natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
64 In this regard, it is to be stressed, as the Advocate General did in point 103 of her Opinion, that the element of protection afforded by the requirement of notification of incriminating evidence and the right to make representations before the adoption of a measure, such as the contested decision, that sets in motion the application of restrictive measures is fundamental and essential to the rights of defence. 
64 U tom pogledu valja naglasiti, kao što je to učinila nezavisna odvjetnica u točki 103. mišljenja, da je zaštita koju pružaju obveza obavješćivanja o dokazima i pravo na ulaganje prigovora prije donošenja mjere, kao što je sporna odluka, kojom se pokreće primjena mjera ograničavanja temeljna i ključna za pravo na obranu.
This is all the more the case because such measures have a considerable effect on the rights and freedoms of the persons and groups concerned. 
To je tim važnije što te mjere znatno utječu na prava i slobode osoba i skupina na koje se odnose.
65 The purpose of the rule that the addressee of a decision affecting him adversely must be placed in a position to submit his observations before that decision is adopted is to enable the authority concerned effectively to take into account all relevant information. 
65 Svrha pravila na temelju kojega adresat neke odluke koja na njega negativno utječe mora imati priliku podnijeti svoje primjedbe prije nego ta odluka bude donesena jest da se zainteresiranom tijelu omogući da stvarno uzme u obzir sve relevantne informacije.
In order to ensure that the addressee is in fact protected, the object of that rule is, in particular, to enable him to correct an error or produce such information relating to his personal circumstances as will tell in favour of the decision's being adopted or not, or of its having this content or that (see, to this effect, Case C-349/07 Sopropé [2008] ECR I-10369, paragraph 49). 
Kako bi se osigurala stvarna zaštita navedenog adresata, svrha tog pravila posebno je omogućiti adresatu da ispravi grešku ili dostavi informacije koje se odnose na njegov osobni slučaj, koje će ići u prilog donošenju ili nedonošenju odluke ili u prilog ovakva ili onakva njezina sadržaja (vidjeti u tom smislu, presudu od 18. prosinca 2008., Sopropé, C-349/07, Zb., str. I-10369., točka 49.).
66 That right, fundamental to observance of the rights of defence during a procedure preceding the adoption of a restrictive measure such as the contested decision, is moreover expressly affirmed in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, recognised by Article 6(1) TEU as having the same legal value as the Treaties. 
66 To je temeljno pravo za poštovanje prava na obranu tijekom postupka koji prethodi donošenju neke mjere ograničavanja, kao što je sporna odluka, štoviše izričito zajamčeno člankom 41. stavkom 2. točkom (a) Povelje o temeljnim pravima Europske unije, kojoj se člankom 6. stavkom 1. UEU-a priznaje pravna snaga jednaka onoj kakvu imaju Ugovori.
67 If, as has been noted at paragraph 61 above, an exception to that fundamental right has been allowed with regard to initial decisions to freeze funds, that is justified by the need to ensure that the freezing measures are effective and, in short, by overriding considerations to do with safety or the conduct of the international relations of the Union and of its Member States (see, to this effect, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, paragraph 342). 
67 Ako je, kao što se navodi u prethodno navedenoj točki 61., dopuštena iznimka od tog temeljnog prava u pogledu prvotnih odluka o zamrzavanju sredstava, ona se opravdava potrebom da se osigura učinkovitost mjera zamrzavanja i, ukratko, važnim razlozima povezanim sa sigurnošću ili vođenjem međunarodnih odnosa Unije i njezinih država članica (vidjeti u tom smislu gore navedenu presudu Kadi i Al Barakaat International Foundation/Vijeće i Komisija, točka 342.).
68 In paragraphs 39 to 44 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court nevertheless considered the Council's argument that that institution was justified in communicating the new incriminating evidence against the PMOI at the same time as the contested decision was adopted and not before, despite the fact that it was not an initial decision to freeze funds, because of the particular situation in which the Council found itself in that case, more specifically, the urgency with which the contested decision had to be adopted. 
68 U točkama od 39. do 44. pobijane presude Opći sud je ipak razmatrao argument Vijeća da je ta institucija imala pravo što je o novim dokazima protiv PMOI-ja tu organizaciju obavijestila u isto vrijeme kad je donesena sporna odluka, a ne prije, unatoč činjenici da to nije bila prvotna odluka o zamrzavanju sredstava, zato što se u tom predmetu Vijeće našlo u posebnoj situaciji ili, preciznije, zbog žurnosti kojom je spornu odluku trebalo donijeti.
