natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
56 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first part of Question 1 and to Questions 2 and 3 must be that Directive 2000/78, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (2)(a) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by those provisions is not limited only to people who are themselves disabled. 
56 S obzirom na prethodna razmatranja, na prvi dio prvog pitanja te na drugo i treće pitanje valja odgovoriti da se Direktiva 2000/78, a posebno njezin članak 1., članak 2. stavak 1. i stavak 2. točka (a), moraju tumačiti na način da zabrana izravne diskriminacije utvrđena tim odredbama nije ograničena samo na osobe koje su same osobe s invaliditetom.
Where an employer treats an employee who is not himself disabled less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and it is established that the less favourable treatment of that employee is based on the disability of his child, whose care is provided primarily by that employee, such treatment is contrary to the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by Article 2(2)(a). 
Ako poslodavac prema radniku koji sam nije osoba s invaliditetom postupa nepovoljnije nego što postupa, je postupao ili bi postupao prema drugom radniku u usporedivoj situaciji, te se utvrdi da se nepovoljnije postupanje prema tom radniku temelji na invaliditetu njegova djeteta koje njeguje prvenstveno taj radnik, takvo se postupanje protivi zabrani izravne diskriminacije utvrđene člankom 2. stavkom 2. točkom (a).
The second part of Question 1, and Question 4 
Drugi dio prvog pitanja i četvrto pitanje
57 By these questions, which should be examined together, the referring tribunal asks, in essence, whether Directive 2000/78, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (3) thereof, must be interpreted as prohibiting harassment related to disability only in respect of an employee who is himself disabled, or whether the prohibition of harassment applies equally to an employee who is not himself disabled but who, as in the present case, is the victim of unwanted conduct amounting to harassment related to the disability of his child, for whom he is the primary provider of the care required by virtue of the child's condition. 
57 Ovim pitanjima, koje valja ispitati zajedno, sud koji je uputio zahtjev u biti pita mora li se Direktiva 2000/78, a posebno njezin članak 1. i članak 2. stavci 1. i 3., tumačiti na način da zabranjuje uznemiravanje povezano s invaliditetom samo u odnosu na radnika koji je sam osoba s invaliditetom ili se zabrana uznemiravanja primjenjuje jednako na radnika koji sam nije osoba s invaliditetom, ali je, kao što je riječ u glavnom postupku, žrtva nepoželjnog postupanja s ishodom uznemiravanja povezanog s invaliditetom njegova djeteta, za koje je on primarni pružatelj njege koja je djetetu potrebna zbog njegovog zdravstvenog stanja.
58 Since, under Article 2(3) of Directive 2000/78, harassment is deemed to be a form of discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(1), it must be held that, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 34 to 51 of this judgment, that directive, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (3) thereof, must be interpreted as not being limited to the prohibition of harassment of people who are themselves disabled. 
58 Budući da se prema članku 2. stavku 3. Direktive 2000/78 smatra da je uznemiravanje oblik diskriminacije u smislu stavka 1. tog članka, valja istaknuti da se iz istih razloga kao što su oni u točkama 34. do 51. ove presude, ta direktiva, a posebno njezin članak 1. i članak 2. stavci 1. i 3., mora tumačiti na način da zabrana uznemiravanja nije ograničena samo na osobe s invaliditetom.
59 Where it is established that the unwanted conduct amounting to harassment which is suffered by an employee who is not himself disabled is related to the disability of his child, whose care is provided primarily by that employee, such conduct is contrary to the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Directive 2000/78 and, in particular, to the prohibition of harassment laid down by Article 2(3) thereof. 
59 Ako se utvrdi da je nepoželjno postupanje s ishodom uznemiravanja, koje trpi radnik koji sam nije osoba s invaliditetom, povezano s invaliditetom njegova djeteta koje njeguje prvenstveno taj radnik, takvo se postupanje protivi načelu jednakog postupanja iz Direktive 2000/78, a posebno zabrani uznemiravanja utvrđenoj njezinim člankom 2. stavkom 3.
60 In that regard, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that, according to the actual wording of Article 2(3) of the directive, the concept of harassment may be defined in accordance with the national laws and practice of the Member States. 
