natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
40 In addition, Danske Slagterier pleads a breach of the principle of equivalence since German law provides for interruption of the limitation period when a domestic action under Paragraph 839 of the BGB is brought in parallel and proceedings under Article 226 EC must be treated in the same way as such an action.
40 Osim toga, Danske Slagterier poziva se na povredu načela ekvivalentnosti jer je njemačkim pravom predviđen prekid roka zastare u slučaju istodobnog podnošenja pravnog sredstva na temelju nacionalnog prava u skladu s člankom 839. BGB-a, što znači da tužbu u skladu s člankom 226. UEZ-a treba tretirati jednako kao to pravno sredstvo.
41 As to those submissions, in order to decide whether procedural rules are equivalent, it is necessary to verify objectively, in the abstract, whether the rules at issue are similar taking into account the role played by them in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation of that procedure and any special features of the rules (see, to this effect, Case C-78/98 Preston and Others [2000] ECR I-3201, paragraph 63).
41 U tom pogledu valja istaknuti da je za odluku o ekvivalentnosti postupovnih pravila potrebno objektivno i apstraktno provjeriti sličnost dotičnih pravila uzimajući pritom u obzir njihovu ulogu u cjelokupnom postupku, odvijanju tog postupka i sve posebnosti pravila (vidjeti u tom smislu presudu od 16. svibnja 2000., Preston i dr., C-78/98, Zb., str. I-3201., t. 63.).
42 When assessing whether the rules at issue here are similar, account must be taken of the specific features of proceedings under Article 226 EC.
42 Pri ocjenjivanju sličnosti dotičnih pravila valja uzeti u obzir posebnosti postupka u skladu s člankom 226. UEZ-a.
43 In exercising its powers under Article 226 EC the Commission does not have to show that there is a specific interest in bringing an action (see Case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359, paragraph 15, and Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission v Germany [2003] ECR I-3609, paragraph 29).
43 U tom pogledu valja podsjetiti da u okviru svojih nadležnosti u skladu s člankom 226. UEZ-a Komisija ne mora dokazati postojanje pravnog interesa (vidjeti presude od 4. travnja 1974., Komisija/Francuska, 167/73, Zb., str. 359., t. 15., i od 10. travnja 2003., Komisija/Njemačka, C-20/01 i C-28/01, Zb., str. I-3609., t. 29.).
The Commission's function is to ensure, of its own motion and in the general interest, that the Member States give effect to Community law and to obtain a declaration of any failure to fulfil the obligations deriving therefrom with a view to bringing it to an end (see Commission v France, paragraph 15, and Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission v Germany, paragraph 29).
Komisija je dužna po službenoj dužnosti i u općem interesu nadzirati primjenu prava Zajednice u državama članicama i utvrditi sve povrede obveza proizišlih iz te primjene s ciljem njihova uklanjanja (vidjeti gore navedenu presudu Komisija/Francuska, t. 15., i presudu od 10. travnja 2003., Komisija/Njemačka, t. 29.).
44 Article 226 EC is not therefore intended to protect the Commission's own rights.
44 Stoga cilj članka 226. UEZ-a nije zaštita prava te institucije.
It is for the Commission alone to decide whether or not it is appropriate to bring proceedings against a Member State for a declaration that it has failed to fulfil its obligations and, as the case may be, because of what conduct or omission those proceedings should be brought (Case C-394/02 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I-4713, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
Samo Komisija može odlučivati o tome je li prikladno pokrenuti postupak protiv države članice za utvrđivanje povrede obveza i, ovisno o slučaju, zbog koje radnje ili propusta taj postupak treba pokrenuti (presuda od 2. lipnja 2005., Komisija/Grčka, C-394/02, Zb., str. I-4713., t. 16., i navedena sudska praksa).
The Commission consequently has a discretion in this regard which excludes the right for individuals to require it to adopt a specific position (see Case 247/87 Star Fruit v Commission [1989] ECR 291, paragraph 11).
Slijedom toga, Komisija u tom pogledu ima diskrecijsku ovlast kojom se isključuje pravo pojedinaca da od nje zahtijevaju donošenje određenog stajališta (vidjeti presudu od 14. veljače 1989., Star Fruit/Komisija, 247/87, Zb., str. 291., t. 11.).
45 It must accordingly be concluded that the principle of equivalence is observed by national legislation which does not provide that the limitation period for a claim seeking reparation on account of State liability for breach of Community law is interrupted or suspended when proceedings under Article 226 EC have been brought by the Commission.
