natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
56 The Ombudsman further criticises the Court of First Instance for conducting, in paragraphs 64 to 85 of the judgment appealed against, a detailed analysis of his inquiry and conclusions, as it would have done in the case of an action for annulment, and thus for carrying out an actual review of legality of the whole of the inquiry and his conclusions. 
56 Ombudsman nadalje prigovara Prvostupanjskom sudu, u točkama 64. do 85. pobijane presude, zbog provođenja detaljne analize njegove istrage i zaključaka kakvu bi proveo u slučaju tužbe za poništenje, kojom je tako proveo stvarni nadzor zakonitosti cijele istrage i njegovih zaključaka.
57 In doing so, the Court of First Instance did not observe the distinction between actions for damages, on the one hand, and actions for annulment and for failure to act, on the other, and disregarded its own case-law and that of the Court from which it is apparent that the Ombudsman's inquiries and decisions cannot be subject to judicial review in the context of the two last-mentioned forms of action. 
57 Pritom Prvostupanjski sud nije poštovao razliku između tužbe za naknadu štete, s jedne strane, te tužbe za poništenje i tužbe zbog propusta, s druge strane, te je zanemario svoju sudsku praksu i praksu Suda iz koje je vidljivo da istrage i odluke ombudsmana ne mogu biti predmet sudskog nadzora u okviru zadnje navedenih dvaju oblika tužbi.
58 The Ombudsman criticises the Court of First Instance for none the less allowing such judicial review under the guise of an action for damages and thus opening the way to the introduction of numerous actions for annulment, or for failure to act, against the Ombudsman in the guise of purported actions for damages. 
58 Ombudsman prigovara Prvostupanjskom sudu da je dopustio takav sudski nadzor pod krinkom tužbe za naknadu štete i tako otvorio put za uvođenje brojnih tužbi za poništenje odnosno tužbi zbog propusta protiv ombudsmana pod krinkom navodnih tužbi za naknadu štete.
The Court of First Instance failed to take account of the fact that, in actual fact, the action for damages against the Ombudsman constituted a misuse by Mr Lamberts of the actions for annulment and for failure to act. 
Prvostupanjski sud propustio je uzeti u obzir činjenicu da tužbom za naknadu štete protiv ombudsmana F. Lamberts u biti zloupotrebljava tužbu za poništenje i tužbu zbog propusta kao pravna sredstva.
59 The action to establish liability is an autonomous form of action, with a particular purpose to fulfil within the system of legal remedies and subject to conditions of use dictated by its specific purpose (Case 4/69 Lütticke v Commission [1971] ECR 325, paragraph 6, and the order of 21 June 1993 in Case C-257/93 Van Parijs and Others v Council and Commission [1993] ECR I-3335, paragraph 14). 
59 Tužba za utvrđivanje odgovornosti autonomno je pravno sredstvo koje ima posebnu funkciju u sustavu pravnih sredstava i ovisi o pretpostavkama za primjenu koje su određene uzimajući u obzir njegovu posebnu svrhu (presuda od 28. travnja 1971., Lütticke/Komisija, 4/69, Zb., str. 325., t. 6., i rješenje od 21. lipnja 1993., Van Parijs i dr./Vijeće i Komisija, C-257/93, Zb., str. I-3335., t. 14.).
Although actions for annulment and for failure to act seek a declaration that a legally binding measure is unlawful or that such a measure has not been taken, an action to establish liability seeks compensation for damage resulting from a measure or from unlawful conduct, attributable to a Community institution or body (see to that effect Case 118/83 CMC v Commission [1985] ECR 2325, paragraphs 29 to 31; Case C-308/87 Grifoni v Commission [1990] ECR I-1203, and Case C-146/91 KYDEP v Council and Commission [1994] ECR I-4199). 
