natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
32 It is to be noted in that regard that Articles 274 EC and 279 EC, and also the provisions of the Financial Regulation, determine, inter alia, the powers of the institutions to establish and implement the budget. 
32 U tom pogledu valja utvrditi da članci 274. UEZ-a i 279. UEZ-a i odredbe Financijske uredbe određuju osobito ovlast institucija za utvrđivanje i izvršenje proračuna.
By contrast, Article 282 EC confers legal capacity on the Community and governs the way it is represented, inter alia, before the courts of the Member States. 
Suprotno tome, članak 282. UEZ-a povjerava Zajednici pravnu sposobnost i uređuje način zastupanja Zajednice osobito pred sudovima država članica.
The question of Community representation before those courts is distinct from the question concerning measures for budgetary implementation adopted by a Community institution. 
Pitanje zastupanja Zajednice pred tim sudovima nije isto što i pitanje o mjerama koje za izvršenje proračuna donosi institucija Zajednice.
For that reason, the principle lex specialis generalibus derogat is of no relevance here. 
Zbog toga načelo „lex specialis generalibus derogat" u ovom predmetu nije relevantno.
33 With regard, in particular, to Articles 103 and 104 of the Financial Regulation, to which the referring court alludes when formulating its first question, it must be stated that those provisions contain rules relating to the award and enforcement of public contracts and not to the representation of the EU before the courts of the Member States. 
33 U pogledu osobito članaka 103. i 104. Financijske uredbe na koje se sud koji je uputio zahtjev poziva kada navodi svoje prvo pitanje, valja utvrditi da te odredbe sadržavaju pravila o sklapanju i izvršavanju ugovora o javnoj nabavi, a ne o zastupanju Unije pred sudovima država članica.
34 It follows that the Commission had authority, under Article 282 EC, to represent the Community before the referring court. 
34 Iz toga proizlazi da je na temelju članka 282. UEZ-a Komisija bila ovlaštena zastupati Zajednicu pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev.
35 So far as Article 335 TFEU is concerned, it is to be noted that the FEU Treaty contains no transitional provisions concerning the representation of the EU in proceedings which were brought before the courts of the Member States prior to that Treaty's entry into force but which were still pending thereafter. 
35 Što se tiče članka 335. UFEU-a, valja utvrditi da Ugovor o funkcioniranju Europske unije ne sadržava prijelaznu odredbu u pogledu zastupanja Unije u postupcima koji su pred sudovima država članica pokrenuti prije stupanja toga Ugovora na snagu, nego koji su nakon što je Ugovor stupio na snagu još uvijek u tijeku.
In those circumstances, the relevant provision governing that representation is Article 282 EC, since the main proceedings were commenced before the entry into force of the FEU Treaty. 
U tim uvjetima relevantna odredba kojom se uređuje to zastupanje je članak 282. UEZ-a, budući da je spor u glavnom postupku započet prije stupanja na snagu Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije.
36 In view of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that EU law must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the Commission is not precluded from representing the EU before a national court hearing a civil action for damages in respect of loss caused to the EU by an agreement or practice prohibited by Articles 81 EC and 101 TFEU which may have affected certain public contracts awarded by various institutions and bodies of the EU, there being no need for the Commission to have authorisation for that purpose from those institutions and bodies. 
36 S obzirom na prethodna razmatranja, na prvo pitanje valja odgovoriti da pravo Unije treba tumačiti na način da mu u okolnostima kao što su one u glavnom postupku nije protivno da Komisija zastupa Uniju pred nacionalnim sudom u parničnom postupku za naknadu štete koja je Uniji prouzročena sporazumom ili praksom koji su zabranjeni člancima 81. UEZ-a i 101. UFEU-a, a mogli su utjecati na određene ugovore o javnoj nabavi koje su sklopile razne institucije i razna tijela Unije, a da pri tome Komisija ne mora imati njihovo ovlaštenje u tom smislu.
Second question 
Drugo pitanje
37 By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 47 of the Charter precludes the Commission from bringing an action, on behalf of the EU, before a national court for damages in respect of loss sustained by the EU as a result of an agreement or practice which has been found by a decision of the Commission to infringe Article 81 EC. 
37 Svojim drugim pitanjem sud koji je uputio zahtjev u biti pita je li članku 47. Povelje protivno da Komisija u ime Unije pred nacionalnim sudom podnese tužbu za naknadu štete nanesene Uniji zbog sporazuma za koji ili prakse za koju je odlukom te institucije utvrđeno da su protivni članku 81. UEZ-a.
