natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
An action seeking reparation for damage caused by the conduct of a Community institution or body must be directed against that institution or body.
Tužba za naknadu štete uzrokovane postupanjem institucije ili tijela Zajednice mora biti usmjerena protiv te institucije ili tijela.
68 In support of the action brought at first instance Mr Lamberts argued that he had suffered damage caused by the misconduct and negligence of the Ombudsman in the examination of his complaint.
68 U prilog tužbi koja je podnesena Prvostupanjskom sudu, F. Lamberts tvrdi da je pretrpio štetu uzrokovanu propustom u radu i nemarom ombudsmana u ispitivanju njegove pritužbe.
His action does not therefore seek reparation of damage caused by conduct of the Commission occasioning damage.
Njegovom se tužbom stoga ne traži naknada štete koja je uzrokovana postupanjem Komisije zbog kojeg je šteta nastala.
69 Accordingly, the Court of First Instance was right to hold, in paragraph 51 of the judgment appealed against, that, by means of the action brought before it, Mr Lamberts was seeking to obtain compensation for damage allegedly sustained as a result of negligence on the part of the Ombudsman in the performance of the duties assigned to him by the EC Treaty.
69 U skladu s tim, Prvostupanjski sud je imao pravo smatrati u točki 51. pobijane presude da je pomoću tužbe podnesene Prvostupanjskom sudu F. Lamberts htio ostvariti naknadu pretrpljene štete navodno nastale zbog nemara ombudsmana u obavljanju dužnosti koje su mu dodijeljene Ugovorom o EZ-u.
70 Consequently, the third limb of the plea relied on by the Ombudsman is unfounded.
70 Slijedom toga, treći dio žalbenog razloga ombudsmana je neosnovan.
71 In those circumstances the main appeal must be dismissed.
71 U tim okolnostima, glavnu žalbu treba odbiti.
72 In support of his cross-appeal Mr Lamberts relies on two pleas.
72 U prilog svojoj protužalbi, F. Lamberts se poziva na dva protužalbena razloga.
73 The Ombudsman and the Parliament maintain that the cross-appeal should be rejected as inadmissible.
73 Ombudsman i Parlament tvrde da je protužalbu potrebno odbaciti kao nedopuštenu.
First plea
Prvi protužalbeni razlog
74 In his first plea Mr Lamberts criticises the Court of First Instance for infringing Decision 94/262 by not upholding any allegation of misconduct on the part of the Ombudsman.
74 U svojem prvom protužalbenom razlogu F. Lamberts prigovara Prvostupanjskom sudu da je time što nije podržao tvrdnju o propustu u radu ombudsmana povrijedio Odluku 94/262.
The Court of First Instance thus infringed Article 2(5) of that decision by not sanctioning the Ombudsman for failing to advise Mr Lamberts in due time to bring an action before the Community courts and Article 3(5) thereof by not sanctioning him for failing to seek to obtain a friendly solution satisfactory to the complainant; by failing to do these things the Ombudsman had not fulfilled the task for which he was established by the Parliament.
Prvostupanjski sud prekršio je članak 2. stavak 5. te odluke time što nije sankcionirao ombudsmana za to što nije pravovremeno savjetovao F. Lambertsu da podnese tužbu pred sudovima Zajednice kao i njezin članak 3. stavak 5. jer ga nije sankcionirao za to što nije pokušao postići sporazumno rješenje koje bi bilo prihvatljivo podnositelju pritužbe, a ombudsman, propustivši učiniti navedeno, nije ispunio zadaću radi koje ga je Parlament ustanovio.
Admissibility of the plea
Dopuštenost protužalbenog razloga
75 It must be borne in mind that, where an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal.
75 Mora se imati na umu da, ako žalitelj osporava tumačenje ili primjenu prava Zajednice od strane Prvostupanjskog suda, o točkama zakona ispitanim u prvom stupnju može se ponovno raspravljati u tijeku žalbenog postupka.
Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see order in Case C-488/01 P Martinez v Parliament [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 39 and case-law cited).
Naime, ako žalitelj ne bi mogao temeljiti svoju žalbu na razlozima i argumentima već korištenima pred Prvostupanjskim sudom, žalbeni bi postupak djelomično izgubio svoj smisao (vidjeti rješenje od 11. studenoga 2003., Martinez/Parlament, C-488/01 P, Zb., str. I-13355., t. 39. i navedenu sudsku praksu).
76 However, it follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1), first subparagraph, (c) of its Rules of Procedure that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see order in Martinez v Parliament, paragraph 40 and case-law cited).
76 Međutim, iz članka 225. UEZ-a, članka 58. stavka 1. Statuta Suda i članka 112. stavka 1. prvog podstavka točke (c) Poslovnika Suda proizlazi da u žalbi treba precizno naznačiti sporne dijelove presude čije se ukidanje traži, kao i pravne argumente koji posebno podupiru žalbeni zahtjev (vidjeti gore navedeno rješenje Martinez/Parlament, t. 40. i navedenu sudsku praksu).
77 Where an appeal merely reproduces the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal, it fails to satisfy that requirement.
77 Žalba u kojoj se samo ponavljaju žalbeni razlozi i argumenti već podneseni Prvostupanjskom sudu, bez uključivanja argumenta kojim bi se mogla utvrditi pogreška koja se tiče prava počinjena u pobijanoj presudi, ne zadovoljava taj uvjet.
In reality, such an appeal amounts to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the Court of First Instance, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 35).
Naime, takva žalba u stvarnosti predstavlja zahtjev za preispitivanje tužbe podnesene Općem sudu, što nije u nadležnosti Suda (presuda od 4. srpnja 2000., Bergaderm i Goupil/Komisija, C-352/98 P, Zb., str. I-5291., t. 35.).
78 However, in the present case, in his first plea, Mr Lamberts specifically identified the error of law alleged against the Court of First Instance and in fact criticised the interpretation of Community law on which it relied.
78 Međutim, u ovom slučaju, u svojem prvom protužalbenom razlogu F. Lamberts je posebno identificirao pogrešku koja se tiče prava koju navodi protiv Prvostupanjskog suda i u stvari kritizirao tumačenje prava Zajednice na koje se Prvostupanjski sud oslanja.
In fact, that plea seeks to call in question the position adopted by the Court of First Instance on a point of law submitted to it at first instance, namely the interpretation of provisions of Community law under which the Ombudsman may advise the complainant to apply to another authority and must as far as possible seek a friendly solution.
Ustvari, tim se protužalbenim razlogom nastoji dovesti u pitanje stajalište Prvostupanjskog suda o pravnom pitanju koje mu je podneseno u prvom stupnju, a to je tumačenje odredaba prava Zajednice prema kojima ombudsman može savjetovati podnositelja pritužbe da se obrati drugom tijelu i mora tražiti, u mjeri u kojoj je to moguće, sporazumno rješenje.
79 The first plea is therefore admissible.
79 Prvi protužalbeni razlog je stoga dopušten.
Substance of the plea
Osnovanost protužalbenog razloga
80 It should be stated that the provisions governing the performance of the Ombudsman's duties, and more specifically Article 2(5) of Decision 94/262, do not impose on the Ombudsman any obligation to inform the complainant of the other legal remedies afforded to him and of the time-limits to be observed with regard to rights of action before the courts.
80 Valja utvrditi da odredbe kojima se uređuje obnašanje dužnosti ombudsmana, a posebno članak 2. stavak 5. Odluke 94/262, ne nameću ombudsmanu obvezu obavješćivanja podnositelja pritužbe o ostalim pravnim sredstvima koja su mu na raspolaganju i rokovima koji se moraju poštovati u vezi s pravom na podnošenje tužbe pred sudovima.
