natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
17 In respect of the pecuniary loss exceeding that amount, the claims of Paul and others were rejected by the Landgericht Bonn and by the Oberlandesgericht Köln (Higher Regional Court, Cologne) (Germany). According to those two courts, liability for breach of official duty is incurred under Paragraph 839 of the BGB in conjunction with Article 34 of the GG in the event of a breach of ‘official duty … as against a third party’, that is a duty which exists in any case as against the injured party. They held that that was precluded in the case of the Bundesaufsichtsamt, which exercises the functions assigned to it only in the public interest, pursuant to Paragraph 6(4) of the KWG.
17 Što se tiče novčane štete koja prelazi taj iznos, Landgericht Bonn i Oberlandesgericht Köln (Njemačka) odbili su zahtjeve P. Paula i dr. Prema mišljenju tih dvaju sudova, odgovornost upravnog tijela na temelju članka 839. BGB-a u skladu s člankom 34. GG-a predstavlja povredu „obveza službene dužnosti prema trećoj osobi”, tj. obvezu koja postoji u svakom slučaju prema strani koja je pretrpjela štetu. Smatraju da je to bilo isključeno u slučaju Bundesaufsichtsamta, koji je obavljao dodijeljene mu zadaće samo u javnom interesu, u skladu s člankom 6. stavkom 4. KWG-a.
18 Paul and others thus brought an appeal on a point of law (‘Revision’) before the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) and sought an order against the Bundesrepublik Deutschland for payment of damages for breach of Community law.
18 P. Paul i dr. uložili su pravni lijek „revizije” pred Bundesgerichtshofom i zahtijevali da se Saveznoj republici Njemačkoj naloži plaćanje štete radi povrede prava Zajednice.
19 The Bundesgerichtshof observes, first, that Paul and others have not stated in detail what supervisory measures would have been necessary but were not taken by the Bundesaufsichtsamt. Second, it notes that the Bundesrepublik Deutschland has not expressly disputed the accusation of misconduct on the part of the Bundesaufsichtsamt, but has simply denied liability on the ground that that authority exercises its functions only in the public interest. In those circumstances the Bundesgerichtshof finds that, for the purposes of examining the appeal, it must presume that the Bundesaufsichtsamt failed to take the required supervisory measures or took them belatedly and that Paul and others thereby incurred loss in excess of the amounts already awarded to them at first instance.
19 S jedne strane, Bundesgerichtshof smatra da P. Paul i dr. nisu detaljno naveli koje bi nadzorne mjere bile nužne, a koje Bundesaufsichtsamt nije poduzeo. S druge strane, napominje da Savezna republika Njemačka nije izričito opovrgnula optužbu o propustu Bundesaufsichtsamta, nego je samo zanijekala odgovornost na osnovi toga što to tijelo obavlja zadaće samo u javnom interesu. U tim je okolnostima Bundesgerichtshof ocijenio da se preispitivanje pravnog lijeka „revizije” mora temeljiti na pretpostavci da Bundesaufsichtsamt nije proveo nadzorne mjere koje su se od njega zahtijevale ili ih je poduzeo prekasno te da su posljedično P. Paul i dr. pretrpjeli štetu koja prelazi iznos koji im je već dodijeljen u prvom stupnju.
20 The Bundesgerichtshof finds that the decisive issue for the legal assessment in the proceedings pending before it is whether a rule such as that in Paragraph 6(4) of the KWG can, in an unobjectionable manner, limit the liability for breach of official duty of the Bundesaufsichtsamt by imposing on it official obligations only in the public interest – in which case the lower courts have correctly found that the Bundesrepublik Deutschland is not liable under Paragraph 839 of the BGB in conjunction with Article 34 of the GG –, or whether that provision must be disregarded on account of the primacy of Community law.
20 Bundesgerichtshof smatra da je za pravna pitanja u postupku koji se vodi pred njim odlučujuće to može li pravilo poput onog iz članka 6. stavka 4. KWG-a na način koji nije moguće kritizirati ograničiti odgovornost za povredu službene dužnosti Bundesaufsichtsamta, priznajući mu službene obaveze samo u javnom interesu - u slučaju u kojem su sudovi koji su odlučivali o sporu pravično odbili odgovornost Savezne republike Njemačke na temelju članka 839. BGB-a u skladu s člankom 34. GG-a -, ili takva odredba treba ostati neprimjenjiva zbog nadređenosti prava Zajednice.
21 The Bundesgerichtshof explains that, if the Court were to hold that Directive 94/19 or other directives in the field of credit institutions confer on depositors the right to have the competent authorities take supervisory measures in their interest, Paragraph 6(4) of the KWG would be contrary to Community law.