60 U tom smislu ipak valja podsjetiti da se, sukladno sadržaju članka 2. stavka 3. direktive, pojam uznemiravanja može definirati u skladu s nacionalnim zakonodavstvom i praksom država članica.
61 With regard to the burden of proof which applies in situations such as that in the main proceedings, it must be observed that, since harassment is deemed to be a form of discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/78, the same rules apply to harassment as those set out in paragraphs 52 to 55 of this judgment. 
61 U odnosu na teret dokaza, koji se primjenjuje u situaciji kao što je ona u glavnom postupku, valja primijetiti da se na uznemiravanje primjenjuju jednaka pravila kao ona u točkama 52. do 55. ove presude, budući da se uznemiravanje smatra oblikom diskriminacije u smislu članka 2. stavka 1. Direktive 2000/78.
62 Consequently, as is apparent from paragraph 54 of this judgment, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Directive 2000/78 and recital 31 in the preamble thereto, the rules on the burden of proof must be adapted when there is a prima facie case of discrimination. 
62 Kao posljedica toga, iz točke 54. ove presude proizlazi da se, u skladu sa člankom 10. stavkom 1. Direktive 2000/78 i njezinom uvodnom izjavom 31., pravila o teretu dokaza moraju prilagoditi kada postoji pretpostavka diskriminacije.
In the event that Ms Coleman establishes facts from which it may be presumed that there has been harassment, the effective application of the principle of equal treatment then requires that the burden of proof should fall on the respondents, who must prove that there has been no harassment in the circumstances of the present case. 
U slučaju da S. Coleman utvrdi činjenice iz kojih se može pretpostaviti da je došlo do uznemiravanja, djelotvorna primjena načela jednakog postupanja tada zahtijeva da teret dokaza padne na tuženike koji bi trebali dokazati da nije bilo uznemiravanja u okolnostima ovoga predmeta.
63 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second part of Question 1 and to Question 4 must be that Directive 2000/78, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (3) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition of harassment laid down by those provisions is not limited only to people who are themselves disabled. 
63 S obzirom na prethodna razmatranja, na drugi dio prvog pitanja te na četvrto pitanje valja odgovoriti da se Direktiva 2000/78, a posebno njezin članak 1. i članak 2. stavci 1. i 3., moraju tumačiti na način da zabrana uznemiravanja, utvrđena tim odredbama, nije ograničena samo na osobe s invaliditetom.
Where it is established that the unwanted conduct amounting to harassment which is suffered by an employee who is not himself disabled is related to the disability of his child, whose care is provided primarily by that employee, such conduct is contrary to the prohibition of harassment laid down by Article 2(3). 
Ako se utvrdi da je nepoželjno postupanje s ishodom uznemiravanja, koje trpi radnik koji sam nije osoba s invaliditetom, povezano s invaliditetom njegova djeteta koje njeguje prvenstveno taj radnik, takvo se postupanje protivi zabrani uznemiravanja utvrđenoj u članku 2. stavku 3.
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules: 
Slijedom navedenoga, Sud (treće vijeće) odlučuje:
1. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (2)(a) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by those provisions is not limited only to people who are themselves disabled. 
1. Direktiva 2000/78/EZ od 27. studenoga 2000. o uspostavi općeg okvira za jednako postupanje pri zapošljavanju i obavljanju zanimanja, a posebno njezin članak 1., i članak 2. stavak 1. i stavak 2. točka (a), moraju se tumačiti na način da zabrana izravne diskriminacije utvrđena tim odredbama nije ograničena samo na osobe s invaliditetom.
2. Directive 2000/78, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (3) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition of harassment laid down by those provisions is not limited only to people who are themselves disabled. 
2. Direktiva 2000/78, a posebno njezin članak 1. i članak 2. stavci 1. i 3., moraju se tumačiti na način da zabrana uznemiravanja, utvrđena tim odredbama, nije ograničena samo na osobe s invaliditetom.
