natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In practice, member countries come up against very tight constraints in the formulation of fiscal policies, so that a very high degree of coordination among them has already been attained. 
U praksi se zemlje članice susreću s vrlo čvrstim ograničenjima pri formulaciji fiskalnih politika tako da je već postignut visok stupanj njihove koordinacije.
Variables such as average level of inflation or the value of the euro in terms of other currencies have become a common asset in the EMU, hence every national policy that affects these variables can lead to an ECB reaction, and consequently, to changes in the environment for all the member states. 
Varijable poput prosječne razine inflacije ili tečaja eura prema trećim valutama postale su u EMU-u zajedničko dobro, pa stoga svaka nacionalna politika koja utječe na te varijable može dovesti do reakcije ECB-a i time do promjene okruženja za sve zemlje članice.
Also, rules with respect to running fiscal policy have been introduced because of the dangers of a spill-over of effects of risk growth from one of the EU members as a result of irresponsible fiscal policy. 
Također, pravila u vođenju fiskalne politike uvedena su zbog opasnosti od prelijevanja većeg rizika u nekoj od članica EU-a zbog neodgovornog vođenja fiskalne politike.
Finally, although it is explicitly banned for the ECB to directly buy bonds of any of the member countries, there is always a danger that a panic reaction on the financial markets will lead to monetary instability in the whole EMU area. 
Konačno, iako je eksplicitno zabranjeno da ECB izravno otkupljuje obveznice neke od zemalja članica, uvijek postoji opasnost da će panična reakcija financijskih tržišta dovesti do monetarnih nestabilnosti na cijelom području EMU-a.
Fiscal rules in the European Union 
Fiskalna pravila Europske unije
Getting the balance of the budget of general consolidated government close to equilibrium or into a small surplus is the main aim of each member country. 
Dovođenje salda proračuna opće konsolidirane države blizu ravnoteže ili ostvarivanje blagoga suficita glavni je cilj svake zemlje članice.
Balancing the budget relates to its structural balance, while the cyclical component of the budget can be adjusted depending on the state of the economic cycle, which makes possible the working of automatic stabilisers. 
Uravnoteženje proračuna odnosi se na njegov strukturni saldo, dok se ciklička komponenta proračuna može prilagođivati ovisno o stanju ekonomskog ciklusa, što omogućuje djelovanje automatskih stabilizatoraxix.
™ In addition to balancing the structural budget, the largest deficit of the budget of general consolidated government is limited to 3% of GDP. 
Uz uravnoteženje strukturnog proračuna, najveći deficit proračuna opće konsolidirane države ograničen je na 3% BDP-a.
In emergency situations, which are defined as a reduction of GDP by more than 2 percentage points, the resort to sanctions laid down by the SGP is automatically suspended. 
Pri tome se u izvanrednim okolnostima, koje su definirane kao smanjenje BDP-a za više od 2 postotna boda, automatski prekida provođenje sankcija propisanih SGP-om.
The SGP imposed constraints are stated in such a way that they allow for the working of automatic stabilisers in the case of the normal cyclical fluctuations. 
Ograničenja iz SGP-a postavljena su upravo tako da dopuštaju djelovanje automatskih stabilizatora pri normalnim cikličkim fluktuacijama.
In the definition of the restrictions, attention was paid to the potential rate of growth of the economies, fluctuations in growth and sensitivity of the budgetary balance to cyclical movements. 
Pri definiciji ograničenja vodila se briga o potencijalnoj stopi rasta tih gospodarstava, kolebljivosti rasta i osjetljivosti proračunskog salda na ciklička kretanja.
The potential rate of growth in member countries is about 2.5%, while in the case of a reduction of the growth rate by 1% below the potential on average there is a cyclical budgetary deficit of 0.6% of GDP. 
Tako potencijalna stopa rasta u zemljama članicama iznosi oko 2,5%, dok se pri smanjenju stope rasta za 1% ispod potencijalnoga u prosjeku pojavljuje ciklički proračunski deficit od 0,6% BDP-a.