Iako tužbe za poništenje ili zbog propusta imaju za cilj sankcioniranje nezakonitosti obvezujućeg pravnog akta ili nedostatka takvog akta, predmet je tužbe za utvrđivanje odgovornosti zahtjev za naknadu štete koja proizlazi iz akta ili nezakonitog ponašanja pripisivog instituciji ili tijelu Zajednice (vidjeti u tom smislu presude od 10. srpnja 1985., CMC/Komisija, 118/83, Zb., str. 2325., t. 29. do 31.; od 27. ožujka 1990., Grifoni/ Komisija, C-308/87, Zb., str. I-1203., i od 15. rujna 1994., KYDEP/Vijeće i Komisija, C-146/91, Zb., str. I-4199.).
60 One of the preconditions of the right to reparation is, as has been recalled in paragraph 49 above, that there must be a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals. 
60 Jedan od preduvjeta za pravo na naknadu štete je, kako je navedeno u točki 49. ove presude, da mora postojati dovoljno ozbiljna povreda pravnog pravila kojim se pojedincu dodjeljuju prava.
Thus, with regard to the non-contractual liability of the Community, it is necessary to assess the conduct causing the damage in order to establish the liability of a Community institution or body. 
Stoga, u području izvanugovorne odgovornosti Zajednice, kako bi se utvrdila odgovornost institucije ili tijela Zajednice, valja ocijeniti postupanje koje je prouzročilo štetu.
61 In fact, if a Community court were unable to assess the legality of the conduct of a Community institution or body, the procedure provided for in Article 235 EC would be rendered ineffective. 
61 U stvari, ako sud Zajednice ne bi mogao ocijeniti zakonitost postupanja institucije ili tijela Zajednice, postupak predviđen u članku 235. UEZ-a bio bi lišen svojeg korisnog učinka.
62 Consequently, in the context of an action founded on the non-contractual liability of the Community and seeking reparation for loss allegedly caused by the manner in which the Ombudsman dealt with a complaint, it is appropriate to assess the lawfulness of the Ombudsman's conduct in the performance of his duties. 
62 Prema tome, u sklopu tužbe koja se temelji na izvanugovornoj odgovornosti Zajednice i kojom se traži naknada štete za štetu navodno uzrokovanu načinom na koji je ombudsman postupao u rješavanju pritužbe, valja ocijeniti zakonitost postupanja ombudsmana u obavljanju dužnosti.
63 The Court of First Instance was therefore entitled, in paragraphs 64 to 85 of the judgment appealed against, to seek to determine whether the Ombudsman had committed the sufficiently serious breach of Community law alleged against him by Mr Lamberts and to review the manner in which the Ombudsman had dealt with the latter's complaint, in order to determine whether it should uphold the action brought before it. 
63 Prvostupanjski sud je, dakle, imao pravo kada je u točkama 64. do 85. pobijane presude želio utvrditi je li ombudsman počinio dovoljno ozbiljnu povredu prava Zajednice za koje ga tereti F. Lamberts i ispitati način na koji je ombudsman postupio s pritužbom potonjeg kako bi utvrdio treba li prihvatiti tužbu koja mu je podnesena.
64 In conclusion the Court of First Instance did not err in law as to the scope of the action for damages by declaring admissible the action brought by Mr Lamberts. 
64 Zaključno, Prvostupanjski sud nije počinio pogrešku koja se tiče prava u pogledu područja primjene tužbe za naknadu štete proglasivši tužbu koju je podnio F. Lamberts dopuštenom.
65 Accordingly, the second limb of the plea is unfounded. 
65 U skladu s tim, drugi dio žalbenog razloga je neosnovan.
Third limb of the plea 
Treći dio žalbenog razloga
66 In the third limb of his plea the Ombudsman, supported by the Parliament, is essentially alleging that the Court of First Instance infringed Community law by declaring admissible the action for damages brought against him by Mr Lamberts, although that action sought reparation of damage caused by the conduct of the Commission. 
