natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Your analyses are thorough, leading and set the agenda.
Your analyses are thorough, leading and set the agenda.
As a student, I was greatly inspired by leaders such as Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt.
As a student, I was greatly inspired by leaders such as Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt.
They represented social democracy and international solidarity at its best.
They represented social democracy and international solidarity at its best.
Basic values.
Basic values.
I became Foreign Minister in 2005 at the same time as Frank-Walter Steinmeier came into office.
I became Foreign Minister in 2005 at the same time as Frank-Walter Steinmeier came into office.
We both shared the same perspectives on many global challenges, and I appreciated the close cooperation we had on disarmament issues.
We both shared the same perspectives on many global challenges, and I appreciated the close cooperation we had on disarmament issues.
Among other things, we managed to bring disarmament back onto NATO’s agenda, which – in 2007 – was a rather tall order.
Among other things, we managed to bring disarmament back onto NATO’s agenda, which – in 2007 – was a rather tall order.
This morning I had a good meeting with Guido Westerwelle, and I am glad that our close cooperation continues.
This morning I had a good meeting with Guido Westerwelle, and I am glad that our close cooperation continues.
This brings me to today’s topic: disarmament as a global challenge.
This brings me to today’s topic: disarmament as a global challenge.
For me the very notion of disarmament represents more than anything an opportunity to enhance security.
For me the very notion of disarmament represents more than anything an opportunity to enhance security.
And enhancing security is all about credibility and relevance: We must make the best use of the opportunities at hand, in order to reduce armament levels, and in order to eliminate weapons that weaken security rather than strengthen it.
And enhancing security is all about credibility and relevance: We must make the best use of the opportunities at hand, in order to reduce armament levels, and in order to eliminate weapons that weaken security rather than strengthen it.
In my view: All countries have a responsibility to forge an international environment that is conducive for disarmament.
In my view: All countries have a responsibility to forge an international environment that is conducive for disarmament.
There is no good reason to let the disarmament agenda be dominated by a handful of countries, or to let those who want to achieve the least set the pace.
There is no good reason to let the disarmament agenda be dominated by a handful of countries, or to let those who want to achieve the least set the pace.
Unfortunately, this is precisely how the institutionalised intergovernmental disarmament agenda has been working.
Unfortunately, this is precisely how the institutionalised intergovernmental disarmament agenda has been working.
For nearly 15 years, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) has delivered nothing at all of practical value.
For nearly 15 years, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) has delivered nothing at all of practical value.
If this situation continues, we should reconsider whether the current CD (as well as other intergovernmental disarmament institutions) is the best response we can come up with to today’s challenges.
If this situation continues, we should reconsider whether the current CD (as well as other intergovernmental disarmament institutions) is the best response we can come up with to today’s challenges.
For one thing, we know that there are alternative approaches:
For one thing, we know that there are alternative approaches:
Firstly.
Firstly.
In the field of humanitarian disarmament, multilateralism has been working: We must learn from the experiences from the Mine Ban Convention and the Cluster Munitions Convention.
In the field of humanitarian disarmament, multilateralism has been working: We must learn from the experiences from the Mine Ban Convention and the Cluster Munitions Convention.
Secondly.
Secondly.
A renewed intergovernmental machinery is needed.
A renewed intergovernmental machinery is needed.
This should: o be inclusive and open for all interested states; o be much more transparent, and open for active participation of civil society (and other relevant actors); o have a clear orientation towards practical on-the-ground impact; and most of all o be structured so that the spoilers cannot set the agenda.
This should: o be inclusive and open for all interested states; o be much more transparent, and open for active participation of civil society (and other relevant actors); o have a clear orientation towards practical on-the-ground impact; and most of all o be structured so that the spoilers cannot set the agenda.
Now, these points should be taken into account when we consider how to make use of the window of opportunity we now have - so we can move closer to a world free from nuclear weapons.
Now, these points should be taken into account when we consider how to make use of the window of opportunity we now have - so we can move closer to a world free from nuclear weapons.
The window is open, but could shut again, just as the optimism of the 1990s was followed by some very difficult years.
The window is open, but could shut again, just as the optimism of the 1990s was followed by some very difficult years.
Let me illustrate this by focusing on three main areas or arenas: o First: the NPT and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. o Second: the role of NATO. o Third: the concept of humanitarian disarmament.
