natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission wishes to point out that this case was not included in the TFR audit selection on account of the wrong amount reported in ECR. (b) The objective of the amendment of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 is, inter alia, to address the shortcomings pointed out by the Court by making Member Sates more responsible and by providing ex post controls in the clearance-of-accounts framework. (c) According to Article 280(2) of the EC Treaty ÔMember States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interestsŐ. 
The Commission wishes to point out that this case was not included in the TFR audit selection on account of the wrong amount reported in ECR. (b) The objective of the amendment of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 is, inter alia, to address the shortcomings pointed out by the Court by making Member Sates more responsible and by providing ex post controls in the clearance-of-accounts framework. (c) According to Article 280(2) of the EC Treaty ‘Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests’.
In its Communication COM(202) 671 final of 3 December 2002, the Commission recommended the initiation of corrective measures, namely: Ń setting up of the Task Force Recovery to speed up the treatment of the backlog, Ń modifying Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and therefore Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 to prevent new backlogs in the future. 
In its Communication COM(202) 671 final of 3 December 2002, the Commission recommended the initia-tion of corrective measures, namely: — setting up of the Task Force Recovery to speed up the treatment of the backlog, — modifying Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and therefore Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 to prevent new backlogs in the future.
4.11.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 269/23 (d) (f) constant case law of the ECJ which stipulates that the rules applicable in cases where there are violations to Community law cannot be less favourable than the rules prevailing in cases where there are violations to national law. 
2004.11.4. HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja C 269/23 (d) (f) constant case law of the ECJ which stipulates that the rules applicable in cases where there are violations to Community law cannot be less favourable than the rules prevailing in cases where there are violations to national law.
Accepting transactions or partial payments are conditions to be assessed on a case-by-case approach on the basis of national law and in conjunction with the criteria as laid down in Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999. Ń the recovery procedure must be started as soon as possible after the irregularity has been detected and should be completed within four years of the fraud or irregularity first being reported. If not, the Member State must show there has been no negligence. 
Accepting transactions or partial payments are conditions to be assessed on a case-by-case approach on the basis of national law and in conjunction with the criteria as laid down in Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999. been conducted with all the diligence required, the amounts in question are charged to defaulting Member States. — the recovery procedure must be started as soon as possible after the irregularity has been detected and should be completed within four years of the fraud or irregularity first being reported.
Ń the treatment of individual cases must be discussed in detail with all the Member States concerned. 
If not, the Member State must show there has been no negligence. — the treatment of individual cases must be discussed in detail with all the Member States concerned.
As regards the procedural criteria, the questions to be answered are: Ń Has the recovery procedure started? 
As regards the procedural criteria, the questions to be answered are: — Has the recovery procedure started?
Can it be completed within a reasonable period? Ń Has the recovery procedure not been completed for reasons of force majeure or for other compelling reasons? Ń Was recovery not initiated because of the negligence of the Member State or its failure to take action? 
Can it be completed within a reasonable period? — Has the recovery procedure not been completed for reasons of force majeure or for other compelling reasons? — Was recovery not initiated because of the negligence of the Member State or its failure to take action?
The updated figures are: Ń charged to Member States: EUR 144 million, Ń charged to EAGGF: EUR 153 million. 
The updated figures are: — charged to Member States: EUR 144 million, — charged to EAGGF: EUR 153 million.
As regards the guiding principles: Ń if the whole amount cannot be recovered for objective reasons and the Member State has done all it can to recover the amount on time without displaying any negligence, the unrecovered amounts are charged to the Community budget. Ń in all other cases, where the irregularity is attributed to the Member State or where the recovery procedures have not been conducted with all the diligence required, the amounts in question are charged to defaulting Member States. The Commission has undertaken to bring forward pro- 
As regards the guiding principles: — if the whole amount cannot be recovered for objective reasons and the Member State has done all it can to recover the amount on time without displaying any negligence, the unre-covered amounts are charged to the Community budget. — in all other cases, where the irregularity is attributed to the Member State or where the recovery procedures have not The Commission has undertaken to bring forward pro- C 269/24 HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja 2004.11.4.
