natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
12 The defendant in the main proceedings states that Mr I. had been relentless in his criminal conduct and caused his victim ‘endless suffering’ through abuse lasting many years. The possibility cannot be ruled out that, in similar circumstances, he will re-offend, committing acts of the same or similar nature to those he engaged in before his arrest, on account in particular of the extended period during which the offences were perpetrated and the continuing lack of remorse on Mr I.’s part. The interests of Mr I. which merit protection have nevertheless been taken into consideration and there has been no particular economic or social integration into German society.
12 Tuženica u glavnom postupku navodi da je P. I. uložio značajnu kriminalnu energiju u svoje postupke i uzrokovao svojoj žrtvi „beskrajnu patnju” zlostavljajući je dugi niz godina. Nije isključeno da bi u sličnim okolnostima ponovio ista ili slična kaznena djela poput onih koja je činio prije uhićenja, prije svega imajući u vidu dugo razdoblje činjenja kaznenih djela i činjenice da se kod počinitelja još uvijek nije javio osjećaj krivnje. Interesi P. I.-ja koje treba zaštititi uzeti su u obzir, a on se nije ekonomski ni socijalno posebno integrirao u njemačko društvo.
13 On 12 June 2008, Mr I. brought an action against the expulsion decision of 6 May 2008 and requested that enforcement of the order be suspended. By judgment of 14 July 2008, the Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf (Administrative court, Düsseldorf) dismissed that action, considering in particular that the acts which warranted the conviction revealed personal conduct which gave rise to fears of a present, genuine and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society, namely the protection of girls and women from sexual assault and rape. Mr I. had been relentless in his criminal conduct, having regard in particular to the lengthy period during which the offences were committed, the age of the victim and the measures he took to prevent the offences being discovered, by continually threatening his victim and isolating her.
13 P. I. je 12. lipnja 2008. podnio tužbu protiv odluke o protjerivanju od 6. svibnja 2008. te zatražio da se suspendira njezino izvršenje. Presudom od 14. srpnja 2008. Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf (Upravni sud, Düsseldorf) odbacio je tužbu, posebno smatrajući da djela zbog kojih je osuda izrečena otkrivaju osobno ponašanje koje opravdava bojazan da postoji trenutačna, stvarna i dovoljno ozbiljna opasnost koja ugrožava neki od temeljnih interesa društva, a to je zaštita djevojaka i žena od seksualnog nasilja i silovanja. P. I. je pokazivao značajnu kriminalnu energiju, posebno s obzirom na duljinu razdoblja u kojem su počinjenja kaznena djela, dob žrtve i mjere koje je poduzeo da ta djela ne budu otkrivena tako što je neprekidno prijetio žrtvi i izolirao je.
14 Mr I. lodged an appeal against that judgment before the Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, which, after restoring the suspensory effect of the application, decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
14 P. I. je na tu presudu uložio žalbu pred Oberverwaltungsgerichtom für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, koji je, nakon što je potvrdio suspenzivni učinak tužbe, odlučio prekinuti postupak i postaviti Sudu sljedeće prethodno pitanje:
‘Does the term “imperative grounds of public security” contained in Article 28(3) of Directive [2004/38] cover only threats posed to the internal and external security of the State in terms of the continued existence of the State with its institutions and important public services, the survival of the population, foreign relations and the peaceful co-existence of nations?’
„Obuhvaća li pojam „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti”, koji je sadržan u članku 28. stavku 3. Direktive [2004/38], samo prijetnje unutarnjoj i vanjskoj sigurnosti države u smislu kontinuiranog postojanja države s njezinim institucijama i važnim javnim uslugama, opstanka stanovništva, vanjskih odnosa i mirnog suživota među narodima?”
Consideration of the question referred
O prethodnom pitanju
15 At paragraph 56 of its judgment in Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] ECR I-11979, the Court held that Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that the fight against crime in connection with dealing in narcotics as part of an organised group is capable of being covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, which may justify a measure expelling a Union citizen who has resided in the host Member State for the preceding 10 years.
