natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
12 The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (`the DDA') essentially aims to make it unlawful to discriminate against disabled persons in connection, inter alia, with employment.
12 Zakon o diskriminaciji na temelju invaliditeta iz 1995. godine (u daljnjem tekstu: „DDA") u bitnome nastoji učiniti nezakonitom diskriminaciju osoba s invaliditetom, između ostaloga u vezi s njihovim zapošljavanjem.
13 Part 2 of the DDA, which regulates the employment field, was amended, on the transposition of Directive 2000/78 into United Kingdom law, by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, which came into force on 1 October 2004.
13 Dio 2. DDA-a, koji uređuje područje zapošljavanja, izmijenjen je prilikom prenošenja Direktive 2000/78 u zakonodavstvo Ujedinjene Kraljevine, uredbom iz 2003. o izmjenama zakona iz 1995. o diskriminaciji na temelju invaliditeta (Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003), koji je stupio na snagu 1. listopada 2004.
14 According to section 3A(1) of the DDA, as amended by those 2003 Regulations (`the DDA as amended in 2003'):
14 U skladu s člankom 3.A stavkom 1. DDA-a, kako je izmijenjen navedenom uredbom iz 2003. godine (dalje u tekstu: DDA iz 2003.):
`... a person discriminates against a disabled person if -
„[...] osoba diskriminira osobu s invaliditetom ako:
(a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that reason does not or would not apply, and
(a) zbog invaliditeta osobe s invaliditetom, s njom postupa nepovoljnije nego što postupa ili bi postupala s drugima na koje se taj razlog ne odnosi ili se ne bi odnosio, i
(b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified.'
(b) ne može dokazati da je predmetno postupanje opravdano."
15 Section 3A(4) of the DDA as amended in 2003 none the less specifies that the treatment of a disabled person cannot be justified if it amounts to direct discrimination falling within section 3A(5), according to which:
15 Članak 3.A stavak 4. DDA-a iz 2003. osim toga navodi da postupanje prema osobi s invaliditetom ne može biti opravdano ako dovodi do izravne diskriminacije obuhvaćene stavkom 5. tog članka, prema kojemu:
`A person directly discriminates against a disabled person if, on the ground of the disabled person's disability, he treats the disabled person less favourably than he treats or would treat a person not having that particular disability whose relevant circumstances, including his abilities, are the same as, or not materially different from, those of the disabled person.'
„Osoba izravno diskriminira osobu s invaliditetom ako zbog invaliditeta osobe s invaliditetom s njom postupa nepovoljnije nego što postupa ili bi postupala s osobom koja nema taj određeni invaliditet i čije su bitne osobine, uključujući njezine sposobnosti, jednake odnosno nisu bitno različite od osobina osobe s invaliditetom."
16 Harassment is defined in section 3B of the DDA as amended in 2003 as follows:
16 Uznemiravanje je u članku 3.B DDA-a iz 2003. definirano kako slijedi:
`(1) ... a person subjects a disabled person to harassment where, for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he engages in unwanted conduct which has the purpose or effect of -
„(1) [...] osoba izlaže uznemiravanju osobu s invaliditetom ako se, zbog invaliditeta osobe s invaliditetom, upušta u nepoželjno postupanje sa svrhom ili učinkom:
(a) violating the disabled person's dignity, or
(a) povrede dostojanstva osobe s invaliditetom, ili
(b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for him.
(b) stvaranja zastrašujuće, neprijateljske, degradirajuće, ponižavajuće ili uvredljive sredine za tu osobu.
(2) Conduct shall be regarded as having the effect referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) only if, having regard to all the circumstances, including in particular the perception of the disabled person, it should reasonably be considered as having that effect.'
(2) Smatra se da postupanje ima učinak iz točke (a) ili (b) stavka 1. samo ako se, uzimajući u obzir sve okolnosti, a posebno percepciju osobe s invaliditetom, može razumno smatrati da ima taj učinak."
17 Under section 4(2)(d) of the DDA as amended in 2003, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a disabled person whom he employs by dismissing him or by subjecting him to any other detriment.
17 U skladu s člankom 4. stavkom 2. točkom (d) DDA-a iz 2003., poslodavcu je zabranjeno diskriminirati osobu s invaliditetom, koju zapošljava, na način da je otpusti ili podvrgne nekoj drugoj šteti.
18 Section 4(3)(a) and (b) of the DDA as amended in 2003 provides that it is also unlawful for an employer, in relation to employment by him, to subject to harassment a disabled person whom he employs or a disabled person who has applied to him for employment.