Since the average largest output gap recorded in the member countries during the period from 1960 to 1997 was 4%, which corresponded to a 1.5% reduction of GDP, appeals to extraordinary circumstances in the context of the SGP should be a rarity (European Commission, 1999). 
Kako prosječni najveći jaz zabilježen u zemljama članicama u razdoblju od 1960. do 1997. doseže 4%, što odgovara smanjenju BDP-a za 1,5%, pozivanje na izvanredne okolnosti u sklopu SGP-a trebalo bi biti rijetkost (European Commission, 1999).
Of course, fluctuations in GDP are not the same in all the countries, and the automatic stabilisers do not react equally strongly because of differences in the structure of revenue and expenditure. 
Naravno, kolebljivost BDP-a nije jednaka u svim zemljama, a ni automatski stabilizatori ne reagiraju jednako snažno zbog razlika u strukturi prihoda i rashoda.
For this reason those countries that are exposed to greater shocks and that have more powerful automatic stabilisers, or that wish to back them up with active countercyclical fiscal policy, must aim at higher budgetary surpluses. 
Stoga one zemlje koje su izložene većim šokovima i imaju snažnije automatske stabilizatore, ili njihovo djelovanje žele dopunjavati aktivnom protucikličkom fiskalnom politikom, moraju ciljati i na veće proračunske suficite.
Fiscal constraints from the SGP also enable the stabilisation of the level of public debt. 
Fiskalno ograničenje iz SGP-a također omogućuje stabiliziranje razine javnog zaduženja.
Thus an average budgetary deficit at the level of 3% of GDP, with an expected 5% growth rate of nominal GDP,™ is in line with the maintenance of public debt at a level of 60% of GDP. 
Tako je prosječan proračunski deficit na razini od 3% BDP-a, uz očekivanu stopu rasta nominalnog BDP-a od 5%xx, u skladu s održavanjem javnog duga na razini od 60% BDP-a.
This level of public debt is also prescribed by the SGP as the highest permissible level of public debt that all members with a higher public debt should aim at. 
Ta je razina javnog zaduženja također propisana SGP-om kao najviša dopuštena razina javnog zaduženja kojoj bi trebale težiti sve članice s višim javnim dugom.
Since the SGP nevertheless prescribes the balancing of public finances, in the event of achievement of it, in the mid-term reduced levels of public indebtedness should be expected (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2003). 
Kako je SGP-om ipak propisano uravnoteženje javnih financija, uz njegovo poštovanje u srednjem bi se roku moglo očekivati smanjenje razine javne zaduženosti (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2003).
Effects of fiscal rules on future members 
Učinci fiskalnih pravila na buduće članice
Immediately on joining the EU new members assume all obligations laid down by the SGP. 
Nove članice odmah nakon pristupanja EU preuzimaju sve obveze propisane SGP-om.
For this reason, accession countries and candidates usually take part in a pre-accession fiscal surveillance procedure in order to prepare as well as possible for the obligations that membership will entail with regard to running macroeconomic policy, within the context of which they do not have any formal obligations except to inform the EU of their economic policy and establish communication channels. 
Stoga zemlje pristupnice i kandidatkinje obično sudjeluju u proceduri za pretpristupno fiskalno nadgledanje (Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure) kako bi se bolje pripremile za obveze koje će im članstvo donijeti u smislu vođenja makroekonomske politike, u sklopu kojega ne snose nikakve formalne obveze osim izvješćivanja EU-a o svojoj ekonomskoj politici i uspostavljanja komunikacije.
Of course, after entry into the EU, before joining the EMU, which is actually obligatory for new members after they have met the Maastricht criteria,xxii provisions regarding sanctions for not fulfilling the SGP do not apply to new members. 
