natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
39 In addition to the infringement of essential procedural requirements, the appellant accuses the General Court of providing erroneous grounds for its judgment by considering that the information provided to the appellant by the French banking commission made good the nullity and justifying that finding by the fact that the Council did not determine there to be ‘exceptional circumstances’, even though the failure to notify a measure having adverse effects constitutes an infringement of a rule of European Union law which is of a public policy nature.
39 Osim povrede bitnih postupovnih zahtjeva, žalitelj Općem sudu prigovara i da je naveo pogrešne razloge za svoju presudu jer je smatrao da je informacijama koje je tužitelju poslala francuska komisija za bankarstvo ispravljena ništavost i jer je potvrdio da je propust Vijeća da ispuni svoju obvezu opravdan „iznimnim okolnostima”, iako izostanak obavijesti o aktu koji nepovoljno utječe na prava osobe predstavlja povredu pravila prava Unije u vezi s javnim poretkom.
40 The French Republic and the Commission dispute the General Court’s reasons and suggest that the Court of Justice substitute those grounds for its own. In their view, Article 15(3) of Regulation No 423/2007 does not require individual notification of the contested decision and no obligation to notify can be inferred from primary law. The General Court was thus wrong to require, in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council provide individual notification.
40 Francuska Republika i Komisija osporavaju razloge Općeg suda i predlažu Sudu preinaku obrazloženja. Po njihovom se mišljenju člankom 15. stavkom 3. Uredbe br. 423/2007 ne zahtijeva pojedinačna obavijest o spornoj odluci, a iz primarnog prava isto tako ne proizlazi nikakva obveza obavješćivanja. Stoga je Opći sud u točki 88. pobijane presude pogrešno zahtijevao od Vijeća osiguravanje pojedinačne obavijesti.
41 The Council, the French Republic and the Commission note the prescriptive nature of a decision to freeze funds. The Council states that, in spite of its reasoning in relation to the obligation to notify, the General Court did not conclude that the contested measure constituted a decision and not a regulation.
41 Vijeće, Francuska Republika i Komisija ističu regulatornu prirodu odluke o zamrzavanju financijskih sredstava. Vijeće navodi da unatoč obrazloženju u vezi s obvezom obavješćivanja, Opći sud nije zaključio da je sporna mjera odluka, a ne uredba.
"42 The French Republic also contests the comparison made by the General Court, in paragraph 87 of the judgment under appeal, between fund-freezing measures adopted in the campaign against nuclear proliferation, which concern third countries, and those adopted in the campaign against terrorism, which concern individuals and entities on an individual basis. It was never claimed that a measure imposing sanctions on a third country had to be notified to that country individually. The difference in objectives results, moreover, from a difference in legal bases; Regulation No 423/2007 was adopted on the basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, whereas the measures in relation to terrorism were adopted on the basis of Article 308 EC."
42 Francuska Republika isto tako osporava usporedbu, koju Opći sud navodi u točki 87. pobijane presude, između mjera zamrzavanja financijskih sredstava donesenih u okviru borbe protiv širenja nuklearnog oružja koje se odnose na treće zemlje i mjera donesenih u okviru borbe protiv terorizma koje se odnose na pojedince i subjekte koji djeluju samostalno. Nikada se nije tvrdilo da o mjeri kojom se trećoj zemlji određuju sankcije treba pojedinačno obavijestiti tu zemlju. Štoviše, razlika u ciljevima proizlazi iz razlike u pravnim osnovama jer je Uredba br. 423/2007 donesena na temelju članaka 60. i 301. UEZ-a, dok su mjere u vezi s terorizmom donesene na temelju članka 308. UEZ-a.
43 At the hearing, the Council stated that fund-freezing measures taken against persons linked to terrorism are notified in accordance with the guidelines set out in paragraph 147 of the judgment of the General Court in Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran v Council, that is to say that, in order to prevent the legitimate expectations of those persons from being jeopardised, only the general grounds for the decision are published in the Official Journal of the European Union, whereas the specific and concrete grounds are notified to them.
