natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
See also the article Brussels lobbyists to come under tighter scrutiny, www.euractiv. com, March, 7 2005. 
Također vidjeti članak Brussels lobbyists to come under tighten scrutiny, www euractiv. com, 7. ožujka 2005.
xi It is estimated that approximately 80% of all economic and 50% of all political decisions made by the EU member states are shaped, implemented or directly influenced by the EU. 
xii Procjenjuje se da EU oblikuje, provodi odnosno izravno utječe na približno 80% svih gospodarskih te 50% svih političkih odluka koje se donose na području Unije.
See for example Van Schendelen (2002). 
O tome vidjeti u van Schendelen (2002).
xv See for example the representative office of the Slovenian Business and Research Association (SBRA) in Brussels, www.sbra.be. 
xvi Vidjeti, primjerice, ured Slovenskoga gospodarskog i istraživačkog udruženja (Slovenian Business and Research Association, SBRA) u Bruxellesu, www.sbra.be.
xvi It is estimated that around 500 journalists, reporters from various European media, are working in Brussels. 
xvii Procjenjuje se da u Bruxellesu radi više od 500 dopisnika europskih medija.
xvii According to Radaelli, the concept of Europeanisation could be defined as the “process of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and ways of action, but also shared beliefs and norms that are first defined and consolidated in the making ofEU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2000). 
xviii Prema Radaelliju, pojam europeizacije može se definirati kao “proces izgradnje, širokog prihvaćanja i institucionalizacije formalnih i neformalnih pravila, procedura, policy paradigmi, stilova i načina djelovanja, te zajedničkih uvjerenja i normi koje se najprije definiraju i utvrđuju u procesu donošenja odluka na razini EU, a zatim se ugrađuju u logiku diskursa, identiteta, političkih struktura i javnih politika na nacionalnoj razini” (Radaelli, 2000).
EUROSCEPTICISM IN CROATIA: 
EUROSKEPTICIZAM U HRVATSKOJ:
ON THE FAR SIDE OF RATIONALITY? 
S ONU STRANU RACIONALNOSTI?
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb Zagreb 
Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu Zagreb
This paper deals with the characteristics of euroscepticism in Croatia, defined as a combination of distrust in the European Union and distaste for membership. 
Rad se bavi odrednicama euroskepticizma u Hrvatskoj, definiranoga kao kombinacija nepovjerenja u Europsku uniju i nesklonosti priključivanju.
An analysis of the dynamics of the two dimensions shows that initially these two factors did not coincide, but that after 2004 they converged. 
Analiza dinamike dviju dimenzija pokazuje njihovu inicijalnu nepodudarnost, koja nestaje u 2004. godini.
Starting off from a theoretical model according to which the attitude to the EU is affected by both utilitarian or pragmatic as well as ethnic-cum-nationalist (symbolic) factors, the analysis of data collected at the end of 2003 on a probabilistic national sample draws attention to the heterogeneous motives behind euroscepticism, which calls into question the effectiveness of any single intervention strategy. 
Polazeći od teorijskog modela, prema kojemu na odnos prema EU utječu utilitarni (pragmatični) i etnonacionalni (simbolički) čimbenici, analiza podataka prikupljenih krajem 2003. godine na nacionalnom uzorku hrvatskih građana upućuje na raznorodne motive euroskepticizma, što dovodi u pitanje djelotvornost jedinstvene intervencijske strategije.
Exclusive nationalism and its socio-cultural, political and economic premises have been confirmed as an important source of euroscepticism. 
Isključivi nacionalizam i njegove sociokulturne, političke i gospodarske pretpostavke i u ovom su istraživanju potvrđeni kao važan izvor euroskepticizma.
As against symbolic motivations, the impact of utilitarian motives on the attitude to the EU turned out to be marginal, but it is not clear to what extent this result is the consequence of methodological constraints. 
