natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
1. Does the right to apply for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom and the right to have that application considered constitute a social advantage within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68? 
„1. Jesu li pravo na podnošenje zahtjeva za boravak na državnom području Ujedinjene Kraljevine na neodređeno vrijeme i pravo da taj zahtjev bude razmotren „socijalna povlastica" u smislu članka 7. stavka 2. Uredbe br. 1612/68?
2. Does the requirement imposed on the spouses of EC nationals to have been resident in the United Kingdom for four years before an application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom may be made and considered (see paragraph 255 of the United Kingdom Immigration Rules, House of Commons Paper 395), as compared to a requirement of 12 months' residence before such application can be made, as is applied to spouses of UK nationals and spouses of those present and settled in the United Kingdom (paragraph 287 of the United Kingdom Immigration Rules, House of Commons Paper 395), constitute unlawful discrimination contrary to Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68? 
2. Čini li uvjet koji se primjenjuje prema bračnim drugovima državljana Zajednice u vidu obveze boravka u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini tijekom četiri godine prije nego što mogu podnijeti zahtjev za boravak na državnom području Ujedinjene Kraljevine na neodređeno vrijeme, a da taj zahtjev bude razmotren (vidjeti članak 255. Immigration Rules, House of Commons Paper 395), u usporedbi s uvjetom boravka od 12 mjeseci prije podnošenja zahtjeva, koji se primjenjuje na bračne drugove državljana Ujedinjene Kraljevine i bračne drugove osoba koje su prisutne i nastanjene u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini (članak 287. Immigration Rules, House of Commons Paper 395), nezakonitu diskriminaciju protivnu članku 7. stavku 2. Uredbe br. 1612/68?"
23 The hearing before the Court took place on 15 June 1999 and the Advocate General delivered his Opinion on 30 September 1999 ( the first Opinion). 
23 Rasprava pred Sudom održana je 15. lipnja 1999., a nezavisni odvjetnik iznio je svoje mišljenje 30. rujna 1999. (u daljnjem tekstu: prvo mišljenje).
An English version of this Opinion was sent to Mr Kaba on 27 January 2000. 
Engleska inačica mišljenja poslana je A. Kabi 27. siječnja 2000.
24 By fax of 3 February 2000, Mr Kaba informed the Court of his doubts as to the accuracy of certain factual issues on which the first Opinion appeared to be based. 
24 A. Kaba je faksimilom od 3. veljače 2000. obavijestio Sud o svojim sumnjama u točnost određenih činjenica na kojima je prvo mišljenje naizgled bilo zasnovano.
Arguing that these inaccuracies amounted to exceptional grounds justifying the re-opening of the oral procedure, Mr Kaba stated that further observations would shortly be lodged. 
Tvrdeći da su ove netočnosti izniman razlog koji ponovno otvaranje usmenog postupka čini osnovanim, A. Kaba je najavio da će uskoro biti podnesena daljnja očitovanja.
25 By fax dated 16 March 2000 Mr Kaba submitted further written observations, which concluded as follows: The points made above are demonstrated by the documents already submitted to the Court. 
25 A. Kaba je faksimilom od 16. ožujka 2000. podnio daljnja pismena očitovanja u kojima je zaključeno kako slijedi: „Gore navedene točke dokazane su pomoću isprava koje su već podnesene Sudu.
However, if the Court considers that it is necessary to reopen the oral procedure to ensure that it fully understands the critical facts and corrects any erroneous conclusions reached by the Advocate General, Mr Kaba's representatives would offer the Court every assistance. 
Međutim, ako Sud smatra da je potrebno ponovno otvoriti usmeni postupak s ciljem potpunog razumijevanja presudnih činjenica i ispravljanja pogrešnih zaključaka nezavisnog odvjetnika, zastupnici A. Kabe ponudili bi Sudu svaku potrebnu pomoć."
26 By letter dated 31 March 2000, the Registrar of the Court acknowledged receipt of these further written submissions and pointed out, for Mr Kaba's information, that the Rules of Procedure of the Court made no provision for the submission of observations after the oral procedure had been closed. In those circumstances, the submissions were returned and were not accepted as forming part of the Court file. 
26 U dopisu od 31. ožujka 2000. tajnik Suda potvrdio je primitak daljnjih pismenih podnesaka i naglasio, u svrhu informiranja A. Kabe, da Poslovnik Suda ne predviđa podnošenje očitovanja nakon zaključenja usmenog postupka. U tim su okolnostima podnesci vraćeni i nisu prihvaćeni kao dio sudskog spisa.