18 Članak 4. stavak 3. točke (a) i (b) DDA-a iz 2003. predviđaju da je poslodavcu prilikom zapošljavanja kod sebe također zabranjeno izložiti uznemiravanju osobu s invaliditetom koju zapošljava odnosno osobu s invaliditetom koja se kod njega prijavila za posao.
19 Ms Coleman worked for her former employer as a legal secretary from January 2001.
19 S. Coleman je radila za svojeg bivšeg poslodavca kao pravna tajnica od siječnja 2001.
20 In 2002, she gave birth to a son who suffers from apnoeic attacks and congenital laryngomalacia and bronchomalacia.
20 Ona je 2002. rodila sina koji pati od napadaja apneje te urođene laringomalacije i bronhomalacije.
Her son's condition requires specialised and particular care.
Stanje njezina sina zahtijeva specijaliziranu i posebnu njegu.
The claimant in the main proceedings is his primary carer.
Tužiteljica u glavnom postupku pruža mu osnovnu skrb koja mu je potrebna.
21 On 4 March 2005, Ms Coleman accepted voluntary redundancy, which brought her contract of employment with her former employer to an end.
21 S. Coleman je 4. ožujka 2005. prihvatila dobrovoljni raskid radnog odnosa („voluntary redundancy"), čime je njezin ugovor o radu kod bivšeg poslodavca okončan.
22 On 30 August 2005, she lodged a claim with the Employment Tribunal, London South, alleging that she had been subject to unfair constructive dismissal and had been treated less favourably than other employees because she was the primary carer of a disabled child.
22 Ona je 30. kolovoza 2005. podnijela tužbu sudu Employment Tribunal, London South, u kojoj navodi da je bila podvrgnuta nepravednom otkazu („unfair constructive dismissal"), te da se prema njoj postupalo nepovoljnije nego prema ostalim radnicima jer je ona primarna njegovateljica djeteta s invaliditetom.
She claims that that treatment caused her to stop working for her former employer.
Ona navodi da je to postupanje razlog njezinog prestanka rada kod bivšeg poslodavca.
23 The order for reference states that the material facts of the case in the main proceedings have not yet been fully established, since the questions referred for a preliminary ruling arose only as a preliminary issue.
23 Odluka kojom se upućuje zahtjev za prethodnu odluku navodi da bitne okolnosti predmeta u glavnom postupku još nisu u potpunosti utvrđene, s obzirom da su se pitanja iz zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku pojavila samo kao prethodno pitanje u glavnom postupku.
The referring tribunal stayed that part of the action concerning Ms Coleman's dismissal, but held a preliminary hearing on 17 February 2006 to consider the discrimination plea.
Sud koji je uputio zahtjev prekinuo je taj dio postupka vezan uz otkaz S. Coleman, ali je 17. veljače 2006. održao prethodnu raspravu radi razmatranja tužbenog zahtjeva u vezi s diskriminacijom.
24 The preliminary issue raised before that tribunal is whether the claimant in the main proceedings can base her application on national law, in particular those provisions designed to transpose Directive 2000/78, in order to plead discrimination against her former employer on the ground that she was subjected to less favourable treatment connected with her son's disability.
24 Prethodno pitanje postavljeno tom sudu glasi može li tužiteljica u glavnom postupku svoju tužbu temeljiti na odredbama nacionalnog prava, a posebno onima sastavljenima radi prenošenja Direktive 2000/78, kako bi svojeg bivšeg poslodavca teretila za diskriminaciju na osnovi toga što je podvrgnuta nepovoljnijem postupanju povezanom s invaliditetom svojega sina.
25 It is apparent from the order for reference that, should the Court's interpretation of Directive 2000/78 contradict that put forward by Ms Coleman, her application to the referring tribunal could not succeed under national law.
25 Iz odluke kojom se upućuje zahtjev za prethodnu odluku proizlazi da, ako bi tumačenje Direktive 2000/78 od strane Suda proturječilo tumačenju S. Coleman, prihvaćanje njezine tužbe koju je podnijela nacionalnom sudu protivilo bi se nacionalnom pravu
26 It is also apparent from the order for reference that, under United Kingdom law, where there is a preliminary hearing on a point of law, the court or tribunal hearing the case assumes that the facts are as related by the claimant.
26 Iz zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku također proizlazi da, prema pravu Ujedinjene Kraljevine, ako se održava prethodna rasprava o nekom pravnom pitanju, sud koji razmatra predmet polazi od toga da su činjenice onakve kako ih je iznio tužitelj.