U usporedbi sa simboličkim motivima, utjecaj utilitarnih motiva na odnos prema EU pokazao se marginalnim, no ostaje nejasno u kojoj je mjeri takav rezultat posljedica metodoloških ograničenja.
The data also show that lack of trust in the EU partially reflects distrust in national institutions. 
Podatci također pokazuju kako nepovjerenje u EU dijelom odražava nepovjerenje u nacionalne institucije.
The paper concludes with a brief list of recommendations, focused particularly on ways of increasing trust in both national and EU institutions. 
Rad završava kratkom listom preporuka, poglavito usredotočenih na povećanje povjerenja u nacionalne institucije i institucije EU.
European Union, euroscepticism, attitudes towards accession, public opinion, trust in the European Union, trust in national institutions, Croatia 
Europska unija, euroskepticizam, stavovi prema priključivanju, javnost, povjerenje u Europsku uniju, povjerenje u institucije vlasti, Hrvatska
A number of press commentaries and analyses have been written on the reasons for the reduced support for accession. 
O razlozima smanjenja potpore pridruživanju napisani su brojni novinski komentari i analize.
Although we are still waiting for detailed empirical studies, several explanations of the dynamics described have been put forward. 
Premda još uvijek čekamo prve empirijski potkrijepljene studije, ponuđeno je nekoliko tumačenja opisane dinamike.
The reasons range from bruised national pride (the issue of the extradition of a suspected general to The Hague) and the strengthening of the appropriate symbolic resistance, via economic fears (the rise in the price of real estate as a result of demand from foreign purchasers, the import of cheaper agricultural products, the obliteration of indigenous products and the like), to loss of trust in the whole of the EU project after the shipwreck of the European Constitution in France and Holland. 
Razlozi variraju od povrijeđenoga nacionalnog ponosa (pitanje izručenja osumnjičenoga generala) i jačanja odgovarajućega simboličkog otpora, preko ekonomskih strahovanja (rast cijena zemlje i nekretnina zbog potražnje stranih kupaca, uvoz jeftinijih poljoprivrednih proizvoda, ukidanje autohtonih proizvoda i sl.), do gubitka povjerenja u EU projekt nakon brodoloma Europskog ustava u Francuskoj i Nizozemskoj.
Most commentators have stated several reasons behind the fall in the support for EU accession, emphasising the complexity of the situation as well as the questionable success of any attempt to reverse the trend. 
Dakako, većina je komentatora iznijela mišljenje da se iza pada potpore priključivanju EU krije više od jednog čimbenika, naglašavajući time složenost situacije, ali i nezahvalnost pokušaja promjene trenda.
In this short paper, I shall attempt to throw light on the growth of euroscepticism in Croatian public opinion, analysing particularly the dynamics of support for Croatia's joining the EU, and trust in the EU. 
Ovaj kratki rad pokušaj je rasvjetljavanja rastućega euroskepticizma u hrvatskoj javnosti, poglavito analiziranjem dinamike potpore priključivanju Hrvatske EU i povjerenja u EU.
Although it handles an issue that has already received a fair share of debate, the advantage of the paper is in its use of empirical analyses founded on a nationally representative dataset. 
Premda se bavi temom o kojoj se već dosta raspravljalo, prednost rada je u empirijskim analizama koje se temelje na podatcima prikupljenim na nacionalnim uzorcima.
On the other hand, it is precisely here that the shortcoming of the proposed analyses inheres. 
S druge strane, upravo se u tome krije i nedostatak analiza koje slijede.
Unfortunately, the research study (South East European Social Survey Project; SEESSP-A and SEESSP-B) was not designed to measure, or test out public opinions to do with the EU.iii From this point of view, the indicators that are available are anything but ideal. 
Činjenica je, naime, da istraživanje čijim se podatcima koristim u statističkim analizama (South Eeast European Social Survey Project; SEESSP-A i SEESSP-B) nije bilo osmišljeno kako bi se izmjerio, odnosno ispitao odnos javnosti prema EU.iii U tom smislu, indikatori koji su na raspolaganju daleko su od idealnih.