Nor, a fortiori, is it incumbent on him to advise the complainant to pursue any particular legal remedy.
Niti mu je, štoviše, dužnost savjetovati podnositelja pritužbe o uporabi bilo kojeg određenog pravnog sredstva.
81 Whilst it may be in the interests of the proper fulfilment of the tasks conferred on him by the Treaty for the Ombudsman, if appropriate, to inform the citizen concerned of the actions to be brought in order to serve his interests in the best way possible, Article 2(5) of Decision 94/262 cannot be interpreted as founding a right in favour of the complainant to be referred to the Court of First Instance in order to bring before it an action for annulment against the decision of the institution which is the subject of the complaint.
81 Iako bi možda bilo u interesu pravilnog ispunjavanja svih zadaća koje su mu povjerene Ugovorom da ombudsman, prema potrebi, obavijesti predmetnog građanina o tome koje tužbe treba podnijeti kako bi na najbolji mogući način služio svojim interesima, članak 2. stavak 5. Odluke 94/262 ne može se tumačiti u smislu da utemeljuje pravo u korist podnositelja tužbe da ga se uputi na Prvostupanjski sud kako bi pred njim podnio tužbu za poništenje odluke institucije koja je predmet pritužbe.
82 As regards the search for a friendly solution to the dispute between the person who has referred a complaint to him and a Community institution, in accordance with Article 3(5) of Decision 94/262, the Ombudsman is solely required to cooperate with the institution concerned in order to seek a solution such as to eliminate the instance of maladministration and satisfy the complainant.
82 Što se tiče traženja sporazumnog rješenja spora između osobe koja mu je uputila pritužbu i institucije Zajednice, u skladu s člankom 3. stavkom 5. Odluke 94/262, ombudsman je samo dužan surađivati s predmetnom institucijom u traženju rješenja kojim bi otklonio slučaj nepravilnosti u postupanju i zadovoljio podnositelja pritužbe.
In that regard he enjoys very wide discretion.
U tom smislu on uživa vrlo široku diskrecijsku ovlast.
In particular, he must assess whether the search for a solution satisfying the complainant may be contemplated, since there are situations in which the search for such a solution is not possible, as is envisaged in Article 6(3) of the implementing provisions, in which case the Ombudsman is to close the case with a reasoned decision.
Konkretno, on mora ocijeniti je li moguće tražiti rješenje koje bi zadovoljilo podnositelja pritužbe, jer postoje okolnosti u kojima traženje takvog rješenja nije moguće, kao što je predviđeno u članku 6. stavku 3. provedbenih odredbi, u kojem slučaju ombudsman zaključuje predmet uz obrazloženu odluku.
In any event, the Ombudsman cannot be criticised for not correctly performing the mission entrusted to him on the sole ground that he concluded that it was not possible to find a solution satisfactory to the complainant.
U svakom slučaju, ombudsmanu se ne može prigovoriti da zadaću koja mu je povjerena nije pravilno obavio samo na temelju toga što je zaključio da nije bilo moguće pronaći rješenje koje bi zadovoljilo podnositelja pritužbe.
The Court of First Instance did not therefore err in law either in its interpretation of the Community provisions under which the Ombudsman is to seek, as far as possible, a friendly solution or when it held in paragraph 85 of its judgment that the Ombudsman is able, without being guilty of wrongful conduct, to conclude in the decision closing a specific inquiry that there is no prospect of a friendly solution acceptable to the complainant.
Prvostupanjski sud dakle nije počinio pogrešku koja se tiče prava ni u svojem tumačenju odredbi Zajednice prema kojima ombudsman treba, u mjeri u kojoj je to moguće, tražiti sporazumno rješenje, ni kada je u točki 85. svoje presude smatrao da ombudsman može, a da time ne postupi nepravilno, u odluci o zaključenju određene istrage zaključiti da ne postoji mogućnost sporazumnog rješenja prihvatljivog za podnositelja pritužbe.