45 Stoga valja utvrditi da se načelo ekvivalentnosti poštuje u nacionalnom propisu kojim nisu predviđeni prekid ili suspenzija roka zastare za zahtjev za naknadu štete na temelju odgovornosti države za povredu prava Zajednice ako je Komisija pokrenula postupak u skladu s člankom 226. UEZ-a.
46 In view of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the third question is that, where the Commission has brought infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC, Community law does not require the limitation period laid down by national legislation for a claim seeking reparation on account of State liability for breach of Community law to be interrupted or suspended during those proceedings.
46 S obzirom na sva prethodna razmatranja, na treće pitanje valja odgovoriti da se pravom Zajednice ne zahtijeva da se, ako je Komisija pokrenula postupak zbog povrede obveza u skladu s člankom 226. UEZ-a, tijekom tog postupka prekine ili suspendira rok zastare za zahtjev za naknadu štete na temelju odgovornosti države za povredu prava Zajednice koji je utvrđen nacionalnim propisom.
47 By its fourth question, the referring court essentially asks whether the limitation period applicable to an action for damages against the State for incorrect transposition of a directive begins to run, irrespective of the applicable national law, only when the directive has been fully transposed, or whether that period begins to run, in accordance with national law, on the date on which the first injurious effects of the incorrect transposition have been produced and further injurious effects thereof are foreseeable.
47 Svojim četvrtim pitanjem sud koji je uputio zahtjev u biti pita počinje li rok zastare za tužbu za naknadu štete protiv države zbog nepravilnog prenošenja direktive, neovisno o primjenjivom nacionalnom pravu, teći tek nakon što je ta direktiva potpuno prenesena ili taj rok u skladu s nacionalnim pravom počinje teći od datuma nastanka prvih štetnih učinaka nepravilnog prenošenja, pri čemu se mogu očekivati njegovi daljnji štetni učinci.
If full transposition has a bearing on the course of the limitation period, the referring court asks whether that is true generally or whether it applies only where the directive confers a right on individuals.
Ako potpuno prenošenje utječe na tijek roka zastare, sud koji je uputio zahtjev pita je li riječ o općem pravilu ili se to primjenjuje samo ako se direktivom dodjeljuje pravo pojedincima.
48 It should be recalled that, as is apparent from paragraphs 31 and 32 of the present judgment, in the absence of Community legislation, it is for the Member States to lay down the detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings intended to safeguard the rights which individuals derive from Community law, including the provisions governing limitation, in so far as those rules observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
48 U tom pogledu valja podsjetiti da je, kao što proizlazi iz točaka 31. i 32. ove presude, na državama članicama da u nedostatku propisa Zajednice utvrde detaljna postupovna pravila za sudske postupke za zaštitu prava koja pojedinci uživaju na temelju prava Zajednice, uključujući pravila o zastari, ako se tim pravilima poštuju načela ekvivalentnosti i djelotvornosti.
It should further be recalled that the setting of reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings observes those principles and cannot, in particular, be considered to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by Community law.
Osim toga valja podsjetiti da se određivanjem razumnih rokova za podnošenje pravnih sredstava poštuju ta načela i da se osobito ne može smatrati da se time u praksi onemogućuje ili pretjerano otežava ostvarivanje prava dodijeljenih pravom Zajednice.
49 The fact that the limitation period laid down by national law begins to run when the first injurious effects have been produced, although other effects of that kind are foreseeable, is likewise not liable to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by Community law.
49 Činjenicom da rok zastare utvrđen nacionalnim pravom počinje teći u trenutku nastanka prvih štetnih učinaka, iako se mogu očekivati i daljnji takvi učinci, vjerojatno se jednako tako ne onemogućuje odnosno ne otežava pretjerano ostvarivanje prava dodijeljenih pravom Zajednice.
50 The judgment in Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi and Others [2006] ECR I-6619, to which Danske Slagterier refers, cannot cast doubt on that conclusion.
50 Taj se zaključak ne može dovesti u pitanje presudom od 13. srpnja 2006., Manfredi i dr. (C-295/04 do C-298/04, Zb., str. I-6619.), na koju se poziva Danske Slagterier.
51 In paragraphs 78 and 79 of that judgment, the Court held that it is conceivable that a short limitation period for bringing an action for damages that runs from the day on which an agreement or concerted practice has been adopted could make it impossible in practice to exercise the right to seek compensation for the harm caused by that prohibited agreement or practice.
