natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
– Arcor AG & Co. KG, by N. Nolte and J. Tiedemann, Rechtsanwälte,
– za Arcor AG & Co. KG, N. Nolte i J. Tiedemann, Rechtsanwälte,
– Bundesrepublik Deutschland, by S. Prömper, acting as Agent,
– za Bundesrepublik Deutschland, S. Prömper, u svojstvu agenta,
– the Netherlands Government, by H. G. Sevenster and C. ten Dam, acting as Agents,
– za nizozemsku vladu, H. G. Sevenster i C. ten Dam, u svojstvu agenata,
– the Commission of the European Communities, by M. Shotter and S. Grünheid, acting as Agents,
– za Komisiju Europskih zajednica, M. Shotter i S. Grünheid, u svojstvu agenata,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 16 March 2006,
saslušavši mišljenje nezavisnog odvjetnika na raspravi održanoj 16. ožujka 2006.,
2 The references have been made in the course of two sets of proceedings between, first, i-21 Germany GmbH (‘i-21’) and, second, Arcor AG & Co. KG, formerly ISIS Multimedia Net GmbH & Co. KG (‘Arcor’), and the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) concerning fees paid by those companies in order to obtain a telecommunications licence.
2 Zahtjevi su upućeni u okviru dva spora između, u prvom slučaju, društva i‑21 Germany GmbH (u daljnjem tekstu: i-21) i, u drugom slučaju, društva Arcor AG & Co. KG, prije ISIS Multimedia Net GmbH & Co. KG (u daljnjem tekstu: Arcor), i Bundesrepublik Deutschland u vezi s naknadama koje su ta društva platila za dobivanje telekomunikacijskih dozvola.
3 Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 provides:
3 Članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13 predviđa:
‘Member States shall ensure that any fees imposed on undertakings as part of authorisation procedures seek only to cover the administrative costs incurred in the issue, management, control and enforcement of the applicable individual licences. The fees for an individual licence shall be proportionate to the work involved and be published in an appropriate and sufficiently detailed manner, so as to be readily accessible.’
„Države članice osiguravaju da su sve naknade nametnute poduzetnicima u okviru postupaka za izdavanje dozvola namijenjene samo pokrivanju upravnih troškova povezanih s izdavanjem, upravljanjem, kontrolom i uporabom pojedinačnih dozvola koje se primjenjuju. Naknade za pojedinačnu dozvolu proporcionalne su opsegu posla i objavljuju se na odgovarajući način i dovoljno detaljno kako bi informacije bile lako dostupne.ˮ [neslužbeni prijevod]
5 Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 was transposed into German national law by the Law on Telecommunications (Telekommunikationsgesetz) of 25 July 1996 (BGBl. 1996 I, p. 1120, the ‘TKG’), which is an enabling law, and by the Regulation on Telecommunications Licence Fees (Telekommunikations-Lizenzgebührenverordnung) of 28 July 1997 (BGBl. 1997 I, p. 1936, the ‘TKLGebV’), adopted by the Federal Minister for Post and Telecommunications on the basis of the TKG.
5 Članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13 prenesen je u njemačko nacionalno pravo Zakonom o telekomunikacijama (Telekommunikationsgesetz) od 25. srpnja 1996. (BGBl. 1996 I, str. 1120., u daljnjem tekstu: TKG), kao zakon o ovlaštenjima, i Uredbom o davanjima za telekomunikacijske dozvole (Telekommunikations-Lizenzgebührenverordnung) od 28. srpnja 1997. (BGBl. 1997 I, str. 1936., u daljnjem tekstu: TKLGebV), koju je na temelju TKG-a donio savezni ministar za poštu i telekomunikacije.
‘Withdrawal of unlawful administrative acts
„Povlačenje nezakonitog upravnog akta
An unlawful administrative act may, even after it can no longer be challenged, be withdrawn either wholly or in part with prospective or retroactive effect. An administrative act by which a right or a legally significant advantage has been either conferred or confirmed (an administrative act conferring a benefit) may only be withdrawn under the conditions set out in subparagraphs 2 to 4.
Čak i nakon što je postao konačan, nezakoniti upravni akt može se povući bilo u cijelosti ili djelomično s učinkom ex nunc ili ex tunc. Konstitutivni ili deklaratorni upravni akt u pogledu prava ili pravne koristi (upravni akt o generiranju prava) može se povući samo uz poštovanje uvjeta iz stavaka od 2. do 4.
