natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Norway attaches particular importance to ensuring that this work has the support of the UN.
For Norge er det særlig viktig at dette arbeidet også forankres i FN.
It is crucial that all countries, not just the nuclear-weapon states themselves, can be confident that agreements are being followed up.
Det er viktig at alle land, ikke bare kjernevåpenstatene selv, har tillit til at avtalene blir fulgt opp.
The work on nuclear disarmament verification is an important part of Norway's disarmament and non-proliferation policy.
Arbeidet med verifikasjon utgjør en viktig del av den helhetlige norske nedrustnings- og ikke-spredningspoltikken.
'Norway is working towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
- Norge arbeider for målet om en verden uten kjernevåpen.
Although the Iran agreement in 2015 was an important achievement, today's security policy landscape does not give much grounds for optimism.
Selv om Iran-avtalen fra 2015 var et viktig lyspunkt, gir ikke dagens sikkerhetspolitiske klima særlig grunn til optimisme.
Norway votes against nuclear disarmament resolution in the UN
Avviser ensidig nedrustning i FN
Strong UN support for Norwegian disarmament resolution
Sterk FN-støtte til norsk resolusjon om nedrustning
For example, experience from humanitarian disarmament should guide us on how to pursue and negotiate disarmament issues in general, Støre said at the opening lecture at the Leangkollen Conference in Oslo 1 February 2010.
Under den årlige Leangkollen-konferansen i Oslo (1. februar) gikk utenriksminister Jonas Gahr Støre gjennom hele nedrustningsfeltet – fra kjernefysisk nedrustning og avtalen om ikke-spredning av kjernefysiske våpen (NPT) til humanitær nedrustning og arbeidet mot klasevåpen og væpnet vold.
Ambassadors, ladies and gentlemen,
Ambassadors, ladies and gentlemen,
It is an honour to address you at the 45th Annual Leangkollen Conference.
It is an honour to address you at the 45th Annual Leangkollen Conference.
During 55 years, and still (since 1997) under the inspiring leadership of Chris Prebensen, the Committee has been an important institution in the Norwegian security policy landscape of discussions, setting broad and comprehensive foreign policy agendas.
During 55 years, and still (since 1997) under the inspiring leadership of Chris Prebensen, the Committee has been an important institution in the Norwegian security policy landscape of discussions, setting broad and comprehensive foreign policy agendas.
Its comprehensiveness is important.
Its comprehensiveness is important.
In our complex world we need a broader perspective: one that can include the long lines in our common history, acknowledging the hard mix of how to combine what is politically and morally desirable with what is politically and strategically achievable.
In our complex world we need a broader perspective: one that can include the long lines in our common history, acknowledging the hard mix of how to combine what is politically and morally desirable with what is politically and strategically achievable.
Single mindedness is rarely a wise approach to take us forward in the security policy terrain.
Single mindedness is rarely a wise approach to take us forward in the security policy terrain.
A comprehensive approach is crucial to the theme I have chosen to focus on today: security and disarmament.
A comprehensive approach is crucial to the theme I have chosen to focus on today: security and disarmament.
It is a theme of vital importance to security policy in all ages, combining political, economic, technological, moral and ethical perspectives.
It is a theme of vital importance to security policy in all ages, combining political, economic, technological, moral and ethical perspectives.
The main focus of my address will be the need for a comprehensive approach to disarmament – and that is the reason why I have chosen Disarmament – reframing the challenge as the title for my lecture.
The main focus of my address will be the need for a comprehensive approach to disarmament – and that is the reason why I have chosen Disarmament – reframing the challenge as the title for my lecture.
2010 will be a critical year for global disarmament issues.
2010 will be a critical year for global disarmament issues.
This is the year of the upcoming NPT conference; we see continued US-Russian efforts to make further cuts in nuclear arsenals; the Iranian nuclear file is as high as ever on the agenda; and new light is being shed on the fatal consequences of small arms and their toll on human development.
This is the year of the upcoming NPT conference; we see continued US-Russian efforts to make further cuts in nuclear arsenals; the Iranian nuclear file is as high as ever on the agenda; and new light is being shed on the fatal consequences of small arms and their toll on human development.
Just to mention a few features.
Just to mention a few features.
Norway alone will not tilt the balance on any of these issues.
Norway alone will not tilt the balance on any of these issues.
But no country can escape the disarmament agenda; this is indeed one of the truly global agendas that challenge us all – it is in fact everybody’s business.
But no country can escape the disarmament agenda; this is indeed one of the truly global agendas that challenge us all – it is in fact everybody’s business.
And consequently, disarmament is an integral part of the Norwegian Government’s foreign and security policy.
