natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The external debt increased at a faster pace only in Slovenia in this period (i.e., by 9% of GDP); however, this increase occurred from a much lower level of total debt (36% of GDP). 
Samo je u Sloveniji vanjska zaduženost brže porasla u tom razdoblju (za 9% BDP-a), ali je to povećanje nastalo na nižoj razini ukupnog duga (36% BDP-a).
The structure of foreign debt in terms of domestic sectors is relatively even. 
Struktura inozemnog duga prema domaćim sektorima relativno je ravnomjerna.
The public sector is the biggest debtor (43% of total foreign debt); followed by the non-financial sector (27%) and domestic commercial banks (19%); while 10% of the foreign debt derives from direct investment. 
Najveći je dužnik država (43% ukupnog inozemnog duga); slijedi nefinacijski sektor (27%) i domaće poslovne banke (19%); a 10% inozemnog duga proistječe iz izravnih ulaganja.
This debt structure leaves some room for the reduction of the total level of indebtedness in the medium term without any negative consequences to economic growth. 
Takva struktura duga ostavlja određeni prostor za smanjivanje ukupne razine zaduženosti u srednjem roku bez negativnih posljedica za gospodarski rast.
For example, while lower public debt is necessary for the sake of attaining fiscal sustainability and the reinforcement of external stability, the private sector debt and indebtedness deriving from foreign direct investment can be increased without any threat to macroeconomic and external stability. 
Primjerice, dok je smanjivanje razine zaduženosti države potrebno radi postizanja fiskalne održivosti i jačanja vanjske otpornosti, dug privatnog sektora i zaduživanje po osnovi stranih direktnih ulaganja mogu se povećati bez ugrožavanja makroekonomske i vanjske stabilnosti.
• Capacity to repay the foreign debt is lower than in the other CE countries except in Poland, as 20% of export income has to be used for principal and interest payments, as against 15% in Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, and less than 9% in the Czech Republic. 
• Kapacitet otplate inozemnog duga niži je nego u ostalim srednjoeuropskim zemljama, osim u Poljskoj: na otplatu dospjelih kamata i glavnica inozemnog duga u Hrvatskoj odlazi 20% prihoda ostvarenih izvozom roba i usluga, u Mađarskoj, Slovačkoj i Sloveniji oko 15%, a u Češkoj manje od 9%.
• The coverage of short-term foreign debt by foreign currency reserves is relatively low: foreign debt falling due within one year would absorb 60% of disposable international reserves of the CNB if the public and the private sector were to become insolvent. 
• Pokrivenost kratkoročnog inozemnog duga deviznim pričuvama relativno je niska: inozemni dug s dospijećem unutar jedne godine apsorbirao bi 60% bruto raspoloživih međunarodnih pričuva HNB-a u slučaju devizne nelikvidnosti države i privatnog sektora.
This indicator is even more unfavourable in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (75-80% of reserves) and reveals potential problems with the servicing of short-term debt in the event of a sudden depreciation of the domestic currency. 
Taj je pokazatelj još nepovoljniji u Češkoj i Slovačkoj (75-80% pričuva) i očituje potencijalne probleme sa servisiranjem kratkoročnog duga u slučaju iznenadne deprecijacije domaće valute.
The Czech Republic and Slovakia, however, have greater capacities to service the foreign debt. 
Češka i Slovačka, međutim, imaju veći kapacitet otplate inozemnog duga.
• Although in the last few years the spread on Croatian government bonds has been reduced, it is still considerably above the average for the region: about 190 basis points (1.9 percentage points) in compared to only 40 basis points in Slovenia and 100-120 points in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. 
• Iako je posljednjih godina smanjen, kamatni raspon na državne obveznice Hrvatske još je uvijek znatno iznad prosjeka u regiji: otprilike 190 postotnih bodova (1,9 postotaka) u usporedbi sa samo 40 bodova u Sloveniji i 100-120 bodova u Češkoj, Mađarskoj i Slovačkoj.
