natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
44 i-21 maintains that to uphold such an administrative act is contrary to the principle of the primacy of Community law and the need to maintain its effectiveness. It submits that even if the Court acknowledges the importance of the principle of legal certainty, the latter does not in every case outweigh the principle of lawfulness. i-21 points out that, in the judgment in Kühne & Heitz, cited above, the Court considered that an administrative act which had acquired binding force following a judgment which could not be the subject of an appeal could be annulled, in certain circumstances, if it were contrary to Community law. i-21 takes the view that this possibility becomes even greater in the case of an administrative act which was not the subject of a judicial decision and which became final merely upon expiry of the time-limits allowed for appealing. 
44 i-21 tvrdi da je zadržavanje takvog upravnog akta u suprotnosti s načelom nadređenosti prava Zajednice i potrebom da se održi njegov korisni učinak. Ono tvrdi da čak i ako Sud uvaži važnost načela pravne sigurnosti, to načelo ne može u svakom slučaju nadvladati načelo zakonitosti. Društvo i-21 naglašava da, da je u gore navedenoj presudi Kühne & Heitz Sud ustanovio da se upravni akt, koji je postao pravomoćan na temelju presude protiv koje nema pravnog lijeka može poništiti u određenim okolnostima ako je u suprotnosti s pravom Zajednice. Društvo i-21 smatra da je ta mogućnost čak i veća u slučaju upravnog akta koji nije bio predmet sudske odluke i postao je pravomoćan samo na temelju isteka roka propisanog za žalbu.
45 Arcor considers, for its part, that the judgment in Kühne & Heitz is not relevant inasmuch as it concerns an indirect conflict between a rule of national procedure and a rule of substantive Community law, the first rule preventing application of the second. According to Arcor, the case in the main proceedings should be regarded as a direct conflict between two rules of substantive law. Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13, read in the light of Article 10 EC, requires fees levied in breach of Article 11 to be repaid, while the national legislation prohibits such reimbursement. Arcor takes the view that Community law should, in such a case, prevail over conflicting national law. 
45 Arcor smatra sa svoje strane da presuda u predmetu Kühne & Heitz nije relevantna jer se ona odnosi na posredan sukob između pravila nacionalnog postupka i pravila materijalnog prava Zajednice, pri čemu prvo pravilo sprečava uporabu drugog. Prema mišljenju Arcora, predmet u glavnom postupku treba gledati kao izravan sukob dva pravila materijalnog prava. Članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13, s obzirom na članak 10. UEZ-a, zahtijeva povrat naknada naplaćenih zbog kršenja članka 11. dok nacionalno zakonodavstvo zabranjuje takav povrat. Arcor smatra da bi pravo Zajednice u takvom slučaju moralo imati prednost u odnosu na suprotstavljeno nacionalno pravo.
46 The Commission maintains, on the other hand, that the judgment in Kühne & Heitz is a suitable starting point and points out that, in principle, an administrative act which has not been challenged within the time-limits laid down should not be withdrawn. The Commission goes on to state that, in the present case, it must be ascertained whether upholding the unlawful fee assessments should nevertheless be considered to be ‘downright intolerable’ in the light of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 and that that question should be examined in the light of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 
46 Komisija tvrdi da je gore navedena presuda Kühne & Heitz primjereno ishodište i upozorava da se u načelu upravni akt koji nije bio osporavan u propisanom roku ne smije povući. Komisija zatim navodi da je u ovom slučaju potrebno provjeriti treba li zadržavanje nezakonitih odluka o visini naknade ipak smatrati „jednostavno nedopustivimˮ s obzirom na članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13 i da to pitanje treba ispitati s obzirom na načela ekvivalentnosti i djelotvornosti.
47 In relation to the principle of equivalence, the Commission submits that, according to German law, an administrative act which is manifestly unlawful under national law cannot be upheld. If that examination were also carried out in the light of Community law, the result would, in the Commission’s view, be that the fee assessments at issue in the main proceedings and the legislation on which they are based would have to be considered to be manifestly unlawful in the light of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13. 
47 U vezi s načelom ekvivalentnosti Komisija ističe da se u skladu s njemačkim pravom upravni akt koji je očito nezakonit ne može zadržati. Da se takvo ispitivanje provede i u skladu s pravom Zajednice, po mišljenju Komisije, došlo bi se do toga da odluke o visini naknade o kojima je riječ u glavnom postupku i zakonodavstvo na kojem se temelje treba smatrati očito nezakonitima s obzirom na članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13.