Naravno, nakon ulaska u EU, a prije pristupanja EMU-u, koje je zapravo obvezno za sve nove članice odmah nakon ispunjenja kriterija iz Maastrichtaxxi, na nove se članice ne odnose odredbe sa sankcijama za nepoštovanje SGP-a.
Although they will not be exposed to financial penalties, they will be under very strong pressure to start running their fiscal policy in line with common rules. 
No iako neće biti izložene financijskim kaznama, one će se naći pod izuzetnim pritiskom i zahtjevom da fiskalnu politiku poenu voditi u skladu sa zajedničkim pravilima.
In Croatia the deficit was 0.9% worse than the average, but the growth rate was 1.4% higher than the average, which came to 3.8%, and this should also be taken into account when assessing the differences in the structural deficit. 
Hrvatski je deficit bio 0,9 postotnih bodova lošiji od prosjeka tih zemalja, ali je stopa rasta u Hrvatskoj bila 1,4% viša od prosjeka, koji je iznosio 3,8%, što bi također valjalo uzeti u obzir pri ocjeni razlika u strukturnom deficitu.
In addition, all the countries with worse indicators with respect to budgetary deficit also had lower rates of growth than Croatia. 
Također, sve su zemlje s lošijim pokazateljima proračunskog deficita istodobno imale i niže stope rasta od Hrvatske.
According to these indicators, we can conclude that Croatia, like most of the transition countries, is only coming up to the process of fiscal consolidation. 
Na temelju tih pokazatelja može se zaključiti kako Hrvatsku, kao i većinu tranzicijskih zemalja, tek očekuje proces fiskalne konsolidacije.
Hence, considering the rate of growth that can be expected in the mid-term, probably a little lower than the current rate, in Croatia the budgetary deficit should be reduced by about 6% of GDP, so as to ensure a structurally balanced budget. 
Stoga bi u Hrvatskoj, s obzirom na stope rasta koje se mogu očekivati u srednjemu roku, a koje će vjerojatno biti nešto niže od sadašnjih, trebalo smanjiti proračunski manjak za otprilike 6% BDP-a kako bi se ostvario strukturno uravnotežen proračun.
We have already mentioned that the effects of the SGP on the fiscal policy of each member depend essentially on its characteristics. 
Već je napomenuto kako utjecaji SGP-a na fiskalnu politiku svake članice bitno ovise o njezinim obilježjima.
Future members, like Croatia, differ in several important features from the current members. 
Buduće se članice, kao i Hrvatska, razlikuju po nekoliko značajnih obilježja od sadašnjih članica.
Firstly, these countries are much poorer than the current members and they possess a considerable potential for real convergence. 
Prvo, riječ je o zemljama koje su bitno siromašnije od sadašnjih članica i koje posjeduju znatan potencijal za realnu konvergenciju.
In this paper we have assumed the potential rate of real growth for Croatia to be 4%. 
U ovome smo radu pretpostavili kako potencijalna stopa realnog rasta za Hrvatsku iznosi 4%.
Secondly, because of the level of prices that is about half the EU average, nominal convergence brought about by the Balassa-Samuleson effect and a growth of the level of administrative prices can be expected. 
Nadalje, zbog razine cijena koja je gotovo dvostruko niža od prosjeka EU-a može se očekivati i nominalna konvergencija uzrokovana Balassa-Samuelsonovim učinkom i porastom razine administrativnih cijena.
This will make the differences in rates of nominal growth, which is essential for the dynamics of public debt, still greater than the difference in the rates of real growth. 
Ona će razliku u stopama nominalnog rasta, koja je bitna za dinamiku javnog duga, učiniti još većom od razlike u stopama realnog rasta.
Also, the levels of public revenue and expenditure in the future members, including Croatia, irrespective of the lower level of development attained, are not essentially below the revenues and expenditures of the current members. 
Usto, razine javnih prihoda i rashoda u budućim članicama, pa tako i Hrvatskoj, bez obzira na nižu dosegnutu razinu razvoja, nisu bitno ispod prihoda i rashoda u sadašnjim članicama.