43 Na raspravi je Vijeće izjavilo da se obavijest o mjerama zamrzavanja financijskih sredstava poduzetih protiv osoba povezanih s terorizmom upućuje u skladu sa smjernicama utvrđenima točkom 147. gore navedene presude Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran/Vijeće, što znači da se u Službenom listu Europske unije objavljuje samo opće obrazloženje odluke, dok se obavijest o posebnom i konkretnom obrazloženju upućuje tim osobama kako se ne bi naštetilo njihovim legitimnim interesima.
44 The United Kingdom states that the purpose of notification is to inform the addressee of a decision and to enable him to bring an action. In the present case, as regards the freezing of funds, prior notification would not have been possible given the required surprise effect. Article 254 EC does not state how notification is to be effected. The United Kingdom considers, in that regard, that an opinion published in the Official Journal of the European Union at the same time as the decision draws sufficient attention. In any event, the entity concerned would immediately feel the effects of the implementation of the decision. In the present case, the French branch of Bank Melli Iran was informed of the contested decision and the appellant could have brought an action. The United Kingdom, the Council, the French Republic and the Commission point out that the appellant did not suffer any harm as a result of the failure to notify the contested decision.
44 Ujedinjena Kraljevina podsjeća da je svrha obavijesti informirati adresata o odluci i omogućiti mu podnošenje pravnog sredstva. U ovom slučaju prethodna obavijest u vezi sa zamrzavanjem financijskih sredstava ne bi bila moguća zbog potrebnog učinka iznenađenja. Člankom 254. UEZ-a nije određen način upućivanja obavijesti. S tim u vezi Ujedinjena Kraljevina smatra da se objavljivanjem mišljenja u Službenom listu Europske unije istovremeno s odlukom skreće dovoljna pozornost. U svakom slučaju, predmetni bi subjekt odmah osjetio učinke provedbe odluke. U ovom je slučaju francuska podružnica Bank Melli Iran bila obaviještena o spornoj odluci i žalitelj je mogao podnijeti pravno sredstvo. Ujedinjena Kraljevina, Vijeće, Francuska Republika i Komisija ističu da žalitelju nije nanesena nikakva šteta time što nije dobio obavijest o spornoj odluci.
45 The Court of Justice notes, first, that, in spite of its title, the contested decision is of the same nature as a regulation. It contains just one annex, which replaces Annex V to Regulation No 423/2007. The effect of that annex is determined in the second paragraph of Article 19 of that regulation, which provides that the regulation is to be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, which corresponds to the effects of a regulation as provided for in Article 249 EC.
45 Kao prvo, valja navesti da je unatoč svojem naslovu sporna odluka po svojoj prirodi jednaka uredbi. Ona sadržava samo jedan prilog kojim je zamijenjen Prilog V. Uredbi br. 413/2007. Učinak tog priloga određen je člankom 19. drugim podstavkom navedene uredbe, kojim je predviđeno da je uredba u cijelosti obvezujuća i izravno se primjenjuje u svim državama članicama, što odgovara učincima uredbe kako je predviđeno člankom 249. UEZ-a.
50 Although Regulation No 423/2007 does not state how reasons are ‘to be made known’ to the persons, entities and bodies concerned, the claim made by the United Kingdom that publication in the Official Journal of the European Union is sufficient cannot be upheld.
50 Iako u Uredbi br. 423/2007 nije navedeno kako predmetne osobe, subjekte i tijela treba „upoznati” s razlozima, tvrdnja Ujedinjene Kraljevine da je objava u Službenom listu Europske unije dovoljna ne može se prihvatiti.
"53 That conclusion is not called into question by Article 254(3) EC, to which the appellant refers, concerning the notification of a decision in the narrow sense; besides, the appellant did not allege an infringement of that provision before the General Court."