48 The Commission arrives at the same conclusion as regards the principle of effectiveness. It takes the view that to uphold the fee assessments would make it practically impossible to exercise the rights derived from Article 11(1) of the directive, by allowing an overcompensation which leads to restricting competition over a period of 30 years. 
48 U pogledu načela djelotvornosti Komisija dolazi do istog zaključka. Ona smatra da zadržavanje odluka o visini naknade praktično onemogućuje izvršavanje prava iz članka 11. stavka 1. Direktive jer omogućava prekomjernu naknadu koja dovodi do ograničavanja konkurencije u razdoblju od 30 godina.
49 The context in which the question referred arises should be made clear. Contrary to Arcor’s claims, the second question does not relate to a conflict between two sets of rules of substantive law on the repayment of fees levied unlawfully. Neither the provisions of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 nor those of the TKG and the TKLGebV, as that Law and that Regulation were presented in the file submitted to the Court, deal with such reimbursement. 
49 Valja objasniti okvir u kojem je postavljeno pitanje. U suprotnosti s onim što tvrdi Arcor, drugo se pitanje ne odnosi na sukob između dva pravna pravila materijalnog prava o povratu nezakonito zaračunatih naknada. Takav povrat ne određuju ni odredbe članka 11. stavka 1. Direktive 97/13 ni odredbe TKG-a i TKLGebV-a, kako su taj zakon i uredba dostavljeni Sudu u spisu.
50 The question relates rather to the relationship between Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 and Paragraph 48 of the Law on Administrative Procedure, as interpreted by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht. Pursuant to the latter paragraph, upon expiry of a given period, the fee assessments become final and the addressees of those assessments no longer have a legal remedy enabling them to assert a right which they derive from Article 11(1) of the directive, subject to the proviso that the competent administrative authority should withdraw an unlawful administrative act if it would be ‘downright intolerable’ to uphold it. 
50 Pitanje se više odnosi na odnos članka 11. stavka 1. Direktive 97/13 i članka 48. Zakona o upravnom postupku, kako ga tumači Bundesverwaltungsgericht. U skladu s potonjim člankom, po isteku danog razdoblja, odluke o visini naknade postaju pravomoćne i njihovi adresati nemaju više na raspolaganju pravno sredstvo kojim bi mogli ostvariti pravo koje imaju na temelju članka 11. stavka 1. Direktive. Ostaje međutim obveza nadležnog upravnog tijela da poništi nezakoniti upravni akt ukoliko je njegovo zadržavanje „jednostavno nedopustivoˮ.
51 In accordance with the principle of legal certainty, Community law does not require that administrative bodies be placed under an obligation, in principle, to reopen an administrative decision which has become final upon expiry of the reasonable time-limits for legal remedies or by exhaustion of those remedies (see Kühne & Heitz, paragraph 24). Compliance with that principle prevents administrative acts which produce legal effects from being called into question indefinitely (see, by analogy, Case C-310/97 Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products AB and Others [1999] ECR I-5363, paragraph 61). 
51 U skladu s načelom pravne sigurnosti, pravo Zajednice ne zahtijeva da nadležna tijela načelno imaju obvezu ponovno otvaranje postupka donošenja upravne odluke koja je postala pravomoćna po isteku razumnih rokova za podnošenje pravnih sredstava ili nakon što su pravna sredstva iscrpljena (vidjeti Kühne & Heitz, t. 24.). Poštovanje tog načela sprečava da se upravni akti koji proizvode pravne učinke dovode u pitanje na neograničen rok (vidjeti analogijom presudu od 14. rujna 1999., Komisija/AssiDomän Kraft Products i dr., C-310/97 P, Zb., str. I-5363., t. 61.).
52 The Court has, however, acknowledged that there could be a limit to this principle in certain cases. Thus it held in paragraph 27 of the judgment in Kühne & Heitz that the administrative body responsible for the adoption of an administrative decision is, in accordance with the principle of cooperation arising from Article 10 EC, under an obligation to review and possibly to reopen that decision if four conditions are fulfilled. First, the administrative body must, under national law, have the power to reopen that decision. Secondly, the administrative decision in question must have become final as a result of a judgment of a national court ruling at final instance. Thirdly, that judgment must, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, be based on a misinterpretation of Community law which was adopted without a question being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling in the circumstances set out in the third paragraph of Article 234 EC. Fourthly, the person concerned must have complained to the administrative body immediately after becoming aware of that decision of the Court. 