83 The first plea raised by Mr Lamberts must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
83 Stoga prvi protužalbeni razlog treba odbiti kao neosnovan.
Second plea
Drugi protužalbeni razlog
84 In his second plea Mr Lamberts alleges that the Court of First Instance erred in its appraisal in two significant respects.
84 U drugom protužalbenom razlogu F. Lamberts prigovara Prvostupanjskom sudu da je učinio dvije važne pogreške u ocjeni.
85 First, Mr Lamberts alleges an error in that regard in paragraph 82 of the judgment appealed against inasmuch as it is therein stated that `it is clear both from the Commission's opinion on the applicant's complaint and from the letter of 15 December 1999 from the Commissioner responsible for personnel matters that the Commission refused to allow the applicant to retake the oral test or to seek an alternative settlement', even though Mr Lamberts had never requested to retake the oral test.
85 Prvo, F. Lamberts navodi pogrešku u tom pogledu u točki 82. pobijane presude utoliko što se u njoj navodi da „i iz mišljenja Komisije o pritužbi podnositelja zahtjeva i iz dopisa povjerenika za pitanje osoblja od 15. prosinca 1999. proizlazi da je Komisija odbila podnositelju zahtjeva dopustiti ponovno polaganje usmenog ispita ili traženje alternativnog rješenja" iako F. Lamberts nikad nije tražio ponavljanje usmenog ispita.
86 In that regard, it should be pointed out, on the one hand, that the Court of First Instance recalled in paragraph 81 of the judgment appealed against that there are some situations in which the search by the Ombudsman for a friendly solution is not possible and considered, in paragraph 82, that that was indeed the case in this instance since the Commission refused to allow Mr Lamberts to retake the oral test or to seek an alternative settlement.
86 U tom smislu treba istaknuti, s jedne strane, da je Prvostupanjski sud podsjetio u točki 81. pobijane presude da postoje neke okolnosti u kojima ombudsman ne može tražiti sporazumno rješenje i da smatra, u točki 82., da je to doista bio slučaj u ovom predmetu, jer je Komisija odbila dopustiti F. Lambertsu ponovno polaganje usmenog ispita ili traženje alternativnog rješenja.
87 The critique by Mr Lamberts of paragraph 82 of the judgment appealed against does not, on the other hand, seek to demonstrate in what regard the Court of First Instance erred in law in verifying whether in the present case a friendly solution was possible.
87 S druge strane, argument F. Lambertsa u vezi s točkom 82. pobijane presude ne dokazuje da je Prvostupanjski sud počinio pogrešku koja se tiče prava time što je ispitao je li u ovom slučaju sporazumno rješenje bilo moguće.
88 The argument principally put forward by Mr Lamberts must therefore be rejected as inadmissible for the reasons stated in paragraph 76 above.
88 Argument koji je iznio F. Lamberts stoga treba odbaciti kao nedopušten iz gore navedenih razloga u točki 76. ove presude.
89 Secondly, the Court of First Instance is said to have erred in its assessment by its reliance on manifestly erroneous reasoning when, in paragraph 84 of the judgment appealed against, it claimed that `it was only in the course of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance that the applicant gave examples of various alternative settlements which he considers should and could have been envisaged', even though it is clear from the evidence in the file, in particular Annex 26 where the applicant refers to the concept of `special adviser', that Mr Lamberts mentioned such solutions when his complaint was being investigated and before the Ombudsman took his decision, and that the latter never took account of them.