15 U točki 56. presude u predmetu C-145/09 od 23. studenoga 2010., Tsakouridis (C-145/09, Zb., str. I-11979., Sud je presudio da se članak 28. stavak 3. Direktive 2004/38 mora tumačiti na način da borba protiv kriminala povezanog s trgovinom opojnim sredstvima u organiziranoj skupini može biti obuhvaćena pojmom „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti”, čime se može opravdati mjera protjerivanja građanina Unije koji je u državi članici domaćinu boravio prethodnih deset godina.
16 In response to a written question put by the Court following the judgment in Tsakouridis, the referring court stated that doubts remained in the main proceedings as to whether and, if so, under what conditions, the fight against other forms of crime than drug-related crime as part of an organised group may also constitute an ‘imperative ground of public security’ within the meaning of Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38.
16 U odgovoru na pisano pitanje koje je Sud postavio nakon izricanja gore navedene presude u predmetu Tsakouridis, sud koji je uputio zahtjev naveo je da su u glavnom predmetu postojale nedoumice o tome može li i, ako može, pod kojim uvjetima borba protiv ostalih oblika kriminala drukčijih od onih povezanih s drogama u organiziranoj skupini također biti „prisilni razlog javne sigurnosti” u smislu članka 28. stavka 3. Direktive 2004/38.
17 The referring court asks, in particular, whether it is possible to expel from the host Member State Union citizens who, whilst not belonging to a group or any other kind of criminal organisation, have committed extremely serious criminal offences which affect individual interests benefiting from legal protection, such as sexual autonomy, life, freedom and physical integrity, where there is a high level of risk that they will re-offend, committing other similar offences.
17 Sud koji je uputio zahtjev pita posebno je li moguće protjerati iz države članice domaćina građane Unije koji su, premda ne pripadaju skupini ili drugoj vrsti kriminalne organizacije, počinili iznimno teška kaznena djela koja se odnose na ugrožavanje pravno zaštićenih individualnih interesa, kao što su seksualna autonomija, život, sloboda i fizički integritet, ako postoji visoki rizik da će ponovo počiniti slična kaznena djela.
18 As regards public security, the Court has already held that this covers both a Member State’s internal and its external security (Tsakouridis, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
18 Što se tiče javne sigurnosti, Sud je već presudio da ona obuhvaća i unutarnju i vanjsku sigurnost države članice (gore navedena presuda Tsakouridis, t. 43. i navedena sudska praksa).
19 According to the Court, it follows from the wording and scheme of Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38 that, by subjecting all expulsion measures in the cases referred to in that provision to the existence of ‘imperative grounds’ of public security, a concept which is considerably stricter than that of ‘serious grounds’ within the meaning of Article 28(2), the European Union legislature clearly intended to limit measures based on Article 28(3) to ‘exceptional circumstances’, as set out in recital 24 in the preamble to that directive (Tsakouridis, paragraph 40).
19 Prema mišljenju Suda, iz teksta i strukture članka 28. stavka 3. Direktive 2004/38 proizlazi da je zakonodavac Unije, uvjetujući sve mjere protjerivanja u slučajevima iz te odredbe postojanjem „prisilnih razloga” javne sigurnosti, to jest s pojmom koji je znatno stroži od pojma „ozbiljni razlozi” u smislu stavka 2. tog članka, imao očitu namjeru ograničiti mjere koje se temelje na navedenom stavku 3. na „iznimne okolnosti”, kako su navedene u 24. uvodnoj izjavi navedene Direktive (presuda Tsakouridis, t. 40.).
20 The concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ presupposes not only the existence of a threat to public security, but also that such a threat is of a particularly high degree of seriousness, as is reflected by the use of the words ‘imperative grounds’ (Tsakouridis, paragraph 41).
20 Pojam „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti” podrazumijeva ne samo postojanje prijetnje javnoj sigurnosti, nego i to da je ta prijetnja dosegla osobito visok stupanj težine, kao što to odražava primjena izraza „prisilni razlozi” (presuda Tsakouridis, t. 41.).