In the main proceedings, the facts of the dispute are assumed to be as follows:
U glavnom postupku pretpostavljaju se sljedeće činjenice spora:
On Ms Coleman's return from maternity leave, her former employer refused to allow her to return to her existing job, in circumstances where the parents of non-disabled children would have been allowed to take up their former posts;
nakon povratka S. Coleman s rodiljnog dopusta, njezin bivši poslodavac odbio joj je dopustiti povratak na njezino postojeće radno mjesto, u okolnostima u kojima bi roditeljima djece bez invaliditeta bio dopušten povratak na njihova stara radna mjesta;
her former employer also refused to allow her the same flexibility as regards her working hours and the same working conditions as those of her colleagues who are parents of non-disabled children;
njezin joj je bivši poslodavac također odbio dopustiti jednaku fleksibilnost u odnosu na radne sate i jednake radne uvjete kao drugim njezinim kolegama koji su roditelji djece bez invaliditeta;
Ms Coleman was described as `lazy' when she requested time off to care for her child, whereas parents of non-disabled children were allowed time off;
S. Coleman je opisana kao „lijena" kad je zatražila slobodno vrijeme kako bi njegovala svoje dijete, dok je to vrijeme bilo dopušteno roditeljima djece bez invaliditeta;
the formal grievance which she lodged against her ill treatment was not dealt with properly and she felt constrained to withdraw it;
službeni prigovor koji je podnijela zbog lošeg postupanja prema njoj nije bio propisno obrađen te se ona osjećala prisiljenom povući ga;
abusive and insulting comments were made about both her and her child.
bilo je neprimjerenih i uvredljivih komentara na račun nje i njezinog djeteta.
No such comments were made when other employees had to ask for time off or a degree of flexibility in order to look after non-disabled children; and
Takvih komentara nije bilo kad su drugi radnici trebali tražiti slobodno vrijeme ili određenu fleksibilnost kako bi se brinuli o djeci bez invaliditeta; i
having occasionally arrived late at the office because of problems related to her son's condition, she was told that she would be dismissed if she came to work late again.
zbog povremenog kašnjenja na posao uzrokovanog problemima povezanima sa stanjem njezinog sina, rečeno joj je da će biti otpuštena ako ponovno zakasni na posao.
No such threat was made in the case of other employees with non-disabled children who were late for similar reasons.
Takvih prijetnji nije bilo u slučaju drugih radnika s djecom bez invaliditeta, koji su kasnili iz sličnih razloga.
27 Since the Employment Tribunal, London South, considered that the case before it raised questions of interpretation of Community law, it decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
27 Budući da je Employment Tribunal, London South, smatrao da se u sporu koji se pred njim vodi javljaju pitanja tumačenja prava Zajednice, odlučio je prekinuti postupak i uputiti Sudu sljedeća prethodna pitanja:
`(1) In the context of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability, does [Directive 2000/78] only protect from direct discrimination and harassment persons who are themselves disabled?
„1. U kontekstu zabrane diskriminacije na temelju invaliditeta, štiti li direktiva [2000/78] od izravne diskriminacije i uznemiravanja samo osobe koje same imaju invaliditet?
(2) If the answer to Question (1) above is in the negative, does [Directive 2000/78] protect employees who, though they are not themselves disabled, are treated less favourably or harassed on the ground of their association with a person who is disabled?
2. Ako je odgovor na prvo pitanje negativan, štiti li direktiva [2000/78] samo radnike prema kojima se, iako sami nisu osobe s invaliditetom, postupa nepovoljnije ili ih se uznemirava zbog njihove povezanosti s osobom koja ima invaliditet?
(3) Where an employer treats an employee less favourably than he treats or would treat other employees, and it is established that the ground for the treatment of the employee is that the employee has a disabled son for whom the employee cares, is that treatment direct discrimination in breach of the principle of equal treatment established by [Directive 2000/78]?
3. Ako poslodavac prema radniku postupa nepovoljnije nego što postupa ili bi postupao prema drugim radnicima, te se utvrdi da je razlog postupanja prema tom radniku to što taj radnik ima sina s invaliditetom kojega njeguje taj radnik, je li takvo postupanje izravna diskriminacija kojom se krši načelo jednakog postupanja utvrđeno u direktivi [2000/78]?
(4) Where an employer harasses an employee, and it is established that the ground for the treatment of the employee is that the employee has a disabled son for whom the employee cares, is that harassment a breach of the principle of equal treatment established by [Directive 2000/78]?'