66 U trećem dijelu žalbenog razloga ombudsman, kojeg podupire Parlament, u biti navodi da je Prvostupanjski sud povrijedio pravo Zajednice proglasivši dopuštenom tužbu za naknadu štete koju je protiv njega podnio F. Lamberts, iako se u toj tužbi traži naknada štete koja je uzrokovana postupanjem Komisije.
In reality Mr Lamberts, who had not brought within the requisite time-limit an action for annulment against the decisions of the Commission concerning him, was seeking, in the guise of an action for damages against the Ombudsman, to circumvent the mandatory time-limits governing the action for annulment in order to challenge before the Community courts the legality of those Commission decisions. 
U stvari, F. Lamberts, koji nije u traženom roku podnio tužbu za poništenje odluka Komisije koje se odnose na njega, htio je, pod krinkom tužbe za naknadu štete protiv ombudsmana, izbjeći obvezne rokove koji uređuju postupak za poništenje kako bi pred sudom Zajednice osporio zakonitost tih odluka Komisije.
67 The Ombudsman cannot in any event be held liable for the conduct of the Commission. 
67 Ombudsman ni u kojem slučaju ne može biti odgovoran za postupanje Komisije.
An action seeking reparation for damage caused by the conduct of a Community institution or body must be directed against that institution or body. 
Tužba za naknadu štete uzrokovane postupanjem institucije ili tijela Zajednice mora biti usmjerena protiv te institucije ili tijela.
68 In support of the action brought at first instance Mr Lamberts argued that he had suffered damage caused by the misconduct and negligence of the Ombudsman in the examination of his complaint. 
68 U prilog tužbi koja je podnesena Prvostupanjskom sudu, F. Lamberts tvrdi da je pretrpio štetu uzrokovanu propustom u radu i nemarom ombudsmana u ispitivanju njegove pritužbe.
His action does not therefore seek reparation of damage caused by conduct of the Commission occasioning damage. 
Njegovom se tužbom stoga ne traži naknada štete koja je uzrokovana postupanjem Komisije zbog kojeg je šteta nastala.
69 Accordingly, the Court of First Instance was right to hold, in paragraph 51 of the judgment appealed against, that, by means of the action brought before it, Mr Lamberts was seeking to obtain compensation for damage allegedly sustained as a result of negligence on the part of the Ombudsman in the performance of the duties assigned to him by the EC Treaty. 
69 U skladu s tim, Prvostupanjski sud je imao pravo smatrati u točki 51. pobijane presude da je pomoću tužbe podnesene Prvostupanjskom sudu F. Lamberts htio ostvariti naknadu pretrpljene štete navodno nastale zbog nemara ombudsmana u obavljanju dužnosti koje su mu dodijeljene Ugovorom o EZ-u.
70 Consequently, the third limb of the plea relied on by the Ombudsman is unfounded. 
70 Slijedom toga, treći dio žalbenog razloga ombudsmana je neosnovan.
71 In those circumstances the main appeal must be dismissed. 
71 U tim okolnostima, glavnu žalbu treba odbiti.
The cross-appeal 
Protužalba
72 In support of his cross-appeal Mr Lamberts relies on two pleas. 
72 U prilog svojoj protužalbi, F. Lamberts se poziva na dva protužalbena razloga.
73 The Ombudsman and the Parliament maintain that the cross-appeal should be rejected as inadmissible. 
73 Ombudsman i Parlament tvrde da je protužalbu potrebno odbaciti kao nedopuštenu.
First plea 
Prvi protužalbeni razlog
74 In his first plea Mr Lamberts criticises the Court of First Instance for infringing Decision 94/262 by not upholding any allegation of misconduct on the part of the Ombudsman. 
74 U svojem prvom protužalbenom razlogu F. Lamberts prigovara Prvostupanjskom sudu da je time što nije podržao tvrdnju o propustu u radu ombudsmana povrijedio Odluku 94/262.
The Court of First Instance thus infringed Article 2(5) of that decision by not sanctioning the Ombudsman for failing to advise Mr Lamberts in due time to bring an action before the Community courts and Article 3(5) thereof by not sanctioning him for failing to seek to obtain a friendly solution satisfactory to the complainant; by failing to do these things the Ombudsman had not fulfilled the task for which he was established by the Parliament. 
