natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Twenty-one years ago, I joined Professor Roger Fisher and Bruce Patton at the Harvard Negotiation Project for the January workshop, followed by six turbulent months of field work in South Africa.
Twenty-one years ago, I joined Professor Roger Fisher and Bruce Patton at the Harvard Negotiation Project for the January workshop, followed by six turbulent months of field work in South Africa.
Our aim was to help design a process for political change as apartheid was drawing to an end.
Our aim was to help design a process for political change as apartheid was drawing to an end.
When I left Harvard on a cold January morning in 1986, Roger Fisher invited me to sum up what I had learned.
When I left Harvard on a cold January morning in 1986, Roger Fisher invited me to sum up what I had learned.
I remember concluding that it felt like having been given an intensive introduction to common sense.
I remember concluding that it felt like having been given an intensive introduction to common sense.
Unfortunately, I was wrong.
Unfortunately, I was wrong.
Had it been a simple matter of common sense, then Roger Fisher and Bruce Patton would not have needed to go on tirelessly writing books and coaching people on how to reach agreement and satisfy their interests.
Had it been a simple matter of common sense, then Roger Fisher and Bruce Patton would not have needed to go on tirelessly writing books and coaching people on how to reach agreement and satisfy their interests.
The truth, of course, is that reaching agreement, bridging divides, consolidating interests – all of this is exceedingly complex.
The truth, of course, is that reaching agreement, bridging divides, consolidating interests – all of this is exceedingly complex.
Since 1986 I have regularly returned to the key lessons of interest-based negotiations.
Since 1986 I have regularly returned to the key lessons of interest-based negotiations.
The eye-opener that changed my outlook was when I realised that I could get further in satisfying my own interests by spending more time trying to understand the interests of the other side.
The eye-opener that changed my outlook was when I realised that I could get further in satisfying my own interests by spending more time trying to understand the interests of the other side.
Not giving in.
Not giving in.
Not yielding to pressure.
Not yielding to pressure.
But better promoting my own interests when the other side also felt that its interests were being taken adequately into account.
But better promoting my own interests when the other side also felt that its interests were being taken adequately into account.
I cannot deny that applying this approach is difficult, whether in dealing with my three boys, my wife, my coalition partners in government or, as Foreign Minister, with other governments.
I cannot deny that applying this approach is difficult, whether in dealing with my three boys, my wife, my coalition partners in government or, as Foreign Minister, with other governments.
Yet, I see no better alternative.
Yet, I see no better alternative.
It is a daunting task to find outcomes that satisfy interests, that are legitimate and that will last.
It is a daunting task to find outcomes that satisfy interests, that are legitimate and that will last.
This goes for a whole range of modern challenges – from the conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan, to our shared burdens of fighting poverty and dealing with climate change.
This goes for a whole range of modern challenges – from the conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan, to our shared burdens of fighting poverty and dealing with climate change.
Deep down, Professor Fisher’s message was really about culture and civilisation.
Deep down, Professor Fisher’s message was really about culture and civilisation.
Today’s mantra about a looming clash of civilisations, about their being wrong and our being right, about being either with us or against us – this whole unilateral and confrontational approach takes us further away from bridging gaps, further away from reaching lasting and equitable agreement, further away from proving the extremists wrong.
Today’s mantra about a looming clash of civilisations, about their being wrong and our being right, about being either with us or against us – this whole unilateral and confrontational approach takes us further away from bridging gaps, further away from reaching lasting and equitable agreement, further away from proving the extremists wrong.
This is the paradox: In an interdependent world, the need to understand the other side’s interests, the need to understand what guides their emotions and motivates their behaviour and actions – this need is increasing – not in any altruistic sense – but as the only real strategy for securing a political outcome that maximises our own interests.
This is the paradox: In an interdependent world, the need to understand the other side’s interests, the need to understand what guides their emotions and motivates their behaviour and actions – this need is increasing – not in any altruistic sense – but as the only real strategy for securing a political outcome that maximises our own interests.
Yet, overwhelmed by the complexity of interdependence, it is tempting to revert to the simple notion that the best approach for getting it our way is to insist that we are right and to use all our might and force to prove the point.
Yet, overwhelmed by the complexity of interdependence, it is tempting to revert to the simple notion that the best approach for getting it our way is to insist that we are right and to use all our might and force to prove the point.
My message this evening is that we must do everything we can to turn this tide of unilateralism in our response to conflict and opposing interests.
My message this evening is that we must do everything we can to turn this tide of unilateralism in our response to conflict and opposing interests.
We must revert to the essence of diplomacy, which is engagement.