21 Bundesgerichtshof objašnjava da bi članak 6. stavak 4. KWG-a bio protivan pravu Zajednice, da je Sud smatrao da Direktiva 94/19 ili druge direktive u području kreditnih institucija daju deponentima pravo da nadležna tijela u njihovom interesu provode nadzorne mjere.
22 As regards the various coordinating banking directives to which it refers, the Bundesgerichtshof states that, in the context of their appeal, Paul and others submitted that it followed from all those directives that the purpose of banking supervisory measures was to protect depositors. Although those directives, which are relevant from the point of view of banking supervision law, do not contain any express reference to the protection of depositors, they form part of an overall scheme of banking supervision rules which, according to Paul and others, would be denied practical effectiveness if the Bundesaufsichtsamt were to exercise its functions only in the public interest, pursuant to Paragraph 6(4) of the KWG.
22 S obzirom na različite direktive o usklađivanju u području bankarstva na koje se poziva, Bundesgerichtshof navodi da su P. Paul i dr. u okviru svojeg pravnog lijeka „revizije” tvrdili da iz svih navedenih direktiva proizlazi da je cilj bankovnih nadzornih mjera zaštita deponenta. Da te direktive, relevantne sa stajališta prava bankarskog nadzora, ne sadržavaju nijednu izričitu naznaku o zaštiti deponenata, činile bi dio globalnog regulatornog sustava o nadzoru banaka koji bi prema mišljenju P. Paula i dr. bio lišen praktične primjene da je Bundesaufsichtsamt, na temelju članka 6. stavka 4. KWG-a, obavljao svoje djelatnosti samo u javnom interesu.
23 In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
23 U tim je okolnostima Bundesgerichtshof odlučio prekinuti postupak i postaviti Sudu sljedeća prethodna pitanja:
‘(1) (a) Do the provisions of Articles 3 and 7 of Directive 94/19 … confer on the depositor, in addition to the right to be compensated by a deposit-guarantee scheme up to the amount specified in Article 7(1) in the event of his deposit being unavailable, the more far-reaching right to require that the competent authorities avail themselves of the measures mentioned in Article 3(2) to (5) and, if necessary, revoke the credit institution’s authorisation?
„1. a) Daju li odredbe članaka 3. i 7. Direktive 94/19 [...] deponentu, osim prava da mu u slučaju nedostupnosti njegovog depozita sustav osiguranja depozita plati naknadu štete u iznosu navedenom u članku 7. stavku 1., dodatno pravo da nadležna tijela provedu mjere navedene u članku 3. stavcima 2. do 5. i da, prema potrebi, oduzmu odobrenje za rad izdano kreditnoj instituciji?
(b) In so far as such a right is conferred on the depositor, does that also include the right to claim compensation for damage resulting from the misconduct of the competent authorities, beyond the amount specified in Article 7(1) of [Directive 94/19]?
b) Ako je deponentu takvo pravo priznato, uključuje li to također mogućnost zahtijevanja naknade štete koja proizlazi iz propusta nadležnih tijela i prelazi iznos utvrđen u članku 7. stavku 1. Direktive [94/19]?
(2) (a) Do the provisions, as listed below, of directives harmonising the law on the prudential supervision of banks – either individually or in combination and, if so, from what date onwards – confer on the saver and investor rights to the effect that the competent authorities of the Member States must take prudential supervisory measures, with which they are charged by those directives, in the interests of that category of persons and must incur liability for any misconduct,
2. a) Daju li niže navedene odredbe direktiva o usklađivanju prava o nadzoru banaka - pojedinačno ili ukupno i ako da, od kada - štediši i ulagaču prava u smislu da nadležna tijela država članica moraju u interesu tih osoba provoditi nadzorne mjere koje su im dodijeljene tim direktivama i da su odgovorna u slučaju propusta,
or does Directive [94/19] on deposit-guarantee schemes contain an exhaustive set of special provisions for all cases of unavailability of deposits?
ili Direktiva [94/19] sadržava posebne propise isključivo za sve slučajeve nedostupnosti depozita?
