natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
7 The purpose of Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (OJ 2011 L 335, p. 1) is to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, child pornography and solicitation of children for sexual purposes. It also introduces provisions to strengthen the prevention of those crimes and the protection of the victims thereof. 
7 Svrha je Direktive 2011/93/EU Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 13. prosinca 2011. o suzbijanju seksualnog zlostavljanja i seksualnog iskorištavanja djece i dječje pornografije, te o zamjeni Okvirne odluke Vijeća 2004/68/PUP (SL 2011, L 335, str. 1.) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje19., svezak 16., str. 261.) utvrditi minimalna pravila za određivanje kaznenih djela i sankcija u području seksualnog zlostavljanja i seksualnog iskorištavanja djece, dječje pornografije i mamljenja djece za seksualne potrebe. Njome se također uvode odredbe za jačanje sprečavanja takvih kaznenih djela i za zaštitu žrtava tih djela.
8 Paragraph 6 of the Law on general freedom of movement of citizens of the Union (Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von Unionsbürgern) of 30 July 2004 (BGBl. 2004 I, p. 1950), as amended by the Law amending the Federal Police Law and other laws (Gesetz zur Änderung des Bundespolizeigesetzes und anderer Gesetze) of 26 February 2008 (BGBl. 2008 I, p. 215), provides as follows: 
8 Zakon o općoj slobodi kretanja građana Unije (Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von Unionsbürgern) od 30. srpnja 2004. (BGBl. 2004 I, str. 1950.), kako je izmijenjen Zakonom o izmjeni Zakona o saveznoj policiji i drugih zakona (Gesetz zur Änderung des Bundespolizeigesetzes und anderer Gesetze) od 26. veljače 2008. (BGBl. 2008 I, str. 215.), u svojem članku 6. određuje:
‘(1) Loss of the right under Paragraph 2(1) may, without prejudice to Paragraph 5(5), be determined and the document attesting to the right of residence or permanent residence under Community law withdrawn and the residence permit or permanent residence permit revoked only on grounds of public policy, security or health (Articles 39(3) and 46(1) of the Treaty …). Entry may also be refused on those grounds. A determination on grounds of public health may be made only if the illness occurs within the first three months from entry. 
„(1) Ne dovodeći u pitanje članak 5. stavak 5., jedino se zbog razloga javnog poretka, javne sigurnosti ili javnog zdravlja (članak 39. stavak 3. i članak 46. stavak 1. Ugovora […]) može utvrditi gubitak prava iz članka 2. stavka 1., povući potvrda o pravu na boravak na temelju prava Zajednice ili o pravu na stalni boravak i opozvati dozvola boravka ili dozvola stalnog boravka. Zbog tih je razloga moguće odbiti i ulazak na državno područje. Utvrđenje na temelju razloga javnog zdravlja moguće je jedino ako se bolest pojavi unutar prva tri mjeseca od ulaska.
(2) The existence of a criminal conviction shall not in itself constitute a sufficient ground for the adoption of the decisions or measures referred to in subparagraph 1. Only criminal convictions which have not yet been erased from the Central Register may be taken into account, and only in so far as the circumstances on which they are based disclose personal conduct which constitutes a present threat to public policy. There must be a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting a fundamental interest of society. 
(2) Kaznena presuda sama po sebi nije dovoljan razlog za donošenje odluka ili mjera iz stavka 1. U obzir se mogu uzeti samo kaznene presude koje još nisu izbrisane iz središnjeg registra, i to samo u mjeri u kojoj okolnosti na kojima se one temelje ukazuju na osobno ponašanje koje predstavlja stvarnu prijetnju javnom poretku. Mora se raditi o stvarnoj i dovoljno ozbiljnoj prijetnji koja ugrožava neki temeljni interes društva.
(3) When a decision under subparagraph 1 is made, account must be taken in particular of how long the person concerned has resided in Germany, his age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration in Germany and the extent of his ties to his country of origin. 
(3) Pri donošenju odluke iz stavka 1. posebno se mora uzeti u obzir duljina boravka predmetne osobe u Njemačkoj, njezina dob, zdravstveno stanje, obiteljske i ekonomske prilike, socijalna i kulturalna integracija u Njemačku te opseg njezinih veza s državom podrijetla.
(4) Once a right of permanent residence has been acquired, a determination under subparagraph 1 may be made only on serious grounds. 
(4) Nakon stjecanja prava na stalni boravak, utvrđenje iz stavka 1. može se temeljiti samo na ozbiljnim razlozima.