69 That line of argument is in substance repeated by the French Republic in this appeal. 
69 Takvu argumentaciju Francuska Republika u bitnome ponavlja u ovoj žalbi.
70 The General Court held, first, that as of 7 May 2008, the date on which the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment, it became once and for all impossible for the Council to rely on the order of the Home Secretary of 28 March 2001 as a decision of a competent authority for the purpose of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 in order to maintain the inclusion of the PMOI in the list referred to in Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001. 
70 Opći sud presudio je, prvo, da je od 7. svibnja 2008., datuma kad je Court of Appeal donio presudu, za Vijeće zauvijek postalo nemoguće oslanjati se na rješenje koje je donio Home Secretary 28. ožujka 2001. kao na odluku nadležnog tijela u smislu članka 1. stavka 4. Zajedničkog stajališta 2001/931, radi zadržavanja PMOI-ja na popisu iz članka 2. stavka 3. Uredbe br. 2580/2001.
In addition, by order of 23 June 2008, which entered into force the following day, the Home Secretary acted on that judgment, striking the PMOI's name from the list of organisations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. 
Osim toga, rješenjem od 23. lipnja 2008. koje je stupilo na snagu sljedećeg dana, Home Secretary je postupio u skladu s tom presudom izbrisavši naziv PMOI-ja s popisa organizacija zabranjenih na temelju Zakona o terorizmu iz 2000. (Terrorism Act 2000).
71 Secondly, it is not disputed that on 9 June 2008 the Council received from the French Republic new information relating to legal proceedings brought in France against alleged members of the PMOI, which that Member State considered could warrant the continued inclusion of the organisation in the list referred to in Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001. 
71 Drugo, nesporno je da je Vijeće 9. lipnja 2008. od Francuske Republike primilo nove informacije o sudskom postupku koji je Francuska pokrenula protiv navodnih članova PMOI-ja, kojim bi se prema mišljenju te države članice moglo opravdati zadržavanje te organizacije na popisu iz članka 2. stavka 3. Uredbe br. 2580/2001.
72 It must be pointed out here that the Council had, therefore, within a very short period of time, to examine that new material in order to decide whether it could constitute the decision of a competent authority for the purpose of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 in order to justify the continued inclusion of the PMOI in that list or whether that group must be removed forthwith from the list. 
72 U tom pogledu valja naglasiti da je Vijeće stoga u vrlo kratkom roku trebalo ispitati navedeni novi materijal kako bi odlučilo može li on predstavljati odluku nadležnog tijela u smislu članka 1. stavka 4. Zajedničkog stajališta 2001/931 kako bi se opravdalo zadržavanje PMOI-ja na tom popisu ili trenutačno uklanjanje te skupine s popisa.
73 While it is indeed true, as the French Republic has maintained, that, at the very least as from 24 June 2008, the Council could not possibly allow a situation to continue in which Decision 2007/868 lacked any basis, but had as soon as possible to take appropriate action, the fact nevertheless remains, as indeed that Member State accepts and as the General Court rightly pointed out at paragraph 42 of the judgment under appeal, that neither the judgment of the Court of Appeal nor the Home Secretary's order of 23 June 2008 had an automatic, immediate effect on Decision 2007/868, then applicable. 
73 Iako je zaista točno, kako tvrdi Francuska Republika, da Vijeće barem od 24. lipnja 2008. nije moglo dopustiti nastavak stanja u kojemu nije bilo temelja za Odluku 2007/868, nego je u najkraćem roku moralo poduzeti odgovarajuće radnje, ipak ostaje činjenica, koju ta država članica prihvaća i koju je Opći sud ispravno istaknuo u točki 42. pobijane presude, da ni presuda koju je donio Court of Appeal niti rješenje od 23. lipnja 2008. koje je donio Home Secretary nisu imali automatski i neposredan učinak na Odluku 2007/868 koja se tad primjenjivala.
74 In fact, that latter decision remained in force by reason of the presumption that acts of the institutions of the European Union are lawful, which, according to the Court's settled case-law, means that those acts produce legal effects until such time as they are withdrawn, annulled in an action for annulment or declared invalid following a reference for a preliminary ruling or a plea of illegality (see, inter alia, Case C-199/06 CELF and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication [2008] ECR I-469, paragraph 60 and case-law cited). 
74 U stvari, ova potonja odluka ostala je na snazi zbog pretpostavke zakonitosti akata institucija Europske unije, što po ustaljenoj sudskoj praksi Suda znači da ti akti proizvode pravne učinke sve do njihova povlačenja, poništavanja u postupku tužbe za poništenje ili proglašenja nevažećim nakon zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku ili prigovora nezakonitosti (vidjeti, među ostalim, presudu od 12. veljače 2008., CELF i Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, C-199/06, Zb., str. I-469., točka 60. i navedena sudska praksa).