"– First Council Directive 77/780 …: Article 6(1), 4th and 12th recitals in the preamble;"
"Prva direktiva 77/780 [...], članak 6. stavak 1., uvodne izjave 4. i 12.;"
"– Second … Directive 89/646 …: Articles 3, 4 to 7, 10 to 17, 11th recital in the preamble;"
"Druga direktiva 89/646 [...], članak 3., članci 4. do 7., članci 10. do 17., uvodna izjava 11.;"
"– … Directive 89/299: Article 7 in conjunction with Articles 2 to 6;"
"Direktiva 89/299 [...], članak 7. zajedno s člancima 2. do 6.;"
– European Parliament and Council Directive 95/26/EC of 29 June 1995 [amending Directives 77/780/EEC and 89/646/EEC in the field of credit institutions, Directives 73/239/EEC and 92/49/EEC in the field of non-life insurance, Directives 79/267/EEC and 92/96/EEC in the field of life assurance, Directive 93/22/EEC in the field of investment firms and Directive 85/611/EEC in the field of undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (Ucits), with a view to reinforcing prudential supervision] (OJ 1995 L 168, p. 7): recital 15 in the preamble.
Direktiva Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća 95/26/EZ od 29. lipnja 1995. [o izmjeni direktiva 77/780/EEZ i 89/646/EEZ u području kreditnih ustanova, direktiva 73/239/EEZ i 92/49/EEZ u području neživotnog osiguranja, direktiva 79/267/EEZ i 92/96/EEZ u području životnog osiguranja, Direktive 93/22/EEZ u području investicijskih društava i Direktive 85/611/EEZ u području subjekata za zajednička ulaganja u prenosive vrijednosne papire (UCITS) za potrebe jačanja bonitetnog nadzora] (SL L 168, str. 7.) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 6., svezak 10., str. 79. - 85.), uvodna izjava 15.
(b) Do Council Directives
b) Jesu li Direktive
"– 92/30/EEC of 6 April 1992 on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis (OJ 1992 L 110, p. 52): 11th recital in the preamble;"
"Vijeća 92/30/EEZ od 6. travnja 1992. o nadzoru kreditnih institucija na konsolidiranoj osnovi (SL L 110, str. 52.), uvodna izjava 11.;"
"– 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (OJ 1993 L 141, p. 1): eighth recital in the preamble;"
"Vijeća 93/6/EEZ od 15. ožujka 1993. o primjerenosti kapitala investicijskih društava i kreditnih institucija (SL L 141, str. 1.) [neslužbeni prijevod], uvodna izjava 8.;"
"– 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field (OJ 1993 L 141, p. 27): 2nd, 5th, 29th, 32nd, 41st and 42nd recitals;"
Vijeća 93/22/EEZ od 10. svibnja 1993. o investicijskim uslugama u području vrijednosnih papira (SL L 141, str. 27.) [neslužbeni prijevod], uvodne izjave 2., 5., 29., 32., 41. i 42.,
provide assistance with interpretation for the purpose of answering the above question, regardless of whether they otherwise contain law applicable in the present case?
sredstvo tumačenja za odgovor na prijašnje pitanje, neovisno o činjenici sadržavaju li ili ne sadržavaju u zadanom primjeru primjenjivo pravo?
(3) Should the Court find that all or any one of the directives cited above confer(s) on savers or investors the right to require the competent authorities to avail themselves of prudential supervisory measures in their interest, the following further questions are submitted:
3. Ako Sud treba priznati da navedene direktive ili neke među njima daju štedišama i ulagačima pravo da zahtijevaju da nadležna tijela osiguraju u njihovom interesu nadzorne mjere, vijeće postavlja još sljedeća pitanja:
(a) Does a right for a saver or investor to have prudential supervisory measures taken in his interest have direct effect in proceedings brought against the Member State concerned in the sense that the national rules which preclude such a right must be disregarded,
a) ima li pravo štediše ili ulagača na provedbu nadzornih mjera u njihovom interesu u postupku koji se vodi protiv države članice izravan učinak tako da se nacionalna pravila koja su mu protivna ne smiju upotrebljavati,
(b) does a Member State which has failed to respect that right of savers or investors when transposing directives incur liability only in accordance with the principles governing claims for damages against the State under Community law?
b) snosi li država članica, koja prilikom prenošenja direktiva nije poštovala to pravo štediša i ulagača, odgovornost samo na temelju načela Zajednice o odgovornosti države,
(c) In the latter case, has the Member State committed a sufficiently serious breach of Community law where it has failed to recognise that a right to have prudential supervisory measures taken is conferred?’
c) je li država članica, u ovom zadnjem primjeru, povrijedila pravo Zajednice na dovoljno karakterističan način jer nije priznala dodjelu prava na zahtijevanje provedbe nadzornih mjera?”
