natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The speakers also pointed to the challenges concerning coordination within the six humanitarian agencies of the UN, and even more so, between external organizations such as NATO, EU, AU, and with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 
The speakers also pointed to the challenges concerning coordination within the six humanitarian agencies of the UN, and even more so, between external organizations such as NATO, EU, AU, and with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
Additionally, inclusion early on in the planning phase is important as all these actors are also often the implementers at the operational and tactical levels. 
Additionally, inclusion early on in the planning phase is important as all these actors are also often the implementers at the operational and tactical levels.
There was broad agreement about the UN taking the lead in the planning process and that the new UN doctrine for peacekeeping operations would function as a model for integrated mission planning in the future. 
There was broad agreement about the UN taking the lead in the planning process and that the new UN doctrine for peacekeeping operations would function as a model for integrated mission planning in the future.
However, several participants made remarks about humanitarian agencies and especially NGOs posing a particular challenge as they will oftentimes not exclusively be engaged in humanitarian work, but will be pursuing separate agendas. 
However, several participants made remarks about humanitarian agencies and especially NGOs posing a particular challenge as they will oftentimes not exclusively be engaged in humanitarian work, but will be pursuing separate agendas.
So-called multi-mandated integrated mission pose a particular challenge for many NGOs with the end-result that some decide not to be part of an integrated mission – neither at the strategic planning phase nor at the operational or tactical level. 
So-called multi-mandated integrated mission pose a particular challenge for many NGOs with the end-result that some decide not to be part of an integrated mission – neither at the strategic planning phase nor at the operational or tactical level.
In light of these concerns, some suggested that one should demarcate what is a military and what is a humanitarian mission, while others pointed out that such a separation does not in itself necessarily achieve a higher level of security or other goals for the humanitarian participants. 
In light of these concerns, some suggested that one should demarcate what is a military and what is a humanitarian mission, while others pointed out that such a separation does not in itself necessarily achieve a higher level of security or other goals for the humanitarian participants.
The issue of security in particular was used as a major rationale by NGOs for not taking part in integrated missions. 
The issue of security in particular was used as a major rationale by NGOs for not taking part in integrated missions.
Following this line of argumentation, emphasis was then put on the importance of keeping impartiality and objectivity due to perceptions – particularly within the general population in the mission areas but also in reference to the popular opinion in contributing countries – so that both security and access could be assured at the operational and tactical levels. 
Following this line of argumentation, emphasis was then put on the importance of keeping impartiality and objectivity due to perceptions – particularly within the general population in the mission areas but also in reference to the popular opinion in contributing countries – so that both security and access could be assured at the operational and tactical levels.
Based on this, three strategic approaches to peace operations were offered by OCHA: 
Based on this, three strategic approaches to peace operations were offered by OCHA:
• one foot in, one foot out (for example OCHA outside, but still linked to the mission) • full integration • complete separation (rare – mostly during political operations). 
• one foot in, one foot out (for example OCHA outside, but still linked to the mission) • full integration • complete separation (rare – mostly during political operations).
Panel 2 The United Nation’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Concepts and Challenges 
Panel 2 The United Nation’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Concepts and Challenges
Broad agreement in the panel that the UN’s integrated approach is the right response to today’s complex peace operations, which require a more flexible and multidimensional response that goes well beyond establishing a secure environment. 
Broad agreement in the panel that the UN’s integrated approach is the right response to today’s complex peace operations, which require a more flexible and multidimensional response that goes well beyond establishing a secure environment.
The UN is uniquely placed to provide the right tools and mandate and has, through its operational experiences, proved that a “shock and awe” approach is not a workable response to security challenges and threats facing the international community or other actors involved in peace operations. 
The UN is uniquely placed to provide the right tools and mandate and has, through its operational experiences, proved that a “shock and awe” approach is not a workable response to security challenges and threats facing the international community or other actors involved in peace operations.
The UN has a unique capacity and ability to apply a wide spectrum of instruments – economic, political, developmental and humanitarian – in an integrated and coordinated manner. 
The UN has a unique capacity and ability to apply a wide spectrum of instruments – economic, political, developmental and humanitarian – in an integrated and coordinated manner.
If peace operations are to lay the foundations for sustainable peace, focus should be on providing a coherent and well-coordinated structure in the field. 
If peace operations are to lay the foundations for sustainable peace, focus should be on providing a coherent and well-coordinated structure in the field.