51 U točkama 78. i 79. te presude Sud je smatrao da se ne može isključiti to da se kratkim rokom zastare za podnošenje tužbe za naknadu štete koji teče od dana donošenja zabranjenog sporazuma ili usklađenog djelovanja može u praksi onemogućiti ostvarivanje prava na zahtijevanje naknade štete uzrokovane tim zabranjenim sporazumom ili djelovanjem.
The Court stated that, where there are continuous or repeated infringements, it is thus possible for the limitation period to expire even before the infringement is brought to an end, in which case it would be impossible for any individual who has suffered harm after the expiry of the limitation period to bring an action.
Stoga u slučaju kontinuiranih ili ponovljenih povreda rok zastare može isteći prije okončanja povrede, pri čemu pojedinac kojemu je nanesena šteta ne može nakon isteka tog roka podnijeti tužbu.
52 However, that is not the situation in the main proceedings.
52 Međutim, to ne vrijedi za predmet u glavnom postupku.
It is clear from the order for reference that the limitation period at issue in the main proceedings cannot begin to run until the injured party has become aware of the loss or damage and of the identity of the person required to pay compensation.
Iz odluke kojom se upućuje zahtjev za prethodnu odluku proizlazi da rok zastare o kojem je riječ u glavnom postupku ne može početi teći prije no što oštećena stranka sazna za gubitak i identitet osobe koja je obvezna platiti naknadu.
In such circumstances, it is thus impossible for a person who has sustained loss or damage to find himself in a situation in which the limitation period begins to run, or indeed expires, without his even knowing that he has been harmed, as could have been the position in the context of the case which gave rise to the judgment in Manfredi and Others, where the limitation period began to run on the adoption of the agreement or concerted practice, of which certain persons concerned may not have been aware until much later.
U takvim se okolnostima stoga osoba koja je pretrpjela štetu ne može naći u situaciji u kojoj rok zastare počinje teći ili zapravo ističe a da ta osoba nije saznala da joj je nanesena šteta, što se moglo dogoditi u okviru predmeta u kojem je donesena gore navedena presuda Manfredi i dr. i u kojem je rok zastare počeo teći od donošenja zabranjenog sporazuma ili usklađenog djelovanja, za što su neke zainteresirane osobe možda saznale puno kasnije.
53 As regards the possibility of setting the point at which a limitation period begins to run as being before the directive in question has been fully transposed, it is true that the Court held in Case C-208/90 Emmott [1991] ECR I-4269, paragraph 23, that, until such time as a directive has been properly transposed, a defaulting Member State may not rely on an individual's delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon him by the provisions of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time.
53 U pogledu mogućnosti određivanja početka roka zastare prije potpunog prenošenja dotične direktive, točno je da je Sud u točki 23. presude od 25. srpnja 1991., Emmott (C-208/90, Zb., str. I-4269.), presudio da se država članica koja kasni ne može do pravilnog prenošenja direktive pozvati na to da je pojedinac protiv nje prekasno podnio tužbu za zaštitu prava koja su mu dodijeljena odredbama te direktive i da rok za podnošenje tužbe koji je utvrđen nacionalnim pravom može početi teći tek tada.
54 However, as was confirmed in Case C-410/92 Johnson [11994] ECR I-5483, paragraph 26, it is clear from the judgment in Case C-338/91 Steenhorst-Neerings [1993] ECR I-5475 that the solution adopted in Emmott was justified by the particular circumstances of that case, in which a time-bar had the result of depriving the applicant in the main proceedings of any opportunity whatsoever to rely on her right to equal treatment under a directive (see also Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, paragraph 52; Joined Cases C-114/95 and C-115/95 Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark [1997] ECR I-4263, paragraph 48; and Joined Cases C-279/96 to C-281/96 Ansaldo Energia and Others [1998] ECR I-5025, paragraph 20).
54 Međutim, kao što je potvrđeno presudom od 6. prosinca 1994., Johnson (C-410/92, Zb., str. I-5483., t. 26.), iz presude od 27. listopada 1993., Steenhorst-Neerings (C-338/91, Zb., str. I-5475.), proizlazi da je rješenje doneseno u gore navedenoj presudi Emmott bilo opravdano posebnim okolnostima tog predmeta u kojem je bila donesena ta presuda i u kojem je tužitelju u glavnom postupku zbog prekluzije bila uskraćena svaka mogućnost ostvarivanja prava na jednako postupanje koje mu je bilo priznato direktivom (vidjeti i presude od 17. srpnja 1997., Haahr Petroleum, C-90/94, Zb., str. I-4085., t. 52., i Texaco i Olieselskabet Danmark, C-114/95 i C-115/95, Zb., str. I-4263., t. 48., te od 15. rujna 1998., Ansaldo Energia i dr., C-279/96 do C-281/96, Zb., str. I-5025., t. 20.).