We must revert to the essence of diplomacy, which is engagement.
In his acceptance speech, Pearson put it quite bluntly: “The grim fact is that we prepare for war like precocious giants and for peace like retarded pygmies.”
In his acceptance speech, Pearson put it quite bluntly: “The grim fact is that we prepare for war like precocious giants and for peace like retarded pygmies.”
As our men and women in uniform in Afghanistan told me when I visited them a month ago: Do not expect us to deliver a stable Afghanistan.
As our men and women in uniform in Afghanistan told me when I visited them a month ago: Do not expect us to deliver a stable Afghanistan.
Only political processes and civil efforts can do that; our mission is strictly speaking to provide the necessary stability for that to happen.
Only political processes and civil efforts can do that; our mission is strictly speaking to provide the necessary stability for that to happen.
They went on: If you fall short on that critical civil agenda of reconciliation, reconstruction and Afghanisation, if the average Afghan does not see any change for the better in his daily life, then we, ISAF, the military – who are there with the best of mandates and the best of intentions, may end up being perceived as occupiers and part of the problem, rather than part of the solution.
They went on: If you fall short on that critical civil agenda of reconciliation, reconstruction and Afghanisation, if the average Afghan does not see any change for the better in his daily life, then we, ISAF, the military – who are there with the best of mandates and the best of intentions, may end up being perceived as occupiers and part of the problem, rather than part of the solution.
Now, towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century, this is the new dominant paradigm of modern conflict: War, failing states, acts of terrorism, strong religious and cultural sentiments, widespread poverty, human misery, lack of development, the struggle for resources, impending climate change – in most conflicts, all of these factors meet and are intertwined.
Now, towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century, this is the new dominant paradigm of modern conflict: War, failing states, acts of terrorism, strong religious and cultural sentiments, widespread poverty, human misery, lack of development, the struggle for resources, impending climate change – in most conflicts, all of these factors meet and are intertwined.
We cannot address one of them without addressing the others.
We cannot address one of them without addressing the others.
The challenge is to apply a comprehensive approach in dealing with this complexity and pave the way for real engagement.
The challenge is to apply a comprehensive approach in dealing with this complexity and pave the way for real engagement.
Isolation and boycott as foreign policy tools are becoming less and less useful.
Isolation and boycott as foreign policy tools are becoming less and less useful.
Because it is virtually impossible to isolate conflicts.
Because it is virtually impossible to isolate conflicts.
They have a tendency to spread, unless we get involved and engaged.
They have a tendency to spread, unless we get involved and engaged.
Globalisation means that we are affected by conflicts that we used to define as far away.
Globalisation means that we are affected by conflicts that we used to define as far away.
Local conflicts are emerging as global concerns.
Local conflicts are emerging as global concerns.
As Vaclav Havel put it: “In today’s world everything concerns everyone.”
As Vaclav Havel put it: “In today’s world everything concerns everyone.”
Terrorists are being trained in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Terrorists are being trained in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Failed states in Africa – collapsing under the weight of poverty, disease and conflict – are providing new breeding ground for instability and insecurity.
Failed states in Africa – collapsing under the weight of poverty, disease and conflict – are providing new breeding ground for instability and insecurity.
The heroin and cocaine sold on the streets of Oslo and Boston come from Afghanistan and Colombia.
The heroin and cocaine sold on the streets of Oslo and Boston come from Afghanistan and Colombia.
States and groups, whether religious, national, or political extremists, using terror and destroying bridges must be dealt with firmly, including with adequate police and military force when needed.
States and groups, whether religious, national, or political extremists, using terror and destroying bridges must be dealt with firmly, including with adequate police and military force when needed.
States have a right and a duty to protect themselves.
States have a right and a duty to protect themselves.
In NATO we all agreed that the terrible attacks on 9/11 were to be considered an attack on all the allies, in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
In NATO we all agreed that the terrible attacks on 9/11 were to be considered an attack on all the allies, in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
However, how we protect ourselves matters.
However, how we protect ourselves matters.
Military means may be necessary.
Military means may be necessary.
But only by demonstrating that there is a better option, through political and economic means, processes and governance, will we be able to build lasting solutions and stem the flow of recruits to extremist groups.
But only by demonstrating that there is a better option, through political and economic means, processes and governance, will we be able to build lasting solutions and stem the flow of recruits to extremist groups.
We need to bring this into our equation: Military action may defeat one enemy.
We need to bring this into our equation: Military action may defeat one enemy.
But what if that very action creates ten new enemies – are we then better off?
But what if that very action creates ten new enemies – are we then better off?