The UN today is a leading player in the management of armed conflicts, and undertakes a considerable number of peace operations on a global level. 
The UN today is a leading player in the management of armed conflicts, and undertakes a considerable number of peace operations on a global level.
At the same time, there are still several challenges in terms of improving the UN’s integrated missions concept and the implementation of it in the field. 
At the same time, there are still several challenges in terms of improving the UN’s integrated missions concept and the implementation of it in the field.
Some of the key challenges facing the UN when conducting multidimensional peace operations were identified as: 
Some of the key challenges facing the UN when conducting multidimensional peace operations were identified as:
• Integration gives contradiction. 
• Integration gives contradiction.
On the one hand, there is a need to maintain a clear distinction between the role and functions of humanitarian actors from that of the military or political. 
On the one hand, there is a need to maintain a clear distinction between the role and functions of humanitarian actors from that of the military or political.
On the other hand, today’s integrated missions involve coordination of efforts between the UN and other actors, including humanitarian actors, presenting a challenge for humanitarian actors’ claim for neutrality and impartiality. 
On the other hand, today’s integrated missions involve coordination of efforts between the UN and other actors, including humanitarian actors, presenting a challenge for humanitarian actors’ claim for neutrality and impartiality.
• The role and presence of humanitarian actors is not necessarily neutral or impartial as they impose “Western values”. 
• The role and presence of humanitarian actors is not necessarily neutral or impartial as they impose “Western values”.
For instance, building schools for girls in Afghanistan is a (Western) political effort. 
For instance, building schools for girls in Afghanistan is a (Western) political effort.
• Force flexibility. 
• Force flexibility.
This is limited by the UN’s lack of sufficient capabilities in the area of planning, and command and control, as well as an inflexible force generation system. 
This is limited by the UN’s lack of sufficient capabilities in the area of planning, and command and control, as well as an inflexible force generation system.
• A fragmented and inflexible UN system (i.e., bureaucracy), including dysfunctional financial mechanisms. 
• A fragmented and inflexible UN system (i.e., bureaucracy), including dysfunctional financial mechanisms.
Particularly, the UN’s lack of a common funding system and the fact that the organization is not sufficiently able to adapt its financial mechanisms in a way that ensures a flexible and responsive reaction to needs on the ground. 
Particularly, the UN’s lack of a common funding system and the fact that the organization is not sufficiently able to adapt its financial mechanisms in a way that ensures a flexible and responsive reaction to needs on the ground.
This often prevents a timely availability of financial and other resources. 
This often prevents a timely availability of financial and other resources.
The conclusion therefore, is that the UN has to get its priorities right. 
The conclusion therefore, is that the UN has to get its priorities right.
Panel 3 The European Union’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Concepts and Challenges 
Panel 3 The European Union’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Concepts and Challenges
The main message from the EU was that cooperation with the UN is vital and that resolutions in the UN Security Council are the preferable legal base for EU operations. 
The main message from the EU was that cooperation with the UN is vital and that resolutions in the UN Security Council are the preferable legal base for EU operations.
The EU has within a very short time built a crisis management capability and is currently running a total of 15 operations (11 civilian ops/4 military ops), totaling about 10 000 personnel under EU flag on several continents. 
The EU has within a very short time built a crisis management capability and is currently running a total of 15 operations (11 civilian ops/4 military ops), totaling about 10 000 personnel under EU flag on several continents.
Since the beginning of the EU’s participation in international operations in 1999, the goal has been integrated solutions. 
Since the beginning of the EU’s participation in international operations in 1999, the goal has been integrated solutions.
The EU is a global actor in crisis management and covers the whole specter from military to civilian operations, security sector reform, police reform etc. 
The EU is a global actor in crisis management and covers the whole specter from military to civilian operations, security sector reform, police reform etc.
The EU’s focus on effective multilateralism is provided through the European Security Strategy (2003). 
The EU’s focus on effective multilateralism is provided through the European Security Strategy (2003).
Complex challenges require solutions that focus on getting in at an early stage, referred to as “preventive engagement”. 
Complex challenges require solutions that focus on getting in at an early stage, referred to as “preventive engagement”.
Inherent in this is a plan for an end stage, a roadmap, an exit strategy and cooperation with other international actors. 