This means that the automatic stabilisers should not be any weaker than in the present members. 
To znači da automatski stabilizatori ne bi trebali djelovati slabije nego u sadašnjim članicama.
However, the future members have a relatively unfavourable structure of expenditure, with a high proportion of fixed expenditures, like pensions and healthcare expenses, which do not change depending on the state of the business cycle (Richter and Romisch, 2003). 
Međutim, buduće članice imaju razmjerno nepovoljniju strukturu rashoda, s visokim udjelom “fiksnih” rashoda poput mirovina ili izdataka na zdravstvo, koji se ne mijenjaju ovisno o stanju poslovnog ciklusa (Richter i Romisch, 2003).
Although it would seem that because of the weaker automatic stabilisers the new members will not be confronted with the appearance of impermissible deficits, they will actually have to depend even more on an active fiscal policy in order to stabilise the economy. 
Iako se čini da se zbog slabijih automatskih stabilizatora nove članice neće suočiti s nedopuštenim deficitima, one će se zapravo morati intenzivnije oslanjati na aktivnu fiskalnu politiku kako bi stabilizirale gospodarstva.
This has proved dangerous to date in their case because after the end of the recession the cyclical deficits gradually turned into structural deficits (Kopits and Szekely, 2003). 
To se u njihovu primjeru do sada pokazalo opasnim jer su nakon prestanka recesije ciklički deficiti polako prelazili u strukturne (Kopits G. i Szekely, 2003).
Finally, future members, including Croatia, are on the whole smaller and more open than the present members. 
Konačno, buduće su članice, pa tako i Hrvatska, uglavnom manje i otvorenije od sadašnjih.
This means that fluctuations of production will be greater in their case, as will the need for the concomitant stabilisation, which can bring about greater cyclical deficits during some periods than those common with the old members. 
To znači da će i kolebljivost proizvodnje u njima biti veća, kao i potreba za njezinom stabilizacijom, što može tijekom pojedinih razdoblja uzrokovati veće cikličke deficite od uobičajenih u starim članicama.
All these features could well have a negative effect on the efficiency of fiscal policy in Croatia and in some other transition countries within the framework of the SGP. 
Sve navedene odrednice mogle bi negativno utjecati na učinkovitost fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj i u drugim tranzicijskim zemljama unutar SGP-a.
For example, for Croatia, because of its relatively high potential rate of growth, the sanctions provided for in the SGP would be suspended only in the case of a reduced rate of growth of GDP by 6 percentage points below the potential, while for member countries this reduction comes on the average only to 4.5 percentage points. 
Primjerice, za Hrvatsku bi se, zbog njezine relativno više potencijalne stope rasta, sankcije predviđene SGP-om suspendirale tek nakon smanjenja stope rasta BDP-a za 6 postotnih bodova ispod potencijalne, dok za zemlje članice to smanjenje u prosjeku iznosi tek 4,5 postotna boda.
For this reason, Croatia will have to make a stronger effort toward fiscal adjustment if it wants to retain flexibility of fiscal policy. 
Stoga će se Hrvatska morati snažnije fiskalno prilagoditi želi li zadržati fleksibilnost fiskalne politike.
Furthermore, automatic stabilisers constitute a special problem. 
Nadalje, poseban su problem automatski stabilizatori.
In Croatia at the moment we have no understanding of the structural balance of the budget or of the working of automatic stabilisers, because of which we are unable to say whether they will suffice to stabilise the economy, or in what way the budget balance will react to a change in the rate of growth. 
U Hrvatskoj trenutačno nema spoznaja o strukturnom saldu proračuna, kao ni o djelovanju automatskih stabilizatora, zbog čega ne možemo reći jesu li oni dovoljni za stabiliziranje gospodarstva niti na koji će način proračunski saldo reagirati na promjenu stope rasta.