The first part offers a definition of euroscepticism and sets forth the current state of knowledge concerning the symbolic and material interests that affect its dynamics. 
Prvo dio donosi definiciju euroskepticizma i dosadašnje spoznaje o simboličkim i materijalnim interesima koji utječu na njegovu dinamiku.
In the second part I outline the dynamics of two basic dimensions of euroscepticism in Croatia; the rise in the disinclination to joining and the relative stability of the lack of trust in the EU. 
U drugom dijelu prikazana je dinamika dviju temeljnih dimenzija euroskepticizma u Hrvatskoj: rast nesklonosti pridruživanju i razmjerna stabilnost nepovjerenja u EU.
The lack of association between the two dimensions in the period prior to 2004 is discussed, as well its occurrence in 2004. 
Pritom se naglašava nepodudarnost među dimenzijama u ranijem razdoblju, koja nestaje u 2004. godini.
The third section is devoted to an analysis of the social-demographic profile of local eurosceptics, and to testing the relative influence of symbolic and materialistic factors on the basic dimensions of euroscepticism. 
Treći je dio posvećen analizi sociodemografskog profila domaćih euroskeptika te ispitivanju relativnog utjecaja simboličkih i materijalnih čimbenika na temeljne dimenzije euroskepticizma.
The last, fourth, part puts forward a debate that places the findings in the context of the debate on the rational (pragmatic) and irrational (symbolic) bases of euroscepticism in general. 
U pretposljednjemu, četvrtom dijelu ponuđena je rasprava koja dobivene nalaze smješta u kontekst rasprave o racionalnim (pragmatičnim) i iracionalnim (simboličkim) temeljima euroskepticizma.
The paper ends with a brief list of recommendations founded upon the results of the analyses carried out with the aim of increasing trust in national and European Union institutions. 
Rad završava kratkom listom preporuka utemeljenih na rezultatima provedenih analiza, čiji je smisao povećanje povjerenja u nacionalne institucije i institucije EU.
EUROSCEPTICISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
EUROSKEPTICIZAM: TEORIJA I PRAKSA
As mentioned, this paper does not investigate the euroscepticism of the political elites. 
Kao što je već rečeno, ovaj rad ne propituje euroskepticizam političkih elita.
For this reason I use the expression popular euroscepticism throughout the rest of the paper to describe the degree to which members of the public in Croatia express the lack of trust in the EU and/or their disinclination to join the Union}'' Popular euroscepticism, in other words, can be either more theoretical (the utterance of lack of trust) or practical (the disinclination to accede) and it can vary in degrees, with radical euroscepticism being marked by a high degree of distrust in the EU as well as unconditional opposition to Croatian accession. 
Zbog toga se u nastavku upotrebljava izraz popularni euroskepticizam, kojim se opisuje stupanj u kojemu hrvatski građani iskazuju nepovjerenje u EU i/ili nesklonost priključenju Hrvatske EU.iv Popularni euroskepticizam, drugim riječima, može biti više teorijski (iskazivanje nepovjerenja) ili praktičan (nesklonost priključenju) te varirati stupnjem, pri čemu bi radikalni euroskepticizam obilježavalo izrazito nepovjerenje u EU i bezuvjetno protivljenje pridruživanju.
Although it might seem at first glance that these dimensions of popular euroscepticism are almost identical, it should be noted that someone might have trust in a given institution and yet still be of the opinion that it is better for him or her to stay out. 
Premda se na prvi pogled može činiti da su navedene dimenzije popularnog euroskepticizma gotovo istovjetne, valja uočiti kako netko može imati povjerenja u određenu instituciju, ali i dalje biti mišljenja kako mu/joj je bolje ostati izvan nje.
v This has, for example, been to date the majority viewpoint in Norwegian public opinion. 
v To je, primjerice, do sada bio stav većeg dijela norveškog javnog mnijenja.
