natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This has never been achieved before. 
Ezt azelőtt soha nem sikerült még elérni.
While not all early ambitions were realised in a timeframe compressed by rapid acceleration in the negotiations, the ESC initiative, among others, had a very significant impact on the negotiations themselves and on institutional developments. 
Noha nem került sor minden egyes korai ambíció megvalósítására a tárgyalások hirtelen felgyorsulásának eredményeként összezsugorodott időkeretben, az ESC kezdeményezése – egyebek mellett – nagyon számottevő hatást gyakorolt magukra a tárgyalásokra és az intézményi fejlődésre.
As a result the Council was able to close negotiations on the main Structural Funds related chapter (21) in 2002 on the basis of legislative alignment and designation of structures. 
Ennek eredményeként a Tanács 2002 folyamán, a struktúrák törvényhozói igazítása és kijelölése alapján, a 21. fejezetre vonatkozóan be tudta fejezni a főbb strukturális alapokkal kapcsolatos tárgyalásokat.
The second objective of ESC was Ôto begin to make an impact on development disparitiesŐ through focus and concentration. 
Az ESC második célkitűzése a következő volt: „...kezdeti eredmények elérése a fejlődési egyenlőtlenségek terén” a figyelem összpontosítása és az erőfeszítések koncentrálása révén.
Any intentionally diffused approach would have been a very poor learning model and this was clearly stated at the outset: ÔIt is neither feasible nor wise to pilot test all structures and instruments that will be developed...Ő (Phare 2000 Review). 
Bármiféle szándékosan diffúz megközelítés nagyon gyenge tanulási modell lett volna, és ennek a hangsúlyozására már a kezdet kezdetén sor került: „Sem nem lehetséges, sem nem bölcs dolog a kifejlesztendő struktúrák és eszközök teljes területét próbának alávetni” (2000. évi PHARE Review).
It was foreseen from the outset that extending decentralised management (EDIS) and multiannual programming Ôcould not start until 2002 at the earliestŐ (Phare 2000 Review). 
Már a kezdet kezdetén látni lehetett, hogy a kiterjesztett decentralizált végrehajtási rendszer (EDIS) biztosítása és a több évet átfogó tervezés „legalább 2002-ig nem kezdődhet meg” (2000. évi PHARE Review).
It transpired that 2002 was the year that negotiation closed and consequently there has been a compression of the timeframe. 
Kiszivárgott, hogy 2002 lesz az az év, amikor a tárgyalások befejeződnek, és ebből adódóan, törekvés volt a rendelkezésre álló időkeret zsugorítására.
EDIS is a complex and lengthy process, not a punctual event, and the countries have been working on this process for several years. 
Az EDIS összetett és időt igénylő folyamat, nem pedig egy adott időpontban lezajló esemény, és az egyes országok már évek óta tevékenykedtek a folyamat kialakítása érdekében.
The determining factor for moving to ex post controls is overwhelmingly the acceding countries ÔownershipŐ of the process to establish their own safe management and control systems. 
Az utólagos ellenőrzésre való áttérés meghatározó tényezője túlnyomórészt az, hogy a csatlakozó országok gyakoroljanak „tulajdonjogot” a folyamat fölött, hogy megteremtsék a biztonságos irányításra és ellenőrzésre vonatkozó saját rendszerüket.
Difficulties encountered in grant schemes were mainly due to the learning curve the countries had to undergo. 
A segélyprogramok során felmerülő nehézségek főleg annak a tanulási folyamatnak voltak a következményei, amellyel az egyes országoknak meg kellett bir-kózni.
Hence, they were not related to the type of Commission control (ex ante or ex post). 
Ennélfogva tehát ezek a nehézségek nem a Bizottság által gyakorolt (előzetes vagy utólagos) ellenőrzés típusával voltak kapcsolatban.
Although the objective of allocating approximately 35 % of Phare national programmes to ESC was indicative only Ôto be applied with flexibility on a country by country basisŐ, (Phare Guidelines Decision 1999), the 2001 to 2003 figures indicate that the average of around 35 % has been maintained. 
