natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Working Document SEC (2006) 1385. 
Work ing Document SEC (2006) 1385.
A. R., Oxley, L. and Carlaw, K. 
“The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth.”
tion Function Method. 
Zagreb: Središnji državni ured
Growth Real GDP growth, 2002-2005 
Rast Realna stopa rasta BDP-a, 2002-2005.
Population Age dependency ratio, 2004 
Stanovništvo Koeficijent starosne ovisnosti, 2004.
Population growth (in %), 2002-2004 
Rast stanovništva (u %), 2002-2004.
Foreign direct investment, inflows (in % of GDP), 2002-2005 
Izravna strana ulaganja, priljevi (u % BDP-a), 2002-2005.
General government, total expenditure and net lending (in % of GDP), 2005 
Opća država, ukupni troškovi i neto zajmovi (u % BDP-a), 2005.
General government, gross debt (in percent of GDP), 2005 
Opća država, bruto dug (u % BDP-a), 2005.
Monetary policy CPI inflation (in %), 2005 
Monetarna politika CPI inflacija (u %), 2005.
Economic freedom index (index, increasing from 1 to 10), 2004 
Indeks ekonomske slobode (indeks, raste od 1 do 10), 2004.
Size of government (index, increasing from 1 to 10), 2004 
Veličina vlade (indeks, raste od 1 do 10), 2004.
Financial sector development M2 (in % of GDP), 2004 
Razvijenost financijskog sustava M2 (u % BDP-a), 2004.
Domestic credit to private sector (in % of GDP), 2004 
Domaći krediti privatnom sektoru (u % BDP-a), 2004.
Business environment Business regulations (index, increasing from 1 to 10), 2004 
Poslovno okruženje Poslovne regulacije (indeks, raste od 1 do 10), 2004.
Overall infrastructure reform (index, increasing from 1 to 5), 2005 
Ukupne infrastrukturne reforme (indeks, raste od 1 do 5), 2005.
International trade Trade (% of GDP), 2005 
Međunarodna trgovina Trgovina (% BDP-a), 2005.
Freedom to trade internationally (index, increasing from 1 to 10), 2004 
Sloboda međunarodnog trgovanja (indeks, raste od 1 do 10), 2004.
Primary school enrollment ratio (in % of relevant age group), 2003 
Koeficijent upisanih u osnovnu školu (u % relevantne dobne skupine), 2003.
Secondary school enrollment ratio (in % of relevant age group), 2003 
Koeficijent upisanih u srednju školu (u % relevantne dobne skupine), 2003.
Expenditure per student, primary (in % of GDP per capita), 2002 
Troškovi po učeniku, osnovna škola (u % BDP-a po stanovniku), 2002.
Expenditure per student, secondary (in % of GDP per capita), 2002 
Troškovi po učeniku, srednja škola (u % BDP-a po stanovniku), 2002.
Labor market Unemployment rate (in %), 2005 
Tržište rada Stopa nezaposlenosti (u %), 2005.
Long-term unemployment (in % of total unemployment), 2002 
Dugoročna nezaposlenost (u % ukupne nezaposlenosti), 2002.
Josip Franić, Institute of Public Finance 
Josip Franić, Institut za javne financije
The Project start date is 1 October 2013 and its duration is 48 months. 
Projekt je započeo 1. listopada 2013. i traje 48 mjeseci.
The main goal is to provide concrete policy recommendations about what policies may work better, based on rigorous empirical evidence, for those seeking to tackle the undeclared economy in mentioned countries. 
Glavna svrha projekta je na temelju čvrstih empirijskih pokazatelja, pružiti konkretne preporuke za politike i mjere o tome što može biti učinkovito u suzbijanju neprijavljenog rada u promatranim zemljama.
Conduct a comprehensive review of the policy approaches and measures being used to tackle undeclared work. 
Provesti sveobuhvatni pregled politika i mjere koje se provode u suzbijanju neprijavljenog rada.