This shows that foreign investors continue to have certain reservations about the credibility of the overall economic policy of the Croatian government. 
Taj pokazatelj odražava određene nedoumice koje kupci državih obveznica RH još uvijek imaju glede kredibilnosti ukupne ekonomske politike hrvatske Vlade.
Along with Slovakia, the credit rating of the government debt of Croatia is the lowest in the region, and lies at the border between speculative and mature forms of investment. 
Uz Slovačku, kreditni rejting državnog duga Hrvatske najniži je u regiji i nalazi se na rubu između špekulativnih i zrelih oblika ulaganja.
By contrast, the government bonds of Slovenia and Hungary are considered investment grade, entailing a risk similar to that of the bonds of most of the countries of the EU.xvi A further negative factor is that the credit rating of Croatia has not improved since it was first quoted in January 1997, while the ratings of Hungary and Slovenia have improved since 1999. 
Nasuprot tome, državne obveznice Slovenije i Mađarske smatraju se "zrelim" financijskim ulaganjima (investment grade), sličnog rizika kao i obveznice većine zemalja EU.xvii Nepovoljan je i podatak da se kreditni rejting Hr-vatske nije popravio otkako je prvi put uveden u siječnju 1997, dok se već ionako povoljniji rejting Mađarske i Slovenije od 1999. poboljšao.
What are the implications of these vulnerabilities for the sustainability of external equilibrium in the medium term? 
Koje su implikacije tih "točaka ranjivosti" za održivost vanjske ravnoteže u srednjem roku?
With the current rate of interest of 4.6% on a ten-year German government bond and an interest spread of 190 points for Croatian government bonds, about 97 million USD would have to be spent each year on servicing the new borrowings projected for 2002-04. 
Uz sadašnju kamatu od 4,6% na 10-godišnje obveznice njemačke vlade i kamatni raspon od 190 postotnih bodova za obveznice RH, na otplatu kamata na novi dug svake godine odlazilo bi dodatnih 97 mil. USD.
If the interest spread increased by one percent (100 points), because of the perception of increased risk of investing in Croatia, servicing would cost another 15 million USD pa. 
Ako bi se kamatni raspon povećao za jedan postotak (100 postotnih bodova), zbog percepcija o većem riziku ulaganja u Hrvatsku otplata kamata povećala bi se za dodatnih 15 mil. USD godišnje.
This amount, of course, would not threaten Croatia's external stability, but it is not insignificant for public finances: 15 million USD amounts to almost 10% of the annual budgetary resources spent on science and technology. 
Taj iznos, naravno, ne bi ugrozio vanjsku stabilnost, ali nije beznačajan za javne financije: 15 mil. USD čini gotovo 10% godišnjih proračunskih sredstava za znanost i tehnologiju.
Under such circumstances, new borrowing is impossible regardless of the interest rate, because international investors seek liquidity and are not at all prepared to invest in risky securities. 
U takvim uvjetima novo zaduživanje ni uz kakve kamate nije moguće jer međunarodni investitori zahtijevaju isključivo likvidnost i uopće nisu spremni ulagati u riskantnije vrijednosnice.
New issues markets can dry up completely for several months, with serious consequences for the highly indebted emerging economies. 
Na tržištima novih izdanja obveznica zbog toga mjesecima može vladati potpuna "suša", što za visokozadužene zemlje može imati vrlo teške posljedice.
Developments since the Turkish and Argentine crises of 2001-2002 indicate that investors in the meantime have started to distinguish better those economies that are good risks from those that are bad, so that extreme cases of contagion on the financial markets (like the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-1998) are generally no longer expected (see BIS, 2002). 
Razvoj događaja nakon turske i argentinske krize 2001-2002. pokazao je da su investitori u međuvremenu počeli znatno bolje razlikovati gospodarstva dobroga od onih lošega kreditnog rizika, tako da se ekstremni slučajevi "zaraze" na financijskim tržištima (poput azijske i ruske krize 1997-1998.) uglavnom više ne očekuju (v. BIS, 2002).
