natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission notes that in their opinions concerning the bill, the Supreme Court and the National Council for the Judiciary raised a number of concerns as regards the constitutionality of the new regime.
Posebice je primijećeno da bi zbog novih pravila Državno sudbeno vijeće postalo ovisno o političkim odlukama parlamentarne većine.
In particular, it was noted that the new rules would render the National Council for the Judiciary dependent on the political decisions of the parliamentary majority.
U mišljenjima je ujedno istaknuto da je Državno sudbeno vijeće jedinstveno tijelo koje nije moguće podijeliti na dva organa koja nisu predviđena Ustavom te da bi se zakonom izmijenio ustavni poredak tako što bi Sejm stekao dominantni položaj nad sudbenom vlasti.
The opinions also underlined that the National Judicial Council is a unitary body that cannot be subdivided in two organs unknown to the Constitution and the bill would change the constitutional order by providing the Sejm with a dominating position over the judiciary.
Nadalje, prijevremenim prekidom mandata sudaca članova Vijeća i rada ustavnog organa narušilo bi se načelo demokratske države koja se temelji na vladavini prava i načelu zakonitosti.
Furthermore, the premature termination of the mandate of the judges-members of the Council, and of the functioning of a constitutional organ, would violate the principle of a democratic state governed by the rule of law and the principle of legality.
Kako je prethodno objašnjeno, Komisija podsjeća da trenutačno nije moguće provesti učinkovitu ocjenu ustavnosti tih odredbi.
As explained above, the Commission recalls that an effective constitutional review of these provisions is currently not possible.
Dob za umirovljenje i ovlast za produljenje mandata sudaca
The retirement age and the power to prolong the mandate of judges
U članku 1. stavku 26. točkama od b. do c. i članku 13. stavku 1. zakona o izmjeni zakona o organizaciji redovnih sudova navodi se da će se dob za umirovljenje redovnih sudaca smanjiti s 67 na 60 godina za sutkinje te s 67 na 65 godina za suce, a ministar pravosuđa dobit će ovlast za odlučivanje o produljenju mandata sudaca (do dobi od 70 godina) na temelju nejasnih kriterija.
Articles 1(26)b-c and 13(1) of the law amending the law on Ordinary Courts Organisation stipulate that the retirement regime applicable to ordinary judges will be reduced from 67 to 60 for female judges and from 67 to 65 for male judges and the Minister of Justice will be granted the power to decide on the prolongation of judicial mandates (until the age of 70) on the basis of vague criteria.
Predmetni suci i dalje ostaju na dužnosti do donošenja te odluke.
Pending this decision the judges concerned remain in office.
Novim sustavom umirovljenja negativno bi se utjecalo na neovisnost sudstva [25].
The new retirement regime would adversely impacts on the independence of judges [25].
Nova su pravila dodatno sredstvo kojim ministar pravosuđa može utjecati na pojedine suce.
The new rules create an additional tool through which the Minister of Justice can exert influence on individual judges.
Naime, zbog nejasnih kriterija za produljenje mandata moguća je nepravedna primjena diskrecijskog prava, čime se narušava načelo nesmjenjivosti sudaca [26].
In particular, the vague criteria for prolongation of the mandates allow for undue discretion, undermining the principle of irremovability of judges [26].
Uz smanjenje dobi za umirovljenje u zakonu je predviđena mogućnost da ministar pravosuđa produlji trajanje mandata sudaca, i to sutkinjama za najviše deset godina, a sucima za pet godina.
While decreasing the retirement age, the law allows judges to have their mandate extended by the Minister of Justice for up to 10 years for female judges and 5 years for male judges.
Isto tako, nije naveden rok u kojemu ministar pravosuđa mora donijeti odluku o produljenju mandata, što mu omogućuje da zadrži utjecaj nad predmetnim sucima tijekom preostalog trajanja njihova mandata.
Also, there is no time-frame for the Minister of Justice to make a decision on the extension of the mandate, which allows the Minister of Justice to retain influence over the judges concerned for the remaining time of their judicial mandate.
Čak i prije no što dosegnu dob za umirovljenje, predmetni suci bi, već zbog samog izgleda da će od ministra pravosuđa morati zatražiti produljenje mandata, mogli osjećati pritisak.33.
Even before the retirement age is reached, the mere prospect of having to request the Minister of Justice for such a prolongation could exert pressure on the judges concerned.33.
