natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Thus, on 1st October 1991, in the Montenegro Government headquarters, the defendant Pavle Strugar, the then-commander of the Montenegro Territorial Defense, along with the President of Montenegro, Momir Bulatović, announced that Montenegro had been attacked, ie. that around 30 000 Ustashas were ready to attack Montenegro. 
Tako je 1. listopada 1991. u sjedištu Vlade Crne Gore, okrivljeni Pavle Strugar koji je tada bio zapovjednik TO Crne Gore, zajedno sa predsjednikom Crne Gore Momirom Bulatovićem, objavio da je Crna Gora napadnuta tj. da je oko 30000 ustaša spremno napasti Crnu Goru .
At the same time, the head of the Trebinje Municipality Assembly, Božidar Vučurević, announced by mass media that the Trebinje municipality area had been attacked by the Croatian forces and that the former JNA had to counter-attack. 
Također u to vrijeme predsjednik Skupštine općine Trebinje Božidar Vučurević putem sredstava javnog priopćavanja je izjavio da je od strane hrvatskih snaga napadnuto područje općine Trebinje i da bivša JNA mora preći u kontranapad.
The facts that all the heavy weaponry remained under the control of the former JNA units, that the Republic of Croatia was under an international embargo on the import of weapons and that the National Guard Corps was at that time armed only with light infantry weapons, prove that the allegations were common lies. 
Da su to bile obične laži proizlazi iz činjenice da je sve teško naoružanje ostalo pod kontrolom jedinica bivše JNA, da je Republika Hrvatska bila pod međunarodnim embargom na uvoz oružja i da je tadašnji Zbor narodne garde bio naoružan samo lakim pješačkim oružjem.
Even though the military reports of the former JNA from 1991 state that around 30,000 armed Croatian soldiers were stationed in the Dubrovnik area and thus represented a security threat for Montenegro, it is indisputable that the allegations were lies used in an attempt to justify the attack on the Republic of Croatia, but also for propaganda purposes, in order to motivate the citizens of Montenegro and Serbia for war. 
Premda se u vojnim izvješćima bivše JNA tijekom 1991. navodi kako je na Dubrovačkom području stacionirano oko 30 000 naoružanih hrvatskih vojnika koji prijete sigurnosti Crne Gore, nesporno je da su to bile laži kojima se pokušavala opravdati agresija na Republiku Hrvatsku a služile su i u propagandne svrhe da bi se na rat motiviralo stanovništvo Crne Gore i Srbije.
The intelligence services of the former JNA most definitely knew how small the number of Croatian soldiers in this area was and what their weaponry was like. 
Obavještajne službe bivše JNA sa sigurnošću su znale koliki je mali broj hrvatskih vojnika na ovom području i kakvo je njihovo naoružanje.
According to the documentation of the Croatian Armed Forces, the witness testimony of the Croatian Army General Nojko Marinković, commander of the South Front, as well as the European Community observers, who had been situated in Dubrovnik and have given a testimony to the International Criminal Tribunal, the armed forces had only approximately 700 members of the National Guard Corps, armed with light infantry weapons, with a couple of mortars and small-calibre cannons, distributed over the 75 kilometres long area from the Montenegrin border to Pelješac, at the time of the attack by the former JNA on the Dubrovnik region. 
Prema dokumentaciji Hrvatskih oružanih snaga, svjedočkom iskazu generala Hrvatske vojske Nojka Marinovića zapovjednika Južnog bojišta, te promatrača Europske zajednice koji su se nalazili u Dubrovniku i koji su dali iskaz pred Haškim sudom proizlazi, da su u trenutku napada bivše JNA na Dubrovačko područje Hrvatske oružane snage imale samo oko 700 pripadnika Zbora narodne garde koji su bili naoružani lakim pješačkim naoružanjem sa nekoliko minobacača i topova malog kalibra, koji su bili raspoređeni na prostoru dužine 75 kilometara od granice sa Crnom Gorom do Pelješca.
