natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Renews the call to create the conditions required to develop a competitive European defence equipment industry; proposes, with a view to pursuing a harmonised European approach, that obstacles to the transfer of defence equipment within the Community be removed, the public procurement rules applying to defence equipment harmonised, the defence industry opened to more competition, and export controls regulated uniformly throughout the EU and enforced effectively where dual-use goods are concerned; considers that budgetary regulations should be drawn up in keeping with the measures specified above; encourages the promotion of standardisation and interoperability of security systems and the effective implementation of export controls for dual-use goods; is convinced that this means that Article 296 EC should be modified such that free competition between industrial arms companies in the EU can no longer be distorted, and artificial duplication and uneconomical spending can be avoided;
Renews the call to create the conditions required to develop a competitive European defence equipment industry; proposes, with a view to pursuing a harmonised European approach, that obstacles to the transfer of defence equipment within the Community be removed, the public procurement rules applying to defence equipment harmonised, the defence industry opened to more competition, and export controls regulated uniformly throughout the EU and enforced effectively where dual-use goods are concerned; considers that budgetary regulations should be drawn up in keeping with the measures specified above; encourages the promotion of standardisation and interoperability of security systems and the effective implementation of export controls for dual-use goods; is convinced that this means that Article 296 EC should be modified such that free competition between industrial arms companies in the EU can no longer be distorted, and artificial duplication and uneconomical spending can be avoided;
Advocates that, in parallel to technology-driven research, efforts should be focused with a view to developing shared modelling and simulation competence and the capability to analyse threats and security plans, utilising the comparative advantages enjoyed by Member States in every given instance; recommends that tasks, including budgetary and decision-making responsibilities, be transferred in stages to the European Defence Agency; is seeking in the long term to pursue a unifying policy and develop a distinct, self-determined EU security identity;
Advocates that, in parallel to technology-driven research, efforts should be focused with a view to developing shared modelling and simulation competence and the capability to analyse threats and security plans, utilising the comparative advantages enjoyed by Member States in every given instance; recommends that tasks, including budgetary and decision-making responsibilities, be transferred in stages to the European Defence Agency; is seeking in the long term to pursue a unifying policy and develop a distinct, self-determined EU security identity;
Requests that the Council and the Commission give consideration to the development of more efficient and interoperable surveillance systems and to the improvement of EU communication and reconnaissance capabilities;
Requests that the Council and the Commission give consideration to the development of more efficient and interoperable surveillance systems and to the improvement of EU communication and reconnaissance capabilities;
Calls for the setting up of a self-contained European security research programme with instruments, regulations and funding models appropriate for security questions, as recommended by the Group of Personalities in the security research field, subject to special legal conditions and financed by specific sources of funding;
Calls for the setting up of a self-contained European security research programme with instruments, regulations and funding models appropriate for security questions, as recommended by the Group of Personalities in the security research field, subject to special legal conditions and financed by specific sources of funding;
Proposes that a joint strategy be drawn up to transform and unify European armed forces and that joint armed forces equipment planning be based on that transformation strategy;
Proposes that a joint strategy be drawn up to transform and unify European armed forces and that joint armed forces equipment planning be based on that transformation strategy;
Recommends that increased efforts be made to set up an early warning system for threats, using innovative technologies from the civil IT field for data analysis and evaluation, an exchange of information between the civil and military spheres, the multilateral planning and leadership of operational units and the creation of a corresponding project group in the EU and a coordination body in the EU Military Committee;
Recommends that increased efforts be made to set up an early warning system for threats, using innovative technologies from the civil IT field for data analysis and evaluation, an exchange of information between the civil and military spheres, the multilateral planning and leadership of operational units and the creation of a corresponding project group in the EU and a coordination body in the EU Military Committee;
Emphasises the "space" dimension as a contribution to Common foreign and security policy;
Emphasises the “space” dimension as a contribution to Common foreign and security policy;
Requests that the Council and the Commission consider security in its broadest sense and ensure that they have given careful thought to and considered initiatives relating to issues concerning the protection of EU territory, protection of the economy, environmental protection, security of energy supplies, law enforcement and humanitarian aid.
Requests that the Council and the Commission consider security in its broadest sense and ensure that they have given careful thought to and considered initiatives relating to issues concerning the protection of EU territory, protection of the economy, environmental protection, security of energy supplies, law enforcement and humanitarian aid.
