natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
18 After receiving a number of complaints, the Commission, in 2004, began an investigation into the possible existence of a cartel among the four major European manufacturers of elevators and escalators, namely the Otis, Kone, Schindler and ThyssenKrupp groups. The investigation culminated in Commission Decision C(2007) 512 final of 21 February 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC (Case COMP/E-1/38.823 − Elevators and Escalators) (‘the decision of 21 February 2007’).
18 Nakon što je primila nekoliko pritužbi, Komisija je 2004. započela istragu o mogućem postojanju sporazuma četiri velika europska proizvođača dizala i pokretnih stepenica, poimence grupâ Otis, Kone, Schindler i ThyssenKrupp. Kao rezultat istrage donesena je Odluka Komisije od 21. veljače 2007. o postupku primjene članka 81. Ugovora o EZ-u (predmet COMP/E-1/38.823 – Dizala i pokretne stepenice) [C(2007) 512 final] (dalje u tekstu: Odluka od 21. veljače 2007.).
19 In that decision the Commission found that the undertakings to which it was addressed, including the defendants in the main proceedings, had infringed Article 81 EC by allocating tenders and other contracts in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in order to share markets and fix prices, by agreeing on a compensation scheme in certain cases, by exchanging information on sales volumes and prices and by participating in regular meetings and by establishing other contacts in order to decide on the abovementioned restrictions and implement them. The Commission imposed fines totalling more than EUR 990 million in respect of those infringements.
19 U toj odluci Komisija je utvrdila da su poduzetnici kojima je upućena, uključujući tuženike u glavnom postupku, povrijedili članak 81. UEZ-a time što su si pozive na nuđenje i druge ugovore u Belgiji, Njemačkoj, Luksemburgu i Nizozemskoj međusobno raspoređivali s ciljem podjele tržišta i utvrđivanja cijena dogovarajući se u određenim slučajevima o mehanizmu naknada, razmjenjujući informacije o obujmu prodaje i cijenama, sudjelujući na redovnim sastancima i uspostavljajući druge kontakte kako bi odredili i proveli gore spomenuta ograničenja. Za te je povrede Komisija izrekla novčane kazne u ukupnom iznosu od preko 992 milijuna eura.
21 By judgments of 13 July 2011 in Case T-138/07 Schindler Holding and Others v Commission [2011] ECR II-0000, Cases T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 General Technic-Otis v Commission [2011] ECR II-0000, Cases T-144/07, T-147/07 to T-150/07 and T-154/07 ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs v Commission [2011] ECR II-0000 and Case T-151/07 Kone and Others v Commission [2011] ECR II-0000, the General Court dismissed those actions, with the exception of the actions brought by the ThyssenKrupp group, which it upheld in part with regard to the amounts of the fines.
21 Presudama od 13. srpnja 2011., Schindler Holding i dr./Komisija (T-138/07, Zb., str. II-4819.), General Technic-Otis/Komisija (T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 i T-146/07, Zb., str. II-4977.), ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs/Komisija (T-144/07, T-147/07 do T-150/07 i T-154/07, Zb., str. II-5129.), i Kone i dr./Komisija (T-151/07, Zb., str. II-5313.), Opći sud odbio je te tužbe, uz izuzetak onih koje je podnijela grupa ThyssenKrupp, koje su djelomično prihvaćene u pogledu iznosa novčanih kazni.
22 The applicants went on to bring appeals before the Court of Justice, seeking to have those judgments set aside. The appeals were registered under case numbers C-493/11 P, C-494/11 P, C-501/11 P, C-503/11 P to 506/11 P, C-510/11 P, C-516/11 P and C-519/11 P. By orders of 24 April and 8 May 2012, the President of the Court ordered Cases C-503/11 P to 506/11 P, C-516/11 P and C-519/11 P to be removed from the register of the Court. By orders of 15 June 2012 in United Technologies v Commission and Otis Luxembourg and Others v Commission, the Court dismissed the appeals in Cases C-493/11 P and C-494/11 P. Cases C-501/11 P and C-510/11 P are pending before the Court.