Empirically evaluate the measures for facilitating the shift of undeclared work into the declared economy in the selected target region. 
Empirijski evaluirati mjere za lakši prijelaz iz neprijavljenog u prijavljeno gospodarstvo u odabranim ciljanim područjima.
Based on the results of the first two objectives, the final objective is to recommend possible new policy approaches and measures (or endorse old ones) that will facilitate the shift of undeclared work into the declared 
Na temelju spoznaja iz prva dva cilja, konačni cilj je preporučiti nove pristupe i mjere (ili pojačati postojeće) za olakšanje prijelaza iz neprijavljenog rada u prijavljeni.
LAW, INFORMAL RULES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCETHE CASE FOR COMMON LAW, Svetozar Pejovich, 2008, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 178 p. 
LAW, INFORMAL RULES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE - THE CASE FOR COMMON LAW, Svetozar Pejovich, 2008, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 178 str.
In the preface to his book Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance - The Case 
U predgovoru svoje knjige Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance - The
for Common Law Pejovich states that the book is about capitalism and its economic performance. 
Case for Common Law Pejovich navodi kako je u knjizi riječ o kapitalizmu i njegovoj ekonomskoj uspješnosti.
He describes capitalism as the “only system in recorded history that has been successful in pulling the average person above the subsistence level and sustaining a steady, if cyclical, rate of economic development”. 
Kapitalizam opisuje kao “jedini sustav u dosadašnjoj povijesti koji je bio uspješan u izvlačenju prosječne osobe iznad egzistencijalnog minimuma i u postizanju stabilne, premda ciklične, stope ekonomskog razvoja”.
However, Pejovich adds that his book is not concerned with advocating capitalism on philosophical or ideological grounds. 
Međutim, Pejovich dodaje kako u njegovoj knjizi nije riječ o zagovaranju kapitalizma na filozofskim ili ideološkim osnovama.
Rather, his purpose is to explain why the system has done so well. 
Umjesto toga, njegov je cilj objasniti zašto je taj sustav bio tako uspješan.
In order to do so, the analysis goes in two directions: 1) analysis of the incentive effects of formal and informal institutions on the economic behaviour of individuals or, put differently, analysis of the effects of capitalist rules on the game itself, and 2) examination of adjustments in the rules over time. 
Kako bi to učinio, njegov postupak ide u dva smjera: 1. analizira učinke poticaja formalnih i neformalnih institucija na ekonomsko ponašanje pojedinaca ili, drugim riječima, analizira učinke kapitalističkih pravila na samu igru te 2. ispituje prilagodbu pravila tijekom vremena.
In his analysis Pejovich differentiates two major types of capitalism - Anglo-American and Continental, whereby he focuses on the two legal systems upon which the two types depend - common and civil law. 
Pejovich razlikuje dva osnovna tipa kapitalizma - angloamerički i kontinentalni, pri čemu se usredotočuje na dva pravna sustava na kojima se oni temelje - na običajno i građansko pravo.
His goal is to explain how and why different versions of capitalism have led to different socioeconomic results. 
Autorov je cilj objasniti kako su i zašto različite verzije kapitalizma dovele do različitih društveno-ekonomskih rezultata.
The author defines informal institutions as “traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs and all the other norms of behaviour that have emerged spontaneously, survived the test of time and served to bind generations”. 
Pritom definira neformalne institucije kao “tradicije, običaje, moralne vrijednosti, vjerska uvjerenja i sve ostale norme ponašanja koje su nastale spontano, preživjele test vremena i služile povezivanju generacija”.
Formal institutions are “constitutions, statutes, common laws and other governmental regulations”. 
Formalne su institucije “ustavi, statuti, zakoni i drugi državni propisi”.
As the author states, the major premise of the book is that the changes in institutions affect the economy, and that changes in the economy have predictable effects on the development and modifications of institutions. 
Kao što autor navodi, glavno je polazište knjige da promjene u institucijama utječu na gospodarstvo i da promjene u gospodarstvu imaju predvidive učinke na razvoj i modificiranje institucija.
nal economics, the fist part of this book will provide a good introduction. 
