natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
21 As that first set of proceedings before the Luxembourg courts was definitively terminated, Mr Koelzsch, on 1 March 2007, brought an action for damages against the État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Loi du 1er septembre 1988 relative à la responsabilité civile de l’État et des collectivités publiques (Law of 1 September 1988 concerning the civil liability of the State and of public authorities) (Mémorial A 1988, No 51, p. 1000) by invoking maladministration on the part of its judicial services. 
21 Nakon konačnog dovršetka postupaka pred luksemburškim sudovima, H. Koelzsch je 1. ožujka 2007. podnio tužbu za naknadu štete protiv Velikog Vojvodstva Luksemburg u skladu s prvim stavkom članka 1. Zakona od 1. rujna 1988. o građanskoj odgovornosti države i javnih tijela (Loi du 1er septembre 1988 relative à la responsabilité civile de l’État et des collectivités publiques) (Mémorial A 1988, br. 51, str. 1000.) pozivajući se na nepravilnosti u funkcioniranju sudskih službi.
22 Mr Koelzsch claimed in particular that those judicial decisions had breached Article 6(1) and (2) of the Rome Convention in declaring that the mandatory rules of German law on protection against dismissal were not applicable to his contract of employment and by turning down his application to have a reference for a preliminary ruling made to the Court of Justice in order to clarify, in the light of the facts of the case, the criterion of the habitual place of performance of the work. 
22 H. Koelzsch je posebno tvrdio kako je sudskim odlukama prekršen članak 6. stavci 1. i 2. Rimske konvencije tvrdnjom da se prisilne norme njemačkog prava o zaštiti od otpuštanja ne mogu primijeniti na njegov ugovor o radu, kao i odbijanjem zahtjeva da se prethodnom odlukom Suda razjasni, u svjetlu činjenica ovog slučaja, poveznica mjesta u kojem se obično obavlja posao.
23 By judgment of 9 November 2007, the Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg (Luxembourg) (District Court, Luxembourg), declared the action to be admissible but unfounded. With regard, in particular, to the question of determining the applicable law, that court observed that the courts dealing with the dispute between Mr Koelzsch and his employer had been correct to hold that the parties to the contract of employment had designated Luxembourg law as the applicable law, with the result that Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention was not to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, it pointed out that staff representation bodies are governed by the mandatory provisions of the country in which the employer is established. 
23 Presudom od 9. studenoga 2007., Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg (luksemburški okružni sud) odlučio je da je tužba dopuštena ali neutemeljena. Sud je posebno u pogledu utvrđivanja mjerodavnog prava zaključio da su sudovi koji su odlučivali o sporu između H. Koelzscha i njegovog poslodavca ispravno presudili da je luksemburško pravo mjerodavno za ugovor o radu, pa se članak 6. stavak 2. Rimske konvencije nije mogao uzeti u obzir. Nadalje, sud je odlučio da tijela koja zastupaju osoblje podliježu prisilnim normama prava zemlje u kojoj poslodavac ima poslovni nastan.
24 On 17 June 2008, Mr Koelzsch appealed against that judgment to the referring court. 
24 H. Koelzsch je 17. lipnja 2008. podnio žalbu protiv te presude sudu koji je uputio zahtjev.
25 The Cour d’appel de Luxembourg takes the view that the appellant’s criticism regarding the interpretation of Article 6(1) of the Rome Convention by the Luxembourg courts does not appear to be entirely unfounded, because those courts did not determine the law which , in the absence of choice by the parties, would be applicable on the basis of that provision. 
25 Cour d’appel de Luxembourg smatra da prigovor žalitelja na tumačenje članka 6. stavka 1. Rimske konvencije od strane luksemburških sudova nije u potpunosti neutemeljen, jer ti sudovi nisu utvrdili koje bi se pravo u nedostatku izbora stranaka primjenjivalo na temelju te odredbe.
26 It points out that, if Luxembourg law is to be considered as the law which would be applicable to the contract in the absence of choice by the parties, it is not necessary to proceed to a comparison between that law and the provisions of German law relied on by the appellant to establish which is more favourable to the employee, for the purposes of Article 6(1) of the Rome Convention. However, if German law is to be considered as the law which would be applicable in the absence of choice by the parties, the mandatory nature of the rules established by the Luxembourg law on dismissal should not prevent the application of the German law on the special protection of members of works councils against dismissal. 
