natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The quarterly national accounts for the second quarter of 2003 showed that the mainland economy grew slightly.
Kvartalsvis nasjonalregnskap for 2. kvartal viste en liten oppgang i fastlandsøkonomien.
Growth in goods consumption has increased, as expected.
Veksten i varekonsumet har som ventet økt.
Households are now more optimistic about the economic outlook.
Husholdningene ser nå mer optimistisk på de økonomiske utsiktene.
Household debt is still increasing at a high rate, but growth has slowed since the spring.
Husholdningenes gjeld øker fortsatt mye, men veksten er dempet siden i vår.
House prices have stabilised after falling slightly in the first half of 2003.
Boligprisene har stabilisert seg etter en viss nedgang i 1. halvår.
Housing turnover is high.
Det meldes om høy boligomsetning.
The rise in equity prices since the beginning of 2003 may reflect improved corporate profitability and increased optimism regarding the outlook ahead.
Oppgangen i aksjekursene siden nyttår kan gjenspeile bedret lønnsomhet i foretakene og økt optimisme om utsiktene fremover.
According to Norges Bank's regional network, activity in retail trade and services for households has increased since the spring.
Ifølge Norges Banks regionale nettverk har aktiviteten økt i varehandelen og tjenesteyting rettet mot husholdningene.
Both the domestic and export market for manufacturing have improved slightly.
Både hjemme- og eksportmarkedet for industrien har bedret seg litt.
Activity in industries providing services for the enterprise sector remains low.
Det er fortsatt lav aktivitet i tjenesteytende næringer som leverer til bedrifter.
A number of enterprises in the regional network report plans for investments that will contribute to rationalisation.
Flere bedrifter i det regionale nettverket rapporterer om planlagte investeringer som bidrar til rasjonalisering.
The low pay increases in this year's wage settlement may indicate that the social partners are placing increased emphasis on the effects of pay increases on future developments in interest rates, the krone exchange rate and employment.
De lave tilleggene i årets lønnsoppgjør kan tyde på at partene legger økt vekt på virkningene av lønnstillegg på den fremtidige utviklingen i renten, kronekursen og sysselsettingen.
In the light of experience from 2002, it must be assumed that government agencies will be more cautious in future wage settlements.
Etter erfaringene fra 2002 må det antas at offentlige virksomheter vil være mer aktpågivende i lønnsoppgjørene fremover.
Improved profitability and a weaker krone are enhancing the competitiveness of internationally exposed enterprises, but competitiveness is substantially weaker than in the 1990s.
Bedret lønnsomhet og lavere kroneverdi styrker de bedriftene som konkurrerer med utlandet, men konkurranseevnen er vesentlig svakere enn på 1990-tallet.
Surveys conducted by TNS Gallup indicate that economic agents expect low wage and price inflation for a period ahead.
Undersøkelser TNS Gallup har gjennomført tyder på at aktørene i det økonomiske livet venter lav lønns- og prisvekst en tid fremover.
Inflation of approximately 2½ per cent is expected in the longer term.
Det ventes prisstigning på om lag 2 ½ prosent på lengre sikt.
Nor do bond yields provide any indication that inflation expectations will deviate from the target for inflation over time.
Rentene i obligasjonsmarkedet gir heller ikke holdepunkter for at forventningene til inflasjonen avviker fra målet for prisstigningen over tid.
It has been appropriate to cut interest rates markedly this year because growth in the Norwegian economy is low.
Det har vært riktig å redusere renten markert i år fordi veksten i norsk økonomi er lav.
Interest rate reductions have been important in preventing inflation expectations from taking hold at too low a level.
Rentereduksjonene har vært viktige for å motvirke at inflasjonsforventningene festner seg på et for lavt nivå.
Developments in the Norwegian economy in recent months have been approximately as projected in the June 2003 Inflation Report.
Utviklingen i norsk økonomi de siste månedene har vært om lag som lagt til grunn i inflasjonsrapporten fra juni i år.
According to Norges Bank's assessment, with a sight deposit rate of 2.5 per cent, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be higher than 2½ per cent is now the same as the probability that it will be lower.