27 In its judgment of 11 April 2000 in Case C-356/98 Kaba [2000] ECR I-2623, as rectified by an unpublished order of 4 May 2001, the Court ruled as follows: Legislation of a Member State which requires spouses of migrant workers who are nationals of other Member States to have resided in the territory of that Member State for four years before they become entitled to apply for indefinite leave to remain and to have their applications considered, but which requires residence of only 12 months for the spouses of persons who are present and settled in that territory and are not subject to any restriction on the period for which they may remain there, does not constitute discrimination contrary to Article 7(2) of Regulation ... No 1612/68 .... 
27 U svojoj presudi od 11. travnja 2000., Kaba (C-356/98, Zb., str. I-2623.), kako je ispravljena rješenjem od 4. svibnja 2001. (nije objavljeno u Zborniku), Sud je odlučio kako slijedi: „Propis države članice prema kojem bračni drugovi radnika migranata koji su državljani drugih država članica moraju boraviti na državnom području države članice četiri godine prije nego što steknu pravo na podnošenje zahtjeva za boravak na neodređeno vrijeme i na razmatranje istoga, ali prema kojem se od bračnih drugova osoba koje su prisutne i nastanjene na tom državnom području zahtijeva boravak od samo 12 mjeseci i koje ujedno ne podliježu nikakvim ograničenjima razdoblja boravka, nije diskriminacija protivna članku 7. stavku 2. Uredbe [...] br. 1612/68 [...]"
28 Following that judgment, Mr Kaba argued before the Immigration Adjudicator that the first Opinion was based on a misunderstanding of the facts found in the first order for reference and of the relevant national law. 
28 Nakon te presude A. Kaba je istaknuo pred Immigration Adjudicatorom da se prvo mišljenje zasniva na netočnom razumijevanju činjenica iz prve odluke kojom se upućuje prethodno pitanje i relevantnog nacionalnog prava.
29 Mr Kaba contended, first, that the Court had erroneously treated indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom as being significantly more secure or more stable than the status which EC nationals have within that Member State. 
29 A. Kaba, kao prvo, smatra da je boravak u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini na neodređeno vrijeme Sud pogrešno okvalificirao kao status koji je puno sigurniji ili stabilniji od statusa koji u toj državi članici imaju državljani EZ-a.
That treatment may, according to the Immigration Adjudicator, have been influenced by the Opinion of the Advocate General, who had construed the observations made by the United Kingdom Government as providing justification for the difference in treatment found to have been made between a person such as Mr Kaba and the spouse of a person present and settled in the United Kingdom. 
Na takvu je kvalifikaciju, prema mišljenju Immigration Adjudicatora, moglo utjecati mišljenje nezavisnog odvjetnika koji je očitovanja vlade Ujedinjene Kraljevine protumačio na način da čine osnovanom utvrđenu razliku između postupanja prema osobi kao što je A. Kaba i postupanja prema bračnom drugu osobe koja je prisutna i nastanjena u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini.
Those observations were, however, based in reality on the comparability of situations. 
Međutim, ta su očitovanja ustvari bila zasnovana na usporedivosti situacija.
The issue of justification was not raised in the proceedings before the Court. 
Pitanje osnovanosti nije bilo postavljeno u postupku pred Sudom.
30 Second, Mr Kaba submitted that the Advocate General had reappraised the facts underlying the case in the main proceedings. 
30 Kao drugo, A. Kaba tvrdi da je nezavisni odvjetnik rekvalificirao činjenice u osnovi glavnog predmeta.
The Immigration Adjudicator endorsed that argument in so far as, in her view, the only critical feature in the first order for reference was the difference between the periods of residency required of the two categories of persons in question. 
Immigration Adjudicator se slaže s navedenim argumentom jer je, prema njezinome mišljenju, jedina kritična stavka u prvoj odluci kojom se upućuje prethodno pitanje bila razlika u trajanju boravka koje se zahtijeva od dotične dvije kategorije osoba.
31 The Immigration Adjudicator pointed out that, while leave to remain indefinitely in the United Kingdom could not be subject to an express condition as to the duration of its validity, that was also the case with regard to the right of residence of a worker who is a national of a Member State. 
31 Immigration Adjudicator naglasila je da ako odobrenje boravka u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini na neodređeno vrijeme ne može podlijegati izričitom uvjetu u odnosu na trajanje njegove valjanosti, isto vrijedi u odnosu na pravo boravka radnika koji je državljanin države članice.