(Maritime transport - Ship-source pollution - Directive 2005/35/EC - Validity - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Marpol 73/78 Convention - Legal effects of the Conventions - Ability to rely on them - Serious negligence - Principle of legal certainty) 
„Pomorski promet - Onečišćenje mora s brodova - Direktiva 2005/35/EZ - Valjanost - Konvencija iz Montego Baya - Konvencija MARPOL 73/78 - Pravni učinci - Mogućnost isticanja - Teški nemar - Načelo pravne sigurnosti"
REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court), made by decision of 4 July 2006, received at the Court on 14 July 2006, in the proceedings 
povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 234. Ugovora o EZ-u, koji je uputio High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen's Bench Division (Visoki sud, Engleska i Wales, Odjel Queen's Bench, Upravni sud, Ujedinjena Kraljevina), odlukom od 4. srpnja 2006., koju je Sud zaprimio 14. srpnja 2006., u postupku
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), 
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko),
International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), 
International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo),
Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, 
Greek Shipping Co - operation Committee,
Lloyd's Register, 
Lloyd's Register,
International Salvage Union, 
International Salvage Union,
v Secretary of State for Transport, 
protiv Secretary of State for Transport,
composed of V. Skouris, President, P. Jann, C.W.A. Timmermans, A. Rosas, K. Lenaerts, L. Bay Larsen, Presidents of Chambers, K. Schiemann, J. Makarczyk, P. Kūris, J. Malenovský (Rapporteur), A. Ó Caoimh, P. Lindh and J.-C. Bonichot, Judges, 
u sastavu: V. Skouris, predsjednik, P. Jann, C. W. A. Timmermans, A. Rosas, K. Lenaerts, L. Bay Larsen, predsjednici vijeća, K. Schiemann, J. Makarczyk, P. Kūris, J. Malenovský (izvjestitelj), A. Ó Caoimh, P. Lindh i J. - C. Bonichot, suci,
Advocate General: J. Kokott, 
nezavisna odvjetnica: J. Kokott,
Registrars: L. Hewlett, Principal Administrator, and C. Strömholm, Administrator, 
tajnici: L. Hewlett, glavna administratorica i C. Strömholm, administratorica,
the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Lloyd's Register and the International Salvage Union, by C. Greenwood QC and H. Mercer, barrister, 
za International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), Greek Shipping Co - operation Committee, Lloyd's Register i International Salvage Union, C. Greenwood, QC i H. Mercer, barrister,
the United Kingdom Government, by C. Gibbs, acting as Agent, assisted by C. Lewis and S. Wordsworth, barristers, 
za vladu Ujedinjene Kraljevine, C. Gibbs, u svojstvu agenta, uz asistenciju C. Lewisa i S. Wordswortha, barristers,
the Danish Government, by J. Bering Liisberg and B. Weis Fogh, acting as Agents, 
za dansku vladu, J. Bering Liisberg i B. Weis Fogh, u svojstvu agenata,
the Greek Government, by A. Samoni-Rantou, S. Khala and G. Karipsiadis, acting as Agents, 
za grčku vladu, A. SamonI-Rantou, S. Khala i G. Karipsiadis, u svojstvu agenata,
the Spanish Government, by M. Sampol Pucurull, acting as Agent, 
za španjolsku vladu, M. Sampol Pucurull, u svojstvu agenta,
the French Government, by G. de Bergues, L. Butel and C. Jurgensen, acting as Agents, 
za francusku vladu, G. de Bergues, L. Butel i C. Jurgensen, u svojstvu agenata,
the Italian Government, by I.M. Braguglia, acting as Agent, assisted by P. Gentili, avvocato dello Stato, 
za talijansku vladu, I. M. Braguglia, u svojstvu agenta, uz asistenciju P. Gentilija, avvocato dello Stato,
the Cypriot Government, by D. Lisandrou and N. Kharalampidou, acting as Agents, 
za ciparsku vladu, D. Lysandrou i N. Kharalampidou, u svojstvu agenata,
the Maltese Government, by S. Camilleri, acting as Agent, 
za maltešku vladu, S. Camilleri, u svojstvu agenta,
the Swedish Government, by K. Wistrand and A. Falk, acting as Agents, 
za švedsku vladu, K. Wistrand i A. Falk, u svojstvu agenata,
the European Parliament, by M. Gómez-Leal and J. Rodrigues, acting as Agents, 
za Europski parlament, M. Gómez-Leal i J. Rodrigues, u svojstvu agenata,
the Council of the European Union, by E. Karlsson and E. Chaboureau, acting as Agents, 
za Vijeće Europske unije, E. Karlsson i E. Chaboureau, u svojstvu agenata,
the Commission of the European Communities, by K. Simonsson, H. Ringbom and F. Hoffmeister, acting as Agents, 
za Komisiju Europskih zajednica, K. Simonsson, H. Ringbom i F. Hoffmeister, u svojstvu agenata,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 20 November 2007, 
saslušavši mišljenje nezavisne odvjetnice na raspravi održanoj 20. studenoga 2007.,
1 This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the validity of Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements (OJ 2005 L 255, p. 11; corrigenda at OJ 2006 L 33, p. 87, and OJ 2006 L 105, p. 65). 