On the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
O prethodnim pitanjima
24 Although doubts have been raised in a number of the observations submitted to the Court as to the admissibility of the questions referred, the Court finds that, by its developed statement of grounds referred to in paragraphs 19 to 22 above, the Bundesgerichtshof has demonstrated why the interpretation of the Community legislation in question seems to it necessary to enable it to give judgment in the main proceedings. Furthermore, it has set out the legal and factual background sufficiently to enable the Court to give it an effective answer and to give the parties to the main proceedings, the Member States and the Commission, in particular, the opportunity to submit observations in accordance with Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
24 Iako su bile izražene sumnje u određena očitovanja podnesena Sudu u pogledu dopuštenosti prethodnih pitanja, valja utvrditi da je svojim detaljnim obrazloženjem na koje se podsjeća u točkama 19. do 22. ove presude Bundesgerichtshof dokazao zašto je tumačenje dotičnih pravila Zajednice nužno za odlučivanje o sporu u glavnom postupku. Osim toga, dovoljno je naveo pravni i činjenični okvir da omogući Sudu da mu da koristan odgovor i da posebno strankama iz glavnog postupka, državama članicama i Komisiji omogući podnošenje očitovanja u skladu s člankom 23. Statuta Suda.
On the first question
Prvo pitanje
25 By its first question, the Bundesgerichtshof seeks essentially to ascertain whether Directive 94/19, insofar as it refers in Article 3(2) to (5) thereof to the adoption of supervisory measures and an obligation to revoke a credit institution’s authorisation, precludes a national rule to the effect that the functions of the national authority responsible for supervising credit institutions are to be fulfilled only in the public interest, which under national law precludes individuals from claiming compensation for damage resulting from defective supervision on the part of that authority.
25 Svojim prvim pitanjem Bundesgerichtshof u biti pita je li Direktivi 94/19, koja u svojem članku 3. stavcima 2. do 5. predviđa donošenje nadzornih mjera i obvezu oduzimanja odobrenja za rad kreditnoj instituciji, protivno nacionalno pravilo prema kojem se zadaće nacionalnog tijela za nadzor kreditnih institucija provode samo u javnom interesu, što prema nacionalnom pravu isključuje mogućnost da pojedinci zahtijevaju naknadu štete uzrokovane nedostatnim nadzorom od strane tog tijela.
26 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that Directive 94/19 seeks to introduce cover for depositors, wherever deposits are located in the Community, in the event of the unavailability of deposits made with a credit institution which is a member of a deposit guarantee-scheme.
26 U tom pogledu valja podsjetiti da, bez obzira na to gdje u Zajednici se depoziti nalazili, Direktiva 94/19 teži uvođenju zaštite deponenata u slučaju nedostupnosti depozita kod kreditne institucije koja je dio sustava osiguranja depozita.
27 The depositor’s right to compensation in such a situation is governed by Article 7(1) and (6) of that directive. Article 7(1) determines the maximum amount of compensation which a depositor may claim on the basis of the directive, whilst Article 7(3) specifies that Member States may under their national law provide for rules offering depositors a higher or more comprehensive cover for deposits. Article 7(6) of Directive 94/19 requires Member States to ensure that the depositor’s rights to compensation, as defined in particular in Article 7(1) and (3), may be the subject of an action by the depositor against the deposit-guarantee scheme.
27 Pravo deponenata na naknadu štete u takvoj situaciji uređeno je odredbama članka 7. stavaka 1. i 6. te direktive. Taj članak u svojem stavku 1. određuje maksimalan iznos naknade štete koji deponent može zahtijevati na osnovi direktive, dok stavak 3. istog članka navodi da države članice mogu u svojem nacionalnom pravu predvidjeti propise koji deponentima pružaju veću ili obuhvatniju zaštitu depozita. Članak 7. stavak 6. Direktive 94/19 obvezuje države članice da osiguravaju da prava deponenata na naknadu, što je posebno utvrđeno u stavcima 1. i 3., mogu biti predmet zahtjeva koji deponent podnosi protiv sustava osiguranja depozita.
28 Article 3(2) to (5) of the directive provides for an obligation for the competent authorities which have issued authorisations to credit institutions to ensure, in cooperation with the deposit-guarantee scheme, that those institutions comply with their obligations as members of that scheme and to adopt, where appropriate, in the conditions specified in Article 3(5), a decision revoking the authorisation of the institution in question.
28 Članak 3. stavci 2. do 5. iste direktive predviđaju obvezu za nadležna tijela koja su izdala odobrenje za rad kreditnim institucijama da u suradnji sa sustavom osiguranja depozita osiguraju da navedene kreditne institucije koje su članice sustava osiguranja depozita ispunjavaju svoje obveze i da, prema potrebi, u uvjetima navedenima u stavku 5. donesu odluku o oduzimanju odobrenja za rad dotičnoj kreditnoj instituciji.