…’
[…]ˮ
8 It follows from the referral decisions that, according to German case-law, the administrative authority has discretion in principle, pursuant to Paragraph 48 of the Law on Administrative Procedure, to withdraw an unlawful administrative act which has become final. That discretion may, however, be extinguished if to uphold the act in question would be ‘downright intolerable’ in respect of public policy, good faith, fairness, equal treatment or manifest unlawfulness.
8 Iz gore navedenih odluka proizlazi da, u skladu s njemačkom sudskom praksom, upravno tijelo u načelu ima diskrecijsko pravo, u skladu s člankom 48. Zakona o upravnom postupku, povući nezakoniti upravni akt koji je postao konačan. To diskrecijsko pravo može se poništiti ako je zadržavanje dotičnog akta „jednostavno nedopustivoˮ u pogledu javnog poretka, dobre vjere, pravednosti, jednakog postupanja ili očite nezakonitosti.
9 Arcor and i-21 are two telecommunications undertakings. By way of two assessment notices of 14 June 2000 and 18 May 2001, the undertakings were charged fees for individual telecommunications licences of approximately EUR 5 420 000 in the case of i-21 and approximately EUR 67 000 in the case of Arcor. They paid the fees without objection and did not appeal against them within the time-limit of one month from the date of notification of the fee assessments.
9 Arcor i i-21 su dva društva za telekomunikacije. Odlukama od 14. lipnja 2000. i 18. svibnja 2001. zaračunane su im naknade za pojedinačne telekomunikacijske dozvole u približnom iznosu od 5 420 000 eura u slučaju društva i-21 i približno 67 000 eura u slučaju društva Arcor. Ta su društva naknade platila bez prigovora i nisu se žalila na njih u roku od mjesec dana od datuma uručenja odluka o visini naknade.
12 Following that judgment, i-21 and Arcor sought repayment of the fees which they had paid. However, their claims were not granted. They therefore each brought proceedings before the Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court), which dismissed them on the ground that their fee notices had become final and that in the present situation there were no grounds for challenging the administrative body’s refusal to withdraw those assessments.
12 Na temelju te presude i‑21 i Arcor tražili su povrat naknada koje su platili. Međutim, njihovi zahtjevi nisu uvaženi. Oni su stoga svatko za sebe uložili tužbu na Verwaltungsgericht (Upravni sud), koji je obje tužbe odbacio zbog toga što su njihove odluke o naknadi postale konačne i zato što u ovom slučaju nije bilo temelja da se dovede u pitanje odbijanje upravnog tijela da povuče te odluke.
14 In its referral decisions, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht states that the appeals on a point of law could not succeed on the basis of national law alone. According to that court, these are not cases in which to uphold the fee assessments would be ‘downright intolerable’ and in which the administration’s discretion was reduced to such a degree that it had no choice other than to withdraw the notices. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht takes the view that upholding the fee assessments does not prejudice the concepts of good faith, equal treatment or those of public policy or fairness, and that the notices at issue are also not based on manifestly unlawful legislation.
14 U odlukama kojima Bundesverwaltungsgericht upućuje prethodna pitanja navodi da se prijedlozi za ponavljanje postupka (revision) ne mogu prihvatiti samo na temelju nacionalnog prava. Prema mišljenju tog suda, ovdje se ne radi o slučajevima u kojima bi zadržavanje odluke o visini naknade bilo „jednostavno nedopustivoˮ i u kojima bi diskrecijsko pravo upravnog tijela bilo tako smanjeno da ono nema drugog izbora nego povući odluke. Bundesverwaltungsgericht smatra da zadržavanje odluka o visini naknade ne zadire u pojam dobre vjere ili jednakog postupanja ni u pojam javnog poretka ili pravednosti i da se dotične odluke ne temelje na očito nezakonitom propisu.
15 The national court, however, raises the question of the scope of Community law. It considers that Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 seems to preclude legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings. On the assumption that its interpretation of that provision is correct, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht then enquires as to whether that provision, read in conjunction with Article 10 EC concerning the obligation of loyal cooperation, fetters the regulatory authority’s discretion having regard, inter alia, to Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837.
15 Sud koji je uputio zahtjev, međutim, postavlja pitanje o dosegu prava Zajednice. On smatra da je članku 11. stavku 1. Direktive 97/13 protivan pravni propis kao što je onaj o kojem je riječ u glavnom postupku. Pod pretpostavkom da je njegovo tumačenje te odredbe ispravno, Bundesverwaltungsgericht se zatim pita ne ograničava li ta odredba, u vezi s člankom 10. UEZ-a, koji se odnosi na obvezu lojalne suradnje, diskrecijsko pravo regulatornog tijela, osobito s obzirom na presudu od 13. siječnja 2004., Kühne & Heitz (C-453/00, Zb., str. I-837.).