She further took the view that once a person with indefinite leave to remain leaves the United Kingdom, his leave lapses under section 3(4) of the Immigration Act 1971 and he is required to obtain fresh leave to enter, subject to fulfilling the conditions laid down in paragraph 18 of the Immigration Rules. 
Nadalje je zauzela stajalište da jednom kada osoba s odobrenjem boravka na neodređeno vrijeme napusti Ujedinjenu Kraljevinu, njezino odobrenje prestaje na temelju članka 3. stavka 4. Zakona o useljeništvu iz 1971. te je dužna ishoditi novo odobrenje ulaska, podložno ispunjenju uvjeta predviđenih u članku 18. Immigration Rules.
The Immigration Adjudicator also noted that both persons with indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom and workers who are EC nationals can be deported from that Member State on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 
Immigration Adjudicator također je primijetila da osobe s odobrenjem boravka u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini na neodređeno vrijeme i radnici koji su državljani EZ-a mogu biti protjerani iz te države članice zbog razloga javnog poretka, javne sigurnosti ili javnog zdravlja.
32 Mr Kaba also referred to the established practice of the Nationality Directorate of the Home Office of treating nationals of Member States as being settled in the United Kingdom, this being an additional factor tending to show that spouses of Community nationals are in a comparable situation to that of spouses of United Kingdom nationals and persons settled in the United Kingdom. 
32 A. Kaba također se pozvao na postojeću praksu Nationality Directorate of the Home Office (Uprava za državljanstvo Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova) prema kojoj se prema državljanima država članica postupa kao da su nastanjeni u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini, što je dodatni čimbenik koji može poslužiti kao dokaz da se bračni drugovi državljana Zajednice nalaze u situaciji koja je usporediva sa situacijom bračnih drugova državljana Ujedinjene Kraljevine i osoba nastanjenih u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini.
Regarding this latter point, the Immigration Adjudicator did not make any further finding as the matter had not been fully argued before her. 
Immigration Adjudicator nije utvrdila dodatne činjenice u odnosu na potonju točku budući da joj nije u cijelosti izložena.
33 Third, the Immigration Adjudicator found that the Advocate General had stated, at paragraph 3 of the first Opinion, that the EEA Order was not of concern to United Kingdom citizens and their families. 
33 Kao treće, Immigration Adjudicator utvrdila je da je nezavisni odvjetnik u točki 3. prvog mišljenja naveo da se EEA Order ne odnosi na građane Ujedinjene Kraljevine i njihove obitelji.
That statement, it was claimed, was incorrect in so far as the EEA Order applies, pursuant to the judgment in Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, to all those United Kingdom citizens and their families who return to the United Kingdom after having exercised their rights under the Treaty in another Member State. 
Međutim, ta je izjava netočna u smislu da se EEA Order primjenjuje, na temelju presude od 7. srpnja 1992., Singh (C-370/90, Zb., str. I-4265.), na sve građane Ujedinjene Kraljevine i njihove obitelji koji se vraćaju u Ujedinjenu Kraljevinu nakon što su u drugoj državi članici ostvarivali svoja prava koja proizlaze iz Ugovora.
34 In those circumstances, the Immigration Adjudicator was unsure whether the proceedings before the Court had been conducted in accordance with Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 ( the ECHR). 
34 U tim okolnostima Immigration Adjudicator nije bila sigurna je li postupak pred Sudom proveden u skladu s člankom 6. stavkom 1. Europske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda koja je potpisana u Rimu 4. studenoga 1950. (u daljnjem tekstu: EKLJP).
She pointed out in this connection that the proceedings before the Court formed an integral part of the proceedings before her and that she was therefore responsible for any infringement of Article 6 that might have occurred. 
S tim u vezi naglasila je da je postupak pred Sudom sastavni dio postupka koji se vodi pred njom i da je prema tome odgovorna za svako eventualno kršenje članka 6.
She referred in this context to the order in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-665. 
U ovom se kontekstu pozvala na rješenje od 4. veljače 2000., Emesa Sugar (C-17/98, Zb., str. I-665.).
35 The Immigration Adjudicator also referred to certain doubts concerning the reply in the abovementioned judgment in Kaba to the questions which had been submitted to the Court. 
35 Immigration Adjudicator također se pozvala na određene sumnje u vezi s odgovorom na prethodna pitanja danim u gore navedenoj presudi Kaba.