Therefore, the motive for the attack of the former JNA on the Republic of Croatia, ie. the Dubrovnik region, was neither the security threat to the Serbian population in this area, nor the attack of the Republic of Croatia on Montenegro, ie. the municipality of Trebinje, but solely the idea of Greater-Serbian nationalists to create the so-called Greater Serbia, which would also encompass the Dubrovnik region, 
Stoga povod za napad na Republiku Hrvatsku odnosno Dubrovačko područje od strane bivše JNA nije bila ugroženost srpskog stanovništva na ovom područja a niti napad Republike Hrvatske na Crnu Goru odnosno općinu Trebinje, već isključivo zamisao velikosrpskih nacionalista da nakon raspada bivše Jugoslavije okupacijom dijelova Republike Hrvatske stvore tzv.
by occupying parts of the Republic of Croatia after the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
Veliku Srbiju u čijem bi sastavu bilo i područje Dubrovnika.
Army Naval Sector of the ex JNA and attack parts of Dubrovnik hinterland from the direction of Trebinje towards Brgat, Dubrovnik, Mokošica and Zaton, and regardless of the fact that they witnessed, while visiting the occupied areas, that units under their command excessively and unselectively, with artillery weapons and mine throwers, shelled villages, killing civilians who should be protected from any kind of violence originating from military operations, detained them, harassed and forced them to flee, and upon entrance into populated villages destroyed civil, cultural and business objects, looted them and set on fire, thus acting against the provisions of the Article 3, paragraph 1, item 1 and paragraph 2, items a, 27, 32, 33 and 53 
Vojno pomorskog sektora bivše JNA napadaju dijelove dubrovačkog zaleđa iz pravca Trebinja prema Brgatu, Dubrovniku, Mokošici i Zatonu, pa iako su obilazili napadnuta i a kasnije okupirana područja i uvjerili se da njima podređene postrojbe prekomjerno i bez izbora cilja artiljerijskim oružjem i minobacačima granatiraju naselja i ubijaju civilno stanovništvo koje je moralo biti zaštićeno od svakog nasilja koje proizlazi iz vojnih operacija zatvaraju ga, maltretiraju i natjeravaju ga u bijeg, a po ulasku u naseljena mjesta ruše civilne, kulturne i gospodarske objekte, pljačkaju ih i pale te da postupaju protivno odredbama čl.3. st.1.t.1. i st.2.t.a, 27., 32., 33. i 53.
This was the goal of the attack of the former JNA on the Dubrovnik region, which started on 1st October 1991. The war activity and occupation of this region lasted until 26th October 1992, when the former JNA units withdrew from the occupied area in consequence of attacks by the Croatian Army and the pressure of the International Community. 
S takvim ciljem počela je 1. listopada 1991. agresija bivše JNA na Dubrovačko područje a ratna djelovanja i okupacija ovog područja trajala su 26. listopada 1992. kada su se jedinice bivše JNA pred napadima Hrvatske vojske i pritiskom međunarodne zajednice povukle sa okupiranog područja.
The former JNA had all locations from the Montenegrin border to Pelješac, ie. the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, under occupation, except the city of Dubrovnik. 
Od strane bivše JNA bila su okupirana sva mjesta od granice Crne Gore do Pelješca odnosno do granice sa Bosnom i Hercegoviom, osim grada Dubrovnika.