Jan Christian Ehle24.11.2004
Jan Christian Ehler 24.11.2004
Richard James Ashworth, Ivo Belet, Jan Březina, Jerzy Buzek, Joan Calabuig Rull, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Giles Chichester, Lena Ek, Nicole Fontaine, Adam Gierek, András Gyürk, Fiona Hall, Rebecca Harms, Pia Elda Locatelli, Angelika Niebler, Reino Paasilinna, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Vincent Peillon, Umberto Pirilli, Miloslav Ransdorf, Vladimír Remek, Herbert Reul, Teresa Riera Madurell, Paul Rübig, Britta Thomsen, Catherine Trautmann, Claude Turmes, Nikolaos Vakalis, Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca, Dominique Vlasto
Richard James Ashworth, Jan Březina, Jerzy Buzek, Joan Calabuig Rull, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Lorenzo Cesa, Giles Chichester, Lena Ek, Nicole Fontaine, Adam Gierek, Umberto Guidoni, Fiona Hall, Rebecca Harms, Ján Hudacký, Werner Langen, Pia Elda Locatelli, Eluned Morgan, Reino Paasilinna, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Umberto Pirilli, Vladimír Remek, Herbert Reul, Teresa Riera Madurell, Mechtild Rothe, Paul Rübig, Andres Tarand, Patrizia Toia, Catherine Trautmann, Claude Turmes, Nikolaos Vakalis, Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca
teikiama Užsienio reikalų komitetui
for the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Piliečių laisvių, teisingumo ir vidaus reikalų komitetas ragina atsakingą Užsienio reikalų komitetą į savo pasiūlymą dėl rezoliucijos įtraukti šiuos pasiūlymus:
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
Pirma pasiūlymų grupė: sustiprinti Europos saugumo strategijos teisėtumą ir veiksmingumą tiek vidaus, tiek išorės politikos klausimais.
First set of suggestions: To reinforce the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European Security Strategy, both internally and externally
Piliečių laisvių, teisingumo ir vidaus reikalų komitetas:
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs:
4. pabrėžia, kad ESS, kaip nacionalinių saugumo strategijų papildas, deramai atsižvelgus į transatlantinius santykius turėtų būti skirta kovoti su grėsme Europos lygmeniu;
Stresses that the ESS, as a complement to national security strategies, and while having due regard to transatlantic relations, should be designed to counter threats at a European level;
9. apgailestauja, kad Taryba toliau ignoruoja Parlamento siūlymą sukurti tikrą Europos vidaus saugumo strategiją, remiantis Europos vidaus teisėtvarkos koncepcija, pertvarkyti Europolą į tikrą europinę agentūrą ir sukurti tvirtą teisinį pagrindą, apibrėžiantį keitimąsi duomenimis tarp saugos ir saugumo tarnybų nacionaliniu ir Europos mastu, kuris sudarytų sąlygas veiksmingai kovai su organizuotu nusikalstamumu ir terorizmu ir tuo pat metu visiškai atitiktų duomenų apsaugos ir ES piliečių pagrindinių teisių apsaugos reikalavimus;
Regrets that the Council continues to ignore Parliament’s suggestions of establishing a true European internal security strategy founded on the concept of a European internal legal order, transforming Europol into a true European body and creating a solid legal framework for data exchanges between the security and intelligence services at national and European levels that would allow the fight against organised crime and terrorism to be efficient, while fully complying with data protection requirements and respecting the fundamental rights of EU citizens;
- sukurti integruotus suderintus ES krizių valdymo planus krizėms, kurios turėtų poveikį valstybėms ES viduje, valdyti;
– set up integrated and coordinated EU crisis-management arrangements for crises with cross-border effects within the EU,
- įsteigti Solidarumo programą terorizmo grėsmių ir išpuolių padariniams likviduoti;
– establish “a Solidarity Programme” addressing the consequences of terrorist threats and attacks,
- įvertinti pajėgumus, kuriais valstybės narės galėtų leisti naudotis Civilinės saugos mechanizmui išpuolio atveju;
– assess the capabilities that Member States could make available to the Civil Protection Mechanism in the event of an attack,
- didinti civilinės saugos pajėgumus, įskaitant bendrus mokymus ir visuomenės informavimo koordinavimą, bei esamus medicininius išteklius;
– develop civil protection capabilities, including joint exercises and coordination of public information, and improved availability of medical resources,
- priimti Europos svarbiausios infrastruktūros apsaugos programą, kuri galėtų turėti poveikį keletui valstybių;
– adopt a European Programme for critical infrastructure protection with potential trans-boundary effects,
- sustiprinti greito reagavimo mechanizmą atsakingų institucijų bendradarbiavimo policijos tyrimų metu atvejais;
– strengthen the rapid response mechanism for cooperation between the competent authorities in police investigation;
primena, kad visos šios veiklos sritys yra itin svarbios kuriant nuoseklią, išsamią ESS ir jų veikla turi būti vykdoma remiantis tinkamu teisiniu pagrindu, kurį kuriant Europos Parlamentas dalyvauja kaip teisės aktus leidžianti ir biudžetą valdanti institucija, o šį procesą prižiūri valstybių narių parlamentai.