Det er Norges Banks vurdering at med en foliorente på 2,5 prosent er det nå like sannsynlig at inflasjonen på to års sikt blir høyere enn 2½ prosent som at den blir lavere.
International economy (201 kB)
Internasjonal økonomi (198 kB)
Financial markets (323 kB)
Finansielle markeder (322 kB)
Demand and output (78 kB)
Etterspørsel og produksjon (76 kB)
The labour market (69 kB)
Arbeidsmarkedet (67 kB)
Prices (78 kB)
Priser (74 kB)
Norges Bank has decided to increase the interest rate on banks' deposits with Norges Bank, the deposit rate, by 0.50 percentage point with effect from Thursday, 10 August 2000.
Norges Bank setter opp bankenes innskuddsrente i Norges Bank, foliorenten, med 0,50 prosentpoeng med virkning fra torsdag 10. august.
The deposit rate and overnight lending rate will hence be 6.75 per cent and 8.75 per cent respectively.
Foliorenten og D-lånsrenten er etter dette henholdsvis 6,75 prosent og 8,75 prosent.
Deputy Governor Jarle Bergo says that in light of recent trends in the economy and the current balance of risks, the probability that the next change in interest rates will be an increase is greater that the probability of a reduction.
Visesentralbanksjef Jarle Bergo sier at tendensen i den økonomiske utviklingen og risikobildet slik vi nå ser det, gjør det mer sannsynlig at neste endring i renten vil være en økning enn at det blir en reduksjon.
The Deputy Governor's introductory statement will be published simultaneously on the Norges Bank website.
Visesentralbanksjefens innledning vil samtidig bli offentliggjort på Norges Banks internettsider.
A negative return on the equity portfolio was counterbalanced by a positive return on the fixed income portfolio.
En negativ avkastning på aksjeporteføljen ble motsvart av en positiv avkastning på obligasjonsporteføljen.
The returns on the portfolios in the second quarter were -1.7 per cent and 1.2 per cent respectively.
Periodeavkastningen på porteføljene var henholdsvis -1,7 og 1,2 prosent.
The return on the Petroleum Fund in the first half of the year was 2.4 per cent.
For første halvår var avkastningen på Petroleumsfondet 2,4 prosent.
As in the first quarter, the stock market was characterised by price volatility and substantial differences across sectors.
Som i første kvartal var aksjemarkedet preget av store kurssvingninger og betydelige forskjeller mellom ulike sektorer.
Equity prices fell in Europe, Japan and the US.
Kursene falt i både Europa, Japan og USA.
In the fixed income market, on the other hand, positive performances were recorded in all the main markets.
I obligasjonsmarkedene var det derimot positiv avkastning i alle hovedmarkedene.
The return on the Petroleum Fund in the second quarter of 2000 was 0.09 percentage point higher than the return on the benchmark portfolio defined by the Ministry of Finance.
I andre kvartal 2000 var avkastning på Petroleumsfondet 0,09 prosentpoeng høyere enn avkastningen på den referanseporteføljen som Finansdepartementet har definert.
This excess return is attributable to good results on the parts of both internal and external managers.
Meravkastningen kan tilskrives gode resultater i både den interne og eksterne forvaltningen.
The excess return for the first half of the year was 0.47 percentage point.
For første halvår var meravkastningen 0,47 prosentpoeng.
Measured in NOK, the returns for the second quarter and the first half of the year were 0.2 per cent and 5.5 per cent respectively.
Målt i norske kroner var periodeavkastningen 0,2 prosent i andre kvartal og 5,5 prosent i første halvår.
However, it is the return measured in terms of the currency basket that best expresses the Fund's international purchasing power, so it is most appropriate to use this figure for measuring the return.
Men det er avkastningen målt i valutakurven som gir best uttrykk for utviklingen i fondets internasjonale kjøpekraft, og det er derfor mest relevant å bruke det avkastningstallet.
Norges Bank wants the media, markets and other interested parties to receive identical and simultaneous information on monetary policy decisions.
Norges Bank ønsker at medier, markeder og andre interesserte skal få lik og samtidig informasjon om bankens rentebeslutninger.
All questions at press conferences must be asked in plenary.
På pressekonferansene må alle spørsmål stilles i plenum.
In the same year non-performing loans accounted for 9 per cent of loans outstanding for the entire banking industry1.