22 Slijedom toga tužitelji su Sudu podnijeli žalbe radi ukidanja tih presuda. Žalbe su uvedene u upisnik pod brojevima C-493/11 P, C-494/11 P, C-501/11 P, C-503/11 P do 506/11 P, C-510/11 P, C-516/11 P i C-519/11 P. Rješenjima od 24. travnja i 8. svibnja 2012. predsjednik Suda izbrisao je iz upisnika Suda predmete C-503/11 P do 506/11 P, C-516/11 P i C-519/11 P. Rješenjima od 15. lipnja 2012., United Technologies/Komisija i Otis Luxembourg i dr./Komisija, odbijene su žalbe u predmetima C-493/11 P i C-494/11 P. Predmeti C-501/11 P i C-510/11 P u tijeku su pred Sudom.
23 By an originating summons dated 20 June 2008, the European Community, now the European Union (‘the EU’), represented by the Commission, brought proceedings before the referring court, seeking, primarily, an order that the defendants in the main proceedings pay the EU the provisional sum of EUR 7 061 688 (exclusive of interest and costs) in respect of the loss sustained by it as a result of the anti-competitive practices established in the decision of 21 February 2007. The EU had concluded with the defendants in the main proceedings several contracts for the installation, maintenance and renewal of elevators and escalators in various buildings, located in Belgium and Luxembourg, of the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions of the European Union and the Publications Office of the European Union. In the alternative, the EU requested that an expert be appointed in order to determine, inter alia, the entirety of the loss sustained.
23 Uvodnim pozivom od 20. lipnja 2008. Europska zajednica, sada Europska unija, koju zastupa Komisija, podnijela je tužbu pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev tražeći u prvom redu da se izda nalog da tuženici u glavnom postupku Uniji plate privremeni iznos od 7 061 688 eura (bez kamata i troškova postupka) za gubitak koji je Unija imala zbog protutržišne prakse utvrđene odlukom od 21. veljače 2007. Unija je ustvari s tuženicima u glavnom postupku sklopila nekoliko ugovora za ugradnju, održavanje i obnovu liftova i pokretnih stepenica u raznim zgradama Vijeća Europske unije, Europskog parlamenta, Komisije, Europskoga gospodarskog i socijalnog odbora, Odbora regija Europske unije i Ureda za publikacije Europske unije, smještenim u Belgiji i Luksemburgu. Podredno, Unija je zahtijevala da se odredi stručnjak koji će utvrditi osobito sveukupnost pretrpljene štete.
24 The defendants in the main proceedings dispute the Commission’s capacity to act as the EU’s representative in the absence of express authorisation to that effect from the other EU institutions that have allegedly suffered harm as a result of the infringement in question. They have also maintained that there is an infringement of the principles of judicial independence and equality of arms on account of the special role played by the Commission in proceedings relating to infringements of Article 81(1) EC. They submit that, if account is taken of the fact that, under Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003, the decision of 21 February 2007 is binding on the referring court, there is also an infringement of the principle that no one can be a judge in his own cause (nemo judex in sua causa).
24 Tuženici u glavnom postupku osporavaju ovlast Komisije da postupa kao zastupnik Unije bez izričitog odobrenja drugih institucija Unije koje su navodno oštećene zbog dotične povrede. Osim toga istaknuli su i povredu načela neovisnosti suda i jednakosti oružja zbog posebne uloge koju Komisija ima u postupku u okviru postupka primjene članka 81. stavka 1. UEZ-a. Uzimajući u obzir činjenicu da je, u skladu s člankom 16. Uredbe br. 1/2003, odluka od 21. veljače 2007. ograničavajuća za sud koji je uputio zahtjev, povrijeđeno je i načelo prema kojem nitko ne može biti sudac u vlastitoj stvari (nemo judex in sua causa).