Inherent in this is a plan for an end stage, a roadmap, an exit strategy and cooperation with other international actors.
Civilian-military coordination implies from the EU point of view that all military operations should be part of a larger civilian effort to be successful. 
Civilian-military coordination implies from the EU point of view that all military operations should be part of a larger civilian effort to be successful.
Many civilian missions need military support and protection. 
Many civilian missions need military support and protection.
The EU’s military capacities will play an important role in that regard and its main efforts will be directed towards reconstruction, security sector reform, economic support, security and development, and long-term stabilization. 
The EU’s military capacities will play an important role in that regard and its main efforts will be directed towards reconstruction, security sector reform, economic support, security and development, and long-term stabilization.
However, development has also a security element and ESDP operations may create security in order to facilitate development. 
However, development has also a security element and ESDP operations may create security in order to facilitate development.
The Aceh-operation was pointed out as a model for a successful integrated mission with participation from the EU Council, the Commission, the Parliament and other EU institutions. 
The Aceh-operation was pointed out as a model for a successful integrated mission with participation from the EU Council, the Commission, the Parliament and other EU institutions.
According to the EU perspective, the organization’s potential for integrated missions has not yet been exhausted, but is hindered by internal EU politics. 
According to the EU perspective, the organization’s potential for integrated missions has not yet been exhausted, but is hindered by internal EU politics.
However, the impending EU Reform Treaty will likely make coordination within the EU better and facilitate even more integrated solutions. 
However, the impending EU Reform Treaty will likely make coordination within the EU better and facilitate even more integrated solutions.
As a part of the Council Secretariat, two new bodies have been established: a civilian/military cell in the EU Military Staff and an Operations Centre. 
As a part of the Council Secretariat, two new bodies have been established: a civilian/military cell in the EU Military Staff and an Operations Centre.
A common concern during this session was challenges linked to the fragmentation of the instruments and actors available for integrated operations. 
A common concern during this session was challenges linked to the fragmentation of the instruments and actors available for integrated operations.
Although operations are different, the organizations face similar challenges. 
Although operations are different, the organizations face similar challenges.
There is much to gain by more cooperation in the field between NATO, the EU and the UN. 
There is much to gain by more cooperation in the field between NATO, the EU and the UN.
And such cooperation is possible due to overlapping and compatible capabilities. 
And such cooperation is possible due to overlapping and compatible capabilities.
This, however, would work even better if properly planned in advance. 
This, however, would work even better if properly planned in advance.
Better advance planning calls for a more institutionalized process to get the most out of available resources. 
Better advance planning calls for a more institutionalized process to get the most out of available resources.
The primary challenge is that the security environment is very fragmented and that there are too many actors on the scene. 
The primary challenge is that the security environment is very fragmented and that there are too many actors on the scene.
Another major challenge on the civilian side is how to finance operations. 
Another major challenge on the civilian side is how to finance operations.
Should means for operations be kept in a stabilization fund or a trust fund? 
Should means for operations be kept in a stabilization fund or a trust fund?
That is the case for AU operations in Africa. 
That is the case for AU operations in Africa.
What about security sector reform that requires increased cooperation between different organizations? 
What about security sector reform that requires increased cooperation between different organizations?
The EU underlined the good internal cooperation between the different EU bodies in this field and emphasized that the EU should be more eager to promote its successes in promoting security sector reform. 
The EU underlined the good internal cooperation between the different EU bodies in this field and emphasized that the EU should be more eager to promote its successes in promoting security sector reform.
It is important to improve the cooperation between the international organizations to prevent an increase in the number of international conflicts. 
It is important to improve the cooperation between the international organizations to prevent an increase in the number of international conflicts.
The world is as complex to the EU as it is to NATO and the UN. 
The world is as complex to the EU as it is to NATO and the UN.
Today, the EU is increasingly taking on tasks that used to be handled by the UN. 
Today, the EU is increasingly taking on tasks that used to be handled by the UN.
In sum, all institutions meet the same challenges and the only way to handle them is to improve the bureaucracy and make things simpler. 
In sum, all institutions meet the same challenges and the only way to handle them is to improve the bureaucracy and make things simpler.
The audience posed a most pertinent question: when do crisis management end and development start? 
The audience posed a most pertinent question: when do crisis management end and development start?
The answer given was that in order to succeed, development should start as early as possible in light of the security situation. 