C 269/24 EN Official Journal of the European Union 4.11.2004 The distribution of the costs of writes off between the Commu-nitiy budget and Member States budget in the June 2003 decision should not be taken as a precedent for future decisions. 
The distribution of the costs of writes off between the Commu-nitiy budget and Member States budget in the June 2003 decision should not be taken as a precedent for future decisions.
In the (1) Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom. year 2003 the first basic analyses on the basis of the data of ECR database have been presented to Member States in the framework of the Working Group ÔIrregularities and Mutual Assistance Ń Agricultural ProductsŐ. 
The related clearance-of-accounts procedure for the bulk of examined files is ongoing. year 2003 the first basic analyses on the basis of the data of ECR database have been presented to Member States in the framework of the Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’.
The Commission endorses the CourtŐs statement on the weaknesses of the ECR system and has performed some analyses in which the use and the frequency of codes were examined. 
The Commission endorses the Court’s statement on the weaknesses of the ECR system and has performed some analyses in which the use and the frequency of codes were examined.
The Commission has asked Member States to update these cases during the Article 280 Working Group meeting of 12 March 2003 and Working Group ÔIrregularities and Mutual Assistance Ń Agricultural ProductsŐ of 11 March 2003 (see paragraph 25). 
The Commission has asked Member States to update these cases the during Article 280 Working Group meeting of 12 March 2003 and Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’ of 11 March 2003 (see paragraph 25).
Among the difficulties put forward by Member States are: Ń the concept of Ôserious negligenceŐ is a legal concept unknown in certain Member States in civil law, having in some Member States more affinity with the criminal process, Ń the absence of an explicit clause which regulates liability in the case of a consortium or associated operators, Ń the risk of having to pay for damages for a blacklisting that was ultimately overturned, which could have serious financial consequences for the Member State involved. 
Among the difficulties put forward by Member States are: — the concept of ‘serious negligence’ is a legal concept unknown in certain Member States in civil law, having in some Member States more affinity with the criminal process, — the absence of an explicit clause which regulates liability in the case of a consortium or associated operators, — the risk of having to pay for damages for a blacklisting that was ultimately overturned, which could have serious financial consequences for the Member State involved.
4.11.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 269/25 66. and 67. 
HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja C 269/25 66. and 67.
Table 105 aims at: Ń overseeing and control of amounts of liabilities held by Member States, Ń reflection on the level of liabilities, Ń a tentative reconciliation of the data of Table 105 and the Paying AgenciesŐ debtorsŐ ledgers, and Table 104 with the ECR data base managed by OLAF. 
Table 105 aims at: — overseeing and control of amounts of liabilities held by Member States, — reflection on the level of liabilities, — a tentative reconciliation of the data of Table 105 and the Paying Agencies’ debtors’ ledgers, and Table 104 with the ECR data base managed by OLAF.
The Commission informs Member States of OLAFŐs recommendations, which are only mere proposals at that stage, the final decision being taken by the College. 
The Commission informs Member States of OLAF’s recommendations, which are only mere proposals at that stage, the final decision being taken by the College.
It is not excluded that some Member States already ÔanticipateŐ these recommendations and take them for granted. 
It is not excluded that some Member States already ‘anticipate’ these recommendations and take them for granted.
During the clearance-of-accounts procedure, the Commission has very substantial powers; firstly, it is responsible for auditing and evaluating the Member StateŐs management of EAGGF Guarantee expenditure, and secondly, it is the institution which unilaterally decides which amounts to refuse for financing. 
During the clearance-of-accounts procedure, the Commission has very substantial powers; firstly, it is responsible for auditing and evaluating the Member State’s management of EAGGF Guarantee expenditure, and secondly, it is the institution which unilaterally decides which amounts to refuse for financing.
In 2000, on the initiative of the Commission and based on the same observations as the Court, proposals were discussed with Member States to remedy the situation of the ÔpendingŐ cases. 
In 2000, on the initiative of the Commission and based on the same observations as the Court, proposals were discussed with Member States to remedy the situation of the ‘pending’ cases.