75 In consequence, having regard too to the fundamental importance that must attach, as indicated in paragraphs 64 and 65 above, to observance of the rights of the defence in the procedure preceding the adoption of a decision such as the contested decision, the General Court did not err in law in holding, at paragraphs 39 and 43 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had not established that the contested decision had so urgently to be adopted that it was impossible for that institution to notify the PMOI of the new evidence adduced against it and to allow the PMOI to be heard before the contested decision was adopted. 
75 Kao posljedica toga, uzevši u obzir i temeljnu važnost koja se mora pridavati, kako se navodi u točkama 64. i 65., poštovanju prava na obranu u postupku koji prethodi donošenju odluke kakva je sporna odluka, Opći sud nije počinio pogrešku koja se tiče prava kad je presudio, u točkama 39. i 43. pobijane presude, da Vijeće nije utvrdilo da je spornu odluku trebalo donijeti toliko žurno, da je za tu instituciju bilo nemoguće obavijestiti PMOI o novim dokazima protiv njega i omogućiti da se PMOI izjasni prije donošenja sporne odluke.
76 It follows from all those considerations that the first ground of appeal is unfounded. 
76 Iz svih ovih razmatranja proizlazi da je prvi žalbeni razlog neosnovan.
The second and third grounds of appeal 
Drugi i treći žalbeni razlog
77 The second and third grounds of appeal, claiming breach of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 and an error of law in the assessment of the principles relating to the right to effective judicial protection, respectively, are directed against the second part of the judgment under appeal in which the General Court examined, and held well founded, the second and third pleas in law put before it by the PMOI. 
77 Drugi i treći žalbeni razlog, u kojima se tvrdi da je prekršen članak 1. stavak 4. Zajedničkog stajališta 2001/931 i pogrešno primijenjeno pravo prilikom procjene načela koja se odnose na pravo na djelotvornu pravnu zaštitu, usmjereni su na drugi dio pobijane presude u kojem je Opći sud ispitao, i kao osnovane prosudio, drugi i treći tužbeni razlog koje je pred njega iznio PMOI.
78 In this regard, it is to be noted that the General Court, after finding at paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, that the contested decision must be annulled by reason of breach of the PMOI's rights of defence, considered at paragraph 48 that, although it was not necessary, in those circumstances, to consider the other pleas in law in the action, it would none the less examine the second and third pleas in law raised before it, having regard to their importance in relation to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection. 
78 S tim u vezi valja primijetiti da Opći sud, nakon što je u točki 47. pobijane presude ustvrdio da se sporna odluka mora poništiti zbog povrede prava PMOI-ja na obranu, u točki 48. smatra da će, iako u postojećim okolnostima nije bilo nužno razmatrati druge tužbene razloge, svejedno ispitati drugi i treći tužbeni razlog koji su pred njega izneseni, uzimajući u obzir njihovu važnost za temeljno pravo na djelotvornu pravnu zaštitu.
79 According to settled case-law, the Court of Justice will reject outright complaints directed against grounds of a judgment of the General Court included purely for the sake of completeness, since they cannot lead to the judgment's being set aside and are therefore ineffective (see, inter alia, Case C-399/08 P Commission v Deutsche Post [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 75, and Case C-96/09 P Anheuser-Busch v Budějovický Budvar [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 211 and case-law cited). 
79 Sud će u skladu s ustaljenom sudskom praksom bez razmatranja odbiti pritužbe protiv razloga u presudi Općeg suda koji su u nju uključeni isključivo radi upotpunjavanja, jer one ne mogu dovesti do ukidanja presude i stoga su bespredmetni (vidjeti, među ostalim, presude od 2. rujna 2010., Komisija/Deutsche Post, C-399/08 P, Zb., str. I-7831., točka 75., i presudu od 29. ožujka 2011., Anheuser-Busch/Budějovický Budvar, C-96/09 P, Zb., str. I-2131., točka 211. i navedena sudska praksa).
80 In those circumstances, it must be held that the second and third grounds of appeal are ineffective. 
80 U ovim okolnostima treba utvrditi da su drugi i treći žalbeni razlozi bespredmetni.
81 None of the grounds of appeal raised by the French Republic having been successful, the appeal must be dismissed. 
81 Budući da ni jedan od žalbenih razloga koje navodi Francuska Republika nije prihvaćen, žalbu valja odbiti.
82 Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 118 thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party's pleadings. 