Let me illustrate this by focusing on three main areas or arenas: o First: the NPT and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. o Second: the role of NATO. o Third: the concept of humanitarian disarmament.
First: my views on a very topical issue – the NPT.
First: my views on a very topical issue – the NPT.
For nearly ten years, we have been accustomed to bad news when it came to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
For nearly ten years, we have been accustomed to bad news when it came to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Many factors contributed to a deep sense of pessimism, and many of them are still valid: o North Korea’s announcement in 2003 of its withdrawal from the NPT created a genuine fear that other countries would follow suit.
Many factors contributed to a deep sense of pessimism, and many of them are still valid: o North Korea’s announcement in 2003 of its withdrawal from the NPT created a genuine fear that other countries would follow suit.
North Korea’s behaviour, building up its nuclear capacities and its possible international proliferation activities, is a grave challenge in itself. o Iran’s blatant refusal to comply with clear and legitimate demands by the international community has raised questions about how we can deal effectively with potential breakouts from the non-proliferation regime.
North Korea’s behaviour, building up its nuclear capacities and its possible international proliferation activities, is a grave challenge in itself. o Iran’s blatant refusal to comply with clear and legitimate demands by the international community has raised questions about how we can deal effectively with potential breakouts from the non-proliferation regime.
It is further cause for concern that these two proliferation challenges (and possibly others, like Syria) have emerged at a time when we are seeing what has been described as a civilian “nuclear renaissance”.
It is further cause for concern that these two proliferation challenges (and possibly others, like Syria) have emerged at a time when we are seeing what has been described as a civilian “nuclear renaissance”.
We may like it or not, but it is expected that more countries, particularly in the South, will develop nuclear energy in the decades to come.
We may like it or not, but it is expected that more countries, particularly in the South, will develop nuclear energy in the decades to come.
This is already happening on a large scale in countries such as China.
This is already happening on a large scale in countries such as China.
Partly, of course, in response to the legitimate need for energy sources to fuel economic growth.
Partly, of course, in response to the legitimate need for energy sources to fuel economic growth.
But we should not overlook the challenge represented by sensitive technologies being made more widely available worldwide.
But we should not overlook the challenge represented by sensitive technologies being made more widely available worldwide.
Alongside the proliferation challenges, it is also a fact that many countries, especially those in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), find that nuclear weapons states have not delivered on their disarmament pledges.
Alongside the proliferation challenges, it is also a fact that many countries, especially those in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), find that nuclear weapons states have not delivered on their disarmament pledges.
To understand this, we should take a closer look at the NPT and its history.
To understand this, we should take a closer look at the NPT and its history.
The NPT was negotiated in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
The NPT was negotiated in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
Its underlying principle is that countries that did not already possess nuclear arms would pledge not to acquire such weapons, provided that they were ensured the right to nuclear energy for peaceful uses, and that nuclear weapons states committed themselves to nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of their nuclear weapons.
Its underlying principle is that countries that did not already possess nuclear arms would pledge not to acquire such weapons, provided that they were ensured the right to nuclear energy for peaceful uses, and that nuclear weapons states committed themselves to nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of their nuclear weapons.
The NPT is a product of the Cold War.
The NPT is a product of the Cold War.
Today, it is highly unlikely that an agreement would be reached under which five states are given the exclusive right to possess a particular weapon such as the nuclear bomb.
Today, it is highly unlikely that an agreement would be reached under which five states are given the exclusive right to possess a particular weapon such as the nuclear bomb.
Many of us remember the freeze movement in the 1980s, the peace camps and massive demonstrations against the deployment of new US nuclear weapons in Western Europe to counter the Soviet SS20 missiles.
Many of us remember the freeze movement in the 1980s, the peace camps and massive demonstrations against the deployment of new US nuclear weapons in Western Europe to counter the Soviet SS20 missiles.
The NPT was originally given a duration of 25 years.
The NPT was originally given a duration of 25 years.
When the question of extension came up in 1995, the world had changed dramatically.
When the question of extension came up in 1995, the world had changed dramatically.
While nuclear deterrence could have been justified during the East–West confrontation, it was harder to explain why certain states were still to maintain large stockpiles of nuclear arms in the absence of any obvious enemy.
While nuclear deterrence could have been justified during the East–West confrontation, it was harder to explain why certain states were still to maintain large stockpiles of nuclear arms in the absence of any obvious enemy.
In short, the credibility and relevance of nuclear weapons were questioned in a way never done before.