Detailed instructions on the audit of the debtorsŐ ledgers have been provided to the Certifying Bodies. 
Detailed instructions on the audit of the debtors’ ledgers have been provided to the Certifying Bodies.
The Commission has extensively discussed the application of the Black List in the framework of the Working Group ÔIrregularities and Mutual Assistance Ń Agricultural ProductsŐ and is committed to presenting a second report to the European Parliament and to the Council containing a comprehensive assessment of the black list Regulation and suggested options for action. 
The Commission has extensively discussed the application of the Black List in the framework of the Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’ and is committed to presenting a second report to the European Parliament and to the Council containing a comprehensive assessment of the black list Regulation and suggested options for action.
C 269/26 EN Official Journal of the European Union 4.11.2004 Commission estimates that, in undertaking its tasks, it should primarily focus on the appraisal of the efficiency and adequacy of adopted and executed measures. 
C 269/26 HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja 2004.11.4.
Some of the changes welcomed by the Court are already in place. Ń Ń Ń Ń The Commission has invited Member States to proceed to a tentative reconciliation of OLAF ECR/595 data and the debtorsŐ ledgers data. 
Some of the changes welcomed by the Court are already in place. — — — — The Commission has invited Member States to proceed to a tentative reconciliation of OLAF ECR/595 data and the debtors’ ledgers data.
However this does not amount to conferring a preferential status to CAP debts. Ń Ń Ń Ń Ń The quality of the available data related to CAP irregular payments should be improved. 
However this does not amount to confering a preferential status to CAP debts. — — — — — The quality of the available data related to CAP irregular payments should be improved.
The Commission has extensively discussed the application of the Black List in the framework of the Working Group ÔIrregularities and Mutual Assistance Ń Agricultural ProductsŐ and is committed to presenting a second report to the European Parliament and to the Council containing comprehensive assessment of the black list Regulation and suggested options for action (see also answer in paragraph IX). 
The Commission has extensively discussed the application of the Black List in the framework of the Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’ and is committed to presenting a second report to the European Parliament and to the Council containing comprehensive assessment of the black list Regulation and suggested options for action (see also answer in paragraph IX).
7.12.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 303/1 I (Information) COURT OF AUDITORS SPECIAL REPORT No 4/2004 on the programming of the Community Initiative concerning trans-European cooperation Đ Interreg III, together with the CommissionŐs replies (pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph of the EC Treaty) (2004/C 303/01) CONTENTS SUMMARY ................................................................ 
HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja C 303/1 I (Tájékoztatások) SZÁMVEVŐSZÉK 2004/4 sz. KÜLŐN JELENTÉS az Interreg III. európai együttműködési közösségi kezdeményezés programozásáról a Bizottság válaszaival együtt (az EK-Szerződés 248. cikke (4) bekezdésének második albekezdése alapján) (2004/C 303/01) TARTALOMJEGYZÉK ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ ...........................................................
Context ............................................................... 
ASzámvevőszékellenőrzése...............................................
TheCourtŐsaudit........................................................ 
Azintézkedésekcélzottátétele .........................................
THECOMMISSIONGUIDELINES ............................................... 
Helyes-eatámogathatóterületekmeghatározása? ..............................
Objectivesandindicators ............................................. 
Konzultációsfolyamatkeretébendolgozták-ekiaKKP-kat?.......................
Targetingofmeasures................................................ 
29 Sorkerült-eatérségekhelyzeténekintegráltelemzésére? .........................
Aretheeligibleareasclearlydefined? ........................................ 
Megegyeznek-eaprogramokprioritásaiafelmértigényekkel? .....................
TheCommissionŐsreplies .............................................................. 
Helyes-eaprogramokcélstruktúrája? ........................................
Is there complementarity between the Interreg III CIPs and traditional ERDF interven-tions?................................................................. 
KÖVETKEZTETÉSÉSAJÁNLÁSOK .............................................
Conclusion ............................................................ 
JavítanikellaKKP-javaslatokvizsgálatánakfolyamatát ......................