36 Under those circumstances the Immigration Adjudicator decided to stay the proceedings for a second time and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: 
36 U tim okolnostima Immigration Adjudicator odlučila je prekinuti postupak drugi put i uputiti Sudu sljedeća prethodna pitanja:
1. What mechanisms are there for the referring court or the parties to the proceedings (before the referring court and the ECJ) to ensure that the totality of the proceedings comply with the obligations under Article 6 ECHR and therefore to ensure that no liability for breach of Article 6 ECHR arises either under the domestic human rights statute or before the Court of Human Rights? and 
„1. (a) Koji su mehanizmi na raspolaganju sudu koji je uputio zahtjev ili strankama u postupku (pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev i Sudom) kako bi se osiguralo da je cijeli postupak u skladu s obvezama iz članka 6. EKLJP-a te, posljedično, kako bi se osiguralo da iz nacionalnog zakonodavstva o ljudskim pravima ili pred Europskim sudom za ljudska prava ne proizlazi odgovornost za kršenje članka 6. EKLJP-a?
2. Was the procedure followed in this case in compliance with the requirements of Article 6 ECHR and, if not, how does this affect the validity of the first judgment? 
(b) Je li postupak primijenjen u ovom predmetu u skladu sa zahtjevima članka 6. EKLJP-a te, ako nije, na koji način to utječe na valjanost prve presude?
2: The Immigration Adjudicator having found that the Appellant and the spouse of a person present and settled in the United Kingdom were (or would be) afforded different treatment in that 
2. Immigration Adjudicator utvrdila je da se na podnositelja žalbe primjenjuje (ili vjerojatno primjenjuje) drukčiji tretman nego na bračnog druga osobe koja je prisutna i nastanjena u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini jer je
(a) the Appellant, having entered the United Kingdom as the spouse of an EU citizen exercising free movement rights, was required to have been in the United Kingdom for four years before he could apply for indefinite leave to remain, whereas 
(a) podnositelj žalbe, nakon što je ušao u Ujedinjenu Kraljevinu kao bračni drug državljanina EU-a, ostvarujući svoja prava na slobodu kretanja, dužan provesti u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini četiri godine za stjecanje uvjeta za boravak na neodređeno vrijeme, dok
(b) the spouse of a person who was present and settled in the United Kingdom (whether a British national or as a person who had been granted indefinite leave to remain) would qualify after one year for indefinite leave to remain. 
(b) bračni drug osobe koja je u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini prisutna i nastanjena (kao britanski državljanin ili kao osoba koja je dobila odobrenje boravka na neodređeno vrijeme) stječe uvjete za boravak na neodređeno vrijeme nakon jedne godine.
No evidence (or argument) concerning justification of the differential treatment between the applicant and such a spouse of a person present and settled having been presented to the referring court either at the hearing leading up to the Order for Reference of 25 September 1998, in the written or oral observations made by the Respondent before the European Court of Justice or the hearing leading up to the present Order for Reference, despite the request by the Adjudicator for full argument, the Immigration Adjudicator asks 
Budući da sudu koji je uputio zahtjev nisu podneseni dokazi (ili argumenti) u vezi osnovanosti različitog postupanja prema podnositelju i bračnom drugu osobe koja je prisutna i nastanjena na raspravi koja je dovela do odluke kojom se upućuje prethodno pitanje od 25. rujna 1998., u pismenim ili usmenim očitovanjima tuženika pred Sudom Europske unije ili na raspravi koja je dovela do sadašnje odluke kojom se upućuje prethodno pitanje, usprkos zahtjevu Adjudicatora za cjelovitost argumenta, Immigration Adjudicator postavlja sljedeća pitanja:
1. Whatever the answer to the first question set out above, is the Court's judgment of 11 April 2000 in this case (Case C-356/98) to be interpreted as stating that, in these circumstances, there was discrimination contrary to Article 39 EC and/or Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68? 
i. Bez obzira na to kakav je odgovor na gore utvrđeno prvo pitanje, treba li presudu od 11. travnja 2000. u ovom predmetu (C-356/98) tumačiti na način da određuje da je u tim okolnostima došlo do diskriminacije protivne članku 39. UEZ-a i/ili članku 7. stavku 2. Uredbe br. 1612/68?
2. After re-assessment of the facts, is there discrimination contrary to Article 39 EC and/or Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68? Concerning the questions submitted for preliminary ruling 
ii. Nakon ponovnog pregleda činjenica, postoji li diskriminacija protivna članku 39. UEZ-a i/ili članku 7. stavku 2. Uredbe br. 1612/68?" O prethodnim pitanjima
37 In order to reply most usefully to the Immigration Adjudicator, it is appropriate to begin by examining the second question submitted. 