16 The Bundesverwaltungsgericht is in particular unsure as to whether Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 is to be interpreted as requiring the Member States, when calculating the fee, to comply with the objectives of the directive and ensure that those objectives are observed. Those objectives include that of facilitating significantly the entry of new competitors onto the market. However, upholding the fee assessments at issue amounts to a restriction on competition for the undertakings concerned, which are at a disadvantage compared, in particular, with those undertakings which contested the assessments addressed to them within the given time-limits and succeeded in having them annulled. According to the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, if that article were to be construed as prohibiting such a restriction on competition, the principle of cooperation contained in Article 10 EC might give rise to an obligation to reopen the fee assessments at issue under national law without the administrative authority having any discretion.
16 Bundesverwaltungsgericht se pita osobito treba li članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13 tumačiti tako da se od država članica zahtijeva da pri izračunu naknade poštuju ciljeve Direktive i osiguravaju njihovo poštovanje. Jedan od tih ciljeva je i cilj da se novim konkurentima značajno olakša ulazak na tržište. Međutim, zadržavanje dotičnih odluka o visini naknade znači ograničavanje tržišnog natjecanja za dotične poduzetnike, koji bi bili stavljeni u slabiji položaj posebno u usporedbi s onim poduzetnicima koji su u propisanim rokovima osporavali odluke o visini naknade koje su im bile upućene i koji su ishodili da ih se poništi. Prema mišljenju Bundesverwaltungsgerichta, ukoliko taj članak treba tumačiti tako da zabranjuje takvo ograničenje u području tržišnog natjecanja, načelo suradnje iz članka 10. UEZ-a može imati za posljedicu obvezu ponovnog otvaranja postupka za dotične odluke o visini naknade na temelju nacionalnog prava, bez diskrecijskog prava upravnog tijela.
‘(1) Is Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13/EC … to be interpreted as precluding the imposition of a licence fee calculated to anticipate the amount of a national regulatory authority’s general administrative costs over a period of 30 years, to be charged in advance?
„(1) Treba li članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13/EZ […] tumačiti tako da mu je protivno plaćanje naknade za dozvolu koja se zaračunava unaprijed na temelju iznosa očekivanih općih upravnih troškova nacionalnog regulatornog tijela u 30-godišnjem razdoblje?
(2) Are Article 10 EC and Article 11 of the Directive [97/13] to be interpreted as meaning that a fee assessment that determines fees within the meaning of Question 1 and which has not been contested, although such a possibility is afforded under national law, must be set aside where that is permissible under national law but not mandatory?’
(2) Treba li članak 10. UEZ-a i članak 11. Direktive [97/13] tumačiti tako da odluku o visini naknade u smislu prvog pitanja, koja nije bila osporavana iako takva mogućnost postoji prema nacionalnom pravu, treba proglasiti nevaljanom kada nacionalno pravo to dozvoljava, ali ne zahtijeva?ˮ
21 The German Government maintains that, in any event, Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 does not preclude the imposition of a charge such as that provided for in the German legislation. First, the administrative costs referred to in that article include general administrative costs. Secondly, that article does not provide that only administrative costs actually incurred can be included in the charge, to the exclusion of future administrative costs. Taking the latter into account constitutes a guarantee of certainty for undertakings which are assured of being subject to no further charges in the future in relation to the licence.
21 Njemačka vlada tvrdi da članku 11. stavku 1. Direktive 97/13 nikako nije protivno nametanje naknade kao što je ona koju predviđa njemačko zakonodavstvo. S jedne strane, upravni troškovi iz tog članka uključuju opće upravne troškove. S druge strane, taj članak ne predviđa da se u naknadu mogu uključiti samo stvarno nastali upravni troškovi uz isključenje budućih upravnih troškova. Uzimanje u obzir potonjih jamstvo je sigurnosti za poduzetnike kojima se tako osigurava da u budućnosti neće biti izloženi daljnjim terećenjima u vezi s dozvolom.
26 It is also necessary to establish whether the concept of ‘administrative costs’ referred to in that article covers the general administrative costs arising from individual licensing regimes, calculated over a period of 30 years.
26 Također treba ustanoviti obuhvaća li pojam „Upravni troškoviˮ iz tog članka opće upravne troškove koji proizlaze iz sustava pojedinačnih dozvola i izračunavaju se za razdoblje od 30 godina.
29 It is clear from the wording of that provision, as interpreted by the Court in paragraph 25 of Albacom and Infostrada, cited above, that that work must relate only to four activities, namely the issue, management, control and enforcement of individual licences. Furthermore, the fee must be proportionate to the work involved and be published in an appropriate and sufficiently detailed manner, so as to render the information readily accessible.