55 It is not apparent either from the documents before the court or from the hearing which took place in the oral procedure that, in the main proceedings, the existence of the time-limit at issue had the result, as in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment in Emmott, of depriving the injured parties of any opportunity whatsoever to rely on their rights before the national courts.
55 U predmetu u glavnom postupku iz spisa i iz rasprava provedenih u usmenom dijelu postupka ne proizlazi da je posljedica spornog roka, kao u predmetu u kojem je bila donesena gore navedena presuda Emmott, bilo uskraćivanje svake mogućnosti oštećenim strankama da ostvare svoja prava pred nacionalnim sudovima.
56 Accordingly, the answer to the fourth question is that Community law does not preclude the limitation period applicable to an action for damages against the State for incorrect transposition of a directive from beginning to run on the date on which the first injurious effects of the incorrect transposition have been produced and the further injurious effects thereof are foreseeable, even if that date is prior to the correct transposition of the directive.
56 Stoga na četvrto pitanje valja odgovoriti da pravu Zajednice nije protivno da rok zastare za tužbu za naknadu štete protiv države zbog nepravilnog prenošenja direktive počne teći od datuma nastanka prvih štetnih učinaka tog nepravilnog prenošenja, pri čemu se mogu očekivati njegovi daljnji štetni učinci, čak i ako taj datum prethodi pravilnom prenošenju te direktive.
57 In the light of the answer given to the first part of the fourth question, there is no need to answer the second part.
57 Uzimajući u obzir odgovor na prvi dio četvrtog pitanja, nije potrebno odgovoriti na drugi dio.
Question 5
Peto pitanje
58 By its fifth question, the referring court essentially asks whether Community law precludes a rule such as that laid down in Paragraph 839(3) of the BGB which provides that an individual cannot obtain reparation for loss or damage which he has wilfully or negligently failed to avert by utilising a legal remedy.
58 Svojim petim pitanjem sud koji je uputio zahtjev u biti pita je li pravu Zajednice protivno pravilo kao što je ono utvrđeno člankom 839. stavkom 3. BGB-a, kojim je predviđeno da pojedinac ne može dobiti naknadu za štetu čiji nastanak namjerno ili zbog nemara nije spriječio primjenom pravnog sredstva.
The referring court elaborates upon its question by asking whether such a national rule would be contrary to Community law in so far as it were applied subject to the proviso that recourse to that remedy be reasonable for the person concerned.
Sud koji je uputio zahtjev svoje pitanje precizira pitanjem je li takav nacionalni propis protivan pravu Zajednice ako se primjenjuje pod uvjetom da upotreba tog pravnog sredstva mora biti razumno prihvatljiva za zainteresiranu osobu.
The referring court would like, finally, to ascertain whether recourse to a legal remedy may be regarded as reasonable when it is likely that the court before which a case is brought will make a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC or when infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC have been brought.
Naposljetku, sud koji je uputio zahtjev želi znati može li se pravno sredstvo smatrati razumnim ako će sud pred kojim se vodi postupak vjerojatno uputiti zahtjev za prethodnu odluku u skladu s člankom 234. UEZ-a ili ako je pokrenut postupak zbog povrede obveza u skladu s člankom 226. UEZ-a.
59 As has been recalled when answering the previous two questions, it is for the Member States, in the absence of Community legislation, to lay down the detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings intended to safeguard the rights which individuals derive from Community law, in so far as those rules observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
59 Kako je navedeno u okviru odgovora na prethodna dva pitanja, na državama članicama je da u nedostatku propisa Zajednice urede detaljna postupovna pravila za sudske postupke za zaštitu prava koja pojedinci uživaju na temelju prava Zajednice tako da se tim pravilima poštuju načela ekvivalentnosti i djelotvornosti.
60 As regards utilisation of the available legal remedies, the Court held in Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 84, in relation to liability of a Member State for breach of Community law, that the national court may inquire whether the injured person showed reasonable diligence in order to avoid the loss or damage or limit its extent and whether, in particular, he availed himself in time of all the legal remedies available to him.
