natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the case of Italy, Romania, the Czech Republic, along with Slovakia and 27 36 Article 67 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 28 Bulgaria, the absorption rate was well below this level i.e. between 61 % and 68 %, whereas in the case of Croatia37, the absorption rate was around 46 %. 
3 6 7
Although the TFBI was set up late, its results were significant 34. 
34.
In November 2014, 11 months after the end of the programme period, the Commission38 set up the Task Force for Better Implementation (TFBI). 
3
This was designed to support Member States facing difficulties in implementing their OPs in using the remaining funding from the 2007-2013 period. 
3 7
The TFBI, represented by officials from DG REGIO39, covered Member States whose overall absorption rate was below the EU average (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Italy and Croatia)40. 
3
In total, the TFBI concentrated on 38 ERDF and CF OPs. 
3
Box 3 provides an outline of the work of the TFBI. Box 3 Đ The Task Force for Better Implementation The TFBI was responsible for drawing up action plans (or reviewing existing plans if already in place) with each Member State concerned with the aim of improving implementation. 
3 6
Press release MEMO/15/4654, 24.3.2015. 
3 5 6
However, within the span of one year the absorption rate for the EU-28 increased from around 77 % (December 2014) to almost 90 % (December 2015). 
5 7
Table 1 Đ Increase in the absorption rate for Member States assisted by the TFBI 29 Member State Absorption rate December 2014 (%) Absorption rate December 2015 (%) Increase absorption (% points) Czech Republic 64.4 85.3 20.9 Slovakia 61.7 87.6 25.9 Bulgaria 68.0 87.5 19.5 Italy 63.8 79.9 16.1 Hungary 76.1 88.4 12.3 Romania 62.1 77.0 14.9 Note: Slovenia and Croatia are not included in the table as their situation was not comparable to that of the other Member States (see footnotes 37 and 40). 
3 projekata. 5 6 7
The Member States visited said that they had found the TFBI useful because of the technical guidance and assistance it had provided, in particular on the phasing of major projects (see paragraphs 60 to 62). 
60. 6
The work of the TFBI finished at the end of 2015. 
5
Reprogramming was an effective tool for optimising absorption but resulted in significant changes to the initial plans, presenting risks to value for money 43. 
3
It was used frequently during the 2007-2013 programme period and resulted in significant changes when compared with the initial financing plan. 
3 7
However, we also noted some risks to value for money associated with the use of reprogramming (see paragraphs 53 and 55). 
3 5
45. 
5
The following sections (paragraphs 46 to 59) discuss the change made to the regulatory framework to ease reprogramming, analyse the impact of reprogramming on initial planning and illustrate the use of each of these reprogramming methods from our sample of 20 OPs. 
5 6
An amendment to the Regulation made it easier to revise OPs 46. 
6
The conditions for such revisions as stipulated in Article 33 of the General Regulation, are very broad in scope and provide the Member States with considerable room for manoeuvre. 
3
This was relaxed in 2010 with the Member States being required to provide an analysis justifying the revision of the OP and its expected impact. 
3
During the 2007-2013 programme period, reprogramming was used frequently by the Member States. 
3 7
For example, one Czech ERDF OP ŇEnterprises and InnovationsÓ had eight different versions, of which two were submitted in 2013 and another two in 2015. 
3 5
Recital 6 and Article 48(3) of Regulation (EU) No 539/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 June 2010 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund as regards simplification of certain requirements and as regards certain provisions relating to financial management (OJ L 158, 24.6.2010, p. 
3 5 6
Figure 7 Đ Number of versions submitted for each OP 32 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Number of changes before 31.12.2013 Number of changes after 31.12.2013 OPs Source: ECA. 
3 5 6 7
Reprogramming resulted in significant changes in the financial allocation to priority axes which was not always reflected in the target values of the performance indicators 49. 
49.
In general, a 2007BG161PO005 2007CZ05UPO001 2007CZ161PO004 2007CZ161PO006 2007ES16UPO001 2007ES16UPO003 2007IT051PO002 2007IT161PO007 2007IT161PO008 2007IT161PO011 2007HU161PO002 2007HU161PO006 2007HU161PO007 2007RO051PO001 2007RO161PO002 2007RO161PO004 2007SK05UPO001 2007SK161PO004 2007SK161PO006 Number of versions 
3 5 6 7
However, for one Slovak OP ŇCompetitiveness and Economic GrowthÓ, the EU contribution to the OP increased by 25.4 %. 