4. Ako poslodavac uznemirava radnika te se utvrdi da je razlog postupanja prema tom radniku to što taj radnik ima sina s invaliditetom kojega njeguje, je li takvo uznemiravanje povreda načela jednakog postupanja utvrđenog u direktivi [2000/78]?"
28 While accepting that the questions put by the referring tribunal are based on an actual dispute, the Netherlands Government called into question the admissibility of the reference for a preliminary ruling on the basis that, given that these are preliminary questions raised at a preliminary hearing, all the facts at issue have not yet been established.
28 Iako prihvaća da se pitanja suda koji je uputio zahtjev temelje na stvarnom sporu, nizozemska vlada sumnja u dopuštenost zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku zbog toga što, s obzirom da su to prethodna pitanja postavljena na prethodnoj raspravi, sve činjenice još nisu utvrđene.
It points out that, for the purposes of such a preliminary hearing, the national court or tribunal presumes that the facts are as related by the claimant.
Ona ističe da za svrhe takve prethodne rasprave nacionalni sud pretpostavlja da su činjenice onakve kako ih je iznio tužitelj.
29 It must be borne in mind that Article 234 EC establishes the framework for a relationship of close cooperation between the national courts or tribunals and the Court of Justice based on the assignment to each of different functions.
29 Valja imati na umu da članak 234. UEZ-a utvrđuje okvir bliske suradnje između nacionalnih sudova i Suda, koji se temelji na međusobnoj raspodjeli funkcija.
It is clear from the second paragraph of that article that it is for the national court or tribunal to decide at what stage in the proceedings it is appropriate for that court or tribunal to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (see Joined Cases 36/80 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and Others [1981] ECR 735, paragraph 5, and Case C-236/98 JämO [2000] ECR I-2189, paragraph 30).
Iz stavka 2. toga članka jasno je da je na nacionalnom sudu da odluči u kojoj fazi postupka prikladno da taj sud uputi Sudu prethodno pitanje (vidjeti presude od 10. ožujka 1981., Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association i drugi, 36/80 i 71/80, Zb., str. 735., t. 5. i od 30. ožujka 2000., JämO, C-236/98, Zb., str. I-2189., t. 30.).
30 In the case in the main proceedings, the referring tribunal found that, if the Court of Justice should decide not to interpret Directive 2000/78 in accordance with Ms Coleman's submissions, her case would fail in the material respects.
30 S obzirom na predmet u glavnom postupku, valja istaknuti da je sud koji je uputio zahtjev utvrdio da, ako bi Sud tumačio Direktivu 2000/78 na način koji nije u skladu s tvrdnjama S. Coleman, njezin bi predmet u meritumu bio pobijen.
The referring tribunal therefore decided, as permitted under United Kingdom legislation, to consider whether that directive must be interpreted as being applicable to the dismissal of an employee in Ms Coleman's situation, before establishing whether, in fact, Ms Coleman did suffer less favourable treatment or harassment.
Stoga je sud koji je uputio zahtjev, kako je to dozvoljeno prema zakonodavstvu Ujedinjene Kraljevine, odlučio razmotriti treba li tu direktivu tumačiti na način da je primjenjiva na otkaz radnika koji je u istoj situaciji kao S. Coleman, prije nego što činjenično utvrdi je li S. Coleman pretrpjela nepovoljnije postupanje ili uznemiravanje.
It is for that reason that the questions referred for a preliminary ruling were based on the presumption that the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings are as summarised in paragraph 26 of this judgment.
Zbog toga su se prethodna pitanja temeljila na pretpostavci da su činjenice spora u glavnom postupku onakve kako su sažete u točki 26. ove presude.
31 Where, as here, the Court receives a request for interpretation of Community law which is not manifestly unrelated to the reality or the subject-matter of the main proceedings and it has the necessary information in order to give appropriate answers to the questions put to it in relation to the applicability of Directive 2000/78 to those proceedings, it must reply to that request and is not required to consider the facts as presumed by the referring court or tribunal, a presumption which it is for the referring court or tribunal to verify subsequently if that should prove to be necessary (see, to that effect, Case C-127/92 Enderby [1993] ECR I-5535, paragraph 12).