Seen from our side of the Atlantic, some of the most prominent US foreign policy achievements have been based on engagement combined with strength.
Seen from our side of the Atlantic, some of the most prominent US foreign policy achievements have been based on engagement combined with strength.
This was how we broke out of the Cold War and paved the way for a new and free Europe.
This was how we broke out of the Cold War and paved the way for a new and free Europe.
The US and the Alliance opposed the Soviet Union, but we kept talking to them and engaging them.
The US and the Alliance opposed the Soviet Union, but we kept talking to them and engaging them.
This was how a new era in relations with China was opened up.
This was how a new era in relations with China was opened up.
And more recently, this is how the US and other nations managed to move forward in addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge.
And more recently, this is how the US and other nations managed to move forward in addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge.
There was strength.
There was strength.
But it was when this strength was combined with engagement and the application of a variety of measures that new breakthroughs were achieved.
But it was when this strength was combined with engagement and the application of a variety of measures that new breakthroughs were achieved.
On the other hand, there are not many examples of conflicts where military action or pressure combined with isolation has led to durable peace and stability.
On the other hand, there are not many examples of conflicts where military action or pressure combined with isolation has led to durable peace and stability.
Pressure combined with isolation has too often led to a hardening of positions and the perpetuation and widening of conflicts.
Pressure combined with isolation has too often led to a hardening of positions and the perpetuation and widening of conflicts.
Not engaging means depriving ourselves of a much more fully equipped toolbox.
Not engaging means depriving ourselves of a much more fully equipped toolbox.
Not engaging limits our options and may make us hostage to our own unilateral approaches.
Not engaging limits our options and may make us hostage to our own unilateral approaches.
And action to bring about change, stability, freedom, democracy, rule of law – based on military intervention alone, without a comprehensive political strategy – has proven devastating.
And action to bring about change, stability, freedom, democracy, rule of law – based on military intervention alone, without a comprehensive political strategy – has proven devastating.
In the troubled arc stretching from Kabul to Khartoum, conflicts have not only spread, but in many ways melted together.
In the troubled arc stretching from Kabul to Khartoum, conflicts have not only spread, but in many ways melted together.
Each of the conflicts in this area has its own distinctive character, and needs to be addressed on its own merits.
Each of the conflicts in this area has its own distinctive character, and needs to be addressed on its own merits.
But they also fuel and draw inspiration from each other.
But they also fuel and draw inspiration from each other.
I will come back to two of these burning issues – Afghanistan and the Middle East – but let me first run through Norway’s approach to peace and conflict resolution.
I will come back to two of these burning issues – Afghanistan and the Middle East – but let me first run through Norway’s approach to peace and conflict resolution.
This approach, shaped by Norway’s history, experience, size and geographical location, differs of course from that of the United States.
This approach, shaped by Norway’s history, experience, size and geographical location, differs of course from that of the United States.
But we are united as allies.
But we are united as allies.
When the United States was attacked on 9/11, we too were attacked, because the security of the United States is also the security of Norway.
When the United States was attacked on 9/11, we too were attacked, because the security of the United States is also the security of Norway.
Because we are allies and partners, united by values, purpose and numerous bonds across the Atlantic.
Because we are allies and partners, united by values, purpose and numerous bonds across the Atlantic.
Joseph Nye has, with his reflections on the role and nature of “soft power”, enabled us to understand the bigger picture of state power.
Joseph Nye has, with his reflections on the role and nature of “soft power”, enabled us to understand the bigger picture of state power.
Norway’s deep partnership with the US did not spring from respect for your military might, but from the power of American ideas and values.
Norway’s deep partnership with the US did not spring from respect for your military might, but from the power of American ideas and values.
And Norway’s ability to weigh in beyond its borders has never been a result of military might or economic muscles.
And Norway’s ability to weigh in beyond its borders has never been a result of military might or economic muscles.
It has been a shared vision of Norwegians to take a broader responsibility, to engage in the settlement of disputes and to contribute to peace and security.
It has been a shared vision of Norwegians to take a broader responsibility, to engage in the settlement of disputes and to contribute to peace and security.
The goal of this government is to increase Norway’s official development assistance to 1 percent of our GDP.
The goal of this government is to increase Norway’s official development assistance to 1 percent of our GDP.
We are almost there, at a current level of 0.98%.
We are almost there, at a current level of 0.98%.
One mainstay of Norwegian foreign policy is our continuous support of the UN-led multilateral system, both when it comes to world security and when it comes to driving forward agendas and programmes for development and the fight against poverty.