26 Ističe da, ako se luksemburško pravo smatra pravom mjerodavnim za ugovor u nedostatku izbora stranaka, nije potrebno uspoređivati to pravo i odredbe njemačkog prava koje je žalitelj istaknuo da bi se utvrdilo što je za radnika povoljnije u smislu članka 6. stavka 1. Rimske konvencije. Međutim, ako je njemačko pravo mjerodavno u nedostatku izbora od strane stranaka, obvezujuće značajke odredbi luksemburškog prava o otpuštanju ne sprečavaju primjenu njemačkog prava o posebnoj zaštiti od otpuštanja članova radničkih vijeća.
27 In that regard, according to the referring court, the connecting criteria set out in Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention, in particular that of the country of habitual performance of the work, do not, in contrast to the approach taken by the Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg in its judgment, allow German law to be rejected at the outset as the lex contractus. 
27 Prema mišljenju suda koji je uputio zahtjev, poveznice iz članka 6. stavka 2. Rimske konvencije, posebice ona o zemlji uobičajenog obavljanja posla, u tom pogledu ne dopuštaju da se njemačko pravo odmah odbaci kao lex contractus, za razliku od pristupa koji je u svojoj presudi imao Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg.
28 The referring court takes the view that a need for consistency militates in favour of an interpretation of the concept of ‘law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work’, within the terms of Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention, in the light of that set out in Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention and by taking account of the wording used in Article 19 of Regulation No 44/2001 and in Article 8 of Regulation No 593/2008, which refer not only to the country in which the work is carried out but also to the country from which the employee carries out his activities. 
28 Sud koji je uputio zahtjev smatra da potreba za dosljednošću govori u prilog tumačenju koncepta „države u kojoj radnik obično obavlja svoj posao” u smislu članka 6. stavka 2. točke (a) Rimske konvencije, s obzirom na sadržaj članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije iz Bruxellesa te uzimajući u obzir tekst članka 19. Uredbe br. 44/2001 te članka 8. Uredbe br. 593/2008 koji se odnose ne samo na državu u kojoj se posao obavlja već i na državu iz koje radnik obavlja svoje aktivnosti.
29 In the light of those considerations, the Cour d’appel de Luxembourg decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: 
29 Zbog tih je razmatranja Cour d’appel de Luxembourg odlučio prekinuti postupak i postaviti Sudu sljedeće prethodno pitanje:
‘Is the rule of conflict in Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention … , which states that an employment contract is governed by the law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the situation where the employee works in more than one country, but returns systematically to one of them, that country must be regarded as that in which the employee habitually carries out his work?’ 
„Treba li se pravilo o sukobu zakona iz članka 6. stavka 2. točke (a) Rimske konvencije [...], u kojoj stoji da se ugovor o radu uređuje pravom države u kojoj radnik obično obavlja svoj posao sukladno ugovoru, tumačiti na način da se, kada radnik radi u više država, ali se sustavno vraća u jednu od njih, ta država mora smatrati onom u kojoj radnik obično obavlja svoj posao?”
30 As the question has been referred by an appeal court, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on the reference for a preliminary ruling pursuant to the First Protocol on the interpretation of the Rome Convention, which entered into force on 1 August 2004. 
30 Budući da je pitanje uputio žalbeni sud, Sud je nadležan za davanje odgovora na zahtjev za prethodnu odluku u skladu s Prvim protokolom o tumačenju Rimske konvencije, koji je stupio na snagu 1. kolovoza 2004.
31 In order to answer the question referred, it is necessary to interpret the rule set out in Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention and, in particular, the criterion of the country in which the employee ‘habitually carries out his work’. 
31 Kako bi se odgovorilo na prethodno pitanje, valja dati tumačenje pravila iz članka 6. stavka 2. točke (a) Rimske konvencije te posebice poveznice države u kojoj radnik „obično obavlja svoj posao”.
32 In that regard, it should be noted, as the European Commission has correctly pointed out, that that criterion must be interpreted autonomously, in the sense that the meaning and scope of that referential rule cannot be established on the basis of the law of the court seised, but must be established according to consistent and independent criteria in order to guarantee the full effectiveness of the Rome Convention in view of the objectives which it pursues (see, by way of analogy, Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC [1993] ECR I-4075, paragraphs 10 and 16). 