In short, the credibility and relevance of nuclear weapons were questioned in a way never done before.
In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely, with the following provisions: o that nuclear weapons states committed themselves to disarmament with a view to elimination of their arsenals; o that nuclear weapons states gave guarantees that – under specific conditions – they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states; o and that the international community would aim to set up a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely, with the following provisions: o that nuclear weapons states committed themselves to disarmament with a view to elimination of their arsenals; o that nuclear weapons states gave guarantees that – under specific conditions – they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states; o and that the international community would aim to set up a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
The last of these was essential for securing the continued support of Arab states to the NPT regime.
The last of these was essential for securing the continued support of Arab states to the NPT regime.
These disarmament commitments were further elaborated by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, through the adoption of 13 practical nuclear disarmament steps.
These disarmament commitments were further elaborated by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, through the adoption of 13 practical nuclear disarmament steps.
And most importantly the nuclear weapons states committed themselves “unequivocally” to eliminating their nuclear arsenals.
And most importantly the nuclear weapons states committed themselves “unequivocally” to eliminating their nuclear arsenals.
However, as it turned out, the 2000 NPT Review Conference marked the end of the immediate post-Cold War era of optimism on arms control.
However, as it turned out, the 2000 NPT Review Conference marked the end of the immediate post-Cold War era of optimism on arms control.
There had been many achievements in a short period of time: o In addition to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, o the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had been opened up for signature in 1998. o The IAEA Model Additional Protocol, which provided enhanced IAEA verification of civilian nuclear activities, had been adopted in 1997. o The Chemical Weapons Convention had entered into force in 1997. o The same year, the Mine Ban Convention had been negotiated in Oslo.
There had been many achievements in a short period of time: o In addition to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, o the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had been opened up for signature in 1998. o The IAEA Model Additional Protocol, which provided enhanced IAEA verification of civilian nuclear activities, had been adopted in 1997. o The Chemical Weapons Convention had entered into force in 1997. o The same year, the Mine Ban Convention had been negotiated in Oslo.
But: the tide turned.
But: the tide turned.
Already in 2001, there were clear signs that the nuclear weapons states were distancing themselves from their commitments.
Already in 2001, there were clear signs that the nuclear weapons states were distancing themselves from their commitments.
This became even more apparent in the aftermath of 9/11.
This became even more apparent in the aftermath of 9/11.
The Bush administration made it plain that it did not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The Bush administration made it plain that it did not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The US withdrew from the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty with Russia.
The US withdrew from the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty with Russia.
And, the new security doctrines of the nuclear weapons states put more - rather than less - emphasis on nuclear deterrence (contrary to the 13 practical steps I mentioned earlier).
And, the new security doctrines of the nuclear weapons states put more - rather than less - emphasis on nuclear deterrence (contrary to the 13 practical steps I mentioned earlier).
The set-back in nuclear disarmament was matched by a definite lack of progress in strengthening the non-proliferation regime:
The set-back in nuclear disarmament was matched by a definite lack of progress in strengthening the non-proliferation regime:
In addition to the unresolved cases of Iran and North Korea, it was not possible to achieve a common understanding that the IAEA Additional Protocol should be universally applied, and that the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies should be prevented.
In addition to the unresolved cases of Iran and North Korea, it was not possible to achieve a common understanding that the IAEA Additional Protocol should be universally applied, and that the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies should be prevented.
The lack of a common vision on how to move the NPT process led to increased polarisation.
The lack of a common vision on how to move the NPT process led to increased polarisation.
The low point was 2005, when the NPT Review Conference failed miserably, followed by an inability to reach consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the UN World Summit.
The low point was 2005, when the NPT Review Conference failed miserably, followed by an inability to reach consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the UN World Summit.
So, when I became Foreign Minister in the autumn of 2005, I was struck by the sad state of affairs in nuclear arms control.
So, when I became Foreign Minister in the autumn of 2005, I was struck by the sad state of affairs in nuclear arms control.
It was imperative to move out of this impasse.
It was imperative to move out of this impasse.
The alternative would have been a continued weakening of the NPT regime’s credibility, and the danger that more countries could chose the nuclear option.
The alternative would have been a continued weakening of the NPT regime’s credibility, and the danger that more countries could chose the nuclear option.
So, the German Foreign Minister and I published articles in our national newspapers, advocating renewed efforts to address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and calling for concrete steps to reduce their role in security policies.