(5) In the case of Union citizens and their family members who have resided in Federal territory for the previous 10 years, and in the case of minors, a determination under subparagraph 1 may be made only on imperative grounds of public security. In the case of minors, this does not apply where the loss of the right of residence is necessary for the best interests of the child. Imperative grounds of public security may exist only if the person concerned, after being convicted of one or more intentional offences, has been definitively sentenced to at least five years’ imprisonment or youth custody or if, on the occasion of the most recent definitive conviction, a term of preventive detention was ordered, where the security of the Federal Republic of Germany is affected or the person concerned poses a terrorist risk. 
(5) U slučaju građana Unije i članova njihovih obitelji koji na saveznom teritoriju žive zadnjih deset godina te u slučaju maloljetnika, odluka iz stavka 1. može se donijeti jedino zbog prisilnih razloga javne sigurnosti. Ovo se pravilo ne primjenjuje na maloljetnike ako je gubitak prava na boravak potreban jer je to u interesu djeteta. Prisilni razlozi javnog poretka mogu postojati jedino ako je predmetna osoba za jedno ili više namjerno počinjenih kaznenih djela pravomoćno osuđena na zatvorsku kaznu ili kaznu maloljetničkog zatvora u trajanju od najmanje pet godina ili ako joj je kod zadnje pravomoćne presude određeno preventivno zadržavanje, ako je ugrožena sigurnost Savezne Republike Njemačke ili ako predmetna osoba predstavlja terorističku opasnost.
9 Mr I. was born in Italy on 3 September 1965 and has lived in Germany since 1987. In April 1987, he was granted his first residence permit, which has been subsequently extended on a number of occasions. He is single and has no children. He has never gained a school-leaving certificate or professional qualifications and has been employed in Germany only occasionally. Mr I. has five siblings, some of whom live in Germany and some of whom live in Italy. Since his arrest in April 2006, his mother has lived partly in Germany and partly in Italy. 
9 P. I. je rođen u Italiji 3. rujna 1965. i od 1987. živi u Njemačkoj. U travnju 1987. izdana mu je prva dozvola boravka, koja je potom više puta produljivana. Neoženjen je i nema djece. Nije stekao nikakvu školsku ili stručnu spremu i u Njemačkoj je radio samo povremeno. P. I. ima petero braće i sestara, od kojih neki žive u Njemačkoj, a neki u Italiji. Od njegova uhićenja u siječnju 2006. majka mu živi djelomično u Njemačkoj i djelomično u Francuskoj.
10 By judgment of 16 May 2006, which became definitive on 28 October 2006, the Landgericht Köln (Regional Court, Cologne) sentenced Mr I. to a term of imprisonment of seven years and six months for the sexual assault, sexual coercion and rape of a minor. The acts which gave rise to that conviction took place between 1990 and 2001. From 1992, Mr I. compelled his victim to have sexual intercourse with him or perform other sexual acts on an almost weekly basis by using force and threatening to kill her mother or brother. The victim of the criminal offences was his former partner’s daughter, who was 8 years old when the offences commenced. Mr I. has been in custody since 10 January 2006 and is due to complete his sentence on 9 July 2013. 
10 Presudom od 16. svibnja 2006., koja je postala pravomoćna 28. listopada 2006., Landgericht Köln (Okružni sud u Kölnu) osudio je P. I. na zatvorsku kaznu od sedam godina i šest mjeseci zbog seksualne zlouporabe djeteta, seksualnog nasilja i silovanja maloljetne osobe. Djela zbog kojih je donesena ta presuda počinjena su između 1990. i 2001. Od 1992. P. I. je skoro svakog tjedna prisiljavao svoju žrtvu na spolni odnošaj s njim ili izvršavanje drugih spolnih radnji, koristeći pri tom silu i prijeteći joj da će joj ubiti majku ili brata. Žrtva kaznenih djela bila je kći njegove bivše partnerice i imala je osam godina u vrijeme kad su počela kaznena djela. P. I. je u zatvoru od 10. siječnja 2006. i kazna mu istječe 9. srpnja 2013.
11 By decision of 6 May 2008, the Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, the defendant in the main proceedings, determined that Mr I. had lost the right to enter and reside in Germany, ordered that that measure be immediately enforceable and ordered Mr I. to leave the territory, failing which he would be deported to Italy. 
11 Odlukom od 6. svibnja 2008. Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, tuženica u glavnom postupku, utvrdila je gubitak prava P. I.-ja na ulazak i boravak na njemačkom državnom području, naredila neposredno izvršenje te mjere i naložila P. I.-ju da napusti to područje, pod prijetnjom protjerivanja u Italiju.