29 Iz teksta te odredbe, kako je tumači Sud u točki 25. gore navedene presude Albacom i Infostrada, proizlazi da se taj rad mora odnositi samo na četiri aktivnosti u vezi s pojedinačnim dozvolama, odnosno na izdavanje, upravljanje, kontrolu i uporabu. Osim toga, naknada mora biti proporcionalna utrošenom radu i objavljena na odgovarajući način i dovoljno detaljno kako bi informacije bile lako dostupne.
32 In this respect, it should be pointed out, first of all, that the concept of administrative costs is sufficiently wide to cover so-called ‘general’ administrative costs.
32 U tom pogledu kao prvo treba istaknuti da je pojam upravnih troškova dovoljno širok da uključi takozvane „općeˮ upravne troškove.
34 According to the information submitted to the Court, the calculation of the fee at issue in the main proceedings includes expenditure relating to other tasks such as the regulatory authority’s general supervisory activities and, in particular, monitoring possible abuses of a dominant position.
34 U skladu s informacijama dostavljenima Sudu, izračun naknade o kojoj je riječ u glavnom postupku uključuje troškove koji se odnose na druge zadaće kao što su opće aktivnosti nadzora regulatornog tijela, a posebno na nadzor mogućih zloupotreba dominantnog položaja.
35 Since this form of monitoring goes beyond the work strictly generated by the implementation of individual licences, it follows that taking into account expenditure linked to this monitoring is contrary to Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13.
35 S obzirom da takav oblik nadzora izlazi izvan okvira rada na izradi pojedinačnih dozvola, proizlazi da je uzimanje u obzir troškova povezanih s tim nadzorom u suprotnosti s člankom 11. stavkom 1. Direktive 97/13.
37 It is clear from the observations submitted to the Court by i-21, Arcor and the Commission that an estimation covering such a long period raises problems of reliability, having regard to the particularities of the telecommunications sector. Given that this sector is expanding and developing constantly, it would indeed appear difficult to predict the market situation and the number of telecommunications undertakings in several years’ time, all the more so over a period of 30 years. Thus, the number of individual licences to be managed in the future and, therefore, the level of general costs arising from such management are unclear. Furthermore, the applicable legislation has been subject to significant changes, as shown by the new directives adopted in 2002, including Directive 2002/21 which repeals Directive 97/13. Those legislative amendments are also likely to affect the scope of the administrative costs generated by the individual licensing regimes.
37 Iz očitovanja koja su Sudu dostavili i-21 i Arcor te Komisija proizlazi da procjena koja obuhvaća tako dugo razdoblje otvara problem pouzdanosti, uzimajući u obzir posebnosti telekomunikacijskog sektora. S obzirom da se taj sektor neprestano širi i razvija, teško je predvidjeti tržišnu situaciju i broj društava za telekomunikacije u sljedećih nekoliko godina, a pogotovo za razdoblje od 30 godina. Stoga su broj pojedinačnih dozvola kojima je potrebno upravljati u budućnosti i razina troškova koji proizlaze iz takvog upravljanja neizvjesni. Osim toga zakonodavstvo koje se primjenjuje predmet je značajnih izmjena, što pokazuju nove direktive donesene 2002. uključujući Direktivu 2002/21 kojom se stavlja izvan snage Direktiva 97/13. Te zakonodavne izmjene će također vjerojatno utjecati na opseg upravnih troškova koji nastaju unutar režima pojedinačnih dozvola.
38 The lack of reliability of the estimation and its effects on the fee calculation affect the latter’s compatibility with the requirements of proportionality, transparency and non-discrimination.
38 Nepouzdanost procjene i posljedice te nepouzdanosti na izračun naknade utječu na spojivost naknade sa zahtjevima proporcionalnosti, transparentnosti i nediskriminacije.
39 First, the calculation of the general costs over a period of 30 years entails an extrapolation of the expenditure that may be incurred in the future which, by definition, does not represent the expenditure actually incurred. In the absence of a mechanism to revise the amount of fee claimed, that amount cannot be strictly proportionate to the work involved, as Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 expressly requires.
39 Kao prvo, izračun općih troškova za 30-godišnje razdoblje znači ekstrapolaciju izdataka koji bi mogli nastati u budućnosti, što po definiciji ne znači stvarno nastale troškove. Budući da nema mehanizma ponovne provjere iznosa zahtijevane naknade, taj iznos ne može biti strogo proporcionalan opsegu posla, kako to izričito zahtijeva članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13.