In the same year non-performing loans accounted for 9 per cent of loans outstanding for the entire banking industry1.
The corresponding figure for Indonesia was as high as 70 per cent, 33 per cent in Thailand, and 18 per cent in Sweden2.
The corresponding figure for Indonesia was as high as 70 per cent, 33 per cent in Thailand, and 18 per cent in Sweden2.
In this relatively short presentation, I will concentrate on the main issues of the crisis and its resolution.
In this relatively short presentation, I will concentrate on the main issues of the crisis and its resolution.
Thus, not every stage in the development of the crisis will be recapitulated, or every step and detail in its resolution.
Thus, not every stage in the development of the crisis will be recapitulated, or every step and detail in its resolution.
The views I put forward are my own and have been deliberately sharpened to promote discussion.
The views I put forward are my own and have been deliberately sharpened to promote discussion.
The most important characteristics of the resolution of the Norwegian crisis can be summarized as follows:
The most important characteristics of the resolution of the Norwegian crisis can be summarized as follows:
The banks' own collective guarantee funds handled the problems in the banking sector before the crisis became systemic.
The banks' own collective guarantee funds handled the problems in the banking sector before the crisis became systemic.
No blanket guarantee for the banks' debts was provided by the government.
No blanket guarantee for the banks' debts was provided by the government.
No regulatory forebearance.
No regulatory forebearance.
No liquidity support to banks whose solvency was in doubt.
No liquidity support to banks whose solvency was in doubt.
A clear and transparent division of responsibility between the political authorities, the supervisory authority and the central bank was established early on.
A clear and transparent division of responsibility between the political authorities, the supervisory authority and the central bank was established early on.
Government support was contingent on strict requirements being met, e.g. existing shareholders accepting a write-down to cover losses to the extent possible.
Government support was contingent on strict requirements being met, e.g. existing shareholders accepting a write-down to cover losses to the extent possible.
No micro-management of the banks.
No micro-management of the banks.
Measures taken to prevent supported banks exploiting the situation vis-à-vis non-supported banks.
Measures taken to prevent supported banks exploiting the situation vis-à-vis non-supported banks.
No asset management companies or "bad banks".
No asset management companies or "bad banks".
I shall comment on each of these issues, but before doing this let me briefly mention the background for the crisis:
I shall comment on each of these issues, but before doing this let me briefly mention the background for the crisis:
During 1984 and 1985, the Norwegian banking system was deregulated.
During 1984 and 1985, the Norwegian banking system was deregulated.
In this new environment, banks started to compete for market shares.
In this new environment, banks started to compete for market shares.
In short, deregulation, a lending boom, and an ensuing recession set the stage for increasing bank losses.
In short, deregulation, a lending boom, and an ensuing recession set the stage for increasing bank losses.
The Norwegian banking crisis evolved in two stages:
The Norwegian banking crisis evolved in two stages:
In the first stage from 1988 till 1990, several small and some medium banks failed.
In the first stage from 1988 till 1990, several small and some medium banks failed.
From 1990 - 1991, the crisis became systemic.
From 1990 - 1991, the crisis became systemic.
These funds had a wider mandate than just paying out depositors at the closure of a failed bank.
These funds had a wider mandate than just paying out depositors at the closure of a failed bank.
To make sure that there would still be a safety net present, the government established the Government Bank Insurance Fund - or GBIF - in early 1991.
To make sure that there would still be a safety net present, the government established the Government Bank Insurance Fund - or GBIF - in early 1991.
At the same time it was made clear that it was through this fund only that public money might be injected into failing banks.
At the same time it was made clear that it was through this fund only that public money might be injected into failing banks.
The central bank might provide liquidity support only once solvency was assured.
The central bank might provide liquidity support only once solvency was assured.
The GBIF was given a specific grant by the Storting (parliament).
The GBIF was given a specific grant by the Storting (parliament).
The new fund could lend money to the banks' own guarantee funds to enable them to recapitalize failing banks.
The new fund could lend money to the banks' own guarantee funds to enable them to recapitalize failing banks.
Later, as the crisis escalated, the GBIF was permitted to recapitalize the banks directly.