If it is concluded that automatic stabilisers are too weak to bring the economy into balance, of which there are already indications, it would be good to think about ways of preparing an active fiscal policy to respond fast and effectively to the state of the economy, that is, how the budget deficit could be simply increased or reduced in the current year. 
Ako se utvrdi kako su automatski stabilizatori preslabi za stabiliziranje gospodarstva, o čemu postoje indicije, valjalo bi razmišljati o načinima primjene aktivne fiskalne politike koja bi brzo i učinkovito odgovarala na stanje gospodarske konjunkture, odnosno pomoću koje bi se proračunski deficit u tekućoj godini mogao jednostavno povećati, ali i smanjiti.
Also relatively unfavourable are the consequences that EU fiscal rules will have on the level of public debt of new members in the event of the strict application of the SGP. 
Razmjerno su nepovoljne i posljedice koje će fiskalna pravila EU-a imati na razinu javnog duga novih članica pri dosljednom provođenju SGP-a.
Because of the essentially higher potential rate of growth of nominal GDP, bringing the structural budget into balance will rapidly reduce their public debt. 
Naime, zbog bitno više potencijalne stope rasta nominalnog BDP-a, dovođenje strukturnog salda proračuna u ravnotežu brzo će smanjivati njihov javni dug.
While for EU countries with a structural deficit of the budget at the level of 3% one can expect an equilibrium level of public debt at 60% of GDP, for transition countries, assuming a nominal rate of growth of 7% and an identical start level for public debt, their convergence on 43% of GDP can be expected. 
Dok se za zemlje EU-a uz strukturni deficit proračuna na razini od 3% može očekivati ravnotežna razina javnoga duga na razini od 60% BDP-a, za tranzicijske se zemlje, uz pretpostavljenu stopu nominalnog rasta od 7% i jednaku početnu razinu javnog duga, može očekivati njezina konvergencija prema 43% BDP-a.
In addition, in the case of a structural imbalance of the budget, in the new members it is possible to expect a much more rapid reduction of the ratio of public debt and GDP. 
Također, u slučaju strukturnog uravnoteženja proračuna, u novim se članicama može očekivati znatno brže smanjenje omjera javnoga duga i BDP-a.
In case of the initial assumptions concerning growth and level of indebtedness, new members could halve this ratio in some ten years. 
Uz polazne pretpostavke o rastu i razini zaduženosti nove bi članice prepolovile taj omjer već nakon desetak godina.
This means that new members, which because of the high expected rates of growth have a greater capacity to take on debt and a larger need for infrastructure investments, will in fact be forced into a more rapid reduction of public debt. 
To znači da će nove članice, koje zbog viših očekivanih stopa rasta imaju i veći kapacitet zaduživanja, kao i veću potrebu za infrastrukturnim investicijama, zapravo biti prisiljene brže smanjivati javni dug.
The Government has made fiscal projections up to 2007, by which time we assume that with a bit of luck Croatia might enter the EU. 
Vlada je donijela fiskalne projekcije do 2007. godine, do koje pretpostavljamo da bi se Hrvatska, uz malo sreće, mogla naći u EU.
Our estimates say that in 2007 we might expect negative fiscal effects of accession in a total amount of about 1% of the anticipated BDP. 
Naše procjene govore kako bi se u 2007. godini mogli očekivati negativni fiskalni učinci pristupanja EU u ukupnom neto iznosu od približno 1% očekivanoga BDP-a.
Of course, the reserve of potential savings through the reduction of state aid should also be kept in mind, which might be considerable, although its dynamics would be hard to predict in that year. 
Naravno, valja imati na umu i rezervu potencijalnih ušteda ostvarenih smanjenjem državnih potpora, koja može biti značajna, ali njezinu dinamiku u toj godini ne možemo predvidjeti.
Additional difficulties derive from the framework of the SGP for running fiscal policy. 
Dodatne teškoće proizlaze iz okvira SGP-a za vođenje fiskalne politike.