12 The defendant in the main proceedings states that Mr I. had been relentless in his criminal conduct and caused his victim ‘endless suffering’ through abuse lasting many years. The possibility cannot be ruled out that, in similar circumstances, he will re-offend, committing acts of the same or similar nature to those he engaged in before his arrest, on account in particular of the extended period during which the offences were perpetrated and the continuing lack of remorse on Mr I.’s part. The interests of Mr I. which merit protection have nevertheless been taken into consideration and there has been no particular economic or social integration into German society. 
12 Tuženica u glavnom postupku navodi da je P. I. uložio značajnu kriminalnu energiju u svoje postupke i uzrokovao svojoj žrtvi „beskrajnu patnju” zlostavljajući je dugi niz godina. Nije isključeno da bi u sličnim okolnostima ponovio ista ili slična kaznena djela poput onih koja je činio prije uhićenja, prije svega imajući u vidu dugo razdoblje činjenja kaznenih djela i činjenice da se kod počinitelja još uvijek nije javio osjećaj krivnje. Interesi P. I.-ja koje treba zaštititi uzeti su u obzir, a on se nije ekonomski ni socijalno posebno integrirao u njemačko društvo.
13 On 12 June 2008, Mr I. brought an action against the expulsion decision of 6 May 2008 and requested that enforcement of the order be suspended. By judgment of 14 July 2008, the Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf (Administrative court, Düsseldorf) dismissed that action, considering in particular that the acts which warranted the conviction revealed personal conduct which gave rise to fears of a present, genuine and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society, namely the protection of girls and women from sexual assault and rape. Mr I. had been relentless in his criminal conduct, having regard in particular to the lengthy period during which the offences were committed, the age of the victim and the measures he took to prevent the offences being discovered, by continually threatening his victim and isolating her. 
13 P. I. je 12. lipnja 2008. podnio tužbu protiv odluke o protjerivanju od 6. svibnja 2008. te zatražio da se suspendira njezino izvršenje. Presudom od 14. srpnja 2008. Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf (Upravni sud, Düsseldorf) odbacio je tužbu, posebno smatrajući da djela zbog kojih je osuda izrečena otkrivaju osobno ponašanje koje opravdava bojazan da postoji trenutačna, stvarna i dovoljno ozbiljna opasnost koja ugrožava neki od temeljnih interesa društva, a to je zaštita djevojaka i žena od seksualnog nasilja i silovanja. P. I. je pokazivao značajnu kriminalnu energiju, posebno s obzirom na duljinu razdoblja u kojem su počinjenja kaznena djela, dob žrtve i mjere koje je poduzeo da ta djela ne budu otkrivena tako što je neprekidno prijetio žrtvi i izolirao je.
14 Mr I. lodged an appeal against that judgment before the Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, which, after restoring the suspensory effect of the application, decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: 
14 P. I. je na tu presudu uložio žalbu pred Oberverwaltungsgerichtom für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, koji je, nakon što je potvrdio suspenzivni učinak tužbe, odlučio prekinuti postupak i postaviti Sudu sljedeće prethodno pitanje:
‘Does the term “imperative grounds of public security” contained in Article 28(3) of Directive [2004/38] cover only threats posed to the internal and external security of the State in terms of the continued existence of the State with its institutions and important public services, the survival of the population, foreign relations and the peaceful co-existence of nations?’ 
„Obuhvaća li pojam „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti”, koji je sadržan u članku 28. stavku 3. Direktive [2004/38], samo prijetnje unutarnjoj i vanjskoj sigurnosti države u smislu kontinuiranog postojanja države s njezinim institucijama i važnim javnim uslugama, opstanka stanovništva, vanjskih odnosa i mirnog suživota među narodima?”
Consideration of the question referred 
O prethodnom pitanju
15 At paragraph 56 of its judgment in Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] ECR I-11979, the Court held that Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that the fight against crime in connection with dealing in narcotics as part of an organised group is capable of being covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, which may justify a measure expelling a Union citizen who has resided in the host Member State for the preceding 10 years. 
15 U točki 56. presude u predmetu C-145/09 od 23. studenoga 2010., Tsakouridis (C-145/09, Zb., str. I-11979., Sud je presudio da se članak 28. stavak 3. Direktive 2004/38 mora tumačiti na način da borba protiv kriminala povezanog s trgovinom opojnim sredstvima u organiziranoj skupini može biti obuhvaćena pojmom „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti”, čime se može opravdati mjera protjerivanja građanina Unije koji je u državi članici domaćinu boravio prethodnih deset godina.