For Croatia this is good news because currently it has found favour with foreign investors. 
Za Hrvatsku je to dobra vijest jer trenutačno ima naklonost stranih ulagača.
But at the same time one should bear in mind that, given the greater ability of investors to distinguish among emerging economies, any threats to macroeconomic stability would be costly for the Croatian economy and would have long-term negative consequences for economic development. 
No istodobno treba imati na umu da bi zbog veće sposobnosti investitora da procijene rizik ulaganja eventualno narušavanje makroekonomske stabilnosti hrvatsko gospodarstvo skupo koštalo i imalo bi dugotrajne negativne posljedice za ekonomski razvoj.
The budget deficit and the public debt 
Proračunski deficit i javni dug
Apart from Croatia, the CE countries were closer to having a budget deficit of 3% of GDP in 1999 than in 2001 (Table 3). 
Osim Hrvatske, srednjoeuropske su zemlje bile bliže ostvarenju proračunskog deficita od 3% BDP-a 1999. nego 2001. godine (tabl.
All this will create a pressure on the budgets of central governments and local units in both Croatia and the other CE countries. 
Sve će to stvarati pritisak na proračune središnje vlade i lokalnih jedinica kako u Hrvatskoj, tako i u drugim srednjoeuropskim zemljama.
The Czech Republic is expected, for instance, to record a budget deficit in the region of 6-7% of GDP in 2002, and Hungary of 7-8%. 
Za Češku se npr. u 2002. očekuje proračunski deficit od 6-7% BDP-a, a za Mađarsku od 7-8% BDP-a.
Some public finance experts have argued that reducing the budget deficit is essentially a matter of political will, and have referred to the experience of Italy, which has managed to reduce its long-standing deficits of 9-10% of GDP to less than 3% since 1997 (Gros, 2001). 
Mnogi poznavatelji fiskalnih kretanja u Europi smatraju da je postizanje proračunskog deficita u osnovi pitanje političke volje i upućuju na spomenuto iskustvo Italije, koja je od 1997. uspjela smanjiti dugogodišnje deficite sa 9-10% BDP-a na manje od 3% (Gros, 2002).
The case of Italy is, however, rather specific. 
Međutim, primjer Italije je specifičan.
Extensive development of a welfare state and economic subsidies can be reduced in the short term without negative consequences for growth, but not the expenditures for structural reforms necessary for long-term sustainable growth in the transition economies. 
Snažan rast države blagostanja i ekonomske subvencije moguće je u kratkom roku smanjiti bez negativnih posljedica za rast, ali ne i izdatke za strukturne reforme nužne za dugoročno održivi rast u tranzicijskim zemljama.
The financial markets, on the other hand, look upon large deficits with suspicion, irrespective of the possible justification of temporarily higher deficits in the transition economies. 
Financijska tržišta, međutim, sa sumnjom gledaju na visoke deficite, bez obzira na eventualnu opravdanost privremeno viših deficita u tranzicijskim gospodarstvima.
As a result, there is considerable market pressure to reduce high deficits. 
Stoga je tržišni pritisak na smanjenje deficita vrlo velik.
Croatia and many other CE countries will thus have to choose between alternatives that are politically equally unattractive: a significant fiscal adjustment in the short term (e.g., reducing the deficit by 3-4% of GDP in two years), or more moderate but disciplined adjustment spread out over several years (e.g., reduction of the budget deficit by 1% of GDP during 3-4 consecutive years), which in practice can mean during the term of office of several different governments. 
Hrvatska i većina drugih srednjoeuropskih zemalja zbog toga će morati birati između politički podjednako neprivlačnih alternativa: velikog fiskalnog prilagođavanja u kratkom roku (npr. smanjenjem deficita za 3-4% BDP-a u dvije godine), odnosno umjerenijega ali discipliniranog prilagođavanja raspoređenog na nekoliko godina (npr. smanjenje deficita za 1% BDP-a tijekom 3-4 uzastopne godine), što u praksi može značiti tijekom mandata nekoliko različitih vlada.