1 Zahtjev za prethodnu odluku odnosi se na valjanost članaka 4. i 5. Direktive 2005/35/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 7. rujna 2005. o onečišćenju mora s brodova i uvođenju kazni za prekršaje (SL L 255, str. 11. i ispravci u SL 2006 L 33, str. 87. i SL 2006 L 105, str. 65.) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 15., svezak 28., str. 18.).
2 The reference was made in the course of proceedings brought by the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Lloyd's Register and the International Salvage Union against the Secretary of State for Transport concerning implementation of Directive 2005/35. 
2 Zahtjev je upućen u okviru spora između International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), Greek Shipping Co - operation Committee, Lloyd's Register i International Salvage Union, s jedne strane, i Secretary of State for Transport (Ministar prometa), s druge strane, u vezi s provedbom Direktive 2005/35.
International law 
Međunarodno pravo
3 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 (`UNCLOS'), entered into force on 16 November 1994. 
3 Konvencija Ujedinjenih naroda o pravu mora, potpisana u Montego Bayu 10. prosinca 1982. (dalje u tekstu: Konvencija iz Montego Baya), stupila je na snagu 16. studenoga 1994.
It was approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 98/392/EC of 23 March 1998 (OJ 1998 L 179, p. 1). 
Konvencija je u ime Europske zajednice odobrena Odlukom Vijeća 98/392/EZ od 23. ožujka 1998. (SL L 179, str. 1.) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 4., svezak 2., str. 88.).
4 Article 2 of UNCLOS refers to the legal status of the territorial sea in the following terms: 
4 Članak 2. Konvencije iz Montego Baya odnosi se na pravni položaj teritorijalnog mora kako slijedi:
`1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. 
„1. Suverenost obalne države proteže se - izvan njezinoga kopnenog područja i njezinih unutrašnjih voda i, ako se radi o arhipelaškoj državi, njezinih arhipelaških voda - na susjedni pojas mora, koji se naziva teritorijalnim morem. [...]
... 3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law.' 
3. Suverenost nad teritorijalnim morem ostvaruje se prema odredbama ove Konvencije i prema drugim pravilima međunarodnog prava."
5 Article 17 of UNCLOS provides: 
5 Članak 17. Konvencije iz Montego Baya predviđa:
`Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.' 
„Uz uvjet poštivanja Konvencije, brodovi svih država, obalnih i neobalnih, uživaju pravo neškodljivog prolaska teritorijalnim morem."
6 Article 34 of UNCLOS specifies as follows the legal status of waters forming straits used for international navigation: 
6 Članak 34. Konvencije iz Montego Baya određuje pravni položaj voda u tjesnacima koji služe međunarodnoj plovidbi:
`1. The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the exercise by the States bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their airspace, bed and subsoil. 
„1. Režim prolaska tjesnacima koji služe međunarodnoj plovidbi, ustanovljen u ovom dijelu, ni u kojem drugom smislu ne dira u pravni položaj voda u takvim tjesnacima, ni u ostvarivanje suverenosti ili jurisdikcije obalnih država na tjesnacima nad tim vodama, zračnim prostorom iznad njih i njihovim dnom i podzemljem.
2. The sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the straits is exercised subject to this Part and to other rules of international law.' 
2. Suverenost ili jurisdikcija obalnih država na tjesnacima vrše se u skladu s ovim dijelom i drugim pravilima međunarodnog prava."