5
In one Hungarian OP changes in the financial allocation did not result in a change in the target value of the performance indicator (see Box 5). 
5
Box 5 Đ Significant transfers of EU contribution between priority axes without proportional adjustment of target value of the performance indicator The Hungarian ERDF OP for Environment and Energy was revised four times. 
5
In 2012, a transfer was made from another OP, whereas in 2013, 2015 and 2016, transfers between priority axes were made. 
5 6
As a result the EU contribution to Priority 5 ŇEfficient Energy UseÓ was increased by 390 % (from 131.2 to 642.6 million euros). 
5 6
At the same time, the target value for the indicator Ôenergy resources saved through energy efficiencyŐ was reduced in 2012 to less than a third from 11 to 2.7 petajoules per year, but was not reviewed when additional funding was allocated to the priority axis. 
7
53. 
5
Increasing the EU co-financing rate boosts absorption but reduces the value that can be obtained from EU funds 54. 
5
55. 
5
34 43 Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
1083/2006. 6
Table 2 Đ Decrease in national contribution as a result of increase in the co-financing rate 35 Member State Operational Programme Initial EU co-financing rate (in %) Revised EU co-financing rate (in %) Decrease of national contribution (in million euro) Romania Environment 80 85 302.1 Bulgaria Environment 81 85 75.5 Spain Research, Development and Innovation (R&D&I) for and by Enterprises Đ Technology Fund 67 75 356.8 Knowledge-based economy 70 80 259.0 Italy Calabria FSE 50 75 286.8 Security for development 50 75 386.0 Calabria 50 75 999.4 Sicily 50 75 2 179.8 Total 4 845.4 Note: The regulatory maximum EU co-financing rate is 85 % for Bulgaria and Romania, 80 % for Spain and 75 % for Italy. 
5 6 7
Member States introduced private contributions to increase their rates of absorption, but this also resulted in reduced interventions 57. 
5 7
However, since part of the private contribution is expenditure that would have been incurred irrespective of the public contribution, the replacement of the public contribution with the private reduces overall the 44 Article 37(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
Uredbe (EZ) br. 1083/2006. 7
Member StatesŐ investment. As indicated above (see paragraph 55) this reduces the scale of intervention to achieve the Cohesion policy objectives. 
5
Table 3 Đ Private contribution replacing the public contribution and theoretical EU contribution generated 36 Member State OP Private contribution introduced (million euro) Co-financing rate (%) Theoretical EU contribution generated by private contribution (million euro) Spain Research, Development and Innovation (R&D&I) for and by Enterprises Đ Technology Fund 500.5 75 375.4 Czech Republic Enterprises and Innovations 472.5 85 401.6 Environment 97.2 85 82.7 Hungary Environment and Energy 85.1 85 72.3 North Hungary 54.2 85 46.0 Note: The theoretical EU contribution generated by including private expenditure is calculated by applying the EU co-financing rate to the private contribution. 
5 6 7
Phasing of projects reduces the risk of de-commitment if projects are not entirely completed at closure 60. 
60.
The 2007-2013 regulatory framework provided for the implementation of a major project45 over two programme periods, i.e. dividing a project into two stages, between the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programme periods 46. Although the General Regulation provided only for the phasing of major projects, the CommissionŐs closure guidelines went even further, extending the principle of phasing to non-major projects with a value of at least 5 million euros 47. 
5 6 7
The benefit of phasing is that it reduces the risk that on-going major projects which are non-functional by 31 March 2017 (i.e. the date for submitting closure documents), or by 31 March 2019 at the very latest48, are considered ineligible and the corresponding EU funding is not used. 
7
Nine out of 1449 OPs in our sample opted to phase major projects or projects above 5 million euros. 
5
The use of phasing reduced the risk of EU co-financing for these projects of 4.5 billion euros (3.8 billion euros for major projects and 0.7 billion euros for non-major projects over 5 million euros) would not be used in the 2007-2013 programme period. 62. 
5 7
While phasing is beneficial to absorption and acknowledges that on-going project implementation does not stop at programme end, a recent audit revealed that phasing in Major projects comprise an economically indivisible series of works, activities or services fulfilling a precise technical function and having clearly identified aims and whose total cost exceeds 50 million euro, or 75 million euro in the case of a transport project. 
projekata. 5 7
Article 40(d) of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
Uredbe (EZ) br. 1083/2006.