And consequently, disarmament is an integral part of the Norwegian Government’s foreign and security policy.
We pursue disarmament in order to enhance international, national and individual security.
We pursue disarmament in order to enhance international, national and individual security.
We pursue disarmament in accordance with international humanitarian law and human rights.
We pursue disarmament in accordance with international humanitarian law and human rights.
And we pursue a comprehensive disarmament agenda that makes sense both from a political, military, humanitarian and economic perspective – in addition to the fundamental moral and ethical dimensions.
And we pursue a comprehensive disarmament agenda that makes sense both from a political, military, humanitarian and economic perspective – in addition to the fundamental moral and ethical dimensions.
Our ambitions are spelled out in the Government’s policy platform:
Our ambitions are spelled out in the Government’s policy platform:
First: to work for a world free of nuclear weapons, in close cooperation with our NATO allies, in all relevant forums.
First: to work for a world free of nuclear weapons, in close cooperation with our NATO allies, in all relevant forums.
Second: to promote further efforts of humanitarian disarmament, such as following up on the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and increasing the efforts against armed violence.
Second: to promote further efforts of humanitarian disarmament, such as following up on the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and increasing the efforts against armed violence.
In short: this is a comprehensive approach, acknowledging that disarmament and arms reduction are at the core of both security policy and development policy.
In short: this is a comprehensive approach, acknowledging that disarmament and arms reduction are at the core of both security policy and development policy.
A few months from today, on August 6, we will commemorate the fact that 65 years have passed since Hiroshima – a day forever branded in our memory - the day mankind’s capacity to destroy was demonstrated for all to see.
A few months from today, on August 6, we will commemorate the fact that 65 years have passed since Hiroshima – a day forever branded in our memory - the day mankind’s capacity to destroy was demonstrated for all to see.
Since that day in 1945, we have lived with the threat, the fear and at certain moments also the imminent possibility of nuclear war.
Since that day in 1945, we have lived with the threat, the fear and at certain moments also the imminent possibility of nuclear war.
Nuclear holocaust is not some imaginary notion.
Nuclear holocaust is not some imaginary notion.
The possibility is real because the arsenal is real; it is there.
The possibility is real because the arsenal is real; it is there.
This threat, however, has not been viewed exclusively as a bad thing.
This threat, however, has not been viewed exclusively as a bad thing.
It has, as you all know, even been a core element of our security policy.
It has, as you all know, even been a core element of our security policy.
Take the doctrine of mutually assured destruction: it was – and still is, one could argue – a doctrine designed to protect us from a nuclear holocaust, and actually from war itself.
Take the doctrine of mutually assured destruction: it was – and still is, one could argue – a doctrine designed to protect us from a nuclear holocaust, and actually from war itself.
For decades the logic was that war between nuclear powers had become practically impossible.
For decades the logic was that war between nuclear powers had become practically impossible.
The more destructive a weapon’s power, the more it can deter, as the logic goes.
The more destructive a weapon’s power, the more it can deter, as the logic goes.
Historically, we cannot exclude the possibility that it was the existence of nuclear weapons that kept the Cold War chilly and not warm.
Historically, we cannot exclude the possibility that it was the existence of nuclear weapons that kept the Cold War chilly and not warm.
But let us not forget that those post World War II decades only kept a fragile, dangerous peace in Europe, that it was a period of violent competition between the superpowers elsewhere on our planet, and that the logic of MAD presupposed that there were rational actors on both sides.
But let us not forget that those post World War II decades only kept a fragile, dangerous peace in Europe, that it was a period of violent competition between the superpowers elsewhere on our planet, and that the logic of MAD presupposed that there were rational actors on both sides.
The so-called hawks were the main proponents of this logic.
The so-called hawks were the main proponents of this logic.
We remember the classic Cold War infighting between hawks and doves: those advocating massive arsenals of weapons, versus those promoting disarmament and dialogue.
We remember the classic Cold War infighting between hawks and doves: those advocating massive arsenals of weapons, versus those promoting disarmament and dialogue.
During the Cold War, the disarmament community was often portrayed as idealistic and even naïve by the security policy establishment.
During the Cold War, the disarmament community was often portrayed as idealistic and even naïve by the security policy establishment.
Disarmament was seen – by some – as irreconcilable with state security.
Disarmament was seen – by some – as irreconcilable with state security.
– And, as a consequence, as an attitude and act of irresponsibility.
– And, as a consequence, as an attitude and act of irresponsibility.
But as we remember, this was not the only line of thinking.
But as we remember, this was not the only line of thinking.