recalls that all these activities are of fundamental importance to the development of a coherent and complete ESS and should be pursued on a sound legal basis which involves the European Parliament as a legislator and budgetary authority and comes under the scrutiny of the national parliaments.
PRANEŠĖJO PAAIŠKINIMAS
RAPPORTEUR’S EXPLANATORY NOTE
Europos Tarybos 2003 gruodį priimtoje Europos saugumo strategijoje (ESS) Sąjungai ir valstybėms narėms nustatyta labai bendra Sąjungos vidaus ir išorės saugumo gerinimo kompetencija.
The European Security Strategy (“ESS”) adopted by the European Council in December 2003 outlines a very general scope for the Union and its Member States in improving the Union’s internal and external security.
Teigiamas dalykas yra tai, kad ESS pripažįstama, jog daugybė socialinių faktorių, tarp jų skurdas, bloga mityba, ligos ir ekonominės suirutės, prisideda prie nestabilumo atmosferos ir didina grėsmę saugumui, nes dažnai sukelia konfliktus regionuose arba valstybių žlugimą, taip pat skatina palaikyti arba toleruoti organizuotą nusikalstamumą ir terorizmą.
The ESS, to its credit, recognises that a number of social factors – including poverty, malnutrition, disease, and economic collapse – all contribute to a climate of instability and increased security threats, as they can often lead to regional conflict and failed states and, as a consequence, fuel support or tolerance for organised crime and terrorism.
ESS konstatuojama, kad penkios pagrindinės grėsmės Europos saugumui šiuo metu yra: a) terorizmas; b) masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimas; c) regioniniai konfliktai (kurie, kaip nurodyta ESS, keldami grėsmę mažumoms, pagrindinėms laisvėms ir žmogaus teisėms, gali būti viena ekstremizmo, organizuoto nusikalstamumo ir terorizmo priežasčių); d) valstybių žlugimas; e) organizuotas nusikalstamumas.
The ESS identifies five “key threats” against Europe today: (a) Terrorism; (b) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; (c) Regional Conflicts (which, according to the ESS, by threatening minorities, fundamental freedoms, and human rights, can lead to extremism, organised crime and terrorism); (d) State Failure; and (e) Organised Crime.
ESS aiškiai pripažįstama, kad, kovojant su šiomis grėsmėmis, turėtų būti kartu įgyvendinamos įvairios (ekonominės, humanitarinės, civilinės, diplomatinės, teisminės, slaptųjų tarnybų, policijos, prekybos politikos, vystymosi politikos, kultūrinės ir kt.) priemonės ir kad karinės priemonės tėra viena iš galimybių, kuria gali naudotis veiksminga grėsmių užkirtimo Europos strategija.
In addressing these threats, the ESS explicitly recognises that a whole host of means (including economic, humanitarian, civilian, diplomatic, judicial, intelligence, police, trade, development, cultural, and others) should be utilised in conjunction with each other, and that military means may be only one of many methods to be used in an effective European threat-averting strategy.
ESS taip pat pripažįstama, kad saugumo kūrimas Sąjungos kaimynystėje gali žymiai padėti šalinti regioninio pobūdžio grėsmes, tuo tarpu globalaus pobūdžio grėsmėms įveikti reikalingos daugiašalės tarptautinės struktūros, o Europos svarbiausias tikslas turi būti stiprinti Jungtines Tautas ir aprūpinti jas ištekliais, reikalingais jų uždaviniams įgyvendinti ir veiksmingai dirbti.
The ESS further notes that the pursuit of building security in the Union’s neighbourhood can largely help in addressing regional threats, whereas threats of a global nature must be tackled through effective multilateral structures where “strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority”.