16 In response to a written question put by the Court following the judgment in Tsakouridis, the referring court stated that doubts remained in the main proceedings as to whether and, if so, under what conditions, the fight against other forms of crime than drug-related crime as part of an organised group may also constitute an ‘imperative ground of public security’ within the meaning of Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38. 
16 U odgovoru na pisano pitanje koje je Sud postavio nakon izricanja gore navedene presude u predmetu Tsakouridis, sud koji je uputio zahtjev naveo je da su u glavnom predmetu postojale nedoumice o tome može li i, ako može, pod kojim uvjetima borba protiv ostalih oblika kriminala drukčijih od onih povezanih s drogama u organiziranoj skupini također biti „prisilni razlog javne sigurnosti” u smislu članka 28. stavka 3. Direktive 2004/38.
17 The referring court asks, in particular, whether it is possible to expel from the host Member State Union citizens who, whilst not belonging to a group or any other kind of criminal organisation, have committed extremely serious criminal offences which affect individual interests benefiting from legal protection, such as sexual autonomy, life, freedom and physical integrity, where there is a high level of risk that they will re-offend, committing other similar offences. 
17 Sud koji je uputio zahtjev pita posebno je li moguće protjerati iz države članice domaćina građane Unije koji su, premda ne pripadaju skupini ili drugoj vrsti kriminalne organizacije, počinili iznimno teška kaznena djela koja se odnose na ugrožavanje pravno zaštićenih individualnih interesa, kao što su seksualna autonomija, život, sloboda i fizički integritet, ako postoji visoki rizik da će ponovo počiniti slična kaznena djela.
18 As regards public security, the Court has already held that this covers both a Member State’s internal and its external security (Tsakouridis, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). 
18 Što se tiče javne sigurnosti, Sud je već presudio da ona obuhvaća i unutarnju i vanjsku sigurnost države članice (gore navedena presuda Tsakouridis, t. 43. i navedena sudska praksa).
19 According to the Court, it follows from the wording and scheme of Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38 that, by subjecting all expulsion measures in the cases referred to in that provision to the existence of ‘imperative grounds’ of public security, a concept which is considerably stricter than that of ‘serious grounds’ within the meaning of Article 28(2), the European Union legislature clearly intended to limit measures based on Article 28(3) to ‘exceptional circumstances’, as set out in recital 24 in the preamble to that directive (Tsakouridis, paragraph 40). 
19 Prema mišljenju Suda, iz teksta i strukture članka 28. stavka 3. Direktive 2004/38 proizlazi da je zakonodavac Unije, uvjetujući sve mjere protjerivanja u slučajevima iz te odredbe postojanjem „prisilnih razloga” javne sigurnosti, to jest s pojmom koji je znatno stroži od pojma „ozbiljni razlozi” u smislu stavka 2. tog članka, imao očitu namjeru ograničiti mjere koje se temelje na navedenom stavku 3. na „iznimne okolnosti”, kako su navedene u 24. uvodnoj izjavi navedene Direktive (presuda Tsakouridis, t. 40.).
20 The concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ presupposes not only the existence of a threat to public security, but also that such a threat is of a particularly high degree of seriousness, as is reflected by the use of the words ‘imperative grounds’ (Tsakouridis, paragraph 41). 
20 Pojam „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti” podrazumijeva ne samo postojanje prijetnje javnoj sigurnosti, nego i to da je ta prijetnja dosegla osobito visok stupanj težine, kao što to odražava primjena izraza „prisilni razlozi” (presuda Tsakouridis, t. 41.).
21 It should also be noted that European Union law does not impose on Member States a uniform scale of values as regards the assessment of conduct which may be considered to be contrary to public security (see, by analogy, Case C-268/99 Jany and Others [2001] ECR I-8615, paragraph 60). 
21 Treba također podsjetiti da pravo Unije ne nameće državama članicama jedinstvenu skalu vrijednosti za ocjenu ponašanja koje se može smatrati protivnim javnoj sigurnosti (vidjeti po analogiji presudu od 20. studenoga 2001., Jany i dr., C-268/99, Zb., str. I-8615., t. 60.).
22 Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38 provides that imperative grounds of public security are to be ‘defined by Member States’. 