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), although they were obligated to do so, they omitted to perform actions in order to prevent such illegal behaviour and sanction the perpetrators, instead by behaving as they did, supported such behaviour, allowing units under their superior authority to continue such activities and agreed to the consequences of such actions, so the presently unknown members of units under their command in the field and during the period previously mentioned, from artillery and infantry weapons killed 65 civilians: 
Dopunskog protokola Ženevskim konvencijama od 12. kolovoza 1949. o zaštiti žrtava međunarodnih oružanih sukoba (Protokol I ), premda su bili dužni nisu ništa poduzeli da se takvo nedopušteno ponašanje spriječi i počinitelji kazne, već su takvim svojim ponašanjem to podržavali, pristajući da njima podređene vojne postrojbe nastave s takvim postupanjem i pristali na njihove posljedice pa su tako za sada nepoznati pripadnici njemu podređenih postrojbi na terenu u naznačenom vremenu iz artiljerijskog i pješačkog oružja ubili 65 civilnih osoba
During the investigation procedure, many witnesses, participants of the war events in the Dubrovnik area, were questioned, and the International Criminal Tribunal procured the documentation of the former JNA on the units which operated in this area, their commanders, the combat orders they issued and the weaponry of the units. Also, the testimonies by witnesses questioned by the International Criminal Tribunal, the expert analysis of Major General Milovan Zorac, the reports on on-site investigations of damages on cultural monuments, religious and residential objects in the Old Town, reports on the damages caused in the areas of Sustjepan, Pobrežaj, Mokošica, video recordings of the on-site investigations of 74 locations from the Montenegrin border to Pelješac, which had been occupied and demolished by the former JNA, photo documentations of the on-site investigations of the 30 most demolished locations in the Dubrovnik area, data on the destroyed and stolen marine vehicles in the Miho Pracat Marina in Komolac, list of damages at the Dubrovnik airport in Čilipi, journal of the shelling of the Dubrovnik area from 1st October 1991 to 26th May 1992, amateur video recordings of the shelling of Dubrovnik, video tapes of Montenegrin television shows on the war activity of the former JNA in the Dubrovnik area, official records, ie. reports on on-site investigations of the deaths of civilians, autopsy reports and reports on the external examinations of murdered persons, medical documentation on the civilian victims from the Dubrovnik region, photo documentation of murdered civilians, as well as the list of displaced persons from the occupied areas, were procured. 
Tijekom istražnog postupka saslušani su brojni svjedoci, sudionici ratnih događaja na području Dubrovnika, putem Međunarodnog suda u Hagu pribavljena je dokumentacija bivše JNA o jedinicama koje su djelovale na ovom području, njihovim zapovjednicima, borbena naređenja koje su izdavali, naoružanju jedinica , pribavljeni su iskazi svjedoka saslušanih pred Međunarodnim sudom u Hagu, vještačenje general majora Milovana Zorca, zapisnici o očevidu o oštećenjima spomenka kulture, vjerskih i stambenih objekata unutar stare gradske jezgre, zapisnici o štetama počinjenih na području Sustjepan, Pobrežaj, Mokošice, video snimke očevida 74 naselja od granice Crne Gore do Pelješca koja su bila okupirana i razrušena od strane bivše JNA, fotodokumentacije očevida 30 najrazrušenijih mjesta na Dubrovačkom području, podaci o uništenim i otuđenim plovilima u marini Miho Pracat u Komolcu, popis štete na aerodromu Dubrovnik u Čilipima, dnevnik granatiranja Dubrovačkog područja od 1. listopada 1991. do 26. svibnja 1992., amaterske video snimke o granatiranju Dubrovnika, video kazete televizijskih emisija Crne Gore o ratnim djelovanjima bivše JNA na Dubrovačkom području, službene zabilješke odnosno zapisnici o očevidu sačinjeni prilikom pogibije civilnih osoba, zapisnici obdukcijama i zapisnici o vanjskim pregledima ubijenih osoba, medicinska dokumentacija o civilnim žrtvama sa Dubrovačkog područja, fotodokumentacija ubijenih civila, popis prognanika s okupiranih područja.
Books by the defendant Jevrem Cokić, "The Beginning of the End", the journalist Veseljko Koprivica "Everything was Target", Veljko Kadijević "My View on the Break-Up" and Vojislav Beloić "The Prevlaka of Herceg Novi", were also procured. 
Također su pribavljene knjige okrivljenog Jevrema Cokića „Početak kraja“, novinara Veseljka Koprivice „Sve je bilo meta“, Veljka Kadijevića „ Moje viđenje raspada“ te knjiga Vojislava Beloica „Prevlaka hercegnovska“.