Prvostupanjski sud prekršio je članak 2. stavak 5. te odluke time što nije sankcionirao ombudsmana za to što nije pravovremeno savjetovao F. Lambertsu da podnese tužbu pred sudovima Zajednice kao i njezin članak 3. stavak 5. jer ga nije sankcionirao za to što nije pokušao postići sporazumno rješenje koje bi bilo prihvatljivo podnositelju pritužbe, a ombudsman, propustivši učiniti navedeno, nije ispunio zadaću radi koje ga je Parlament ustanovio.
Admissibility of the plea 
Dopuštenost protužalbenog razloga
75 It must be borne in mind that, where an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. 
75 Mora se imati na umu da, ako žalitelj osporava tumačenje ili primjenu prava Zajednice od strane Prvostupanjskog suda, o točkama zakona ispitanim u prvom stupnju može se ponovno raspravljati u tijeku žalbenog postupka.
Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see order in Case C-488/01 P Martinez v Parliament [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 39 and case-law cited). 
Naime, ako žalitelj ne bi mogao temeljiti svoju žalbu na razlozima i argumentima već korištenima pred Prvostupanjskim sudom, žalbeni bi postupak djelomično izgubio svoj smisao (vidjeti rješenje od 11. studenoga 2003., Martinez/Parlament, C-488/01 P, Zb., str. I-13355., t. 39. i navedenu sudsku praksu).
76 However, it follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1), first subparagraph, (c) of its Rules of Procedure that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see order in Martinez v Parliament, paragraph 40 and case-law cited). 
76 Međutim, iz članka 225. UEZ-a, članka 58. stavka 1. Statuta Suda i članka 112. stavka 1. prvog podstavka točke (c) Poslovnika Suda proizlazi da u žalbi treba precizno naznačiti sporne dijelove presude čije se ukidanje traži, kao i pravne argumente koji posebno podupiru žalbeni zahtjev (vidjeti gore navedeno rješenje Martinez/Parlament, t. 40. i navedenu sudsku praksu).
77 Where an appeal merely reproduces the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal, it fails to satisfy that requirement. 
77 Žalba u kojoj se samo ponavljaju žalbeni razlozi i argumenti već podneseni Prvostupanjskom sudu, bez uključivanja argumenta kojim bi se mogla utvrditi pogreška koja se tiče prava počinjena u pobijanoj presudi, ne zadovoljava taj uvjet.
In reality, such an appeal amounts to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the Court of First Instance, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 35). 
Naime, takva žalba u stvarnosti predstavlja zahtjev za preispitivanje tužbe podnesene Općem sudu, što nije u nadležnosti Suda (presuda od 4. srpnja 2000., Bergaderm i Goupil/Komisija, C-352/98 P, Zb., str. I-5291., t. 35.).
78 However, in the present case, in his first plea, Mr Lamberts specifically identified the error of law alleged against the Court of First Instance and in fact criticised the interpretation of Community law on which it relied. 
78 Međutim, u ovom slučaju, u svojem prvom protužalbenom razlogu F. Lamberts je posebno identificirao pogrešku koja se tiče prava koju navodi protiv Prvostupanjskog suda i u stvari kritizirao tumačenje prava Zajednice na koje se Prvostupanjski sud oslanja.
In fact, that plea seeks to call in question the position adopted by the Court of First Instance on a point of law submitted to it at first instance, namely the interpretation of provisions of Community law under which the Ombudsman may advise the complainant to apply to another authority and must as far as possible seek a friendly solution. 
Ustvari, tim se protužalbenim razlogom nastoji dovesti u pitanje stajalište Prvostupanjskog suda o pravnom pitanju koje mu je podneseno u prvom stupnju, a to je tumačenje odredaba prava Zajednice prema kojima ombudsman može savjetovati podnositelja pritužbe da se obrati drugom tijelu i mora tražiti, u mjeri u kojoj je to moguće, sporazumno rješenje.
