Conference is implemented.
One arena where Germany and Norway could make a footprint is NATO. 
One arena where Germany and Norway could make a footprint is NATO.
I fully recognise that NATO is a security organisation and not a disarmament agency. 
I fully recognise that NATO is a security organisation and not a disarmament agency.
Yet, NATO acknowledged already in the Harmel Report in 1967 that arms control was part of its security policy. 
Yet, NATO acknowledged already in the Harmel Report in 1967 that arms control was part of its security policy.
Indeed, the best safeguard against any use of nuclear weapons is undeniably their full elimination. 
Indeed, the best safeguard against any use of nuclear weapons is undeniably their full elimination.
When former “cold warriors” such as Henry Kissinger and George Schultz have called for a world without nuclear weapons, they have done so out of security concerns. 
When former “cold warriors” such as Henry Kissinger and George Schultz have called for a world without nuclear weapons, they have done so out of security concerns.
In the coming months, NATO will give shape to its new strategic concept. 
In the coming months, NATO will give shape to its new strategic concept.
One of the key issues is the nuclear doctrine. 
One of the key issues is the nuclear doctrine.
In February, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway asked the Secretary General of NATO to put nuclear issues on the agenda of the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April. 
In February, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway asked the Secretary General of NATO to put nuclear issues on the agenda of the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April.
It was encouraging that our initiative received widespread support, but judging from our discussions in Tallinn, it is evident that we are far from consensus on the future nuclear policy of the Alliance. 
It was encouraging that our initiative received widespread support, but judging from our discussions in Tallinn, it is evident that we are far from consensus on the future nuclear policy of the Alliance.
The report from the group of experts appointed by the NATO Secretary General on the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, could also have been more forward-looking with respect to reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security posture. 
The report from the group of experts appointed by the NATO Secretary General on the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, could also have been more forward-looking with respect to reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security posture.
And it could have been more up-to-date in integrating the disarmament perspective into the security policy framework of the Alliance. 
And it could have been more up-to-date in integrating the disarmament perspective into the security policy framework of the Alliance.
Furthermore, it is important that NATO takes fully into account the commitments made in the NPT Review Conference. 
Furthermore, it is important that NATO takes fully into account the commitments made in the NPT Review Conference.
There should be less emphasis on the nuclear component in NATO’s deterrence policy, and a readiness to expand the scope of negative security assurances. 
There should be less emphasis on the nuclear component in NATO’s deterrence policy, and a readiness to expand the scope of negative security assurances.
Here I fully share the US view that the only condition for non-nuclear weapons states to obtain guarantees should be compliance with their NPT non-proliferation obligations. 
Here I fully share the US view that the only condition for non-nuclear weapons states to obtain guarantees should be compliance with their NPT non-proliferation obligations.
Nuclear deterrence only makes sense in deterring others states from using nuclear weapons against us. 
Nuclear deterrence only makes sense in deterring others states from using nuclear weapons against us.
Using nuclear weapons to counter other threats, such as conventional weapons, would in the long run lead to further proliferation. 
Using nuclear weapons to counter other threats, such as conventional weapons, would in the long run lead to further proliferation.
The debate has just begun. 
The debate has just begun.
Few countries support NATO as strongly as Germany and Norway do. 
Few countries support NATO as strongly as Germany and Norway do.
It is all the more important that we join other like-minded allies and consider seriously how to develop NATO’s strategy in a way that is credible and relevant in view of today’s security challenges. 
It is all the more important that we join other like-minded allies and consider seriously how to develop NATO’s strategy in a way that is credible and relevant in view of today’s security challenges.
This involves reconsidering the role we have given nuclear weapons. 
This involves reconsidering the role we have given nuclear weapons.
Knowing the immense destructive power of such weapons – the horrendous humanitarian, economic and environmental consequences – it is very difficult indeed to contemplate any situation where they might actually be employed. 