Nojko Marinković, Ahmet Ališani, Ivan Kulaš and Željko Soldo testified on the situation in the former JNA immediately before and during the attack on the Republic of Croatia. 
O stanju u bivšoj JNA, neposredno i tijekom agresije na Republiku Hrvatsku svjedočili su Nojko Marinović, Ahmet Ališani, Ivan Kulaš i Željko Soldo.
During the investigation procedure, but also at the International Criminal Tribunal, the Croatian Army General Nojko Marinković gave a detailed testimony, which depicted the situation in the former JNA immediately prior to the attack on the Dubrovnik area and the organization, numbers and weaponry of the Croatian Army at the time of the attack of the former JNA on this area. 
General Hrvatske vojske Nojko Marinović dao je tijekom istražnog postupka a i pred Međunarodnim sudom u Hagu iscrpni iskaz iz kojeg je vidljivo stanje u bivšoj JNA neposredno prije agresije na Dubrovačko područje te organizacija, brojno stanje i naoružanje Hrvatske vojske u trenutku napada bivše JNA na ovo područje.
The above named had been an active military person in the service of the former JNA for more than 20 years, until 17th September 1991, when he went over to the Croatian Army. 
Naime, isti je više od dvadeset godina bio aktivna vojna osoba u službi bivše JNA i to do 17. rujna 1991. kada je prešao u postrojbe Hrvatske vojske.
His last service had been in Trebinje, where he was commander of the 472nd Motor Brigade, and also commander of the Trebinje garrison, encompassing the area from the river of Neretva to Montenegro. 
Zadnja njegova služba bila je u Trebinju gdje je bio zapovjednik 472. mtbr a ujedno i komandant garnizona Trebinje koji je obuhvaćao područje od rijeke Neretve do Crne Gore.
That was one of the best elite brigades in the former JNA. 
Ta brigada bila je jedna od najelitnijih brigada u bivšoj JNA.
In 1991, he noticed that men of Serbian nationality were handed out weapons in the Herzegovina region, while most of the former JNA officers, in service in Trebinje, often communicated and cooperated with Serbian politicians, such as the head of the Trebinje Municipality Assembly Božidar Vučurević, and others. 
Tijekom 1991. primijetio je da se na području Hercegovine dijeli oružje muškarcima srpske nacionalnosti a većina oficira bivše JNA koji su bili na službi u Trebinju često je kontaktirala i surađivala sa srpskim političarima kao što je predsjednik Skupštine općine Trebinje Božidarom Vučurevićem i drugim.
thus, breaching the rules of the international law in war time, although they were obligated to do so, they omitted to prevent it and in the manner already described supported the unselective attack which hit the civilians killing them and inflicting severe bodily injuries, inhumane treatment, to forced displacement, looting of their property and unlawful and arbitrary destruction of property on a large scale which was not justified by military purposes, and breaching the rules of the international law during war time, although they were obligated, omitted to prevent destruction of cultural and historical monuments, 
dakle, kršeći pravila međunarodnog prava za vrijeme oružanog sukoba, iako su bili dužni propustili su spriječiti te na opisani način podržavali napad bez izbora cilja kojim se pogađa civilno stanovništvo, da se civilno stanovništvo ubija, da se prema njemu nečovječno postupak da se provodi raseljavanje, da se pljačka imovina stanovništva te protuzakonito i samovoljno uništava imovina velikih razmjera što nije opravdano vojnim potrebama, te je kršeći pravila međunarodnog prava za vrijeme oružanog sukoba iako su bili dužni propustili spriječiti da se uništavaju kulturni i povijesni spomenici,
From their reactions, as well as the facts that the mobilisation of reserves from the wider area of Trebinje had been initiated, and that the restructuring of personnel in the former JNA represented the begin of the implementation of Greater-Serbian policy, he gained the impression that an attack on the Dubrovnik region was under preparation. Thus, he decided to leave the JNA and go over to Dubrovnik on 17th September 1991. 