60 U pogledu primjene raspoloživih pravnih sredstava, Sud je u točki 84. gore navedene presude Brasserie du pêcheur i Factortame u vezi s odgovornošću države članice za povredu prava Zajednice presudio da nacionalni sud može ispitati je li oštećena osoba postupala s odgovarajućom pažnjom kako bi izbjegla štetu ili ograničila njezin opseg te, osobito, je li na vrijeme iskoristila pravna sredstva koja su joj stajala na raspolaganju.
61 Indeed, it is a general principle common to the legal systems of the Member States that the injured party must show reasonable diligence in limiting the extent of the loss or damage, or risk having to bear the loss or damage himself (Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder and Others v Council and Commission [1992] ECR I-3061, paragraph 33, and Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 85).
61 Naime, opće je načelo zajedničko pravnim sustavima država članica da oštećena stranka mora postupati s odgovarajućom pažnjom u ograničavanju opsega štete, ili u protivnom riskirati da sama snosi štetu (presuda od 19. svibnja 1992., Mulder i dr./Vijeće i Komisija, C-104/89 i C-37/90, Zb., str. I-3061., t. 33., i gore navedena presuda Brasserie du pêcheur i Factortame, t. 85.).
62 It would, however, be contrary to the principle of effectiveness to oblige injured parties to have recourse systematically to all the legal remedies available to them even if that would give rise to excessive difficulties or could not reasonably be required of them.
62 Međutim, načelu djelotvornosti bilo bi protivno obvezati oštećene stranke na automatsku sustavnu primjenu svih pravnih sredstava koja su im na raspolaganja čak i ako bi im se time uzrokovale pretjerane poteškoće ili se to od njih ne bi moglo razumno zahtijevati.
63 In Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others [2001] ECR I-1727, paragraph 106, the Court indeed held that the exercise of rights conferred on private persons by directly applicable provisions of Community law would be rendered impossible or excessively difficult if their claims for compensation based on Community law were rejected or reduced solely because the persons concerned did not apply for grant of the right which was conferred by Community provisions, and which national law denied them, with a view to challenging the refusal of the Member State by means of the legal remedies provided for that purpose, invoking the primacy and direct effect of Community law.
63 U presudi od 8. ožujka 2001., Metallgesellschaft i dr. (C-397/98 i C-410/98, Zb., str. I-1727., t. 106.), Sud je presudio da bi ostvarivanje prava dodijeljenih izravno primjenjivim odredbama prava Zajednice pojedincima bilo onemogućeno ili pretjerano otežano ako bi se njihovi zahtjevi za naknadu štete na temelju povrede prava Zajednice odbijali ili umanjivali samo zbog toga što ti pojedinci nisu zahtijevali ostvarivanje prava koje im je dodijeljeno odredbama prava Zajednice, a koje im nije bilo priznato nacionalnim pravom, kako bi pravnim sredstvima predviđenima za tu namjenu osporili odbijanje države članice i kako bi se pozvali na prvenstvo i izravan učinak prava Zajednice.
In a case of that kind, it would not have been reasonable to require the injured parties to utilise the legal remedies available to them, since they would in any event have had to make the payment at issue in advance, and even if the national court had held the fact that payment had to be made in advance incompatible with Community law, the persons in question would not have been able to obtain interest on that sum and they would have laid themselves open to the possibility of penalties (see, to this effect, Metallgesellschaft and Others, paragraph 104).
U takvom slučaju ne bi bilo razumno od oštećenih stranaka zahtijevati primjenu pravnih sredstava koja su im na raspolaganju jer bi u svakom slučaju morale unaprijed platiti sporni iznos te, iako je nacionalni sud presudio da plaćanje unaprijed nije u skladu s pravom Zajednice, dotične osobe ne bi mogle dobiti kamate na taj iznos i izložile bi se mogućnosti novčanih kazna (vidjeti u tom smislu gore navedenu presudu Metallgesellschaft i dr., t. 104.).
64 Consequently, it is to be concluded that Community law does not preclude the application of a national rule such as that laid down in Paragraph 839(3) of the BGB, provided that utilisation of the legal remedy in question can reasonably be required of the injured party.
64 Slijedom toga valja zaključiti da pravu Zajednice nije protivna primjena nacionalnog propisa kao što je onaj utvrđen člankom 839. stavkom 3. BGB-a pod uvjetom da se primjena dotičnog pravnog sredstva može razumno zahtijevati od oštećene stranke.
It is for the referring court to determine in light of all the circumstances of the main proceedings whether that is so.
Na sudu koji je uputio zahtjev je da s obzirom na sve okolnosti predmeta u glavnom postupku utvrdi je li to tako.