Novim pravilima o smanjenju dobi za umirovljenje sudaca i o produljenju mandata sudaca na temelju odluke ministra pravosuđa narušava se načelo nesmjenjivosti sudaca, što je ključni element neovisnosti sudaca u skladu sa sudskom praksom Suda Europske unije i Europskog suda za ljudska prava.
By decreasing the retirement age of judges while making prolongation of the judicial mandate conditional upon the decision of the Minister of Justice, the new rules undermine the principle of irremovability of judges which is a key element of the independence of judges according to the case law of the Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights.
Jedan je od zahtjeva za neovisnost suda koje navodi Sud Europske unije taj da suci budu osobno i operativno neovisni u obavljanju svojih dužnosti te da budu zaštićeni od razrješenja učinkovitim mehanizmima zaštite od neprimjerenog uplitanja ili pritiska izvršne vlasti [27].
Among the requirements of an independent court, the Court of Justice stated that judges should enjoy personal and operational independence in the exercise of their duties and should also be protected against dismissal through the existence of effective safeguards against undue intervention or pressure from the executive [27].
Predmetne odredbe isto tako nisu u skladu s europskim standardima u skladu s kojima bi se sucima trebalo jamčiti trajanje mandata do obvezne dobi za umirovljenje, ako je takva dob određena.34.
The provisions concerned are also not in line with the European standards according to which judges should have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age, where such retirement age exists.34.
Komisija napominje da se uvođenjem novih pravila ujedno pojavljuju razlozi za zabrinutost u pogledu ustavnosti.
The Commission notes that the new rules also raise constitutionality concerns.
U skladu s mišljenjem Vrhovnog suda [28] dopuštanjem ministru pravosuđa da odlučuje o produljenju mandata suca te istodobnim smanjenjem dobi za umirovljenje sudaca krši se načelo nesmjenjivosti sudaca (članak 180. stavak 1.
According to the opinion of the Supreme Court [28], allowing the Minister of Justice to decide on the prolongation of a judge's mandate, in combination with lowering the retirement age of judges, violates the principle of irremovability of judges (Article 180(1) of the Constitution).
Ustava).
According to Article 87 of the new law on the Supreme Court, on the day following the entry into force of the law, all judges of the Supreme Court would be dismissed and retired [29].
U skladu s člankom 87. novog zakona o Vrhovnom sudu, dan nakon stupanja na snagu tog zakona svi bi suci Vrhovnog suda trebali biti razriješeni dužnosti i umirovljeni [29].
According to Article 88 of the same law, only the judges indicated by the Minister of Justice would remain initially active for an interim period until the President of the Republic has made a final selection of the judges who will be allowed to stay in office following a special verification procedure.
U skladu s člankom 88. istog Zakona samo bi suci koje je odredio ministar pravosuđa isprva ostali aktivni u prijelaznom razdoblju dok predsjednik Republike konačno ne odabere suce kojima će se dopustiti da ostanu na dužnosti nakon provedbe postupka posebne provjere.
According to Article 91 of the law on the Supreme Court, if the judge holding the office of the First President of the Supreme Court is dismissed and retired, the President of the Republic chooses an interim First President of the Supreme Court.
U skladu s člankom 91. zakona o Vrhovnom sudu, ako je sudac koji obnaša dužnost prvog predsjednika Vrhovnog suda razriješen dužnosti ili umirovljen, predsjednik Republike odabire privremenog prvog predsjednika Vrhovnog suda.
The irremovability of judges by the executive during their term of office is a consequence of their independence and thus included in the guarantees of Article 6(1) ECHR [33].
Neovisnost sudaca za sobom povlači zabranu izvršnoj vlasti da smjenjuje suce tijekom njihova mandata te je nesmjenjivost stoga uključena u jamstva iz članka 6. stavka 1.
As a consequence, judges must only be dismissed individually, if this is justified on the basis of a disciplinary procedure concerning their individual activity and presenting all guarantees for the defence in a democratic society.
Europske konvencije o ljudskim pravima [33].
Judges cannot be dismissed as a group; judges cannot be dismissed for general reasons not related to individual behaviour.38.
Zbog toga se suce mora razrješavati samo pojedinačno, ako je to opravdano stegovnim postupkom povezanim s njihovim pojedinačnim djelovanjem te uz davanje svih jamstava za mogućnost obrane u demokratskom društvu.
These guarantees and safeguards are lacking in the present case and the provisions concerned would constitute a flagrant violation of the independence of judges of the Supreme Court and of the separation of powers [34], and therefore of the rule of law.
Nije moguće razriješiti skupinu sudaca; nije moguće razriješiti suce zbog općenitih razloga koji nisu povezani s ponašanjem pojedinca.38.