The possibility of running an anti-cyclical fiscal policy in line with these rules will not be retained with a structural deficit of the budget of 2% of GDP, as the Government's projections look for, or even 3% of GDP, if we count on the potential fiscal effects of joining. 
Želimo li zadržati mogućnost vođenja anticikličke fiskalne politike u skladu s tim pravilima, strukturni saldo proračuna neće se moći zadržati na deficitu od 2% BDP-a, kako se navodi u Vladinim projekcijama, ili od čak 3% BDP-a uračunamo li potencijalne fiskalne učinke priključivanja.
In connection with this, certain recommendations as to how to prepare fiscal policy for the challenges of EU membership might be drawn from the paper: 
U vezi s time, iz rada se mogu izvući neke preporuke za pripremu fiskalne politike izazovima članstva u EU.
• As soon as possible it is necessary to realistically assess the structural balance of the budget, and also the effect of the automatic stabilisers on the budgetary balance. 
• U što skorijoj budućnosti potrebno je realistično ocijeniti strukturni saldo proračuna, kao i učinak automatskih stabilizatora na proračunski saldo.
• If the automatic stabilisers are judged to be inadequate to stabilise the economy, which is likely because of the structure of budgetary revenues and expenditure, it will be necessary to develop a fiscal activism policy capable of rapidly and flexibly increasing and decreasing the budgetary deficit in line with the movements of the business cycle. 
• Ako se automatski stabilizatori ocijene nedovoljnima za stabiliziranje gospodarstva, što je izgledno zbog strukture proračunskih prihoda i rashoda, potrebno je razviti strategiju fiskalnog aktivizma koja bi mogla brzo i fleksibilno povećavati i smanjivati proračunski deficit, u skladu s kretanjem gospodarskog ciklusa.
• According to an assessment of the structural balance of the budget and the strength of the automatic stabilisers, or the expected degree of fiscal activism, it is necessary to draw up a projection of fiscal adjustment to facilitate the running of an anti-cyclical fiscal policy that does not involve infringements of the SGP. 
• Na temelju procjene strukturnog salda proračuna i snage automatskih stabilizatora, odnosno očekivanog stupnja fiskalnog aktivizma, potrebno je izraditi projekciju fiskalne prilagodbe koja bi omogućila vođenje anticikličke fiskalne politike bez kršenja SGP-a.
Because of a rate of potential growth higher than that of current members, Croatia would very likely have to create a structural surplus so that the automatic stabilisers could act without exposing Croatia to possible sanctions in the case of a deeper recession. 
Zbog više stope potencijalnoga rasta od sadašnjih članica, Hrvatska bi vjerojatno morala ostvarivati strukturni suficit kako bi automatski stabilizatori mogli djelovati bez izlaganja Hrvatske mogućim sankcijama u slučaju jače recesije.
It is important to realise that all these recommendations lend force to the already routine steps that the European Commission takes when estimating the harmonisation of each country with the SGP. 
Važno je shvatiti kako sve te preporuke podupiru već postojeće rutinske korake koje Europska komisija poduzima pri ocjeni usklađenosti svake zemlje sa SGP-om.
In addition, they are a necessary part of the consideration of each of the candidates of the EU as it prepares to join the EU. 
Dodatno, one su nužan dio razmatranja svake od članica EU-a u sklopu priprema za EMU.
On its way to membership in the EU Croatia will certainly meet the necessity of carrying out all these steps. 
Hrvatska bi se na svome putu u članstvo EU-a prije ili kasnije susrela s nužnošću provođenja svih tih koraka.
However, we think that these steps should be taken as soon as possible because of the long period in which fiscal adjustment is usually made, and the shortness of the time span in which Croatia plans to become an EU member. 
Međutim, smatramo kako je te korake nužno poduzeti što prije zbog dugog vremenskog horizonta u kojemu se obično ostvaruje fiskalna prilagodba, kao i zbog kratkoće razdoblja u kojemu Hrvatska planira postati članicom EU-a.