C(2015) 2771 final. 
5 7
Fourteen out of 20 OPs in our sample had major projects or projects over 5 million euro. 
5
37 45 46 47 48 49 
5 6 7
In its guidance on retrospective EU assistance51 the Commission discourages their use as they entail a high risk of non-compliance with the relevant Union and national rules. 
5
In addition, as retrospective projects are already implemented with national funding, this raises doubt as to the added value of using EU funding to co-finance these projects. 
projekata.
Of the four Member States we visited, three (Italy, Hungary and Romania) stated that they used retrospective projects (see Box 6). 
6
67. 
6 7
Our work undertaken for the statement of assurance shows that many Member States use retrospective expenditure and that EU co-financing of retrospective projects is likely to be significant for the 2007-2013 period. 
7
As part of our work for the 2015 Annual Report, we identified errors relating to expenditure on retrospective projects (see Box 7). 
5 7
In a previous report the Court has said that such projects are more error-prone than those selected in the normal way52. 
5
39 In the case of two Hungarian OPs ŇTransportÓ and ŇEnvironment and EnergyÓ the national authorities indicated that the retrospective projects identified amounted to a total eligible cost of 195.1 million euros and 74.5 million euros, respectively. 
5 7
For the Romanian OP ŇHuman Resources and DevelopmentÓ the national authorities indicated that seven retrospective projects were identified with a total eligible cost of 166.7 million euros. 
6 7
Operations (consisting of one or several projects) that have started to 52 Paragraph 6.19 of the 2008 annual report, Chapter 6 ŇCohesionÓ. incur expenditure but have not been physically completed or fully implemented before the beneficiary submits the application for funding under the programme to the Managing Authority may be eligible for EU funding53. 
5
Even though the eligibility period was extended, 8 % of endowments to financial instruments were not used and had no revolving effect 70. 
70.
During the 2007-2013 programme period Member States could absorb money temporarily by paying it into a financial instrument and receiving reimbursement from the Commission, thereby avoiding the risk of de-commitment during the implementation phase. 
7
In addition, to help improve absorption, the eligibility period for disbursements from financial instruments to final recipients was extended by the Commission from 31 December 2015 to 31 March 201754. 
Članak 65. stavak 6. 5 7
This resulted in additional payments to final recipients of 1.6 billioneuros55.TheCourthasreported onthisissueinprevious reports56. 
5 6
71. 
7
We have previously reported that low disbursement rates in particular in the first years of the 2007-2013 programme period limited the revolving effect57. 
5 7
In October 2017, the Commission has reported on the financial implementation as at 31 March 2017 (at closure) for financial instruments. 
7
A desk review of the figures in this report revealed a number of inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the Member StatesŐ reporting58. 
5
41 57 58 59 Contractual advances made towards the end of the eligibility period may pose risks to value for money and compliance 74. 
7
A contractual advance payment is eligible if it was paid to the contractor by 31 December 2015 and converted into actual expenditure before 31 March 2017. 
5 7
However for projects approved towards the end of the eligibility period (i.e. 31 December 2015) the need to finalize the projects by the closure deadline (i.e. 31 March 2017) may result in allocation of funds to projects based on their capacity to spend quickly rather than on their ability to provide results. 
5 7
For example, the Czech Managing Authority indicated that as of September 2016, for OP ŇEnvironmentÓ, total advance invoices amounted to 133 million euros in EU contributions. 
6
This represented around 5 % of total absorption in 2014 and 2015 (see Box 8). 
5
42 Box 8 Đ advances amounting to a high percentage of contract value For the Czech OP ŇEnvironmentÓ contractual advances were used to avoid de-commitment and improve absorption. 
5
Between November 2013 and March 2016, the national rules were gradually relaxed, and beneficiaries were encouraged to use advance and supported in doing so. 
6
In 2014 and 2015 contractual advances up to 90 % of the contractual value were permitted without supporting clearing invoices. 
5
After November 2015, advances of 100 % of the contract value were permitted although the National Authorities indicated that no certification was possible without proof of settlement of invoices. 
5
This goes beyond what the Commission identified as market practice (see paragraph 74). 