38 In particular, the referring court entertains doubts, in the first place, as to whether, in such an action, the right to a fair hearing, laid down in Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 of the ECHR, is infringed on account of the fact that, under Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003, a Commission decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC is binding on that court. The referring court states that a decision adopted by one of the parties to the dispute requires it to accept the finding of an infringement of Article 81 EC, which thus prevents the national court from considering in its absolute discretion one of the elements conferring entitlement to compensation, namely the occurrence of an event giving rise to damage (a `harmful event'). 
38 Konkretno, Sud koji je uputio zahtjev pita se, kao prvo, je li u takvoj tužbi pravo na pošteno suđenje, utvrđeno u članku 47. Povelje i članku 6. EKLJP-a, povrijeđeno zbog toga što je na temelju članka 16. stavka 1. Uredbe br. 1/2003 odluka Komisije o postupku primjene članka 81. UEZ-a obvezujuća za taj sud. Ustvari, nametnuto mu je utvrđenje povrede članka 81. UEZ-a, i to odlukom jedne od stranaka u sporu, čime je nacionalni sud spriječen da suvereno ispita jedan od elemenata na temelju kojih nastaje pravo na naknadu štete, tj. nastanak štetnog događaja.
39 The referring court also wishes to ascertain whether, in the context of such an action, the Commission is not both judge and party in its own cause in breach of the nemo judex in sua causa principle. 
39 Osim toga, sud koji je uputio zahtjev želi znati nije li Komisija u okviru takve tužbe i sudac i stranka u vlastitoj stvari, čime se povređuje načelo da nitko ne može biti sudac u vlastitoj stvari (nemo judex in sua causa).
40 The Court has already had occasion to state that any person can rely on a breach of Article 81 EC before a national court and therefore rely on the invalidity of an agreement or practice prohibited under that article (see Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi and Others [2006] ECR I-6619 [HYPERLINK: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=62004C?0295&locale=EN], paragraph 59). 
40 Sud je već imao priliku naglasiti da svaka osoba ima pravo pozivati se pred sudom na povredu članka 81. UEZ-a i time isticati nevaljanost sporazuma ili prakse koje taj članak zabranjuje (presuda od 13. srpnja 2006., Manfredi i dr., od C-295/04 do C-298/04, Zb., str. I-6619., t. 59.).
41 As regards, in particular, the possibility of seeking compensation for loss caused by a contract or conduct liable to restrict or distort competition, it should be recalled that the full effectiveness of Article 81 EC and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC would be put at risk if it were not open to any person to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or conduct liable to restrict or distort competition (see Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297 [HYPERLINK: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61999C?0453&locale=EN], paragraph 26, and Manfredi and Others, paragraph 60). 
41 Osobito što se tiče mogućnosti da se zahtijeva naknada štete uzrokovane ugovorom ili ponašanjem koji bi mogli ograničiti ili narušiti tržišno natjecanje, valja podsjetiti da se puna djelotvornost članka 81. UEZ-a i, osobito, korisni učinak zabrane utvrđene u članku 81. stavku 1. UEZ-a dovode u pitanje ako nema svaka osoba mogućnost tražiti naknadu štete uzrokovane ugovorom ili ponašanjem koji bi mogli ograničiti ili narušiti tržišno natjecanje (presude od 20. rujna 2001., Courage i Crehan, C-453/99, Zb., str. I-6297., t. 26. i prethodno navedena, Manfredi i dr., t. 60.).
42 Such a right in fact strengthens the working of the EU competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. 
42 To pravo zapravo jača funkcioniranje pravila Unije o tržišnom natjecanju i destimulira često prikrivene sporazume ili praksu koji bi mogli ograničiti ili narušiti tržišno natjecanje.
From that point of view, actions for damages before national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the EU (Courage and Crehan, paragraph 27). 
S tog stajališta tužbe za naknadu štete pred nacionalnim sudovima mogu značajno doprinijeti održavanju učinkovitog tržišnog natjecanja u Uniji. (presuda Courage i Crehan, prethodno navedena, t. 27.).
43 It follows that any person can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 81(1) EC (see Manfredi and Others, paragraph 61). 
43 Iz toga proizlazi da svaka osoba ima pravo tražiti naknadu za pretrpljenu štetu u slučaju kada između te štete i sporazuma ili prakse koji su zabranjeni na temelju članka 81. stavka 1. UEZ-a postoji uzročna veza (presuda Manfredi i dr., prethodno navedena, t. 61.).