So, the German Foreign Minister and I published articles in our national newspapers, advocating renewed efforts to address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and calling for concrete steps to reduce their role in security policies.
In parallel, there was growing awareness of the threat of nuclear war, and the need to aim - not for constraints on the nuclear arms race – but for a world free of nuclear weapons.
In parallel, there was growing awareness of the threat of nuclear war, and the need to aim - not for constraints on the nuclear arms race – but for a world free of nuclear weapons.
A focus on this vision.
A focus on this vision.
The election of Barack Obama as President and his Prague speech last year were important events that gave this zero option more political clout.
The election of Barack Obama as President and his Prague speech last year were important events that gave this zero option more political clout.
It was indeed a great change to see a world free from nuclear weapons enter the general political vocabulary.
It was indeed a great change to see a world free from nuclear weapons enter the general political vocabulary.
Over the last year, I have seen that many countries are moving towards firmer commitments, and that the general view is that we need to engage actively in setting up a roadmap to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Over the last year, I have seen that many countries are moving towards firmer commitments, and that the general view is that we need to engage actively in setting up a roadmap to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Here again (and my point, again, is) the credibility issue: Once it is made clear for all that we would actually be safer without nuclear weapons, it is very hard to find good arguments for keeping them.
Here again (and my point, again, is) the credibility issue: Once it is made clear for all that we would actually be safer without nuclear weapons, it is very hard to find good arguments for keeping them.
The successful outcome (in my view) of the NPT 2010 Review Conference a few weeks ago has provided us with additional tools for this work.
The successful outcome (in my view) of the NPT 2010 Review Conference a few weeks ago has provided us with additional tools for this work.
I know that some NGOs, observers and others are disappointed that the outcome document did not set up timelines for the elimination of existing nuclear weapons, or initiate a process to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention.
I know that some NGOs, observers and others are disappointed that the outcome document did not set up timelines for the elimination of existing nuclear weapons, or initiate a process to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention.
I too, would certainly have welcomed a more ambitious outcome.
I too, would certainly have welcomed a more ambitious outcome.
But, the fact that the outcome succeeded in salvaging the credibility and relevance of the treaty is in itself of great importance.
But, the fact that the outcome succeeded in salvaging the credibility and relevance of the treaty is in itself of great importance.
The alternative would have left us with little to build on and greater challenges to overcome.
The alternative would have left us with little to build on and greater challenges to overcome.
As for the outcome itself, it went very far in restoring the underlying compact from 1995 and 2000.
As for the outcome itself, it went very far in restoring the underlying compact from 1995 and 2000.
Looking at what was actually adopted I see the glass as “half full” rather than “half empty”.
Looking at what was actually adopted I see the glass as “half full” rather than “half empty”.
Let me explain: o The Review Conference agreed on 64 concrete actions along the three pillars of the NPT, o as well as steps to be taken with respect to the Middle East. o In this sense, it was more comprehensive than the 2000 outcome. o The Conference strongly emphasised the overall objective to eliminate nuclear weapons. o It explicitly brought the concept of international humanitarian law into the discussion of nuclear weapons. o It made clear that a convention (or other legally binding arrangement) was the ultimate objective of the disarmament obligations under the NPT. o It addressed all categories of nuclear weapons, and not least the question of their location.
Let me explain: o The Review Conference agreed on 64 concrete actions along the three pillars of the NPT, o as well as steps to be taken with respect to the Middle East. o In this sense, it was more comprehensive than the 2000 outcome. o The Conference strongly emphasised the overall objective to eliminate nuclear weapons. o It explicitly brought the concept of international humanitarian law into the discussion of nuclear weapons. o It made clear that a convention (or other legally binding arrangement) was the ultimate objective of the disarmament obligations under the NPT. o It addressed all categories of nuclear weapons, and not least the question of their location.
This may be of particular interest for a country like Germany. o The Conference brought forward the question of negative security assurances. o And although no deadlines have been set for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Conference agreed that nuclear weapons states should report back by 2014 on their progress in implementing their commitments. o The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of the disarmament commitments. o The final document also contains clear non-proliferation obligations.
This may be of particular interest for a country like Germany. o The Conference brought forward the question of negative security assurances. o And although no deadlines have been set for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Conference agreed that nuclear weapons states should report back by 2014 on their progress in implementing their commitments. o The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of the disarmament commitments. o The final document also contains clear non-proliferation obligations.