natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
That interpretation is supported by the wording of Article 13 EC, which constitutes the legal basis of Directive 2000/78, and which confers on the Community the competence to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based, inter alia, on disability.
Ovo je tumačenje potkrijepljeno sadržajem članka 13. UEZ-a, koji predstavlja pravnu osnovu Direktive 2000/78 i koji Zajednici povjerava nadležnost poduzimanja potrebnih mjera radi borbe protiv diskriminacije koja se, između ostaloga, temelji na invaliditetu.
39 It is true that Directive 2000/78 includes a number of provisions which, as is apparent from their very wording, apply only to disabled people.
39 Dakako, Direktiva 2000/78 sadržava određeni broj odredaba koje se, kao što je razvidno iz njihova sadržaja, primjenjuju samo na osobe s invaliditetom.
Thus, Article 5 provides that, in order to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment in relation to persons with disabilities, reasonable accommodation is to be provided.
Tako njezin članak 5. predviđa da se, kako bi se zajamčilo poštovanje načela jednakog postupanja u pogledu osoba s invaliditetom, moraju osigurati razumne prilagodbe.
This means that employers must take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer.
To znači da poslodavac prema potrebi u određenoj situaciji poduzima odgovarajuće mjere kako bi osobi s invaliditetom omogućio pristup zapošljavanju, sudjelovanje ili napredovanje na radu ili usavršavanje, ako takve mjere za poslodavca ne predstavljaju nerazmjeran teret.
40 Article 7(2) of Directive 2000/78 also provides that, with regard to disabled persons, the principle of equal treatment is to be without prejudice either to the right of Member States to maintain or adopt provisions on the protection of health and safety at work or to measures aimed at creating or maintaining provisions or facilities for safeguarding or promoting the integration of such persons into the working environment.
40 Članak 7. stavak 2. navedene direktive također predviđa da u pogledu osoba s invaliditetom načelo jednakog postupanja ne dovodi u pitanje pravo država članica da zadrže ili donesu odredbe o zaštiti zdravlja i sigurnosti na radu, ni mjere kojima je cilj stvaranje ili zadržavanje odredbi ili mogućnosti za osiguranje ili poticanje uključivanja tih osoba u radno okruženje.
41 The United Kingdom, Greek, Italian and Netherlands Governments contend, in the light of the provisions referred to in the two preceding paragraphs and also of recitals 16, 17 and 27 in the preamble to Directive 2000/78, that the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by the directive cannot be interpreted as covering a situation such as that of the claimant in the main proceedings, since the claimant herself is not disabled.
41 Vlade Ujedinjene Kraljevine, Grčke, Italije i Nizozemske, s obzirom na odredbe spomenute u dvije prethodne točke, kao i u uvodnim izjavama 16., 17. i 27. Direktive 2000/78, mišljenja su da se zabrana izravne diskriminacije utvrđena direktivom ne može tumačiti na način da obuhvaća jednaku situaciju kao kod tužiteljice u glavnom postupku, budući da sama tužiteljica nije osoba s invaliditetom.
Only persons who, in a comparable situation to that of others, are treated less favourably or are placed in a disadvantageous situation because of characteristics which are particular to them can rely on that directive.
Samo osobe prema kojima se u situaciji usporedivoj s onom ostalih osoba postupa nepovoljnije ili ih se stavlja u nepovoljniji položaj zbog obilježja koja su im svojstvena, mogu se pozivati na odredbe te direktive.
42 Nevertheless, it must be noted in that regard that the provisions referred to in paragraphs 39 and 40 of this judgment relate specifically to disabled persons either because they are provisions concerning positive discrimination measures in favour of disabled persons themselves or because they are specific measures which would be rendered meaningless or could prove to be disproportionate if they were not limited to disabled persons only.
42 Ipak valja primijetiti da se u tom smislu odredbe spomenute u točkama 39. i 40. ove presude odnose izričito na osobe s invaliditetom, bilo zato što su to odredbe o mjerama pozitivne diskriminacije u korist samih osoba s invaliditetom, ili jer su to posebne mjere koje bi postale besmislene ili bi se pokazale nerazmjernima da nisu ograničene samo na osobe s invaliditetom.
Thus, as recitals 16 and 20 in the preamble to Directive 2000/78 indicate, the measures in question are intended to accommodate the needs of disabled people at the workplace and to adapt the workplace to their disability.