7
Since advances could be turned into actual expenditure until 31 March 2017, the closer the actual expenditure is to the deadline the less the time available for audit authorities to verify it and provide assurance to its eligibility60. 
6 7
Overall the error rate fell since 2007 for Cohesion even though retrospective projects led to some errors 79. 
7
We looked at the developments in the Cohesion control framework during the 2007-2013 programme period and how this impacted on the error rate. 
7
Our examination of the error rates reported by the Court since 2007 shows a significant reduction in the error rate for 2007-2013 expenditure compared to the previous programme period. 
7
The error rate was consistently lower from 2011 to 2016 resulting in a most likely error rate of 4.8 % in 2016 (lower error limit of 3.1 % compared to 11 % in 2007 and 2008 for payments from the 2000-2006 period). 
6 7
As indicated above, some measures to improve absorption such as the use of retrospective projects (see Box 7) resulted in some errors. 
7
On the other hand, other significant factors such as overall improvements in the Member StatesŐ management, control and supervisory systems and the 43 60 Special Report No 36/16. CommissionŐs use of preventive (interruptions and suspensions) and corrective measures for the 2007-2013 programme period have led to a reduction in the error rate. 
7
To maintain a focus on achieving good results, it is crucial that Member States avoid a situation where a significant amount of funds remain to be absorbed at the end of the programme period, since the rush to absorb funds may lead to insufficient consideration to value for money. 
6
The Commission has encouraged an early political agreement on the post-2020 MFF in order to provide legal and financial certainty to the national and regional authorities and enable implementation to start immediately at the start of the programme period (see paragraphs 16 to 19). 
6
This is why, in a previous special report, we recommended that the Commission should ensure, in its legislative proposals for the post-2020 period, that eligibility periods no longer overlap with the 44 45 subsequent programme period and that the closure procedure is finalised promptly after the end of the eligibility period61. 
6
Some Member States and the Commission identified difficulties in absorbing funding relatively early in the 2007-2013 programme period. 
7
86. 
6
At the start of 2018 the average EU absorption rate stood at 97.2 %. 
7
Several Member States did not manage to use all the funding available and unused funding at the end of 2017 amounted to 4.4 billion euros. 
7
The value of these projects for all 2007-2013 OPs is likely to be significantly higher. 
7
Thus these funds had no revolving effect and the management fees incurred thereupon, even though in accordance with the financial agreements, did not provide any added value to the EU budget (paragraph 70 to 73). Ľ Contractual advances also helped improve absorption. 
7
Moreover the closer the actual expenditure is to the eligibility deadline the less the time available for Audit Authorities to verify its eligibility (see paragraphs 74 to 78). 
7
These two factors hampered its ability to get a comprehensive overview of the measures used and their individual financial impact (see paragraph 37, 67 and 78). 
7
Although the pressure to spend money towards the end of the 2007-2013 period resulted in some errors, the estimated error rate for Cohesion was consistently lower from 2011 to 2016, compared to 2007 and 2008. 
7
List of Operational Programmes selected for review Annex 1 Member State Operational Programme Fund Covered by the TFBI Bulgaria Environment (2007BG161PO005) CF&ERDF x Czech Republic1 Environment (2007CZ161PO006)2 CF&ERDF x Central Bohemia (2007CZ161PO009) ERDF Enterprises and Innovations (2007CZ161PO004) ERDF Human Resource and Employment (2007CZ05UPO001)2 ESF Hungary1 Environment and Energy (2007HU161PO002)2 CF&ERDF x North Hungary (2007HU161PO006) ERDF Transport (2007HU161PO007)2 CF&ERDF x Italy1 Calabria (2007IT161PO008) ERDF x Security for development (2007IT161PO007)2 ERDF Sicily (2007IT161PO011)2 ERDF x Calabria FSE (2007IT051PO002) ESF Romania1 Sectorial Development of Human Resources (2007RO051PO001)2 ESF x Increase in Economic Competitiveness (2007RO161PO002)2 ERDF x Environment (2007RO161PO004)2 CF&ERDF x Slovakia Competitiveness and Economic growth (2007SK161PO006) ERDF x Transport (2007SK161PO004) CF&ERDF Education (2007SK05UPO001) ESF x Spain Research, Development and Innovation (R&D&I) for and by Enterprises Đ Technology Fund (2007ES16UPO001) ERDF Knowledge-based economy (2007ES16UPO003) ERDF 1 Member States visited on-the-spot. 