In both cases the key question will be whether the reduction of the deficit is sustainable over the long term. 
U oba slučaja ključno će pitanje biti je li smanjenje deficita održivo u dugom roku.
In Croatia, retaining public debt below 60% of GDP could also require considerable efforts. 
Zadržavanje javnog duga ispod 60% BDP-a moglo bi u Hrvatskoj također iziskivati znatne napore.
Between 1999 and 2001, the amount of guarantees issued also rose considerably. 
Između 1999. i 2001. znatno je porastao i iznos izdanih jamstava.
Debt servicing absorbed about 2% of GDP in recent years. 
Na otplatu kamata posljednjih godina odlazi oko 2% BDP-a.
The proportions of foreign and internal debt stabilised in 2001 at the level of 31% and 22% of GDP, respectively (Figure 5, right panel). 
Udjeli inozemnog i unutarnjeg duga stabilizirali su se u 2001. godine na razini od 31% odnosno 22% BDP-a (sl.
A similar conclusion has been reached in a recent CNB analysis (Kraft and Stucka, 2002). 
Slična se ocjena iznosi u analizi HNB-a (Kraft i Stučka, 2002).
The IMF estimates that in order for the public debt to stabilise at 53% of GDP, it is necessary to reduce the budget deficit to 3.8% of GDP by 2005 at the latest, while maintaining real growth of 3.8% pa and average interest rate of 5%. 
MMF ocjenjuje da je za stabiliziranje javnog duga na razini od 53% BDP-a nužno smanjiti proračunski deficit na 3,8% BDP-a najkasnije do 2005. godine, uz održavanje realnog rasta po stopi od 3,5% godišnje i zadržavanje prosječne kamate od 5%.
And in order for the level of the debt to be reduced long-term to less than 50% of GDP, the budget deficit should be cut to 3.3% of GDP by 2004, and to 2.6% by 2009. 
A da bi se razina duga trajno smanjila na manje od 50% BDP-a, deficit proračuna trebalo bi smanjiti na 3,3% BDP-a do 2004. te na 2,6% do 2009.
This calculation, however, assumes an acceleration of the rate of growth from 4.5% in 2003 to as much as 7% in 2006-2010, which is unrealistic when compared with the estimated potential growth rate of at most 5-6%. 
Ta računica, međutim, pretpostavlja ubrzavanje stope rasta sa 4,5% u 2003. na čak 7% u 2006-2010, što nije realno s obzirom na ocijenjenu potencijalnu stopu rasta od najviše 5-6%.
What are the dangers, from a macroeconomic perspective, of too great a reliance on foreign borrowing? 
Koje su opasnosti, iz makroekonomske perspektive, vezane za preveliko oslanjanje na vanjski dug?
Currently the conditions for borrowing are favourable. 
Trenutačno su uvjeti zaduživanja povoljni.
On the international capital market, interest rates are low; Croatia and other countries in the region have a very low interest spread; and there is investor demand for their government bonds. 
Kamate su na međunarodnom tržištu kapitala niske, Hrvatska i druge zemlje u ovoj regiji imaju vrlo niski raspon kamata i postoji potražnja investitora za njihovim državnim obveznicima.
This, naturally, encourages the public sector to borrow. 
To, naravno, privlači javni sektor da se zadužuje.
But one should take into account the fact that the conditions for financing can quickly change. 
Ali treba voditi brigu o tome da se uvjeti financiranja mogu brzo promijeniti.
High indebtedness increases the sensitivity of the external sector and the national budget to exchange rate and international interest rate changes, over which the monetary authorities have little (the exchange rate) or no influence (the interest rates). 
Visoka zaduženost povećava osjetljivost vanjskoga sektora i državnog proračuna na promjene tečaja i međunarodnih kamata, nad kojima monetarna vlast ima ograničen (tečaj) ili gotovo nikakav (kamate) utjecaj.
Numerous unfavourable constellations of these parameters are possible: pressure on the exchange rate to depreciate would increase the domestic currency equivalent of interest and principal payments due, and hence the budget deficit. 