TheprocedureforexaminingCIPproposalsmustbeimproved................ Preparation and the start of implementation are generally characterised by coopera-tion.............................................................. 
Az előkészítés és a kezdeti végrehajtás általában az együttműködés szellemében zajlik .............................................................
Analyses are generally integrated but of little use; no connection exists between analyses and the definition of programme measures; the added value of projects needstobeenhanced ................................................ 
Általában integrált elemzésekre kerül sor, de ezek kevéssé hasznosulnak; nincs kapcsolat az elemzések, illetve a program intézkedéseinek meghatározása között; növelni kelleneaprojektekhozzáadottértékét ...................................
97-99 17 7.12.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 303/3 CI CIP EEIG ERDF ESDP JTS Managing authority Monitoring committee NUTS Objective 1 Objective 2 Paying authority ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY Community Initiative. 
2004.12.7. HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja C 303/3 1. célkitűzés 2. célkitűzés EGE ERFA ESDP Felügyeleti Bizottság irányító hatóság irányítóbizottság kifizető hatóság KK KKP NUTS RÖVIDÍTÉS-ÉS KIFEJEZÉSJEGYZÉK A Strukturális Alapok három prioritást élvező célkitűzésének egyike.
European Economic Interest Grouping. 
Európai Gazdasági Egyesülés.
EEIGs are legal instruments established under Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 (OJ L 199, 31.7.1985, p. 
Ezt a jogi struktúrát a Tanács 1985. július 25-i 2137/85/EGK rendelete (HL L 199., 1985.7.31., 1. o.) vezette be.
1) to permit legal entities and natural persons from different Member States to form legal groupings. European Regional Development Fund European Spatial Development Perspective. 
Lehetővé teszi, hogy különböző tagállamok jogi és természetes személyei jogi csoportosulásokat hozzanak létre Európai Regionális Fejlesztési Alap Európai területfejlesztési terv.
A discretionary and non-binding intergovernmental document adopted in Potsdam in May 1999 by the Informal Council of Ministers responsible for Spatial Planning. 
Kormányközi jellegű, nem kötelező érvényű dokumentum, amit 1999 májusában, Potsdamban fogadtak el a területfejlesztésért felelős miniszterek informális tanácskozásán.
It is a policy framework that was adopted to improve cooperation between Community sectoral policies with significant spatial impacts. 
Ezt a politikai orientációs keretet a területfejlesztésre jelentős hatást gyakorló ágazati közösségi együttműködés javítása érdekében fogadták el.
An authority or body designated to manage an intervention programme. 
Az a hatóság vagy szervezet, amelyet egy beavatkozási program irányítására jelöltek ki.
It is responsible, on the one hand, for the efficiency and correctness of management and, on the other hand, for implementation (receiving, examining and evaluating proposed operations, gathering data, drawing up the annual report, organising the mid-term evaluation, etc.). 
Felelős egyrészt az irányítás hatékonyságáért és szabályosságáért, másrészt pedig a megvalósításáért is (a javasolt műveletek átvétele, vizsgálata és értékelése, adatgyűjtés, éves jelentés, köztes értékelések szervezése, stb.).
An authority or body designated for the purposes of drawing up and submitting payment applications and receiving payments from the Commission. 
Az a hatóság vagy szervezet, amelyet a kifizetési kérelmek összeállításával és a Bizottsághoz történő benyújtásával, valamint a bizottsági kifizetések átvételével bíztak meg.
SFs Structural Funds 
SA Strukturális Alapok
Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. 
Erősségek, gyengeségek, lehetőségek és fenyegetések.
SWOT analysis is a strategy definition tool. 
A SWOT-elemzés segít meghatározni a stratégiákat.
It consists of establishing a list of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the field concerned, which in this case is a territorial area. 
Ennek során összesítik az adott területre jellemző erősségeket, gyengeségeket, valamint a lehetőségeket és a fenyegetéseket.