‘(1) (a) The Treaty states in Article 282, now Article [3]35 [TFEU], that the [EU] is to be represented by the Commission. Article 335 TFEU, on the one hand, and Articles 103 and 104 of the Financial Regulation, on the other, state that, in administrative matters relating to their operation, the institutions concerned are to represent the [EU], with the possible result that [it] is the institutions, whether or not exclusively, … which may be parties to legal proceedings. There is no doubt that receipt by, amongst others, contractors of payment of inflated prices as a result of collusive practices comes within the concept of fraud. In Belgian national law there is the principle of ‘Lex specialis generalibus derogat’. To the extent to which that principle of law also finds acceptance in [EU] law, is it then not the case that the initiative for bringing the claims (except where the Commission itself was the contracting authority) was vested in the institutions concerned?
"„(1) (a) Na temelju članka 282. UEZ-a, koji je postao članak 335. UFEU-a, Uniju zastupa Komisija; članak 335. UFEU-a, s jedne strane, i članci 103. i 104. Financijske uredbe, s druge strane, određuju da u administrativnim pitanjima povezanima s funkcioniranjem tih institucija dotične institucije zastupaju Uniju, a to može podrazumijevati da su te institucije ovlaštene, bez obzira na to imaju li izričito ovlaštenje ili ne, same se zastupati pred sudom; nema sumnje, osobito za poduzetnike, da je stvaranje kartela kojim su postigli pretjerano visoke cijene obuhvaćeno pojmom prijevare; u belgijskom nacionalnom pravu postoji načelo ‚lex specialis generalibus derogat’; budući da to načelo vrijedi i u europskom pravu, ne bi li trebalo smatrati da (osim u slučaju kada je sama Komisija naručitelj) inicijativa pokretanja postupka pripada dotičnim institucijama?"
(2) (a) Article 47 of the [Charter] and Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human [Rights] and Fundamental Freedoms [signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (the ‘ECHR’)] guarantee every person’s right to a fair trial as well as the related principle that no one can be a judge in his own cause. Is it reconcilable with that principle if the Commission, in an initial phase, acts as the competition authority and penalises the conduct complained of – namely, the formation of a cartel – as a breach of Article 81 [EC], now Article 101 [TFEU] after it has itself conducted the investigation in that regard, and subsequently, in a second phase, prepares the proceedings for seeking compensation before the national court and takes the decision to bring those proceedings, while the same Member of the Commission is responsible for both matters, which are connected, a fortiori as the national court seised of the matter cannot depart from the decision imposing penalties?
"(2) (a) Članak 47. [Povelje] i članak 6. stavak 1. Europske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava [i temeljnih sloboda, potpisane 4. studenoga 1950. u Rimu (dalje u tekstu: EKLJP)] jamče pravo svake osobe na pošteno suđenje kao i na s tim povezano načelo da nitko ne može biti sudac u vlastitoj stvari; je li u skladu s tim načelom da, ako Komisija u početnoj fazi, nakon što je sama provela istragu u tom pogledu, postupa kao tijelo nadležno za tržišno natjecanje i kažnjava sporno ponašanje, odnosno stvaranje kartela, kao povredu članka 81. UEZ-a, koji je postao članak 101. UFEU-a, a naknadno, u drugoj fazi, priprema postupak u kojem pred nacionalnim sudom traži naknadu štete i donosi odluku da pokrene taj postupak, pri čemu je isti član Komisije odgovoran za obje stvari, koje su međusobno povezane, tim više što a fortiori nacionalni sud pred kojim se predmet vodi ne može odstupiti od odluke o kažnjavanju?"
(b) (Subsidiary question) If the answer to Question 2(a) is in the [negative], (there is irreconcilability), how then must the victim (the Commission and/or the institutions and/or the [EU]) of an unlawful act (the formation of the cartel) assert its entitlement to compensation under [EU] law, which is likewise a fundamental right?’