79 The first plea is therefore admissible. 
79 Prvi protužalbeni razlog je stoga dopušten.
Substance of the plea 
Osnovanost protužalbenog razloga
80 It should be stated that the provisions governing the performance of the Ombudsman's duties, and more specifically Article 2(5) of Decision 94/262, do not impose on the Ombudsman any obligation to inform the complainant of the other legal remedies afforded to him and of the time-limits to be observed with regard to rights of action before the courts. 
80 Valja utvrditi da odredbe kojima se uređuje obnašanje dužnosti ombudsmana, a posebno članak 2. stavak 5. Odluke 94/262, ne nameću ombudsmanu obvezu obavješćivanja podnositelja pritužbe o ostalim pravnim sredstvima koja su mu na raspolaganju i rokovima koji se moraju poštovati u vezi s pravom na podnošenje tužbe pred sudovima.
Nor, a fortiori, is it incumbent on him to advise the complainant to pursue any particular legal remedy. 
Niti mu je, štoviše, dužnost savjetovati podnositelja pritužbe o uporabi bilo kojeg određenog pravnog sredstva.
81 Whilst it may be in the interests of the proper fulfilment of the tasks conferred on him by the Treaty for the Ombudsman, if appropriate, to inform the citizen concerned of the actions to be brought in order to serve his interests in the best way possible, Article 2(5) of Decision 94/262 cannot be interpreted as founding a right in favour of the complainant to be referred to the Court of First Instance in order to bring before it an action for annulment against the decision of the institution which is the subject of the complaint. 
81 Iako bi možda bilo u interesu pravilnog ispunjavanja svih zadaća koje su mu povjerene Ugovorom da ombudsman, prema potrebi, obavijesti predmetnog građanina o tome koje tužbe treba podnijeti kako bi na najbolji mogući način služio svojim interesima, članak 2. stavak 5. Odluke 94/262 ne može se tumačiti u smislu da utemeljuje pravo u korist podnositelja tužbe da ga se uputi na Prvostupanjski sud kako bi pred njim podnio tužbu za poništenje odluke institucije koja je predmet pritužbe.
82 As regards the search for a friendly solution to the dispute between the person who has referred a complaint to him and a Community institution, in accordance with Article 3(5) of Decision 94/262, the Ombudsman is solely required to cooperate with the institution concerned in order to seek a solution such as to eliminate the instance of maladministration and satisfy the complainant. 
82 Što se tiče traženja sporazumnog rješenja spora između osobe koja mu je uputila pritužbu i institucije Zajednice, u skladu s člankom 3. stavkom 5. Odluke 94/262, ombudsman je samo dužan surađivati s predmetnom institucijom u traženju rješenja kojim bi otklonio slučaj nepravilnosti u postupanju i zadovoljio podnositelja pritužbe.
In that regard he enjoys very wide discretion. 
U tom smislu on uživa vrlo široku diskrecijsku ovlast.
In particular, he must assess whether the search for a solution satisfying the complainant may be contemplated, since there are situations in which the search for such a solution is not possible, as is envisaged in Article 6(3) of the implementing provisions, in which case the Ombudsman is to close the case with a reasoned decision. 
Konkretno, on mora ocijeniti je li moguće tražiti rješenje koje bi zadovoljilo podnositelja pritužbe, jer postoje okolnosti u kojima traženje takvog rješenja nije moguće, kao što je predviđeno u članku 6. stavku 3. provedbenih odredbi, u kojem slučaju ombudsman zaključuje predmet uz obrazloženu odluku.
In any event, the Ombudsman cannot be criticised for not correctly performing the mission entrusted to him on the sole ground that he concluded that it was not possible to find a solution satisfactory to the complainant. 
U svakom slučaju, ombudsmanu se ne može prigovoriti da zadaću koja mu je povjerena nije pravilno obavio samo na temelju toga što je zaključio da nije bilo moguće pronaći rješenje koje bi zadovoljilo podnositelja pritužbe.