Habár az a célkitűzés, hogy a PHARE nemzeti programjainak megközelítőleg a 35 %-át az ESC területére kell előirányozni, indikatív jellegű volt csupán, amelyet „rugalmasan, országonként eltérő módon kell alkalmazni” (a PHARE-irányelvekről szóló 1999. évi határozat), a 2001–2003. évi adatok azt mutatják, hogy sikerült tartani az átlagosan 35 % körüli előirányzatot.
The insignificant dip in percentage terms in 2002 due to the Action Plans on Administrative and Judicial Capacity was fully compensated in 2003 allocations. 
A közigazgatási és igazságügyi képesség cselekvési programja következtében 2002 folyamán előállott néhány százalékos visszaesést a 2003. évi előirányzatok teljes egészében kár-pótolták.
In addition there were both investment and institution-building allocations in other horizontal chapters that had an indirect bearing on preparing for managing Structural Funds. 
Más horizontális fejezetekben emellett beruházási és intézményfejlesztési előirányzatokra is sor került, amelyek a strukturális alapok igazgatására való felkészülés terén közvetett hatással voltak.
In 2003, which was beyond the audit period, there was a deliberate focus on ESC. 
2003-ban, amely kívül esett már az ellenőrzési időszakon, számottevő figyelem-összpontosításra került sor az ESC területén.
The average was 39 %. 
Az átlag 39 % volt.
V. The Commission endeavoured to stimulate institutional progress and Phare Twinning and ESC actions were launched considerably ahead of final decisions on requirements for closure of negotiations on Regional Policy e.g. designation of the Paying and Managing Authorities. 
V. A Bizottság igyekezett ösztönözni az intézmények területén történő előrehaladást, a PHARE Twinning és ESC programok beindítására pedig jóval a regionális politikával, pl. a kifizető és irányító hatóságok kijelölésével kapcsolatos tárgyalások bezárásának a követelményeire vonatkozó végső döntés meghozatala előtt sor került.
This process involved prolonged political discussion in the countries and Phare helped accelerate agreements on solutions essential for the eventual success of the negotiations and not least on preparing for Structural Funds. 
Az egyes országokban ez a folyamat elhúzódó politikai vitákat eredményezett, de a PHARE segített felgyorsítani a tárgyalások későbbi sikere szempontjából fontos megoldásokra, és nem kevésbé a strukturális alapok fogadásának előkészítésére vonatkozó tárgyalásokat.
Even if not all initial ambitions were realised within a timeframe reduced by rapid accelerations in the negotiations, this was primarily due to the inherent difficulties and delays in designation of the future institutions responsible for managing structural funds. 
Még ha nem is minden kezdeti ambíciót sikerült elérni a tárgyalások hirtelen felgyorsulása révén leszűkült időkeretben, ez főként azoknak a belső nehézségeknek és késedelmeknek volt a következménye, amelyek a strukturális alapok kezeléséért felelős jövőbeni intézmények kijelölése terén voltak tapasztalhatók.
In certain instances, insufficient stability of some institutions indeed significantly impeded the impact of preparatory pre-accession assistance. 
Kétségtelen, hogy bizonyos esetekben egyes intézmények elégtelen stabilitása is számottevően akadályozta az előcsatlakozási segítség előkészítésének a hatását.
Nevertheless, the evidence to date is that the main objectives were indeed realised as reflected in the negotiations themselves and follow-up monitoring reports and in all subsequent programming developments to an extent never achieved before. 
Mindazonáltal mind a mai napig érvényes bizonyíték van arra, hogy a fő célkitűzéseket igenis sikerült mind ez ideig példa nélkül álló módon elérni, amint az a tárgyalások során, a nyomon követő utólagos jelentésekből és az összes későbbi programozási fejleményből is kiderült.
After accession the new Member States will continue to receive a great deal of direct support from the Structural Funds Directorates-General to help them manage programmes effectively, just as they have in framing the programmes and designing their delivery and management systems. 
Csatlakozásuk után az új tagállamok, a programok hatékony kezelésének segítése céljából, továbbra is jelentős közvetlen támogatásban részesülnek a strukturális alapokkal foglalkozó főigazgatóságoktól, csakúgy mint ahogyan az a programok, valamint a programok teljesítésével és igazgatásával foglalkozó rendszereik kialakítása során történt.
The lessons learned are already being taken into account and the Bulgaria and Romania Roadmaps together with the revised 2003 Phare Guidelines already outline the strategy underway. 