89 Drugo, navodi se da je Prvostupanjski sud, oslonivši se na očigledno pogrešno rasuđivanje, počinio pogrešku koja se tiče prava kada u točki 84. pobijane presude tvrdi da je „podnositelj pritužbe samo u toku postupka pred Prvostupanjskim sudom naveo kao primjer različita alternativna rješenja za koja on smatra da ih je trebalo i da ih se moglo predvidjeti", iako iz dokaza u spisu, posebno u Prilogu 26. u kojem se podnositelj pritužbe poziva na pojam „posebnog savjetnika", jasno proizlazi da je F. Lamberts spomenuo takva rješenja u tijeku ispitivanja njegove pritužbe i prije nego što je ombudsman donio odluku, te da ih potonji nikada nije uzeo u obzir.
90 Inasmuch as it refers to the whole of the evidence in the file, that critique of paragraph 84 of the judgment appealed against must be regarded as a criticism of the assessment of the evidence considered by the Court of First Instance, a matter which is not reviewable by the Court on an appeal, which is limited to points of law, in accordance with Article 225 EC and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
90 Budući da se odnosi na cjelokupne dokaze u spisu, prigovor na točku 84. pobijane presude valja smatrati prigovorom na ocjenu dokaza koju je dao Prvostupanjski sud, a koju Sud ne može ispitivati u postupku žalbe jer je u skladu s člankom 225. UEZ-a i člankom 58. Statuta Suda žalba ograničena na pitanja prava.
91 On the supposition that the reference to Annex 26 of the dossier submitted by Mr Lamberts to the Court of First Instance may be analysed as a plea alleging distortion of the clear sense of that document, it should be stated that that annex is constituted by correspondence between Mr Lamberts and the secretariat of the Ombudsman, and in particular by a letter of 12 March 1999 in which reference is made to the concept of `special adviser'.
91 Pod pretpostavkom da se pozivanje na Prilog 26. spisu koji je F. Lambert dostavio Prvostupanjskom sudu može analizirati kao žalbeni razlog prema kojem se navodno iskrivljuje jasan smisao tog dokumenta, valja navesti da se Prilog sastoji od korespondencije između F. Lambertsa i tajništva ombudsmana i da sadržava posebno dopis od 12. ožujka 1999. u kojem se poziva na pojam „posebnog savjetnika".
In that letter Mr Lamberts refers to a practice of integration without prior competition, contrary to the rules concerning access to the Community civil service, as provided for by the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities, which was said to have been implemented in the context of the integration of the staff of the Schengen secretariat into the Secretariat-General of the Council of the European Union, and requests the appointing authority at the Commission to show flexibility in his regard.
U tom se dopisu F. Lamberts poziva na praksu integracije bez prethodnog natječaja suprotno pravilima koja se odnose na pristup državnoj službi Zajednice kako je predviđeno u Pravilniku o osoblju za dužnosnike Europskih zajednica, za koju se tvrdi da je provedena u okviru integracije osoblja Schengenskog tajništva u Glavno tajništvo Vijeća Europske unije, te od tijela za imenovanje pri Komisiji zahtijeva da pokaže fleksibilnost u njegovom slučaju.
92 In light of the abovementioned documents it does not appear that, at a stage earlier than that of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, Mr Lamberts made concrete proposals as to the solutions which might be envisaged in preference to a fresh invitation to take the oral test.
92 U svjetlu gore navedenih dokumenata ne čini se da je u fazi prije postupka pred Prvostupanjskim sudom F. Lamberts iznio konkretne prijedloge u pogledu rješenja kojima bi trebalo dati prednost pred novim pozivom na usmeni ispit.
Besides, the Court of First Instance was right not to take into consideration the proposal that flexibility should be shown to Mr Lamberts as an alternative solution capable of being envisaged.
Osim toga, Prvostupanjski sud bio je u pravu kada nije uzeo u obzir prijedlog da pokazivanje fleksibilnosti prema slučaju F. Lambertsu bude alternativno rješenje koje je bilo moguće predvidjeti.
93 Thus, it was without distorting the clear sense of the evidence adduced before it that, in paragraph 84 of the judgment appealed against, the Court of First Instance took the view that Mr Lamberts had not proposed alternative solutions at a stage prior to the bringing of his action, with the result that the Ombudsman had been unable to take a view specifically on such proposals before that action was brought.