44 The EU, therefore, also enjoys that right. 
44 Stoga to pravo pripada i Uniji.
45 When that right is exercised, however, the fundamental rights of the defendants, as safeguarded, inter alia, by the Charter, must be observed. 
45 Međutim, to se pravo ostvaruje uz poštovanje temeljnih prava tuženika kako su zajamčena, između ostalog, Poveljom.
The provisions of the Charter are addressed, pursuant to Article 51(1) thereof, both to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU and to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. 
Na temelju članka 51. stavka 1. Povelje, odredbe te Povelje odnose se na institucije, tijela, urede i agencije Unije, te na države članice kada provode pravo Unije.
46 It must be borne in mind in that regard that the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EU law, to which expression is now given by Article 47 of the Charter (see Case C-279/09 DEB [2010] ECR I-13849, paragraphs 30 and 31; order in Case C-457/09 Chartry [2011] ECR I-819, paragraph 25; and Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf [2011] ECR I-7151, paragraph 49). 
46 U tom pogledu valja podsjetiti da je načelo djelotvorne sudske zaštite opće načelo prava Unije, koje je danas izraženo u članku 47. Povelje (vidjeti presudu od 2. prosinca 2010., DEB, C-279/09, Zb., str. I-13849. t. 30. i 31.; rješenje od 1. ožujka 2011., Chartry, C-457/09, Zb., str. I-819. t. 25., kao i presudu od 28. srpnja 2011., Samba Diouf, C-69/10, Zb., str. I-7151., t. 49.).
47 Article 47 of the Charter secures in EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR. It is necessary, therefore, to refer only to Article 47 (Case C-386/10 P Chalkor v Commission [2011] ECR I-13085, paragraph 51). 
47 Spomenuti članak 47. Povelje u pravu Unije osigurava zaštitu dodijeljenu člankom 6. stavkom 1. EKLJP-a. Stoga se valja pozivati isključivo na tu prvu odredbu (presuda od 8. prosinca 2011., Chalkor/Komisija, C-386/10 P, Zb., str. I-13085., t. 51.).
48 The principle of effective judicial protection laid down in Article 47 of the Charter comprises various elements; in particular, the rights of the defence, the principle of equality of arms, the right of access to a tribunal and the right to be advised, defended and represented. 
48 Načelo djelotvorne sudske zaštite utvrđeno u članku 47. Povelje obuhvaća različite elemente, a posebno pravo na obranu, načelo jednakosti oružja, pravo pristupa pravosuđu i pravo da bude savjetovan, branjen i zastupan.
49 With regard, in particular, to the right of access to a tribunal, it must be made clear that, for a `tribunal' to be able to determine a dispute concerning rights and obligations arising under EU law in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, it must have power to consider all the questions of fact and law that are relevant to the case before it. 
49 Osobito što se tiče pristupa pravosuđu, valja pojasniti da „sud", kako bi mogao odlučiti o sporu u pogledu prava i obveza koji proizlaze iz prava Unije u skladu s člankom 47. Povelje, treba imati nadležnost ispitati sve činjenične i pravne elemente relevantne za predmet koji se vodi pred njim.
50 It is true in that respect that, according to the Court's case-law (Case C-344/98 Masterfoods and HB [2000] ECR I-11369 [HYPERLINK: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61998C?0344&locale=EN], paragraph 52), which is now given legislative expression in Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003, when national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under, inter alia, Article 101 TFEU which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission. 
50 Točno je u tom pogledu da u skladu sa sudskom praksom Suda (presuda od 14. rujna 2000., Masterfoods i HB, C-344/98, Zb., str. I-11369., t. 52.), koju danas nalazimo kodificiranu u članku 16. Uredbe br. 1/2003, kada nacionalni sudovi odlučuju o sporazumima, odlukama ili praksi, koji su obuhvaćeni osobito člankom 101. UFEU-a i koji već jesu predmet odluke Komisije, ti sudovi ne mogu donositi odluke suprotne odluci koju je donijela Komisija.
51 That rule also applies when national courts are hearing an action for damages for loss sustained as a result of an agreement or practice which has been found by a decision of the Commission to infringe Article 101 TFEU. 
51 To načelo primjenjuje se i ako je pred nacionalnim sudovima pokrenuta tužba za naknadu štete zbog sporazuma za koji ili prakse za koju je odlukom Komisije utvrđeno da su protivni članku 101. UFEU-a.