In 1967, NATO adopted the Harmel Report emphasising the close interlinkage between confidence-building measures and deterrence capability.
In 1967, NATO adopted the Harmel Report emphasising the close interlinkage between confidence-building measures and deterrence capability.
This helped to create an atmosphere in the 1970s that led to important arms control treaties.
This helped to create an atmosphere in the 1970s that led to important arms control treaties.
This spring, in 2010, we will pay particular attention to one of the most important milestones reached in that period – the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
This spring, in 2010, we will pay particular attention to one of the most important milestones reached in that period – the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
It is appropriate to recall the critical importance of this treaty, which entered into force in 1970 and still is – as you all know - the main multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
It is appropriate to recall the critical importance of this treaty, which entered into force in 1970 and still is – as you all know - the main multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
The treaty is based on three pillars – pillars of equal importance: i) non-proliferation, ii) disarmament and iii), the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The treaty is based on three pillars – pillars of equal importance: i) non-proliferation, ii) disarmament and iii), the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.
I think it is fair to say that for too long, the disarmament pillar of the Treaty was neglected.
I think it is fair to say that for too long, the disarmament pillar of the Treaty was neglected.
In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely, provided that the nuclear weapons states agreed on fundamental disarmament principles.
In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely, provided that the nuclear weapons states agreed on fundamental disarmament principles.
These principles were further elaborated at the NPT Review Conference in 2000.
These principles were further elaborated at the NPT Review Conference in 2000.
However, since 2000, we have witnessed a gradual roll-back in global efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and in their role in security policies.
However, since 2000, we have witnessed a gradual roll-back in global efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and in their role in security policies.
The first decade of the 21st century now stands out as a lost decade in terms of nuclear disarmament.
The first decade of the 21st century now stands out as a lost decade in terms of nuclear disarmament.
The optimistic atmosphere that characterised the first years after 1989 was subdued by the so-called Global War on Terror after 9/11 2001.
The optimistic atmosphere that characterised the first years after 1989 was subdued by the so-called Global War on Terror after 9/11 2001.
Hope was replaced by fear in international politics.
Hope was replaced by fear in international politics.
Key actors lost their faith in multilateral organisations and regimes.
Key actors lost their faith in multilateral organisations and regimes.
Deeply rooted norms and values were challenged by the notion that the times we were living in warranted urgent and extraordinary responses.
Deeply rooted norms and values were challenged by the notion that the times we were living in warranted urgent and extraordinary responses.
This also influenced the work of the NPT, and we all remember that the review conference in 2005 ended in total failure.
This also influenced the work of the NPT, and we all remember that the review conference in 2005 ended in total failure.
Basically, the NPT has been viewed from two different perspectives: one is that the real purpose of the treaty is limited to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; the other is that the main focus should be on the elimination of existing arsenals.
Basically, the NPT has been viewed from two different perspectives: one is that the real purpose of the treaty is limited to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; the other is that the main focus should be on the elimination of existing arsenals.
This disagreement also contributed to the failure of the 2005 review conference.
This disagreement also contributed to the failure of the 2005 review conference.
Today, however, the tide may be changing again.
Today, however, the tide may be changing again.
Multilateralism is regaining centre-stage.
Multilateralism is regaining centre-stage.
Respect for fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles is on the rise.
Respect for fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles is on the rise.
And nuclear disarmament is again heading the global agenda.
And nuclear disarmament is again heading the global agenda.
In a few months time, in May, the international community will have an opportunity to restore the NPT compact.
In a few months time, in May, the international community will have an opportunity to restore the NPT compact.
It is now more important than ever that this review conference really closes the current loopholes in the regime, and that it holds the state parties accountable to their obligations.
It is now more important than ever that this review conference really closes the current loopholes in the regime, and that it holds the state parties accountable to their obligations.
In other words, we must ensure that it starts a process towards full elimination of nuclear weapons.
In other words, we must ensure that it starts a process towards full elimination of nuclear weapons.
This is not a utopian dream.
This is not a utopian dream.
As President Obama said in Prague last April, it may not happen in his lifetime, but it must happen and we must set the course to get there.
As President Obama said in Prague last April, it may not happen in his lifetime, but it must happen and we must set the course to get there.
To succeed we must respect the comprehensiveness of the NPT agenda.
To succeed we must respect the comprehensiveness of the NPT agenda.
We must accept the fact that the three pillars have equal weight, that respect for one depends on respect for the other.
We must accept the fact that the three pillars have equal weight, that respect for one depends on respect for the other.