37 S ciljem davanja korisnog odgovora Immigration Adjudicatoru, valja početi s ispitivanjem drugog upućenog pitanja.
38 By its second question, the national tribunal is asking essentially whether the reply which the Court, in its judgment in Kaba , gave to the questions referred would have been different had the Court taken account of the facts, first, that the situation under national law of the spouse of a migrant worker who is a national of a Member State other than the United Kingdom and the situation of the spouse of a person present and settled in the United Kingdom are in all respects comparable except with regard to the prior period of residence required for the purpose of being granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom and, second, that no argument was submitted by the competent authorities of the United Kingdom to justify such a difference in treatment. 
38 Svojim drugim pitanjem, sud koje je uputio zahtjev u biti pita bi li odgovor koji je Sud u svojoj presudi Kaba dao na upućena pitanja bio drukčiji da je Sud uzeo u obzir činjenice, kao prvo, da su situacija u kojoj se prema nacionalnom pravu nalazi bračni drug radnika migranta koji je državljanin države članice koja nije Ujedinjena Kraljevina i situacija u kojoj se nalazi bračni drug osobe koja je prisutna i nastanjena u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini usporedive u svakom pogledu osim u odnosu na razdoblje prethodnog boravka koje je potrebno u svrhu odobrenja boravka u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini na neodređeno vrijeme i, kao drugo, da nadležna tijela Ujedinjene Kraljevine nisu istaknula nikakav argument kojim bi razliku u postupanju učinila osnovanom.
39 It should be noted at the outset that the authority of a preliminary ruling does not preclude the national court or tribunal to which it is addressed from taking the view that it is necessary to make a further reference to the Court before giving judgment in the main proceedings. 
39 Valja primijetiti odmah na početku da obvezujući učinak odluke o prethodnom pitanju ne sprječava nacionalni sud kojem je upućena da procijeni da postoji potreba upućivanja dodatnog prethodnog pitanja Sudu prije donošenja presude u glavnom postupku.
Such a procedure may be justified when the national court or tribunal encounters difficulties in understanding or applying the judgment, when it refers a fresh question of law to the Court, or again when it submits new considerations which might lead the Court to give a different answer to a question submitted earlier (order in Case 69/85 Wünsche [1986] ECR 947, paragraph 15). 
Takav postupak može biti osnovan kada nacionalni sud naiđe na poteškoće u razumijevanju ili primijeni presude, kada Sudu uputi novo pravno prethodno pitanje ili kada podnese nove činjenice na razmatranje koje mogu navesti Sud da donese drukčiji odgovor na ranije postavljeno pitanje (rješenje od 5. ožujka 1986., Wünsche, 69/85, Zb., str. 947., t. 15.).
40 The Court has, moreover, consistently ruled that, as the power to formulate the questions to be referred is vested in the national court or tribunal alone, the parties cannot alter the wording of those questions (Case 5/72 Grassi [1972] ECR 443, paragraph 4, and Case C-297/94 Bruyère and Others [1996] ECR I-1551, paragraph 19). 
40 Usto, Sud je bio dosljedan u svojoj sudskoj praksi da mogućnost utvrđivanja pitanja koja treba uputiti Sudu ima samo nacionalni sud, a stranke u glavnom postupku ne mogu promijeniti njihov smisao (presude od 15. lipnja 1972., Grassi, 5/72, Zb., str. 443., t. 4., i od 21. ožujka 1996., Bruyère i dr., C-297/94, Zb., str. I-1551., t. 19.).
41 It follows that the Court must in principle confine its examination to the matters which the court or tribunal making the reference has decided to submit to it for consideration. 
41 Iz navedenoga slijedi da Sud u načelu treba ograničiti svoj pregled na ona pitanja koja mu sud koji upućuje prethodno pitanje podnese na očitovanje.
The Court must therefore, as regards application of the relevant national rules, proceed on the basis of the situation which that court or tribunal considers to be established; it cannot be bound by suppositions raised by one of the parties to the main proceedings which the national court or tribunal has merely reproduced but on which it has not expressed an opinion. 
Kada se radi o primjeni odgovarajućeg nacionalnog propisa Sud se dakle treba držati situacije koju taj sud smatra utvrđenom; ne može biti vezan pretpostavkama koje je istaknula jedna od stranaka u glavnom postupku, a koje je nacionalni sud ponovio, ali o kojima nije izrazio svoje mišljenje.