53 Taj se zaključak ne dovodi u pitanje člankom 254. stavkom 3. UEZ-a na kojeg se poziva žalitelj i koji se odnosi na obavijest o odluci u užem smislu, pri čemu žalitelj nije naveo povredu te odredbe pred Općim sudom.
54 The same is true of paragraphs 68 to 73 of the judgment in Hoechst v Commission, to which the appellant refers and which need to be understood in the light of the parties’ arguments to which they respond and their context. As is apparent from paragraphs 44 to 53 of the judgment in Hoechst v Commission, and paragraphs 21 to 24 of the Opinion of Advocate General Cosmos in that case, Hoechst AG relied on the lack of authentification of the contested decision and the fact that the text sent to it was not that adopted on the date indicated. In paragraph 69 of that judgment, the Court of Justice answered that line of argument by referring to paragraphs 48 and 49 of the judgment in Case C-137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others [1994] ECR I-2555, which relate to irregularities such as that at issue in that case, namely the lack of authentification of the measure. In so far as concerns paragraph 72 of the judgment in Hoechst v Commission, reference is clearly made to the issue ruled upon in Commission v BASF and Others, namely, the legal consequences of the lack of authentification of a measure.
54 Isto proizlazi iz točaka 68. do 73. gore navedene presude Hoechst/Komisija na koju se poziva žalitelj i koju valja tumačiti uzimajući u obzir argumente stranaka na koje se odgovara u tim točkama i njihov kontekst. Kao što proizlazi iz točaka 44. do 53. gore navedene presude Hoechst/Komisija i točaka 21. do 24. mišljenja nezavisnog odvjetnika Cosmasa iz te presude, Hoechst AG se pozvao na nevjerodostojnost sporne odluke i činjenicu da tekst koji mu je poslan nije bio jednak tekstu donesenom navedenog dana. Sud je u točki 69. te presude odgovorio na tu argumentaciju upućivanjem na točke 48. i 49. presude od 15. lipnja 1994., Komisija/BASF i dr. (C-137/92 P, Zb., str. I-2555.), koje se odnose na nepravilnosti kao što su one u tom predmetu, odnosno nevjerodostojnost akta. Što se tiče točke 72. gore navedene presude Hoechst/Komisija, jasno se upućuje na pitanje riješeno gore navedenom presudom Komisija/BASF i dr., odnosno na pravne posljedice nevjerodostojnosti akta.
55 In the present case, the individual and specific reasons for the freezing of funds provided for in Article 15(3) of Regulation No 423/2007 have not been communicated by the Council, but sufficient information was communicated to the appellant’s branch by the French banking commission and the appellant was able to bring an action. In the light of those factors, nor did the General Court commit an error of law, in paragraph 90 of the judgment under appeal, in holding that the fact that the Council did not apprise the appellant of the statement of reasons for the contested decision did not have the effect of depriving it of an opportunity of knowing, in good time, the reasons for the contested decision or of assessing the validity of the fund-freezing measure adopted in its regard.
55 U ovom slučaju Vijeće nije uputilo obavijest o pojedinačnim i posebnim razlozima zamrzavanja financijskih sredstava predviđenu člankom 15. stavkom 3. Uredbe br. 423/2007, ali je francuska komisija za bankarstvo poslala dostatne informacije podružnici žalitelja i žalitelj je mogao podnijeti tužbu. S obzirom na navedene elemente, Opći sud nije počinio pogrešku koja se tiče prava u točki 90. pobijane presude presudivši da time što Vijeće nije upoznalo žalitelja s obrazloženjem sporne odluke tužitelju nije bila uskraćena mogućnost da se pravodobno upozna s obrazloženjem sporne odluke ili da ocijeni osnovanost mjere zamrzavanja financijskih sredstva donesene protiv njega.