Pažymėtina, kad Europos saugumo tikslų atžvilgiu ESS pabrėžiama, jog ES privalo panaudoti visas turimas galimybes ir išteklius gerai valstybių valdymo praktikai skleisti, socialinėms ir politinėms reformoms remti, kovoti su korupcija ir piktnaudžiavimu valdžia, teisėtumui remti ir žmogaus teisėms ginti.
Significantly, regarding Europe’s security goals, the ESS stresses that the EU must appropriately utilise all the means available to it in “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights”.
ESS išreiškiama nuomonė, kad tai būtų geriausios tarptautinio saugumo stiprinimo priemonės.
This is of paramount importance, according to the ESS, as these are “the best means of strengthening the international order.”
ESS vis dėlto neatsižvelgiama į ES įsipareigojimus dėl žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių įgyvendinant ESS.
However, the ESS makes no reference to the human and fundamental rights obligations of the EU when implementing ESS actions.
Galiausiai Piliečių laisvių, teisingumo ir vidaus reikalų komiteto specialios kompetencijos atžvilgiu ESS nurodymai yra nepakankami.
Finally, with regard to the specific competencies of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the ESS references are few and far between.
ESS paminimos neseniai priimtos priemonės, tarp jų Europos arešto orderio priėmimas, priemonės, užkertančias kelią teroristų finansavimui ir ES ir JAV susitarimas dėl teisinės pagalbos.
The ESS notes with satisfaction recent measures, including the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing, and the EU-US agreement on mutual legal assistance.
ESS išreiškiama nuomonė, kad bendra grėsmių analizė yra geriausias pagrindas bendroms priemonėms, ir reikalaujama geresnio keitimosi informacija tarp valstybių narių ir partnerių.
The ESS also mentions that “common threat assessments” are the “best basis for common actions” and states that “this requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.”
(Užsienio reikalų komiteto pranešėjas pritaria šiam aspektui ir pareiškia, kad, jo nuomone, visi ES įnašai iš pradžių turėtų būti ribotos apimties ir pobūdžio, siekiant kuo geresnio rezultato.)
(The AFET Rapporteur agrees on this point and states that, in his view, any contributions by the Union in this regard “must be initially limited in scope and in nature in order to have full effect.”).
Galiausiai pranešime dėl ESS, toliau klausimo neplėtojant, pažymima, kad kovai su terorizmu ir organizuotu nusikalstamumu esminę reikšmę turi geresnis užsienio politikos veiksmų ir teisingumo bei vidaus politikos koordinavimas.
Finally, the ESS Report also concludes, without elaboration, that “better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.”
(Užsienio reikalų komiteto pranešėjas priima šią nuostatą domėn, tačiau pažymi, kad ESS apie šių dviejų koncepcijų jungimą, siekiant nuosekliai šalinti grėsmes, beveik nekalbama.)
(The AFET Rapporteur takes note of this provision but notes, appropriately, the “sparsity of content within the ESS on linking the two concepts to coherently address threats”.)
Europos Sąjungos požiūriu, Užsienio reikalų komiteto pranešimas rodo, kad valstybių narių bendradarbiavimas (tiek valstybių vadovų, tiek gynybos ministrų, tiek nacionalinių kariuomenių vadų lygiais) stiprinant išorinį saugumą lėtai, bet užtikrintai gerėja.
From the European Union point of view, the AFET Report indicates a slow but sure improvement in the cooperation among Member States (whether on the level of heads of state, Defence ministers, or heads of national armies) towards the goal of strengthening external security.
Sąveika šioje srityje politiniais, institucijų ir operatyvinės veiklos lygiais, be abejonės, sukūrė impulsą, kuris galėtų padidinti Sąjungos laipsnišką gebėjimą susikurti tikrą bendrą gynybos politiką, kokią numato Sutartis dėl Konstitucijos Europai.
Indeed, the interaction between the political, the institutional and the operational layers in this domain has arguably created a momentum which could increase the Union’s gradual ability to establish a real common defence policy as outlined in the Constitutional Treaty.
Kuriant išorinį saugumą, priešingai, varomosios jėgos ir politinė valia yra silpnos arba jų nėra išvis, ypač kalbant apie patikimos vidaus saugumo politikos, paremtos demokratinio atskaitingumo principu, sukūrimą, net jei Sutartis dėl Konstitucijos Europai (turinčios įsigalioti 2006 lapkritį) teroro išpuolių ir stichinių nelaimių atvejais numato solidarumo nuostatą.