A megszerzett tanulságok figyelembevételére máris sor került; a Bulgária és Románia részére kialakított útvonaltervek, csakúgy, mint a módosított 2003. évi PHARE-irányelvek, már világosan körvonalazzák a megvalósulás alatt álló stratégiát.
On implementing agencies, in moving to ex-post controls, the process is the other way round. 
Az utólagos ellenőrzés felé történő haladással a végrehajtó ügynökségek vonatkozásában a folyamat ezzel ellentétesen alakul.
Phare agencies, in order not to lose the expertise they THE COMMISSIONŐS REPLY 
A PHARE-ügynökségeknek – hogy ne vesszen el az általuk korábban megszerzett szakértelem – a strukturális alapok igazgató és végrehajtó testületeivé kell válni (vagy ezekbe
In most new Member States this is the reality when the structure, or at least the staff, have been transferred to the management and payment agencies. 
A legtöbb új tagállamban ténylegesen ez a helyzet alakult ki, amikor a struktúrát, vagy legalábbis a személyi állományt áthelyezték az igazgatással és kifizetésekkel foglalkozó ügynökségekhez.
Building on positive pilot experience in 2003 the Phare Guidelines have been revised and the Programming Guide for 2004 has been revised to introduce multiannual planning for the ESC and, where appropriate and feasible, also for institution building. 
A pozitív kísérleti tapasztalatokra építve, 2003-ban felülvizsgálták a PHARE-irányelveket és a 2004. évre vonatkozó tervezési útmutatót, hogy az ESC területén bevezetésre kerülhessen a több évet átfogó tervezés és – ahol az alkalmazható és megvalósítható – intézményfejlesztés is.
The Phare Guidelines Decision of 1999 stipulated that Ôthe split of around 30 % for institution building and around 70 % for investment is indicative only. 
The PHARE Guidelines Decision of 1999 stipulated that „the split of around 30 % for institution building and around 70 % for investment is indicative only.
These proportions had to be applied with flexibility on a country-by-country basis, giving priority to the needs arising in the field of institution buildingŐ. 
These proportions had to be applied with flexibility on a country-by-country basis, giving priority to the needs arising in the field of institution building”.
8. ÔMoving to Structural FundsŐ was also indicated in the 2000 Review as a broad challenge to which all components of Phare would have to contribute. 
8. „Moving to Structural Funds” was also indicated in the 2000 Review as a broad challenge to which all components of PHARE would have to contribute.
The Phare Review (point 5.1.1) set ESC objectives as follows: Ô(1) to strengthen the countriesŐ programming and administrative capacities through institution-building support across their entire national territories so that they may absorb the Structural Funds upon accession; (2) to use investment in support of institution building and, closely coordinated with it, to begin to make an impact on development disparities and to allow pilot testing of integrated development programmes similar to Objective 1 and Community Initiatives at national and/or regional level (...)Ő Concerning investment support, the Review and programming documents prescribed focus and concentration in order to ensure impact. 
The PHARE Review (point 5.1.1) set ESC objectives as follows: „(1) to strengthen the countries’ programming and administrative capacities through institution-building support across their entire national territories so that they may absorb the Structural Funds upon accession; (2) to use investment in support of institution building and, closely coordinated with it, to begin to make an impact on development disparities and to allow pilot testing of integrated development programmes similar to Objective 1 and Community Initiatives at national and/or regional level (...)” Concerning investment support, the Review and programming documents prescribed focus and concentration in order to ensure impact.
The Phare Review stated: ÔPhare is pushing for maximum impact from its investment support budget in this area...Ő consequently the aim was to devote approximately 35 % of countriesŐ Phare national programmes to economic and social cohesion support. 
The PHARE Review stated: „PHARE is pushing for maximum impact from its investment support budget in this area...” consequently the aim was to devote approximately 35 % of countries’ PHARE national programmes to economic and social cohesion support.
Thus this aim was directly related to the other ÔimpactŐ objective in the Phare Review and not to the objective of Ômoving to Structural FundsŐ as such. 
Thus this aim was directly related to the other „impact” objective in the PHARE Review and not to the objective of „moving to Structural Funds” as such.
Concerning the twofold objective of Phare ESC, see reply to paragraph 9. 