S. Pejovich: Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance - the Case for Common Law
sm and its dependence on the rule of law. 
ovisnosti o vladavini prava.
He also stresses the importance of individualism, which “rewards competitive performance, promotes risk taking and views income inequalities as desirable results of entrepreneurship and free trade”. 
Također naglašava važnost individualizma, koji “nagrađuje konkurentsko ponašanje, promiče preuzimanje rizika i dohodovne nejednakosti smatra poželjnim rezultatom poduzetništva i slobodne trgovine”.
Apart from the rule of law and the culture of individualism, the third cornerstone of capitalism is competitive markets. 
Osim vladavine prava i kulture individualizma, treći je temelj kapitalizma konkurentsko tržište.
The four basic institutions of capitalism are, according to the author, private property rights, the law of contract, an independent judiciary and a constitution. 
Prema autoru, četiri su temeljne institucije kapitalizma: privatna vlasnička prava, ugovori, nezavisno sudstvo i ustav.
They are all embodied in the rule of law. 
Te su institucije utkane u vladavinu prava.
The second part of the book also contains a reprint of Buchanan's paper “Afraid to be free: dependency as desideratum”. 
U drugom dijelu knjige nalazi se pretisak Buchananova članka Afraid to be free: dependancy as desideratum.
In the third part Pejovich proposes and develops “a theory of efficiently-friendly institutional changes that are consistent with both the culture of capitalism and sustainable economic development”. 
U trećem dijelu knjige Pejovich predlaže i razvija “teoriju institucionalnih promjena koje podržavaju učinkovitost, a koje su konzistentne kako s kulturom kapitalizma, tako i s održivim ekonomskim razvojem”.
The theory is based on three major factors: the rule of law, the carriers of change (individuals), and the interaction between formal and informal institutions. 
Teorija se temelji na tri glavna čimbenika: vladavini prava, nositeljima promjena (pojedinci) i interakciji između formalnih i neformalnih institucija.
The gist of the theory (the interaction thesis) is that the rule of law provides incentives for the carriers of change to narrow the gap between the culture of capitalism and the prevailing culture in the community. 
Bit teorije (interakcijske teze) jest da vladavina prava daje poticaje nositeljima promjena da smanje jaz između kulture kapitalizma i prevladavajuće kulture u društvu.
Pejovich actually attempts to introduce culture into the model of institutional changes. 
Pejovich zapravo nastoji uvesti kulturu u model institucionalnih promjena.
There are several things worth pointing out regarding Pejovich's views. 
Potrebno je istaknuti nekoliko detalja vezanih za Pejovicheva stajališta.
believes that, contrary to the English and American experiences, the “role of a powerful state has never been seriously questioned on the European continent, not even by its prominent classical liberals”. 
tra da se, suprotno engleskome i američkom iskustvu, “na europskom kontinentu nikad nije ozbiljno sumnjalo u ulogu moćne države, čak to nisu činili ni najistaknutiji europski klasični liberali”.
In Anglo-American capitalism the government is a predator which the rule of law is to tame, and in Continental capitalism the government is a partner in the economic game. 
U angloameričkom kapitalizmu država je predator kojega treba ukrotiti vladavina prava, dok je u kontinentalnom kapitalizmu država partner u ekonomskoj igri.
Secondly, the author stresses that an expansion of the role of the state in economic affairs makes the economy less efficient. 
Drugo, autor naglašava da upletanje države u ekonomske aktivnosti čini gospodarstvo manje učinkovitim.
In the overregulated European Union phenomena like Bill Gates and John Dell are not happening. 
U odveć reguliranoj Europskoj uniji ne događaju se fenomeni poput Billa Gatesa i Johna Della.
Thirdly, Continental capitalism privileges social justice over freedom of choice, while in Anglo-American capitalism the system is about freedom of choice and private property rights. 