52 An application of the EU competition rules is thus based on an obligation of sincere cooperation between the national courts, on the one hand, and the Commission and the EU Courts, on the other, in the context of which each acts on the basis of the role assigned to it by the Treaty (Masterfoods and HB, paragraph 56). 
52 Primjena pravila Unije o tržišnoj utakmici, dakle, počiva na obvezi lojalne suradnje, s jedne strane, nacionalnih sudova i, s druge, Komisije odnosno sudova Unije, u okviru koje svatko djeluje na temelju uloge koja mu je dodijeljena Ugovorom (presuda Masterfoods i HB, prethodno navedena, t. 56.).
53 It must be borne in mind in that regard that it is the EU Courts - not the courts of the Member States - which have exclusive jurisdiction to review the legality of the acts of the EU institutions. 
53 Važno je podsjetiti u tom pogledu da isključiva nadležnost da nadziru zakonitost akata institucija Unije pripada sudovima Unije, a ne nacionalnim sudovima.
National courts do not have power to declare such acts invalid (see, to that effect, Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199 [HYPERLINK: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/query.html?DN=61985??0314&locale=EN], paragraphs 12 to 20). 
Potonji nemaju ovlasti da takve akte proglase nevaljanima (vidjeti u tom smislu osobito presudu od 22. listopada 1987., Foto-Frost, predmet 314/85, Zb., str. 4199., t. od 12. do 20.).
54 The rule that national courts may not take decisions running counter to a Commission decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU is thus a specific expression of the division of powers, within the EU, between, on the one hand, national courts and, on the other, the Commission and the EU Courts. 
54 Pravilo prema kojem nacionalni sudovi ne mogu donositi odluke suprotne odluci Komisije je dakle poseban izraz podjele ovlasti unutar Unije između, s jedne strane, nacionalnih sudova i, s druge, Komisije i sudova Unije.
55 That rule does not mean, however, that the defendants in the main proceedings are denied their right of access to a tribunal, as referred to in Article 47 of the Charter. 
55 Međutim, to pravilo ne podrazumijeva da se tužiteljima u glavnom postupku uskraćuje pravo na pristup pravosuđu u smislu članka 47. Povelje.
56 Indeed, EU law provides for a system of judicial review of Commission decisions relating to proceedings under Article 101 TFEU which affords all the safeguards required by Article 47 of the Charter. 
56 Doista, pravo Unije predviđa sustav sudskog nadzora odluka Komisije o postupcima primjene članka 101. UFEU-a, koji pruža sva jamstva iz članka 47. Povelje.
57 In this connection, it must be stated that the legality of a Commission decision may be reviewed by the EU Courts under Article 263 TFEU. 
57 U vezi s tim važno je utvrditi da odluka Komisije može podlijegati nadzoru zakonitosti koji obavljaju sudovi Unije na temelju članka 263. UFEU-a.
In this case, the defendants in the main proceedings, to whom the decision had been addressed, did in fact bring actions for the annulment of that decision, as has been recalled in paragraphs 20 to 22 of this judgment. 
U ovom predmetu tužitelji u glavnom postupku, kojima je odluka upućena, ustvari su podnijeli tužbe za poništenje te odluke, kao što je to navedeno u točkama od 20. do 22. ove presude.
58 Those defendants maintain, however, that the review of legality carried out by the EU Courts under Article 263 TFEU in the sphere of competition law is insufficient because of, inter alia, the margin of discretion which those Courts allow the Commission in economic matters. 
58 Međutim, spomenuti tužitelji ističu da nadzor zakonitosti koji obavljaju sudovi Unije na temelju članka 263. UFEU-a u području prava tržišnog natjecanja nije potpun zbog, između ostalog, margine prosudbe koju ti sudovi dozvoljavaju Komisiji u gospodarskom dijelu.
59 The Court of Justice has stated in this connection that, whilst, in areas giving rise to complex economic assessments, the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the EU Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission's interpretation of information of an economic nature. 
59 Sud je u vezi s tim izjavio da iako u područjima u kojima je nužno provoditi složene gospodarske ocjene Komisija uživa diskrecijski prostor u gospodarskom dijelu, to ne znači da se sudac Unije dužan uzdržati od nadzora nad tumačenjem ekonomskih podataka od strane Komisije.
Those Courts must, among other things, not only establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also ascertain whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it (see Chalkor v Commission, paragraph 54 and case-law cited). 