31 Ako Sud isto tako zaprimi zahtjev za tumačenje prava Zajednice koji nije očigledno nevezan uz stvarnost ili predmet glavnog postupka, te ima informacije potrebne za davanje prikladnih odgovora na pitanja koja su postavljena u vezi s primjenjivošću Direktive 2000/78 na taj postupak, on treba odgovoriti na taj zahtjev te nije obvezan razmatrati činjenice koje je utvrdio sud koji je uputio zahtjev, a tu će pretpostavku sud koji je uputio zahtjev naknadno potvrditi pokaže li se to potrebnim (vidjeti, u tom smislu, presudu od 27. listopada 1993., Enderby, C-127/92, Zb., str. I-5535., t. 12.).
32 In those circumstances, the request for a preliminary ruling must be held to be admissible.
32 U tim okolnostima zahtjev za prethodnu odluku treba smatrati dopuštenim.
The first part of Question 1, and Questions 2 and 3
Prvi dio prvog pitanja, drugo i treće pitanje
33 By these questions, which should be examined together, the referring tribunal asks, in essence, whether Directive 2000/78, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (2)(a), must be interpreted as prohibiting direct discrimination on grounds of disability only in respect of an employee who is himself disabled, or whether the principle of equal treatment and the prohibition of direct discrimination apply equally to an employee who is not himself disabled but who, as in the present case, is treated less favourably by reason of the disability of his child, for whom he is the primary provider of the care required by virtue of the child's condition.
33 Ovim pitanjima, koja valja ispitati zajedno, sud koji je uputio zahtjev u biti pita treba li Direktivu 2000/78, a posebno članak 1. te članak 2. stavak 1. i stavak 2. točku (a), tumačiti na način da zabranjuju izravnu diskriminaciju na temelju invaliditeta samo u odnosu na radnika koji je sam osoba s invaliditetom, ili se načelo jednakog postupanja i zabrane izravne diskriminacije primjenjuje jednako na radnika koji sam nije osoba s invaliditetom ali se, kao što je slučaj u ovom predmetu, prema njemu nepovoljnije postupa na temelju invaliditeta njegova djeteta, za koje je on primarni pružatelj njege potrebne zbog stanja djeteta.
34 Article 1 of Directive 2000/78 identifies its purpose as being to lay down, as regards employment and occupation, a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
34 Članak 1. Direktive 2000/78 utvrđuje da je njezina svrha, u pogledu zapošljavanja i obavljanja zanimanja, odrediti opći okvir za borbu protiv diskriminacije na temelju vjere ili uvjerenja, invaliditeta, dobi ili spolnog opredjeljenja.
35 Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/78 defines the principle of equal treatment as meaning that there is to be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1, including, therefore, disability.
35 Članak 2. stavak 1. iste direktive definira da načelo jednakog postupanja znači nepostojanje bilo kakve izravne ili neizravne diskriminacije na temelju razloga iz članka 1., uključujući tako i invaliditet.
36 According to Article 2(2)(a), direct discrimination is to be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on the grounds, inter alia, of disability.
36 Sukladno članku 2. stavku 2. točki (a) smatra se da se radi o izravnoj diskriminaciji u slučaju kada se prema jednoj osobi postupa lošije nego prema drugoj osobi, se postupalo ili bi se postupalo u sličnim situacijama, zbog razloga koji između ostaloga uključuju invaliditet.
37 Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78 provides that the directive is to apply, within the limits of the areas of competence conferred on the Community, to all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, in relation to employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay.
37 Na temelju članka 3. stavka 1. točke (c), u granicama nadležnosti prenesenih na Zajednicu, Direktiva 2000/78 se primjenjuje na sve osobe, bilo u javnom ili privatnom sektoru, uključujući javna tijela, u odnosu na zapošljavanje i uvjete rada, uključujući otkaze i plaće.
38 Consequently, it does not follow from those provisions of Directive 2000/78 that the principle of equal treatment which it is designed to safeguard is limited to people who themselves have a disability within the meaning of the directive.
38 Stoga iz tih odredaba Direktive 2000/78 ne proizlazi da je načelo jednakog postupanja, koje se njome osigurava, ograničeno na osobe koje su same osobe s invaliditetom u smislu te direktive.
On the contrary, the purpose of the directive, as regards employment and occupation, is to combat all forms of discrimination on grounds of disability.
Naprotiv, njezin je cilj, u odnosu na zapošljavanje i obavljanje zanimanja, borba protiv svih oblika diskriminacije na temelju invaliditeta.
The principle of equal treatment enshrined in the directive in that area applies not to a particular category of person but by reference to the grounds mentioned in Article 1.
Načelo jednakog postupanja, sadržano u direktivi u tom području, ne primjenjuje se na određenu kategoriju osoba, već je vođeno razlozima koje navodi članak 1.