56 Although, as just pointed out, an individual communication is necessary in principle, it is sufficient to note that Article 15(3) of Regulation No 423/2007 does not require communications to take a specific form, and refers only to the obligation to ‘make them known’. What matters is that useful effect should have been given to that provision, namely, effective judicial protection of the persons and entities concerned by the restrictive measures adopted pursuant to Article 7(2) of the regulation, which was the case in this instance.
56 Iako je, kako je upravo istaknuto, pojedinačna obavijest u načelu neophodna, dovoljno je utvrditi da se člankom 15. stavkom 3. Uredbe br. 423/2007, u kojem se navodi samo obveza „upoznavanja”, ne zahtijeva neki poseban oblik obavijesti. Važno je toj odredbi dati koristan učinak, a to je djelotvorna sudska zaštita predmetnih osoba i subjekata mjerama ograničavanja donesenima u skladu s člankom 7. stavkom 2. uredbe, što je u ovom slučaju učinjeno.
‘45 It is a special feature of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC that they form a bridge between the actions of the Community involving economic measures under Articles 60 EC and 301 EC and the objectives of the EU Treaty [in the version prior to the Treaty of Lisbon] in the sphere of external relations, including the [common foreign and security policy] (CFSP) (see, to that effect, Kadi [and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission,] paragraph 197). Articles 60 EC and 301 EC are provisions expressly envisaging that action by the Community may prove necessary in order to attain one of the objectives specifically assigned to the Union by Article 2 EU, namely the implementation of a common foreign and security policy.
„45 Posebnost je članaka 60. i 301. UEZ-a da oni čine premošćujuću klauzulu između djelovanja Zajednice koja uključuju gospodarske mjere ciljeva Ugovora o EU-a [u verziji ranijoj od Ugovora iz Lisabona] u području vanjskih odnosa, uključujući ZVSP (u tom smislu vidjeti gore navedenu presudu Kadi [i Al Barakaat International/Vijeće i Komisija], t. 197.). Članci 60. i 301. UEZ-a su odredbe kojima je izričito predviđeno da se djelovanje Zajednice može pokazati neophodnim za ostvarivanje jednog od ciljeva posebno dodijeljenog Uniji člankom 2. UEU-a, a to je provedba zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike.
46 That fact is, however, without prejudice to the coexistence of the Union and the Community as integrated but separate legal orders, or to the constitutional architecture of the pillars, as intended by the framers of the Treaties now in force (see, to that effect, Kadi [and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission], paragraph 202). Consequently, even though an action by the Community under Articles 60 EC and 301 EC gives effect to one of the objectives of the Union, it is nevertheless undertaken on the basis of the Community pillar. The lawfulness of measures taken in that sphere, such as Regulation No 423/2007 and the measures implementing it, must therefore be assessed in relation to the conditions laid down by the rules of that pillar, including the appropriate voting rule.
46 Međutim, tom se činjenicom ne dovodi u pitanje istodobno postojanje Unije i Zajednice kao integriranih, ali odvojenih pravnih poredaka ni ustavna struktura stupova, kako su je predvidjeli autori ugovora koji su sada na snazi (u tom smislu vidjeti gore navedenu presudu Kadi [i Al Barakaat International/Vijeće i Komisija], t. 202.). Slijedom toga, iako se djelovanjem Zajednice na temelju članaka 60. i 301. UEZ-a provodi jedan od ciljeva Unije, to se djelovanje provodi na temelju stupa Zajednice. Stoga zakonitost akata donesenih u tom području, kao što su Uredba br. 423/2007 i akti za njezinu provedbu, valja ocijeniti u odnosu na uvjete utvrđene pravilima tog stupa, uključujući odgovarajuće pravilo o glasovanju.