Knowing the immense destructive power of such weapons – the horrendous humanitarian, economic and environmental consequences – it is very difficult indeed to contemplate any situation where they might actually be employed.
They are simply not very relevant from a military point of view. 
They are simply not very relevant from a military point of view.
This will eventually have a negative spin-off effect on their political relevance. 
This will eventually have a negative spin-off effect on their political relevance.
For NATO, it would make good sense to find a means of withdrawing all sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe and subsequently eliminating them. 
For NATO, it would make good sense to find a means of withdrawing all sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe and subsequently eliminating them.
It is also vital to engage Russia on sub-strategic nuclear weapons. 
It is also vital to engage Russia on sub-strategic nuclear weapons.
This should be on the agenda in the next round of negotiations between the US and Russia, the follow-on to the new START. 
This should be on the agenda in the next round of negotiations between the US and Russia, the follow-on to the new START.
In the meantime, these negotiations could be facilitated by enhanced dialogue with Russia on these weapons systems. 
In the meantime, these negotiations could be facilitated by enhanced dialogue with Russia on these weapons systems.
Norway and Poland have just called for such a step-wise and balanced approach, starting with increased transparency and confidence-building measures. 
Norway and Poland have just called for such a step-wise and balanced approach, starting with increased transparency and confidence-building measures.
I am pleased that this initiative has received widespread support. 
I am pleased that this initiative has received widespread support.
But, while both Germany and Norway are committed to reducing and eventually eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security policy, it is apparent that some allied countries do not share our view. 
But, while both Germany and Norway are committed to reducing and eventually eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security policy, it is apparent that some allied countries do not share our view.
This was clearly illustrated at the recent meeting of ministers of defence, where France blocked all language on nuclear disarmament in the final communiqué. 
This was clearly illustrated at the recent meeting of ministers of defence, where France blocked all language on nuclear disarmament in the final communiqué.
It is also a fact that some of the new members of NATO consider the continued deployment of US nuclear weapons as a transatlantic “superglue”, a fundamental bond. 
It is also a fact that some of the new members of NATO consider the continued deployment of US nuclear weapons as a transatlantic “superglue”, a fundamental bond.
I do not see nuclear weapons, or the Alliance for that matter, in this way. 
I do not see nuclear weapons, or the Alliance for that matter, in this way.
In my view, the cohesion of NATO is founded on a joint commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, political solidarity and joint decision-making - and not on the continued presence of a particular category of weapons of mass destruction. 
In my view, the cohesion of NATO is founded on a joint commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, political solidarity and joint decision-making - and not on the continued presence of a particular category of weapons of mass destruction.
Therefore, from my perspective, the Strategic Concept should not stand in the way of the NPT objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. 
Therefore, from my perspective, the Strategic Concept should not stand in the way of the NPT objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
It is important that NATO’s new nuclear posture is changed to reflect new realities. 
It is important that NATO’s new nuclear posture is changed to reflect new realities.
Finally, let me add some thoughts on what I call new arenas – new methods or new partners. 
Finally, let me add some thoughts on what I call new arenas – new methods or new partners.
While NATO and the NPT are important forums, I do not believe it will be possible to reach the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons unless we engage a much broader spectrum of society. 
While NATO and the NPT are important forums, I do not believe it will be possible to reach the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons unless we engage a much broader spectrum of society.
In sum, it is crucial to involve humanitarian actors. 
In sum, it is crucial to involve humanitarian actors.
They were key partners in the process that led to banning anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, as they will be in our efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. 
They were key partners in the process that led to banning anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, as they will be in our efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
The Norwegian Government has over the years developed a comprehensive approach to what I call humanitarian disarmament: recognising disarmament as a humanitarian and developmental imperative, in addition to being a security issue. 
The Norwegian Government has over the years developed a comprehensive approach to what I call humanitarian disarmament: recognising disarmament as a humanitarian and developmental imperative, in addition to being a security issue.