One mainstay of Norwegian foreign policy is our continuous support of the UN-led multilateral system, both when it comes to world security and when it comes to driving forward agendas and programmes for development and the fight against poverty.
Another mainstay is the belief in the pre-eminence of international law that regulates the use of force and creates a level playing field in world markets.
Another mainstay is the belief in the pre-eminence of international law that regulates the use of force and creates a level playing field in world markets.
Such a legal order is key to our security as well as to our national interest, not least given our position as a coastal state with rights and responsibilities in waters that are six times the size of mainland Norway.
Such a legal order is key to our security as well as to our national interest, not least given our position as a coastal state with rights and responsibilities in waters that are six times the size of mainland Norway.
Then there is the tradition of active engagement in peace and development processes.
Then there is the tradition of active engagement in peace and development processes.
This is a matter of both values and interests.
This is a matter of both values and interests.
Values, because we – as a rich nation in a peaceful corner of Europe – have a moral responsibility to engage in the cause of peace and development for others.
Values, because we – as a rich nation in a peaceful corner of Europe – have a moral responsibility to engage in the cause of peace and development for others.
And interests, because ultimately our security is served by less suffering and less instability and more progress in the fight against world poverty.
And interests, because ultimately our security is served by less suffering and less instability and more progress in the fight against world poverty.
We cannot spread ourselves too thinly.
We cannot spread ourselves too thinly.
We try to seize strategic opportunities where we can make a difference, such as our long-standing engagement with the parties to the Middle East conflict.
We try to seize strategic opportunities where we can make a difference, such as our long-standing engagement with the parties to the Middle East conflict.
Such as grasping the opportunity to assist the parties in Sri Lanka to move towards peace, despite all the obstacles.
Such as grasping the opportunity to assist the parties in Sri Lanka to move towards peace, despite all the obstacles.
Such as engaging in the Horn of Africa.
Such as engaging in the Horn of Africa.
Or such as taking the lead among governments in the efforts to reach the goal of immunising all children, everywhere.
Or such as taking the lead among governments in the efforts to reach the goal of immunising all children, everywhere.
Looking at the Norwegian involvement in peace processes, we see some key features.
Looking at the Norwegian involvement in peace processes, we see some key features.
Let me mention six:
Let me mention six:
First, we seek to be consistent, and history has shown that the nature of our involvement remains stable, even when there is a change of government, thanks to the broad political consensus in Norway on the value of this kind of involvement.
First, we seek to be consistent, and history has shown that the nature of our involvement remains stable, even when there is a change of government, thanks to the broad political consensus in Norway on the value of this kind of involvement.
Second, we focus on the interplay between humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peace efforts.
Second, we focus on the interplay between humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peace efforts.
In many cases, our humanitarian activities in conflict areas have served as a gateway for our engagement in various peace and reconciliation processes.
In many cases, our humanitarian activities in conflict areas have served as a gateway for our engagement in various peace and reconciliation processes.
At times, this humanitarian experience may give us better insight into the core complexity of conflicts, and – to follow Professor Fisher’s logic – enable us to understand key interests of groups that are all too often neglected by those who carry bigger sticks.
At times, this humanitarian experience may give us better insight into the core complexity of conflicts, and – to follow Professor Fisher’s logic – enable us to understand key interests of groups that are all too often neglected by those who carry bigger sticks.
Third, and as a consequence of my second point, there is our close cooperation with NGOs and civil society.
Third, and as a consequence of my second point, there is our close cooperation with NGOs and civil society.
Norwegian NGOs and research institutions have played key roles, both as initiators and implementers of Norwegian involvement in peace processes.
Norwegian NGOs and research institutions have played key roles, both as initiators and implementers of Norwegian involvement in peace processes.
About one third of our development budget is channelled through our NGOs.
About one third of our development budget is channelled through our NGOs.
This in turn, provides us with channels to important population groups and civil society.
This in turn, provides us with channels to important population groups and civil society.
In many cases we can work across boundaries, in close cooperation between state and independent actors.
In many cases we can work across boundaries, in close cooperation between state and independent actors.
Fourth, in many contexts our lack of direct national interests in a conflict proves to be an asset.
Fourth, in many contexts our lack of direct national interests in a conflict proves to be an asset.
We can engage in a conflict without changing the balance of power between the parties or within a region.
We can engage in a conflict without changing the balance of power between the parties or within a region.
We have no colonial past and no direct national interests to defend.
We have no colonial past and no direct national interests to defend.
Fifth, our contribution is rarely made in splendid isolation.
Fifth, our contribution is rarely made in splendid isolation.