21 It should also be noted that European Union law does not impose on Member States a uniform scale of values as regards the assessment of conduct which may be considered to be contrary to public security (see, by analogy, Case C-268/99 Jany and Others [2001] ECR I-8615, paragraph 60).
21 Treba također podsjetiti da pravo Unije ne nameće državama članicama jedinstvenu skalu vrijednosti za ocjenu ponašanja koje se može smatrati protivnim javnoj sigurnosti (vidjeti po analogiji presudu od 20. studenoga 2001., Jany i dr., C-268/99, Zb., str. I-8615., t. 60.).
22 Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38 provides that imperative grounds of public security are to be ‘defined by Member States’.
22 Prema članku 28. stavku 3. Direktive 2004/38, prisilne razloge javne sigurnosti „utvrđuju države članice”.
"23 While Member States essentially retain the freedom to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in accordance with their national needs, which can vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another, particularly as justification for a derogation from the fundamental principle of free movement of persons, those requirements must nevertheless be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the institutions of the European Union (see, inter alia, Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] ECR I-5157, paragraph 23; C-430/10 Gaydarov [2011] ECR I-11637, paragraph 32; and Case C-434/10 Aladzhov [2011] ECR I-11659, paragraph 34)."
23 Iako države članice u biti zadržavaju slobodu da u skladu sa svojim nacionalnim potrebama, koje se mogu razlikovati od jedne države članice do druge ili od jednog razdoblja do drugog, utvrđuju zahtjeve javnog poretka i javne sigurnosti, posebno kao opravdanje za odstupanje od temeljnog načela slobodnog kretanja osoba, ti se zahtjevi ipak moraju strogo tumačiti tako da njihov opseg ne može jednostrano odrediti svaka država članica bez nadzora institucija Europske unije (osobito vidjeti presude od 10. srpnja 2008., Jipa, C-33/07, Zb., str. I-5157., t. 23. i od 17. studenoga 2011., Gaydarov, C-430/10, Zb., str. I-11637., t. 32. te presudu Aladzhov, C-434/10, Zb., str. I-11659., t. 34.).
24 In order to determine whether offences such as those committed by Mr I. may be covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, the following factors must be taken into account.
24 Kako bi se utvrdilo mogu li kaznena djela koje je počinio P.I. biti obuhvaćena pojmom „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti”, u obzir se moraju uzeti sljedeći faktori.
25 Article 83(1) TFEU provides that the sexual exploitation of children is one of the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension in which the European Union legislature may intervene.
25 U skladu s člankom 83. stavkom 1. UFEU-a seksualno iskorištavanje djece jedno je od područja osobito teškog kriminaliteta s prekograničnim elementima u kojemu je predviđeno interveniranje zakonodavca Europske unije.
26 Reflecting that objective, the first recital in the preamble to Directive 2011/93 states that sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children constitute serious violations of fundamental rights, in particular the rights of children to the protection and care necessary for their well-being, as provided for by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
26 U prvoj uvodnoj izjavi Direktive 2011/93 izražen je navedeni cilj i naglašeno je da seksualno zlostavljanje i seksualno iskorištavanje djece predstavljaju teška kršenja temeljnih prava, posebno prava djece na zaštitu i brigu za njihovu dobrobit, kako je to utvrđeno Konvencijom Ujedinjenih naroda o pravima djece od 20. studenoga 1989. i Poveljom Europske unije o temeljnim pravima.
27 The serious nature of those kinds of offences is also apparent from Article 3 of Directive 2011/93, which provides, in Article 3(4), that engaging in sexual activities with a child who has not reached the age of sexual consent is to be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 5 years, and Article 3(5)(i), which states that engaging in such activities where abuse is made of a recognised position of trust, authority or influence over the child is to be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 8 years. Under Article 3(5)(iii), where use is made of coercion, force or threats, that term of imprisonment must be at least 10 years. In accordance with Article 9(b) and (g) of Directive 2011/93, the fact that the offence was committed by a member of the child’s family, a person cohabiting with the child or a person who has abused a recognised position of trust or authority and that the offence involved serious violence or caused serious harm to the child are to be regarded as aggravating circumstances.