Concerning the twofold objective of PHARE ESC, see reply to paragraph 9.
As Structural Funds (SF) operate under shared management and Phare under decentralised implementation, legal and financial procedures are different and Ôlearning by doingŐ would be thereby constrained. 
As Structural Funds (SF) operate under shared management and PHARE under decentralised implementation, legal and financial procedures are different and „learning by doing” would be thereby constrained.
This is why the Phare Review referred specifically to Ôpilot testingŐ of SF-type measures. 
This is why the PHARE Review referred specifically to „pilot testing” of SF-type measures.
Outside the limits mentioned in paragraph 15, the use of Phare institution building for Structural Funds preparation was not problematic. 
Outside the limits mentioned in paragraph 15, the use of PHARE institution building for Structural Funds preparation was not problematic.
Phare is a flexible, general external assistance instrument, within which it is possible to combine investment and institution-building actions as well as partial alignment with other instruments. 
PHARE is a flexible, general external assistance instrument, within which it is possible to combine investment and institution-building actions as well as partial alignment with other instruments.
In the interests of sound financial management it was prudent to remain within the established evolutionary approach of Phare involving gradual and controlled progress from centralised to decentralised with ex ante control, to fully decentralised management systems. 
In the interests of sound financial management it was prudent to remain within the established evolutionary approach of PHARE involving gradual and controlled progress from centralised to decentralised with ex ante control, to fully decentralised management systems.
In the late 1990s the decision to establish only two new pre-accession instruments reflected a complete consensus and was fully endorsed by the European Parliament and the Council. 
In the late 1990s the decision to establish only two new pre-accession instruments reflected a complete consensus and was fully endorsed by the European Parliament and the Council.
Therefore it was prudent to opt for a more phased approach under Phare in order to avoid overloading the limited resources of the candidate countries as well as avoiding a potential interruption of pre-accession assistance delivery. 
Therefore it was prudent to opt for a more phased approach under PHARE in order to avoid overloading the limited resources of the candidate countries as well as avoiding a potential interruption of pre-accession assistance delivery.
Only the ESC (approximately 35 %) component of Phare National Programmes was deemed to support Objective 1 ERDF and ESF-type projects. 
Only the ESC (approximately 35 %) component of PHARE National Programmes was deemed to support Objective 1 ERDF and ESF-type projects.
Implementation of Phare and coordination of all pre-accession assistance has been the competence of DG Enlargement. 
Implementation of PHARE and coordination of all pre-accession assistance has been the competence of DG Enlargement.
In particular, 
In particular, the Regional Policy DG was
C 15/22 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.1.2005 the Regional Policy DG was systematically involved in annual ESC programming and in programming missions. 
C 15/22 HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja 2005.1.20. systematically involved in annual ESC programming and in programming missions.
In the context of the progressive move towards the Objective 1, this approach was widened in 2001 ESC programming (see the Phare Review) where the possibility to have sectoral schemes at national level was introduced. 
In the context of the progressive move towards the Objective 1, this approach was widened in 2001 ESC programming (see the PHARE Review) where the possibility to have sectoral schemes at national level was introduced.
While the county level regions were likely not to perform Structural Fund managing authorityŐs functions, they would almost certainly perform Structural Fund intermediate bodyŐs functions (see paragraph 25). 
While the county level regions were likely not to perform Structural Fund managing authority’s functions, they would almost certainly perform Structural Fund intermediate body’s functions (see paragraph 25).
Concerning acceding countries, the CommissionŐs approach to recommending sectoral programmes was mainly dictated by the aim of simplifying a very short (less than three-year) Structural Funds programming period (see paragraph 23). 
Concerning acceding countries, the Commission’s approach to recommending sectoral programmes was mainly dictated by the aim of simplifying a very short (less than three-year) Structural Funds programming period (see paragraph 23).
For larger Ôregiona-lisedŐ countries, sector schemes could co-exist with the regional approach (see Phare 2000 Review). 
For larger „regionalised” countries, sector schemes could co-exist with the regional approach (see PHARE 2000 Review).
Thus Phare institution building to strengthen programming and administrative capacity was done at both central and regional level. 
Thus PHARE institution building to strengthen programming and administrative capacity was done at both central and regional level.