Kako proizlazi iz uvodnih izjava 16. i 20. te direktive, predmetne mjere namijenjene su zadovoljenju potreba osoba s invaliditetom na radnom mjestu i prilagodbi radnog mjesta njihovom invaliditetu.
Such measures are therefore designed specifically to facilitate and promote the integration of disabled people into the working environment and, for that reason, can only relate to disabled people and to the obligations incumbent on their employers and, where appropriate, on the Member States with regard to disabled people.
Prema tome, izričita namjena takvih mjera jest omogućiti i poticati uključivanje osoba s invaliditetom u radno okruženje, te se iz tog razloga mogu odnositi samo na osobe s invaliditetom i na obveze koje u vezi s osobama s invaliditetom pripadaju njihovim poslodavcima i, prema potrebi, državama članicama.
43 Therefore, the fact that Directive 2000/78 includes provisions designed to accommodate specifically the needs of disabled people does not lead to the conclusion that the principle of equal treatment enshrined in that directive must be interpreted strictly, that is, as prohibiting only direct discrimination on grounds of disability and relating exclusively to disabled people.
43 Prema tome, činjenica da Direktiva 2000/78 uključuje odredbe sastavljene izričito radi zadovoljenja potreba osoba s invaliditetom ne dovodi do zaključka da načelo jednakog postupanja sadržano u toj direktivi treba strogo tumačiti, tj. na način da zabranjuje samo izravnu diskriminaciju na temelju invaliditeta i odnosi se isključivo na osobe s invaliditetom.
Furthermore, recital 6 in the preamble to the directive, concerning the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, refers both to the general combating of every form of discrimination and to the need to take appropriate action for the social and economic integration of disabled people.
Nadalje, uvodna izjava 6. te direktive, koja se odnosi na Povelju o osnovnim socijalnim pravima radnika, odnosi se kako na opću borbu protiv svakog oblika diskriminacije, tako i na potrebu za poduzimanjem odgovarajućih mjera za socijalno i gospodarsko uključivanje osoba s invaliditetom.
44 The United Kingdom, Italian and Netherlands Governments also contend that it follows from the judgment in Case C-13/05 Chacón Navas [2006] ECR I-6467 that the scope ratione personae of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted strictly.
44 Vlade Ujedinjene Kraljevine, Italije i Nizozemske također su mišljenja da iz presude od 11. srpnja 2006., Chacón Navas (C-13/05, Zb., str. I-6467.) proizlazi strogo tumačenje područja primjene ratione personae Direktive 2000/78.
According to the Italian Government, in Chacón Navas, the Court opted for a strict interpretation of the concept of disability and its implications in an employment relationship.
Prema mišljenju talijanske vlade, u navedenoj je presudi Sud odabrao strogo tumačenje pojma invaliditeta i njegovih implikacija u radnom odnosu.
45 The Court defined the concept of `disability' in its judgment in Chacón Navas and, in paragraphs 51 and 52 of that judgment, it found that the prohibition, as regards dismissal, of discrimination on grounds of disability contained in Articles 2(1) and 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78 precludes dismissal on grounds of disability which, in the light of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities, is not justified by the fact that the person concerned is not competent, capable and available to perform the essential functions of his post.
45 U gore navedenoj presudi Chacón Navas Sud je definirao pojam „invaliditeta" te je u točkama 51. i 52. te presude utvrdio da se u smislu otkaza zabrani diskriminacije na temelju invaliditeta, sadržana u članku 2. stavku 1. i članku 3. stavku 1. točki (c) Direktive 2000/78, protivi otkaz na temelju invaliditeta koji, s obzirom na obvezu osiguranja razumnih prilagodbi za osobe s invaliditetom, nije opravdan činjenicom da predmetna osoba nije stručna, sposobna i raspoloživa za obavljanje ključnih funkcija njezinog radnog mjesta.
However, it does not follow from this interpretation that the principle of equal treatment defined in Article 2(1) of that directive and the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by Article 2(2)(a) cannot apply to a situation such as that in the present case, where the less favourable treatment which an employee claims to have suffered is on grounds of the disability of his child, for whom he is the primary provider of the care required by virtue of the child's condition.