(b) (podredno pitanje) Ako je odgovor na pitanje iz točke 2.(a) [negativan] (u smislu da nespojivost postoji), kako je moguće da stranka (Komisija, institucije ili Unija) oštećena nezakonitim činom (stvaranjem kartela) sama mora isticati u pravu Unije svoje pravo na odštetu, koje je jedno od temeljnih prava?”
31 The defendants in the main proceedings contend, however, that Article 282 EC is only a general rule, from which Articles 274 EC and 279 EC derogate. They argue that the latter provisions have been implemented by the Financial Regulation, Articles 59 and 60 of which authorise each EU institution to implement its own budgetary items. They also maintain that it follows from Articles 103 and 104 of the Financial Regulation that it falls to each of those institutions – if they consider themselves to have suffered harm as a result of the infringement in question – to bring an action for damages, given that most of the contracts were awarded in their own name and on their own behalf.
31 Međutim, tuženici u glavnom postupku ističu da je članak 282. UEZ-a tek opće pravilo od kojeg se odstupa u člancima 274. UEZ-a i 279. UEZ-a. Odredbe ta dva članka provedene su Financijskom uredbom, čiji članci 59. i 60. svakoj instituciji Unije dodjeljuju ovlasti za izvršenje vlastitih proračunskih stavaka. Nadalje, iz članaka 103. i 104. Financijske uredbe proizlazi da je na svakoj od tih institucija, ako se smatra oštećenom zbog dotične povrede, da pokrene tužbu za naknadu štete, budući da većinu ugovora dodjeljuju u svoje ime i za svoj račun.
32 It is to be noted in that regard that Articles 274 EC and 279 EC, and also the provisions of the Financial Regulation, determine, inter alia, the powers of the institutions to establish and implement the budget. By contrast, Article 282 EC confers legal capacity on the Community and governs the way it is represented, inter alia, before the courts of the Member States. The question of Community representation before those courts is distinct from the question concerning measures for budgetary implementation adopted by a Community institution. For that reason, the principle lex specialis generalibus derogat is of no relevance here.
32 U tom pogledu valja utvrditi da članci 274. UEZ-a i 279. UEZ-a i odredbe Financijske uredbe određuju osobito ovlast institucija za utvrđivanje i izvršenje proračuna. Suprotno tome, članak 282. UEZ-a povjerava Zajednici pravnu sposobnost i uređuje način zastupanja Zajednice osobito pred sudovima država članica. Pitanje zastupanja Zajednice pred tim sudovima nije isto što i pitanje o mjerama koje za izvršenje proračuna donosi institucija Zajednice. Zbog toga načelo „lex specialis generalibus derogat” u ovom predmetu nije relevantno.
35 So far as Article 335 TFEU is concerned, it is to be noted that the FEU Treaty contains no transitional provisions concerning the representation of the EU in proceedings which were brought before the courts of the Member States prior to that Treaty’s entry into force but which were still pending thereafter. In those circumstances, the relevant provision governing that representation is Article 282 EC, since the main proceedings were commenced before the entry into force of the FEU Treaty.
35 Što se tiče članka 335. UFEU-a, valja utvrditi da Ugovor o funkcioniranju Europske unije ne sadržava prijelaznu odredbu u pogledu zastupanja Unije u postupcima koji su pred pred sudovima država članica pokrenuti prije stupanja toga Ugovora na snagu, nego koji su nakon što je Ugovor stupio na snagu još uvijek u tijeku. U tim uvjetima relevantna odredba kojom se uređuje to zastupanje je članak 282. UEZ-a, budući da je spor u glavnom postupku započet prije stupanja na snagu Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije.