7
The adoption date of the legislative framework strongly depends on the co-legislators; for the 2021-2027 period, the Commission presented its proposal 30 months before the planned start of the eligibility period. 
7
The Commission assists Member States in spending the available funds which led to an absorption level of 97% for the 2007-2013 Đ which is 2 pp above the levels for 2000-2006. 
7
The Commission proposed measures to Member States being at risk of absorption which were in line with the 2007-2013 legal framework and were adapted to the circumstances of the Member States and the particular programmes. 
7
For the 2021-2027 period the Commission presented its proposal 30 months before the planned start of the eligibility period. 
7
Box 2 Đ 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 OPs adopted after the programme periods had started The Commission notes that its performance on the negotiations and adoption of programmes in comparison with the previous programming period can also be assessed by comparing the first 12 months following the adoption of the legal framework. 
7
This would mean that in 2014-2020, in the first 12 months after the adoption of the regulation 40 % of OPs were adopted, in comparison to 6% of OPs in the same timeframe of the 2007-13 programming period. 
7
2 3 7 
7
The Commission does not see a higher absorption risk at the end of the programme period for 2014-2020 than for 2007-2013. 
7
Taking into account n+3 and current selection rates as well as payments certified by beneficiaries the Commission considers that potentially the same level of absorption could be achieved for 2014-2020 as for 2007-2013. 
7
While absorption can always be improved, the Commission considers that the average rate of 97% is comparable to the earlier periods and is satisfied with this result. 
7
37. 
7
The Commission notes that the first guidance on phasing of major projects was issued already in 2012 and presented to the MS during the COCOF meeting (COCOF_12-0047-02-EN). 
7
47. 
7
This enables the Commission to ensure that the focus of interventions is kept and the basis for programme implementation remains sound (cf. elements listed under Article 37 of the General Regulation and those that are part of the approved programme). 
7
This is less than planned in 2007, but double the amount of the planned result from 2012, in line with the budget doubling compared between 2012 and 2016. 
7
It reduced the target to 2.7 petajoule, based on the experiences in 2011 (justification available in SFC 2007) when it turned out that the target was far overestimated compared to the results of concrete first projects approved and implemented during 2011. 
7
Had Member States programmed up to the highest possible level the EU co-financing rate from the outset the total budget available for cohesion policy would have been significantly lower than the amount finally programmed for 2007-2013. 
7
The Commission stresses that the end of the 2007-13 period corresponded to the post-crisis era of austerity in public budgets/investments. 
7
Had they done so the total budget available for cohesion policy would have been significantly lower than the amount finally programmed for 2007-2013. 
7
For the period 2007-2013, the Commission listed the rules to which particular attention should be paid by the managing authorities in case they include retrospective operations in the operational programmes (see COCOF note 12-0050-01). 
7
The Commission clarifies that the 2007-2013 legal framework did not prohibit the selection of already completed operations ("retrospective operations"), provided that these were completed after the starting date for eligibility3. 
7
The approach in the programming period 2014-2020 is therefore more restrictive than the approach in 2007-2013. 
7
70. 
7
72. 
7
73. 
7
The disbursement rates in 2007-2013 programming period followed the lifecycle of the financial instruments. 
7
78. 
7
On the basis of the results of the ex-post evaluation of the 2007-2013 programming period and of the 7th report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, Cohesion policy has shown overall good results. 
7
The Commission started taking actions for some Member States as early as 2010 immediately when some risk of slow absorption was perceived7. 
7
87. 
7
It is standard programme management practice that when a programme shows indication of 6 7 Please see the Commission replies to paragraphs 129 and 130 of the ECA's SR36/2016 For example, regular monitoring of the performance of programmes had been undertaken since the beginning of the period. 
7
The Commission also used an Expert Evaluation Network to provide an annual overview of implementation and its synthesis and annual reports are available on: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/ec/2007-2013 The Commission started taking actions for some Member States as early as 2010 immediately when some risk of slow absorption was perceived. 
7
On this link: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/eval2007/2013_een_task2_synthesis_final.pdf The Strategic Reports adopted by the Commission in 2010 and 2013 provided an EU overview of implementation, and passed messages on the need to accelerate implementation and delivery of investment objectives. 6 
7