By contrast, the push factors and political will present in external security-building are either weak or non-existent as far as the establishment of a credible and democratically accountable internal security policy is concerned, even as the Constitutional Treaty (which is planned to enter into force in November 2006) foresees a solidarity clause in case of terrorist attacks or natural catastrophes.
Tokia padėtis buvo pasmerkta X darbo grupės „Laisvė, saugumas ir teisingumas“ baigiamajame pranešime Konventui, kuriame bendrai pripažįstama, kad „ operatyvus bendradarbiavimas nėra pakankamai efektyvus, skaidrus ir patikimas “ , ir tai dar kartą patvirtinta ir Europos Tarybos analizėje po išpuolių Madride, ir paskutiniajame Hagos penkerių metų plane.
This situation was denounced in the Working Group X “Freedom, Security and Justice” final report to the Convention which broadly acknowledged that “ ... current operational collaboration lacks efficiency, transparency and responsibility,” and became even more pronounced in the analysis of the European Council after the Madrid attacks and in the recent Hague five-year plan.
Tokia praraja tarp siekių ir realybės, kalbant apie vidaus saugumo klausimus, nestebina, nes iš pat pradžių vidaus saugumas buvo traktuojamas (ir tebėra iki šiol) kaip „draudžiama teritorija“ Europos institucijoms.
This gap between aspirations and reality in dealing with internal security matters is not surprising, as the internal security order has been treated from the beginning (and still is) as a “forbidden area” for the European Institutions.
Šiomis aplinkybėmis nekyla abejonių, kad tuo atveju, jei Sąjunga siekia kada nors turėti vidaus saugumo politiką, gerbiančią jos demokratines vertybes ir piliečių poreikius, turi būti atitinkamai kovojama su kultūrinėmis, teisinėmis ir institucinėmis kliūtimis, šiuo metu blokuojančiomis Europos saugumo erdvę.
Having said that, it is beyond doubt that the cultural, legal and institutional barriers presently blocking the European security area will have to be appropriately addressed if the Union is ever to establish an internal security policy that fully respects its democratic values and of the demands of its citizens.
Vadinamasis „pragmatiškas“ ar laipsniškas veikimo būdas šioje srityje, kaip jau parodė ir mūsų patirtis su Europolu, naująja Šengeno sistema ir Operatyvinio bendradarbiavimo prie išorės sienų valdymo agentūra, yra neteisingas kelias.
A so-called “pragmatic” or piecemeal approach in this domain is a false shortcut, as is currently arguably demonstrated by our experience with Europol, the new Schengen System and the External Borders Agency.
Europolas buvo sutartas prieš Amsterdamo sutartį, bet vėliau neaktualizuotas, Šengeno sistema buvo sukurta išorės sienoms kontroliuoti, bet dabar valstybės narės planuoja šią sistemą pertvarkyti į universalų policijos instrumentą, neapibrėžiant naujai jos paskirties, tuo tarpu Operatyvinio bendradarbiavimo prie išorės sienų valdymo agentūra pradės po kelių mėnesių dirbti neatsižvelgdama į reikalingus ryšius su policijos tarnybomis.
In fact, Europol was negotiated before the Amsterdam Treaty but was not updated thereafter, the Schengen System was created for controlling external borders but now the Member States plan to transform it into a multi-purpose police tool, without a redefinition of its mission, while the External Borders Agency will be operational in a few months, but without having taken into due account the links needed with police services.
Taigi vargu ar kelia nuostabą tai, kad ilgalaikės perspektyvos nebuvimas ir galima šių iniciatyvų sąveika dar labiau supainioja padėtį, kuri kelia rimtų klausimų dėl demokratinės atskaitomybės, pagrindinių teisių apsaugos ir veiksmingumo.
So it is not surprising that the lack of a long term perspective and of possible interactions between these initiatives has created an even more confusing situation that raises serious questions of democratic accountability, protection of fundamental rights, and efficiency.
Pranešėjo požiūriu, vidaus saugumo strategija (netgi labiau nei išorės saugumo sritis) gali būti kuriama tik griežtų politinių įsipareigojimų ir tvirtu teisiniu pagrindu, kaip numatyta Konstitucijoje Europai.
From the Rapporteur’s point of view, the internal security strategy (more than the external security domain) can only be founded on a strong political commitment and on a more solid legal framework, as provided for by the European Constitution.