29 The purpose of Article 3(2) to (5) of Directive 94/19 is to guarantee to depositors that the credit institution in which they make their deposits belongs to a deposit-guarantee scheme, in order to ensure protection of their right to compensation in the event that their deposits are unavailable, in accordance with the rules laid down in that directive and more specifically in Article 7 thereof. Those provisions thus relate only to the introduction and proper functioning of the deposit-guarantee scheme as provided for by Directive 94/19.
29 Cilj članka 3. stavaka 2. do 5. Direktive 94/19 je osigurati deponentima da kreditna institucija u koju su položili svoje depozite pripada sustavu osiguranja depozita, kako bi se osiguralo njihovo pravo na naknadu štete u slučaju nedostupnosti njihovog depozita u skladu s pravilima predviđenima navedenom direktivom i posebno s njezinim člankom 7. Ove odredbe tako služe samo uspostavi i pravilnom funkcioniranju sustava osiguranja depozita kako je predviđeno Direktivom 94/19.
30 Under those conditions, as pointed out by the governments which submitted observations to the Court and by the Commission, if the compensation of depositors is ensured in the event that their deposits are unavailable, as prescribed by Directive 94/19, Article 3(2) to (5) thereof does not confer on depositors a right to have the competent authorities take supervisory measures in their interest.
30 U tim okolnostima i kako su navele vlade koje su podnijele očitovanja Sudu i Komisija, s obzirom da je osigurana naknada štete deponentima u slučaju nedostupnosti njihovih depozita, kako je predviđeno Direktivom 94/19, njezin članak 3. stavci 2. do 5. ne daju deponentima pravo da nadležna tijela u njihovom interesu provedu nadzorne mjere.
31 That interpretation of Directive 94/19 is supported by the 24th recital in the preamble thereto, which states that the directive may not result in the Member States’ or their competent authorities’ being made liable in respect of depositors if they have ensured the compensation or protection of depositors under the conditions prescribed in the directive.
31 To tumačenje Direktive 94/19 potkrijepljeno je njezinom uvodnom izjavom 24., koja isključuje da ova direktiva može imati za posljedicu odgovornost država članica ili njihovih nadležnih tijela s obzirom na deponente, ako su osigurali naknadu štete ili zaštitu deponenata pod uvjetima utvrđenima ovom direktivom.
32 The answer to the first question must therefore be that, if the compensation of depositors prescribed by Directive 94/19 is ensured, Article 3(2) to (5) thereof cannot be interpreted as precluding a national rule to the effect that the functions of the national authority responsible for supervising credit institutions are to be fulfilled only in the public interest, which under national law precludes individuals from claiming compensation for damage resulting from defective supervision on the part of that authority.
32 Stoga na prvo pitanje valja odgovoriti da, s obzirom da je deponentima osigurana naknada štete predviđena Direktivom 94/19, njezin članak 3. stavci 2. do 5. ne mogu se tumačiti tako da im je protivno nacionalno pravilo prema kojem se zadaće nacionalnog tijela za nadzor kreditnih institucija provode samo u javnom interesu, što prema nacionalnom pravu isključuje mogućnost da pojedinci zahtijevaju naknadu štete uzrokovane nedostatnim nadzorom od strane tog tijela.
On the second question
Drugo pitanje
33 By its second question, the Bundesgerichtshof essentially seeks to ascertain whether Directives 77/780, 89/299 and 89/646, insofar as they contain rules on the supervision of credit institutions, preclude a national rule to the effect that the functions of the national authority responsible for supervising credit institutions are to be fulfilled only in the public interest, which under national law precludes individuals from claiming compensation for damage resulting from defective supervision on the part of that authority.
33 Svojim drugim pitanjem Bundesgerichtshof u biti želi utvrditi je li direktivama 77/780, 89/299 i 89/646, u mjeri u kojoj sadržavaju pravila o nadzoru kreditnih institucija, protivno nacionalno pravilo prema kojem se zadaće nacionalnog tijela za nadzor kreditnih institucija provode samo u javnom interesu, što prema nacionalnom pravu isključuje mogućnost da pojedinci zahtijevaju naknadu štete uzrokovane nedostatnim nadzorom od strane tog tijela.
34 In that regard, it should first be observed that Directives 77/780, 89/299 and 89/646 were combined in Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ 2000 L 126, p. 1), the Community legislature having codified them because they had been frequently and substantially amended.
34 U tom pogledu najprije valja navesti da su direktive 77/780, 89/299 i 89/646 preraspoređene u okviru Direktive 2000/12/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 20. ožujka 2000. o osnivanju i obavljaju poslovanja kreditnih institucija (SL L 126, str. 1.), koje je zakonodavac Zajednice kodificirao zbog njihovih učestalih i bitnih izmjena.