Later, as the crisis escalated, the GBIF was permitted to recapitalize the banks directly.
In both cases, strict conditions were attached.
In both cases, strict conditions were attached.
Most often these included:
Most often these included:
the management and board of directors of the bank were replaced
the management and board of directors of the bank were replaced
the existing share capital was written down to cover losses to the fullest extent possible
the existing share capital was written down to cover losses to the fullest extent possible
the bank's operating costs were reduced and some of its activities downsized
the bank's operating costs were reduced and some of its activities downsized
measures were taken to restrain growth in the bank's total assets.
measures were taken to restrain growth in the bank's total assets.
An example of the conditions that were imposed can be found in chart 8.
An example of the conditions that were imposed can be found in chart 8.
These conditions were of course rather unattractive to bank managers, board members and shareholders.
These conditions were of course rather unattractive to bank managers, board members and shareholders.
Such decisions would normally have to be made by the banks' General Meetings.
Such decisions would normally have to be made by the banks' General Meetings.
This authority was used in two instances where shareholders refused to write down a bank's shares as required by GBIF.
This authority was used in two instances where shareholders refused to write down a bank's shares as required by GBIF.
Shareholders in one bank brought the case to the courts, but lost.
Shareholders in one bank brought the case to the courts, but lost.
This agreement was made public.
This agreement was made public.
However, the GBIF kept in close contact with the financial supervisors and the central bank.
However, the GBIF kept in close contact with the financial supervisors and the central bank.
General assurances were given that the central bank would provide liquidity support to sound financial institutions (including non-banks).
General assurances were given that the central bank would provide liquidity support to sound financial institutions (including non-banks).
Before GBIF injected capital into crisis-stricken banks, efforts were made to attract private investors.
Before GBIF injected capital into crisis-stricken banks, efforts were made to attract private investors.
However, these efforts did not succeed.
However, these efforts did not succeed.
Under these circumstances, the government was the only source available to support the financial system.
Under these circumstances, the government was the only source available to support the financial system.
Hence, it might have been a profitable investment for private investors, although with a huge risk ex ante.
Hence, it might have been a profitable investment for private investors, although with a huge risk ex ante.
The Fund was intended to take part in equity emissions at (non-problem) banks on commercial terms.
The Fund was intended to take part in equity emissions at (non-problem) banks on commercial terms.
Certain other forms of general support to the banking industry were also provided.
Certain other forms of general support to the banking industry were also provided.
At its peak, the share of state ownership in the banking sector was close to 60 percent.
At its peak, the share of state ownership in the banking sector was close to 60 percent.
Unlike many other countries dealing with a banking crisis, Norway did not set up a separate asset management company - or "bad bank" - to handle problem loans.
Unlike many other countries dealing with a banking crisis, Norway did not set up a separate asset management company - or "bad bank" - to handle problem loans.
There were several reasons why we chose not to do this:
There were several reasons why we chose not to do this:
The banks themselves knew their borrowers best and had experience in working out defaulted loans.
The banks themselves knew their borrowers best and had experience in working out defaulted loans.
Setting up an asset management company and transferring bad loans from the banks would have required complicated accounting and legal work.
Setting up an asset management company and transferring bad loans from the banks would have required complicated accounting and legal work.
Thus, more taxpayers' money would have been put at risk.
Thus, more taxpayers' money would have been put at risk.
None chose to do so.
None chose to do so.
Nor did the Norwegian authorities issue a blanket guarantee for the banks' liabilities.
Nor did the Norwegian authorities issue a blanket guarantee for the banks' liabilities.
Such a guarantee can create moral hazard problems and actually lead to more bank problems in the future4.
Such a guarantee can create moral hazard problems and actually lead to more bank problems in the future4.
No assurances were given that individual banks would be rescued.
No assurances were given that individual banks would be rescued.
The discounted value of the gross fiscal costs of the resolution of the Norwegian crisis resolution is estimated at 2.9 per cent of GDP as of year end 1993.
The discounted value of the gross fiscal costs of the resolution of the Norwegian crisis resolution is estimated at 2.9 per cent of GDP as of year end 1993.
Looking at simple non-discounted sums, gross fiscal costs for Sweden were 3.6 per cent of GDP in 1997.