Disciplinary proceedings
Ta jamstva i mehanizmi zaštite u ovom slučaju ne postoje i predmetne bi odredbe značile očiglednu povredu neovisnosti sudaca Vrhovnog suda i načela diobe vlasti [34] te, prema tome, vladavine prava.
The law on the Supreme Court would establishes a new disciplinary chamber and new rules for disciplinary proceedings against Supreme Court judges [35].
Stegovni postupak
These new rules on disciplinary proceedings would adversely affect judicial independence.
Zakonom o Vrhovnom sudu uspostavilo bi se novo stegovno vijeće i nova pravila za stegovne postupke protiv sudaca Vrhovnog suda [35].
In particular, the involvement of the Minister of Justice in disciplinary proceedings against judges of the Supreme Court would constitute a threat to their independence: the fact that the Minister of Justice would have the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Supreme Court judges and also to influence the conduct of the investigations, would provide the Minister of Justice with an additional tool to put considerable pressure on judges.
Ta bi nova pravila o stegovnom postupku imala negativan učinak na neovisnost sudstva.
Notably, according to Article 56(5) of the law on the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice could object to the decision of the disciplinary officer of the Supreme Court who conducts an investigation to terminate this investigation due to a lack of grounds; in such a case the disciplinary officer of the Supreme Court would have to continue conducting the disciplinary proceedings and would be bound by the instructions from the Minister of Justice.
Naime, sudjelovanje ministra pravosuđa u stegovnim postupcima protiv sudaca Vrhovnog suda predstavljalo bi prijetnju njihovoj neovisnosti: na temelju činjenice da bi imao ovlast za pokretanje stegovnih postupaka protiv sudaca Vrhovnog suda te bi ujedno mogao utjecati na provedbu istraga, ministar pravosuđa dobio bi dodatno sredstvo za vršenje znatnog pritiska na suce.
Additionally, the Minister of Justice could himself appoint a disciplinary officer on a case-by-case basis [36].
Naime, u skladu s člankom 56. stavkom 5. zakona o Vrhovnom sudu ministar pravosuđa mogao bi se usprotiviti odluci o prekidu istrage zbog nepostojanja osnove, koju je donijela osoba zadužena za stegovni postupak na Vrhovnom sudu nadležna za provedbu istrage; u takvom bi slučaju osoba zadužena za stegovni postupak na Vrhovnom sudu trebala nastaviti stegovni postupak i morala bi se pridržavati uputa ministra pravosuđa.
The appointment of a disciplinary officer by the Minister of Justice would exclude every other disciplinary officer from a given case.
Osim toga, sam ministar pravosuđa mogao bi, za svaki slučaj posebno, imenovati osobu zaduženu za stegovni postupak [36].
Whenever the Minister of Justice has appointed a disciplinary officer, a preliminary investigation must be conducted.
Ako bi ministar pravosuđa imenovao osobu zaduženu za stegovni postupak, svaka druga takva osoba isključila bi se iz određenog predmeta.
According to Article 57(2), the disciplinary officer appointed by the Minister would be bound by the instructions provided by the Minister of Justice in certain cases.
Ako ministar pravosuđa imenuje osobu zaduženu za stegovni postupak, mora se provesti prethodna istraga.
The Court of Justice has held that for a court to be independent it should exercise its functions wholly autonomously, without being subordinated to any other body and be thus protected against external interventions or pressure liable to jeopardise the independent judgment of its members as regards proceedings before them [37].
Čak i sama mogućnost pokretanja stegovnog postupka na temelju uputa ministra pravosuđa imala bi izravan negativni učinak na neovisnost sudaca Vrhovnog suda.
These conditions are not fulfilled in the present case.
Mišljenje je Suda Europske unije da bi sud, kako bi bio neovisan, trebao potpuno autonomno izvršavati svoje funkcije bez podređivanja nekom drugom tijelu te bi na taj način bio zaštićen od vanjskih djelovanja ili pritisaka kojima se može ugroziti neovisnost njegovih članova u donošenju odluka u postupcima pred tim sudovima [37].
As a consequence, Supreme Court judges may feel pressure to follow the position of the executive power when adjudicating cases.3.5.3.
Ti uvjeti u predmetnom slučaju nisu ispunjeni.
Legislative process
Vrhovni sud stoga može biti izložen pritisku da pri odlučivanju u predmetima zauzme stajalište izvršne vlasti.3.5.3.
The Commission notes that the law on the Supreme Court, which is a self-standing new act of more than 110 Articles and which amends six existing laws, would have a serious impact on the independence of the Supreme Court and more generally on the separation of powers and the rule of law in Poland.