Naime, sudac Unije ne samo da mora provjeriti materijalnu točnost navedenih dokaznih elemenata, kao i njihovu pouzdanost i dosljednost, već i to predstavljaju li navedeni elementi skup relevantnih podataka koje treba uzeti u obzir prilikom ocjene složene situacije te jesu li oni takve naravi da podupiru zaključke koji su iz njih izvedeni (prethodno navedena presuda Chalkor/Komisija, t. 54. i navedena sudska praksa).
60 The EU Courts must also establish of their own motion that the Commission has stated reasons for its decision and, among other things, that it has explained the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account (see, to that effect, Chalkor v Commission, paragraph 61). 
60 Sud Unije također je dužan po službenoj dužnosti provjeriti je li Komisija obrazložila svoju odluku i, između ostalog, objasnila kako je odvagnula i procijenila elemente uzete u obzir (vidjeti u tom smislu prethodno navedenu presudu Chalkor/Komisija, t. 61.).
61 The EU Courts must also carry out the review of legality incumbent upon them on the basis of the evidence adduced by the applicant in support of the pleas in law put forward. 
61 Na sudovima Unije je, između ostalog, da nadzor zakonitosti izvršavaju na temelju dokaza koje tužitelj iznese u prilog istaknutim tužbenim razlozima.
In carrying out such a review, the Courts cannot use the Commission's margin of discretion - either as regards the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the criteria mentioned in the Commission notice entitled `Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003' (OJ 2006 C 210, p. 2) or as regards the assessment of those factors - as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts (Chalkor v Commission, paragraph 62). 
Tijekom tog nadzora sudovi se, kako bi odustali od provođenja dubinskog pravnog i činjeničnog nadzora (presuda Chalkor/Komisija, gore navedena, točka 62.), ne mogu pozvati na diskrecijsku ovlast Komisije, ni u odnosu na izbor dokaza uzetih u obzir prilikom primjene kriterija navedenih u komunikaciji Komisije pod naslovom „Smjernice o metodi za utvrđivanje kazni koje se propisuju u skladu s člankom 23. stavkom 2. točkom (a) Uredbe br. 1/2003 (SL 2006, C 210, str. 2.) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 8., svezak 4., str. 58.) ni u odnosu na ocjenu tih dokaza.
62 Finally, the review of legality is supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction which the EU Courts were afforded by Article 17 of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles [81] and [82] of the Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition 1959 to 1962, p. 87) and which is now recognised by Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, in accordance with Article 261 TFEU. That jurisdiction empowers the Courts, in addition to carrying out a mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute their own appraisal for the Commission's and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed (Chalkor v Commission, paragraph 63 and case-law cited). 
62 Na kraju, nadzor zakonitosti dopunjen je neograničenom nadležnošću koja je sudu Unije priznata člankom 17. Uredbe Vijeća br. 17 od 6. veljače 1962., koja je prva uredba o primjeni članaka 81. i 82. Ugovora (SL 1962., 13., str. 204.) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 8., svezak 3., str. 3.), a danas je priznata člankom 31. Uredbe br. 1/2003 u skladu s člankom 261. UFEU-a. Ta nadležnost daje sudu ovlasti da provodi ne samo puki nadzor zakonitosti novčane kazne nego i da ocjenu Komisije zamjeni svojom ocjenom i da, posljedično, ukine, umanji ili uveća izrečenu novčanu kaznu ili periodični penal (gore navedena presuda Chalkor/Komisija, t. 63.).
63 The review provided for by the Treaties thus involves review by the EU Courts of both the law and the facts, and means that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested decision and to alter the amount of a fine. 
63 Nadzor predviđen Ugovorima podrazumijeva da sudovi Unije provode pravni i činjenični nadzor i da su ovlašteni ocjenjivati dokaze, poništiti pobijanu odluku i izmijeniti iznose novčanih kazni.
The review of legality provided for in Article 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the amount of the fine, provided for in Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, therefore meets the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, Chalkor v Commission, paragraph 67). 
Nadzor zakonitosti predviđen člankom 263. UFEU-a, dopunjen neograničenom nadležnošću u pogledu iznosa novčane kazne iz članka 31. Uredbe br. 1/2003, stoga ispunjava zahtjeve načela učinkovite sudske zaštite iz članka 47. Povelje (vidjeti u tom smislu gore navedenu presudu Chalkor/Komisija, t. 67.).