82 Na temelju članka 69. stavka 2. Poslovnika koji se na temelju članka 118. tog Poslovnika primjenjuje na žalbeni postupak, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku dužna je, na zahtjev protivne stranke, snositi troškove.
Since the French Republic has been unsuccessful and the PMOI has applied for an order for costs, the French Republic must be ordered to pay the costs. 
Budući da Francuska Republika nije uspjela u postupku te s obzirom na to da je PMOI zatražio da ona snosi troškove, Francuskoj Republici valja naložiti snošenje troškova.
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby: 
Slijedom navedenoga, Sud (veliko vijeće) presuđuje:
1. Dismisses the appeal; 
1. Žalba se odbija.
2. Orders the French Republic to pay the costs. 
2. Francuskoj Republici nalaže se snošenje troškova.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber) 
PRESUDA SUDA (prvo vijeće)
20 January 2011 
20 siječnja 2011.
(Appeal - Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Rubber chemicals sector - Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC - Group of undertakings - Joint and several liability of a parent company for infringements of the competition rules committed by its subsidiaries - Attribution of liability to the parent company at the head of a group) 
„Žalba - Tržišno natjecanje - Sporazumi, odluke i usklađena djelovanja - Sektor kemikalija za obradu kaučuka - Odluka koja utvrđuje povredu članka 81. UEZ-a - Grupa poduzetnika - Solidarna odgovornost matičnog društva za povredu pravila o tržišnom natjecanju koju su počinila njegova društva kćeri - Pripisivanje odgovornosti matičnom društvu kao vodećem društvu grupe"
General Química SA, established in Alava (Spain), 
General Química SA, sa sjedištem u Alavi (Španjolska),
Repsol Química SA, established in Madrid (Spain), 
Repsol Química SA, sa sjedištem u Madridu (Španjolska),
Repsol YPF SA, established in Madrid, 
Repsol YPF SA, sa sjedištem u Madridu,
represented by J.M. Jiménez-Laiglesia Oñate and J. Jiménez-Laiglesia Oñate, abogados, 
koje zastupaju J. M. Jiménez-Laiglesia Oñate i J. Jiménez-Laiglesia Oñate, abogados,
appellants, 
žalitelji,
the other party to the proceedings being: 
druga stranka u postupku je:
European Commission, represented by F. Castillo de la Torre and E. Gippini Fournier, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg, 
Europska komisija, koju zastupaju F. Castillo de la Torre i E. Gippini Fournier, u svojstvu agenata, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu,
composed of A. Tizzano (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, J.-J. Kasel, M. Ilešič, E. Levits and M. Safjan, Judges, 
u sastavu: A. Tizzano (izvjestitelj), predsjednik vijeća, J.-J. Kasel, M. Ilešič, E. Levits i M. Safjan, suci,
1 By their appeal, General Química SA (`GQ'), Repsol Química SA (`RQ'), and Repsol YPF SA (`RYPF') seek to have set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (now `the General Court') of 18 December 2008 in Case T-85/06 General Química and Others v Commission (`the judgment under appeal'), by which the General Court dismissed their action brought against Commission Decision 2006/902/EC of 21 December 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement against Flexsys NV, Bayer AG, Crompton Manufacturing Company Inc. (formerly Uniroyal Chemical Company Inc.), Crompton Europe Ltd, Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation), General Química SA, Repsol Química SA and Repsol YPF SA (Case No COMP/F/C.38.443 - Rubber chemicals) (OJ 2006 L 353, p. 50) 
1 General Química SA (u daljnjem tekstu: GQ), Repsol Química SA (u daljnjem tekstu: RQ) i Repsol YPF SA (u daljnjem tekstu: RYPF) u svojoj žalbi traže ukidanje presude Prvostupanjskog suda Europskih zajednica (sada „Opći sud") od 18. prosinca 2008. u predmetu T-85/06 General Química i dr. / Komisija (u daljnjem tekstu: pobijana presuda), kojom je taj sud odbio njihovu tužbu protiv Odluke Komisije 2006/902/EZ od 21. prosinca 2005. o postupku prema članku 81. Ugovora o EZ-u i članku 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u protiv Flexsys NV, Bayer AG, Crompton Manufacturing Company Inc (prethodno Uniroyal Chemical Company Inc.), Crompton Europe Ltd, Chemtura Corporation (prethodno Crompton Corporation), General Química SA, Repsol Química SA i Repsol YPF SA (predmet COMP/F/C.38.443 - Kemikalije za obradu kaučuka) (SL 2006, L 353, str. 50.) [neslužbeni prijevod]
(`the contested decision'), which imposed a fine on those undertakings jointly and severally for participating in a series of agreements and concerted practices. 