47 It follows from the foregoing that, contrary to the applicant’s claims, Common Position 2007/140, which forms part of the second pillar of the Union, is not a legal basis for Regulation No 423/2007 or for the measures implementing it, which means that the voting rule applicable to the adoption of that common position and to its amendment is irrelevant. Indeed, the existence of a common position or of a joint action previously adopted in the sphere of the CFSP is simply a condition laid down by Article 301 EC, which also defines the voting rule applicable to the adoption of the measures taken to give it effect.
47 Iz prethodno navedenog proizlazi da, suprotno tvrdnjama tužitelja, Zajedničko stajalište 2007/140, koje čini dio drugog stupa Unije, nije pravna osnova Uredbe br. 423/2007 ili akata za njezinu provedbu, što znači da je pravilo o glasovanju koje se primjenjuje na donošenje tog zajedničkog stajališta i na njegove izmjene irelevantno. Naime, postojanje zajedničkog stajališta ili zajedničkog djelovanja prethodno donesenih u području ZVSP-a samo je uvjet utvrđen člankom 301. UEZ-a, kojim je određeno i pravilo o glasovanju koje se primjenjuje na donošenja akata za njihovu provedbu.
48 In the present case, it is not disputed that Regulation No 423/2007 and the contested decision were adopted by a qualified majority, in accordance with the rule laid down in Article 301 EC. Nor is it disputed that the adoption of that regulation was preceded by the unanimous adoption of Common Position 2007/140 or that the adoption of the contested decision was preceded by the unanimous adoption of Common Position 2008/479, by which the applicant’s name was entered in the list of entities to which the fund-freezing measure applied by virtue of Article 5(1)(b) of Common Position 2007/140. It is accordingly to be concluded that the conditions laid down by Article 301 EC have been complied with.
48 U ovom slučaju nije sporno da su Uredba br. 423/2007 i sporna odluka donesene kvalificiranom većinom, u skladu s pravilom utvrđenim člankom 301. UEZ-a. Nije sporno ni da je donošenju te uredbe prethodilo jednoglasno donošenje Zajedničkog stajališta 2007/140 ili da je donošenju sporne odluke prethodilo jednoglasno donošenje Zajedničkog stajališta 2008/479, u kojem je naziv tužitelja uvršten u popis subjekata na koje se primjenjuje mjera zamrzavanja financijskih sredstava na temelju članka 5. stavka 1. točke (b) Zajedničkog stajališta 2007/140. U skladu s tim valja zaključiti da su se poštovali uvjeti utvrđeni člankom 301. UEZ-a.
49 Consequently the applicant’s head of claim alleging failure to follow the applicable voting rule must be rejected.
49 Slijedom toga prigovor tužitelja koji se odnosi na nepoštovanje primjenjivog pravila o glasovanju valja odbiti.
50 With regard to the applicant’s other heads of claim, it is to be borne in mind that a measure is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or of evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see Case C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paragraph 75, and Case T-158/99 Thermenhotel Stoiser Franz and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II-1, paragraph 164, and the case-law cited). In this case, the applicant has not adduced evidence suggesting that the Council, in adopting the contested decision, pursued any end other than that of stopping nuclear proliferation by freezing the funds of entities which it considered were engaged in, directly associated with, or provided support for the activities concerned, in accordance with the procedure laid down for that purpose by the EC Treaty and by Regulation No 423/2007.’