Iz njihovih reakcija te činjenice da su se počeli mobilizirati rezervisti sa šireg područja Trebinja i da se kroz kadrovske poteze u bivšoj JNA počela provoditi velikosrpska politika, stekao je dojam da se priprema napad na Dubrovačko područje pa je 17. rujna 1991. odlučio napustiti JNA i prijeći u Dubrovnik.
Upon arrival in Dubrovnik, he noticed that the city was utterly defenceless and reported to the Crisis Management Committee of the city of Dubrovnik. Along with them, he took the most basic actions to organize the defence of the area. 
Došavši u Dubrovnik primijetio je da je grad bez ikakve obrane pa se javio u Krizni stožer grada Dubrovnika i zajedno s njima poduzeo najosnovnije radnje da bi se organizirala obrana tog područja.
There was only one Battalion of the National Guard Corps in Dubrovnik by that time, with 87 members, while there were similar units in the areas of Neretva and Korčula. 
U to vrijeme u Dubrovniku je postojala samo jedna satnija Zbora narodne garde sa 87 pripadnika a slične jedinice bile su na području Neretve i Korčule.
The only unit with a high level of training was the Special Police Unit with 37 members. 
Jedina jedinica visoke razine obučenosti bila je Jedinica specijalne policije sa 37 pripadnika.
When he was appointed deputy commander for South Dalmatia, he persuaded some other officers of the former JNA, of Croatian nationality, to go over to the side of the Croatian Armed Forces, after which he put efforts in procuring weapons, in order to organize the defence of the Dubrovnik region more effectively. 
Kada je imenovan za zamjenika zapovjednika za Južnu Dalmaciju privolio je još nekoliko oficira bivše JNA hrvatske nacionalnosti da prijeđu na stranu Hrvatskih oružanih snaga a zatim je pokušao nabaviti oružje kako bi se efikasnije postaviti obrana Dubrovačkog područja.
On the day of the attack, ie. 
Na dan napada tj.
1st October 1991, there was a total of 670 soldiers in the Dubrovnik area, consisting of members of the National Guard Corps, Ministry of the Interior as well as mobilised people. They were distributed along the border, in a 75 kilometres long area. 
1. listopada 1991. na području Dubrovnika bilo je sveukupno 670 vojnika a to su bili pripadnici Zbora narodne garde, MUP-a te mobilizirani ljudi a bili raspoređeni na prostoru granice na području dugom 75 kilometara.
Besides the infantry weapons, they had four 85 mm calibre cannons, two anti-tank cannons, two mortars of the 120 mm calibre and 13 mortars of the 82 mm calibre. The weapons were also distributed over the 75 kilometres long area. 
Osim pješačkog naoružanja imali su četiri topa kalibra 85mm, dva protutenkovska topa, dva minobacača kalibra 120 mm i 13 minobacača kalibra 82 mm koje oružje je također bilo raspoređeno na prostoru dugom oko 75 kilometara.
With regards to their weaponry, the Croatian forces could not even think of provoking the former JNA, who only waited for an attack motive, especially as there were around 36 howitzers, 60 heavy mortars, 240 bazookas, 60 anti-aircraft cannons and 44 tanks in the former JNA units that attacked Dubrovnik. Apart from that, the forces that attacked Dubrovnik also had the air support of squadrons from Mostar, Tivto and Podgorica, three missile and two patrol ships, as well as three batteries of earth-sea missiles with an 80 kilometre-range. 
Obzirom na takvo naoružanje nije bilo ni pomisli da bi Hrvatske snage provocirale bivšu JNA, koja je samo čekala povod za napad pogotovo što je u jedinicama bivše JNA koje su napadale Dubrovnik bilo oko 36 haubica, 60 teških minobacača, 240 bazuka, 60 protuzračnih topova i 44 tenka.Osim toga snage koje su napadale Dubrovnik imale su zračnu potporu eskadrila iz Mostara, Tivta i Podgorice, tri raketna i dva patrolna broda te tri baterije raketa zemlja more dometa 80 kilometara.
Predicting the location from which the attack on the Dubrovnik region would ensue, he distributed his units along the whole front line, while 150 men were distributed around the very city of Dubrovnik, armed with light infantry weapons of the former Dubrovnik Territorial Defence, mostly M-48 rifles. 