Međutim, iz tog tumačenja ne proizlazi da se načelo jednakog postupanja, definirano u članku 2. stavku 1. te direktive, te zabrana izravne diskriminacije, utvrđena u stavku 2. točki (a) istog članka, ne mogu primijeniti na situaciju kao u ovom predmetu, gdje se nepovoljnije postupanje, za koje radnik tvrdi da ga je pretrpio, temelji na invaliditetu njegova djeteta kojemu je on primarni pružatelj njege potrebne zbog stanja djeteta.
46 Although the Court explained in paragraph 56 of the judgment in Chacón Navas that, in view of the wording of Article 13 EC, the scope of Directive 2000/78 cannot be extended beyond the discrimination based on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 of the directive, with the result that a person who has been dismissed by his employer solely on account of sickness cannot fall within the scope of the general framework established by Directive 2000/78, it nevertheless did not hold that the principle of equal treatment and the scope ratione personae of that directive must be interpreted strictly with regard to those grounds.
46 Iako je Sud u točki 56. gore navedene presude Chacón Navas pojasnio da se, s obzirom na sadržaj članka 13. UEZ-a, područje primjene Direktive 2000/78 ne može širiti izvan okvira diskriminacije koja se temelji na razlozima koji su taksativno popisani u njezinom članku 1. direktive, tako da osoba koju je njezin poslodavac otpustio isključivo zbog bolesti ne može biti obuhvaćena područjem primjene općeg okvira utvrđenog Direktivom 2000/78, ipak nije smatrao da načelo jednakog postupanja i područje primjene ratione personae te direktive treba strogo tumačiti u odnosu na te razloge.
47 So far as the objectives of Directive 2000/78 are concerned, as is apparent from paragraphs 34 and 38 of the present judgment, the directive seeks to lay down, as regards employment and occupation, a general framework for combating discrimination on one of the grounds referred to in Article 1 - including, in particular, disability - with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment.
47 U pogledu ciljeva Direktive 2000/78, kao što proizlazi iz točaka 34. i 38. ove presude, direktiva nastoji u odnosu na zapošljavanje i obavljanje zanimanja utvrditi opći okvir borbe protiv diskriminacije iz nekog od razloga spomenutih u članku 1. te direktive - uključujući posebno invaliditet - s ciljem provođenja načela jednakog postupanja u državama članicama.
It follows from recital 37 in the preamble to the directive that it also has the objective of creating within the Community a level playing field as regards equality in employment and occupation.
Iz uvodne izjave 37. direktive proizlazi da je njezin cilj također stvoriti jednake uvjete za sve u Zajednici u pogledu jednakosti pri zapošljavanju i obavljanju zanimanja.
48 As Ms Coleman, the Lithuanian and Swedish Governments and the Commission maintain, those objectives, and the effectiveness of Directive 2000/78, would be undermined if an employee in the claimant's situation cannot rely on the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by Article 2(2)(a) of that directive where it has been established that he has been treated less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on the grounds of his child's disability, and this is the case even though that employee is not himself disabled.
48 Kako navode S. Coleman, te litvanska i švedska vlada i Komisija, ti su ciljevi i korisni učinak Direktive 2000/78 ugroženi ako se radnik koji se nalazi u jednakoj situaciji kao tužiteljica ne može osloniti na zabranu izravne diskriminacije utvrđenu u članku 2. stavku 2. točki (a) te direktive, ako je utvrđeno da se na temelju invaliditeta njegova djeteta prema njemu postupa nepovoljnije nego što se postupa, se postupalo ili bi se postupalo prema drugom radniku u usporedivoj situaciji, a da pri tome on sam nije osoba s invaliditetom.
49 In that regard, it follows from recital 11 in the preamble to the directive that the Community legislature also took the view that discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation may undermine the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty, in particular, as regards employment.
49 U tom smislu, iz uvodne izjave 11. direktive proizlazi da je zakonodavac Zajednice također zauzeo stajalište da diskriminacija na temelju vjere ili uvjerenja, invaliditeta, dobi ili spolnog opredjeljenja može ugroziti ostvarivanje ciljeva Ugovora, posebno u odnosu na zapošljavanje.
50 Although, in a situation such as that in the present case, the person who is subject to direct discrimination on grounds of disability is not herself disabled, the fact remains that it is the disability which, according to Ms Coleman, is the ground for the less favourable treatment which she claims to have suffered.