32 Kako je Europska komisija ispravno istaknula, u tom smislu valja ustvrditi da se poveznica mora tumačiti neovisno, u smislu da se značenje i područje primjene pravila o kojem se traži prethodna odluka ne mogu utvrditi na temelju prava suda pred kojim se vodi postupak, već moraju biti utvrđeni u skladu s dosljednim i neovisnim kriterijima kako bi se jamčila potpuna učinkovitost Rimske konvencije s obzirom na ciljeve postavljene u njoj (vidjeti po analogiji presudu od 13. srpnja 1993. Mulox IBC, C-125/92 Zb., str. I-4075., t. 10. i 16.).
33 Moreover, such an interpretation must not disregard that relating to the criteria set out in Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention where they lay down the rules for determining jurisdiction for the same matters and set out similar concepts. It follows from the preamble to the Rome Convention that it was concluded in order to continue, in the field of private international law, the work of unification of law set in motion by the adoption of the Brussels Convention (see Case C-133/08 ICF [2009] ECR I-9687, paragraph 22). 
33 Nadalje, takvim tumačenjem ne smije se zanemariti tumačenje u odnosu na poveznice iz članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije iz Bruxellesa kada one utvrđuju pravila za određivanje nadležnosti za ista pitanja i uređuju slične pojmove. Iz preambule Rimske konvencije proizlazi da je ona sklopljena kako bi se u području međunarodnog privatnog prava nastavilo ujednačavanje prava koje je započelo usvajanjem Konvencije iz Bruxellesa (vidjeti presudu od 6. listopada 2009., ICF, C-133/08, Zb., str. I-9687., t. 22.).
34 With regard to the content of Article 6 of the Rome Convention, it should be noted that it lays down special conflict rules relating to individual contracts of employment. Those rules derogate from those of a general nature set out in Articles 3 and 4 of that convention, which concern, respectively, the freedom of choice of the applicable law and the criteria for determining that law in the absence of such a choice. 
34 U pogledu sadržaja članka 6. Rimske konvencije, valja ustvrditi da on propisuje posebna pravila o rješavanju sukoba zakona u vezi s pojedinačnim ugovorom o radu. Ta pravila odstupaju od općih pravila iz članaka 3. i 4. te konvencije o slobodnom izboru mjerodavnog prava i poveznicama za određivanje prava u nedostatku takvog izbora.
35 Article 6(1) of the Rome Convention limits the freedom to choose the applicable law. It provides that the parties to the contract cannot, by their agreement, exclude the application of mandatory rules of law which would govern the contract in the absence of such choice. 
35 Članak 6. stavak 1. Rimske konvencije ograničava slobodu izbora mjerodavnog prava. Predviđa da ugovorne stranke ne mogu sporazumno isključiti primjenu prisilnih normi prava koje bi uređivale ugovor u nedostatku takvog izbora.
36 Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention lays down specific connecting criteria, which are either that of the country in which the employee ‘habitually carries out his work’ (a), or, in the absence of such a place, that of the seat of ‘the place of business through which he was engaged’ (b). Article 6(2) also provides that those two connecting criteria are not to apply where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract of employment is more closely connected with another country, in which case the law of that other country is to apply. 
36 Članak 6. stavak 2. Rimske konvencije utvrđuje poveznice koje su bilo iz države u kojoj radnik „obično obavlja svoj posao” (a), ili u nedostatku takvog mjesta, iz sjedišta „mjesta poslovanja preko kojeg je zaposlen” (b). Člankom 6. stavkom 2. također se predviđa da ove dvije poveznice nisu primjenjive ako iz okolnosti u cjelini proizlazi da je ugovor uže povezan s drugom državom, a u tom se slučaju na ugovor primjenjuje pravo te države.
37 In its order for reference, the Cour d’appel de Luxembourg seeks to determine, essentially, which of the first two criteria is applicable to the employment contract at issue in the main proceedings. 
37 U svom zahtjevu za prethodnu odluku, Cour d’appel de Luxembourg u biti želi utvrditi koja je od dvije poveznice mjerodavna za ugovor o kojem se odlučuje u glavnom postupku.