22 Prema članku 28. stavku 3. Direktive 2004/38, prisilne razloge javne sigurnosti „utvrđuju države članice”.
"23 While Member States essentially retain the freedom to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in accordance with their national needs, which can vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another, particularly as justification for a derogation from the fundamental principle of free movement of persons, those requirements must nevertheless be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the institutions of the European Union (see, inter alia, Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] ECR I-5157, paragraph 23; C-430/10 Gaydarov [2011] ECR I-11637, paragraph 32; and Case C-434/10 Aladzhov [2011] ECR I-11659, paragraph 34)." 
23 Iako države članice u biti zadržavaju slobodu da u skladu sa svojim nacionalnim potrebama, koje se mogu razlikovati od jedne države članice do druge ili od jednog razdoblja do drugog, utvrđuju zahtjeve javnog poretka i javne sigurnosti, posebno kao opravdanje za odstupanje od temeljnog načela slobodnog kretanja osoba, ti se zahtjevi ipak moraju strogo tumačiti tako da njihov opseg ne može jednostrano odrediti svaka država članica bez nadzora institucija Europske unije (osobito vidjeti presude od 10. srpnja 2008., Jipa, C-33/07, Zb., str. I-5157., t. 23. i od 17. studenoga 2011., Gaydarov, C-430/10, Zb., str. I-11637., t. 32. te presudu Aladzhov, C-434/10, Zb., str. I-11659., t. 34.).
24 In order to determine whether offences such as those committed by Mr I. may be covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, the following factors must be taken into account. 
24 Kako bi se utvrdilo mogu li kaznena djela koje je počinio P.I. biti obuhvaćena pojmom „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti”, u obzir se moraju uzeti sljedeći faktori.
25 Article 83(1) TFEU provides that the sexual exploitation of children is one of the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension in which the European Union legislature may intervene. 
25 U skladu s člankom 83. stavkom 1. UFEU-a seksualno iskorištavanje djece jedno je od područja osobito teškog kriminaliteta s prekograničnim elementima u kojemu je predviđeno interveniranje zakonodavca Europske unije.
26 Reflecting that objective, the first recital in the preamble to Directive 2011/93 states that sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children constitute serious violations of fundamental rights, in particular the rights of children to the protection and care necessary for their well-being, as provided for by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
26 U prvoj uvodnoj izjavi Direktive 2011/93 izražen je navedeni cilj i naglašeno je da seksualno zlostavljanje i seksualno iskorištavanje djece predstavljaju teška kršenja temeljnih prava, posebno prava djece na zaštitu i brigu za njihovu dobrobit, kako je to utvrđeno Konvencijom Ujedinjenih naroda o pravima djece od 20. studenoga 1989. i Poveljom Europske unije o temeljnim pravima.
27 The serious nature of those kinds of offences is also apparent from Article 3 of Directive 2011/93, which provides, in Article 3(4), that engaging in sexual activities with a child who has not reached the age of sexual consent is to be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 5 years, and Article 3(5)(i), which states that engaging in such activities where abuse is made of a recognised position of trust, authority or influence over the child is to be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 8 years. Under Article 3(5)(iii), where use is made of coercion, force or threats, that term of imprisonment must be at least 10 years. In accordance with Article 9(b) and (g) of Directive 2011/93, the fact that the offence was committed by a member of the child’s family, a person cohabiting with the child or a person who has abused a recognised position of trust or authority and that the offence involved serious violence or caused serious harm to the child are to be regarded as aggravating circumstances. 
27 Težina tih vrsta kaznenih djela proizlazi i iz članka 3. Direktive 2011/93 u čijem se stavku 4. utvrđuje da se sudjelovanje u spolnim aktivnostima s djetetom koje još nije dosegnulo dob za pristanak na spolni odnos kažnjava se najvećom kaznom zatvora, ali ne manjom od pet godina zatvora, dok se u stavku 5. točki i. istog članka utvrđuje da sudjelovanje u takvim aktivnostima zlouporabljujući priznati položaja povjerenja, autoriteta ili utjecaja nad djetetom kažnjava najvećom kaznom zatvora od najmanje osam godina. Prema stavku 5. točki iii. istog članka, ta kazna zatvora mora iznositi najmanje deset godina u slučaju uporabe prisile, sile ili prijetnje. U skladu s člankom 9. točkama (b) i (g) Direktive 2011/93, okolnost da je kazneno djelo počinio član obitelji djeteta, osoba koja stanuje zajedno s djetetom ili osoba koja je zlorabila svoj priznati položaj povjerenja ili autoritet te okolnost da je kazneno djelo uključivalo teško nasilje ili je djetetu prouzročilo ozbiljnu štetu mogu se uzeti kao otegotne okolnosti.