50 Iako, u situaciji kao što je ova u ovom predmetu, osoba koja je bila izložena izravnoj diskriminaciji na temelju invaliditeta nije osoba s invaliditetom, ostaje činjenica da je S. Coleman navela invaliditet kao razlog za nepovoljnije postupanje za koje tvrdi da ga je pretrpjela.
As is apparent from paragraph 38 of this judgment, Directive 2000/78, which seeks to combat all forms of discrimination on grounds of disability in the field of employment and occupation, applies not to a particular category of person but by reference to the grounds mentioned in Article 1.
Kao što proizlazi iz točke 38. ove presude, Direktiva 2000/78 koja se nastoji boriti protiv svih oblika diskriminacije na temelju invaliditeta u području zapošljavanja i obavljanja zanimanja ne primjenjuje se na određenu kategoriju osoba, već se temelji na razlozima koje navodi članak 1.
51 Where it is established that an employee in a situation such as that in the present case suffers direct discrimination on grounds of disability, an interpretation of Directive 2000/78 limiting its application only to people who are themselves disabled is liable to deprive that directive of an important element of its effectiveness and to reduce the protection which it is intended to guarantee.
51 Ako se utvrdi da radnik u situaciji kao što je ona u glavnom postupku trpi izravnu diskriminaciju na temelju invaliditeta, tumačenje Direktive 2000/78 kojim se njezina primjena ograničava samo na osobe koje su same osobe s invaliditetom, može tu direktivu lišiti bitnog elementa njezinog korisnog učinka i umanjiti zaštitu koju bi ona trebala jamčiti.
52 As to the burden of proof which applies in a situation such as that in the present case, it should be observed that, under Article 10(1) of Directive 2000/78, Member States are required to take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it is for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of that principle.
52 U pogledu tereta dokaza koji se primjenjuje u situaciji kao što je ona u glavnom postupku, valja primijetiti da su države članice, prema članku 10. stavku 1. Direktive 2000/78, obvezne poduzeti potrebne mjere, u skladu sa svojim nacionalnim pravosudnim sustavom, kojima će osigurati da je na tuženiku da dokaže da nije došlo do povrede načela jednakog postupanja u situaciji u kojoj osobe koje smatraju da su oštećene jer na njih nije primijenjeno načelo jednakog postupanja pred sudom ili drugim nadležnim tijelom utvrde činjenice iz kojih se može pretpostaviti da je došlo do izravne ili neizravne diskriminacije.
According to Article 10(2), Article 10(1) does not prevent Member States from introducing rules on the burden of proof which are more favourable to plaintiffs.
Sukladno članku 10. stavku 2., članak 10. stavak 1. ne sprečava države članice da uvedu pravila o teretu dokaza koja su povoljnija za tužitelja.
53 In the case before the referring tribunal, it is therefore for Ms Coleman, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Directive 2000/78, to establish, before that tribunal, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct discrimination on grounds of disability contrary to the directive.
53 U glavnom postupku S. Coleman stoga mora u skladu s člankom 10. stavkom 1. Direktive 2000/78 pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev utvrditi činjenice iz kojih se može pretpostaviti da je došlo do izravne diskriminacije na temelju invaliditeta, koja je zabranjena tom direktivom.
54 In accordance with Article 10(1) of Directive 2000/78 and recital 31 in the preamble thereto, the rules on the burden of proof must be adapted when there is a prima facie case of discrimination.
54 U skladu s tom odredbom Direktive 2000/78 i njezinom uvodnom izjavom 31., pravila o teretu dokaza moraju se prilagoditi kada postoji pretpostavka diskriminacije.
In the event that Ms Coleman establishes facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct discrimination, the effective application of the principle of equal treatment then requires that the burden of proof should fall on the respondents, who must prove that there has been no breach of that principle.
U slučaju da S. Coleman utvrdi činjenice iz kojih se može pretpostaviti da je došlo do izravne diskriminacije, djelotvorna primjena načela jednakog postupanja tada zahtijeva da teret dokaza padne na tuženike koji bi trebali dokazati da nije bilo povrede toga načela.
55 In that context, the respondents could contest the existence of such a breach by establishing by any legally permissible means, in particular, that the employee's treatment was justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of disability and to any association which that employee has with a disabled person.