27 Težina tih vrsta kaznenih djela proizlazi i iz članka 3. Direktive 2011/93 u čijem se stavku 4. utvrđuje da se sudjelovanje u spolnim aktivnostima s djetetom koje još nije dosegnulo dob za pristanak na spolni odnos kažnjava se najvećom kaznom zatvora, ali ne manjom od pet godina zatvora, dok se u stavku 5. točki i. istog članka utvrđuje da sudjelovanje u takvim aktivnostima zlouporabljujući priznati položaja povjerenja, autoriteta ili utjecaja nad djetetom kažnjava najvećom kaznom zatvora od najmanje osam godina. Prema stavku 5. točki iii. istog članka, ta kazna zatvora mora iznositi najmanje deset godina u slučaju uporabe prisile, sile ili prijetnje. U skladu s člankom 9. točkama (b) i (g) Direktive 2011/93, okolnost da je kazneno djelo počinio član obitelji djeteta, osoba koja stanuje zajedno s djetetom ili osoba koja je zlorabila svoj priznati položaj povjerenja ili autoritet te okolnost da je kazneno djelo uključivalo teško nasilje ili je djetetu prouzročilo ozbiljnu štetu mogu se uzeti kao otegotne okolnosti.
28 It is apparent from the above that it is open to the Member States to regard criminal offences such as those referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 83(1) TFEU as constituting a particularly serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society, which might pose a direct threat to the calm and physical security of the population and thus be covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, capable of justifying an expulsion measure under Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38, as long as the manner in which such offences were committed discloses particularly serious characteristics, which is a matter for the referring court to determine on the basis of an individual examination of the specific case before it.
28 Iz gore navedenog je proizlazi da države članice mogu smatrati da kaznena djela poput onih iz članka 83. stavka 1. drugog podstavka UFEU-a predstavljaju osobito ozbiljnu prijetnju nekom od temeljnih interesa društva koja može izravno ugroziti mir i fizičku sigurnost stanovništva te, stoga, može biti obuhvaćena pojmom „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti”, čime se može opravdati mjera protjerivanja iz članka 28. stavka 3. Direktive 2004/38 pod uvjetom da način na koji su takva djela počinjena pokazuje osobito ozbiljne karakteristike, što sud koji je uputio zahtjev za prethodnu odluku treba utvrditi na temelju pojedinačnog ispitivanja konkretnog predmeta koji se pred njim vodi.
29 Should the referring court find that, according to the particular values of the legal order of the Member State in which it has jurisdiction, offences such as those committed by Mr I. pose a direct threat to the calm and physical security of the population, that should not necessarily lead to the expulsion of the person concerned.
29 Ako sud koji je uputio zahtjev utvrdi, prema specifičnim vrijednostima pravnog sustava države članice kojoj pripada, da su kaznena djela poput onih koja je počinio P. I. izravna prijetnja miru i fizičkoj sigurnosti stanovništva, to ne mora nužno dovesti do protjerivanja predmetne osobe.
30 Under the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38, the issue of any expulsion measure is conditional on the requirement that the personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a genuine, present threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society or of the host Member State, which implies, in general, the existence in the individual concerned of a propensity to act in the same way in the future.
30 Naime, člankom 27. stavkom 2. drugim podstavkom Direktive 2004/38 svaka mjera protjerivanja uvjetuje se zahtjevom da osobno ponašanje dotičnog pojedinca mora predstavljati stvarnu i trenutačnu opasnost koja ugrožava neki temeljni interes društva ili države članice domaćina, što općenito podrazumijeva da kod dotičnog pojedinca postoji sklonost takvom ponašanju i u budućnosti.