Treće, kontinentalni kapitalizam daje prednost društvenoj pravednosti pred slobodom izbora, dok su u angloameričkom kapitalizmu najvažniji sloboda izbora i vlasnička prava.
Generally, according to Pejovich, Anglo-American capitalism is better at protecting the institutions of capitalism. 
Općenito, angloamerički kapitalizam bolje štiti institucije kapitalizma.
Fourthly, Pejovich makes a clear distinction between common law and civil law. 
Četvrto, autor jasno razlikuje sustav običajnoga i građanskog prava.
Common law judges can choose either to stick with the prevailing precedents or to ignore them and “legislate from the bench”. 
Suci u sustavu običajnog prava mogu birati hoće li se držati prevladavajućih prošlih presuda ili će ih ignorirati i donijeti nove.
This means that the judges have discretionary power to make decisions that are not consistent with either the wisdom of the past or existing procedures. 
To znači da suci imaju diskrecijsku moć za donošenje odluka koje nisu u skladu s nečim što je u prošlosti ili u postojećim pravilima bilo općeprihvaćeno.
In civil law countries legislators debate scholars' propositions and enact those that pass their scrutiny. 
U zemljama građanskog prava zakonodavci raspravljaju o prijedlozima stručnjaka i prihvaćaju one koji prođu njihovu kontrolu.
Bureaucrats and courts then implement and enforce new formal rules. 
Državni službenici i sudovi zatim primjenjuju i provode nova formalna pravila.
Furthermore, the legislative process is influenced by various interest groups. 
Nadalje, zakonodavni je proces pod utjecajem različitih interesnih skupina.
Formal rules in civil law countries are also made in response to changes in the game, but legislators have incentives to enact formal rules that promise to push human interactions towards the results desired by a majority of voters, the median voter, rent-seeking groups, or all of these. 
Formalna pravila u zemljama građanskog prava također nastaju kao odgovor na promjene u igri, ali zakonodavci su motivirani primijeniti ona formalna pravila koja usmjeravaju interakcije među ljudima prema ishodu koji želi većina glasača, medijanski glasač, skupine koje traže rentu ili svi zajedno.
Pejovich believes that the transaction costs of merging the two legal systems are very high. 
Pejovich smatra da su transakcijski troškovi spajanja tih dvaju pravnih sustava vrlo visoki.
Secondly, in the US there are presently fifteen federal cabinet departments and more than one hundred federal agencies and commissions. 
Drugo, u SAD-u trenutačno postoji petnaest ministarstava i više od stotinu državnih agencija i komisija.
Apart from that, there is a massive apparatus of laws, departments, agencies and regulations at the state and local level. 
Osim toga, u SAD-u na razini saveznih država postoji masivan aparat zakona, državnih odjela, agencija i propisa.
It is also questionable that in Europe government is viewed as a partner in the economic game. 
Nadalje, upitno je smatra li se doista u Europi država partnerom u ekonomskoj igri.
This is too general. 
Ta je tvrdnja previše općenita.
It is highly likely that entrepreneurs in Europe have an opposite view of the state. 
Vrlo vjerojatno poduzetnici u Europi imaju upravo suprotno mišljenje o državi.
Also, a powerful state has never been accepted in Switzerland, and it was quite successfully challenged by leading German liberals such as Kant and von Humboldt. 
Nadalje, moćna država nikad nije bila prihvaćena u Švicarskoj, a vodeći njemački liberali poput Kanta i von Humboldta uspješno su je osporavali.
Pejovich uses the Index of Economic Freedom to assess whether Anglo-American 
Pejovich se koristi indeksom ekonomske slobode kako bi ocijenio je li angloamerič
or Continental capitalism is better at protecting the institutions of capitalism. 
ki ili kontinentalni kapitalizam bolji u njegovanju institucija kapitalizma.