55 U tom bi kontekstu tuženici mogli osporavati postojanje takve povrede, posebno utvrđujući svim zakonski dopuštenim sredstvima da je postupanje prema radniku bilo opravdano objektivnim čimbenicima koji nisu vezani ni uz kakvu diskriminaciju na temelju invaliditeta, te ni uz kakav odnos koji taj radnik ima s osobom s invaliditetom.
56 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first part of Question 1 and to Questions 2 and 3 must be that Directive 2000/78, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (2)(a) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by those provisions is not limited only to people who are themselves disabled.
56 S obzirom na prethodna razmatranja, na prvi dio prvog pitanja te na drugo i treće pitanje valja odgovoriti da se Direktiva 2000/78, a posebno njezin članak 1., članak 2. stavak 1. i stavak 2. točka (a), moraju tumačiti na način da zabrana izravne diskriminacije utvrđena tim odredbama nije ograničena samo na osobe koje su same osobe s invaliditetom.
Where an employer treats an employee who is not himself disabled less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and it is established that the less favourable treatment of that employee is based on the disability of his child, whose care is provided primarily by that employee, such treatment is contrary to the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by Article 2(2)(a).
Ako poslodavac prema radniku koji sam nije osoba s invaliditetom postupa nepovoljnije nego što postupa, je postupao ili bi postupao prema drugom radniku u usporedivoj situaciji, te se utvrdi da se nepovoljnije postupanje prema tom radniku temelji na invaliditetu njegova djeteta koje njeguje prvenstveno taj radnik, takvo se postupanje protivi zabrani izravne diskriminacije utvrđene člankom 2. stavkom 2. točkom (a).
The second part of Question 1, and Question 4
Drugi dio prvog pitanja i četvrto pitanje
57 By these questions, which should be examined together, the referring tribunal asks, in essence, whether Directive 2000/78, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (3) thereof, must be interpreted as prohibiting harassment related to disability only in respect of an employee who is himself disabled, or whether the prohibition of harassment applies equally to an employee who is not himself disabled but who, as in the present case, is the victim of unwanted conduct amounting to harassment related to the disability of his child, for whom he is the primary provider of the care required by virtue of the child's condition.
57 Ovim pitanjima, koje valja ispitati zajedno, sud koji je uputio zahtjev u biti pita mora li se Direktiva 2000/78, a posebno njezin članak 1. i članak 2. stavci 1. i 3., tumačiti na način da zabranjuje uznemiravanje povezano s invaliditetom samo u odnosu na radnika koji je sam osoba s invaliditetom ili se zabrana uznemiravanja primjenjuje jednako na radnika koji sam nije osoba s invaliditetom, ali je, kao što je riječ u glavnom postupku, žrtva nepoželjnog postupanja s ishodom uznemiravanja povezanog s invaliditetom njegova djeteta, za koje je on primarni pružatelj njege koja je djetetu potrebna zbog njegovog zdravstvenog stanja.
58 Since, under Article 2(3) of Directive 2000/78, harassment is deemed to be a form of discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(1), it must be held that, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 34 to 51 of this judgment, that directive, and, in particular, Articles 1 and 2(1) and (3) thereof, must be interpreted as not being limited to the prohibition of harassment of people who are themselves disabled.
58 Budući da se prema članku 2. stavku 3. Direktive 2000/78 smatra da je uznemiravanje oblik diskriminacije u smislu stavka 1. tog članka, valja istaknuti da se iz istih razloga kao što su oni u točkama 34. do 51. ove presude, ta direktiva, a posebno njezin članak 1. i članak 2. stavci 1. i 3., mora tumačiti na način da zabrana uznemiravanja nije ograničena samo na osobe s invaliditetom.
59 Where it is established that the unwanted conduct amounting to harassment which is suffered by an employee who is not himself disabled is related to the disability of his child, whose care is provided primarily by that employee, such conduct is contrary to the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Directive 2000/78 and, in particular, to the prohibition of harassment laid down by Article 2(3) thereof.
59 Ako se utvrdi da je nepoželjno postupanje s ishodom uznemiravanja, koje trpi radnik koji sam nije osoba s invaliditetom, povezano s invaliditetom njegova djeteta koje njeguje prvenstveno taj radnik, takvo se postupanje protivi načelu jednakog postupanja iz Direktive 2000/78, a posebno zabrani uznemiravanja utvrđenoj njezinim člankom 2. stavkom 3.