Looking at simple non-discounted sums, gross fiscal costs for Sweden were 3.6 per cent of GDP in 1997.
For Norway, the comparable figure was only 2 per cent6.
For Norway, the comparable figure was only 2 per cent6.
Part of this difference can probably be traced back to Sweden's use of government-financed asset management companies as part of their crisis resolution.
Part of this difference can probably be traced back to Sweden's use of government-financed asset management companies as part of their crisis resolution.
The two others are now subsidiaries of a Danish and a Nordic banking group respectively.
The two others are now subsidiaries of a Danish and a Nordic banking group respectively.
In one respect, we were rather lucky compared to others.
In one respect, we were rather lucky compared to others.
The focus must be on saving the financial system, not the individual bank.
The focus must be on saving the financial system, not the individual bank.
As then, owners should be the first in line to shoulder losses.
As then, owners should be the first in line to shoulder losses.
Hopefully we have all, bankers and authorities alike, learnt from the crisis.
Hopefully we have all, bankers and authorities alike, learnt from the crisis.
At the central bank, we have strengthened our surveillance of the soundness of our financial system (macro-prudential supervision).
At the central bank, we have strengthened our surveillance of the soundness of our financial system (macro-prudential supervision).
There is also an extensive exchange of information with the supervisors in the Banking Insurance and Securities Commission.
There is also an extensive exchange of information with the supervisors in the Banking Insurance and Securities Commission.
However, the financial system is evolving rapidly.
However, the financial system is evolving rapidly.
Tomorrow's problems could easily be different from the past.
Tomorrow's problems could easily be different from the past.
Today, a large part of our banking industry is part of Nordic banking groups.
Today, a large part of our banking industry is part of Nordic banking groups.
This raises the question of whether a model for crisis resolution only based on national considerations would work.
This raises the question of whether a model for crisis resolution only based on national considerations would work.
In terms of crisis resolution, this is most probably a further complication.
In terms of crisis resolution, this is most probably a further complication.
Banking crises have occurred at irregular intervals as long as banks have existed.
Banking crises have occurred at irregular intervals as long as banks have existed.
And it could happen again.
And it could happen again.
We need to be vigilant and alert in our macro prudential supervision, and willing to consider new approaches in crisis resolution to lessen the impact of any new financial crisis.
We need to be vigilant and alert in our macro prudential supervision, and willing to consider new approaches in crisis resolution to lessen the impact of any new financial crisis.
References
References
Drees, Burkhard and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu (1998).
Drees, Burkhard and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu (1998).
The Nordic Banking Crisis: Pitfalls in Financial Liberalisation.
The Nordic Banking Crisis: Pitfalls in Financial Liberalisation.
IMF Occasional Paper.
IMF Occasional Paper.
Hoggarth, Glenn, Ricardo Reis and Victoria Saporta (2002).
Hoggarth, Glenn, Ricardo Reis and Victoria Saporta (2002).
Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence.
Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence.
IMF (2001).
IMF (2001).
Thailand: Selected Issues.
Thailand: Selected Issues.
IMF Country Report 01/147, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
IMF Country Report 01/147, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
Jennergren, Peter and Bertil Näslund (1998).
Jennergren, Peter and Bertil Näslund (1998).
Efter Bankkrisen: Vad blev notan för skattebetalarna?
Efter Bankkrisen: Vad blev notan för skattebetalarna?
Kane, Edward J. and Daniela Klingebiel (2002) Alternatives to blanket guarantees for containing a systemic crisis.
Kane, Edward J. and Daniela Klingebiel (2002) Alternatives to blanket guarantees for containing a systemic crisis.
At: www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/ Kane_Klingebiel--alterns_to_blnkt_guars-doc.pdf,
At: www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/ Kane_Klingebiel--alterns_to_blnkt_guars-doc.pdf,
The Norwegian Banking Crisis, Norges Bank Occasional Paper No. 3X.
The Norwegian Banking Crisis, Norges Bank Occasional Paper No.
Nåverdien av statens investeringer i og støtte til norske banker.
Nåverdien av statens investeringer i og støtte til norske banker.
Working Paper ANO 2003/6, Norges Bank, Oslo
Working Paper ANO 2003/6, Norges Bank, Oslo