And as highlighted in the Phare Review, it was neither feasible nor wise to pilot test all regional structures by spreading limited resources across too many programmes. 
And as highlighted in the PHARE Review, it was neither feasible nor wise to pilot test all regional structures by spreading limited resources across too many programmes.
The 1999 Guidelines Decision stipulated that: Ôproject selection and monitoring remain the responsibility of the ministries/administrations directly benefiting from assistanceŐ and Ôas far as possible, of sustainable institutions which will be responsible for management and implementation of Community funds upon accession, particularly the structural fundsŐ. 
The 1999 Guidelines Decision stipulated that: „project selection and monitoring remain the responsibility of the ministries/administrations directly benefiting from assistance” and „as far as possible, of sustainable institutions which will be responsible for management and implementation of Community funds upon accession, particularly the structural funds”.
It is also worth mentioning that the Guidelines stipulated Ôinstitution building (IB) activities will be focused on the weaknesses identified at the central, regional, and local level particularly in view of the increased emphasis to be given to economic and social cohesionŐ. 
It is also worth mentioning that the Guidelines stipulated „institution building (IB) activities will be focused on the weaknesses identified at the central, regional, and local level particularly in view of the increased emphasis to be given to economic and social cohesion”.
20.1.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 15/23 27. 
HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja C 15/23 27.
ESC objectives (see paragraph 9) were not conflicting and, as quoted in paragraph 24, the Ôtarget regionŐ approach for investments was followed only in the first year of ESC programming (2000). 
ESC objectives (see paragraph 9) were not conflicting and, as quoted in paragraph 24, the „target region” approach for investments was followed only in the first year of ESC programming (2000).
This strategy included the responsive and evolving policy framework of the progress reports and resulting accession partnership priorities which underpinned the Commission decision to make Phare ESC investment available under conditions of slow designation of managing structures and insufficient institutional stability. 
This strategy included the responsive and evolving policy framework of the progress reports and resulting accession partnership priorities which underpinned the Commission decision to make PHARE ESC investment available under conditions of slow designation of managing structures and insufficient institutional stability.
This approach involved first the Decentralised Implementation System (DIS) and then the Extended Decentralised Implementation System (EDIS) which both facilitates the phasing out of Phare as indicated in the 2002 Communication and allows the countries to operate with ex-post controls. 
This approach involved first the Decentralised Implementation System (DIS) and then the Extended Decentralised Implementation System (EDIS) which both facilitates the phasing out of PHARE as indicated in the 2002 Communication and allows the countries to operate with ex-post controls.
Even though the Coordination Regulation of 1999 did not make the process mandatory for the countries, already in 2000 the Commission elaborated guidelines on preparing for EDIS (see Commission working document Preparing for Extended Decentralisation of the Phare and Ispa Programmes). 
Even though the Coordination Regulation of 1999 did not make the process mandatory for the countries, already in 2000 the Commission elaborated guidelines on preparing for EDIS (see Commission working document Preparing for Extended Decentralisation of the PHARE and Ispa Programmes).
In 2001, the Roadmap to EDIS for Ispa and Phare was prepared and sent to the countries, giving a step-by-step methodology for realisation of the conditions set out in the Coordination Regulation. 
In 2001, the Roadmap to EDIS for Ispa and PHARE was prepared and sent to the countries, giving a step-by-step methodology for realisation of the conditions set out in the Coordination Regulation.
Both the Working documents and Roadmap were sent by joint letters from the Regional Policy and Enlargement DGs underpinning the strong coordinated approach maintained for Phare and Ispa programmes. 
Both the Working documents and Roadmap were sent by joint letters from the Regional Policy and Enlargement DGs underpinning the strong coordinated approach maintained for PHARE and Ispa programmes.
The Phare Review affirmed that Ôdecentralisation cannot start before 2002 at the earliestŐ and it will not be implemented Ôunless clear preconditions have been met and the necessary financial and human resources are in placeŐ. 
The PHARE Review affirmed that „decentralisation cannot start before 2002 at the earliest” and it will not be implemented „unless clear preconditions have been met and the necessary financial and human resources are in place”.
Consequently, there was was no material time difference in initiating extended decentralisation for Phare in comparison to ISPA. 
Consequently, there was was no material time difference in initiating extended decentralisation for PHARE in comparison to ISPA.