38 According to the État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, it follows from the wording of Article 6 of the Rome Convention that the situation referred to in the question submitted for a preliminary ruling, which concerns employment in the transport sector, is that referred to by the criterion set out in Article 6(2)(b) thereof. To allow the application to such a contract of the connecting rule set out in Article 6(2)(a) would, it argues, have the effect of rendering meaningless Article 6(2)(b), which refers precisely to cases in which the employee does not habitually carry out his work in a single country. 
38 Prema mišljenju Velikog Vojvodstva Luksemburg, iz teksta članka 6. Rimske konvencije proizlazi da je situacija iz zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku koja se odnosi na zapošljavanje u sektoru prometa ona iz poveznice u članku 6. stavku 2. točki (b) Rimske konvencije. Dopuštanje primjene poveznice iz članka 6. stavka 2. točke (a) na takav ugovor imalo bi, prema tome, učinak da bi članak 6. stavak 2. točka (b) Konvencije, koji se upravo odnosi na slučajeve u kojima radnici obično ne obavljaju posao u jednoj državi, izgubio smisao.
39 By contrast, according to the appellant in the main proceedings, the Greek Government and the Commission, it follows from the Court’s case-law on Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention that the consistent interpretation of the criterion of the place where the employee ‘habitually carries out his work’ has the result that that rule can also be applied in cases where work is carried out in several Member States. In particular, they point out that, for the purposes of specifically determining that place, the Court has made reference to the place from which the employee mainly carries out his obligations towards his employer (Mulox IBC, paragraphs 21 to 23) or to the place in which he has established the effective centre of his working activities (Case C-383/95 Rutten [1997] ECR I-57, paragraph 23), or, in the absence of an office, to the place in which the employee carries out the majority of his work (Case C-37/00 Weber [2002] ECR I-2013, paragraph 42). 
39 Suprotno tome, prema mišljenju tužitelja u glavnom postupku, grčkoj vladi i Komisiji, iz sudske prakse Suda o članku 5. stavku 1. Konvencije iz Bruxellesa proizlazi da dosljedno tumačenje poveznice mjesta u kojem radnik „obično obavlja svoj posao” ima za posljedicu da se pravilo također može primijeniti u slučajevima kad se posao obavlja u više država članica. Posebice ističu da je, za potrebe određivanja tog mjesta, Sud uputio na mjesto iz kojeg radnik uglavnom izvršava obveze prema poslodavcu (gore navedena presuda Mulox IBC, t. 21. do 23.) ili na mjesto u kojem je osnovao radno središte djelatnosti (presuda od 9. siječnja 1997., Rutten, C-383/95, Zb., str. I-57., t. 23.), ili u nedostatku ureda, na mjesto u kojem radnik obavlja većinu svog posla (presuda od 27. veljače 2002., Weber, C-37/00, Zb., str. I-2013, t. 42.).
40 In that regard, it is apparent from the Giuliano and Lagarde Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (OJ 1980 C 282, p. 1) that Article 6 thereof was intended to provide ‘a more appropriate arrangement for matters in which the interests of one of the contracting parties are not the same as those of the other, and … more adequate protection for the party who from the socio-economic point of view is regarded as the weaker in the contractual relationship’. 
40 U tom smislu, iz Izvješća Giuliana i Lagardea o Konvenciji o pravu koje je mjerodavno za ugovorne obveze (SL 1980, C 282, str. 1.) [neslužbeni prijevod] proizlazi da je članak 6. Konvencije bio osmišljen kako bi „na odgovarajući način uredio slučajeve u kojima interesi jedne ugovorne stranke nisu na istoj razini kao i interesi druge te na taj način osigurao odgovarajuću zaštitu stranci koja je sa socioekonomskog stajališta slabija stranka u ugovornom odnosu“.
41 The Court has also been guided by those principles in the interpretation of the rules of jurisdiction relating to those contracts which are laid down by the Brussels Convention. It has held that, in a situation in which, as in the main proceedings, the employee carries out his working activities in more that one Contracting State, it is necessary to take due account of the need to guarantee adequate protection to the employee as the weaker of the contracting parties (see, to that effect, Rutten, paragraph 22, and Case C-437/00 Pugliese [2003] ECR I-3573, paragraph 18). 