Predviđajući odakle će doći napad na Dubrovačko područje svoje je postrojbe rasporedio duž cijele linije bojišta a oko samog grada Dubrovnika imao je raspoređenih 150 ljudi, koji su bili naoružani lakim pješačkim naoružanjem bivše Teritorijalne obrane Dubrovnik i to većinom puškama M-48.
After the former JNA units occupied Konavle and Župa Dubrovačka, ie. the region east of Dubrovnik, most members of the Croatian Army, along with the weaponry, withdrew to the wider area around the city of Dubrovnik. 
Nakon što su jedinice bivše JNA okupirale Konavle i Župu Dubrovačku tj. područje istočno od Dubrovnika, veći dio pripadnika Hrvatske vojske i naoružanja povukao je na šire područje oko grada Dubrovnika.
He categorically points out that there was no heavy weaponry within the city walls for the whole duration of the war, and that he had strictly banned the setting up of those in the proximity of the Old Town and the hospital. He had issued the order that UNESCO flags be hanged on the Old Town walls, a culture monument. The flags remained there for the whole duration of the war. 
Kategorički ističe da tijekom cijelog rata unutar gradskih zidina nije bilo teškog naoružanja te da je izričito zabranio postavljanje istog u blizini Starog grada i bolnice a izdao je zapovijed da se na zidine Starog grada, koji je spomenik kulture, istaknu zastave UNESCO-a koje su se tamo nalazile tijekom cijelog rata.
In this way, he avoided that the Old Town became a military target and enabled the Dubrovnik citizens to find shelter there. 
Na takav način izbjegao je da Stari grad postane vojnom metom a omogućio građanima Dubrovnika da tamo pronađu sklonište.
According to his orders, no heavy weaponry was allowed at a distance closer than a couple hundred meters from the Old Town walls, and there was therefore no reason to shell the Old Town as a military target. 
Prema njegovim naredbama teško naoružanje nije smjelo biti bliže od nekoliko stotina metara od zidina Starog grada pa stoga nije bilo razloga da se Stari grad bombardira kao vojni cilj.
The attacks on the Old Town were by no means provoked by the Croatian side, and they were performed along with the infantry attack by the former JNA units on the positions of the Croatian army on the mountain of Srđ, because the former JNA wanted to conquer the mountain and the Imperial fortress at any price, for that would have enabled them to gain a view over the whole of Dubrovnik from that position. Therefore, he directed all the artillery situated in the proximity of the Old Town towards Srđ, in order to be able to open fire on the former JNA units in case of an attack, thus improving the position of the Srđ defenders. 
Napadi na Stari grad nisu bili ničim isprovocirani sa Hrvatske strane a isti su poduzimani zajedno sa pješačkim napadom jedinica bivše JNA na položaj Hrvatske vojske na brdu Srđ jer je bivša JNA pod svaku cijenu željela zauzeti to brdo i tvrđavu Imperial jer bi s tih položaja kao na dlanu mogli vidjeti cijeli Dubrovnik.Stoga je sve topništvo koje se nalazilo u blizini Starog grada usmjerio prema brdu Srđ kako bi u slučaju napada jedinica bivše JNA na te položaje mogao otvoriti vatru po njima i time olakšati poziciju braniteljima Srđa.
The heaviest shelling of the Old Town took place on 6th December 1991. On his opinion, it could never have taken place without the knowledge of the supreme military commanders of the 2nd 
Najžešće bombardiranje Starog grada dogodilo se 6. prosinca 1991. a po njegovo mišljenju nije se moglo dogoditi bez znanja najviših vojnih zapovjednika 2.
Operational Group, because it lasted all day and it was of too much significance for the former JNA, to be kept silent even before the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav army. 
Operativne grupe, jer je trajalo cijeli dan i bilo je od prevelikog značaja za bivšu JNA da bi se čak prešutjelo i Generalštabu vojske Jugoslavije.