Or to put it this way – the failure of the major nuclear states to disarm directly impedes our collective ability to win respect for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
Or to put it this way – the failure of the major nuclear states to disarm directly impedes our collective ability to win respect for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
And the other way round – nuclear abolition simply cannot be achieved unless we tighten up the non-proliferation regime.
And the other way round – nuclear abolition simply cannot be achieved unless we tighten up the non-proliferation regime.
Existing nuclear states will not give up their weapons unless there is a water-tight regime in place that ensures that other states are barred from gaining this capacity.
Existing nuclear states will not give up their weapons unless there is a water-tight regime in place that ensures that other states are barred from gaining this capacity.
Hence we must empower the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to credibly verify that all nuclear activities remain solely for peaceful purposes.
Hence we must empower the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to credibly verify that all nuclear activities remain solely for peaceful purposes.
All states must be ready to accept such verification, and we must install effective and strong sanctions in order to collectively punish violations.
All states must be ready to accept such verification, and we must install effective and strong sanctions in order to collectively punish violations.
Furthermore, if there is no movement on key disarmament objectives, the NPT regime will suffer.
Furthermore, if there is no movement on key disarmament objectives, the NPT regime will suffer.
Therefore, we urgently need a legally binding test ban.
Therefore, we urgently need a legally binding test ban.
We must cap all production of fissile material for weapons purposes and deal with the vast existing stocks.
We must cap all production of fissile material for weapons purposes and deal with the vast existing stocks.
We must put in place improved assurances for non-nuclear weapon states so that they will not be exposed to - or threatened with - nuclear devastation.
We must put in place improved assurances for non-nuclear weapon states so that they will not be exposed to - or threatened with - nuclear devastation.
We must accelerate the process of destroying weapons, which would be the best way to ensure that they do not end up in wrong hands.
We must accelerate the process of destroying weapons, which would be the best way to ensure that they do not end up in wrong hands.
We also need to consider the threat of nuclear terrorism.
We also need to consider the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Therefore, I welcome President Obama’s initiative to convene a summit on this issue.
Therefore, I welcome President Obama’s initiative to convene a summit on this issue.
Norway has a solid record in nuclear security.
Norway has a solid record in nuclear security.
Then there is the civilian dimension.
Then there is the civilian dimension.
Given the expected rise in the use of nuclear energy, we also need to sharpen our approach:
Given the expected rise in the use of nuclear energy, we also need to sharpen our approach:
we must limit the spread of sensitive technologies for uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing,
we must limit the spread of sensitive technologies for uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing,
we must devise international cooperative mechanisms for nuclear fuel production, we must protect nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands, and
we must devise international cooperative mechanisms for nuclear fuel production, we must protect nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands, and
we must limit or stop the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector.
we must limit or stop the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector.
These issues are sensitive.
These issues are sensitive.
Many non-aligned nations fear that non-proliferation measures will restrict access to technology that may be important for their economic development and energy security.
Many non-aligned nations fear that non-proliferation measures will restrict access to technology that may be important for their economic development and energy security.
However, by implementing and balancing both non-proliferation and nuclear security measures, developing countries will be better positioned to take part in developing civilian nuclear cooperation.
However, by implementing and balancing both non-proliferation and nuclear security measures, developing countries will be better positioned to take part in developing civilian nuclear cooperation.
The same logic is being applied to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The same logic is being applied to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
There are no lack of challenges and challengers to the NPT regime and the disarmament agenda.
There are no lack of challenges and challengers to the NPT regime and the disarmament agenda.
Iran and North Korea are among those rightly mentioned in this regard.
Iran and North Korea are among those rightly mentioned in this regard.
But we should also take a broader perspective.
But we should also take a broader perspective.
Today’s globalised world is increasingly multipolar.
Today’s globalised world is increasingly multipolar.
New powers have emerged, not least in Asia and Latin America.
New powers have emerged, not least in Asia and Latin America.
These new powers will claim their seats at the table and demand to be shown respect for their opinions and interests.
These new powers will claim their seats at the table and demand to be shown respect for their opinions and interests.
This does not have to be a more dangerous world.
This does not have to be a more dangerous world.
But if we want to prevent a new era of great power competition and the risk of large-scale conflicts, we need to adapt and strengthen our multilateral security regimes so that they reflect this emerging order.
But if we want to prevent a new era of great power competition and the risk of large-scale conflicts, we need to adapt and strengthen our multilateral security regimes so that they reflect this emerging order.
We need a more updated and firm commitment from the key players in the international system.
We need a more updated and firm commitment from the key players in the international system.
First and foremost, we need a shared understanding of the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, including with the regard to the emerging powers.
First and foremost, we need a shared understanding of the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, including with the regard to the emerging powers.