The answer given was that in order to succeed, development should start as early as possible in light of the security situation.
Panel 4 NATO’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Pace Operations: Concepts and Challenges 
Panel 4 NATO’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Pace Operations: Concepts and Challenges
NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999) provides the overall guidance for the development of detailed policies and military plans for NATO. 
NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999) provides the overall guidance for the development of detailed policies and military plans for NATO.
While security primarily used to be defined in military terms, this document also includes political, environmental, economic and social aspects in addition to the military element. 
While security primarily used to be defined in military terms, this document also includes political, environmental, economic and social aspects in addition to the military element.
NATO has a strong focus on developing its own concept for integrated missions, the “Comprehensive Approach”, to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction, realizing that today’s challenges requires a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. 
NATO has a strong focus on developing its own concept for integrated missions, the “Comprehensive Approach”, to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction, realizing that today’s challenges requires a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments.
However, NATO has no intentions to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes. 
However, NATO has no intentions to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes.
The primary challenge for NATO all along has been that they only have military tools at their disposal, which means NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach has to be seen within a larger framework – preferably the UN – in which all available tools and instruments are applied, including diplomatic, political, economic and military. 
The primary challenge for NATO all along has been that they only have military tools at their disposal, which means NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach has to be seen within a larger framework – preferably the UN – in which all available tools and instruments are applied, including diplomatic, political, economic and military.
NATO’s efforts so far have been fairly ad-hoc and there is a need for a standardized approach, but without threatening the independence and autonomy of each participating organization – including NATO’s decision-making autonomy. 
NATO’s efforts so far have been fairly ad-hoc and there is a need for a standardized approach, but without threatening the independence and autonomy of each participating organization – including NATO’s decision-making autonomy.
The concrete driver for a comprehensive approach in NATO can largely be traced to the tactical and operational levels. 
The concrete driver for a comprehensive approach in NATO can largely be traced to the tactical and operational levels.
During operations such as in Afghanistan, people in the field have found pragmatic ways to work together in order to solve problems and to achieve the desirable goals and effects set forth in the mandates. 
During operations such as in Afghanistan, people in the field have found pragmatic ways to work together in order to solve problems and to achieve the desirable goals and effects set forth in the mandates.
One notable and enduring challenge is the scepticism expressed by many NGOs in working together with the military, both in the Afghan theatre and elsewhere. 
One notable and enduring challenge is the scepticism expressed by many NGOs in working together with the military, both in the Afghan theatre and elsewhere.
Playing into this is also the sheer number of NGOs in Afghanistan – an estimated 2 000 NGOs currently operate within Afghanistan – making it impossible and even undesirable to coordinate all these humanitarian efforts. 
Playing into this is also the sheer number of NGOs in Afghanistan – an estimated 2 000 NGOs currently operate within Afghanistan – making it impossible and even undesirable to coordinate all these humanitarian efforts.
Adding to the complexity is that many NGOs were already engaged in Afghanistan prior to NATO’s arrival. 
Adding to the complexity is that many NGOs were already engaged in Afghanistan prior to NATO’s arrival.
The ongoing dialog in NATO today about the comprehensive approach is basically stuck at the strategic level. 
The ongoing dialog in NATO today about the comprehensive approach is basically stuck at the strategic level.
The challenge – as expressed by several of the participants – is largely related to the lack of political resolve, leading to a less than clear political guidance at the lower echelons. 
The challenge – as expressed by several of the participants – is largely related to the lack of political resolve, leading to a less than clear political guidance at the lower echelons.
One of the possible root causes for this – which there seemed to be a wide consensus about – was the lack of cooperation and coordination within the various capitals in so far as agreeing to a coherent and consistent national policy, but also a lack of coordination as such within and between organizations themselves, ultimately leading to confusion and inconsistency. 
One of the possible root causes for this – which there seemed to be a wide consensus about – was the lack of cooperation and coordination within the various capitals in so far as agreeing to a coherent and consistent national policy, but also a lack of coordination as such within and between organizations themselves, ultimately leading to confusion and inconsistency.
While establishing concise and clearly defined comprehensive political objectives was important, it was equally important to have these objectives understood and shared by all the actors in the field, i.e., “be on the same page”. 
While establishing concise and clearly defined comprehensive political objectives was important, it was equally important to have these objectives understood and shared by all the actors in the field, i.e., “be on the same page”.