31 It should be added that where an expulsion measure has been adopted as a penalty or legal consequence of a custodial penalty, but is enforced more than two years after it was issued, Article 33(2) of Directive 2004/38 requires the Member State to check that the individual concerned is currently and genuinely a threat to public policy or public security and to assess whether there has been any material change in the circumstances since the expulsion order was issued.
31 Valja dodati da ako se mjera protjerivanja donese kao kazna ili kao pravna posljedica kazne zatvora, ali se izvrši nakon više od dvije godine od njezinog donošenja, člankom 33. stavkom 2. Direktive 2004/38 zahtijeva se od države članice da provjeri je li dotična osoba trenutačna i stvarna prijetnja javnom poretku ili javnoj sigurnosti te procijeni jesu li se nakon donošenja odluke o protjerivanju okolnosti značajno promijenile.
32 Lastly, as is clear from the terms in which Article 28(1) of Directive 2004/38 is couched, before taking an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or public security, the host Member State must take account of considerations such as how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration into that State and the extent of his/her links with the country of origin.
32 Naposljetku, kao što proizlazi iz samog teksta članka 28. stavka 1. Direktive 2004/38, prije donošenja odluke o protjerivanju s državnog područja zbog razloga javnog poretka ili javne sigurnosti, država članica domaćin mora uzeti u obzir činjenice kao što su duljina boravka pojedinca na njezinom državnom području, dob, zdravstveno stanje, obiteljske i ekonomske prilike, socijalna i kulturalna integracija u tu državu i opseg njegovih veza sa zemljom podrijetla.
33 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 28(3)(a) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that it is open to the Member States to regard criminal offences such as those referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 83(1) TFEU as constituting a particularly serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society, which might pose a direct threat to the calm and physical security of the population and thus be covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, capable of justifying an expulsion measure under Article 28(3), as long as the manner in which such offences were committed discloses particularly serious characteristics, which is a matter for the referring court to determine on the basis of an individual examination of the specific case before it.
33 Uzimajući u obzir prethodna razmatranja, na postavljeno pitanje valja odgovoriti da članak 28. stavak 3. točku (a) Direktive 2004/38 treba tumačiti na način da države članice mogu smatrati da kaznena djela poput onih iz članka 83. stavka 1. drugog podstavka UFEU-a predstavljaju osobito ozbiljnu prijetnju nekom od temeljnih interesa društva koja može izravno ugroziti mir i fizičku sigurnost stanovništva te, stoga, može biti obuhvaćena pojmom „prisilni razlozi javne sigurnosti”, kojima se može opravdati mjera protjerivanja iz navedenog članka 28. stavka 3., pod uvjetom da način na koji su takva djela počinjena pokazuje osobito ozbiljne karakteristike, a što sud koji je uputio zahtjev za prethodnu odluku treba utvrditi na temelju pojedinačnog ispitivanja konkretnog predmeta koji se pred njim vodi.
34 The issue of any expulsion measure is conditional on the requirement that the personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a genuine, present threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society or of the host Member State, which implies, in general, the existence in the individual concerned of a propensity to act in the same way in the future. Before taking an expulsion decision, the host Member State must take account of considerations such as how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration into that State and the extent of his/her links with the country of origin.
34 Svaka mjera protjerivanja uvjetovana je zahtjevom da osobno ponašanje dotičnog pojedinca mora predstavljati stvarnu i trenutačnu opasnost koja ugrožava neki temeljni interes društva ili države članice domaćina, što općenito podrazumijeva da kod dotičnog pojedinca postoji sklonost takvom ponašanju i u budućnosti. Prije donošenja odluke o protjerivanju država članica domaćin mora uzeti u obzir činjenice kao što su duljina boravka pojedinca na njezinom državnom području, dob, zdravstveno stanje, obiteljske i ekonomske prilike, socijalna i kulturalna integracija u tu državu i opseg njegovih veza sa zemljom podrijetla.
35 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
35 Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka. Troškovi podnošenja očitovanja Sudu, koji nisu troškovi spomenutih stranaka, ne nadoknađuju se.