(u daljnjem tekstu: sporna odluka), kojom je tim poduzetnicima solidarno izrečena kazna za sudjelovanje u nizu sporazuma i usklađenih djelovanja.
Facts at the origin of the dispute 
Činjenice iz kojih proizlazi spor
2 GQ is a company governed by Spanish law which produces certain rubber chemicals. 
2 GQ je poduzetnik, osnovan u skladu sa španjolskim pravom, koji proizvodi određene kemikalije za obradu kaučuka.
It is a wholly owned subsidiary of RQ, which is itself wholly owned by RYPF. 
On je društvo kći, u cijelosti u vlasništvu RQ-a, koji je u cijelosti u vlasništvu RYPF-a.
3 On 12 April 2005, the Commission of the European Communities notified to the appellants a statement of objections relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3). 
3 Komisija Europskih zajednica je 12. travnja 2005. žaliteljima dostavila obavijest o preliminarno utvrđenim činjenicama vezanu uz postupak prema članku 81. UEZ-a i članku 53. Sporazuma o Europskom gospodarskom prostoru od 2. svibnja 1992. (SL 1994, L 1, str. 3.).
4 By the contested decision, the Commission found RQ and RYPF, collectively referred to as `Repsol', jointly and severally liable for GQ's infringement. 
4 Spornom odlukom Komisija je utvrdila da su RQ i RYPF, skupno nazvani „Repsol", solidarno odgovorni za povredu koju je počinio GQ.
5 In that regard, the Commission stated in the contested decision that a parent company can, a priori, be presumed liable for the unlawful conduct of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, but that it is possible for it to rebut the presumption of actual exercise of decisive influence over those subsidiaries. 
5 S obzirom na to, Komisija je u spornoj odluci navela da se matično društvo može a priori smatrati odgovornim za nezakonito postupanje svojih društava kćeri u kojima ima 100% udjela, no da ono može oboriti pretpostavku stvarnog izvršavanja odlučujućeg utjecaja nad tim društvima.
6 The Commission stated that such a presumption cannot be rebutted by alleging that the parent company was not directly involved in the cartel or was not aware of its existence or that it did not encourage its subsidiaries to behave unlawfully. 
6 Komisija je navela da se takva pretpostavka ne može oboriti navodom da matično društvo nije bilo izravno uključeno u kartel ili da nije bilo svjesno njegova postojanja, odnosno da svoja društva kćeri nije poticalo na nezakonito postupanje.
The Commission also considered that the contention that RQ and RYPF were not entrusted with the day-to-day business or the operational management of GQ was not sufficient to rebut that presumption. 
Komisija je također smatrala da navod kako društva RQ i RYPF nisu preuzela odgovornost za svakodnevno poslovanje GQ-a odnosno vođenje njegovog poslovanja, nije dovoljan za obaranje te pretpostavke.
7 In addition, the Commission observed that, in the present case, even though the sole director of GQ had delegated his powers with regard to the operational management of the company, he still acted as a `link' between GQ and RQ, through whom information on sales, production and financial results were passed on to the parent company. 
7 Osim toga, Komisija je u ovom predmetu ocijenila da, iako je jedini direktor GQ-a prenio svoje ovlasti za poslovno upravljanje društvom, on je ipak djelovao u svojstvu „veze" između GQ-a i RQ-a, putem koje su podaci o prodaji, proizvodnji i financijskim rezultatima prosljeđivani matičnom društvu.
Furthermore, GQ's financial results were consolidated with those of `Repsol', with the result that GQ's profits or losses were reflected in the profits or losses of the group. 
Nadalje, financijski rezultati GQ-a konsolidirani su s onima „Repsola", tako da su se dobit ili gubitak GQ-a odražavali u dobicima ili gubicima grupe.
8 Accordingly, the Commission found, in Article 1(f) to (h) of the contested decision, that the appellants had participated, from 31 October 1999 to 30 June 2000, in a complex of agreements and concerted practices consisting of price fixing and the exchange of confidential information on certain rubber chemical products in the European Economic Area, in infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992. 
8 U tim je okolnostima Komisija u članku 1. stavcima (f) do (h) sporne odluke utvrdila da su žalitelji od 31. listopada 1999. do 30. lipnja 2000. sudjelovali u skupu sporazuma i usklađenih djelovanja koji su se sastojali od utvrđivanja cijena i razmjene povjerljivih informacija o određenim kemikalijama za obradu kaučuka u Europskom gospodarskom prostoru, što je protivno članku 81. UEZ-a i članku 53. Sporazuma o Europskom gospodarskom prostoru od 2. svibnja 1992.