93 Stoga je Prvostupanjski sud, bez iskrivljavanja smisla izvedenih dokaza, u točki 84. pobijane presude zauzeo stajalište da F. Lamberts nije predložio alternativna rješenja u fazi prije podnošenja tužbe, te slijedom toga ombudsman takve prijedloge nije mogao posebno razmotriti prije podnošenja dotične tužbe.
94 In light of the foregoing, the cross-appeal is to be dismissed in its entirety.
94 S obzirom na gore navedeno, protutužbu treba odbiti u cijelosti.
Under Article 69(3) thereof, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, or where the circumstances are exceptional, the Court may however order that the costs be shared or that the parties bear their own costs.
U skladu s člankom 69. stavkom 3. Poslovnika, Sud može podijeliti troškove ili odlučiti da svaka stranka snosi vlastite troškove ako stranke djelomično uspiju u svojim zahtjevima ili ako postoje izvanredne okolnosti.
Since each of the parties has partially failed in its submissions, it is appropriate to order the parties to bear their own costs.
Budući da svaka stranka djelomično nije uspjela u svojim zahtjevima, potrebno je odlučiti da svaka stranka snosi svoje troškove.
Moreover, under Article 69(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Parliament, which intervened in the proceedings, is to bear its own costs.
Nadalje, u skladu s člankom 69. stavkom 4. Poslovnika, Parlament, koji je intervenirao u postupak, snosi vlastite troškove.
hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal and cross-appeal;
proglašava i presuđuje: 1. Žalba i protužalba se odbijaju;
2. Orders the parties to bear their own costs. Skouris
2. Strankama se nalaže snošenje vlastitih troškova.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)14 December 2004
PRESUDA SUDA (veliko vijeće) 14. prosinca 2004. ()
(Environment - Free movement of goods - Packaging and packaging waste - Directive 94/62/EC - Deposit and return obligations for non-reusable packaging that depend on the overall percentage of reusable packaging)
„Okoliš - Slobodno kretanje robe - Ambalaža i ambalažni otpad - Direktiva 94/62/EZ - Obveza naplate kaucije i vraćanja ambalaže za jednokratnu uporabu s obzirom na ukupni postotak ambalaže za višekratnu uporabuˮ
In Case C-309/02,REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 ECfrom the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Germany), made by order of 21 August 2002, received at the Court on 29 August 2002, in the proceedings
U predmetu C-309/02, povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 234. UEZ-a, koji je uputio Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Upravni sud u Stuttgartu, Njemačka), odlukom od 21. kolovoza 2002., koju je Sud zaprimio 29. kolovoza 2002., u postupku
Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co.,S. Spitz KG
Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co., S. Spitz KG protiv
v Land Baden-Württemberg,
Land Baden-Württemberg,
composed of: V. Skouris, President, P. Jann and K. Lenaerts (Rapporteur), Presidents of Chambers, C. Gulmann, J.-P. Puissochet, R. Schintgen, N. Colneric, S. von Bahr and J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, Judges,
u sastavu: V. Skouris, predsjednik, P. Jann i K. Lenaerts (izvjestitelj), predsjednici vijeća, C. Gulmann, J.-P. Puissochet, R. Schintgen, N. Colneric, S. von Bahr i J. N. Cunha Rodrigues, suci,
Advocate General: D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,Registrar: M.-F. Contet, Principal Administrator,
nezavisni odvjetnik: D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, tajnik: M.-F. Contet, glavna administratorica,
Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co. and S. Spitz KG, by R. Karpenstein, Rechtsanwalt,
za Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co. i S. Spitz KG, R. Karpenstein, Rechtsanwalt,
Land Baden-Württemberg, by L.-A. Versteyl, Rechtsanwalt,
za Land Baden-Württemberg, L.-A. Versteyl, Rechtsanwalt,