38 In particular, the referring court entertains doubts, in the first place, as to whether, in such an action, the right to a fair hearing, laid down in Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 of the ECHR, is infringed on account of the fact that, under Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003, a Commission decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC is binding on that court. The referring court states that a decision adopted by one of the parties to the dispute requires it to accept the finding of an infringement of Article 81 EC, which thus prevents the national court from considering in its absolute discretion one of the elements conferring entitlement to compensation, namely the occurrence of an event giving rise to damage (a ‘harmful event’).
38 Konkretno, Sud koji je uputio zahtjev pita se, kao prvo, je li u takvoj tužbi pravo na pošteno suđenje, utvrđeno u članku 47. Povelje i članku 6. EKLJP-a, povrijeđeno zbog toga što je na temelju članka 16. stavka 1. Uredbe br. 1/2003 odluka Komisije o postupku primjene članka 81. UEZ-a obvezujuća za taj sud. Ustvari, nametnuto mu je utvrđenje povrede članka 81. UEZ-a, i to odlukom jedne od stranaka u sporu, čime je nacionalni sud spriječen da suvereno ispita jedan od elemenata na temelju kojih nastaje pravo na naknadu štete, tj. nastanak štetnog događaja.
40 The Court has already had occasion to state that any person can rely on a breach of Article 81 EC before a national court and therefore rely on the invalidity of an agreement or practice prohibited under that article (see Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi and Others [2006] ECR I-6619, paragraph 59).
40 Sud je već imao priliku naglasiti da svaka osoba ima pravo pozivati se pred sudom na povredu članka 81. UEZ-a i time isticati nevaljanost sporazuma ili prakse koje taj članak zabranjuje (presuda od 13. srpnja 2006., Manfredi i dr., od C-295/04 do C-298/04, Zb., str. I-6619., t. 59.).
41 As regards, in particular, the possibility of seeking compensation for loss caused by a contract or conduct liable to restrict or distort competition, it should be recalled that the full effectiveness of Article 81 EC and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC would be put at risk if it were not open to any person to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or conduct liable to restrict or distort competition (see Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraph 26, and Manfredi and Others, paragraph 60).
41 Osobito što se tiče mogućnosti da se zahtijeva naknada štete uzrokovane ugovorom ili ponašanjem koji bi mogli ograničiti ili narušiti tržišno natjecanje, valja podsjetiti da se puna djelotvornost članka 81. UEZ-a i, osobito, korisni učinak zabrane utvrđene u članku 81. stavku 1. UEZ-a dovode u pitanje ako nema svaka osoba mogućnost tražiti naknadu štete uzrokovane ugovorom ili ponašanjem koji bi mogli ograničiti ili narušiti tržišno natjecanje (presude od 20. rujna 2001., Courage i Crehan, C-453/99, Zb., str. I-6297., t. 26. i prethodno navedena, Manfredi i dr., t. 60.).
42 Such a right in fact strengthens the working of the EU competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. From that point of view, actions for damages before national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the EU (Courage and Crehan, paragraph 27).
42 To pravo zapravo jača funkcioniranje pravila Unije o tržišnom natjecanju i destimulira često prikrivene sporazume ili praksu koji bi mogli ograničiti ili narušiti tržišno natjecanje. S tog stajališta tužbe za naknadu štete pred nacionalnim sudovima mogu značajno doprinijeti održavanju učinkovitog tržišnog natjecanja u Uniji. (presuda Courage i Crehan, prethodno navedena, t. 27.).
45 When that right is exercised, however, the fundamental rights of the defendants, as safeguarded, inter alia, by the Charter, must be observed. The provisions of the Charter are addressed, pursuant to Article 51(1) thereof, both to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU and to the Member States when they are implementing EU law.
45 Međutim, to se pravo ostvaruje uz poštovanje temeljnih prava tuženika kako su zajamčena, između ostalog, Poveljom. Na temelju članka 51. stavka 1. Povelje, odredbe te Povelje odnose se na institucije, tijela, urede i agencije Unije, te na države članice kada provode pravo Unije.