50 U vezi s drugim prigovorima tužitelja, valja podsjetiti da u odnosu na akt može govoriti o postojanju zlouporabe ovlasti ako se utvrdi, na temelju objektivnih, relevantnih i usklađenih pokazatelja, da je on donesen s isključivim ciljem, ili barem odlučujućim, postizanja drugih ciljeva od ciljeva na koje se poziva ili izbjegavanja postupka posebno predviđenog Ugovorom za rješavanje okolnosti predmetnog slučaja (vidjeti presudu Suda od 14. prosinca 2004., Swedish Match, C-210/03, Zb., str. I-11893., t. 75., presudu Općeg suda od 13. siječnja 2004., Thermenhotel Stoiser Franz i dr./Komisija, T-158/99, Zb., str. II-1., t. 164., i navedenu sudsku praksu). U ovom slučaju tužitelj nije podnio dokaze da je Vijeće donošenjem sporne odluke slijedilo drugi cilj osim sprečavanja širenja nuklearnog oružja zamrzavanjem financijskih sredstava subjekata za koje je smatralo da sudjeluju u predmetnim aktivnostima, da su izravno s njima povezani ili da ih podupiru, u skladu s postupkom utvrđenim za tu namjenu Ugovorom o EZ-u i Uredbom br. 423/2007.” [neslužbeni prijevod]
60 The appellant observes that Article 7(2) of Regulation No 423/2007 relates to entities that ‘[are] engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support’ for nuclear proliferation. On the basis of the judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, paragraph 167, it submits that, since the relevant criterion adopted by Regulation No 423/2007 and the contested decision is not the fact of being controlled by a third country, but participation in certain proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, those provisions go beyond the scope of Article 60 EC and 301 EC. Consequently, it was essential to base those provisions not only on Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, but also on Article 308 EC, which requires a unanimous vote.
60 Žalitelj podsjeća da se članak 7. stavak 2. Uredbe br. 423/2007 odnosi na subjekte koji „sudjeluju u širenj[u] nuklearnog oružja, izravno su s njim povezani ili [mu] pružaju potporu.” [neslužbeni prijevod]. Na temelju gore navedene presude Kadi i Al Barakaat International Foundation/Vijeće i Komisija (t. 167.), on tvrdi da budući da mjerodavni kriterij donesen Uredbom br. 423/2007 i spornom odlukom nije nadzor koji provodi treća zemlja, već sudjelovanje u određenim nuklearnim aktivnostima širenja nuklearnog oružja, te odredbe ne ulaze u područje primjene članaka 60. i 301. UEZ-a. Slijedom toga, bilo je neophodno temeljiti te odredbe ne samo na člancima 60. i 301. UEZ-a, već i na članku 308. UEZ-a, kojim se zahtijeva jednoglasna odluka.
61 The appellant submits that the General Court also erred in law in considering that Common Position 2007/140 did not constitute a legal basis for Regulation No 423/2007 and the contested decision, but merely a ‘condition’ laid down by Article 301 EC. In doing so, the General Court made a distinction which is not made in the rules laid down in the Treaty. The appellant argues that the list in Annex V to Regulation No 423/2007 is identical to that in Annex II to Common Position 2007/140, which, pursuant to Article 7(2) of that common position, can be amended only unanimously. Since Regulation No 423/2007 is based on Articles 60 EC and 301 EC and on Common Position 2007/140, Annex V to the regulation should have been amended in accordance with the rule of unanimity. By disregarding that rule in adopting the contested decision, the Council misused its powers.
61 Žalitelj tvrdi da je Opći sud isto tako počinio pogrešku koja se tiče prava kada je utvrdio da Zajedničko stajalište 2007/140 ne predstavlja pravnu osnovu Uredbe br. 423/2007 i sporne odluke, već samo „uvjet” utvrđen člankom 301. UEZ-a. Time je Opći sud napravio razliku koja ne postoji u pravilima utvrđenima Ugovorom. Žalitelj tvrdi da je popis iz Priloga V. Uredbi br. 423/2007 jednak onome iz Priloga II. Zajedničkom stajalištu 2007/140, koji se u skladu s člankom 7. stavkom 2. tog zajedničkog stajališta može izmijeniti samo jednoglasnom odlukom. Budući da se Uredba br. 423/2007 temelji na člancima 60. i 301. UEZ-a i na Zajedničkom stajalištu 2007/140, Prilog V. toj uredbi trebalo je izmijeniti u skladu s pravilom jednoglasnosti. Nepoštovanjem tog pravila pri donošenju sporne odluke, Vijeće je zlorabilo svoje ovlasti.