41 Sud se u tumačenju pravila nadležnosti u odnosu na ugovore utvrđene Konvencijom iz Bruxellesa također vodio tim načelima. Presudio je da je kad radnik obavlja posao u više država ugovornica, kao što je slučaj u glavnom postupku, potrebno uzeti u obzir potrebu osiguravanja adekvatne zaštite radniku kao slabijoj ugovornoj stranci (vidjeti u tom smislu gore navedenu presudu Rutten, t. 22. te presudu od 10. travnja 2003., Pugliese, C-437/00, Zb., str. I-3573., t. 18.).
42 It follows that, in so far as the objective of Article 6 of the Rome Convention is to guarantee adequate protection for the employee, that provision must be understood as guaranteeing the applicability of the law of the State in which he carries out his working activities rather than that of the State in which the employer is established. It is in the former State that the employee performs his economic and social duties and, as was noted by the Advocate General in point 50 of her Opinion, it is there that the business and political environment affects employment activities. Therefore, compliance with the employment protection rules provided for by the law of that country must, so far as is possible, be guaranteed. 
42 Iz toga proizlazi da, s obzirom na to da je cilj članka 6. Rimske konvencije osigurati odgovarajuću zaštitu radniku, navedena odredba mora se tumačiti u smislu da jamči primjenjivost prava države u kojoj radnik obavlja posao, a ne prava države u kojoj poslodavac ima poslovni nastan. U prvoj državi radnik obavlja svoje gospodarske i socijalne dužnosti te prema mišljenju nezavisne odvjetnice u točki 50. svog mišljenja, na tom mjestu poslovno i političko okružje utječe na aktivnosti rada. Stoga poštovanje propisa o zaštiti radnog mjesta te države mora biti zajamčeno u mjeri u kojoj je to moguće.
43 Consequently, in the light of the objective of Article 6 of the Rome Convention, it must be held that the criterion of the country in which the employee ‘habitually carries out his work’, set out in Article 6(2)(a) thereof, must be given a broad interpretation, while the criterion of ‘the place of business through which [the employee] was engaged’, set out in Article 6(2)(b) thereof, ought to apply in cases where the court dealing with the case is not in a position to determine the country in which the work is habitually carried out. 
43 Prema tome, uzimajući u obzir cilj članka 6. Rimske konvencije, valja ustvrditi da je poveznicu države u kojoj radnik „obično obavlja svoj posao”, iz njezinog članka 6. stavka 2. točke (a), potrebno široko tumačiti, dok bi se poveznica „mjesta poslovanja preko kojeg je [radnik] zaposlen” iz njezinog članka 6. stavka 2. točke (b) trebala primjenjivati u slučajevima ako predmetni sudac ne može utvrditi državu uobičajenog obavljanja posla.
44 It follows from the foregoing that the criterion in Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention can apply also in a situation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where the employee carries out his activities in more than one Contracting State, if it is possible, for the court seised, to determine the State with which the work has a significant connection. 
44 Iz gore navedenog proizlazi da se poveznica iz članka 6. stavka 2. točke (a) Rimske konvencije također može primijeniti u situaciji, kao što je to slučaj u glavnom postupku, kada radnik izvršava svoje aktivnosti u više država ugovornica, ukoliko je sud pred kojim se vodi postupak u mogućnosti utvrditi državu s kojom posao ima značajnu vezu.
45 According to the Court’s case-law, cited in paragraph 39 of the present judgment, which remains relevant to the analysis of Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention, where work is carried out in more than one Member State, the criterion of the country in which the work is habitually carried out must be given a broad interpretation and be understood as referring to the place in which or from which the employee actually carries out his working activities and, in the absence of a centre of activities, to the place where he carries out the majority of his activities. 
45 U skladu sa sudskom praksom Suda navedenom u točki 39. ove presude, koja ostaje relevantna za analizu članka 6. stavka 2. Rimske konvencije, kad se posao obavlja u više država članica, poveznicu države u kojoj radnik obično obavlja posao treba široko tumačiti tako da se odnosi na mjesto u kojem ili iz kojeg radnik zapravo izvršava svoje radne aktivnosti te, ako ne postoji središte djelatnosti, na mjesto u kojem izvršava većinu svojih aktivnosti.