"46 It must be borne in mind in that regard that the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EU law, to which expression is now given by Article 47 of the Charter (see Case C-279/09 DEB [2010] ECR I-13849, paragraphs 30 and 31; order in Case C-457/09 Chartry [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25; and Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 49)."
"46 U tom pogledu valja podsjetiti da je načelo djelotvorne sudske zaštite opće načelo prava Unije, koje je danas izraženo u članku 47. Povelje (vidjeti presudu od 2. prosinca 2010., DEB, C-279/09, Zb., str. I-13849. t. 30. i 31.; rješenje od 1. ožujka 2011., Chartry, C-457/09, Zb., str. I-819. t. 25., kao i presudu od 28. srpnja 2011., Samba Diouf, C-69/10, Zb., str. I-7151., t. 49.)."
47 Article 47 of the Charter secures in EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR. It is necessary, therefore, to refer only to Article 47 (Case C-386/10 P Chalkor v Commission [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 51).
47 Spomenuti članak 47. Povelje u pravu Unije osigurava zaštitu dodijeljenu člankom 6. stavkom 1. EKLJP-a. Stoga se valja pozivati isključivo na tu prvu odredbu (presuda od 8. prosinca 2011., Chalkor/Komisija, C-386/10 P, Zb., str. I-13085., t. 51.).
"48 The principle of effective judicial protection laid down in Article 47 of the Charter comprises various elements; in particular, the rights of the defence, the principle of equality of arms, the right of access to a tribunal and the right to be advised, defended and represented."
48 Načelo djelotvorne sudske zaštite utvrđeno u članku 47. Povelje obuhvaća različite elemente, a posebno pravo na obranu, načelo jednakosti oružja, pravo pristupa pravosuđu i pravo da bude savjetovan, branjen i zastupan.
49 With regard, in particular, to the right of access to a tribunal, it must be made clear that, for a ‘tribunal’ to be able to determine a dispute concerning rights and obligations arising under EU law in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, it must have power to consider all the questions of fact and law that are relevant to the case before it.
49 Osobito što se tiče pristupa pravosuđu, valja pojasniti da „sud”, kako bi mogao odlučiti o sporu u pogledu prava i obveza koji proizlaze iz prava Unije u skladu s člankom 47. Povelje, treba imati nadležnost ispitati sve činjenične i pravne elemente relevantne za predmet koji se vodi pred njim.
50 It is true in that respect that, according to the Court’s case-law (Case C-344/98 Masterfoods and HB [2000] ECR I-11369, paragraph 52), which is now given legislative expression in Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003, when national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under, inter alia, Article 101 TFEU which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission.
50 Točno je u tom pogledu da u skladu sa sudskom praksom Suda (presuda od 14. rujna 2000., Masterfoods i HB, C-344/98, Zb., str. I-11369., t. 52.), koju danas nalazimo kodificiranu u članku 16. Uredbe br. 1/2003, kada nacionalni sudovi odlučuju o sporazumima, odlukama ili praksi, koji su obuhvaćeni osobito člankom 101. UFEU-a i koji već jesu predmet odluke Komisije, ti sudovi ne mogu donositi odluke suprotne odluci koju je donijela Komisija.
53 It must be borne in mind in that regard that it is the EU Courts – not the courts of the Member States – which have exclusive jurisdiction to review the legality of the acts of the EU institutions. National courts do not have power to declare such acts invalid (see, to that effect, Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraphs 12 to 20).
53 Važno je podsjetiti u tom pogledu da isključiva nadležnost da nadziru zakonitost akata institucija Unije pripada sudovima Unije, a ne nacionalnim sudovima. Potonji nemaju ovlasti da takve akte proglase nevaljanima (vidjeti u tom smislu osobito presudu od 22. listopada 1987., Foto-Frost, predmet 314/85, Zb., str. 4199., t. od 12. do 20.).