A similar situation can be found in the case of the opposition of most Swedes to replacing their national currency by the Euro. 
Sličnu situaciju nalazimo i u protivljenju većine Šveđana zamjeni nacionalne valute eurom.
The difference between the wish to accede and trust is clearly contoured in a case when they are marked by a cause-and-effect relationship. 
Razlika između želje za priključivanjem i povjerenja jasno se ocrtava i u slučaju kada ih obilježava uzročno-posljedični odnos.
After the fall of communism, in the countries of Central Europe there was very quickly a highly marked desire for EU accession that, irrespective of the lack of information, resulted in emphatic trust in the EU. 
Nakon pada komunizma u tranzicijskim se zemljama središnje Europe brzo pojavila naglašena želja za priključivanjem EU, koja je, bez obzira na nedostatak informacija, rezultirala velikim povjerenjem u EU.
On the other hand, precisely the opposite relationship is also possible. 
No moguć je i upravo obrnut odnos.
If Norway and Switzerland ever join the EU, the readiness of their citizens for their countries to accede will necessarily reflect widespread trust in the effectiveness of the Union's institutions. 
Uđu li ikada Norveška ili Švicarska u EU, spremnost njihovih građana na pridruživanje nužno će biti posljedica raširenog povjerenja u djelotvornost institucija EU.
Research to date into euroscepticism in the post-communist countries of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe has concentrated on two aspects: (i) the connection of the phenomenon with party dynamics and (ii) non-party causes of popular euroscepticism. 
Dosadašnja istraživanja euroskepticizma u postkomunističkim zemljama srednje, istočne i jugoistočne Europe usredotočila su se na dva aspekta: 1. na vezanost fenomena za dinamiku stranačke borbe, te 2. na nestranačke uzroke popularnog euroskepticizma.
This approach is well illustrated by the frequently quoted works of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002; 2004), who claim that the euroscepticism to be seen in all the post-transitional countries (except, perhaps, for Bulgaria) is the consequence of the opposition's confrontation with the Europhile parties in power (Sitter, 2001). 
Prvi pristup dobro ilustriraju često citirani radovi Taggarta i Szczerbiaka (2002; 2004), prema kojima je euroskepticizam, zamjetan u svim (post)tranzicijskim zemljama osim, čini se, u Bugarskoj, posljedica opozicijskog sučeljavanja s “EU-filskim” strankama na vlasti (Sitter, 2001).
Because of the relative marginality of parties that stand for hard-line euroscepticism, party-induced popular euroscepticism should be of a quite limited extent. 
S obzirom na razmjernu marginalnost stranaka koje zastupaju tvrdi euroskepticizam, stranački inducirani popularni euroskepticizam trebao bi biti vrlo ograničenog dometa.
Research focused on the viewpoints and values of public opinion very often discuss the influence of symbolic (cultural, identity-related) and materialistic (economically rational) factors in euroscepticism.vi The authors, in other words, endeavour to quantify the relative contribution of these two dimensions to the negative attitude of the public vis-a-vis the EU. 
U radovima usredotočenim na stavove i vrijednosti javnog mnijenja najčešće se raspravlja o utjecaju simboličkih (kulturnih, identitetskih) i materijalnih (ekonomski racionalnih) čimbenika euroskepticizma.vi Autori, drugim riječima, nastoje izmjeriti relativni doprinos tih dviju dimenzija negativnom odnosu javnosti spram EU.
The impact of what is usually called exclusive national identity on popular euroscepticism has been borne out in several studies (Care, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004).vii Within this value pattern, the integration, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism that EU-isation embodies are considered a threat to the national culture and indigenous traditions. 