40 Next, since it is not based on expenditure actually incurred, such a system of calculation risks falling foul of the requirement to publish details of the fee as provided for in Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13, and, thereby, the objective of transparency.
40 Osim toga, s obzirom da se ne temelji na stvarno nastalim troškovima, takav sustav izračuna dovodi u pitanje zahtjev detaljne objave informacija u vezi s naknadom, kako predviđa članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13, i slijedom toga postizanje cilja transparentnosti.
42 It follows from the foregoing that Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 precludes the application of a fee for individual licences calculated by taking into account the regulatory body’s general administrative costs linked to implementing those licences over a period of 30 years.
42 Iz navedenog proizlazi da je članku 11. stavku 1. Direktive 97/13 protivna primjena naknade za pojedinačne dozvole koja se izračunava tako da se uzimaju u obzir upravni troškovi regulatornog tijela povezani s izradom tih dozvola u razdoblju od 30 godina.
44 i-21 maintains that to uphold such an administrative act is contrary to the principle of the primacy of Community law and the need to maintain its effectiveness. It submits that even if the Court acknowledges the importance of the principle of legal certainty, the latter does not in every case outweigh the principle of lawfulness. i-21 points out that, in the judgment in Kühne & Heitz, cited above, the Court considered that an administrative act which had acquired binding force following a judgment which could not be the subject of an appeal could be annulled, in certain circumstances, if it were contrary to Community law. i-21 takes the view that this possibility becomes even greater in the case of an administrative act which was not the subject of a judicial decision and which became final merely upon expiry of the time-limits allowed for appealing.
44 i-21 tvrdi da je zadržavanje takvog upravnog akta u suprotnosti s načelom nadređenosti prava Zajednice i potrebom da se održi njegov korisni učinak. Ono tvrdi da čak i ako Sud uvaži važnost načela pravne sigurnosti, to načelo ne može u svakom slučaju nadvladati načelo zakonitosti. Društvo i-21 naglašava da, da je u gore navedenoj presudi Kühne & Heitz Sud ustanovio da se upravni akt, koji je postao pravomoćan na temelju presude protiv koje nema pravnog lijeka može poništiti u određenim okolnostima ako je u suprotnosti s pravom Zajednice. Društvo i-21 smatra da je ta mogućnost čak i veća u slučaju upravnog akta koji nije bio predmet sudske odluke i postao je pravomoćan samo na temelju isteka roka propisanog za žalbu.
45 Arcor considers, for its part, that the judgment in Kühne & Heitz is not relevant inasmuch as it concerns an indirect conflict between a rule of national procedure and a rule of substantive Community law, the first rule preventing application of the second. According to Arcor, the case in the main proceedings should be regarded as a direct conflict between two rules of substantive law. Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13, read in the light of Article 10 EC, requires fees levied in breach of Article 11 to be repaid, while the national legislation prohibits such reimbursement. Arcor takes the view that Community law should, in such a case, prevail over conflicting national law.
45 Arcor smatra sa svoje strane da presuda u predmetu Kühne & Heitz nije relevantna jer se ona odnosi na posredan sukob između pravila nacionalnog postupka i pravila materijalnog prava Zajednice, pri čemu prvo pravilo sprečava uporabu drugog. Prema mišljenju Arcora, predmet u glavnom postupku treba gledati kao izravan sukob dva pravila materijalnog prava. Članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13, s obzirom na članak 10. UEZ-a, zahtijeva povrat naknada naplaćenih zbog kršenja članka 11. dok nacionalno zakonodavstvo zabranjuje takav povrat. Arcor smatra da bi pravo Zajednice u takvom slučaju moralo imati prednost u odnosu na suprotstavljeno nacionalno pravo.
46 The Commission maintains, on the other hand, that the judgment in Kühne & Heitz is a suitable starting point and points out that, in principle, an administrative act which has not been challenged within the time-limits laid down should not be withdrawn. The Commission goes on to state that, in the present case, it must be ascertained whether upholding the unlawful fee assessments should nevertheless be considered to be ‘downright intolerable’ in the light of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 and that that question should be examined in the light of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
46 Komisija tvrdi da je gore navedena presuda Kühne & Heitz primjereno ishodište i upozorava da se u načelu upravni akt koji nije bio osporavan u propisanom roku ne smije povući. Komisija zatim navodi da je u ovom slučaju potrebno provjeriti treba li zadržavanje nezakonitih odluka o visini naknade ipak smatrati „jednostavno nedopustivimˮ s obzirom na članak 11. stavak 1. Direktive 97/13 i da to pitanje treba ispitati s obzirom na načela ekvivalentnosti i djelotvornosti.