The Court of First Instance did not therefore err in law either in its interpretation of the Community provisions under which the Ombudsman is to seek, as far as possible, a friendly solution or when it held in paragraph 85 of its judgment that the Ombudsman is able, without being guilty of wrongful conduct, to conclude in the decision closing a specific inquiry that there is no prospect of a friendly solution acceptable to the complainant. 
Prvostupanjski sud dakle nije počinio pogrešku koja se tiče prava ni u svojem tumačenju odredbi Zajednice prema kojima ombudsman treba, u mjeri u kojoj je to moguće, tražiti sporazumno rješenje, ni kada je u točki 85. svoje presude smatrao da ombudsman može, a da time ne postupi nepravilno, u odluci o zaključenju određene istrage zaključiti da ne postoji mogućnost sporazumnog rješenja prihvatljivog za podnositelja pritužbe.
83 The first plea raised by Mr Lamberts must therefore be rejected as unfounded. 
83 Stoga prvi protužalbeni razlog treba odbiti kao neosnovan.
Second plea 
Drugi protužalbeni razlog
84 In his second plea Mr Lamberts alleges that the Court of First Instance erred in its appraisal in two significant respects. 
84 U drugom protužalbenom razlogu F. Lamberts prigovara Prvostupanjskom sudu da je učinio dvije važne pogreške u ocjeni.
85 First, Mr Lamberts alleges an error in that regard in paragraph 82 of the judgment appealed against inasmuch as it is therein stated that `it is clear both from the Commission's opinion on the applicant's complaint and from the letter of 15 December 1999 from the Commissioner responsible for personnel matters that the Commission refused to allow the applicant to retake the oral test or to seek an alternative settlement', even though Mr Lamberts had never requested to retake the oral test. 
85 Prvo, F. Lamberts navodi pogrešku u tom pogledu u točki 82. pobijane presude utoliko što se u njoj navodi da „i iz mišljenja Komisije o pritužbi podnositelja zahtjeva i iz dopisa povjerenika za pitanje osoblja od 15. prosinca 1999. proizlazi da je Komisija odbila podnositelju zahtjeva dopustiti ponovno polaganje usmenog ispita ili traženje alternativnog rješenja" iako F. Lamberts nikad nije tražio ponavljanje usmenog ispita.
86 In that regard, it should be pointed out, on the one hand, that the Court of First Instance recalled in paragraph 81 of the judgment appealed against that there are some situations in which the search by the Ombudsman for a friendly solution is not possible and considered, in paragraph 82, that that was indeed the case in this instance since the Commission refused to allow Mr Lamberts to retake the oral test or to seek an alternative settlement. 
86 U tom smislu treba istaknuti, s jedne strane, da je Prvostupanjski sud podsjetio u točki 81. pobijane presude da postoje neke okolnosti u kojima ombudsman ne može tražiti sporazumno rješenje i da smatra, u točki 82., da je to doista bio slučaj u ovom predmetu, jer je Komisija odbila dopustiti F. Lambertsu ponovno polaganje usmenog ispita ili traženje alternativnog rješenja.
87 The critique by Mr Lamberts of paragraph 82 of the judgment appealed against does not, on the other hand, seek to demonstrate in what regard the Court of First Instance erred in law in verifying whether in the present case a friendly solution was possible. 
87 S druge strane, argument F. Lambertsa u vezi s točkom 82. pobijane presude ne dokazuje da je Prvostupanjski sud počinio pogrešku koja se tiče prava time što je ispitao je li u ovom slučaju sporazumno rješenje bilo moguće.
88 The argument principally put forward by Mr Lamberts must therefore be rejected as inadmissible for the reasons stated in paragraph 76 above. 
88 Argument koji je iznio F. Lamberts stoga treba odbaciti kao nedopušten iz gore navedenih razloga u točki 76. ove presude.