52 Sud je međutim priznao da to načelo može biti ograničeno u određenim slučajevima. Stoga je u točki 28. gore navedene presude Kühne & Heitz presudio da je upravno tijelo odgovorno za donošenje upravne odluke dužno, u skladu s načelom suradnje iz članka 10. UEZ-a, preispitati tu odluku i eventualno ponovno otvoriti postupak ako su ispunjena četiri uvjeta. Prvo, da je upravno tijelo prema nacionalnom pravu nadležno za ponovno otvaranje postupka. Drugo, da je dotična upravna odluka postala pravomoćna na temelju presude nacionalnog suda koji je odlučivao u zadnjem stupnju. Treće, da se ta presuda s obzirom na kasniju praksu Suda temelji na krivom tumačenju prava Zajednice koje je doneseno, a da Sudu nije bilo upućeno prethodno pitanje u skladu s odredbama članka 234. UEZ-a. Četvrto, da se dotična osoba žalila upravnom tijelu čim je saznala za tu odluku suda.
53 The case giving rise to the judgment in Kühne & Heitz, however, was entirely different from those at issue in the main proceedings. Whilst the undertaking Kühne & Heitz NV had exhausted all legal remedies available to it, i-21 and Arcor did not avail themselves of their right to appeal against the fee assessments issued to them. 
53 Predmet u kojem je donesena prethodno navedena presuda Kühne & Heitz potpuno je različit od onih o kojima je riječ u glavnom postupku. Dok je Kühne & Heitz NV iscrpio sva pravna sredstva koja su mu bila dostupna, i-21 i Arcor nisu upotrijebili svoje pravo žalbe protiv odluka o visini naknade koje su im bile upućene.
57 It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in the absence of relevant Community rules, the detailed procedural rules designed to ensure the protection of the rights which individuals acquire under Community law are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, under the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, provided that they are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see, inter alia, C-78/98 Preston and Others [2000] ECR I-3201, paragraph 31, and Case C-201/02 Wells [2004] ECR I-723, paragraph 67). 
57 Valja podsjetiti u vezi s tim da su prema ustaljenoj sudskoj praksi, u nedostatku propisa Zajednice u ovom pogledu procesnopravna pravila namijenjena zaštiti pravâ koja pojedinci uživaju na temelju prava Zajednice uređena su nacionalnim pravnim poretkom svake države članice, sukladno načelu njihove procesne autonomije, pod uvjetom da nisu nepovoljnija od onih koja uređuju slične nacionalne situacije (načelo ekvivalentnosti) te da u praksi ne onemogućuju ili pretjerano ne otežavaju ostvarivanje pravâ koja im dodjeljuje pravni poredak Unije (načelo djelotvornosti) (vidjeti osobito presude od 16. svibnja 2000., Preston i dr., C-78/98, Zb., I-3201., t. 31., i od 7. siječnja 2004., Wells, C-201/02, Zb., str. I-723., t. 67.).
63 It follows that, if the national rules applicable to appeals impose an obligation to withdraw an administrative act that is unlawful under domestic law, even though that act has become final, where to uphold that act would be ‘downright intolerable’, the same obligation to withdraw must exist under equivalent conditions in the case of an administrative act which does not comply with Community law. 
63 Proizlazi da, ako nacionalna pravila koja se primjenjuju na žalbe nameću obvezu povlačenja upravnog akta koji je nezakonit prema nacionalnom pravu, čak i ako je postao konačan i ako bi zadržavanje takvog akta bilo „jednostavno nedopustivoˮ, ista obveza povlačenja mora postojati pod ekvivalentnim uvjetima u slučaju upravnog akta koji nije sukladan s pravom Zajednice.
64 It is clear from the information provided by the national court that, for the purposes of construing the term ‘downright intolerable’, the national court examined whether upholding the fee assessments at issue in the main proceedings ran counter to the national legal principles of equal treatment, fairness, public policy or good faith, and whether the incompatibility of the fee assessments with rules of higher-ranking law was manifest. 