Generic term used for the three strands of the Initiative: cross-border cooperation (Strand A), transnational cooperation (Strand B) and interregional cooperation (Strand C). 7.12.2004 
Ezt a kifejezést a kezdeményezés mindhárom területén általánosan használják: határokon átnyúló együttműködés (A terület), transznacionális együttműködés (B terület) és régiók közötti együttműködés (C terület).
7.12.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union SUMMARY I. The Interreg Community Initiative (CI) was launched in 1990 in an attempt to tackle the isolation of border areas. 
2004.12.7. HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ I. Az Interreg Közösségi Kezdeményezés (KK) 1990-ben jött létre abból a célból, hogy mérsékelje a határmenti térségek elszigeteltségét.
By proposing cooperation between partners in different Member States, it contributes to the opening of borders. 
Az Interreg különböző tagállamokból származó partnerek együttműködésé-hez nyújt lehetőséget, és ezzel is hozzájárul a határok megnyitásához.
It was renewed for the periods 1994 to 1999 (Interreg II) and 2000 to 2006 (Interreg III). 
A kezdeményezést az 1994–1999-es (Interreg II.) és 2000–2006-os (Interreg III.) időszakokra is megújították.
With commitment appropriations of 4 875 million euro, Interreg III is the most substantial CI. 
Az Interreg III. a legjelentősebb KK, hiszen kötelezettségvállalási előirányzatai 4 875 millió EUR-ra rúgnak.
The CourtŐs audit of Interreg III covered the period from the preparation of the Commission guidelines to the first decisions to adopt beneficiariesŐ projects. 
A Számvevőszéknek az Interreg III.-ra vonatkozó ellenőrzése a bizottsági iránymutatások kidolgozásától a kedvezményezettek projektjeit elfogadó első döntésekig tartó időszakra terjedt ki.
The objective was to answer the following questions: (a) Do the guidelines make it easier to attain the CI objectives? (b) Did the Commission use a suitable procedure for examining CIP proposals and were decisions taken within the agreed deadlines? (c) Did the various partners cooperate as provided by the guidelines? (d) Was the initial analysis for each region consistent with the priorities and measures of the corresponding CIP, as required by the guidelines? (e) Will it be possible to measure progress ex post? 
A vizsgálat a következő kérdésekre keresett választ: a) Megkönnyítik-e az iránymutatások a KK céljainak elérését? b) Megfelelő eljárást alkalmazott-e a Bizottság a közösségi kezdeményezési program (KKP) javaslatainak vizsgálata során, és a tervezett határidőn belül hozta-e meg döntéseit? c) Az iránymutatások szellemében működnek-e együtt a különböző szereplők? d) Összhangban állnak-e az érintett térségről készített kiinduló elemzés megállapításai a KKP prioritásaival és intézkedéseivel, amint azt az iránymutatások előírják? e) Lehetséges lesz-e utólag felmérni az elért haladást?
The Interreg III guidelines focus on the procedures for implementing programmes that seek to enhance cooperation. 
Az Interreg III. iránymutatásai elsősorban olyan programok megvalósításának módjaira vonatkoznak, amelyek az együttműködés erősítését célozzák.
However, they were not made available until preparation of the CIP proposals had been under way for at least a year. 
Az iránymutatásokat azonban csak akkor bocsátották ki, amikor a KKP-javaslatok kidolgozása már legalább egy éve folyamatban volt.
There are no indicators with which to assess how much overall progress has been made. 
Hiányoznak belőlük az általános haladás mérésére szolgáló mutatók is.
However, the assessment criteria were under-prepared and insufficient improvements had been made in response to the significant shortcomings identified in the proposals. 
Nem dolgozták viszont ki kellőképpen az értékelés kritériumait, és a javaslatokban észlelt hiányosságok jelzése sem vont maga után kielégítő javításokat.
The adoption of the programmes was delayed, with the result that the process of cooperation between eligible regions was interrupted and the available appropriations were under-utilised. 
A programokat késve fogadták el, ami megakasztotta a támogatható térségek közötti együttműködés folyamatát, és a rendelkezésre álló előirányzatok korlátozott igénybevételéhez vezetett.