Moguće su brojne nepovoljne konstelacije tih parametara: pritisak na deprecijaciju tečaja povećao bi kunsku protuvrijednost dospjelih otplata kamata i glavnice i time prouzročio proračunski deficit.
The government would then have to increase taxes or domestic interest rates in order to bring in extra revenue, or else issue new domestic bonds, which would slow the economy. 
Država bi onda morala povisiti poreze ili domaće kamate kako bi prikupila dodatne prihode odnosno izdala nove domaće obveznice, što bi usporilo razvoj.
Weaker outlook for growth would in turn increase the risk of investment in Croatia, and foreign investors would then seek higher interest on any new international issues of government bonds. 
Slabije perspektive rasta povećale bi rizik ulaganja u Hrvatsku, pa bi strani investitori tražili višu kamatu za nova međunarodna izdanja državnih obveznica.
Real shocks such as a slowdown in the growth of the world economy and negative trends in international capital markets would further complicate such negative dynamics. 
Realni "šokovi" poput usporavanja rasta svjetskoga gospodarstva i negativnih kretanja na međunarodnim financijskim tržištima mogli bi dodatno zakomplicirati takvu negativnu dinamiku.
Excessive reliance on external debt also has an unfavourable effect on the development of domestic financial markets. 
Preveliko oslanjanje na vanjski dug nepovoljno utječe i na razvoj domaćih financijskih tržišta.
The ratio of foreign and internal debt is currently unfavourable: 62% is accounted for by foreign and 38% by domestic public debt. 
Omjer udjela inozemnoga i unutarnjeg duga trenutačno je nepovoljan: na inozemni dug otpada 62%, a na unutarnji 38% ukupnoga javnog duga.
Since the start of the pension reforms, there is no reason for this ratio not to be improved. 
Nakon počinjanja mirovinske reforme više ne postoji objektivan razlog da se taj odnos ne popravi.
CONCLUSION 
ZAKLJUCAK
The Croatian public has been faced for some time with rather different views of the complex and long-lasting process of convergence between Croatia and European economic integrations. 
Hrvatska je javnost već dulje suočena s dosta različitim ocjenama složenog i dugotrajnog procesa približavanja Hrvatske europskim ekonomskim integracijama.
In some circles, a marked pessimism can be felt, with occasional knee-jerk statements about the incompetence of the Croatian economy, the public administration and the society as a whole to be able to meet the conditions for membership in the EU and the EMU in the next ten to fifteen years. 
U jednom dijelu javnosti osjeća se naglašeni pesimizam, s pokatkad paušalnim tvrdnjama o nesposobnosti hrvatskoga gospodarstva, javne uprave i cjelokupnog društva da u idućih 10-15 godina ispune uvjete za članstvo u EU i EMU.
In other circles, unrealistic expectations about fast-track approach to the EU are being stirred up, if only we could make this or that political move to convince Brussels that we should at long last be accepted “where we really belong”. 
Istodobno se u nekim krugovima podgrijavaju nerealna očekivanja o brzom priključenju EU ako se povuče ovaj ili onaj - obično politički - potez kojim bismo službeni Bruxelles uvjerili da nas konačno treba primiti "ondje gdje nam je mjesto".
The adoption of such opposing viewpoints avoids a thorough analysis of conditions for membership in the EU and EMU, and the conditions are interpreted quite simply as being very rigid or only cosmetic. 
Zauzimanjem takvih stavova izbjegava se temeljita analiza uvjeta za članstvo u EU i EMU, i ti se uvjeti interpretiraju jednoznačno, kao krajnje rigidni ili isključivo kozmetički.
Another common feature of many evaluations is superficiality in the analysis of the starting position of Croatia as against the other applicant countries. 
Drugo je zajedničko obilježje mnogih ocjena površnost u analizi startne pozicije Hrvatske u odnosu prema drugim zemljama kandidatkinjama.