64 Iz navoda koje dostavlja sud koji je uputio zahtjev za prethodnu odluku proizlazi da je nacionalni sud za potrebe analiziranja pojma „jednostavno nedopustivoˮ preispitao krši li zadržavanje odluka o visini naknade o kojima je riječ u glavnom postupku načela nacionalnog prava jednakog postupanja, pravednosti, javnog poretka ili dobre vjere i je li nespojivost odluka o visini naknade s pravnim pravilima više razine očita.
65 As regards the principle of equal treatment, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht considers that there is no breach of that principle in so far as undertakings such as i-21 and Arcor, whose fee assessments have been upheld, had not exercised their right to challenge those assessments. They are therefore not in a situation comparable to that of undertakings which, having exercised that right, succeeded in having the fee assessments which had been addressed to them withdrawn. 
65 U pogledu načela jednakog postupanja, Bundesverwaltungsgericht smatra da nema kršenja tog načela budući da poduzetnici kao što su i-21 i Arcor, čije su odluke o visini naknade bile zadržane, nisu iskoristili mogućnost osporavanja tih odluka. Oni stoga nisu u situaciji koja se može usporediti sa situacijom u kojoj se nalaze poduzetnici koji su iskoristili tu mogućnost i ishodili da odluke o visini naknade koje su im bile upućene budu povučene.
68 However, the question has been raised as to whether the concept of manifest unlawfulness was applied in an equivalent manner. According to the Commission, the national court examined whether the fee assessments were based on legislation that was manifestly unlawful with regard to rules of higher-ranking law, namely the TKG and German constitutional law, but did not or did not correctly conduct that examination with regard to Community law. The Commission maintains that the legislation is manifestly unlawful with regard to the provisions of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 and that the principle of equivalence has therefore not been complied with. 
68 Međutim, bilo je postavljeno pitanje je li pojam očite nezakonitosti primijenjen ekvivalentno. U skladu s mišljenjem Komisije, nacionalni sud proučio je temelje li se odluke o visini naknade na pravnom propisu koji je očito nezakonit u odnosu na pravne propise više razine, odnosno TKG i njemačko ustavno pravo, ali to ispitivanje nije ispravno proveo u odnosu na pravo Zajednice. Komisija tvrdi da je pravni propis očito nezakonit s obzirom na odredbe članka 11. stavka 1. Direktive 97/13 i da načelo ekvivalentnosti nije poštovano.
70 In order to assess the degree of clarity of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 and to determine whether or not the incompatibility of the national law with that article is manifest, the objectives of that directive, which is among the measures adopted for the complete liberalisation of telecommunications services and infrastructures and is intended to encourage the entry of new operators onto the market, must be taken into account (see, to that effect, Albacom and Infostrada, cited above in paragraph 35). In that regard, the imposition of a very high fee to cover an estimation of the general costs over a period of 30 years is such as to seriously impair competition, as the national court points out in its references for a preliminary ruling, and constitutes a relevant factor in that assessment. 
70 Kako bi se ocijenio stupanj jasnoće članka 11. stavka 1. Direktive 97/13 i odredilo je li nespojivost nacionalnog prava s tim člankom očita ili ne, valja uzeti u obzir ciljeve te direktive kao mjere donesene za potpunu liberalizaciju telekomunikacijskih usluga i infrastrukture, čiji je cilj olakšati ulaz na tržište novim operaterima (vidjeti u tom smislu gore navedenu presudu Albacom and Infostrada, t. 35.). U tom pogledu nametanje vrlo visoke naknade koja pokriva opće troškove procijenjene za razdoblje od 30 godina može ozbiljno narušiti tržišno natjecanje, kao što to nacionalni sud ističe u svojim prethodnim pitanjima, i relevantni je faktor u toj ocjeni.
72 The reply to the second question must therefore be that Article 10 EC, read in conjunction with Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13, requires the national court to ascertain whether legislation which is clearly incompatible with Community law, such as that on which the fee assessments at issue in the main proceedings are based, constitutes manifest unlawfulness within the meaning of the national law concerned. If that is the case, it is for the national court to draw the necessary conclusions under its national law with regard to the withdrawal of those assessments. 
72 Zato na drugo pitanje valja odgovoriti da članak 10. UEZ-a, u vezi s člankom 11. stavkom 1. Direktive 97/13, zahtijeva od nacionalnog suda da odredi predstavlja li pravni propis koji je očito nespojiv s pravom Zajednice, kao što je onaj na kojem se temelje odluke o visini naknade o kojima je riječ u glavnom postupku, očitu nezakonitost u smislu dotičnog nacionalnog prava. Ako je to slučaj, na nacionalnom sudu je da utvrdi sve posljedice koje u skladu s nacionalnim pravom iz toga proizlaze u pogledu povlačenja tih odluka.