1 It turns out that economic freedom is higher in Anglo-American capitalism, i.e. common law countries. 
1 Proizlazi da je ekonomska sloboda veća u angloameričkom kapitalizmu, odnosno u zemljama običajnog prava.
The first group of countries consists of the United States, England, Ireland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
Prvu skupinu zemalja čine SAD, Engleska, Irska, Australija, Kanada i Novi Zeland.
In these countries common law is the dominant legal system. 
U tim je zemljama običajno pravo dominantni pravni sustav.
In the second group (all western countries, in a cultural sense, that use civil law) are Portugal, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Denmark. 
U drugoj su skupini zemalja (sve zemlje Zapada, u kulturološkom smislu, koje se temelje na građanskom pravu) Portugal, Španjolska, Francuska, Luksemburg, Njemačka, Belgija, Nizozemska, Italija, Švicarska, Austrija, Švedska i Danska.
Pejovich left out Greece because it was dominated by the Ottoman Empire for centuries, Finland because “it has remained between the West and the East”, and Norway because it uses both common law and civil law. 
Autor je izostavio Grčku jer je u njoj stoljećima dominiralo Otomansko Carstvo, Finsku “jer je ostala između Zapada i Istoka” i Norvešku jer primjenjuje i običajno i građansko pravo.
Hong Kong and Singapore are left out “because it is not clear whether they are part of Western civilization”. 
Hong Kong i Singapur izostavio je zato što “nije jasno jesu li dio zapadne civilizacije”.
There are several problematic issues regarding Pejovich's analysis by using the Index 
U Pejovichevoj analizi na temelju primjene indeksa ekonomske slobode postoji ne
of Economic Freedom. 
koliko spornih točki.
He acknowledges that it is not a perfect measure. 
Autor priznaje da indeks nije savršena mjera.
still the only one he uses. 
Općenito, što je s azijskim zemljama?
Finally, Pejovich fails to notice that there is a strong correlation between a country's GDP p.c. and the index score (see graph 1). 
Konačno, Pejovich propušta uočiti snažnu korelaciju BDP-a po stanovniku i indeksa (v. grafikon 1).
In other words, countries that are richer have more economic freedom. 
Drugim riječima, bogatije zemlje imaju više ekonomske slobode.
It is not necessary for those countries to have a legal system based on common law. 
Nije nužno da te zemlje imaju pravni sustav koji se temelji na običajnom pravu.
Let us now focus on the common law vs. civil law issue. 
Usredotočimo se sada na pitanje običajnoga i građanskog prava.
One endnote contains 
Jedna bilješka u
Colombatto's argument that in civil law countries precedent is becoming more and more important in many public administration cases, where judges can interpret the law as they like but are under pressure to justify differences with respect to previous, similar cases. 
knjizi sadržava Colombattovu tvrdnju da u zemljama građanskog prava prethodne sudske odluke postaju sve važnije u mnogim upravno-pravnim predmetima, u kojima sutkinja može tumačiti pravo kako želi, ali je pod pritiskom da objasni razlike u odnosu prema prethodnim sličnim slučajevima.
Furthermore, Pejovich mentions several times, but casually, that the difference between common law and civil law is not black and white. 
Naime, u zemljama građanskog prava pozornost se obraća na prethodne sudske odluke, a u zemljama običajnog prava oslanja se na zakone.
The former does rely on statutes and the latter does pay attention to previous courts' decisions. 
Razlika je u relativnoj važnosti tih dvaju modela u oblikovanju formalnih pravila.
Weber (1972:471) claimed that England became economically successful not because of its legal system, but partly despite of it. 
Weber je (1972:471) tvrdio da je Engleska postala ekonomski uspješna ne zbog svoga pravnog sustava nego djelomično usprkos njemu.
Namely, only the propertied classes had access to the royal courts, which used the common law, while everybody else was “sentenced” to Khadi-justice, or completely denied justice. 
Naime, samo su imućni imali pristup kraljevskim sudovima, koji su primjenjivali običajno pravo, dok su svi ostali bili osuđeni na “kadija te tuži, kadija ti sudi” sustav ili uopće nisu imali pristup pravosuđu.