Utjecaj tzv. isključujućega nacionalnog identiteta na popularni euroskepticizam potvrđen je u više studija (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe i Marks, 2004).vii Unutar tog vrijednosnog obrasca, integracija, multikulturalizam i kozmopolitizam koje EU-izacija intenzivira doživljavaju se prijetnjom “autohotonoj” nacionalnoj kulturi i tradiciji.
Resistance to the EU is thus perceived as an act of patriotism. 
Otpor EU tako se percipira kao patriotski čin.
In the first case, popular euroscepticism will depend on the success of the country during transition. 
U prvom slučaju popularni će euroskepticizam ovisiti o tranzicijskoj uspješnosti zemlje.
As suggested by Linden and Pohlman (2003), countries that have successfully carried out the transition will have less benefit from joining than countries that are still grappling with the transitional processes. 
Kao što sugeriraju Linden i Pohlman (2003), zemlje koje su uspješno provele tranziciju imaju manje koristi od pridruživanja nego zemlje koje se još uvijek hrvaju s tranzicijskim procesima.
The Czechs, hence, necessarily showed less enthusiasm for joining the EU than, for example, the Romanians today (Linden and Pohlman, 2003:328).ix Differences in success at the macro level can work in another way as well. 
Česi će, stoga, iskazivati manje entuzijazma za priključivanje EU od, primjerice, Rumunja (Linden i Pohlman, 2003:328).ix Razlike u makrouspješnosti mogu djelovati na još jedan način.
Since the economic benefits of joining are smaller in successful transition countries, the weakening of economic interests in such countries could well affect the increase in the perception of the symbolic costs (fear of loss of identity, for example). 
S obzirom na to da su gospodarske koristi od priključivanja manje u tranzicijski uspješnim zemljama, slabljenje gospodarskih interesa u tim bi zemljama moglo utjecati na rast percepcija simboličkih troškova (npr. strah od gubitka identiteta).
At the micro level, inside both successful and less successful transition countries, the affinity for euroscepticism tends to depend on personal perception of the costs and benefits of joining. 
Na mikrorazini, kako unutar tranzicijski uspješnih, tako i unutar manje uspješnih zemalja, sklonost euroskepticizmu ovisit će o osobnoj percepciji troškova i koristi od pridruživanja.
Somewhat simplified, the greater the human resources that the individual can deploy (education, skills, age, professional status, income) the greater are the potential benefits from European integration and the smaller the likelihood of euroscepticism. 
Jednostavno rečeno, što su veći humani resursi kojima pojedinac raspolaže (obrazovanje, vještine, dob, profesionalni status, prihodi), veće su i moguće koristi od europskih integracija, a time je manja i sklonost euroskepticizmu.
Empirical research has provided some support for these hypotheses, showing that popular euroscepticism is mainly a marker of transitional losers (Szczerbiak, 2001; McLaren, 2002; Jacobs and Pollack, 2004; Tucker et al., 2002). 
Empirijska su istraživanja jasno potvrdila tu pretpostavku, pokazujući da je popularni euroskepticizam poglavito obilježje tranzicijskih “gubitnika” (Szczerbiak, 2001; McLaren, 2002; Jacobs i Pollack, 2004; Tucker i sur.,
The first of these, the point of view that rejects Croatian joining in European integration, has in the last two years been much more widespread than in the earlier period. 
Prva od njih, stav koji odbija priključivanje Hrvatske europskim integracijama, u posljednje je dvije godine bio znatno veći nego u ranijem razdoblju.
As Figure 1 shows, unwillingness to join was until the very end of 2003 quite marginal (up to 20%). 
Kao što slika 1. prikazuje, nesklonost priključivanju je sve do kraja 2003. godine bila razmjerno marginalna (do 20%).
During 2004 a dramatic growth ensued (to about 40%), which, though with considerably diminished dynamics, went on in 2005. 
Tijekom 2004. godine enormno raste (na otprilike 40%), što se, znatno smanjenom dinamikom, nastavlja i u 2005. godini.