73 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. 
73 Budući da ovi postupci imaju značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka. Troškovi podnošenja očitovanja Sudu, koji nisu troškovi spomenutih stranaka, ne nadoknađuju se.
1. Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services precludes the application of a fee for individual licences calculated by taking into account the regulatory body’s general administrative costs linked to implementing those licences over a period of 30 years. 
1. Članku 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 10. travnja 1997. o zajedničkom okviru za opća ovlaštenja i pojedinačne dozvole u području telekomunikacijskih usluga protivna je primjena naknade za pojedinačne dozvole koja se izračunava tako da se uzimaju u obzir opći upravni troškovi regulatornog tijela povezani s izradom tih dozvola za razdoblje od 30 godina.
2. Article 10 EC, read in conjunction with Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13, requires the national court to ascertain whether legislation which is clearly incompatible with Community law, such as that on which the fee assessments at issue in the main proceedings are based, constitutes manifest unlawfulness within the meaning of the national law concerned. If that is the case, it is for the national court to draw the necessary conclusions under its national law with regard to the withdrawal of those assessments. 
2. Članak 10. UEZ-a u vezi s člankom 11. stavkom 1. Direktive 97/13 zahtijeva od nacionalnog suda da odredi predstavlja li pravni propis koji je očito nespojiv s pravom Zajednice, kao što je onaj na kojem se temelje odluke o visini naknade o kojima je riječ u glavnom postupku, očitu nezakonitost u smislu dotičnog nacionalnog prava. Ako je to slučaj, na nacionalnom sudu je da utvrdi sve posljedice koje u skladu s nacionalnim pravom iz toga proizlaze u pogledu povlačenja tih odluka.
* Language of the cases: German. 
* Jezik postupka: njemački.
18 July 2007 (*) 
18. srpnja 2007. (*)
(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Judgment of the Court establishing the failure to fulfil obligations – Non-implementation – Article 228 EC – Measures necessary to comply with the judgment of the Court – Rescission of a contract) 
„Povreda obveze države članice - Presuda Suda kojom se utvrđuje povreda obveze - Neizvršenje - Članak 228. UEZ-a - Mjere potrebne za izvršenje presude Suda - Raskid ugovora”
In Case C-503/04, 
U predmetu C-503/04,
ACTION under Article 228 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, brought on 7 December 2004, 
povodom tužbe zbog povrede obveze na temelju članka 228. UEZ-a, podnesene 7. prosinca 2004.,
Commission of the European Communities, represented by B. Schima, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg, applicant, 
Komisija Europskih zajednica, koju zastupa B. Schima, u svojstvu agenta, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu, tužitelj,
Federal Republic of Germany, represented by W.-D. Plessing and C. Schulze-Bahr, acting as Agents, and H.-J. Prieß, Rechtsanwalt, 
Savezne Republike Njemačke, koju zastupaju W.-D. Plessing i C. Schulze-Bahr, u svojstvu agenata, uz asistenciju H.-J. Prieß, Rechtsanwalt,
French Republic, represented by G. de Bergues and J.-C. Gracia, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg, 
Francuska Republika, koju zastupaju G. de Bergues i J.-C. Gracia, u svojstvu agenata, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu,
Kingdom of the Netherlands, represented by H.G. Sevenster and D.J.M. de Grave, acting as Agents, 
Kraljevina Nizozemska, koju zastupaju H. G. Sevenster i D. J. M. de Grave, u svojstvu agenata,
Republic of Finland, represented by T. Pynnä, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg, 
Republika Finska, koju zastupa T. Pynnä, u svojstvu agenta, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu,
composed of C.W.A. Timmermans (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, P. Kūris, K. Schiemann, J. Makarczyk and J.-C. Bonichot, Judges, 
u sastavu: C. W. A. Timmermans (izvjestitelj), predsjednik vijeća, P. Kūris, K. Schiemann, J. Makarczyk i J.-C. Bonichot, suci,
having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 7 December 2006, 
uzimajući u obzir pisani postupak i nakon rasprave održane 7. prosinca 2006.,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 28 March 2007, 
saslušavši mišljenje nezavisne odvjetnice na raspravi održanoj 28. ožujka 2007.,