Zakonodavni proces
The Commission regrets that this important law has not been subject to the appropriate preparation and consultations that it should have deserved.
Komisija napominje da bi zakon o Vrhovnom sudu, koji je samostalan novi zakon s više od 110 članaka i kojim se mijenja šest postojećih zakona, mogao imati ozbiljan učinak na neovisnost Vrhovnog suda te, u općenitijem smislu, na diobu vlasti i vladavinu prava u Poljskoj.
On the contrary, the draft was tabled on 12 July 2017 and was adopted on 22 July 2017.
Komisija žali što taj važan zakon nije prošao odgovarajući postupak pripreme i savjetovanja kakav zaslužuje.
The Commission considers that such a fast-track legislative process of the two chambers undermines in itself the trust in the judiciary in Poland and is not in line with the spirit of loyal cooperation between state institutions which should characterise a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
Ostale odredbe
Other provisions
Četiri zakona sadržavaju niz drugih osjetljivih odredbi kada se uzmu u obzir vladavina prava i načelo diobe vlasti, a posebice kad je riječ o prijevremenom prekidu mandata osoba zaduženih za stegovni postupak pri sudovima [38], ovlastima ministra pravosuđa za ocjenjivanje rada sudova [39], premještaju sudaca [40], strukturi Državne škole za pravosudne dužnosnike [41], prijavi imovine sudaca [42] te osoblju Državnog sudbenog vijeća i Vrhovnog suda [43].
The four laws contain a number of other sensitive provisions from the point of view of the rule of law and the separation of powers, in particular regarding the premature termination of mandates of disciplinary officers in courts [38], the powers of the Minister of Justice to assess the performance of courts [39], the transfer of judges [40], the structure of the National School for Judiciary [41], the declaration of assets of judges [42], and the staff of the National Council for the Judiciary and of the Supreme Court [43].
U nizu analiza, a posebice u onima koje su izradili Vrhovni sud i Državno sudbeno vijeće, ta su pitanja označena kao zabrinjavajuća, a među njima su i pitanja u pogledu usklađenosti s Ustavom [44].
These issues have been identified in a number of analyses, in particular from the Supreme Court and the National Council for the Judiciary as raising concerns, including questions of compliance with the Constitution [44].
Međutim, kako je prethodno objašnjeno, trenutačno nije moguće provesti neovisnu i zakonitu ocjenu ustavnosti.4.
However, as explained above an independent and legitimate constitutional review is currently not possible.4.
UTVRĐIVANJE SUSTAVNE PRIJETNJE VLADAVINI PRAVA
FINDING OF A SYSTEMIC THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
Komisija zbog prethodno navedenih razloga smatra da se situacija sustavne prijetnje vladavini prava u Poljskoj kako je opisana u njezinim preporukama od 27. srpnja 2016. i 21. prosinca 2016. znatno pogoršala.
For the reasons set out above, the Commission considers that the situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland as presented in its Recommendations of 27 July 2016 and 21 December 2016 has seriously deteriorated.
Konkretno:
In particular:
Zbog nezakonitog imenovanja predsjednice Ustavnog suda, imenovanja triju sudaca koje je bez valjane pravne osnove predložio 8. saziv Sejma činjenice da je jedan od tih sudaca imenovan potpredsjednikom Ustavnog suda, činjenice da tri suca koje je u listopadu 2015. zakonito predložila prethodna zakonodavna vlast nisu bila u mogućnosti preuzeti svoju dužnost sudaca na Ustavnom sudu te naknadnih događaja na Ustavnom sudu koji su prethodno opisani, de facto je uslijedilo potpuno preoblikovanje sastava Ustavnog suda izvan okvira uobičajenog ustavnog postupka predviđenog za imenovanja sudaca.
The unlawful appointment of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, the admission of the three judges nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm without a valid legal basis, the fact that one of these judges has been appointed as Vice-President of the Tribunal, the fact that the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the previous legislature have not been able to take up their function of judge in the Tribunal, as well as the subsequent developments within the Tribunal described above have de facto led to a complete recomposition of the Tribunal outside the normal constitutional process for the appointment of judges.
Zbog tog razloga Komisija smatra da su neovisnost i legitimitet Ustavnog suda ozbiljno ugroženi te se stoga ustavnost poljskih zakona ne može više učinkovito jamčiti.
For this reason, the Commission considers that the independence and legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal are seriously undermined and, consequently, the constitutionality of Polish laws can no longer be effectively guaranteed.