In the last year, the number of those who were opposed to Croatia joining the EU was more or less the same as the number of those who expressed the opposite viewpoint. 
U posljednju godinu dana broj onih koji se protive priključivanju Hrvatske EU otprilike se podudara s brojem građana koji iskazuju upravo suprotan stav.
Unlike the first, the second dimension of popular euroscepticism, lack of trust in the EU, is not regularly measured. 
Za razliku od prve, druga dimenzija popularnog euroskeptizima, nepovjerenje u EU, nije redovito mjerena.
Unlike the dynamics of attitudes toward accession, distrust in the EU is relatively stable during the period. 
Za razliku od dinamike stavova prema uključivanju, nepovjerenje u EU razmjerno je stabilno tijekom promatranog razdoblja.
On average, distrust of the EU was felt by 54% of the population. 
Nepovjerenje u EU u prosjeku iznosi 54%.
Contrary to expectations, the dynamics of the two dimensions of popular euroscepticism do not overlap. 
Protivno očekivanju, dinamika se dviju dimenzija popularnog euroskepticizma ne podudara.
How are we to explain their different dynamics up to 2004? 
Kako objasniti razliku koja postoji sve do 2004. godine?
Since they show greater instability, it should be hypothesised that the attitudes toward joining the EU are more affected by situational factors than is the case with the dynamics of trust in the EU. 
S obzirom na to da iskazuju veću nestabilnost, valja pretpostaviti da su stavovi o pridruživanju pod većim utjecajem situacijskih čimbenika od (ne)povjerenja u EU.
It is also plausible that respondents may think the EU is generally a good idea, but not necessarily for their country. 
Također je moguće pretpostaviti da netko može smatrati kako je EU dobra ideja, samo ne za vlastitu zemlju.
Theoretically, then, a situation in which there is a relatively high degree of trust in the EU and a relatively low level of willingness to join need not be unusual. 
Teorijski, dakle, situacija u kojoj postoji razmjerno veliko povjerenje u EU i razmjerno niska spremnost na pridruživanje ne bi trebala biti neobična.
The problem though is that up to 2004, exactly the opposite situation was present in Croatia: the desire to join the EU (80% for) was widespread in spite of the relatively low degree of trust in the Union (34%).xi 
No problem je u tome što je do 2004. godine u Hrvatskoj bilo upravo suprotno: želja za priključivanjem EU bila je velika (80%) usprkos razmjerno slabom povjerenju (34%).xi
Bearing in mind the low level of information about the EU among the members of the public during the nineties, it seems reasonable to assume that the majority support for the accession of Croatia to the EU was based on motives typical of the initial reactions of transitional societies to European integration (Malova and Haughton, 2002). 
Imajući na umu vrlo slabu informiranost hrvatskih građana o EU tijekom devedesetih godina, čini se razumnim pretpostaviti da se većinska potpora javnosti priključivanju Hrvatske EU temeljila na motivima karakterističnim za inicijalne reakcije tranzicijskih društava na europske integracije (Malova i Haughton, 2002).
This is on the whole a desire to show that they belong to Europe, both in a cultural sense and in terms of political compatibility, and a belief that becoming a member of the EU will result in a rapid increase in the standard of living. 
Riječ je poglavito o želji za potvrđivanjem kulturne pripadnosti i političke kompatibilnosti europskom prostoru te predodžbi da će posljedica uključivanja u EU biti brzi rast životnog standarda i nestajanje nezaposlenosti.
When the negotiation process started, this naive idealism dissolved fairly rapidly in the countries that recently became EU members. 
Otpočinjanjem procesa pregovora o pridruživanju, taj je naivni “idealizam” relativno brzo okopnio u zemljama koje su nedavno postale članicama EU.
A similar process, it would seem, has been at work in Croatia in the last few years. 
Sličan je proces, čini se, u nekoliko posljednjih godina zamjetan i u Hrvatskoj.