For this reason one of the basic goals of this paper was to analyse more thoroughly the economic significance of the criteria for membership in the EU and EMU and objectively to compare the initial positions of Croatia and the other CE countries. 
Stoga je jedan od osnovnih ciljeva ovoga rada bio temeljitije analizirati ekonomsko značenje kriterija za članstvo u EU i EMU i objektivno usporediti početnu poziciju Hrvatske s drugim srednjoeuropskim zemljama.
For this reason great attention has been paid to the international comparability of the statistical data and the preciseness of the economic argumentation. 
Zbog toga je velika pozornost u radu pridana međunarodnoj usporedivosti statističkih podataka i preciznosti ekonomske argumentacije.
What are the basic conclusions of this analysis? 
Koji su osnovni zaključci te analize?
The rationale for the provisions concerning regional co-operation - the main additional (as compared with the other CE countries) condition for Croatian membership in the EU - is to induce the states in SEE to put their relationships on the same footing and to found these relations on the same principles as those on which inter-state relations are arranged within the EU. 
Cilj ispunjavanja odredbi o regionalnog suradnji - glavnog "dodatnog" (u usporedbi s drugim srednjoeuropskim zemljama) uvjeta za članstvo Hrvatske u EU - jest potaknuti države u jugoistočnoj Europi da svoje odnose urede na istim načelima na kojima su uređeni međudržavni odnosi unutar EU i odnosi među potencijalnim kandidatima i EU.
In spite of important advances (particularly bilateral free trade agreements), Croatia still needs to show that it is fulfilling all the provisions on regional cooperation. 
Unatoč značajnim pomacima (osobito sporazumu o slobodnoj trgovini), Hrvatska još treba dokazati da ispunjava sve odredbe o regionalnoj suradnji.
The purpose of meeting the Copenhagen criteria is to create the conditions for normal functioning of market economy and public administration in CE countries before they join the EU. 
Cilj ispunjavanja kopenhaških kriterija jest stvoriti uvjete za normalno funkcioniranje tržišnoga gospodarstva i javne uprave srednjoeuropskih zemalja unutar EU.
A certain flexibility has been built into these conditions. 
U te je uvjete ugrađena određena fleksibilnost.
At the moment, Croatia does not lag significantly behind the CE average when it comes to institutional development and can be compared with Slovakia. 
Hrvatska za sada ne zaostaje bitno u institucionalnom razvoju za srednjoeuropskim prosjekom i može se usporediti sa Slovačkom.
In trade foreign exchange and banking systems, Croatia has converged considerably to the EU standards. 
U vanjskotrgovinskom, deviznom i bankarskom sustavu Hrvatska se znatno približila standardima EU.
In the non-bank financial system, competition policy, the legal system and in corporate governance, the implementation of reforms in Croatia is about four years behind the central European average. 
Na tržištu vrijednosnica, u politici tržišnog natjecanja, u pravnom sustavu, i upravljanju poduzećima provođenje reformi u Hrvatskoj zaostaje otprilike četiri godine za srednjoeuropskim prosjekom.
These transitional weaknesses of Croatia are closely related to the low share of private sector in GDP (about 60%). 
Te su tranzicijske slabosti Hrvatske usko povezane s niskim udjelom (oko 60%) privatnog sektora u društvenom proizvodu.
The purpose of fulfilling the Maastricht criteria is to create stable macroeconomic conditions for the adoption of common currency and participation in European Monetary Union as a higher degree of economic integration than that of the common market. 
Cilj ispunjavanja maastrichtskih kriterija jest stvoriti stabilne makroekonomske uvjete za prihvaćanje zajedničke valute kao višeg stupnja ekonomske integracije od zajedničkog tržišta.
Although they have to meet more stringent criteria for joining the EMU than Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain did in the mid-nineties, the CE countries are now relatively close to meeting these conditions. 
Iako trebaju ispuniti strože kriterije za pristup EMU nego Grčka, Irska, Portugal i Španjolska sredinom devedesetih godina, srednjoeuropske su zemlje već sada relativno blizu ispunjenju tih uvjeta.