`1. Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits, in respect of all or any of the following: 
„1. U skladu s odredbama ovoga odsjeka, obalne države na tjesnacu mogu donositi zakone i druge propise o tranzitnom prolasku tjesnacem koji se odnose na sva ili neka od ovih pitanja: [...]
... (b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait; 
(b) sprečavanje, smanjivanje i nadziranje onečišćenja, provedbu primjenjivih međunarodnih propisa koji se odnose na ispuštanje u tjesnacu nafte [ulja], naftnih otpadaka [uljnog otpada] i drugih škodljivih tvari;
8 Part V of UNCLOS lays down a specific legal regime governing the exclusive economic zone. 
8 Dio V. Konvencije iz Montego Baya utvrđuje poseban pravni režim kojim se uređuje isključivi gospodarski pojas.
9 In this Part, Article 56(1) provides: 
9 U tom dijelu članak 56. stavak 1.
`1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
„1. U isključivom gospodarskom pojasu obalna država ima:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; 
(a) suverena prava radi istraživanja i iskorištavanja, očuvanja i gospodarenja živim i neživim prirodnim bogatstvima voda nad morskim dnom i onih morskog dna i njegova podzemlja, te glede drugih djelatnosti radi gospodarskog istraživanja i iskorištavanja pojasa, kao što je proizvodnja energije korištenjem vode, struja i vjetrova;
10 Article 58(1) provides: 
10 Članak 58. stavak 1.
`In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in Article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.' 
Konvencije iz Montego Baya predviđa: „U isključivom gospodarskom pojasu sve države, obalne i neobalne, uživaju, u uvjetima određenim u relevantnim odredbama Konvencije [iz Montego Baya], slobode plovidbe, prelijetanja i polaganja podmorskih kabela i cjevovoda navedene u članku 87. i druge međunarodnopravno dopuštene upotrebe mora koje se tiču tih sloboda, kao što su one vezane uz iskorištavanje brodova, zrakoplova i podmorskih kabela i cjevovoda, a u skladu su s drugim odredbama Konvencije [iz Montego Baya]."
11 Article 79(1) of UNCLOS states: 
11 Članak 79. stavak 1.
`All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, in accordance with the provisions of this Article.' 
Konvencije iz Montego Baya predviđa: „Sve su države ovlaštene polagati podmorske kabele i cjevovode na epikontinentalnom pojasu, u skladu s odredbama ovoga članka."
`No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.' 
„Nijedna država nema pravo zahtijevati da podvrgne bilo koji dio otvorenog mora svojoj suverenosti."
13 Article 90 provides: 
13 Članak 90.
`Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.' 
„Sve države, obalne i neobalne, imaju pravo da na otvorenom moru plove brodovi koji vijore njezinu zastavu".
`All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas ...' 
„Sve države imaju pravo da se njihovi državljani bave ribolovom na otvorenom moru [...]"
15 Part XII of UNCLOS is devoted to protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
15 Dio XII. Konvencije iz Montego Baya posvećen je zaštiti i očuvanju morskog okoliša.
16 In Part XII, Article 211 provides: 
16 U dijelu XII. članak 211. navedene konvencije predviđa:
`1. States, acting through the competent international organisation or general diplomatic conference, shall establish international rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from vessels and promote the adoption, in the same manner, wherever appropriate, of routeing systems designed to minimise the threat of accidents which might cause pollution of the marine environment, including the coastline, and pollution damage to the related interests of coastal States. 
„1. Države, djelujući preko nadležne međunarodne organizacije ili na općoj diplomatskoj konferenciji, usvajaju međunarodna pravila i standarde radi sprečavanja, smanjivanja i nadziranja onečišćenja morskog okoliša s brodova i potiču prihvaćanje, na isti način, gdje god je to umjesno, sustava plovidbe kojima je svrha umanjiti prijetnju od nezgoda koje bi mogle uzrokovati onečišćenje morskog okoliša, uključujući obalu, te štetu od onečišćenja koja bi se mogla nanijeti s tim povezanim interesima obalnih država.
Such rules and standards shall, in the same manner, be re-examined from time to time as necessary. 
Ta se pravila i standardi, na isti način, ovisno o potrebi, povremeno preispituju.