U tim okolnostima nije moguće više smatrati da se odlukama Ustavnog suda osigurava učinkovita ocjena ustavnosti.
The judgments rendered by the Tribunal under these circumstances can no longer be considered as providing an effective constitutional review.
Zakonom o Državnoj školi za pravosudne dužnosnike, koji je već na snazi, te zakonom o Državnom sudbenom vijeću, zakonom o organizaciji redovnih sudova i zakonom o Vrhovnom sudu, koji trebaju stupiti na snagu, u strukturnom se smislu narušava neovisnost sudstva u Poljskoj, a njihova bi primjena imala trenutačan i konkretan učinak na neovisnost funkcioniranja sudstva u cjelini.
The law on the National School of Judiciary already in force, and the law on the National Council for the Judiciary, the law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation and the law on the Supreme Court should they enter into force, structurally undermine the independence of the judiciary in Poland and would have an immediate and concrete impact on the independent functioning of the judiciary as a whole.
S obzirom na to da je neovisnost sudstva ključna sastavnica vladavine prava, tim se novim zakonima znatno povećava sustavna prijetnja vladavini prava, kako je utvrđeno u prethodnim preporukama.
Given that the independence of the judiciary is a key component of the rule of law, these new laws increase significantly the systemic threat to rule of law as identified in the previous Recommendations.
Naime, odredbama o razrješenju sudaca Vrhovnog suda, mogućnosti njihova ponovnog imenovanja i ostalim mjerama sadržanima u zakonu o Vrhovnom sudu znatno bi se pogoršala sustavna prijetnja vladavini prava.
In particular, the dismissal of Supreme Court judges, their possible reappointment and other measures contained in the law on the Supreme Court would very seriously aggravate the systemic threat to the rule of law.
Kako je istaknuto u nizu izjava, a posebice u onima Vrhovnog suda, Državnog sudbenog vijeća, poljskog pravobranitelja, Odvjetničke komore, udruženja sudaca i odvjetnika te ostalih relevantnih dionika [45], novi zakoni razlog su za ozbiljnu zabrinutost u pogledu njihove usklađenosti s poljskim Ustavom.
The new laws raise serious concerns as regards their compatibility with the Polish Constitution as underlined by a number of statements, in particular from the Supreme Court, the National Council for the Judiciary, the Polish Ombudsman, the Bar Association and associations of judges and lawyers, and other relevant stakeholders [45].
Međutim, kako je prethodno objašnjeno, više nije moguće provesti učinkovitu ocjenu ustavnosti tih zakona.
However, as explained above an effective constitutional review of these laws is no longer possible.
Naposljetku, postupci i javne izjave poljskih vlasti i zastupnika koji čine vladajuću većinu u parlamentu protiv sudaca i sudova u Poljskoj narušili su povjerenje u cjelokupni pravosudni sustav.
Finally, actions and public statements against judges and courts in Poland made by the Polish Government and by members of Parliament from the ruling majority have damaged the trust in the justice system as a whole.
Komisija ističe načelo lojalne suradnje između državnih organa koja je, kako je naglašeno u mišljenjima Venecijanske komisije, ustavni preduvjet u demokratskoj državi uređenoj vladavinom prava.
The Commission underlines the principle of loyal cooperation between state organs which is, as highlighted in the opinions of the Venice Commission, a constitutional precondition in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
Komisija podsjeća da ondje gdje je uspostavljen sustav ustavnog pravosuđa, njegova učinkovitost predstavlja ključnu sastavnicu vladavine prava.
The Commission recalls that where a constitutional justice system has been established, its effectiveness is a key component of the rule of law.
Komisija ističe i da se bez obzira na odabrani model pravosudnog sustava neovisnost sudstva mora jamčiti u skladu s pravom EU-a.
The Commission also underlines that whatever the model of the justice system chosen, the independence of the judiciary must be safeguarded as a matter of EU law.
Države članice same odlučuju o organizaciji svojih pravosudnih sustava, među ostalim i o osnivanju državnog sudbenog vijeća, čija je uloga osiguravanje neovisnosti sudstva.
It is up to the Member States to organise their justice systems, including whether or not to establish a Council for the Judiciary the role of which is to safeguard judicial independence.
Međutim, ako je država članica osnovala takvo vijeće, kao što je to slučaj u Poljskoj, u kojoj je Državnom sudbenom vijeću poljskim Ustavom izričito povjerena zadaća osiguravanja neovisnosti sudstva, neovisnost takvog vijeća mora se zajamčiti u skladu s europskim standardima.