This changed in the course of the 20th century. 
To se promijenilo tijekom 20. stoljeća.
Finally, the author does not differentiate between the subcategories of civil law: scholars of comparative law usually subdivide civil law into three groups: German, French, and Scandinavian civil law. 
On je naveo da su suci u Habsburškoj Monarhiji prilikom donošenja presuda različito tumačili ista zakonska pravila u različitim dijelovima monarhije, i to zato što su uzimali u obzir neformalne institucije.
Pejovich's interaction thesis is worth quoting: “When the members of the community 
Konačno, autor ne razlikuje različite potkategorije građanskog prava.
The actual economic outcome is the joint product of the interaction of a new rule with the prevailing informal rules.” 
Stvarni ekonomski rezultat zajednički je proizvod interakcije novog pravila s prevladavajućim neformalnim pravilima.”
In order to prove his thesis Pejovich just compares the Index of Economic Freedom scores for central and east European countries, but he divides them in two groups: those with greater Western influence and those with lesser Western influence. 
Kako bi dokazao svoju tezu, Pejovich samo uspoređuje rezultate indeksa ekonomske slobode za zemlje središnje i istočne Europe, ali ih dijeli u dvije skupine: one s većim i one s manjim utjecajem Zapada.
The former have a higher average of the index which, according to Pejovich, is “striking” evidence in support of the interaction thesis. 
Prve imaju viši prosječni indeks, što je prema Pejovichu “izvanredna” potvrda interakcijske teze.
Countries with more Western influence had stronger institutional restructuring. 
Zemlje sa snažnijim zapadnim utjecajem prošle su kroz veće institucionalno restrukturiranje.
In other words, countries where collectivism and egalitarianism were less widespread could more easily accept the institutions of capitalism. 
Drugim riječima, zemlje u kojima su kolektivizam i egalitarizam bili slabiji lakše su mogle prihvatiti institucije kapitalizma.
Although the interaction thesis is interesting, it is not new. 
Iako je interakcijska teza zanimljiva, nije nova.
By now it has become almost conventional wisdom, which was not true at the beginning of transition. 
Dosad je već postala gotovo općepoznata, što nije bio slučaj na početku tranzicije.
It is a pity that Pejovich did not study transition economies and their legal systems in more detail. 
Šteta je što Pejovich nije detaljnije proučio tranzicijske zemlje i njihove pravne sustave.
Most of Pejovich's basic ideas, especially those about institutional changes, are di 
S većinom Pejovichevih ideja, osobito s onima o institucionalnim promjenama, teško
However, Pejovich oversimplifies matters. 
Međutim, Pejovich pojednostavnjuje stvari.
Despite the author's intention not to defend capitalism on ideological grounds, some conclusions in the book that are not well supported by empirical evidence might be interpreted as doing just this. 
Unatoč autorovoj namjeri da ne brani kapitalizam uz pomoć ideoloških razloga, neki zaključci u knjizi koji nisu čvrsto utemeljeni empirijskim rezultatima mogli bi se protumačiti upravo kao ideološki obojeni.
Finally, in his analysis Pejovich focuses on several countries which are probably clear-cut examples of common law or civil law systems. 
No između te dvije “krajnosti” nalaze se mnoge druge zemlje koje se ne uklapaju ni u jedan od tih modela te svaka od njih ima svoje specifičnosti.
Danijela Medak Fell, Institute of Public Finance 
Danijela Medak Fell, Institut za javne financije
In Croatia, VAT was introduced on January 1, 1998, as a replacement for the multistage turnover tax. 
U Hrvatskoj je PDV uveden 1. siječnja 1998. godine kao zamjena za višefazni porez na promet.
It was levied at a single rate of 22%, with a small number of standard exemptions and without any zero rates, except those on exports. 
Primjenjivao se po jedinstvenoj stopi od 22%, uz mali broj standardnih izuzeća i bez nultih stopa osim one za izvoz.